,,aristotle4 ,,by ,,george ,,grote1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,d4,c4,l4 ,,oxford1 ,,and ,,ll4,d4 ,,cambridge2 ,,late ,,vice-,,chancellor ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,london2 ,,president ,,of ,,university ,,college1 ,,london2 ,,and ,,foreign ,,member ,,of ,,the ,,institute ,,of ,,france4 ,,edited ,,by ,,alexander ,,bain1 ,,ll4,d41 ,,professor ,,of ,,logic ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,aberdeen1 ,,and ,g4 ,,croom ,,robertson1 ,m4,a41 ,,professor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,of ,,mind ,,and ,,logic ,,in ,,university ,,college1 ,,london4 ,,second ,,edition1 ,,with ,,additions4 ,,london3 ,,john ,,murray1 ,,albemarle ,,street4 #ahhj4 ,the right of ,translation is reserved4 ,,printed ,,by ,,william ,,clowes ,,and ,,sons1 ,,london3 ,,stamford ,,street ,,and ,,charing ,,cross4 ,,notice ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,edition4 ,this ,edition is an exact reprint of the ,first ,edition1 with the addition of two important ,essays on the ,ethics and ,politics of ,aristotle1 which were found among the author's posthumous papers4 ,they were originally published in #ahgf1 in ',fragments on ,ethical ,subjects1 by the late ,george ,grote1' but would have been included in the ,first ,edition of this ,work1 had they been discovered in time4 ,these ,essays are the fruit of long and laborious study1 and1 so far as they extend1 embody the writer's matured views upon the ,ethics and the ,politics3 the two treatises whose omission from his published exposition of the ,aristotelian philosophy has been most regretted4 ,the ,essay on ',the ,ethics of ,aristotle' falls naturally into two divisions2 the first treats of ,happiness2 the second of what1 according to ,aristotle1 is the chief ingredient of ,happiness1 namely4 ,virtue4 ,on ,aristotle's own conception of ,happiness1 ,mr4 ,grote dwells very minutely2 turning it over on all sides1 and looking at it from every point of view4 ,while fully acknowledging its merits1 he gives also the full measure of its defects4 ,his criticisms on this head are in the author's best style and are no less important as regards ,ethical discussion than as a commentary on ,aristotle4 ,his handling of ,aristotle's doctrine of ,virtue is equally subtle and instructive4 ,particularly striking are the remarks on the ,voluntary and the ,involuntary1 and on ,greek3 proai_/resis1 or deliberate preference4 ,the treatment of the ,virtues in detail is1 unhappily1 more fragmentary2 but what he does say regarding ,justice and ,equity has a permanent interest4 ,the ,essay on ',the ,politics of ,aristotle' must be studied in connection with the preceding4 ,although but a brief sketch1 it is remarkable for the insight which it affords us into the most consummate political ideal of the ancient world4 ,,preface ,,by ,,the ,,editors ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition4 ,the ,historian of ,greece1 when closing his great narrative in the year #ahef1 promised to follow out in a separate work that speculative movement of the fourth century ,b4,c4 which upheld the supremacy of the ,hellenic intellect long after the decline of ,hellenic liberty4 ,he had traced the beginnings of the movement in the famous chapter on ,sokrates1 but to do justice to its chief heroes--,plato and ,aristotle--proved to be impossible within the limits of the ,history4 ,when1 however1 the promised work appeared1 after nine laborious years1 it was found to compass only ,plato and the other immediate companions of ,sokrates1 leaving a full half of the appointed task unperformed4 ,mr4 ,grote had already passed his #gjth year1 but saw in this only a reason for turning1 without a moment's pause1 to the arduous labour still before him4 ,thenceforth1 in spite of failing strength and the increasing distraction of public business1 he held steadily on till death overtook him in the middle of the course4 ,what he was able to accomplish1 though not what study he had gone through towards the remainder of his design1 these volumes will show4 ,the office of preparing and superintending their publication was entrusted to the present editors by ,mrs4 ,grote1 in the exercise of her discretion as sole executrix under his last ,will4 ,as now printed1 the work has its form determined by the author himself up to the end of ,chapter ,,xi4 ,the first two chapters1 containing a biography of ,aristotle and a general account of his works1 are followed by a critical analysis1 in eight chapters1 of all the treatises included under the title ',organon2' and in the remaining chapter of the eleven the handling of the ,physica and ,metaphysica 7taken together for the reasons given7 is begun4 ,what now stand as ,chapters ,,iii41 ,,iv41 c41 were marked1 however1 as ,chapters ,,vi41 ,,vii41 c41 by the author2 his design evidently being to interpolate before publication three other chapters of an introductory cast4 ,unfortunately no positive indication remains as to the subject of these2 although there is reason to believe that1 for one thing1 he intended to prefix to the detailed consideration of the works a key to ,aristotle's perplexing terminology4 ,possibly also he designed to enter upon a more particular discussion of the ,canon1 after having viewed it externally in ,chapter ,,ii42 citations and references bearing on such a discussion being found among his loose notes4 ,what might have been the course of the work from the point where it is broken off1 is altogether matter of inference1 beyond an indication of the subject of the chapter next to follow2 but the remarks at the beginning of ,chapter ,,iii4 point to some likely conclusions4 ,after the metaphysical discussions1 which must have been prolonged through several chapters1 there would probably have been taken in order the treatises ,de ,coelo1 ,de ,generatione et ,corruptione1 the ,meteorologica1 and next the various ,biological works2 though with what detail in each case it is impossible to guess4 ,then must have followed the ,de ,anim with the minor ,psychological treatises summed up as ,parva ,naturalia1 and next1 without doubt1 the ,ethica and ,politica2 last of all1 the ,rhetorica and ,poetica4 ,that ,mr4 ,grote had carefully mastered all these works is evident from his marginal annotations in the various copies which he read4 ,with the ,ethica and ,politica in particular he had early been familiar1 and most there is reason to regret that he has left nothing worked out upon this field so specially his own4#a ,fortunately it happens that on the psychological field next adjoining there is something considerable to show4 ,footnote #a3 ,it has been already stated that two important ,essays on these subjects have been discovered among ,mr4 ,grote's posthumous papers since the publication of the ,first ,edition4 ,they are printed in this ,edition after the chapter ,de ,anim4--,second ,edition4 ,in the autumn of #ahfg ,mr4 ,grote undertook to write a short account of ,aristotle's striking recognition of the physical aspect of mental phenomena1 to be appended to the third edition of the senior editor's work1 ',the ,senses and the ,intellect2' but1 on following out the indications relative to that point1 he was gradually led by his interest in the subject to elaborate a full abstract of the ,de ,anim and the other psychological treatises4 ,several months were spent on this task1 and at the end he declared that it had greatly deepened his insight into ,aristotle's philosophy as a whole4 ,he also expressed his satisfaction at having thus completed an exposition of the ,psychology1 fitted to stand as his contribution to that part of ,aristotle1 in case he should never reach the subject in the regular course of his general work4 ,the exposition was printed in full at the time 7#ahfh71 and drew the attention of students4 ,it is now reprinted1 with the prominence due to its literary finish and intrinsic value1 as a chapter--the last--in the body of the present work4 ,the long ,appendix coming after is composed of elements somewhat heterogeneous2 but the different sections were all written in the period since #ahfe1 and all1 not excepting the last two 7treating briefly of ,epikurus and the ,stoics71 have a bearing upon the author's general design4 ,the first section--an historical account of ancient theories of ,universals--has already seen the light4#b ,it brings together1 as nowhere else1 all the chief references to the doctrine of ,realism in ,plato1 and exhibits the directly antagonistic position taken up by ,aristotle towards his master4 ,this it does so impressively that there could be no question of excluding it1 even although it reproduces in part some of the matter of ,chapter ,,iii41 on the ,categories4 ,being composed1 in #ahfg1 later than this ,chapter1 it is on that account written with all the firmer a grasp4 ,on finishing it as it stands1 ,mr4 ,grote1 in a private letter1 expressed himself in terms that deserve to be quoted3--,i never saw before so clearly the extreme importance of ,aristotle's speculations as the guides and stimulants of medival philosophy4 ,if ,i had time to carry the account further1 ,i should have been able to show how much the improved views of the question of ,universals depended on the fact that more and more of the works of ,aristotle1 and better texts1 became known to ,albertus ,magnus1 ,thomas ,aquinas1 and their successors4 ,during the centuries immediately succeeding ,bothius1 nothing of ,aristotle except the ,categories and the treatise ,de ,interpretatione was known1 and these in a ,latin translation4 ,most fortunately the ,categories was never put out of sight2 and it is there that the doctrine of ,substantia ,prima stands clearly proclaimed4 ,footnote #b3 ,in the ,appendix to the senior editor's ',manual of ,mental and ,moral ,science' 7#ahfg74 ,the second section1 or1 rather1 the part therein treating of ,aristotle's doctrine of ,first ,principles1 is also a reprint4 ,it was composed 7in #ahfg7 at the same time as the section on ,universals1 and was printed along with that2 shorn1 however1 of the critical examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's views on ,aristotle1 which is now prefixed to the statement of the ,aristotelian doctrine4 ,hamilton having 7in ,note ,a1 appended to his edition of ,reid's ,works7 claimed ,aristotle as a supporter of the ,philosophy of ,common ,sense1 basing upon a long list of passages quoted1 these were subjected by ,mr4 ,grote to a searching criticism1 the pointed vigour of which will be duly appreciated4 ,the statement of his own view of ,aristotle's doctrine1 though containing little that may not be found at more places than one in the body of the present work1 is yet reprinted1 because iteration was his favourite art for impressing anything to which he attached as much importance as he did attach to this conviction of his1 regarding the very heart of ,aristotle's thought4 ,the long abstracts of six books of the ,metaphysica and two books of the ,de ,coelo1 next following in the ,appendix1 are sections of a character altogether different from the foregoing4 ,evidently not intended for publication1 they have been included1 partly as furnishing some indication of the labour the author underwent in seeking to lay hold of his subject1 partly because of their inherent value4 ,from the first motive1 they are here reproduced as nearly as possible in the guise they wore as preliminary drafts1 bestrewed with references4 ,their value consists in the fact that they give ,mr4 ,grote's interpretation of the text of treatises at once exceedingly difficult and important3 difficult1 as is proved by the great divergence1 among commentators at many points2 important1 not more for the deeper aspects of ,aristotle's own system1 than for the speculations of the earlier ,greek philosophers on which they are the classical authority4 ,what relation1 in the case of each treatise1 the books abstracted 7often translated7 hold to the other books left untouched1 is specially indicated at the beginning of the third section and at the end of the fourth4 ,here let it suffice to mention that each abstract has a certain completeness in itself1 and at the same time a bond of connection with the other4 ,the abstract of the ,metaphysica closes where ,aristotle descends to speak of the concrete heavenly bodies1 and just as much of the ,de ,coelo is given as treats specially of these4 ,this connection1 whether or not it was present to the author's mind1 enhances the value of the abstracts as here presented4#c ,footnote #c3 ,the author carried the abstract of ,de ,coelo a little farther1 and then abruptly broke it off2 probably finding himself borne too far away from the logical treatises with which he was at the time dealing4 ,in the remaining sections of the ,appendix1 not dealing with ,aristotle1 the short account of ,epikurus aims at setting in its true light a much-maligned system of thought4 ,on writing it1 in #ahfg1 ,mr4 ,grote remarked that the last word had not yet been said on ,epikurus4 ,the ethical part of the sketch was printed at the time3#d the whole is now given4 ,more fragmentary is the notice of the ,stoics1 as merely replacing passages that he considered inadequate in a sketch submitted to him4 ,since it formed part of his entire design to add to the treatment of ,aristotle a full exposition both of ,stoic and ,epikurean doctrines1 considered as the outgrowth of the ,cynic and ,kyrenaic theories already handled at the end of the ',plato1' the two fragments may not unfitly close the present work4 ,footnote #d3 ,also in the ',manual of ,mental and ,moral ,science1' among ',ethical ,systems4' ,taken altogether1 the two volumes are undoubtedly a most important contribution to the history of ancient thought4 ,as regards ,aristotle1 the author's design must be gathered chiefly from the first eleven chapters1--begun as these were in #ahfe1 and proceeded with in their order1 till he was overtaken1 in the act of composing the last1 by the insidious malady which1 after six months1 finally carried him off4 ,perhaps the most striking feature in the exposition of the ,organon1 is the very full analysis given of the long treatise called ,topica4 ,while the other treatises have all1 more or less1 been drawn upon for the ordinary theory of ,logic1 the ,topica1 with its mixed logical and rhetorical bearings1 has ceased to be embodied in modern schemes of discipline or study4 ,mr4 ,grote's profound interest in everything pertaining to ,dialectic drew him especially to this work1 as the exhibition in detail of that habit of methodized discussion so deep rooted in the ,hellenic mind4 ,and in the same connection it may be noted how the natural course of his work brought him1 in the last months of his intellectual activity1 to tread again old and familiar ground4 ,a plea--this time against ,aristotle--for the decried ,sophists1 and1 once more1 a picture of that 9999dialectical mission of ,sokrates which for him had an imperishable charm1 were among the very last efforts of his pen4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,besides making up the ,second ,volume from the end of ,chapter ,,xi41 the editors have1 throughout the whole work1 bestowed much attention on the notes and references set down by the author with his usual copious minuteness4 ,it was deemed advisable to subject these everywhere to a detailed verification2 and1 though the editors speak on the matter with a diffidence best understood by those who may have undergone a similar labour1 it is hoped that a result not unworthy of the author has been attained4 ,in different places additional references have been supplied1 either where there was an obvious omission on the author's part1 or in farther confirmation of his views given in the text3 such references1 mostly to the works of ,aristotle himself1 it has not been thought necessary to signalize4 ,where1 as once or twice in the ,appendix1 a longer note in explanation seemed called for1 this has been printed within square brackets4 ,from the text some passages1 where the iterations seemed excessive1 have been withheld1 but only such as it was thought the author would himself have struck out upon revision3 wherever there was evidence that revision had been made1 the iterations1 freely employed for emphasis1 have been allowed to stand4 ,on rare occasions1 interpolations and verbal changes have been made with the view of bringing out more clearly the meaning sought to be conveyed4 ,it is impossible to be more deeply sensible than the editors are1 of the responsibility they have thus incurred2 but they have been guided by their very respect for the venerable author1 and they were fortunate in the many opportunities they enjoyed of learning from his own lips the cast of his views on ,aristotle4#e ,footnote #e3 ,it is but due to the younger editor to state that the heaviest part of all the work here indicated has been done by him4--,a4 ,b4 ,an index has been drawn up with some care2 as was needful1 if meant to be of real service to the readers of so elaborate a work4 ,it only remains to add that in printing the ,greek of the notes1 c41 the text of ,waitz has been followed for the ,organon 7everywhere short of the beginning72 the text of ,bonitz1 for the ,metaphysica2 and for other works of ,aristotle1 generally the ,berlin edition4 ,regard was had1 as far as the editors' knowledge went1 to the author's own preferences in his reading4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,life ,,of ,,aristotle #a ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,aristotelian ,,canon #bg ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,categori #ed ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,de ,,interpretatione #ajh ,,chapter ,v4 ,,analytica ,,priora ,i4 #aci ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,analytica ,,priora ,,ii4 #aga ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,analytica ,,posteriora ,i4 #bjg ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,analytica ,,posteriora ,,ii4 #bch ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,topica 7,i4-,,viii47 #bfb ,,chapter ,x4 ,,sophistici ,,elenchi #cgf ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,physica ,,and ,,metaphysica #dbb ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,de ,,anim1 ,,etc4 #ddf ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,ethica #did ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,politica #eci ,,appendix4 ,i4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,universals #eea ,,ii4 ,,first ,,principles3 ,a4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton on ,aristotle's ,doctrine #efe ,b4 ,aristotle's ,doctrine #egc ,,iii4 ,,metaphysica3 ,book ,greek3 ,g4 #ehc ,book ,greek3 ,e4 #eib ,book ,greek3 ,z4 #eid ,book ,greek3 4 #fji ,book ,greek3 ,th4 #fac ,book ,greek3 ,l4 #fai ,,iv4 ,,de ,,coelo3 ,book ,i4 #fcj ,book ,,ii4 #fci ,v4 ,,epikurus #fed ,,vi4 ,,the ,,stoics4--,a ,,fragment #ffj ,,aristotle4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,life ,,of ,,aristotle4 ,in my preceding work1 ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,i described a band of philosophers differing much from each other1 but all emanating from ,sokrates as common intellectual progenitor2 all manifesting themselves wholly or principally in the composition of dialogues2 and all living in an atmosphere of ,hellenic freedom1 as yet untroubled by any over-ruling imperial ascendancy from without4 ,from that band1 among whom ,plato is facil princeps1 ,i now proceed to another1 among whom the like pre-eminence belongs to ,aristotle4 ,this second band knew the ,sokratic stimulus only as an historical tradition2 they gradually passed1 first from the ,sokratic or ,platonic dialogue--dramatic1 colloquial1 cross-examining--to the ,aristotelian dialogue1 semi-dramatic1 rhetorical1 counter-expository2 and next to formal theorizing1 ingenious solution and divination of special problems1 historical criticism and abundant collections of detailed facts3 moreover1 they were witnesses of the extinction of freedom in ,hellas1 and of the rise of the ,macedonian kingdom out of comparative nullity to the highest pinnacle of supremacy and mastership4 ,under the successors of ,alexander1 this extraneous supremacy1 intermeddling and dictatorial1 not only overruled the political movements of the ,greeks1 but also influenced powerfully the position and working of their philosophers2 and would have become at once equally intermeddling even earlier1 under ,alexander himself1 had not his whole time and personal energy been absorbed by insatiable thirst for eastern conquest1 ending with an untimely death4 ,aristotle was born at ,stageira1 an unimportant ,hellenic colony in ,thrace1 which has obtained a lasting name in history from the fact of being his birthplace4 ,it was situated in the ,strymonic ,gulf1 a little north of the isthmus which terminates in the mountainous promontory of ,athos2 its founders were ,greeks from the island of ,andros1 reinforced afterwards by additional immigrants from ,chalkis in ,euboea4 ,it was1 like other ,grecian cities1 autonomous--a distinct1 self-governing community2 but it afterwards became incorporated in the confederacy of free cities under the presidency of ,olynthus4 ,the most material feature in its condition1 at the period of ,aristotle's birth1 was1 that it lay near the frontier of ,macedonia1 and not far even from ,pella1 the residence of the ,macedonian king ,amyntas 7father of ,philip74 ,aristotle was born1 not earlier than #cib ,b4,c41 nor later than #che-chd ,b4,c4 ,his father1 ,nikomachus1 was a citizen of ,stageira1 distinguished as a physician1 author of some medical works1 and boasting of being descended from the heroic gens of the ,asklepiads2 his mother1 ,phaestis1 was also of good civic family1 descended from one of the first ,chalkidian colonists4#a ,moreover1 ,nikomachus was not merely learned in his art1 but was accepted as confidential physician and friend of ,amyntas1 with whom he passed much of his time--a circumstance of great moment to the future career of his son4 ,we are told that among the ,asklepiads the habit of physical observation1 and even manual training in dissection1 were imparted traditionally from father to son1 from the earliest years1 thus serving as preparation for medical practice when there were no written treatises to study4#b ,the mind of ,aristotle may thus have acquired that appetite for physiological study which so many of his treatises indicate4 ,footnote #a3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #aj4 ,this was probably among the reasons which induced ,aristotle to prefer ,chalkis as his place of temporary retirement1 when he left ,athens after the death of ,alexander4 ,footnote #b3 ,galen1 ,de ,anatomicis ,administr4 ii4 #a4 ,t4 ii4 pp4 #bhj-bha1 ed4 ,khn4 ,greek3 para tois goneusin e7k pai_/dn a7skoume_/nois1 7_/sper a7nagin_/skein kai gra_/phein1 ou7_/ts a7nate_/mnein--7compare ,plato--,protagoras1 p4 #cbh ,a1 p4 #caa ,c74 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #a4 ,greek3 ,o7 de ,niko_/machos 7n a7po ,nikoma_/chou tou ,macha_/nos tou ,a7sklpiou1 katha_/ phsin ,e7_/rmippos e7n t peri ,a7ristote_/lous kai sunebi_/ ,a7mu_/nta t ,makedo_/nn basilei i7atrou kai phi_/lou chrei_/a4 ,we here learn that in the heroic genealogy of the ,asklepiads1 the son of ,machaon himself bore the name of ,nikomachus4 ,i do not think that ,will4 v4 ,humboldt and ,bernays are warranted in calling ,aristotle ein ,halbgrieche1 kein vollbrtiger ,hellene--7,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 pp4 #b-ef-acd74 ,an ,hellenic family which migrated from ,athens1 ,chalkis1 ,corinth1 etc41 to establish a colony on the coast of ,thrace1 or ,asia ,minor1 did not necessarily lose its ,hellenism4 ,one cannot designate ,demokritus1 ,xenokrates1 ,anaxagoras1 ,empedokles1 c41 half ,greeks4 ,diogenes here especially cites ,hermippus 7,b4,c4 #bbj-baj71 from whom several of his statements in this and other biographies appear to have been derived4 ,the work of ,hermippus seems to have been entitled ,lives of the ,philosophers 7v4 #b71 among which lives that of ,aristotle was one4 ,hermippus mentioned1 among other matters1 communications made to ,aristotle by ,stroebus 7a person engaged in the service of ,kallisthenes as reader7 respecting the condemnation and execution of ,kallisthenes in ,baktria1 by order of ,alexander 7,plutarch1 ,alex4 c4 #ed74 ,from what source did ,hermippus derive these statements made by ,stroebus to ,aristotle8 ,respecting the character of his youth1 there existed1 even in antiquity1 different accounts4 ,we learn that he lost his father and mother while yet a youth1 and that he came under the guardianship of ,proxenus1 a native of ,atarneus who had settled at ,stageira4 ,according to one account1 adopted apparently by the earliest witnesses preserved to us1#c he was at first an extravagant youth1 spent much of his paternal property1 and then engaged himself to military service2 of which he soon became weary1 and went back to ,stageira1 turning to account the surgical building1 apparatus1 and medicines left by his father as a medical practitioner4 ,after some time1 we know not how long1 he retired from this profession1 shut up the building1 and devoted himself to rhetoric and philosophy4 ,he then went to ,athens1 and there entered himself in the school of ,plato1 at the age of thirty4#d ,the philosophical life was thus 7if this account be believed7 a second choice1 adopted comparatively late in life4#e ,the other account1 depending also upon good witnesses1 represents him as having come to ,athens and enlisted as pupil of ,plato1 at the early age of seventeen or eighteen3 it omits all mention of an antecedent period1 occupied by military service and a tentative of medical profession4#f ,in both the two narratives1 ,aristotle appears as resident at ,athens1 and devoting himself to rhetoric and philosophy1 from some period before #cfj ,b4,c4 down to the death of ,plato in #cdg ,b4,c42 though1 according to the first of the two narratives1 he begins his philosophical career at a later age1 while his whole life occupied seventy years instead of sixty-two years4 ,footnote #c3 ,epikurus and ,timus4 ,greek3 ,e7pi_/kouros e7n t peri e7pitdeuma_/tn e7pistol 7,eusebius1 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #e7--;,diogen4 ,l4 x4 #h2 lian4 ,v4 ,h4 v4 #i4 ,footnote #d3 ,an author named ,eumlus 7cited by ,diogenes1 v4 #f1 ,greek e7n t pe_/mpt tn i7storin1 but not otherwise known7 stated that ,aristotle came to ,plato at the age of thirty1 and that he lived altogether to seventy years of age1 instead of sixty-three1 as ,hermippus and ,apollodorus affirmed4 ,eumlus conceived ,aristotle as born in #cib ,b4,c41 and coming to ,plato in #cfb ,b4,c4 ,his chronological data are in harmony with the statements of ,epikurus and ,timus respecting the early life of ,aristotle4 ,the ,greek3 ,bi_/os ,a7n_/numos given by ,mnage recognizes two distinct accounts as to the age at which ,aristotle died3 one assigning to him #gj years1 the other only #fc4 ,footnote #e3 ,see the ,fragments of ,timus in ,didot1 ,fragmenta ,historicorum ,grcorum1 ,fr4 #gj-gd2 also ,aristokles1 ap4 ,eusebium1 ,prp4 ,evang4 xv4 #b2 ,diogenes1 ,l4 x4 #h2 ,athenus1 viii4 p4 #ced4 ,timus called ,aristotle ,greek3 sophistn o7psimath kai misto_/n1 kai to poluti_/mton i7atreion a7rti_/s a7pokekeiko_/ta4 ,the speaker in ,athenus designates him as ,greek3 o7 pharmakop_/ls4 ,the terms used by these writers are illtempered and unbecoming in regard to so great a man as ,aristotle2 but this is irrelevant to the question1 whether they do not describe1 in perverted colouring1 some real features in his earlier life1 or whether there was not1 at least1 a chronological basis of possibility for them4 ,that no such features were noticed by other enemies of ,aristotle1 such as ,eubulides and ,kephisodrus1 is a reason as far as it goes for not believing them to be real1 yet not at all a conclusive reason2 nor is the speaker in ,athenus exact when he says that ,epikurus is the only witness1 for we find ,timus making the same statements4 ,the ,greek3 i7atreion 7see ,antiphanes1 apud ,polluc4 iv4 #ahc--;,fragmenta ,comic4 cxxv41 ,meineke7 of a ,greek physician 7more properly we should call the ,greek3 i7atros a general practitioner and chemist7 was the repository of his materials and the scene of his important operations2 for many of which instructions are given in the curious ,hippokratic treatise entitled ,greek3 ,kat' ,i7treion1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bfb-ccg of the edition of ,m4 ,littr1 who in his preface to the treatise1 p4 #bfe1 remarks about ,aristotle3--,il parat qu',aristote1 qui tait de famille mdicale1 avoit renonc une officine de ce genre1 d'une grande valeur4 ,stahr speaks of this ,greek3 i7atreion as if ,aristotle had set up one at ,athens 7,aristotelia1 p4 #ch71 which the authorities do not assert2 it was probably at ,stageira4 ,ideler 7,comm4 9999ad ,aristot4 ,meteorol4 iv4 #c1 #af1 p4 #dcc7 considers this story about ,aristotle's ,greek3 i7atreion to have been a fiction arising out of various expressions in his writings about the preparation of drugs--,greek3 ta pha_/rmaka e7_/psein1 c4 ,i think this is far-fetched4 ,and when we find ,aristokles rejecting the allegation about the ,greek3 i7atreion1 by speaking of it as an ,greek3 a7_/doxon i7atreion1 we can admit neither the justice of the epithet nor the ground of rejection4 ,footnote #f3 ,this account rested originally 7so far as we know7 upon the statement of ,hermippus 7,b4,c4 #bbj71 and was adopted by ,apollodrus in his ,chronology 7,b4,c4 #aej71 both of them good authorities1 yet neither of them so early as ,epikurus and ,timus4 ,diogenes ,laertius and ,dionysius of ,halikarnassus alike follow ,hermippus4 ,both the life of ,aristotle ascribed to ,ammonius1 and the ,anonymous ,life first edited by ,robbe 7,leyden1 #ahfa1 p4 #b71 include the same strange chronological blunder3 they affirm ,aristotle to have come to ,athens at the age of seventeen1 and to have frequented the society of ,sokrates 7who had been dead more than thirty years7 for three years2 then to have gone to ,plato at the age of twenty4 ,zeller imagines1 and ,i think it likely1 that ,aristotle may have been for a short time pupil with ,isokrates1 and that the story of his having been pupil with ,sokrates has arisen from confusion of the two names1 which confusion has been seen on several occasions 7,zeller1 ,gesch4 der ,philos4 der ,griechen1 ii4 #b1 p4 #ae47 ,during the interval1 #cfg-cfj ,b4,c41 ,plato was much absent from ,athens1 having paid two separate visits to ,dionysius the younger at ,syracuse4 ,the time which he spent there at each visit is not explicitly given2 but as far as we can conjecture from indirect allusions1 it cannot have been less than a year at each1 and may possibly have been longer4 ,if1 therefore1 ,aristotle reached ,athens in #cfg ,b4,c4 7as ,hermippus represents7 he cannot have enjoyed continuous instructions from ,plato for the three or four years next ensuing4 ,however the facts may stand as to ,aristotle's early life1 there is no doubt that in or before the year #cfb ,b4,c4 he became resident at ,athens1 and that he remained there1 profiting by the society and lectures of ,plato1 until the death of the latter in #cdg ,b4,c4 ,shortly after the loss of his master1 he quitted ,athens1 along with his fellow-pupil ,xenokrates1 and went to ,atarneus1 which was at that time ruled by the despot ,hermeias4 ,that despot was a remarkable man1 who being a eunuch through bodily hurt when a child1 and having become slave of a prior despot named ,eubulus1 had contrived to succeed him in the supreme power1 and governed the towns of ,atarneus and ,assos with firmness and energy4 ,hermeias had been at ,athens1 had heard ,plato's lectures1 and had contracted friendship with ,aristotle2 which friendship became farther cemented by the marriage of ,aristotle1 during his residence at ,atarneus1 with ,pythias the niece of ,hermeias4#g ,for three years ,aristotle and ,xenokrates remained at ,assos or ,atarneus1 whence they were then forced to escape by reason of the despot's death2 for ,mentor the ,rhodian1 general of the ,persians in those regions1 decoyed ,hermeias out of the town under pretence of a diplomatic negociation1 then perfidiously seized him1 and sent him up as prisoner to the ,persian king1 by whose order he was hanged4 ,mentor at the same time seized the two towns and other possessions of ,hermeias1#h while ,aristotle with his wife retired to ,mitylene4 ,his deep grief for the fate of ,hermeias was testified in a noble hymn or pan which he composed1 and which still remains1 as well as by an epigram inscribed on the statue of ,hermeias at ,delphi4 ,we do not hear of his going elsewhere1 until1 two or three years afterwards 7the exact date is differently reported71 he was invited by ,philip into ,macedonia1 to become preceptor to the young prince ,alexander1 then thirteen or fourteen years old4 ,the reputation1 which ,aristotle himself had by this time established1 doubtless coincided with the recollection of his father ,nikomachus as physician and friend of ,amyntas1 in determining ,philip to such a choice4 ,aristotle performed the duties required from him1#i enjoying the confidence and favour both of ,philip and ,alexander1 until the assassination of the former and the accession of the latter in #ccf ,b4,c4 ,his principle residence during this period was in ,macedonia1 but he paid occasional visits to ,athens1 and allusion is made to certain diplomatic services which he rendered to the ,athenians at the court of ,philip2 moreover he must have spent some time at his native city ,stageira1#aj which had been among the many ,greek cities captured and ruined by ,philip during the ,olynthian war of #cdi-cdg ,b4,c4 ,having obtained the consent and authority of ,philip1 ,aristotle repaired to ,stageira for the purpose of directing the re-establishment of the city4 ,recalling such of its dispersed inhabitants as could be collected1 either out of the neighbouring villages or from more distant parts1 he is said to have drawn up laws1 or framed regulations for the returned citizens1 and new comers4 ,he had reason to complain of various rivals who intrigued against him1 gave him much trouble1 and obstructed the complete renovation of the city2 but1 notwithstanding1 his services were such that an annual festival was instituted to commemorate them4#aa ,it is farther stated1 that at some time during this period he had a school 7analogous to the ,academy at ,athens7 in the ,nymphum of the place called ,mieza2 where stone seats and shady walks1 ennobled by the name of ,aristotle1 were still shown even in the days of ,plutarch4#ab ,footnote #g3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #faj2 ,diodor4 xvi4 #eb4 ,it appears that ,aristotle incurred censure1 even from contemporary rivals1 for this marriage with ,pythias4 ,on what ground we cannot exactly make out 7,aristokles ap4 ,eusebium ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b71 unless it be from her relationship to ,hermeias4 ,she died long before ,aristotle1 but he mentions her in his will in terms attesting the constant affection which had reigned between them until her death4 ,aristotle thought it right to reply to the censure in one of his letters to ,antipater4 ,aristokles 7ap4 ,euseb4 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b7 says that ,aristotle did not marry ,pythias until after the death of ,hermeias1 when she was compelled to save herself by flight1 and was in distress and poverty4 ,mr4 ,blakesley 7,life of ,aristotle1 p4 #cf7 and ,oncken 7,die ,staatslehre des ,aristoteles1 p4 #aeh7 concur in thinking that the departure of ,aristotle from ,athens had nothing to do with the death of ,plato1 but was determined by the capture of ,olynthus1 and by the fear and dislike of ,philip which that event engendered at ,athens4 ,but the fact that ,xenokrates left ,athens along with ,aristotle disproves this supposition1 and proves that the death of ,plato was the real cause4 ,footnote #h3 ,diog4 ,laert4 v4 #g-h4 ,diodorus ascribes this proceeding to ,mentor the ,rhodian3 ,strabo1 to his brother ,memnon4 ,i think ,diodorus is right4 ,a remarkable passage in the ,magna ,moralia 7genuine or spurious7 of ,aristotle1 seems to me to identify the proceeding with ,mentor 7,aristot4 ,magn4 ,mor4 i4 #ce1 p4 #aaig1 b4 #ba2 as also the spurious second book of the ,o,ekonomica1 p4 #acea1 a4 #cc74 ,footnote #i3 ,it was probably during this period that ,aristotle introduced to ,alexander his friend the rhetor ,theodekts of ,phaslis4 ,alexander took delight in the society of ,theodekts1 and testified this feeling1 when he conquered ,phaslis1 by demonstrations of affection and respect towards the statue of the rhetor1 who had died during the intervening years--,greek3 a7podidous timn t genome_/n di' ,a7ristote_/ln kai philosophi_/an o7mili_/a pros ton a7_/ndra 7,plutarch1 ,alex4 c4 #ag74 ,footnote #aj3 ,it is to this period of ,aristotle's life that the passage extracted from his letters in ,demetrius 7so-called ,greek3 peri ,e7rmnei_/as7 refers4 ,greek3 7s ,a7ristote_/ls phsi_/n--e7g e7k men ,a7thnn ei7s ,sta_/geira 7lthon dia ton basile_/a ton me_/gan1 e7k de ,stagei_/rn ei7s ,a7th_/nas dia ton cheimna ton me_/gan--s4 #bi4 ,we shall hardly consider this double employment of the epithet ,greek3 9999me_/gan as an instance of that success in epistolary style1 which ,demetrius ascribes to ,aristotle 7s4 #bci72 but the passage proves ,aristotle's visits both to ,stageira and to ,athens4 ,the very cold winters of the ,chalkidic peninsula were severely felt by the ,greeks 7,plato--,symposion1 p4 #bbj71 and may well have served as motive to ,aristotle for going from ,stageira to ,athens4 ,footnote #aa3 ,ammonius1 ,vit4 ,aristot4 ,see the curious statements given by ,dion ,chrysostom1 out of the epistles of ,aristotle2 ,orat4 ii4 p4 #ajj1 xlvii4 p4 #bbe1 ,reiske4 ,respecting the allusions made in these statements to various persons who were reluctant to return out of the separate villages into the restored city1 compare what ,xenophon says about the ,greek3 dioi_/kisis1 and subsequent restitution1 of ,mantineia2 ,hellenica1 v4 #b1 #a-h1 vi4 #e1 #c-f4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plutarch1 ,alexander1 c4 #g4 ,what ,plutarch calls the ,nymphum1 is considered by ,stahr 7,aristotelia1 i4 p4 #ic n47 to be probably the same as what ,pliny denominates the ,museum at ,stageira 7,n4 ,h4 xvi4 c4 #bc72 but ,zeller 7p4 #bc1 n471 after ,geier1 holds that ,mieza lay ,s4,w4 of ,pella1 in ,emathia1 far from ,stageira4 ,plutarch seems to imply that ,aristotle was established along with ,alexander at ,meiza by ,philip4 ,compare1 for these facts of the biography of ,aristotle1 ,stahr1 ,aristotelia1 ,part ,i41 pp4 #hf-id1 #ajc-ajf4 ,i conceive that it was during this residence in ,macedonia and at ,pella1 that ,aristotle erected the cenotaph in honour of ,hermeias1 which is so contemptuously derided by the ,chian poet ,theokritus in his epigram1 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #aa4 ,the epigram is very severe on ,aristotle1 for preferring ,pella to the ,academy as a residence2 ascribing such preference to the exigencies of an ungovernable stomach4 ,in #ccf ,b4,c4 ,alexander became king of ,macedonia1 and his vast projects for conquest1 first of ,persia1 next of other peoples known and unknown1 left him no leisure for anything but military and imperial occupations4 ,it was in the ensuing year 7#cce ,b4,c4 when the preparations for the ,persian expedition were being completed1 ready for its execution in the following spring1 that ,aristotle transferred his residence to ,athens4 ,the ,platonic philosophical school in which he had studied was now conducted by ,xenokrates as ,scholarch1 having passed at the death of ,plato1 in #cdg ,b4,c41 to his nephew ,speusippus1 and from the latter to ,xenokrates in #cci ,b4,c4 ,aristotle established for himself a new and rival school on the eastern side of ,athens1 in the gymnasium attached to the temple of ,apollo ,lykeius1 and deriving from thence the name by which it was commonly known--the ,lykeium4 ,in that school1 and in the garden adjoining1 he continued to lecture or teach1 during the succeeding twelve years1 comprising the life and the brilliant conquests of ,alexander4 ,much of his instruction is said to have been given while walking in the garden1 from whence the students and the sect derived the title of ,peripatetics4 ,in the business of his school and the composition of his works all his time was occupied2 and his scholars soon became so numerous that he found it convenient to desire them to elect from themselves every ten days a rector to maintain order1 as ,xenokrates had already done at the ,academy4#ac ,aristotle farther maintained correspondence1 not merely with ,alexander and ,antipater but also with ,themison1 one of the princes of ,cyprus1 as ,isokrates had corresponded with ,nikokles1 and ,plato with ,dionysius of ,syracuse4#ad ,footnote #ac3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #d4 ,brandis notes it as a feature in ,aristotle's character 7p4 #fe71 that he abstained from meddling with public affairs at ,athens4 ,but we must remember1 that1 not being a citizen of ,athens1 ,aristotle was not competent to meddle personally4 ,his great and respected philosophical competitor1 ,xenokrates 7a non-citizen or metic as well as he71 was so far from being in a condition to meddle with public affairs1 that he was once even arrested for not having paid in due season his ,greek3 metoi_/kion1 or capitation-tax imposed upon metics4 ,he was liberated1 according to one story1 by ,lykurgus 7,plutarch1 ,vit4 x4 ,oratt4 p4 #hdb72 according to another story 7seemingly more probable71 by ,demetrius ,phalereus 7,diog4 ,la4 iv4 #ad74 ,the anonymous life of ,aristotle published by ,robbe 7,leyden1 #ahfa1 p4 #c71 takes due notice of ,aristotle's position at ,athens as a metic4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristotle addressed to ,themison a composition now lost1 but well known in antiquity1 called ,greek3 ,protreptiko_/s4 ,it was probably a dialogue2 and was intended as an encouragement to the study of philosophy4 ,see ,rose1 ,aristot4 ,pseud4 pp4 #fi-gb1 who gives a very interesting fragment of it out of ,stobus4 ,we have the titles of two lost works of ,aristotle--,greek3 ,peri ,basilei_/as1 and ,greek3 ,a7le_/xandros1 7 u7per a7poi_/kn 7or ,greek3 a7poikin74 ,both seem to have been dialogues4 ,in one1 or in both1 he gave advice to ,alexander respecting the manner of ruling his newly acquired empire in ,asia2 and respecting the relations proper to be established between ,hellenes and native ,asiatics 7see ,rose1 ,arist4 ,pseud4 pp4 #ib-if2 ,bernays1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristot4 pp4 #ea-eg74 ,in ,june1 #cbc ,b4,c41 occurred the premature and unexpected decease of the great ,macedonian conqueror1 aged #cb years and #h months1 by a violent fever at ,babylon4 ,so vast was his power1 and so unmeasured his ambition1 that the sudden removal of such a man operated as a shock to the hopes and fears of almost every one1 both in ,greece and ,asia4 ,it produced an entire change in the position of ,aristotle at ,athens4 ,to understand what that position really was1 we must look at it in connection with his ,macedonian sympathies1 and with the contemporaneous political sentiment at ,athens4 ,it was in the middle of the year #cce ,b4,c41 that ,alexander put down by force the revolt of the ,thebans1 took their city by assault1 demolished it altogether 7leaving nothing but the citadel called ,kadmeia1 occupied by a ,macedonian garrison71 and divided its territory between two other ,boeotian towns4 ,immediately after that terror-striking act1 he demanded from the ,athenians 7who had sympathized warmly with ,thebes1 though without overt acts of assistance7 the surrender of their principal anti-,macedonian politicians4 ,that demand having been refused1 he at first prepared to extort compliance at the point of the sword1 but was persuaded1 not without difficulty1 to renounce such intention1 and to be content with the voluntary exile of ,ephialtes and ,charidemus from ,athens4 ,though the unanimous vote of the ,grecian ,synod at ,corinth constituted him ,imperator1 there can be no doubt that the prevalent sentiment in ,greece towards him was that of fear and dislike2 especially among the ,athenians1 whose dignity was most deeply mortified1 and to whom the restriction of free speech was the most painful4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,see ,history of ,greece1 chap4 xci4 pp4 #ah1 #da1 #fd4 ,now it was just at this moment 7in #cce ,b4,c47 that ,aristotle came to ,athens and opened his school4 ,we cannot doubt that he was already known and esteemed as the author of various published writings4 ,but the prominent mark by which every one now distinguished him1 was1 that he had been for several years confidential preceptor of ,alexander1 and was still more or less consulted by that prince1 as well as sustained by the friendship of ,antipater1 viceroy of ,macedonia during the king's absence4 ,aristotle was regarded as philo-,macedonian1 and to a certain extent1 anti-,hellenic--the sentiment expressed towards him in the unfriendly epigram of the contemporary ,chian poet ,theokritus4#af ,his new school1 originally opened under the protection and patronage of ,alexander and ,antipater1 continued to be associated with their names1 by that large proportion of ,athenian citizens who held anti-,macedonian sentiments4 ,alexander caused the statue of ,aristotle to be erected in ,athens1#ag and sent to him continual presents of money1 usefully employed by the philosopher in the prosecution of his physical and zoological researches1#ah as well as in the purchase of books4 ,moreover1 ,aristotle remained in constant and friendly correspondence with ,antipater1 the resident viceroy at ,pella1#ai during the absence of ,alexander in ,asia4 ,letters of recommendation from ,aristotle to the ,macedonian rulers were often given and found useful3 several of them were preserved and published afterwards4 ,there is even reason to believe that the son of ,antipater--,kassander1 afterwards viceroy or king of ,macedonia1 was among his pupils4#bj ,footnote #af3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #aa4 ,greek3 ,e7rmi_/ou eu7nou_/chou 7_/d' ,eu7bou_/lou a7_/ma dou_/lou ,sma kenon keno_/phrn teuxen ,a7ristote_/ls2 ,o7s dia tn a7krat gastros phu_/sin ei7_/leto nai_/ein ,a7nt' ,a7kadmei_/as ,borbo_/rou e7n prochoais4 ,cf4 ,plutarch1 ,de ,exilio1 p4 #fjc4 ,footnote #ag3 ,stahr1 ,aristotelia1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bij4 ,footnote #ah3 ,athenus1 ix4 #cih2 ,pliny1 ,h4 ,n4 viii4 c4 #af4 ,athenus alludes to #hjj talents as having been given by ,alexander to ,aristotle for this purpose4 ,pliny tells us that ,alexander put thousands of men at his service for enquiry and investigation4 ,the general fact is all that we can state with confidence1 without pretending to verify amounts4 ,footnote #ai3 ,vit4 ,aristotelis1 ,leyden1 #ahfa1 ,robbe1 pp4 #d-f2 ,aristokles ap4 ,eusebium ,prp4 ,evang4 xv4 #b4 ,respecting the ,epistles of ,aristotle1 and the collection thereof by ,artemon1 see ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigr4 pp4 #eid-eih4 ,footnote #bj3 ,we may infer this fact from the insulting reply made by ,alexander1 not long before his death1 to ,kassander1 who had just then joined him for the first time at ,babylon1 having been sent by ,antipater at the head of a reinforcement4 ,some recent comers from ,greece complained to ,alexander of having been ill-used by ,antipater4 ,kassander being present at the complaint1 endeavoured to justify his father and to invalidate their testimony1 upon which ,alexander silenced him by the remark that he was giving a specimen of sophistical duplicity learnt from ,aristotle4 ,greek3 ,tauta e7keina sophi_/smata tn ,a7ristote_/lous ei7s e7ka_/teron tn lo_/gn1 oi7mxome_/nn1 a7n kai mikron a7dikountes tous a7nthr_/pous phante 7,plutarch1 ,alex4 #gd74 ,i have recounted elsewhere how the character of ,alexander became gradually corrupted by unexampled success and ,asiatic influences2#ba how he thus came to feel less affection and esteem for ,aristotle1 to whom he well knew that his newly acquired imperial and semi-divine pretensions were not likely to be acceptable2 how1 on occasion of the cruel sentence passed on ,kallisthenes1 he threatened even to punish ,aristotle himself1 as having recommended ,kallisthenes1 and as sympathizing with the same free spirit2 lastly1 how ,alexander became more or less alienated1 not only from the society of ,hellenic citizens1 but even from his faithful viceroy1 the ,macedonian ,antipater4 ,but these changed relations between ,aristotle and ,alexander did not come before the notice of the ,athenians1 nor alter the point of view in which they regarded the philosopher2 the rather1 since the relations of ,aristotle with ,antipater continued as intimate as ever4 ,footnote #ba3 ,histor4 of ,greece1 ch4 xciv4 pp4 #bia1 #cja1 #cda2 ,plutarch1 ,alexand4 c4 lv42 ,dion ,chrysostom4 ,orat4 #fd1 p4 #cch1 ,reiske4 ,it will thus appear1 that though all the preserved writings of ,aristotle are imbued with a thoroughly independent spirit of theorizing contemplation and lettered industry1 uncorrupted by any servility or political bias--yet his position during the twelve years between #cce-cbc ,b4,c4 inevitably presented him to the ,athenians as the macedonizing philosopher1 parallel with ,phokion as the macedonizing politician1 and in pointed antithesis to ,xenokrates at the ,academy1 who was attached to the democratical constitution1 and refused kingly presents4 ,besides that enmity which he was sure to incur1 as an acute and self-thinking philosopher1 from theology and the other anti-philosophical veins in the minds of ordinary men1 ,aristotle thus became the object of unfriendly sentiment from many ,athenian patriots1#bb who considered the school of ,plato generally as hostile to popular liberty1 and who had before their eyes examples of individual ,platonists1 ruling their respective cities with a sceptre forcibly usurped4#bc ,footnote #bb3 ,the statement of ,aristokles 7ap4 ,eusebium1 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b7 is doubtless just--,greek3 phaneron ou7n1 o7_/ti katha_/per pollois kai a7_/llois1 ou7_/t kai ,a7ristote_/lei sune_/b1 dia_/ te tas pros tous basileis phili_/as kai dia tn e7n tois lo_/gois u7peroch_/n1 u7po tn to_/te sophistn phthoneisthai4 ,the like is said by the rhetor ,aristeides--,or4 xii4 p4 #add1 ,dindorf4 ,i have already observed that the phrase of ,halbgrieche applied by ,bernays and ,w4 v4 ,humboldt to ,aristotle 7,bernays1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 p4 #b1 p4 #acd7 is not accurate literally1 unless we choose to treat all the ,hellenic colonies as half-,greek4 ,his ancestry was on both sides fully ,hellenic4 ,but it is true of him1 in the same metaphorical sense in which it is true of ,phokion4 ,aristotle was semi-,macedonian in his sympathies4 ,he had no attachment to ,hellas as an organized system autonomous1 self-acting1 with an ,hellenic city as president3 which attachment would have been considered1 by ,perikles1 ,archidamus1 and ,epameinondas1 as one among the constituents indispensable to ,hellenic patriotism4 ,footnote #bc3 ,quintilian--,declamat4 #bfh4 ,quis ignorat1 ex ips ,socratis 7quo velut fonte omnis philosophia manasse creditur7 schol evasisse tyrannos et hostes patri su8 ,compare ,athenus1 xi4 #ejh-eji4 ,such sentiment was probably aggravated by the unparalleled and offensive ,macedonian demonstration at the ,olympic festival of #cbd ,b4,c4 ,it was on that occasion that ,alexander1 about one year prior to his decease1 sent down a formal rescript1 which was read publicly to the assembled crowd by a herald with loud voice2 ordering every ,grecian city to recall all exiles who had been banished by judicial sentence1 and intimating1 that if the rescript were not obeyed spontaneously1 ,antipater would be instructed to compel the execution of it by force4 ,a large number of the exiles whose restitution was thus ordered1 were present on the plain of ,olympia1 and heard the order proclaimed1 doubtless with undisguised triumph and exultation4 ,so much the keener must have been the disgust and humiliation among the other ,grecian hearers1 who saw the autonomy of each separate city violently trampled down1 without even the pretence of enquiry1 by this high-handed sentence of the ,macedonian conqueror4 ,among the ,athenians especially1 the resentment felt was profound2 and a vote was passed appointing deputies to visit ,alexander in person1 for the purpose of remonstrating against it4 ,the orator ,demosthenes1 who happened to be named ,archi-,therus of ,athens 7chief of the solemn legation sent to represent ,athens7 at this ,olympic festival1 incurred severe reproach from his accuser ,deinarchus1 for having even been seen in personal conversation with the ,macedonian officer who had arrived from ,asia as bearer of this odious rescript4#bd ,footnote #bd3 ,see the description of this event in ,history of ,greece1 ch4 xcv4 p4 #daf4 ,there is reason for supposing that ,hypereides also 7as well as ,deinarchus7 inveighed against ,demosthenes for having publicly sought the company of ,nikanor at this ,olympic festival4 ,at least we know that ,hypereides1 in his oration against ,demosthenes1 made express allusion to ,nikanor4 ,see ,harpokration v4 ,greek3 ,nika_/nr4 ,the exordium prefixed to the ,pseud-,aristotelian ,rhetorica ad ,alexandrum1 announces that discourse to have been composed pursuant to the desire of ,alexander2 and notices especially one message transmitted by him to ,aristotle through ,nikanor 7p4 #adbj a4 #f1 #adba a4 #bf-ch1 ,greek3 katha_/per 7min e7d_/lse ,nika_/nr1 c474 ,now it happened that this officer1 the bearer of the rescript1 was ,nikanor of ,stageira2#be son of ,proxenus who had been ,aristotle's early guardian1 and himself the cherished friend or ward1 ultimately the son-in-law1 of the philosopher4 ,we may be certain that ,aristotle would gladly embrace the opportunity of seeing again this attached friend1 returning after a long absence on service in ,asia2 that he would be present with him at the ,olympic festival1 perhaps receive a visit from him at ,athens also4 ,and the unpopularity of ,aristotle at ,athens1 as identified with ,macedonian imperial authority1 would thus be aggravated by his notorious personal alliance with his fellow-citizen ,nikanor1 the bearer of that rescript in which such authority had been most odiously manifested4 ,footnote #be3 ,diodor4 xviii4 #h4 ,greek3 dio_/per u7pogu_/n o7_/ntn tn ,o7lumpi_/n e7xe_/pempsen 7,alexander7 ,greek3 ei7s tn ,e7lla_/da ,nika_/nora ton ,stageiri_/tn1 dous e7pistoln peri ts katho_/dou4 ,antipater1 when re-distributing the satrapies of the ,macedonian empire1 after the death both of ,alexander and of ,perdikkas1 appointed ,nikanor prefect or satrap of ,kappadokia 7,arrian1 ,greek3 ,ta meta ,a7le_/xandron1 apud ,photium1 cod4 #ib1 s4#cg1 ,didot74 ,ammonius1 in the life of ,aristotle1 mentions ,nikanor as son of ,proxenus of ,atarneus4 ,sextus ,empiricus alludes to ,nikanor as son-in-law of ,aristotle 7adv4 ,mathematicos1 sect4 #beh4 p4 #bga1 ,fabr474 ,see ,mnage ad ,diogen4 ,laert4 v4 #ab4 ,robbe's ,life of ,aristotle also 7,leyden1 #ahfa1 p4 #b7 mentions ,nikanor as son of ,proxenus4 ,nikanor was appointed afterwards 7in #cah ,b4,c41 five years later than the death of ,aristotle7 by ,kassander1 son of ,antipater1 to be commander of the ,macedonian garrison which occupied ,munychia1 as a controlling force over ,athens 7,diodor4 xviii4 #fd74 ,it will be seen in my ,history of ,greece 7ch4 xcvi4 p4 #deh7 that ,kassander was at that moment playing a difficult game1 his father ,antipater being just dead2 that he could only get possession of ,munychia by artifice1 and that it was important for him to entrust the mission to an officer who already had connections at ,athens2 that ,nikanor1 as adopted son of ,aristotle1 possessed probably beforehand acquaintance with ,phokion and the other macedonizing leaders at ,athens2 so that the ready way in which ,phokion now fell into co-operation with him is the more easily explained4 ,nikanor1 however1 was put to death by ,kassander himself1 some months afterwards4 ,during the twelve or thirteen years#bf of ,aristotle's teaching and ,alexander's reign1 ,athens was administered by macedonizing citizens1 with ,phokion and ,demades at their head4 ,under such circumstances1 the enmity of those who hated the imperial philosopher could not pass into act2 nor was it within the contemplation of any one1 that only one year after that rescript which insulted the great ,pan-,hellenic festival1 the illustrious conqueror who issued it would die of fever1 in the vigour of his age and at the height of his power 7,june1 #cbc ,b4,c474 ,but as soon as the news of his decease1 coming by surprise both on friends and enemies1 became confirmed1 the suppressed anti-,macedonian sentiment burst forth in powerful tide1 not merely at ,athens1 but also throughout other parts of ,greece4 ,there resulted that struggle against ,antipater1 known as the ,lamian war3#bg a gallant struggle1 at first promising well1 but too soon put down by superior force1 and ending in the occupation of ,athens by ,antipater with a ,macedonian garrison in ,september1 #cbb ,b4,c41 as well as in the extinction of free speech and free citizenship by the suicide of ,demosthenes and the execution of ,hypereides4 ,footnote #bf3 ,there remain small fragments of an oration of ,demades in defence of his administration1 or political activity1 for twelve years--,greek3 u7per ts ddekaeti_/as 7,demad4 ,fragm4 #agi1 #cb74 ,the twelve years of ,demades1 however1 seem to be counted from the battle of ,chroneia in #cch ,b4,c42 so that they end in ,b4,c4 #cbf4 ,see ,clinton1 ,fast4 ,hellen4 ,b4,c4 #cbf4 ,footnote #bg3 ,for the account of the ,lamian war1 see ,history of ,greece1 ch4 xcv4 pp4 #dbj-ddj4 ,as to the 9999anti-,macedonian sentiment prevalent at ,athens1 see ,diodorus1 xviii4 #aj4 ,during the year immediately succeeding the death of ,alexander1 the anti-,macedonian sentiment continued so vehemently preponderant at ,athens1 that several of the leading citizens1 friends of ,phokion1 left the city to join ,antipater1 though ,phokion himself remained1 opposing ineffectually the movement4 ,it was during this period that the enemies of ,aristotle found a favourable opportunity for assailing him4 ,an indictment on the score of impiety was preferred against him by ,eurymedon the ,hierophant 7chief priest of the ,eleusinian ,demeter71 aided by ,demophilus1 son of the historian ,ephorus4 ,the ,hymn or ,pan 7still existing71 which ,aristotle had composed in commemoration of the death1 and in praise of the character1 of the eunuch ,hermeias1#bh was arraigned as a mark of impiety2 besides which ,aristotle had erected at ,delphi a statue of ,hermeias with an honorific inscription1 and was even alleged to have offered sacrifices to him as to a god4 ,in the published writings of ,aristotle1 too1 the accusers found various heretical doctrines1 suitable for sustaining their indictment2 as1 for example1 the declaration that prayer and sacrifices to the gods were of no avail4#bi ,but there can be little doubt that the ,hymn1 ,ode1 or ,pan1 in honour of ,hermeias1 would be more offensive to the feelings of an ordinary ,athenian than any philosophical dogma extracted from the cautious prose compositions of ,aristotle4 ,it is a hymn1 of noble thought and dignified measure1 addressed to ,virtue 7,greek3 ,a7ret--masculine or military ,virtue71 in which are extolled the semi-divine or heroic persons who had fought1 endured1 and perished in her service4 ,the name and exploits of ,hermeias are here introduced as the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with ,hrakls1 the ,dioskri1 ,achilles1 and ,ajax4 ,now the poet ,kallistratus1 in his memorable ,skolion1 offers a like compliment to ,harmodius and ,aristogeiton2 and ,pindar1 to several free ,greeks of noble family1 who paid highly for his epinician ,odes now remaining4 ,but all the persons thus complimented were such as had gained prizes at the sacred festivals1 or had distinguished themselves in other ways which the public were predisposed to honour2 whereas ,hermeias was a eunuch1 who began by being a slave1 and ended by becoming despot over a free ,grecian community1 without any exploit conspicuous to the eye4 ,to many of the ,athenian public it would seem insult1 and even impiety1 to couple ,hermeias with the greatest personages of ,hellenic mythology1 as a successful competitor for heroic honours4 ,we need only read the invective of ,claudian against ,eutropius1 to appreciate the incredible bitterness of indignation and contempt1 which was suggested by the spectacle of a eunuch and a slave exercising high public functions4#cj ,and the character of a despot was1 to the anti-macedonizing ,athenians1 hardly less odious than either of the others combined with it in ,hermeias4 ,footnote #bh3 ,diogen4 ,l4 v4 #e2 ,athenus1 xv4 #fif4 ,the name of ,demophilus was mentioned by ,favorinus as also subscribed to the indictment3 this ,demophilus was probably son of the historian ,ephorus4 ,see ,val4 ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1 p4 #ehb4 ,he took part afterwards in the indictment against ,phokion4 ,as an historian1 he completed the narrative of the ,sacred ,war1 which his father ,ephorus had left unfinished 7,diodor4 xvi4 #ad74 ,the words of ,athenus1 as far as ,i can understand them1 seem to imply that he composed a speech for the ,hierophant ,eurymedon4 ,footnote #bi3 ,see the passages from ,origen advers4 ,celsum1 cited in ,stahr's ,aristotelia1 vol4 i4 p4 #adf4 ,among the titles of the lost works of ,aristotle 7,no4 #ad in the ,catalogue of ,diogenes ,laertius1 ,no4 #i in that of the ,anonymous2 see ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1 pp4 #ab-ah71 one is ,greek3 ,peri ,eu7chs4 ,from its position in the ,catalogue1 it seems plainly to have been a dialogue2 and the dialogues were the most popular and best-known writings of ,aristotle4 ,now we know from the ,nikomach4 ,ethica 7x4 #h1 #aagh1 b4 #f-cb7 that ,aristotle declared all constructive effort1 and all action with a view to external ends1 to be inconsistent with the ,divine ,nature1 which was blest exclusively in theorizing and contemplation4 ,if he advocated the same doctrine in the dialogue ,greek3 ,peri ,eu7chs1 he must have contended that persons praying could have no additional chance of obtaining the benefits which they prayed for2 and this would have placed him in conflict with the received opinions4 ,respecting the dialogue ,greek3 ,peri ,eu7chs1 see ,bernays1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 pp4 #abj-abb2 and ,rose1 ,arist4 ,pseudepigr4 pp4 #fg1 #fh4 ,footnote #cj3 ,omnia cesserunt1 eunucho consule1 monstra3 this is among the bitter lines of ,claudian1 too numerous to cite2 but they well deserve to be read in the original4 ,compare also1 about the ancient sentiment towards eunuchs1 ,herodotus1 viii4 #ajf2 ,xenophon1 ,cyropd4 viii4 #c4 #ae4 ,apellikon thought it worth while to compose a special treatise1 for the purpose of vindicating ,aristotle from the aspersions circulated in regard to his relations with ,hermeias4 ,aristokles speaks of the vindication as successful 7ap4 ,euseb4 ,p4 ,e4 xv4 #b74 ,taking these particulars into account1 we shall see that a charge thus sustained1 when preferred by a venerable priest1 during the prevalence of strong anti-,macedonian feeling1 against a notorious friend of ,antipater and ,nikanor1 was quite sufficient to alarm the prudence of the accused4 ,aristotle bowed to the storm 7if indeed he had not already left ,athens1 along with other philo-,macedonians7 and retired to ,chalkis 7in ,euboea71#ca then under garrison by ,antipater4 ,an accused person at ,athens had always the option of leaving the city1 at any time before the day of trial2 ,sokrates might have retired1 and obtained personal security in the same manner1 if he had chosen to do so4 ,aristotle must have been served1 of course1 with due notice3 and according to ,athenian custom1 the indictment would be brought into court in his absence1 as if he had been present2 various accusers1 among them ,demochares1#cb the nephew of ,demosthenes1 would probably speak in support of it2 and ,aristotle must been found guilty in his absence4 ,but there is no ground for believing that he intended to abandon ,athens1 and live at ,chalkis1 permanently2 the rather1 inasmuch as he seems to have left not only his school1 but his library1 at ,athens under the charge of ,theophrastus4 ,aristotle knew that the ,macedonian chiefs would not forego supremacy over ,greece without a struggle2 and1 being in personal correspondence with ,antipater himself1 he would receive direct assurance of this resolution1 if assurance were needed4 ,in a question of military force1 ,aristotle probably felt satisfied that ,macedonian arms must prevail2 after which the affairs of ,athens would be again administered1 at least in the same spirit1 as they had been before ,alexander's death1 if not with more complete servility4 ,he would then have returned thither to resume his school1 in competition with that of ,plato under ,xenokrates at the ,academy2 for he must have been well aware that the reputation of ,athens1 as central hearth of ,hellenic letters and philosophy1 could not be transferred to ,chalkis or to any other city4#cc ,footnote #ca3 ,that ,chalkis was among the ,grecian towns then occupied by a ,macedonian garrison is the statement of ,brandis 7,entwickelungen der ,griechischen ,philosophie1 i4 p4 #cia1 #ahfb74 ,though ,i find no direct authority for this statement1 ,i adopt it as probable in the highest degree4 ,footnote #cb3 ,aristokles 7ap4 ,eusebium ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b7 takes notice of the allegations of ,demochares against ,aristotle3 ,that letters of ,aristotle had been detected or captured 7,greek3 a7lnai71 giving information injurious to ,athens3 ,that ,aristotle had betrayed ,stageira to ,philip3 ,that when ,philip1 after the capture of ,olynthus1 was selling into slavery the ,olynthian prisoners1 ,aristotle was present at the auction 7,greek3 e7pi tou laphuroplei_/ou71 and pointed out to him which among the prisoners were men of the largest property4 ,we do not know upon what foundation of fact 7if upon any7 these allegations were advanced by a contemporary orator4 ,but they are curious1 as illustrating the view taken of ,aristotle by his enemies4 ,they must have been delivered as parts of one of the accusatory speeches on ,aristotle's trial par contumace3 for this was the earliest occasion on which ,aristotle's enemies had the opportunity of publicly proclaiming their antipathy against him1 and they would hardly omit to avail themselves of it4 ,the ,hierophant1 the principal accuser1 would be supported by other speakers following him2 just as ,meltus1 the accuser of ,sokrates1 was supported by ,anytus and ,lykon4 ,the ,greek3 i7stori_/ai of ,demochares were not composed until seventeen years after this epoch--certainly not earlier than #cjf ,b4,c4--sixteen years after the death of ,aristotle1 when his character was not prominently before the public4 ,nevertheless ,demochares may possibly have included these accusatory allegations against the philosopher in his ,greek3 i7stori_/ai1 as well as in his published speech4 ,his invectives against ,antipater1 and the friends of ,antipater1 were numerous and bitter3--,polybius4 xii4 #ac1 #i2 ,cicero1 ,brutus1 #hc2 compare ,democharis ,fragmenta1 in ,didot's ,fragm4 ,historicorum ,grcorum1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ddh4 ,philn1 who indicted ,sophokles 7under the ,greek3 graph parano_/mn7 for the law which the latter had proposed in #cjf ,b4,c4 against the philosophers at ,athens1 had been a friend of ,aristotle1 ,greek3 ,a7ristote_/lous gn_/rimos4 ,athenus1 xiii4 #faj4 ,footnote #cc3 ,we may apply here the same remark that ,dionysius makes about ,deinarchus as a speech-maker2 when ,deinarchus retired to ,chalkis1 no one would send to ,chalkis for a speech3 ,greek3 ,ou7 gar ei7s ,chalki_/da a7_/n tines e7_/pleon lo_/gn cha_/rin1 7 i7di_/n1 7 dmosi_/n2 ou7 gar te_/leon 7po_/roun ou7_/t lo_/gn4 ,dionys4 ,halic4 ,dinar4 p4 #fci4 ,this is what would probably have occurred1 when the ,lamian war was finished and the ,macedonian garrison installed at ,athens1 in ,sept4 #cbb ,b4,c4--had ,aristotle's life lasted longer4 ,but in or about that very period1 a little before the death of ,demosthenes1 he died at ,chalkis of illness2 having for some time been troubled with indigestion and weakness of stomach4#cd ,the assertion of ,eumlus and others that he took poison1 appears a mere fiction suggested by the analogy of ,sokrates4#ce ,one of his latest compositions was a defence of himself against the charge of impiety1 and against the allegations of his accusers 7as reported to him1 or published7 in support of it4 ,a sentence of this defence remains1#cf wherein he points out the inconsistency of his accusers in affirming that he intended to honour ,hermeias as an immortal1 while he had notoriously erected a tomb1 and had celebrated funeral ceremonies to him as a mortal4 ,and in a letter to ,antipater1 he said 7among other things7 that ,athens was a desirable residence1 but that the prevalence of sycophancy or false accusation was a sad drawback to its value2 moreover that he had retired to ,chalkis1 in order that the ,athenians might not have the opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy1 as they had already done once1 in the person of ,sokrates4#cg ,in the same or another letter to ,antipater1 he adverted to an honorific tribute which had been voted to him at ,delphi before the death of ,alexander1 but the vote for which had been since rescinded4 ,he intimated that this disappointment was not indifferent to him1 yet at the same time no serious annoyance4#ch ,footnote #cd3 ,censorinus1 ,de ,die ,natali--,mnage ad ,diogen4 ,laert4 v4 #af4 ,footnote #ce3 ,diogenes ,l4 however 7v4 #h7 gave credit to this story1 as we may see by his ,epigram4 ,footnote #cf3 ,athenus xv4 p4 #fif1 #fig4 ,probably this reply of ,aristotle 7though ,zeller1 p4 #cc1 declares it to be spurious1 in my judgment very gratuitously71 may have been suited to the words of the speech 7not preserved to us7 which it was intended to answer4 ,but the reply does not meet what ,i conceive to have been the real feeling in the minds of those who originated the charge4 ,the logical inconsistency which he points out did not appear an inconsistency to ,greeks generally4 ,aristotle had rendered to the deceased ,hermeias the same honours 7though less magnificent in degree7 as ,alexander to the deceased ,hephstion1 and the ,amphipolitans to the deceased ,brasidas 7,thucyd4 v4 #aa2 ,aristotel4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 v4 #g4 #a74 ,in both these cases a tomb was erected to the deceased1 implying mortality2 and permanent sacrifices were offered to him1 implying immortality3 yet these two proceedings did not appear to involve any logical contradiction1 in the eyes of the worshippers4 ,that which offended the ,athenians1 really1 in the case of ,aristotle1 was the worthlessness of ,hermeias1 to whom he rendered these prodigious honours--eunuch1 slave1 and despot2 an assemblage of what they considered mean attributes4 ,the solemn measure and character of a ,pan was disgraced by being applied to such a vile person4 ,footnote #cg3 ,ammonius1 ,vit4 ,aristotelis1 p4 #dh1 in ,buhle's ,aristot4 vol4 i42 ,mnage ad ,diog4 ,laert4 v4 #e1 with the passage from ,origen 7adv4 ,celsum7 there cited2 lian1 ,v4 ,h4 iii4 #cf4 ,we learn from ,diogenes that ,theophrastus was indicted for impiety by ,agnonides2 but such was the esteem in which ,theophrastus was held1 that the indictment utterly failed2 and ,agnonides was very near incurring the fine which every accuser had to pay1 if he did not obtain one-fifth of the suffrages of the ,dikasts 7,diog4 ,l4 v4 #cg74 ,now ,agnonides comes forward principally as the vehement accuser of ,phokion four years after the death of ,aristotle1 during the few months of democratical reaction brought about by the edicts and interference of ,polysperchon 7#cah ,b4,c47 after the death of ,antipater 7,history of ,greece1 ch4 xcvi4 p4 #dgg74 ,agnonides must have felt himself encouraged by what had happened five years before with ,aristotle1 to think that he would succeed in a similar charge against ,theophrastus4 ,but ,theophrastus was personally esteemed2 he was not intimately allied with ,antipater1 or directly protected by him2 moreover1 he had composed no hymn to a person like ,hermeias4 ,accordingly1 the indictment recoiled upon the accuser himself4 ,footnote #ch3 lian1 ,v4 ,h4 xiv4 #a4 ,greek3 ,a7ristote_/ls1 e7pei_/ tis au7tou a7phei_/leto tas psphisthei_/sas e7n ,delphois tima_/s1 e7piste_/lln pros ,a7nti_/patron peri tou_/tn1 phsi_/n--,u7per tn e7n ,delphois psphisthe_/ntn moi1 kai 7n a7ph_/rmai nun1 ou7_/ts e7_/ch 7s m_/te moi spho_/dra me_/lein au7tn1 m_/te moi mden me_/lein4 ,the statue of ,aristotle at ,athens was before the eyes of ,alexander of ,aphrodisias about ,a4,d4 #bjj4 ,see ,zumpt1 ,scholarchen zu ,athen1 p4 #gd4 ,in regard to the person and habits of ,aristotle1 we are informed that he had thin legs and small eyes2 that in speech he was somewhat lisping2 that his attire was elegant and even showy2 that his table was well-served--according to his enemies1 luxurious above the measure of philosophy4 ,his pleasing and persuasive manners are especially attested by ,antipater1 in a letter1 apparently of marked sympathy and esteem1 written shortly after the philosopher's death4#ci ,he was deeply attached to his wife ,pythias1 by whom he had a daughter who bore the same name4 ,his wife having died after some years1 he then re-married with a woman of ,stageira1 named ,herpyllis1 who bore him a son called ,nikomachus4 ,herpyllis lived with him until his death2 and the constant as well as reciprocal attachment between them is attested by his last will4#dj ,at the time of his death1 his daughter ,pythias had not yet attained marriageable age2 ,nikomachus was probably a child4 ,footnote #ci3 ,plutarch--,alkibiad4 et ,coriolan4 ,comp4 c4 #c2 ,aristeid4 cum ,caton4 maj4 ,comp4 c4 #b4 ,the accusation of luxury and dainty feeding was urged against him by his contemporary assailant ,kephisodorus 7,eusebius1 ,pr4 ,ev4 xv4 #b72 according to some statements1 by ,plato also1 lian1 ,v4 ,h4 iii4 #ai4 ,contrast the epigram of the contemporary poet ,theokritus of ,chios1 who censures ,aristotle ,greek3 dia tn a7krat gastros phu_/sin1 with the satirical drama of the poet ,lykophron 7ap4 ,athenum1 ii4 p4 #ee71 in which he derided the suppers of philosophers1 for their coarse and unattractive food3 compare the verses of ,antiphanes1 ap4 ,athen4 iii4 p4 #ih ,f42 and ,diog4 ,l4 vii4 #bg2 ,timus ap4 ,athenum1 viii4 #cdb4 ,the lines of ,antiphanes ap4 ,athen4 iv4 #acdf1 seem to apply to ,aristotle1 notwithstanding ,meineke's remarks1 p4 #ei4 ,footnote #dj3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #a1 #ac2 ,aristokles ap4 ,euseb4 ,pr4 ,ev4 xv4 #b4 ,the will or testament of the philosopher is preserved4#da ,its first words constitute ,antipater his general executor in the most comprehensive terms1#db words well calculated to ensure that his directions should be really carried into effect2 since not only was ,antipater now the supreme potentate1 but ,nikanor1 the chief beneficiary under the will1 was in his service and dependent on his orders4 ,aristotle then proceeds to declare that ,nikanor shall become his son-in-law1 by marriage with his daughter ,pythias as soon as she shall attain suitable age2 also1 his general heir1 subject to certain particular bequests and directions1 and the guardian of his infant son ,nikomachus4 ,nikanor being at that time on service1 and perhaps in ,asia1 ,aristotle directs that four friends 7named ,aristomenes1 ,timarchus1 ,hipparchus1 ,diotels7 shall take provisional care of ,herpyllis1 his two children1 and his effects1 until ,nikanor can appear and act3 ,theophrastus is to be conjoined with these four if he chooses1 and if circumstances permit him4#dc ,the daughter ,pythias1 when she attains suitable age1 is to become the wife of ,nikanor1 who will take the best care both of her and her son ,nikomachus1 being in the joint relation of father and brother to them4#dd ,if ,pythias shall die1 either before the marriage or after it1 but without leaving offspring1 ,nikanor shall have discretion to make such arrangements as may be honourable both for himself and for the testator respecting ,nikomachus and the estate generally4 ,in case of the death of ,nikanor himself1 either before the marriage or without offspring1 any directions given by him shall be observed2 but ,theophrastus shall be entitled1 if he chooses1 to become the husband of ,pythias1 and if ,theophrastus does not choose1 then the executors along with ,antipater shall determine what they think best both for her and for ,nikomachus4#de ,the will then proceeds as follows3--,the executors 7here ,antipater is not called in to co-operate7 with ,nikanor1 in faithful memory of me and of the steady affection of ,herpyllis towards me1 shall take good care of her in every way1 but especially if she desires to be married1 in giving her away to one not unworthy of me4 ,they shall assign to her1 besides what she has already received1 a talent of silver1 and three female slaves chosen by herself1 out of the property1 together with the young girl and the ,pyrrhan slave now attached to her person4 ,if she prefers to reside at ,chalkis1 she may occupy the lodging near the garden2 if at ,stageira1 she may live at my paternal house4 ,whichever of the two she may prefer1 the executors shall provide it with all such articles of furniture as they deem sufficient for her comfort and dignity4#df ,footnote #da3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #aa4 ,greek3 ,e7_/stai men eu72 e7an de_/ ti sumbai_/n1 ta_/de die_/theto ,a7ristote_/ls2 e7pi_/tropon men ei7nai pa_/ntn kai dia pantos ,a7nti_/patron1 c4 ,the testament of ,aristotle was known to ,hermippus 7,athenus1 xiii4 p4 #ehi7 about a century later than ,aristotle1 and the most ancient known authority respecting the facts of his life4 ,stahr 7,aristotelia1 vol4 i4 #aei7 and ,brandis 7,arist4 p4 #fb7 suppose that what ,diogenes gives is only an extract from the will2 since nothing is said about the library1 and ,aristotle would not omit to direct what should be done with a library which he so much valued4 ,but to this ,i reply1 that there was no necessity for his making any provision about the library2 he had left it at ,athens along with his school1 in the care of ,theophrastus4 ,he wished it to remain there1 and probably considered it as an appendage to the school2 and it naturally would remain there1 if he said nothing about it in his testament4 ,we must remember 7as ,i have already intimated7 that when ,aristotle left ,athens1 he only contemplated being absent for a time2 and intended to come back and resume his school1 when ,macedonian supremacy should be re-established4 ,footnote #db3 ,pausanias 7vi4 #d1 #e7 describes a statue of ,aristotle which he saw at ,olympia3 the fact by which ,aristotle was best known both to him and to the guides1 seems to have been the friendship first of ,alexander1 next of ,antipater4 ,footnote #dc3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ab4 ,greek3 e7_/s d' a7n ,nika_/nr katala_/b1 e7pimeleisthai ,a7ristome_/nn1 ,ti_/marchon1 ,i7_/pparchon1 ,diote_/ln1 ,theo_/phraston1 e7an bou_/ltai kai e7nde_/chtai au7t1 tn te paidi_/n kai ,e7rpulli_/dos kai tn kataleleimme_/nn4 ,the four persons here named were probably present at ,chalkis1 so that ,aristotle could count upon them2 but at the time when this will was made1 ,theophrastus was at ,athens1 conducting the ,aristotelian school2 and in the critical condition of ,grecian politics1 there was room for doubt how far he could securely or prudently act in this matter4 ,the words of ,diogenes--,greek3 e7_/s d' a7n ,nika_/nr katala_/b--are rendered in the improved translation of the edition by ,firmin ,didot1 quoad vero ,nicanor adolescat1 c4 ,i cannot think this a correct understanding1 either of the words or of the fact4 ,nikanor was not a minor under age1 but an officer on active service4 ,the translation given by ,mnage appears to me more true--tantisper dum redux sit ,nicanor3 7ad4 ,d4 ,l4 v4 #ab47 ,footnote #dd3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ab4 ,greek3 7s kai patr 7n kai a7delpho_/s4 ,footnote #de3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ac4 ,in following the phraseology of this testament1 we remark that when ,aristotle makes allusion to these inauspicious possibilities--the death of ,nikanor or of ,pythias1 he annexes to them a deprecatory phrase3 ,greek3 e7an de t paidi sumb--o7 m ge_/noito ou7de e7_/stai1 c4 ,footnote #df3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ad4 ,greek3 kai e7an men e7n ,chalki_/di bou_/ltai oi7kein1 ton xenna ton pros t k_/p2 e7an de e7n ,stagei_/rois1 tn patr_/an oi7ki_/an4 ,the lodging near the garden may probably have been the residence occupied by ,aristotle himself1 during his temporary residence at ,chalkis4 ,the mention of his paternal house1 which he still possessed at ,stageira1 seems to imply that ,philip1 when he destroyed that town1 respected the house therein which had belonged to his father's physician4 ,we find in the will of ,theophrastus 7,diog4 ,l4 v4 #eb7 mention made of a property 7,greek3 chri_/on7 at ,stageira belonging to ,theophrastus1 which he bequeaths to ,kallinus4 ,probably this is the same property which had once belonged to ,aristotle2 for ,i do not see how else ,theophrastus 7who was a native of ,eresus in ,lesbos7 could have become possessed of property at ,stageira4 ,aristotle proceeds to direct that ,nikanor shall make comfortable provision for several persons mentioned by name1 male and female1 most of them slaves1 but one 7,myrmex71 seemingly1 a free boarder or pupil1 whose property he had undertaken to manage4 ,two or three of these slaves are ordered to be liberated1 and to receive presents1 as soon as his daughter ,pythias shall be married4 ,he strictly enjoins that not one of the youthful slaves who attended him shall be sold4 ,they are to be brought up and kept in employment2 when of mature age1 they are to be liberated according as they shew themselves worthy4#dg ,footnote #dg3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ae4 ,greek3 m plein de tn pai_/dn mde_/na tn e7me therapeuo_/ntn1 9999a7lla chrsthai au7tois2 o7_/tan d' e7n 7liki_/a ge_/nntai1 e7leuthe_/rous a7pheinai kat' a7xi_/an4 ,aristotle had in his lifetime ordered1 from a sculptor named ,gryllion1 busts of ,nikanor and of the mother of ,nikanor2 he intended farther to order from the same sculptor a bust of ,proxenus1 ,nikanor's father4 ,nikanor is instructed by the will to complete these orders1 and to dedicate the busts properly when brought in4 ,a bust of the mother of ,aristotle is to be dedicated to ,demeter at ,nemea1 or in any other place which ,nikanor may prefer2 another bust of ,arimnstus 7brother of ,aristotle7 is to be dedicated as a memento of the same1 since he has died childless4#dh ,footnote #dh3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #ae4 ,during some past danger of ,nikanor 7we do not know what7 ,aristotle had made a vow of four marble animal figures1 in case the danger were averted1 to ,zeus the ,preserver and ,athn the ,preserver4 ,nikanor is directed to fulfil this vow and to dedicate the figures in ,stageira4#di ,footnote #di3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #af4 ,greek3 a7natheinai de kai ,nika_/nora sthe_/nta1 7n eu7chn u7per au7tou u7xa_/mn1 za li_/thina tetrap_/ch ,dii ,s_/tri kai ,a7th_/na ,stei_/ra e7n ,stagei_/rois4 ,here is a vow1 made by ,aristotle to the gods under some unknown previous emergency1 which he orders his executor to fulfil4 ,i presume that the last words of direction given by ,sokrates before his death to ,kriton were of the same nature3 ,we owe a cock to sculapius3 pay the debt1 and do not fail4 7,see my preceding work1 ,plato and the other ,companions of ,sokrates1 vol4 ii4 ch4 #bc1 p4 #aie47 ,lastly1 wherever ,aristotle is buried1 the bones of his deceased wife ,pythias are to be collected and brought to the same spot1 as she had commanded during her lifetime4#ej ,footnote #ej3 ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #af4 ,this testament is interesting1 as it illustrates the personal circumstances and sentiments of the philosopher1 evincing an affectionate forethought and solicitude for those who were in domestic relations with him4 ,as far as we can judge1 the establishment and property which he left must have been an ample one4#ea ,how the provisions of the will were executed1 or what became of most persons named in it1 we do not know1 except that ,pythias the daughter of ,aristotle was married three times3 first1 to ,nikanor 7according to the will72 secondly1 to ,prokls1 descendant of ,demaratus 7the king of ,sparta formerly banished to ,asia7 by whom she had two sons1 ,prokls and ,demaratus1 afterwards pupils in the school of ,theophrastus2 thirdly1 to a physician named ,metrodrus1 by whom she had a son named ,aristotle4#eb ,footnote #ea3 ,the elder ,pliny 7,h4 ,n4 xxxv4 #ab1 #df2 compare also ,diogen4 ,l4 v4 #a1 #af7 mentions that in the sale of ,aristotle's effects by his heirs there were included seventy dishes or pans 7patinas1 earthenware74 ,pliny considered this as a mark of luxurious living2 since 7according to ,fenestella7 tripatinium appellabatur summam coenarum lautitia4 ,footnote #eb3 ,sextus ,empiric4 adv4 ,mathematicos1 i4 p4 #bga ,f4 sect4 #beh4 ,about the banishment1 or rather voluntary exile1 of ,demaratus to ,asia1 in the reign of ,darius ,i4 king of ,persia1 see ,herodot4 vi4 #gj4 ,some towns and lands were assigned to him in olis1 where ,xenophon found his descendant ,prokles settled1 after the conclusion of the ,cyreian expedition 7,xen4 ,anab4 vii4 #h1 #ag74 ,respecting this younger ,aristotle--son of ,metrodorus and grandson of the great philosopher--mention is made in the testament of ,theophrastus1 and directions are given for promoting his improvement in philosophy 7,diog4 ,la4 v4 #ec74 ,nikomachus was brought up chiefly by ,theophrastus1 but perished young in battle 7,aristokles ap4 ,euseb4 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b74 ,there existed in antiquity several works1 partly by contemporaries like the ,megaric ,eubulides1 partly by subsequent ,platonists1 in which ,aristotle was reproached with ingratitude to ,plato1#ec servility to the ,macedonian power1 love of costly display and indulgences1 c4 ,what proportion of truth may lie at the bottom of these charges we do not know enough to determine confidently2 but we know that he had many enemies1 philosophical as well as political2#ed and controversy on those grounds 7then as now7 was rarely kept free from personal slander and invective4 ,footnote #ec3 ,euseb4 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b2 ,diog4 ,la4 ii4 #aji4 ,footnote #ed3 ,the remarkable passage of ,themistius 7,orat4 xxiii4 p4 #cdf7 attests the number and vehemence of these opponents4 ,greek3 ,kphisodrous te kai ,eu7bouli_/das kai ,timai_/ous kai ,dikaia_/rchous1 kai stra_/ton o7_/lon tn e7pitheme_/nn ,a7ristote_/lei t ,stageiri_/t1 po_/t' a7n katale_/xaimi eu7pets1 7n kai lo_/goi e7xiknountai ei7s to_/nde ton chro_/non1 diatrountes tn a7pe_/chtheian kai philoneiki_/an8 ,the accusation of ingratitude or unbecoming behaviour to ,plato is no way proved by any evidence now remaining4 ,it seems to have been suggested to the ,platonists mainly1 if not wholly1 by the direct rivalry of ,aristotle in setting up a second philosophical school at ,athens1 alongside of the ,academy2 by his independent1 self-working1 philosophical speculation2 and by the often-repeated opposition which he made to some capital doctrines of ,plato1 especially to the so-called ,platonic ,ideas4#ee ,such opposition was indeed expressed1 as far as we can judge1 in terms of respectful courtesy1 and sometimes even of affectionate regret2 examples of which we shall have to notice in going through the ,aristotelian writings4 ,yet some ,platonists seem to have thought that direct attack on the master's doctrines was undutiful and ungrateful in the pupil1 however unexceptionable the language might be4 ,they also thought1 probably1 that the critic misrepresented what he sought to refute4 ,whether ,aristotle really believed that he had superior claims to be made ,scholarch of the ,platonic school at the death of ,plato in #cdg ,b4,c41 or at the death of ,speusippus in #cci ,b4,c41 is a point which we can neither affirm nor deny4 ,but we can easily understand that the act of setting up a new philosophical school at ,athens1 though perfectly fair and admissible on his part1 was a hostile competition sure both to damage and offend the pre-established school1 and likely enough to be resented with unbecoming asperity4 ,ingratitude towards the great common master ,plato1 with arrogant claims of superiority over fellow-pupils1 were the allegations which this resentment would suggest1 and which many ,platonists in the ,academy would not scruple to advance against their macedonizing rival at the ,lykeium4 ,footnote #ee3 ,this is what lies at the bottom of the charges advanced by ,eubulides1 probably derived from the ,platonists1 ,greek3 kai ,eu7bouli_/ds prod_/ls e7n t kat' au7tou bibli_/ pseu_/detai1 pha_/skn1 teleutnti ,pla_/tni m paragene_/sphai1 ta_/ te bi_/blia au7tou diaphtheirai 7,aristokles ap4 ,euseb4 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #b74 ,there can be no possible basis for this last charge--destroying or corrupting the books of ,plato--except that ,aristotle had sharply criticized them1 and was supposed to have mis-stated or unfairly discredited them4 ,the frequently recurring protest of ,aristotle against the ,platonic doctrine of ,ideas may be read now in the ,analytica1 ,topica1 ,metaphysica1 and ,ethica ,nikomachea1 but was introduced even in the lost ,dialogues4 ,see ,plutarch adv4 ,kolten1 c4 #ad2 and ,proklus adv4 ,joann4 ,philoponum ap4 ,bernays1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 not4 #bb1 p4 #aea4 ,such allegations moreover would find easy credence from other men of letters1 whose enmity ,aristotle had incurred1 and to a certain extent even provoked--,isokrates and his numerous disciples4 ,this celebrated rhetor was an elderly man at the zenith of his glory and influence1 during those earlier years which ,aristotle passed at ,athens before the decease of ,plato4 ,the ,isokratean school was then the first in ,greece1 frequented by the most promising pupils from cities near and far1 perhaps even by ,aristotle himself4 ,the political views and handling1 as well as the rhetorical style of which the master set the example1 found many imitators4 ,illustrious statesmen1 speakers1 and writers traced their improvement to this teaching4 ,so many of the pupils1 indeed1 acquired celebrity--among them ,theodekts1 ,theopompus1 ,ephorus1 ,naukrates1 ,philiskus1 ,kephisodrus1 and others--that ,hermippus#ef thought it worth his while to draw up a catalogue of them3 many must have been persons of opulent family1 highly valuing the benefit received from ,isokrates1 since each of them was required to pay to him a fee of #ajjj drachm4#eg ,during the first sojourn of ,aristotle in ,athens 7#cfb-cdg ,b4,c471 while he was still attached to and receiving instruction from ,plato1 he appears to have devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy1 and even to have given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric4 ,he thus entered into rivalry with ,isokrates1 for whom1 as a teacher and author1 he contracted dislike or contempt4 ,footnote #ef3 ,athenus x4 p4 #dea2 ,dionys4 ,hal41 ,de ,iso ,judic4 pp4 #ehh1 #fbe4 ,greek3 ou7de gar o7 tous ,i7sokra_/tous mathtas a7nagra_/phas ,e7_/rmippos1 a7kribs e7n tois a7_/llois geno_/menos1 u7per toude tou r7_/toros ou7den ei7_/rken1 e7_/x duoin tou_/toin1 o7_/ti di_/kouse men ,i7sokra_/tous1 kathg_/sato de ,dmosthe_/nous1 sunege_/neto de tois a7ri_/stois tn philoso_/phn4 ,see ,hermippi ,fragmenta ed4 ,lozinski1 ,bonn1 #ahcb1 pp4 #db-dc4 ,cicero1 ,de ,oratore1 ii4 #bb1 #id4 ,ecce tibi exortus est ,isocrates1 magister istorum omnium1 cujus ludo1 tanquam ex equo ,trojano1 meri principes exierunt3 sed eorum partim in pomp1 partim in acie1 illustres esse voluerunt4 ,atqui et illi--,theopompi1 ,ephori1 ,philiski1 ,naucrat1 multique alii--ingeniis differunt1 c4 ,compare also ,cicero1 ,brutus1 #h1 #cb2 and ,dionys4 ,hal41 ,de ,isocrate ,judicium1 p4 #ecf4 ,greek3 e7piphane_/statos de geno_/menos tn kata ton aou7ton a7kmasa_/ntn chro_/non1 kai tous krati_/stous tn e7n ,a7th_/nsi_/ te kai e7n t a7_/ll ,e7lla_/di ne_/n paideu_/sas2 7n oi7 men e7n tois dikanikois e7ge_/nonto a7_/ristoi lo_/gois1 oi7 d' e7n t politeu_/esthai kai ta koina pra_/ttein dinegkan1 kai a7_/lloi de tas koinas tn e7ll_/nn te kai barba_/rn pra_/xeis a7ne_/grapsan1 c4 ,footnote #eg3 ,see ,demosthenes1 adv4 ,lakritum1 pp4 #ibh1 #ich4 ,lakritus was a citizen of ,phaslis--,greek3 me_/ga pragma1 ,i7sokra_/tous matht_/s4 ,to have gone through a course of teaching from ,isokrates1 was evidently considered as a distinction of some importance4 ,the composition of ,isokrates was extremely elegant3 his structure of sentences was elaborate even to excess1 his arrangement of words rhythmical1 his phrases nicely balanced in antithetical equipoise1 like those of his master ,gorgias2 the recital of his discourses proved highly captivating to the ear4#eh ,moreover1 he had composed a book of rhetorical precepts known and esteemed by ,cicero and ,quintilian4 ,besides such technical excellence1 ,isokrates strove to attain1 and to a certain extent actually attained1 a higher order of merit4 ,he familiarized his pupils with thoughts and arguments of lofty bearing and comprehensive interest2 not assisting them to gain victory either in any real issue tried before the ,dikasts1 or in any express motion about to be voted on by the public assembly1 but predisposing their minds to prize above all things the great ,pan-hellenic aggregate--its independence in regard to external force1 and internal harmony among its constituent cities1 with a reasonable recognition of presidential authority1 equitably divided between ,athens and ,sparta1 and exercised with moderation by both4 ,he inculcated sober habits and deference to legal authority on the part of the democrats of ,athens2 he impressed upon princes1 like ,philip and ,nikokles1 the importance of just and mild bearing towards subjects4#ei ,such is the general strain of the discourses which we now possess from ,isokrates2 though he appears to have adopted it only in middle life1 having begun at first in the more usual track of the logographer--composing speeches to be delivered before the ,dikastery by actual plaintiffs or defendants1#fj and acquiring thus both reputation and profit4 ,his reputation as a teacher was not only maintained but even increased when he altered his style2 and he made himself peculiarly attractive to foreign pupils who desired to acquire a command of graceful expressions1 without special reference to the ,athenian ,assembly and ,dikastery4 ,but his new style being midway between ,demosthenes and ,plato--between the practical advocate and politician on one side1 and the generalizing or speculative philosopher on the other--he incurred as a semi-philosopher1 professing to have discovered the juste milieu1 more or less of disparagement from both extremes2#fa and ,aristotle1 while yet a young man in the ,platonic school1 raised an ardent controversy against his works1 on the ground both of composition and teaching4 ,though the whole controversy is now lost1 there is good ground for believing that ,aristotle must have displayed no small acrimony4 ,he appears to have impugned the ,isokratean discourses1 partly as containing improper dogmas1 partly as specimens of mere unimpressive elegance1 intended for show1 pomp1 and immediate admiration from the hearer--ad implendas aures--but destitute both of comprehensive theory and of applicability to any useful purpose4#fb ,kephisodrus1 an intimate friend and pupil of ,isokrates1 defended him in an express reply1 attacking both ,aristotle the scholar and ,plato the master4 ,this reply was in four books1 and ,dionysius characterizes it by an epithet of the highest praise4#fc ,footnote #eh3 ,dionysius1 while admiring ,isocrates1 complains of him1 and complains still more of his imitators1 as somewhat monotonous1 wanting in flexibility and variety 7,de ,compos4 ,verborum1 p4 #acd74 ,yet he pronounces ,isokrates and ,lysias to be more natural1 shewing less of craft and art than ,isus and ,demosthenes 7,de ,iso ,judicium1 p4 #eib74 ,isokrates ,greek3 ton o7_/gkon ts poitiks kataskeus e7pi lo_/gous 7_/gage philoso_/phous1 zl_/sas tous peri ,forgi_/an4 7,dionys4 ,hal4 ad ,pompeium de ,platone1 p4 #gfd2 also ,de ,iso ,judicium1 p4 #eib2 besides the special chapter1 p4 #ecd1 seq41 which he has devoted to ,isokrates47 ,cicero1 ,de ,oratore1 iii4 #dd1 #agc3 ,idque princeps ,isocrates instituisse fertur1 ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem delectationis atque aurium caus1 quemadmodum scribit discipulus ejus ,naucrates1 numeris adstringeret4 ,compare ,cicero1 ,orator4 #eb1 #age1 #agf4 ,the reference to ,naucrates 7whose works have not been preserved1 though ,dionysius commends his ,greek3 ,lo_/gos ,e7pita_/phios1 ,ars4 ,rhet4 p4 #bei7 is interesting1 as it shews what was said of ,isokrates by his own disciples4 ,cicero says of the doctrines in his own dialogue ,de ,oratore 7,epist4 ad ,famil4 i4 #i1 #bc71 ,abhorrent a communibus prceptis1 et omnem antiquorum1 et ,aristoteleam et ,isocrateam1 rationem oratoriam complectuntur4 ,about the ,greek3 ,te_/chn of ,isokrates1 see ,spengel1 ,greek3 ,sunagg ,technn 7,munich71 pp4 #aee-agj4 ,footnote #ei3 ,dionysius ,hal4 dwells emphatically on the lofty morality inculcated in the discourses of ,isokrates1 and recommends them as most improving study to all politicians 7,de ,isocrate ,judic4 pp4 #ecf1 #edd1 #eee1 seq47--more improving than the writers purely theoretical1 among whom he probably numbered ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,footnote #fj3 ,dionysius ,hal4 ,de ,isocrate ,judicium1 pp4 #egf1 #egg1 ,reiske3 ,greek3 de_/smas pa_/nu pollas dikanikn lo_/gn ,i7sokratei_/n periphe_/resthai_/ phsin u7po tn bibliopln ,a7ristote_/ls4 ,it appears that ,aphareus1 the adopted son of ,isokrates1 denied that ,isokrates had ever written any judicial orations2 while ,kephisodrus1 the disciple of ,isokrates1 in his reply to ,aristotle's accusations1 admitted that ,isokrates had composed a few1 but only a few4 ,dionysius accepts the allegation of ,kephisodrus and discredits that of ,aristotle3 ,i1 for my part1 believe the allegation of ,aristotle1 upon a matter of fact which he had the means of knowing4 ,cicero also affirms 7,brutus1 xii4 #df-dh71 on the authority of ,aristotle1 that ,isokrates distinguished himself at first as a composer of speeches intended to be delivered by actual pleaders in the ,dikastery or ,ekklesia2 and that he afterwards altered his style4 ,and this is what ,aristotle says 7respecting ,isokrates7 in ,rhetoric4 i4 #i1 #acfh1 a4 #bj1 ,greek3 o7_/per ,i7sokra_/ts e7poi_/ei dia tn sun_/theian tou dikologein1 where ,bekker has altered the substantive to ,greek3 tn a7sun_/theian2 in my judgment1 not wisely4 ,i do not perceive the meaning or pertinence of ,greek3 a7sun_/theian in that sentence4 ,footnote #fa3 ,see ,plato1 ,euthydemus1 p4 #cje2 also ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 i4 ch4 xix4 pp4 #eeg-efc4 ,it is exactly this juste milieu which ,dionysius ,hal4 extols as the most worthy of being followed1 as being ,greek3 7 a7lthin philosophi_/a4 ,de ,isocrate ,jud4 pp4 #edc1 #eeh4 ,footnote #fb3 ,cicero1 ,de ,oratore1 iii4 #ce1 #ada4 ,itaque ipse ,aristoteles quum florere ,isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret1 quod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset1 mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplin su1 versumque quendam ,philoctet paulo secus dixit4 ,ille enim 'turpe sibi ait esse tacere1 quum barbaros'--hic autem1 'quum ,isocratem'--'pateretur dicere' ,see 9999,quintilian1 ,inst4 ,or4 iv4 #b1 #aif2 and ,cicero1 ,orator4 #ai1 #fb3 ,aristoteles ,isocratem ipsum lacessivit4 ,also1 ib4 #ea1 #agb3 ,omitto ,isocratem discipulosque ejus ,ephorum et ,naucratem2 quanquam orationis faciend et ornand auctores locupletissimi summi ipsi oratores esse debebant4 ,sed quis omnium doctior1 quis acutior1 quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel judicandis acrior ,aristotele fuit8 ,quis porro ,isocrati adversatus est infensius8 ,that ,aristotle was the first to assail ,isokrates1 and that ,kephisodrus wrote only in reply1 is expressly stated by ,numenius1 ap4 ,euseb4 ,pr4 ,ev4 xiv4 #f3 ,greek3 o7 ,kphiso_/dros1 e7peid u7p' ,a7ristote_/lous ballo_/menon e7aut ton dida_/skalon ,i7sokra_/tn e7_/ra1 c4 ,quintilian also says1 ,inst4 ,or4 iii4 #a1 p4 #abf3 ,nam et ,isocratis prstantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere2 eoque jam seniore 7octavum enim et nonagesimum implevit annum7 pomeridianis scholis ,aristoteles prcipere artem oratoriam coepit2 noto quidem illo 7ut traditur7 versu ex ,philoctet frequenter usus3 ,greek3 ,ai7schron sipan me_/n1 kai ,i7sokra_/tn e7an le_/gein4 ,diogenes ,la4 7v4 #c7 maintains that ,aristotle turned the parody not against ,isokrates1 but against ,xenokrates3 ,greek3 ,ai7schron sipan1 ,xenokra_/tn d' e7an le_/gein4 ,but the authority of ,cicero and ,quintilian is decidedly preferable4 ,when we recollect that the parody was employed by a young man1 as yet little known1 against a teacher advanced in age1 and greatly frequented as well as admired by pupils1 it will appear sufficiently offensive4 ,moreover1 it does not seem at all pertinent2 for the defects of ,isokrates1 however great they may have been1 were not those of analogy with ,greek3 ba_/rbaroi1 but the direct reverse4 ,dionysius must have been forcibly struck with the bitter animus displayed by ,aristotle against ,isokrates1 when he makes it a reason for rejecting the explicit averment of ,aristotle as to a matter of fact3 ,greek3 kai ou7_/t' ,a7ristote_/lei pei_/thomai r7upai_/nein ton a7_/ndra boulome_/n 7,de ,isocr4 ,jud4 p4 #egg74 ,mr4 ,cope1 in his ,introduction to ,aristotle's ,rhetoric 7p4 #ci1 seq471 gives a just representation of the probable relations between ,aristotle and ,isokrates2 though ,i do not concur in the unfavourable opinion which he expresses about the malignant influence exercised by ,isokrates upon education in general 7p4 #dj74 ,mr4 ,cope at the same time remarks1 that ,aristotle in the ,rhetorica draws a greater number of illustrations of excellences of style from ,isokrates than from any other author 7p4 #da72 and he adds1 very truly1 that the absence of any evidence of ill feeling towards ,isokrates in ,aristotle's later work1 and the existence of such ill feeling as an actual fact at an earlier period1 are perfectly reconcileable in themselves 7p4 #db74 ,that the ,rhetorica of ,aristotle which we now possess is a work of his later age1 certainly published1 perhaps composed1 during his second residence at ,athens1 ,i hold with ,mr4 ,cope and other antecedent critics4 ,footnote #fc3 ,athenus1 ii4 #fj1 iii4 #abb2 ,euseb4 ,pr4 ,e4 xiv4 #f2 ,dionys4 ,h4 de ,isocrate ,judic4 p4 #egg3 ,greek3 i7kanon 7gsa_/menos ei7nai ts a7lthei_/as bebaitn ton ,a7thnaion ,kphiso_/dron1 o7s kai sunebi_/sen ,i7sokra_/tei1 kai gnsi_/tatos a7kousts e7ge_/neto1 kai tn a7pologi_/an tn pa_/nu thaumastn e7n tais pros ,a7ristote_/l a7ntigraphais e7poi_/sato1 ,c4 ,kephisodrus1 in this defence1 contended that you might pick out1 even from the very best poets and sophists1 ,greek3 e7n 7 du_/o ponrs ei7rme_/na4 ,this implies that ,aristotle1 in attacking ,isokrates1 had cited various extracts which he denounced as exceptionable4 ,these polemics of ,aristotle were begun during his first residence at ,athens1 prior to #cdg ,b4,c41 the year of ,plato's decease1 and at the time when he was still accounted a member of the ,platonic school4 ,they exemplify the rivalry between that school and the ,isokratean1 which were then the two competing places of education at ,athens3 and we learn that ,aristotle1 at that time only a half-fledged ,platonist1 opened on his own account not a new philosophical school in competition with ,plato1 as some state1 but a new rhetorical school in opposition to ,isokrates4#fc ,but the case was different at the latter epoch1 #cce ,b4,c41 when ,aristotle came to reside at ,athens for the second time4 ,isokrates was then dead1 leaving no successor1 so that his rhetorical school expired with him4 ,aristotle preferred philosophy to rhetoric3 he was no longer trammelled by the living presence and authority of ,plato4 ,the ,platonic school at the ,academy stood at that time alone1 under ,xenokrates1 who1 though an earnest and dignified philosopher1 was deficient in grace and in persuasiveness1 and had been criticized for this defect even by ,plato himself4 ,aristotle possessed those gifts in large measure1 as we know from the testimony of ,antipater4 ,by these circumstances1 coupled with his own established reputation and well-grounded self-esteem1 he was encouraged to commence a new philosophical school2 a school1 in which philosophy formed the express subject of the morning lecture1 while rhetoric was included as one among the subjects of more varied and popular instruction given in the afternoon4#fd ,during the twelve ensuing years1 ,aristotle's rivalry was mainly against the ,platonists or ,xenokrateans at the ,academy2 embittered on both sides by acrimonious feelings1 which these expressed by complaining of his ingratitude and unfairness towards the common master1 ,plato4 ,footnote #fd3 ,that ,aristotle had a school at ,athens before the death of ,plato we may see by what ,strabo 7xiii4 #faj7 says about ,hermeias3 ,greek3 geno_/menos d' ,a7th_/nsin 7kroa_/sato kai ,pla_/tnos kai ,a7ristote_/lous4 ,compare ,cicero1 ,orator4 #df2 also ,michelet1 ,essai sur la ,mtaphys4 d',aristote1 p4 #bbg4 ,the statement that ,aristotle during ,plato's lifetime tried to set up a rival school against him1 is repeated by all the biographers1 who do not however believe it to be true1 though they cite ,aristoxenus as its warrant4 ,i conceive that they have mistaken what ,aristoxenus said2 and that they have confounded the school which ,aristotle first set up as a rhetor1 against ,isokrates1 with that which he afterwards set up as a philosopher1 against ,xenokrates4 ,footnote #fe3 ,aulus ,gellius1 ,n4 ,a4 xx4 #e4 ,quintilian 7see note on p4 #ce7 puts the rhetorical pomeridian schol within the lifetime of ,isokrates2 but ,aristotle did not then lecture on philosophy in the morning4 ,there were thus1 at ,athens1 three distinct parties inspired with unfriendly sentiment towards ,aristotle3 first1 the ,isokrateans2 afterwards1 the ,platonists2 along with both1 the anti-,macedonian politicians4 ,hence we can account for what ,themistius entitles the army of assailants 7,greek3 stra_/ton o7_/lon7 that fastened upon him1 for the unfavourable colouring with which his domestic circumstances are presented1 and for the necessity under which he lay of ,macedonian protection2 so that when such protection was nullified1 giving place to a reactionary fervour1 his residence at ,athens became both disagreeable and insecure4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,aristotelian ,,canon4 ,in the fourth and fifth chapters of my work on ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,i investigated the question of the ,platonic ,canon1 and attempted to determine1 upon the best grounds open to us1 the question1 ,what are the real works of ,plato8 ,i now propose to discuss the like question respecting ,aristotle4 ,but the premisses for such a discussion are much less simple in regard to ,aristotle than in regard to ,plato4 ,as far as the testimony of antiquity goes1 we learn that the ,canon of ,thrasyllus1 dating at least from the time of the ,byzantine ,aristophanes1 and probably from an earlier time1 was believed by all readers to contain the authentic works of ,plato and none others2 an assemblage of dialogues1 some unfinished1 but each undivided and unbroken4 ,the only exception to unanimity in regard to the ,platonic ,canon1 applies to ten dialogues1 which were received by some 7we do not know by how many1 or by whom7 as ,platonic1 but which1 as ,diogenes informs us1 were rejected by agreement of the most known and competent critics4 ,this is as near to unanimity as can be expected4 ,the doubts1 now so multiplied1 respecting the authenticity of various dialogues included in the ,canon of ,thrasyllus1 have all originated with modern scholars since the beginning of the present century1 or at least since the earlier compositions of ,wyttenbach4 ,it was my task to appreciate the value of those doubts2 and1 in declining to be guided by them1 ,i was at least able to consider myself as adhering to the views of all known ancient critics4 ,very different is the case when we attempt to frame an ,aristotelian ,canon1 comprising all the works of ,aristotle and none others4 ,we find the problem far more complicated1 and the matters of evidence at once more defective1 more uncertain1 and more contradictory4 ,the different works now remaining1 and published in the ,berlin edition of ,aristotle1 are forty-six in number4 ,but1 among these1 several were disallowed or suspected even by some ancient critics1 while modern critics have extended the like judgment yet farther4 ,of several others again1 the component sections 7either the books1 in our present phraseology1 or portions thereof7 appear to have existed once as detached rolls1 to have become disjointed or even to have parted company1 and to have been re-arranged or put together into aggregates1 according to the judgment of critics and librarians4 ,examples of such doubtful aggregates1 or doubtful arrangements1 will appear when we review the separate ,aristotelian compositions 7the ,metaphysica1 ,politica1 c474 ,it is1 however1 by one or more of these forty-six titles that ,aristotle is known to modern students1 and was known to medival students4 ,but the case was very different with ancient literati1 such as ,eratosthenes1 ,polybius1 ,cicero1 ,strabo1 ,plutarch1 c41 down to the time of ,alexander of ,aphrodisias1 ,athenus1 ,diogenes ,laertius1 c41 towards the close of the second century after the ,christian era4 ,it is certain that these ancients perused many works of ,aristotle1 or generally recognized as his1 which we do not now possess2 and among those which we do now possess1 there are many which it is not certain that they perused1 or even knew4 ,diogenes ,laertius1 after affirming generally that ,aristotle had composed a prodigious number of books 7,greek3 pa_/mpleista bi_/blia71 proceeds to say1 that1 in consequence of the excellence of the author in every variety of composition1 he thinks it proper to indicate them briefly4#a ,he then enumerates one hundred and forty-six distinct titles of works1 with the number of books or sections contained in each work4 ,the subjects are exceedingly heterogeneous1 and the form of composition likewise very different2 those which come first in the list being ,dialogues1#b while those which come last are ,epistles1 ,hexameters1 and ,elegies4 ,at the close of the list we read3 ,all of them together are #dde1bgj lines1 and this is the number of books 7works7 composed by ,aristotle4#c ,a little farther on1 ,diogenes adds1 as an evidence of the extraordinary diligence and inventive force of ,aristotle1 that the books 7works7 enumerated in the preceding list were nearly four hundred in number1 and that these were not contested by any one2 but that there were many other writings1 and dicta besides1 ascribed to ,aristotle--ascribed 7we must understand him to mean7 erroneously1 or at least so as to leave much doubt4#d ,footnote #a3 ,diog4 ,la4 v4 #ba4 ,greek3 ,sune_/grapse de pa_/mpleista bi_/blia1 a7_/per a7ko_/louthon 7gsa_/mn u7pogra_/psai1 dia tn peri pa_/ntas lo_/gous ta7ndros a7ret_/n4 ,footnote #b3 ,bernays has pointed out 7in his valuable treatise1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 p4 #acc7 that the first in order1 nineteen in number1 among the titles enumerated by ,diogenes1 designate ,dialogues4 ,the longest of them1 those which included more than one book or section1 are enumerated first of all4 ,some of the dialogues appear to have coincided1 either in title or in subject1 with some of the ,platonic3--,greek3 ,peri ,dikaiosu_/ns1 in four books 7comparable with ,plato's ,republic72 ,greek3 ,politikou1 in two books2 ,greek3 ,sophists1 ,mene_/xenos1 ,sumpo_/sion1 each in one book2 all similar in title to works of ,plato2 perhaps also another1 ,greek3 ,peri r7toriks 7 ,gru_/llos1 the analogue of ,plato's ,gorgias4 ,footnote #c3 ,diog4 ,la4 v4 #bg4 ,greek3 gi_/gnontai ai7 pasai muria_/des sti_/chn te_/ttares kai tettara_/konta pros tois pentakischili_/ois kai diakosi_/ois e7bdom_/konta4 ,kai tosauta men au7t pepragma_/teutai bi_/blia4 ,footnote #d3 ,diog4 ,la4 v4 #cd4 ,heitz 7,die ,verlorenen ,schriften des ,aristoteles1 p4 #ag7 notices1 as a fact invalidating the trustworthiness of the catalogue given by ,diogenes1 that ,diogenes1 in other places1 alludes to ,aristotelian compositions which are not mentioned in his own catalogue4 ,for example1 though ,diogenes1 in the catalogue1 allows only five books to the ,ethica1 yet he himself alludes 7v4 #ba7 to the seventh book of the ,ethica4 ,but this example can hardly be relied upon1 because ,greek3 e7n t e7bdo_/m tn 7thikn is only a conjecture of ,h4 ,stephens or ,mnage4 ,the only case which ,heitz really finds to sustain his remark1 is the passage of the ,prooemium 7i4 #h71 where ,diogenes cites ,aristotle ,greek3 e7n t ,magik1 that work not being named in his catalogue4 ,but there is another case 7not noticed by ,heitz7 which appears to me still stronger4 ,diogenes cites at length the ,hymn or ,pan composed by ,aristotle in honour of ,hermeias4 ,now there is no general head of his catalogue under which this hymn could fall4 ,here ,anonymus 7to be presently mentioned7 has a superiority over ,diogenes2 for he introduces1 towards the close of his catalogue1 one general head--,greek3 e7gk_/mia 7 u7_/mnous1 which is not to be found in ,diogenes4 ,we have another distinct enumeration of the titles of ,aristotle's works1 prepared by an anonymous biographer cited in the notes of ,mnage to ,diogenes ,laertius4#e ,this anonymous list contains only one hundred and twenty-seven titles1 being nineteen less than the list in ,diogenes4 ,the greater number of titles are the same in both2 but ,anonymus has eight titles which are not found in ,diogenes1 while ,diogenes has twenty-seven titles which are not given by ,anonymus4 ,there are therefore thirty-five titles which rest on the evidence of one alone out of the two lists4 ,anonymus does not specify any total number of lines2 nevertheless he gives the total number of books composed by ,aristotle as being nearly four hundred--the same as ,diogenes4 ,this total number cannot be elicited out of the items enumerated by ,anonymus2 but it may be made to coincide pretty nearly with the items in ,diogenes1#f provided we understand by books1 sections or subdivisions of one and the same title or work4 ,footnote #e3 ,mnage ad ,diog4 tom4 ii4 p4 #bja4 ,see the very instructive treatise of ,professor ,heitz1 ,die ,verlorenen ,schriften des ,aristoteles1 p4 #ae 7,leipzig1 #ahfe74 ,footnote #f3 ,heitz1 ,die ,verl4 ,schrift4 des ,aristot4 p4 #ea4 ,such coincidence assumes that we reckon the ,greek3 ,politeiai and the ,epistles each as one book4 ,i think it unnecessary to transcribe these catalogues of the titles of works mostly lost4 ,the reader will find them clearly printed in the learned work of ,val4 ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1 pp4 #ab-bj4 ,the two catalogues just mentioned1 agreeing as they do in the total number of books and in the greater part of the items1 may probably be considered not as original and copy1 but as inaccurate transcripts from the same original authority4 ,yet neither of the two transcribers tells us what that original authority was4 ,we may1 however1 be certain that each of them considered his catalogue to comprehend all that ,aristotle could be affirmed on good authority to have published2 ,diogenes plainly signifies thus much1 when he gives not only the total number of books1 but the total number of lines4 ,such being the case1 we expect to find in it1 of course1 the titles of the forty-six works composing the ,berlin edition of ,aristotle now before us4 ,but this expectation is disappointed4 ,the far greater number of the ,aristotelian works which we now peruse are not specified either in the list of ,diogenes1 or in that of ,anonymus4#g ,moreover1 the lists also fail to specify the titles of various works which are not now extant1 but which we know from ,aristotle himself that he really composed4#h ,footnote #g3 ,heitz1 ,verl4 ,schr4 ,aristot4 p4 #ah1 remarks that ,in diesem ,verzeichnisse 7that of ,diogenes7 die bei weitem grsste ,zahl derjenigen ,schriften fehlt1 welche wir heute noch besitzen1 und die wir als den eigentlichen ,kern der aristotelischen ,lehre enthaltend zu betrachten gewohnt sind4 ,cf4 p4 #cb4 ,brandis expresses himself substantially to the same effect 7,aristoteles1 ,berlin1 #ahec1 pp4 #gg1 #gh1 #if72 and ,zeller also 7,gesch4 der ,phil4 #bnd ed4 ,aristot4 ,schriften1 p4 #dc74 ,footnote #h3 ,heitz1 ,verl4 ,schr4 des ,aristoteles1 p4 #ef1 seq4 ,the last-mentioned fact is in itself sufficiently strange and difficult to explain1 and our difficulty becomes aggravated when we combine it with another fact hardly less surprising4 ,both ,cicero1 and other writers of the century subsequent to him 7,dionysius ,hal41 ,quintilian1 c471 make reference to ,aristotle1 and especially to his dialogues1 of which none have been preserved1 though the titles of several are given in the two catalogues mentioned above4 ,these writers bestow much encomium on the style of ,aristotle2 but what is remarkable is1 that they ascribe to it attributes which even his warmest admirers will hardly find in the ,aristotelian works now remaining4 ,cicero extols the sweetness1 the abundance1 the variety1 the rhetorical force which he discovered in ,aristotle's writings3 he even goes so far as to employ the phrase flumen orationis aureum 7a golden stream of speech71 in characterizing the ,aristotelian style4#i ,such predicates may have been correct1 indeed were doubtless correct1 in regard to the dialogues1 and perhaps other lost works of ,aristotle2 but they describe exactly the opposite#aj of what we find in all the works preserved4 ,with most of these 7except the ,history of ,animals7 ,cicero manifests no acquaintance2 and some of the best modern critics declare him to have been ignorant of them4#aa ,nor do other ancient authors1 ,plutarch1 ,athenus1 ,diogenes ,laertius1 c41 give evidence of having been acquainted with the principal works of ,aristotle known to us4 ,they make reference only to works enumerated in the ,catalogue of ,diogenes ,laertius4#ab ,footnote #i3 ,cicero1 ,acad4 ,prior4 ii4 #ch1 #aai3 ,quum enim tuus iste ,stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit1 veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens ,aristoteles1 qui illum desipere dicat4 ,also ,topica1 i4 #c4 ,quibus 7i4e4 those who were ignorant of ,aristotle7 eo minus ignoscendum est1 quod non modo rebus iis1 qu ab illo dict et invent sunt1 adlici debuerunt1 sed dicendi quoque incredibili qudam quum copi1 tum suavitate4 ,also ,de ,oratore1 i4 #aa1 #di2 ,brutus1 #ca1 #aba2 ,de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #cg2 ,de ,inventione1 ii4 #b2 ,de ,finibus1 i4 #e1 #ad2 ,epistol4 ad ,atticum1 ii4 #a1 where he speaks of the ,aristotelia pigmenta1 along with the ,greek3 muroth_/kion of ,isokrates4 ,dionysius ,hal4 recommends the style of ,aristotle in equal terms of admiration3 ,greek3 paralpte_/on de kai ,a7ristote_/l ei7s mi_/msin ts te peri tn e7rmnei_/an deino_/ttos kai ts saphnei_/as1 kai tou 7de_/os kai polumathous 7,de ,veter4 ,script4 ,censur1 p4 #dcj1 ,r42 ,de ,verb4 ,copi1 p4 #ahg74 ,quintilian extols the eloquendi suavitas among ,aristotle's excellences 7,inst4 ,or4 ,x4 i4 p4 #eaj74 ,demetrius ,phalereus 7or the author who bears that title71 ,de ,eloquenti1 s4 #abh1 commends ,greek3 ai7 ,a7ristote_/lous cha_/rites4 ,david the ,armenian1 who speaks of him 7having reference to the dialogue7 as ,greek3 ,a7phrodi_/ts e7nno_/mou ge_/mn 7the correction of ,bernays1 ,dial4 des ,arist4 p4 #acg7 ,greek3 kai chari_/tn a7na_/mestos1 probably copies the judgment of predecessors 7,scholia ad ,categor4 p4 #bf1 b4 #cf1 ,brandis74 ,bernays 7,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 pp4 #c-e7 points out how little justice has been done by modern critics to the literary merits1 exhibited in the dialogues and other works now lost1 of one whom we know only as a dornichten und wortkargen ,systematiker4 ,footnote #aj3 ,this opinion is insisted on by ,ravaisson1 ,essai sur la ,mtaphysique d',aristote1 pp4 #baj1 #baa4 ,footnote #aa3 ,valentine ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1 p4 #bc3 ,cicero philosophicis certe ipsius ,aristotelis libris nunquam usus est4 ,heitz1 ,die ,verlor4 ,schrift4 des ,aristot4 pp4 #ca1 #aeh1 #ahg3 ,cicero1 dessen ,unbekanntschaft mit beinahe smmtlichen heute vorhandenen ,werken des ,aristoteles eine unstreitige ,thatsache bildet1 deren ,bedeutung man sich umsonst bemht hat abzuschwchen4 ,madvig1 ,excursus ,,vii4 ad ,ciceron4 ,de ,finibus1 p4 #hee3 ,non dubito profiteri1 ,ciceronem mihi videri dialogos ,aristotelis populariter scriptos1 et ,rhetorica 7quibus hic ,topica adnumero7 tum ,greek3 politei_/as legisse2 difficiliora vero1 quibus omnis interior philosophia continebatur1 aut omnino non attigisse1 aut si aliquando attigerit1 non longe progressum esse1 ut ipse de subtilioribus ,aristotelis sententiis aliquid habere possit explorati4 ,the language here used by ,madvig is more precise than that of the other two2 for ,cicero must be allowed to have known1 and even to have had in his library1 the ,topica of ,aristotle4 ,footnote #ab3 ,see this point enforced by ,heitz1 pp4 #bi-ca4 ,athenus 7xiv4 #fef7 refers to a passage of ,philochorus1 in which ,philochorus alludes to ,aristotle1 that is1 as critics have hitherto supposed1 to ,aristot4 ,meteorol4 iv4 #c1 #ba4 ,bussemaker 7in his ,prfat4 ad ,aristot4 ,didot1 vol4 iv4 p4 xix47 has shewn that this supposition is unfounded1 and that the passage more probably refers to one of the ,problemata ,inedita 7iii4 #dc7 which ,bussemaker has first published in ,didot's edition of ,aristotle4 ,here1 then1 we find several embarrassing facts in regard to the ,aristotelian ,canon4 ,most of the works now accepted and known as belonging to ,aristotle1 are neither included in the full ,aristotelian ,catalogue given by ,diogenes1 nor were they known to ,cicero2 who1 moreover1 ascribes to ,aristotle attributes of style not only different1 but opposite1 to those which our ,aristotle presents4 ,besides1 more than twenty of the compositions entered in the ,catalogue are dialogues1 of which form our ,aristotle affords not a single specimen3 while others relate to matters of ancient exploit or personal history2 collected proverbs2 accounts of the actual constitution of many ,hellenic cities2 lists of the ,pythian victors and of the scenic representations2 erotic discourses2 legendary narratives1 embodied in a miscellaneous work called ',peplus'--a title perhaps borrowed from the ,peplus or robe of ,athn at the ,panathenaic festival1 embroidered with various figures by ,athenian women2 a symposion or banquet-colloquy2 and remarks on intoxication4 ,all these subjects are foreign in character to those which our ,aristotle treats4#ac ,footnote #ac3 ,brandis and ,zeller1 moreover1 remark1 that among the allusions made by ,aristotle in the works which we possess to other works of his own1 the majority relate to other works actually extant1 and very few to any of the lost works enumerated in the ,catalogue 7,brand4 ,aristoteles1 pp4 #ig-aja2 ,zeller1 ,phil4 der ,griech4 ii4 #b1 p4 #gi1 ed4 #bnd74 ,this however is not always the case3 we find 7e4g47 in ,aristotle's notice of the ,pythagorean tenets 7,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #ihf1 a4 #ab7 the remark1 ,greek3 di_/ristai de peri tou_/tn e7n e7te_/rois 7min a7kribe_/steron2 where he probably means to indicate his special treatises1 ,greek3 ,peri tn ,puthagorei_/n and ,greek3 ,pros tous ,puthagorei_/ous1 enumerated by ,diog4 ,l4 v4 #be1 and mentioned by ,alexander1 ,porphyry1 and ,simplikius4 ,see ,alexander1 ,schol4 ad ,metaphys4 p4 #edb1 b4 #e1 #efj1 b4 #be1 ,br42 and the note of ,schwegler on ,metaphys4 i4 #e1 p4 #dg4 ,the difficulty of harmonizing our ,aristotle with the ,aristotle of the ,catalogue is thus considerable4 ,it has been so strongly felt in recent years1 that one of the ablest modern critics altogether dissevers the two1 and pronounces the works enumerated in the ,catalogue not to belong to our ,aristotle4 ,i allude to ,valentine ,rose1 who in his very learned and instructive volume1 ',aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1' has collected and illustrated the fragments which remain of these works4 ,he considers them all pseudo-,aristotelian1 composed by various unknown members of the ,peripatetic school1 during the century or two immediately succeeding the death of ,aristotle1 and inscribed with the illustrious name of the master1 partly through fraud of the sellers1 partly through carelessness of purchasers and librarians4#ad ,emil ,heitz1 on the other hand1 has argued more recently1 that upon the external evidence as it stands1 a more correct conclusion to draw would be 7the opposite of that drawn by ,rose1 viz473 ,that the works enumerated in the ,catalogue are the true and genuine2 and that those which we possess1 or most of them1 are not really composed by ,aristotle4#ae ,heitz thinks this conclusion better sustained than that of ,rose1 though he himself takes a different view1 which ,i shall presently mention4 ,footnote #ad3 ,valent4 ,rose1 ,aristoteles ,pseudepigr4 pp4 #d-aj4 ,the same opinion is declared also in the earlier work of the same author1 ,de ,aristotelis ,librorum ,ordine et ,auctoritate4 ,footnote #ae3 ,heitz1 ,die ,verlor4 ,schrift4 des 9999,ar4 pp4 #bi1 #cj4 ,it will be seen from the foregoing observations how much more difficult it is to settle a genuine ,canon for ,aristotle than for ,plato4 ,i do not assent to either of the two conclusions just indicated2 but ,i contend that1 if we applied to this question the same principles of judgment as those which modern ,platonic critics often apply1 when they allow or disallow dialogues of ,plato1 we should be obliged to embrace one or other of them1 or at least something nearly approaching thereto4 ,if a critic1 after attentively studying the principal compositions now extant of our ,aristotle1 thinks himself entitled1 on the faith of his acquired ,aristotelisches ,gefhl1 to declare that no works differing materially from them 7either in subject handled1 or in manner of handling1 or in degree of excellence71 can have been composed by ,aristotle--he will assuredly be forced to include in such rejection a large proportion of those indicated in the ,catalogue of ,diogenes4 ,especially he will be forced to reject the ,dialogues--the very compositions by which ,aristotle was best known to ,cicero and his contemporaries4 ,for the difference between them and the known compositions of ,aristotle1 not merely in form but in style 7the style being known from the epithets applied to them by ,cicero71 must have been more marked and decisive than that between the ,alkibiades1 ,hippias1 ,theages1 ,erast1 ,leges1 c4--which most ,platonic critics now set aside as spurious--and the ,republic1 ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 ,philbus1 c41 which they treat as indisputably genuine4#af ,footnote #af3 ,thus 7for example7 in ,bernays1 who has displayed great acuteness and learning in investigating the ,aristotelian ,canon1 and in collecting what can be known respecting the lost dialogues of ,aristotle1 we read the following observations3--,in der ,that mangelt es auch nicht an den bestimmtesten ,nachrichten ber die vormalige ,existenz einer grossen aristotelischen ,schriftenreihe1 die von der jetzt erhaltenen durch die tiefste formale ,verschiedenheit getrennt war4 ,das ,verzeichniss aristotelischer ,werke fhrt an seiner ,spitze sieben und zwanzig ,bnde jetzt verlorener ,schriften auf1 die alle in der knstlerischen ,gesprchsform abgefasst waren1 c4 7,bernays1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 p4 #b2 compare ibid4 p4 #cj74 ,if1 as ,bernays justly contends1 we are to admit these various writings1 notwithstanding the profound difference of form1 as having emanated from the same philosopher ,aristotle1 how are we to trust the ,platonic critics when they reject about one-third of the preserved dialogues of ,plato1 though there is no difference of form to proceed upon1 but only a difference of style1 merit1 and1 to a certain extent1 doctrine8 ,zeller 7,die ,phil4 der ,griechen1 ii4 #b1 pp4 #de1 #df1 #bnd ed47 remarks that the dialogues composed by ,aristotle are probably to be ascribed to the earlier part of his literary life1 when he was still 7or had recently been7 ,plato's scholar4 ,in discussing the ,platonic ,canon1 ,i have already declared that ,i consider these grounds of rejection to be unsafe and misleading4 ,such judgment is farther confirmed1 when we observe the consequences to which they would conduct in regard to the ,aristotelian ,canon4 ,in fact1 we must learn to admit among genuine works1 both of ,plato and ,aristotle1 great diversity in subject1 in style1 and in excellence4 ,i see no ground for distrusting the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes1 as being in general an enumeration of works really composed by ,aristotle4 ,these works must have been lodged in some great library--probably the ,alexandrine--where they were seen and counted1 and the titles of them enrolled by some one or more among the literati1 with a specification of the sum total obtained on adding together the lines contained in each4#ag ,i do not deny the probability1 that1 in regard to some1 the librarians may have been imposed upon1 and that pseudo-,aristotelian works may have been admitted2 but whether such was partially the fact or not1 the general goodness of the ,catalogue seems to me unimpeachable4 ,as to the author of it1 the most admissible conjecture seems that of ,brandis and others1 recently adopted and advocated by ,heitz3 that the ,catalogue owes its origin to one of the ,alexandrine literati2 probably to ,hermippus of ,smyrna1 a lettered man and a pupil of ,kallimachus at ,alexandria1 between #bdj-baj ,b4,c44 ,diogenes does not indeed tell us from whom he borrowed the ,catalogue2 but in his life of ,aristotle1 he more than once cites ,hermippus1 as having treated of ,aristotle and his biography in a work of some extent2 and we know from other sources that ,hermippus had devoted much attention to ,aristotle as well as to other philosophers4 ,if ,hermippus be the author of this ,catalogue1 it must have been drawn up about the same time that the ,byzantine ,aristophanes arranged the dialogues of ,plato4 ,probably1 indeed1 ,kallimachus the chief librarian1 had prepared the way for both of them4 ,we know that he had drawn up comprehensive tables1 including1 not only the principal orators and dramatists1 with an enumeration of their discourses and dramas1 but also various miscellaneous authors1 with the titles of their works4 ,we know1 farther1 that he noticed ,demokritus and ,eudoxus1 and we may feel assured that1 in a scheme thus large1 he would not omit ,plato or ,aristotle1 the two great founders of the first philosophical schools1 nor the specification of the works of each contained in the ,alexandrine library4#ah ,heitz supposes that ,hermippus was the author of most of the catalogues 7not merely of ,aristotle1 but also of other philosophers7 given by ,diogenes2#ai yet that nevertheless ,diogenes himself had no direct acquaintance with the works of ,hermippus1 but copied these catalogues at second-hand from some later author1 probably ,favorinus4 ,this last supposition is noway made out4 ,footnote #ag3 ,stahr1 who in the first volume of his work ,aristotelia 7p4 #aid71 had expressed an opinion that the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes is the ,catalogue der eigenen ,schritten des ,stageiriten1 wie sie sich in seinem ,nachlasse befanden1 retracts that opinion in the second volume of the same work 7pp4 #fh-gj71 and declares the ,catalogue to be an enumeration of the ,aristotelian works in the library of ,alexandria4 ,trendelenburg concurs in this later opinion 7,prooemium ad ,commentar4 in ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 p4 #abc74 ,footnote #ah3 ,greek3 ,e7_/rmippos o7 ,kallima_/cheios e7n t pr_/t peri ,a7ristote_/lous1 is cited by ,athenus1 xv4 #fif2 also v4 #bac4 ,among the ,tables prepared by ,kallimachus1 one was ,greek3 ,pantoda_/pn ,suggramma_/tn ,pi_/nax2 and in it were included the ,greek3 ,plakountopoiika suggra_/mmata ,ai7gimi_/ou1 kai 7gsi_/ppou1 kai ,mtrobi_/ou1 e7_/ti de ,phai_/tou 7,athenus1 xiv4 #fdd74 ,if ,kallimachus carried down his catalogue of the contents of the library to works so unimportant as these1 we may surely believe that he would not omit to catalogue such works of ,aristotle as were in it4 ,he appears to have made a list of the works of ,demokritus 7i4e4 such as were in the library7 with a glossary4 ,see ,brandis 7,aristoteles1 ,berlin1 #ahec1 p4 #gd72 also ,suidas v4 ,greek3 ,kalli_/machos1 ,diogen4 ,laert4 viii4 #hf2 ,dionys4 ,hal4 ,de ,dinarcho1 pp4 #fcj1 #feb ,r42 ,athenus1 viii4 #ccf1 xv4 #ffi4 ,footnote #ai3 ,heitz1 ,die ,verl4 ,schr4 des ,aristot4 pp4 #de-dh4 ,patricius1 in his ,discuss4 ,peripatetic4 7t4 i4 pp4 #ac-ah71 had previously considered ,hermippus as having prepared a ,catalogue of the works of ,aristotle1 partly on the authority of the ,scholion annexed to the conclusion of the ,metaphysica of ,theophrastus4 ,hermippus recited the testament of ,aristotle 7,athenus1 xiii4 #ehi74 ,both ,valentine ,rose and ,bernays regard ,andronikus as author of the ,catalogue of ,aristotle in ,diogenes4 ,but ,i think that very sufficient reasons to refute this supposition have been shown by ,heitz1 pp4 #di-eb4 ,the opinion given by ,christ1 respecting the ,catalogue which we find in ,diogenes ,laertius--illum catalogum non ,alexandrin bibliothec1 sed exemplarium ,aristotelis ab ,apelliconte ,athenas translatorum fuisse equidem censeo--is in substance the same as that of ,rose and ,bernays4 ,i do not concur in it4 7,christ1 ,studia in ,aristotelis ,libros ,metaphysicos1 ,berlin1 #ahec1 p4 #aje74 ,it seems thus probable that the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes derives its origin from ,hermippus or ,kallimachus1 enumerating the titles of such works of ,aristotle as were contained in the ,alexandrine library4 ,but the aggregate of works composing our ,aristotle is noway in harmony with that ,catalogue4 ,it proceeds from a source independent and totally different1 viz41 the edition and classification first published by the ,rhodian ,andronikus1 in the generation between the death of ,cicero and the ,christian era4 ,to explain the existence of these two distinct and independent sources and channels1 we must have recourse to the remarkable narrative 7already noticed in my chapter on the ,platonic ,canon71 delivered mainly by ,strabo and less fully by ,plutarch1 respecting the fate of the ,aristotelian library after ,aristotle's death4 ,at the decease of ,aristotle1 his library and ,,mss4 came to ,theophrastus1 who continued chief of the ,peripatetic school at ,athens for thirty-five years1 until his death in #bhg ,b4,c4 ,both ,aristotle and ,theophrastus not only composed many works of their own1 but also laid out much money in purchasing or copying the works of others2#bj especially we are told that ,aristotle1 after the death of ,speusippus1 expended three talents in purchasing his books4 ,the entire library of ,theophrastus1 thus enriched from two sources1 was bequeathed by his testament to a philosophical friend and pupil1 ,neleus2#ba who left ,athens1 and carried away the library with him to his residence at the town of ,skpsis1 in the ,asiatic region known as olis1 near ,troad4 ,at ,skpsis the library remained for the greater part of two centuries1 in possession of the descendants of ,neleus1 men of no accomplishments and no taste for philosophy4 ,it was about thirty or forty years after the death of ,theophrastus that the kings of ,pergamus began to occupy themselves in collecting their royal library1 which presently reached a magnitude second only to that of ,alexandria4 ,now ,skpsis was under their dominion1 and it would seem that the kings seized the books belonging to their subjects for the use of the royal library2 for we are told that the heirs of ,neleus were forced to conceal their literary treasures in a cellar1 subject to great injury1 partly from damp1 partly from worms4 ,in this ruinous hiding-place the manuscripts remained for nearly a century and a half--blattarum ac tinearum epul1--until the ,attalid dynasty at ,pergamus became extinct4 ,the last of these kings1 ,attalus1 died in #acc ,b4,c41 bequeathing his kingdom to the ,romans4 ,all fear of requisitions for the royal library being thus at end1 the manuscripts were in course of time withdrawn by their proprietors from concealment1 and sold for a large sum to ,apellikon1 a native of ,teos1 a very rich resident at ,athens1 and attached to the ,peripatetic sect4 ,probably this wealthy ,peripatetic already possessed a library of his own1 with some ,aristotelian works2 but the new acquisitions from ,skpsis1 though not his whole stock1 formed the most rare and precious ingredients in it4 ,here1 then1 the manuscripts and library both of ,aristotle and ,theophrastus became1 for the first time since #bhg ,b4,c41 open to the inspection of the ,athenian ,peripatetics of the time 7about #ajj ,b4,c471 as well as of other learned men4 ,among the stock were contained many compositions which the ,scholarchs1 successors of 9999,theophrastus at ,athens1 had neither possessed nor known4#bb ,but the manuscripts were found imperfect1 seriously damaged1 and in a state of disorder4 ,apellikon did his best to remedy that mischief1 by causing new copies to be taken1 correcting what had become worm-eaten1 and supplying what was defective or illegible4 ,he appears to have been an erudite man1 and had published a biography of ,aristotle1 refuting various calumnies advanced by other biographers2 but being 7in the words of ,strabo7 a lover of books rather than a philosopher1 he performed the work of correction so unskilfully1 that the copies which he published were found full of errors4#bc ,in the year #hf ,b4,c41 ,sylla besieged ,athens1 and captured it by storm2 not long after which he took to himself as a perquisite the library of ,apellikon1 and transported it to ,rome4#bd ,it was there preserved under custody of a librarian1 and various literary ,greeks resident at ,rome obtained access to it1 especially ,tyrannion1 the friend of ,cicero and a warm admirer of ,aristotle1 who took peculiar pains to gain the favour of the librarian4#be ,it was there also that the ,rhodian ,andronikus obtained access to the ,aristotelian works4#bf ,he classified them to a great degree anew1 putting in juxtaposition the treatises most analogous in subject2#bg moreover1 he corrected the text1 and published a new edition of the manuscripts1 with a tabulated list4 ,this was all the more necessary1 because some booksellers at ,rome1 aiming only at sale and profit1 had employed bad writers1 and circulated inaccurate copies1 not collated with the originals4#bh ,these originals1 however1 were so damaged1 and the restitutions made by ,apellikon were so injudicious1 that the more careful critics who now studied them were often driven to proceed on mere probable evidence4 ,footnote #bj3 ,diog4 ,l4 iv4 #e2 ,aulus ,gellius1 ,n4 ,a4 iii4 #ag4 ,footnote #ba3 ,from a passage of ,lucian 7,de ,parasito1 c4 xxxv47 we learn that ,aristoxenus spoke of himself as friend and guest of ,neleus3 ,greek3 kai ti_/s peri tou_/tou le_/gei8 ,polloi men kai a7_/lloi1 ,a7risto_/xenos de o7 mousiko_/s1 pollou lo_/gou a7_/xios kai au7tos de para_/sitos ,n_/les 7n4 ,footnote #bb3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fjh1 #fji2 ,athenus1 v4 #bad4 ,the narrative of ,strabo has been often misunderstood and impugned1 as if he had asserted that none of the main works of ,aristotle had ever been published until they were thus exhumed by ,apellikon4 ,this is the supposed allegation which ,stahr1 ,zeller1 and others have taken so much pains to refute4 ,but in reality ,strabo says no such thing4 ,his words affirm or imply the direct contrary1 viz41 that many works of ,aristotle1 not merely the exoteric works but others besides1 had been published earlier than the purchase made by ,apellikon4 ,what ,strabo says is1 that few of these works were in possession of the ,peripatetic ,scholarchs at ,athens before the time of that purchase2 and he explains thus how it was that these ,scholarchs1 during the century intervening1 had paid little attention to the profound and abstruse speculations of ,aristotle2 how it was that they had confined themselves to dialectic and rhetorical debate on special problems4 ,i see no ground for calling in question the fact affirmed by ,strabo--the poverty of the ,peripatetic school-library at ,athens2 though he may perhaps have assigned a greater importance to that fact than it deserves1 as a means of explaining the intellectual working of the ,peripatetic ,scholarchs from ,lykon to ,kritolaus4 ,the philosophical impulse of that intervening century seems to have turned chiefly towards ethics and the ,summum ,bonum1 with the conflicting theories of ,platonists1 ,peripatetics1 ,stoics1 and ,epikureans thereupon4 ,footnote #bc3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fji4 ,greek3 7n de o7 ,a7pellikn philo_/biblos mallon 7 philo_/sophos1 dio kai ztn e7pano_/othsin tn diabrma_/tn1 ei7s a7nti_/grapha kaina met_/negke tn graphn a7naplrn ou7k eu71 kai e7xe_/dken a7marta_/dn pl_/r ta bi_/blia4 ,footnote #bd3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fji2 ,plutarch1 ,sylla1 c4 xxvi4 ,footnote #be3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fji4 ,greek3 ,turanni_/n1 o7 grammatikos diecheiri_/sato philaristote_/ls 7_/n1 therapeu_/sas ton e7pi ts bibloth_/ks4 ,tyrannion had been the preceptor of ,strabo 7xii4 #edh72 and ,bothus1 who studied ,aristotle along with ,strabo1 was a disciple of the ,rhodian ,andronikus4 ,see ,ammonius ad ,categorias1 f4 #h2 and ,ravaisson1 ,essai sur la ,mtaphysique d',aristote1 ,introduction1 p4 #aj4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plutarch1 ,sylla1 c4 xxvi4 ,footnote #bg3 ,the testimony of ,porphyry in respect to ,andronikus1 and to the real service performed by ,andronikus1 is highly valuable4 ,porphyry was the devoted disciple and friend1 as well as the literary executor1 of ,plotinus2 whose writings were left in an incorrect and disorderly condition4 ,porphyry undertook to put them in order and publish them2 and he tells us that1 in fulfilling this promise1 he followed the example of what ,andronikus had done for the works of ,aristotle and ,theophrastus4 ,greek3 ,e7pei de au7tos 7,plotinus7 ,greek3 tn dio_/rthsin kai tn dia_/taxin tn bibli_/n poieisthai 7min e7pe_/trepsen1 e7g de e7kei_/n znti u7pescho_/mn kai tois a7_/llois e7tai_/rois e7pggeila_/mn poisai touto1 prton men ta bi_/blia ou7 kata chro_/nous e7asai phu_/rdn e7kdedome_/na e7dikai_/sa1 mimsa_/menos d' ,a7pollo_/dron ton ,a7thnaion kai ,a7ndro_/nikon ton ,peripattiko_/n1 7n o7 men ,e7pi_/charmon ton kmdiogra_/phon ei7s de_/ka to_/mous phe_/rn sun_/gagen1 o7 de ta ,a7ristote_/lous kai ,theophra_/stou ei7s pragmatei_/as dieile1 tas oi7kei_/as u7pothe_/seis ei7s tau7ton sunagag_/n1 ou7_/t d kai e7g pent_/konta te_/ssarau7_/nta e7_/chn ta tou ,plti_/nou bi_/blia dieilon men ei7s e7x e7nnea_/das1 t teleio_/tti tou e7x a7rithmou kai tais e7nnea_/sin a7sme_/ns e7pituch_/n1 e7ka_/st de e7nnea_/di ta oi7keia phe_/rn sunepho_/rsa1 dous kai ta_/xin pr_/tn tois e7laphrote_/rois probl_/masin4 7,porphyry1 ,vita ,plotini1 p4 #aag1 ,didot47 ,porphyry here distinctly affirms that ,andronikus rendered this valuable service not merely to the works of ,aristotle1 but also to those of ,theophrastus4 ,this is important1 as connecting him with the library conveyed by ,sylla to ,rome2 which library we know to have contained the manuscripts of both these philosophers4 ,and in the ,scholion appended to the ,metaphysica of ,theophrastus 7p4 #cbc1 ,brandis7 we are told that ,andronikus and ,hermippus had made a catalogue of the works of ,theophrastus1 in which the ,metaphysics was not included4 ,footnote #bh3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fji3 ,greek3 biblioplai_/ tines grapheusi phau_/lois chr_/menoi kai ou7k a7ntiba_/llontes1 c4 ,this interesting narrative--delivered by ,strabo1 the junior contemporary of ,andronikus1 and probably derived by him either from ,tyrannion his preceptor or from the ,sidonian ,bothus#bi and other philosophical companions jointly1 with whom he had prosecuted the study of ,aristotle--appears fully worthy of trust4 ,the proceedings both of ,apellikon and of ,sylla prove1 what indeed we might have presumed without proof1 that the recovery of these long-lost original manuscripts of ,aristotle and ,theophrastus excited great sensation in the philosophical world of ,athens and of ,rome4 ,with such newly-acquired materials1 a new epoch began for the study of these authors4 ,the more abstruse philosophical works of ,aristotle now came into the foreground under the auspices of a new ,scholarch2 whereas ,aristotle had hitherto been chiefly known by his more popular and readable compositions4 ,of these last1 probably1 copies may have been acquired to a certain extent by the previous ,peripatetic ,scholarchs or ,school at ,athens2 but the ,school had been irreparably impoverished1 so far as regarded the deeper speculations of philosophy1 by the loss of those original manuscripts which had been transported from ,athens to ,skpsis4 ,what ,aristotelian ,scholarchs1 prior to ,andronikus1 chiefly possessed and studied1 of the productions of their illustrious founder1 were chiefly the exoteric or extra-philosophical and comparatively popular3--such as the dialogues2 the legendary and historical collections2 the facts respecting constitutional history of various ,hellenic cities2 the variety of miscellaneous problems respecting ,homer and a number of diverse matters2 the treatises on animals and on anatomy1 c4#cj ,in the ,alexandrine library 7as we see by the ,catalogue of ,diogenes7 there existed all these and several philosophical works also2 but that library was not easily available for the use of the ,scholarchs at ,athens1 who worked upon their own stock1 confining themselves mainly to smooth and elegant discourses on particular questions1 and especially to discussions1 with the ,platonists1 ,stoics1 and ,epikureans1 on the principia of ,ethics1 without any attempt either to follow up or to elucidate the more profound speculations 7logical1 physical1 metaphysical1 cosmical7 of ,aristotle himself4 ,a material change took place when the library of ,apellikon came to be laid open and studied1 not merely by lecturers in the professorial chair at ,athens1 but also by critics like ,tyrannion and ,andronikus at ,rome4 ,these critics found therein the most profound and difficult philosophical works of ,aristotle in the handwriting of the philosopher himself2 some probably1 of which copies may have already existed in the ,alexandrine library1 but some also as yet unpublished4 ,the purpose of ,andronikus1 who is described as ,peripatetic ,scholarch1 eleventh in succession from ,aristotle1 was not simply to make a ,catalogue 7as ,hermippus had made at ,alexandria71 but to render a much greater service1 which no critic could render without having access to original ,,mss41 namely1 to obtain a correct text of the books actually before him1 to arrange these books in proper order1 and then to publish and explain them1#ca but to take no account of other ,aristotelian works in the ,alexandrine library or elsewhere4 ,the ,aristotelian philosophy thus passed into a new phase4 ,our editions of ,aristotle may be considered as taking their date from this critical effort of ,andronikus1 with or without subsequent modifications by others1 as the case may be4 ,footnote #bi3 ,strabo1 xvi4 #geg4 ,stahr1 in his minor work1 ,aristoteles unter den ,rmern1 p4 #cb1 considers that this circumstance lessens the credibility of ,strabo4 ,i think the contrary4 ,no one was so likely to have studied the previous history of the ,,mss4 as the editors of a new edition4 ,footnote #cj3 ,strabo1 xiii4 #fji3 ,greek3 sune_/b de tois e7k tn peripa_/tn tois men pa_/lai tois meta ,theo_/phraston1 o7_/ls ou7k e7_/chousi ta bi_/blia pln o7li_/gn kai ma_/lista tn e7xterikn1 mden e7_/chein philosophein pragmatiks1 a7lla the_/seis lkuthi_/zein2 tois d' u7_/steron1 a7ph' ou7 ta bi_/blia tauta prolthen1 a7_/meinon men e7kei_/nn philosophein kai a7ristoteli_/zein1 a7nagka_/zesthai me_/ntoi ta polla ei7ko_/ta le_/gein dia to plthos tn a7martin4 ,also ,plutarch1 ,sylla1 c4 xxvi4 ,the passage of ,strabo is so perspicuous and detailed1 that it has all the air of having been derived from the best critics who frequented the library at ,rome1 where ,strabo was when he wrote 7,greek3 kai e7_/nthade kai e7n ,a7lexandrei_/a1 xiii4 #fji74 ,the ,peripatetic ,andronikus1 whom he names among the celebrated ,rhodians 7xiv4 #fee71 may have been among his informants4 ,his statements about the bad state of the manuscripts2 the unskilful emendations of ,apellikon2 the contrast between the vein of ,peripatetic study1 as it had stood before the revelation of the manuscripts1 and as it came to stand afterwards2 the uncertain evidences upon which careful students1 even with the manuscripts before them1 were compelled to proceed2 the tone of depreciation in which he speaks of the carelessness of booksellers who sought only for profit1--all these points of information appear to me to indicate that ,strabo's informants were acute and diligent critics1 familiar with the library1 and anxious both for the real understanding of these documents1 and for philosophy as an end4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plutarch1 ,sylla1 c4 xxvi4 ,spengel 7,ueber die ,reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen ,schriften des ,aristoteles1 ,mnchen4 philol4 ,abhandl4 #ahdh17 remarks justly that the critical arrangement of ,aristotle's writings1 for collective publication1 begins from the library of ,apellikon at ,rome1 not from that of ,alexandria4 ,see p4 #adf3 ,mehr als zweihundert ,jahre lang fehlt uns alle nhere ,kunde ber die peripatetische ,schule4 ,erst mit der viel besprochenen ,auffindung der ,bibliothek des ,aristoteles in ,athen und deren ,wegfhrung nach ,rom durch ,sulla wird ein regeres ,studium fr die ,schriften des ,philosophen bemerkbar--und zwar jetzt eigentlich der ,schriften1 weniger der ,lehre und ,philosophie im ,allgemeinen1 welche frher allein beachtet worden ist4 ,wir mchten sagen1 von jetzt an beginne das philologische ,studium mit den ,werken des ,aristoteles1 die kritische und exegetische ,behandlung dieser durch ,tyrannion1 ,andronikus1 ,adrastus und viele andre nachlfolgende1 c4 ,the explanation just given1 coinciding on many points with ,brandis and ,heitz1 affords the most probable elucidation of that obscurity which arises about the ,aristotelian ,canon1 when we compare our ,aristotle with the ,catalogue of ,diogenes--the partial likeness1 but still greater discrepancy1 between the two4 ,it is certain that neither ,cicero#cb nor the great ,alexandrine literati1 anterior to and contemporary with him1 knew ,aristotle from most of the works which we now possess4 ,they knew him chiefly from the dialogues1 the matters of history and legend1 some zoological books1 and the problems2 the dialogues1 and the historical collections respecting the constitutions of ,hellenic cities1#cc being more popular and better known than any other works4 ,while the ,republic of ,plato is familiar to them1 they exhibit no knowledge of our ,aristotelian ,politica1 in which treatise the criticism upon the ,platonic ,republic is among the most interesting parts4 ,when we look through the contents of our editions of ,aristotle the style and manner of handling is indeed pretty much the same throughout1 but the subjects will appear extremely diverse and multifarious2 and the encyclopedical character of the author1 as to science and its applications1 will strike us forcibly4 ,the entire and real ,aristotle1 however1 was not only more encyclopedical as to subjects handled1 but also more variable as to style and manner of handling2 passing from the smooth1 sweet1 and flowing style--which ,cicero extols as characterizing the ,aristotelian dialogues--to the elliptical brevity and obscurity which we now find so puzzling in the ,de ,anim and the ,metaphysica4#cd ,footnote #cb3 ,this is certain1 from the remarks addressed by ,cicero to ,trebatius at the beginning of the ,ciceronian ,topica1 that in his time ,aristotle was little known and little studied at ,rome1 even by philosophical students4 ,trebatius knew nothing of the ,topica1 until he saw the work by chance in ,cicero's library1 and asked information about the contents4 ,the reply of ,cicero illustrates the little notice taken of ,aristotle by ,roman readers4 ,cum autem ego te1 non tam vitandi laboris mei caus1 quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer1 vel ut eos per te ipse legeres1 vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam rhetore acciperes1 hortatus essem1 utrumque ut ex te audiebam1 es expertus4 ,sed a libris te obscuritas rejecit3 rhetor autem ille magnus1 ut opinor1 ,aristotelia se ignorare respondit4 ,quod quidem minime sum admiratus1 eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum1 qui ab ipsis philosophis1 prter admodum paucos1 ignoraretur4 ,compare also ,cicero1 ,academ4 ,post4 i4 #c1 #aj4 ,footnote #cc3 ,even the philosophical commentators on ,aristotle1 such as ,david the ,armenian1 seem to have known the lost work of ,aristotle called ,greek3 ,politeiai 7the history of the constitutions of #bej ,hellenic cities71 better than the theoretical work which we possess1 called the ,politica2 though they doubtless knew both4 7,see ,scholia ad ,categorias1 ,brandis1 p4 #af1 b4 #bj2 p4 #bd1 a4 #be2 p4 #be1 b4 #e47--,we read in ,schneider's ,preface to the ,aristotelian ,politica 7p4 x473 ,altum et mirabile silentium est apud antiquitatem ,grcam et ,romanam de nov ,aristotelis ,republic1 cum omnes fer scriptores ,grci et ,romani1 mentione ,reipublic ,platonic pleni1 vel laudibus vel vituperiis ejus abundant4--,there is no clear reference to the ,aristotelian ,politica earlier than ,alexander of ,aphrodisias4 ,both ,hildenbrand 7,geschichte der ,staats- und ,rechts-,philosophen1 t4 i4 pp4 #ceh-cfa71 and ,oncken 7,staatslehre des ,aristot4 pp4 #fe-ff71 think that the ,aristotelian ,politica was not published until after the purchase of the library by ,apellikon4 ,footnote #cd3 ,what ,strabo asserts about the ,peripatetic ,scholarchs succeeding ,theophrastus 7viz41 ,greek3 mden e7_/chein philosophein pragmatiks1 a7lla the_/seis lkuthi_/zein3 that they could not handle philosophy in a businesslike way--with those high generalities and that subtle analysis which was supposed to belong to philosophy--but gave smooth and ornate discourses on set problems or theses7 is fully borne out by what we read in ,cicero about these same ,peripatetics4 ,the ,stoics 7immediate successors and rivals7 accused their ,peripatetic contemporaries even of being ignorant of ,dialectic3 which their founder1 ,aristotle1 in his works that we now possess1 had been the first to raise into something like a science4 ,cicero says 7,de ,finibus1 iii4 #ab1 #da73 ,his igitur ita positis 7inquit ,cato7 sequitur magna contentio3 quam tractatam ,peripateticis mollius 7est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta1 propter ignorationem ,dialectic71 ,carneades tuus1 egregi qudam exercitatione in dialecticis summque eloquenti1 rem in summum discrimen adduxit4 ,also ,cicero1 in ,tuscul4 ,disput4 iv4 #e4 #i3 ,quia ,chrysippus et ,stoici1 quum de animi perturbationibus disputant1 magnam partem in iis partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt1 illa eorum perexigua oratio est1 qu medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur4 ,peripatetici autem ad placandos animos multa afferunt1 spinas partiendi et definiendi prtermittunt4 ,this last sentence is almost an exact equivalent of the words of ,strabo3 ,greek3 mden e7_/chein philosophein pragmatiks1 a7lla the_/seis lkuthi_/zein4 ,aristotle himself1 in the works which we possess1 might pass as father of the ,stoics rather than of the ,peripatetics2 for he abounds in classification and subdivision 7spinas partiendi et dividendi71 and is even derided on this very ground by opponents 7see ,atticus ap4 ,euseb4 ,prp4 ,ev4 xv4 #d72 but he has nothing of the polished amplification ascribed to the later ,peripatetics by ,strabo and ,cicero4 ,compare1 about the ,peripatetics from ,lykon to ,kritolaus1 ,cicero1 ,de ,finibus1 v4 #e3 ,lyco1 oratione locuples1 rebus ipsis jejunior4 ,plutarch 7,sylla1 c4 xxvi47 calls these later ,peripatetics ,greek3 charie_/ntes kai philo_/logoi1 c4 ,i shall assume this variety1 both of subject and of handling1 as a feature to be admitted and allowed for in ,aristotle1 when ,i come to discuss the objections of some critics against the authenticity of certain treatises among the forty-six which now pass under his name4 ,but in canvassing the ,aristotelian ,canon ,i am unable to take the same ground as ,i took in my former work1 when reviewing the ,platonic ,canon4 ,in regard to ,plato1 ,i pointed out a strong antecedent presumption in favour of the ,canon of ,thrasyllus--a canon derived originally from the ,alexandrine librarians1 and sustained by the unanimous adhesion of antiquity4 ,in regard to ,aristotle1 there are no similar grounds of presumption to stand upon4 ,we have good reason for believing that the works both of ,plato and ,aristotle--if not all the works1 at least many of them1 and those the most generally interesting--were copied and transmitted early to the ,alexandrine library4 ,now our ,plato represents that which was possessed and accredited as ,platonic by the ,byzantine ,aristophanes and the other ,alexandrine librarians2 but our ,aristotle does not1 in my judgment1 represent what these librarians possessed and accredited as ,aristotelian4 ,that which they thus accredited stands recorded in the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes1 probably the work of ,hermippus1 as ,i have already stated2 while our ,aristotle is traceable to the collection at ,athens1 including that of ,apellikon1 with that which he bought from the heirs of ,neleus1 and to the sifting1 correction1 and classification1 applied thereto by able critics of the first century ,b4,c4 and subsequently2 among whom ,andronikus is best known4 ,we may easily believe that the library of ,apellikon contained various compositions of ,aristotle1 which had never been copied for the ,alexandrine library--perhaps never prepared for publication at all1 so that the task of arranging detached sections or morsels into a whole1 with one separate title1 still remained to be performed4 ,this was most likely to be the case with abstruser speculations1 like the component books of the ,metaphysica1 which ,theophrastus may not have been forward to tender1 and which the library might not be very eager to acquire1 having already near four hundred other volumes by the same author4 ,these reserved works would therefore remain in the library of ,theophrastus1 not copied and circulated 7or at least circulated only to a few private philosophical brethren1 such as ,eudmus71 so that they never became fully published until the days of ,apellikon4#ce ,footnote #ce3 ,the two ,peripatetic ,scholarchs at ,athens1 ,straton and ,lykon1 who succeeded 7after the death of ,theophrastus and the transfer of his library to ,skpsis7 in the conduct of the school1 left at their decease collections of books1 of which each disposes by his will 7,diogen4 ,l4 v4 #fb2 v4 #gc74 ,the library of ,apellikon1 when sent by ,sylla to ,rome1 contained probably many other ,aristotelian ,,mss41 besides those purchased from ,skpsis4 ,michelet1 in his ,commentary on the ,nikomachean ,ethica1 advances a theory somewhat analogous but bolder1 respecting the relation between the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes1 and the works contained in our ,aristotle4 ,comm4 p4 #b4 ,id solum addam1 hoc ,aristotelis opus 7the ,nikomachean ,ethica71 ut reliqua omnia1 ex brevioribus commentationibus consarcinatum fuisse1 qu quidem vivo ,aristotele in lucem prodierint1 cum unaquque disciplina1 e qu excerpta fuerint in admirabilem illum quem habemus ordinem jam ab ipso ,aristotele sive quodam ejus discipulo redacta1 in libris ,aristotelis manu scriptis latitaverit1 qui hereditate ad ,nelei prolem1 ut notum est1 transmissi1 in cell ill subterrane ,scepsi absconditi fuerunt1 donec ,apellicon ,teius et ,rhodius ,andronicus eos ediderint4 ,leguntur autem commentationum illarum de ,moribus tituli in elencho librorum ,aristotelis apud ,diogenem 7v4 #bb-bf73 ,greek3 peri a7retn 7,lib4 ii41 iii4 c4 #f-;fin4 iv4 nostrorum ,ethicorum72 ,greek3 peri e7kousi_/ou 7,lib4 iii4 c4 #a-e72 c4 ,plerumque enim non integra volumina1 sed singulos libros vel singula volumina diversarum disciplinarum1 ,diogenes in elencho suo enumeravit4 ,in his other work 7,essai sur la ,mtaphysique d',aristote1 pp4 #bjb1 #bje1 #bbe7 ,michelet has carried this theory still farther1 and has endeavoured to identify separate fragments of the ,aristotelian works now extant1 with various titles in the ,catalogue given by ,diogenes4 ,the identification is not convincing4 ,but though the edition published by ,andronikus would thus contain many genuine works of ,aristotle not previously known or edited1 we cannot be sure that it would not also include some which were spurious4 ,reflect what the library of ,apellikon1 transported to ,rome by ,sylla1 really was4 ,there was in it the entire library of ,theophrastus2 probably1 also1 that of ,neleus1 who must have had some books of his own1 besides what he inherited from ,theophrastus4 ,it included all the numerous manuscript works composed by ,aristotle and ,theophrastus1 and many other manuscript works purchased or acquired by them1 but composed by others--the whole in very bad order and condition2 and1 moreover1 the books which ,apellikon possessed before1 doubtless as many ,aristotelian books as he could purchase4 ,to distinguish1 among this heterogeneous mass of manuscripts1 which of them were the manuscripts composed by ,aristotle2 to separate these from the writings of ,theophrastus1 ,eudmus1 or other authors1 who composed various works of their own upon the same subjects and with the same titles as those of ,aristotle--required extreme critical discernment and caution2 the rather1 since there was no living companion of ,aristotle or ,theophrastus to guide or advise1 more than a century and a half having elapsed since the death of ,theophrastus1 and two centuries since that of ,aristotle4 ,such were the difficulties amidst which ,apellikon1 ,tyrannion1 and ,andronikus had to decide1 when they singled out the manuscripts of ,aristotle to be published4 ,i will not say that they decided wrongly2 yet neither can ,i contend 7as ,i argued in the case of the ,platonic dialogues7 that the presumption is very powerful in favour of that ,canon which their decision made legal4 ,the case is much more open to argument1 if any grounds against the decision can be urged4 ,andronikus put in1 arranged1 and published the treatises of ,aristotle 7or those which he regarded as composed by ,aristotle7 included in the library conveyed by ,sylla to ,rome4 ,i have already observed1 that among these treatises there were some1 of which copies existed in the ,alexandrine library 7as represented by the ,catalogue of ,diogenes71 but a still greater number which cannot be identified with the titles remaining of works there preserved4 ,as to the works common to both libraries1 we must remember that ,andronikus introduced a classification of his own1 analogous to the ,enneads applied by ,porphyry to the works of ,plotinus1 and to the ,tetralogies adopted by ,thrasyllus in regard to the ,dialogues of ,plato2 so that even these works might not be distributed in the same partitions under each of the two arrangements4 ,and this is what we actually see when we compare the ,catalogue of ,diogenes with our ,aristotle4 ,rhetoric1 ,ethics1 ,physics1 ,problems1 c41 appear in both as titles or subjects1 but distributed into a different number of books or sections in one and in the other2 perhaps1 indeed1 the compositions are not always the same4 ,before ,i proceed to deal with the preserved works of ,aristotle--those by which alone he is known to us1 and was known to medival readers1 ,i shall say a few words respecting the import of a distinction which has been much canvassed1 conveyed in the word exoteric and its opposite4 ,this term1 used on various occasions by ,aristotle himself1 has been also employed by many ancient critics1 from ,cicero downwards2 while by medival and modern critics1 it has not merely been employed1 but also analysed and elucidated4 ,according to ,cicero 7the earliest writer subsequent to ,aristotle in whom we find the term71 it designates one among two classes of works composed by ,aristotle3 exoteric works were those composed in a popular style and intended for a large1 indiscriminate circle of readers3 being contrasted with other works of elaborated philosophical reasoning1 which were not prepared for the public taste1 but left in the condition of memorials for the instruction of a more select class of studious men4 ,two points are to be observed respecting ,cicero's declaration4 ,first1 he applies it to the writings not of ,aristotle exclusively1 but also to those of ,theophrastus1 and even of succeeding ,peripatetics2 secondly1 he applies it directly to such of their writings only as related to the discussion of the ,summum ,bonum4#cf ,furthermore1 ,cicero describes the works which ,aristotle called exoteric1 as having proems or introductory prefaces4#cg ,footnote #cf3 ,cicero1 ,de ,finibus1 v4 #e1 #ab4 ,de summo autem bono1 quia duo genera librorum sunt1 unum populariter scriptum1 quod ,greek3 e7xterikon appellabant1 alterum limatius1 quod in commentariis reliquerunt1 non semper idem dicere videntur3 nec in summ tamen ips aut varietas est ulla1 apud hos quidem quos nominavi1 aut inter ipsos dissensio4 ,the word limatius here cannot allude to high polish and ornament of style 7nitor orationis71 but must be equivalent to ,greek3 a7kribe_/steron1 doctius1 subtilius1 c4 7as ,buhle and others have already remarked1 ,buhle1 ,de ,libris ,aristot4 ,exoter4 et ,acroam4 p4 #aae2 ,madvig1 ad ,cicero de ,finib4 v4 #ab2 ,heitz1 p4 #acd71 applied to profound reasoning1 with distinctions of unusual precision1 which it required a careful preparatory training to apprehend4 ,this employment of the word limatius appears to me singular1 but it cannot mean anything else here4 ,the commentarii are the general heads--plain unadorned statements of facts or reasoning--which the orator or historian is to employ his genius in setting forth and decorating1 so that it may be heard or read with pleasure and admiration by a general audience4 ,cicero1 in that remarkable letter wherein he entreats ,lucceius to narrate his 7,cicero's7 consulship in an historical work1 undertakes to compose commentarios rerum omnium as materials for the use of ,lucceius 7,ep4 ad ,famil4 v4 #ab4 #aj74 ,his expression1 in commentariis reliquerunt1 shows that he considered the exoteric books to have been prepared by working up some naked preliminary materials into an ornate and interesting form4 ,footnote #cg3 ,cicero1 ,ep4 ad ,att4 iv4 #af4 ,in the main1 the distinction here drawn by ,cicero1 understood in a very general sense1 has been accepted by most following critics as intended by the term exoteric3 something addressed to a wide1 indiscriminate circle of general readers or hearers1 and intelligible or interesting to them without any special study or training--as contrasted with that which is reserved for a smaller circle of students assumed to be specially qualified4 ,but among those who agree in this general admission1 many differences have prevailed4 ,some have thought that the term was not used by ,aristotle to designate any writings either of his own or of others1 but only in allusion to informal oral dialogues or debates4 ,others again1 feeling assured that ,aristotle intended by the term to signify some writings of his own1 have searched among the works preserved1 as well as among the titles of the works lost1 to discriminate such as the author considered to be exoteric3 though this search has certainly not ended in unanimity2 nor do ,i think it has been successful4 ,again1 there have not been wanting critics 7among them1 ,thomas ,aquinas and ,sepulveda71 who assign to the term a meaning still more vague and undefined2 contending that when ,aristotle alludes to exoteric discourses1 he indicates simply some other treatise of his own1 distinct from that in which the allusion occurs1 without meaning to imply anything respecting its character4#ch ,footnote #ch3 ,sepulveda1 p4 #abe 7cited by ,bernays1 ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 p4 #da73 ,externos sermones sive exotericos solet ,aristoteles libros eos appellare1 quicunque sunt extra id opus in quo tunc versatur1 ut jure pontificio periti consueverunt3 non enim exoterici sermones seu libri certo aliquo genere continentur1 ut est publicus error4 ,zeller lends his high authority to an explanation of exoteric very similar to the above4 7,gesch4 der ,philos4 ii4 #b1 p4 #ajj1 seq43--dass unter exoterischen ,reden nicht eine eigene ,klasse populr geschriebener ,bcher1 sondern nur berhaupt solche ,errterungen verstanden werden1 welche nicht in den ,bereich der vorliegenden ,untersuchung gehren47 ,he discusses the point at some length2 but the very passages which he cites1 especially ,physica1 iv4 #aj1 appear to me less favourable to his view than to that which ,i have stated in the text1 according to which the word means dialectic as contrasted with didactic4 ,to me it appears that this last explanation is untenable1 and that the term exoteric designates matter of a certain character1 assignable to some extent by positive marks1 but still more by negative2 matter1 in part1 analogous to that defined by ,cicero and other critics4 ,but to conceive clearly or fully what its character is1 we must turn to ,aristotle himself1 who is of course the final authority1 wherever he can be found to speak in a decisive manner4 ,his preserved works afford altogether eight passages 7two of them indeed in the ,eudemian ,ethics1 which1 for the present at least1 ,i shall assume to be his work71 wherein the phrase exoteric discourses 7,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi7 occurs4 ,out of these eight passages1 there are seven which present the phrase as designating some unknown matter1 not farther specified1 but distinct from the work in which the phrase occurs3 ,enough has been said 7or is said1 ,aristotle intimates7 about this subject1 even in the exoteric discourses4 ,to what it is that he here alludes--whether to other writings of his own or oral discussions of his own1 or writing and speech of a particular sort by others--we are left to interpret as we best may1 by probable reason or conjecture4 ,but there is one among the eight passages1 in which ,aristotle uses the term exoteric as describing1 not what is to be looked for elsewhere1 but what he is himself about to give in the treatise in hand4 ,in the fourth book of the ,physica1 he discusses the three high abstractions1 ,place1 ,vacuum1 ,time4 ,after making an end of the first two1 he enters upon the third1 beginning with the following words3--,it follows naturally on what has been said1 that we should treat respecting ,time4 ,but first it is convenient to advert to the difficulties involved in it1 by exoteric discourse also--whether ,time be included among entities or among non-entities2 then afterwards1 what is its nature4 ,now a man might suspect1 from the following reasons1 that ,time either absolutely does not exist1 or exists scarcely and dimly1 c4 ,aristotle then gives a string of dialectic reasons1 lasting through one of the columns of the ,berlin edition1 for doubting whether ,time really exists4 ,he afterwards proceeds thus1 through two farther columns3--,let these be enumerated as the difficulties accompanying the attributes of ,time4 ,what ,time is1 and what is its nature1 is obscure1 as well from what has been handed down to us by others1 as from what we ourselves have just gone through2#ci and this question also he first discusses dialectically1 and then brings to a solution4 ,footnote #ci3 ,aristot4 ,physic4 iv4 #aj1 p4 #bag1 b4 #bi4 ,greek3 ,e7cho_/menon de tn ei7rme_/nn e7stin e7pelthein peri chro_/nou2 prton de kals e7_/chei diaporsai peri au7tou kai dia tn e7xterikn lo_/gn1 po_/teron tn o7_/ntn e7stin 7 tn m o7_/ntn1 ei7ta ti_/s 7 phu_/sis au7tou4 ,o7_/ti men ou7n 7 o7_/ls e7_/stin1 7 mo_/lis kai a7mudrs1 e7k tnde_/ tis a7n u7popteu_/seien4 ,then1 after a column of text urging various ,greek3 a7pori_/as as to whether ,time is or is not1 he goes on1 p4 #bah1 a4 #ca3--;,greek3 ,peri men ou7n tn u7parcho_/ntn au7t tosaut' e7_/st diporme_/na4 ,ti_/ d' e7stin o7 chro_/nos1 kai ti_/s au7tou 7 phu_/sis1 o7moi_/s e7_/k te tn paradedome_/nn a7_/dlo_/n e7sti1 kai peri 7n tugcha_/nomen diellutho_/tes pro_/teron--thus taking up the questions1 ,what ,time is8 ,what is the nature of ,time8 ,upon this he goes through another column of ,greek3 a7pori_/ai1 difficulties and counter-difficulties1 until p4 #bai1 a4 #a1 when he approaches to a positive determination1 as the sequel of various negatives--,greek3 o7_/ti men ou7n ou7_/te ki_/nsis ou7_/t' a7_/neu kin_/ses o7 chro_/nos e7sti_/1 phanero_/n4 lpte_/on de_/1 e7pei ztoumen ti_/ e7stin o7 chro_/nos1 e7nteuthen a7rchome_/nois1 ti_/ ts kin_/se_/s e7stin4 ,he pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns 7see ,greek3 u7pokei_/sth1 a4 #cj71 until at length he arrives at his final definition of ,time--,greek3 a7rithmos kin_/ses kata to pro_/teron kai u7_/steron1 kai sunech_/s 7sunechous gar7--which he declares to be ,greek3 phanero_/n1 p4 #bbj1 a4 #be4 ,it is plain that the phrase ,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi here designates the preliminary dialectic tentative process1 before the final affirmative is directly attempted1 as we read in ,de ,gener4 et ,corr4 i4 #c1 p4 #cag1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 peri men ou7n tou_/tn e7n a7_/llois te dipo_/rtai kai di_/ristai tois lo_/gois e7pi pleion--first1 ,greek3 to diaporein1 next1 ,greek3 to diori_/zein4 ,now what is it that ,aristotle here means by exoteric discourse8 ,we may discover by reading the matter comprised between the two foregoing citations4 ,we find a string of perplexing difficulties connected with the supposition that ,time exists3 such as1 ,that all ,time is either past or future1 of which the former no longer exists1 and the latter does not yet exist2 that the ,now is no part of ,time1 for every ,whole is composed of its ,parts1 and ,time is not composed of ,nows1 c4 ,i do not go farther here into these subtle suggestions1 because my present purpose is only to illustrate what ,aristotle calls exoteric discourse1 by exhibiting what he himself announces to be a specimen thereof4 ,it is the process of noticing and tracing out all the doubts and difficulties 7,greek3 a7pori_/as7 which beset the enquiry in hand1 along with the different opinions entertained about it either by the vulgar1 or by individual philosophers1 and the various reasons whereby such opinions may be sustained or impugned4 ,it is in fact the same process as that which1 when performed 7as it was habitually and actively in his age7 between two disputants1 he calls dialectic debate2 and which he seeks to encourage as well as to regulate in his treatise entitled ,topica4 ,he contrasts it with philosophy1 or with the strictly didactic and demonstrative procedure3 wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires the learner to admit1 and then deduces from them1 by syllogisms constructed in regular form1 consequences indisputably binding on all who have admitted the principles4 ,but though ,aristotle thus distinguishes ,dialectic from ,philosophy1 he at the same time declares it to be valuable as an auxiliary towards the purpose of philosophy1 and as an introductory exercise before the didactic stage begins4 ,the philosopher ought to show his competence as a dialectician1 by indicating and handling those various difficulties and controversies bearing on his subject1 which have already been made known1 either in writings or in oral debate4#dj ,footnote #dj3 ,see ,aristot4 ,topic4 i4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #ba1 p4 #aja1 a4 #be1 #cd-cf1 b4 #b4 ,greek3 ,pros de tas kata philosophi_/an e7pist_/mas 7chr_/simos 7 pragmatei_/a71 o7_/ti duna_/menoi pros a7mpho_/tera diaporsai r7aon e7n e7ka_/stois katopso_/metha ta7lthe_/s te kai to pseudos1 p4 #aje1 b4 #cj4 ,greek3 ,pros men ou7n philosophi_/an kat' a7ltheian peri 9999au7tn pragmateue_/on1 9999dialektiks de pros do_/xan4 ,compare also the commencement of book ,b4 in the ,metaphysica1 p4 #iie1 a4 #bh seq41 and1 indeed1 the whole of book ,b41 which contains a dialectic discussion of numerous ,greek3 a7pori_/ai4 ,aristotle himself refers to it afterwards 7,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajjd1 a4 #cb7 in the words ,greek3 u7_/per e7n tais a7pori_/ais e7lechth4 ,the ,scholia of ,alexander on the beginning of the ,topica 7pp4 #bea1 #beb1 ,brandis7 are instructive2 also his ,scholia on p4 #aje1 b4 #cj1 p4 #bfj1 a4 #bd4 ,greek3 dialektiks de pros do_/xan1 7s e7n tau_/t t pragmatei_/a 7i4e4 the ,topica7 ,greek3 kai e7n tois r7torikois1 kai e7n tois e7xterikois4 kai gar e7n e7kei_/nois pleista kai peri tn9999 7thikn kai peri tn phusikn e7ndo_/xs le_/getai4 ,we see here that ,alexander understands by the exoteric the dialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics4 ,in the ,eudemian ,ethica also 7i4 #h1 p4 #abag1 b4 #af7 we find ,greek3 e7pe_/skeptai de pollois peri au7tou tro_/pois1 kai e7n tois e7xterikois lo_/gois kai e7n tois kata philosophi_/an1 where we have the same antithesis in other words--,exoteric or ,dialectic versus ,philosophical or ,didactic4 ,compare a clear statement in ,simplikius 7,schol4 ad ,physic4 p4 #cfd1 b4 #ai74 ,greek3 ,prton men logiks e7picheirei1 tou_/testi pithans kai e7ndo_/xs1 kai e7_/ti koino_/tero_/n ps kai dialektik_/teron4 7 gar dialektik 7 ,a7ristote_/lous koin_/ e7sti me_/thodos peri pantos tou protethe_/ntos e7x e7ndo_/xn sullogizome_/n--to gar logikon 7s koinon ei7_/then a7ntidiaste_/llein ta oi7kei_/ kai kata phu_/sin tou pra_/gmatos kai a7podeiktik4 ,we thus learn1 from the example furnished by ,aristotle himself1 what he means by exoteric discourses4 ,the epithet means literally1 extraneous to1 lying on the outside of2 in the present case1 on the outside of philosophy1 considered in its special didactic and demonstrative march4#da ,yet what thus lies outside philosophy1 is nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for philosophy4 ,we shall find ,aristotle insisting upon this in his ,topica and ,analytica2 and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises 7the ,physica is one of the most abstruse7 as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a dialectic survey of opinions1 puzzles1 and controverted points1 before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of his own4 ,he does this not only throughout the ,physica 7in several other passages besides that which ,i have just cited71#db but also in the ,metaphysica1 the treatises ,de ,anim1 ,de ,generatione et ,corruptione1 c4 ,footnote #da3 ,we find the epithet ,greek3 e7xterikos used once by ,aristotle1 not in conjunction with ,greek3 lo_/goi1 but with ,greek3 pra_/xeis1 designating those acts which are performed with a view to some ulterior and extraneous end 7,greek3 tn a7pobaino_/ntn cha_/rin1 as contrasted with ,greek3 pra_/xeis au7toteleis--oi7keiai73 ,polit4 vii4 p4 #acbe1 b4 #bb-bi4 ,greek3 schol 9999gar a7n o7 theos e7_/choi kals kai pas o7 ko_/smos1 oi7s ou7k ei7sin e7xterikai pra_/xeis para tas oi7kei_/as tas au7tn4 ,in the ,eudemian ,ethics the phrase ,greek3 tois a7llotri_/ois lo_/gois sophi_/zontai is used much in the same sense as ,greek3 tois e7xterikois lo_/gois3 i4e4 opposed to ,greek3 tois oi7kei_/ois--to that which belongs specially to the scientific determination of the problem 7,ethic4 ,eudem4 i4 p4 #abah1 b4 #ah74 ,the phrase ,greek3 dia tn e7xterikn lo_/gn1 in ,aristot4 ,physic4 iv4 #aj1 p4 #bag1 b4 #ca1 and the different phrase ,greek3 e7k tn ei7tho_/tn lo_/gn le_/gesthai1 in ,phys4 vi4 #b1 p4 #bcc1 a4 #ac1 appear to have the same meaning and reference4 ,compare ,prantl not4 ad ,arist4 ,phys4 p4 #eja4 ,footnote #db3 ,if we turn to the beginning of book iv4 of the ,physica1 where ,aristotle undertakes to examine ,greek3 ,to_/pos1 ,place1 we shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of ,greek3 a7pori_/ai1 exactly analogous to that which he himself calls ,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi1 when he proceeds to examine ,greek3 ,chro_/nos1 ,time3 see ,physica1 iv4 pp4 #bjh1 a4 #cb-ce1 #bji1 a4 #cj2 #baj1 a4 #ab1 b4 #ca4 ,he does the like also about ,greek3 ,keno_/n1 ,vacuum1 p4 #bac1 a4 #bj1 b4 #bh1 and about ,greek3 ,a7_/peiron1 ,infinitum1 iii4 p4 #bjd1 b4 #d 7with the ,scholia of ,simplikius1 p4 #cfd1 b4 #bj1 ,br474 ,compare the ,scholion of ,simplikius ad ,physica 7i4 p4 #cbi1 b4 #a1 ,br47--,greek3 i7_/ss de 7,simplikius uses this indecisive word ,greek3 i7_/ss7 ,greek3 o7_/ti 7 e7ph' e7ka_/tera a7pori_/a tou lo_/gou e7xterik_/ tis 7n1 7s ,eu7_/dmo_/s phsi1 dialektik mallon ou7sa1 with this last ,scholion1 on p4 #cfd1 b4 #bj1 which describes the same dialectic handling1 though without directly calling it exoteric4 ,having thus learnt to understand1 from one distinct passage of ,aristotle himself1 what he means by exoteric discourses1 we must interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages in which the phrase occurs4 ,we see clearly that in using the phrase1 he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his own--nor even to any other writings at all4 ,he may possibly mean this2 but we cannot be sure of it4 ,he means by the phrase1 a dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions and probabilities3 whether in his own writings1 or in those of others1 or in no writings at all1 but simply in those oral debates which his treatise called ,topica presupposes--this is a point which the phrase itself does not determine4 ,he may mean to allude1 in some cases where he uses the phrase1 to his own lost dialogues2 but he may also allude to ,platonic and other dialogues1 or to colloquies carried on orally by himself with his pupils1 or to oral debates on intellectual topics between other active-minded men4 ,when ,bernays refers exoteric discourse to the lost ,aristotelian ,dialogues2 when ,madvig1 ,zeller1 ,torstrick1 ,forchhammer1 and others1 refer it to the contemporary oral dialectic#dc--;,i think that neither of these explanations is in itself inadmissible4 ,the context of each particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable4 ,we cannot go farther1 in explaining the seven doubtful passages where ,aristotle alludes to the exoteric discourses1 than to understand the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus designates4 ,extra-philosophical1 double-sided1 dialectic1 is in general 7he holds7 insufficient by itself1 and valuable only as a preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process4 ,but there are some particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient and satisfactory1 which can be safely accepted as the basis of future deduction4 ,these points he indicates in the passages above cited2 without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was written or spoken1 and whether by himself or by others4#dd ,footnote #dc3 ,ueberweg 7,geschichte der ,philos4 des ,alterthums1 vol4 i4 #df1 p4 #abg1 #bnd ed47 gives a just and accurate view of ,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi1 as conceived by ,aristotle4 ,see also the dissertation of ,buhle1 prefixed to his unfinished edition of ,aristotle1 ,de ,aristotelis ,libris ,exotericis et ,acroamaticis1 pp4 #ajg-aeb--which discusses this subject copiously1 and gives a collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it4 ,it is instructive1 though his opinion leans too much towards the supposition of a double doctrine4 ,bernays1 in his dissertation1 ,die ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 maintains that by exoteric books are always meant the lost dialogues of ,aristotle2 and he employs much reasoning to refute the supposition of ,madvig 7,excurs4 ,,vii4 ad ,cicero1 de ,fin4 p4 #hfa71 of ,torstrick 7ad ,aristotel4 de ,anim1 p4 #abc71 and also of ,zeller1 that by exoteric discourses are not meant any writings at all1 but simply the colloquies and debates of cultivated men1 apart from the philosophical schools4 ,on the other hand1 ,forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion1 and has defended it against the objections of ,bernays 7,forchhammer1 ,aristoteles und die exoterischen ,reden1 p4 #af1 seq474 ,the question is thus fully argued on both sides4 ,to me it seems that each of these two opinions is partially right1 and neither of them exclusively right4 ,exoteric discourse1 as ,i understand it1 might be found both in the ,aristotelian dialogues1 and in the debates of cultivated men out of the schools1 and also in parts of the ,aristotelian akroamatic works4 ,the argument of ,bernays 7p4 #cf1 seq471 that the points which ,aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses1 were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by cultivated men out of the schools1 or 7as he expresses it7 in the salons or coffee-houses 7or what corresponded thereto7 at ,athens--this argument seems to me untenable4 ,we know well1 from the ,topica of ,aristotle1 that the most abstruse subjects were handled dialectically1 in a manner which he called extra-philosophical2 and that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at ,athens4 ,to discuss these matters in the way which he calls ,greek3 pros do_/xan1 was more frequent than to discuss them ,greek3 pros a7l_/theian4 ,zell remarks 7ad ,ethica ,nikom4 i4 #ac71 after referring to the passage in ,aristotle's ,physica1 iv4 #aj 7to which ,i have called attention in a previous note71 quo loco1 ,buhlio neglecto1 ,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi idem significant quod alibi ,greek3 koinai do_/xai1 ei7tho_/tes lo_/goi1 vel ,greek3 ta lego_/mena3 qu semper1 priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat1 disquirere solet ,aristoteles4 ,vide supra1 ad cap4 viii4 #a4 ,i find also in ,weisse 7,translation of and ,comment on the ,physica of ,aristotle1 p4 #eag7 a fair explanation of what ,aristotle really means by exoteric2 an explanation1 however1 which ,ritter sets aside1 in my judgment erroneously 7,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 iii4 p4 #bc74 ,footnote #dd3 ,thus1 for example1 the passage in the ,ethica ,nikom4 i4 #ac1 p4 #aajb1 a4 #bf4 ,greek3 le_/getai de peri au7tn kai e7n tois e7xterikois lo_/gois a7rkou_/nts e7_/nia1 kai chrste_/on au7tois1 is explained in the ,paraphrase of the ,pseudo-,andronikus as referring to oral colloquy of ,aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors2 and this may possibly be a correct explanation4 ,from the time of ,cicero downward1 a distinction has been drawn between some books of ,aristotle which were exoteric1 and others that were not so2 these last being occasionally designated as akroamatic4 ,some modern critics have farther tried to point out which1 among the preserved works of ,aristotle1 belonged to each of these heads4 ,now there existed1 doubtless1 in the days of ,cicero1 ,strabo1 ,plutarch1 and ,gellius1 books of ,aristotle properly called exoteric1 i4e4 consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse and debate2 though whether ,aristotle himself would have spoken of an exoteric book1 ,i have some doubt4 ,of such a character were his ,dialogues4 ,but all the works designated as akroamatic 7or non-exoteric7 must probably have contained a certain admixture of exoteric discourse2 as the ,physica 7,greek3 ,phusik ,a7kro_/asis7 and the ,metaphysica are seen to contain now4 ,the distinction indicated by ,cicero would thus be really between one class of works1 wherein exoteric discourse was exclusive or paramount1--and another1 in which it was partially introduced1 subordinate to some specified didactic purpose4#de ,to this last class belong all the works of ,aristotle that we possess at present4 ,cicero would have found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book4 ,footnote #de3 ,to this extent ,i go along with the opinion expressed by ,weisse in his translation of the ,physica of ,aristotle1 p4 #eag3 ,dass dieser ,gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten ,bcherclassen ist1 sondern dass ein und dasselbe ,werk zugleich exoterisch und esoterisch sein konnte2 und zweitens1 dass exoterisch berhaupt dasjenige heisst1 was nicht in den positiv-dogmatischen ,zusammenhang der ,lehre des ,philosophen unmittelbar als ,glied eintritt4 ,but ,weisse goes on afterwards to give a different opinion 7about the meaning of exoteric books71 conformable to what ,i have cited in a previous note from ,sepulveda2 and in that ,i do not concur4 ,however1 he remarks that the manner in which ,aristotle handled the ,abstracta1 ,place and ,infinite1 is just the same as that which he declares to be exoteric in the case of ,time4 ,the distinction drawn by ,aulus ,gellius 7xx4 #e7 is not accurate3 ,greek3 ,e7xterika dicebantur1 qu ad rhetoricas meditationes1 facultatem argutiarum1 civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant4 ,greek3 ,a7kroatika autem vocabantur1 in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur2 quque ad natur contemplationes1 disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant4 ,it appears to me that disceptationes dialectic ought to be transferred to the department ,greek3 e7xterika_/1 and that civilium rerum notitia belongs as much to ,greek3 a7kroatika as to ,greek3 e7xterika_/4 ,m4 ,ravaisson has discussed this question very ably and instructively1 ,essai sur la ,mtaphysique d',aristote1 pp4 #bbd-bdd4 ,he professes indeed to defend the opinion which ,i have cited from ,sepulveda1 and which ,i think erroneous2 but his reasonings go really to the support of the opinion given in my text4 ,he remarks1 justly1 that the dialogues of ,plato 7at least all the dialogues of ,search7 are specimens of exoteric handling2 of which attribute ,forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the ,charmides 7,aristot4 ,exot4 ,reden4 p4 #bb74 ,brandis 7,aristoteles1 p4 #aje7 thinks that when ,aristotle says in the ,politica1 vii4 #a1 p4 #acbc1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 nomi_/santas ou7n i7kans polla le_/gesthai kai tn e7n tois e7xterikois lo_/gois peri ts a7ri_/sts z_/s1 kai nun chrste_/on au7tois1 he intends to designate the ,ethica4 ,it may be so2 yet the ,politica seems a continuation of the ,ethica3 moreover1 even in the ,ethica1 we find reference made to previous discussions1 ,greek3 e7n tois e7xteriks lo_/gois 7,eth4 ,n4 ,i4 #ac74 ,to understand fully the extent comprehended by the word exoteric1 we must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative-- extraneous to philosophy1 and suitable to an audience not specially taught or prepared for philosophy4 ,now this negative characteristic belongs not merely to dialectic 7as we see it in the example above cited from the ,aristotelian ,physica71 but also to rhetoric or rhetorical argument4 ,we know that1 in ,aristotle's mind1 the rhetorical handling and the dialectical handling1 are placed both of them under the same head1 as dealing with opinions rather than with truth4#df ,both the one and the other are parted off from the didactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth2 though dialectic has a distant affinity with that march1 and is indeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher4 ,the term exoteric will thus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical argument4#dg ,of the latter1 we have just seen a specimen extracted from the ,physica2 of the former1 ,i know no specimen remaining1 but there probably were many of them in the ,aristotelian dialogues now lost--that which was called ',eudemus1' and others4 ,with these dialogues ,cicero was probably more familiar than with any other composition of ,aristotle4 ,i think it highly probable that ,aristotle alludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to exoteric discourses4 ,to that extent ,i agree with ,bernays2 but ,i see no reason to believe 7as he does7 that the case is the same with all the passages1 or that the epithet is to be understood always as implying one of these lost ,aristotelian dialogues4#dh ,footnote #df3 ,see the first two chapters of ,aristotle's ,rhetorica1 especially pp4 #acee a4 #bd-ce1 #aceh a4 #e1 #aa1 #be1 also p4 #adjd a4 #a43 ,greek3 o7_/ls ou7_/ss pros do_/xan ts pragmatei_/as ts peri tn r7torik_/n1 which is exactly what he says also about ,dialectic1 in the commencement of the ,topica4 ,footnote #dg3 ,octavianus ,ferrarius observes1 in his treatise ,de ,sermonibus ,exotericis 7,venet4 #aege71 p4 #bd3 ,quod si ,dialecticus et ,rhetor inter se mutant1 ut aiunt1 ita ut ,dialecticus ,rhetorem et ,rhetor ,dialecticum vicissim induat--de his ipsis veteribus ,dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est1 quin iidem dialectice simul et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint4 ,nec valde mirum debet hoc videri2 libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt3 qui cum scripti essent 7ut posterius planum faciam7 dialectico more1 illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentes--,ferrari adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician 7sensu ,aristotelico71 handling often the same subjects1 but in a different way3 between the ,greek3 oi7keiai a7rchai_/1 upon which didactic method rested1 and the ,greek3 do_/xai or diverse opinions1 each countenanced by more or less authority1 from which dialectic took its departure 7pp4 #cf1 #hf1 #hi74 ,footnote #dh3 ,i agree very much with the manner in which ,bernays puts his case1 pp4 #gi1 #hj1 #ib1 #ic3 though there is a contradiction between p4 #hj and p4 #ib1 in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior public for dialectic debate2 which is affirmed in the former page1 denied in the latter4 ,but the doctrine asserted in the pages just indicated amounts only to this--that the dialogues were included in ,aristotle's phrase1 ,greek3 e7xterikoi lo_/goi2 which appears to me true4 ,there grew up1 in the minds of some commentators1 a supposition of exoteric doctrine as denoting what ,aristotle promulgated to the public1 contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved for a special few1 and denoted by the term esoteric2 though this term is not found in use before the days of ,lucian4#di ,i believe the supposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to ,aristotle2 but it is true as to the ,pythagoreans1 and is not without some colour of truth even as to ,plato4 ,that ,aristotle employed one manner of explanation and illustration1 when discussing with advanced pupils1 and another1 more or less different1 when addressing an unprepared audience1 we may hold as certain and even unavoidable2 but this does not amount to a double positive doctrine4 ,properly speaking1 indeed1 the term exoteric 7as ,i have just explained it out of ,aristotle himself7 does not designate1 or even imply1 any positive doctrine at all4 ,it denotes a many-sided controversial debate1 in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled2 the express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing aspects of each4 ,there are indeed a few exceptional cases1 in which exoteric discourse will itself have thrown up a tolerably trustworthy result3 these few 7as ,i have above shown7 ,aristotle occasionally singles out and appeals to4 ,but as a general rule1 there is no doctrine which can properly be called exoteric3 the exoteric discourse suggests many new puzzles1 but terminates without any solution at all4 ,the doctrine1 whenever any such is proved1 emerges out of the didactic process which follows4 ,footnote #di3 ,luc4 ,vit4 ,auct4 #bf4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,categori4 ,of the prodigious total of works composed by ,aristotle1 ,i have already mentioned that the larger number have perished4 ,but there still remain about forty treatises1 of authenticity not open to any reasonable suspicion1 which attest the grandeur of his intelligence1 in respect of speculative force1 positive as well as negative1 systematizing patience1 comprehensive curiosity as to matters of fact1 and diversified applications of detail4 ,in taking account of these treatises1 we perceive some in which the order of sequence is determined by assignable reasons2 as regards others1 no similar grounds of preference appear4 ,the works called #a4 ,de ,coelo2 #b4 ,de ,generatione et ,corruptione2 #c4 ,meteorologica1--are marked out as intended to be studied in immediate succession1 and the various ,zoological treatises after them4 ,the cluster entitled ,parva ,naturalia is complementary to the treatise ,de ,anim4 ,the ,physica ,auscultatio is referred to in the ,metaphysica1 and discusses many questions identical or analogous1 standing in the relation of prior to a posterior1 as the titles indicate2 though the title ',metaphysica' is not affixed or recognized by ,aristotle himself1 and the treatise so called includes much that goes beyond the reach of the ,physica4 ,as to the treatises on ,logic1 ,rhetoric1 ,ethics1 ,politics1 ,poetics1 ,mechanics1 c41 we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient order of study4 ,of no one among them can we assign the date of composition or publication4 ,there are indeed in the ,rhetorica1 ,politics1 and ,meteorologica1 various allusions which must have been written later than some given events of known date2 but these allusions may have been later additions1 and cannot be considered as conclusively proving1 though they certainly raise a presumption1 that the entire work was written subsequently to those events4 ,the proper order in which the works of ,aristotle ought to be studied 7like the order proper for studying the ,platonic dialogues71#a was matter of debate from the time of his earliest editors and commentators1 in the century immediately preceding the ,christian era4 ,bothus the ,sidonian 7,strabo's contemporary and fellow-student7 recommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology should be perused first2 contending that these were the easiest1 the most interesting1 and1 on the whole1 the most successful among all the ,aristotelian productions4 ,some ,platonists advised that the ethical treatises should be put in the front rank1 on the ground of their superior importance for correcting bad habits and character2 others assigned the first place to the mathematics1 as exhibiting superior firmness in the demonstrations4 ,but ,andronikus himself1 the earliest known editor of ,aristotle's works1 arranged them in a different order1 placing the logical treatises at the commencement of his edition4 ,he considered these treatises1 taken collectively1 to be not so much a part of philosophy as an ,organon or instrument1 the use of which must be acquired by the reader before he became competent to grasp or comprehend philosophy2 as an exposition of method rather than of doctrine4#b ,from the time of ,andronikus downward1 the logical treatises have always stood first among the written or printed works of ,aristotle4 ,they have been known under the collective title of the ',organon1' and as such it will be convenient still to regard them4#c ,footnote #a3 ,scholia1 p4 #be1 b4 #cg1 seq4 ,br42 p4 #cba1 b4 #cj2 ,diogen4 ,l4 iii4 #fb4 ,the order in which the forty-six ,aristotelian treatises stand printed in the ,berlin edition1 and in other preceding editions1 corresponds to the tripartite division1 set forth by ,aristotle himself1 of sciences or cognitions generally3 #a4 ,theoretical2 ,greek3 thertikai_/ #b4 ,practical2 ,greek3 praktikai_/4 #c4 ,constructive or ,technical2 ,greek3 poitikai_/4 ,patricius1 in his ,discussiones ,peripatetic1 published in #aeha 7tom4 i4 lib4 xiii4 p4 #agc71 proclaims himself to be the first author who will undertake to give an account of ,aristotle's philosophy from ,aristotle himself 7instead of taking it1 as others before him had done1 from the ,aristotelian expositors1 ,andronikus1 ,alexander1 ,porphyry1 or ,averroes72 likewise1 to be the first author who will consult all the works of ,aristotle1 instead of confining himself1 as his predecessors had done1 to a select few of the works4 ,patricius then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the professors in ,italicis scholis lectured1 and to which the attention of all readers was restricted4 #a4 ,the ,predicabilia1 or ,eisagoge of ,porphyry4 #b4 ,the ,categori4 #c4 ,the ,de ,interpretatione4 #d4 ,the ,analytica ,priora2 but only the four first chapters of the first book4 #e4 ,the ,analytica ,posteriora2 but only a few chapters of the first book2 nothing of the second4 #f4 ,the ,physica2 books first and second2 then parts of the third and fourth2 lastly1 the eighth book4 #g4 ,the ,de ,coelo2 books first and second4 #h4 ,the ,de ,generatione et ,corruptione2 books first and second4 #i4 ,the ,de ,anim2 all the three books4 #aj4 ,the ,metaphysica2 books ,alpha major1 ,alpha minor1 third1 sixth1 and eleventh4 ,idque1 quadriennio integro1 quadruplicis ordinis ,philosophi perlegunt auditoribus4 ,de reliquis omnibus tot libris1 mirum silentium4 ,patricius expressly remarks that neither the ,topica nor the ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis was touched in this full course of four years4 ,but he does not remark--what to a modern reader will seem more surprising--that neither the ,ethica1 nor the ,politica1 nor the ,rhetorica1 is included in the course4 ,footnote #b3 ,aristot4 ,topica1 i4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #a1 with the ,scholia of ,alexander1 p4 #bei1 a4 #dh ,br42 ,scholia ad ,analyt4 ,prior4 p4 #adj1 a4 #dg1 p4 #ada1 a4 #be2 also ,schol4 ad ,categor4 p4 #cf1 a41 p4 #dj1 a41 #h4 ,this conception of the ,organon is not explicitly announced by ,aristotle1 but seems quite in harmony with his views4 ,the contemptuous terms in which ,prantl speaks of it 7,gesch4 der ,logik1 i4 #acf71 as a silly innovation of the ,stoics1 are unwarranted4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,e4 i4 p4 #ajbe1 b4 #bf7 classifies the sciences as ,greek3 thertikai_/1 praktikai_/1 poitikai_/2 next he subdivides the first of the three into ,greek3 phusik_/1 mathmatik_/1 pr_/t philosophi_/a4 ,brentano1 after remarking that no place in this distribution is expressly provided for ,logic1 explains the omission as follows3 ,diese auffallende ,erscheinung erklrt sich daraus1 dass diese the three above-named theoretical sciences allein das reelle ,sein betrachten1 und nach den drei ,graden der ,abstraktion in ihrer ,betrachtungsweise verschieden1 geschieden werden2 whrend die ,logik das bloss rationelle ,sein1 das ,greek3 o7n 7s a7lthe_/s1 behandelt4 7,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles1 p4 #ci47--;,investigations ,greek3 peri ts a7lthei_/as1 o7n tro_/pon dei a7pode_/chesthai are considered by ,aristotle as belonging to ,greek3 ta ,a7naluktika2 enquiries into method in the first instance1 and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method 7,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #b4 ,in ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 #ajje1 b4 #g1 he declares that these enquiries into method1 or analysis of the principia of syllogistic reasoning1 belong to the ,philosophia ,prima 7compare ,metaphys4 ,z4 #ab1 p4 #ajcg1 b4 #h74 ,schwegler in his ,commentary 7p4 #afa7 remarks that this is one of the few passages in which ,aristotle indicates the relation in which ,logic stands to ,metaphysics1 or ,first ,philosophy4 ,the question has been started among his ,greek3 ,a7pori_/ai ,metaph4 ,b4 #b1 p4 #iii1 b4 #cj4 ,footnote #c3 ,respecting the title of ,organon which was sometimes applied to the ,analytica ,posteriora only1 see ,waitz ad ,organ1 ii4 p4 #bid4 ,these treatises are six in number3--#a4 ,categori2#d #b4 ,de ,interpretatione1 or ,de ,enunciatione2 #c4 ,analytica ,priora2 #d4 ,analytica ,posteriora2 #e4 ,topica2 #f4 ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis4 ,this last short treatise--,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis--belongs naturally to the ,topica which precedes it1 and of which it ought to be ranked as the ninth or concluding book4 ,waitz has printed it as such in his edition of the ,organon2 but as it has been generally known with a separate place and title1 ,i shall not depart from the received understanding4 ,footnote #d3 ,some eminent critics1 ,prantl and ,bonitz among them1 consider the treatise ,categori not to be the work of ,aristotle4 ,the arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me2 and even if they were1 the treatise could not be left out of consideration1 since the doctrine of the ,ten ,categories is indisputably ,aristotelian4 ,see ,zeller1 ,die ,phil4 der ,griech4 ii4 #b1 pp4 #ej1 #ea1 #bnd ed4 ,aristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a distinct aggregate1 nor as belonging to one and the same department1 nor as bearing one comprehensive name4 ,we find indeed in the ,topica references to the ,analytica1 and in the ,analytica references to the ,topica4 ,in both of them1 the ten ,categories are assumed and presupposed1 though the treatise describing them is not expressly mentioned3 to both also1 the contents of the treatise ,de ,interpretatione or ,enunciatione1 though it is not named1 are indispensable4 ,the affinity and interdependence of the six is evident1 and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating them as belonging to one and the same department4 ,to that department there belonged also several other treatises of ,aristotle1 not now preserved1 but specified in the catalogue of his lost works2 and these his disciple ,theophrastus1 ,eudemus1 and ,phanias1 had before them4 ,as all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on the same or similar topics1#e amplifying1 elucidating1 or controverting the views of their master1 the ,peripatetics immediately succeeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature1 in which the six treatises now constituting the ,organon appeared as portions1 but not as a special aggregate in themselves4 ,footnote #e3 ,ammonius ap4 ,schol4 p4 #bh1 a4 #da2 p4 #cc1 b4 #bg1 ,br4 ,of the two treatises which stand first in the ,aristotelian ,organon--the ,categori and the ,de ,interpretatione--each forms in a certain sense the complement of the other4 ,the treatise ,de ,interpretatione handles ,propositions 7combinations of terms in the way of ,subject and ,predicate71 with prominent reference to the specific attribute of a ,proposition--the being true or false1 the object of belief or disbelief2 the treatise ,categori deals with these same ,terms 7to use ,aristotle's own phrase7 pronounced without or apart from such combination4 ,in his definition of the simple ,term1 the ,proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown as the correlate or antithesis to it4#f ,footnote #f3 ,greek3 ,ta a7_/neu sumploks lego_/mena--tn kata mdemi_/an sumplokn legome_/nna ,categ4 p4 #a1 a4 #af1 b4 #be74 ,see ,schol4 ad ,aristot4 ,physica1 p4 #cbc1 b4 #be1 ,br42 and ,bonitz ad ,aristotel4 ,metaph4 7,a4 p4 #ihg7 p4 #ij4 ,the ,categories of ,aristotle appear to formed one of the most prominent topics of the teaching of ,themistius3 rebutting the charge1 advanced both against himself1 and1 in earlier days1 against ,sokrates and the ,sophists1 of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited1 he asks1 ,greek3 7kou_/sate de au7 tinos tn e7mn e7pitdei_/n u7pslogoume_/nou kai brenthuome_/nou e7pi tois sunnu_/mois 7 o7mnu_/mois 7 parnu_/mois2 7,orat4 xxiii4 p4 #cea47 ,reference is made 7in the ,scholia on the ,categori1 p4 #dc1 b4 #ai7 to a classification of names made by ,speusippus1 which must have been at least as early as that of ,aristotle2 perhaps earlier1 since ,speusippus died in #cci ,b4,c4 ,we do not hear enough of this to understand clearly what it was4 ,bothus remarked that ,aristotle had omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by ,speusippus on this matter1 ,schol4 p4 #dc1 a4 #bi4 ,compare a remark in ,aristot4 ,de ,coelo1 i4 p4 #bhj1 b4 #b4 ,the first distinction pointed out by ,aristotle among simple1 uncombined ,terms1 or the things denoted thereby1 is the ,homonymous1 the ,synonymous1 and the ,paronymous4 ,homonymous are those which are called by the same name1 used in a different sense or with a different definition or rational explanation4 ,synonymous are those called by the same name in the same sense4 ,paronymous are those called by two names1 of which the one is derived from the other by varying the inflexion or termination4#g ,footnote #g3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #a1 a4 #a-ae4 ,we can hardly doubt that it was ,aristotle who first gave this peculiar distinctive meaning to the two words ,homonymous and ,synonymous1 rendered in modern phraseology 7through the ,latin7 ,equivocal and ,univocal4 ,before his time this important distinction between different terms had no technical name to designate it4 ,the service rendered to ,logic by introducing such a technical term1 and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking which it indicated1 was great4 ,in every branch of his writings ,aristotle perpetually reverts to it1 applying it to new cases1 and especially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and frequently1 under the common persuasion that their meaning is not only thoroughly known but constant and uniform4 ,as a general fact1 students are now well acquainted with this source of error1 though the stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant1 ever renewed and diversified4 ,but in the time of ,aristotle the source itself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice1 nor signalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon4 ,the natural bias which lead us to suppose that one term always carries one and the same meaning1 was not counteracted by any systematic warning or generalized expression4 ,sokrates and ,plato did indeed expose many particular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology4 ,no part of the ,platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which this operation is performed1 forcing the respondent to feel how imperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use4 ,but it is rarely ,plato's practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or systematic distinctions4 ,he has no general term corresponding to homonymous or equivocal2 and there are even passages where 7under the name of ,prodikus7 he derides or disparages a careful distinctive analysis of different significations of the same name4 ,to recognize a class of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name1 was an important step in logical procedure2 and that step1 among so many others1 was made by ,aristotle4#h ,footnote #h3 ,in the instructive commentary of ,dexippus on the ,categori 7contained in a supposed dialogue between ,dexippus and his pupil ,seleukus1 of which all that remains has been recently published by ,spengel1 ,munich1 #ahei71 that commentator defends ,aristotle against some critics who wondered why he began with these ,ante-predicaments 7,greek3 o7m_/numa1 sun_/numa1 c471 instead of proceeding at once to the ,predicaments or ,categories themselves4 ,dexippus remarks that without understanding this distinction between equivoca and univoca1 the ,categories themselves could not be properly appreciated2 for ,ens--,greek3 to o7n--is homonymous in reference to all the ,categories1 and not a ,summum ,genus1 comprehending the ,categories as distinct species under it2 while each ,category is a ,genus in reference to its particulars4 ,moreover1 ,dexippus observes that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind 7,greek3 o7_/sn gar e7_/nnoian ou7k e7_/chomen1 tou_/tn pro_/lpsin ou7k e7_/chomen1 p4 #bj71 and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the beginning2 whereas the ,post-predicaments 7to which we shall come later on7 were postponed to the end1 because they were cases of familiar terms loosely employed1 7,see ,spengel1 ,dexipp4 pp4 #ai1 #bj1 #ba47 ,though ,aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms implicated in predication1 and terms not so implicated1#i yet when he comes to explain the functions of the latter class1 he considers them in reference to their functions as constituent members of propositions4 ,he immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of matters 7,entia73 ,that which is affirmable of a ,subject1 but is not in a ,subject2 ,that which is in a ,subject1 but is not affirmable of a ,subject2 ,that which is both in a ,subject1 and affirmable of a ,subject2 ,that which is neither in a ,subject1 nor affirmable of a ,subject4#aj ,footnote #i3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #a1 a4 #af4 ,greek3 tn legome_/nn ta men kata sumplokn le_/getai1 ta d' a7_/neu sumploks2 ta men ou7n kata sumplokn oi7on a7_/nthrpos tre_/chei1 a7_/nthrpos nika2 ta d' a7_/neu sumploks oi7on a7_/nthrpos1 bous1 tre_/chei1 nika4 ,it will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can only explained relatively to the complete proposition1 which must be assumed as foreknown4 ,that which ,aristotle discriminates in this treatise1 in the phrases--,greek3 le_/gesthai kata sumplokn and ,greek3 le_/gesthai a7_/neu sumploks is equivalent to what we read in the ,de ,interpretatione 7p4 #af1 b4 #bg1 p4 #ag1 a4 #ag7 differently expressed1 ,greek3 phn smantik 7s kata_/phasis and ,greek3 phn smantik 7s pha_/sis4 ,footnote #aj3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #a1 a4 #bj4 ,this fundamental quadruple distinction of ,entia1 which serves as an introduction to the ten ,categories or ,predicaments1 belongs to words altogether according to their relative places or functions in the proposition2 the meanings of the words being classified accordingly4 ,that the learner may understand it1 he ought properly to be master of the first part of the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 wherein the constituent elements of a proposition are explained3 so intimate is the connection between that treatise and this4 ,the classification applies to ,entia 7,things or ,matters7 universally1 and is thus a first step in ,ontology4 ,he here looks at ,ontology in one of its several diverse aspects--as it enters into predication1 and furnishes the material for ,subjects and ,predicates1 the constituent members of a proposition4 ,ontology1 or the ,science of ,ens quatenus ,ens1 occupies an important place in ,aristotle's scientific programme2 bearing usually the title of ,first ,philosophy1 sometimes ,theology1 though never 7in his works7 the more modern title of ,metaphysica4 ,he describes it as the universal and comprehensive ,science1 to which all other sciences are related as parts or fractions4 ,ontology deals with ,ens in its widest sense1 as an ,unum not generic but analogical--distinguishing the derivative varieties into which it may be distributed1 and setting out the attributes and accompaniments of ,essentia universally2 while other sciences1 such as ,geometry1 ,astronomy1 c41 confine themselves to distinct branches of that whole2#aa each having its own separate class of ,entia for special and exclusive study4 ,this is the characteristic distinction of ,ontology1 as ,aristotle conceives it2 he does not set it in antithesis to ,phenomenology1 according to the distinction that has become current among modern metaphysicians4 ,footnote #aa3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajjc1 a4 #ba1 #be-cc1 ,e4 p4 #ajbe1 b4 #h4 ,greek3 e7_/stin e7pist_/m tis 7 therei to o7n 7 o7n kai ta tou_/t u7pa_/rchonta kath' au7to_/2 au7_/t d' e7stin ou7demia tn a7_/lln e7piskopei katho_/lou peri tou o7_/ntos 7 o7_/n1 a7lla me_/ros au7tou ti a7potemo_/menai peri tou_/tou therousi to sumbebko_/s1 c4 ,compare p4 #ajje1 a4 #b-ad4 ,now ,ens 7or ,entia71 in the doctrine of ,aristotle1 is not a synonymous or univocal word1 but an homonymous or equivocal word2 or1 rather1 it is something between the two1 being equivocal1 with a certain qualification4 ,though not a ,summum ,genus1 i4e4 not manifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity1 nor divisible into species by the addition of well-marked essential differenti1 it is an analogical aggregate1 or a ,summum ,analogon1 comprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name from being all related in some way or other to a common root or fundamentum1 the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer or more distant in degree4 ,the word ,ens is thus homonymous1 yet in a qualified sense4 ,while it is not univocal1 it is at the same time not absolutely equivocal4 ,it is multivocal 7if we may coin such a word71 having many meanings held together by a multifarious and graduated relationship to one common fundamentum4#ab ,ens 7or ,entia71 in this widest sense1 is the theme of ,ontology or ,first ,philosophy1 and is looked at by ,aristotle in four different principal aspects4#ac ,footnote #ab3 ,simplikius speaks of these ,analoga as ,greek3 to me_/son tn te sunnu_/mn kai tn o7mnu_/mn1 to a7ph' e7no_/s1 c4 ,schol4 ad ,categor4 p4 #fi1 b4 #bi1 ,brand4 ,see also ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajcj1 a4 #cd4 ,dexippus does not recognize1 formally and under a distinct title1 this intermediate stage between ,greek3 sun_/numa and ,greek3 o7m_/numa4 ,he states that ,aristotle considered ,ens as ,greek3 o7m_/numon1 while other philosophers considered it as ,greek3 sun_/numon 7,dexippus1 p4 #bf1 book i4 sect4 #ai1 ed4 ,spengel74 ,but he intimates that the ten general heads called ,categories have a certain continuity and interdependence 7,greek3 sune_/cheian kai a7lllouchi_/an7 each with the others1 branching out from ,greek3 ou7si_/a in ramifications more or less straggling 7p4 #dh1 book ii4 sects4 #a1 #b1 ,spengel74 ,the list 7he says1 p4 #dg7 does not depend upon ,greek3 diai_/resis 7generic division71 nor yet is it simple enumeration 7,greek3 a7pari_/thmsis of incoherent items4 ,in the ,physica1 vii4 #d1 p4 #bdi1 a4 #bc1 ,aristotle observes3 ,greek3 ei7si de tn o7mnumin ai7 men polu a7pe_/chousi ai7 de e7_/chousai_/ tina o7moio_/tta1 ai7 d' e7ggus 7 ge_/nei 7 a7nalogi_/a1 dio ou7 dokousin o7mnumi_/ai ei7nai ou7sai4 ,footnote #ac3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag1 a4 #g1 ,e4 p4 #ajbe1 a4 #cd1 p4 #ajbf1 a4 #cc1 b4 #d2 upon which last passage see the note of ,bonitz4 #a4 ,greek3 ,to o7n kata sumbebko_/s--,ens per ,accidens--,ens accidental1 or rather concomitant1 either as rare and exceptional attribute to a subject1 or along with some other accident in the same common subject4 #b4 ,greek3 ,to o7n 7s a7lthe_/s1 kai to m o7n 7s pseudos--,ens1 in the sense _/of ,truth1 ,non-,ens1 in the sense of ,falsehood4 ,this is the ,ens of the ,proposition2 a true affirmation or denial falls under ,ens in this mode1 when the mental conjunction of terms agrees with reality2 a false affirmation or denial1 where no such agreement exists1 falls under ,non-,ens4#ad ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,e4 #d1 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #ah1--p4 #ajbh1 a4 #d4 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7sti to pseudos kai to a7lthes e7n tois pra_/gmasin--a7ll' e7n dianoi_/a--ou7k e7_/x dlousin ou7sa_/n tina phu_/sin tou o7_/ntos4 ,also ,greek3 ,th4 #aj1 p4 #ajea1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 to kuri_/tata o7n a7lthes kai pseudos4 ,in a ,scholion1 ,alexander remarks3 ,greek3 to de 7s a7lths o7n pa_/thos e7sti kai bou_/lma dianoi_/as1 to de ztein to e7ka_/st dokoun ou7 spho_/dra a7nagkaion4 #c4 ,greek3 ,to o7n duna_/mei kai to o7n e7nergei_/a--,ens1 potential1 actual4 #d4 ,greek3 ,to o7n kata ta sch_/mata tn katgorin--,ens1 according to the ten varieties of the ,categories1 to be presently explained4 ,these four are the principal aspects under which ,aristotle looks at the aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal word ,entia4 ,in all the four branches1 the varieties comprised are not species under a common genus1 correlating1 either as co-ordinate or subordinate1 one to the other2 they are analoga1 all having relationship with a common term1 but having no other necessary relationship with each other4 ,aristotle does not mean that these four modes of distributing this vast aggregate1 are the only modes possible2 for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of distributions4#ae ,nor would he maintain that the four distributions were completely distinguished from each other1 so that the same subordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two2 for on the contrary1 the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great degree1 especially the first and fourth4 ,but he considers the four as discriminating certain distinct aspects of ,entia or ,entitas1 more important than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out1 and as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the ,science called ,ontology4 ,footnote #ae3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajjc1 a4 #cc1 b4 #aj4 ,compare the able treatise of ,brentano1 ,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles1 pp4 #f1 #g4 ,of these four heads1 however1 the first and second are rapidly dismissed by ,aristotle in the ,metaphysica1#af being conceived as having little reference to real essence1 and therefore belonging more to ,logic than to ,ontology2 i4e4 to the subjective processes of naming1 predicating1 believing1 and inferring rather than to the objective world of ,perceivables and ,cogitables4#ag ,it is the third and fourth that are treated in the ,metaphysica2 while it is the fourth only 7,ens according to the ten figures of the ,categories7 which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the ,organon1 where ,aristotle appears to blend ,logic and ,ontology into one4 ,footnote #af3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,e4 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #af1 p4 #ajbh4 a4 #f4 ,footnote #ag3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,th4 #aj1 p4 #ajea1 b4 #b-ae1 with ,schwegler's ,comment1 p4 #ahf4 ,this is the distinction drawn by ,simplikius 7,schol4 ad ,categ4 p4 #gf1 b4 #dg7 between the ,organon and the ,metaphysica3 ,greek3 ,ai7 gar a7rchai kata men t_/n smantikn au7tn le_/xin e7n t logik pragmatei_/a dlountai1 kata de ta smaino_/mena e7n t ,meta ta ,phusika oi7kei_/s4 ,greek3 ,ta o7_/nta are equivalent to ,greek3 ta lego_/mena1 in this and the other logical treatises of ,aristotle4 ,categ4 p4 #a1 a4 #af-bj1 b4 #be2 ,analyt4 ,prior4 i4 p4 #dc1 a4 #be4 ,this is the logical aspect of ,ontology2 that is1 ,entia are considered as ,objects to be named1 and to serve as ,subjects or ,predicates for propositions3 every such term having a fixed denotation1 and 7with the exception of proper names7 a fixed connotation1 known to speakers and hearers4 ,greek3 ,ta lego_/mena 7or ,entia considered in this aspect7 are distinguished by ,aristotle into two classes3 #a4 ,greek3 ,ta lego_/mena kata sumplok_/n1 oi7on a7_/nthrpos tre_/chei1 a7_/nthropos nika4 #b4 ,greek3 ,ta lego_/mena a7_/neu sumploks 7or ,greek3 kata mdemi_/an sumplok_/n7 ,greek3 oi7on a7_/nthrpos1 bous1 tre_/chei1 nika4 ,we are to observe here1 that in ,logic the ,proposition or ,enunciation is the ,prius ,natur1 which must be presupposed as known before we can understand what the separate terms are 7,analytic4 ,prior4 i4 p4 #bd1 a4 #af73 just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain what is an acute or an obtuse angle 7to use an illustration of ,aristotle2 see ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajce1 b4 #g74 ,we must understand the entire logical act1 called ,affirming or ,denying1 before we can understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which that act is performed4 ,aristotle defines the ,term by means of the ,proposition1 ,greek3 o7_/ron de kal ei7 o7n dialu_/etai 7 pro_/tasis 7,anal4 ,pr4 i4 #bd1 b4 #af74 ,greek3 ,ta lego_/mena1 as here used by ,aristotle1 coincides in meaning with what the ,stoics afterwards called ,greek3 ,ta lekta_/--of two classes3 #a4 ,greek3 lekta au7totel1 one branch of which1 ,greek3 ta a7xi_/mata1 are equivalent to the ,aristotelian ,greek3 ta kata sumplokn lego_/mena4 #b4 ,greek3 lekta e7llip1 equivalent to ,greek3 ta a7_/neu sumploks lego_/mena 7,diogen4 ,laert4 vii4 #dc1 #dd1 #fc1 #fd2 ,sext4 ,emp4 adv4 ,mathemat4 viii4 #fi1 #gj1 #gd73 equivalent also1 seemingly1 to ,greek3 ta dianota in ,aristotle3 ,greek3 o7 dianotos ,a7ristome_/ns 7,anal4 ,pr4 ,i4 p4 #dg1 b4 #bb74 ,hobbes observes 7,computation or ,logic1 part i4 #b1 #e73 ,nor is it at all necessary that every name should be the name of something4 ,for as these1 a man1 a tree1 a stone1 are the names of the things themselves1 so the images of a man1 of a tree1 of a stone1 which are represented to men sleeping1 have their names also1 though they be not things1 but only fictions and phantasms of things4 ,for we can remember these2 and therefore it is no less necessary that they have names to mark and signify them1 than the things themselves4 ,also this word future is a name2 but no future thing has yet any being4 ,moreover1 that which neither is1 nor has been1 nor ever shall or ever can be1 has a name--impossible4 ,to conclude1 this word nothing is a name1 which yet cannot be name of any thing2 for when we subtract two and three from five1 and1 so nothing remaining1 we would call that subtraction to mind1 this speech nothing remains1 and in it the word nothing1 is not unuseful4 ,and for the same reason we say truly1 less than nothing remains1 when we subtract more from less2 for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake1 and desires1 as often as is necessary1 to call the same to memory4 ,but seeing every name has some relation to that which is named1 though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature1 yet is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word thing to whatsoever we name2 as it were all one whether that thing truly existent1 or be only feigned4 ,the ,greek neuter gender 7,greek3 to lego_/menon or ,greek3 to lekto_/n1 ta lego_/mena or ,greek3 ta lekta_/7 covers all that ,hobbes here includes under the word thing4--,scholia ad ,aristot4 ,physic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #cbc1 a4 #ba1 ,brand43 ,greek3 o7noma_/zontai men kai ta m o7_/nta1 o7ri_/zontai de mo_/na ta o7_/nta4 ,of this mixed character1 partly logical1 partly ontological1 is the first distinction set forth in the ,categori--the distinction between matters predicated of a ,subject1 and matters which are in a ,subject--the ,subject itself being assumed as the fundamentum correlative to both of them4 ,the definition given of that which is in a ,subject is ontological3 viz41 ,in a ,subject1 ,i call that which is in anything1 not as a part1 yet so that it cannot exist separately from that in which it is4#ah ,by these two negative characteristics1 without any mark positive1 does ,aristotle define what is meant by being in a ,subject4 ,modern logicians1 and ,hobbes among them1 can find no better definition for an ,accident2 though ,hobbes remarks truly1 that ,accident cannot be properly defined1 but must be elucidated by examples4#ai ,footnote #ah3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #a1 a4 #bd4 ,footnote #ai3 ,hobbes1 ,computation or ,logic1 part i4 #c1 #c1 i4 #f1 #b1 ii4 #h1 #b-c4 ,the distinction here drawn by ,aristotle between being predicated of a ,subject1 and being in a ,subject1 coincides with that between essential and non-essential predication3 all the predicates 7including the differentia7 which belong to the essence1 fall under the first division2#bj all those which do not belong to the essence1 under the latter4 ,the ,subjects--what ,aristotle calls the ,first ,essences or ,substances1 those which are essences or substances in the fullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual things or persons2 such as ,sokrates1 this man1 that horse or tree4 ,these are never employed as predicates at all 7except by a distorted and unnatural structure of the proposition1 which ,aristotle indicates as possible1 but declines to take into account72 they are always ,subjects of different predicates1 and are1 in the last analysis1 the ,subjects of all predicates4 ,but besides these ,first ,essences1 there are also ,second ,essences--,species and ,genus1 which stand to the first ,essence in the relation of predicates to a ,subject1 and to the other ,categories in the relation of ,subjects to predicates4#ba ,these ,second ,essences are less of ,essences than the ,first1 which alone is an ,essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense4 ,among the ,second ,essences1 ,species is more of an ,essence than ,genus1 because it belongs more closely and specially to the ,first ,essence2 while ,genus is farther removed from it4 ,aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of more or less in ,essence2 the individual is more ,essence1 or more complete as an ,essence1 than the ,species1 the ,species more than the ,genus4 ,as he recognizes a ,first ,essence1 i4e4 an individual object 7such as ,sokrates1 this horse1 c471 so he also recognizes an individual accident 7this particular white colour1 that particular grammatical knowledge7 which is in a ,subject1 but is not predicated of a ,subject2 this particular white colour exists in some given body1 but is not predicable of any body4#bb ,footnote #bj3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #c1 a4 #bj4 ,it appears that ,andronikus did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same manner as ,aristotle3 he included many non-essential predicates in ,greek3 ta kath' u7pokeime_/nou4 ,see ,simplikius1 ad ,categorias1 ,basil4 #aeea1 fol4 #ac1 #ba1 ,b4 ,nor was either ,alexander or ,porphyry careful to observe the distinction between the two classes4 ,see ,schol4 ad ,metaphys4 p4 #gja4 b4 #bc1 ,br42 ,schol4 ad ,de ,interpret4 p4 #ajf1 a4 #bi1 ,br4 ,and when ,aristotle says1 ,analyt4 ,prior4 i4 p4 #bd1 b4 #bf1 ,greek3 to de e7n o7_/l ei7nai e7_/teron e7te_/r1 kai to kata pantos katgoreisthai thate_/rou tha_/teron1 tau7to_/n e7stin1 he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely4 ,footnote #ba3 ,categor4 p4 #b1 a4 #ae1 seq4 ,in ,aristotle phraseology it is not said that ,second ,essences are contained in ,first ,essences1 but that ,first ,essences are contained in ,second ,essences1 i4e4 in the species which ,second ,essences signify4 ,see the ,scholion to p4 #c1 a4 #i1 in ,waitz1 vol4 i4 p4 #cb4 ,footnote #bb3 ,arist4 ,categ4 p4 #a1 a4 #bf2 b4 #g3 ,greek3 ,a7npls de ta a7_/toma kai e7n a7rithm kat' ou7denos u7pokeime_/nou le_/getai1 e7n u7pokeime_/n de e7_/nia ou7den klu_/ei ei7nai2 7 ga_/r tis grammatik tn e7n u7pokeime_/n e7sti_/n4 ,aristotle here recognizes an attribute as individual and as numerically one2 and various other logicians have followed him4 ,but is it correct to say1 that an attribute1 when it cannot be farther divided specifically1 and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series1 is ,unum ,numero8 ,the attribute may belong to an indefinite number of different objects2 and can we count it as ,one1 in the same sense in which we count each of these objects as ,one8 ,i doubt whether ,unum ,numero be applicable to attributes4 ,aristotle declares that the ,greek3 deute_/ra ou7si_/a is not ,unum ,numero like the ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a--ou7 gar e7n e7sti to u7pokei_/menon 7_/sper 7 pr_/t ou7si_/a1 a7lla kata polln o7 a7_/nthrpos le_/getai kai to zon 7,categ4 p4 #c1 b4 #af74 ,upon the same principle1 ,i think1 he ought to declare that the attribute is not ,unum ,numero2 for though it is not 7in his language7 predicable of many ,subjects1 yet it is in many ,subjects4 ,it cannot correctly be called ,unum ,numero1 according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two passages of the ,metaphysica1 ,b4 p4 #iii1 b4 #cc2 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajaf1 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 a7rithm men 7n 7 u7_/l mi_/a1 c4 ,respecting the logical distinction1 which ,aristotle places in the commencement of this treatise on the ,categories--between predicates which are affirmed of a ,subject1 and predicates which are in a ,subject#bc--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by which you describe the predicate4 ,thus he tells us that the ,species and ,genus 7man1 animal71 and the ,differentia 7rational71 may be predicated of ,sokrates1 but are not in ,sokrates2 while knowledge is in ,sokrates1 but cannot be predicated of ,sokrates2 and may be predicated of grammar1 but is not in grammar4 ,but if we look at this comparison1 we shall see that in the last-mentioned example1 the predicate is described by an abstract word 7knowledge72 while in the preceding examples it is described by a concrete word 7man1 animal1 rational74#bd ,if1 in place of these three last words1 we substitute the abstract words corresponding to them--humanity1 animality1 rationality--we shall have to say that these are in ,sokrates1 though they cannot 7in their abstract form7 be predicated of ,sokrates1 but only in the form of their concrete paronyms1 which ,aristotle treats as a distinct predication4 ,so if1 instead of the abstract word knowledge1 we employ the concrete word knowing or wise1 we can no longer say that this is in ,sokrates1 and that it may be predicated of grammar4 ,abstract alone can be predicated of abstract2 concrete alone can be predicated of concrete2 if we describe the relation between ,abstract and ,concrete1 we must say1 ,the ,abstract is in the ,concrete--the ,concrete contains or embodies the ,abstract4 ,indeed we find ,aristotle referring the same predicate1 when described by the abstract name1 to one ,category2 and when described by the concrete paronymous adjective1 to another and different ,category4#be ,the names ,concrete and ,abstract were not in the philosophical vocabulary of his day4 ,in this passage of the ,categori1 he establishes a distinction between predicates essential and predicates non-essential2 the latter he here declares to be in the ,subject1 the former not to be in it1 but to be co-efficients of its essence4 ,but we shall find that he does not adhere to this distinction even throughout the present treatise1 still less in other works4 ,it seems to be a point of difference between the ,categori on one side1 and the ,physica and ,metaphysica on the other1 that in the ,categori he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on verbal etiquette1 and on precise adherence to the syntactical structure of a proposition4#bf ,footnote #bc3 ,the distinction is expressed by ,ammonius 7,schol4 p4 #ea1 b4 #df7 as follows3--,greek3 ai7 prtai ou7si_/ai u7pokeuntai pasin1 a7ll' ou7ch o7moi_/s2 tois men gar pros u7_/parxin1 tou_/testi tois sumbebko_/sin1 tois de pros katgori_/an1 tou_/testi tais katho_/lou ou7si_/ais4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ueberweg makes a remark similar to this4--,system der ,logik1 sect4 #ef1 note1 p4 #aaj1 ed4 second4 ,footnote #be3 ,the difference of opinion as to the proper mode of describing the ,differentia--whether by the concrete word ,greek3 pezon1 or by the abstract ,greek3 pezo_/ts--gives occasion to an objection against ,aristotle's view1 and to a reply from ,dexippus not very conclusive 7,dexippus1 book ii4 s4 #bb1 pp4 #fj1 #fa1 ed4 ,spengel74 ,footnote #bf3 ,categor4 p4 #c1 a4 #c4 ,in the ,physica1 iv4 p4 #baj1 a4 #ad-cj1 ,aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase ,greek3 e7_/n tini4 ,his own use of the phrase is not always uniform or consistent4 ,if we compare the ,scholia on the ,categori1 pp4 #dd1 #de1 #ec1 #eh1 #ei1 ,br41 with the ,scholia on the ,physica1 pp4 #cgb1 #cgc1 ,br41 we shall see that the ,commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his fluctuation4 ,the doctrine of the ,categori was found especially difficult in its application to the ,differentia4 ,in ,analyt4 ,post4 i4 p4 #hc1 a4 #cj1 ,aristotle says1 ,greek3 o7_/sa de m ou7si_/an smai_/nei1 dei kata_/ tinos u7pokeime_/nou katgoreisthai1 which is at variance with the language of the ,categori1 as the ,scholiast remarks1 p4 #bbh1 a4 #cc4 ,the like may be said about ,metaphys4 ,b4 p4 #ajja1 b4 #bi2 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag1 b4 #ac4 ,see the ,scholia of ,alexander1 p4 #gja1 b4 #be1 ,br4 ,see also ,de ,gener4 et ,corrupt4 p4 #cai1 b4 #h2 ,physic4 i4 p4 #ahe1 a4 #ca3 ,greek3 ou7then gar tn a7_/lln christo_/n e7sti para tn ou7si_/an2 pa_/nta gar kath' u7pokeime_/nou ts ou7si_/as le_/getai1 where ,simplikius remarks that the phrase is used ,greek3 a7nti tou e7n u7pokeime_/n 7,schol4 p4 #cbh1 b4 #dc74 ,lastly1 ,aristotle here makes one important observation respecting those predicates which he describes as 7not in a ,subject but7 affirmed or denied of a ,subject--i4e4 the essential predicates4 ,in these 7he says7 whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied of the predicate1 the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the ,subject4#bg ,this observation deserves notice1 because it is in fact a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the ,syllogism2 which theory he afterwards expands in the ,analytica ,priora1 and traces into its varieties and ramifications4 ,footnote #bg3 ,categor4 p4 #a1 b4 #aj-ae4 ,after such preliminaries1 ,aristotle proceeds#bh to give the enumeration of his ,ten ,categories or ,predicaments2 under one or other of which1 every subject or predicate1 considered as capable of entering into a proposition1 must belong3 #a4 ,essence or ,substance2 such as1 man1 horse4 #b4 ,how much or ,quantity2 such as1 two cubits long1 three cubits long4 #c4 ,what manner of or ,quality2 such as1 white1 erudite4 #d4 ,ad aliquid--,to something or ,relation2 such as1 double1 half1 greater4 #e4 ,where2 such as1 in the market-place1 in the ,lykeium4 #f4 ,when2 such as1 yesterday1 last year4 #g4 ,in what posture2 such as1 he stands up1 he is sitting down4 #h4 ,to have2 such as1 to be shod1 to be armed4 #i4 ,activity2 such as1 he is cutting1 he is turning4 #aj4 ,passivity2 such as1 he is being cut1 he is being burned4 ,footnote #bh3 ,ibid4 p4 #a1 b4 #be1 seq4 ,ens in its complete state--concrete1 individual1 determinate-- includes an embodiment of all these ten ,categories2 the ,first ,ens being the ,subject of which the rest are predicates4 ,whatever question be asked respecting any individual ,subject1 the information given in the answer must fall1 according to ,aristotle1 under one or more of these ten general heads2 while the full outfit of the individual will comprise some predicate under each of them4 ,moreover1 each of the ten is a ,generalissimum2 having more or fewer species contained under it1 but not being itself contained under any larger genus 7,ens not being a genus7 ,so that ,aristotle does not attempt to define or describe any one of the ten2 his only way of explaining is by citing two or three illustrative examples of each4 ,some of the ten are even of wider extent than ,summa ,genera2 thus1 ,quality cannot be considered as a true genus1 comprehending generically all the cases falling under it4 ,it is a ,summum ,analogon1 reaching beyond the comprehension of a genus2 an analogous or multivocal name1 applied to many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other4#bi ,and again the same particular predicate may be ranked both under ,quality and under ,relation2 it need not belong exclusively to either one of them4#cj ,moreover1 ,good1 like ,ens or ,unum1 is common to all the ,categories1 but is differently represented in each4#ca ,footnote #bi3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #h1 b4 #bf4 ,greek3 e7_/sti de 7 poio_/ts tn pleonachs legome_/nn1 c4 ,see the ,scholia1 p4 #fh1 b4 #fi a41 ,brandis4 ,ammonius gives the true explanation of this phrase1 ,greek3 tn pleonachs legome_/nn 7p4 #fi1 b4 #g74 ,alexander and ,simplikius try to make out that it implies here a ,greek3 sun_/nomon4 ,footnote #cj3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #aa1 a4 #cg4 ,compare the ,scholion of ,dexippus1 p4 #dh1 a4 #bh-cg4 ,footnote #ca3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikomach4 i4 p4 #ajif1 a4 #be2 ,ethic4 ,eudem4 i4 p4 #abag1 b4 #be4 ,aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the ten ,categories4 #a4 ,essence or ,substance4 #b4 ,quantity4 #c4 ,quality4 #d4 ,relation4 ,as to the six last1 he says little upon any of them2 upon some1 nothing at all4 ,his decuple partition of ,entia or ,enunciata is founded entirely upon a logical principle4 ,he looks at them in their relation to ,propositions2 and his ten classes discriminate the relation which they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a proposition4 ,aristotle takes his departure1 not from any results of scientific research1 but from common speech2 and from the dialectic1 frequent in his time1 which debated about matters of common life and talk1 about received and current opinions4#cb ,we may presume him to have studied and compared a variety of current propositions1 so as to discover what were the different relations in which ,subjects and ,predicates did stand or could stand to each other2 also the various questions which might be put respecting any given subject1 with the answers suitable to be returned4#cc ,footnote #cb3 ,waitz1 ad ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #bhd3 ,id ,categoriis non de ips rerum natura et veritate exponit1 sed res tales capit1 quales apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto1 unde fit1 ut in ,categoriis alia sit ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a et in prima philosophia3 illa enim partes habet1 hc vero non componitor ex partibus4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajcb1 b4 #b1 and the ,greek3 a7pori_/a in ,z4 p4 #ajbi1 a41 p4 #ajcg1 a4 #bh4 ,the different meaning of ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a in the ,categori and in the ,metaphysica1 is connected with various difficulties and seeming discrepancies in the ,aristotelian theory of cognition1 which ,i shall advert to in a future chapter4 ,see ,zeller1 ,philos4 der ,griech4 ii4 #b1 pp4 #bcd1 #bfb2 ,heyder1 ,aristotelische und ,hegelsche ,dialektik1 p4 #ada1 seq4 ,footnote #cc3 ,thus he frequently supposes a question put1 an answer given1 and the proper mode of answering4 ,categor4 p4 #b1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 e7an gar a7podid tis tn pr_/tn ou7si_/an ti_/ e7sti1 gnrim_/teron kai oi7keio_/teron a7pod_/sei1 c42 also ibid4 p4 #b1 b4 #cb2 p4 #c1 a4 #d1 #bj4 ,aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental ,category ,substance or ,essence--,greek3 ,ou7si_/a2 the abstract substantive word corresponding to ,greek3 ,to o7_/n2 which last is the vast aggregate1 not generically ,one but only analogically ,one1 destined to be distributed among the ten ,categories as ,summa ,genera4 ,the ,first ,ens or ,first ,essence--that which is ,ens in the fullest sense--is the individual concrete person or thing in nature2 ,sokrates1 ,bukephalus1 this man1 that horse1 that oak-tree1 c4 ,this ,first ,ens is indispensable as ,subject or ,substratum for all the other ,categories1 and even for predication generally4 ,it is a ,subject only2 it never appears as a predicate of anything else4 ,as ,hic ,aliquis or ,hoc ,aliquid1 it lies at the bottom 7either expressed or implied7 of all the work of predication4 ,it is ,ens or ,essence most of all1 par excellence2 and is so absolutely indispensable1 that if all ,first ,entia were supposed to be removed1 neither ,second ,entia nor any of the other ,categories could exist4#cd ,footnote #cd3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #b1 a4 #aa1 b4 #f4 ,greek3 ,ou7si_/a 7 kuri_/tata kai pr_/ts kai ma_/lista legome_/n--m ou7sn ou7n tn pr_/tn ou7sin1 a7du_/naton tn a7_/lln ti ei7nai4 ,the ,species is recognized by ,aristotle as a ,second ,ens or ,essence1 in which these ,first ,essences reside2 it is less 7has less completely the character7 of ,essence than the ,first1 to which it serves as ,predicate4 ,the ,genus is 7strictly speaking7 a ,third ,essence1#ce in which both the ,first and the ,second ,essence are included2 it is farther removed than the ,species from the ,first ,essence1 and has therefore still less of the character of ,essence4 ,it stands as predicate both to the ,first and to the ,second ,essence4 ,while the ,first ,essence is more ,essence than the ,second1 and the ,second more than the ,third1 all the varieties of the ,first ,essence are in this respect upon an equal footing with each other4 ,this man1 this horse1 that tree1 c41 are all ,essence1 equally and alike4#cf ,the ,first ,essence admits of much variety1 but does not admit graduation1 or degrees of more or less4 ,footnote #ce3 ,aristotle here1 in the ,categori1 ranks ,genus and ,species as being1 both of them1 ,greek3 deu_/terai ou7si_/ai4 ,yet since he admits ,genus to be farther removed from ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a than ,species is1 he ought rather to have called ,genus a ,third ,essence4 ,in the ,metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or ordination of ,greek3 ou7si_/a into ,first1 ,second1 and ,third1 founded upon a totally different principle3 the ,concrete1 which in the ,categori ranks as ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a1 ranks as ,greek3 tri_/t ou7si_/a in the ,metaphysica4 ,see ,metaphys4 ,greek3 4 p4 #ajdc4 a4 #ah-bh4 ,footnote #cf3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #b1 b4 #bj2 p4 #c1 b4 #ce4 ,nothing else except ,genera and ,species can be called ,second ,essences1 or said to belong to the ,category ,essence2 for they alone declare what the ,first ,essence is4 ,if you are asked respecting ,sokrates1 ,what he is8 and if you answer by stating the ,species or the ,genus to which he belongs--that he is a man or an animal--your answer will be appropriate to the question2 and it will be more fully understood if you state the ,species than if you state the ,genus4 ,but if you answer by stating what belongs to any of the other ,categories 7viz41 that he is white1 that he is running71 your answer will be inappropriate1 and foreign to the question2 it will not declare what ,sokrates is4#cg ,accordingly1 none of these other ,categories can be called ,essences4 ,all of them rank as predicates both of ,first and of ,second ,essence2 just as ,second ,essences rank as predicates of ,first ,essences4#ch ,footnote #cg3 ,ibid4 p4 #b1 b4 #bi-cg4 ,greek3 ei7ko_/ts de meta tas pr_/tas ou7si_/as mo_/na tn a7_/lln ta ei7_/d kai ta ge_/n deu_/terai ou7si_/ai le_/gontai2 mo_/na gar dloi tn pr_/tn ou7si_/an tn katgoroume_/nn4 ton ga_/r tina a7_/nthrpon e7an a7podid tis ti_/ e7sti1 to men ei7dos 7 to ge_/nos a7podidous oi7kei_/s a7pod_/sei1 kai gnrim_/teron poi_/sei a7_/nthrpon 7 zon a7podidou_/s2 tn de a7_/lln o7_/1 ti a7n a7podid tis1 a7llotri_/s e7_/stai a7podedk_/s1 oi7on leuko_/n 7 tre_/chei 7 o7tioun tn toiou_/tn a7podidou_/s4 7_/ste ei7ko_/ts tn a7_/lln tauta mo_/na ou7si_/ai le_/gontai4 ,footnote #ch3 ,ibid4 p4 #c1 a4 #b4 ,essence or ,substance is not in a ,subject2 neither ,first nor ,second ,essence4 ,the ,first ,essence is neither in a ,subject nor predicated of a ,subject2 the ,second ,essences are not in the ,first1 but are predicated of the ,first4 ,both the ,second ,essence1 and the definition of the word describing it1 may be predicated of the ,first2 that is1 the predication is synonymous or univocal2 whereas1 of that which is in a ,subject1 the name may often be predicated1 but never the definition of the name4 ,what is true of the ,second ,essence1 is true also of the ,differentia2 that it is not in a ,subject1 but that it may be predicated univocally of a ,subject-- not only its name1 but also the definition of its name4#ci ,footnote #ci3 ,ibid4 p4 #c1 a4 #g1 #ba1 #cd4 ,greek3 koinon de kata pa_/ss ou7si_/as to m e7n u7pokeime_/n ei7nai--ou7k i7_/dion de ts touto ou7si_/as1 a7lla kai 7 diaphora tn m e7n u7pokeime_/n e7sti_/n--u7pa_/rchei de tais ou7si_/ais kai tais diaphorais to pa_/nta sunnu_/ms a7p' au7tn le_/gesthai4 ,all ,essence or ,substance seems to signify ,hoc ,aliquid ,unum ,numero4 ,the ,first ,essence really does so signify1 but the ,second ,essence does not really so signify3 it only seems to do so1 because it is enunciated by a substantive name1 like the ,first4#dj ,it signifies really ,tale ,aliquid1 answering to the enquiry ,quale ,quid8 for it is said not merely of one thing numerically1 but of many things each numerically one4 ,nevertheless1 a distinction must be drawn4 ,the ,second ,essence does not 7like the ,accident1 such as white7 signify ,tale ,aliquid simply and absolutely1 or that and nothing more4 ,it signifies ,talem ,aliquam ,essentiam2 it declares what the ,essence is1 or marks off the characteristic feature of various ,first ,essences1 each ,unum ,numero4 ,the ,genus marks off a greater number of such than the ,species4#da ,footnote #dj3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #c1 b4 #aj-af3 ,greek3 ,pasa de ou7si_/a dokei to_/de ti smai_/nein4 e7pi men ou7n tn pr_/tn ou7sin a7namphisb_/tton kai a7lthe_/s e7stin o7_/ti to_/de ti smai_/nei2 a7_/tomon gar kai e7n a7rithm to dlou_/meno_/n e7stin2 e7pi de tn deute_/rn ou7sin phai_/netai men o7moi_/s t sch_/mati ts prosgori_/as to_/de ti smai_/nein1 o7_/tan ei7_/p a7_/nthrpon 7 zon1 ou7 mn a7lthe_/s ge1 a7lla mallon poio_/n ti smai_/nei4 ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 p4 #c1 b4 #ah-bd4 ,again1 ,essences have no contraries4#db ,but this is not peculiar to ,essences1 for ,quanta also have no contraries2 there is nothing contrary to ten1 or to that which is two cubits long4 ,nor is any one of the varieties of ,first ,essence more or less ,essence than any other variety4 ,an individual man is as much ,essence as an individual horse1 neither more nor less4 ,nor is he at one time more a man than he was at another time2 though he may become more or less white1 more or less handsome4#dc ,footnote #db3 ,ibid4 b4 #bd-cj4 ,footnote #dc3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd1 seq4 ,but that which is most peculiar to ,essence1 is1 that while remaining ,unum et ,idem ,numero1 it is capable by change in itself of receiving alternately contrary ,accidents4 ,this is true of no other ,category4 ,for example1 this particular colour1 being one and the same in number1 will never be now black1 and then white2 this particular action1 being one and the same in number1 will not be at one time virtuous1 at another time vicious4 ,the like is true respecting all the other ,categories4 ,but one and the same man will be now white1 hot1 virtuous2 at another time1 he will be black1 cold1 vicious4 ,an objector may say that this is true1 not merely of ,essence1 but also of ,discourse and of ,opinion2 each of which 7he will urge7 remains ,unum ,numero1 but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes2 for the proposition or assertion1 ,sokrates is sitting1 may now be true and may presently become false4 ,but this case is different1 because there is no change in the proposition itself1 but in the person or thing to which the proposition refers2 while one and the same man1 by new affections in himself1 is now healthy1 then sick2 now hot1 then cold4#dd ,footnote #dd3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #d1 a4 #aj-;b4 #bj4 ,here ,aristotle concludes his first ,category or ,predicament--,essence or ,substance4 ,he proceeds to the other nine1 and ranks ,quantity first among them4#de ,quantum is either ,continual or ,discrete2 it consists either of parts having position in reference to each other1 or of parts not having position in reference to each other4 ,discrete ,quanta are ,number and ,speech2 ,continual ,quanta are ,line1 ,surface1 ,body1 and besides these1 ,time and ,place4 ,the parts of ,number have no position in reference to each other2 the parts of ,line1 ,surface1 ,body1 have position in reference to each other4 ,these are called ,quanta1 primarily2 other things are called ,quanta in a secondary way1 ,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s4#df ,thus we say much white1 when the surface of white is large2 we say1 the action is long1 because much time and movement have been consumed in it4 ,if we are asked1 how long the action is8 we must answer by specifying its length in time--a year or a month4 ,footnote #de3 ,ibid4 b4 #ba1 seq4 ,footnote #df3 ,ibid4 p4 #e1 a4 #ch1 seq4 ,to ,quantum 7as to ,essence or ,substance7 there exists no contrary4#dg ,there is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits or an area of four square feet4 ,great1 little1 long1 short1 are more properly terms of ,relation than terms of ,quantity2 thus belonging to another ,category4 ,nor is ,quantum ever more or less ,quantum2 it does not admit of degree4 ,the ,quantum a yard is neither more nor less ,quantum than that called a foot4 ,that which is peculiar to ,quanta is to be equal or unequal3#dh the relations of equality and inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of ,quanta4 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 b4 #aa1 seq4 ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 p4 #f1 a4 #bf-ce4 ,from the ,category of ,quantity1 ,aristotle proceeds next to that of ,relation2#di which he discusses in immediate sequence after ,quantity1 and before ,quality1 probably because in the course of his exposition about ,quantity1 he had been obliged to intimate how closely ,quantity was implicated with ,relation1 and how essential it was that the distinction between the two should be made clear4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 a4 #cf1 seq4 ,relata 7,greek3 ta pro_/s ti--ad ,aliquid7 are things such1 that what they are1 they are said to be of other things1 or are said to in some other manner towards something else 7,greek3 o7_/sa au7ta a7_/per e7stin 9999e7te_/rn ei7nai le_/getai1 7 o7pstoun a7_/lls pros e7_/teron74 ,thus1 that which is greater1 is said to be greater than another2 that which is called double is called also double of another4 ,habit1 disposition1 perception1 cognition1 position1 c41 are all ,relata4 ,habit1 is habit of something2 perception and cognition1 are always of something2 position1 is position of something4 ,the ,category of ,relation admits contrariety in some cases1 but not always2 it also admits1 in some cases1 graduation1 or the more or less in degree2 things are more like or less like to each other4#ej ,all ,relata are so designated in virtue of their relation to other ,correlata2 the master is master of a servant--the servant is servant of a master4 ,sometimes the ,correlatum is mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case2 thus cognition is cognition of the cognitum1 but cognitum is cognitum by cognition2 perception is perception of the perceptum1 but the perceptum is perceptum by perception4#ea ,the correlation indeed will not manifestly appear1 unless the ,correlate be designated by its appropriate term3 thus1 if the wing be declared to be wing of a bird1 there is no apparent correlation2 we ought to say1 the wing is wing of the winged1 and the winged is winged through or by the wing2 for the wing belongs to the bird1 not qu bird1 but qu winged1#eb since there are many things winged1 which are not birds4 ,sometimes there is no current term appropriate to the ,correlate1 so that we are under the necessity of coining one for the occasion3 we must say1 to speak with strict accuracy1 ,greek3 7 kephal_/1 tou kephaltou kephal_/ not ,greek3 7 kephal_/1 tou zou kephal_/2 ,greek3 to pda_/lion1 tou pdalitou pda_/lion1 not ,greek3 to pda_/lion1 ploi_/ou pda_/lion4#ec ,footnote #ej3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #f1 b4 #bj4 ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 b4 #bh-cg4 ,footnote #eb3 ,ibid4 b4 #cf2 p4 #g1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 ou7 mn a7ll' e7ni_/ote ou7 do_/xei a7ntistre_/phein1 e7an m oi7kei_/s pros o7 le_/getai a7podoth1 a7lla diama_/rt o7 a7podidou_/s1 oi7on to pteron e7an a7podoth o7_/rnithos1 ou7k a7ntistre_/phei o7_/rnis pterou2 ou7 gar oi7kei_/s to prton a7pode_/dotai pteron o7_/rnithos2 ou7 gar 7 o7_/rnis1 tau_/t to pteron au7tou le_/getai1 a7ll' 7 pterto_/n e7sti2 polln gar kai a7_/lln ptera_/ e7stin1 a7 ou7k ei7sin o7_/rnithes4 ,footnote #ec3 ,ibid4 p4 #g1 a4 #f-be4 ,greek3 e7ni_/ote de kai o7nomatopoiein ,i7_/ss a7nagkaion1 e7an m kei_/menon 7 o7_/noma pros o7 oi7kei_/s a7n a7podothei_/1 c4 ,the ,relatum and its ,correlate seem to be simul natur4 ,if you suppress either one of the pair1 the other vanishes along with it4 ,aristotle appears to think1 however1 that there are many cases in which this is not true4 ,he says that there can be no cognoscens without a cognoscibile1 nor any percipiens without a percipibile2 but that there may be cognoscibile without any cognoscens1 and percipibile without any percipiens4 ,he says that ,greek3 to ai7sthton exists ,greek3 pro tou ai7_/sthsin ei7nai4#ed ,whether any ,essence or ,substance can be a ,relatum or not1 he is puzzled to say2 he seems to think that the ,second ,essence may be1 but that the ,first ,essence cannot be so4 ,he concludes1 however1 by admitting that the question is one of doubt and difficulty4#ee ,footnote #ed3 ,ibid4 b4 #ae2 p4 #h1 a4 #ab4 ,the ,scholion of ,simplikius on this point 7p4 #fe1 a4 #af1 b4 #ah1 ,br47 is instructive4 ,he gives his own opinion1 and that of some preceding commentators1 adverse to ,aristotle4 ,he says that ,greek3 e7pist_/m and ,greek3 to e7pistto_/n1 ai7sthsis and ,greek3 to ai7sthto_/n1 are not properly correlates4 ,the actual correlates with the actual1 the potential with the potential4 ,now1 in the above pairs1 ,greek3 to e7pistton and ,greek3 to ai7sthton are potentials1 while ,greek3 9999e7pist_/m and ,greek3 ai7_/sthsis are actuals2 therefore it is correct to say that ,greek3 to e7pistton and ,greek3 to ai7sthton will not cease to exist if you take away ,greek3 e7pist_/m and ,greek3 ai7_/sthsis4 ,but the real and proper correlate to ,greek3 to e7pistton would be ,greek3 to e7pistmoniko_/n3 the proper correlate to ,greek3 to ai7sthton would be ,greek3 to ai7sthtikon4 ,and when we take these two latter pairs1 it is perfectly correct to say1 ,greek3 sunanairei tauta a7_/llla4 ,in the treatise1 ,de ,partibus ,animalium1 i4 p4 #fda1 b4 #b1 where ,aristotle makes ,greek3 nous correlate with ,greek3 ta nota_/1 we must understand ,greek3 nous as equivalent to ,greek3 to notiko_/n1 and as different from ,greek3 7 no_/sis4 ,footnote #ee3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #h1 b4 #bb4 ,quality is that according to which ,subjects are called ,such and ,such 7,greek3 poioi_/ tines74 ,it is1 however1 not a true genus1 but a vague word1 of many distinct1 though analogous1 meanings including an assemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie4#ef ,the more familiar varieties are--#a4 ,habits or endowments 7,greek3 e7_/xeis7 of a durable character1 such as1 wise1 just1 virtuous2 #b4 ,conditions more or less transitory1 such as1 hot1 cold1 sick1 healthy1 c4 7,greek3 diathe_/seis72 #c4 ,natural powers or incapacities1 such as hard1 soft1 fit for boxing1 fit for running1 c4 #d4 ,capacities of causing sensation1 such as sweet of honey1 hot and cold of fire and ice4 ,but a person who occasionally blushes with shame1 or occasionally becomes pale with fear1 does not receive the designation of such or such from this fact2 the occasional emotion is a passion1 not a quality4#eg ,footnote #ef3 ,see the first note on p4 #ff4 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #h1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de 7 poio_/ts tn pleonachs legome_/nn1 c4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 a4 #cc1 and the ,scholion of ,alexander1 p4 #gae1 a4 #e1 ,br4 ,the abstract term ,greek3 ,poio_/ts was a new coinage in ,plato's time2 he introduces it with an apology 7,thetet4 p4 #ahb ,a474 ,footnote #eg3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #i1 b4 #bj-cc4 ,a fifth variety of ,quality is figure or circumscribing form1 straightness or crookedness4 ,but dense1 rare1 rough1 smooth1 are not properly varieties of ,quality2 objects are not denominated such and such from these circumstances4 ,they rather declare position of the particles of an object in reference to each other1 near or distant1 evenly or unevenly arranged4#eh ,footnote #eh3 ,ibid4 p4 #aj1 a4 #aa-bd4 ,quality admits1 in some cases but not in all1 both contrariety and graduation4 ,just is contrary to unjust1 black to white2 but there is no contrary to red or pale4 ,if one of two contraries belongs to ,quality1 the other of the two will also belong to ,quality4 ,in regard to graduation1 we can hardly say that ,quality in the abstract is capable of more and less2 but it is indisputable that different objects have more or less of the same quality4 ,one man is more just1 healthy1 wise1 than another2 though justice or health in itself cannot be called more or less4 ,one thing cannot be more a triangle1 square1 or circle than another2 the square is not more a circle than the oblong4#ei ,footnote #ei3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #aj1 b4 #ab2 p4 #aa1 a4 #aj1 #aa-bd4 ,what has just been said is not peculiar to ,quality2 but one peculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned4 ,quality is the foundation of ,similarity and ,dissimilarity4 ,objects are called like or unlike in reference to qualities4#fj ,footnote #fj3 ,ibid4 p4 #aa1 a4 #ae4 ,in speaking about ,quality1 ,aristotle has cited many illustrations from ,relata4 ,habits and dispositions1 described by their generic names1 are ,relata2 in their specific varieties they are ,qualities4 ,thus cognition is always cognition of something1 and is therefore a ,relatum2 but grammatik 7grammatical cognition7 is not grammatik of any thing1 and is therefore a ,quality4 ,it has been already intimated#fa that the same variety may well belong to two distinct ,categories4 ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj-ch4 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 tu_/gchanoi to au7to pro_/s ti kai poion o7_/n1 ou7den a7_/topon e7n a7mphote_/rois tois ge_/nesin au7to katarithmeisthai4 ,after having thus dwelt at some length on each of the first four ,categories1 ,aristotle passes lightly over the remaining six4 ,respecting ,agere and ,pati1 he observes that they admit 7like ,quality7 both of graduation and contrariety4 ,respecting ,jacere he tells us that the predicates included in it are derived from the fact of positions1 which positions he had before ranked among the ,relata4 ,respecting ,ubi1 ,quando1 and ,habere1 he considers them all so manifest and intelligible1 that he will say nothing about them2 he repeats the illustrations before given--,habere1 as1 to be shod1 or to be armed 7to have shoes or arms72 ,ubi1 as1 in the ,lykeium2 ,quando1 as1 yesterday1 last year4#fb ,footnote #fb3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ae4 ,greek3 dia to prophan ei7nai1 ou7den u7per au7tn a7_/llo le_/getai 7 o7_/sa e7n a7rch e7rre_/th1 c4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,no part of the ,aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated with logical tradition1 or elicited a greater amount of comment and discussion1#fc than these ,ten ,categories or ,predicaments4 ,i have endeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and with the illustrations of ,aristotle2 because in many of the comments new points of view are introduced1 sometimes more just than those of ,aristotle1 but not present to his mind4 ,modern logicians join the ,categories side by side with the five ,predicables1 which are explained in the ,eisagoge of ,porphyry1 more than five centuries after ,aristotle's death4 ,as expositors of ,logic they are right in doing this2 but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of ,aristotle4 ,the mind of ,aristotle was not altogether exempt from that fascination#fd which particular numbers exercised upon the ,pythagoreans and after them upon ,plato4 ,to the number ,ten the ,pythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection4 ,the fundamental ,contraries1 which they laid down as the ,principles of the ,universe1 were ten in number4#fe ,after them1 also1 ,plato carried his ideal numbers as far as the ,dekad1 but no farther4 ,that ,aristotle considered ,ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of general heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten1 and looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different manner in which he deals with the different items4 ,at least1 such was his point of view when he composed this treatise4 ,though he recognizes all the ten ,categories as co-ordinate in so far that 7except ,quale7 each is a distinct ,genus1 not reducible under either of the others1 yet he devotes all his attention to the first four1 and gives explanations 7copious for him7 in regard to these4 ,about the fifth and sixth 7,agere and ,pati7#ff he says a little1 though much less than we should expect1 considering their extent and importance4 ,about the last four1 next to nothing appears4 ,there are even passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of the two last 7,jacere and ,habere71 and to recognize no more than eight ,predicaments4 ,in the treatise ,categori where his attention is fastened on ,terms and their signification1 and on the appropriate way of combining these terms into propositions1 he recites the ten seriatim2 but in other treatises1 where his remarks bear more upon the matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified1 he thinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose applications are most confined to special subjects4 ,if he had thought fit to carry the total number of ,predicaments to twelve or fifteen instead of ten1#fg he would probably have had little difficulty in finding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than ,jacere and ,habere2 the rather1 as he himself allows1 even in regard to the principal ,categories1 that particulars comprised under one of them may also be comprised under another1 and that there is no necessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one ,category exclusively4 ,footnote #fc3 ,about the prodigious number of these comments1 see the ,scholion of ,dexippus1 p4 #ci1 a4 #cd1 ,br42 p4 #e1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,footnote #fd3 ,see ,simpl4 in ,categ4 ,schol4 p4 #gh1 b4 #ad1 ,br42 also the two first chapters of the ,aristotelian treatise ,de ,coelo2 compare also1 about the perfection of the ,greek3 tri_/t su_/stasis1 ,de ,partibus ,animalium1 ii4 p4 #fdf1 b4 #i2 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 iii4 p4 #gfj1 a4 #cd4 ,footnote #fe3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 p4 #ihf1 a4 #h4 ,there existed1 in the time of the later ,peripatetics1 a treatise in the ,doric dialect by ,archytas--,greek3 ,peri tou ,panto_/s--discriminating ,ten ,categories1 and apparently the same ten ,categories as ,aristotle4 ,by several ,aristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed by ,archytas the ,tarentine1 eminent both as a ,pythagorean philosopher and as the leading citizen of ,tarentum--the contemporary and friend of ,plato1 and1 therefore1 of course1 earlier than ,aristotle4 ,several critics believed that ,aristotle had borrowed his ,ten ,categories from this work of ,archytas2 and we know that the latter preserved the total number of ,ten4 ,see ,schol4 ad ,categor4 p4 #gi1 b4 #c1 ,br4 ,but other critics affirmed1 apparently with better reason1 that the ,archytas1 author of this treatise1 was a ,peripatetic philosopher later than ,aristotle2 and that the doctrine of ,archytas on the ,categories was copied from ,aristotle in the same manner as the ,doric treatise on the ,kosmos1 ascribed to the ,lokrian ,timus1 was copied from the ,timus of ,plato1 being translated into a ,doric dialect4 ,see ,scholia of ,simplikius and ,bothius1 p4 #cc1 a4 #a1 n42 p4 #dj1 a4 #dc1 ,brandis4 ,the fact that this treatise was ascribed to the ,tarentine ,archytas1 indicates how much the number ,ten was consecrated in men's minds as a ,pythagorean canon4 ,footnote #ff3 ,trendelenburg thinks 7,geschichte der ,kategorienlehre1 p4 #aca7 that ,aristotle must have handled the ,categories ,agere1 and ,pati more copiously in other treatises2 and there are some passages in his works which render this probable4 ,see ,de ,anim1 ii4 p4 #daf1 b4 #ce2 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 iv4 p4 #gfh1 b4 #ae4 ,moreover1 in the list of ,aristotle's works given by ,diogenes ,laertius1 one title appears-- ,greek3 ,peri tou poiein kai peponthe_/nai 7,diog4 ,l4 v4 #bb74 ,footnote #fg3 ,prantl expresses this view in his ,geschichte der ,logik 7p4 #bjf71 and ,i think it just4 ,these remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by commentators in regard to the ,ten ,categories4 ,from the century immediately succeeding ,aristotle1 down to recent times1 the question has always been asked1 why did ,aristotle fix upon ,ten ,categories rather than any other number8 and why upon these ,ten rather than others8 ,and ancient commentators#fh as well as modern have insisted1 that the classification is at once defective and redundant2 leaving out altogether some particulars1 while it enumerates others twice over or more than twice4 7,this last charge is1 however1 admitted by ,aristotle himself1 who considers it no ground of objection that the same particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads47 ,the replies made to the questions1 and the attempts to shew cause for the selection of these ,ten classes1 have not been satisfactory2 though it is certain that ,aristotle himself treats the classification as if it were real and exhaustive1#fi obtained by comparing many propositions and drawing from them an induction4 ,he tries to determine1 in regard to some particular enquiries1 under which of the ,ten ,summa ,genera the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged2 he indicates some predicate of extreme generality 7,unum1 ,bonum1 c471 which extend over all or several ,categories1 as equivocal or analogous1 representing no true ,genera4 ,but though ,aristotle takes this view of the completeness of his own classification1 he never assigns the grounds of it1 and we are left to make them out in the best way we can4 ,footnote #fh3 ,schol4 p4 #dg1 b4 #ad1 seq41 #di1 a4 #aj1 seq4 ,br42 also ,simplikius ad ,categor4 fol4 #ae1 #ca ,a1 #cc ,e4 ed4 ,basil41 #aeea4 ,footnote #fi ,scholia ad ,analyt4 ,poster4 7,i4 xxiii4 p4 #hc1 a4 #ba7 p4 #bbg1 b4 #dj1 ,br4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ti de tosautai mo_/nai ai7 katgori_/ai ai7 kata tn ou7sin lego_/menai1 e7k ts e7paggs lamba_/nei4 ,brentano 7in his treatise1 ,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,seienden in ,aristoteles1 ,sects4 #ab and #ac1 pp4 #adh-agg7 attempts to draw out a scheme of systematic deduction for the ,categories4 ,he quotes 7pp4 #aha1 #ahb7 a passage from ,thomas ,aquinas1 in which such a scheme is set forth acutely and plausibly4 ,but if ,aristotle had had any such system present to his mind1 he would hardly have left it to be divined by commentators4 ,simplikius observes 7,schol4 ad ,categ4 p4 #dd1 a4 #cj7 that the last nine ,categories coincide in the main 7excepting such portion of ,quale as belongs to the ,essence7 with ,greek3 to o7_/n kata sumbebko_/s3 which latter1 according to ,aristotle's repeated declarations1 can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific treatment--,greek3 ou7demi_/a e7sti peri au7to theri_/a1 ,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #d2 ,k4 p4 #ajfd1 b4 #ag4 ,this view of ,aristotle respecting ,greek3 to sumbebko_/s1 is hardly consistent with a scheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates4 ,we cannot safely presume1 ,i think1 that he followed out any deductive principle or system2 if he had done so1 he would probably have indicated it4 ,the decuple indication of general heads arose rather from comparison of propositions and induction therefrom4 ,under each of these ten heads1 some predicate or other may always be applied to every concrete individual object1 such as a man or animal4 ,aristotle proceeded by comparing a variety of propositions1 such as were employed in common discourse or dialectic1 and throwing the different predicates into genera1 according as they stood in different logical relation to the ,subject4 ,the analysis applied is not metaphysical but logical2 it does not resolve the real individual into metaphysical ,greek3 a7rchai or ,principles1 such as ,form and ,matter2 it accepts the individual as he stands1 with his full complex array of predicates embodied in a proposition1 and analyses that proposition into its logical constituents4#gj ,the predicates derive their existence from being attached to the ,first ,subject1 and have a different manner of existence according as they are differently related to the ,first ,subject4#ga ,what is this individual1 ,sokrates8 ,he is an animal4 ,what is his ,species8 ,man4 ,what is the ,differentia1 limiting the ,genus and constituting the ,species8 ,rationality1 two-footedness4 ,what is his height and bulk8 ,he is six feet high1 and is of twelve stone weight4 ,what manner of man is he8 ,he is flat-nosed1 virtuous1 patient1 brave4 ,in what relation does he stand to others8 ,he is a father1 a proprietor1 a citizen1 a general4 ,what is he doing8 ,he is digging his garden1 ploughing his field4 ,what is being done to him8 ,he is being rubbed with oil1 he is having his hair cut4 ,where is he8 ,in the city1 at home1 in bed4 ,when do you speak of him8 ,as he is1 at this moment1 as he was1 yesterday1 last year4 ,in what posture is he8 ,he is lying down1 sitting1 standing up1 kneeling1 balancing on one leg4 ,what is he wearing8 ,he has a tunic1 armour1 shoes1 gloves4 ,footnote #gj3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajch1 b4 #ae4 ,greek3 dichs u7pokeitai1 7 to_/de ti o7_/n1 7_/sper to zon tois pa_/thesin1 7 7s 7 u7_/l t e7ntelechei_/a4 ,the first mode of ,greek3 u7pokei_/menon is what is in the ,categories4 ,for the second1 which is the metaphysical analysis1 see ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,z4 p4 #ajbi1 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 ta men gar a7_/lla ts ou7si_/as katgoreitai1 au7_/t de ts u7_/ls4 7_/ste to e7_/schaton kath' au7to ou7_/te ti ou7_/te poson ou7_/te a7_/llo ou7the_/n e7sti4 ,porphyry and ,dexippus tell us 7,schol4 ad ,categ4 p4 #de1 a4 #f-cj7 that both ,aristotle and the ,stoics distinguished ,greek3 prton u7pokei_/menon and ,greek3 deu_/teron u7pokei_/menon4 ,the ,greek3 prton u7pokei_/menon is ,greek3 7 a7_/poios u7_/l--to duna_/mei sma1 which ,aristotle insists upon in the ,physica and ,metaphysica1 the ,greek3 deu_/teron u7pokei_/menon1 o7 koins poion 7 i7di_/s u7phi_/statai1 coincides with the ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a of the ,categories1 already implicated with ,greek3 ei7dos and stopping short of metaphysical analysis4 ,the remarks of ,bothus and ,simplikius upon this point deserve attention4 ,schol4 pp4 #ej-ed1 ,br42 p4 #ed1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 ou7 peri ts a7sche_/tou u7_/ls e7stin o7 parn lo_/gos1 a7lla ts 7_/d sche_/sin e7chou_/ss pros to ei7dos4 to de su_/ntheton dlo_/noti1 o7_/per e7sti to a7_/tomon1 e7pide_/chetai to to_/de4 ,they point out that the terms ,form and ,matter are not mentioned in the ,categories1 nor do they serve to illustrate the ,categories1 which do not carry analysis so far back1 take their initial start from ,greek3 to_/de ti1 the ,greek3 su_/ntheton of ,form and ,matter1--,greek3 ou7si_/a kuri_/tata kai pr_/ts kai ma_/lista legome_/n4 ,simplikius says 7p4 #ej1 a4 #ag73--;,greek3 dunaton de tou m mnmoneusai tou ei7_/dous kai ts u7_/ls ai7_/tion le_/gein1 kai to tn tn ,katgorin pragmatei_/an kata tn pro_/cheiron kai koinn tou lo_/gou chrsin poieisthai2 to de ts u7_/ls kai tou ei7_/dous o7_/noma kai ta u7po tou_/tn smaino_/mena ou7k 7n tois pollois sun_/th1 c4 ,compare p4 #dg1 a4 #bg4 ,this what ,dexippus says also1 that the ,categories bear only upon ,greek3 tn pr_/tn chrei_/an tou lo_/gou kath' 7n ta pra_/gmata dloun a7lllois e7phie_/metha 7p4 #ac1 ed4 ,spengel2 also p4 #di74 ,waitz1 ad ,categor4 p4 #bhd4 ,in ,categoriis1 non de ips rerum natur et veritate exponit1 sed res tales capit1 quales apparent in communi vit homini philosophi non imbuto4 ,we may add1 that ,aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--,form and ,matter--not only to the ,category ,greek3 ou7si_/a but also to that of ,greek3 poion and ,greek3 poso_/n 7,de ,coelo1 iv4 #cab1 a4 #ad47 ,footnote #ga3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 #ajag1 a4 #bc4 ,greek3 o7sachs gar le_/getai1 tosautachs to ei7nai smai_/nei4 ,confining ourselves 7as ,i have already observed that ,aristotle does in the ,categories7 to those perceptible or physical subjects which every one admits1#gb and keeping clear of metaphysical entities1 we shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine questions here put may all be put and answered2 that the two last are most likely to be put in regard to some living being2 and that the last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person 7including man1 woman1 or child74 ,every individual person falls necessarily under each of the ten ,categories2 belongs to the ,genus animal1 ,species man2 he is of a certain height and bulk2 has certain qualities2 stands in certain relations to other persons or things2 is doing something and suffering something2 is in a certain place2 must be described with reference to a certain moment of time2 is in a certain attitude or posture2 is clothed or equipped in a certain manner4 ,information of some kind may always be given respecting him under each of these heads2 he is always by necessity quantus1 but not always of any particular quantity4 ,until such information is given1 the concrete individual is not known under conditions thoroughly determined4#gc ,moreover each head is separate and independent1 not resolvable into any of the rest1 with a reservation1 presently to be noticed1 of ,relation in its most comprehensive meaning4 ,when ,i say of a man1 that he is at home1 lying down1 clothed with a tunic1 c41 ,i do not predicate of him any quality1 action1 or passion4 ,the information which ,i give belongs to three other heads distinct from these last1 and distinct also from each other4 ,if you suppress the two last of the ten ,categories and leave only the preceding eight1 under which of these eight are you to rank the predicates1 ,sokrates is lying down1 ,sokrates is clothed with a tunic1 c48 ,the necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth ,categories 7,jacere and ,habere7 as separate general heads in the list1 is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the ,categories which precede4 ,the ninth and tenth are of narrower comprehension1#gd and include a smaller number of distinguishable varieties1 than the preceding2 but they are not the less separate heads of information4 ,so1 among the chemical elements enumerated by modern science1 some are very rarely found2 yet they are not for that reason the less entitled to a place in the list4 ,footnote #gb3 ,ibid4 ,z4 p4 #ajbh1 b4 #h1 seq43 p4 #ajdb1 a4 #be4 ,greek3 ai7 ai7sthtai ou7si_/ai--ai7 o7mologou_/menai ou7si_/ai4 ,footnote #gc3 ,prantl observes1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 p4 #bjh3--;,fragen wir1 wie ,aristoteles berhaupt dazu gekommen sei1 von ,kategorien zu sprechen1 und welche ,geltung dieselben bei ihm haben1 so ist unsere ,antwort hierauf folgende3 ,aristoteles geht1 im ,gegensatze gegen ,platon1 davon aus1 dass die ,allgemeinheit in der ,concretion des ,seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser ,realitt von dem menschlichen ,denken und ,sprechen ergriffen werde2 der ,verwirklichungsprocess des concret ,seienden ist der ,uebergang vom ,unbestimmten1 jeder ,bestimmung aber fhigen1 zum allseitig ,bestimmten1 welchem demnach die ,bestimmtheit berhaupt als eine selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des ,menschen ,rede von ihm ausgesagt wird4 ,das grundwesentliche ,ergebniss der ,verwirklichung ist sonach3 die zeitlich-rumlich concret auftretende und hiemit individuell gewordene ,substanzialitt1 in einer dem ,zustande der ,concretion entsprechenden ,erscheinungsweise2 diese letztere umfasst das ganze habituelle ,dasein und ,wirken der concreten ,substanz1 welche in der ,welt der rumlichen ,ausdehnung numerren ,vielheit erscheint4 ,die ontologische ,basis demnach der ,kategorien ist der in die ,concretion fhrende ,verwirklichungsprocess der ,bestimmtheit berhaupt4 ,footnote #gd3 ,plotinus1 among his various grounds of exception to the ten ,aristotelian ,categories1 objects to the ninth and tenth on the ground of their narrow comprehension 7,ennead4 vi4 #a1 #bc1 #bd74 ,bothus expressly vindicated the title of ,greek3 e7_/chein to be recognized as a separate ,category1 against the ,stoic objectors4--,schol4 ad ,categ4 p4 #ha1 a4 #e4 ,if we seek not to appreciate the value of the ,ten ,categories as a philosophical classification1 but to understand what was in the mind of ,aristotle when he framed it1 we shall attend1 not much to the greater features1 which it presents in common with every other scheme of classification1 as to the minor features which constitute its peculiarity4 ,in this point of view the two last ,categories are more significant than the first four1 and the tenth is the most significant of all2 for every one is astonished when he finds ,habere enrolled as a tenth ,summum ,genus1 co-ordinate with ,quantum and ,quale4 ,now what is remarkable about the ninth and tenth ,categories is1 that individual persons or animals are the only ,subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated1 and are at the same time ,subjects respecting whom they are constantly 7or at least frequently7 predicated4 ,an individual person is habitually clothed in some particular way in all or part of his body2 he 7and perhaps his horse also7 are the only ,subjects that are ever so clothed4 ,moreover animals are the only ,subjects1 and among them man is the principal ,subject1 whose changes of posture are frequent1 various1 determined by internal impulses1 and at the same time interesting to others to know4 ,hence we may infer that when ,aristotle lays down the ,ten ,categories1 as ,summa ,genera for all predications which can be made about any given ,subject1 the ,subject which he has wholly1 or at least principally1 in his mind is an individual ,man4 ,we understand1 then1 how it is that he declares ,habere and ,jacere to be so plain as to need no farther explanation4 ,what is a man's posture8 ,what is his clothing or equipment8 are questions understood by every one4#ge ,but when ,aristotle treats of ,habere elsewhere1 he is far from recognizing it as narrow and plain per se4 ,even in the ,post-,predicamenta 7an appendix tacked on to the ,categori1 either by himself afterwards1 or by some follower7 he declares ,habere to be a predicate of vague and equivocal signification2 including portions of ,quale1 ,quantum1 and ,relata4 ,and he specifies the personal equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of signification4 ,he takes the same view in the fourth book 7,greek3 ,d47 of the ,metaphysica1 which book is a sort of lexicon of philosophical terms4#gf ,this enlargement of the meaning of the word ,habere seems to indicate an alteration of ,aristotle's point of view1 dropping that special reference to an individual man as ,subject1 which was present to him when he drew up the list of ,ten ,categories4 ,the like alteration carried him still farther1 so as to omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely1 when he discusses the more extensive topics of philosophy4 ,some of his followers1 on the contrary1 instead of omitting ,habere out of the list of ,categories1 tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it bears in the ,metaphysica4 ,archytas ranked it fifth in the series1 immediately after ,relata4#gg ,footnote #ge3 ,in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of ,mr4 ,james ,harris's ,philosophical ,arrangements1 there is a learned and valuable illustration of these two last ,aristotelian ,categories4 ,i think1 however1 that he gives to the ,predicament ,greek3 ,keisthai 7,jacere7 a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in the treatise ,categori2 and that neither he1 nor the commentators whom he cites 7p4 #cag71 take sufficient notice of the marked distinction drawn in that treatise between ,greek3 keisthai and ,greek3 the_/sis 7,cat4 p4 #f1 b4 #ab74 ,mr4 ,harris ranks the arrangement of words in an orderly discourse1 and of propositions in a valid syllogism1 as cases coming under the ,predicament ,greek ,keisthai2 which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the ,aristotelian ,categories4 ,at the same time he brings out strongly the fact1 that living beings1 and especially men1 are the true and special subjects of predicates belonging to ,greek3 ,keisthai and ,greek3 ,e7_/chein4 ,the more we attend to this1 the nearer approach shall we make to the state of ,aristotle's mind when he drew up the list of ,categories2 as indeed ,harris himself seems to recognize 7chap4 ii4 p4 #bi74 ,footnote #gf3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #ae1 b4 #ag2 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbc1 a4 #h4 ,footnote #gg3 ,see the ,scholia of ,simplikius1 p4 #hj1 b4 #g1 seq42 p4 #ib1 b4 #da1 ,brand42 where the different views of ,archytas1 ,plotinus1 and ,bothus1 are given2 also p4 #ei1 b4 #dc3 ,greek3 progeitai gar 7 sumphus tn pro_/s ti sche_/sis tn e7pikt_/tn sche_/sen1 7s kai t ,a7rchu_/ta dokei4 ,in the language of ,archytas1 ,greek3 ai7 e7pi_/kttoi sche_/seis were the equivalent of the ,aristotelian ,greek3 e7_/chein4 ,the narrow manner in which ,aristotle conceives the ,predicament ,habere in the treatise ,categori1 and the enlarged sense given to that term both in the ,post-,predicaments and in the ,metaphysica1 lead to a suspicion that the ,categori is comparatively early1 in point of date1 among his compositions4 ,it seems more likely that he should begin with the narrower view1 and pass from thence to the larger1 rather than vice vers4 ,probably the predicates specially applicable to ,man would be among his early conceptions1 but would by later thought be tacitly dropped1#gh so as to retain those only which had a wider philosophical application4 ,footnote #gh3 ,respecting the paragraph 7at the close of the ,categori7 about ,greek3 to e7_/chein1 see the ,scholion in ,waitz's ed4 of the ,organon1 p4 #ch4 ,the fact that ,archytas in his treatise presented the ,aristotelian ,category ,greek3 e7_/chein under the more general phrase of ,greek3 ai7 e7pi_/kttoi sche_/seis 7see the preceding note71 is among the reasons for believing that treatise to be later than ,aristotle4 ,i have already remarked that ,aristotle1 while enrolling all the ,ten ,predicaments as independent heads1 each the ,generalissimum of a separate descending line of predicates1 admitted at the same time that various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these lines exclusively1 but might take rank in more than one line4 ,there are some which he enumerates under all the different heads of ,quality1 ,relation1 ,action1 ,passion4 ,the classification is evidently recognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes especially in regard to ,quality and ,relation1 under both of which heads 7he says7 the same predicates may sometimes be counted4#gi ,and the observation is much more extensively true than he was aware2 for he both conceives and defines the ,category of ,relation or ,relativity 7,ad ,aliquid7 in a way much narrower than really belongs to it4 ,if he had assigned to this ,category its full and true comprehension1 he would have found it implicated with all the other nine4 ,none of them can be isolated from it in predication4 ,footnote #gi3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #aa1 a4 #cg4 ,simplikius says that what ,aristotle admits about ,greek3 poio_/ts1 is true about all the other ,categories also1 viz43 that it is not a strict and proper ,greek3 ge_/nos4 ,each of the ten ,categories is 7what ,aristotle says about ,greek3 to o7n7 ,greek3 me_/son tn te sunno_/mn kai o7mnu_/mn4--ou7de gar e7keina kuri_/s e7sti ge_/n1 ou7de 7s ge_/n tn u7p' au7ta katgoreitai1 ta_/xes ou7_/ss pantachou pr_/tn kai deute_/rn4 7,scholia ad ,categor4 p4 #fi1 b4 #cj1 ,br47 ,this is a remarkable observation1 which has been sufficiently adverted to1 ,i think1 by ,brentano in his treatise on ,aristotle's ,ontology4 ,that ,agere and ,pati 7with the illustrations which he himself gives thereof--urit1 uritur7 may be ranked as varieties under the generic ,category of ,relation or ,relativity1 can hardly be overlooked4 ,the like is seen to be true about ,ubi and ,quando1 when we advert to any one of the predicates belonging to either2 such as1 in the market-place1 yesterday4#hj ,moreover1 not merely the last six of the ten ,categories1 but also the second and fourth 7,quantum and ,quale7 are implicated with and subordinated to ,relation4 ,if we look at ,quantum1 we shall find that the example which ,aristotle gives of it is ,greek3 tripchus1 tricubital1 or three cubits long2 a term quite as clearly relative as the term ,greek3 dipla_/sios or double1 which he afterwards produces as instance of the ,category ,ad ,aliquid4#ha ,when we are asked the questions1 ,how much is the height8 ,how large is the field8 we cannot give the information required except by a relative predicate--it is three feet--it is four acres2 we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some unit of length or superficies already known to him1 and we convey our meaning by comparison with such unit4 ,again1 if we turn from ,quantum to ,quale1 we find the like ,relativity implied in all the predicates whereby answer is made to the question ,greek3 ,poios ti_/s e7sti8 ,qualis est8 ,what manner of man is he8 ,he is such as ,a1 ,b1 ,c--persons whom we have previously seen1 or heard1 or read of4#hb ,footnote #hj3 ,the remarks of ,plotinus upon these four last-mentioned ,categories are prolix and vague1 but many of them go to shew how much ,greek3 to pro_/s ti is involved in all of the four 7,ennead4 vi4 #a1 #ad-ah74 ,footnote #ha3 ,trendelenburg 7,kategorienlehre1 p4 #ahd7 admits a certain degree of interference and confusion between the ,categories of ,quantum and ,ad ,aliquid2 but in very scanty measure1 and much beneath the reality4 ,footnote #hb3 ,the following passages from ,mr4 ,james ,mill 7,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 vol4 ii4 ch4 xiv4 sect4 ii4 pp4 #dh1 #di1 #ef1 #ast ed47 state very clearly the ,relativity of the predicates of ,quantity and ,quality3-- ,it seems necessary that ,i should say something of the word ,quantus1 from which the word ,quantity is derived4 ,quantus is the correlate of ,tantus4 ,tantus1 ,quantus1 are relative terms1 applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms ,great1 ,little4--,of two lines1 we call the one tantus1 the other quantus4 ,the occasions on which we do so1 are when the one is as long as the other4--,when we say that one thing is tantus1 quantus another1 or one so great1 as the other is great2 the first is referred to the last1 the tantus to the quantus4 ,the first is distinguished and named by the last4 ,the ,quantus is the standard4--,on what account1 then1 is it that we give to any thing the name ,quantus8 ,as a standard by which to name another thing1 ,tantus4 ,the thing called ,quantus is the previously known thing1 the ascertained amount1 by which we can mark and define the other amount4 ,talis1 ,qualis1 are applied to objects in the same way1 on one account1 as ,tantus1 ,quantus1 on another2 and the explanation we gave of ,tantus1 ,quantus1 may be applied1 mutatis mutandis1 to the pair of relatives which we have now named4 ,tantus1 ,quantus1 are names applied to objects on account of dimension4 ,talis1 ,qualis1 are names applied to objects on account of all other sensations4 ,we apply ,tantus1 ,quantus1 to a pair of objects when they are equal2 we apply ,talis1 ,qualis1 to a pair of objects when they are alike4 ,one of the objects is then the standard4 ,the object ,qualis is that to which the reference is made4 ,compare the same work1 vol4 i4 ch4 ix4 p4 #bbe3--,the word ,such is a relative term1 and always connotes so much of the meaning of some other term4 ,when we call a thing such1 it is always understood that it is such as some other thing4 ,corresponding with our words such as1 the ,latins had ,talis1 ,qualis4 ,we thus see that all the predicates1 not only under the ,category which ,aristotle terms ,ad ,aliquid1 but also under all the last nine ,categories1 are relative4 ,indeed the work of predication is always relative4 ,the express purpose1 as well as the practical usefulness1 of a significant predicate is1 to carry the mind of the hearer either to a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past comparisons4 ,but though each predicate connotes ,relation1 each connotes a certain fundamentum besides1 which gives to the ,relation its peculiar character4 ,relations of ,quantity are not the same as relations of ,quality2 the predicates of the former connote a fundamentum different from the predicates of the latter1 though in both the meaning conveyed is relative4 ,in fact1 every predicate or concrete general name is relative1 or connotes a ,relation to something else1 actual or potential1 beyond the thing named4 ,the only name not relative is the ,proper name1 which connotes no attributes1 and cannot properly be used as a predicate 7so ,aristotle remarks71 but only as a ,subject4#hc ,sokrates1 ,kallias1 ,bukephalus c41 denotes the ,hoc ,aliquid or ,unum ,numero1 which1 when pronounced alone1 indicates some concrete aggregate 7as yet unknown7 which may manifest itself to my senses1 but does not1 so far as the name is concerned1 involve necessary reference to anything besides2 though even these names1 when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same object1 may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past or future existence1 and become thus to a certain extent relative4 ,footnote #hc3 ,you may make ,sokrates a predicate1 in the proposition1 ,greek3 to leukon e7keino ,skra_/ts e7sti_/n1 but ,aristotle dismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking 7see ,analytic4 ,priora1 i4 p4 #dc1 a4 #ce2 ,analyt4 ,poster4 i4 p4 #hc1 a4 #b-af74 ,alexander calls these propositions ,greek3 ai7 para phu_/sin prota_/seis 7see ,schol4 ad ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag1 a4 #bc74 ,mr4 ,james ,harris observes 7,philosophical ,arrangements1 ch4 x4 p4 #bad2 also #cag1 #cdh73--;,hence too we may see why ,relation stands next to ,quantity2 for in strictness the ,predicaments which follow are but different modes of ,relation1 marked by some peculiar character over their own1 over and above the relative character1 which is common to them all4 ,to which ,i would add1 that the first two ,categories1 ,substance and ,quantity1 are no less relative or correlative than the eight later ,categories2 as indeed ,harris himself thinks2 see the same work1 pp4 #ij1 #dgc3 ,matter and ,attribute are essentially distinct1 yet1 like convex and concave1 they are by nature inseparable4 ,we have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes2 we now speak as to that of matter4 ,greek3 7meis de phamen men ei7nai_/ tina u7_/ln tn sma_/tn tn ai7sthtn1 a7lla tau_/tn ou7 christn a7ll' a7ei met' e7nanti_/ses--u7_/ln tn a7ch_/riston men1 u7pokeime_/nn de tois e7nanti_/ois 7,aristot4 ,de ,gen4 et ,corr4 p4 #cbi1 a4 #bd74 ,by contraries1 ,aristotle means here the several attributes of matter1 hot1 cold1 c42 from some one or other of which matter is always inseparable4 ,we must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain concrete ,one and individual1#hd with his attributes essential and non-essential1 whatever they may be1 though as yet undeclared1 and with his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even opposite4 ,this is what ,aristotle indicates as the most special characteristic of ,substance or ,essence1 that while it is ,unum et ,idem ,numero1 it is capable of receiving contraries4 ,this potentiality of contraries1 described as characterizing the ,unum et ,idem ,numero1#he is relative to something about to come2 the ,first ,essence is doubtless logically ,first1 but it is just as much relative to the ,second1 as the ,second to the ,first4 ,we know it only by two negations and one affirmation1 all of which are relative to predications in futuro4 ,it is neither in a ,subject1 nor predicable of a ,subject4 ,it is itself the ultimate ,subject of all predications and all inherencies4 ,plainly1 therefore1 we know it only relatively to these predications and inherencies4 ,aristotle says truly1 that if you take2 away the ,first ,essences1 everything else1 ,second ,essences as well as ,accidents1 disappears along with them4 ,but he might have added with equal truth1 that if you take away all ,second ,essences and all ,accidents1 the ,first ,essences will disappear equally4 ,the correlation and interdependence is reciprocal4#hf ,it may be suitable1 with a view to clear and retainable philosophical explanation1 to state the ,subject first and the predicates afterwards2 so that the ,subject may thus be considered as logically prius4 ,but in truth the ,subject is only a substratum for predicates1#hg as much as the predicates are superstrata upon the ,subject4 ,the term substratum designates not an absolute or a per se1 but a ,correlatum to certain superstrata1 determined or undetermined3 now the ,correlatum is one of the pair implicated directly or indirectly in all ,relation2 and it is in fact specified by ,aristotle as one variety of the ,category ,ad ,aliquid4#hh ,we see therefore that the idea of ,relativity attaches to the first of the ten ,categories1 as well as to the nine others4 ,the inference from these observations is1 that ,relation or ,relativity1 understood in the large sense which really belongs to it1 ought to be considered rather as an ,universal1 comprehending and pervading all the ,categories1 than as a separate ,category in itself1 co-ordinate with the other nine4 ,it is the condition and characteristic of the work of predication generally2 the last analysis of which is into ,subject and ,predicate1 in reciprocal implication with each other4 ,i remark that this was the view taken of it by some well-known ,peripatetic commentators of antiquity2#hi by ,andronikus1 for example1 and by ,ammonius after him4 ,plato1 though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of ,categories1 has an incidental passage respecting ,relativity2#ij conceiving it in a very extended sense1 apparently as belonging more or less to all predicates4 ,aristotle1 though in the ,categori he gives a narrower explanation of it1 founded upon grammatical rather than real considerations1 yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked under the heads of ,quale1 ,actio1 ,passio1 ,jacere1 c41 may also be looked at as belonging to the head of ,ad ,aliquid4#ia ,this latter1 moreover1 he himself declares elsewhere to be ,ens in the lowest degree1 farther removed from the ,prima ,essentia than any of the other ,categories2 to be more in the nature of an appendage to some of them1 especially to ,quantum and ,quale2#ib and to presuppose1 not only the ,prima ,essentia 7which all the nine later ,categories presuppose71 but also one or more of the others1 indicating the particular mode of comparison or ,relativity in each case affirmed4 ,thus1 under one aspect1 ,relation or ,relativity may be said to stand prius natur1 and to come first in order before all the ,categories1 inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business of predication 7which those ,categories are intended to resolve into its elements71 and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we call the ,subject1 than to the mode of conceiving what we call its ,predicates1 each and all4 ,under another aspect1 ,relativity may be said to stand last in order among the ,categories--even to come after the adverbial ,categories ,ubi et ,quando2 because its locus standi is dim and doubtful1 and because every one of the subordinate predicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of the remaining ,categories also4 ,aristotle remarks that the ,category ,ad ,aliquid has no peculiar and definite mode of generation corresponding to it1 in the manner that ,increase and ,diminution belong to ,quantum1 ,change to ,quale1 ,generation1 simple and absolute1 to ,essence or ,substance4#ic ,new relations may become predicable of a thing1 without any change in the thing itself1 but simply by changes in other things4#id ,footnote #hd3 ,simplikius ap4 ,schol4 p4 #eb1 a4 #db3 ,greek3 pros o7_/ phasin oi7 spoudaio_/teroi tn e7xgtn1 o7_/ti 7 ai7stht ou7si_/a sumpho_/rsi_/s ti_/s e7sti poiot_/tn kai u7_/ls1 kai o7mou men pa_/nta sumpage_/nta mi_/an poiei tn ai7sthtn ousi_/an1 chris de e7_/kaston lambano_/menon to men poion to de poso_/n e7sti lambano_/menon1 7_/ ti a7_/llo4 ,footnote #he3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #d1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 ,ma_/lista de ,i7_/dion touto ts ou7si_/as dokei ei7nai1 to tau7ton kai e7n a7rithm o7n tn e7nanti_/n ei7nai dektiko_/n4 ,see ,waitz1 note1 p4 #bij3 ,greek3 dektikon dicitur ,greek3 to e7n 7 pe_/phuken u7pa_/rchein ti4 ,dexippus1 and after him ,simplikius1 observe justly1 that the characteristic mark of ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a is this very circumstance of being unum numero1 which belongs in common to all ,greek3 prtai ou7si_/ai1 and is indicated by the ,proper name3 ,greek3 lu_/sis de touo_/tou1 o7_/ti au7to to mi_/an ei7nai a7rithm1 koino_/s e7sti lo_/gos4 7,simpl4 in ,categor41 fol4 #bb ,greek3 ,d42 ,dexippus1 book ii4 sect4 #ah1 p4 #eg1 ed4 ,spengel47 ,footnote #hf3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #b1 b4 #e4 ,greek3 m ou7sn ou7n tn pr_/tn ou7sin a7du_/naton tn a7_/lln ti ei7nai4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill observes3 ,as to the self-existence of ,substance1 it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist without any other substance2 but so also may an attribute without any other attributes4 ,and we can no more imagine a substance without attributes1 than we can imagine attributes without a substance4 7,system of ,logic1 bk4 i4 ch4 iii4 p4 #fa1 #fth ed47 ,footnote #hg3 ,aristot4 ,physic4 ii4 p4 #aid1 b4 #h4 ,greek3 e7_/ti tn pro_/s ti 7 u7_/l2 a7_/ll gar ei7_/dei a7_/ll u7_/l4 ,plotinus puts this correctly1 in his criticisms on the ,stoic ,categories2 criticisms which on this point equally apply to the ,aristotelian3 ,greek3 pro_/s ti gar to u7pokei_/menon1 ou7 pros to e7n au7t1 a7lla pros to poioun ei7s au7to_/1 kei_/menon4 ,kai to u7pokei_/menon u7pokeitai pros to ou7ch u7pokei_/menon2 ei7 touto1 pros ta to e7_/x1 c4 ,also ,dexippus in the ,scholia ad ,categor4 p4 #de1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 to gar u7pokei_/menon kata pro_/s ti le_/gesthai e7do_/kei1 tini gar u7pokei_/menon4 ,footnote #hh3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 b4 #ca1 p4 #ajba1 a4 #bg1 seq4 ,footnote #hi3 ,schol4 p4 #fj1 a4 #ch1 ,br42 p4 #dg1 b4 #bf4 ,xenokrates and ,andronikus included all things under the two heads ,greek3 to kath' au7to and ,greek3 to pro_/s ti4 ,greek3 ,a7ndro_/nikos men gar o7 ,r7o_/dios teleutai_/an a7pone_/mei tois pros ti ta_/xin1 le_/gn ai7ti_/an toiau_/tn4 ta pro_/s ti oi7kei_/an u7_/l ou7k e7_/chei2 paraphua_/di gar e7_/oiken oi7kei_/an phu_/sin m e7chou_/s a7lla periplekome_/n tois e7_/chousin oi7kei_/an r7i_/zan2 ai7 de e7_/nnea katgori_/ai oi7kei_/an u7_/ln e7_/chousin2 ei7ko_/ts ou7n teleutai_/an 7_/pheilon e7_/chein ta_/xin4 ,again1 ,schol4 p4 #fj1 a4 #bd 7,ammonius73 ,greek3 kals de_/ tines a7peika_/zousi ta pro_/s ti paraphua_/sin1 c4 ,also p4 #ei1 b4 #da2 p4 #di1 a4 #dg2 p4 #fa1 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 i7_/ss de kai o7_/ti ta pro_/s ti e7n tois a7_/llois ge_/nesin u7phe_/stke1 dia touto sun au7tois thereitai1 ka7n m progoume_/ns e7_/tuche mn_/ms 7and the ,scholia ad p4 #f1 a4 #cf1 prefixed to ,waitz's edition1 p4 #cc74 ,also p4 #fb1 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 dia tauta de 7s paraphuome_/nn tais a7_/llais katgori_/ais tn tou pro_/s ti e7peisodi_/d nomi_/zousi1 kai_/toi progoume_/nn ou7san kai kata diaphoran oi7kei_/an theroume_/nn4 ,bothus had written an entire book upon ,greek3 ta pro_/s ti1 ,schol4 p4 #fa1 b4 #i4 ,footnote #ij3 ,plato1 ,republic1 iv4 #dcg ,c4 to #dci ,b4 7compare also ,sophistes1 p4 #bee ,c41 and ,politicus1 p4 #bhe74 ,greek3 ,kai ta plei_/ d pros ta e7la_/tt kai ta dipla_/sia pros ta 7mi_/sea kai pa_/nta ta toiauta1 kai au7 baru_/tera pros koupho_/tera kai tha_/tt pros bradu_/tera1 kai e7_/ti ge ta therma pros ta psuchra kai pa_/nta ta tou_/tois o7_/moia1 a7r' ou7ch ou7_/ts e7_/chei8 7#dch ,c47 ,footnote #ia3 ,see ,metaphysic4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 b4 #bf1 p4 #ajba1 b4 #aj4 ,trendelenburg observes 7,gesch4 der ,kategorienlehre1 pp4 #aah-abb1 seq47 how much more the description given of ,greek3 pro_/s ti in the ,categori is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations1 than in the ,metaphysica and other treatises of ,aristotle4 ,footnote #ib3 ,see ,ethic4 ,nikomach4 i4 p4 #ajif1 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 to de kath' au7to kai 7 ou7si_/a pro_/teron t phu_/sei tou pro_/s ti2 paraphua_/di gar tout' e7_/oike kai sumbebko_/ti tou o7_/ntos1 7_/ste ou7k a7n ei7_/ koin_/ tis e7pi tou_/tn i7de_/a4 7,the expression ,greek3 paraphua_/di was copied by ,andronikus2 see a note on the preceding page47 ,metaphys4 ,n4 p4 #ajhh1 a4 #bb-bf3 ,greek3 to de pro_/s ti pa_/ntn 7_/kista phu_/sis tis 7 ou7si_/a tn katgorin e7sti_/1 kai u7ste_/ra tou poiou kai posou2 kai pa_/thos ti tou posou to pro_/s ti1 7_/sper e7le_/chth1 a7ll' ou7ch u7_/l1 ei7_/ ti e7_/teron kai t o7_/ls koin pro_/s ti kai tois me_/resin au7tou kai ei7_/desin4 ,compare ,bonitz in his note on p4 #ajgj1 a4 #cc4 ,the general doctrine laid down by ,aristotle1 ,metaphys4 ,n4 p4 #ajhg1 b4 #cd1 seq41 about the universality of ,greek3 me_/tron as pervading all the ,categories1 is analogous to the passage above referred to in the ,politicus of ,plato1 and implies the ,relativity involved more or less in all predicates4 ,footnote #ic3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,n4 p4 #ajhh1 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 smeion de o7_/ti 7_/kista ou7si_/a tis kai o7_/n ti to pro_/s ti to mo_/non m ei7nai ge_/nesin au7tou mde phthoran mde ki_/nsin1 7_/sper kata to poson au7_/xsis kai phthi_/sis1 kata to poion a7lloi_/sis1 kata to_/pon phora_/1 kata tn ou7si_/an 7 a7pl ge_/nesis kai phthora_/4 ,compare ,k4 p4 #ajfh1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 a7na_/gk treis ei7nai kin_/seis1 poiou1 posou1 to_/pou4 kat' ou7si_/an d' ou7_/1 dia to mthen ei7nai ou7si_/a e7nanti_/on1 ou7de tou pro_/s ti4 ,also ,physica1 v4 p4 #bbe1 b4 #aa3 ,greek3 e7nde_/chetai gar thate_/rou metaba_/llontos a7ltheu_/esthai tha_/teron mden meta_/ballon4 ,see about this passage ,bonitz and ,schwegler's notes on ,metaphys4 p4 #ajfh4 ,footnote #id3 ,hobbes observes 7,first ,philosophy1 part ii4 ch4 xi4 #f73 ,but we must not so think of ,relation as if it were an accident differing from all the other accidents of the relative2 but one of them1 namely1 that by which the comparison is made4 ,for example1 the likeness of one white to another white1 or its unlikeness to black1 is the same accident with its whiteness4 ,this may be true about the relations ,like and ,unlike 7see ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 ,logic1 ch4 iii4 p4 #hj1 #fth ed47 ,but1 in ,relations generally1 the fundamentum may be logically distinguished from the ,relation itself4 ,aristotle makes the same remarks upon ,greek3 to sumbebkos as upon ,greek3 to pro_/s ti3--,that it verges upon ,non-ens2 and that it has no special mode of being generated or destroyed4 ,greek3 phai_/netai gar to sumbebkos e7ggu_/s ti tou m o7_/ntos2 tn men gar a7_/llon tro_/pon o7_/ntn e7_/sti ge_/nesis kai phthora_/1 tn de kata sumbebkos ou7k e7_/stin4 7,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ba47 ,those among the ,aristotelian commentators who denied the title of ,ad ,aliquid to a place among the ,categories or ,summa ,genera of predicates1 might support their views from passages where ,aristotle ranks the ,genus as a ,relatum1 though he at the same time declares that the ,species under it are not ,relata4 ,thus scientia is declared by him to be a ,relatum2 because it must be of something--alicujus scibilis2 while the something thus implied is not specified4#ie ,but 7scientia7 musica1 grammatica1 medica1 c41 are declared not to be ,relata2 the indeterminate something being there determined1 and bound up in one word with the predication of ,relativity4 ,now the truth is that both are alike ,relata1 though both also belong to the ,category of ,quality2 a man is called ,talis from being sciens1 as well as from being grammaticus4 ,again1 he gives as illustrative examples of the ,category ,ad ,aliquid1 the adjectives double1 triple4 ,but he ranks in a different ,category 7that of ,quantum7 the adjectives bicubital1 tricubital 7,greek3 dipchus1 tripchus4 ,it is plain that the two last of these predicates are species under the two first1 and that all four predicates are alike relative1 under any real definition that can be given of ,relativity1 though all four belong also to the ,category of ,quantum4 ,yet ,aristotle does not recognize any predicates as belonging to ,ad ,aliquid1 except such as are logically and grammatically elliptical2 that is1 such as do not include in themselves the specification of the ,correlate1 but require to be supplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case1 specifying the latter4 ,as we have already seen1 he lays it down generally1 that all ,relata 7or ,ad ,aliquid7 imply a ,correlatum2 and he prescribes that when the ,correlatum is indicated1 care shall be taken to designate it by a precise and specific term1 not of wider import than the ,relatum1#if but specially reciprocating therewith3 thus he regards ala 7a wing7 as ,ad ,aliquid1 but when you specify its correlate in order to speak with propriety 7,greek3 oi7kei_/s71 you must describe it as ala alati 7not as ala avis71 in order that the ,correlatum may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating with the ,relatum4 ,wing1 head1 hand1 c41 are thus ,ad ,aliquid1 though there may be no received word in the language to express their exact ,correlata2 and though you may find it necessary to coin a new word expressly for the purpose4#ig ,in specifying the ,correlatum of servant1 you must say1 servant of a master1 not servant of a man or of a biped2 both of which are in this case accompaniments or accidents of the master1 being still accidents1 though they may be in fact constantly conjoined4 ,unless you say master1 the terms will not reciprocate2 take away master1 the servant is no longer to be found1 though the man who was called servant is still there2 but take away man or biped1 and the servant may still continue4#ih ,you cannot know the ,relatum determinately or accurately1 unless you know the ,correlatum also2 without the knowledge of the latter1 you can only know the former in a vague and indefinite manner4#ii ,aristotle raises1 also1 the question whether any ,essence or ,substance can be described as ,ad ,aliquid4#ajj ,he inclines to the negative1 though not decisively pronouncing4 ,he seems to think that ,simo and ,davus1 when called men1 are ,essences or ,substances2 but that when called master and slave1 they are not so2 this1 however1 is surprising1 when he had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents 7,greek3 sumbebko_/ta7 belonging to the connotation of master4 ,he speaks of the members of an organized body 7wing1 head1 foot7 as examples of ,ad ,aliquid2 while in other treatises1 he determines very clearly that these members presuppose1 as a prius natur1 the complete organism whereof they are parts1 and that the name of each member connotes the performance of1 or aptitude to perform1 a certain special function3 now1 such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole organism be held together in co-operative agency1 so that if this last condition be wanting1 the names1 head1 eye1 foot1 can no longer be applied to the separate members1 or at least can only be applied equivocally or metaphorically4#aja ,it would seem therefore that the functioning something is here the ,essence1 and that all its material properties are accidents 7,greek3 sumbebko_/ta74 ,footnote #ie3 ,categor4 p4 #f1 b4 #ab1 p4 #aa1 a4 #bd2 ,topic4 iv4 p4 #abd1 b4 #af4 ,compare also ,topica1 iv4 p4 #aba1 a4 #a1 and the ,scholia thereupon1 p4 #bgh1 b4 #ab-af1 ,br42 in which ,scholia ,alexander feels the difficulty of enrolling a generic term as ,greek3 pro_/s ti1 while the specific terms comprised under it are not ,greek3 pro_/s ti2 and removes the difficulty by suggesting that ,greek3 e7pist_/m may be at once both ,greek3 poio_/ts and ,greek3 pro_/s ti2 and that as ,greek3 poio_/ts 7not as ,greek3 pro_/s ti7 it may be the genus including ,greek3 mousik and ,greek3 gemetri_/a1 which are not ,greek3 pro_/s ti1 but ,greek3 poio_/ttes4 ,footnote #if3 ,categor4 p4 #f1 b4 #cj1 p4 #g1 b4 #ab4 ,footnote #ig3 ,categor4 p4 #g1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 e7ni_/ote de o7nomatopoiein ,i7_/ss a7nagkaion1 e7an m kei_/menon 7 o7_/noma pros o7 oi7kei_/s a7n a7podothei_/4 ,footnote #ih3 ,categor4 p4 #g1 a4 #ca4 ,greek3 e7_/ti d' e7an me_/n ti oi7kei_/s a7podido_/menon 7 pros o7 le_/getai1 pa_/ntn periairoume_/nn tn a7_/lln o7_/sa sumbebko_/ta e7sti_/1 kataleipome_/nou de mo_/nou tou_/tou pros o7 a7pedo_/th oi7kei_/s1 a7ei pros au7to r7th_/setai1 oi7on o7 doulos e7an pros despo_/tn le_/gtai1 periairoume_/nn tn a7_/lln a7pa_/ntn o7_/sa sumbebko_/ta e7sti t despo_/t oi7on to di_/podi ei7nai kai to e7pist_/ms dektik kai to a7nthr_/p1 kataleipome_/nou de mo_/nou tou despo_/tn ei7nai1 a7ei o7 doulos pros au7to r7thsetai4 ,this is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of predication1 but deserves attention also in another point of view4 ,in general1 it would be said that man and biped belonged to the ,essence 7,greek3 ou7si_/a72 and the being a master to the ,accidents or ,accompaniments 7,greek3 sumbebko_/ta74 ,here the case is reversed2 man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments2 master is the ,essence4 ,what is connoted by the term master is here the essential idea1 that which is bound up with the idea connoted by servant2 while the connotation of man or biped sinks into the character of an accessory or accompaniment4 ,the master might possibly not be a man1 but a god2 the ,delphian ,apollo 7,euripid4 ,ion1 #acb71 and the ,corinthian ,aphrodit1 had each many slaves belonging to them4 ,moreover1 even if every master were a man1 the qualities connoted by man are here accidental1 as not being included in those connoted by the term master4 ,compare ,metaphysica1 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbe1 a4 #cb2 ,topica1 i4 p4 #ajb1 a4 #ah4 ,footnote #ii3 ,that ,plato was fully sensible to the necessity of precision and appropriateness in designating the ,correlatum belonging to each ,relatum1 may be seen by the ingenious reasoning in the ,platonic ,parmenides1 pp4 #acc-acd1 where ,greek3 despo_/ts and ,greek3 doulos are also the illustrative examples employed4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,categor4 p4 #h1 a4 #ce1 b4 #bj4 ,footnote #aja3 ,see ,politica1 i4 p4 #abec1 a4 #ah3 ,greek3 kai pro_/tero d t phu_/sei po_/lis 7 oi7ki_/a kai e7_/kastos 7mn e7sti_/n2 to gar o7_/lon pro_/teron a7nagkaion ei7nai tou me_/rous2 a7nairoume_/nou gar tou o7_/lou ou7k e7_/stai pous ou7de cheir1 ei7 m o7mnu_/ms1 7_/sper ei7_/ tis le_/gei 9999tn lithi_/nn2 diaphthareisa gar e7_/stai toiau_/t4 pa_/nta det e7_/rg 7_/ristai kai t duna_/mei1 _/ste mke_/ti toiauta o7_/nta ou7 lekte_/on ta au7ta ei7nai a7ll' o7m_/numa2 also p4 #abed1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 to_/ te gar mo_/rion ou7 mo_/non a7_/llou e7sti mo_/rion1 a7lla kai a7_/llou4 ,compare ,de ,anim1 ii4 #a1 p4 #dab1 b4 #bj2 ,meteorologic4 iv4 p4 #cij1 a4 #ab4 ,the doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one1 in the ,aristotelian philosophy4 ,trendelenburg 7,kategorienlehre1 p4 #ahb7 touches upon this confusion of the ,categories1 but faintly and partially4 ,in the fourth book of the ,metaphysica1 ,aristotle gives an explanation of ,ad ,aliquid different from1 and superior to1 that which we read in the ,categori2 treating it1 not as one among many distinct ,categories1 but as implicated with all the ,categories1 and taking a different character according as it is blended with one or the other--,essentia1 ,quantum1 ,quale1 ,actio1 ,passio1 c4#ajb ,he there1 also1 enumerates as one of the varieties of ,relata1 what seems to go beyond the limit1 or at least beyond the direct denotation1 of the ,categories2 for1 having specified1 as one variety1 ,relata ,numero1 and1 as another1 ,relata secundum actionem et passionem 7,greek3 to thermantikon pros to thermanto_/n1 c471 he proceeds to a third variety1 such as the mensurabile with reference to mensura1 the scibile with reference to scientia1 the cogitabile with reference to cogitatio2 and in regard to this third variety1 he draws a nice distinction4 ,he says that mensura and cogitatio are ,ad ,aliquid1 not because they are themselves related to mensurabile and cogitabile1 but because mensurabile and cogitabile are related to them4#ajc ,you cannot say 7he thinks7 that mensura is referable to the mensurabile1 or cogitatio to the cogitabile1 because that would be repeating the same word twice over--mensura est illius cujus est mensura--cogitatio est illius cujus est cogitatio4 ,so that he regards mensura and cogitatio as ,correlata1 rather than as ,relata2 while mensurabile and cogitabile are the ,relata to them4 ,but in point of fact1 the distinction is not important2 of the relative pair there may be one which is more properly called the ,correlatum2 yet both are alike relative4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 b4 #bg-cb4 ,at the same time we must remark1 that while ,aristotle enumerates ,greek3 to u7pe_/rechon and ,greek3 to u7perecho_/menon under ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti1 he had just before 7a4 #be7 ranked ,greek3 to me_/ga kai to mikro_/n1 to meizon kai to e7_/latton1 under the general head ,greek3 ,poso_/n--as ,greek3 posou pa_/th kath' au7ta_/4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajba1 a4 #bf1 b4 #c2 also ,i4 p4 #ajef1 b4 #cd4 ,bonitz in his note 7p4 #bfb7 remarks that the distinction here drawn by ,aristotle is not tenable2 and ,i agree with him that it is not4 ,but it coincides with what ,aristotle asserts in other words in the ,categori2 viz41 that to be simul natur is not true of all ,relata1 but only of the greater part of them2 that ,greek3 to ai7sthton is ,greek3 pro_/teron ts ai7sth_/ses1 and ,greek3 to e7pistton pro_/teron ts e7pist_/ms 7,categor4 p4 #g1 b4 #bc2 p4 #h1 a4 #aj74 ,as ,i have mentioned before 7p4 #ga n471 ,simplikius1 in the ,scholia 7p4 #fe1 b4 #ad71 points out that ,aristotle has not been careful here to observe his own precept of selecting ,greek3 oi7kei_/s the correlative term4 ,he ought to have stated the potential as correlating with the potential1 the actual with the actual4 ,if he had done this1 the ,greek3 sunu_/parxis tn pro_/s ti would have been seen to be true in all cases4 ,eudorus noticed a similar inadvertence of ,aristotle in the case of ,greek3 pte_/ron and ,greek3 pterto_/n 7,schol4 #fc1 a4 #dc74 ,see ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 ii4 p4 #ccj1 note x4 ,i transcribe a curious passage of ,leibnitz1 bearing on the same question3--,on rplique maintenant1 que la vrit du mouvement est indpendante de l'observation3 et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer1 sans que celui qui est dedans s'en aperoive4 ,je rponds1 que le mouvement est indpendant de l'observation3 mais qu'il n'est point indpendant de l'observabilit4 ,il n'y a point de mouvement1 quand il n'y a point de changement observable4 ,et mme quand il n'y a point de changement observable1 il n'y a point de changement du tout4 ,le contraire est fond sur la supposition d'un ,espace rel absolu1 que j'ai rfut demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une ,raison suffisante des choses4 7,correspondence with ,clarke1 p4 #ggj4 ,erdmann's edition47 ,if we compare together the various passages in which ,aristotle cites and applies the ,ten ,categories 7not merely in the treatise before us1 but also in the ,metaphysica1 ,physica1 and elsewhere71 we shall see that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly2 that the same predicate is referred to one head in one place1 and to another head in another3 what is here spoken of as belonging to ,actio or ,passio1 will be treated in another place as an instance of ,quale or ,ad ,aliquid2 even the derivative noun ,greek3 e7_/xis 7habitus7 does not belong to the ,category ,greek3 e7_/chein 7,habere71 but sometimes to ,quale1 sometimes to ,ad ,aliquid4#ajd ,this is inevitable2 for the predicates thus differently referred have really several different aspects1 and may be classified in one way or another1 according as you take them in this or that aspect4 ,moreover1 this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would still be felt1 even if the ,categories1 instead of the full list of ,ten1 were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal ,categories--,substance1 ,quantity1 ,quality1 and ,relation2 a reduction which has been recommended by commentators on ,aristotle as well as by acute logicians of modern times4 ,even these four cannot be kept clearly apart3 the predicates which declare ,quantity or ,quality must at the same time declare or imply ,relation2 while the predicates which declare ,relation must also imply the fundamentum either of ,quantity or of ,quality4#aje ,footnote #ajd3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #f1 b4 #b2 p4 #h1 b4 #bg4 ,footnote #aje3 ,see ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre1 p4 #aag1 seq4 ,the remarks made by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7in his ,system of ,logic1 book i4 ch4 iii47 upon the ,aristotelian ,categories1 and the enlarged philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place1 well deserve to be studied4 ,after enumerating the ten ,predicaments1 ,mr4 ,mill says3--,it is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life1 with little or no attempt to penetrate1 by philosophic analysis1 to the rationale even of these common distinctions4 ,such an analysis would have shewn the enumeration to be both redundant and defective4 ,some objects are omitted1 and others repeated several times under different heads4 7,compare the remarks of the ,stoic commentators1 and ,porphyry1 ,schol4 p4 #dh1 b4 #aj ,br43 ,greek3 a7thetountes tn diai_/resin 7s polla parieisan kai m perilamba_/nousan1 7 kai pa_/lin pleona_/zousan4 ,and ,aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be ranked often under more than one head47 ,that could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of ,relation1 which could exclude action1 passivity1 and local situation from that category4 ,the same objection applies to the categories ,quando 7or position in time71 and ,ubi 7or position in space72 while the distinction between the latter and ,situs 7,greek3 ,keisthai7 is merely verbal4 ,the incongruity of erecting into a summum genus the tenth ,category is manifest4 ,on the other hand1 the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but ,substances and ,attributes4 ,in what ,category are we to place sensations1 or any other feelings and states of mind8 as hope1 joy1 fear2 sound1 smell1 taste2 pain1 pleasure2 thought1 judgment1 conception1 and the like8 ,probably all these would have been placed by the ,aristotelian school in the ,categories of ,actio and ,passio2 and the relation of such of them as are active1 to their objects1 and of such of them as are passive1 to their causes1 would have been rightly so placed2 but the things themselves1 the feelings or states of mind1 wrongly4 ,feelings1 or states of consciousness1 are assuredly to be counted among realities2 but they cannot be reckoned either among substances or among attributes4 ,among the many deficiencies of the ,aristotelian ,categories1 as a complete catalogue1 there is none more glaring than the imperfect conception of ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti 7the ,relative71 which ,mr4 ,mill here points out4 ,but the ,category ,greek3 ,keisthai 7badly translated by commentators ,situs1 from which ,aristotle expressly distinguishes it1 ,categor4 p4 #f1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 to de a7nakeisthai 7 e7sta_/nai 7 kathsthai au7ta men ou7k ei7si the_/seis7 appears to be hardly open to ,mr4 ,mill's remark1 that it is only verbally distinguished from ,greek3 ,pou1 ,ubi4 ,greek3 ,keisthai is intended to mean posture1 attitude1 c4 ,it is a reply to the question1 ,in what posture is ,sokrates8 ,answer4--,he is lying down1 standing upright1 kneeling1 ,greek3 pux protei_/nn1 c4 ,this is quite different from the question1 ,where is ,sokrates8 ,in the market-place1 in the palstra1 c4 ,greek3 ,keisthai 7as ,aristotle himself admits1 ,categ4 p4 #f1 b4 #ab7 is not easily distinguished from ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti3 for the abstract and general word ,greek3 the_/sis 7position7 is reckoned by ,aristotle under ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti1 though the paronyma ,greek3 a7nakeisthai1 e7sta_/nai1 kathsthai are affirmed not to be ,greek3 the_/seis1 but to come under the separate ,category ,greek3 ,keisthai4 ,but ,greek3 ,keisthai is clearly distinguishable from ,greek3 ,pou ,ubi4 ,again1 to ,mr4 ,mill's question1 ,in what ,category are we to place sensations or other states of mind--hope1 fear1 sound1 smell1 pain1 pleasure1 thought1 judgment1 c48 ,aristotle would have replied 7,i apprehend7 that they come under the ,category either of ,quale or of ,pati--,greek3 ,poio_/ttes or ,greek3 ,pa_/th4 ,they are attributes or modifications of ,man1 ,kallias1 ,sokrates1 c4 ,if the condition of which we speak be temporary or transitory1 it is a ,greek3 pa_/thos1 and we speak of ,kallias as ,greek3 pa_/schn ti2 if it be a durable disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations1 it is ,greek3 poio_/ts1 and we describe ,kallias as ,greek3 poio_/s tis 7,categ4 p4 #i1 a4 #bh-p4 #aj a4 #i74 ,this equally applies to mental and bodily conditions 7,greek3 o7moi_/s de tou_/tois kai kata tn psuchn pathtikai poio_/ttes kai pa_/th le_/getai4--p4 #i1 b4 #cc74 ,the line is dubious and difficult between ,greek3 pa_/thos and ,greek3 poio_/ts1 but one or other of the two will comprehend all the mental states indicated by ,mr4 ,mill4 ,aristotle would not have admitted that feelings are to be counted among realities1 except as they are now or may be the feelings of ,kallias1 ,sokrates1 or some other ,hic ,aliquis--one or many4 ,he would consider feelings as attributes belonging to these ,greek3 ,prtai ,ou7si_/ai2 and so in fact ,mr4 ,mill himself considers them 7p4 #hc71 after having specified the ,mind 7distinguished from ,body or external object7 as the ,substance to which they belong4 ,mr4 ,mill's classification of ,nameable ,things is much better and more complete than the ,aristotelian ,categories1 inasmuch as it brings into full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective points of view1 and1 likewise1 the all-pervading principle of ,relativity1 which implicates the two2 whereas1 ,aristotle either confuses the one with the other1 or conceives them narrowly and inadequately4 ,but we cannot say1 ,i think1 that ,aristotle1 in the ,categories1 assigns no room for the mental states or elements4 ,he has a place for them1 though he treats them altogether objectively4 ,he takes account of himself only as an object--as one among the ,greek3 prtai ou7si_/ai1 or individuals1 along with ,sokrates and ,kallias4 ,the most capital distinction1 however1 which is to be found among the ,categories is that of ,essence or ,substance from all the rest4 ,this is sometimes announced as having a standing per se2 as not only logically distinguishable1 but really separable from the other nine1 if we preserve the ,aristotelian list of ten1#ajf or from the other three1 if we prefer the reduced list of four4 ,but such real separation cannot be maintained4 ,the ,prima ,essentia 7we are told7 is indispensable as a ,subject1 but cannot appear as ,predicate2 while all the rest can and do so appear4 ,now we see that this definition is founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication1 and therefore presupposes the fact of predication1 which is in itself a ,relation4 ,the ,category of ,relation is thus implied1 in declaring what the ,first ,essence is1 together with some predicabilia as correlates1 though it is not yet specified what the predicabilia are4 ,but besides this1 the distinction drawn by ,aristotle1 between ,first and ,second ,essence or ,substance1 abolishes the marked line of separation between ,substance and ,quality1 making the former shade down into the latter4 ,the distinction recognizes a more or less in ,substance1 which graduation ,aristotle expressly points out1 stating that the ,species is more ,substance or ,essence1 and that ,genus less so4 ,we see thus that he did not conceive ,substance 7apart from attributes7 according to the modern view1 as that which exists without the mind 7excluding within the mind or relation to the mind72 for in that there can be no graduation4 ,that which is without the mind1 must also be within2 and that which is within must also be without2 the subject and the object correlating4 ,this implication of within and without understood1 there is then room for graduation1 according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less prominent4 ,aristotle1 in point of fact1 confines himself to the mental or logical work of predication1 to the conditions thereof1 and to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act4 ,when he speaks of the ,first ,essence or ,substance1 without the ,second1 all that he can say about it positively is to call it ,unum numero and indivisible3#ajg even thus1 he is compelled to introduce unity1 measure1 and number1 all of which belong to the two ,categories of ,quantity and ,relation2 and yet still the ,first ,essence or ,substance remains indeterminate4 ,we only begin to determine it when we call it by the name of the ,second ,substance or ,essence2 which name connotes certain attributes1 the attributes thus connoted being of the essence of the ,species2 that is1 unless they be present1 no individual would be considered as belonging to the ,species1 or would be called by the specific name4#ajh ,when we thus1 however1 introduce attributes1 we find ourselves not merely in the ,category of ,substantia 7,secunda71 but also in that of ,qualitas4 ,the boundary between ,substantia and ,qualitas disappears2 the latter being partially contained in the former4 ,the ,second ,substance or ,essence includes attributes or ,qualities belonging to the ,essence4 ,in fact1 the ,second ,substance or ,essence1 when distinguished from the ,first1 is both here and elsewhere characterized by ,aristotle1 as being not ,substance at all1 but ,quality1#aji though when considered as being in implication with the ,first1 it takes on the nature of ,substance and becomes substantial or essential ,quality4 ,the ,differentia belongs thus both to ,substance and to ,quality 7quale quid71 making up as complement that which is designated by the specific name4#aaj ,footnote #ajf3 ,aristotle sometimes speaks of it as ,greek3 christo_/n1 the other ,categories being not ,greek3 christa_/ 7,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajbh1 a4 #cd74 ,it is not easy1 however1 always to distinguish whether he means by the term ,greek3 christa sejuncta re1 or sejuncta notione sol4 ,see ,bonitz ad ,metaphysic4 7,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag71 p4 #bdd4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,categor4 p4 #c1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 a7_/tomon gar kai e7n a7rithm to dlou_/meno_/n e7stin4 ,compare ,metaphysic4 ,n4 p4 #ajhg1 b4 #cc2 p4 #ajhh1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,hobbes says3--,now that accident 7i4e4 attribute7 for which we give a certain name to any body1 or the accident which denominates its ,subject1 is commonly called the ,essence thereof2 as rationality is the essence of a man1 whiteness of any white thing1 and extension the essence of a body 7,hobbes1 ,philosophy1 ch4 viii4 s4 #bc74 ,this topic will be found discussed1 most completely and philosophically1 in ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ,system of ,logic1 ,book ,i4 ch4 vi4 ss4 #b-c2 ch4 vii4 s4 #e4 ,footnote #aji3 ,categor4 p4 #c1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 e7pi de tn deute_/rn ou7sin phai_/netai men o7moi_/s t sch_/mati ts prosgori_/as to_/de ti smai_/nein1 o7_/tan ei7_/p a7_/nthrpon 7 zon1 ou7 mn a7lthe_/s ge1 a7lla mallon poio_/n ti smai_/nei--poian ga_/r tina ou7si_/an smai_/nei 7b4 #bj74 ,metaphysic4 ,z4 p4 #ajch1 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 phaneron o7_/ti ou7then tn katho_/lou u7parcho_/ntn ou7si_/a e7sti_/1 kai o7_/ti ou7then smai_/nei tn koin katgoroume_/nn to_/de ti1 a7lla toio_/nde4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,m4 p4 #ajhg1 a4 #a2 ,sophistic4 ,elench4 p4 #agh1 b4 #cg2 #agi1 a4 #i4 ,that which is called ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a in the ,categori is called ,greek3 tri_/t ou7si_/a in ,metaphys4 ,greek3 4 p4 #ajdc1 a4 #ah4 ,in ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,z4 p4 #aadc1 a4 #cb1 seq41 the generalissima are called ,greek3 prta1 and particulars are called ,greek3 e7_/schata4 ,zell observes in his commentary 7p4 #bbd71 ,greek3 ta e7_/schata sunt res singul1 qu et ips sunt extrem1 ratione mentis nostr1 ab universis ad singula delabentis4 ,patricius remarks upon the different sense of the terms ,greek3 ,pr_/t ,ou7si_/a in the ,categori and in the ,de ,interpretatione 7,discuss4 ,peripatetic4 p4 #ba74 ,footnote #aaj3 ,metaphysic4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 schedon d kata du_/o tro_/pous le_/goit' a7n to poio_/n1 kai tou_/tn e7_/na ton kuri_/taton2 pr_/t men gar poiots 7 ts ou7si_/as diaphora_/4 ,compare ,physic4 v4 p4 #bbf1 a4 #bg4 ,see ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre1 pp4 #ef1 #ic4 ,the remarks of the different expositors 7contained in ,scholia1 pp4 #eb1 #ec1 #ed1 ,brand471 are interesting upon the ambiguous position of ,differentia1 in regard to ,substance and ,quality4 ,it comes out to be ,neither and ,both--,greek3 ou7de_/tera kai a7mpho_/tera 7,plato1 ,euthydemus1 p4 #cjj ,c474 ,dexippus and ,porphyry called it something intermediate between ,greek3 ou7si_/a and ,greek3 poio_/ts1 or between ,greek3 ou7si_/a and ,greek3 sumbebko_/s4 ,we see1 accordingly1 that neither is the line of demarcation between the ,category of ,substance or ,essence and the other ,categories so impassable1 nor the separability of it from the others so marked as some thinkers contend4 ,substance is represented by ,aristotle as admitting of more and less1 and as graduating by successive steps down to the other ,categories2 moreover1 neither in its complete manifestation 7as ,first ,substance71 nor in its incomplete manifestation 7as ,second ,substance71 can it be explained or understood without calling in the other ,categories of ,quantity1 ,quality1 and ,relation4 ,it does not correspond to the definition of ,substantia given by ,spinoza--quod in se est et per se concipitur4 ,it can no more be conceived or described without some of the other ,categories1 than they can be conceived or described without it4 ,aristotle defines it by four characteristics1 two negative1 and two positive4 ,it cannot be predicated of a ,subject3 it cannot inhere in a ,subject3 it is1 at bottom1 the 9999,subject of all ,predicates3 it is ,unum numero and indivisible4#aaa ,not one of these four determinations can be conceived or understood1 unless we have in our minds the idea of other ,categories and its relation to them4 ,substance is known only as the ,subject of predicates1 that is1 relatively to them2 as they also are known relatively to it4 ,without the ,category of ,relation1 we can no more understand what is meant by a ,subject than what is meant by a ,predicate4 ,the ,category of ,substance1 as laid out by ,aristotle1 neither exists by itself1 nor can be conceived by itself1 without that of ,relation and the generic notion of ,predicate4#aab ,all three lie together at the bottom of the analytical process1 as the last findings and residuum4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,categor4 p4 #b1 a4 #ad1 b4 #d2 p4 #c1 b4 #ab4 ,footnote #aab3 ,aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by ,greek3 kath' au7to_/--kath' au7ta_/1 in the ,analytic4 ,post4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #gc1 a4 #cd1 b4 #ac4 ,according to that explanation it will be necessary to include in ,greek3 to kath' au7to of the ,category ,greek3 ,ou7si_/a1 all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation of that ,category understood4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 in the valuable ,preface introducing his translation of the ,organon1 gives what ,i think a just view of the ,categories generally1 and especially of ,greek3 pr_/t ou7si_/a1 as simply naming 7i4e4 giving a proper name71 and doing nothing more4 ,i transcribe the passage1 merely noting that the terms anterior and posterior can mean nothing more than logical anteriority and posteriority4 ,mais comment classer les mots8--,c'est la ralit seule qu'il faut le demander2 la ralit dont le langage n'est que le rflet1 dont les mots ne sont que le symbole4 ,que nous prsente la ralit8 ,des individus1 rien que des individus1 existant par eux-mmes1 et se groupant1 par leurs ressemblances et leurs diffrences1 sous des espces et sous des genres4 ,ainsi donc1 en tudiant l'individu1 l'tre individuel1 et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est possible d'en dire en tant qu'tre1 on aura les classes les plus gnrales des mots2 les catgories1 ou pour prendre le terme franais1 les attributions1 qu'il est possible de lui appliquer4 ,voil tout le fondement des ,catgories4--,ce n'est pas du reste1 une classification des choses la manire de celles de l'histoire naturelle1 qu'il s'agit de faire en logique3 c'est une simple numration de tous les points de vue1 d'9999o l'esprit peut considrer les choses1 non pas1 il est vrai1 par rapport l'esprit lui-mme1 mais par rapport leur ralit et leurs appellations4--,aristote distingue ici dix points de vue1 dix significations principales des mots4--,la ,catgorie de la ,substance est la tte de toutes les autres1 prcisment parceque la premire1 la plus essentielle1 marque d'un tre1 c'est d'tre4 ,cela revient dire qu'avant tout1 l'tre est1 l'tre existe4 ,par suite les mots qui expriment la substance sont antrieurs tous les autres et sont les plus importants4 ,il faut ajouter que ces mots l participeront en quelque sorte cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la nature4 ,mais de mme que1 dans la ralit1 les individus subsistant par eux seuls forment des espces et des genres1 qui ont bien aussi une existence substantielle1 la substance se divisera de mme en substance premire et substance seconde4--,les espces et les genres1 s'ils expriment la substance1 ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa puret2 c'est 9999dj de la substance qualifi1 comme le dit ,aristote4--,il n'y a bien dans la ralit que des individus et des espces ou genres4 ,mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent pas seulement2 ils existent sous certaines conditions2 leur existence se produit sous certaines modifications1 que les mots expriment aussi1 tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue4 ,ces nouvelles classes de mots formeront les autres ,catgories4--,ces modifications1 ces accidents1 de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf3 ,aristote n'en reconnat pas davantage4--9999,voil donc les dix ,catgories3 les dix seules attributions possibles4 ,par la premire1 on nomme les individus1 sans faire plus que les nommer3 par les autres1 on les qualifie4 ,on dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu1 et ensuite quel il est4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,logique d',aristote1 ,preface1 pp4 lxxii4-lxxvii4 ,aristotle1 taking his departure from an analysis of the complete sentence or of the act of predication1 appears to have regarded the ,subject as having a natural priority over the ,predicate4 ,the noun-substantive 7which to him represents the ,subject71 even when pronounced alone1 carries to the hearer a more complete conception than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone2 these make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing complementary adjuncts4 ,but this is only true in so far as the conception1 raised by the substantive named alone 7,greek3 a7_/neu sumploks71 includes by anticipation what would be included1 if we added to it some or all of its predicates4 ,if we could deduct from this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates1 it would seem essentially barren or incomplete1 awaiting something to come2 a mere point of commencement or departure1#aac known only by the various lines which may be drawn from it2 a substratum for various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in4 ,that which is known only as a substratum1 is known only relatively to a superstructure to come2 the one is ,relatum1 the other ,correlatum1 and the mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other4 ,there may be a logical priority1 founded upon expository convenience1 belonging to the substratum1 because it remains numerically one and the same1 while the superstructure is variable4 ,but the priority is nothing more than logical and notional2 it does not amount to an ability of prior independent existence4 ,on the contrary1 there is simultaneity by nature 7according to ,aristotle's own definition of the phrase7 between ,subject1 ,relation1 and ,predicate2 since they all imply each other as reciprocating correlates1 while no one of them is the cause of the others4#aad ,footnote #aac3 ,plato would not admit the point as as anything more than ,greek3 a7rchn gramms 7,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #iib1 a4 #ba74 ,footnote #aad3 ,aristot4 ,categor4 p4 #ad1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 phu_/sei de a7_/ma1 o7_/sa a7ntistre_/phei kata tn tou ei7nai a7kolou_/thsin1 mdams de ai7_/tion tha_/teron thate_/r tou ei7nai e7stin1 oi7on e7pi tou diplasi_/ou kai tou 7mi_/seos2 c4 ,when ,aristotle says1 very truly1 that if the ,first ,substances were non-existent1 none of the other ,predicaments could exist1 we must understand what he means by the term first4 ,that term bears1 in this treatise1 a sense different from what it bears elsewhere3 here it means the extreme concrete and individual2 elsewhere it means the extreme abstract and universal4 ,the ,first ,substance or ,first ,essence1 in the ,categories1 is a ,hoc ,aliquid 7,greek3 to_/de ti71 illustrated by the examples hic homo1 hic equus4 ,now1 as thus explained and illustrated1 it includes not merely the ,second ,substance1 but various accidental attributes besides4 ,when we talk of ,this man1 ,sokrates1 ,kallias1 c41 the hearer conceives not only the attributes for which he is called a man1 but also various accidental attributes1 ranking under one or more of the other ,predicaments4 ,the ,first ,substance thus 7as explained by ,aristotle7 is not conceived as a mere substratum without ,second ,substance and without any ,accidents1 but as already including both of them1 though as yet indeterminately2 it waits for specializing words1 to determine what its ,substance or ,essence is1 and what its accompanying ,accidents are4 ,being an individual 7,unum numero71 it unites in itself both the essential attributes of its species1 and the unessential attributes peculiar to itself4#aae ,it is already understood as including attributes of both kinds2 but we wait for predicates to declare 7,greek3 dloun--a7podido_/nai#aaf7 what these attributes are4 ,the ,first or ,complete ,ens embodies in itself all the ,predicaments1 though as yet potential and indeterminate1 until the predicating adjuncts are specified4 ,there is no priority1 in the order of existence1 belonging to ,substance over ,relation or ,quality2 take away either one of the three1 and the ,first ,ens disappears4 ,but in regard to the order of exposition1 there is a natural priority1 founded on convenience and facility of understanding4 ,the ,hoc ,aliquid or ,unum ,numero1 which intimates in general outline a certain concretion or co-existence of attributes1 though we do not yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally as ,subject before the predicates1 whose function is declaratory and specifying as to those attributes3 moreover1 the essential attributes1 which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a specific name on the subject1 come naturally before the unessential attributes1 which are predicated of the subject already called by a specific name connoting other attributes4#aag ,the essential characters are native and at home2 the accidental attributes are domiciliated foreigners4#aah ,footnote #aae3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajcc1 b4 #bd2 p4 #ajcd1 a4 #h4 ,greek3 ,to d' a7_/pan to_/de ,kalli_/as 7 ,skra_/ts e7stin 7_/sper 7 sphaira 7 chalk 7di_/1 o7 d' a7_/nthrpos kai to zon 7_/sper sphaira chalk o7ls4--to d' a7_/pan 7_/d to toio_/nde ei7dos e7n taisde tais sarxi kai o7stois ,kalli_/as kai ,skra_/ts2 kai e7_/teron men dia tn u7_/ln1 e7_/tera ga_/r1 tau7to de t ei7_/dei2 a7_/tomon gar to ei7dos4 ,footnote #aaf3 ,categor4 p4 #b1 b4 #bi1 seq4 ,greek3 ei7ko_/ts de meta tas pr_/tas ou7si_/as mo_/na tn a7_/lln ta ei7_/d kai ta ge_/n deu_/terai ou7si_/ai le_/gontai2 mo_/na gar dloi tn pr_/tn ou7si_/an tn katgoroume_/nn4 c4 ,footnote #aag3 ,analyt4 ,poster4 i4 p4 #gc1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 oi7on to badi_/zon e7_/tero_/n ti o7n badi_/zon e7sti kai leuko_/n1 7 d' ou7si_/a1 kai o7_/sa to_/de ti smai_/nei1 ou7ch e7_/tero_/n ti o7_/nta o7_/per e7sti_/n4 ,also p4 #hc1 a4 #ca4 ,greek3 kai m ei7nai_/ ti leuko_/n1 o7 ou7ch e7_/tero_/n ti o7n leuko_/n e7stin3 also p4 #hc1 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #aah3 ,categor4 p4 #b1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 ton ga_/r tina a7nthrpon e7an a7podid tis ti_/ e7sti1 to men ei7dos 7 to ge_/nos a7podidous oi7kei_/s a7pod_/sei--tn d' a7_/lln o7_/ ti a7n a7podid tis1 a7llotri_/s e7stai a7podedk_/s1 c4 ,it is thus that ,aristotle has dealt with ,ontology1 in one of the four distinct aspects thereof1 which he distinguishes from each other2 that is1 in the distribution of ,entia according to their logical order1 and the reciprocal interdependence1 in predication4 ,ens is a multivocal word1 neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal4 ,it denotes 7as has been stated above7 not a generic aggregate1 divisible into species1 but an analogical aggregate1 starting from one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives1 having no other community except that of relationship to the same terminus4#aai ,the different modes of ,ens are distinguished by the degree or variety of such relationship4 ,the ,ens ,primum1 ,proprium1 ,completum1 is 7in ,aristotle's view7 the concrete individual2 with a defined essence or essential constituent attributes 7,greek3 ti_/ 7_/n ei7nai71 and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all embodied and implicated in the ,one ,hoc ,aliquid4 ,in the ,categori ,aristotle analyses this ,ens ,completum 7not metaphysically1 into ,form and ,matter1 as we shall find him doing elsewhere1 but7 logically into ,subject and ,predicates4 ,in this logical analysis1 the ,subject which can never be a ,predicate stands first2 next1 come the near kinsmen1 ,genus and ,species 7expressed by substantive names1 as the ,first ,substance is71 which are sometimes ,predicates--as applied to ,substantia ,prima1 sometimes ,subjects--in regard to the extrinsic accompaniments or accidents2#abj in the third rank1 come the more remote kinsmen1 ,predicates pure and simple4 ,these are the logical factors or constituents into which the ,ens ,completum may be analysed1 and which together make it up as a logical sum-total4 ,but no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent locus standi1 apart from the others4 ,each is relative to the others2 the ,subject to its ,predicates1 not less than the ,predicates to their ,subject4 ,it is a mistake to describe the ,subject as having a real standing separately and alone1 and the ,predicates as something afterwards tacked on to it4 ,the ,subject per se is nothing but a general potentiality or receptivity for ,predicates to come2 a relative general conception1 in which the two1 ,predicate and ,subject1 are jointly implicated as ,relatum and ,correlatum4#aba ,footnote #aai3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag1 a4 #bb4 ,greek3 kath' au7ta de ei7nai le_/getai o7_/saper smai_/nei ta sch_/mata ts katgori_/as2 o7sachs gar le_/getai1 tosautachs to ei7nai smai_/nei4 ,footnote #abj3 ,categor4 p4 #c1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 7s de_/ ge ai7 prtai ou7si_/ai pros ta a7_/lla pa_/nta e7_/chousin1 ou7_/t ta ei7_/d kai ta ge_/n pros ta loipa pa_/nta e7_/chei2 kata tou_/tn gar pa_/nta ta loipa katgoreitai4 ,footnote #aba3 ,bonitz has an instructive note upon ,form and ,matter1 the metaphysical constituents of ,prima ,substantia1 ,hoc ,aliquid1 ,sokrates1 ,kallias 7see ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajcc1 b4 #bd71 which illustrates pertinently the relation between ,predicate and ,subject1 the logical constituents of the same ,greek3 su_/nolon4 ,he observes 7not4 p4 #cbg1 9999ad ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,z4 p4 #ajcc1 b4 #ai74 ,quoniam ex duabus substantiis1 qu quidem actu sint1 nunquam una existit substantia1 si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus1 nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis1 ,greek3 to_/de ti4 ,ponendum potius1 si recte assequor ,aristotelis sententiam1 utrumque 7,form and ,matter7 ita ut alterum exspectet1 materia ut form definitionem1 forma ut materiam definiendam1 exspectet1 neutra vero per se et absolute sit4 ,what ,bonitz says here about ,matter and ,form is no less true about ,subject and ,predicate3 each is relative to the other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other4 ,in fact1 the explanation given by ,aristotle of ,materia 7,metaph4 ,z4 p4 #ajbh1 b4 #cf7 coincides very much with the ,prima ,essentia of the ,categories1 if abstracted from the ,secunda ,essentia4 ,materia is called there by ,aristotle ,greek3 to u7pokei_/menon1 kath' ou7 ta a7_/lla le_/getai4 e7keino d' au7to mke_/ti kat' a7_/llo--le_/g d' u7_/ln 7 kath' au7tn m_/te ti m_/te poson m_/te a7_/llo mthen le_/getai oi7s 7_/ristai to o7_/n 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #bj74 ,greek3 e7_/sti ga_/r ti kath' ou7 katgoreitai tou_/tn e7_/kaston1 7 to ei7nai e7_/teron kai tn katgorin e7ka_/st2 ta men gar a7_/lla ts ou7si_/as katgoreitai1 au7_/t de ts u7_/ls4 ,aristotle proceeds to say that this ,subject--the ,subject for all ,predicates1 but never itself a ,predicate--cannot be the genuine ,greek3 ou7si_/a1 which must essentially be ,greek3 christon kai to to_/de ti 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #bh71 and which must have a ,greek3 ti_/ 7n ei7nai 7#ajbi1 b4 #b74 ,the ,subject is in fact not true ,greek3 ou7si_/a1 but is one of the constituent elements thereof1 being relative to the ,predicates as ,correlata3 it is the potentiality for ,predicates generally1 as ,materia is the potentiality for ,forms4 ,the logical aspect of ,ontology1 analysing ,ens into a common ,subject with its various classes of ,predicates1 appears to begin with ,aristotle4 ,he was1 as far as we can see1 original1 in taking as the point of departure for his theory1 the individual man1 horse1 or other perceivable object2 in laying down this ,concrete ,particular with all its outfit of details1 as the type of ,ens proper1 complete and primary2 and in arranging into classes the various secondary modes of ,ens1 according to their different relations to the primary type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its completeness4 ,he thus stood opposed to the ,pythagoreans and ,platonists1 who took their departure from the ,universal1 as the type of full and true ,entity2#abb while he also dissented from ,demokritus1 who recognized no true ,ens except the underlying1 imperceptible1 eternal atoms and vacuum4 ,moreover ,aristotle seems to have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of ,entity in its widest sense1 as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which we read in his other works2 the two not being contradictory1 but distinct and tending to different purposes4 ,both in the one and in the other1 his principal controversy seems to have been with the ,platonists1 who disregarded both individual objects and accidental attributes2 dwelling upon ,universals1 ,genera and ,species1 as the only real ,entia capable of being known4 ,with the ,sophists1 ,aristotle contends on a different ground1 accusing them of neglecting altogether the essential attributes1 and confining themselves to the region of accidents1 in which no certainty was to be found2#abc in ,plato1 he points out the opposite mistake1 of confining himself to the essentials1 and ascribing undue importance to the process of generic and specific subdivision4#abd ,his own logical analysis takes account both of the essential and accidental1 and puts them in what he thinks their proper relation4 ,the ,accidental 7,greek3 sumbebko_/s71 concomitant1 i4e4 of the essence7 is per se not knowable at all 7he contends71 nor is ever the object of study pursued in any science2 it is little better than a name1 designating the lowest degree of ,ens1 bordering on ,non-,ens4#abe ,it is a term comprehending all that he includes under his nine last ,categories2 yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion1 or even so much as analogical relation4#abf ,in the treatise now before us1 he does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to all those nine ,categories2 each of the nine is here treated as a ,summum ,genus1 having its own mode of relationship1 and clinging by its own separate thread to the ,subject4 ,he acknowledges the ,accidents in his classification1 not as a class by themselves1 but as subordinated to the ,essence1 and1 as so many threads of distinct1 variable1 and irregular accompaniments1 attaching themselves to this constant root1 without uniformity or steadiness4#abg ,footnote #abb3 ,simplikius ad ,categ4 p4 #b1 b4 #e2 ,schol4 p4 #eb1 a4 #a1 ,br3 ,greek3 ,a7rchu_/tas o7 ,puthagoreios ou7 prosi_/etai tn nuni prokeime_/nn tn ou7si_/n diai_/resin1 a7ll' a7_/lln a7nti tau_/ts e7keinos e7gkri_/nei--tn me_/ntoi ,puthagorei_/n ou7deis a7n pro_/soito tau_/tn tn diai_/resin tn pr_/tn kai deute_/rn ou7sin1 o7_/ti tois katho_/lou to pr_/ts u7pa_/rchein marturousi1 to de e7_/schaton e7n tois meristois a7polei_/pousi1 kai dio_/ti e7n tois a7plousta_/tois tn pr_/tn kai kurita_/tn ou7si_/an a7poti_/thentai1 a7ll' ou7ch 7s nun le_/getai e7n tois sunthe_/tois kai ai7sthtois1 kai dio_/ti ta ge_/n kai ta ei7_/d o7_/nta nomi_/zousin1 a7ll' ou7chi sugkephalaiou_/mena tais christais e7pinoi_/ais4 ,footnote #abc3 ,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ae3 ,greek3 ei7si gar oi7 tn sophistn lo_/goi peri to sumbebkos 7s ei7pein ma_/lista pa_/ntn1 c42 also ,k4 p4 #ajfa1 b4 #h2 ,analytic4 ,poster4 i4 p4 #ga1 b4 #aj4 ,footnote #abd3 ,analytic4 ,priora1 i4 p4 #df1 a4 #ca4 ,footnote #abe3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ac-ba4 ,greek3 7_/sper gar o7no_/mati mo_/non to sumbebko_/s--phai_/netai gar to sumbebkos e7ggu_/s ti tou m o7_/ntos4 ,footnote #abf3 ,physica1 iii4 #a1 p4 #bjj1 b4 #cd4 ,greek3 koinon d' e7pi tou_/tn ou7de_/n e7sti labein1 c4 ,footnote #abg3 ,see the explanation given of ,greek3 to o7n kata sumbebkos in ,metaphys4 ,e4 pp4 #ajbf b41 #ajbg a4 ,this is the sense in which ,aristotle most frequently and usually talks of ,greek3 sumbebko_/s1 though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant and inseparable accompaniment or ,accident1 if it be not included in the ,essence 7i4 e4 not connoted by the specific name72 thus1 to have the three angles equal to two right angles is a ,greek3 sumbebkos of the triangle1 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbe1 a4 #hj4 ,the proper sense in which he understands ,greek3 to sumbebkos is as opposed to ,greek3 to a7ei e7x a7na_/gks1 as well as ,greek3 to 7s e7pi to polu_/4 ,see ,metaphys4 ,k4 p4 #ajfe1 a4 #b2 ,analyt4 ,poster4 i4 p4 #gd1 b4 #ab1 p4 #ge1 a4 #ah4 ,it is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable4 ,see the valuable chapter 7ii7 in ,brentano1 ,von der ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles 7pp4 #h-ba71 in which the meaning of ,greek3 to sumbebkos in ,aristotle is clearly set forth4 ,in discriminating and arranging the ,ten ,categories1 ,trendelenburg supposes that ,aristotle was guided1 consciously or unconsciously1 by grammatical considerations1 or by a distinction among the parts of speech4 ,it should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as the eight parts of speech1 had not yet been distinguished or named in the time of ,aristotle1 nor did the distinction come into vogue before the time of the ,stoic and ,alexandrine grammarians1 more than a century after him4 ,essentia or ,substantia1 the first ,category1 answers 7so ,trendelenburg thinks#abh7 to the ,substantive2 ,quantum and ,quale represent the ,adjective2 ,ad ,aliquid1 the comparative ,adjective1 of which ,quantum and ,quale are the positive degree2 ,ubi and ,quando the ,adverb2 ,jacere1 ,habere1 ,agere1 ,pati the ,verb4 ,of the last four1 ,agere and ,pati correspond to the active and passive voices of the ,verb2 ,jacere to the neuter or intransitive ,verb2 and ,habere to the peculiar meaning of the ,greek perfect--the present result of a past action4 ,footnote #abh3 ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre1 pp4 #bc1 #baa4 ,this general view1 which ,trendelenburg himself conceives as having been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of ,aristotle1#abi appears to me likely and plausible1 though ,bonitz and others have strongly opposed it4 ,we see from ,aristotle's own language1 that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon his mind2 that the form 7e4g47 of a substantive implied in his view a mode of signification belonging to itself1 which was to be taken into account in arranging and explaining the ,categories4#acj ,i apprehend that ,aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his ,categories by analysing various complete sentences1 which would of course include substantives1 adjectives1 verbs1 and adverbs4 ,it is also remarkable that ,aristotle should have designated his four last ,categories by the indication of verbs1 the two immediately preceding by adverbs1 the second and third by adjectives1 and the first by a substantive4 ,there remains the important ,category ,ad ,aliquid1 which has no part of speech corresponding to it specially4 ,even this ,category1 though not represented by any part of speech1 is nevertheless conceived and defined by ,aristotle in a very narrow way1 with close reference to the form of expression1 and to the requirement of a noun immediately following1 in the genitive or dative case4 ,and thus1 where there is no special part of speech1 the mind of ,aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from grammatical and syntactic forms4 ,footnote #abi3 ,ibid4 p4 #bji3 ,gesichtspunkte der ,sprache leiteten den erfindenden ,geist1 um sie 7die ,kategorien7 zu bestimmen4 ,aber die grammatischen ,beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht4 ,p4 #baf3 der grammatische ,leitfaden der ,satzzergliederung wird anerkannt4 ,footnote #acj3 ,categor4 p4 #c1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 e7pi de tn deute_/rn ou7sin phai_/netai men o7moi_/s t sch_/mati ts prosgori_/as to_/de ti smai_/nein1 o7_/tan ei7_/p a7_/nthrpon 7 zon1 ou7 mn a7lthe_/s ge1 a7lla mallon poio_/n ti smai_/nei4 c4 ,we may illustrate the ten ,categories of ,aristotle by comparing them with the four ,categories of the ,stoics4 ,during the century succeeding ,aristotle's death1 the ,stoics1 ,zeno and ,chrysippus 7principally the latter71 having before them what he had done1 proposed a new arrangement for the complete distribution of ,subject and ,predicates4 ,their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple4 ,their first ,category was ,greek3 ti_/1 ,aliquid or ,quiddam--,greek3 to u7pokei_/menon1 the ,substratum or ,subject4 ,their second was ,greek3 poio_/n1 ,quale or ,quality4 ,their third was ,greek3 ps e7_/chon1 certo ,modo se habens4 ,their fourth was1 ,greek3 pro_/s ti ps e7_/chon1 ,ad ,aliquid certo ,modo se habens4#aca ,footnote #aca3 ,plotinus1 ,ennead4 vi4 #a1 #be2 vi4 #a1 #cj3 ,greek3 ta ps e7_/chonta tri_/ta ti_/thesthai4 ,simplikius ad ,categor4 f4 #g1 p4 #dh1 a4 #ac1 ,brand4 ,schol43 ,greek3 ,oi7 ,stikoi ei7s e7la_/ttona suste_/llein a7xiousi ton tn pr_/tn genn a7rithmo_/n kai_/ tina e7n tois a7la_/ttosin u7pllagme_/na paralamba_/nousi4 poiountai gar tn tomn ei7s te_/ssara1 ei7s u7pokei_/mena1 kai poia1 kai ps e7_/chonta1 kai pro_/s ti ps e7_/chonta4 ,it would seem from the adverse criticisms of ,plotinus1 that the ,stoics recognized one grand ,greek3 9999ge_/nos comprehending all the above four as distinct species3 see ,plotinus1 ,ennead41 vi4 #b1 #a2 vi4 #a1 #be4 ,he charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so4 ,he admits1 however1 that ,aristotle did not recognize any one supreme ,greek3 ge_/nos comprehending all the ten ,categories 7vi4 #a1 #a71 but treated all the ten as ,greek3 prta ge_/n1 under an analogous aggregate4 ,i cannot but think that the 9999,stoics looked upon their four ,greek3 ge_/n in the same manner2 for ,i do not see what they could find more comprehensive to rank generically above ,greek3 ti_/4 ,we do not possess the advantage 7which we have in the case of ,aristotle7 of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by its authors4 ,we know it only through the abridgment of ,diogenes ,laertius1 together with incidental remarks and criticisms1 chiefly adverse1 by ,plutarch1 ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,plotinus1 and some ,aristotelian commentators4 ,as far as we can make out upon this evidence1 it appears that the first ,stoic ,category corresponded with the ,greek3 ,pr_/t ,ou7si_/a1 ,first ,essence or ,substance of ,aristotle4 ,it was exclusively ,subject1 and could never become ,predicate2 but it was indispensable as ,subject1 to the three other ,predicates4 ,its meaning was concrete and particular2 for we are told that all general notions or conceptions were excluded by the ,stoics from this ,category1#acb and were designated as ,greek3 ,ou7_/tina1 ,non-,individuals1 or ,non-,particulars4 ,homo was counted by them1 not under the ,category ,greek3 ti_/1 ,quid1 but under the ,category ,greek3 poio_/n1 ,quale2 in its character of predicate determining the ,subject ,greek3 ti_/s or ,greek3 ti_/4 ,the ,stoic ,category ,quale thus included the ,aristotelian ,second ,essences or ,substances1 and also the ,aristotelian differentia4 ,quale was a species-making ,category 7,greek3 ei7dopoio_/s74#acc ,it declared what was the ,essence of the ,subject ,greek3 ti_/--the essential qualities or attributes1 but also the derivative manifestations thereof1 coinciding with what is called the proprium in ,porphyry's ,eisagoge4 ,it therefore came next in order immediately after ,greek3 ti_/3 since the ,essence of the ,subject must be declared1 before you proceed to declare its ,accidents4 ,footnote #acb3 ,simpl4 ad ,categ41 p4 #ed1 a4 #ab1 ,schol4 ,brand43 ,greek3 sumparalpte_/on de kai tn sun_/theian tn ,stikn peri tn genikn poin1 ps ai7 pt_/seis kat' au7tous prophe_/rontai1 kai ps ou7_/tina ta koina par' au7tois le_/getai1 kai o7_/ps para tn a7_/gnoian tou m pasan ou7si_/an to_/de ti smai_/nein kai to para ton ou7_/tina so_/phisma gi_/netai para to schma ts le_/xes2 oi7on ei7_/ ti_/s e7stin e7n ,a7th_/nais1 ou7k e7_/stin e7n ,mega_/rois2 o7 gar a7_/nthrpos ou7_/tis e7sti_/n1 ou7 ga_/r e7sti_/ tis o7 koino_/s1 7s tina de au7ton e7la_/bomen e7n t lo_/g1 kai para touto to o7_/noma touto e7_/schen o7 lo_/gos ou7_/tis klthei_/s4 ,compare ,schol4 p4 #de99991 a4 #g1 where ,porphyry says that the ,stoics1 as well as ,aristotle1 in arranging ,categories1 took as their point of departure ,greek3 to 9999deu_/teron u7pokei_/menon1 not ,greek3 to prton u7pokei_/menon 7 tn a7_/poion u7_/ln74 ,footnote #acc3 ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre p4 #bbb2 ,plutarch1 ,de ,stoicor4 ,repugnantiis1 p4 #ajed a42 ,simpl4 ad ,categor4 ,schol4 p4 #fg4 ,br4 ,greek3 ,poia were distributed by the ,stoics into three varieties2 and the abstract word ,greek3 ,poio_/ts1 in the ,stoic sense1 corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these three varieties1 not to the second or third variety1 so that ,geek3 poio_/ts had a narrower extension than ,greek3 poio_/n3 there were ,greek3 poia without any ,greek3 poiots corresponding to them4 ,to the third ,category1 ,greek3 ,ps e7_/chonta1 which was larger and more varied than the second1 they had no abstract term corresponding2 nor to the fourth ,category1 ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti4 ,hence1 we may see one reason why the ,stoics1 confining the abstract term ,greek3 poio_/ttes to durable attributes1 were disposed to maintain that the ,greek3 poio_/ttes tn sma_/tn were themselves ,greek3 s_/mata or ,greek3 smatika_/3 which ,galen takes much pains to refute 7vol4 xix4 p4 #dfc1 seq4 ed4 ,khn74 ,the ,stoics considered these qualities as ,greek3 a7e_/ras tina_/s1 or ,greek3 pneu_/mata1 c41 spiritual or gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance4 ,it is difficult to make out these ,stoic theories clearly from the evidence before us4 ,from the statements of ,simplikius in ,scholia1 pp4 #fg-fi1 ,i cannot understand the line of distinction between ,greek3 poia and ,greek3 ps e7_/chonta4 ,the ,stoics considered ,greek3 poio_/ts to be ,greek3 du_/namis plei_/stn e7poistik sumptma_/tn1 7s 7 phro_/nsis tou te phroni_/ms peripatein kai tou phron_/ms diale_/gesthai 7p4 #fi1 b4 #b72 and if all these ,greek3 sumpt_/mata were included under ,greek3 poio_/n1 so that ,greek3 o7 phroni_/ms peripatn1 o7 pux protei_/nn and ,greek3 o7 tre_/chn1 were ,greek3 poioi_/ tines 7p4 #fg1 b4 #cd74 ,i hardly see what was left for the third ,category ,greek3 ps e7_/chonta to comprehend2 although1 according to the indications of ,plotinus1 it would be the most comprehensive4 ,the ,stoic writers seem both to have differed among themselves and to have written inconsistently4 ,neither ,trendelenburg 7,kategorienlehre1 pp4 #bbc-bbf71 nor even ,prantl1 in his more elaborate account 7,gesch4 der ,logik1 pp4 #dbi-dcg71 clears up this obscurity4 ,the ,third ,stoic ,category 7,greek3 ps e7_/chon7 comprised a portion of what ,aristotle ranked under ,quale1 and all that he ranked under ,quantum1 ,ubi1 ,quando1 ,agere1 ,pati1 ,jacere1 ,habere4 ,the fourth ,stoic ,category coincided with the ,aristotelian ,ad ,aliquid4 ,the third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute or non-relative ,accidents2 the fourth included what were understood as ,relative ,accidents4 ,the order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and peremptory4 ,they were not co-ordinate species under one and the same genus1 but superordinate and subordinate1#acd the second presupposing and attaching to the first2 the third1 presupposing and attaching to the first1 plus the second2 the fourth1 presupposing and attaching to the first1 plus the second and third4 ,the first proposition to be made is1 in answer to the question ,quale ,quid8 ,you answer ,tale ,aliquid1 declaring the essential attributes4 ,upon this1 the next question is put1 ,quali ,modo se habens8 ,you answer by a term of the third ,category1 declaring one or more of the accidental attributes non-relative1 ,tale ,aliquid1 tali ,modo se habens4 ,upon this1 the fourth and last question follows1 ,quali ,modo se habens ad alia8 ,answer is made by the predicate of the fourth ,category1 i4e4 a ,relative4 ,hic ,aliquis--homo 7#a71 niger 7#b71 servus 7#c74 ,footnote #acd3 ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 vol4 i4 pp4 #dbh1 #dbi2 ,simplikius ad ,categor4 fol4 #dc1 ,a3 ,greek3 ka7keino a7_/topon to su_/ntheta poiein ta ge_/n e7k prote_/rn tinn kai deute_/rn 7s to pro_/s ti e7k poiou kai pro_/s ti4 ,cf4 ,plotinus1 ,ennead4 vi4 #a1 #be-bi4 ,porphyry appears to include all ,greek3 sumbebko_/ta under ,greek3 poion and ,greek3 ps e7_/chon3 he gives as examples of the latter1 what ,aristotle would have assigned to the ,category ,greek3 keisthai 7,eisagoge1 cc4 #b1 #aj2 ,schol4 ,br4 p4 #a1 b4 #cb1 p4 #e1 a4 #cj74 ,in comparing the ten ,aristotelian with the four ,stoic ,categories we see that the first great difference is in the extent and comprehension of ,quale1 which ,aristotle restricts on one side 7by distinguishing from it ,essentia ,secunda71 and enlarges on the other 7by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the ,essence74 ,the second difference is1 that the ,stoics did not subdivide their third ,category1 but included therein all the matter of six ,aristotelian ,categories1#ace and much of the matter of the ,aristotelian ,quale4 ,both schemes agree on two points3--#a4 ,in taking as the point of departure the concrete1 particular1 individual1 ,substance4 #b4 ,in the narrow1 restricted1 inadequate conception formed of the ,relative--,ad ,aliquid4 ,footnote #ace3 ,plotinus 7,ennead4 vi4 #a4 #hj7 disapproves greatly the number of disparates ranked under ,greek3 to ps e7_/chon1 which has 7he contends7 no discoverable unity as a generic term4 ,it is curious to see how he cites the ,aristotelian ,categories1 as if the decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible4 ,simplikius says that the ,stoics distinguished between ,greek3 to pro_/s ti and ,greek3 to pro_/s ti ps e7_/chon2 and ,trendelenburg1 7pp4 #bbh1 #bbi7 explains and illustrate this distinction1 which1 however1 appears to be very obscure4 ,plotinus himself recognizes five ,summa or ,prima ,genera1#acf 7he does not call them ,categories7 ,ens1 ,motus1 ,quies1 ,idem1 ,diversum2 the same as those enumerated in the ,platonic ,sophistes4 ,he does not admit ,quantum1 ,quale1 or ,ad ,aliquid1 to be ,prima ,genera2 still less the other ,aristotelian ,categories4 ,moreover1 he insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world1 which distinction he censures ,aristotle for neglecting4 ,his five ,genera he applies directly and principally to the intelligible world4 ,for the sensible world he admits ultimately five ,catgories2 ,substantia or ,essentia 7though he conceives this as fluctuating between ,form1 ,matter1 and the ,compound of the two71 ,ad ,aliquid1 ,quantum1 ,quale1 ,motus4 ,but he doubts whether ,quantum1 ,quale1 and ,motus1 are not comprehended in ,ad ,aliquid4#acg ,he considers1 moreover1 that ,sensible ,substance is not ,substance1 properly speaking1 but only an imitation thereof2 a congeries of non-substantial elements1 qualities and matter4#ach ,dexippus1#aci in answering the objections of ,plotinus1 insists much on the difference between ,aristotle's point of view in the ,categori1 in the ,physica1 and in the ,metaphysica4 ,in the ,categori1 ,aristotle dwells mainly on sensible substances 7such as the vulgar understand7 and the modes of naming and describing them4 ,footnote #acf3 ,plotinus1 ,ennead4 vi4 #b1 #h1 #ad1 #af4 ,footnote #acg3 ,plotinus1 ,ennead4 vi4 #c4 #c4 ,greek3 7 kai tauta ei7s ta pro_/s ti2 periektikon gar mallon4 ,his idea of ,relation is more comprehensive than that of ,aristotle1 for he declares that terms1 propositions1 discourse1 c41 are ,greek3 pro_/s ti2 kath' o7 smantika_/ 7vi4 #c4 #ai74 ,footnote #ach3 ,ibid4 vi4 #c4 #h-ae4 ,footnote #aci3 ,the second and third books of ,dexippus's ,dialogue contain his answers to many of the objections urged by ,plotinus4 ,aristotle1 in the ,categori 7,dexippus says71 accommodates himself both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary conception of ,greek3 ou7si_/a entertained by youth or unphilosophical men--,greek3 ou7_/te gar peri tn o7_/ntn1 ou7_/te peri tn genn ts pr_/ts ou7si_/as nun au7t pro_/keitai le_/gein2 stocha_/zetai gar tn ne_/n tois a7plouste_/rois e7pakolouthein duname_/nn 7p4 #di74 ,compare also pp4 #ej-ed1 where ,dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the ,physica and ,metaphysica1 with the more obvious and unpretending thoughts worked out by ,aristotle in the ,categori4 ,dexippus gives an interesting piece of advice to his pupil1 that he should vary his mode of discussing these topics1 according as his companions are philosophical or otherwise--,greek3 e7g men ou7n1 7 kale ka7gathe ,se_/leuke1 dogmatik_/teron pros ,pltinon a7pant1 su de_/1 e7pei bathu_/terai_/ ps ei7sin ai7 lu_/seis au7tai1 pros men tous e7k philosophi_/as o7rmme_/nous tais toiau_/tais a7pant_/sesi chr1 pros de tous o7li_/ga e7pistame_/nous tn dogma_/tn tais prochei_/rois chr dialu_/sesin1 e7keino le_/gn1 o7_/ti peri po_/da poieisthai e7_/thos tas a7kroa_/seis ,a7ristote_/lei2 dio kai nun ou7den e7_/xthen e7peisa_/gei tn a7nte_/r keime_/nn philosophma_/tn1 c4 7pp4 #ej1 #ea74 ,galen also recognizes five ,categories2 but not the same five as ,plotinus4 ,he makes a new list1 formed partly out of the ,aristotelian ten1 partly out of the ,stoic four3--,greek3 ,ou7si_/a1 poso_/n1 poio_/n1 pro_/s ti1 pro_/ ti ps e7_/chon4#adj ,footnote #adj3 ,schol4 ad ,categor4 p4 #di a4 #cj4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,the latter portion of this ,aristotelian treatise1 on the ,categories or ,predicaments1 consists of an ,appendix1 usually known under the title of ',post-,predicamenta2'#ada wherein the following terms or notions are analysed and explained--,opposita1 ,prius1 ,simul1 ,motus1 ,habere4 ,footnote #ada3 ,andronikus and other commentators supposed the ,post-,predicamenta to have been appended to the ,categori by some later hand4 ,most of the commentators dissented from this view4 ,the distinctions and explanations seem all ,aristotelian4 ,of ,opposita1 ,aristotle reckons four modes1 analogous to each other1 yet not different species under the same genus3#adb--a4 ,relative-,opposita--,relatum and ,correlatum4 #b4 ,contraria4 #c4 ,habitus and ,privatio4 #d4 ,affirmatio and ,negatio4 ,footnote #adb3 ,categ4 p4 #aa1 b4 #af3 ,greek3 peri de tn a7ntikeime_/nn1 posachs ei7_/then a7ntikeisthai r7te_/on4 ,see ,simpl4 in ,schol4 p4 #ha1 a4 #cg-;b4 #bd4 ,whether ,aristotle reckoned ,greek3 ta a7ntikei_/mena a true genus or not1 was debated among the commentators4 ,the word ,greek3 posachs implies that he did not2 and he treats even the term ,greek3 e7nanti_/a as a ,greek3 pollachs lego_/menon1 though it is less wide in its application than ,greek3 a7ntikei_/mena1 which includes ,relata 7,metaphys4 ,i4 p4 #ajee1 a4 #ag74 ,he even treats ,greek3 ste_/rsis as a ,greek3 pollachs lego_/menon 7p4 #ajee1 a4 #cd74 ,greek3 ,ai7 a7ntithe_/seis te_/ssares1 the four distinct varieties of ,greek3 ta a7ntikei_/mena are enumerated by ,aristotle in various other places3--,topic4 ii4 p4 #aji1 b4 #ag2 p4 #aac1 b4 #ae2 ,metaphys4 ,i4 p4 #ajee1 a4 #ch4 ,in ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajah1 a4 #bj1 two other varieties are added4 ,bonitz observes 7ad ,metaph4 p4 #bdg7 that ,aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of ,opposita1 tanquam certum et exploratum1 pariter ac causarum numerum1 c4 ,these four modes of opposition have passed from the ,categori of ,aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on ,logic4 ,the three last of the four are usefully classed together1 and illustrated by their contrasts with each other4 ,but as to the first of the four1 ,i cannot think that ,aristotle has been happy in the place which he has assigned to it4 ,to treat ,relativa as a variety of ,opposita1 appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification2 placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less comprehensive4 ,instead of saying that ,relatives are a variety of the ,opposite1 we ought rather to say that ,opposites are varieties of the ,relative4 ,we have here another proof of what has been remarked a few pages above2 the narrow and inadequate conception which ,aristotle formed of his ,ad ,aliquid or the ,relative2 restricting it to cases in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical4#adc ,the three classes last-mentioned by ,aristotle 7#a4 ,contraria1 #b4 ,habitus and ,privatio1 #c4 ,affirmatio and ,negatio7 are truly ,opposita2 in each there is a different mode of opposition1 which it is good to distinguish from the others4 ,but the ,relatum and its ,correlatum1 as such1 are not necessarily ,opposite at all2 they are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other2 while a name1 called relative1 which connotes such comparison1 c41 is bestowed upon each4 ,opposita fall under this general description1 as parts 7together with other parts not ,opposita7 of a larger whole4 ,they ought properly to be called ,opposite-,relativa3 the phrase ,relative-,opposita1 as applied to ,relatives generally1 being discontinued as incorrect4#add ,footnote #adc3 ,categ4 p4 #aa1 b4 #bd4 ,ammonius and ,simplikius inform us that there was much debate among the commentators about these four alleged varieties of ,greek3 a7ntikei_/mena2 also1 that even ,aristotle himself had composed a special treatise 7not now extant71 ,greek3 ,peri tn ,a7ntikeime_/nn1 full of perplexing ,greek3 a7pori_/ai1 which the ,stoics afterwards discussed without solving 7,schol4 p4 #hc1 a4 #ae-dh74 ,herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all ,relatives ,greek3 a7ntikei_/mena2 for they admitted that the antithesis between the ,relative and its ,correlate was of gentler character1 not conflicting1 but reciprocally sustaining4 ,alexander ingeniously compared ,relatum and its ,correlatum to the opposite rafters of a roof1 each supporting the other 7,greek3 malak_/tera kai 7tton macho_/mena e7n tois a7ntikeime_/nois1 7s kai a7mphiba_/lesthai ei7 ei7sin a7ntikei_/mena s_/zonta a7_/llla2 a7lla touto men dei_/knusin ,a7le_/xandros o7_/ti a7ntikei_/mena1 o7s kai ta labdoeid xu_/la paradeigma lamba_/nei1 c41 ,schol4 p4 #ha1 b4 #cb2 p4 #hb1 a4 #ae1 b4 #bj74 ,this is an undue enlargement of the meaning of ,opposita1 by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct to the logical4 ,on the contrary1 the ,stoics are alleged to have worked out the views of ,aristotle about ,greek3 e7nanti_/a1 but to have restricted the meaning of ,greek3 9999a7ntikei_/mena to contradictory opposition1 i4 e4 to ,affirmative and ,negative ,propositions with the same subject and predicate 7,schol4 p4 #hc1 b4 #aa2 p4 #hg1 a4 #bi74 ,in ,metaphysica1 ,a4 #ihc1 a4 #ca1 ,aristotle calls the final cause 7,greek3 to ou7 e7_/neka kai ta7gatho_/n7 tn a7ntikeime_/nn ai7ti_/an to the cause 7among his four71 ,greek3 to 9999o7_/then 7 ki_/nsis4 ,this is a misleading phrase2 the two are not opposed1 but mutually implicated and correlative4 ,footnote #add3 ,see the just and comprehensive definition of ,relative ,names given by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 in his ,system of ,logic1 ,book ,i4 chap4 ii4 #g1 p4 #df4 ,after reading that definition1 the inconvenience of ranking ,relatives as a species or variety of ,opposites1 will be seen at once4 ,from ,opposita ,aristotle passes to ,prius and ,simul2 with the different modes of each4#ade ,successive and ,synchronous1 are the two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast4 ,they include between them all that is meant by ,order in ,time4 ,they admit of no definition1 and can be explained only by appeal to immediate consciousness in particular cases4 ,priority and ,simultaneity1 in this direct and primary sense1 are among the clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind4 ,but ,aristotle recognizes four additional meanings of these same words1 which he distinguishes from the primary1 in the same way as he distinguishes 7in the ten ,categories7 the different meanings of ,essentia1 in a gradually descending scale of analogy4 ,the secondary ,prius is that which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with its ,posterius2 where the ,posterius presupposes the ,prius1 while the ,prius does not presuppose the ,posterius3 for example1 given two1 the existence of one is necessarily implied2 but given one1 the existence of two is not implied4#adf ,the tertiary ,prius is that which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse3 as1 in geometry1 point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and demonstrations2 in writing1 letters are prior as compared with syllables2 in speeches1 the proem is prior as compared with the exposition4 ,a fourth mode of ,prius 7which is the most remote and far-fetched7 is1 that the better and more honourable is prius natur4 ,still a fifth mode is1 when1 of two ,relatives which reciprocate with each other as to existence1 one is cause and the other effect3 in such a case1 the cause is said to be prior by nature to the effect4#adg ,for example1 if it be a fact that ,caius exists1 the proposition ,caius exists1 is a true proposition2 and vice vers1 if the proposition ,caius exists is a true proposition1 it is a fact that ,caius exists4 ,but though from either 9999of these you can infer the other1 the truth of the proposition is the effect1 and not the cause1 of the reality of the fact4 ,hence it is correct to say that the latter is prius natur1 and the former posterius natur4 ,footnote #ade3 ,categ4 p4 #ad1 a4 #bf1 seq4 ,footnote #adf3 ,ibid4 p4 #ad1 a4 #bi1 seq4 ,this second mode of ,prius is entitled by ,alexander 7see ,schol4 7ad ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d47 p4 #gjg1 b4 #g1 ,brandis7 ,greek3 pro_/teron t phu_/sei4 ,but ,aristotle does not so call it here2 he reserves that title for the fourth and fifth modes4 ,it appears that debates1 ,greek3 ,peri ,prote_/rou kai ,u7ste_/rou were frequent in the dialectic schools of ,aristotle's day as well as debates1 ,greek3 ,peri ,tau7tou kai ,e7te_/rou1 ,peri ,o7moi_/ou kai ,a7nomoi_/ou1 ,peri ,tau7to_/ttos kai ,e7nantio_/ttos 7,arist4 ,metaph4 ,b4 p4 #iie1 b4 #bj74 ,footnote #adg3 ,aristot4 ,categ4 p4 #ad1 b4 #aj4 ,this is a sort of article in a ,philosophical ,dictionary1 tracing the various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases2 and there is another article in the fourth book of the ,metaphysica1 where the derivations of the same terms are again traced out1 though by roads considerably different4#adh ,the two terms are relatives2 ,prius implies a ,posterius1 as ,simul implies another ,simul2 and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various meanings assigned to each4 ,aristotle has done this1 not indeed clearly nor consistently with himself1 but with an earnest desire to elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing4 ,yet there are few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading4 ,though he sets out1 plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of ,priority1 7the temporal or real71 as discriminated from the various secondary and metaphorical senses1 nevertheless when he comes to employ the term ,prius in the course of his reasonings1 he often does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be understood4 ,and as the literal sense 7temporal or real priority7 is the most present and familial to every man's mind1 so the term is often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the metaphorical sense4 ,the confusion of logical or emotional priority 7priority either in logical order of conception1 or in esteem and respect7 with priority in the order of time1 involving separability of existence1 is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the ,aristotelian ,physics and ,metaphysics4 ,the order of logical antecedence and sequence1 or the fact of logical coexistence1 is of great importance to be understood1 with a view to the proof of truth1 to the disproof of error1 or to the systematization of our processes of thought2 but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order1 orf separable in real existence1 or fit to be appealed to as a real ,cause or ,agent4#adi ,footnote #adh3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajah1 b4 #aa-p4 #ajai1 a4 #ab4 ,the article in the ,metaphysica is better and fuller than that in the ,categori4 ,in this last1 ,order in ,place receives no special recognition1 while we find such recognition in the ,metaphysica1 and we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or intellectual ,prius4 ,footnote #adi3 ,in the language of ,porphyry1 ,greek3 prouphe_/stke 7priority in real existence7 means nothing more than ,greek3 proepinoeitai 7priority in the order of conception71 ,eisagoge1 cc4 xv41 xvi42 ,schol4 ,br4 p4 #f1 a4 #g-ba4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,de ,,interpretatione4 ,in the preceding chapter ,i enumerated and discussed what ,aristotle calls the ,categories4 ,we shall now proceed to the work which stands second in the aggregate called the ,organon--the treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,we have already seen that the ,aristotelian ,ontology distinguishes one group of varieties of ,ens 7or different meanings of the term ,ens7 as corresponding to the diversity of the ten ,categories2 while recognizing also another variety of ,ens as ,truth1 with its antithesis ,non-,ens as ,falsehood4#a ,the former group was dealt with in the preceding chapter2 the latter will form the subject of the present chapter4 ,in both1 indeed1 ,ontology is looked at as implicated with ,logic2 that is1 ,ens is considered as distributed under significant names1 fit to be coupled in propositions4 ,this is the common basis both of the ,categori and of the treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,the whole classification of the ,categories rests on the assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts1 and on the different relation borne by each of the nine genera of predicates towards their common ,subject4 ,but in the ,categori no account was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood1 in the application of these predicates to the ,subject4 ,if we say of ,sokrates1 that he is fair1 pug-nosed1 brave1 wise1 c41 we shall predicate truly2 if we say that he is black1 high-nosed1 cowardly1 stupid1 c41 we shall predicate falsely2 but in each case our predicates will belong to the same ,category--that of ,quale4 ,whether we describe him as he now is1 standing1 talking1 in the market-place at ,athens2 or whether we describe him as he is not1 sitting down1 singing1 in ,egypt--in both speeches1 our predicates rank under the same ,categories1 ,jacere1 ,agere1 ,ubi4 ,no account is taken in the ,categori of the distinction between true and false application of predicates2 we are only informed under what number of general heads all our predicates must be included1 whether our propositions be true or false in each particular case4 ,footnote #a3 ,see above in the preceding chapter1 p4 #fj4 ,but this distinction between true and false1 which remained unnoticed in the ,categori1 comes into the foreground in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,the ,proposition1 or enunciative speech1#b is distinguished from other varieties of speech 7interrogative1 precative1 imperative7 by its communicating what is true or what is false4 ,it is defined to be a complex significant speech1 composed of two terms at least1 each in itself significant1 yet neither of them1 separately taken1 communicating truth or falsehood4 ,the terms constituting the ,proposition are declared to be a ,noun in the nominative case1 as ,subject1 and a ,verb1 as ,predicate2 this latter essentially connoting time1 in order that the synthesis of the two may become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact1 susceptible of being believed or disbelieved4 ,all this mode of analysing a proposition1 different from the analysis thereof given or implied in the ,categori1 is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its function of imparting true or false information4 ,the treatise called the ,categori is a theory of significant names subjicible and predicable1 fit to serve as elements of propositions1 but not yet looked at as put together into actual propositions2 while in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione they are assumed to be put together1 and a theory is given of ,propositions thus completed4 ,footnote #b3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #ag1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 lo_/gos a7pophantiko_/s4 ,words spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated with them both by speaker and hearer2 words written are symbols of those thus uttered4 ,both speech and writing differ in different nations1 having no natural connection with the things signified4 ,but these last1 the affections or modifications of the mind1 and the facts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses1 are the same to all4 ,words are marks primarily and directly of the first1 secondarily and indirectly of the second4#c ,aristotle thus recognizes these two aspects--first1 the subjective1 next the objective1 as belonging1 both of them conjointly1 to significant language1 yet as logically distinguishable2 the former looking to the proximate correlatum1 the latter to the ultimate4 ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 p4 #af1 a4 #c1 seq4 ,greek3 7n me_/ntoi tauta smeia pr_/ts1 tau7ta pasi path_/mata ts psuchs1 kai 7n tauta o7moi_/mata1 pra_/gmata 7_/d tau7ta_/4 ,for this doctrine1 that the mental affections of mankind1 and the things or facts which they represent1 are the same everywhere1 though the marks whereby they are signified differ1 ,aristotle refers us to his treatise ,de ,anim1 to which he says that it properly belongs4#d ,he thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of ,logic on ,psychology or ,mental ,philosophy4 ,footnote #d3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #af1 a4 #h3 ,greek3 peri men ou7n tau_/tn ei7_/rtai e7n tois peri psuchs2 a7_/lls gar pragmatei_/as4 ,it was upon this reference1 mainly1 that ,andronikus the ,rhodian rested his opinion1 that the treatise ,de ,interpretatione was not the work of ,aristotle4 ,andronikus contended that there was nothing in the ,de ,anim to justify the reference4 ,but ,ammonius in his ,scholia 7p4 #ig1 ,brand47 makes a sufficient reply to the objection of ,andronikus4 ,the third book ,de ,anim 7pp4 #dcj1 #dca7 lays down the doctrine here alluded to4 ,compare ,torstrick's ,commentary1 p4 #baj4 ,that which is signified by words 7either single or in combination7 is some variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they represent4 ,but the signification of a single ,term is distinguished1 in an important point1 from the signification of that conjunction of terms which we call a ,proposition4 ,a noun1 or a verb1 belonging to the aggregate called a language1 is associated with one and the same phantasm#e or notion1 without any conscious act of conjunction or disjunction1 in the minds of speakers and hearers3 when pronounced1 it arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas1 and determines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is called its meaning4#f ,but neither the noun nor the verb1 singly taken1 does more than this2 neither one of them affirms1 or denies1 or communicates any information true or false4 ,for this last purpose1 we must conjoin the two together in a certain way1 and make a ,proposition4 ,the signification of the ,proposition is thus specifically distinct from that of either of its two component elements4 ,it communicates what purports to be matter of fact1 which may be either true or false2 in other words1 it implies in the speaker1 and raises in the hearer1 the state of belief or disbelief1 which does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately4 ,herein the ,proposition is discriminated from other significant arrangements of words 7precative1 interrogative1 which convey no truth or falsehood71 as well as from its own component parts4 ,each of these parts1 noun and verb1 has a significance of its own2 but these are the ultimate elements of speech1 for the parts of the noun or of the verb have no significance at all4 ,the ,verb is distinguished from the ,noun by connoting time1 and also by always serving as predicate to some noun as subject4#g ,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 p4 #af1 a4 #ac3 ,greek3 ta men ou7n o7no_/mata au7ta kai ta r7_/mata e7_/oike t a7_/neu diaire_/ses kai sunthe_/ses no_/mati1 oi7on to a7_/nthrpos kai to leuko_/n1 o7_/tan m proste_/th ti2 ou7_/te gar pseudos ou7_/te a7lthe_/s p4 ,footnote #f3 ,ibid4 p4 #af1 b4 #ai3 ,greek3 au7ta men kath' e7auta lego_/mena ta r7_/mata o7no_/mata_/ e7sti kai smai_/nei ti 7i7_/stsi gar o7 le_/gn tn dia_/noian1 kai o7 a7kou_/sas 7re_/msen7 a7ll' ei7 e7stin 7 m_/1 ou7_/p smai_/nei1 c4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,,ii4 xix4 pp4 #ii1 #ajj1 where the same doctrine occurs3 the movement of association is stopped1 and the mind is determined to dwell upon a certain idea2 one among an aggregate of runaways being arrested in flight1 another halts also1 and so the rest in succession1 until at length the ,universal1 or the sum total1 is detained1 or stands still as an object of attention4 ,also ,aristot4 ,problem4 p4 #ief1 b4 #ci4 ,footnote #g3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #af1 b4 #b1 seq4 ,aristotle intimates his opinion1 distinctly and even repeatedly1 upon the main question debated by ,plato in the ,kratylus4 ,he lays it down that all significant speech is significant by convention only1 and not by nature or as a natural instrument4#h ,he tells us also that1 in this treatise1 he does not mean to treat of all significant speech1 but only of that variety which is known as enunciative4 ,this last1 as declaring truth or falsehood1 is the only part belonging to ,logic as he conceives it2 other modes of speech1 the precative1 imperative1 interrogative1 c41 belong more naturally to ,rhetoric or ,poetic4#i ,enunciative speech may be either simple or complex2 it may be one enunciation1 declaring one predicate 7either in one word or in several words7 of one subject2 or it may comprise several such4#aj ,the conjunction of the predicate with the subject constitutes the variety of proposition called ,affirmation2 the disjunction of the same two is ,negation or ,denial4#aa ,but such conjunction or disjunction1 operated by the cogitative act1 between two mental states1 takes place under the condition that1 wherever conjunction may be enunciated1 there also disjunction may be enunciated1 and vice vers4 ,whatever may be affirmed1 it is possible also to deny2 whatever may be denied1 it is possible also to affirm4#ab ,footnote #h3 ,ibid4 p4 #af1 a4 #bf2 p4 #ag1 a4 #b4 ,footnote #i3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #f3 ,greek3 o7 de a7pophantikos ts nun theri_/as4 ,see the 9999,scholion of ,ammonius1 pp4 #ie1 #if1 #ajh1 a4 #bg4 ,in the last passage1 ,ammonius refers to a passage in one of the lost works of ,theophrastus1 wherein that philosopher distinguished ,greek3 ton a7pophantikon lo_/gon from the other varieties of ,greek3 lo_/gos1 by the difference of ,greek3 sche_/sis3 the ,greek3 a7pophantikos lo_/gos was ,greek3 pros ta pra_/gmata1 or objective2 the others were ,greek3 pros tous a7krome_/nous1 i4e4 varying with the different varieties of hearers1 or subjective4 ,footnote #aj3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #aa3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #ab3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 a7_/pan a7n e7nde_/choito kai o7 kate_/phse_/ tis a7pophsai1 kai o7 a7pe_/phse_/ tis kataphsai4 ,to every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a contradictory negative proposition2 to every negative a contradictory affirmative4 ,this pair of contradictory opposites may be called an ,antiphasis2 always assuming that the predicate and subject of the two shall be really the same1 without equivocation of terms--a proviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by ,sophists4#ac ,and we must also distinguish these propositions opposite as ,contradictories1 from propositions opposite as ,contraries4 ,for this1 it has to be observed that there is a distinction among things 7,greek3 pra_/gmata7 as universal or singular1 according as they are1 in their nature1 predicable of a number or not3 homo is an example of the first1 and ,kallias is an example of the second4 ,when1 now1 we affirm a predicate universally1 we must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the predicate2 we must say1 ,every man is white1 ,no man is white4 ,we cannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate1 and say1 ,every man is every animal2 this would be untrue4#ad ,an affirmation1 then1 is contradictorily opposed to a negation1 when one indicates that the subject is universally taken1 and the other1 that the subject is taken not universally1 e4g4 ,omnis homo est albus1 ,non omnis homo est albus2 ,nullus homo est albus1 ,est aliquis homo albus4 ,the opposition is contrary1 when the affirmation is universal1 and the negation is also universal1 i4e41 when the subject is marked as universally taken in each3 for example1 ,omnis homo est albus1 ,nullus homo est albus4 ,of these contrary opposites1 both cannot be true1 but both may be false4 ,contradictory opposites1 on the other hand1 while they cannot both be true1 cannot both be false2 one must be false and the other true4 ,this holds also where the subject is a singular term1 as ,sokrates4#ae ,if1 however1 an universal term appear as subject in the proposition indefinitely1 that is1 without any mark of universality whatever1 e4g41 ,est albus homo1 ,non est albus homo1 then the affirmative and negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory1 though they may be so sometimes3 there is no opposition1 properly speaking1 between them2 both may alike be true4 ,this last observation 7says ,aristotle7 will seem strange1 because many persons suppose that ,non est homo albus is equivalent to ,nullus homo est albus2 but the meaning of the two is not the same1 nor does the truth of the latter follow from that of the former1#af since homo in the former may be construed as not universally taken4 ,footnote #ac3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 kai e7_/st a7nti_/phasis touto1 kata_/phasis kai a7po_/phasis ai7 a7ntikei_/menai4 ,it seems 7as ,ammonius observes1 ,schol4 p4 #aab1 a4 #cc7 that ,greek3 a7nti_/phasis in this sense was a technical term1 introduced by ,aristotle4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ag1 a4 #cg-;b4 #ad3 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7sti ta men katho_/lou tn pragma_/tn1 ta de kath' e7_/kaston 7le_/g de katho_/lou men o7 e7pi pleio_/nn pe_/phuke katgoreisthai1 kath' e7_/kaston de o7 m1 oi7on a7_/nthrpos men tn katho_/lou1 ,kalli_/as de tn kath' e7_/kaston72 c4 ,ammonius 7in ,schol4 p4 #aac1 a4 #ch7 says that what is predicated1 either of many subjects or of one1 must be ,greek3 mi_/a phu_/sis4 ,the warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical treatise of ,aristotle1 and is repeated in the ,analytica ,priora1 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 b4 #ag4 ,here we have3 ,greek3 ou7demi_/a kata_/phasis a7lths e7_/stai1 e7n 7 tou katgoroume_/nou katho_/lou to katho_/lou katgoreitai1 oi7on e7_/sti pas a7_/nthrpos pan zon 7b4 #ad74 ,footnote #ae3 ,ibid4 b4 #af-bi4 ,footnote #af3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 b4 #bi-cg4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7,system of ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 s4 #d7 cites and approves ,dr4 ,whately's observation1 that the recognition of a class of ,propositions called indefinite is a solecism1 of the same nature as that committed by grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the doubtful gender4 ,the speaker must mean to assert the proposition either as an universal or as a particular proposition1 though he has failed to declare which4 ,but ,aristotle would not have admitted ,dr4 ,whately's doctrine1 declaring what the speaker must mean4 ,aristotle fears that his class1 indefinite1 will appear impertinent1 because many speakers are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the particular and the general4 ,the looseness of ordinary speech and thought1 which ,logic is intended to bring to view and to guard against1 was more present to his mind than to that of ,dr4 ,whately3 moreover1 the forms of ,greek speech favoured the ambiguity4 ,aristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common speaking1 as to clearness and limitation of meaning1 at the time when he began to theorize on propositions4 ,i think that ,whately's assumption--the speaker must mean--is analogous to the assumption on which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton founds his proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate1 viz41 that the speaker must1 implicitly or mentally1 quantify the predicate2 and that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification explicit4 ,mr4 ,mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of ,sir4 ,w4 ,hamilton's is incorrect4 ,it thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to one and the same affirmation2 making up together the ,antiphasis1 or pair of contradictory opposites1 quite distinct from contrary opposites4 ,by one affirmation we mean1 that in which there is one predicate only1 and one subject only1 whether taken universally or not universally3-- ,e4g4 ,omnis homo est albus 444 444 ,non omnis homo est albus4 ,est homo albus 444 444 444 ,non est homo albus4 ,nullus homo est albus 444 444 ,aliquis homo est albus4 ,but this will only hold on the assumption that album signifies one and the same thing4 ,if there be one name signifying two things not capable of being generalized into one nature1 or not coming under the same definition1 then the affirmation is no longer one4#ag ,thus if any one applies the term himation to signify both horse and man1 then the proposition1 ,est himation album1 is not one affirmation1 but two2 it is either equivalent to ,est homo albus and ,est equus albus--or it means nothing at all2 for this or that individual man is not a horse4 ,accordingly1 in this case also1 as well as in that mentioned above1 it is not indispensable that one of the two propositions constituting the ,antiphasis should be true and the other false4#ah ,footnote #ag3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ah1 a4 #ac1 seq43 ,greek3 mi_/a de_/ e7sti kata_/phasis kai a7po_/phasis 7 e7n kath' e7nos smai_/nousa1 7 katho_/lou o7_/ntos katho_/lou 7 m o7moi_/s1 oi7on pas a7_/nthrpos leuko_/s e7stin 4 4 4 ei7 to leukon e7n smai_/nei4 ei7 de duoin e7n o7_/noma keitai1 e7x 7n m_/ e7stin e7_/n1 ou7 mi_/a kata_/phasis1 c41 and the ,scholion of ,ammonius1 p4 #aaf1 b4 #f1 seq4 ,footnote #ah3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ah1 a4 #bf4 ,the example which ,aristotle here gives is one of a subject designated by an equivocal name2 when he had begun with the predicate4 ,it would have been more pertinent if he had said at first1 ,greek3 ei7 o7 a7_/nthrpos e7n smai_/nei4 ,with these exceptions ,aristotle lays it down1 that1 in every ,antiphasis1 one proposition must be true and the other must be false4 ,but 7he goes on to say7 this is only true in regard to matters past or present2 it is not true in regard to events particular and future4 ,to admit it in regard to these latter1 would be to affirm that the sequences of events are all necessary1 and none of them casual or contingent2 whereas we know1 by our own personal experience1 that many sequences depend upon our deliberation and volition1 and are therefore not necessary4 ,if all future sequences are necessary1 deliberation on our part must be useless4 ,we must therefore 7he continues7 recognize one class of sequences which are not uniform--not predetermined by antecedents2 events which may happen1 but which also may not happen1 for they will not happen4 ,thus1 my coat may be cut into two halves1 but it never will be so cut2 it will wear out without any such bisection occurring4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ah1 a4 #bh-p4 #ai1 b4 #d4 ,if you affirm the reality of a fact past or present1 your affirmation is of necessity determinately true1 or it is determinately false1 i4e4 the contradictory negation is determinately true4 ,but if you affirm the reality of a fact to come1 then your affirmation is not by necessity determinately true1 nor is the contradictory negation determinately true4 ,neither the one nor the other separately is true3 nothing is true except the disjunctive antithesis as a whole1 including both4 ,if you say1 ,to-morrow there will either be a sea-fight1 or there will not be a sea-fight1 this disjunctive or indeterminate proposition1 taken as a whole1 will be true4 ,yet neither of its constituent parts will be determinately true2 neither the proposition1 ,to-morrow there will be a sea-fight1 nor the proposition1 ,to-morrow there will not be a sea-fight4 ,but if you speak with regard to past or present--if you say1 ,yesterday either there was a sea-fight or there was not a sea-fight--then not only will the disjunctive as a whole be true1 but also one or other of its parts will be determinately true4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,ibid4 p4 #ah1 b4 #bi4 ,ammonius 7,scholia ad ,de ,interpret4 p4 #aai1 bb4 #ah1 #bh1 seq47 expresses ,aristotle's meaning in terms more distinct than ,aristotle himself3 ,greek3 m pa_/nts e7_/chein to e7_/teron mo_/rion ts a7ntipha_/ses a7phrisme_/ns a7ltheuon1 c4 7b4 #dc74 ,this remarkable logical distinction is founded on ,aristotle's ontological or physical doctrines respecting the sequence and conjunction of events4 ,he held 7as we shall see more fully in the ,physica and other treatises7 that sequences throughout the ,kosmos were to a certain extent regular1 to a certain extent irregular4 ,the exterior sphere of the ,kosmos 7the ,aplanes7 with the countless number of fixed stars fastened into it1 was a type of regularity and uniformity2 eternal and ever moving in the same circular orbit1 by necessity of its own nature1 and without any potentiality of doing otherwise4 ,but the earth and the elemental bodies1 organized and unorganized1 below the lunar sphere and in the interior of the ,kosmos1 were of inferior perfection and of very different nature4 ,they were indeed in part governed and pervaded by the movement and influence of the celestial substance within which they were comprehended1 and from which they borrowed their ,form or constituent essence2 but they held this ,form implicated with ,matter1 i4e4 the principle of potentiality1 change1 irregularity1 generation1 and destruction1 c4 ,there are thus in these sublunary bodies both constant tendencies and variable tendencies4 ,the constant ,aristotle calls ',nature2' which always aspires to ,good1 or to perpetual renovation of ,forms as perfect as may be1 though impeded in this work by adverse influences1 and therefore never producing any thing but individuals comparatively defective and sure to perish4 ,the variable he calls ',spontaneity' and ',chance1' forming an independent agency inseparably accompanying ,nature--always modifying1 distorting1 frustrating1 the full purposes of ,nature4 ,moreover1 the different natural agencies often interfere with each other1 while the irregular tendency interferes with them all4 ,so far as ,nature acts1 in each of her distinct agencies1 the phenomena before us are regular and predictable2 all that is uniform1 and all that 7without being quite uniform7 recurs usually or frequently1 is her work4 ,but1 besides and along with ,nature1 there is the agency of ,chance and ,spontaneity1 which is essentially irregular and unpredictable4 ,under this agency there are possibilities both for and against2 either of two alternative events may happen4 ,it is with a view to this doctrine about the variable kosmical agencies or potentialities that ,aristotle lays down the logical doctrine now before us1 distinguishing propositions affirming particular facts past or present1 from propositions affirming particular facts future4 ,in both cases alike1 the disjunctive antithesis1 as a whole1 is necessarily true4 ,either there was a sea-fight yesterday1 or there was not a sea-fight yesterday3 ,either there will be a sea-fight to-morrow1 or there will not be a sea-fight to-morrow--both these disjunctives alike are necessarily true4 ,there is1 however1 a difference between the one disjunctive couple and the other1 when we take the affirmation separately or the negation separately4 ,if we say1 ,there will be a sea-fight to-morrow1 that proposition is not necessarily true nor is it necessarily false2 to say that it is either the one or the other 7,aristotle argues7 would imply that every thing in nature happened by necessary agency--that the casual1 the potential1 the may be or may not be1 is stopped out and foreclosed4 ,but this last is really the case1 in regard to a past fact4 ,there was a sea-fight yesterday1 is a proposition either necessarily true or necessarily false4 ,here the antecedent agencies have already spent themselves1 blended1 and become realized in one or other of the two alternative determinate results4 ,there is no potentiality any longer open2 all the antecedent potentiality has been foreclosed4 ,the proposition therefore is either necessarily true or necessarily false2 though perhaps we may not know whether it is the one or the other4 ,in defending his position regarding this question1 ,aristotle denies 7what he represents his opponents as maintaining7 that all events happen by necessity4 ,he points to the notorious fact that we deliberate and take counsel habitually1 and that the event is frequently modified1 according as we adopt one mode of conduct or another2 which could not be 7he contends71 if the event could be declared beforehand by a proposition necessarily or determinately true4 ,what ,aristotle means by necessity1 however1 is at bottom nothing else than constant sequence or conjunction1 conceived by him as necessary1 because the fixed ends which ,nature is aiming at can only be attained by certain fixed means4 ,to this he opposes ,spontaneity and ,chance1 disturbing forces essentially inconstant and irregular2 admitting1 indeed1 of being recorded when they have produced effects in the past1 yet defying all power of prediction as to those effects which they will produce in the future4 ,hence arises the radical distinction that he draws in ,logic1 between the truth of propositions relating to the past 7or present7 and to the future4 ,but this logical distinction cannot be sustained1 because his metaphysical doctrine 7on which it is founded7 respecting the essentially irregular or casual1 is not defensible4 ,his opponents would refuse to grant that there is any agency essentially or in itself irregular1 casual1 and unpredictable4#ba ,the aggregate of ,nature consists of a variety of sequences1 each of them constant and regular1 though intermixed1 co-operating1 and conflicting with each other1 in such manner that the resulting effects are difficult to refer to their respective causes1 and are not to be calculated beforehand except by the highest scientific efforts2 often1 not by any scientific efforts4 ,we must dismiss the hypothesis of ,aristotle1 assuming agencies essentially irregular and unpredictable1 either as to the past or as to the future4 ,the past has been brought about by agencies all regular1 however multifarious and conflicting1 and the future will be brought about by the like3 there is no such distinction of principle as that which ,aristotle lays down between propositions respecting the past and propositions respecting the future4 ,footnote #ba3 ,the ,stoics were opposed to ,aristotle on this point4 ,they recognized no logical difference in the character of the ,antiphasis1 whether applied to past and present1 or to future4 ,nikostratus defended the thesis of ,aristotle against them4 ,see the ,scholia of ,simplikius on the ,categori1 p4 #hg1 b4 #cj-p4 #hh1 a4 #bd4 ,greek3 ai7 gar ei7s ton me_/llonta chro_/non e7gklino_/menai prota_/seis ou7_/te a7ltheis ei7sin ou7_/te pseudeis dia tn tou e7ndechome_/nou phu_/sin4 ,the remarks of ,hobbes1 upon the question here discussed by ,aristotle1 well deserve to be transcribed 7,de ,corpore1 part ,,ii4 ch4 ,x4 s4 #e73-- ,but here1 perhaps1 some man may ask whether those future things1 which are called contingents1 are necessary4 ,i say1 therefore1 that generally all contingents have their necessary causes1 but are called contingents in respect of other events1 upon which they do not depend2 as the rain1 which shall be to-morrow1 shall be necessary1 that is1 from necessary causes2 but we think and say1 it happens by chance1 because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof1 though they exist now4 ,for men commonly call that casual or contingent1 whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause2 and in the same manner they use to speak of things past1 when not knowing whether a thing be done or no1 they say1 it is possible it never was done4 ,wherefore1 all propositions concerning future things1 contingent or not contingent--as this1 ,it will rain to-morrow1 or this1 ,to-morrow the sun will rise--are either necessarily true1 or necessarily false2 but we call them contingent1 because we do not yet know whether they be true or false2 whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge1 but upon the foregoing of their causes4 ,but there are some1 who1 though they confess this whole proposition1 ,to-morrow it will either rain or not rain1 to be true1 yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it1 as ,to-morrow it will rain1 or ,to-morrow it will not rain1 to be either of them true by itself2 because they say neither this nor that is true determinately4 ,but what is this determinately true1 but true upon our knowledge1 or evidently true8 ,and therefore they say no more1 but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no2 but they say it more obscurely1 and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance4 ,compare also the fuller elucidation of the subject given by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 in his ,system of ,logic1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 xvii4 s4 #b3--;,an event occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity2 the occurrence of an event in certain circumstances1 without our having reason on that account to infer that it will happen again in those circumstances4 ,this1 however1 when looked closely into1 implies that the enumeration of the circumstances is not complete4 ,whatever the fact was1 since it has occurred once1 we may be sure that if all the circumstances were repeated1 it would occur again2 and not only if all1 but there is some particular portion of those circumstances1 on which the phenomenon is invariably consequent4 ,with most of them1 however1 it is not connected in any permanent manner3 its conjunction with those is said to be the effect of chance1 to be merely casual4 ,facts casually conjoined are separately the effect of causes1 and therefore of laws2 but of different causes1 and causes not connected by any law4 ,it is incorrect then to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance2 but we may say that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance1 that they co-exist or succeed one another only by chance4 ,there is1 indeed1 one distinction between inferences as to the past and inferences as to the future1 which may have contributed to suggest1 though it will not justify1 the position here laid down by ,aristotle4 ,in regard to the disjunctive--,to-morrow there will be a sea-fight1 or there will not be a sea-fight--nothing more trustworthy than inference or anticipation is practicable3 the anticipation of a sagacious man with full knowledge is more likely to prove correct than that of a stupid man with little knowledge2 yet both are alike anticipations1 unverifiable at the present moment4 ,but if we turn to the other disjunctive--,yesterday there was a sea-fight1 or there was not a sea-fight--we are no longer in the same position4 ,the two disputants1 supposed to declare thus1 may have been far off1 and may have no other means of deciding the doubt than inference4 ,but the inference here is not unverifiable3 there exist1 or may exist1 witnesses or spectators of the two fleets1 who can give direct attestation of the reality1 and can either confirm or refute the inference1 negative or affirmative1 made by an absentee4 ,thus the proposition1 ,yesterday there was a sea-fight1 or the other1 ,yesterday there was not a sea-fight1 will be verifiable or determinably true4 ,there are indeed many inferences as to the past1 in regard to which no direct evidence is attainable4 ,still this is an accident2 for such direct evidence may always be supposed or imagined as capable of being brought into court4 ,but1 in respect to the future1 verification is out of the question2 we are confined to the region of inference1 well or ill-supported4 ,here1 then1 we have a material distinction between the past and the future4 ,it was probably present to the mind of ,aristotle1 though he misconceives its real extent of operation1 and makes it subservient to his still more comprehensive classification of the different contemporaneous agencies 7regular and irregular7 which he supposes to pervade the ,kosmos4 ,in the treatise before us1 he next proceeds to state what collocation of the negative particle constitutes the special or legitimate negation to any given affirmation1 or what are the real forms of proposition1 standing in contradictory opposition to certain other forms1 so as to make up one ,antiphasis4#bb ,the simplest proposition must include a noun and a verb1 either definite or indefinite3 non homo is a specimen of an indefinite noun--non currit1 of an indefinite verb4 ,there must be1 in any one proposition1 one subject and one predicate2 even the indefinite noun or verb signifies1 in a certain sense1 one thing4 ,each affirmation comprises a noun1 or an indefinite noun1 with a verb2 the special corresponding or contradictory negation 7making up the ,antiphasis along with the former7 comprises a noun 7or an indefinite noun7 with an indefinite verb4 ,the simplest proposition is-- ,affirmative4 ,contradictory ,negative4 ,est homo 444 444 444 444 ,non est homo4 ,est non homo 444 444 444 444 ,non est non homo4 ,here are only two pairs of antithetic propositions1 or one quaternion4 ,the above is an indefinite proposition 7which may be either universal or not74 ,when we universalize it1 or turn it an universal proposition1 we have-- ,affirmative4 ,contradictory ,negative4 ,est omnis homo 444 444 444 ,non est omnis homo4 ,est omnis non homo 444 444 ,non est omnis non homo4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ai1 b4 #e1 seq4 ,the above are specimens of the smallest proposition2 but when we regard larger propositions1 such as those 7called tertii adjacentis7 where there are two terms besides est1 the collocation of the negative particle becomes more complicated1 and requires fuller illustration4 ,take1 as an example1 the affirmative ,est justus homo1 the true negation of this is1 ,non est justus homo4 ,in these two propositions1 homo is the subject2 but we may join the negative with it1 and we may consider non homo1 not less than homo1 as a distinct subject for predication1 affirmative or negative4 ,farther1 we may attach est and non est either to justus or to non justus as the predicate of the proposition1 with either homo1 or non homo1 as subject4 ,we shall thus obtain a double mode of antithesis1 or two distinct quaternions1 each containing two pairs of contradictory propositions4 ,the second pair of the first quaternion will not be in the same relation as the second pair of the second quaternion1 to the proposition just mentioned1 viz4--7,a7 ,est justus homo2 with its negative1 7,b7 ,non est justice homo4#bc ,footnote #bc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ai1 b4 #ai4 ,greek3 o7_/tan de to e7_/sti tri_/ton proskatgortai1 7_/d dichs le_/gontai ai7 a7ntithe_/seis2 le_/g de oi7on e7_/sti di_/kaios a7_/nthrpos2 to e7_/sti tri_/ton phmi sugkeisthai o7_/noma 7 r7ma e7n t katapha_/sei4 7_/ste dia touto te_/ttara e7_/stai tauta1 7n ta men du_/o pros tn kata_/phasin kai a7po_/phasin e7_/xei kata to stoichoun 7s ai7 ster_/seis1 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/4 le_/g de o7_/ti to e7_/stin 7 t dikai_/ proskei_/setai 7 t ou7 dikai_/1 7_/ste kai 7 a7po_/phasis4 te_/ttara ou7n e7_/stai4 nooumen de to lego_/menon e7k tn u7pogegramme_/nn4 ,in this passage the words which ,i have enclosed between brackets are altered by ,waitz3 ,i shall state presently what ,i think of his alteration4 ,following upon these words there ought to be1 and it seems from ,ammonius 7,schol4 p4 #aba1 a4 #bj7 that there once was1 a scheme or table arranging the four propositions in the order and disposition which we read in the ,analytica ,priora1 ,i4 xlvi4 p4 #ea1 b4 #cg1 and which ,i shall here follow4 ,but no such table now appears in our text2 we have only an enumeration of the four propositions1 in a different order1 and then a reference to the ,analytica4 ,first1 let us assume homo as subject4 ,we have then 7,,quaternion ,i47 7,a7 ,est justus homo 444 444 444 444 7,b7 ,non est justus homo4 7,d7 ,non est non justus homo 444 444 444 7,c7 ,est non justus homo4 ,examining the relation borne by the last two among these four propositions 7,c and ,d71 to the first two 7,a and ,b71 the simple affirmative and negative1 we see that ,b is the legitimate negative of ,a1 and ,d that of ,c4 ,we farther see that ,b is a consequence of ,c1 and ,d a consequence of ,a1 but not vice vers3 that is1 if ,c is true1 ,b must certainly be true2 but we cannot infer1 because ,b is true1 that ,c must also be true3 while1 if ,a is true1 ,d must also be true2 but ,d may perhaps be true1 though ,a be not true4 ,in other words1 the relation of ,d to ,a and of ,c to ,b1 is the same as it would be if the privative term injustus were substituted in place of non justus2 i4e4 if the proposition ,c 7,est injustus homo7 be true1 the other proposition ,b 7,non est justus homo7 must certainly be true1 but the inference will not hold conversely2 while if the proposition ,a 7,est justus homo7 be true1 it must also be true to say ,d 7,non est injustus homo71 but not vice vers4#bd ,footnote #bd3 ,referring to the words cited in the preceding note1 ,i construe ,greek3 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/ as ,boethius does 7,,ii4 pp4 #chd-che71 and not in agreement with ,ammonius 7,schol4 p4 #abb1 a4 #bf1 ,br471 who1 however1 is followed both by ,julius ,pacius and ,waitz 7p4 #cdd74 ,i think it impossible that these words1 ,greek3 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/1 can mean 7as ,ammonius thinks7 the ,greek3 kata_/phasis and ,greek3 a7po_/phasis themselves1 since the very point which ,aristotle is affirming is the relation of these words1 ,greek3 pros tn kata_/phasin kai a7po_/phasin1 i4e4 to the affirmative and negative started from-- 7,a7 ,est justus homo 444 444 444 444 7,b7 ,non est justus homo4 ,as the words ,greek3 ta men du_/o refer to the second contradictory pair 7that is1 ,c and ,d7 in the first ,quaternion1 so the words ,greek3 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/ designate the second contradictory pair 7,g and ,h7 in the second ,quaternion4 ,though ,g and ,h are included in the second ,quaternion1 they are here designated by the negative relation 7,greek3 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/7 which they bear to ,a and ,b1 the first contradictory pair of the first ,quaternion4 ,greek3 dichs le_/gontai ai7 a7ntithe_/seis 7line #bj7 is explained and illustrated by line #cg--;,greek3 au7tai men ou7n du_/o a7nti_/keintai1 a7_/llai de du_/o pros to ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti prostethe_/n4 ,lastly1 ,aristotle expressly states that the second ,quaternion will stand independently and by itself 7p4 #bj1 a4 #a71 having noticed it in the beginning only in relation to the first4 ,such is the result obtained when we take homo as the subject of the proposition2 we get four propositions1 of which the two last 7,c and ,d7 stand to the two first 7,b and ,a7 in the same relation as if they 7,c and ,d7 were privative propositions4 ,but if1 instead of homo1 we take non homo as ,subject of the proposition 7justus or non justus being predicates as before71 we shall then obtain two other pairs of contradictory propositions2 and the second pair of this new quaternion will not stand in that same relation to these same propositions ,b and ,a4 ,we shall then find that1 instead of ,b and ,a1 we have a different negative and a different affirmative1 as the appropriate correlates to the third and fourth propositions4 ,the new quaternion of propositions1 with non homo as subject1 will stand thus-- 7,,quaternion ,,ii47 7,e7 ,est justus non homo 444 444 444 7,f7 ,non est justus non homo4 7,h7 ,non est non justus non homo 444 7,g7 ,est non justus non homo4#be ,here we see that propositions ,g and ,h do not stand to ,b and ,a in the same relations as ,c and ,d stand to ,b and ,a2 but that they stand in that same relation to two perfectly different propositions1 ,f and ,e4 ,that is1 if in place of non 9999justus1 in propositions ,g and ,h1 we substitute the privative term injustus 7thus turning ,g into ,est injustus non homo1 and turning ,h into ,non est injustus non homo71 the relation of ,g1 when thus altered1 to ,f1 and the relation of ,h1 when thus altered1 to ,e1 will be the same as it was before4 ,or1 in other words1 if ,g be true1 ,f will certainly be true1 but not vice vers2 and if ,e be true1 ,h will certainly be true1 but not vice vers4 ,footnote #be3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ai1 b4 #cf4 ,greek3 au7tai men ou7n du_/o a7nti_/keintai 7the two pairs--,a ,b and ,c ,d--of the first quaternion71 ,greek3 a7_/llai de du_/o pros to ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti prostethe_/n2 7,e7 ,greek3 e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos 444 444 444 7,f7 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 7,h7 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos 444 7,g7 ,greek3 e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 ,greek3 plei_/ous de tou_/tn ou7k e7_/sontai a7ntithe_/seis4 au7tai de chris e7kei_/nn au7tai kath' e7autas e7_/sontai1 7s o7no_/mati t ou7k a7_/nthrpos chr_/menai4 ,the second ,greek3 au7tai alludes to this last quaternion1 ,greek3 e7kei_/nn to the first4 ,i have1 as in the former case1 transposed propositions three and four of this second quaternion1 in order that the relation of ,g to ,f and of ,h to ,e may be more easily discerned4 ,there are few chapters in ,aristotle more obscure and puzzling than the tenth chapter of the ,de ,interpretatione4 ,it was found so by ,alexander1 ,herminus1 ,porphyry1 ,ammonius1 and all the ,scholiasts4 ,ammonius 7,schol4 pp4 #aba1 #abb1 ,br47 reports these doubts1 and complains of it as a riddle almost insolvable4 ,the difficulties remain1 even after the long note of ,waitz1 and the literal translation of ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire4 ,the propositions which we have hitherto studied have been indefinite2 that is1 they might be universal or not4 ,but if we attach to them the sign of universality1 and construe them as universals1 all that we have said about them would still continue to be true1 except that the propositions which are diametrically 7or diagonally7 opposed would not be both true in so many instances4 ,thus1 let us take the first quaternion of propositions1 in which est is attached to homo1 and let us construe these propositions as universal4 ,they will stand thus-- 7,a7 ,omnis est homo justus 444 444 7,b7 ,non omnis est homo justus4 7,d7 ,non omnis est homo non justus 7,c7 ,omnis est homo non justus4 ,in these propositions1 as in the others before noticed1 the same relation prevails between ,c and ,b1 and between ,a and ,d2 if ,c be true1 ,b also is true1 but not vice vers2 if ,a be true1 ,d also will be true1 but not vice vers4 ,but the propositions diagonally opposed will not be so often alike true3#bf thus1 if ,a be true 7,omnis est homo justus71 ,c cannot be true 7,omnis est homo non justus72 whereas in the former quaternion of propositions 7indefinite1 and therefore capable of being construed as not universal7 ,a and ,c might both be alike true4#bg ,footnote #bf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #ai1 b4 #ce4 ,greek3 pln ou7ch o7moi_/s tas kata dia_/metron e7nde_/chetai sunaltheu_/ein2 e7nde_/chetai de pote_/4 ,the diameter or diagonal is to be understood with reference to the scheme or square mentioned p4 #aai1 note1 the related propositions standing at the angles1 as above4 ,footnote #bg3 ,the ,scholion of ,ammonius1 p4 #abc1 a4 #ag1 ,br41 explains this very obscure passage3 ,greek3 a7ll' e7pi men tn a7prosdiori_/stn 7indefinite propositions1 such as may be construed either as universal or as particular71 ,greek3 kata tn e7ndechome_/nn u7_/ln ta_/s te katapha_/seis 7of the propositions diagonally opposite71 ,greek3 sunaltheu_/ein a7ll_/lais sumbai_/nei kai tas a7popha_/seis1 a7_/te tais merikais i7sodunamou_/sas4 e7pi de tn prosdirisme_/nn 7those propositions where the mark of universality is tacked to the ,subject71 ,greek3 peri 7n nuni au7t o7 lo_/gos1 ts katho_/lou katapha_/ses kai ts e7pi me_/rous a7popha_/ses1 tas men katapha_/seis a7du_/naton sunaltheusai kath' oi7and_/pote u7_/ln1 tas me_/ntoi a7popha_/seis sumbai_/nei sunaltheu_/ein kata mo_/nn tn e7ndechome_/nn2 c4 ,it is thus that ,aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in propositions1 arising out of the altered collocation of the negative particle2 the distinction between 7#a7 ,non est justus1 7#b7 ,est non justus1 7#c7 ,est injustus4 ,the first of the three is the only true negative1 corresponding to the affirmative ,est ,justus4 ,the second is not a negative at all1 but an affirmative 7,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses1 or by transposition1 as ,theophrastus afterwards called it74 ,the third is an affirmative1 but privative4 ,both the second and the third stand related in the same manner to the first2 that is1 the truth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or of the third1 but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the first4 ,this is explained still more clearly in the ,prior ,analytics2 to which ,aristotle here makes express reference4#bh ,footnote #bh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ai1 b4 #ca4 ,greek3 tauta men ou7n1 7_/sper e7n tois ,a7nalutikois le_/getai1 ou7_/t te_/taktai4 ,waitz in his note suggests that instead of ,greek3 te_/taktai we ought to read ,greek3 teta_/chth4 ,but if we suppose that the formal table once existed in the text1 in an order of arrangement agreeing with the ,analytica1 this conjectural change would be unnecessary4 ,waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter1 which appear to me partly for the better1 partly not for the better4 ,both ,bekker and ,bussemaker 7,firmin ,didot7 retain the old text2 but this old text was a puzzle to the ancient commentators1 even anterior to ,alexander of ,aphrodisias4 ,i will here give first the text of ,bekker1 next the changes made by ,waitz3 my own opinion does not wholly coincide with either4 ,i shall cite the text from p4 #ai1 b4 #ai1 leaving out the portion between lines #cj and #cf1 which does not bear upon the matter here discussed1 while it obscures the legitimate sequence of ,aristotle's reasoning4 7,bekker47--,greek3 ,o7_/tan de to e7_/sti tri_/ton proskatgortai1 7_/d dichs le_/gontai ai7 a7ntithe_/seis4 le_/g de oi7on e7_/sti di_/kaios a7_/nthrpos2 to e7_/sti tri_/ton phmi sugkeisthai o7_/noma 7 r7ma e7n t katapha_/sei4 7_/ste dia touto te_/ttara e7_/stai tauta1 7n ta men du_/o pros tn kata_/phasin kai a7po_/phasin e7_/xei kata to stoichoun 7s ai7 ster_/seis1 ta de du_/o1 ou7_/4 le_/g d' o7_/ti to e7_/stin 7 t dikai_/ proskei_/setai 7 t ou7 dikai_/ 7#be71 ,greek3 7_/ste kai 7 a7po_/phasis4 te_/ttara ou7n e7_/stai4 7,here follow the first pairs of ,antitheses1 or the first ,quaternion of propositions in the order as given7-- 7,a7 ,greek3 e7_/sti di_/kios a7_/nthrpos 444 444 7,b7 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti di_/kios a7_/nthrpos4y 7,c7 ,greek3 e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios a7_/nthrpos 444 7,d7 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios a7_/nthrpos4 ,greek3 to gar e7_/stin e7ntautha kai to ou7k e7_/sti t dikai_/ proskei_/setai kai t ou7 dikai_/ 7#cj74--;,greek3 ,au7tai men ou7n du_/o a7nti_/keintai1 a7_/llai de du_/o pros to ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti 7#ch7 ,greek3 prostethe_/n4 7,here follow the second pairs of ,antitheses1 or the second ,quaternion of propositions1 again in the order from which ,i have departed above7-- 7,e7 ,greek3 e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos 444 444 7,f7 ,greek3 ,ou7k e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 7,g7 ,greek3 e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos 444 7,h7 ,greek3 ,ou7k e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 ,greek3 plei_/ous de tou_/tn ou7k e7_/sontai a7ntithe_/seis4 au7tai de 7the second ,quaternion7 ,greek3 chris e7kei_/nn 7first ,quaternion7 ,greek3 au7tai kath' e7autas e7_/sontai1 7s o7no_/mati t ou7k a7_/nthrpos chr_/menai4 ,in this text ,waitz makes three alterations3--#a4 ,in line #bd1 instead of ,greek3 7 t dikai_/ proskei_/setai 7 t ou7 dikai_/--he reads1 ,greek3 7 t a7nthr_/p proskei_/setai 7 t ou7k a7nthr_/p4 #b4 ,in line #cj he makes a similar change2 instead of ,greek3 t dikai_/ proskei_/setai kai t ou7 dikai_/--he reads1 ,greek3 t a7nthr_/p proskei_/setai kai t ou7k a7nthr_/p4 ,in line #ch1 instead of ,greek3 prostethe_/n1 he reads ,greek3 prostethe_/ntos4 ,of these three alterations the first appears to me good1 but insufficient2 the second not good1 though the passage as it stands in ,bekker requires amendment2 and the third1 a change for the worse4 ,the purpose of ,aristotle is here two-fold4 ,first1 to give the reason why1 when the propositions were tertii adjacentis1 there were two ,quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions2 whereas in propositions secundi adjacentis1 there was only one ,quaternion or two couples of antithetical propositions4 ,next1 to assign the distinction between the first and the second ,quaternion in propositions tertii adjacentis4 ,now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line #be1 which ,i think we ought to read not by substituting the words of ,waitz in place of the words of ,bekker1 but by retaining the words of ,bekker and inserting the words of ,waitz as an addition to them4 ,the passage after such addition will stand thus--,greek3 le_/g d' o7_/ti to e7_/stin 7 t dikai_/ proskei_/setai 7 t ou7 dikai_/1 kai 7 t a7nthr_/p 7 t ou7k a7nthr_/p1 7_/ste kai 7 a7po_/phasis4 te_/ttara ou7n e7_/stai4 ,here ,aristotle declares the reason why 7,greek3 ou7n7 there come to be four couples of propositions2 that reason is1 because ,greek3 e7_/sti and ,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti may be joined either with ,greek3 di_/kaios or ,greek3 ou7 di_/kaios and either with ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos or with ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 ,both these alternatives must be specified in order to make out a reason why there are two ,quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions4 ,but the passage1 as read by ,bekker1 gives only one of these alternatives1 while the passage1 as read by ,waitz1 gives only the other4 ,accordingly1 neither of them separately is sufficient2 but both of them taken together furnish the reason required1 and thus answer ,aristotle's purpose4 ,aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two ,quaternions1 and then proceeds to line #cj1 where the reading of ,bekker is irrelevant and unmeaning2 but the amendment of ,waitz appears to me still worse1 being positively incorrect in statement of fact4 ,waitz reads ,greek3 to gar e7_/stin e7ntautha 7in the first ,quaternion1 which has just been enunciated7 ,greek3 kai to ou7k e7_/stin t a7nthr_/p proskei_/setai kai t ou7k a7nthr_/p4 ,these last words are incorrect in fact1 for ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos does not appear in the first ,quaternion1 but is reserved for the second4 ,while the reading of ,waitz is thus evidently wrong1 that of ,bekker asserts nothing to the purpose4 ,it is useless to tell us merely that ,greek3 e7_/sti and ,greek3 ou7k e7_/stin attach both to ,greek3 di_/kaios and to ,greek3 ou7 di_/kaios in this first ,quaternion 7,greek3 e7ntautha71 because that characteristic is equally true of the second ,quaternion 7presently to follow71 and therefore constitutes no distinction between the two4 ,to bring out the meaning intended by ,aristotle ,i think we ought here also to retain the words of ,bekker1 and to add after them some1 though not all1 of the words of ,waitz4 ,the passage would then stand thus--,greek3 to gar e7_/stin e7ntautha kai to ou7k e7_/sti t dikai_/ proskei_/setai kai t ou7 dikai_/1 kai t a7nthr_/p1 a7ll' ou7 t ou7k a7nthr_/p4 ,or perhaps ,greek3 kai ou7 t ou7k a7nthr_/p might suffice in the last clause 7being a smaller change71 though ,greek3 a7ll' ou7 seem the proper terms to declare the meaning4 ,in the reading which ,i propose1 the sequence intended by ,aristotle is clear and intelligible4 ,having first told us that ,greek3 e7_/stin and ,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti being joined alternately with ,greek3 di_/kaios and with ,greek3 ou7 di_/kaios and also with ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos and ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos1 make up two ,quaternions1 he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character belonging to the first ,quaternion of the two1 viz41 that in it ,greek3 e7_/sti and ,greek3 ou7k e7_/stin are joined both with ,greek3 di_/kaios and ,greek3 ou7 di_/kaios1 and also with ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos but not with ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos1 ,this is exactly the truth4 ,aristotle next proceeds to the second ,quaternion1 where he points out1 as the characteristic distinction1 that ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos comes in and ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos disappears1 while ,greek3 di_/kaios and ,greek3 ou7 di_/kaios remain included1 as in the first4 ,this is declared plainly by ,aristotle in line #cg3--;,greek3 au7tai men ou7n du_/o a7nti_/keintai 7referring to the two pairs of antithetical propositions in the first ,quaternion71 ,greek3 a7_/llai de pros to ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti prostethe_/n2 e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos1 e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos-ou7k e7_/sti di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos1 e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos-ou7k e7_/stin ou7 di_/kaios ou7k a7_/nthrpos4 ,when we read these words1 ,greek3 a7_/llai de du_/o pros to ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti prostethe_/n1 as applied to the second ,quaternion1 we see that there must have been some words preceding which excluded ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos from the first ,quaternion4 ,waitz contends for the necessity of changing ,greek3 prostethe_/n into ,greek3 prostethe_/ntos4 ,i do not concur with his reasons for the change2 the words that follow1 p4 #bj1 line #b1 ,greek3 7s o7no_/mati t ou7k a7_/nthrpos chr_/menai 7proschr_/menai71 are a reasonable justification of ,greek3 prostethe_/n--ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s u7pokei_/meno_/n ti prostethe_/n being very analogous to ,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos 7s o7_/noma4 ,this long note1 for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure text1 will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the perplexities and complaints of the ancient ,scholiasts1 revealed by ,ammonius and ,boethius4 ,even earlier than the time of ,alexander 7,schol4 p4 #abb99991 b4 #dg7 there was divergence in the ,,mss4 of ,aristotle2 several read ,greek3 t dikai_/ 7p4 #ai1 b4 #be71 several others read ,greek3 t a7nthr_/p4 ,i think that all of them were right in what they retained1 and wrong by omission only or mainly4 ,after this very subtle and obscure distinction between propositions secundi adjacentis1 and those tertii adjacentis1 in respect to the application of the negative1 ,aristotle touches on the relation of contrariety between propositions4 ,the universal affirmation ,omne est animal justum has for its contrary ,nullum est animal justum4 ,it is plain that both these propositions will never be true at once4 ,but the negatives or contradictories of both may well be true at once3 thus1 ,non omne animal est justum 7the contradictory of the first7 and ,est aliquid animal justum 7the contradictory of the second7 may be and are both alike true4 ,if the affirmative proposition ,omnis homo est non justus be true1 the negative ,nullus est homo justus must also be true2 if the affirmative ,est aliquis homo justus be true1 the negative ,non omnis homo est non justus must also be true4 ,in singular propositions1 wherever the negative or denial is true1 the indefinite affirmative 7,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses1 in the language of ,theophrastus7 corresponding to it will also be true2 in universal propositions1 the same will not always hold4 ,thus1 if you ask1 ,is ,sokrates wise8 and receive for answer ,no1 you are warranted in affirming1 ,sokrates is not wise 7the indefinite affirmation74 ,but if you ask1 ,are all men wise8 and the answer is ,no1 you are not warranted in affirming1 ,all men are not wise4 ,this last is the contrary of the proposition1 ,all men are wise2 and two contraries may both be false4 ,you are warranted in declaring only the contradictory negative1 ,not all men are wise4#bi ,footnote #bi3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #bj1 a4 #af-cj4 ,neither the indefinite noun 7,greek3 ou7k a7_/nthrpos7 nor the indefinite verb 7,greek3 ou7 tre_/chei--ou7 di_/kaios7 is a real and true negation1 though it appears to be such4 ,for every negation ought to be either true or false2 but non homo1 if nothing be appended to it1 is not more true or false 7indeed less so7 than homo4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,ibid4 a4 #ca1 seq4 ,the transposition of substantive and adjective makes no difference in the meaning of the phrase2 ,est albus homo is equivalent to ,est homo albus4 ,if it were not equivalent1 there would be two negations corresponding to the same affirmation2 but we have shown that there can be only one negation corresponding to one affirmation1 so as to make up an ,antiphasis4#ca ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 b4 #a-ab4 ,that ,greek3 e7sti leukos a7_/nthrpos1 and ,greek3 e7stin a7_/nthrpos leuko_/s1 mean exactly the same1 neither more nor less--we might have supposed that ,aristotle would have asserted without any proof2 that he would have been content ,greek3 a7po tn pragma_/tn pistousthai 7to use the phrase of ,ammonius in a portion of the ,scholia1 p4 #aba1 a4 #bg74 ,but he prefers to deduce it as a corollary from a general doctrine much less evident than the statement itself2 and after all1 his deduction is not conclusive1 as ,waitz has already remarked 7ad ,organ4 ,i4 p4 #cea74 ,in one and the same proposition1 it is indispensable that the subject be one and the predicate one2 if not1 the proposition will not be one1 but two or more4 ,both the subject and the predicate indeed may consist of several words2 but in each case the several words must coalesce to make one total unity2 otherwise the proposition will not be one4 ,thus1 we may predicate of man--animal1 bipes1 mansuetum2 but these three coalesce into one1 so that the proposition will be a single one4 ,on the other hand the three terms homo1 albus1 ambulans1 do not coalesce into one2 and therefore1 if we predicate all respecting the same subject1 or if we affirm the same predicate respecting all three1 expressing them all by one word1 the proposition will not be one1 but several4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #bj1 b4 #ac-bb4 ,aristotle follows this up by a remark interesting to note1 because we see how much his generalities were intended to bear upon the actual practice of his day1 in regard to dialectical disputation4 ,in dialectic exercise1 the respondent undertook to defend a thesis1 so as to avoid inconsistency between one answer and another1 against any questions which might be put by the opponent4 ,both the form of the questions1 and the form of the answers1 were determined beforehand4 ,no question was admissible which tended to elicit information or a positive declaration from the respondent4 ,a proposition was tendered to him1 and he was required to announce whether he affirmed or denied it4 ,the question might be put in either one of two ways3 either by the affirmative alone1 or by putting both the affirmative and the negative2 either in the form1 ,is ,rhetoric estimable8 or in the form1 ,is ,rhetoric estimable or not8 ,to the first form the respondent answered ,yes or ,no3 to the second form1 he replied by repeating either the affirmative or the negative1 as he preferred4 ,but it was not allowable to ask him1 ,what is ,rhetoric8 so as to put him under the necessity of enunciating an explanation of his own4#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,see the ,scholia of ,ammonius1 p4 #abg1 ,br4 ,under these canons of dialectic debate1 each question was required to be really and truly one1 so as to admit of a definite answer in one word4 ,the questioner was either unfair or unskilful1 if he wrapped up two questions really distinct in the same word1 and thus compelled the respondent either to admit them both1 or to deny them both1 at once4 ,against this inconvenience ,aristotle seeks to guard1 by explaining what are the conditions under which one and the same word does in fact include more than one question4 ,he had before brought to view the case of an equivocal term1 which involves such duplication3 if himation means both horse and man1 it will often happen that questions respecting himation cannot be truly answered either by ,yes or ,no4 ,he now brings to view a different case in which the like ambiguity is involved4 ,to constitute one proposition1 it is essential both that the subject should be one1 and that the predicate should be one2 either of them indeed may be called by two or three names1 but these names must coalesce into one4 ,thus1 animal1 bipes1 mansuetum1 coalesce into homo1 and may be employed either as one subject or as one predicate2 but homo1 albus1 ambulans1 do not coalesce into one2 so that if we say1 ,kallias est homo1 albus1 ambulans1 the proposition is not one but three4#cd ,accordingly1 the respondent cannot make one answer to a question thus complicated4 ,we thus find ,aristotle laying down principles--and probably no one had ever attempted to do so before him--for the correct management of that dialectical debate which he analyses so copiously in the ,topica4 ,footnote #cd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #bj1 b4 #b4 seq42 ,ammonius1 ,schol4 pp4 #abg-abh1 a4 #ba1 ,br4 ,compare ,de ,sophist4 ,elench4 p4 #afi1 a4 #f-ae4 ,there are cases 7he proceeds to state7 in which two predicates may be truly affirmed1 taken separately1 respecting a given subject1 but in which they cannot be truly affirmed1 taken together4#ce ,kallias is a currier1 ,kallias is good--both these propositions may be true2 yet the proposition1 ,kallias is a good currier1 may not be true4 ,the two predicates are both of them accidental co-inhering in the same individual2 but do not fuse themselves into one4 ,so1 too1 we may truly say1 ,homer is a poet2 but we cannot truly say1 ,homer is4#cf ,we see by this last remark1#cg how distinctly ,aristotle assigned a double meaning to est3 first1 per se1 as meaning existence2 next1 relatively1 as performing the function of copula in predication4 ,he tells us1 in reply either to ,plato or to some other contemporaries1 that though we may truly say1 ,non-,ens est opinabile1 we cannot truly say ,non-,ens est1 because the real meaning of the first of these propositions is1 9999,non-,ens est opinabile non esse4#ch ,footnote #ce3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ba1 a4 #g1 seq4 ,footnote #cf3 ,ibid4 a4 #bg4 ,footnote #cg3 ,compare ,schol4 7ad ,anal4 ,prior4 ,i47 p4 #adf1 a4 #ai-bg2 also ,eudemi ,fragment4 cxiv4 p4 #afg1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,eudemus considered ,greek3 e7_/stin as one term in the proposition4 ,alexander dissented from this1 and regarded it as being only a copula between the terms1 ,greek3 sunthe_/ses mnutikon mo_/rion tn e7n t prota_/sei o7_/rn4 ,footnote #ch3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ba1 a4 #cb2 compare ,rhetorica1 ii4 p4 #adjb1 a4 #e4 ,the remark of ,aristotle seems to bear upon the doctrine laid down by ,plato in the ,sophistes1 p4 #beh--the close of the long discussion which begins1 p4 #bcg1 about ,greek3 to m o7_/n1 as ,ammonius tells us in the ,scholia1 p4 #aab1 b4 #e1 p4 #abi1 b4 #bj1 ,br4 ,ammonius also alludes to the ,republic2 as if ,plato had delivered the same doctrine in both2 which is not the fact4 ,see ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxvii4 pp4 #ddg-deh1 seq4 ,aristotle now discusses the so-called ,modal ,propositions--the ,possible and the ,necessary4 ,what is the appropriate form of ,antiphasis in the case of such propositions1 where possible to be1 or necessary to be1 is joined to the simple is4 ,after a chapter of some length1 he declares that the form of ,antiphasis suitable for the ,simple proposition will not suit for a ,modal proposition2 and that in the latter the sign of negation must be annexed to the modal adjective--possible1 not possible1 c4 ,his reasoning here is not merely involved1 but substantially incorrect2 for1 in truth1 both in one and in the other1 the sign of contradictory negation ought to be annexed to the copula4#ci ,from the ,antiphasis in ,modals ,aristotle proceeds to legitimate sequences admissible in such propositions1 how far any one of them can be inferred from any other4#dj ,he sets out four tables1 each containing four modal determinations interchangeable with each other4 #a4 #a4 ,possible 7physically7 to be4 #b4 ,possible 7logically7 to be4 #c4 ,not impossible to be4 #d4 ,not necessary to be4 #b4 #a4 ,possible 7physically7 not to be4 #b4 ,possible 7logically7 not to be4 #c4 ,not impossible not to be4 #d4 ,not necessary not to be4 #c4 #a4 ,not possible 7physically7 to be4 #b4 ,not possible 7logically7 to be4 #c4 ,impossible to be4 #d4 ,necessary not to be4 #d4 #a4 ,not possible 7physically7 not to be4 #b4 ,not possible 7logically7 not to be4 #c4 ,impossible not to be4 #d4 ,necessary to be4 ,aristotle canvasses these tables at some length1 and amends them partly by making the fourth case of the second table change place with the fourth of the first4#da ,he then discusses whether we can correctly say that the necessary to be is also possible to be4 ,if not1 then we might say correctly that the necessary to be is not possible to be2 for one side or other of a legitimate ,antiphasis may always be truly affirmed4 ,yet this would be absurd3 accordingly we must admit that the necessary to be is also possible to be4 ,here1 however1 we fall seemingly into a different absurdity2 for the possible to be is also possible not to be2 and how can we allow that what is necessary to be is at the same time possible not to be8 ,to escape from such absurdities on both sides1 we must distinguish two modes of the ,possible3 one1 in which the affirmative and negative are alike possible2 the other in which the affirmative alone is possible1 because it is always and constantly realized4 ,if a man is actually walking1 we know that it is possible for him to walk2 and even when he is not walking1 we say the same1 because we believe that he may walk if he chooses4 ,he is not always walking2 and in his case1 as in all other intermittent realities1 the affirmative and the negative are alike possible4 ,but this is not true in the case of necessary1 constant1 and sempiternal realities4 ,with them there is no alternative possibility1 but only the possibility of their doing or continuing to do4 ,the celestial bodies revolve1 sempiternally and necessarily2 it is therefore possible for them to revolve2 but there is no alternative possibility2 it is not possible for them not to revolve4 ,perpetual reality thus includes the unilateral1 but not the bilateral1 possibility4#db ,footnote #ci3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #ba1 a4 #cd-p4 #bb1 a4 #ac4 ,see the note of ,waitz1 ad ,organ4 ,i4 p4 #cei1 who points out the error of ,aristotle1 partly indicated by ,ammonius in the ,scholia4 ,the rule does not hold in propositions with the sign of universality attached to the subject2 but it is at least the same for ,modals and ,non-modals4 ,footnote #dj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #bb1 a4 #ad-;b4 #bh4 ,footnote #da3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #bb1 b4 #bb1 ,greek3 lei_/petai toi_/nun c42 ,ammonius1 ,schol4 p4 #acc1 b4 #e-bg-cf4 ,aristotle also intimates 7p4 #bc1 a4 #ah7 that it would be better to reverse the order of the propositions in the tables1 and to place the ,necessary before the ,possible4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire has inserted 7in the note to his ,translation1 p4 #aig7 tables with this reversed order4 ,footnote #db3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #bb1 b4 #bi-p4 #bc1 a4 #ae4 ,having thus stated that possible to be1 in this unilateral and equivocal sense but in no other1 is a legitimate consequence of necessary to be1 ,aristotle proceeds to lay down a tripartite distinction which surprises us in this place4 ,it is plain from what has been said that that which is by ,necessity1 is in ,act or ,actuality2 so that if things sempiternal are prior1 ,actuality is prior to ,possibility4 ,some things1 like the first 7or celestial7 substances1 are ,actualities without ,possibility2 others 7the generated and perishable substances7 which are prior in nature but posterior in generation1 are ,actualities along with ,possibility2 while a third class are ,possibilities only1 and never come into ,actuality 7such as the largest number1 or the least magnitude74#dc ,footnote #dc3 ,ibid4 p4 #bc1 a4 #ba-bf4 ,now the sentence just translated 7enunciating a doctrine of ,aristotle's ,first ,philosophy rather than of ,logic7 appears decidedly to contradict what he had said three lines before1 viz41 that in one certain sense1 the necessary to be included and implied the possible to be2 that is1 a possibility or potentiality unilateral only1 not bilateral2 for we are here told that the celestial substance is ,actuality without ,possibility 7or ,potentiality71 so that the unilateral sense of this last term is disallowed4 ,on the other hand1 a third sense of the same term is recognized and distinguished2 a sense neither bilateral nor unilateral1 but the negation of both4 ,this third sense is hardly intelligible1 giving as it does an impossible ,possible2 it seems a self-contradictory description4#dd ,at best1 it can only be understood as a limit in the mathematical sense2 a terminus towards which potentiality may come constantly nearer and nearer1 but which it can never reach4 ,the first1 or bilateral potentiality1 is the only sense at once consistent1 legitimate1 and conformable to ordinary speech4 ,aristotle himself admits that the second and third are equivocal meanings1#de departing from the first as the legitimate meaning2 but if equivocal departure to so great an extent were allowed1 the term1 put to such multifarious service1 becomes unfit for accurate philosophical reasoning4 ,and we find this illustrated by the contradiction into which ,aristotle himself falls in the course of a few lines4 ,the sentence of ,first ,philosophy 7which ,i translated in the last page7 is a correction of the logical statement immediately preceding it1 in so far as it suppresses the necessary ,possible1 or the unilateral potentiality4 ,but on the other hand the same sentence introduces a new confusion by its third variety--the impossible ,potential1 departing from all clear and consistent meaning of potentiality1 and coinciding only with the explanation of ,non-,ens1 as given by ,aristotle elsewhere4#df ,footnote #dd3 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 in the note to his translation 7p4 #aig7 calls it justly--le possible qui n'est jamais2 et qui par cela mme1 porte en lui une sorte d'impossibilit4 ,it contradicts both the two explanations of ,greek3 dunaton which ,aristotle had given a few lines before4 #a4 ,greek3 dunaton o7_/ti e7nergei4 #b4 ,greek3 dunaton o7_/ti e7nerg_/seien a7_/n 7p4 #bc1 a4 #aj74 ,footnote #de3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #bc1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 touto men tou_/tou cha_/rin ei7_/rtai1 o7_/ti ou7 pasa du_/namis tn a7ntikeime_/nn1 ou7d' o7_/sai le_/gontai kata to au7to ei7dos4 e7_/niai de duna_/meis o7m_/numoi_/ ei7sin2 to gar dunaton ou7ch a7pls le_/getai1 a7lla to men o7_/ti a7lthes 7s e7nergei_/a o7_/n1 c4 ,if we read the thirteenth chapter of ,analytica ,priora ,i4 7p4 #cb1 a4 #ah-bi7 we shall see that ,greek3 to e7ndecho_/menon is declared to be ,greek3 ou7k a7nagkaion1 and that in the definition of ,greek3 to e7ndecho_/menon1 the words ,greek3 ou7 m o7_/ntos a7nagkai_/ou are expressly inserted4 ,when ,greek3 to a7nagkaion is said ,greek3 e7nde_/chesthai1 this is said only in an equivocal sense of ,greek3 e7nde_/chesthai--to gar a7nagkaion o7mnu_/ms e7nde_/chesthai le_/gomen4 ,on the meaning of ,greek3 to e7ndecho_/menon1 translated above1 in the table1 possible 7logically7 to be1 and its relation to ,greek3 to dunato_/n1 see ,waitz1 ad ,organ4 ,i4 pp4 #cge-h4 ,compare ,prantl4 ,gescht4 der ,logik1 ,i4 pp4 #aff-h4 ,footnote #df3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ba1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 to de m o7_/n1 o7_/ti doxasto_/n1 ou7k a7lthes ei7pein o7_/n ti2 do_/xa gar au7tou ou7k e7_/stin o7_/ti e7_/stin1 a7ll' o7_/ti ou7k e7_/stin4 ,to m o7_/n is the true description of that which ,aristotle improperly calls ,greek3 du_/namis 7 ou7de_/pote e7ne_/rgeia_/ e7stin4 ,the triple enumeration given by ,aristotle 7#a4 ,actuality without ,potentiality4 #b4 ,actuality with ,potentiality4 #c4 ,potentiality without ,actuality7 presents a neat symmetry which stands in the place of philosophical exactness4 ,the contrast of ,actual and ,potential stands so prominently forward in ,aristotle's ,first ,philosophy1 and is1 when correctly understood1 so valuable an element in ,first ,philosophy generally1 that we cannot be too careful against those misapplications of it into which he himself sometimes falls4 ,the sense of ,potentiality1 as including the alternative of either affirmative or negative--may be or may not be--is quite essential in comprehending the ontological theories of ,aristotle2 and when he professes to drop the may not be and leave only the may be1 this is not merely an equivocal sense of the word1 but an entire renunciation of its genuine sense4 ,in common parlance1 indeed1 we speak elliptically1 and say1 ,it may be1 when we really mean1 ,it may or may not be4 ,but the last or negative half1 though not expressly announced1 is always included in the thought and belief of the speaker and understood by the hearer4#dg ,footnote #dg3 ,see ,trendelenburg ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 pp4 #cjc-cjg4 ,many logicians1 and ,sir ,william ,hamilton very emphatically1 have considered the ,modality of propositions as improper to be included in the province of ,logic1 and have treated the proceeding of ,aristotle in thus including it1 as one among several cases in which he had transcended the legitimate boundaries of the science4#dh ,this criticism1 to which ,i cannot subscribe1 is founded upon one peculiar view of the proper definition and limits of ,logic4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton lays down the limitation peremptorily1 and he is warranted in doing this for himself2 but it is a question about which there has been great diversity of view among expositors1 and he has no right to blame others who enlarge it4 ,my purpose in the present volume is to explain how the subject presented itself to ,aristotle4 ,he was the first author that ever attempted to present ,logic in a scientific aspect2 and it is hardly fair to try him by restrictions emanating from critics much later4 ,yet1 if he is to be tried upon this point1 ,i think the latitude in which he indulges preferable to the restricted doctrine of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,footnote #dh3 ,see pp4 #adc-e of the article1 ,logic1 in ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,discussions on ,philosophy--a very learned and instructive article1 even for those who differ from most of its conclusions4 ,compare the opposite view1 as advocated by ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,logique d',aristote1 ,prface1 pp4 9999lxii4-lxviii4 ,in the treatise now before us 7,de ,interpretatione7 ,aristotle announces his intention to explain the ,proposition or ,enunciative ,speech1 the conjunction of a noun and a verb2 as distinguished1 first1 from its two constituents 7noun and verb7 separately taken2 next1 from other modes of speech1 also combining the two 7precative1 interrogative1 c474 ,all speech 7he says71 the noun or verb separately1 as well as the proposition conjointly1 is1 in the first instance1 a sign of certain mental states common to the speaker with his hearers2 and1 in the second instance1 a sign of certain things or facts1 resembling 7or correlating with7 these mental states4#di ,the noun1 pronounced separately1 and the verb1 pronounced separately1 are each signs of a certain thought in the speaker's mind1 without either truth or falsehood2 the ,proposition1 or conjunction of the two1 goes farther and declares truth or falsehood4 ,the words pronounced 7he says7 follow the thoughts in the mind1 expressing an opinion 7i4e4 belief or disbelief7 entertained in the mind2 the verbal affirmation or negation gives utterance to a mental affirmation or negation--a feeling of belief or disbelief--that something is1 or that something is not4#ej ,thus1 ,aristotle intends to give a theory of the ,proposition1 leaving other modes of speech to ,rhetoric or ,poetry3#ea the ,proposition he considers under two distinct aspects4 ,in its first or subjective aspect1 it declares the state of the speaker's mind1 as to belief or disbelief4 ,in its second or objective aspect1 it declares a truth or falsehood correlating with such belief or disbelief1 for the information of the hearer4 ,now the ,mode belonging to a proposition of this sort1 in virtue of its form1 is to be true or false4 ,but there are also other propositions--other varieties of speech enunciative--which differ from the ,simple or ,assertory ,proposition having the form is or is not1 and which have distinct modes belonging to them1 besides that of being true or false4 ,thus we have the ,necessary ,proposition1 declaring that a thing is so by necessity1 that it must be so1 or cannot but be so2 again1 the ,problematical ,proposition1 enunciating that a thing may or may not be so4 ,these two modes attach to the form of the proposition1 and are quite distinct from those which attach to its matter as simply affirmed or denied2 as when1 instead of saying1 ,john is sick1 we say1 ,john is sick of a fever1 ,john is dangerously sick1 with a merely material modification4 ,such adverbs1 modifying the matter affirmed or denied1 are numerous1 and may be diversified almost without limit4 ,but they are not to be placed in the same category with the two just mentioned1 which modify the form of the proposition1 and correspond to a state of mind distinct from simple belief or disbelief1 expressed by a simple affirmation or negation4#eb ,in the case of each of the two1 ,aristotle has laid down rules 7correct or incorrect7 for constructing the legitimate ,antiphasis1 and for determining other propositions equipollent to1 or following upon1 the propositions given2 rules distinct from those applying to the simple affirmation4 ,when we say of anything1 ,it may be or may not be1 we enunciate here only one proposition1 not two2 we declare a state of mind which is neither belief nor disbelief1 as in the case of the ,simple ,proposition1 but something wavering between the two2 yet which is nevertheless frequent1 familiar to every one1 and useful to be made known by a special form of proposition adapted to it--the ,problematical4 ,on the other hand1 when we say1 ,it is by necessity--must be--cannot but be--we declare our belief1 and something more besides2 we declare that the supposition of the opposite of what we believe1 would involve a contradiction--,i would contradict some definition or axiom to which we have already sworn adherence4 ,this again is a state of mind known1 distinguishable1 and the same in all1 subjectively2 though as to the objective correlate--what constitutes the ,necessary1 several different opinions have been entertained4 ,footnote #di3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #af1 a4 #c-h3 ,greek3 e7_/sti men ou7n ta e7n t phn tn e7n t psuch pathma_/tn su_/mbola--7n me_/ntoi tauta smeia pr_/ts1 tau7ta pasi path_/mata ts psuchs1 kai 7n tauta o7moi_/mata1 pra_/gmata 7_/d tau7ta_/4 ,ibid4 a4 #ac3 ,greek3 ta men ou7n o7no_/mata au7ta kai ta r7_/mata e7_/oike t a7_/neu sunthe_/ses kai diaire_/ses no_/mati--ou7_/te gar pseudos ou7_/t' a7lthe_/s p4 ,ib4 p4 #ag1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 lo_/gos a7pophantikos1 e7n 7 to a7ltheu_/ein 7 pseu_/desthai u7pa_/rchei4 ,compare p4 #bj1 a4 #cd4 ,footnote #ej3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #bc1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 ta men e7n t phn a7kolouthei tois e7n t dianoi_/a1 e7kei de e7nanti_/a do_/xa 7 tou e7nanti_/ou1 c4 ,ib4 p4 #bd1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 7_/ste ei7_/per e7pi do_/xs ou7_/ts e7_/chei1 ei7si de ai7 e7n t phn katapha_/seis kai a7popha_/seis su_/mbola tn e7n t psuch1 dlon o7_/ti kai katapha_/sei e7nanti_/a men a7po_/phasis 7_/ peri tou au7tou katho_/lou1 c4 ,ib4 p4 #ag1 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de 7 a7pl a7po_/phansis phn smantik peri tou u7pa_/rchein ti 7 m u7pa_/rchein1 c4 ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 p4 #ag1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 oi7 men ou7n a7_/lloi 7lo_/goi7 a7phei_/sthsan2 r7toriks gar 7 poitiks oi7keiote_/ra 7 ske_/psis2 o7 de a7pophantikos ts nun theri_/as4 ,footnote #eb3 ,ammonius 7in the ,scholia on ,de ,interpret4 p4 #acj1 a4 #af1 seq41 ,brand47 ranks all modal propositions under the same category1 and considers the number of them to be1 not indeed infinite1 but very great4 ,he gives as examples3 ,the moon changes fast2 ,plato loves ,dion vehemently4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton adopts the same view as ,ammonius3 ,modes may be conceived without end--all must be admitted1 if any are2 the line of distinction attempted to be drawn is futile4 7,discussions on ,phil4 ut sup4 p4 #ade47 ,on the other hand1 we learn from ,ammonius that most of the ,aristotelian interpreters preceding him reckoned the simple proposition ,greek3 to u7pa_/rchein as a modal2 and ,aristotle himself seems so to mention it 7,analytica ,priora1 ,i4 ii4 p4 #be1 a4 #a72 besides that he enumerates true and false1 which undoubtedly attach to ,greek3 to u7pa_/rchein1 as examples of modes 7,de ,interpret4 c4 #ab1 p4 #bb1 a4 #ac74 ,ammonius himself protests against this doctrine of the former interpreters4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7,system of ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 s4 #b7 says3--,a remark of a similar nature may be applied to most of those distinctions among propositions which are said to have reference to their modality2 as difference of tense or time2 the sun did rise1 is rising1 will rise4 4 4 4 ,the circumstance of time is properly considered as attaching to the copula1 which is the sign of predication1 and not to the predicate4 ,if the same cannot be said of such modifications as these1 ,csar is perhaps dead2 it is possible that ,csar is dead2 it is only because these fall together under another head2 being properly assertions not of anything relating to the fact itself1 but of the state of our own mind in regard to it2 namely1 our absence of disbelief of it4 ,thus1 ,csar may be dead1 means1 ,i am not sure that ,csar is alive4 ,i do not know whether ,mr4 ,mill means that the function of the copula is different in these problematical propositions1 from what it is in the categorical propositions3 ,i think there is no difference4 ,but his remark that the problematical proposition is an assertion of the state of our minds in regard to the fact1 appears to me perfectly just4 ,only1 we ought to add1 that this is equally true about the categorical proposition4 ,it is equally true about all the three following propositions3--#a4 ,the three angles of a triangle may or may not be equal to two right angles4 #b4 ,the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 #c4 ,the three angles of a triangle are necessarily equal to two right angles4 ,in each of these three propositions1 an assertion of the state of our minds is involved1 and a different state of mind in each4 ,this is the subjective aspect of the proposition2 it belongs to the form rather than to the matter1 and may be considered as a mode4 ,the commentators preceding ,ammonius did so consider it1 and said that the categorical proposition had its mode as well as the others4 ,ammonius differed from them1 treating the categorical as having no mode--as the standard unit or point of departure4 ,the propositions now known as ,hypothetical and ,disjunctive1 which may also be regarded as in a certain sense ,modals1 are not expressly considered by ,aristotle4 ,in the ,anal4 ,prior4 ,i4 xliv4 p4 #ej a4 #af-ch1 he adverts to hypothetical syllogisms1 and intimates his intention of discussing them more at length3 but this intention has not been executed1 in the works that we possess4 ,in every complete theory of enunciative speech1 these modal propositions deserve to be separately explained1 both in their substantive meaning and in their relation to other propositions4 ,their characteristic property as ,modals belongs to form rather than to matter2 and ,aristotle ought not to be considered as unphilosophical for introducing them into the ,organon1 even if we adopt the restricted view of ,logic taken by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 that it takes no cognizance of the matter of propositions1 but only of their form4 ,but though ,i dissent from ,hamilton's criticisms on this point1 ,i do not concur with the opposing critics who think that ,aristotle has handled the ,modal ,propositions in a satisfactory manner4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think that the equivocal sense which he assigns to the ,potential or ,possible1 and his inconsistency in sometimes admitting1 sometimes denying1 a ,potential that is always actual1 and a ,potential that is never actual--are serious impediments to any consistent ,logic4 ,the ,problematical ,proposition does not admit of being cut in half2 and if we are to recognize a necessary ,possible1 or an impossible ,possible1 we ought to find different phrases by which to designate them4 ,we must observe that the distinction of ,problematical and ,necessary ,propositions corresponds1 in the mind of ,aristotle1 to that capital and characteristic doctrine of his ,ontology and ,physics1 already touched on in this chapter4 ,he thought1 as we have seen1 that in the vast circumferential region of the ,kosmos1 from the outer sidereal sphere down to the lunar sphere1 celestial substance was a necessary existence and energy1 sempiternal and uniform in its rotations and influence2 and that through its beneficent influence1 pervading the concavity between the lunar sphere and the terrestrial centre 7which included the four elements with their compounds7 there prevailed a regularizing tendency called ,nature3 modified1 however1 and partly counteracted by independent and irregular forces called ,spontaneity and ,chance1 essentially unknowable and unpredictable4 ,the irregular sequences thus named by ,aristotle were the objective correlate of the ,problematical ,proposition in ,logic4 ,in these sublunary sequences1 as to future time1 may or may not was all that could be attained1 even by the highest knowledge2 certainty1 either of affirmation or negation1 was out of the question4 ,on the other hand1 the necessary and uniform energies of the celestial substance1 formed the objective correlate of the ,necessary ,proposition in ,logic2 this substance was not merely an existence1 but an existence necessary and unchangeable4 ,i shall say more on this when ,i come to treat of ,aristotle as a kosmical and physical philosopher2 at present it is enough to remark that he considers the ,problematical ,proposition in ,logic to be not purely subjective1 as an expression of the speaker's ignorance1 but something more1 namely1 to correlate with an objective essentially unknowable to all4 ,the last paragraph of the treatise ,de ,interpretatione discusses the question of ,contraries and ,contradictories1 and makes out that the greatest breadth of opposition is that between a proposition and its contradictory 7,kallias is just--,kallias is not just71 not that between1 a proposition and what is called its contrary 7,kallias is just--,kallias is unjust72 therefore1 that according to the definition of contrary1 the true contrary of a proposition is its contradictory4#ec ,this paragraph is not connected with that which precedes2 moreover1 both the reasoning and the conclusion differ from what we read as well in this treatise as in other portions of ,aristotle4 ,accordingly1 ,ammonius in the ,scholia1 while informing us that ,porphyry had declined to include it in his commentary1 intimates also his own belief that it is not genuine1 but the work of another hand4 ,at best 7,ammonius thinks71 if we must consider it as the work of ,aristotle1 it has been composed by him only as a dialectical exercise1 to debate an unsettled question4#ed ,i think the latter hypothesis not improbable4 ,the paragraph has certainly reference to discussions which we do not know1 and it may have been composed when ,aristotle had not fully made up his mind on the distinction between ,contrary and ,contradictory4 ,considering the difficult problems that he undertook to solve1 we may be sure that he must have written down several trains of thought merely preliminary and tentative4 ,moreover1 we know that he had composed a distinct treatise ',de ,oppositis1'#ee which is unfortunately lost1 but in which he must have included this very topic--the distinction between ,contrary and ,contradictory4 ,footnote #ec3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #bc1 a4 #bg1 seq4 ,footnote #ed3 ,scholia ad ,arist4 pp4 #ace-aci1 ,br4 ,greek3 gumna_/sai mo_/non boulthe_/ntos tous e7ntugcha_/nontas pros tn e7pi_/krisin tn pithans men ou7 me_/ntoi a7lths legome_/nn lo_/gn c4 7p4 #ace1 b4 #ae2 also p4 #acf1 a4 #db74 ,footnote #ee3 ,scholia ad ,categorias1 p4 #hc1 a4 #ag-ai1 b4 #aj1 p4 #hd1 a4 #bi1 p4 #hf1 b4 #db1 p4 #hh1 a4 #cj4 ,it seems much referred to by ,simplikius1 who tells us that the ,stoics adopted most of its principles 7p4 #hc1 a4 #ba1 b4 #g74 ,whatever may have been the real origin and purpose of this last paragraph1 ,i think it unsuitable as a portion of the treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,it nullifies1 or at least overclouds1 one of the best parts of that treatise1 the clear determination of ,anaphasis and its consequences4 ,if1 now1 we compare the theory of the ,proposition as given by ,aristotle in this treatise1 with that which we read in the ,sophistes of ,plato1 we shall find ,plato already conceiving the proposition as composed indispensably of noun and verb1 and as being either affirmative or negative1 for both of which he indicates the technical terms4#ef ,he has no technical term for either subject or predicate2 but he conceives the proposition as belonging to its subject3#eg we may be mistaken in the predicates1 but we are not mistaken in the subject4 ,aristotle enlarges and improves upon this theory4 ,he not only has a technical term for affirmation and negation1 and for negative noun and verb1 but also for subject and predicate2 again1 for the mode of signification belonging to noun and verb1 each separately1 as distinguished from the mode of signification belonging to them conjointly1 when brought together in a proposition4 ,he follows ,plato in insisting upon the characteristic feature of the proposition--aptitude for being true or false2 but he gives an ampler definition of it1 and he introduces the novel and important distribution of propositions according to the quantity of the subject4 ,until this last distribution had been made1 it was impossible to appreciate the true value and bearing of each ,antiphasis and the correct language for expressing it1 so as to say neither more nor less4 ,we see1 by reading the ,sophistes1 that ,plato did not conceive the ,antiphasis correctly1 as distinguished from ,contrariety on the one hand1 and from mere ,difference on the other4 ,he saw that the negative of any proposition does not affirm the contrary of its affirmative2 but he knew no other alternative except to say1 that it affirms only something different from the affirmative4 ,his theory in the ,sophistes recognizes nothing but affirmative propositions1 with the predicate of contrariety on one hand1 or of difference on the other2#eh he ignores1 or jumps over1 the intermediate station of propositions affirming nothing at all1 but simply denying a pre-understood affirmative4 ,there were other contemporaries1 ,antisthenes among them1 who declared contradiction to be an impossibility2#ei an opinion coinciding at bottom with what ,i have just cited from ,plato himself4 ,we see1 in the ,thettus1 the ,euthydmus1 the ,sophistes1 and elsewhere1 how great was the difficulty felt by philosophers of that age to find a proper locus standi for false propositions1 so as to prove them theoretically possible1 to assign a legitimate function for the negative1 and to escape from the interdict of ,parmenides1 who eliminated ,non-,ens as unmeaning and incogitable4 ,even after the death of ,aristotle1 the acute disputation of ,stilpon suggested many problems1 but yielded few solutions2 and ,menedmus went so far as to disallow negative propositions altogether4#fj ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 pp4 #bfa-bfb4 ,greek3 pha_/sin kai a7po_/phasin4--ib4 p4 #bfc ,e4 ,in the so-called ,platonic ',definitions1' we read ,greek3 e7n katapha_/sei kai a7popha_/sei 7p4 #dac ,c72 but these are probably after ,aristotle's time4 ,in another of these ,definitions 7#dac ,d47 we read ,greek3 a7po_/phasis1 where the word ought to be ,greek3 a7po_/phansis4 ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,sophist4 p4 #bfc ,a-,c4 ,footnote #eh3 ,ibid4 p4 #beg1 ,b3 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7r'1 e7nanti_/on o7_/tan a7po_/phasis le_/gtai smai_/nein1 sugchrso_/metha1 tosouton de mo_/non1 o7_/ti tn a7_/lln ti mnu_/ei to m kai to ou7_/ protithe_/mena tn e7pio_/ntn o7noma_/tn1 mallon de tn pragma_/tn1 peri a7_/tt' a7n ke_/tai ta e7piphtheggo_/mena u7_/steron ts a7popha_/ses o7no_/mata4 ,the term ,greek3 a7nti_/phasis1 and its derivative ,greek3 a7ntiphatiks1 are not recognized in the ,platonic ,lexicon4 ,compare the same dialogue1 ,sophistes1 p4 #bfc2 also ,euthydmus1 p4 #bih1 ,a4 ,plato does not seem to take account of negative propositions as such4 ,see ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxvii4 pp4 #ddf-dee4 ,footnote #ei3 ,aristot4 ,topica1 ,i4 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #bj2 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbd1 b4 #cb2 ,analytic4 ,poster4 ,i4 xxv4 p4 #hf1 b4 #cd4 ,footnote #fj3 ,diogon4 ,laert4 ii4 #acd-ace4 ,see the long discussion in the ,platonic ,thettus 7pp4 #ahg-aif71 in which ,sokrates in vain endeavours to produce some theory whereby ,greek3 pseuds do_/xa may be rendered possible4 ,hobbes1 also1 in his ,computation or ,logic 7,de ,corp4 c4 iii4 #f71 followed by ,destutt ,tracy1 disallows the negative proposition per se1 and treats it as a clumsy disguise of the affirmative ,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses1 to use the phrase of ,theophrastus4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill has justly criticized this part of ,hobbes's theory 7,system of ,logic1 ,book ,i4 ch4 iv4 #b74 ,such being the conditions under which philosophers debated in the age of ,aristotle1 we can appreciate the full value of a positive theory of propositions such as that which we read in his treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,it is1 so far as we know1 the first positive theory thereof that was ever set out2 the first attempt to classify propositions in such a manner that a legitimate ,antiphasis could be assigned to each2 the first declaration that to each affirmative proposition there belonged one appropriate negative1 and to each negative proposition one appropriate counter-affirmative1 and one only2 the earliest effort to construct a theory for this purpose1 such as to hold ground against all the puzzling questions of acute disputants4#fa ,the clear determination of the ,antiphasis in each case--the distinction of ,contradictory antithesis from ,contrary antithesis between propositions--this was an important logical doctrine never advanced before ,aristotle2 and the importance of it becomes manifest when we read the arguments of ,plato and ,antisthenes1 the former overleaping and ignoring the contradictory opposition1 the latter maintaining that it was a process theoretically indefensible4 ,but in order that these two modes of antithesis should be clearly contrasted1 each with its proper characteristic1 it was requisite that the distinction of quantity between different propositions should also be brought to view1 and considered in conjunction with the distinction of quality4 ,until this was done1 the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 denied by some1 could not be shown in its true force or with its proper limits4 ,now1 we find it done1#fb for the first time1 in the treatise before us4 ,here the ,contradictory antithesis 7opposition both in quantity and quality7 in which one proposition must be true and the other false1 is contrasted with the ,contrary 7propositions opposite in quality1 but both of them universal74 ,aristotle's terminology is not in all respects fully developed2 in regard1 especially1 to the quantity of propositions it is less advanced than in his own later treatises2 but from the theory of the ,de ,interpretatione all the distinctions current among later logicians1 take their rise4 ,footnote #fa3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 p4 #ag1 a4 #cf3 ,greek3 pros tas sophistikas e7nochl_/seis4 ,footnote #fb3 ,we see1 from the argument in the ,metaphysica of ,aristotle1 that there were persons in his day who denied or refused to admit the ,maxim of ,contradiction2 and who held that contradictory propositions might both be true or both false 7,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajjf1 a4 #a2 p4 #ajji1 a4 #bd74 ,he employs several pages in confuting them4 ,see the ,antinomies in the ,platonic ,parmenides 7pp4 #aed-aee71 some of which destroy or set aside the ,maxim of ,contradiction 7',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxv4 p4 #cjf74 ,the distinction of ,contradictory and ,contrary is fundamental in ratiocinative ,logic1 and lies at the bottom of the syllogistic theory as delivered in the ,analytica ,priora4 ,the precision with which ,aristotle designates the ,universal proposition with its exact contradictory antithesis1 is remarkable in his day4 ,some1 however1 of his observations respecting the place and functions of the negative particle 7,greek3 ou771 must be understood with reference to the variable order of words in a ,greek or ,latin sentence2 for instance1 the distinction between ,kallias non est justus and ,kallias est non justus does not suggest itself to one speaking ,english or ,french4#fc ,moreover1 the ,aristotelian theory of the ,proposition is encumbered with various unnecessary subtleties2 and the introduction of the ,modals 7though they belong1 in my opinion1 legitimately to a complete logical theory7 renders the doctrine so intricate and complicated1 that a judicious teacher will prefer1 in explaining the subject1 to leave them for second or ulterior study1 when the simpler relations between categorical propositions have been made evident and familiar4 ,the force of this remark will be felt more when we go through the ,analytica ,priora4 ,the two principal relations to be considered in the theory of ,propositions--,opposition and ,equipollence--would have come out far more clearly in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 if the discussion of the ,modals had been reserved for a separate chapter4 ,footnote #fc3 ,the diagram or parallelogram of logical antithesis1 which is said to have begun with ,apuleius1 and to have been transmitted through ,boethius and the ,schoolmen to modern times 7,ueberweg1 ,system der ,logik1 sect4 #gb1 p4 #agd7 is as follows3-- ,a4 ,omnis homo est justus4 --- ,e4 ,nullus homo est justus4 ,x ,i4 ,aliquis homo est justus4 --- ,o4 ,aliquis homo non est justus4 ,but the parallelogram set out by ,aristotle in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 or at least in the ,analytica ,priora1 is different1 and intended for a different purpose4 ,he puts it thus3-- #a4 ,omnis homo est justus 4 4 4 4 4 #b4 ,non omnis homo est justus4 #d4 ,non omnis homo est non justus 4 #c4 ,omnis homo est non justus4 ,here ,proposition 7#a7 is an affirmative1 of which 7#b7 is the direct and appropriate negative3 also ,proposition 7#c7 is an affirmative 7,aristotle so considers it71 of which 7#d7 is the direct and appropriate negative4 ,the great aim of ,aristotle is to mark out clearly what is the appropriate negative or ,greek3 ,a7po_/phasis to each ,greek3 ,kata_/phasis 7mi_/a a7po_/phasis mias katapha_/ses1 p4 #ag1 b4 #ch71 making up together the pair which he calls ,greek3 ,a7nti_/phasis1 standing in ,contradictory ,opposition2 and to distinguish this appropriate negative from another proposition which comprises the particle of negation1 but which is really a new affirmative4 ,the true negatives of homo est justus--,omnis homo est justus are1 ,homo non est justus--,non omnis homo est justus4 ,if you say1 ,homo est non justus--,omnis homo est non justus1 these are not negative propositions1 but new affirmatives 7,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses in the language of ,theophrastus74 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,analytica ,,priora ,i4 ,reviewing the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 we have followed ,aristotle in his first attempt to define what a ,proposition is1 to point out its constituent elements1 and to specify some of its leading varieties4 ,the characteristic feature of the ,proposition he stated to be--,that it declares1 in the first instance1 the mental state of the speaker as to belief or disbelief1 and1 in its ulterior or final bearing1 a state of facts to which such belief or disbelief corresponds4 ,it is thus significant of truth or falsehood2 and this is its logical character 7belonging to ,analytic and ,dialectic71 as distinguished from its rhetorical character1 with other aspects besides4 ,aristotle farther indicated the two principal discriminative attributes of propositions as logically regarded1 passing under the names of quantity and quality4 ,he took great pains1 in regard to the quality1 to explain what was the special negative proposition in true contradictory antithesis to each affirmative4 ,he stated and enforced the important separation of contradictory propositions from contrary2 and he even parted off 7which the ,greek and ,latin languages admit1 though the ,french and ,english will hardly do so7 the true negative from the indeterminate affirmative4 ,he touched also upon equipollent propositions1 though he did not go far into them4 ,thus commenced with ,aristotle the systematic study of propositions1 classified according to their meaning and their various interdependences with each other as to truth and falsehood--their mutual consistency or incompatibility4 ,men who had long been talking good ,greek fluently and familiarly1 were taught to reflect upon the conjunctions of words that they habitually employed1 and to pay heed to the conditions of correct speech in reference to its primary purpose of affirmation and denial1 for the interchange of beliefs and disbeliefs1 the communication of truth1 and the rectification of falsehood4 ,to many of ,aristotle's contemporaries this first attempt to theorize upon the forms of locution familiar to every one would probably appear hardly less strange than the interrogative dialectic of ,sokrates1 when he declared himself not to know what was meant by justice1 virtue1 piety1 temperance1 government1 c42 when he astonished his hearers by asking them to rescue him from this state of ignorance1 and to communicate to him some portion of their supposed plenitude of knowledge4 ,aristotle tells us expressly that the theory of the ,syllogism1 both demonstrative and dialectic1 on which we are now about to enter1 was his own work altogether and from the beginning2 that no one had ever attempted it before2 that he therefore found no basis to work upon1 but was obliged to elaborate his own theory1 from the very rudiments1 by long and laborious application4 ,in this point of view1 he contrasts ,logic pointedly with ,rhetoric1 on which there had been a series of writers and teachers1 each profiting by the labours of his predecessors4#a ,there is no reason to contest the claim to originality here advanced by ,aristotle4 ,he was the first who endeavoured1 by careful study and multiplied comparison of propositions1 to elicit general truths respecting their ratiocinative interdependence1 and to found thereupon precepts for regulating the conduct of demonstration and dialectic4#b ,footnote #a3 ,see the remarkable passage at the close of the ,sophistici ,elenchi1 p4 #ahc1 b4 #cd-p4 #ahd1 b4 #i3 ,greek3 tau_/ts de ts pragmatei_/as ou7 to men 7n to de ou7k 7n proexeirgasme_/non1 a7ll' ou7den pantels u7prche--kai peri men tn r7torikn u7prche polla kai palaia ta lego_/mena1 peri de tou sullogi_/zesthai pantels ou7den ei7_/chomen pro_/teron a7_/llo le_/gein1 a7ll' 7 trib ztountes polun chro_/non e7ponoumen4 ,footnote #b3 ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton1 ,lectures on ,logic1 ,lect4 v4 pp4 #hg-ia1 vol4 ,,iii43--,the principles of ,contradiction and ,excluded ,middle can both be traced back to ,plato1 by whom they were enounced and frequently applied2 though it was not till long after1 that either of them obtained a distinctive appellation4 ,to take the principle of ,contradiction first4 ,this law ,plato frequently employs1 but the most remarkable passages are found in the ,phdo 7p4 #ajc71 in the ,sophista 7p4 #beb71 and in the ,republic 7iv4 #dcf1 vii4 #ebe74 ,this law was however more distinctively and emphatically enounced by ,aristotle4 4 4 4 4 ,following ,aristotle1 the ,peripatetics established this law as the highest principle of knowledge4 ,from the ,greek ,aristotelians it obtained the name by which it has subsequently been denominated1 the principle1 or law1 or axiom1 of ,contradiction 7,greek3 a7xi_/ma ts a7ntipha_/ses74 4 4 4 4 ,the law of ,excluded ,middle between two contradictories remounts1 as ,i have said1 also to ,plato2 though the ,second ,alcibiades1 in which it is most clearly expressed 7p4 #aci2 also ,sophista1 p4 #bej71 must be admitted to be spurious4 4 4 4 4 ,this law1 though universally recognized as a principle in the ,greek ,peripatetic school1 and in the schools of the middle ages1 only received the distinctive appellation by which it is now known at a comparatively modern date4 ,the passages of ,plato1 to which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton here refers1 will not be found to bear out his assertion that ,plato enounced and frequently applied the principles of ,contradiction and ,excluded ,middle4 ,these two principles are both of them enunciated1 denominated1 and distinctly explained by ,aristotle1 but by no one before him1 as far as our knowledge extends4 ,the conception of the two maxims1 in their generality1 depends upon the clear distinction between ,contradictory ,opposition and ,contrary ,opposition2 which is fully brought out by ,aristotle1 but not adverted to1 or at least never broadly and generally set forth1 by ,plato4 ,indeed it is remarkable that the word ,greek3 ,a7nti_/phasis1 the technical term for ,contradiction1 never occurs in ,plato2 at least it is not recognized in the ,lexicon ,platonicum4 ,aristotle puts it in the foreground of his logical exposition2 for1 without it1 he could not have explained what he meant by ,contradictory ,opposition4 ,see ,categori1 pp4 #ac-ad1 and elsewhere in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione and in the ,metaphysica4 ,respecting the idea of the ,negative as put forth by ,plato in the ,sophistes 7not coinciding either with ,contradictory ,opposition or with ,contrary ,opposition71 see ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxvii4 pp4 #ddi-dei4 ,i have remarked in that chapter1 and the reader ought to recollect1 that the philosophical views set out by ,plato in the ,sophistes differ on many points from what we read in other ,platonic dialogues4 ,he begins the ,analytica ,priora by setting forth his general purpose1 and defining his principal terms and phrases4 ,his manner is one of geometrical plainness and strictness4 ,it may perhaps have been common to him with various contemporary geometers1 whose works are now lost2 but it presents an entire novelty in ,grecian philosophy and literature4 ,it departed not merely from the manner of the rhetoricians and the physical philosophers 7as far as we know them1 not excluding even ,demokritus71 but also from ,sokrates and the ,sokratic school4 ,for though ,sokrates and ,plato were perpetually calling for definitions1 and did much to make others feel the want of such1 they neither of them evinced aptitude or readiness to supply the want4 ,the new manner of ,aristotle is adapted to an undertaking which he himself describes as original1 in which he has no predecessors1 and is compelled to dig his own foundations4 ,it is essentially didactic and expository1 and contrasts strikingly with the mixture of dramatic liveliness and dialectical subtlety which we find in ,plato4 ,the terminology of ,aristotle in the ,analytica is to a certain extent different from that in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione4 ,the ,enunciation 7,greek3 ,a7po_/phanis7 appears under the new name of ,greek3 ,pro_/tasis1 ,proposition 7in the literal sense7 or ,premiss2 while1 instead of ,noun and ,verb1 we have the word ,term 7,greek3 ,o7_/ros71 applied alike both to ,subject and to ,predicate4#c ,we pass now from the region of declared truth1 into that of inferential or reasoned truth4 ,we find the proposition looked at1 not merely as communicating truth in itself1 but as generating and helping to guarantee certain ulterior propositions1 which communicate something additional or different4 ,the primary purpose of the ,analytica is announced to be1 to treat of ,demonstration and demonstrative ,science2 but the secondary purpose1 running parallel with it and serving as illustrative counterpart1 is1 to treat also of ,dialectic2 both of them#d being applications of the inferential or ratiocinative process1 the theory of which ,aristotle intends to unfold4 ,footnote #c3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 i4 p4 #bd1 b4 #af3 ,greek3 o7_/ron de kal ei7s o7n dialu_/etai 7 pro_/tasis1 oi7on to_/ te katgorou_/menon kai to kath' ou7 katgoreitai1 c4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ros--,terminus--seems to have been a technical word first employed by ,aristotle himself to designate subject and predicate as the extremes of a proposition1 which latter he conceives as the interval between the termini--,greek3 dia_/stma4 7,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #ce1 a4 #ab4 ,greek3 stertikn diastma_/tn1 c4 ,see ,alexander1 ,schol4 pp4 #ade-adf47 ,in the ,topica ,aristotle employs ,greek3 o7_/ros in a very different sense--,greek3 lo_/gos o7 to ti_/ 7n ei7nai smai_/nn 7,topic4 ,i4 v4 p4 #aja1 b4 #ci7--;hardly distinguished from ,greek3 o7rismo_/s4 ,the ,scholia take little notice of this remarkable variation of meaning1 as between two treatises of the ,organon so intimately connected 7pp4 #bef-beg1 ,br474 ,footnote #d3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 i4 p4 #bd1 a4 #be4 ,the three treatises--#a1 ,analytica ,priora1 #b1 ,analytica ,posteriora1 #c1 ,topica with ,sophistici ,elenchi--thus belong all to one general scheme2 to the theory of the ,syllogism1 with its distinct applications1 first1 to demonstrative or didactic science1 and1 next1 to dialectical debate4 ,the scheme is plainly announced at the commencement of the ,analytica ,priora2 which treatise discusses the ,syllogism generally1 while the ,analytica ,posteriora deals with ,demonstration1 and the ,topica with ,dialectic4 ,the first chapter of the ,analytica ,priora and the last chapter of the ,sophistici ,elenchi 7closing the ,topica71 form a preface and a conclusion to the whole4 ,the exposition of the ,syllogism1 ,aristotle distinctly announces1 precedes that of ,demonstration 7and for the same reason also precedes that of ,dialectic71 because it is more general3 every demonstration is a sort of syllogism1 but every syllogism is not a demonstration4#e ,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #be1 b4 #cj4 ,as a foundation for the syllogistic theory1 propositions are classified according to their quantity 7more formally than in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione7 into ,universal1 ,particular1 and ,indefinite or ,indeterminate2#f ,aristotle does not recognize the ,singular ,proposition as a distinct variety4 ,in regard to the ,universal ,proposition1 he introduces a different phraseology according as it is looked at from the side of the ,subject1 or from that of the ,predicate4 ,the ,subject is1 or is not1 in the whole ,predicate2 the ,predicate is affirmed or denied respecting all or every one of the ,subject4#g ,the minor term of the ,syllogism 7in the first mode of the first figure7 is declared to be in the whole middle term2 the major is declared to belong to1 or to be predicable of1 all and every the middle term4 ,aristotle says that the two are the same2 we ought rather to say that each is the concomitant and correlate of the other1 though his phraseology is such as to obscure the correlation4 ,footnote #f3 ,ibid4 ,i4 i4 p4 #bd1 a4 #ag4 ,the ,particular 7,greek3 e7n me_/rei71 here for the first time expressly distinguished by ,aristotle1 is thus defined3--,greek3 e7n me_/rei de to tini 7 m tini 7 m panti u7pa_/rchein4 ,footnote #g3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 to d' e7n o7_/l ei7nai e7_/teron e7te_/r1 kai to kata pantos katgoreisthai thate_/rou tha_/teron1 tau7to_/n e7sti--tau7ton1 i4e4 ,greek3 a7ntestramme_/ns1 as ,waitz remarks in note4 ,julius ,pacius says3--,idem re1 sed ratione differunt ut ascensus et descensus2 nam subjectum dicitur esse vel non esse in toto attributo1 quia attributum dicitur de omni vel de nullo subjecto 7p4 #abh74 ,the definition given of a ,syllogism is very clear and remarkable3--,it is a speech in which1 some positions having been laid down1 something different from these positions follows as a necessary consequence from their being laid down4 ,in a perfect ,syllogism nothing additional is required to make the necessity of the consequence obvious as well as complete4 ,but there are also imperfect ,syllogisms1 in which such necessity1 though equally complete1 is not so obviously conveyed in the premisses1 but requires some change to be effected in the position of the terms in order to render it conspicuous4#h ,footnote #h3 ,aristot4 ,anal4 ,prior4 ,i4 i4 p4 #bd1 b4 #ah-bf4 ,the same1 with a little difference of wording1 at the commencement of ,topica1 p4 #ajj1 a4 #be4 ,compare also ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 x4 p4 #gf1 b4 #ch3 ,greek3 o7_/sn o7_/ntn t e7keina ei7nai gi_/netai to sumpe_/rasma4 ,the term ,syllogism has acquired1 through the influence of ,aristotle1 a meaning so definite and technical1 that we do not easily conceive it in any other meaning4 ,but in ,plato and other contemporaries it bears a much wider sense1 being equivalent to reasoning generally1 to the process of comparison1 abstraction1 generalization4#i ,it was ,aristotle who consecrated the word1 so as to mean exclusively the reasoning embodied in propositions of definite form and number4 ,having already analysed propositions separately taken1 and discriminated them into various classes according to their constituent elements1 he now proceeds to consider propositions in combination4 ,two propositions1 if properly framed1 will conduct to a third1 different from themselves1 but which will be necessarily true if they are true4 ,aristotle calls the three together a ,syllogism4#aj ,he undertakes to shew how it must be framed in order that its conclusion shall be necessarily true1 if the premisses are true4 ,he furnishes schemes whereby the cast and arrangement of premisses1 proper for attaining truth1 may be recognized2 together with the nature of the conclusion1 warrantable under each arrangement4 ,footnote #i3 ,see especially ,plato1 ,thett4 p4 #ahf1 ,b-,d41 where ,greek3 o7 sullogismos and ,greek3 ta a7nalogi_/smata are equivalents4 ,footnote #aj3 ,julius ,pacius 7ad ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 i47 says that it is a mistake on the part of most logicians to treat the ,syllogism as including three propositions 7ut vulgus logicorum putat74 ,he considers the premisses alone as constituting the ,syllogism2 the conclusion is not a part thereof1 but something distinct and superadded4 ,it appears to me that the vulgus logicorum are here in the right4 ,in the ,analytica ,priora1 we find ourselves involved1 from and after the second chapter1 in the distinction of ,modal propositions1 the necessary and the possible4 ,the rules respecting the simple ,assertory propositions are thus1 even from the beginning1 given in conjunction and contrast with those respecting the ,modals4 ,this is one among many causes of the difficulty and obscurity with which the treatise is beset4 ,theophrastus and ,eudemus seem also to have followed their master by giving prominence to the ,modals3#aa recent expositors avoid the difficulty1 some by omitting them altogether1 others by deferring them until the simple assertory propositions have been first made clear4 ,i shall follow the example of these last2 but it deserves to be kept in mind1 as illustrating ,aristotle's point of view1 that he regards the ,modals as principal varieties of the proposition1 co-ordinate in logical position with the simple assertory4 ,footnote #aa3 ,eudemi ,fragmenta1 cii4-ciii4 p4 #ade1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,before entering on combinations of propositions1 ,aristotle begins by shewing what can be done with single propositions1 in view to the investigation or proving of truth4 ,a single proposition may be converted2 that is1 its subject and predicate may be made to change places4 ,if a proposition be true1 will it be true when thus converted1 or 7in other words7 will its converse be true8 ,if false1 will its converse be false8 ,if this be not always the case1 what are the conditions and limits under which 7assuming the proposition to be true7 the process of conversion leads to assured truth1 in each variety of propositions1 affirmative or negative1 universal or particular8 ,as far as we know1 ,aristotle was the first person that ever put to himself this question2 though the answer to it is indispensable to any theory of the process of proving or disproving4 ,he answers it before he enters upon the ,syllogism4 ,the rules which he lays down on the subject have passed into all logical treatises4 ,they are now familiar2 and readers are apt to fancy that there never was any novelty in them--that every one knows them without being told4 ,such fancy would be illusory4 ,these rules are very far from being self-evident1 any more than the maxims of ,contradiction and of the ,excluded ,middle4 ,not one of the rules could have been laid down with its proper limits1 until the discrimination of propositions1 both as to quality 7affirmative or negative71 and as to quantity 7universal or particular71 had been put prominently forward and appreciated in all its bearings4 ,the rule for trustworthy conversion is different for each variety of propositions4 ,the ,universal ,negative may be converted simply2 that is1 the predicate may become subject1 and the subject may become predicate--the proposition being true after conversion1 if it was true before4 ,but the ,universal ,affirmative cannot be thus converted simply4 ,it admits of conversion only in the manner called by logicians per accidens3 if the predicate change places with the subject1 we cannot be sure that the proposition thus changed will be true1 unless the new subject be lowered in quantity from universal to particular2 e4g4 the proposition1 ,all men are animals1 has for its legitimate converse not1 ,all animals are men1 but only1 ,some animals are men4 ,the ,particular ,affirmative may be converted simply3 if it be true that ,some animals are men1 it will also be true that ,some men are animals4 ,but1 lastly1 if the true proposition to be converted be a ,particular ,negative1 it cannot be converted at all1 so as to make sure that the converse will be true also4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #be1 a4 #a-bf4 ,here then are four separate rules laid down1 one for each variety of propositions4 ,the rules for the second and third variety are proved by the rule for the first 7the ,universal ,negative71 which is thus the basis of all4 ,but how does ,aristotle prove the rule for the ,universal ,negative itself8 ,he proceeds as follows3 ,if ,a cannot be predicated of any one among the ,b's1 neither can ,b be predicated of any one among the ,a's4 ,for if it could be predicated of any one among them 7say ,c71 the proposition that ,a cannot be predicated of any ,b would not be true2 since ,c is one among the ,b's4#ac ,here we have a proof given which is no proof at all4 ,if ,i disbelieved or doubted the proposition to be proved1 ,i should equally disbelieve or doubt the proposition given to prove it4 ,the proof only becomes valid1 when you add a farther assumption which ,aristotle has not distinctly enunciated1 viz43 ,that if some ,a 7e4g4 ,c7 is ,b1 then some ,b must also be ,a2 which would be contrary to the fundamental supposition4 ,but this farther assumption cannot be granted here1 because it would imply that we already know the rule respecting the convertibility of ,particular ,affirmatives1 viz41 that they admit of being converted simply4 ,now the rule about ,particular ,affirmatives is afterwards itself proved by help of the preceding demonstration respecting the ,universal ,negative4 ,as the proof stands1 therefore1 ,aristotle demonstrates each of these by means of the other2 which is not admissible4#ad ,footnote #ac3 ,ibid4 p4 #be1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n mdeni tn ,b to ,a u7pa_/rchei1 ou7de tn ,a ou7deni u7pa_/rxei to ,b4 ei7 gar tini1 oi7on t ,g1 ou7k a7lthes e7_/stai to mdeni tn ,b to ,a u7pa_/rchein2 to gar ,g tn ,b ti_/ e7stin4 ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #abi7 proves the ,universal ,negative to be convertible simpliciter1 by a ,reductio ad ,absurdum cast into a syllogism in the ,first figure4 ,but it is surely unphilosophical to employ the rules of ,syllogism as a means of proving the legitimacy of ,conversion1 seeing that we are forced to assume conversion in our process for distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms4 ,moreover the ,reductio ad ,absurdum assumes the two fundamental ,maxims of ,contradiction and ,excluded ,middle1 though these are less obvious1 and stand more in need of proof than the simple conversion of the ,universal ,negative1 the point that they are brought to establish4 ,footnote #ad3 ,waitz1 in his note 7p4 #cgd71 endeavours1 but ,i think without success1 to show that ,aristotle's proof is not open to the criticism here advanced4 ,he admits that it is obscurely indicated1 but the amplification of it given by himself still remains exposed to the same objection4 ,even the friends and companions of ,aristotle were not satisfied with his manner of establishing this fundamental rule as to the conversion of propositions4 ,eudmus is said to have given a different proof2 and ,theophrastus assumed as self-evident1 without any proof1 that the ,universal ,negative might always be converted simply4#ae ,it appears to me that no other or better evidence of it can be offered1 than the trial upon particular cases1 that is to say1 ,induction4#af ,nothing is gained by dividing 7as ,aristotle does7 the whole ,a into parts1 one of which is ,c2 nor can ,i agree with ,theophrastus in thinking that every learner would assent to it at first hearing1 especially at a time when no universal maxims respecting the logical value of propositions had ever been proclaimed4 ,still less would a ,megaric dialectician1 if he had never heard the maxim before1 be satisfied to stand upon an alleged priori necessity without asking for evidence4 ,now there is no other evidence except by exemplifying the formula1 ,no ,a is ,b1 in separate propositions already known to the learner as true or false1 and by challenging him to produce any one case1 in which1 when it is true to say ,no ,a is ,b1 it is not equally true to say1 ,no ,b is ,a2 the universality of the maxim being liable to be overthrown by any one contradictory instance4#ag ,if this proof does not convince him1 no better can be produced4 ,in a short time1 doubtless1 he will acquiesce in the general formula at first hearing1 and he may even come to regard it as self-evident4 ,it will recall to his memory an aggregate of separate cases each individually forgotten1 summing up their united effect under the same aspect1 and thus impressing upon him the general truth as if it were not only authoritative but self-authorized4 ,footnote #ae3 ,see the ,scholia of ,alexander on this passage1 p4 #adh1 a4 #cj-de1 ,brandis2 ,eudemi ,fragm4 ci4-cv4 pp4 #ade-adi1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,footnote #af3 ,we find ,aristotle declaring in ,topica1 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #aac1 b4 #ae1 that in converting a true ,universal ,affirmative proposition1 the negative of the ,subject of the convertend is always true of the negative of the ,predicate of the convertend2 e4g4 ,if every man is an animal1 every thing which is not an animal is not a man4 ,this is to be assumed 7he says7 upon the evidence of ,induction--uncontradicted iteration of particular cases1 extended to all cases universally--,greek3 lamba_/nein d' e7x e7paggs1 oi7on ei7 o7 a7_/nthrpos zon1 to m zon ou7k a7_/nthrpos2 o7moi_/s de kai e7pi tn a7_/lln4 4 4 4 4 e7pi pa_/ntn ou7n to toiouton a7xite_/on4 ,the rule for the simple conversion of the ,universal ,negative rests upon the same evidence of ,induction1 never contradicted4 ,footnote #ag3 ,dr4 ,wallis1 in one of his acute controversial treatises against ,hobbes1 remarks upon this as the process pursued by ,euclid in his demonstrations3--,you tell us next that an ,induction1 without enumeration of all the particulars1 is not sufficient to infer a conclusion4 ,yes1 ,sir1 if after the enumeration of some particulars1 there comes a general clause1 and the like in other cases 7as here it doth71 this may pass for a proofe till there be a possibility of giving some instance to the contrary1 which here you will never be able to doe4 ,and if such an ,induction may not pass for proofe1 there is never a proposition in ,euclid demonstrated4 ,for all along he takes no other course1 or at least grounds his ,demonstrations on ,propositions no otherwise demonstrated4 ,as1 for instance1 he proposeth it in general 7i4 c4 #a47--,to make an equilateral triangle on a line given4 ,and then he shows you how to do it upon the line ,a ,b1 which he there shows you1 and leaves you to supply3 ,and the same1 by the like means1 may be done upon any other strait line2 and then infers his general conclusion4 ,yet ,i have not heard any man object that the ,induction was not sufficient1 because he did not actually performe it in all lines possible4--7,wallis1 ,due ,correction to ,mr4 ,hobbes1 ,oxon4 #afef1 sect4 v4 p4 #db47 ,this is induction by parity of reasoning4 ,so also ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #gc1 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 to katho_/lou de u7pa_/rchei to_/te1 o7_/tan e7pi tou tucho_/ntos kai pr_/tou deiknu_/tai4 ,aristotle passes next to ,affirmatives1 both ,universal and ,particular4 ,first1 if ,a can be predicated of all ,b1 then ,b can be predicated of some ,a2 for if ,b cannot be predicated of any ,a1 then 7by the rule for the ,universal ,negative7 neither can ,a be predicated of any ,b4 ,again1 if ,a can be predicated of some ,b1 in this case also1 and for the same reason1 ,b can be predicated of some ,a4#ah ,here the rule for the ,universal ,negative1 supposed already established1 is applied legitimately to prove the rules for ,affirmatives4 ,but in the first case1 that of the ,universal1 it fails to prove some in the sense of not-all or some-at-most1 which is required2 whereas1 the rules for both cases can be proved by ,induction1 like the formula about the ,universal ,negative4 ,when we come to the ,particular ,negative1 ,aristotle lays down the position1 that it does not admit of being necessarily converted in any way4 ,he gives no proof of this1 beyond one single exemplification3 ,if some animal is not a man1 you are not thereby warranted in asserting the converse1 that some man is not an animal4#ai ,it is plain that such an exemplification is only an appeal to ,induction3 you produce one particular example1 which is entering on the track of ,induction2 and one example alone is sufficient to establish the negative of an universal proposition4#bj ,the converse of a ,particular ,negative is not in all cases true1 though it may be true in many cases4 ,footnote #ah3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #be1 a4 #ag-bb4 ,footnote #ai3 ,ibid4 p4 #be1 a4 #bb-bf4 ,footnote #bj3 ,though some may fancy that the rule for converting the ,universal ,negative is intuitively known1 yet every one must see that the rule for converting the ,universal ,affirmative is not thus self-evident1 or derived from natural intuition4 ,in fact1 ,i believe that every learner at first hears it with great surprise4 ,some are apt to fancy that the ,universal ,affirmative 7like the ,particular ,affirmative7 may be converted simply4 ,indeed this error is not unfrequently committed in actual reasoning2 all the more easily1 because there is a class of cases 7with subject and predicate co-extensive7 where the converse of the ,universal ,affirmative is really true4 ,also1 in the case of the ,particular ,negative1 there are many true propositions in which the simple converse is true4 ,a novice might incautiously generalize upon those instances1 and conclude that both were convertible simply4 ,nor could you convince him of his error except by producing examples in which1 when a true proposition of this kind is converted simply1 the resulting converse is notoriously false4 ,the appeal to various separate cases is the only basis on which we can rest for testing the correctness or incorrectness of all these maxims proclaimed as universal4 ,from one proposition taken singly1 no new proposition can be inferred2 for purposes of inference1 two propositions at least are required4#ba ,this brings us to the rules of the ,syllogism1 where two propositions as premisses conduct us to a third which necessarily follows from them2 and we are introduced to the well-known three ,figures with their various ,modes4#bb ,to form a valid ,syllogism1 there must be three terms and no more2 the two1 which appear as ,subject and ,predicate of the conclusion1 are called the minor term 7or minor extreme7 and the major term 7or major extreme7 respectively2 while the third or middle term must appear in each of the premisses1 but not in the conclusion4 ,these terms are called extremes and middle1 from the position which they occupy in every perfect ,syllogism--that is in what ,aristotle ranks as the ,first among the three figures4 ,in his way of enunciating the ,syllogism1 this middle position formed a conspicuous feature2 whereas the modern arrangement disguises it1 though the denomination middle term is still retained4 ,aristotle usually employs letters of the alphabet1 which he was the first to select as abbreviations for exposition2#bc and he has two ways 7conforming to what he had said in the first chapter of the present treatise7 of enunciating the modes of the ,first figure4 ,in one way1 he begins with the major extreme 7,predicate of the conclusion73 ,a may be predicated of all ,b1 ,b may be predicated of all ,c2 therefore1 ,a may be predicated of all ,c 7,universal ,affirmative74 ,again1 ,a cannot be predicated of any ,b1 ,b can be predicated of all ,c2 therefore1 ,a cannot be predicated of any ,c 7,universal ,negative74 ,in the other way1 he begins with the minor term 7,subject of the conclusion73 ,c is in the whole ,b1 ,b is in the whole ,a2 therefore1 ,c is in the whole ,a 7,universal ,affirmative74 ,and1 ,c is in the whole ,b1 ,b is not in the whole ,a2 therefore1 ,c is not in the whole ,a 7,universal ,negative74 ,we see thus that in ,aristotle's way of enunciating the ,first figure1 the middle term is really placed between the two extremes1#bd though this is not so in the ,second and ,third figures4 ,in the modern way of enunciating these figures1 the middle term is never placed between the two extremes2 yet the denomination middle still remains4 ,footnote #ba3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #cd1 a4 #ag2 xxiii4 p4 #dj1 b4 #ce2 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gc1 a4 #g4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #be1 b4 #bf1 seq4 ,footnote #bc3 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire 7,logique d',aristote1 vol4 ii4 p4 #g1 n471 referring to the examples of ,conversion in chap4 ii41 observes3--,voici le prmier usage des lettres reprsentant des ides2 c'est un procd tout fait algbrique1 c'est dire1 de gnralisation4 ,dj1 dans l',hermneia1 ch4 #ac1 #a et suiv41 ,aristote a fait usage de tableaux pour reprsenter sa pense relativement la conscution des modales4 ,il parle encore spcialement de figures explicatives1 liv4 #b4 des ,derniers ,analytiques1 ch4 #ag1 #g4 ,vingt passages de l',histoire des ,animaux attestent qu'il joignait des dessins ses observations et ses thories zoologiques4 ,les illustrations pittoresques datent donc de fort loin4 ,l'emploi symbolique des lettres a t appliqu aussi par ,aristote la ,physique4 ,il l'avait emprunt1 sans doute1 aux procds des mathmaticiens4 ,we may remark1 however1 that when ,aristotle proceeds to specify those combinations of propositions which do not give a valid conclusion1 he is not satisfied with giving letters of the alphabet2 he superadds special illustrative examples 7,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 v4 p4 #bg1 a4 #g1 #ab1 #cd1 #ch74 ,footnote #bd3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #be1 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 kal de me_/son1 o7 kai au7to e7n a7_/ll kai a7_/llo e7n tou_/t e7sti_/n1 o7 kai t the_/sei gi_/netai me_/son4 ,the ,modes of each figure are distinguished by the different character and relation of the two premisses1 according as these are either affirmative or negative1 either universal or particular4 ,accordingly1 there are four possible varieties of each1 and sixteen possible modes or varieties of combinations between the two4 ,aristotle goes through most of the sixteen modes1 and shows that in the first ,figure there are only four among them that are legitimate1 carrying with them a necessary conclusion4 ,he shows1 farther1 that in all the four there are two conditions observed1 and that both these conditions are indispensable in the ,first figure3--7#a7 ,the major proposition must be universal1 either affirmative or negative2 7#b7 ,the minor proposition must be affirmative1 either universal or particular or indefinite4 ,such must be the character of the premisses1 in the first ,figure1 wherever the conclusion is valid and necessary2 and vice vers1 the conclusion will be valid and necessary1 when such is the character of the premisses4#be ,footnote #be3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #bf1 b4 #bf1 et sup4 ,in regard to the four valid modes 7,barbara1 ,celarent1 ,darii1 ,ferio1 as we read in the scholastic ,logic7 ,aristotle declares at once in general language that the conclusion follows necessarily2 which he illustrates by setting down in alphabetical letters the skeleton of a syllogism in ,barbara4 ,if ,a is predicated of all ,b1 and ,b of all ,c1 ,a must necessarily be predicated of all ,c4 ,but he does not justify it by any real example2 he produces no special syllogism with real terms1 and with a conclusion known beforehand to be true4 ,he seems to think that the general doctrine will be accepted as evident without any such corroboration4 ,he counts upon the learner's memory and phantasy for supplying1 out of the past discourse of common life1 propositions conforming to the conditions in which the symbolical letters have been placed1 and for not supplying any contradictory examples4 ,this might suffice for a treatise2 but we may reasonably believe that ,aristotle1 when teaching in his school1 would superadd illustrative examples2 for the doctrine was then novel1 and he is not unmindful of the errors into which learners often fall spontaneously4#bf ,footnote #bf3 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 b4 #ba4 ,when he deals with the remaining or invalid modes of the ,first figure1 his manner of showing their invalidity is different1 and in itself somewhat curious4 ,if 7he says7 the major term is affirmed of all the middle1 while the middle is denied of all the minor1 no necessary consequence follows from such being the fact1 nor will there be any syllogism of the two extremes2 for it is equally possible1 either that the major term may be affirmed of all the minor1 or that it may be denied of all the minor2 so that no conclusion1 either universal or particular1 is necessary in all cases4#bg ,examples of such double possibility are then exhibited3 first1 of three terms arranged in two propositions 7,a and ,e71 in which1 from the terms specially chosen1 the major happens to be truly affirmable of all the minor2 so that the third proposition is an universal ,affirmative3-- ,major and ,animal is predicable of every ,man2 ,middle4 ,middle and ,man is not predicable of any ,horse2 ,minor ,major and ,animal is predicable of every ,horse4 ,minor ,next1 a second example is set out with new terms1 in which the major happens not to be truly predicable of any of the minor2 thus exhibiting as third proposition an universal ,negative3-- ,major and ,animal is predicable of every ,man2 ,middle4 ,middle and ,man is not predicable of any ,stone2 ,minor ,major and ,animal is not predicable of any ,stone4 ,minor ,here we see that the full exposition of a syllogism is indicated with real terms common and familiar to every one2 alphabetical symbols would not have sufficed1 for the learner must himself recognize the one conclusion as true1 the other as false4 ,hence we are taught that1 after two premisses thus conditioned1 if we venture to join together the major and minor so as to form a pretended conclusion1 we may in some cases obtain a true proposition universally ,affirmative1 in other cases a true proposition universally ,negative4 ,therefore 7,aristotle argues7 there is no one necessary conclusion1 the same in all cases1 derivable from such premisses2 in other words1 this mode of syllogism is invalid and proves nothing4 ,he applies the like reasoning to all the other invalid modes of the first ,figure2 setting them aside in the same way1 and producing examples wherein double and opposite conclusions 7improperly so called71 both true1 are obtained in different cases from the like arrangement of premisses4 ,footnote #bg3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #bf1 a4 #b1 seq4 ,this mode of reasoning plainly depends upon an appeal to prior experience4 ,the validity or invalidity of each mode of the ,first figure is tested by applying it to different particular cases1 each of which is familiar and known to the learner aliunde2 in one case1 the conjunction of the major and minor terms in the third proposition makes an universal ,affirmative which he knows to be true2 in another case1 the like conjunction makes an universal ,negative1 which he also knows to be true2 so that there is no one necessary 7i4e4 no one uniform and trustworthy7 conclusion derivable from such premisses4#bh ,in other words1 these modes of the ,first figure are not valid or available in form2 the negation being sufficiently proved by one single undisputed example4 ,footnote #bh3 ,though ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire 7note1 p4 #ai7 declares ,aristotle's exposition to be a model of analysis1 it appears to me that the grounds for disallowing this invalid mode of the ,first figure 7,a--,e--,a1 or ,a--,e--,e7 are not clearly set forth by ,aristotle himself1 while they are rendered still darker by some of his best commentators4 ,thus ,waitz says 7p4 #cha73 ,per exempla allata probat 7,aristoteles7 quod demonstrare debebat ex ips ratione quam singuli termini inter se habeant3 est enim proprium artis logic1 ut terminorum rationem cognoscat1 dum res ignoret4 ,num de ,caio prdicetur animal nescit1 scit de ,caio prdicari animal1 si animal de homine et homo de ,caio prdicetur4 ,this comment of ,waitz appears to me founded in error4 ,aristotle had no means of shewing the invalidity of the mode ,a ,e in the ,first figure1 except by an appeal to particular examples4 ,the invalidity of the invalid modes1 and the validity of the valid modes1 rest alike upon this ultimate reference to examples of propositions known to be true or false1 by prior experience of the learner4 ,the valid modes are those which will stand this trial and verification2 the invalid modes are those which will not stand it4 ,not till such verification has been made1 is one warranted in generalizing the result1 and enunciating a formula applicable to unknown particulars 7rationem terminorum cognoscere1 dum res ignoret74 ,it was impossible for ,aristotle to do what ,waitz requires of him4 ,i take the opposite ground1 and regret that he did not set forth the fundamental test of appeal to example and experience1 in a more emphatic and unmistakeable manner4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire 7in the note to his translation1 p4 #ad7 does not lend any additional clearness1 when he talks of the conclusion from the propositions ,a and ,e in the ,first figure4 ,julius ,pacius says 7p4 #acd73 ,si tamen conclusio dici debet1 qu non colligitur ex propositionibus1 c4 ,moreover1 ,m4 ,st4 ,hilaire 7p4 #ai7 slurs over the legitimate foundation1 the appeal to experience1 much as ,aristotle himself does3 ,puis prenant des exemples o la conclusion est de toute vidence1 ,aristote les applique successivement chacune de ces combinaisons2 celles qui donnent la conclusion fournie d'ailleurs par le bon sens1 sont concluantes ou syllogistiques1 les autres sont asyllogistiques4 ,we are now introduced to the ,second figure1 in which each of the two premisses has the middle term as ,predicate4#bi ,to give a legitimate conclusion in this figure1 one or other of the premisses must be negative1 and the major premiss must be universal2 moreover no affirmative conclusions can ever be obtained in it--none but negative conclusions1 universal or particular4 ,in this ,second figure too1 ,aristotle recognizes four valid modes2 setting aside the other possible modes as invalid#cj 7in the same way as he had done in the ,first figure71 because the third proposition or conjunction of the major term with the minor1 might in some cases be a true universal affirmative1 in other cases a true universal negative4 ,as to the third and fourth of the valid modes1 he demonstrates them by assuming the contradictory of the conclusion1 together with the major premiss1 and then showing that these two premisses form a new syllogism1 which leads to a conclusion contradicting the minor premiss4 ,this method1 called ,reductio ad ,impossibile1 is here employed for the first time2 and employed without being ushered in or defined1 as if it were familiarly known4#ca ,footnote #bi3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 v4 p4 #bf1 b4 #cd4 ,as ,aristotle enunciates a proposition by putting the predicate before the subject1 he says that in this ,second figure the middle term comes ,greek3 prton t the_/sei4 ,in the ,third figure1 for the same reason1 he calls it ,greek3 e7_/schaton t the_/sei1 vi4 p4 #bh1 a4 #ae4 ,footnote #cj3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 v4 p4 #bg1 a4 #ah4 ,in these invalid modes1 ,aristotle says there is no syllogism2 therefore we cannot properly speak of a conclusion1 but only of a third proposition1 conjoining the major with the minor4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 p4 #bg1 a4 #ae1 #bf1 seq4 ,it is said to involve ,greek3 u7po_/thesis1 p4 #bh1 a4 #g2 to be ,greek3 e7x u7pothe_/ses xxiii4 p4 #da1 a4 #be2 to be ,greek3 tou e7x u7pothe_/ses1 as opposed to ,greek3 deiktiko_/s1 xxiii4 p4 #dj1 b4 #be4 ,m4 ,b4 ,st4 ,hilaire remarks justly1 that ,aristotle might be expected to define or explain what it is1 on first mentioning it 7note1 p4 #bb74 ,lastly1 we have the ,third figure1 wherein the middle term is the ,subject in both premisses4 ,here one at least of the premisses must be universal1 either affirmative or negative4 ,but no universal conclusions can be obtained in this figure2 all the conclusions are particular4 ,aristotle recognizes six legitimate modes2 in all of which the conclusions are particular1 four of them being affirmative1 two negative4 ,the other possible modes he sets aside as in the two preceding figures4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,ibid4 ,i4 vi4 p4 #bh1 a4 #aj-p4 #bi1 a4 #ah4 ,but ,aristotle assigns to the ,first figure a marked superiority as compared with the ,second and ,third4 ,it is the only one that yields perfect syllogisms2 those furnished by the other two are all imperfect4 ,the cardinal principle of syllogistic proof1 as he conceives it1 is--,that whatever can be affirmed or denied of a whole1 can be affirmed or denied of any part thereof4#cc ,the major proposition affirms or denies something universally respecting a certain whole2 the minor proposition declares a certain part to be included in that whole4 ,to this principle the four modes of the ,first figure manifestly and unmistakably conform1 without any transformation of their premisses4 ,but in the other figures such conformity does not obviously appear1 and must be demonstrated by reducing their syllogisms to the ,first figure2 either ostensively by exposition of a particular case1 and conversion of the premisses1 or by ,reductio ad ,impossibile4 ,aristotle1 accordingly1 claims authority for the ,second and ,third figures only so far as they can be reduced to the ,first4#cd ,we must1 however1 observe that in this process of reduction no new evidence is taken in2 the matter of evidence remains unchanged1 and the form alone is altered1 according to laws of logical conversion which ,aristotle has already laid down and justified4 ,another ground of the superiority and perfection which he claims for the ,first figure1 is1 that it is the only one in which every variety of conclusion can be proved2 and especially the only one in which the ,universal ,affirmative can be proved--the great aim of scientific research4 ,whereas1 in the ,second figure we can prove only negative conclusions1 universal or particular2 and in the ,third figure only particular conclusions1 affirmative or negative4#ce ,footnote #cc3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xli4 p4 #di1 b4 #cg3 ,greek3 o7_/ls gar o7 m_/ e7stin 7s o7_/lon pros me_/ros kai a7_/llo pros touto 7s me_/ros pros o7_/lon1 e7x ou7denos tn toiou_/tn dei_/knusin o7 deiknu_/n1 7_/ste ou7de gi_/netai sullogismo_/s4 ,he had before said this about the relation of the three terms in the ,syllogism1 ,i4 iv4 p4 #be1 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 o7_/tan o7_/roi treis ou7_/ts e7_/chsi pros a7ll_/lous 7_/ste ton e7_/schaton e7n o7_/l ei7nai t me_/s kai ton me_/son e7n o7_/l t pr_/t 7 ei7nai 7 m ei7nai1 a7na_/gk tn a7_/krn ei7nai sullogismon te_/leion 7,dictum de ,omni et ,nullo74 ,footnote #cd3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #bi1 a4 #cj-;b4 #be4 ,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #bf1 b4 #cj1 p4 #bg1 a4 #a1 p4 #bh1 a4 #i1 p4 #bi1 a4 #ae4 ,an admissible syllogism in the ,second or ,third figure is sometimes called ,greek3 dunatos as opposed to ,greek3 te_/leios1 p4 #da1 b4 #cc4 ,compare ,kampe1 ,die ,erkenntniss-,theorie des ,aristoteles1 p4 #bde1 ,leipzig1 #ahgj4 ,such are the main principles of syllogistic inference and rules for syllogistic reasoning1 as laid down by ,aristotle4 ,during the medival period1 they were allowed to ramify into endless subtle technicalities1 and to absorb the attention of teachers and studious men1 long after the time when other useful branches of science and literature were pressing for attention4 ,through such prolonged monopoly--which ,aristotle1 among the most encyclopedical of all writers1 never thought of claiming for them--they have become so discredited1 that it is difficult to call back attention to them as they stood in the ,aristotelian age4 ,we have to remind the reader1 again1 that though language was then used with great ability for rhetorical and dialectical purposes1 there existed as yet hardly any systematic or scientific study of it in either of these branches4 ,the scheme and the terminology of any such science were alike unknown1 and ,aristotle was obliged to construct it himself from the foundation4 ,the rhetorical and dialectical teaching as then given 7he tells us7 was mere unscientific routine1 prescribing specimens of art to be committed to memory3 respecting syllogism 7or the conditions of legitimate deductive inference7 absolutely nothing had been said4#cf ,under these circumstances1 his theory of names1 notions1 and propositions as employed for purposes of exposition and ratiocination1 is a remarkable example of original inventive power4 ,he had to work it out by patient and laborious research4 ,no way was open to him except the diligent comparison and analysis of propositions4 ,and though all students have now become familiar with the various classes of terms and propositions1 together with their principal characteristics and relations1 yet to frame and designate such classes for the first time without any precedent to follow1 to determine for each the rules and conditions of logical convertibility1 to put together the constituents of the ,syllogism1 with its graduation of ,figures and difference of ,modes1 and with a selection1 justified by reasons given1 between the valid and the invalid modes--all this implies a high order of original systematizing genius1 and must have required the most laborious and multiplied comparisons between propositions in detail4 ,footnote #cf3 ,aristot4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 p4 #ahd1 a4 #a1 b4 #b3 ,greek3 dio_/per tacheia men a7_/technos d' 7n 7 didaskali_/a tois mantha_/nousi par' au7tn2 ou7 gar te_/chnn a7lla ta a7po ts te_/chns dido_/ntes paideu_/ein u7pela_/mbanon 4 4 4 4 peri de tou sullogi_/zesthai pantels ou7den ei7_/chomen pro_/teron a7_/llo le_/gein1 a7ll' 7 trib ztountes polun chro_/non e7ponoumen4 ,the preceding abridgment of ,aristotle's exposition of the ,syllogism applies only to propositions simply affirmative or simply negative4 ,but ,aristotle himself1 as already remarked1 complicates the exposition by putting the ,modal propositions 7,possible1 ,necessary7 upon the same line as the above-mentioned ,simple propositions4 ,i have noticed1 in dealing with the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 the confusion that has arisen from thus elevating the ,modals into a line of classification co-ordinate with propositions simply ,assertory4 ,in the ,analytica1 this confusion is still more sensibly felt1 from the introduction of syllogisms in which one of the premisses is necessary1 while the other is only possible4 ,we may remark1 however1 that1 in the ,analytica1 ,aristotle is stricter in defining the ,possible than he has been in the ,de ,interpretatione2 for he now disjoins the ,possible altogether from the ,necessary1 making it equivalent to the ,problematical 7not merely may be1 but may be or may not be74#cg ,in the middle1 too1 of his diffuse exposition of the ,modals1 he inserts one important remark1 respecting universal propositions generally1 which belongs quite as much to the preceding exposition about propositions simply assertory4 ,he observes that universal propositions have nothing to do with time1 present1 past1 or future2 but are to be understood in a sense absolute and unqualified4#ch ,footnote #cg3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 viii4 p4 #bi1 a4 #cb2 xiii4 p4 #cb1 a4 #bj-cf3 ,greek3 to gar a7nagkaion o7mnu_/ms e7nde_/chesthai le_/gomen4 ,in xiv4 p4 #cc1 b4 #bb1 he excludes this equivocal meaning of ,greek3 to e7ndecho_/menon--dei de to e7nde_/chestha lamba_/nein m e7n tois a7nagkai_/ois1 a7lla kata ton ei7rme_/non diorismo_/n4 ,see xiii4 p4 #cb1 a4 #cc1 where ,greek3 to e7nde_/chesthai u7pa_/rchein is asserted to be equivalent to or convertible with ,greek3 to e7nde_/chesthai m u7pa_/rchein2 and xix4 p4 #ch1 a4 #ce3 ,greek3 to e7x a7na_/gks ou7k 7n e7ndecho_/menon4 ,theophrastus and ,eudemus differed from ,aristotle about his theory of the ,modals in several points 7,scholia ad ,analyt4 ,priora1 pp4 #afa1 b4 #cj2 #afb1 b4 #bc2 #aff1 a4 #ab1 b4 #ae1 ,brand474 ,respecting the want of clearness in ,aristotle about ,greek3 to e7ndecho_/menon1 see ,waitz's note 9999ad p4 #cb1 b4 #af4 ,moreover1 he sometimes uses ,greek3 u7pa_/rchon in the widest sense1 including ,greek3 e7ndecho_/menon and ,greek3 a7nagkaion1 xxiii4 p4 #dj1 b4 #bd4 ,footnote #ch3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #cd1 b4 #g4 ,having finished with the ,modals1 ,aristotle proceeds to lay it down1 that all demonstration must fall under one or other of the three figures just described2 and therefore that all may be reduced ultimately to the two first modes of the ,first figure4 ,you cannot proceed a step with two terms only and one proposition only4 ,you must have two propositions including three terms2 the middle term occupying the place assigned to it in one or other of the three figures4#ci ,this is obviously true when you demonstrate by direct or ostensive syllogism2 and it is no less true when you proceed by ,reductio ad ,impossibile4 ,this last is one mode of syllogizing from an hypothesis or assumption3#dj your conclusion being disputed1 you prove it indirectly1 by assuming its contradictory to be true1 and constructing a new syllogism by means of that contradictory together with a second premiss admitted to be true2 the conclusion of this new syllogism being a proposition obviously false or known beforehand to be false4 ,your demonstration must be conducted by a regular syllogism1 as it is when you proceed directly and ostensively4 ,the difference is1 that the conclusion which you obtain is not that which you wish ultimately to arrive at1 but something notoriously false4 ,but as this false conclusion arises from your assumption or hypothesis that the contradictory of the conclusion originally disputed was true1 you have indirectly made out your case that this contradictory must have been false1 and therefore that the conclusion originally disputed was true4 ,all this1 however1 has been demonstration by regular syllogism1 but starting from an hypothesis assumed and admitted as one of the premisses4#da ,footnote #ci3 ,ibid4 xxiii4 p4 #dj1 b4 #bj1 p4 #da1 a4 #d-bj4 ,footnote #dj3 ,ibid4 p4 #dj1 b4 #be3 ,greek3 e7_/ti 7 deiktiks 7 e7x u7pothe_/ses2 tou d' e7x u7pothe_/ses me_/ros to dia tou a7duna_/tou4 ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 p4 #da1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 pa_/ntes gar oi7 dia tou a7duna_/tou perai_/nontes to men pseudos sullogi_/zontai1 to d' e7x a7rchs e7x u7pothe_/ses deiknu_/ousin1 o7_/tan a7du_/nato_/n ti sumbai_/n ts a7ntipha_/ses tethei_/ss4 ,it deserves to be remarked that ,aristotle uses the phrase ,greek3 sullogismos e7x u7pothe_/ses1 not ,greek3 sullogismos u7pothetiko_/s4 ,this bears upon the question as to his views upon what subsequently received the title of hypothetical syllogisms2 a subject to which ,i shall advert in a future note4 ,aristotle here again enforces what he had before urged--that in every valid syllogism1 one premiss at least must be affirmative1 and one premiss at least must be universal4 ,if the conclusion be universal1 both premisses must be so likewise2 if it be particular1 one of the premisses may not be universal4 ,but without one universal premiss at least1 there can be no syllogistic proof4 ,if you have a thesis to support1 you cannot assume 7or ask to be conceded to you7 that very thesis1 without committing petitio principii1 7i4e4 qusiti or probandi72 you must assume 7or ask to have conceded to you7 some universal proposition containing it and more besides2 under which universal you may bring the subject of your thesis as a minor1 and thus the premisses necessary for supporting it will be completed4 ,aristotle illustrates this by giving a demonstration that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal2 justifying every step in the reasoning by an appeal to some universal proposition4#db ,footnote #db3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #da1 b4 #f-ca4 ,the demonstration given 7b4 #ac-bb7 is different from that which we read in ,euclid1 and is not easy to follow4 ,it is more clearly explained by ,waitz 7p4 #dcd7 than either by ,julius ,pacius or by ,m4 ,barth4 ,st4 ,hilaire 7p4 #ajh74 ,again1 every demonstration is effected by two propositions 7an even number7 and by three terms 7an odd number72 though the same proposition may perhaps be demonstrable by more than one pair of premisses1 or through more than one middle term2#dc that is1 by two or more distinct syllogisms4 ,if there be more than three terms and two propositions1 either the syllogism will no longer be one but several2 or there must be particulars introduced for the purpose of obtaining an universal by induction2 or something will be included1 superfluous and not essential to the demonstration1 perhaps for the purpose of concealing from the respondent the real inference meant4#dd ,in the case 7afterwards called ,sorites7 where the ultimate conclusion is obtained through several mean terms in continuous series1 the number of terms will always exceed by one the number of propositions2 but the numbers may be odd or even1 according to circumstances4 ,as terms are added1 the total of intermediate conclusions1 if drawn out in form1 will come to be far greater than that of the terms or propositions1 multiplying as it will do in an increasing ratio to them4#de ,footnote #dc3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxv4 p4 #da1 b4 #cf1 seq4 ,footnote #dd3 ,ibid4 xxv4 p4 #db1 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 ma_/tn e7_/stai ei7lmme_/na1 ei7 m e7paggs 7 kru_/pses 7_/ tinos a7_/llou tn toiou_/tn cha_/rin4 ,ib4 a4 #ch3 ,greek3 ou7tos o7 lo_/gos 7 ou7 sullelo_/gistai 7 plei_/ tn a7nagkai_/n 7r_/tke pros tn the_/sin4 ,footnote #de3 ,ibid4 p4 #db1 b4 #e-bf4 ,it will be seen clearly from the foregoing remarks that there is a great difference between one thesis and another as to facility of attack or defence in ,dialectic4 ,if the thesis be an ,universal ,affirmative proposition1 it can be demonstrated only in the ,first figure1 and only by one combination of premisses2 while1 on the other hand1 it can be impugned either by an universal negative1 which can be demonstrated both in the ,first and ,second figures1 or by a particular negative1 which can be demonstrated in all the three figures4 ,hence an ,universal ,affirmative thesis is at once the hardest to defend and the easiest to oppugn3 more so than either a ,particular ,affirmative1 which can be proved both in the ,first and ,third figures2 or a ,universal ,negative1 which can be proved either in ,first or ,second4#df ,to the opponent1 an universal thesis affords an easier victory than a particular thesis2 in fact1 speaking generally1 his task is easier than that of the defendant4 ,footnote #df3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxvi4 p4 #db1 b4 #bg1 p4 #dc1 a4 #ae4 ,in the ,analytica ,priora1 ,aristotle proceeds to tell us that he contemplates not only theory1 but also practice and art4 ,the reader must be taught1 not merely to understand the principles of ,syllogism1 but likewise where he can find the matter for constructing syllogisms readily1 and how he can obtain the principles of demonstration pertinent to each thesis propounded4#dg ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 ps d' eu7por_/somen au7toi pros to tithe_/menon a7ei sullogismn1 kai dia poi_/as o7dou lpso_/metha tas peri e7_/kaston a7rcha_/s1 nun 7_/d lekte_/on2 ou7 gar mo_/non i7_/ss dei tn ge_/nesin therein tn sullogismn1 a7lla kai tn du_/namin e7_/chein tou poiein4 ,the second section of ,book ,i4 here begins4 ,a thesis being propounded in appropriate terms1 with subject and predicate1 how are you the propounder to seek out arguments for its defence8 ,in the first place1 ,aristotle reverts to the distinction already laid down at the beginning of the ,categori4#dh ,individual things or persons are subjects only1 never appearing as predicates--this is the lowest extremity of the logical scale3 at the opposite extremity of the scale1 there are the highest generalities1 predicates only1 and not subjects of any predication1 though sometimes supposed to be such1 as matters of dialectic discussion4#di ,between the lowest and highest we have intermediate or graduate generalities1 appearing sometimes as subjects1 sometimes as predicates2 and it is among these that the materials both of problems for debate1 and of premisses for proof1 are usually found4#ej ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 a4 #be1 seq4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 p4 #dc1 a4 #ci3 ,greek3 pln ei7 m kata do_/xan4 ,cf4 ,schol4 of ,alexander1 p4 #age1 a4 #dd1 ,br43 ,greek3 e7ndo_/xs kai dialektiks1 7_/sper ei7pen e7n tois ,topikois1 that even the principia of science may be debated2 for example1 in book ,b4 of the ,metaphysica4 ,aristotle does not recognize either ,greek3 to o7_/n or ,greek3 to e7_/n as true genera1 but only as predicates4 ,footnote #ej3 ,ibid4 a4 #dj-dc4 ,you must begin by putting down1 along with the matter in hand itself1 its definition and its propria2 after that1 its other predicates2 next1 those predicates which cannot belong to it2 lastly1 those other subjects1 of which it may itself be predicated4 ,you must classify its various predicates distinguishing the essential1 the propria1 and the accidental2 also distinguishing the true and unquestionable1 from the problematical and hypothetical4#ea ,you must look out for those predicates which belong to it as subject universally1 and not to certain portions of it only2 since universal propositions are indispensable in syllogistic proof1 and indefinite propositions can only be reckoned as particular4 ,when a subject is included in some larger genus--as1 for example1 man in animal--you must not look for the affirmative or negative predicates which belong to animal universally 7since all these will of course belong to man also7 but for those which distinguish man from other animals2 nor must you1 in searching for those lower subjects of which man is the predicate1 fix your attention on the higher genus animal2 for animal will of course be predicable of all those of which man is predicable4 ,you must collect what pertains to man specially1 either as predicate or subject2 nor merely that which pertains to him necessarily and universally1 but also usually and in the majority of cases2 for most of the problems debated belong to this latter class1 and the worth of the conclusion will be co-ordinate with that of the premisses4#eb9999 ,do not select predicates that are predicable#ec both of the predicate and subject2 for no valid affirmative conclusion can be obtained from them4 ,footnote #ea3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 kai tou_/tn poia doxastiks kai poia kat' a7l_/theian4 ,footnote #eb3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 b4 #aj-ce4 ,footnote #ec3 ,ibid4 b4 #cf3 ,greek3 e7_/ti ta pasin e7po_/mena ou7k e7klekte_/on2 ou7 gar e7_/stai sullogismos e7x au7tn4 ,the phrase ,greek3 ta pasin e7po_/mena1 as denoting predicates applicable both to the predicate and to the subject1 is curious4 ,we should hardly understand it1 if it were not explained a little further on1 p4 #dd1 b4 #ba4 ,both the ,scholiast and the modern commentators understand ,greek3 ta pasin e7po_/mena in this sense2 and ,i do not venture to depart from them4 ,at the same time1 when ,i read six lines afterwards 7p4 #dd1 b4 #bf7 the words ,greek3 oi7on ei7 ta e7po_/mena e7kate_/r tau7ta_/ e7stin--in which the same meaning as that which the commentators ascribe to ,greek3 ta pasin e7po_/mena is given in its own special and appropriate terms1 and thus the same supposition unnecessarily repeated--,i cannot help suspecting that ,aristotle intends ,greek3 ta pasin e7po_/mena to mean something different2 to mean such wide and universal predicates as ,greek3 to e7n and ,greek3 to o7_/n which soar above the ,categories and apply to every thing1 but denote no real genera4 ,thus1 when the thesis to be maintained is an universal affirmative 7e4g4 ,a is predicable of all ,e71 you will survey all the subjects to which ,a will apply as predicate1 and all the predicates applying to ,e as subject4 ,if these two lists coincide in any point1 a middle term will be found for the construction of a good syllogism in the ,first figure4 ,let ,b represent the list of predicates belonging universally to ,a2 ,d1 the list of predicates which cannot belong to it2 ,c1 the list of subjects to which ,a pertains universally as predicate4 ,likewise1 let ,f represent the list of predicates belonging universally to ,e2 ,h1 the list of predicates that cannot belong to ,e2 ,g1 the list of subjects to which ,e is applicable as predicate4 ,if1 under these suppositions1 there is any coincidence between the list ,c and the list ,f1 you can construct a syllogism 7in ,barbara1 ,fig4 #a71 demonstrating that ,a belongs to all ,e2 since the predicate in ,f belongs to all ,e1 and ,a universally to the subject in ,c4 ,if the list ,c coincides in any point with the list ,g1 you can prove that ,a belongs to some ,e1 by a syllogism 7in ,darapti1 ,fig4 #c74 ,if1 on the other hand1 the list ,f coincides in any point with the list ,d1 you can prove that ,a cannot belong to any ,e3 for the predicate in ,d cannot belong to any ,a1 and therefore 7by converting simply the universal negative7 ,a cannot belong as predicate to any ,d2 but ,d coincides with ,f1 and ,f belongs to all ,e2 accordingly1 a syllogism 7in ,celarent1 ,fig4 #a7 may be constructed1 shewing that ,a cannot belong to any ,e4 ,so also1 if ,b coincides in any point with ,h1 the same conclusion can be proved2 for the predicate in ,b belongs to all ,a1 but ,b coincides with ,h1 which belongs to no ,e2 whence you obtain a syllogism 7in ,camestres1 ,fig4 #b71 shewing that no ,a belongs to ,e4#ed ,in collecting the predicates and subjects both of ,a and of ,e1 the highest and most universal expression of them is to be preferred1 as affording the largest grasp for the purpose of obtaining a suitable middle term4#ee ,it will be seen 7as has been declared already7 that every syllogism obtained will have three terms and two propositions2 and that it will be in one or other of the three figures above described4#ef ,footnote #ed3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxviii4 p4 #dc1 b4 #ci-p4 #dd1 a4 #ce4 ,footnote #ee3 ,ibid4 p4 #dd1 a4 #ci4 ,alexander and ,philoponus 7,scholia1 p4 #agg1 a4 #ai1 #ci1 ,brandis7 point out an inconsistency between what ,aristotle says here and what he had said in one of the preceding paragraphs1 dissuading the inquirer from attending to the highest generalities1 and recommending him to look only at both subject and predicate in their special place on the logical scale4 ,alexander's way of removing the inconsistency is not successful3 ,i doubt if there be an inconsistency4 ,i understand ,aristotle here to mean only that the universal expression ,,kz 7,greek3 to katho_/lou ,z7 is to be preferred to the indefinite or indeterminate 7simply ,z1 ,greek3 a7dio_/riston71 also ,k,greek3 ,g 7,greek3 to katho_/lou ,g7 to simple ,greek3 ,g 7a7dio_/riston74 ,this appears to me not inconsistent with the recommendation which ,aristotle had given before4 ,footnote #ef3 ,ibid4 p4 #dd1 b4 #f-bj4 ,the way just pointed out is the only way towards obtaining a suitable middle term4 ,if1 for example1 you find some predicate applicable both to ,a and ,e1 this will not conduct you to a valid syllogism2 you will only obtain a syllogism in the ,second figure with two affirmative premisses1 which will not warrant any conclusion4 ,or if you find some predicate which cannot belong either to ,a or to ,e1 this again will only give you a syllogism in the ,second figure with two negative premisses1 which leads to nothing4 ,so also1 if you have a term of which ,a can be predicated1 but which cannot be predicated of ,e1 you derive from it only a syllogism in the ,first figure1 with its minor negative2 and this1 too1 is invalid4 ,lastly1 if you have a subject1 of which neither ,a nor ,e can be predicated1 your syllogism constructed from these conditions will have both its premisses negative1 and will therefore be worthless4#eg ,footnote #eg3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxviii4 p4 #dd1 b4 #be-cg4 ,in the survey prescribed1 nothing is gained by looking out for predicates 7of ,a and ,e7 which are different or opposite3 we must collect such as are identical1 since our purpose is to obtain from them a suitable middle term1 which must be the same in both premisses4 ,it is true that if the list ,b 7containing the predicates universally belonging to ,a7 and the list ,f 7containing the predicates universally belonging to ,e7 are incompatible or contrary to each other1 you will arrive at a syllogism proving that no ,a can belong to ,e4 ,but this syllogism will proceed1 not so much from the fact that ,b and ,f are incompatible1 as from the other fact1 distinct though correlative1 that ,b will to a certain extent coincide with ,h 7the list of predicates which cannot belong to ,e74 ,the middle term and the syllogism constituted thereby1 is derived from the coincidence between ,b and ,h1 not from the opposition between ,b and ,f4 ,those who derive it from the latter1 overlook or disregard the real source1 and adopt a point of view merely incidental and irrelevant4#eh ,footnote #eh3 ,ibid4 p4 #dd1 b4 #ch-p4 #de1 a4 #bb4 ,greek3 sumbai_/nei d tois ou7_/ts e7piskopousi prosepible_/pein a7_/lln o7don ts a7nagkai_/as1 dia to lantha_/nein tn tau7to_/tta tn ,b kai tn ,th4 ,the precept here delivered--,that in order to obtain middle terms and good syllogisms1 you must study and collect both the predicates and the subjects of the two terms of your thesis--,aristotle declares to be equally applicable to all demonstration1 whether direct or by way of ,reductio ad ,impossibile4 ,in both the process of demonstration is the same--involving two premisses1 three terms1 and one of the three a suitable middle term4 ,the only difference is1 that in the direct demonstration1 both premisses are propounded as true1 while in the ,reductio ad ,impossibile1 one of the premisses is assumed as true though known to be false1 and the conclusion also4#ei ,in the other cases of hypothetical syllogism your attention must be directed1 not to the original qusitum1 but to the condition annexed thereto2 yet the search for predicates1 subjects1 and a middle term1 must be conducted in the same manner4#fj ,sometimes1 by the help of a condition extraneous to the premisses1 you may demonstrate an universal from a particular3 e4g41 ,suppose ,c 7the list of subjects to which ,a belongs as predicate7 and ,g 7the list of subjects to which ,e belongs as predicate7 to be identical2 and suppose farther that the subjects in ,g are the only ones to which ,e belongs as predicate 7this seems to be the extraneous or extra-syllogistic condition assumed1 on which ,aristotle's argument turns72 then1 ,a will be applicable to all ,e4 ,or if ,d 7the list of predicates which cannot belong to ,a7 and ,g 7the list of subjects to which ,e belongs as predicate7 are identical2 then1 assuming the like extraneous condition1 ,a will not be applicable to any ,e4#fa ,in both these cases1 the conclusion is more universal than the premisses2 but it is because we take in an hypothetical assumption1 in addition to the premisses4 ,footnote #ei3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxix4 p4 #de1 a4 #be-;b4 #ae4 ,footnote #fj3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxix4 p4 #de1 b4 #ae-bj4 ,this paragraph is very obscure4 ,neither ,alexander1 nor ,waitz1 nor ,st4 ,hilaire clears it up 9999completely4 ,see ,schol4 pp4 #agh1 b41 #agi1 a4 ,brandis4 ,aristotle concludes by saying that syllogisms from an hypothesis ought to be reviewed and classified into varieties--,greek3 e7piske_/psasthai de dei kai dielein posachs oi7 e7x u7pothe_/ses 7b4 #bj74 ,but it is doubtful whether he himself ever executed this classification4 ,it was done in the ,analytica of his successor ,theophrastus 7,schol4 p4 #agi1 a4 #f1 #bd74 ,compare the note of ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 p4 #adj4 ,footnote #fa3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxix4 p4 #de1 b4 #ba-cj4 ,aristotle has now shown a method of procedure common to all investigations and proper for the solution of all problems1 wherever soluble4 ,he has shown1 first1 all the conditions and varieties of probative ,syllogism1 two premisses and three terms1 with the place required for the middle term in each of the three figures2 next1 the quarter in which we are to look for all the materials necessary or suitable for constructing valid syllogisms4 ,having the two terms of the thesis given1 we must study the predicates and subjects belonging to both1 and must provide a large list of them2 out of which list we must make selection according to the purpose of the moment4 ,our selection will be different1 according as we wish to prove or to refute1 and according as the conclusion that we wish to prove is an universal or a particular4 ,the lesson here given will be most useful in teaching the reasoner to confine his attention to the sort of materials really promising1 so that he may avoid wasting his time upon such as are irrelevant4#fb ,footnote #fb3 ,ibid4 b4 #cf-xxx4 p4 #df1 a4 #aj4 ,this method of procedure is alike applicable to demonstration in ,philosophy or in any of the special sciences1#fc and to debate in ,dialectic4 ,in both1 the premisses or principia of syllogisms must be put together in the same manner1 in order to make the syllogism valid4 ,in both1 too1 the range of topics falling under examination is large and varied2 each topic will have its own separate premisses or principia1 which must be searched out and selected in the way above described4 ,experience alone can furnish these principia1 in each separate branch or department4 ,astronomical experience--the observed facts and phenomena of astronomy--have furnished the data for the scientific and demonstrative treatment of astronomy4 ,the like with every other branch of science or art4#fd ,when the facts in each branch are brought together1 it will be the province of the logician or analytical philosopher to set out the demonstrations in a manner clear and fit for use4 ,for if nothing in the way of true matter of fact has been omitted from our observation1 we shall be able to discover and unfold the demonstration1 on every point where demonstration is possible2 and1 wherever it is not possible1 to make the impossibility manifest4#fe ,footnote #fc3 ,ibid4 p4 #df1 a4 #h99993 ,greek3 kata men a7l_/theian e7k tn kat' a7l_/theian diagegramme_/nn u7pa_/rchein1 ei7s de tous dialektikous sullogismous e7k tn kata do_/xan prota_/sen4 ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #beg7 remarks upon the word ,greek3 diagegramme_/nn as indicating that ,aristotle1 while alluding to special sciences distinguishable from philosophy on one side1 and from dialectic on the other1 had in view geometrical demonstrations4 ,footnote #fd3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxx4 p4 #df1 a4 #aj-bj99993 ,greek3 ai7 d' a7rchai tn sullogismn katho_/lou men ei7_/rntai--i7_/diai de kath' e7ka_/stn ai7 pleistai4 dio tas men a7rchas tas peri e7_/kaston e7mpeiri_/as e7_/sti paradounai4 le_/g d' oi7on tn a7strologikn men e7mpeiri_/an ts a7strologiks e7pist_/ms2 lphthe_/ntn gar i7kans tn phainome_/nn ou7_/ts eu7re_/thsan ai7 a7strologikai a7podei_/xeis4 o7moi_/s de kai peri a7_/lln o7poianoun e7_/chei te_/chnn te kai e7pist_/mn4 ,what ,aristotle says here--of astronomical observation and experience as furnishing the basis for astronomical science--stands in marked contrast with ,plato1 who rejects this basis1 and puts aside1 with a sort of contempt1 astronomical observation 7,republic1 vii4 pp4 #ecj-eca72 treating acoustics also in a similar way4 ,compare ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,l4 p4 #ajgc1 a4 #f1 seq41 with the commentary of ,bonitz1 p4 #ejf4 ,footnote #fe3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxx4 p4 #df1 a4 #bb-bg99993 ,greek3 7_/ste a7n lphth ta u7pa_/rchonta peri e7_/kaston1 7me_/teron 7_/d tas a7podei_/xeis e7toi_/ms e7mphani_/zein4 ei7 gar mden kata tn i7stori_/an paraleiphthei_/ tn a7lths u7parcho_/ntn tois pra_/gmasin1 e7_/xomen peri a7_/pantos ou7 men e7_/stin a7po_/deixis1 tau_/tn eu7rein kai a7podeiknu_/nai1 ou7 de m pe_/phuken a7po_/deixis1 touto poiein phanero_/n4 ,respecting the word ,greek3 i7stori_/a--investigation and record of matters of fact--the first sentence of ,herodotus may be compared with ,aristotle1 ,histor4 ,animal4 p4 #dia1 a4 #ab2 also p4 #geg1 b4 #ce2 ,rhetoric4 p4 #acei1 b4 #cb4 ,for the fuller development of these important principles1 the reader is referred to the treatise on ,dialectic1 entitled ,topica1 which we shall come to in a future chapter4 ,there is nothing in all ,aristotle's writings more remarkable than the testimony here afforded1 how completely he considered all the generalities of demonstrative science and deductive reasoning to rest altogether on experience and inductive observation4 ,we are next introduced to a comparison between the syllogistic method1 as above described and systematized1 and the process called logical ,division into genera and species2 a process much relied upon by other philosophers1 and especially by ,plato4 ,this logical ,division1 according to ,aristotle1 is a mere fragment of the syllogistic procedure2 nothing better than a feeble syllogism4#ff ,those who employed it were ignorant both of ,syllogism and of its conditions4 ,they tried to demonstrate--what never can be demonstrated--the essential constitution of the subject4#fg ,instead of selecting a middle term1 as the ,syllogism requires1 more universal than the subject but less universal 7or not more so7 than the predicate1 they inverted the proper order1 and took for their middle term the highest universal4 ,what really requires to be demonstrated1 they never demonstrated but assume4#fh ,footnote #ff3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxi4 p4 #df1 a4 #cc4 ,alexander1 in ,scholia1 p4 #ahj1 a4 #ad4 ,the ,platonic method of ,greek3 diai_/resis is exemplified in the dialogues called ,sophists and ,politicus2 compare also ,philbus1 c4 v41 p4 #ae4 ,footnote #fg3 ,ibid4 p4 #df1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 prton d' au7to touto e7lel_/thei tous chrme_/nous au7t pa_/ntas1 kai pei_/thein e7pechei_/roun 7s o7_/ntos dunatou peri ou7si_/as a7po_/deixin gi_/nesthai kai tou ti_/ e7stin4 ,footnote #fh3 ,ibid4 p4 #df1 b4 #a-ab4 ,thus1 they take the subject man1 and propose to prove that man is mortal4 ,they begin by laying down that man is an animal1 and that every animal is either mortal or immortal4 ,here1 the most universal term1 animal1 is selected as middle or as medium of proof2 while after all1 the conclusion demonstrated is1 not that man is mortal1 but that man is either mortal or immortal4 ,the position that man is mortal1 is assumed but not proved4#fi ,moreover1 by this method of logical division1 all the steps are affirmative and none negative2 there cannot be any refutation of error4 ,nor can any proof be given thus respecting genus1 or proprium1 or accidens2 the genus is assumed1 and the method proceeds from thence to species and differentia4 ,no doubtful matter can be settled1 and no unknown point elucidated by this method2 nothing can be done except to arrange in a certain order what is already ascertained and unquestionable4 ,to many investigations1 accordingly1 the method is altogether inapplicable2 while even where it is applicable1 it leads to no useful conclusion4#gj ,footnote #fi3 ,ibid4 p4 #df1 b4 #a-ab4 ,footnote #gj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf-cg4 ,alexander in ,schol4 p4 #ahj1 b4 #a4 ,we now come to that which ,aristotle indicates as the third section of this ,first ,book of the ,analytica ,priora4 ,in the first section he explained the construction and constituents of ,syllogism1 the varieties of figure and mode1 and the conditions indispensable to a valid conclusion4 ,in the second section he tells us where we are to look for the premisses of syllogisms1 and how we may obtain a stock of materials1 apt and ready for use when required4 ,there remains one more task to complete his plan--that he should teach the manner of reducing argumentation as it actually occurs 7often invalid1 and even when valid1 often elliptical and disorderly71 to the figures of syllogism as above set forth1 for the purpose of testing its validity4#ga ,in performing this third part 7,aristotle says7 we shall at the same time confirm and illustrate the two preceding parts2 for truth ought in every way to be consistent with itself4#gb ,footnote #ga3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxii4 p4 #dg1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 loipon gar e7_/ti touto ts ske_/pses2 ei7 gar t_/n te ge_/nesin tn sullogismn theroimen kai tou eu7ri_/skein e7_/choimen du_/namin1 e7_/ti de tous gegenme_/nous a7nalu_/oimen ei7s ta proeirme_/na sch_/mata1 te_/los a7n e7_/choi 7 e7x a7rchs pro_/thesis4 ,footnote #gb3 ,ibid4 a4 #h4 ,when a piece of reasoning is before us1 we must first try to disengage the two syllogistic premisses 7which are more easily disengaged than the three terms71 and note which of them is universal or particular4 ,the reasoner1 however1 may not have set out both of them clearly3 sometimes he will leave out the major1 sometimes the minor1 and sometimes1 even when enunciating both of them1 he will join with them irrelevant matter4 ,in either of these cases we must ourselves supply what is wanting and strike out the irrelevant4 ,without this aid1 reduction to regular syllogism is impracticable2 but it is not always easy to see what the exact deficiency is4 ,sometimes indeed the conclusion may follow necessarily from what is implied in the premisses1 while yet the premisses themselves do not form a correct syllogism2 for though every such syllogism carries with it necessity1 there may be necessity without a syllogism4 ,in the process of reduction1 we must first disengage and set down the two premisses1 then the three terms2 out of which three1 that one which appears twice will be the middle term4 ,if we do not find one term twice repeated1 we have got no middle and no real syllogism4 ,whether the syllogism when obtained will be in the first1 second1 or third figure1 will depend upon the place of the middle term in the two premisses4 ,we know by the nature of the conclusion which of the three figures to look for1 since we have already seen what conclusions can be demonstrated in each4#gc ,footnote #gc3 ,ibid4 a4 #aj-;b4 #ad4 ,sometimes we may get premisses which look like those of a true syllogism1 but are not so in reality2 the major proposition ought to be an universal1 but it may happen to be only indefinite1 and the syllogism will not in all cases be valid2 yet the distinction between the two often passes unnoticed4#gd ,another source of fallacy is1 that we may set out the terms incorrectly2 by putting 7in modern phrase7 the abstract instead of the concrete1 or abstract in one premiss and concrete in the other4#ge ,to guard against this1 we ought to use the concrete term in preference to the abstract4 ,for example1 let the major proposition be1 ,health cannot belong to any disease2 and the minor4 ,disease can belong to any man2 ,ergo1 ,health cannot belong to any man4 ,this conclusion seems valid1 but is not really so4 ,we ought to substitute concrete terms to this effect3--,it is impossible that the sick can be well2 ,any man may be sick2 ,ergo1 ,it is impossible that any man can be well4 ,to the syllogism1 now1 as stated in these concrete terms1 we may object1 that the major is not true4 ,a person who is at the present moment sick may at a future time become well4 ,there is therefore no valid syllogism4#gf ,when we take the concrete man1 we may say with truth that the two contraries1 health-sickness1 knowledge-ignorance1 may both alike belong to him2 though not to the same individual at the same time4 ,footnote #gd3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxxiii4 p4 #dg1 b4 #af-dj3 ,greek3 au7_/t men ou7n 7 a7pa_/t gi_/netai e7n t para mikro_/n2 s gar ou7den diaphe_/ron ei7pein to_/de tde u7pa_/rchein1 7 to_/de tde panti u7pa_/rchein1 sugchroumen4 ,m4 ,b4 ,st4 ,hilaire observes in his note 7p4 #aee73 ,l'erreur vient uniquement de ce qu'on confond l'universel et l'indetermin spars par une nuance trs faible d'expression1 qu'on ne doit pas cependant negliger4 ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #bfd7 gives the same explanation at greater length2 but the example chosen by ,aristotle 7,greek3 o7 ,a7ristome_/ns e7sti dianotos ,a7ristome_/ns7 appears open to other objections besides4 ,footnote #ge3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxiv4 p4 #dh1 a4 #a-bh4 ,footnote #gf3 ,ibid4 a4 #b-bc4 ,see the ,scholion of ,alexander1 p4 #aha1 b4 #af-bg1 ,brandis4 ,again1 we must not suppose that we can always find one distinct and separate name belonging to each term4 ,sometimes one or all of the three terms can only be expressed by an entire phrase or proposition4 ,in such cases it is very difficult to reduce the reasoning into regular syllogism4 ,we may even be deceived into fancying that there are syllogisms without any middle term at all1 because there is no single word to express it4 ,for example1 let ,a represent equal to two right angles2 ,b1 triangle2 ,c1 isosceles4 ,then we have a regular syllogism1 with an explicit and single-worded middle term2 ,a belongs first to ,b1 and then to ,c through ,b as middle term 7triangle74 ,but how do we know that ,a belongs to ,b8 ,we know it by demonstration2 for it is a demonstrable truth that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles4 ,yet there is no other more general truth about triangles from which it is a deduction2 it belongs to the triangle per se1 and follows from the fundamental properties of the figure4#gg ,there is1 however1 a middle term in the demonstration1 though it is not single-worded and explicit2 it is a declaratory proposition or a fact4 ,we must not suppose that there can be any demonstration without a middle term1 either single-worded or many-worded4 ,footnote #gg3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxxv4 p4 #dh1 a4 #cj-ci3 ,greek3 phaneron o7_/ti to me_/son ou7ch ou7_/ts a7ei lpte_/on 7s to_/de ti1 a7ll' e7ni_/ote lo_/gon1 o7_/per sumbai_/nei ka7pi tou lechthe_/ntos4 ,a good ,scholion of ,philoponus is given1 p4 #aha1 b4 #bh-de1 ,brand4 ,when we are reducing any reasoning to a syllogistic form1 and tracing out the three terms of which it is composed1 we must expose or set out these terms in the nominative case2 but when we actually construct the syllogism or put the terms into propositions1 we shall find that one or other of the oblique cases1 genitive1 dative1 c41 is required4#gh ,moreover1 when we say1 'this belongs to that1' or 'this may be truly predicated of that1' we must recollect that there are many distinct varieties in the relation of predicate to subject4 ,each of the ,categories has its own distinct relation to the subject2 predication secundum quid is distinguished from predication simpliciter1 simple from combined or compound1 c4 ,this applies to negatives as well as affirmatives4#gi ,there will be a material difference in setting out the terms of the syllogism1 according as the predication is qualified 7secundum quid7 or absolute 7simpliciter74 ,if it be qualified1 the qualification attaches to the predicate1 not to the subject3 when the major proposition is a qualified predication1 we must consider the qualification as belonging1 not to the middle term1 but to the major term1 and as destined to re-appear in the conclusion4 ,if the qualification be attached to the middle term1 it cannot appear in the conclusion1 and any conclusion that embraces it will not be proved4 ,suppose the conclusion to be proved is4 ,the wholesome is knowledge quatenus bonum or quod bonum est2 the three terms of the syllogism must stand thus3-- ,major--,bonum is knowable1 quatenus bonum or quod bonum est4 ,minor--,the wholesome is bonum4 ,ergo--,the wholesome is knowable1 quatenus bonum1 c4 ,for every syllogism in which the conclusion is qualified1 the terms must be set out accordingly4#hj ,footnote #gh3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxvi4 p4 #dh1 a4 #dj-p4 #di1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 a7pls le_/gomen gar touto kata pa_/ntn1 o7_/ti tous men o7_/rous a7_/ei thete_/on kata tas kl_/seis tn o7noma_/tn--tas de prota_/seis lpte_/on kata tas e7ka_/stou pt_/seis4 ,several examples are given of this precept4 ,footnote #gi3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxxvii4 p4 #di1 a4 #f-aj4 ,alexander remarks in the ,scholia 7p4 #ahc1 a4 #b7 that the distinction between simple and compound predication has already been adverted to by ,aristotle in ,de ,interpretatione 7see p4 #bj1 b4 #ce72 and that it was largely treated by ,theophrastus in his work1 ,greek3 ,peri ,katapha_/ses1 not preserved4 ,footnote #hj3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxxviii4 p4 #di1 a4 #aa-;b4 #b4 ,greek3 phaneron ou7n o7_/ti e7n tois e7n me_/rei sullogismois ou7_/t lpte_/on tous o7_/rous4 ,alexander explains ,greek3 oi7 e7n me_/rei sullogismoi_/ 7,schol4 p4 #ahc1 b4 #cb1 ,br47 to be those in which the predicate has a qualifying adjunct tacked to it4 ,we are permitted1 and it is often convenient1 to exchange one phrase or term for another of equivalent signification1 and also one word against any equivalent phrase4 ,by doing this1 we often 9999facilitate the setting out of the terms4 ,we must carefully note the different meanings of the same substantive noun1 according as the definite article is or is not prefixed4 ,we must not reckon it the same term1 if it appears in one premiss with the definite article1 and in the other without the definite article4#ha ,nor is it the same proposition to say ,b is predicable of ,c 7indefinite71 and ,b is predicable of all ,c 7universal74 ,in setting out the syllogism1 it is not sufficient that the major premiss should be indefinite2 the major premiss must be universal2 and the minor premiss also1 if the conclusion is to be universal4 ,if the major premiss be universal1 while the minor premiss is only affirmative indefinite1 the conclusion cannot be universal1 but will be no more than indefinite1 that is1 counting as particular4#hb ,footnote #ha3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxix4-xl4 p4 #di1 b4 #c-ac4 ,greek3 ou7 tau7ton e7sti to ei7nai tn 7donn a7gathon kai to ei7nai tn 7donn to a7gatho_/n1 c4 ,footnote #hb3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xli4 p4 #di1 b4 #ad-cb4 ,the ,scholion of ,alexander 7,schol4 p4 #ahd1 a4 #bb-dj7 alludes to the peculiar mode1 called by ,theophrastus ,greek3 kata pro_/slpsin1 of stating the premisses of the syllogism3 two terms only1 the major and the middle1 being enunciated1 while the third or minor was included potentially1 but not enunciated4 ,theophrastus1 however1 did not recognize the distinction of meaning to which ,aristotle alludes in this chapter4 ,he construed as an universal minor1 what ,aristotle treats as only an indefinite minor4 ,the liability to mistake the ,indefinite for an ,universal is here again adverted to4 ,there is no fear of our being misled by setting out a particular case for the purpose of the general demonstration2 for we never make reference to the specialties of the particular case1 but deal with it as the geometer deals with the diagram that he draws4 ,he calls the line ,a ,b1 straight1 a foot long1 and without breadth1 but he does not draw any conclusion from these assumptions4 ,all that syllogistic demonstration either requires or employs1 is1 terms that are related to each other either as whole to part or as part to whole4 ,without this1 no demonstration can be made3 the exposition of the particular case is intended as an appeal to the senses1 for facilitating the march of the student1 but is not essential to demonstration4#hc ,footnote #hc3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xli4 p4 #ej1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 t d' e7kti_/thesthai ou7_/t chr_/metha 7_/sper kai t ai7stha_/nesthai ton mantha_/nonta le_/gontes2 ou7 gar ou7_/ts 7s a7_/neu tou_/tn ou7ch oi7o_/n t' a7podeichthnai1 7_/sper e7x 7n o7 sullogismo_/s4 ,this chapter is a very remarkable statement of the ,nominalistic doctrine2 perceiving or conceiving all the real specialties of a particular case1 but attending to1 or reasoning upon1 only a portion of them4 ,plato treats it as a mark of the inferior scientific value of ,geometry1 as compared with true and pure ,dialectic1 that the geometer cannot demonstrate through ,ideas and ,universals alone1 but is compelled to help himself by visible particular diagrams or illustrations4 7,plato1 ,repub4 vi4 pp4 #eaj-eaa1 vii4 p4 #ecc1 ,c47 ,aristotle reminds us once more of what he had before said1 that in the ,second and ,third figures1 not all varieties of conclusion are possible1 but only some varieties2 accordingly1 when we are reducing a piece of reasoning to the syllogistic form1 the nature of the conclusion will inform us which of the three figures we must look for4 ,in the case where the question debated relates to a definition1 and the reasoning which we are trying to reduce turns upon one part only of that definition1 we must take care to look for our three terms only in regard to that particular part1 and not in regard to the whole definition4#hd ,all the modes of the ,second and ,third figures can be reduced to the ,first1 by conversion of one or other of the premisses2 except the fourth mode 7,baroco7 of the ,second1 and the fifth mode 7,bocardo7 of the ,third1 which can be proved only by ,reductio ad ,absurdum4#he ,footnote #hd3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xlii41 xliii4 p4 #ej1 a4 #e-ae4 ,i follow here the explanation given by ,philoponus and ,julius ,pacius1 which ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire adopts4 ,but the illustrative example given by ,aristotle himself 7the definition of water7 does not convey much instruction4 ,footnote #he3 ,ibid4 xlv4 p4 #ej1 b4 #e-p4 #ea1 b4 #b4 ,no syllogisms from an ,hypothesis1 however1 are reducible to any of the three figures2 for they are not proved by syllogism alone3 they require besides an extra-syllogistic assumption granted or understood between speaker and hearer4 ,suppose an hypothetical proposition given1 with antecedent and consequent3 you may perhaps prove or refute by syllogism either the antecedent separately1 or the consequent separately1 or both of them separately2 but you cannot directly either prove or refute by syllogism the conjunction of the two asserted in the hypothetical4 ,the speaker must ascertain beforehand that this will be granted to him2 otherwise he cannot proceed4#hf ,the same is true about the procedure by ,reductio ad ,absurdum1 which involves an hypothesis over and above the syllogism4 ,in employing such ,reductio ad ,absurdum1 you prove syllogistically a certain conclusion from certain premisses2 but the conclusion is manifestly false2 therefore1 one at least of the premisses from which it follows must be false also4 ,but if this reasoning is to have force1 the hearer must know aliunde that the conclusion is false2 your syllogism has not shown it to be false1 but has shown it to be hypothetically true2 and unless the hearer is prepared to grant the conclusion to be false1 your purpose is not attained4 ,sometimes he will grant it without being expressly asked1 when the falsity is glaring3 e4g4 you prove that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side1 because if it were taken as commensurable1 an odd number might be shown to be equal to an even number4 ,few disputants will hesitate to grant that this conclusion is false1 and therefore that its contradictory is true2 yet this last 7viz4 that the contradictory is true7 has not been proved syllogistically2 you must assume it by hypothesis1 or depend upon the hearer to grant it4#hg ,footnote #hf3 ,ibid4 xliv4 p4 #ej1 a4 #af-bh4 ,footnote #hg3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xliv4 p4 #ej1 a4 #bi-ch4 ,see above1 xxiii4 p4 #dj1 a4 #be4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire remarks in the note to his translation of the ,analytica ,priora 7p4 #agh73 ,ce chapitre suffit prouver qu',aristote a distingu trs-nettement les syllogismes par l'absurde1 des syllogismes hypothtiques4 ,cette dernire dnomination est tout fait pour lui ce qu'elle est pour nous4 ,of these two statements1 ,i think the latter is more than we can venture to affirm1 considering that the general survey of hypothetical syllogisms1 which ,aristotle intended to draw up1 either never was really completed1 or at least has perished3 the former appears to me incorrect4 ,aristotle decidedly reckons the ,reductio ad ,impossibile among hypothetical proofs4 ,but he understands by ,reductio ad ,impossibile something rather wider than what the moderns understand by it4 ,it now means only1 that you take the contradictory of the conclusion together with one of the premisses1 and by means of these two demonstrate a conclusion contradictory or contrary to the other premiss4 ,but ,aristotle understood by it this1 and something more besides1 namely1 whenever1 by taking the contradictory of the conclusion1 together with some other incontestable premiss1 you demonstrate1 by means of the two1 some new conclusion notoriously false4 ,what ,i here say1 is illustrated by the very example which he gives in this chapter4 ,the incommensurability of the diagonal 7with the side of the square7 is demonstrated by ,reductio ad ,impossibile2 because if it be supposed commensurable1 you may demonstrate that an odd number is equal to an even number2 a conclusion which every one will declare to be inadmissible1 but which is not the contradictory of either of the premisses whereby the true proposition was demonstrated4 ,here ,aristotle expressly reserves for separate treatment the general subject of ,syllogisms from ,hypothesis4#hh ,footnote #hh3 ,the expressions of ,aristotle here are remarkable1 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xliv4 p4 #ej1 a4 #ci-;b4 #c3 ,greek3 polloi de kai e7_/teroi perai_/nontai e7x u7pothe_/ses1 ou7s e7piske_/psasthai dei kai diasmnai kathars4 ti_/nes men ou7n ai7 diaphorai tou_/tn1 kai posachs gi_/netai to e7x u7pothe_/ses1 u7_/steron e7roumen2 nun de tosounton 7min e7_/st phanero_/n1 o7_/ti ou7k e7_/stin a7nalu_/ein ei7s ta sch_/mata tous toiou_/tous sullogismou_/s4 kai di' 7n ai7ti_/an1 ei7r_/kamen4 ,syllogisms from ,hypothesis were many and various1 and ,aristotle intended to treat them in a future treatise2 but all that concerns the present treatise1 in his opinion1 is1 to show that none of them can be reduced to the three ,figures4 ,among the ,syllogisms from ,hypothesis1 two varieties recognized by ,aristotle 7besides ,greek3 oi7 dia tou a7duna_/tou7 were ,greek3 oi7 kata meta_/lpsin and ,greek3 oi7 kata poio_/tta4 ,the same proposition which ,aristotle entitles ,greek3 kata meta_/lpsin1 was afterwards designated by the ,stoics ,greek3 kata pro_/slpsin 7,alexander ap4 ,schol4 p4 #agh1 b4 #f-bd74 ,it seems that ,aristotle never realized this intended future treatise on ,hypothetical ,syllogisms2 at least ,alexander did not know it4 ,the subject was handled more at large by ,theophrastus and ,eudmus after ,aristotle 7,schol4 p4 #ahd1 b4 #de4 ,br42 ,boethius1 ,de ,syllog4 ,hypothetico1 pp4 #fjf-fjg72 and was still farther expanded by ,chrysippus and the ,stoics4 ,compare ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 ,i4 pp4 #bie1 #cgg1 seq4 ,he treats the ,hypothetical ,syllogism as having no logical value1 and commends ,aristotle for declining to develop or formulate it2 while ,ritter 7,gesch4 ,phil4 iii4 p4 #ic71 and1 to a certain extent1 ,ueberweg 7,system der ,logik1 sect4 #aba1 p4 #cbf71 consider this to be a defect in ,aristotle4 ,in the last chapter of the first book of the ,analytica ,priora1 ,aristotle returns to the point which we have already considered in the treatise ,de ,interpretatione1 viz4 what is really a negative proposition2 and how the adverb of negation must be placed in order to constitute one4 ,we must place this adverb immediately before the copula and in conjunction with the copula3 we must not place it after the copula and in conjunction with the predicate2 for1 if we do so1 the proposition resulting will not be negative but affirmative 7,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses1 by transposition1 according to the technical term introduced afterwards by ,theophrastus74 ,thus of the four propositions3 #a4 ,est bonum4 #b4 ,non est bonum4 #d4 ,non est non bonum4 #c4 ,est non bonum4 ,no4 #a is affirmative2 ,no4 #c is affirmative 7,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses72 ,nos4 #b and #d are negative4 ,wherever ,no4 #a is predicable1 ,no4 #d will be predicable also2 wherever ,no4 #c is predicable1 ,no4 #b will be predicable also--but in neither case vice vers4#hi ,mistakes often flow from incorrectly setting out the two contradictories4 ,footnote #hi3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xlvi4 p4 #ea1 b4 #e1 ad finem4 ,see above1 ,chap4 ,,iv4 p4 #aah1 seq4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,analytica ,,priora ,,ii4 ,the ,second ,book of the ,analytica ,priora seems conceived with a view mainly to ,dialectic and ,sophistic1 as the ,first ,book bore more upon ,demonstration4#a ,aristotle begins the ,second ,book by shortly recapitulating what he had stated in the ,first2 and then proceeds to touch upon some other properties of the ,syllogism4 ,universal syllogisms 7those in which the conclusion is universal7 he says1 have always more conclusions than one2 particular syllogisms sometimes1 but not always1 have more conclusions than one4 ,if the conclusion be universal1 it may always be converted--simply1 when it is negative1 or per accidens1 when it is affirmative2 and its converse thus obtained will be proved by the same premisses4 ,if the conclusion be particular1 it will be convertible simply when affirmative1 and its converse thus obtained will be proved by the same premisses2 but it will not be convertible at all when negative1 so that the conclusion proved will be only itself singly4#b ,moreover1 in the universal syllogisms of the ,first figure 7,barbara1 ,celarent71 any of the particulars comprehended under the minor term may be substituted in place of the minor term as subject of the conclusion1 and the proof will hold good in regard to them4 ,so1 again1 all or any of the particulars comprehended in the middle term may be introduced as subject of the conclusion in place of the minor term2 and the conclusion will still remain true4 ,in the ,second figure1 the change is admissible only in regard to those particulars comprehended under the subject of the conclusion or minor term1 and not 7at least upon the strength of the syllogism7 in regard to those comprehended under the middle term4 ,finally1 wherever the conclusion is particular1 the change is admissible1 though not by reason of the syllogism in regard to particulars comprehended under the middle term2 it is not admissible as regards the minor term1 which is itself particular4#c ,footnote #a3 ,this is the remark of the ancient ,scholiasts4 ,see ,schol4 p4 #ahh1 a4 #dd1 b4 #aa4 ,footnote #b3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #ec1 a4 #c-ad4 ,footnote #c3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #ec1 a4 #ad-ce4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 following ,pacius1 justly remarks 7note1 p4 #bjc of his translation7 that the rule as to particulars breaks down in the cases of ,baroco1 ,disamis1 and ,bocardo4 ,on the chapter in general he remarks 7note1 p4 #bjd73--;,cette thorie des conclusions diverses1 soit patentes soit caches1 d'un mme syllogisme1 est surtout utile en dialectique1 dans la discussion2 o il faut faire la plus grande attention ce qu'on accorde l'adversaire1 soit explicitement1 soit implicitement4 ,this illustrates the observation cited in the preceding note from the ,scholiasts4 ,aristotle has hitherto regarded the ,syllogism with a view to its formal characteristics3 he now makes an important observation which bears upon its matter4 ,formally speaking1 9999the two premisses are always assumed to be true2 but in any real case of syllogism 7form and matter combined7 it is possible that either one or both may be false4 ,now1 ,aristotle remarks that if both the premisses are true 7the syllogism being correct in form71 the conclusion must of necessity be true2 but that if either or both the premisses are false1 the conclusion need not necessarily be false likewise4 ,the premisses being false1 the conclusion may nevertheless be true2 but it will not be true because of or by reason of the premisses4#d ,footnote #d3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #ec1 b4 #e-aj3 ,greek3 e7x a7lthn men ou7n ou7k e7_/sti pseudos sullogi_/sasthai1 e7k pseudn d' e7_/stin a7lthe_/s1 pln ou7 dio_/ti a7ll' o7_/ti2 tou gar dio_/ti ou7k e7_/stin e7k pseudn sullogismo_/s2 di' 7n d' ai7ti_/an1 e7n tois e7pome_/nois lechth_/setai4 ,the true conclusion is not true by reason of these false premisses1 but by reason of certain other premisses which are true1 and which may be produced to demonstrate it4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #ai4 ,first1 he would prove that if the premisses be true1 the conclusion must be true also2 but the proof that he gives does not seem more evident than the probandum itself4 ,assume that if ,a exists1 ,b must exist also3 it follows from hence 7he argues7 that if ,b does not exist1 neither can ,a exist2 which he announces as a reductio ad absurdum1 seeing that it contradicts the fundamental supposition of the existence of ,a4#e ,here the probans is indeed equally evident with the probandum1 but not at all more evident2 one who disputes the latter1 will dispute the former also4 ,nothing is gained in the way of proof by making either of them dependent on the other4 ,both of them are alike self-evident2 that is1 if a man hesitates to admit either of them1 you have no means of removing his scruples except by inviting him to try the general maxim upon as many particular cases as he chooses1 and to see whether it does not hold good without a single exception4 ,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #ec1 b4 #aa-af4 ,in regard to the case here put forward as illustration1 ,aristotle has an observation which shows his anxiety to maintain the characteristic principles of the ,syllogism2 one of which principles he had declared to be--,that nothing less than three terms and two propositions1 could warrant the inferential step from premisses to conclusion4 ,in the present case he assumed1 ,if ,a exists1 then ,b must exist2 giving only one premiss as ground for the inference4 ,this 7he adds7 does not contravene what has been laid down before2 for ,a in the case before us represents two propositions conceived in conjunction4#f ,here he has given the type of hypothetical reasoning2 not recognizing it as a variety per se1 nor following it out into its different forms 7as his successors did after him71 but resolving it into the categorical syllogism4#g ,he however conveys very clearly the cardinal principle of all hypothetical inference--,that if the antecedent be true1 the consequent must be true also1 but not vice vers2 if the consequent be false1 the antecedent must be false also1 but not vice vers4 ,footnote #f3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #ec1 b4 #af-be4 ,greek3 to ou7n ,a 7_/sper e7n keitai1 du_/o prota_/seis sullphtheisai4 ,footnote #g3 ,aristotle1 it should be remarked1 uses the word ,greek3 katgoriko_/s1 not in the sense which it subsequently acquired1 as the antithesis of ,greek3 u7pothetiko_/s in application to the proposition and syllogism1 but in the sense of affirmative as opposed to ,greek3 stertiko_/s4 ,having laid down the principle1 that the conclusion may be true1 though one or both the premisses are false1 ,aristotle proceeds1 at great length1 to illustrate it in its application to each of the three syllogistic figures4#h ,no portion of the ,analytica is traced out more perspicuously than the exposition of this most important logical doctrine4 ,footnote #h3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 ii4-iv4 p4 #ec1 b4 #bf-p4 #eg1 b4 #ag4 ,at the close 7p4 #eg1 a4 #cf-;b4 #ag71 the general doctrine is summed up4 ,it is possible 7he then continues1 again at considerable length7 to invert the syllogism and to demonstrate in a circle4 ,that is1 you may take the conclusion as premiss for a new syllogism1 together with one of the old premisses1 transposing its terms2 and thus you may demonstrate the other premiss4 ,you may do this successively1 first with the major1 to demonstrate the minor2 next1 with the minor1 to demonstrate the major4 ,each of the premisses will thus in turn be made a demonstrated conclusion2 and the circle will be complete4 ,but this can be done perfectly only in ,barbara1 and when1 besides1 all the three terms of the syllogism reciprocate with each other1 or are co-extensive in import2 so that each of the two premisses admits of being simply converted4 ,in all other cases1 the process of circular demonstration1 where possible at all1 is more or less imperfect4#i ,footnote #i3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 v4-viii4 p4 #eg1 b4 #ah-p4 #ei1 a4 #ce4 ,having thus shown under what conditions the conclusion can be employed for the demonstration of the premisses1 ,aristotle proceeds to state by what transformation it can be employed for the refutation of them4 ,this he calls converting the syllogism2 a most inconvenient use of the term convert 7,greek3 a7ntistre_/phein71 since he had already assigned to that same term more than one other meaning1 distinct and different1 in logical procedure4#aj ,what it here means is reversing the conclusion1 so as to exchange it either for its contrary1 or for its contradictory2 then employing this reversed proposition as a new premiss1 along with one of the previous premisses1 so as to disprove the other of the previous premisses--i4e4 to prove its contrary or contradictory4 ,the result will here be different1 according to the manner in which the conclusion is reversed2 according as you exchange it for its contrary or its contradictory4 ,suppose that the syllogism demonstrated is3 ,a belongs to all ,b1 ,b belongs to all ,c2 ,ergo1 ,a belongs to all ,c 7,barbara74 ,now1 if we reverse this conclusion by taking its contrary1 ,a belongs to no ,c1 and if we combine this as a new premiss with the major of the former syllogism1 ,a belongs to all ,b1 we shall obtain as a conclusion ,b belongs to no ,c2 which is the contrary of the minor1 in the form ,camestres4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we reverse the conclusion by taking its contradictory1 ,a does not belong to all ,c1 and combine this with the same major1 we shall have as conclusion1 ,b does not belong to all ,c2 which is the contradictory of the minor1 and in the form ,baroco3 though in the one case as in the other the minor is disproved4 ,the major is contradictorily disproved1 whether it be the contrary or the contradictory of the conclusion that is taken along with the minor to form the new syllogism2 but still the form varies from ,felapton to ,bocardo4 ,aristotle shows farther how the same process applies to the other modes of the ,first1 and to the modes of the ,second and ,third figures4#aa ,the new syllogism1 obtained by this process of reversal1 is always in a different figure from the syllogism reversed4 ,thus syllogisms in the ,first figure are reversed by the ,second and ,third2 those in the second1 by the ,first and ,third2 those in the ,third1 by the ,first and ,second4#ab ,footnote #aj3 ,schol4 7ad ,analyt4 ,prior4 p4 #ei1 b4 #a71 p4 #aij1 b4 #bj1 ,brandis4 ,compare the notes of ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 pp4 #ee1 #bdb4 ,footnote #aa3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 viii4-x4 p4 #ei1 b4 #a-p4 #fa1 a4 #d4 ,footnote #ab3 ,ibid4 x4 p4 #fa1 a4 #g-ae4 ,of this reversing process1 one variety is what is called the ,reductio ad ,absurdum2 in which the conclusion is reversed by taking its contradictory 7never its contrary71 and then joining this last with one of the premisses1 in order to prove the contradictory or contrary of the other premiss4#ac ,the ,reductio ad ,absurdum is distinguished from the other modes of reversal by these characteristics3 7#a7 ,that it takes the contradictory1 and not the contrary1 of the conclusion2 7#b7 ,that it is destined to meet the case where an opponent declines to admit the conclusion2 whereas the other cases of reversion are only intended as confirmatory evidence towards a person who already admits the conclusion2 7#c7 ,that it does not appeal to or require any concession on the part of the opponent2 for if he declines to admit the conclusion1 you presume1 as a matter of course1 that he must adhere to the contradictory of the conclusion2 and you therefore take this contradictory for granted 7without asking his concurrence7 as one of the bases of a new syllogism2 7#d7 ,that it presumes as follows3--,when1 by the contradictory of the conclusion joined with one of the premisses1 you have demonstrated the opposite of the other premiss1 the original conclusion itself is shown to be beyond all impeachment on the score of form1 i4e4 beyond impeachment by any one who admits the premisses4 ,you assume to be true1 for the occasion1 the very proposition which you mean finally to prove false2 your purpose in the new syllogism is1 not to demonstrate the original conclusion1 but to prove it to be true by demonstrating its contradictory to be false4#ad9999 ,footnote #ac3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #fa1 a4 #ah1 seq4 ,footnote #ad3 ,ibid4 p4 #fb1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 phaneron ou7n o7_/ti ou7 to e7nanti_/on1 a7lla to a7ntikei_/menon1 u7pothete_/on e7n a7_/pasi tois sullogismois4 ou7_/t gar to a7nagkaion e7_/stai kai to a7xi_/ma e7_/ndoxon4 ei7 gar kata pantos 7 kata_/phasis 7 a7po_/phasis1 deichthe_/ntos o7_/ti ou7ch 7 a7po_/phasis1 a7na_/gk tn kata_/phasin a7ltheu_/esthai4 ,see ,scholia1 p4 #aij1 b4 #dj1 seq41 ,brand4 ,by the ,reductio ad ,absurdum you can in all the three figures demonstrate all the four varieties of conclusion1 universal and particular1 affirmative and negative2 with the single exception1 that you cannot by this method demonstrate in the ,first figure the ,universal ,affirmative4#ae ,with this exception1 every true conclusion admits of being demonstrated by either of the two ways1 either directly and ostensively1 or by reduction to the impossible4#af ,footnote #ae3 ,ibid4 p4 #fa1 a4 #ce-p4 #fb1 b4 #aj2 xii4 p4 #fb1 a4 #ba4 ,alexander1 ap4 ,schol4 p4 #aia1 a4 #ag-cf1 ,brand4 ,footnote #af3 ,ibid4 xiv4 p4 #fc1 b4 #ab-ba4 ,in the ,second and ,third figures1 though not in the ,first1 it is possible to obtain conclusions even from two premisses which are contradictory or contrary to each other2 but the conclusion will1 as a matter of course1 be a self-contradictory one4 ,thus if in the ,second figure you have the two premisses--,all ,science is good2 ,no ,science is good--you get the conclusion 7in ,camestres71 ,no ,science is ,science4 ,in opposed propositions1 the same predicate must be affirmed and denied of the same subject in one of the three different forms--,all and ,none1 ,all and ,not ,all1 ,some and ,none4 ,this shows why such conclusions cannot be obtained in the ,first figure2 for it is the characteristic of that figure that the middle term must be predicate in one premiss1 and subject in the other4#ag ,in dialectic discussion it will hardly be possible to get contrary or contradictory premisses conceded by the adversary immediately after each other1 because he will be sure to perceive the contradiction3 you must mask your purpose by asking the two questions not in immediate succession1 but by introducing other questions between the two1 or by other indirect means as suggested in the ,topica4#ah ,footnote #ag3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xv4 p4 #fc1 b4 #bb-p4 #fd1 a4 #cb4 ,aristotle here declares ,subcontraries 7as they were later called71--,some men are wise1 ,some men are not wise1--to be opposed only in expression or verbally 7,greek3 kata tn le_/xin mo_/non74 ,footnote #ah3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xv4 p4 #fd1 a4 #cc-cg4 ,see ,topica1 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 a4 #bf2 ,julius ,pacius1 p4 #cgb1 note4 ,in the ,topica1 ,aristotle suggests modes of concealing the purpose of the questioner and driving the adversary to contradict himself3 ,greek3 e7n de ts ,topikois paradi_/dsi metho_/dous tn kru_/psen di' a7s touto doth_/setai 7,schol4 p4 #aib1 a4 #ah1 ,br474 ,compare also ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ff1 a4 #cc4 ,aristotle now passes to certain general heads of ,fallacy1 or general liabilities to ,error1 with which the syllogizing process is beset4 ,what the reasoner undertakes is1 to demonstrate the conclusion before him1 and to demonstrate it in the natural and appropriate way2 that is1 from premisses both more evident in themselves and logically prior to the conclusion4 ,whenever he fails thus to demonstrate1 there is error of some kind2 but he may err in several ways3 7#a7 ,he may produce a defective or informal syllogism2 7#b7 ,his premisses may be more unknowable than his conclusion1 or equally unknowable2 7#c7 ,his premisses1 instead of being logically prior to the conclusion1 may be logically posterior to it4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xvi4 p4 #fd1 b4 #cj-ce3 ,greek3 kai gar ei7 o7_/ls m sullogi_/zetai1 kai ei7 di' a7gnstote_/rn 7 o7moi_/s a7gn_/stn1 kai ei7 dia tn u7ste_/rn to pro_/teron2 7 gar a7po_/deixis e7k pistote_/rn te kai prote_/rn e7stin4444 ta men di' au7tn pe_/phuke gnri_/zesthai1 ta de di' a7_/lln4 ,distinct from all these three1 however1 ,aristotle singles out and dwells upon another mode of error1 which he calls ,petitio ,principii4 ,some truths1 the principia1 are by nature knowable through or in themselves1 others are knowable only through other things4 ,if you confound this distinction1 and ask or assume something of the latter class as if it belonged to the former1 you commit a ,petitio ,principii4 ,you may commit it either by assuming at once that which ought to be demonstrated1 or by assuming1 as if it were a principium1 something else among those matters which in natural propriety would be demonstrated by means of a principium4 ,thus1 there is 7let us suppose7 a natural propriety that ,c shall be demonstrated through ,a2 but you1 overlooking this1 demonstrate ,b through ,c1 and ,a through ,b4 ,by thus inverting the legitimate order1 you do what is tantamount to demonstrating ,a through itself2 for your demonstration will not hold unless you assume ,a at the beginning1 in order to arrive at ,c4 ,this is a mistake made not unfrequently1 and especially by some who define parallel lines2 for they give a definition which cannot be understood unless parallel lines be presupposed4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xvi4 p4 #fd1 b4 #cc-p4 #fe1 a4 #i4 ,petere principium is1 in the phrase of ,aristotle1 not ,greek3 tn a7rchn ai7teisthai1 but ,greek3 to e7n a7rch ai7teisthai or ,greek3 to e7x a7rchs ai7teisthai 7xvi4 p4 #fd1 b4 #bh1 #cd74 ,when the problem is such1 that it is uncertain whether ,a can be predicated either of ,c or of ,b1 if you then assume that ,a is predicable of ,b1 you may perhaps not commit ,petitio ,principii1 but you certainly fail in demonstrating the problem2 for no demonstration will hold where the premiss is equally uncertain with the conclusion4 ,but if1 besides1 the case be such1 that ,b is identical with ,c1 that is1 either co-extensive and reciprocally convertible with ,c1 or related to ,c as genus or species1--in either of these cases you commit ,petitio ,principii by assuming that ,a may be predicated of ,b4#ba ,for seeing that ,b reciprocates with ,c1 you might just as well demonstrate that ,a is predicable of ,b1 because it is predicable of ,c2 that is1 you might demonstrate the major premiss by means of the minor and the conclusion1 as well as you can demonstrate the conclusion by means of the major and the minor premiss4 ,if you cannot so demonstrate the major premiss1 this is not because the structure of the syllogism forbids it1 but because the predicate of the major premiss is more extensive than the subject thereof4 ,if it be co-extensive and convertible with the subject1 we shall have a circular proof of three propositions in which each may be alternately premiss and conclusion4 ,the like will be the case1 if the ,petitio ,principii is in the minor premiss and not in the major4 ,in the ,first syllogistic figure it may be in either of the premisses2 in the ,second figure it can only be in the minor premiss1 and that only in one mode 7,camestres7 of the figure4#bb ,the essence of ,petitio ,principii consists in this1 that you exhibit as true per se that which is not really true per se4#bc ,you may commit this fault either in ,demonstration1 when you assume for true what is not really true1 or in ,dialectic1 when you assume as probable and conformable to authoritative opinion what is not really so4#bd9999 ,footnote #ba3 ,ibid4 p4 #fe1 a4 #a-aj4 ,footnote #bb3 ,ibid4 p4 #fe1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n tis1 a7d_/lou o7_/ntos o7_/ti to ,a u7pa_/rchei t ,g1 o7moi_/s de kai o7_/ti t ,b1 ai7toito t ,b u7pa_/rchein to ,a1 ou7_/p dlon ei7 to e7n a7rch ai7teitai1 a7ll' o7_/ti ou7k a7podei_/knusi1 dlon2 ou7 gar a7rch a7podei_/xes to o7moi_/s a7_/dlon4 ei7 me_/ntoi to ,b pros to ,g ou7_/ts e7_/chei 7_/ste tau7ton ei7nai1 7 dlon o7_/ti a7ntistre_/phousin1 7 u7pa_/rchei tha_/teron thate_/r1 to e7n a7rch ai7teitai4 kai gar a7_/n1 o7_/ti t ,b to ,a u7pa_/rchei1 di' e7kei_/nn deiknu_/oi1 ei7 a7ntistre_/phoi4 nun de touto klu_/ei1 a7ll' ou7ch o7 tro_/pos4 ei7 de touto poioi1 to ei7rme_/non a7n poioi kai a7ntistre_/phoi 7s dia trin4 ,this chapter1 in which ,aristotle declares the nature of ,petitio ,principii1 is obscure and difficult to follow4 ,it has been explained at some length1 first by ,philoponus in the ,scholia 7p4 #aib1 a4 #ce1 b4 #bd71 afterwards by ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #cgf1 whose explanation is followed by ,m4 ,b4 ,st4 ,hilaire1 p4 #bhh71 and by ,waitz1 7,i4 p4 #ead74 ,but the translation and comment given by ,mr4 ,poste appear to me the best3 ,assuming the conclusion to be affirmative1 let us examine a syllogism in ,barbara3-- ,all ,b is ,a4 4 ,all ,c is ,b4 4 4 ,all ,c is ,a4 ,and let us first suppose that the major premiss is a ,petitio ,principii2 i4e4 that the proposition ,all ,b is ,a is identical with the proposition ,all ,c is ,a4 ,this can only be because the terms ,b and ,c are identical4 ,next1 let us suppose that the minor premiss is a ,petitio ,principii3 i4e4 that the proposition ,all ,c is ,b is identical with the proposition ,all ,c is ,a4 ,this can only be because ,b and ,a are identical4 ,the identity of the terms is1 their convertibility or their sequence 7,greek3 u7pa_/rchei1 e7_/petai74 ,this however requires some limitation2 for as the major is always predicated 7,greek3 u7pa_/rchei1 e7_/petai7 of the middle1 and the middle of the minor1 if this were enough to constitute ,petitio ,principii1 every syllogism with a problematical premiss would be a ,petitio ,principii4 7,see the ,appendix ,a1 pp4 #agh-ahc1 attached to ,mr4 ,poste's edition of ,aristotle's ,sophistici ,elenchi47 ,compare1 about ,petitio ,principii1 ,aristot4 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #cd1 in which passage ,aristotle gives to the fallacy called ,petitio ,principii a still larger sweep than what he assigns to it in the ,analytica ,priora4 ,mr4 ,poste's remark is perfectly just1 that according to the above passage in the ,analytica1 every syllogism with a problematical 7i4e4 real as opposed to verbal7 premiss would be a ,petitio ,principii2 that is1 all real deductive reasoning1 in the syllogistic form1 would be a ,petitio ,principii4 ,to this we may add1 that1 from the passage above referred to in the ,topica1 all inductive reasoning also 7reasoning from parts to whole7 would involve ,petitio ,principii4 ,mr4 ,poste's explanation of this difficult passage brings into view the original and valuable exposition made by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill of the ,functions and ,logical ,value of the ,syllogism4--,system of ,logic1 ,book ,,ii4 ch4 iii4 sect #b3--;,it must be granted1 that in every syllogism1 considered as an argument to prove the conclusion1 there is a ,petitio ,principii1 c4 ,petitio ,principii1 if ranked among the ,fallacies1 can hardly be extended beyond the first of the five distinct varieties enumerated in the ,topica1 ,,viii4 xiii4 ,footnote #bc3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xvi4 p4 #fe1 a4 #bc-bg3 ,greek3 to gar e7x a7rchs ti_/ du_/natai1 ei7_/rtai 7min1 o7_/ti to di' au7tou deiknu_/nai to m di' au7tou dlon4--touto d' e7_/sti1 to m deiknu_/nai4 ,the meaning of some lines in this chapter 7p4 #fe1 a4 #ag-ah7 is to me very obscure1 after all the explanations of commentators4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 p4 #fe1 a4 #ce2 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #ca4 ,we must be careful to note1 that when ,aristotle speaks of a principium as knowable in itself1 or true in itself1 he does not mean that it is innate1 or that it starts up in the mind ready made without any gradual building up or preparation4 ,what he means is1 that it is not demonstrable deductively from anything else prior or more knowable by nature than itself4 ,he declares 7as we shall see7 that principia are acquired1 and mainly by ,induction4 ,next to ,petitio ,principii1 ,aristotle indicates another fallacious or erroneous procedure in dialectic debate2 misconception or misstatement of the real grounds on which a conclusion rests--,non per ,hoc4 ,you may impugn the thesis 7set up by the respondent7 directly1 by proving syllogistically its contrary or contradictory2 or you may also impugn it indirectly by ,reductio ad ,absurdum2 i4e4 you prove by syllogism some absurd conclusion1 which you contend to be necessarily true1 if the thesis is admitted4 ,suppose you impugn it in the first method1 or directly1 by a syllogism containing only two premisses and a conclusion3 ,non per ,hoc is inapplicable here1 for if either premiss is disallowed1 the conclusion is unproved2 the respondent cannot meet you except by questioning one or both of the premisses of your impugning syllogism4#be ,but if you proceed by the second method or indirectly1 ,non per ,hoc may become applicable2 for there may then be more than two premisses1 and he may1 while granting that the absurd conclusion is correctly made out1 contend that the truth or falsehood of his thesis is noway implicated in it4 ,he declares 7in ,aristotle's phrase7 that the absurdity or falsehood just made out does not follow as a consequence from his thesis1 but from other premisses independent thereof2 that it would stand equally proved1 even though his thesis were withdrawn4#bf ,in establishing the falsehood or absurdity you must take care that it shall be one implicated with or dependent upon his thesis4 ,it is this last condition that he 7the respondent7 affirms to be wanting4#bg ,footnote #be3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #fe1 b4 #d3 ,greek3 o7_/tan a7naire_/th ti deiktiks dia tn ,a1 ,b1 ,g1 c42 xviii4 #ff1 a4 #ag3 ,greek3 7 gar e7k tn du_/o prota_/sen 7 e7k pleio_/nn pas e7sti sullogismo_/s2 ei7 men ou7n e7k tn du_/o1 tou_/tn a7na_/gk tn men e7te_/ran 7 kai a7mphote_/ras ei7nai pseudeis2 c4 ,whoever would understand this difficult chapter xvii41 will do well to study it with the notes of ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #cfj71 and also the valuable exposition of ,mr4 ,poste1 who has extracted and illustrated it in ,appendix ,b4 7p4 #aij7 of the notes to his edition of the ,sophistici ,elenchi4 ,the six illustrative diagrams given by ,julius ,pacius afford great help1 though the two first of them appear to me incorrectly printed1 as to the brackets connecting the different propositions4 ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #fe1 b4 #ch1 b4 #ad1 p4 #ff1 a4 #b1 #g3 ,greek3 to m para touto sumbai_/nein to pseudos--tou m para tn the_/sin ei7nai to pseudos--ou7 para tn the_/sin sumbai_/nei to pseudos--ou7k a7n ei7_/ para tn the_/sin4 ,instead of the preposition ,greek3 para_/1 ,aristotle on two occasions employs ,greek3 dia_/--ou7_/t gar e7_/stai dia tn u7po_/thesin--p4 #fe1 b4 #cc1 p4 #ff1 a4 #c4 ,the preposition ,greek3 para_/1 with acc4 case1 means on account of1 owing to1 c4 ,see ,matthi and ,khner's ,grammars1 and the passage of ,thucydides i4 #ada2 ,greek3 kai e7_/kastos ou7 para tn e7autou a7me_/leian oi7etai bla_/psein1 me_/lein de_/ tini kai a7_/ll u7per e7autou ti proidein1 c41 which ,i transcribe partly on account of ,dr4 ,arnold's note1 who says about ,greek3 para here3--,this is exactly expressed in vulgar ,english1 all along of his own neglect1 i4 e4 owing to his own neglect4 ,footnote #bg3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #fe1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 dei pros tous e7x a7rchs o7_/rous suna_/ptein to a7du_/naton2 ou7_/t gar e7_/stai dia tn u7po_/thesin4 ,aristotle tells us that this was a precaution which the defender of a thesis was obliged often to employ in dialectic debate1 in order to guard against abuse or misapplication of ,reductio ad ,absurdum on the part of opponents1 who 7it appears7 sometimes took credit for success1 when they had introduced and demonstrated some absurd conclusion that had little or no connection with the thesis4#bh ,but even when the absurd conclusion is connected with the thesis continuously1 by a series of propositions each having a common term with the preceding1 in either the ascending or the descending scale1 we have here more than three propositions1 and the absurd conclusion may perhaps be proved by the other premisses1 without involving the thesis4 ,in this case the respondent will meet you with ,non per ,hoc3#bi he will point out that his thesis is not one of the premisses requisite for demonstrating your conclusion1 and is therefore not overthrown by the absurdity thereof4 ,perhaps the thesis may be false1 but you have not shown it to be so1 since it is not among the premisses necessary for proving your absurdum4 ,an absurdum may sometimes admit of being demonstrated by several lines of premisses1#cj each involving distinct falsehood4 ,every false conclusion implies falsity in one or more syllogistic or prosyllogistic premisses that have preceded it1 and is owing to or occasioned by this first falsehood4#ca ,footnote #bh3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #fe1 a4 #ch3 ,greek3 o7 polla_/kis e7n tois lo_/gois ei7_/thamen le_/gein1 c4 ,that the ,reductio ad ,absurdum was sometimes made to turn upon matters wholly irrelevant1 we may see from the illustration cited by ,aristotle1 p4 #fe1 b4 #ag4 ,footnote #bi3 ,in this chapter of the ,analytica1 ,aristotle designates the present fallacy by the title1 ,non per ,hoc1 ,greek3 ou7 para touto--ou7 para tn the_/sin sumbai_/nei to pseudos4 ,he makes express reference to the ,topica 7i4e4 to the fifth chapter of ,sophist4 ,elenchi1 which he regards as part of the ,topica71 where the same fallacy is designated by a different title1 ,non ,causa pro ,caus1 ,greek3 to a7nai_/tion 7s ai7_/tion tithe_/nai4 ,we see plainly that this chapter of the ,anal4 ,priora was composed later than the fifth chapter of ,soph4 ,el42 whether this is true of the two treatises as wholes is not so certain4 ,i think it probable that the change of designation for the same fallacy was deliberately adopted4 ,it is an improvement to dismiss the vague term ,cause4 ,footnote #cj3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #ff1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 e7pei tau7to_/ ge pseudos sumbai_/nein dia pleio_/nn u7pothe_/sen ou7den i7_/ss a7_/topon1 oi7on tas parall_/lous sumpi_/ptein1 c4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xviii4 p4 #ff1 a4 #af-bd3 ,greek3 o7 de pseuds lo_/gos gi_/netai para to prton pseudos1 c4 ,in impugning the thesis and in extracting from your opponent the proper concessions to enable you to do so1 you will take care to put the interrogations in such form and order as will best disguise the final conclusion which you aim at establishing4 ,if you intend to arrive at it through preliminary syllogisms 7prosyllogisms71 you will ask assent to the necessary premisses in a confused or inverted order1 and will refrain from enunciating at once the conclusion from any of them4 ,suppose that you wish to end by showing that ,a may be predicated of ,f1 and suppose that there must be intervening steps through ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e4 ,you will not put the questions in this regular order1 but will first ask him to grant that ,a may be predicated of ,b2 next1 that ,d may be predicated of ,e2 afterwards1 that ,b may be predicated of ,c1 c4 ,you will thus try to obtain all the concessions requisite for your final conclusion1 before he perceives your drift4 ,if you can carry your point by only one syllogism1 and have only one middle term to get conceded1 you will do well to put the middle term first in your questions4 ,this is the best way to conceal your purpose from the respondent4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ff1 a4 #cc-;b4 #c3 ,greek3 chr d' o7_/per phila_/ttesthai paragge_/llomen a7pokrinome_/nous1 au7tous e7picheirountas peirasthai lantha_/nein4--ka7n di' e7nos me_/sou gi_/ntai o7 sullogismo_/s1 a7po tou me_/sou a7_/rchesthai2 ma_/lista gar a7n ou7_/t la_/nthanoi ton a7pokrino_/menon4 ,see the explanation of ,pacius1 p4 #che4 ,since the middle term does not appear in the conclusion1 the respondent is less likely to be prepared for the conclusion that you want to establish4 ,to put the middle term first1 in enunciating the ,syllogism1 is regarded by ,aristotle as a perverted and embarrassing order1 yet it is the received practice among modern logicians4 ,it will be his business to see that he is not thus tripped up in the syllogistic process4#cc ,if you ask the questions in the order above indicated1 without enunciating your preliminary conclusions1 he must take care not to concede the same term twice1 either as predicate1 or as subject1 or as both2 for you can arrive at no conclusion unless he grants you a middle term2 and no term can be employed as middle1 unless it be repeated twice4 ,knowing the conditions of a conclusion in each of the three figures1 he will avoid making such concessions as will empower you to conclude in any one of them4#cd ,if the thesis which he defends is affirmative1 the elenchus by which you impugn it must be a negative2 so that he will be careful not to concede the premisses for a negative conclusion4 ,if his thesis be negative1 your purpose will require you to meet him by an affirmative2 accordingly he must avoid granting you any sufficient premisses for an affirmative conclusion4 ,he may thus make it impossible for you to prove syllogistically the contrary or contradictory of his thesis2 and it is in proving this that the elenchus or refutation consists4 ,if he will not grant you any affirmative proposition1 nor any universal proposition1 you know1 by the rules previously laid down1 that no valid syllogism can be constructed2 since nothing can be inferred either from two premisses both negative1 or from two premisses both particular4#ce ,footnote #cc3 ,analyt ,prior4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ff1 a4 #be-cb3 ,greek3 pros de to m katasullogi_/zesthai paratrte_/on1 o7_/tan a7_/neu tn sumperasma_/tn e7rta ton lo_/gon1 c4 ,waitz 7p4 #ebj7 explains ,greek3 katasullogi_/zesthai1 disputationum et interrogationum laqueis aliquem irretire4 ,this is1 ,i think1 more correct than the distinction which ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire seeks to draw1 entre le ,catasyllogisme et la ,rfutation1 in the valuable notes to his translation of the ,analytica ,priora1 p4 #cjc4 ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ff1 a4 #be-cb4 ,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 xx4 p4 #ff1 b4 #d-ag4 ,the reader will observe how completely this advice given by ,aristotle is shaped for the purpose of obtaining victory in the argument and how he leaves out of consideration both the truth of what the opponent asks to be conceded1 and the belief entertained by the defendant4 ,this is exactly the procedure which he himself makes a ground of contemptuous reproach against the ,sophists4 ,we have already seen that error may arise by wrong enunciation or arrangement of the terms of a syllogism1 that is1 defects in its form2 but sometimes also1 even when the form is correct1 error may arise from wrong belief as to the matters affirmed or denied4#cf ,thus the same predicate may belong1 immediately and essentially1 alike to several distinct subjects2 but you may believe 7what is the truth7 that it belongs to one of them1 and you may at the same time believe 7erroneously7 that it does not belong to another4 ,suppose that ,a is predicable essentially both of ,b and ,c1 and that ,a1 ,b1 and ,c1 are all predicable essentially of ,d4 ,you may know that ,a is predicable of all ,b1 and that ,b is predicable of all ,d2 but you may at the same time believe 7erroneously7 that ,a is not predicable of any ,c1 and that ,c is predicable of all ,d4 ,under this state of knowledge and belief1 you may construct two valid syllogisms2 the first 7in ,barbara1 with ,b for its middle term7 proving that ,a belongs to all ,d2 the second 7in ,celarent1 with ,c for its middle term7 proving that ,a belongs to no ,d4 ,the case will be the same1 even if all the terms taken belong to the same ascending or descending logical series4 ,here1 then1 you know one proposition2 yet you believe the proposition contrary to it4#cg ,how can such a mental condition be explained8 ,it would1 indeed1 be an impossibility1 if the middle term of the two syllogisms were the same1 and if the premisses of the one syllogism thus contradicted directly and in terms1 the premisses of the other3 should that happen1 you cannot know one side of the alternative and believe the other4 ,but if the middle term be different1 so that the contradiction between the premisses of the one syllogism and those of the other1 is not direct1 there is no impossibility4 ,thus1 you know that ,a is predicable of all ,b1 and ,b of all ,d2 while you believe at the same time that ,a is predicable of no ,c1 and ,c of all ,d2 the middle term being in one syllogism ,b1 in the other1 ,c4#ch ,this last form of error is analogous to what often occurs in respect to our knowledge of particulars4 ,you know that ,a belongs to all ,b1 and ,b to all ,c2 you know1 therefore1 that ,a belongs to all ,c4 ,yet you may perhaps be ignorant of the existence of ,c4 ,suppose ,a to denote equal to two right angles2 ,b1 to be the triangle generally2 ,c1 a particular visible triangle4 ,you know ,a ,b the universal proposition2 yet you may at the same time believe that ,c does not exist2 and thus it may happen that you know1 and do not know1 the same thing at the same time4 ,for1 in truth1 the knowledge1 that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles1 is not 7as a mental fact7 simple and absolute1 but has two distinct aspects2 one as concerns the universal1 the other as concerns the several particulars4 ,now1 assuming the case above imagined1 you possess the knowledge in the first of these two aspects1 but not in the second2 so that the apparent contrariety between knowledge and no knowledge is not real4#ci ,and in this sense the doctrine of ,plato in the ,menon is partially true--that learning is reminiscence4 ,we can never know beforehand particular cases per se2 but in proportion as we extend our induction to each case 9999successively1 we1 as it were1 recognize that1 which we knew beforehand as a general truth1 to be realized in each4 ,thus when we ascertain the given figure before us to be a triangle1 we know immediately that its three angles are equal to two right angles4#dj ,footnote #cf3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #ff1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 sumbai_/nei d' e7ni_/ote1 katha_/per e7n t the_/sei tn o7_/rn a7pat_/metha1 kai kata tn u7po_/lpsin gi_/nesthai tn a7pa_/tn4 ,the vague and general way in which ,aristotle uses the term ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis1 seems to be best rendered by our word belief4 ,see ,trendelenburg ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 p4 #dfi2 ,biese1 ,philos4 des ,aristot4 i4 p4 #baa4 ,footnote #cg3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #ff1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 7_/ste o7_/ ps e7pi_/statai1 touto o7_/ls a7xioi m u7polamba_/nein2 o7_/per a7du_/naton4 ,footnote #ch3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #e-h4 ,footnote #ci3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #ai3 ,greek3 ou7_/t men ou7n 7s t katho_/lou ou7de to ,g o7_/ti du_/o o7rthai_/1 7s de t kath' e7_/kaston ou7k oi7den1 7_/st' ou7ch e7_/xei tas e7nanti_/as 7sc4 ,greek3 e7pist_/mos74 ,footnote #dj3 ,ibid4 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 ou7damou gar sumbai_/nei proepi_/stasthai to kath' e7_/kaston1 a7ll' a7_/ma t e7pagg lamba_/nein tn tn kata me_/ros e7pist_/mn 7_/sper a7nagnri_/zontas1 c4 ,cf4 ,anal4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #i1 seq42 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #ha-hb4 ,we thus1 by help of the universal1 acquire a theoretical knowledge of particulars1 but we do not know them by the special observation properly belonging to each particular case3 so that we may err in respect to them without any positive contrariety between our cognition and our error2 since what we know is the universal1 while what we err in is the particular4 ,we may even know that ,a is predicable of all ,b1 and that ,b is predicable of all ,c2 and yet we may believe that ,a is not predicable of ,c4 ,we may know that every mule is barren1 and that the animal before us is a mule1 yet still we may believe her to be in foal2 for perhaps we may never have combined in our minds the particular case along with the universal proposition4#da ,a fortiori1 therefore1 we may make the like mistake1 if we know the universal only1 and do not know the particular4 ,and this is perfectly possible4 ,for take any one of the visible particular instances1 even one which we have already inspected1 so soon as it is out of sight we do not know it by actual and present cognition2 we only know it1 partly from the remembrance of past special inspection1 partly from the universal under which it falls4#db ,we may know in one1 or other1 or all1 of these three distinct ways3 either by the universal2 or specially 7as remembered73 or by combination of both--actual and present cognition1 that is1 by the application of a foreknown generality to a case submitted to our senses4 ,and as we may know in each of these three ways1 so we may also err or be deceived in each of the same three ways4#dc ,it is therefore quite possible that we may know1 and that we may err or be deceived about the same thing1 and that1 too1 without any contrariety4 ,this is what happens when we know both the two premisses of the syllogism1 but have never reflected on them before1 nor brought them into conjunction in our minds4 ,when we believe that the mule before us is in foal1 we are destitute of the actual knowledge2 yet our erroneous belief is not for that reason contrary to knowledge2 for an erroneous belief1 contrary to the universal proposition1 must be represented by a counter-syllogism4#dd ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #cf3 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7pi_/statai o7_/ti to ,a t ,g1 m sunthern to kath' e7ka_/teron4 ,footnote #db3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #ci3 ,greek3 ou7den gar tn ai7sthtn e7_/x ts ai7sth_/ses geno_/menon i7_/smen1 ou7_/d' a7n 7sthme_/noi tugcha_/nmen1 ei7 m 7s t katho_/lou kai t e7_/chein tn oi7kei_/an e7pist_/mn1 a7ll' ou7ch 7s t e7nergein4 ,complete cognition 7,greek3 to e7nergein1 according to the view here set forth7 consists of one mental act corresponding to the major premiss2 another corresponding to the minor2 and a third including both the two in conscious juxta-position4 ,the third implies both the first and the second2 but the first and the second do not necessarily imply the third1 nor does either of them imply the other2 though a person cognizant of the first is in a certain way1 and to a certain extent1 cognizant of all the particulars to which the second applies4 ,thus the person who knows ,ontology 7the most universal of all sciences1 ,greek3 tou o7_/ntos 7 o7_/n71 knows in a certain way all scibilia4 ,metaphys4 ,a41 p4 #ihb1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 tou_/tn de to men pa_/nta e7pi_/stasthai t ma_/lista e7_/chonti tn katho_/lou e7pist_/mn a7nagkaion u7pa_/rchein2 ou7_/tos gar oi7de_/ ps pa_/nta ta u7pokei_/mena4 ,ib4 a4 #h3 ,greek3 u7polamba_/nomen d prton men e7pi_/stasthai pa_/nta ton sophon 7s e7nde_/chetai1 m kath' e7_/kaston e7_/chonta e7pist_/mn au7tn4 ,see the ,scholia of ,alexander on these passages1 pp4 #ebe1 #ebf1 ,brandis2 also ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #hf1 a4 #be2 ,physica1 ,,vii4 p4 #bdg1 a4 #e4 ,bonitz observes justly 7,comm4 9999ad ,metaphys4 p4 #da7 as to the doctrine of ,aristotle3 ,scientia et ars versatur in notionibus universalibus1 solutis ac liberis conceptu singularum rerum2 ideoque1 etsi orta est principio et experienti1 tradi tamen etiam iis potest qui careant experienti4 ,footnote #dc3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 to gar e7pi_/stasthai le_/getai trichs1 7 7s t katho_/lou1 7 7s t oi7kei_/a1 7 7s t e7nergein2 7_/ste kai to 7patsthai tosautachs4 ,footnote #dd3 ,ibid4 b4 #e3 ,greek3 ou7den ou7n klu_/ei kai ei7de_/nai kai 7patsthai peri au7to_/1 pln ou7k e7nanti_/s4 o7_/per sumbai_/nei kai t kath' e7kate_/ran ei7do_/ti tn pro_/tasin kai m e7peskemme_/n pro_/teron4 u7polamba_/nn gar ku_/ein tn 7mi_/onon ou7k e7_/chei tn kata to e7nergein e7pist_/mn1 ou7d' au7 dia tn u7po_/lpsin e7nanti_/an a7pa_/tn t e7pist_/m2 sullogismos gar 7 e7nanti_/a a7pa_/t t katho_/lou4 ,about erroneous belief1 where a man believes the contrary of a true conclusion1 adopting a counter-syllogism1 compare ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #gi1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 a7_/gnoia kata dia_/thesin4 ,it is impossible1 however1 for a man to believe that one contrary is predicable of its contrary1 or that one contrary is identical with its contrary1 essentially and as an universal proposition2 though he may believe that it is so by accident 7i4e4 in some particular case1 by reason of the peculiarities of that case74 ,in various ways this last is possible2 but this we reserve for fuller examination4#de ,footnote #de3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 a7ll' i7_/ss e7keino pseudos1 to u7polabein tina kak ei7nai to a7gath ei7nai1 ei7 m kata sumbebko_/s2 pollachs gar e7gchrei touth' u7polamba_/nein4 e7piskepte_/on de touto be_/ltion4 ,this distinction is illustrated by what we read in ,plato1 ,republic1 v4 pp4 #dgh-dgi4 ,the impossibility of believing that one contrary is identical with its contrary1 is maintained by ,sokrates in ,plato1 ,thetetus1 p4 #aij1 ,b-,d1 as a part of the long discussion respecting ,greek3 pseuds do_/xa3 either there is no such thing as ,greek3 pseuds do_/xa1 or a man may know1 and not know1 the same thing1 ibid4 p4 #aif ,c4 ,aristotle has here tried to show in what sense this last-mentioned case is possible4 ,whenever 7,aristotle next goes on to say7 the extremes of a syllogism reciprocate or are co-extensive with each other 7i4e4 when the conclusion being affirmative is convertible simply71 the middle term must reciprocate or be co-extensive with both4#df ,if there be four terms 7,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d71 such that ,a reciprocates with ,b1 and ,c with ,d1 and if either ,a or ,c must necessarily be predicable of every subject2 then it follows that either ,b or ,d must necessarily also be predicable of every subject4 ,again1 if either ,a or ,b must necessarily be predicable of every subject1 but never both predicable of the same at once2 and if1 either ,c or ,d must be predicable of every subject1 but never both predicable of the same at once2 then1 if ,a and ,c reciprocate1 ,b and ,d will also reciprocate4#dg ,when ,a is predicable of all ,b and all ,c1 but of no other subject besides1 and when ,b is predicable of all ,c1 then ,a and ,b must reciprocate with each other1 or be co-extensive with each other2 that is1 ,b may be predicated of every subject of which ,a can be predicated1 though ,b cannot be predicated of ,a itself4#dh ,again1 when ,a and ,b are predicable of all ,c1 and when ,c reciprocates with ,b1 then ,a must also be predicable of all ,b4#di ,footnote #df3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxii4 p4 #fg1 b4 #bg1 seq4 ,in this chapter ,aristotle introduces us to affirmative universal propositions convertible simpliciter2 that is1 in which the predicate must be understood to be distributed as well as the subject4 ,here1 then1 the quantity of the predicate is determined in thought4 ,this is 7as ,julius ,pacius remarks1 p4 #cga7 in order to lay down principles for the resolution of ,induction into ,syllogism1 which is to be explained in the next chapter4 ,in these peculiar propositions1 the reason urged by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton for his favourite precept of verbally indicating the quantity of the predicate1 is well founded as a fact3 though he says that in all propositions the quantity of the predicate is understood in thought1 which ,i hold to be incorrect4 ,we may remark that this recognition by ,aristotle of a class of universal affirmative propositions in which predicate and subject reciprocate1 contrived in order to force ,induction into the syllogistic framework1 is at variance with his general view both of reciprocating propositions and of ,induction4 ,he tells us 7,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gc1 a4 #ah7 that such reciprocating propositions are very rare1 which would not be true if they are taken to represent every ,induction2 and he forbids us emphatically to annex the mark of universality to the predicate2 which he has no right to do1 if he calls upon us to reason on the predicate as distributed 7,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxvii41 p4 #dc1 b4 #ag2 ,de ,interpret4 p4 #ag1 b4 #ad74 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxii4 p4 #fh1 a4 #b-ae4 ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 a4 #af-ba4 ,greek3 pln au7tou tou ,a4 ,waitz explains these words in his note 7p4 #eca73 yet ,i do not clearly make them out2 and ,alexander of ,aphrodisias declared them to assert what was erroneous 7,greek3 e7spha_/lthai le_/gei1 ,schol4 p4 #aid1 a4 #dj1 ,brandis74 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxii4 p4 #fh1 a4 #ba-be4 ,lastly1 suppose two pairs of opposites1 ,a and ,b1 ,c and ,d2 let ,a be more eligible than ,b1 and ,d more eligible than ,c4 ,then1 if ,a ,c is more eligible than ,b ,d1 ,a will also be more eligible than ,d4 ,for ,a is as much worthy of pursuit as ,b is worthy of avoidance1 they being two opposites2 the like also respecting ,c and ,d4 ,if then ,a and ,d are equally worthy of pursuit1 ,b and ,c are equally worthy of avoidance2 for each is equal to each4 ,accordingly the two together1 ,a ,c1 will be equal to the two together1 ,b ,d4 ,but this would be contrary to the supposition2 since we assumed ,a to be more eligible than ,b1 and ,d to be more eligible than ,c4 ,it will be seen that on this supposition ,a is more worthy of pursuit than ,d1 and that ,c is less worthy of avoidance than ,b2 the greater good and the lesser evil being more eligible than the lesser good and the greater evil4 ,now apply this to a particular case of a lover1 so far forth as lover4 ,let ,a represent his possession of those qualities which inspire reciprocity of love towards him in the person beloved2 ,b1 the absence of those qualities2 ,d1 the attainment of actual sexual enjoyment2 ,c1 the non-attainment thereof4 ,in this state of circumstances1 it is evident that ,a is more eligible or worthy of preference than ,d4 ,the being loved is a greater object of desire to the lover qua lover than sexual gratification2 it is the real end or purpose to which love aspires2 and sexual gratification is either not at all the purpose1 or at best only subordinate and accessory4 ,the like is the case with our other appetites and pursuits4#ej ,footnote #ej3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxii4 p4 #fh1 a4 #be-;b4 #ag4 ,aristotle may be right in the conclusion which he here emphatically asserts2 but ,i am surprised that he should consider it to be proved by the reasoning that precedes4 ,it is probable that ,aristotle here understood the object of ,greek3 e7_/rs 7as it is conceived through most part of the ,symposion of ,plato7 to be a beautiful youth3 7see ,plato1 ,sympos4 pp4 #bah-bbb2 also ,xenophon1 ,sympos4 c4 viii41 ,hiero1 c4 xi4 #aa1 ,memorab4 ,i4 ii4 #bi1 #cj74 ,yet this we must say--what the two women said when they informed ,simtha of the faithlessness of ,delphis 7,theokrit4 ,id4 ii4 #adi7--;,greek3 ,k7pe_/ moi a7_/lla te polla_/1 kai 7s a7_/ra ,de_/lphis e7_/ratai2 ,k7_/te min au7te gunaikos e7_/chei po_/thos1 ei7_/te kai a7ndro_/s1 ,ou7k e7_/phat' a7trekes i7_/dmen4 ,such is the relation of the terms of a syllogism in regard to reciprocation and antithesis4 ,let it next be understood that the canons hitherto laid down belong not merely to demonstrative and dialectic syllogisms1 but to rhetorical and other syllogisms also2 all of which must be constructed in one or other of the three figures4 ,in fact1 every case of belief on evidence1 whatever be the method followed1 must be tested by these same canons4 ,we believe everything either through ,syllogism or upon ,induction4#ea ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 a7_/panta gar pisteu_/omen 7 dia sullogismou 7 e7x e7paggs4 ,though ,aristotle might seem1 even here1 to have emphatically contrasted ,syllogism with ,induction as a ground of belief1 he proceeds forthwith to indicate a peculiar form of ,syllogism which may be constructed out of ,induction4 ,induction1 and the ,syllogism from or out of ,induction 7he says7 is a process in which we invert the order of the terms4 ,instead of concluding from the major through the middle to the minor 7i4e4 concluding that the major is predicable of the minor71 we now begin from the minor and conclude from thence through the middle to the major 7i4e4 we conclude that the major is predicable of the middle74#eb ,in ,syllogism as hitherto described1 we concluded that ,a the major was predicable of ,c the minor1 through the middle ,b2 in the ,syllogism from ,induction we begin by affirming that ,a the major is predicable of ,c the minor2 next1 we affirm that ,b the middle is also predicable of ,c the minor4 ,the two premisses1 standing thus1 correspond to the ,third figure of the ,syllogism 7as explained in the preceding pages7 and would not therefore by themselves justify anything more than a particular affirmative conclusion4 ,but we reinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption3--,that the minor ,c is co-extensive with the middle ,b1 and comprises the entire aggregate of individuals of which ,b is the universal or class-term4 ,by reason of this assumption the minor proposition becomes convertible simply1 and we are enabled to infer 7according to the last preceding chapter7 an universal affirmative conclusion1 that the major term ,a is predicable of the middle term ,b4 ,thus1 let ,a 7the major term7 mean the class-term1 long-lived2 let ,b 7the middle term7 mean the class-term1 bile-less1 or the having no bile2 let ,c 7the minor term7 mean the individual animals--man1 horse1 mule1 c41 coming under the class-term ,b1 bile-less4#ec ,we are supposed to know1 or to have ascertained1 that ,a may be predicated of all ,c2 7i4e4 that all men1 horses1 mules1 c41 are long-lived72 we farther know that ,b is predicable of all ,c 7i4e4 that men1 horses1 mules1 c41 belong to the class bile-less74 ,here1 then1 we have two premisses in the ,third syllogistic figure1 which in themselves would warrant us in drawing the particular affirmative conclusion1 that ,a is predicable of some ,b1 but no more4 ,accordingly1 ,aristotle directs us to supplement these premisses#ed by the extraneous assumption or postulate1 that ,c the minor comprises all the individual animals that are bile-less1 or all those that correspond to the class-term ,b2 in other words1 the assumption1 that ,b the middle does not denote any more individuals than those which are covered by ,c the minor--that ,b the middle does not stretch beyond or overpass ,c the minor4#ee ,having the two premisses1 and this postulate besides1 we acquire the right to conclude that ,a is predicable of all ,b4 ,but we could not draw that conclusion from the premisses alone1 or without the postulate which declares ,b and ,c to be co-extensive4 ,the conclusion1 then1 becomes a particular exemplification of the general doctrine laid down in the last chapter1 respecting the reciprocation of extremes and the consequences thereof4 ,we thus see that this very peculiar ,syllogism from ,induction is 7as indeed ,aristotle himself remarks7 the opposite or antithesis of a genuine ,syllogism4 ,it has no proper middle term2 the conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition1 the characteristic feature of which it is to be immediate1 or not to be demonstrated through a middle term4 ,aristotle adds that the genuine ,syllogism1 which demonstrates through a middle term1 is by nature prior and more effective as to cognition2 but that the ,syllogism from ,induction is to us plainer and clearer4#ef ,footnote #eb3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ae3 ,greek3 e7pagg men ou7n e7sti kai o7 e7x e7paggs sullogismos to dia tou e7te_/rou tha_/teron a7_/kron t me_/s sullogi_/sasthai2 oi7on ei7 tn ,,ag me_/son to ,b1 dia tou ,g deixai to ,a t ,b u7pa_/rchon2 ou7_/t gar poiou_/metha tas e7pagga_/s4 ,waitz in his note 7p4 #ecb7 says3 ,fit ,inductio1 cum per minorem terminum demonstratur medium prdicari de majore4 ,this is an erroneous explanation4 ,it should have been3 demonstratur majorem prdicari de medio4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 #fh1 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 kai tro_/pon tina a7ntikeitai 7 e7pagg t sullogism2 o7 men gar dia tou me_/sou to a7_/kron t tri_/t dei_/knusin1 7 de dia tou tri_/tou to a7_/kron t me_/s4 ,footnote #ec3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 oi7on e7_/st to ,a makro_/bion1 to d' e7ph' 7 ,b1 to choln m e7_/chon1 e7ph' 7 de ,g1 to kath' e7_/kaston makro_/bion1 oi7on a7_/nthrpos kai i7_/ppos kai 7mi_/onos4 t d ,g o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a2 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion2 a7lla kai to ,b1 to m e7_/chein chol_/n1 panti u7pa_/rchei t ,g4 ei7 ou7n a7ntistre_/phei to ,g t ,b kai m u7pertei_/nei to me_/son1 a7na_/gk to ,a t ,b u7pa_/rchein4 ,i have transcribed this ,greek text as it stands in the editions of ,buhle1 ,bekker1 ,waitz1 and ,f4 ,didot4 ,yet1 notwithstanding these high authorities1 ,i venture to contend that it is not wholly correct2 that the word ,greek3 makro_/bion1 which ,i have emphasized1 is neither consistent with the context1 nor suitable for the point which ,aristotle is illustrating4 ,instead of ,greek3 makro_/bion1 we ought in that place to read ,greek3 a7_/cholon2 and ,i have given the sense of the passage in my ,english text as if it did stand ,greek3 a7_/cholon in that place4 ,i proceed to justify this change4 ,if we turn back to the edition by ,julius ,pacius 7#aehd1 p4 #cgg71 we find the text given as follows after the word ,greek3 7mi_/onos 7down to that word the text is the same73 ,greek3 t d ,g o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a2 pan gar to ,g makro_/bion2 a7lla kai to ,b1 to m e7_/chon chol_/n1 panti u7pa_/rchei t ,g4 ei7 ou7n a7ntistre_/phei to ,g t ,b1 kai m u7pertei_/nei to me_/son1 a7na_/gk to ,a t ,b u7pa_/rchein4 ,earlier than ,pacius1 the edition of ,erasmus 7,basil4 #aeej7 has the same text in this chapter4 ,here it will be seen that in place of the words given in ,waitz's text1 ,greek3 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion1 ,pacius gives ,greek3 pan gar to ,g makro_/bion3 annexing however to the letter ,greek3 ,g an asterisk referring to the margin1 where we find the word ,greek3 a7_/cholon inserted in small letters1 seemingly as a various reading not approved by ,pacius4 ,and ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire has accommodated his ,french translation 7p4 #cbh7 to the text of ,pacius3 ,donc ,a est ,c tout entier1 car tout ,c est longve4 ,boethius in his ,latin translation 7p4 #eai7 recognizes as his original ,greek3 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion1 but he alters the text in the words immediately preceding3--,ergo toti ,b 7instead of toti ,c7 inest ,a1 omne enim quod sine cholera est1 longvum1 c4 7p4 #eai74 ,the edition of ,aldus 7,venet4 #adie7 has the text conformable to the ,latin of ,boethius3 ,greek3 t d ,b o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a2 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion4 ,three distinct ,latin translations of the #afth century are adapted to the same text1 viz41 that of ,vives and ,valentinus 7,basil4 #aedb72 that published by the ,junta 7,venet4 #aeeb72 and that of ,cyriacus 7,basil4 #aefc74 ,lastly1 the two ,greek editions of ,sylburg 7#aehg7 and ,casaubon 7,lugduni #aeij71 have the same text also3 ,greek3 t d ,b o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a2 pan gar to ,g to a7_/cholon makro_/bion4 ,casaubon prints in brackets the words ,greek3 to ,g before ,greek3 to a7_/cholon4 ,now it appears to me that the text of ,bekker and ,waitz 7though ,waitz gives it without any comment or explanation7 is erroneous2 neither consisting with itself1 nor conforming to the general view enunciated by ,aristotle of the ,syllogism from ,induction4 ,i have cited two distinct versions1 each different from this text1 as given by the earliest editors2 in both the confusion appears to have been felt1 and an attempt made to avoid it1 though not successfully4 ,aristotle's view of the ,syllogism from ,induction is very clearly explained by ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire in the instructive notes of his translation1 pp4 #cbf-cbh2 also in his ,preface1 p4 lvii43--,l'induction n'est au fond qu'un syllogisme dont le mineur et le moyen sont d'extension gale4 ,du reste1 il n'est qu'une seule manire dont le moyen et le mineur puissent tre d'gale extension2 c'est que le mineur se compose de toutes les parties dont le moyen reprsente la totalit4 ,d'une part1 tous les individus3 de l'autre1 l'espce totale qu'ils forment4 ,l'intelligence fait aussitt quation entre les deux termes gaux4 ,according to the ,aristotelian text1 as given both by ,pacius and the others1 ,a1 the major term1 represents longvum 7long-lived1 the class-term or total72 ,b1 the middle term1 represents vacans bile 7bile-less1 the class-term or total72 ,c1 the minor term1 represents the aggregate individuals of the class longvum1 man1 horse1 mule1 c4 ,julius ,pacius draws out the ,inductive ,syllogism1 thus3-- #a4 ,omnis homo1 equus1 asinus1 c41 est longvus4 #b4 ,omnis homo1 equus1 asinus1 c41 vacat bile4 ,ergo3 #c4 ,quicquid vacat bile1 est longvum4 ,convertible into a ,syllogism in ,barbara3-- #a4 ,omnis homo1 equus1 asinus1 c41 est longvus4 #b4 ,quicquid vacat bile1 est homo1 equus1 asinus1 c4 ,ergo3 #c4 ,quicquid vacat bile1 est longvum4 ,here the force of the proof 7or the possibility1 in this exceptional case1 of converting a syllogism in the ,third figure into another in ,barbara of the ,first figure7 depends upon the equation or co-extensiveness 7not enunciated in the premisses1 but assumed in addition to the premisses7 of the minor term ,c with the middle term ,b4 ,but ,i contend that this is not the condition peremptorily required1 or sufficient for proof1 if we suppose ,c the minor term to represent omne longvum4 ,we must understand ,c the minor term to represent omne vacans bile1 or quicquid vacat bile3 and unless we understand this1 the proof fails4 ,in other words1 homo1 equus1 asinus1 c4 7the aggregate of individuals71 must be co-extensive with the class-term bile-less or vacans bile3 but they need not be co-extensive with the class-term long-lived or longvum4 ,in the final conclusion1 the subject vacans bile is distributed2 but the predicate longvum is not distributed2 this latter may include1 besides all bile-less animals1 any number of other animals1 without impeachment of the syllogistic proof4 ,such being the case1 ,i think that there is a mistake in the text as given by all the editors1 from ,pacius down to ,bekker and ,waitz4 ,what they give1 in setting out the terms of the ,aristotelian ,syllogism from ,induction1 is3 ,greek3 e7_/st to ,a makro_/bion1 to d' e7ph' 7 ,b1 to choln m e7_/chon1 e7ph' 7 de ,g1 to kath' e7_/kaston makro_/bion1 oi7on a7_/nthrpos kai i7_/ppos kai 7mi_/onos4 ,instead of which the text ought to run1 ,greek3 e7ph' 7 de ,g1 to kath' e7_/kaston a7_/cholon1 oi7on a7_/nthr4 k4 i7_/p4 k4 7mi_/4 ,that these last words were the original text1 is seen by the words immediately following3 ,greek3 t d ,g o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a4 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion4 ,for the reason thus assigned 7in the particle ,greek3 ga_/r7 is irrelevant and unmeaning if ,greek3 ,g designates ,greek3 to kath' e7_/kaston makro_/bion 1 while it is pertinent and even indispensable if ,greek3 ,g designates ,greek3 to kath' e7_/kaston a7_/cholon4 ,pacius 7or those whose guidance he followed in his text7 appears to have perceived the incongruity of the reason conveyed in the words ,greek3 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion2 for he gives1 instead of these words1 ,greek3 pan gar to ,g makro_/bion4 ,in this version the reason is indeed no longer incongruous1 but simply useless and unnecessary2 for when we are told that ,a designates the class longvum1 and that ,greek3 ,g designates the individual longva1 we surely require no reason from without to satisfy us that ,a is predicable of all ,greek3 ,g4 ,the text1 as translated by ,boethius and others1 escapes that particular incongruity1 though in another way1 but it introduces a version inadmissible on other grounds4 ,instead of ,greek3 t d ,g o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a1 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion1 ,boethius has ,greek3 t d ,b o7_/l u7pa_/rchei to ,a1 pan gar to a7_/cholon makro_/bion4 ,this cannot be accepted1 because it enunciates the conclusion of the syllogism as if it were one of the premisses4 ,we must remember that the conclusion of the ,aristotelian ,syllogism from ,induction is1 that ,a is predicable of ,b1 one of the premisses to prove it being that ,a is predicable of the minor term ,c4 ,but obviously we cannot admit as one of the premisses the proposition that ,a may be predicated of ,b1 since this proposition would then be used as premiss to prove itself as conclusion4 ,if we examine the ,aristotelian ,inductive ,syllogism which is intended to conduct us to the final probandum1 we shall see that the terms of it are incorrectly set out by ,bekker and ,waitz1 when they give the minor term ,greek3 ,g as designating ,greek3 to kath' e7_/kaston makro_/bion4 ,this last is not one of the three terms1 nor has it any place in the syllogism4 ,the three terms are3 #a4 ,a--major--the class-term or class ,greek3 makro_/bion--longvum4 #b4 ,b--middle--the class term or class ,greek3 a7_/cholon--bile-less4 #c4 ,c--minor--the individual bile-less animals1 man1 horse1 c4 ,there is no term in the syllogism corresponding to the individual longva or long-lived animals2 this last 7,i repeat7 has no place in the reasoning4 ,we are noway concerned with the totality of long-lived animals2 all that the syllogism undertakes to prove is1 that in and among that totality all bile-less animals are included2 whether there are or are not other long-lived animals besides the bile-less1 the syllogism does not pretend to determine4 ,the equation or co-extensiveness required 7as described by ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire in his note7 is not between the individual long-lived animals and the class1 bile-less animals 7middle term71 but between the aggregate of individual animals known to be bile-less and the class1 bile-less animals4 ,the real minor term1 therefore1 is 7not the individual long-lived animals1 but7 the individual bile-less animals4 ,the two premisses of the ,inductive ,syllogism will stand thus3-- ,men1 ,horses1 ,mules1 c41 are long-lived 7major74 ,men1 ,horses1 ,mules1 c41 are bile-less 7minor74 ,and1 inasmuch as the subject of the minor proposition is co-extensive with the predicate 7which1 if quantified according to ,hamilton's phraseology1 would be1 ,all bile-less animals71 so that the proposition admits of being converted simply1--the middle term will become the subject of the conclusion1 ,all bileless animals are long-lived4 ,footnote #ed3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 dei de noein to ,g to e7x a7pa_/ntn tn kath' e7_/kaston sugkei_/menon2 7 gar e7pagg dia pa_/ntn4 ,footnote #ee3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 9999xxiii4 p4 #fh1 p4 #bc3 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n a7ntistre_/phei to ,g t ,b1 kai m u7pertei_/nei to me_/son1 a7na_/gk to ,a t ,b u7pa_/rchein4 ,julius ,pacius translates this3 ,si igitur convertatur ,greek3 to ,g cum ,b1 nec medium excedat1 necesse est ,greek3 to ,a t ,b inesse4 ,these ,latin words include the same grammatical ambiguity as is found in the ,greek original3 medium1 like ,greek3 to me_/son1 may be either an accusative case governed by excedat1 or a nominative case preceding excedat4 ,the same may be said of the other ,latin translations1 from ,boethius downwards4 ,but ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire in his ,french translation1 and ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in his ,english translation 7,lectures on ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #ceh1 ,appendix71 steer clear of this ambiguity4 ,the former says3 ,si donc ,c est rciproque ,b1 et qu'il ne dpasse pas le moyen1 il est ncessaire alors que ,a soit ,b3 to the same purpose1 ,hamilton1 l4 c4 ,these words are quite plain and unequivocal4 ,yet ,i do not think that they convey the meaning of ,aristotle4 ,in my judgment1 ,aristotle meant to say3 ,if then ,c reciprocates with ,b1 and if the middle term 7,b7 does not stretch beyond 7the minor ,c71 it is necessary that ,a should be predicable of ,b4 ,to show that this must be the meaning1 we have only to reflect on what ,c and ,b respectively designate4 ,it is assumed that ,c designates the sum of individual bile-less animals2 and that ,b designates the class or class-term bile-less1 that is1 the totality thereof4 ,now the sum of individuals included in the minor 7,c7 cannot upon any supposition overpass the totality3 but it may very possibly fall short of totality2 or 7to state the same thing in other words7 the totality may possibly surpass the sum of individuals under survey1 but it cannot possibly fall short thereof4 ,b is here the limit1 and may possibly stretch beyond ,c2 but cannot stretch beyond ,b4 ,hence ,i contend that the translations1 both by ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire and ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 take the wrong side in the grammatical alternative admissible under the words ,greek3 kai m u7pertei_/nei to me_/son4 ,the only doubt that could possibly arise in the case was1 whether the aggregate of individuals designated by the minor did1 or did not1 reach up to the totality designated by the middle term2 or 7changing the phrase7 whether the totality designated by the middle term did1 or did not1 stretch beyond the aggregate of individuals designated by the minor4 ,aristotle terminates this doubt by the words3 ,and if the middle term does not stretch beyond 7the minor74 ,of course the middle term does not stretch beyond1 when the terms reciprocate2 but when they do not reciprocate1 the middle term must be the more extensive of the two2 it can never be the less extensive of the two1 since the aggregate of individuals cannot possibly exceed totality1 though it may fall short thereof4 ,i have given in the text what ,i think the true meaning of ,aristotle1 departing from the translations of ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire and ,sir9999 ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,footnote #ef3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #cj-ch3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' o7 toioutos sullogismos ts pr_/ts kai a7me_/sou prota_/ses2 7n men ga_/r e7sti me_/son1 dia tou me_/sou o7 sullogismo_/s1 7n de m_/ e7sti1 di' e7paggs4--phu_/sei men ou7n pro_/teros kai gnrim_/teros o7 dia tou me_/sou sullogismo_/s1 7min d' e7narge_/steros o7 dia ts e7paggs4 ,from ,induction he proceeds to ,example4 ,you here take in 7besides the three terms1 major1 middle1 and minor1 of the ,syllogism7 a fourth term2 that is1 a new particular case analogous to the minor4 ,your purpose here is to show--not1 as in the ordinary ,syllogism1 that the major term is predicable of the minor1 but1 as in the ,inductive ,syllogism--that the major term is predicable of the middle term2 and you prove this conclusion1 not 7as in the ,inductive ,syllogism7 through the minor term1 but through the new case or fourth term analogous to the minor4#eg ,let ,a represent evil or mischievous2 ,b1 war against neighbours1 generally2 ,c1 war of ,athens against ,thebes1 an event to come and under deliberation2 ,d1 war of ,thebes against ,phokis1 a past event of which the issue is known to have been signally mischievous4 ,you assume as known1 first1 that ,a is predicable of ,d1 i4e4 that the war of ,thebes against ,phokis has been disastrous2 next1 that ,b is predicable both of ,c and of ,d1 i4e4 that each of the two wars1 of ,athens against ,thebes1 and of ,thebes against ,phokis1 is a war of neighbours against neighbours1 or a conterminous war4 ,now from the premiss that ,a is predicable of ,d1 along with the premiss that ,b is predicable of ,d1 you infer that ,a is predicable of the class ,b1 or of conterminous wars generally2 and hence you draw the farther inference1 that ,a is also predicable of ,c1 another particular case under the same class ,b4 ,the inference here is1 in the first instance1 from part to whole2 and finally1 through that whole1 from the one part to another part of the same whole4 ,induction includes in its major premiss all the particulars1 declaring all of them to be severally subjects of the major as predicate2 hence it infers as conclusion1 that the major is also predicable of the middle or class-term comprising all these particulars1 but comprising no others4 ,example includes not all1 but only one or a few particulars2 inferring from it or them1 first1 to the entire class1 next1 to some new analogous particular belonging to the class4#eh ,footnote #eg3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxiv4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ch3 ,greek3 paradeigma d' e7stin o7_/tan t me_/s to a7_/kron u7pa_/rchon deichth dia tou o7moi_/ou t tri_/t4 ,footnote #eh3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiv4 p4 #fi1 a4 #a-ai99994 ,julius ,pacius 7p4 #djj7 notes the unauthorized character of this so-called ,paradeigmatic ,syllogism1 contradicting the rules of the figures laid down by ,aristotle1 and also the confused manner in which the scope of it is described3 first1 to infer from a single example to the universal2 next1 to infer from a single example through the universal to another parallel case4 ,to which we may add the confused description in p4 #fi1 a4 #ag1 #ah1 where ,greek3 to a7_/kron in the first of the two lines signifies the major extreme--in the second of the two the minor extreme4 ,see ,waitz's note1 p4 #ecc4 ,if we turn to ch4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 a4 #cj-cd1 we shall find ,aristotle on a different occasion disallowing altogether this so-called ,syllogism from ,example4 ,these chapters respecting ,induction and ,example are among the most obscure and perplexing in the ,aristotelian ,analytica4 ,the attempt to throw both ,induction and ,example into the syllogistic form is alike complicated and unfortunate2 moreover1 the unsatisfactory reading and diversities in the text1 among commentators and translators1 show that the reasoning of ,aristotle has hitherto been imperfectly apprehended4#ei ,from some of his phrases1 we see that he was aware of the essential antithesis between ,induction and ,syllogism2 yet the syllogistic forms appear to have exercised such fascination over his mind1 that he could not be satisfied without trying to find some abnormal form of ,syllogism to represent and give validity to ,induction4 ,in explaining generally what the ,syllogism is1 and what ,induction is1 he informs us that the ,syllogism presupposes and rests upon the process of ,induction as its postulate4 ,for there can be no valid ,syllogism without an universal proposition in one 7at least7 of the premisses2 and he declares1 unequivocally1 that universal propositions are obtained only through ,induction4 ,how ,induction operates through the particular facts of sense1 remembered1 compared1 and coalescing into clusters held together by associating similarity1 he has also told us2 it is thus that ,experience1 with its universal notions and conjunctions1 is obtained4 ,but this important process is radically distinct from that of syllogizing1 though it furnishes the basis upon which all syllogizing is built4 ,footnote #ei3 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton 7,lectures on ,logic1 vol4 i4 p4 #cai7 says justly1 that ,aristotle has been very brief and unexplicit in his treatment of ,induction4 ,yet the objections that ,hamilton makes to ,aristotle are very different from those which ,i should make4 ,in the learned and valuable ,appendix to his ,lectures 7vol4 iv4 pp4 #ceh-cfi71 he collects various interesting criticisms of logicians respecting ,induction as handled by ,aristotle4 ,ramus 7in his ,schol ,dialectic1 ,,viii4 xi47 says very truly3--,quid vero sit ,inductio1 perobscure ab ,aristotele declaratur2 nec ab interpretibus intelligitur1 quo modo syllogismus per medium concludat majus extremum de minore2 inductio1 majus de medio per minus4 ,the ,inductive ,syllogism1 as constructed by ,aristotle1 requires a reciprocating minor premiss4 ,it may1 indeed1 be cited 7as ,i have already remarked7 in support of ,hamilton's favourite precept of quantifying the predicate4 ,the predicate of this minor must be assumed as quantified in thought1 the subject being taken as co-extensive therewith4 ,therefore ,hamilton's demand that it shall be quantified in speech has really in this case that foundation which he erroneously claims for it in all cases4 ,he complains that ,lambert and some other logicians dispense with the necessity of quantifying the predicate of the minor by making it disjunctive2 and adds the remarkable statement that the recent ,german logicians1 ,herbart1 ,twesten1 ,drobisch1 c41 following ,lambert1 make the ,inductive ,syllogism a byeword 7p4 #cff74 ,i agree with them in thinking the attempted transformation of ,induction into ,syllogism very unfortunate1 though my reasons are probably not the same as theirs4 ,trendelenburg agrees with those who said that ,aristotle's doctrine about the ,inductive ,syllogism required that the minor should be disjunctively enunciated 7,logische ,untersuchungen1 xiv4 p4 #age1 xvi4 pp4 #bfb1 #bfc2 also ,erluterungen zu den ,elementen der ,aristotelischen ,logik1 ss4 #cd-cf1 p4 #ga74 ,ueberweg takes a similar view 7,system der 9999,logik1 sect4 #abh1 p4 #cfg1 #crd ed474 ,if the ,inductive ,inference is to be twisted into ,syllogism1 it seems more naturally to fall into an hypothetical syllogism1 e4 g43-- ,if this1 that1 and the other magnet attract iron1 all magnets attract iron2 ,but this1 that1 and the other magnet do attract iron3 ,ergo1 c4 ,the central idea of the ,syllogism1 as defined by ,aristotle1 is that of a conclusion following from given premisses by necessary sequence2#fj meaning by the term necessary thus much and no more--that you cannot grant the premisses1 and deny the conclusion1 without being inconsistent with yourself1 or falling into contradiction4 ,in all the various combinations of propositions1 set forth by ,aristotle as the different figures and modes of ,syllogism1 this property of necessary sequence is found4 ,but it is a property which no ,induction can ever possess4#fa ,when ,aristotle professes to point out a particular mode of ,syllogism to which ,induction conforms1 he can only do so by falsifying the process of ,induction1 and by not accurately distinguishing between what is observed and what is inferred4 ,in the case which he takes to illustrate the ,inductive ,syllogism--the inference from all particular bile-less animals to the whole class bile-less--he assumes that we have ascertained the attribute to belong to all the particulars1 and that the inductive inference consists in passing from all of them to the class-term2 the passage from premisses to conclusion being here necessary1 and thus falling under the definition of ,syllogism2 since1 to grant the premisses1 and yet to deny the conclusion1 involves a contradiction4 ,but this doctrine misconceives what the inductive inference really is4 ,we never can observe all the particulars of a class1 which is indefinite as to number of particulars1 and definite only in respect of the attributes connoted by the class-term4 ,we can only observe some of the particulars1 a greater or smaller proportion4 ,now it is in the transition from these to the totality of particulars1 that the real inductive inference consists2 not in the transition from the totality to the class-term which denotes that totality and connotes its determining common attribute4 ,in fact1 the distinction between the totality of particulars and the meaning of the class-term1 is one not commonly attended to2 though it is worthy of note in an analysis of the intellectual process1 and is therefore brought to view by ,aristotle4 ,but he employs it incorrectly as an intermediate step to slur over the radical distinction between ,induction and ,syllogism4 ,he subjoins3#fb--,you must conceive the minor term ,c 7in the ,inductive ,syllogism7 as composed of all the particulars2 for ,induction is through all of them4 ,you may say that ,induction is through all the particulars1 if you distinguish this totality from the class-term1 and if you treat the class-term as the ultimate terminus ad quem4 ,but the ,induction must first travel to all the particulars2 being forced to take start from a part only1 and then to jump onward far enough to cover the indefinite unobserved remainder4 ,this jump is the real ,induction2 and this can never be brought under the definition of ,syllogism2 for in the best and most certain ,induction the sequence is never a necessary one3 you may grant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting yourself4 ,footnote #fj3 ,alexander intimates that ,aristotle enunciated necessary sequence as a part of his definition of ,syllogism1 for the express purpose of distinguishing it from ,induction1 which is a sequence not necessary 7,schol4 ad ,top4 p4 #bec1 a4 #ai1 ,br473 ,greek3 to d' e7x a7na_/gks proskei_/menon e7n t o7_/r1 ts 9999e7paggs chri_/zei ton sullogismo_/n2 9999e7_/sti men gar kai e7pagg lo_/gos e7n 7 tethe_/ntn tinn e7_/tero_/n ti tn keime_/nn sumbai_/nei1 a7ll' ou7k e7x a7na_/gks4 ,footnote #fa3 ,alexander 7in his ,scholia on the ,metaphysica1 ,e4 i4 p4 #djf99991 ed4 ,bonitz7 observes truly3 ,greek3 a7ll' ei7 e7k ts ai7sth_/ses kai ts e7paggs pi_/stis1 ou7k e7_/stin a7po_/deixis1 pros pasan gar e7paggn du_/natai_/ tis e7ni_/stasthai kai m e7an to katho_/lou sumperai_/nein4 ,footnote #fb3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 dei de noein to ,g to e7x a7pa_/ntn tn kath' e7_/kaston sugkei_/menon2 7 gar e7pagg dia pa_/ntn4 ,see ,professor ,bain's ',inductive ,logic1' chap4 i4 s4 #b1 where this process is properly criticised4 ,aristotle states very clearly3--,we believe everything either through ,syllogism1 or from ,induction4#fc ,here1 as well as in several other passages1 he notes the two processes as essentially distinct4 ,the ,syllogism requires in its premisses at least one general proposition2 nor does ,aristotle conceive the generalities as the original data3#fd he derives them from antecedent ,induction4 ,the two processes are 7as he says7 opposite in a certain way2 that is1 they are complementary halves of the same whole2 ,induction being the establishment of those universals which are essential for the deductive march of the ,syllogism2 while the two together make up the entire process of scientific reasoning4 ,but he forgets or relinquishes this antithesis1 when he presents to us the ,inductive process as a given variety of ,syllogism4 ,and the objection to such a doctrine becomes the more manifest1 since in constructing his ,inductive ,syllogism1 he is compelled to admit either that there is no middle term1 or that the middle term is subject of the conclusion1 in violation of the syllogistic canons4#fe ,footnote #fc3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 a7_/panta gar pisteu_/omen 7 dia sullogismou 7 e7x e7paggs4 ,here ,induction includes ,example1 though in the next stage he puts the two apart4 ,compare ,anal4 ,poster4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ga1 a4 #i4 ,footnote #fd3 ,see ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ,system of ,logic1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 iii4 a4 #d1 p4 #bai1 #eth ed4 ,footnote #fe3 ,aldrich 7,artis ,log4 ,rudim4 ch4 iii4 #i1 #b1 p4 #age7 and ,archbishop ,whately 7,elem4 of ,logic1 ch4 i4 p4 #bji7 agree in treating the argument of ,induction as a defective or informal ,syllogism3 see also to the same purpose ,sir49999 ,w4 ,hamilton1 ,lectures on ,logic1 vol4 i4 p4 #cbb4 ,aldrich treats it as a ,syllogism in ,barbara1 with the minor suppressed2 but ,whately rejects this1 because the minor necessary to be supplied is false4 ,he maintains that the premiss suppressed is the major1 not the minor4 ,i dissent from both4 ,it appears to me that the opinion which ,whately pronounces to be a fallacy is the real truth3 ,induction is a distinct kind of argument from the ,syllogism 7p4 #bjh74 ,it is the essential property of the ,syllogism1 as defined by ,aristotle and by every one after him1 that the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from the truth of its premisses3 that you cannot admit the premisses and reject the conclusion without contradicting yourself4 ,now this is what the best ,induction never attains2 and ,i contend that the presence or absence of this important characteristic is quite enough to constitute two distinct kinds of argument4 ,whately objects to ,aldrich 7whom ,hamilton defends7 for supplying a suppressed minor1 because it is manifestly false 7p4 #bji74 ,i object to ,whately's supplied major1 because it is uncertified1 and therefore cannot be used to prove any conclusion4 ,by clothing arguments from ,induction in syllogistic form1 we invest them with a character of necessity which does not really belong to them4 ,the establishment of general propositions1 and the interpretation of them when established 7to use the phraseology of ,mr4 ,mill71 must always be distinct mental processes2 and the forms appropriate to the latter1 involving necessary sequence1 ought not to be employed to disguise the want of necessity--the varying and graduated probability1 inherent in the former4 ,mr4 ,mill says 7,syst4 ,log4 ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 iii4 s4 #a1 p4 #cdc1 #eth ed437--,as ,whately remarks1 every induction is a syllogism with the major premiss suppressed2 or 7as ,i prefer expressing it7 every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism1 by supplying a major premiss4 ,even in this modified phraseology1 ,i cannot admit the propriety of throwing ,induction into syllogistic forms of argument4 ,by doing this we efface the special character of ,induction1 as the jump from particular cases1 more or fewer1 to an universal proposition comprising them and an indefinite number of others besides4 ,to state this in forms which imply that it is a necessary step1 involving nothing more than the interpretation of a higher universal proposition1 appears to me unphilosophical4 ,mr4 ,mill says with truth 7in his admirable chapter explaining the real function of the major premiss in a ,syllogism1 p4 #baa71 that the individual cases are all the evidence which we possess2 the step from them to universal propositions ought not to be expressed in forms which suppose universal propositions to be already attained4 ,i will here add that1 though ,aldrich himself 7as ,i stated at the beginning of this note7 treats the argument from ,induction as a defective or informal ,syllogism1 his anonymous ,oxonian editor and commentator takes a sounder view4 ,he says 7pp4 #agf1 #agg1 #ahd1 ed4 #ahbc4 ,oxon473-- ,the principles acquired by human powers may be considered as twofold4 ,some are intuitive1 and are commonly called ,axioms2 the other class of general principles are those acquired by ,induction4 ,but it may be doubted whether this distinction is correct4 ,it is highly probable1 if not certain1 that those primary ,axioms generally esteemed intuitive1 are in fact acquired by an inductive process2 although that process is less discernible1 because it takes place long before we think of tracing the actings of our own minds4 ,it is often found necessary to facilitate the understanding of those ,axioms1 when they are first proposed to the judgment1 by illustrations drawn from individual cases4 ,but whether it is1 as is generally supposed1 the mere enunciation of the principle1 or the principle itself1 which requires the illustration1 may admit of a doubt4 ,it seems probable1 however that1 such illustrations are nothing more than a recurrence to the original method by which the knowledge of those principles was acquired4 ,thus1 the repeated trial or observation of the necessary connection between mathematical coincidence and equality1 first authorizes the general position or ,axiom relative to that subject4 ,if this conjecture is founded in fact1 it follows that both primary and ultimate principles have the same nature and are alike acquired by the exercise of the inductive faculty4 ,those who acquiesce in the preceding observations will feel a regret to find ,induction classed among defective or informal ,syllogisms4 ,it is in fact prior in its order to ,syllogism2 nor can syllogistic reasoning he carried on to any extent without previous ,induction 7p4 #ahd74 ,we must presume ,syllogisms without a middle term1 when we read3--,the ,syllogism through a middle term is by nature prior1 and of greater cognitive efficacy2 but to us the ,syllogism through ,induction is plainer and clearer4#ff ,nor1 indeed1 is the saying1 when literally taken1 at all well-founded2 for the pretended ,syllogisms from ,induction and ,example1 far from being clear and plain1 are more involved and difficult to follow than ,barbara and ,celarent4 ,yet the substance of ,aristotle's thought is true and important1 when considered as declaring the antithesis 7not between varieties of ,syllogisms1 but7 between ,induction and ,example on the one part1 and ,syllogism 7,deduction7 on the other4 ,it is thus that he sets out the same antithesis elsewhere1 both in the ,analytica ,posteriora and the ,topica4#fg ,prior and more cognizable by nature or absolutely1 prior and more cognizable to us or in relation to us--these two are not merely distinct1 but the one is the correlate and antithesis of the other4 ,footnote #ff3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 phu_/sei men ou7n pro_/teros kai gnrim_/teros o7 dia tou me_/sou sullogismo_/s1 7min d' e7narge_/steros o7 dia ts e7paggs4 ,footnote #fg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #b1 b4 #bi2 ,ethic4 ,nik4 ,,vi4 iii99994 p4 #aaci1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 7 men d e7pagg a7rch_/ e7sti kai tou katho_/lou1 o7 de sullogismos e7k tn katho_/lou4 ei7sin a7_/ra a7rchai e7x 7n o7 sullogismo_/s1 7n ou7k e7_/sti sullogismo_/s2 e7pagg a7_/ra4 ,compare ,topica1 ,i4 xii4 p4 #aje1 a4 #aa2 ,,vi4 iv4 pp4 #ada1 #adb99992 ,physica1 ,i4 i4 p4 #ahd1 a4 #af2 ,metaphysic4 ,e4 iv4 p4 #ajbi1 b99994 #d-ab4 ,compare also ,trendelenburg's explanation of this doctrine1 ,erluterungen zu den ,elementen der ,aristotelischen ,logik1 sects4 #ah1 #ai1 #bj1 p4 #cc1 seq4 ,to us the particulars of sense stand first1 and are the earliest objects of knowledge4 ,to us1 means to the large variety of individual minds1 which grow up imperceptibly from the simple capacities of infancy to the mature accomplishments of adult years2 each acquiring its own stock of sensible impressions1 remembered1 compared1 associated2 and each learning a language1 which both embodies in general terms and propositions the received classification of objects1 and communicates the current emotional beliefs4 ,we all begin by being learners2 and we ascend by different paths to those universal notions and beliefs which constitute the common fund of the advanced intellect2 developed in some minds into principia of philosophy with their consequences4 ,by nature1 or absolutely1 these principia are considered as prior1 and as forming the point of departure3 the advanced position is regarded as gained1 and the march taken is not that of the novice1 but that of the trained adult1 who having already learnt much1 is doubly equipped either for learning more or for teaching others2 who thus stands on a summit from whence he surveys nature as a classified and coherent whole1 manifesting herself in details which he can interpret and sometimes predict4 ,the path of knowledge1 seen relatively to us1 is one through particulars1 by way of example to fresh particulars1 or by way of induction to universals4 ,the path of knowledge1 by nature or absolutely1 is from universals by way of deduction either to new universals or to new particulars4 ,by the cognitive nature of man1 ,aristotle means the full equipment1 of and for cognition1 which our mature age exhibits2 notiora natur are the acquisitions1 points of view1 and processes1 familiar in greater or less perfection to such mature individuals and societies4 ,notiora nobis are the facts and processes with which all of us begin1 and which belong to the intellect in its highest as well as its lowest stage2 though1 in the higher stages1 they are employed1 directed1 and modified1 by an acquired intellectual capital1 and by the permanent machinery of universal significant terms in which that capital is invested4 ,such is the antithesis between notiora natur 7or simpliciter7 and notiora nobis 7or quoad nos71 which ,aristotle recognizes as a capital point in his philosophy1 and insists upon in many of his writings4 ,the antithesis is represented by ,example and ,induction1 in the point of view--quoad nos--last mentioned2 by ,syllogism or ,deduction1 in the other point of view--natur4 ,induction 7he says71#fh or the rising from particulars to universals1 is plainer1 more persuasive1 more within the cognizance of sensible perception1 more within the apprehension of mankind generally1 than ,syllogism2 but ,syllogism is more cogent and of greater efficacy against controversial opponents4 ,what he affirms here about ,induction is equally true about the inference from ,example1 that is1 the inference from one or some particulars1 to other analogous particulars2 the rudimentary intellectual process1 common to all human and to many animal minds1 of which ,induction is an improvement and an exaltation4 ,while ,induction will be more impressive1 and will carry assent more easily with an ordinary uncultivated mind1 an acute disputant may always deny the ultimate inference1 for the denial involves no contradiction4 ,but the rightly constructed ,syllogism constrains assent2#fi the disputant cannot grant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting himself4 ,the constraining force1 however1 does not come into accurate and regulated working until the principles and conditions of deductive reasoning have been set forth--until the ,syllogism has been analysed1 and the characteristics of its validity1 as distinguished from its invalidity1 have been marked out4 ,this is what ,aristotle teaches in the ,analytica and ,topica4 ,it admits of being set out in regular figure and mode--forms of premisses with the conclusion appropriate to each2 and the lesson must be learnt before we can know how far the force of deductive reasoning1 which begins with the notiora natur1 is legitimately binding and trustworthy4 ,footnote #fh3 ,aristot4 ,topica1 ,i4 xii4 p4 #aje1 a4 #ac-ai3 ,greek3 e7pagg de 7 a7po tn kath' e7_/kaston e7pi ta katho_/lou e7_/phodos2 oi7on ei7 e7_/sti kubern_/ts o7 e7pista_/menos kra_/tistos kai 7ni_/ochos1 kai o7_/ls e7stin o7 e7pista_/menos peri e7_/kaston a7_/ristos4 e7_/sti d' 7 men e7pagg pithan_/teron kai saphe_/steron kai kata tn ai7_/sthsin gnrim_/teron1 kai tois pollois koino_/n2 o7 de sullogismos biastik_/teron kai pros tous a7ntilogikous e7nerge_/steron4 ,also the same treatise4 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #ada1 b4 #ag4 ,the inductive interrogations of ,sokrates relating to matters of common life1 and the way in which they convinced ordinary hearers1 are strikingly illustrated in the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon1 especially ,,iv4 vi43 ,greek3 polu ma_/lista 7n e7g oi7da1 o7_/te le_/goi1 tous a7kou_/ontas o7mologountas pareichen 7#ae74 ,the same can hardly be said of the ,platonic dialogues4 ,footnote #fi3 ,bacon1 ,novum ,organ4 ,i4 ,aphor4 #ac3--,syllogismus assensum constringit1 non res4 ,both the two main points of ,aristotle's doctrine--the antithesis between ,induction and ,deduction1 and the dependence of the latter process upon premisses furnished by the former1 so that the two together form the two halves of complete ratiocination and authoritative proof--both these two are confused and darkened by his attempt to present the ,inductive inference and the ,analogical or ,paradeigmatic inference as two special forms of ,syllogistic deduction4#gj ,but when we put aside this attempt1 and adhere to ,aristotle's main doctrine--of ,induction as a process antithetical to and separate from ,deduction1 yet as an essential preliminary thereto1--we see that it forms the basis of that complete and comprehensive ,system of ,logic1 recently elaborated in the work of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,the inference from ,example 7i4e4 from some particulars to other similar particulars7 is distinguished by ,aristotle from ,induction1 and is recognized by him as the primitive intellectual energy1 common to all men1 through which ,induction is reached2 its results he calls ,experience 7,greek3 e7mpeiri_/a71 and he describes it as the real guide1 more essential than philosophical generalities1 to exactness of performance in detail4#ga ,mr4 ,john ,mill has been the first to assign to ,experience1 thus understood1 its full value and true position in the theory of ,ratiocination2 and to show that the ,paradeigmatic process exhibits the prime and ultimate reality of all ,inference1 the real premisses and the real conclusion which ,inference connects together4 ,between these two is interposed the double process of which ,induction forms the first half and ,deduction the second2 neither the one nor the other being indispensable to ,inference1 but both of them being required as securities for ,scientific inference1 if we desire to have its correctness tested and its sufficiency certified2 the real evidence1 whereby the conclusion of a ,syllogism is proved1 being the minor premiss1 together with 7not the major premiss itself1 but7 the assemblage of particular facts from which by ,induction the major premiss is drawn4 ,now ,aristotle had present to his mind the conception of ,inference as an entire process1 enabling us from some particular truths to discover and prove other particular truths3 he considers it as an unscientific process1 of which to a limited extent other animals besides man are capable1 and which1 as operative under the title of ,experience in mature practical men1 is a safer guide than ,science amidst the doubts and difficulties of action4 ,upon this foundation he erects the superstructure of ,science2 the universal propositions acquired through ,induction1 and applied again to particulars or to lower generalities1 through the rules of the deductive ,syllogism4 ,he signalizes1 with just emphasis1 the universalizing point of view called ,science or ,theory2 but he regards it as emerging from particular facts1 and as travelling again downwards towards particular facts4 ,the misfortune is1 that he contents himself with barely recognizing1 though he distinctly proclaims the necessity of1 the inductive part of this complex operation2 while he bestows elaborate care upon the analysis of the deductive part1 and of the rules for conducting it4 ,from this disproportionate treatment1 one half of ,logic is made to look like the whole2 ,science is disjoined from ,experience1 and is presented as consisting in ,deduction alone2 every thing which is not ,deduction1 is degraded into unscientific ,experience2 the major premiss of the ,syllogism being considered as part of the proof of the conclusion1 and the conclusion being necessarily connected therewith1 we appear to have acquired a locus standi and a binding cogency such as ,experience could never supply2 lastly1 when ,aristotle resolves ,induction into a peculiar variety of the ,syllogism1 he appears finally to abolish all its separate dignity and jurisdiction4 ,this one-sided view of ,logic has been embraced and perpetuated by the ,aristotelian expositors1 who have carefully illustrated1 and to a certain extent even amplified1 the part which was already in comparative excess1 while they have added nothing to the part that was in defect1 and have scarcely even preserved ,aristotle's recognition of it as being not merely legitimate but essential4 ,the vast body of ,inductive ,science1 accumulated during the last three centuries1 has thus1 until recently1 been allowed to grow up1 as if its proofs and processes had nothing to do with ,logic4 ,footnote #gj3 ,heyder 7in his learned treatise1 ,darstellung der ,aristotelischen und ,hegelschen ,dialektik1 p4 #bbf71 after having considered the unsatisfactory process whereby ,aristotle attempts to resolve ,induction into a variety of ,syllogism1 concludes by a remark which ,i think just3--,aus alle dem erhellt zur ,genge1 dass sich ,aristoteles bei dem ,versuch die ,induction auf eine ,schlussform zurckzufhren1 selbst sich nicht recht befriedigt fhlte1 und derselbe wohl nur aus seinem durchgngigen ,bestreben zu erklren ist1 alles wissenschaftliche ,verfahren in die ,form des ,schlusses zu bringen2 dass dagegen1 seiner eigentlichen ,meinung und der strengen ,consequenz seiner ,lehre zu ,folge1 die ,induction zum syllogistischen und beweisenden ,verfahren einen in dem ,begriff der beiden ,verfahrungsweisen liegenden ,gegensatz bildete1 was sich ihm dann auch auf das ,verhltniss der ,induction zur ,begriffsbestimmung ausdehnen musste4 ,footnote #ga3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxiii4 p4 #fh1 b4 #ab2 xxvi4 p4 #fi1 a4 #ag4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #cj1 seq999942 xiii4 p4 #ig1 b4 #g4 ,topica1 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #ce2 p4 #aef1 b4 #aj2 p4 #aeg1 a4 #ad-bc2 p4 #afj1 a4 #cf4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 i4 p4 #ihj1 b4 #be-p4 #iha1 a4 #cj4 ,this first chapter of the ,metaphysica is one of the most remarkable passages of ,aristotle1 respecting the analytical philosophy of mind4 ,but though this restricted conception of ,logic or the theory of ,reasoning has arisen naturally from ,aristotle's treatment1 ,i maintain that it does not adequately represent his view of that theory4 ,in his numerous treatises on other subjects1 scarcely any allusion is made to the ,syllogism2 nor is appeal made to the rules for it laid down in the ,analytica4 ,his conviction that the formalities of ,deduction were only one part of the process of general reasoning1 and that the value of the final conclusion depended not merely upon their being correctly performed1 but also upon the correctness of that initial part whereby they are supplied with matter for premisses--is manifested as well by his industry 7unrivalled among his contemporaries7 in collecting multifarious facts1 as by his specific declarations respecting ,induction4 ,indeed1 a recent most erudite logician1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 who insists upon the construction of ,logic in its strictest sense as purely formal1 blames ,aristotle#gb for having transgressed this boundary1 and for introducing other considerations bearing on diversities of matter and of material evidence4 ,the charge so made1 to whatever extent it is well-founded1 does rather partake of the nature of praise2 inasmuch as it evinces ,aristotle's larger views of the theory of ,inference1 and confirms his own statement that the ,deductive process was only the last half of it1 presupposing a prior ,induction4 ,it is only this last half that ,aristotle has here analysed1 setting forth its formal conditions with precepts founded thereupon2 while he claims to have accomplished the work by long and patient investigation1 having found not the smallest foundation laid by others1 and bespeaks indulgence#gc as for a first attempt requiring to be brought to completion by others4 ,he made this first step for himself2 and if any one would make a second step1 so as to apply the same analysis to the other half1 and to bring out in like manner the formal conditions and principles of ,induction1 we may fairly believe that ,aristotle would have welcomed the act1 as filling up what he himself recognized to be a gap in the entire compass of ,reasoning4 ,as to his own achievement1 it is certain that he could not have composed the ,analytica and ,topica1 if he had not had before him many specimens of the deductive process to study and compare4 ,neither could the inductive process have been analysed1 until after the examples of successful advance in inductive science which recent years have furnished4 ,upon these examples1 mainly1 has been based the profound ,system of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 analysing and discriminating the formalities of ,induction in the same way as those of ,deduction had before been handled by ,aristotle2 also fusing the two together as co-operative towards one comprehensive scheme of ,logic--the ,logic of ,evidence generally1 or of ,truth as discoverable and proveable4 ,in this scheme the ,syllogistic ,theory1 or ,logic of ,consistency between one proposition and others1 is recognized as an essential part1 but is no longer tolerated as an independent whole4#gd ,footnote #gb3 ,see his ,discussions on ,philosophy1 p4 #aci1 seq42 ,lectures on ,logic1 vol4 i4 p4 #bg4 ,footnote #gc3 ,see the remarkable paragraph at the close of the ,sophistici ,elenchi1 already quoted 7supra1 p4 #adj1 note74 ,footnote #gd3 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill says 7,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 i4 sect4 #c73 9999,induction is inferring a proposition from premisses less general than itself1 and ,ratiocination is inferring a proposition from premisses equally or more general4 ,again in another passage3 ,we have found that all ,inference1 consequently all ,proof1 and all discovery of truths not self-evident1 consists of inductions1 and the interpretation of inductions2 that all our knowledge1 not intuitive1 comes to us exclusively from that source4 ,what ,induction is1 therefore1 and what conditions render it legitimate1 cannot but be deemed the main question of logic--the question which includes all others4 ,it is however one which professed writers on logic have almost entirely passed over4 ,the generalities of the subject1 indeed1 have not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians2 but1 for want of sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has actually succeeded in establishing general truths1 their analysis of the inductive operation1 even when unexceptionable as to correctness1 has not been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical rules1 which might be for ,induction itself what the rules of the ,syllogism are for interpretation of ,induction 7,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 i4 s4 #a4 p4 #cac47--,the business of ,inductive ,logic is to provide rules and models 7such as the ,syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination7 to which if inductive arguments conform1 those arguments are conclusive1 and not otherwise4 ,this is what the ,four ,methods profess to be1 and what ,i believe they are universally considered to be by experimental philosophers1 who had practised all of them long before any one sought to reduce the practice to theory 7,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 ix4 s4 #e1 p4 #dga1 #eth ed47--,see also the same point of view more copiously set forth1 in ,mr4 ,mill's later work1 ',examination of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's ,philosophy' 7ch4 xx4 pp4 #ded-dfb1 #crd ed473 ,it is only as a means to material truth that the formal 7or to speak more clearly1 the conditional7 validity of an operation of thought is of any value2 and even that value is only negative3 we have not made the smallest positive advance towards right thinking1 by merely keeping ourselves consistent in what is perhaps systematic error4 ,this by no means implies that ,formal ,logic1 even in its narrowest sense1 is not of very great1 though purely negative value4--,not only however is it indispensable that the larger ,logic1 which embraces all the general conditions of the ascertainment of truth1 should be studied in addition to the smaller ,logic1 which only concerns itself with the conditions of consistency2 but the smaller ,logic ought to be 7at least1 finally7 studied as part of the greater--as a portion of the means to the same end2 and its relation to the other parts--to the other means--should be distinctly displayed4 ,after adverting to another variety of ratiocinative procedure1 which he calls ,apagoge or ,abduction 7where the minor is hardly more evident than the conclusion1 and might sometimes conveniently become a conclusion first to be proved71#ge ,aristotle goes on to treat of ,objection generally--the function of the dialectical respondent4 ,the ,enstasis or ,objection is a proposition opposed not to a conclusion1 but to the proposition set up by the defendant4 ,when the proposition set up by him is universal1 as it must be if he seeks to establish an universal conclusion1 your objection may be either universal or particular3 you may deny either the whole of his proposition1 or only one portion of the particulars contained under it2 the denial of one single particular1 when substantiated1 being enough to overthrow his universal4 ,accordingly1 your objection1 being thus variously opposed to the proposition1 will lie in the syllogistic figures which admit opposite conclusions2 that is1 either in the ,first or ,third2 for the ,second figure admits only negative conclusions not opposed to each other4 ,if the defendant has set up an ,universal ,affirmative1 you may deny the whole and establish a contrary negative1 in the ,first figure2 or you may deny a part only1 and establish a contradictory negative1 in the ,third figure4 ,the like1 if he has set up an ,universal ,negative3 you may impugn it either by an universal contrary affirmative1 in the ,first figure2 or by a particular contradictory affirmative1 in the ,third figure4#gf ,footnote #ge3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxv4 p4 #fi1 a4 #bj-cf4 ,footnote #gf3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxvi4 p4 #fi1 a4 #cg-;b4 #cg4 ,in objecting to ,a universally1 you take a term comprehending the original subject2 in objecting particularly1 a term comprehended by it4 ,of the new term in each case you deny the original predicate1 and have thus1 as a major premiss1 ,e4 ,for a minor premiss1 you affirm1 in the first case1 the new term as predicate of the original subject 7less comprehensive72 in the second case1 the original subject 7more comprehensive7 as predicate of the new term4 ,this gives you1 in the first case1 a conclusion in ,celarent 7,fig4 ,i471 and1 in the second1 a conclusion in ,felapton 7,fig4 ,,iii472 opposed1 the one universally or contrarily1 the other particularly or contradictorily1 to the original proposition4 ,the ,enthymeme is a syllogism from ,probabilities or ,signs2#gg the two being not exactly the same4 ,probabilities are propositions commonly accepted1 and true in the greater number of cases2 such as1 ,envious men hate those whom they envy1 ,persons who are beloved look with affection on those who love them4 ,we call it a ,sign1 when one fact is the antecedent or consequent of another1 and therefore serves as mark or evidence thereof4 ,the conjunction may be either constant1 or frequent1 or merely occasional3 if constant1 we obtain for the major premiss of our syllogism a proposition approaching that which is universally or necessarily true2 if not constant but only frequent or occasional1 the major premiss of our syllogism will at best only be probable4 ,the constant conjunction will furnish us with a ,syllogism or ,enthymeme in the ,first figure2 the significant mark being here a genuine middle term--subject in the major premiss1 and predicate in the minor4 ,we can then get a conclusion both affirmative and universally true4 ,in other cases1 we cannot obtain premisses for a syllogism in the ,first figure1 but only for a syllogism in the ,second or ,third4 ,in the ,third figure1 since we get by right no universal conclusions at all1 but only particular conclusions1 the conclusion of the ,enthymeme1 though it may happen to be true1 is open to refutation4 ,where by the laws of ,syllogism no affirmative conclusion whatever is possible1 as in the ,second figure1 the conclusion obtained by ,enthymeme is altogether suspicious4 ,in contrast with the ,sign in these figures1 that which enters as an effective middle term into the ,first figure1 should be distinguished under the name of ,proof 7,greek3 tekm_/rion47#gh ,footnote #gg3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 e7nthu_/mma men ou7n e7sti sullogismos e7x ei7ko_/tn 7 smei_/n2 lamba_/netai de to smeion trichs1 o7sachs kai to me_/son e7n tois sch_/masi4 ,footnote #gh3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 a4 #ca-;b4 #f4 ,aristotle throws in the remark 7a4 #bd71 that1 when one premiss only of the ,enthymeme is enunciated1 it is a ,sign2 when the other is added1 it becomes a ,syllogism4 ,in the examples given to illustrate the description of the ,enthymeme1 that which belongs to the ,first figure has its three terms and two propositions specified like a complete and regular ,syllogism2 but when we come to the ,third and ,second figures1 ,aristotle gives two alternate ways of stating each3 one way in full1 with both premisses enunciated1 constituting a normal1 though invalid1 ,syllogism2 the other way1 with only one of the premisses enunciated1 the other being suppressed as well-known and familiar4 ,among logicians posterior to ,aristotle1 the definition given of the ,enthymeme1 and supposed to be derived from ,aristotle was1 that it was a ,syllogism with one of the premisses suppressed--,greek3 monol_/mmatos4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has impugned this doctrine1 and has declared the definition to be both absurd in itself1 and not countenanced by ,aristotle4 7,lectures on ,logic1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,lect4 xx4 p4 #chf1 seq47 ,i think ,hamilton is mistaken on this point4 7,see ,mr4 ,cope's ,introd4 to ,arist4 ,rhetoric1 p4 #ajc1 seq47 ,even in the present chapter ,aristotle distinctly alludes to the monolemmatic enunciation of the ,enthymeme as one mode of distinguishing it from a full ,syllogism2 and in the ,rhetorica he brings out this characteristic still more forcibly4 ,the distinction is one which belongs to ,rhetoric more than to ,logic2 the rhetor1 in enunciating his premisses1 must be careful not to weary his auditors2 he must glance at or omit reasons that are familiar to them2 logical fulness and accuracy would be inconsistent with his purpose4 ,the writers subsequent to ,aristotle1 who think much of the rhetorical and little of the logical point of view1 bring out the distinction yet more forcibly4 ,but the rhetorical mode of stating premisses is often not so much an omission either of major or minor1 as a confused blending or packing up of both into one4 ,aristotle concludes his ,analytica ,priora by applying this doctrine of ,signs to determine the limits within which ,physiognomy as a science is practicable4 ,the basis upon which it rests is this general fact or postulate3 ,that in all natural affections of the animal1 bodily changes and mental changes accompany each other4 ,the former1 therefore1 may become signs or proofs of the latter1#gi if1 in each class of animals1 we can discriminate the one specific bodily phenomenon which attaches to each mental phenomenon4 ,thus1 the lion is a courageous animal4 ,what is the bodily sign accompanying a courageous disposition8 ,it is 7we assume here7 the having extremities of great size4 ,this belongs to all lions1 as a proprium2 in the sense that1 though it may or does belong also to some individuals of other races 7as men71 it does not belong to any other entire race4 ,physiognomy as a science will1 then1 be possible1 if we can find races of animals which have only one characteristic mental attribute1 and if we can discover what is the physical attribute correlating with it4#hj ,but the difficulties are greater when the same race has two characteristic mental attributes 7e4g4 lions are both courageous and generous71 each with its correlative physical attribute2 for how can we tell which belongs to which8 ,we have then to study individuals of other races possessing one of these attributes without the other2 thus1 if we find that courageous men1 who are not generous1 agree in having large extremities1 we may infer that this last circumstance is1 in the lion1 the correlative mark of his courage and not of his generosity4 ,the physiognomonic inference will be expressed by a syllogism in the ,first figure1 in which the major term 7,a7 reciprocates and is convertible with the middle term 7,b71 while ,b stretches beyond 7or is more extensive than7 the minor 7,c72 this relation of the terms being necessary1 if there is to be a single mark for a particular attribute4#ha ,footnote #gi3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 b4 #g-af3 ,greek3 ei7_/ tis di_/dsin a7_/ma metaba_/llein to sma kai tn psuch_/n1 o7_/sa phusika_/ e7sti path_/mata2--sumpa_/schein gar a7ll_/lois u7pokeitai4 ,see the ,aristotelian treatise entitled ,greek3 ,phusiognmonika_/1 pp4 #hjh-hji1 ,bekk4 ,footnote #hj3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 b4 #bb4 ,about the characteristics of the lion see ,aristot4 ,physiognom4 p4 #hji1 b4 #ad-cf3 ,greek3 ta peri tn psuchn dotikon kai e7leu_/theron1 megalo_/psuchon kai philo_/nikon1 kai prau kai di_/kaion kai philo_/storgon pros a7 a7n o7mil_/s4 ,footnote #ha3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 b4 #ca-cf4 ,here the treatise ends2 but the reader will remember that1 in describing the canons laid down by ,aristotle for the ,syllogism with its three ,figures and the ,modes contained therein1 ,i confined myself to the simple ,assertory syllogism1 postponing for the moment the long expositions added by him about ,modal syllogisms1 involving the ,possible and the ,necessary4 ,what is proper to be said about this complicated and useless portion of the ,analytica ,priora1 may well come in here2 for1 in truth1 the doctrines just laid down about ,probabilities1 ,signs1 and ,proofs1 bring us back to the ,modals under a different set of phrases4 ,the ,possible or ,problematical is that1 of the occurrence or reality of which we doubt1 neither believing nor disbelieving it1 not being prepared to assert either that it is1 or that it is not2 that which may be or may not be4 ,it is our manner of speaking1 when we have only signs or probabilities to guide us1 and not certain proofs4 ,the feeling of doubt is1 as a psychological phenomenon1 essentially distinct from the feeling of belief which1 in its objective aspect1 correlates with certainty or matter of fact2 as well as from the feeling of disbelief1 the correlate of which can only be described negatively4 ,every man knows these feelings by his own mental experience4 ,but in describing the feeling of doubt1 as to its matter or in its objective aspect1 we must take care to use phrases which declare plainly both sides of its disjunctive or alternative character4 ,the ,possible is1 ,that which either may be or may not be4 ,as ,that which may be1 it stands opposed to the ,impossible2 as ,that which may not be1 it stands opposed to the ,necessary4 ,it thus carries with it negation both of impossibility and of necessity2 but1 in common parlance1 the first half of this meaning stands out prominently1 and is mistaken for the whole4 ,aristotle1 as we saw previously1 speaks equivocally on this point1 recognizing a double signification of the term3 he sometimes uses it in the sense opposed only to impossible1 maintaining that what is necessary must also be possible2 sometimes in the truer sense1 opposed both to necessity and to impossibility4#hb ,footnote #hb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,interpret4 xiii4 p4 #bb4 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #cb1 a4 #ba1 #bi1 #cf1 xiv4 p4 #cc1 b4 #bb2 xix4 p4 #ch1 a4 #ce4 ,the ,possible or ,problematical1 however1 in this latter complete sense--,what may or may not be--exhibits various modifications or gradations4 #a4 ,the chances on either side may be conceived as perfectly equal1 so that there is no probability1 and we have no more reason for expecting one side of the alternative than the other2 the sequence or conjunction is indeterminate4 ,aristotle construes this indeterminateness in many cases 7not as subjective1 or as depending upon our want of complete knowledge and calculating power1 but7 as objective1 insuperable1 and inherent in many phenomenal agencies2 characterizing it1 under the names of ,spontaneity and ,chance1 as the essentially unpredictable4 #b4 ,the chances on both sides may be conceived as unequal and the ratio between them as varying infinitely3 the usual and ordinary tendency of phenomena--what ,aristotle calls ,nature--prevails in the majority of cases1 but not in all2 being liable to occasional counteraction from ,chance and other forces4 ,thus1 between ,necessity and perfect constancy at one extreme 7such as the rotation of the sidereal sphere71 and ,chance at the other1 there may be every shade of gradation2 from natural agency next below the constant1 down to the lowest degree of probability4#hc ,footnote #hc3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #cb1 b4 #e-ai4 ,greek3 to d' a7o_/riston t mden mallon ou7_/ts 7 e7kei_/ns4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,k4 p4 #ajfd1 b4 #cb4 ,now1 within the range of these limits lie what ,aristotle describes as ,signs and ,probabilities2 in fact1 all the marks which we shall presently come to as distinguishing the dialectical syllogism from the demonstrative4 ,but here is involved rather the matter of the ,syllogism than its form4 ,the form indeed is so far implicated1 that 7as ,aristotle justly remarks at the end of the ,analytica ,priora#hd71 the ,first figure is the only one that will prove both conjunctions and disjunctions1 as well constant as occasional2 the ,third figure proves only occasional conjunctions and occasional disjunctions1 not constant2 the ,second figure will prove no conjunctions at all1 but only disjunctions1 constant as well as occasional4 ,here a difference of form is properly pointed out as coupled with and founded on a difference of matter4 ,but the special rules given by ,aristotle1 early in the present treatise1 for the conversion of ,modal ,propositions1 and the distinctions that he draws as to the modal character of the conclusion according as one or other of the premisses belongs to one or other of the different modes1--are both prolix and of little practical value4#he ,footnote #hd3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxvii4 p4 #gj1 a4 #b-ch4 ,compare what is said here about ,greek3 ei7ko_/s1 smeion1 tekm_/rion1 with the first chapter of the ,topica1 and the dialectic syllogism as there described3 ,greek3 o7 e7x e7ndo_/xn sullogizo_/menos4 ,footnote #he3 ,ibid4 ,i4 viii4-xxii4 p4 #bi1 b4 #bi-p4 #dj1 b4 #af4 ,what he calls the ,necessary might indeed1 from the point of view now reached1 cease to be recognized as a separate mode at all4 ,the ,certain and the ,problematical are real modes of the ,proposition2 objective correlates to the subjective phases called ,belief and ,doubt4 ,but no proposition can be more than certain3 the word necessary1 in strictness1 implies only a peculiarity of the evidence on which our belief is grounded4 ,granting certain given premisses to be true1 a given conclusion must be true also1 if we would avoid inconsistency and contradiction4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,analytica ,,posteriora ,i4 ,in the two books of ,analytica ,priora1 ,aristotle has carried us through the full doctrine of the functions and varieties of the ,syllogism2 with an intimation that it might be applied to two purposes--,demonstration and ,dialectic4 ,we are now introduced to these two distinct applications of the ,syllogism3 first1 in the ,analytica ,posteriora1 to ,demonstration2 next1 in the ,topica1 to ,dialectic4 ,we are indeed distinctly told that1 as far as the forms and rules of ,syllogism go1 these are alike applicable to both2#a but the difference of matter and purpose in the two cases is so considerable as to require a distinct theory and precepts for the one and for the other4 ,footnote #a3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxx4 p4 #df1 a4 #d-aj2 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 a4 #bc4 ,the contrast between ,dialectic 7along with ,rhetoric7 on the one hand and ,science on the other is one deeply present to the mind of ,aristotle4 ,he seems to have proceeded upon the same fundamental antithesis as that which appears in the ,platonic dialogues2 but to have modified it both in meaning and in terminology1 dismissing at the same time various hypotheses with which ,plato had connected it4 ,the antithesis that both thinkers have in view is ,opinion or ,common ,sense versus ,science or ,special ,teaching and ,learning2 those aptitudes1 acquirements1 sentiments1 antipathies1 c41 which a man imbibes and appropriates insensibly1 partly by his own doing and suffering1 partly by living amidst the drill and example of a given society--as distinguished from those accomplishments which he derives from a teacher already known to possess them1 and in which both the time of his apprenticeship and the steps of his progress are alike assignable4 ,common ,sense is the region of ,opinion1 in which there is diversity of authorities and contradiction of arguments without any settled truth2 all affirmations being particular and relative1 true at one time and place1 false at another4 ,science1 on the contrary1 deals with imperishable ,forms and universal truths1 which ,plato regards1 in their subjective aspect1 as the innate1 though buried1 furniture of the soul1 inherited from an external pre-existence1 and revived in it out of the misleading data of sense by a process first of the cross-examining ,elenchus1 next of scientific ,demonstration4 ,plato depreciates altogether the untaught1 unexamined1 stock of acquirements which passes under the name of ,common ,sense1 as a mere worthless semblance of knowledge without reality2 as requiring to be broken up by the scrutinizing ,elenchus1 in order to impress a painful but healthy consciousness of ignorance1 and to prepare the mind for that process of teaching whereby alone ,science or ,cognition can be imparted4#b ,he admits that ,opinion may be right as well as wrong4 ,yet even when right1 it is essentially different from ,science1 and is essentially transitory2 a safe guide to action while it lasts1 but not to be trusted for stability or permanence4#c ,by ,plato1 ,rhetoric is treated as belonging to the province of ,opinion1 ,dialectic to that of ,science4 ,the rhetor addresses multitudes in continuous speech1 appeals to received common places1 and persuades3 the dialectician1 conversing only with one or a few1 receives and imparts the stimulus of short question and answer2 thus awakening the dormant capacities of the soul to the reminiscence of those universal ,forms or ,ideas which are the only true ,knowable4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 pp4 #bbh-bbi2 ,symposion1 pp4 #bjc-bjd2 ,thetetus1 pp4 #adh1 #adi1 #aej4 ,compare also ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,vol4 ,i4 chs4 vi4-vii4 pp4 #bde-bhh2 ,,ii4 ch4 xxvi4 p4 #cgf1 seq4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,republic1 v4 pp4 #dgg-dgh2 ,menon1 pp4 #ig-ih4 ,like ,plato1 ,aristotle distinguishes the region of ,common ,sense or ,opinion from that of ,science1 and regards ,universals as the objects of ,science4 ,but his ,universals are very different from those of ,plato3 they are not self-existent realities1 known by the mind from a long period of pre-existence1 and called up by reminiscence out of the chaos of sensible impressions4 ,to operate such revival is the great function that ,plato assigns to ,dialectic4 ,but in the philosophy of ,aristotle ,dialectic is something very different4 ,it is placed alongside of ,rhetoric in the region of ,opinion4 ,both the rhetor and the dialectician deal with all subjects1 recognizing no limit2 they attack or defend any or all conclusions1 employing the process of ratiocination which ,aristotle has treated under the name of ,syllogism2 they take up as premisses any one of the various opinions in circulation1 for which some plausible authority may be cited2 they follow out the consequences of one opinion in its bearing upon others1 favourable or unfavourable1 and thus become well furnished with arguments for and against all4 ,the ultimate foundation here supposed is some sort of recognized presumption or authoritative sanction#d--law1 custom1 or creed1 established among this or that portion of mankind1 some maxim enunciated by an eminent poet1 some doctrine of the ,pythagoreans or other philosophers1 current proverb1 answer from the ,delphian oracle1 c4 ,any one of these may serve as a dialectical authority4 ,but these authorities1 far from being harmonious with each other1 are recognized as independent1 discordant1 and often contradictory4 ,though not all of equal value1#e each is sufficient to warrant the setting up of a thesis for debate4 ,in ,dialectic1 one of the disputants undertakes to do this1 and to answer all questions that may be put to him respecting the thesis1 without implicating himself in inconsistencies or contradiction4 ,the questioner or assailant1 on the other hand1 shapes his questions with a view to refute the thesis1 by eliciting answers which may furnish him with premisses for some syllogism in contradiction thereof4 ,but he is tied down by the laws of debate to syllogize only from such premisses as the respondent has expressly granted2 and to put questions in such manner that the respondent is required only to give or withhold assent1 according as he thinks right4 ,footnote #d3 ,aristot4 ,topica1 ,i4 x4 p4 #ajd1 a4 #h1 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #ai4 ,compare ,metaphysica1 ,a4 p4 #iie1 a4 #a-aj4 ,footnote #e3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xix4 p4 #ha1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 kata men ou7n do_/xan sullogizome_/nois kai mo_/non dialektiks dlon o7_/ti touto mo_/non skepte_/on1 ei7 e7x 7n e7nde_/chetai e7ndoxota_/tn gi_/netai o7 sullogismo_/s1 7_/st' ei7 kai e7_/sti ti t a7lthei_/a tn ,,ab me_/son1 dokei de m_/1 o7 dia tou_/tou sullogizo_/menos sullelo_/gistai dialektiks1 pros d' a7l_/theian e7k tn u7parcho_/ntn dei skopein4 ,compare ,topica1 ,,viii4 xii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #bg4 ,we shall see more fully how ,aristotle deals with ,dialectic1 when we come to the ,topica3 here ,i put it forward briefly1 in order that the reader may better understand1 by contrast1 its extreme antithesis1 viz41 ,demonstrative ,science and ,necessary ,truth as conceived by ,aristotle4 ,first1 instead of two debaters1 one of whom sets up a thesis which he professes to understand and undertakes to maintain1 while the other puts questions upon it1--,demonstrative ,science assumes a teacher who knows1 and a learner conscious of ignorance but wishing to know4 ,the teacher lays down premisses which the learner is bound to receive2 or if they are put in the form of questions1 the learner must answer them as the teacher expects1 not according to his own knowledge4 ,secondly1 instead of the unbounded miscellany of subjects treated in ,dialectic1 ,demonstrative ,science is confined to a few special subjects1 in which alone appropriate premisses can be obtained1 and definitions framed4 ,thirdly1 instead of the several heterogeneous authorities recognized in ,dialectic1 ,demonstrative ,science has principia of its own1 serving as points of departure2 some principia common to all its varieties1 others special or confined to one alone4 ,fourthly1 there is no conflict of authorities in ,demonstrative ,science2 its propositions are essential1 universal1 and true per se1 from the commencement to the conclusion2 while ,dialectic takes in accidental premisses as well as essential4 ,fifthly1 the principia of ,demonstrative ,science are obtained from ,induction only2 originating in particulars which are all that the ordinary growing mind can at first apprehend 7notiora nobis71 but culminating in universals which correspond to the perfection of our cognitive comprehension 7notiora natur47#f ,footnote #f3 ,aristot4 ,topica1 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #ada1 b4 #c-ad4 ,greek3 oi7 polloi gar ta toiauta prognri_/zousin2 ta men gar ts tuchou_/ss1 ta d' a7kribous kai peritts dianoi_/as katamathein e7sti_/n4 ,compare in ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xii4 pp4 #gg-gh1 the contrast between ,greek3 ta math_/mata and ,greek3 oi7 dia_/logoi4 ,amidst all these diversities1 ,dialectic and ,demonstrative ,science have in common the process of ,syllogism1 including such assumptions as the rules of syllogizing postulate4 ,in both1 the conclusions are hypothetically true 7i4e4 granting the premisses to be so74 ,but1 in demonstrative syllogism1 the conclusions are true universally1 absolutely1 and necessarily2 deriving this character from their premisses1 which ,aristotle holds up as the cause1 reason1 or condition of the conclusion4 ,what he means by ,demonstrative ,science1 we may best conceive1 by taking it as a small ,greek3 te_/menos or specially cultivated enclosure1 subdivided into still smaller separate compartments--the extreme antithesis to the vast common land of ,dialectic4 ,between the two lies a large region1 neither essentially determinate like the one1 nor essentially indeterminate like the other2 an intermediate region in which are comprehended the subjects of the treatises forming the very miscellaneous ,encyclopdia of ,aristotle4 ,these subjects do not admit of being handled with equal exactness2 accordingly1 he admonishes us that it is important to know how much exactness is attainable in each1 and not to aspire to more4#g ,footnote #g3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,i4 p4 #ajid1 b4 #ab-be2 p4 #ajih1 a4 #bf-;b4 #h2 ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #iie1 a4 #ae2 ,ethic4 ,eudem4 ,i4 p4 #abaf1 b4 #cj-p4 #abag1 a4 #ag2 ,politic4 ,,vii4 p4 #acbh1 a4 #ai2 ,meteorolog4 ,i4 p4 #cch1 a4 #ce4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #gh1 b4 #cb 7with ,waitz's note1 ,,ii4 p4 #cce72 and ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #hg1 a4 #ca4 ,the passages above named in the ,nikomachean ,ethica are remarkable3 ,greek3 le_/goito d' a7n i7kans1 ei7 kata tn u7pokeime_/nn u7_/ln diasaphthei_/2 to gar a7kribes ou7ch o7moi_/s e7n a7_/pasi tois lo_/gois e7piztte_/on1 7_/sper ou7d' e7n tois dmiourgoume_/nois4 tn a7kri_/beian m o7moi_/s e7n a7_/pasin e7piztein 7chr_/71 a7ll' e7n e7ka_/stois kata tn u7pokeime_/nn u7_/ln1 kai e7pi tosouton e7ph' o7_/son oi7keion t method4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbe1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 a7podeiknu_/ousin 7 a7nagkai_/oteron 7 malak_/teron4 ,the different degrees of exactness attainable in different departments of science1 and the reasons upon which such difference depends are well explained in the sixth book of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ,system of ,logic1 vol4 ,,ii4 chap4 iii4 pp4 #dbb-dbe1 #eth ed4 ,aristotle says that there can be no scientific theory or cognition about ,greek3 to sumbebko_/s which he defines to be that which belongs to a subject neither necessarily1 nor constantly1 nor usually1 but only on occasion 7,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #c1 #bf1 #cc2 ,k4 p4 #ajfe1 a4 #a1 meaning ,greek3 to sumbebkos m kath' au7to_/1--,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 #f1 #ge1 a4 #ah2 for he uses the term in two different senses--,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbe1 a4 #ca74 ,in his view1 there can be no science except about constant conjunctions2 and we find the same doctrine in the following passage of ,mr4 ,mill3--,any facts are fitted1 in themselves1 to be a subject of science1 which follow one another according to constant laws2 although those laws may not have been discovered1 nor even be discoverable by our existing resources4 ,take1 for instance1 the most familiar class of meteorological phenomena1 those of rain and sunshine4 ,scientific inquiry has not yet succeeded in ascertaining the order of antecedence and consequence among these phenomena1 so as to be able1 at least in our regions of the earth1 to predict them with certainty1 or even with any high degree of probability4 ,yet no one doubts that the phenomena depend on laws4 4 4 4 4 ,meteorology not only has in itself every requisite for being1 but actually is1 a science2 though from the difficulty of observing the facts upon which the phenomena depend 7a difficulty inherent in the peculiar nature of those phenomena71 the science is extremely imperfect2 and were it perfect1 might probably be of little avail in practice1 since the data requisite for applying its principles to particular instances would rarely be procurable4 ,a case may be conceived of an intermediate character between the perfection of science1 and this its extreme imperfection4 ,it may happen that the greater causes1 those on which the principal part of the phenomena depends1 are within the reach of observation and measurement2 so that1 if no other causes intervened1 a complete explanation could be given1 not only of the phenomenon in general1 but of all the variations and modifications which it admits of4 ,but inasmuch as other1 perhaps many other1 causes1 separately insignificant in their effects1 co-operate or conflict in many or in all cases with those greater causes1 the effect1 accordingly1 presents more or less of aberration from what would be produced by the greater causes alone4 ,now if these minor causes are not so constantly accessible1 or not accessible at all1 to accurate observation1 the principal mass of the effect may still1 as before1 be accounted for1 and even predicted2 but there will be variations and modifications which we shall not be competent to explain thoroughly1 and our predictions will not be fulfilled accurately1 but only approximately4 ,it is thus1 for example1 with the theory of the ,tides4 4 4 4 4 ,and this is what is or ought to be meant by those who speak of sciences which are not exact sciences4 ,astronomy was once a science1 without being an exact science4 ,it could not become exact until not only the general course of the planetary motions1 but the perturbations also1 were accounted for and referred to their causes4 ,it has become an exact science because its phenomena have been brought under laws comprehending the whole of the causes by which the phenomena are influenced1 whether in a great or only in a trifling degree1 whether in all or only in some cases1 and assigning to each of those causes the share of effect that really belongs to it4 4 4 4 4 ,the science of human nature falls far short of the standard of exactness now realized in ,astronomy2 but there is no reason that it should not be as much a science as ,tidology is1 or as ,astronomy was when its calculations had only mastered the main phenomena1 but not the perturbations4 ,in setting out the process of ,demonstration1 ,aristotle begins from the idea of teaching and learning4 ,in every variety thereof some prcognita must be assumed1 which the learner must know before he comes to be taught1 and upon which the teacher must found his instruction4#h ,this is equally true1 whether we proceed 7as in ,syllogism7 from the more general to the less general1 or 7as in ,induction7 from the particular to the general4 ,he who comes to learn ,geometry must know beforehand the figures called circle and triangle1 and must have a triangular figure drawn to contemplate2 he must know what is a unit or monad1 and must have1 besides1 exposed before him what is chosen as the unit for the reasoning on which he is about to enter4 ,these are the prcognita required for ,geometry and ,arithmetic4 ,some prcognita are also required preparatory to any and all reasoning3 e4g41 the maxim of ,identity 7fixed meaning of terms and propositions71 and the maxims of ,contradiction and of ,excluded ,middle 7impossibility that a proposition and its contradictory can either be both true or both false47#i ,the learner must thus know beforehand certain ,definitions and ,axioms1 as conditions without which the teacher cannot instruct him in any demonstrative science4 ,footnote #h3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 i4 pp4 #ga-gb2 ,metaphys4 ,a4 ,,ix4 p4 #iib1 b4 #cj4 ,footnote #i3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i1 i4 p4 #ga1 a4 #aa-ag4 ,greek3 a7_/pan 7 phsai 7 a7pophsai a7lthe_/s4 ,aristotle1 here at the beginning1 seeks to clear up a difficulty which had been raised in the time of ,plato as between knowledge and learning4 ,how is it possible to learn at all8 is a question started in the ,menon4#aj ,you either know a thing already1 and1 on this supposition1 you do not want to learn it2 or you do not know it1 and in this case you cannot learn it1 because1 even when you have learnt1 you cannot tell whether the matter learnt is what you were in search of4 ,to this difficulty1 the reply made in the ,menon is1 that you never do learn any thing really new4 ,what you are said to learn1 is nothing more than reminiscence of what had once been known in an anterior life1 and forgotten at birth into the present life2 what is supposed to be learnt is only the recall of that which you once knew1 but had forgotten4 ,such is the ,platonic doctrine of ,reminiscence4 ,aristotle will not accept that doctrine as a solution2 but he acknowledges the difficulty1 and intimates that others had already tried to solve it without success4 ,his own solution is that there are two grades of cognition3 7#a7 the full1 complete1 absolute2 7#b7 the partial1 incomplete1 qualified4 ,what you already know by the first of these grades1 you cannot be said to learn2 but you may learn that which you know only by the second grade1 and by such learning you bring your incomplete cognition up to completeness4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,menon4 p4 #hj4 ,thus1 you have learnt1 and you know1 the universal truth1 that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles2 but you do not yet know that ,a ,b ,c1 ,d ,e ,f1 ,g ,h ,i1 c41 have their two angles equal to two right angles2 for you have not yet seen any of these figures1 and you do not know that they are triangles4 ,the moment that you see ,a ,b ,c1 or hear what figure it is1 you learn at one and the same time two facts3 first1 that it is a triangle2 next1 by virtue of your previous cognition1 that it possesses the above-mentioned property4 ,you knew this in a certain way or incompletely before1 by having followed the demonstration of the universal truth1 and by thus knowing that every triangle had its three angles equal to two right angles2 but you did not know it absolutely1 being ignorant that ,a ,b ,c was a triangle4#aa ,footnote #aa3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ga1 a4 #ag-;b4 #h3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de gnri_/zein ta men pro_/teron gnri_/zonta1 tn de kai a7_/ma lamba_/nonta tn gnsin1 oi7on o7_/sa tugcha_/nei o7_/nta u7po to katho_/lou1 7n e7_/chei tn gnsin4 o7_/ti men gar pan tri_/gnon e7_/chei dusin o7rthais i7_/sas1 pro_/dei2 o7_/ti de to_/de to e7n t 7mikukli_/ tri_/gno_/n e7stin1 a7_/ma e7pago_/menos e7gn_/risen4--prin d' e7pachthnai 7 labein sullogismo_/n1 tro_/pon me_/n tina i7_/ss phate_/on e7pi_/stasthai1 tro_/pon d' a7_/llon ou7_/4 o7 gar m 7_/dei ei7 e7_/stin a7pls1 touto ps 7_/dei o7_/ti du_/o o7rthas e7_/chei a7pls8 a7lla dlon 7s 7di men e7pi_/statai1 o7_/ti katho_/lou e7pi_/statai1 a7pls d' ou7k e7pi_/statai4--ou7den 7oi7mai7 klu_/ei1 o7 mantha_/nei1 e7_/stin 7s e7pi_/stasthai1 e7_/sti d' 7s a7gnoein2 a7_/topon gar ou7k ei7 oi7de_/ ps o7 mantha_/nei1 a7ll' ei7 7di_/1 oi7on 7 mantha_/nei kai 7_/s4 ,compare also ,anal4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #hf1 a4 #bc1 and ,metaph4 ,a4 ii4 p4 #ihb1 a4 #h2 ,anal4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #e-;b4 #aj47 ,aristotle reports the solution given by others1 but from which he himself dissented1 of the ,platonic puzzle4 ,the respondent was asked1 ,do you know that every ,dyad is even8--,yes4 ,some ,dyad was then produced1 which the respondent did not know to be a ,dyad2 accordingly he did not know it to be even4 ,now the critics alluded to by ,aristotle said that the respondent made a wrong answer2 instead of saying ,i know every ,dyad is even1 he ought to have said4 ,every ,dyad which ,i know to be a ,dyad is even4 ,aristotle pronounces that this criticism is incorrect4 ,the respondent knows the conclusion which had previously been demonstrated to him2 and that conclusion was1 ,every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles2 it was not1 ,every thing which ,i know to be a triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles4 ,this last proposition had never been demonstrated1 nor even stated3 ,greek3 ou7demi_/a gar pro_/tasis lamba_/netai toiau_/t1 o7_/ti o7n su oi7das a7rithmo_/n1 7 o7 su oi7das eu7thu_/grammon1 a7lla kata panto_/s 7b4 #c-e74 ,this discussion1 in the commencement of the ,analytica ,posteriora 7combined with ,analyt4 ,priora1 ,,ii4 xxi471 is interesting1 because it shows that even then the difficulties were felt1 about the major proposition of the ,syllogism1 which ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill has so ably cleared up1 for the first time1 in his ,system of ,logic4 ,see ,book ,,ii4 ch4 iii4 of that work1 especially as it stands in the sixth edition1 with the note there added1 pp4 #bcb-bcc4 ,you affirm1 in the major proposition of the ,syllogism1 that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles2 does not this include the triangle ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and is it not therefore a petitio principii8 ,or1 if it be not so1 does it not assert more than you know8 ,the ,sophists 7upon whom both ,plato and ,aristotle are always severe1 but who were valuable contributors to the theory of ,logic by fastening upon the weak points7 attacked it on this ground1 and raised against it the puzzle described by ,aristotle 7in this chapter71 afterwards known as the ,sophism entitled ,greek3 o7 e7gkekalumme_/nos 7see ,themistius ,paraphras4 ,i4 i42 also ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,vol4 ,,iii4 ch4 xxxviii4 p4 #dhi74 ,the critics whom ,aristotle here cites and disapproves1 virtually admitted the pertinence of this puzzle by modifying their assertion1 and by cutting it down to ,everything which we know to be a triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles4 ,aristotle finds fault with this modification1 which1 however1 is one way of abating the excess of absolute and peremptory pretension contained in the major1 and of intimating the want of a minor to be added for interpreting and supplementing the major2 while ,aristotle himself arrives at the same result by admitting that the knowledge corresponding to the major proposition is not yet absolute1 but incomplete and qualified2 and that it is only made absolute when supplemented by a minor4 ,the very same point1 substantially1 is raised in the discussion between ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill and an opponent1 in the note above referred to4 ,a writer in the ',british ,quarterly ,review' endeavours to show that there is no petitio principii in the ,syllogism1 by denying that the proposition ,all men are mortal1 asserts or assumes that ,socrates is mortal4 ,in support of this denial1 he argues that we may1 and in fact do1 admit the general proposition without having particularly examined the case of ,socrates1 and even without knowing whether the individual so named is a man or something else4 ,but this of course was never denied4 ,that we can and do draw inferences concerning cases specifically unknown to us1 is the datum from which all who discuss this subject must set out4 ,the question is1 in what terms the evidence or ground on which we draw these conclusions may best be designated--whether it is most correct to say that the unknown case is proved by known cases1 or that it is proved by a general proposition including both sets of cases1 the known and the unknown8 ,i contend for the former mode of expression4 ,i hold it an abuse of language to say1 that the proof that ,socrates is mortal1 is that all men are mortal4 ,turn it in what way we will1 this seems to me asserting that a thing is the proof of itself4 ,whoever pronounces the words1 ,all men are mortal1 has affirmed that ,socrates is mortal1 though he may never have heard of ,socrates2 for since ,socrates1 whether known to be a man or not1 really is a man1 he is included in the words1 ,all men1 and in every assertion of which they are the subject4 4 4 4 4 ,the reviewer acknowledges that the maxim 7,dictum de ,omni et ,nullo7 as commonly expressed--',whatever is true of a class is true of everything included in the class1' is a mere identical proposition1 since the class is nothing but the things included in it4 ,but he thinks this defect would be cured by wording the maxim thus3 ',whatever is true of a class is true of everything which can be shown to be a member of the class3' as if a thing could be shown to be a member of the class without being one4 ,the qualified manner in which the maxim is here enunciated by the reviewer 7what can be shown to be a member of the class7 corresponds with the qualification introduced by those critics whom ,aristotle impugns 7,greek3 lu_/ousi gar ou7 pha_/skontes ei7de_/nai pasan dua_/da a7rti_/an ou7san1 a7ll' 7n i7_/sasin o7_/ti dua_/s72 and the reply of ,mr4 ,mill would have suited for these critics as well as for the reviewer4 ,the puzzle started in the ,platonic ,menon is1 at bottom1 founded on the same view as that of ,mr4 ,mill1 when he states that the major proposition of the ,syllogism includes beforehand the conclusion4 ,the general principle1 7says ,mr4 ,mill1 p4 #bje71 instead of being given as evidence of the particular case1 cannot itself be taken for true without exception1 until every shadow of doubt which could affect any case comprised in it is dispelled by evidence aliunde2 and then what remains for the syllogism to prove8 ,from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars but those which the principle itself assumes as known4 ,to enunciate this in the language of the ,platonic ,menon1 we learn nothing by or through the evidence of the ,syllogism1 except a part of what we have already professed ourselves to know by asserting the major premiss4 ,aristotle proceeds to tell us what is meant by knowing a thing absolutely or completely 7,greek3 a7pls74 ,it is when we believe ourselves to know the cause or reason through which the matter known exists1 so that it cannot but be as it is4 ,that is what ,demonstration1 or ,scientific ,syllogism1 teaches us2#ab a ,syllogism derived from premisses true1 immediate1 prior to1 and more knowable than the conclusion--causes of the conclusion1 and specially appropriate thereto4 ,these premisses must be known beforehand without being demonstrated 7i4e4 known not through a middle term72 and must be known not merely in the sense of understanding the signification of the terms1 but also in that of being able to affirm the truth of the proposition4 ,prior or more knowable is understood here as prior or more knowable by nature 7not relatively to us1 according to the antithesis formerly explained72 first1 most universal1 undemonstrable principia are meant4 ,some of these are ,axioms1 which the learner must bring with him from home1 or know before the teacher can instruct him in any special science2 some are ,definitions of the name and its essential meaning2 others1 again1 are ,hypotheses or affirmations of the existence of the thing defined1 which the learner must accept upon the authority of the teacher4#ac ,as these are the principia of ,demonstration1 so it is necessary that the learner should know them1 not merely as well as the conclusions demonstrated1 but even better2 and that among matters contradictory to the principia there should be none that he knows better or trusts more4#ad ,footnote #ab3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #i-ag4 ,julius ,pacius says in a note1 ad c4 ii4 p4 #cid3 ,propositio demonstrativa est prima1 immediata1 et indemonstrabilis4 ,his tribus verbis significatur una et eadem conditio2 nam propositio prima est1 qu1 quod medio caret1 demonstrari nequit4 ,so also ,zabarella 7,in lib4 ,i4 ,post4 ,anal4 ,comm41 p4 #cdj1 ,op4 ed4 ,venet4 #afag73 ,du ill dictiones 7primis et immediatis7 unam tantum significant conditionem ordine secundam1 non duas2 idem namque est1 principia esse medio carentia1 ac esse prima4 ,footnote #ac3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #a-bd2 ,themistius1 ,paraphr4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aj1 ed4 ,spengel2 ,schol4 p4 #aii1 b4 #dd4 ,themistius quotes the definition of an ,axiom as given by ,theophrastus3 ,greek3 ,a7xi_/ma_/ e7sti do_/xa tis1 c4 ,this shows the difficulty of adhering precisely to a scientific terminology4 ,theophrastus explains an axiom to be a sort of ,greek3 do_/xa1 thus lapsing into the common loose use of the word4 ,yet still both he and ,aristotle declare ,greek3 do_/xa to be of inferior intellectual worth as compared with ,greek3 e7pist_/m 7,anal4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiii471 while at the same time they declare the ,axiom to be the very maximum of scientific truth4 ,theophrastus gave1 as examples of ,axioms1 the 9999maxim of ,contradiction1 universally applicable1 and1 ,if equals be taken from equals the remainders will be equal1 applicable to homogeneous quantities4 ,even ,aristotle himself sometimes falls into the same vague employment of ,greek3 do_/xa1 as including the ,axioms4 ,see ,metaphys4 ,b4 ii4 p4 #iif1 b4 #bh2 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #cc4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,anal4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #be1 b4 #d4 ,i translate these words in conformity with ,themistius1 pp4 #ab-ac1 and with ,mr4 ,poste's translation1 p4 #dc4 ,julius ,pacius and ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire render them somewhat differently4 ,they also read ,greek3 a7meta_/pttos1 while ,waitz and ,firmin ,didot read ,greek3 a7meta_/peistos1 which last seems preferable4 ,in ,aristotle's time two doctrines had been advanced1 in opposition to the preceding theory3 7#a7 ,some denied the necessity of any indemonstrable principia1 and affirmed the possibility of1 demonstrating backwards ad infinitum2 7#b7 ,others agreed in denying the necessity of any indemonstrable principia1 but contended that demonstration in a circle is valid and legitimate--e4g4 that ,a may be demonstrated by means of ,b1 and ,b by means of ,a4 ,against both these doctrines ,aristotle enters his protest4 ,the first of them--the supposition of an interminable regress--he pronounces to be obviously absurd3 the second he declares tantamount to proving a thing by itself2 the circular demonstration1 besides1 having been shown to be impossible1 except in the ,first figure1 with propositions in which the predicate reciprocates or is co-extensive with the subject--a very small proportion among propositions generally used in demonstrating4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gb1 b4 #e-p4 #gc1 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 7_/st' e7peid o7li_/ga toiauta e7n tais a7podei_/xesin1 c4 ,demonstrative ,science is attained only by syllogizing from necessary premisses1 such as cannot possibly be other than they are4 ,the predicate must be 7#a7 de omni1 7#b7 per se1 7#c7 quatenus ipsum1 so that it is a ,primum ,universale2 this third characteristic not being realized without the preceding two4 ,first1 the predicate must belong1 and belong at all times1 to everything called by the name of the subject4 ,next1 it must belong thereunto per se1 or essentially2 that is1 either the predicate must be stated in the definition declaring the essence of the subject1 or the subject must be stated in the definition declaring the essence of the predicate4 ,the predicate must not be extra-essential to the subject1 nor attached to it as an adjunct from without1 simply concomitant or accidental4 ,the like distinction holds in regard to events3 some are accidentally concomitant sequences which may or may not be realized 7e4g41 a flash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey72 in others1 the conjunction is necessary or causal 7as when an animal dies under the sacrificial knife74#af ,both these two characteristics 7de omni and per se7 are presupposed in the third 7quatenus ipsum72 but this last implies farther1 that the predicate is attached to the subject in the highest universality consistent with truth2 i4e41 that it is a ,first ,universal1 a primary predicate and not a derivative predicate4 ,thus1 the predicate of having its three angles equal to two right angles1 is a characteristic not merely de omni and per se1 but also a ,first ,universal1 applied to a triangle4 ,it is applied to a triangle1 quatenus triangle1 as a primary predicate4 ,if applied to a subject of higher universality 7e4g41 to every geometrical figure71 it would not be always true4 ,if applied to a subject of lower universality 7e4g41 to a right-angled triangle or an isosceles triangle71 it would be universally true and would be true per se1 but it would be a derivative predicate and not a ,first ,universal2 it would not be applied to the isosceles quatenus isosceles1 for there is a still higher ,universal of which it is predicable1 being true respecting any triangle you please4 ,thus1 the properties with which ,demonstration1 or full and absolute ,science1 is conversant1 are de omni1 per se1 and quatenus ipsum1 or ,universalia ,prima2#ag all of them necessary1 such as cannot but be true4 ,footnote #af3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #gc1 a4 #ba1 b4 #af4 ,greek3 ,ta a7_/ra lego_/mena e7pi tn a7pls e7pisttn kath' au7ta ou7_/ts 7s e7nupa_/rchein tois katgoroume_/nois 7 e7nupa_/rchesthai di' au7ta_/ te_/ e7sti kai e7x a7na_/gks 7b4 #af1 seq474 ,line must be included in the definition of the opposites straight or curve4 ,also it is essential to every line that it is either straight or curve4 ,number must be included in the definition of the opposites odd or even2 and to be either odd or even is essentially predicable of every number4 ,you cannot understand what is meant by straight or curve unless you have the notion of a line4 ,the example given by ,aristotle of causal conjunction 7the death of an animal under the sacrificial knife7 shows that he had in his mind the perfection of ,inductive ,observation1 including full application of the ,method of ,difference4 ,footnote #ag3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #gc1 b4 #be-p4 #gd1 a4 #c4 ,greek3 o7 toi_/nun to tuchon prton dei_/knutai du_/o o7rthas e7_/chon 7 o7tioun a7_/llo1 tou_/t pr_/t u7pa_/rchei katho_/lou1 kai 7 a7po_/deixis kath' au7to tou_/tou katho_/lou e7sti1 tn d' a7_/lln tro_/pon tina ou7 kath' au7to_/2 ou7de tou i7soske_/lous ou7k e7_/sti katho_/lou a7ll' e7pi ple_/on4 ,about the precise signification of ,greek3 katho_/lou in ,aristotle1 see a valuable note of ,bonitz 7ad ,metaphys4 ,z4 iii47 p4 #bii2 also ,waitz 7ad ,aristot4 ,de ,interpr4 c4 vii47 ,i4 p4 #ccd4 ,aristotle gives it here1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 katho_/lou de le_/g o7 a7n kata panto_/s te u7pa_/rch kai kath' au7to kai 7 au7to_/4 ,compare ,themistius1 ,paraphr4 p4 #ai1 ,spengel4 ,greek3 ,to kath' au7to_/ is described by ,aristotle confusedly4 ,greek3 ,to katho_/lou1 is that which is predicable of the subject as a whole or summum genus3 ,greek3 to kata panto_/s1 that which is predicable of every individual1 either of the summum genus or of any inferior species contained therein4 ,cf4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 7 gar kath' au7to u7pa_/rchei ti1 touto au7to au7t ai7_/tion--the subject is itself the cause or fundamentum of the properties per se4 ,see the explanation and references in ,kampe1 ,die ,erkenntniss-theorie des ,aristoteles1 ch4 v4 pp4 #afj-afe4 ,aristotle remarks that there is great liability to error about these ,universalia ,prima4 ,we sometimes demonstrate a predicate to be true1 universally and per se1 of a lower species1 without being aware that it might also be demonstrated to be true1 universally and per se1 of the higher genus to which that species belongs2 perhaps1 indeed1 that higher genus may not yet have obtained a current name4 ,that proportions hold by permutation1 was demonstrated severally for numbers1 lines1 solids1 and intervals of time2 but this belongs to each of them1 not from any separate property of each1 but from what is common to all3 that1 however1 which is common to all had received no name1 so that it was not known that one demonstration might comprise all the four4#ah ,in like manner1 a man may know that an equilateral and an isosceles triangle have their three angles equal to two right angles1 and also that a scalene triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles2 yet he may not know 7except sophistically and by accident#ai7 that a triangle in genere has its three angles equal to two right angles1 though there be no other triangles except equilateral1 isosceles1 and scalene4 ,he does not know that this may be demonstrated of every triangle quatenus triangle4 ,the only way to obtain a certain recognition of ,primum ,universale1 is1 to abstract successively from the several conditions of a demonstration respecting the concrete and particular1 until the proposition ceases to be true4 ,thus1 you have before you a brazen isosceles triangle1 the three angles whereof are equal to two right angles4 ,you may eliminate the condition brazen1 and the proposition will still remain true4 ,you may also eliminate the condition isosceles2 still the proposition is true4 ,but you cannot eliminate the condition triangle1 so as to retain only the higher genus1 geometrical figure2 for the proposition then ceases to be always true4 ,triangle is in this case the ,primum ,universale4#bj ,footnote #ah3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post ,i4 v4 p4 #gd1 a4 #d-bc4 ,greek3 a7lla dia to m ei7nai 7nomasme_/non ti pa_/nta tauta e7_/n1 a7rithmoi_/1 m_/k1 chro_/nos1 sterea_/1 kai ei7_/dei diaphe_/rein a7ll_/ln1 chris e7lamba_/neto4 ,what these four have in common is that which he himself expresses by ,greek3 ,poso_/n--,quantum--in the ,categori and elsewhere4 7,categor4 p4 #d1 b4 #bj1 seq42 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbj1 a4 #g1 seq47 ,footnote #ai3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 v4 p4 #gd1 a4 #bg3 ,greek3 ou7_/p oi7de to tri_/gnon o7_/ti du_/o o7rthais1 ei7 m ton sophistikon tro_/pon ou7de katho_/lou tri_/gnon1 ou7_/d' ei7 mde_/n e7sti para tauta tri_/gnon e7_/teron4 ,the phrase ,greek3 ton sophistikon tro_/pon is equivalent to ,greek3 ton sophistikon 9999tro_/pon ton kata sumbebko_/s1 p4 #ga1 b4 #aj4 ,i see nothing in it connected with ,aristotle's characteristic of a ,sophist 7special professional life purpose--,greek3 tou bi_/ou t proaire_/sei1 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajjd1 b4 #bd73 the phrase means nothing more than unscientific4 ,footnote #bj3 ,aristot4 ,analyt ,post ,i4 v4 p4 #gd1 a4 #cb-;b4 #d4 ,in every demonstration the principia or premisses must be not only true1 but necessarily true2 the conclusion also will then be necessarily true1 by reason of the premisses1 and this constitutes ,demonstration4 ,wherever the premisses are necessarily true1 the conclusion will be necessarily true2 but you cannot say1 vice vers1 that wherever the conclusion is necessarily true1 the syllogistic premisses from which it follows must always be necessarily true4 ,they may be true without being necessarily true1 or they may even be false3 if1 then1 the conclusion be necessarily true1 it is not so by reason of these premisses2 and the syllogistic proof is in this case no demonstration4 ,your syllogism may have true premisses and may lead to a conclusion which is true by reason of them2 but still you have not demonstrated1 since neither premisses nor conclusion are necessarily true4#ba ,when an opponent contests your demonstration1 he succeeds if he can disprove the necessity of your conclusion2 if he can show any single case in which it either is or may be false4#bb ,it is not enough to proceed upon a premiss which is either probable or simply true3 it may be true1 yet not appropriate to the case3 you must take your departure from the first or highest universal of the genus about which you attempt to demonstrate4#bc ,again1 unless you can state the why of your conclusion2 that is to say1 unless the middle term1 by reason of which the conclusion is necessarily true1 be itself necessarily true1--you have not demonstrated it1 nor do you know it absolutely4 ,your middle term not being necessary may vanish1 while the conclusion to which it was supposed to lead abides3 in truth no conclusion was known through that middle4#bd ,in the complete demonstrative or scientific syllogism1 the major term must be predicable essentially or per se of the middle1 and the middle term must be predicable essentially or per se of the minor2 thus alone can you be sure that the conclusion also is per se or necessary4 ,the demonstration cannot take effect through a middle term which is merely a ,sign2 the sign1 even though it be a constant concomitant1 yet being not1 or at least not known to be1 per se1 will not bring out the why of the conclusion1 nor make the conclusion necessary4 ,of non-essential concomitants altogether there is no demonstration2 wherefore it might seem to be useless to put questions about such2 yet1 though the questions cannot yield necessary premisses for a demonstrative conclusion1 they may yield premisses from which a conclusion will necessarily follow4#be ,footnote #ba3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #gd1 b4 #e-ah4 ,greek3 e7x a7lthn men gar e7_/sti kai m a7podeiknu_/nta sullogi_/sthai1 e7x a7nagkai_/n d' ou7k e7_/stin a7ll' 7 a7podeiknu_/nta2 touto gar 7_/d a7podei_/xe_/s e7stin4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ec1 b4 #g-be4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 vi4 p4 #gd1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 smeion d' o7_/ti 7 a7po_/deixis e7x a7nagkai_/n1 o7_/ti kai tas e7nsta_/seis ou7_/t phe_/romen pros tous oi7ome_/nous a7podeiknu_/nai1 o7_/ti ou7k a7na_/gk1 c4 ,footnote #bc3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #gd1 b4 #ba-bf3 ,greek3 dlon d' e7k tou_/tn kai o7_/ti eu7_/theis oi7 lamba_/nein oi7o_/menoi kals tas a7rcha_/s1 e7an e7_/ndoxos 7 7 pro_/tasis kai a7lth_/s1 oi7on oi7 sophistai o7_/ti to e7pi_/stasthai to e7pist_/mn e7_/chein21 c4 ,footnote #bd3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 vi4 p4 #gd1 b4 #bf-p4 #ge1 a4 #ag4 ,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #ge1 a4 #h-cg4 ,on the point last mentioned1 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire observes in his note1 p4 #da3 ,dans les questions de dialectique1 la conclusion est ncessaire en ce sens1 qu'elle suit ncessairement des prmisses2 elle n'est pas du tout ncessaire en ce sens1 que la chose qu'elle exprime soit ncessaire4 ,ainsi il faut distinguer la ncessit de la forme et la ncessit de la matire3 ou comme disent les scholastiques1 necessitas illationis et necessitas materi4 ,la dialectique se contente de la premire1 mais la demonstration a essentiellement besoin des deux4 ,in every demonstration three things may be distinguished3 7#a7 ,the demonstrated conclusion1 or ,attribute essential to a certain genus2 7#b7 ,the ,genus1 of which the attributes per se are the matter of demonstration2 7#c7 ,the ,axioms1 out of which1 or through which1 the demonstration is obtained4 ,these ,axioms may be and are common to several genera3 but the demonstration cannot be transferred from one genus to another2 both the extremes as well as the middle term must belong to the same genus4 ,an arithmetical demonstration cannot be transferred to magnitudes and their properties1 except in so far as magnitudes are numbers1 which is partially true of some among them4 ,the demonstrations in arithmetic may indeed be transferred to harmonics1 because harmonics is subordinate to arithmetic2 and1 for the like reason1 demonstrations in geometry may be transferred to mechanics and optics4 ,but we cannot introduce into geometry any property of lines1 which does not belong to them qu lines2 such1 for example1 as that a straight line is the most beautiful of all lines1 or is the contrary of a circular line2 for these predicates belong to it1 not qu line1 but qu member of a different or more extensive genus4#bf ,there can be no complete demonstration about perishable things1 or about any individual line1 except in regard to its attributes as member of the genus line4 ,where the conclusion is not eternally true1 but true at one time and not true at another1 this can only be because one of its premisses is not universal or essential4 ,where both premisses are universal and essential1 the conclusion must be eternal or eternally true4 ,as there is no demonstration1 so also there can be no definition1 of perishable attributes4#bg ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #ge1 a4 #ch-;b4 #bj4 ,mr4 ,poste1 in his translation1 here cites 7p4 #ej7 a good illustrative passage from ,dr4 ,whewell's ,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences1 ,book ,,ii4 ii43--,but1 in order that we may make any real advance in the discovery of truth1 our ideas must not only be clear2 they must also be appropriate4 ,each science has for its basis a different class of ideas2 and the steps which constitute the progress of one science can never be made by employing the ideas of another kind of science4 ,no genuine advance could ever be obtained in ,mechanics by applying to the subject the ideas of space and time merely2 no advance in ,chemistry by the use of mere mechanical conceptions2 no discovery in ,physiology by referring facts to mere chemical and mechanical principles4 c4 ,footnote #bg3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 viii4 p4 #ge1 b4 #ba-cf4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,z4 p4 #ajdj1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 dlon o7_/ti ou7k a7n ei7_/ au7tn 7tn phthartn7 ou7_/th' o7rismos ou7_/t' a7po_/deixis4 ,also ,biese1 ,die ,philosophie des ,aristoteles1 ch4 iv4 p4 #bdi4 ,for complete demonstration1 it is not sufficient that the premisses be true1 immediate1 and undemonstrable2 they must1 furthermore1 be essential and appropriate to the class in hand4 ,unless they be such1 you cannot be said to know the conclusion absolutely2 you know it only by accident4 ,you can only know a conclusion when demonstrated from its own appropriate premisses2 and you know it best when it is demonstrated from its highest premisses4 ,it is sometimes difficult to determine whether we really know or not2 for we fancy that we know1 when we demonstrate from true and universal principia1 without being aware whether they are1 or are not1 the principia appropriate to the case4#bh ,but these principia must always be assumed without demonstration--the class whose essential constituent properties are in question1 the universal ,axioms1 and the ,definition or meaning of the attributes to be demonstrated4 ,if these definitions and axioms are not always formally enunciated1 it is because we tacitly presume them to be already known and admitted by the learner4#bi ,he may indeed always refuse to grant them in express words1 but they are such that he cannot help granting them by internal assent in his mind1 to which every syllogism must address itself4 ,when you assume a premiss without demonstrating it1 though it be really demonstrable1 this1 if the learner is favourable and willing to grant it1 is an assumption or ,hypothesis1 valid relatively to him alone1 but not valid absolutely3 if he is reluctant or adverse1 it is a ,postulate1 which you claim whether he is satisfied or not4#cj ,the ,definition by itself is not an hypothesis2 for it neither affirms nor denies the existence of anything4 ,the pupil must indeed understand the terms of it2 but this alone is not an hypothesis1 unless you call the fact that the pupil comes to learn1 an hypothesis4#ca ,the ,hypothesis or assumption is contained in the premisses1 being that by which the reason of the conclusion comes to be true4 ,some object that the geometer makes a false hypothesis or assumption1 when he declares a given line drawn to be straight1 or to be a foot long1 though it is neither one nor the other4 ,but this objection has no pertinence1 since the geometer does not derive his conclusions from what is true of the visible lines drawn before his eyes1 but from what is true of the lines conceived in his own mind1 and signified or illustrated by the visible diagrams4#cb ,footnote #bh3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #ge1 b4 #cg-p4 #gf1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #bi3 ,ibid4 x4 p4 #gf1 a4 #ca-;b4 #bb4 ,footnote #cj3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 x4 p4 #gf1 b4 #bi-cd3 ,greek3 e7an men dokounta lamba_/n t mantha_/nonti1 u7poti_/thetai1 kai e7_/stin ou7_/ch a7pls u7po_/thesis1 a7lla pros e7keinon mo_/non1 a7n de 7 mdemi_/as e7nou_/ss do_/xs 7 kai e7nanti_/as e7nou_/ss lamba_/n to au7to_/1 ai7teitai4 kai tou_/t diaphe_/rei u7po_/thesis kai ai7_/tma1 c4 ,themistius1 ,paraphras4 p4 #cg1 ,spengel4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 p4 #gf1 b4 #cf3 ,greek3 touto d' ou7ch u7po_/thesis1 ei7 m kai to a7kou_/ein u7po_/thesi_/n tis ei7nai ph_/sei4 ,for the meaning of ,greek3 to a7kou_/ein1 compare ,greek3 o7 a7kou_/n1 infra1 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #cb3 ,ibid4 p4 #gg1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 o7 de geme_/trs ou7den sumperai_/netai t t_/nde ei7nai tn grammn 7n au7tos e7_/phthegktai1 a7lla ta dia tou_/tn dlou_/mena4 ,themistius1 ,paraphr4 p4 #cg3 ,greek3 7_/sper ou7d' oi7 geme_/trai ke_/chrntai tais grammais u7per 7n diale_/gontai kai deiknu_/ousin1 a7ll' a7s e7_/chousin e7n t psuch1 7n ei7si su_/mbola ai7 grapho_/menai4 ,a similar doctrine is asserted1 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xli4 p4 #di1 b4 #ce1 and still more clearly in ,de ,memoria et ,reminiscentia1 p4 #dej1 a4 #b-ab4 ,the process of ,demonstration neither requires1 nor countenances1 the ,platonic theory of ,ideas--universal substances beyond and apart from particulars4 ,but it does require that we should admit universal predications2 that is1 one and the same predicate truly applicable in the same sense to many different particulars4 ,unless this be so1 there can be no universal major premiss1 nor appropriate middle term1 nor valid demonstrative syllogism4#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xi4 p4 #gg1 a4 #e-i4 ,the ,maxim or ,axiom of ,contradiction1 in its most general enunciation1 is never formally enunciated by any special science2 but each of them assumes the ,maxim so far as applicable to its own purpose1 whenever the ,reductio ad ,absurdum is introduced4#cd ,it is in this and the other common principles or ,axioms that all the sciences find their point of contact and communion2 and that ,dialectic also comes into communion with all of them1 as also the science 7,first ,philosophy7 that scrutinizes the validity or demonstrability of the ,axioms4#ce ,the dialectician is not confined to any one science1 or to any definite subject-matter4 ,his liberty of interrogation is unlimited2 but his procedure is essentially interrogatory1 and he is bound to accept the answer of the respondent--whatever it be1 affirmative or negative--as premiss for any syllogism that he may construct4 ,in this way he can never be sure of demonstrating any thing2 for the affirmative and the negative will not be equally serviceable for that purpose4 ,there is indeed also1 in discussions on the separate sciences1 a legitimate practice of scientific interrogation4 ,here the questions proper to be put are limited in number1 and the answers proper to be made are determined beforehand by the truths of the science--say ,geometry2 still1 an answer thus correctly made will serve to the interrogator as premiss for syllogistic demonstration4#cf ,the respondent must submit to have such answer tested by appeal to geometrical principia and to other geometrical propositions already proved as legitimate conclusions from the principia2 if he finds himself involved in contradictions1 he is confuted qu geometer1 and must correct or modify his answer4 ,but he is not bound1 qu geometer1 to undergo scrutiny as to the geometrical principia themselves2 this would carry the dialogue out of the province of ,geometry into that of ,first ,philosophy and ,dialectic4 ,care1 indeed1 must be taken to keep both questions and answers within the limits of the science4 ,now there can be no security for this restriction1 except in the scientific competence of the auditors4 ,refrain1 accordingly1 from all geometrical discussions among men ignorant of geometry and confine yourself to geometrical auditors1 who alone can distinguish what questions and answers are really appropriate4 ,and what is here said about geometry1 is equally true about the other special sciences4#cg ,answers may be improper either as foreign to the science under debate1 or as appertaining to the science1 yet false as to the matter1 or as equivocal in middle term2 though this last is less likely to occur in ,geometry1 since the demonstrations are accompanied by diagrams1 which help to render conspicuous any such ambiguity4#ch ,to an inductive proposition1 bringing forward a single case as contributory to an ultimate generalization1 no general objection should be offered2 the objection should be reserved until the generalization itself is tendered4#ci ,sometimes the mistake is made of drawing an affirmative conclusion from premisses in the ,second figure2 this is formally wrong1 but the conclusion may in some cases be true1 if the major premiss happens to be a reciprocating proposition1 having its predicate co-extensive with its subject4 ,this1 however1 cannot be presumed2 nor can a conclusion be made to yield up its principles by necessary reciprocation2 for we have already observed that1 though the truth of the premisses certifies the truth of the conclusion1 we cannot say vice vers that the truth of the conclusion certifies the truth of the premisses4 ,yet propositions are more frequently found to reciprocate in scientific discussion than in ,dialectic2 because1 in the former1 we take no account of accidental properties1 but only of definitions and what follows from them4#dj ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 a4 #aj1 seq4 ,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf-cj3 ,greek3 kai ei7_/ tis katho_/lou peirto deiknu_/nai ta koina_/1 oi7on o7_/ti a7_/pan pha_/nai 7 a7popha_/nai1 7 o7_/ti i7_/sa a7po i7_/sn1 7 tn toiou_/tn a7_/tta4 ,compare ,metaph4 ,k4 p4 #ajfa99991 b4 #ah4 ,footnote #cf3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xii1 p4 #gg1 a4 #cf-dj2 ,themistius1 p4 #dj4 ,the text is here very obscure4 ,he proceeds to distinguish ,geometry especially 7also other sciences1 though less emphatically7 from ,greek3 ta e7n tois dialo_/gois 7,i4 xii4 p4 #gh1 a4 #ab74 ,julius ,pacius1 ad ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 viii4 7he divides the chapters differently71 p4 #dag1 says3--,differentia interrogationis dialectic et demonstrativ hc est4 ,dialecticus ita interrogat1 ut optionem det adversario1 utrum malit affirmare an negare4 ,demonstrator vero interrogat ut rem evidentiorem faciat2 id est1 ut doceat ex principiis auditori notis4 ,footnote #cg3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xii4 p4 #gg1 b4 #a-ae2 ,themistius1 p4 #da3 ,greek3 ou7 gar 7_/sper tn e7ndo_/xn oi7 polloi kritai_/1 ou7_/t kai tn kat' e7pist_/mn oi7 a7nepist_/mones4 ,footnote #ch3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xii4 p4 #gg1 b4 #af-cc4 ,propositions within the limits of the science1 but false as to matter1 are styled by ,aristotle ,greek3 pseudograph_/mata4 ,see ,aristot4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #ad2 p4 #agb1 a4 #a4 ,l'interrogation syllogistique se confondant avec la proposition1 il s'ensuit que l'interrogation doit tre1 comme la proposition1 propre la science dont il s'agit4 7,barthlemy ,st ,hilaire1 note1 p4 #gj74 ,interrogation here has a different meaning from that which it bears in ,dialectic4 ,footnote #ci3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xii4 p4 #gg99991 b4 #cd seq4 ,this passage is to me hardly intelligible4 ,it is differently understood by commentators and translators4 ,john ,philoponus in the ,scholia 7p4 #bag1 b4 #ag-cb1 ,brandis71 cites the explanation of it given by ,ammonius1 but rejects that explanation1 and waits for others to supply him with a better4 ,zabarella 7,comm4 in ,analyt4 ,post4 pp4 #dbf1 #def1 ed4 ,venet #afag7 admits that as it stands1 and where it stands1 it is unintelligible1 but transposes it to another part of the book 7to the end of cap4 xvii41 immediately before the words ,greek3 phaneron de kai o7_/ti1 c41 of c4 xviii471 and gives an explanation of it in this altered position4 ,but ,i do not think he has succeeded in clearing it up4 ,footnote #dj3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xii4 p4 #gg1 b4 #dj-p4 #gh1 a4 #ac4 ,knowledge of ,fact and knowledge of the ,cause must be distinguished1 and even within the same ,science4#da ,in some syllogisms the conclusion only brings out ,greek3 to o7_/ti--the reality of certain facts2 in others1 it ends in ,greek3 to dio_/ti--the affirmation of a cause1 or of the ,why4 ,the syllogism of the ,why is1 where the middle term is not merely the cause1 but the proximate cause1 of the conclusion4 ,often1 however1 the effect is more notorious1 so that we employ it as middle term1 and conclude from it to its reciprocating cause2 in which case our syllogism is only of the ,greek3 o7_/ti2 and so it is also when we employ as middle term a cause not proximate but remote1 concluding from that to the effect4#db ,sometimes the syllogisms of the ,greek3 o7_/ti may fall under one science1 those of the ,greek3 dio_/ti under another1 namely1 in the case where one science is subordinate to another1 as optics to geometry1 and harmonics to arithmetic2 the facts of optics and harmonics belonging to sense and observation1 the causes thereof to mathematical reasoning4 ,it may happen1 then1 that a man knows ,greek3 to dio_/ti well1 but is comparatively ignorant ,greek3 tou o7_/ti3 the geometer may have paid little attention to optical facts4#dc ,cognition of the ,greek3 dio_/ti is the maximum1 the perfection1 of all cognition2 and this1 comprising arithmetical and geometrical theorems1 is almost always attained by syllogisms in the ,first figure4 ,this figure is the most truly scientific of the three2 the other two figures depend upon it for expansion and condensation4 ,it is1 besides1 the only one in which universal affirmative conclusions can be obtained2 for in the ,second figure we get only negative conclusions2 in the ,third1 only particular4 ,accordingly1 propositions declaring ,essence or ,definition1 obtained only through universal affirmative conclusions1 are yielded in none but the ,first figure4#dd ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #gg1 a4 #bb seq4 ,footnote #db3 ,themistius1 p4 #de3 ,greek3 polla_/kis sumbai_/nei kai a7ntistre_/phein a7ll_/lois to ai7tion kai to smeion kai a7_/mph dei_/knusthai di' a7ll_/ln1 dia tou smei_/ou men 7s to o7_/ti1 dia thate_/rou de 7s to dio_/ti4 ,cum enim vera demonstratio1 id est ,greek3 tou dio_/ti1 fiat per causam proximam1 consequens est1 ut demonstratio vel per effectum proximum1 vel per causam remotam1 sit demonstratio ,greek3 tou o7_/ti 7,julius ,pacius1 ,comm4 p4 #dbb74 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire observes 7,note1 p4 #hb73--,la cause loigne non immdiate1 donne un syllogisme dans la seconde figure4--,il est vrai qu',aristote n'appelle cause que la cause immdiate2 et que la cause loigne n'est pas pour lui une vritable cause4 ,see in ,schol4 p4 #ahh1 a4 #ai1 the explanation given by ,alexander of the syllogism ,greek3 tou dio_/ti4 ,footnote #dc3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #gi1 a4 #b1 seq43 ,greek3 e7ntautha gar to men o7_/ti tn ai7sthtikn ei7de_/nai1 to de dio_/ti tn mathmatikn1 c4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xxi4 p4 #fg1 a4 #aa2 and ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #iha1 a4 #ae4 ,footnote #dd3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xiv4 p4 #gi1 a4 #ag-cb4 ,as there are some affirmative propositions that are indivisible1 i4e41 having affirmative predicates which belong to a subject at once1 directly1 immediately1 indivisibly1--so there are also some indivisible negative propositions1 i4e41 with predicates that belong negatively to a subject at once1 directly1 c4 ,in all such there is no intermediate step to justify either the affirmation of the predicate1 or the negation of the predicate1 respecting the given subject4 ,this will be the case where neither the predicate nor the subject is contained in any higher genus4#de ,footnote #de3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #gi1 a4 #cc-;b4 #bb4 ,the point which ,aristotle here especially insists upon is1 that there may be and are immediate1 undemonstrable1 negative 7as well as affirmative7 predicates3 ,greek3 phaneron ou7n o7_/ti e7nde_/chetai_/ te a7_/llo a7_/ll m u7pa_/rchein a7to_/ms4 7,themistius1 ,paraphr4 p4 #dh1 ,spengel3 ,greek3 a7_/mesoi de prota_/seis ou7 katapha_/seis mo_/non ei7si_/n1 a7lla kai a7popha_/seis o7moi_/s ai7 m du_/nantai dia sullogismou deichthnai1 au7tai d' ei7sin e7ph' 7n ou7dete_/rou tn o7_/rn a7_/llos tis o7_/lou katgoreitai47 ,it had been already shown1 in an earlier chapter of this treatise 7p4 #gb1 b4 #ai71 that there were affirmative predicates immediate and undemonstrable4 ,this may be compared with that which ,plato declares in the ,sophistes 7pp4 #bec-bed1 seq47 about the intercommunion ,greek3 tn genn kai tn ei7dn with each other4 ,some of them admit such intercommunion1 others repudiate it4 ,in regard both to these propositions immediate and indivisible1 and to propositions mediate and deducible1 there are two varieties of error4#df ,you may err simply1 from ignorance1 not knowing better1 and not supposing yourself to know at all2 or your error may be a false conclusion1 deduced by syllogism through a middle term1 and accompanied by a belief on your part that you do know4 ,this may happen in different ways4 ,suppose the negative proposition1 ,no ,b is ,a1 to be true immediately or indivisibly4 ,then1 if you conclude the contrary of this#dg 7,all ,b is ,a7 to be true1 by syllogism through the middle term ,c1 your syllogism must be in the ,first figure2 it must have the minor premiss false 7since ,b is brought under ,c1 when it is not contained in any higher genus71 and it may have both premisses false4 ,again1 suppose the affirmative proposition1 ,all ,b is ,a1 to be true immediately or indivisibly4 ,then if you conclude the contrary of this 7,no ,b is ,a7 to be true1 by syllogism through the middle term ,c1 your syllogism may be in the ,first figure1 but it may also be in the ,second figure1 your false conclusion being negative4 ,if it be in the ,first figure1 both its premisses may be false1 or one of them only may be false1 either indifferently4#dh ,if it be in the ,second figure1 either premiss singly may be wholly false1 or both may be partly false4#di ,footnote #df3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #gi1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 a7_/gnoia kat' a7po_/phasin--a7_/gnoia kata dia_/thesin4 ,see ,themistius1 p4 #di1 ,spengel4 ,in regard to simple and uncombined ideas1 ignorance is not possible as an erroneous combination1 but only as a mental blank4 ,you either have the idea and thus know so much truth1 or you have not the idea and are thus ignorant to that extent2 this is the only alternative4 ,cf4 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,th4 p4 #ajea1 a4 #cd2 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #bf4 ,footnote #dg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #gi1 b4 #bi4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire remarks 7p4 #ie1 n473--,il faut remarquer qu',aristote ne s'occupe que des modes universels dans la premire et dans la seconde figure1 parceque1 la dmonstration tant toujours universelle1 les propositions qui expriment l'erreur oppose doivent l'tre comme elle4 ,ainsi ce sont les propositions contraires1 et non les contradictoires1 dont il sera question ici4 ,for the like reason the ,third figure is not mentioned here1 but only the ,first and ,second3 because in the ,third figure no universal conclusion can be proved 7,julius ,pacius1 p4 #dca74 ,footnote #dh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #hj1 a4 #f-bf4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 a4 #bg-;b4 #ad3 ,greek3 e7n de t me_/s sch_/mati o7_/las men ei7nai tas prota_/seis a7mphote_/ras pseudeis ou7k e7nde_/chetai--e7pi_/ ti d' e7kate_/ran ou7den klu_/ei pseud ei7nai4 ,let us next assume the affirmative proposition1 ,all ,b is ,a1 to be true1 but mediate and deducible through the middle term ,c4 ,if you conclude the contrary of this 7,no ,b is ,a7 through the same middle term ,c1 in the ,first figure1 your error cannot arise from falsity in the minor premiss1 because your minor 7by the laws of the figure7 must be affirmative2 your error must arise from a false major1 because a negative major is not inconsistent with the laws of the ,first figure4 ,on the other hand1 if you conclude the contrary in the ,first figure through a different middle term1 ,d1 either both your premisses will be false1 or your minor premiss will be false4#ej ,if you employ the ,second figure to conclude your contrary1 both your premisses cannot be false1 though either one of them singly may be false4#ea ,footnote #ej3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #hj1 b4 #ag-p4 #ha1 a4 #d4 ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 p4 #ha1 a4 #e-ad4 ,such will be the case when the deducible proposition assumed to be true is affirmative1 and when therefore the contrary conclusion which you profess to have proved is negative4 ,but if the deducible proposition assumed to be true is negative1 and if consequently the contrary conclusion must be affirmative1--then1 if you try to prove this contrary through the same middle term1 your premisses cannot both be false1 but your major premiss must always be false4#eb ,if1 however1 you try to prove the contrary through a different and inappropriate middle term1 you cannot convert the minor premiss to its contrary 7because the minor premiss must continue affirmative1 in order that you may arrive at any conclusion at all71 but the major can be so converted4 ,should the major premiss thus converted be true1 the minor will be false2 should the major premiss thus converted be false1 the minor may be either true or false4 ,either one of the premisses1 or both the premisses1 may thus be false4#ec ,footnote #eb3 ,ibid4 xvii4 p4 #ha1 a4 #ae-bj4 ,footnote #ec3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj-cd4 ,mr4 ,poste's translation 7pp4 #fe-gj7 is very perspicuous and instructive in regard to these two difficult chapters4 ,errors of simple ignorance 7not concluded from false syllogism7 may proceed from defect or failure of sensible perception1 in one or other of its branches4 ,for without sensation there can be no induction2 and it is from induction only that the premisses for demonstration by syllogism are obtained4 ,we cannot arrive at universal propositions1 even in what are called abstract sciences1 except through induction of particulars2 nor can we demonstrate except from universals4 ,induction and ,demonstration are the only two ways of learning2 and the particulars composing our inductions can only be known through sense4#ed ,footnote #ed3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xviii4 p4 #ha1 a4 #ch-;b4 #i4 ,in this important chapter 7the doctrines of which are more fully expanded in the last chapter of the ,second ,book of the ,analyt4 ,post471 the text of ,waitz does not fully agree with that of ,julius ,pacius4 ,in ,firmin ,didot's edition the text is the same as in ,waitz2 but his ,latin translation remains adapted to that of ,julius ,pacius4 ,waitz gives the substance of the chapter as follows 7ad ,organ4 ,,ii4 p4 #cdg73-- ,universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur1 quum etiam in iis1 qu a sensibus maxime aliena videntur et qu1 ut mathematica 7,greek3 ta e7x a7phaire_/ses71 cogitatione separantur materia quacum conjuncta sunt1 inductione probentur ea qu de genero 7e4 g41 de linea vel de corpore mathematico71 ad quod demonstratio pertineat1 prdicentur ,greek3 kath' au7ta_/ et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint4 ,inductio autem iis nititur qu sensibus percipiuntur2 nam res singulares sentiuntur1 scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine inductione1 non datur inductio sine sensu4 ,aristotle next proceeds to show 7what in previous passages he had assumed7#ee that1 if ,demonstration or the syllogistic process be possible--if there be any truths supposed demonstrable1 this implies that there must be primary or ultimate truths4 ,it has been explained that the constituent elements assumed in the ,syllogism are three terms and two propositions or premisses2 in the major premiss1 ,a is affirmed 7or denied7 of all ,b2 in the minor1 ,b is affirmed of all ,c2 in the conclusion1 ,a is affirmed 7or denied7 of all ,c4#ef ,now it is possible that there may be some one or more predicates higher than ,a1 but it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such higher predicates4 ,so also there may be one or more subjects lower than ,c1 and of which ,c will be the predicate2 but it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such lower subjects4 ,in like manner there may perhaps be one or more middle terms between ,a and ,b1 and between ,b and ,c2 but it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such intervening middle terms4 ,there must be a limit to the series ascending1 descending1 or intervening4#eg ,these remarks have no application to reciprocating propositions1 in which the predicate is co-extensive with the subject4#eh ,but they apply alike to demonstrations negative and affirmative1 and alike to all the three figures of ,syllogism4#ei ,footnote #ee3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #dc1 a4 #ch2 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #ba4 ,footnote #ef3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xix4 p4 #ha1 b4 #aj-ag4 ,footnote #eg3 ,ibid4 p4 #ha1 b4 #cj-p4 #hb1 a4 #ad4 ,footnote #eh3 ,ibid4 p4 #hb1 a4 #ae-bj4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 p4 #aag3--;,ceci ne saurait s'appliquer aux termes rciproques1 parce que dans les termes qui peuvent tre attribus rciproquement l'un l'autre1 on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait ni premier ni dernier rlativement l'attribution4 ,footnote #ei3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xx41 xxi4 p4 #hb1 a4 #ba-;b4 #cf4 ,in ,dialectical ,syllogism it is enough if the premisses be admitted or reputed as propositions immediately true1 whether they are so in reality or not2 but in ,scientific or ,demonstrative ,syllogism they must be so in reality3 the demonstration is not complete unless it can be traced up to premisses that are thus immediately or directly true 7without any intervening middle term74#fj ,that there are and must be such primary or immediate premisses1 ,aristotle now undertakes to prove1 by some dialectical reasons1 and other analytical or scientific reasons4#fa ,he himself thus distinguishes them2 but the distinction is faintly marked1 and amounts1 at most1 to this1 that the analytical reasons advert only to essential predication1 and to the conditions of scientific demonstration1 while the dialectical reasons dwell upon these1 but include something else besides1 viz41 accidental predication4 ,the proof consists mainly in the declaration that1 unless we assume some propositions to be true immediately1 indivisibly1 undemonstrably1--,definition1 ,demonstration1 and ,science would be alike impossible4 ,if the ascending series of predicates is endless1 so that we never arrive at a highest generic predicate2 if the descending series of subjects is endless1 so that we never reach a lowest subject1--no definition can ever be attained4 ,the essential properties included in the definition1 must be finite in number2 and the accidental predicates must also be finite in number1 since they have no existence except as attached to some essential subject1 and since they must come under one or other of the nine later ,categories4#fb ,if1 then1 the two extremes are thus fixed and finite--the highest predicate and the lowest subject--it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of terms between the two4 ,the intervening terms must be finite in number4 ,the ,aristotelian theory therefore is1 that there are certain propositions directly and immediately true1 and others derived from them by demonstration through middle terms4#fc ,it is alike an error to assert that every thing can be demonstrated1 and that nothing can be demonstrated4 ,footnote #fj3 ,ibid4 xix4 p4 #ha1 b4 #ah-bi4 ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 xxi4 p4 #hb1 b4 #ce2 xxii4 p4 #hd1 a4 #g3 ,greek3 logiks men ou7n e7k tou_/tn a7_/n tis pisteu_/seie peri tou lechthe_/ntos1 a7nalutiks de dia tnde phaneron suntom_/teron4 ,in ,scholia1 p4 #bbg1 a4 #db1 the same distinction is expressed by ,philoponus in the terms ,greek3 logik_/tera and ,greek3 pragmatde_/stera4 ,compare ,biese1 ,die ,philosophie des ,aristoteles1 pp4 #acd1 #bfa2 ,bassow1 ,de ,notionis ,definitione1 pp4 #ai1 #bj2 ,heyder1 ,aristot4 u4 ,hegel4 ,dialektik1 pp4 #caf1 #cag4 ,aristotle1 however1 does not always adhere closely to the distinction4 ,thus1 if we compare the logical or dialectical reasons given1 p4 #hb1 b4 #cg1 seq41 with the analytical1 announced as beginning p4 #hd1 a4 #h1 seq41 we find the same main topic dwelt upon in both1 namely1 that to admit an infinite series excludes the possibility of ,definition4 ,both ,alexander and ,ammonius agree in announcing this as the capital topic on which the proof turned2 but ,alexander inferred from hence that the argument was purely dialectical 7,greek3 logikon e7pichei_/rma71 while ,ammonius regarded it as a reason thoroughly convincing and evident3 ,greek3 o7 me_/ntoi philo_/sophos 7,ammonius7 ,greek3 e7_/lege m dia touto le_/gein logika ta e7picheir_/mata2 e7narges gar o7_/ti ei7sin o7rismoi_/1 ei7 m a7katalpsi_/an ei7saga_/gmen 7,schol4 p4 #bbg1 a4 #dj1 seq41 ,brand474 ,footnote #fb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxii4 p4 #hc1 a4 #bj1 b4 #ad4 ,only eight of the ten ,categories are here enumerated4 ,footnote #fc3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxii4 p4 #hd1 a4 #cj-ce4 ,the paraphrase of ,themistius 7pp4 #ee-eh1 ,spengel7 states the ,aristotelian reasoning in clearer language than ,aristotle himself4 ,zabarella 7,comm4 in ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xviii42 context4 #adh1 #aej1 #aed7 repeats that ,aristotle's proof is founded upon the undeniable fact that there are definitions1 and that without them there could be no demonstration and no science4 ,this excludes the supposition of an infinite series of predicates and of middle terms3--,sumit rationem definitione2 si in predicatis in quid procederetur ad infinitum1 sequeretur auferri definitionem et omnino essenti cognitionem2 sed hoc dicendum non est1 quum omnium consensioni adversetur 7p4 #dff1 ,ven4 #afag74 ,it is plain from ,aristotle's own words#fd that he intended these four chapters 7xix4-xxii47 as a confirmation of what he had already asserted in chapter iii4 of the present treatise1 and as farther refutation of the two distinct classes of opponents there indicated3 7#a7 those who said that everything was demonstrable1 demonstration in a circle being admissible2 7#b7 those who said that nothing was demonstrable1 inasmuch as the train of predication upwards1 downwards1 and intermediate1 was infinite4 ,both these two classes of opponents agreed in saying1 that there were no truths immediate and indemonstrable2 and it is upon this point that ,aristotle here takes issue with them1 seeking to prove that there are and must be such truths4 ,but ,i cannot think the proof satisfactory2 nor has it appeared so to able commentators either of ancient or modern times--from ,alexander of ,aphrodisias down to ,mr4 ,poste4#fe ,the elaborate amplification added in these last chapters adds no force to the statement already given at the earlier stage2 and it is in one respect a change for the worse1 inasmuch as it does not advert to the important distinction announced in chapter iii41 between universal truths known by ,induction 7from sense and particulars71 and universal truths known by ,deduction from these4 ,the truths immediate and indemonstrable 7not known through a middle term7 are the inductive truths1 as ,aristotle declares in many places1 and most emphatically at the close of the ,analytica ,posteriora4 ,but in these chapters1 he hardly alludes to ,induction4 ,moreover1 while trying to prove that there must be immediate universal truths1 he neither gives any complete list of them1 nor assigns any positive characteristic whereby to identify them4 ,opponents might ask him whether these immediate universal truths were not ready-made inspirations of the mind2 and if so1 what better authority they had than the ,platonic ,ideas1 which are contemptuously dismissed4 ,footnote #fd3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxii4 p4 #hd1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 o7_/per e7_/phame_/n tinas le_/gein kat' a7rcha_/s1 c4 ,footnote #fe3 ,see ,mr4 ,poste's note1 p4 #gg1 of his translation of this treatise4 ,after saying that the first of ,aristotle's dialectical proofs is faulty1 and that the second is a petitio principii1 ,mr4 ,poste adds1 respecting the so-called analytical proof given by ,aristotle3--,it is not so much a proof1 as a more accurate determination of the principle to be postulated4 ,this postulate1 the existence of first principles1 as concerning the constitution of the world1 appears to belong properly to ,metaphysics1 and is merely borrowed by ,logic4 ,see ,metaph4 ii4 #b1 and ,introduction4 ,in the passage of the ,metaphysica 7,greek3 a4 p4 #iid7 here cited the main argument of ,aristotle is open to the same objection of petitio principii which ,mr4 ,poste urges against ,aristotle's second dialectical argument in this place4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 in his ,system of ,logic1 takes for granted that there must be immediate1 indemonstrable truths1 to serve as a basis for deduction2 that there cannot be a chain of proof suspended from nothing2 that there must be ultimate laws of nature1 though we cannot be sure that the laws now known to us are ultimate4 ,on the other hand1 we read in the recent work of an acute contemporary philosopher1 ,professor ,delboeuf 7,essai de ,logique ,scientifique1 ,lige1 #ahfe1 ,pref4 pp4 v1 vii1 viii1 pp4 #df1 #dg37--;,il est des points sur lesquels je crains de ne m'tre pas expliqu assez nettement1 entre autres la question du fondement de la certitude4 ,je suis de ceux qui repoussent de toutes leurs forces l'axiome si spcieux qu'on ne peut tout dmontrer2 cette proposition aurait1 mes yeux1 plus besoin que toute autre d'une dmonstration4 ,cette dmonstration ne sera en partie donne que quand on aura une bonne fois numr toutes les propositions indmontrables2 et quand on aura bien dfini le caractre auquel on les reconnait4 ,nulle part on ne trouve ni une semblable numration1 ni une semblable dfinition4 ,on reste cet gard dans une position vague1 et par cela mme facile dfendre4 ,it would seem1 by these words1 that ,m4 ,delboeuf stands in the most direct opposition to ,aristotle1 who teaches us that the ,greek3 a7rchai or principia from which demonstration starts cannot be themselves demonstrated4 ,but when we compare other passages of ,m4 ,delboeuf's work1 we find that1 in rejecting all undemonstrable propositions1 what he really means is to reject all self-evident universal truths1 ,c'est donc une vritable illusion d'admettre des vrits videntes par elles-mmes4 ,il n'y a pas de proposition fausse que nous ne soyons disposs d'admettre comme axiome1 quand rien ne nous a encore autoriss la repousser 7p4 ix474 ,this is quite true in my opinion2 but the immediate indemonstrable truths for which ,aristotle contends as ,greek3 a7rchai of demonstration1 are not announced by him as self-evident1 they are declared to be results of sense and induction1 to be raised from observation of particulars multiplied1 compared1 and permanently formularized under the intellectual habitus called ,nos4 ,by ,demonstration ,aristotle means deduction in its most perfect form1 beginning from these ,greek3 a7rchai which are inductively known but not demonstrable 7i4 e4 not knowable deductively74 ,and in this view the very able and instructive treatise of ,m4 ,delboeuf mainly coincides1 assigning even greater preponderance to the inductive process1 and approximating in this respect to the important improvements in logical theory advanced by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,among the universal propositions which are not derived from ,induction1 but which serve as ,greek3 a7rchai for ,deduction and ,demonstration1 we may reckon the religious1 ethical1 sthetical1 social1 political1 c41 beliefs received in each different community1 and impressed upon all newcomers born into it by the force of precept1 example1 authority4 ,here the major premiss is felt by each individual as carrying an authority of its own1 stamped and enforced by the sanction of society1 and by the disgrace or other penalties in store for those who disobey it4 ,it is ready to be interpreted and diversified by suitable minor premisses in all inferential applications4 ,but these ,greek3 a7rchai for deduction1 differing widely at different times and places1 though generated in the same manner and enforced by the same sanction1 would belong more properly to the class which ,aristotle terms ,greek3 ta e7_/ndoxa4 ,we have thus recognized that there exist immediate 7ultimate or primary7 propositions1 wherein the conjunction between predicate and subject is such that no intermediate term can be assigned between them4 ,when ,a is predicated both of ,b and ,c1 this may perhaps be in consequence of some common property possessed by ,b and ,c1 and such common property will form a middle term4 ,for example1 equality of angles to two right angles belongs both to an isosceles and to a scalene triangle1 and it belongs to them by reason of their common property--triangular figure2 which last is thus the middle term4 ,but this need not be always the case4#ff ,it is possible that the two propositions--,a predicated of ,b1 ,a predicated of ,c--may both of them be immediate propositions2 and that there may be no community of nature between ,b and ,c4 ,whenever a middle term can be found1 demonstration is possible2 but where no middle term can be found1 demonstration is impossible4 ,the proposition1 whether affirmative or negative1 is then an immediate or indivisible one4 ,such propositions1 and the terms of which they are composed1 are the ultimate elements or principia of ,demonstration4 ,predicate and subject are brought constantly into closer and closer conjunction1 until at last they become one and indivisible4#fg ,here we reach the unit or element of the syllogizing process4 ,in all scientific calculations there is assumed an unit to start from1 though in each branch of science it is a different unit2 e4g4 in barology1 the pound-weight2 in harmonics1 the quarter-tone2 in other branches of science1 other units4#fh ,analytical research teaches us that the corresponding unit in ,syllogism is the affirmative or negative proposition which is primary1 immediate1 indivisible4 ,in ,demonstration and ,science it is the ,nos or ,intellect4#fi ,footnote #ff3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiii4 p4 #hd1 b4 #c-ah4 ,greek3 touto d' ou7k a7ei ou7_/ts e7_/chei4 ,footnote #fg3 ,ibid4 b4 #be-cg4 ,greek3 a7ei to me_/son puknoutai1 e7_/s a7diai_/reta ge_/ntai kai e7_/n4 e7_/sti d' e7_/n1 o7_/tan a7_/meson ge_/ntai kai mi_/a pro_/tasis a7pls 7 a7_/mesos4 ,footnote #fh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiii4 p4 #hd1 b4 #cg3 ,greek3 kai 7_/sper e7n tois a7_/llois 7 a7rch a7ploun1 touto d' ou7 tau7to pantachou1 a7ll' e7n barei men mna1 e7n de me_/lei di_/esis1 a7_/llo d' e7n a7_/ll1 ou7_/ts e7n sullogism to e7n pro_/tasis a7_/mesos1 e7n d' a7podei_/xei kai e7pist_/m o7 nous4 ,footnote #fi3 ,ibid4 b4 #ce-p4 #he1 a4 #a4 ,having thus1 in the long preceding reasoning1 sought to prove that all demonstration must take its departure from primary undemonstrable principia--from some premisses1 affirmative and negative1 which are directly true in themselves1 and not demonstrable through any middle term or intervening propositions1 ,aristotle now passes to a different enquiry4 ,we have some demonstrations in which the conclusion is ,particular1 others in which it is ,universal3 again1 some ,affirmative1 some ,negative1 ,which of the two1 in each of these alternatives1 is the best8 ,we have also demonstrations ,direct or ,ostensive1 and demonstrations ,indirect or by way of ,reductio ad ,absurdum4 ,which of these two is the best8 ,both questions appear to have been subjected to debate by contemporary philosophers4#gj ,footnote #gj3 ,ibid4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 a4 #ac-ah4 ,greek3 a7mphisbteitai pote_/ra belti_/n2 7s d' au7_/ts kai peri ts a7podeiknu_/nai legome_/ns kai ts ei7s to a7du_/naton a7gou_/ss a7podei_/xes4 ,aristotle discusses these points dialectically 7as indeed he points out in the ,topica that the comparison of two things generally1 as to better and worse1 falls under the varieties of 9999dialectical enquiry#ga71 first stating and next refuting the arguments on the weaker side4 ,some persons may think 7he says7 that demonstration of the ,particular is better than demonstration of the ,universal3 first1 because it conducts to fuller cognition of that which the thing is in itself1 and not merely that which it is quatenus member of a class2 secondly1 because demonstrations of the ,universal are apt to generate an illusory belief1 that the ,universal is a distinct reality apart from and independent of all its particulars 7i4e41 that figure in general has a real existence apart from all particular figures1 and number in general apart from all particular numbers1 c471 while demonstrations of the ,particular do not lead to any such illusion4#gb ,footnote #ga3 ,aristot4 ,topic4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aaf1 a4 #a1 seq4 ,footnote #gb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 a4 #bj-;b4 #c4 ,themistius1 pp4 #eh-ei1 ,spengel3 ,greek3 ou7 gar o7m_/numon to katho_/lou e7sti_/n1 ou7de phn mo_/non1 a7ll' u7po_/stasis1 ou7 christ men 7_/sper ou7de ta sumbebko_/ta1 e7nargs d' ou7n emphainome_/n tois pra_/gmasin4 ,the ,scholastic doctrine of ,universalia in re is here expressed very clearly by ,themistius4 ,to these arguments ,aristotle replies3--#a4 ,it is not correct to say that cognition of the ,particular is more complete1 or bears more upon real existence1 than cognition of the ,universal4 ,the reverse would be nearer to the truth4 ,to know that the isosceles1 quatenus triangle1 has its three angles equal to two right angles1 is more complete cognition than knowing simply that the isosceles has its three angles equal to two right angles4 #b4 ,if the ,universal be not an equivocal term--if it represents one property and one definition common to many particulars1 it then has a real existence as much or more than any one or any number of the particulars4 ,for all these particulars are perishable1 but the class is imperishable4 #c4 ,he who believes that the universal term has one meaning in all the particulars1 need not necessarily believe that it has any meaning apart from all particulars2 he need not believe this about ,quiddity1 any more than he believes it about ,quality or ,quantity4 ,or if he does believe so1 it is his own individual mistake1 not imputable to the demonstration4 #d4 ,we have shown that a complete demonstration is one in which the middle term is the cause or reason of the conclusion4 ,now the ,universal is most of the nature of ,cause2 for it represents the ,first ,essence or the ,per ,se1 and is therefore its own cause1 or has no other cause behind it4 ,the demonstration of the ,universal has thus more of the ,cause or the ,why1 and is therefore better than the demonstration of the ,particular4 #e4 ,in the ,final ,cause or ,end of action1 there is always some ultimate end for the sake of which the intermediate ends are pursued1 and which1 as it is better than they1 yields1 when it is known1 the only complete explanation of the action4 ,so it is also with the ,formal ,cause3 there is one highest form which contains the ,why of the subordinate forms1 and the knowledge of which is therefore better2 as when1 for example1 the exterior angles of a given isosceles triangle are seen to be equal to four right angles1 not because it is isosceles or triangle1 but because it is a rectilineal figure4 #f4 ,particulars1 as such1 fall into infinity of number1 and are thus unknowable2 the ,universal tends towards oneness and simplicity1 and is thus essentially knowable1 more fully demonstrable than the infinity of particulars4 ,the demonstration thereof is therefore better4 #g4 ,it is also better1 on another ground2 for he that knows the ,universal does in a certain sense know also the ,particular2#gc but he that knows the ,particular cannot be said in any sense to know the ,universal4 #h4 ,the principium or perfection of cognition is to be found in the immediate proposition1 true per se4 ,when we demonstrate1 and thus employ a middle term1 the nearer the middle term approaches to that principium1 the better the demonstration is4 ,the demonstration of the ,universal is thus better and more accurate than that of the ,particular4#gd ,footnote #gc3 ,compare ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ga1 a4 #be2 also ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #iha1 a4 #ab4 ,footnote #gd3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 b4 #d-p4 #hf1 a4 #ba4 ,schol4 p4 #bcc1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 o7moi_/s de o7_/ntn gnri_/mn1 7 di' e7latto_/nn me_/sn ai7rette_/ra2 mallon gar e7ggute_/r ts tou nou e7nergei_/as4 ,such are the several reasons enumerated by ,aristotle in refutation of the previous opinion stated in favour of the ,particular4 ,evidently he does not account them all of equal value3 he intimates that some are purely dialectical 7,greek3 logika_/72 and he insists most upon the two following3--#a4 ,he that knows the ,universal knows in a certain sense the ,particular2 if he knows that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles1 he knows potentially that the isosceles has its three angles equal to the same1 though he may not know as yet that the isosceles is a triangle4 ,but he that knows the ,particular does not in any way know the ,universal1 either actually or potentially4#ge #b4 ,the ,universal is apprehended by ,intellect or ,nos1 the highest of all cognitive powers2 the ,particular terminates in sensation4 ,here1 ,i presume1 he means1 that1 in demonstration of the ,particular1 the conclusion teaches you nothing more than you might have learnt from a direct observation of sense2 whereas in that of the ,universal the conclusion teaches you more than you could have learnt from direct sensation1 and comes into correlation with the highest form of our intellectual nature4#gf ,footnote #ge3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #hf99991 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 a7lla tn men ei7rme_/nn e7_/nia logika_/ e7sti2 ma_/lista de dlon o7_/ti 7 katho_/lou kurite_/ra1 o7_/ti--o7 de tau_/tn e7_/chn tn pro_/tasin 7the ,particular7 ,greek3 to katho_/lou ou7dams oi7den1 ou7_/te duna_/mei ou7_/t' e7nergei_/a4 ,footnote #gf3 ,ibid4 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 kai 7 men katho_/lou not_/1 7 de kata me_/ros ei7s ai7_/sthsin teleuta4 ,compare xxiii4 p4 #hd1 b4 #ci1 where we noticed the doctrine that ,greek3 ,nous is the unit of scientific demonstration4 ,next1 ,aristotle compares the ,affirmative with the ,negative demonstration1 and shows that the ,affirmative is the better4 ,of two demonstrations 7he lays it down7 that one which proceeds upon a smaller number of postulates1 assumptions1 or propositions1 is better than the other2 for1 to say nothing of other reasons1 it conducts you more speedily to knowledge than the other1 and that is an advantage4 ,now1 both in the affirmative and in the negative syllogism1 you must have three terms and two propositions2 but in the affirmative you assume only that something is2 while in the negative you assume both that something is1 and that something is not4 ,here is a double assumption instead of a single2 therefore the negative is the worse or inferior of the two4#gg ,moreover1 for the demonstration of a negative conclusion1 you require one affirmative premiss 7since from two negative premisses nothing whatever can be concluded72 while for the demonstration of an affirmative conclusion1 you must have two affirmative premisses1 and you cannot admit a negative4 ,this1 again1 shows that the affirmative is logically prior1 more trustworthy1 and better than the negative4#gh ,the negative is only intelligible and knowable through the affirmative1 just as ,non-,ens is knowable only through ,ens4 ,the affirmative demonstration therefore1 as involving better principles1 is1 on this ground also1 better than the negative4#gi ,a fortiori1 it is also better than the demonstration by way of ,reductio ad ,absurdum1 which was the last case to be considered4 ,this1 as concluding only indirectly and from impossibility of the contradictory1 is worse even than the negative2 much more therefore is it worse than the direct affirmative4#hj ,footnote #gg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxv4 p4 #hf1 a4 #ca-;b4 #i4 ,footnote #gh3 ,ibid4 b4 #aj-cj4 ,footnote #gi3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj-ci4 ,footnote #hj3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxvi4 p4 #hg1 a4 #b-cj4 ,waitz 7,,ii4 p4 #cgj71 says3 deductio 7ad absurdum71 quippe qu per ambages cogat1 post ponenda1 est demonstrationi rect4 ,philoponus says 7,schol4 pp4 #bcd-bce99991 ,brand47 that the ,commentators all censured ,aristotle for the manner in which he here laid out the ,syllogism ,greek3 di' a7duna_/tou4 ,i do not1 however1 find any such censure in ,themistius4 ,philoponus defends ,aristotle from the censure4 ,if we next compare one ,science with another1 the prior and more accurate of the two is1 7#a7 ,that which combines at once the ,greek3 o7_/ti and the ,greek3 dio_/ti2 7#b7 ,that which is abstracted from material conditions1 as compared with that which is immersed therein--for example1 arithmetic is more accurate than harmonics2 7#c7 ,the more simple as compared with the more complex3 thus1 arithmetic is more accurate than geometry1 a monad or unit is a substance without position1 whereas a point 7more concrete7 is a substance with position4#ha ,one and the same science is that which belongs to one and the same generic subject-matter4 ,the premisses of a demonstration must be included in the same genus with the conclusion2 and where the ultimate premisses are heterogeneous1 the cognition derived from them must be considered as not one but a compound of several4#hb ,you may find two or more distinct middle terms for demonstrating the same conclusion2 sometimes out of the same logical series or table1 sometimes out of different tables4#hc ,footnote #ha3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxvii4 p4 #hg1 a4 #ca-cg4 ,themistius1 ,paraphras4 p4 #fj1 ed4 ,speng43 ,greek3 kat' a7_/llon de 7tro_/pon71 e7an 7 men peri u7pokei_/mena_/ tina kai ai7sthta pragmateu_/tai1 7 de peri nota kai katho_/lou4 ,philoponus illustrates this 7,schol4 p4 #bce1 b4 #da1 ,br473 ,greek3 oi7on ta ,theodosi_/ou sphairika a7kribe_/stera_/ e7stin e7pist_/m ts tn ,au7tolu_/kou peri kinoume_/ns sphai_/ras4 c4 ,footnote #hb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxviii4 p4 #hg1 a4 #ch-;b4 #e4 ,themistius1 p4 #fa3 ,greek3 dlon de touto gi_/netai proiousin e7pi tas a7napodei_/ktous a7rcha_/s2 au7tai gar ei7 mdemi_/an e7_/choien sugge_/neian1 e7_/terai ai7 e7pistmai4 ,footnote #hc3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxix4 p4 #hg1 b4 #e-ah4 ,aristotle gives an example to illustrate this general doctrine3 ,greek3 7_/desthai1 to kineisthai1 to 7remi_/zesthai1 to metaba_/llein4 ,as he includes these terms und this subject among the topics for demonstration1 it is difficult to see where he would draw a distinct line between topics for ,demonstration and topics for ,dialectic4 ,there cannot be demonstrative cognition of fortuitous events1#hd for all demonstration is either of the necessary or of the customary4 ,nor can there be demonstrative cognition through sensible perception4 ,for though by sense we perceive a thing as such and such 7through its sensible qualities71 yet we perceive it inevitably as hoc aliquid1 hic1 et nunc4 ,but the ,universal cannot be perceived by sense2 for it is neither hic nor nunc1 but semper et ubique4#he ,now demonstrations are all accomplished by means of the ,universal1 and demonstrative cognition cannot therefore be had through sensible perception4 ,if the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles were a fact directly perceivable by sense1 we should still have looked out for a demonstration thereof3 we should have no proper scientific cognition of it 7though some persons contend for this73 for sensible perception gives us only particular cases1 and ,cognition or ,science proper comes only through knowing the ,universal4#hf ,if1 being on the surface of the moon1 we had on any one occasion seen the earth between us and the sun1 we could not have known from that single observation that such interposition is the cause universally of eclipses4 ,we cannot directly by sense perceive the ,universal1 though sense is the principium of the ,universal4 ,by multiplied observation of sensible particulars1 we can hunt out and elicit the ,universal1 enunciate it clearly and separately1 and make it serve for demonstration4#hg ,the ,universal is precious1 because it reveals the ,cause or ,greek3 dio_/ti1 and is therefore more precious1 not merely than sensible observation1 but also than intellectual conception of the ,greek3 o7_/ti only1 where the ,cause or ,greek3 dio_/ti lies apart1 and is derived from a higher genus4 ,respecting ,first ,principles or ,summa ,genera1 we must speak elsewhere4#hh ,it is clear1 therefore1 that no demonstrable matter can be known1 properly speaking1 from direct perception of sense2 though there are cases in which nothing but the impossibility of direct observation drives us upon seeking for demonstration4 ,whenever we can get an adequate number of sensible observations1 we can generalize the fact2 and in some instances we may perhaps not seek for any demonstrative knowledge 7i4e4 to explain it by any higher principle74 ,if we could see the pores in glass and the light passing through them1 we should learn through many such observations why combustion arises on the farther side of the glass2 each of our observations would have been separate and individual1 but we should by intellect generalize the result that all the cases fall under the same law4#hi ,footnote #hd3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxx4 p4 #hg1 b4 #ai-bg4 ,footnote #he3 ,ibid4 xxxi4 p4 #hg1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 ei7 gar kai e7_/stin 7 ai7_/sthsis tou toioude kai m toude_/ tinos1 a7ll' ai7stha_/nesthai_/ ge a7nagkaion to_/de ti kai pou kai nun4 ,footnote #hf3 ,ibid4 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 dlon o7_/ti kai ei7 7n ai7stha_/nesthai to tri_/gnon o7_/ti dusin o7rthais i7_/sas e7_/chei tas gni_/as1 e7ztoumen a7n a7po_/deixin1 kai ou7ch 77_/sper phasi_/ tines7 7pista_/metha2 ai7stha_/nesthai men gar a7na_/gk kath' e7_/kaston1 7 d' e7pist_/m t to katho_/lou gnri_/zein e7sti_/n4 ,euclid1 in the #bjth ,proposition of his first ,book1 demonstrates that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side4 ,according to ,proklus1 the ,epikureans derided the demonstration of such a point as absurd2 and it seems that some contemporaries of ,aristotle argued in a similar way1 judging by the phrase ,greek3 7_/sper phasi_/ tines4 ,footnote #hg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxxi4 p4 #hh1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 ou7 mn a7ll' e7k tou therein touto polla_/kis sumbainon1 to katho_/lou a7n threu_/santes a7po_/deixin ei7_/chomen2 e7k gar tn kath' e7_/kasta pleio_/nn to katho_/lou dlon4 ,themistius1 p4 #fb1 ,sp43 ,greek3 a7rch men gar a7podei_/xes ai7_/sthsis1 kai to katho_/lou e7nnooumen dia to polla_/kis ai7sthe_/sthai4 ,footnote #hh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxxi4 p4 #hh1 a4 #f3 ,greek3 to de katho_/lou ti_/mion1 o7_/ti dloi to ai7_/tion2 7_/ste peri tn toiou_/tn 7 katho_/lou timite_/ra tn ai7sth_/sen kai ts no_/ses1 o7_/sn e7_/teron to ai7_/tion2 peri de tn pr_/tn a7_/llos lo_/gos4 ,by ,greek3 ta prta1 he means the ,greek3 a7rchai of ,demonstration1 which are treated especially in ,,ii4 xix4 ,see ,biese1 ,die ,philos4 des ,aristoteles1 p4 #bgg4 ,footnote #hi3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxxi4 p4 #hh1 a4 #i-ag4 ,greek3 e7_/sti me_/ntoi e7_/nia a7nago_/mena ei7s ai7sth_/ses e7_/kleipsin e7n tois probl_/masin2 e7_/nia gar ei7 e7_/rmen1 ou7k a7n e7ztoumen1 ou7ch 7s ei7do_/tes t o7ran1 a7ll' 7s e7_/chontes to katho_/lou e7k tou o7ran4 ,the text of this and the succeeding words seems open to doubt1 as well as that of ,themistius 7p4 #fc74 ,waitz in his note 7p4 #cgd7 explains the meaning clearly3--non ita quidem ut ipsa sensuum perceptio scientiam afferat2 sed ita ut quod in singulis accidere videamus1 idem etiam in omnibus accidere coniicientes universe intelligamus4 ,aristotle next proceeds to refute1 at some length1 the supposition1 that the principia of all syllogisms are the same4 ,we see at once that this cannot be so1 because some syllogisms are true1 others false4 ,but1 besides1 though there are indeed a few ,axioms essential to the process of demonstration1 and the same in all syllogisms1 yet these are not sufficient of themselves for demonstration4 ,there must farther be other premisses or matters of evidence--propositions immediately true 7or established by prior demonstrations7 belonging to each branch of ,science specially1 as distinguished from the others4 ,our demonstration relates to these special matters or premisses1 though it is accomplished out of or by means of the common ,axioms4#ij ,footnote #ij3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxxii4 p4 #hh1 a4 #ah-;b4 #bi4 ,greek3 ai7 gar a7rchai dittai_/1 e7x 7n te kai peri o72 ai7 men ou7n e7x 7n koinai_/1 ai7 de peri o7_/ i7_/diai1 oi7on a7rithmo_/s1 me_/gethos4 ,compare xi4 p4 #gg1 a4 #bg4 ,see ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,plan ,gnral des ,derniers ,analytiques1 p4 lxxxi4 ,science or scientific ,cognition differs from true ,opinion1 and the cognitum from the opinatum1 herein1 that ,science is of the ,universal1 and through necessary premisses which cannot be otherwise2 while ,opinion relates to matters true1 yet which at the same time may possibly be false4 ,the belief in a proposition which is immediate 7i4 e41 undemonstrable7 yet not necessary1 is ,opinion2 it is not ,science1 nor is it ,nos or ,intellect--the principium of ,science or scientific ,cognition4 ,such beliefs are fluctuating1 as we see every day2 we all distinguish them from other beliefs1 which we cannot conceive not to be true and which we call cognitions4#ia ,but may there not be ,opinion and ,cognition respecting the same matters8 ,there may be 7says ,aristotle7 in different men1 or in the same man at different times2 but not in the same man at the same time4 ,there may also be1 respecting the same matter1 true opinion in one man's mind1 and false opinion in the mind of another4#ib ,footnote #ia3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxxiii4 p4 #hh1 b4 #cj-p4 #hi1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #ib3 ,ibid4 p4 #hi1 a4 #aa-;b4 #f4 ,that eclipse of the sun is caused by the interposition of the moon was to the astronomer ,hipparchos scientific ,cognition2 for he saw that it could not be otherwise4 ,to the philosopher ,epikurus it was ,opinion2 for he thought that it might be otherwise 7,themistius1 p4 #ff1 ,spengel74 ,with some remarks upon ,sagacity1 or the power of divining a middle term in a time too short for reflection 7as when the friendship of two men is on the instant referred to the fact of their having a common enemy71 the present book is brought to a close4#ic ,footnote #ic3 ,ibid4 xxxiv4 p4 #hi1 b4 #aj-bj4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,analytica ,,posteriora ,,ii4 ,aristotle begins the ,second ,book of the ,analytica ,posteriora by an enumeration and classification of ,problems or ,questions suitable for investigation4 ,the matters knowable by us may be distributed into four classes3-- ,greek3 ,o7_/ti4 ,greek3 ,dio_/ti4 ,greek3 ,ei7 e7_/sti4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ e7sti4 #a4 ,quod4 #b4 ,cur4 #c4 ,an sit4 #d4 ,quid sit4 ,under the first head come questions of ,fact2 under the second head1 questions of ,cause or ,reason2 under the third1 questions of ,existence2 under the fourth1 questions of ,essence4 ,under the first head we enquire1 ,whether a fact or event is so or so8 ,whether a given subject possesses this or that attribute1 or is in this or that condition8 enumerating in the question the various supposable alternatives4 ,under the second head1 we assume the first question to have been affirmatively answered1 and we proceed to enquire1 ,what is the cause or reason for such fact1 or such conjunction of subject and attribute8 ,under the third head1 we ask1 ,does a supposed subject exist8 ,and if the answer be in the affirmative1 we proceed to enquire1 under the fourth head1 ,what is the essence of the subject8#a ,footnote #a3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #hi1 b4 #bc1 seq4 ,themistius observes1 p4 #fg1 ,speng43 ,greek3 ztoumen ti_/nun 7 peri a7plou tinos kai a7sunthe_/tou1 7 peri sunthe_/tou kai e7n prota_/sei4 ,themistius has here changed ,aristotle's order1 and placed the third and fourth heads before the first and second4 ,compare ,schol4 p4 #bdj1 b4 #cj2 p4 #bda1 a4 #ah4 ,the ,scholiast complains of the enigmatical style of ,aristotle3 ,greek3 t griph_/dei tou r7tou e7paggeli_/a 7p4 #bdj1 b4 #be74 ,we have here two distinct pairs of ,qusita3 ,obviously the second head presupposes the first1 and is consequent thereupon2 while the fourth also presupposes the third4 ,but it might seem a more suitable arrangement 7as ,themistius and other expositors have conceived7 that the third and fourth heads should come first in the list1 rather than the first and second2 since the third and fourth are simpler1 and come earlier in the order of philosophical exposition1 while the first and second are more complicated1 and cannot be expounded philosophically until after the philosophical exposition of the others4 ,this is cleared up by adverting to the distinction1 so often insisted on by ,aristotle1 between what is first in order of cognition relatively to us 7nobis notiora71 and what is first in order of cognition by nature 7natur notiora74 ,to us 7that is to men taken individually and in the course of actual growth7 the phenomena of nature#b present themselves as particulars confused and complicated in every way1 with attributes essential and accidental implicated together3 we gradually learn first to see and compare them as particulars1 next to resolve them into generalities1 bundles1 classes1 and partially to explain the ,why of some by means of others4 ,here we start from facts embodied in propositions1 that include subjects clothed with their attributes4 ,but in the order of nature 7that is1 in the order followed by those who know the scibile as a whole1 and can expound it scientifically7 that which comes first is the ,universal or the simple ,subject abstracted from its predicates or accompaniments3 we have to enquire1 first1 whether a given subject exists2 next1 if it does exist1 what is its real constituent essence or definition4 ,we thus see the reason for the order in which ,aristotle has arranged the two co-ordinate pairs of ,qusita or ,problems1 conformable to the different processes pursued1 on the one hand1 by the common intellect1 growing and untrained--on the other1 by the mature or disciplined intellect1 already competent for philosophical exposition and applying itself to new incognita4 ,footnote #b3 9999,schol4 ,philopon4 p4 #bda1 a4 #ah-bd3 ,greek3 tou_/tn to ei7 e7_/sti kai to ti_/ e7stin ei7sin a7pla1 to de o7_/ti kai to dio_/ti su_/ntheta--pro_/tera gar 7min kai gnrim_/tera ta su_/ntheta1 7s t phu_/sei ta a7pla4 ,mr4 ,poste observes upon this quadruple classification by ,aristotle 7p4 #if73--,the two last of these are problems of ,inductive1 but first principles of ,deductive1 ,science2 the one being the hypothesis1 the other the definition4 ,the 9999attribute as well as the subject must be defined 7,i4 x471 so that to a certain degree the second problem also is assumed among the principles of ,demonstration4 ,comparing together these four ,qusita1 it will appear that in the first and third 7,quod and ,an71 we seek to find out whether there is or is not any middle term4 ,in the second and fourth 7,cur and ,quid71 we already know or assume that there is a middle term2 and we try to ascertain what that middle term is4#c ,the enquiry ,cur1 is in the main analogous to the enquiry ,quid2 in both cases1 we aim at ascertaining what the cause or middle term is4 ,but1 in the enquiry ,cur1 what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event1 which is the cause of the event qusitum2 while1 in the enquiry ,quid1 what we seek is the real essence or definition of the substance--the fundamental1 generating1 immanent cause of its concomitant attributes4 ,sometimes1 however1 the ,quid and the ,cur are only different ways of stating the same thing4 ,e4g41 ,quid est eclipsis lun8 ,answer3 ,the essence of an eclipse is a privation of light from the moon1 through intervention of the earth between her and the sun4 ,cur locum habet eclipsis lun8 ,answer3 ,because the light of the sun is prevented from reaching the moon by intervention of the earth4 ,here it is manifest that the answers to the enquiries ,quid and ,cur are really and in substance the same fact1 only stated in different phrases4#d ,footnote #c3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #hhi1 b4 #cg-p4 #ij1 a4 #g4 ,greek3 sumbai_/nei a7_/ra e7n a7pa_/sais tais zt_/sesi ztein 7 ei7 e7_/sti me_/son1 7 ti_/ e7sti to me_/son2 to men gar ai7_/tion to me_/son1 e7n a7_/pasi de touto zteitai4 ,compare ,schol4 p4 #bda1 b4 #aj1 ,br4 ,footnote #d3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #ij1 a4 #ad-bc1 #ca3 ,greek3 to ti_/ e7stin ei7de_/nai tau7to_/ e7sti kai dia ti_/ e7stin4 ,that the qusitum in all these researches is a middle term or medium1 is plain from those cases wherein the medium is perceivable by sense2 for then we neither require nor enter upon research4 ,for example1 if we were upon the moon1 we should see the earth coming between us and the sun1 now and in each particular case of eclipse4 ,accordingly1 after many such observations1 we should affirm the universal proposition1 that such intervention of the earth was the cause of eclipses2 the universal becoming known to us through induction of particular cases4#e ,the middle term1 the ,cause1 the ,quid1 and the ,cur1 are thus all the same enquiry1 in substance2 though sometimes such qusitum is the quiddity or essential nature of the thing itself 7as the essence of a triangle is the cause or ground of its having its three angles equal to two right angles1 as well as of its other properties71 sometimes it is an extraneous fact4#f ,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd-cj4 ,greek3 e7k gar tou ai7sthe_/sthai kai to katho_/lou e7ge_/neto a7n 7min ei7de_/nai2 7 men gar ai7_/sthsis o7_/ti nun a7ntiphra_/ttei2 kai gar dlon o7_/ti nun e7klei_/pei2 e7k de tou_/tou to katho_/lou a7n e7ge_/neto4 ,the purport and relation of this quadruple classification of problems is set forth still more clearly in the sixth book of the ,metaphysica 7,z4 p4 #ajda7 with the explanations of ,bonitz1 ,comm4 pp4 #ceh1 #cei4 ,footnote #f3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #ij1 a4 #ca4 ,but how or by what process is this qusitum obtained and made clear8 ,is it by ,demonstration or by ,definition8 ,what is ,definition1 and what matters admit of ,definition8#g ,aristotle begins by treating the question dialectically2 by setting out a series of doubts and difficulties4 ,first1 ,is it possible that the same cognition1 and in the same relation1 can be obtained both by ,definition and by ,demonstration8 ,no2 it is not possible4 ,it is plain that much that is known by ,demonstration cannot be known by ,definition2 for we have seen that conclusions both particular and negative are established by ,demonstration 7in the ,third and ,second figures71 while every ,definition is universal and affirmative4 ,but we may go farther and say1 that even where a conclusion universal and affirmative is established 7in the ,first figure7 by ,demonstration1 that same conclusion can never be known by ,definition2 for if it could be known by ,definition1 it might have been known without ,demonstration4 ,now we are assured1 by an uncontradicted induction1 that this is not the fact2 for that which we know by ,demonstration is either a proprium of the subject per se1 or an accident or concomitant2 but no ,definition ever declares either the one or the other3 it declares only the essence4#h ,footnote #g3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #ij1 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 ti_/ e7stin o7rismo_/s1 kai ti_/nn1 ei7_/pmen1 diapor_/santes prton peri au7tn4 ,footnote #h3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #ij1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 i7kan de pi_/stis kai e7k ts e7paggs2 ou7den gar p_/pote o7risa_/menoi e7_/gnmen1 ou7_/te tn kath' au7to u7parcho_/ntn ou7_/te tn sumbebko_/tn4 e7_/ti ei7 o7 o7rismos ou7si_/as tis gnrismo_/s1 ta ge toiauta phaneron o7_/ti ou7k ou7si_/ai4 ,again1 let us ask1 vice vers1 ,can everything that is declared by ,definition1 or indeed anything that is declared by ,definition1 be known also by ,demonstration8 ,neither is this possible4 ,one and the same cognitum can be known only by one process of cognition4 ,definitions are the principia from which ,demonstration departs2 and we have already shown that in going back upon demonstrations1 we must stop somewhere1 and must recognize some principia undemonstrable4#i ,the ,definition can never be demonstrated1 for it declares only the essence of the subject1 and does not predicate anything concerning the subject2 whereas ,demonstration assumes the essence to be known1 and deduces from such assumption an attribute distinct from the essence4#aj ,footnote #i3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah-bg4 ,footnote #aj3 ,ibid4 b4 #cc1 seq43 ,greek3 e7_/ti pasa a7po_/deixis ti kata_/ tinos dei_/knusin1 oi7on o7_/ti e7_/stin 7 ou7k e7_/stin2 e7n de t o7rism ou7den e7_/teron e7te_/rou katgoreitai1 oi7on ou7_/te to zon kata tou di_/podos ou7de touto kata tou zou--o7 men ou7n o7rismos ti_/ e7sti dloi1 7 de a7po_/deixis o7_/ti 7 e7_/sti to_/de kata toude 7 ou7k e7_/stin4 ,themistius 7p4 #ga1 ,speng47 distinguishes the ,greek3 o7rismo_/s itself from ,greek3 7 pro_/tasis 7 ton o7rismon katgorou_/menon e7_/chousa4 ,prosecuting still farther the dialectical and dubitative treatment1#aa ,aristotle now proceeds to suggest1 that the ,essence 7that is1 the entire ,essence or ,quiddity71 which is declared by ,definition1 can never be known by ,demonstration4 ,to suppose that it could be so known1 would be inconsistent with the conditions of the syllogistic proof used in demonstrating4 ,you prove by syllogism1 through a middle term1 some predicate or attribute2 e4g4 because ,a is predicable of all ,b1 and ,b is predicable of all ,c1 therefore ,a is predicable of all ,c4 ,but you cannot prove1 through the middle term ,b1 that ,a is the essence or quiddity of ,c1 unless by assuming in the premisses that ,b is the essence of ,c1 and that ,a is the essence of ,b2 accordingly1 that the three propositions1 ,,ab1 ,,bc1 ,,ac1 are all co-extensive and reciprocate with each other4 ,here1 then1 you have assumed as your premisses two essential propositions1 ,,ab1 ,,bc1 in order to prove as an essential proposition the conclusion ,,ac4 ,but this is inadmissible2 for your premisses require demonstration as much as your conclusion4 ,you have committed a ,petitio ,principii2#ab you have assumed in your minor premiss the very point to be demonstrated4 ,footnote #aa3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #ia1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 tauta men ou7n me_/chri tou_/tou dipor_/sth4 ,one would think1 by these words1 that ,greek3 to diaporein 7or the dubitative treatment7 finished here4 ,but the fact is not so3 that treatment is continued for four chapters more1 to the commencement of ch4 viii4 p4 #ic4 ,footnote #ab3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #ia1 a4 #ab-cb3 ,greek3 tauta d' a7na_/gk antistre_/phein2 ei7 gar to ,a tou ,g i7_/dion1 dlon o7_/ti kai tou ,b kai touto tou ,g1 7_/ste pa_/nta a7ll_/ln4--lamba_/nei ou7n o7 dei deixai2 kai gar to ,b e7_/sti ti_/ e7stin a7_/nthrpos4 ,themistius1 pp4 #gb1 #gc3 ,greek3 ton a7podeiknu_/nta to ti_/ 7n ei7nai tou a7nthr_/pou1 a7_/llo ti dei prolabein tou au7tou to ti_/ 7n ei7nai4--ou7 gar bou_/letai ton o7rismon a7podeixai1 tou_/tou prolamba_/nei tina o7rismon ei7nai chtis a7podei_/xes4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 notes1 p4 #bje3--;,il faut donc1 pour conclure par syllogisme que ,a est la dfinition essentielle de ,c1 que ,a soit la dfinition essentielle de ,b1 et que ,b soit lui-mme la dfinition essentielle de ,c4 ,mais alors la dfinition de la chose sera dans le moyen terme lui-mme1 avant d'tre dans la conclusion2 en effet1 la mineure3 ,b est la dfinition essentielle de ,c1 donne la dfinition essentielle de ,c1 sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller jusqu'9999 la conclusion4 ,donc la dmonstration de l'essence ainsi entendue est absurde4 ,if you cannot obtain ,definition as the conclusion of syllogistic ,demonstration1 still less can you obtain it through the method of generic and specific ,division2 which last method 7as has been already shown in the ,analytica ,priora7 is not equal even to the ,syllogism in respect of usefulness and efficacy4#ac ,you cannot in this method distinguish between propositions both true and essential1 and propositions true but not essential2 you never obtain1 by asking questions according to the method of generic subdivision1 any premisses from which the conclusion follows by necessity4 ,yet this is what you ought to obtain for the purpose of ,demonstration2 for you are not allowed to enunciate the full actual conclusion among the premisses1 and require assent to it4 ,division of a genus into its species will often give useful information1 as ,induction also will2#ad but neither the one nor the other will be equivalent to a demonstration4 ,a definition obtained only from subdivisions of a genus1 may always be challenged1 like a syllogism without its middle term4 ,footnote #ac3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #ia1 b4 #ab1 seq42 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 xxxi4 p4 #df1 a4 #ca4 ,aristotle here alludes to the method pursued by ,plato in the ,sophistes and ,politicus1 though he does not name ,plato3 ,greek3 7 dia tn diaire_/sen o7do_/s1 c4 ,footnote #ad3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #ia1 b4 #ae-cc3 ,greek3 ou7de gar o7 e7pa_/gn i7_/ss a7podei_/knusin1 a7ll' o7_/ms dloi ti4 ,compare ,themistius1 p4 #gd4 ,again1 neither can you arrive at the definition of a given subject1 by assuming in general terms what a definition ought to be1 and then declaring a given form of words to be conformable to such assumption2 because your minor premiss must involve ,petitio ,principii4 ,the same logical fault will be committed1 if you take your departure from an hypothesis in which you postulate the definition of a certain subject1 and then declare inferentially what the definition of its contrary must be4 ,the definition which you here assume requires proof as much as that which you infer from it4#ae ,moreover1 neither by this process1 nor by that of generic subdivision1 can you show any reason why the parts of the definition should coalesce into one essential whole4 ,if they do not thus coalesce--if they be nothing better than distinct attributes conjoined in the same subject1 like musicus and grammaticus--the real essence is not declared1 and the definition is not a good one4#af ,footnote #ae3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #ib1 a4 #f-bh4 ,themist4 p4 #gf4 ,rassow renders ,greek3 e7x u7pothe_/ses--assumpt generali definitionis notione2 and also says3 ,greek3 to ti_/ 7n ei7nai--generalem definitionis notionem2 ,greek3 to ti_/ e7stin--certam quandam definitionem1 significare perspicuum est4 7,aristotelis de ,notionis ,definitione ,doctrina1 p4 #fe74 ,footnote #af3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #ib1 a4 #cb4 ,that the parts of the definition must coalesce into one unity is laid down again in the ,metaphysica1 ,z4 pp4 #ajcg1 #ajch1 where ,aristotle makes reference to the ,analytica as haying already treated the same subject1 and professes an intention to complete what has been begun in the ,analytica2 ,greek3 e7ph' o7_/son e7n tois ,a7nalutikois peri o7rismou m ei7_/rtai4 ,after stating some other additional difficulties which seem to leave the work of ,definition inexplicable1 ,aristotle relinquishes the dubitative treatment1 and looks out for some solution of the puzzle3 ,how may it be possible that the ,definition shall become known8#ag ,he has already told us that to know the essence of a thing is the same as to know the cause or reason of its existence2 but we must first begin by knowing that the definiendum exists2 for there can be no definition of a non-entity1 except a mere definition of the word1 a nominal or verbal definition4 ,now sometimes we know the existence of the subject by one or other of its accidental attributes2 but this gives us no help towards finding the definition4#ah ,sometimes1 however1 we obtain a partial knowledge of its essence along with the knowledge of its existence2 when we know it along with some constant antecedent1 or through some constant1 though derivative1 consequent4 ,knowing thus much1 we can often discover the cause or fundamental condition thereof1 which is the essence or definition of the subject4#ai ,indeed1 it may happen that the constant derivative1 and the fundamental essence on which it depends1 become known both together2 or1 again1 the cause or fundamental condition may perhaps not be the essence of the subject alone1 but some fact including other subjects also2 and this fact may then be stated as a middle term4 ,thus1 in regard to eclipse of the moon1 we know the constant phenomenal fact about it1 that1 on a certain recurrence of the time of full moon1 the moon casts no light and makes no shadow4 ,hence we proceed to search out the cause4 ,is it interposition of the earth1 or conversion of the moon's body1 or extinction of her light1 c48 ,the new fact when shown1 must appear as a middle term1 throwing into syllogistic form 7in the ,first figure7 the cause or rational explanation of a lunar eclipse2 showing not merely that there is an eclipse1 but what an eclipse is1 or what is its definition4#bj ,footnote #ag3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #ib1 a4 #cd1 seq4 ,the ,greek3 a7po_/riai continue to the end of ch4 vii4 ,he goes on1 ch4 viii4 p4 #ic1 a4 #a-b3 ,greek3 pa_/lin de skepte_/on ti_/ tou_/tn le_/getai kals1 kai ti_/ ou7 kals1 c4 ,tout ce qui prcde ne reprsente pas la thorie proprement dite2 ce n'est qu'une discussion prliminaire 7,barth4 ,st4 ,hilaire1 not4 p4 #bbb74 ,these difficult chapters are well illustrated by ,hermann ,rassow1 ch1 i4 pp4 #i-ad4 ,footnote #ah3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #ic1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7sti_/n1 7s e7_/phamen1 tau7ton to ei7de_/nai ti_/ e7sti kai to ei7de_/nai to ai7_/tion tou ei7 e7_/sti2 ,ibid4 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 o7_/sa men ou7n kata sumbebkos oi7_/damen o7_/ti e7_/stin1 a7nagkaion mdams e7_/chein pros to ti_/ e7stin2 9999ou7de gar o7_/ti e7_/stin i7_/smen2 to de ztein ti_/ e7sti m e7_/chontas o7_/ti e7_/sti1 mden ztein e7sti_/n4 kath' o7_/sn d' e7_/chome_/n ti1 r7aon2 7_/ste 7s e7_/chomen o7_/ti e7_/stin1 ou7_/ts e7_/chomen kai pros to ti_/ e7stin4 ,compare ,brentano1 ,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles1 p4 #ag4 ,footnote #ai3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #ic1 a4 #ba4 ,themistius1 p4 #gi1 ,speng43 ,greek3 o7_/sa de a7po tn oi7kei_/n te kai e7x au7tou tou pra_/gmatos1 a7po tou_/tn 7_/d r7aon ei7s to ti_/ e7sti metabai_/nomen4 ,footnote #bj3 ,ibid4 p4 #ic1 a4 #cj-;b4 #ad4 ,aristotle has thus shown how the ,essence or ,quiddity 7,greek3 ti_/ e7sti7 may become known in this class of cases4 ,there is neither syllogism nor demonstration thereof1 yet it is declared through syllogism and demonstration3 though no demonstration thereof is possible1 yet you cannot know it without demonstration1 wherever there is an extraneous cause4#ba ,footnote #ba3 ,ibid4 b4 #ae-bj3 ,greek3 7_/ste sullogismos men tou ti_/ e7stin ou7 gi_/netai ou7d' a7po_/deixis1 dlon me_/ntoi dia sullogismou kai di' a7podei_/xes4 ,mr4 ,poste translates an earlier passage 7p4 #ic1 a4 #e7 in this very difficult chapter as follows 7p4 #ajg73 ,if one cause is demonstrable1 another indemonstrable cause must be the intermediate2 and the proof is in the first figure1 and the conclusion affirmative and universal4 ,in this mode of demonstrating the essence1 we prove one definition by another1 for the intermediate that proves an essence or a peculiar predicate must itself be an essence or a peculiar predicate4 ,of two definitions1 then1 one is proved and the other assumed2 and1 as we said before1 this is not a demonstration but a dialectical proof of the essence4 ,mr4 ,poste here translates ,greek3 logikos sullogismo_/s dialectical proof4 ,i understand it rather as meaning a syllogism1 ,greek3 tou u7pa_/rchein simply 7,top4 ,i4 v4 p4 #ajb1 b4 #e71 in which all that you really know is that the predicate belongs to the subject1 but in which you assume besides that it belongs to the subject essentially4 ,it is not a demonstration because1 in order to obtain ,essence in the conclusion1 you are obliged to postulate ,essence in your premiss4 7,see ,alexander ad ,topic4 ,i4 p4 #bfc1 ,br474 ,you have therefore postulated a premiss which required proof as much as the conclusion4 ,but the above doctrine will hold only in cases where there is a distinct or extraneous cause2 it will not hold in cases where there is none4 ,it is only in the former 7as has been said7 that a middle term can be shown2 rendering it possible that ,quiddity or ,essence should be declared by a valid formal syllogism1 though it cannot be demonstrated by syllogism4 ,in the latter1 where there is no distinct cause1 no such middle term can be enunciated3 the ,quiddity or ,essence must be assumed as an immediate or undemonstrable principium1 and must be exposed or set out in the best manner practicable as an existent reality1 on ,induction or on some other authority4 ,the arithmetician makes his first steps by assuming both what a monad is and that there exists such a monad4#bb ,footnote #bb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #ic1 b4 #ba4 ,greek3 e7_/sti de tn men e7_/tero_/n ti ai7_/tion1 tn d' ou7k e7_/stin4 7_/ste dlon o7_/ti kai tn ti_/ e7sti ta men a7_/mesa kai a7rchai_/ ei7sin1 a7 kai ei7nai kai ti_/ e7stin u7pothe_/sthai dei 7 a7_/llon tro_/pon phanera poisai4 o7_/per o7 a7rithmtikos poiei2 kai gar ti_/ e7sti tn mona_/da u7poti_/thetai1 kai o7_/ti e7_/stin4 ,themistius1 p4 #hj3 ,greek3 a7 kai ei7nai kai ti_/ e7stin u7pothe_/sthai dei1 7 a7_/llon tro_/pon phanera poisai e7x e7paggs 7 pi_/stes 7 e7mpeiri_/as4 ,rassow1 ,de ,notionis ,definitione1 pp4 #ah-bb4 ,we may distinguish three varieties of ,definition4 #a4 ,sometimes it is the mere explanation what a word signifies2 in this sense1 it has nothing to do with essence or existence2 it is a nominal definition and nothing more4#bc #b4 ,sometimes it enunciates the ,essence1 cause1 or reason of the definitum2 this will happen where the cause is distinct or extraneous1 and where there is accordingly an intervening middle term3 the definition will then differ from a demonstration only by condensing into one enunciation the two premisses and the conclusion which together constitute the demonstration4#bd #c4 ,sometimes it is an immediate proposition1 an indemonstrable hypothesis1 assuming ,essence or ,quiddity2 the essence itself being cause1 and no extraneous cause--no intervening middle term--being obtainable4#be ,footnote #bc3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #ic1 b4 #bi-cg4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 p4 #ic1 b4 #ch1 seq4 ,greek3 oi7on a7po_/deixis tou ti_/ e7stin1 t the_/sei diaphe_/rn ts a7podei_/xes2--sullogismos tou ti_/ e7sti1 pt_/sei diaphe_/rn ts a7podei_/xes--differing situ et positione terminorum 7,julius ,pacius1 p4 #dic74 ,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 p4 #id1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 o7 de tn a7me_/sn o7rismo_/s1 the_/sis e7sti tou ti_/ e7stin a7napo_/deiktos4 ,compare ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 7 gar kath' au7to u7pa_/rchei ti1 touto au7to au7t ai7_/tion4 ,see ,kampe1 ,die ,erkenntniss-theorie des ,aristoteles1 p4 #bab1 seq4 ,to know or cognize is1 to know the ,cause2 when we know the ,cause1 we are satisfied with our cognition4 ,now there are four ,causes1 or varieties of ,cause3-- #a4 ,the ,essence or ,quiddity 7,form7--,greek3 to ti_/ 7n ei7nai4 #b4 ,the necessitating conditions 7,matter7--,greek3 to_/ ti_/nn o7_/ntn a7na_/gk tout' ei7nai4 #c4 ,the proximate mover or stimulator of change 7,efficient7--,greek3 7 ti_/ prton e7ki_/nse4 #d4 ,that for the sake of which 7,final ,cause or ,end7--,greek3 to ti_/nos e7_/neka4 ,all these four ,causes 7,formal1 ,material1 ,efficient1 ,final7 appear as middle terms in demonstrating4 ,we can proceed through the medium either of ,form1 or of ,matter1 or of ,efficient1 or of ,end4 ,the first of the four has already been exemplified--the demonstration by ,form4 ,the second appears in demonstrating that the angle in a semi-circle is always a right angle2 where the middle term 7or matter of the syllogism1 7,greek3 to e7x ou77 is1 that such angle is always the half of two right angles4#bf ,the ,efficient is the middle term1 when to the question1 ,why did the ,persians invade ,athens8 it is answered that the ,athenians had previously invaded ,persia along with the ,eretrians4 7,all are disposed to attack those who have attacked them first2 the ,athenians attacked the ,persians first2 ergo1 the ,persians were disposed to attack the ,athenians47 ,lastly1 the ,final ,cause serves as middle term1 when to the question1 ,why does a man walk after dinner8 the response is1 ,for the purpose of keeping up his health4 ,in another way1 the middle term here is digestion3 walking after dinner promotes digestion2 digestion is the efficient cause of health4#bg ,footnote #bf3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #id1 a4 #ba-cf4 ,themistius1 p4 #hc3 ,greek3 ma_/lista men gar e7pi pa_/ss a7podei_/xes o7 me_/sos e7_/stin oi7on 7 u7_/l t sullogism2 ou7_/tos gar o7 poin tas du_/o prota_/seis1 e7ph' ai7s to sumpe_/rasma4 ,footnote #bg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #id1 a4 #cf-;b4 #ba4 ,the ,final ,cause or ,end is prior in the order of nature1 but posterior to the terms of the conclusion in the order of time or generation2 while the ,efficient is prior in the order of time or generation4 ,the ,formal and ,material are simultaneous with the effect1 neither prior nor posterior4#bh ,sometimes the same fact may proceed both from a ,final cause1 and from a cause of ,material ,necessity2 thus the light passes through our lantern for the purpose of guiding us in the dark1 but also by reason that the particles of light are smaller than the pores in the glass4 ,nature produces effects of finality1 or with a view to some given end2 and also effects by necessity1 the necessity being either inherent in the substance itself1 or imposed by extraneous force4 ,thus a stone falls to the ground by necessity of the first kind1 but ascends by necessity of the second kind4 ,among products of human intelligence some spring wholly from design without necessity2 but others arise by accident or chance and have no final cause4#bi ,footnote #bh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #id1 a4 #ba-bf4 ,themistius1 p4 #hc3 ,greek3 7 ge_/nesis ou7n tou me_/sou kai ai7ti_/ou tn au7tn ou7k e7_/chei ta_/xin e7ph' a7pa_/ntn1 a7ll' ou7 men pr_/tn 7s e7pi tn kintikn1 ou7 de teleutai_/an 7s e7pi tn teln kai 7n e7_/neka1 ou7 d' a7_/ma 7s e7pi tn o7rismn kai tou ti_/ 7n ei7nai4 ,footnote #bi3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 p4 #id1 b4 #bg-p4 #ie1 a4 #i4 ,that the middle term is the ,cause1 is equally true in respect to ,entia1 ,fientia1 ,prterita1 and ,futura2 only that in respect to ,entia1 the middle term or ,cause must be an ,ens2 in respect to ,fientia it must be a ,fiens2 in respect to ,prterita1 a ,prteritum2 and in respect to ,futura1 a ,futurum2 that is1 in each case1 it must be generated at the corresponding time with the major and minor terms in the conclusion4#cj ,what is the cause of an eclipse of the moon8 ,the cause is1 that the earth intervenes between moon and sun2 and this is true alike of eclipses past1 present1 and future4 ,such an intervention is the essence or definition of a lunar eclipse3 the cause is therefore ,formal1 and cause and effect are simultaneous1 occurring at the same moment of time4 ,but in the other three ,causes--,material1 ,efficient1 ,final--where phenomena are successive and not simultaneous1 can we say that the antecedent is cause and the consequent effect1 time being1 as seems to us1 a continuum8 ,in cases like this1 we can syllogize from the consequent backward to the antecedent2 but not from the antecedent forward to the consequent4 ,if the house has been built1 we can infer that the foundations have been laid2 but1 if the foundations have been laid1 we cannot infer that the house has been built4#ca ,there must always be an interval of time during which inference from the antecedent will be untrue2 perhaps1 indeed1 it may never become true4 ,cause and causatum in these three last varieties of ,cause1 do not universally and necessarily reciprocate with each other1 as in the case of the ,formal cause4 ,though time is continuous1 events or generations are distinct points marked in a continuous line1 and are not continuous with each other4#cb ,the number of these points that may be taken is indeed infinite2 yet we must assume some of them as ultimate and immediate principia1 in order to construct our syllogism1 and provide our middle term4#cc ,where the middle term reciprocates and is co-extensive with the major and the minor1 in such cases we have generation of phenomena in a cycle2 e4g41 after the earth has been made wet1 vapour rises of necessity3 hence comes a cloud1 hence water2 which again falls1 and the earth again becomes wet4#cd ,finally1 wherever our conclusion is not universally and necessarily true1 but true only in most cases1 our immediate principia must also be of the same character1 true in most cases1 but in most cases only4#ce ,footnote #cj3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #ie1 a4 #aj1 #cf3 ,greek3 to gar me_/son o7mo_/gonon dei ei7nai1 c4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd seq41 b4 #cb2 ,julius ,pacius1 ad loc42 ,biese1 ,die ,philosophie des ,aristot4 pp4 #cjb-cjc4 ,footnote #cb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #ie1 a4 #ci-;b4 #h2 ,themistius1 p4 #hf4 ,footnote #cc3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #ie1 b4 #ad-ca3 ,greek3 a7rch de kai e7n tou_/tois a7_/mesos lpte_/a4 ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 b4 #ch-p4 #if1 a99994 #g4 ,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 p4 #if1 a4 #h-ai4 ,how are we to proceed in hunting out those attributes that are predicated in ,quid1#cf as belonging to the ,essence of the subject8 ,the subject being a lowest species1 we must look out for such attributes as belong to all individuals thereof1 but which belong also to individuals of other species under the same genus4 ,we shall thus find one1 two1 three1 or more1 attributes1 each of which1 separately taken1 belongs to various individuals lying out of the species2 but the assemblage of which1 collectively taken1 does not belong to any individual lying out of the species4 ,the ,assemblage thus found is the ,essence2 and the enunciation thereof is the ,definition of the species4 ,thus1 the triad is included in the genus number2 in searching for its definition1 therefore1 we must not go beyond that genus1 nor include any attributes 7such as ens1 c47 predicable of other subjects as well as numbers4 ,keeping within the limits of the genus1 we find that every triad agrees in being an odd number4 ,but this oddness belongs to other numbers also 7pentad1 heptad1 c474 ,we therefore look out for other attributes1 and we find that every triad agrees in being a prime number1 in two distinct senses2 first1 that it is not measured by any other number2 secondly1 that it is not compounded of any other numbers4 ,this last attribute belongs to no other odd number except the triad4 ,we have now an assemblage of attributes1 which belong each of them to every triad1 universally and necessarily1 and which1 taken all together1 belong exclusively to the triad1 and therefore constitute its essence or definition4 ,the triad is a number1 odd1 and prime in the two senses4#cg ,the definitum and the definition are here exactly co-extensive4 ,footnote #cf3 ,ibid4 xiii4 p4 #if1 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 ps dei threu_/ein ta e7n t ti_/ e7sti katgorou_/mena8 ,footnote #cg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #if1 a4 #bd-;b4 #ad4 ,greek3 ei7 toi_/nun mdeni u7pa_/rchei a7_/ll 7 tais a7to_/mois tria_/si1 tout' a7n ei7_/ to tria_/di ei7nai4 u7pokei_/sth gar kai touto1 7 ou7si_/a 7 e7ka_/stou ei7nai 7 e7pi tais a7to_/mois e7_/schatos toiau_/t katgori_/a4 7_/ste o7moi_/s kai a7_/ll o7toun tn ou7_/t deichthe_/ntn to au7t ei7nai e7_/stai4 ,where the matter that we study is the entire genus1 we must begin by distributing it into its lowest species2 e4g4 number into dyad1 triad1 c42 in like manner1 taking straight line1 circle1 right angle1 c4#ch ,we must first search out the definitions of each of these lowest species2 and these having been ascertained1 we must next look above the genus1 to the ,category in which it is itself comprised1 whether ,quantum1 ,quale1 c4 ,having done thus much we must study the derivative attributes or propria of the lowest species through the common generalities true respecting the larger4 ,we must recollect that these derivative attributes are derived from the essence and definition of the lowest species1 the complex flowing from the simple as its principium3 they belong per se only to the lowest species thus defined2 they belong to the higher genera only through those species4#ci ,it is in this way1 and not in any other1 that the logical ,division of genera1 according to specific differences1 can be made serviceable for investigation of essential attributes2 that is1 it can only be made to demonstrate what is derivative from the essence4 ,we have shown already that it cannot help in demonstrating essence or ,definition itself4 ,we learn to marshal in proper order the two constituent elements of our definition1 and to attach each specific difference to the genus to which it properly belongs4 ,thus we must not attempt to distribute the genus animal according to the difference of having the wing divided or undivided3 many animals will fall under neither of the two heads2 the difference in question belongs to the lower genus winged animal1 and distributes the same into two species4 ,the characteristic or specific difference must be enunciated and postulated by itself1 and must be attached to its appropriate genus in order to form the definition4 ,it is only by careful attention to the steps of legitimate logical ,division that we can make sure of including all the particulars and leaving out none4#dj ,footnote #ch3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah4 ,the straight line is the first or lowest of all lines3 no other line can be understood1 unless we first understand what is meant by a straight line4 ,in like manner the right angle is the first of all angles1 the circle the first of all curvilinear figures 7,julius ,pacius1 ad loc4 p4 #ejd74 ,footnote #ci3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #if1 b4 #ai-be3 ,greek3 meta de touto1 la_/bo_/nta ti_/ to ge_/nos1 oi7on po_/teron tn posn 7 tn poin1 ta i7_/dia pa_/th therein dia tn koinn pr_/tn4 tois gar suntitheme_/nois e7k tn a7to_/mn 7speciebus infimis7 ,greek3 ta sumbai_/nonta e7k tn o7rismn e7_/stai dla1 dia to a7rchn ei7nai pa_/ntn ton o7rismo_/n kai to a7ploun1 kai tois a7plois kath' au7ta u7pa_/rchein ta sumbai_/nonta mo_/nois1 tois d' a7_/llois kat' e7keina4 ,themistius illustrates this obscure passage1 p4 #hi4 ,the definitions of ,greek3 eu7theia gramm_/1 keklasme_/n gramm_/1 periphers gramm_/1 must each of them contain the definition of ,greek3 gramm_/ 7 mkos a7plate_/s71 since it is in the ,category ,greek3 ,poso_/n 7poson mkos a7plate_/s74 ,but the derivative properties of the circle 7,greek3 periphers gramm_/7 are deduced from the definition of a circle1 and belong to it in the first instance qu ,greek3 periphers gramm_/1 in a secondary way qu ,greek3 gramm_/4 ,footnote #dj3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #if1 b4 #be-p4 #ig1 a4 #f4 ,some contemporaries of ,aristotle1 and among them ,speusippus1 maintained that it was impossible either to define1 or to divide logically1 unless you knew all particulars without exception4 ,you cannot 7they said7 know any one thing1 except by knowing its differences from all other things2 which would imply that you knew also all these other things4#da ,to these reasoners ,aristotle replies3 ,it is not necessary to know all the differences of every thing2 you know a thing as soon as you know its essence1 with the properties per se which are derivative therefrom4 ,there are many differences not belonging to the essence1 but distinguishing from each other two things having the same essence3 you may know the thing1 without knowing these accidental differences4#db ,when you divide a genus into two species1 distinguished by one proximate specific difference1 such that there cannot be any thing that does not fall under one or other of these membra condividentia1 and when you have traced the subject investigated under one or other of these members1 you can always follow this road until no lower specific difference can be found1 and you have then the final essence and definition of the subject2 even though you may not know how many other subjects each of the two members may include4#dc ,thus does ,aristotle reply to ,speusippus1 showing that it is not necessary1 for the definition of one thing1 that you should know all other things4 ,his reply1 as in many other cases1 is founded on the distinction between the ,essential and the ,accidental4 ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 p4 #ig1 a4 #f-aj2 ,themistius1 p4 #ib4 ,aristotle does not here expressly name ,speusippus1 but simply says ,greek3 phasi_/ tines4 ,it is ,themistius who names ,speusippus2 and one of the ,scholiasts refers to ,eudemus as having expressly indicated ,speusippus 7,schol4 p4 #bdh1 a4 #bd1 ,br474 ,footnote #db3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 pollai gar diaphorai u7pa_/rchousi tois au7tois t ei7_/dei1 a7ll' ou7 kat' ou7si_/an ou7de kath' au7ta_/4 ,footnote #dc3 ,ibid4 a4 #ah-bb3 ,greek3 phaneron gar o7_/ti a7n ou7_/t badi_/zn e7_/lth ei7s tauta 7n mke_/ti e7sti diaphora_/1 e7_/xei ton lo_/gon ts ou7si_/as4 ,to obtain or put together a definition through logical ,division1 three points are to be attended to4#dd ,collect the predicates in ,quid2 range them in the proper order2 make sure that there are no more1 or that you have collected all4 ,the essential predicates are genera1 to be obtained not otherwise than by the method 7dialectical7 used in concluding accidents4 ,as regards order1 you begin with the highest genus1 that which is predicable of all the others1 while none of these is predicable of it1 determining in like fashion the succession of the rest respectively4 ,the collection will be complete1 if you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference1 such that every thing must be included in one or other of the two proximate and opposed portions2 and then taking the species thus found as your dividendum1 subdivide it until no lower specific difference can be found1 or you obtain from the elements an exact equivalent to the subject4#de ,footnote #dd3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 ei7s de to kataskeua_/zein o7_/ron dia diaire_/sen4 ,the ,scholiast1 p4 #bdh1 a4 #da1 explains ,greek3 kataskeua_/zein by ,greek3 eu7rein1 suntheinai1 a7podounai4 ,he distinguishes it from ,greek3 a7podeiknu_/nai2 demonstration of the definition being impracticable4 ,footnote #de3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 a4 #bc seq4 ,see ,waitz1 ,comm4 p4 #dah4 ,when the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of similar particulars1 you compare them1 and note what is the same in all2 then turn to another group which are the same in genere yet differ in specie from the first group1 and have a different point of community among themselves4 ,you next compare the point of community among the members of the first group1 and that among the members of the second group4 ,if the two points of community can be brought under one rational formula1 that will be the definition of the subject2 but if at the end of the process1 the distinct points of community are not found resolvable into any final one1 this proves that the supposed definiendum is not one but two or more4#df ,for example1 suppose you are investigating1 ,what is the essence or definition of magnanimity8 ,you must study various magnanimous individuals1 and note what they have in common qu magnanimous4#dg ,thus1 ,achilles1 ,ajax1 ,alkibiades were all magnanimous4 ,now1 that which the three had in common was1 that they could not endure to be insulted2 on that account ,alkibiades went to war with his countrymen1 ,achilles was angry and stood aloof from the ,greeks1 ,ajax slew himself4 ,but1 again1 you find two other magnanimous men1 ,sokrates and ,lysander4 ,these two had in common the quality1 that they maintained an equal and unshaken temper both in prosperity and adversity4 ,now when you have got thus far1 the question to be examined is1 ,what is the point of identity between the temper that will not endure insult1 and the temper that remains undisturbed under all diversities of fortune8 ,if an identity can be found1 this will be the essence or definition of magnanimity2 to which will belong equanimity as one variety1 and intolerance of insult as another4 ,if1 on the contrary1 no identity can be found1 you will then have two distinct mental dispositions1 without any common definition4#dh ,footnote #df3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 b4 #g-ae4 ,greek3 pa_/lin skopein ei7 tau7ton e7_/s a7n ei7s e7_/na e7_/lth lo_/gon2 ou7tos gar e7_/stai tou pra_/gmatos o7rismo_/s4 e7an de m badi_/z ei7s e7_/na a7ll' ei7s du_/o 7 plei_/1 dlon o7_/ti ou7k a7n ei7_/ e7_/n ti ei7nai to ztou_/menon1 a7lla plei_/4 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 b4 #af3 ,greek3 skepte_/on e7pi_/ tinn megalopsu_/chn1 ou7s i7_/smen1 ti_/ e7_/chousin e7n pa_/ntes 7 toioutoi4 ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-be4 ,greek3 tauta du_/o labn skop ti_/ to au7to e7_/chousin 7_/ te a7pa_/theia 7 peri tas tu_/chas kai 7 m u7pomon a7timazome_/nn4 ei7 de mde_/n1 du_/o ei7_/d a7n ei7_/ ts megalopsuchi_/as4 quam memento rebus in arduis ,servare mentem3 non secus in bonis ,ab insolenti temperatam ,ltiti4--,horace4 ,ode1 ii4 #c4 ,aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity4 ,but surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they are not rightly called species1 nor is magnanimity rightly called a genus4 ,equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity2 ,sokrates and ,lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous4 ,every definition must be an universal proposition1 applicable1 not exclusively to one particular object1 but to a class of greater or less extent4 ,the lowest species is easier to define than the higher genus2 this is one reason why we must begin with particulars1 and ascend to universals4 ,it is in the higher genera that equivocal terms most frequently escape detection4#di ,when you are demonstrating1 what you have first to attend to is1 the completeness of the form of syllogizing3 when you are defining1 the main requisite is to be perspicuous and intelligible2 i4e4 to avoid equivocal or metaphorical terms4#ej ,you will best succeed in avoiding them1 if you begin with the individuals1 or with examples of the lowest species1 and then proceed to consider not their resemblances generally1 but their resemblances in certain definite ways1 as in colour or figure4 ,these more definite resemblances you will note first2 upon each you will found a formula of separate definition2 after which you will ascend to the more general formula of less definite resemblance common to both4 ,thus1 in regard to the acute or sharp1 you will consider the acute in sound1 and in other matters 7tastes1 pains1 weapons1 angles1 c471 and you will investigate what is the common point of identity characterizing all4 ,perhaps there may be no such identity2 the transfer of the term from one to the other may be only a metaphor3 you will thus learn that no common definition is attainable4 ,this is an important lesson2 for as we are forbidden to carry on a dialectical debate in metaphorical terms1 much more are we forbidden to introduce metaphorical terms in a definition4#ea ,footnote #di3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 kai gar ai7 o7mnumi_/ai 9999lantha_/nousi mallon e7n tois katho_/lou 7 e7n tois a7diapho_/rois4 ,footnote #ej3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 7_/sper de e7n tais a7podei_/xesi dei to_/ ge sullelogi_/sthai u7pa_/rchein1 ou7_/t kai e7n tois o7_/rois to saphe_/s4 ,by ,greek3 to saphe_/s1 he evidently means the avoidance of equivocal or metaphorical terms1 and the adherence to true genera and species4 ,compare ,biese1 ,die ,philosophie des ,aristot4 pp4 #cjh-caj4 ,footnote #ea3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #ig1 b4 #ce-ci4--7;,greek3 diale_/gesthai_/ phsi1 to dialektiks o7milein4--,schol4 p4 #bdh1 b4 #bc1 ,brand474 ,aristotle considers it metaphorical when the term acute is applied both to a sound and to an angle4 ,the treatment of this portion of the ,aristotelian doctrine by ,prantl 7,geschichte der ,logik1 vol4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 pp4 #bdf1 #bdg1 #cch71 is instructive4 ,he brings out1 in peculiar but forcible terms1 the idea of notional causality which underlies ,aristotle's ,logic4 ,so also ist die ,definition das ,aussprechen des schpferischen ,wesensbegriffes4 4 4 4 4 ,soweit der schpferische ,wesensbegriff erreicht werden kann1 ist durch denselben die begriffliche ,causalitt erkannt2 und die ,einsicht in diese primitive ,urschlichkeit wird in dem ,syllogismus vermittelst des ,mittelbegriffes erreicht4 ,ueber den schpferischen ,wesensbegriff hinauszugehen1 ist nicht mglich4 4 4 4 4 ,sobald die ,definition mehr als eine blosse ,namenserklrung ist--und sie muss mehr seyn--erkennt sie den ,mittelbegriff als schpferische ,causalitt4 4 4 4 4 ,die ontologische ,bedeutung des ,mittelbegriffes ist1 dass er schpferischer ,wesensbegriff ist4 ,rassow 7pp4 #ea1 #fc1 c47 adopts a like metaphorical phrase3--,definitionem est1 explicare notionem2 qu quidem est creatrix rerum causa4 ,to obtain and enunciate correctly the problems suitable for discussion in each branch of science1 you must have before you tables of dissection and logical division1 and take them as guides2#eb beginning with the highest genus and proceeding downward through the successively descending scale of sub-genera and species4 ,if you are studying animals1 you first collect the predicates belonging to all animals2 you then take the highest subdivision of the genus animal1 such as bird1 and you collect the predicates belonging to all birds2 and so on to the next in the descending scale4 ,you will be able to show cause why any of these predicates must belong to the man ,sokrates1 or to the horse ,bukephalus2 because it belongs to the genus animal1 which includes man and horse4 ,animal will be the middle term in the demonstration4#ec ,this example is taken from the class-terms current in vulgar speech4 ,but you must not confine yourself to these2 you must look out for new classes1 bound together by the possession of some common attribute1 yet not usually talked of as classes1 and you must see whether other attributes can be found constantly conjoined therewith4 ,thus you find that all animals having horns1 have also a structure of stomach fit for rumination1 and teeth upon one jaw only4 ,you know1 therefore1 what is the cause that oxen and sheep have a structure of stomach fit for rumination4 ,it is because they have horns4 ,having-horns is the middle term of the demonstration4#ed ,cases may also be found in which several objects possess no common nature or attribute to bind them into a class1 but are yet linked together1 by analogy1 in different ways1 to one and the same common term4#ee ,some predicates will be found to accompany constantly this analogy1 or to belong to all the objects qu analogous1 just as if they had one and the same class-nature4 ,demonstration may be applied to these1 as to the former cases4 ,footnote #eb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiv4 p4 #ih99991 a4 #a4 ,greek3 pros de to e7_/chein ta probl_/mata1 le_/gein dei ta_/s te a7natomas kai tas diaire_/seis1 ou7_/t de diale_/gein1 u7pothe_/menon to ge_/nos to koinon a7pa_/ntn4 ,this is ,waitz's text1 which differs from ,julius ,pacius and from ,firmin ,didot4 ,themistius 7pp4 #id-ie7 explains ,greek3 tas a7natomas to be anatomical drawings or exercises prepared by ,aristotle for teaching3 ,greek3 kai tas a7natomas e7_/chein dei prochei_/rs1 o7_/sai pepoi_/ntai ,a7ristote_/lei4 ,the collection of ,problems or questions for investigation was much prosecuted1 not merely by ,aristotle but by ,theophrastus 7,schol4 p4 #bdi1 a4 #ab1 ,br474 ,footnote #ec3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xiv4 p4 #ih1 a4 #e-ab4 ,footnote #ed3 ,ibid4 a4 #ac-ai4 ,aristotle assumes that the material which ought to have served for the upper teeth1 is appropriated by ,nature for the formation of horns4 ,footnote #ee3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj-bc3 ,greek3 e7_/ti d' a7_/llos tro_/pos e7sti kata to a7na_/logon e7kle_/gein4 ,he gives as examples1 ,greek3 s_/pion1 a7_/kantha1 o7stoun4 ,problems must be considered to be the same1 when the middle term of the demonstration is the same for each1 or when the middle term in the one is a subordinate or corollary to that in the other4 ,thus1 the cause of echo1 the cause of images in a mirror1 the cause of the rainbow1 all come under the same general head or middle term 7refraction71 though with a specific difference in each case4 ,again1 when we investigate the problem1 ,why does the ,nile flow with a more powerful current in the last half of the 7lunar7 month8 the reason is that the month is then more wintry4 ,but why is the month then more wintry8 ,because the light of the moon is then diminishing4 ,here are two middle terms1 the one of which depends upon the other4 ,the problem for investigation is therefore the same in both4#ef ,footnote #ef3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xv4 p4 #ih1 a4 #bd-cd4 ,theophrastus is said to have made collections of like problems1 problems of which the solution depended upon the same middle term 7,schol4 p4 #bdi1 a4 #aa99991 ,brand474 ,respecting ,causa and ,causatum question may be made whether it is necessary that when the causatum exists1 the causa must exist also8 ,the answer must be in the affirmative1 if you include the cause in the definition of causatum4 ,thus1 if you include in the definition of a lunar eclipse1 the cause thereof1 viz41 intervention of the earth between moon and sun--then1 whenever an eclipse occurs1 such intervention must occur also4 ,but it must not be supposed that there is here a perfect reciprocation1 and that as the causatum is in this case demonstrable from the cause1 so there is the like demonstration of the cause from the causatum4 ,such a demonstration is never a demonstration of ,greek3 dio_/ti2 it is only a demonstration of ,greek3 o7_/ti4 ,the causatum is not included in the definition of the cause2 if you demonstrate that because the moon is eclipsed1 therefore the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun1 you prove the fact of the interposition1 but you learn nothing about the cause thereof4 ,again1 in a syllogism the middle term is the cause of the conclusion 7i4e41 it is the reason why the major term is predicated of the minor1 which predication is the conclusion72 and in this sense the cause and causatum may sometimes reciprocate1 so that either may be proved by means of the other4 ,but the causatum here reciprocates with the causa only as premiss and conclusion 7i4e41 we may know either by means of the other71 not as cause and effect2 the causatum is not cause of the causa as a fact and reality1 as the causa is cause of the causatum4#eg ,footnote #eg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xvi4 p4 #ih1 a4 #ce1 seq4 ,themistius1 pp4 #if-ig3 ,greek3 ou7 ga_/r e7stin ai7_/tion tou tn gn e7n me_/s ei7nai to tn sel_/nn e7klei_/pein1 a7lla me_/son tou sullogismou2 kai tou sumpera_/smatos i7_/ss ai7_/tion1 tou pra_/gmatos de ou7dams4 ,themistius here speaks with a precision which is not always present to the mind of ,aristotle2 for he discriminates the cause of the fact from the cause of the affirmed fact or conclusion4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire says 7,plan ,gnral des ,derniers ,analytiques1 p4 cxl473--,ainsi1 la dmonstration de l'effet par la cause apprend pourquoi la chose est2 la dmonstration par l'effet apprend seulement que la chose est4 ,on sait que la terre s'interpose1 mais on ne sait pas pourquoi elle s'interpose3 et ce qui le montre bien1 c'est que l'ide de l'interposition de la terre est indispensable la dfinition essentielle de l'clipse tandis que l'ide de l'clipse n'a que faire dans la dfinition de l'interposition4 ,l'interposition de la terre fait donc comprendre l'clipse2 tandis que l'clipse ne fait pas du tout comprendre l'interposition de la terre4 ,the question then arises1 ,can there be more than one cause of the same causatum8 ,is it necessary that the same effect should be produced in all cases by the same cause8 ,in other words1 when the same predicate is demonstrated to be true of two distinct minors1 may it not be demonstrated in one case by one middle term1 and in the other case by a different middle term8#eh ,answer3 ,in genuine and proper scientific problems the middle term is the rational account 7definition1 interpretation7 of the major extreme2 this middle term therefore1 or the cause1 must in all cases be one and the same4 ,the demonstration in these cases is derived from the same essence2 it is per se1 not per accidens4 ,but there are other problems1 not strictly and properly scientific1 in which cause and causatum are connected merely per accidens2 the demonstration being operated by a middle term which is not of the essence of the major1 but is only a sign or concomitant4#ei ,according as the terms of the conclusion are related to each other1 so also will the middle term be related to both4 ,if the conclusion be equivocal1 the middle term will be equivocal also2 if the predicate in the conclusion be in generic relation to the subject1 the major also will be in generic relation to the middle4 ,thus1 if you are demonstrating that one triangle is similar to another1 and that one colour is similar to another1 the word similar in these two cases is not univocal1 but equivocal2 accordingly1 the middle term in the demonstration will also be equivocal4 ,again1 if you are demonstrating that four proportionals will also be proportionals alternately1 there will be one cause or middle term1 if the subject of the conclusion be lines2 another1 if the subject be numbers4 ,yet the middle term or cause in both is the same1 in as far as both involve a certain fact of increment4#fj ,footnote #eh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xvi4 p4 #ih1 b4 #be4 ,footnote #ei3 ,ibid4 xvii4 p4 #ii1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de kai ou7 ai7_/tion kai 7 skopein kata sumbebko_/s2 ou7 mn dokei probl_/mata ei7nai4 ,veluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum1 quia homo est aptus ad ridendum4 7,julius ,pacius1 p4 #ead47 ,footnote #fj3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #ii1 a4 #h-af4 ,the major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger than any particular minor1 but equal or co-extensive with the sum total of the particulars4 ,thus the predicate deciduous1 affirmable of all plants with broad leaves1 is greater in extension than the subject vines1 also than the subject fig-trees2 but it is equal in extension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees 7the other particular broad-leaved plant74 ,the middle also1 in an universal demonstration1 reciprocates with the major1 being its definition4 ,here the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees shed their leaves1 is not that they are broad-leaved plants1 but rather a coagulation of sap or some such fact4#fa ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 a4 #af seq4 ,the last chapter of the present treatise is announced by ,aristotle as the appendix and completion of his entire theory of ,demonstrative ,science1 contained in the ,analytica ,priora1 which treats of ,syllogism1 and the ,analytica ,posteriora1 which treats of ,demonstration4 ,after formally winding up the whole enquiry1 he proceeds to ask regarding the principia of ,demonstrative ,science3 ,what are they8 ,how do they become known8 ,what is the mental habit or condition that is cognizant of them8#fb ,footnote #fb3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #ae-ai3 ,greek3 peri men ou7n sullogismou kai a7podei_/xes1 ti_/ te e7ka_/tero_/n e7sti kai ps gi_/netai1 phanero_/n1 a7_/ma 9999de kai peri e7pist_/ms a7podeiktiks2 tau7ton ga_/r e7stin4 peri de tn a7rchn1 ps te gi_/nontai gn_/rimoi1 kai ti_/s 7 gnri_/zousa e7_/xis1 e7nteuthe_/n e7sti dlon proapor_/sasi prton4 ,bekker and ,waitz1 in their editions1 include all these words in ch4 xix43 the older editions placed the words preceding ,greek3 peri de in ch4 xviii4 ,zabarella observes the transition to a new subject 7,comm4 ad ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 ch4 xv4 p4 #fdj73--,postremum hoc caput 7beginning at ,greek3 peri de7 extra primariam tractationem positum esse manifestum est3 quum prcesserit epilogus respondens prooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri ,priorum ,analyticorum4 ,aristotle has already laid down that there can be no ,demonstration without certain prcognita to start from2 and that these prcognita must1 in the last resort1 be principia undemonstrable1 immediately known1 and known even more accurately than the conclusions deduced from them4 ,are they then cognitions1 or cognizant habits and possessions1 born along with us1 and complete from the first8 ,this is impossible 7,aristotle declares72 we cannot have such valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood1 and yet not be at all aware of them4 ,they must therefore be acquired2 yet how is it possible for us to acquire them8#fc ,the fact is1 that1 though we do not from the first possess any such complete and accurate cognitions as these1 we have from the first an inborn capacity or potentiality of arriving at them4 ,and something of the same kind belongs to all animals4#fd ,all of them possess an apprehending and discriminating power born with them1 called ,sensible ,perception2 but1 though all possess such power1 there is this difference1 that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer or shorter time in the mind2 with others it does not4 ,in animals with whom it does not dwell1 there can be no knowledge beyond perception1 at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent2 but with those that both perceive and retain perceptions in their minds1 ulterior knowledge grows up4#fe ,there are many such retentive animals1 and they differ among themselves3 with some of them reason or rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained2 with others1 it is not so4 ,first1 out of perception arises memory2 next1 out of memory of the same often repeated1 arises experience1 since many remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one experience4 ,lastly1 out of experience1 or out of the universal notion1 the unum et idem which pervades and characterizes a multitude of particulars1 when it has taken rest and root in the mind1 there arises the principium of art and science3 of science1 in respect to objects existent2 of art1 in respect to things generable4#ff ,and thus these mental habits or acquirements neither exist in our minds determined from the beginning1 nor do they spring from other acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy4 ,they spring from sensible perception2 and we may illustrate their growth by what happens in the panic of a terrified host1 where first one runaway stops in his flight1 then a second1 then a third1 until at last a number docile to command is collected4 ,one characteristic feature of the mind is to be capable of this process4#fg ,footnote #fc3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #be-cj3 ,greek3 po_/teron ou7k e7nousai ai7 e7_/xeis e7ggi_/nontai1 7 e7nousai lel_/thasin4 ei7 men d e7_/chomen au7ta_/s1 a7_/topon2 sumbai_/nei gar a7kribeste_/ras e7_/chontas gn_/seis a7podei_/xes lantha_/nein2 ei7 de lamba_/nomen m e7_/chontes pro_/teron1 ps a7n gnri_/zoimen kai mantha_/noimen e7k m prouparchou_/ss gn_/ses8 ,compare1 supra1 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gb1 b4 #bj-cj2 ,metaphys4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iic1 a4 #a1 with the ,comment4 of ,alexander1 p4 #if1 ,bonitz4 ,footnote #fd3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #cj3 ,greek3 phaneron toi_/nun ou7_/t' e7_/chein oi7o_/n te1 ou7_/t' a7gnoousi kai mdemi_/an e7_/chousin e7_/xin e7ggi_/nesthai2 a7na_/gk a7_/ra e7_/chein me_/n tina du_/namin1 m toiau_/tn d' e7_/chein 7 e7_/stai tou_/tn timite_/ra kat' a7kri_/beian4 phai_/netai de touto_/ ge pasin u7pa_/rchon tois z_/ois4 ,footnote #fe3 ,analyt4 ,post ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #cg3 ,greek3 o7_/sois men ou7n m e7ggi_/netai1 7 o7_/ls 7 peri a7 m e7ggi_/netai1 ou7k e7_/sti tou_/tois gnsis e7_/x tou ai7stha_/nesthai2 e7n oi7s d' e7_/nestin ai7sthanome_/nois e7_/chein e7_/ti e7n t psuch4 polln de toiou_/tn ginome_/nn 7_/d diaphora_/ tis gi_/netai1 7_/ste tois men gi_/nesthai lo_/gon e7k ts tn toiou_/tn mons1 tois de m_/4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 p4 #ha1 a4 #ch1 seq41 where the dependence of ,induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed4 ,see ,themistius1 pp4 #ej-ea1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,the first chapter of the ,metaphysica 7p4 #iha71 contains a striking account of this generation of universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible particulars3 ,greek3 gi_/netai de te_/chn1 o7_/tan e7k polln ts e7mpeiri_/as e7nnoma_/tn mi_/a katho_/lou ge_/ntai peri tn o7moi_/n u7po_/lpsis 7intellecta similitudo74 ,also in the ,physica ,,vii4 p4 #bdg1 b4 #bj 7in the ,paraphrase of ,themistius1 as printed in the ,berlin edition1 at bottom of page73 ,greek3 e7k gar ts kata me_/ros e7mpeiri_/as tn katho_/lou lamba_/nomen e7pist_/mn4 ,footnote #ff3 ,analyt ,post ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #c-aj3 ,greek3 e7k men ou7n ai7sth_/ses gi_/netai mn_/m1 7_/sper le_/gomen1 e7k de mn_/ms polla_/kis tou au7tou ginome_/ns e7mpeiri_/a2 ai7 gar pollai mnmai t a7rithm e7mpeiri_/a mi_/a e7sti_/n4 e7k d' e7mpeiri_/as1 7 e7k pantos 7rem_/santos tou katho_/lou e7n t psuch1 tou e7nos para ta polla_/1 o7 a7n e7n a7_/pasin e7n e7n e7kei_/nois to au7to_/1 te_/chns a7rch kai e7pist_/ms2 e7an men peri ge_/nesin1 te_/chns1 e7an de peri to o7_/n1 e7pist_/ms4 ,a theory very analogous to this 7respecting the gradual generation of scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of sense7 is stated in the ,phdon of ,plato1 ch4 xlv4 p4 #if1 ,b41 where ,sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in philosophy3 ,greek3 kai po_/teron to ai7ma_/ e7stin 7 phronoumen1 7 o7 a7r1 7 to pur1 7 tou_/tn men ou7de_/n1 o7 de e7gke_/phalo_/s e7stin o7 tas ai7sth_/seis pare_/chn tou a7kou_/ein kai o7pan kai o7sphrai_/nesthai1 e7k tou_/tn de gi_/gnoito mn_/m kai do_/xa1 e7k de mn_/ms kai do_/xs1 labou_/ss to 7remein1 kata tauta gi_/gnesthai e7pist_/mn4 ,boethius says1 ,comm4 in ,ciceronis ,topica1 p4 #hje3--,plato ideas quasdam esse ponebat1 id est1 species incorporeas1 substantiasque constantes et per se ab aliis natur ratione separatas1 ut hoc ipsum homo1 quibus participantes cter res homines vel animalia fierent4 ,at vero ,aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias2 sed intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium substantialem1 genus putat esse vel speciem4 ,nam cum homo et equus differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate1 horum intellecta similitudo efficit genus4 ,ergo communitas qudam et plurimorum inter se differentium similitudo notio est2 cujus notionis aliud genus est1 aliud forma4 ,sed quoniam similium intelligentia est omnis notio1 in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum discretio1 idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione2 velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit1 c4 ,the phrase intellecta similitudo plurimorum embodies both ,induction and ,intellection in one4 ,a like doctrine appears in the obscure passages of ,aristotle1 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 viii4 p4 #dbi1 b4 #aj2 also p4 #dcb1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 o7 nous1 ei7dos ei7dn1 kai 7 ai7_/sthsis1 ei7dos ai7sthtn4 e7pei de ou7de pragma ou7the_/n e7sti para ta mege_/th1 7s dokei1 ta ai7sthta kechrisme_/non1 e7n tois ei7_/desi tois ai7sthtois ta nota_/ e7stin4 ,footnote #fg3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #aj-ad3 ,greek3 ou7_/te d e7nupa_/rchousin a7phrisme_/nai ai7 e7_/xeis1 ou7_/t' a7p' a7_/lln e7_/xen gi_/nontai gnrimte_/rn1 a7ll' a7po ai7sth_/ses1--7 de psuch u7pa_/rchei toiau_/t ou7sa oi7_/a du_/nasthai pa_/schein touto4 ,the varieties of intellectual ,greek3 e7_/xeis enumerated by ,aristotle in the sixth book of the ,nikomachean ,ethica1 are elucidated by ,alexander in his ,comment4 on the ,metaphysica4 7,a4 p4 #iha7 pp4 #g1 #h1 ,bonitz4 ,the difference of ,greek3 e7_/xis and ,greek3 dia_/thesis1 the durable condition as contrasted with the transient1 is noted in ,categori1 pp4 #h1 #i4 ,see also ,eth4 ,nikom4 ,,ii4 i4 ii4 pp #aajc1 #d4 ,aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms--at least in terms which he thinks clearer4#fh ,we perceive the particular individual2 yet sensible perception is of the universal in the particular 7as1 for example1 when ,kallias is before us1 we perceive man1 not the man ,kallias74 ,now1 when one of a set of particulars dwells some time in the mind1 first an universal notion arises2 next1 more particulars are perceived and detained1 and universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive1 until at last we reach the highest stage--the most universal and simple4 ,from ,kallias we rise to man2 from such and such an animal1 to animal in genere2 from animal in genere1 still higher1 until we reach the highest or indivisible genus4#fi ,hence it is plain that the first and highest principia can become known to us only by ,induction2 for it is by this process that sensible perception builds up in us the ,universal4#gj ,now among 7those intellective habits or acquirements1 whereby we come to apprehend truth1 there are some 7,science and ,nos7 that are uniformly and unerringly true1 while others 7,opinion and ,ratiocination7 admit an alternative of falsehood4#ga ,comparing ,science with ,nos1 the latter1 and the latter only1 is more accurate and unerring than ,science4 ,but all ,science implies demonstration1 and all that we know by ,science is conclusions deduced by demonstration4 ,we have already said that the principia of these demonstrations cannot be themselves demonstrated1 and therefore cannot be known by ,science2 we have also said that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions4 ,how then can these principia themselves be known8 ,they can be known only by ,nos1 and from particulars4 ,it is from the principia known by ,nos1 with the maximum of accuracy1 that ,science demonstrates her conclusions4 ,nos is the great principium of ,science4#gb ,footnote #fh3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #ad3 ,greek3 o7 d' e7le_/chth men pa_/lai1 ou7 saphs de e7le_/chth1 pa_/lin ei7_/pmen4 ,waitz supposes that ,aristotle here refers to a passage in the first book of the ,analytica ,posteriora1 c4 xxxi4 p4 #hg1 b4 #cj4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire thinks 7p4 #bij7 that reference is intended to an earlier sentence of this same chapter4 ,neither of these suppositions seems to suit 7least of all the last7 with the meaning of ,greek3 pa_/lai4 ,but whichever he meant1 ,aristotle has not done much to clear up what was obscure in the antecedent statements4 ,footnote #fi3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 sta_/ntos gar tn a7diapho_/rn e7no_/s1 prton men e7n t psuch katho_/lou 7kai gar ai7sthsis tou katho_/lou e7sti_/n1 oi7on a7nthr_/pou1 a7ll' ou7 ,kalli_/ou a7nthr_/pou7 pa_/lin d' e7n tou_/tois i7_/statai1 e7_/s a7n ta a7mer st kai ta katho_/lou1 oi7on toiondi zon1 e7_/s zon2 kai e7n tou_/t 7sau_/ts4 ,these words are obscure3 ,greek3 ta a7mer must mean the highest genera2 indivisible1 i4e4 being a minimum in respect of comprehension4 ,instead of ,greek3 ta katho_/lou1 we might have expected ,greek3 ta ma_/lista katho_/lou1 or1 perhaps1 that ,greek3 kai should be omitted4 ,trendelenburg comments at length on this passage1 ,arist4 ,de ,anim ,comment4 pp4 #agj-agd4 ,footnote #gj3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 dlon d o7_/ti 7min ta prta e7pagg gnri_/zein a7nagkaion2 kai gar kai ai7_/sthsis ou7_/t to katho_/lou e7mpoiei4 ,compare1 supra1 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xviii4 p4 #ha1 b4 #a4 ,some commentators contended that ,aristotle did not mean to ascribe an inductive origin to the common ,axioms properly so called1 but only to the special principia belonging to each science4 ,zabarella refutes this doctrine1 and maintains that the ,axioms 7,dignitates7 are derived from ,induction 7,comm4 in ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #fdi1 ed4 ,venet41 #afag73--,quum igitur inductio non sit proprie discursus1 nec ratio1 jure dicit ,aristoteles principiorum notitiam non esse cum ratione1 quia non ex aliis innotescunt1 sed ex seipsis dum per inductionem innotescunt4 ,propterea in illa propositione1 qu in initio 9999primi libri legitur1 sub doctrina discursiva cognitio principiorum non comprehenditur1 quia non est dianotica4 ,hoc1 quod modo diximus1 si nonnulli advertissent1 fortasse non negassent principia communia1 qu dicuntur ,dignitates1 inductione cognosci4 ,dixerunt enim ,aristotelem hic de principiis loquentem sola principia propria considerasse1 qu cum non proprio lumine cognoscantur1 inductione innotescunt2 at ,dignitates 7inquiunt7 proprio lumine ab intellectu nostro cognoscuntur per solam terminorum intelligentiam1 ut quod omne totum majus est su parte2 hoc enim non magis est evidens sensui in particulari1 quam intellectui in universali1 proinde inductione non eget4 ,sed hanc sententiam hic ,averroes refutat1 dicens hc quoque inductione cognosci1 sed non animadverti nobis tempus hujus inductionis2 id enim omnino confitendum est1 omnem intellectualem doctrinam sensu originem ducere1 et nihil esse in intellectu quod prius in sensu non fuerit1 ut ubique asserit ,aristoteles4 ,to the same purpose ,zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion of his ,commentary on the ,analyt4 ,post41 where he lays it down that the truth of the proposition1 ,every whole is greater than its part1 is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of ,induction4 ,compare the ,scholion of ,philoponus1 ad ,analyt4 ,post4 p4 #bbe1 a4 #cb1 ,brand41 where the same is said about the ,axiom1 ,things equal to the same are equal to each other4 ,footnote #ga3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #e3 ,greek3 e7pei de tn peri tn dia_/noian e7_/xen1 ai7s a7ltheu_/omen1 ai7 men a7ei a7ltheis ei7si_/n1 ai7 de e7pide_/chontai to pseudos1 c4 ,footnote #gb3 ,ibid4 fin4 p4 #ajj4 ,the manner in which ,aristotle here describes how the principia of ,syllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention4 ,the march up to principia is not only different from1 but the reverse of1 the march down from principia2 like the athlete who runs first to the end of the stadium1 and then back4#gc ,generalizing or universalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent endowment2 growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of sense1 remembered1 compared1 and coalescing into one mental group through associating resemblance4 ,as the ethical1 moral1 practical habits1 are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular acts1 so also the intellectual1 theorizing habits are mental results generated by a multitude of particular judgments of sense1 retained and compared1 so as to imprint upon the mind a lasting stamp of some identity common to all4 ,the ,universal 7notius natur7 is thus generated in the mind by a process of ,induction out of particulars which are notiora nobis2 the potentiality of this process1 together with sense and memory1 is all that is innate or connatural4 ,footnote #gc3 ,aristot4 ,eth4 ,nikom4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #ajie1 b4 #a4 ,the principia1 from which the conclusions of ,syllogism are deduced1 being thus obtained by ,induction1 are1 in ,aristotle's view1 appreciated by1 or correlated with1 the infallible and unerring ,nos or ,intellect4#gd ,he conceives repeated and uncontradicted ,induction as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity3 the syllogistic deductions constituting ,science he regards as also certain2 but their certainty is only derivative1 and the principia from which they flow he ranks still higher1 as being still more certain4#ge ,both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with ,opinion and ,calculation1 which he declares to be liable to error4 ,footnote #gd3 ,the passages respecting ,greek3 a7rchai or principia1 in the ,nikomachean ,ethica 7especially ,books ,i4 and ,,vi471 are instructive as to ,aristotle's views4 ,the principia are universal notions and propositions1 not starting up ready-made nor as original promptings of the intellect1 but gradually built up out of the particulars of sense and ,induction1 and repeated particular acts4 ,they are judged and sanctioned by ,greek3 ,nous or ,intellect1 but it requires much care to define them well4 ,they belong to the ,greek3 o7_/ti1 while demonstration belongs to the ,greek3 dio_/ti4 ,eth4 ,nik4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #ajih1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 ou7k a7paitte_/on d' ou7de tn ai7ti_/an e7n a7_/pasin o7moi_/s1 a7ll' i7kanon e7_/n tisi to o7_/ti deichthnai kals1 oi7on kai peri tas a7rcha_/s2 to d' o7_/ti prton kai a7rch_/4 tn a7rchn d' ai7 men e7pagg therountai1 ai7 d' ai7sth_/sei1 ai7 d' e7thism tini1 kai a7_/llai d' a7lls4 metie_/nai de peirate_/on e7ka_/stas 7 pephu_/kasin1 kai spoudaste_/on o7_/ps o7risthsi kals2 mega_/ln gar e7_/chousi r7opn pros ta e7po_/mena4 ,compare ,eth4 ,nik4 ,,vi4 iii4 p4 #aaci1 b4 #be1 where the ,analytica is cited by name--,greek3 7 men d e7pagg a7rch_/ e7sti kai tou katho_/lou1 o7 de sullogismos e7k tn katho_/lou2 ei7sin a7_/ra a7rchai e7x 7n o7 sullogismo_/s1 7n ou7_/k e7sti sullogismo_/s2 e7pagg a7_/ra4--ib4 p4 #aada1 a4 #g3 ,greek3 lei_/petai noun ei7nai tn a7rchn4--p4 #aadb1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 o7 men gar nous tn o7_/rn1 7n ou7_/k e7sti lo_/gos4--p4 #aadc1 b4 #a4 ,footnote #ge3 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 ton de me_/llonta e7_/xein tn e7pist_/mn tn di' a7podei_/xes ou7 mo_/non dei tas a7rchas gnri_/zein kai mallon au7tais pisteu_/ein 7 t deiknume_/n1 a7lla md' a7_/llo au7t pisto_/teron ei7nai mde gnrim_/teron tn a7ntikeime_/nn tais a7rchais1 e7x 7n e7_/stai sullogismos o7 ts e7nanti_/as a7pa_/ts1 ei7_/per dei ton e7pista_/menon a7pls a7meta_/peiston ei7nai4 ,aristotle had inherited from ,plato this doctrine of an infallible ,nos or ,intellect1 enjoying complete immunity from error4 ,but1 instead of connecting it 7as ,plato had done7 with reminiscences of an anterior life among the ,ideas1 he assigned to it a position as terminus and correlate to the process of ,induction4#gf ,the like postulate and pretension passed afterwards to the ,stoics1 and various other philosophical sects3 they could not be satisfied without finding infallibility somewhere4 ,it was against this pretension that the ,academics and ,sceptics entered their protest2 contending1 on grounds sometimes sophistical but often very forcible1 that it was impossible to escape from the region of fallibility1 and that no criterion of truth1 at once universal and imperative1 could be set up4 ,footnote #gf3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #gb1 b4 #bj-cj4 ,greek3 kai ou7 mo_/non e7pist_/mn a7lla kai a7rchn e7pist_/ms ei7nai tina_/ phamen1 7 tous o7_/rous gnri_/zomen4 ,themistius1 p4 #ad3 ,greek3 7n d a7_/rchei pa_/lin o7 nous 7 tous o7_/rous threu_/omen1 e7x 7n sugkeitai ta a7xi_/mata4 ,the ,paraphrase of ,themistius 7pp4 #ajj-ajd7 is clear and instructive1 where he amplifies the last chapter1 and explains ,greek3 ,nous as the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul1 growing up gradually out of the particulars furnished by ,sense and ,induction4 ,it is to be regretted that ,aristotle should have contented himself with proclaiming this ,inductive process as an ideal1 culminating in the infallible ,nos2 and that he should only have superficially noticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality1 in order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results4 ,this is a deficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present century4#gg ,footnote #gg3 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 ,lectures on ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,lect4 xix4 p4 #chj1 says3--,in regard to simple syllogisms1 it was an original dogma of the ,platonic ,school1 and an early dogma of the ,peripatetic1 that philosophy 7science strictly so-called7 was only conversant with1 and was exclusively contained in1 universals2 and the doctrine of ,aristotle1 which taught that all our general knowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars1 was too easily forgotten or perverted by his followers4 ,it thus obtained almost the force of an acknowledged principle1 that everything to be known must be known under some general form or notion4 ,hence the exaggerated importance attributed to definition and deductions1 it not being considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had previously placed therein1 and that the amplification of our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but from below1--not from speculation about abstract generalities1 but from the observation of concrete particulars4 ,but however erroneous and irrational1 the persuasion had its day and influence1 and it perhaps determined1 as one of its effects1 the total neglect of one half1 and that not the least important half1 of the reasoning process4 ,for while men thought only of looking upward to the more extensive notions1 as the only objects and the only media of science1 they took little heed of the more comprehensive notions1 and absolutely contemned individuals1 as objects which could neither be scientifically known in themselves nor supply the conditions of scientifically knowing aught besides4 ,the ,logic of ,comprehension and of ,induction was therefore neglected or ignored1--the ,logic of ,extension and ,deduction exclusively cultivated1 as alone affording the rules by which we might evolve higher notions into their subordinate concepts4 7,hamilton1 in this passage1 considers the ,logic of ,induction to be the same as the ,logic of ,comprehension47 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,topica4 ,i4 ,in treating of the ,analytica ,posteriora ,i have already adverted1 in the way of contrast1 to the ,topica2 and1 in now approaching the latter work1 ,i must again bring the same contrast before the mind of the reader4 ,the treatise called ,topica 7including that which bears the separate title ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis1 but which is properly its ,ninth or last ,book1 winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of the ,analytica and ,topica considered as one scheme7 is of considerable length1 longer than the ,prior and ,posterior ,analytics taken together4 ,it contains both a theory and precepts of ,dialectic2 also1 an analysis of the process called by ,aristotle ,sophistical ,refutation1 with advice how to resist or neutralize it4 ,all through the works of ,aristotle1 there is nothing which he so directly and emphatically asserts to be his own original performance1 as the design and execution of the ,topica3 i4e41 the deduction of ,dialectic and ,sophistic from the general theory of ,syllogism4 ,he had to begin from the beginning1 without any model to copy or any predecessor to build upon3 and in every sort of work1 he observes justly1 the first or initial stages are the hardest4#a ,in regard to ,rhetoric much had been done before him2 there were not only masters who taught it1 but writers who theorized well or ill1 and laid down precepts about it2 so that1 in his treatise on that subject1 he had only to enlarge and improve upon pre-existing suggestions4 ,but in regard to ,dialectic as he conceives it--in its contrast with ,demonstration and ,science on the one hand1 and in its analogy or kinship with ,rhetoric on the other--nothing whatever had been done4 ,there were1 indeed1 teachers of contentious dialogue1 as well as of ,rhetoric2#b but these teachers could do nothing better than recommend to their students dialogues or orations ready made1 to be learnt by heart4 ,such a mode of teaching 7he says71 though speedy1 was altogether unsystematic4 ,the student acquired no knowledge of the art1 being furnished only with specimens of art-results4 ,it was as if a master1 professing to communicate the art of making the feet comfortable1 taught nothing about leather-cutting or shoe-making1 but furnished his pupils with different varieties of ready-made shoes2 thus supplying what they wanted for the protection of the feet1 but not imparting to them any power of providing such protection for themselves4#c ,in regard to the process of syllogizing 7says ,aristotle1 including both ,analytic and ,dialectic7 ,i found positively nothing said before me3 ,i had to work it out for myself by long and laborious research4#d ,footnote #a3 ,aristot4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahc1 b4 #bb3 ,greek3 me_/giston gar i7_/ss a7rch panto_/s1 7_/sper le_/getai2 dio kai chalep_/taton4 o7_/s gar kra_/tiston t duna_/mei1 tosou_/t mikro_/taton o7n t mege_/thei chalep_/tato_/n e7stin o7phthnai4 ,footnote #b3 ,sophist4 ,elench4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahc1 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 tau_/ts de ts pragmatei_/as ou7 to men 7n to d' ou7k 7n proexeirgasme_/non1 a7ll' ou7den pantels u7prchen4 kai gar tn peri tous e7ristikous lo_/gous mistharnou_/ntn o7moi_/a tis 7n 7 pai_/deusis t ,gorgi_/ou pragmatei_/a2 lo_/gous gar oi7 men r7torikous oi7 de e7rtti_/kous e7di_/dosan e7kmantha_/nein1 ei7s ou7s pleista_/kis e7mpi_/ptein 7_/thsan e7ka_/teroi tous a7ll_/ln lo_/gous4 ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahd1 a4 #b4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 a4 #g3 ,greek3 kai peri men tn r7torikn polla kai palaia ta lego_/mena1 peri de tou sullogi_/zesthai pantels ou7den ei7_/chomen pro_/teron a7_/llo le_/gein1 a7ll' 7 trib ztountes polun chro_/non e7ponoumen4 ,this is one of the few passages1 throughout the philosopher's varied and multitudinous works1 in which he alludes to his own speciality of method4 ,it is all the more interesting on that account4 ,if we turn back to ,sokrates and ,plato1 we shall understand better what the innovation operated by ,aristotle was2 what the position of ,dialectic had been before his time1 and what it became afterwards4 ,in the minds of ,sokrates and ,plato1 the great antithesis was between ,dialectic and ,rhetoric--interchange of short question and answer before a select audience1 as contrasted with long continuous speech addressed to a miscellaneous crowd with known established sentiments and opinions1 in the view of persuading them on some given interesting point requiring decision4 ,in such ,dialectic ,sokrates was a consummate master2 passing most of his long life in the market-place and palstra1 and courting disputation with every one4 ,he made formal profession of ignorance1 disclaimed all power of teaching1 wrote nothing at all1 and applied himself almost exclusively to the cross-examining ,elenchus by which he exposed and humiliated the ablest men not less than the vulgar4 ,plato1 along with the other companions of ,sokrates1 imbibed the ,dialectic of his master1 and gave perpetuity to it in those inimitable dialogues which are still preserved to us from his pen4 ,he composed nothing but dialogues2 thus giving expression to his own thoughts only under borrowed names1 and introducing that of ,sokrates very generally as chief spokesman4 ,but ,plato1 though in some dialogues he puts into the mouth of his spokesman the genuine ,sokratic disclaimer of all power and all purpose of teaching1 yet does not do this in all4 ,he sometimes assumes the didactic function2 though he still adheres to the form of dialogue1 even when it has become inconvenient and unsuitable4 ,in the ,platonic ,republic ,sokrates is made to alternate his own peculiar vein of cross-examination with a vein of dogmatic exposition not his own2 but both one and the other in the same style of short question and answer4 ,in the ,leges becomes still more manifest the inconvenience of combining the substance of dogmatic exposition with the form of dialogue3 the same remark may also be made about the ,sophistes and ,politicus2 in which two dialogues1 moreover1 the didactic process is exhibited purely and exclusively as a logical partition1 systematically conducted1 of a genus into its component species4 ,long-continued speech1 always depreciated by ,plato in its rhetorical manifestations1 is foreign to his genius even for purposes of philosophy3 the very lecture on cosmogony which he assigns to ,timus1 and the mythical narrative 7unfinished7 delivered by ,kritias1 are brought into something like the form of dialogue by a prefatory colloquy specially adapted for that end4 ,it thus appears that1 while in ,sokrates the dialectic process is exhibited in its maximum of perfection1 but disconnected altogether from the didactic1 which is left unnoticed1--in ,plato the didactic process is recognized and postulated1 but is nevertheless confounded with or absorbed into the dialectic1 and admitted only as one particular1 ulterior1 phase and manifestation of it4 ,at the same time1 while both ,sokrates and ,plato bring out forcibly the side of antithesis between ,rhetoric and ,dialectic1 they omit entirely to notice the side of analogy or parallelism between them4 ,on both these points ,aristotle has corrected the confusion1 and improved upon the discrimination1 of his two predecessors4 ,he has pointedly distinguished the dialectic process from the didactic2 and he has gone a step farther1 furnishing a separate theory and precepts both for the one and for the other4 ,again1 he has indicated the important feature of analogy between ,dialectic and ,rhetoric1 in which same feature both of them contrast with ,didactic--the point not seized either by ,sokrates or by ,plato4 ,plato1 in his ,sokratic dialogues or dialogues of ,search1 has given admirable illustrative specimens of that which ,sokrates understood and practised orally as ,dialectic4 ,aristotle1 in his ,topica1 has in his usual vein of philosophy theorized on this practice as an art4 ,he had himself composed dialogues1 which seem as far as we can judge from indirect and fragmentary evidence1 to have been ,ciceronian or rhetorical colloquies--a long pleading pro followed by a long pleading con1 rather than examples of ,sokratic brachylogy and cross-examination4 ,but his theory given in the ,topica applies to genuine ,sokratic fencing1 not to the ,ciceronian alternation of set speeches4 ,he disallows the conception of ,plato1 that ,dialectic is a process including not merely dispute but all full and efficacious employment of general terms and ideas for purposes of teaching3 he treats this latter as a province by itself1 under the head of ,analytic3 and devotes the ,topica to the explanation of argumentative debate1 pure and simple4 ,he takes his departure from the ,syllogism1 as the type of deductive reasoning generally2 the conditions under which syllogistic reasoning is valid and legitimate1 having been already explained in his treatise called ,analytica ,priora4 ,so obtained1 and regulated by those conditions1 the ,syllogism may be applied to one or other of two distinct and independent purposes3--7#a7 ,to ,demonstration or ,scientific ,teaching1 which we have had before us in the last two chapters1 commenting on the ,analytica ,posteriora2 7#b7 ,to ,dialectic1 or ,argumentative ,debate1 which we are now about to enter on in the ,topica4 ,the ,dialectic ,syllogism1 explained in the ,topica1 has some points in common with the ,demonstrative ,syllogism1 treated in the ,analytica ,posteriora4 ,in both1 the formal conditions are the same1 and the conclusions will certainly be true1 if the premisses are true2 in both1 the axioms of deductive reasoning are assumed1 namely1 the maxims of ,contradiction and ,excluded ,middle4 ,but1 in regard to the subject-matter1 the differences between them are important4 ,the ,demonstrative ,syllogism applies only to a small number of select sciences1 each having special principia of its own1 or primary1 undemonstrable truths1 obtained in the first instance by induction from particulars4 ,the premisses being thus incontrovertibly certain1 the conclusions deduced are not less certain2 there is no necessary place for conflicting arguments or counter-syllogisms1 although in particular cases paralogisms may be committed1 and erroneous propositions or majors for syllogism may be assumed4 ,on the contrary1 the ,dialectic ,syllogism applies to all matters without exception2 the premisses on which it proceeds are neither obtained by induction1 nor incontrovertibly certain1 but are borrowed from some one among the varieties of accredited or authoritative opinion4 ,they may be opinions held by the multitude of any particular country1 or by an intelligent majority1 or by a particular school of philosophers or wise individuals1 or from transmission as a current proverb or dictum of some ancient poet or seer4 ,from any one of these sources the dialectician may borrow premisses for syllogizing4 ,but it often happens that the premisses which they supply are disparate1 or in direct contradiction to each other2 and none of them is entitled to be considered as final or peremptory against the rest4 ,accordingly1 it is an essential feature of ,dialectic as well as of ,rhetoric that they furnish means of establishing conclusions contrary or contradictory1 by syllogisms equally legitimate4#e ,the dialectic procedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious1 implying a debate between two persons1 one of whom sets up a thesis to defend1 while the other impugns it by interrogation3 the assailant has gained his point1 if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of contradicting himself2 while the defendant on his side has to avoid giving any responses which may drive him to the necessity of such contradiction4 ,footnote #e3 ,aristot4 ,rhetoric4 ,i4 i4 p4 #acee1 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 e7_/ti de ta7nanti_/a dei du_/nasthai pei_/thein1 katha_/per kai e7n tois sullogismois1 ou7ch o7_/ps a7mpho_/tera pra_/ttmen1 7ou7 gar dei ta phaula pei_/thein71 a7ll' i7_/na m_/te lantha_/n ps e7_/chei1 kai o7_/ps a7_/llou chrme_/nou tois lo_/gois m dikai_/s au7toi lu_/ein e7_/chmen4 tn men ou7n a7_/lln technn ou7demi_/a ta7nanti_/a sullogi_/zetai2 7 de dialektik kai 7 r7torik mo_/nai touto poiousin2 o7moi_/s ga_/r ei7sin a7mpho_/terai tn e7nanti_/n4 ,aristotle takes great pains to enforce the separation both of ,dialectic and ,rhetoric from ,science or ,instruction with its purpose of teaching or learning4 ,he disapproves of those 7seemingly intending ,plato7 who seek to confound the two4 ,dialectic and ,rhetoric 7he says7 have for their province words and discourse1 not facts or things3 they are not scientific or didactic processes1 but powers or accomplishments of discourse2 and whoever tries to convert them into means of teaching or learning particular subjects1 abolishes their characteristic feature and restricts their universality of application4#f ,both of them deal not with scientific facts1 but with the sum total of accredited opinions1 though each for its own purpose3 both of them lay hold of any one among the incoherent aggregate of accepted generalities1 suitable for the occasion2 the ,dialectician trying to force his opponent into an inconsistency1 the ,rhetor trying to persuade his auditors into a favourable decision4 ,neither the one nor the other goes deeper than opinion for his premisses1 nor concerns himself about establishing by induction primary or special principia1 such as may serve for a basis of demonstration4 ,footnote #f3 ,ibid4 iv4 #b1 p4 #acei1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 o7_/s d' a7_/n tis 7 tn dialektikn 7 tau_/tn 7tn r7torikn7 m katha_/per a7n duna_/meis1 a7ll' e7pist_/mas1 peiratai kataskeua_/zein1 l_/setai tn phu_/sin au7tn a7phani_/sas1 t metabai_/nein e7piskeua_/zn ei7s e7pist_/mas u7pokeime_/nn tinn pragma_/tn1 a7lla m mo_/non lo_/gn4 ,in every society there are various floating opinions and beliefs1 each carrying with it a certain measure of authority1 often inconsistent with each other1 not the same in different societies1 nor always the same even in the same society4 ,each youthful citizen1 as he grows to manhood1 imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly and without special or professional teaching4#g ,the stock of opinions thus transmitted would not be identical even at ,athens and ,sparta3 the difference would be still greater1 if we compared ,athens with ,rome1 ,alexandria1 or ,jerusalem4 ,such opinions all carry with them more or less of authority1 and it is from them that the reasonings of common life1 among unscientific men1 are supplied4 ,the practice of dialectical discussion1 prevalent in ,athens during and before the time of ,aristotle1 was only a more elaborate1 improved1 and ingenious exhibition of this common talk2 proceeding on the same premisses1 but bringing them together from a greater variety of sources1 handling them more cleverly1 and having for its purpose to convict an opponent of inconsistency4 ,the dialecticians dwelt exclusively in the region of these received opinions2 and the purpose of their debates was to prove inconsistency1 or to repel the proof of inconsistency1 between one opinion and another4 ,footnote #g3 ,for an acute and interesting description of this unsystematic transmission of opinions1 see1 in the ,protagoras of ,plato1 the speech put into the mouth of ,protagoras1 pp4 #cbc-cbe4 ,see also ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,vol4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxi4 p4 #de1 seq4 ,this dialectic debate1 which ,aristotle found current at ,athens1 he tries in the ,topica to define and reduce to system4 ,the dialectician must employ ,syllogism2 and we are first taught to distinguish the ,syllogism that he employs from others4 ,the ,dialectic syllogism is discriminated on one side from the ,demonstrative1 on the other from the ,eristic 7or litigious72 also from the scientific ,paralogism or ,pseudographeme4 ,this discrimination is founded on the nature of the evidence belonging to the premisses4 ,the ,demonstrative syllogism 7which we have already gone through in the ,analytica ,posteriora7 has premisses noway dependent upon opinion3 it deduces conclusions from true first principles1 obtained by ,induction in each science1 and different in each different science4 ,the ,dialectic syllogism does not aspire to any such evidence1 but borrows its premisses from ,opinion of some sort2 accredited either by numbers1 or by wise individuals1 or by some other authoritative holding4 ,as this evidence is very inferior to that of the demonstrative syllogism1 so again it is superior to that of the third variety--the ,eristic syllogism4 ,in this third variety1#h the premisses do not rest upon any real opinion1 but only on a fallacious appearance or simulation of opinion2 insomuch that they are at once detected as false1 by any person even of moderate understanding2 whereas 7according to ,aristotle7 no real opinion ever carries with it such a merely superficial semblance1 or is ever so obviously and palpably false4 ,a syllogism is called ,eristic also when it is faulty in form1 though its premisses may be borrowed from real opinion1 or when it is both faulty in form and false in the matter of the premisses4 ,still a fourth variety of syllogism is the scientific ,paralogism3 where the premisses are not borrowed from any opinion1 real or simulated1 but belong properly to the particular science in which they are employed1 yet nevertheless are false or erroneous4#i ,footnote #h3 ,topic4 ,i4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 e7ristikos d' e7_/sti sullogismos o7 e7k phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn1 m o7_/ntn de_/1 kai o7 e7x e7ndo_/xn 7 phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn phaino_/menos4 ou7 gar pan to phaino_/menon e7_/ndoxon kai e7_/stin e7_/ndoxon4 ou7then gar tn legome_/nn e7ndo_/xn e7pipo_/laion e7_/chei pantels tn phantasi_/an1 katha_/per peri tas tn e7ristikn lo_/gn a7rchas sumbe_/bken e7_/chein2 parachrma gar kai 7s e7pi to polu tois kai mikra sunoran duname_/nois kata_/dlos e7n au7tois 7 tou pseu_/dous e7sti phu_/sis4 ,footnote #i3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #aja1 a4 #e-ag4 ,upon the classification of syllogisms here set forth by ,aristotle1 we may remark that the distinction between the ,demonstrative and the ,dialectic is true and important2 but that between the ,dialectic and the ,eristic is faint and unimportant2 the class called ,eristic syllogisms being apparently introduced merely to create a difference1 real or supposed1 between the ,dialectician and the ,sophist1 and thus to serve as a prelude to the last book of this treatise1 entitled ,sophistici ,elenchi4 ,the class-title ,eristic 7or litigious7 is founded upon a supposition of dishonest intentions on the part of the disputant2 but it is unphilosophical to make this the foundation of a class1 and to rank the same syllogism in the class1 or out of it1 according as the intentions of the disputant who employs it are honest or dishonest4 ,besides1 a portion of ,aristotle's definition tells us that the ,eristic syllogism is one of which the premisses can impose upon no one2 being such that a very ordinary man can at once detect their falsity4 ,the dishonest disputant1 surely1 would argue to little purpose1 if he intentionally employed such premisses as these4 ,lastly1 according to another portion of ,aristotle's definition1 every syllogism faulty in form1 or yielding no legitimate conclusion at all1 will fall under the class ,eristic1 and this he himself in another place explicitly states2#aj which would imply that the bad syllogism must always emanate from litigious or dishonest intentions4 ,but in defining the ,pseudographeme1 immediately afterwards1 ,aristotle does not imply that the false scientific premiss affords presumption of litigious disposition on the part of those who advance it2 nor does there seem any greater propriety in throwing all bad dialectic syllogisms under the general head of ,eristic4 ,footnote #aj3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #d4 ,the dialectician1 then1 will carry on debate only by means of premisses sustained by real opinion2 which not only always carry some authority1 but are assumed as being never obviously fallacious2 though often inconsistent with each other1 and admitting of argumentation pro and con4 ,these are what ,aristotle calls ,endoxa2 opposed to ,adoxa1 or propositions which are discountenanced1 or at least not countenanced1 by opinion1 and to ,paradoxa 7a peculiar variety of ,adoxa71#aa or propositions which1 though having ingenious arguments in their favour1 yet are adverse to some proclaimed and wide-spread opinions1 and thus have the predominant authority of opinion against them4 ,footnote #aa3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 peri 7n lo_/gon e7_/chomen e7nanti_/on tais do_/xais4 ,of these three words1 ,paradox is the only one that has obtained a footing in modern languages1 thanks to ,cicero and the ,latin authors4 ,if the word ,endox had obtained the like footing1 we should be able to keep more closely to the thought and views of ,aristotle4 ,as it is1 we are obliged to translate the ,greek ,endoxon as ,probable1 and ,adoxon as ,improbable3#ab which1 though not incorrect1 is neither suitable nor exactly coincident4 ,probable corresponds more nearly to what ,aristotle 7both in this treatise and in the ,analytica7 announces sometimes as ,greek3 to 7s e7pi to polu_/--that which happens in most cases but not in all1 as distinguished from the universal and necessary on one side1 and from the purely casual on the other2#ac sometimes1 also1 as ,greek3 to ei7ko_/s or ,greek3 to smeion4 ,now this is a different idea from 7though it has a point of analogy with7 the ,endoxon3 which is not necessarily true even in part1 but may be wholly untrue2 which always has some considerations against it1 though there may be more in its favour2 and which1 lastly1 may be different1 or even opposite1 in different ages and different states of society4 ,when ,josephus distinguished himself as a disputant in the schools of ,jerusalem on points of law and custom1#ad his arguments must have been chiefly borrowed from the ,endoxa or prevalent opinions of the time and place2 but these must have differed widely from the ,endoxa found and argued upon by the contemporaries of ,aristotle at ,athens4 ,the ,endoxon may indeed be rightly called probable1 because1 whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain body of opinion1 ,aristotle admits a certain presumption 7greater or less7 that it is true4 ,but such probability is not essential to the ,endoxon3 it is only an accident or accompaniment 7to use the ,aristotelian phrase71 and by no means an universal accompaniment4 ,the essential feature of the ,endoxon is1 that it has acquired a certain amount of recognition among the mass of opinions and beliefs floating and carrying authority at the actual time and place4 ,the ,english word whereby it is translated ought to express this idea1 and nothing more2 just as the correlative word ,paradox does express its implication1 approached from the other side4 ,unfortunately1 in the absence of ,endox1 we have no good word for the purpose4 ,footnote #ab3 ,aristotle gives a double meaning of ,greek3 a7_/doxon 7,topic4 ,,viii4 ix4 ix4 #afj1 b4 #ag73-- #a4 ,that which involves absurd or strange consequences 7,greek3 a7_/topa74 #b4 ,that which affords presumption of a bad disposition1 such as others will disapprove--,greek3 oi7on o7_/ti 7don ta7gathon kai to a7dikein be_/ltion tou a7dikeisthai4 ,footnote #ac3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #aab1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 e7pei de tn pragma_/tn ta men e7x a7na_/gks e7sti_/1 ta d' 7s e7pi to polu_/1 ta d' o7po_/ter' e7_/tuchen1 c4 ,compare also ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 xxx41 et alib4 ,footnote #ad3 ,see ,josephus1 ,de ,vit ,su1 c4 ii4 ,it is within this wide field of floating opinions that dialectical debate and rhetorical pleading are carried on4 ,dialectic supposes a questioner or assailant1 and a respondent or defendant4 ,the respondent selects and proclaims a problem or thesis1 which he undertakes to maintain3 the assailant puts to him successive questions1 with the view of obtaining concessions which may serve as premisses for a counter-syllogism1 of which the conclusion is contradictory or contrary to the thesis itself1 or to some other antecedent premiss which the respondent has already conceded4 ,it is the business of the respondent to avoid making any answers which may serve as premisses for such a counter-syllogism4 ,if he succeeds in this1 so as not to become implicated in any contradiction with himself1 he has baffled his assailant1 and gained the victory4 ,there are1 however1 certain rules and conditions1 binding on both parties1 under which the debate must be carried on4 ,it is the purpose of the ,topica to indicate these rules2 and1 in accordance therewith1 to advise both parties as to the effective conduct of their respective cases--as to the best thrusts and the best mode of parrying4 ,the assailant is supplied with a classified catalogue of materials for questions1 and with indications of the weak points which he is to look out for in any new subject which may turn up for debate4 ,he is farther instructed how to shape1 marshal1 and disguise his questions1 in such a way that the respondent may least be able to foresee their ultimate bearing4 ,the respondent1 on his side1 is told what he ought to look forward to and guard against4 ,such is the scope of the present treatise2 the entire process being considered in the large and comprehensive spirit customary with ,aristotle1 and distributed according to the ,aristotelian terminology and classification4 ,it is plain that neither the direct purpose of the debaters1 nor the usual result of the debate1 is to prove truth or to disprove falsehood4 ,such may indeed be the result occasionally2 but the only certain result is1 that an inconsistency is exposed in the respondent's manner of defending his thesis1 or that the assailant fails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency4 ,whichever way the debate may turn1 no certain inference can be drawn as to the thesis itself3 not merely as to whether it is true or false1 but even as to whether it consists or does not consist with other branches of received opinions4 ,such being the case1 what is the use or value of dialectic debate1 or of a methodized procedure for conducting it8 ,aristotle answers this question1 telling us that it is useful for three purposes4#ae ,first1 the debate is a valuable and stimulating mental exercise2 and1 if a methodized procedure be laid down1 both parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more efficaciously4 ,secondly1 it is useful for our intercourse with the multitude2#af for the procedure directs us to note and remember the opinions of the multitude1 and such knowledge will facilitate our intercourse with them3 we shall converse with them out of their own opinions1 which we may thus be able beneficially to modify4 ,thirdly1 dialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the processes of science and philosophy1 and upon the truths thereby acquired4#ag ,for it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both sides of every question1 and thus assists us in detecting and discriminating truth and falsehood4 ,moreover1 apart from this mode of usefulness1 it opens a new road to the scrutiny of the first principia of each separate science4 ,these principia can never be scrutinized through the truths of the science itself1 which presuppose them and are deduced from them4 ,to investigate and verify them1 is the appropriate task of ,first ,philosophy4 ,but ,dialectic also1 carrying investigation as it does everywhere1 and familiarized with the received opinions on both sides of every subject1 suggests many points of importance in regard to these principia4 ,footnote #ae3 ,topic4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d pros tri_/a1 pros gumnasi_/an1 pros tas e7nteu_/xeis1 pros tas kata philosophi_/an e7pist_/mas4 ,footnote #af3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 pros de tas e7nteu_/xeis1 dio_/ti tas tn polln katrithmme_/noi do_/xas ou7k e7k tn a7llotri_/n a7ll' e7k tn oi7kei_/n dogma_/tn o7mil_/somen pros au7tou_/s1 metabiba_/zontes o7_/ ti a7n m kals phai_/nntai le_/gein 7min4 ,footnote #ag3 ,ibid4 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 pros de tas kata philosophi_/an e7pist_/mas1 c4 ,the three heads just enumerated illustrate the discriminating care of ,aristotle4 ,the point of the first head is brought out often in the ,platonic ,dialogues of ,search3 the stimulus brought to bear in awakening dormant intellectual power1 and in dissipating that false persuasion of knowledge which is the general infirmity of mankind1 is frequently declared by ,plato to be the most difficult1 but the indispensable1 operation of the teacher upon his pupil4 ,under the third head1 ,aristotle puts this point more justly than ,plato1 not as a portion of teaching1 nor as superseding direct teaching1 but as a preliminary thereunto2 and it is a habit of his own to prefix this antecedent survey of doubts and difficulties on both sides1 as a means of sharpening our insight into the dogmatic exposition which immediately follows4 ,under the second head1 we find exhibited another characteristic feature of ,aristotle's mind--the value which he sets upon a copious acquaintance with received opinions1 whether correct or erroneous4 ,the philosophers of his day no longer talked publicly in the market-place and with every one indiscriminately1 as ,sokrates had done3 scientific study1 and the habit of written compositions naturally conducted them into a life apart1 among select companions4 ,aristotle here indicates that such estrangement from the multitude lessened their means of acting beneficially on the multitude1 and in the way of counteraction he prescribes dialectical exercise4 ,his own large and many-sided observation1 extending to the most vulgar phenomena1 is visible throughout his works1 and we know that he drew up a collection of current proverbs4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,diog4 ,laert4 v4 #bf4 ,kephisodorus1 the disciple of ,isokrates1 in defending his master1 depreciated this ,aristotelian collection2 see in ,athenus ,,ii4 lvi41 comparing ,schweighuser's ,animadversiones ,i4 p4 #djf4 ,again1 what we read under the third head shows that1 while ,aristotle everywhere declares ,demonstration and teaching to be a process apart from ,dialectic1 he at the same time recognizes the legitimate function of the latter1 for testing and verifying the principia of ,demonstration3#ai which principia cannot be reached by ,demonstration itself1 since every demonstration presupposes them4 ,he does not mean that these principia can be proved by ,dialectic1 for ,dialectic does not prove any thing2 but it is necessary as a test or scrutinizing process to assure us that all the objections capable of being offered against them can be met by sufficient replies4 ,in respect of universal competence and applicability1 ,dialectic is the counterpart1 or rather the tentative companion and adjunct1 of what ,aristotle calls ,first ,philosophy or ,ontology2 to which last he assigns the cognizance of principia1 as we shall see when we treat of the ,metaphysica4#bj ,dialectic 7he repeats more than once7 is not a definite science or body of doctrine1 but1 like rhetoric or medicine1 a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying situations of the dialogue2 of imagining and enunciating the question proper for attack1 or the answer proper for defence1 as the case may be4 ,as in the other arts1 its resources are not unlimited4 ,nor can the dialectician1 any more than the rhetor or the physician1 always guarantee success4 ,each of them has an end to be accomplished2 and if he employs for its accomplishment the best means that the situation permits1 he must be considered a master of his own art and procedure4#ba ,to detect truth1 and to detect what is like truth1 belong 7in ,aristotle's judgment7 to the same mental capacity4 ,mankind have a natural tendency towards truth1 and the common opinions therefore are1 in most cases1 coincident with truth4 ,accordingly1 the man who divines well in regard to verisimilitude1 will usually divine well in regard to truth4#bb ,footnote #ai3 ,topic4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 e7xetastik gar ou7sa pros tas a7pasn tn metho_/dn a7rchas o7don e7_/chei4 ,footnote #bj3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 a4 #bj-;b4 #aj2 ,greek3 ,g4 ii4 p4 #ajjd1 b4 #ae-cj4 ,footnote #ba3 ,topic4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #aja1 b4 #e3 ,greek3 e7_/xomen de tele_/s tn me_/thodon1 o7_/tan o7moi_/s e7_/chmen 7_/sper e7pi r7toriks kai i7atriks kai tn toiou_/tn duna_/men4 touto d' e7sti to e7k tn e7ndechome_/nn poiein a7 proairou_/metha4 ou7_/te gar o7 r7torikos e7k pantos tro_/pou pei_/sei1 ou7_/th' o7 i7atrikos u7gia_/sei2 a7ll' e7an tn e7ndechome_/nn mden parali_/p1 i7kans au7ton e7_/chein tn e7pist_/mn ph_/somen4 ,the word ,greek3 e7pist_/mn in the last line is used loosely1 since ,aristotle1 in the ,rhetorica 7p4 #acfi1 b4 #ab71 explicitly states that ,rhetoric and ,dialectic are not to be treated as ,greek3 e7pist_/mas but as mere ,greek3 duna_/meis4 ,footnote #bb3 ,rhetoric4 ,i4 i4 p4 #acee1 a4 #ag4 ,the subject-matter of dialectic debate1 speaking generally1 consists of ,propositions and ,problems1 to be propounded as questions by the assailant and to be admitted or disallowed by the defendant4 ,they will relate either to ,expetenda and ,fugienda1 or they must bear1 at least indirectly1 upon some point of scientific truth or observed cognition4#bc ,they will be either ethical1 physical1 or logical2 class-terms which ,aristotle declines to define1 contenting himself with giving an example to illustrate each of them1 while adding that the student should collect other similar examples1 and gradually familiarize himself with the full meaning of the general term1 through such inductive comparison of particulars4#bd ,footnote #bc3 ,topic4 ,i1 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #b4 ,footnote #bd3 ,topic4 ,i4 xiv4 p4 #aje1 b4 #bj-bi3 ,greek3 ai7 men gar 7thikai prota_/seis ei7si_/n1 ai7 de phusikai_/1 ai7 de logikai_/4--poiai d' e7_/kastai tn proeirme_/nn1 o7rism men ou7k eu7petes a7podounai peri au7tn1 t de dia ts e7paggs sunthei_/a peirate_/on gnri_/zein e7ka_/stn au7tn1 kata ta proeirme_/na paradei_/gmata e7piskopounta4 ,this illustrates ,aristotle's view of the process of ,induction and its results2 the acquisition of the import of a general term1 through comparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it4 ,the term logical does not exactly correspond with ,aristotle's ,greek3 logikai_/1 but on the present occasion no better term presents itself4 ,but it is not every problem coming under one of these three heads that is fit for dialectic debate4 ,if a man propounds as subject for debate1 ,whether we ought to honour the gods or to love our parents1 he deserves punishment instead of refutation3 if he selects the question1 ,whether snow is white or not1 he must be supposed deficient in perceptive power4#be ,what all persons unanimously believe1 is unsuitable3#bf what no one believes is also unsuitable1 since it will not be conceded by any respondent4 ,the problem must have some doubts and difficulties1 in order to afford scope for discussion2 yet it must not be one of which the premisses are far-fetched or recondite1 for that goes beyond the limits of dialectic exercise4#bg ,it ought to be one on which opinions are known to be held1 both in the affirmative and in the negative2 on which either the multitude differ among themselves1 the majority being on one side1 while yet there is an adverse minority2 or some independent authority stands opposed to the multitude1 such as a philosopher of eminence1 a professional man or artist speaking on his own particular craft1 a geometer or a physician on the specialities of his department4 ,matters such as these are the appropriate subjects for dialectic debate2 and new matters akin to them by way of analogy may be imagined and will be perfectly admissible4#bh ,even an ingenious paradox or thesis adverse to prevailing opinions may serve the purpose1 as likely to obtain countenance from some authority1 though as yet we know of none4#bi ,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #aje1 a4 #fg3 ,greek3 kola_/ses--ai7sth_/ses1 de_/ontai4 ,yet he considers the question1 ,whether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands of our parents1 in case of discrepancy between the two1--as quite fit for debate 7xiv4 p4 #aje1 b4 #bb74 ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 x4 p4 #ajd1 a4 #e4 ,footnote #bg3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #aje1 a4 #g3 ,greek3 ou7de d 7n su_/neggus 7 a7po_/deixis1 ou7_/d' 7n li_/an po_/r7r72 ta men gar ou7k e7_/chei a7pori_/an1 ta de 9999plei_/on 7 kata gumnastik_/n4 ,the loose use of the word ,greek3 a7po_/deixis deserves note here3 it is the technical term of the ,analyt4 ,post41 denoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with ,dialectic altogether4 ,aristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits are the best for dialectic discussion2 but1 in his suggestions later on1 he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost generalities of philosophy4 ,for example1 he often adverts to dialectic debate on the ,platonic ,ideas or ,forms 7,topic4 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #aac1 a4 #be2 ,v4 vii4 p4 #acg1 b4 #g2 ,,vi4 vi4 p4 #adc1 b4 #bd4 ,compare also ,i4 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #ad47 ,footnote #bh3 ,topic4 ,i4 x4 p4 #ajd1 a4 #aa-cg4 ,footnote #bi3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #ajd1 b4 #bd-bh3 ,greek3 7 peri 7n lo_/gon e7_/chomen e7nanti_/on tais do_/xais--touto ga_/r1 ei7 kai_/ tini m dokei1 do_/xeien a7n dia to lo_/gon e7_/chein4 ,these conditions apply both to problems propounded for debate1 and to premisses tendered on either side during the discussion4 ,both the interrogator and the respondent--the former having to put appropriate questions1 and the latter to make appropriate answers--must know and keep in mind these varieties of existing opinion among the multitude as well as among the special dissident authorities above indicated4 ,the dialectician ought to collect and catalogue such ,endoxa1 with the opinions analogous to them1 out of written treatises and elsewhere2#cj distributing them under convenient heads1 such as those relating to good and evil generally1 and to each special class of good1 c4 ,aristotle1 however1 admonishes him that he is debating problems not scientifically1 but dialectically3 having reference not to truth1 but to opinion4#ca ,if the interrogator were proceeding scientifically and didactically1 he would make use of all true and ascertained propositions1 whether the respondent conceded them or not1 as premisses for his syllogism4 ,but in ,dialectic he is dependent on the concession of the respondent1 and can construct his syllogisms only from premisses that have been conceded to him4#cb ,hence he must keep as closely as he can to opinions carrying extrinsic authority1 as being those which the respondent will hesitate to disallow4#cc ,footnote #cj3 ,topic4 ,i4 xiv4 p4 #aje1 b4 #a-ah4 ,greek3 e7kle_/gein de chr kai e7k tn gegramme_/nn lo_/gn4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj3 ,greek3 pros men ou7n philosophi_/an kat' a7l_/theian peri au7tn pragmateute_/on1 dialektiks de pros do_/xan4 ,footnote #cb3 ,ibid4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #aj3 ,greek3 pros e7_/teron gar pan to toiouton1 t de philoso_/ph kai ztounti kath' e7auton ou7den me_/lei1 e7an a7lth men 7 kai gn_/rima di' 7n o7 sullogismo_/s1 m th d' au7ta o7 a7pokrino_/menos1 c4 ,footnote #cc3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #aef1 b4 #bj3 ,greek3 chr_/simon de kai to e7pile_/gein o7_/ti su_/nthes kai lego_/menon to toiouton2 o7knousi gar kinein to ei7tho_/s1 e7_/nstasin m e7_/chontes4 ,moreover1 the form of the interrogation admissible in dialectic debate is peculiar4 ,the respondent is not bound to furnish any information in his answer3 he is bound only to admit1 or to deny1 a proposition tendered to him4 ,you must not ask him1 ,what is the genus of man8 ,you must yourself declare the genus1 and ask whether he admits it1 in one or other of the two following forms--7#a7 ,is animal the genus of man8 7#b7 ,is animal the genus of man1 or not8 to which the response is an admission or a denial4#cd ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #aja1 b4 #cj4 ,the first of these two forms ,aristotle calls a ,greek3 pro_/tasis1 the second he calls a ,greek3 pro_/blma4 ,but this distinction between these two words is not steadily adhered to3 it is differently declared in ,topic4 ,i4 x41 xi4 p4 #ajd1 as ,alexander has remarked in the ,scholia1 p4 #beh1 b4 #d1 ,brand4 ,compare also ,de ,interpretat4 p4 #bj1 b4 #bf2 and ,topic4 ,,viii4 ii4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #ad3 ,greek3 ou7 dokei de pan to katho_/lou dialektik pro_/tasis ei7nai1 oi7on ti_/ e7stin a7_/nthrpos1 7 posachs le_/getai ta7gatho_/n8 e7_/sti gar pro_/tasis dialektik pros 7n e7_/stin a7pokri_/nasthai nai 7 ou7_/2 pros de tas ei7rme_/nas ou7k e7_/stin4 dio ou7 dialektika_/ e7sti ta toiauta tn e7rtma_/tn1 a7n m au7tos diori_/sas 7 dielo_/menos ei7_/p4 ,dialectic procedure1 both of the assailant and of the defendant1 has to do with propositions and problems2 accordingly1 ,aristotle introduces a general distribution of propositions under four heads4 ,the predicate must either be ,genus1 or ,proprium1 or ,accident1 of its subject4 ,but the ,proprium divides itself again into two4 ,it always reciprocates with1 or is co-extensive with1 its subject2 but sometimes it declares the essence of the subject1 sometimes it does not4 ,when it declares the essence of the subject1 ,aristotle calls it the ,definition2 when it does not declare the essence of the subject1 although reciprocating therewith1 he reserves for it the title of ,proprium4 ,every proposition1 and every problem1 the entire material of ,dialectic1 will declare one of these four--,proprium1 ,definition1 ,genus1 or ,accident4#ce ,the ,differentia1 as being attached to the ,genus1 is ranked along with the ,genus4#cf ,footnote #ce3 ,topic4 ,i4 iv4 p4 #aja1 b4 #ag-cf4 ,footnote #cf3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 tn diaphoran 7s ou7san genikn o7mou t ge_/nei takte_/on4 ,the above four general heads include all the ,predicables1 which were distributed by subsequent logicians 7from whom ,porphyry borrowed7 into five heads instead of four--,genus1 ,species1 ,differentia1 ,proprium1 ,accident2 the ,differentia being ranked as a separate item in the quintuple distribution1 and the ,species substituted in place of the ,definition4 ,it is under this quadruple classification that ,aristotle intends to consider propositions and problems as matters for dialectic procedure3 he will give argumentative suggestions applicable to each of the four successively4 ,it might be practicable 7he thinks7 to range all the four under the single head of ,definition2 since arguments impugning ,genus1 ,proprium1 and ,accident1 are all of them good also against ,definition4 ,but such a simplification would be perplexing and unmanageable in regard to dialectic procedure4#cg ,footnote #cg3 ,topic4 ,i4 vi4 p4 #ajb1 b4 #bg-ch4 ,greek3 a7ll' ou7 dia touto mi_/an e7pi pa_/ntn katho_/lou me_/thodon ztte_/on2 ou7_/te gar r7a_/dion eu7rein tout' e7sti_/n1 ei7_/ th' eu7rethei_/1 pantels a7saphs kai du_/schrstos a7n ei7_/ pros tn prokeime_/nn pragmatei_/an4 ,that the quadruple classification is exhaustive1 and that every proposition or problem falls under one or other of the four heads1 may be shown in two ways4 ,first1 by ,induction3 survey and analyse as many propositions as you will1 all without exception will be found to belong to one of the four4#ch ,secondly1 by the following ,deductive proof3--,in every proposition the predicate is either co-extensive and reciprocating with the subject1 or it is not4 ,if it does reciprocate1 it either declares the essence of the subject1 or it does not3 if the former1 it is the ,definition2 if the latter1 it is a ,proprium4 ,but1 supposing the predicate not to reciprocate with the subject1 it will either declare something contained in the ,definition1 or it will not4 ,if it does contain a part of the ,definition1 that part must be either a ,genus or a ,differentia1 since these are the constituents of the ,definition4 ,if it does not contain any such part1 it must be an ,accident4#ci ,hence it appears that every proposition must belong to one or other of the four1 and that the classification is exhaustive4 ,footnote #ch3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #ajc1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 mi_/a men pi_/stis 7 dia ts e7paggs2 ei7 ga_/r tis e7piskopoi_/ e7ka_/stn tn prota_/sen kai tn problma_/tn1 phai_/noit' a7n 7 a7po tou o7_/rou 7 c4 ,footnote #ci3 ,topic4 ,i4 9999viii4 p4 #ajc1 b4 #f-ai3 ,greek3 a7_/ll de pi_/stis 7 dia sullogismou4 ,it will be observed that ,aristotle here resolves ,definition into ,genus and ,differenti--,greek3 e7peid o7 o7rismos e7k ge_/nous kai diaphorn e7sti_/n4 ,moreover1 though he does not recognize ,species as a separate head1 yet in his definition of ,genus he implies ,species as known--,greek3 ge_/nos e7sti to kata pleio_/nn kai diaphero_/ntn t ei7_/dei e7n t ti_/ e7sti katgorou_/menon 7p4 #ajb1 a4 #ca74 ,it thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and logical one2 but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the ,topica1 with a view to dialectic procedure1 since debates turn upon the attack and defence of a ,definition4 ,moreover1 each of the four ,predicables must fall under one or other of the ten ,categories or ,predicaments4 ,if the predicate be either of ,genus or ,definition1 declaring the essence of the subject1 it may fall under any one of the ten ,categories2 if of ,proprium or ,accident1 not declaring essence1 it cannot belong to the first ,category 7,greek3 ,ou7si_/a71 but must fall under one of the remaining nine4#dj ,footnote #dj3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #ajc1 b4 #bj-ci4 ,the notion of ,sameness or ,identity occurs so often in dialectic debate1 that ,aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or grades3 7#a7 ,numero2 7#b7 ,specie2 7#c7 ,genere4 ,water from the same spring is only idem specie1 though the resemblance between two cups of water from the same spring is far greater than that between water from different sources4 ,even ,idem ,numero has different significations3 sometimes there are complete synonyms2 sometimes an individual is called by its proprium1 sometimes by its peculiar temporary accident4#da ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #ajc1 a4 #f-ci4 ,having thus classified dialectic propositions1 ,aristotle proceeds to the combination of propositions1 or dialectic discourse and argument4 ,this is of two sorts1 either ,induction or ,syllogism2 of both which we have already heard in the ,analytica4 ,induction is declared to be plainer1 more persuasive1 nearer to sensible experience1 and more suitable to the many1 than ,syllogism2 while this latter carries greater compulsion and is more irresistible against professed disputants4#db ,a particular example is given to illustrate what ,induction is4 ,but we remark that though it is always mentioned as an argumentative procedure important and indispensable1 yet neither here nor elsewhere does ,aristotle go into any discriminative analysis of the conditions under which it is valid1 as he does about ,syllogism in the ,analytica ,priora4 ,footnote #db3 ,ibid4 xii4 p4 #aje1 a4 #aj-ai3 ,greek3 po_/sa tn lo_/gn ei7_/d tn dialektikn1 c4 ,what helps are available to give to the dialectician a ready and abundant command of syllogisms8 ,four distinct helps may be named3#dc 7#a7 ,he must make a large collection of ,propositions2 7#b7 ,he must study and discriminate the different senses in which the ,terms of these propositions are used2 7#c7 ,he must detect and note ,differences2 7#d7 ,he must investigate ,resemblances4 ,footnote #dc3 ,topic4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #aje1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 ta d' o7_/rgana1 di' 7n eu7por_/somen tn sullogismn1 e7sti te_/ttara1 e7_/n men to prota_/seis labein1 deu_/teron de posachs e7_/kaston le_/getai du_/nasthai dielein1 tri_/ton tas diaphoras eu7rein1 te_/tarton de 7 tou o7moi_/ou ske_/psis4 ,the term ,greek3 o7_/rgana1 properly signifying instruments1 appears here by a strained metaphor4 ,it means simply helps or aids1 as may be seen by comparing ,top4 ,,viii4 xiv4 p4 #afc1 b4 #i4 ,waitz says truly 7,prolegg4 ad ,analyt4 ,post4 p4 #bid73 unde fit1 ut ,greek3 o7_/rgana dicat qucunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum afferant4 #a4 ,about collecting ,propositions1 ,aristotle has already indicated that those wanted are such as declare ,endoxa1 and other modes of thought cognate or 9999analogous to the ,endoxa3#dd opinions of the many1 and opinions of any small sections or individuals carrying authority4 ,all such are to be collected 7out of written treatises as well as from personal enquiry72 nor are individual philosophers 7like ,empedokles7 to be omitted1 since a proposition is likely enough to be conceded when put upon the authority of an illustrious name4#de ,if any proposition is currently admitted as true in general or in most cases1 it must be tendered with confidence to the respondent as an universal principle2 for he will probably grant it1 not being at first aware of the exceptions4#df ,all propositions must be registered in the most general terms possible1 and must then be resolved into their subordinate constituent particulars1 as far as the process of subdivision can be carried4#dg ,footnote #dd3 ,topic4 ,i4 xiv4 p4 #aje1 b4 #d3 ,greek3 e7kle_/gein m mo_/non tas ou7_/sas e7ndo_/xous1 a7lla kai tas o7moi_/as tau_/tais4 ,footnote #de3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag3 ,greek3 thei_/ gar a7_/n tis to u7po_/ tinos ei7rme_/non e7ndo_/xou4 ,footnote #df3 ,ibid4 b4 #aj3 ,greek3 o7_/sa e7pi pa_/ntn 7 tn plei_/stn phai_/netai1 lpte_/on 7s a7rchn kai dokousan the_/sin2 tithe_/asi gar oi7 m sunorntes e7pi ti_/nos ou7ch ou7_/ts4 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 b4 #ca-cg3 ,greek3 lpte_/on d' o7_/ti ma_/lista katho_/lou pa_/sas tas prota_/seis1 kai tn mi_/an pollas poite_/on--diairete_/on1 e7_/s a7n e7nde_/chtai diairein1 c4 #b4 ,the propositions having been got together1 they must be examined in order to find out ,equivocation or double meaning of terms4 ,there are various ways of going about this task4 ,sometimes the same predicate is applied to two different subjects1 but in different senses2 thus1 courage and justice are both of them good1 but in a different way4 ,sometimes the same predicate is applied to two different classes of subjects1 each admitting of being defined2 thus1 health is good in itself1 and exercise is good as being among those things that promote health4#dh ,sometimes the equivocal meaning of a term is perceived by considering its contrary2 if we find that it has two or more distinct contraries1 we know at once that it has different meanings4 ,sometimes1 though there are not two distinct contraries1 yet the mere conjunction of the same adjective with two substantives shows us at once that it cannot mean the same in both#di 7,greek3 leuk phn_/--leukon chrma74 ,in one sense1 the term may have an assignable contrary1 while in another sense it may have no contrary2 showing that the two senses are distinct3 for example1 the pleasure of drinking has for its contrary the pain of thirst2 but the pleasure of scientifically contemplating that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side1 has no contrary2 hence1 we see that pleasure is an equivocal term4#ej ,in one sense1 there may be a term intermediate between the two contraries2 in another sense1 there may be none2 or there may be two distinct intermediate terms for the two distinct senses2 or there may be several intermediate terms in one of the senses1 and only one or none in the other3 in each of these ways the equivocation is revealed4#ea ,we must look also to the contradictory opposite 7of a term71 which may perhaps have an obvious equivocation of meaning2 thus1 ,greek3 m ble_/pein means sometimes to be blind1 sometimes not to be seeing actually1 whence we discover that ,greek3 ble_/pein also has the same equivocation4#eb ,if a positive term is equivocal1 we know that the privative term correlating with it must also be equivocal2 thus1 ,greek3 to ai7stha_/nesthai has a double sense1 according as we speak with reference to mind or body2 and this will be alike true of the correlating privative--,greek3 to a7nai_/sthton ei7nai4#ec ,farther1 an equivocal term will have its derivatives equivocal in the same manner2 and conversely1 if the derivative be equivocal1 the radical will be so likewise4#ed ,the term must also be looked at in reference to the ten ,categories3 if its meanings fall under more than one ,category1 we know that it is equivocal4#ee ,if it comprehends two subjects which are not in the same genus1 or in genera not subordinate one to the other1 this too will show that it is equivocal4#ef ,the contrary1 also1 of the term must be looked at with a view to the same inference4#eg ,footnote #dh3 ,topic4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #ajf1 a4 #a-h3 ,greek3 to de posachs1 pragmateute_/on m mo_/non o7_/sa le_/getai kath' e7_/teron tro_/pon1 a7lla kai tous lo_/gous au7tn peirate_/on a7podido_/nai4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 a4 #i-ce4 ,footnote #ej3 ,ibid4 a4 #cf4 ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 b4 #d4 ,footnote #eb3 ,ibid4 b4 #ac-bj4 ,footnote #ec3 ,ibid4 b4 #ba-bh4 ,footnote #ed3 ,ibid4 b4 #bh4 ,footnote #ee3 ,ibid4 p4 #ajg1 a4 #c-ag4 ,footnote #ef3 ,ibid4 a4 #ah4 ,footnote #eg3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-ce4 ,again1 it will be useful to bring together the same term in two different conjunctions1 and to compare the definitions of the two4 ,define both of them1 and then deduct what is peculiar to each definitum3 if the remainder be different1 the term will be equivocal2 if the remainder be the same1 the term will be univocal4 ,thus1 ,greek3 leukon sma will be defined1 a body having such and such a colour3 ,greek3 leuk phn_/1 a voice easily and distinctly heard3 deduct ,greek3 sma from the first definition1 and ,greek3 phn from the second1 the remainder will be totally disparate2 therefore1 the term ,greek3 leuko_/n is equivocal4#eh ,sometimes1 also1 the ambiguity may be found in definitions themselves1 where the same term is used to explain subjects that are not the same2 whether such use is admissible1 has to be considered4#ei ,if the term be univocal1 two conjunctions of it may always be compared as to greater or less1 or in respect of likeness2 whenever this cannot be1 the term is equivocal4#fj ,if1 again1 the term is used as a differentia for two genera quite distinct and independent of each other1 it must be equivocal2 for genera that are unconnected and not subordinate one to the other1 have their differenti also disparate4#fa ,and1 conversely1 if the term be such that the differenti applied to it are disparate1 we may know it to be an equivocal term4 ,the like1 if the term be used as a species in some of its conjunctions1 and as a differentia in others4#fb ,footnote #eh3 ,topic4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #ajg1 a4 #cf-;b4 #c4 ,footnote #ei3 ,ibid4 b4 #h4 ,footnote #fj3 ,ibid4 b4 #ac-ah3 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 m sumblta kata to mallon 7 o7moi_/s1--to gar sun_/numon pan sumblto_/n4 ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 b4 #ai-bf4 ,footnote #fb3 ,ibid4 b4 #bg-cg4 #c4 ,aristotle has thus indicated1 at considerable length1 the points to be looked for when we are examining whether a term is univocal or equivocal4 ,he is more concise when he touches on the last two out of the four helps 7,greek3 o7_/rgana7 enumerated for supplying syllogisms when needed1--viz4 the study of ,differences and of ,resemblances4 ,in regard to the study of ,differences1 standing third1 while he remarks that1 where these are wide and numerous1 they are sure without any precept to excite our attention1 he advises that we should study the differences of subjects that are nearly allied1--those within the same genus1 or comprehended in genera not much removed from one another1 such as1 the distinction between sensible perception and science4 ,but he goes into no detail4#fc ,footnote #fc3 ,ibid4 xvi4 p4 #ajg1 b4 #ci4 #d4 ,in regard to the study of ,resemblances1 he inverts the above precept1 and directs us to note especially the points of resemblance between subjects of great apparent difference4#fd ,we must examine what is the quality common to all species of the same genus--man1 horse1 dog1 c42 for it is in this that they are similar4 ,we may also compare different genera with each other1 in respect to the analogies that are to be found in each3 e4g41 as science is to the cognizable1 so is perception to the perceivable2 as sight is in the eye1 so is intellection in the soul2 as ,greek3 gal_/n is in the sea1 so is ,greek3 nnemi_/a in the air4#fe ,footnote #fd3 ,ibid4 xvii4 p4 #ajh1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 ma_/lista d' e7n tois polu diestsi gumna_/zesthai dei2 r7aon gar e7pi tn loipn dunso_/metha ta o7_/moia sunoran4 ,footnote #fe3 ,topic4 ,i4 xvii4 p4 #ajh1 a4 #g4 ,such are the four distinct helps1 towards facility of syllogizing1 enumerated by ,aristotle4 ,it will be observed that the third and fourth 7study of ,resemblances and ,differences7 bear more upon matters of fact and less upon words2 while the second 7,greek3 to posachs71 though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and deriving from thence its main real worth1 yet takes its departure from terms and propositions1 and proceeds by comparing multiplied varieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning4 ,upon this ground it is1 apparently1 that ,aristotle has given so much fuller development to the second head than to the third and fourth2 for1 in the ,topica1 he is dealing with propositions and counter-propositions--with opinions and counter-opinions1 not with science and truth4 ,he proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps 7the second1 third1 and fourth7 further the purpose of the dialectician--respondent as well as assailant4 ,unless the different meanings of the term be discriminated1 the respondent cannot know clearly what he admits or what he denies2 he may be thinking of something different from what the assailant intends1 and the syllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only1 not upon any reality4#ff ,the respondent will be able to protect himself better against being driven into contradiction1 if he can distinguish the various meanings of the same term2 for he will thus know whether the syllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has admitted4#fg ,on the other hand1 the assailant will have much facility in driving his opponent into contradiction1 if he 7the assailant7 can distinguish the different meanings of the term1 while the respondent cannot do so2 in those cases at least where the proposition is true in one sense of the term and false in another4#fh ,this manner of proceeding1 however1 is hardly consistent with genuine ,dialectic4 ,no dialectician ought ever to found his interrogations and his arguments upon a mere unanalysed term1 unless he can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate4#fi ,footnote #ff3 ,ibid4 xviii4 p4 #ajh1 a4 #bb4 ,footnote #fg3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 chr_/simon de kai pros to m paralogisthnai kai pros to paralogi_/sasthai4 ei7do_/tes gar posachs le_/getai ou7 m paralogisthmen1 a7ll' ei7d_/somen e7an m pros to au7to ton lo_/gon poitai o7 e7rtn4 ,footnote #fh3 ,ibid4 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 au7toi_/ te e7rtntes dunso_/metha paralogi_/sasthai e7an m tugcha_/n ei7ds o7 a7pokrino_/menos posachs le_/getai2 touto d' ou7k e7pi pa_/ntn dunato_/n1 a7ll' o7_/tan 7 tn pollachs legome_/nn ta men a7lth1 ta de pseud4 ,footnote #fi3 ,topic4 ,i4 xviii4 p4 #ajh1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 dio pantels eu7labte_/on tois dialektikois to toiounton1 to pros tou7_/noma diale_/gesthai1 e7an m_/ tis a7_/lls e7xadunat peri tou prokeime_/nou diale_/gesthai4 ,the third help 7an acquaintance with ,differences7 will be of much avail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon ,same and ,different1 and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition of any thing2 for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign thereunto1 founded on the appropriate differences in each case4#gj ,footnote #gj3 ,ibid4 b4 #b4 ,lastly1 the fourth help 7the intelligent survey of ,resemblances7 serves us in different ways3--7#a7 ,towards the construction of inductive arguments2 7#b7 ,towards syllogizing founded upon assumption2 7#c7 ,towards the declaration of definitions4 ,as to the inductive argument1 it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar particulars1 whereby the universal is obtained4#ga ,as to the syllogizing from an assumption1 the knowledge of resemblances is valuable1 because we are entitled to assume1 as an ,endoxon or a doctrine conformable to common opinion1 that what happens in any one of a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest4 ,we lay down this as the major proposition of a syllogism2 and thus1 if we can lay hold of any one similar case1 we can draw inference from it to the matter actually in debate4#gb ,again1 as to the declaration of definitions1 when we have once discovered what is the same in all particular cases1 we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject before us belongs2#gc for that one of the common predicates which is most of the essence1 will be the genus4 ,even where the two matters compared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus1 the knowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful analogies1 and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative4 ,thus1 as the point is in a line1 so is the unit in numbers2 each of them is a principium2 this1 therefore1 is a common genus1 which will serve as a tolerable definition4 ,indeed this is the definition of them commonly given by philosophers2 who call the unit principium of number1 and the point principium of a line1 thus putting one and the other into a genus common to both4#gd ,footnote #ga3 ,ibid4 b4 #i4 ,footnote #gb3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 pros de tous e7x u7pothe_/ses sullogsismou_/s1 dio_/ti e7_/ndoxo_/n e7stin1 7_/s pote e7ph' e7nos tn o7moi_/n e7_/chei1 ou7_/ts kai e7i tn loipn2 7_/ste pros o7_/ ti a7n au7tn eu7pormen diale_/gesthai1 prodiomologso_/metha1 7_/s pote e7pi tou_/tn e7_/chei1 ou7_/t kai e7pi tou prokeime_/nou e7_/chein4 dei_/xantes de e7keino kai 9999to prokei_/menon e7x u7pothe_/ses dedeicho_/tes e7so_/metha2 u7pothe_/menoi ga_/r1 7_/s pote e7pi tou_/tn e7_/chei1 ou7_/t kai e7pi tou prokeime_/nou e7_/chein1 tn a7po_/deixin pepoi_/metha4 ,for ,greek3 to e7x u7pothe_/ses1 compare ,topic4 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #aai1 b4 #ce4 ,footnote #gc3 ,topic4 ,i4 xviii4 p4 #ajh1 b4 #ai4 ,footnote #gd3 ,topic4 ,i4 xviii4 p4 #ajh1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 7_/ste to koinon e7pi pa_/ntn ge_/nos a7podi_/dontes do_/xomen ou7k a7llotri_/s o7ri_/zesthai4 ,it will be recollected that all the work of ,dialectic 7as ,aristotle tells us often7 has reference to ,greek3 do_/xa and not to scientific truth4 ,we shall seem to define not in a manner departing from the reality of the subject is1 therefore1 an appropriate dialectic artifice4 ,,ii4 ,the ,first ,book of the ,topica1 which we have thus gone through1 was entitled by some ancient commentators ,greek3 ta pro tn ,to_/pn--matters preliminary to the ,loci4 ,this is quite true1 as a description of its contents2 for ,aristotle in the last words of the book1 distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the ,loci towards which the four above-mentioned ,organa will be useful4#ge ,footnote #ge3 ,ibid4 p4 #ajh1 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 oi7 de to_/poi pros ou7s chr_/sima ta lechthe_/nta oi7_/de ei7si_/n4 ,locus 7,greek3 to_/pos7 is a place in which many arguments pertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose1 may be found-- sedes argumentorum4 ,in each locus1 the arguments contained therein look at the thesis from the same point of view2 and the locus implies nothing distinct from the arguments1 except this manner of view common to them all4 ,in fact1 the metaphor is a convenient one for designating the relation of every ,universal generally to its particulars3 the ,universal is not a new particular1 nor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars1 but simply a place in which all known similar particulars may be found grouped together1 and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new ones4 ,if we wish to arm the student with a large command of dialectical artifices1 we cannot do better than discriminate the various groups of arguments1 indicating the point of view common to each group1 and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable4 ,by this means1 whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate1 he will consider the thesis in reference to each one of these different loci1 and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them1 according as the case may admit4 ,the four ,helps 7,greek3 o7_/rgana7 explained in the last book differ from the ,loci in being of wider and more undefined bearing3 they are directions for preparatory study1 rather than for dealing with any particular situation of a given problem2 though it must be confessed that1 when ,aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in which the three last-mentioned helps are useful1 he makes considerable approach towards the greater detail and particularization of the ,loci4 ,in entering now upon these1 he reverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems 7according to the four ,predicables71 noted at the beginning of the treatise1 in which the predicate is either ,definition1 ,proprium1 ,genus1 or ,accident1 of the subject4 ,he makes a fourfold distribution of ,loci1 according as they bear upon one or other of these four4 ,in the ,second and ,third ,books1 we find those which bear upon propositions predicating ,accident2 in the ,fourth ,book1 we pass to ,genus2 in the ,fifth1 to ,proprium2 in the ,sixth and ,seventh1 to ,definition4 ,the problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on which it may be impugned3 either it may be untrue2 or it may be expressed in a way departing from the received phraseology4#gf ,it will be universal1 or particular1 or indefinite2 and either affirmative or negative2 but1 in most cases1 the respondent propounds for debate an affirmative universal1 and not a negative or a particular4#gg ,aristotle therefore begins with those loci that are useful for refuting an ,affirmative ,universal2 though1 in general1 the same arguments are available for attack and defence both of the universal and of the particular2 for if you can overthrow the particular1 you will have overthrown the universal along with it1 while if you can defend the universal1 this will include the defence of the particular4 ,as the thesis propounded is usually affirmative1 the assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation4 ,and this indeed 7as ,eudemus1 the pupil of ,aristotle1 remarked1 after his master#gh7 is the principal function and result of dialectic exercise2 which refutes much and proves very little1 according to the analogy of the ,platonic ,dialogues of ,search4 ,footnote #gf3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #aji1 a4 #bg3 ,greek3 diori_/sasthai de dei kai tas a7marti_/as tas e7n tois probl_/masin1 o7_/ti ei7si dittai_/1 7 t pseu_/desthai1 7 t parabai_/nein tn keime_/nn le_/xin4 ,alexander remarks 7,schol4 p4 #bfd1 b4 #bc1 ,br47 that ,greek3 pro_/blma here means1 not the interrogation1 but ,greek3 to 7risme_/non 7_/d kai kei_/menon--ou7 proi_/statai_/ tis1 o7_/n o7 dialektikos e7le_/gchein e7picheirei4 ,footnote #gg3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #aji1 a4 #h3 ,greek3 dia to mallon tas the_/seis komi_/zein e7n t u7pa_/rchein 7 m_/1 tous de dialegome_/nous a7naskeua_/zein4 ,footnote #gh3 ,alexander ap4 ,schol4 p4 #bfd1 a4 #bg1 ,br43 ,greek3 o7_/ti de oi7keio_/teron t dialektik to a7naskeua_/zein tou kataskeua_/zein1 e7n t pr_/t tn e7pigraphome_/nn ,eu7dmei_/n ,a7nalutikn 7e7pigra_/phetai de au7to kai ,eu7d_/mou u7per tn ,a7nalutikn7 ou7_/ts le_/getai1 o7_/ti o7 dialektikos a7 men kataskeua_/zei mikra_/ e7sti1 to de polu ts duna_/mes au7tou pros to a7nairein ti e7sti_/n4 ,aristotle takes the four heads--,accident1 ,genus1 ,proprium1 and ,definition1 in the order here enumerated4 ,the thesis of which the predicate is enunciated as ,accident1 affirms the least1 is easiest to defend1 and hardest to upset4#gi ,when we enunciate ,genus or ,proprium1 we affirm1 not merely that the predicate belongs to the subject 7which is all that is affirmed in the case of ,accident71 but1 also something more--that it belongs to the subject in a certain manner and relation4 ,and when we enunciate ,definition1 we affirm all this and something reaching yet farther--that it declares the whole essence of the definitum1 and is convertible therewith4 ,accordingly1 the thesis of ,definition1 affirming as it does so very much1 presents the most points of attack and is by far the hardest to defend4#hj ,next in point of difficulty1 for the respondent1 comes the ,proprium4 ,footnote #gi3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 v4 p4 #aee1 a4 #bg3 ,greek3 r7aston de pa_/ntn kataskeua_/sai to sumbebko_/s--a7naskeua_/zein de chalep_/taton to sumbebko_/s1 o7_/ti e7la_/chista e7n au7t de_/dotai2 ou7 gar prossmai_/nei e7n t sumbebko_/ti ps u7pa_/rchei1 7_/st' e7pi men tn a7_/lln dichs e7_/stin a7nelein1 7 dei_/xanta o7_/ti ou7ch u7pa_/rchei 7 o7_/ti ou7ch ou7_/ts u7parchei1 e7pi de tou sumbebko_/tos ou7k e7_/stin a7nelein a7ll' 7 dei_/xanta o7_/ti ou7ch u7pa_/rchei4 ,footnote #hj3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 v4 p4 #aee1 a4 #c4 ,greek3 pa_/ntn r7aston o7_/ron a7naskeua_/sai2 pleista gar e7n au7t ta dedome_/na polln ei7rme_/nn4 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 tn d' a7_/lln to i7_/dion ma_/lista toiouton4 ,beginning thus with the thesis enunciating ,accident1 ,aristotle enumerates no less than thirty-seven distinct loci or argumentative points of view bearing upon it4 ,most of them suggest modes of assailing the thesis2 but there are also occasionally intimations to the respondent how he may best defend himself4 ,in this numerous list there are indeed some items repetitions of each other1 or at least not easily distinguishable4#ha ,as it would be tedious to enumerate them all1 ,i shall select some of the most marked and illustrative4 ,footnote #ha3 ,aristotle himself admits the repetition in some cases1 ,topic4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #aaj1 a4 #ab3 the fourth locus is identical substantially with the second locus4 ,theophrastus distinguished ,greek3 para_/ggelma as the general precept1 from ,greek3 to_/pos or locus1 as any proposition specially applying the precept to a particular case 7,schol4 p4 #bfd1 b4 #ch74 #a4 ,the respondent has enunciated a certain predicate as belonging in the way of accident1 to a given subject4 ,perhaps it may belong to the subject2 yet not as accident1 but under some one of the other three ,predicables4 ,perhaps he may have enunciated 7either by explicit discrimination1 or at least by implication contained in his phraseology7 the genus as if it were an accident1--an error not unfrequently committed4#hb ,thus1 if he has said1 ,to be a colour is an accident of white1 he has affirmed explicitly the genus as if it were an accident4 ,and he has affirmed the same by implication1 if he has said1 ,white 7or whiteness7 is coloured4 ,for this is a form of words not proper for the affirmation of a genus respecting its species1 in which case the genus itself ought to stand as a literal predicate 7,white is a colour71 and not to be replaced by one of its derivatives 7,white is coloured74 ,nor can the proposition be intended to be taken as affirming either proprium or definition2 for in both these the predicate would reciprocate and be co-extensive with the subject1 whereas in the present case there are obviously many other subjects of which it may be predicated that they are coloured4#hc ,in saying1 ,white is coloured1 the respondent cannot mean to affirm either genus1 proprium1 or definition2 therefore he must mean to affirm accident4 ,the assailant will show that this is erroneous4 ,footnote #hb3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #aji1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 ei7s men d to_/pos to e7pible_/pein ei7 to kat' a7_/llon tina tro_/pon u7pa_/rchon 7s sumbebkos a7pode_/dken4 a7marta_/netai de ma_/lista touto peri ta ge_/n1 oi7on ei7_/ tis t leuk phai_/ sumbebke_/nai chr_/mati ei7nai2 ou7 gar sumbe_/bke t leuk chr_/mati ei7nai1 a7lla ge_/nos au7tou to chrma_/ e7stin4 ,footnote #hc3 ,we may find cases in which ,aristotle has not been careful to maintain the strict logical sense of ,greek3 sumbebko_/s or ,greek3 sumbe_/bken where he applies these terms to ,genus or ,proprium3 e4g4 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #aaj1 b4 #bd2 ,soph4 ,el4 vi4 p4 #afh1 b4 #a4 #b4 ,suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal affirmative1 or an universal negative4 ,you 7the interrogator or assailant7 should review the particulars contained under these universals4 ,review them not at once as separate individuals1 but as comprised in subordinate genera and species2 beginning from the highest1 and descending down to the lowest species which is not farther divisible except into individuals4 ,thus1 if the thesis propounded be1 ,the cognition of opposites is one and the same cognition2 you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated respecting all the primary species of ,opposita3 respecting ,relata and ,correlata1 respecting ,contraries1 respecting ,contradictories1 respecting ,habitus and ,privatio4 ,if1 by going thus far1 you obtain no result favourable to your purpose1#hd you must proceed farther1 and subdivide until you come to the lowest species3--,is the cognition of just and unjust one and the same8 that of double and half8 of sight and blindness8 of existence and non-existence8 ,if in all1 or in any one1 of these cases you can show that the universal thesis does not hold1 you will have gained your point of refuting it4 ,on the other hand1 if1 when you have enumerated many particulars1 the thesis is found to hold in all1 the respondent is entitled to require you to grant it as an universal proposition1 unless you can produce a satisfactory counter-example4 ,if you decline this challenge1 you will be considered an unreasonable debater4#he ,footnote #hd3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #aji1 b4 #bj3 ,greek3 ka7n e7pi tou_/tn m_/p phaneron 71 pa_/lin tauta diairete_/on me_/chri tn a7to_/mn1 oi7on ei7 tn dikai_/n kai a7di_/kn1 c4 ,footnote #he3 ,ibid4 b4 #be-cj4 ,greek3 e7an gar mde_/teron tou_/tn poi1 a7_/topos phaneitai m tithei_/s4 #c4 ,you will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in the thesis1 and the subject respecting which it is predicated1 or at least one of them3 you will see then whether these definitions reveal anything false in the affirmation of the thesis4 ,thus1 if the thesis affirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god1 you will define what is meant by doing injustice4 ,the definition is--hurting intentionally3 you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no injustice to a god can possibly be done2 for a god cannot be hurt4#hf ,or let the thesis maintained be1 ,the virtuous man is envious4 ,you define envy1 and you find that it is--vexation felt by reason of the manifest success of some meritorious man4 ,upon this definition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy3 he would be worthless1 if he did feel it4 ,perhaps some of the terms employed in your definition may themselves require definition2 if so1 you will repeat the process of defining until you come to something plain and clear4#hg ,such an analysis will often bring out some error at first unperceived in the thesis4 ,footnote #hf3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #aji1 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7nde_/chetai bla_/ptesthai ton theo_/n4 ,footnote #hg3 ,ibid4 p4 #aaj1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 lamba_/nein de kai a7nti tn e7n tois lo_/gois o7noma_/tn lo_/gous1 kai m a7phi_/stasthai e7_/s a7n ei7s gn_/rimon e7_/lth4 #d4 ,it will be advisable1 both for assailant and respondent1 to discriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is conclusive from those in which it is not4 ,thus1 in regard to the meaning of terms and in naming objects1 we must speak like the multitude2 but1 when the question is as to what objects deserve to be denominated so and so1 we must not feel bound by the multitude1 if there be any special dissentient authority4#hh ,that which produces good health we must call wholesome1 as the multitude do2 but1 in calling this or that substance wholesome1 the physician must be our guide4 ,footnote #hh3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad-bb4 #e4 ,aristotle gives more than one suggestion as to those cases in which the terms of the thesis have a double or triple sense1 yet in which the thesis is propounded either as an universal affirmative or as an universal negative4 ,if the respondent is himself not aware of the double sense of his thesis1 while you 7the questioner7 are aware of it1 you will prove the point which you are seeking to establish against him in one or other of the two senses1 if you cannot prove it in both4 ,if he is aware of it in the double sense1 he will insist that you have chosen the sense which he did not intend4#hi ,this mode of procedure will be available to the respondent as well as to you2 but it will be harder to him1 since his thesis is universal4 ,for1 in order to make good an universal thesis1 he must obtain your assent to a preliminary assumption or convention1 that1 if he can prove it in one sense of the terms1 it shall be held proved in both2 and1 unless the proposition be so plausible that you are disposed to grant him this1 he will not succeed in the procedure4#ij ,but you on your side1 as refuting1 do not require any such preliminary convention or acquiescence2 for1 if you prove the negative in any single case1 you succeed in overthrowing the universal affirmative1 while1 if you prove the affirmative in any single case1 you succeed in overthrowing the universal negative4#ia ,such procedure1 however1 is to be adopted only when you can find no argument applicable to the equivocal thesis in all its separate meanings2 this last sort of argument1 wherever it can be found1 being always better4#ib ,footnote #hi3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #aaj1 a4 #bd4 ,footnote #ij3 ,ibid4 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 kataskeua_/zousi de prodiomologte_/on o7_/ti ei7 o7toun u7pa_/rchei1 panti u7pa_/rchei1 a7n pithanon 7 to a7xi_/ma2 ou7 gar a7po_/chr pros to deixai o7_/ti panti u7pa_/rchei to e7ph' e7nos dialechthnai4 ,footnote #ia3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #aaj1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 pln a7naskeua_/zonti men ou7den dei e7x o7mologi_/as diale_/gesthai4 ,footnote #ib3 ,ibid4 b4 #d4 ,in cases where the double meaning is manifest1 the two meanings must be distinguished by both parties1 and the argument conducted accordingly4 ,where the term has two or more meanings 7not equivocal but7 related to each other by analogy1 we must deal with each of these meanings distinctly and separately4#ic ,if our purpose is to refute1 we select any one of them in which the proposition is inadmissible1 neglecting the others3 if our purpose is to prove1 we choose any one in which the proposition is true1 neglecting the others4#id ,footnote #ic3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #aaj1 b4 #af-p4 #aaa1 a4 #g4 ,this locus is very obscurely stated by ,aristotle4 ,footnote #id3 ,ibid4 p4 #aaj1 b4 #bi-cb3 ,greek3 e7an boul_/metha kataskeua_/sai1 ta toiauta prooiste_/on o7_/sa e7nde_/chetai1 kai diairete_/on ei7s tauta mo_/non o7_/sa kai chr_/sima pros to kataskeua_/sai2 a7n d' a7naskeua_/sai1 o7_/sa m e7nde_/chetai1 ta de loipa paraleipte_/on4 ,aristotle's precepts indicate the way of managing the debate with a view to success4 #f4 ,observe that a predicate which belongs to the genus does not necessarily belong to any one of its species1 but that any predicate which belongs to one of the species does belong also to the genus2 on the other hand1 that any predicate which can be denied of the genus may be denied also of all its contained species1 but that any predicate which can be denied of some one or some portion of the contained species cannot for that reason be denied of the genus4 ,you may thus prove from one species to the genus1 and disprove from the genus to each one species2 but not vice vers4 ,thus1 if the respondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and worthless1 you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of mind estimable and worthless2 for cognition is a species under the genus habit of mind4 ,but if the negative were granted1 that there exist no cognitions both estimable and worthless1 you could not for that reason infer that there are no habits of mind estimable and worthless4 ,so1 if it were granted to you that there are judgments correct and erroneous1 you could not for that reason infer that there were perceptions of sense correct and erroneous2 perceiving by sense being a species under the genus judging4 ,but1 if it were granted that there were no judgments correct and erroneous1 you might thence infer the like negative about perceptions of sense4#ie ,footnote #ie3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #aaa1 a4 #ad-cb4 ,greek3 nun men ou7n e7k tou ge_/nous peri to ei7dos 7 a7po_/deixis2 to gar kri_/nein ge_/nos tou ai7stha_/nesthai2 o7 gar ai7sthano_/menos kri_/nei ps--o7 men ou7n pro_/teros to_/pos pseud_/s e7sti pros to kataskeua_/sai1 o7 de deu_/teros a7lth_/s4--pros de to a7naskeua_/zein o7 men pro_/teros a7lth_/s1 o7 de deu_/teros pseud_/s4 ,it is here a point deserving attention1 that ,aristotle ranks ,greek3 to ai7stha_/nesthai as a species under the genus ,greek3 to kri_/nein4 ,this is a notable circumstance in the ,aristotelian psychology4 #g4 ,keep in mind also that if there be any subject of which you can affirm the genus1 of that same subject you must be able to affirm one or other of the species contained under the genus4 ,thus1 if science be a predicate applicable1 grammar1 music1 or some other of the special sciences must also be applicable3 if any man can be called truly a scientific man1 he must be a grammarian1 a musician1 or some other specialist4 ,accordingly1 if the thesis set up by your respondent be1 ,the soul is moved1 you must examine whether any one of the known varieties of motion can be truly predicated of the soul1 e4g41 increase1 destruction1 generation1 c4 ,if none of these special predicates is applicable to the soul1 neither is the generic predicate applicable to it2 and you will thus have refuted the thesis4 ,this locus may serve as a precept for proof as well as for refutation2 for1 equally1 if the soul be moved in any one species of motion1 it is moved1 and1 if the soul be not moved in any species of motion1 it is not moved4#if ,footnote #if3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #aaa1 a4 #cc-;b4 #aa4 #h4 ,where the thesis itself presents no obvious hold for interrogation1 turn over the various definitions that have been proposed of its constituent terms2 one or other of these definitions will often afford matter for attack4#ig ,look also to the antecedents and consequents of the thesis--what must be assumed and what will follow1 if the thesis be granted4 ,if you can disprove the consequent of the proposition1 you will have disproved the proposition itself4 ,on the other hand1 if the antecedent of the proposition be proved1 the proposition itself will be proved also4#ih ,examine also whether the proposition be not true at some times1 and false at other times4 ,the thesis1 ,what takes nourishment grows necessarily1 is true not always1 but only for a certain time3 animals take nourishment during all their lives1 but grow only during a part of their lives4 ,or1 if a man should say that knowing is remembering1 this is incorrect2 for we remember nothing but events past1 whereas we know not only these1 but present and future also4#ii ,footnote #ig3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-af4 ,footnote #ih3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-bc4 ,footnote #ii3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #aaa1 b4 #bd-ca4 #i4 ,it is a sophistical procedure 7so ,aristotle terms it7 to transfer the debate to some point on which we happen to be well provided with arguments1 lying apart from the thesis defended4 ,such transfer1 however1 may be sometimes necessary4 ,in other cases it is not really but only apparently necessary2 in still other cases it is purely gratuitous1 neither really nor apparently necessary4 ,it is really necessary1 when the respondent1 having denied some proposition perfectly relevant to his thesis1 stands to his denial and accepts the debate upon it1 the proposition being one on which a good stock of arguments may be found against him2 also1 when you are endeavouring to disprove the thesis by an induction of negative analogies4#ajj ,it is only apparently1 and not really1 necessary1 when the proposition in debate is not perfectly relevant to the thesis1 but merely has the semblance of being so4 ,it is neither really nor apparently necessary1 when there does not exist even this semblance of relevance1 and when some other way is open of bringing bye-confutation to bear on the respondent4 ,you ought to avoid entirely such a procedure in this last class of cases2 for it is an abuse of the genuine purpose of ,dialectic4 ,if you do resort to it1 the respondent should grant your interrogations1 but at the same time notify that they are irrelevant to the thesis4 ,such notification will render his concessions rather troublesome than advantageous for your purpose4#aja ,footnote #ajj3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #aaa1 b4 #cb-p4 #aab1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 e7_/ti o7 sophistikos tro_/pos1 to a7_/gein ei7s toiouton pros o7 eu7por_/somen e7picheirma_/tn1 c4 ,footnote #aja3 ,ibid4 p4 #aab1 a4 #b-ae4 ,greek3 dei d' eu7labeisthai ton e7_/schaton tn r7the_/ntn tro_/pn2 pantels gar a7prtme_/nos kai a7llo_/trios e7_/oiken ei7nai ts dialektiks4 ,the epithet ,greek3 sophistikos tro_/pos is probably intended by ,aristotle to apply only to this last class of cases4 ,this paragraph is very obscure1 and is not much elucidated by the long ,scholion of ,alexander 7pp4 #bfg-bfh1 ,br474 #aj4 ,you will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by the respondent carries with it by implication many other propositions2 since every affirmation has necessary consequences1 more or fewer4 ,whoever says that ,sokrates is a man1 has said also that he is an animal1 that he is a living creature1 biped1 capable of acquiring knowledge4 ,if you can disprove any of these necessary consequences1 you will have disproved the thesis itself4 ,you must take care1 however1 that you fix upon some one of the consequences which is really easier1 and not more difficult1 to refute than the thesis itself4#ajb ,footnote #ajb3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #aab1 a4 #af-bc4 #aa4 ,perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a nature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to the subject2 e4g41 either health or sickness4 ,in that case1 if you are provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries1 the same arguments will also serve indirectly for proof1 or for disproof1 of the other4 ,thus1 if you show that one of the two contraries does belong to the subject1 the same arguments prove that the other does not2 vice vers1 if you show that one of them does not belong1 it follows that the other does4#ajc ,footnote #ajc3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #aab1 a4 #be-ca4 ,greek3 dlon ou7n o7_/ti pros a7mph chr_/simos o7 to_/pos4 #ab4 ,you may find it advantageous1 in attacking the thesis1 to construe the terms in their strict etymological sense1 rather than in the sense which common 9999usage gives them4#ajd ,footnote #ajd3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-ch3 ,greek3 e7_/ti to e7picheirein metaphe_/ronta tou7_/noma e7pi ton lo_/gon1 7s ma_/lista proskon e7klamba_/nein 7 7s keitai tou7_/noma4 ,the illustrative examples which follow prove that ,greek3 lo_/gon here means the etymological origin1 and not the definition1 which is its more usual meaning4 #ac4 ,the predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily1 or usually1 or by pure hazard4 ,you will take notice in which of these three ways the respondent affirms it1 and whether that which he chooses is conformable to the fact4 ,if he affirms it as necessary1 when it is really either usual or casual1 the thesis will be open to your attacks4 ,if he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in which of the three senses he intends it to be understood1 you are at liberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best suits your argument4#aje ,footnote #aje3 ,ibid4 b4 #a-bj4 ,this locus seems unsuitable in that part of the ,topica where ,aristotle professes to deal with theses ,greek3 tou symbebko_/tos1 or theses affirming or denying accidental predicates4 ,it is one of the suppositions here that the respondent affirms the predicate as necessary4 #ad4 ,perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly synonymous1 so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of itself4 ,on this ground it will be assailable4#ajf ,footnote #ajf3 ,ibid4 b4 #ba-bf4 #ae4 ,sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary to it4 ,if so1 you may employ in arguing against it that one among its various contraries which is most convenient for your purpose4#ajg ,perhaps the predicate 7accidental7 of the thesis may have some contrary3 if it has1 you will examine whether that contrary belongs to the subject of the thesis2 and1 should such be the case1 you may use it as an argument to refute the thesis itself4#ajh ,or the predicate of the thesis may be such that1 if the thesis be granted1 it will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates must belong to the same subject4 ,thus1 if the thesis be that the ,platonic ,ideas exist in us1 it follows necessarily that they are both in motion and at rest2 both perceivable by sense1 and cogitable by intellect4#aji ,as these two predicates 7those constituting the first pair as well as the second pair7 are contrary to each other1 and cannot both belong to the same subject1 this may be used as an argument against the thesis from which such consequence follows4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #aab1 b4 #bh-p4 #aac1 a4 #ai4 ,greek3 dlon ou7n e7k tn ei7rme_/nn o7_/ti t au7t plei_/ona e7nanti_/a sumbai_/nei gi_/nesthai4--lamba_/nein ou7n tn e7nanti_/n o7po_/teron a7n 7 pros tn the_/sin chr_/simon4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #aac1 a4 #bj-bc4 ,footnote #aji3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #aac1 a4 #bd-cb3 ,greek3 7 ei7_/ ti toiouton ei7_/rtai kata_/ tinos1 ou7 o7_/ntos a7na_/gk ta e7nanti_/a u7pa_/rchein2 oi7on ei7 tas i7de_/as e7n 7min e7_/phsen ei7nai2 kineisthai_/ te gar kai 7remein au7tas sumb_/setai1 e7_/ti de ai7sthtas kai notas ei7nai4 ,aristotle then proceeds to state how this consequence arises4 ,those who affirm the ,platonic ,ideas1 assign to them as fundamental characteristic1 that they are at rest and cogitable4 ,but1 if the ,ideas exist in us1 they must be moveable1 because we are moved2 they must also be perceivable by sense1 because it is through vision only that we discriminate and know differences of form4 ,waitz observes 7in regard to the last pair1 ,greek3 kai ai7sthtai_/73 ,nam singul ide certam quandam rerum speciem et formam exprimunt3 species autem et forma oculis cernitur4 ,i do not clearly see1 however1 that this is a consequence of affirming ,ideas to be ,greek3 e7n 7min2 it is equally true if they are not ,greek3 e7n 7min4 #af4 ,we know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries1 is capable also of becoming recipient of the other4 ,if1 therefore1 the predicate of the thesis has any contrary1 you will examine whether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such contrary4 ,if not1 you have an argument against the thesis4 ,let the thesis be1 ,the appetitive principle is ignorant4 ,if this be true1 that principle must be capable of knowledge4#aaj ,since this last is not generally admitted1 you have an argument against the thesis4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #aac1 a4 #cc-;b4 #aj4 #ag4 ,we recognize four varieties of ,opposita3 7#a7 ,contradictory2 7#b7 ,contrary2 7#c7 ,habitus and ,privatio2 7#d7 ,relata4 ,you will consider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon the thesis in debate4 ,in regard to ,contradictories1 you are entitled1 converting the terms of the thesis1 to deny the predicate of the converted proposition respecting the negation of the subject4 ,thus1 if man is an animal1 you are entitled to infer1 ,what is not an animal is not a man4 ,you will prove this to be an universal rule by ,induction2 that is1 by citing a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably true1 without possibility of finding any one case in which it does not apply4 ,if you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the thesis--,what is not an animal is not a man--you will have proved or disproved1 the thesis itself1 ,man is an animal4 ,this locus is available both for assailant and respondent4#aaa ,footnote #aaa3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #aac1 b4 #ae-bf3 ,greek3 e7pei d' ai7 a7ntithe_/sis te_/ssares1 skopein e7k men tn a7ntipha_/sen e7k ts a7kolouth_/ses kai a7nairounti kai kataskeua_/zonti2 lamba_/nein d' e7x e7paggs1 oi7on ei7 o7 a7_/nthrpos zon1 to m zon ou7k a7_/nthrpos2 o7moi_/s de kai e7pi tn a7_/lln--e7pi pa_/ntn ou7n to toiouton a7xite_/on4 ,aristotle's declaration1 that this great logical rule can only be proved by ,induction1 deserves notice4 ,i have remarked the same thing about his rules for the conversion of propositions1 in the beginning of the ,analytica ,priora4 ,see above1 p4 #ade1 seq4 ,in regard to ,contraries1 you will study the thesis1 to see whether the contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the subject1 or whether the contrary of the subject can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate4 ,this last alternative occurs sometimes1 but not often2 in general the first alternative is found to be true4 ,you must make good your point here also by ,induction1 or by repetition of particular examples4 ,this locus will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that of defence1 according to circumstances4 ,if neither of the two alternatives above-mentioned is found correct1 this is an argument against the thesis4#aab ,footnote #aab3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #aac1 b4 #bg-p4 #aad1 a4 #f4 ,greek3 lamba_/nein de kai ta toiauta e7x e7paggs1 e7ph' o7_/son chr_/simon4--spa_/nion de to a7na_/palin e7pi tn e7nanti_/n sumbai_/nei1 a7lla tois plei_/stois e7pi tau7ta 7 a7kolou_/thsis4 ei7 ou7n mt' e7pi tau7ta t e7nanti_/ to e7nanti_/on a7kolouthei m_/te a7na_/palin1 dlon o7_/ti ou7de tn r7the_/ntn a7kolouthei to e7_/teron t e7te_/r4 ,in regard to ,habitus and ,privatio1 the rule is the same as about ,contraries2 only that the first of the two above alternatives always holds1 and the second never occurs4#aac ,if sensible perception can be predicated of vision1 insensibility also can be predicated of blindness2 otherwise1 the thesis fails4 ,footnote #aac3 ,ibid4 p4 #aad1 a4 #g-ab4 ,in regard to ,relata1 the inference holds from the correlate of the subject to the correlate of the predicate4 ,if knowledge is belief1 that which is known is believed2 if vision is sensible perception1 that which is visible is sensibly perceivable4 ,some say that there are cases in which the above does not hold2 e4g41 ,that which is sensibly perceivable is knowable2 yet sensible perception is not knowledge4 ,but this objection is not valid2 for many persons dispute the first of the two propositions4 ,this locus will be equally available for the purpose of refutation--thus1 you may argue--,that which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable1 because sensible perception is not knowledge4#aad ,footnote #aad3 ,ibid4 a4 #ac-be4 #ah4 ,you will look at the terms of the proposition1 also1 in regard to their ,derivatives1 ,inflections1 c41 and to matters associated with them in the way of production1 preservation1 c4 ,this locus serves both for proof and for refutation4 ,what is affirmable of the subject1 is affirmable also of its derivatives3 what is not affirmable of the derivatives1 is not affirmable of the subject itself4#aae ,footnote #aae3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #aad1 a4 #bf-;b4 #e4 ,greek3 du_/stoicha1 pt_/seis1 ta poitika kai phulaktika_/--dlon ou7n o7_/ti e7nos o7poiououn deichthe_/ntos tn kata tn au7tn sustoichi_/an a7gathou 7 e7painetou1 kai ta loipa pa_/nta dedeigme_/na gi_/netai4--b4 #bc3 ,greek3 7n men gar ta poitika a7gatha_/1 kai au7ta tn a7gathn1 7n de ta phthartika a7gatha_/1 au7ta tn kakn4 #ai4 ,arguments may often be drawn1 both for proof and for refutation1 from matters ,similar or ,analogous to the subject or predicate of the thesis4 ,thus1 if one and the same cognition comprehends many things1 one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things4 ,if to possess vision is to see1 then also to possess audition is to hear4 ,if to possess audition is not to hear1 then neither is to possess vision to see4 ,the argument may be urged whether the resemblance is real or only generally supposed4 ,sometimes1 however1 the inference will not hold from one to many4 ,thus1 if to know is to cogitate1 then to know many things should be to cogitate many things4 ,but this last is impossible4 ,a man may know many things1 but he cannot cogitate many things2 therefore1 to know is not to cogitate4#aaf ,footnote #aaf3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #aad1 b4 #be-cf3 ,greek3 pa_/lin e7pi tn o7moi_/n1 ei7 o7moi_/s e7_/chei1--kai e7pi tn o7_/ntn kai tn dokou_/ntn2 chr_/simos d' o7 to_/pos pros a7_/mph2--skopein de kai ei7 e7ph' e7nos kai ei7 e7pi polln o7moi_/s e7_/chei2 e7niachou gar diaphnei4 #bj4 ,there are various loci for argument1 arising from degrees of ,comparison--more1 less1 equally4 ,one is the argument from concomitant variations1 which is available both for proof and for disproof4 ,if to do injustice is evil1 to do more injustice is more evil4 ,if an increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of the predicate1 then the predicate is truly affirmed2 if not1 not4 ,this may be shown by ,induction1 or repetition of particular instances4#aag ,again1 suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of two distinct subjects ,a and ,b1 but to be more probably affirmable of ,a than of ,b4 ,then1 if you can show that it does not belong to ,a1 you may argue 7 fortiori7 that it does not belong to ,b2 or1 if you can show that it belongs to ,b1 you may argue 7 fortiori7 that it belongs also to ,a4 ,or1 if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability1 then1 if you can disprove the more probable of the two1 you may argue from thence in disproof of the less probable2 and1 if you can prove the less probable1 you may argue from thence in proof of the more probable4 ,or1 if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability1 then1 if you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against the less probable2 and1 if you can prove the less probable1 you are furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable4#aah ,if the degrees of probability1 instead of being unequal1 are equal or alike1 you may still1 in the cases mentioned1 argue in like manner from proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other4#aai ,footnote #aag3 ,ibid4 b4 #cg-p4 #aae1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 ei7si de tou mallon to_/poi te_/ssares1 ei7s men ei7 a7kolouthei to mallon t mallon1--chr_/simos de pros a7_/mph o7 to_/pos2 ei7 men gar a7kolouthei t tou u7pokeime_/nou e7pido_/sei 7 tou sumbebko_/tos e7pi_/dosis1 katha_/per ei7_/rtai1 dlon o7_/ti sumbe_/bken1 ei7 de m a7kolouthei1 ou7 sumbe_/bken4 touto d' e7pagg lpte_/on4 ,footnote #aah3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #aae1 a4 #e-ad4 ,footnote #aai3 ,ibid4 a4 #ae-bd3 ,greek3 e7k tou o7moi_/s u7pa_/rchein 7 dokein u7pa_/rchein1 c4 #ba4 ,another locus for argument is1 that ex adjuncto4 ,if the subject1 prior to adjunction of the attribute1 be not white or good1 and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good1 then1 you may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good4 ,and you might argue in like manner1 if the subject prior to adjunction were to a certain extent white or good1 but became more white or more good after such adjunction4#abj ,but this locus will not be found available for the negative inference or refutation4 ,you cannot argue1 because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good1 that therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good4#aba ,footnote #abj3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #aae1 a4 #bf-cc4 ,footnote #aba3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-;b4 #b4 #bb4 ,if the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less degree1 it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely4 ,unless the subject be one that can be called white or good1 you can never call it more white or more good4 ,this locus again1 however1 cannot be employed in the negative1 for the purpose of refutation4 ,because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or less degree1 you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be affirmed of the subject at all4 ,sokrates cannot be called in greater or less degree a man2 but you cannot thence infer that he is not called a man simply4#abb ,if the predicate can be denied of the subject simply and absolutely1 it can be denied thereof with every sort of qualification3 if it can be affirmed of the subject with qualification1 it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely1 as a possible predicate4#abc ,this1 however1 when it comes to be explained1 means only that it can be affirmed of some among the particulars called by the name of the subject4 ,aristotle recognizes that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject secundum quid1 and denied of the subject simply and absolutely4 ,in some places 7as among the ,triballi71 it is honourable to sacrifice your father2 simply and absolutely1 it is not honourable4 ,to one who is sick1 it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment2 speaking simply and absolutely 7i4e41 to persons generally in the ordinary state of health71 it is not advantageous4 ,it is only when you can truly affirm the proposition1 without adding any qualifying words1 that the proposition is true simply and absolutely4#abd ,footnote #abb3 ,ibid4 b4 #c-aj4 ,footnote #abc3 ,ibid4 b4 #aa-ce4 ,greek3 ei7 gar kata_/ ti e7nde_/chetai1 kai a7pls e7nde_/chetai4 ,footnote #abd3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #aae1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 7_/ste o7 a7n mdenos prostitheme_/nou dok ei7nai kalon 7 ai7schron 7 a7_/llo ti tn toioutn1 a7pls r7th_/setai4 ,,iii4 ,such are the chief among the thirty-seven ,loci which ,aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of ,accident--not of ,genus1 or ,proprium1 or ,definition4 ,he proceeds 7in the ,third ,book of the ,topica7 to deal separately with one special branch of such theses1 respecting ,expetenda and ,fugienda3 where the question put is1 ,of two or more distinct subjects1 which is the more desirable or the better8 ,the cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable1 but where there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them1 so as to warrant doubt and debate4#abe ,footnote #abe3 ,ibid4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aaf1 a4 #a-ab3 ,greek3 ,po_/teron d' ai7ret_/teron 7 be_/ltion duein 7 pleio_/nn1 e7k tnde skepte_/on4 c4 ,we must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently among the dialectical debates of ,aristotle's contemporaries2 so that he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in the best manner4 #a4 ,of two good subjects compared1 that is better and more desirable which is the more lasting2 or which is preferred by the wise and good man2 or by the professional artist in his own craft2 or by right law2 or by the multitude1 all or most of them4 ,that is absolutely or simply better and more desirable1 which is declared to be such by the better cognition2 that is better to any given individual1 which is declared to be better by his own cognition4#abf ,footnote #abf3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aaf1 a4 #ac-bb4 #b4 ,that is more desirable which is included in the genus good1 than what is not so included2 that which is desirable on its own account and per se1 is better than what is desirable only on account of something else and per accidens2 the cause of what is good in itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by accident4#abg ,footnote #abg3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc-;b4 #g4 #c4 ,what is good absolutely and simply 7i4e41 to all and at all times7 is better than what is good only for a special occasion or individual2 thus1 to be in good health is better than being cut for the stone4 ,what is good by nature is better than what is good not by nature2 e4g41 justice 7good by nature71 than the just individual1 whose character must have been acquired4#abh ,what is good1 or what is peculiarly appurtenant1 to the more elevated of two subjects is better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated4 ,good1 having its place in the better1 prior1 and more exalted elements of any subject1 is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative1 secondary1 and less exalted2 thus1 health1 which has its seat in proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of the body 7wet1 dry1 hot1 cold71 is better than strength or beauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles1 beauty in proper symmetry of the limbs4#abi ,next1 an end is superior to that which is means thereunto2 and1 in comparing two distinct means1 that which is nearer to the end is the better4 ,that which tends to secure the great end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end2 means to happiness is better than means to intelligence2 also the possible end1 to the impossible4 ,comparing one subject as means with another subject as end1 we must examine whether the second end is more superior to the end produced by the first subject1 than the end produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first subject itself4 ,for example1 in the two ends1 happiness and health1 if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater proportion than health surpasses the means of health1 then the means producing happiness is better than the end health4#acj ,footnote #abh3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aaf1 b4 #g-ab4 ,footnote #abi3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-bb3 ,greek3 kai to e7n belti_/osin 7 prote_/rois 7 timite_/rois be_/ltion1 oi7on u7gi_/eia i7schu_/os kai ka_/llous4 7 men gar e7n u7grois kai xrois kai thermois kai psuchrois1 a7pls d' ei7pein e7x 7n pr_/tn sune_/stke to zon1 ta d' e7n tois u7ste_/rois2 7 men gar i7schus e7n tois neu_/rois kai o7stois1 to de ka_/llos tn meln tis summetri_/a dokei ei7nai4 ,the reason given in this locus for superior estimation is a very curious one3 the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them4 ,also1 the definition of beauty deserves attention3 the ,greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face4 ,footnote #acj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bb-cf4 ,again1 that which is more beautiful1 honourable1 and praiseworthy per se1 is better than what possesses these same attributes in equal degree but only on account of some other consequence4 ,thus1 friendship is superior to wealth1 justice to strength2 for no one values wealth except for its consequences1 whereas we esteem friendship per se1 even though no consequences ensue from it4#aca ,footnote #aca3 ,ibid4 b4 #cc-p4 #aag1 a4 #d4 ,where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned1 we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each1 especially to the consequents2 and1 according as these exhibit most of good or least of evil1 we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong4#acb ,the larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller4 ,sometimes what is not in itself good1 if cast into the same lot with other things very good1 is preferable to another thing that is in itself good4 ,thus1 what is not per se good1 if it goes along with happiness1 is preferable even to justice and courage4 ,the same things1 when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain1 are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain4#acc ,everything is better1 at the season when it tells for most1 than itself at any other season2 thus1 intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth2 but courage and temperance are more indispensably required1 and therefore more to be esteemed1 in youth than in old age4 ,what is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then2 e4g41 justice and moderation1 as compared with courage3 also that which being possessed by every one1 the other would not be required2 e4g41 justice is better than courage1 for1 if every one were just1 courage would not be required4#acd ,footnote #acb3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aag1 a4 #e-ae4 ,footnote #acc3 ,ibid4 a4 #af-be4 ,footnote #acd3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf-;b4 #b4 ,among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable2 that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored2 that which is nearer or more like to the ,summum ,bonum or to that which is better than itself 7unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side1 in the nature of a caricature1 as the ape is to man#ace72 that which is the more conspicuous2 the more difficult to attain2 the more special and peculiar2 the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments2 that which we can best share with friends2 that which we wish to do to our friends1 rather than to ordinary strangers 7e4g41 doing justice or conferring benefit1 than seeming to do so2 for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality1 while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so#acf72 that which we cannot obtain from others1 as compared with that which can be hired2 that which is unconditionally desirable1 as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it2 that of which the absence is a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed2#acg that which does good to the proprietor1 or to the best parts of the proprietor 7to his mind rather than his body72#ach that which is eligible on its own ground1 rather than from opinion of others2 that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly1 than either4#aci ,acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries1 and are sometimes more eligible3 thus1 to live well is better than life simply2 philosophizing is better than money-making2 but sometimes necessaries are more eligible1 as1 e4g41 to a starving man4 ,speaking generally1 necessaries are more eligible2 but the others are better4#adj ,footnote #ace3 ,ibid4 p4 #aag1 b4 #b-ag4 ,greek3 skopein de kai ei7 e7pi ta geloio_/tera ei7_/ o7_/moion1 katha_/per o7 pi_/thkos t a7nthr_/p1 tou i7_/ppou m o7_/ntos o7moi_/ou2 ou7 gar ka_/llion o7 pi_/thkos1 o7moio_/teron de t a7nthr_/p4 ,footnote #acf3 ,ibid4 b4 #bj-p4 #aah1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 a7 pros ton phi_/lon praxai mallon boulo_/metha 7 a7 pros ton tucho_/nta1 tauta ai7ret_/tera1 oi7on to dikaiopragein kai eu7 poiein mallon 7 to dokein2 tous gar phi_/lous eu7 poiein boulo_/metha mallon 7 dokein1 tous de tucho_/ntas a7na_/palin4 ,footnote #acg3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 ii4 p4 #aah1 a4 #af-bf4 ,footnote #ach3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #aah1 a4 #bi4 ,footnote #aci3 ,ibid4 b4 #bj4 ,the definition of this last condition is--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that we possessed it3 ,greek3 o7_/ros de tou pros do_/xan1 to mdenos suneido_/tos m a7n spouda_/sai u7pa_/rchein4 ,footnote #adj3 ,ibid4 p4 #aah1 a4 #f-ad4 ,greek3 ou7 gar ei7 belti_/1 a7nagkaion kai ai7ret_/tera2 to goun philosophein be_/ltion tou chrmati_/zesthai1 a7ll' ou7ch ai7ret_/teron t e7ndeei tn a7nagkai_/n4 to d' e7k periousi_/as e7sti_/n1 o7_/tan u7parcho_/ntn tn a7nagkai_/n a7_/lla tina proskataskeua_/ztai_/ tis tn kaln4 schedon d' i7_/ss ai7ret_/teron to a7nagkaio_/n e7sti1 be_/ltion de to e7k periousi_/as4 ,among many other loci1 applicable to this same question of comparative excellence between two different subjects1 one more will suffice here4 ,you must distinguish the various ends in relation to which any given subject is declared to be eligible3 the advantageous1 the beautiful1 the agreeable4 ,that which conduces to all the three is more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only4 ,if there be two subjects1 both of them conducive to the same end among the three1 you must examine which of them conduces to it most4 ,again1 that which conduces to the better end 7e4g41 to virtue rather than to pleasure7 is the more eligible4 ,the like comparison may be applied to the ,fugienda as well as to the ,expetenda4 ,that is most to be avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions3 e4g41 sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form2 for sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from pleasure4#ada ,footnote #ada3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #aah1 b4 #bg-cf4 ,the same loci which are available for the question of comparison will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or positive ineligibility4#adb ,further1 it holds for all cases of the kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms that each case admits3 in this way it will cover a greater number of particulars4 ,slight mutations of language will often here strengthen your case3 that which is 7good7 by nature is more 7good7 than that which is 7good7 not by nature2 that which makes the subject to which it is better than that which does not make the subject good4#adc ,footnote #adb3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #aai1 a4 #a4 ,footnote #adc3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 v4 p4 #aai1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 lpte_/on d' o7_/ti ma_/lista katho_/lou tous to_/pous peri tou mallon kai tou mei_/zonos2 lphthe_/ntes gar ou7_/ts pros plei_/ chr_/simoi a7n ei7_/san4 ,the loci just enumerated are ,universal1 and applicable to the debate of theses propounded in universal terms2 but they will also be applicable1 if the thesis propounded be a ,particular proposition4 ,if you prove the universal affirmative1 you will at the same time prove the particular2 if you prove the universal negative1 you prove the particular negative also4 ,the universal loci from ,opposites1 from ,conjugates1 from ,inflections1 will be alike applicable to particular propositions4 ,thus1 if we look at the universal locus from ,contraries1 ,if all pleasure is good1 then all pain is evil1--this will apply also to the particular1 ,if some pleasure is good1 then some pain is evil3 in the particular as in the universal form the proposition is alike an ,endox or conformable to common received opinion4 ,the like may be said about the loci from ,habitus and ,privatio2 also about those from ,generation and ,destruction2#add again1 from ,more1 ,less1 and ,equally--this last1 however1 with some restriction1 for the locus from ,less will serve only for proving an affirmative4 ,thus1 if some capacity is a less good than science1 while yet some capacity is a good1 then1 fortiori1 some science is a good4 ,but1 if you take the same locus in the negative and say that the capacity is a good1 you will not be warranted in saying1 for that reason1 that no science is a good4#ade ,you may apply this same locus from ,less to compare1 not merely two subjects in different genera1 but also two subjects of different degrees under the same genus4 ,thus1 let the thesis be1 ,some science or cognition is a good4 ,you will disprove this thesis1 if you can show that prudence 7,greek3 phro_/nsis7 is not a good2 for1 if prudence1 which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good1 be really not so1 you may argue that1 fortiori no other science can be so4 ,again1 let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that1 if it can be proved true or false in any one case1 it shall be accepted as true or false in all universally 7for example1 that1 if the human soul is immortal1 all other souls are immortal also2 or if not that1 then none of the others73 evidently1 the propounder of such a thesis extends the particular into an universal4 ,if he propounds his thesis affirmatively1 you must try to prove the negative in some particular case2 for this1 under the conditions supposed1 will be equivalent to proving an universal negative4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he puts his thesis negatively1 you will try to prove some particular affirmative2 which 7always under the given conditions7 will carry the universal affirmative also4#adf ,footnote #add3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #aai1 a4 #cb-;b4 #af4 ,greek3 o7moi_/s gar e7_/ndoxon to a7xisai1 ei7 pasa 7don a7gatho_/n1 kai lu_/pn pasan ei7nai kako_/n1 t ei7_/ tis 7don a7gatho_/n1 kai lu_/pn ei7nai_/ tina kako_/n--e7n a7_/pasi gar o7moi_/s to e7_/ndoxon4 ,footnote #ade3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-cj4 ,greek3 dlon ou7n o7_/ti kataskeua_/zein mo_/non e7k tou 7tton e7_/stin4 ,footnote #adf3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #aai1 b4 #ca-p4 #abj1 a4 #e4 ,suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely1 not carrying the indication either of universal or particular2 e4g41 ,pleasure is good4 ,this can be proved by showing either that all pleasure is good1 or that some pleasure is good2 while it can be refuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no pleasure is good4#adg ,but1 if the thesis be divested of its indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as particular1 there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it4 ,if it be farther specialized--e4g41 ,one pleasure only is good--there will be three ways of refuting3 you may show either that all pleasures are good2 or that no pleasure is good2 or that more pleasures than one are good4 ,if the proposition be specialized farther still--e4g41 ,prudence alone among all the virtues is science1--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it3 you may prove either that all virtue is science2 or that no virtue is science2 or that some other virtue 7such as justice7 is science2 or that prudence is not science4#adh ,footnote #adg3 ,ibid4 p4 #abj1 a4 #f-bj3 ,greek3 a7diori_/stou men ou7n o7_/ntos tou probl_/matos monachs a7naskeua_/zein e7nde_/chetai--a7nairein men monachs e7nde_/chetai1 kataskeua_/zein de dichs4 c4 ,footnote #adh3 ,ibid4 a4 #ae-ca4 ,in dealing with a particular proposition as thesis1 still other loci already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will be available4 ,you will run through the particulars comprised in the subject1 distributed into genera and species4 ,when you have produced a number of particulars successively to establish the universal1 affirmative or negative1 you are warranted in calling on the respondent either to admit the universal1 or to produce on his side some adverse particular4#adi ,you will also 7as was before recommended7 distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various species which it comprehends4 ,if no one of these species be truly affirmable of the subject1 then neither can the genus be truly affirmable2 so that you will have refuted the thesis1 supposing it to be affirmative4 ,if1 on the contrary1 any one of the species be truly affirmable of the subject1 then the genus will also be truly affirmable2 so that you will have refuted the thesis1 supposing it to be negative4 ,thus1 if the thesis propounded be1 ,the soul is a number3 you divide number into its two species1 odd and even1 and prove that the soul is neither odd nor even2 wherefore1 it is not a number4#aej ,footnote #adi3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-ch3 ,greek3 a7_/n te gar panti phai_/ntai u7pa_/rchon a7_/n te mdeni_/1 polla proene_/gkanti a7xite_/on katho_/lou o7mologein1 7 phe_/rein e7_/nstasin e7pi ti_/nos ou7ch ou7_/ts4 ,footnote #aej3 ,topic4 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #abj1 a4 #cg-;b4 #f4 ,it would appear from the examples here given by ,aristotle--,greek3 o7 chro_/nos ou7 kineitai1 o7 chro_/nos ou7_/k e7sti ki_/nsis1 7 psuch ou7_/k e7stin a7rithmo_/s1 that he considers these propositions as either indefinite or particular4 ,,iv4 ,after this long catalogue of ,loci belonging to debate on propositions of ,accident1 ,aristotle proceeds to enumerate those applicable to propositions of ,genus and of ,proprium4 ,neither ,genus nor ,proprium is often made subject of debate as such2 but both of them are constituent elements of the debate respecting ,definition1 which is of frequent occurrence4#aea ,for that reason1 both deserve to be studied4 ,footnote #aea3 ,ibid4 ,,iv4 i4 p4 #abj1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 meta de tauta peri tn pros to ge_/nos kai to i7_/dion e7piskepte_/on2 e7_/sti de tauta stoicheia tn pros tous o7_/rous2 peri au7tn de tou_/tn o7liga_/kis ai7 ske_/pseis gi_/nontai tois dialegome_/nois4 ,when the thesis propounded affirms that ,a is genus of ,b1 you will run over all the cognates of ,b1 and see whether there is any one among them respecting which ,a cannot be affirmed as genus4 ,if there be1 this is a good argument against the thesis2 for the genus ought to be predicable of all4 ,next1 whether what is really no more than an accident is affirmed as genus1 which ought to belong to the essence of the subject4 ,perhaps 7e4g47 white is affirmed in the thesis as being genus of snow2 but white cannot be truly so affirmed2 for it is not of the essence of snow1 but is only a quality or accident4#aeb ,examine whether the predicate ,a comes under the definition already given of an ,accident1--that which may or may not be predicated of the subject2 also1 whether ,a and ,b both fall under the same one out of the ten ,categories or ,predicaments4 ,if ,b the subject comes under ,essentia1 or ,quale1 or ,ad ,aliquid1 the predicate ought also to belong to ,essentia1 or ,quale1 or ,ad ,aliquid3 the species and the genus ought to come under the same ,category4#aec ,if this be not the case in a thesis of ,genus1 the thesis cannot be maintained4 ,footnote #aeb3 ,ibid4 b4 #bc-bi4 ,footnote #aec3 ,ibid4 p4 #abj1 b4 #cf-p4 #aba1 a4 #i4 ,greek3 katho_/lou d' ei7pein u7po tn au7tn diai_/resin dei to ge_/nos t ei7_/dei ei7nai4 ,aristotle here enunciates this as universally true1 whereas if we turn to ,categor4 p4 #aa1 a4 #bd1 seq4 we shall find him declaring it not to be universally true4 ,compare also ,topic4 ,,iv4 iv4 p4 #abd1 b4 #ae4 ,you are aware that the species always partakes of the genus1 while the genus never partakes of the species2 to partake meaning that the species includes the essence or definition of the genus1 but the genus never includes the essence or definition of the species4 ,you will examine1 therefore1 whether in the thesis propounded to you this condition is realized2 if not1 the thesis may be refuted4 ,suppose1 e4g41 that it enunciates some superior genus as including ,ens or ,unum4 ,if this were true1 the genus so assigned would still partake of ,ens and ,unum2 for ,ens and ,unum maybe predicated of all existences whatever4 ,therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a genus1 cannot be a real genus4#aed ,footnote #aed3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 i4 p4 #aba1 a4 #aj-ai4 ,perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject 7species7 may be truly affirmed1 while the predicate 7genus7 cannot be truly affirmed4 ,if so1 the predicate is not a real genus4 ,thus1 the thesis may enunciate ,ens or ,scibile as being the genus of ,opinabile4 ,but this last1 the species or subject ,opinabile1 may be affirmed respecting ,non-,ens also2 while the predicates ,ens or ,scibile 7given as the pretended genus of ,opinabile7 cannot be affirmed respecting ,non-,ens4 ,you can thus show that ,ens or ,scibile is not the real genus of ,opinabile4#aee ,the pretended species ,opinabile 7comprising as it does both ,ens and ,non-,ens7 stretches farther than the pretended genus ,ens or ,scibile3 whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any portion of its constituent species4#aef ,the thesis may thus be overthrown1 if there be any one species which stretches even equally far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus4#aeg ,footnote #aee3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj-bf4 ,footnote #aef3 ,ibid4 b4 #a-ad4 ,greek3 stoicheion de pros a7_/panta ta toiauta1 to e7pi ple_/on to ge_/nos 7 to ei7dos kai tn diaphoran le_/gesthai2 e7p' e7_/latton gar kai 7 diaphora tou ge_/nous le_/getai4 ,footnote #aeg3 ,ibid4 b4 #d4 ,it is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two distinct genera1 unless one of the two be subordinate to the other1 or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher genus4 ,you will examine1 therefore1 whether there is any other genus1 besides the predicate of the thesis1 to which the subject of the thesis can be referred4 ,if there be some other genus1 not under either of the two conditions above indicated1 the predicate enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject4 ,thus1 if the thesis declares justice to be science 7or to belong to the genus science71 you may remark that there is another distinct genus 7virtue7 to which justice also belongs4 ,in this particular case1 however1 it would be replied that science and virtue can both be referred to one and the same higher genus1 viz41 habit and disposition4 ,therefore the thesis1 ,justice is science1 will not be truly open to objection on this ground4#aeh ,footnote #aeh3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 ii4 p4 #aba1 b4 #bd1 seq4 ,again1 if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the subject1 all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained must also be predicated in ,quid 7as the predicate itself is99997 respecting the subject4 ,this you must show by an induction of particular instances1 no counter-instance being producible4#aei ,if the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition1 you will have a good argument against it4 ,you will also run over the sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis1 considered as a genus2 and you will examine whether the predicate of the thesis 7together with all its superior genera7 is predicable essentially or in ,quid of all these sub-species4 ,if you can find any one among these sub-species1 of which it is not essentially predicable1 the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the subject2#afj the like also1 if the definitions of those genera are not predicable of the subject or its sub-species4#afa ,footnote #aei3 ,ibid4 p4 #abb1 a4 #e-ai4 ,greek3 o7_/ti de e7nos e7n t ti_/ e7sti katgoroume_/nou pa_/nta ta loipa_/1 a7_/nper katgortai1 e7n t ti_/ e7sti katgorth_/setai1 di' e7paggs lpte_/on4 ,footnote #afj3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba-;b4 #f4 ,footnote #afa3 ,ibid4 b4 #g-aa4 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n diaphnei1 dlon o7_/ti ou7 ge_/nos to a7podothe_/n4 ,perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing more than a differentia4 ,it may also enunciate the differentia either as a part of the genus or as a part of the species2 or it may enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part of the species4 ,all these are attackable4 ,the differentia is not a genus1 nor does it respond to the question ,quid est1 but to the question ,quale quid est4 ,it is always either 9999more extensive than the species1 or co-extensive therewith4#afb ,if none of the differenti belonging to a genus can be predicated of a species1 neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof4 ,thus1 neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul2 accordingly1 neither can the genus 7number7 be predicated of the soul4#afc ,if the species be prius natur1 so that when it disappears the enunciated genus disappears along with it1 this cannot be the real genus2 nor1 if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear and yet the species does not disappear along with them4#afd ,if the species partakes of 7includes in its essence7 something contrary to the enunciated genus1 this last cannot be the real genus2 nor1 if the species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in that genus4 ,thus1 if the soul partakes of 7or includes in its essence7 life1 and if no number can possibly live1 the soul cannot be a species of number4#afe ,footnote #afb3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-p4 #abc1 a4 #aj4 ,greek3 ou7de dokei mete_/chein 7 diaphora tou ge_/nous2 pan gar to mete_/chon tou ge_/nous 7 ei7dos 7 a7_/tomo_/n e7stin4 a7ei gar 7 diaphora e7p' i7_/ss 7 e7pi pleion tou ei7_/dous le_/getai4--e7pi ple_/on te gar to ge_/nos ts diaphoras dei le_/gesthai1 kai m mete_/chein ts diaphoras4 ,as an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the species 7,greek3 ei7 to ge_/nos ei7s to ei7dos e7_/thken71 ,aristotle cites a definition given by ,plato1 who defined ,greek3 tn kata to_/pon ki_/nsin1 as ,greek3 phora_/n4 ,now ,greek3 phora is less extensive in its meaning than ,greek3 7 kata to_/pon ki_/nsis1 which includes ,greek3 ba_/disis and other terms of motion apart from or foreign to ,greek3 phora_/4--,example of enunciating differentia as a genus is1 if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs4 ,immortal is the differentia belonging to ,greek3 zon1 and constituting therewith the species god4--,example of enclosing the differentia in the genus is1 if odd be given as the essence of number 7,greek3 o7_/per a7rithmo_/n74--,example of enclosing differentia in the species is1 if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god 7,greek3 o7_/per theo_/n74--,example of enclosing the genus in the differentia is1 number given as the essence of the odd4--,example of enunciating the genus as a differentia is1 when change of place is given as the differentia of ,greek3 phora_/4 ,footnote #afc3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 ii4 p4 #abc1 a4 #aa-ad4 ,footnote #afd3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad-ai4 ,footnote #afe3 ,ibid4 iii4 a4 #bj-bf4 ,again1 the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in signification4 ,you must examine 7according to the tests indicated in the ,first ,book of the ,topica7 whether it be taken equivocally in the thesis4 ,if it be so1 you have a ground of attack1 and also if it be taken metaphorically2 for every genus ought to be enunciated in the proper sense of the term1 and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a genus4#aff ,note farther that every true genus has more than one distinct species4 ,you will1 therefore1 examine whether any other species1 besides the subject of the thesis1 can be suggested as belonging to the predicate of the thesis4 ,if none1 that predicate cannot be the true genus of the subject4#afg ,footnote #aff3 ,ibid4 a4 #bg-cg4 ,greek3 skopein de kai ei7 to metaphora lego_/menon 7s ge_/nos a7pode_/dken1 oi7on tn sphrosu_/nn sumphni_/an2 pan gar ge_/nos kuri_/s kata tn ei7dn katgoreitai1 7 de sumphni_/a kata ts sphrosu_/ns ou7 kuri_/s a7lla metaphora2 pasa gar sumphni_/a e7n phtho_/ggois4 ,footnote #afg3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 iii4 p4 #abc1 a4 #cj4 ,several loci are furnished by ,contraries1 either to the species or the genus4 ,if there be something contrary to the species1 but nothing contrary to the genus1 then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself2 but1 if there be something contrary to the species1 and also something contrary to the genus1 then that which is contrary to the species ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus4 ,each of these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular cases4#afh ,if that which is contrary to the species be a genus itself 7e4g41 bonum7 and not included in any superior genus1 then the like will be true respecting the species itself3 it will not be included in any genus2 and the predicate of the thesis will not be a true genus4 ,bonum and malum are not included in any common superior genus2 each is a genus per se4#afi ,or suppose that the subject 7species7 of the thesis1 and the predicate 7genus7 of the thesis1 have both of them contraries2 but that in the one there is an intermediate between the two contraries1 and in the other1 not4 ,this shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species2 for1 wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of the species1 there also is an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus2 and vice vers4#agj ,if there be an intermediate between the two contraries of the species1 and also an intermediate between the two contraries of the genus1 you will examine whether both intermediates are of like nature1 designated by analogous terms4 ,if it be not so 7if1 e4g41 the one intermediate is designated by a positive term1 and the other only by a negative term71 you will have ground for contending against the thesis1 that the predicate enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject4 ,at any rate1 this is a probable 7,greek3 e7_/ndoxon7 dialectical argument--to insist upon analogy between the two intermediates2 though there are some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold4#aga ,footnote #afh3 ,ibid4 b4 #a-h4 ,greek3 phaneron de tou_/tn e7_/kaston dia ts e7paggs4 ,footnote #afi3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ab4 ,footnote #agj3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 iii4 p4 #abc1 b4 #ab1 seq4 ,footnote #aga3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-bc3 ,greek3 e7_/nstasis tou_/tou o7_/ti u7giei_/as kai no_/sou ou7den metaxu_/1 kakou de kai a7gathou2 7 ei7 e7_/sti me_/n ti a7mphoin a7na me_/son1 kai tn ei7dn kai tn genn1 m o7moi_/s de_/1 a7lla tn men kat' a7po_/phasin1 tn d' 7s u7pokei_/menon4 e7_/ndoxon gar to o7moi_/s a7mphoin1 katha_/per e7p' a7rets kai kaki_/as1 kai dikaiosu_/ns kai a7diki_/as2 a7mphoin gar kata a7po_/phasin ta a7na me_/son4 ,again1 suppose different conditions3 that there is no contrary to the genus1 but that there is a contrary to the species4 ,you will examine whether not merely the contrary of the species1 but also the intermediate between its two contraries1 is included in the same genus2 for1 if the two contraries are included therein1 the intermediate ought also to be included4 ,this is a line of argument probable 7i4e41 conformable to general presumption1 and recommendable in a dialectical debate71 though there are not wanting examples adverse to it3 thus1 excess and defect are included in the same genus evil1 but the moderate or measured 7,greek3 to me_/trion7 is not in the genus evil1 but in the genus good4#agb ,we must remark1 moreover1 that though it be a probable dialectical argument1 that1 wherever the genus has a contrary1 the species will also have a contrary1 yet there are cases adverse to this principle4 ,thus1 sickness in general has for its contrary health in general2 but particular species of sickness 7such as fever1 ophthalmia1 gout1 c47 have no contrary4#agc ,footnote #agb3 ,ibid4 b4 #bc-cj4 ,footnote #agc3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj-cg4 ,such will be your way of procedure1 if the thesis propounded be ,affirmative1 and if you have to make out a negative against it4 ,but if1 on the contrary1 the thesis be ,negative1 so that you have to make out an affirmative against it1 you have then three lines of procedure open4 #a4 ,the genus may have no contrary1 while the species has a contrary3 in that case1 you may perhaps be able to show that the contrary of the species 7subject7 is included in the predicate of the thesis 7genus72 if so1 then the species also will be included therein4 #b4 ,or1 if you can show that the intermediate between the species and its contrary is included in the predicate 7genus71 then that same genus will also include the species and its contrary2 for1 wherever the intermediate is1 there also are the two extremes between which it is intermediate4 #c4 ,lastly1 if the genus has a contrary as well as the species1 you may be able to show that the contrary of the species is included in the contrary of the genus2 assuming which to be the case1 then the species itself will be included in the genus4#agd ,these are the three modes of procedure1 if your task is to make out the negative4 ,footnote #agd3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 iii4 p4 #abd1 a4 #a-i4 ,if the genus enunciated by the thesis be a true one1 all the ,derivatives and ,collaterals of the predicate will be fit and suitable for those of the subject4 ,thus1 if justice be a sort of science1 justly will be scientifically1 and the just man will be a scientific man4 ,this locus is useful to be kept in mind1 whether you have to make out an affirmative or a negative4#age ,you may reason in the same way about the ,analoga of the predicate and the subject2 about the productive and destructive causes of each2 the manifestations present1 past1 and future1 of each1 c4#agf ,footnote #age3 ,ibid4 a4 #aj-ad4 ,footnote #agf3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #abd1 a4 #ae-cd4 ,when the opposite of the species 7subject7 is ,privative1 the thesis will be open to attack in two ways4 #a4 ,if the privative opposite be contained in the predicate1 the subject itself will not be contained therein2 for it is a general truth that a subject and its privative opposite are never both of them contained in the same lowest genus3 thus1 if vision is sensible perception1 blindness is not sensible perception4 #b4 ,if both the species and the genus have privative opposites1 then if the privative opposite of the species be contained in the privative opposite of the genus1 the species itself will also be contained in the genus2 if not1 not4 ,thus1 if blindness be an inability of sensible perception1 vision will be a sensible perception4 ,this last locus will be available1 whether you are making out an affirmative or a negative4#agg ,footnote #agg3 ,ibid4 a4 #ce-;b4 #f4 ,if the predicate of the thesis be a true genus1 you may convert the thesis simply1 having substituted for the predicate the denial of its ,contradictory2 if not1 not4 ,vice vers1 if the new proposition so formed be true1 the predicate of the thesis will be a true genus2 if not1 not4 ,thus1 if good be the true genus of pleasurable1 nothing that is not good will be pleasurable4 ,this locus also will serve both for making out an affirmative and for making out a negative4#agh ,footnote #agh3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 iv4 p4 #abd1 b4 #g-ad3 ,greek3 pa_/lin e7pi tn a7popha_/sen skopein a7na_/palin1 c4 ,if the subject 7species7 of the thesis be a ,relative1 you will examine whether the predicate 7genus7 be relative also2 if not1 it will not be the true genus of the subject4 ,the converse of this rule1 however1 will not hold2 and indeed the rule itself is not absolutely universal4#agi ,you may also argue that1 if the correlate of the genus be not the same as the correlate of the species1 the genus cannot be truly predicated of that species3 thus1 half is the correlate of double1 but half is not the proper correlate of multiple2 therefore1 multiple is not the true genus of double4 ,but your argument may here be met by contradictory instances2 thus1 cognition has reference to the cognitum1 but habitus and dispositio 7the genera to which cognitio belongs7 do not refer to cognitum but to anima4#ahj ,you may also examine whether the correlate1 when applied to the genus1 is put in the same case 7e4g41 genitive1 dative1 c47 as when it is applied to the species3 if it be put into a different case1 this affords presumption that the genus is not a true genus2 though here again instances may be produced showing that your presumption will not hold universally4 ,farther1 you will observe whether the correlates thus similarly inflected reciprocate like the species and genus2 if not1 this will furnish you with the same adverse presumption4#aha ,footnote #agi3 ,ibid4 b4 #ae-bb4 ,footnote #ahj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bc-cd4 ,footnote #aha3 ,ibid4 b4 #ce1 seq4 ,again1 examine whether the correlate of the genus is genus to the correlate of the species2 if it be not so1 you may argue that the genus is not truly predicated4 ,thus1 if the thesis affirms that perceptio is the genus of cognitio1 it will follow that percipibile is the genus of cognoscibile4 ,now this cannot be maintained2 for there are some cognoscibilia which are not perceivable1 e4g41 some cogitabilia 7intelligibilia1 ,greek3 nota_/74 ,since therefore percipibile is not the true genus of cognoscibile1 neither can perceptio be the true genus of cognitio4#ahb ,footnote #ahb3 ,ibid4 p4 #abe1 a4 #be-cb3 ,greek3 o7ran de kai ei7 tou a7ntikeime_/nou to a7ntikei_/menon ge_/nos1 oi7on ei7 tou diplasi_/ou to pollapla_/sion kai tou 7mi_/seos to pollostmo_/rion2 dei gar to a7ntikei_/menon tou a7ntikeime_/nou ge_/nos ei7nai4 ,we must take note here of the large sense in which ,aristotle uses ,greek3 ,a7ntikei_/mena--,opposita1 including as one of the four varieties ,relata and ,correlata ,relativ-,opposita 7to use a technical word familiar in logical manuals74 ,i have before 7supra1 p4 #aje7 remarked the inconvenience of calling the ,relative opposite to its ,correlate2 and have observed that it is logically incorrect to treat ,relata as a species or mode of the genus ,opposita4 ,the reverse would be more correct3 we ought to rank ,opposita or a species or mode under the genus ,relata4 ,since ,aristotle numbers ,relata among the ten ,categories1 he ought to have seen that it cannot be included as a subordinate under any superior genus4 ,suppose the thesis predicates of memory that it is--a continuance of cognition4 ,this will be open to attack1 if the predicate be affirmed as the genus 7or even as the accident7 of the subject4 ,for every continuance must be in that which continues4 ,but memory is of necessity in the soul2 it cannot therefore be in cognition4#ahc ,there is another ground on which the thesis will be assailable1 if it defines memory to be--a habit or acquirement retentive of belief4 ,this will not hold1 because it confounds habit or disposition with act2 which last is the true description of memory4 ,the opposite error will be committed if the respondent defines perceptivity to be a--movement through or by means of the body4 ,here perceptivity1 which is a habit or disposition1 is ranked under movement1 which is the act exercising the same1 i4e41 perceptivity in actual exercise4#ahd ,or1 the mistake may be made of ranking some habit or disposition under the power consequent on the possession thereof1 as if this power were the superior genus3 thus the respondent may define gentleness to be a continence of anger2 courage1 a continence of fears2 justice1 a continence of appetite of lucre4 ,but the genus here assigned is not a good one3 for a man who feels no anger is called gentle2 a man who feels no fear is called courageous2 whereas the continent man is he who feels anger or fear1 but controls them4 ,such controlling power is a natural consequence of gentleness and courage1 insomuch that1 if the gentle man happened to feel anger1 or the courageous man to feel fear1 each would control these impulses2 but it is no part of the essence thereof1 and therefore cannot be the genus under which they fall4#ahe ,a like mistake is made if pain be predicated as the genus of anger1 or supposition as the genus of belief4 ,the angry man doubtless feels pain1 but his pain precedes his anger in time1 and is the antecedent cause thereof2 now the genus can never precede its species in time4 ,so also a man may have the same supposition sometimes with belief1 sometimes without it2 accordingly1 supposition cannot be the genus of belief any more than the same animal can be sometimes a man1 sometimes a brute4#ahf ,and indeed the same negative conclusion would follow1 even if we granted that every supposition was always attended with belief4 ,for1 in that case1 supposition and belief would be co-extensive terms2 but the generic term must always be more extensive than its specific4#ahg ,footnote #ahc3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 iv4 p4 #abe1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 oi7on ei7 tn mn_/mn monn e7pist_/ms ei7pen4 pasa gar mon e7n t me_/nonti kai peri e7keino1 7_/ste kai 7 ts e7pist_/ms mon e7n t e7pist_/m4 7 mn_/m a7_/ra e7n t e7pist_/m1 e7peid mon ts e7pist_/ms e7sti_/n4 touto d' ou7k e7nde_/chetai2 mn_/m gar pasa e7n psuch4 ,a definition similar to this is found in the ,kratylus of ,plato1 p4 #dcg1 ,b43 ,greek3 e7_/peita de 7 mn_/m panti_/ pou mnu_/ei o7_/ti mon_/ e7stin e7n t psuch1 a7ll' ou7 phora_/4 ,footnote #ahd3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #abe1 b4 #ae-ai4 ,greek3 oi7on tn ai7_/sthsin ki_/nsin dia s_/matos2 7 men gar ai7_/sthsis e7_/xis1 7 de ki_/nsis e7ne_/rgeia4 ,this1 too1 seems to allude to ,plato's explanation of ,greek3 ai7_/sthsis in the ,timus1 pp4 #dc1 ,c1 #fd1 ,b2 compare also the ,platonic or pseudo-,platonic ,definitiones1 p4 #dad1 ,c4 ,footnote #ahe3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 v4 p4 #abe1 b4 #bj-bg4 ,footnote #ahf3 ,waitz1 in his notes 7p4 #dgh71 says that ,aristotle is here in the wrong4 ,but ,i do not agree with ,waitz4 ,aristotle considers ,greek3 pi_/stis to be an accidental accompaniment of ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis1 not a species thereof4 ,it may be present or absent without determining any new specific name to ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis1 which term has reference only to the intellectual or conceptive part of the mental supposition4 ,at least there seems to be nothing contradictory or erroneous in what ,aristotle here says1 though he does not adhere everywhere to this restricted meaning of ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis ,footnote #ahg3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 v4 p4 #abe1 b4 #bh-p4 #abf1 a4 #b4 ,you will farther examine whether the predicate of the thesis be of a nature to inhere in the same substance as the subject4 ,if it be not1 it cannot be truly predicated thereof1 either as genus or even as accident4 ,white 7species7 and colour 7genus7 are of a nature to inhere or belong to the same substance4 ,but1 if the thesis declares that shame is a species of fear1 or that anger is a species of pain1 you may impugn it on the ground that shame belongs to the reasoning element in man1 fear to the courageous or energetic element2 and that pain belongs to the appetitive element1 anger to the courageous4 ,this proves that fear can neither be the genus nor the accident of shame2 that pain can neither be the genus nor the accident of anger4#ahh ,footnote #ahh3 ,ibid4 p4 #abf1 a4 #c-af4 ,compare ,v4 iv4 p4 #acc1 a4 #ca4 ,aristotle appears here to recognize the ,platonic doctrine as laid down in the ,republic and ,timus1 asserting either three distinct parts of the soul1 or1 rather1 three distinct souls4 ,in the treatise ,de ,anim 7,,iii4 ix4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #be2 ,i4 v4 p4 #daa1 b4 #be71 he dissents from and impugns this same doctrine4 ,suppose the thesis declares that animal is a species under the genus visibile or percepibile4 ,you may oppose it by pointing out that animal is only visibile secundum quid1 or partially2 that is1 only so far as regards body1 not as regards mind4 ,but the species always partakes of its genus wholly1 not partially or secundum quid2 thus1 man is not partially animal1 but wholly or essentially animal4 ,if what is predicated as the genus be not thus essentially partaken1 it cannot be a true genus2 hence neither visibile nor percepibile is a true genus of animal4#ahi ,footnote #ahi3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 v4 p4 #abf1 a4 #ag-be4 ,sometimes what is predicated as the genus is1 when compared to its species1 only as a part to the whole2 which is never the case with a true genus4 ,some refer animal to the genus living body2 but body is only part of the whole animal1 and therefore cannot be the true genus thereof4#aij ,sometimes a species which is blameworthy and hateful1 or a species which is praiseworthy and eligible1 may be referred to the power or capacity from which it springs1 as genus2 thus1 the thief1 a blameworthy and hateful character1 may be referred to the predicate--capable of stealing another man's property4 ,but this1 though true as a predicate1 is not the true genus2 for the honest man is also capable of so acting1 but he is distinguished from the thief by not acting so1 nor having the disposition so to act4 ,all power and capacity is eligible2 if the above were the true genus of thief1 it would be a case in which power and capacity is blameworthy and hateful4 ,neither1 on the other hand1 can any thing in its own nature praiseworthy and eligible1 be referred to power and capacity as its genus2 for all power and capacity is praiseworthy and eligible not in itself or its own nature1 but by reason of something else1 namely1 its realizable consequences4#aia ,footnote #aij3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf-bi4 ,footnote #aia3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 v4 p4 #abf1 a4 #cj-;b4 #f3 ,greek3 o7ran de kai ei7_/ ti tn psektn 7 pheutn ei7s du_/namin 7 to dunaton e7_/thken1 oi7on ton sophistn 7 dia_/bolon 7 kle_/ptn ton duna_/menon la_/thra ta a7llo_/tria kle_/ptein4 ,the general drift of ,aristotle is here illustrated better by taking the thief separately1 apart from the other two4 ,but we must notice here the proof of his temper or judgment concerning the persons called ,sophists1 when we find him grouping them in the bunch of ,greek3 psekta and ,greek3 pheukta along with thieves4 ,the majority of his uninstructed contemporaries would probably have agreed in this judgment1 but they would certainly have enrolled ,aristotle himself among the ,sophists thus depreciated4 ,again1 you may detect in the thesis sometimes the mistake of putting under one genus a species which properly comes under two genera conjointly1 not subalternate one to the other2 sometimes1 the mistake of predicating the genus as a differentia1 or the differentia as a genus4#aib ,sometimes1 also1 the subject in which the attribute or affection resides is predicated as if it were the genus of such affection2 or1 converso1 the attribute or affection is predicated as the genus of the subject wherein it resides2 e4g41 when breath or wind1 which is really a movement of air1 is affirmed to be air put in motion1 and thus constituted as a species under the genus air2 or when snow is declared to be water congelated2 or mud1 to be earth mixed with moisture4#aic ,in none of these cases is the predicate a true genus2 for it cannot be always affirmed of the subject4 ,footnote #aib3 ,ibid4 b4 #g-cc4 ,footnote #aic3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd-p4 #abg1 a4 #ai4 ,or perhaps the predicate affirmed as genus may be no genus at all2 for nothing can be a genus unless there are species contained under it2 e4g41 if the thesis declare white to be a genus1 this may be impugned1 because white objects do not differ in specie from each other4 ,or a mere universal predicate 7such as ,ens or ,unum7 may be put forward as a genus or differentia2 or a simple concomitant attribute1 or an equivocal term1 may be so put forward4#aid ,footnote #aid3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 vi4 p4 #abg1 a4 #bj-;b4 #g4 ,perhaps it may happen that the subject 7species7 and the predicate 7genus7 of the thesis may each have a contrary term2 and that in each pair of contrary terms one may be better1 the other worse4 ,if1 in that case1 the better species be referred to the worse genus1 or vice vers1 this will render the thesis assailable4 ,or perhaps the species may be fit to be referred equally to both the contrary genera2 in which case1 if the thesis should refer it to the worse of the two1 that will be a ground of objection4 ,thus1 if the soul be referred to the genus mobile1 you are at liberty to object that it is equally referable to the genus stabile3 and that1 as the latter is the better of the two1 it ought to be referred to the better in preference to the worse4#aie ,footnote #aie3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ag4 ,there is a locus of ,more and ,less1 which may be made available in various ways4 ,thus1 if the genus predicated admits of being graduated as more or less1 while the species of which it is predicated does not admit of such graduation1 you may question the applicability of the genus to the species4#aif ,you may raise the question also1 if there be any thing else which looks equally like the true genus1 or more like it than the genus predicated by the thesis4 ,this will happen often1 when the essence of the species includes several distinct elements2 e4g41 in the essence of anger1 there is included both pain 7an emotional element71 and the supposition or belief of being undervalued 7an intellectual element72 hence1 if the thesis ranks anger under the genus pain1 you may object that it equally belongs to the genus supposition#aig ,this locus is useful for raising a negative question1 but will serve little for establishing an affirmative4 ,towards the affirmative1 you will find advantage in examining the subject 7species7 respecting which the thesis predicates a given genus2 for1 if it can be shown that this supposed species is no real species but a genus1 the genus predicated thereof will be fortiori a genus4#aih ,footnote #aif3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah-be3 ,greek3 e7_/ti e7k tou mallon kai 7tton1 a7naskeua_/zonti me_/n1 ei7 to ge_/nos de_/chetai to mallon1 to d' ei7dos m de_/chetai m_/t' au7to m_/te to kat' e7keino lego_/menon4 ,footnote #aig3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf-cg3 ,greek3 chr_/simos d' o7 to_/pos e7pi tn toiou_/tn ma_/lista e7ph' 7n plei_/ phai_/netai tou ei7_/dous e7n t ti_/ e7sti katgorou_/mena1 kai m di_/ristai1 m_/d' e7_/chomen ei7pein poion au7tn ge_/nos1 c4 ,footnote #aih3 ,ibid4 b4 #ch-p4 #abh1 a4 #ab4 ,some think 7says ,aristotle7#aii that ,differentia as well as ,genus is predicated essentially respecting the ,species4 ,accordingly1 ,genus must be discriminated from ,differentia4 ,for such discrimination the following characteristics are pointed out3--#a4 ,genus has greater extent in predication than ,differentia4 #b4 ,in replying to the enquiry1 ,quid est8 it is more suitable and significant to declare the ,genus than the ,differentia4 #c4 ,differentia declares a quality of ,genus1 and therefore presupposes ,genus as already known2 but ,genus does not in like manner presuppose ,differentia4 ,if you wish to show that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs1 you must examine whether the cognoscens believes qu cognoscens4 ,if he does so1 your point is made out4#bjj ,footnote #aii3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj1 seq43 ,greek3 e7pei de dokei tisi kai 7 diaphora e7n t ti_/ e7sti tn ei7dn katgoreisthai1 christe_/on to ge_/nos a7po ts diaphoras1 c4 ,footnote #bjj3 ,topic4 ,,iv4 vi4 p4 #abh1 a4 #ce4 ,if you are trying to show ,greek3 tn e7pist_/mn o7_/per pi_/stin1 you must examine ,greek3 ei7 o7 e7pista_/menos 7 e7pi_/statai pisteu_/ei2 dlon gar o7_/ti 7 e7pist_/m pi_/stis a7_/n tis ei7_/4 ,wherever a predicate is universally true of its subject1 while the proposition is not true if simply converted 7i4e41 wherever the predicate is of larger extension than the subject71 there is difficulty in distinguishing it from a genus4 ,accordingly1 when you are respondent1 maintaining the affirmative side1 you will use such predicate as if it were a genus2 but1 when you are assailant1 you will not allow the respondent to do so4 ,you may quote against him the instance of ,non-,ens2 which is predicable of every thing generated1 but which is not a genus1 since it has no species under it4#bja ,footnote #bja3 ,ibid4 a4 #ch-;b4 #i4 ,v4 ,aristotle passes1 in the ,fifth book of the ,topica1 to those debates in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as ,proprium of the subject4 ,a ,proprium may belong to its subject either per se and semper1 or relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes4 ,it is a proprium per se of man to be an animal by nature tractable4 ,it is a relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body1 to exercise command2 of the body in regard to the soul1 to obey command4 ,it is a proprium semper of a god1 to be immortal2 it is an occasional proprium 7i4e41 sometimes7 of this or that man1 to be walking in the market-place4#bjb ,when the proprium is set out relatively to something else1 the debate must involve two questions1 and may involve four4 ,thus1 if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of man relatively to horse 7discriminating man from horse7 to be by nature two-footed1 you may 7as opponent7 either deny that man is two-footed1 or affirm that horse is two-footed2 or you may go farther and affirm that man is by nature four-footed1 or deny that horse is by nature four-footed4 ,if you can succeed in showing any one of these four1 you will have refuted the thesis4#bjc ,footnote #bjb3 ,ibid4 ,v4 i4 p4 #abh1 b4 #ad-ba4 ,that which ,aristotle calls ,proprium per se is a proprium of the subject as much relative as what he calls specially the relative ,proprium4 ,the ,proprium per se discriminates the subject from everything else2 the relative ,proprium discriminates it from some given correlate4 ,footnote #bjc3 ,topic4 ,v4 i4 p4 #abh1 b4 #bb-cc4 ,the ,proprium per se discriminates its subject from everything else1 and is universally true thereof2 the relative ,proprium discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject4 ,the relative ,proprium may be either constant and universally true1 or true with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of things3 it may be tested through those ,loci which have been enumerated as applicable to the ,accident4 ,the ,proprium per se1 and the constant ,proprium1 have certain ,loci of their own1 which we shall now indicate4 ,these are the most logical 7sensu ,aristotelico7 or suitable for ,dialectic2 furnishing the most ample matter for debates4#bjd ,footnote #bjd3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd-p4 #abi1 a4 #ce4 ,greek3 tn d' i7di_/n e7sti lo_/gika ma_/lista2 c4 ,he explains presently what he means by ,greek3 logika_/--logikon de tout' e7sti pro_/blma1 pros o7 lo_/goi ge_/noit' a7n kai suchnoi kai kaloi_/4 ,the distinctions in this paragraph are not very sharply drawn4 ,aristotle distinguishes 7#a7 those cases in which the alleged proprium is a true proprium1 but is incorrectly or informally set out in the thesis1 from those 7#b7 in which it is untruly predicated1 or is no proprium at all4 ,to set out a proprium well1 that which is predicated ought to be clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated1 since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate knowledge4#bje ,if it be more obscure or less known1 you may impugn the thesis as bad in form1 or badly set out4 ,thus1 if the thesis declare1 as a proprium of fire1 that fire is of all things the most like to the soul1 this is not well set out1 because the essence of the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire4 ,moreover1 the fact that the predicate belongs to the subject1 ought to be better known even than the subject itself2 for whoever is ignorant that ,a belongs to ,b at all1 cannot possibly know that ,a is the proprium of ,b4#bjf ,thus1 if the thesis declare1 as proprium of fire1 that it is the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul to be found1 the predicate is here doubly unknowable3 first1 the hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all2 next1 he does not know that fire is the first subject in which soul is found4 ,on the other hand1 the respondent will repel your attack if he can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two above-mentioned ways4 ,if1 for example1 he declares as thesis1 ,to have sensible perception is the proprium of an animal1 here the proprium is both well known in itself1 and well known as belonging to the given subject4 ,accordingly1 it is well set out1 as far as this condition is concerned4#bjg ,footnote #bje3 ,ibid4 p4 #abi1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 gn_/ses gar e7_/neka to i7_/dion poiou_/metha2 dia gnrimte_/ron ou7n a7podote_/on2 ou7_/t gar e7_/stai katanoein i7kans mallon4 ,he repeats the same dictum1 substantially1 in the next page1 p4 #acj1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 to gar i7_/dion tou mathein cha_/rin a7podi_/dotai2 and1 again1 p4 #aca1 a4 #a4 ,footnote #bjf3 ,ibid4 b4 #ae3 ,greek3 o7 m gar ei7ds ei7 td' u7pa_/rchei1 ou7d' ei7 td' u7pa_/rchei mo_/n gnriei4 ,footnote #bjg3 ,topic4 ,v4 ii4 p4 #abi1 b4 #ba-bi4 ,a second condition of its being well set out is1 that it shall contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical proposition4 ,thus1 if the thesis declares1 ,to perceive is the proprium of an animal1 it is equivocal2 for it may mean either to have sensible perception1 or to exercise sensible perception actually4 ,you may apply the test to such a thesis1 by syllogizing from one or both of these equivocal meanings4 ,the respondent will make good his defence1 if he shows that there is no such equivocation3 as1 for example1 if the thesis be1 ,it is a proprium of fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region2 where there is no equivocation1 either of term or proposition4#bjh ,sometimes the equivocation may be1 not in the name of the proprium itself1 but in the name of the subject to which it is applied4 ,where this last is not unum et simplex but equivocal1 the thesis must specify which among the several senses is intended2 and1 if that be neglected1 the manner of setting out is incorrect4#bji ,footnote #bjh3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj-p4 #acj1 a4 #ac4 ,footnote #bji3 ,ibid4 p4 #acj1 a4 #ae-bh4 ,another form of the like mistake is1 where the same term is repeated both in the predicate and in the subject2 which is often done1 both as to ,proprium and as to ,definition1 though it is a cause of obscurity1 as well as a tiresome repetition4#baj ,the repetition may be made in two ways3 either directly1 by the same term occurring twice2 or indirectly1 when the second term given is such that it cannot be defined without repeating the first4 ,an example of direct repetition is1 ,fire is a body the rarest among bodies 7for proprium of fire74 ,an example of indirect repetition is1 ,earth is a substance which tends most of all bodies downwards to the lowest region 7as proprium of earth72 for1 when the respondent is required to define bodies1 he must define them--such and such substances4#baa ,an example free from objection on this ground is1 ,man is an animal capable of receiving cognition 7as proprium of man74 ,footnote #baj3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj-cd4 ,greek3 tara_/ttei gar ton a7kou_/onta pleona_/kis lechthe_/n--kai pros tou_/tois a7doleschein dokousin4 ,footnote #baa3 ,ibid4 a4 #cd-;b4 #e4 ,greek3 e7_/n gar kai tau7to_/n e7sti sma kai ou7si_/a toiadi_/2 e7_/stai 9999gar ou7tos to ou7si_/a pleona_/kis ei7rk_/s4 ,another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is1 when the term predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject1 but also to all other subjects4 ,such a proposition is useless2 for it furnishes no means of discriminating the subject from anything2 whereas discrimination is one express purpose of the ,proprium as well as of the ,definition4#bab ,again1 another mode is1 when the thesis declares several propria belonging to the same subject1 without announcing that they are several4 ,as the definer ought not to introduce into his definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the essence of the subject1 so neither should the person who sets out a proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the proprium4 ,thus1 if the thesis enunciates1 as proprium of fire1 that it is the thinnest and lightest body1 here are two propria instead of one4 ,contrast with this another proprium1 free from the objection just pointed out--,moist is that which may assume every variety of figure4#bac ,footnote #bab3 ,topic4 ,v4 ii4 p4 #acj1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 a7chreion 9999gar e7_/stai to m chri_/zon a7po_/ tinn1 9999to d' e7n tois i7di_/ois lego_/menon chri_/zein dei1 katha_/per kai ta e7n tois o7_/rois4 ,footnote #bac3 ,ibid4 b4 #bc-cg4 ,a farther mistake is1 when the predicate declaring the proprium includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under the subject2 for example1 when we are told1 as a proprium of animal1 that animal is a substance of which man is a species4 ,we have already seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject2 but man is even less known 7posterior in respect to cognition7 than animal1 because it is a species under the genus animal4#bad ,footnote #bad3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #acj1 b4 #ch4 ,again1 our canon--,that the ,proprium should be better known than its subject1 or should make the subject better known--will be violated in another way1 if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the subject1 or in any other way simul natur as compared with the subject2 and still more1 if it be posterius natur as compared with the subject4 ,thus1 if a man enunciates1 as proprium of good1 that good is that which is most opposite to evil1 his proprium will not be well or correctly set out4#bae ,footnote #bae3 ,ibid4 p4 #aca1 a4 #ab-bf4 ,this locus is not clear or satisfactory1 as ,alexander remarks in ,scholia 7p4 #bhd1 b4 #ab-bc1 ,br474 ,he says that it may pass as an ,greek3 e7_/ndoxon--something sufficiently plausible to be employed in ,dialectic4 ,in fact1 ,alexander virtually controverts this locus in what he says a little farther down 7,schol4 p4 #bhe1 a4 #ca71 that the ,proprium is always simul natur with its subject4 ,perhaps1 again1 the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not constantly appurtenant to the subject1 but is sometimes absent therefrom2 or1 intending to enunciate an occasional proprium1 it may omit to specify the qualifying epithet occasional4 ,in either case the proprium is not well set out1 and a ground is furnished for censure1 which ought always to be avoided4#baf ,footnote #baf3 ,topic4 ,v4 iii4 p4 #aca1 a4 #bg-;b4 #ah4 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/stai kals kei_/menon to i7_/dion--ou7_/koun dote_/on e7stin e7pitim_/ses skpsin4 ,moreover1 the proprium will not be well set out1 if it be such as does not necessarily belong to the subject1 but is only shown by the evidence of sense to belong thereunto4 ,in this case1 when the subject is out of the reach of sensible perception1 no one knows whether the supposed proprium still continues as its attribute4 ,thus1 suppose the thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun1 that it is the brightest star borne in movement above the earth3 the fact that it is so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible perception only2 accordingly1 after the sun sets and we cease to see it1 we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement4 ,if a proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen1 it ought to be one which is also knowable independently1 as belonging to the subject by necessity4 ,thus1 if a man enunciates1 as proprium of superficies1 that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives colour1 this is a proprium well set out4 ,for we know clearly that it must always belong to a superficies2 though we may also obtain the additional evidence of sense1 by looking at some perceivable body4#bag ,footnote #bag3 ,ibid4 b4 #ai-cf4 ,greek3 oi7on e7pei o7 the_/menos e7piphanei_/as i7_/dion o7 prton ke_/chrstai1 ai7stht me_/n tini proske_/chrtai t kechrsthai1 toiou_/t d' o7 phanero_/n e7stin u7pa_/rchon a7ei_/1 ei7_/ a7n kata touto kals a7podedome_/non to ts e7piphanei_/as i7_/dion4 ,aristotle means that we know clearly1 by evidence independent of sense1 that the superficies must be the first portion of the body that becomes coloured1 though we may attain the additional evidence of our senses 7,greek3 proske_/chrtai7 to the same fact4 ,perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the ,definition as if it were a ,proprium2 which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is not well set out4 ,thus1 the thesis may enunciate1 as proprium of man1 that man is a land animal walking on two feet4 ,here what is given as proprium is the essence of man1 which never ought to be affirmed in the proprium4 ,to set out the proprium well1 the predicate ought to reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject1 but it ought not to affirm the essence thereof4 ,a good specimen of proprium well set out is the following1 ,man is an animal by nature gentle2 for here the predicate is co-extensive with the subject1 yet does not declare the essence of the subject4#bah ,footnote #bah3 ,ibid4 b4 #cg-p4 #acb1 a4 #i4 ,lastly1 the proprium1 to be well set out1 though it does not declare the essence of the subject1 yet ought to begin by presupposing the generic portion of the essence1 and to attach itself thereunto as a constant adjunct or concomitant4 ,thus1 suppose the thesis to enunciate1 as proprium1 ,animal is that which has a soul2 this will not be well set out1 for the predicate is not superadded or attached to the declared generic essence of animal4 ,but1 if the thesis enunciates1 as proprium of man1 ,man is an animal capable of acquiring cognition1--this will be a proprium well set out1 so far as the present objection is concerned4 ,for here the predicate declares first the generic essence of the subject1 and then superinduces the peculiar adjunct thereupon4#bai ,footnote #bai3 ,topic4 ,v4 iii4 p4 #aca1 a4 #aj-ba4 ,thus far ,aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended to in determining whether a ,proprium is well set out or described1 without determining whether it be really a ,propium or not4 ,it may perhaps be truly predicated of the subject1 and may even admit of a better description which would show it to be a proprium of the subject2 but the description actually set out is defective1 and the assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground4 ,he now proceeds to a larger discussion3 ,what are the conditions for determining whether the supposed ,proprium be really a ,proprium at all1 in respect to the subject of which it is predicated8 ,assuming that the description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds above enumerated1 are there not other real grounds of objection1 disproving its title to the character of ,proprium8#bbj ,footnote #bbj3 ,ibid4 p4 #acb1 a4 #bb-bg4 ,greek3 po_/teron men ou7n kals 7 ou7 kals a7pode_/dotai to i7_/dion1 dia tnde skepte_/on2 po_/teron d' i7_/dio_/n e7stin o7_/ls to ei7rme_/non 7 ou7k i7_/dion1 e7k tnde therte_/on4 ,the distinction here noted by ,aristotle 7between the two questions3--7#a7 ,whether the alleged ,proprium is well set out or clearly described8 7#b7 ,whether the alleged ,proprium is a ,proprium at all87 is not carried out1 nor indeed capable of being carried out1 with strict precision4 ,the two heads of questions run together and become confounded4 ,alexander remarks 7,scholia1 p4 #bhd1 b4 #bd-df1 ,br47 that the three or four last-mentioned loci under the first head embrace the second head also4 ,he allows only three loci as belonging peculiarly to the first head--,greek3 tou m kals a7podedo_/sthai to i7_/dion3--7#a7 ,equivocal terms2 7#b7 ,predicate not reciprocating or co-extensive with subject2 7#c7 ,predicate not more knowable than subject4 ,the other loci 7besides these three7 enumerated by ,aristotle under the first head1 ,alexander considers as belonging equally to the second head4 ,but he commends ,aristotle for making a distinction between the two heads3 ,greek3 ou7 gar pan to a7pllotrime_/non tou_/tn1 kai m e7_/chon o7mnu_/mous phnas 7_/ ti tn ei7rme_/nn1 kai i7_/dion r7te_/on e7x a7na_/gks4 ,the manner in which ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire explains this nice distinction is not clear to me 7,note to his translation of ,topica1 p4 #agg74 #a4 ,suppose your respondent to set up ,a as a proprium of ,b3 you will examine first whether ,a can be truly predicated of ,b at all2 next1 if it can so be1 whether it is truly predicable of ,b qu ,b1 or of every thing that comes under ,b qu ,b4 ,thus1 if he contends that not to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men1 you will be able to show that this does not hold in geometry1 since geometricians are deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms4 ,or1 should the respondent deny that ,a is a proprium of ,b1 you will succeed in refuting him1 if you can prove that ,a is truly predicable of every ,b and qu ,b4 ,thus1 it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of acquiring knowledge2 because that attribute is truly predicable of every man qu man4#bba ,footnote #bba3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acb1 a4 #bg1 seq4 #b4 ,again1 suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium ,a of ,b3 you will examine whether ,a can be truly predicated of every thing called ,b1 and whether ,b can be truly predicated of every thing called ,a2 if not1 the alleged proprium will not hold4 ,thus the affirmation1 ,a god is an animal participant of knowledge1 is a true affirmation2 but it would not be true to say1 ,a god is a man3 wherefore1 to be participant of knowledge is not proprium of man2 and1 if this be the proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain1 you will be able to refute him4 ,on the other hand1 if what he undertakes is the negation of a proprium 7,a is not a proprium of ,b71 you will establish the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting which ,a can be truly affirmed ,b can be affirmed also1 and vice vers4 ,you will thus show that ,a is a true proprium of ,b4#bbb ,footnote #bbb3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ah4 #c4 ,again1 the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a proprium of something inherent in the subject4 ,you may refute this by showing that1 if it were so1 the same thing would be a proprium of several things differing from each other in species4 ,on the other hand1 the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the subject is a proprium3 you may then refute him by showing that it is truly predicable of the subject only1 and not truly predicable of any thing else4#bbc ,footnote #bbc3 ,ibid4 b4 #ai-cd4 ,alexander1 in the ,scholia 7p4 #bhe1 a4 #ad1 ,br47 has stated this locus more clearly than ,aristotle--,greek3 to gar i7_/dion u7pa_/rchein dei e7n e7te_/r1 ou7ch e7_/teron e7n au7t4 #d4 ,the respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something contained in the essence of the subject3 if so1 you will refute him by showing this4 ,on the other hand1 if he denies something to be a proprium1 you will refute him by showing that1 though it is not contained in the essence of the subject1 it is nevertheless predicable co-extensively therewith4#bbd ,footnote #bbd3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acb1 b4 #ce-p4 #acc1 a4 #aa4 #e4 ,the respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a necessary concomitant of the subject1 but may either precede or follow it4 ,or1 on the other hand1 he may deny something to be a proprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary concomitant of the subject1 without being included either in its definition or differentia4 ,in each case you will have a ground for refuting him4#bbe ,footnote #bbe3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acc1 a4 #ab-bc4 #f4 ,the respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has already denied of the same subject under some other name2 or he may deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name4 ,you will have grounds for refuting him4#bbf ,footnote #bbf3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd-cb4 #g4 ,if there be two subjects 7e4g41 man and horse7 the same with each other in species1 the respondent may affirm respecting one of them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of the other4 ,thus1 it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand still spontaneously2 accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of man to move spontaneously2 these two propria being the same in species1 and belonging both to man and to horse quatenus animal4#bbg ,if1 therefore1 the respondent affirms the one while he denies the other1 you have an argument in refutation4 ,on the other hand1 he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium1 while he affirms or admits the other4 ,here too you will be able to make good the counter-affirmation against his denial1 on the ground of that which he admits4 ,thus1 if it be proprium of man to be a walking-biped1 it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped4 ,the two pairs1 man and bird1 walking and flying1 are the same in species with each other1 since both pairs are subordinates under the same genus3 man and bird are species1 flying and walking are differenti1 under the same genus animal4 ,this locus1 however1 is not universally applicable2 for perhaps one of the two predicates may not be of exclusive application to the subject1 but may belong to other subjects also4 ,thus walking-biped designates only one variety--man2 but walking-quadruped designates several--horse1 ass1 dog1 c4 ,walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse4#bbh ,footnote #bbg3 ,ibid4 a4 #ce-;b4 #e4 ,greek3 oi7on e7pei tau7to_/n e7sti t ei7_/dei a7_/nthrpos kai i7_/ppos1 ou7k a7ei de tou i7_/ppou e7stin i7_/dion to e7sta_/nai u7ph' au7tou1 ou7k a7n ei7_/ tou a7nthr_/pou i7_/dion to kineisthai u7ph' au7tou2 tau7ton ga_/r e7sti t ei7_/dei to kineisthai kai e7sta_/nai u7ph' au7tou1 7 z_/ e7stin e7kate_/r au7tn to sumbebke_/nai4 ,the last words are very obscure3 they are explained by ,waitz 7p4 #dhf7--;,greek3 7 to sumbebke_/nai e7ka_/teron 7to kineisthai kai e7sta_/nai u7ph' au7tou intell47 ,greek3 e7kate_/r au7tn e7sti sumbebke_/nai 7 z_/1 quatenus utrumque de utroque1 quatenus animal est1 prdicatur4 ,footnote #bbh3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acc1 b4 #e-ad4 ,alexander declares this locus to be obscure4 ,he comments1 not without reason1 on the loose manner in which ,aristotle uses the term ,greek3 ei7dos2 and he observes that ,aristotle himself admits the locus to be ,greek3 kata_/ ti pseud_/s 7,schol4 p4 #bhe1 a4 #dj-de1 ,br474 ,it is strange to read that man and horse1 man and bird1 are ,greek3 tau7ton ei7_/dei1 the same in species4 #h4 ,there is some difficulty in discussing the proprium1 when the respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails himself of the equivocal application of ,idem and ,diversum3 contending that ,subject with an ,accident becomes a different subject--e4g41 homo albus1 a subject different from homo 7so that1 when a proprium has been shown to belong to homo1 it has not been shown that the same proprium belongs to homo albus72 and that the ,abstract is a different subject from the ,concrete--e4g4 cognition1 from the cognizing man 7so that what has been shown as proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing man74 ,if the respondent shall himself set up these negatives1 leaving to you the task of establishing the proprium against him1 you will meet him by saying that homo is not a subject absolutely different and distinct from homo albus1 but that there is only a notional distinction1 the same subject having here two names each with a distinct connotation3 homo has its own connotation2 homo albus has also its own connotation1 embodying in one total that which each of the terms connotes4 ,and1 when the ,sophist remarks that what is a proprium of scientia cannot be predicated also as a proprium of homo sciens1 you will reply that it may be so predicated1 only with a slight change of inflection4 ,for you need not scruple to employ sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a sophistical way4#bbi ,footnote #bbi3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acc1 b4 #ae-p4 #acd1 a4 #d4 ,greek3 pros gar ton pa_/nts e7nista_/menon1 pa_/nts a7ntitakte_/on e7sti_/n4 ,it appears to me that ,aristotle is not entitled to treat this objection as sophistical 7i4e4 as unfair ,dialectic74 ,he is here considering predication as ,proprium1 contrasted with predication as ,accident4 ,what is true as an accident respecting homo albus1 will also be true as an accident respecting homo3 but what is true as a proprium respecting homo albus1 will not be true as a proprium respecting homo--nor vice vers4 ,this is a good locus for objections in predication of ,proprium4 ,there is a real distinction between homo and homo albus2 between ,koriskus and ,koriskus albus3 and one of the ways of elucidating that distinction is by pointing out that the proprium of one is not the same as the proprium of the other4 ,aristotle treats those who dwelt upon this distinction as ,sophists3 what their manner of noticing it may have been he does not clearly tell us2 but if we are to have that logical accuracy of speech which his classification and theory demand1 this distinction must undoubtedly be brought to view among the rest4 #i4 ,the respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something which by nature belongs to the subject2 but he may err in his mode of stating it1 and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject4 ,thus1 he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man4 ,under this mode of expression1 you will be able to show that he is wrong2 for there are some men who have not two feet4 ,on the other hand1 if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man1 relying upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual1 you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct phraseology of belonging to man by nature4#bcj ,footnote #bcj3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #aca1 a4 #e-ag4 ,this locus is a question rather of phraseology than of real fact1 and seems therefore rather to belong to the former class of ,loci respecting the ,proprium--,greek3 po_/teron kals 7 ou7 kals a7pode_/dotai to i7_/dion--than to the present class1 which ,aristotle declares 7,v4 iv4 p4 #acb1 a4 #be7 to relate to the question ,greek3 po_/teron i7_/dio_/n e7stin o7_/ls to 9999ei7rme_/non 7 ou7k i7_/dion4 #aj4 ,that which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject either primarily and immediately1 or in a secondary way--relatively to some prior denomination of the same subject4 ,in such cases it is difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly unobjectionable4 ,thus1 the superficies of a body is what is first coloured3 when we speak of corpus album1 this is by reason of its white superficies4 ,album is a proprium true both of body and of superficies2 but the explanation usually given of ,proprium will not hold here--that1 wherever the predicate can be affirmed1 the subject can be affirmed also4 ,album is proprium of superficies2 and album can be truly affirmed as also proprium of body2 but superficies cannot be truly affirmed of body4#bca ,footnote #bca3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #acd1 a4 #ah-be4 ,this is a very obscure and difficult locus4 ,i am not sure that ,i understand it4 #aa4 ,the respondent who is affirming a ,proprium may sometimes err by not clearly distinguishing in what mode1 and in respect to what precise subject1 he intends to affirm it4 ,there are ten different modes1 in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm it3--#bcb a4 ,as belonging to the subject by nature4 ,e4g41 ,biped is by nature a proprium of man4 b4 ,as belonging to the subject simply--in some way or other4 ,e4g41 ,to have four fingers1 belongs to ,koriskus or some other individual man4 c4 ,as belonging to the species4 ,e4g41 ,it belongs to fire to be the most subtle of all bodies4 d4 ,as belonging absolutely 7,greek3 a7pls1 katha_/per z_/ou to zn7--in virtue of the essence of the subject--per se4#bcc e4 ,as belonging to the subject by reason of some primary intervening aspect or attribute thereof4 ,e4g41 ,prudence is a proprium of the soul1 looked at quatenus reasonable or intellectual4 f4 ,as belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect1 logically distinguished and named separately from the subject4 ,e4g41 ,prudence is a proprium of the logistikon or rationale4 g4 ,as belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in possession4 ,e4g41 ,the scientific man possesses that acquired mental habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther altered by discussion4 h4 ,as belonging to some possession held by a possessing person4 ,e4g41 ,science is unalterable by discussion2 where science1 a possession of the scientific man1 is assigned as subject of the proprium1 unalterable by discussion4 i4 ,as belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in participation by another subject lying behind4 ,e4g41 ,sensible perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken or held in participation by this individual man1 that individual horse1 c42 whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also of man1 as thus participant4 k4 ,as belonging to the ultimate subject partaking4 ,e4g41 ,to live is a proprium of this particular man or horse1 participant in the genus animal1 in the way just indicated4 ,footnote #bcb3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf-;b4 #d3 ,greek3 sumbai_/nei d' e7n e7ni_/ois tn i7di_/n 7s e7pi to polu gi_/nesthai_/ tina a7marti_/an para to m diori_/zesthai ps kai ti_/nn ti_/thsi to i7_/dion4 a7_/pantes gar e7picheirousin a7podido_/nai to i7_/dion 7 to phu_/sei u7pa_/rchon1 c4 ,he then proceeds to enumerate the ten diversities of ,proprium which ,i have given in the text3 this paragraph also is very obscure4 ,i cannot but repeat the remark here 7which ,i made supra p4 #cah71 that the contents of this paragraph also belong to the former investigation 7viz41 ,how ought the ,proprium to be set out and described87 rather than to the present investigation 7viz41 ,whether the alleged ,proprium is really a ,proprium of the assigned subject or not874 ,footnote #bcc3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #acd1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 7 a7pls1 katha_/per z_/ou to zn4 ,is not ,greek3 to zn included in the essentia 7,greek3 to ti 7n ei7nai7 of ,greek3 zon8 ,if so1 how can it be admitted as a proprium thereof8 ,now each of these varieties of the ,proprium is liable to its own mode of erroneous setting out or description4 ,thus the corresponding errors will be3--#bcd a4 ,not to add the qualifying words by nature4 b4 ,not to state the proprium as simply belonging1 when it does only belong to the subject now1 and may presently cease to belong4 c4 ,not to state the proprium as belonging to the species4 ,if he omits these words1 he may be told that it belongs to one variety alone among the species 7e4g41 should it be a superlative7 and not to others3 perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously1 and to others faintly4 ,or perhaps1 if he does add the express words--to the species1 he may err1 inasmuch as there exists no real species properly so called4 e4 f4 ,not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of ,b by reason of ,a1 or of ,a directly3 he will lay himself open to the objection that his proprium1 and the subject term of which he declares it to be a proprium1 are not co-extensive in predication4 g4 h4 ,not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person possessing1 or the possession4 ,if he leaves this undetermined1 the objector may attack him on one ground or the other4 i4 k4 ,not to distinguish whether he means as subject the partaker1 or the genus which is partaken4 ,here too the objector will have ground for attack either from one side or from the other4 ,footnote #bcd3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #acd1 b4 #e-p4 #ace1 a4 #e4 ,for the fourth head 7d471 no corresponding error is assigned4 ,it should be noted that the illustration given of it1 and remarked upon at the foot of the last page1 is repeated for the concluding head of the list4 ,in case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of the above defective ways1 you will thus know where to find objections against him4 ,but1 if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium1 you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections1 by discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm it4#bce ,footnote #bce3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #ace1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 a7_/llou men ou7n ou7_/ts a7podido_/ntos to i7_/dion e7picheirte_/on1 au7t d' ou7 dote_/on e7sti tau_/tn tn e7_/nstasin1 a7ll' eu7thus tithe_/menon to i7_/dion dioriste_/on o7n tro_/pon ti_/thsi to i7_/dion4 #ab4 ,again1 the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate really identical with the subject1 though under a different name4 ,thus1 he may declare to ,greek3 to pre_/pon to be a proprium ,greek3 tou kalou3 you may then refute him by showing that ,greek3 pre_/pon is identical with ,greek3 kalo_/n4 ,if he is on the negative side1 denying ,a to be a proprium of ,b on the ground that ,a is identical with ,b1 you will make out the affirmative against him by showing that ,a is not identical with ,b1 but only co-extensive and reciprocating therewith4 ,thus1 you may show that animated substance is not identical with animal1 but a proprium of animal4#bcf ,footnote #bcf3 ,ibid4 a4 #aa-ai4 #ac4 ,where the subject is homoeomeric1 the respondent may declare as proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a part separately2 or he may declare as proprium of a part separately what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole4 ,in either case1 you have a plausible argument for refuting him2 but your refutation will not be always conclusive1 because there are various cases in which what is true of each homoeomeric part is not true of the whole2 and vice vers4 ,if your position in the debate is affirmative1 you will select as illustration some case in which what is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part3 e4g41 ,the earth as a whole1 and each of its parts1 tend by nature downwards4 ,this is a proprium of the earth4#bcg ,footnote #bcg3 ,topic4 ,v4 v4 p4 #ace1 a4 #bj-;b4 #f4 #ad4 ,respecting ,opposita1 there are different loci for different varieties4 a4 ,contraria4--,suppose the respondent to affirm ,a as proprium of ,b3 you will examine whether the contrary of ,a is proprium of the contrary of ,b4 ,if it be not1 then neither is ,a proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 if best is not a proprium of justice1 neither can worst be a proprium of injustice4 ,if the respondent is on the negative side1 you may prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged subject4#bch ,footnote #bch3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #ace1 b4 #g-af4 b4 ,relata4--,suppose the respondent to affirm a relatum ,a as proprium of a relatum ,b1 you may refute him by showing that the correlate of ,a is not proprium of the correlate of ,b4 ,suppose him to deny the same1 you will refute him by proving the affirmative between correlate and correlate4#bci ,footnote #bci3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #ace1 b4 #ag-bf4 c4 ,habitus et ,privatio4--,suppose the respondent to affirm an attribute of the habitus ,b1 as proprium thereof3 you may refute him by showing that the corresponding attribute of the privatio correlating with habitus ,b1 is not proprium of that privatio4 ,suppose him to take the negative side1 you will refute him by proving the affirmative of this latter proposition4#bdj ,footnote #bdj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bg-p4 #acf1 a4 #d4 #ae4 ,respecting ,contradictory ,propositions 7affirmation and negation of the same71 more than one mode of dealing may be stated4 ,wherever the affirmation is a proprium of the subject1 the negation cannot also be a proprium thereof2 and vice vers4 ,if the affirmative predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject1 neither can the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject2 and vice vers4 ,if the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative subject1 the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative subject4 ,the same predicate cannot be proprium both of the affirmative subject and of the negative subject4#bda ,footnote #bda3 ,ibid4 p4 #acf1 a4 #e-;b4 #b4 ,this locus is declared by ,aristotle to furnish arguments for refutation only1 and not for proof4 #af4 ,respecting two or more ,contra-,specific ,terms under the same genus and exhausting the whole genus3--,suppose ,a and ,b contra-specific terms used as subjects2 ,c and ,d contra-specific terms used as predicates4 ,if ,c be not a proprium of ,a1 neither will ,d be a proprium of ,b2 thus1 if perceivable 7,greek3 ai7sthto_/n7 is not a proprium of any other species 7except gods7 included under the genus animal1 neither will intelligible 7,greek3 noto_/n7 be proprium of a god4 ,again1 if ,c be a proprium of ,a1 ,d also will be a proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the excellence of the rational or calculating soul 7,greek3 logistikou71 we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it is the excellence of the appetitive soul 7,greek3 e7pithumtikou74#bdb ,footnote #bdb3 ,topic4 ,v4 vi4 p4 #acf1 b4 #c-ac4 ,il faut supposer ici quatre termes1 qui sont deux deux les membres d'une division3 si le premier n'est pas le propre du troisime1 le second ne le sera pas du quatrime2 et rciproquement pour la ngation d'abord4 ,les quatre termes sont ici3 sensible1 intelligible1 membres d'une mme division3 mortel1 divinit1 membres d'une autre division4 7,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire1 p4 #aig47 #ag4 ,respecting ,cases or ,inflections1 either of the subject ,b1 or the predicate ,a3--,if the case or inflection of the predicate be not a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject1 neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject4 ,if the case or inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject1 then the predicate itself will also be proprium of the subject4 ,pulchr is not proprium of just2 therefore1 pulchrum is not proprium of justum4 ,this locus will be found available in combination with the preceding locus bearing on ,opposita4 ,not only opposita themselves1 but also the cases and inflections of opposita1 may be adduced as arguments1 following the rules above laid down4#bdc ,footnote #bdc3 ,topica1 ,v4 vii4 p4 #acf1 b4 #ae-cb4 #ah4 ,analogous cases or propositions3--,if the respondent affirms ,a as proprium of ,b1 you have an argument against him by showing that something analogous to ,a is not proprium of a subject analogous to ,b4 ,thus1 the builder1 in relation to house-making1 is analogous to the physician1 in relation to health-making2 now health-making is not the proprium of the physician1 and therefore neither is house-making the proprium of the builder4 ,if the respondent has advanced a negative1 you will apply this same locus in the affirmative against him3 e4g41 as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit of body1 so it is the proprium of the physician to impart health4#bdd ,footnote #bdd3 ,ibid4 b4 #cc-p4 #acg1 a4 #g4 #ai4 ,esse1 and ,generari or ,fieri3--,if ,a considered as ,ens is not the proprium of ,b considered as ,ens1 then neither will ,a considered as ,fiens be the proprium of ,b considered as ,fiens4 ,vice vers1 on the affirmative side3 if the former of these two be the fact1 you may argue that the latter is the fact also4#bde ,footnote #bde3 ,topic4 ,v4 vii4 p4 #acg1 a4 #ba-;b4 #b4 #bj4 ,comparison with the ,idea3--,if the respondent sets up ,a as proprium of ,b1 you will turn your mind to the ,idea of ,b1 and note whether ,a is proprium of this ,idea1 in the same sense and under the same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of ,b4 ,if it be not so1 you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent4 ,thus1 if he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest1 you will argue that this cannot be so1 because to be at rest is not the proprium of the ,self-man 7,greek3 au7toa_/nthrpos7 quatenus man1 but quatenus ,idea4 ,vice vers1 you will have an affirmative argument1 if you can show that it is the proprium of the ,idea4 ,thus1 since it is a proprium of the self-animal quatenus animal to be composed of soul and body1 you may infer that to be composed of soul and body is really a proprium of animal4#bdf ,footnote #bdf3 ,ibid4 b4 #c-ac4 #ba4 ,locus from ,more and ,less3--,suppose the respondent to affirm ,a as proprium of ,b3 you will have an argument against him1 if you can show that what is more ,a is not proprium of that which is more ,b4 ,thus1 if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more body1 neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less body2 nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply4 ,vice vers1 if you can show that what is more ,a is proprium of what is more ,b1 you will have an affirmative argument to establish that ,a is proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living4 ,hence1 to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply2 also1 to perceive most1 least1 or less1 is proprium of that which is most1 least1 or less living1 respectively4#bdg ,footnote #bdg3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #acg1 b4 #ad-bg4 ,if you can show that ,a simply is not proprium of ,b simply1 you have an argument to establish that what is more or less ,a is not proprium of that which is more or less ,b4 ,if1 on the other land1 you show the affirmative of the first1 this will be an argument sustaining the affirmative of the last4#bdh ,perhaps you can show that what is more ,a is not proprium of what is more ,b3 this will be an argument to show that ,a is not proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 to perceive is more proprium of animal than to know is proprium of man2 but to perceive is not proprium of animal2 therefore1 to know is not proprium of man4 ,or again1 if you can show that what is less ,a is proprium of what is less ,b1 this will form an argument to show that ,a is proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is proprium of animal2 but natural mansuetude is proprium of man3 therefore life is proprium of animal4#bdi ,farther1 if you can show that ,a is more a proprium of ,c than it is a proprium of ,b1 yet nevertheless that it is not a proprium of ,c you may thence argue that ,a is not a proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 to be coloured is more a proprium of superficies than it is a proprium of body2 yet it is not a proprium of superficies2 therefore1 it is not a proprium of body4 ,this last variety of the locus of ,more and ,less 7,aristotle remarks7 affords no corresponding affirmative plea2#bej for the same predicate cannot be a proprium of many subjects4 ,if ,a be really a proprium of superficies1 it cannot be also proprium of body4 ,lastly1 you may perhaps be able to show that ,c is more a proprium of ,b than ,a is a proprium of ,b2 yet1 if ,c is not a proprium of ,b1 you will infer negatively that neither is ,a proprium of ,b4 ,thus1 to be perceivable is more proprium of animal1 than to be divisible is proprium of animal2 yet to be perceivable is not proprium of animal1 and1 therefore1 neither is to be divisible proprium of animal4 ,you may invert this argument for the affirmative1 if you can show that ,c is less a proprium of ,b than ,a is a proprium of ,b1 yet still that ,c is a proprium of ,b2 hence you will infer1 fortiori1 that ,a is a proprium thereof4 ,e4g41 ,if to perceive is less a proprium of animal than to live is a proprium thereof1 yet to perceive is a proprium of animal2 then1 to live is so likewise4#bea ,footnote #bdh3 ,ibid4 b4 #bh-p4 #ach1 a4 #c4 ,footnote #bdi3 ,topica1 ,v4 viii4 p4 #ach1 a4 #d-ab4 ,footnote #bej3 ,ibid4 p4 #ach1 a4 #ac-bj3 ,greek3 kataskeua_/zonti de o7 to_/pos ou7tos ou7_/k e7sti chr_/simos2 a7du_/naton ga_/r e7sti tau7to pleio_/nn i7_/dion ei7nai4 ,footnote #bea3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba-cj4 #bb4 ,locus from ,equal ,relation3--,arguments both negative and affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different things which are 7not more or less propria1 but7 alike or equally propria of some other subject4 ,if ,a is as much a proprium of ,b as ,c is proprium of ,d1 while yet ,a is not a proprium of ,b1 you may hence infer that ,c is not a proprium of ,d4 ,if1 under this hypothesis1 ,a is a proprium of ,b1 you may infer affirmatively that ,c is a proprium of ,d4#beb ,or1 if ,a and ,c be1 alike and equally1 propria of the same subject ,b1 then1 if you show that ,a is not proprium thereof1 you will infer negatively that ,c is not so2 if you show that ,a is proprium of ,b1 you will infer affirmatively that ,c is so likewise4 ,or1 thirdly1 if ,a be1 alike and equally1 a proprium of ,b and of ,e1 then1 if you can show that ,a is not a proprium of ,e1 you may infer negatively that it is not a proprium of ,b4 ,here1 however1 the counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable2 for the same proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects1 as was stated before4#bec ,footnote #beb3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj-;b4 #ae4 ,footnote #bec3 ,ibid4 b4 #af-bb4 #bc4 ,locus from ,potentiality3--,no potentiality whatever can belong to ,non-,ens4 ,accordingly1 if ,a1 the proprium affirmed of a subject ,b1 is a potentiality1 this must imply some real ,ens in which it inheres1 and which is correlate to the subject4 ,but1 if in the specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate1 you will attack it as a bad proprium--as a potentiality inhering in ,non-,ens or nothing4 ,e4g41 if the case be1 ,it is a proprium of air to be respirable1 you will refute this by pointing out that this is true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of breathing resides2 that no mention is made by the respondent of this correlate or of any other correlate2 in other words1 that1 so far as the specification is concerned1 the correlate is passed over as ,non-,ens or a non-entity4 ,therefore the proprium is not a good proprium4#bed ,again1 suppose the affirmation to be1 ,it is a proprium of ,ens to be capable of doing or suffering something2 this will be defensible because it is only when the subject is ,ens1 that it is declared to have such proprium4#bee ,footnote #bed3 ,topica1 ,v4 ix4 p4 #ach1 b4 #bg-cg4 ,greek3 oi7on e7pei o7 ei7_/pas a7e_/ros i7_/dion to a7napneusto_/n t duna_/mei men a7pe_/dke to i7_/dion 7to gar toiouton i7_/dion oi7on a7napneisthai a7napneusto_/n e7stin71 a7pode_/dke de kai pros to m o7n to i7_/dion2 kai gar m o7_/ntos z_/ou1 oi7on a7napnein pe_/phuke ton a7e_/ra1 e7nde_/chetai a7e_/ra ei7nai2 ou7 me_/ntoi m o7_/ntos z_/ou dunato_/n e7stin a7napnein2 7_/st' ou7d' a7e_/ros e7_/stai i7_/dion to toiouton oi7on a7napneisthai1 to_/te o7_/te z_/on ou7k e7_/stai toiouton oi7on a7napnein4 ou7k a7n ou7n ei7_/ a7e_/ros i7_/dion to a7napneusto_/n4 ,respirability 7the proprium here discussed7 being a relative term1 ,aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and included in setting out the proprium4 ,if this be not done1 a refutative argument may be drawn from such omission--that the respondent was not aware of the relativity4 ,we may remark here that this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the proprium in question3 it is not an objection against the reality of that proprium itself1 if carefully described4 ,the objection belongs to that class which ,aristotle had discussed before1 at the commencement of ,book ,v4 ,footnote #bee3 ,ibid4 p4 #aci1 a4 #a-h4 #bd4 ,locus from the ,superlative3--,suppose the affirmation to be1 ,it is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies3 this you may refute by showing that1 if fire ceased to exist1 there would still be some other body the lightest of all bodies4 ,therefore the proprium may still be predicated of something else1 when its alleged subject has ceased to exist4 ,the proprium and its subject are not reciprocating and co-extensive2 therefore it is not a true proprium4#bef ,footnote #bef3 ,ibid4 a4 #i-bj4 ,,vi4 ,we now enter on the ,sixth ,book1 containing the ,loci bearing on ,definition4 ,in debates respecting ,definition1 there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn3--#beg #a4 ,that which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true at all1 even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be defined2 or at least not true of everything that bears the name of the subject4 #b4 ,the definiend may have been included in a genus1 but not in that genus to which it rightly and specially belongs4 #c4 ,the definition given may not be specially appropriate to the definiend 7i4e41 it may include1 not only that but1 other matters besides74 #d4 ,the definition1 though unobjectionable on any of the above three grounds1 may nevertheless not declare the ,essence of the definiend4 #e4 ,lastly1 the definition may be good in substance1 but badly expressed or set out4 ,footnote #beg3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 i4 p4 #aci1 a4 #bd-ce3 ,greek3 ts de peri tous o7_/rous pragmatei_/as me_/r pe_/nte e7sti_/n4 ,as to the first of these five heads1 the ,loci bearing thereupon have already been enumerated in the ,third ,book1 on ,accident3 in accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth or falsehood of the predication4#beh ,as to the second and third of the five heads1 these have been dealt with in the ,fourth and ,fifth ,books1 enumerating the ,loci on ,genus and ,proprium4#bei ,footnote #beh3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 i4 p4 #aci1 a4 #cf4 ,footnote #bei3 ,ibid4 b4 #c4 ,there remain the fourth and fifth heads1 on which we are about to enter3 7#a7 ,whether the definition is well expressed or set out 7the fifth head72 7#b7 ,whether it has any right to be called a definition at all1 i4e41 whether it declares the ,essence of the subject 7the fourth74#bfj ,the fifth is taken first1 because to do a thing well is always more difficult than to do it simply1 and is therefore likely to afford greater opening for argumentative attack4 ,footnote #bfj3 ,ibid4 b4 #f4 ,the definition1 while unobjectionable in substance1 may be badly set out in two ways4 ,first1 it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor clear4 ,next1 it may be redundant3 the terms may include more than is required for the definition4 ,under each of these defects of expression several loci may be indicated4#bfa ,footnote #bfa3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-ah4 #a4 ,indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in the definition4 ,or it may arise from the term to be defined being itself equivocal2 while the definer1 taking no notice of such equivocation1 has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and the same definition4 ,you may attack him either by denying that the definition as given covers all the different meanings of the definiend2 or you may yourself distinguish 7which the definer has omitted to do7 these different meanings1 and show that none of them or few of them are covered by the definition4#bfb ,footnote #bfb3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 ii4 p4 #aci1 b4 #ai4 ,greek3 o7moi_/s de kai ei7 tou o7rizome_/nou pleonachs legome_/nou m dieln ei7pen2 a7_/dlon gar o7pote_/rou ton o7_/ron a7pode_/dken1 e7nde_/chetai_/ te sukophantein 7s ou7k e7pharmo_/ttontos tou lo_/gou e7pi pa_/nta 7n ton o7rismon a7pode_/dken4 ,the term ,greek3 sukophantein surprises us here1 because the point under consideration is indicated by ,aristotle himself as a real mistake2 accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed as mere cavil--,greek3 sukophanti_/a4 ,alexander1 in the ,scholia 7p4 #bhg1 b4 #a1 ,br471 says that ,aristotle intends to apply the term ,greek3 sukophantein to the respondent who advances this bad definition1 not to the assailant who impeaches it4 ,but the text of ,aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation4 #b4 ,indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor2 but ,aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as though it were proprio sensu4#bfc ,he declares it to be wrong1 but he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a metaphor1 without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate4 ,footnote #bfc3 ,ibid4 b4 #cb3 ,greek3 e7nde_/chetai de kai tn metaphoran ei7po_/nta sukophantein 7s kuri_/s ei7rko_/ta4 ,here again we have the word ,greek3 sukophantein to designate what seems a legitimate mode of argumentative attack4 #c4 ,indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known4#bfd ,definitions given by ,plato are cited to illustrate this4 ,footnote #bfd3 ,ibid4 p4 #adj1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 pan gar a7saphes to m ei7tho_/s4 #d4 ,indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image1 which is even worse than a professed metaphor3 as where law is defined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just4#bfe ,footnote #bfe3 ,ibid4 a4 #f-ag4 ,greek3 cheiron o7poiouous tn kata metaphoran legome_/nn4 #e4 ,the definition is indistinct1 if it does not1 while making known the definiend1 make clear at the same time its contrary4#bff ,footnote #bff3 ,ibid4 a4 #ah4 #f4 ,the definition is also indistinct if it does not1 when enunciated1 make known what the definiend is1 without requiring that the definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated4 ,the definition by itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend4 ,otherwise1 the definer is no better than those archaic painters1 who1 when painting a dog or a horse1 were compelled to write the name alongside in order that the animal might be recognized4#bfg ,footnote #bfg3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj4 ,this last condition is a high measure of perfection to exact from a definition4 ,assuredly ,aristotle's own definitions often fall lamentably short of it4 ,such are the ,loci regarding ,indistinctness in the setting out of the definition4 ,the second defect is ,redundancy4 #a4 ,redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include either all things absolutely1 or all things contained in the same genus as the definiend2 since the definition ought to consist of a generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic things1 and a differential term to discriminate it from other things within the same genus4 ,a definition of the kind mentioned will be useless through redundancy4#bfh ,it will also be open to the like objection1 if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend1 over and above the essential attributes2 or1 indeed1 if it includes any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the definiend4#bfi ,it will be still worse1 if it comprises any attribute not belonging to all individuals of the species2 for then it will not even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication4#bgj ,footnote #bfh3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 iii4 p4 #adj1 a4 #bc-cb4 ,alexander1 however1 remarks very pertinently1 that the defects of such a definition are defects of substance rather than of expression4 ,aristotle has passed unconsciously from the latter to the former3 ,greek3 e7n men t pr_/t tn e7pho_/dn do_/xeien a7n o7 ,a7ristote_/ls meta_/gein ei7s tas pragmatikas e7xeta_/seis 7,schol4 p4 #bhg1 b4 #bg1 ,br474 ,footnote #bfi3 ,ibid4 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 a7pls d' ei7pein1 a7_/pan peri_/ergon ou7 a7phairethe_/ntos to loipon dlon poiei to o7rizo_/menon4 ,footnote #bgj3 ,ibid4 b4 #af4 #b4 ,repetition is another fault sometimes committed4 ,the same attribute may be predicated twice over4 ,or a particular and narrow attribute may be subjoined1 in addition to a more general and comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included4#bga ,footnote #bga3 ,ibid4 b4 #bg-p4 #ada1 a4 #bb4 ,so much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the definition tendered4 ,next1 as bearing on the matter and substance of the definition1 the following loci are distinguishable4 #a4 ,the first of these loci is1 if the matter of the definition is not prius and notius as compared with the definiend4 ,it is one of the canons of ,definition1 the purpose of which is to impart knowledge of the definiend1 to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature and better known than the latter4 ,the essence of each definiend--the being what it is--is one and only one4 ,if a definition be given1 other than that by means of what is prius and notius1 it would follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences2 which is impossible4 ,accordingly1 any proposition tendered as a definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better known than the definiend sins against this canon1 and is to be held as no true definition at all4#bgb ,footnote #bgb3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #ada1 a4 #bd-;b4 #b4 ,the locus here indicated by this general feature is one1 but it includes a number of varieties4#bgc ,more known1 or less known1 it should first be observed1 has two distinct meanings3 either more or less known absolutely 7by nature72 or more or less known to us4 ,absolutely1 or by nature1 the point is better known than the line2 the line1 than the superficies2 the superficies1 than the solid2 the prius1 than the posterius4 ,but to us the reverse is true4 ,the solid1 as object of sensible perception1 is earlier known and more known than the superficies2 the superficies1 than the line2 the line1 than the point2 the posterius1 than the prius4 ,to us means to the bulk of mankind3 absolutely or by nature refers to the instructed1 superior1 teaching and expository1 intellects4#bgd ,there may be some cases in which the notius nobis coincides and is identical with the notius natur2#bge but1 as a rule1 the two are distinct1 and the one is the inverse of the other4 ,a genuine and perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the ,species through ,genus and ,differenti1 which are both of them absolutely prior and more knowable than the ,species1 since1 if they be supposed non-existent1 the ,species is nowhere to be found4 ,no man can know the ,species without knowing its ,genus and ,differenti2 but you may know the ,genus and ,differenti without knowing the ,species2 hence the ,species is more unknowable than they are4#bgf ,this is the true scientific definition2 but there are persons incapable of acquiring knowledge by means of it4 ,to these persons1 an imperfect explanation or quasi-definition must be given1 by means of matters knowable to them4#bgg ,those1 however1 who regard such imperfect explanations as true definitions1 must be reminded that1 upon that hypothesis1 we should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same definiend4 ,for individuals differ from each other in respect to what is more knowable3 what is more so to one man is not more so to another4 ,indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at different periods3 to the early and untrained mind objects of sensible perception are the most knowable2 but1 when a man has been improved by training and instruction1 the case is reversed1 and the objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind4#bgh ,to define properly1 therefore1 we must enunciate1 not the notiora nobis but1 the notiora natur or simpliciter2 understanding by this last phrase1 not what is more knowable to all actual men but1 what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted intellect2 just as1 when we speak of the wholesome1 we mean what is wholesome to the well-constituted body4#bgi ,these conditions of ,definition you must thoroughly master1 and apply to each debate as the occasion may require4 ,your task in refuting an alleged definition will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of the above conditions2 that is1 when it enunciates neither what is notius natur nor what is notius nobis4#bhj ,footnote #bgc3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #adb1 b4 #bj4 ,footnote #bgd3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #ada1 b4 #c-ad4 ,footnote #bge3 ,ibid4 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #bgf3 ,ibid4 b4 #be4 ,footnote #bgg3 ,ibid4 b4 #af4 ,footnote #bgh3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd4 ,the general mental fact here noticed by ,aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of ,professor ,bain on the ,emotions and the ,will4 7,chapter on ,consciousness1 sect4 #ai1 p4 #eha1 #bnd ed47 ,a sensation is1 under any view of it1 a conscious element of the mind4 ,as pleasure or pain1 we are conscious in one way2 as discrimination1 we are conscious in the other way1 namely1 in a mode of neutral excitement4--,but this is not all4 ,after much contact with the sensible world1 a new situation arises1 and a new variety of the consciousness1 which stands in need of some explanation4 ,when a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet1 there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense4 4 4 4 ,it is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock1 our position in mature life being totally altered4 ,it is the rarest thing for us then to come under a radically new impression2 and we can only1 by help of imperfect analogies1 form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation4 ,the process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition1 gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first4 ,the second shock of scarlet1 if it stood alone1 would doubtless resemble the preceding2 but such is the nature of the mind1 that the new shock will not stand alone1 but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former4 ,the sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise1 but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions4 ,hence it may properly be said1 when we see1 or hear1 or touch1 or move1 that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present4 ,the consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements--the new shock1 the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past1 and the feeling of that past as revived in the present4 ,in truth1 the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old2 and1 in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it1 our discrimination follows another course4 ,for example1 if ,i have before me two shades of colour1 instead of feeling the difference exactly as ,i am struck at the moment1 my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions2 and1 having two sum-totals in my mind1 the difference that ,i feel is between those totals4 ,if ,i made a mistake1 it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination1 as to a wrong act of identification4--,all sensations1 therefore1 after the first of each kind1 involve a flash of recovery from the past1 which is what really determines their character4 ,the present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others2 the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant1 serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets4--,sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws1 in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference4--,when we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing1 we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations4 ,footnote #bgi3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #adb1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #bhj3 ,ibid4 a4 #ab2 also1 a4 #cb4 ,the canon being1 ,that what is posterius must be defined by its prius1--the definer may sin against this in defining the prius by its posterius2 e4g41 if he defines the stationary and the determinate by means of the moveable and the variable4#bha ,also1 when his definition is neither prius1 nor posterius1 but of equal position with the definiend1 he is at fault4 ,this may happen 7#a7 when he defines by an ,opposite 7for1 according to some1 the science of ,opposites is one and the same1 and it is impossible that either one of a pair can be absolutely more knowable than the other2 though it is true that no relative can be understood or explained without the knowledge of its correlative1 e4g41 double and half72 or 7#b7 when he includes the definiend itself in his definition1 either under its proper name or any other name2#bhb or 7#c7 when he defines by means of a contra-specific to the definiend--by something of equal specific rank or position1 which is therefore simul natur therewith 7e4g41 ,odd is that which is greater than even by unity72 or 7#d7 when he defines by something specifically subordinate 7e4g41 ,an even number is that which may be bisected1 where bisected means divisible by two1 itself one among the even numbers#bhc74 ,footnote #bha3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 pro_/teron gar to me_/non kai to 7risme_/non tou a7ori_/stou kai e7n kin_/sei o7_/ntos4 ,footnote #bhb3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #adb1 a4 #bb-;b4 #f4 ,footnote #bhc3 ,ibid4 b4 #g-ai3 ,greek3 pa_/lin1 ei7 t a7ntidirme_/n to a7ntidirme_/non 7_/ristai--o7moi_/s de kai ei7 dia tn u7poka_/t to e7pa_/n 7_/ristai4 #b4 ,the second locus 7after that bearing on the ,prius et ,notius7 of argument for 9999impugning a definition is1 where it does not enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included4 ,the mention of the genus1 as enunciating the fundamental essence of the definiend1 ought to stand first in the definition4 ,if your opponent defines body--that which has three dimensions1 or man--that which knows how to count1 you attack him by asking1 ,what is it that has three dimensions8 ,what is it that knows how to count8 ,no genus has been assigned4#bhd ,footnote #bhd3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #adb1 b4 #bb-bi4 #c4 ,a third locus is1 where the definiend is a complex whole having reference to several distinct facts or phenomena1 while the definition indicates only one of them4 ,thus1 if grammar be defined--the knowing how to write from dictation1 you will object that it is just as much--the knowing how to read4 ,the definition is incomplete unless it includes both4#bhe ,footnote #bhe3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj4 #d4 ,a fourth locus is1 where the definiend admits both of a better and a worse construction1 and where the definition enunciates only the worse4 ,you may impugn it1 on the ground that every cognition and every power must be understood as tending to its best results4#bhf ,footnote #bhf3 ,ibid4 p4 #adc1 a4 #i4 #f4 ,a fifth locus is1 where the definiend is enunciated as ranking1 not in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but1 in some higher and more distinct genus4 ,here the real essence will not be declared1 and the definition will thus be incomplete2 unless indeed it includes1 along with the highest genus1 the superadded mention of all the differenti descending down to the lowest species4 ,it will then be complete1 because it will include1 in circumlocutory phrase1 all that would be declared by enunciating the specific name4#bhg ,footnote #bhg3 ,ibid4 a4 #ae-bh4 #f4 ,assuming the genus to be truly declared in the definition you will examine whether the differenti enunciated are differenti at all8 whether they really belong to the definiend8 what is it which they serve to contrast with and exclude1--since1 if there be nothing such1 they cannot be truly differenti8 whether the differential term and its counter-differential apply to and cover the whole genus8 whether1 granting the differentia to be real1 it be such1 when taken along with the genus1 as to constitute a true species1 and whether its counter-differentia be such also8 ,this is a locus furnishing many possibilities of impugning the definition4#bhh ,footnote #bhh3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 vi4 p4 #adc1 a4 #bi-;b4 #aj4 #g4 ,perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely negative2 e4g41 ,a line is length without breadth4 ,if you are debating with a respondent who holds the 7,platonic7 doctrine of ,ideas1 and who considers each ,idea or genus to be something numerically one1 distinct from all its participants1 you will find here a locus for attacking them4#bhi ,he asserts the existence of a ,self-long or generical long1 a ,self-animal or generic animal1 each numerically one4 ,now1 upon this hypothesis1 since of all long you may predicate either in the affirmative or the negative 7i4e41 either it is broad or it is not broad71 so this alternative may be predicated of the ,self-long or generical long2 and thus the genus will coincide with1 or fall under the definition of1 one among its own species4 ,or1 if this be denied1 it will follow that the generic long must be both broad and not broad2 which is a contradiction still more inadmissible4 ,accordingly1 against one who holds the doctrine of ,ideas1 declaring the genus to be unum numero1 the negative differentia will furnish grounds for attack2 but not against any other respondent4#bij ,for there are various cases in which the negative must be employed as a part of the differentia3 e4g41 in privative terms1 blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does not see4 ,and1 even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative1 it may have for its condivident member only a negative term1 e4g41 length having-breadth has for its condivident member only the negative1 length not-having-breadth4#bia ,footnote #bhi3 ,ibid4 b4 #aa-cj4 ,footnote #bij3 ,ibid4 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 7_/ste pros e7kei_/nous mo_/nous chr_/simos o7 to_/pos1 o7_/soi to ge_/nos e7n a7rithm phasin ei7nai4 touto de poiousin oi7 tas i7de_/as tithe_/menoi2 au7to gar mkos kai au7to zon ge_/nos phasin ei7nai4 ,footnote #bia3 ,ibid4 b4 #cc4 #h4 ,perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is really a subordinate species2 or what is really the genus itself under another name2 or what is not ,quale1 but ,quid2 or what belongs to the definiend as an accident only4 ,each of these is a locus for arguments against the definition4#bib ,footnote #bib3 ,topica1 ,,vi4 vi4 p4 #add1 a4 #e-bg4 #i4 ,perhaps also1 in the definition given1 the differentia or the species may be found predicable of the entire genus2 or the genus may be found predicable of the differentia itself1 and not of objects under it2 or the species 7sometimes even one of its sub-species7 may be found predicable of the differentia2 or perhaps the differentia may not be a prius as regards the species 7which it ought to be1 while it is a posterius as regards the genus74 ,arguments against the definition may be drawn from any one of these loci4#bic ,footnote #bic3 ,ibid4 a4 #bh-;b4 #aa4 #aj4 ,recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct genera neither of which comprehends the other1 unless both are comprehended under some higher genus4 ,examine whether this is observed in the definition tendered to you4#bid ,footnote #bid3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab4 #aa4 ,no genuine differentia can be derived either from the ,category ,ubi or from the ,category ,passio2 for neither of them furnishes characteristics essential to the subject4 ,all ,passio when intensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject and removes it from its own appropriate species2 but the differentia is inseparable from its subject2 accordingly1 nothing by virtue of which the subject is called ,greek3 a7lloion can be a true differentia4 ,if the definition sins against this rule1 it will be open to question4#bie ,footnote #bie3 ,ibid4 b4 #ca-p4 #ade1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 o7ran de kai ei7 to e7_/n tini diaphoran a7pode_/dken ou7si_/as2 ou7 dokei gar diaphe_/rein ou7si_/a ousi_/as t pou ei7nai4--pa_/lin ei7 to pa_/thos diaphoran a7pode_/dken4--a7pls d' ei7pein1 kath' o7_/sa a7lloioutai to e7_/chon1 ou7den tou_/tn diaphora e7kei_/nou2--a7pls gar ou7k a7lloiou_/metha kata tas diaphora_/s4 #ab4 ,if the subject be relative1 its true differentia ought to be relative also2 thus1 science or cognition is a relatum1 and accordingly its three differenti--theoretical1 practical1 constructive--are all relata also4#bif ,the definition must conform to this2 and it must also1 in cases where the relative subject has more than one correlate1 declare that correlate which is the ordinary and natural one1 not any other which is rare and realized only on occasion4#big ,you must watch to see whether this condition is observed2 and also whether the correlative enunciated in the definition is the one strictly proximate4 ,thus1 if the definition given of prudence be1 ,it is an excellence of man or an excellence of the soul1 this will not be a good definition4 ,it ought to be--an excellence of the rational department of the soul2 for it is through and by reason of this department that both man and soul are denominated prudent4#bih ,footnote #bif3 ,ibid4 a4 #ac4 ,footnote #big3 ,ibid4 a4 #ai-bf4 ,footnote #bih3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 vi4 p4 #ade1 a4 #bh-cb4 ,greek3 pr_/ton gar tou logistikou a7ret 7 phro_/nsis2 kata gar touto kai 7 psuch kai o7 a7_/nthrpos phronein le_/getai4 #ac4 ,when the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition of some subject1 you must examine whether it really resides or can reside 7as by nature it ought to do7 in the subject to which it is referred in the definition4 ,if it cannot1 the 9999definition is untenable2 and this mistake is sometimes made1 the producing conditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon itself1 or vice vers4#bii ,thus1 some persons have defined sleep--incapacity of sensible perception2 doubt--equality of contrary reasonings2 pain--breach of continuity violently made in parts of the organism which naturally grow together4 ,now sleep does not reside in perception1 nor doubt in reasonings4 ,sleep is that which produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception2 doubt is a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings4#cjj ,this will be a locus for arguing against the definition4 ,footnote #bii3 ,ibid4 b4 #aa3 ,greek3 to poiou_/menon ei7s to poitikon 7 a7na_/palin sumbai_/nei tithe_/nai tois ou7_/ts o7rizome_/nois4 ,footnote #cjj3 ,ibid4 a4 #cc-;b4 #bj4 #ad4 ,another locus is1 when the definiend has direct bearing and reference to something different from what is enunciated in the definition4 ,thus1 if the respondent defines justice--a power tending to make equal distribution1 you may remark hereupon1 that the just man is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution1 not he who has the power to do so4 ,if this definition were allowed1 the justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so distributing4#cja ,footnote #cja3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #ade1 b4 #cd-p4 #adf1 a4 #b4 #ae4 ,again1 the definition will be assailable1 if the definiend admits graduation of ,more or ,less1 while that which is enunciated in the definition does not admit it1 or vice vers2 also1 if both of them admit graduation1 but the variations of the two are not corresponding and concomitant4 ,the defining phrase ought to be identical in signification with the term defined4#cjb ,if both of them agree in reference to some common correlate1 but one is to this in the relation of more while the other is in the relation of less1 the definition is faulty4#cjc ,footnote #cjb3 ,ibid4 p4 #adf1 a4 #c-ab4 ,greek3 ei7_/per d tau7to_/n e7sti to kata ton lo_/gon a7podothen t pra_/gmati4 ,here we have a principle of ,concomitant ,variations analogous to that which is so well unfolded1 as one of the ,four ,inductive ,methods1 in ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill's ',system of ,logic4' ,see ,book ,,iii4 ch4 viii4 sect4 #f4 ,footnote #cjc3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 vii4 p4 #adf1 a4 #f-bj3 ,greek3 e7_/dei d' a7mpho_/tera mallon t au7t u7pa_/rchein1 ei7_/per tau7ta 7n1 c4 #af4 ,again1 you will be able to object1 if the definition enunciate references to two distinct correlates1 severally or alternately3 e4g41 ,the beautiful is that which affords pleasure either through the eye or through the ear2 ,ens is that which is capable either of suffering or acting4 ,you may show that1 according to this definition1 beautiful and not beautiful1 or that ,ens and ,non-,ens1 will coincide and be predicable of the same subjects4#cjd ,footnote #cjd3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 vii4 p4 #adf1 a4 #ba-cb4 ,the definition here given of ,ens appears in the ,sophistes of ,plato1 p4 #bdg1 ,e4 ,the definition of the beautiful 7,greek3 to kalo_/n7 appears in the ,hippias ,major of ,plato 7p4 #bih1 ,e1 seq471 where it is criticized by ,sokrates4 #ag4 ,when the definition is tendered1 you ought to examine and define its own terms1 which1 of course1 profess to enunciate genus and differentia of the definiend4#cje ,you will see whether the definitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to the definiend4 ,footnote #cje3 ,ibid4 a4 #cc-ce4 #ah4 ,if the definiend be a ,relatum1 the definition ought to enunciate its true correlate1 or the true correlate of the genus to which it belongs4 ,you must examine whether this is done1 and whether the correlate enunciated be an ultimate end1 as it ought to be 7i4e4 not merely a means towards something ulterior74 ,if the correlate enunciated is a generation or a process1 this will afford you an argument against the definition2 for all generation or process is a means towards some ulterior end4#cjf ,footnote #cjf3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #adf1 a4 #cf-;b4 #ai4 ,this is a subtle distinction4 ,he says that desire must be defined 7not desire of the pleasurable1 but7 desire of pleasure3 we desire the pleasurable for the sake of pleasure4 ,he admits1 however1 that there are cases in which the argument will not hold3 ,greek3 schedon gar oi7 pleistoi 7_/desthai mallon bou_/lontai 7 pepausthai 7do_/menoi2 7_/ste to e7nergein mallon te_/los a7n poiointo tou e7nrgke_/nai4 #ai4 ,the definition ought not to omit any of the differenti of the definiend2 if any be omitted1 the real essence is not declared4 ,here then is a defect in the definition1 which it is your business always to assail on its defective side4#cjg ,thus1 if the definiend be a relatum corresponding1 not to some correlate absolutely but1 to some correlate specially quantified or qualified1 the definition ought to enunciate such quantification or qualification2 if it does not1 it is open to attack4 ,footnote #cjg3 ,ibid4 b4 #bj3 ,greek3 pa_/lin e7p' e7ni_/n ei7 m di_/rike tou po_/sou1 7 poi_/ou1 7 pou1 7 kata tas a7_/llas diaphora_/s1--a7polei_/pn gar diaphoran 7ntinoun ou7 le_/gei to ti 7n ei7nai2 dei d' a7ei pros to e7ndees e7picheirein4 #bj4 ,suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites1 relative to an appetitum as correlate1 a mode of the good or agreeable4 ,you will take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the correlate as only an apparent mode of good3 if it does not1 you have a locus for attacking it4 ,but if it does1 and if the definer be one who believes in the ,platonic ,ideas1 you may attack him by showing that his definition will not square with that doctrine4 ,for the definition as so given will not suit for the ideal or generic appetite--the ,self-appetite2 which correlates with the ideal or generic good--the ,self-good4 ,in this no distinction is admissible of real and apparent3 a ,self-apparent-good is an absurdity4#cjh ,footnote #cjh3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 viii4 p4 #adf1 b4 #cf-p4 #adg1 a4 #aa4 ,greek3 e7an de kai a7pod to ei7rme_/non1 e7pi ta ei7_/d a7kte_/on ton tithe_/menon i7de_/as ei7nai2 ou7 ga_/r e7stin i7de_/a phainome_/nou ou7deno_/s1 to d' ei7dos pros to ei7dos dokei le_/gesthai1 oi7on au7t e7pithumi_/a au7tou 7de_/os kai au7t bou_/lsis au7tou a7gathou4 ou7k e7_/stai ou7n phainome_/nou a7gathou ou7de phainome_/nou 7de_/os2 a7_/topon gar to ei7nai au7to phaino_/menon a7gathon 7 7du_/4 ,compare ,plato1 ,parmenides1 pp4 #acc-acd1 where this doctrine that if the relatum be an ,idea 7sensu ,platonico71 the correlatum must also be an ,idea1 is enunciated and pushed to its consequences3 ,greek3 o7_/sai tn i7den pros a7ll_/las ei7sin ai7_/ ei7sin1 au7tai pros au7tas tn ou7si_/an e7_/chousin1 a7ll' ou7 pros ta par' 7min ei7_/te o7moi_/mata ei7_/te o7_/p d_/ tis au7ta ti_/thetai1 c4--,greek3 au7t de despotei_/a au7ts doulei_/as e7stin o7_/ e7sti1 c4 7#acc1 ,c-,e47 #ba4 ,again1 suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition4 ,you will examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual person who has the habit2 and how far it fits when taken in comparison with subjects contrary or congeneric4 ,every such definition1 if good1 implies in a certain way the definition of the contrary3 he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the definition of ignorance4#cji ,footnote #cji3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 ix4 p4 #adg1 a4 #ab-bb4 #bb4 ,or suppose the definiend to be a generic relatum1 and the definition to enunciate its generic correlate4 ,you must call to mind the specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms1 and observe whether they fit on to each other respectively4 ,if they do not1 the definition is faulty4#caj ,footnote #caj3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc-bh4 #bc4 ,you will farther examine whether the ,opposite of the definition will serve as definition to the ,opposite of the definiend1 as the definition of half is opposite to the definition of double2 thus1 if double is that which exceeds equality1 half is that which is exceeded by equality4 ,the like is true of ,contraries3 if the profitable be that which is productive of good1 the hurtful will be that which is productive of evil or destructive of good4 ,if1 on trying the contraries1 you find that this will not hold1 the definition originally given will be found unsatisfactory4#caa ,in defining the privative contrary of any term1 a man cannot avoid enunciating in the definition the term of which it is the privative3 but he is not allowed to define the term itself by means of its privative4 ,to define equality--that which is contrary to inequality1 is improper4 ,you will require him at once to define inequality2 and his definition must be--the privation of equality4 ,substitute this definition of the term inequality1 in place of that term itself1 in the above-named definition of equality3 and the last definition will then run as follows3 ,equality is that which is contrary to the privation of equality4 ,here the definiend is enunciated as a part of the definition of itself2 a proof that the original definition--,equality is the contrary of inequality--is itself wrong4#cab ,footnote #caa3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 ix4 p4 #adg1 a4 #bi-;b4 #d4 ,we most remember that ,aristotle1 classifying ,relata as one species under the genus ,opposita1 treats double and half as ,opposita1 i4e4 ,relative-,opposita4 ,i have already said that ,i think this classification improper1 and that ,opposita ought to be ranked as a species under the genus ,relata4 ,footnote #cab3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 ix4 p4 #adg1 b4 #d-be4 #bd4 ,when the definiend is a ,privative ,term1 the definition given ought to enunciate that which it is1 and that of which it is the privation2 also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the first instance4 ,in defining ignorance1 the definition must enunciate not privation only1 but privation of knowledge2 nor will this be sufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in the rational department of the soul 7,greek3 e7n t logistik74 ,privation of knowledge in the soul or in the man1 will not suffice2 because neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute resides in the first instance3 the rational department of the soul must be named by itself1 as being the primary subject of the attribute4 ,if the definition be wanting in any of these conditions1 you will have an argument for impeaching it4#cac ,footnote #cac3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf-p4 #adh1 a4 #b4 #be4 ,a term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the sense of mere negation1 not in that of privation4 ,if this term be defined generally by privation1 the definition will not include the merely negative sense1 and will therefore be impeachable4 ,the only general explanation attainable is that by pure negation1 which is common both to the negative and the privative4 ,thus1 if the respondent defines ignorance--privation of knowledge1 such privation can be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have knowledge or who might be expected to have it3 such privation cannot be predicated of infants1 or of inanimate objects like stones4 ,to include these1 ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or non-existence of knowledge2 the definition thereof by privation is inadequate4#cad ,footnote #cad3 ,ibid4 p4 #adh1 a4 #c-i3 ,greek3 o7ran de kai ei7 m legome_/nou kata ste_/rsin ster_/sei 7ri_/sato1 oi7on kai e7pi ts a7gnoi_/as do_/xeien a7n u7pa_/rchein 7 toiau_/t a7marti_/a tois m kat' a7po_/phasin tn a7_/gnoian le_/gousin4 ,waitz says in note1 p4 #ejc3--,sensus loci hic est4 ,peccant qui per privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire voluerunt qu est ,greek3 kat' a7po_/phasin1 sed eam qu est ,greek3 kata dia_/thesin4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 xvi4 p4 #gi1 b4 #bc4 #bf4 ,if you are debating with one who holds the ,platonic doctrine of ,ideas1 you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not only the definiend itself but also the ,idea of the definiend4 ,thus1 ,plato in defining animal introduces mortality as a part of his definition2#cae but mortality cannot be predicated of the ,idea or generic animal--the ,self-animal2 therefore1 you will have an argument against his definition4 ,in like manner1 if any active or passive attribute is brought into his definition1 you will object that this cannot apply to the ,ideas2 which are avowedly impassive and unchangeable4#caf ,footnote #cae3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 oi7on 7s ,pla_/tn o7ri_/zetai to thnton prosa_/ptn e7n tois tn z_/n o7rismois4 ,this may perhaps allude to ,plato's manner of speaking of ,greek3 za in ,sophistes1 p4 #bdf1 ,e41 p4 #bfe1 ,c42 ,timus1 p4 #fi1 ,c4 ,footnote #caf3 ,topica1 ,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 a4 #ad-bb4 ,greek3 a7patheis gar kai a7ki_/ntoi dokousin ai7 i7de_/ai tois le_/gousin i7de_/as ei7nai4 #bg4 ,another locus for counter-argument is1 where the definiend is ,equivocal or ,analogous1 while one and the same definition is made to apply to all its distinct meanings4 ,such a definition1 pretending to fit all1 will in reality fit none2 nothing but an univocal term can come under one and the same definition4 ,it is wrong to attempt to define an equivocal term4#cag ,when its equivocation is not obvious1 the respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal2 while you as assailant will expose the equivocation4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 a respondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal1 or that an equivocal word is univocal1 in the course of the debate4 ,to obviate such misconception1 you will do well to come to an agreement with him prior to the debate1 or to determine by special antecedent reasonings what terms are univocal or equivocal2 for at that early stage1 when he does not foresee the consequence of your questions1 he is more likely to concede what will facilitate your attack4 ,in the absence of such preliminary agreement1 if the respondent1 when you have shown that his bad definition will not apply universally1 resorts to the pretence that the definiend1 though really univocal1 is equivocal1 you will press him with the true definition of the part not included under his definition1 and you will show that this true definition suits also for the remaining parts of the definiend4 ,you will thus confute him by showing that1 upon his original hypothesis1 it must follow that there are two distinct definitions for the same definiend--the bad one which he has given1 and the true one which you have constrained him to admit4#cah ,perhaps1 however1 the term which he has undertaken to define may be really equivocal1 and therefore indefinable2 nevertheless1 when you have shown the insufficiency of his definition1 he may refuse to admit that the term is equivocal1 but will deny a portion of its real meaning4 ,you will then remind him that1 as to the meaning of names1 we must recognize tradition and custom without presuming to disturb it2 but that1 when we combine these names in our own discourse1 we must beware of those equivocations which mislead the multitude4#cai ,footnote #cag3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc-cg3 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 tn kath' o7mnumi_/an legome_/nn e7_/na lo_/gon a7pa_/ntn koinon a7pe_/dken4--a7ll' ou7den 7tton1 ei7 o7potersoun pepoi_/ken1 7ma_/rtken4 ,aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a philosopher named ,dionysius2 he remarks that life is an equivocal term1 having one meaning in animals1 another and a different one in plants4 ,dr4 ,whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good definition of life is matter of dispute1 and still a desideratum with philosophers4 ,mr4 ,john ,s4 ,mill adverts1 in more than one portion of his ',system of ,logic' 7,bk4 ,,iv4 ch4 iii4 s4 #e1 p4 #bbb1 seq42 ,bk4 ,v4 ch4 v4 s4 #h1 p4 #cga71 to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define ,equivocal ,terms4 ,the inquiries of ,plato into the definitions of some of the most general terms of moral speculation1 are characterized by ,bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is elsewhere to be found among the ancients1 and are1 indeed1 almost perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and abstraction2 but1 from being unaware of the law just mentioned1 he often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries in which it could realize no result1 since the phenomena1 whose common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect1 had not really any common properties4 ,bacon himself fell into the same error in his speculations on the nature of heat1 in which he evidently confounded1 under the name hot1 classes of phenomena which had no property in common4--,he occasionally proceeds like one who seeking for the cause of hardness1 after examining that quality in iron1 flint1 and diamond1 should expect to find that it is something that can be traced also in hard water1 a hard knot1 and a hard heart4 ,footnote #cah3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 a4 #cg1 seq4 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7_/nia lantha_/nei tn o7mnu_/mn1 e7rtnti men 7s sunnu_/mois chrste_/on1 au7t d' a7pokrinome_/n diairete_/on4 e7pei d' e7_/nioi tn a7pokrinome_/nn to men sun_/numon o7m_/numo_/n phasin ei7nai1 o7_/tan m e7pharmo_/tt e7pi pan o7 a7podotheis lo_/gos1--prodiomologte_/on u7per tn toiou_/tn 7 prosullogiste_/on o7_/ti o7m_/numon 7 sun_/numon1 o7po_/teron a7n 72 mallon gar sugchrousin ou7 proorntes to sumbso_/menon4 ,these counsels of ,aristotle are remarkable1 as bearing on the details1 and even the artifices1 of dialectical debate4 ,footnote #cai3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 b4 #af-bb4 ,greek3 r7te_/on pros ton toiouton o7_/ti t men o7nomasi_/a dei chrsthai t paradedome_/n kai parepome_/n kai m kinein ta toiauta1 e7_/nia d' ou7 lekte_/on o7moi_/s tois pollois4 #bh4 ,if the definiend1 of which a definition is tendered to you1 is a compound1 you may subtract from this definition the definition of one of the parts of the definiend1 and then examine whether the remainder will suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend4 ,if the remainder should not suit1 this will show that the entire definition tendered is not tenable4 ,thus1 if the definiend be a finite straight line1 and if the definition tendered be1 ,it is the boundary of a finite plane1 of which 7boundary7 the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities2 you may subtract from this definition the definition of a finite line1 viz41 the boundary of a plane surface having boundaries1 and the remainder of the definition ought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend4 ,now the remainder of the definiend is--straight2 and the remainder of the definition is--that of which the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities4 ,but these two will not suit2 for a line may be straight1 yet infinite1 in which case it will have neither middle nor extremities4 ,accordingly1 since the remainder of the definition will not suit for the remainder of the definiend1 this will serve as an argument that the entire definition tendered is not a good one4#cbj ,footnote #cbj3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xi4 p4 #adh1 b4 #bc-cb4 ,if the definiend be a compound1 and if the definition contain no greater number of words than the definiend1 the definition must be faulty2 it will be nothing better than a substitution of words4 ,still more faulty will it be1 if it substitutes rare and strange words in place of others which are known and familiar2 or if it introduces a new word which signifies something different from that which it replaces4#cba ,footnote #cba3 ,ibid4 b4 #cb-p4 #adi1 a4 #ac4 ,the definiend1 being compound1 will contain both a generic and a differential term4 ,in general1 the generic term will be the better known of the two2 yet sometimes the other is the better known4 ,whichever of the two is the better known1 the definer ought to choose that1 if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in place of another4 ,but1 if he aims at something more or at the substitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name 7without which there can be no true definition71 he ought then to choose the differentia in preference to the genus2 for the definition is produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge1 and the differentia1 being usually less known than the genus1 stands most in need of extraneous help to cognition4#cbb ,when the definition of the differentia has thus been tendered1 you will examine whether it will be equally suitable for any other definiend also4 ,if it be1 you have an argument against the goodness of the definition4 ,for example1 the definition of odd number tendered to you may be--number having a middle4 ,here1 since number is common both to the definiend and to the definition1 having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the equivalent of odd4 ,but this cannot stand as equivalent to odd2 since various other subjects which are not odd 7such1 for example1 as a body or a line71 nevertheless have a middle4 ,since1 then1 we see that having-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are not odd1 it cannot be admitted1 without some qualifying adjunct1 as a good definition of odd4 ,the adjunct annexed must declare in what sense middle is intended1 since it is an equivocal phrase4#cbc ,footnote #cbb3 ,ibid4 p4 #adi1 a4 #ad-bh4 ,footnote #cbc3 ,ibid4 a4 #bi-cg4 #bi4 ,if the definiend be a something really existent1 the definition given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible combination1 such as neither does nor can exist4 ,some1 for example1 define white--colour mingled with fire2 which is incompatible1 since that which is incorporeal 7colour7 cannot be mingled with a body 7fire74#cbd ,footnote #cbd3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xii4 p4 #adi1 a4 #ch-;b4 #c4 #cj4 ,again1 suppose the definiend to be a ,relatum3 the correlate thereof must of course be declared in the definition4 ,care1 however1 must be taken that it shall be declared1 not in vague generality but1 distinctly and with proper specialization2 otherwise1 the definition will be incorrect either entirely or partially4 ,thus1 if the respondent defines medicine--the science of the really existent1 he is incorrect either wholly or partially4 ,the relatum ought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate4#cbe ,when the correlate1 however1 is properly specialized in the definition1 it may be declared under several different descriptions2 for the same real thing may be at once ens1 album1 bonum4 ,none of these descriptions will be incorrect4 ,yet1 if the correlate is thus described in the definition of a relatum1 the definition cannot be considered good or sufficient4 ,for it applies to more things besides the definiend2 and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its definiend4#cbf ,footnote #cbe3 ,ibid4 b4 #d1 seq43 ,greek3 e7_/ti o7_/soi m diairousin e7n tois pro_/s ti pros o7 le_/getai1 a7ll' e7n plei_/osi perilabo_/ntes ei7pan1 7 o7_/ls 7 e7pi_/ ti pseu_/dontai1 oi7on ei7_/ tis tn i7atrikn e7pist_/mn o7_/ntos ei7pen--o7moi_/s de kai e7pi tn a7_/lln1 e7peid a7ntistre_/phei pa_/nta ta pro_/s ti4 ,footnote #cbf3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-bc4 ,greek3 e7_/ti d' a7du_/naton ton toiouton lo_/gon i7_/dion tou a7podothe_/ntos ei7nai2--dlon ou7n o7_/ti o7 toioutos ou7demias e7stin e7pist_/ms o7rismo_/s2 i7_/dion gar kai ou7 koinon dei ton o7rismon ei7nai4 #ca4 ,another mistake in defining is committed1 when a man defines1 not the subject purely and simply but1 the subject in a high measure of excellence4 ,sometimes the rhetor 7e4g47 is defined--one who can perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in any cause2 the thief is defined--one who takes away secretly what belongs to another4 ,but these are the definitions1 not of a rhetor and a thief generally but1 of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief4 ,the thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly1 not one who does take away secretly4#cbg ,footnote #cbg3 ,ibid4 b4 #bd-cj4 ,greek3 ou7 gar o7 la_/thra lamba_/nn1 a7ll' o7 boulo_/menos la_/thra lamba_/nein1 kle_/pts e7sti_/n4 #cb4 ,again1 another error consists in defining what is desirable in itself and on its own account1 as if it were desirable as a means towards some other end--as productive or preservative thereof4 ,for example1 if a man defines justice--that which is preservative of the laws2 or wisdom--that which is productive of happiness1 he presents them as if they were desirable1 not for themselves but1 with reference to something different from themselves4 ,this is a mistake2 and it is not less a mistake1 though very possibly the same subject may be desirable both for itself and for the sake of something else4 ,for the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend2 and the best of everything resides most in its essence1 not in what it is relatively to something else4 ,it is better to be desirable per se1 than alterius caus4#cbh ,footnote #cbh3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xii4 p4 #adi1 b4 #ca-ci4 ,greek3 e7ka_/stou gar to be_/ltiston e7n t ou7si_/a ma_/lista1 be_/ltion de to di' au7to ai7reton ei7nai tou di' e7_/teron1 7_/ste touto kai ton o7rismon e7_/dei mallon smai_/nein4 #cc4 ,perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition1 enunciating two terms either jointly or severally1 in one or other of three combinations4 ,either the definiend is ,a and ,b2 or it is that which springs out of ,a and ,b2 or it is ,a with ,b4#cbi ,in each of these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the definition4 ,footnote #cbi3 ,ibid4 xiii4 p4 #aej1 a4 #a-d3 ,greek3 skopein de kai ei7_/ tinos o7rismon a7podidous ta_/de1 7 to e7k tou_/tn1 7 to_/de meta toude 7ri_/sato4 a4 ,thus1 take the first of the three4 ,suppose the respondent to define justice by saying1 ,it is temperance and courage4 ,you may urge against him1 that two men1 one of whom is temperate without being courageous1 while the other is courageous without being temperate1 will be just together1 though neither of them separately is just2 nay1 that each of them separately 7the one being temperate and cowardly1 the other courageous and intemperate71 will be both just and unjust2 since1 if justice is temperance and courage1 injustice will be intemperance and cowardice4#ccj ,the definer is open to the farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical with the whole2 as if he defined a house--bricks and mortar1 forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together4 ,bricks and mortar may exist1 and yet there may be no house4#cca ,footnote #ccj3 ,ibid4 a4 #d-ad4 ,footnote #cca3 ,ibid4 a4 #ae-ba4 ,greek3 dlon gar o7_/ti tn mern o7_/ntn ou7den klu_/ei to o7_/lon m ei7nai2 7_/ste ou7 tau7ton ta me_/r t o7_/l4 b4 ,next1 suppose the definition to declare1 that the definiend is that which springs from ,a and ,b--is a result or compound of ,a and ,b4 ,you will then examine whether ,a and ,b are such as to yield any result2 for some couples 7as a line and a number7 yield no result4 ,or1 perhaps1 the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first subject1 while ,a and ,b do not inhere in any one first subject1 but one in the other2 in which case the definition is assailable4#ccb ,or1 even granting that it is the nature of ,a and ,b to inhere in the same first subject1 you may find that that first subject is not the same as the one in which the definiend inheres4 ,now the whole cannot thus inhere in one1 and the parts in another3 you will here have a good objection4 ,or1 perhaps1 it may appear that1 if the whole be destroyed1 the parts will be destroyed also2 which ought not to be1 but the reverse2 for1 when the parts are destroyed1 the whole must necessarily vanish4 ,or1 perhaps1 the definiend may be good or bad1 while the parts of the definition 7,a and ,b7 are neither one nor the other4 7,yet this last is not a conclusive objection2 for it will sometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients is good1 while they are bad if given in conjunction47#ccc ,or1 perhaps1 the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts3 this1 also1 will render the definition impeachable4 ,still more will it be impeachable1 if it enunciates simply a result or compound of ,a and ,b1 without specifying the manner of composition2 it ought to declare not merely the parts of the compound1 but also the way in which they are put together to form the compound4#ccd ,footnote #ccb3 ,ibid4 a4 #bb-cj4 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 to men 7risme_/non e7n e7ni_/ tini pe_/phuke t pr_/t gi_/nesthai1 e7x 7n d' e7_/phsen au7to ei7nai1 m e7n e7ni_/ tini t pr_/t1 all' e7ka_/teron e7n e7kate_/r4 ,footnote #ccc3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xiii4 p4 #aej1 a4 #cj-;b4 #ac4 ,footnote #ccd3 ,ibid4 b4 #ad-bf4 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 m ei7_/rke ton tro_/pon ts sunthe_/ses2 c4 c4 ,lastly1 suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is ,a along with ,b4 ,you will note1 first1 that this third head must be identical either with the first or with the second 7e4g41 honey with water means either honey and water1 or the compound of honey with water72 it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other of the above-named grounds of objection1 according as the respondent may admit4#cce ,you may also distinguish all the different senses in which one thing may be said to be with another 7e4g41 when the two are in the same recipient1 justice and courage together in the soul2 or in the same place2 or in the same time71 and you may be able to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the definition be truly said to be one along with the other4#ccf ,or1 if it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time1 you may enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different correlates4 ,e4g41 ,the definition of courage may be tendered thus3 ,courage is daring along with right intelligence2 upon which you may remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation1 and that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of health4 ,now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in these senses1 cannot be termed courageous1 and thus you will have an argument against the definition4 ,and1 even if they be affirmed with reference to the same correlate 7e4g41 the duties of a physician71 a man who has both daring and right intelligence in reference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous2 the term courage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate end2 e4g41 the dangers of war1 or any still more public-spirited end4#ccg ,another mistake may1 perhaps1 be committed in this same sort of definition--,a along with ,b2 as when1 for example1 the definition tendered of anger is--pain along with the belief of being treated with contempt4 ,what the definer really intends here is1 that the pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt4 ,but this is not expressed by the terms of his definition1 in any one of their admissible meanings4#cch ,footnote #cce3 ,ibid4 b4 #bg-cb4 ,greek3 7_/st' e7an o7poteroun tn ei7rme_/nn tau7ton o7molog_/s ei7nai to to_/de meta toude1 tau7ta a7rmo_/sei le_/gein a7_/per pros e7ka_/teron tou_/tn e7_/mprosthen ei7_/rtai4 ,footnote #ccf3 ,ibid4 b4 #cb-ci4 ,greek3 7 7s e7_/n tini tau7t dektik1 c4 ,footnote #ccg3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xiii4 p4 #aea1 a4 #a-ac4 ,greek3 ou7_/te gar pros e7_/teron au7tn e7ka_/teron dei le_/gesthai ou7_/te pros tau7ton to tucho_/n1 a7lla pros to ts a7ndrei_/as te_/los1 oi7on pros tous polemikous kindu_/nous 7 ei7_/ ti mallon tou_/tou te_/los4 ,footnote #cch3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad-ai4 #cd4 ,perhaps the definition1 while including two or more distinct parts1 may be tendered in this form3 ,the definiend is the composition of ,a and ,b2 e4g41 animal is the composition of soul and body4 ,you will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of composition4 ,there is a great difference between one mode of composition and another2 the mode must be specialized4 ,both flesh and bone may be defined--a composition of fire1 earth1 and water2 but one mode of composition makes flesh1 another makes bone1 out of these same elements4 ,you may also take the farther objection that to define a compound as composition is erroneous2 the two are essentially disparate1 one of them being abstract1 the other concrete4#cci ,footnote #cci3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj-ca4 #ce4 ,if the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two contrary attributes1 and if the respondent define it by one or other of them1 you have an argument against him4 ,if one of them is admissible1 the other must be equally so2 and upon this supposition there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject2 which has been already declared impossible4 ,thus1 it is wrong to define the soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge2 the soul is also recipient of ignorance4#cdj ,footnote #cdj3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-;b4 #b4 #cf4 ,perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable you to attack the definition as a whole1 but you may find arguments against one or other of its parts2 this is sufficient to upset it4 ,if it be obscure and unintelligible1 you should help to correct and re-model it until it becomes clear2 you will then see what are the really assailable points in it4 ,when you indicate and expose the obscurity1 the respondent must either substitute some clearer exposition of his own meaning1 or else he must acquiesce in that which you propose as substitute4#cda ,if the improved definition which you propose is obviously clearer and better1 his previous definition is of course put out of court2 since there cannot be several definitions of the same subject4#cdb ,footnote #cda3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 xiv4 p4 #aea1 b4 #c-aa4 ,greek3 o7_/soi t' a7sapheis tn o7rismn1 sundiorth_/santa kai suschmati_/santa pros to dloun ti kai e7_/chein e7pichei_/rma1 ou7_/ts e7piskopein2 a7nagkaion gar t a7pokrinome_/n 7 de_/chesthai to e7klambano_/menon u7po tou e7rtntos1 7 au7ton diasaphsai ti_/ pote tugcha_/nei to dlou_/menon u7po tou lo_/gou4 ,footnote #cdb3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-ag4 ,to conclude1 one suggestion may be given bearing upon all the arguments that you have to carry on against definitions tendered by respondents3--,reflect on the definiend1 and frame a definition of it for yourself1 as cleverly as you can at the moment2 or call to mind any good definition of it which you may have heard before4 ,this will serve you as a standard with which to compare the definition tendered1 so that you will see at once what there is in it either defective or redundant1 and where you can find arguments against it4#cdc ,footnote #cdc3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah-bc4 ,greek3 a7na_/gk gar1 7_/sper pros para_/deigma the_/menon1 to_/ t' e7lleipon 7n prosken e7_/chein ton o7rismon kai to proskei_/menon perie_/rgs kathoran1 7_/ste mallon e7picheirma_/tn eu7porein4 ,,vii4 ,in the ,seventh ,book of the ,topica ,aristotle continues his review of the manner of debating theses which profess to define1 but enters also on a collateral question connected with that discussion3 viz41 ,by what arguments are we to determine whether two ,subjects or ,predicates are the same ,numero 7modo maxime proprio71 as distinguished from being the same merely ,specie or ,genere8 ,to measure the extent of identity between any two subjects1 is important towards the attack and defence of a definition4#cdd ,footnote #cdd3 ,ibid4 ,,vii4 i4 p4 #aea1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 po_/teron de tau7ton 7 e7_/teron kata ton kuri_/taton tn r7the_/ntn peri tau7tou tro_/pn 7e7le_/geto de kuri_/tata tau7ton to t a7rithm e7_/n7 c4 ,two subjects 7,a and ,b7 being affirmed as the same numero1 you may test this by examining the ,derivatives1 the ,co-ordinates1 and the ,opposites1 of each4 ,thus1 if courage is identical with justice1 the courageous man will be identical with the just man2 courageously will be identical with justly4 ,likewise1 the opposite of courage 7in all the four modes of ,opposition7 will be identical with the opposite of justice4 ,then1 again1 the generators and destroyers1 the generations and destructions1 of courage1 will be identical with those of justice4#cde ,if there be any predicate applied to courage in the superlative degree1 the same predicate will also be applied to justice in the superlative degree4#cdf ,if there be a third subject ,c with which ,a is identical1 ,b also will be identical therewith4 ,the same attributes predicable of ,a will also be predicable of ,b2 and1 if the two be attributes1 each will be predicable of the same subjects of which the other is predicable4 ,both will be comprised in the same ,category1 and will have the same genus and differentia4 ,both will increase or diminish under the same circumstances4 ,each1 when added to or subtracted from any third subject1 will yield the same result4#cdg ,footnote #cde3 ,ibid4 p4 #aeb1 a4 #b4 ,footnote #cdf3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 p4 #aeb1 a4 #e-cj3 ,greek3 skopein de kai 7n tha_/teron ma_/lista le_/getai o7tioun1 ei7 kai tha_/teron tn au7tn tou_/tn kata to au7to ma_/lista le_/getai1 katha_/per ,xenokra_/ts ton eu7dai_/mona bi_/on kai ton spoudaion a7podei_/knusi ton au7to_/n1 e7peid pa_/ntn tn bi_/n ai7ret_/tatos o7 spoudaios kai o7 eu7dai_/mn2 e7n gar to ai7ret_/taton kai to me_/giston2 c4 ,aristotle remarks that ,xenokrates here carried his inference too far3 that the application of the same superlative predicate to ,a and ,b affords indeed a presumption that they are ,idem numero1 but not a conclusive proof thereof2 that the predicate might be applied in like manner1 if ,b were a species comprised in ,a as genus4 ,xenokrates made the mistake of drawing an affirmative conclusion from syllogistic premisses in the ,second figure4 ,footnote #cdg3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 i4 p4 #aeb1 a4 #ca-;b4 #af4 ,farther1 in examining the thesis 7,a is identical numero with ,b7 you must look not merely whether it involves actually any impossible consequences1 but also whether any cases can be imagined in which it would involve such2#cdh whether the identity is not merely specie or genere2 finally1 whether the one can exist without the other4#cdi ,footnote #cdh3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-bd4 ,aristotle illustrates this locus as follows3--,some say that to be void1 and to be full of air1 are the same4 ,but suppose the air to be drawn away2 then the place will no longer be full of air1 yet it will still be void1 even more than it was before4 ,one of the two terms declared to be identical is thus withdrawn1 while the other remains4 ,accordingly1 the two are not really identical4 ,this illustration fits better to the principle laid down1 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 ei7 du_/naton tha_/teron a7_/neu thate_/rou ei7nai2 ou7 gar a7n ei7_/ tau7to_/n4 ,footnote #cdi3 ,ibid4 b4 #be-ce4 ,such are the various loci available for argument against the thesis affirming the equivocal predicate same4 ,all of them may be useful when you are impugning a definition2 for the characteristic of this is to declare that the defining proposition is equivalent or identical with the defined name2 and1 if you can disprove such identity1 you upset the definition4 ,but these loci will be of little avail1 if your task is to defend or uphold a definition2 for1 even if you succeed in establishing the above-mentioned identity1 the definition may still be open to attack for other weaknesses or defects4#cej ,footnote #cej3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #aeb1 b4 #cf-p4 #aeh1 a4 #e4 ,greek3 a7_/pantes oi7 pros tau7ton a7naskeuastikoi to_/poi kai pros o7_/ron chr_/simoi--tn de kataskeuastikn to_/pn ou7deis chr_/simos pros o7_/ron2 c4 ,to uphold1 or prove by way of syllogism1 requires a different procedure4 ,it is a task hard1 but not impossible4 ,most disputants assume without proving their definition1 in the same way as the teachers of ,geometry and ,arithmetic do in their respective sciences4 ,aristotle tells us that he does not here intend to give a didactic exposition of ,definition1 nor of the proper way of defining accurately or scientifically4 ,to do this 7he says7 belongs to the province of ,analytic2 while in the present treatise he is dealing merely with ,dialectic4 ,for the purposes1 then1 of ,dialectic1 he declares that syllogistic proof of a definition is practicable1 inasmuch as the definition is only a proposition declaring what is essential to the definiend2 and nothing is essential except genus 7or genera7 and differenti4#cea ,footnote #cea3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 iii4 p4 #aec1 a4 #f-bb4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 iii4-x41 where the theory of ,scientific ,definition is elaborately worked out2 supra1 ,vol4 ,i4 ch4 viii4 pp4 #cdf-cec4 ,towards the establishment of the definition which you have to defend1 you may find arguments by examining the ,contraries and ,opposites of the component terms1 and of the defining proposition4 ,if the opposite of the definition is allowed as defining properly the opposite of the definiend1 you may argue from hence that your own definition is a good one4#ceb ,if you can show that there is declared in your definition a partial correspondence of contraries either separately in the genus1 or separately in the differentia1 you have a certain force of argument in your favour2 and1 if you can make out both the two separately1 this will suffice for your entire definition4#cec ,you may also draw arguments from the ,derivatives1 or ,co-ordinates of your own terms2 from ,analogous ,terms1 or from ,comparates 7,more or ,less74 ,if the definition of any one of these is granted to you1 an argument is furnished for the defence of an analogous definition in the case of your own term4 ,if it is conceded as a good definition that forgetfulness is--the casting away of knowledge1 then the definition must also hold good that to forget is--to cast away knowledge4 ,if destruction is admitted to be well defined--dissolution of essence1 then to be destroyed is well defined--to be dissolved as to essence4 ,if the wholesome may be defined--that which is productive of health1 then also the profitable may be defined--that which is productive of good2 that is1 if the declaration of the special end makes a good definition in one case1 so it will also in the other4#ced ,footnote #ceb3 ,ibid4 a4 #bh3 ,greek3 ei7 gar o7 a7ntikei_/menos tou a7ntikeime_/nou1 kai ton ei7rme_/nou tou prokeime_/nou a7na_/gk ei7nai 7o7_/ron74 ,footnote #cec3 ,ibid4 b4 #ad3 ,greek3 katho_/lou d' ei7pein1 e7pei o7 o7rismo_/s e7stin e7k ge_/nous kai diaphorn1 a7n o7 tou e7nanti_/ou o7rismos phaneros 71 kai o7 tou prokeime_/nou o7rismos phaneros e7_/stai4 ,footnote #ced3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 iii4 p4 #aec1 b4 #be-p4 #aed1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 e7_/ti e7k tn pt_/sen kai tn sustoi_/chn2 a7na_/gk a7kolouthein ta ge_/n tois ge_/nesin kai tous o7_/rous tois o7_/rois4--e7nos ou7n o7poiououn tn ei7rme_/nn o7molthe_/ntos1 a7na_/gk ki ta loipa o7mologeisthai4--kai e7k tn o7moi_/s e7cho_/ntn pros a7_/llla--o7moi_/s gar e7_/kaston tn ei7rme_/nn pros to oi7keion te_/los e7_/chei4 ,these loci1 from ,analoga1 from ,derivatives1 from ,conjugates1 are of the most frequent avail in dialectical debates or definitions4 ,the disputant must acquire promptitude in the employment of them4 ,he must learn1 moreover1 to test a definition tendered to him by calling to mind particulars and sub-species1 so as to determine whether the definition fits them all4 ,such a procedure will be found especially serviceable in debate with one who upholds the ,platonic ,ideas4 ,care must also be taken to see whether the definiend is distorted from its proper signification1 or whether it is used in defining itself4#cee ,footnote #cee3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 iv4 p4 #aed1 a4 #ab-bb4 ,these last observations are addressed to the questioner or assailant of the definition4 ,we have already seen however that his task is comparatively easy2 the grand difficulty is to defend a definition4 ,the respondent cannot at once see what he ought to aim at2 and1 even when he does see it1 he has farther difficulty in obtaining the requisite concessions from his opponent1 who may decline to grant that the two parts of the definition tendered are really the genus and differentia of the definiend2 while1 if there be any thing besides these two parts contained in the essence of the definiend1 there is an excuse for declining to grant it4#cef ,the opponent succeeds1 if he can establish one single contradictory instance2 accordingly1 a syllogism with particular conclusion will serve his purpose4 ,the respondent on the other hand1 must meet each one of these instances1 must establish an universal conclusion1 and must show that his definition reciprocates with the definiend1 so that1 wherever the latter is predicable1 the former is predicable likewise1 and not in any other case whatever4#ceg ,footnote #cef3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 v4 p4 #aed1 a4 #bc1 seq4 ,greek3 kai gar i7dein au7ton kai labein para tn e7rtme_/nn tas toiau_/tas prota_/seis ou7k eu7pete_/s1 c4 ,footnote #ceg3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-;b4 #ab4 ,so much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a ,definition1 as compared with the attack upon it2 and the same may be said about attack and defence of a ,proprium1 and of a ,genus4 ,in both cases1 the assailant will carry his point1 if he can show that the predicate in question is not predicable1 in this relation1 of all1 or that it is not predicable1 in this relation1 of any one4 ,but the defendant is required to make good the universal against every separate objection advanced against any one of the particulars4 ,it is a general rule1 that the work of destruction is easier than that of construction2 and the present cases come under that rule4#ceh ,the hardest of all theses to defend1 and the easiest to overthrow1 is where ,definition is affirmed2 for the respondent in this case is required to declare well the essence of his subject1 and he stands in need of the greatest number of auxiliary data2 while all the ,loci for attack1 even those properly belonging to the ,proprium1 the ,genus1 and the ,accident1 are available against him4#cei ,next in order1 as regards difficulty of defence1 comes the theses affirming ,proprium2 where the respondent has to make out1 not merely that the predicate belongs to the subject1 but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and reciprocally3 here also all the ,loci for attack1 even those properly belonging to ,accident1 are available4#cfj ,easiest of all theses to defend1 while it is the hardest to impugn1 is that in which ,accident alone is affirmed--the naked fact1 that the predicate ,a belongs to the ,subject ,b1 without investing it with the character either of ,genus or ,proprium4 ,here what is affirmed is a minimum1 requiring the smallest array of data to be conceded2 moreover1 the ,loci available for attack are the fewest1 since many of those which may be employed against ,genus1 ,proprium1 and ,definition1 have no application against a thesis affirming merely ,accident4#cfa ,indeed1 if the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular 7and not universal71 affirming ,accident 7and nothing more71 the task of refuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it4#cfb ,footnote #ceh3 ,ibid4 b4 #ac-cb4 ,greek3 e7_/oike d'1 7_/sper kai e7n tois a7_/llois to diaphtheirai toi poisai r7aon1 ou7_/t kai e7pi tou_/tn to a7naskeua_/sai tou kataskeua_/sai4 ,footnote #cei3 ,topic4 ,,vii4 v4 p4 #aee1 a4 #c-ba3 ,greek3 phaneron de kai dio_/ti pa_/ntn r7aston o7_/ron a7naskeua_/sai4 ,footnote #cfj3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc-bg4 ,aristotle has in view the most complete ,proprium3 belonging omni1 soli1 et semper4 ,footnote #cfa3 ,ibid4 a4 #bh-cf3 ,greek3 r7aston de pa_/ntn kataskeua_/sai to sumbebko_/s2--a7naskeua_/zein de chalep_/taton to sumbebko_/s1 o7_/ti e7la_/chista e7n au7t de_/dotai1 c4 ,footnote #cfb3 ,ibid4 p4 #aed1 b4 #cf-p4 #aee1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 to d' e7pi me_/rous a7na_/palin r7aon kataskeua_/sai 7 a7naskeua_/sai2 kataskeua_/zonti men gar a7po_/chr deixai tini u7pa_/rchon1 a7naskeua_/zonti de deikte_/on o7_/ti ou7deni u7pa_/rchei4 ,,viii4 ,the ,eighth ,book of the ,topica brings our attention back to the general considerations contained in the ,first4 ,in the intervening part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of dialectical problems1 with the enumeration of those ,loci of argument which bear upon each or all3 we are now invited to study the application of these distinctions in practice1 and with this view to look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical debate4 ,what is the order of procedure most suitable1 first1 for the questioner or assailant2 next1 for the respondent or defender8#cfc ,this order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation between the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher3 to both of them the ,loci of arguments are alike available1 though each of them deals with those arguments in his own way1 and in an arrangement suitable for his purpose4#cfd ,the dialectician1 being engaged in debate1 must shape his questions1 and regulate his march as questioner1 according to the concessions obtained or likely to be obtained from his respondent2 who1 if a question be asked having an obvious refutative bearing on the thesis1 will foresee the consequences of answering in the affirmative1 and will refuse to grant what is asked4 ,on the contrary1 the philosopher1 who pursues investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone1 is under no similar restriction4 ,he looks out at once for such premisses as conduct straight to a conclusion2 and1 the more obvious their bearing on the conclusion is1 the more scientific will the syllogism be1 and the better will he be pleased4#cfe ,footnote #cfc3 ,ibid4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 meta de tauta peri ta_/xes1 kai ps dei e7rtan1 lekte_/on4 ,footnote #cfd3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 me_/chri men ou7n tou eu7rein ton to_/pon1 o7moi_/s tou philoso_/phou kai tou dialektikou 7 ske_/psis1 to d' 7_/d tauta ta_/ttein kai e7rtmati_/zein i7_/dion tou dialektikou4 ,footnote #cfe3 ,ibid4 b4 #aj-af4 ,in the praxis dialectica 7as has already been stated7 two talkers are assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes to defend1 and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn it2 or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an inconsistent or contradictory manner4 ,we are to assume1 farther1 a circle of listeners1 who serve to a certain extent as guarantees against any breach of the rules of debate4#cff ,three distinct purposes may be supposed in the debate4 #a4 ,you as a questioner may be a teacher1 and the respondent a learner2 your purpose is to teach what you know1 while he wishes to learn from you what he does not know4 #b4 ,you engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the respondent1 each of you seeking only victory over the other1 though subject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate4 #c4 ,you neither seek to teach1 nor to conquer2 you and the respondent have both the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of different admissions1 and to acquire a larger command of the chains of reasoning pro and con1 bearing on some given topic4#cfg ,footnote #cff3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #cfg3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #aei1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 ou7 gar oi7 au7toi skopoi tois dida_/skousin 7 mantha_/nousi kai tois a7gnnizome_/nois1 ou7de tou_/tois te kai tois diatri_/bousi met' a7ll_/ln ske_/psis cha_/rin4 ,according as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three1 the good or bad conduct of the dialogue1 on the part both of questioner and of respondent1 must be differently appreciated4 ,of each of the three1 specimens may be found in ,plato1 though not carefully severed but running one into the other4 ,aristotle appears to have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically1 and to prescribe for the practice of each separately4 ,he tells us particularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the third head1 and prescribed for it apart from the second4 ,the merit of having first done this he expressly claims for the ,topica4#cfh ,footnote #cfh3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 v4 p4 #aei1 a4 #be-cg3 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7stin a7dio_/rista tois gumnasi_/as kai pei_/ras e7_/neka tous lo_/gous poioume_/nois--e7n de tais dialektikais suno_/dois tois m a7gnos cha_/rin a7lla pei_/ras kai ske_/pses tous lo_/gous 9999poioume_/nois1 ou7 9999di_/rthrtai_/ p ti_/nos dei stocha_/zesthai ton a7pokrino_/menon kai o7poia dido_/nai kai poia m_/1 pros to kals 7 m kals phula_/ttein tn the_/sin4 e7pei ou7n ou7den e7_/chomen paradedome_/non u7p' a7_/lln1 au7toi_/ ti peirathmen ei7pein4 ,both the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the dialogue2 their common purpose is to conduct it well1 not only obeying the peremptory rules1 but displaying1 over and above1 skill for the attainment of their separate ends4 ,under the first and third heads1 both may be alike successful4 ,under the second or contentious head1 indeed1 one only of the two can gain the victory2 yet1 still1 even the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his position admits4 ,this is sufficient for his credit2 so that the common work will still be well performed4#cfi ,but a partner who performs his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this common work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered contention rather than of regular ,dialectic--deserves censure4#cgj ,footnote #cfi3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #ai-;b4 #aj3 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7_/stin e7pi thate_/r mo_/non to lals e7pitelesthnai to koinon e7_/rgon--e7pei de phaulos koinnos o7 e7mpodi_/zn to koinon e7_/rgon1 dlon o7_/ti kai e7n lo_/g4 ,compare ,topica1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #aja1 b4 #h4 ,footnote #cgj3 ,ibid4 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 dialektiks kai m e7ristiks4--b4 #b-ah4 ,having thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit1 ,aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the responding partner4 ,you as questioner have to deal with a thesis set up by the respondent4 ,you see at once what the syllogism is that is required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis2 and your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism4 ,if you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses1 he sees your drift and answers in the negative4 ,you must therefore begin your approaches from a greater distance4 ,you must ask questions bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate conclusion4#cga ,these outlying and preparatory questions will fall under four principal heads4 ,either 7#a7 they will be inductive particulars1 multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an universal comprising them all2 or 7#b7 they will be put for the purpose of giving dignity to your discourse2 or 7#c7 they will be shaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate conclusion that you aim at2 or 7#d71 lastly1 they will be introduced to make your whole argument clearer4#cgb ,the third of these four general heads--the head of questions for the purpose of concealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for victory4 ,in those it is of supreme importance1 and the result depends much on the employment of it2 but even in other dialectical debates you must employ it to a certain extent4#cgc ,footnote #cga3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 tas men ou7n a7nagkai_/as1 di' 7n o7 sullogismo_/s1 ou7k eu7thus au7tas protate_/on1 a7ll' a7postate_/on o7_/ti a7nta_/t1 c4 ,footnote #cgb3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #bj4 ,footnote #cgc3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf4 ,aristotle goes at great length into the means of ,concealment4 ,suppose the proposition which you desire to get conceded is1 ,the science of two contraries is the same4 ,you will find it useful to commence by a question more general3 e4g41 ,is the science of two opposites the same8 ,if the respondent answers in the affirmative1 you will deduce from his concession1 by syllogism1 the conclusion which you desire4 ,if he answers in the negative1 you must then try to arrive at your end by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or opposites2 which if the respondent grants successively1 you will bring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result from those concessions4#cgd ,your particulars must be selected from obvious matters of sense and notoriety4 ,you are likely to obtain in this way admissions which will serve as premisses for several different prosyllogisms1 not indeed sufficient by themselves1 yet valuable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism whereby the thesis is refuted4 ,for1 when the questions are put in this way1 the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences of his own concessions2 so that he will more readily concede what you want4#cge ,the better to conceal your purpose1 you will refrain from drawing out any of these prosyllogisms clearly at once2 you will not even put the major and minor premiss of any one of them in immediate sequence2 but you will confound the order of them intentionally1 stating first a premiss belonging to one1 and next a premiss belonging to another4#cgf ,the respondent1 thus kept in the dark1 answers in the affirmative to each of your questions successively4 ,at length you find that you have obtained a sufficient number of concessions from him1 to enable you to prove the syllogism contradictory of his thesis4 ,you inform him of this2 and it shows the perfect skill and success of your procedure1 when he expresses surprise at the announcement1 and asks on what premisses you reckon4#cgg ,footnote #cgd3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 a7n de m tith1 di' e7paggs lpte_/on1 protei_/nanta e7pi tn kata me_/ros e7nanti_/n4 ,footnote #cge3 ,ibid4 p4 #aef1 a4 #g3 ,greek3 kru_/ptonta de prosullogi_/zesthai di' 7n o7 sullogismos tou e7x a7rchs me_/llei gi_/nesthai1 kai tauta 7s pleista4 ,footnote #cgf3 ,ibid4 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 chr_/simon de kai to m sunech ta a7xi_/mata lamba_/nein e7x 7n oi7 sullogismoi_/1 a7ll' e7nallax to pros e7_/teron kai e7_/teron sumpe_/rasma4 ,footnote #cgg3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aef1 a4 #ac3 ,greek3 katho_/lou d' ei7pein1 ou7_/t dei e7rtan ton kruptiks punthano_/menon1 7_/st' 7rtme_/nou tou pantos lo_/gou kai ei7po_/ntos to sumpe_/rasma zteisthai to dia ti_/4 ,there are also other manoeuvres serving your purpose of concealment1 and preventing the respondent from seeing beforehand the full pertinence of your questions4 ,thus1 if you wish to obtain the definition of your major1 you will do well to ask the definition1 not of the term itself but1 of some one among its conjugates4 ,you will put your question1 as if the answer were of little importance in itself1 and as if you did not care whether it was given in the affirmative or in the negative2#cgh you will sometimes even suggest objections to that which you are seeming to aim at4 ,all this will give you the air of a candid disputant2 it will throw the respondent off his guard1 and make him more ready to answer as he really thinks1 without alarm for the consequences4#cgi ,when you wish to get a certain premiss conceded1 you will put the question first upon a different premiss analogous to it4 ,in putting your question1 you will add that the answer which you desire is a matter of course1 familiar and admitted by every one2 for respondents are shy of contradicting any received belief1 unless they have present to their minds a clear instance adverse to it4#chj ,you will never manifest apparent earnestness about an answer2 which would make the respondent less willing to concede it4#cha ,you will postpone until the last the premiss which you wish to obtain1 and will begin by putting questions the answers to which serve as remote premisses behind it1 only in the end conducting to it as consequence4 ,generally speaking1 questioners do the reverse1 putting first the questions about which they are most anxious2 while most respondents1 aware of this habit1 are most intractable in regard to the first questions1 except some presumptuous and ill-tempered disputants1 who concede what is asked at first but afterwards become obstinate in denegation4#chb ,you will throw in some irrelevant questions with a view to lengthen the procedure1 like fallacious geometers who complicate a diagram by drawing unnecessary lines4 ,amidst a multitude of premisses falsehood is more likely to escape detection2 and thus1 also1 you may perhaps be able to slip in1 unperceived and in a corner1 some important premiss1 which1 if put as a separate question by itself1 would certainly not have been granted4#chc ,footnote #cgh3 ,ibid4 b4 #f3 ,greek3 a7pls d' ei7pein1 o7_/ti ma_/lista poiein a7_/dlon1 po_/teron to proteino_/menon 7 to a7ntikei_/menon bou_/letai labein2 a7d_/lou gar o7_/ntos tou pros ton lo_/gon chrsi_/mou1 mallon to dokoun au7tois tithe_/asin4 ,footnote #cgi3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 dei de kai au7to_/n pote au7t e7_/nstasin phe_/rein2 a7nupo_/pts gar e7_/chousin oi7 a7pokrino_/menoi pros tous dokountas dikai_/s e7picheirein4 ,footnote #chj3 ,ibid4 b4 #aj1 #bj3 ,greek3 chr_/simon de kai to e7pile_/gein o7_/ti su_/nthes kai lego_/menon to toiouton2 o7knousi gar kinein to ei7tho_/s1 e7_/nstasin m e7_/chontes4 ,footnote #cha3 ,ibid4 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 e7_/ti to m spouda_/zein4 ,footnote #chb3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj-ci3 ,greek3 kai to e7p' e7scha_/t e7rtan o7 ma_/lista bou_/letai labein2 c4 ,footnote #chc3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aeg1 a4 #a-e3 ,greek3 e7_/ti to mku_/nein kai paremba_/llein ta mden chr_/sima pros ton lo_/gon1 katha_/per oi7 pseudographountes2 polln gar o7_/ntn a7_/dlon e7n o7poi_/ to pseudos4 dio kai lantha_/nousin e7ni_/ote oi7 e7rtntes e7n parabu_/st prostithe_/ntes a7 kath' au7ta proteino_/mena ou7k a7n tethei_/4 ,such are the multifarious suggestions addressed by ,aristotle to the questioner for concealing his method of attack2#chd ,concealment being the third of the four general heads relating to the treatment of premisses not immediately necessary for proof of the final refutative conclusion4 ,on the other three general heads--,induction from particulars to an universal1 ,dignity1 ,clearness--,aristotle goes into less detail4 ,for ,clearness1 he recommends that examples should be introduced2 especially familiar examples1 taken from well-known poets like ,homer1 not from obscure poets like ,choerilus4#che ,footnote #chd3 ,ibid4 a4 #f3 ,greek3 ei7s men ou7n pru_/psin tois ei7rme_/nois chrste_/on1 c4 ,footnote #che3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad4 ,in regard to ,induction1 ,aristotle points out an embarrassment often arising from the want of suitable universal names4 ,when1 after having obtained an affirmative answer about several similar particulars1 you wish to put a question generalizing the result1 you will sometimes find no universal term fitting the position4 ,you are obliged to say3 ,will it not be so in all such cases8 and this lets in a serious difficulty1 how to know what other cases are like1 and what are not4 ,here the respondent will often dispute your right to include this or that other particular4#chf ,you will do well to coin a new universal term fitting the situation4 ,footnote #chf3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #aeg1 a4 #ah-cc4 ,greek3 dio peirate_/on e7pi pa_/ntn tn toiou_/tn o7nomatopoiein au7to_/n1 c4 ,if the respondent answers in the affirmative to several questions of similar particulars1 but answers in the negative when you sum them up in an universal comprehending all similar cases1--you may require him to cite some particular case justifying his denial2 though you cannot require him to do this before he has made the affirmative answers4#chg ,it is not sufficient that he should cite1 as the single case of exception1 the express case which forms the subject of the thesis3 ,he ought to produce some distinct and independent instance1 really comprised within the genus1 and not merely connected with it by the link of an equivocal term4#chh ,if he produces an adverse instance really comprised within the genus1 you may perhaps be able to re-model your question1 so as to make reserve for the basis on which this objection is founded4 ,the respondent will then be compelled 7unless he can foresee some new case of objection7 to concede the universal with this special qualification2 so that you will have gained all that you really require4 ,should the respondent continue to refuse1 without producing any new case1 he will transgress the rules of ,dialectic2 which recognize an universal affirmative1 wherever there are numerous affirmative particulars without one assignable negative4#chi ,indeed1 if you know the universal to hold in many particular cases1 and do not know of any others adverse1 you may boldly put your question at once in reference to the universal 7without going first through the series of particulars74 ,the respondent will hardly venture to deny it1 not having in his mind any negative particulars4#cij ,footnote #chg3 ,ibid4 a4 #cd-cg4 ,footnote #chh3 ,ibid4 a4 #cg-;b4 #h4 ,footnote #chi3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 ix4 p4 #aegg1 b4 #h-cc4 ,greek3 dialektik ga_/r e7sti pro_/tasis pros 7n ou7_/ts e7pi polln e7_/chousan m e7_/stin e7_/nstasis4 ,footnote #cij3 ,ibid4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #c-f4 ,you must however keep in mind what a dialectic universal premiss really is4 ,not every question requiring an universal answer is allowed to be put4 ,you must not ask for positive information1 nor put such questions as the following3 ,what is man8 ,in how many different senses is good employed8 ,a dialectic question is one to which the respondent makes sufficient reply by saying1 ,yes or ,no4#cia ,you must ask in this form3 ,is the definition of man so and so8 ,is good enunciated in this or that different sense8 ,to these questions the respondent may answer ,yes or ,no4 ,but if he persists in negative answers to your multiplied questions as to this or that sense of the term good1 you may perhaps stand excused for asking him3 ,in how many different senses1 then1 do you yourself use the term good8#cib ,footnote #cia3 ,ibid4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #ad1 seq4 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar pro_/tasis dialektik pros 7n e7_/stin a7pokri_/nasthai nai 7 ou7_/4 ,footnote #cib3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba-bd4 ,when you have obtained concessions which furnish premisses for a formal syllogism1 you will draw out and propound that syllogism and its conclusion forthwith1 without asking any farther question from the respondent or any leave from him to do so4 ,he may indeed deny your right to do this1 in spite of the concessions which he has made2 and the auditors around1 not fully appreciating all his concessions1 may perhaps think that he is entitled to deny it4 ,but1 if you ask his leave to draw out the syllogism and he refuses to give leave1 the auditors are much more likely to think that your syllogism is not allowable4#cic ,if you have the choice between an ostensive syllogism and a ,reductio ad ,absurdum1 you ought always to prefer the former1 as plainer and more incontestable4#cid ,footnote #cic3 ,ibid4 a4 #g-ab3 ,greek3 ou7 dei de to sumpe_/rasma e7r_/tma poiein2 ei7 de m_/1 a7naneu_/santos ou7 dokei gegone_/nai sullogismo_/s4 ,footnote #cid3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 ii4 p4 #aeh1 b4 #cd-p4 #aeh1 a4 #b4 ,you must not persevere long in the same line of questions4 ,for1 if the respondent answers them all1 it will soon appear that you are in the wrong course1 since your syllogism1 if you can get one at all1 will always be obtained from a small number of premisses2 and1 if the respondent will not answer them1 you have no alternative except to protest and desist4#cie ,footnote #cie3 ,ibid4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #be-cj4 ,the theses that are most difficult to attack are also most easy to defend2 and these are the highest universals1 and the lowest particulars4 ,the highest you cannot deal with1 unless you can get a definition of them2 which is sometimes impossible and always difficult2 since the respondent will neither define them himself nor accept your definitions4 ,those which are next to the highest are also difficult to impugn1 because there are few intermediate steps of proof4 ,again1 the lowest particulars are also difficult for the contrary reason1 that there are so many intermediate steps1 and it is tedious to enumerate them all continuously2 while1 if any are omitted1 the demonstration is incomplete1 and the procedure will appear sophistical4#cif ,the most difficult of all to impugn are definitions framed in vague and unintelligible terms1 where you do not know whether they are univocal or equivocal1 literal or metaphorical4 ,when the thesis tendered to you presents such difficulty1 you may presume that it is affected with the obscurity of terms here indicated2 or1 at any rate1 that its terms stand in need of definition4#cig ,in geometrical construction1 as well as in dialectical debate1 it is indispensable that the principia or primary terms should be defined1 and defined properly2 without this1 neither the one nor the other can be pursued4#cih ,footnote #cif3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #aeh1 a4 #ca1 seq4 ,greek3 7 sophismat_/d phai_/netai ta e7picheir_/mata4 ,footnote #cig3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #aeh1 b4 #h-bc2 p4 #aei1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 ou7_/koun dei lantha_/nein1 o7_/tan dusepichei_/rtos 7 7 the_/sis1 o7_/ti pe_/ponthe_/ ti tn ei7rme_/nn4 ,footnote #cih3 ,ibid4 p4 #aeh1 b4 #bd-p4 #aei1 a4 #b4 ,sometimes the major and minor premisses of your syllogistic conclusion are more difficult to establish--more beyond the level of average intelligence--than the thesis itself4 ,in such a case some may think that the respondent ought to grant these premisses1 because1 if he refuses and requires them to be proved1 he will be imposing upon the questioner a duty more arduous than the thesis itself imposes2 others may say that he ought not to grant them1 because1 if he did1 he would be acknowledging a conclusion derived from premisses requiring proof as much or more than itself4#cii ,a distinction must here be made4 ,if you are putting questions with a view to teach1 the learner ought not to grant such premisses as those above described1 because he is entitled to require that in every step of the process he shall be inducted from what is more knowable to what is less knowable4 ,accordingly1 when you attempt to demonstrate to him something which he knows little1 by requiring him to concede something which he knows still less1 he cannot be advised to grant what you ask4 ,but1 if you are debating with a companion for the purpose of dialectical exercise1 he ought to grant what you ask whenever the affirmative really appears to him true4#djj ,footnote #cii3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 iii4 p4 #aei1 a4 #d-aa4 ,greek3 o7_/tan d' 7 pros to a7xi_/ma kai tn pro_/tasin meizon e7_/rgon dialegnai 7 tn the_/sin1 diapor_/seien a7_/n tis po_/teron thete_/on ta toiauta 7 ou7_/2 c4 ,footnote #djj3 ,ibid4 a4 #aa-ad3 ,greek3 7 t men mantha_/nonti ou7 thete_/on1 a7n m gnrim_/teron 71 t de gumnazome_/n thete_/on1 a7n a7lthes mo_/non phai_/ntai4 7_/ste phaneron o7_/ti ou7ch o7moi_/s e7rtnti_/ te ki dida_/skonti a7xite_/on tithe_/nai4 ,this section is obscure and difficult4 ,i am not sure that ,i understand it4 ,it seems doubtful whether the verb ,greek3 tithe_/nai is intended to apply to the questioner or to the respondent4 ,we have now said enough for the purpose of instructing the questioner how to frame and marshal his interrogations4 ,we must turn to the respondent1 and point out how he must answer in order to do well and perform his duty to the common work of dialogue4 ,speaking generally1 the task of the questioner is to conduct the dialogue so as to make the respondent enunciate the most improbable and absurd replies which follow necessarily from the thesis that he has undertaken to defend2 while the task of the respondent is to make it appear that these absurdities follow from the thesis itself1 and not from his manner of defending it4 ,the respondent may err in one of two ways1 or indeed in both together3 either he may set up an indefensible thesis2 or he may fail to defend it in the best manner that it really admits2 or he may do both4 ,the second is a worse error than the first1 in reference to the general purpose of ,dialectic4#dja ,footnote #dja3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #aei1 a4 #ae-bd3 ,greek3 tou d' a7pokrinome_/nou to m di' au7ton phai_/nesthai sumbai_/nein to a7du_/naton 7 to para_/doxon1 a7lla dia tn the_/sin2 e7te_/ra gar i7_/ss a7marti_/a to the_/sthai prton o7 m dei kai to the_/menon m phula_/xai kata tro_/pon4 ,aristotle distinguishes 7as has been already stated7 three purposes in the dialogue3--7#a7 ,teaching and ,learning2 7#b7 ,contention1 where both questioner and respondent strive only for victory2 7#c7 ,investigating and ,testing the consequences of some given doctrine4#djb ,the first two of these three are dismissed rapidly4 ,in the first1 the teaching questioner has no intention of deceiving1 and the pupil respondent has only to answer by granting all that appears to him true4#djc ,in the second1 ,aristotle tells us only that the questioner must always appear as if he were making some point of his own2 while the respondent1 on his side1 must always appear as if no point were made against him4#djd ,but in regard to the third head--dialogues of ,search1 ,testing1 ,exercise--he is more copious in suggestions3 he considers these as the proper field of ,dialectic1 and1 as we saw1 claims to have been the first who treated them apart from the didactic dialogues on one side1 and the contentious on the other4#dje ,footnote #djb3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #aei1 a4 #bd-bh4 ,footnote #djc3 ,ibid4 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 t men gar mantha_/nonti thete_/on a7ei ta dokounta2 kai gar ou7_/d' e7picheirei pseudos ou7deis dida_/skein4 ,footnote #djd3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 iv4 p4 #aei14 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 tn d' a7gnnizome_/nn ton men e7rtnta phai_/nesthai_/ ti dei poiein pa_/nts1 ton d' a7pokrino_/menon mden phai_/nesthai pa_/schein4 ,footnote #dje3 ,ibid4 a4 #cb-cg2 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #bc-be3 ,greek3 duskolai_/nontes ou7n a7gnnistikas kai ou7 dialektikas poiountai tas diatriba_/s2 e7_/ti d' e7pei gumnasi_/as kai pei_/ras cha_/rin a7ll' ou7 didaskali_/as oi7 toioutoi tn lo_/gn1 c4 ,the thesis which the respondent undertakes to defend 7in a dialogue of ,search or ,testing7 must be either probable1 or improbable1 or neither one nor the other4 ,the probability or improbability may be either simple and absolute1 or special and relative--in the estimation of the respondent himself or of some one or more persons4 ,now1 if the thesis be improbable1 the opposite thereof1 which you the questioner try to prove1 must be probable2 if the thesis be probable1 the opposite thereof must be improbable2 if the thesis be neither1 its opposite will also be neither4 ,suppose1 first1 that the thesis is improbable absolutely4 ,in that case1 its opposite1 which you the questioner must fish for premisses to prove1 will be probable2 the respondent therefore ought not to grant you any demand which is either simply improbable or less probable than the conclusion which you aim at proving2 for no such concessions can really serve your purpose1 since you are bound to prove your conclusion from premisses more probable than itself4#djf ,suppose1 next1 that the thesis is probable absolutely4 ,in that case1 the opposite conclusion1 which you have to make out1 will be improbable absolutely4 ,accordingly1 whenever you ask concessions that are probable1 the respondent ought to grant them2 whenever you ask for concessions that are less improbable than your intended conclusion1 he ought to grant these also2 but1 if you ask for any thing more improbable than your intended conclusion1 he ought to refuse it4#djg ,suppose1 thirdly1 that the thesis is neither probable nor improbable4 ,here1 too1 the respondent ought to grant all concessions that appear to him probable1 as well as all that he thinks more probable than the opposite conclusion which you are seeking to arrive at2 but no others4 ,this is sufficient for the purpose of ,dialectic1 and for keeping open the lines of probable argument4#djh ,footnote #djf3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #aei1 b4 #i3 ,greek3 phaneron 7s a7do_/xou men o7_/ntos a7pls tou keime_/nou ou7 dote_/on t a7pokrinome_/n ou7_/th' o7 m dokei a7pls1 ou7_/th' o7 dokei me_/n 7tton de tou sumpera_/smatos dokei4 a7do_/xou gar ou7_/ss ts the_/ses e7_/ndoxon to sumpe_/rasma1 7_/ste dei ta lambano_/mena e7ndoxa pa_/nt' ei7nai kai mallon e7_/ndoxa tou prokeime_/nou1 ei7 me_/llei dia tn gnrimte_/rn to 7tton gn_/rimon perai_/nesthai4 7_/st' ei7_/ ti m toiouto_/n e7sti tn e7rtme_/nn1 ou7 thete_/on t a7pokrinome_/n4 ,footnote #djg3 ,ibid4 b4 #af4 ,footnote #djh3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 v4 p4 #aei1 b4 #ai-bc3 ,greek3 i7kans gar a7n do_/xeie dieile_/chthai--ou7_/t gar e7ndoxote_/rous sumb_/setai tous lo_/gous gi_/nesthai4 ,when the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered simply and absolutely1 the respondent ought to measure his concessions by the standard of opinion received usually4#dji ,when the probability or improbability of the thesis is considered as referable to the respondent himself1 he has only to consult his own judgment and estimation in granting or refusing what is asked4 ,when he undertakes to defend a thesis avowedly as the doctrine of some known philosopher1 such as ,herakleitus1 he must1 in giving his answers1 measure probability and improbability according to what ,herakleitus would determine4#daj ,footnote #dji3 ,ibid4 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 pros ta dokounta a7pls tn 9999su_/gkrisin poite_/on4 ,footnote #daj3 ,ibid4 b4 #be-ce4 ,greek3 pros tn e7kei_/nou dia_/noian a7poble_/ponta thete_/on e7_/kasta kai a7rnte_/on4 ,since all the questions that you ask must be either probable1 improbable1 or neuter1 and either relevant#daa or not relevant to your purpose of refuting the thesis1 let us first suppose that you ask for a concession which is in itself probable1 but not relevant4 ,the respondent ought to grant it1 adding that he thinks it probable4 ,if what you ask is neither probable nor relevant1 he ought even then to grant it2 but annexing a notification that he is aware of its improbability1 in order to save his own credit for intelligence4#dab ,if it be both probable and relevant1 he ought to say that he is aware of its probability1 but that it is too closely connected with the thesis1 and that1 if he grants it1 the thesis will stand refuted4 ,if it be relevant1 yet at the same time very improbable1 he must reply that1 if he grants it1 the thesis will be refuted1 but that it is too silly to be propounded4 ,if1 being neutral1 it is also not relevant1 he ought to grant it without comment2 but if1 being neutral1 it is relevant1 he ought to notify that he is aware that by granting it his thesis will be refuted4#dac ,footnote #daa3 ,ibid4 vi4 p4 #aei1 b4 #ci3 ,greek3 7 pros ton lo_/gon1 7 m pros ton lo_/gon4 ,by this phrase ,aristotle seems to mean1 not simply relevant1 but closely1 directly1 conspicuously relevant--equivalent to ,greek3 li_/an suneggus tou e7n a7rch 7p4 #afj1 a4 #e74 ,footnote #dab3 ,ibid4 b4 #cf-p4 #afj1 a4 #b4 ,greek3 e7an de m dokoun kai m pros ton lo_/gon1 dote_/on me_/n1 e7pismante_/on de to m dokoun pros eu7la_/beian eu7thei_/as4 ,how is this to be reconciled with what ,aristotle says in the preceding chapter1 p4 #aei1 b4 #aa-ah1 that the respondent ought not to grant such improbabilities at all8 ,footnote #dac3 ,ibid4 p4 #afj1 a4 #f-aa4 ,in this way of proceeding1 the march of the dialogue on both sides will be creditable4 ,the respondent1 signifying plainly that he understands the full consequences of his own concessions1 will not appear to be worsted through any short-comings of his own1 but only through what is inherent in his thesis2 while you the questioner1 having asked for such premisses as are really more probable than the conclusion to be established1 and having had them granted1 will have made out your point4 ,it must be understood that you ought not to try to prove your conclusion from premisses less probable than itself2 and that1 if you put questions of this sort1 you transgress the rules of dialectical procedure4#dad ,footnote #dad3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 vi4 p4 #afj1 a4 #aa-af4 ,greek3 ou7_/t gar o7_/ t' a7pokrino_/menos ou7den do_/xei di' au7ton pa_/schein1 e7an proorn e7_/kasta tith1 o7_/ t' e7rtn teu_/xetai sullogismou titheme_/nn au7t pa_/ntn e7ndoxote_/rn tou sumpera_/smatos4 o7_/soi d' e7x a7doxote_/rn tou sumpera_/smatos e7picheirousi sullogi_/zesthai1 dlon 7s ou7 kals sullogi_/zontai2 dio tois e7rtsin ou7 thete_/on4 ,if you ask a dialectical question in plain and univocal language1 the respondent is bound to answer ,yes or ,no4 ,but if you ask it in terms obscure or equivocal1 he is not obliged to answer thus directly4 ,he is at liberty to tell you that he does not understand the question2 he ought to have no scruple in telling you so1 if such is really the fact4 ,suppose the terms of your question to be familiar1 but equivocal2 the answer to it may perhaps be either true or false1 alike in all the different senses of the terms4 ,in that case1 the respondent ought to answer ,yes or ,no directly4 ,but1 if the answer would be an affirmation in one sense of the terms and a negation in another1 he must take care to signify that he is aware of the equivocation1 and to distinguish at once the two-fold meaning2 for1 if the distinction is not noticed till afterwards1 he cannot clearly show that he was aware of it from the first4 ,if he really was not at first aware of the equivocation1 and gave an affirmative answer looking only to one among the several distinct meanings1 you will try to convict him of error by pushing him on the other meaning4 ,the best thing that he can then do will be to confess his oversight1 and to excuse himself by saying that misconception is easy where the same term or the same proposition may mean several different things4#dae ,footnote #dae3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #afj1 a4 #ag-cd4 ,suppose you put several particular questions 7or several analogous questions7 with the view of arriving ultimately by induction at the concession of an universal1 comprising them all4 ,if they are all both true and probable1 the respondent must concede them all severally2 yet he may still intend to answer ,no1 when the universal is tendered to him after them4 ,he has no right to answer thus1 however1 unless he can produce some contradictory particular instance1 real or apparent1 to justify him2 and1 if he does so without such justification1 he is a perverse dialectician4#daf ,perhaps he may try to sustain his denegation of the universal1 after having conceded many particulars1 by a counter-attack founded on some chain of paradoxical reasoning such as that of ,zeno against motion2 there being many such paradoxes contradictory of probabilities1 yet hard to refute4 ,but this is no sufficient justification for refusing to admit the universal1 when1 after having admitted many particulars1 he can produce no particular adverse to them4 ,the case will be still worse1 if he refuses to admit the universal1 having neither any adverse instance1 nor any counter-ratiocinative attack4 ,it is then the extreme of perverse ,dialectic4#dag ,footnote #daf3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 viii4 p4 #afj1 b4 #b-e3 ,greek3 to gar a7_/neu e7nsta_/ses1 7 ou7_/ss 7 dokou_/ss1 klu_/ein ton lo_/gon duskolai_/nein e7sti_/n4 ei7 ou7n e7pi polln phainome_/nou m di_/dsi to katho_/lou m e7_/chn e7_/nstasin1 phaneron o7_/ti duskolai_/nei4 ,footnote #dag3 ,ibid4 b4 #e1 seq4 ,greek3 e7_/ti ei7 md' a7ntepicheirein e7_/chei o7_/ti ou7k a7lthe_/s1 poll mallon a7n do_/xeie duskolai_/nein4 kai_/toi ou7de touth' i7kano_/n2 pollous gar lo_/gous e7_/chomen e7nanti_/ous tais do_/xais1 ou7s chalepon lu_/ein1 katha_/per ton ,z_/nnos o7_/ti ou7k e7nde_/chetai kineisthai ou7de to sta_/dion dielthein2 a7ll' ou7 dia touto ta7ntikei_/mena tou_/tois ou7 thete_/on4 ,before the respondent undertakes to defend any thesis or definition1 he ought to have previously studied the various modes attacking it1 and to have prepared himself for meeting them4#dah ,he must also be cautious of taking up improbable theses1 in either of the senses of improbable4 ,for a thesis is so called when it involves strange and paradoxical developments1 as if a man lays down either that every thing is in motion or that nothing is in motion2 and also1 when it implies a discreditable character and is contrary to that which men wish to be thought to hold1 as1 for example1 the doctrine that pleasure is the good1 or that it is better to do wrong than to suffer wrong4 ,if a man defends such theses as these1 people hate him because they presume that he is not merely propounding them as matter for dialectical argument1 but advocating them as convictions of his own4#dai ,footnote #dah3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #afj1 b4 #ad4 ,footnote #dai3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-bb3 ,greek3 a7_/doxon d' u7po_/thesin eu7labte_/on u7pe_/chein2 ei7_/ d' a7n a7_/doxos dichs2 c4 ,the respondent must farther be able1 if you bring against him a false syllogistic reasoning1 to distinguish upon which among your premisses the false conclusion really turns1 and to refute that one4 ,your reasoning may have more than one false premiss2 but he must not content himself with refuting any one or any other3 he must single out that one which is the chief determining cause of the falsehood4 ,thus1 if your syllogism be3--,every man in a sitting position is writing1 ,sokrates is a man in a sitting position2 therefore1 ,sokrates is writing1--it will not suffice that the respondent should refute your minor premiss1 though this may be false2#dbj because such a refutation will not apply to the number of other cases in which men are sitting but not writing2 and therefore it will not expose the full bearing of the falsehood4 ,your major premiss is that upon which the full bearing of the falsehood depends2 and the respondent must show that he is aware of this by refuting your major4#dba ,footnote #dbj3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 x4 p4 #afj1 b4 #bc-bf4 ,greek3 ou7 gar o7 o7tioun a7neln le_/luken1 ou7_/d' ei7 pseudo_/s e7sti to a7nairou_/menon2 e7_/choi gar a7n plei_/ pseud o7 lo_/gos4 ,footnote #dba3 ,ibid4 b4 #cj-ci4 ,greek3 oi7de de tn lu_/sin o7 ei7ds o7_/ti para touto o7 lo_/gos--ou7 gar a7po_/chr to e7nstnai1 ou7_/d' a7n pseudos 7 to a7nairou_/menon1 a7lla kai dio_/ti pseudos a7podeikte_/on2 ou7_/t gar a7n ei7_/ phaneron po_/teron proorn ti 7 ou7 poieitai tn e7_/nstasin4 ,this last-mentioned proceeding--refutation of that premiss upon which your false conclusion in its full bearing really turns--is the only regular1 valid1 and complete objection whereby the respondent can stop out your syllogistic approaches4 ,there are indeed three other modes of objection to which he may resort2 but these are all either inconclusive or unfair4 ,he may turn his objection against you personally2 and1 without refuting any of your premisses1 he may thus perplex and confuse you1 so that you are disqualified from pursuing the thread of your questions4 ,or he may turn his objections against portions of your questions2 not refuting any one of your premisses1 but showing that1 as they stand1 they are insufficient to warrant the conclusion which you seek to establish2 when1 if you are master of your subject1 and retain your calmness1 you will at once supply the deficiency by putting additional questions1 so that his objection thus vanishes4 ,or1 lastly1 he may multiply irrelevant objections against time1 for the purpose of prolonging the discussion and tiring you out4#dbb ,of these four modes of objection open to the respondent the first is the only one truly valid and conclusive2 the three others are obstructions either surmountable or unfair1 and the last is the most discreditable of all4#dbc ,footnote #dbb3 ,ibid4 p4 #afa1 a4 #a-ab3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de lo_/gon klusai sumpera_/nasthai tetrachs4 7 gar a7nelo_/nta par' o7 gi_/netai to pseudos4 7 pros ton e7rtnta e7_/nstasin ei7po_/nta2--tri_/ton de pros ta 7rtme_/na2--teta_/rt de kai cheiri_/st tn e7nsta_/sen 7 pros ton chro_/non4 ,footnote #dbc3 ,ibid4 a4 #ac-ae3 ,greek3 ai7 men ou7n e7nsta_/seis1 katha_/per ei7_/pamen1 tetrachs gi_/nontai2 lu_/sis d' e7sti tn ei7rme_/nn 7 pr_/t mo_/non1 ai7 de loipai klu_/seis tines kai e7mpodismoi tn sumperasma_/tn4 ,to blame the argumentative procedure and to blame the questioner are two distinct things4 ,perhaps your manner of conducting the interrogation1 preparatory to your final syllogism1 may be open to censure2 yet nevertheless you the questioner may deserve no censure2 for it may be the respondent's fault1 not yours4 ,he may refuse to grant the very premisses which are essential to the good conduct of your case2 he may resort to perverse evasions and contradictions for the mere purpose of thwarting you2 so that you are forced to adapt yourself to his unworthy manoeuvres rather than to aim at the thesis itself4 ,dialectic cannot be well conducted unless both the partners do their duty to the common purpose2 the bad conduct of your respondent puts you out1 and the dialectic presently degenerates on both sides into angry contention4#dbd ,apart from this1 too1 it must be remembered that the express purpose of ,dialectic is not to teach1 but to search and test consequences and to exercise the intellect of both parties4 ,accordingly you are not always restricted to true syllogistic premisses and conclusions4 ,you are allowed to resort occasionally to false premisses and false conclusions2 for1 if what the respondent advances be true1 you have no means of refuting it except by falsehood2 and1 if what he advances be false1 the best way of refuting it may be through some other falsehood4#dbe ,you render service to him by doing so2 for1 since his beliefs are contrary to truth1 if the dialogue is confined to his beliefs1 the result may perhaps contribute to persuade him1 but it will not instruct or profit him4#dbf ,it is your business to bring him round and emancipate him from these erroneous beliefs2 but you must accomplish this in a manner truly dialectical1 and not contentious2 whether you proceed by true or by false conclusions4#dbg ,if you on your side1 indeed1 put questions in a contentious spirit1 it is you that are to blame4 ,but often the respondent is most to blame1 when he refuses to grant what he thinks probable1 and when he does not apprehend what you really intend to ask4#dbh ,he is sometimes also to blame for granting what he ought to refuse2 such as ,petitio ,principii or ,affirmation of ,contraries4 ,it is often difficult to distinguish what questions involve ,petitio ,principii or ,affirmation of ,contraries3 they are asked and granted without either party being aware1 and the like mistake is committed by men in private talk1 not merely in formal dialogue4 ,when this happens1 the argument will inevitably be a bad one2 but the fault is with the respondent who1 having before refused what he ought to have granted1 now grants what he ought to refuse4#dbi ,footnote #dbd3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #af-bd4 ,greek3 duskolai_/nontes ou7n a7gnistikas kai ou7 dialektikas poiountai tas diatriba_/s4 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 phaulos koinnos o7 e7mpodi_/zn to koinon e7_/rgon4 ,footnote #dbe3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd-ca3 ,greek3 e7_/ti d' e7pei gumnasi_/as kai pei_/ras cha_/rin a7ll' ou7 didaskali_/as oi7 toioutoi tn lo_/gn1 dlon 7s ou7 mo_/non ta7lth sullogiste_/on a7lla kai pseudos1 ou7de di' a7lthn a7ei a7ll' e7ni_/ote kai pseudn4 polla_/kis gar a7lthous tethe_/ntos a7nairein a7na_/gk ton dialego_/menon1 7_/ste protate_/on ta pseud4 e7ni_/ote de kai pseu_/dous tethe_/ntos a7nairete_/on dia pseudn4 ,footnote #dbf3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 ou7den gar klu_/ei tini dokein ta m o7_/nta mallon tn a7lthn1 7_/st' e7k tn e7kei_/n dokou_/ntn tou lo_/gou genome_/nou mallon e7_/stai pepeisme_/nos 7 7phelme_/nos4 ,footnote #dbg3 ,ibid4 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 dei de ton kals metabiba_/zonta dialektiks kai m e7ristiks metabiba_/zein4 ,about ,greek3 to metabiba_/zein1 compare ,topica1 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #bc4 ,footnote #dbh3 ,ibid4 b4 #b3 ,greek3 o7_/ te gar e7ristiks e7rtn phau_/ls diale_/getai1 o7_/ t' e7n t a7pokri_/nesthai m didous ta phaino_/menon md' e7kdecho_/menos o7_/ ti_/ pote bou_/letai o7 e7rtn puthe_/sthai4 ,footnote #dbi3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 b4 #aa-ah3 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7stin a7dio_/riston po_/te ta7nanti_/a kai po_/te ta e7n a7rch lamba_/nousin oi7 a7_/nthrpoi 7polla_/kis gar kath' au7tous le_/gontes ta7nanti_/a le_/gousi1 kai a7naneu_/santes pro_/teron dido_/asin u7_/steron2 dio_/per e7rt_/menoi ta7nanti_/a kai to e7n a7rch polla_/kis u7pakou_/ousin7--a7na_/gk phau_/lous gi_/nesthai tous lo_/gous2 ai7_/tios d' o7 a7pokrino_/menos1 ta men ou7 didou_/s1 ta de toiauta didou_/s4 ,this passage is not very clear4 ,such then are the cases in which the conduct of the dialogue is open to censure1 without any fault on your part as questioner4 ,but there are other cases in which the fault is really yours4 ,these are five in number3--7#a7 ,when all or most of your questions are so framed as to elicit premisses either false or improbable1 so that neither the conclusion which you seek to obtain1 nor any other conclusion at all1 follows from them2 7#b7 ,when1 from similar defects1 the proper conclusion that you seek to obtain cannot be drawn from your premisses2 7#c7 ,when the proper conclusion would follow1 if certain additions were made to your premisses1 but such additions are of a character worse than the premisses already obtained1 and are even less probable than the conclusion itself2 7#d7 ,when you have accumulated a superfluous multitude of premisses1 so that the proper conclusion does not follow from all of them but from a part of them only 7#e7 ,when your premisses are more improbable and less trustworthy than the proper conclusion1 or when1 though true1 they are harder and more troublesome to prove than the problem itself4#dcj ,footnote #dcj3 ,ibid4 b4 #ai-cc3 ,greek3 kath' au7ton de t lo_/g pe_/nte ei7sin e7pitim_/seis4 ,in regard to the last item1 however1 the fault may sometimes be in the problem itself rather than in you as questioner4 ,some problems1 being in their own nature hard and not to be settled from probable or plausible data1 ought not to be admitted into ,dialectic4 ,all that can be required from you as questioner is that you shall know and obtain the most probable premisses that the problem admits3 your procedure may be thus in itself blameable1 yet it may even deserve praise1 having regard to the problem1 if this last be very intractable2 or it may be in itself praiseworthy1 yet blameable in regard to the problem1 if the problem admit of being settled by premisses still more probable4#dca ,you may even be more blameable1 if you obtain your conclusion but obtain it from improbable premisses1 than if you failed to obtain it2 the premisses required to make it complete being true and probable and not of capital importance1 but being refused by the respondent4#dcb ,however1 you ought not to be blamed if you obtain your true and proper conclusion but obtain it through premisses in themselves false2 for this is recognized in analytical theory as possible3 if the conclusion is false1 the premisses 7one or both7 must be false1 but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses4#dcc ,footnote #dca3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd-p4 #afb1 a4 #c4 ,footnote #dcb3 ,ibid4 p4 #afb1 a4 #c-h4 ,footnote #dcc3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afb1 a4 #h-aa3 ,greek3 tois de dia pseudn a7lthes sumperainome_/nois ou7 di_/kaion e7pitiman-- phaneron d' e7k tn ,a7nalutikn4 ,when you have obtained your premisses and proved a conclusion1 these same premisses will not serve as proof of any other proposition separate and independent of the conclusion2 such may sometimes seem to be the case1 but it is a mere sophistical delusion4 ,if your premisses are both of them probable1 your conclusion may in some cases be more probable than either4#dcd ,footnote #dcd3 ,ibid4 a4#ab-bd4 ,aristotle here introduces four definitions of terms1 which are useful in regard to his thoughts but have no great pertinence in the place where they occur3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de philoso_/phma men sullogismos a7podeiktiko_/s1 e7pichei_/rma de sullogismos dialektiko_/s1 so_/phisma de sullogismos e7ristiko_/s1 a7po_/rma de sullogismos dialektikos a7ntipha_/ses4 ,one other matter yet remains in which your procedure as questioner may be blameable4 ,the premisses through which you prove your conclusion may be long and unnecessarily multiplied2 the conclusion may be such that you ought to have obtained it through fewer1 yet equally pertinent premisses4#dce ,footnote #dce3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd-cd4 ,the example whereby ,aristotle illustrates this position is obscure and difficult to follow4 ,it is borrowed from the ,platonic theory of ,ideas4 ,the point which you are supposed to be anxious to prove is1 that one opinion is more opinion than another 7,greek3 o7_/ti e7sti do_/xa mallon e7te_/ra e7te_/ras74 ,to prove it you ask as premisses3 7#a7 ,that the ,idea of every class of things is more that thing than any one among the particulars of the class2 7#b7 ,that there is an ,idea of matter of opinion1 and that this ,idea is more opinion than any one of the particular matters of opinion4 ,if this ,idea is more opinion1 it must also be more true and accurate than any particular matter of opinion4 ,and it is this last conclusion that ,aristotle seems to indicate as the conclusion to be proved3 ,greek3 7_/ste au7t 7 do_/xa a7kribeste_/ra e7sti_/n 7a4 #cb74 ,as ,i understand it1 ,aristotle supposes that the doctrine which you are here refuting is1 that all ,greek3 e7_/ndoxa are on an equal footing as to truth and accuracy2 and that the doctrine which you are proving against it is1 that one ,greek3 e7_/ndoxon is more true and accurate than another4 ,if you attempt to prove this last by invoking the ,platonic theory of ,ideas1 you will introduce premisses far-fetched and unnecessary1 even if true2 whereas you might prove your conclusion from premisses easier and more obvious4 ,the fault is 7he says7 that such roundabout procedure puts out of sight the real ground of the proof3 ,greek3 ti_/s de 7 mochthri_/a8 7 o7_/ti poiei1 par' o7 o7 lo_/gos1 lantha_/nein to ai7_/tion 7a4 #cc74 ,the dubitative and problematical form here is remarkable4 ,how would ,aristotle himself have proved the above conclusion8 ,by ,induction8 ,he does not tell us4 ,the cases in which your argument will carry the clearest evidence1 impressing itself even on the most vulgar minds1 are those in which you obtain such premisses as will enable you to draw your final conclusion without asking any farther concessions4 ,but this will rarely happen4 ,even after you have obtained all the premisses substantially necessary to your final conclusion1 you will generally be forced to draw out two or more prosyllogisms or preliminary syllogisms1 and to ask the assent of the respondent to these1 before you can venture to enunciate the final conclusion4 ,this second grade of evidence is however sufficient1 even if the premisses fall short of the highest probability4#dcf ,footnote #dcf3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xii4 p4 #afb1 a4 #ce-;b4 #b4 ,on the other hand1 your argument may deserve to be pronounced false on four distinct grounds3--7#a7 ,if your syllogism appears to prove the conclusion but does not really prove it1 being then an eristic or contentious syllogism2 7#b7 ,if the conclusion be good but not 9999relevant to the thesis1 which is most likely to happen where you employ ,reductio ad ,impossible2 7#c7 ,if your conclusion though valid and even relevant1 is not founded on the premisses and principia appropriate to the thesis2 7#d7 ,if your premisses are false1 even though the conclusion in itself may prove true1 since it has already been said that a true conclusion may sometimes be obtained from false premisses4#dcg ,footnote #dcg3 ,ibid4 b4 #c-ae3 ,greek3 pseuds de lo_/gos kaleitai tetrachs1 c4 ,falsehood in your argument will be rather your own fault than that of your argument1 especially if you yourself are not aware of its falsehood4 ,indeed1 there are some false arguments which are more valuable in ,dialectic than many true ones2 where1 for example1 from highly probable premisses you refute some recognized truth4 ,such an argument is sure to serve as a demonstration of other truths2 at the very least1 it shows that some one of the propositions concerned is altogether untrue4#dch ,on the other hand1 if you prove a true conclusion by premisses false and improbable1 your argument will be more worthless than many others in which the conclusion is false2 from such premisses1 indeed1 the conclusion may well be really false4#dci ,footnote #dch3 ,ibid4 b4 #af-bb3 ,greek3 to men ou7n pseud ton lo_/gon ei7nai tou le_/gontos a7ma_/rtma mallon 7 tou lo_/gou1 kai ou7de tou le_/gontos a7ei to a7ma_/rtma1 a7ll' o7_/tan lantha_/n au7to_/n1 e7pei kath' au7to_/n ge polln a7lthn a7podecho_/metha mallon1 a7n e7x o7_/ti ma_/lista dokou_/ntn a7nair ti tn a7lthn2 toioutos gar 7n e7te_/rn a7lthn a7po_/deixi_/s e7stin2 dei gar tn keime_/nn ti m ei7nai pantels1 7_/st' e7_/stai tou_/tou a7po_/deixis4 ,footnote #dci3 ,ibid4 b4 #bb-bd4 ,in estimating the dialectical value of an argument1 therefore1 we must first look whether the conclusion is formally valid2 next1 whether the conclusion is true or false2 lastly1 what are the premisses from whence it is derived4#ddj ,for1 if it be derived from premisses false yet probable1 it has logical or dialectical value2 while1 if derived from premisses true yet improbable1 it has none4#dda ,if derived from premisses both false and improbable1 it will of course be worthless2 either absolutely in itself1 or with reference to the thesis under debate4 ,footnote #ddj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 7_/ste dlon o7_/ti pr_/t men e7pi_/skepsis lo_/gou kath' au7ton ei7 sumperai_/netai1 deute_/ra de po_/teron a7lthes 7 pseudos2 tri_/t d' e7k poi_/n tinn4 ,footnote #dda3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 ei7 men gar e7k pseudn e7ndo_/xn de_/1 logiko_/s1 ei7 d' e7x o7_/ntn men a7do_/xn de_/1 phaulos1 c4 ,two faults of questioners in ,dialectic are dealt with specially by ,aristotle3--7#a7 ,petitio ,principii2 7#b7 ,petitio ,contrariorum4 ,he had touched upon both of them 7in the ,analytica ,priora7 as they concerned the demonstrative process1 or the proving of truth3 he now deals with them as they concern the dialectical process1 or the setting out of opinions and probabilities4#ddb ,footnote #ddb3 ,ibid4 xiii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 to d' e7n a7rch kai ta e7nanti_/a ps ai7teitai o7 e7rtn1 kat' a7l_/theian men e7n tois ,a7nalutikois 7,priora1 ,,ii4 xvi47 ,greek3 ei7_/rtai1 kata do_/xan de nun lekte_/on4 ,five distinct modes may be enumerated of committing the fault called ,petitio ,principii3-- #a4 ,you may put as a question the very conclusion which it is incumbent on you to prove1 in refutation of the thesis of the respondent4 ,if this is done in explicit terms1 your opponent can hardly fail to perceive it2 but he possibly may fail1 if you substitute an equivalent term or the definition in place of the term4#ddc ,footnote #ddc3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd4 ,greek3 prton ei7_/ tis au7to to dei_/knusthai de_/on ai7t_/sei2 touto d' e7p' au7tou men ou7 r7a_/dion lantha_/nein1 e7n de tois sunnu_/mois1 kai e7n o7_/sois to o7_/noma kai o7 lo_/gos to au7to smai_/nei1 mallon4 #b4 ,if the conclusion which you are seeking to prove is a particular one1 you may put as a question the universal in which it is comprised4 ,thus1 if you are to prove that the knowledge of ,contraries is one and the same1 you may put as a question1 ,is not the knowledge of ,opposites one and the same8 ,you are asking the very point which it was your business to show2 but you are asking along with it much more besides4#ddd ,footnote #ddd3 ,ibid4 p4 #afc1 a4 #a4 #c4 ,if you are seeking to prove an universal conclusion1 9999you may put as a question one of the particulars comprised therein4 ,thus1 if you are to prove that the knowledge of ,contraries is one and the same1 you may put as a question1 ,is not the knowledge of white and black1 good and evil1 or any other pair of particular contraries1 one and the same8 ,it was your business to prove this particular1 along with many others besides2 but you are now asking it as a question separately4#dde ,footnote #dde3 ,ibid4 a4 #e4 #d4 ,if the conclusion which you are seeking to prove has two terms conjointly1 you may put as a question one or the other of these separately4 ,thus1 when you are trying to show that the healing art is knowledge of what is wholesome and unwholesome1 you may ask1 ,is it a knowledge of the wholesome8#ddf ,footnote #ddf3 ,ibid4 a4 #h4 #e4 ,suppose there are two conclusions necessarily implicated with each other1 and that it is your business to prove one of them3 you may put as a question the other of the two4 ,thus1 if you are seeking to prove that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side1 you may put as a question1 ,is not the side incommensurable with the diagonal8#ddg ,footnote #ddg3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiii4 p4 #afc1 a4 #aj4 ,there are also five distinct modes of ,petitio ,contrariorum3-- #a4 ,you may ask the respondent1 in plain terms1 to grant first the affirmative1 next1 the negative1 of a given proposition4#ddh ,footnote #ddh3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad3 ,greek3 prton men gar ei7_/ tis tas a7ntikeime_/nas ai7t_/saito pha_/sin kai a7nti_/phasin4 #b4 ,you may ask him to grant1 first1 that a given subject is1 e4g41 good1 next1 that the same subject is bad4#ddi ,footnote #ddi3 ,ibid4 a4 #af3 ,greek3 deu_/teron de ta7nanti_/a kata tn a7nti_/thesin1 oi7on a7gathon kai kakon tau7to_/n4 #c4 ,after he has granted to you the affirmative universally1 you may ask him to grant the negative in some particular case under the universal3 e4g41 after he has granted that the knowledge of ,contraries is one and the same1 you ask him to grant that the knowledge of wholesome and unwholesome is not one and the same4 ,or you may proceed by the way of reversing this process4#dej ,footnote #dej3 ,ibid4 a4 #ag-ba4 #d4 ,you may ask the contrary of that which follows necessarily from the premisses admitted4#dea ,footnote #dea3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba4 #e4 ,instead of asking the two contraries in plain and direct terms1 you may ask the two contraries in different propositions1 yet necessarily implicated with the first two4#deb ,footnote #deb3 ,ibid4 a4 #bb4 ,there is this difference between ,petitio ,principii1 and ,petitio ,contrariorum3 the first has reference to the conclusion which you have to prove1 and the wrong procedure involved in it is relative to that conclusion2 but in the second the wrong procedure affects only the two propositions themselves and the relation subsisting between them4#dec ,footnote #dec3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 diaphe_/rei de to ta7nanti_/a lamba_/nein tou e7n a7rch1 o7_/ti tou me_/n e7stin 7 a7marti_/a pros to sumpe_/rasma 7pros gar e7keino ble_/pontes to e7n a7rch le_/gomen ai7teisthai71 ta d' e7nanti_/a e7stin e7n tais prota_/sesi t e7_/chein ps tau_/tas pros a7ll_/las4 ,aristotle now1 finally1 proceeds to give some general advice for exercise and practice in ,dialectic4 ,you ought to accustom yourself to treat arguments by converting the syllogisms of which they consist2 that is1 by applying to them the treatment of which the ,reductio ad ,absurdum is one case4#ded ,you ought to test every thesis by first assuming it to be true1 then assuming it to be false1 and following out the consequences on both sides4#dee ,when you have hunted out each train of arguments1 look out at once for the counter-arguments available against it4 ,this will strengthen your power both as questioner and as respondent4 ,it is indeed an exercise so valuable1 that you will do well to go through it by yourself1 if you have no companion4#def ,put the different trains of argument1 bearing on the same thesis1 into comparison with each other4 ,a wide command of arguments affirmative as well as negative will serve you well both for attack and for defence4#deg ,footnote #ded3 ,ibid4 xiv4 p4 #afc1 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 pros de gumnasi_/an kai mele_/tn tn toiou_/tn lo_/gn prton men a7ntistre_/phein e7thi_/zesthai chr tous lo_/gous4 ,for ,conversion of ,syllogism1 see p4 #agd4 ,footnote #dee3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiv4 p4 #afc1 a4 #cf3 ,greek3 pros a7_/pasa_/n te the_/sin kai o7_/ti ou7_/ts kai o7_/ti ou7ch ou7_/ts to e7pichei_/rma skepte_/on4 ,footnote #def3 ,ibid4 b4 #c3 ,greek3 ka7n pros mde_/na a7_/llon e7_/chmen1 pros au7tou_/s4 ,footnote #deg3 ,ibid4 b4 #e3 ,greek3 touto gar pro_/s te to bia_/zesthai polln eu7pori_/an poiei kai pros to e7le_/gchein mega_/ln e7_/chei bo_/theian1 o7_/tan eu7por tis kai o7_/ti ou7_/ts kai o7_/ti ou7ch ou7_/ts2 pros ta e7nanti_/a gar sumbai_/nei poieisthai tn phulak_/n4 ,instead of ,greek3 pro_/s te to bia_/zesthai1 ought we not to read here ,greek3 pro_/s te to m bia_/zesthai1 taking this verb in the passive sense8 ,surely ,greek3 bia_/zesthai in the active sense gives the same meaning substantially as ,greek3 e7le_/gchein1 which comes afterwards1 both of them referring to the assailant or questioner1 whereas ,aristotle intends here to illustrate the usefulness of the practice to both parties4 ,this same accomplishment will be of use1 moreover1 for acquisitions even in ,science and ,philosophy4 ,it is a great step to see and grasp in conjunction the trains of reasoning on both sides of the question2 the task that remains--right determination which of the two is the better--becomes much easier4 ,to do this well1 however1--to choose the true and to reject the false correctly--there must be conjoined a good natural predisposition4 ,none but those who are well constituted by nature1 who have their likings and dislikes well set in regard to each particular conjuncture1 can judge correctly what is best and what is worst4#deh ,footnote #deh3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-af3 ,greek3 dei de pros to toiouto u7pa_/rchein eu7phua2 kai tout' e7_/stin 7 kat' a7l_/theian eu7phui_/a1 to du_/nasthai kals e7le_/sthai ta7lthes kai phugein to pseudos2 o7_/per oi7 pephuko_/tes eu7 du_/nantai poiein2 eu7 gar philountes kai misountes to prosphero_/menon eu7 kri_/nousi to be_/ltiston4 ,in regard to the primary or most universal theses1 and to those problems which are most frequently put in debate1 you will do well to have reasonings ready prepared1 and even to get them by heart4 ,it is on these first or most universal theses that respondents become often reluctant and disgusted4 ,to be expert in handling primary doctrines and probabilities1 and to be well provided with the definitions from which syllogisms must start1 is to the dialectician an acquisition of the highest moment2 like familiarity with the ,axioms to a geometer1 and ready application of the multiplication table to an arithmetical calculator4#dei ,when you have these generalities and major propositions firmly established in your mind1 you will recall1 in a definite order and arrangement1 the particular matters falling under each of them1 and will throw them more easily into syllogisms4 ,they will assist you in doing this1 just as the mere distribution of places in a scheme for topical memory makes you recollect what is associated with each4 ,you should lodge in your memory1 however1 universal major premisses rather than complete and ready-made reasonings2 for the great difficulty is about the principia4#dfj ,footnote #dei3 ,ibid4 b4 #ag-bf4 ,footnote #dfj3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiv4 p4 #afc1 b4 #bg-cc3 ,greek3 o7moi_/s kai e7n tois lo_/gois to pro_/cheiron ei7nai peri tas a7rchas kai tas prota_/seis a7po sto_/matos e7xepi_/stasthai2 katha_/per gar e7n t mnmonik mo_/non oi7 to_/poi tethe_/ntes eu7thus poiousin au7ta mnmoneu_/ein1 kai tauta poi_/sei sullogistik_/teron dia to pros 7risme_/nas au7tas ble_/pein kat' a7rithmo_/n2 pro_/tasi_/n te koinn mallon 7 lo_/gon ei7s mn_/mn thete_/on2 a7rchs gar kai u7pothe_/ses eu7porsai metri_/s chalepo_/n4 ,you ought also to accustom yourself to break down one reasoning into many2 which will be done most easily when the theme of the reasoning is most universal4 ,conceal this purpose as well as you can2 and in this view begin with those particulars which lie most remote from the subject in hand4#dfa ,in recording arguments for your own instruction1 you will generalize them as much as possible1 though perhaps when spoken they may have been particular2 for this is the best way to break down one into several4 ,in conducting your own case as questioner you will avoid the higher generalities as much as you can4#dfb ,but you must at the same time take care to keep up some common or general premisses throughout the discourse2 for every syllogistic process1 even where the conclusion is particular1 implies this1 and no syllogism is valid without it4#dfc ,footnote #dfa3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd4 ,footnote #dfb3 ,ibid4 p4 #afd1 a4 #b-g3 ,greek3 dei de kai tas a7pomnmoneu_/seis katho_/lou poieisthai tn lo_/gn1 ka7n 7 dieilegme_/nos e7pi me_/rous2--au7ton de o7_/ti ma_/lista pheu_/gein e7pi to katho_/lou phe_/rein tous sullogismou_/s4 ,this passage is to me obscure4 ,i have given the best meaning which it seems to offer4 ,footnote #dfc3 ,ibid4 a4 #h4 ,exercise in inductive discourse is most suitable for a young beginner2 exercise in deductive or syllogistic discourse1 for skilful veterans4 ,from those who are accomplished in the former you can learn the art of multiplying particular comparisons2 from those who are accomplished in the latter you derive universal premisses2 such being the strong points of each4 ,when you go through a dialectical exercise1 try to bring away with you for future use either some complete syllogism1 or some solution of an apparent refutation1 or a major premiss1 or a well-sustained exceptional example 7,greek3 e7_/nstasin72 note also whether either you or your respondent question correctly or otherwise1 and on what reason such correctness or incorrectness turned4#dfd ,it is the express purpose of dialectical exercise to acquire power and facility in this procedure1 especially as regards universal premisses and special exceptions4 ,indeed the main characteristic of the dialectician is to be apt at universal premisses1 and apt at special exceptions4 ,in the first of these two aptitudes he groups many particulars into one universal1 without which he cannot make good his syllogism2 in the second of the two he breaks up the one universal into many1 distinguishing the separate constituents1 and denying some while he affirms others4#dfe ,footnote #dfd3 ,ibid4 a4 #ab-ai4 ,greek3 o7_/ls d' e7k tou gumna_/zesthai dialego_/menon peirate_/on a7pophe_/resthai 7 sullogismon peri tinos1 7 lu_/sin 7 pro_/tasin 7 e7_/nstasin1 c4 ,footnote #dfe3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xiv4 p4 #afd1 b4 #b-f3 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar 7s a7pls ei7pein dialektikos o7 protatikos kai e7nstatiko_/s2 e7_/sti de to men protei_/nesthai e7n poiein ta plei_/ 7dei 9999gar e7n o7_/ls lphthnai pros o7 o7 lo_/gos71 to d' e7ni_/stasthai to e7n polla_/2 7 gar diairei 7 a7nairei1 to men didous to d' ou7 tn 9999proteinome_/nn4 ,you must take care however not to carry on this exercise with every one1 especially with a vulgar-minded man4 ,with some persons the dispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn4 ,when the respondent tries to make a show of escaping by unworthy manoeuvres1 the questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing2 but this is a disgraceful scene4 ,to keep clear of such abusive discourse1 you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace1 unprepared1 respondents4#dff ,footnote #dff3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ae3 ,greek3 pros gar ton pa_/nts peir_/menon phai_/nesthai diapheu_/gein1 di_/kaion men pa_/nts peirasthai sullogi_/sasthai1 ou7k eu7_/schmon de_/4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,sophistici ,,elenchi4 ,the ,sophist 7according to ,aristotle7 is one whose professional occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he possesses wisdom and knowledge4 ,the abstract substantive noun ,sophistic1 with the verb to practice as a ,sophist 7,greek3 sophisteu_/ein71 expresses such profession and purpose4#a ,this application of the term is derived from ,plato1 who has in various dialogues 7,protagoras1 ,hippias1 ,euthydmus1 c47 introduced ,sokrates conversing with different professional ,sophists1 and who has1 in a longer dialogue called ,sophistes1 attempted an elaborate definition of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named4 ,it is the actual argumentative procedure of the ,sophist that ,aristotle proposes to himself as the theme of this little treatise1 appended to his general theory of the ,syllogism2 a treatise which1 though forming properly the ,ninth and concluding ,book of the ,topica1 is commonly known as a separate appendix thereto1 under the title of ,sophistici ,elenchi1 or ,sophistical ,refutations4 ,footnote #a3 ,soph4 ,el4 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ba1 #bh1 #cb3 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar 7 sophistik phainome_/n sophi_/a ou7sa d' ou7_/1 kai o7 sophists chrmatists a7po phainome_/ns sophi_/as a7ll' ou7k ou7_/ss2--a7na_/gk ou7n tous boulome_/nous sophisteu_/ein to tn ei7rme_/nn lo_/gn ge_/nos ztein2--o7_/ti men ou7n e7_/sti ti toiouton lo_/gn ge_/nos1 kai o7_/ti toiau_/ts e7phi_/entai duna_/mes ou7s kaloumen sophista_/s1 dlon4 ,also xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #bg4 ,the ,sophistical ,elenchus or ,refutation1 being a delusive semblance of refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept it as real1 cannot be properly understood without the theory of ,elenchus in general2 nor can this last be understood without the entire theory of the ,syllogism1 since the ,elenchus is only one variety of ,syllogism4#b ,the ,elenchus is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis or proposition4 ,accordingly we must first understand the conditions of a good and valid ,syllogism1 before we study those of a valid ,elenchus2 these last1 again1 must be understood1 before we enter on the distinctive attributes of the ,pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical1 invalid1 or sham1 refutation4 ,in other words1 an enumeration and classification of ,fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise on ,logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with ,aristotle1 and copied by most logicians after him4 ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 x4 p4 #aga1 a4 #a-e4 ,aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive appearance2 and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail not less in syllogisms than in other matters4 ,next he designates a notorious class of persons1 called ,sophists1 who made it their profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of syllogizing2 and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of debate3--7#a7 ,didactic2 7#b7 ,dialectic2 7#c7 ,peirastic2 7#d7 ,eristic or ,sophistic4#c ,in this quadruple arrangement1 however1 he is not consistent with his own definitions1 when he ranks the four as distinct and co-ordinate species4 ,the marked and special antithesis is between ,didactic and ,dialectic4 ,both ,peirastic and ,eristic fall as varieties or sub-species under the species ,dialectic2 and there is under the species ,didactic a variety called ,pseudo-graphic or ,pseudo-didactic1 which stands to ,didactic in the same relation in which ,eristic stands to ,dialectic4#d ,footnote #c3 ,soph4 ,el4 ii4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ch3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d tn e7n t diale_/gesthai lo_/gn te_/ttara ge_/n1 didaskalikou kai dialektikoi kai peirastikoi kai e7ristikoi_/4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #cd4 ,didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately1 but only to certain special sciences2 each of which has its own separate1 undemonstrable principia1 from which its conclusions1 so far as true and valid1 must be deduced4 ,it supposes a teacher acquainted with these principia and deductions1 talking with some one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn4 ,the teacher puts questions1 to which the learner makes the best answers that he can2 and1 if the answers are wrong1 corrects them and proceeds to draw1 according to syllogistic canons1 conclusions from premisses which he himself knows to be the truth4 ,these premisses the learner must believe upon the teacher's authority4 ,properly speaking1 indeed1 the didactic process is not interrogative 7in the same sense that ,dialectic is73 the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and reason from it1 if he thinks it wrong4#e ,footnote #e3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #agb1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 nun d' ou7k e7_/stin o7 dialektios peri ge_/nos ti 7risme_/non1 ou7de deiktikos ou7deno_/s1 ou7de toioutos oi7os o7 katho_/lou4 ou7_/te ga_/r e7stin a7_/panta e7n e7ni_/ tini ge_/nei1 ou7_/te ei7 ei7_/1 oi7o_/n te u7po tas au7tas a7rchas ei7nai ta o7_/nta4 7_/st' ou7demi_/a te_/chn tn deiknuousn tina phu_/sin e7rttik_/ e7stin2 ou7 gar e7_/xestin o7poteronoun tn mori_/n dounai2 sullogismos gar ou7 gi_/netai e7x a7mphoin4 7 de dialektik e7rtrik_/ e7stin2 ei7 d' e7dei_/knuen1 ei7 kai m pa_/nta1 a7lla ta_/ ge prta kai tas oi7kei_/as a7rcha_/s1 ou7k a7n 7r_/ta4 m dido_/ntos gar ou7k a7n e7_/ti ei7chen e7x 7n e7_/ti diale_/xetai pros tn e7_/nstasin4 ,when ,aristotle1 therefore1 reckons ,greek3 lo_/gous didaskalikou_/s as one of the four species ,greek3 tn e7n t diale_/gesthai lo_/gn 7,soph4 ,el4 ii4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ch71 we must understand ,greek3 to diale_/gesthai in a very wide and vague sense1 going much beyond the derivative noun ,greek3 dialektik_/4 ,dialectic1 on the contrary1 is applicable to all matters universally and indiscriminately1 including even the undemonstrable principia which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic syllogisms4 ,it supposes1 in place of teacher and learner1 an interrogator 7or opponent7 and a respondent4 ,the respondent declares a problem or thesis1 which he undertakes to defend2 while the other puts questions to him respecting it1 with the purpose of compelling him either to contradict the thesis1 or to contradict himself on some other point4 ,the interrogator is allowed only to ask questions1 and to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the respondent in answer3 he is not permitted to introduce any other premisses4 ,the premisses upon which the debate turns are understood all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary multitude or among a few wise men1 but to have no higher authority4 ,accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments pro and con1 much diversified4 ,the process is essentially controversial2 and1 if the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction1 the respondent is victorious1 and remains in possession of the field4 ,such is the capital antithesis1 much dwelt upon by ,aristotle1 between ,didactic and ,dialectic4 ,but that which he calls ,peirastic1 and that which he calls ,eristic1 are not species co-ordinate with and distinguished from ,dialectic3 they are peculiar aspects1 subordinate varieties or modes1 of ,dialectic itself4 ,aristotle himself1 indeed1 admits ,peirastic to be a mode or variety of ,dialectic2#f and the like is equally true respecting what he terms ,eristic or ,sophistic4 ,footnote #f3 ,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #d-i3 ,greek3 7 gar peirastik_/ e7sti dialektik_/ tis1 c4--p4 #agb1 a4 #ce3 ,greek3 o7 te_/chn sullogistik peirastiko_/s1 dialektiko_/s4--viii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #be3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' 7 peirastik me_/ros ts dialektiks4 ,these subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner1 the limitations1 and the purpose1 for and under which the dialectical process is conducted4 ,dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic3#g it may be looked at either as gymnastic1 in reference to the two debaters1 or as peirastic1 in reference to the arguments and doctrines brought forward2 intellectual exercise and stimulation of the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing and confronting various probable doctrines4 ,it is the common purpose 7,greek3 koinon e7_/rgon7#h of the two champions1 to improve and enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all1 by following out a variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies1 bearing more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination4 ,certain rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and respondent2 but1 subject to these rules1 each of them is bound to exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory2 and1 though one only can gain it1 the debate may be well and creditably conducted on both sides4 ,if the rules are not observed1 if the assailing champion1 bent upon victory at all cost1 has recourse to dishonest interrogative tricks1 or the defensive champion to perverse and obstructive negations1 beyond the prescribed boundary1 in that case the debate is called by ,aristotle eristic or contentious1 from the undue 9999predominance of the controversial spirit and purpose2 also sophistic1 from the fact that there existed 7as he asserts7 a class or profession of persons called ,sophists1 who regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres1 first with a view to reputation1 and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit1 being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to justify them4#i ,footnote #g3 ,topic4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #bf1 b4 #b3 ,greek3 pros gumnasi_/an--e7xetastik gar ou7sa1 c4 ,compare also ,topica1 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #be2 xiv4 p4 #afc1 a4 #bi1 p4 #afd1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 to de gumna_/zesthai duna_/mes cha_/rin1 kai ma_/lista peri tas prota_/seis kai e7nsta_/seis2 e7_/sti gar 7s a7pls ei7pein dialektikos o7 protatikos kai e7nstatiko_/s4 ,footnote #h3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #bj1 #cg4 ,footnote #i3 ,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #be-ce3 ,greek3 oi7 men ou7n ts ni_/ks au7ts cha_/rin toioutoi e7ristikoi a7_/nthrpoi kai phile_/rides dokousin ei7nai1 oi7 de do_/xs cha_/rin ts ei7s chrmatismon sophistikoi_/2--kai tn lo_/gn tn au7tn me_/n ei7sin oi7 phile_/rides kai sophistai_/1 a7ll' ou7 tn au7tn e7_/neken4 kai lo_/gos o7 au7tos men e7_/stai sophistikos kai e7ristiko_/s1 a7ll' ou7 kata tauto_/n1 a7ll' 7 men ni_/ks phainome_/ns1 e7ristiko_/s1 7 de sophi_/as1 sophistiko_/s4 c4 ,we thus see plainly that ,peirastic and ,eristic are not to be ranked as two distinct species of discourse1 co-ordinate with ,didactic and ,dialectic2 but that peirastic is in fact an epithet applicable generally to ,dialectic1 bringing to view one of its useful and appropriate functions2 while eristic designates only a peculiar mode of conducting the process1 the essential feature of which is that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations4 ,still less ought ,sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species2 since it involves no intrinsic or intellectual differentia1 but connotes only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the ,sophist1 who is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of pecuniary profit4#aj ,footnote #aj3 ,aristot4 ,rhetoric4 ,i4 i4 p4 #acee1 b4 #ag3 ,greek3 o7 gar sophistikos ou7k e7n t duna_/mei1 a7ll' e7n t proaire_/sei2--sophists men kata tn proai_/resin1 dialektikos d' ou7 kata tn proai_/resin a7lla kata tn du_/namin4 ,to the same purpose he speaks in ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 ii4 p4 #ajjd1 b4 #be1 distinguishing the ,sophist by his ,greek3 proai_/resis from the ,dialectician1 but recognizing that in point of ,greek3 du_/namis both are alike4 ,mr4 ,poste observes justly 7in ,transl4 of the ,soph4 ,el41 notes1 p4 #ii73--;,greek3 du_/namis1 capacity1 is in the intellect2 ,greek3 proai_/resis1 purpose1 in the will4 ,the antithesis between these terms may throw light on what ,aristotle conceived to be the relation between ,sophistic and ,dialectic4 4 4 ,the power plus the will to deceive is called ,sophistic2 the power without the will1 ,dialectic 7p4 #ajj74 ,while1 however1 we recognize as main logical distinctions only the two heads ,didactic and ,dialectic1 we note another way that ,aristotle has of bringing in what he calls ,sophistic as a variety of the latter4 ,both in ,didactic and ,dialectic 7he tells us7 the speakers enunciate and prove their propositions by ,syllogism2 the didactic syllogism is derived from the principia belonging specially to one particular science1 and proceeds from premisses that are true to conclusions that are true2 while the dialectic syllogism starts from probable premisses 7i4e41 accredited by the ordinary public or by a few wise men71 and marches in correct form to conclusions that are probable4 ,now1 corresponding to each of these two1 ,aristotle recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart4 ,to the didactic syllogism there corresponds the pseudographic syllogism or the paralogism3 which draws its premisses 7as the didactic syllogism does7 from the special matters of some given science1#aa yet which nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality2 either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form1 or because the matter of the premisses 7the major1 the minor1 or both7 is untrue4 ,to the dialectic syllogism in like manner1 there corresponds the eristic or sophistic syllogism3 which is a good syllogism in appearance1 but not in reality2 either because it is incorrect in form1 or because its premisses1 in respect of their matter1 appear to be probable without being really probable4#ab ,footnote #aa3 ,topic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #aja1 a4 #e-ae4 ,greek3 oi7 e7k tn peri_/ tinas e7pist_/mas oi7kei_/n gino_/menoi paralogismoi_/1 katha_/per e7pi ts gemetri_/as kai tn tau_/t suggenn sumbe_/bken e7_/chein2--e7k tn oi7kei_/n men t e7pist_/m lmma_/tn1 ou7k a7lthn de_/1 ton sullogismon poieitai4 ,footnote #ab3 ,ibid4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #ca-p4 #aja1 a4 #af2 ,soph4 ,el4 i4 p4 #afd1 a4 #bj-;b4 #ba4 ,one would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and the didactic syllogism1 was the same as that between the pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic2 so that1 if the pseudo-dialectic deserved to be called sophistic or eristic1 the pseudo-didactic would deserve these appellations also2 especially1 since the formal conditions of the syllogism are alike for both4 ,this ,aristotle does not admit1 but draws instead a remarkable distinction4 ,the ,sophist 7he says7 is a dishonest man1 making it his professional purpose to deceive2 the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always1 though sometimes mistaken4 ,so long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps within the limits belonging to its own special science1 it may be false1 since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science geometry1#ac but it cannot be sophistic or eristic2 yet1 whenever it transgresses those limits1 even though it be true and though it solves the problem proposed1 it deserves to be called by those two epithets4 ,thus1 there were two distinct methods proposed for the quadrature of the circle--one by ,hippokrates1 on geometrical principles1 the other by ,bryson1 upon principles extra-geometrical4 ,both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful2 yet that of ,hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic1 because he kept within the sphere of geometry2 while that of ,bryson was so1 because it travelled out of geometry4 ,nay more1 this last would have been equally sophistic and eristic1 and on the same ground1 even if it had succeeded in solving the problem4#ad ,if indeed the pseudo-graphic syllogism be invalid in form1 it must be considered as sophistic1 even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter2 but1 if it be correct in form and within these same limits1 then1 however untrue its premisses may be1 it is to be regarded as not sophistic or eristic4#ae ,footnote #ac3 ,topic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #acb1 a4 #cb4 ,footnote #ad3 ,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #ab-bj3 ,greek3 ta gar pseudograph_/mata ou7k e7ristika_/ 7kata gar ta u7po tn te_/chnn oi7 paralogismoi_/71 ou7de_/ g' ei7_/ ti_/ e7sti pseudogra_/phma peri a7lthe_/s1 oi7on to ,i7ppokra_/tous 7 o7 tetragnismos o7 dia tn mni_/skn4 a7ll' 7s ,bru_/sn e7tetrag_/nize ton ku_/klon1 ei7 kai tetragni_/zetai o7 ku_/klos1 a7ll' o7_/ti ou7 kata to pragma1 dia touto sophistiko_/s4 ,also p4 #agb1 a4 #a-h4 ,footnote #ae3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #ai-bj4 ,compare ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 dei de ton kals metabiba_/zonta dialektiks kai m e7ristiks metabiba_/zein1 katha_/per ton geme_/trn gemetriks1 a7_/n te pseudos a7_/n t' a7lthes 7 to sumperaino_/menon4 ,also ,topic4 ,,viii4 xii4 p4 #afb1 b4 #aj4 ,such is the test whereby ,aristotle distinguishes the sophistication of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process4 ,now this same test cannot be applied to ,dialectic1 which has no appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters1 but deals with ,omne ,scibile1 universally and indiscriminately4 ,aristotle therefore puts the analogy in another way4 ,both in ,didactic and in ,dialectic the ,sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the task which he undertakes2 these conditions being1 that in ,didactic he shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given science1--in ,dialectic1 to matters probable of whatever kind they may be4 ,transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and dishonest manoeuvre1 whether of teacher or questioner2 like breach of the regulations on the part of competitors1 bent on victory at all price1 in the ,olympic games4 ,aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a species1 under the name of ,sophistic or ,eristic1 admitting of being analysed and defined2#af and his treatise on ,sophistical ,refutations is intended to describe and illustrate the ,loci belonging to it1 and contributing to its purpose4#ag ,footnote #af3 ,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #bb3 ,greek3 7_/sper gar 7 e7n a7gni a7diki_/a ei7do_/s ti e7_/chei kai e7_/stin a7dikomachi_/a tis1 ou7_/ts e7n a7ntilogi_/a a7dikomachi_/a 7 e7ristik_/ e7stin2 e7kei te gar oi7 pa_/nts nikan proairou_/menoi pa_/ntn a7_/ptontai1 kai e7ntautha oi7 e7ristikoi_/4 ,footnote #ag3 ,soph4 ,el4 ix4 p4 #agj1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 dlon ou7n o7_/ti ou7 pa_/ntn tn e7_/legchn a7lla tn para tn dialektikn lpte_/on tous to_/pous4 ,fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to dishonesty of purpose 7either contentious or profit-seeking7 and being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate1 we have to see by what characteristic ,aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses from fair and admissible premisses4 ,dialectic 7he tells us7 has for its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few4 ,but 7he goes on to say7 not everything which appears probable is really probable4 ,nothing that is really probable is a mere superficial fancy2 wherever this last is the case1 the probabilia are apparent only and not real2 they have the character of falsehood stamped upon them1 so as to be immediately manifest and obvious1 even to persons of very narrow intelligence4 ,it is such apparent probabilia as these1 which make up the premisses of eristic or sophistic discourse1 and upon which the sophistical or fallacious refutations turn4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,topic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 e7ristikos d' e7_/sti sullogismos o7 e7k phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn m o7_/ntn de_/1 kai o7 e7x e7ndo_/xn 7 phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn phaino_/menos4 ou7 gar pan to phaino_/menon e7_/ndoxon1 kai e7_/stin e7_/ndoxon4 ou7then gar tn legome_/nn e7ndo_/xn e7pipo_/laion e7_/chei pantels tn phantasi_/an1 katha_/per peri tas tn e7ristikn lo_/gn a7rchas sumbe_/bken e7_/chein2 parachrma gar kai 7s e7pi to polu_/ tois kai mikra sunoran duname_/nois kata_/dlos e7n au7tois 7 tou pseu_/dous e7sti phu_/sis4 ,compare ,soph4 ,el4 ii4 p4 #afe1 b4 #g4 ,aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between ,dialectic on the one hand1 and ,eristic or ,sophistic on the other2 and he treats the whole important doctrine of ,logical ,fallacies as coming under this latter department4 ,the distinction that he draws between them is two-fold3 first as to purpose1 next as to subject-matter4 ,on the part of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose of victory at all cost1 or for profit2 and probabilities merely apparent--such as any one may see not to be real probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms4 ,now1 as to the distinction of purpose1 we may put aside the idea of profit as having no essential connection with the question4 ,it is quite possible to suppose the fair ,dialectician1 not less than the ,sophist1 as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward2 while the eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even in well-conducted debate1 in order that the appropriate stimulus and benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized4 ,but1 if the distinction of purpose and procedure1 between the ,dialectician and the ,sophist1 is thus undefined and unsatisfactory1 still more unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter4 ,to discriminate between what is really probable 7i4e41 accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few71 and what is only probable in appearance and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty4 ,the explanation given by ,aristotle himself#ai--when he describes the apparently probable as that which has only superficial show1 and which the most ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the more gross and obvious fallacies1 but leaves out all the rest4 ,nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption1 in regard to fallacies generally1 that the appearance of probability is too faint to impose upon any ordinary man4 ,if all fallacies could be supposed to come under this definition1 the theory of ,fallacies would undoubtedly be worthless 7as ,mr4 ,poste suggests that it is1 in the ,preface to his translation of the ,sophistici ,elenchi72 and the most dishonest ,sophist would at any rate be harmless4 ,but1 in fact1 ,aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning of the ,sophistici ,elenchi2 for he there treats the sophistic syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible enough to impose upon many persons1 and to be difficult of detection2 like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver1 and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger than they really are4#bj ,here we have the eristic or sophistic syllogism presented as fallacious1 yet as very likely to be mistaken for truth1 by unprepared auditors1 unless warning and precaution be applied2 not 7as it was set forth in the definition above cited7 as bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood1 recognizable even by the vulgar4 ,at the time when ,aristotle constructed that definition1 he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of dialectical questions as ,plato 7in the dialogue ,euthydmus7 puts into the mouth of the ,sophists ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus4 ,and1 since ,aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest purposes1 and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest debaters1 he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept as true3 the ,sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but as a fool4 ,footnote #ai3 ,topic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #bd1 seq4 ,footnote #bj3 ,soph4 ,el4 i4 p4 #afd1 a4 #bc-;b4 #bg4 ,greek3 ton au7ton de tro_/pon kai sullogismos kai e7_/legchos o7 men e7_/stin1 o7 d' ou7k e7_/sti me_/n1 phai_/netai de dia tn a7peiri_/an2 oi7 gar a7_/peiroi 7_/sper a7n a7pe_/chontes po_/r7r7then therousin4 ,i think it a mistake on the part of ,aristotle to treat the fallacies incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by ,sophists and litigants2 and as if they would never show themselves1 assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out argumentative consequences4 ,it is true that1 if there are infirmities incident to the human intellect1 a dishonest disputant will be likely to take advantage of them4 ,so far it may be well to note his presence4 ,but the dishonest disputant does not originate these infirmities3 he finds them already existing1 and manifested undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate1 but even in ordinary discourse4 ,it is the business of those who theorize on the intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the ,fallacies as liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general1 honest or dishonest1 with a view to precaution against their occurrence1 or correction if they do occur2 not to present them as inventions of a class of professional cheats1#ba or as tares sown by the enemy in a field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat4 ,footnote #ba3 ,soph4 ,el4 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ai1 seq4 ,in point of fact the actual classification of ,fallacies given by ,aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to expect4 ,though he entitles them ,sophistical ,refutations1 describing them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by professional ,sophists for gain1 or by unprincipled litigants for victory1 yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection1 and as an essential portion of the theory of ,dialectic generally4#bb ,the various general heads under which he distributes them are each characterized by intellectual or logical marks4 ,footnote #bb3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #agb1 b4 #g4 ,his first and most general observation is1 that language is the usual medium and instrument through which fallacies are operated4#bc ,names and propositions are of necessity limited in number2 but things named or nameable are innumerable2 hence it happens inevitably that the same name or the same proposition must have several different meanings4 ,since we cannot talk of things except by means of their names1 the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant source of false conclusions4#bd ,footnote #bc3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #e4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 ta men gar o7no_/mata pepe_/rantai kai to tn lo_/gn plthos1 ta de pra_/gmata ton a7rithmon a7_/peira_/ e7stin4 a7nagkaion ou7n plei_/ ton au7ton lo_/gon kai tou7_/noma to e7n smai_/nein4 ,in dialectical procedure1 the ,sophist and the litigious debater aim at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends3--7#a7 ,to refute1 or obtain the false appearance of refuting1 the thesis2 7#b7 ,to catch1 or appear to catch1 the opponent in affirming something false or contradictory2 7#c7 ,or in affirming something paradoxical2 7#d7 ,or in uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech2 7#e7 ,or in tautological repetition4 ,the first of these five ends is what the ,sophist most desires2 where that cannot be had1 then1 as secondary purposes1 the succeeding four1 in the order in which they are enumerated4#be ,footnote #be3 ,soph4 ,el4 iii4 p4 #afe1 b4 #ab-bb4 ,the syllogism whereby the ,sophist appears to refute without really refuting1 is either faulty in form1 or untrue in matter1 or irrelevant to the purpose4 ,the ,fallacies that he employs to bring about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various1 and may be distributed first under two great divisions3-- ,i4 ,fallaci ,dictionis4 ,,ii4 ,fallaci ,extra ,dictionem4 ,i4 ,the first division--,fallaci ,dictionis--includes all those cases wherein1 under the same terms or propositions1 more than one meaning is expressed4 ,six heads may be distinguished3-- #a4 ,homonymy 7,equivocation73 where the double meaning resides in one single term--noun or verb4 #b4 ,amphiboly3 where the double meaning resides1 not in a single word but1 in a combination of words--proposition1 phrase1 or sentence4 #c4 ,conjunction 7hardly distinguishable from that immediately preceding--,amphiboly74 #d4 ,disjunction3 where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true disjunctively1 or the reverse4 7,e4g41 ,five are two and three2 but you cannot say1 ,five are even and odd4 ,the greater is equal and something besides2 but you cannot say1 ,the greater is equal47 #e4 ,accentuation3 where the same word differently accentuated has a different meaning4 #f4 ,figura ,dictionis3 where two words1 from being analogous in form1 structure1 or conjugation1 are erroneously supposed to be analogous in meaning also4#bf ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #afe1 b4 #bc-p4 #aff1 b4 #ai4 ,such are the six heads of ,fallaci ,dictionis--,fallacies or ,paralogisms arising from words as such1 or something directly appertaining to them4 ,,ii4 ,under the second division--,fallacies or ,paralogisms ,extra ,dictionem--there are seven heads3 #a4 ,fallacia ,accidentis4 #b4 ,fallacia a dicto ,secundum ,quid ad dictum ,simpliciter4 #c4 ,ignoratio ,elenchi4 #d4 ,fallacia ,consequentis #e4 ,petitio ,principii4 #f4 ,non ,causa pro ,caus4 #g4 ,fallacia ,plurium ,interrogationum4#bg ,footnote #bg3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #aff1 b4 #bj-bg4 #a4 ,the first of these varieties1 called ,fallacia ,accidentis1 arises when a syllogism is made to conclude that1 because a given predicate may be truly affirmed of a given subject1 the same predicate may also be truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject3 as when ,koriskus is denied to be a man1 because he is not ,sokrates1 who is a man2 or is denied to be ,koriskus1 because he is a man1 while a man is not ,koriskus4 ,in the title given to this general head of ,fallacy1#bh we must understand ,accident1 not in its special logical sense as opposed to ,essence1 but in a far larger sense1 including both ,genus when predicated separately from ,differentia1 and ,differentia when predicated separately from ,genus2 including1 in fact1 every thing which is distinguishable from the subject in any way1 and at the same time predicable of it--every thing except the ,definition1 which conjoins ,genus and ,differentia together1 and is thus identical and convertible with the definitum4 ,footnote #bh3 ,ibid4 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 oi7 para to sumbebkos paralogismoi_/4 ,every man is an animal2 but1 because a predicate is true of the subject man1 you cannot infer that the same predicate is true of the subject animal4 ,this title comprehends within its range another1 which is presently announced as distinct and separate--,fallacia ,consequentis4 #b4 ,the second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed with qualification or limitation in the premisses1 but is affirmed without qualification1 simply and absolutely1 in the conclusion4 ,the ,ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin2 therefore1 he is both white and not white--both white and black4 ,in this example the fallacy is obvious1 and can hardly escape any one2 but there are many other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous1 and in which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or refuse a question simply and absolutely4#bi ,one example given by ,aristotle deserves notice on its own account3 ,non-,ens est opinabile1 therefore ,non-,ens est2 or1 again1 ,ens non est homo1 therefore1 ,ens non est4 ,this is one among ,aristotle's ways of bringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double function of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication1 and to predicate existence4#cj ,he regards the confusion between these two functions as an example of the ,fallacy now before us--of passing a dicto ,secundum ,quid ad dictum ,simpliciter4#ca ,footnote #bi3 ,ibid4 b4 #cg1 seq4 ,greek3 o7_/tan to e7n me_/rei lego_/menon 7s a7pls ei7rme_/non lphth--to de toiouton e7p' e7ni_/n men panti thersai r7a_/dion--e7p' e7ni_/n de lantha_/nei polla_/kis4 ,footnote #cj3 ,the same double or multiple meaning of ,est is discriminated by ,aristotle in the ,metaphysica1 but in a different way--,greek3 to o7n 7s a7lthe_/s1 kai to m o7n 7s pseudos--,greek3 ,d4 vii4 p4 #ajag1 a4 #ca2 ,e4 iv4 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #ah-cf4 ,bonitz 7ad4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 iv4 p4 #caj7 says3--,quid quod etiam illud esse huc refert1 quo non existentiam significamus1 sed predicati cum subjecto conjunctionem4 ,aristotle is even more precise than modern logicians in analysing the different meanings of ,greek3 to o7_/n3 he distinguishes four of them4 ,footnote #ca3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #afg1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 oi7on ei7 to m o7_/n e7sti doxasto_/n1 o7_/ti to m o7n e7_/stin2 ou7 gar tau7ton ei7nai te_/ ti kai ei7nai a7pls4 ,compare ,metaphys4 ,z4 iv4 p4 #ajcj1 a4 #be1 and ,de ,interpretatione1 p4 #ba1 a4 #be-cd3 ,greek3 7_/sper ,o7_/mro_/s e7sti_/ ti1 oi7on poit_/s2 a7r' ou7n kai e7_/stin1 7 ou7_/8 kata sumbebkos gar katgoreitai tou ,o7m_/rou to e7_/stin2 o7_/ti gar poit_/s e7stin1 a7ll' ou7 kath' au7to_/1 katgoreitai kata tou ,o7m_/rou to e7_/stin4 ,it is clear from the above passages that ,aristotle was thoroughly aware of the logical fact which ,hobbes1 ,james ,mill1 and ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 have more fully brought out and illustrated1 as the confusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb4 ,many excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the ',system of ,logic1' by ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill 7,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 s4 #a72 also in the ',analysis of the ,human ,mind1' by ,james ,mill1 especially in the recent edition of that work1 containing the explanatory notes by ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill and ,dr4 ,findlater 7,vol4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 p4 #agd1 seq474 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 however1 speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having escaped the notice of ,aristotle1 and as having been brought to light only by or since ,hobbes4 ,he says 7in a note on the ',analysis1' p4 #ahc73--;,as in the case of many other luminous thoughts1 an approach is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers4 ,hobbes1 though he did not reach it1 came very close to it2 and it was still more distinctly anticipated by ,laromiguire1 though without any sufficient perception of its value 4 4 4 in the following words3--',quand on dit1 l'tre est1 c41 le mot est1 ou le verbe1 n'exprime pas la mme chose que le mot tre1 sujet de la dfinition4 ,si j'nonce la proposition suivante3 ,dieu est existant1 je ne voudrais pas dire assurment1 ,dieu existe existant3 cela ne ferait pas un sens3 de mme1 si je dis que ,virgile est pote1 je ne veux pas donner entendre que ,virgile existe4 ,le verbe est dans la proposition n'exprime dont pas l'existence relle2 il n'exprime qu'un rapport spcial entre le sujet et l'attribut1 c4' ,the passages above cited from ,aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as ,laromiguire1 but even illustrated it by the same example 7,homer instead of ,virgil74 ,i shall in another place state more fully the views of ,aristotle respecting ,existence4 #c4 ,the third of these heads of ,fallacy--,ignoratio ,elenchi--is1 when the speaker1 professing to contradict the thesis1 advances another proposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in reality1 because he does not know what are the true and sufficient conditions of a valid ,elenchus4 ,in order to be valid1 it must be real1 not merely verbal2 it must be proved by good syllogistic premisses1 without any ,petitio ,principii2 and it must deny the same matter1 in the same relations1 and at the same time1 as that which the thesis affirmed4 ,thus1 it is no contradiction to affirm and deny doubleness of the same body2 both affirmation and denial may be true1 if you take the comparison against different numbers or different bodies1 or at different times4 ,sometimes persons neglect some of these conditions1 and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis1 when they have not3 this is ,ignoratio ,elenchi4#cb 7,if the thesis be an affirmative universal1 it is sufficient contradiction if you prove a negative particular against it47 ,footnote #cb3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #afg1 a4 #ba-ce3 ,greek3 oi7 de para to m diri_/sthai ti_/ e7sti sullogismos 7 ti_/ e7_/legchos1 a7lla para tn e7_/lleipsin gi_/nontai tou lo_/gou4 ,we may remark1 by the way1 that it is not very consistent in ,aristotle to recognize one general head of ,sophistical ,refutation called ,ignoratio ,elenchi1 after the definition that he has given of the ,sophist at the beginning of this treatise4 ,he had told us that the ,sophist was a dishonest man1 who made it his profession to study and practise these tricks1 for the purpose of making himself pass for a clever man1 and of getting money4 ,according to this definition1 there is no ,ignoratio ,elenchi in the ,sophist1 though there may be in the person who supposes himself refuted4 ,the ,sophist is assumed to know what he is about1 and to be aware that his argument is a fallacious one4 #d4 ,the fourth head includes what are called ,fallaci ,consequentis3 when a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a categorical proposition affirmative and universal1 thinking that it may be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of the predicate2 or when1 in an hypothetical proposition1 he inverts the relation between antecedent and consequent1 arguing that1 because the consequent is true1 the antecedent must for that reason be true also4 ,honey is of yellow colour2 you see a yellow substance1 and you infer for that reason that it must be honey4 ,thieves generally walk out by night2 you find a man walking out by night1 and you infer that he must be a thief4 ,these are inferences from ,signs1 opinions founded on facts of sense1 such as are usually employed in ,rhetoric2 often or usually true1 but not necessarily or universally true1 and therefore fallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism4#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #afg1 b4 #a-ah4 ,this head 7,fallacia ,consequentis7 is not essentially distinguishable from the first 7,fallacia ,accidentis71 being nothing more than a peculiar species or variety thereof1 as ,aristotle himself admits a little farther on--vi4 p4 #afh1 a4 #bf2 vii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #g2 viii4 p4 #agj1 a4 #c4 ,compare also xxviii4 p4 #aha1 a4 #be4 #e4 ,the fifth head is that of ,petitio ,principii3 a man sometimes assumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be proved1 without being aware of the identity4#cd ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #afg1 a4 #ch3 ,greek3 dia to m du_/nasthai sunoran to tau7ton kai to e7_/teron4 #f4 ,the sixth head of ,fallacy--,non ,causa pro ,caus--is1 when we mistake for a cause that which is not really a cause2 or1 to drop the misleading word cause1 and to adopt the clearer terms in which this same fallacy is announced in the ,analytica ,priora#ce--,non per ,hoc--,non propter ,hoc1 it arises when we put forward1 as an essential premiss of a given conclusion1 something that is not really an essential premiss thereof4 ,when you intend to refute a given thesis by showing1 that1 if admitted1 it leads to impossible or absurd conclusions1 you must enunciate that thesis itself among the premisses that lead to such absurdities4#cf ,but1 though enunciated in this place1 it may often happen that the thesis may be an unnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and essential3 and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently proved1 even though the thesis were omitted4 ,still1 since the thesis is declared along with the rest1 it will appear falsely to be a part of the real proof4 ,it will often appear so even to yourself the questioner2 you not detecting the fallacy4#cg ,under such circumstances the respondent meets you by ,non propter ,hoc4 ,he admits your conclusion to be impossible1 and at the same time to be duly proved1 but he shows you that it is proved by evidence independent of his thesis1 and not by reason or means of his thesis4 ,accordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself1 but not good for the purpose which you aimed at2#ch viz41 to refute the thesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences4 ,you will fail1 even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a proposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of intermediate propositions1 each of them having one common term with the next4 ,much more will you fail1 if your impossible consequence is quite foreign and unconnected with the thesis2 as we sometimes find in ,dialectic4 ,footnote #ce3 ,ibid4 b4 #ba2 vii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #ac4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,,ii4 xvii4 p4 #fe4 ,in commenting on the above chapter of the ,analytica ,priora1 ,i have already remarked 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #beh1 note7 how much better is the designation there given of the present fallacy--,non per ,hoc 7,greek3 ou7 para tn the_/sin to pseudos7--than the designation here given of the same fallacy--,non ,causa pro ,caus4 ,aristotle is speaking of a syllogistic process1 consisting of premisses and a conclusion2 the premisses being the reasons or grounds of the conclusion1 not the cause thereof1 as that term is commonly understood4 ,the term cause is one used in so many different senses that we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it4 ,see ,whately's remarks on this subject1 ,bk4 iii4 ,sect4 #ad1 of his ,logic3 also his ,appendix ,i4 to that work1 under article ,reason4 ,footnote #cf3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #afg1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 e7an ou7n e7gkatarithm_/th e7n tois a7nagkai_/ois e7rt_/masi pros to sumbainon a7du_/naton1 do_/xei para touto gi_/nesthai polla_/kis o7 e7_/legchos4 ,footnote #cg3 ,ibid4 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 kai lantha_/nei polla_/kis ou7ch 7tton au7tous tous e7rtntas to toiouton4 ,footnote #ch3 ,ibid4 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 a7sullo_/gistoi men ou7n a7pls ou7k ei7sin oi7 toioutoi lo_/goi1 pros de to prokei_/menon a7sullo_/gistoi4 #g4 ,the seventh and last of these heads of ,fallacy is1 when the questioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words1 as if they were one--,fallacia ,plurium ,interrogationum ut ,unius4 ,in well-conducted ,dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either ,yes or ,no to the question put2 or1 if it was put in the form of an alternative1 he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative4 ,under such conditions he could not reply to one of these double-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself4 ,are the earth and the sea liquid8 ,is the heaven or the earth sea8 ,the questions are improperly put1 and neither admits of any one correct answer4 ,you ought to confine yourself to one question at a time1 with one subject and one predicate1 making what is properly understood by one single proposition4 ,the two questions here stated as examples ought properly to be put as four4#ci ,footnote #ci3 ,ibid4 b4 #ch-p4 #afh1 a4 #af2 vi4 p4 #afi1 a4 #f-ab4 ,greek3 7 gar pro_/tasi_/s e7stin e7n kath' e7no_/s4--ei7 ou7n mi_/a pro_/tasis 7 e7n kath' e7nos a7xiousa1 kai a7pls e7_/stai pro_/tasis 7 toiau_/t e7r_/tsis4 ,the examples given of this fallacy by ,aristotle are so palpable--the expounder of every fallacy must make it clear by giving examples that every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine that no one can be imposed on by it4 ,but ,aristotle himself remarks1 very justly1 that there occur many cases in which we do not readily see whether one question only1 or more than one1 is involved2 and in which one answer is made1 though two questions are concerned4 ,to set out distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most essential precautions for ensuring correct decision4 ,the importance of such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed by ,descartes in his ,discours de la ,mthode4 ,the present case comes under ,mr4 ,mill's ,fallacies of ,confusion4 ,aristotle has thus distinguished and classified ,fallacies under thirteen distinct heads in all--six ,in ,dictione1 and seven ,extra ,dictionem2 among which last one is ,ignoratio ,elenchi4 ,he now proceeds to show that1 in another way of looking at the matter1 all the ,fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads1 may be shown to be reducible to this single one--,ignoratio ,elenchi4 ,every ,fallacy1 whatever it be1 transgresses or fails to satisfy1 in some way or other1 the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid ,elenchus1#dj or a valid ,syllogism4 ,for a true ,elenchus is only one mode of a true ,syllogism2 namely1 that of which the conclusion is contradictory to some given thesis or proposition4#da ,with this particular added1 the definition of a valid ,syllogism will also be the definition of a good ,elenchus4 ,and thus ,ignoratio ,elenchi--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good ,elenchus--understood in its largest meaning1 is rather a characteristic common to all varieties of ,fallacy1 than one variety among others4#db ,footnote #dj3 ,soph4 ,el4 vi4 p4 #afh1 a4 #ai3 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar a7_/pantas a7nalusai tous lechthe_/ntas tro_/pous ei7s ton tou e7le_/gchou diorismo_/n4 ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 a4 #ce4 ,footnote #db3 ,ibid4 p4 #afi1 b4 #ae4 ,in regard to two among the thirteen heads--,fallacia ,accidentis and ,fallacia ,consequentis 7which however ought properly to rank as only one head1 since the second is merely a particular variety of the first7--,aristotle's observations are remarkable4 ,after having pointed out that a ,syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or conclusive 7thus showing that it involves ,ignoratio ,elenchi71 he affirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it1 and conceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent urging against them such an inconclusive syllogism4 ,to take an example3--,every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles2 every triangle is a figure2 therefore1 every figure has its three angles equal to two right angles4#dc ,here we have an invalid syllogism2 for it is in the ,third figure1 and sins against the conditions of that figure1 by exhibiting an universal affirmative conclusion3 it is a syllogism properly concluding in ,darapti1 but with conclusion improperly generalized4 ,yet ,aristotle intimates that a scientific geometer of his day1 in argument with an unscientific opponent1 would admit the conclusion to be well proved1 not knowing how to point out where the fallacy lay3 he would1 if asked1 grant the premisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism2 and1 even if not asked1 would suppose that he had already granted them1 or that they ought to be granted4#dd ,footnote #dc3 ,ibid4 p4 #afh1 a4 #dj3 ,greek3 ou7d' ei7 to tri_/gnon duoin o7rthain i7_/sas e7_/chei1 sumbe_/bke d' au7t sch_/mati ei7nai 7 pr_/t 7 a7rch1 o7_/ti schma 7 a7rch 7 prton touto4 ,here we have ,figure reckoned as an accident of ,triangle4 ,this is a specimen of ,aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word ,greek3 sumbebko_/s4 ,he commonly uses it as contrasted with essential1 of which last term ,mr4 ,poste says very justly 7notes1 p4 #abi73--,to complete the statement of ,aristotle's view1 it should be added1 that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot be defined without naming the subject1 or whose subject cannot be defined without naming the predicate4 ,now figure is the genus to which triangle belongs1 and triangle cannot be defined without naming its genus figure4 ,but to include ,genus as a predicable under the head of ,greek3 sumbebko_/sor ,accident1 is in marked opposition to ,aristotle's own doctrine elsewhere3 see ,topic4 ,i4 v4 p4 #ajb1 b4 #d2 iv4 p4 #aja1 b4 #ag2 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #i2 ,metaphys4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #cb4 ,it is a misfortune that ,aristotle gave to this general head of ,fallacy the misleading title of ,fallacia ,accidentia--,greek3 para to sumbebko_/s4 ,when he gave this title1 he probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates in ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #aff1 b4 #cb4 ,throughout the ,topica and elsewhere1 ,genus is distinguished pointedly from ,greek3 sumbebko_/s1 though examples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected4 ,the two ,fallacies called ,accidentis and ,consequentis1 would both be more properly ranked under one common logical title--,supposed convertibility or interchangeableness between ,subject and ,predicate--,greek3 ei7 to_/de a7po toude m chri_/zetai1 md' a7po thate_/rou chri_/zesthai tha_/teron 7vii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #h74 ,footnote #dd3 ,soph4 ,el4 vi4 p4 #afh1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 a7lla para touto kai oi7 technitai kai o7_/ls oi7 e7pist_/mones u7po tn a7nepistmo_/nn e7le_/gchontai2 kata sumbebkos gar poiountai tous sullogismous pros tous ei7do_/tas2 oi7 d' ou7 duna_/menoi diairein 7 e7rt_/menoi dido_/asin 7 ou7 do_/ntes oi7_/ontai dedke_/nai4 ,the passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp of the scientific men contemporary with ,aristotle4 ,most of them were prepared to admit fallacious inferences 7such as the above7 which assumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate4 ,they had paid little or no attention to the logical relations between one proposition and another1 and between the two different terms of the same proposition4 ,the differences of essential from accidental predication1 and of each among the five ,predicables from the others1 must have been practically familiar to them1 as to others1 from the habit of correct speaking in detail2 but they had not been called upon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory1 nor to understand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of their argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results4 ,and1 if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical fallacies1 we may be sure that this must have been still more the case with unscientific men1 of ordinary intelligence and education4 ,aristotle tells us here1 in more than one passage1 how widespread such illogical tendencies were3 to fancy that two subjects which had one predicate the same must be the same with each other in all respects2#de to understand each predicate applied to a subject as being itself an independent subject1 implying a new ,hoc ,aliquid or ,unum2#df to treat the universal1 not as a common epithet but1 as a substantive and singular apart2#dg to use equivocal words or phrases1 even the most wide and vague1 without any attempt to discriminate their various meanings4#dh ,such insensibility to the conditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men and among the men of special science4 ,a geometer would be imposed upon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph1 which1 as being founded on the ,fallacia ,accidentia 7or interchangeability of subject and predicate71 ,aristotle numbers among ,sophistical ,refutations4 ,such a refutation1 however1 even when successful1 would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in knowledge of his own science2#di for it would puzzle the really scientific man as well as the pretender4 ,footnote #de3 ,soph4 ,el4 vi4 p4 #afh1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 ta gar e7ni tau7ta_/1 kai a7ll_/lois a7xioumen ei7nai tau7ta_/4--vii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 e7_/ti kai e7pi polln phai_/netai kai a7xioutai ou7_/ts1 ei7 to_/de a7po toude m chri_/zetai1 md' a7po thate_/rou chri_/zesthai tha_/teron4 ,footnote #df3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #afi1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 o7_/ti pan to katgorou_/meno_/n tinos u7polamba_/nomen to_/de ti kai 7s e7n u7pakou_/omen2 t gar e7ni kai t ou7si_/a ma_/lista dokei pare_/pesthai to to_/de ti kai to o7_/n4 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 xxii4 p4 #agh1 b4 #cg-p4 #agi1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #afi1 a4 #bb4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 oi7 de sophistikoi e7_/legchoi1 a7n kai sullogi_/zntai tn a7nti_/phasin1 ou7 poiousi dlon ei7 a7gnoei2 kai gar ton ei7do_/ta e7mpodi_/zousi tou_/tois tois lo_/gois4 ,compare vi4 p4 #afh1 b4 #f4 ,we must always recollect that ,aristotle was the first author who studied the logical relations between ,terms and ,propositions1 with a view to theory and to general rules founded thereupon4 ,the distinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties2 even the simplest rules1 such as those relating to the ,conversion of propositions1 or to ,contraries and ,contradictories1 had never been stated in general terms before4 ,up to a certain point1 indeed1 acquired habit1 even without these generalities1 would doubtless lead to correct speech and reasoning2 yet liable to be perverted in many cases by erroneous tendencies1 requiring to be indicated and guarded against by a logician4 ,when we are told that even a professed geometer was imposed upon by these fallacies1 we learn at once how deep-seated were such illogical deficiencies1 how useful was ,aristotle's theoretical study in marking them out1 and how insufficient was his classification when he described the ,fallacies as obvious frauds1 broached only by dishonest professional ,sophists4 ,as he himself states1 the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling difference2 having its root in the imperfection of language and in our frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical distinctions4#ej ,footnote #ej3 ,soph4 ,el4 vii4 p4 #afi1 b4 #ad3 ,greek3 e7n a7_/pasi gar 7 a7pa_/t dia to para mikro_/n2 ou7 gar diakriboumen ou7_/te ts prota_/ses ou7_/te tou sullogismou ton o7_/ron dia tn ei7rme_/nn ai7ti_/an4 ,compare v4 p4 #afg1 a4 #e-ad2 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #f-ai4 ,under one or other1 then1 of the thirteen general heads above enumerated1 all ,paralogisms must be included--merely apparent syllogisms1 or refutations1 which are not real and valid2#ea and all of them designated by ,aristotle as sophistic or eristic4 ,besides these1 moreover1 he includes1 as we saw1 under the same designation1 syllogisms or refutations valid in form1 and true as to conclusion1 yet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate2 i4e41 not suited to ,dialectic4 ,now1 here it is that difficulty arises4 ,dialectic and ,rhetoric are carefully distinguished by ,aristotle from all the special sciences 7such as ,geometry1 ,astronomy1 ,medicine1 c472 and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative dicta1 current beliefs1 and matters of opinion1 together with all the most general maxims and hypotheses of ,ontology and ,metaphysics1 of ,physics and ,ethics1 and the common ,axioms assumed in all the sciences1 as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each4 ,construed in this way1 we might imagine that the subject-matter of ,dialectic was all-comprehensive1 and that every thing without exception belonged to it1 except the specialties of ,geometry and of the other sciences2 and such is the usual language of ,aristotle4 ,yet in the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish another classification1 and to part off ,dialectic from a certain other science or art which he acknowledges under the title of ,sophistic or ,eristic4#eb ,elsewhere he describes ,sophistic as occupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions2 and this characteristic feature parts it off from ,demonstration and ,science4 ,but there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off from ,dialectic4 ,where are we to find a clear line of distinction between the matter of dialectic debate 7gymnastic or testing7 on the one hand1 and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious1 on the other8 ,at the beginning of the ,topica ,aristotle assigned1 as the distinction1 that the ,dialectician argues upon premisses really probable1 while the litigious ,sophist takes up premisses which are probable in appearance only1 and not in reality2 such apparent probabilia 7he goes on to say7 having only the most superficial semblance of truth1 and being seen immediately to be manifest falsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence4#ec ,but ,i have already pointed out that this description of apparent probabilia1 if considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally1 is both untenable in itself1 and contradicted by ,aristotle himself elsewhere4 ,the truth is1 that there is no clear distinction between the matter of ,dialectic and the matter of ,sophistic4 ,and so1 indeed1 ,aristotle must be understood to admit1 when he falls back upon an alleged distinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and the other4 ,the litigious man 7he tells us7 is bent upon nothing but victory in debate1 per fas et nefas3 the ,sophist aims at passing himself off falsely for a wise or clever man1 and making money thereby4#ed ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #agj1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #eb3 ,metaphys4 ,k4 viii4 p4 #ajfd1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 touto de 7to sumbebko_/s7 ou7demi_/a ztei tn o7mologoume_/ns ou7sn e7pistmn1 pln 7 sophistik_/2 peri to sumbebkos gar au7_/t mo_/n pragmateu_/etai4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #aj4 ,footnote #ec3 ,topic4 ,i1 i4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 ou7 gar pan to phaino_/menon e7_/ndoxon kai e7_/stin e7_/ndoxon4 ou7then gar tn legome_/nn e7_/ndoxn e7pipo_/laion e7_/chei pantels tn phantasi_/an1 katha_/per peri tas tn e7ristikn lo_/gn a7rchas sumbe_/bken e7_/chein2 parachrma gar kai 7s e7pi to polu tois kai mikra sunoran duname_/nois kata_/dlos e7n au7tois 7 tou pseudous e7sti phu_/sis4 ,it is by reference to this distinction between ,greek3 e7_/ndoxa which are genuine and ,greek3 e7_/ndoxa which are only such in appearance that the ,scholiast 7p4 #cjf1 b4 #dj7 explains the meaning of ,aristotle in the eleventh chapter of ,sophistici ,elenchi3 ,greek3 o7 men ou7n kata to pragma thern ta koina dialektiko_/s1 o7 de touto phainome_/ns poin sophistiko_/s 7p4 #aga1 b4 #f-bj74 ,i confess that ,i attach no distinct meaning to the words ,greek3 kata to pragma thern ta koina1 which characterizes the ,dialectician as contrasted with the ,sophist2 nor can ,i learn much from the notes either of ,waitz1 or of ,mr4 ,poste 7p4 #abi1 seq47 on the passage4 ,take for example the last half of the ,parmenides of ,plato1 or ,book ,b4 of the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle4 ,are we to say that in these two compositions ,plato and ,aristotle speculate on to ,greek3 ta koina kata to pragma1 or that they do so only in appearance8 ,footnote #ed3 ,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #be-ce2 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ba-ca4 ,now1 in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by ,aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or sophistic disputant1 we see at once1 as was before suggested1 that it lies apart from the critical estimate of art1 science1 or philosophy2 and that it belongs1 so far as it is well founded1 to the estimate of individuals ethically and politically1 as worthy men or patriotic citizens4 ,whether ,euripides or ,sophokles composed finer tragedies 7as we find argued in the ,ran of ,aristophanes71 must be decided by examining the tragedies themselves1 not by enquiring whether one of them was vain and greedy of money1 the other free from these blemishes4 ,a theorist who is laying down general principles of ,rhetoric1 and illustrating them by the study of schines and ,demosthenes1 will appreciate the oration against ,ktesiphon and the oration ,de ,coron in their character of compositions intended for a particular purpose4 ,for ,rhetoric it is of no moment whether schines was venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot2 this is an enquiry important indeed1 but belonging to the historian and not to the rhetorical theorist4 ,whether ,aristotle was or was not guided1 in his animadversions on ,plato1 by an unworthy and captious jealousy of his master1 is an interesting question in reference to his character2 but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed upon an examination1 not of his motives but1 of his doctrines and reasonings as we find them4 ,a good argument is not deprived of its force when enunciated by a knave1 nor is a bad argument rendered good because it proceeds from a virtuous man4 ,indeed1 so far as the character of the speaker counts at all1 in falsifying the fair logical estimate of an argument1 it operates in a direction opposite to that here indicated by ,aristotle4 ,the same argument in the mouth of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth2 in the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is worth4#ee ,to distribute arguments into two classes--those employed by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by honourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of ,logic4 ,footnote #ee3 ,eurip4 ,hecub4 #bic4 ,greek3 to d' a7xi_/ma1 ka7n kas le_/gs1 to son pei_/sei2 lo_/gos gar e7_/k t' a7doxou_/ntn i7n ka7k tn dokou_/ntn au7tos ou7 tau7ton sthe_/nei4 ,aristot4 ,rhetoric4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #acef1 a4 #e-ae4 ,as to the other part of the case 7if it is still necessary to recur to it71 touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical arguments1 the inconsistency of ,aristotle is most apparent4 ,in enumerating the ,sophistical ,refutations he tells us that these fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected1 but that they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading2 that an unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them1 and even a scientific hearer by some2 and that1 even where the fallacy does not actually deceive1 the proper mode of meeting and exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in ,dialectic4#ef ,that ,fallacies ,in ,dictione1 taken as a class 7though these are what he declares to be the most usual modus operandi of the sham dialecticians called ,sophists#eg71 often passed unperceived1 and were hard to solve and elucidate even when perceived--we know to have been his opinion2 for it is not only in the ,topica and ,sophistici ,elenchi1 but also in the ,metaphysica and other works1#eh that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one1 such as idem1 unum1 pulchrum1 bonum1 amare1 album1 acutum1 c41 which terms therefore1 when employed in argument1 were always liable to introduce a fallacy of ,equivocation or ,amphiboly4 ,he tells us the like in specifying the seven ,fallacies ,extra ,dictionem3 that they also were often unnoticed1 and required vigilant practice to see through and solve4 ,the description in detail1 therefore1 which ,aristotle gives 7in ,sophistici ,elenchi7 of the working process peculiar to the litigious ,sophist1 is completely at variance with the definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the commencement of the ,topica4 ,that definition is indeed suitable for the type-specimens which he and other logicians give to illustrate this or that class of ,fallacies3 the type-specimen produced must carry absurdity on the face of it1 so that the reader may at first sight recognize it as a fallacy2 and he may even find difficulty in believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling4 ,but1 though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately1 this definition fails in the essential character which ,aristotle postulates for a definition1 since it is quite untrue and unsuitable for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated4#ei ,aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute ,fallacies into classes1 such that1 while in each class there were certain specimens palpably stamped with the fallacious character1 there were also in each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily1 but required attentive consideration to detect it1 often indeed remaining undetected1 and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion4 ,this was one of his many great merits in regard to ,logic2 and the classification of ,fallacies 7modified as to details7 has passed to all subsequent logicians1 so that we find difficulty in understanding that the contemporaries of ,sokrates and ,plato had no idea of it4 ,but the value of his service to ,logic would be much lessened1 if all fallacies were sophistic syllogisms1 intended to deceive but never really deceiving1 corresponding to his definition at the beginning of the ,topica2 if 7as he tells us in the ,sophistici ,elenchi7 they were only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional knaves called ,sophists2 and if all non-sophistical dialecticians1 and all the world without1 could be trusted as speaking correctly by nature and as never falling into them4 ,footnote #ef3 ,soph4 ,el4 v4 p4 #afg1 a4 #e-ae1 b4 #e-ce4 ,greek3 kai lantha_/nei polla_/kis ou7ch 7tton au7tous tous e7rtntas to toiouton4--vii4 p4 #afi1 a4 #bb-cj1 b4 #h-ae3 ,greek3 e7n a7_/pasi gar 7 a7pa_/t dia to para mikro_/n4--xv4 p4 #age1 a4 #bj4 ,footnote #eg3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #b-bj4 ,footnote #eh3 ,topic4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #ajc1 a4 #f-ci2 p4 #ajf1 b4 #c-i2 p4 #ajg1 a4 #ab1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 polla_/kis de kai e7n au7tois tois lo_/gois lantha_/nei parakolouthoun to o7m_/numon4 ,cf4 ,topic4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #aaj1 b4 #cc2 ,v4 ii4 p4 #abi1 b4 #cj1 seq42 ,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 a4 #bc1 seq4 ,soph4 ,el4 x4 p4 #aga1 a4 #ag4 ,compare also ,book ,greek3 ,d4 of the ,metaphysica1 and the frequent recognition and analysis ,greek3 tn polla_/ks legome_/nn throughout the other ,books of the ,metaphysica4 ,footnote #ei3 ,topic4 ,,vi4 i4 p4 #aci1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 dei gar ton tou a7nthr_/pou o7rismon kata pantos a7nthr_/pou a7ltheu_/esthai4--,,vi4 x4 p4 #adh1 x4 p4 #adh1 b4 #b3 ,greek3 dei gar e7pi pan to sun_/numon e7pharmo_/ttein4 ,whoever reads the ,sixth ,book of the ,topica1 wherein ,aristotle indicates to the questioner ,loci for impugning a definition1 will see how little this definition of the ,sophistic ,syllogism will stand such attacks4 ,the appeal made by ,aristotle to a difference of character and motives as the distinction between the ,dialectician and the ,sophist is all the more misplaced1 because he himself lays down as the essential feature of ,dialectic generally1 that it is a match or contention between two rivals1 each anxious to obtain the victory4 ,it is like a match at chess between two expert players1 or a fencing-match between two celebrated masters at arms4 ,its very nature is to be an attack and defence1 in which each combatant resorts to stratagem1 and each outwits the other if he can4 ,whether the match is played for money or for nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less intense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure4 ,it is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should exert their full force1 the one in thrusting1 the other in parrying3 if they do not1 the purpose of ,dialectic1 which is the common business of both1 will not be attained4 ,that purpose is clearly declared by ,aristotle4 ,it is not didactic3 he distinguishes it expressly from teaching1#fj where one man who knows communicates such knowledge to an ignorant pupil4 ,it is gymnastic1 exercising the promptitude and invention of both parties2 or peirastic1 testing whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or notoriously false4#fa ,each party seeks1 not to help or enlighten but1 to puzzle and defeat the other4 ,as at chess or in fencing1 to mask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the work and to its purpose2 each expects it from the other1 and undertakes to meet and parry it4 ,the theses debated were always such that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the negative4 ,footnote #fj3 ,soph4 ,el4 ii4 p4 #afe1 b4 #a-e2 x4 p4 #aga1 a4 #cb-;b4 #b4 ,cf4 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #fa3 ,topic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #bj2 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #aj-bh4 ,according to ,aristotle himself1 therefore1 the ,dialectician is agonistic and eristic1 just as much as the ,sophist4 ,if the one tries to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory1 so also does the other3 the line which ,aristotle draws between them is one not founded upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of procedure1 but is merely verbal and sentimental2 putting aside under a discredited title what he himself disliked4 ,he admits that the dialectical questioner1 whenever the thesis which he undertakes to refute is true1 can never refute it except by inducing the respondent to concede what is false2 that1 even where the thesis is false1 he often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood1 because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses2 that1 where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion1 his only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion4#fb ,but these ends--fallacious refutation1 falsehood1 and paradox--are the very same as those which ,aristotle 7in the ,sophistici ,elenchi7#fc sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious ,sophist4 ,and the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to ,sophistic1 are almost identical with those attributed to ,dialectic1 being declared in very similar words4#fd ,that there were dialecticians of every degree of merit1 in the time of ,aristotle1 cannot be doubted2 some clever and ready1 others stupid and destitute of invention4 ,but that there were any two classes of dialecticians such as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class1 called ,sophists1 who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen fallacious refutations1 and another orthodox class who purposely avoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably doubt4 ,if the argument in the ,sophistici ,elenchi is good at all1 it is good against all ,dialectic4 ,the ,sophist1 as ,aristotle describes him1 is only the ,dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and painted by an enemy4 ,we know that there were in ,greece many enemies of ,dialectic generally2 the intense antipathy inspired by the cross-examining colloquy of ,sokrates1 and attested by his own declarations1 is a sufficient proof of this4 ,the enemies of ,sokrates depicted him--as ,aristotle depicts the ,sophist in the ,sophistici ,elenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and puzzles2 to which ,aristotle adds the farther charge 7advanced by ,plato before him7 against the ,sophist1 of arguing for lucre--which is an irrelevant charge1 travelling out of the region of art1 and bearing on the personal character of the individual4 ,if the sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when exhibited for money1 they would be no less such if exhibited gratuitously4 ,the sophistical discourse is not 7as ,aristotle would have us believe7 generically distinguishable from the dialectical2#fe nor is ,sophistic an art distinct from ,dialectic while adjoining to it1 but an inseparable portion of the tissue of ,dialectic itself4#ff ,if the ,sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know1 so also did the ,dialectician2 as we know from the testimony of ,sokrates1 the most consummate master of the art4 ,the conflict of two minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions1 short-comings1 and blindness of the other1 is the essential feature of ,dialectic as ,aristotle conceives it2 to which the eight books of his ,topica are adapted1 with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both for attack and defence4 ,there cannot be a game of chess without stratagems1 nor a fencing-match without feints2 the power of such aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player4 ,those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude stratagem1 but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding4 ,mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack4 ,footnote #fb3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 xi4 p4 #afa1 a4 #bd4 ,footnote #fc3 ,soph4 ,el4 iii4 p4 #afe1 b4 #ad4 ,footnote #fd3 ,compare ,topic4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #bf-;b4 #d1 with ,soph4 ,el4 xvi4 p4 #age1 a4 #e-af4 ,footnote #fe3 ,soph4 ,el4 ii4 p4 #afe1 a4 #cb2 xxxiv4 p4 #ahc1 b4 #a4 ,footnote #ff3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokrat4 p4 #bc1 ,a4 ,compare this with ,aristot4 ,soph4 ,el4 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #cj4 ,doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the dialectical attack and defence1 as there are rules for all other matches such as chess or fencing4 ,i should have been glad if ,aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these rules were4 ,he describes the ,sophist as one who plays the game unfairly2 but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the ,dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those aimed at by the ,sophist4 ,if we look to the account of the means employed by one and the other1 we shall in like manner fail to see how any real line can be drawn between them4 ,thus1 one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the ,sophist is--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random1 without any visible bearing on the thesis2 practising a sort of fishing examination1 in order to obtain some answer of which he may take advantage4#fg ,but1 when we turn to the ,eighth ,book of the ,topica1 we find ,aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the ,dialectician2 advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme and intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible apart from the thesis1 to put the questions in a succession designedly incoherent and unintelligible1 and to obtain 7what1 if obtained1 ensured complete success7 the full extent of premisses necessary for his final refutative syllogism1 without the respondent being aware that he had conceded them4#fh ,the questioner is farther advised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or negatively1 and by occasionally taking objection against himself1 in order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest purpose4#fi ,if we compare the interrogative procedure which ,aristotle recommends to the ,dialectician with that which he blames in the ,sophist1 we shall find that the former is even a greater refinement of deception than the latter4 ,footnote #fg3 ,soph4 ,el4 xii4 p4 #agb1 b4 #i-be4 ,aristotle treats the ,sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding herein--,greek3 du_/nantai de nun 7tton katourgein dia tou_/tn 7 pro_/teron4 ,the very same charge was urged against the dialectic of ,sokrates by his opponents3 ,plato1 ,hippias ,minor1 p4 #cgc--;,greek3 a7lla ,skra_/ts a7ei tara_/ttei e7n tois lo_/gois kai e7_/oiken 7_/sper kakourgounti4 ,compare ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dfa1 ,b41 #dhb1 ,e41 #dhc1 ,a4 ,footnote #fh3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aee1 b4 #a4-p4 #aee1 b4 #cj2 p4 #aef1 a4 #e-bb4 ,compare ,analyt4 ,priora1 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ff1 a4 #cc4 ,footnote #fi3 ,topic4 ,,viii4 i4 p4 #aef1 b4 #c1 #ag4 ,compare ,,viii4 i4 pp4 #aee-aef1 with ,soph4 ,el4 xv4 p4 #agd1 a4 #bh4 ,the next trick which we find ascribed to the ,sophist is--that he conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with topics4 ,aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably1 or ill and dishonourably4#gj ,from his own admission we see that this practice was not peculiar to ,sophists1 but was common also to those whom he calls ,dialecticians3 like every other part of the procedure1 it might be done well or ill2 but wherein this difference consisted he does not further explain4 ,indeed1 when we recollect that the elaborate details and classification of the ,topica are mainly intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses well-arranged and ready for interrogation1#ga we may be sure that every ,dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them would be impatient to apply them2 and would make an opportunity for doing so1 if none were spontaneously tendered to him4 ,but1 if the answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of refuting the thesis1 they would be nothing but embarrassment to him4#gb ,we must1 therefore1 understand that the questions put would be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative ,syllogism which the questioner was bound to conclude with4 ,if they were not1 he was of course punished by failure4 ,footnote #gj3 ,soph4 ,el4 xii4 p4 #agb1 b4 #bf4 ,in ,topic4 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #aaf1 a4 #bj1 ,aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the ,dialectician4 ,see also ,waitz's note on the passage4 ,alexander 7in ,scholia1 p4 #bfg1 b4 #h7 tells us that it was customary for the ,sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis1 and he shows this by mentioning the ,platonic ,protagoras1 in which he says that the ,sophist ,protagoras does so4 ,but the illustration here produced does not serve ,alexander's purpose4 ,the ,sophist ,protagoras 7in the ,platonic dialogue so called7 is represented1 not as shifting dialectic from one point to another1 but as running away from it altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric 7,plato1 ,protagor4 pp4 #ccc1 #ccd1 #cce74 ,in respect to the thesis started for debate1 the dialectic of ,sokrates departs from it as widely as that of ,protagoras1 and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue1 p4 #cfa4 ,compare ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates'1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ec1 #ei1 #gj4 ,footnote #ga3 ,topic4 ,i4 v4 p4 #ajb1 a4 #ac2 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #aje1 a4 #bb2 ,,viii4 xiv4 p4 #afc1 a4 #ca-;b4 #b4 ,footnote #gb3 ,aristotle himself observes this1 ,topic4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #aab1 a4 #ad4 ,a third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the ,sophist is--that he takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the respondent belongs1 and endeavours to bring out by interrogations whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect4#gc ,but would not any expert ,dialectician do just the same8 ,what else would be done by ,sokrates1 if cross-examining an ,anaxagorean or a ,herakleitean8 or by ,aristotle himself1 if interrogating a ,platonist8 ,footnote #gc3 ,soph4 ,el4 xii4 p4 #agb1 b4 #bi4 ,another proceeding treated as peculiar to the ,sophist is--that he seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox1 by bringing out in cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions which subsist together in the opinions of mankind4 ,thus1 men profess in their public talk high principles of virtue2 but secretly and at the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power per fas et nefas4 ,again1 there are two kinds of justice3 one1 that which is just by nature and in truth1 such as wise men or philosophers approve2 the other1 that which is just according to law or custom1 such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve4 ,there is1 also1 conflict between the authority of a father1 and that of the wise2 between justice and expediency2 and as to whether it is more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong4#gd ,all these antitheses are presented to us in the ,platonic ,gorgias1 to which 7i4e41 to the speech of ,kallikles therein7 ,aristotle here makes reference2 and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the ,sophist from the genuine ,dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers4 ,but1 surely1 the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name are of a class utterly opposed to the class of pseudo-probabilia1 which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious ,sophist1 though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight as fallacies4 ,they are all real and serious issues1#ge having plausible arguments pro and con1 debateable without end1 and settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and predisposition4 ,they are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for the acute ,dialectician4 ,no man would be allowed by ,aristotle to deserve that title1 if he omitted to raise and argue them1 the thesis being supposed suitable4#gf ,aristotle himself speaks often of the equivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what is just by nature and what is just according to some local or peculiar sentiment4#gg ,the manoeuvre which ,aristotle imputes to the ,sophist being exactly the same as that which ,kallikles imputes to ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,gorgias1#gh it is ,sokrates1 and not ,kallikles1 who serves here as illustrating what ,aristotle calls a ,sophist4 ,indeed1 if we read the ,gorgias1 we shall find the ,platonic ,sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what is probable 7conformable to received opinion7 and what is paradoxical4 ,he admits that he stands alone in his opinion1 against all the world1 and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering them2 but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency1 so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved contradiction with themselves4#gi ,himself maintaining a paradox1 he constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it2 which is exactly what ,aristotle imputes to the ,sophists of his day as a reproach4 ,footnote #gd3 ,ibid4 b4 #cf-p4 #agc1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #ge3 ,rhetoric4 ,,ii4 xxv4 p4 #adjb1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 oi7 men gar sullogismoi e7k tn e7ndo_/xn1 dokounta de polla e7nanti_/a a7ll_/lois e7sti_/n4 ,a disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses1 must be allowed ,greek3 kata to pragma therein ta koina_/1 which is the characteristic feature assigned by ,aristotle to the ,dialectician1 as contrasted with the ,sophist 7,soph4 ,el4 xi4 p4 #aga1 b4 #e71 in so far us ,i can understand the words ,greek3 kata to pragma4 ,see note b p4 #cid supra4 ,footnote #gf3 ,topic4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #e-aj4 ,greek3 e7k tn e7ndechome_/nn poiein a7 proairou_/metha4 ,footnote #gg3 ,topic4 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #aae1 b4 #be4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,v4 x4 p4 #aacd1 b4 #ah2 ,i4 i4 p4 #ajid1 b4 #ae4 ,rhetoric4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #acgc1 b4 #e4 ,footnote #gh3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dhb-dhc4 ,greek3 o7 d kai su 7,sokrates7 ,greek3 touto to sophon katanenoks kakourgeis e7n tois lo_/gois1 e7an me_/n tis kata no_/mon le_/g1 kata phu_/sin u7pertn1 e7an de ta ts phu_/ses1 ta tou no_/mou4 ,footnote #gi3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dgj1 #dgb1 #dha1 #dhb4 ,some predecessors of ,aristotle had distinguished arguments or discourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name1 and those addressed to the thought4#hj ,this distinction ,aristotle disapproves1 denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality4 ,there can be no arguments addressed to the thought only1 apart from the name3 all of them must be addressed to the name1 and through it to the thought4#ha ,whether an argument is addressed to the thought or not1 depends not upon any thing in the argument itself1 but upon the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the words3 if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended1 it is addressed to the thought2 if not1 not4#hb ,to require that the questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts the question1 would1 according to ,aristotle1 convert him into a teacher--would confound the line between ,dialectic and ,didactic4#hc ,and this may be granted2 but not less1 if ,dialecticians are to refrain from all those proceedings which ,aristotle notes and condemns as peculiar to the ,sophist1 must they be held to pass into the attitude of teacher and learner2 the questioner doing what he can1 not to embarrass but1 to enlighten and assist the respondent4 ,the purpose of victory1 and the stimulus of competition in the double function of question and answer 7while entirely absent from ,didactic71 are quite as essential to the ,dialectician as to the ,sophist4 ,that the ,sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all cost1 while the ,dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed2 yet not a differentia giving name and essence to a new species4 ,the unfair ,dialectician is a ,dialectician still2 all his purposes remain the same1 though the means whereby he pursues them are altered4 ,this distinction of means between the two1 ,aristotle has taken very insufficient pains to point out4 ,rude and provocative manner1 either on the part of questioner or respondent1 and impudent assumption of concessions which have neither been asked nor granted1--these are justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair ,dialectic4#hd ,but the enumeration is most incompletely performed2 because ,aristotle1 in his anxiety to erect ,sophistic into an art or procedure by itself1 distinct from and alongside of ,dialectic1 has transferred to it much that belongs to fair and and admissible ,dialectic4 ,hence the really unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the foreground4 ,footnote #hj3 ,soph4 ,el4 x4 p4 #agj1 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti de diaphora tn 7n le_/gousi tines1 to ei7nai tous men pros tou7_/noma lo_/gous1 e7te_/rous de pros tn dia_/noian4 ,from this allusion 7and other allusions also xvii4 p4 #agf1 a4 #f2 xx4 p4 #agg1 b4 #h2 xxii4 p4 #agh1 b4 #aj7 to the doctrines of predecessors1 we see that the assertion made by ,aristotle 7in the last chapter of ,sophistici ,elenchi7 of his own originality1 and of the absence of prior researches1 must be taken with some indulgence4 ,footnote #ha3 ,soph4 ,el4 x4 p4 #agj1 b4 #bc4 ,footnote #hb3 ,ibid4 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7n t lo_/g e7_/sti to pros tn dia_/noian ei7nai1 a7ll' e7n t ton a7pokrino_/menon e7_/chein ps pros ta dedome_/na4 ,footnote #hc3 ,ibid4 p4 #aga1 a4 #bh1 seq4 ,footnote #hd3 ,soph4 ,el4 xv4 p4 #agd1 a4 #bb1 b4 #aj4 ,though ,aristotle speaks so contemptuously about ,sophistic1 he nevertheless indicates ,loci 7or general heads of subjects7 to assist the sophistical questioner in attacking1 and precepts to the sophistical respondent for warding off attack4 ,on the whole1 these precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the ,topica for ,dialectic2 except that he gives greater prominence to ,solecism and ,tautology1 as thrusts practised by the sophistical questioner4 ,he insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice in sophistical debate1 hardly less than in what he calls dialectical1 and1 as was remarked1 upon similar grounds4#he ,he recommends it as valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument1 but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific truths4 ,without it 7he declares7 we cannot become familiar with the equivocations of terms and propositions1 nor acquire the means of escaping them4 ,if we allow ourselves to be entangled in them1 without being aware of it1 by others1 we shall also be entangled in them when we pursue reflections of our own4#hf ,it is not enough to see generally that there is a fallacy2 we must farther learn to detect at once the precise seat of the fallacy1 and to point out rapidly how it may be cleared up4 ,this is the more difficult to do1 because fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our notice under inversion and substitution of words4#hg ,unless we acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates1 we shall find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular case of confusion4 ,if we complain and condemn such debates generally1 we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own stupidity and incompetence4#hh ,footnote #he3 ,ibid4 xvi4 p4 #age1 a4 #e-af4 ,compare ,topica99991 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #cj1 seq4 ,footnote #hf3 ,soph4 ,el4 xvi4 p4 #age1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 deu_/teron de pros tas kath' au7ton zt_/seis 7chr_/simoi72 o7 gar u7ph' e7te_/rou r7adis paralogizo_/menos kai touto m ai7sthano_/menos ka7n au7tos u7ph' au7tou touto pa_/thoi polla_/kis4 ,footnote #hg3 ,ibid4 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 ou7 tau7to d' e7sti labo_/nta te ton lo_/gon i7dein kai lusai tn mochthri_/an1 kai e7rt_/menon a7pantan du_/nasthai tache_/s4 o7 gar i7_/smen1 polla_/kis metatithe_/menon a7gnooumen4 ,compare xxxiii4 p4 #ahb1 b4 #g4 ,footnote #hh3 ,soph4 ,el4 xvi4 p4 #age1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 7_/ste1 a7n dlon men 7min 71 a7mele_/ttoi d' 7men1 u7steroumen tn kairn polla_/kis4 ,accordingly the ,sophistici ,elenchi contains precepts1 at considerable length1#hi to the respondent in a sophistical debate1 how reply or solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions2 all the thirteen ,fallacies1 7the six ,in ,dictione1 and the seven ,extra ,dictionem7 being treated in succession4 ,in conducting his defensive procedure1 the respondent must keep constantly in mind what the ,sophistical ,refutation really is4 ,he must treat it not as a real or genuine refutation1 but as a mere simulation of such2 and he must so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of simulation4 ,what he has to guard against is1 not the being really refuted but1 the seeming to be refuted4#ij ,the refutative syllogism constructed by the sophistical questioner1 including as it does ,equivocation1 ,amphiboly1 or some other verbal fallacy1 and therefore yielding no valid conclusion1 does not settle whether the respondent is really refuted or not4 ,if indeed the questioner1 in putting his interrogation1 discriminates the double meaning of his words1 where they have a double meaning1 the respondent ought to answer plainly and briefly ,yes1 or ,no2 either affirming or denying what is tendered4 ,but1 if the questioner does not so discriminate1 the respondent cannot reply simply ,yes1 or ,no3 he must himself discriminate the two meanings1 and affirm or deny accordingly4#ia ,unless he guards himself by such discrimination1 he cannot avoid falling into a contradiction1 at least in appearance4 ,the equivocal wording of the question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions as one4#ib ,footnote #hi3 ,from xvi4 p4 #age1 to xxxiii4 p4 #ahc1 of ,soph4 ,el4 ,footnote #ij3 ,soph4 ,el4 xvii4 p4 #age1 a4 #cc3 ,greek3 o7_/ls gar pros tous e7ristikous machete_/on1 ou7k 7s e7le_/gchontas1 a7ll' 7s phainome_/nous2 ou7 ga_/r phamen sullogi_/zesthai_/ ge au7tou_/s1 7_/ste pros to m dokein diorthte_/on4 ,footnote #ia3 ,ibid4 b4 #a-ad4 ,compare ,topica1 ,,viii4 vii4 p4 #afj1 a4 #bi4 ,aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct1 without any qualifying additions or distinctions1 was advanced by dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his own--,greek3 o7_/ t' e7piztousi nun men 7tton pro_/teron de mallon oi7 e7ristikoi_/1 to 7 nai 7 ou7 a7pokri_/nesthai ton e7rt_/menon1 e7gi_/net' a7_/n4 ,i presume that he makes comparison with the ,platonic dialogues--,euthydemus1 p4 #bie2 ,gorgias1 pp4 #ddh-ddi2 ,protagoras1 pp4 #ccd-cce4 ,footnote #ib3 ,soph4 ,el4 xvii4 #age1 b4 #ae-p4 #agf1 a4 #ah4 ,as the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such but is not so in reality1 so the respondent may meet it by what is an apparent solution but no solution in reality1 ,there occur various cases1 in sophistic or agonistic debate1 wherein a simulated solution of this kind is even preferable to a real one4#ic ,if the question is plausible1 the respondent may answer1 ,be it so2 but1 if it involves any paradox in answering1 he will answer by saying1 ,so it would appear3 he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to refutation or paradox4#id ,where the question put is such that1 while involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative1 it is at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set up1--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a ,petitio ,principii1 and make answer in the negative4 ,also1 where the questioner1 trying to establish an universal proposition by ,induction1 puts the final question1 not under an universal term but1 as the general result of the particulars conceded 7and such like71--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step1 and may say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood4#ie ,footnote #ic3 ,ibid4 p4 #agf1 a4 #ba4 ,footnote #id3 ,ibid4 a4 #be4 ,footnote #ie3 ,ibid4 a4 #bg-ce4 ,if a question is put in plain and appropriate language1 answer must be made plainly or with some clear distinction2 but1 where the question is put obscurely and elliptically1 leaving part of the meaning unexpressed1 the respondent must not concede it unreservedly4 ,if he does1 fallacious refutation may very possibly be the result3#if he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real refutation4 ,if1 of two propositions1 the second follows upon the first1 but the first does not follow upon the second1 the respondent1 where he has the choice1 ought to grant the second only1 and not the first4 ,he ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape with a less2#ig e4g41 he ought to concede the particular rather than the universal4 ,footnote #if3 ,ibid4 a4 #ch-;b4 #g4 ,footnote #ig3 ,ibid4 b4 #h-ac4 ,again1 among opinions generally received1 there are some which the public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty2 others1 on which they are firmly assured that every one who contradicts them speaks falsely4 ,when it is uncertain to which of these two classes the question put is referable1 the respondent will be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively1 but simply1 ,i go with the received opinions4#ih ,in cases where opinions are divided1 he may find opportunity for changing the terms1 and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes4 ,such change of terms may pass without protest1 in consequence of the doubtful character of the matter2 while it will embarrass the questioner in constructing his refutation4#ii ,the respondent may further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to be put1 and by objecting against them beforehand4#ajj ,footnote #ih3 ,soph4 ,el4 9999xvii4 p4 #agf1 b4 #ad-bj4 ,both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are differently given by various commentators4 ,the text and construction of ,waitz appears to me the best1 and ,i have followed him4 ,i cannot agree with ,mr4 ,poste when he declares 7notes1 p4 #adc7 ,greek3 a7popha_/neis to be the true reading1 instead of ,greek3 a7popha_/seis1 which last is adopted both by ,bekker and in the edition of 9999,firmin ,didot4 ,footnote #ii3 ,ibid4 b4 #bj-be4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf4 ,when the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks necessary1 and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism1 the respondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or not4#aja ,a good and proper solution is1 to point out on which premiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends4 ,first1 he must examine whether it is formally correct1 or whether it has only a false appearance of being so3 if the last be the case1 he must distinguish in which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has arisen4 ,if on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct1 he must look whether the conclusion is true or false4 ,should it be true1 he cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of the premisses2 but should the conclusion be false1 two modes of solution are open to him4 ,one mode is1 if he can point out an equivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion2 another mode will be1 to controvert1 or exhibit a fallacy in1 one of the premisses4#ajb ,the respondent1 however1 must learn to apply this examination rapidly and unhesitatingly3 to do so at once is very difficult1 though it may be easily done if he has leisure to reflect4#ajc ,footnote #aja3 ,soph4 ,el4 xviii4 p4 #agf1 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 7 me_/n o7rth lu_/sis e7mpha_/nisis pseudous sullogismou1 par' o7poi_/an e7r_/tsin sumbai_/nei to pseudos4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,soph4 ,el4 xviii4 p4 #agf1 b4 #ch3 ,greek3 tous men kata to sumpe_/rasma pseudeis dichs e7nde_/chetai lu_/ein2 kai gar t a7nelein ti tn 7rtme_/nn1 kai t deixai to sumpe_/rasma e7_/chon ou7ch ou7_/ts4 ,mr4 ,poste translates these last words--or by a counterproof directed against the conclusion3 and he remarks in his note 7pp4 #ade-adg71 that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative syllogism is one mode of solution--is both manifestly inadmissible1 and flatly contradicted by ,aristotle himself elsewhere4 ,the words of ,aristotle doubtless seem to countenance ,mr4 ,poste's translation2 yet the contradiction pointed out by ,mr4 ,poste 7and very imperfectly explained1 p4 #adg7 ought to make us look out for another meaning2 which is suggested by the chapter immediately following 7xix4 p4 #agg1 a4 #i71 where ,aristotle treats of the ,fallacies of ,equivocation and ,amphiboly4 ,he tells us that equivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the premisses2 and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of solving or invalidating the refutation4 ,this is what ,aristotle means by the words cited at the beginning of this note3 ,greek3 t deixai to sumpe_/rasma e7_/chon ou7ch o7rths4 ,in ,mr4 ,poste's translation these words mean the same as ,greek3 a7nelein used just before1 which ,aristotle obviously does not intend4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,soph4 ,el4 xviii4 p4 #agg1 a4 #g4 ,aristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent may provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious refutation above enumerated4 ,for these thirteen classes1 he pronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to all fallacies contained in one and the same class4#ajd ,footnote #ajd3 ,scholia1 p4 #cab1 a4 #d1 ,br42 ,soph4 ,el4 #bj1 p4 #agg1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 tn gar para tau7ton lo_/gn 7 au7t lu_/sis1 c4 ,thus1 in the two first of them--,equivocation of ,terms and ,amphiboly of ,propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the conclusion1 or in the premisses1 of the refutative syllogism4 ,if it be in the conclusion1 the refutation must at once be rejected1 unless the respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing the equivocal word as one of its terms1 so that the refutation may appear to contradict it expressly and distinctly4 ,but1 if it be in the premisses1 then there is no necessity that the respondent should have previously admitted such a proposition2 for the equivocal word may form the middle term of the refutative syllogism1 and may thus not appear in the conclusion thereof4#aje ,the proper way for the respondent to deal with these questions1 involving equivocation or amphiboly1 is to answer them1 at the outset1 with a reserve for the double meaning1 thus3 ,in one sense1 it is so2 in another sense1 it is not4 ,if he does not perceive the double meaning until he has already answered the first question1 he must recover himself1 when he answers the second1 by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly1 and by specifying how much he is prepared to concede4#ajf ,even if he has been taken unawares1 and has not perceived the equivocation until the refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely1 he should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been apparently refuted1 and that the refutation tells only against the name1 not against the thing meant2#ajg so that there is no genuine refutation at all4 ,footnote #aje3 ,soph4 ,el4 xix4 p4 #agg1 a4 #ah3 ,greek3 o7_/sois d' e7n tois e7rt_/masin1 ou7k a7na_/gk proapophsai to ditto_/n2 ou7 gar pros touto a7lla dia touto o7 lo_/gos4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 e7an de la_/th1 e7pi te_/lei prostithe_/nta t e7rt_/sei diorthte_/on2 c4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 o7_/ls te machete_/on1 a7n kai a7pls sullogi_/ztai1 o7_/ti ou7ch o7 e7_/phsen a7pe_/phse pragma1 a7ll' o7_/noma2 7_/st' ou7k e7_/legchos4 ,instead of ,greek3 a7n kai_/1 ,julius ,pacius reads ,greek3 ka7_/n3 the meaning is much the same4 ,in the next two ,fallacies--those of ,composition and ,division1 or ,conjunction and ,disjunction--when the questioner draws up his refutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded1 the respondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended only in the other construction of the words4 ,this fallacy is distinct from ,equivocation2 and it is a mistake to try 7as some have tried7 to reduce all fallacies to ,equivocation or ,amphiboly4#ajh ,the respondent will distinguish1 in each particular case1 that construction of the words which he intended in his admission1 from that which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation4#aji ,footnote #ajh3 ,soph4 ,el4 xx4 p4 #agg1 a4 #cc-;b4 #i4 ,greek3 ou7 pa_/ntes oi7 e7_/legchoi para to ditto_/n1 katha_/per tine_/s phasin4 ,this is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists prior to ,aristotle on logical proof2 and that his declaration of originality 7in the concluding chapter of ,sophist4 ,elenchi7 must be taken with reserve4 ,footnote #aji3 ,soph4 ,el4 xx4 p4 #agg1 b4 #aj-bf3 ,greek3 diairete_/on ou7n t a7pokrinome_/n2 c4 ,the ,fallacies of ,accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations1#aaj but those of ,figura ,dictionis furnish a great many4 ,when two words have the like form and structure1 it may naturally be imagined that the signification of one belongs to the same ,category as that of the other4 ,but this is often an illusion2 and in such cases a sophistical refutation may be founded thereupon4 ,the respondent will solve it by denying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of meaning1 and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten ,categories the meaning of each several word or each proposition belongs4 ,when two words thus seem1 by their form1 to belong to the same ,category1 the questioner will often take it for granted1 without expressly asking1 that they do belong to the same1 and will found a confutation thereupon2 but the respondent must not admit the confutation to be valid1 unless this question has been explicitly put to him and conceded4#aaa ,a question is put which1 in its direct and obvious meaning1 bears only on the category of ,quantity1 of ,quality1 of ,relation1 of ,action1 or of ,passion2 but the respondent1 not aware of the equivocation1 answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the ,category of ,substance1 and is so understood by the questioner when he constructs his refutative syllogism4 ,the respondent will secure himself from being thus confuted1 by keeping constantly in view to which of the ,categories his answer is intended to refer4#aab ,footnote #aaj3 ,ibid4 xxi4 p4 #agg1 b4 #ce4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,ibid4 xxii4 p4 #agh1 a4 #d-bh4 ,greek3 to gar loipon au7tos prosti_/thsin o7 a7kou_/n 7s o7moi_/s lego_/menon2 to de le_/getai men ou7ch o7moi_/s1 phai_/netai de dia tn le_/xin4 ,footnote #aab3 ,several illustrative examples of this mode of sophistical refutation1 founded on the ,fallacy called ,figura ,dictionis1 are indicated in this chapter by ,aristotle4 ,the indication however1 is often so brief and elliptical1 that there is great difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full1 and still greater difficulty in translating them into any modern language4 #a4 ,is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same thing8--,no4 ,to see something is to do something2 to have seen something is to have done something8--,yes4 ,is it possible at the same time to see and to have seen the same thing8--,yes4 ,the respondent has thus contradicted himself4 ,the form of the word ,greek3 o7ran appears to rank it under the ,category ,greek3 poiein4 ,however1 ,i think that the mistake really made here was1 that the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the first question4 #b4 ,does anything coming under the ,category ,pati come under the ,category ,agere8--,no4 ,but ,greek3 te_/mnetai1 kai_/etai1 ai7stha_/netai1 all show by their form that they belong to the ,category ,pati8--,yes4 ,again1 ,greek3 le_/gein1 tre_/chein1 o7ran1 show by their form that they belong to the ,category ,agere8--,yes4 ,you will admit1 however1 that ,greek3 to o7ran is ,greek3 ai7stha_/nesthai_/ ti8--,certainly4 ,therefore something that belongs to the ,category ,agere belongs also to that of ,pati4 ,if we turn back to ,aristot4 ,categ4 viii4 p4 #aa1 a4 #cg1 we shall find that he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to two distinct ,categories4 #c4 ,did any one write that which stands here written8--,yes4 ,it stands here written that you are standing up--a false statement2 but when it was written the statement was true8--,yes4 ,therefore the writer has written a statement both true and false8--,yes4 ,here true and false belong to the ,category ,quality2 the statement or matter written belongs to that of ,substance4 ,what the writer wrote had nothing to do with the former of the two ,categories2 and no contradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement was once true and is now false4 #d4 ,does a man tread that which he walks8--,yes4 ,but he walks the whole day8--,yes4 ,therefore he treads the whole day4 ,here the ,category of ,quando is confused with that of ,substance4 #e4 ,but the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one ,category with another1 is furnished by ,aristotle in respect of the difference between himself and ,plato as to ,ideas or ,universals4 ,according to ,plato the universal term denoted a separate something apart from the particulars1 yet of which each of these particulars partook4 ,according to ,aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the particulars1 but something belonging 7essentially or non-essentially7 to all and each of the particulars4 ,in the ,platonic theory it was an ,hoc ,aliquid 7,greek3 to_/de ti71 or had an existence substantive and separate3 in the ,aristotelian it was a ,quale or ,quale ,quid 7,greek3 poio_/n71 having an existence merely adjective or predicative4 ,aristotle maintains that ,plato or the ,platonists placed it in the wrong ,category--in the ,category of ,substance instead of in that of ,quality4 ,now it is by rectifying this confusion of ,categories that ,aristotle solves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical3--7#a7 ,the argument concluding in what was called the ',third ,man2' 7#b7 ,the following question3 ,koriskus1 and the musical ,koriskus--are these the same1 or is the second different from the first8 ,what is called the ',third ,man' was a refutation of the ,platonic theory of ,ideas4 ,because ,plato recognized a substantive existence1 corresponding to each common denomination connoting likeness1 apart from all the similar particulars denominated1 e4g41 a ,self-man1 or separate self-existent man1 corresponding to the ,idea1 and apart from all individual men1 ,caius1 c4--opponents argued against him1 saying3--,if this is recognized1 you must also recognize that the ,self-man1 and the individual man called ,caius1 have also a common denomination and similarity1 which 7upon your principles7 corresponds to another ,ideal ,man1 or a ,third ,man4 ,you must1 therefore1 go on inferring upwards to a ,fourth ,man1 a ,fifth ,man1 c41 and so onwards to an indefinite number of ,ideal ,men1 one above the other4 ,this was intended as a refutation1 by ,reductio ad ,impossibile1 of the ,platonic view of ,ideas as separate ,entities1 each of them ,one and ,universal4 ,but ,aristotle here treats it as a ,sophistical ,refutation2 and he indicates what he calls the solution of it by saying that it confounds the ,categories of ,substance and ,quality1 putting the ,universal 7which ought to be under the ,category of ,quality7 under the ,category of ,substance4 ,he has no right1 however1 to include this among ,sophistical ,refutations1 which are 7as he himself defines them7 not real but fallacious refutations1 invented by a dishonest money-getting profession called ,sophists1 and which are solved by pointing out the precise seat of the fallacy4 ,the refutation called the ',third ,man' is so far from being fallacious1 that it is valid1 and is recited as such elsewhere by ,aristotle himself 7,metaphs4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iij1 b4 #ag999972 while the solution tendered by ,aristotle1 instead of being a solution1 is a confirmation1 pointing out1 not where the fallacy of the refutation resides but1 where the fallacy of the doctrine refuted resides4 ,moreover1 if we are to treat the refutation called the ',third ,man' as sophistical1 we must number ,plato himself among the dishonest class called ,sophists4 ,here is one among the many proofs that the strong line drawn by ,aristotle between the ,dialectician and the ,sophist is quite untenable4 ,the argument is distinctly enunciated in the ,platonic ,parmenides 7pp4 #aca-acc74 ,the meaning of the ,universal 7,aristotle maintains7 must be considered as predicative only1 tacked on to some ,hoc ,aliquid1 and belonging to ,quale or some other of the nine latter ,categories4 ,it may be set out as a distinct subject for logical consideration and reasoning3 but it cannot be set out as a distinct existence beyond and apart from its particulars 7,greek3 para tous pollous e7_/n ti74 ,it is ,greek3 poio_/n1 and it cannot even be recognized as ,greek3 o7_/per poio_/n or ,greek3 au7to-poio_/n1 for this would put it apart from all the other ,greek3 poia_/1 and would be open to the refutation above noticed called the ',third ,man4' ,such is the drift of the very difficult passage of the ,sophistici ,elenchi 7xxii4 p4 #agh1 b4 #cg-p4 #agi1 a4 #aj999974 ,i differ from ,mr4 ,poste's translation 7p4 #ga7 of part of this passage1 and still more from the explanation given in the latter part of his note 7p4 #aee74 ,i think that the doctrine of ,greek3 to e7n para ta polla_/ is produced by ,aristotle here and elsewhere in his work as untrue and inadmissible1 not as his own doctrine4 ,mr4 ,poste understands this passage differently from the previous translators1 with whom ,i agree for the most part1 though ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire appears to me to have missed the hinge upon which ,aristotle's argument turns1 by translating ,greek3 o7_/per poio_/n--id ipsum1 quod quale est 7,j4 ,pacius7--une qualit3 the argument turns upon the distinction between ,greek3 o7_/per poio_/n and ,greek3 poio_/n4 ,i come now to the second sophistical refutation given by ,aristotle3 ,koriskus1 and the musician ,koriskus--are the two the same or different8 ,this is what ,aristotle calls a sophistical or fallacious argument 7compare ,metaphys4 ,e4 ii4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ae72 but it can hardly be so called with propriety1 for the only solution that ,aristotle himself gives of it is1 that the two are idem numero1 but in an improper or secondary sense 7,topic4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #ajc1 a4 #cj72 i4 e41 that they are in one point of view the same1 in another point of view different--they are ,greek3 e7n kata sumbebko_/s4 ,see ,arist4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 vi4 p4 #ajae1 b4 #af2 ,scholia1 p4 #fif1 a4 #bb1 seq42 and ,alexand4 ,aphrodis4 ad ,metaph4 pp4 #cba1 #cbb1 #dad1 #dae1 ed4 ,bonitz4 ,i understand ,aristotle to say that ,greek3 ,ko_/riskos mousiko_/s cannot be properly set out or abstracted 7,greek3 ou7k e7_/stin au7to e7kthe_/sthai71 because it includes two ,categories 7,substance and ,quality7 in one2 wherefore it cannot be properly compared either with ,greek3 ,ko_/riskos simply 7,category of ,substance7 or with ,greek3 mousiko_/s simply 7,category of ,quality74 ,it seems strange that ,aristotle does not notice this argumentative difficulty in the discussion which he bestows on ,greek3 tau7to_/n in the ,seventh ,book of the ,topica4 ,the subtle reasonings1 very hard to follow1 which ,aristotle employs 7,physic4 ,v4 iv4 p4 #bbg7 might have made him cautious in treating the difficulties of opponents as so many dishonest cavils4 ,it is curious that ,alexander1 in reciting the sophistical argument1 assumes as a matter of course that ,greek3 o7 grammatikos ,skra_/ts is ,greek3 o7 au7tos t ,skra_/tei 7,schol4 ad ,metaphys4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #bf1 ,brand474 ,as a general rule1 in all the refutations founded on the seven ,fallacies ,in ,dictione1 the respondent will solve the refutation by distinguishing the double meaning of the words or of the phrase1 and by adopting as his own the one opposite to that which the questioner proceeds upon4 ,if the ,fallacy is of ,conjunction and ,disjunction1 and if the questioner assumes ,conjunction1 the respondent will adopt ,disjunction2 if it be a ,fallacy of ,accent1 and if the questioner assumes the grave accent1 the respondent will adopt the acute4#aac ,footnote #aac3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxiii4 p4 #agi1 a4 #aa-be4 ,passing to the ,fallacies ,extra ,dictionem1 where the sophistical refutation is founded upon a ,fallacy of ,accident1 the respondent ought to apply one and the same solution to all4 ,he will say3 ,the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses2 and he will be prepared with an example1 in which the conclusion obtained under this fallacy is notoriously untrue4#aad ,do you know ,koriskus8--,yes4 ,do you know the distant person coming this way8--,no4 ,that distant person is ,koriskus3 therefore you know1 and you do not know1 the same person4 ,the inference here is not necessary4 ,to be coming this way--is an accident of ,koriskus2 and1 because you do not know the accident1 we cannot infer that you do not know the subject2 such may or may not be the case4#aae ,footnote #aad3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxiv4 p4 #agi1 a4 #cj3 ,greek3 r7te_/on ou7n sumbibasthe_/ntas o7moi_/s pros a7_/pantas o7_/ti ou7k a7nagkaion2 e7_/chein de dei prophe_/rein to oi7on4 ,footnote #aae3 ,ibid4 a4 #ce-;b4 #g4 ,the major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation must rest1 is1 ,that it is impossible both to know and not to know the same thing4 ,this must be put as a direct question by the questioner1 and must be conceded by the respondent1 before the intended refutation can be made good4 ,now there are some persons who solve the refutation by answering this question in the negative1 and by saying that it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing1 only not in the same respect3 such is the case when we know ,koriskus1 but do not know ,koriskus approaching from a distance4#aaf ,aristotle disapproves this mode of solution1 as well as another mode which refers the fallacy to equivocation of terms4 ,he points out that there are many other sophistical refutations1 coming under the general head of ,fallaci ,accidentis1 to which such solution will not apply2 and that there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to every fallacy coming under the same general head2 though he admits at the same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious in more than one way4 ,he says1 moreover1 that this contradiction or negation of the premiss is no true solution2 for a solution ought to bring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation appears to be a real refutation4 ,thus the ,fallacia ,accidentis consists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true also of the subject thereof3 you explain that such inference1 though apparently cogent1 has no real cogency1 and in that explanation consists the only proper solution of the fallacy4#aag ,footnote #aaf3 ,ibid4 b4 #g1 #ah1 #cg3 ,greek3 lu_/ousi de_/ tines a7nairountes tn e7r_/tsin2 phasi gar e7nde_/chesthai tau7to pragma ei7de_/nai kai a7gnoein1 a7lla m kata tau7to_/4 ,mr4 ,poste 7pp4 #aeb-aeg7 translates ,greek3 a7nairountes tn e7r_/tsin--contradicting the thesis1 and he expresses his surprise at the assertion1 observing 7very truly7 that contradiction of the thesis is the very opposite of a solution2 it helps in the very work which the refutation aims at accomplishing4 ,but ,i cannot think that ,greek3 e7r_/tsis does mean the thesis1 either here or in the other passage to which ,mr4 ,poste refers 7xxii4 p4 #agh1 b4 #ad74 ,i think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded1 or must be presumed to have conceded1 essential to the validity of the refutation4 ,the term ,greek3 e7r_/tsis cannot surely1 with any propriety1 be applied to the thesis4 ,it means either a question1 or what is conceded in reply to a question2 and the thesis cannot come under either one meaning or the other1 being the proposition which the respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend4 ,footnote #aag3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxiv4 p4 #agi1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 7n gar 7 lu_/sis e7mpha_/nisis pseudous sullogismou1 par' o7 pseud_/s4 ,in like manner1 all those ,fallacies which come under the general head of ,a dicto ,secundum ,quid ad dictum ,simpliciter1 can only be solved by pointing out1 in each particular case1 in what terms this confusion is concealed--wherein resides the inference apparently cogent which is mistaken for one really cogent4 ,the respondent is driven to an apparent contradiction1 by having granted premisses from which the inference is derivable that both sides of the ,antiphasis are true--that the same predicate ,a may be both affirmed and denied of the same subject ,b4 ,he solves the contradiction by analysing the ,antiphasis1 and by showing that affirmation is secundum quid1 while denial is simpliciter2 and that there is a contradiction not real1 but only apparent1 between the two4#aah ,footnote #aah3 ,ibid4 xxv4 p4 #ahj1 a4 #bc-ca4 ,in like manner1 the ,fallacy ,ignoratio ,elenchi will be solved by analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the ,antiphasis1 and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency between them4#aai ,footnote #aai3 ,ibid4 xxvi4 p4 #aha1 a4 #a-ad4 ,in regard to the ,fallacies under ,petitio ,principii1 the respondent if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a fallacy1 must refuse to grant it1 however probable it may be in itself4 ,if he does not perceive this until after he has granted it1 he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner2 declaring that an ,elenchus involving assumption of the matter in question is null1 and that the concession was made under the supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in contemplation4#abj ,footnote #abj3 ,ibid4 xxvii4 p4 #aha1 a4 #ae-ba4 ,there are two distinct ways in which the ,fallacia ,consequentis may be employed4 ,the predicate may be an universal1 comprehending the subject3 because animal always goes along with man1 it is falsely inferred that man always goes along with animal2 or it is falsely inferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man4 ,the fallacy is solved when this is pointed out4 ,the last inference is only valid when the terms are inverted2 if animal always goes along with man1 not-man will always go along with not-animal4#aba ,footnote #aba3 ,ibid4 xxviii4 p4 #aha1 a4 #bb-cj4 ,greek3 a7na_/palin gar 7 a7kolou_/thsis4 ,if the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are indispensable to the conclusion1 the respondent1 after having satisfied himself that this is the fact1 will point out the mal-procedure of the questioner1 and will say that he conceded the superfluous premiss1 not because it was in itself probable but1 because it seemed relevant to the debate2 while nevertheless the questioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards that object4#abb ,this is the mode of solution applicable in the case of the ,fallacies coming under the head ,non ,causa pro ,caus4#abc ,footnote #abb3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxix4 p4 #aha1 a4 #ca-ce4 ,footnote #abc3 ,schol4 p4 #cah1 a4 #cf1 ,br4 ,where the sophistical questioner tries to refute by the ,fallacia ,plurium ,interrogationum 7i4e41 by putting two or more questions as one71 the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question into its component simple questions1 and make answer accordingly4 ,he must not give one answer1 either affirmative or negative1 to that which is more than one question4 ,even if he does give one answer1 he may sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction2 for it may happen that the same predicate is truly affirmable1 or truly deniable1 of two or more distinct and independent subjects4 ,often1 however1 the contrary is the case3 no one true answer1 either affirmative or negative1 can be given to one of these complex questions3 the one answer given1 whatever it be1 must always be partially false or inconsistent4#abd ,suppose two subjects1 ,a and ,b1 one good1 the other bad3 if the question be1 ,whether ,a and ,b are good or bad1 it will be equally true to say--,both are good1 or1 ,both are bad1 or1 ,both are neither good nor bad4 ,there may indeed be other solutions for this fallacy3 ,both or ,all may signify two or more items taken individually1 or taken collectively2 but the only sure precaution is--one answer to one question4#abe ,footnote #abd3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxx4 p4 #aha1 a4 #ch3 ,greek3 ou7_/te plei_/ kath' e7nos ou7_/te e7n kata polln1 a7ll' e7n kath' e7nos phate_/on 7 a7pophate_/on4 ,footnote #abe3 ,ibid4 b4 #f-be4 ,suppose that1 instead of aiming at a seeming refutation1 the ,sophist tries to convict the respondent of ,tautology4 ,the source of this embarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used and conveys clear meaning without its correlate1 though the correlate is always implied and understood4 ,the respondent must avoid this trap by refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without its correlate2 and by requiring that the correlate shall be distinctly enunciated along with it4 ,he ought to treat the relative without its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant expression--as merely syncategorematic2 just as ten is in the phrase--ten minus one1 or as the affirmative word is in a negative proposition4#abf ,thus he will not recognize double as significant by itself without its correlate half1 nor half without its correlate double2 although in common parlance such correlate is often understood without being formally enunciated4 ,footnote #abf3 ,soph4 ,el4 ,xxxi4 p4 #aha1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 ou7 dote_/on tn pro_/s ti legome_/nn smai_/nein ti chrizome_/nas kath' au7tas tas katgori_/as4 ,mr4 ,poste observes in his note3--,the sophistic locus of tautology may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus4 ,one fault which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction of superfluous words4 ,he then cites ,topic4 ,,vi4 ii4 7p4 #ada1 a4 #d1 seq472 but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety1 so that the ,sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology4 ,lastly1 another purpose which ,aristotle ascribes to the ,sophist1 is that of driving the respondent into a ,solecism--into some grammatical or syntactical impropriety1 such as1 using a noun in the wrong case or gender1 using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the noun to which it belongs1 c4 ,he points out that the solution of these verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case2 in general1 when thrown into a regular syllogistic form1 even the questioner himself will be found to speak bad ,greek4 ,the examples given by ,aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern language1 so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their peculiarity4#abg ,footnote #abg3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxii4 p4 #ahb1 a4 #g-;b4 #e4 ,after having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to the ,sophist1 and the ways of solving or meeting them1 ,aristotle remarks that there are material distinctions between the different cases which fall under one and the same general head of ,sophistical ,paralogism4 ,some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself1 and the particular point upon which it turns1 are obvious and discernible at first sight4 ,in other cases1 again1 an ordinary person does not perceive that there is any fallacy at all2 or1 if he does perceive it1 he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy1 so that one man will refer the case to one general head1 and another1 to a different one4#abh ,thus1 for example1 ,fallacies of ,equivocation are perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies2 some of them are childish and jocular1 not really imposing upon any one2 but there are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at first unnoticed1 and is disputed even when pointed out1 so that it can only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis4 ,this happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and general3 which are treated by many1 including even 9999philosophers like ,parmenides and ,zeno1 as if they were not equivocal at all1 but univocal4#abi ,again1 the ,fallaci ,accidentis1 and the other classes ,extra ,dictionem1 are also often hard to detect4 ,on the whole1 it is often hard to determine1 not merely to which of the classes any case of fallacy belongs1 but even whether there is any fallacy at all--whether the refutation is1 or is not1 a valid one4#acj ,footnote #abh3 ,ibid4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahb1 b4 #f-ab4 ,footnote #abi3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahb1 b4 #ac-be3 ,greek3 7_/sper ou7n e7n tois para tn o7mnumi_/an1 o7_/sper dokei tro_/pos eu7the_/statos ei7nai tn paralogismn1 ta men kai tois tuchousi_/n e7sti dla--ta de kai tous e7mpeirota_/tous phai_/netai lantha_/nein2 smeion de tou_/tn o7_/ti ma_/chontai polla_/kis peri o7noma_/tn1 oi7on po_/teron tau7to smai_/nei kata pa_/ntn to o7n kai to e7n 7 e7_/teron4 ,footnote #acj3 ,ibid4 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 o7moi_/s de kai peri tou sumbebko_/tos kai peri tn a7_/lln e7_/kaston1 oi7 men e7_/sontai r7a_/ous i7dein oi7 de chalep_/teroi tn lo_/gn2 kai labein e7_/n tini ge_/nei1 kai po_/teron e7_/legchos 7 ou7k e7_/legchos1 ou7 r7a_/dion o7moi_/s peri pa_/ntn4 ,the pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly1 and create the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle4#aca ,in dialectical debate a puzzle arises1 when the respondent finds that a correct syllogism has been established against him1 and when he does not at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert1 in order to overthrow the conclusion4 ,in the eristic or sophistic debate the puzzle of the respondent is1 in what language to enunciate his propositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will be brought against him by the questioner4#acb ,it is these pungent arguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation4 ,the most pungent of all is1 where the syllogistic premisses are highly probable1 yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion which is also highly probable4 ,here we have an equal antithesis as to presumptive credibility1 between the premisses taken together on one side and the conclusion on the other4#acc ,we do not know whether it is in the premisses only1 or in the conclusion1 that we are to look for untruth3 the conclusion1 though improbable1 may yet be true1 while we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from untrue premisses2 or the conclusion may be both improbable and untrue1 in which case we must look for untruth in one of the premisses also--either the major or the minor4 ,this is the most embarrassing position of all4 ,another1 rather less embarrassing1 is1 where our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting conclusion to be untrue1 but where each of the premisses on which the conclusion depends is equally probable1 so that we do not at once see in which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought4 ,these two are the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of dialectical debate4 ,footnote #aca3 ,ibid4 #cb3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de drimus lo_/gos o7_/stis a7porein poiei ma_/lista2 da_/knei gar ou7tos ma_/lista4 ,footnote #acb3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahb1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 a7pori_/a d' e7sti ditt_/1 7 men e7n tois sullelogisme_/nois1 o7_/ ti a7ne_/l tis tn e7rtma_/tn1 7 d' e7n tois e7ristikois1 ps ei7_/p tis to protathe_/n4 ,the difficulty here pointed out1 of finding language not open to some logical objection by an acute ,sophist1 is illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for guarding his definitions against attack2 see ,de ,interpret4 vi4 p4 #ag1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 le_/g de a7ntikeisthai tn tou au7tou kata tou au7tou1 m o7mnu_/ms de_/1 kai o7_/sa a7_/lla prosdiorizo_/metha pros tas sophistikas e7nochl_/seis4 ,what is here meant by ,greek3 sophistikai e7nochl_/seis is expressed elsewhere by ,greek3 pros tas logikas duscherei_/as--,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #ba2 ,n4 i4 p4 #ajhg1 b4 #bj4 ,see the ,scholia 7pp4 #aab1 #fea1 ,br47 of ,ammonius and ,alexander upon the above passages of ,de ,interpr4 and ,metaphys4 ,footnote #acc3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahb1 b4 #cg-p4 #ahc1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de sullogistikos men lo_/gos drimu_/tatos1 a7n e7x o7_/ti ma_/lista dokou_/ntn o7_/ti ma_/lista e7_/ndoxon a7nair2 ei7s gar 7n o7 lo_/gos1 metatitheme_/ns ts a7ntipha_/ses1 a7_/pantas o7moi_/ous e7_/xei tous sullogismou_/s2 a7ei gar e7x e7ndo_/xn o7moi_/s e7_/ndoxon a7nair_/sei 7 kataskeua_/sei2 dio_/per a7porein a7nagkaion4 ma_/lista men ou7n o7 toioutos drimu_/s1 o7 e7x i7_/sou to sumpe_/rasma poin tois e7rt_/masi4 ,i transcribe this text as it is given by ,bekker1 ,waitz1 ,bussemaker1 and ,mr4 ,poste4 ,the editions anterior to ,bekker had the additional words ,greek3 7 kataskeua_/z after ,greek3 a7nair in the fourth line2 and ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire in his translation defends and retains them4 ,bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them1 but have retained the last words ,greek3 7 kataskeua_/sei in the seventh line4 ,to me this seems inconsistent3 the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both4 ,i think they ought to be omitted in both4 ,i have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line4 ,this difficult passage 7not well explained by ,alexander1 ,schol4 p4 #cbj1 b4 #i7 requires the explanations of ,waitz and ,mr4 ,poste4 ,the note of ,mr4 ,poste is particularly instructive1 because he expands in full 7p4 #afd7 the three similar syllogisms to which ,aristotle here briefly alludes4 ,the phrase ,greek3 metatitheme_/ns ts a7ntipha_/ses is determined by a passage in ,analyt4 ,priora1 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #ei1 b4 #a3 it means employment of the contradictory of the conclusion1 in combination with either one of the premisses1 to upset the other4 ,the original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses1 each highly probable1 while the conclusion is highly improbable1 being the negation of a highly probable proposition4 ,the original syllogism will stand thus3 ,all ,m is ,p2 ,all ,s is ,m2 ,ergo1 ,all ,s is ,p3 the two premisses being supposed highly probable1 and the conclusion highly improbable4 ,of course1 therefore1 the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable--,some ,s is not ,p4 ,we take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows3--,all ,m is ,p2 ,some ,s is not ,p2 ,ergo ,some ,s is not ,m4 ,and again1 ,some ,s is not ,p3 ,all ,s is ,m2 ,ergo1 ,some ,m is not ,p4 ,all these three syllogisms are similar in this respect3 that each has two highly probable premisses1 while the conclusion is highly improbable4 ,but in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not1 and whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction4#acd ,next in order as to embarrassment stands the case1 where we see in which of the two processes 7negation or distinction7 we are to find our solution1 yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to bring the process to bear2 or whether1 if distinction be the process required1 we are to apply it to the conclusion1 or to one of the premisses4#ace ,a defective syllogistic argument is silly1 when the deficient points are of capital importance--relating to the minor or to the middle term1 or when the assumptions are false and strange2 but it will sometimes be worthy of attention1 if the points deficient are outlying and easily supplied2 in which cases it is the carelessness of the questioner that is to blame1 rather than the argument itself4#acf ,both the line of argument taken by the questioner1 and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent1 may be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes3 either to the thesis and main subject discussed2 or to the adversary personally 7i4e41 to the particular way in which he has been arguing72 or to neither of these1 but simply to prolong the discussion 7i4e41 against time74 ,the solution may thus be sometimes such that it would take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors will allow4#acg ,footnote #acd3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahc1 a4 #g4 ,footnote #ace3 ,ibid4 a4 #i3 ,greek3 deu_/teros de tn a7_/lln o7 dlos men o7_/ti para diai_/resin 7 a7nai_/resi_/n e7sti1 m phaneros d' 7n dia ti_/nos tn 7rtme_/nn a7nai_/resin 7 diai_/resin lute_/os e7sti_/n1 a7lla po_/teron au7_/t para to sumpe_/rasma 7 para_/ ti tn e7rtma_/tn e7sti_/n4 ,mr4 ,poste translates these last words very correctly3--,whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction4 ,here ,aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applying distinction 7,greek3 diai_/resis7 to the conclusion as well as to the premisses1 though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applying disproof 7,greek3 a7nai_/resis7 to the conclusion4 ,see my remarks1 a few pages above1 on ,mr4 ,poste's note respecting ch4 xviii4 7supra1 p4 #djf74 ,footnote #acf3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiii4 p4 #ahc1 a4 #ad-bj4 ,footnote #acg3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba4 ,the last chapter of the ,sophistici ,elenchi is employed by ,aristotle in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine ,books of ,topica 7reckoning the ,sophistici ,elenchi as the ,ninth1 as we ought in propriety to do72 and in appreciating the general bearing and value of that treatise1 having regard to the practice and theory of the day4 ,the business of ,dialectic and ,peirastic is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis1 with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis4 ,this ,aristotle treats as the proper function of ,dialectic per se and of ,peirastic2 considering both--the last1 of course--as referring wholly to the questioner4 ,his purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power--the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis1 so as to drive him into inconsistent answers4 ,it appears that ,aristotle would not have cared to teach the respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure1 if there had not happened to be another art--,sophistic1 closely bordering on ,dialectic and ,peirastic4 ,he considers it indispensable to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical cross-examination2 and this could not be done without teaching him at the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of ,dialectic and ,peirastic4 ,for this reason it is 7,aristotle 9999tells us#ach7 that he has included in the ,topica precepts on the best mode of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments1 as well as of impugning it4 ,the respondent professes to know 7while the questioner does not71 and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man of knowledge4 ,sokrates1 the prince of dialecticians1 did nothing but question and cross-examine3 he would never be respondent at all2 for he explicitly disclaimed knowledge4 ,and if it were not for the neighbourhood of ,sophistic1 ,aristotle would have thought it sufficient to teach a procedure like that of ,sokrates4 ,it was the danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his scheme--to unmask the ,sophists by enumerating the paralogisms peculiar to them1 and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against them4 ,we remember that ,aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called ,sophistic1 and as if they were employed by ,sophists exclusively2 as if the ,dialecticians and the ,peirasts1 including among them ,sokrates and ,plato1 put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling into paralogisms4 ,footnote #ach3 ,ibid4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahc1 a4 #cg-;b4 #h3 ,greek3 proeilo_/metha men ou7n eu7rein du_/nami_/n tina sullogistikn peri tou problthe_/ntos e7k tn u7parcho_/ntn 7s e7ndoxota_/tn2 touto gar e7_/rgon e7sti ts dialektiks kath' au7tn kai ts peirastiks4 e7pei de proskataskeua_/zetai pros au7tn dia tn ts sophistiks geitni_/asin1 7s ou7 mo_/non peiran du_/natai labein dialektiks1 a7lla kai 7s ei7d_/s1 dia touto ou7 mo_/non to lechthen e7_/rgon u7pethe_/metha ts pragmatei_/as to lo_/gon du_/nasthai labein1 a7lla kai o7_/ps lo_/gon u7pe_/chontes phula_/xomen tn the_/sin 7s di' e7ndoxota_/tn o7motro_/ps4 tn d' ai7ti_/an ei7r_/kamen tou_/tou1 e7pei kai dia touto ,skra_/ts 7r_/ta a7ll' ou7k a7pekri_/neto2 7molo_/gei gar ou7k ei7de_/nai4 ,it appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word has dropped out which is necessary to the sense4 ,we now read 7about the middle7 ,greek3 7s ou7 mo_/non peiran du_/natai labein dialektiks1 a7lla kai 7s ei7d_/s4 ,now the words ,greek3 peiran labein as the passage stands1 must be construed along with ,greek3 7s ei7d_/s1 and this makes no meaning at all1 or an inadmissible meaning4 ,i think it clear that the word ,greek3 u7pe_/chein or ,greek3 dounai has dropped out before ,greek3 ei7d_/s4 ,the passage will then stand3--,greek3 7s ou7 mo_/non peiran du_/natai labein dialektiks1 a7lla kai u7pe_/chein 7or ,greek3 dounai7 7s ei7d_/s4 ,when this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in harmony with what follows1 which at present it is not4 ,greek3 ,peiran labein applies to the questioner1 but not to the respondent2 ,greek3 7s ei7d_/s applies to the respondent1 but not to the questioner2 ,greek3 peiran u7pe_/chein applies to the respondent1 and is therefore the fit concomitant of ,greek3 7s ei7d_/s4 ,the translation given by ,mr4 ,poste first 7p4 #ic73--professing not only to test knowledge with the resources of ,dialectic1 but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility of science appears to me 7excepting the word infallibility1 which is unsuitable7 to render ,aristotle's thought1 though not his words as they now stand2 but ,mr4 ,poste has given what he thinks an amended translation 7p4 #age73--,since it claims the power of catechizing or cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically4 ,this second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of ,aristotle1 but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine4 ,aristotle does not claim for either ,dialecticians or ,sophists the power of cross-examining scientifically4 ,he ascribes to the ,sophists nothing but cavil and fallacy--verbal and extra-verbal--the pretence and sham of being wise or knowing 7,soph4 ,el4 i41 ii4 p4 #afe74 ,aristotle1 we have already more than once seen1 asserts emphatically his claim to originality as having been the first to treat these subjects theoretically1 and to suggest precepts founded on the theory4 ,on all important subjects 7he remarks7 the elaboration of any good theory is a gradual process1 the work of several successive authors4 ,the first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary2 upon these1 however1 subsequent authors build1 both correcting and enlarging1 until1 after some considerable time1 a tolerably complete scheme or system comes to be constructed4 ,such has been the case with ,rhetoric and other arts4 ,tisias was the first writer and preceptor on ,rhetoric1 yet with poor and insufficient effect4 ,to him succeeded ,thrasymachus1 next ,theodorus1 and various others2 from each of whom partial improvements and additions were derived1 until at length we have now 7it is ,aristotle that speaks7 a copious body of rhetorical theory and precept1 inherited from predecessors and accumulated by successive traditions4 ,compared with this1 the earliest attempt at theory was indeed narrow and imperfect2 but it was nevertheless the first step in a great work1 and1 as such1 it was the most difficult and the most important4 ,the task of building on a foundation already laid1 is far easier4#aci ,footnote #aci3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahc1 b4 #ag-bf3 ,greek3 tn gar eu7riskome_/nn a7pa_/ntn ta men par' e7te_/rn lphthe_/nta pro_/teron peponme_/na kata me_/ros e7pide_/dken u7po tn paralabo_/ntn u7_/steron2 ta d' e7x u7parchs eu7risko_/mena mikran to prton e7pi_/dosin lamba_/nein ei7_/the1 chrsimte_/ran me_/ntoi poll ts u7_/steron e7k tou_/tn au7x_/ses2 me_/giston gar i7_/ss a7rch panto_/s1 7_/sper le_/getai2 dio kai chalep_/taton2 o7_/s gar kra_/tiston t duna_/mei1 tosou_/t mikro_/taton o7n t mege_/thei chalep_/tato_/n e7stin o7phthnai2 tau_/ts d' eu7rme_/ns r7aon prostithe_/nai kai sunau_/xein to loipo_/n e7stin4 ,while rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to maturity1 the case has been altogether different with ,dialectic4 ,in this ,i 7,aristotle7 found no basis prepared2 no predecessor to follow2 no models to copy4 ,i had to begin from the beginning1 and to make good the first step myself4 ,the process of syllogizing had never yet been analysed or explained by any one2 much less had anything been set forth about the different applications of it in detail4 ,i worked it out for myself1 without any assistance1 by long and laborious application4#adj ,there existed indeed paid teachers1 both in ,dialectic and in ,eristic 7or ,sophistic72 but their teaching has been entirely without analysis1 or theory1 or system4 ,just as rhetoricians gave to their pupils orations to learn by heart1 so these dialectical teachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects which they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse4 ,they thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency2 but they communicated no art1 no rational conception of what was to be sought or avoided1 no skill or power of dealing with new circumstances4#ada ,they proceeded like men1 who1 professing to show how comfortable covering might be provided for the feet1 should not teach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself1 but should merely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes--a present valuable indeed for use1 but quite unconnected with any skill as an artificer4 ,the syllogism as a system and theory1 with precepts founded on that theory for ,demonstration and ,dialectic1 has originated first with me 7,aristotle74 ,mine is the first step1 and therefore a small one1 though worked out with much thought and hard labour3 it must be looked at as a first step1 and judged with indulgence4 ,you1 my readers1 or hearers of my lectures1 if you think that ,i have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start1 compared with other more advanced departments of theory1 will acknowledge what ,i have achieved1 and pardon what ,i have left for others to accomplish4#adb ,footnote #adj3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahd1 a4 #h3 ,greek3 kai peri men tn r7torikn u7prche polla kai palaia ta lego_/mena1 peri de tou sullogi_/zesthai pantels ou7den ei7_/chomen pro_/teron a7_/llo le_/gein1 a7ll' 7 trib ztountes polun chro_/non e7ponoumen4 ,footnote #ada3 ,ibid4 a4 #a3 ,greek3 dio_/per tacheia men a7_/technos d' 7n 7 didaskali_/a tois mantha_/nousi par' au7tn2 ou7 gar te_/chnn a7lla ta a7po ts te_/chns dido_/ntes paideu_/ein u7pela_/mbanon4 ,cicero1 in describing his own treatise ,de ,oratore1 insists upon the marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common rhetorical precepts2 he claims to have followed the manner of the ,aristotelian ,dialogues3--,scripsi ,aristoteleo more1 quemadmodum quidem volui1 tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de ,oratore1 quos arbitror ,lentulo tuo fore non inutiles4 ,abhorrent enim a communibus prceptis1 atque omnem antiquorum et ,aristoteleam et ,isocrateam rationem oratoriam complectuntur 7,cicero1 ,epist4 ad ,famill4 i4 #i74 ,footnote #adb3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahd1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 ei7 de phai_/netai theasame_/nois u7min 7s e7k toiou_/tn e7x a7rchs u7parcho_/ntn e7_/chein 7 metho_/dos i7kans para tas a7_/llas pragmatei_/as tas e7k parado_/ses 7uxme_/nas1 loipon a7n ei7_/ pa_/ntn u7mn 7 tn 7kroame_/nn e7_/rgon tois men paraleleimme_/nois ts metho_/dou suggn_/mn tois d' eu7rme_/nois polln e7_/chein cha_/rin4 ,it would seem that by ,greek3 tois theasame_/nois ,aristotle means to address the readers of the present treatise1 while by ,greek3 tn 7kroame_/nn he designates those who had heard his oral expositions on the same subject4 ,such is the impressive closing chapter of the ,sophistici ,elenchi4 ,it is remarkable in two ways3 first1 that ,aristotle expressly addresses himself to hearers and readers in the second person2 next1 that he asserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on ,logic1 and declares himself to have worked out even the first beginnings of such theory by laborious application4 ,i understand his claim to originality as intended to bear1 not simply on the treatise called ,sophistici ,elenchi and on the enumeration of ,fallacies therein contained1 but1 in a larger sense1 on the theory of the ,syllogism2 as first unfolded in the ,analytica ,priora1 applied to ,demonstration in the ,analytica ,posteriora1 applied afterwards to ,dialectic in the ,topica1 applied lastly to ,sophistic 7or ,eristic7 in the ,sophistici ,elenchi4 ,the phrase1 ,respecting the process of syllogizing1#adc ,i found absolutely nothing prepared1 but worked it out by laborious application for myself--seems plainly to denote this large comprehension4 ,and1 indeed1 in respect to ,sophistic separately1 the remark of ,aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him1 would not be well founded3 we find in his own treatise of the ,sophistici ,elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines1 from which he dissents4#add ,in these prior doctrines1 however1 his predecessors had treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to the ,syllogism and its general theory4#ade ,it is against such separation that ,aristotle distinctly protests4 ,he insists upon the necessity of first expounding the ,syllogism1 and of discussing the laws of good or bad ,refutation as a corollary or dependant of the syllogistic theory4 ,accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating that he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest generalities of the subject2#adf and he concludes it by claiming this method of philosophizing as original with himself4 ,footnote #adc3 ,soph4 ,el4 xxxiv4 p4 #ahd1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 peri de tou sullogi_/zesthai pantels ou7den ei7_/chomen pro_/teron a7_/llo le_/gein1 c4 7cited in a preceding note74 ,footnote #add3 ,see note p4 #djb4 ,footnote #ade3 ,soph4 ,el4 x4 p4 #aga1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 o7_/ls te a7_/topon1 to peri e7le_/gchou diale_/gesthai1 a7lla' m pro_/teron peri sullogismou2 o7 gar e7_/legchos sullogismo_/s e7stin1 7_/ste chr kai peri sullogismou pro_/teron 7 peri pseudous e7le_/gchou4 ,footnote #adf3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #afd1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 le_/gmen1 a7rxa_/menoi kata phu_/sin a7po tn pr_/tn4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,physica ,,and ,,metaphysica4 ,aristotle distinguishes1 in clear and explicit language1 a science which he terms ,wisdom1 ,philosophy1 or ,first ,philosophy2 the subject-matter of which he declares to be ,ens quatenus ,ens1 together with the concomitants belonging to it as such4 ,with this ,ontology the treatise entitled ,metaphysica purports to deal1 and the larger portion of it does really so deal4 ,at the same time1 the line that parts off ,ontology from ,logic 7,analytic and ,dialectic7 on the one hand1 and from ,physics on the other1 is not always clearly marked4 ,for1 though the whole process of ,syllogism1 employed both in ,analytic and ,dialectic1 involves and depends upon the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 yet the discussion of this ,maxim is declared to belong to ,first ,philosophy2#a while not only the four ,aristotelian varieties of ,cause or ,condition1 and the distinction between ,potential and ,actual1 but also the abstractions ,form1 ,matter and ,privation1 which play so capital a part in the ,metaphysica1 are equally essential and equally appealed to in the ,physica4#b ,footnote #a3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 a4 #ai-;b4 #aa4 ,whether that discussion properly belongs to ,philosophia ,prima1 or not1 stands as the first ,greek3 ,a7pori_/a enumerated in the list which occupies ,book ,b4 in that treatise1 p4 #iie1 b4 #d-ac2 compare ,k4 i4 p4 #ajei1 a4 #bd4 ,footnote #b3 ,physica1 ,i4 pp4 #aij-aia2 ,,ii4 p4 #aid1 b4 #bj1 seq42 ,metaph4 ,a4 p4 #ihc1 a4 #cc2 ,alexander ad ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #cjf1 ed4 ,bonitz2 p4 #fhi1 b4 ,schol4 ,br4 ,if we include both what is treated in the ,analytica ,posteriora 7the scientific explanation of ,essence and ,definition7 and what is treated in the ,physica1 we shall find that nearly all the expository processes employed in the ,metaphysica are employed also in these two treatises4 ,to look upon the general notion as a cause1 and to treat it as a creative force 7der schpferische ,wesensbegriff1 to use the phrase of ,prantl and other ,german logicians#c71 belongs alike to the ,physica and to the ,analytica ,posteriora4 ,the characteristic distinction of the treatise entitled ,metaphysica is1 that it is all-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered2 that the expository process is applied1 not exclusively to any separate branch of ,ens1 but to ,ens as a whole quatenus ,ens--to all the varieties of ,ens that admit of scientific treatment at all2#d that the same abstractions and analytical distinctions1 which1 both in the ,analytica and in the ,physica1 are indicated and made to serve an explanatory purpose1 up to a certain point--are in the ,metaphysica sometimes assumed as already familiar1 sometimes followed out with nicer accuracy and subtlety4#e ,indeed both the ,physica and the ,metaphysica1 as we read them in ,aristotle1 would be considered in modern times as belonging alike to the department of ,metaphysics4 ,footnote #c3 ,see ch4 viii4 pp4 #bdj seq4 of the present work1 with the citations in note b1 p4 #beb1 from ,prantl and ,rassow4 ,footnote #d3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 i4 p4 #ajjc1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 e7_/stin e7pist_/m tis 7 therei to o7n 7 o7n kai ta tou_/t u7pa_/rchonta kath' au7to_/4 ,au7_/t d' e7stin ou7demi_/a tn e7n me_/rei legome_/nn 7 au7t_/4 ou7demi_/a gar tn a7_/lln e7piskopei katho_/lou peri tou o7_/ntos 7 o7_/n1 a7lla me_/ros au7tou ti a7potemo_/menai1 c4 ,footnote #e3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,l4 vii4 p4 #ajgc1 a4 with ,bonitz's ,comment4 pp4 #ejd-eje4 ,physica1 ,i4 ix4 p4 #aib1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 peri de ts kata to ei7dos a7rchs1 po_/teron mi_/a 7 pollai kai ti_/s 7 ti_/nes ei7si_/1 di' a7kribei_/as ts pr_/ts philosophi_/as e7_/rgon e7sti diori_/sai1 7_/st' ei7s e7keinon ton kairon a7pokei_/sth4 ,compare ,physic4 ,i4 viii4 p4 #aia1 b4 #bi1 and ,weisse1 ,aristoteles ,physik1 p4 #bhe4 ,about the ,metaphysica1 as carrying out and completing the exposition of the ,analytica ,posteriora1 see ,metaphys4 ,z4 xii4 p4 #ajcg1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 nun de le_/gmen prton1 e7ph' o7_/son e7n tois ,a7nalutikois peri o7rismou m ei7_/rtai 7,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #ib1 a4 #cb2 see note b1 p4 #bdc74 ,the primary distinction and classification recognized by ,aristotle among ,sciences or ,cognitions1 is1 that of 7#a7 ,theoretical1 7#b7 ,practical1 7#c7 ,artistic or ,constructive4#f ,of these three divisions1 the second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action1 but the two are distinguished from each other by this--that in the ,artistic there is always some assignable product which the agency leaves behind independent of itself1 whereas in the ,practical no such independent result remains1#g but the agency itself1 together with the purpose 7or intellectual and volitional condition7 of the agent1 is every thing4 ,the division named ,theoretical comprises intelligence alone--intelligence of principia1 causes and constituent elements4 ,here again we find a tripartite classification4 ,the highest and most universal of all ,theoretical ,sciences is recognized by ,aristotle as ,ontology 7,first ,philosophy1 sometimes called by him ,theology7 which deals with all ,ens universally quatenus ,ens1 and with the ,prima ,moventia1 themselves immoveable1 of the entire ,kosmos4 ,the two other heads of ,theoretical ,science are ,mathematics and ,physics2 each of them special and limited1 as compared with ,ontology4 ,in ,physics we scientifically study natural bodies with their motions1 changes1 and phenomena2 bodies in which ,form always appears implicated with ,matter1 and in which the principle of motion or change is immanent and indwelling 7i4e41 dependent only on the universal ,prima ,moventia1 and not impressed from without by a special agency1 as in works of human art74 ,in ,mathematics1 we study immoveable and unchangeable numbers and magnitudes1 apart from the bodies to which they belong2 not that they can ever be really separated from such bodies1 but we intellectually abstract them1 or consider them apart4#h ,footnote #f3 ,metaphys4 ,e4 i4 p4 #ajbe1 b4 #be4 ,footnote #g3 ,ibid4 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #h3 ,metaphys4 ,e4 i4 p4 #ajbf2 ,k4 vii4 p4 #ajfd1 a4 #bh-;b4 #ad2 ,m4 iii4 pp4 #ajgg-ajgh2 ,bonitz1 ,commentar4 p4 #bhd4 ,such is ,aristotle's tripartite distribution of ,theoretical or ,contemplative ,science4 ,in introducing us to the study of ,first ,philosophy1 he begins by clearing up the meaning of the term ,ens4 ,it is a term of many distinct significations2 being neither univocal1 nor altogether equivocal1 but something intermediate between the two1 or multivocal4 ,it is not a generic whole1 distributed exhaustively among correlative species marked off by an assignable difference3#i it is an analogical whole1 including several genera distinct from each other at the beginning1 though all of them branches derivative from one and the same root2 all of them connected by some sort of analogy or common relation to that one root1 yet not necessarily connected with each other by any direct or special tie4 ,footnote #i3 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 ii4 p4 #ajjc1 a4 #cc-p4 #ajjd1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 to d' o7n le_/getai men pollachs1 a7lla pros e7n kai mi_/an tina phu_/sin1 kai ou7ch o7mnu_/m s--u7pa_/rchei gar eu7thus ge_/n e7_/chonta to o7n kai to e7_/n4 ,compare ,k4 iii4 p4 #ajfj1 b4 #cb4 ,see also above1 ch4 iii4 p4 #fj1 of the present work4 ,of these various significations1 he enumerates1 as we have already seen1 four3--7#a7 ,ens which is merely concomitant with1 dependent upon1 or related to1 another ,ens as terminus2 7#b7 ,ens in the sense of the ,true1 opposed to ,non-,ens in the sense of the ,false2 7#c7 ,ens according to each of the ,ten ,categories2 7#d7 ,ens potentially1 as contrasted with ,ens actually4 ,but among these four heads1 the two last only are matters upon which science is attainable1 in the opinion of ,aristotle4 ,to these two1 accordingly1 he 9999confines ,ontology or ,first ,philosophy4 ,they are the only two that have an objective1 self-standing1 independent1 nature4 ,that which falls under the first head 7,ens per ,accidens7 is essentially indeterminate2 and its causes1 being alike indeterminate1 are out of the reach of science4 ,so also is that which falls under the second head--,ens tanquam verum1 contrasted with ,non-,ens tanquam falsum4 ,this has no independent standing1 but results from an internal act of the judging or believing mind1 combining two elements1 or disjoining two elements1 in a way conformable to1 or non-conformable to1 real fact4 ,the true combination or disjunction is a variety of ,ens2 the false combination or disjunction is a variety of ,non-,ens4 ,this mental act varies both in different individuals1 and at different times with the same individual1 according to a multitude of causes often unassignable4 ,accordingly1 it does not fall under ,ontological ,science1 nor can we discover any causes or principles determining it4#aj ,when ,aristotle says that the two first heads are out of the reach of science1 or not proper subjects of science1 he means that their first principia1 causes1 or deepest foundations1 cannot be discovered and assigned2 for it is in determining these principia and causes that true scientific cognition consists4#aa ,footnote #aj3 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,e4 iv4 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #ag2 ,greek3 ,th4 p4 #ajea1 b4 #b2 p4 #ajeb1 a4 #ag-cj2 ,k4 viii4 p4 #ajfe1 a4 #ba4 ,there remains much obscurity about this meaning of ,ens 7,ens ,greek3 7s a7lthe_/s71 even after the ,scholia of ,alexander 7p4 #gja1 a4 #aj1 ,sch4 ,brand471 and the instructive comments of ,bonitz1 ,schwegler1 and ,brentano 7,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles1 ch4 iii4 pp4 #ba-ci74 ,the foundation of this meaning of ,ens lies in the legitimate ,antiphasis1 and the proper division thereof 7,greek3 to de su_/nolon peri merismon a7ntipha_/ses1 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #bj74 ,it is a first principle 7p4 #ajje1 b4 #cj7 that1 if one member of the ,antiphasis must be affirmed as true1 the other must be denied as false4 ,if we fix upon the right combination to affirm1 we say the thing that is3 if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it1 we say the thing that is not 7p4 #ajab1 b4 #aj74 ,falsehood and ,truth 7,aristotle says1 ,e4 iv4 p4 #ajbg1 b4 #be7 are not in things but in our mental combination2 and as regards simple 7uncombined7 matters and essences1 they are not even in our mental combination3 ,greek3 ou7 ga_/r e7sti to pseudos kai to a7lthes e7n tois pra_/gmasin1 oi7on to men a7gathon a7lthe_/s1 to de kakon eu7thus pseudos1 a7ll' e7n dianoi_/a2 peri de ta a7pla kai ta ti_/ e7stin ou7d' e7n t dianoi_/a4 ,compare ,bonitz 7ad ,ar4 ,metaph4 ,z4 iv4 p4 #ajcj1 a471 p4 #caj1 ,comm4 ,in regard to cogitabilia--simple1 indivisible1 uncompounded--there is no combination or disjunction2 therefore1 strictly speaking1 neither truth nor falsehood 7,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #bf2 also ,categor4 x4 p4 #ac1 b4 #aj74 ,the intellect either apprehends these simple elements1 or it does not apprehend them2 there is no ,greek3 dia_/noia concerned4 ,not to apprehend them is ignorance1 ,greek3 a7_/gnoia1 which sometimes loosely passes under the title of ,greek3 pseudos 7,schwegler1 ,comm4 ,pt4 ,,ii41 p4 #cb74 ,footnote #aa3 ,metaphys4 ,e4 i4 p4 #ajbe1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 ai7 a7rchai kai ta ai7_/tia zteitai tn o7_/ntn1 dlon d' o7_/ti 7 o7_/nta4--o7_/ls de pasa e7pist_/m dianotik 7 mete_/chousa_/ ti dianoi_/as peri ai7ti_/as kai a7rcha_/s e7stin 7 a7kribeste_/ras 7 a7plouste_/ras4 ,compare ,metaph4 ,k4 vii4 p4 #ajfc1 b4 #cf2 p4 #ajfe1 a4 #h-bf4 ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #ga1 b4 #i4 ,there remain1 as matter proper for the investigation of ,first ,philosophy1 the two last-mentioned heads of ,ens2 viz41 ,ens according to the ,ten ,categories1 and ,ens potential and actual4 ,but1 along with these1 ,aristotle includes another matter also2 viz41 the critical examination of the ,axioms and highest generalities of syllogistic proof or ,demonstration4 ,he announces as the first principle of these ,axioms--as the highest and firmest of all ,principles--the ,maxim of ,contradiction3#ab ,the same predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the same subject1 at the same time and in the same sense2 or1 ,you cannot both truly affirm1 and truly deny1 the same predicate respecting the same subject2 or1 ,the same proposition cannot be at once true and false4 ,this ,axiom is by nature the beginning or source of all the other ,axioms4 ,it stands first in the order of knowledge2 and it neither rests upon nor involves any hypothesis4#ac ,footnote #ab3 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #g1 #ag1 #bb1 #cd3 ,greek3 au7_/t d pasn e7sti bebaiota_/t tn a7rchn--phu_/sei gar a7rch kai tn a7_/lln a7xima_/tn au7_/t pa_/ntn4--p4 #ajaa1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 bebaiota_/t do_/xa pasn to m ei7nai a7ltheis a7_/ma tas a7ntikeime_/nas pha_/seis--7,he here applies the term ,greek3 do_/xa to designate this fundamental maxim4 ,this deserves notice1 because of the antithesis1 common with him elsewhere1 between ,greek3 do_/xa and ,greek3 e7pist_/m74 ,footnote #ac3 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #ac-ad3 ,greek3 gnrimta_/tn--a7nupo_/theton4 ,the ,syllogism is defined by ,aristotle as consisting of premisses and a conclusion3 if the two propositions called premisses be granted as true1 a third as conclusion must for that reason be granted as true also4#ad ,the truth of the conclusion is affirmed conditionally on the truth of the premisses2 and the rules of ,syllogism set out those combinations of propositions in which such affirmation may be made legitimately4 ,the rules of the ,syllogism being thus the rules for such conditional affirmation1 the ,principle or ,axiom thereof enunciates in the most general terms what is implied in all those rules1 as essential to their validity4 ,and1 since the syllogistic or deductive process is applicable without exception to every variety of the ,scibile1 ,aristotle considers the ,axioms or ,principles thereof to come under the investigation of ,ontology or ,first ,philosophy4 ,thus it is1 that he introduces us to the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 and its supplement or correlative1 the ,maxim of the ,excluded ,middle4 ,footnote #ad3 ,analyt4 ,prior4 ,i4 i4 p4 #bd1 b4 #ah-bj1 et alib4 ,his vindication of these ,axioms is very illustrative of the philosophy of his day4 ,it cannot be too often impressed that he was the first either to formulate the precepts2 or to ascend to the theory1 of deductive reasoning2 that he was the first to mark by appropriate terms the most important logical distinctions and characteristic attributes of propositions2 that before his time1 there was abundance of acute dialectic1 but no attempt to set forth any critical scheme whereby the conclusions of such dialectic might be tested4 ,anterior to ,sokrates1 the cast of ,grecian philosophy had been altogether either theological1 or poetical1 or physical1 or at least some fusion of these three varieties into one4 ,sokrates was the first who broke ground for ,logic--for testing the difference between good and bad ratiocination4 ,he did this by enquiry as to the definition of general terms1#ae and by dialectical exposure of the ignorance generally prevalent among those who familiarly used them4 ,plato in his ,sokratic dialogues followed in the same negative track2 opening up many instructive points of view respecting the erroneous tendencies by which reasoners were misled1 but not attempting any positive systematic analysis1 nor propounding any intelligible scheme of his own for correction or avoidance of the like4 ,if ,sokrates and ,plato1 both of them active in exposing ratiocinative error and confusion1 stopped short of any wide logical theory1 still less were the physical philosophers likely to supply that deficiency4 ,aristotle tells us that several of them controverted the ,maxim of ,contradiction4#af ,herakleitus and his followers maintained the negative of it1 distinctly and emphatically2#ag while the disciples of ,parmenides1 though less pronounced in their negative1 could not have admitted it as universally true4 ,even ,plato must be reckoned among those who1 probably without having clearly stated to himself the ,maxim in its universal terms1 declared doctrines quite incompatible with it3 the ,platonic ,parmenides affords a conspicuous example of contradictory conclusions deduced by elaborate reasoning and declared to be both of them firmly established4#ah ,moreover1 in the ,sophistes1#ai ,plato explains the negative proposition as expressing what is different from that which is denied1 but nothing beyond2 an explanation which1 if admitted1 would set aside the ,maxim of ,contradiction as invalid4 ,footnote #ae3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 vi4 p4 #ihg1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 ,s kra_/tous de peri men ta 7thika pragmateuome_/nou1 peri de ts o7_/ls phu_/ses ou7the_/n1 e7n me_/ntoi tou_/tois to katho_/lou ztountos1 kai peri o7rismn e7pist_/santos pr_/tou tn dia_/noian4 ,footnote #af3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 ei7si de_/ tines1 oi7_/1 katha_/per ei7_/pomen1 au7toi_/ te e7nde_/chesthai_/ phasi to au7to ei7nai kai m ei7nai1 kai u7polamba_/nein ou7_/ts4 chrntai de t lo_/g tou_/t polloi kai tn peri phu_/ses4 ,footnote #ag3 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #be2 v4 p4 #ajaj1 a4 #ac2 vi4 p4 #ajaa1 a4 #bd4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,republic4 v4 p4 #dgi1 ,a42 vii4 p4 #ech1 ,e4 ,compare also the conclusion of the ,platonic ,parmenides1 and the elaborate dialectic or antinomies by which the contradictions involved in it are proved4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 p4 #beg1 ,b4 ,while ,aristotle mentions these various dissentients1 and especially ,herakleitus1 he seems to imagine that they were not really in earnest#bj in their dissent4 ,yet he nevertheless goes at length into the case against them1 as well as against others1 who agreed with him in affirming the ,maxim1 but who undertook also to demonstrate it4 ,any such demonstration ,aristotle declares to be impossible4 ,the ,maxim is assumed in all demonstrations2 unless you grant it1 no demonstration is valid2 but it cannot be itself demonstrated4 ,he had already laid down in the ,analytica that the premisses for demonstration could not be carried back indefinitely1 and that the attempt so to carry them back was unphilosophical4#ba ,there must be some primary1 undemonstrable truths2 and the ,maxim of ,contradiction he ranks among the first4 ,still1 though in attempting any formal demonstration of the ,maxim you cannot avoid assuming the ,maxim itself and thus falling into ,petitio ,principii1 ,aristotle contends that you can demonstrate it in the way of refutation1#bb relatively to a given opponent1 provided such opponent will not content himself with simply denying it1 but will besides advance some affirmative thesis of his own1 as a truth in which he believes2 or provided he will even grant the fixed meaning of words1 defining them in a manner significant alike to himself and to others1--each word to have either one fixed meaning1 or a limited number of different meanings1 clear and well defined4#bc ,it is impossible for two persons to converse1 unless each understands the other4 ,a word which conveys to the mind not one meaning1 but a multitude of unconnected meanings1 is for all useful purposes unmeaning4#bd ,if1 therefore1 the opponent once binds himself to an affirmative definition of any word1 this definition may be truly predicated of the definitum as subject2 while he must be considered as interdicting himself from predicating of the same subject the negative of that definition4 ,but when you ask for the definition1 your opponent must answer the question directly and bon fide4 ,he must not enlarge his definition so as to include both the affirmative and negative of the same proposition2 nor must he tack on to the real essence 7declared in the definition7 a multitude of unessential attributes4 ,if he answers in this confused and perplexing manner1 he must be treated as not answering at all1 and as rendering philosophical discussion impossible4#be ,such a mode of speaking goes to disallow any ultimate essence or determinate subject1 and shuts out all predication2 for there cannot be an infinite regress of predicates upon predicates1 and accidents upon accidents1 without arriving at an ultimate substratum--,subject or ,essence4#bf ,if1 wherever you can truly affirm a predicate of any subject1 you can also truly deny the same predicate of the same subject1 it is manifest that all subjects are one3 there is nothing to discriminate man1 horse1 ship1 wall1 c41 from each other2 every one speaks truth1 and every one at the same time speaks falsehood2 a man believes and disbelieves the same thing at the same time2 or he neither believes nor disbelieves1 and then his mind is blank1 like a vegetable4#bg ,footnote #bj3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #bf2 ,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #cb4 ,here ,aristotle intimates that ,herakleitus may have asserted what he did not believe2 though we find him in another place citing ,herakleitus as an example of those who adhered as obstinately to their opinions as other persons adhered to demonstrated truth 7,ethic4 ,nik4 ,,vii4 v4 p4 #aadf1 b4 #cj474 ,footnote #ba3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 a7xiousi d kai touto a7podeiknu_/nai tines di' a7paideusi_/an2 e7_/sti gar a7paideusi_/a to m gign_/skein ti_/nn dei ztein a7po_/deixin kai ti_/nn ou7 dei4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' a7podeixai e7legktiks kai peri tou_/tou o7_/ti a7du_/naton1 a7n mo_/non ti le_/g o7 a7mphisbtn4--,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 kai peri tn toiou_/tn a7pls men ou7k e7_/stin a7po_/deixis1 pros to_/nde d' e7_/stin4--p4 #ajfb1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #bc3 ,ibid4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 a4 #ah-cd4 ,greek3 diaphe_/rei d' ou7then ou7_/d' ei7 plei_/ tis phai_/ smai_/nein1 mo_/non de 7risme_/na4--,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #ab4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 to gar m e7_/n ti smai_/nein ou7then smai_/nein e7sti_/n1 m smaino_/ntn de tn o7noma_/tn a7n_/rtai to diale_/gesthai pros a7ll_/lous1 kata de tn a7l_/theian kai pros au7to_/n2 ou7then 9999gar e7nde_/chetai noein m noounta e7_/n4--,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #bj4 ,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 b4 #cj-p4 #ajjg1 a4 #bj4 ,greek3 sumbai_/nei to lechthe_/n1 a7n a7pokri_/ntai to e7rt_/menon4 e7an de prostith e7rtntos a7pls kai tas a7popha_/seis1 ou7k a7pokri_/netai to e7rt_/menon4--e7an de touto poi1 ou7 diale_/getai4 ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 p4 #ajjg1 a4 #bj-;b4 #ai3 ,greek3 o7_/ls d' a7nairousin oi7 touto le_/gontes ou7si_/an kai to ti_/ 7n ei7nai4--ei7 de pa_/nta kata sumbebkos le_/getai1 ou7then e7_/stai prton to kath' ou71 ei7 a7ei to sumbebkos kath' u7pokeime_/nou tinos smai_/nei tn katgori_/an2 a7na_/gk a7_/ra ei7s a7_/peiron i7e_/nai2 a7ll' a7du_/naton4 ,footnote #bg3 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjh1 a4 #ah-;b4 #ab3 ,greek3 ei7 de o7moi_/s kai o7_/sa a7pophsai pha_/nai a7na_/gk--pa_/nta d' a7n ei7_/ e7_/n--ou7then dioi_/sei e7_/teron e7te_/rou--ei7 de mthen u7polamba_/nei a7ll' o7moi_/s oi7_/etai kai ou7k oi7_/etai1 ti_/ a7n diaphero_/nts e7_/choi tn phutn8 ,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #bh4 ,the man who professes this doctrine1 however 7continues ,aristotle#bh71 shows plainly by his conduct that his mind is not thus blank2 that99991 in respect of the contradictory alternative1 he does not believe either both sides or neither side1 but believes one and disbelieves the other4 ,when he feels hungry1 and seeks what he knows to be palatable and wholesome1 he avoids what he knows to be nasty and poisonous4 ,he knows what is to be found in the market-place1 and goes there to get it2 he keeps clear of falling into a well or walking into the sea2 he does not mistake a horse for a man4 ,he may often find himself mistaken2 but he shows by his conduct that he believes certain subjects to possess certain definite attributes1 and not to possess others4 ,though we do not reach infallible truth1 we obtain an approach to it1 sometimes nearer1 sometimes more remote2 and we thus escape the extreme doctrine which forbids all definite affirmation4#bi ,footnote #bh3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjh1 b4 #ab-ca2 ,k4 vi4 p4 #ajfc1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #bi3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjh1 b4 #cf3 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n to mallon e7ggu_/teron1 ei7_/ ge a7_/n ti a7lthes ou7 e7ggu_/teron to mallon a7lthe_/s2 ka7n ei7 m_/ e7stin1 a7ll' 7_/d ge_/ ti e7sti bebaio_/teron kai a7lthin_/teron1 kai tou lo_/gou a7pllagme_/noi a7n ei7_/men tou a7kra_/tou kai klu_/onto_/s ti t dianoi_/a o7ri_/sai4 ,it is in this manner that ,aristotle1 vindicating the ,maxims of ,contradiction and of ,excluded ,middle as the highest principia of syllogistic reasoning1 disposes of the two contemporaneous dogmas that were most directly incompatible with these ,maxims3--7#a7 ,the dogma of ,herakleitus1 who denied all duration or permanence of subject1 recognizing nothing but perpetual process1 flux1 or change1 each successive moment of which involved destruction and generation implicated with each other3 ,is and is not are both alike and conjointly true1 while neither is true separately1 to the exclusion of the other2#cj 7#b7 ,the dogma of ,anaxagoras1 who did not deny fixity or permanence of subject1 but held that everything was mixed up with everything2 that every subject had an infinite assemblage of contrary predicates1 so that neither of them could be separately affirmed or separately denied3 ,the truth lies in a third alternative or middle1 between affirmation and denial4#ca ,footnote #cj3 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,a4 vi4 p4 #ihg1 a4 #cd2 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 ,kra_/tulos--o7s to teleutaion ou7then _/eto dein le_/gein a7lla ton da_/ktulon e7ki_/nei mo_/non1 kai 7raklei_/t e7peti_/ma ei7po_/nti o7_/ti dis t au7t pota_/m ou7k e7_/stin e7mbnai2 au7tos gar 7_/eto ou7_/d' a7pa_/x4 ,herakleitus adopted as his one fundamentum ,fire or ,heat1 as being the principle of mobility or change3 ,greek3 chrntai gar 7s kintikn e7_/chonti t puri tn phu_/sin--,metaph4 ,a4 iii4 p4 #ihd1 b4 #e4 ,ibid4 ,k4 v4 p4 #ajfb1 a4 #ca-;b4 #aj2 ,k4 x4 p4 #ajfg1 a4 #e2 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #ae4 ,footnote #ca3 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,k4 vi4 p4 #ajfc1 b4 #be2 ,a4 viii4 p4 #ihi1 a4 #ca-;b4 #af4 ,greek3 o7_/te gar ou7then 7n a7pokekrime_/non1 dlon 7s ou7then 7n a7lthes ei7pein kata ts ou7si_/as e7kei_/ns1 le_/g d' oi7on o7_/ti ou7_/te leukon ou7_/te me_/lan 7 phaion 7 a7_/llo chrma1 a7ll' a7_/chrn 7n e7x a7na_/gks2 o7moi_/s de kai a7_/chumon t au7t lo_/g tou_/t1 ou7de a7_/llo tn o7moi_/n ou7the_/n2 ou7_/te gar poio_/n ti oi7o_/n te au7to ei7nai ou7_/te poson ou7_/te ti_/4--,greek3 ,g4 iv4 b4 #ajjg1 b4 #be3 ,greek3 kai gi_/gnetai d to tou ,a7naxago_/rou1 o7mou pa_/nta chr_/mata2 7_/ste mthen a7lths u7pa_/rchein4--,greek3 ,g4 viii4 p4 #ajab1 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 e7_/oike d' o7 men 7raklei_/tou lo_/gos1 le_/gn pa_/nta ei7nai kai m ei7nai1 a7_/panta a7lth poiein1 o7 d' ,a7naxago_/rou ei7nai_/ ti metaxu ts a7ntipha_/ses1 7_/ste pa_/nta pseud2 o7_/tan gar michth1 ou7_/t' a7gathon ou7_/t' ou7k a7gathon to migma1 7_/st' ou7then ei7pein a7lthe_/s4 ,having thus refuted these dogmas to his own satisfaction1 ,aristotle proceeds to impugn a third doctrine which he declares to be analogous to these two and to be equally in conflict with the two syllogistic principia which he is undertaking to vindicate4 ,this third doctrine is the ,homo ,mensura of ,protagoras3 ,man is the measure of all things--the measure of things existent as well as of things non-existent3 ,to each individual that is true or false which he believes to be such1 and for as long as he believes it4 ,aristotle contends that this doctrine is homogeneous with those of ,herakleitus and ,anaxagoras1 and must stand or fall along with them2 all three being alike adverse to the ,maxim of ,contradiction4#cb ,herein he follows partially the example of ,plato1 who 7in his ,thettus#cc71 though not formally enunciating the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 had declared the tenets of ,protagoras to be coincident with or analogous to those of ,herakleitus1 and had impugned both one and the other by the same line of arguments4 ,protagoras agreed with ,herakleitus 7so ,plato and ,aristotle tell us7 in declaring both affirmative and negative 7in the contradictory alternative7 to be at once and alike true2 for he maintained that what any person believed was true1 and that what any person disbelieved was false4 ,accordingly1 since opinions altogether opposite and contradictory are held by different persons or by the same person at different times1 both the affirmative and the negative of every ,antiphasis must be held as true alike2#cd in other words1 all affirmations and all negations were at once true and false4 ,such co-existence or implication of contradictions is the main doctrine of ,herakleitus4 ,footnote #cb3 ,aristot4 ,met ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajji1 a4 #f3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' a7po ts au7ts do_/xs kai o7 ,prtago_/rou lo_/gos1 kai a7na_/gk o7moi_/s a7_/mph au7tous 7 ei7nai 7 m ei7nai4 ,footnote #cc3 ,aristotle refers here to ,plato by name1 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 b4 #ab4 ,footnote #cd3 ,ibid4 p4 #ajji1 a4 #h-bj4 ,greek3 a7na_/gk pa_/nta a7_/ma a7lth kai pseud ei7nai4--p4 #ajaa1 a4 #cj4 ,i have already in another work1#ce while analysing the ,platonic dialogues ,thettus and ,kratylus1 criticized at some length the doctrine here laid down by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,i have endeavoured to show that the capital tenet of ,protagoras is essentially distinct from the other tenets with which these two philosophers would identify it3 distinct both from the dogma of ,herakleitus1 ,that everything is in unceasing flux and process1 each particular moment thereof being an implication of contradictions both alike true2 and distinct also from the other dogma held by others1 ,that all cognition is sensible perception4 ,the ,protagorean tenet ,homo ,mensura is something essentially distinct from either of these two2 though possibly ,protagoras himself may have held the second of the two1 besides his own4 ,his tenet is nothing more than a clear and general declaration of the principle of universal ,relativity4 ,true belief and affirmation have no meaning except in relation to some believer1 real or supposed2 true disbelief and negation have no meaning except in relation to some disbeliever1 real or supposed4 ,when a man affirms any proposition as true1 he affirms only what he 7perhaps with some other persons also7 believes to be true1 while others may perhaps disbelieve it as falsehood4 ,object and ,subject are inseparably implicated3 we may separate them by abstraction1 and reason about each apart from the other2 but1 as reality1 they exist only locked up one with the other4 ,footnote #ce3 ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,vol4 ,,ii4 c4 xxvi4 pp4 #cbe-cfc3 ,the ,protagorean doctrine--,man is the measure of all things--is simply the presentation in complete view of a common fact2 uncovering an aspect of it which the received phraseology hides4 ,truth and ,falsehood have reference to some believing subject--and the words have no meaning except in that relation4 ,protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same complex fact1 of which ,truth and ,falsehood denote the objective side4 ,he refuses to admit the object absolute--the pretended thing in itself--,truth without a believer4 ,his doctrine maintains the indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every perception--of the concipient mind in every conception--of the cognizant mind in every cognition4 ,farther1 ,protagoras acknowledges many distinct believing or knowing ,subjects3 and affirms that every object known must be relative to 7or in his language1 measured by7 the knowing ,subject3 that every cognitum must have its cognoscens1 and every cognoscibile its cognitionis capax2 that the words have no meaning unless this be supposed2 that these two names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of cognition--actual or potential--not two factors1 which are in themselves separate or separable1 and which come together to make a compound product4 ,a man cannot in any case get clear of or discard his own mind as a ,subject4 ,self is necessarily omnipresent1 concerned in every moment of consciousness1 c4 ,compare also c4 xxiv4 p4 #bfa4 ,that such is and always has been the state of the fact1 in regard to truth and falsehood1 belief and disbelief1 is matter of notoriety3 ,protagoras not only accepts it as a fact1 but formulates it as a theory4 ,instead of declaring that what he 7or the oracle which he consults and follows7 believes to be true1 is absolute truth1 while that which others believe1 is truth relatively to them1--he lowers his own pretensions to a level with theirs4 ,he professes to be a measure of truth only for himself1 and for such as may be satisfied with the reasons that satisfy him4 ,aristotle complains that this theory discourages the search for truth as hopeless1 not less than the chase after flying birds4#cf ,but1 however serious such discouragement may be1 we do not escape the real difficulty of the search by setting up an abstract idol and calling it ,absolute ,truth1 without either relativity or referee2 while1 if we enter1 as sincere and bon fide enquirers1 on the search for reasoned truth or philosophy1 we shall find ourselves not departing from the ,protagorean canon1 but involuntarily conforming to it4 ,aristotle1 after having declared that the ,maxim of ,contradiction was true beyond the possibility of deception1#cg but yet that there were several eminent philosophers who disallowed it1 is forced to produce the best reasons in his power to remove their doubts and bring them round to his opinion4 ,his reasons must be such as to satisfy not his own mind only1 but the minds of opponents and indifferent auditors as referees4 ,this is an appeal to other men1 as judges each for himself and in his own case3 it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy of each individual enquirer as a measure of truth to himself4 ,in other words1 it is a recognition of the ,protagorean canon4 ,footnote #cf3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajji1 b4 #ch4 ,footnote #cg3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 b4 #aa3 ,greek3 bebaiota_/t d' a7rch pasn1 peri 7n diapseusthnai a7du_/naton4 ,we know little about the opinions of ,protagoras2 but there was nothing in this canon necessarily at variance either with the ,maxim of ,contradiction or with that of ,excluded ,middle4 ,both ,aristotle and ,plato would have us believe that ,protagoras was bound by his canon to declare every opinion to be alike false and true1 because every opinion was believed by some and disbelieved by others4#ch ,but herein they misstate his theory4 ,he did not declare any thing to be absolutely true1 or to be absolutely false4 ,truth and ,falsehood were considered by him as always relative to some referee1 and he recognized no universal or infallible referee4 ,in his theory the necessity of some referee was distinctly enunciated1 instead of being put out of sight under an ellipsis1 as in the received theories and practice4 ,and this is exactly what ,plato and ,aristotle omit1 when they refute him4 ,he proclaimed that each man was a measure for himself alone1 and that every opinion was true to the believer1 false to the disbeliever2 while they criticize him as if he had said--,every opinion is alike true and false2 thus leaving out the very qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his theory4 ,they commit that fallacy which ,plato shows up in the ,euthydmus1 and which ,aristotle#ci numbers in his list of ,fallaci ,extra ,dictionem1 imputing it as a vice to the ,sophists3 they slide dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter4 ,and it is remarkable that ,aristotle1 in one portion of his argument against ,homo ,mensura1 expressly admonishes the ,protagoreans that they must take care to adhere constantly to this qualified mode of enunciation2#dj that they must not talk of apparent truth generally1 but of truth as it appears to themselves or to some other persons1 now or at a different time4 ,protagoras hardly needed such an admonition to keep to what is the key-note and characteristic peculiarity of his own theory2 since it is only by suppressing this peculiarity that his opponents make the theory seem absurd4 ,he would by no means have disclaimed that consequence of his theory1 which ,aristotle urges against it as an irrefragable objection2 viz41 that it makes every thing relative1 and recognizes nothing as absolute4 ,this is perfectly true1 and constitutes its merit in the eyes of its supporters4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,thett4 pp4 #aga-agi4 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjg1 b4 #ba3 ,greek3 ei7 kata panto_/s ti 7 kataphsai 7 a7pophsai e7nde_/chetai1 katha_/per a7na_/gk tois ton ,prtago_/rou le_/gousi lo_/gon4 ,compare v4 p4 #ajji1 a4 #f2 viii4 p4 #ajab1 b4 #ae4 ,footnote #ci3 ,aristot4 ,soph4 ,el4 p4 #afg1 a4 #c2 ,rhetoric4 ,,ii4 xxiv4 p4 #adjb1 a4 #b-ae4 ,greek3 7_/sper kai e7pi tn e7ristikn to kata_/ ti kai pro_/s ti kai p ou7 prostithe_/mena poiei tn sukophanti_/an4 ,footnote #dj3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 vi4 p4 #ajaa1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 dio kai phulakte_/on tois tn bi_/an e7n t lo_/g ztousin1 a7_/ma de kai u7pe_/chein lo_/gon a7xiousin1 o7_/ti ou7 to phaino_/menon e7_/stin1 a7lla to phaino_/menon7 phai_/netai kai o7_/te phai_/netai kai 7 kai 7_/s4--b4 #a3 ,greek3 a7ll' i7_/ss dia tout' a7na_/gk le_/gein tois m di' a7pori_/an a7lla lo_/gou cha_/rin le_/gousin1 o7_/ti ou7k e7_/stin a7lthes touto1 a7lla tou_/t a7lthe_/s4 ,another argument of ,aristotle#da against the ,protagorean ,homo ,mensura--,that it implies in every affirming ,subject an equal authority and equal title to credence1 as compared with every other affirming ,subject--,i have already endeavoured to combat in my review of the ,platonic ,thettus1 where the same argument appears fully developed4 ,the antithesis between ,plato and ,aristotle on one side1 and ,protagoras on the other1 is indeed simply that between ,absolute and ,relative4 ,the ,protagorean doctrine is quite distinct from the other doctrines with which they jumble it together--from those of ,herakleitus and ,anaxagoras1 and from the theory that ,knowledge is sensible perception4 ,the real opponents of the ,maxim of ,contradiction were ,herakleitus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,parmenides1 and ,plato himself as represented in some of his dialogues1 especially the ,parmenides1 ,timus1 ,republic1 ,sophistes4 ,each of these philosophers adopted a ,first ,philosophy different from the others3 but each also adopted one completely different from that of ,aristotle1 and not reconcileable with his logical canons4 ,none of them admitted determinate and definable attributes belonging to determinate particular subjects1 each with a certain measure of durability4 ,footnote #da3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 b4 #aa4 ,now the common speech of mankind throughout the ,hellenic world was founded on the assumption of such fixed subjects and predicates4 ,those who wanted information for practical guidance or security1 asked for it in this form2 those who desired to be understood by others1 and to determine the actions of others1 adopted the like mode of speech4 ,information was given through significant propositions1 which the questioner sought to obtain1 and which the answer1 if cognizant1 enunciated3 e4g41 ,thettus 9999is sitting down#db--to repeat the minimum or skeleton of a proposition as given by ,plato1 requiring both subject and predicate in proper combination1 to convey the meaning4 ,now the logical analysis1 and the syllogistic precepts of ,aristotle1--as well as his rhetorical and dialectical suggestions for persuading1 for refuting1 or for avoiding refutation--are all based upon the practice of common speech4 ,in conversing 7he says7 it is impossible to produce and exhibit the actual objects signified2 the speaker must be content with enunciating1 instead thereof1 the name significant of each4#dc ,the first beginning of rhetorical diction is1 to speak good ,greek2#dd the rhetor and the dialectician must dwell upon words1 propositions1 and opinions1 not peculiar to such as have received special teaching1 but common to the many and employed in familiar conversation2 the auditors1 to whom they address themselves1 are assumed to be commonplace men1 of fair average intelligence1 but nothing beyond4#de ,thus much of acquirement is imbibed by almost every one as he grows up1 from the ordinary intercourse of society4 ,the men of special instruction begin with it1 as others do2 but they also superadd other cognitions or accomplishments derived from peculiar teachers4 ,universally--both in the interior of the family1 amidst the unscientific multitude1 and by the cultivated few--habitual speech was carried on through terms assuming fixed subjects and predicates4 ,it was this recognized process in its two varieties of ,analytic and ,dialectic1 which ,aristotle embraced in his logical theory1 and to which he also adapted his ,first ,philosophy4 ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 pp4 #bfb-bfc4 ,footnote #dc3 ,aristot4 ,soph4 ,el4 p4 #afe1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 e7pei gar ou7k e7_/stin au7ta ta pra_/gmata diale_/gesthai phe_/rontas1 a7lla tois o7no_/masin a7nti tn pragma_/tn chr_/metha sumbo_/lois4 ,footnote #dd3 ,aristot4 ,rhet4 ,,iii4 v4 p4 #adjg1 b4 #ai3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' a7rch ts le_/xes to ,e7llni_/zein4 ,footnote #de3 ,aristot4 ,rhet4 ,i4 i4 p4 #aced1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 7 r7torik a7nti_/stropho_/s e7sti t dialektik2 a7mpho_/terai gar peri toiou_/tn tinn ei7sin a7 koina tro_/pon tina a7pa_/ntn e7sti gnri_/zein kai ou7demias e7pist_/ms a7phrisme_/ns2 dio kai pa_/ntes tro_/pon tina mete_/chousin a7mphoin4--p4 #acee1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 didaskali_/as ga_/r e7stin o7 kata tn e7pist_/mn lo_/gos1 touto de a7du_/naton1 a7ll' a7na_/gk dia tn koinn poieisthai tas pi_/steis kai tous lo_/gous1 7_/sper kai e7n tois ,topikois e7le_/gomen peri ts pros tous pollous e7nteu_/xes4--p4 #aceg1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de to e7_/rgon au7ts peri_/ te toiou_/tn peri 7n bouleuo_/metha kai te_/chnas m e7_/chomen1 kai e7n tois toiou_/tois a7kroatais oi7 ou7 du_/nantai dia polln sunoran ou7de logi_/zesthai po_/r7r7then4--p4 #aceg1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 o7 gar kri_/ts u7pokeitai ei7nai a7plous4 ,compare ,topica1 ,i4 ii4 p4 #aja1 a4 #bf-cf2 ,soph4 ,el4 p4 #agb1 a4 #cj4 ,but the ,first ,philosophy that preceded his1 had not been so adapted4 ,the ,greek philosophers1 who flourished before dialectical discussion had become active1 during the interval between ,thales and ,sokrates1 considered ,philosophy as one whole--rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia--destined to render ,nature or the ,kosmos more or less intelligible4 ,they took up in the gross all those vast problems1 which the religious or mythological poets had embodied in divine genealogies and had ascribed to superhuman personal agencies4 ,thales and his immediate successors 7like their predecessors the poets7 accommodated their hypotheses to intellectual impulses and aspirations of their own2 with little anxiety about giving satisfaction to others1#df still less about avoiding inconsistencies or meeting objections4 ,each of them fastened upon some one grand and imposing generalization 7set forth often in verse7 which he stretched as far as it would go by various comparisons and illustrations1 but without any attention or deference to adverse facts or reasonings4 ,provided that his general point of view was impressive to the imagination1#dg as the old religious scheme of personal agencies was to the vulgar1 he did not concern himself about the conditions of proof or disproof4 ,the data of experience were altogether falsified 7as by the ,pythagoreans7#dh in order to accommodate them to the theory2 or were set aside as deceptive and inexplicable from the theory 7as by both ,parmenides and ,herakleitus74#di ,footnote #df3 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,b4 iv4 p4 #ajjj1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 oi7 men ou7n peri 7si_/odon kai pa_/ntes o7_/soi theo_/logoi mo_/non e7phro_/ntisan tou pithanou tou pros au7tou_/s1 7mn d' 7lig_/rsan2--kai gar o7_/nper oi7thei_/ le_/gein a7_/n tis ma_/lista o7mologoume_/ns au7t1 ,e7mpedokls1 kai ou7tos tau7ton pe_/ponthen4--,metaph4 ,n4 iv4 p4 #ajia1 b4 #a-ae4 ,footnote #dg3 ,this is strikingly expressed by a phrase of ,aristotle about the ,platonic theory1 ,metaph4 ,n4 iii4 p4 #ajij1 a4 #ce3 ,greek3 oi7 de christon poiountes1 o7_/ti e7pi tn ai7sthtn ou7k e7_/stai ta a7xi_/mata1 a7lth de ta lego_/mena kai sai_/nei tn psuch_/n1 ei7nai_/ te u7polamba_/nousi kai christa ei7nai4 ,footnote #dh3 ,metaph4 ,n4 iii4 p4 #ajij1 a4 #cd3 ,greek3 e7oi_/kasi peri a7_/llou ou7ra_/nou le_/gein kai sma_/tn a7ll' ou7 tn ai7stht n4--,metaph4 ,a4 v4 p4 #ihf1 a4 #e2 and ,de ,coelo1 ,,ii4 xiii4 p4 #bic1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #di3 ,physic4 ,i4 ii4-iii4 pp4 #ahe-ahf4 ,but these vague hypotheses became subjected to a new scrutiny1 when the dialectical age of ,zeno and ,sokrates supervened4 ,opponents of ,parmenides impugned his theory of ,ens ,unum ,continuum ,immobile1 as leading to absurdities2 while his disciple ,zeno replied1 not by any attempt to disprove such allegations but1 by showing that the counter-theory of ,entia ,plura ,discontinua ,moventia1 or ,mutabilia1 involved consequences yet more absurd4#ej ,in the acute dialectical warfare1 to which the old theories thus stood exposed1 the means of attack much surpassed those of defence2 moreover1 the partisans of ,herakleitus despised all coherent argumentation1 confining themselves to obscure oracular aphorisms and multiplied metaphors4#ea ,in point of fact1 no suitable language could be found1 consistently with common speech or common experience1 for expanding in detail either the ,herakleitean#eb or the ,parmenidean theory2 the former suppressing all duration and recognizing nothing but events--a perpetual stream of ,fientia or interchange of ,ens with ,non-,ens2 the latter discarding ,non-,ens as unmeaning1 and recognizing no real events or successions1 but only ,ens ,unum perpetually lasting and unchangeable4 ,the other physical hypotheses1 broached by ,pythagoras1 ,empedokles1 ,anaxagoras1 and ,demokritus1 each altogether discordant with the others1 were alike imposing in their general enunciation and promise1 alike insufficient when applied to common experience and detail4 ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,parmenid4 p4 #abh1 ,d4 ,footnote #ea3 ,plato1 ,thett4 p4 #agi1 ,e3 ,greek3 peri tou_/tn tn 7rakleitei_/n1--to e7pimeinai e7pi lo_/g kai e7rt_/mati kai 7suchi_/s e7n me_/rei a7pokri_/nasthai kai e7re_/sthai 7tton au7tois e7_/ni 7 to mde_/n2--7_/sper e7k phare_/tras r7mati_/skia ai7nigmat_/d a7naspntes a7potoxeu_/ousi1 ka7n tou_/tou zts lo_/gon labein1 ti_/ ei7_/rken1 e7te_/r pepl_/xei kains metnomasme_/n1 peraneis de ou7de_/pote ou7den pros ou7de_/na au7t n4 ,footnote #eb3 ,ibid4 p4 #ahc1 ,b3 ,greek3 a7lla_/ tin' a7_/lln phnn thete_/on tois ton lo_/gon touton le_/gousin1 7s nun ge pros tn au7tn u7po_/thesin ou7k e7_/chousi r7_/mata1 ei7 m a7_/ra to ou7_/d' o7_/ps2 ma_/lista d' ou7_/ts a7n au7tois a7_/rmottoi1 a7_/peiron lego_/menon4 ,plato applies this remark to the theory of ,protagoras2 but the remark belongs properly to that of ,herakleitus4 ,but the great development of ,dialectic during the ,sokratic age1 together with the new applications made of it by ,sokrates and the unrivalled acuteness with which he wielded it1 altered materially the position of these physical theories4 ,sokrates was not ignorant of them2#ec but he discouraged such studies1 and turned attention to other topics4 ,he passed his whole life in public and in indiscriminate conversation with every one4 ,he deprecated astronomy and physics as unbecoming attempts to pry into the secrets of the gods2 who administered the general affairs of the ,kosmos according to their own pleasure1 and granted only1 through the medium of prophecy or oracles1 such special revelations as they thought fit4 ,in his own discussions ,sokrates dwelt only on matters of familiar conversation and experience--social1 ethical1 political1 c41 such as were in every one's mouth1 among the daily groups of the market-place4 ,these he declared to be the truly human topics#ed--the proper study of mankind--upon which it was disgraceful to be ignorant1 or to form untrue and inconsistent judgments4 ,he found1 moreover1 that upon these topics no one supposed himself to be ignorant1 or to require teaching4 ,every one gave confident opinions1 derived from intercourse with society1 embodied in the familiar words of the language1 and imbibed almost unconsciously along with the meaning of these words4 ,now ,sokrates not only disclaimed all purpose of teaching1 but made ostentatious profession of his own ignorance4 ,his practice was to ask information from others who professed to know2 and with this view1 to question them about the import of vulgar words with the social convictions contained in them4#ee ,to the answers given he applied an acute cross-examination1 which seldom failed to detect so much inconsistency and contradiction as to cover the respondent with shame1 and to make him sensible that he was profoundly ignorant of matters which he had believed himself to know well4 ,sokrates declared1 in his last speech before condemnation by the ,athenian ,dikasts1 that such false persuasion of knowledge1 combined with real ignorance1 was universal among mankind2 and that the exposure thereof1 as the great misguiding force of human life1 had been enjoined upon him as his mission by the ,delphian ,god4#ef ,footnote #ec3 ,xenophon1 ,mem4 ,,iv4 vii4 #e3 ,greek3 kai_/toi ou7de tou_/t n ge a7n_/koos 7n4 ,footnote #ed3 ,xenophon1 ,mem4 ,i4 i4 #ab-af3 ,greek3 kai prton men au7tn e7sko_/pei po_/tera_/ pote nomi_/santes i7kans 7_/d ta7nthr _/peia ei7de_/nai e7_/rchontai e7pi to peri tn toiou_/tn phronti_/zein1 7 ta men a7nthr_/peia pare_/ntes1 ta de daimo_/nia skopountes1 7gountai ta pros_/konta pra_/ttein4--au7tos de peri tn a7nthrpei_/n a7ei diele_/geto1 skopn ti_/ eu7sebe_/s1 ti_/ a7sebe_/s1 ti_/ kalo_/n1 ti_/ ai7schro_/n1 ti_/ di_/kaion1 ti_/ a7_/dikon1 ti_/ sphrosu_/n1 ti_/ mani_/a1 ti_/ po_/lis1 ti_/ politiko_/s1 ti_/ a7rch a7nthr_/pn1 ti_/ a7rchikos a7nthr_/pn1 c4 ,compare ,,iv4 vii4 #b-i4 ,footnote #ee3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 ,i4 ii4 #bf-df2 ,,iii4 vi4 #b-ae2 ,,iv4 ii42 ,,iv4 vi4 #a3 ,greek3 skopn sun tois sunoisi ti_/ e7_/kaston ei7_/ tn o7_/ntn ou7de_/pot' e7_/lge4--,,iv4 iv4 #i3 ,greek3 a7rkei gar o7_/ti tn a7_/lln katagelas1 e7rtn men kai e7le_/gchn pa_/ntas1 au7tos d' ou7deni the_/ln u7pe_/chein lo_/gon ou7de gn_/mn a7pophai_/nesthai perei ou7deno_/s4--,plato1 ,republic ,i4 pp4 #ccf-ccg2 ,thett4 p4 #aej ,c4 ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokrat4 pp4 #bb1 #bh1 #cc3 ,greek3 e7moi de touto1 7s e7g_/ phmi1 proste_/taktai u7po tou theou pra_/ttein kai e7k mantein kai e7x e7nupni_/n kai panti tro_/p1 7pe_/r ti_/s pote kai a7_/ll thei_/a moira a7nthr_/p kai o7tioun prose_/taxe pra_/ttein4--,plato1 ,sophist4 pp4 #bcj-bca2 ,menon1 pp4 #hj1 ,a41 #hd1 ,b4 ,compare the analysis of the ,platonic ,apology in my work1 ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,vol4 ,i4 c4 vii4 ,the peculiarities which ,aristotle ascribes to ,sokrates are--that he talked upon ethical topics instead of physical1 that he fastened especially on the definitions of general terms1 and that his discussions were inductive1 bringing forward many analogous illustrative or probative particulars to justify a true general proposition1 and one or a few to set aside a false one4#eg ,this ,sokratic practice is copiously illustrated both by ,plato in many of his dialogues1 and by ,xenophon throughout all the ,memorabilia4#eh ,in ,plato1 however1 ,sokrates is often introduced as spokesman of doctrines not his own2 while in ,xenophon we have before us the real man as he talked in the market-place1 and apparently little besides4 ,xenophon very emphatically exhibits to us a point which in ,plato's ,dialogues of ,search is less conspicuously marked1 though still apparent3 viz41 the power possessed by ,sokrates of accommodating himself to the ordinary mind in all its varieties--his habit of dwelling on the homely and familiar topics of the citizen's daily life--his constant appeal to small and even vulgar details1 as the way of testing large and imposing generalities4#ei ,sokrates possessed to a surprising degree the art of selecting arguments really persuasive to ordinary non-theorizing men2 so as often to carry their assent along with him1 and still oftener to shake their previous beliefs1 if unwarranted1 or even if adopted by mere passive receptivity without preliminary reflection and comparison4 ,footnote #eg3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 du_/o ga_/r e7stin a7_/ tis a7n a7podoi_/ ,skra_/tei dikai_/s1 tou_/s t' e7paktikous lo_/gous kai to o7ri_/zesthai katho_/lou2 tauta ga_/r e7stin a7_/mph peri a7rchn e7pist_/ms4--ib4 ,a4 p4 #ihg1 b4 #a3 ,greek3 ,skra_/tous de peri men ta 7thika pragmateuome_/nou1 peri de ts o7_/ls phu_/ses ou7the_/n1 e7n me_/ntoi tou_/tois to katho_/lou ztountos kai peri o7rismn e7pist_/santos pr_/tou tn dia_/noian4 ,footnote #eh3 ,no portion of the ,memorabilia illustrates this point better than the dialogue with ,euthydmus1 ,,iv4 vi4 ,footnote #ei3 ,xenophon1 ,memor4 ,,iv4 vi4 #ae3 ,greek3 o7_/pote de au7to_/s ti t lo_/g diexi_/oi1 dia tn ma_/lista o7mologoume_/n n e7poreu_/eto1 nomi_/zn tau_/tn tn a7spha_/leian ei7nai lo_/gou2 toigaroun polu ma_/lista 7n e7g oi7da1 o7_/te le_/goi1 tous a7kou_/ontas o7mologountas pareichen2 e7_/ph de kai ,o7_/mron t ,o7dussei a7natheinai to a7sphal r7_/tora ei7nai1 7s i7kanon au7ton o7_/nta dia tn dokou_/ntn tois a7nthr_/pois a7_/gein tous lo_/gous4 ,compare ib4 ,i4 ii4 #ch2 ,,iv4 iv4 #f2 also ,plato1 ,thettus1 p4 #adg1 ,a1 ,b2 ,republic ,i4 p4 #cch1 ,c4 ,without departing from ,aristotle's description1 therefore1 we may conceive the change operated by ,sokrates in philosophical discussion under a new point of view4 ,in exchanging ,physics for ,ethics1 it vulgarized both the topics and the talk of philosophy4 ,physical philosophy as it stood in the age of ,sokrates 7before ,aristotle had broached his peculiar definition of ,nature7 was merely an obscure1 semi-poetical1 hypothetical ,philosophia ,prima1#fj or rather ,philosophia ,prima and ,philosophia ,secunda blended in one4 ,this is true of all its varieties1--of the ,ionic philosophers as well as of ,pythagoras1 ,parmenides1 ,herakleitus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,empedokles1 and even ,demokritus4 ,such philosophy1 dimly enunciated and only half intelligible1#fa not merely did not tend to explain or clear up phenomenal experiences1 but often added new difficulties of its own4 ,it presented itself sometimes even as discrediting1 overriding1 and contradicting experience2 but never as opening any deductive road from the ,universal down to its particulars4#fb ,such theories1 though in circulation among a few disciples and opponents1 were foreign and unsuitable to the talk of ordinary men4 ,to pass from these cloudy mysteries to social topics and terms which were in every one's mouth1 was the important revolution in philosophy introduced in the age of ,sokrates1 and mainly by him4 ,footnote #fj3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 a4 #ca4 ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 ,a4 x4 p4 #iic1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 psellizome_/n gar e7_/oiken 7 pr_/t philosophi_/a peri pa_/ntn1 a7_/te ne_/a te kat' a7rchas ou7sa kai to prton4 ,footnote #fb3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 a4 i4 p4 #iic1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 to o7_/lon ti e7_/chein kai me_/ros m du_/nasthai dloi to chalepon au7ts 7ts peri ts a7lthei_/as theri_/as74 ,alexander ap4 ,schol4 p4 #ajd1 ,bonitz3 ,greek3 ei7s e7_/nnoian men tou o7_/lou kai e7pi_/stasin pa_/ntas e7lthein1 mden de me_/ros au7ts e7xakrib_/sasthai dunthnai1 dloi to chalepon au7ts4 ,aristotle indicates how much the ,philosophia ,prima of his earlier predecessors was uncongenial to and at variance with phenomenal experience--,metaphys4 ,a4 v4 p4 #ihf1 b4 #ca4 ,to shape their theories in such a way--,greek3 ta phaino_/mena ei7 me_/llei tis a7pod_/sein 7,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,l4 viii4 p4 #ajgc1 b4 #cf71 was an obligation which philosophers hardly felt incumbent on them prior to the ,aristotelian age4 ,compare ,simplikius 7ad4 ,aristot4 ,physic4 ,i471 p4 #cbh1 a4 #a-bf1 ,schol4 ,br42 ,schol4 7ad4 ,aristot4 ,de ,coelo ,,iii4 ,i47 p4 #eji1 a4 #bf-p4 #eaj1 a4 #ac4 ,the drift of the ,sokratic procedure was to bring men into the habit of defining those universal terms which they had hitherto used undefined1 the definitions being verified by induction of particulars as the ultimate authority4 ,it was a procedure built upon common speech1 but improving on common speech2 the talk of every man being in propositions1 each including a subject and predicate1 but neither subject nor predicate being ever defined4 ,it was the mission of ,sokrates to make men painfully sensible of that deficiency1 as well as to enforce upon them the inductive evidence by which alone it could be rectified4 ,now the ,analytic and ,dialectic of ,aristotle grew directly out of this ,sokratic procedure1 and out of the ,platonic dialogues in so far as they enforced and illustrated it4 ,when ,sokrates had supplied the negative stimulus and indication of what was amiss1 together with the appeal to ,induction as final authority1 ,aristotle furnished1 or did much to furnish1 the positive analysis and complementary precepts1 necessary to clear up1 justify1 and assure the march of reasoned truth4#fc ,what ,aristotle calls the syllogistic principia1 or the principles of syllogistic demonstration1 are nothing else than the steps towards reasoned truth1 and the precautions against those fallacious appearances that simulate it4 ,the steps are stated in their most general terms1 as involving both ,deduction and ,induction2 though in ,aristotle we find the deductive portion copiously unfolded and classified1 while ,induction1 though recognized as the only verifying foundation of the whole1 is left without expansion or illustration4 ,footnote #fc3 ,though the theorizing and the analysis of ,aristotle presuppose and recognize the ,sokratic procedure1 yet1 if we read the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 ,,iv4 vii41 and compare therewith the first two chapters of ,aristotle's ,metaphysica1 in which he describes and extols ,philosophia ,prima1 we shall see how radically antipathetic were the two points of view3 ,sokrates confining himself to practical results--,greek3 me_/chri tou 7phelimou2 ,aristotle extolling ,philosophia ,prima1 because it soars above practical results1 and serves as its own reward1 elevating the philosopher to a partial communion with the contemplative self-sufficiency of the ,gods4 ,indeed the remark of ,aristotle1 p4 #ihc1 a4 #a-f1 denying altogether the jealousy ascribed to the ,gods1 c41 is almost a reply to the opinion expressed by ,sokrates1 that a man by such overweening researches brought upon himself the displeasure of the ,gods1 as prying into their secrets 7,xen4 ,mem4 ,,iv4 vii4 #f2 ,i4 i4 #ab74 ,if we go through the ,sokratic conversations as reported in the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon1 we shall find illustration of what has been just stated3 we shall see ,sokrates recognizing and following the common speech of men1 in propositions combining subject and predicate2 but trying to fix the meaning of both these terms1 and to test the consistency of the universal predications by appeal to particulars4 ,the syllogizing and the inductive processes are exhibited both of them in actual work on particular points of discussion4 ,now on these processes ,aristotle brings his analysis to bear1 eliciting and enunciating in general terms their principia and their conditions4 ,we have seen that he expressly declares the analysis of these principia to belong to ,first ,philosophy4#fd ,and thus it is that ,first ,philosophy as conceived by ,aristotle1 acknowledges among its fundamenta the habits of common ,hellenic speech2 subject only to correction and control by the ,sokratic cross-examining and testing discipline4 ,he stands distinguished among the philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects and builds upon the beliefs actually prevalent among mankind4#fe ,herein as well as in other respects his ,first ,philosophy not only differed from that of all the pre-,sokratic philosophers 7such as ,herakleitus1 ,parmenides1 ,anaxagoras1 c47 by explaining the principia of ,analytic and ,dialectic as well as those of ,physics and ,physiology1 but it also differed from that of the post-,sokratic and semi-,sokratic ,plato1 by keeping up a closer communion both with ,sokrates and with common speech4 ,though ,plato in his ,dialogues of ,search appears to apply the inductive discipline of ,sokrates1 and to handle the ,universal as referable to and dependent upon its particulars2 yet the ,platonic ,philosophia ,prima proceeds upon a view totally different4 ,it is a fusion of ,parmenides with ,herakleitus2#ff divorcing the ,universal altogether from its particulars2 treating the ,universal as an independent reality and as the only permanent reality2 negating the particulars as so many unreal1 evanescent1 ever-changing copies or shadows thereof4 ,aristotle expressly intimates his dissent from the divorce or separation thus introduced by ,plato4 ,he proclaims his adherence to the practice of ,sokrates1 which kept the two elements together1 and which cognized particulars as the ultimate reality and test for the ,universal4#fg ,upon this doctrine his ,first ,philosophy is built3 being distinguished hereby from all the other varieties broached by either his predecessors or contemporaries4 ,footnote #fd3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iii4 p4 #ajje1 a4 #ai-;b4 #aa4 ,footnote #fe3 ,see ,aristot4 ,de ,divinat4 per ,somnum1 i4 p4 #dfb1 b4 #ae2 ,de ,coelo1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #bgj1 b4 #c1 #bj2 ,metaphys4 ,a4 ii4 p4 #ihb1 a4 #d-ad4 ,alexander ap4 ,scholia1 p4 #ebe1 b4 #cf1 ,br43 ,greek3 e7n pasin e7_/thos a7ei tais koinais kai phusikais tn a7nthr_/pn prol_/psesin a7rchais ei7s ta deiknu_/mena pros au7tou chrsthai4 ,footnote #ff3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 vi4 p4 #ihg1 a4 #cb2 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #ab4 ,that ,plato's ,philosophia ,prima involved a partial coincidence with that of ,herakleitus is here distinctly announced by ,aristotle3 that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of ,parmenides with ,herakleitus is made out in the ingenious ,dissertation of ,herbart1 ,de ,platonici ,systematis ,fundamento1 ,gttingen 7#ahje71 which winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result 7p4 #ej73--;,divide ,heracliti ,greek3 ge_/nesin ou7si_/a ,parmenidis1 et habebis ,ideas ,platonicas4 ,compare ,plato1 ,republic ,,vii4 p4 #eae1 seq4 ,footnote #fg3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #ag1 seq42 ix4 p4 #ajhf1 a4 #cg3 ,greek3 ta men ou7n e7n tois ai7sthtois kath' e7_/kasta r7ein e7no_/mizon 7,platonici7 ,greek3 kai me_/nein ou7then au7tn1 to de katho_/lou para tauta ei7nai_/ te kai e7_/tero_/n ti ei7nai4 touto d'1 7_/sper e7n tois e7_/mprosthen e7le_/gomen1 e7ki_/nse men ,skra_/ts dia tous o7rismou_/s1 ou7 mn e7ch_/rise_/ ge tn kath' e7_/kaston4 kai touto o7rths e7no_/sen ou7 chri_/sas4 ,the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 which ,aristotle proclaims as the first and firmest principium of syllogizing1 may be found perpetually applied to particular cases throughout the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon and the ,sokratic dialogues of ,plato4 ,indeed the ,elenchus for which ,sokrates was so distinguished1 is nothing more than an ever-renewed and ingenious application of it2 illustrating the painful and humiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a plain contradiction1 when a respondent1 having at first confidently laid down some universal affirmative1 finds himself unexpectedly compelled to admit1 in some particular case1 the contradictory negative4 ,as against a ,herakleitean1 who saw no difficulty in believing both sides of the contradiction to be true at once1 the ,sokratic ,elenchus would have been powerless4 ,what ,aristotle did was1 to abstract and elicit the general rules of the process2 to classify propositions according to their logical value1 in such manner that he could formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between which an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted4 ,the important logical distinctions between propositions contradictory and propositions contrary1 was first clearly enunciated by ,aristotle2 and1 until this had been done1 the ,maxim of ,contradiction could not have been laid down in a defensible manner4 ,indeed we may remark that1 while this ,maxim is first promulgated as a formula of ,first ,philosophy in ,book ,greek3 ,g4 of the ,metaphysica1 it had already been tacitly assumed and applied by ,aristotle throughout the ,de ,interpretatione1 ,analytica1 and ,topica1 as if it were obvious and uncontested4 ,the ,first ,philosophy of ,aristotle was adapted to the conditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by ,sokrates1 furnishing the theoretical basis of his practical ,logic4 ,but1 as ,aristotle tells us1 there were several philosophers and dialecticians who did not recognize the ,maxim2 maintaining that the same proposition might be at once true and false--that it was possible for the same thing both to be and not to be4 ,how is he to deal with these opponents8 ,he admits that he cannot demonstrate the ,maxim against them1 and that any attempt to do this would involve ,petitio ,principii4 ,but he contends for the possibility of demonstrating it in a peculiar way--refutatively or indirectly2 that is1 provided that the opponents can be induced to grant 7not indeed the truth of any proposition1 to the exclusion of its contradictory antithesis1 which concession he admits would involve ,petitio ,principii1 but7 the fixed and uniform signification of terms and propositions4 ,aristotle contends that the opponents ought to grant thus much1 under penalty of being excluded from discussion as incapables or mere plants4#fh ,i do not imagine that the opponents themselves would have felt obliged to grant as much as he here demands4 ,the onus probandi lay upon him1 as advancing a positive theory2 and he would have found his indirect or refutative demonstration not more available in convincing them than a direct or ordinary demonstration4 ,against respondents who proclaim as their thesis the negative of the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 refutation and demonstration are equally impossible4 ,no dialectical discussion could ever lead to any result2 for you can never prove more against them than what their own thesis unequivocally avows4#fi ,as against ,herakleitus and ,anaxagoras1 ,i do not think that ,aristotle's qualified vindication of the ,maxim has any effective bearing4 ,footnote #fh3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 iv4 p4 #ajjf1 a4 #aa1 seq4 ,footnote #fi3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 a7nairn gar lo_/gon u7pome_/nei lo_/gon4--p4 #ajjh1 a4 #cj4 ,but ,aristotle is quite right in saying that neither dialectical debate nor demonstration can be carried on unless terms and propositions be defined1 and unless to each term there be assigned one special signification1 or a limited number of special significations--excluding a certain number of others4 ,this demand for definitions1 and also the multiplied use of inductive interrogations1 keeping the ,universal implicated with and dependent upon its particulars--are the innovations which ,aristotle expressly places to the credit of ,sokrates4 ,the ,sokratic ,elenchus operated by first obtaining from the respondent a definition1 and then testing it through a variety of particulars3 when the test brought out a negative as against the pre-asserted affirmative1 the contradiction between the two was felt as an intellectual shock by the respondent1 rendering it impossible to believe both at once2 and the unrivalled acuteness of ,sokrates was exhibited in rendering such shock peculiarly pungent and humiliating4 ,but the ,sokratic ,elenchus presupposes this psychological fact1 common to most minds1 ordinary as well as superior1--the intellectual shock felt when incompatible beliefs are presented to the mind at once4 ,if the collocutors of ,sokrates had not been so constituted by nature1 the magic of his colloquy would have been unfelt and inoperative4 ,against a ,herakleitean1 who professed to feel no difficulty in believing both sides of a contradiction at once1 he could have effected nothing3 and if not he1 still less any other dialectician4 ,proof and disproof1 as distinguished one from the other1 would have had no meaning2 dialectical debate would have led to no result4 ,thus1 then1 although ,aristotle was the first to enunciate the ,maxim of ,contradiction in general terms1 after having previously originated that logical distinction of contrary and contradictory ,propositions and doctrine of legitimate ,antiphasis which rendered such enunciation possible1--yet1 when he tries to uphold it against dissentients1 it cannot be said that he has correctly estimated the logical position of those whom he was opposing1 or the real extent to which the defence of the ,maxim can be carried without incurring the charge of ,petitio ,principii4 ,as against ,protagoras1 no defence was needed1 for the ,protagorean ,homo ,mensura is not incompatible with the ,maxim of ,contradiction2 while1 as against ,herakleitus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,parmenides1 c41 no defence was practicable1 and the attempt of ,aristotle to construct one appears to me a failure4 ,all that can be really done in the way of defence is1 to prove the ,maxim in its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases3 if your opponent is willing to grant these particular cases1 you establish the general ,maxim against him by way of ,induction2 if he will not grant them1 you cannot prove the general ,maxim at all4 ,suppose you are attempting to prove to an ,herakleitean that an universal affirmative and its contradictory particular negative cannot be both true at once4 ,you begin by asking him about particular cases1 ,whether it is possible that the two propositions--,all men are mortal1 and1 ,some men are not mortal--can both be true at once8 ,if he admits that these two propositions cannot both be true at once1 if he admits the like with regard to other similar pairs of contradictories1 and if he can suggest no similar pair in which both propositions are true at once1 then you may consider yourself as having furnished a sufficient inductive proof1 and you may call upon him to admit the ,maxim of ,contradiction in its general enunciation4 ,but1 if he will not admit it in the particular cases which you tender1 or if1 while admitting it in these1 he himself can tender other cases in which he considers it inadmissible1 then you have effected nothing sufficient to establish the general ,maxim against him4 ,the case is not susceptible of any other or better proof4 ,it is in vain that ,aristotle tries to diversify the absurdity1 and to follow it out into collateral absurd consequences4 ,if the ,herakleitean does not feel any repulsive shock of contradiction in a definite particular case1 if he directly announces that he believes the two propositions to be both at once true1 then the collateral inconsistencies and derivative absurdities1 which ,aristotle multiplies against him1 will not shock him more than the direct contradiction in its naked form4 ,neither the general reasoning of ,aristotle1 nor the ,elenchus of ,sokrates brought to bear in particular cases1 would make any impression upon him2 since he will not comply with either of the two conditions required for the ,sokratic ,elenchus3 he will neither declare definitions1 nor give suitable point and sequence to inductive interrogatories4 ,nor is anything gained1 as ,aristotle supposes1 by reminding the ,herakleitean of his own practice in the daily concerns of life and in conversation with common persons3 that he feeds himself with bread to-day1 in the confidence that it has the same properties as it had yesterday2#gj that1 if he wishes either to give or to obtain information1 the speech which he utters or that which he acts upon must be either affirmative or negative4 ,he will admit that he acts in this way1 but he will tell you that he has no certainty of being right2 that the negative may be true as well as the affirmative4 ,he will grant that there is an inconsistency between such acts of detail and the principles of the ,herakleitean doctrine1 which recognize no real stability of any thing1 but only perpetual flux or process2 but inconsistency in detail will not induce him to set aside his principles4 ,the truth is1 that neither ,herakleitus1 nor ,parmenides1 nor ,anaxagoras1 nor ,pythagoras1 gave themselves much trouble to reconcile ,philosophy with facts of detail4 ,each fastened upon some grand and impressive primary hypothesis1 illustrated it by a few obvious facts in harmony therewith1 and disregarded altogether the mass of contradictory facts4 ,that a favourite hypothesis should contradict physical details1 was noway shocking to them4 ,both the painful feeling accompanying that shock1 and the disposition to test the value of the hypothesis by its consistency with inductive details1 became first developed and attended to in the dialectical age1 mainly through the working of ,sokrates4 ,the ,analytic and the ,first ,philosophy of ,aristotle were constructed after the time of ,sokrates1 and with regard1 in a very great degree1 to the ,sokratic tests and conditions--to the indispensable necessity for definite subjects and predicates1 capable of standing the inductive scrutiny of particulars4 ,in this respect the ,philosophia ,prima of ,aristotle stands distinguished from that of any of the earlier philosophers1 and even from that of ,plato4 ,he departed from ,plato by recognizing the ,hoc ,aliquid or the definite ,individual1 with its essential ,predicates1 as the foundation of the ,universal1 and by applying his analytical factors of ,form and ,matter to the intellectual generation of the ,individual 7,greek3 to su_/nolon--to sunampho_/teron72 and thus he devised a ,first ,philosophy conformable to the habits of common speech as rectified by the critical scrutiny of ,sokrates4 ,we shall see this in the next ,chapter4 99 99 99 99 ,footnote #gj3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,k4 vi4 p4 #ajfc1 a4 #ca4 ,the ,author's ,,ms4 breaks off here4 ,what follows on the next page1 as ,chapter ,,xii1 is the exposition of ,aristotle's ,psychology1 originally contributed to the third edition of ,professor ,bain's work ',the ,senses and the ,intellect1' in #ahfh4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,de ,,anim1 ,,etc4 ,to understand ,aristotle's ,psychology1 we must look at it in comparison with the views of other ancient ,greek philosophers on the same subject1 as far as our knowledge will permit4 ,of these ancient philosophers1 none have been preserved to us except ,plato1 and to a certain extent ,epikurus1 reckoning the poem of ,lucretius as a complement to the epistolary remnants of ,epikurus himself4 ,the predecessors of ,aristotle 7apart from ,plato7 are known only through small fragments from themselves1 and imperfect notices by others2 among which notices the best are from ,aristotle himself4 ,in the ,timus of ,plato we find ,psychology1 in a very large and comprehensive sense1 identified with ,kosmology4 ,the ,kosmos1 a scheme of rotatory spheres1 has both a soul and a body3 of the two1 the soul is the prior1 grander1 and predominant1 though both of them are constructed or put together by the ,divine ,architect or ,demiurgus4 ,the kosmical soul1 rooted at the centre1 and stretched from thence through and around the whole1 is endued with self-movement1 and with the power of initiating movement in the kosmical body2 moreover1 being cognitive as well as motive1 it includes in itself three ingredients mixed together3--7#a7 ,the ,same--the indivisible and unchangeable essence of ,ideas2 7#b7 ,the ,diverse--the ,plural--the divisible bodies or elements2 7#c7 ,a ,compound1 formed of both these ingredients melted into one4 ,as the kosmical soul is intended to know all the three--,idem1 ,diversum1 and ,idem with ,diversum in one1 so it must comprise in its own nature all the three ingredients1 according to the received ,axiom--,like knows like--,like is known by ,like4 ,the ingredients are blended together according to a scale of harmonic proportion4 ,the element ,idem is placed in an even and undivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the ,kosmos2 the element ,diversum is distributed among the rotations1 all oblique1 of the seven interior planetary spheres1 that is1 the five planets1 with the ,sun and ,moon4 ,impressions of identity and diversity1 derived either from the ideal and indivisible1 or from the sensible and divisible1 are thus circulated by the kosmical soul throughout its own entire range1 yet without either voice or sound4 ,reason and ,science are propagated by the circle of ,idem3 ,sense and ,opinion1 by those of ,diversum4 ,when these last-mentioned circles are in right movement1 the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy4#a ,footnote #a3 ,see this doctrine of the ,timus more fully expounded in ',plato and the ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1' ,,iii4 xxxvi4 pp4 #bej-bef1 seq4 ,it is thus that ,plato begins his ,psychology with ,kosmology3 the ,kosmos is in his view a divine immortal being or animal1 composed of a spherical rotatory body and a rational soul1 cognitive as well as motive4 ,among the tenants of this ,kosmos are included1 not only gods1 who dwell in the peripheral or celestial regions1 but also men1 birds1 quadrupeds1 and fishes4 ,these four inhabit the more central or lower regions of air1 earth1 and water4 ,in describing men and the inferior animals1 ,plato takes his departure from the divine ,kosmos1 and proceeds downwards by successive stages of increasing degeneracy and corruption4 ,the cranium of man was constructed as a little ,kosmos1 including in itself an immortal rational soul1 composed of the same materials1 though diluted and adulterated1 as the kosmical soul2 and moving with the like rotations1 though disturbed and irregular1 suited to a rational soul4 ,this cranium1 for wise purposes which ,plato indicates1 was elevated by the gods upon a tall body1 with attached limbs for motion in different directions--forward1 backward1 upward1 downward1 to the right and left4#b ,within this body were included two inferior and mortal souls3 one in the thoracic region near the heart1 the other lower down1 below the diaphragm1 in the abdominal region2 but both of them fastened or rooted in the spinal marrow or cord1 which formed a continuous line with the brain above4 ,these two souls were both emotional2 the higher or thoracic soul being the seat of courage1 energy1 anger1 c41 while to the lower or abdominal soul belonged appetite1 desires1 love of gain1 c4 ,both of them were intended as companions and adjuncts1 yet in the relation of dependence and obedience1 to the rational soul in the cranium above2 which1 though unavoidably debased and perturbed by such unworthy companionship1 was protected partially against the contagion by the difference of location1 the neck being built up as an isthmus of separation between the two4 ,the thoracic soul1 the seat of courage1 was placed nearer to the head1 in order that it might be the medium for transmitting influence from the cranial soul above1 to the abdominal soul below2 which last was at once the least worthy and the most difficult to control4 ,the heart1 being the initial point of the veins1 received the orders and inspirations of the cranial soul1 transmitting them onward through its many blood-channels to all the sensitive parts of the body2 which were thus rendered obedient1 as far as possible1 to the authority of man's rational nature4#c ,the unity or communication of the three souls was kept up through the continuity of the cerebro-spinal column4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #dd1 ,e42 ',plato and ,other ,comp4 of ,sokr4'1 ,,iii4 xxxvi4 p4 #bfd4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #gj2 ',plato and ,other ,comp4 of ,sokr4'1 ,,iii4 pp4 #bga-bgb4 ,but1 though by these arrangements the higher soul in the cranium was enabled to control to a certain extent its inferior allies1 it was itself much disturbed and contaminated by their reaction4 ,the violence of passion and appetite1 the constant processes of nutrition and sensation pervading the whole body1 the multifarious movements of the limbs and trunk1 in all varieties of direction1--these causes all contributed to agitate and to confuse the rotations of the cranial soul1 perverting the arithmetical proportions and harmony belonging to them4 ,the circles of ,same and ,diverse were made to convey false information2 and the soul1 for some time after its first junction with the body1 became destitute of intelligence4#d ,in mature life1 indeed1 the violence of the disturbing causes abates1 and the man may become more and more intelligent1 especially if placed under appropriate training and education4 ,but in many cases no such improvement took place1 and the rational soul of man was irrecoverably spoiled2 so that new and worse breeds were formed1 by successive steps of degeneracy4 ,the first stage1 and the least amount of degeneracy1 was exhibited in the formation of woman2 the original type of man not having included diversity of sex4 ,by farther steps of degradation1 in different ways1 the inferior animals were formed--birds1 quadrupeds1 and fishes4#e ,in each of these1 the rational soul became weaker and worse2 its circular rotations ceased with the disappearance of the spherical cranium1 and animal appetites with sensational agitations were left without control4 ,as man1 with his two emotional souls and body joined on to the rational soul and cranium1 was a debased copy of the perfect rational soul and 9999spherical body of the divine ,kosmos1 so the other inhabitants of the ,kosmos proceeded from still farther debasement and disrationalization of the original type of man4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,timus1 pp4 #dc-dd2 ',plato and ,other ,comp4 of ,sokr4'1 ,,iii4 pp4 #bfb-bfd4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #ia2 ',plato and ,other ,comp4 of ,sokr4'1 pp4 #bha-bhb4 ,such is the view of ,psychology given by ,plato in the ,timus2 beginning with the divine ,kosmos1 and passing downwards from thence to the triple soul of man1 as well as to the various still lower successors of degenerated man4 ,it is to be remarked that ,plato1 though he puts soul as prior to body in dignity and power1 and as having for its functions to control and move body1 yet always conceives soul as attached to body1 and never as altogether detached1 not even in the divine ,kosmos4 ,the soul1 in ,plato's view1 is self-moving and self-moved3 it is both ,primum ,mobile in itself1 and ,primum ,movens as to the body2 it has itself the corporeal properties of being extended and moved1 and it has body implicated with it besides4 ,the theory above described1 in so far as it attributes to the soul rational constituent elements 7,idem1 ,diversum71 continuous magnitude1 and circular rotations1 was peculiar to ,plato1 and is criticized by ,aristotle as the peculiarity of his master4#f ,but several other philosophers agreed with ,plato in considering self-motion1 together with motive causality and faculties perceptive and cognitive1 to be essential characteristics of soul4 ,alkmon declared the soul to be in perpetual motion1 like all the celestial bodies2 hence it was also immortal1 as they were4#g ,herakleitus described it as the subtlest of elements1 and as perpetually fluent2 hence it was enabled to know other things1 all of which were in flux and change4 ,diogenes of ,apollonia affirmed that the element constituent of soul was air1 at once mobile1 all-penetrating1 and intelligent4 ,demokritus declared that among the infinite diversity of atoms those of spherical figure were the constituents both of the element fire and of the soul3 the spherical atoms were by reason of their figure the most apt and rapid in moving2 it was their nature never to be at rest1 and they imparted motion to everything else4#h ,anaxagoras affirmed soul to be radically and essentially distinct from every thing else1 but to be the great primary source of motion1 and to be endued with cognitive power1 though at the same time not suffering impressions from without4#i ,empedokles considered soul to be a compound of the four elements--fire1 water1 air1 earth2 with love and hatred as principles of motion1 the former producing aggregation of elements1 the latter1 disgregation3 by means of each element the soul became cognizant of the like element in the ,kosmos4 ,some ,pythagoreans looked upon the soul as an aggregate of particles of extreme subtlety1 which pervaded the air and were in perpetual agitation4 ,other ,pythagoreans1 however1 declared it to be an harmonious or proportional mixture of contrary elements and qualities2 hence its universality of cognition1 extending to all4#aj ,footnote #f3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #djg1 a4 #b4 ,footnote #g3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #dje1 a4 #bi4 ,footnote #h3 ,ibid4 p4 #djd1 a4 #h2 p4 #dje1 a4 #bb2 p4 #djf1 b4 #ag4 ,footnote #i3 ,ibid4 p4 #dje1 a4 #ac1 b4 #ai4 ,footnote #aj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 ii4 p4 #djd1 a4 #af2 p4 #djg1 b4 #bg4 ,a peculiar theory was delivered by ,xenokrates 7who1 having been fellow-pupil with ,aristotle under ,plato1 afterwards conducted the ,platonic ,school1 during all the time that ,aristotle taught at the ,lykeium71 which ,aristotle declares to involve greater difficulty than any of the others4 ,xenokrates described the soul as a number 7a monad or indivisible unit7 moving itself4#aa ,he retained the self-moving property which ,plato had declared to be characteristic of the soul1 while he departed from ,plato's doctrine of a soul with continuous extension4 ,he thus fell back upon the ,pythagorean idea of number as the fundamental essence4 ,aristotle impugns1 as alike untenable1 both the two properties here alleged--number and self-motion4 ,if the monad both moves and is moved 7he argues71 it cannot be indivisible2 if it be moved1 it must have position1 or must be a point2 but the motion of a point is a line1 without any of that variety that constitutes life4 ,how can the soul be a monad8 or1 if it be1 what difference can exist between one soul and another1 since monads cannot differ from each other except in position8 ,how comes it that some bodies have souls and others not8 and how1 upon this theory1 can we explain the fact that many animated bodies1 both plants and animals1 will remain alive after being divided1 the monadic soul thus exhibiting itself as many and diverse8 ,besides1 the monad set up by ,xenokrates is hardly distinguishable from the highly attenuated body or spherical atom recognized by ,demokritus as the origin or beginning of bodily motion4#ab ,footnote #aa3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #djh1 b4 #cb4 ,footnote #ab3 ,ibid4 p4 #dji1 b4 #ab4 ,these and other arguments are employed by ,aristotle to refute the theory of ,xenokrates4 ,in fact1 he rejects all the theories then current4 ,after having dismissed the self-motor doctrine1 he proceeds to impugn the views of those who declared the soul to be a compound of all the four elements1 in order that they might account for its percipient and cognitive faculties upon the maxim then very generally admitted#ac--,that like is perceived and known by like4 ,this theory1 the principal champion of which was ,empedokles1 appears to ,aristotle inadmissible4 ,you say 7he remarks7 that like knows like2 how does this consist with your other doctrine1 that like cannot act upon1 or suffer from1 like1 especially as you consider that both in perception and in cognition the percipient and cognizant suffers or is acted upon8#ad ,various parts of the cognizant subject1 such as bone1 hair1 ligaments1 c41 are destitute of perception and cognition2 how then can we know anything about bone1 hair1 and ligaments1 since we cannot know them by like8#ae ,suppose the soul to be compounded of all the four elements2 this may explain how it comes to know the four elements1 themselves1 but not how it comes to know all the combinations of the four2 now innumerable combinations of the four are comprised among the cognita4 ,we must assume that the soul contains in itself not merely the four elements1 but also the laws or definite proportions wherein they can combine2 and this is affirmed by no one4#af ,moreover1 ,ens is an equivocal1 or at least a multivocal1 term2 there are ,entia belonging to each of the ten ,categories4 ,now the soul cannot include in itself all the ten1 for the different ,categories have no elements in common2 in whichever ,category you rank the soul1 it will know 7by virtue of likeness7 the cognita belonging to that category1 but it will not know the cognita belonging to the other nine4#ag ,besides1 even if we grant that the soul includes all the four elements1 where is the cementing principle that combines all the four into one8 ,the elements are merely matter2 and what holds them together must be the really potent principle of soul2 but of this no explanation is given4#ah ,footnote #ac3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #dji1 b4 #bi4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 v4 p4 #daj1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #ae3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #af3 ,ibid4 p4 #dji1 b4 #bh2 p4 #daj1 a4 #ab4 ,footnote #ag3 ,ibid4 p4 #daj1 a4 #bj4 ,footnote #ah3 ,ibid4 p4 #daj1 b4 #aj4 ,some philosophers have assumed 7continues ,aristotle7 that soul pervades the whole ,kosmos and its elements2 and that it is inhaled by animals in respiration along with the air4#ai ,they forget that all plants1 and even some animals1 live without respiring at all2 moreover1 upon this theory1 air and fire also1 as possessing soul1 and what is said to be a better soul1 ought 7if the phrase were permitted7 to be regarded as animals4 ,the soul of air or fire must be homogeneous in its parts2 the souls of animals are not homogeneous1 but involve several distinct parts or functions4#bj ,the soul perceives1 cogitates1 opines1 feels1 desires1 repudiates2 farther1 it moves the body locally1 and brings about the growth and decay of the body4 ,here we have a new mystery3#ba--;,is the whole soul engaged in the performance of each of these functions1 or has it a separate part exclusively consecrated to each8 ,if so1 how many are the parts8 ,some philosophers 7,plato among them7 declare the soul to be divided1 and that one part cogitates and cognizes1 while another part desires4 ,but upon that supposition what is it that holds these different parts together8 ,certainly not the body 7which is ,plato's theory72 on the contrary1 it is the soul that holds together the body2 for1 as soon as the soul is gone1 the body rots and disappears4#bb ,if there be anything that keeps together the divers parts of the soul as one1 that something must be the true and fundamental soul2 and we ought not to speak of the soul as having parts1 but as essentially one and indivisible1 with several distinct faculties4 ,again1 if we are to admit parts of the soul1 does each part hold together a special part of the body1 as the entire soul holds together the entire body8 ,this seems impossible2 for what part of the body can the ,nos or ,intellect 7e4g47 be imagined to hold together8 ,and1 besides1 several kinds of plants and of animals may be divided1 yet so that each of the separate parts shall still continue to live2 hence it is plain that the soul in each separate part is complete and homogeneous4#bc ,footnote #ai3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #djd1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 tou zn o7_/ron ei7nai tn a7napno_/n1 c4 ,compare the doctrine of ,demokritus4 ,footnote #bj3 ,ibid4 v4 p4 #daa1 a4 #a1 #h1 #af4 ,footnote #ba3 ,ibid4 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 v4 p4 #daa1 b4 #h4 ,footnote #bc3 ,ibid4 b4 #ae-bg4 ,aristotle thus rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent philosophers1 but more especially the two following3--,that the soul derives its cognitive powers from the fact of being compounded of the four elements2 ,that the soul is self-moved4 ,he pronounces it incorrect to say that the soul is moved at all4#bd ,he farther observes that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the full meaning or all the varieties of soul2 and that none of these defective theories suffices for the purpose that every good and sufficient theory ought to serve1 viz41 not merely to define the essence of the soul1 but also to define it in such a manner that the concomitant functions and affections of the soul shall all be deducible from it4#be ,lastly1 he points out that most of his predecessors had considered that the prominent characteristics of soul were--to be motive and to be percipient3#bf while1 in his opinion1 neither of these two characteristics is universal or fundamental4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 a4 #be4 ,footnote #be3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #djb1 b4 #af1 seq42 v4 p4 #dji1 b4 #ae4 ,footnote #bf3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #djc1 b4 #cj4 ,aristotle requires that a good theory of the soul shall explain alike the lowest vegetable soul1 and the highest functions of the human or divine soul4 ,and1 in commenting on those theorists who declared that the essence of soul consisted in movement1 he remarks that their theory fails altogether in regard to the ,nos 7or cogitative and intellective faculty of the human soul72 the operation of which bears far greater analogy to rest or suspension of movement than to movement itself4#bg ,footnote #bg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #djg1 a4 #cb3 ,greek3 e7_/ti d' 7 no_/sis e7_/oiken 7rem_/sei tini 7 e7pista_/sei mallon 7 kin_/sei4 ,we shall now proceed to state how ,aristotle steers clear 7or at least believes himself to steer clear7 of the defects that he has pointed out in the psychological theories of his predecessors4 ,instead of going back 7like ,empedokles1 ,plato1 and others7 to a time when the ,kosmos did not yet exist1 and giving us an hypothesis to explain how its parts came together or were put together1 he takes the facts and objects of the ,kosmos as they stand1 and distributes them according to distinctive marks alike obvious1 fundamental1 and pervading2 after which he seeks a mode of explanation in the principles of his own ,first ,philosophy or ,ontology4 ,whoever had studied the ,organon and the ,physica of ,aristotle 7apparently intended to be read prior to the treatise ,de ,anim7 would be familiar with his distribution of ,entia into ten ,categories1 of which ,essence or ,substance was the first and the fundamental4 ,of these ,essences or ,substances the 9999most complete and recognized were physical or natural bodies2 and among such bodies one of the most striking distinctions1 was between those that had life and those that had it not4 ,by life1 ,aristotle means keeping up the processes of nutrition1 growth1 and decay4#bh ,footnote #bh3 ,ibid4 ,,ii i4 p4 #dab1 a4 #aa3 ,greek3 ou7si_/ai de ma_/list' ei7nai dokousi ta s_/mata1 kai tou_/tn ta phusika_/2 tn de phusikn ta men e7_/chei z_/n1 ta d' ou7k e7_/chei2 zn de le_/g1 tn di' au7tou trophn kai au7_/xsin kai phthi_/sin4 ,to live 7,aristotle observes7 is a term used in several different meanings2 whatever possesses any one of the following four properties is said to live3#bi 7#a7 ,intellect1 7#b7 ,sensible perception1 7#c7 ,local movement and rest1 7#d7 ,internal movement of nutrition1 growth1 and decay4 ,but of these four the last is the only one common to all living bodies without exception2 it is the foundation presupposed by the other three4 ,it is the only one possessed by plants1#cj and common to all plants as well as to all animals--to all animated bodies4 ,footnote #bi3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #dac1 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 pleonachs de tou zn legome_/nou1 ka7n e7_/n ti tou_/tn e7nupa_/rch mo_/non1 zn au7to_/ phamen1 c4 ,footnote #cj3 ,ibid4 ,i4 v4 p4 #daa1 b4 #bg1 ad fin4 ,what is the animating principle belonging to each of these bodies1 and what is the most general definition of it8 ,such is the problem that ,aristotle states to himself about the soul4#ca ,he explains it by a metaphysical distinction first introduced 7apparently7 by himself into ,philosophia ,prima4 ,he considers ,substance or ,essence as an ideal compound2 not simply as clothed with all the accidents described in the nine last ,categories1 but also as being analysable in itself1 even apart from these accidents1 into two abstract1 logical1 or notional elements or principia--,form and ,matter4 ,this distinction is borrowed from the most familiar facts of the sensible world--the shape of solid objects4 ,when we see or feel a cube of wax1 we distinguish the cubic shape from the waxen material2#cb we may find the like shape in many other materials--wood1 stone1 c42 we may find the like material in many different shapes--sphere1 pyramid1 c42 but the matter has always some shape1 and the shape has always some matter4 ,we can name and reason about the matter1 without attending to the shape1 or distinguishing whether it be cube or sphere2 we can name and reason about the shape1 without attending to the material shaped1 or to any of its various peculiarities4 ,but this1 though highly useful1 is a mere abstraction or notional distinction4 ,there can be no real separation between the two3 no shape without some solid material2 no solid material without some shape4 ,the two are correlates2 each of them implying the other1 and neither of them admitting of being realized or actualized without the other4 ,footnote #ca3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 p4 #dac1 b4 #aa3 ,greek3 7 psuch tn ei7rme_/nn tou_/tn a7rch_/4--,ibid4 ,i4 p4 #dab1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 ti_/s a7n ei7_/ koino_/tatos lo_/gos au7ts4 ,footnote #cb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #dab1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 ton kron kai to schma4 ,this distinction of ,form and ,matter is one of the capital features of ,aristotle's ,philosophia ,prima4 ,he expands it and diversifies it in a thousand ways1 often with subtleties very difficult to follow2 but the fundamental import of it is seldom lost--two correlates inseparably implicated in fact and reality in every concrete individual that has received a substantive name1 yet logically separable and capable of being named and considered apart from each other4 ,the ,aristotelian analysis thus brings out1 in regard to each individual substance 7or ,hoc ,aliquid1 to use his phrase71 a triple point of view3 7#a7 ,the ,form2 7#b7 ,the ,matter2 7#c7 ,the compound or aggregate of the two--in other words1 the inseparable ,ens1 which carries us out of the domain of logic or abstraction into that of the concrete or reality4#cc ,footnote #cc3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 iii4 p4 #ajbi1 a4 #a-cd2 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #dab1 a4 #f2 p4 #dad1 a4 #ae4 ,in the first book of the ,physica1 ,aristotle pushes this analysis yet further1 introducing three principia instead of two3--7#a7 ,form1 7#b7 ,matter1 7#c7 ,privation 7of ,form72 he gives a distinct general name to the negation as well as to the affirmation2 he provides a sign minus as counter-denomination to the sign plus4 ,but he intimates that this is only the same analysis more minutely discriminated1 or in a different point of view3 ,greek3 dio e7_/sti men 7s du_/o lekte_/on ei7nai tas a7rcha_/s1 e7_/sti d' 7s treis 7,phys4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #aij1 b4 #bi74 ,materia ,prima 7,aristotle says1 ,phys4 ,i4 vii4 p4 #aia1 a4 #h7 is knowable only by analogy--i4e41 explicable only by illustrative examples3 as the brass is to the statue1 as the wood is to the couch1 c42 natural substances being explained from works of art1 as is frequent with ,aristotle4 ,aristotle farther recognizes1 between these two logical correlates1 a marked difference of rank4 ,the ,form stands first1 the ,matter second1--not in time1 but in notional presentation4 ,the ,form is higher1 grander1 prior in dignity and esteem1 more ,ens1 or more nearly approaching to perfect entity2 the ,matter is lower1 meaner1 posterior in dignity1 farther removed from that perfection4 ,the conception of wax1 plaster1 wood1 c41 without amy definite or determinate shape1 is confused and unimpressive2 but a name1 connoting some definite shape1 at once removes this confusion1 and carries with it mental pre-eminence1 alike as to phantasy1 memory1 and science4 ,in the logical hierarchy of ,aristotle1 ,matter is the inferior and ,form the superior2#cd yet neither of the two can escape from its relative character3 ,form requires ,matter for its correlate1 and is nothing in itself or apart1#ce just as much as ,matter requires ,form2 though from the inferior dignity of ,matter we find it more frequently described as the second or correlate1 while ,form is made to stand forward as the relatum4 ,for complete reality1 we want the concrete individual having the implication of both2 while1 in regard to each of the constituents per se1 no separate real existence can be affirmed1 but only a nominal or logical separation4 ,footnote #cd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #gbi1 a4 #aj4 ,matter and ,form are here compared to the female and the male--to mother and father4 ,form is a cause operative1 ,matter a cause co-operative1 though both are alike indispensable to full reality4 ,compare ,physic4 ,i4 ix4 p4 #aib1 a4 #ac3 ,greek3 7 men gar u7pome_/nousa sunaiti_/a t morph tn ginome_/nn e7sti_/n1 7_/sper m_/tr2--a7lla tout' e7_/stin 7 u7_/l1 7_/sper a7n ei7 thlu a7_/r7r7enos kai ai7schron kalou 7e7phi_/eto74--,de ,partibus ,animalium1 ,i4 i4 p4 #fdj1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 7 gar kata tn morphn phu_/sis kurite_/ra ts u7liks phu_/ses4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 iii4 p4 #ajbi1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 to ei7dos ts u7_/ls pro_/teron kai mallon o7_/n--p4 #ajci1 a4 #a4 ,see in ,schwegler1 pp4 #ac1 #db1 #hc1 ,part ,,ii4 of his ,commentary on the ,aristotelian ,metaphysica4 ,footnote #ce3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,z4 viii4 p4 #ajcc1 b4 #aj1 seq4 ,this difference of rank between ,matter and ,form--that the first is inferior and the last the superior--is sometimes so much put in the foreground1 that the two are conceived in a different manner and under other names1 as ,potential and ,actual4 ,matter is the potential1 imperfect1 inchoate1 which the supervening ,form actualizes into the perfect and complete2 a transition from half-reality to entire reality or act4 ,the ,potential is the undefined or indeterminate#cf--what may be or may not be--what is not yet actual1 and may perhaps never become so1 but is prepared to pass into actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid4 ,in this way of putting the antithesis1 the ,potential is not so much implicated with the ,actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the ,actual3 it is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown2 being itself essential as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation4#cg ,the three logical divisions--,matter1 ,form1 and the resulting ,compound or ,concrete 7,greek3 to su_/nolon1 to suneilmme_/non71 are here compressed into two--the ,potential and the ,actualization thereof4 ,actuality 7,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia1 e7ntele_/cheia7 coincides in meaning partly with the ,form1 partly with the resulting ,compound2 the ,form being so much exalted1 that the distinction between the two is almost effaced4#ch ,footnote #cf3 ,ibid4 ,greek3 ,th4 viii4 p4 #ajej1 b4 #aj4 ,he says1 p4 #ajdh1 a4 #ce1 that this distinction between ,potential and ,actual cannot be defined1 but can only be illustrated by particular examples1 several of which he proceeds to enumerate4 ,trendelenburg observes 7,note 9999ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 p4 #cjg73--;,greek3 ,du_/namis contraria adhuc in se inclusa tenet1 ut in utrumque abire possit3 ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia alterum excludit4 ,compare also ib4 p4 #cjb4 ,this ,may or ,may not be is the widest and most general sense of the terms ,greek3 du_/namis and ,greek3 dunato_/n1 common to all the analogical or derivative applications that ,aristotle points out as belonging to them4 ,it is more general than that which he gives as the ,greek3 ku_/rios o7_/ros ts pr_/ts duna_/mes--a7rch_/ metabltik e7n a7_/ll 7 7 a7_/llo1 and ought seemingly to be itself considered as the ,greek3 ku_/rios o7_/ros4 ,cf4 ,arist4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 xii4 p4 #ajbj1 a4 #e1 with the comment of ,bonitz1 who remarks upon the loose language of ,aristotle in this chapter but imputes to ,aristotle a greater amount of contradiction than he seems to deserve 7,comm4 ad ,metaphys4 pp4 #bef1 #cic74 ,footnote #cg3 ,ens potenti is a variety of ,ens 7,arist4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d4 vii4 p4 #ajag1 b4 #f71 but an imperfect variety3 it is ,greek3 o7n a7tele_/s1 which may become matured into ,greek3 o7n te_/leion1 o7n e7ntelechei_/a or ,greek3 e7nergei_/a 7,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,th4 i4 p4 #ajde1 a4 #cd74 ,matter is either remote or proximate1 removed either by one stage or several stages from the ,greek3 su_/nolon in which it culminates4 ,strictly speaking1 none but proximate matter is said to exist ,greek3 duna_/mei4 ,alexander ,schol4 7ad ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,th4 p4 #ajdi1 a4 #ai7 p4 #gha1 b4 #ci3 ,greek3 7 po_/r7r7 u7_/l ou7 le_/getai duna_/mei4 ti_/ d_/ pote8 o7_/ti ou7 parnumia_/zomen ta pra_/gmata e7k ts po_/r7r7 a7ll' e7k ts prosechous2 le_/gomen gar to kib_/tion xu_/linon e7k ts prosechous1 a7ll' ou7 g_/inon e7k ts po_/r7r74 ,footnote #ch3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 4 i4 p4 #ajdb1 a4 #be1 seq4 ,he scarcely makes any distinction here between ,greek3 u7_/l and ,greek3 du_/namis1 or between ,greek3 morph and ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia 7cf4 ,greek3 ,th4 viii4 p4 #ajej1 a4 #ae74 ,alexander in his ,commentary on this book 7,greek3 ,th4 iii4 p4 #ajdg1 a4 #cj7 p4 #edb1 ,bonitz's edit41 remarks that ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia is used by ,aristotle in a double sense2 sometimes meaning ,greek3 ki_/nsis pros to te_/los1 sometimes meaning the ,greek3 te_/los itself4 ,comp4 ,greek3 4 iii4 p4 #ajdc1 a4 #cb2 also the commentary of ,bonitz1 p4 #cic4 ,two things are to be remembered respecting ,matter1 in its ,aristotelian 7logical or ontological7 sense3 7#a7 ,it may be ,body1 but it is not necessarily ,body2#ci 7#b7 ,it is only intelligible as the correlate of ,form3 it can neither exist by itself1 nor can it be known by itself 7i4e41 when taken out of that relativity74 ,this deserves notice1 because to forget the relativity of a relative word1 and to reason upon it as if it were an absolute1 is an oversight not unfrequent4 ,furthermore1 each variety of ,matter has its appropriate ,form1 and each variety of ,form its appropriate ,matter1 with which it correlates4 ,there are various stages or gradations of ,matter2 from ,materia ,prima1 which has no ,form at all1 passing upwards through successive partial developments to ,materia ,ultima2 which last is hardly#dj distinguishable from ,form or from ,materia ,formata4 ,footnote #ci3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,z4 xi4 p4 #ajcf1 a4 #h3 ,greek3 7 d' u7_/l a7_/gnstos kath' au7t_/n4 u7_/l d' 7 men ai7stht_/1 7 de not_/2 ai7stht men oi7on chalkos kai xu_/lon kai o7_/s kint u7_/l1 not de 7 e7n tois ai7sthtois u7pa_/rchousa m 7 ai7sthta_/1 oi7on ta mathmatika_/4--p4 #ajce1 a4 #g4 ,physica1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #bjg1 a4 #bf2 ,de ,generat4 et ,corrupt4 ,i4 v4 p4 #cbj1 b4 #ad-be4 ,footnote #dj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #dad1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 e7ka_/stou gar 7 e7ntele_/cheia e7n t duna_/mei u7pa_/rchonti kai t oi7kei_/a u7_/l pe_/phuken e7ggi_/nesthai4--,physica1 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #aid1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 e7_/ti tn pro_/s ti 7 u7_/l2 a7_/ll gar ei7_/dei a7_/ll u7_/l4--,metaph4 ,greek3 4 vi4 p4 #ajde1 b4 #ag3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d'1 7_/sper ei7_/rtai1 kai 7 e7scha_/t u7_/l kai 7 morph tau7to_/ kai duna_/mei1 to de e7nergei_/a4 ,see upon this doctrine ,schwegler's ,commentary1 pp4 #ajj1 #aed1 #agc1 #bdj1 ,pt4 #bnd4 ,compare also ,arist4 ,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #gce1 a4 #i2 also ,de ,coelo1 ,,iv4 iii4 p4 #caj1 b4 #ad4 ,the distinction above specified is employed by ,aristotle in his exposition of the ,soul4 ,the soul belongs to the ,category of ,substance or ,essence 7not to that of ,quantity1 ,quality1 c472 but of the two points of view under which ,essence may be presented1 the soul ranks with ,form1 not with ,matter--with the ,actual1 not with the ,potential4 ,the ,matter to which 7as correlate7 soul stands related1 is a natural body 7i4e41 a body having within it an inherent principle of motion and rest7 organized in a certain way1 or fitted out with certain capacities and preparations to which soul is the active and indispensable complement4 ,these capacities would never come into actuality without the soul2 but1 on the other hand1 the range of actualities or functions in the soul depends upon1 and is limited by1 the range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body4 ,the implication of the two constitutes the living subject1 with all its functions1 active and passive4 ,if the eye were an animated or living subject1 seeing would be its soul2 if the carpenter's axe were living1 cutting would be its soul2#da the matter would be the lens or the iron in which this soul is embodied4 ,it is not indispensable1 however1 that all the functions of the living subject should be at all times in complete exercise3 the subject is still living1 even while asleep2 the eye is still a good eye1 though at the moment closed4 ,it is enough if the functional aptitude exist as a dormant property1 ready to rise into activity1 when the proper occasions present themselves4 ,this minimum of ,form suffices to give living efficacy to the potentialities of body2 it is enough that a man1 though now in a dark night and seeing nothing1 will see as soon as the sun rises2 or that he knows geometry1 though he is not now thinking of a geometrical problem4 ,this dormant possession is what ,aristotle calls the ,first ,entelechy or ,energy1 i4e41 the lowest stage of ,actuality1 or the minimum of influence required to transform ,potentiality into ,actuality4 ,the ,aristotelian definition of ,soul is thus3 ,the first entelechy of a natural organized body1 having life in potentiality4#db ,this is all that is essential to the soul2 the second or higher entelechy 7actual exercise of the faculties7 is not a constant or universal property4#dc ,footnote #da3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #dab1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 ei7 gar 7n o7 o7phthalmos zo_/n1 psuch a7n 7n au7tou 7 o7_/psis2 au7_/t gar ou7si_/a o7phthalmou 7 kata ton lo_/gon4 o7 d' o7phthalmos u7_/l o7_/pses1 7s a7poleipou_/ss ou7ke_/t' o7phthalmo_/s1 pln o7mnu_/ms1 katha_/per o7 li_/thinos kai o7 gegramme_/nos4 ,footnote #db3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #dab1 a4 #bg3 ,greek3 dio psuch_/ e7stin e7ntele_/cheia 7 pr_/t s_/matos phusikou duna_/mei zn e7_/chontos2 toiouto de o7 a7n 7 o7rganiko_/n4 ,compare ,metaphysica1 ,z4 x4 p4 #ajce1 b4 #ad-bg4 ,footnote #dc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #dad1 a4 #h-ah4 ,the distinction here taken between the first or lower stage of ,entelechy1 and the second or higher stage1 coincides substantially with the distinction in the ,nikomachean ,ethica and elsewhere between ,greek3 e7_/xis and ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia4 ,see ,topica1 ,,iv4 v4 p4 #abe1 b4 #ae2 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,,ii4 i4-v4 p4 #aajc seq4 ,in this definition of ,soul1 ,aristotle employs his own ,philosophia ,prima to escape the errors committed by prior philosophers4 ,he does not admit that the soul is a separate entity in itself2 or that it is composed 7as ,empedokles and ,demokritus had said7 of corporeal elements1 or 7as ,plato had said7 of elements partly corporeal1 partly logical and notional4 ,he rejects the imaginary virtues of number1 invoked by the ,pythagoreans and ,xenokrates2 lastly1 he keeps before him not merely man1 but all the varieties of animated objects1 to which his definition must be adapted4 ,his first capital point is to put aside the alleged identity1 or similarity1 or sameness of elements1 between soul and body2 and to put aside equally any separate existence or substantiality of soul4 ,he effects both these purposes by defining them as essentially relatum and correlate2 the soul1 as the relatum1 is unintelligible and unmeaning without its correlate1 upon which accordingly its definition is declared to be founded4 ,the real animated subject may be looked at either from the point of view of the relatum or from that of the correlate2 but1 though the two are thus logically separable1 in fact and reality they are inseparably implicated2 and1 if either of them be withdrawn1 the animated subject disappears4 ,the soul 7says ,aristotle7 is not any variety of body1 but it cannot be without a body2 it is not a body1 but it is something belonging to or related to a body2 and for this reason it is in a body1 and in a body of such or such potentialities4#dd ,soul is to body 7we thus read71 not as a compound of like elements1 nor as a type is to its copy1 or vice vers1 but as a relatum to its correlate2 dependent upon the body for all its acts and manifestations1 and bringing to consummation what in the body exists as potentiality only4 ,soul1 however1 is better than body2 and the animated being is better than the inanimate by reason of its soul4#de ,footnote #dd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #dad1 a4 #ai3 ,greek3 kai dia touto kals u7polamba_/nousin oi7s dokei mt' a7_/neu s_/matos ei7nai m_/te s_/ma_/ ti 7 psuch_/2 sma men gar ou7k e7_/sti1 s_/matos de_/ ti1 kai dia touto e7n s_/mati u7pa_/rchei1 kai e7n s_/mati toiou_/t4 ,compare ,aristot4 ,de ,juventute et ,senectute1 i4 p4 #dfg1 b4 #ad4 ,footnote #de3 ,aristot4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #gca1 b4 #bi4 ,the animated subject is thus a form immersed or implicated in matter2 and all its actions and passions are so likewise4#df ,each of these has its formal side1 as concerns the soul1 and its material side1 as concerns the body4 ,when a man or animal is angry1 for example1 this emotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact of the body3 in the first of these two characters1 it may be defined as an appetite for hurting some one who has hurt us2 in the second of the two1 it may be defined as an ebullition of the blood and heat round the heart4#dg ,the emotion1 belonging to the animated subject or aggregate of soul and body1 is a complex fact having two aspects1 logically distinguishable from each other1 but each correlating and implying the other4 ,this is true not only in regard to our passions1 emotions1 and appetites1 but also in regard to our perceptions1 phantasms1 reminiscences1 reasonings1 efforts of attention in learning1 c4 ,we do not say that the soul weaves or builds 7,aristotle observes#dh73 we say that the animated subject1 the aggregate of soul and body1 the man1 weaves or builds4 ,so we ought also to say1 not that the soul feels anger1 pity1 love1 hatred1 c41 or that the soul learns1 reasons1 recollects1 c41 but that the man with his soul does these things4 ,the actual movement throughout these processes is not in the soul1 but in the body2 sometimes going to the soul 7as in sensible perception71 sometimes proceeding from the soul to the body 7as in the case of reminiscence74 ,all these processes are at once corporeal and psychical1 pervading the whole animated subject1 and having two aspects coincident and inter-dependent1 though logically distinguishable4 ,the perfect or imperfect discrimination by the sentient soul depends upon the good or bad condition of the bodily sentient organs2 an old man that has become shortsighted would see as well as before1 if he could regain his youthful eye4 ,the defects of the soul arise from defects in the bodily organism to which it belongs1 as in cases of drunkenness or sickness2 and this is not less true of the ,nos1 or intellective soul1 than of the sentient soul4#di ,intelligence1 as well as emotion1 are phenomena1 not of the bodily organism simply1 nor of the ,nos simply1 but of the community or partnership of which both are members2 and1 when intelligence gives way1 this is not because the ,nos itself is impaired1 but because the partnership is ruined by the failure of the bodily organism4 ,footnote #df3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 i4 p4 #djc1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 ta pa_/th lo_/goi e7_/nuloi_/ ei7sin4 ,compare ,,ii4 p4 #dab1 b4 #aj-be2 p4 #dac1 a4 #b4 ,footnote #dg3 ,ibid4 ,i4 i4 p4 #djc1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #dh3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #djh1 b4 #ab4 ,greek3 to de le_/gein o7rgi_/zesthai tn psuchn o7_/moion ka7n ei7_/ tis le_/goi tn psuchn u7phai_/nein 7 oi7kodomein2 be_/ltion gar i7_/ss m le_/gein tn psuchn e7leein 7 mantha_/nein 7 dianoeisthai1 a7lla ton a7_/nthrpon t psuch2 touto de m 7s e7n e7kei_/n ts kin_/ses ou7_/ss1 a7ll' o7_/te men me_/chri e7kei_/ns1 o7_/te d' a7p' e7kei_/ns1 c4 ,again1 b4 #cj3 ,greek3 o7_/ti men ou7n ou7ch oi7o_/n te kineisthai tn psuch_/n1 phaneron e7k tou_/tn4 ,footnote #di3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf4 ,compare a similar doctrine in the ,timus of ,plato1 p4 #hf1 ,b4-,d4 ,respecting the ,nos 7the theorizing ,nos71 we must here observe that ,aristotle treats it as a separate kind or variety of soul1 with several peculiarities4 ,we shall collect presently all that he says upon that subject1 which is the most obscure portion of his psychology4 ,in regard to soul generally1 the relative point of view with body as the correlate is constantly insisted on by ,aristotle2 without such correlate his assertions would have no meaning4 ,but the relation between them is presented in several different ways4 ,the soul is the cause and principle of a living body2#ej by which is meant1 not an independent and pre-existent something that brings the body into existence but1 an immanent or indwelling influence which sustains the unity and guides the functions of the organism4 ,according to the quadruple classification of ,cause recognized by ,aristotle--,formal1 ,material1 ,movent1 and ,final--the body furnishes the ,material ,cause1 while the soul comprises all the three others4 ,the soul is 7as we have already seen7 the ,form in relation to the body as ,matter1 but it is1 besides1 the ,movent1 inasmuch as it determines the local displacement as well as all the active functions of the body--nutrition1 growth1 generation1 sensation1 c42 lastly1 it is also the ,final ,cause1 since the maintenance and perpetuation of the same ,form1 in successive individuals1 is the standing purpose aimed at by each body in the economy of ,nature4#ea ,under this diversity of aspect1 soul and body are reciprocally integrant and complementary of each other1 the real integer 7the ,living or ,animated ,body7 including both4 ,footnote #ej3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #dae1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' 7 psuch tou zntos s_/matos ai7ti_/a kai a7rch_/2 tauta de pollachs le_/getai4 ,footnote #ea3 ,ibid4 b4 #a4 ,soul1 in the ,aristotelian point of view--what is common to all living bodies1 comprises several varieties4 ,but these varieties are not represented as forming a genus with co-ordinate species under it1 in such manner that the counter-ordinate species1 reciprocally excluding each other1 are1 when taken together1 co-extensive with the whole genus2 like man and brute in regard to animal4 ,the varieties of soul are distributed into successive stages gradually narrowing in extension and enlarging in comprehension2 the first or lowest stage being co-extensive with the whole1 but connoting only two or three simple attributes2 the second1 or next above1 connoting all these and more besides1 but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by the first2 the third connoting all this and more1 but denoting yet fewer individuals2 and so on forward4 ,thus the concrete individuals1 called living bodies1 include all plants as well as all animals2 but the soul1 called ,nutritive by ,aristotle1 corresponding thereto connotes only nutrition1 growth1 decay1 and generation of another similar individual4#eb ,in the second stage1 plants are left out1 but all animals remain3 the ,sentient soul1 belonging to animals1 but not belonging to any plants1 connotes all the functions and unities of the ,nutritive soul1 together with sensible perception 7at least in its rudest shape7 besides4#ec ,we proceed onward in the same direction1 taking in additional faculties--the ,movent1 ,appetitive1 ,phantastic 7,imaginative71 ,notic 7,intelligent7 soul1 and thus diminishing the total of individuals denoted4 ,but each higher variety of soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower4 ,thus the ,sentient soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of the ,nutritive1 though the ,nutritive exists 7in plants7 without any admixture of the ,sentient4 ,again1 the ,sentient soul does not necessarily possess either memory1 imagination1 or intellect 7,nos72 but no soul can be either ,imaginative or ,notic1 without being ,sentient as well as ,nutritive4 ,the ,notic ,soul1 as the highest of all1 retains in itself all the lower faculties2 but these are found to exist apart from it4#ed ,footnote #eb3 ,in the ,aristotelian treatise ,de ,plantis1 p4 #hae1 b4 #af1 it is stated that ,empedokles1 ,anaxagoras1 and ,demokritus1 all affirmed that plants had both intellect and cognition up to a certain moderate point4 ,we do not cite this treatise as the composition of ,aristotle1 but it is reasonably good evidence in reference to the doctrine of those other philosophers4 ,footnote #ec3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 v4 p4 #daa1 b4 #bh4 ,footnote #ed3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #dac1 a4 #be-cj1 b4 #cb2 iii4 p4 #dad1 b4 #bi2 p4 #dae1 a4 #aj4 ,we may remark here that the psychological classification of ,aristotle proceeds in the inverse direction to that of ,plato4 ,in the ,platonic ,timus we begin with the grand soul of the ,kosmos1 and are conducted by successive steps of degradation to men1 animals1 plants2 while ,aristotle lays his foundation in the largest1 most multiplied1 and lowest range of individuals1 carrying us by successive increase of conditions to the fewer and the higher4 ,the lowest or ,nutritive soul1 in spite of the small number of conditions involved in it1 is the indispensable basis whereon all the others depend4 ,none of the other souls can exist apart from it4#ee ,it is the first constituent of the living individual--the implication of ,form with ,matter in a natural body suitably organized2 it is the preservative of the life of the individual1 with its aggregate of functions and faculties1 and with the proper limits of size and shape that characterize the species2#ef it is1 moreover1 the preservative of perpetuity to the species1 inasmuch as it prompts and enables each individual to generate and leave behind a successor like himself2 which is the only way that an individual can obtain quasi-immortality1 though all aspire to become immortal4#eg ,this lowest soul is the primary cause of digestion and nutrition4 ,it is cognate with the celestial heat1 which is essential also as a co-operative cause2 accordingly1 all animated bodies possess an inherent natural heat4#eh ,footnote #ee3 ,ibid4 iv4 p4 #dae1 a4 #be3 ,greek3 pr_/t kai koinota_/t du_/nami_/s e7sti psuchs1 kath' 7n u7pa_/rchei to zn a7_/pasin4--p4 #dae1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 tou zntos s_/matos ai7ti_/a kai a7rch_/4--,,iii4 xii4 p4 #dcd1 a4 #bb-cj1 b4 #bd4 ,aristot4 ,de ,respiratione1 viii4 p4 #dgd1 a4 #cj1 b4 #aa4 ,footnote #ef3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #daf1 a4 #ag4 ,footnote #eg3 ,ibid4 p4 #dae1 b4 #b2 p4 #daf1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 e7pei d' a7po tou te_/lous a7_/panta prosagoreu_/ein di_/kaion1 te_/los de to gennsai oi7on au7to_/1 a7n 7 pr_/t psuch genntik oi7on au7to_/4 ,also ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #gca1 b4 #cc4 ,footnote #eh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #daf1 a4 #aj-ah1 b4 #bi4 ,we advance upwards now from the nutritive soul to that higher soul which is at once nutritive and ,sentient2 for ,aristotle does not follow the example of ,plato in recognizing three souls to one body1 but assigns only one and the same soul1 though with multiplied faculties and functions1 to one and the same body4 ,sensible perception1 with its accompaniments1 forms the characteristic privilege of the animal as contrasted with the plant4#ei ,sensible perception admits of many diversities1 from the simplest and rudest tactile sensation1 which even the lowest animals cannot be without1 to the full equipment of five senses which ,aristotle declares to be a maximum not susceptible of increase4#fj ,but the sentient faculty1 even in its lowest stage1 indicates a remarkable exaltation of the soul in its character of form4 ,the soul1 qu sentient and percipient1 receives the form of the perceptum without the matter2 whereas the nutritive soul cannot disconnect the two1 but receives and appropriates the nutrient substance1 form and matter in one and combined4#fa ,aristotle illustrates this characteristic feature of sensible perception by recurring to his former example of the wax and the figure4 ,just as wax receives from a signet the impression engraven thereon1 whether the matter of the signet be iron1 gold1 stone1 or wood2 as the impression stamped has no regard to the matter1 but reproduces only the figure engraven on the signet1 the wax being merely potential and undefined1 until the signet comes to convert it into something actual and definite2#fb so the percipient faculty in man is impressed by the substances in nature1 not according to the matter of each but1 according to the qualitative form of each4 ,such passive receptivity is the first and lowest form of sensation1#fc not having any magnitude in itself1 but residing in bodily organs which have magnitude1 and separable from them only by logical abstraction4 ,it is a potentiality1 correlating with1 and in due proportion to1 the exterior percipibile1 which1 when acting upon it1 brings it into full actuality4 ,the actuality of both 7percipiens and perceptum7 is one and the same1 and cannot be disjoined in fact1 though the potentialities of the two are distinct yet correlative2 the percipiens is not like the percipibile originally1 but becomes like it by being thus actualized4#fd ,footnote #ei3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 i4 p4 #dcf1 b4 #ab4 ,he considers sponges to have some sensation 7,hist4 ,animal4 ,i4 i4 p4 #dhg1 b4 #i74 ,footnote #fj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #dad1 b4 #b2 p4 #dae1 a4 #c2 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #dbd1 b4 #bb2 xiii4 p4 #dce1 b4 #ae4 ,footnote #fa3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #dbd1 a4 #cb-;b4 #d3 ,greek3 dia ti_/ pote ta phuta ou7k ai7stha_/netai1 e7_/chonta_/ ti mo_/rion psuchikon kai pa_/schonta_/ ti u7po tn a7ptn8 kai gar psu_/chetai kai thermai_/netai2 ai7_/tion gar to m e7_/chein meso_/tta1 mde toiau_/tn a7rchn oi7_/an ta ei7_/d de_/chesthai tn ai7sthtn1 a7lla pa_/schein meta ts u7_/ls4 ,themistius ad loc4 p4 #add1 ed4 ,spengel3 ,greek3 pa_/schei 7ta phuta_/7 suneisiou_/ss ts u7_/ls tou poiountos1 c4 ,footnote #fb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #dbd1 a4 #ai4 ,footnote #fc3 ,ibid4 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 ai7stht_/rion de prton e7n 7 7 toiau_/t du_/namis1 c4--,,iii4 xii4 p4 #dcd1 a4 #bi4 ,footnote #fd3 ,ibid4 ,,iii4 ii4 p4 #dbe1 b4 #be3 ,greek3 7 de tou ai7sthtou e7ne_/rgeia kai ts ai7sth_/ses 7 au7t me_/n e7sti kai mi_/a1 to d' ei7nai ou7 tau7ton au7tais4--,,ii4 v4 p4 #dah1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 to d' ai7sthtikon duna_/mei e7stin oi7on to ai7sthton 7_/d e7ntelechei_/a1--pa_/schei men ou7n ou7ch o7_/moion o7_/n1 peponthos d' 7moi_/tai kai e7_/stin oi7on e7keino4 ,also p4 #dag1 a4 #g1 #ad1 #bj4 ,there were conflicting doctrines current in ,aristotle's time3 some said that1 for an agent to act upon a patient1 there must be likeness between the two2 others said that there must be unlikeness4 ,aristotle dissents from both1 and adopts a sort of intermediate doctrine4 ,the sentient soul is communicated by the male parent in the act of generation1#fe and is complete from the moment of birth1 not requiring a process of teaching after birth2 the sentient subject becomes at once and instantly1 in regard to sense1 on a level with one that has attained a certain actuality of cognition1 but is not at the moment reflecting upon the cognitum4 ,potentiality and ,actuality are in fact distinguishable into lower and higher degrees2 the ,potential that has been actualized in a first or lower stage1 is still a ,potential relatively to higher stages of ,actuality4#ff ,the ,potential may be acted upon in two opposite ways2 either by deadening and extinguishing it1 or by developing and carrying it forward to realization4 ,the sentient soul1 when asleep or inert1 requires a cause to stimulate it into actual seeing or hearing2 the notic or cognizant soul1 under like circumstances1 must also be stimulated into actual meditation on its cognitum4 ,but there is this difference between the two4 ,the sentient soul communes with particulars2 the notic soul with universals4 ,the sentient soul derives its stimulus from without1 and from some of the individual objects1 tangible1 visible1 or audible2 but the notic soul is put into action by the abstract and universal1 which is in a certain sense within the soul itself2 so that a man can at any time meditate on what he pleases1 but he cannot see or hear what he pleases1 or anything except such visible or audible objects as are at hand4#fg ,footnote #fe3 ,aristot4 ,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #gda1 a4 #ac1 b4 #g2 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #dag1 b4 #ag4 ,footnote #ff3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #dag1 b4 #ah-cb4 ,see above1 p4 #deg1 note a4 ,the extent of ,potentiality1 or the partial ,actuality1 which ,aristotle claims for the sentient soul even at birth1 deserves to be kept in mind2 we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the ,nos4 ,footnote #fg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #dag1 b4 #bb3 ,greek3 ai7_/tion de o7_/ti1 tn kath' e7_/kaston 7 kat' e7ne_/rgeian ai7_/sthsis1 7 d' e7pist_/m tn katho_/lou2 tauta d' e7n au7t p_/s e7sti t psuch4 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbg1 b4 #ah4 ,we have already remarked1 that in many animals the sentient soul is little developed2 being confined in some to the sense of touch 7which can never be wanting71#fh and in others to touch and taste4 ,but even this minimum of sense--though small1 if compared with the variety of senses in man--is a prodigious step in advance of plants2 it comprises a certain cognition1 and within its own sphere it is always critical1 comparing1 discriminative4#fi ,the sentient soul possesses this discriminative faculty in common with the notic soul or ,intelligence1 though applied to different objects and purposes2 and possesses such faculty1 because it is itself a mean or middle term between the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance1--hot and cold1 hard and soft1 wet and dry1 white and black1 acute and grave1 bitter and sweet1 light and darkness1 visible and invisible1 tangible and intangible1 c4 ,we feel no sensation at all when the object touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves1 neither hotter nor colder2 the sentient soul1 being a mean between the two extremes1 is stimulated to assimilate itself for the time to either of them1 according as it is acted upon from without4 ,it thus makes comparison of each with the other1 and of both with its own mean4#gj ,lastly1 the sentient faculty in the soul is really one and indivisible1 though distinguishable logically or by abstraction into different genera and species4#ga ,of that faculty the central physical organ is the heart1 which contains the congenital or animal spirit4 ,the ,aristotelian psychology is here remarkable1 affirming as it does the essential relativity of all phenomena of sense to the appreciative condition of the sentient2 as well as the constant implication of intellectual and discriminative comparison among them4 ,footnote #fh3 ,ibid4 ,,iii4 xii4 p4 #dcd1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 phaneron o7_/ti ou7ch oi7o_/n te a7_/neu a7phs ei7nai zon4 ,footnote #fi3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #af3 ,greek3 t kritik1 o7 dianoi_/as e7_/rgon e7sti kai ai7sth_/ses4--,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbg1 a4 #bj2 p4 #dbf1 b4 #aj-ae4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,i4 xxiii4 p4 #gca1 a4 #cj-;b4 #e2 ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 i4 p4 #deh99991 b4 #b4 ,the sentient faculty is called ,greek3 du_/namin su_/mphuton kritik_/n in ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #ce4 ,footnote #gj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #dbb1 a4 #bj2 ix4 p4 #dba1 b4 #d-aa2 xi4 p4 #dbd1 a4 #e3 ,greek3 kai dia touto kri_/nei ta ai7sthta_/--to gar me_/son kritiko_/n4 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 e7_/sti to 7_/desthai kai lupeisthai to e7nergein t ai7sthtik meso_/tti pros to a7gathon 7 kako_/n1 7 toiauta4 ,,iii4 xiii4 p4 #dce1 a4 #ba4 ,he remarks that plants have no similar ,greek3 meso_/ts--,,ii4 xii4 p4 #dbd1 b4 #a4 ,footnote #ga3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 vii4 p4 #ddi1 a4 #h1 #ag4 ,de ,motu ,animal4 x4 p4 #gjc1 a4 #ae4 ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 ii4 p4 #dee1 a4 #ae1 #ba1 #ce2 p4 #def1 a4 #e4 ,de ,juventute et ,senect4 p4 #dfg1 b4 #bg2 p4 #dfi1 a4 #d-ab4 ,all the objects generating sensible perception1 are magnitudes4#gb ,some perceptions are peculiar to one sense alone1 as colour to the eye1 c4 ,upon these we never make mistakes directly2 in other words1 we always judge rightly what is the colour or what is the sound1 though we are often deceived in judging what the thing coloured is1 or where the sonorous object is4#gc ,there are1 however1 some perceivables not peculiar to any one sense alone1 but appreciable by two or more2 though chiefly and best by the sense of vision2 such are motion1 rest1 number1 figure1 magnitude4 ,here the appreciation becomes less accurate1 yet it is still made directly by sense4#gd ,but there are yet other matters that1 though not directly affecting sense1 are perceived indirectly1 or by way of accompaniment to what is directly perceived4 ,thus we see a white object2 nothing else affecting our sense 9999except its whiteness4 ,beyond this1 however1 we judge and declare1 that the object so seen is the son of ,kleon4 ,this is a judgment obtained indirectly1 or by way of accompaniment2 by accident1 so to speak1 inasmuch as the same does not accompany all sensations of white4 ,it is here that we are most liable to error4#ge ,footnote #gb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 vii4 p4 #ddi1 a4 #bj3 ,greek3 to ai7sthton pan e7sti me_/gethos4 ,footnote #gc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #dah1 a4 #aj-af4 ,footnote #gd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 i4 p4 #dcg1 a4 #h2 iv4 p4 #ddb1 b4 #d-ab4 ,he says in this last passage1 that the common perceivables are appreciable at least by both sight and touch--if not by all the senses4 ,footnote #ge3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #dah1 a4 #g-be3 ,greek3 le_/getai de to ai7sthton trichs1 7n du_/o men kath' au7ta_/ phamen ai7stha_/nesthai1 to de e7n kata sumbebko_/s4 ,also1 ,,iii4 i4 p4 #dbe1 b4 #bd2 iii4 p4 #dbh1 b4 #ah-be4 ,among the five senses1 ,aristotle distinguishes two as operating by direct contact between subject and object 7touch1 taste72 three as operating through an external intervening medium 7vision1 smell1 taste74 ,he begins with ,vision1 which he regards as possessing most completely the nature and characteristics of a sense4#gf ,the direct and proper object of vision is colour4 ,now colour operates upon the eye not immediately 7for1 if the coloured object be placed in contact with the eye1 there will be no vision71 but by causing movements or perturbations in the external intervening medium1 air or water1 which affect the sense through an appropriate agency of their own4#gg ,this agency is1 according to ,aristotle1 the ,diaphanous or ,transparent4 ,when actual or in energy1 the transparent is called light2 when potential or in capacity only1 it is called darkness4 ,the eye is of watery structure1 apt for receiving these impressions4#gh ,it is the presence either of fire1 or of something analogous to the celestial body1 that calls forth the diaphanous from the state of potentiality into that of actuality or light2 in which latter condition it is stimulated by colour4 ,the diaphanous1 whether as light or as darkness1 is a peculiar nature or accompaniment1 not substantive in itself1 but inherent chiefly in the ,first or ,celestial ,body1 yet also in air1 water1 glass1 precious stones1 and in all bodies to a greater or less degree4#gi ,the diaphanous passes at once and simultaneously1 in one place as well as in another1 from potentiality to actuality--from darkness to light4 ,light does not take time to travel from one place to another1 as sound and smell do4#hj ,the diaphanous is not a body1 nor effluvium from a body1 nor any one of the elements3 it is of an adjective character--a certain agency or attribute pervading or belonging to bodies1 along with their extension4#ha ,colour marks and defines the surface of the body qu diaphanous1 as figure defines it qu extended4 ,colour makes the diaphanous itself visible1 and its own varieties visible through the diaphanous4 ,air and water are transparent throughout1 though with an ill-defined superficial colour4 ,white and black1 as colours in solid bodies1 correspond to the condition of light or darkness in air4 ,there are some luminous objects visible in the dark1 as fire1 fungous matter1 eyes1 and scales of fish1 c41 though they have no appropriate colour4#hb ,there are seven species or varieties of colours1 but all of them proceed from white and black1 blended in different proportions1 or seen one through another2 white and black are the two extremes1 the other varieties being intermediate between them4 ,footnote #gf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 7 o7_/psis ma_/lista ai7sthsi_/s e7stin4 ,also ,metaphysica1 ,a4 init4 ,footnote #gg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dai1 a4 #ab1 #ad1 #ai2 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 iii4 p4 #ddj1 a4 #ah3 ,greek3 7_/st' eu7thus kreitton pha_/nai1 t kineisthai to metaxu ts ai7sth_/ses u7po tou ai7sthtou gi_/nesthai tn ai7_/sthsin1 a7ph kai m tais a7por7r7oi_/ais4--,ib4 ii4 p4 #dch1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 ei7_/te phs ei7_/t' a7_/r e7sti to metaxu tou o7rme_/nou kai tou o7_/mmatos1 7 dia tou_/tou ki_/nsi_/s e7stin 7 poiousa to o7ran4 ,footnote #gh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dai1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 touto gar 7n au7t to chr_/mati ei7nai1 to kintik ei7nai tou kat' e7ne_/rgeian diaphanous phs e7sti_/n4--,ib4 ii4 p4 #dah1 b4 #aa-ag3 ,greek3 o7_/tan 7 e7ntelechei_/a diaphanes u7po puros 7 toiou_/tou oi7on to a7_/n sma2--puros 7 toiou_/tou tinos parousi_/a e7n t diaphanei4 ,footnote #gi3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dah1 b4 #d4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 ii4 p4 #dch1 a4 #ad1 b4 #g2 iii4 p4 #dci1 a4 #ba1 seq43 ,greek3 o7 de le_/gomen diaphane_/s1 ou7k e7_/stin i7_/dion a7e_/ros 7 u7_/datos1 ou7d' a7_/llou tn ou7_/t legome_/nn sma_/tn1 a7lla_/ ti_/s e7sti koin phu_/sis kai du_/namis1 7 christ men ou7k e7_/stin1 e7n tou_/tois d' e7sti_/1 kai tois a7_/llois s_/masin e7nupa_/rchei1 tois men mallon tois d' 7tton4 ,footnote #hj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 vi4 p4 #ddf1 a4 #bc1 seq41 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 t ei7nai ga_/r ti phs e7sti_/n1 a7ll' ou7 ki_/nsi_/s tis4 ,empedokles affirmed that light travelling from the ,sun reached the intervening space before it came to the earth2 ,aristotle contradicts him4 ,footnote #ha3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dah1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 e7_/sti de to sko_/tos ste_/rsis ts toiau_/ts e7_/xes e7k diaphanous1 7_/ste dlon o7_/ti kai 7 tou_/tou parousi_/a phs e7sti_/n4--,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 iii4 p4 #dci1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 7 men ou7n tou phtos phu_/sis e7n ao7ri_/st t diaphanei e7sti_/n2 tou d' e7n tois s_/masi diaphanous to e7_/schaton1 o7_/ti men ei7_/ a7_/n ti1 dlon2 o7_/ti de touto e7sti to chrma1 e7_/k tn sumbaino_/ntn phanero_/n4--e7_/sti men gar e7n t tou s_/matos pe_/rati1 a7ll' ou7_/ ti to tou s_/matos pe_/ras1 a7lla tn au7tn phu_/sin dei nomi_/zein1 7_/per kai e7_/x chrmati_/zetai1 tau_/tn kai e7nto_/s4 ,footnote #hb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dai1 a4 #b-be2 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 iv4 p4 #ddb1 a4 #bj1--seven colours4 ,the same necessity for an intervening medium external to the subject1 as in the case of vision1 prevails also in the senses of hearing and smell4 ,if the audible or odorous object be placed in contact with its organ of sense1 there will be no hearing or smell4 ,whenever we hear or smell any object1 there must be interposed between us and the object a suitable medium that shall be affected first2 while the organ of sense will be affected secondarily through that medium4 ,air is the medium in regard to sound1 both air and water in regard to smell2 but there seems besides 7analogous to the transparent in regard to vision7 a special agency called the ,trans-,sonant1 which pervades air and enables it to transmit sound2 and certainly another special agency called the ,trans-,olfacient1 which pervades both air and water1 and enables them to transmit smell4#hc 7,it seems thus that something like a luminiferous ether--extended1 mobile1 and permeating bodies1 yet still incorporeal in itself--was an hypothesis as old as ,aristotle2 and one other ether besides1 analogous in property and purpose--an odoriferous ether2 perhaps a third or soniferous ether1 but this is less distinctly specified by ,aristotle47 ,footnote #hc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dai1 a4 #be-ce2 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 v4 p4 #ddb1 b4 #cj2 ,themistius ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii41 viii4 p4 #aae1 ,spengel4 ,of the three names1 ,greek3 to diaphane_/s--to diche_/s--to di_/osmon1 the last two are not distinctly stated by ,aristotle1 but are said to have been first applied by ,theophrastus after him4 ,see the notes of ,trendelenburg and ,torstrick2 the latter supposes ,themistius to have had before him a fuller and better text of ,aristotle than that which we now possess1 which seems corrupt4 ,in our present text1 the transparent as well as the trans-olfacient ether are clearly indicated1 the trans-sonant not clearly4 ,sound1 according to ,aristotle1 arises from the shock of two or more solid bodies communicated to the air4 ,it implies local movement in one at least of those bodies4 ,many soft bodies are incapable of making sound2 those best suited for it are such as metals1 hard in structure1 smooth in surface1 hollow in shape4 ,the blow must be smart and quick1 otherwise the air slips away and dissipates itself before the sound can be communicated to it4#hd ,sound is communicated through the air to the organ of hearing2 the air is one continuum 7not composed of adjacent particles with interspaces71 and a wave is propagated from it to the internal ear1 which contains some air enclosed in the sinuous ducts within the membrane of the tympanum1 congenitally attached to the organ itself1 and endued with a certain animation4#he ,this internal air within the ear1 excited by the motion propagated from the external ear1 causes hearing4 ,the ear is enabled to appreciate accurately the movements of the external air1 because it has itself little or no movement within4 ,we cannot hear with any other part of the body2 because it is only in the ear that nature has given us this stock of internal air4 ,if water gets into the ear1 we cannot hear at all2 because the wave generated in the air without1 cannot propagate itself within4 ,nor can we hear1 if the membrane of the ear be disordered2 any more than we can see1 when the membrane of the eye is disordered4#hf ,footnote #hd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 9999,,ii4 viii4 p4 #dai1 b4 #d seq4 ,he calls air ,greek3 psathuro_/s1 eu7_/thruptos 7p4 #dbj1 a4 #a-h71--;,greek3 eu7diai_/retos1 eu7o_/listhos 7,themistius1 pp4 #aaf1 #aag1 ,sp47--quod facil diffluit 7,trendelenburg1 ,comm4 p4 #chd74 ,he says that for sonorous purposes air ought to be ,greek3 a7throun--compact or dense3 sound reverberates best from metals with smooth surface1 p4 #dbj1 a4 #be4 ,footnote #he3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #dai1 b4 #cd seq43 ,greek3 ou7tos d' 7o7 a7r7 e7stin o7 poin a7kou_/ein1 o7_/tan kinth sunechs kai ei7s2--psophtikon men ou7n to kintikon e7nos a7e_/ros sunechei_/a me_/chris a7kos4 a7ko de sumphus a7_/r2 dia de to e7n a7e_/ri ei7nai1 kinoume_/nou tou e7_/x to ei7_/s kinei4 dio_/per ou7 pa_/nt to zon a7kou_/ei1 ou7de pa_/nt die_/rchetai o7 a7_/r2 ou7 gar pa_/nt e7_/chei a7e_/ra to kinso_/menon me_/ros kai e7_/mpsuchon4--dia tas e7_/likas 7p4 #dbj1 a4 #ac74 ,the text of this passage is not satisfactory4 ,it has been much criticised as well as amended by ,torstrick2 see his ,comment4 p4 #adh seq4 ,i cannot approve his alteration of ,greek3 e7_/mpsuchon into ,greek3 e7_/mpsophon4 ,footnote #hf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #dbj1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 o7 d' e7n tois 7sin e7gkatkodo_/mtai pros to a7ki_/ntos ei7nai1 o7_/ps a7kribs ai7stha_/ntai pa_/sas tas diaphoras ts kin_/ses4--p4 #dbj1 a4 #ad4 ,greek3 ou7d' 7a7kou_/omen7 a7n 7 m_/nigx ka_/m1 7_/sper to e7pi t ko_/r de_/rma o7_/tan ka_/m4 ,voice is a kind of sound peculiar to animated beings2 yet not belonging to all of them1 but only to those that inspire the air4 ,nature employs respiration for two purposes3 the first1 indispensable to animal life1--that of cooling and tempering the excessive heat of the heart and its adjacent parts2 the second1 not indispensable to life1 yet most valuable to the higher faculties of man1--significant speech4 ,the organ of respiration is the larynx2 a man cannot speak either when inspiring or expiring1 but only when retaining and using the breath within4 ,the soul in those parts1 when guided by some phantasm or thought1 impels the air within against the walls of the trachea1 and this shock causes vocal sounds4#hg ,footnote #hg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 viii4 p4 #dbj1 b4 #e-p4 #dba1 a4 #f4 ,greek3 7_/ste 7 plg tou a7napneome_/nou a7e_/ros u7po ts e7n tou_/tois tois mori_/ois psuchs pros tn kaloume_/nn a7rtri_/an phn_/ e7stin4 ou7 gar pas z_/ou pso_/phos phn_/1 katha_/per ei7_/pomen 7e7_/sti gar kai t gl_/tt psophein kai 7s oi7 b_/ttontes7 a7lla dei e7_/mpsucho_/n te ei7nai to tu_/pton kai meta phantasi_/as tino_/s2 smantikos gar d_/ tis pso_/phos e7stin 7 phn_/2 kai ou7 tou a7napneome_/nou a7e_/ros1 7_/sper 7 b_/x1 a7lla tou_/t tu_/ptei ton e7n t a7rtri_/a pros au7t_/n4 ,aristotle seems to have been tolerably satisfied with the above explanation of sight and hearing2 for1 in approaching the sense of ,smell with the olfacients1 he begins by saying that it is less definable and explicable4 ,among the five senses1 smell stands intermediate between the two 7taste and touch7 that operate by direct contact1 and the other two 7sight and hearing7 that operate through an external medium4 ,man is below other animals in this sense2 he discriminates little in smells except the pleasurable and the painful4#hh ,his taste1 though analogous in many points to smell1 is far more accurate and discriminating1 because taste is a variety of touch2 and in respect to touch1 man is the most discriminating of all animals4 ,hence his great superiority to them in practical wisdom4 ,indeed the marked difference of intelligence between one man and another1 turns mainly upon the organ of touch3 men of hard flesh 7or skin7 are by nature dull in intelligence1 men of soft flesh are apt and clever4#hi ,the classifying names of different smells are borrowed from the names of the analogous tastes to which they are analogous--sweet1 bitter1 tart1 dry1 sharp1 smooth1 c4#ij ,smells take effect through air as well as through water2 by means of a peculiar agency or accompaniment 7mentioned above1 called the ,trans-,olfacient7 pervading both one and the other4 ,it is peculiar to man that he cannot smell except when inhaling air in the act of inspiration2 any one may settle this for himself by making the trial4#ia ,but fishes and other aquatic animals1 which never inhale air1 can smell in the water2 and this proves that the trans-olfacient agency is operative to transmit odours not less in water than in air4#ib ,we know that the sense of smell in these aquatic animals is the same as it is in man1 because the same strong odours that are destructive to man are also destructive to them4#ic ,smell is the parallel1 and in a certain sense the antithesis of taste2 smell is of the dry1 taste is of the moist3 the olfactory matter is a juicy or sapid dryness1 extracted or washed out from both air and water by the trans-olfacient agency1 and acting on the sensory potentialities of the nostrils4#id ,this olfactory inhalation is warm as well as dry4 ,hence it is light1 and rises easily to the brain1 the moisture and coldness of which it contributes to temper2 this is a very salutary process1 for the brain is the wettest and coldest part of the body1 requiring warm and dry influences as a corrective4 ,it is with a view to this correction that ,nature has placed the olfactory organ in such close proximity to the brain4#ie ,there are two kinds of olfactory impressions4 ,one of them is akin to the sense of taste--odour and savour going together--an affection 7to a great degree7 of the nutritive soul2 so that the same odour is agreeable when we are hungry1 disagreeable when our hunger is fully satisfied4 ,this first kind of impression is common to men with other animals2 but there is a second1 peculiar to man1 and disconnected from the sense of taste1 viz41 the scent of flowers1 unguents1 c41 which are agreeable or disagreeable constantly and per se4#if ,nature has assigned this second kind of odours as a privilege to man1 because his brain1 being so large and moist1 requires to be tempered by an additional stock of drying and warming olfactory influence4 ,footnote #hh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #dba1 a4 #g4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 v4 p4 #dde1 a4 #f2 iv4 p4 #dda1 a4 #a4 ,de ,partibus ,animal4 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #fef1 a4 #ca2 p4 #feg1 a4 #i4 ,footnote #hi3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #dba1 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 kata de tn a7phn poll tn a7_/lln z_/n diaphero_/nts a7kriboi 7o7 a7_/nthrpos74 dio kai phronim_/tato_/n e7sti tn z_/n4 smeion de to kai e7n t ge_/nei tn a7nthr_/pn para to ai7stht_/rion touto ei7nai eu7phueis kai a7phueis1 par' a7_/llo de mde_/n2 oi7 men gar sklro_/sarkoi a7phueis tn dia_/noian1 oi7 de malako_/sarkoi eu7phueis4 ,footnote #ij3 ,ibid4 a4 #bf4 ,footnote #ia3 ,ibid4 b4 #i-ai4 ,greek3 to a7_/neu tou a7napnein m ai7stha_/nesthai i7_/dion e7pi tn a7nthr_/pn2 dlon de peirme_/nois4 ,he seems to think that this is not true of any animal other than man4 ,footnote #ib3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 v4 p4 #ddc1 a4 #c-ca2 p4 #ddd1 b4 #i4 ,footnote #ic3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #dba1 b4 #bc4 ,he instances brimstone1 ,greek3 a7_/sphaltos1 c4 ,footnote #id3 ,this is difficult to understand1 but it seems to be what ,aristotle here means4--,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #dbb1 a4 #f3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' 7 o7sm tou xrou1 7_/sper o7 chumos tou u7grou2 to d' o7sphrantikon ai7stht_/rion duna_/mei toiouton4--,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 v4 p4 #ddc1 a4 #a-i3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' o7sphranton ou7ch 7 diaphane_/s1 a7ll' 7 pluntikon 7 r7uptikon e7gchu_/mou xro_/ttos2--7 e7n u7gr tou e7gchu_/mou xrou phu_/sis o7sm_/1 kai o7sphranton to pa_/thos1 dlon e7k tn e7cho_/ntn kai m e7cho_/ntn o7sm_/n1 c4 ,also p4 #ddc1 b4 #c-g4 ,in the treatise ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 there is one passage 7ii4 p4 #dch1 b4 #bd71 wherein ,aristotle affirms that smell is ,greek3 kapn_/ds a7nathumi_/asis1 e7k puro_/s2 but we also find a subsequent passage 7v4 p4 #ddc1 a4 #ba1 seq47 where he cites that same doctrine as the opinion of others1 but distinctly refutes it4 ,footnote #ie3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 v4 p4 #ddd1 a4 #aj1 #bb1 #bd3 ,greek3 7 gar ts o7sms du_/namis therm tn phu_/sin e7sti_/n4 ,footnote #if3 ,ibid4 p4 #ddc1 b4 #ag2 p4 #ddd1 a4 #f4 #ae1 #bh3 ,greek3 i7_/dion de ts tou a7nthr_/pou phu_/se_/s e7sti to ts o7sms ts toiau_/ts ge_/nos dia to pleiston e7gke_/phalon kai u7gro_/taton e7_/chein tn z_/n 7s kata me_/gethos4 ,plato also reckons the pleasures of smell among the pure and admissible pleasures 7,philebus1 p4 #ea1 ,e42 ,timus1 p4 #fe1 ,a41 p4 #fg1 ,a474 ,taste is a variety of touch1 and belongs to the lower or nutritive soul1 as a guide to the animal in seeking or avoiding different sorts of food4 ,the object of taste is essentially liquid1 often strained and extracted from dry food by warmth and moisture4 ,the primary manifestation of this sensory phenomenon is the contrast of drinkable and undrinkable4#ig ,the organ of taste1 the tongue1 is a mean between dryness and moisture2 when either of these is in excess1 the organ is disordered4 ,among the varieties of taste1 there are two fundamental contraries 7as in colour1 sound1 and the objects of the other senses except touch7 from which the other contrasts are derived4 ,these fundamentals in taste are sweet and bitter2 corresponding to white and black1 acute and grave1 in colours and sounds4 ,the sense of taste is potentially sweet or bitter2 the gustable object is what makes it sweet or bitter in actuality4#ih ,footnote #ig3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #dbb1 a4 #cj-cc4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 i4 p4 #dcf1 b4 #ae2 iv4 p4 #dda1 b4 #ag3 ,greek3 dia tou xrou kai ge_/dous dithousa 77 phu_/sis7 kai kinousa t therm poio_/n ti to u7gron paraskeua_/zei4 kai e7_/sti touto chumos to gigno_/menon u7po tou ei7rme_/nou xrou pa_/thos e7n t u7gr4--,ib4 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 ou7 pantos xrou a7lla tou trophi_/mou4 ,footnote #ih3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #dbb1 b4 #e-af2 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #dbb1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 pasa_/ te gar ai7_/sthsis mias e7nanti_/ses ei7nai dokei1 c4 ,the sense of touch1 in which man surpasses all other animals1 differs from the other senses by not having any two fundamental contraries giving origin to the rest1 but by having various contraries alike fundamental4 ,it is thus hardly one sense1 but an aggregate of several senses4 ,it appreciates the elementary differences of body qu body--hot1 cold1 dry1 moist1 hard1 soft1 c4 ,it is a mean between each of these two extremes2 being potentially either one of them1 and capable of being made to assimilate itself actually to either4#ii ,in this sense1 the tangible object operates when in contact with the skin2 and1 as has been already said1 much of the superiority of man depends upon his superior fineness and delicacy of skin4#ajj ,still ,aristotle remarks that the true organ of touch is not the skin or flesh1 but something interior to the flesh4 ,this last serves only as a peculiar medium4 ,the fact that the sensation arises when the object touches our skin1 does not prove that the skin is the true organ2 for1 if there existed a thin exterior membrane surrounding our bodies1 we should still feel the same sensation4 ,moreover1 the body is not in real contact with our skin1 though it appears to be so2 there is a thin film of air between the two1 though we do not perceive it2 just as1 when we touch an object under water1 there is a film of water interposed between1 as is seen by the wetness of the finger4#aja ,the skin is1 therefore1 not the true organ of touch1 but a medium between the object and the organ2 and this sense does in reality agree with the other senses in having a certain medium interposed between object and organ4 ,but there is this difference3 in touch the medium is close to and a part of ourselves2 in sight and hearing it is exterior to ourselves1 and may extend to some distance4 ,in sight and hearing the object does not affect us directly2 it affects the external medium1 which again affects us4 ,but in touch the object affects1 at the same time and by the same influence1 both the medium and the interior organ2 like a spear that1 with the same thrust1 pierces the warrior's shield and wounds the warrior himself4#ajb ,apparently1 therefore1 the true organ of touch is something interior1 and skin and flesh is an interposed medium4#ajc ,but what this interior organ is1 ,aristotle does not more particularly declare4 ,he merely states it to be in close and intimate communication with the great central focus and principle of all sensation--the heart2#ajd more closely connected with the heart 7he appears to think7 than any of the other organs of sense1 though all of them are so connected more or less closely4 ,footnote #ii3 ,ibid4 xi4 p4 #dbb1 b4 #ag seq4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,aristot4 ,histor4 ,animal4 ,i4 xv4 p4 #did1 b4 #ag4 ,man is ,greek3 leptodermo_/tatos tn zn 7,aristot4 ,de ,partib4 ,animal4 ii4 p4 #feg1 b4 #b71 and has the tongue also looser and softer than any of them1 most fit for variety of touch 7p4 #ffj1 a4 #bj7 as well as for articulate speech4 ,footnote #aja3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #dbc1 a4 #be-cb4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,ibid4 p4 #dbc1 b4 #ab-ag3 ,greek3 diaphe_/rei to a7pton tn o7ratn kai tn psophtikn o7_/ti e7kei_/nn men ai7sthano_/metha t to metaxu poiein ti 7mas1 tn de a7ptn ou7ch u7po tou metaxu a7ll' a7_/ma t metaxu_/1 7_/sper o7 di' a7spi_/dos plgei_/s2 ou7 gar 7 a7spis plgeisa e7pa_/taxen1 a7ll' a7_/m' a7_/mph sune_/b plgnai4 ,this analogy of the warrior pierced at the same time with his shield illustrates ,aristotle's view of the eighth ,category--,habere3 of which he gives ,greek3 7_/plistai as the example4 ,he considers a man's clothes and defensive weapons as standing in a peculiar relation to him like a personal appurtenance and almost as a part of himself4 ,it is under this point of view that he erects ,habere into a distinct ,category4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 xi4 p4 #dbc1 b4 #bb-bf3 ,greek3 7 kai dlon o7_/ti e7ntos to tou a7ptou ai7sthtiko_/n4--to metaxu tou a7ptikou 7 sa_/rx4 ,footnote #ajd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,partibus ,animal4 ,,ii4 x4 p4 #fef1 a4 #cj2 ,de ,vit et ,morte1 iii4 p4 #dfi1 a4 #ab3 ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 ii4 p4 #dee1 a4 #bc2 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 ii4 p4 #dci1 a4 #b4 ,having gone through the five senses seriatim1 ,aristotle offers various reasons to prove that there neither are1 nor can be1 more than five2 and then discusses some complicated phenomena of sense4 ,we perceive that we see or hear2#aje do we perceive this by sight or by hearing8 and if not1 by what other faculty8#ajf ,aristotle replies by saying that the act of sense is one and the same1 but that it may be looked at in two different points of view4 ,we see a coloured object2 we hear a sound3 in each case the act of sense is one2 the energy or actuality of the visum1 and videns1 of the sonans and audiens1 is implicated and indivisible4 ,but the potentiality of the one is quite distinct from the potentiality of the other1 and may be considered as well as named apart4#ajg ,when we say3 ,i perceive that ,i see--we look at the same act of vision from the side of the videns2 the visum being put out of sight as the unnoticed correlate4 ,this is a mental fact distinct from1 though following upon1 the act of vision itself4 ,aristotle refers it rather to that general sentient soul or faculty1 of which the five senses are partial and separate manifestations1 than to the sense of vision itself4#ajh ,he thus considers what would now be termed consciousness of a sensation1 as being merely the subjective view of the sensation1 distinguished by abstraction from the objective4 ,footnote #aje3 ,in modern psychology the language would be--,we are conscious that we see or hear4 ,but ,sir ,william ,hamilton has remarked that the word ,consciousness has no equivalent usually or familiarly employed in the ,greek psychology4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 ii4 p4 #dbe1 b4 #ad4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,ibid4 b4 #bf2 p4 #dbf1 a4 #af-ai4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 ii4 p4 #dee1 a4 #ab-ag2 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 ii4 with ,torstrick's note1 p4 #aff1 and the exposition of ,alexander of ,aphrodisias therein cited4 ,these two passages of ,aristotle are to a certain extent different yet not contradictory1 though ,torstrick supposes them to be so4 ,it is the same general sentient faculty1 though diversified and logically distinguishable in its manifestations1 that enables us to conceive many sensations as combined into one2 and to compare or discriminate sensations belonging to different senses4#aji ,footnote #aji3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 vii4 p4 #ddi1 a4 #h-bj4 ,white and sweet are perceived by two distinct senses1 and at two distinct moments of time2 but they must be compared and discriminated by one and the same sentient or cogitant act1 and at one moment of time4#aaj ,this mental act1 though in itself indivisible1 has yet two aspects1 and is thus in a certain sense divisible2 just as a point taken in the middle of a line1 while indivisible in itself1 may be looked upon as the closing terminus of one-half of the line1 and as the commencing terminus of the other half4 ,the comparison of two different sensations or thoughts is thus one and the same mental fact1 with two distinguishable aspects4#aaa ,footnote #aaj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 ii4 p4 #dbf1 b4 #ag-bi3 ,greek3 ou7_/te d kechrisme_/nois e7nde_/chetai kri_/nein o7_/ti e7_/teron to gluku tou leukou1 a7lla dei e7ni_/ tini a7_/mph dla ei7nai4--dei de to e7n le_/gein o7_/ti e7_/teron2 e7_/teron gar to gluku tou leukou4--a7ch_/riston kai e7n a7chri_/st chro_/n4 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #bj4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 ii4 p4 #dbg1 a4 #aj-ad3 ,greek3 7_/sper 7n kalousi_/ tines stigm_/n1 7 mia kai 7 du_/o1 tau_/t kai a7diai_/retos kai diaire_/t2 7 men ou7n a7diai_/reton1 e7n to krino_/n e7sti kai a7_/ma1 7 de diai_/reton u7pa_/rchei1 ou7ch e7_/n2 dis gar t au7t chrtai smei_/ a7_/ma4 ,it is to be remarked that1 in explaining this mental process of comparison1 ,aristotle three several times applies it both to ,greek3 ai7_/sthsis and to ,greek3 no_/sis1 p4 #dbf1 b4 #bb-ca2 p4 #dbg1 a4 #i4 ,aristotle devotes a chapter to the enquiry3 whether we can perceive two distinct sensations at once 7i4e4 in one and the same moment of time74 ,he decides that we cannot2 that the sentient soul or faculty is one and indivisible1 and can only have a single energy or actuality at once4#aab ,if two causes of sensation are operative together1 and one of them be much superior in force1 it will render us insensible to the other4 ,he remarks that1 when we are pre-occupied with loud noise1 or with deep reflection1 or with intense fright1 visual objects will often pass by us unseen and unnoticed4#aac ,often the two simultaneous sensations will combine or blend into one compound1 so that we shall feel neither of them purely or separately4#aad ,one single act of sensational energy may however have a double aspect2 as the same individual object may be at once white and sweet1 though its whiteness and its sweetness are logically separable4#aae ,footnote #aab3 ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 vii4 p4 #ddg1 a4 #ab4 ,footnote #aac3 ,ibid4 a4 #ae4 ,footnote #aad3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab-bj4 ,footnote #aae3 ,ibid4 p4 #ddi1 a4 #ad4 ,to the sentient soul1 even in its lowest manifestations1 belong the feelings of pleasure and pain1 appetite and aversion4#aaf ,the movements connected with these feelings1 as with all sensation1 begin and close with the central organ--the heart4#aag ,upon these are consequent the various passions and emotions2 yet not without certain faculties of memory and phantasy accompanying or following the facts of sense4 ,footnote #aaf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #dad1 b4 #c-af2 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #i2 ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 i4 p4 #ded1 b4 #bi4 ,footnote #aag3 ,aristot4 ,de ,partibus ,animalium1 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #fff1 a4 #ab4 ,aristotle proceeds by gradual steps upward from the ,sentient soul to the ,notic 7,cogitant or ,intelligent7 soul1 called in its highest perfection ,nos4 ,while refuting the doctrine of ,empedokles1 ,demokritus1 and other philosophers1 who considered cogitation or intelligence to be the same as sensible perception1 and while insisting upon the distinctness of the two as mental phenomena1 he recognizes the important point of analogy between them1 that both of them include judgment and comparison2#aah and he describes an intermediate stage called ,phantasy or ,imagination1 forming the transition from the lower of the two to the higher4 ,we have already observed that1 in the ,aristotelian psychology1 the higher functions of the soul presuppose and are built upon the lower as their foundation1 though the lower do not necessarily involve the higher4 ,without nutrition1 there is no sense2 without sense1 there is no phantasy2 without phantasy1 there is no cogitation or intelligence4#aai ,the higher psychical phenomena are not identical with the lower1 yet neither are they independent thereof2 they presuppose the lower as a part of their conditions4 ,here1 and indeed very generally elsewhere1 ,aristotle has been careful to avoid the fallacy of confounding or identifying the conditions of a phenomenon with the phenomenon itself4#abj ,footnote #aah3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbg1 a4 #bj4 ,footnote #aai3 ,ibid4 b4 #ad3 ,greek3 phantasi_/a gar e7_/teron kai ai7sth_/ses kai dianoi_/as4--,ib4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #af3 ,greek3 ou7de_/pote noei a7_/neu phanta_/smatos 7 psuch_/4--,de ,memori et ,reminiscent4 i4 p4 #ddi1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 noein ou7k e7_/stin a7_/neu phanta_/smatos4 ,footnote #abj3 ,mill's ,system of ,logic1 ,book ,v4 ch4 #c1 s4 #h4 ,he proceeds to explain ,phantasy or the ,phantastic department of the soul1 with the phantasms that belong to it4 ,it is not sensible perception1 nor belief1 nor opinion1 nor knowledge1 nor cogitation4 ,our dreams1 though affections of the sentient soul1 are really phantasms in our sleep1 when there is no visual sensation2 even when awake1 we have a phantasm of the sun1 as of a disk one foot in diameter1 though we believe the sun to be larger than the earth4#aba ,many of the lower animals have sensible perception without any phantasy3 even those among them that have phantasy have no opinion2 for opinion implies faith1 persuasion1 and some rational explanation of that persuasion1 to none of which does any animal attain4#abb ,phantasy is an internal movement of the animated being 7body and soul in one72 belonging to the sentient soul1 not to the cogitant or intelligent2 not identical with the movement of sense1 but continued from or produced by that1 and by that alone2 accordingly1 similar to the movement of sense and relating to the same matters4#abc ,since our sensible perceptions may be either true or false1 so also may be our phantasms4 ,and1 since these phantasms are not only like our sensations1 but remain standing in the soul long after the objects of sense have passed away1 they are to a great degree the determining causes both of action and emotion4 ,they are such habitually to animals1 who are destitute of ,nos2 and often even to intelligent men1 if the ,nos be overclouded by disease or drunkenness4#abd ,footnote #aba3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbh1 a4 #e1 b4 #c2 ,de ,somno et ,vig4 ii4 p4 #def1 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 kinountai d' e7_/nioi katheu_/dontes kai poiousi polla e7grgorika_/1 ou7 me_/ntoi a7_/neu phanta_/smatos kai ai7sth_/se_/s tinos2 to gar e7nu_/pnio_/n e7stin ai7_/sthma tro_/pon tina_/4--,ibid4 i4 p4 #ded1 b4 #aj4 ,footnote #abb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbh1 a4 #aj1 #bb1 #be4 ,footnote #abc3 ,ibid4 b4 #aj-ae2 ,de ,somniis1 i4 p4 #dei1 a4 #ae4 ,footnote #abd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbh1 b4 #af3 ,greek3 kai polla kat' au7tn 7i4e4 ,greek3 kata tn phantasi_/an7 kai poiein kai pa_/schein to e7_/chon4--,ibid4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 kai dia to e7mme_/nein kai o7moi_/as ei7nai 7tas phantasi_/as7 tais ai7sth_/sesi1 polla kat' au7tas pra_/ttei ta za1 c4 ,in the chapter now before us1 ,aristotle is careful to discriminate phantasy from several other psychological phenomena wherewith it is liable to be confounded4 ,but we remark with some surprise1 that neither here1 nor in any other part of his general ,psychology1 does he offer any exposition of ,memory1 the phenomenon more nearly approaching than any other to phantasy4 ,he supplied the deficiency afterwards by a short but valuable tract on ,memory and ,reminiscence2 wherein he recognizes1 and refers to1 the more general work on ,psychology4 ,memory bears on the past1 as distinguished both from the present and future4 ,memory and phantasy are in some cases so alike1 that we cannot distinguish clearly whether what is in our minds is a remembrance or a phantasm4#abe ,both of them belong to the same psychological department--to the central sentient principle1 and not to the cogitant or intelligent ,nos4 ,memory as well as phantasy are continuations1 remnants1 or secondary consequences1 of the primary movements of sense2 what in itself is a phantasm1 may become an object of remembrance directly and per se2 matters of cogitation1 being included or implicated in phantasms1 may also become objects of remembrance1 indirectly and by way of accompaniment4#abf ,we can remember our prior acts of cogitation and demonstration2 we can remember that1 a month ago1 we demonstrated the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles2 but1 as the original demonstration could not be carried on without our having before our mental vision the phantasm of some particular triangle1 so neither can the remembrance of the demonstration be made present to us without a similar phantasm4#abg ,in acts of remembrance we have a conception of past time1 and we recognize what is now present to our minds as a copy of what has been formerly present to us1 either as perception of sense or as actual cognition2#abh while in phantasms there is no conception of past time1 nor any similar recognition1 nor any necessary reference to our own past mental states2 the phantasm is looked at by itself1 and not as a copy4 ,this is the main point of distinction between phantasm and remembrance3#abi what is remembered is a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of the past4 ,some of the superior animals possess both memory and phantasy4 ,but other animals have neither2 their sensations disappear1 they have no endurance2 while endurance is the basis both of phantasy and memory4#acj ,footnote #abe3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i4 p4 #dea1 a4 #e2 p4 #ddi1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #abf3 ,ibid4 p4 #dej1 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 ti_/nos men ou7n tn ts psuchs e7stin 7 mn_/m1 phaneron o7_/ti ou7per kai 7 phantasi_/a2 kai e7_/sti mnmoneuta kath' au7ta men o7_/sa e7sti phantasta_/1 kata sumbebkos d' o7_/sa m a7_/neu phantasi_/as4 ,footnote #abg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et4 ,rem4 i4 p4 #ddi1 b4 #ah4 ,footnote #abh3 ,ibid4 b4 #bb3 ,greek3 a7ei gar o7_/tan e7nerg kata to mnmoneu_/ein1 ou7_/ts e7n t psuch le_/gei1 o7_/ti pro_/teron touto 7_/kousen 7 7_/stheto 7 e7no_/sen4--,ibid4 p4 #deb1 b4 #bh4 ,footnote #abi3 ,ibid4 p4 #dej1 a4 #cj2 p4 #dea1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 to mnmoneu_/ein1 7s ei7ko_/nos ou7 pha_/ntasma1 e7_/xis4 ,themistius 9999ad ,aristot4 ,de ,memori1 p4 #bdj1 ed4 ,spengel4 ,footnote #acj3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ii4 p4 #ii1 b4 #cf3 ,greek3 mon tou ai7sth_/matos4 ,it may be remarked that in the ,topica ,aristotle urges a dialectical objection against this or a similar doctrine 7,topic4 ,,iv4 iv4 v4 p4 #abe1 b4 #f-ai71 and against his own definition cited in the preceding note1 where he calls ,greek3 mn_/m an ,greek3 e7_/xis4 ,compare the first chapter of the ,metaphysica4 ,but though some animals have memory1 no animal except man has ,reminiscence4 ,herein man surpasses them all4#aca ,aristotle draws a marked distinction between the two2 between the 7memorial7 retentive and reviving functions1 when working unconsciously and instinctively1 and the same two functions1 when stimulated and guided by a deliberate purpose of our own--which he calls reminiscence4 ,this last is like a syllogism or course of ratiocinative inference1 performable only by minds capable of taking counsel and calculating4 ,he considers memory as a movement proceeding from the centre and organs of sense to the soul1 and stamping an impression thereupon2 while reminiscence is a counter-movement proceeding from the soul to the organs of sense4#acb ,in the process of reminiscence1 movements of the soul and movements of the body are conjoined1#acc more or less perturbing and durable according to the temperament of the individual4 ,the process is intentional and deliberate1 instigated by the desire to search for and recover some lost phantasm or cognition2 its success depends upon the fact that there exists by nature a regular observable order of sequence among the movements of the system1 physical as well as psychical4 ,the consequents follow their antecedents either universally1 or at least according to customary rules1 in the majority of cases4#acd ,footnote #aca3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #dec1 a4 #h4 ,he draws the same distinction in ,hist4 ,animal4 ,i4 i4 p4 #dhh1 b4 #bf4 ,footnote #acb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,i4 iv4 p4 #djh1 b4 #ag4 ,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i4 p4 #dej1 a4 #cj2 ii4 p4 #dec1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 to a7namimn_/skesthai_/ e7stin oi7on sullo_/gismo_/s tis4 ,footnote #acc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #dec1 a4 #ad-bc4 ,footnote #acd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #dea1 b4 #aj3 ,greek3 sumbai_/nousi d' ai7 a7namn_/seis1 e7peid pe_/phuken 7 ki_/nsis 7_/de gene_/sthai meta t_/nde4 ,the consequent is either 7#a7 like its antecedent1 wholly or partially2 or 7#b7 contrary to it2 or 7#c7 has been actually felt in juxtaposition with it4 ,in reminiscence1 we endeavour to regain the forgotten consequent by hunting out some antecedent whereupon it is likely to follow2 taking our start either from the present moment or from some other known point4#ace ,we run over many phantasms until we hit upon the true antecedent2 the possibility of reminiscence depends upon our having this within our mental reach1 among our accessible stock of ideas3 if such be not the case1 reminiscence is impracticable1 and we must learn over again4#acf ,we are most likely to succeed1 if we get upon the track or order wherein events actually occurred2 thus1 if we are trying to recollect a forgotten verse or sentence1 we begin to repeat it from the first word2 the same antecedent may indeed call up different consequents at different times1 but it will generally call up what has habitually followed it before4#acg ,footnote #ace3 ,ibid4 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 dio kai to e7phexs threu_/omen no_/santes a7po tou nun 7 a7_/llou tino_/s1 kai a7ph' o7moi_/ou 7 e7nanti_/ou 7 tou su_/neggus4 ,about the associative property of ,contraries see also ,de ,somno et ,vigil4 i4 p4 #dec1 b4 #bg4 ,footnote #acf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #deb1 a4 #g3 ,greek3 polla_/kis d' 7_/d men a7dunatei a7namnsthnai1 ztein de du_/natai kai eu7ri_/skei4 touto de gi_/netai kinounti polla_/1 e7_/s a7n toiau_/tn kin_/s ki_/nsin1 7 a7kolouth_/sei to pragma4 to gar memnsthai_/ e7sti to e7neinai duna_/mei 9999tn kinousan2 touto de_/1 7st' e7x au7tou kai 7n e7_/chei kin_/sen kinthnai1 7_/sper ei7_/rtai4 ,footnote #acg3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #deb1 a4 #b4 ,the movements of ,memory and of ,reminiscence are partly corporeal and partly psychical1 just as those of ,sensation and ,phantasy are4 ,we compare in our remembrance greater and less 7either in time or in external magnitudes7 through similar internal movements differing from each other in the same1 proportion1 but all on a miniature scale4#ach ,these internal movements often lead to great discomfort1 when a person makes fruitless efforts to recover the forgotten phantasm that he desires2 especially with excitable men1 who are much disturbed by their own phantasms4 ,they cannot stop the movement once begun2 and1 when their sensitive system is soft and flexible1 they find that they have unwittingly provoked the bodily movements belonging to anger or fear1 or some other painful emotion4#aci ,these movements1 when once provoked1 continue in spite of the opposition of the person that experiences them4 ,he brings upon himself the reality of the painful emotion2 just as we find that1 after we have very frequently pronounced a sentence or sung a song1 the internal movements left in our memories are sometimes so strong and so persistent1 that they act on our vocal organs even without any volition on our parts1 and determine us to sing the song or pronounce the sentence over again in reality4#adj ,slow men are usually good in memory1 quick men and apt learners are good in reminiscence3 the two are seldom found together4#ada ,footnote #ach3 ,ibid4 b4 #ab3 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar e7n au7t ta o7_/moia sch_/mata kai kin_/seis4--pa_/nta gar ta e7ntos e7la_/tt1 7_/sper a7na_/logon kai ta e7kto_/s4 ,footnote #aci3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #dec1 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 o7 a7namimnsko_/menos kai threu_/n smatiko_/n ti kinei1 e7n 7 to pa_/thos4 ,footnote #adj3 ,ibid4 p4 #dec1 a4 #bh3 ,greek3 e7_/oike to pa_/thos tois o7no_/masi kai me_/lesi kai lo_/gois1 o7_/tan dia sto_/matos ge_/ntai_/ ti au7tn spho_/dra2 pausame_/nois gar kai ou7 boulome_/nois e7pe_/rchetai pa_/lin a7_/dein 7 le_/gein4 ,footnote #ada3 ,ibid4 i4 p4 #ddi1 b4 #g4 ,in this account of ,memory and ,reminiscence1 ,aristotle displays an acute and penetrating intelligence of the great principles of the ,association of ,ideas4 ,but these principles are operative not less in memory than in reminiscence3 and the exaggerated prominence that he has given to the distinction between the two 7determined apparently by a wish to keep the procedure of man apart from that of animals7 tends to perplex his description of the associative process4 ,at the same time1 his manner of characterizing phantasy1 memory1 and reminiscence1 as being all of them at once corporeal and psychical--involving1 like sensation1 internal movements of the body as well as phases of the consciousness1 sometimes even passing into external movements of the bodily organs without our volition--all this is a striking example of psychological observation1 as well as of consistency in following out the doctrine laid down at the commencement of his chief treatise3 ,soul as the ,form implicated with ,body as the ,matter1--the two being an integral concrete separable only by abstraction4 ,we come now to the highest and 7in ,aristotle's opinion7 most honourable portion of the soul--the ,nos or notic faculty1 whereby we cogitate1 understand1 reason1 and believe or opine under the influence of reason4#adb ,according to the uniform scheme of ,aristotle1 this highest portion of the soul1 though distinct from all the lower1 presupposes them all4 ,as the sentient soul presupposes the nutrient1 so also the cogitant soul presupposes the nutrient1 the sentient1 the phantastic1 the memorial1 and the reminiscent4 ,aristotle carefully distinguishes the sentient department of the soul from the cogitant1 and refutes more than once the doctrine of those philosophers that identified the two4 ,but he is equally careful to maintain the correlation between them1 and to exhibit the sentient faculty not only as involving in itself a certain measure of intellectual discrimination1 but also as an essential and fundamental condition to the agency of the cogitant1 as a portion of the human soul4 ,we have already gone through the three successive stages--phantastic1 memorial1 reminiscent--whereby the interval between sensation and cogitation is bridged over4 ,each of the three is directly dependent on past sensation1 either as reproduction or as corollary2 each of them is an indispensable condition of man's cogitation2 moreover1 in the highest of the three1 we have actually slid unperceived into the cogitant phase of the human soul2 for ,aristotle declares the reminiscent process to be of the nature of a syllogism4#adc ,that the soul cannot cogitate or reason without phantasms--that phantasms are required for the actual working of the human ,nos--he affirms in the most explicit manner4#add ,footnote #adb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 peri de tou mori_/ou tou ts psuchs 7 gin_/skei te 7 psuch kai phronei4 ,he himself defines what he means by ,greek3 nous a few lines lower2 and he is careful to specify it as ,greek3 o7 ts psuchs nous--o7 a7_/ra kalou_/menos ts psuchs nous 7le_/g de noun1 7 dianoeitai kai u7polamba_/nei 7 psuch_/7--a4 #bb4 ,in the preceding chapter he expressly discriminates ,greek3 no_/sis from ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis4 ,this last word ,greek3 u7po_/lpsis is the most general term for believing or opining upon reasons good or bad2 the varieties under it are ,greek3 e7pist_/m1 do_/xa1 phro_/nsis kai ta7nanti_/a tou_/tn 7p4 #dbg1 b4 #af-bg74 ,footnote #adc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,rem4 ii4 p4 #dec a4 #aj4 ,footnote #add3 ,ibid4 p4 #ddi1 b4 #ca-p4 #dej1 a4 #ab3 ,greek3 noein ou7k e7_/stin a7_/neu phanta_/smatos--7 de mn_/m kai 7 tn notn ou7k a7_/neu phanta_/smato_/s e7stin4--,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #af4 ,the doctrine of ,aristotle respecting ,nos has been a puzzle1 even from the time of his first commentators4 ,partly from the obscurity inherent in the subject1 partly from the defective condition of his text as it now stands1 his meaning cannot be always clearly comprehended1 nor does it seem that the different passages can be completely reconciled4 ,anaxagoras1 ,demokritus1 and other philosophers1 appear to have spoken of ,nos or ,intellect in a large and vague sense1 as equivalent to ,soul generally4 ,plato seems to have been the first to narrow and specialize the meaning2 distinguishing pointedly 7as we have stated above7 the rational or encephalic soul1 in the cranium1 with its circular rotations1 from the two lower souls1 9999thoracic and abdominal4 ,aristotle agreed with him in this distinction 7either of separate souls or of separate functions in the same soul72 but he attenuated and divested it of all connexion with separate corporeal lodgment1 or with peculiar movements of any kind4 ,in his psychology1 the brain no longer appears as the seat of intelligence1 but simply as a cold1 moist1 and senseless organ1 destined to countervail the excessive heat of the heart3 which last is the great centre of animal heat1 of life1 and of the sentient soul4 ,aristotle declares ,nos not to be connected with1 or dependent on1 any given bodily organs or movements appropriated to itself3 this is one main circumstance distinguishing it from the nutrient soul as well as from the sentient soul1 each of which rests indispensably upon corporeal organs and agencies of its own4 ,it will be remembered that we stated the relation of ,soul to ,body 7in ,aristotle's view7 as that of ,form to ,matter2 the two together constituting a concrete individual1 numerically one2 also that ,form and ,matter1 each being essentially relative to the other1 admitted of gradations1 higher and lower2 e4g4 a massive cube of marble is already materia formata1 but it is still purely materia1 relative to the statue that may be obtained from it4 ,now1 the grand region of ,form is the ,celestial ,body--the vast1 deep1 perceivable1 circular mass circumscribing the ,kosmos1 and enclosing1 in and around its centre1 ,earth with the other three elements1 tenanted by substances generated and perishable4 ,this ,celestial ,body is the abode of divinity1 including many divine beings who take part in its eternal rotations1 viz4 the ,sun1 ,moon1 ,stars1 c41 and other ,gods4 ,now1 every soul1 or every form that animates the matter of a living being1 derives its vitalizing influence from this celestial region4 ,all seeds of life include within them a spiritual or gaseous heat1 more divine than the four elements1 proceeding from the sun1 and in nature akin to the element of the stars4 ,such solar or celestial heat differs generically from the heat of fire4 ,it is the only source from whence the principle of life1 with the animal heat that accompanies it1 can be obtained4 ,soul1 in all its varieties1 proceeds from hence4#ade ,footnote #ade3 ,aristot4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #bi3 ,greek3 pa_/ss men ou7n psuchs du_/namis e7te_/rou s_/matos e7_/oike kekoinnke_/nai kai theiote_/rou tn kaloume_/nn stoichei_/n2 7s de diaphe_/rousi timio_/tti ai7 psuchai kai a7timi_/a a7ll_/ln1 ou7_/t kai 7 toiau_/t diaphe_/rei phu_/sis2 pa_/ntn men gar e7n t spe_/rmati e7nupa_/rchei1 o7_/per poiei go_/nima ei7nai ta spe_/rmata1 to kalou_/menon thermo_/n4 ,but though all varieties of ,soul emanate from the same celestial source1 they possess the divine element in very different degrees1 and are very unequal in comparative worth and dignity4 ,the lowest variety1 or nutritive soul--the only one possessed by plants1 among which there is no separation of sex#adf--;is contained potentially in the seed1 and is thus transmitted when that seed is matured into a new individual4 ,in animals1 which possess it along with the sensitive soul and among which the sexes are separated1 it is also contained potentially in the generative system of the female separately2 and the first commencement of life in the future animal is thus a purely vegetable life4#adg ,the sensitive soul1 the characteristic of the complete animal1 cannot be superadded except by copulation and the male semen4 ,the female1 being comparatively impotent and having less animal heat1 furnishes only the matter of the future offspring2 form1 or the moving1 fecundating1 cause1 is supplied by the male4 ,through the two together the new individual animal is completed1 having not merely the nutritive soul1 but also the sentient soul along with it4#adh ,footnote #adf3 ,ibid4 ,i4 xxiii4 p4 #gca1 a4 #bg4 ,footnote #adg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #ab4 ,footnote #adh3 ,ibid4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gaf1 a4 #d-ag2 xix4 p4 #gbf1 b4 #cc2 xx4 p4 #gbh1 a4 #ag2 xxi4 p4 #gbi1 b4 #f-bg4 ,both the nutritive and the sentient souls have1 each of them respectively1 a special bodily agency and movement belonging to them4 ,but the ,nos1 or the notic soul1 has no partnership with any similar bodily agency4 ,there is no special corporeal potentiality 7to speak in ,aristotelian language7 which it is destined to actualize4 ,it enters from without1 and emanates from a still more exalted influence of that divine celestial substance from which all psychical or vitalizing heat proceeds4#adi ,it is superinduced upon the nutritive and sentient souls1 and introduces itself at an age of the individual later than both of them4 ,having no part of the bodily organism specially appropriated to it1 this variety of soul--what is called the ,nos--stands distinguished from the other two in being perfectly separable from the body2#aej that is1 separable from the organized body which it is the essential function of the two lower souls to actualize1 and with which both of them are bound up4 ,the ,nos is not separable from the body altogether2 it belongs essentially to the divine celestial body1 and to those luminaries and other divine beings by whom portions of it are tenanted4 ,theorizing contemplation--the perfect1 unclouded1 unembarrassed1 exercise of the theoretical ,nos--is the single mental activity of these divinities2 contemplation of the formal regularity of the ,kosmos1 with its eternal and faultless rotations1 and with their own perfection as participating therein4 ,the celestial body is the body whereto ,nos1 or the notic soul1 properly belongs2#aea quite apart from the two other souls1 sentient and nutritive1 upon which it is grafted in the animal body2 and apart also from all the necessities of human action1 preceded by balanced motives and deliberate choice4#aeb ,footnote #adi3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #bg3 ,greek3 lei_/petai de ton noun mo_/non thu_/rathen e7peisie_/nai1 kai theion ei7nai mo_/non2 ou7then gar au7tou t e7nergei_/a koinnei smatik e7ne_/rgeia4 ,the words ,greek3 theion ei7nai mo_/non must not be construed strictly1 for in the next following passage he proceeds to declare that all ,greek3 psuch_/1 psuchik du_/namis or ,greek3 a7rch_/1 partakes of the divine element1 and that in this respect there is only a difference of degree between one ,greek3 psuch and another4 ,footnote #aej3 ,ibid4 p4 #gcg1 a4 #aj3 ,greek3 o7 kalou_/menos nous4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #dac1 b4 #be2 iii4 p4 #dae1 a4 #aa4 ,footnote #aea3 ,respecting ,greek3 to a7_/n sma1 see the copious citations in ,trendelenburg's note ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii42 ,comm4 p4 #cgc4 ,footnote #aeb3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,x4 viii4 p4 #aagh1 b4 #bj3 ,greek3 t d znti tou pra_/ttein a7phrme_/n1 e7_/ti de mallon tou poiein1 ti_/ lei_/petai pln theri_/as8 7_/ste 7 tou theou e7ne_/rgeia1 makario_/tti diaphe_/rousa1 thertik a7n ei7_/4--,see also ,metaphysic4 ,greek3 ,l4 v4 p4 #ajgd1 b4 #bf-ce4 ,from this celestial body1 a certain influence of ,nos is transferred to some of the mortal inhabitants of earth1 water1 and air4 ,thus a third or notic soul--or rather a third notic function--is added to the two existing functions1 sensitive and nutrient1 of the animal soul1 which acquires thereby an improved aptitude for1 and correlation with1 the ,formal and ,universal4 ,we have already stated that the sensitive soul possesses this aptitude to a certain extent2 it receives the impression of sensible forms1 without being impressed by the matter accompanying them4 ,the notic function strengthens and sharpens the aptitude2 the soul comes into correlation with those cogitable or intellective forms which are involved in the sensible forms2#aec it rises from the lower generalities of the ,second ,philosophy1 to the higher generalities of the ,first ,philosophy4 ,footnote #aec3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 viii4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #f3 ,greek3 e7n tois ei7_/desi tois ai7sthtois ta nota_/ e7stin4 ,as the sentient or percipient soul is the form or correlate of all perceivables1 and thus identified with them in nature1 all of them having existence only in relation to it1--so the cogitant or intellective soul is the form or correlate of all cogitables1 all of which exist relatively to it1 and only relatively4#aed ,it is in fact the highest of all forms--the ,form of ,forms2 the mental or subjective aspect of all formal reality4 ,footnote #aed3 ,ibid4 p4 #dcb1 b4 #b3 ,greek3 o7 nous ei7_/dos ei7dn kai 7 ai7_/sthsis ei7dos ai7sthtn4 ,such at least is the tendency and purpose of that notic influence which the celestial substance imparts to the human soul2 but it is realized only to a very small degree4 ,in its characteristic theorizing efficacy1 the godlike ,nos counts for a small fraction of the whole soul1 though superexcellent in quality4#aee ,there are but few men in whom it is tolerably developed1 and even in those few it is countervailed by many other agencies4#aef ,the notic function in men and animals exists only in companionship with the two other psychical functions4 ,it is subservient to the limits and conditions that they impose1 as well as to the necessities of individual and social action2 to all that is required for acting like a man1 according to the ,aristotelian phrase4 ,man's nature is complex1 and not self-sufficing for a life of theorizing contemplation1 such as that wherein the celestial inmates pass their immortality of happiness4#aeg ,footnote #aee3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,x4 vii4 p4 #aagg1 b4 #cd3 ,greek3 ei7 gar kai t o7_/gk mikro_/n e7sti1 duna_/mei kai timio_/tti polu mallon pa_/ntn u7pere_/chei4 ,footnote #aef3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i4 p4 #dej1 a4 9999#ah4 ,footnote #aeg3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,x4 vii4 p4 #aagg1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 o7 de toioutos a7n ei7_/ bi_/os krei_/ttn 7 kat' a7_/nthrpon4--viii4 p4 #aagh1 b4 #f3 ,greek3 de_/setai ou7n toiou_/tn pros to a7nthrpeu_/esthai4--ix4 p4 #aagh1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 ou7k au7ta_/rks 7 phu_/sis pros to therein4 ,compare similar sentiments in ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 ii4 p4 #ihc1 a4 #a4 ,we have thus to study the notic function according to the manifestations of it that we find in man1 and to a certain extent in some other privileged animals4 ,bees1 for example1 partake in the divine gift to a certain extent2 being distinguished in this respect from their analogues--wasps and hornets4#aeh ,footnote #aeh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,gen4 ,animal4 ,,iii4 x4 p4 #gfj1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 o7_/ntos de perittou tou ge_/nous kai i7di_/ou tou tn melittn4--p4 #gfa1 a4 #d3 ,greek3 ou7 gar e7_/chousin 7wasps and hornets7 ,greek3 ou7den theion1 7_/sper to ge_/nos tn melittn4 ,it is remarkable that ,greek3 peritto_/s1 the epithet here applied by ,aristotle to bees1 is the epithet that he also applies to men of theoretical and speculative activity1 as contrasted with men prudent and judicious in action 7see ,metaphys4 ,a4 ii4 p4 #ihc1 a4 #b2 also ,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,,vi4 vii4 p4 #aada1 b4 #f74 ,elsewhere he calls bees ,greek3 phro_/nima 7,metaphys4 ,a4 i4 p4 #ihj1 b4 #bb74 ,see a good note of ,torstrick 7on ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 p4 #dbh1 a4 #aj71 p4 #agb of his ,commentary4 ,aristotle may possibly have been one among the philosophers that ,virgil had in his mind1 in ,georgics1 iv4 #bai3-- ,his quidam signis1 atque hc exempla secuti1 ,esse apibus partem divin mentis1 et haustus thereos dixere3 ,deum namque ire per omnes ,terrasque1 tractusque maris1 coelumque profundum1 c4 ,in these and other animals1 and in man to a still greater degree1 the theorizing activity exists2 but it is either starved1 or at least has to deal with materials obscure1 puzzling1 conflicting2 while1 on the other hand1 the practical intellect becomes largely developed1 through the pressure of wants and desires1 combined with the teaching of experience4 ,in ,aristotle's view1 sensible perception is a separate source of knowledge1 accompanied with judgment and discrimination1 independent of the notic function4 ,occasionally1 he refers the intellectual superiority of man to the properly attempered combination and antagonism of heat in the heart with cold in the brain1 each strong and pure2#aei all the highly endowed animals 7he says7 have greater animal heat1 which is the essential condition of a better soul2#afj he reckons the finer sense of touch possessed by man as an essential condition of the same intellectual result4#afa ,sensible perception in its five diverse manifestations1 together with its secondary psychical effects--phantasy and memory1 accumulates in the human mind 7and in some animals7 a greater or less experience of particular facts2 from some of which inferences are drawn as to others unknown1 directing conduct as well as enlarging knowledge4#afb ,footnote #aei3 ,aristot4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 vi4 p4 #gdd1 a4 #aa-ca3 ,greek3 dloi de tn eu7krasi_/an 7 dia_/noia2 phronim_/taton ga_/r e7sti tn zn a7_/nthrpos4 ,we may remark that ,aristotle considers cold as in some cases a positive property1 not simply as the absence or privation of heat 7,de ,partibus ,animal4 ,,ii4 ii4 p4 #fdi1 a4 #ah74 ,the heart is the part wherein the psychical fire 7as it were7 is kept burning3 ,greek3 ts psuchs 7_/sper e7mpepureume_/ns e7n tois mori_/ois tou_/tois 7,aristot4 ,de ,vit et ,morte1 iv4 p4 #dfi1 b4 #af74 ,virgil1 in the beautiful lines of his ,second ,georgic 7#dhc71 laments that he is disqualified for deep philosophical studies by the want of heat round his heart3--,p ,sin1 has ne possim natur accedere partes1 ,frigidus obstiterit circum prcordia sanguis1 c4 ,footnote #afj3 ,aristot4 ,de ,respirat4 xiii4 p4 #dgg1 a4 #af4 ,footnote #afa3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 ix4 p4 #dba1 a4 #ba4 ,footnote #afb3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 i4 pp4 #ihj-a4 ,all this process--a perpetual movement of sense and memory--begins from infancy1 and goes on independently of ,nos or the notic function properly so called2 which grows up gradually at a later age1 aided by the acquisition of language and by instruction conveyed through language4 ,the supervening ,nos presupposes and depends upon what has been thus treasured up by experience4 ,though1 in the celestial body4 ,nos exists separately from human beings1 and though it there operates proprio motu apart from sense1 such is not the case with the human ,nos2 which depends upon the co-operation1 and is subject to the restrictions1 of the complicated soul and body wherewith it is domiciled--restrictions differing in each individual case4 ,though the notic process is distinct from sense1 yet without sense it cannot take place in man4 ,aristotle expressly says3 ,you cannot cogitate without a phantasm or without a continuous image4 ,now the phantasm has been already explained as a relic of movements of sense--or as those movements themselves1 looked at in another point of view4#afc ,when we cogitate 7he says71 our mental affection is the same as when we draw a triangle for geometrical study2 for there1 though we do not make use of the fact that the triangle is determinate in its magnitude1 we still draw it of a determinate magnitude4 ,so in cogitation1 even when we are not cogitating a determinate quantum1 we nevertheless set before our eyes a determinate quantum1 but we do not cogitate it quatenus determinate4#afd ,we cannot even 7he goes on to say7 remember the cogitabilia without a phantasm or sensible image2 so that our memory of them is only by way of concomitance 7indirect and secondary74#afe ,phantasy is thus absolutely indispensable to cogitation3 first to carrying on the process at all2 next to remembering it after it is past4 ,without either the visible phantasm of objects seen and touched1 or the audible phantasm of words heard and remembered1 the ,nos in human beings would be a nullity4#aff ,footnote #afc3 ,aristot4 ,de ,somniis1 i4 p4 #dei1 a4 #ae2 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #dca1 a4 #ag2 iii4 p4 #dbh1 b4 #ab4 ,footnote #afd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i4 p4 #ddi1 b4 #cj3 ,greek3 e7pei de peri phantasi_/as ei7_/rtai pro_/teron e7n tois peri psuchs1 kai noein ou7k e7_/stin a7_/neu phanta_/smatos2 sumbai_/nei gar to au7to pa_/thos e7n t noein o7_/per kai e7n t diagra_/phein2 e7kei te gar ou7then proschr_/menoi t to poson 7risme_/non ei7nai to trig_/nou1 o7_/ms gra_/phomen 7risme_/non kata to poso_/n2 kai o7 non 7sau_/ts1 ka7n m poson no1 ti_/thetai pro o7mma_/tn poso_/n1 noei d' ou7ch 7 poso_/n4 ,this passage appears to be as clear a statement of the main doctrine of ,nominalism as can be found in ,hobbes or ,berkeley4 ,in the sixteenth section of the ,introduction to the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 ,berkeley says3--,and here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular1 without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides4--,in like manner we may consider ,peter to far forth as man1 or so far forth as animal1 without framing the forementioned idea1 either of man or animal1 inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered4 ,berkeley has not improved upon the statement of ,aristotle4 ,footnote #afe3 ,aristot4 ,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i4 p4 #dej1 a4 #ac4 ,footnote #aff3 ,about sense and hearing1 as the fundamenta of intellect1 see ,aristot4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 i4 p4 #dcg1 a4 #a-ag4 ,we see that1 though ,aristotle recognizes a general distinction between phantasy and cogitation1 and alludes to many animals as having the former without attaining to the latter1 yet he also declares that in man1 who possesses both1 not only is cogitation dependent upon phantasy1 but phantasy passes into cogitation by gradations almost imperceptible4 ,in regard to the practical application of ,nos 7i4e4 to animal movements determined either by appetite or by reason71 he finds a great difficulty in keeping the distinction clearly marked4 ,substantially1 indeed1 he lets it drop4 ,when he speaks of phantasy as being either calculating or perceptive1 we are unable to see in what respect calculating phantasy 7which he states not to belong to other animals7 differs from an effort of cogitation4#afg ,indeed1 he speaks with some diffidence respecting any distribution of parts in the same soul1 suspecting that such distribution is not real but logical3 you may subdivide as much as you choose4#afh ,footnote #afg3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 x4 p4 #dcc1 a4 #i-;b4 #cj3 ,greek3 ei7_/ tis tn phantasi_/an tithei_/ 7s no_/si_/n tina--phantsi_/a de pasa 7 logistik 7 ai7sthtik_/2 tau_/ts men ou7n kai ta a7_/lla za mete_/chei4 ,also vii4 p4 #dca1 b4 #g4 ,footnote #afh3 ,ibid4 ix4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #bc4 ,it thus appears clear that ,aristotle restricts the ,nos or notic function in man to the matters of sense and experience1 physical or mental1 and that he considers the phantasm to be an essential accompaniment of the cogitative act4 ,yet this does not at all detract from his view of the grandeur1 importance1 and wide range of survey1 belonging to the notic function4 ,it is the portion of man's nature that correlates with the abstract and universal2 but it is only a portion of his nature1 and must work in conjunction and harmony with the rest4 ,the abstract cannot be really separated from the concrete1 nor the universal from one or other of its particulars1 nor the essence from that whereof it is the essence1 nor the attribute from that of which it is the attribute1 nor the genus and species from the individuals comprehended therein2 nor1 to speak in purely ,aristotelian language1 the ,form from some ,matter1 or the ,matter from some ,form4 ,in all these cases there is a notional or logical distinction1 impressing the mind as the result of various comparisons1 noted by an appropriate term1 and remembered afterwards by means of that term 7that is1 by means of an audible or visible phantasm72 but real separation there neither is nor can be4 ,this is the cardinal principle of ,aristotle1 repeated in almost all his works--his marked antithesis against ,plato4 ,such logical distinctions as those here noticed 7they might be multiplied without number7 it belongs to ,nos or the notic function to cognize4 ,but the real objects1 in reference to which alone the distinctions have a meaning1 are concrete and individual2 and the cognizing subject is really the entire man1 employing indeed the notic function1 but employing it with the aid of other mental forces1 phantasms and remembrances1 real and verbal4 ,the notic soul is called by ,aristotle the place of ,forms1 the potentiality of ,forms1 the correlate of things apart from ,matter4#afi ,it cogitates these ,forms in or along with the phantasms3 the cogitable ,forms are contained in the sensible ,forms2 for there is nothing really existent beyond or apart from visible or tangible magnitudes1 with their properties and affections1 and with the so-called abstractions considered by the geometer4 ,hence1 without sensible perception1 a man can neither learn nor understand anything2 in all his theoretical contemplations1 he requires some phantasm to contemplate along with them4#agj ,footnote #afi3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #bg1 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #agj3 ,ibid4 vii4 p4 #dca1 b4 #b3 ,greek3 ta men ou7n ei7_/d to notikon e7n tois phanta_/smasi noei4--viii4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #c3 ,greek3 e7pei de ou7de pragma ou7the_/n e7sti para ta mege_/th1 7s dokei1 ta ai7sthta kechrisme_/non1 e7n tois ei7_/desi tois ai7sthtois ta nota_/ e7sti1 ta_/ te e7n a7phaire_/sei lego_/mena1 kai o7_/sa tn ai7sthtn e7_/xeis kai pa_/th2 kai dia touto ou7_/te m ai7sthano_/menos mthen ou7then a7n ma_/thoi ou7de xunei_/2 o7_/tan de ther1 a7na_/gk a7_/ma pha_/ntasma_/ ti therein4 ,herein lies one of the main distinctions between the notic and the sentient souls4 ,the sentient deals with particulars1 and correlates with external bodies2 the notic apprehends universals1 which in a certain sense are within the soul3 hence a man can cogitate whenever or whatever he chooses1 but he can see or touch only what is present4#aga ,another distinction is1 that the sentient soul is embodied in special organs1 each with determinate capacities1 and correlating with external objects1 themselves alike determinate1 acting only under certain conditions of locality4 ,the possibilities of sensation are thus from the beginning limited2 moreover1 a certain relative proportion must be maintained between the percipient and the perceivable2 for extreme or violent sounds1 colours1 c41 produce no sensation2 on the contrary1 they deaden the sentient organ4#agb ,but the notic soul 7what is called the ,nos of the soul1 to use ,aristotle's language7#agc is nothing at all in actuality before its notic function commences1 though it is everything in potentiality4 ,it is not embodied in any corporeal organ of its own1 nor mingled as a new elementary ingredient with the body2 it does not correlate with any external objects2 it is not so specially attached to some particulars as to make it antipathetic to others4 ,accordingly its possibilities of cogitation are unlimited2 it apprehends with equal facility what is most cogitable and what is least cogitable4 ,it is thoroughly indeterminate in its nature1 and is in fact at first a mere unlimited cogitative potentiality2#agd like a tablet1 upon which no letters have as yet been written1 but upon which all or any letters may be written4#age ,footnote #aga3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #dag1 b4 #bb4 ,footnote #agb3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #ca4 ,footnote #agc3 ,ibid4 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 o7 a7_/ra kalou_/menos ts psuchs nous 7le_/g de noun 7 dianoeitai kai u7polamba_/nei 7 psuch_/7 ou7the_/n e7stin e7nergei_/a tn o7_/ntn prin noein4 ,footnote #agd3 ,ibid4 a4 #ba3 ,greek3 7_/ste md' au7tou ei7nai phu_/sin mdemi_/an a7ll' 7 tau_/tn1 o7_/ti dunato_/n4 ,footnote #age3 ,ibid4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #a4 ,we have already said that the ,nos of the human soul emanates from a peculiar influence of the celestial body1 which is the special region of ,form in the ,kosmos4 ,through it we acquire an enlarged power of apprehending the abstract and universal2 we can ascend above sensible forms to the cogitable forms contained therein2 we can consider all forms in themselves1 without paying attention to the matter wherein they are embodied4 ,instead of considering the concrete solid or liquid before us1 we can mentally analyse them1 and thus study solidity in the abstract1 fluidity in the abstract4 ,while our senses judge of water as hot and cold1 our notic function enables us to appreciate water in the abstract--to determine its essence1 and to furnish a definition of it4#agf ,in all these objects1 as combinations of ,form with ,matter1 the cogitable form exists potentially2 and is abstracted or considered abstractedly1 by the cogitant ,nos4#agg ,yet this last 7as we have already seen7 cannot operate except along with and by aid of phantasms--of impressions revived or remaining from sense4 ,it is thus immersed in the materials of sense1 and has no others4 ,but it handles them in a way of its own1 and under new points of view2 comparing and analysing2 recognizing the abstract in the concrete1 and the universal in the particular2 discriminating mentally and logically the one from the other2 and noting the distinction by appropriate terms4 ,such distinctions are the nomena1 generated in the process of cogitation by ,nos itself4 ,the ,nos1 as it exists in any individual1 gradually loses its original character of naked potentiality1 and becomes an actual working force1 by means of its own acquired materials4#agh ,it is an aggregate of nomena1 all of them in nature identical with itself2 and1 while cogitating them1 the ,nos at the same time cogitates itself4 ,considered abstractedly1 apart from matter1 they exist only in the mind itself2 in theoretical speculation1 the cognoscens and the cognitum are identical4 ,but they are not really separable from matter1 and have no reality apart from it4 ,footnote #agf3 ,ibid4 p4 #dbi1 b4 #aj4 ,footnote #agg3 ,ibid4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #b-i4 ,footnote #agh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 v4 p4 #dag1 b4 #bc4 ,ibid4 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #dbi1 b4 #g3 ,greek3 o7_/tan du_/ntai e7nergein di' au7tou4 ,the distinction1 yet at the same time correlation1 between ,form and ,matter1 pervades all nature 7,aristotle affirms71 and will be found in the ,nos as elsewhere4 ,we must recognize an ,intellectus ,agens or constructive1 and an ,intellectus ,patiens or receptive4#agi ,the ,agens is the great intellectual energy pervading the celestial body1 and acting upon all the animals susceptible of its operation2 analogous to light1 which illuminates the diaphanous medium1 and elevates what was mere potential colour into colour actual and visible4#ahj ,the ,patiens is the intellectual receptivity acted upon in each individual1 and capable of being made to cogitate every thing2 anterior to the ,agens1 in time1 so far as regards the individual1 yet as a general fact 7when we are talking of man as a species7 not anterior even in time1 but correlative4 ,of the two1 the ,intellectus ,agens is the more venerable2 it is pure intellectual energy1 unmixed1 unimpressible from without1 and separable from all animal body4 ,it is this1 and nothing more1 when considered apart from animal body2 but it is then eternal and immortal1 while the ,intellectus ,patiens perishes with the remaining soul and with the body4 ,yet though the ,intellectus ,agens is thus eternal1 and though we have part in it1 we cannot remember any of its operations anterior to our own maturity2 for the concurrence of the ,intellectus ,patiens1 which begins and ends with us1 is indispensable both to remembrance and to thought4#aha ,footnote #agi3 ,ibid4 ,,iii4 v4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #aj4 ,footnote #ahj3 ,ibid4 a4 #ad3 ,greek3 kai e7_/stin o7 men toioutos nous t pa_/nta gi_/nesthai1 o7 de t pa_/nta poiein1 7s e7_/xis tis1 oi7on to phs2 tro_/pon ga_/r tina kai to phs poiei ta duna_/mei o7_/nta chr_/mata e7nergei_/a chr_/mata4 ,aristotle here illustrates ,greek3 nous poitiko_/s by ,greek3 phs and ,greek3 e7_/xis2 and we know what view he takes of ,greek3 phs 7,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 vii4 p4 #dah1 b4 #i7 as the ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia or ,greek3 e7_/xis tou diaphanous--which diaphanous he explains to be a ,greek3 phu_/sis tis e7nupa_/rchousa e7n a7e_/ri kai u7_/dati kai e7n t a7idi_/ t a7_/n s_/mati4 ,judging by this illustration1 it seems proper to couple the ,greek3 nous poitiko_/s here with his declaration in ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #bh3 ,greek3 ton noun mo_/non thu_/rathen e7peise_/nai kai theion ei7nai mo_/non3 he cannot consider the ,greek3 nous poitiko_/s1 which is of the nature of ,form1 as belonging to each individual man like the ,greek3 nous pathtiko_/s4 ,footnote #aha3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 v4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #ag3 ,greek3 kai ou7tos o7 nous 7i4 e4 ,greek3 poitiko_/s7 christos kai a7paths kai a7mig_/s1 t ou7si_/a 7n e7ne_/rgeia2 a7ei gar timi_/teron to poioun tou pa_/schontos1 kai 7 a7rch ts u7_/ls4--,ibid4 a4 #bb3 ,greek3 christheis d' e7sti mo_/non touth' o7_/per e7sti_/1 kai touto mo_/non a7tha_/naton kai a7i_/dion2 ou7 mnmoneu_/omen de_/1 o7_/ti touto men a7pathe_/s1 o7 de pathtikos nous phtharto_/s1 kai a7_/neu tou_/tou ou7then noei4 ,in this obscure and difficult chapter 7difficult even to ,theophrastus the friend and pupil of the author71 we have given the best meaning that the words seem to admit4 ,we see here the full extent of ,aristotle's difference from the ,platonic doctrine1 in respect to the immortality of the soul4 ,he had defined soul as the first actualization of a body having potentiality of life with a determinate organism4 ,this of course implied1 and he expressly declares it1 that soul and body in each individual case were one and indivisible1 so that the soul of ,sokrates perished of necessity with the body of ,sokrates4#ahb ,but he accompanied that declaration with a reserve in favour of ,nos1 and especially of the theorizing ,nos2 which he recognized as a different sort of soul1 not dependent on a determinate bodily organism1 but capable of being separated from it1 as the eternal is from the perishable4#ahc ,the present chapter informs us how far such reserve is intended to go4 ,that the theorizing ,nos is not limited1 like the sentient soul1 to a determinate bodily organism1 but exists apart from that organism and eternally--is maintained as incontestable3 it is the characteristic intellectual activity of the eternal celestial body and the divine inmates thereof4 ,but the distinction of ,form and ,matter is here pointed out1 as prevailing in ,nos and in ,soul generally1 not less than throughout all other ,nature4 ,the theorizing ,nos1 as it exists in ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,demokritus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,empedokles1 ,xenokrates1 c41 is individualized in each1 and individualized differently in each4 ,it represents the result of the ,intellectus ,agens or ,formal ,nos1 universal and permanent1 upon the ,intellectus ,patiens or notic receptivity peculiar to each individual2 the co-operation of the two is indispensable to sustain the theorizing intellect of any individual man4 ,but the ,intellectus ,patiens1 or ,receptivus1 perishes along with the individual4 ,accordingly1 the intellectual life of ,sokrates cannot be continued farther4 ,it cannot be prolonged after his sensitive and nutritive life has ceased2 the notic function1 as it exists in him1 is subject to the same limits of duration as the other functions of the soul4 ,the intellectual man is no more immortal than the sentient man4 ,footnote #ahb3 ,ibid4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #dac1 a4 #c4 ,footnote #ahc3 ,ibid4 ii4 p4 #dac1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 peri de tou nou kai ts thertiks duna_/mes ou7de_/n p phanero_/n1 a7ll' e7_/oike psuchs ge_/nos e7_/teron ei7nai1 kai touto mo_/non e7nde_/chetai chri_/zesthai1 katha_/per to a7i_/dion tou phthartou4 ,such is the opinion here delivered by ,aristotle4 ,and it follows indeed as a distinct corollary from his doctrine respecting animal and vegetable procreation in general4 ,individuality 7the being unum numero in a species7 and immortality are in his view incompatible facts2 the one excludes the other4 ,in assigning 7as he so often does7 a final cause or purpose to the wide-spread fact of procreation of species by animals and vegetables1 he tells us that every individual living organism1 having once attained the advantage of existence1 yearns and aspires to prolong this for ever1 and to become immortal4 ,but this aspiration cannot be realized2 ,nature has forbidden it1 or is inadequate to it2 no individual can be immortal4 ,being precluded from separate immortality1 the individual approaches as near to it as is possible1 by generating a new individual like itself1 and thus perpetuating the species4 ,such is the explanation given by ,aristotle of the great fact pervading the sublunary1 organized world#ahd--;immortal species of plants1 animals1 and men1 through a succession of individuals each essentially perishable4 ,the general doctrine applies to ,nos as well as to the other functions of the soul4 ,nos is immortal2 but the individual ,sokrates1 considered as notic or intellectual1 can no more be immortal than the same individual considered as sentient or reminiscent4 ,footnote #ahd3 ,aristot4 ,de ,generat4 ,animal4 ,,ii4 i4 p4 #gca1 b4 #bj1 seq42 ,de ,anim1 ,,ii4 iv4 p4 #dae1 a4 #bf1 seq42 ,o,economica1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #acdc1 b4 #bc4 ,we have already stated that ,nos--,intellect--the notic function--is that faculty of the soul that correlates with the abstract and universal2 with ,form apart from ,matter4 ,its process is at once analytical1 synthetical1 and retentive4 ,nature presents to us only concretes and particulars1 in a perpetual course of change and reciprocal action2 in these the abstract and universal are immersed1 and out of these they have to be disengaged by logical analysis4 ,that the abstract is a derivative from the concrete1 and the universal from particulars--is the doctrine of ,aristotle4 ,ascending from particulars1 the analysis is carried so far that at length it can go no farther4 ,it continues to divide until it comes to indivisibles1 or simple notions1 the highest abstractions1 and the largest universals4 ,these are the elements out of which universal propositions are formed1 the first premisses or principia of demonstration4 ,unphilosophical minds do not reach these indivisibles at all3 but it is the function of the theorizing ,nos to fasten on them1 and combine them into true propositions4 ,in so far as regards the indivisibles themselves1 falsehood is out of the question1 and truth also1 since they affirm nothing4 ,the mind either apprehends them1 or it does not apprehend them3 there is no other alternative4#ahe ,but1 when combined into affirmative propositions1 they then are true or false1 as the case may be4 ,the formal essence of each object is among these indivisibles1 and is apprehended as such by the intellect2 which1 while confining itself to such essence1 is unerring1 as each sense is in regard to its own appropriate perceivables4#ahf ,but1 when the intellect goes father1 and proceeds to predicate any attribute respecting the essence1 then it becomes liable to error1 as sense is when drawing inferences4 ,footnote #ahe3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #dcj1 a4 #bf3 ,greek3 7 men ou7n tn a7diaire_/tn no_/sis e7n tou_/tois peri a7 ou7k e7_/sti to pseudos2 e7n oi7s de kai to pseudos kai to a7lthe_/s1 su_/nthesi_/s tis 7_/d noma_/tn 7_/sper e7n o7_/ntn4--,metaphysica1 ,greek3 ,th4 x4 p4 #ajea1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 peri tauta ou7k e7_/stin a7patthnai1 a7ll' 7 noein 7 m_/4 ,footnote #ahf3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #dcj1 b4 #bi4 ,this portion of the treatise is peculiarly confused and difficult to understand4 ,one of the chief functions that ,aristotle assigns to ,nos1 or the notic function1 is that the principia of demonstration and knowledge belong to it2 and not merely the principia1 but also1 in cases of action preceded by deliberation and balance of motives1 the ultimate application of principia to action4 ,so that he styles ,nos both beginning and end2 also the beginning of the beginning2 and1 moreover1 he declares it to be always right and unerring--equal to ,science and even more than ,science4#ahg ,these are high praises1 conveying little information1 and not reconcilable with other passages wherein he speaks of the exercise of the notic function 7,greek3 to noein7 as sometimes right1 sometimes wrong4#ahh ,but1 for the question of psychology1 the point to be determined is1 in what sense he meant that principia belonged to ,nos4 ,he certainly did not mean that the first principles of reasoning were novelties originated1 suggested1 or introduced into the soul by notic influence4 ,not only he does not say this1 but he takes pains to impress the exact contrary4 ,in passages cited a few pages back1 he declares that ,nos in entering the soul brings nothing whatever with it2 that it is an universal potentiality--a capacity in regard to truth1 but nothing more2#ahi that it is in fact a capacity not merely for comparing and judging 7to both of which he recognizes even the sentient soul as competent71 but also for combining many into one1 and resolving the apparent one into several2 for abstracting1 generalizing1 and selecting among the phantasms present1 which of them should be attended to1 and which should be left out of attention4#aij ,such is his opinion about the notic function2 and he states explicitly that the abstract and universal not only arise from the concrete and particular1 but are inseparable from the same really--separable only logically4 ,footnote #ahg3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikomach4 ,,vi4 xii4 p4 #aadc1 a4 #be1 b4 #aj3 ,greek3 dio kai a7rch kai te_/los nous4--,analyt4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xviii4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #e4 ,footnote #ahh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 iii4 p4 #dbg1 b4 #h3 ,greek3 a7ll' ou7de to noein1 e7n 7 e7_/sti to o7rths kai m o7rths--dianoeisthai d' e7nde_/chetai kai pseuds4 ,footnote #ahi3 ,ibid4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #djd1 a4 #cj1 where he censures ,demokritus3 ,greek3 ou7 d chrtai t n 7s duna_/mei tini peri tn a7l_/theian1 a7lla tau7to le_/gei psuchn kai noun4--,compare ibid4 ,,iii4 iv4 p4 #dbi1 a4 #ba1 b4 #cj4 ,footnote #aij3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 vi4 p4 #dcj1 b4 #e3 ,greek3 to de e7n poioun1 touto o7 nous e7_/kaston4--,ibid4 xi4 p4 #dcd1 a4 #i4 ,he describes1 at the end of the ,analytica ,posteriora and elsewhere1 the steps whereby the mind ascends gradually from sense1 memory1 and experience1 to general principles4 ,and he indicates a curious contrast between these and the notic functions4 ,sense1 memory1 phantasy1 reminiscence1 are movements of the body as well as of the soul2 our thoughts and feelings come and go1 none of them remaining long4 ,but the notic process is the reverse of this2 it is an arrest of all this mental movement1 a detention of the fugitive thoughts1 a subsidence from perturbation--so that the attention dwells steadily and for some time on the same matters4#aia ,analysis1 selection1 and concentration of attention1 are the real characteristics of the ,aristotelian ,nos4 ,it is not 7as some philosophers have thought7 a source of new general truths1 let into the soul by a separate door1 and independent of experience as well as transcending experience4 ,footnote #aia3 ,aristot4 ,physica1 ,,vii4 iii4 p4 #bdg1 b4 #i3 ,greek3 7 d' e7x a7rchs lpsis ts e7pist_/ms ge_/nesis ou7k e7_/stin2 t gar 7remsai kai stnai tn dia_/noian e7pi_/stasthai kai phronein le_/gomen4--,also ,de ,anim1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #djg1 b4 #cb1 and the remarkable passage in the ,analytica ,poster4 ,,ii4 xviii4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #c-;b4 #e4 ,passing now to the ,emotions1 we find that these are not systematically classified and analysed by ,aristotle1 as belonging to a scheme of ,psychology2 though he treats them incidentally1 with great ability and acuteness1 both in his ,ethics1 where he regards them as auxiliaries or impediments to a rational plan of life1 and in his ,rhetoric1 where he touches upon their operation as it bears on oratorical effect4 ,he introduces however in his ,psychology some answer to the question1 ,what is it that produces local movement in the animal body8 ,he replies that movement is produced both by ,nos and by ,appetite4 ,speaking strictly1 we ought to call ,appetite alone the direct producing cause1 acted upon by the appetitum1 which is here the ,primum ,movens ,immobile4 ,but this appetitum cannot act without coming into the intellectual sphere1 as something seen1 imagined1 cogitated4#aib ,in this case the ,nos or ,intellect is stimulated through appetite1 and operates in subordination thereto4 ,such is the ,intellect1 considered as ,practical1 the principle or determining cause of which is the appetitum or object of desire2 the ,intellect manifesting itself only for the sake of some end1 to be attained or avoided4 ,herein it is distinguished altogether from the ,theoretical ,nos or ,intellect1 which does not concern itself with any expetenda or fugienda and does not meddle with conduct4 ,the appetitum is good1 real or apparent1 in so far as it can be achieved by our actions4 ,often we have contradictory appetites2 and1 in such cases1 the ,intellect is active generally as a force resisting the present and caring for the future4 ,but ,appetite or ,desire1 being an energy including both soul and body1 is the real and appropriate cause that determines us to local movement1 often even against strong opposition from the ,intellect4#aic ,footnote #aib3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 x4 p4 #dcc1 b4 #aa3 ,greek3 prton de pa_/ntn to o7rekto_/n 7touto gar kinei ou7 kinou_/menon t nothnai 7 phantasthnai74 ,footnote #aic3 ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 ,,iii4 x4 p4 #dcc1 a4 #be1 b4 #ai3 ,greek3 dio e7n tois koinois s_/matos kai psuchs e7_/rgois1 c4 ,aristotle thus concludes his scheme of ,psychology1 comprehending all plants as well as all animals2 a scheme differing in this respect1 as well as in others1 from the schemes of those that had preceded him1 and founded upon the peculiar principles of his own ,first ,philosophy4 ,soul is to organized body as ,form to ,matter1 as ,actualizer to the ,potential2 not similar or homogeneous1 but correlative2 the two being only separable as distinct logical points of view in regard to one and the same integer or individual4 ,aristotle recognizes many different varieties of ,soul1 or rather many distinct functions of the same soul1 from the lowest or most universal1 to the highest or most peculiar and privileged2 but the higher functions presuppose or depend upon the lower1 as conditions2 while the same principle of ,relativity pervades them all4 ,he brings this principle prominently forward1 when he is summing up#aid in the third or last book of the treatise ,de ,anim3--,the ,soul is in a certain way all existent things2 for all of them are either ,perceivables or ,cogitables2 and the ,cogitant ,soul is in a certain way the matters cogitated1 while the ,percipient ,soul is in a certain way the matters perceived4 ,the ,percipient and its ,percepta--the ,cogitant and its ,cogitata--each implies and correlates with the other3 the ,percipient is the highest ,form of all ,percepta2 the ,cogitant is the ,form of ,forms1 or the highest of all ,forms1 cogitable or perceivable4#aie ,the ,percipient or ,cogitant ,subject is thus conceived only in relation to the ,objects perceived or cogitated1 while these ,objects again are presented as essentially correlative to the ,subject4 ,the realities of ,nature are particulars1 exhibiting ,form and ,matter in one3 though1 for purposes of scientific study--of assimilation and distinction--it is necessary to consider each of the two abstractedly from the other4 ,footnote #aid3 ,ibid4 viii4 p4 #dca1 b4 #bj1 seq43 ,greek3 nun de peri psuchs ta lechthe_/nta sugkephalai_/santes1 ei7_/pmen pa_/lin o7_/ti 7 psuch ta o7_/nta p_/s e7sti pa_/nta4 7 gar ai7sthta ta o7_/nta 7 nota_/1 e7_/sti de 7 e7pist_/m men ta e7pistta_/ ps1 7 d' ai7_/sthsis ta ai7sthta_/4 ,footnote #aie3 ,ibid4 p4 #dcb1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 o7 nous ei7dos ei7dn1 kai 7 ai7_/sthsis ei7dos ai7sthtn4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,ethica4 ,i4 ,the ,ethics of ,aristotle presuppose certain conditions in the persons to whom they are addressed1 without which they cannot be read with profit4 ,they presuppose a certain training1 both moral and intellectual1 in the pupil4 ,first1 the reason of the pupil must be so far developed1 as that he shall be capable of conceiving the idea of a scheme of life and action1 and of regulating his momentary impulses more or less by a reference to this standard4 ,he must not live by passion1 obeying without reflection the appetite of the moment1 and thinking only of grasping at this immediate satisfaction4 ,the habit must have been formed of referring each separate desire to some rational measure1 and of acting or refraining to act according as such a comparison may dictate4 ,next1 a certain experience must have been acquired concerning human affairs1 and concerning the actions of men with their causes and consequences4 ,upon these topics all the reasonings and all the illustrations contained in every theory of ,ethics must necessarily turn3 so that a person thoroughly inexperienced would be incompetent to understand them4 ,for both these two reasons1 no youthful person1 nor any person of mature years whose mind is still tainted with the defects of youth1 can be a competent learner of ,ethics or ,politics 7,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #g4 ,compare vii4 #h74 ,such a pupil will neither appreciate the reasonings1 nor obey the precepts 7i4 #c74 ,again1 a person cannot receive instruction in ,ethics with advantage unless he has been subjected to a good practical discipline1 so as to have acquired habits of virtuous action1 and to have been taught to feel pleasure and pain on becoming occasions and in reference to becoming objects4 ,unless the circumstances by which he has been surrounded and the treatment which he has received1 have been such as to implant in him a certain vein of sentiment and to give a certain direction to his factitious pleasures and pains--unless obedience to right precepts has to a certain degree been made habitual with him--he will not be able to imbibe1 still less to become attached to1 even the principia of ethical reasoning 7,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #d4 #g74 ,the well-trained man1 who has already acquired virtuous habits1 has within himself the ,greek3 a7rch1 or beginning1 from which happiness proceeds3 he may do very well1 even though the reason on which these habits were formed should never become known to him3 but he will at least readily apprehend and understand the reason when it is announced4 ,the ,greek3 a7rchai or beginnings to which ethical philosophy points and from whence the conduct which it enjoins is derived1 are obtained only by habituation1 not by induction nor by perception1 like other ,greek3 a7rchai_/3 and we ought in all our investigations to look after the ,greek3 a7rch in the way which the special nature of the subject requires1 and to be very careful to define it well 7i4 #d1 i4 #g74 ,in considering ,aristotle's doctrine respecting the ,greek3 a7rchai of ethical and political science1 and the way in which they are to be discovered and made available1 we should keep in mind that he announces the end and object of these sciences to be1 not merely the enlargement of human knowledge1 but the determination of human conduct towards certain objects3 not theory1 but practice3 not to teach us what virtue is1 but to induce us to practise it--,since then the present science is not concerned with speculation1 like the others4 ,for here we enquire1 not in order that we may know what virtue is1 but in order that we may become good1 otherwise there would be no profit in the enquiry 7ii4 #b4 ,see also i4 #b1 i4 #e1 vi4 #e74 ,the remarks which ,aristotle makes about the different ways of finding out and arriving at ,greek3 a7rchai1 are curious4 ,some principles or beginnings are obtained by induction--others by perception--others by habituation in a certain way--others again in other ways4 ,other modes of arriving at ,greek3 a7rchai are noticed by the philosopher himself in other places4 ,for example1 the ,greek3 a7rchai of demonstrative science are said to be discovered by intellect 7,greek3 nous7--vi4 #f-g4 ,there is a passage however in vi4 #h in which he seems to say that the ,greek3 a7rchai of the wise man 7,greek3 so_/phos7 and the natural man 7,greek3 phusikos7 are derived from experience3 which ,i find it difficult to reconcile with the preceding chapters1 where he calls wisdom a compound of intellect and science 7,greek3 e7pist_/m71 and where he gives ,thales and ,anaxagoras as specimens of wise men4 ,by vi4 #f--;it seems that wisdom has reference to matters of demonstrative science3 how then can it be true that a youth may be a mathematician without being a wise man8 ,moreover1 ,aristotle takes much pains1 at the commencement of his treatise on ,ethics1 to set forth the inherent intricacy and obscurity of the subject1 and to induce the reader to be satisfied with conclusions not absolutely demonstrative4 ,he repeats this observation several times--a sufficient proof that the evidence for his own opinions did not appear to himself altogether satisfactory 7,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #c1 i4 #g1 ii4 #b74 ,the completeness of the proof 7he says7 must be determined by the subject-matter3 a man of cultivated mind will not ask for better proof than the nature of the case admits3 and human action1 to which all ethical theory relates1 is essentially fluctuating and uncertain in its consequences1 so that every general proposition which can be affirmed or denied concerning it1 is subject to more or less of exception4 ,if this degree of uncertainty attaches even to general reasonings on ethical subjects1 the particular applications of these reasonings are still more open to mistake3 the agent must always determine for himself at the moment1 according to the circumstances of the case1 without the possibility of sheltering himself under technical rules of universal application3 just as the physician or the pilot is obliged to do in the course of his profession4 ,now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule1 just like the conditions of health4 ,and if this is the case with the universal theory1 still more does the theory that refers to particular acts present nothing that can be accurately fixed2 for it falls not under any art or any system1 but the actors themselves must always consider what suits the occasion1 just as happens in the physician's and the pilot's art4 ,but though this is the case with the theory at present1 we must try to give it some assistance 7,greek3 peirati_/on bothein 74--,eth4 ,nic4 #b4 ,the last words cited are remarkable4 ,they seem to indicate1 that ,aristotle regarded the successful prosecution of ethical enquiries as all but desperate4 ,he had previously said 7i4 #c7--,there is so much difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable and just1 of which political science treats1 that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment1 and not by nature4 ,and there is the same sort of error respecting what things are good1 because many persons have sustained injury from them1 some having already been brought to destruction through their wealth1 others through their courage4 ,one cannot but remark how entirely this is at variance with the notion of a moral sense or instinct1 or an intuitive knowledge of what is right and wrong4 ,aristotle most truly observes that the details of our daily behaviour are subject to such an infinite variety of modifications1 that no pre-established rules can be delivered to guide them3 we must act with reference to the occasion and the circumstances4 ,some few rules may indeed be laid down1 admitting of very few exceptions3 but the vast majority of our proceedings cannot be subjected to any rule whatever1 except to the grand and all-comprehensive rule1 if we are indeed so to call it1 of conforming to the ultimate standard of morality4 ,supposing the conditions above indicated to be realized--supposing a certain degree of experience in human affairs1 of rational self-government1 and of habitual obedience to good rules of action1 to be already established in the pupil's mind1 the theory of ethics may then be unfolded to him with great advantage 7i4 #c74 ,it is not meant to be implied that a man must have previously acquired the perfection of practical reason and virtue before he acquaints himself with ethical theory2 but he must have proceeded a certain way towards the acquisition4 ,ethics1 as ,aristotle conceives them1 are a science closely analogous to if not a subordinate branch of ,politics4 7,i do not however think that he employs the word ,greek3 7thik in the same distinct and substantive meaning as ,greek3 politik 7e7pist_/m71 although he several times mentions ,greek3 ta 7thika and ,greek3 7thikoi lo_/goi47 ,ethical science is for the individual what political science is for the community 7i4 #b74 ,in every variety of human action1 in each separate art and science1 the agents1 individual or collective1 propose to themselves the attainment of some good as the end and object of their proceedings4 ,ends are multifarious1 and good things are multifarious3 but good1 under one shape or another1 is always the thing desired by every one1 and the determining cause of human action 7,greek3 ou7 pa_/nta e7phi_/etai7--i4 #a4 ,sometimes the action itself1 or the exercise of the powers implied in the action1 is the end sought1 without anything beyond4 ,sometimes there is an ulterior end1 or substantive business1 to be accomplished by means of the action and lying beyond it4 ,in this latter class of cases1 the ulterior end is the real good3 better than the course of action used to accomplish it--the external results are naturally 7,greek3 pe_/phuke7 better than the course of action 7i4 #a74 ,taking this as a general position1 it is subject to many exceptions3 but the word ,greek3 pe_/phuke seems to signify only that such is naturally and ordinarily the case1 not that the reverse never occurs4 ,again some ends are comprehensive and supreme2 others1 partial and subordinate4 ,the subordinate ends are considered with reference to the supreme1 and pursued as means to their accomplishment4 ,thus the end of the bridle-maker is subservient to that of the horseman1 and the various operations of war to the general scheme of the commander4 ,the supreme1 or architectonic1 ends1 are superior in eligibility to the subordinate1 or ministerial1 which1 indeed1 are pursued only for the sake of the former4 ,one end 7or one good71 as subordinate1 is thus included in another end 7or another good7 as supreme4 ,the same end may be supreme with regard to one end different from itself1 and subordinate with regard to another4 ,the end of the general is supreme with reference to that of the soldier or the maker of arms1 subordinate with reference to that of the statesman4 ,in this scale of comprehensiveness of ends there is no definite limit2 we may suppose ends more and more comprehensive as we please1 and we come from thence to form the idea of one most comprehensive and sovereign end1 which includes under it every other without exception--with reference to which all other ends stand in the relation either of parts or of means--and which is itself never in any case pursued for the sake of any other or independent end4 ,the end thus conceived is the ,sovereign ,good of man1 or ,the ,good--,the ,summum ,bonum--,greek3 ,ta7gathon--,to a7_/riston--,ta7nthr_/pinon a7gatho_/n 7i4 #b74 ,to comprehend1 to define1 and to prescribe means for realizing the ,sovereign ,good1 is the object of ,political ,science1 the paramount and most architectonic ,science of all1 with regard to which all other ,sciences are simply ministerial4 ,it is the business of the political ruler to regulate the application of all other ,sciences with reference to the production of this his ,end--to determine how far each shall be learnt and in what manner each shall be brought into practice--to enforce or forbid any system of human action according as it tends to promote the accomplishment of his supreme purpose--the ,sovereign ,good of the ,community4 ,strategical1 rhetorical1 economical1 science1 are all to be applied so far as they conduce to this purpose and no farther3 they are all simply ministerial2 political science is supreme and self-determining 7i4 #b74 ,what ,political ,science is for the community1 ,ethical ,science is for the individual citizen4 ,by this it is not meant that the individual is to be abstracted from society or considered as living apart from society3 but simply that human action and human feeling is to be looked at from the point of view of the individual1 mainly and primarily--and from the point of view of the society1 only in a secondary manner3 while in political science1 the reverse is the case--our point of view is1 first as regards the society2--next1 and subordinate to that1 as regards the individual citizen 7,see ,eth4 ,nic4 vii4 #h74 ,the object of the ,ethical ,science is1 the ,supreme ,good of the individual citizen--the ,end of all ,ends1 with reference to his desires1 his actions1 and his feelings--the end which he seeks for itself and without any ulterior aim--the end which comprehends all his other ends as merely partial or instrumental and determines their comparative value in his estimation 7i4 #b1 i4 #d74 ,it is evident that this conception of an ,end of all ,ends is what ,kant would call an ,idea--nothing precisely conformable to it1 in its full extent1 can ever exist in reality4 ,no individual has ever been found1 or ever will be found1 with a mind so trained as to make every separate and particular desire subservient to some general preconceived ,end however comprehensive4 ,but it is equally certain that this subordination of ,ends one to another is a process performed to a greater or less degree in every one's mind1 even in that of the rudest savage4 ,no man can blindly and undistinguishingly follow every immediate impulse3 the impulse1 whatever it be1 when it arises1 must be considered more or less as it bears upon other pursuits and other objects of desire4 ,this is an indispensable condition even of the most imperfect form of social existence4 ,in civilized society1 we find the process carried very far indeed in the minds of the greater number of individuals4 ,every man has in his view certain leading ,ends1 such as the maintenance of his proper position in society1 the acquisition of professional success1 the making of his fortune1 the prosecution of his studies1 c41 each of which is essentially paramount and architectonic1 and with reference to which a thousand other ends are simply subordinate and ministerial4 ,suppose this process to be pushed farther1 and you arrive at the idea of an ,end still more comprehensive1 embracing every other end which the individual can aspire to1 and forming the central point of an all-comprehensive scheme of life4 ,such a maximum1 never actually attainable1 but constantly approachable1 in reality1 forms the ,object of ,ethical ,science4 ,quorsum victuri gignimur6 ,what is the ,supreme ,good--the ,end of all ,ends8 ,how are we to determine wherein it consists1 or by what means it is to be attained--at least1 as nearly attained as the limitations of human condition permit8 ,ethical ,science professes to point out what the end ought to be--,ethical precepts are suggestions for making the closest approaches to it which are practicable4 ,even to understand what the end is1 is a considerable acquisition3 since we thus know the precise point to aim at1 even if we cannot hit it 7i4 #b74 ,the approaches which different men make towards forming this idea1 of an ,end of ,ends or of a ,supreme ,good1 differ most essentially3 although there seems a verbal agreement between them4 ,every man speaks of ,happiness as his ,end of ,ends 7,greek3 o7no_/mati o7mologeitai1 i4 #d73 he wishes to live well or to do well1 which he considers to be the same as being happy4 ,but men disagree exceedingly in their opinions as to that which constitutes happiness3 nay the same man sometimes places it in one thing1 sometimes in another--in health or in riches1 according as he happens to be sick or poor4 ,there are however three grand divisions1 in one or other of which the opinions of the great majority of mankind may be distributed4 ,some think that happiness consists in a life of bodily pleasure 7,greek3 bi_/os a7polaustiko_/s73 others1 in a life of successful political action or ambition 7,greek3 bi_/os politiko_/s73 others again1 in a life of speculative study and the acquisition of knowledge 7,greek3 bi_/os thertiko_/s74 ,he will not consent to number the life of the 7,greek3 chrmatists7 money-maker among them because he attains his end at the expense of other people and by a force upon their inclinations 7this at least seems the sense of the words--,greek3 o7 gar chrmatists bi_/aio_/s ti_/s e7sti71 and because wealth can never be the good1 seeing that it is merely useful for the sake of ulterior objects4 7,the reason which ,aristotle gives for discarding from his catalogue the life of the money-seeker1 while he admits that of the pleasure-seeker and the honour-seeker1 appears a very inconclusive one4 ,he believed them to be all equally mistaken in reference to real happiness3 the two last just as much as the first3 and certainly1 if we look to prevalence in the world and number of adherents1 the creed of the first is at least equal to that of the two last47 ,the first of the three is the opinion of the mass1 countenanced by many ,sovereigns such as ,sardanapalus--it is more suitable to animals than to men1 in the judgment of ,aristotle 7i4 #e74 ,honour and glory--the reward of political ambition1 cannot be the sovereign good1 because it is a possession which the person honoured can never be sure of retaining3 for it depends more upon the persons by whom he is honoured than upon himself1 while the ideas which we form of the sovereign good suppose it to be something intimately belonging to us and hard to be withdrawn 7i4 #e74 ,moreover those who aspire to honour1 desire it not so much on its own account as in order that they may have confidence in their own virtue3 so that it seems even in their estimation as if virtue were the higher aim of the two4 ,but even virtue itself 7meaning thereby the simple possession of virtue as distinguished from the active habitual exercise of it7 cannot be the sovereign good3 for the virtuous man may pass his life in sleep or in inaction--or he may encounter intolerable suffering and calamity 7i4 #e74 ,besides1 ,happiness as we conceive it1 is an ,end perfect1 final1 comprehensive and all-sufficient--an end which we always seek on its own account and never with a view to anything ulterior4 ,but neither honour1 nor pleasure1 nor intelligence1 nor virtue1 deserves these epithets3 each is an end special1 insufficient1 and not final--for each is sought partly indeed on its own account1 but partly also on account of its tendency to promote what we suppose to be our happiness 7i4 #g74 ,the latter is the only end always sought exclusively for itself3 including as it always does and must do1 the happiness of a man's relatives1 his children and his countrymen1 or of all with whom he has sympathies2 so that if attained1 it would render his life desirable and wanting for nothing--,greek3 o7 monou_/menon1 ai7reton poiei ton bi_/on1 kai mdenos e7ndea 7i4 #g74 ,the remark which ,aristotle here makes in respect to the final aim or happiness of an individual--viz41 that it includes the happiness of his family and his countrymen and of those with whom he has sympathies--deserves careful attention4 ,it shows at once the largeness and the benevolence of his conceptions4 ,we arrive thus at the same end as that proposed by political science--the happiness of the community3 but we reach it by a different road1 starting from the point of view of the individual citizen4 ,having shown that this ,happiness1 which is our being's end and aim1 does not consist in any special acquisition such as pleasure1 or glory1 or intelligence1 or virtue1 ,aristotle adopts a different method to show wherein it does consist4 ,every artist and every professional man 7he says--i4 #g71 the painter1 the musician1 c41 has his peculiar business to do1 and the ,good of each artist consists in doing his business well and appropriately4 ,each separate portion of man1 the eye1 the hand and the foot1 has its peculiar function3 and in analogy with both these1 man as such has his business and function1 in the complete performance of which human ,good consists4 ,what is the business and peculiar function of ,man1 as ,man8 ,not simply ,life1 for that he has in common with the entire vegetable and animal world3 nor a mere sensitive ,life1 for that he has in common with all ,animals3 it must be something which he has1 apart both from plants and animals--viz41 an active life in conformity with reason 7,greek3 praktik_/ tis tou lo_/gon e7_/chontos72 or the exercise of ,reason as a directing and superintending force1 and the exercise of the appetites1 passions1 and capacities1 in a manner conformable to ,reason4 ,this is the special and peculiar business of man3 it is what every man performs either well or ill3 and the virtue of a man is that whereby he is enabled to perform it well4 ,the ,supreme ,good of humanity1 therefore1 consisting as it does in the due performance of this special business of man1 is to be found in the virtuous activity of our rational and appetitive soul3 assuming always a life of the ordinary length1 without which no degree of mental perfection would suffice to attain the object4 ,the full position will then stand thus--,happiness1 or the highest good of a human being1 consists in the working of the soul and in a course of action1 pursuant to reason and conformable to virtue1 throughout the full continuance of life4 7,the argument respecting a man's proper business 7,greek3 e7_/rgon7 and virtue 7,greek3 a7ret7 seems to be borrowed from ,plato--,republic1 i4 c4 #bc1 p4 #ceb2 c4 #bd1 p4 #cec4 ,compare also ,xenophon--,memorabilia1 iv4 #b1 #ad47 ,this explanation is delivered by ,aristotle as a mere outline1 which he seems to think that any one may easily fill up 7i4 #g74 ,and he warns us not to require a greater degree of precision than the subject admits of3 since we ought to be content with a rough approximation to the truth1 and with conclusions which are not universally true1 but only true in the majority of instances1 such being the nature of the premisses with which we deal 7i4 #c74 ,having determined in this manner what ,happiness or the ,supreme ,good consists in1 ,aristotle next shows that the explanation which he gives of it conforms in a great degree to the opinions previously delivered by eminent philosophers1 and fulfils at least all the requisite conditions which have ever been supposed to belong to ,happiness 7i4 #h74 ,all philosophers have from very early times agreed in distributing good things into three classes--,mental1 ,corporeal1 and ,external4 ,now the first of these classes is incomparably the highest and most essentially good of the three3 and the explanation which ,aristotle gives of happiness ranks it in the first class4 ,again1 various definitions of happiness have been delivered by eminent authorities more or less ancient 7,greek3 polloi kai palaioi_/74 ,eudoxus laid down the principle that happiness consists in pleasure3 others have maintained the opinion that it is entirely independent both of pleasure and pain--that the former is no good1 and the latter no evil 7i4 #ab1 vii4 #aa-ac1 x4 #a4 #b74 ,some have placed happiness in virtue3 others in prudence3 others in a certain sort of wisdom 7,greek3 sophi_/a tis73 others have added to the definition this condition1 that pleasure or external prosperity should be coupled with the above-mentioned objects 7i4 #h74 ,the moral doctrines propounded by ,zeno and ,epicurus were therefore in no way new3 how far the reasonings by which these philosophers sustained them were new we cannot judge accurately1 from the loss of the treatises of ,eudoxus and others to which ,aristotle makes reference4 ,now1 in so far as virtue is introduced1 the explanation of ,happiness given by ,aristotle coincides with these philosophers and improves upon them by substituting the active exercise of virtuous habits in place of the mere possession of virtue4 ,and in regard to pleasure1 the man who has once acquired habits of virtuous agency stands in no need of pleasure from without1 as a foreign accessory3 for he finds pleasure in his own behaviour1 and he would not be denominated virtuous unless he did so3 ,now 7he says7 their life stands in no need of pleasure1 like an extraneous appendage1 but has pleasure in itself 7ii4 #h74 ,again1 ii4 #c1 he says that the symptom of a perfect habit is the pleasure or pain which ensues upon the performance of the acts in which the habit consists3 for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and rejoices in doing so1 is temperate1 while he who does it reluctantly and painfully1 is intemperate4 ,and the man who sustains dangers with pleasure1 or at least without pain1 is courageous3 if with pain1 he is a coward4 ,for ethical virtue has reference to our pleasures and pains3 it is on account of pleasure that we commit vicious acts1 and on account of pain that we shrink from virtuous performances4 ,wherefore1 as ,plato directs1 we ought to be trained at once from our infancy by some means or other so as to feel pleasure and pain from the proper sources3 for that is the right education4 ,moreover1 the man who is in the active exercise of virtue derives his pleasure from the performance of that which is the appropriate business of humanity1 so that all his pleasures are conformable to the pleasures natural to man and therefore consistent with each other3 whereas the pleasures of most people are contradictory and inconsistent with each other1 because they are not conformable to our nature 7i4 #h74 ,it is not easy to understand perfectly what ,aristotle means by saying that the things agreeable to the majority of mankind are not things agreeable by nature4 ,the construction above put upon this expression seems the only plausible one--that those pleasures which inhere in the performance of the appropriate business of man1 are to be considered as our natural pleasures2 those which do not so inhere1 as not natural pleasures3 inasmuch as they arise out of circumstances foreign to the performance of our appropriate business4 ,this however hardly consists with the explanation which ,aristotle gives of ,greek3 to phu_/sei--in another place and with reference to another subject4 ,in the ,magna ,moralia 7i4 #cd1 pp4 #aaid-aaie ,bek471 in distinguishing between natural justice 7,greek3 to di_/kaion phu_/sei7 and conventional justice 7,greek3 to di_/kaion no_/m71 he tells us that the naturally just is that which most commonly remains just4 7,similarly ,ethic4 ,eudem4 iv4 #ad1 p4 #abag ,bek47 ,that which exists by nature 7he says7 may be changed by art and practice2 the left hand may by these means be rendered as strong as the right in particular cases1 but if in the greater number of cases and for the longer portion of time the left remains left and the right remains right1 this is to be considered as existing by nature4 ,if we are to consider that arrangement as natural which we find to prevail in the greatest number of cases and for the greatest length of time1 then undoubtedly the pleasures arising out of virtuous active behaviour must be regarded as less natural than those other pleasures which ,aristotle admits to form the enjoyment of the majority of mankind4 ,but again there is a third passage1 respecting nature and natural arrangements1 which appears scarcely reconcilable with either of the two opinions just noticed4 ,in ,eth4 ,nicom4 ii4 #a3 ,ethical virtue is a result of habit1 whence it is evident that not one of the ethical virtues exists in us by nature4 ,for none of those things which exist by nature is altered by habit4 ,for example1 the stone which naturally moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards1 not even if a man should endeavour so to habituate it by throwing it upwards ten thousand times2 nor in like manner fire downwards3 nor can any other of the things formed by nature in one way be changed by habit to any other than that natural way4 ,virtues therefore are not generated in us either by nature1 or contrary to nature2 but we are formed by nature so as to be capable of receiving them1 and we are perfected in them through the influence of habit4 ,if it be true that nothing which exists in one manner by nature can be changed by habit so as to exist in another manner1 ,i do not see how the assertion contained in the passage above cited out of the ,magna ,moralia can be reconciled with it1 where we are told--,for even things which exist by nature partake of change4 ,thus if we all should practise throwing with the left hand1 we should become ambidextrous3 but still it is the left hand by nature1 and the right hand is not the less better by nature than the left1 although we should do everything with the left as we do with the right4 7,mag4 ,mor4 i4 #cd1 ut sup47 ,in the one case he illustrates the meaning of natural properties by the comparative aptitudes of the right and left hand3 in the other by the downward tendency of the stone4 ,the idea is plainly different in the one case and in the other4 ,on the other hand1 there seems to be not less variance between the one passage quoted out of the ,nicomacheian ,ethics and the other4 ,for in the passage last quoted1 we are told that none of the ethical virtues is generated in us by nature--neither by nature1 nor contrary to nature3 nature makes us fit to receive them1 habit introduces and creates them--an observation perfectly true and accurate4 ,but if this was the sentiment of ,aristotle1 how could he also believe that the pleasures arising out of the active manifestation of ethical virtue were the natural pleasures of man8 ,if ethical virtue does not come by nature1 the pleasures belonging to it cannot come by nature either4 ,on the whole1 these three passages present a variance which ,i am unable to reconcile in the meaning which ,aristotle annexes to the very equivocal word--nature4 ,although ,aristotle tells us that the active exercise of the functions of the soul according to virtue confers happiness1 yet he admits that a certain measure of external comfort and advantages must be superadded as an indispensable auxiliary and instrument4 ,disgusting ugliness1 bad health1 low birth1 loss of friends and relatives or vicious conduct of friends and relatives1 together with many other misfortunes1 are sufficient to sully the blessed condition of the most virtuous man 7,greek3 r7upai_/nousi to maka_/rion--i4 #h7--;for which reason it is that some persons have ranked both virtue and good fortune as co-ordinate ingredients equally essential to happiness3 and have doubted also whether it can ever be acquired either by teaching1 or by training1 or by any other method except chance or ,divine inspiration4 ,to suppose that so magnificent a boon is conferred by chance1 would be an absurdity3 it is a boon not unworthy indeed of the ,divine nature to confer2 but still the magnificence of it will appear equally great and equally undeniable1 if we suppose it to be acquired by teaching or training4 ,and this is really the proper account to give of the way in which ,happiness is acquired3 for the grand and primary element in it1 is the virtuous agency of the soul1 which is undoubtedly acquired by training3 while external advantages1 though indispensable up to a certain limit1 are acquired only as secondary helps and instruments4 ,the creation of these virtuous habits among the citizens is one of the chief objects of political science and legislation3 when once acquired1 they are the most lasting and ineffaceable of all human possessions3 and as they are created by special training1 they may be imparted to every man not disqualified by some natural defect of organization1 and may thus be widely diffused throughout the community 7i4 #i74 ,this is an important property4 ,if happiness be supposed to be derived from the possession of wealth or honour or power1 it can only be possessed by a small number of persons4 ,for these three considered as objects of human desire1 are essentially comparative4 ,a man does not think himself rich1 or honoured1 or powerful1 unless he becomes so to a degree above the multitude of his companions and neighbours4 ,aristotle insists most earnestly that the only way of acquiring the character proper for happiness is by a course of early and incessant training in virtuous action4 ,moral teaching1 he says1 will do little or nothing1 unless it be preceded by1 or at least coupled with1 moral training4 ,motives must be applied sufficient to ensure performance of what is virtuous and abstinence from what is vicious1 until such a course of conduct becomes habitual1 and until a disposition is created to persevere in them4 ,it is the business of the politician and the legislator to employ their means of working upon the citizens for the purpose of enforcing this training4 ,it is not with virtue 7he says7 as it is with those faculties which we receive ready-made from nature1 as for example1 the external senses4 ,we do not acquire the faculty of sight by often seeing1 but we have it from nature and then exercise it3 whereas with regard to virtue1 we obtain our virtues by means of a previous course of virtuous action1 just as we learn other arts4 ,for those things which we must learn in order to do1 we learn by actually doing3 thus by building we become builders1 and by harping we become harpers3 by doing just and temperate and courageous actions1 we become just and temperate and courageous4 ,all legislators try1 some in a better and others in a worse manner1 to ethise 7,greek3 e7thi_/zontes7--to create habits among--the citizens for the purpose of making them good4 ,in one word habits are created by repeated action1 wherefore our actions must be determined in a suitable way1 for according as they differ1 so will our habits differ4 ,nor is the difference small whether we are ethised in one way or in another1 from our youth upwards3 the difference is very great1 or rather it is everything 7ii4 #a74 ,neither an ox1 nor a horse1 can acquire such habits1 and therefore neither of them can be called happy3 even a child cannot be called so1 except from the hope and anticipation of what he will become in future years4 ,it may appear somewhat singular that ,aristotle characterises a child as incapable of happiness1 since in common language a child when healthy and well treated is described as peculiarly happy4 ,but happiness1 as ,aristotle understands it1 is something measured more by the estimate of the judicious spectator than by the sentiment of the man in whose bosom it resides4 ,no person is entitled to be called happy1 whom the intelligent and reflective observer does not macarise 7or 9999eudmonise71 or whose condition he would not desire more or less to make his own4 ,now the life of a child1 even though replete with all the enjoyments belonging to childhood1 is not such as any person in the state of mind of a mature citizen could bring himself to accept 7i4 #aj1 x4 #c74 ,the test to which ,aristotle appeals1 either tacitly or openly1 seems always to be the judgment of the serious man 7i4 #h1 x4 #e74 ,it is no sufficient proof of happiness that the person who feels it is completely satisfied with his condition and does not desire anything beyond4 ,such self-satisfaction is indeed necessary1 but is not by itself sufficient3 it must be farther confirmed by the judgment of persons without--not of the multitude1 who are apt to judge by a wrong standard--nor of princes1 who are equally incompetent1 and who have never tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasures 7x4 #f7--;but of the virtuous and worthy1 who have arrived at the most perfect condition attainable by human beings 7x4 #e1 x4 #f1 x4 #h74 ,the different standard adopted by the many and by the more discerning few1 in estimating human happiness1 is again touched upon in ,politica1 vii4 #a4 ,it is in some respects treated more clearly and simply in this passage than in the ,ethics4 ,both the ,many and the ,few 7he says7 agree that in order to constitute ,happiness1 there must be a coincidence of the three distinct kinds of ,good things--,the ,mental--,the ,corporeal--,the ,external4 ,but with respect to the proportions in which the three ought to be intermingled1 a difference of opinion arises4 ,most persons are satisfied with a very moderate portion of mental excellence1 while they are immoderate in their desire for wealth and power 7,for of virtue they think that they have a sufficiency1 whatever be the quantity they have2 but of wealth and possessions they seek the excess without bound4--,pol4 vii4 #a74 ,on the other hand1 the opinion sanctioned by the few of a higher order of mind1 and adopted by ,aristotle1 was1 that ,happiness was possessed in a higher degree by those who were richly set forth with moral and intellectual excellence and only moderately provided with external advantages1 than by those in regard to whom the proportion was reversed 7ib474 ,the same difference of estimate1 between the few and the many1 is touched upon ,polit4 vii4 #ac1 where he says that men in general esteem external advantages to be the causes of happiness3 which is just as if they were to say that the cause why a musician played well was his lyre1 and not his proficiency in the art4 ,in this chapter of the ,politica 7vii4 #ac71 he refers to the ,ethica in a singular manner4 ,having stated that the point of first importance is1 to determine wherein happiness consists1 he proceeds to say--,we have said also in the ,ethics1 if there be any good in that treatise 7,greek3 ei7_/ ti tn lo_/gn e7kei_/nn o7_/phelos71 that it 7happiness7 is the active exertion and perfected habit of virtue4--,this is a singular expression--if there be any good in the ,ethics--it seems rather to fall in with the several passages in that treatise in which he insists upon the inherent confusion and darkness of the subject-matter4 ,the definition of what happiness really is seems to be one of the weak points of ,aristotle's treatise4 ,in a work addressed to the public1 it is impossible to avoid making the public judges of the pleasure and pain1 the happiness and unhappiness of individuals4 ,a certain measure of self-esteem on the part of the individual1 and a certain measure of esteem towards him on the part of persons without1 come thus to be regarded as absolutely essential to existence4 ,without these1 life would appear intolerable to any spectator without1 though the individual himself might be degraded enough to cling to it4 ,but these are secured by the ordinary morality of the age and of the locality4 ,the question arises as to degrees of virtue beyond the ordinary level3 ,are we sure that such higher excellence contributes to the happiness of the individual who possesses it8 ,assuming that it does so contribute1 are we certain that the accession of happiness which he thereby acquires is greater than he would have acquired by an increase of his wealth and power1 his virtue remaining still at the ordinary level8 ,these are points which ,aristotle does not establish satisfactorily1 although he professes to have done so3 nor do ,i think that they are capable of being established4 ,the only ground on which a moralist can inculcate aspirations after the higher degrees of virtue1 is1 the gain which thereby accrues to the happiness of others1 not to that of the individual himself4 ,aristotle appeals to ,god as a proof of the superiority of an internal source of happiness to an external source--vii4 #a1 using ,god as a witness who is happy and blessed1 yet not through any external good1 but through ,himself and from ,his own nature4 ,again1 vii4 #c1 ,for at leisure ,god would be happy1 and the whole universe 7,greek3 ko_/smos71 who have no external actions except such as are proper to themselves--in proof of the superiority of a life of study and speculation to a life of ambition and political activity4 ,the same argument is insisted upon in ,eth4 ,nic4 x4 #h4 ,it is to be observed that the ,greek3 ,ko_/smos as well as ,god is here cited as experiencing happiness4 ,the analogy to which ,aristotle appeals here is undoubtedly to a certain extent a just one4 ,the most perfect happiness which we can conceive--our ,idea1 to use ,kant's phrase1 of perfect happiness--is that of a being who is happy in and for his own nature1 with the least possible aid from external circumstances--a being whose nature or habits dispose him only to acts1 the simple performance of which confers happiness4 ,but is this true of the perfectly virtuous nature and habits8 ,does the simple performance of the acts to which they dispose us1 always confer happiness8 ,is not the existence of a very high standard of virtuous exigency in a man's mind1 a constant source of self-dissatisfaction1 from the difficulty of acting up to his own ideas of what is becoming and commendable8 ,that the most virtuous nature is in itself and essentially the most happy nature1 is a point highly questionable--to say the least of it3 and even if we admit the fact1 we must at the same time add that it cannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without4 ,the internal pleasures of a highly virtuous man cannot be properly appreciated by any person not of similar character4 ,so that unless a person be himself disposed to believe it1 you could find no means of proving it to him4 ,to a man not already virtuous1 you cannot bring this argument persuasively home for the purpose of inducing him to become so4 ,in regard to prudence and temperance1 indeed1 qualities in the first instance beneficial to himself1 it is clear that the more perfectly he possesses them1 the greater and more assured will be his happiness4 ,but in regard to virtuous qualities1 beneficial in the first instance to others and not to himself1 it can by no means be asserted that the person who possesses these qualities in the highest degree is happier than one who possesses them in a more moderate and ordinary degree4 ,aristotle indeed says that the being just necessarily includes the having pleasure in such behaviour3 for we do not call a man just or liberal unless he has a pleasure in justice or liberality 7,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #h74 ,but this does not refute the supposition1 that another man1 less just or liberal than he1 may enjoy greater happiness arising out of other tastes and other conduct4 ,in order to sustain the conclusion of ,aristotle respecting the superior happiness of the virtuous man1 it is necessary to assume that the pleasures of self-esteem and self-admiration are generically distinguished from other pleasures and entitled to a preference in the eyes of every right judging person4 ,and ,aristotle does seem to assume something of this nature4 ,he says--x4 #c--,or that pleasures differ in kind8 ,for the pleasures arising from the honourable are different from those arising from the base2 and it is not the case that the unjust man experiences the pleasure of the just1 or he that is unmusical that of the musician4 ,the inherent difference between various pleasures is again touched upon x4 #e--;,and since the functions differ in goodness and badness--some of them being objects of desire1 others of them to be eschewed1 and others of them neither--so is it likewise with the pleasures3 for each function has its own pleasures4 ,the pleasure then that is proper to the function of good is good1 and that which is proper to the function of bad is bad2 for the desires of things honourable are praiseworthy1 those of things base are to be blamed4 ,and the pleasures attaching to them are more proper to the functions than are the appetencies themselves4 ,in the next chapter1 in that remarkable passage where he touches upon the predilections of men in power for the society of jesters and amusing companions 7,the many have recourse to the amusements of those that are accounted happy7--,for it is not in kingly power that you find either virtue or intellect1 on which the higher functions of man depend4 ,nay1 not if princes who have never tasted the relish of pure and liberal pleasure1 have recourse to the pleasures of the body1 on which account these must be thought the more desirable4 ,for children consider those things to be best that are held in honour among themselves4 ,here we have a marked distinction drawn between the different classes of pleasures--some being characterised as good1 some bad1 some indifferent4 ,the best of all are those which the virtuous man enjoys1 and which he considers the best3 the pleasures inseparably annexed to virtuous agency4 ,these pleasures are thus assumed to be of a purer and more exalted character1 and to deserve a decided preference over every other class of pleasures4 ,and if this be assumed1 the superior happiness of the virtuous man follows as a matter of course4 ,i should observe that ,aristotle considers happiness to consist in the exercise of the faculties agreeably to virtue 7,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia kat' a7retn7--the pleasure 7,greek3 7don7 is something different from the exercise 7,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia7--inseparably attending it1 indeed1 yet not the same--conjoined with the functions 7,greek3 e7nergei_/ais71 and the two are so inseparable as to raise a question whether the function is not identical with the pleasure 7x4 #e74 ,and he says1 x4 #g--,we think that pleasure should be mixed up 7,greek3 paramemi_/chthai7 with happiness4 ,it seems to be in the sense of self-esteem1 which constitutes the distinctive mark of virtuous agency1 that ,aristotle supposes happiness to consist3 the pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable concomitant1 but yet not the same4 ,the self-esteem is doubtless often felt in cases where a man is performing a painful duty--where the sum total of feelings accompanying the performance of the act is the very reverse of pleasurable4 ,but still the self-esteem1 or testimony of an approving conscience1 is per se always pleasurable1 and is in fact the essential pleasure inherent in virtuous behaviour4 ,i do not see the propriety of the distinction here taken by ,aristotle4 ,he puts it somewhat differently1 ,polit4 vii4 #a--,living happily consists either in joy or in virtue to men1 or in both4 ,and ,polit4 viii4 #e--;,for happiness is a compound of both these 7honour and pleasure74 ,so ,polit4 viii4 #c4 ,happiness 7again he says--,polit4 vii4 #ac1 p4 #ddj ,e4 p4 #bhf7 consists in the perfect employment and active exercise of virtue3 and that absolutely 7or under the most favourable external conditions7--not under limitation 7,greek3 e7x u7pothe_/ses7 or subject to very trying and difficult circumstances4 ,for a man of virtue may be so uncomfortably placed that he has no course open to him except a choice of evils1 and can do nothing but make the best of a bad position4 ,such a man will conduct himself under the pressure of want or misfortune as well as his case admits3 but happiness is out of his reach4 7,compare ,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #aj47 ,to be happy1 it is necessary that he should be so placed as to be capable of aspiring to the accomplishment of positive good and advantage--he must be admitted to contend for the great prizes1 and to undertake actions which lead to new honours and to benefits previously unenjoyed3 he must be relieved from the necessity of struggling against overwhelming calamities4 ,aristotle tells us in the beginning of the ,ethics 7,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #c7--;,but there is so much difference of opinion and so much error respecting what is honourable and just1 of which political science treats1 that these properties of human action seem to exist merely by positive legal appointment1 and not by nature4 ,and there is the same sort of error respecting what things are good4 ,if there be this widespread error and dissension among mankind with respect to the determining of what is good and just1 what standard has ,aristotle established for the purpose of correcting it8 ,i do not find that he has established any standard1 nor even that he has thought it necessary to make the attempt4 ,there are indeed a great number of observations1 and many most admirable observations in his ,treatise1 on the various branches of ,virtue and ,vice3 many which tend to conduct the mind of the reader unconsciously to the proper standard3 but no distinct announcement of any general principle1 whereby a dispute between two dissentient moralists may be settled4 ,when he places virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess on one side and defect on the other1 this middle point is not in any way marked or discoverable3 it is a point not fixed1 but variable according to the position of the individual agent1 and is to be determinable in every case by right reason and according to the judgment of the prudent man--in the mean with reference to ourselves1 as it has been determined by reason1 and as the prudent man 7,greek3 o7 phro_/nimos7 would determine it 7,eth4 ,nic4 ii4 #f74 ,but though the decision is thus vested in the prudent man1 no mention is made of the principle which the appointed arbiter would follow in delivering his judgment1 assuming a dispute to arise4 ,in a previous part of ,chapter ,,ii41 he defines the mean with reference to ourselves to be that which neither exceeds1 nor falls short of1 the rule of propriety 7,greek3 tou de_/ontos74 ,but this is not one1 nor is it the same to all4 ,to render this definition sufficient and satisfactory1 ,aristotle ought to have pointed out to us how we are to find out that rule of propriety 7,greek3 to de_/on7 which marks and constitutes the medium point1 of actions and affections1 in relation to ourselves--this medium point being in his opinion virtue4 ,to explain what is meant by a medium in relation to ourselves1 by the words ,greek3 to de_/on1 the rule of propriety1 is only a change of language1 without any additional information4 ,thus the capital problem of moral philosophy still remains unsolved4 ,it is remarkable that ,aristotle in some parts of his treatise states very distinctly what this problem is1 and what are the points essential to its solution3 he speaks as if he were fully aware of that which was wanting to his own treatise1 and as if he were preparing to supply the defect3 but still the promise is never realized4 ,take for example the beginning of ,book ,,vi4 ,eth4 ,nic4 ,since it has been already laid down1 that we ought to choose the middle point and not either the excess or the defect--and since the middle point is that which right reason determines--let us distinguish what that is4 ,for in all the mental habits which have been described1 as well as in all others also1 there is a certain aim1 by a reference to which the rational being is guided either in relaxing or in restricting3 and there is a certain definite boundary of those medial points1 which we affirm to exist between excess and defect1 determinable according to right reason4 ,to speak thus1 however1 is indeed correct enough1 but it gives no distinct information 7,greek3 ou7then de saphe_/s73 for in all other modes of proceeding which are governed by scientific principles it is quite just to say that you ought neither to work nor to rest more than is sufficient nor less than is sufficient1 but to a degree midway between the two and agreeably to right reason4 ,but a man who has only this information would be no wiser than he was before it1 any more than he would know what things he ought to apply to his body1 by being simply told that he must apply such things as medical science and as the medical practitioner directed4 ,wherefore1 with respect also to the habits of the soul we must not be content with merely giving a general statement in correct language1 but we must farther discriminate what right reason is1 and what is its definition4 ,this is a very clear and candid statement of the grand and fundamental defect in ,aristotle's theory of ,ethics4 ,he says very truly that there is a certain end and aim 7,greek3 sko_/pos71 to which a rational being has reference when he either restricts or relaxes any disposition4 ,it was incumbent on ,aristotle to explain what this ,greek3 sko_/pos was2 but this he never does1 though he seems so clearly to have felt the want of it4 ,we might have supposed that after he had pointed out what was required to impart specific meaning to correct but vague generalities1 he would have proceeded at once to fill up the acknowledged chasm in his theory3 but instead of this1 he enters into an analysis of the intellect1 speculative and practical1 and explains the varieties of intellectual1 as contradistinguished from moral1 excellence4 ,this part of his work is highly valuable and instructive3 but ,i cannot find that he ever again touches upon the ,greek3 sko_/pos1 which had been admitted to be as yet undetermined4 ,in a certain sense1 it is indeed true that he endeavours to discriminate what right reason is1 and what is its definition3 for he classifies the intellectual functions into intellect 7,greek3 nous71 science 7,greek3 e7pist_/m71 wisdom 7,greek3 sophi_/a71 art 7,greek3 te_/chn71 prudence 7,greek3 phro_/nsis73 he states the general nature of each of these attributes1 and the range of subjects to which it applies4 ,he tells us that intellect and prudence have reference to human conduct--that prudence is concerned with things just and honourable and good for man 7vii4 #ab7--with the things of man1 and those things regarding which we deliberate 7vii4 #g7--prudence must needs be a true habit according to reason1 concerned with the good of man 7vii4 #e74 ,in explaining what prudence is1 he tells us that it is according to reason3 in explaining what is right reason1 he tells us that it is according to prudence4 ,he thus seems to make use of each as a part of the definition of the other4 ,but however this may be1 certain it is that he never fulfils the expectation held out in the beginning of the ,sixth ,book1 nor ever clears up the ,greek3 ou7den saphes there acknowledged4 ,there is one sentence at the beginning of vi4 #e1 which looks as if it conveyed additional information upon the difficulty in question--,now it seems to belong to the prudent man to be able to deliberate aright concerning the things that are good and profitable to himself--not in part1 as concerning the things that have a reference to health or strength--but concerning the things that refer to the whole of living well 7,greek3 pros to eu7 zn74 ,but this in point of fact explains nothing4 ,for living well is the same as happiness3 happiness is the active exercise of the soul according to virtue3 therefore virtue must be known1 before we can know what living well is4 ,i think that this ,greek3 sko_/pos or end1 which ,aristotle alludes to in the beginning of the ,sixth ,book as not having been yet made clear1 appears to be more distinctly brought out in a previous passage than it is in any portion of the ,treatise after the beginning of the ,sixth ,book4 ,in ,book ,,iv4 #f1 ,aristotle treats of the virtues and defects connected with behaviour in social intercourse3 the obsequious at one extreme1 the peevish or quarrelsome at the other3 and the becoming medium1 though it had no special name1 which lay between them4 ,speaking of the person who adopts this becoming medium1 he says--,we have said generally1 then1 that he will associate with people as he ought2 and having1 moreover1 a constant reference to what is honourable and what is expedient1 he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure4 ,again in regard to ,temperance--iii4 #aa--;he states the ,greek3 sko_/pos of the temperate man--,what things have a reference to health or vigour1 and are agreeable1 these he desires in measure and as he ought2 as well as the other agreeable things that are not opposed to these1 either as being contrary to what is honourable or as being beyond his fortune4 ,for he that desires things agreeable1 which yet are contrary to what is honourable or beyond his fortune1 loves these pleasures more than they are worth4 ,but not so with the temperate man who lives according to right reason4 ,these passages are not very distinct1 as an explanation of the proper ,greek3 sko_/pos3 but ,i cannot find any passages after the beginning of the ,sixth ,book which are more distinct than they3 or perhaps1 equally distinct4 ,in one passage of the ,seventh ,book1 ,aristotle refers1 though somewhat obscurely1 to the average degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of mankind as the standard to be consulted when we pronounce upon excess or defect 7vii4 #g74 ,aristotle seems in some passages to indicate pleasure and pain as the end with reference to which actions or dispositions are denominated good and evil4 ,he says--vii4 #aa--,to theorise respecting pleasure and pain1 is the business of the political philosopher3 for he is the architect of that end with reference to which we call each matter either absolutely good or absolutely evil4 ,moreover1 it is indispensable to institute an enquiry respecting them3 for we have explained ethical virtue and vice as referring to pleasures and pains3 and most people affirm happiness to be coupled with pleasure3 for which reason they have named ,greek3 to maka_/rion a7po tou chai_/rein4 ,in ,book ,,viii4 #i-aj1 the ,greek3 sko_/pos is indeed stated very clearly1 but not as such--not as if ,aristotle intended to make it serve as such1 or thought that it ought to form the basis upon which our estimate of what is the proper middle point should be found4 ,in viii4 #i-aj1 he tells us that all justice and benevolence 7,greek3 to di_/kaion kai 7 phili_/a7 is a consequence and an incident of established communion among human beings 7,greek3 koinni_/a7--that the grand communion of all1 which comprehends all the rest1 is the ,political ,communion--that the end and object of the ,political ,communion1 as well that for which it was originally created as that for which it subsists and continues1 is the common and lasting advantage 7,greek3 to koin su_/mpheron7--that all other communions1 of relations1 friends1 fellow-soldiers1 neighbours1 c41 are portions of the all-comprehensive political communion1 and aim at realizing some partial advantage to the constituent members4 ,these chapters are very clear and very important1 and they announce plainly enough the common and lasting interest as the foundation and measure of justice as well as of benevolence4 ,but they do not apply the same measure1 to the qualities which had been enumerated in the ,books prior to the ,sixth1 as a means of ascertaining where the middle point is to be found which is alleged to constitute virtue4 ,nevertheless1 ,aristotle tells us that it is in the highest degree difficult to find the middle point which constitutes virtue 7ii4 #i74 ,it might seem at first sight not easy for ,aristotle1 consistently with the plan of his treatise1 to point out any such standard or measure4 ,for none can be mentioned1 with any tolerable pretensions to admissibility1 except that of tendency to promote happiness--the happiness both of the individual agent and of the society to which he belongs4 ,but as he had begun by introducing the ideas of reason and virtue as media for explaining what happiness was1 there would have been at least an apparent incongruity in reverting back to the latter as a means of clearing up what was obscure in the former4 ,i say--at least an apparent incongruity--because after all the incongruity is more apparent than real4 ,if we carefully preserve the distinction between the happiness of the individual agent and the happiness of the ,society to which he belongs1 it will appear that ,aristotle might without any inconsistency have specified the latter as being the object to which reason has regard1 in regulating and controlling the various affections of each individual4 ,wherein consists the happiness of an individual man8 ,in a course of active exertion of the soul conformably to virtue3 virtue being understood to consist in a certain mediocrity of our various affections as determined by right reason4 ,when we next enquire1 to what standard does right reason look in making this determination8 it may without inconsistency be answered--,right reason determines the proper point of mediocrity by a reference to happiness generally--that is1 to the happiness of society at large1 including that of the individual agent in question--in other words1 to the common and lasting advantage1 which ,aristotle describes as the grand object of the statesman4 ,there is no inconsistency in reverting to happiness1 thus explained1 as the standard by which right reason judges in controlling our different affections4 ,in all moral enquiries1 it is of the greatest importance to keep in view the happiness of the individual1 and the happiness of the society at large1 as two distinct and separate objects--which coincide indeed ,greek3 7s e7pi to polu_/1 in the majority of instances and with regard to the majority of individuals--but which do not coincide necessarily and universally1 nor with regard to every individual4 ,a particular man may be placed in such a position1 or animated with such feelings1 that his happiness may be promoted by doing what is contrary to the happiness of the society4 ,he will under these circumstances do what is good for himself but bad for others3 he will do what is morally wrong1 and will incur the blame of society4 ,in speaking of good and evil it is always necessary to keep in mind1 that what is good for an individual may be bad for the society3 ,i mean1 understanding the words good for an individual in the most comprehensive sense1 as including all that he has to suffer from the unfavourable sentiments of society4 ,much confusion has arisen from moralists speaking of good and evil absolutely1 without specifying whether they meant good for the individual or for the society3 more particularly in the writings of the ancient philosophers4 ,from the manner in which ,aristotle arrives at his definition of what constitutes happiness1 we might almost suppose that he would have been led to the indication of the happiness of society at large as the standard for right reason to appeal to4 ,for in examining what is the proper business of man in general1 he has recourse to the analogy of the various particular arts and professions--the piper1 the statuary1 the carpenter1 the carrier1 c4 ,each has his particular business and walk of action1 and in the performance of that business consists the good and the well in his case 7i4 #g74 ,so in like manner there is a special business for man in general1 in the performance of which we are to seek human good4 ,now this analogy of particular artists and professional men might have conducted ,aristotle to the idea of the general happiness of society as a standard4 ,for the business of every artist or artisan consists in conducing to the comfort1 the protection1 or the gratification of the public1 each in his particular walk3 professional excellence for them consists in accomplishing this object perfectly4 ,for every special profession therefore the happiness of society at large1 under one form or another1 is introduced as the standard by which good and excellence are to be measured4 ,apply this analogy to man in general1 taken apart from any particular craft or profession4 ,if each man1 considered simply as such1 has his appropriate business1 in the good performance of which happiness for him consists1 the standard of excellence in respect to such 9999performance is to be found in its conduciveness to the happiness of society at large4 ,it can be found nowhere else1 if we are to judge according to the analogy of special arts and professions4 ,until this want of a standard or measure is supplied1 it is clear that the treatise of ,aristotle is defective in a most essential point--a defect which is here admitted by himself in the first chapter of the ,sixth ,book4 ,nor is there any other way of supplying what is wanting except by reference to the general happiness of society1 the end and object 7as he himself tells us7 of the statesman4 ,what then1 says ,aristotle1 prevents our calling him happy who is in the active exercise of his soul agreeably to perfect virtue1 and is sufficiently well furnished with external goods1 not for a casual period but for a complete lifetime8 7i4 #aj74 ,he thinks himself obliged to add1 however1 that this is not quite sufficient--for that after death a man will still be affected with sympathy for the good or bad fortunes and conduct of his surviving relatives1 affected however faintly and slightly1 so as not to deprive him of the title to be called happy1 if on other grounds he deserves it4 ,the deceased person sees the misfortunes of his surviving friends with something of the same kind of sympathetic interest1 though less in degree1 as is felt by a living person in following the representation of a tragedy 7i4 #aa74 ,the difference between a misfortune1 happening during a man's life or after his death1 is much greater than that between scenic representation of past calamities and actual reality 7ib474 ,it seems as if ,aristotle was reluctantly obliged to make this admission--that deceased persons were at all concerned in the calamities of the living--more in deference to the opinions of others than in consequence of any conviction of his own4 ,his language in the two chapters wherein he treats of it is more than usually hesitating and undecided3 and in the beginning of ,chapter ,,xi41 he says--,to have no interest whatever in the fortunes of their descendants and friends1 seems exceedingly heartless and contrary to what we should expect--he then1 farther on1 states it to be a great matter of doubt whether the dead experience either good or evil--but if anything of the kind does penetrate to them1 it must be feeble and insignificant1 so as to make no sensible difference to them4 ,,ii4 ,aristotle distributes good things into three classes--the admirable or worshipful--the praiseworthy--the potential4 #a4 ,good--as an ,end3 that which is worthy of being honoured and venerated in itself and from its own nature1 without regard to anything ulterior3 that which comes up to our idea of perfection4 #b4 ,good--as a means3 that which is good1 not on its own account nor in its own nature1 but on account of certain ulterior consequences which flow from it4 #c4 ,good--as a means1 but not a certain and constant means3 that which produces generally1 but not always1 ulterior consequences finally good3 that which1 in order to produce consequences in themselves good1 requires to be coupled with certain concomitant conditions4 #a4 ,happiness belongs to the first of these classes3 it is put along with the divine1 the better1 soul1 intellect1 the more ancient1 the principle1 the cause1 c4 7,mag4 ,moral4 i4 #b74 ,such objects as these1 we contemplate with awe and reverence4 #b4 ,virtue belongs to the second of the classes3 it is good from the acts to which it gives birth1 and from the end 7happiness7 which those acts1 when sufficiently long continued1 tend to produce4 #c4 ,wealth1 power1 beauty1 strength1 c41 belong to the third class3 these are generally good because under most circumstances they tend to produce happiness3 but they may be quite otherwise1 if a man's mind be so defectively trained as to dispose him to abuse them4 ,it is remarkable that this classification is not formally laid down and explained1 but is assumed as already well known and familiar1 in the ,nicom4 ,ethics1 i4 #ab3 whereas it is formally stated and explained in the ,magna ,moralia1 i4 #b4 ,praise1 according to ,aristotle1 does not belong to the best things1 but only to the second-best4 ,the ,gods are to be macarised1 not praised3 the praise of the ,gods must have reference to ourselves1 and must be taken in comparison with ourselves and our acts and capacities3 and this is ridiculously degrading1 when we apply it to the majesty of the ,gods4 ,in like manner the most divine and perfect men deserve to be macarised rather than praised4 ,no man praises happiness1 as he praises justice1 but macarises 7blesses7 it as something more divine and better4 ,happiness is to be numbered amongst the perfect and worshipful objects--it is the ,greek3 a7rch for the sake of which all of us do everything3 and we consider the principle and the cause of all good things to be something divine and venerable 7i4 #ab74 ,since then ,happiness is the action of the soul conformably to perfect virtue1 it is necessary to examine what human virtue is3 and this is the most essential mark to which the true politician will direct his attention 7i4 #ac74 ,there are two parts of the soul--the rational and the irrational4 ,whether these two are divisible in fact1 like the parts of the body1 or whether they are inseparable in fact1 and merely susceptible of being separately dealt with in reasoning1 like the concavity and convexity of a circle1 is a matter not necessary to be examined in the present treatise4 ,aristotle speaks as if he considered this as really a doubtful point4 ,of the irrational soul1 one branch is1 the nutritive and vegetative faculty1 common to man with animals and plants4 ,the virtue of this faculty is not special to man1 but common to the vegetable and animal world3 it is in fact most energetic during sleep1 at the period when all virtue special to man is for the time dormant 7i4 #ac74 ,but the irrational soul has also another branch1 the appetites1 desires1 and passions3 which are quite distinct from reason1 but may either resist reason1 or obey it1 as the case may happen4 ,it may thus in a certain sense be said to partake of reason1 which the vegetative and nutritive faculty does not in any way4 ,the virtue of this department of the soul consists in its due obedience to reason1 as to the voice of a parent 7i4 #ac74 ,human virtue1 then1 distributes itself into two grand divisions--#a4 ,the virtue of the rational soul1 or ,intellectual ,virtue4 #b4 ,the virtue of the semi-rational soul1 or ,ethical ,virtue4 ,perhaps the word ,excellence more exactly corresponds to ,greek3 a7ret1 than ,virtue4 ,intellectual excellence is both generated and augmented by teaching and experience4 ,ethical excellence by practical training4 ,the excellence is not natural to us3 but we are susceptible of being trained1 and the training creates it4 ,by training1 according as it is either good or bad1 all excellence is either created or destroyed3 just as a man becomes a good or a bad musician1 according as he has been subjected to a good or a bad mode of practice4 ,it is by doing the same thing many times that we acquire at last the habit of doing it--,for what things we have to learn to do1 these we learn by doing 7ii4 #a73 according as the things we are trained to do are good or bad1 we acquire good habits or bad habits4 ,by building we become builders1 by playing on the harp we become harpers--good or indifferent1 according to the way in which we have practised4 ,all legislators wish and attempt to make their citizens good1 by means of certain habits3 some succeed in the attempt1 others fail3 and this is the difference between a good and a bad government4 ,it is by being trained to do acts of justice and courage that we become at last just and courageous--,in one word1 habits are generated by 7a succession of7 like operations3 for this reason it is the character of the operations performed which we ought chiefly to attend to3 for according to the difference of these will be the habits which ensue4 ,it is therefore not a matter of slight difference whether immediately from our earliest years we are ethised in one way or in another--it makes a prodigious difference--or rather1 it makes the whole difference 7ii4 #a74 ,uniform perseverance in action1 then1 creates a habit3 but of what nature is the required action to be8 ,in every department of our nature1 where any good result is to be produced1 we may be disappointed of our result by two sorts of error3 either an excess or on the side of defect4 ,to work or eat too much1 or too little1 prevents the good effects of training upon the health and strength3 so with regard to temperance1 courage and the other virtues--the man who is trained to fear everything and the man who is trained to fear nothing1 will alike fail in acquiring the genuine habit of courage4 ,the acquisition of the habit makes the performance of the action easy3 by a course of abstinent acts1 we acquire the habit of temperance3 and having acquired this habit1 we can with the greater ease perform the act of abstinence 7ii4 #b74 ,the symptom which indicates that the habit has been perfectly acquired1 is the facility or satisfaction with which the act comes to be performed 7ii4 #c74 ,the man who abstains from bodily pleasures1 and who performs this contentedly 7,greek3 au7t tou_/t chai_/rn71 is the temperate man3 the man who does the same thing but reluctantly and with vexation 7,greek3 a7chtho_/nimos7 is intemperate3 the like with courage4 ,ethical excellence1 or ethical badness1 has reference to our pleasures and pains3 whenever we do any thing mean1 or shrink from any thing honourable1 it is some pleasure or some pain which determines our conduct3 for which reason ,plato rightly prescribes that the young shall be educated even from the earliest moment so as to give a proper direction to their pleasures and pains 7ii4 #c74 ,by often pursuing pleasure and pain under circumstances in which we ought not to do so1 we contract bad habits1 by a law similar to that which under a good education would have imparted to us good habits4 ,ethical virtue then consists in such a disposition of our pleasures and pains as leads to performance of the best actions4 ,some persons have defined it to consist in apathy and imperturbability of mind3 but this definition is erroneous3 the mind ought to be affected under proper circumstances 7ii4 #c74 7,this seems to be the same doctrine which was afterwards preached by the ,stoic school47 ,there are three ingredients which determine our choice1 the honourable--the expedient--the agreeable3 and as many which occasion our rejection--the base--the inexpedient--the painful or vexatious4 ,in respect to all these three the good man judges rightly1 the wicked man wrongly1 and especially in regard to the latter4 ,pleasure and pain are familiar to us from our earliest childhood1 and are ineffaceable from human nature3 all men measure and classify actions 7,greek3 kanoni_/zomen tas pra_/xeis7 by pleasure and pain3 some men to a greater degree1 others to a less degree4 ,all ethical excellence1 and all the political science1 turns upon pleasure and pain 7ii4 #c74 ,a man becomes just and temperate by doing just and temperate actions1 thus by degrees acquiring the habit4 ,but how 7it is asked7 can this be true8 for if a man performs just and temperate actions1 he must already start by being just and temperate4 ,the objection is not well founded4 ,a man may do just and temperate actions1 and yet not be just and temperate4 ,if he does them1 knowing what he does1 intending what he does1 and intending to do the acts for their own sake1 then indeed he is just and temperate1 but not otherwise4 ,the productions of art carry their own merit along with them3 a work of art is excellent or defective1 whatever be the state of mind of the person who has executed it4 ,but the acts of a man cannot be said to be justly or temperately done1 unless there be a certain state of mind accompanying their performance by the doer3 they may indeed be called just and temperate acts1 meaning thereby that they are such as a just and temperate man would do1 but the man who does them does not necessarily deserve these epithets4 ,it is only by frequent doing of acts of this class that a man can acquire the habit of performing them intentionally and for themselves1 in which consists the just and temperate character4 ,to know what such acts are1 is little or nothing3 you must obey the precepts1 just as you follow the prescriptions of a physician4 ,many men think erroneously that philosophy will teach them to be virtuous1 without any course of action adopted by themselves 7ii4 #d74 ,aristotle classifies the phenomena of the soul 7the non-rational soul7 into three--,passions--,capacities or ,faculties--,states4 ,the first are the occasional affections--anger1 fear1 envy1 joy1 aversion--in short1 everything that is accompanied by pleasure or pain 7ii4 #e74 ,the second are1 the capacities of being moved by such affections--the affective faculties1 if one may so call them 7ib4 ,so ,eth4 ,eudem4 ii4 #b74 ,the third are1 those habits according to which we are said to be well or ill disposed towards this or that particular affection3 to be disposed to violent anger or violent fear1 is a bad habit4 ,virtues and vices are neither affections1 nor faculties1 but habits1 either good or bad4 ,this is the genus to which the virtues belong 7,greek3 t ge_/nei--,eth4 ,nic4 ii4 #e74 ,virtue is that habit from the possession of which a man is called good1 and by which he performs well his appropriate function 7ii4 #f74 ,it consists in a certain medium between two extremes1 the one of excess1 the other of defect--a medium not positive and absolute1 but variable and having reference to each particular person and each particular case--neither exceeding nor falling short of what is proper 7ii4 #f74 ,all ethical virtue aims at the attainment of this middle point in respect to our affections and actions--to exhibit each on the proper occasions1 in the proper degree1 towards the proper persons1 c4 ,this middle point is but one1 but errors on both sides of it are numberless3 it must be determined by reason and by the judgment of the prudent man 7ii4 #f74 ,virtue therefore1 according to its essence and generic definition 7,greek3 kata men tn ousi_/an1 kai ton lo_/gon ton ti_/ 7n ei7nai le_/gonta71 is a certain mediocrity4 ,but there are some actions and some affections which do not admit of mediocrity1 and which imply at once in their names evil and culpability 7ii4 #f7--such as impudence1 envy1 theft1 c4 ,each of these names implies in its meaning a certain excess and defect1 and does not admit of mediocrity3 just as temperance and courage imply in their meaning the idea of mediocrity1 and exclude both excess and defect4 ,aristotle then proceeds to apply his general doctrine--that virtue or excellence consists in a medium between two extremes1 both defects--to various different virtues4 ,he again insists upon the extreme difficulty of determining where this requisite medium is1 in each individual instance3 either excess or defect is the easy and natural course4 ,in finding and adhering to the middle point consists the well1 the rare1 the praiseworthy1 the honourable 7ii4 #i74 ,the extremes1 though both wrong1 are not always equally wrong3 that which is the most wrong ought at any rate to be avoided3 and we ought to be specially on our guard against the seductions of pleasure 7ib471 since our natural inclinations carry us in that direction4 ,aristotle so often speaks of the propriety of following nature1 and produces nature so constantly as an authority and an arbiter1 that it seems surprising to find him saying--,we must be on our guard with reference to the things whereto we ourselves are prone4 ,for some of us are by nature disposed towards some things1 others towards others4--,but we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction 7ii4 #i74 ,there is a singular passage in the same chapter with respect to our moral judgments4 ,after having forcibly insisted on the extreme difficulty of hitting the proper medium point of virtue1 he says that a man who commits only small errors on one side or on the other side of this point1 is not censured1 but only he who greatly deviates from it--he then proceeds--,but it is not easy to define in general language at what point a man becomes deserving of censure3 nor indeed is it easy to do this with regard to any other matter of perception4 ,questions of this sort depend upon the circumstances of the particular case1 and the judgment upon each resides in our perception 7ii4 #i74 ,the first five chapters1 of the third ,book of the ,ethics1 are devoted to an examination of various notions involved in our ideas of virtue and vice--,voluntary and ,involuntary--,greek3 e7kou_/sion kai a7kou_/sion--,ignorance--,greek3 a7_/gnoia--,choice or resolution1 consequent upon previous deliberation--,greek3 proai_/resis4 ,those actions are involuntary1 which are done either by compulsion1 or through ignorance4 ,an action is done by compulsion when the proximate cause of it 7or beginning--,greek3 a7rch7 is something foreign to the will of the agent--the agent himself neither concurring nor contributing4 ,actions done from the fear of greater evils are of a mixed character1 as where a navigator in a storm throws his goods overboard to preserve the ship4 ,such actions as this1 taken as a class1 and apart from particular circumstances1 are what no one would do voluntarily3 but in the particular circumstances of the supposed case1 the action is done voluntarily4 ,every action is voluntary1 wherein the beginning of organic motion is1 the will of the agent 7iii4 #a74 ,men are praised if under such painful circumstances they make a right choice--if they voluntarily undergo what is painful or dishonourable for the purpose of accomplishing some great and glorious result 7ib473 they are censured1 if they shrink from this course1 or if they submit to the evil without some sufficient end4 ,if a man is induced to do what is unbecoming by the threat of evils surpassing human endurance1 he is spoken of with forbearance3 though there are some crimes of such magnitude as cannot be excused even by the greatest possible apprehension of evil1 such as death and torture4 ,in such trying circumstances1 it is difficult to make a right choice1 and still more difficult to adhere to the choice when it is made4 ,what is done through ignorance1 can never be said to be done voluntarily3 if the agent shall be afterwards grieved and repentant for what he has done1 it is involuntary4 ,if he be not repentant1 though he cannot be said to have done the deed voluntarily1 yet neither ought it to be called involuntary4 ,a distinction however is to be taken in regard to ignorance1 considered as a ground for calling the action involuntary1 and for excusing the agent4 ,a man drunk or in a violent passion1 misbehaves1 ignorantly but not through ignorance3 that is1 ignorance is not the cause of his misbehaviour1 but drunkenness or rage4 ,in like manner1 every depraved person may be ignorant of his true interest1 or the rule which he ought to follow1 but this sort of ignorance does not render his behaviour involuntary1 nor entitle him to any indulgence4 ,it must be ignorance with regard to some particular circumstance connected with the special action which he is committing--ignorance of the person with whom1 or the instrument with which1 or the subject matter in regard to which he is dealing4 ,ignorance of this special kind1 if it be accompanied with subsequent sorrow and repentance1 constitutes an action involuntary1 and forms a reasonable ground for indulgence 79999iii4 #a74 ,a voluntary action1 then1 is that of which the beginning is in the agent--he knowing the particular circumstances under which he is acting4 ,some persons have treated actions1 performed through passion or through desire1 as involuntary2 but this is an error4 ,if this were true1 neither children nor animals would be capable of voluntary action4 ,besides1 it is proper1 on some occasions1 to follow the dictates both of anger and of desire3 and we cannot be said to act involuntarily in these cases when we do exactly what we ought to do4 ,moreover sins from passions and sins from bad reasoning are alike voluntary or alike involuntary3 both of them ought to be avoided3 and the nonrational affections are just as much a part of human nature as reason is 79999iii4 #a74 ,having explained the proper meaning of voluntary and involuntary as applied to actions1 ,aristotle proceeds to define ,greek3 proai_/resis 7deliberate choice72 which is most intimately connected with excellence1 and which indeed affords a better test of disposition than actions themselves can do 79999iii4 #b74 ,all premeditated choice is voluntary1 but all voluntary action is not preconcerted4 ,children and animals are capable of voluntary action1 but not of preconcerted action3 sudden deeds1 too1 are voluntary1 but not preconcerted4 ,premeditated choice is different from desire--from passion--from wishing--and from opinion4 ,desire and passion are common to animals1 who are nevertheless incapable of deliberate preference4 ,the incontinent man acts from desire1 but not from deliberate preference3 the continent man acts from deliberate preference1 but not from desire4 ,nor is premeditated choice the same as wishing3 for we often wish for what is notoriously impracticable or unattainable1 but we do not deliberately prefer any such thing3 moreover we wish for the end1 but we deliberately choose the means conducting to the end4 ,we wish to be happy3 but it cannot with propriety be said that we deliberately choose to be happy4 ,deliberate choice has reference to what it is or seems in our own power to achieve4 ,again1 deliberate choice is not to be regarded as a simple modification of opinion4 ,opinions extend to everything3 deliberate choice belongs exclusively to matters within our grasp4 ,opinion is either true or false3 deliberate choice is either good or evil4 ,we are good or bad1 according to the turn which our deliberate choice takes3 not according to our opinions4 ,we deliberately choose to seek something or to avoid something1 and our choice is praised when it falls upon what is proper3 the points upon which we form an opinion are1 what such or such a thing is1 whom it will benefit1 and how3 and our opinion is praised when it happens to be true4 ,it often occurs1 too1 that men who form the truest opinions are not the best in their deliberate preferences4 ,opinion may precede or accompany every deliberate choice1 but still the latter is something distinct in itself4 ,it is in fact a determination of the will1 preceded by deliberate counsel1 and thus including or presupposing the employment of reason 79999iii4 #b74 ,it is an appetency1 determined by previous counsel1 of some matter within our means1 either really or seemingly1 to accomplish--,greek3 bouleutik o7_/rexis tn e7ph' 7min 79999iii4 #c74 ,it seems from the language of ,aristotle that the various explanations of ,greek3 ,proai_/resis which he has canvassed and shown to be inadmissible1 had all been advanced by various contemporary philosophers4 ,greek3 ,proai_/resis1 or deliberate preference1 includes the idea of deliberation4 ,a reasonable man does not deliberate upon all matters--he does not deliberate respecting mathematical or physical truths1 or respecting natural events altogether out of his reach1 or respecting matters of pure accident1 or even respecting matters of human design carried on by distant foreign nations4 ,he only deliberates respecting matters which are more or less within his own agency and control3 respecting matters which are not certain1 but of doubtful issue4 ,he does not deliberate about the end1 but about the means towards the end3 the end itself is commonly assumed1 just as the physician assumes the necessity of establishing good health and the orator that of persuading his hearers4 ,if there be more than one way of accomplishing the end1 he deliberates by which out of these several means he can achieve it best and most easily3 proceeding from the end itself first to the proximate cause of that end1 then to the cause immediately preceding that cause1 and so backwards until he arrives at the primary cause1 which is either an action of his own1 within his own means1 or something requiring implements and assistance beyond his power to procure4 ,this is a process of analysis1 similar to that which is pursued by geometricians in seeking the way of solving a problem3 they assume the figure with the required conditions to be constructed3 they then take it to pieces1 following back the consequences of each separate condition which it has been assumed to possess4 ,if by this way of proceeding they arrive at some known truth1 their problem is solved2 if they arrive at some known untruth1 the problem is insoluble4 ,that step which is last arrived at in the analysis1 is the first in the order of production 7iii4 #c74 ,when a man in carrying back mentally this deliberative analysis arrives at something manifestly impracticable1 he desists from farther deliberation3 if he arrives at something within his power to perform1 he begins action accordingly4 ,the subject of deliberation1 and the subject of deliberate preference1 are the same1 but the latter represents the process as accomplished and the result of deliberation decided4 ,we take counsel and deliberation 7as has been said71 not about the end1 but about the means or the best means towards the end assumed4 ,we wish for the end 7,greek3 7 bou_/lsis tou te_/lous e7_/sti--iii4 #d74 ,our wish is for good1 real or apparent3 whether for the one or the other1 is a disputed question4 ,speaking generally1 and without reference to peculiar idiosyncrasies1 the real good or the good is the object of human wishes3 speaking with reference to any particular individual1 it is his own supposed or apparent good4 ,on this matter1 the virtuous man is the proper judge and standard of reference3 that which is really good appears good to him4 ,each particular disposition has its own peculiar sentiment both of what is honourable and of what is agreeable 7iii4 #d73 the principal excellence of the virtuous man is1 that he in every variety of circumstances perceives what is truly and genuinely good2 whereas to most men1 pleasure proves a deception1 and appears to be good1 not being so in reality4 ,both virtue and vice consists in deliberate preference1 of one or of another course of action4 ,both therefore are voluntary and in our own power3 both equally so4 ,it is not possible to refer virtuous conduct or vicious conduct to any other beginning except to ourselves3 the man is the cause of his own actions1 as he is the father of his own children4 ,it is upon this assumption that all legal reward and punishment is founded3 it is intended for purposes of encouragement and prevention1 but it would be absurd to think either of encouraging or preventing what is involuntary1 such as the appetite of hunger and thirst4 ,a man is punished for ignorance1 when he is himself the cause of his own ignorance1 or when by reasonable pains he might have acquired the requisite knowledge4 ,every man above the limit of absolute fatuity 7,greek3 komid a7naisth_/tou7 must know that any constant repetition of acts tends to form a habit3 if then by repetition of acts he allows himself to form a bad habit1 it is his own fault4 ,when once the bad habit is formed1 it is true that he cannot at once get rid of it3 but the formation of such a habit originally was not the less imputable to himself 7iii4 #e74 ,defects of body also which we bring upon ourselves by our own negligence or intemperance1 bring upon us censure3 if they are constitutional and unavoidable1 we are pitied for them4 ,some persons seem to have contended at that time1 that no man could justly be made responsible for his bad conduct3 because 7they said7 the end which he proposed to himself was good or bad according to his natural disposition1 not according to any selection of his own4 ,aristotle seems to be somewhat perplexed by this argument3 nevertheless he maintains1 that whatever influence we may allow to original and uncontrollable nature1 still the formation of our habits is more or less under our own concurrent control2 and therefore the end which we propose to ourselves being dependent upon those habits1 is also in part at least dependent upon ourselves 7iii4 #e7--our virtues and our vices are both voluntary4 ,the first five chapters of the third ,book 7in which ,aristotle examines the nature of ,greek3 to e7kou_/sion1 to a7kou_/sion1 proai_/resis1 bou_/lsis1 c47 ought perhaps to constitute a ,book by themselves4 ,they are among the most valuable parts of the ,ethics4 ,he has now established certain points with regard to our virtues generally4 #a4 ,they are mediocrities 7,greek3 meso_/ttes74#b4 ,they are habits1 generated by particular actions often repeated4#c4 ,when generated1 they have a specific influence of their own in facilitating the performance of actions of the same class4 #d4 ,they are in our own power originally1 and voluntary4#e4 ,they are under the direction of right reason4 ,it is to be observed that our actions are voluntary from the beginning to the end--the last of a number of repeated actions is no less voluntary than the first4 ,but our habits are voluntary only at the beginning--they cease to be voluntary after a certain time--but the permanent effect left by each separate repetition of the action is inappreciable 7iii4 #e74 ,aristotle then proceeds to an analysis of the separate virtues--,courage1 ,temperance1 ,liberality1 ,magnificence1 ,magnanimity1 ,gentleness1 ,frankness1 ,simplicity1 ,elegant playfulness1 ,justice1 ,equity1 c4 ,he endeavours to show that each of these is a certain mediocrity--excess lying on one side of it1 defect on the other4 ,there are various passages of ,aristotle which appear almost identical with the moral doctrine subsequently maintained by the ,stoic school3 for example--iii4 #f--;,in like manner he ought not to fear penury1 nor sickness1 nor in any way such things as arise not from moral baseness nor are dependent on himself4 ,the courageous man is afraid of things such as it befits a man to fear1 but of no others3 and even these he will make head against on proper occasions1 when reason commands and for the sake of honour1 which is the end of virtue 7iii4 #g74 ,to fear nothing1 or too little1 is rashness or insanity3 to fear too much1 is timidity3 the courageous man is the mean between the two1 who fears what he ought1 when he ought1 as he ought1 and with the right views and purposes 7ib474 ,the ,greek3 moichos 7adulterer7 exposes himself often to great dangers for the purpose of gratifying his passion3 but ,aristotle does not hold this to be courage4 ,neither does he thus denominate men who affront danger from passion1 or from the thirst of revenge1 or from a sanguine temperament--there must be deliberate preference and a proper motive1 to constitute courage--the motive of honour 7iii4 #h74 ,the end of courage 7says ,aristotle7 is in itself pleasant1 but it is put out of sight by the circumstances around it3 just as the prize for which the pugilist contends is in itself pleasurable1 but being of small moment and encompassed with painful accessories1 it appears to carry with it no pleasure whatever4 ,fatigue1 and wounds and death are painful to the courageous man--death is indeed more painful to him1 inasmuch as his life is of more value3 but still he voluntarily and knowingly affronts these pains for the sake of honour4 ,this is painful3 but pleasure is not to be anticipated in the exercise of all the different virtues1 except in so far as the attainment of the end is concerned 7iii4 #i74 7,this is perfectly true3 but it contradicts decidedly the remark which ,aristotle had made before in his first ,book 7i4 #h7 respecting the inherent pleasure of virtuous agency47 ,courage and ,temperance are the virtues of the instincts 7,greek3 tn a7lo_/gn mern--iii4 #aj74 ,temperance is the observance of a rational medium with respect to the pleasures of eating1 drinking1 and sex4 ,aristotle seems to be inconsistent when he makes it to belong to those pleasures in which animals generally partake 7iii4 #aj72 for other animals do not relish intoxicating liquors3 unless indeed these are considered as ranking under drink generally4 ,the temperate man desires these pleasures as he ought1 when he ought1 within the limits of what is honourable1 and having a proper reference to the amount of his own pecuniary means3 just as right reason prescribes 7iii4 #aa74 ,to pursue them more1 is excess3 to pursue them less1 is defect4 ,there is however1 in estimating excess and defect1 a certain tacit reference to the average dispositions of the many4 ,wherefore the desires of the temperate man ought to harmonize with reason2 for the aim of both is the honourable4 ,and the temperate man desires what he ought1 and as he ought1 and when3 and this too is the order of reason 7iii4 #ab74 ,all virtuous acts are to be on account of the honourable--thus ,aristotle says that the donations of the ,greek3 a7_/stos 7prodigal7 are not to be called liberal--,neither are their gifts liberal1 for they are not honourable1 nor on account of this1 nor as they ought to be 7iv4 #a74 ,again about the ,greek3 megalopreps or magnificent man--,now the magnificent man will expend such things on account of the honourable2 for this is a condition shared in by all the virtues3 and still he will do so pleasantly and lavishly 7iv4 #b74 ,on the contrary1 the ,greek3 ba_/nausos or vulgar man1 who differs from the magnificent man in the way of ,greek3 u7perbol or excess1 is said to spend--,not for the sake of the honourable1 but for the purpose of making a display of his wealth 7iv4 #b74 ,with respect to those epithets which imply praise or blame1 there is always a tacit comparison with some assumed standard4 ,thus with regard to the ,greek3 philo_/timos 7lover of honour71 ,aristotle observes--,it is evident that1 as the term 'lover of such and such things' is used in various senses1 we do not always apply 'lover of honour' to express the same thing2 but when we praise1 we praise that ambition which is more than most men's1 and blame that which is greater than it ought to be 7iv4 #d74 ,in the fifth ,book1 ,aristotle proceeds to explain wherein consist ,justice and ,injustice4 ,these words are used in two senses--a larger sense and a narrower sense4 ,in the larger sense1 just behaviour is equivalent to the observance of law1 generally3 unjust behaviour is equivalent to the violation of law generally4 ,but the law either actually does command1 or may be understood to command1 that we should perform towards others the acts belonging to each separate head of virtue3 it either actually prohibits1 or may be understood to prohibit1 us from performing towards others any of the acts belonging to each separate head of vice4 ,in this larger sense1 therefore1 justice is synonymous generally with perfect virtue--injustice1 with perfect wickedness3 there is only this difference1 that just or unjust are expressions applied to behaviour in so far as it affects other persons besides the agent3 whereas virtuous or wicked are expressions applied simply to the agent without connoting any such ulterior reference to other persons4 ,just or unjust1 is necessarily towards somebody else3 and this reference is implied distinctly in the term4 ,virtuous and vicious do not in the force of the term connote any such relations1 but are employed with reference to the agent simply--,this justice then is perfect virtue2 yet not absolutely1 but with reference to one's neighbour4--,in one sense we call those things just that are productive and preservative of happiness and its parts to the political communion 7v4 #a74 ,justice in this sense1 is the very fulness of virtue1 because it denotes the actual exercise of virtuous behaviour towards others3 there are many who behave virtuously in regard to their own personal affairs1 but who are incapable of doing so in what regards others 7ib474 ,for this reason1 justice has been called by some the good of another and not our own--justice alone of all the virtues1 because it necessarily has reference to another3 the just man does what is for the interest of some one else1 either the magistrate1 or the community 7v4 #a74 ,justice in the narrower sense1 is that mode of behaviour whereby a man1 in his dealings with others1 aims at taking to himself his fair share and no more of the common objects of desire3 and willingly consents to endure his fair share of the common hardships4 ,injustice is the opposite--that by which a man tries to appropriate more than his fair share of the objects of desire1 while he tries to escape his fair share of the objects of aversion4 ,to aim at this unfair distribution of the benefits of the society1 either in one's own favour or in favour of any one else1 is injustice in the narrow sense 7v4 #b74 ,justice in this narrower sense is divided into two branches--#a4 ,distributive ,justice4 #b4 ,corrective ,justice4 ,distributive ,justice has reference to those occasions on which positive benefits are to be distributed among the members of the community1 wealth and honours1 c4 7v4 #b74 ,in this case1 the share of each citizen is to be a share not absolutely of equality1 but one proportional to his personal worth 7,greek3 a7xi_/an73 and it is in the estimation of this personal worth that quarrels and dissension arise4 ,corrective ,justice has reference to the individual dealings1 or individual behaviour1 between man and man3 either to the dealings implying mutual consent and contract1 as purchase1 sale1 loan1 hire1 suretyship1 deposit1 c43 or such as imply no such mutual consent1--such as are on the contrary proceedings either by fraud or by force--as theft1 adultery1 perjury1 poisoning1 assassination1 robbery1 beating1 mutilation1 murder1 defamation1 c4 ,in regard to transactions of this nature1 the citizens are considered as being all upon a par--no account is taken of the difference between them in point of individual worth4 ,each man is considered as entitled to an equal share of good and evil3 and if in any dealings between man and man1 one man shall attempt to increase his own share of good or to diminish his own share of evil at the expense of another man1 corrective justice will interpose and re-establish the equality thus improperly disturbed4 ,he who has been made to lose or to suffer unduly1 must be compensated and replaced in his former position3 he who has gained unduly1 must be mulcted or made to suffer1 so as to be thrown back to the point from which he started4 ,the judge1 who represents this corrective justice1 is a kind of mediator1 and the point which he seeks to attain in directing redress1 is the middle point between gain and loss--so that neither shall the aggressive party be a gainer1 nor the suffering party a loser--,so that justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in voluntary things1--it is the having the same after as before 7v4 #d74 ,aristotle admits that the words gain and loss are not strictly applicable to many of the transactions which come within the scope of interference from corrective justice--that they properly belong to voluntary contracts1 and are strained in order to apply them to acts of aggression1 c4 7ib474 ,the ,pythagoreans held the doctrine that justice universally speaking consisted in simple retaliation--in rendering to another the precise dealing which that other had first given4 ,this definition will not suit either for distributive justice or corrective justice3 the treatment so prescribed would be sometimes more1 sometimes less1 than justice3 not to mention that acts deserve to be treated differently according as they are intentional or unintentional4 ,but the doctrine is to a certain extent true in regard to the dealings between man and man 7,greek3 e7n tais a7llaktikais koinni_/ais7--if it be applied in the way of general analogy and not with any regard to exact similarity--it is of importance that the man who has been well treated1 and the man who has been illtreated1 should each show his sense of the proceeding by returning the like usage3 for by proportionate requital the ,state is held together 7v4 #e74 ,the whole business of exchange and barter1 of division of labour and occupation1--the co-existence of those distinct and heterogeneous ingredients which are requisite to constitute the political communion--the supply of the most essential wants of the citizens--is all founded upon the continuance and the expectation of this assured requital for acts done4 ,money is introduced as an indispensable instrument for facilitating this constant traffic3 it affords a common measure for estimating the value of every service--,and thus if there were no possibility of retaliation1 there would be no communion 7v4 #e74 ,justice is thus a mediocrity--or consists in a just medium--between two extremes1 but not in the same way as the other virtues4 ,the just man is one who awards both to himself and to every one else the proper and rightful share both of benefit and burthen4 ,injustice1 on the contrary1 consists in the excess or defect which lie on one side or the other of this medium point 7v4 #e74 ,distributive justice is said by ,aristotle to deal with individuals according to geometrical ratio2 corrective justice1 according to arithmetical proportion4 ,justice1 strictly and properly so called1 is political justice3 that reciprocity of right and obligation which prevails between free and equal citizens in a community1 or between citizens who1 if not positively equal1 yet stand in an assured and definite ratio one to the other 7v4 #f74 ,this relation is defined and maintained by law1 and by judges and magistrates to administer the law4 ,political justice implies a state of law--a community of persons qualified by nature to obey and sustain the law--and a definite arrangement between the citizens in respect to the alternation of command and obedience--,for this is1 as we have said 7,greek3 7n71 according to law1 and among those who can naturally have law2 those1 namely1 as we have said 7,greek3 7san71 who have an equality of ruling and being ruled4 ,as the law arises out of the necessity of preventing injustice1 or of hindering any individual from appropriating more than his fair share of good things1 so it is felt that any person invested with sovereign authority may and will commit this injustice4 ,reason therefore is understood to hold the sovereign authority1 and the archon acts only as the guardian of the reciprocal rights and obligations--of the constitutional equality--between the various citizens3 undertaking a troublesome duty and paid for his trouble by honour and respect 7v4 #f74 ,the relation which subsists between master and slave1 or father and son1 is not properly speaking that of justice1 though it is somewhat analogous4 ,both the slave1 and the non-adult son1 are as it were parts of the master and father3 there can therefore be no injustice on his part towards them1 since no one deliberately intends to hurt a part of himself4 ,between husband and wife there subsists a sort of justice--household justice 7,greek3 to oi7konomikon di_/kaion7--but this too is different from political justice 7v4 #f74 ,political justice is in part natural--in part conventional4 ,that which is natural is everywhere the same3 that which is conventional is different in different countries1 and takes its origin altogether from positive and special institution4 ,some persons think that all political justice is thus conventional1 and none natural3 because they see that rights and obligations 7,greek3 ta di_/kaia7 are everywhere changeable1 and nowhere exhibit that permanence and invariability which mark the properties of natural objects4 ,this is true to a certain extent1 but not wholly true3 probably among the ,gods it is not true at all3 but with us that which is natural is in part variable1 though not in every case3 yet there is a real distinction between what is natural and what is not natural4 ,both natural justice and conventional justice1 are thus alike contingent and variable3 but there is a clear mode of distinguishing between the two1 applicable not only to the case of justice but to other cases in which the like distinction is to be taken4 ,for by nature the right hand is the stronger3 but nevertheless it may happen that there are ambidextrous men4--,and in like manner those rules of justice which are not natural1 but of human establishment1 are not the same everywhere3 nor indeed does the same mode of government prevail everywhere1 though there is but one mode of government which is everywhere agreeable to nature--the best of all 7v4 #g74 7,the commentary of ,andronicus upon this passage is clearer and more instructive than the passage of ,aristotle itself3 and it is remarkable as a distinct announcement of the principle of utility4 ,since both natural justice1 and conventional justice1 are changeable1 in the way just stated1 how are we to distinguish the one of these fluctuating institutions from the other8 ,the distinction is plain4 ,each special precept of justice is to be examined on its own ground to ascertain whether it be for the advantage of all that it should be maintained unaltered1 or whether the subversion of it would occasion mischief4 ,if this be found to be the fact1 the precept in question belongs to natural justice3 if it be otherwise1 to conventional justice 7,andronic4 ,rh4 v4 c4 #aj74 ,the just1 and the unjust1 being thus defined1 a man who does1 willingly and knowingly1 either the one or the other1 acts justly or unjustly3 if he does it unwillingly or unknowingly1 he neither acts justly nor unjustly1 except by accident--that is1 he does what is not essentially and in its own nature unjust1 but is only so by accident 7v4 #h74 ,injustice will thus have been done1 but no unjust act will have been committed1 if the act be done involuntarily4 ,the man who restores a deposit unwillingly and from fear of danger to himself1 does not act justly1 though he does what by accident is just3 the man who1 anxious to restore the deposit1 is prevented by positive superior force from doing so1 does not act unjustly1 although he does what by accident is unjust4 ,when a man does mischief1 it is either done contrary to all reasonable expectation1 in such manner that neither he nor any one else could have anticipated from his act the mischief which has actually ensued from it 7,greek3 paralo_/gs71 and in this case it is a pure misfortune 7,greek3 a7tu_/chma73 or he does it without intention or foreknowledge1 yet under circumstances in which mischief might have been foreseen1 and ought to have been foreseen2 in this case it is a fault 7,greek3 a7ma_/rtma73 or he does it intentionally and with foreknowledge1 yet without any previous deliberation1 through anger1 or some violent momentary impulse2 in this case it is an unjust act 7,greek3 a7di_/kma71 but the agent is not necessarily an unjust or wicked man for having done it3 or he does it with intention and deliberate choice1 and in this case he is an unjust and wicked man4 ,the man who does a just thing1 or an unjust thing1 is not necessarily a just or an unjust man4 ,whether he be so or not1 depends upon the state of his mind and intention at the time 7v4 #h74 ,equity1 ,greek3 to e7pieikes1 is not at variance with justice1 but is an improvement upon justice4 ,it is a correction and supplement to the inevitable imperfections in the definitions of legal justice4 ,the law wishes to comprehend all cases1 but fails in doing so3 the words of its enactment do not fully and exactly express its real intentions1 but either something more or something less4 ,when the lawgiver speaks in general terms1 a particular case may happen which falls within the rule as he lays it down1 but which he would not have wished to comprehend if he had known how to avoid it4 ,it is then becoming conduct in the individual to whose advantage the law in this special case turns1 that he should refrain from profiting by his position1 and that he should act as the legislator himself would wish1 if consulted on the special case4 ,the general rules laid down by the legislator are of necessity more or less defective3 in fact1 the only reason why everything is not determined by law1 is1 that there are some matters respecting which it is impossible to frame a law 7v4 #aj74 ,such is the conduct of the equitable man--the man who refrains from pushing his legal rights to the extreme1 to the injury of others1 but who foregoes the advantage of his position1 although the law is in his favour 7,greek3 o7 m a7kribodi_/kaios e7pi cheiron1 a7ll' e7latttikos1 kai_/per e7_/chn ton no_/mon botho_/n74 ,a man may hurt himself1 but he cannot act unjustly towards himself4 ,no injustice can be done to a man except against his own consent4 ,suicide is by implication forbidden by the law3 to commit suicide is wrong1 because a man in so doing acts unjustly towards the city1 not towards himself1 which is impossible 7v4 #ab74 ,to act unjustly--and to be the object of unjust dealing by others--are both bad3 but which is the worst8 ,it is the least of the two evils to be the object of unjust dealing by others4 ,both are bad1 because in the one case a man gets more than his share1 in the other less than his share3 in both cases the just medium is departed from4 ,to act unjustly is blameable1 and implies wickedness3 to be the object of unjust dealing by others is not blameable1 and implies no wickedness3 the latter is therefore in itself the least evil1 although by accident it may perhaps turn out to be the greater evil of the two4 ,in the same manner a pleurisy is in itself a greater evil than a trip and a stumble3 but by accident it may turn out that the latter is the greater evil of the two1 if it should occur at the moment when a man is running away from the enemy1 so as to cause his being taken prisoner and slain4 ,the question here raised by ,aristotle--which is the greater evil--to act unjustly or to be the object of unjust dealing--had been before raised by ,plato in the ,gorgias4 ,aristotle follows out his theory about virtue1 whereby he makes it consist in the observance of a medium point4 ,the man that acts unjustly sins on one side of this point1 the object of unjust dealing misses it on the other side3 the one is comparable to a man who eats or works too much for his health1 the other to a man who eats or works too little4 ,the question is one which could hardly arise1 according to the view taken by modern ethical writers of the principles of moral science4 ,the two things compared are not in point of fact commensurable4 ,looking at the question from the point of view of the moralist1 the person injured has incurred no moral guilt1 but has suffered more or less of misfortune3 the unjust agent on the contrary has suffered no misfortune--perhaps he has reaped benefit--but at any rate he has incurred moral guilt4 ,society on the whole is a decided loser by the act3 but the wrong done implies the suffering inflicted3 the act is considered and called wrong because it does inflict suffering1 and for no other reason4 ,it seems an inadmissible question therefore1 to ask which of the two is the greater evil--the suffering undergone by ,a--or the wrong by which ,b occasioned that suffering3 at least so far as society is concerned4 ,but the ancient moralists1 in instituting this comparison1 seem to have looked1 not at society1 but at the two individuals--the wrong doer and the wrong sufferer--and to have looked at them too from a point of view of their own4 ,if we take the feelings of these two parties themselves as the standard by which to judge1 the sentence must be obviously contrary to the opinion delivered by ,aristotle3 the sufferer1 according to his own feeling1 is worse off than he was before3 the doer is better off4 ,and it is for this reason that the act forms a proper ground for judicial punishment or redress4 ,but the moralist estimates the condition of the two men by a standard of his own1 not by the feelings which they themselves entertain4 ,he decides for himself that a virtuous frame of mind is the primary and essential ingredient of individual happiness--a wicked frame of mind the grand source of misery3 and by this test he tries the comparative happiness of every man4 ,the man who manifests evidence of a guilty frame of mind is decidedly worse off than he who has only suffered an unmerited misfortune4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,politica4 ,the scheme of government proposed by ,aristotle1 in the two last books of his ,politics1 as representing his own ideas of something like perfection1 is evidently founded upon the ,republic of ,plato3 from whom he differs in the important circumstance of not admitting either community of property or community of wives and children4 ,each of these philosophers recognises one separate class of inhabitants1 relieved from all private toil and all money-getting employments1 and constituting exclusively the citizens of the commonwealth4 ,this small class is in effect the city--the commonwealth3 the remaining inhabitants are not a part of the commonwealth1 they are only appendages to it--indispensable indeed1 but still appendages1 in the same manner as slaves or cattle 7vii4 #h74 ,in the ,republic of ,plato this narrow aristocracy are not allowed to possess private property or separate families1 but form one inseparable brotherhood4 ,in the scheme of ,aristotle1 this aristocracy form a distinct caste of private families each with its separate property4 ,the whole territory of the ,state belongs to them1 and is tilled by dependent cultivators1 by whom the produce is made over and apportioned under certain restrictions4 ,a certain section of the territory is understood to be the common property of the body of citizens 7i4e4 of the aristocracy71 and the produce of it is handed over by the cultivators into a common stock1 partly to supply the public tables at which all the citizens with their wives and families are subsisted1 partly to defray the cost of religious solemnities4 ,the remaining portion of the territory is possessed in separate properties by individual citizens1 who consume the produce as they please 7vii4 #i73 each citizen having two distinct lots of land assigned to him1 one near the outskirts of the territory1 the other near the centre4 ,this latter regulation also had been adopted by ,plato in the treatise de ,legibus1 and it is surprising to observe that ,aristotle himself had censured it1 in his criticisms on that treatise1 as incompatible with a judicious and careful economy 7ii4 #c4 #h74 ,the syssitia or public tables are also adopted by ,plato1 in conformity with the institutions actually existing in his time in ,crete and elsewhere4 ,the dependent cultivators1 in ,aristotle's scheme1 ought to be slaves1 not united together by any bond of common language or common country 7vii4 #i1 #i73 if this cannot be1 they ought to be a race of subdued foreigners1 degraded into perioeci1 deprived of all use of arms1 and confined to the task of labouring in the field4 ,those slaves who till the common land are to be considered as the property of the collective body of citizens3 the slaves on land belonging to individual citizens1 are the property of those citizens4 ,when we consider the scanty proportion of inhabitants whom ,aristotle and ,plato include in the benefits of their community1 it will at once appear how amazingly their task as political theorists is simplified4 ,their 9999commonwealth is really an aristocracy on a very narrow scale4 ,the great mass of the inhabitants are thrust out altogether from all security and good government1 and are placed without reserve at the disposal of the small body of armed citizens4 ,there is but one precaution on which ,aristotle and ,plato rely for ensuring good treatment from the citizens towards their inferiors3 and that is1 the finished and elaborate education which the citizens are to receive4 ,men so educated1 according to these philosophers1 will behave as perfectly in the relation of superior to inferior1 as in that of equal to equal--of citizen to citizen4 ,this supposition would doubtless prove true1 to a certain extent1 though far short of that extent which would be requisite to assure the complete comfort of the inferior4 ,but even if it were true to the fullest extent1 it would be far from satisfying the demands of a benevolent theorist4 ,for though the inferior should meet with kindness and protection from his superior1 still his mind must be kept in a degradation suitable to his position4 ,he must be deprived of all moral and intellectual culture3 he must be prevented from imbibing any ideas of his own dignity3 he must be content to receive whatever is awarded1 to endure whatever treatment is vouchsafed1 without for an instant imagining that he has a right to benefits or that suffering is wrongfully inflicted upon him4 ,both ,plato and ,aristotle acknowledge the inevitable depravation and moral abasement of all the inhabitants excepting their favoured class4 ,neither of them seems solicitous either to disguise or to mitigate it4 ,but if they are thus indifferent about the moral condition of the mass1 they are in the highest degree exact and careful respecting that of their select citizens4 ,this is their grand and primary object1 towards which the whole force of their intellect1 and the full fertility of their ingenious imagination1 is directed4 ,their plans of education are most elaborate and comprehensive3 aiming at every branch of moral and intellectual improvement1 and seeking to raise the whole man to a state of perfection1 both physical and mental4 ,you would imagine that they were framing a scheme of public education1 not a political constitution3 so wholly are their thoughts engrossed with the training and culture of their citizens4 ,it is in this respect that their ideas are truly instructive4 ,viewed with reference to the general body of inhabitants in a ,state1 nothing can be more defective than the plans of both these great philosophers4 ,assuming that their objects were completely attained1 the mass of the people would receive nothing more than that degree of physical comfort and mild usage which can be made to consist with subjection and with the extortion of compulsory labour4 ,viewed with reference to the special class recognized as citizens1 the plans of both are to a high degree admirable4 ,a better provision is made for the virtue as well as for the happiness of this particular class than has ever been devised by any other political projector4 ,the intimate manner in which ,aristotle connects virtue with happiness1 is above all remarkable4 ,he in fact defines happiness to consist in the active exertion and perfected habit of virtue 7,greek3 a7rets e7ne_/rgeia kai chrsi_/s tis te_/leios--vi4 #i4 #c473 and it is upon this disposition that he founds the necessity of excluding the mass of inhabitants from the citizenship4 ,for the purpose to be accomplished by the political union1 is1 the assuring of happiness to every individual citizen1 which is to be effected by implanting habits of virtue in every citizen4 ,whoever therefore is incapable of acquiring habits of virtue1 is disqualified from becoming a citizen4 ,but every man whose life is spent in laborious avocations1 whether of husbandry1 of trade1 or of manufacture1 becomes thereby incapable of acquiring habits of virtue1 and cannot therefore be admitted to the citizenship4 ,no man can be capable of the requisite mental culture and tuition1 who is not exempted from the necessity of toil1 enabled to devote his whole time to the acquisition of virtuous habits1 and subjected from his infancy to a severe and systematic training4 ,the exclusion of the bulk of the people from civil rights is thus founded1 in the mind of ,aristotle1 on the lofty idea which he forms of individual human perfection1 which he conceives to be absolutely unattainable unless it be made the sole object of a man's life4 ,but then he takes especial care that the education of his citizens shall be really such as to compel them to acquire that virtue on which alone their pre-eminence is built4 ,if he exempts them from manual or money-getting labours1 he imposes upon them an endless series of painful restraints and vexatious duties for the purpose of forming and maintaining their perfection of character4 ,he allows no luxury or self-indulgence1 no misappropriation of time1 no ostentatious display of wealth or station4 ,the life of his select citizens would be such as to provoke little envy or jealousy1 among men of the ordinary stamp4 ,its hard work and its strict discipline would appear repulsive rather than inviting3 and the pre-eminence of strong and able men1 submitting to such continued schooling1 would appear well deserved and hardly earned4 ,oligarchical reasoners in modern times employ the bad part of ,aristotle's principle without the good4 ,they represent the rich and great as alone capable of reaching a degree of virtue consistent with the full enjoyment of political privileges3 but then they take no precautions1 as ,aristotle does1 that the men so preferred shall really answer to this exalted character4 ,they leave the rich and great to their own self-indulgence and indolent propensities1 without training them by any systematic process to habits of superior virtue4 ,so that the select citizens on this plan are at the least no better1 if indeed they are not worse1 than the remaining community1 while their unbounded 9999indulgences excite either undue envy or undue admiration1 among the excluded multitude4 ,the select citizens of ,aristotle are both better and wiser than the rest of their community3 while they are at the same time so hemmed in and circumscribed by severe regulations1 that nothing except the perfection of their character can appear worthy either of envy or admiration4 ,though therefore these oligarchical reasoners concur with ,aristotle in sacrificing the bulk of the community to the pre-eminence of a narrow class1 they fail of accomplishing the end for which alone he pretends to justify such a sacrifice--the formation of a few citizens of complete and unrivalled virtue4 ,the arrangements made by ,aristotle for the good government of his aristocratical citizens among themselves1 are founded upon principles of the most perfect equality4 ,he would have them only limited in number1 for in his opinion1 personal and familiar acquaintance among them all is essentially requisite to good government 7vii4 #d4 #g74 ,the principal offices of the ,state are all to be held by the aged citizens3 the military duties are to be fulfilled by the younger citizens4 ,the city altogether1 with the territory appertaining to it1 must be large enough to be ,greek3 au7ta_/rks3 but it must not be so extensive as to destroy personal intimacy among the citizens4 ,a very large body are1 in ,aristotle's view1 incapable of discipline or regularity4 ,to produce a virtuous citizen1 nature1 habit1 and reason must coincide4 ,they ought to be endued with virtues qualifying them both for occupation and for leisure3 with courage1 self-denial 7,greek3 karteri_/a71 and fortitude1 to maintain their independence3 with justice and temperance1 to restrain them from abusing the means of enjoyment provided for them3 and with philosophy or the love of contemplative wisdom and science1 in order to banish ennui1 and render the hours of leisure agreeable to them 7vii4 #ac4 #ag74 ,they are to be taught that their hours of leisure are of greater worth and dignity than their hours of occupation4 ,occupation is to be submitted to for the sake of the quiet enjoyment of leisure1 just as war is made for the sake of procuring peace1 and useful and necessary employments undertaken for the sake of those which are honourable 7vii4 #ac4 #h74 ,aristotle greatly censures 7see vii4 #b4 #e7 7as indeed ,plato had done before him7 the institutions of ,lacedmon1 as being directed exclusively to create excellent warriors1 and to enable the nation to rule over foreigners4 ,this 7he says7 is not only not the right end1 but is an end absolutely pernicious and culpable4 ,to maintain a forcible sovereignty over free and equal foreigners1 is unjust and immoral3 and if the minds of the citizens be corrupted with this collective ambition and love of power1 it is probable that some individual citizen1 taught by the education of the ,state to consider power as the first of all earthly ends1 will find an opportunity to aggrandize himself by force or fraud1 and to establish a tyranny over his countrymen themselves 7viii4 #ac4 #ac74 ,the ,lacedmonians conducted themselves well and flourished under their institutions1 so long as they were carrying on war for the enlargement of their dominion3 but they were incapable of tasting or profiting by peace3 they were not educated by their legislator so as to be able to turn leisure to account 7,greek3 ai7_/tios d' o7 nomothe_/ts1 ou7 paideu_/sas du_/nasthai schola_/zein--vii4 #ac4 #ae74 ,the education of the citizen is to commence with the body3 next the irrational portion of the soul is to be brought under discipline--that is1 the will and the appetites1 the concupiscent and irascible passions3 thirdly1 the rational portion of the soul is to be cultivated and developed4 ,the habitual desires are to be so moulded and tutored as to prepare them for the sovereignty of reason1 when the time shall arrive for bringing reason into action 7vii4 #ac4 #bc74 ,they are to learn nothing until five years old 7vii4 #ae4 #d71 their diversions are to be carefully prepared and presented to them1 consisting generally of a mimicry of subsequent serious occupations 7vii4 #ae4 #ae73 and all the fables and tales which they hear recited are to be such as to pave the way for moral discipline 7ib472 all under the superintendence of the ,pdonom4 ,no obscene or licentious talk is to be tolerated in the city 7vii4 #ae4 #g71 nor any indecent painting or statue1 except in the temples of some particular ,deities4 ,no youth is permitted to witness the recitation either of iambics or of comedy 7vii4 #ae4 #i71 until he attains the age which qualifies him to sit at the public tables4 ,immense stress is laid by the philosopher on the turn of ideas to which the tender minds of youth become accustomed1 and on the earliest combinations of sounds or of visible objects which meet their senses 7vii4 #ae4 #aj74 ,greek3 ,pros pa_/sas duna_/meis kai te_/chnas e7stin a7 dei propaideu_/esthai kai proethi_/zesthai pros tas e7ka_/stn e7rgasi_/as1 7_/ste dlon o7_/ti kai pros tas ts a7rets pra_/xeis 7viii4 #a4 #b74 ,all the citizens in ,aristotle's republic are to be educated according to one common system3 each being regarded as belonging to the commonwealth more than to his own parents4 ,this was the practice at ,lacedmon1 and ,aristotle greatly eulogizes it 7viii4 #a4 #c74 ,aristotle does not approve of extreme and violent bodily training1 such as would bring the body into the condition of an athlete3 nor does he even sanction the gymnastic labours imposed by the ,lacedmonian system1 which had the effect of rendering the ,spartans brutal of soul1 for the purpose of exalting their courage 7,greek3 oi7 ,la_/knes--thri_/deis a7perga_/zontai tois po_/nois1 7s touto ma_/lista pros a7ndrei_/an su_/mpheron74 ,he remarks1 first1 that courage is not the single or exclusive end to be aimed at in a civil education3 next1 that a savage and brutal soul is less compatible with exalted courage than a gentle soul1 trained so as to be exquisitely sensible to the feelings of shame and honour 7viii4 #c4 #c-e74 ,the most sanguinary and unfeeling among the barbarous tribes1 he remarks1 were very far from being the most courageous4 ,a man trained on the ,lacedmonian system1 in bodily exercises alone1 destitute even of the most indispensable mental culture 7see below71 was a real ,greek3 ba_/nausos--useful only for one branch of political duties1 and even for that less useful than if he had been trained in a different manner4 ,up to the age of #ad1 ,aristotle prescribes 7,greek3 7_/b means #ad years of age--see vii4 #ae4 #aa7 that boys shall be trained in gentle and regular exercises1 without any severe or forced labour4 ,from #ad to #ag they are to be instructed in various branches of knowledge3 after #ag1 they are to be put to harder bodily labour and to be nourished with a special and peculiar diet 7,greek3 a7nagkophagi_/ais74 ,for how long this is to continue1 is not stated4 ,but ,aristotle insists on the necessity of not giving them at the same time intellectual instruction and bodily training1 for the one of these1 he says1 counteracts and frustrates the other 7viii4 #d4 #b-c74 ,the ,lacedmonians made music no part of their education3 ,isocrat4 ,panathen4 ,or4 xii4 p4 #cge1 ,b42 they did not even learn 'letters' 7,greek3 gra_/mmata71 but they are said to have been good judges of music 7viii4 #d4 #f74 ,aristotle himself however seems to think it next to impossible that men who have not learned music can be good judges 7viii4 #f4 #a74 ,aristotle admits that music may be usefully learnt as an innocent pleasure and relaxation3 but he chiefly considers it as desirable on account of its moral effects1 on the dispositions and affections4 ,a right turn of the pleasurable and painful emotions is1 in his opinion1 essential to virtue3 particular strains and particular rhythms are naturally associated with particular dispositions of mind3 by early teaching1 those strains and those rhythms which are associated with temperate and laudable dispositions may be made more agreeable to a youth than any others4 ,he will like best those which he hears earliest1 and which he finds universally commended and relished by those about him4 ,a relish for the ,greek3 o7moi_/mata of virtuous dispositions will tend to increase in him the love of virtue itself 7viii4 #f4 #e4 #h74 ,aristotle enjoins that the youth be taught to execute music instrumentally and vocally1 because it is only in this way that they can acquire a good taste or judgment in music3 besides which1 it is necessary to furnish boys with some occupation1 to absorb their restless energies1 and there is none more suitable than music4 ,some persons alleged that the teaching music as a manual art was banausic and degrading1 lowering the citizen down to the station of a hired professional singer4 ,aristotle meets this objection by providing that youths shall be instructed in the musical art1 but only with the view of correcting and cultivating their taste3 they are to be forbidden from making any use of their musical acquisitions1 in riper years1 in actual playing or singing 7viii4 #f4 #c74 ,aristotle observes1 that music more difficult of execution had been recently introduced into the agones1 and had found its way from the agones into the ordinary education4 ,he decidedly disapproves and excludes it 7viii4 #f4 #d74 ,he forbids both the flute and the harp1 and every other instrument requiring much art to play upon it3 especially the flute1 which he considers as not ethical1 but orgiastical--calculated to excite violent and momentary emotions4 ,the flute obtained a footing in ,greece after the ,persian invasion2 in ,athens at that time it became especially fashionable2 but was discontinued afterwards 7,plutarch alleges1 through the influence of ,alcibiades74 ,the suggestions of ,aristotle for the education of his citizens are far less copious and circumstantial than those of ,plato in his ,republic4 ,he delivers no plan of study1 no arrangement of sciences to be successively communicated1 no reasons for preferring or rejecting4 ,we do not know what it was precisely which ,aristotle comprehended in the term philosophy1 intended by him to be taught to his citizens as an aid for the proper employment of their leisure4 ,it must probably have included the moral1 political1 and metaphysical sciences1 as they were then known--those sciences to which his own voluminous works relate4 ,by means of the public table1 supplied from the produce of the public lands1 ,aristotle provides for the full subsistence of every citizen4 ,yet he is well aware that the citizens will be likely to increase in numbers too rapidly1 and he suggests very efficient precautions against it4 ,no child at all deformed or imperfect in frame is to be brought up3 children beyond a convenient number1 if born1 are to be exposed3 but should the law of the ,state forbid such a practice1 care must be taken to forestall consciousness and life in them1 and to prevent their birth by ,greek3 a7_/mblsis 7vii4 #ad4 #aj74 ,aristotle establishes two agora in his city3 one situated near to the harbour1 adapted to the buying1 selling1 and storing of goods1 under the surveillance of the agoranomus3 the other called the free agora1 situated in the upper parts of the city1 set apart for the amusement and conversation of the citizens1 and never defiled by the introduction of any commodities for sale4 ,no artisan or husbandman is ever to enter the latter unless by special order from the authorities4 ,the temples of the ,gods1 the residences of the various boards of government functionaries1 the gymnasia of the older citizens1 are all to be erected in this free agora 7vii4 #aa74 ,the ,thessalian cities had an agora of this description where no traffic or common occupations were permitted4 ,the moral tendency of ,aristotle's reflections is almost always useful and elevating4 ,the intimate union which he formally recognizes and perpetually proclaims between happiness and virtue1 is salutary and instructive3 and his ideas of what virtue is1 are perfectly just1 so far as relates to the conduct of his citizens towards each other3 though they are miserably defective as regards obligation towards non-citizens4 ,he always assigns the proper pre-eminence to wisdom and virtue3 he never overvalues the advantages of riches1 nor deems them entitled on their own account1 to any reverence or submission3 he allows no title to the obedience of mankind1 except that which arises from superior power and disposition to serve them4 ,superior power and station1 as he considers them1 involve a series of troubles--some obligations which render them objects of desire only to men of virtue and beneficence4 ,what is more rare and more creditable still1 he treats all views of conquest and aggrandizement by a ,state as immoral and injurious1 even to the conquerors themselves4 ,,appendix4 ,,appendix4 ,i4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,universals4 ,the controversy respecting ,universals first obtained its place in philosophy from the colloquies of ,sokrates1 and the writings and teachings of ,plato4 ,we need not here touch upon their predecessors1 ,parmenides and ,herakleitus1 who1 in a confused and unsystematic manner1 approached this question from opposite sides1 and whose speculations worked much upon the mind of ,plato in determining both his aggressive dialectic1 and his constructive theories4 ,parmenides of ,elea1 improving upon the ruder conceptions of ,xenophanes1 was the first to give emphatic proclamation to the celebrated ,eleatic doctrine1 ,absolute ,ens as opposed to ,relative ,fientia3 i4e4 the ,cogitable1 which ,parmenides conceived as the ,one and ,all of reality1 ,greek3 e7n kai pan1 enduring and unchangeable1 of which the negative was unmeaning1--and the ,sensible or ,perceivable1 which was in perpetual change1 succession and multiplicity1 without either unity1 or reality1 or endurance4 ,to the last of these two departments ,herakleitus assigned especial prominence4 ,in place of the permanent underlying ,ens1 which he did not recognize1 he substituted a cogitable process of change1 or generalized concept of what was common to all the successive phases of change--a perpetual stream of generation and destruction1 or implication of contraries1 in which everything appeared only that it might disappear1 without endurance or uniformity4 ,in this doctrine of ,herakleitus1 the world of sense and particulars could not be the object either of certain knowledge or even of correct probable opinion2 in that of ,parmenides1 it was recognized as an object of probable opinion1 though not of certain knowledge4 ,but in both doctrines1 as well as in the theories of ,demokritus1 it was degraded1 and presented as incapable of yielding satisfaction to the search of a philosophizing mind1 which could find neither truth nor reality except in the world of ,concepts and ,cogitables4 ,besides the two theories above-mentioned1 there were current in the ,hellenic world1 before the maturity of ,sokrates1 several other veins of speculation about the ,kosmos1 totally divergent one from the other1 and by that very divergence sometimes stimulating curiosity1 sometimes discouraging all study as though the problems were hopeless4 ,but ,parmenides and ,herakleitus1 together with the arithmetical and geometrical hypotheses of the ,pythagoreans1 are expressly noticed by ,aristotle as having specially contributed to form the philosophy of ,plato4 ,neither ,parmenides1 nor ,herakleitus1 nor the ,pythagoreans were dialecticians4 ,they gave out their own thoughts in their own way1 with little or no regard to dissentients4 ,they did not cultivate the art of argumentative attack or defence1 nor the correct application and diversified confrontation of universal terms1 which are the great instruments of that art4 ,it was ,zeno1 the disciple of ,parmenides1 that first employed dialectic in support of his master's theory1 or rather against the counter-theories of opponents4 ,he showed by arguments memorable for their subtlety1 that the hypothesis of an ,absolute1 composed of ,entia ,plura ,discontinua1 led to consequences even more absurd than those that opponents deduced from the ,parmenidean hypothesis of ,ens ,unum ,continuum4 ,the dialectic1 thus inaugurated by ,zeno1 reached still higher perfection in the colloquies of ,sokrates2 who not only employed a new method1 but also introduced new topics of debate--ethical1 political1 and social matters instead of physical things and the ,kosmos4 ,the peculiar originality of ,sokrates is well known3 a man who wrote nothing1 but passed his life in indiscriminate colloquy with every one2 who professed to have no knowledge himself1 but interrogated others on matters that they talked about familiarly and professed to know well2 whose colloquies generally ended by puzzling the respondents1 and by proving to themselves that they neither knew nor could explain even matters that they had begun by affirming confidently as too clear to need explanation4 ,aristotle tells us#a that ,sokrates was the first that set himself expressly and methodically to scrutinize the definitions of general or universal terms1 and to confront them1 not merely with each other1 but also1 by a sort of inductive process1 with many particular cases that were1 or appeared to be1 included under them4 ,and both ,xenophon and ,plato give us abundant examples of the terms to which ,sokrates applied his interrogatories3 ,what is the ,holy8 ,what is the ,unholy8 ,what is the ,beautiful or ,honourable8 ,what is the ,ugly or ,base8 ,what is ,justice--,injustice--,temperance--,madn ess--,courage--,cowardice--,a ,city--,a man fit for civil life8 ,what is the ,command of ,men8 ,what is the character fit for commanding men8 ,such are the specimens1 furnished by a hearer1#b of the universal terms whereon the interrogatories of ,sokrates bore4 ,all of them were terms spoken and heard familiarly by citizens in the market-place1 as if each understood them perfectly2 but when ,sokrates1 professing his own ignorance1 put questions asking for solutions of difficulties that perplexed his own mind1 the answers showed that these difficulties were equally insoluble by respondents1 who had never thought of them before4 ,the confident persuasion of knowledge1 with which the colloquy began1 stood exposed as a false persuasion without any basis of reality4 ,such illusory semblance of knowledge was proclaimed by ,sokrates to be the chronic1 though unconscious1 intellectual condition of his contemporaries4 ,how he undertook1 as the mission of a long life1 to expose it1 is impressively set forth in the ,platonic ,apology4 ,footnote #a3 ,metaphysica1 ,a4 p4 #ihg1 b4 #b2 ,m4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #ah4 ,footnote #b3 ,xenophon ,memorab4 ,i4 i4 #af2 ,,iv4 vi4 #a-ac4 ,it was thus by ,sokrates that the meaning of universal terms and universal propositions1 and the relation of each respectively to particular terms and particular propositions were first made a subject of express enquiry and analytical interrogation4 ,his influence was powerful in imparting the same dialectical impulse to several companions2 but most of all to ,plato1 who not only enlarged and amplified the range of ,sokratic enquiry1 but also brought the meaning of universal terms into something like system and theory1 as a portion of the conditions of trustworthy science4 ,plato was the first to affirm the doctrine afterwards called ,realism1 as the fundamental postulate of all true and proved cognition4 ,he affirmed it boldly1 and in its most extended sense1 though he also produces 7according to his frequent practice7 many powerful arguments and unsolved objections against it4 ,it was he 7to use the striking phrase of ,milton#c7 that first imported into the schools the portent of ,realism4 ,the doctrine has been since opposed1 confuted1 curtailed1 transformed1 diversified in many ways2 but it has maintained its place in logical speculation1 and has remained1 under one phraseology or another1 the creed of various philosophers1 from that time down to the present4 ,footnote #c3 ,see the ,latin verses ',de ,ide ,platonic quemadmodum ,aristoteles intellexit'-- ,at tu1 perenne ruris ,academi decus1 ,hc monstra si tu primus induxti scholis1 c4 ,the following account of the problems of ,realism was handed down to the speculations of the medival philosophers by ,porphyry 7between #bgj-cjj ,a4,d471 in his ,introduction to the treatise of ,aristotle on the ,categories4 ,after informing ,chrysaorius that he will prepare for him a concise statement of the doctrines of the old philosophers respecting ,genus1 ,differentia1 ,species1 ,proprium1 ,accidens1 abstaining from the deeper enquiries1 but giving suitable development to the more simple1--,porphyry thus proceeds3--,for example1 ,i shall decline discussing1 in respect to ,genera and ,species1 7#a7 ,whether they have a substantive existence1 or reside merely in naked mental conceptions2 7#b7 ,whether1 assuming them to have substantive existence1 they are bodies or incorporeals2 7#c7 ,whether their substantive existence is in and along with the objects of sense1 or apart and separable4 ,upon this task ,i shall not enter1 since it is of the greatest depth1 and requires another larger investigation2 but shall try at once to show you how the ancients 7especially the ,peripatetics71 with a view to logical discourse1 dealt with the topics now propounded4#d ,footnote #d3 ,porphyry1 ,introd4 in ,categor4 init4 p4 #a1 a4 #a1 ,schol4 ,br4 ,before ,porphyry1 all these three problems had been largely debated1 first by ,plato1 next by ,aristotle against ,plato1 again by the ,stoics against both1 and lastly by ,plotinus and the ,neo-,platonists as conciliators of ,plato with ,aristotle4 ,after ,porphyry1 problems the same1 or similar1 continued to stand in the foreground of speculation1 until the authority of ,aristotle became discredited at all points by the influences of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries4 ,but in order to find the beginning of them1 as questions provoking curiosity and opening dissentient points of view to inventive dialecticians1 we must go back to the age and the dialogues of ,plato4 ,the real ,sokrates 7i4e4 as he is described by ,xenophon7 inculcated in his conversation steady reverence for the invisible1 as apart from and overriding the phenomena of sensible experience2 but he interpreted the term in a religious sense1 as signifying the agency of the personal gods1 employed to produce effects beneficial or injurious to mankind4#e ,he also puts forth his dialectical acuteness to prepare consistent and tenable definitions of familiar general terms 7of which instances have already been given71 at least so far as to make others feel1 for the first time1 that they did not understand these terms1 though they had been always talking like persons that did understand4 ,but the ,platonic ,sokrates 7i4e4 as spokesman in the dialogues of ,plato7 enlarges both these discussions materially4 ,plato recognizes1 not simply the invisible persons or gods1 but also a separate world of invisible1 impersonal entities or objects2 one of which he postulates as the objective reality1 though only a cogitable reality1 correlating with each general term4 ,these ,entia he considers to be not merely distinct realities1 but the only true and knowable realities3 they are eternal and unchangeable1 manifested by the fact that particulars partake in them1 and imparting a partial show of stability to the indeterminate flux of particulars3 unless such separate ,universal ,entia be supposed1 there is nothing whereon cognition can fasten1 and consequently there can be no cognition at all4#f ,these are the substantive1 self-existent ,ideas1 or ,forms that ,plato first presented to the philosophical world2 sometimes with logical acuteness1 oftener still with rich poetical and imaginative colouring4 ,they constitute the main body and characteristic of the hypothesis of ,realism4 ,footnote #e3 ,xenophon1 ,memorab4 ,i4 iv4 #i-ag2 ,,iv4 iii4 #ad4 ,footnote #f3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 vi4 p4 #ihg1 b4 #e2 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #ae4 ,but1 though the main hypothesis is the same1 the accessories and manner of presentation differ materially among its different advocates4 ,in these respects1 indeed1 ,plato differs not only from others1 but also from himself4 ,systematic teaching or exposition is not his purpose1 nor does he ever give opinions in his own name4 ,we have from him an aggregate of detached dialogues1 in many of which this same hypothesis is brought under discussion1 but in each dialogue1 the spokesmen approach it from a different side2 while in others 7distinguished by various critics as the ,sokratic dialogues7 it does not come under discussion at all1 ,plato being content to remain upon the ,sokratic platform1 and to debate the meaning of general terms without postulating in correlation with them an objective reality1 apart from their respective particulars4 ,at the close of the ,platonic dialogue called ,kratylus1 ,sokrates is introduced as presenting the hypothesis of self-existent1 eternal1 unchangeable ,ideas 7exactly in the way that ,aristotle ascribes to ,plato7 as the counter-proposition to the theory of universal flux and change announced by ,herakleitus4 ,particulars are ever changing 7it is here argued7 and are thus out of the reach of cognition2 but1 unless the ,universal ,ideas above them1 such as the ,self-beautiful1 the ,self-good1 c41 be admitted as unchangeable1 objective realities1 there can be nothing either nameable or knowable3 cognition becomes impossible4 ,in the ,timus1 ,plato describes the construction of the ,kosmos by a ,divine ,architect1 and the model followed by the latter in his work4 ,the distinction is here again brought out1 and announced as capital1 between the permanent1 unalterable ,entia1 and the transient1 ever-fluctuating ,fientia1 which come and go1 but never really are4 ,entia are apprehended by the cogitant or intelligent soul of the ,kosmos1 ,fientia by the sentient or percipient soul2 the cosmical soul as a whole1 in order to suffice for both these tasks1 is made up of diverse component elements--,idem1 correlating with the first of the two1 ,diversum1 correlating with the second1 and ,idem implicated with ,diversum1 corresponding to both in conjunction4 ,the ,divine ,architect is described as constructing a ,kosmos1 composed both of soul and body1 upon the pattern of the grand pre-existent ,idea--,greek3 au7tozon or the ,self-,animal2 which included in itself as a genus the four distinct species--celestial 7gods1 visible and invisible71 terrestrial1 aerial1 and aquatic4 ,the main point that ,plato here insists upon is--the eternal and unchangeable reality of the cogitable objects called ,ideas1 prior both in time and in logical order to the transient objects of sight and touch1 and serving as an exemplar to which these latter are made to approximate imperfectly4 ,he assumes such priority1 without proof1 in the case of the ,idea of ,animal2 but1 when he touches upon the four elements--,fire1 ,air1 ,water1 ,earth--he hesitates to make the same assumption1 and thinks himself required to give a reason for it4 ,the reason that he assigns 7announced distinctly as his own7 is as follows3 ,if ,intellection 7,cogitation1 ,greek3 ,nous7 and true ,opinion are two genera distinct from each other1 there must clearly exist ,forms or ,ideas imperceptible to our senses1 and apprehended only by cogitation or intellection2 but if1 as some persons think1 true opinion is noway different from intellection1 then we must admit all the objects perceived by our senses as firm realities4 ,now the fact is 7he proceeds to say7 that true opinion is not identical with intellection1 but quite distinct1 separate1 and unlike to it4 ,intellection is communicated by teaching1 through true reasoning1 and is unshakeable by persuasion2 true opinion is communicated by persuasion and removed by counter-persuasion1 without true reasoning4 ,true opinion may belong to any man2 but intellection is the privilege only of gods and of a small section of mankind4 ,accordingly1 since the two are distinct1 the objects correlating with each of them must also be distinct from each other4 ,there must exist1 first1 primary1 eternal1 unchangeable ,forms1 apprehended by intellect or cogitation1 but imperceptible by sense2 and1 secondly1 resemblances of these bearing the same name1 generated and destroyed each in some place1 and apprehended first by sense1 afterwards by opinion4 ,thirdly1 there must be the place wherein such resemblances are generated2 a place itself imperceptible by sense1 yet postulated1 as a receptacle indispensable for them1 by a dreamy kind of computation4 ,we see here that the proof given by ,plato1 in support of the existence of ,forms as the primary realities1 is essentially psychological3 resting upon the fact that there is a distinct mental energy or faculty called ,intellection 7apart from ,sense and ,opinion71 which must have its distinct objective correlate2 and upon the farther fact1 that intellection is the high prerogative of the gods1 shared only by a few chosen men4 ,this last point of the case is more largely and emphatically brought out in the ,phdrus1 where ,sokrates delivers a highly poetical effusion respecting the partial intercommunion of the human soul with these eternal intellectual realities4 ,to contemplate them is the constant privilege of the gods2 to do so is also the aspiration of the immortal soul of man generally1 in the pre-existent state1 prior to incorporation with the human body2 though only in a few cases is such aspiration realized4 ,even those few human souls1 that have succeeded in getting sight of the intellectual ,ideas 7essences without colour1 figure1 or tactile properties71 lose all recollection of them when first entering into partnership with a human body2 but are enabled gradually to recall them1 by combining repeated impressions and experience of their resemblances in the world of sense4 ,the revival of these divine elements is an inspiration of the nature of madness2 though it is a variety of madness as much better than uninspired human reason as other varieties are worse4 ,the soul1 becoming insensible to ordinary pursuits1 contracts a passionate devotion to these ,universal ,ideas1 and to that dialectical communion1 especially with some pregnant youthful mind1 that brings them into clear separate contemplation disengaged from the limits and confusion of sense4 ,here philosophy is presented as the special inspiration of a few1 whose souls during the period of pre-existence have sufficiently caught sight of the ,universal ,ideas or ,essences2 so that these last1 though overlaid and buried when the soul is first plunged in a body1 are yet revivable afterwards under favourable circumstances1 through their imperfect copies in the world of sense2 especially by the sight of personal beauty in an ingenuous and aspiring youth1 in which case the visible copy makes nearest approach to the perfection of the ,universal ,idea or ,type4 ,at the same time1 ,plato again presents to us the ,cogitable ,universals as the only objects of true cognition1 the ,sensible ,particulars being objects merely of opinion4 ,in the ,phdon1 ,sokrates advances the same doctrine1 that the 9999perceptions of sense are full of error and confusion1 and can at best suggest nothing higher than opinion2 that true cogitation can never be attained except when the cogitant mind disengages itself from the body and comes into direct contemplation of the ,universal ,entia1 objects eternal and always the same--,the ,self-beautiful1 ,self-good1 ,self-just1 ,self-great1 ,healthy1 ,strong1 c41 all which objects are invisible1 and can be apprehended only by the cogitation or intellect4 ,it is this ,cogitable ,universal that is alone real2 ,sensible ,particulars are not real1 nor lasting1 nor trustworthy4 ,none but a few philosophers1 however1 can attain to such pure mental energy during this life2 nor even they fully and perfectly4 ,but they will attain it fully after death 7their souls being immortal71 if their lives have been passed in sober philosophical training4 ,and their souls enjoyed it before birth during the period of pre-existence2 having acquired1 before junction with the body1 the knowledge of these ,universals1 which are forgotten during childhood1 but recalled in the way of ,reminiscence1 by sensible perceptions that make a distant approach to them4 ,thus1 according to the ,phdon and some other dialogues1 all learning is merely reminiscence2 the mind is brought back1 by the laws of association1 to the knowledge of ,universal ,realities that it had possessed in its state of pre-existence4 ,particulars of sense participate in these ,universals to a certain extent1 or resemble them imperfectly2 and they are therefore called by the same name4 ,in the ,republic1 we have a repetition and copious illustration of this antithesis between the world of ,universals or ,cogitables1 which are the only unchangeable realities and the only objects of knowledge1--and the world of ,sensible ,particulars1 which are transitory and confused shadows of these ,universals1 and are objects of opinion only4 ,full and real ,ens is knowable1 ,non-,ens is altogether unknowable2 what is midway between the two is matter of opinion1 and in such midway are the ,particulars of sense4#g ,respecting these last1 no truth is attainable3 whenever you affirm a proposition respecting any of them1 you may with equal truth affirm the contrary at the same time4 ,nowhere is the contrast between the ,universals or real ,ideas 7among which the ,idea of ,good is the highest1 predominant over all the rest71 and the unreal ,particulars1 or ,percepta1 of ,sense1 more forcibly insisted upon than in the ,republic4 ,even the celestial bodies and their movements1 being among these ,percepta of sense1 are ranked among phantoms interesting but useless to observe2 they are the best of all ,percepta1 but they fall very short of the perfection that the mental eye contemplates in the ,ideal--in the true ,figures and ,numbers1 in the real ,velocity and the real ,slowness4 ,in the simile commencing the seventh book of the ,republic1 ,plato compares mankind to prisoners in a cave1 chained in one particular attitude1 so as to behold only an ever-varying multiplicity of shadows1 projected1 through the opening of the cave upon the wall before them1 by certain unseen realities behind4 ,the philosopher is one among a few1 who by training or inspiration1 have been enabled to face about from this original attitude1 and to contemplate with his mind the real unchangeable ,universals1 instead of having his eye fixed upon their particular manifestations1 at once shadowy and transient4 ,by such mental revolution he comes round from the ,perceivable to the ,cogitable1 from ,opinion to ,knowledge4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,republic4 v4 pp4 #dgg1 #dgh4 ,the distinction between these two is farther argued in the elaborate dialogue called ,thetetus1 where ,sokrates1 trying to explain what ,knowledge or ,cognition is1 refutes three proposed explanations and shows1 to his own satisfaction1 that it is not sensible perception1 that it is not true opinion1 that it is not true opinion coupled with rational explanation4 ,but he confesses himself unable to show what ,knowledge or ,cognition is1 though he continues to announce it as correlating with ,realities ,cogitable and ,universal only4#h ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,thett4 pp4 #agc1 #agf1 #ahf4 ,grote's ,plato1 ,,ii4 xxvi4 pp4 9999#cbj-cie4 ,in the passages above noticed1 and in many others besides1 we find ,plato drawing a capital distinction between ,universals eternal and unchangeable 7each of them a ,unit as well as a ,universal71#i which he affirms to be the only real ,entia1--and ,particulars transient and variable1 which are not ,entia at all1 but are always coming or going2 the ,universals being objects of cogitation and of a psychological fact called ,cognition1 which he declares to be infallible2 and the ,particulars being objects of ,sense1 and of another psychological fact radically different1 called ,opinion1 which he pronounces to be fallible and misleading4 ,plato holds1 moreover1 that the ,particulars1 though generically distinct and separate from the ,universals1 have nevertheless a certain communion or participation with them1 by virtue of which they become half existent and half cognizable1 but never attain to full reality or cognizability4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,philbus1 p4 #ae1 ,a4 ,b42 ,republic1 x4 p4 #eif1 ,a4 ,the phrase of ,milton1 unus et universus1 expresses this idea2 also the lines3-- ,sed quamlibet natura sit communior1 ,tamen seorsus extat ad modum unius1 c4 ,this is the first statement of the theory of complete and unqualified ,realism1 which came to be known in the ,middle ,ages under the phrase ,universalia ante rem or extra rem1 and to be distinguished from the two counter-theories ,universalia in re 7,aristotelian71 and ,universalia post rem 7,nominalism74 ,indeed1 the ,platonic theory goes even farther than the phrase ,universalia ante rem1 which recognizes the particular as a reality1 though posterior and derivative2 for ,plato attenuates it into phantom and shadow4 ,the problem was now clearly set out in philosophy--,what are the objects correlating with ,universal terms1 and with ,particular terms8 ,what is the relation between the two8 ,plato first gave to the world the solution called ,realism1 which lasted so long after his time4 ,we shall presently find ,aristotle taking issue with him on both the affirmations included in his theory4 ,but though ,plato first introduced this theory into philosophy1 he was neither blind to the objections against it1 nor disposed to conceal them4 ,his mind was at once poetically constructive and dialectically destructive2 to both these impulses the theory furnished ample scope1 while the form of his compositions 7separate dialogues1 with no mention of his own name7 rendered it easy to give expression either to one or to the other4 ,before ,aristotle arose to take issue with him1 we shall find him taking issue with himself1 especially in the dialogues called ,sophistes and ,parmenides1 not to mention the ,philbus1 wherein he breaks down the unity even of his sovereign ,idea1 which in the ,republic governs the ,cogitable ,world1--the ,idea of ,good4#aj ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,philbus1 pp4 #fe1 #ff4 ,see ,grote's ,plato1 ,,ii4 xxx4 pp4 #ehd1 #ehe4 ,both in the ,sophistes and in the ,parmenides1 the leading disputant introduced by ,plato is not ,sokrates1 but ,parmenides and another person 7unnamed7 of the ,eleatic school4 ,in both dialogues objections are taken against the ,realistic theory elsewhere propounded by ,plato1 though the objections adduced in the one are quite distinct from those noticed in the other4 ,in the ,sophistes1 the ,eleatic reasoner impugns successfully the theories of two classes of philosophers1 one the opposite of the other3 first1 the ,materialists1 who recognized no ,entia except the ,percepta of ,sense2 next1 the ,realistic ,idealists1 who refused to recognize these last as real ,entia1 or as anything more than transient and mutable ,generata or ,fientia1 while they confined the title of ,entia to the ,forms1 cogitable1 incorporeal1 eternal1 immutable1 neither acting on anything1 nor acted upon by anything4 ,these persons are called in the ,sophistes ,friends of ,forms1 and their theory is exactly what we have already cited out of so many other dialogues of ,plato1 drawing the marked line of separation between ,entia and ,fientia2 between the ,immutable1 which alone is real and cognizable1 and the ,mutable1 neither real nor cognizable4 ,the ,eleate in the ,sophistes controverts this ,platonic theory1 and maintains that among the ,universal ,entia there are included items mutable as well as immutable2 that both are real and both cognizable2 that ,non-,ens 7instead of being set in glaring contrast with ,ens1 as the totally incogitable against the infallibly cognizable7#aa is one among the multiplicity of ,real ,forms1 meaning only what is different from ,ens1 and therefore cognizable not less than ,ens2 that ,percepta and ,cogitata are alike real1 yet both only relatively real1 correlating with minds percipient and cogitant4 ,thus1 the reasoning in the ,sophistes1 while it sets aside the doctrine of ,universalia ante rem1 does not mark out any other relation between ,universals and ,particulars 7neither in re nor post rem74 ,it discusses chiefly the intercommunion or reciprocal exclusion of ,universals with respect to each other2 and upon this point1 far from representing them as objects of infallible ,cognition as contrasted with ,opinion1 it enrolls both ,opinion and ,discourse among the ,universals themselves1 and declares both of them to be readily combinable with ,non-,ens and ,falsehood4 ,so that we have here error and fallibility recognized in the region of ,universals1 as well as in that of ,particulars4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,republic1 v4 pp4 #dgh1 #dgi4 ,but it is principally in the dialogue ,parmenides that ,plato discusses with dialectical acuteness the relation of ,universals to their ,particulars2 putting aside the intercommunion 7affirmed in the ,sophistes7 or reciprocal exclusion between one ,universal and another1 as an hypothesis at least supremely difficult to vindicate1 if at all admissible4#ab ,in the dialogue1 ,sokrates is introduced in the unusual character of a youthful and ardent aspirant in philosophy1 defending the ,platonic theory of ,ideas as we have seen it proclaimed in the ,republic and in the ,timus4 ,the veteran ,parmenides appears as the opponent to cross-examine him2 and not only impugns the theory by several interrogatories which ,sokrates cannot answer1 but also intimates that there remain behind other objections equally serious requiring answer4 ,yet at the same time he declares that1 unless the theory be admitted1 and unless ,universalia ante rem can be sustained as existent1 there is no trustworthy cognition attainable1 nor any end to be served by philosophical debate4 ,moreover1 ,parmenides warns ,sokrates that1 before he can acquire a mental condition competent to defend the theory1 he must go through numerous preliminary dialectical exercises2 following out both the affirmative and the negative hypotheses in respect to a great variety of ,universals severally4 ,to illustrate the course prescribed1 ,parmenides gives a long specimen of this dialectic in handling his own doctrine of ,ens ,unum4 ,he takes first the hypothesis ,si ,unum est1 next the hypothesis ,si ,unum non est2 and he deduces from each1 by ingenious subtleties1 double and contradictory conclusions4 ,these he sums up at the end1 challenging ,sokrates to solve the puzzles before affirming his thesis4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,parmenid4 p4 #abi1 ,e42 with ,stallbaum's ,prolegomena to that dialogue1 pp4 #ch-db4 ,apart from these antinomies at the close of the dialogue1 the cross-examination of ,sokrates by ,parmenides1 in the middle of it1 brings out forcibly against the ,realistic theory objections such as those urged against it by the ,nominalists of the ,middle ,ages4 ,in the first place1 we find that ,plato conceived the theory itself differently from ,porphyry and the philosophers that wrote subsequently to the ,peripatetic criticism4 ,porphyry and his successors put the question1 ,whether ,genera and ,species had a separate existence1 apart from the ,individuals composing them8 ,now1 the world of ,forms 7the ,cogitable or ,ideal world as opposed to the ,sensible7 is not here conceived by ,plato as peopled in the first instance by ,genera and ,species4 ,its first tenants are ,attributes1 and attributes distinctly relative--,likeness1 ,one and ,many1 ,justice1 ,beauty1 ,goodness1 c4 ,sokrates1 being asked by ,parmenides whether he admits ,forms corresponding with these names1 answers unhesitatingly in the affirmative4 ,he is next asked whether he admits forms corresponding to the names ,man1 ,fire1 ,water1 c41 and1 instead of replying in the affirmative1 intimates that he does not feel sure4 ,lastly1 the question is put whether there are ,forms corresponding to the names of mean objects--,mud1 ,hair1 ,dirt1 c4 ,at first he answers emphatically in the negative1 and treats the affirmative as preposterous2 there exist no cogitable ,hair1 c41 but only the object of sense that we so denominate4 ,yet1 on second thoughts1 he is not without misgiving that there may be ,forms even of these2 though the supposition is so repulsive to him that he shakes it off as much as he can4 ,upon this last expression of sentiment ,parmenides comments1 ascribing it to the juvenility of ,sokrates1 and intimating that1 when ,sokrates has become more deeply imbued with philosophy1 he will cease to set aside any of these objects as unworthy4 ,here we see that1 in the theory of ,realism as conceived by ,sokrates1 the ,self-,existent ,universals are not ,genera and ,species as such1 but ,attributes--not ,second ,substances or ,essences1 but ,accidents or ,attributes1 e4g4 ,quality1 ,quantity1 ,relation1 c41 to use the language afterwards introduced in the ,aristotelian ,categories2 that no ,genera or ,species are admitted except with hesitation2 and that the mean and undignified among them are scarcely admissible at all4 ,this sentiment of dignity1 associated with the ,universalia ante rem1 and emotional necessity for tracing back particulars to an august and respected origin1 is to be noted as a marked and lasting feature of the ,realistic creed2 and it even passed on to the ,universalia in re1 as afterwards affirmed by ,aristotle4 ,parmenides here takes exception to it 7and so does ,plato elsewhere#ac7 as inconsistent with faithful adherence to scientific analogy4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,sophist4 p4 #bbg1 ,a4 ,politikus1 p4 #bff1 ,d4 ,parmenides then proceeds 7interrogating ,sokrates7 first to state what the ,realistic theory is 7,universals apart from ,particulars--,particulars apart from ,universals1 yet having some participation in them1 and named after them71 next to bring out the difficulties attaching to it4 ,the ,universal or ,form 7he argues7 cannot be entire in each of its many separate particulars2 nor yet is it divisible1 so that a part can be in one particular1 and a part in another4 ,for take the ,forms ,great1 ,equal1 ,small2 ,equal magnitudes are equal because they partake in the ,form of ,equality4 ,but how can a part of the ,form ,equality1 less than the whole ,form1 cause the magnitudes to be equal8 ,how can the ,form ,smallness have any parts less than itself1 or how can it be greater than anything8 ,the ,form cannot be divided1 nor can it co-exist undivided in each separate particular2 accordingly1 particulars can have no participation in it at all4 ,again1 you assume a ,form of ,greatness1 because you see many particular objects1 each of which appears to you great2 this being the point of resemblance between them4 ,but if you compare the ,form of ,greatness with any or all of the particular great objects1 you will perceive a resemblance between them2 this will require you to assume a higher ,form1 and so on upward without limit4 ,sokrates1 thus embarrassed1 starts the hypothesis that perhaps each of these ,forms may be a cogitation1 and nothing more1 existing only within the mind4 ,how8 rejoins ,parmenides4 ,can there be a cogitation of nothing at all8 ,must not each cogitation have a real cogitatum correlating with it1--in this case1 the one ,form that is identical throughout many particulars8 ,if you say that particulars partake in the ,form1 and that each ,form is nothing but a cogitation1 does not this imply that each particular is itself cogitant8 ,again ,sokrates urges that the ,forms are constant1 unalterable1 stationary in nature2 that particulars resemble them1 and participate in them only so far as to resemble them4 ,but 7rejoins ,parmenides71 if particulars resemble the ,form1 the ,form must resemble them2 accordingly1 you must admit another and higher ,form1 as the point of resemblance between the ,form and its particulars2 and so on1 upwards4 ,and farther 7continues ,parmenides71 even when admitting these ,universal ,forms as self-existent1 how can we know anything about them8 ,forms can correlate only with ,forms1 ,particulars only with ,particulars4 ,thus1 if ,i1 an individual man1 am master1 ,i correlate with another individual man1 who is my servant1 and he on his side with me4 ,but the ,form of mastership1 the ,universal self-existent ,master1 must correlate with the ,form of servantship1 the ,universal ,servant4 ,the correlation does not subsist between members of the two different worlds1 but between different members of the same world respectively4 ,thus the ,form of ,cognition correlates with the ,form of ,truth2 and the ,form of each variety of ,cognition1 with the ,form of the corresponding variety of ,truth4 ,but we1 as individual subjects1 do not possess in ourselves the ,form of ,cognition2 our cognition is our own1 correlating with such truth as belongs to it and to ourselves4 ,our cognition cannot reach to the ,form of ,truth1 nor therefore to any other ,form2 we can know nothing of the ,self-good1 ,self-beautiful1 ,self-just1 c41 even supposing such ,forms to exist4 ,these acute and subtle arguments are nowhere answered by ,plato4 ,they remain as unsolved difficulties1 embarrassing the ,realistic theory2 they are reinforced by farther difficulties no less grave1 included in the dialectical antinomies of ,parmenides at the close of the dialogue1 and by an unknown number of others indicated as producible1 though not actually produced4 ,yet still ,plato1 with full consciousness of these difficulties1 asserts unequivocally that1 unless the ,realistic theory can be sustained1 philosophical research is fruitless1 and truth cannot be reached4 ,we see thus that the author of the theory has also left on record some of the most forcible arguments against it4 ,it appears from ,aristotle 7though we do not learn the fact from the ,platonic dialogues71 that ,plato1 in his later years1 symbolized the ,ideas or ,forms under the denomination of ,ideal ,numbers1 generated by implication of ,the ,one with what he called ,the ,great and ,little1 or the ,indeterminate ,dyad4 ,this last1 however1 is not the programme wherein the ,realistic theory stands opposed to ,nominalism4 ,but the dialogue ,parmenides1 though full of acuteness on the negative side1 not only furnishes no counter-theory1 but asserts continued allegiance to the ,realistic theory1 which passes as ,plato's doctrine to his successors4 ,to impugn1 forcibly and even unanswerably1 a theory at once so sweeping and so little fortified by positive reasons1 was what many dialecticians of the age could do4 ,but to do this1 and at the same time to construct a counter-theory1 was a task requiring higher powers of mind4 ,one1 however1 of ,plato's disciples and successors was found adequate to the task--,aristotle4 ,the ,realistic ,ontology of ,plato is founded 7as ,aristotle himself remarks7 upon mistrust and contempt of perception of sense1 as bearing entirely on the flux of particulars1 which never stand still so as to become objects of knowledge4 ,all reality1 and all cognoscibility1 were supposed to reside in the separate world of ,cogitable ,universals 7extra rem or ante rem71 of which1 in some confused manner1 particulars were supposed to partake4 ,the ,universal1 apart from its particulars1 was clearly and fully knowable1 furnishing propositions constantly and infallibly true3 the ,universal as manifested in its particulars was never fully knowable1 nor could ever become the subject of propositions1 except such as were sometimes true and sometimes false4 ,against this separation of the ,universal from its ,particulars1 ,aristotle entered a strong protest2 as well as against the subsidiary hypothesis of a participation of the latter in the former2 which participation1 when the two had been declared separate1 appeared to him not only untenable and uncertified1 but unintelligible4 ,his arguments are interesting1 as being among the earliest objections known to us against ,realism4 #a4 ,realism is a useless multiplication of existences1 serving no purpose4 ,wherever a number of particulars--be they substances1 eternal or perishable1 or be they qualities1 or relations--bear the same name1 and thus have a ,universal in re predicable of them in common1 in every such case ,plato assumes a ,universal extra rem1 or a separate self-existent ,form2 which explains nothing1 and merely doubles the total to be summed up4#ad ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iij1 a4 #cd2 ,m4 iv4 p4 #ajgi1 a4 #b4 ,here we have the first appearance of the argument that ,william of ,ockham1 the ,nominalist1 put in the foreground of his case against ,realism3 ,entia non sunt multiplicanda prter necessitatem4 #b4 ,plato's arguments in support of ,realism are either inconclusive1 or prove too much4 ,wherever there is cognition 7he argues71 there must exist an eternal and unchangeable object of cognition1 apart from particulars1 which are changeable and perishable4 ,no1 replies ,aristotle3 cognition does not require the ,universale extra rem2 for the ,universale in re1 the constant predicate of all the particulars1 is sufficient as an object of cognition4 ,moreover1 if the argument were admitted1 it would prove that there existed separate ,forms or ,universals of mere negations2 for many of the constant predicates are altogether negative4 ,again1 if ,self-existent ,universals are to be assumed corresponding to all our cogitations1 we must assume ,universals of extinct particulars1 and even of fictitious particulars1 such as hippocentaurs or chimeras2 for of these1 too1 we have phantasms or concepts in our minds4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iij1 b4 #ad2 ,scholia1 p4 #efe1 b4 #i1 ,br4 #c4 ,the most subtle disputants on this matter include ,relata1 among the ,universal ,ideas or ,forms4 ,this is absurd1 because these do not constitute any ,genus by themselves4 ,these disputants have also urged against the ,realistic theory that powerful and unsolved objection1 entitled ,the ,third ,man4#af ,footnote #af3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iij1 b4 #ae3 ,greek3 oi7 a7kribe_/steroi tn lo_/gn4 ,both the points here noticed appear in the ,parmenides of ,plato4 ,the objection called ,the ,third ,man is expressed by saying that1 if there be a ,form of man1 resembling individual men1 you must farther postulate some higher ,form1 marking the point of resemblance between the two2 and so on higher1 without end4 ,the authenticity of the ,platonic ,parmenides is disputed by ,ueberweg 7,untersuchungen ber die ,echtheit und ,zeitfolge der ,platonischen ,schriften1 pp4 #agf-aha71 upon the ground 7among others7 that1 while ,aristotle never cites the dialogue by its title1 nor ever makes probable allusion to it1 the ,parmenides advances against the theory of the ,platonic ,ideas this objection of ,aristotle's1 known under the name of ,the ,third ,man4 ,aristotle 7says ,ueberweg71 if he had known the ,parmenides1 would not have advanced this objection as his own4 ,we must therefore suppose that the ,parmenides was composed later than ,aristotle1 and borrowed this objection from ,aristotle4 ,in reply to this argument ,i transcribe the passage of ,aristotle 7,metaphys4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iij1 b4 #ae7 to which ,ueberweg himself refers3 ,greek3 e7_/ti de oi7 a7kribe_/steroi tn lo_/gn oi7 men tn pro_/s ti poiousin i7de_/as1 7n ou7_/ phamen ei7nai kath' au7to ge_/nos1 oi7 de ton tri_/ton a7_/nthrpon le_/gousin4 ,the same words 7with the exception of ,greek3 phasi_/n in place of ,greek3 phame_/n7 are repeated in ,m4 p4 #ajgi1 a4 #aa4 ,now these words plainly indicate that ,aristotle does not profess to advance the objection1 called ,greek3 o7 tri_/tos a7_/nthrpos1 as his own1 or as broached by himself4 ,he derives it from what he calls ,greek3 oi7 a7kribe_/steroi tn lo_/gn4 ,the charge against ,aristotle1 therefore1 of advancing as his own an objection which had already been suggested by ,plato himself in the ,parmenides1 is unfounded4 ,and it is the more unfounded1 because ,aristotle1 in the first book of the ,metaphysica1 speaks in the language of a ,platonist1 and considers himself as partly responsible for the doctrine of ,ideas3 ,greek3 dei_/knumen1 phame_/n1 oi7o_/metha1 c4 7,alexand4 in ,schol4 p4 #efc1 b4 #bg1 ,brand47 ,but what are we to understand by these words--,greek3 oi7 a7kribe_/steroi tn lo_/gn--from which ,aristotle derives the objection8 ,the words refer to certain expositions or arguments 7oral1 or written1 or both7 which were within the knowledge of ,aristotle1 and were of a peculiarly subtle and analytical character4 ,among them is very probably included the ,platonic ,parmenides itself1 distinguished as it is for extreme subtlety4 7,see ,stallbaum's ,prolegg4 pp4 #bdi1 #bgg1 #ccg1 who says1 ,in uno fer ,parmenide idearum doctrina subtilius investigatur47 ,i see no reason why it should not be included within the fair and reasonable meaning of the words4 ,and such being the case1 ,i cannot go along with ,ueberweg 7and other critics7 who say that ,aristotle has not even made an indirect allusion to the ,parmenides4 ,but why did not ,aristotle specify the ,parmenides directly and by name8 ,i do not know what was his reason4 ,we may feel surprise 7as ,stallbaum feels1 p4 #ccg7 that he does not2 but1 when critics infer from the omission that he did not know the dialogue as a work of ,plato1 ,i contest the inference4 ,we see that ,alexander1 in his elaborate commentary 7p4 #eff1 ,schol4 ,brand47 makes no allusion to the ,parmenides1 though he alludes to ,eudmus1 to ,diodrus1 ,kronus1 and to the manner in which the objection called ,greek3 o7 tri_/tos a7_/nthrpos was handled by various ,sophists4 ,now we are fully assured that the ,parmenides was acknowledged as a work of ,plato1 long before the time of ,alexander 7since it is included in the catalogue of ,thrasyllus72 yet he1 the most instructed of all the commentators1 makes no allusion to it4 ,why he did not1 ,i cannot say1 but his omission affords no ground for concluding that he did not know it1 or did not trust its authenticity4 #d4 ,the supporters of these ,self-existent ,universals trace them to two principia--,the ,one1 and the ,indeterminate ,dyad2 which they affirm to be prior in existence even to the ,universals themselves4 ,but this cannot be granted2 for the ,idea of ,number must be logically prior to the ,idea of the ,dyad2 but the ,idea of ,number is relative1 and the ,relative can never be prior to the ,absolute or ,self-existent4 #e4 ,if we grant that1 wherever there is one constant predicate belonging to many particulars1 or wherever there is stable and trustworthy cognition1 in all such cases a ,self-existent ,universal ,correlate extra rem is to be assumed1 we shall find that this applies not merely to ,substances or ,essences1 but also to the other ,categories--,quality1 ,quantity1 ,relation1 c4 ,but hereby we exclude the possibility of participation in them by ,particulars2 since from such participation the ,particular derives its ,substance or ,essence alone1 not its accidental predicates4 ,thus the ,self-existent ,universal ,dyad is eternal3 but a particular pair1 which derives its essential property of doubleness from partaking in this ,universal ,dyad1 does not at the same time partake of eternity1 unless by accident4 ,accordingly1 there are no ,universal ,ideas1 except of ,substances or ,essences3 the common name1 when applied to the world of sense and to that of cogitation1 signifies the same thing--,substance or ,essence4 ,it is unmeaning to talk of anything else as signified--any other predicate common to many4 ,well then1 if the ,form of the ,universals and the ,form of those ,particulars that participate in the ,universals be the same1 we shall have something common to both the one and the other1 so that the objection called ,the ,third ,man will become applicable1 and a higher ,form must be postulated4 ,but1 if the ,form of the ,universals and the ,form of the participating ,particulars1 be not identical1 then the same name1 as signifying both1 will be used equivocally2 just as if you applied the same denomination man to ,kallias and to a piece of wood1 without any common property to warrant it4 #f4 ,but the greatest difficulty of all is to understand how these ,cogitable ,universals1 not being causes of any change or movement1 contribute in any way to the objects of sense1 either to the eternal or to the perishable2 or how they assist us towards the knowledge thereof1 being not in them1 and therefore not their substance or essence2 or how they stand in any real relation to their participants1 being not immanent therein4 ,particulars certainly do not proceed from these ,universals1 in any intelligible sense4 ,to say that the ,universals are archetypes1 and that ,particulars partake in them1 is unmeaning1 and mere poetic metaphor4 ,for where is the working force to mould them in conformity with the ,universals8 ,any one thing may be like1 or may become like1 to any other particular thing1 by accident1 or without any regular antecedent cause to produce such assimilation4 ,the same particular substance1 moreover1 will have not one universal archetype only1 but several4 ,thus1 the same individual man will have not only the ,self-animal and the ,self-biped1 but also the ,self-man1 as archetype4 ,then again1 there will be universal archetypes1 not merely for particular sensible objects1 but also for ,universals themselves2 thus the genus will be an archetype for its various species2 so that the same which is now archetype will1 under other circumstances1 be copy4 #g4 ,furthermore1 it seems impossible that what is ,substance or ,essence can be separate from that whereof it is the substance or essence4 ,how then can the ,universals1 if they be the essences of sensible things1 have any existence apart from those sensible things8 ,plato tells us in the ,phdon1 that the ,forms or ,universals are the causes why particulars both exist at all1 and come into such or such modes of existence4 ,but even if we assume ,universals as existing1 still the ,particulars participant therein will not come into being1 unless there be some efficient cause to produce movement2 moreover1 many other things come into being1 though there be no ,universals correlating therewith1 e4g4 a house1 or a ring4 ,the same causes that were sufficient to bring these last into being1 will be sufficient to bring all particulars into being1 without assuming any ,universals extra rem at all4 #h4 ,again1 if the ,universals or ,forms are ,numbers1 how can they ever be causes8 ,even if we suppose ,particulars to be ,numbers also1 how can one set of ,numbers be causes to the others8 ,there can be no such causal influence1 even if one set be eternal1 and the other perishable4#ag ,footnote #ag3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,a4 p4 #iia1 b4 #ac4 ,several other objections are made by ,aristotle against that variety of the ,platonic theory wherein the ,ideas were commuted into ,ideal ,numbers4 ,these objections do not belong to the controversy of ,realism against ,nominalism4 ,out of the many objections raised by ,aristotle against ,plato1 we have selected such as bear principally upon the theory of ,realism2 that is1 upon the theory of ,universalia ante rem or extra rem--self-existent1 archetypal1 cogitable substances1 in which ,particulars faintly participate4 ,the objections are not superior in acuteness1 and they are decidedly inferior1 in clearness of enunciation1 to those that ,plato himself produces in the ,parmenides4 ,moreover1 several of them are founded upon ,aristotle's point of view1 and would have failed to convince ,plato4 ,the great merit of ,aristotle is1 that he went beyond the negative of the ,parmenides1 asserted this new point of view of his own1 and formulated it into a counter-theory4 ,he rejected altogether the separate and exclusive reality which ,plato had claimed for his ,absolutes of the cogitable world1 as well as the derivative and unreal semblance that alone ,plato accorded to the sensible world4 ,without denying the distinction of the two1 as conceivable and nameable1 he maintained that truth and cognition required that they should be looked at in implication with each other4 ,and he went even a step farther1 in antithesis to ,plato1 by reversing the order of the two4 ,instead of considering the ,cogitable ,universals alone as real and complete in themselves1 and the ,sensible ,particulars as degenerate and confused semblances of them1 he placed complete reality in the ,sensible ,particulars alone1#ah and treated the ,cogitable ,universals as contributory appendages thereto2 some being essential1 others non-essential1 but all of them relative1 and none of them independent integers4 ,his philosophy was a complete revolution as compared with ,parmenides and ,plato2 a revolution1 too1 the more calculated to last1 because he embodied it in an elaborate and original theory of ,logic1 ,metaphysics1 and ,ontology4 ,he was the first philosopher that1 besides recognizing the equivocal character of those general terms whereon speculative debate chiefly turns1 endeavoured methodically to set out and compare the different meanings of each term1 and their relations to each other4 ,footnote #ah3 ,aristotle takes pains to vindicate against both ,plato and the ,herakleiteans the dignity of the ,sensible ,world4 ,they that depreciate sensible objects as perpetually changing1 unstable1 and unknowable1 make the mistake 7he observes7 of confining their attention to the sublunary interior of the ,kosmos1 where1 indeed1 generation and destruction largely prevail4 ,but this is only a small portion of the entire ,kosmos4 ,in the largest portion--the visible1 celestial1 superlunary regions--there is no generation or destruction at all1 nothing but permanence and uniformity4 ,in appreciating the sensible world 7,aristotle says7 philosophers ought to pardon the shortcomings of the smaller portion on account of the excellences of the larger2 and not condemn both together on account of the smaller 7,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 a4 #cj74 ,however much the ,ontology of ,aristotle may fail to satisfy modern exigencies1 still1 as compared with the ,platonic ,realism1 it was a considerable improvement4 ,instead of adopting ,ens as a self-explaining term1 contrasted with the ,generated and ,perishable 7the doctrine of ,plato in the ,republic1 ,phdon1 and ,timus71 he discriminates several distinct meanings of ,ens2 a discrimination not always usefully pursued1 but tending in the main towards a better theory4 ,the distinction between ,ens potential1 and ,ens actual1 does not belong directly to the question between ,realism and ,nominalism1 yet it is a portion of that philosophical revolution wrought by ,aristotle against ,plato--displacement of the seat of reality1 and transfer of it from the ,cogitable ,universal to the ,sensible ,particular4 ,the direct enunciation of this change is contained in his distinction of ,ens into ,fundamental and ,concomitant 7,greek3 sumbebko_/s71 and his still greater refinement on the same principle by enumerating the ten varieties of ,ens called ,categories or ,predicaments4#ai ,he will not allow ,ens 7nor ,unum7 to be a genus1 partible into species3 he recognizes it only as a word of many analogous meanings1 one of them principal and fundamental1 the rest derivative and subordinate thereto1 each in its own manner4 ,aristotle thus establishes a graduated scale of ,entia1 each having its own value and position1 and its own mode of connexion with the common centre4 ,that common centre ,aristotle declared to be of necessity some individual object--,hoc ,aliquid1 ,that ,man1 ,this ,horse1 c4 ,this was the common subject1 to which all the other ,entia belonged as predicates1 and without which none of them had any reality4 ,we here fall into the language of ,logic1 the first theory of which we owe to ,aristotle4 ,his ontological classification was adapted to that theory4 ,footnote #ai3 ,in enumerating the ,ten ,categories1 ,aristotle takes his departure from the ,proposition--,homo currit--,homo vincit4 ,he assumes a particular individual as subject2 and he distributes1 under ten general heads1 all the information that can be asked or given about that subject--all the predicates that can be affirmed or denied thereof4 ,see ,ch4 iii41 especially p4 #gc1 seq4 ,as we are here concerned only with the different ways of conceiving the relation between the ,particular and the ,universal1 we are not called on to criticize the well-known decuple enumeration of ,categories or ,predicaments given by ,aristotle1 both in his treatise called by that name and elsewhere4 ,for our purpose it is enough to point out that the particular sensible ,hoc ,aliquid is declared to be the ultimate subject1 to which all ,universals attach1 as determinants or accompaniments2 and that1 if this condition be wanting1 the unattached ,universal cannot rank among complete ,entia4 ,the subject or ,first ,substance1 which can never become a predicate1 is established as the indispensable ultimate subject for all predicates2 if that disappears1 all predicates disappear along with it4 ,the ,particular thus becomes the keystone of the arch whereon all ,universals rest4 ,aristotle is indeed careful to point out a gradation in these predicates3 some are essential to the subject1 and thus approach so near to the ,first ,substance that he calls them ,second ,substances2 others1 and the most in number1 are not thus essential2 these last are ,concomitants or ,accidents1 and some of them fall so much short of complete ,entity that he describes them as near to ,non-,entia4#bj ,but all of them1 essential or unessential1 are alike constituents or appendages of the ,first ,substance or ,particular ,subject1 and have no reality in any other character4 ,footnote #bj3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,e4 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ba3 ,greek3 phai_/netas ga_/r to_/ sumbebkos e7ggu_/s ti tou m o7_/ntos4 ,there cannot be a stronger illustration of the difference between the ,platonic and the ,aristotelian point of view1 than the fact that ,plato applies the same designation to all particular objects of sense--that they are only midway between ,entia and ,non-,entia 7,republic1 v4 pp4 #dgh-dgi74 ,we thus have the counter-theory of ,aristotle against the ,platonic ,realism4 ,instead of separate ,universal ,substances1 containing in themselves full reality1 and forfeiting much of that reality when they faded down into the shadowy copies called ,particulars1 he inverts the ,platonic order1 announces full reality to be the privilege of the ,particular ,sensible1 and confines the function of the ,universal to that of a predicate1 in or along with the ,particular4 ,there is no doctrine that he protests against more frequently than the ascribing of separate reality to the ,universal4 ,the tendency to do this1 he signalizes as a natural but unfortunate illusion1 lessening the beneficial efficacy of universal demonstrative reasoning4#ba ,and he declares it to be a corollary from this view of the ,particular as indispensable subject along with the ,universal as its predicate--,that the first principles of ,demonstration in all the separate theoretical sciences must be obtained by ,induction from particulars3 first by impressions of sense preserved in the memory2 then by multiplied remembrances enlarged into one experience2 lastly1 by many experiences generalized into one principle by the ,nos4#bb ,footnote #ba3 ,aristot4 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 xxiv4 p4 #he1 a4 #ca1 b4 #ai4 ,footnote #bb3 ,see the concluding chapter of the ,analytica ,posteriora4 ,a similar doctrine is stated by ,plato in the ,phdon 7p4 #if1 ,b7 as one among the intellectual phases that ,sokrates had passed through in the course of his life1 without continuing in them4 ,while ,aristotle thus declares ,induction to be the source from whence ,demonstration in these separate sciences draws its first principles1 we must at the same time acknowledge that his manner of treating ,science is not always conformable to this declaration1 and that he often seems to forget ,induction altogether4 ,this is the case not only in his ,first ,philosophy1 or ,metaphysics1 but also in his ,physics4 ,he there professes to trace out what he calls beginnings1 causes1 elements1 c41 and he analyses most of the highest generalities4 ,yet still these analytical enquiries 7whatever be their value7 are usually1 if not always1 kept in subordination to the counter-theory that he had set up against the ,platonic ,realism4 ,complete reality resides 7he constantly repeats7 only in the particular sensible substances and sensible facts or movements that compose the aggregate ,kosmos3 which is not generated1 but eternal1 both as to substance and as to movement4 ,if these sensible substances disappear1 nothing remains4 ,the beginnings and causes exist only relatively to these particulars4 ,form1 ,matter1 ,privation1 are not real ,beings1 antecedent to the ,kosmos1 and pre-existent generators of the substances constituting the ,kosmos2 they are logical fragments or factors1 obtained by mental analysis and comparison1 assisting to methodize our philosophical point of view or conception of those substances1 but incapable of being understood1 and having no value of their own1 apart from the substances4 ,some such logical analysis 7that of ,aristotle or some other7 is an indispensable condition even of the most strictly inductive philosophy4 ,there are some portions of the writings of ,aristotle 7especially the third book ,de ,anim and the twelfth book of the ,metaphysica7 where he appears to lose sight of the limit here indicated2 but1 with few exceptions1 we find him constantly remembering1 and often repeating1 the great truth formulated in his ,categories3 that full or substantive reality resides only in the ,hoc ,aliquid1 with its predicates implicated with it1 and that even the highest of these predicates 7,second ,substances7 have no reality apart from some one of their particulars4 ,we must recollect that1 though ,aristotle denies to the predicates a separate reality1 he recognizes in them an adjective reality1 as accompaniments and determinants3 he contemplates all the ten ,categories as distinct varieties of existence4#bc ,this is sufficient as a basis for abstraction1 whereby we can name them and reason upon them as distinct objects of thought or points of view1 although none of them come into reality except as implicated with a sensible particular4 ,of such reasoning ,aristotle's ,first ,philosophy chiefly consists2 and he introduces peculiar phrases to describe this distinction of reason between two different points of view1 where the real object spoken of is one and the same4 ,the frequency of the occasions taken to point out that distinction marks his anxiety to keep the ,first ,philosophy in harmony with the theory of ,reality announced in his ,categories4 ,footnote #bc3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajag1 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 o7sachs gar le_/getai 7ta sch_/mata ts katgori_/as71 tosautachs to ei7nai smai_/nei4 ,the ,categories of ,aristotle appear to have become more widely known than any other part of his philosophy4 ,they were much discussed by the sects coming after him2 and1 even when not adopted1 were present to speculative minds as a scheme to be amended4#bd ,most of the arguments turned upon the nine later ,categories3 it was debated whether these were properly enumerated and discriminated1 and whether the enumeration as a whole was exhaustive4 ,footnote #bd3 ,this is the just remark of ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre1 p4 #bag4 ,with these details1 however1 the question between ,realism and its counter-theory 7whether ,conceptualism or ,nominalism7 is not materially concerned4 ,the standard against ,realism was raised by ,aristotle in the ,first ,category1 when he proclaimed the ,hoc ,aliquid to be the only complete ,ens1 and the ,universal to exist only along with it as a predicate1 being nothing in itself apart2 and when he enumerated ,quality as one among the predicates1 and nothing beyond4 ,in the ,platonic ,realism 7,phdon1 ,timus1 ,parmenides7 what ,aristotle called ,quality was the highest and most incontestable among all ,substances--the ,good1 the ,beautiful1 the ,just1 c42 what ,aristotle called ,second ,substance was also ,substance in the ,platonic ,realism1 though not so incontestably2 but what ,aristotle called ,first ,substance was in the ,platonic ,realism no ,substance at all1 but only one among a multitude of confused and transient shadows4 ,it is in the ,first and ,third ,categories that the capital antithesis of ,aristotle against the ,platonic ,realism is contained4 ,as far as that antithesis is concerned1 it matters little whether the aggregate of predicates be subdivided under nine general heads 7,categories7 or under three4 ,in the century succeeding ,aristotle1 the ,stoic philosophers altered his ,categories1 and drew up a new list of their own1 containing only four distinct heads instead of ten4 ,we have no record or explanation of the ,stoic ,categories from any of their authors2 so that we are compelled to accept the list on secondary authority1 from the comments of critics1 mostly opponents4 ,but1 as far as we can make out1 they retained in their ,first ,category the capital feature of ,aristotle's ,first ,category--the primacy of the ,first ,substance or ,hoc ,aliquid and its exclusive privilege of imparting reality to all the other ,categories4 ,indeed1 the ,stoics seem not only to have retained this characteristic1 but to have exaggerated it4 ,they did not recognize so close an approach of the ,universal to the ,particular1 as is implied by giving to it a second place in the same ,category1 and calling it ,second ,substance4 ,the ,first ,category of the ,stoics 7,something or ,subject7 included only particular substances2 all ,universals were by them ranked in the other ,categories1 being regarded as negations of substances1 and designated by the term ,non-,somethings--,non-,substances4#be ,footnote #be3 ,prantl1 ,gesch4 der ,logik1 ,i4 vi4 p4 #dbj3 ,greek3 ou7_/tina ta7koina par' au7tois le_/getai4 c4 ,the ,neo-,platonist ,plotinus1 in the third century after the ,christian era1 agreed with the ,stoics 7though looking from the opposite point of view7 in disapproving ,aristotle's arrangement of ,second ,substance in the same ,category with ,first ,substance4#bf ,he criticizes at some length both the ,aristotelian list of ,categories1 and the ,stoic list2 but he falls back into the ,platonic and even the ,parmenidean point of view4 ,his capital distinction is between ,cogitables and ,sensibles4 ,the ,cogitables are in his view the most real 7i4e4 the ,aristotelian ,second ,substance is more real than the ,first72 among them the highest1 ,unum or ,bonum1 is the grand fountain and sovereign of all the rest4 ,plotinus thus departed altogether from the ,aristotelian ,categories1 and revived the ,platonic or ,parmenidean ,realism2 yet not without some ,aristotelian modifications4 ,but it is remarkable that in this departure his devoted friend and scholar ,porphyry did not follow him4 ,porphyry not only composed an ,introduction to the ,categories of ,aristotle1 but also vindicated them at great length1 in a separate commentary1 against the censures of ,plotinus2 ,dexippus1 ,jamblichus1 and ,simplikius1 followed in the same track4#bg ,still1 though ,porphyry stood forward both as admirer and champion of the ,aristotelian ,categories1 he did not consider that the question raised by the ,first ,category of ,aristotle against the ,platonic ,realism was finally decided4 ,this is sufficiently proved by the three problems cited above out of the ,introduction of ,porphyry2 where he proclaims it to be a deep and difficult enquiry1 whether ,genera and ,species had not a real substantive existence apart from the individuals composing them4 ,aristotle1 both in the ,categories and in many other places1 had declared his opinion distinctly in the negative against ,plato2 but ,porphyry had not made up his mind between the two1 though he insists1 in language very ,aristotelian1 on the distinction between ,first and ,second ,substance4#bh ,footnote #bf3 ,plotinus1 ,ennead4 vi4 #a1 #b4 ,footnote #bg3 ,simplikius1 ,schol4 in ,aristotel4 ,categ4 p4 #dj1 a1 b1 ,brandis4 ,footnote #bh3 ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 ,i4 xi4 p4 #fcd1 n4 #fi4 ,upon this account ,prantl finds ,porphyry guilty of empiricism in its extreme crudeness--jene usserste ,rohheit des ,empirismus4 ,through the translations and manuals of ,bothius and others1 the ,categories of ,aristotle were transmitted to the ,latin ,churchmen1 and continued to be read even through the darkest ages1 when the ,analytica and the ,topica were unknown or neglected4 ,the ,aristotelian discrimination between ,first and ,second ,substance was thus always kept in sight1 and ,bothius treated it much in the same manner as ,porphyry had done before him4#bi ,alcuin1 ,rhabanus ,maurus1 and ,eric of ,auxerre1#cj in the eighth and ninth centuries1 repeated what they found in ,bothius1 and upheld the ,aristotelian tradition unimpaired4 ,but ,scotus ,erigena 7d4 #hhj ,a4,d47 took an entirely opposite view1 and reverted to the ,platonic traditions1 though with a large admixture of ,aristotelian ideas4 ,he was a ,christian ,platonist1 blending the transcendentalism of ,plato and ,plotinus with theological dogmatic influences 7derived from the ,pseudo-,dionysius ,areopagita and others7 and verging somewhat even towards ,pantheism4 ,scotus ,erigena revived the doctrine of ,cogitable ,universalia extra rem and ante rem4 ,he declared express opposition to the arrangement of the ,first ,aristotelian ,category1 whereby the individual was put first1 in the character of subject2 the ,universal second1 in the character only of predicate2 complete reality belonging to the two in conjunction4 ,scotus maintained that the ,cogitable or ,incorporeal ,universal was the first1 the true and complete real2 from whence the sensible individuals were secondary1 incomplete1 multiple1 derivatives4#ca ,but1 though he thus adopts and enforces the ,platonic theory of ,universals ante rem and extra rem1 he does not think himself obliged to deny that ,universals may be in re also4 ,footnote #bi3 ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 ,i4 xii4 p4 #fhe2 ,trendelenburg1 ,kategorienlehre1 p4 #bde4 ,footnote #cj3 ,ueberweg1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie der scholastischen ,zeit1 p4 #ac4 ,footnote #ca3 ,prantl1 ,gesch4 der ,logik1 ,,ii4 xiii1 pp4 #bi-ce4 ,the contradiction of the ,aristotelian traditions1 so far as concerns the ,first ,category1 thus proclaimed by ,scotus ,erigena1 appears to have provoked considerable opposition among his immediate successors4 ,nevertheless he also obtained partizans4 ,remigius of ,auxerre and others not only defended the ,platonic ,realism1 but carried it as far as ,plato himself had done2 affirming that not merely ,universal ,substances1 but also ,universal ,accidents1 had a real separate existence1 apart from and anterior to individuals4#cb ,the controversy for and against the ,platonic ,realism was thus distinctly launched in the schools of the ,middle ,ages4 ,it was upheld both as a philosophical revival1 and as theologically orthodox1 entitled to supersede the traditional counter-theory of ,aristotle4 ,footnote #cb3 ,prantl1 ,gesch4 der ,logik1 ,,ii4 xiii1 pp4 #dd1 #de-dg4 ,,ii4 ,,first ,,principles4 ,a4--,sir ,william ,hamilton on ,aristotle's ,doctrine4 ,in reading attentively ,hamilton's ,dissertation on the ,philosophy of ,common ,sense 7,note ,a1 annexed to ed4 of ,reid's ,works1 p4 #gdb1 seq471 ,i find it difficult to seize accurately what he means by the term4 ,it seems to me that he unsays in one passage what he says in another2 and that what he tells us 7p4 #gej1 b471 viz4 that philosophers have rarely scrupled1 on the one hand1 quietly to supersede the data of consciousness1 so often as these did not fall in with their pre-adopted opinions2 and on the other clamorously to appeal to them as irrecusable truths1 so often as they could allege them in corroboration of their own1 or in refutation of a hostile1 doctrine--is illustrated by his own practice4 ,on page #geb1 a41 he compares ,common ,sense to ,common ,law1 and regards it as consisting in certain elementary feelings and beliefs1 which1 though in possession of all1 can only be elicited and declared by philosophers1 who declare it very differently4 ,this comparison1 however1 sets aside unassisted ,common ,sense as an available authority4 ,to make it so we must couple with it the same supplement that ,common ,law requires2 that is1 we must agree on some one philosopher as authoritative exponent of ,common ,sense4 ,the ,common ,law of one country is different from that of another4 ,even in the same country1 it is differently construed and set forth by different witnesses1 advocates1 and judges4 ,in each country1 a supreme tribunal is appointed to decide between these versions and to declare the law4 ,the analogy goes farther than ,hamilton wishes4 ,on the same page1 he remarks3--,in saying 7to use the words of ,aristotle7 simply and without qualification1 that this or that is a known truth1 we do not mean that it is in fact recognized by all1 but only by such as are of a sound understanding2 just as1 in saying absolutely that a thing is wholesome1 we must be held to mean1 to such as are of a hale constitution4 ,the passage of ,aristotle's ,topica here noticed will be found to have a different bearing from that which ,hamilton gives it4 ,aristotle is laying down 7,topica1 ,,vi4 iv4 p4 #ada1 a4 #bc-p4 #adb1 a4 #af7 the various lines of argument which may be followed out1 when you are testing in dialectical debate a definition given or admitted by the opponent4 ,there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing3 the definition ought to declare the essence of the thing1 which can only be done by means of priora and notiora4 ,but notiora admits of two meanings3 7#a7 notiora simpliciter2 7#b7 notiora nobis or singulis hominibus4 ,under the first head1 that which is prius is absolutely more knowable than that which is posterius2 thus1 a point more than a line1 a line more than a plane1 a plane more than a solid4 ,but under the second head this order is often reversed3 to most men the solid 7as falling more under sense7 is more knowable than the plane1 the plane than the line1 the line than the point4 ,the first 7notiora simpliciter7 is the truly scientific order1 suited to superior and accurate minds1 employed in teaching1 learning1 and demonstration 7p4 #ada1 a4 #bi3 ,greek3 katha_/per e7n tais a7podei_/xesin1 ou7_/t gar pasa didaskali_/a kai ma_/thsis e7_/chei1--b4 #af3 ,greek3 e7pistmonik_/teron gar to toiouto_/n e7stin74 ,the second 7notiora nobis7 is adapted to ordinary minds1 who cannot endure regular teaching1 nor understand a definition founded on the first order4 ,but definitions founded on the second alone 7,aristotle says7 are not satisfactory1 nor do they reveal the true essence of the thing defined3 there can be no satisfactory definition unless what is notius simpliciter coincides with what is notius nobis 7p4 #ada1 b4 #bd74 ,he then proceeds to explain what is meant by notius simpliciter2 and this is the passage quoted by ,hamilton4 ,after having said that the notiora nobis are not fixed and uniform1 but vary with different individuals1 and even in the same individual at different times1 he goes on3 ,it is plain therefore that we ought not to define by such characteristics as these 7the notiora nobis71 but by the notiora simpliciter3 for it is only in this way that we can obtain a definition one and the same at all times4 ,perhaps1 too1 the notius simpliciter is not that which is knowable to all1 but that which is knowable to those who are well trained in their intelligence2 just as the absolutely wholesome is that which is wholesome to those who are well constituted in their bodies 7,greek3 i7_/ss de kai to a7pls gn_/rimon ou7 to pasi gn_/rimo_/n e7stin1 a7lla to tois eu7 diakeime_/nois tn dia_/noian1 katha_/per kai to a7pls u7gieinon to tois eu7 e7_/chousi to sma--p4 #adb1 a4 #i74 ,hamilton's translation misses the point of ,aristotle1 who here repeats what he frequently also declares in other parts of his writings 7see ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ga1 b4 #cc71 namely1 the contrast and antithesis between notius simpliciter 7or natur7 and notius nobis4 ,this is a technical distinction of his own1 which he had explained very fully in the page preceding the words translated by ,hamilton2 and the words are intended as a supplementary caution1 to guard against a possible misunderstanding of the phrase4 ,hamilton's words--saying simply1 and without qualification1 that this or that is a known truth1 do not convey ,aristotle's meaning at all2 again1 the words--such as are of a sound understanding1 fail equally in rendering what ,aristotle means by ,greek3 tois eu7 diakeime_/nois tn dia_/noian4 ,aristotle tells us distinctly 7in the preceding part of the paragraph7 that he intends to contrast the few minds scientific or prepared for scientific discipline1 with the many minds unscientific or unprepared for such discipline3 he does not intend to contrast men of sound understanding with men not of sound understanding4 ,it appears to me that ,hamilton has here taken a passage away from its genuine sense in the ,aristotelian context1 and has pressed it into his service to illustrate a view of his own1 foreign to that of ,aristotle4 ,he has done the like with some other passages1 to which ,i will now advert4 ,what he says1 pp4 #gfd-gff1 about ,aristotle's use of the term ,greek3 a7xi_/ma is quite opposed to the words of ,aristotle himself1 who plainly certifies it as being already in his time a technical term with mathematicians 7,met4 ,greek3 ,g4 p4 #ajje1 a4 #bj74 ,on p4 #gff1 a41 ,hamilton says that the word ,greek3 a7xi_/ma is not used in any work extant prior to ,aristotle in a logical sense4 ,this is true as to any work remaining to us1 but ,aristotle himself talks of previous philosophers or reasoners who had so used it2 thus he speaks of ,greek3 kata to ,z_/nnos a7xi_/ma 7,metaph4 ,b4 p4 #ajja1 b4 #g7--;according to the assumption laid down by ,zeno as authoritative4 ,of this passage ,hamilton takes no notice3 he only refers to the ,topica1 intimating a doubt 7in my judgment groundless and certainly professed by few modern critics1 if any7 whether the ,topica is a genuine work of ,aristotle4 ,in the time of ,aristotle1 various mathematical teachers laid down ,axioms1 such as1 ,if equals be taken from equals1 the remainders will be equal2 ,in all propositions1 either the affirmative or the negative must be true1 c4 ,but the case of ,zeno shows us that other philosophers also laid down ,axioms of their own1 which were not universally accepted by others4 ,what ,hamilton here says1 about ,axioms1 has little pertinence as a contribution to the ,philosophy of ,common ,sense4 ,again1 ,hamilton says1 p4 #ggj1 a43 ,the native contributions by the mind itself to our concrete cognitions have1 prior to their elicitation into consciousness through experience1 only a potential1 and in actual experience only an applied1 engaged1 or implicate1 existence4 ,these words narrow the line of distinction between the two opposite schools so much1 that ,i cannot see where it is drawn4 ,every germ has in it the potentialities of that which it will afterwards become4 ,no one disputes that a baby just born has mental potentialities not possessed by a puppy1 a calf1 or an acorn4 ,what is the difference between cognitions elicited through experience1 and cognitions derived from experience8 ,to those who hold the doctrine of ,relativity1 both our impressions of sense and our mental activities 7such as memory1 discrimination1 comparison1 abstraction1 c47 are alike indispensable to experience4 ,the difference1 so far as ,i can see1 between ,hamilton and the ,inductive ,school1 is not so much about the process whereby cognitions are acquired1 as about the mode of testing and measuring the authority of those cognitions when acquired4 ,hamilton will not deny that many of the cognitions which he describes as elicited by experience are untrue or exaggerated4 ,how are we to discriminate these from the true8 ,the ,inductive ,school would reply3 ,by the test of experience1 and by that alone3 if these cognitions1 which have been elicited in your mind through experience1 are refuted or not confirmed when tested by subsequent experience carefully watched and selected for the purpose1 they are not true or trustworthy cognitions4 ,but ,hamilton would not concur in this answer3 he would say that the cognitions1 though elicited through experience1 did not derive their authority or trustworthiness from experience1 but were binding and authoritative in themselves1 whether confirmed by experience or not4 ,in speaking about ,axioms1 p4 #gfd1 b41 he says3 ,aristotle limited 7this is not correct3 ,aristotle did not limit as here affirmed7 the expression ,axiom to those judgments which1 on occasion of experience1 arise naturally and necessarily in the conscious mind1 and which are therefore virtually prior to experience4 ,that they are not prior to experience in order of time1 is admitted in the words just cited from ,hamilton himself3 he means1 therefore1 prior in logical authority--carrying with them the quality of necessity1 even though experience may afford no confirmation of them4 ,this is what he says1 on pp4 #gec-ged1 about causality3 metaphysical causality must be believed1 as a necessary and subjective law of the observer--though there is no warrant for it in experience4 ,the question between ,hamilton and the ,inductive ,school1 ,i repeat1 is not so much about the psychological genesis of beliefs1 as about the test for distinguishing true from false or uncertified beliefs1 among those beliefs which arise1 often and usually1 in the minds of most men4 ,is there any valid test other than experience itself1 as intentionally varied by experiments and interpreted by careful ,induction8 ,are we ever warranted in affirming what transcends experience1 except to the extent to which the inference from ,induction 7from some to all7 always transcends actual observation8 ,this seems to me the real question at issue between the contending schools of ,metaphysics4 ,hamilton1 while he rejects experience as the test1 furnishes no other test whereby we can discriminate the erroneous beliefs which are elicited into consciousness through experience1 from the true beliefs which are elicited in like manner4 ,in discussing the doctrine which ,hamilton and other philosophers entitle ,common ,sense 7in the metaphysical import which they assign to it71 it is proper to say a few words on the legitimate meaning of this phrase1 before it was pressed into service by a particular school of metaphysicians4 ,every one who lives through childhood and boyhood up to man's estate will unavoidably acquire a certain amount of knowledge and certain habits of believing1 feeling1 judging1 c42 differing materially in different ages and countries1 and varying to a less degree in different individuals of the same age and country1 yet still including more or less which is common to the large majority4 ,that fire burns2 that water quenches thirst and drowns2 that the sun gives light and heat2 that animals are all mortal and cannot live long without nourishment1--these and many other beliefs are not possessed by a very young child1 but are acquired by every man as he grows up1 though he cannot remember how or when he learnt them4 ,the sum total of the beliefs thus acquired1 by the impressions and influences under which every growing mind might pass1 constitutes the ,common ,sense of a particular age and country4 ,a person wanting in any of them would be considered1 by the majority of the inhabitants1 as deficient in ,common ,sense4 ,if ,i meet an adult stranger1 ,i presume as a matter of course that he has acquired them1 and ,i talk to him accordingly4 ,i also presume 7being in ,england7 that he has learnt the language of the country2 and that he is familiar with the forms of ,english speech whereby such beliefs and their correlative disbeliefs are enunciated4 ,if ,i affirm to him any one of these beliefs1 he assents to it at once3 it appears to him self-evident--that is1 requiring no farther or extraneous evidence to support it4 ,though it appears to him self-evident1 however1 the proposition may possibly be false4 ,to a ,greek of the ,aristotelian age1 no proposition could appear more self-evident than that of the earth being at rest4 ,no term can be more thoroughly relative than the term self-evident3 that which appears so to one man1 will often not appear so to another1 and may sometimes appear altogether untrue4 ,but1 if we suppose an individual to whom one of these beliefs does not appear self-evident1 and who requires proof1 he will not be satisfied to be told that every one else believes it1 and that it is a dictate of ,common ,sense4 ,he probably knows that already1 and yet1 nevertheless1 he is not convinced4 ,aristarchus of ,samos was told doubtless1 often enough1 that the doctrine of the earth being at rest was the plain verdict of ,common ,sense2 but he did not the less controvert it4 ,you must produce the independent proof which the recusant demands2 and1 if your doctrine is true and trustworthy1 such proof can be produced4 ,i will here remark that1 in so far as ,common ,sense can properly be quoted as an authority or presumptive authority1 it is such only in the sense proclaimed by ,herakleitus and ,la ,mennais1 as cited by ,hamilton1 pp4 #ggj-gga3 as a magazine of ready-fabricated dogmas4 ,hamilton finds fault with both of them2 but it appears to me that they rightly interpret1 and that he wrongly interprets1 what ,common ,sense1 as generally understood1 is2 and moreover1 that most of the other authorities whom he himself quotes understand the phrase as these two understand it4 ,common ,sense is a magazine of ready-fabricated dogmas1 as ,la ,mennais 7see p4 #gga1 a47 considers it--dogmas assumed as self-evident1 and as requiring no proof4 ,it only becomes a source of elementary truths when analysed and remodelled by philosophers4 ,now philosophers differ much in their mode of analysing it 7as ,hamilton himself declares emphatically71 and bring out of it different elementary truths2 each of them professing to follow ,common ,sense and quoting ,common ,sense as warranty4 ,it is plain that ,common ,sense is no authority for either one of two discrepant modes of analysis4 ,its authority counts for those dogmas out of which the analysis is made1 in so far as ,common ,sense is authoritative at all4 ,hamilton cites or indicates thirteen different ,aristotelian passages1 in order to support his view that ,aristotle is to be numbered among the champions of authoritative ,common ,sense4 ,it will be seen that most of the passages prove nothing1 and that only one proves much1 in favour of that view4 ,i shall touch upon them seriatim4 7a7 ,first truths are such as are believed1 not through aught else 7say rather through other truths7 but through themselves alone4 ,for1 in regard to the first principles of science1 we ought not to require the reason ,why2 for each such principle behoves to be itself a belief in and of itself4#a ,after the words reason ,why1 ,hamilton inserts the following additional words of his own in brackets--but only the fact ,that they are given4 ,footnote #a3 ,aristot4 ,topic4 ,i4 i4 p4 #ajj1 a4 #cj2 ,hamilton's ,reid1 p4 #ggb1 a4 ,i demur to the words in brackets1 as implying an hypothesis not contained in ,aristotle2 who says only that the truth affirmed by the teacher must be such as the learner is prepared to believe without asking any questions4 ,it may be an analytical truth 7sensu ,kantiano71 in which the predicate asserts only what the learner knows to be already contained in the definition of the subject4 ,it may be a synthetical truth2 yet asserting only what he is familiar with by constant1 early1 uncontradicted1 obvious1 experience4 ,in either case1 he is prepared to believe it at once2 and thus the conditions of a ,first ,scientific ,truth are satisfied1 as here described by ,aristotle2 who says nothing about the truth being given4 ,the next passage cited 7b7 is from the ,analytica ,posteriora 7the reference is printed by mistake ,priora74 ,according to ,hamilton1 ,aristotle says3--,we assert not only that science does exist1 but also that there is given a certain beginning or principle of science1 in so far as 7or1 on another interpretation of the term ,greek3 7--by which7 we recognize the import of the terms4#b ,i think ,hamilton has not exactly rendered the sense of the original when he translates it--we recognize the import of the terms2 and he proceeds to add expository words of his own which carry us still farther away from what ,i understand in ,aristotle4 ,if ,hamilton's rendering is correct1 all the principia of ,science would be analytical propositions 7sensu ,kantiano71 which ,i do not think that ,aristotle intended to affirm or imply4 ,in the last chapter of the ,analytica ,posteriora1 ,aristotle not only affirmed that there were ,first ,principles of ,science1 but described at length the inductive process by which we reached them3 referring them ultimately to the cognizance and approval of ,nos or ,intellect4 ,what ,aristotle means is1 that1 in ascending from propositions of lower to propositions of higher universality1 we know when we have reached the extreme term of ascent2 and this forms the principium4 ,footnote #b3 ,aristot4 ,anal4 ,post4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gb1 b4 #bc3 ,greek3 tauta_/ t' ou7n ou7_/t le_/gomen1 kai ou7 mo_/non e7pist_/mn a7lla kai a7rchn e7pist_/ms ei7nai_/ tina_/ phamen1 7 tous o7_/rous gnri_/zomen4 ,neither ,philoponus1 nor ,buhle1 nor ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4-,hilaire1 translate the words ,greek3 tous o7_/rous gnri_/zomen in the same way as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,it rather seems to me that the words mean terms or limits of regress1 which coincides with the paraphrase of ,philoponus3 ,greek3 tou_/t gar 7t n7 tas a7rchoeidesta_/tas kai oi7onei o7_/rous ou7_/sas gnri_/zomen 7,schol4 p4 #bja1 b4 #ac1 ,br471 as well as substantially with the note of ,m4 ,st4-,hilaire4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton next gives us another passage 7c7 from the ,analytica ,posteriora1 in which ,aristotle affirms that the ,first ,principles must be believed in a superlative degree1 because we know and believe all secondary truths through them3#c a doctrine which appears to me to require both comment and limitation2 but about which ,i say nothing1 because1 even granting it to be true1 ,i do not see how it assists the purpose--to prove that ,aristotle is the champion of authoritative ,common ,sense4 ,nor do ,i find any greater proof in another passage previously 7p4 #gfd1 b47 produced from ,aristotle3 ,of the immediate principles of syllogism1 that which cannot be demonstrated1 but which it is not necessary to possess as the pre-requisite of all learning1 ,i call ,thesis3 and that ,axiom1 which he who would learn aught1 must himself bring 7and not receive from his instructor74 ,for some such principles there are2 and it is to these that we are accustomed to apply the name4#d ,such principles there doubtless are1 which the learner must bring with him2 but ,aristotle does not assert1 much less prove1 that they are intuitions given by authoritative ,common ,sense4 ,nay1 in the passage cited in my former page1 he both asserted and proved that the principia of ,science were raised from ,sense by ,induction4 ,the learner1 when he comes to be taught1 must bring some of these principia with him1 if he is to learn ,science from his teacher2 just as he must also bring with him a knowledge of the language1 of the structure of sentences1 of the forms for affirmation and denial1 c41 and various other requisites4 ,a recruit1 when first coming to be drilled1 must bring with him a certain power of walking and of making other movements of the limbs4 ,but these pre-requisites1 on the part of the learner as well as on that of the recruit1 are not intuitive products or inspirations of the mind3 they are acquirements made by long and irksome experience1 though often forgotten in its details4 ,we are not to reason upon the learner or the recruit as if they were children just born4 ,footnote #c3 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 ii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #bg4 ,footnote #d3 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #gb1 a4 #ag3 ,greek3 touto gar ma_/list' e7pi tois toiou_/tois ei7_/thamen o7_/noma le_/gein--we are for the most part accustomed3 ,hamilton has not translated the word ,greek3 ma_/lista1 which it would have been better for him to do1 because he founds upon the passage an argument to prove that ,aristotle limited in a certain way the sense of the word ,axiom4 ,the passages out of the ,rhetorica and the ,metaphysica 7cited on p4 #ggb1 b41 and marked d and e7 are hardly worth notice4 ,but that which immediately follows 7marked f71 out of the ,nikomachean ,ethica1 is the most pertinent of all that are produced4 ,hamilton writes3--,arguing against a paradox of certain ,platonists in regard to the ,pleasurable1 ,aristotle says--',but they who oppose themselves to ,eudoxus1 as if what all nature desiderates were not a good1 talk idly4 ,for what appears to all1 that we affirm to be2 and he who would subvert this belief1 will himself assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit4'#e ,compare also ,l4 vii4 c4 #ac 7#ad74 ,in his paraphrase of the above passage1 the ,pseudo-,andronicus in one place uses the expression common opinion1 and in another all but uses 7what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an ,aristotelian1 if indeed in ,greek at all7 the expression common sense1 which ,d4 ,heinsius in his ,latin version actually employs4 ,thus far ,hamilton2 but the words of ,aristotle which immediately follow are even stronger3--,for1 in so far as foolish creatures desire pleasure1 the objection taken would be worth something2 but1 when intelligent creatures desire it also1 how can the objectors make out their case8 ,even in mean and foolish creatures1 moreover1 there is perhaps a certain good natural appetite1 superior to themselves1 which aims at their own good4#f ,or as ,aristotle 7according to some critics1 the ,aristotelian ,eudemus7 states it in the ,seventh ,book of the ,nikomachean ,ethica1 referred to by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton without citing it3--,perhaps all creatures 7brutes as well as men7 pursue1 not that pleasure which they think they are pursuing1 nor what they would declare themselves to be pursuing1 but all of them the same pleasure2 for all creatures have by nature something divine4#g ,footnote #e3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nik4 ,x4 ii4 p4 #aagb1 b4 #cf3 ,greek3 o7 gar pasi dokei1 tout' ei7nai_/ phamen2 o7 d' a7nairn tau_/tn tn pi_/stin1 ou7 pa_/nu pisto_/tera e7rei4 ,footnote #f3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nik4 ,x4 ii4 p4 #aagc1 a4 #b3 ,greek3 7 men gar ta a7no_/ta o7re_/getai au7tn1 7n a7_/n ti to lego_/men2 ei7 de kai ta phro_/nima1 ps a7n le_/goie_/n ti8 i7_/ss de kai e7n tois phau_/lois e7sti_/ ti phusikon a7gathon kreitton 7 kath' au7ta_/1 o7 e7phi_/etai tou oikei_/ou a7gathou4 7,i adopt here the text as given by ,michelet1 ,greek3 99997 men in place of ,greek3 ei7 men1 but not in leaving out ,greek3 to before ,greek3 lego_/menon47 ,i think the sentence would stand better if ,greek3 a7gathon were omitted after ,greek3 phusiko_/n4 ,footnote #g3 ,eth4 ,nikom4 ,,vii4 xiv4 p4 #aaec1 b4 #ca3 ,greek3 i7_/ss de kai di_/kousin ou7ch 7n oi7_/ontai 77don_/n7 ou7d' 7n a7n phaien1 a7lla tn au7t_/n2 pa_/nta gar phu_/sei e7_/chei ti theion4 ,the sentiment is here declared even more strongly respecting the appetency of all animals--brutes as well as men4 ,in this passage1 ,aristotle does really appear as the champion of authoritative ,common ,sense4 ,he enunciates the general principle3 ,that which appears to all1 that we affirm to be4 ,and he proceeds to claim 7with the qualification of perhaps7 for this universal belief a divine or quasi-divine authority2 like ,hesiod in the verses cited by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 p4 #ggj1 b41 and like ,dr4 ,reid in the motto prefixed to his ',inquiry into the ,human ,mind on the ,principles of ,common ,sense4' ,if ,aristotle had often spoken in this way1 he would have been pre-eminently suitable to figure in ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's list of authorities4 ,but the reverse is the fact4 ,in the ,analytica and ,topica1 ,aristotle is so far from accepting the opinion and belief of all as a certificate of truth and reality1 that he expressly ranks the matters so certified as belonging to the merely probable1 and includes them in his definition thereof4 ,universal belief counts for more or less1 as a certificate of the truth of what is believed1 according to the matter to which it refers2 and there are few matters on which it is of greater value than pleasure and pain4 ,yet even upon this point ,aristotle rejects the authority of the many1 and calls upon us to repose implicit confidence in the verdict of the just and intelligent individual1 whom he enthrones as the measure4 ,those alone are pleasures 7says ,aristotle7 which appear pleasures to this man2 those alone are pleasant things in which he takes delight4 ,if things which are revolting to him appear pleasurable to others1 we ought not to wonder1 since there are many corruptions and degenerations of mankind2 yet these things are not really pleasurable1 except to these men and to men of like disposition4#h ,this declaration1 repeated more than once in the ,nikomachean ,ethica1 and supported by ,analytica and ,topica1 more than countervails the opposite opinion expressed by ,aristotle1 in the passage where he defends ,eudoxus4 ,footnote #h3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nik4 ,x4 v4 p4 #aagf1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 dokei d' e7n a7_/pasi toiou_/tois ei7nai to phaino_/menon t spoudai_/4 ei7 de touto kals le_/getai1 katha_/per dokei1 kai e7_/stin e7ka_/stou me_/tron 7 a7ret kai o7 a7gathos 7 toioutos1 kai 7donai ei7en a7n ai7 tou_/t phaino_/menai1 kai 7de_/a oi7s ou7tos chai_/rei c4 ,ib4 vi4 p4 #aagf1 b4 #bd3 ,greek3 katha_/per ou7n polla_/kis ei7_/rtai1 kai ti_/mia kai 7de_/a e7sti ta t spoudai_/ toiauta o7_/nta4 ,the next passage 7g7 produced by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton is out of the ,eudemian ,ethica4 ,but this passage1 when translated more fully and exactly than we read it in his words1 will be found to prove nothing to the point which he aims at4 ,he gives it as follows1 p4 #ggc1 a43--,but of all these we must endeavour to seek out rational grounds of belief1 by adducing manifest testimonies and authorities4 ,for it is the strongest evidence of a doctrine1 if all men can be adduced as the manifest confessors of its positions2 because every individual has in him a kind of private organ of the truth4 ,hence we ought not always to look to the conclusions of reasoning1 but frequently rather to what appears and is believed to be4 ,the original is given below4#i ,footnote #i3 ,aristot4 ,eth4 ,eud4 ,i4 vi4 p4 #abah1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 peirate_/on de peri tou_/tn pa_/ntn ztein tn pi_/stin dia tn lo_/gn1 marturi_/ois kai paradei_/gmasi chr_/menon tois phainome_/nois4 kra_/tiston men gar pa_/ntas a7nthr_/pous phai_/nesthai sunomologountas tois pa_/nts1 o7_/per metabibazo_/menoi poi_/sousin2 e7_/chei gar e7_/kastos oi7keio_/n ti pros tn a7l_/theian1 e7x 7n a7nagkaion deiknu_/nai ps peri au7tn4 e7k gar tn a7lths men legome_/nn1 ou7 saphs de_/1 proiousin e7_/stai kai to saphs1 metalamba_/nousin a7ei ta gnrim_/tera tn ei7tho_/tn le_/gesthai sugkechume_/ns4 ,then after an interval of fifteen lines3 ,greek3 kals d' e7_/chei kai to chris kri_/nein ton ts ai7ti_/as lo_/gon kai to deiknu_/menon1 dia_/ te to r7then a7rti_/s1 o7_/ti prose_/chein ou7 dei pa_/nta tois dia tn lo_/gn1 a7lla polla_/kis mallon tois phainome_/nois 7nun d' o7_/pot' a7n lu_/ein m e7_/chsin1 a7nagka_/zontai pisteu_/ein tois ei7rme_/nois71 kai dio_/ti polla_/kis to men u7po tou lo_/gou dedeichthai dokoun a7lthes me_/n e7stin1 ou7 me_/ntoi dia tau_/tn tn ai7ti_/an di' 7_/n phsin o7 lo_/gos4 e7_/sti gar dia pseu_/dous a7lthes deixai2 dlon d' e7k tn ,a7nalutikn4 ,the following is a literal translation1 restoring what ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton omits3--,but1 respecting all these matters1 we must endeavour to seek belief through general reasoning1 employing the appearances before us 7i4e4 the current dicta and facta of society7 as testimonies and examples4 ,for it is best that all mankind should be manifestly in agreement with what we are about to say2 but1 if that cannot be1 that at all events they should be in some sort of agreement with us2 which they will come to be when brought round 7by being addressed in the proper style74 ,for every man has in him some tendencies favourable to the truth1 and it is out of these that we must somehow or other prove our conclusions4 ,by taking our departure from what is said around us truly but not clearly1 we shall by gradual advance introduce clearness1 taking along with us such portion of the confused common talk as is most congruous to ,science4 4 4 4 ,it is well also to consider apart the causal reasoning 7syllogistic1 deductive premisses71 and the conclusion shown3 first1 upon the ground just stated1 that we must not pay exclusive attention to the results of deductive reasoning1 but often rather to apparent facts1 whereas it often happens now that1 when men cannot refute the reasoning1 they feel constrained to believe in the conclusion2 next1 because the conclusion1 shown by the reasoning1 may often be true in itself1 but not from the cause assigned in the reasoning4 ,for a true conclusion may be shown by false premisses2 as we have seen in the ,analytica4 ,whoever reads the original words of ,aristotle 7or ,eudemus7 will see how much ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's translation strains their true meaning4 ,greek3 ,kra_/tiston does not correspond to the phrase--it is the strongest evidence of a doctrine4 ,greek3 ,kra_/tiston is the equivalent of ,greek3 a7_/riston1 as we find in chap4 iii4 of this ,book of the ,eudemian ,ethica 7p4 #abae1 a4 #c73 ,greek3 e7pei d' ei7sin a7pori_/ai peri e7ka_/stn pragmatei_/an oi7keiai1 dlon o7_/ti kai peri bi_/ou tou krati_/stou kai zs ts a7ri_/sts ei7si_/n4 ,nor ought the words ,greek3 oi7keio_/n ti pros tn a7l_/theian to be translated--a kind of private organ of the truth3 they mean simply--something in him favourable or tending towards the truth1 as we read in chap4 ii4 of this same ,book--,greek3 oi7keion pros eu7exi_/an 7p4 #abad1 b4 #bb74 ,moreover1 ,hamilton has omitted to translate both the words preceding and the words following2 accordingly he has missed the real sense of the passage4 ,aristotle inculcates upon the philosopher never to neglect the common and prevalent opinions1 but to acquaint himself with them carefully2 because1 though these opinions are generally full of confusion and error 7,greek3 ei7k gar le_/gousi schedon peri a7pa_/ntn 7oi7 polloi_/7--,ethic4 ,eudem4 ,i4 iii4 p4 #abae1 a4 #a71 he will find in them partial correspondences with the truth1 of which he may avail himself to bring the common minds round to better views2 but1 unless he knows pretty well what the opinions of these common minds are1 he will not be able to address them persuasively4 ,this is the same reasonable view which ,aristotle expresses at the beginning of the ,topica 7in a passage already cited1 above71 respecting the manner of dealing proper for a philosopher towards current opinion4 ,but it does not at all coincide with the representation given by ,hamilton4 ,the next piece of evidence 7h7 which we find tendered is another passage out of the ,eudemian ,ethica4 ,it will be seen that this passage is strained with even greater violence than the preceding4 ,hamilton writes as follows1 first translating the words of ,aristotle1 then commenting on them3--,the problem is this--,what is the beginning or principle of motion in the soul8 ,now it is evident1 as ,god is in the universe1 and the universe in ,god1 that ,i read ,greek3 kinein kai_/--,w4 ,h4 the divinity in us is also1 in a certain sort1 the universal mover of the mind4 ,for the principle of ,reason is not ,reason but something better4 ,now what can we say is better than even ,science1 except ,god8#aj ,so far ,hamilton's translation2 now follows his comment3--,the import of this singular passage is very obscure4 ,it has excited1 ,i see1 the attention1 and exercised the ingenuity1 of ,pomponatius1 ,j4 ,c4 ,scaliger1 ,de ,raei1 ,leibnitz1 ,leidenfrost1 ,jacobi1 c4 ,but without viewing it as of pantheistic tendency1 as ,leibnitz is inclined to do1 it may be interpreted as a declaration1 that ,intellect1 which ,aristotle elsewhere allows to be pre-existent and immortal1 is a spark of the ,divinity2 whilst its data 7from which as principles more certain than their deductions1 ,reason1 ,demonstration1 ,science1 must depart7 are to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man3 ,that1 in short1 ',the voice of ,nature is the voice of ,god4' ,by the bye1 it is remarkable that this text was not employed by any of those ,aristotelian philosophers who endeavoured to identify the ,active ,intellect with the ,deity4 ,footnote #aj3 ,ethic4 ,eud4 ,,vii4 xiv4 p4 #abdh1 a4 #bd3 ,greek3 to de ztou_/menon tout' e7sti_/1 ti_/s 7 ts kin_/ses a7rch e7n t psuch8 dlon d_/1 7_/sper e7n t o7_/l theo_/s1 kai pan 7,fritzsche reads ,greek3 e7n7 e7kei_/n4 kinei ga_/r ps pa_/nta to e7n 7min theion4 lo_/gou d' a7rch ou7 lo_/gos a7lla ti kreitton4 ti_/ ou7n a7n kreitton kai e7pist_/ms ei7_/poi pln theo_/s8 ,instead of ,greek3 ei7_/poi 7the last word but two7 ,fritzsche reads ,greek3 ei7_/ kai nou4 ,this is the passage translated by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton4 ,the words of the original immediately following are these3 ,greek3 7 gar a7ret tou nou o7_/rganon2 kai dia touto oi7 pa_/lai e7_/legon--eu7tucheis kalountai1 oi7 a7n o7r_/ssi katopthousin a7_/logoi o7_/ntes1 kai bouleu_/esthai ou7 sumphe_/rei au7tois--e7_/chousi gar a7rchn toiou_/tn 7 krei_/ttn tou nou kai bouleu_/ses4 oi7 de ton lo_/gon2 touto d' ou7k e7_/chousi4 kai e7nthousismoi_/2 touto d' ou7 du_/nantai2 a7_/logoi gar o7_/ntes e7pitugcha_/nousi 7so ,fritzsche reads in place of ,greek3 a7potugcha_/nousi74 ,i maintain that this passage noway justifies the interpretation whereby ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton ascribes to ,aristotle a doctrine so large and important4 ,the acknowledged obscurity of the passage might have rendered any interpreter cautious of building much upon it3 but this is not all3 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has translated it separately1 without any allusion to the chapter of which it forms part4 ,this is a sure way of misunderstanding it2 for it cannot be fairly construed except as bearing on the problem enunciated and discussed in that chapter4 ,aristotle 7or ,eudemus7 propounds for discussion explicitly in this chapter a question which had been adverted to briefly in the earlier part of the ,eudemian ,ethica 7,i4 i4 p4 #abad1 a4 #bd7--,what is the relation between good fortune and happiness8 ,upon what does good fortune depend8 ,is it produced by special grace or inspiration from the ,gods8 ,this question is taken up and debated at length in the chapter from which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has made his extract4 ,it is averred1 as a matter of notoriety1 that some men are fortunate4 ,though fools1 they are constantly successful--more so than wiser men2 and this characteristic is so steady1 that men count upon it and denominate them accordingly4 7,see this general belief illustrated in the debate at ,athens recorded by ,thukydides1 vi4 #ag1 the good fortune of ,nikias being admitted even by his opponents47 ,upon what does this good fortune depend8 ,upon nature8 ,upon intelligence8 ,upon fortune herself as a special agent8 ,upon the grace and favour of the gods to the fortunate individual8 ,aristotle 7or ,eudemus7 discusses the problem in a long and perplexed chapter1 stating each hypothesis1 together with the difficulties and objections attaching to it4 ,as far as we can make out from an obscure style and a corrupt text1 the following is the result arrived at4 ,there are two varieties of the fortunate man3 one is1 he who succeeds through a rightly directed impulse1 under special inspiration of the divine element within him and within all men2 the other is1 he who succeeds without any such impulse1 through the agency of ,fortune proper4 ,the good fortune of the first is more constant than that of the second2 but both are alike irrational or extra-rational4#aa ,now the divine element in the soul is the beginning or principle of motion for all the manifestations in the soul--for reason as well as feeling3 that which calls reason into operation1 is something more powerful than reason4 ,but in the intelligent man this divine mover only calls reason into operation1 leaving reason1 when once in operation1 to its own force and guidance1 of course liable to err2 whereas in the fortunate man 7first variety7 the divine element inspires all his feelings and volitions1 without any rational deliberation1 so that he executes exactly the right thing at the right time and place1 and accordingly succeeds4#ab ,footnote #aa3 ,eth4 ,eudem4 ,,vii4 xiv4 p4 #abdh1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 phaneron de o7_/ti du_/o ei7_/d eu7tuchi_/as1 7 men thei_/a1 dio kai dokei o7 eu7tuchs dia theon katorthoun2 ou7tos d' e7stin o7 kata tn o7rmn diorthtiko_/s1 o7 d' e7_/teros o7 para tn o7rmn2 a7_/logoi d' a7mpho_/teroi4 kai 7 men sunechs eu7tuchi_/a mallon1 au7_/t d' ou7 sunech_/s4 ,the variety ,greek3 o7 para tn o7rmn diorthtiko_/s is exemplified in the ,physica 7,,ii4 iv4 p4 #aif1 a4 #d71 where ,aristotle again discusses ,greek3 tu_/ch3 the case of a man who comes to the market-place on his ordinary business1 and there by accident meets a friend whom he particularly wished to see1 but whom he never dreamt of seeing there and then4 ,footnote #ab3 ,eth4 ,eud4 ,,vii4 xiv4 p4 #abdh1 a4 #bg-cb3 ,greek3 eu7tucheis kalountai1 c4 ,compare also ib4 p4 #abdg1 b4 #ah4 ,aristotle 7or ,eudemus7 thus obtains a psychological explanation 7good or bad7 of the fact1 that there are fools who constantly succeed in their purposes1 and wise men who frequently fail4 ,he tells us that there is in the soul a divine principle of motion1 which calls every thing--reason as well as appetite or feeling--into operation4 ,but he says nothing of what ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton ascribes to him--about ,intellect as a spark of the ,divinity1 or about data of ,intellect to be reverenced as the revelation of hidden truths4 ,his drift is quite different and even opposite3 to account for the success of individuals without intellect or reason--to bring forward a divine element in the soul1 which dispenses with intellect1 and which conducts these unintelligent men to success1 solely by infusing the most opportune feelings and impulses4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton has misunderstood this passage1 by taking no notice of the context and general argument to which it belongs4 ,besides1 when ,hamilton represents ,aristotle here as declaring3 ,that the data of ,intellect are to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man--how are we to reconcile this with what we read two pages before 7p4 #gga1 a47 as the view of ,aristotle about these same data of ,intellect1 that they are themselves pre-eminently certain2 and1 if denied in words1 they are still always mentally admitted8 ,is it reasonable to say that the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 and the proposition1 ,that if equals be subtracted from equals1 the remainders will be equal--are data to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man8 ,at any rate1 ,i protest against the supposition that ,aristotle has ever declared this4 ,the next two passages cited from ,aristotle have really no bearing upon the authority of ,common ,sense in its metaphysical meaning3 they are 7i7 from ,physic4 ,,viii4 iii4 and 7k7 from ,de ,gen4 ,animal4 ,,iii4 x4 ,both passages assert the authority of sensible perception against general reasoning1 where the two are conflicting4 ,they assert1 in other words1 that general reasoning ought to be tested by experience and observation1 and is not to be accepted when disallowed by these tests4 7,the only condition is1 that the observation be exact and complete47 ,this is just1 and is often said1 though often disregarded in fact1 by ,aristotle4 ,but it has no proper connexion with the problem about the trustworthiness of ,common ,sense4 ,next ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton refers us to 7without citing7 three other places of ,aristotle4 ,of these1 the first 7,de ,coelo1 ,i4 iii4 p4 #bgj1 b4 #d-ac1 marked l7 is one which ,i am much surprised to find in a modern champion of ,common ,sense3 since it represents ,common ,sense as giving full certificate to errors now exploded and forgotten4 ,aristotle had begun by laying down and vindicating his doctrine of the ,first or ,celestial ,body1 forming the exterior portion of the ,kosmos1 radically distinct from the four elements2 revolving eternally in uniform1 perfect1 circular motion1 eternal1 unchangeable1 c4 ,having stated this1 he proceeds to affirm that the results of these reasonings coincide with the common opinions of mankind1 that is1 with ,common ,sense2 and that they are not contradicted by any known observations of perceptive experience4 ,this illustrates what ,i have before observed about ,aristotle's position in regard to ,common ,sense4 ,he does not extol it as an authority1 or tell us that it is to be reverenced as a revelation2 but1 when he has proved a conclusion on what he thinks good grounds1 he is glad to be able to show that it tallies with common opinions2 especially when these opinions have some alliance with the received religion4 ,the next passage 7m7 referred to 7,de ,coelo1 ,,iii4 vii4 p4 #cjf1 a4 #ac7 has nothing to do with ,common ,sense1 but embodies a very just protest by ,aristotle against those philosophers who followed out their theories consistently to all possible consequences1 without troubling themselves to enquire whether those consequences were in harmony with the results of observation4 ,there follows one other reference 7n7 which was hardly worth ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's notice4 ,in ,meteorologic4 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #cdi1 a4 #be1 ,aristotle1 after reciting a theory of some philosophers 7respecting the winds7 which he considers very absurd1 then proceeds to say3--,the many1 without going into any enquiry at all1 talk better sense than those who after enquiry bring forward such conclusions as these4 ,it is not saying much for the authority of ,common ,sense1 to affirm that there have been occasionally philosophical theories so silly as to be worse than ,common ,sense4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,b4--,aristotle's ,doctrine4 ,in regard to ,aristotle1 there are two points to be examined-- ,i4 ,what position does he take up in respect to the authority of ,common ,sense8 ,,ii4 ,what doctrine does he lay down about the first principia or beginnings of scientific reasoning--the ,greek3 a7rchai sullogistikai_/8 ,i4--,that ,aristotle did not regard ,cause1 ,substance1 ,time1 c41 as ,intuitions1 is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he employs to explain them1 and by the censure that he bestows on the erroneous explanations and shortcomings of others4 ,indeed1 in regard to ,causality1 when we read the great and perplexing diversity of meaning which ,aristotle 7and ,plato before him in the ,phdon7 recognizes as belonging to this term1 we cannot but be surprised to find modern philosophers treating it as enunciating a simple and intuitive idea4 ,but as to ,common ,sense--taking the term as above explained1 and as it is usually understood by those that have no particular theory to support--,aristotle takes up a position at once distinct and instructive2 a position 7to use the phraseology of ,kant7 not dogmatical1 but critical4 ,he constantly notices and reports the affirmations of ,common ,sense2 he speaks of it with respect1 and assigns to it a qualified value1 partly as helping us to survey the subject on all sides1 partly as a happy confirmation1 where it coincides with what has been proved otherwise2 but he does not appeal to it as an authority in itself trustworthy or imperative4 ,common ,sense belongs to the region of ,opinion4 ,now the distinction between matters of ,opinion on the one hand1 and matters of ,science or ,cognition on the other1 is a marked and characteristic feature of ,aristotle's philosophy4 ,he sets1 in pointed antithesis1 ,demonstration1 or the method of ,science--which divides itself into special subjects1 each having some special principia of its own1 then proceeds by legitimate steps of deductive reasoning from such principia1 and arrives at conclusions sometimes universally true1 always true for the most part--against ,rhetoric and ,dialectic1 which deal with and discuss opinions upon all subjects1 comparing opposite arguments1 and landing in results more or less probable4 ,contrasting them as separate lines of intellectual procedure1 ,aristotle lays down a theory of both4 ,he recognizes the procedure of ,rhetoric and ,dialectic as being to a great degree the common and spontaneous growth of society2 while ,demonstration is from the beginning special1 not merely as to subject1 but as to persons1 implying teacher and learner4 ,rhetoric and ,dialectic are treated by ,aristotle as analogous processes4 ,of the matter of opinion and belief1 with which both of them deal1 he distinguishes three varieties3 7#a7 ,opinions or beliefs entertained by all2 7#b7 ,by the majority2 7#c7 ,by a minority of superior men1 or by one man in respect to a science wherein he has acquired renown4 ,it is these opinions or beliefs that the rhetorician and the dialectician attack and defend2 bringing out all the arguments available for or against each4 ,the ,aristotelian treatise on ,rhetoric opens with the following words3--,rhetoric is the counterpart of ,dialectic2 for both of them deal with such matters as do not fall within any special science1 but belong in a certain way to the common knowledge of all4 ,hence every individual has his share of both1 greater or less2 for every one can1 up to a certain point1 both examine others and stand examination from others2 every one tries to defend himself and to accuse others4#ac ,to the same purpose ,aristotle speaks about ,dialectic1 in the beginning of the ,topica3--,the dialectical syllogism takes its premisses from matters of opinion1 that is1 from matters that seem good to 7or are believed by7 all1 or the majority1 or the wise--either all the wise1 or most of them1 or the most celebrated4 ,aristotle distinguishes these matters of common opinion or belief from three distinct other matters3--7#a7 ,from matters that are not really such1 but only in appearance2 in which the smallest attention suffices to detect the false pretence of probability1 while no one except a contentious ,sophist ever thinks of advancing them2 on the contrary1 the real matters of common belief are never thus palpably false1 but have always something deeper than a superficial show2 7#b7 ,from the first truths or principia1 upon which scientific demonstration proceeds2 7#c7 ,from the paralogisms1 or fallacious assumptions 7,greek3 pseudograph_/mata71 liable to occur in each particular science4 ,now what ,aristotle here designates and defines as matters of common opinion and belief 7,greek3 ta e7_/ndoxa7 includes all that is usually meant1 and properly meant1 by ,common ,sense--what is believed by all men or by most men4 ,but ,aristotle does not claim any warrant or authority for the truth of these beliefs1 on the ground of their being deliverances of ,common ,sense1 and accepted 7by all or by the majority7 always as indisputable1 often as self-evident4 ,on the contrary1 he ranks them as mere probabilities1 some in a greater1 some in a less degree2 as matters whereon something may be said both pro and con1 and whereon the full force of argument on both sides ought to be brought out1 notwithstanding the supposed self-evidence in the minds of unscientific believers4 ,though1 however1 he encourages this dialectical discussion on both sides as useful and instructive1 he never affirms that it can by itself lead to certain scientific conclusions1 or to anything more than strong probability on a balance of the countervailing considerations4 ,the language that he uses in speaking of these deliverances of ,common ,sense is measured and just4 ,after distinguishing the real ,common ,opinion from the fallacious simulations of ,common ,opinion set up 7according to him7 by some pretenders1 he declares that in all cases of ,common ,opinion there is always something more than a mere superficial appearance of truth4 ,in other words1 wherever any opinion is really held by a large public1 it always deserves the scrutiny of the philosopher to ascertain how far it is erroneous1 and1 if it be erroneous1 by what appearances of reason it has been enabled so far to prevail4 ,footnote #ac3 ,aristot4 ,rhetor4 ,i4 i4 p4 #aced1 a4 #a4 ,compare ,sophist4 ,elench4 xi4 p4 #agb1 a4 #cj4 ,again1 at the beginning of the ,topica 7in which he gives both a theory and precepts of dialectical debate71 ,aristotle specifies four different ends to be served by that treatise4 ,it will be useful 7he says7-- #a4 ,for our own practice in the work of debate4 ,if we acquire a method and system1 we shall find it easier to conduct a debate on any new subject1 whenever such debate may arise4 #b4 ,for our daily intercourse with the ordinary public4 ,when we have made for ourselves a full collection of the opinions held by the many1 we shall carry on our conversation with them out of their own doctrines1 and not out of doctrines foreign to their minds2 we shall thus be able to bring them round on any matter where we think them in error4 #c4 ,for the sciences belonging to philosophy4 ,by discussing the difficulties on both sides1 we shall more easily discriminate truth and falsehood in each separate scientific question4 #d4 ,for the first and highest among the principia of each particular science4 ,these1 since they are the first and highest of all1 cannot be discussed out of principia special and peculiar to any separate science2 but must be discussed through the opinions commonly received on the subject-matter of each4 ,this is the main province of ,dialectic2 which1 being essentially testing and critical1 is connected by some threads with the principia of all the various scientific researches4 ,we see thus that ,aristotle's language about ,common ,opinion or ,common ,sense is very guarded2 that1 instead of citing it as an authority1 he carefully discriminates it from ,science1 and places it decidedly on a level lower than ,science1 in respect of evidence2 yet that he recognizes it as essential to be studied by the scientific man1 with full confrontation of all the reasonings both for and against every opinion2 not merely because such study will enable the scientific man to study and converse intelligibly and efficaciously with the vulgar1 but also because it will sharpen his discernment for the truths of his own science1 and because it furnishes the only materials for testing and limiting the first principia of that science4 ,,ii4 ,we will next advert to the judgment of ,aristotle respecting these principia of science3 how he supposes them to be acquired and verified4 ,he discriminates various special sciences 7geometry1 arithmetic1 astronomy1 c471 each of which has its own appropriate matter1 and special principia from which it takes its departure4 ,but there are also certain principia common to them all2 and these he considers to fall under the cognizance of one grand comprehensive science1 which includes all the rest2 ,first ,philosophy or ,ontology--the science of ,ens in its most general sense1 quatenus ,ens2 while each of the separate sciences confines itself to one exclusive department of ,ens4 ,the geometer does not debate nor prove the first principia of his own science2 neither those that it has in common with other sciences1 nor those peculiar to itself4 ,he takes these for granted1 and demonstrates the consequences that logically follow from them4 ,it belongs to the ,first ,philosopher to discuss the principia of all4 ,accordingly1 the province of the ,first ,philosopher is all-comprehensive1 co-extensive with all the sciences4 ,so also is the province of the ,dialectician alike all-comprehensive4 ,thus far the two agree2 but they differ as to method and purpose4 ,the ,dialectician seeks to enforce1 confront1 and value all the different reasons pro and con1 consistent and inconsistent2 the ,first ,philosopher performs this too1 or supposes it to be performed by others1 but proceeds farther3 namely1 to determine certain ,axioms that may be trusted as sure grounds 7along with certain other principia7 for demonstrative conclusions in science4 ,aristotle describes in his ,analytica the process of ,demonstration1 and the conditions required to render it valid4 ,but what is the point of departure for this process8 ,aristotle declares that there cannot be a regress without end1 demonstrating one conclusion from certain premisses1 then demonstrating those premisses from others1 and so on4 ,you must arrive ultimately at some premisses that are themselves undemonstrable1 but that may be trusted as ground from whence to start in demonstrating conclusions4 ,all demonstration is carried on through a middle term1 which links together the two terms of the conclusion1 though itself does not appear in the conclusion4 ,those undemonstrable propositions1 from which demonstration begins1 must be known without a middle term1 that is1 immediately known2 they must be known in themselves1 that is1 not through any other propositions2 they must be better known than the conclusions derived from them2 they must be propositions first and most knowable4 ,but these two last epithets 7,aristotle often repeats7 have two meanings3 first and most knowable by nature or absolutely1 are the most universal propositions2 first and most knowable to us1 are those propositions declaring the particular facts of sense4 ,these two meanings designate truths correlative to each other1 but at opposite ends of the intellectual line of march4 ,of these undemonstrable principia1 indispensable as the grounds of all ,demonstration1 some are peculiar to each separate science1 others are common to several or to all sciences4 ,these common principles were called ,axioms1 in mathematics1 even in the time of ,aristotle4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 he designates them as ,axioms1 without any special reference to mathematics2 though he also uses the same name to denote other propositions1 not of the like fundamental character4 ,now1 how do we come to know these undemonstrable ,axioms and other immediate propositions or principia1 since we do not knew them by demonstration8 ,this is the second question to be answered1 in appreciating ,aristotle's views about the ,philosophy of ,common ,sense4 ,he is very explicit in his way of answering this question4 ,he pronounces it absurd to suppose that these immediate principia are innate or congenital1--in other words1 that we possess them from the beginning1 and yet that we remain for a long time without any consciousness of possessing them2 seeing that they are the most accurate of all our cognitions4 ,what we possess at the beginning 7,aristotle says7 is only a mental power of inferior accuracy and dignity4 ,we1 as well as all other animals1 begin with a congenital discriminative power called sensible perception4 ,with many animals1 the data of perception are transient1 and soon disappear altogether1 so that the cognition of such animals consists in nothing but successive acts of sensible perception4 ,with us1 on the contrary1 as with some other animals1 the data of perception are preserved by memory2 accordingly our cognitions include both perceptions and remembrances4 ,farthermore1 we are distinguished even from the better animals by this difference--that with us1 but not with them1 a rational order of thought grows out of such data of perception1 when multiplied and long preserved4 ,and thus out of perception grows memory2 out of memory of the same matter often repeated grows experience1 since many remembrances of the same thing constitute one numerical experience4 ,out of such experience1 a farther consequence arises1 that what is one and the same in all the particulars1 7the ,universal or the ,one alongside of the ,many71 becomes fixed or rests steadily within the mind4 ,herein lies the principium of ,art1 in reference to ,agenda or ,facienda--of ,science1 in reference to ,entia4 ,thus these cognitive principia are not original and determinate possessions of the mind1 nor do they spring from any other mental possessions of a higher cognitive order1 but simply from data of sensible perception2 which data are like runaway soldiers in a panic1 first one stops his flight and halts1 then a second follows the example1 afterwards a third and fourth1 until at length an orderly array is obtained4 ,our minds are so constituted as to render this possible4 ,if a single individual impression is thus detained1 it will presently acquire the character of a ,universal in the mind2 for1 though we perceive the particular1 our perception is of the ,universal 7i4e41 when we perceive ,kallias1 our perception is of man generally1 not of the man ,kallias74 ,again the fixture of these lowest ,universals in the mind will bring in those of the next highest order2 until at length the ,summa ,genera and the absolute ,universals acquire a steady establishment therein4 ,thus1 from this or that particular animal1 we shall rise as high as ,animal universally2 and so on from ,animal upwards4 ,we thus see clearly 7,aristotle says7 that only by ,induction can we come to know the first principia of ,demonstration2 for it is by this process that sensible perception engraves the ,universal on our minds4#ad ,we begin by the notiora nobis 7,particulars71 and ascend to the notiora natur or simpliciter 7,universals74 ,some among our mental habits that are conversant with truth1 are also capable of falsehood 7such as ,opinion and ,reasoning73 others are not so capable1 but embrace uniformly truth and nothing but truth2 such are ,science and ,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous74 ,intellect is the only source more accurate than ,science4 ,now the principia of ,demonstration are more accurate than the demonstrations themselves1 yet they cannot 7as we have already observed7 be the objects of ,science4 ,they must therefore be the object of what is more accurate than ,science1 namely1 of ,intellect4 ,intellect and the objects of ,intellect will thus be the principia of ,science and of the objects of ,science4 ,but these principles are not intuitive data or revelations4 ,they are acquisitions gradually made2 and there is a regular road whereby we travel up to them1 quite distinct from the road whereby we travel down from them to scientific conclusions4 ,footnote #ad3 ,aristot4 ,anal4 ,post4 ,,ii4 p4 #ajj1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 dlon d o7_/ti 7min ta prta e7pagg gnri_/zein a7nagkaion2 kai gar kai ai7_/sthsis ou7_/t to katho_/lou e7mpoiei2 also ibid4 ,i4 xviii41 p4 #ha1 b4 #c1 upon which passage ,waitz1 in his note1 explains as follows 7p4 #cdg73--,sententia nostri loci hc est4 ,universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur1 quum etiam in iis1 qu a sensibus maxime aliena videntur1 et qu1 ut mathematica 7,greek3 ta e7x a7phaire_/ses71 cogitatione separantur a materia quacum conjuncta sunt1 inductione probentur ea qu de genere 7e4g41 de linea vel de corpore mathematico71 ad quod demonstratio pertineat1 prdicentur ,greek3 kath' au7ta_/ et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint4 ,inductio autem iis nititur qu sensibus percipiuntur3 nam res singulares sentiuntur1 scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine inductione1 non datur inductio sine sensu4 ,the chapter just indicated in the ,analytica ,posteriora1 attesting the growth of those universals that form the principia of demonstration out of the particulars of sense1 may be illustrated by a similar statement in the ,first ,book of the ,metaphysica4 ,here1 after stating that sensible perception is common to all animals1 ,aristotle distinguishes the lowest among animals1 who have this alone2 then1 a class next above them1 who have it along with phantasy and memory1 and some of whom are intelligent 7like bees71 yet still cannot learn1 from being destitute of hearing2 farther another class1 one stage higher1 who hear1 and therefore can be taught something1 yet arrive only at a scanty sum of experience2 lastly1 still higher1 the class men1 who possess a large stock of phantasy1 memory1 and experience1 fructifying into science and art4#ae ,experience 7,aristotle says7 is of particular facts2 ,art and ,science are of ,universals4 ,art is attained1 when out of many conceptions of experience there arises one universal persuasion respecting phenomena similar to each other4 ,we may know that ,kallias1 sick of a certain disease--that ,sokrates1 likewise sick of it--that ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and other individuals besides1 have been cured by a given remedy2 but this persuasion respecting ever so many individual cases1 is mere matter of experience4 ,when1 however1 we proceed to generalize these cases1 and then affirm that the remedy cures all persons suffering under the same disease1 circumscribed by specific marks--fever or biliousness--this is ,art or ,science4 ,one man may know the particular cases empirically1 without having generalized them into a doctrine2 another may have learnt the general doctrine1 with little or no knowledge of the particular cases4 ,of these two1 the last is the wiser and more philosophical man2 but the first may be the more effective and successful as a practitioner4 ,footnote #ae3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 i4 p4 #ihj1 a4 #bf1 seq43 ,greek3 phro_/nima men a7_/neu tou mantha_/nein1 o7_/sa m du_/natai tn pso_/phn a7kou_/ein1 oi7on me_/litta1 kai ei7_/ ti toiouton a7_/llo ge_/nos z_/n e7_/stin4 ,we remark here the line that he draws between the intelligence of bees--depending altogether upon sense1 memory1 and experience--and the higher intelligence which is superadded by the use of language2 when it becomes possible to teach and learn1 and when general conceptions can be brought into view through appropriate names4 ,in the passage above noticed1 ,aristotle draws the line of intellectual distinction between man and the lower animals4 ,if he had considered that it was the prerogative of man to possess a stock of intuitive general truths1 ready-made1 and independent of experience1 this was the occasion for saying so4 ,he says the exact contrary4 ,no modern psychologist could proclaim more fully than ,aristotle here does the derivation of all general concepts and general propositions from the phenomena of sense1 through the successive stages of memory1 association1 comparison1 abstraction4 ,no one could give a more explicit acknowledgment of ,induction from particulars of sense1 as the process whereby we reach ultimately those propositions of the highest universality1 as well as of the highest certainty2 from whence1 by legitimate deductive syllogism1 we descend to demonstrate various conclusions4 ,there is nothing in ,aristotle about generalities originally inherent in the mind1 connate although dormant at first and unknown1 until they are evoked or elicited by the senses2 nothing to countenance that nice distinction eulogized so emphatically by ,hamilton 7p4 #ggb1 a4 note73 ,cognitio nostra omnis mente primam originem1 sensibus exordium habet primum4 ,in ,aristotle's view1 the senses furnish both originem and exordium3 the successive stages of mental procedure1 whereby we rise from sense to universal propositions1 are multiplied and gradual1 without any break4 ,he even goes so far as to say that we have sensible perception of the ,universal4 ,his language undoubtedly calls for much criticism here4 ,we shall only say that it discountenances altogether the doctrine that represents the ,mind or ,intellect as an original source of ,first or ,universal ,truths peculiar to itself4 ,that opinion is mentioned by ,aristotle1 but mentioned only to be rejected4 ,he denies that the mind possesses any such ready-made stores1 latent until elicited into consciousness4 ,moreover1 it is remarkable that the ground whereon he denies it is much the same as that whereon the advocates of intuitions affirm it1 viz41 the supreme accuracy of these axioms4 ,aristotle cannot believe that the mind includes cognitions of such value1 without being conscious thereof4 ,nor will he grant that the mind possesses any native and inherent power of originating these inestimable principia4#af ,he declares that they are generated in the mind only by the slow process of induction1 as above described2 beginning from the perceptive power 7common to man with animals71 together with that first stage of the intelligence 7judging or discriminative7 which he combines or identifies with perception1 considering it to be alike congenital4 ,from this humble basis men can rise to the highest grades of cognition1 though animals cannot4 ,we even become competent 7,aristotle says7 to have sensible perception of the ,universal2 in the man ,kallias1 we see ,man2 in the ox feeding near us1 we see ,animal4 ,footnote #af3 ,aristot4 ,anal4 ,post4 ,,ii4 xix4 p4 #ii1 b4 #bf3 ,greek3 ei7 men d e7_/chomen au7ta_/s1 a7_/topon2 sumbai_/nei gar a7kribeste_/ras e7_/chontas gn_/seis a7podei_/xes lantha_/nein4--phaneron toi_/nun o7_/ti ou7_/t' e7_/chein oi7o_/n te1 ou7_/t' a7gnoousi kai mdemi_/an e7_/chousin e7_/xin e7ggi_/nesthai4 a7na_/gk a7_/ra e7_/chein me_/n tina du_/namin1 m toiau_/tn d' e7_/chein 7 e7_/stai tou_/tn timite_/ra kat' a7kri_/beian4 ,see ,metaphys4 ,a4 ix4 p4 #iic1 a4 #a4 ,some modern psychologists1 who admit that general propositions of a lower degree of universality are raised from induction and sense1 contend that propositions of the highest universality are not so raised1 but are the intuitive offspring of the intellect4 ,aristotle does not countenance such a doctrine3 he says 7,metaphys4 ,a4 ii4 p4 #ihb1 a4 #be7 that these truths furthest removed from sense are the most difficult to know of all4 ,if they were intuitions they would be the common possession of the race4 ,it must be remembered that1 when ,aristotle1 in this analysis of cognition1 speaks of ,induction1 he means induction completely and accurately performed2 just as1 when he talks of ,demonstration1 he intends a good and legitimate demonstration2 and just as 7to use his own illustration in the ,nikomachean ,ethica71 when he reasons upon a harper1 or other professional artist1 he always tacitly implies a good and accomplished artist4 ,induction thus understood1 and ,demonstration1 he considers to be the two processes for obtaining scientific faith or conviction2 both of them being alike cogent and necessary1 but ,induction even more so than ,demonstration2 because1 if the principia furnished by the former were not necessary1 neither could the conclusions deduced from them by the latter be necessary4 ,induction may thus stand alone without ,demonstration1 but ,demonstration pre-supposes and postulates ,induction4 ,accordingly1 when ,aristotle proceeds to specify those functions of mind wherewith the inductive principia and the demonstrated conclusions correlate1 he refers both of them to functions wherein 7according to him7 the mind is unerring and infallible--,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous7 and ,science4 ,but1 between these two he ranks ,intellect as the higher1 and he refers the inductive principia to ,intellect4 ,he does not mean that ,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous7 generates or produces these principles4 ,on the contrary1 he distinctly negatives such a supposition1 and declares that no generative force of this high order resides in the ,intellect2 while he tells us1 with equal distinctness1 that they are generated from a lower source--sensible perception1 and through the gradual upward march of the inductive process4 ,to say that they originate from ,sense through ,induction1 and nevertheless to refer them to ,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous7 as their subjective correlate1--are not positions inconsistent with each other1 in the view of ,aristotle4 ,he expressly distinguishes the two points1 as requiring to be separately dealt with4 ,by referring the principia to ,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous71 he does not intend to indicate their generating source1 but their evidentiary value and dignity when generated and matured4 ,they possess1 in his view1 the maximum of dignity1 certainty1 cogency1 and necessity1 because it is from them that even ,demonstration derives the necessity of its conclusions2 accordingly 7pursuant to the inclination of the ancient philosophers for presuming affinity and commensurate dignity between the cognitum and the cognoscens71 they belong as objective correlates to the most unerring cognitive function--the ,intellect 7,greek3 ,nous74 ,it is the ,intellect that grasps these principles1 and applies them to their legitimate purpose of scientific demonstration2 hence ,aristotle calls ,intellect not only the principium of ,science1 but the principium principii4 ,in the ,analytica1 from which we have hitherto cited1 ,aristotle explains the structure of the ,syllogism and the process of ,demonstration4 ,he has in view mainly 7though not exclusively7 the more exact sciences1 arithmetic1 geometry1 astronomy1 c4 ,but he expressly tells us that all departments of inquiry are not capable of this exactness2 that some come nearer to it than others2 that we must be careful to require no more exactness from each than the subject admits2 and that the method adopted by us must be such as will attain the admissible maximum of exactness4 ,now each subject has some principia1 and among them definitions1 peculiar to itself2 though there are also some principia common to all1 and essential to the march of each4 ,in some departments of study 7,aristotle says7 we get our view of principia or first principles by induction2 in others1 by sensible perception2 in others again1 by habitual action in a certain way2 and by various other processes also4 ,in each1 it is important to look for first principles in the way naturally appropriate to the matter before us2 for this is more than half of the whole work2 upon right first principles will mainly depend the value of our conclusions4 ,for what concerns ,ethics1 ,aristotle tells us that the first principles are acquired through a course of well-directed habitual action2 and that they will be acquired easily1 as well as certainly1 if such a course be enforced on youth from the beginning4 ,in the beginning of the ,physica1 he starts from that antithesis1 so often found in his writings1 between what is more knowable to us and what is more knowable absolutely or by nature4 ,the natural march of knowledge is to ascend from the first of these two termini 7particulars of sense7 upward to the second or opposite1#ag and then to descend downward by demonstration or deduction4 ,the fact of motion he proves 7against ,melissus and ,parmenides7 by an express appeal to induction1 as sufficient and conclusive evidence4 ,in physical science 7he says7 the final appeal must be to the things and facts perceived by sense4 ,in the treatise ,de ,coelo he lays it down that the principia must be homogeneous with the matters they belong to3 the principia of perceivable matters must be themselves perceivable2 those of eternal matters must be eternal2 those of perishable matters1 perishable4 ,footnote #ag3 ,see also ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 iv4 p4 #ajbi1 b4 #a-ad4 ,the treatises composing the ,organon stand apart among ,aristotle's works4 ,in them he undertakes 7for the first time in the history of mankind7 the systematic study of significant propositions enunciative of truth and falsehood4 ,he analyses their constituent elements2 he specifies the conditions determining the consistency or inconsistency of such propositions one with another2 he teaches to arrange the propositions in such ways as to detect and dismiss the inconsistent1 keeping our hold of the consistent4 ,here the signification of terms and propositions is never out of sight3 the facts and realities of nature are regarded as so signified4 ,now all language becomes significant only through the convention of mankind1 according to ,aristotle's express declaration3 it is used by speakers to communicate what they mean to hearers that understand them4 ,we see thus that in these treatises the subjective point of view is brought into the foreground--the enunciation of what we see1 remember1 believe1 disbelieve1 doubt1 anticipate1 c4 ,it is not meant that the objective point of view is eliminated1 but that it is taken in implication with1 and in dependence upon1 the subjective4 ,neither the one nor the other is dropped or hidden4 ,it is under this double and conjoint point of view that ,aristotle1 in the ,organon1 presents to us1 not only the processes of demonstration and confutation1 but also the fundamental principia or axioms thereof2 which axioms in the ,analytica ,posteriora 7as we have already seen7 he expressly declares to originate from the data of sense1 and to be raised and generalized by induction4 ,such is the way that ,aristotle represents the fundamental principles of syllogistic ,demonstration1 when he deals with them as portions of ,logic4 ,but we also find him dealing with them as portions of ,ontology or ,first ,philosophy 7this being his manner of characterizing his own treatise1 now commonly known as the ,metaphysica74 ,to that science he decides1 after some preliminary debate1 that the task of formulating and defending the axioms belongs1 because the application of these axioms is quite universal1 for all grades and varieties of ,entia4 ,ontology treats of ,ens in its largest sense1 with all its properties quatenus ,ens1 including ,unum1 ,multa1 ,idem1 ,diversum1 ,posterius1 ,prius1 ,genus1 ,species1 ,totum1 ,partes1 c4 ,now ,ontology is with ,aristotle a purely objective science2 that is1 a science wherein the subjective is dropt out of sight and no account taken of it1 or wherein 7to state the same fact in the language of relativity7 the believing and reasoning subject is supposed constant4 ,ontology is the most comprehensive among all the objective sciences4 ,each of these sciences singles out a certain portion of it for special study4 ,in treating the logical axioms as portions of ,ontology1 ,aristotle undertakes to show their objective value2 and this purpose1 while it carries him away from the point of view that we remarked as prevailing in the ,organon1 at the same time brings him into conflict with various theories1 all of them in his time more or less current4 ,several philosophers--,herakleitus1 ,anaxagoras1 ,demokritus1 ,protagoras--had propounded theories which ,aristotle here impugns4 ,we do not mean that these philosophers expressly denied his fundamental axioms 7which they probably never distinctly stated to themselves1 and which ,aristotle was the first to formulate71 but their theories were to a certain extent inconsistent with these axioms1 and were regarded by ,aristotle as wholly inconsistent4 ,the two ,axioms announced in the ,metaphysica1 and vindicated by ,aristotle1 are-- #a4 ,the ,maxim of ,contradiction3 ,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be2 ,it is impossible for the same to belong and not to belong to the same1 at the same time and in the same sense4 ,this is the statement of the ,maxim as a formula of ,ontology4 ,announced as a formula of ,logic1 it would stand thus3 ,the same proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time2 ,you cannot both believe and disbelieve the same proposition at the same time2 ,you cannot believe1 at the same time1 propositions contrary or contradictory4 ,these last-mentioned formulae are the logical ways of stating the axiom4 ,they present it in reference to the believing or disbelieving 7affirming or denying7 subject1 distinctly brought to view along with the matter believed2 not exclusively in reference to the matter believed1 to the omission of the believer4 #b4 ,the ,maxim of ,excluded ,middle3 ,a given attribute either does belong1 or does not belong to a subject 7i4e41 provided that it has any relation to the subject at all7--there is no medium1 no real condition intermediate between the two4 ,this is the ontological formula2 and it will stand thus1 when translated into ,logic3 ,between a proposition and its contradictory opposite there is no tenable halting ground2 ,if you disbelieve the one1 you must pass at once to the belief of the other--you cannot at the same time disbelieve the other4 ,these two maxims thus teach--the first1 that we cannot at the same time believe both a proposition and its contradictory opposite2 the second1 that we cannot at the same time disbelieve them both4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,we have here discussed these two maxims chiefly in reference to ,aristotle's manner of presenting them1 and to the conceptions of his predecessors and contemporaries4 ,an excellent view of the ,maxims themselves1 in their true meaning and value1 will be found in ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ,examination of the ,philosophy of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 ch4 xxi4 pp4 #djf-dba4 ,now1 ,herakleitus1 in his theory 7a theory propounded much before the time of ,protagoras and the persons called ,sophists71 denied all permanence or durability in nature1 and recognized nothing except perpetual movement and change4 ,he denied both durable substances and durable attributes2 he considered nothing to be lasting except the universal law or principle of change--the ever-renewed junction or co-existence of contraries and the perpetual transition of one contrary into the other4 ,this view of the facts of nature was adopted by several other physical philosophers besides4#ai ,indeed it lay at the bottom of ,plato's new coinage--,rational ,types or ,forms1 at once universal and real4 ,the ,maxim of ,contradiction is intended by ,aristotle to controvert ,herakleitus1 and to uphold durable substances with definite attributes4 ,footnote #ai3 ,see ',plato and other ,comp4 of ,sokr4' ,i4 i4 pp4 #bh-ch4 ,again1 the theory of ,anaxagoras denied all simple bodies 7excepting ,nos7 and all definite attributes4 ,he held that everything was mingled with everything else1 though there might be some one or other predominant constituent4 ,in all the changes visible throughout nature1 there was no generation of anything new1 but only the coming into prominence of some constituent that had before been comparatively latent4 ,according to this theory1 you could neither wholly affirm1 nor wholly deny1 any attribute of its subject4 ,both affirmation and denial were untrue3 the real relation between the two was something half-way between affirmation and denial4 ,the ,maxim of ,excluded ,middle is maintained by ,aristotle as a doctrine in opposition to this theory of ,anaxagoras4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,ibid4 pp4 #di-eg4 ,both the two above-mentioned theories are objective4 ,a third1 that of ,protagoras--,homo ,mensura--brings forward prominently the subjective1 and is quite distinct from either4 ,aristotle does indeed treat the ,protagorean theory as substantially identical with that of ,herakleitus1 and as standing or falling therewith4 ,this seems a mistake3 the theory of ,protagoras is as much opposed to ,herakleitus as to ,aristotle4 ,we have now to see how ,aristotle sustains these two ,axioms 7which he calls the firmest of all truths and the most assuredly known7 against theories opposed to them4 ,in the first place1 he repeats here what he had declared in the ,analytica ,posteriora--that they cannot be directly demonstrated1 though they are themselves the principia of all demonstration4 ,some persons indeed thought that these ,axioms were demonstrable2 but this is an error1 proceeding 7he says7 from complete ignorance of analytical theory4 ,how1 then1 are these ,axioms to be proved against ,herakleitus8 ,aristotle had told us in the ,analytica that axioms were derived from particulars of sense by ,induction1 and apprehended or approved by the ,greek3 ,nous4 ,he does not repeat that observation here2 but he intimates that there is only one process available for defending them1 and that process amounts to an appeal to ,induction4 ,you can give no ontological reason in support of the ,axioms1 except what will be condemned as a petitio principii2 you must take them in their logical aspect1 as enunciated in significant propositions4 ,you must require the ,herakleitean adversary to answer some question affirmatively1 in terms significant both to himself and to others1 and in a proposition declaring his belief on the point4 ,if he will not do this1 you can hold no discussion with him3 he might as well be deaf and dumb3 he is no better than a plant 7to use ,aristotle's own comparison74 ,if he does it1 he has bound himself to something determinate3 first1 the signification of the terms is a fact1 excluding what is contrary or contradictory2 next1 in declaring his belief1 he at the same time declares that he does not believe in the contrary or contradictory1 and is so understood by the hearers4 ,we may grant what his theory affirms--that the subject of a proposition is continually under some change or movement2 yet the identity designated by its name is still maintained1#ba and many true predications respecting it remain true in spite of its partial change4 ,the argument in defence of the ,maxim of ,contradiction is1 that it is a postulate implied in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience1 that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours2 a postulate such that1 if you deny it1 no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it4 ,if the speaker both affirms and denies the same fact at once1 no information is conveyed1 nor can the hearer act upon the words4 ,thus1 in the ,acharnenses of ,aristophanes1 ,dikopolis knocks at the door of ,euripides1 and inquires whether the poet is within2 ,kephisophon1 the attendant1 answers--,euripides is within and not within4 ,this answer is unintelligible2 ,dikopolis cannot act upon it2 until ,kephisophon explains that not within is intended metaphorically4 ,then1 again1 all the actions in detail of a man's life are founded upon his own belief of some facts and disbelief of other facts3 he goes to ,megara1 believing that the person whom he desires to see is at ,megara1 and at the same time disbelieving the contrary3 he acts upon his belief both as to what is good and what is not good1 in the way of pursuit and avoidance4 ,you may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life1 which the ,herakleitean must go through like other persons2 and when1 if he proceeded upon his own theory1 he could neither give nor receive information by speech1 nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind4 ,accordingly1 the ,herakleitean ,kratylus 7so ,aristotle says7 renounced the use of affirmative speech1 and simply pointed with his finger4#bb ,footnote #ba3 ,this argument is given by ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 a4 #g-be1 contrasting change ,greek3 kata to poso_/n and change ,greek3 kata to poio_/n4 ,footnote #bb3 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 v4 p4 #ajaj1 a4 #ab4 ,compare ,plato1 ,thett4 pp4 #agi-ahj1 about the aversion of the ,herakleiteans for clear issues and propositions4 ,the ,maxim of ,contradiction is thus seen to be only the general expression of a postulate implied in all such particular speeches as communicate real information4 ,it is proved by a very copious and diversified ,induction1 from matters of experience familiar to every individual person4 ,it is not less true in regard to propositions affirming changes1 motions1 or events1 than in regard to those declaring durable states or attributes4 ,in the long pleading of ,aristotle on behalf of the ,maxim of ,contradiction against the ,herakleiteans1 the portion of it that appeals to ,induction is the really forcible portion2 conforming as it does to what he had laid down in the ,analytica ,posteriora about the inductive origin of the principia of demonstration4 ,he employs1 however1 besides1 several other dialectical arguments built more or less upon theories of his own1 and therefore not likely to weigh much with an ,herakleitean theorist2 who--arguing1 as he did argue1 that 7because neither subject nor predicate was ever unchanged or stable for two moments together7 no true proposition could be framed but was at the same time false1 and that contraries were in perpetual co-existence--could not by any general reasoning be involved in greater contradiction and inconsistency than he at once openly proclaimed4#bc ,it can only be shown that such a doctrine cannot be reconciled with the necessities of daily speech1 as practised by himself1 as well as by others4 ,we read1 indeed1 one ingenious argument whereby ,aristotle adopts this belief in the co-existence of contraries1 but explains it in a manner of his own1 through his much employed distinction between potential and actual existence4 ,two contraries cannot co-exist 7he says7 in actuality2 but they both may and do co-exist in different senses--one or both of them being potential4 ,this1 however1 is a theory totally different from that of ,herakleitus2 coincident only in words and in seeming4 ,it does indeed eliminate the contradiction2 but that very contradiction formed the characteristic feature and keystone of the ,herakleitean theory4 ,the case against this last theory is1 that it is at variance with psychological facts1 by incorrectly assuming the co-existence of contradictory beliefs in the mind2 and that it conflicts both with postulates implied in the daily colloquy of detail between man and man1 and with the volitional preferences that determine individual action4 ,all of these are founded on a belief in the regular sequence of our sensations1 and in the at least temporary durability of combined potential aggregates of sensations1 which we enunciate in the language of definite attributes belonging to definite substances4 ,this language1 the common medium of communication among non-theorizing men1 is accepted as a basis1 and is generalized and regularized1 in the logical theories of ,aristotle4 ,footnote #bc3 ,this is stated by ,aristotle himself1 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,g4 vi4 p4 #ajaa1 a4 #ae3 ,greek3 oi7 d' e7n t lo_/g tn bi_/an mo_/non ztountes a7du_/naton ztousin2 e7nanti_/a gar ei7pein a7xiousin1 eu7thus e7nanti_/a le_/gontes4 ,he here1 indeed1 applies this observation immediately to the ,protagoreans1 against whom it does not tell1 instead of the ,herakleiteans1 against whom it does tell4 ,the whole of the reasoning in this part of the ,metaphysica is directed indiscriminately1 and in the same words1 against ,protagoreans and ,herakleiteans4 ,the doctrine here mentioned is vindicated by ,aristotle1 not only against ,herakleitus1 by asserting the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 but also against ,anaxagoras1 by asserting the ,maxim of ,excluded ,middle4 ,here we have the second principium of ,demonstration1 which1 if it required to be defended at all1 can only be defended 7like the first7 by a process of ,induction4 ,aristotle adduces several arguments in support of it1 some of which involve an appeal to ,induction1 though not broadly or openly avowed2 but others of them assume what adversaries1 and ,anaxagoras especially1 were not likely to grant4 ,we must remember that both ,anaxagoras and ,herakleitus propounded their theories as portions of ,physical ,philosophy or of ,ontology2 and that in their time no such logical principles and distinctions as those that ,aristotle lays down in the ,organon1 had yet been made known or pressed upon their attention4 ,now1 ,aristotle1 while professing to defend these ,axioms as data of ,ontology1 forgets that they deal with the logical aspect of ,ontology1 as formulated in methodical propositions4 ,his view of the ,axioms cannot be properly appreciated without a classification of propositions1 such as neither ,herakleitus nor ,anaxagoras found existing or originated for themselves4 ,aristotle has taught us what ,herakleitus and ,anaxagoras had not been taught--to distinguish separate propositions as universal1 particular and singular2 and to distinguish pairs of propositions as contrary1 sub-contrary1 and contradictory4 ,to take the simplest case1 that of a singular proposition1 in regard to which the distinction between contrary and contradictory has no application1--such as the answer 7cited above7 of ,kephisophon about ,euripides4 ,here ,aristotle would justly contend that the two propositions--,euripides is within1 ,euripides is not within--could not be either both of them true1 or both of them false2 that is1 that we could neither believe both1 nor disbelieve both4 ,if ,kephisophon had answered1 ,euripides is neither within nor not within1 ,dikopolis would have found himself as much at a loss with the two negatives as he was with the two affirmatives4 ,in regard to singular propositions1 neither the doctrine of ,herakleitus 7to believe both affirmation and negation7 nor that of ,anaxagoras 7to disbelieve both7 is admissible4 ,but1 when in place of singular propositions we take either universal or particular propositions1 the rule to follow is no longer so simple and peremptory4 ,the universal affirmative and the universal negative are contrary2 the particular affirmative and the particular negative are sub-contrary2 the universal affirmative and the particular negative1 or the universal negative and the particular affirmative1 are contradictory4 ,it is now noted in all manuals of ,logic1 that of two contrary propositions1 both cannot be true1 but both may be false2 that of two sub-contraries1 both may be true1 but both cannot be false2 and that of two contradictories1 one must be true and the other false4 ,,iii4 ,,metaphysica4 ,the following ,abstract--when not translation--of six books 7,greek3 ,g1 ,e1 ,z1 1 ,greek3 ,th1 ,greek3 ,l7 out of the fourteen included under the title ',metaphysica1' may be said to cover the whole of ,aristotle's dogmatic exposition of ,first ,philosophy4 ,according to the view of ,brandis1 now in its main features generally accepted1 the exposition continued through ,books ,greek3 ,g1 ,e1 ,z1 1 reaches back to ,books ,a and ,b1 and comes to an end with ,book ,greek3 ,th4 ,still it is only with ,book ,greek3 ,g that the properly didactic treatment begins1 ,book ,a being a historical review of previous opinion1 and ,book ,b a mere collection of ,greek3 a7pori_/ai subjected to a preliminary dialectical handling2 while1 at the other end1 ,book ,greek3 ,l1 though it has no direct connection with ,book ,greek3 ,th1 is1 especially in its latter part1 of undeniable importance for ,aristotle's metaphysical doctrine4 ,the remaining books are known as ,greek3 a1 ,greek3 ,d1 ,i1 ,k1 ,m1 ,n4 ,the short ,book ,greek3 a is entirely unconnected with any of the others1 and most probably is not the work of ,aristotle4 ,book ,greek3 ,d 7,greek3 peri tn posachs legome_/nn7--a vocabulary of philosophical terms--is ,aristotelian beyond question1 being referred to occasionally in the chief books2 but it lies quite apart from the exposition proper4 ,book ,i--dealing with ,unity and ,opposites--though it also has no place in the actual line of treatment1 is truly ontological in character1 and probably was intended to fall within some larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine2 the like1 as far as can be judged1 being true of ,books ,m and ,n1 containing together a criticism of ,pythagorean and ,platonic theories4 ,finally1 ,book ,k1 consisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the ,physica--hardly from the hand of ,aristotle1 gives otherwise only a sketch in outline of the argument of ,books ,b1 ,greek3 ,g1 ,e1 and thus1 although ,aristotelian1 is to be discounted4 ,the author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the six books for a preliminary ,abstract2 but the actual selection1 joined to various indications in the ,abstract and marginal notes in his copies of the ,metaphysica1 leaves no doubt that he accepted the view of ,brandis1 more especially as set forth by ,bonitz4 ,on the whole question of the ,canon of the ,metaphysica1 ,bonitz's ,introduction to his ,commentary may with advantage be consulted4 ,book ,greek3 ,g4 ,in this ,first ,philosophy1 ,aristotle analyses and illustrates the meaning of the generalissima of language--the most general and abstract words which language includes4 ,all these are words in common and frequent use2 in the process of framing or putting together language1 they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the result of many previous comparisons1 gone through but afterwards forgotten1 or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct consciousness4 ,men employ these words familiarly in ordinary speech1 and are understood by others when they do so4 ,for the most part1 they employ the words correctly and consistently1 in the affirmation of particular propositions relating to topics of daily life and experience4 ,but this is not always or uniformly the case4 ,sometimes1 more or less often1 men fall into error and inconsistency in the employment of these familiar general terms4 ,the ,first ,philosophy takes up the generalities and established phrases in this condition2 following back analytically the synthetical process which the framers of language have pursued without knowing or at least without recording it1 and bringing under conscious attention the different meanings1 more or fewer1 in which these general words are used4 ,philosophia ,prima devotes itself1 specially and in the first instance1 to ,ens quatenus ,ens in all its bearings2 being thus distinguished from mathematics and other particular sciences1 each of which devotes itself to a separate branch of ,ens 7p4 #ajjc1 a4 #be74 ,it searches into the ,first ,causes or ,elements of ,ens per se1 not per accidens 7a4 #ca74 ,but ,ens is a commune1 not generically1 but analogically2 constituted by common relationship to one and the same terminus1 as everything healthy is related to health4 ,the ,principle 7,greek3 a7rch_/7 of all ,entia is ,essence 7,greek3 ou7si_/a72 but some ,entia are so called as being affections of ,essence2 others1 as being a transition to ,essence1 or as destruction1 privation1 quality1 efficient or generative cause1 of ,essence or its analoga2 others1 again1 as being negations 7,greek3 a7popha_/seis7 thereof1 whence1 for example1 we say that ,non-,ens is ,non-,ens 7b4 #f-aj74 ,there is one science of all these primary1 secondary1 tertiary1 c41 ,entia2 just as there is one science of all things healthy1 of the primary1 the secondary1 the tertiary1 c41 quatenus healthy4 ,but1 in all such matters1 that science bears in the first instance and specially 7,greek3 kuri_/s7 on the ,primum ,aliquid1 from which all the secondary and other derivatives take their departure1 and upon which they depend 7b4 #af74 ,accordingly1 in the present case1 since ,essence is the ,primum ,aliquid1 the province of ,first ,philosophy is to investigate the causes and principles of ,essences in all their varieties 7b4 #ah-bb74 ,now whatever varieties there are of ,ens1 the like varieties there are of ,unum2 for the two are always implicated together1 though the words are not absolutely the same in meaning 7b4 #bd-ce74 ,accordingly both ,ens and ,unum with all the varieties of each belong to ,philosophia ,prima2 likewise ,idem1 ,simile1 c41 and the opposites thereof4 ,all opposites may be traced in the last analysis to this foundation--the antithesis of ,unum and ,multa 7p4 #ajjd1 a4 #a74 ,we must set forth and discriminate the different varieties--primary1 secondary1 tertiary1 c4--of ,idem and ,simile1 and also of their opposites1 ,diversum and ,dissimile2 and we must show how they are derived from or related to ,primum ,idem1 c41 just as we must do in the case of ,ens and ,unum4 ,all this task belongs to ,first ,philosophy 7a4 #bj-cj74 ,aristotle speaks of ,greek3 o7 philo_/sophos1 as meaning the master of ,philosophia ,prima 7b4 #a2 ,b4 p4 #iig1 a4 #ad74 ,if these investigations do not belong to the ,first ,philosopher1 to which among the other investigators can they belong8 ,who is to enquire whether ,sokrates1 and ,sokrates sitting1 is the same person8 ,whether ,unum is opposite to ,unum8 ,in how many senses ,opposite can be said8 7p4 #ajjd1 b4 #c74 ,all these are affections per se of ,unum quatenus ,unum1 and of ,ens quatenus ,ens1 not quatenus numbers1 or lines1 or fire2 that is1 they are propria 7sensu logico7 of ,ens and ,unum 7not included in the notion or definition1 but deducible therefrom--not consecutione notionis71 just as odd and even1 proportionality1 equality1 excess and defect1 are propria of numbers2 and there are other propria of solids1 whether moved or unmoved1 heavy or light4 ,it is these propria of ,ens and ,unum that ,philosophia ,prima undertakes to explain 7b4 #g-af71 and which others fail to explain1 because they take no account of ,greek3 ou7si_/a 7b4 #aj71 or of the fundamental ,ens or ,essentia to which these belong as propria4 ,these ,propria of ,ens are the ,greek3 oi7keia--the special and peculiar matter or principles--of ,philosophia ,prima4 ,that all of them belong in this special way to the ,first ,philosopher1 we may farther see by the fact that all of them are handled by the ,dialectician and the ,sophist1 who assume an attitude counterfeiting the ,philosopher4 ,all three travel over the same ground1 and deal with ,ens1 as a matter common to all 7p4 #ajjd1 b4 #bj74 ,but the ,sophist differs from the ,philosopher in his purpose1 inasmuch as he aims only at giving the false appearance of wisdom without the reality1 while the ,dialectician differs from the ,philosopher in his manner of handling 7,greek3 t tro_/p ts duna_/mes--b4 #bd74 ,the ,dialectician discusses the subject in a tentative way1 from many different points of view1 suggested by current opinions2 the ,philosopher marches by a straight and assured road from the appropriate principles of his science to certain conclusions and cognitions4 ,the same view of the scope and extent of ,philosophia ,prima may be made out in another way4 ,almost all philosophers affirm that ,entia are composed of contraries1 and may be traced back to opposite principles--odd and even1 hot and cold1 limit and the unlimited1 friendship and enmity1 c4 ,now these and all other contraries may be traced back to ,unum and ,multa3 this we may assume 7p4 #ajje1 a4 #a2 according to ,alexander ,aph41 it had been shown in the treatise ,de ,bono--,schol4 p4 #fdh1 a4 #ch1 ,br474 ,though it be true1 therefore1 that neither ,ens nor ,unum is a true genus1 nor separable1 but both of them aggregates of analogical derivatives1 yet since all these derivatives have their root in one and the same fundamentum1 the study of all of them belongs to one and the same science 7p4 #ajje1 a4 #f-aa74 ,it is not the province of the geometer to examine what is ,the ,opposite1 ,the ,perfect1 ,ens1 ,unum1 ,idem1 ,diversum1 except in their application to his own problems4 ,the general enquiry devolves upon the ,first ,philosopher2 who will investigate ,ens quatenus ,ens1 together with the belongings or appendages 7,greek3 ta u7pa_/rchonta7 of ,ens quatenus ,ens1 including ,prius1 ,posterius1 ,genus1 ,species1 ,totum1 ,pars1 and such like 7a4 #aa-ah74 ,it falls to the ,first ,philosopher also to investigate and explain what mathematicians call their ,axioms3 the mathematician ought not to do this himself1 but to leave it to the ,first ,philosopher4 ,these ,axioms are1 in their highest generality1 affirmations respecting ,ens quatenus ,ens1 all of which belong to the ,first ,philosopher2 from whom the mathematician accepts them1 and applies them as far as his own department requires 7p4 #ajje1 a4 #bj1 seq474 ,in ,first ,philosophy1 the firmest1 best known1 and most unquestionable of all principles is this3 ,it is impossible for the same predicate at the same time and in the same sense to belong and not to belong to the same subject 7p4 #ajje1 b4 #bj74 ,no one can at the same time believe that the same thing both is and is not2 though ,herakleitus professed to believe this1 we must not suppose that he really did believe it 7b4 #be74 ,no man can hold two contrary opinions at the same time 7b4 #ca74 ,this is by nature the first principle of all other axioms2 to which principle all demonstrations are in the last resort brought back 7b4 #cc3 ,greek3 phu_/sei gar a7rch kai tn a7_/lln a7xima_/tn au7_/t pa_/ntn74 ,aristotle then proceeds to explain and vindicate at length this ,greek3 a7rch_/--the ,principle of ,contradiction1 which many at that time denied4 ,this principle is at once the most knowable1 and noway assumed as hypothesis 7,greek3 gnrimta_/tn kai a7nupo_/theton--p4 #ajje1 b4 #ac74 ,you cannot indeed demonstrate it to be true2 the very attempt to demonstrate it would be unphilosophical3 demonstration of every thing1 is an impossibility4 ,you cannot march upwards in an infinite progression of demonstrations2 you must arrive ultimately at some first truth which is not demonstrable2 and1 if any such first truth is to be recognized1 no one can point out any truth better entitled to such privilege than the ,principle of ,contradiction 7p4 #ajjf1 a4 #aa74 ,but you can convict an opponent of self-contradiction 7,greek3 a7podeixai e7legktiks1 a4 #ab1 #ae71 if he will only consent to affirm any proposition in significant terms--that is1 in terms which he admits to be significant to himself and which he intends as such to others2 in other words1 if he will enter into dialogue with you1 for without significant speech there can be no dialogue with him at all 7a4 #ba74 ,when the opponent has shown his willingness to comply with the conditions of dialogue1 by advancing a proposition in terms each having one definite signification1 it is plain1 by his own admission1 that the proposition does not both signify and not signify the same4 ,first1 the copula of the proposition 7est7 does not signify what would be signified if the copula were non est2 so that here is one case wherein the affirmative and the negative cannot be both of them true 7p4 #ajjf1 a4 #cj2 see ,alex4 ,schol4 and ,bonitz's note74 ,next1 let the subject of the proposition be homo2 a term having only one single definite signification1 or perhaps having two or three 7or any definite number of7 distinct significations1 each definite4 ,if the number of distinct significations be indefinite1 the term is unfit for the purpose of dialogue 7a4 #cj-;b4 #aj74 ,the term homo will signify one thing only2 it will have one determinate essence and definition--say animal bipes3 that is1 if any thing be a man1 the same will be animal bipes4 ,but this last cannot be the essence and definition of non-homo also3 non-homo1 as a different name1 must have different definition2 homo and non-homo cannot be like ,greek3 l_/pion and ,greek3 i7ma_/tion1 two terms having the same signification1 essence and definition2 for homo signifies one subject of constant and defined nature1 not simply one among many predicates applicable by accident to this same constant subject2 it signifies ,greek3 mi_/an phu_/sin and not ,greek3 a7_/lln tina phu_/sin 7,scholia1 p4 #fef1 b4 #ba74 ,since each name indeed is applied by convention to what it denominates1 the name non-homo may be applied elsewhere to that which we term homo2 but this is a mere difference of naming2 what bears the name homo1 and what bears the name non-homo1 must always be different1 if homo is defined to signify one determinate nature 7b4 #bb74 ,the one single nature and essence defined as belonging to homo1 cannot be the same as that belonging to non-homo4 ,if any thing be homo1 the same cannot be non-homo3 if any thing be non-homo1 the same cannot be homo 7b4 #be-cd74 ,whoever says that homo and non-homo have the same meaning1 must say fortiori that homo1 fortis1 musicus1 simus1 pulcher1 c41 have the same meaning2 for not one of these terms is so directly and emphatically opposite to homo1 as non-homo is4 ,he must therefore admit that the meaning1 not merely of all these words but also1 of a host besides is the same2 in other words1 that not merely ,opposites are one1 but all other things besides1 under different names 7,greek3 o7_/ti e7n pa_/nta e7_/stai kai ou7 mo_/non ta a7ntikei_/mena--p4 #ajjg1 a4 #f74 ,this argument is directed against those who maintain that affirmative and negative are both true at once1 but who still desire to keep up dialogue 7,alex4 ,schol4 p4 #feh1 a4 #bf1 ,br43 ,greek3 t t_/n te a7nti_/phasin sunaltheu_/ein le_/gonti1 kai s_/zein boulome_/n to diale_/gesthai74 ,no man who maintains this opinion1 can keep his consistency in dialogue1 if he will only give direct answers to the questions put to him1 without annexing provisoes and gratuitous additions to his answers4 ,if you ask him1 ,whether it is true that ,sokrates is homo8 he ought to answer plainly ,yes1 or ,no4 ,he ought not to answer3 ,yes1 but ,sokrates is also non-homo1 meaning that ,sokrates is also the subject of many other accidental predicates--fair1 flat-nosed1 brave1 accomplished1 c4 ,he ought to answer simply to the question1 whether the one essence or definition signified by the word man1 belongs to ,sokrates or not2 he ought not to introduce the mention of these accidental predicates1 to which the question did not refer4 ,these accidental predicates are infinite in number2 he cannot enumerate them all1 and therefore he ought not to introduce the mention of any of them4 ,sokrates is homo1 by the essence and definition of the word2 he is non-homo1 ten thousand times over1 by accidental predicates2 that is1 he is fair1 brave1 musical1 flat-nosed1 c41 all of which are varieties of the general word non-homo 7p4 #ajjg1 a4 #g-ai74 ,those who contend that both members of the ,antiphasis are at once true disallow ,essentia altogether1 and the distinction between it and ,accidens 7p4 #ajjg1 a4 #ba74 ,when we say that the word homo signifies a certain ,essentia1 we mean that its ,essentia is nothing different from this1 and that the being homo cannot be the same as the being non-homo1 or the not being homo4 ,those against whom we are reasoning discard ,essentia as distinguished from ,accidens1 and consider all predicates as ,accidentia4 ,albus belongs to homo as an accident2 but the essence of albus does not coincide with that of homo1 and cannot be predicated of homo 7a4 #cb74 ,upon the theory of these opponents1 there would be no ,prima ,essentia to which all accidents are attached2 but this theory is untenable4 ,accidents cannot be attached one to another in an infinite ascending series 7b4 #a74 ,you cannot proceed more than two steps upward3 first one accident1 then a second2 the two being joined by belonging to one and the same subject4 ,no accident can be the accident of another accident4 ,greek3 ,to leuko_/n may have the accident ,greek3 mousiko_/n1 or ,greek3 to mousiko_/n may have the accident ,greek3 leuko_/n2 each of these may be called indifferently the accident of the other2 but the truth is1 that ,greek3 leuko_/s and ,greek3 mousiko_/s are both of them accidents belonging to the common ,essentia--homo4 ,but1 when we affirm homo est musicus1 we implicate the accident with the ,essentia to which it belongs2 that ,essentia is signified by the subject homo4 ,there must thus be one word which has signification as ,essentia2 and1 when such is the case1 we have already shown that both members of the ,antiphasis cannot be predicated at once 7b4 #e-ah74 7,alexander1 in ,scholia1 p4 #feh1 b4 #dj-p4 #fei1 b4 #ad1 ,br41 remarks on this argument of ,aristotle3 ,those who held the opinion here controverted by ,aristotle--,greek3 tn a7nti_/phasin sunaltheu_/ein--had in their minds accidental propositions1 in regard to which they were right1 except that both members of the ,antiphasis cannot be true at the same time4 ,sokrates est musicus--,sokrates non est musicus3 these two propositions are both true1 in the sense that one or other of them is true only potentially1 and that both cannot be actually true at the same time4 ,one of them is true1 and the other false1 at the present moment2 but that which is now false has been true in the past1 and may become true in the future4 ,aristotle does not controvert this theory so far as regards accidental propositions2 but he maintains that it is untenable about essential propositions1 and that the theorists overlooked this distinction47 ,moreover1 if you say that both members of the ,antiphasis are alike true respecting every predicate of a given subject1 you must admit that all things are one 7p4 #ajjg1 b4 #bj74 ,the same thing will be at once a wall1 a trireme1 a man4 ,respecting every subject1 you may always either affirm or deny any given predicate2 but1 according to this theory1 whenever it is true to affirm1 it is always equally true to deny4 ,if you can say truly1 ,homo non est triremis1 you may say with equal truth1 according to the theory before us1 ,homo est triremis4 ,and1 of course1 ,homo non est triremis may be said truly2 since 7still according to this theory7 the much more special negative1 ,homo non est homo1 may be said truly 7b4 #cb74 ,again1 if this theory be admitted1 the doctrine that every predicate may be either affirmed or denied of any given subject1 will no longer hold true4 ,for1 if it be true to say of ,sokrates both ,est homo and ,est non-homo3 it must also be true to say of him both ,non est homo and ,non est non-homo4 ,if both affirmative and negative may be alike affirmed1 both may be alike denied 7p4 #ajjh1 a4 #b-g74 ,if both members of the ,antiphasis are alike true1 both must be alike false 7,alex4 ,schol4 p4 #ffc1 a4 #ad-cd74 ,again1 the theory that both members of the ,antiphasis are alike true1 is intended by its authors to apply universally or not universally4 ,every thing is both white and not white1 ,ens and ,non-,ens2 or this is true with some propositions1 but not with regard to others4 ,if the theorists take the latter ground and allow some exceptions1 so far at least as those exceptions reach1 firm truth is left 7,greek3 au7tai a7n ei7en o7mologou_/menai--p4 #ajjh1 a4 #aa74 ,but1 if they take the former ground and allow no exceptions1 they may still perhaps say3 ,wherever you can affirm with truth1 we can also deny with truth2 but1 wherever we can deny with truth1 we cannot in every case affirm with truth 7a4 #ae74 ,meeting them upon this last ground1 we remark that at any rate some negative propositions are here admitted to be knowable1 and we obtain thus much of settled opinion2 besides1 wherever the negative is knowable1 the corresponding affirmative must be still more knowable 7a4 #ah74 ,if they take the former ground and say that1 wherever the negative is true1 the affirmative is true also1 they must either mean that each of them is true separately1 or that neither of them is true separately but that both are true when enunciated together in a couple 7a4 #ai74 ,if they mean the latter1 they do not talk either of these things or of any thing else3 there is neither speech nor speaker1 nothing but non-entity2 and how can non-entity either speak or walk 7a4 #bb78 ,every thing would be confounded in one4 ,if they mean the former--that affirmative and negative are each alike true taken separately1 we reply that1 since this must be true as much respecting one subject as respecting another1 so there can be no distinction or difference between one subject and another2 all must be alike and the same2 if there be any difference of any kind1 this must constitute a special and exceptional matter1 standing apart from the theory now under discussion4 ,upon this view of the theory in question1 then1 as well as upon the preceding1 we are landed in the same result3 all things would be confounded into one 7a4 #bg74 ,all men would speak truly and all men alike 7including the theorist himself1 by his own admission7 would speak falsely4 ,indeed in discussing with this theorist we have nothing to talk about2 for he says nothing4 ,he does not say1 ,it is thus2 he does not say1 ,it is not thus2 he says1 ,it is both thus and not thus3 then1 again1 he negatives both1 saying1 ,it is neither thus nor not thus2 so that there is nothing definite in what he says 7a4 #cb74 ,again1 let us ask1 ,does he who believes things to be so1 believe falsely1 and he who believes things not to be so and so1 believe falsely also1 while he who believes both at once1 believes truly8 ,if this last person believes truly1 what is meant by the common saying that such and such is the constitution of nature8 ,if you even say that the last person does not indeed believe truly1 but believes more truly than he who believes the affirmative alone1 or he who believes the negative alone1 we still have something definite in the constitution of nature1 something which is really true1 and not true and false at the same time4 ,but1 if there be no more truly or less truly--if all persons alike and equally speak truly and speak falsely--speech is useless to such persons2 what they say1 they at the same time unsay4 ,if the state of their minds really corresponds to this description--if they believe nothing1 but at once think so and so and do not think so and so--how do such persons differ from plants 7b4 #c-ab2 see ,alexander's ,scholion1 p4 #ffe1 b4 #i-ag ,br41 about the explanation of ,greek3 mallon1 and the distinction between ,greek3 le_/gein and ,greek3 u7polamba_/nein1 p4 #ffe1 b4 #ca1 seq478 ,it is certain1 however1 that these theorists are not like plants1 and do not act as such in matters of ordinary life4 ,they look for water1 when thirsty2 they keep clear of falling into a well or over a precipice4 ,in regard to what is desirable or undesirable1 at least1 they do not really act upon their own theory--,that both members of the ,antiphasis are equally true and equally false4 ,they act upon the contrary theory--,that one of the members is true1 and the other false4 ,but1 if these theorists1 admitting that they act thus1 say that they do not act thus with any profession of knowing the truth1 but simply on the faith of appearance and greater probability1 we reply that this ought to impose upon them a stronger sense of duty in regard to getting at the truth4 ,the state of ,opinion stands to that of ,knowledge in the same relation as that of sickness to health 7p4 #ajjh1 b4 #ab-ca74 ,finally1 to follow up this last argument1 even if we grant to these theorists that both members of the ,antiphasis are true1 still there are degrees of truth3 the ,more and the ,less pervades the constitution of nature 7p4 #ajjh1 b4 #cb74 ,we shall not surely affirm that two and three are equally even2 nor shall we say1 when any one affirms four to be five1 that he commits an equal error with one who affirms four to be a thousand4 ,clearly one of these persons is more near to the truth1 the other is less near to the truth4 ,but1 if there be such a thing as being nearer to the truth1 there must surely be some truth to which you have come nearer2 and1 even if this be denied1 yet at least what we have already obtained 7the ,greek3 e7ggu_/teron ts a7lthei_/as7 is something firmer and of a more truth-like character4 ,we shall thus have got rid of that unqualified theory which forbids all definite conceptions of the intellect 7,greek3 ka7n ei7 m_/ e7stin1 a7ll' 7_/d ge_/ ti e7sti bebaio_/teron kai a7lthin_/teron1 kai tou lo_/gou a7pllagme_/noi a7n ei7_/men tou a7kra_/tou kai klu_/onto_/s ti t dianoi_/a o7ri_/sai--p4 #ajji1 a4 #b74 ,having thus completed his refutation of the unqualified theory1 which declares both members of the ,antiphasis to be alike true1 ,aristotle passes to the examination of the ,protagorean doctrine ,homo ,mensura3 he affirms that it proceeds from the same mode of thinking1 and that the two must stand or fall together4 ,for1 if all things which appear true are true1 all things must be at once true and false2 since the opposition of men's opinions is a notorious fact1 each man thinking his own opinions true and his opponent's opinions false 7p4 #ajji1 a4 #af74 ,aristotle here distinguishes between two classes of reasoners1 both of whom he combats1 but who require to be dealt with in a very different manner3 7#a7 ,those who are sincerely convinced of what they affirm2 7#b7 ,those who have no sincere conviction1 but merely take up the thesis as a matter for ingenious argument 7,greek3 lo_/gou cha_/rin71 and will not relinquish it until they are compelled by a strong case made out against them4 ,the first require persuasion1 for their ignorance may be easily cured1 and the difficulties whereby they are puzzled may be removed2 the second require to be constrained by a forcible ,elenchus or refutation1 which may correct their misuse of dialectic and language 7p4 #ajji1 a4 #bb74 ,aristotle begins with the first class4 ,the difficulties which perplex them proceed from sensible things 7,greek3 e7k tn ai7sthtn--p4 #ajji1 a4 #bc74 ,they perceive contrary things generated by the same2 and this leads them to believe that contraries are both alike real1 and that the two members of the ,antiphasis are alike true4 ,for1 since ,non-,ens cannot be generated1 both the two contraries must have pre-existed together as ,entia1 prior to the generation in the thing as it then stood 7a4 #be74 ,this is the opinion of ,anaxagoras1 who affirms that every thing is mixed in every thing2 and of ,demokritus1 who affirms that ,plenum and ,inane--in other words4 ,ens and ,non-,ens--exist alike and together in every part 7a4 #bh74 ,to these reasoners we reply1 that in a certain sense they are right1 in a certain sense wrong4 ,the term ,ens is used in two senses3 the same thing may therefore be at once ,ens and ,non-,ens1 but not in the same sense2 moreover1 from ,non-,ens in one sense something may be generated1 but not from ,non-,ens in the other4 ,the same thing may be at once two opposites in power1 but not in act 7,greek3 duna_/mei men gar e7nde_/chetai a7_/ma tau7to ei7nai ta e7nanti_/a1 e7ntelechei_/a d' ou7_/--a4 #ce74 ,we must farther remind these reasoners that the basis on which they proceed is not universally admissible2 for there are various ,entia of completely distinct and different essence1 in which there is neither movement nor generation nor destruction of any sort 7a4 #ch74 ,the doctrine held by ,protagoras--,that what appears true is truth1 comes from the same source as the other doctrine--,that both members of the ,antiphasis are true4 ,both doctrines proceed from the sensible world 7,greek3 o7moi_/s de kai 7 peri ta phaino_/mena a7l_/theia e7ni_/ois e7k tn ai7sthtn e7l_/luthen--p4 #ajji1 b4 #b2 ,greek3 o7moi_/s refers back to a4 #bc--;,greek3 au7_/t 7 do_/xa1 the other doctrine74 ,demokritus1 ,protagoras1 and others observe that sensible phenomena are differently appreciated by different men1 by other animals1 and even by the same animal or man at different times4 ,they do not think that truth upon these points of difference can be determined by a majority of voices4 ,demokritus says that either there is nothing true1 or that we cannot know what it is 7b4 #aj74 ,these reasoners identified intelligence with sensible perception1 and considered that this latter implied a change in the subject 7b4 #ac73 they conceived that what appeared to sense was necessarily true4 ,empedokles1 ,demokritus1 ,parmenides1 ,anaxagoras1 ,homer1 c41 all lay down the doctrine1 that the intelligence of men is varied with and determined by their sensible perceptions4 ,they thought that men of wrong intelligence were nevertheless intelligent men1 though their intelligence did not carry them to the same conclusions 7b4 #cj72 that if1 both in one case and in the other1 there were acts of intelligence1 there must be realities corresponding to both1 justifying the affirmative as well as the negative 7b4 #cc74 ,that sincere and diligent enquirers should fall into these errors is very discouraging2 but we must remark that their errors originated from this--that1 while investigating the truth respecting ,entia1 they supposed that ,entia were only the ,percepta or ,percipibilia 7p4 #ajaj1 a4 #b74 ,now in these ,entia ,perceptionis there is a great deal of the ,indefinite and of mere ,potential ,entity 7a4 #c74 ,hence the theories of these reasoners were plausible1 though not true4 ,they saw that all the ,entia ,perceptionis were in perpetual movement1 and they thought it impossible to predicate any thing with truth respecting what was at all times and in every way changing 7a4 #i74 ,kratylus and the ,herakleitizers pushed this to an extreme4 ,even against their reasoning1 we have something to say in reply4 ,we grant that they have some ground for imagining that what undergoes change does not exist at the moment when it changes 7a4 #af74 ,yet even here there is room for dispute2 for that which is in the act of casting off1 still retains something of that which is being cast off2 and of that which is being generated1 something must already be in existence4 ,as a general doctrine1 if something is in course of being destroyed1 something must be in existence2 and1 if something is in course of being generated1 there must exist something out of which it proceeds and by which it is being generated2 nor can this go back ad infinitum 7a4 #bb74 ,dropping this argument1 however1 let us advance another4 ,change as to ,quantity is not the same as change as to ,quality or ,form4 ,let us grant that1 as to ,quantity1 there is change continuous and perpetual--growth or decay--no such thing as stationary condition4 ,but all our knowledge relates to ,quality or ,form1 in which there is no continuous change 7a4 #bd3 ,greek3 kata men ou7n to poso_/n1 e7_/st m me_/non2 a7lla kata to ei7dos a7_/panta gign_/skomen4--,compare ,alex4 ,schol41 p4 #fga1 b4 #e-bb2 p4 #fgj1 a4 #cf3 ,bonitz has good remarks in his note1 pp4 #bjb-bjd9999474 ,again1 we have a farther reproach to make to these reasoners4 ,their argument is based only on the ,percepta or ,percipienda2 yet1 even as to these it is true only as to the minority and untrue as to the majority4 ,it is true merely as far as the sublunary ,percepta2 but as to the superlunary or celestial it is the reverse of truth4 ,our earth and its neighbourhood is indeed in continual generation and destruction2 but this is an insignificant part of the whole4 ,in affirming any thing respecting the whole1 we ought to follow the majority rather than the minority 7p4 #ajaj1 a4 #bh-ca999974 ,lastly1 we must repeat against these reasoners the argument urged just now4 ,we must explain to them1 that there exists1 apart from and besides all generation1 destruction1 change1 motion1 c41 a certain ,immovable ,nature 7,greek3 a7ki_/nto_/s tis phu_/sis--a4 #cd74 ,indeed their own doctrine--,that all things both are and are not--would seem to imply an universal stationary condition rather than universal change 7a4 #ch74 ,there can be no change2 for there is no prospective terminus which can be reached by change4 ,every thing is assumed as already existing4 ,we have now to remark upon the special doctrine of ,protagoras--,greek3 pan to phaino_/menon a7lthe_/s4 ,if we grant that perception is always true upon matters strictly belonging to it1 still phantasy is not identical with perception and we cannot say that what appears to the phantasy is always true 7,greek3 to phaino_/menon--which implies a reference to ,greek3 phantasi_/a--p4 #ajaj1 b4 #b71 ,besides1 it is strange that thinkers should puzzle themselves about the questions3 ,whether the magnitude and colour of objects is that which appears to a spectator near or to a spectator far off8 and to a spectator healthy or jaundiced8 ,whether the weight of an object is as it appears to a weak or to a strong man8 ,whether objects are truly what they appear to men awake or to men asleep8 ,their own actions show that they do not think there is any doubt2 for if1 being in ,libya1 they happen to dream that they are in ,athens1 none of them ever think of going to the ,odeium 7b4 #e-aa74 ,moreover1 respecting the future1 as ,plato remarks1 the anticipations of the ignorant man are not so trustworthy as those of the physician1 whether a patient will recover or not 7b4 #ad74 ,then1 again1 in respect of present sensations1 the perception of sight is not equally trustworthy with the perception of smell about a question of odour 7b4 #ag72 and the perception of smell will never report at the same time and about the same thing1 that it is at once fragrant and not fragrant2 nor1 indeed1 at different times about the affection itself1 but only about the subject to which the affection belonged 7b4 #bj74 ,the same wine which tasted sweet last month1 may now taste not sweet2 but the sweet taste itself is the same now and last month1 and the reports of the sense are never contradictory on this point4 ,the sweet taste which is to come in the future will be of necessity like the sweet taste in the past4 ,now such necessity is abrogated by all those reasonings which affirm at once the two members of the ,antiphasis4 ,these reasonings disallow all essence of every thing1 and all necessity2 for whatever is necessary1 cannot be at once both thus and not thus 7b4 #ba-cj74 ,on the whole1 if nothing exist except ,percepta1 nothing can exist without animated beings2 since without these last there can be no perception4 ,it is indeed true1 perhaps1 that under such a supposition there exist neither ,percepta nor acts of ,perception 7which are affections of the ,percipient72 but that the ,substrata which cause ,perception should not exist even without ,perception--is an impossibility 7p4 #ajaj1 b4 #cc3 ,greek3 to de ta u7pokei_/mena m ei7nai1 a7 poiei tn ai7_/sthsin1 kai a7_/neu ai7sth_/ses1 a7du_/naton74 ,perception is not perception of itself2 there exists besides1 apart from perception1 something else which must necessarily be prior to perception4 ,for the ,movens is by nature prior to the ,motum2 and this is not the less true1 though each of these two is enunciated in relation to the other 7b4 #ce74 ,a difficulty is often started1 and enquiry made1 ,who is to be the judge of health and sickness8 ,whom are we to recognize as the person to judge rightly in each particular case8 ,persons might as well raise difficulty and make enquiry1 ,whether we are now awake or asleep8 ,it is plain by men's actual conduct that they have no real doubt upon the point in any particular case2 and both these enquiries arise from the same fundamental mistake--that men require to have every thing demonstrated1 and will recognize nothing without demonstration4 7,alex4 says in ,scholia1 p4 #fge1 b4 #c3 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar pros a7 e7k phu_/ses be_/ltion e7_/chomen 7 7_/ste deisthai ts peri au7tn a7podei_/xes2 e7_/sti de tauta ai7_/ te ai7sth_/seis1 kai ta a7xi_/mata kai ai7 phusikai_/ te kai koinai e7_/nnoiai47 ,those who sincerely and seriously feel this difficulty1 may be expected to acquiesce in the explanation here given 7p4 #ajaa1 a4 #b-ad74 ,but those who put forward the difficulty merely for the sake of argument1 must be informed that they require an impossibility4 ,they require to have a refutative case made out against them 7which can only be done by reducing them to a ,greek3 sullogismos a7ntipha_/ses72 yet they themselves begin by refusing to acknowledge this refutation as sufficient1 for they maintain the thesis--,that both members of the ,antiphasis are alike and equally true 7a4 #af2 compare ,alex4 ,schol41 p4 #fge1 b4 #bj-bh74 ,those who maintain this last-mentioned thesis say1 in other words1 ,that every thing which appears true1 is true4 ,but this thesis of theirs cannot be defended except by the admission that every thing is relative1 and that nothing is absolute4 ,accordingly they must take care to announce their thesis1 not in absolute terms as it now stands1 but in terms strictly relative3 ,every thing which appears true1 appears true to some individual--at a certain moment of time--under certain circumstances and conditions 7p4 #ajaa1 a4 #bd74 ,for1 if they affirm1 in absolute phrase1 that all things are alike false and true1 on the ground that what appears true is true1 urging that the same things do not appear true either to different persons1 or to the same person at different times--nay1 sometimes even to the same person at the same time1 as may be seen by handling a pebble between two crossed fingers 7,greek3 e7n t e7palla_/xei tn daktu_/ln--a4 #cc71 so that it appears two to the touch1 but only one to the sight2--we shall reply1 that there is no such contradiction of judgment1 if they confine themselves to the same person1 the same time1 and one and the same sense4 ,in these cases1 there is only one affirmation which appears to be true1 and therefore1 according to their theory1 that affirmation is true4 ,they are not1 therefore1 justified in concluding that every thing is alike true and false 7b4 #a74 ,they can only escape this refutation by avoiding to say1 ,this is true1 and by saying1 ,this is true to such an individual1 at such a time1 c42 that is1 by making every affirmation relative to some person's opinion or perception4 ,hence the inference is1 that nothing either ever has occurred or ever will occur1 without the antecedent opinion of some person 7,greek3 mthenos prodoxa_/santos--p4 #ajaa1 b4 #f73 if any thing ever has so occurred1 it cannot be true that all things are relative to opinion4 ,moreover1 if the ,relatum be one1 it must be relative to some one1 some definite1 ,correlate2 and1 even if the same ,relatum be both half and equal1 it will not be equal in reference to a double ,correlate1 but half in reference to a double1 and equal in reference to an equal 7b4 #i74 ,moreover1 if homo and conceptum have both of them no more than a relative existence--that is1 if both of them exist only in correlation with a concipiens--then the concipiens cannot be homo2 it will be the conceptum that is homo4 ,and1 if every individual thing have existence only in relation to a concipiens1 this concipiens must form the ,correlate to an infinite number of ,relata 7b4 #ab74 7,all this is very briefly and obscurely stated in ,aristotle4 ,the commentary of ,alexander is copious and valuable3 one might suppose that he had before him a more ample text2 for it is difficult to find in the present text all that his commentary states999947 ,let thus much be said to establish the opinion1 ,that the two members of the ,antiphasis 7the ,affirmative and the ,negative7 are not both true at the same time4 ,we have shown whence it arises that some persons suppose both to be true2 and what are the consequences in which those who hold this opinion entangle themselves4 ,accordingly1 since both sides of the ,antiphasis cannot be truly predicated of the same subject1 it is impossible that opposite attributes can belong at the same time to the same subject 7p4 #ajaa1 b4 #ag3 ,greek3 ou7de ta7nanti_/a a7_/ma u7pa_/rchein e7nde_/chetai t au7t74 ,for one of these opposites includes in itself privation1 and privation of a certain real essence2 now privation is the negation of a certain definite genus4 ,and1 since affirmation and negation cannot be truly applied at the same time1 it follows that opposite attributes cannot belong at the same time to the same subject4 ,at least it is only possible thus far3 one may belong to it absolutely1 the other secundum quid2 or both of them secundum quid only 7,greek3 tn men gar e7nanti_/n tha_/teron ste_/rsi_/s e7stin ou7ch 7tton1 ou7si_/as de ste_/rsis a7po_/phasi_/s e7stin a7po_/ tinos 7risme_/nou ge_/nous--b4 #bj74 ,but1 also1 there can be nothing intermediate between the two members of the ,antiphasis2 we must of necessity either affirm or deny any one thing of any other 7p4 #ajaa1 b4 #bd74 ,this will appear clearly1 when we have first defined what is ,truth and ,falsehood4 ,to say that ,ens is not1 or that ,non-,ens is1 is false3 ,to say that ,ens is1 or that ,non-,ens is not1 is true4 ,accordingly1 he who predicates est--or he who predicates non est--will speak truly or speak falsely1 according as he applies his predicate to ,ens or to ,non-,ens4 ,but he cannot1 either in application to ,ens or to ,non-,ens1 predicate est aut non est 7b4 #bi74 ,such a predication would be neither true nor false1 but improper and unmeaning4 7,i follow at b4 #bg the text of the ,berlin edition3 ,greek3 7_/ste kai o7 le_/gn ei7nai 7 m a7ltheu_/sei 7 pseu_/setai--which seems to me here better than that of ,bonitz1 who puts ,greek3 7_/ste kai o7 le_/gn touto ei7nai 7 m a7ltheu_/sei 7 pseu_/setai--following ,alexander's explanation1 ,schol41 p4 #fhj1 a4 #cc1 which ,i cannot think to be correct1 though ,bonitz praises it much4 ,aristotle defines ,truth and ,falsehood3 ,when you say ,ens est1 or ,non-,ens non est1 you speak truth2 when you say ,ens non est1 or ,non-,ens est1 you speak falsehood4 ,accordingly1 when you employ the predicate est1 or when you employ the predicate non est1 you will speak truly or falsehood1 according as the subject with which you join it is ,ens or is ,non-,ens4 ,but neither with respect to the subject ,ens nor with respect to the subject ,non-,ens1 can you employ the disjunctive predicate--est aut non est499997 ,again1 a medium between the two horns of the ,antiphasis must be either a medium between opposites1 like grey between white and black1 or like the neither between man and horse4 ,if it be the latter1 it will never change2 for all change is either from a negative to its affirmative 7non-bonum to bonum7 or vice vers3 now that which is both non-homo and non-equus must change1 if it change at all1 into that which is both homo and equus2 but this is impossible4 ,we see change always going on2 but it is always change either into one of the two extremes or into the medium between them4 ,but can we assume that there is such a medium 7so that the case supposed will belong to the analogy of grey1 halfway between white and black78 ,no1 we cannot assume it2 for1 if we granted it1 we should be forced to admit that there was change into white not proceeding from that which is not white3 now nothing of the kind is ever perceived4 ,there cannot therefore be any admissible medium halfway between the two members of the ,antiphasis--something which is neither white nor not-white1 neither black nor not-black 7p4 #ajaa1 b4 #ce3 ,greek3 ei7 d' e7_/sti metaxu_/--if such medium be admitted--,greek3 kai ou7_/ts ei7_/ a7_/n tis ei7s leukon ou7k e7k m leukou ge_/nesis2 nun d' ou7ch o7ratai74 ,furthermore1 whatever our intelligence understands or reasons upon1 it deals with as matter affirmed or denied4 ,the very definition of truth and falsehood recognizes them as belonging only to affirmation or negation3 when we affirm or deny in a certain way we speak truth2 when in another way1 we speak falsely4 ,nothing is concerned but affirmation and denial 7i4e41 there is no mental operation midway between the two--p4 #ajab1 a4 #b-e74 ,if there be any such medium or midway process1 it is not confined to this or that particular ,antiphasis1 but belongs alike to all1 and must lie apart from all the different ,antiphases--at least if it is to be talked of as a reality1 and not as a mere possible combination of words2 so that the speaker will neither speak truth1 nor not speak truth2 which is absurd 7a4 #g74 ,it must also lie apart both from ,ens and from ,non-,ens2 so that we should be compelled to admit a certain mode of change of ,essence1 which yet shall neither be generation nor destruction2 which is impossible4 99997,according to ,aristotle's definition1 all change of ,greek3 ou7si_/a must be either ,generation1 i4e41 passage from ,greek3 to m o7_/n to ,greek3 to o7_/n1 or ,destruction1 i4e41 passage from ,greek3 to o7_/n to ,greek3 to m o7_/n4--,see ,alex4 ,schol4 p4 #fha1 b4 #cj-dj999947 ,again1 there are certain genera in which negation carries with it the affirmation of an opposite2 such as odd and even1 in numbers4 ,in such genera1 if we are to admit any medium apart from and between the two members of the ,antiphasis1 we should be forced to admit some number which is neither odd nor even 7p4 #ajab1 a4 #aa74 ,this is impossible3 the definition excludes it4 7,alexander gives this as the definition of number3 ,greek3 pas gar a7rithmos 7 a7_/rtio_/s e7stin 7 peritto_/s1 kai a7rithmo_/s e7stin o7s 7 a7_/rtio_/s e7stin 7 peritto_/s--,schol4 p4 #fhb1 a4 #af47 ,again1 if the ,antiphasis could be divided1 and a half or intermediate position found1 as this theory contends1 the division of it must be admissible farther and farther1 ad infinitum4 ,after bisecting the ,antiphasis1 you can proceed to bisect each of the sections2 and so on4 ,each section will afford an intermediate term which may be denied with reference to each of the two members of the original ,antiphasis4 ,two new ,antiphases will thus be formed1 each of which may be bisected in the same manner2 and so bisection1 with the formation of successive new ,antiphases1 may proceed without end 7p4 #ajab1 a4 #ac74 ,again1 suppose a questioner to ask you1 ,is this subject white8 ,you answer1 ,no4 ,now you have denied nothing else than the being-white3 this is the ,greek3 a7po_/phasis1 or negative member of the ,antiphasis4 ,but you have neither denied nor affirmed the intermediate stage between the affirmative and the negative2 nor is there any answer possible by which you could do so4 ,therefore there is no real intermediate stage between them 7,greek3 e7_/ti o7_/tan e7rome_/nou ei7 leuko_/n e7stin ei7_/p o7_/ti ou7_/1 ou7then a7_/llo a7pope_/phken 7 to ei7nai2 a7po_/phasis de to m ei7nai--p4 #ajab1 a4 #ae2 see ,alex4 ,schol4 p4 #fhb1 b4 #ae-ch1 and ,bonitz's note4 ,bonitz suggests1 though timidly1 ,greek3 a7pope_/phken instead of the common reading ,greek3 a7pope_/phuken1 which none of the commentators explain1 and which seems unintelligible4 ,i think ,bonitz is right1 though ,greek3 a7pope_/phken is an unknown tense from ,greek3 a7po_/phmi3 it is quite as regular as ,greek3 a7poph_/s or ,greek3 a7pe_/phsa9999474 ,the doctrines which we have been just controverting 7,aristotle says7 arise1 like other paradoxes1 either from the embarrassment in which men find themselves when they cannot solve a sophistical difficulty2 or from their fancying that an explanation may be demanded of every thing4 ,in replying to them1 you must take your start from the definition1 which assigns to each word one fixed and constant signification4 ,the doctrine of ,herakleitus--,that all things are and all things are not--makes all propositions true2 that of ,anaxagoras--,that every thing is intermingled with every thing--makes all propositions false3 such mixture is neither good1 nor not good2 neither of the members of the ,antiphasis is true 7a4 #ag-bh74 ,our preceding reasonings have refuted both these doctrines1 and have shown that neither of the two one-sided extremes can be universally true3 neither the doctrine--,every proposition is true2 nor that--,every proposition is false2 still less that which comprehends them both--,every proposition is both true and false4 ,among these three doctrines1 the second might seem the most plausible1 yet it is inadmissible1 like the other two 7b4 #d74 ,in debating with all these reasoners1 you must require them 7as we have already laid down71 not to admit either existence or non-existence but1 to admit a constant signification for each word4 ,you must begin by defining truth and falsehood2 each of them belongs only to affirmation in a certain way4 ,where the affirmation is true the denial is false2 all propositions cannot be false2 one member of each ,antiphasis must be true1 and the other member must be false4 ,each of these doctrines labours under the often-exposed defect--that it destroys itself 7p4 #ajab1 b4 #ad1 ,greek3 to thrullou_/menon--allusion to the ,thetetus1 according to ,alexander74 ,for whoever declares all propositions to be true1 declares the contradictory of this declaration to be true as well as the rest1 and therefore his own declaration not to be true4 ,whoever declares all propositions to be false1 declares his own declaration to be false as well as all other propositions 7b4 #ag74 ,and1 even if we suppose each of these persons to make a special exception in regard to the particular propositions here respectively indicated1 still this will not serve4 ,the man who declares all propositions to be false1 will be compelled to admit an infinite number of true propositions2 because the proposition declaring the true proposition to be true1 must itself be true2 a second proposition declaring this last to be true1 will itself be true2 and so on to a third1 a fourth1 c41 in endless scale of ascent4 ,the like may be said about the man who declares all propositions to be true3 he too will be obliged to admit an infinite number of false propositions2 for that which declares a true proposition to be false1 must itself be false2 and so on through a second1 a third1 c41 in endless scale of ascent as in the former case 7b4 #bb74 ,it follows from what has been just proved1 that those who affirm every thing to be at rest1 and those who affirm every thing to be in motion1 are both alike wrong4 ,for1 if every thing were at rest1 the same propositions would be always true and always false4 ,but this is plainly contrary to evidence2 for the very reasoner who affirms it was once non-existent1 and will again be non-existent4 ,on the other hand1 if every thing were in motion1 no proposition would be true1 and all would be false3 but we have proved above that this is not so4 ,nor is it true that all things are alternately in motion or at rest2 for there must be something ever-moving and other things ever-moved--and this prime movent must be itself immovable 7p4 #ajab1 b4 #bb-cj74 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,e4 ,the ,first ,philosophy investigates the causes and principles of ,entia quatenus ,entia 7p4 #ajbe1 b4 #c74 ,it is distinguished from other sciences1 by applying to all ,entia1 and in so far as they are ,entia2 for each of the other sciences applies itself to some separate branch of ,entia1 and investigates the causes and principles of that branch exclusively4 ,each assumes either from data of perception1 or avowedly by way of hypothesis1 the portion or genus of ,entia to which it applies2 not investigating the entity thereof1 but pre-supposing this process to have been already performed by ,ontology3 each then investigates the properties belonging per se to that genus 7b4 #ac74 ,it is plain that by such an induction not one of these sciences can demonstrate either the essence of its own separate genus1 nor whether that genus has any real existence4 ,both these questions--both ,greek3 ei7 e7_/stin and ,greek3 ti_/ e7stin--belong to ,ontology 7b4 #ah74 7,the belief derived from perception and induction never amounts to demonstration1 as has been shown in the ,analytica2 you may always contest the universality of the conclusion--,alex4 p4 #gcd1 b4 #af1 ,br47 ,apart from ,ontology1 each of these separate sciences is either theoretical1 or practical1 or constructive 7p4 #ajbe1 b4 #ba74 ,two of the separate sciences are theoretical--,physics and ,mathematics2 and1 as ,ontology 7or ,theology7 is also theoretical1 there are three varieties of theoretical science 7p4 #ajbf1 a4 #ah74 ,physical ,science applies to subjects having in themselves the principle of mobility or change1 and investigates1 principally and for the most part1 the ,essence or ,form thereof2 yet not exclusively the ,form1 for the ,form must always be joined with ,matter4 ,the subject of ,physics includes ,matter in its definition1 like hollow-nosed1 not like hollow 7p4 #ajbe1 b4 #cc74 ,all the animal and vegetable world is comprised therein2 and even some soul1 as far as soul is inseparable from ,matter 7,greek3 peri psuchs 9999e7ni_/as thersai tou phusikou1 o7_/s m a7_/neu ts u7_/ls e7sti_/n--p4 #ajbf1 a4 #e74 ,mathematics is another branch of theoretical science2 applying to subjects immovable and in part inseparable from ,matter2 that is1 separable from ,matter only in logical conception 7p4 #ajbf1 a4 #g-ae74 ,theology1 or ,first ,philosophy1 or ,ontology1 is conversant with subjects self-existent1 immovable1 and separable from ,matter 7p4 #ajbf1 a4 #af74 ,now all causes are necessarily eternal2 but these more than any other1 because they are the causes active among the visible divine bodies2 for1 clearly1 if the ,divinity has any place1 it must be found among subjects of that nature2 and the most venerable science must deal with the most venerable subjects 7p4 #ajbf1 a4 #ai74 ,the theoretical sciences are more worthy than the rest 7,greek3 ai7ret_/terai71 and ,first ,philosophy is the most worthy among the theoretical sciences 7a4 #bb74 ,a man may indeed doubt whether ,first ,philosophy is distinguished from the other theoretical sciences by being more universal1 and by comprehending them all as branches2 or whether it has a separate department of its own1 but more venerable than the others2 as we see that ,mathematics1 as a whole1 comprehends ,geometry and ,astronomy 7a4 #bg74 ,if there exist no other distinct ,essence beyond the compounds of ,nature 7,greek3 para tas phu_/sei sunestkui_/as--a4 #bh71 ,physics would be the first of all sciences4 ,but if there be a distinct immovable ,essence1 that is first2 accordingly the science which deals with it is first1 and1 as being first1 is for that reason universal 7,greek3 kai katho_/lou ou7_/ts o7_/ti pr_/t--a4 #cj74 ,it is the province of this ,first ,philosophy to theorize respecting ,ens qu ,ens--what it is and what are its properties qu ,ens 7a4 #cb74 7,alexander says the ,first ,philosophy is more universal than the rest1 but does not comprehend the rest3 ,greek3 pr_/t pa_/ntn kai katho_/lou 7s pros tas a7_/llas1 ou7 perie_/chousa e7kei_/nas1 a7ll' 7s pr_/t--,schol4 p4 #gcf1 a4 #bg47 ,now ,ens has many different meanings3-- #a4 ,ens ,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s4 #b4 ,ens ,greek3 7s a7lthe_/s--,non-,ens ,greek3 7s pseudos4 #c4 ,ens ,greek3 kata ta sch_/mata ts katgori_/as 7decuple74 #d4 ,ens ,greek3 duna_/mei kai e7nergei_/a4 #a4 ,respecting the first1 there can be no philosophical speculation 7p4 #ajbf1 b4 #c74 ,no science1 either theoretical1 or practical1 or constructive1 investigates ,accidents4 ,he who constructs a house1 does not construct all the accidents or concomitants of the house2 for these are endless and indeterminate4 ,it may be agreeable to one man1 hurtful to a second1 profitable to a third1 and something different in relation to every different ,ens2 but the constructive art called house-building is not constructive of any one among these concomitants 7b4 #g-aj74 ,nor does the geometer investigate the analogous concomitants belonging to his figures2 it is no part of his province to determine whether a triangle is different from a triangle having two right angles 7b4 #ab74 ,this is easy to understand3 the ,concomitant is little more than a name--as it were1 a name and nothing beyond 7b4 #ac74 ,plato came near the truth when he declared that ,sophistic was busied about ,non-,ens2 for the debates of the ,sophists turn principally upon ,accidents or ,concomitants1 such as1 ,whether musical and literary be the same or different8 ,whether ,koriskus or literary ,koriskus1 be the same or different8 ,whether everything which now is1 but has not always been1 has become2 as in the case of a man who being musical has become literary or being literary has become musical8 and such like debates 7see ,alexander1 ,schol4 p4 #gcf1 b4 #dj74 ,for the ,concomitant or ,accident appears something next door to ,non-,ens 7,greek3 e7ggu_/s ti tou m o7_/ntos1 p4 #ajbf1 b4 #ba71 as we may see by these debates4 ,of other ,entia there is generation or destruction1 but of ,accidents there is none 7b4 #bc74 ,nevertheless1 we shall state1 as far as the case admits1 what is the nature of the ,accident1 and through what cause it is 7,greek3 ti_/s 7 phu_/sis au7tou1 kai dia_/ tin' ai7ti_/an e7sti_/n2--p4 #ajbf1 b4 #be73 we shall perhaps at the same time explain why there can be no science respecting it4 ,among ,entia1 some are always and necessarily the same1 others are usually but not always the same4 ,these which come to pass in neither of these two ways1 are called ,accidents or ,concomitants4 ,of the first two1 the ,constant and the ,usual1 there is always some definite cause2 of the third1 or ,accidents1 there is none3 the cause of these is an ,accident 7p4 #ajbg1 a4 #h74 ,in fact1 ,matter is the cause of ,accidents1 admitting as it does of being modified in a way different from the usual and ordinary way 7a4 #ac74 ,it is plain that there can be neither science nor teaching of ,accidents3 the teacher can teach only what is constant or usual1 and nothing beyond 7a4 #bj74 ,now of these ,accidents1 there is a certain principle or cause which it is indispensable to admit--,chance 7,greek3 7 tou o7po_/ter' e7_/tuchen--p4 #ajbg1 b4 #ab74 ,there must be principles and causes1 generable and destructible1 yet which never are either generated or destroyed2 if this were not so1 all events would occur by necessity 7p4 #ajbf1 b4 #bi-ca74 7,thus the builder1 considered as cause of the house which he builds1 has been generated1 i4e41 he has acquired the art of building and the proper accessories2 and he will be destroyed1 i4e41 he will lose his art1 and its conditions of being exercised4 ,but1 considered as the cause of the accidents belonging to the house1 of its being annoying or inconvenient to ,a or ,b1 he has not been generated nor will he be destroyed2 i4e41 he has neither acquired1 nor will he lose1 any skill or conditions tending to the production of this effect4 ,as the contact of two substances is not generated1 but appears of itself along with the substances when they are generated2 as the limits of periods of time appear without generation along with the periods of time themselves2 so the builder1 when he acquires the power of building the house1 stands possessed thereby1 without any additional time or special generation1 of the power to produce the concomitant accidents of the house4 ,the house is thus produced by necessity2 its concomitant accidents not by necessity--,alex4 ,schol4 p4 #gch1 a4 #ai-cc47 ,but whether this ,greek3 to o7po_/ter' e7_/tuchen is to be considered as referable to ,matter1 ,end1 or ,movent1 is a point important to be determined 7p4 #ajbg1 b4 #ae74 ,aristotle shows elsewhere that it is referable to the last of the three--,greek3 to poitiko_/n 7,asklepius1 p4 #gch1 b4 #da74 ,having now said enough upon ,ens per ,accidens1 we proceed to touch upon the second variety of ,ens--,ens as the ,true1 ,non-,ens as the ,false4 ,this variety of ,ens depends upon conjunction and disjunction1 and forms an aggregate of two portions separately exhibited and brought together in the ,antiphasis4 ,such conjunction and disjunction is not in things themselves2 but in the act of intelligence which thinks the two things together and not successively3 in regard to simple matters and ,essence1 not even any special conjoining act of intelligence is required2 such things must be conceived together1 or not conceived at all 7p4 #ajbg1 b4 #bg74 ,the mental act of apprehension1 in these cases1 is one and indivisible3 you either have it entire at once1 or not at all4 ,the cause of this variety of ,ens is to be found in a certain affection of the intelligence2 that of the preceding variety of ,ens is an undefined or indeterminate cause 7b4 #cd74 ,both these two varieties of ,ens are peculiar1 standing apart from what is most properly and par excellence ,ens1 i4e41 from the ,ens according to the ten ,categories1 on which we shall now say something4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,z4 ,we have already stated that ,ens is a ,greek3 pollachs lego_/menon--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera called ,categories4 ,the first is ,greek3 ti_/ e7stin1 or ,greek3 ou7si_/a 7sensu dignissimo7--,essentia1 ,substantia 7p4 #ajbh1 a4 #ae74 ,the remaining ,categories are all appendages of ,essentia1 presupposing it1 and inseparable from it2 whereas ,essentia is separable from all of them1 and stands first in reason1 in cognition1 and in time4 ,all the other ,categories are called ,entia only because they are quantities1 qualities1 affections1 c41 of this ,essentia ,prima4 ,a man may even doubt whether they are ,entia or ,non-,entia1 since none of them is either per se or separable4 ,we ought hardly to say that a quality or an affection1 enunciated abstractedly1 is ,ens at all--such as currere1 sedere1 sanitas3 we ought more properly to say that currens equus1 sedens homo1 sanus miles1 are ,entia1 enunciating along with the quality the definite ,essence or ,individual ,substance to which it belongs 7a4 #bd74 ,the quality then becomes ,ens1 because the subject to which it belongs is an individual ,ens 7a4 #bg74 ,essentia ,prima is first in reason or rational explanation 7,greek3 lo_/g1 a4 #cd71 because in the rational explanation of each of the rest that of ,essentia is implicated4 ,it is first also in cognition1 because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully1 when we are able to answer ,quid est8 and say that it is homo or ignis2 not simply when we are able to answer ,quale or ,quantum est8 ,so that in answering the great and often-considered question1 ,quid est ,ens8 we shall first understand it as meaning ,essentia 7hoc sensu dignissimo71 and shall try to solve it so 7b4 #c1 ,greek3 peri tou ou7_/ts o7_/ntos74 ,essentia 7understood in this sense7 appears to belong in the most manifest manner to bodies3 we predicate it of animals1 plants1 the parts thereof1 the natural bodies such as fire1 water1 and such like1 as well as the parts and aggregates thereof1 such as the heaven and its parts1 the stars1 moon1 and sun 7p4 #ajbh1 b4 #g-ac74 ,but are these the only ,essences1 or are there others besides8 ,or again1 is it an error to call these ,essences1 and are all ,essences really something different from these8 ,this is a point to be examined4 ,some think that the limits of bodies 7surface1 line1 point1 monad7 are ,essences even more than the body and the solid3 others admit no ,essences at all beyond or apart from ,percipienda2 others again recognize other ,essences distinct from and more eternal than the ,percipienda2 for example1 ,plato1 who ranks ,ideas or ,forms1 and the ,mathematica1 as two distinct ,essences1 while he places the ,percipienda only third in the scale of ,essence4 ,speusippus even enumerates a still greater number of ,essences1 beginning with the ,one1 and proceeding to ,numbers1 ,magnitudes1 ,soul1 c41 with a distinct ,greek3 a7rch_/ or principle for each 7b4 #ba74 ,some others hold that ,forms and ,numbers have the same nature1 and that there are other things coming near to these1 such as lines and surfaces1 in a descending scale to the ,heaven and the ,percipienda 7b4 #bd74 ,we must thus investigate which of these doctrines are true or false1 whether there are any ,essences beyond the ,percipienda2 and1 if so1 how they exist3 whether there is any separable essence apart from ,percipienda1 and1 if so1 how and why2 or whether there is nothing of the kind4 ,but first we must give a vague outline what ,essence is generally 7,greek3 u7potupsame_/nois1 b4 #ca74 ,there are four principal varieties of meaning in this ,essentia1 ,greek3 kuri_/s or sensu dignissimo3 7#a7 ,greek3 to ti_/ 7n ei7nai1 7#b7 ,greek3 to katho_/lou1 7#c7 ,greek3 to ge_/nos1 7#d7 ,greek3 to u7pokei_/menon4 ,we shall first speak about the fourth--,substratum--which is the subject of all predicates1 but never itself the predicate of any subject4 ,that which appears most of all to be ,essentia is1 ,greek3 to u7pokei_/menon prton4 ,this name applies1 in one point of view1 to ,matter2 in another1 to ,form2 in a third1 to the total result of the two implicated together 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #a73 e4g41 the brass1 the figure1 and the complete statue of figured brass4 ,if1 therefore1 the ,form be prius1 and more ,ens1 as compared with the ,matter1 it will be also prius and more ,ens as compared with the complete result4 ,we get thus far in the adumbration of ,essentia--that it is the subject of all predicates1 but never itself a predicate4 ,but this is not sufficient to define it3 there still remains obscurity4 ,it would seem that ,matter is ,essentia2 and that1 if it be not so1 nothing else is discernible to be so2 for1 if every thing else be subtracted1 nothing 7save ,matter7 remains4 ,all things else are either affections1 or agencies1 or powers1 of bodies2 and1 while length1 breadth1 depth1 c41 are quantities belonging to ,essence1 ,quantity is not ,essence1 but something belonging to ,essence as ,first ,subject4 ,take away length1 breadth1 depth1 and there will remain only that something which these three circumscribe2 in other words1 ,matter--that which1 in itself and in its own nature1 is neither ,quantity1 nor ,quality1 but of which1 ,quantity1 ,quality1 and the other ,categories1 are predicated4 ,all these ,categories are predicated of ,essence1 and ,essence of ,matter2 so that ,matter is the last remaining per se 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #ab-bd74 ,take away ,matter1 and there remain neither affirmative nor negative predicates2 for these negative predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others 7a4 #be74 ,upon this reasoning1 it seems that ,matter is the true ,essence4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 this will be seen to be impossible4 ,for the principal characteristic of ,essence is to be separable and ,hoc ,aliquid4 ,so that either ,form1 or the ,compound of ,form and ,matter together1 must be the true ,essence4 ,but this last1 the ,compound1 may be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry1 not less than ,matter separately2 for it is manifestly posterior to either of the two components 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #cj74 ,we must therefore investigate the ,form1 though it is full of difficulty 7a4 #cc74 ,we shall begin the investigation from some of the ,percipienda1 which are acknowledged as ,essence2 for it is useful to go across from this starting-point to what is more cognizable 7,greek3 pro e7_/rgou gar to metabai_/nein ei7s to gnrim_/teron--p4 #ajbi1 b4 #c4 ,these words ought properly to come immediately after ,greek3 ztte_/on prton--p4 #ajbh1 a4 #ce1 and the intervening words now standing in the text1 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7n a7rch--peri au7tou1 ought to be transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down1 immediately before the words1 ,greek3 kai prton ei7_/pmen--p4 #ajbi1 b4 #ab4 ,bonitz has made this very just correction in his ,observatt4 pp4 #abi-acj1 referred to in his ,notes on the ,metaphysica474 ,every man learns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by nature to what is more cognizable by nature4 ,and the business 7,greek3 e7_/rgon7 of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to nature1 most cognizable to ourselves also2 just as1 in practical matters1 proceeding from what is good for each1 to make what is good by nature good also for each man's self4 ,for it will often happen that things first and most cognizable to each man's self1 are only faintly cognizable1 and have little or nothing of ,ens 7b4 #i74 ,yet still1 we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable1 by beginning with things poorly knowable1 but knowable to us 7b4 #ab74 ,taking up these ,percipienda1 for the purpose of searching for ,essentia in them1 we shall first advert to ,greek3 ti_/ 7n ei7nai1 which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of ,essentia1 saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it 7p4 #ajbi1 a4 #ab74 ,the ,greek3 t44e4 of each subject is what is affirmed of it per se 7,greek3 e7_/sti to t44e4 e7ka_/st o7 le_/getai kath' au7to_/--a4 #ac74 ,your essence is not to be musical2 you are not musical by yourself3 your essence is1 what you are by yourself4 ,nor does it even include all that you are by yourself4 ,surface is not included in the essence of white2 for the essence of surface is not the same thing as the essence of white4 ,moreover white surface1 the compound of both1 is not the essence of white2 because white itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be tolerated4 ,the definition1 which explains ,greek3 t44e41 must not include the very word of which you intend to declare the ,greek3 t44e4 ,if you intend to declare the ,greek3 t44e4 of white surface by the words smooth surface1 this does not declare it all3 you only declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth 7b4 #bb74 ,now1 since there are compounds in every one of the ,categories1 we must enquire whether there is a ,greek3 t44e4 belonging to each of these4 ,is there1 for example1 a ,greek3 t44e4 for white man8 ,let the meaning of these two words be included in the single word garment4 ,is there a ,greek3 t44e4 for garment8 ,what is it to be a garment8 ,you cannot answer2 for neither is this an enunciation per se 7p4 #ajbi1 b4 #bi74 ,are we to say1 indeed1 that there are two distinct sorts of enunciation per se3 one including an addition 7,greek3 e7k prosthe_/ses71 the other1 not8 ,you may define by intimating something to which the matter defined belongs2 e4g41 in defining white you may give the definition of white man4 ,or you may define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory to the matter defined2 e4g41 garment signifying white man1 you may define garment as white4 ,whereas the truth is1 that1 though a white man is white1 yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him 7p4 #ajcj1 a4 #a74 ,but can we in any way affirm that there is any ,greek3 t44e4 to garment 7taken in the above sense78 ,or ought we to say that there is none 7p4 #ajcj1 a4 #b2 ,bonitz4 ,obss4 p4 #abj78 ,for the ,greek3 t44e4 is of the nature of ,greek3 to_/de ti 7,greek3 o7_/per gar to_/de ti e7_/sti to t44e4--a4 #c71 or ,hoc ,aliquid1 i4e41 a particular concrete2 but1 when one thing is affirmed of another1 as when we say white man1 this is not of the nature of ,greek3 to_/de ti1 if ,greek3 to_/de ti belongs to ,essences alone 7a4 #e74 ,thus it appears that ,greek3 to_/de ti belongs to all those matters of which the rational explanation can be given by ,definition4 ,for to give the equivalent of a name in many other words is not always to give a definition3 if this were so1 a paraphrase of any length1 even the ,iliad1 might be called a definition4 ,there can be no definition except of a primary something2 which is affirmed1 without being affirmed as something about another 7a4 #aj74 ,there will be no ,greek3 t44e41 therefore1 except for species of a genus2 for in these alone what is affirmed is not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation4 ,respecting every thing besides1 there will be no ,greek3 t44e4 or definition1 but there may be a rational explanation 7,greek3 lo_/gos7 of what the name signifies1 or a more precise explanation substituted in place of a simpler 7a4 #af74 ,yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of ,greek3 t44e4 and ,definition8 and ought we not rather to say1 that both the one and the other are used in many different senses 7p4 #ajcj1 a4 #ah78 ,for the ,quid est 7,greek3 to ti_/ e7stin7 signifies in one way ,essence and ,hoc ,aliquid1 and in different ways all the other ,categories each respectively4 ,to all of them ,est belongs1 though not in like manner1 but primarily to one and consequentially to the rest2 so also ,quid est belongs simply and directly to ,essence1 but in a certain way to the others 7a4 #ba74 ,respecting ,quale1 ,quantum1 and the rest1 we may enquire ,quid ,est8 so that ,quale also comes under the ,quid est1 though not absolutely or directly 7,greek3 ou7ch a7pls1 a4 #be71 but analogously to ,non-,ens2 for some assert in words that ,est belongs to ,non-,ens also though not absolutely1 viz41 ,non ,ens est ,non-,ens--7a4 #bf74 ,now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any particular matter1 but we ought not to be less careful to determine how the matter itself really stands 7p4 #ajcj1 a4 #bg3 ,greek3 dei men ou7n skopein kai to ps dei le_/gein peri e7_/kaston1 ou7 mn mallo_/n ge 7 to ps e7_/chei4 ,this contrast of ,greek3 ps dei le_/gein with ,greek3 ps e7_/chei appears to refer to what had been said two lines before3 ,greek3 logiks phasi_/ tines ei7nai to m o7_/n--verbal propositions distinguished from real474 ,the phraseology used just before is clear1 and we must therefore recognize that ,greek3 t44e41 as well as ,greek3 ti_/ e7sti1 belongs absolutely and primarily to ,essentia1 but in a secondary way to the other ,categories2 that is not absolutely1 but ,greek3 poi t44e41 po_/s t44e41 c4 7a4 #ca74 ,for we must either declare the ,categories to be simply quivoca1 or we must recognize this addition and subtraction of the separate title of each1 like the non-cognizable cognizable 7,greek3 7_/sper kai to m e7pistton e7pistto_/n--a4 #cc4 ,i do not understand these words1 nor does the ,scholiast or ,bonitz explain them satisfactorily474 ,but the truth is1 that they are neither quivoca nor univoca1 but in an intermediate grade of relation--not ,greek3 kath' e7_/n1 but ,greek3 pros e7_/n 7b4 #c474 ,people may express this in what phrases they like2 but the truth is1 that there is both ,greek3 t44e4 and ,definition1 directly and primarily1 of ,essence2 and of the other ,categories also1 but not directly and primarily4 ,of white man1 you may give a rational explanation and a definition2 but it will apply in a different manner to white and to the essence of man 7b4 #ab74 ,there is a farther difficulty to be noticed4 ,how are you to define any matter not simple but essentially compound1 where two or more elements coalesce into an indivisible whole1 like hollow-nosedness out of nose and hollowness4 ,here we have hollow-nosedness and hollowness belonging to the nose per se1 not as an affection or accessory2 not as white belongs to ,kallias or man1 but as male belongs to animal1 or equal to quantity1 i4e41 per se 7p4 #ajcj1 b4 #bj74 ,the subject is implicated with the predicate in one name1 and you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other4 ,such predicates belong to their subject per se1 but in a different sense 7see ,bonitz's note74 ,you cannot properly define them1 in the sense given above 7b4 #bg74 ,if definitions of such are to be admitted1 it must be in a different sense3 ,definition and ,greek3 t44e4 being recognized both of them as ,greek3 pollachs lego_/mena4 ,definition therefore is the mode of explanation which declares the ,greek3 t44e41 and belongs to ,essences1 either exclusively1 or at least primarily1 directly1 and chiefly 7p4 #ajca1 a4 #g-ad74 ,we have now to enquire--,whether each particular thing1 and its ,greek3 t44e41 are the same1 or different 7p4 #ajca1 a4 #ae74 ,this will assist us in the investigation of ,essence2 for apparently each thing is not different from its own ,essence1 and the ,greek3 t44e4 is said to be the ,essence of each thing4 ,in regard to subjects enunciated per accidens1 the above two would seem to be distinct4 ,white man is different from the being a white man4 ,if these two were the same1 the being a man would be the same as the being a white man2 for those who hold this opinion affirm that man1 and white man1 are the same2 and1 if this be so1 of course the being a man must also be the same as the being a white man4 ,yet this last inference is not necessary2 for same is used in a different sense1 when you say1 ,man and white man are the same1 and when you say1 ,the being a man and the being a white man are the same4 ,but perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same per accidens 7i4e41 by being truly predicated of the same subject72 and that1 because you say truly1 ,sokrates is white--,sokrates is musical1 therefore you may also say truly1 ,the being white is the same as the being musical4 ,but this will be denied 7,greek3 dokei d' ou7_/--p4 #ajca1 a4 #bh74 ,in regard to subjects enunciated per se1 the case is otherwise3 here each thing is the same with its ,greek3 t44e4 ,suppose1 e4g41 there exist any ,essenti 7such as ,plato and others make the ,ideas7 prior to all others2 in that case1 if the ,greek3 au7toagatho_/n were distinct from ,greek3 to a7gath ei7nai1 and the ,greek3 au7tozon distinct from ,greek3 to z_/ ei7nai1 there must be other ,essences and ,ideas anterior to the ,platonic ,ideas4 ,if we believe ,greek3 t44e4 to be ,essentia1 it must be an ,essentia anterior and superior in dignity to these ,ideas of ,plato4 ,moreover1 if the ,essenti or ,ideas1 and the ,greek3 t44e41 be disjoined 7,greek3 a7polelume_/nai--p4 #ajca1 b4 #c71 the first will be uncognizable1 and the last will be non-existent 7,greek3 ta d' ou7k e7_/stai--b4 #d74 ,for to have cognition of a thing1 is1 to know its ,greek3 t44e4 ,this will be alike true of all ,greek3 t44e42 all of them are alike existent or alike non-existent 7b4 #i74 ,if ,greek3 to o7_/nti ei7nai be not identical with ,greek3 to o7_/n1 neither is ,greek3 to a7gath ei7nai identical with ,greek3 to a7gatho_/n1 c4 ,but that of which ,greek3 to a7gath ei7nai is not truly predicable1 is not ,greek3 a7gatho_/n 7b4 #aa74 ,hence we see that of necessity ,greek3 to a7gatho_/n is one and the same with ,greek3 to a7gath ei7nai2 likewise ,greek3 to kalo_/n1 with ,greek3 to kal ei7nai2 and so in all cases where the term enunciates a subject primarily and per se1 not a predicate of some other and distinct subject 7p4 #ajca1 b4 #ac3 ,greek3 o7_/sa m kat' a7_/llo le_/gtai1 a7lla kath' au7ta kai prta74 ,this last is the characteristic and sufficient mark1 even if the ,platonic ,ideas be not admitted2 and even more evidently so1 if they be admitted 7b4 #ad74 ,it is at the same time clear that1 if the ,ideas be what ,plato declares them to be1 the individual perceivable subjects here cannot be ,essences2 for the ,ideas are necessarily ,essences1 but not as predicable of a subject4 ,if they were ,essences1 in this last sense1 they would be ,essences per participationem2 which is inconsistent with what is said about them by ,plato 7,greek3 e7_/sontai gar kata me_/thexin--b4 #ah74 ,these reasonings show that each separate thing1 enunciated per se and not per accidens1 is the same with its ,greek3 t44e42 that to know each thing1 is1 to know its ,greek3 t44e42 that1 if you proceed to expose or lay them out1 both are one and the same 7,greek3 7_/ste kata tn e7_/kthesin a7na_/gk e7_/n ti ei7nai a7_/mph--p4 #ajca1 b4 #ba2 with ,bonitz's explanation of ,greek3 e7_/kthesis in his ,note74 ,but that which is enunciated per accidens 7e4g41 album1 musicum7 cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its ,greek3 t44e41 because it has a double signification3 it signifies both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs2 so that in a certain aspect it is identical with its ,greek3 t44e41 and in another aspect it is not identical therewith 7p4 #ajca1 b4 #bf74 ,the being a man1 and the being a white man1 are not the same2 but the subject for affection is the same in both 7b4 #bh3 ,greek3 ou7 tau7to1 pa_/thei de tau7to_/--obscure74 ,the absurdity of supposing1 that the ,greek3 t44e4 of a thing is different from the thing itself1 would appear plainly1 if we gave a distinct name to the ,greek3 t44e4 ,for there must be another ,greek3 t44e4 above this1 being the ,greek3 t44e4 of the first ,greek3 t44e42 and it would be necessary to provide a new name for the second ,greek3 t44e42 and so forward1 in an ascending march ad infinitum4 ,what hinders us from admitting some things at once1 as identical with their ,greek3 t44e41 if the ,greek3 t44e4 be ,essentia8 7b4 #ca74 ,we see from the preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with its ,greek3 t44e41 but that the rational explanation 7,greek3 lo_/gos7 of both is the same2 for ,one1 and the being ,one1 are one and the same not per accidens1 but per se 7p4 #ajcb1 a4 #b74 ,if they were different1 you would have to ascend to a higher ,greek3 t44e4 of the being ,one2 and above this1 to a higher still1 without end 7a4 #d74 ,it is therefore clear that1 in matters enunciated per se and primarily1 each individual thing is one and the same with its ,greek3 t44e4 ,the refutations brought by the ,sophists against this doctrine1 and the puzzles which they start1 e4g41 ,whether ,sokrates and the being ,sokrates are the same1--may be cleared up by the explanations just offered 7p4 #ajcb1 a4 #h74 ,it makes no difference what particular questions the objector asks3 one is as easy to solve as another 7a4 #aj74 ,of things generated1 some come by ,nature1 some by ,art1 some ,spontaneously4 ,all generated things are generated out of something1 by something1 and into or according to something 7p4 #ajcb1 a4 #ab74 ,the word something applies to each and all the ,categories4 ,natural generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from ,nature 7,greek3 e7k phu_/ses72 having ,greek3 to e7x ou7--what we call ,matter1 ,greek3 to u7ph' ou7--one of the things existing by nature 7,greek3 tn phu_/sei ti o7_/ntn--a4 #ag71 and ,greek3 to ti_/1 such as a man1 a plant1 or the like1 which we call ,essences in the fullest sense 7,greek3 ma_/lista ou7si_/as74 ,all things generated either by ,nature or ,art have ,matter3 it is possible that each of them may be1 or may not be2 and this is what we call ,matter in each 7a4 #bj74 ,as an universal truth 7,greek3 katho_/lou71 ,nature includes 7#a7 ,that out of which1 or ,matter2 7#b7 ,that according to which 7,greek3 kath' o7_/71 every thing which is generated having a definite nature or ,form1 such as plant or animal2 ,that by which1 or nature characterized according to the ,form1 being the same ,form as the thing generated but in another individual2 for a man begets a man 7a4 #bd74 ,the other generations are called ,constructions 7,greek3 poi_/seis71 which are either from ,art1 or from ,power1 or from ,intelligence4 ,it is with these as with natural generations3 some of them occur both by spontaneity and by chance 7,greek3 kai a7po tau7toma_/tou kai a7po tu_/chs--p4 #ajcb1 a4 #bi2 the principle of these last is apparently ,greek3 du_/namis1 the second of the three principia announced just before 78772 both in the one and in the other1 some products arise without seed as well as with seed1 which we shall presently advert to4 ,the generations from ,art are those of which the ,form is in the mind4 ,by ,form ,i mean the ,greek3 t44e4 of each thing and its ,first ,essence 7,greek3 tn pr_/tn ou7si_/an1 p4 #ajcb1 b4 #a74 ,for1 in a certain way1 the ,form even of contraries is the same2 since the essence of privation is the opposite essence3 for example1 health is the essence of disease2 for disease is declared or described as absence of health1 and health is the rational notion existing in the mind and in science4 ,now a healthy subject is generated by such an antecedent train of thought as follows 7,greek3 gi_/gnetai d to u7gies no_/santos ou7_/ts--b4 #f73--,since health is so and so1 there is necessity1 if the subject is to attain health1 that such and such things should occur1 e4g41 an even temperature of the body1 for which latter purpose heat must be produced2 and so on farther1 until the thought rests upon something which is in the physician's power to construct4 ,the motion proceeding from this last thought is called ,construction 7b4 #aj71 tending as it does towards health4 ,so that1 in a certain point of view1 health may be said to be generated out of health1 and a house out of a house2 for the medical art is the form of health and the building art the form of the house3 ,i mean the ,greek3 t44e41 or the ,essence without ,matter1 thereof 7b4 #ad74 ,of the generations and motions here enumerated1 one is called ,rational ,apprehension1 viz41 that one which takes its departure from the ,principle and the ,form2 the other1 ,construction1 viz41 that which takes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational apprehension 7,greek3 a7po tou teleutai_/ou ts no_/ses--b4 #ag74 ,the like may be said about each of the intermediate steps3 ,i mean1 if the patient is to be restored to health1 he must be brought to an even temperature4 ,but the being brought to an even temperature1 what is it8 ,it is so and so2 it will be a consequence of his being warmed4 ,and this last again--what is it8 ,so and so2 which already exists potentially1 since it depends upon the physician to produce it1 the means being at his command 7,greek3 touto d' 7_/d e7p' au7t--b4 #ba74 ,we see thus that the ,constructive ,agency 7,greek3 to poioun7 and the point from which the motion towards producing health takes its origin1 is1 when the process is one of ,art1 the ,form present in the mind2 and1 when the process is one of ,spontaneity1 it proceeds from that which would be the first proceeding of the artist1 if ,art had been concerned4 ,in the medical art1 e4g41 the artist begins by imparting warmth4 ,he does this by rubbing4 ,but this warmth might perhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by the artist4 ,the warmth is the prime agent1 in the case of spontaneous production4 ,the warmth is either a part of health1 or a condition to the existence of health1 as bricks are to that of a house 7p4 #ajcb1 b4 #cj74 ,nothing can be generated1 if nothing pre-existed--as has been already said before4 ,some part of what is generated must exist before3 ,matter pre-exists1 as in-dwelling and not generated 7,greek3 7 gar u7_/l me_/ros2 e7nupa_/rchei gar kai gi_/gnetai au7_/t--p4 #ajcc1 a4 #a4 ,i do not understand these last words3 it ought surely to be--,greek3 e7nupa_/rchei gar kai ou7 gi_/gnetai au7_/t4 ,bonitz's explanation suits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual text474 ,but something of the ,form or rational explanation 7,greek3 tn e7n t lo_/g7 must also pre-exist4 ,in regard to a brazen circle1 if we are asked1 ,quid est8 we answer in two ways3 ,we say of the ,matter--,it is brass2 ,we say of the ,form--,it is such and such a figure4 ,and this is the genus in which it is first placed 7p4 #ajcc1 a4 #d74 ,the brazen circle has ,matter in its rational explanation4 ,but that which is generated1 is called not by the name of the ,matter out of which it is generated1 but by a derivative name formed therefrom2 not ,greek3 e7keino1 but ,greek3 e7kei_/ninon4 ,a statue is called not ,greek3 li_/thos1 but ,greek3 li_/thinos4 ,but1 when a man is made healthy1 he is not said to be the ,matter out of which the health is generated2 because that which we call the ,matter is generated out of ,privation along with the subject4 ,thus1 both the man becomes healthy1 and the patient becomes healthy2 but the generation is more properly said to come out of ,privation3 we say1 ,sanus ex groto generatur1 rather than1 ,sanus ex homine generatur 7p4 #ajcc1 a4 #ab74 ,in cases where the ,privation is unmarked and unnamed1 as1 in the case of brass1 privation of the spherical1 or any other1 figure1 and1 in the case of a house1 the privation of bricks or wood1 the work is said to be generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man 7a4 #ad74 ,nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the material out of which it is made1 but by a paronym thereof2 not ,greek3 xu_/lon but ,greek3 xu_/linon 7a4 #ah74 ,in strict propriety1 indeed1 we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass1 nor the house out of wood2 for the materia ex qu ought to be something which undergoes change1 not something which remains unchanged 7a4 #ba74 ,it was remarked that in ,generation there are three things or aspects to be distinguished-- #a4 ,greek3 ,to u7ph' ou71 o7_/then 7 a7rch ts gene_/ses4 #b4 ,greek3 ,to e7x ou7--rather ,greek3 u7_/l than ,greek3 ste_/rsis4 #c4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ gi_/gnetai4 ,having already touched upon the two first1 ,i now proceed to the third4 ,what is it that is generated8 ,neither the ,matter1 nor the ,form1 but the embodiment or combination of the two4 ,an artisan does not construct either the brass or the sphere1 but the brazen sphere4 ,if he be said to construct the sphere1 it is only by accident 7,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s71 since the sphere in this particular case happens to be of brass4 ,out of the entire subject-matter1 he constructs a distinct individual ,something 7p4 #ajcc1 a4 #ca74 ,to make the brass round1 is not to make the round1 or to make the sphere1 but to make a something different3 that is the ,form 7of sphericity7 embodied in another thing 7a4 #cb74 ,for1 if the artisan made the round or the sphere1 he must make them out of something different1 pre-existing as a subject3 e4g41 he makes a brazen sphere1 and in this sense--that he makes out of that ,matter1 which is brass1 this different something1 which is a sphere4 ,if he made the sphere itself--the ,form of sphere--he must make it out of some pre-existent subject2 and you would thus carry back ad infinitum the different acts of generation and different pre-existent subjects 7b4 #d74 ,it is1 therefore1 clear that ,greek3 to ei7dos1 or by whatever name the shape of the percipiend is to be called1 is not generated1 nor is generation thereof possible2 nor is there any ,greek3 t44e4 thereof2 that is1 of the ,form abstractedly3 for it is this very ,greek3 t44e4 which is generated or becomes embodied in something else1 either by nature1 or by art1 or by spontaneous power 7p4 #ajcc1 b4 #h74 ,the artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist1 for he makes it out of brass 7,matter71 and the sphere 7,form73 he makes or embodies the ,form into this ,matter1 and that is a brazen sphere 7b4 #aa74 ,if there be any generation of the sphere per se 7,greek3 tou sphaira ei7nai71 it must be ,something out of ,something2 for the ,generatum must always be resolvable into a certain ,matter and a certain ,form4 ,let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points of the circumference are equidistant from the centre2 here are three things to be considered3 7#a7 ,that in which what is constructed resides2 7#b7 ,that which does so reside2 7#c7 ,the entire ,something generated or constructed--the brazen sphere4 ,we see thus plainly that what is called the ,form or ,essence itself is not generated1 but the combination called according to the ,form is generated2 moreover that in every ,generatum there is ,matter1 so that the ,generatum is in each case this or that 7b4 #ai74 ,can it be true1 then1 that there exists any sphere or house beyond those which we see or touch 7i4e41 any ,form or ,idea of a sphere1 such as ,plato advocates78 ,if there existed any such1 it could never have become or been generated into ,hoc ,aliquid4 ,it signifies only tale4 ,it is neither ,this nor ,that nor any thing defined3 but it 7or rather the ,constructive ,agency7 makes or generates ex hoc tale2 and when this last has been generated1 it is ,tale ,hoc 7p4 #ajcc1 b4 #bb71 and the entire compound is ,kallias1 or ,sokrates1 or this brazen sphere1 while man1 animal1 c41 are analogous to brazen sphere generally4 ,even if there exist ,platonic ,forms by themselves1 they could be of no use towards generation or the production of ,essences4 ,frequently it is obvious that the ,generans is like the ,generatum1 only a different individual4 ,there is no occasion to assume the ,platonic ,form as an ,exemplar2 for the generating individual is quite sufficient of itself to be the cause of the ,form in a new mass of ,matter4 ,the entire result is the given ,form in these particular bones and flesh--called ,kallias or ,sokrates3 each is different so far as ,matter1 but the same in the ,form2 for the ,form is indivisible 7p4 #ajcd1 a4 #g74 ,but how does it happen that there are some things which are generated sometimes by art1 sometimes spontaneously 7e4g41 health71 while in other things 7e4g41 a house7 spontaneous production never takes place8 ,the reason is1 that1 in the first class of cases1 the ,matter which governs the work of generation by the artist1 and in which itself a part of the finished product resides1 is of a nature to be moved or modified by itself1 while1 in the second1 this is not the fact2 and to be moved1 besides1 in a certain manner and direction2 for there are many things which are movable by themselves1 but not in such manner and direction as the case which we are supposing requires4 ,for example1 stones are incapable of being moved in certain directions except by some other force1 but they are capable of being moved by themselves in another direction2 the like with fire4 ,it is upon this that the distinction turns between some results which cannot be realized without an artist1 and others which may perhaps be so realized 7a4 #ag74 ,it is plain from what has been said that1 in a certain sense1 everything is generated from something of the same name1 as natural objects are 7e4g41 a man72 or from something in part bearing the same name 7as a house out of the ideal form of a house71 or from something which possesses that which in part bears the same name2 for the first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing generated4 ,the heat in the motion generates heat in the body2 and this is either health1 or a part of health1 or the antecedent of one or other of these2 hence it is said to produce or generate health1 because it produces that of which health is concomitant and consequent 7p4 #ajcd1 a4 #cj2 see ,bonitz's correction in his ,note74 ,essence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all generations1 just as in ,demonstration it is the beginning or principle of all syllogisms 7a4 #cc74 ,in the combinations and growths of ,nature1 the case is similar4 ,the seed constructs1 as ,art constructs its products2 for the seed has in it potentially the ,form1 and that from which comes the seed is1 in a certain manner1 of the same name with the product 7b4 #a74 ,for we must not expect to find all generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is generated from man1 moreover1 mule is not generated from mule--though this is the usual case1 when there is no natural bodily defect 7b4 #c74 ,spontaneous generation occurs in the department of ,nature1 as in that of ,art1 wherever the ,matter can be moved by itself in the same manner as the seed moves it3 wherever the ,matter cannot be so moved by itself1 there can be no generation except the natural1 from similar predecessors 7b4 #g1 ,greek3 e7x au7tn--compare ,bonitz's note3 non ex ipsis1 sed ,greek3 e7x au7tn tn poiou_/ntn74 ,this doctrine--,that the ,form is not generated1 does not belong to ,essence alone1 but also to all the other ,categories alike--,quality1 ,quantity1 and the rest 7p4 #ajcd1 b4 #i74 ,it is not the ,form ,quality per se which is generated1 but tale lignum1 talis homo3 nor the ,form ,quantity per se1 but tantum lignum or animal 7b4 #ae74 ,but1 in regard to ,essence1 there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as compared with the other ,categories3 in the generation of ,essence1 there must pre-exist as generator another actual and complete ,essence2 in the generation of ,quality or ,quantity1 you need nothing pre-existing beyond a potential ,quality or a potential ,quantity 7b4 #af74 ,a difficult question arises in this way3 ,every definition is a rational explanation consisting of parts2 and1 as the parts of the explanation are to the whole explanation1 so are the parts of the thing explained to the whole thing explained4 ,now is it necessary or not1 that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in the rational explanation of the whole 7p4 #ajcd1 b4 #bb78 ,in some cases it appears to be so2 in others1 not4 ,the rational explanation of a circle does not include that of its segments2 but the rational explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters4 ,moreover1 if the parts are prior to the whole1 and if the acute angle be a part of the right angle1 and the finger a part of the man1 the acute angle must be prior to the right angle1 and the finger to the man4 ,yet the contrary seems to be the truth3 the right angle seems prior1 also the man2 for the rational explanation of acute angle is given from right angle1 that of finger from man3 in respect to existing without the other1 right angle and man seem priora4 ,in fact the word part is equivocal1 and it is only one of its meanings to call it--that which quantitatively measures another 7b4 #cc74 ,but let us dismiss this consideration1 and let us enquire of what it is that ,essence consists1 as parts 7b4 #cd74 ,if these are 7#a7 ,matter1 7#b7 ,form1 7#c7 ,the ,compound of the two1 and if each of these three be ,essence1 ,matter must be considered1 in a certain way1 as a part of something1 yet in a certain way as not so2 in this latter point of view1 nothing being a part except those elements out of which the rational explanation of the ,form is framed 7p4 #ajce1 a4 #b74 ,thus1 flesh is not a part of flatness1 being the matter upon which flatness is generated or superinduced1 but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness2 the brass is a part of the entire statue1 but not a part of the statue when enunciated as ,form1 or of the ideal statue4 ,you may discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as ,form 7apart from the complete statue72 but you cannot so discriminate the material part per se1 or the statue considered as ,matter only 7a4 #g74 ,hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain that of the segments of the circle2 but the rational explanation of the syllable does contain that of the component letters4 ,the letters are parts of the ,form1 and not simply the ,matter upon which the ,form is superinduced2 but the segments are parts in the sense of being the ,matter upon which the ,form of the circle is superinduced 7a4 #ab73 they are1 however1 nearer to the ,form than the brass1 when the ,form of a circle or roundness is generated in brass 7a4 #ac74 ,in a certain way1 indeed1 it cannot be said that all the letters are contained in the rational explanation of the syllables2 e4g41 the letters inscribed in wax are not so contained1 nor the sounds of those letters vibrating in the air2 both these are a part of the syllable1 in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof 7a4 #ag3 ,greek3 7s u7_/l ai7stht_/74 ,if a man be destroyed by being reduced to bones1 ligaments1 and flesh1 you cannot for that reason say1 that the man is composed of these as of parts of his ,essence1 but as parts of his ,matter3 they are parts of the entire man1 but not of the ,form1 nor of what is contained in the rational explanation2 accordingly they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational explanation1 but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or concrete subject 7a4 #bc74 ,hence1 in some cases1 things are destroyed into the same principia out of which they are formed2 in other cases1 not4 ,to the first class1 belong all things which are taken in conjunction with ,matter1 such as the flat-nosed or1 the brazen circle2 to the second class1 those which are taken disjoined from ,matter1 with ,form only4 ,objects of the first class1 7i4e41 the concretes7 have thus both principia and parts subordinate2 but neither the one nor the other belong to the ,form alone 7a4 #ca74 ,the plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster1 the brazen circle into brass1 ,kallias into flesh and bones2 and even the circle1 when understood in a certain sense1 into its segments1 for the term circle is used equivocally1 sometimes to designate the ,form of a circle1 sometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular circles having no name peculiar to themselves 7b4 #c74 ,that which has been already said is the truth2 yet let us try to recapitulate it in a still clearer manner 7p4 #ajce1 b4 #d74 ,the parts of the rational explanation or notion1 into which that notion is divided1 are prior to the notion1 at least in some instances4 ,but the notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided2 for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right angle into your definition1 nor can you define the semicircle without introducing the circle1 nor the finger without introducing the man--the finger being such and such a part of the man4 ,the parts into which man is divided as ,matter1 are posterior to man2 those into which man is divided as parts of his ,form or ,formal ,essence1 are prior to man--at least some of them are so 7b4 #ad74 ,now1 since the soul of animals 7which is the ,essence of the animated being--b4 #ae7 is the ,essence and the ,form and the ,greek3 t44e4 of a suitably arranged body2 and1 since no good definition of any one part can be given1 which does not include the function of that part1 and this cannot be given without the mechanism of sense 7b4 #ah71 it follows that the parts of this soul1 or some of them at least1 are prior to the entire animal1 alike in the general and in each particular case4 ,but the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or ,form1 and into these1 as parts1 the entire man 7not the ,essence or ,form7 is divided4 ,these parts are1 in a certain sense1 prior to the entire man1 and1 in a certain sense1 not2 for they cannot even exist at all separately 7b4 #bc73 the finger is not a finger unless it can perform its functions1 i4e41 unless it be animated by a central soul2 it is not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs2 after death1 it is merely a finger by equivocation of language4 ,there are1 however1 some parts1 such1 as the brain or heart1 to which the ,form or ,essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor posterior but simul to the entire animal 7b4 #be74 ,man1 horse1 and such like1 which are predicated universally of particular things1 are not ,essentia2 they are compounds of a given ,form and a given ,matter 7but of that first ,matter7 which goes to compose ,universals4 ,it is out of the last ,matter1 which comes lowest in the series1 and is already partially invested with ,form1 that ,sokrates and other particular beings are constituted 7p4 #ajce1 b4 #cj74 ,thus1 there are parts of the ,form or ,greek3 t44e41 parts of the ,matter1 and parts of the ,compound including both4 ,but it is only the parts of the ,form that are included as parts in the rational explanation or notion2 and this notion belongs to the ,universal2 for circle and the being a circle1 soul and the being a soul--are one and the same 7p4 #ajcf1 a4 #b74 ,of the total compound 7this particular circle71 no notion1 no definition1 can be given3 whether it be a particular circle perceivable by sense1 in wood or brass1 or merely conceivable1 such as the mathematical figures4 ,such particular circles are known only along with actual perception or conception 7a4 #f4 ,greek3 ,noein here means the equivalent of ,greek3 a7phairein chri_/zein t dianoi_/a--die ,thtigkeit des ,abstrahirens1 durch welche das ,mathematische gewonnen wird--,schwegler ad loc4 ,comm41 p4 #aja1 ,pt4 ,,ii473 when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or imagination1 we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or not2 but we always talk of them and know them by the rational explanation or definition of the universal circle 7a4 #g3 ,greek3 a7peltho_/ntas d' e7k ts e7ntelechei_/as ou7 dlon po_/tero_/n pote_/ ei7sin 7 ou7k ei7si_/n1 a7ll' a7ei le_/gontai kai gnri_/zontai t katho_/lou lo_/g4 ,i apprehend that ,aristotle is here speaking of the ,greek3 ku_/klos noto_/s only1 not of the ,greek3 ku_/klos ai7sthto_/s or ,greek3 chalkous ku_/klos4 ,he had before told us that1 when the ,greek3 chalkous ku_/klos passes out of ,greek3 e7ntele_/cheia or ,greek3 phthei_/retai1 it passes into ,greek3 chalko_/s4 ,he can hardly therefore mean to say that1 when the ,greek3 chalkous ku_/klos passes out of ,greek3 e7ntele_/cheia1 we do not clearly know whether it exists or not4 ,but respecting the ,greek3 ku_/klos noto_/s or mathematical circle1 he might well say that we did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the circumstances supposed3 if it cease to exist1 we cannot say ,greek3 ei7s o7 phthei_/retai74 ,matter is unknowable per se 7,greek3 kath' au7t_/n--a4 #i1 i4e41 if altogether without ,form74 ,one variety of ,matter is perceivable by sense1 as brass1 wood1 and all moveable matter2 another variety is conceivable1 viz41 that which exists in the perceivable variety1 but not qu perceivable--the mathematical figures 7,greek3 not de 7 e7n tois ai7sthtois u7pa_/rchousa m 7 ai7sthta_/1 oi7on ta mathmatika_/--a4 #ab2 i4e41 making abstraction of the acts of sense1 or of what is seen and felt by sense1 viz41 colour by the eye1 resistance by the touch2 and leaving behind simply the extension or possibility of motion1 which is a geometrical line74 ,we have now laid down the true doctrine respecting ,whole and ,part1 ,prius and ,posterius4 ,and1 if any one asks whether the right angle1 the circle1 the animal1 is prior or not to the parts into which it is divided and out of which it is formed1 we cannot answer absolutely either ,yes or ,no4 ,we must add some distinguishing words1 specifying what we assert to be prior1 and to what it is prior 7p4 #ajcf1 a4 #ai74 ,if by the soul you mean the ,form or ,essence of the living animal1 by the circle1 the ,form of the circle1 by the right angle1 the ,form or ,essence thereof1--then this ,form is posterior in regard to the notional parts of which it is constituted1 but prior in regard to the particular circle or right angle4 ,but1 if by soul you meant the entire concrete animal1 by right angle or circle1 these two figures realized in brass or wood1 then we must reply that any one of these is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted 7a4 #be74 ,another reasonable doubt arises here 7,greek3 a7poreitai d' ei7ko_/ts--p4 #ajcf1 a4 #bf7 as to which parts belong to the ,form alone1 which to the entire ,concrete4 ,unless this be made clear1 we can define nothing2 for that which we define is the ,universal and the ,form1 and1 unless we know what parts belong to the ,matter and what do not1 the definition of the thing can never be made plain 7a4 #cj74 ,now1 wherever the ,form is seen to be superinduced upon matters diverse in their own ,form1 the case presents no difficulty3 every one sees circles in brass1 stone1 wood1 c41 and is well aware that neither the brass1 nor the stone1 belongs to the ,form or ,essence of the circle1 since he easily conceives a circle without either4 ,but1 if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles1 he would have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass1 and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the ,form of circle2 although1 in point of fact1 he would have no more logical ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed2 for the brass might still belong only to the ,matter of circle 7b4 #b74 ,this is the case with the ,form of man4 ,it is always seen implicated with flesh1 bones1 and such like parts4 ,are these parts of the ,form of man8 ,or are they not rather parts of the ,matter1 though we are unable to conceive the ,form apart from them1 because we never see it in conjunction with any other ,matter8 ,this is at least a possibility1 and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted4 ,some theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther1 and apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle4 ,these theorists contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by figure1 lines1 continuity1 c41 which 7they affirm7 are only parts of the ,matter of circle and triangle2 as flesh and bones are parts of the ,matter of man4 ,they refer all of them to numbers as the ,form1 and they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of a line 7b4 #ab74 ,among the partisans of ,ideas1 some call the dyad ,greek3 au7togramm_/ others call it the ,form of a line2 saying that in some cases the ,form and that of which it is the ,form are the same1 as the dyad and the ,form of the dyad1 but that this is not true about line4 7,these two opinions seem to be substantially the same1 and only to differ in the phrase4 ,greek3 ,au7togramm_/ means the same as ,greek3 to ei7dos ts gramms3 it seems to have been a peculiar phrase adopted by some ,platonists1 but not by all4 ,others preferred to say ,greek3 to ei7dos ts gramms47 ,these reasonings have already misled the ,pythagoreans1 and are likely to mislead others also3 they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same ,form in many cases where the ,form is manifestly different3 they lead us even to assume one single ,form universally1 reducing every thing besides to be no ,form1 but merely ,matter to that one single real ,form4 ,by such reasoning1 we should be forced to consider all things as ,one 7b4 #bj71 which would be obviously absurd4 ,we see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the theory of ,definition1 and how such difficulties arise4 ,it is because some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing and in abstracting altogether from ,matter2 for some things include ,matter along with the ,form1 or determined in a certain way1 i4e41 this along with that1 or these things in this condition 7p1 #ajcf1 b4 #bb74 ,the comparison which the younger ,sokrates was accustomed to make about the animal is a mistaken one 7b4 #bd73 it implies that man may be without his material parts1 as the circle may exist without brass4 ,but this analogy will not hold2 animal is something perceivable by sense and cannot be defined without motion2 of course1 therefore1 not without bodily members organized in a certain way 7b4 #cj74 ,the hand is not a part of man1 when it is in any supposable condition1 but only when it can perform its functions1 that is1 when it is animated2 when not animated1 it is not a part 7b4 #cb74 ,clearly the soul is the first ,essence or ,form1 the body is ,matter1 and man or animal is the compound of both as an ,universal2 while ,sokrates1 ,koriskus c41 are as particulars to this ,universal1 whether you choose to take ,sokrates as soul without body1 or as soul with body 7p4 #ajcg1 a4 #e-aj3 these words are very obscure74 ,respecting ,mathematical ,entia1 why are not the notions of the 9999parts parts of the notion of the whole8 e4g41 why is not the notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle8 ,perhaps it will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable by sense3 but this after all makes no difference2 for some things even not perceivable by sense involve ,matter along with them1 and indeed ,matter is involved in every thing which is not ,greek3 t44e4 and ,form ,greek3 au7to kath' au7to_/4 ,the semi-circles are not included as parts of the notion of the universal circle2 but they are parts of each particular circle3 for there is one ,matter perceivable and another cogitable 7p4 #ajcf1 a4 #cd4--;,bonitz remarks that these words from p4 #ajcf1 a4 #bb to p4 #ajcg1 a4 #e1 are out of their proper place74 ,whether there be any other ,matter1 besides the ,matter of these ,mathematical ,entia1 and whether we are to seek a distinct ,form and ,essence for them--such as numbers1 must be reserved for future enquiry4 ,this has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters about perceivable ,essences2 for these last properly belong to the province of ,second ,philosophy--of the physical theorist 7,greek3 ts phusiks kai deute_/ras philosophi_/as e7_/rgon--p4 #ajcg1 a4 #ae74 ,the physical philosopher studies not merely the ,matter1 but the ,form or notional ,essence even more 7a4 #ag74 ,we are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the ,analytica 7,anal4 ,poster4 ,,ii4 p4 #ib1 a4 #bg2 also1 ,de ,interp4 v4 p4 #ag1 a4 #ac71 but not completed1 respecting ,definition4 ,how is it that the definition is ,one8 ,we define man animal bipes3 ,how is it that this is ,one and not ,many8 ,man and white are two1 when the latter does not belong to the former3 when it does so belong to and affects the former1 the two are ,one--white man 7p4 #ajcg1 b4 #af73 that is1 they are ,one ,greek3 kata pa_/thos4 ,but the parts included in the definition are not ,one ,greek3 kata pa_/thos1 nor are they one ,greek3 kata me_/thexin2 for the ,genus cannot be said to partake of the ,differenti4 ,if it did1 it would at one and the same time partake of ,opposita1 for the ,differenti are ,opposita to each other4 ,and1 even if we say that the ,genus does partake of the ,differenti1 the same difficulty recurs1 when the ,differenti are numerous4 ,the ,genus must partake alike and equally of all of them2 but how is it that all of them are ,one1 and not ,many8 ,it cannot be meant that all of them belong essentially to the thing2 for1 if that were so1 all would be included in the definition1 which they are not4 ,we want to know why or how those ,differenti which are included in the definition coalesce into ,one1 without the rest3 for we call the definiend ,greek3 e7_/n ti kai to_/de ti 7b4 #bg74 ,in answering this question1 we take1 as a specimen1 a definition which arises out of the logical subdivision of a ,genus 7p4 #ajcg1 b4 #bh74 ,definition is given by assigning the ,genus and ,difference3 the ,genus is the ,matter1 the ,difference is the ,form or ,essence2 the two coalesce into one as ,form and ,matter4 ,in the definition of man--animal bipes--animal is the ,matter and bipes the ,form2 so that the two coalescing form an essential ,one4 ,it does not signify through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried1 provided it be well done2 that is1 provided each stage be a special and appropriate division of all that has preceded4 ,if this condition be complied with1 the last differentia will include all the preceding1 and will itself be the ,form of which the genus serves as ,matter4 ,you divide the genus animal first into ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun--zon a7poun2 you next divide ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun into ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun di_/poun--zon u7po_/poun polu_/poun2 or perhaps into ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun schizo_/pun--zon u7po_/poun a7_/schiston4 ,it is essential that the next subdivision applied to ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun should be founded upon some subordinate differentia specially applying to the feet 7p4 #ajch1 a4 #ad3 ,greek3 au7tai gar diaphorai podo_/s2 7 gar schizopodi_/a podo_/ts tis74 ,if it does not specially apply to the feet1 but takes in some new attribute 7e4 g41 ,greek3 pterto_/n1 a7_/pteron71 the division will be unphilosophical4 ,the last differentia ,greek3 zon di_/poun includes the preceding differentia ,greek3 u7po_/poun3 to say ,greek3 zon u7po_/poun di_/poun would be tautology4 ,where each differentia is a differentia of the preceding differenti1 the last differentia includes them all and is itself the ,form and ,essence1 along with the genus as ,matter 7a4 #be74 ,the definition is the rational explanation arising out of these differences1 and by specifying the last it virtually includes all the preceding 7a4 #bi3 ,greek3 o7 o7rismos lo_/gos e7stin o7 e7k tn diaphorn1 kai tou_/tn ts teleutai_/as kata_/ ge to o7rtho_/n74 ,in the constituents of the ,essence1 there is no distinctive order of parts2 no subordination of prius and posterius2 all are equally essential and coordinate 7,greek3 ta_/xis d' ou7k e7_/stin e7n t ou7si_/a--p4 #ajch1 a4 #cc74 ,as we are treating now about ,essence1 it will be convenient to go back to the point from which we departed1 when we enumerated the four varieties recognized by different philosophers4 ,these were 7#a7 ,the ,subject--,substratum--,matter1 which is a subject of predicates in two different ways3 either as already an ,hoc ,aliquid and affected by various accidents1 or as not yet an ,hoc ,aliquid1 but simply ,matter implicated with ,entelechy 7p4 #ajch1 b4 #f72 7#b7 ,form--,essence--the ,greek3 t44e42 7#c7 ,the ,compound or ,product of the preceding two2 7#d7 ,the ,universal 7,greek3 to katho_/lou74 ,of these four1 we have already examined the first three2 we now proceed to the fourth4 ,some philosophers consider the ,universal to be primarily and eminently ,cause and ,principle 7p4 #ajch1 b4 #g74 ,but it seems impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be ,essence4 ,for that is the ,first ,essence of each thing which belongs to nothing but itself2 but the ,universal is by its nature common to many things4 ,of which among these things is it the ,essence8 ,either of all or of no one4 ,not of all certainly2 and1 if it be the ,essence of any one1 the rest of them will be identical with that one2 for1 where the ,essence is one1 the things themselves are one 7b4 #ae74 ,besides1 the ,essence is that which is not predicated of any subject3 but the ,universal is always predicated of a subject4 ,perhaps1 however1 we shall be told1 that the ,universal is not identical with ,greek3 t44e41 but is ,essence which is immanent in or belongs to ,greek3 t44e41 as animal in man and horse4 ,but this cannot be admitted4 ,for1 whether we suppose animal to be definable or not1 if it be essence of any thing1 it must be the essence of something to which it belongs peculiarly1 as homo is the essence of man peculiarly2 but1 if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of man1 it will be the essence of something to which it does not peculiarly belong2 and this contradicts the definition of ,essence 7p4 #ajch1 b4 #ae-bc4 ,this passage is very obscure1 even after ,bonitz and ,schwegler's explanatory notes4 ,i incline to ,schwegler1 and to his remark1 ,comm4 ,,ii4 p4 #aae1 that the text of b4 #bc ought to be written ,greek3 e7n 7 m 7s i7_/dion u7pa_/rchei474 ,again1 it is impossible that ,essence1 if composed of any elements1 can be composed of what is not ,essence1 as of ,quality2 for this would make ,quality prius as regards ,essence2 which it cannot be1 either in reason 7,greek3 lo_/g71 or in time1 or in generation4 ,if this were so1 the affections would be separable from ,essences 7p4 #ajch1 b4 #bh74 ,essence1 if composed of any thing1 must be composed of ,essence4 ,once more1 if the individual man or horse are ,essences1 nothing which is in the definition of these can be ,essence2 nor apart from that of which it is ,essence2 nor in any thing else4 ,there cannot be any man1 apart from individual men 7p4 #ajch1 b4 #cd74 ,hence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are ,essence3 none of them signify ,hoc ,aliquid1 but ,tale4 ,to suppose otherwise1 would open the door to many inadmissible consequences1 especially to the argument of the ',third ,man' 7p4 #ajci1 a4 #b74 ,another argument to the same purpose3--,it is impossible that ,essence can be composed of different ,essences immanent in one ,entelechy4 ,two in the same ,entelechy can never be ,one in ,entelechy4 ,if indeed they be two in potenti1 they may coalesce into one ,entelechy1 like one double out of two potential halves4 ,but ,entelechy establishes a separate and complete existence 7p4 #ajci1 a4 #g72 so that1 if ,essence is ,one1 it cannot be made up of distinct ,essences immanent or inherent4 ,demokritus1 who recognized only the atoms as ,essences1 was right in saying1 that two of them could not be ,one1 nor one of them ,two4 ,the like is true about number1 if number be1 as some contend1 a synthesis of monads4 ,for either the dyad is not ,one2 or else the monads included therein are not monads ,greek3 e7ntelechei_/a 7a4 #ad74 ,here however we stumble upon a difficulty4 ,for1 if no ,essence can be put together out of ,universals1 nor any compound ,essence out of other ,essences existing as ,entelechies1 all ,essence must necessarily be simple and uncompounded1 so that no definition can be given of it4 ,but this is opposed to every one's opinion1 and to what has been said long ago1 that ,essence alone could be defined2 or at least ,essence most of all4 ,it now appears that there can be no definition of ,essence1 nor by consequence of any thing else4 ,perhaps1 however this may be only true in a certain sense3 in one way1 definition is possible2 in another way1 not4 ,we shall endeavour to clear up the point presently 7p4 #ajci1 a4 #bb4--,schwegler says in his note upon this passage3 ,die von ,aristoteles hufig berhrte1 doch nie zur abschliessenden ,lsung gebrachte1 ,grundaporie des aristotelischen ,systems--,comm4 ,,ii4 p4 #aag74 ,those who maintain that ,ideas are self-existent are involved in farther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the ,species is composed out of ,genus and ,differentia4 ,for1 suppose that these ,ideas are self-existent and that ,greek3 au7tozon exists both in man and horse3 ,greek3 au7tozon is1 in these two1 either the same or different numerically4 ,it is1 of course1 the same in definition or notion 7,greek3 lo_/g72 of that there can be no doubt4 ,if it be numerically same 7,greek3 7_/sper su saut7 in man and in horse1 how can this same exist at once in separate beings1 unless we suppose the absurdity that it exists apart from itself 7p4 #ajci1 b4 #a78 ,again1 are we to imagine that this generic ,ens1 ,greek3 au7tozon1 partakes at the same time of contrary differenti--the dipod1 polypod1 apod8 ,if it does not1 how can dipodic or polypodic animals really exist8 ,nor is the difficulty at all lessened1 if1 instead of saying that the generic ,ens partakes of differenti1 you say that it is mixed with them1 or compounded of them1 or in contact with them4 ,there is nothing but a tissue of absurdities 7,greek3 pa_/nta a7_/toma--b4 #f74 ,but take the contrary supposition and suppose that the ,greek3 au7tozon is numerically different in man1 horse1 c4 ,on this admission1 there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of whom the ,greek3 au7tozon is the ,essence2 man1 for example1 since animal is not accidental1 but essential1 as a constituent of man 7p4 #ajci1 b4 #h74 ,greek3 ,au7tozon will thus be ,many 7ein ,vielerlei--,schwegler72 for it will be the ,essence of each particular animal1 of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally 7,greek3 ou7 gar ka_/t' a7_/llo le_/getai--i4e41 this is not a case where the predicate is something distinct from the subject74 ,moreover all the constituents of man will be alike ,ideas 7e4g41 not merely ,greek3 zon1 but ,greek3 di_/poun73 now the same cannot be ,idea of one thing and ,essence of another2 accordingly1 ,greek3 au7tozon will be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals 7,greek3 di_/poun1 polu_/poun1 b4 #ad74 ,again1 whence comes ,greek3 au7tozon itself1 and how do the particular animals arise out of it8 ,how can the ,greek3 zon which is ,essence1 exist apart from and alongside of ,greek3 au7to to zon8 7p4 #ajci1 b4 #ae47 ,these arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any such ,ideas as some philosophers affirm 7p4 #ajci1 b4 #ah74 ,we have already said that there are two varieties of ,essence3 7#a7 ,the ,form alone1 7#b7 ,the ,form embodied in ,matter4 ,the ,form or ,essence in the first meaning1 is neither generable nor destructible2 in the second meaning it is both4 ,greek3 ,to oi7ki_/a ei7nai is neither generable nor destructible2 ,greek3 to tde t oi7ki_/a ei7nai is both the one and the other 7p4 #ajci1 b4 #be74 ,of these last1 therefore1 the perceivable or concrete ,essences1 there can be no definition nor demonstration1 because they are implicated with ,matter1 which is noway necessary1 or unchangeable1 but may exist or not exist1 change or not change4 ,demonstration belongs only to what is necessary2 ,definition only to ,science1 which cannot be to-day ,science and to-morrow ,ignorance4 ,neither ,science1 nor ,demonstration1 nor ,definition1 applies to such things as may be otherwise3 these latter belong to ,opinion 7,greek3 tou e7ndechome_/nou a7_/lls e7_/chein--p4 #ajdj1 a4 #a74 ,you cannot have ,science or ,demonstration or ,definition about particular or perceivable things1 because they are destroyed and pass out of perception1 so that you do not know what continues to be true about them2 even though you preserve the definition in your memory1 you cannot tell how far it continues applicable to them 7a4 #g74 ,any definition given is liable to be overthrown4 ,upon the same principle1 there cannot be any definition of the ,platonic ,ideas2 each of which is announced as a particular1 distinct1 separable1 ,ens 7p4 #ajdj1 a4 #h74 ,the definition must be composed of words--of the words of a language generally understood--and of words which1 being used by many persons1 are applicable to other particulars besides the definiend 7you define ,alexander as white1 thin1 a philosopher1 a native of ,aphrodisias1 c41 all of which are characteristics applicable to many other persons besides74 ,the definer may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply to many things1 but that the aggregate of all together will apply to none except the definiend4 ,we reply however1 that ,greek3 zon di_/poun must have at least two subjects to which it applies--,greek3 to zon and ,greek3 to di_/poun4 ,of course this is all the more evident about eternal ,entia like the ,platonic ,ideas1 which are prior to the compound and parts thereof 7,greek3 zon and ,greek3 di_/poun are each prior and both of them parts of ,greek3 au7toa_/nthrpos71 and separable1 just as ,greek3 au7toa_/nthrpos is separable 7a4 #ad-bj72 for either neither of them is separable1 or both are so4 ,if neither of them is separable1 then the ,genus is nothing apart from the ,species1 and the ,platonic assumption of self-existent ,ideas falls to the ground2 if both are separable1 then the ,differentia is self-existent as well as the ,genus 7a4 #ba73 there exist some ,ideas prior to other ,ideas4 ,moreover1 the ,genus and ,differentia1 the component elements of the ,species1 are logically prior to the ,species3 suppress the ,species1 and you do not suppress its component elements2 suppress these1 and you do suppress the ,species 7a4 #ba74 ,we reply farther that1 if the more compound ,ideas arise out of the less compound1 the component elements 7like ,greek3 zon di_/poun7 must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects4 ,if this be not so always1 how are we to distinguish the cases in which it is true from those in which it is not8 ,you must assume the existence of some ,idea which can only be predicated of some one subject1 and no others4 ,but this seems impossible4 ,every ,idea is participable 7a4 #bg74 ,these philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of eternal ,essences 7which the ,platonic ,ideas are71 especially in cases where the objects are essentially unique1 as ,sun1 or ,moon1 or ,earth 7p4 #ajdj1 a4 #bi74 ,when they try to define ,sun1 they are forced to use phrases which are applicable to many in common2 but ,sun1 7and each ,idea7 is particular and individual1 like ,kleon or ,sokrates4 ,why does none of them produce a definition of an ,idea8 ,if any one tried1 he would soon see the pertinence of the above remarks 7b4 #c74 7,alexander1 ,bonitz1 and ,schwegler1 all observe incidentally that the reasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical4 ,bonitz1 p4 #ceb1 gives a good summary of the chapter1 concluding3 ,hoc capite non id ipsum demonstrat1 res singulas non esse substantias1 sed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam2 nimirum quum substanti vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem demonstratum sit1 c4 #d1 hoc si comprobat1 illud simul est comprobatum47 ,it is farther evident that many apparent ,essences are not strictly and truly ,essences2 for example1 the parts of animals2 since not one of them is separated from the whole 7,greek3 ou7then gar kechrisme_/non au7tn e7sti_/n--p4 #ajdj1 b4 #f2 ,alexander says ad loc43 ,greek3 ou7si_/as e7keina_/ phamen o7_/sa kath' au7ta o7_/nta du_/natai to oi7keion e7_/rgon a7potelein2 ou7si_/a gar ou7den a7_/llo e7stin 7 to a7ph' ou7 to e7ka_/stou e7_/rgon e7kplroutai2 ou7si_/a gar kai ei7dos ,skra_/tous 7 tou ,skra_/tous psuch_/1 a7ph' 7s au7t to tou a7nthr_/pou 7 a7_/nthrpos e7_/rgon e7kplroun74 ,when any one of them is separated1 it exists only in the character of ,matter--earth1 fire1 air2 none of them1 in this separate condition1 being an unity1 but only like a heap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined into one4 ,we might suppose1 indeed1 that the parts of the body1 and the parts of the soul1 of animated beings1 come near to ,essence1 both one and the other1 alike potentially and actually 7b4 #ab71 because they have principles of motion in their turnings 7,greek3 kampais71 so that in some cases they continue separately alive after division4 ,still the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as nothing more than potential1 wherever the oneness and continuity of the whole is the work of ,nature 7b4 #ae71 and not a mere case of contact or forcible conjunction4 ,nevertheless the being ,one1 or ,unity 7p4 #ajdj1 b4 #af71 is not itself the ,essence of things4 ,unum is predicated in the same manner as ,ens2 the two may always be predicated together3 the ,essence of ,unum is ,one2 and things of which the ,essence is ,unum ,numero1 are themselves numerically one4 ,neither ,unum nor ,ens is the ,essence of things any more than the being an ,element1 or the being a ,principle1 can be the ,essence thereof3 we have farther to enquire what the ,principle is1 in order to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape 7b4 #bj74 ,unum and ,ens are more near to ,essence than either ,element1 ,principle1 or ,cause2 nevertheless neither ,unum nor ,ens is ,essence2 for nothing which is common to many things is ,essence4 ,essence belongs only to itself and to that which has itself4 ,farther1 ,unum cannot be in many places at once2 but that which is common is in many places at once4 ,it is thus plain that nothing ,universal exists apart or separate from particulars 7b4 #bg74 ,the advocates of the 7,platonic7 ,ideas are right in affirming them to be separate1 if they be ,essences2 but they are wrong in calling that which is predicable of many things 7the ,universal7 an ,idea 7p4 #ajdj1 b4 #bi74 ,when asked1 ,what are these indestructible ,essences of which you speak1 as apart from the visible individual objects8--they had no intelligible answer to give4 ,accordingly they were forced to make these ,essences the same specifically with the destructible 7individual7 objects2 for these we do know 7b4 #cc74 ,they simply prefixed the word ,greek3 au7to_/ to the names of sensible objects--,greek3 au7toa_/nthrpos1 au7toi_/ppos4 ,but these ,ideas might still exist1 even though we knew not what they were2 just as eternal ,essences like the stars would still exist1 even though we had never seen them 7p4 #ajda1 a4 #b74 ,let us again examine what we call ,essence1 and what sort of thing it is2 and let us take another point of departure1 which may perhaps help us to understand what that ,essence is which is apart and separate from perceivable ,essences 7p4 #ajda1 a4 #i74 ,we know that ,essence is a certain variety of ,principle or ,cause2 and from this premiss we will reason 7a4 #aj74 ,now the enquiry into ,cause1 or the ,why1 always comes in this shape3 ,why does one thing belong to another8 ,the enquiry1 ,why a thing is itself8 is idle4 ,the fact--the ,greek3 o7_/ti--must be assumed to be clear and known in the first instance4 ,you know that the moon is eclipsed1 as matter of fact2 you proceed to enquire into the cause thereof 7a4 #aa-bd74 ,why does it thunder8 or1 to enunciate the same question more fully1 ,why is there noise in the clouds8 ,the qusitum is always one thing predicated of another 7a4 #bf74 ,why are these materials1 bricks and stones1 a house8 ,here the answer sought is1 the ,cause2 and that is the ,greek3 t44e41 speaking in logical or analytical phraseology 7,greek3 logiks--i4e41 that which belongs to the ,greek3 lo_/gos ts ou7si_/as74 ,in some cases1 this qusitum is a ,final ,cause1 as in the case of a bed or a house2 in others1 an ,efficient or ,movent ,cause2 for that also is a variety of ,cause1 generally sought for in regard to things generated or destroyed2 but the other 7viz41 ,greek3 to t44e41 ipsa rei forma ac notio1 aut concepta in animo artificis1 aut inclusa ,greek3 duna_/mei in ips natur ac semine rei--,bonitz1 ,comm4 p4 #cei7 is sought for in regard to ,greek3 ei7nai4 ,the true nature of the qusitum is often unperceived1 when the problem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and predicate in their mutual relations 7,greek3 e7n tois m katall_/ls legome_/nois1 p4 #ajda1 a4 #cc74 ,for example1 ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos dia ti_/ e7stin8 is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation4 ,as it stands1 it might be supposed to be intended as ,greek3 a7_/nthrpos dia ti_/ e7stin a7_/nthrpos8 which would be a question idle or null4 ,to make it clear1 you ought to distinguish the two members to which the real qusitum refers 7b4 #b71 and say ,greek3 dia ti_/ ta_/de 7 to_/de e7stin a7_/nthrpos8 your real enquiry is about the ,greek3 u7_/l or ,matter1 why it exists in this or that manner4 ,why are these materials a house8 ,because the ,essence of a house belongs to them 7b4 #f74 ,some ,greek3 t44e41 some sort of ,greek3 ei7nai1 must belong to the ,matter 7b4 #d74 ,why is this ,matter a man8 or why is the body disposed in this particular way a man8 ,here we enquire as to the ,cause which acts upon a certain ,matter2 and that is the ,form whereby the thing is2 which again is the ,essence 7b4 #h74 ,hence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the ,simple and the ,compound4 ,the enquiry above described1 and the teaching above described1 cannot apply to the ,simple1 which must be investigated in another way 7p4 #ajda1 b4 #i74 ,compounds are of two sorts--aggregates like a heap 7mechanical71 and aggregates like a syllable 7organic or formal74 ,in these last there are not merely the constituent elements1 but something else besides 7b4 #af74 ,the syllable ba is something more than the letters b and a2 flesh is something more than fire and earth1 its constituent elements4 ,now this something more cannot be itself a constituent element2 for1 if that were so1 flesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two1 and we should still have to search for the something beyond1 and this ulterior process might be repeated ad infinitum 7b4 #bb74 ,nor can the something beyond be itself a compound of several elements1 for we should still have to find the independent something which binds these into a compound4 ,it is plain that this something beyond must be in its nature quite distinct from an element1 and must be the cause why one compound is flesh1 another compound a syllable1 and so about all the remaining compounds4 ,now this is the ,essence of each compound--the ,first ,cause of existence to each 7b4 #be74 ,the ,element 7,greek3 stoicheion7 is that into which the compound is separated1 as included ,matter 7,greek3 e7nupa_/rchon 7s u7_/ln73 b and a1 in the syllable ba 7b4 #cb74 ,there are some things which are not the ,essences of objects 7white1 for example1 is not of the ,essence of man1 but an attribute72 but1 in all cases where compounds have come together according to ,nature and by natural process1 that ,nature also which is not ,element but ,principle is the ,essence 7b4 #bh3 ,greek3 e7pei d' e7_/nia ou7k ou7si_/ai tn pragma_/tn1 a7ll' o7_/sai ou7si_/ai kata phu_/sin kai phu_/sei sunest_/kasi1 phanei_/ a7n kai au7_/t 7 phu_/sis ou7si_/a1 7_/ e7stin ou7 stoicheion a7ll' a7rch_/4 ,schwegler in his note1 p4 #ace1 proposes to correct this passage by striking out ,greek3 kai_/ before the words ,greek3 au7t 7 phu_/sis ou7si_/a4 ,but1 if this were done1 it would make the passage mean that ,greek3 u7_/l or ,greek3 stoicheion is not ,greek3 ou7si_/a1 and that the other ,greek3 phu_/sis which is not ,greek3 stoicheion1 is to be regarded exclusively as ,greek3 ou7si_/a4 ,now this is certainly not the doctrine of ,aristotle1 who expressly declares ,greek3 u7_/l to be ,greek3 ou7si_/a2 see ,h1 p4 #ajdb1 a4 #cb4 ,retaining the ,greek3 kai_/1 the passage will then mean that not merely ,greek3 u7_/l1 but also ,greek3 phu_/sis which is not ,greek3 u7_/l1 is ,greek3 ou7si_/a74 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,greek3 4 ,in this ,book1 ,aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and discussions of the preceding4 ,his purpose had been declared to be the investigation of the ,causes1 ,principles1 and ,elements of ,essences4 ,now ,essences are diverse3 some universally admitted1 as the natural elements and simple bodies1 also plants1 animals1 and the parts of each1 lastly1 the heaven and the parts thereof2 others not universally admitted1 but advocated by some philosophers1 as the ,ideas and ,mathematical ,entia2 others1 again1 which we arrive at by dialectical discussion1 as ,greek3 to t44e41 the ,substratum 7,logical ,entia--,greek3 e7k tn lo_/gn1 p4 #ajdb1 a4 #ab71 the ,genus more ,essence than the ,species1 the ,universal more ,essence than ,particulars4 ,the 7,platonic7 ,ideas make a near approach to the ,genus and the ,universal2 they are vindicated as ,essences upon similar grounds4 ,next1 since ,greek3 to t44e4 is ,essence1 and since the ,definition is the rational explanation of ,greek3 t44e41 we found it necessary to discuss ,definition2 and1 since the ,definition is a sentence having parts1 we were called upon to examine these parts1 and to explain what parts belonged both to ,essence and to ,definition4 ,we decided farther1 after discussion1 that the ,universal and the ,genus were not ,essence2 the ,platonic ,ideas and the ,mathematical ,entia we postponed for the moment1 and we confined ourselves to the perceivable ,essences1 recognized by all 7a4 #be74 ,now all these perceivable ,essenti include ,matter4 ,the ,substratum--,matter in one way--is ,essence2 while1 in another way1 the ,form and the ,greek3 lo_/gos is ,essence2 and finally the ,compound of the two is ,essence4 ,matter is ,hoc ,aliquid1 not ,greek3 e7nergei_/a but only ,greek3 duna_/mei4 ,form is an ,hoc ,aliquid separable by reason 7,greek3 t lo_/g christo_/n1 p4 #ajdb1 a4 #bi74 ,the ,compound of the two1 the complete ,hoc ,aliquid1 is capable of existing separably1 in an absolute sense 7which is true also of some ,forms71 and is liable alone to generation and destruction 7a4 #cj74 ,it is clear that ,matter also1 not less than ,form1 is ,essence2 for in all changes from opposite to opposite1 there is a certain substratum to such changes4 ,thus1 in changes of ,place1 there is a substratum which is now here1 presently there2 in changes of ,quantity1 what is now of such and such a size1 is presently greater or less2 in changes of ,quality1 what is now healthy is presently sick2 in changes of ,essence1 what is now in course of generation is presently in course of destruction1 or what is now the substratum of some given ,form 7and is thus ,hoc ,aliquid7 is presently the substratum of ,privation1 and thus no longer ,hoc ,aliquid4 ,among these four varieties of change 7,greek3 kat' ou7si_/an1 kata poso_/n1 kata poio_/n1 kata to_/pon7 the three last are consequent upon the first1 but the first is not consequent upon all the three last2 for we cannot maintain that1 because a thing has ,matter capable of local movement1 it must therefore have generable and destructible ,matter 7p4 #ajdb1 b4 #f74 ,having discussed the ,essence of perceivable things so far forth as potential1 we now proceed to the same ,essence so far forth as actual 7,greek3 7 duna_/mei ou7si_/a--7 7s e7ne_/rgeia ou7si_/a tn ai7sthtn--p4 #ajdb1 b4 #aj74 ,what is this last8 ,demokritus recognizes a primordial body one and the same as to ,matter1 but having three differences--in figure1 in position1 in arrangement4 ,but it is plain that this enumeration is not sufficient and that there are many other differences1 to each of which corresponds a special acceptation of ,greek3 e7_/sti 7,greek3 to e7_/sti tosautachs le_/getai--b4 #bf74 ,some differences depend upon the mode of putting together constituent materials 7,greek3 sunthe_/sei ts u7_/ls--b4 #af71 as mixture1 tying1 gluing1 pegging1 c42 some upon position1 as threshold1 coping1 c42 some upon time2 some upon place2 some upon affections of perceivable things1 such as hardness1 softness1 dryness1 moisture1 density1 rarity1 c42 some upon combinations of the foregoing2 some again simply upon excess or defect in quantity4 ,to one or other of these1 ,greek3 e7_/stin has reference in each particular case4 ,we say--,this is a threshold1 because it lies in a particular manner3 ,is 7or ,to be--,greek3 to ei7nai7 signifies in this case that particular manner of lying4 ,to be ice1 is to have become solidified in this particular manner 7b4 #bh74 ,we must therefore look for the summa genera of the differences2 in some cases ,greek3 to ei7nai will be defined by all these differences3 thus more or less dense1 more or less rare1 belong to the genus excess and defect2 differences of figure1 smoothness1 roughness1 c41 belong to the genus straight and curve2 in other cases1 to be1 or not to be1 will depend upon mixture1 as the genus 7p4 #ajdc1 a4 #a74 ,if then the ,essence is the cause why each thing is what it is1 we must seek in these differences the cause why each thing is what it is 7p4 #ajdc1 a4 #c74 ,none of these differences indeed is itself ,essence1--not even when it is embodied or combined with ,matter2 but it is in each the analogue of ,essence1 and must be employed in defining1 just as in real and true ,essence we define by predicating of ,matter the ,actuality or ,formality 7,greek3 7s e7n tais ou7si_/ais to ts u7_/ls katgorou_/menon au7t 7 e7ne_/rgeia--a4 #f74 ,thus1 if we define a threshold1 we say--a piece of wood or stone lying in this particular way2 if we define ice1 we say--water frozen or solidified in this particular way1 c4 ,the ,form or ,actuality of one ,matter is different from that of another2 so also is the rational explanation or ,definition2 in some cases it is composition1 in others mixture1 c41 and so forth4 ,if any one defines a house by saying that it is stone or brick1 he indicates only the potential house1 for these are the ,matter 7a4 #ae72 if he defines it--a vessel protecting bodies or property1 he then assigns the ,actuality 7,greek3 e7ne_/rgeian72 if he includes both of the above in his definition1 he then gives the third ,essence completed out of the two together 7,greek3 tn tri_/tn kai tn e7k tou_/tn ou7si_/an--a4 #ah74 ,to define from the differences1 is to define from the side of the ,actuality or ,form2 to define from the included elements 7,greek3 e7k tn e7nuparcho_/ntn7 is to define from the side of the ,matter 7a4 #bj74 ,we see herefrom what perceivable ,essence is1 and how it is3 partly1 of the nature of ,matter2 partly1 of ,form and ,actuality or ,energy3 again1 the third or ,concrete1 out of both combined 7p4 #ajdc1 a4 #bh74 ,sometimes1 it is not clear whether the name signifies this third ,concrete1 or the ,form and ,energy4 ,thus1 when you say a house1 do you mean a protective receptacle built of bricks8 or do you mean simply a protective receptacle--the ,form simply1 without specifying the ,matter8 ,when you say a line1 do you mean a dyad in length--,form in ,matter8 or simply a dyad--,form alone8 ,when you talk of an animal1 do you mean soul in body8 or simply soul1 which is the ,essence and ,actuality of a certain body8 ,the word animal may be applied to both1 not indeed univocally1 as implying generic resemblance1 but 7quasi-univocally1 or semi-univocally7 by analogical relationship to a common term 7,greek3 ou7ch 7s e7ni lo_/g lego_/menon1 a7ll' 7s pros e7n--a4 #cf74 ,this distinction however1 though important in some respects1 is unimportant so far as regards the investigation about perceivable ,essence2 for the ,greek3 t44e4 belongs to the ,form and the ,actuality 7a4 #ch74 ,soul1 and the being soul1 are identical2 but man1 and the being man1 are not identical2 unless the soul be called man4 ,thus this identity exists in some cases1 but not in others 7b4 #d74 ,a syllable is not composed merely of letters and synthesis1 nor is a house simply of bricks and synthesis2 for the synthesis or the mixture does not proceed out of the elements which are put together or mixed 7b4 #h74 ,the like is true in other cases2 e4g41 if the threshold is a threshold by position1 the position does not proceed out of the threshold1 but rather the threshold out of the position4 ,nor again is man simply animal and biped4 ,if these two are the ,matter1 there must be something apart from and beyond them1 something not itself an element nor proceeding out of an element--the ,essence2 which is indicated by abstracting from the ,matter 7b4 #ac74 ,this1 as being the ,cause of ,existence and of ,essence 7,greek3 ai7_/tion tou ei7nai kai ts ou7si_/as--b4 #ad7 is what is meant when ,essence is spoken of4 ,this ,essence or ,form must be eternal2 or at least1 if destructible1 it has never been destroyed2 if generable1 it has never been generated4 ,for we have shown already that no one either constructs or generates ,form3 the ,hoc ,aliquid is constructed2 the product of ,form and ,matter is generated 7p4 #ajdc1 b4 #ah74 ,as yet it has not been made clear whether the ,essences of destructible things are separable or not3 in some cases at least1 they certainly are not--in those cases1 namely1 where there can exist nothing beyond the particular things1 as a house or an implement 7b4 #ba74 ,perhaps1 indeed1 these are not truly ,essences--neither these particular things nor any other things which have come together not by natural process2 for we might indicate ,nature alone as the ,essence in destructible things 7,greek3 tn gar phu_/sin mo_/nn a7_/n tis thei_/ tn e7n tois phthartois ou7si_/an7--b4 #bc4 ,aristotle seems to say in what precedes1 that there is no ,greek3 ge_/nesis or ,greek3 phthora_/ of ,greek3 ou7si_/a2 see ,z4 p4 #ajcc1 b4 #ag4 ,but how is this to be reconciled with ,k4 p4 #ajfj1 b4 #ah3 ,greek3 ou7si_/as men gar pa_/ss ge_/nesi_/s e7stin1 stigms d' ou7k e7_/stin8 ,see ,schwegler's ,comm4 explaining ,greek3 gigno_/menon and ,greek3 phtheiro_/menon1 ,pt4 ,,ii4 pp4 #hb1 #hc74 ,hence we see that the difficulty started by ,antisthenes and others equally unschooled 7,greek3 a7pai_/deutoi7 is not without pertinence4 ,they say that1 as a definition is a sentence of many words1 predicating something of something1 so you cannot define ,quid est3 you can only define and inform persons ,quale ,quid est3 you can only tell people what the definiend is like1 not what it is in itself3 you can tell them that silver is like tin1 but you cannot tell what silver is4 ,upon this theory1 definition may be given of ,compound ,essence1 whether perceivable or cogitable2 but not of the primordia of which the compound consists4 ,the definition must predicate a something1 which is of the nature of ,form1 of another something1 which is of the nature of ,matter 7p4 #ajdc1 b4 #ca74 ,if ,essences are 7as the ,platonists say7 in a certain sense ,numbers1 they are so in this sense2 not 7as these philosophers affirm7 in the character of assemblages of ,monads4 ,for the definition is a sort of number1 divisible into indivisible units2 and the number is so likewise4 ,if you add any thing to1 or deduct any thing from1 a number 7let the thing added or deducted be never so small71 it will be no longer the same number2 in like manner1 neither the definition nor the ,greek3 t44e41 will be the same1 if any thing be added or subtracted 7p4 #ajdd1 a4 #a74 ,each number must have something which makes its component units coalesce into one number1 though the ,platonic philosophers cannot tell what that something is2 either the units are a mere 7uncemented7 heap1 or else you must say what is that something which makes them one out of many 7a4 #e74 ,the definition also is one2 yet these philosophers cannot explain what makes it one4 ,the units of the number and that of the definition1 is to be explained in the same way1 and that of the ,essence also2 not as a monad or a point1 but in each case like an ,entelechy and a peculiar nature 7,greek3 ou7ch1 7s le_/gousi_/ tines1 oi7on mona_/s tis ou7sa 7 stigm_/1 a7ll' e7ntele_/cheia kai phu_/sis tis e7ka_/st--a4 #i74 ,a given number admits of no degrees1 more or less3 neither does a given ,essence1 unless it be taken embodied in ,matter 7a4 #aj74 ,respecting the ,material ,essence 7,greek3 peri de ts u7liks ou7si_/as--p4 #ajdd1 a4 #ae71 we must not forget that1 if there be one and the same ,first ,matter common as a principle to all ,generata or ,fientia1 there is nevertheless a certain ,matter special or peculiar 7proximate7 to each 7,greek3 o7_/ms e7_/sti tis oi7kei_/a e7ka_/stou--a4 #ah2 ,greek3 oi7kei_/a kai prosech_/s--,alexander74 ,thus the ,materia ,prima of phlegm is1 sweet or fat things2 that of bile is1 bitter things and such like4 ,perhaps these two come both from the same ,matter2 and there are several different ,matters of the same product1 in cases where one ,matter proceeds from another4 ,thus phlegm proceeds from fat and sweet1 if fat proceeds from sweet2 and even from bile1 if bile be analysed into its ,first ,matter from whence phlegm may proceed by a different road 7a4 #bc74 ,one thing may proceed from another in two different ways3 either ,d may proceed from ,c1 because ,c is its immediate ,matter1 already preformed up to a certain point1 and thus on the way to a perfectly formed state2 or ,d may proceed from ,c1 after the destruction of ,c and the resolution of ,c into its ,materia ,prima 7,greek3 dichs gar to_/d' e7k toude1 7 o7_/ti pro o7dou e7_/stai 7 o7_/ti a7naluthe_/ntos ei7s tn a7rch_/n--a4 #bd74 ,from one and the same ,matter different products may proceed1 if the moving cause be different3 from the same wood there may proceed a box or a bed4 ,what product shall emerge does not1 however1 depend only upon the ,moving ,cause1 but often upon the ,matter also2 thus a saw cannot be made out of wool or wood4 ,if the same product can proceed out of different ,matter1 this is evidently because the ,art or ,moving ,cause is the same3 if this last be different1 and the ,matter different also1 the product will of course be different 7p4 #ajdd1 a4 #cb74 ,when a man asks us1 ,what is the ,cause8 we ought to reply1 since the word has many senses1 by specifying all the causes which can have a bearing on the case 7p4 #ajdd1 a4 #cd74 ,thus1 ,what is the ,cause of man1 as ,matter8 ,perhaps the katamenia4 ,what1 as ,movent8 ,perhaps the seed4 ,what1 as ,form8 ,the ,greek3 t44e4 ,what1 as ,greek3 ou7 e7_/neka8 ,the ,end4 ,these two last are perhaps both the same 7a4 #cf74 ,moreover we ought to make answer by specifying the proximate causes 7not the remote and ultimate74 ,thus1 ,what is the ,matter of man8 ,we must answer by specifying the proximate matter2 not fire and earth1 the ultimate and elemental 7b4 #b74 ,this is the only right way of proceeding in regard to ,essences natural and generable2 since the ,causes are many1 and are what we seek to know4 ,but the case is different in regard to ,essences natural1 yet eternal4 ,some of these last perhaps have no ,matter at all2 or at least a different ,matter1 having no attribute except local movability 7b4 #h4 ,alexander says in explanation3 ,greek3 le_/gei de tn xu_/mpasan tn o7kt sphairn e7na_/da--u7_/ln ou7 genntn kai phthartn a7lla mo_/non kata to_/pon kint_/n--p4 #ebg1 #bj-be1 ,bon474 ,again1 in regard to circumstances which occur by ,nature1 but not in the way of ,essence1 there is no ,matter at all3 the subject itself is the ,essence4 ,thus in regard to an eclipse3 ,what is its ,cause8 ,what is its ,matter8 ,there is no ,matter1 except the moon which is affected in a certain way4 ,what is the ,cause1 as ,movent--here light-destroying8 ,the earth4 ,perhaps there is no ,greek3 ou7 e7_/neka in the case4 ,but the ,cause in the way of ,form is the rational explanation or definition2 and this must include a specification of the ,movent ,cause1 otherwise it will be obscure4 ,thus1 the eclipse is1 privation of light2 and1 when you add--by the earth intervening1 you then specify the ,movent1 and make your definition satisfactory 7b4 #ae74 ,in defining sleep we ought to say what part of the system is first affected thereby2 but this is not clear4 ,shall we indicate only the animal 7as substratum78 ,but this is not enough4 ,we shall be asked1 ,what part of the animal8 ,which part first8 ,the heart1 or what other part8 ,next1 by what ,cause8 ,lastly1 how is the heart affected1 apart from the rest of the system8 ,to say--,sleep is a certain sort of immobility1 will not be a sufficient definition4 ,we must specify from what primary affection such immobility arises 7p4 #ajdd1 b4 #bj74 ,since some things exist1 and do not exist1 without generation or destruction 7as ,forms1 and ,points1 if there be such things as ,points71 it is impossible that all ,contraries can be generated out of each other1 if every generation be both aliquid and ex aliquo4 ,albus homo ex nigro homine must be generated in a different way from album ex nigro4 ,now ,matter is only to be found in those cases where there is generation and change into each other2 in other cases1 where no change takes place1 there is no ,matter4 ,there is a difficulty in understanding how the ,matter of each substance stands in regard to the contrary modifications of that substance 7p4 #ajdd1 b4 #bi74 ,if the body is potentially healthy1 and if disease is the contrary of health1 are we to say that both these states are potential8 ,is water potentially both wine and vinegar8 ,or are we to say rather that the body is the ,matter of health1 and that water is the ,matter of wine1 in the way of acquisition by nature and by taking on the ,form to which it tends2 and that the body is the ,matter of sickness1 and wine the ,matter of vinegar in the way of privation and of destruction contrary to nature 7b4 #cd78 ,however1 there is here some difficulty3 ,since vinegar is generated out of wine1 why is not wine the ,matter of vinegar1 and potentially vinegar8 ,why is not the living man potentially a corpse8 ,is it not rather the truth1 however1 that these are accidental or contra-natural destructions 7,greek3 kata sumbebkos ai7 phthorai_/--b4 #cf1 i4e41 not in the regular appetency and aspirations1 according to which the destruction of one ,form gives place to a better72 and that through such destruction the same ,matter which belonged to the living man becomes afterwards the ,matter of the corpse2 likewise the ,matter of wine becomes1 through the like destruction1 ,matter of vinegar--by a generation like that of night out of day8 ,changes of this sort must take place by complete resolution into the original ,materia ,prima 7,greek3 ei7s tn u7_/ln dei e7panelthein--a4 #c72 thus1 if a living animal comes out of a dead one1 the latter is first resolved into its elements1 and then out of them comes the living animal4 ,so vinegar is first resolved into water1 then out of the water comes wine 7a4 #e74 ,we shall now revert to the difficulty recently noticed1 about ,definitions and ,numbers4 ,what is the cause that each number and each definition is ,one8 ,in all cases where there are several parts not put together as a mere heap1 but where there is a ,whole besides the parts1 there must be some cause of this kind4 ,with some bodies1 contact is such cause2 with others1 viscosity 7,greek3 glischro_/ts--p4 #ajde1 a4 #ab71 or some other affection4 ,but the definition is one complex phrase1 not by conjunction like the ,iliad1 but ,one by being the definition of one subject 7a4 #ad74 ,now what is it which makes the subject man1 ,one8 ,why is he ,one and not ,many1 say animal and a biped--more especially if there exist1 as the ,platonists say1 a ,self-animal and a ,self-biped8 ,why are not these two ,greek3 au7ta_/ the man 7,greek3 dia ti_/ gar ou7k e7keina au7ta o7 a7_/nthrpo_/s e7sti8--a4 #ag71 so that individuals are men by participation not of one ,self-man1 but of the two--,self-animal1 ,self-biped8 ,on this theory altogether1 it would seem that a man cannot be ,one1 but must be ,many--animal and biped4 ,it is plain that in this way of investigation the problem is insoluble4 ,but if1 as we say 7p4 #ajde1 a4 #bc71 there be on one side ,matter1 on the other side ,form--on one side that which is in ,potency1 on the other side that which is in ,act 7a4 #bd7--the problem ceases to be difficult4 ,the difficulty is the same as it would be if the definition of himation were1 round brass3 the word himation would be the sign of that definition1 and the problem would be1 ,what is the ,cause why round and brass are ,one8 ,but the difficulty vanishes1 when we reply that one is ,matter1 the other ,form4 ,and1 in cases where generation intervenes1 what is the ,cause why the potential ,ens is actual ,ens1 except the ,efficient 7,greek3 para to poisan--a4 #ca78 ,there is no other ,cause why the sphere in potency is a sphere in actuality3 such was the ,greek3 t44e4 of each 7,greek3 tout' 7n to t44e4 e7kate_/r--a4 #cc74 ,of ,matter there are two varieties1 the ,cogitable and the ,perceivable2 and1 in the ,definition1 a part is always ,matter1 a part is ,form or ,energy2 as when we define the circle--a plane figure4 7,aristotle argues3--,on the ,platonic theory that ,ideas or ,forms are ,entia1 separate from particulars1 self-existent1 and independent of each other1 no cause can be assigned for the coalescence of any two or more of them into one2 e4g4 animal and biped1 into man4 ,but upon my theory1 ,form and ,matter1 ,power and ,act1 are in their own nature relative to each other4 ,it is their own inherent nature to coalesce into one1 or for ,power to pass into ,act4 ,this is the cause of their unity3 no other cause can be found or is necessary4 ,see ,alexander1 p4 #eca47 ,in those cases where there is no ,matter1 either cogitable or perceivable1 as in the ,categories1 ,hoc ,aliquid1 ,quale1 ,quantum1 c41 each of them is1 in itself and at once1 both ,ens and ,unum 7p4 #ajde1 b4 #b74 ,hence neither ,ens nor ,unum is included in the ,definitions1 and the ,greek3 t44e4 is1 in itself and at once1 both ,ens and ,unum4 ,no other cause can be assigned why each of these is ,ens and ,unum2 each of them is so1 at once and immediately2 yet not as if they were all included in ,ens or ,unum as common genera2 nor as if they were apart and separable from particulars 7b4 #g74 ,philosophers1 who do not adopt this opinion1 resort to various phrases1 all unsatisfactory1 to explain the coalescence or unity of the elements included in the ,definition4 ,some call it ,greek3 me_/thexis1 but they give no cause of the ,greek3 me_/thexis2 others ,greek3 sunousi_/a1 or ,greek3 su_/ndesmos1 or ,greek3 su_/nthesis--of soul with body1 as definition of life4 ,but we might just as well use these phrases on other occasions1 and say that to be well was a synthesis of the soul with health2 that the brazen triangle was a ,greek3 su_/ndesmos of brass with triangle2 that white was a synthesis of superficies with whiteness 7p4 #ajde1 b4 #ae74 ,these phrases carry no explanation2 and these philosophers get into the difficulty by taking a wrong point of departure4 ,they first lay down ,power as different from ,entelechy1 and then look for an explanation which makes them one 7,greek3 ai7_/tion d' o7_/ti duna_/mes kai e7ntelechei_/as ztousi lo_/gon e7nopoion kai diaphora_/n--p4 #ajde1 b4 #af1 ,schwegler observes that the two last words are loosely put1 and that the clear words to express what ,aristotle means would be3 ,greek3 ztousi lo_/gon e7nopoion u7potithe_/ntes diaphora_/n--,comm4 ,,ii4 p4 #aed474 ,but the truth is that ,power and ,entelechy are not essentially two1 but only different aspects of one and the same4 ,the ,last ,matter and the ,form are the same2 but the first is in potency1 the second in perfect actuality 7,stoff und ,form1 ,potenzielles und ,actuelles1 sind eins und dasselbe auf verschiedenen ,entwicklungsstufen--,schwegler ,,ii4 p4 #aea74 ,to enquire in any particular case what is the cause of this ,one1 is the same as to enquire generally the cause of ,unity4 ,each thing is a certain ,one2 the ,potential and the ,actual are ,one1 in a certain way 7b4 #bj74 ,so that no other ,cause can be found except the ,movent or ,efficient--that which moved the matter out of ,potency into ,actuality4 ,as to those things which have no ,matter1 each of them is ,one immediately and per se 7b4 #bc74 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,greek3 ,th4 ,in discriminating the meanings of ,ens1 we noticed one ,greek3 kata du_/namin kai e7ne_/rgeian 7apart from ,ens according to the ,categories74 ,we shall now proceed to discuss these two terms ,greek3 du_/namis and ,greek3 e7ntele_/cheia e7ne_/rgeia 7p4 #ajde1 b4 #ce74 ,it is elsewhere mentioned 7,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajai7 that ,greek3 du_/namis has many senses1 of which some 7like the geometrical1 c47 are equivocal or metaphorical1 so that we shall pass them over here 7p4 #ajdf1 a4 #f74 ,but there is one first and proper sense of ,greek3 du_/namis1 from which many others diverge in different directions of relationship or analogy 7a4 #aj74 ,that first and proper sense is--a principle of change in alio vel quatenus aliud1 or a principle of change ab alio vel quatenus aliud 7,greek3 a7rch metabols e7n a7_/ll 7 7 a7_/llo--a7rch metabols u7p' a7_/llou 7 7 a7_/llo--a4 #aa1 #ad4 ,the same definition is given in terms somewhat different at p4 #ajdh1 a4 #bh3 ,greek3 touto le_/gomen dunaton o7 pe_/phuke kinein a7_/llo 7 kineisthai u7p' a7_/llou1 7 a7pls 7 tro_/pon tina_/4 ,this ,aristotle calls ,greek3 7 kata ki_/nsin du_/namis--expressed by ,bonitz1 ,comm41 p4 #cgi3 agendi patiendive nisum quendam474 ,the notion of ,greek3 du_/namis however extends more widely than this first sense of ,greek3 du_/namis kata ki_/nsin4 ,it includes other cases1 as where we say that ,hermes is ,greek3 duna_/mei in the wood1 and that the half foot is ,greek3 duna_/mei in the whole foot 7p4 #ajdh1 a4 #cc2 ,bonitz distinguishes this last sense as ,mglichkeit1 from the first sense as ,vermgen1 p4 #cgi74 ,we begin by speaking about the first and proper sense--,greek3 du_/namis 7 kata ki_/nsin4 ,one variety thereof is1 when a thing has power of being passively affected so and so--when there resides in the thing a principle of passive change 7,greek3 a7rch metabols pathtiks--p4 #ajdf1 a4 #ac7 by something else or by itself quatenus something else4 7,these last words are added because a sick man has the ,greek3 du_/namis of being cured either by a physician1 or by himself if he be a physician2 but then in this last case he is to be looked upon in two different characters1 as physician and as patient3 he cures himself as physician1 he is cured as patient47 ,another variety of ,greek3 du_/namis kata ki_/nsin is1 when a thing has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any exterior principle of change 7a4 #ad72 as hardness in iron4 ,sometimes this ,greek3 du_/namis is restricted to the cases in which a person can do the thing in question well3 no man is said to have the power of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty well 7a4 #ah74 ,in all these varieties1 the general notion of ,greek3 du_/namis kata ki_/nsin is included 7p4 #ajdf1 a4 #af74 ,the active and passive ,greek3 du_/namis are1 in one sense1 one and the same2 in another sense1 distinct and different4 ,for one of them resides in the patient1 the other in the agent 7a4 #bg73 sometimes the two come by nature together in the same thing2 yet the patient does not suffer from itself as patient1 but from itself as agent4 ,impotence 7,greek3 a7dunami_/a7 is the privation contrary to this ,greek3 9999du_/namis4 ,privation has many different meanings 7a4 #cb74 ,among these principles of change1 some reside in the inanimate substances1 others in the animated2 not only in the soul generally1 but also in the rational branch of the soul 7p4 #ajdf1 a4 #ch74 ,accordingly some ,greek3 duna_/meis are ,rational1 others ,irrational4 ,all arts and constructive sciences are ,greek3 duna_/meis 7or ,greek3 a7rchai metabltikai e7n a7_/ll 7 7 a7_/llo--b4 #c74 ,in the rational capacities1 the same capacity covers both contraries2 in the irrational1 each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively2 thus1 fire will only heat but not chill1 while the medical art will produce either sickness or health4 ,the reason is1 that ,science is based upon rational explanations or definitions2 and the same rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation thereof2 though not indeed in the same manner3 it declares1 in a certain way1 both together1 and1 in a certain way1 chiefly the positive side 7b4 #aj74 ,accordingly these sciences are sciences of both the contraries at once3 namely1 per se1 of one side of the ,antiphasis2 not per se1 of the other side2 since the rational explanation also declares1 directly and per se1 only one side1 while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly1 mediately1 per accidens--i4e41 by negation and exclusion 7,greek3 a7popha_/sei kai a7pophora4--b4 #ad74 ,for the ,contrary is the highest grade of privation2 and this is the exclusion of one side of the alternative 7,greek3 7 gar ste_/rsis 7 pr_/t to e7nanti_/on1 au7_/t d' a7pophora thate_/rou--p4 #ajdf b4 #ae2 ,bonitz says that ,greek3 to e7nanti_/on is the subject of this proposition1 and ,greek3 7 ste_/rsis the predicate74 ,both of two contraries cannot reside1 indeed1 in the same subject2 but ,science is a ,greek3 du_/namis through rational explanation or reason in the soul which has within it a principle of motion2 accordingly the soul can bring to pass either of the two contraries1 through reference to the same rational notion or explanation which comprises both 7b4 #bb74 ,the ,megaric philosophers recognize no ,greek3 du_/namis apart from ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia2 affirming that no one has any power1 except at the moment when he is actually exercising it4 ,these philosophers are wrong 7for various reasons indicated3 p4 #ajdf1 b4 #cj--p4 #ajdg1 a4 #bj74 ,power and ,act are distinct4 ,a particular event is possible to happen1 yet it does not happen2 or possible not to happen1 yet it does happen 7p1 #ajdg1 a4 #bb74 ,that is possible1 to which1 if the act supervene whereto such possibility relates1 nothing impossible will ensue 7a4 #be74 ,the name ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia1 appended to that of ,greek3 e7ntele_/cheia 7,greek3 7 pros tn e7ntele_/cheian suntitheme_/n--a4 #cj71 has come to be applied to other things chiefly from reference to motions2 for motion is par excellence ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia4 ,hence ,non-,entia are never said to be moved1 though other predicates may be applied to them3 we may call them ,greek3 dianota_/ and ,greek3 e7pithumta_/1 but never ,greek3 kinou_/mena2 for1 if we did1 we should be guilty of contradiction1 saying that things which are not ,greek3 e7nergei_/a are ,greek3 e7nergei_/a4 ,among the ,non-,entia there are some which are ,entia ,greek3 duna_/mei3 we call them ,non-,entia1 because they are not ,greek3 e7ntelechei_/a 7b4 #b74 ,if the definition above given of ,greek3 to dunato_/n be admitted1 we see plainly that no one can say truly3 ,this is possible1 yet it will never happen 7p4 #ajdg1 b4 #c1 seq474 ,among all the various ,greek3 duna_/meis1 some are congenital1 such as the perceptive powers 7,greek3 ai7sth_/sen--p4 #ajdg1 b4 #ca72 others are acquired by practice1 such as playing the flute2 others by learning1 like the arts3 these two last varieties we cannot possess without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively 7b4 #cd71 but the others1 which are more of a passive character1 we may possess without such condition4 ,this distinction coincides with that which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational ,greek3 duna_/meis or capacities3 the rational capacities belonging only to a soul1 and to the rational branch thereof4 ,now every ,greek3 dunato_/n has its own specialities and conditions3 it is itself a given something1 and it is surrounded with concomitants of special time1 place1 neighbourhood1 c4 7p4 #ajdh1 a4 #a74 ,the irrational capacities must necessarily pass into reality1 whenever the active and the passive conditions come together1 because there is but one reality to arise2 but the rational capacities not necessarily1 because they tend to either one of two contrary realities1 both of which cannot be produced4 ,which of the two contraries shall be brought to reality1 will depend upon another authority--the appetency or deliberate resolution of the soul3 to whichsoever of the two1 each possible1 such sovereign appetency tends1 that one will be brought to pass1 when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable condition 7a4 #aa72 and under those circumstances1 it will necessarily 7,greek3 a7na_/gk--a4 #ad7 be brought to pass4 ,we need not formally enunciate the clause--if nothing extrinsic occurs to prevent it3 for this is already implied in the definition of ,greek3 du_/namis which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional1 but always under certain given conditions 7a4 #ah3 ,greek3 e7_/sti d' ou7 pa_/nts1 a7ll' e7cho_/ntn ps74 ,accordingly the agent will not be able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once1 even though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it 7a4 #ba74 ,having thus gone through the variety of ,greek3 du_/namis called ,greek3 7 kata ki_/nsin1 we shall now give some explanations of ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia2 in the course of which we shall be able to illustrate by contrast1 the other variety of ,greek3 du_/namis1 which was indicated above 7p4 #ajdh1 a4 #cj74 ,greek3 ,e7ne_/rgeia is used when the thing exists1 not ,greek3 duna_/mei3 meaning by ,greek3 duna_/mei such as ,hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole yard4 ,we shall explain our meaning1 by giving an induction of particulars2 for definition cannot be given of every thing4 ,we must group into one view the analogies following 7,greek3 ou7 dei pantos o7_/ron ztein1 a7lla kai to a7na_/logon sunoran--a4 #cg73 ,as the person now actually building is to the professional builder not so engaged2 as the animal awake is to the animal asleep2 as the animal seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them closed2 as that which is severed from matter is to matter 7,greek3 to a7pokekrime_/non--b4 #c72 as the work completed is to the material yet unworked2--so is ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia to ,greek3 du_/namis4 ,the antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances1 but there is a relationship or analogy pervading all 7,greek3 7s touto e7n tou_/t 7 pros touto1 to_/d' e7n tde 7 pros to_/de--b4 #h74 ,in some of the pairs1 the antithesis is the same as that of ,greek3 ki_/nsis pros du_/namin2 in others1 it is the same as that of ,greek3 ou7si_/a pro_/s tina u7_/ln 7b4 #i74 ,in one member of each pair1 we have ,greek3 7 e7ne_/rgeia a7phrisme_/n2 in the other ,greek3 to dunato_/n 7b4 #e--;,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia here is reality severed and determinate1 as contrasted with ,greek3 du_/namis potentiality huddled together and indeterminate4--,see ,schwegler's note3 ,potenzialitt und ,aktualitt sind reine ,verhltnissbegriffe--p4 #agb1 seq474 ,but in all the above-named examples1 that which is now ,greek3 duna_/mei may come actually to be ,greek3 e7nergei_/a3 the person now sleeping may awake2 the person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see2 the ,hermes now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real statue4 ,it is otherwise with ,the ,infinite1 ,vacuum1 c4 ,these exist ,greek3 duna_/mei only1 and can never come to exist ,greek3 e7nergei_/a1 or independently4 ,the ,infinite can exist ,greek3 e7nergei_/a only for our cognition4 ,the fact that the bisection thereof is never exhausted--that we may go on dividing as long as we choose--gives to the potential ,infinite a certain actuality1 though it cannot be truly separated 7b4 #af74 ,we must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a thing is ,greek3 duna_/mei1 and in what cases it is not proper4 ,you cannot properly say that earth is potentially a man3 you may perhaps say that the semen is potentially a man2 yet even this not certainly1 since other conditions besides semen are required 7p4 #ajdi1 a4 #b74 ,the physician cannot cure every patient1 yet neither is the cure altogether a matter of chance 7,greek3 a7po tu_/chs--a4 #d73 there is a certain measure of cure possible1 and that is called ,greek3 to u7giainon duna_/mei4 ,the definition thereof1 taken from the side of the agent1 would be--that which will come to pass if he wills it1 without any impediment from without2 from the side of the patient--when no impediment occurs from within him 7a4 #h74 ,in like manner1 a house exists ,greek3 duna_/mei1 when all the matter for it is brought together1 without need either of addition or subtraction or change1 and when there is no internal impediment2 and so with other products of art1 where the principle of generation is extrinsic to themselves4 ,in natural products1 where the principle of generation is intrinsic1 we treat them as potentially existing1 when this principle is in a condition to realize itself through itself1 assuming no external impediments to interfere4 ,thus we do not call the semen potentially a man1 because1 before it becomes such1 it must undergo change in something else1 and therefore stands in need of some other principle2 we call it so only when it is in such conditions that its own principle suffices4 ,earth is not said to be a statue ,greek3 duna_/mei1 until it has first been changed into brass 7a4 #ag74 ,we call the product not by the name of the ,matter itself1 but by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent ,matter2 thus we call a box1 not wood1 but wooden3 wood is then a box ,greek3 duna_/mei4 ,but we say this only of the proximate or immediate ,matter1 not of the remote or primary ,matter4 ,we must go back through successive stages to the first or most remote ,matter2 thus wood is not earth1 but earthy3 earth therefore is potentially wood4 ,the earth may be aeriform2 the air may be fiery2 the fire has no analogous adjective whereby it can be called1 and is thus the first or last ,matter4 ,but it is not said to be potentially any thing except the ,greek3 su_/ntheton combined with ,form immediately above it4 ,matter may be either proximate or remote3 ,potentiality is affirmed only of the proximate ,matter4 ,since all the different meanings of ,prius have been enumerated and distinguished1 it is plain that in all those meanings ,actuality is prius as compared with ,potentiality3 whether the ,greek3 du_/namis be ,greek3 a7rch metabltik 7 kintik7 e7n a7_/ll 7 a7_/llo1 like ,art2 or ,greek3 a7rch kintik 7 statik e7n au7t 7 au7to_/1 like ,nature 7p4 #ajdi1 b4 #e-aj74 ,actuality is prius both ,greek3 lo_/g and ,greek3 ou7si_/a3 it is also prius ,greek3 chro_/n in a certain sense1 though not in a certain other sense4 ,it is prius ,greek3 lo_/g1 because the ,actual is included in the definition of the ,potential2 that is1 it must be presupposed and foreknown1 before you can understand what the ,potential is 7p4 #ajdi1 b4 #ag74 ,you explain ,greek3 oi7kodomiko_/s or ,greek3 o7ratiko_/s by saying that he is ,greek3 duna_/menos oi7kodomein 7 o7ran3 you explain ,greek3 o7rato_/n by saying that it is ,greek3 dunaton o7rasthai3 ,greek3 to dunato_/n1 in its first and absolute meaning1 is ,greek3 dunato_/n because it may come into ,actuality 7b4 #ac74 ,it is prius ,greek3 chron in the sense that the ,potential always presupposes an ,actual identical specie1 though not identical numero1 with that ,actual to which the ,potential tends4 ,take a man now existing and now seeing1 or corn now ripe in the field3 these doubtless1 before they came into their present condition1 must have pre-existed in ,potentiality2 that is1 there must have pre-existed a certain matter--seed or a something capable of vision--which at one time was not yet in a state of ,actuality 7p4 #ajdi1 b4 #bc74 ,but prior to this matter there must have existed other ,actualities1 by which this matter was generated3 the ,actual is always generated out of its ,potential by a prior ,actual1 e4g41 a man by a man1 a musical man by a musical man2 there being always some prior movent1 which must be itself already in ,actuality 7b4 #bg74 ,we have already declared that every thing generated is something generated out of something1 and by something which is identical in species with the thing generated 7b4 #bi74 ,hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built nothing1 no harper who has never harped2 for the man who is learning to harp learns by harping 7b4 #cb72 which gave occasion to the sophistical puzzle--,that one1 who does not possess the knowledge1 will nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates4 ,the learner does not possess the knowledge2 yet still he must have possessed some fragments of the knowledge3 just as1 in every thing which is in course of generation1 some fraction must have been already generated2 in every thing which is moved1 some fraction has been already moved 7b4 #cf74 ,lastly1 ,actuality is prius as compared with ,potentiality 7not merely ,greek3 lo_/g1 kai chro_/n e7_/stin 7_/s1 but also7 ,greek3 ou7si_/a 7p4 #ajej1 a4 #d74 ,in the first place1 that which is latest in generation is first in ,form and in ,essence2 a man compared with a child1 man as compared with semen4 ,man already possesses the ,form1 semen does not4 ,next1 every thing generated marches or gradually progresses towards its principle and towards its end4 ,the principle is the ,greek3 ou7 e7_/neka1 and the generation is for the sake of the end4 ,now the end or consummation is ,actuality1 and for the sake of this the ,potentiality is taken on 7,greek3 lamba_/netai--a4 #aj74 ,animals do not see in order that they may have sight2 they have sight in order that they may see3 they do not theorize in order that they may possess theoretical aptitude1 but the converse2 except indeed those who are practising as learners4 ,moreover1 ,matter is said to exist potentially1 because it may come into ,form2 but1 when it exists actually1 it is then in ,form 7a4 #af74 7,alexander says3 ,greek3 7_/ste ka7n tou_/t prote_/ra 77 e7ne_/rgeia7 7s e7pheton kai ta_/sson kai ei7s ko_/smon a7_/gon duna_/mes--p4 #eei1 #aj1 ,bon47 ,the case is the same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion 7e4g41 dancing73 the dancing-master has attained his end when he exhibits his pupil actually dancing4 ,in natural productions this is no less true than in artificial3 ,nature has attained her end1 when the product comes into ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia2 that is1 when it is actually at work1 from whence the name ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia is derived 7,greek3 to gar e7_/rgon te_/los1 7 de e7ne_/rgeia to e7_/rgon--kai suntei_/nei pros tn e7ntele_/cheian--a4 #bc74 ,in some cases 7as we have often remarked7 the ultimatum is use1 without any ulterior product distinct from the use1 e4g41 the act of seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power 7p4 #ajej1 a4 #bd72 in other cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from the building power4 ,in the former of these cases1 ,actuality is the end of ,greek3 du_/namis2 in the latter it is more the end than ,greek3 du_/namis4 7,greek3 ,o7_/ms ou7then 7tton e7_/ntha men te_/los e7_/ntha de mallon te_/los ts duna_/me_/s e7stin2 7 gar oi7kodo_/msis e7n t oi7kodomoume_/n1 kai a7_/ma gi_/gnetai kai e7_/sti t oi7ki_/a--a4 #bi4 ,this passage is obscure3 see the comments of ,alexander1 with the notes of ,schwegler and ,bonitz1 who accuse ,alexander of misunderstanding it2 though it appears to me that neither of them is quite clear4 ,i understand ,aristotle to reason as follows3--,greek3 ,o7_/rasis is the ,greek3 te_/los1 the ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia1 the consummation of the visual power called ,greek3 o7_/psis2 but ,greek3 oi7kodo_/msis1 is not the ,greek3 te_/los1 the ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia1 the consummation of the building power called ,greek3 oi7kodomik_/4 ,this last has its ,greek3 te_/los1 ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia1 consummation1 in the ulterior product ,greek3 oi7ki_/a4 ,nevertheless ,greek3 oi7kodo_/msis1 residing as it does ,greek3 e7n t oi7kodomoume_/n1 and coming into existence simultaneously with the house1 is more the end1 more akin to the end or consummation than the building power called ,greek3 oi7kodomik_/47 ,in cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the exercise of the power1 the ,actuality 7consummation7 resides in that product 7p4 #ajej1 a4 #ca74 ,in cases where is no such ulterior product1 the ,actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides4 ,thus sight resides in him who sees1 and life in the soul4 ,hence also happiness resides in the soul2 for happiness is a certain kind of life 7b4 #a74 ,it is thus plain that ,actuality is the ,essence and the ,form1 and that it is prius ,greek3 t ou7si_/a compared with ,potentiality4 ,and1 as has been already remarked1 one ,actuality always precedes another1 in time1 up to the eternal ,prime ,movent 7p4 #ajej1 b4 #e74 ,moreover1 ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia is prius to ,greek3 du_/namis in respect to speciality and dignity 7,greek3 kurite_/rs--b4 #f74 ,for eternal things are priora in essence to destructible things1 and nothing is eternal ,greek3 duna_/mei1 as the reason of the case will show us 7b4 #h74 ,all ,potentiality applies at once to both sides of the ,antiphasis--to the affirmative as well as to the negative4 ,that which is not possible1 will never occur to any thing2 but every thing which is possible may never come to ,actuality 7,greek3 to dunaton de pan e7nde_/chetai m e7nergein--p4 #ajej1 b4 #aj74 ,that which is possible to be1 is also possible not to be4 ,now that which is possible not to be1 may perhaps not be 7,greek3 e7nde_/chetai m ei7nai--b4 #ac72 but that which may not be1 is destructible1 either absolutely 7that is1 in respect to ,essence71 or in respect to such portions of its nature as may not be1 that is1 in respect to locality or quantity or quality4 ,accordingly1 of those things which are absolutely1 or in respect to ,essence1 indestructible1 nothing exists ,greek3 duna_/mei absolutely or in respect to ,essence1 though it may exist ,greek3 duna_/mei in certain respects1 as in respect to quality or locality72 all of them exist ,greek3 e7nergei_/a 7b4 #ah74 ,nor does any thing exist ,greek3 duna_/mei1 which exists by necessity2 yet the things which exist by necessity are first of all 7i4e41 priora in regard to every thing else72 for1 if they did not exist1 nothing would have existed4 ,moreover1 if there be any ,eternal ,motion1 or any ,eternal ,motum1 it cannot be ,motum ,greek3 duna_/mei except in respect to whence and whither2 in that special respect1 it may have ,matter or ,potentiality 7b4 #ba74 ,accordingly1 the ,sun1 the ,stars1 and the whole ,heaven1 are always at work1 and there is no danger of their ever standing still1 which some physical philosophers fear 7,greek3 a7ei e7nergei o7 7_/lios--p4 #ajej1 b4 #bb72 nor are they fatigued in doing this4 ,motion with them is not a potentiality of both members of the ,antiphasis1 either to be moved or not to be moved4 ,if the fact were so--if their ,essence were ,matter and ,power1 and not ,act--the perpetual continuity of 7one side of the alternative7 motion would be toilsome to them2 but it is not toilsome1 since ,actuality is their very ,essence 7b4 #bh74 ,likewise mutable things 7which are destructible71 such as earth and fire1 imitate these indestructible entities1 being ever at work2 for these elements possess motion by themselves and in themselves1 each changing into another 7b4 #cj2 compare ,de ,gen4 et ,corr4 p4 #ccg1 a4 #b74 ,but the other ,greek3 duna_/meis are all potentialities of both sides of the ,antiphasis1 or of both alternatives4 ,the rational ,greek3 duna_/meis can cause motion in such and such way1 or not in such and such way2 the irrational ,greek3 duna_/meis may be present or absent1 and thus embrace both sides of the alternative 7b4 #cc74 ,hence we draw another argument for not admitting the ,platonic doctrine of ,ideas1 affirmed by the dialecticians 7,greek3 oi7 e7n tois lo_/gois--p4 #ajej1 b4 #ce74 ,if there existed such ,ideas1 they would be only ,greek3 duna_/neis9999duna_/meis in respect to the ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia existing in their particular embodiments4 ,thus an individual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than ,greek3 au7toepist_/m2 a particular substance in motion would be much more in motion than ,greek3 ki_/nsis or ,greek3 au7toki_/nsis itself4 ,for ,greek3 au7toepist_/m or ,greek3 au7toki_/nsis are only ,greek3 duna_/meis to the ,greek3 e7pistmo_/n ti or the ,greek3 kinou_/meno_/n ti1 which belong to ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia 7b4 #cf74 7,we may remark that in the ,platonic ,parmenides1 p4 #acd1 ,c41 an argument the very opposite to this is urged4 ,it is there contended that ,cognitio per se 7the ,idea7 must be far more complete and accurate than any cognition which we possess47 ,it is thus plain that ,greek3 e7ne_/rgeia is prius to ,greek3 du_/namis1 and to every principle of change 7p4 #ajea1 a4 #b74 ,it is also better and more honourable than ,greek3 du_/namis even in the direction of good4 ,we have already observed that ,greek3 du_/namis always includes both of two contraries1 in the way of alternative3 one of these must be the good1 the other the bad4 ,now the actuality of good is better than the potentiality of good2 the actuality of health is better than the potentiality of health1 which latter must also include the potentiality of sickness1 while the actuality of health excludes the actuality of sickness4 ,on the other hand1 the actuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil2 for the potentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once 7a4 #ag74 ,hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular things2 since it is posterior in its nature even to ,potentiality3 there is therefore neither evil1 nor error1 nor destruction1 in any of the principia or eternal ,essences 7a4 #ai74 7,the note of ,bonitz here is just3--,quem in hac argumentatione significavi errorem--judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus1 a quibus illud est alienum--ei non dissimilem ,arist4 in proxim argumentatione1 si recte ejus sententiam intelligo1 videtur admisisse1 quum quidem malum non esse ,greek3 para ta pra_/gmata1 seorsim ac per se existens1 demonstrare conatur4 ,aristotle here as elsewhere confounds the idea of ,good1 ,perfection1 ,completeness1 c41 with that of essential ,priority4 ,but what he says here--,greek3 ou7k e7_/sti to kakon para ta pra_/gmata--can hardly be reconciled with what he says in the ,physica 7pp4 #ahi1 #aia1 #aib7 about ,greek3 ste_/rsis1 which he includes among the three ,greek3 a7rchai_/1 and which he declares to be ,greek3 kakopoio_/s--p4 #aib1 a4 #ae47 ,lastly1 we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams1 and thus translating the ,potentialities into ,actuality4 ,if these diagrams were ready drawn for us by nature1 there would be no difficulty in seeing these truths2 but1 as the case stands1 the truths only inhere in the figures potentially 7p4 #ajea1 a4 #bc3 ,greek3 ei7 d' 7n dirne_/na1 phanera a7n 7n2 nun d' e7nupa_/rchei duna_/mei74 ,if the triangle had a line ready drawn parallel to its side1 we should have seen at once that its three angles were equal to two right angles4 ,potential truths are thus discovered by being translated into ,actuality4 ,the reason of this is1 that the ,actuality is itself an act of cogitation1 so that the ,potentiality springs from ,actuality 7,greek3 ai7_/tion d' o7_/ti no_/sis 7 e7ne_/rgeia2 7_/st' e7x e7nergei_/as 7 du_/namis--a4 #cj4 ,it is not therefore true--what the ,platonists say--that the mathematical bodies and their properties are ,greek3 ou7si_/ai kai e7nergeiai3 they are only ,greek3 duna_/meis1 and they are brought into being by our cogitation or abstraction74 ,it is true that each individual diagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it 7a4 #cb74 ,having gone through the discussion of ,ens according to the first of the ten ,categories1 and of ,ens ,potential and ,actual1 we have now to say something about ,ens as ,true or ,false in the strictest sense of the words 7,greek3 to de kuri_/tata o7n a7lthes 7 pseudos--p4 #ajea1 b4 #a74 ,these words mean1 in reference to things1 either that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined4 ,to speak truth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in fact1 are disjoined or conjoined2 to speak falsely1 the reverse4 ,the appeal is to the fact3 it is not because we truly call you white1 that you are white2 it is because you really are white1 that we who call you white speak truth 7b4 #i74 ,if there are some things which are always conjoined1 others always disjoined1 others again sometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined1 propositions in reference to the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction1 will be always true or always false1 while in reference to the third class propositions may be either true or false1 according to the case 7b4 #aj74 ,but what shall we say in regard to things ,uncompounded8 ,in respect to them1 what is truth or falsehood--to be or not to be8 7,greek3 ta a7su_/ntheta--p4 #ajea1 b4 #ah74 ,if we affirm white of the wood1 or incommensurability of the diagonal1 such conjunction of predicate and subject may be true or false2 but how1 if there be no predicate distinct from the subject8 ,where there is no distinction between predicate and subject1 where the subject stands alone1--in these cases1 there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above3 no other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject1 or fails to do so4 ,you either know the subject1 or you do not know it3 there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance2 to be deceived is impossible about the question ,quid est 7,greek3 to men thigein kai pha_/nai a7lthe_/s1 ou7 gar tau7to kata_/phasis kai pha_/sis1 to d' a7gnoein m thigga_/nein2 a7patthnai gar peri to ti_/ e7stin ou7k e7_/stin a7ll' 7 kata sumbebko_/s--b4 #be4 ,the last words are thus explained by ,bonitz3 nisi forte per abusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem--p4 #daa474 ,all these uncompounded subjects exist actually1 not potentially3 if the latter had been true1 they would have been generated and destroyed2 but ,ens ,ipsum 7,greek3 to o7n au7to_/--b4 #bi7 is neither generated nor destroyed2 for1 if it had been1 it must have been generated out of something4 ,respecting all those things which exist in ,essence and ,actuality1 you cannot be deceived3 you may apprehend them in cogitation1 or fail to apprehend them4 ,the essential question respecting them is1 whether they exist in such or such manner or not2 as it is respecting the ,one and the ,uncompounded--whether1 being an existent1 it exists thus and thus or not 7b4 #ce74 ,truth consists in apprehending or cogitating them 7p4 #ajeb1 a4 #a73 the contrary thereof is non-apprehension of them or ignorance 7,greek3 a7_/gnoia71 yet not analogous to blindness2 for that would be equivalent to having no apprehensive intelligence 7,greek3 7s a7n ei7 to notikon o7_/ls m e7_/choi tis--a4 #c2 one is not absolutely without ,greek3 notiko_/n1 but one's ,greek3 no_/sis does not suffice for apprehending these particular objects74 ,respecting objects immoveable and unchangeable1 and apprehended as such1 it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the ,when 7,greek3 kata to_/ pote_/--p4 #ajeb1 a4 #e2 i4e41 a proposition which is true of them at one time cannot be false at another time74 ,no man will suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles at one time1 but not at another4 ,even in these unchangeables1 indeed1 a man may mistake as to the ,what3 he may suppose that there is no even number which is a prime number1 or he may suppose that there are some even numbers which are prime1 others which are not so2 but1 respecting any particular number1 he will never suppose it to be sometimes prime1 sometimes not prime 7a4 #aj74 7,in respect to the meaning of ,greek3 ta a7su_/ntheta--p4 #ajea1 b4 #ag--;,bonitz and ,schwegler differ4 ,bonitz says1 ,comm4 p4 #dji3 ,composit quas dicit non sunt intelligend e qu ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt1 sed e potius1 in quibus cum substantia conjungitur accidens aliquod1 veluti homo albus1 homo sedens1 diagonalis irrationalis1 et similia4 ,schwegler says1 p4 #ahg3 ,unter den ,greek3 m sunthetai ou7si_/ai versteht ,arist4 nher diejenigen ,substanzen1 die nicht ein ,greek3 su_/ntheton oder ,greek3 su_/nolon sondern ,greek3 a7_/neu u7_/ls 7ou7 duna_/mei7 und schlechthin ,greek3 e7nergei_/a1 also reine ,formen sind1 und als solche kein ,werden und ,vergehen haben4 ,of these two different explanations1 ,i think that the explanation given by ,bonitz is the more correct1 or at least the more probable47 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,greek3 ,l4 ,we have to speculate respecting ,essence2 for that which we are in search of is the principles and causes of ,essences 7p4 #ajfi1 a4 #ah74 ,if we look upon the universe as one whole1 ,essence is the first part thereof3 if we look upon it as a series of distinct units 7,greek3 ei7 t e7phexs1 a4 #bj71 even in that view ,greek3 ou7si_/a stands first1 ,greek3 poio_/n next1 ,greek3 poso_/n third2 indeed these last are not ,entia at all1 strictly speaking 7a4 #ba7--;,i mean1 for example1 qualities and movements1 and negative attributes such as not-white and not-straight2 though we do talk of these last too as ,entia1 when we say ,est non-album4 ,moreover ,essence alone1 and none of the other ,categories1 is separable4 ,the old philosophers 7,greek3 oi7 a7rchaioi7 are in the main concurrent with us on this point1 that ,essence is prius to all others2 for they investigated the principles1 the elements1 and the causes of ,essence4 ,the philosophers of the present day 7,plato1 c47 declare ,universals1 rather than ,particulars1 to be ,essences2 for the genera are universal1 which these philosophers1 from devoting themselves to dialectical discussions1 affirm to be more properly considered as ,principles and ,essences 7a4 #bh72 but the old philosophers considered particular things to be ,essences1 as fire and earth1 for example1 not the common body or ,body in general 7,greek3 ou7 to koinon sma--a4 #cj74 ,now there are three ,essences4 ,the ,perceivable includes two varieties3 one1 the ,perishable1 acknowledged by all1 e4g41 animals and plants2 the other ,eternal1 of which we must determine the elements1 be they many or one4 ,there is also the ,immoveable1 which some consider to be separable 7,greek3 a7_/ll de a7ki_/ntos kai tau_/tn tines ei7nai phasi christ_/n--p4 #ajfi1 a4 #cc2 ,greek3 ou7si_/a not kai a7ki_/ntos--,schwegler's note73 either recognizing two varieties thereof1 distinct from each other--the ,forms and ,mathematical ,entia2 or not recognizing ,forms as separable ,entia1 but only the ,mathematical ,entia 7a4 #cf74 ,now the first1 or ,perceivable ,essences1 belong to physical science1 since they are moveable or endued with motion2 the ,immoveable ,essences1 whether there be two varieties of them or only one1 belong to a science distinct from physical4 ,the ,perceivable and the ,immoveable ,essences have no common principles 7b4 #b74 ,the ,perceivable ,essence is subject to change 7,greek3 metablt_/74 ,since change takes place either out of ,opposites or out of ,intermediates1 and not out of every variety of ,opposites1 but only out of ,contraries 7,greek3 e7k ts oi7kei_/as a7popha_/ses1 e7k ts oi7kei_/as ster_/ses--,alexander1 pp4 #fdd1 #fde1 ,bon42 the voice1 e4g41 is not white1 yet change does not take place from voice to white1 these being disparates1 or of different genera3 ,greek3 ta ge_/nei diaphe_/ronta ou7k e7_/chei o7don ei7s a7_/llla--,i4 iv4 p4 #ajee1 a4 #f71 there must of necessity be a certain ,substratum which changes into the contrary condition2 for contraries do not change into each other4 ,the substratum remains1 but the contraries do not remain3 there is therefore a third something besides the contraries2 and that is ,matter 7p4 #ajfi1 b4 #i74 ,since then the varieties of change are four3 7#a7 ,greek3 ge_/nesis and ,greek3 phthora_/ 7kata to ti_/71 7#b7 ,greek3 au7_/xsis kai phthi_/sis 7kata to poso_/n71 7#c7 ,greek3 a7lloi_/sis 7kata to pa_/thos or ,greek3 kata to poio_/n71 7#d7 ,greek3 phora_/ 7kata to_/pon or ,greek3 kata to pou71 each of these changes will take place into its respective contrary3 the ,matter will necessarily change1 having the potentiality of both contraries 7b4 #ad74 ,ens being two-fold1 all change takes place out of ,ens ,potenti into ,ens ,actu1 e4g41 out of potential white into actual white2 and the like holds for ,increase and ,decrease4 ,thus not only may there be generation from ,non-,ens accidentally but all generation takes place also out of ,ens2 that is1 out of ,ens ,potenti1 not ,ens ,actu 7b4 #bj74 ,this ,ens ,potenti is what ,anaxagoras really means by his ,unum1 which is a better phrase than ,greek3 o7mou pa_/nta2 what ,empedokles and ,anaxagoras mean by their ,greek3 migma2 what ,demokritus means when he says ,greek3 o7mou pa_/nta4 ,they mean that all things existed at once potentially1 though not actually2 and we see that these philosophers got partial hold of the idea of ,matter 7,greek3 7_/ste ts u7_/ls a7n ei7en 7mme_/noi--b4 #bd74 ,all things subject to change possess ,matter1 but each of them a different ,matter2 even the eternal things which are not generated but moved in place1 possess ,matter--not generated1 but from whence whither 7i4e41 the ,matter of local movement pure and simple--direction3 ,greek3 kai tn a7idi_/n o7_/sa m gennta kinta de phora1 a7ll' ou7 gennt_/n 7u7_/ln71 a7lla po_/then poi--b4 #bf74 ,since there are three varieties of ,non-,ens 7p4 #ajfi1 b4 #bg2 ,alexander and ,bonitz explain this ,greek3 trichs differently71 it may seem difficult to determine1 out of which among the three ,generation takes place4 ,but the answer is1 that the ,potential ,ens is not potential of every thing alike and at haphazard1 but potential in each case from something towards something 7,greek3 ei7 d ti_/ e7sti duna_/mei1 a7ll' o7_/ms ou7 tou tucho_/ntos1 a7ll' e7_/teron e7x e7te_/rou--b4 #bi74 ,nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together 7,greek3 o7mou pa_/nta chr_/mata--b4 #cj72 for they differ in respect to ,matter or ,potentiality4 ,if this were not so1 how is it that they are of infinite diversity1 and not all ,one8 ,the ,nos 7i4e41 according to the theory of ,anaxagoras7 is ,one2 so that1 if the ,matter were ,one also1 it would become in actuality that which it was at first in potentiality1 and the result would be all ,one and the ,same 7b4 #cb74 ,the ,causes are thus three and the ,principles are three3 the pair of ,contraries1 one of them ,form 7,greek3 lo_/gos kai ei7dos71 the other ,privation1 and the third ,matter 7p4 #ajfi1 b4 #ce74 ,but we must keep in mind that neither ,materia ,prima nor ,forma ,prima is generated4 ,for in all ,change1 there is something 7the ,matter7 which undergoes change2 something by which the change is effected 7the ,prime ,movent1 ,greek3 u7ph' ou7 me_/n1 tou pr_/tou kinountos--p4 #ajgj1 a4 #a72 and something into which the change takes place 7the ,form74 ,the brass becomes round2 but1 if both the brass becomes and the round becomes1 you will be condemned to an infinite regression3 you must stop somewhere 7,greek3 a7na_/gk d stnai--a4 #d74 ,moreover1 every ,essentia is generated out of another ,essentia of the same name and form 7,greek3 e7k sunnu_/mou--a4 #e74 ,all generated things proceed either from ,nature1 ,art1 ,fortune1 or ,spontaneity4 ,it is ,nature1 where the principle or beginning is in the subject itself2 it is ,art1 where the principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject2 ,fortune is the privation of ,art2 ,spontaneity is the privation of ,nature 7,greek3 ai7 de loipai ai7_/tiai ster_/seis tou_/tn--a4 #i74 ,essenti are threefold3 7#a7 ,matter1 which appears to be ,hoc ,aliquid but is not so1 for detached members or fragments1 simply touching each other without coalescing1 are matter and substratum 7i4e41 prepared for something ulterior72 7#b7 ,nature1 which is really ,hoc ,aliquid--a certain definite condition1 into which generation takes place 7,greek3 7 de phu_/sis kai to_/de ti1 ei7s 7_/n1 kai e7_/xis tis--a4 #ab72 7#c7 ,the ,concrete of the two preceding--the individual object called ,sokrates or ,kallias4 ,in some cases there is no ,hoc ,aliquid except in this ,concrete or ,compound2 thus in artificial objects or productions1 such as a house or health1 there is no ,form except the ,art itself3 the ideal house1 pre-existing in the mind of the builder1 is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the real house4 ,it is in the case of natural objects1 if in any case1 that there exists a ,hoc ,aliquid independent of the concrete individual 7a4 #ag74 ,hence ,plato was not wrong in saying that ,forms were coextensive with natural objects 7,greek3 o7po_/sa phu_/sei--p4 #ajgj1 a4 #ah71 if there are ,forms distinct from these objects3 such as fire1 flesh1 head1 which are all properly ,matter4 ,the ,last ,matter 7or that which has come most under the influence of ,form7 belongs to that which is in the fullest sense ,essentia 7or the individual concrete named ,sokrates or ,kallias--a4 #bj74 ,the ,moving ,causes pre-exist1 as real individual beings or objects3 the ,formal ,causes come into existence simultaneously with the individual real compound4 ,when the patient becomes well1 then health comes at the same time into existence3 when the brazen sphere comes1 the sphericity of it comes at the same time 7a4 #bd74 ,whether any thing of the ,form continues after the dissolution of the individual compound1 is a problem to be investigated 7a4 #be74 ,in some cases nothing hinders but what it may continue2 for example1 the soul may be of such a nature3 ,i do not mean every soul--for every soul perhaps cannot continue--but the ,greek3 ,nous or rational soul 7a4 #bg74 ,still it is plain that this affords no support to the theory of self-existent separate ,ideas2 for every individual man is begotten by another individual man4 ,in like manner also with respect to the arts2 for the medical art affords the ,form or rational explanation of health 7a4 #cj2 i4e41 health is generated1 not by the ,idea of ,health1 but by the medical art1 or by the artist in whom that art is embodied74 ,causes and principles1 in one point of view1 are different3 different subjects2 but in another point of view1 they are the same for all2 that is1 if we speak generally and according to analogy 7if we confine ourselves to the most general terms1 ,form1 ,privation1 ,matter1 c474 ,in respect to ,essentia1 ,relatio1 and the remainder of the ,categories1 a difficulty arises to say whether the causes1 elements1 and principles of all the ,categories are the same4 ,it would be strange if they were all the same2 because then ,essenti1 as well as ,relata1 would proceed out of the same causes and elements4 ,for1 what can these latter be8 ,they cannot be extra-categorical2 since there exists no general class apart from or besides ,essentia and the other ,categories 7p4 #ajgj1 b4 #a74 ,nor can any one ,category be the element of the others3 for the element is prius to that of which it is the element4 ,nor again can ,essentia be the element of ,relata2 nor is any one of the nine ,categories the element of ,essentia4 ,again1 how is it possible that the elements of all the ,categories can be the same8 ,no element can be the same as that compound of which it is an element3 neither ,b nor ,a can be the same as ,b ,a4 ,if1 therefore1 there were such elements1 they must be extra-categorical2 which is impossible4 ,nor can the element in question 7the supposed one and the same7 be any cogitable1 such as ,ens or ,unum2 for every individual ,concrete is both ,ens and ,unum and the element cannot be identical with the compound put together out of it4 ,neither ,essentia nor ,relatio could be said to exist1 if ,ens were the element out of which they are composed2 but these ,categories exist necessarily3 therefore there is no one and the same element common to all the ,categories 7b4 #i74 ,yet we ought perhaps rather to repeat1 what was observed before1 that in one sense1 the elements of all are the same2 in another sense1 different4 ,take for example the perceivable bodies4 ,we find here hot as the ,form1 cold as the ,privation2 as ,matter1 there is that which is1 primarily and per se1 both hot and cold potentially3 the hot and the cold are both ,essenti2 likewise other things of which these are the principles1 e4g41 flesh and bone1 which of necessity are different from the principles out of which they proceed 7b4 #ae74 ,flesh and bone have these elements and principles2 other things have other elements and principles4 ,the same specific principles cannot be assigned to all1 but only principles analogous to these in each case1 as saying1 in general terms1 that there are three principles--,form1 ,privation1 ,matter4 ,each of these is different in every different genus2 thus in colour1 the principles are white1 black1 surface1 light1 darkness1 air1 and out of these are generated day and night 7b4 #ba74 ,the three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent 7,greek3 e7nupa_/rchonta74 ,but there are other causes also extrinsic1 such as the ,movent4 ,so that ,principle and ,element are not exactly identical2 for ,principle as well as ,cause includes all the four3 ,greek3 to kinoun 7 i7sta_/n is a ,principle1 and is itself an ,essentia 7p4 #ajgj1 b4 #be74 ,thus the analogous ,elements are three1 while the ,principles or ,causes are four2 but the four are specifically different in each different case4 ,thus1 health is ,form2 sickness is ,privation2 body is ,matter2 the medical art is ,movent4 ,house is ,form2 disorder of a certain sort is ,privation2 bricks are ,matter2 the building art is ,movent4 ,we thus make out four ,causes2 yet1 in a certain sense1 there will be only three 7b4 #cb74 ,for1 in natural products1 a man is the ,movent ,cause of a man2 in artificial products 7,greek3 e7n tois a7po dianoi_/as7 the ,movent is ,form or ,privation4 ,in a certain sense1 the medical art is health1 and the building art is the ,form of a house1 and a man begets a man4 ,and farther1 over and above these special movent causes1 there is the ,primum ,movens of all 7b4 #ce74 ,we distinguish what is separable from what is not separable4 ,now ,essenti1 and they only1 are separable2 accordingly they are the causes of every thing else1 since without ,essenti there cannot be either affections or movements 7p4 #ajga1 a4 #b74 ,such causes would be soul and body1 or reason1 appetite1 and body4 ,again1 in another sense1 the principles of all things are generically the same1 though specifically different2 such are ,potentia and ,actus4 ,in some cases1 the same thing exists now potentially1 at another time actually2 thus wine1 though actually wine1 is potentially vinegar2 flesh is actually flesh1 potentially a man1 ,potentia and ,actus will merge in the above-mentioned causes--,form1 ,privation1 ,matter1 ,movent 7a4 #g74 ,for the ,form 7if it be separable71 the ,concrete 7of ,form and ,matter71 and ,privation 7like darkness or sickness7--all these exist actually2 while ,matter exists potentially1 capable either of ,form or ,privation4 ,things differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference in the ,matter1 sometime through difference in the ,form4 ,thus1 the cause of a man is1 in the way of ,matter1 the elements fire and earth2 in the way of ,form his own ,form1 and the same ,form in another individual--his father and besides these1 the ,sun with its oblique motion2 which last neither ,matter1 nor ,form1 nor ,privation1 nor the like ,form in another individual1 but a ,movent ,cause 7,greek3 a7lla kinounta--a4 #ag74 ,we must remember1 besides1 that some things may be described in general terms1 others cannot be so described4 ,the first principles of all things are1 speaking in general terms1 ,hoc ,primum ,actu and ,aliud ,primum ,potenti4 ,these universals do not really exist 7p4 #ajga1 a4 #ai71 for the principium of all individuals is some other individual4 ,man indeed is the principium of the ,universal ,man but no ,universal ,man exists 7a4 #ba74 ,peleus is the principium of ,achilles2 your father1 of you2 this ,b1 of that ,b ,a2 ,b1 the universal1 of ,b ,a the universal4 ,next 7after the ,movent7 come the ,forms of ,essences2 but the different genera thereof 7as has been already stated71 colours1 sounds1 essences1 quantities1 c41 have different causes and elements1 though the same when described in general terms and by analogy2 also different individuals in the same species have different causes and elements1 not indeed different in species1 but different individually2 that is1 your ,matter1 your ,movent1 your ,form1 are different from mine1 though in general terms and definition they are the same 7,greek3 t katho_/lou de lo_/g tau7ta_/--a4 #bi74 ,when therefore1 we enquire1 ,what are the principles or elements of ,essences1 of ,relata1 of ,qualities c41 and whether they are the same or different8 it is plain that1 generically speaking 7allowing for difference of meaning--,greek3 pollachs1 p4 #ajga1 a4 #ca71 they are the same in each2 but1 speaking distributively and with reference to particulars1 they are different1 and not the same4 ,in the following sense 7,greek3 7di_/--a4 #cd71 they are the same1 namely1 in the way of ,analogy 7,greek3 t a7na_/logon74 ,they are always ,matter1 ,form1 ,privation1 the ,movent2 hence the causes of ,essences are causes of all other things1 since1 when ,essences disappear1 all the rest disappears along with them3 besides all these1 there is the ,primum ,movens ,actuale1 common to all 7,greek3 e7_/ti to prton e7ntelechei_/a--a4 #cf74 ,in the following sense1 again1 they are different--when we cease to speak of genera1 and pass from equivocal terms to particulars3 wherever there are different opposites 7as white and black1 health and sickness7 and wherever there are different ,matters 7,greek3 kai e7_/ti ai7 u7lai--p4 #ajga1 b4 #a2 ,greek3 u7lai in the plural1 rare74 ,we have thus declared1 respecting the principles of ,perceivable ,essences1 what and how many they are2 in what respect the same1 and in what respect they are different4 ,essences are threefold2 two ,physical and one ,immoveable4 ,we shall proceed to speak of this last4 ,there exists1 of necessity1 some ,eternal1 ,immoveable ,essence4 ,for ,essences are the first of all existent things2 and1 if they all be perishable1 every thing is perishable4 ,but it is impossible that ,motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed2 for it always existed3 it is eternal4 ,there is the like impossibility about ,time3 for1 if ,time did not exist1 there could be nothing prius and nothing posterius 7p4 #ajga1 b4 #h74 ,both ,motion and ,time are thus eternal2 both are also continuous2 for either the two are identical1 or ,time is an affection 7,greek3 pa_/thos7 of ,motion4 ,now no mode of ,motion is continuous except local motion2 and that in a circle 7for rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal74 ,there must be a ,movent or ,producent ,principle 7,greek3 kintikon 7 poitiko_/n--b4 #ab72 but1 if the ,movent existed potentially and not actually1 there could not be motion continuous and eternal2 for that which has mere power may never come into act4 ,there will be no use therefore in such eternal ,essences as ,plato assumes in his ,ideas1 unless there be along with them some principle of potential change 7,greek3 ei7 m_/ tis duname_/n e7ne_/stai a7rch metaba_/llein--b4 #ae74 ,nor indeed will even that be sufficient 7i4e41 any principle of merely potential change71 nor any other ,essence 7such as ,numbers--,schwegler7 besides or along with the ,platonic ,ideas2 for1 if this principium shall not come into ,actuality 7,greek3 ei7 m e7nerg_/sei--b4 #ag71 the motion which we postulate1 continuous and eternal1 will not result from it4 ,nor will it even be sufficient that the ,movent ,principle should be supposed to be in actuality or operation 7,greek3 ou7d' ei7 e7nerg_/sei1 p4 #ajga1 b4 #ah71 if its ,essence be ,potentiality3 the motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal2 for that which exists potentially may perhaps not exist at all4 ,the ,movent ,principles therefore must be something of which the ,essence is ,actuality 7b4 #ai71 and which shall be without ,matter1 for they must be eternal1 otherwise nothing else can be eternal4 ,they must therefore be essential ,actualities 7b4 #bb74 ,here however1 a difficulty suggests itself4 ,it seems that every thing which is in actuality must also be in potentiality1 but that every thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into actuality3 so that ,potentiality seems the prius of the two 7,greek3 dokei gar to men e7nergoun pan du_/nasthai1 to de duna_/menon ou7 pan e7nergein--p4 #ajga1 b4 #bd2 ,bonitz compares p4 #ajfj1 a4 #a3 ,greek3 a7rch gar to sunanairoun74 ,but1 if this were true1 no ,entia could exist2 for it may be that they exist potentially1 but not yet exist actually 7b4 #bf74 ,there is the like impossibility1 if we adopt the theory of those theologians 7,orpheus1 ,hesiod1 c47 who take their departure from ,night1 or of those physical philosophers who begin with a chaotic huddle of all things4 ,in both cases such original condition is one of mere potentiality2 and how can it ever be put in motion1 if there is to be no cause in actuality 7,greek3 ei7 mthen e7_/stai e7nergei_/a ai7_/tion--b4 #bi78 ,matter will never cause motion in itself1 but must wait for the carpenter's art2 nor will the earth1 but must wait for seed4 ,it is for this reason that some philosophers1 like ,plato and ,leukippus1 represent ,actuality as eternal2 for they say that motion has always existed4 ,but they do not say what variety of motion1 nor why that variety1 to the exclusion of others4 ,for nothing is moved at haphazard2 there must always be some reason why it is moved in one way rather than another3 for example1 by nature in one way2 by other causes1 such as violence or ,nos1 in some other way 7p4 #ajga1 b4 #cf74 ,but it is not competent to ,plato to assume what he sometimes does assume as principium 7p4 #ajgb1 a4 #b--;allusion to ,plato ,phdrus #bde1 ,e71 viz41 a ,self-,movent2 for ,plato affirms 7in ,timus #cd1 ,b7 that the soul is posterius1 and coval with the ,kosmos4 ,the doctrine just mentioned--,that the ,potential is prior to the ,actual--is true in one sense1 but not true in another2 we have already explained how 7,greek3 ei7_/rtai de ps--a4 #d4 ,schwegler thinks1 note p4 #bed1 that this ,greek3 ei7_/rtai refers to what has been said in ,book ,greek3 ,th1 p4 #ajdi1 b4 #c1 seq42 and this seems probable1 though ,bonitz in his note contests it1 and refers to his own theory1 set forth in his ,prooemium pp4 #bd1 #be1 that ,book ,greek3 ,l is a separate treatise of ,aristotle1 completely distinct from all the rest of the ,metaphysica4 ,this theory of ,bonitz may be in the main true2 but it is still possible that ,book ,greek3 ,th may have been written previously1 and that ,aristotle may here refer to it1 as ,schwegler suppose9999474 ,that ,actuality is prior to ,potentiality1 is conformable to the doctrine of ,anaxagoras1 ,nos in his doctrine existing in ,actuality2 also to that of ,empedokles1 who introduces ,friendship and ,enmity2 and again1 to that of ,leukippus1 who affirms ,motion to be eternal4 ,so that ,chaos or ,night 7i4e41 mere ,potentiality7 did not prevail for an infinite anterior time1 but the same things came round in perpetual vicissitude or rotation2 which consists with the doctrine that ,actuality is prior to ,potentiality4 ,if the same condition comes round periodically1 we must necessarily assume something ,actual1 which perpetually actualizes in the same manner 7,greek3 dei ti a7ei me_/nein 7sau_/ts e7nergoun--p4 #ajgb1 a4 #aj74 ,again1 if generation and destruction are to take place1 we must assume something else ,actual1 which actualizes in a manner perpetually changing 7,greek3 a7_/llo dei ei7nai a7ei e7nergoun a7_/lls kai a7_/lls--a4 #ab74 ,this last must actualize sometimes per se1 sometimes in a different way2 that is1 according to some other influence1 or according to the ,first 7or ,uniform7 ,actual4 ,but it will necessarily actualize according to the ,first ,actual2 which will thus be a cause both to itself1 and to the variable ,actual4 ,now the ,first ,actual is the best2 for it is the cause of perpetual sameness1 while the other is cause of variety2 both together are the cause of unceasing variety4 ,but this is how the motions really stand4 ,why then1 should we look out for other principles 7a4 #ah78 ,now1 since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may be true 7,greek3 e7pei d' ou7_/t t' e7nde_/chetai--p4 #ajgb1 a4 #ah7--;and1 if they be not true1 we shall be compelled to admit that every thing proceeds either from ,night1 or from confused ,chaos or ,non-,ens--we may consider the problem as solved4 ,there exists something always in unceasing circular motion3 this is evident not merely from reason1 but from fact4 ,the ,first ,heaven 7,aplans or ,fixed ,star sphere7 will therefore be eternal4 ,there must therefore exist something which causes this unceasing motion1 or some ,prime ,movent4 ,but1 since ,movens ,immobile1 ,movens ,motum1 ,motum non ,movens1 form a series of three terms1 and since the two last of these certainly exist1 we may infer that the first exists also2 and that the ,prime ,movent1 which causes the motion of the ,aplans1 is immoveable 7a4 9999#bj-be4--,this passage perplexes all the commentators--,schwegler1 ,bonitz1 ,alexander1 c4 ,it can hardly be construed without more or less change of the text4 ,i do not see to what real things ,aristotle can allude under the description of ,mota which are not ,moventia4 ,there is much to be said for ,pierron and ,zvort's translation1 p4 #bbj3 ,comme il n'y a que trois sortes d'tres--ce qui est mu1 ce qui meut1 et le moyen terme entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut3 c'est un tre 7i4e41 this middle term is an tre7 qui meut sans tre mu4--,bonitz disapproves this interpretation of the word ,greek3 me_/son1 and it is certainly singular to say that between ,movens and ,motum1 the term ,movens sed non ,motum forms a medium3 ,motum sed non ,movens would form just as good a medium9999474 ,this ,prime ,movent1 which causes motion without being itself moved1 must be eternal1 must be ,essentia1 and must be an ,actuality4 ,now both the ,appetibile 7,greek3 to o7rekto_/n7 and the ,cogitabile 7,greek3 to noto_/n7 cause motion in this way1 i4e41 without being moved themselves2 moreover the ,primum ,appetibile and the ,primum ,cogitabile are coincident or identical 7p4 #ajgb1 a4 #bg74 ,for that which appears beautiful1 is the object of desire2 but that which is beautiful1 is the first object of will 7a4 #bh74 ,cogitation is the principium of the two 7the primary fact or fundamental element73 we will so and so1 because we think it good2 it is not true that we think it good because we will it 7,greek3 o7rego_/metha de dio_/ti dokei1 mallon 7 dokei dio_/ti o7rego_/metha--a4 #bi74 ,now the ,cogitant ,mind 7,greek3 nous7 is moved by the ,cogitabile1 and1 in the series of fundamental ,contraries1 the members of one side of the series are ,cogitabilia per se 7while those of the other side are only ,cogitabilia per aliud--,greek3 not d' 7 e7te_/ra sustoichi_/a kath' au7t_/n--a4 #ca2 see ,alex41 p4 #ffh1 #af1 ,bon474 ,these ,cogitabilia per se are first as to ,essentia 7i4e41 compared with the ,cogitabilia per aliud1 they are logically priora73 and again1 among ,essenti1 that variety which is simple and actual comes first 7i4e41 it is logically prius1 as compared with the compound and the potential74 ,now ,unum is not identical with ,simplex3 ,unum signifies that which is a measure of something else1 while ,simplex denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself 7a4 #cd74 ,but the ,pulchrum and the ,eligibile per se belongs to the same side of the series of ,contraries1 as the ,cogitabilia per se3 and the ,primum ,pulchrum or ,eligibile is the ,best or akin thereunto1 in its own particular ascending scale 7b4 #a74 ,that ,greek3 to ou7 e7_/neka is among the ,immoveables1 may be seen by our ,treatise ,de ,bono1 where we give a string of generic and specific distributions 7,greek3 7 diai_/resis dloi--p4 #ajgb1 b4 #b2 see the interpretation of ,alexander1 adopted both by ,schwegler and by ,bonitz74 ,for ,greek3 to ou7 e7_/neka is used in a double sense3 in one of the two senses it ranks among the ,immoveables3 in another it does not 7,greek3 e7_/sti gar ditton to ou7 e7_/neka1 b4 #c--;,greek3 ditto_/n is ,schwegler's correction1 adopted by ,bonitz74 ,it causes motion1 in the manner of a beloved object2 and that which it causes to move1 causes motion in the other things 7,greek3 kinei de 7s e7r_/menon2 to de kinou_/menon ta7_/lla kinei--b4 #c2 ,greek3 to de kinou_/menon is the conjecture of ,schwegler and ,bonitz74 ,now1 if any thing be moved1 there is a possibility that it may be in a condition different from that in which it actually is4 ,if the first actuality of the ,moveable be translation or motion in space1 there is a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place1 even though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to ,essentia 7p4 #ajgb1 b4 #g74 ,but1 as to the ,prime ,movent1 which is itself immoveable1 and which exists in actuality1 it is impossible that that can be other than what it is1 in any respect whatever 7p4 #ajgb1 b4 #h74 ,for the first of all changes is local motion1 or rotation in a circle1 and this is exactly what the ,prime ,movent imparts 7but does not itself possess74 ,it exists by necessity1 and by that species of necessity which implies the perfect and beautiful3 and in this character it is the originating principle4 ,for there are three varieties of necessity3 7#a7 ,that of violence1 in contradiction to the natural impulse2 7#b7 ,that without which good or perfection cannot be had2 7#c7 ,that which is what it is absolutely1 without possibility of being otherwise4 ,from a principle of this nature 7i4e41 necessary in the two last senses7 depend the ,heaven and all ,nature 7b4 #ad74 ,the mode of existence 7,greek3 diagg_/7 of this ,prime ,movent is for ever that which we enjoy in our best moments1 but which we cannot obtain permanently2 for its actuality itself is also pleasure 7p4 #ajgb1 b4 #af74 ,as actuality is pleasure1 so the various actualities of waking1 perceiving1 cogitating1 are to us the pleasantest part of our life2 while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from them 7but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without intermittence74 ,cogitation per se 7i4e41 cogitation in its most perfect condition7 embraces that which is best per se2 and most of all when it is most perfect4 ,the ,nos thus cogitates itself through participation of the ,cogitabile3 for it becomes itself cogitable by touching the ,cogitabile and cogitating3 so that ,cogitans and ,cogitabile become identical4 ,for ,nos in general 7the human ,nos also7 is in potentiality the recipient of the ,cogitabile1 and of ,essentia or ,forms2 and it comes into actuality by possessing these ,forms4 ,so that what the ,prime ,movent possesses is more divine than the divine element which ,nos in general involves2 and the actuality of theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions 7,greek3 notos gar gi_/gnetai thigga_/nn kai non1 7_/ste tau7ton nous kai noto_/n4 to gar dektikon tou notou kai ts ou7si_/as nous4 e7nergei de e7_/chn2 7_/st' e7keino mallon tou_/tou o7 dokei o7 nous theion e7_/chein1 kai 7 theri_/a to 7_/diston kai a7_/riston--b4 #bd4 ,this is a very difficult passage1 in which one cannot be sure of interpreting rightly4 ,none of the commentators are perfectly satisfactory4 ,the pronoun ,greek3 e7keino seems to refer to ,greek3 7 no_/sis 7 kath' au7t_/n--three lines back4 ,the contrast seems to be between the ,prime ,movent1 and ,nos in general1 including the human ,nos4 ,greek3 ,to dektiko_/n cannot refer to the ,prime ,movent1 which has no potentiality1 but must refer to the human ,nos1 which is not at first1 nor always1 in a state of actuality4 ,greek3 ,mallon seems equivalent to ,greek3 theio_/teron4 ,the human ,nos has ,greek3 theio_/n ti1 by reason of its potentiality to theorize474 ,thus it is wonderful1 if ,god has perpetually an existence like that of our best moments2 and still more wonderful1 if he has a better4 ,yet such is the fact4 ,life belongs to him3 for the actuality of ,nos is life1 and ,god is actuality4 ,his life1 eternal and best1 is actuality per se 7or par excellence74 ,we declare ,god to be an ,animal ,optimum ternum1 so that duration eternal and continuous 7,greek3 ai7n sunech_/s7 belongs to him3 for that is ,god 7,greek3 touto gar o7 theo_/s--p4 #ajgb1 b4 #cj74 ,the ,pythagoreans and ,speusippus are mistaken in affirming that ,optimum and ,pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating principle 7,greek3 e7n a7rch72 on the ground that the principles of plants and animals are indeed causes1 but that the beautiful and perfect appears first in the results of those principles4 ,for the seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals3 the first is not seed1 but the perfect animal4 ,thus we must say that the man is prior to the seed3 ,i do not mean the man who sprang from the seed1 but the other man from whom the seed proceeded 7p4 #ajgc1 a4 #b74 ,from the preceding reasonings1 it is evident that there exists an ,essence eternal1 immoveable1 and separated from all the perceivable ,essences4 ,we have shown 7in ,physica2 see ,schwegler's note7 that this ,essence can have no magnitude2 that it is without parts and indivisible 7p1 #ajgc1 a4 #f74 ,for it causes in other subjects motion for an infinite time2 and nothing finite can have infinite power4 ,for this reason the ,prime ,movent cannot have finite magnitude2 but every magnitude is either finite or infinite1 and there is no such thing as infinite magnitude2 therefore the ,prime ,movent can have no magnitude at all4 ,we have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality1 and without any affections 7,greek3 a7pathes kai a7nalloi_/ton74 ,for all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with locomotive change or motion in space1 which is the first of all4 ,as the ,prime ,movent is exempt from this first1 much more is it exempt from the others 7a4 #ac74 ,we must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such ,movent or ,essence only1 or several of the same ,essences8 and1 if several1 how many8 ,respecting the number thereof we must remember that our predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines 7,greek3 a7popha_/seis1 p4 #ajgc1 a4 #af74 ,the ,platonic theory of ,ideas includes no peculiar research on this subject 7a4 #ah74 ,the ,platonists call these ,ideas ,numbers3 about which they talk sometimes as if there were an infinite multitude of them1 sometimes as if they were fixed as reaching to the dekad and not higher--but they furnish no demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad4 ,we shall proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding definitions and with the nature of the subjects 7a4 #bc74 ,the ,principium1 the ,first of all ,entia1 is immoveable both per se and per accidens3 it causes motion in another subject1 to which it imparts the first or locomotive change1 one and eternal 7a4 #be74 ,the ,motum must necessarily be moved by something2 the ,prime ,movent must be immoveable per se2 eternal motion must be caused by an eternal ,movent2 and one motion by one ,movent 7a4 #cj74 ,but we see that1 over and above the simple rotation of the ,all 7or ,first ,heaven71 which rotation we affirm to be caused by the ,primum ,movens ,immobile1 there are also other eternal rotations of the ,planets2 for the circular ,celestial ,body1 as we have shown in the ,physica1 is eternal and never at rest 7a4 #cb74 ,we must therefore necessarily assume that each of these rotations of the ,planets is caused by a ,movent ,immoveable per se--by an eternal ,essence 7a4 #ce74 ,for the ,stars and ,planets are in their nature eternal ,essences3 that which moves them must be itself eternal1 and prior to that which it causes to be moved2 likewise that which1 is prior to ,essence must itself be ,essence1 and cannot be any thing else 7a4 #cg74 ,it is plain1 therefore1 that there must necessarily exist a number of ,essences1 each eternal by nature1 immoveable per se1 and without magnitude1 as ,movents to the ,heavenly ,bodies and equal in number thereto 7a4 #ch74 ,these ,essences are arranged in an order of first1 second1 c41 corresponding to the order of the planetary rotations 7b4 #b71 ,but what the number of these rotations is1 we must learn from ,astronomy--that one among the mathematical sciences which is most akin 7,greek3 oi7keiota_/ts7 to the ,first ,philosophy2 for ,astronomy theorizes about ,essence perceivable but eternal1 while ,arithmetic and ,geometry do not treat of any ,essence at all 7,greek3 peri ou7demias ou7si_/as--b4 #g74 ,that the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies1 is known to all who have any tincture of ,astronomy2 for each of the ,planets is carried round in more than one rotation 7b4 #aj74 ,but what the exact number of these rotations is1 we shall proceed to state upon the authority of some mathematicians1 for the sake of instruction1 that the reader may have some definite number present to his mind3 for the rest1 he must both investigate for himself and put questions to other investigators2 and1 if he learns from the scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down1 he must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most accurately 7,greek3 philein men a7mphote_/rous1 pei_/thesthai de tois a7kribeste_/rois--b4 #af74 ,aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling 7,greek3 a7nelittou_/sas7 spheres implicated with them 7p4 #ajgc1 b4 #ag--p4 #ajgd1 a4 #ad74 ,he afterwards proceeds3 ,let the number of spheres thus be forty-seven2 so that it will be reasonable to assume the ,immoveable ,movent ,essences and ,principles to be forty-seven also1 as well as the perceivable spheres 7,greek3 ai7sthta_/s--p4 #ajgd1 a4 #af73 we say reasonable 7,greek3 eu7_/logon71 for we shall leave to stronger heads to declare it necessary4 ,but1 since there cannot be any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the ,planets1 and since we must assume that each ,nature and each ,essence is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed per se of the ,best as an end1 so there will be no other ,nature besides the forty-seven above enumerated1 and this number will be the necessary total of the ,essences 7a4 #ba74 ,for1 if there were any others1 they would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire to 7,greek3 kinoien a7n 7s te_/los ou7sai phoras--a4 #bc72 but it is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that have been enumerated4 ,we may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in rotation 7,greek3 e7k tn pherome_/nn--p4 #ajgd1 a4 #bd74 ,for1 if every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried1 and if every current or rotation is a current of something carried1 there can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of some other current4 ,every current must exist for the sake of the ,planets1 and with a view to their rotation4 ,for1 if one current existed for the sake of another1 this last must exist for the sake of a third1 and so on2 but you cannot go on in this way ad infinitum2 and therefore the end of every current must be1 one or other of the ,divine ,bodies which are carried round in the heavens 7a4 #ca74 ,that there is only one ,heaven1 we may plainly see4 ,for1 if there were many heavens1 as there are many men1 the principium of each would be one in specie1 though the principia would be many in numero 7p4 #ajgd1 a4 #cc74 ,but all things that are many in number1 have ,matter1 and are many1 by reason of their ,matter2 for to all these many1 there is one and the same ,form 7,greek3 lo_/gos7--definition or rational explanation3 e4g41 one for all men1 among whom ,sokrates is one 7a4 #ce74 ,but the ,first ,essence has no ,matter2 for it is an ,actual 7,greek3 to de ti_/ 7n ei7nai ou7k e7_/chei u7_/ln to prton2 e7ntele_/cheia 9999ga_/r--a4 #cf74 ,the ,primum ,movens ,immobile is therefore ,one1 both in definition and in number2 accordingly1 the ,motum--that which is moved both eternally and continuously--is ,one also4 ,there exists therefore only one ,heaven 7p4 #ajgd1 a4 #ch74 ,now it has been handed down in a mythical way1 from the old and most ancient teachers 7p4 #ajgd1 b4 #a7 to their successors1 that these 7,eternal ,essences7 are gods1 and that the divine element comprehends all nature 7,greek3 o7_/ti theoi_/ te_/ ei7sin ou7toi kai perie_/chei to theion tn o7_/ln phu_/sin--b4 #c74 ,the other accompaniments of the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest 7b4 #d72 wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to some other animals1 combined with other similar accompaniments4 ,if a man1 abstracting from these stories1 accepts only the first and fundamental truth--,that they conceived the ,first ,essences as gods1 he will consider it as a divine doctrine 7,greek3 thei_/s a7n ei7rsthai nomi_/seien--b4 #i71 preserved and handed down as fragments of truth from the most ancient times4 ,for probably all art and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered1 lost1 and rediscovered4 ,to this point alone1 and thus far1 the opinion of our fathers and of the first men is evident to us 7b4 #ad74 ,there are however various difficulties connected with the ,nos2 for it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects1 and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such 7p4 #ajgd1 b4 #ag74 ,for1 if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of slumber and inaction1 what ground can there be for respecting it 7,greek3 ti_/ a7n ei7_/ to semno_/n--b4 #ah78 ,and1 if it cogitates something actually1 yet if this process depends upon something foreign and independent 7i4e41 upon the ,cogitatum71 the ,nos cannot be the best ,essence2 since it is then essentially not ,cogitation in act1 but only the potentiality of ,cogitation2 while its title to respect arises from actual ,cogitation4 ,again1 whether we assume its ,essence to be ,cogitation actual or ,cogitation potential1 what does it cogitate8 ,it must cogitate either itself1 or something different from itself2 and1 if the latter1 either always the same ,cogitatum1 or sometimes one1 sometimes another4 ,but is there no difference whether its ,cogitatum is honourable or vulgar8 ,are there not some things which it is absurd to cogitate8 ,evidently the ,nos must cogitate what is most divine and most honourable1 without any change2 for1 if it did change1 it must change for the worse1 and that very change would at once 7,greek3 7_/d7 be a certain motion2 whereas the ,nos is essentially immoveable 7b4 #bg74 ,first of all1 if the ,essence of the ,nos be1 not ,cogitation actual but ,cogitation potential1 we may reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of ,cogitation would be fatiguing to it 7b4 #bi72 next1 we see plainly that there must exist something else more honourable than the ,nos2 namely1 the ,cogitatum2 for to cogitate1 and the act of cogitation1 will belong even to one who cogitates the vilest object4 ,if cogitation of vile objects be detestable 7,greek3 pheukto_/n1 b4 #cb7--;for not to see some things is better than to see them--,cogitation cannot be the best of all things 7i4e41 ,cogitation absolutely1 whatever be the ,cogitatum74 ,since the ,nos is itself the best of all things1 it must employ its cogitation upon itself and nothing else4 ,its cogitation will thus be ,cogitation of ,cogitation 7,greek3 au7ton a7_/ra noei1 ei7_/per e7sti to kra_/tiston1 kai e7_/stin 7 no_/sis no_/ses no_/sis--p4 #ajgd1 b4 #ce74 ,yet1 if we look to the human mind1 ,cognition1 ,perception1 ,opinion1 ,mental ,discourse1 c41 appear always as having direct reference to something else1 and as referring each to itself only in an indirect and secondary way 7,greek3 a7ei a7_/llou--au7ts d' e7n pare_/rg--b4 #cf72 and farther1 if to cogitate is one thing and to be cogitated another thing1 in which of the two points of view will the bene of the ,nos consist8 ,to be ,cogitation1 and to be a ,cogitatum1 are not logically the same 7,greek3 ou7de gar tau7to to ei7nai no_/sei kai nooume_/n--b4 #ch74 ,but may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are some things in which ,cognition is identical with the ,cognitum8 that is1 in those ,cognita which are altogether exempt from ,matter8 ,in ,constructive cognitions without ,matter1 the ,form and the ,greek3 t44e4 is both ,cognitum and ,cognitio2 in ,theoretical cognitions without ,matter1 the ,notion and the ,cogitation is itself the ,cognitum 7,greek3 o7 lo_/gos to pragma kai 7 no_/sis74 ,since it appears1 therefore1 that1 wherever there is no ,matter1 ,cogitatum and ,nos are not different1 the same will be true of the divine ,nos3 its ,cogitatio and its ,cogitatum will be identical 7p4 #ajge1 a4 #e74 ,one farther difficulty remains1 if we suppose the ,cogitatum to be a ,compound 7,greek3 su_/ntheton72 for1 on that supposition1 the ,cogitans would change in running through the different parts of the whole4 ,but the reply seems to be1 that every thing which has not ,matter is indivisible and not compound 7p4 #ajge1 a4 #g74 ,as the human ,nos1 being that which deals with compounds1 comports itself for a certain time--for it does not attain its bene in cogitating this or that part of the compound1 but in apprehending a certain total or completion which is something different from any of the parts--so does the divine ,nos1 engaged in cogitation of itself1 comport itself in perpetuity 7a4 #aj74 ,another point to be considered is--in what manner the nature of the ,universe 7,greek3 7 tou o7_/lou phu_/sis--p4 #ajge1 a4 #aa7 includes ,bonum and ,optimum4 ,is ,bonum included as something separate and as an adjunct by itself transcendent8 ,or is it immanent1 pervading the whole arrangement of the constituent parts8 ,or does it exist in both ways at once1 as in the case of a disciplined army2 for1 in this latter1 ,bonum belongs both to the array and to the general1 and indeed more to the latter1 since the array is directed by the general1 not the general by the array4 ,all things in the universe are marshalled in a certain orderly way--the aquatic creatures1 the arial1 and the plants2 but all things are not marshalled alike4 ,the universe is not such that there is no relation between one thing and another3 there is such a relation2 for every thing is marshalled with a view to one end1 though in different degrees4 ,as1 in a family1 the freemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard1 but all or most of their proceedings are regulated1 while slaves and oxen are not required to do much towards the common good1 but are left for the most part to act at hazard1--in this way the principium of each is arranged by nature 7a4 #bc74 ,for example1 every thing must necessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to make room for another3 there are also some other facts and conditions common to all things in the universe 7,greek3 le_/g d' oi7on ei7_/s ge to diakrithnai a7na_/gk a7pasin e7lthein--a4 #bc2 see the explanation of ,greek3 diakrithnai1 given by ,bonitz1 ,comm4 p4 #eai--not very certain74 ,in concluding this exposition1 we must not lose sight of the absurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other1 nor what is advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us1 nor which of their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties 7p4 #ajge1 a4 #bg74 ,that all things proceed from ,contraries1 all these philosophers agree in affirming4 ,but it is not true that all things are generated1 nor that they are generated from contraries2 for the celestial substance is not generated at all1 nor has it any contrary4 ,moreover1 in those cases where there really are contraries1 these philosophers do not teach us how generation can take place out of them2 for contraries themselves have no effect upon each other4 ,now our doctrine solves this difficulty reasonably1 by introducing a tertium quid 7p4 #ajge1 a4 #ca7--,matter4 ,some of these philosophers erroneously consider ,matter to be itself one of the contraries3 they consider the ,unequal as matter or substratum to the ,equal2 or the ,many as matter or substratum to the ,one2 7,evil1 as opposed to ,good74 ,we resolve this in the same way3 our ,matter is one1 is contrary itself to nothing1 but may be potentially either of two contraries4 ,farthermore1 if we admit the doctrine that ,evil itself is ,matter or one of the elements1 the inference will follow that every thing whatever1 except the ,unum itself1 partakes of ,evil 7a4 #f74 ,some philosophers do not admit either ,good or ,evil to be principles at all2 but they are manifestly wrong2 for in all things ,good is most of all the principle 7p4 #ajge1 a4 #cg74 ,others again are so far right that they recognize ,good as a principle3 but they do not tell us how it is a principle--whether as ,end1 or as ,movent1 or as ,form4 ,empedokles lays down a strange doctrine3 he makes ,friendship to be the ,good 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #b74 ,but1 in his theory1 ,friendship is principle partly as ,movent1 for its function is to bring together 7,greek3 suna_/gei gar--b4 #c72 partly as ,matter1 for it is itself a portion of the mixture 7,greek3 mo_/rion tou mi_/gmatos--b4 #d74 ,now1 even granting the possibility that the same thing may be per accidens 7,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s--b4 #e1 i4e41 by special coincidence in any one particular case7 principle as ,movent1 and also principle as ,matter1 nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by definition4 ,under which of the two1 therefore1 are we to reckon ,friendship8 ,it is moreover another strange feature in the theory of ,empedokles1 that he makes ,enmity to be indestructible2 for this very ,enmity is with him the nature and principle of ,evil 7b4 #h74 ,anaxagoras declares ,good to be the principle as ,movent2 for1 in his theory1 ,nos causes motion2 but it causes motion with a view to some end1 which is of course different from itself2 so that the real principle is different from ,nos3 unless indeed he adopted one of our tenets2 for we too say that1 in a certain sense1 the medical art is health 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #aj2 ,z4 vii4 p4 #ajcb1 b4 #aj74 ,it is moreover absurd1 that ,anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to ,good and to the ,nos 7b4 #aa74 7,bonitz remarks1 ,comm4 p4 #ebb3--;,aristotle means that ,anaxagoras was wrong1 because he failed ad eam devenire rationem1 ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius ,greek3 te_/los esse statueret2 farther1 he remarks1 on the line b4 #aj--;,greek3 a7_/topon de kai to e7nanti_/on m poisai t a7gath kai t n3 ,quid enim8 nonne pariter et eodem jure ,greek3 nous a7mig_/s1 quem posuit ,anaxagoras1 ab omni contrarietate et oppositione immunis sit1 ac primus motor apud ,aristotelem8--,aristotle would have replied to this3 ,i recognize principles of ,evil under the names of ,greek3 u7_/l and ,greek3 ste_/rsis2 the last of the two being directly opposed to ,form 7,regularity or ,good71 the first of the two being indifferent and equally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good4 ,my ,prime ,movent acts like an ,greek3 e7r_/menon in causing motion in the ,celestial ,substance3 the motion of this last is pure ,good1 without any mixture of ,evil4 ,but1 when this motion is transmitted to the sublunary elements1 it becomes corrupted by ,greek3 u7_/l and ,greek3 ste_/rsis1 so that ,evil becomes mingled with the ,good4 ,anaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles1 analogous to ,greek3 u7_/l and ,greek3 ste_/rsis1 so that ,evil1 on his theory1 remains unexplained47 ,those philosophers who lay down ,contraries as their principles1 do not make proper use of these ,contraries1 unless their language be improved or modified 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #ab74 ,nor do they tell us why some things are destructible1 other things indestructible2 for they trace all things to the same principles4 ,some make all things to proceed from ,non-,ens2 others1 to escape that necessity1 make all things ,one 7and thus recognize no real change or generation at all--the ,eleates1 b4 #af74 ,again1 not one of them tells us why generation must always be1 or what is the cause of generation4 ,once more1 those who recognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third superior to both 7b4 #ah72 and the ,platonists with their ,ideas are under the like necessity4 ,for they must assign some reason why particular things partake of these ,ideas4 ,other philosophers1 moreover1 must consistently with their theories recognize something contrary to ,wisdom and to the most venerable ,cognition4 ,but we are under no such necessity2 for there is nothing contrary to the ,first 7,greek3 t pr_/t74 ,all contraries involve ,matter1 and are in potentiality the same3 one of the two contraries is ignorance in regard to the other2 but the ,first has no contrary 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #bd74 ,again1 if there be no ,entia beyond the ,perceptibilia1 there can be no beginning1 no arrangement in order1 no generation1 no celestial bodies or proceedings 7i4e41 all these will remain unexplained74 ,there will always be a beginning behind the beginning1 ad infinitum2 as there is in the theories of all the theologians and physical philosophers 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #bg74 ,and1 even if we recognize1 beyond the ,perceptibilia1 ,ideas or ,numbers1 these are causes of nothing2 or1 if causes of any thing1 they are certainly not causes of motion4 ,how1 moreover1 can ,magnitude1 and a ,continuum arise out of that which has no ,magnitude8 ,number cannot1 either as ,movent or as ,form1 produce a ,continuum 7b4 #cj74 ,again1 7,contraries cannot be principles1 because7 no ,contrary can be essentially ,constructive and essentially ,movent 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #ca72 for ,contraries involve ,matter and ,potentiality1 and may possibly1 therefore1 not exist4 ,and1 if there be ,potentiality1 it will come prior to ,actuality3 upon that supposition therefore 7i4e41 of ,contraries as the fundamental principles7 ,entia could not be eternal4 ,but ,entia are eternal2 therefore these theories must be in part amended3 we have shown how 7b4 #cd74 ,farther1 none of these theories explains how it is that numbers coalesce into ,one2 or soul and body into ,one2 or ,form and ,matter into one ,concrete4 ,nor can they explain this1 unless they adopt our doctrine1 that the ,movent brings about this coalition 7p4 #ajge1 b4 #cg74 ,those philosophers 7like ,speusippus7 who recognize many different grades and species of ,entia 7first the ,mathematical ,number1 c471 with separate principles for each1 make the ,essence of the ,universe to be incoherent 7,greek3 e7peisodi_/d--p4 #ajgf1 a4 #a7 and set up many distinct principles2 for none of these ,essences contributes to or bears upon the remainder1 whether it exists or does not exist4 ,now ,entia are not willing to be badly governed 7,greek3 ta de o7_/nta ou7 bou_/letai politeu_/esthai kaks4 ou7k a7gathon polukoirani_/2 ei7s koi_/ranos4--p4 #ajgf1 a4 #d74 ,,iv4 ,,de ,,coelo4 ,book ,i4 ,,ch4 #a4--,the science of ,nature has for its principal object--,bodies1 ,magnitudes1 and the various affections and movements of ,bodies and ,magnitudes2 also the beginnings or principles of this sort of ,essence4 ,the ,continuous is that which is divisible into parts perpetually divisible3 and ,body is that which is divisible in every direction4 ,of magnitudes1 some 7lines7 are divisible only in one direction2 others 7planes7 only in two directions2 others again 7bodies7 in three directions4 ,this is the maximum3 there is no other magnitude beyond2 for three are all1 and to say in three directions is the same as to say in all directions4 ,as the ,pythagoreans say1 ,the ,universe and ,all ,things are determined by ,three3 in ,end1 ,middle1 and ,beginning1 lies the number of the ,universe1 or the ,triad4 ,we have received these as laws from nature1 and we accordingly employ this number 7,three7 for solemnities in honour of the ,gods4 ,moreover1 we apply our predicates on the same principle2 for we call ,two1 and ,the ,two--,both1 but we do not call them all4 ,three is the first number to which we apply the predicate ,all4 ,herein 7as was observed before7 we follow the lead of ,nature herself4 ,since therefore these three phrases--,all ,things1 ,the ,universe1 ,the ,perfect or ,complete--do not specifically differ from each other1 but are distinguished only in respect of the matter or occasions on which they are applied4 ,body is the only kind of magnitude which can be declared ,perfect or ,complete1 that is1 ,all2 for it is the only magnitude determined or defined by the ,three4 ,being divisible in three directions1 it is divisible every way2 other magnitudes are divisible either only in one way or only in two4 ,magnitudes are both divisible and continuous according to the number by which they are designated--continuous in one direction1 in two1 in three1 or all4 ,all divisible magnitudes are also continuous3 whether all continuous magnitudes are divisible1 is not yet clear4 ,but what is clear is--that there is no upward transition to a higher genus beyond ,body1 as there is from line to surface1 and from surface to ,body4 ,if there were1 ,body would not be perfect or complete as a magnitude2 for the transition would be made at the point of deficiency2 but the perfect or complete can have no deficiency3 it stretches every way4 ,such is each body included as a part in the universe3 it has dimensions in every direction4 ,yet each is distinguished from its neighbour by contact1 and each therefore in a certain sense is many4 ,but the ,universe 7,greek3 to pan7 including all these parts is of necessity perfect and complete2 extending not merely in one way1 and in another way not1 but ,greek3 pa_/nt1 as the word literally means 7ss4 #a-d74 ,,ch4 #b4--,respecting the nature of the ,universe1 we shall enquire presently whether in the aggregate it be infinite or of finite magnitude4 ,but first let us speak about its different constituent species1 proceeding on the following basis4 ,i affirm that all natural bodies and magnitudes are per se locally moveable2 and that ,nature is to them a beginning or principle of motion4 ,now all ,local ,motion 7known by the name of ,greek3 phora_/7 is either ,rectilinear or ,circular1 or compounded of the two2 for these two are the only simple motions1 by reason that the only two simple magnitudes are the rectilinear and the circular4 ,the circular is motion round the ,centre2 the rectilinear is motion either downwards towards the centre or upwards from the centre4 ,these three are the only simple modes of motion or currents3 as ,i said in the last chapter that body was made complete in the number three1 so also the motion of body is made complete in the number three4 ,now1 as there are some bodies 7such as fire1 earth1 and their cognates7 which are simple 7i4e4 which have in themselves a natural beginning or principle of motion71 and others which are compounds of these1 so also there must be simple motions belonging to the former and compound motions belonging to the latter2 such compound motions being determined by the preponderant element therein4 ,since1 therefore1 circular motion is a simple mode of motion1 and since simple modes of motion belong only to simple bodies1 there must of necessity be a particular variety of simple body1 whose especial nature it is to be carried round in circular motion4 ,by violence1 indeed1 one body might be moved in a mode belonging to another2 but not by nature4 ,moreover1 since motion against nature is opposite to motion conformable to nature1 and since each mode has one single opposite1 simple circular motion1 if it be not conformable to the nature of this body1 must be against its nature4 ,if then the body rotating in a circle be fire or any of the other elements1 its natural mode of motion must be opposite to circular motion4 ,but each thing has only one opposite2 and up and down are each other's opposites4 ,if then the body which rotates in a circle rotates thus against nature1 it must have some other mode of motion conformable to nature4 ,but this is impossible3 for1 if the motion conformable to its nature be motion upwards1 the body must be fire or air2 if motion downwards1 the body must be earth or water 7and there is no other simple mode of motion that it can have74 ,moreover1 its rotatory motion must be a first motion2 for the perfect is prior in nature to the imperfect4 ,now the circle is perfect2 but no straight line is perfect3 neither an infinite straight line1 for in order to be perfect1 it must have an end and a boundary2 nor any finite straight line1 for each has something without it and may be prolonged at pleasure4 ,so that1 if motion first by nature belong to a body first by nature1 if circular motion 7as being perfect7 be prior to rectilinear motion1 and if rectilinear motion belong to a first or a simple body1 as we see both in fire and in earth1--we may be sure fortiori that circular motion belongs to a simple body1 and that there is1 besides the four elements here1 prior to them and more divine than them1 a different body cf special nature and essence4 ,indeed1 since circular motion is against the nature of these four elements1 there must be some other different body to whose nature it is conformable4 ,there must thus be some simple and primary body1 whose nature it is to be carried round in a circle1 as earth is carried downwards and fire upwards4 ,on the assumption that the revolving bodies revolved against their own nature1 it would be wonderful and even unreasonable that this one single mode of motion1 being thus contrary to nature1 should be continuous and eternal2 for in all other things we see that what is contrary to nature dies away most speedily4 ,now1 if the revolving body were fire1 as some affirm1 the revolving motion would be just as much contrary to its nature as motion downwards2 for the natural motion of fire is upwards or away from the centre4 ,reasoning from all these premisses1 we may safely conclude that1 distinct from all these bodies which are here around us1 there exists a body whose nature is more honourable in proportion to its greater distance from us here 7ss4 #a-ac74 ,,ch4 #c4--,we plainly cannot affirm that every body is either heavy or light3 meaning by heavy1 that which is carried by its nature downwards or towards the centre2 by light1 that which is carried by its nature upwards or away from the centre4 ,heaviest 7or earth7 is that which underlies all other downward moving bodies1 lightest 7fire7 is that which floats above all upward moving bodies4 ,air and water are both light and heavy1 relatively1 but relatively to different terms of comparison2 thus1 water is heavy as compared to air and fire1 light as compared to earth4 ,but that body whose nature it is to revolve in a circle1 cannot possibly have either heaviness or levity2 for it cannot move in a right line1 either upwards or downwards1 nor either by nature or against nature4 ,not by nature1 for1 in that case1 it must be identical with some one of the four elements2 not against nature1 because1 if it moved upwards against nature1 this would prove that motion downwards was conformable to its nature1 and it would thus be identical with earth3 we have already seen that1 if a body moves upwards against nature1 it must move downwards according to nature1 and vice vers4 ,now the same natural motion which belongs to any body as a whole1 belongs also to its minute fragments 7to the whole earth and to any of its constituent clods74 ,accordingly the revolving body in its local movement of revolution cannot possibly be dragged in any other direction1 either upward or downward1--neither the whole nor any portion thereof4 ,it is alike reasonable to conceive it as ungenerable1 indestructible1 incapable both of increase and of qualitative change 7,greek3 a7nauxes kai a7nalloi_/ton74 ,it cannot be generated1 because every thing generated comes out of a substratum and an opposite1 into which it relapses on being destroyed4 ,now the revolving body has no opposite2 for we have already seen that opposite bodies have their currents of motion opposite1 and there is no current of motion opposite to that of circular rotation4 ,nature has rightly excepted this ungenerable and indestructible substance from the action of contraries1 in which generation and destruction occur4 ,it is also incapable of increase or diminution1 because these processes take place through the accession of new cognate materials2 and in this case there are none such4 ,it is farther incapable of qualitative change1 because this always implies the being affected favourably or unfavourably 7,greek3 pa_/thos72 and this last never takes place1 in plants or in animals1 without some increase or diminution in quantity 7ss4 #a-e74 ,this ,celestial ,substance is thus eternal1 ungenerable1 indestructible1 noway increased nor diminished1 neither growing old nor capable of disturbing affections nor changeable in quality4 ,herein the evidence of reason and that of phenomena concur4 ,for all men1 ,hellenes and ,barbarians1 have some belief respecting the ,gods1 and all who believe ,gods to exist assign to the divine nature the uppermost place in the ,kosmos2 an immortal place going naturally along with immortal persons4 ,our perceptions confirm this sufficiently1 at least when we speak with reference to human belief4 ,for not the smallest change has ever been observed in the celestial substance1 throughout all past time4 ,under these impressions1 the ancients gave to it the name which it now bears2 for the same opinions suggest themselves to us not once1 nor twice1 but an infinite number of times99994 ,hence the ancients1 regarding the ,first ,body as something distinct from ,fire1 ,earth1 ,air1 or ,water1 called the uppermost place ther1 from its being always running 7,greek3 a7po tou thein a7ei_/71 the adverbial designation being derived from eternal duration4 ,anaxagoras employs this name improperly3 he calls ,fire by the name of ther 7s4 #f74 ,it is plain1 from all we have said1 that the simple bodies cannot be more in number than those just indicated2 for a simple body must of necessity have a simple mode of motion1 and there are only three simple modes of motion--one circular and two rectilinear1 one of these being from the centre1 the other towards the centre 7s4 #g74 ,,ch4 #d4--,that ,circular ,rotation has no motion opposed to it1 may be shown by several different arguments4 ,if there were any1 it would certainly be rectilinear motion2 for convex and concave1 though each respectively opposed to the other1 are1 when both put together1 opposed as a couple to rectilinear motion4 ,but each variety of rectilinear motion has another variety of rectilinear motion opposed to it2 and each thing has but one opposite4 ,moreover the oppositions between one motion 7or one current--,greek3 phora_/7 and another are founded upon oppositions of place1 which are three in number3 7#a7 ,above and ,below2 7#b7 ,before and ,behind2 7#c7 ,right and ,left4 ,now the motion in circular rotation 9999from ,a to ,b is not opposite to that from ,b to ,a3 the opposition of motion is along the straight line which joins the two2 for an infinite number of different circles may be drawn1 not interfering with each other but all passing through the same two points ,a and ,b4 ,in the same circle1 the opposition between the current from ,a to ,b and that from ,b to ,a1 is along the line of diameter--not along the line of circumference4 ,if one circular current were really opposed to any other circular current1 one or other of the two would have existed to no purpose2 for both have the same object4 ,that is to say3 what is carried round in a circle1 let it begin from any point whatever1 must necessarily come round equally to all the opposite places1 above1 below1 before1 behind1 right1 left4 ,if the two 7presumed7 opposite circular currents were equal1 they would neutralize each other1 and there would be no motion at all of either of them4 ,if one of the two were the more powerful1 it would extinguish the other2 so that to suppose the existence of both is to suppose that one or both exists in vain 7i4e41 can never be realized74 ,we say that a sandal exists in vain 7,greek3 ma_/tn71 when it cannot be fastened on4 ,but ,god and nature do nothing in vain 7ss4 #a-h74 ,,ch4 #e4--,most of the ancient philosophers admitted an infinite body2 but this may be shown to be impossible4 ,the question is very important2 for the consequences which follow from admitting the ,infinite as principium1 affect our speculations concerning the whole of ,nature 7s4 #a74 ,every body is of necessity either simple or compound4 ,the infinite body therefore1 if it exists1 must of necessity be either one or the other4 ,but there can be no infinite compound composed of simple bodies finite in magnitude and in number3 so that1 if an infinite body exist1 it must be simple4 ,we shall first enquire whether the ,first ,body1 whose nature it is to move in a circle1 can be infinite in magnitude4 ,now1 if it were infinite1 the radii thrown out from the centre would be infinite1 and the distance between them would also be infinite2 that is1 no finite peripheral line can be found touching all the extremities of the radii without3 if any such line be assumed1 you may always assume a greater4 ,we call ,number infinite1 because the greatest number cannot be given2 and the like may be said about this distance4 ,now1 as an infinite distance cannot be passed over1 no circular motion passing over it is possible1 so as to come round to the point of departure4 ,but we see plainly that the ,first ,body or the ,heaven does come round in a circle2 and it has been shown by reasoning priori that there is a variety of body whose nature it is to move in a circle4 ,such a body therefore as the ,first 7revolving7 ,body cannot be infinite 7ss4 #b1 #c74 ,four other arguments are added1 proving the same conclusion 7s4 #d1 seq474 ,one of them is3 ,that an infinite square1 circle1 or sphere1 is an impossibility2 each of these figures being defined or determined4 ,as there can be no infinite circle1 so neither can an infinite body be moved round in a circle 7s4 #g74 ,,ch4 #f4--;,as the ,first ,body cannot be infinite1 so neither can those bodies be infinite whose nature it is to move to the centre and from the centre--neither the centripetal nor the centrifugal body4 ,for these two currents are opposite in nature2 opposite currents being characterized by the opposite places to which they tend4 ,but of two opposites1 if the one be fixed and determinate1 the other must be fixed and determinate also4 ,now the centre is determined2 for the centripetal body1 let it fall from what height it will1 can never fall lower than the centre2 and1 since the centre is determined1 the upper region or extremity must also be determined4 ,the places at each extreme being thus determined1 the intermediate space must be determined also2 otherwise there would exist motion undetermined or infinite1 which has been shown in a former treatise to be impossible 7,physica1 ,,viii4 viii472 and therefore that body which either is therein1 or may possibly be therein1 must be determined4 ,but it is a fact that the centripetal body and the centrifugal body can be therein2 for centripetality and centrifugality are of the nature of each respectively 7ss4 #a1 #b74 ,hence we see that there can be no infinite body4 ,there are other reasons also4 ,as the centripetal body is heavy1 if it be infinite1 its gravity must also be infinite2 and1 if gravity cannot be infinite1 neither can any heavy body be infinite4 ,the like about any light body1 such as the centrifugal 7s4 #c74 ,he then shows 7by a long process of reasoning1 not easy to follow7 first1 that there cannot be an infinite body with finite gravity2 next1 that there can be no infinite gravity4 ,accordingly there can be no infinite body at all1 having gravity4 ,at the end1 he considers that this is established1 7#a7 by the partial arguments 7,greek3 dia tn kata me_/ros7 immediately preceding2 7#b7 by the general reasonings in his other treatises respecting first principles1 in which he explained the ,infinite--in what sense it existed and did not exist2 7#c7 by an argument about the ,infinite1 upon which he touches in the next chapter 7ss4 #d-ac74 ,,ch4 #g4--;,every body is of necessity either infinite or finite4 ,if infinite1 it is as a whole either of like constituents or of unlike4 ,if the latter1 either of a finite number of species1 or of an infinite number4 ,the last is impossible1 if our fundamental assumptions are allowed to stand4 ,for since the simple modes of motion are limited in number1 the simple bodies must be alike limited2 each simple mode of notion belonging to its own special simple body1 and each natural body having always its own natural motion4 ,but1 if the ,infinite be composed of a finite number of species1 each of these constituent parts must be infinite2 that is1 water and fire must be infinite4 ,yet this too1 is impossible2 for we have seen that there cannot be either infinite levity or infinite gravity 7the attributes of fire and water74 ,moreover1 if these bodies be infinite1 the places which they occupy1 and the motions which they make1 must also be infinite2 but this also we have shown to be inadmissible1 if our fundamental assumptions are admitted4 ,the centripetal body cannot be carried to an infinite distance downward1 nor the centrifugal body to an infinite distance upward4 ,that which cannot come to pass1 cannot be in course of coming to pass2 thus1 if a thing cannot come to be white1 or a cubit long1 or domiciled in ,egypt1 it cannot be in course of becoming white1 or a cubit long1 c4 ,it cannot be in course of being carried to a terminus which cannot be reached4 ,it might be argued that fire1 though discontinuous and dispersed1 might still be infinite1 in the sum total of its different masses4 ,but body is that which is extended in every direction3 how can there be many bodies unlike to each other1 yet each of them infinite8 ,each of them1 if infinite at all1 ought to be infinite in every direction 7ss4 #a-e74 ,we thus see that the ,infinite cannot consist of unlike constituents4 ,but neither can it consist of constituents all similar4 ,for1 first1 there are only three simple motions1 and one of the three it must have2 but we have shown that it cannot have either centripetal or centrifugal motion 7i4e41 that it cannot have either infinite gravity or infinite levity72 nor can it again have circular motion1 for the ,infinite cannot be carried in a circle3 this would amount to saying that the ,heaven is infinite1 which we have shown to be impossible4 ,the ,infinite indeed cannot be moved in any way at all2 for1 if moved1 it must be moved either according to nature1 or contrary to nature 7violently71 and1 if its present motion be violent1 it must have some other mode of motion which is natural to it4 ,but1 if it have any such1 this assumes that there exists some other place belonging to it1 into which it may be conveyed--an obvious impossibility 7ss4 #f1 #g74 ,farthermore1 the ,infinite cannot act in any way upon the ,finite1 nor be acted upon thereby 7ss4 #h-aj74 ,nor can the ,infinite be acted upon in any way by the ,infinite 7ss4 #aa-ab74 ,if then every perceptible body possesses powers1 as agent or patient or both1 there can be no perceptible body which is infinite4 ,but all bodies which are in any place are perceptible2 therefore no body which is in any place can be infinite4 ,there is no infinite body1 indeed there can be no body at all1 outside of the ,heaven2 for that which is outside of the ,heaven is in a place4 ,even if perceivable only up to a certain point 7,greek3 me_/chri tino_/s71 even if merely intelligible1 it would still be in a place1 and would therefore come under the foregoing argument--that there is no body outside of the ,heaven 7ss4 #ac1 #ad74 ,the foregoing reasoning may be summed up1 in more general language 7,greek3 logik_/teron71 as follows3--,the ,infinite assumed as homogeneous cannot be moved in a circle1 since the ,infinite has no centre2 nor in a straight line1 since this would imply a second infinite place into which it must be moved according to nature1 and a third infinite place into which it must be moved against nature1 and since in either case the force which causes it to be moved must be infinite4 ,but we have already argued1 in treating of ,motion 7,phys4 ,,viii4 x47 that nothing finite can have infinite power1 nothing infinite can have finite power2 and1 if that which is moved according to nature can also be moved contrary to nature1 there must of necessity be two ,infinites--,movens and ,motum4 ,yet what can that be which causes the ,infinite to move8 ,if it cause itself to move1 it must be animated 7,greek3 e7_/mpsuchon73 but how can an infinite animated being 7,greek3 zon7 exist8 ,and1 if there be anything else which causes it to move1 there must exist two ,infinites1 each distinguished from the other in form and power 7ss4 #ae-ag74 ,again1 even if we admit the doctrine of ,leukippus and ,demokritus--,that the whole is not continuous1 but discontinuous1 atoms divided by intervening spaces--still the ,infinite is inadmissible4 ,for the nature and essence of these atoms is all the same1 though they are different from each other in figure and arrangement2 accordingly the motion of all must be the same3 if one is heavy or centripetal1 all must be so alike2 if one is light or centrifugal1 all must be so alike4 ,but either of these motions would imply the existence of centre and periphery2 which does not consist with an infinite whole4 ,in the ,infinite1 there is neither centre nor periphery2 no terminus prefixed either for upward or downward motion2 no own place either for centripetal or centrifugal matter4 ,therefore in an infinite universe1 there can be no motion at all 7ss4 #ah1 #ai74 ,,ch4 #h4--,there cannot be more than one ,kosmos4 ,all things both rest and are moved1 either by violence1 or according to nature4 ,in that place to which it is carried by nature1 it also rests by nature3 in that place to which it is carried by violence1 it rests by violence4 ,if the current which we see towards the centre is by violence1 the opposite current must be natural2 if earth is carried by violence from thence hitherward1 its natural current must be from hence thitherward2 and1 if being here it rests without violence1 its current towards here must be a natural one4 ,for there is one only which is natural4 ,now1 if there be many ,kosmi1 they must be alike in their nature1 and must be composed of the same bodies1 having the same nature and powers--fire1 earth1 and the two intermediate elements3 for1 if the bodies here are not the same as those in other ,kosmi--if the same names are given in an equivocal sense and do not connote the same specific attributes--the name ,kosmos must be equivocal also1 and there cannot be many true or real ,kosmi1 in the same sense4 ,to the parts or elements of each ,kosmos1 therefore1 the centripetal and 9999centrifugal currents are natural2 for the simple currents are limited in number1 and each element is so named as to connote one of them specially2 and1 if the currents are the same1 the elements must also be the same everywhere4 ,if there were another ,kosmos1 the earth in that would tend towards the centre of our ,kosmos1 and the fire in that would tend towards the periphery of our ,kosmos4 ,but this is impossible2 since in that case the earth in that ,kosmos would run away from the centre of its own ,kosmos1 and the fire therein would run away from its own periphery4 ,either we must not admit the same nature in the simple elements of the numerous ,kosmi2 or1 if we do admit it1 we must recognize only one centre and one periphery4 ,this difficulty prevents our recognizing more than one ,kosmos 7ss4 #a-f74 ,it is unphilosophical to affirm that the nature of these simple elements becomes changed according as they are more or less distant from their own places4 ,the difference is at best one of degree1 not one of kind4 ,that they are moved1 we see plainly2 there must therefore be some one current of motion natural to them4 ,accordingly every portion of the same element 7or of elements the same in kind7 must tend towards the same numerical place--towards this actual centre 7,greek3 pros to_/de ti me_/son71 or that actual periphery2 and1 if the tendency be towards one centre specie1 but towards many centres numero1 because particulars differ numero alone1 and not specie1 still the attribute will be alike in all1 and will not be present in some portions1 absent in others3 ,i mean that1 if the portions of this ,kosmos are relative to each other1 those in another ,kosmos are in the like condition1 and what is taken from this ,kosmos will not be different from what is taken from the corresponding elements of any other ,kosmos4 ,unless these assumptions can be overthrown1 it is indisputably certain that there can be only one centre and one periphery2 by consequence therefore1 only one ,kosmos and not more 7ss4 #g-aj74 ,there are other reasons to show that there is a given terminus for the natural current both of fire and of earth4 ,a thing moved1 speaking generally1 changes from something definite into something else definite2 but there are different species of such change3 the change called getting-well is from sickness to health2 that called growth is from the little to great2 that called local movement is from a terminus to another terminus1 and local movements are specifically different from each other1 according as the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem is defined in each4 ,the terminus is always a known and definite point3 it is not accidental1 nor dependent upon the arbitrium of the mover4 ,fire and earth therefore do not move on to infinity1 but to definite points in opposite directions2 and the local antithesis is between above and below3 these are the two termini of the respective currents4 ,earth is carried with greater velocity1 the nearer it approaches to the centre2 fire is carried with greater velocity1 the nearer it approaches to the periphery4 ,this shows that its current does not stretch to infinity2 for its velocity would then increase infinitely4 ,earth is not carried downward by the force of any thing else1 nor fire upwards3 not by any violence1 nor by squeezing out 7,greek3 e7kthli_/psei71 as some say4 ,if this were so1 a larger quantity of earth would move downward1 and a larger quantity of fire upward1 more slowly than a smaller4 ,but the reverse is what occurs3 the larger quantity of earth moves downward more rapidly than the smaller2 if its motion had been caused by violence or by squeezing out1 such motion would have slackened as it became more widely distant from the moving force 7ss4 #aa-ad74 ,we may deduce the same conclusion from the reasonings of the ,first ,philosophy1 also from the fact of circular motion which of necessity is constant both here and everywhere4 ,further1 it is clear that there can be only one ,kosmos2 for1 as there are three bodily elements1 so there are three special places of such elements3 one the undermost1 at the centre2 another the uppermost1 at the periphery1 revolving in a circular orbit2 the third1 in the intermediate place between the two1 being the light or floating element 7,greek3 to e7pipo_/lazon72 for1 if not there1 it must be outside of the ,kosmos1 which is impossible 7ss4 #ae1 #af74 ,,ch4 #i4--,we must however now examine some reasons1 which have been alleged to prove the contrary2 and which seem to show1 not only that there are many ,kosmi1 but even that there must be many1 and that the hypothesis of one single ,kosmos is inadmissible4 ,it is urged that in all aggregates1 natural as well as artificial1 the ,form by itself is one thing1 and the ,form implicated with ,matter is another4 ,when we declare the definition of a sphere or a circle1 we do not include therein gold or brass1 for this makes no part of the essence3 if we mention these metals1 it is when we cannot conceive or grasp anything beyond the particular case2 for example1 if we have one particular circle before us4 ,nevertheless1 even here the circle in the abstract is one thing1 and this particular circle is another3 the first is the ,form by itself1 the last is the ,form along with ,matter1 one among particular objects4 ,now1 since the ,heaven is perceivable by sense1 it must be one among particular objects2 for every thing perceivable is implicated with ,matter4 ,as such1 it is this ,heaven3 to be this ,heaven 7,form along with ,matter7 is one thing2 to be the ,heaven simply and absolutely 7,form without ,matter7 is another4 ,now1 wherever there is ,form1 there either are or may be many distinct particulars2 whether we admit 7with ,plato7 that the ,forms exist separately1 or not4 ,in all things where the ,essence is implicated with ,matter1 we see that the particular manifestations are many and of indefinite number4 ,upon this reasoning therefore1 there are or at least may be many ,heavens3 the supposition that there can be no more than one1 is inadmissible 7ss4 #a-b74 ,but we must see how far this reasoning will hold4 ,that the ,form without ,matter differs from the ,form with ,matter1 is perfectly true4 ,but this does not show that there must be many ,kosmi2 nor can there be many1 if this one ,kosmos exhausts all the matter that exists4 ,if the matter of man were flesh and bone1 and if a single man were formed1 including all flesh and all bone indissolubly united2 there could not possibly exist any other man2 and the like is true about other objects2 for1 where the essence is implicated with an underlying matter1 no object can come into existence unless some matter be furnished4 ,the ,kosmos1 or ,heaven1 is a particular object1 composed partly out of appropriate matter3 but if it absorbs all the appropriate matter1 no second ,kosmos can come to pass4 ,we shall now show that it does include all the appropriate matter 7ss4 #c-e74 ,the word ,heaven has three different senses4 #a4 ,it means the essence of the extreme periphery of the universe1 or the natural body which is there situated3 we call this highest and farthest place ,heaven1 where we suppose all the divine agency to be situated 7,greek3 e7n 7 to theion pan i7drusthai_/ phamen74 #b4 ,it means the body continuous 7,greek3 to suneches sma7 with the extreme periphery of the universe1 wherein are contained ,sun1 ,moon1 and some of the ,stars 7,planets72 for these we affirm to be in the ,heaven4 #c4 ,in a third sense1 it means the body circumscribed 7,greek3 periecho_/menon7 by this extreme periphery3 for we usually call the ,whole and the ,universe1 ,heaven4--,these being the three senses of ,heaven1 the ,whole circumscribed by the extreme periphery must by necessity consist of all the natural and perceivable body existing1 since there neither is nor can be any such outside of the ,heaven4 ,for1 if there were any such outside of the ,heaven1 it must be either one of the elements or a compound thereof--either by nature or contrary to nature4 ,for we have shown that each of the three elements--the circular1 the centrifugal1 and the centripetal--has its own special place by nature2 and that1 even if the place in which it now is were not its natural place1 that place would be the natural place of another one among the three2 for1 if a place be contrary to nature in reference to one1 it must be conformable to nature in reference to another4 ,neither of these three elements therefore can be outside of the ,heaven1 nor1 of course1 any of their compounds4 ,and there exists no other body besides these2 nor can 9999there exist any other 7ss4 #f1 #g74 ,we see therefore plainly that there neither is nor can be any mass of body 7,greek3 smatos o7_/gkon7 outside of the ,heaven2 and that the ,heaven comprehends all matter--all body natural and perceptible4 ,so that there neither are1 nor ever have been1 nor ever can be1 many ,heavens3 this one is unique as well as perfect4 ,nor is there either place1 or vacuum1 or time1 outside of the ,heaven4 ,there is no place or vacuum2 because1 if there were1 body might be placed therein2 which we have shown to be impossible4 ,there is no time2 because time is the number of motion1 and there can be no motion without some natural body2 but there cannot exist any extra-celestial body4 ,neither1 therefore1 are the things outside of the ,heaven in place1 nor is there time to affect them with old age1 nor do they undergo change of any kind4 ,they are without any change of quality and without susceptibility of suffering2 they remain1 throughout the entire on1 in possession of the best and most self-sufficing life4 ,the word on is a divine expression proposed 7,greek3 thei_/s e7_/phthegktai7 by the ancient philosophers3 they call the on of each creature that end which circumscribes the natural duration of the creature's life4 ,pursuant to this same explanation1 the end of the whole ,heaven--the end comprising all time and the infinity of all things--is on1 so denominated ,greek3 a7po tou 9999a7ei ei7nai1 immortal and divine4 ,from this is suspended existence and life for all other things2 for some closely and strictly1 for others faintly and feebly4 ,for it is a doctrine often repeated to us in ordinary philosophical discourse 7,greek3 e7n tois e7gkukli_/ois philosoph_/masi7 respecting divine matters--that the ,divine1 every thing primary and supreme1 is by necessity unchangeable2 and this confirms what has been just affirmed4 ,for there exists nothing more powerful than itself which can cause it to be moved 7if there were1 that would be more divine72 nor has it any mean attribute2 nor is it deficient in any of the perfections belonging to its nature4 ,its unceasing motion too is easily explained4 ,for all things cease to be moved1 when they come into their own place2 but with the circular or revolving body the place in which it begins and in which it ends is the same 7ss4 #h-aj74 ,,ch4 #aj4--,we shall next discuss whether the ,kosmos be generable or ungenerable1 and perishable or imperishable2 noticing what others have said on the subject before4 ,all of them consider the ,kosmos to be generated3 but some think it 7although generated7 to be eternal2 others look upon it as perishable1 like other natural compounds2 others again--,empedokles and ,herakleitus--declare it to be generated and destroyed in perpetual alternation4 ,now to affirm that it is generated and yet that it is eternal1 is an impossibility3 we cannot reasonably affirm any thing1 except what we see to happen with all things or with most things2 and1 in the case before us1 what happens is the very reverse of the foregoing affirmation1 for all things generated are seen to be destroyed4 ,again that which has no beginning of being as it is now--that which cannot possibly have been otherwise previously throughout the whole on--can never by any possibility change2 for1 if it could ever change1 there must exist some cause1 which1 if it had existed before1 would have compelled what is assumed to be incapable of being otherwise1 to be otherwise4 ,to those who say that the ,kosmos has come together from materials previously existing in another condition1 we may reply99993 ,if these materials were always in this prior condition and incapable of any other1 the ,kosmos would never have been generated at all2 and1 if it has been generated1 we may be sure that the antecedent materials must have been capable of coming into another condition1 and were not under a necessity to remain always in the same condition2 so that aggregations once existing were dissolved1 and disgregations brought into combination1 many times over before the present ,kosmos2 at least they possibly may have been so3 and this is enough to prove that the ,kosmos is not indestructible 7ss4 #a-c74 ,among those who maintain the ,kosmos to have been generated yet to be indestructible1 there are some who defend themselves in the following manner4 ,they tell us that the generation of which they speak is not meant to be affirmed as a real past fact1 but is a mere explanatory or illustrative fiction1 like the generation of a geometrical figure1 introduced to facilitate the understanding by pupils4 ,but such an analogy cannot be admitted4 ,for in geometry the conclusions are just the same1 if we suppose all the figures existing simultaneously2 but it is not so with the demonstrations which they tender about the generation of the ,cosmos1 where the antecedent condition and the consequent condition are the reverse of each other4 ,out of disorder 7they tell us7 things came into order3 these two conditions cannot be simultaneous2 generation must be a real fact1 and distinction of time comparing the one condition with the other2 whereas in geometrical figures no distinction of time is required 7ss4 #d-f74 ,to assume alternate generation and dissolution1 over and over again1 is in fact to represent the ,kosmos as eternal1 but as changing its form2 as if you should suppose the same person to pass from boyhood to manhood and then back again from manhood to boyhood--calling that by the name of generation and destruction4 ,for1 if the elements come together1 the aggregation resulting will not be accidental and variable but always the same1 especially upon the assumptions of these philosophers4 ,so that1 if the whole ,kosmos1 remaining continuous1 is sometimes arranged in one way1 sometimes in another1 it is these arrangements which are generated and destroyed1 not the ,kosmos itself 7ss4 #g1 #h74 ,total generation1 and total destruction without any renovation1 of ,kosmos might be possible1 if there were an infinity of ,kosmi1 but cannot be possible with only one2 for anterior to the moment of generation there existed the antecedent condition1 which1 never having been generated1 could not be destroyed 7s4 #i74 ,there are some who think 7with ,plato in ,timus7 that the non-generable may yet be destroyed1 and that the generated may be indestructible4 ,we have combated this opinion on physical grounds1 respecting the ,heaven specially4 ,we shall now treat the subject upon universal reasonings 7i4e41 belonging to ,logic or ,metaphysics--,greek3 pros ou7s phusiks men peri tou ou7ra_/nou mo_/non ei7_/rtai2 katho_/lou de peri a7_/pantos skepsame_/nois1 e7_/stai kai peri tou_/tou dlon--s4 #aj74 ,,ch4 #aa4--;,in this reasoning1 the first step is to point out that ,generable and ,non-,generable1 ,destructible or ,indestructible1 are words used in many different senses1 which must be discriminated 7,greek3 pollachs lego_/mena74 ,if a man uses these words in an affirmative proposition without such discrimination1 his affirmation is indeterminate2 you cannot tell in which of their many different senses he intends to affirm4 ,non-,generable means3 7#a7 ,that which now is1 having previously not been1 even though without either generation or change1 as1 to touch or to be moved2 for1 according to some persons1 touching or being moved are not cases of generation2 you cannot become touching1 or become moved2 you are moved1 or you are not moved2 you touch1 or you do not touch 7,greek3 ou7 gar ei7nai gi_/nesthai_/ phasin a7pto_/menon1 ou7de kinou_/menon4 ,he means1 ,i presume1 that to touch1 and to be moved1 are instantaneous acts1 though how they can be said to occur ,greek3 a7_/neu metabols1 ,i do not see474 ,it means3 7#b7 ,that which1 though capable of coming to pass or of having come to pass 7,greek3 e7ndecho_/menon gi_/nesthai 7 gene_/sthai71 nevertheless is not2 for this too is non-generable1 since it might have come to be4 ,again1 it means3 7#c7 ,that which cannot by possibility sometimes exist1 sometimes not exist4 ,impossible has two meanings3 7#a7 ,that of which you cannot truly say that it might be generated 7,greek3 o7_/ti ge_/noit' a7_/n72 7#b7 ,that which cannot be generated easily1 or quickly1 or well 7,greek3 kals74 ,so also the ,generable 7,greek3 to gennto_/n7 means3 7#a7 ,that which1 not existing previously1 afterwards exists at one time and not at another1 whether generated or not 7he seems here to point to ,greek3 to a7_/ptesthai or ,greek3 to kineisthai72 7#b7 ,the possible1 whether it be the strictly possible1 or the easily possible2 7#c7 ,that of which there is generation out of the nonexistent into existence1 whether it now does actually exist1 or may exist hereafter4 ,the ,destructible and ,indestructible 7,greek3 phtharton kai a7_/phtharton7 have similar differences of meaning 7ss4 #a-f74 ,if we say that a man can raise a weight of #ajj pounds1 or march #ajj stadia1 we speak always with reference to a certain extreme1 meaning to imply that he can also raise a weight of #ej1 #dj1 #cj pounds1 and that he can also walk #ej1 #dj1 #cj stadia4 ,if we say that he cannot raise a weight of #ajj pounds1 we mean to imply1 fortiori1 that he cannot raise a weight of #aaj pounds4 ,in regard to sight and hearing1 the case is opposite2 he who can see a small object1 can certainly see a large one2 he who can hear a faint sound1 can certainly hear a loud one4 ,but he who can see a large object1 is not necessarily able to see a small one2 he who can hear a loud sound1 is not necessarily able to hear a faint one4 ,in sight and hearing1 superior power is indicated by the less including the greater2 in motion1 by the greater including the less 7ss4 #g-h74 ,,ch4 #ab4--;,if there are some things capable both of existence and of nonexistence1 we must define on which falls the major portion of time2 for1 if we cannot in either case define the time1 and can only say that it is greater than any assumed length of time and never less than any assumed length1--the same thing will be capable both of existence and of non-existence for an infinite time2 which is an impossibility4 ,we must take our departure from this principle3 ,impossibility is one thing1 ,falsehood another4 ,both the impossible and the false are1 however1 either conditional 7as when it is said to be impossible that the triangle should have its three angles equal to two right angles1 if such and such things are granted1 and that the diameter should be commensurate with the periphery1 if such and such positions were true71 or absolute4 ,but there are matters absolutely false1 which are not absolutely impossible4 ,when you are standing1 ,i affirm that you are sitting3 this is absolutely false1 but not absolutely impossible4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i affirm that you are at the same time sitting and standing1 or that the diameter is commensurable with the periphery1 the proposition is not merely absolutely false1 but absolutely impossible4 ,an assumption simply false is not the same thing as an assumption absolutely impossible3 from an impossible assumption there follow other impossibilities4 ,the power of sitting or standing means that you can do either one at any given time--one at one time1 the other at another2 but not that you can do both at the same time4 ,but1 if any thing has throughout an infinite time the power of doing more things than one1 it must have the power of doing more things than one at the same time2 for this infinite time comprehends its whole existence4 ,accordingly1 if any thing existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible1 this means that it has the possibility not to exist4 ,this being a possibility1 let us imagine it realized3 then the thing in question will both exist actually for an infinite time and yet not exist2 which is a consequence not only false1 but impossible1 and thus proves the premiss assumed to be impossible 7i4e41 that a thing existing for an infinite time is nevertheless destructible74 ,we thus see that what exists always is absolutely indestructible 7ss4 #a-c74 ,it is also ungenerable2 for1 if generable1 there will be a possibility that at some time or other it did not exist4 ,that is generable1 which may possibly have not existed at some anterior time1 finite or infinite3 so that1 if ,greek3 to a7ei o7_/n cannot possibly not exist1 it cannot be generable4 ,now that which is always possible to exist1 has1 for its correlate negative 7,greek3 a7po_/phasis71 that which is not always possible to exist2 and that which is always possible not to exist1 has1 for its contrary1 that which is not always possible not to exist4 ,these two negatives must of necessity be true of the same subject3 there must be something of which we may truly say--,it has no possibility always to exist--,it has no possibility always not to exist4 ,this therefore is something intermediate between that which always exists1 and that which always exists not1 viz41 ,that which may exist and may not exist 7,greek3 kai ei7nai me_/son tou a7ei o7_/ntos kai tou a7ei m o7_/ntos1 to duna_/menon ei7nai kai m ei7nai72 for both the negative predicates will find application1 if it do not exist always4 ,the possible to exist1 and the possible not to exist1 must therefore be the same thing--a mean between the two above-mentioned extremes 7ss4 #d1 #e74 ,after a long metaphysical deduction1 occupying from sections #f to #ag1 ,aristotle proceeds as follows4 ,we may also discern in the following manner that nothing which has been once generated1 can continue indestructible2 nothing which is ungenerable and which always existed heretofore1 can ever be destroyed4 ,for it is impossible that any thing which arises spontaneously 7,greek3 a7po tou au7toma_/tou7 can be either indestructible or ungenerable4 ,the ,spontaneous1 and the ,casual 7,greek3 to a7po ts tu_/chs71 are in antithesis to the always or the most frequently ,ens or ,fiens 7,greek3 para to a7ei kai to 7s e7pi to polu 7 o7n 7 gino_/menon--s4 #ah72 but that which has existed for an infinite or a very long tine1 must belong to this last category4 ,accordingly1 such things must by nature sometimes exist1 sometimes not exist4 ,in them1 both sides of the contradiction are alike true1 owing to the matter of which they are composed3 they exist1 and they do not exist4 ,but you cannot say with truth now that the thing exists last year2 nor could you say last year that it exists now4 ,having once been non-existent1 it cannot be eternal for future time2 for it will still possess in future time the possibility of non-existence1 yet not the power of non-existing at the moment when it does exist1 nor with reference to last year and to past time2 there being no power bearing upon past time1 but only on present and future time4 7,sections #ba and #bb are hardly intelligible to me47 ,on physical grounds also it appears impossible that what is eternal in the past should be destroyed afterwards1 or that what did not exist at some former time should afterwards be eternal4 ,those things which are destructible1 are all of them generable and changeable 7,greek3 gennta kai a7lloita pa_/nta74 ,those things which exist by nature1 are changed by their opposites and by their component materials1 and are destroyed by the same agencies 7s4 #bc74 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,book ,,ii4 ,,ch4 #a4--,the ,heaven has not been generated nor can it be destroyed1 as some 7,plato7 affirm3 it is one and eternal1 having neither beginning nor end of the whole on1 holding and comprehending in itself infinite time4 ,this we may believe not merely from the foregoing reasonings1 but also from the opinion of opponents who suppose the ,cosmos to be generated4 ,for1 since their opinion has been shown to be inadmissible1 and our doctrine is at least admissible1 even thus much will have great force to determine our faith in the immortality and eternity of the ,heaven4 ,hence we shall do well to assist in persuading ourselves that the ancient doctrines1 and especially those of our own country1 are true--,that there is among the substances endowed with motion one immortal and divine1 whose motion is such that it has itself no limit but is rather itself the limit of all other motions1 limit being the attribute of the circumscribing substance4 ,the circular motion of the ,heaven1 being itself perfect1 circumscribes and comprehends all the imperfect motions which are subject to limit and cessation4 ,it has itself neither beginning nor end1 but is unceasing throughout infinite time3 in regard to other motions1 it is the initiatory cause to some1 while it is the recipient of the cessation of others 7ss4 #a1 #b74 ,the ancients assigned ,heaven to the ,gods1 as the only place which was immortal1 and our reasonings show that it is not merely indestructible and ungenerable1 but also unsusceptible of all mortal defect or discomfort4 ,moreover it feels no fatigue1 because it is not constrained by any extraneous force to revolve contrary to its own nature3 if it were so1 that would be tiresome1 and all the more since the motion is eternal2 it would be inconsistent with any supremely good condition4 ,the ancients therefore were mistaken in saying that the ,heaven required to be supported by a person named ,atlas3 the authors of this fable proceeded upon the same supposition as recent philosophers2 regarding the celestial body as heavy and earthy1 they placed under it1 in mythical guise1 an animated necessity 7,greek3 a7na_/gkn e7_/mpsuchon71 or constraint arising from vital force4 ,but they are wrong2 and so is ,empedokles1 when he says that the ,heaven is kept permanently in its place by extreme velocity of rotation1 which counteracts its natural inclination downwards 7,greek3 oi7kei_/as r7ops74 ,nor can we reasonably suppose that it is kept eternally in its place 7i4e41 contrary to its own nature7 by the compulsion of a soul or vital force 7,greek3 u7po psuchs a7nagkazou_/ss73 it is impossible that the life of a soul thus acting can be painless or happy4 ,the motion which it causes1 being accompanied with violence and being also perpetual 7as it is the nature of the ,first ,body to cause motion continuously throughout the ,kosmos71 must be a tiresome duty1 unrelieved by any reasonable relaxation2 since this soul enjoys no repose1 such as the letting down of the body during sleep affords to the soul of mortal animals1 but is subjected to a fate like ,ixion's--ceaseless and unyielding revolution4 ,now our reasonings1 if admissible1 respecting the ,first or ,circular ,motion 7,greek3 pr_/ts phoras7 afford not merely more harmonious conceptions respecting its eternity1 but also the only way of speaking in language which will be allowed as consistent with the vague impressions respecting the ,deity 7,greek3 t mantei_/a t peri ton theo_/n74 ,enough1 however1 of this talk for the present 7ss4 #c-f74 ,,ch4 #b4--,since the ,pythagoreans and others recognize a ,right and ,left in the ,heaven1 let us enquire whether such ,greek3 a7rchai_/ can properly be ascribed to the body of the ,universe2 for1 if these can be ascribed1 much more may the other ,greek3 a7rchai_/ prior to them be ascribed to it4 ,of ,greek3 a7rchai_/ kin_/ses 7termini a quibus71 there are three couples3 7#a7 ,upwards and ,downwards2 7#b7 ,forward and ,backward2 7#c7 ,right and ,left4 ,all the three exist in animals2 but the first alone is found in plants4 ,all the three are in all perfect bodies1 and in all animated bodies which have in themselves a beginning of motion2 but not in inanimate bodies1 which have not in themselves a beginning4 ,each of these three ,greek3 a7rchai_/ or ,greek3 diasta_/seis is true and appropriate as an attribute2 but among the three1 ,upwards and ,downwards comes first in the order of nature1 ,right and ,left1 last4 ,the ,pythagoreans are to be blamed for dwelling on ,right and ,left1 and not noticing the other two pairs which are prior in the order of nature and more appropriate1 and for supposing that ,right and ,left are to be found in every thing4 ,upward is the principle of length2 ,right1 of breadth2 ,forward1 of depth4 ,again1 from upward movement comes growth2 movement from the right is local movement2 movement from before is movement of sense 7,greek3 7 kata tn ai7_/sthsin71 or the line in which sensible impressions are propagated 7,greek3 e7ph' 7 ai7sth_/seis74 ,up is the source from whence motion originates 7,greek3 to o7_/then 7 ki_/nsis--s4 #f72 ,right1 the point from which the direction of the motion starts2 ,forward1 the point towards which it goes 7,greek3 to e7ph' o7_/74 ,in inanimate bodies 7which are either not moved at all1 or only moved in one manner and direction1 as fire only upwards1 earth only downwards71 we speak of above and below1 right and left1 only with reference to ourselves1 and not as attributes really belonging to these objects2 for by inverting the objects these attributes will be inverted also1 right will become left1 and left will become right4 ,but in animated objects1 which have in themselves an ,greek3 a7rch kin_/ses1 a real right and left1 a real upward and downward1 are to be recognized3 of course therefore in the ,heaven1 which is an animated object of this character 7,greek3 e7_/mpsuchos74 ,for we must not make any difficulty in consequence of the spherical figure of the universe1 or suppose that such a figure excludes real right and left1 the parts being all alike and all in perpetual motion4 ,we must conceive the case as like that of a person having a real right and left1 distinct in attributes1 but who has been enclosed in a hollow sphere3 he will still have the real distinct right and left1 yet to a spectator outside he will appear not to have it4 ,in like manner1 we must speak of the ,heaven as having a beginning of motion2 for1 though its motion never did begin1 yet there must be some point from which it would have taken its departure1 if it ever had begun1 and from which it would recommence1 if it ever came to a standstill4 ,i call the length of the ,heaven1 the distance between the poles--one of the poles above1 the other below4 ,now the pole which is above us1 is the lower pole2 that which is invisible to us1 is the upper pole4 ,for that is called right1 in each object1 from whence local movement takes its departure1 or where local movement begins4 ,but the revolution of the ,heaven begins on the side where the stars rise2 this1 therefore1 is the true right1 and the side on which they set1 is left4 ,if1 therefore1 it begins from the right1 and revolves round to the right 7,greek3 e7pi ta de_/xia periphe_/retai71 the invisible pole must be the upper pole2 for1 if the visible pole were the upper1 the movement of the ,heaven would be to the left1 which we deny to be the fact4 ,the invisible pole is therefore the upper1 and those who live near it are in the upper hemisphere1 and to the right 7,greek3 pros tois dexi_/ois72 we on the contrary are in the lower hemisphere1 and to the left4 ,the ,pythagoreans are in error when they say that we are in the upper hemisphere1 and to the right1 and that inhabitants of the southern hemisphere are in the lower hemisphere and to the left4 ,but1 speaking with reference to the second revolution 7,greek3 ts deute_/ras periphoras7 or that of the planets1 which is in the contrary direction to the first revolution or that of the ,first ,heaven1 it is we who are in the upper hemisphere and on the right side2 it is the inhabitants of the southern hemisphere1 who are in the lower hemisphere and on the left side3 that is1 it is we who are on the side of the beginning of motion1 they who are on the side of the end 7ss4 #a-aj74 ,,ch4 #c4--;,i have previously laid it down1 that circular movement is not opposite to circular4 ,but1 if this be the case1 what is the reason that there are many different revolutions in the ,heaven8 ,this is what ,i shall now enquire1 fully aware of the great distance from which the enquiry must be conducted 7,greek3 po_/r7r7then7--not so much a distance in place1 as owing to the small number of accompanying facts which can be observed by the senses respecting them4 ,the cause must be looked for in this direction4 ,every thing which performs a work1 exists for the sake of that work4 ,now the work of ,deity is immortality1 or eternal life2 so that the divine substance must of necessity be in eternal motion4 ,the ,heaven is a divine body and has for that reason the encyclical body1 whose nature it is to be moved for ever in a circle4 ,but why is not the whole body of the ,heaven thus constituted 7i4e41 encyclical78 ,because it is necessary that some portion of its body should remain stationary in the centre2 and no portion of the encyclical body can possibly remain stationary1 either in the centre or elsewhere4 ,for1 if it could1 its natural motion 7i4e41 the motion of that supposed portion7 would be towards the centre2 whereas its natural motion is circular2 and it cannot move towards the centre contrary to its nature1 because on that supposition its motion would not be eternal3 no motion contrary to nature can be eternal4 ,moreover that which is contrary to nature is posterior to that which is natural2 it is a deviation therefrom arising in the course of generation 7s4 #a74 ,hence it is necessary that earth should exist1 the nature of which it is to rest in the centre 7i4e41 the divine encyclical body will not suffice alone1 without adjuncts of different nature74 ,i assume this for the present2 more will be said about it anon4 ,but1 if earth exists1 fire must exist also2 for of two contraries1 if the one exist by nature1 the other must exist by nature also4 ,for the matter of contraries is the same1 and ,form 7positive and affirmable7 is prior by nature to ,privation 7for example1 hot is prior to cold72 now rest and gravity denote the privation of motion and lightness 7s4 #b--;i4e41 fire is prior in nature to earth1 as having the positive essences motion and levity1 while earth has for its essence the privation thereof74 ,again1 if fire and earth exist1 the two other elements intermediate between them must also exist2 for each of the four elements has its peculiar mode of contrariety with reference to each4 ,at least let this be assumed now3 ,i shall show it at length presently4 ,now1 these points being established1 we see that generation must necessarily come to pass1 because no one of the four elements can be eternal3 they act upon each other1 and suffer from each other1 with contrary effects2 they are destructive of each other4 ,besides1 each of them has a mode of motion natural and appropriate to it1 but this mode of motion is not eternal 7because it is either to the centre or to the circumference and therefore has a natural terminus74 ,it is not reasonable to suppose that any ,mobile can be eternal1 whose natural mode of motion cannot be eternal 7s4 #c74 ,thus the four elements are not eternal1 but require to be renewed by generation2 therefore generation must come to pass4 ,but1 if generation be necessary1 more than one revolution of the celestial body is indispensably required3 two at least1 if not more4 ,for1 if there were no other revolution except that of the ,first ,heaven1 that is consistent only with a perfectly uniform condition of the four elements in relation to each other 7s4 #d74 ,when the question is asked1 therefore1 ,why there are 7not one only but7 several encyclical bodies8 ,i answer3 ,because generation must come to pass4 ,there must be generation1 if there be fire2 there must be fire and the other elements1 if there be earth2 there must be earth1 because something must remain stationary eternally in the centre1 if there is to be eternal revolution 7s4 #e74 ,,ch4 #d4--,the ,heaven is by necessity spherical3 this figure is at once both most akin to its essence and first in its own nature4 ,i shall begin with some observations respecting figures generally--plane and solid1 as to which among them is the first4 ,every plane figure is either rectilinear or curvilinear2 the former is comprehended by many lines1 the latter only by one4 ,now1 since in every department one is prior to many and simple to compound1 the first of all plane figures must be the circle4 ,moreover1 since that is perfect which can receive nothing additional from without1 and since addition can be made to every straight line1 but none whatever to the line circumscribing a circle1 it is plain that this latter is perfect2 and therefore the circle is the first of all plane figures1 and the sphere of all solid figures 7ss4 #a1 #b74 ,this doctrine appears most reasonable when we set out the different figures1 each with a number belonging to it in numerical order4 ,the circle corresponds to ,one1 the triangle to ,two1 since its three angles are equal to two right angles2 whereas1 if we assign number ,one to the triangle and place that first1 we can find no number fit for the circle3 the circle will be no longer recognized as a figure 7s4 #d74 ,now1 since the first figure belongs to the first body1 which is that in the extreme or farthest circumference1 this body which revolves constantly in a circle1 will be spherical in figure4 ,that which is continuous with it even to the centre1 will also be spherical2 and all the interior parts are in contact and continuity with it3 the parts below the sphere of the planets touch the sphere above them4 ,so that the whole revolving current1 interior and exterior1 will be spherical2 for all things touch and are continuous with the spheres 7s4 #e74 ,there is another reason too why the universe is spherical in figure1 since it has been shown to revolve in a circle4 ,i have proved before that there exists nothing on the outside of the universe2 neither place nor vacuum4 ,if the figure of the ,kosmos1 revolving as it does in a circle1 were any thing else but spherical--if it were either rectilinear or elliptical--it could not possibly cover exactly the same space during all its revolutions3 there must therefore be place and vacuum without it2 which has been shown to be impossible 7s4 #f74 ,farthermore1 the rotation of the ,heaven is the measure of motions1 because it is the only one continuous and uniform and eternal4 ,now in every department the measure is the least1 and the least motion is the quickest2 accordingly the rotation of the ,heaven will be the quickest of all motions 7s4 #g74 ,but among all curved lines from the same back to the same1 the circumference of the circle is the shortest1 and motion will be quickest over the shortest distance4 ,accordingly1 since the ,heaven revolves in a circle and with the quickest of all motions1 its figure must be spherical 7s4 #h74 ,we may also draw the same conclusion from the bodies fixed in the central parts of the ,kosmos4 ,the ,earth in the centre is surrounded by water2 the water1 by air2 the air1 by fire4 ,the uppermost bodies surround the fire1 following the like proportion or analogy2 being not continuous therewith1 but in contact therewith4 ,now the surface of water is spherical2 and that which is either continuous with the spherical or surrounds the spherical1 must itself be spherical also 7s4 #i74 ,that the surface of the water is truly spherical1 we may infer from the fact1 that it is the nature of water always to flow together into the lowest cavities1 that is1 into the parts nearest to the centre 7s4 #aj74 ,from all the foregoing reasonings1 we see plainly that the ,kosmos is spherical1 and moreover turned with such a degree of exact sphericity 7,greek3 kata a7kri_/beian e7_/ntornos ou7_/ts71 that no piece of human workmanship nor any thing ever seen by us on earth can be compared to it4 ,for none of the component materials here on earth is so fit for receiving perfect level and accuracy as the nature of the ,first or ,peripheral ,body2 it being clear that1 in the same proportion as water is more exactly spherical1 the elements surrounding the water become more and more spherical in proportion as they are more and more distant from the centre 7s4 #aa74 ,,ch4 #e4--;,circular revolution may take place in two directions2 from the point ,a on one side towards ,b1 or on the other side towards ,c4 ,that these two are not contrary to each other1 ,i have already shown4 ,but1 since in eternal substances nothing can possibly take place by chance or spontaneity1 and since both the ,heaven and its circular revolution are eternal1 we may enquire what is the reason why this revolution takes place in one direction and not in the other4 ,this circumstance either depends upon some first principle1 or is itself a first principle 7s4 #a74 ,perhaps some may consider it a mark either of great silliness1 or great presumption1 to declare any positive opinion at all upon some matters1 or upon all matters whatever1 leaving out nothing4 ,but we must not censure indiscriminately all who do this3 we must consider what is the motive which prompts each person to declare himself1 and with what amount of confidence he affirms1 whether allowing for human fallibility or setting himself above it4 ,whenever a man can find out exact and necessary grounds for the conclusions which he propounds1 we ought to be grateful to him3 here we must deliver what appears to be the truth4 ,nature 7we know7 always does what is best among all the practicable courses4 ,now the upper place is more divine than the lower1 and accordingly among rectilinear currents1 that which is directed upwards is the more honourable4 ,in the same manner1 the current forwards is more honourable than backwards2 and the current towards the right more honourable than that towards the left--as was before laid down4 ,the problem above started indicates to us that there is here a real ,prius and ,posterius--a better and a worse2 for1 when we recognize this1 the difficulty is solved4 ,the solution is that this is the best practicable arrangement1 viz41 that the ,kosmos is moved in a motion1 simple1 never-ending1 and in the most honourable direction 7,greek3 e7pi to timi_/teron1 s4 #b74 ,,ch4 #f4--;,i have now to show that this motion of the ,first ,heaven is uniform and not irregular 7,greek3 o7mals kai ou7k a7n_/malos73 ,i speak only of the ,first ,heaven and of the ,first ,rotation2 for in the substances lower than this many rotations or currents have coalesced into one4 ,if the motion of the ,first ,heaven be irregular1 there will clearly be acceleration and remission of its motion1 and an extreme point or maximum 7,greek3 a7km_/7 thereof4 ,now the maximum of motion must take place either at the terminus ad quem1 as in things moved according to nature2 or at the terminus a quo1 as in things moved contrary to nature2 or during the interval between1 as in things thrown 7,greek3 e7n tois r7iptoume_/nois74 ,but in circular motion1 there is neither terminus a quo1 nor terminus ad quem1 nor middle between the two--neither beginning1 nor end1 nor mean2 for it is eternal in duration1 compact as to length or space moved over1 and unbroken 7,greek3 t m_/kei sungme_/n kai a7_/klastos74 ,it thus cannot have any maximum or acceleration or remission2 and of course1 therefore1 it cannot be irregular 7s4 #a74 ,besides1 since every thing that is moved is moved by some thing1 the irregularity1 if there be such1 must arise either from the ,movens1 or the ,motum1 or both3 the power of the ,movens1 or the quality of the ,motum1 or both1 must undergo change4 ,but nothing of the sort can happen with the ,motum1 being in this case the ,heaven2 for it has been shown to be a ,first1 simple1 ungenerable1 indestructible1 and in every way unchangeable4 ,much more then is it reasonable to believe that the ,movens is such2 for that which is qualified to move the ,first1 must be itself a ,first 7,greek3 to gar prton tou pr_/tou kintiko_/n72 that which is qualified to move the simple1 must be itself simple1 c4 ,if then the ,motum1 which is a body1 undergoes no change1 neither will the ,movens1 being as it is incorporeal 7s4 #b74 ,accordingly the current1 or motion 7,greek3 phora_/71 cannot possibly be irregular4 ,for1 if it comes to pass irregularly1 its irregularity either pervades the whole1 the velocity becoming alternately more or less1 or certain parts only4 ,but1 in regard to the parts separately1 there is certainly no irregularity3 if there had been1 the relative distances of the stars one from the other would have varied in the course of infinite time2 now no such variation in their distances has ever been observed4 ,neither in regard to the whole is there any irregularity4 ,for irregularity implies relaxation1 and relaxation arises in every subject from impotence4 ,now impotence is contrary to nature3 in animals1 all impotences 7such as old age or decay7 are contrary to nature2 for all animals1 perhaps1 are compounds put together out of elements each of which has a different place of its own and not one of which is in its own place4 ,in the ,first ,bodies1 on the other hand1 which are simple1 unmixed1 in their own places1 and without any contrary1 there can be no impotence1 and therefore neither relaxation nor intensification1 which always go together 7,greek3 ei7 gar e7pi_/tasis1 kai a7_/nesis1 s4 #c74 ,besides1 we cannot with any reason suppose that the ,movens is impotent for an infinite time1 and then again potent for an infinite time2 nothing contrary to nature lasts for an infinite time1 and impotence is contrary to nature2 nor can it be for an equal time contrary to nature and agreeable to nature--impotent and potent4 ,if the motion relaxes1 it cannot go on relaxing for an infinite time1 nor go on being intensified1 nor the one and the other alternately4 ,for in that case the motion would be infinite and indeterminate2 which is impossible1 since every motion must be from one term to another term and also determinate 7s4 #d3 ,greek3 a7_/peiros gar a7n ei7_/ kai a7o_/ristos 7 ki_/nsis4 a7_/pasan de_/ phamen e7_/k tinos ei7_/s ti ei7nai1 kai 7risme_/nn--i4e41 all motion must be determined both in distance and direction74 ,again1 the supposition may be made that there is a minimum of time required for the revolution of the ,heaven1 in less than which the revolution could not be completed2 just as there is a minimum of time indispensable for a man to walk or play the harp4 ,admitting this supposition1 there cannot be perpetual increase in the intensity or velocity of the motion 7the increase has an impassable limit71 and therefore there cannot be perpetual relaxation2 for both are on the same footing 7s4 #e74 ,it might be urged1 indeed1 that intensification and relaxation go on alternately2 each proceeding to a certain length1 and then giving place to the other4 ,but this is altogether irrational--nothing better than a gratuitous fiction4 ,besides1 if there were this alternation1 we may reasonably assume that it could not remain concealed from us2 for contrasting conditions coming in immediate sequence to each other are more easily discerned by sense4 ,what has been said1 then1 is sufficient to prove--,that the ,heaven or ,cosmos is one and only one2 that it is ungenerable and eternal2 that its motion is uniform 7s4 #f74 ,,ch4 #g4--,next in order1 ,i have to speak of what are called the ,stars 7,greek3 tn kaloume_/nn a7_/strn74 ,of what are they composed8 ,what is their figure8 ,what are their motions8 ,it is consistent with the foregoing reasonings1 as well as in itself the most rational doctrine1 to conceive each of the stars as composed of portions of that body in which its current of motion takes place2 that is1 of that body1 whose nature it is to move in a circle4 ,for those who affirm the stars to be fire say this because they believe the upper body to be fire1 assuming it as reasonable that each thing should be composed of the elements in which it is2 and ,i assume the same also 7s4 #a74 ,the heat and light of the stars arises from their friction with the air in their current of motion4 ,if it is the nature of motion to inflame pieces of wood1 and stones1 and iron1 it is still more reasonable that what is nearest to fire 7that is1 air7 should be so inflamed4 ,we see that darts projected are so inflamed1 that their leaden appendages are melted2 and1 these being thus inflamed1 the air around them must be modified in the same manner4 ,now objects like these darts are thus violently heated1 because they are carried along in the medium of the air1 which through the shock given by their motion becomes fire4 ,but each of the upper bodies or stars is carried round 7not in the air1 but7 in its appropriate sphere1 so that they themselves are not inflamed2 while the air which is under the sphere of the encyclical body becomes of necessity heated by the rotation of that sphere2 and most of all at the point where the ,sun has happened to be fastened in 7,greek3 kai tau_/t ma_/lista1 7 o7 7_/lios tetu_/chken e7ndedeme_/nos74 ,let it then be understood1 that the stars are neither composed of fire1 nor are they carried round in the medium of the fire 7s4 #b74 ,,ch4 #h4--;,it is seen as a fact1 that both the stars1 and the entire ,heaven1 change their place 7,greek3 methista_/mena74 ,now1 in this change1 we must assume either that both continue at rest1 or that both are in motion1 or that one is at rest1 and the other is in motion4 ,now it is impossible that both can be at rest1 at least if we assume the earth to be at rest2 for the facts which we see would not have taken place1 upon that supposition 7s4 #a74 ,either therefore both are in motion1 or one is in motion and the other at rest4 ,now1 if both are in motion1 it is against reason that the stars and the circles in which they are fastened should have equal velocities of motion4 ,each one of them must1 be equal in velocity to the circle or sphere in which it is carried1 since all come back round along with their circles to the same position2 so that in one and the same time1 the star has gone round its circle1 and the circle has completed its revolution4 ,it is not reasonable to suppose that the velocities of the stars and the magnitudes of the circles should be in the same proportion4 ,comparing one circle with another1 indeed1 it is not only not absurd1 but even necessary1 that the velocities should be in proportion to the magnitudes2 but it is not reasonable that each of the stars in these circles should be of such velocity4 ,for1 if it be necessary that what is carried round in the larger circle should have the greater velocity1 the consequence would be that1 if the stars in one circle were transferred to another1 their motions would become accelerated or retarded2 which is equivalent to saying that they have no motion of their own at all1 but are carried round by the revolution of the circles 7s4 #b74 ,if1 on the contrary1 it be not necessary1 but a spontaneous coincidence 7,greek3 ei7_/te a7po tau7toma_/tou sune_/pesen7 that what is carried round in the greater circle has the greater velocity1 neither upon this supposition is it reasonable that in all the circles without exception the circumference should be greater1 and the motion of the star fastened in the greater circle quicker1 in the same proportion4 ,that this should happen with one or two of them1 might be reasonably expected2 but that it should happen with all alike1 savours of fiction4 ,moreover chance has no place in matters according to nature2 nor is that which occurs everywhere and belongs to all1 ever the produce of chance 7s4 #c74 ,so much for the hypothesis1 that both stars and circles are in motion4 ,let us now assume that one is at rest1 and the other in motion2 and first1 let the circles be at rest1 and the stars in motion4 ,this again will lead to absurdities2 for we shall still be unable to explain how it happens that the outermost stars are moved most quickly1 and that their velocities are proportioned to the magnitudes of the circles4 ,since then we cannot assume either that both are moved1 or that the star alone is moved1 we must adopt the third supposition1 that the circles are moved1 and that the stars1 being themselves at rest1 are fastened in the circles and carried round along with them4 ,this is the only hypothesis which entails no unreasonable consequences4 ,for it is reasonable that1 of circles fastened round the same centre1 the greater velocity should belong to the greatest4 ,for1 as in all the varieties of body the heavier fragment is carried with greater velocity than the lighter in its appropriate motion1 so it happens with the encyclical body4 ,when two straight lines are drawn from the centre1 the segment of the greater circle intercepted between them will be greater than the segment of the smaller2 and it is consistent with reason that the greater circle should be carried round in equal time4 ,this is one reason why the ,kosmos is not split into separate parts2 another reason is1 because the universe has been shown to be continuous 7s4 #d1 #e74 ,now we all agree that the stars are of spherical figure3 and spherical bodies have two motions of their own--rolling and rotatory 7,greek3 ku_/lisis kai di_/nsis74 ,if they were moved of themselves1 they would be moved in one or other of these two ways2 but we see that they are so in neither4 ,they do not rotate2 for1 if they did1 they would remain always in the same place1 which contradicts universal observation and belief4 ,besides1 it is reasonable to suppose that all the stars move in the same manner1 but the ,sun is the only one that is seen so to move1 when he rises or sets2 and he too1 not by any movement of his own1 but through the distance of our vision1 which when stretched to a great distance1 rotates from weakness 7s4 #f74 ,this is perhaps the reason why the stars fastened 7in the outer sphere7 twinkle1 while the planets do not twinkle2 for the planets are near to us1 so that our vision reaches them while yet strong2 whereas in regard to the unmoved stars it is made to quiver in consequence of the great distance from being stretched out too far1 and its quivering causes the appearance of motion in the star4 ,for there is no difference between moving the vision and moving the object seen 7,greek3 ou7then gar diaphe_/rei kinein tn o7_/psin 7 to o7r_/menon--s4 #f74 ,again1 neither do the stars roll nor revolve forward4 ,for that which rolls forward must necessarily turn round2 but the same side of the moon--what is called the face of the moon--is always clearly visible to us 7s4 #g74 ,since it is reasonable to believe1 therefore1 that1 if the stars were moved in themselves1 they would be moved in their own special variety of motion 7i4e41 rolling or rotatory71 and since it has been shown that they are not moved in either of these two ways1 we see plainly that they cannot be moved in themselves 7but are carried round in the revolution of the ,aplans74 ,besides1 if they were moved in 9999themselves1 it is unreasonable that ,nature should have assigned to them no organ suitable for motion1 since ,nature does nothing by haphazard2 and that she should have been considerate in providing for animals1 while she overlooked objects so honourable as the stars4 ,the truth rather is1 that she has withheld from them1 as it were by express purpose1 all aids1 through which it was possible for them to advance forward in themselves1 and has placed them at the greatest possible distance from objects furnished with organs for motion 7s4 #h74 ,hence it would seem to be the reasonable doctrine--,that the entire ,heaven is spherical1 and that each of the stars 7fastened in it7 is also spherical4 ,for the sphere is the most convenient of all figures for motion in the same place1 so that the ,heaven being spherical would be moved most rapidly and would best maintain its own place4 ,but for forward motion the sphere is of all figures the most inconvenient2 for it least resembles self-moving bodies2 it has no outlying appendage or projecting end1 as rectilinear figures have1 and stands farthest removed from the figures of marching bodies4 ,since therefore it is the function of 7,greek3 dei7 the ,heaven to be moved by a motion in the same place 7,greek3 kineisthai tn e7n au7t ki_/nsin71 and that of the stars not to make any advance by themselves 7,greek3 ta a7_/lla d' a7_/stra m proie_/nai di' au7tn71 it is with good reason that both of them are spherical4 ,for thus will the ,heaven best be moved1 and the stars will best be at rest4 ,,ch4 #i4--;,from what ,i have said1 it is plain that those who affirm that the revolving celestial bodies emit in their revolutions sounds harmonious to each other1 speak cleverly and ingeniously1 but not consistently with the truth4 ,there must necessarily be sound 7they say7 from the revolution of such vast bodies4 ,since bodies near to us make sound in motion1 the sun1 moon1 and stars1 being so much larger and moving with so much greater velocity1 must make an immense sound2 and1 since their distances and velocities are assumed to be in harmonic proportion1 the sounds emitted in their revolution must also be in harmony4 ,to the question put to them--,why do we not hear this immense sound8 they reply1 that we have been hearing it constantly from the moment of our birth2 that we have no experience of an opposite state1 or state of silence1 with which to contrast it1 and that sound and silence are discriminated only by relation to each other 7,greek3 7_/ste m dia_/dlon ei7nai pros tn e7nanti_/an sig_/n2 pros a7_/llla gar phns kai sigs ei7nai tn dia_/gnsin72 that men thus cease to be affected by it1 just as blacksmiths from constant habit cease to be affected by the noise of their own work 7s4 #a74 ,the reasoning of these philosophers 7the ,pythagoreans71 as ,i have just said1 is graceful and poetical1 yet nevertheless inadmissible4 ,for they ought to explain1 upon their hypothesis1 not merely why we hear nothing1 but why we experience no uncomfortable impressions apart from hearing4 ,for prodigious sounds pierce through and destroy the continuity even of inanimate bodies2 thus thunder splits up stones and other bodies of the greatest strength4 ,the impression produced here by the sound of the celestial bodies must be violent beyond all endurance4 ,but there is good reason why we neither hear nor suffer any thing from them2 viz41 that they make no sound4 ,the cause thereof is one which attests the truth of my doctrine laid down above--,that the stars are not moved of themselves1 but carried round by and in the circle to which they are fastened4 ,bodies thus carried round1 make no sound or shock3 it is only bodies carried round of themselves that make sound and shock4 ,bodies which are fastened in1 or form parts of1 a revolving body1 cannot possibly sound1 any more than the parts of a ship moving1 nor indeed could the whole ship sound1 if carried along in a running river4 ,yet the ,pythagoreans might urge just the same reasons to prove that bodies so large as the mast1 the stern1 and the entire ship1 could not be moved without noise4 ,whatever is carried round1 indeed1 in a medium not itself carried round1 really makes sound2 but it cannot do so1 if the medium itself be carried round continuously4 ,we must therefore in this case maintain that1 if the vast bodies of the stars were carried round in a medium either of air or of fire 7whose motion is rectilinear71 as all men say that they are1 they must necessarily make a prodigious sound1 which would reach here to us and would wear us out 7,greek3 diaknai_/ein74 ,since nothing of this nature occurs1 we may be sure that the stars are not carried round in a current of their own1 either animated or violent4 ,it is as if ,nature had foreseen the consequence1 that1 unless the celestial motions were carried on in the manner in which they are carried on1 nothing of what now takes place near us 7,greek3 tn peri ton deuro to_/pon71 could have been as it is now4 ,i have thus shown that the stars are spherical1 and that they are not moved by a motion of their own 7ss4 #b-e74 ,,ch4 #aj4--,respecting the arrangement of the stars--how each of them is placed1 some anterior others posterior1 and what are their distances from each other--the books on astronomy must be consulted and will explain4 ,it consists with the principles there laid down1 that the motions of the stars 7planets7 should be proportional to their distances1 some quicker1 others slower4 ,for1 since the farthest circle of the ,heaven has a revolution both simple and of extreme velocity1 while the revolutions of the other stars 7planets7 are many in number and slower1 each of them being carried round in its own circle in the direction contrary to that of the first or farthest circle of the ,heaven1 the reasonable consequence is1 that that planet which is nearest to the first and simple revolving circle takes the longest time to complete its own 7counter-revolving7 circle1 while that which is most distant from the same circle takes the shortest time1 and the remaining planets take more or less time in proportion as they are nearer or farther4 ,for the planet nearest to the first revolving circle has its own counterrevolution most completely conquered or overpowered thereby2 the planet farthest from the same1 has its own counterrevolution least conquered thereby2 and the intermediate planets more or less in inverse proportion to their distances from the same1 as mathematicians demonstrate4 ,,ch4 #aa4--,we may most reasonably assume the figure of the stars to be spherical4 ,for1 since we have shown that it is not their nature to have any motion of their own1 and since ,nature does nothing either irrational or in vain1 it is plain that she has assigned to the immovables that figure which is least fit for motion2 which figure is the sphere1 as having no organ for motion4 ,besides1 what is true of one is true of all 7,greek3 e7_/ti d' o7moi_/s men a7_/panta kai e7_/n73 now the ,moon may be shown to be spherical1 first1 by the visible manifestations which she affords in her waxings and wanings1 next1 from astronomical observations of the eclipses of the ,sun4 ,since therefore one among the stars is shown to be spherical1 we may presume that the rest will be so likewise4 ,,ch4 #ab4--;,i proceed to two other difficulties1 which are well calculated to perplex every one4 ,we must try to state what looks most like truth1 considering such forwardness not to be of the nature of audacity1 but rather to deserve respect1 when any one1 stimulated by the thirst for philosophy1 contents himself with small helps and faint approximations to truth1 having to deal with the gravest difficulties4 #a4 ,why is it1 that the circles farthest from the outermost circle 7or ,aplans7 are not always moved by a greater number of motions than those nearer to it8 ,why are some of the intermediate circles 7neither farthest nor nearest7 moved by a greater number of motions than any of the others8 ,for it would seem reasonable1 when the ,first ,body is moved by one single rotatory current1 that the one nearest to it should be moved by two1 the next nearest by three1 and so on in regular sequence to those which are more distant4 ,but we find that the reverse occurs in fact3 ,sun and ,moon have fewer movements than some of the planets1 which are nevertheless farther from the centre1 and nearer to the ,first ,body4 ,in regard to some of the planets1 we know this by visual evidence2 for we have seen the ,moon when at half-moon passing under ,mars1 who was occulted by the dark part of her body1 and emerged on the bright side of it4 ,the like is attested respecting the other planets1 by the ,egyptians and ,babylonians1 the most ancient of all observers4 #b4 ,why is it1 that in the ,first ,revolution 7in the revolution of the ,first ,heaven or ,first ,body7 there is included so vast a multitude of stars as to seem innumerable2 while in each of the others there is one alone and apart1 never two or more fastened in the same current8 ,here are two grave difficulties1 which it is well to investigate and try to understand1 though our means of information are very scanty1 and though we stand at so great a distance from the facts4 ,still1 as far as we can make out from such data1 these difficulties would not seem to involve any philosophical impossibility or incongruity4 ,now we are in the habit of considering these celestial bodies as bodies only2 and as monads which have indeed regular arrangement1 but are totally destitute of soul or vital principle4 7,when ,aristotle here says we1 he must mean the philosophers whose point of view he is discussing3 for the general public certainly did not regard the ,sun1 ,moon1 and stars as ,greek3 a7_/psucha pa_/mpan1 but1 on the contrary1 considered this as blameable heresy1 and looked upon them as ,gods999947 ,we ought1 however1 to conceive them as partaking of life and action 7,greek3 dei d' 7s metecho_/ntn u7polamba_/nein pra_/xes kai zs72 and in this point of view the actual state of the case will appear nowise unreasonable 7s4 #b74 ,for we should naturally expect that to that which is in the best possible condition1 such well-being will belong without any agency at all2 to that which is next best1 through agency single and slight2 to such as are farther removed in excellence of condition1 through action more multiplied and diversified4 ,just so in regard to the human body3 the best constituted body maintains its good condition without any training at all2 there are others which will do the same at the cost of nothing more than a little walking2 there are inferior bodies which require1 for the same result1 wrestling1 running1 and other motions2 while there are even others which cannot by any amount of labour attain a good condition1 but are obliged to be satisfied with something short of it 7s4 #c74 ,moreover it is difficult to succeed in many things1 or to succeed often3 you may throw one or two sixes with the dice1 but you cannot throw ten thousand2 and1 farther1 when the conditions of the problem become complicated--when one thing is to be done for the sake of another1 that other for a third result1 and that third for a fourth1 c4--success1 which may be tolerably easy when the steps are only few1 the more they are multiplied1 becomes harder and harder4 ,hence we must consider the agency of the stars as analogous to that of plants and animals4 ,for here the agency of man is most multifarious1 since he is capable of attaining many varieties of good1 and accordingly busies himself about many things and about one thing for the sake of others4 ,the agency of other animals on the other hand is more restricted2 that of plants yet more so1 being of slight force and only of one special character 7s4 #d74 ,but that which exists in the best possible condition stands in no need of acting or agency2 for it already possesses that for the sake of which action is undertaken4 ,now action always includes two elements--that for the sake of which and what is for the sake thereof--the end and the means3 there is either some one end1 which the agent may attain1 as in the case of man2 or there are many different matters all of which may be used as means towards the best possible condition4 ,thus one agent possesses and partakes of the best possible condition2 another comes near to it with little trouble2 a third1 with much trouble2 a fourth does not even aspire to the end1 but is competent only to arrive near to the last of the means4 ,for example1 let health be the end3 one man is always in health2 a second becomes so1 by being starved down2 a third by that1 combined with running exercise2 a fourth is obliged to take some additional exercise1 in order to qualify himself for running1 so that his motions are multiplied2 a fifth is incapable of arriving at health1 but arrives only at the running and the being thinned down1 one of which in this case serves as end4 ,for it would be best for all1 if they could attain the supreme end--health2 but1 if that be impossible1 then the next best thing is to get as near to the best as possible 7ss4 #e-g74 ,for this reason the ,earth is not moved at all1 and the matters near the ,earth are moved with few motions2 since they do not arrive at the extreme best1 but only as near as their ability permits to obtain or hit the supremely divine principle2 while the ,first ,heaven1 on the contrary1 obtains or hits it at once1 through one single motion2 and the bodies intermediate between the ,first ,heaven and those which are last 7or nearest to the ,earth71 obtain it or arrive at it also1 but only through a greater number of motions4 ,there is the other difficulty also to be considered--that vast multitude of stars are put all together in the one single ,first ,current or ,revolution1 but each of the other stars 7planets7 has its own motions singly and apart4 ,the principal reason of this we may fairly suppose to be that it follows as a natural consequence from the vast superiority of the first1 in each variety of life and in each beginning1 over all posterior to the first4 ,here the ,first ,current or ,revolution1 being one and by itself1 moves many of the divine bodies1 while the others 7secondary or countercurrents71 numerous as they are1 move each only one2 for each one of these wandering bodies or planets is carried by many different currents4 ,thus ,nature establishes equalization and a sort of symmetry1 by assigning1 in the one case1 many bodies to one current1 and in the other1 many currents to one body 7ss4 #h-aj74 ,beside this principal reason1 there is also another4 ,the other currents have each one body only1 because motion is given to many bodies by all of them prior to the last which bears the one star4 ,for the last sphere is carried round fastened into many spheres1 and each sphere is a body 7ss4 #aa1 #ab4 ,i do not clearly understand the lines that follow3--,greek3 e7kei_/ns a7n ou7n koinon ei7_/ to e7_/rgon2 au7_/t men gar e7ka_/st 7 i7_/dios phu_/sei phora_/2 au7_/t de oi7on proskeitai4 pantos de peperasme_/nou s_/matos pros peperasme_/non 7 du_/nami_/s e7stin474#a ,footnote #a3 ,see ,prantl's note on this difficult passage in his ,german translation of the ,de ,coelo1 p4 #cji 7,leipzig1 #aheg74 ,,ch4 #ac4--;,having thus explained1 respecting the ,stars and ,planets which are carried round in circular motion1 what is their essence1 figure1 current1 and order of position1 we now proceed to speak of the ,earth3 ,what is its position8 ,whether is it at rest or in motion8 ,what is its figure8 ,philosophers differ respecting the position of the ,earth4 ,most of those who conceive the entire ,kosmos as finite1 declare the ,earth to be in its centre4 ,but the ,italian philosophers1 called ,pythagoreans1 are of an opposite opinion2 affirming that ,fire is in the centre1 and that the ,earth1 being one of the stars revolving round the centre1 makes night and day4 ,they assume moreover another ,earth opposite to this 7,greek3 e7nanti_/an a7_/lln tau_/t7--which other they call ,antichthon4 ,herein they do not adjust their theories and look out for causes adapted to the phenomena2 but1 on the contrary1 they distort the phenomena so as to suit their own doctrines and reasonings1 and try to constitute themselves auxiliary governors of the ,kosmos 7,greek3 peir_/menoi sugkosmein--s4 #a74 ,and1 if we are to look for assurance not to the phenomena but to our own reasonings1 many others might agree with them1 that it is not proper 7,greek3 m dein7 to assign to the ,earth the central place4 ,they think that the most honourable place belongs to the most honourable body1 and that ,fire is more honourable than ,earth2 that the two extremes1 centre and circumference1 are more honourable than the parts intermediate between them4 ,upon these grounds they consider that ,fire and not ,earth is at the centre of the ,universal ,sphere2 and they have another reason1 peculiar to themselves1 for this conclusion3 they hold that the centre is the most important place in the universe1 and that it ought as such to be the most carefully guarded2 wherefore they call it the watch of ,zeus 7,greek3 ,dios phulak_/n71 and regard it as occupied by ,fire 7s4 #b74 ,this assumes that what is absolutely 7i4e41 without subjoining any qualifying adjunct71 described as the centre1 is at once centre of the magnitude1 centre of the object1 and centre of nature4 ,but we ought rather to follow the analogy of animals1 where the same point is not the centre of the animal and the centre of the body3 the case is the same in the entire ,kosmos4 ,hence the ,pythagoreans need not feel any anxiety about the ,universe 7,greek3 ou7then au7tous dei thorubeisthai peri to pan71 nor introduce a guard at the centre4 ,they ought rather to enquire where and of what character the middle point is2 for that middle point is the true beginning and the honourable4 ,the middle of the place occupied is rather like an end than like a beginning2 for that which is limited is the middle1 that which limits is the boundary3 now that which comprehends and is boundary1 is more honourable than that which is bounded2 the former is the ,essence of the entire compound1 the latter is only its ,matter 7s4 #c74 ,as about the place of the ,earth1 so also about its motion or rest1 philosophers differ4 ,the ,pythagoreans and those who do not even place it at the centre1 consider it to revolve in a circle1 and they consider the ,antichthon to revolve in like manner4 ,some even think it possible that there may be many other bodies carried round the centre in like manner1 though invisible to us1 by reason of the obstructing body of the ,earth4 ,hence 7they say7 the eclipses of the moon are more frequent than those of the ,sun2 since not only the ,earth1 but also each of these unseen bodies1 causes the ,moon to be eclipsed4 ,for1 the ,earth not being a point1 we on the circumference thereof1 even assuming it to occupy the centre1 are distant from the centre by the entire hemisphere of the ,earth2 yet we do not find out that we are not in the centre1 and astronomical appearances present themselves to us just as if we were so4 ,thus it happens 7according to these philosophers71 the ,earth not being in the centre at all3 the appearances presented to us are just the same as if we were at the centre4 ,again1 there are some who 7like ,plato in ,timus7 affirm that the ,earth1 though situated in the centre1 is packed and revolves round the axis stretched across the universe 7s4 #d74 ,about the figure of the ,earth1 there is no less difference of opinion4 ,some say that it is spherical2 others1 that it is flat and in shape like a tambourine 7,greek3 tumpanoeid_/s74 ,these last adduce as proof1 that the ,sun1 at rising and setting1 exhibits a rectilinear section or eclipse of his disk and not a circular one1 when partially concealed by the ,earth1 and becoming invisible under the horizon or visible above the horizon4 ,they do not take proper account of the vast distance of the ,sun and the magnitude of his circumference4 ,the segment of a long circle appears from a distance like a straight line4 ,these philosophers further add1 that the flat tambourine-like shape must be inferred of necessity from the fact that the ,earth remains stationary 7s4 #e74 ,upon this disputed question1 a feeling of perplexity comes unavoidably upon every one4 ,it would argue a very irrational mind not to wonder how a small piece of the ,earth1 if suspended in the air1 is carried downward and will not stop of itself1 and the larger piece is carried downward more quickly than the smaller2 while nevertheless the entire ,earth1 if suspended in like manner1 would not be so carried4 ,in spite of its great weight1 it remains stationary 7s4 #f74 ,but the solutions of this problem which some suggest are more strange and full of perplexity1 and it is surprising that they have not been so considered4 ,the ,kolophonian ,xenophanes affirmed that the lower depths of the ,earth were rooted downwards to infinity1 in order to escape the troublesome obligation of looking for a reason why it remained stationary4 ,others say1 that the ,earth rests upon water1 floating thereupon like wood3 this is an ancient doctrine promulgated by ,thales2 as if there were not as much perplexity about the water which supports the ,earth1 as there is about the ,earth itself4 ,for it is not the nature of water to remain suspended1 but always to rest upon something 7s4 #g74 ,moreover1 air is lighter than water1 and water lighter than earth2 how then can these men think that the substance naturally lighter can lie below the substance naturally heavier8 ,besides1 if it were the nature of the whole ,earth to remain resting on water1 it must be the nature of each part of the ,earth to do the same2 but this does not happen3 each part of the earth is carried down to the bottom1 and the greater part more quickly than the less 7s4 #h74 ,all these philosophers carry their researches to a certain point1 but not to the bottom of the problem4 ,it is indeed a habit with all of us to conduct our enquiries not with reference to the problem itself1 but with reference to our special opponents4 ,if we have no opponent but are conducting our investigations alone1 we pursue them as far as that point where we can make no farther objections to ourselves4 ,whoever therefore intends to investigate completely must take care to make objections to himself upon all the points of objection which really belong to the subject2 and this he can only do after having thoroughly surveyed all the differences of opinion and doctrine 7s4 #i74 ,the reason why the ,earth remains at rest1 ,anaximenes1 ,anaxagoras1 and ,demokritus1 declare to be its breadth or flatness 7,greek3 to pla_/tos73 it does not 7they say7 divide the air beneath1 but covers over the air like a lid 7,greek3 ou7 gar te_/mnein1 a7ll' e7pipmati_/zein ton a7e_/ra ton ka_/tthen72 as we see that flat and spreading bodies usually do1 being difficult to be moved and making strong resistance even against the winds4 ,the ,earth does the same1 through its flatness1 against the air beneath1 which remains at rest there 7in the opinion of these philosophers7 because it finds no sufficient place into which to travel1 like water in a klepsydra3 they also produce many evidences to show that air thus imprisoned1 while remaining stationary1 can support a heavy weight 7s4 #aj74 ,now1 in the first place1 these men affirm that1 unless the shape of the ,earth were flat1 it would not remain at rest4 ,yet on their own showing it is not alone the flat shape of the earth which causes it to remain at rest1 but rather its magnitude4 ,for the air beneath remains in situ by reason of its vast mass1 finding no means of escape through the narrow passage3 and the mass of the air is thus vast1 because it is imprisoned inside by the great magnitude of the ,earth2 which effect will be produced in the same manner1 even though the ,earth be spherical1 provided it be of its present magnitude4 ,moreover1 philosophers who hold this opinion about the motion of the ,earth1 think only of its motion as a whole1 and take no account of its parts4 ,for they ought to define at the first step whether bodies have or have not one special mode of motion by nature2 and1 if none by nature1 then whether they have any mode of motion violent or contra-natural4 ,i have already determined this point as well as my powers admitted1 and shall therefore assume the results as settled4 ,if there be no special motion natural to bodies1 neither will there be any which is contra-natural or violent2 and1 if there be none either natural or violent1 no body will be moved at all4 ,i have already shown that this is a necessary consequence2 and1 farther1 that 7upon that supposition7 there can be no body even at rest2 for rest1 like motion1 is either natural or contra-natural2 and1 if there be any special mode of motion which is natural1 neither contra-natural motion1 nor contra-natural rest1 can stand alone 7ss4 #aa-ac74 ,let us then assume 7reasoning on the hypothesis of these philosophers7 that the ,earth now remains in its present place contrary to nature1 and that it was carried into aggregation at the centre by the revolution of the ,kosmos 7also contrary to nature--,greek3 kai sunlthen e7pi to me_/son pherome_/n dia tn di_/nsin--s4 #ad74 ,for all those who recognize a generation of the ,kosmos assign this revolution as the cause which determined the aggregation of the ,earth at the centre1 upon the analogy of particles carried round in liquids or in air1 where the larger and heavier particles are always carried to the centre of the revolution4 ,they profess thus to know the cause which determined the ,earth to come to the centre2 but what they seek to find out is the cause which determines it to remain there1 and upon that they differ3 some saying1 as has been stated just now1 that its breadth and magnitude is the cause2 others1 with ,empedokles1 ascribing the fact to the revolution of the ,heaven1 the extreme velocity of which checks the fall of the ,earth downward1 just as water in a cup may be whirled rapidly round without falling to the ground4 ,but suppose absence of these two causes3 in which direction will the ,earth be naturally carried8 ,not to the centre2 for 7upon the doctrine which we are now criticising7 its motion to the centre1 and its remaining at the centre1 are both of them contra-natural2 but some special mode of motion1 natural to the ,earth1 there must necessarily be4 ,is this upward1 or downward1 or in what other direction8 ,if there be no greater tendency downward than upward1 and if the air above does not hinder the ,earth from tending upward1 neither will the air beneath hinder it from tending downwards3 the same causes produce the same effects1 operating on the same matter 7ss4 #ad1 #ae74 ,a farther argument becomes applicable1 when we are reasoning against ,empedokles4 ,when the four elements were first separated out of their confused huddle by the influence of ,contention1 what was the cause for the ,earth to remain still and in situ8 ,empedokles cannot claim to introduce then the agency of the cosmical revolution4 ,moreover1 it is strange that he should not have reflected that in the first instance the particles and fragments of the ,earth were carried to the centre4 ,but what is the cause now that every thing having weight is carried towards the ,earth8 ,it cannot be the revolution of the ,heaven which brings these things nearer to us 7s4 #af74 ,again1 ,fire is carried upward4 ,what is the cause of this8 ,the revolution of the ,heaven cannot cause it4 ,but1 if it be the nature of fire to be carried in one certain direction1 it must be equally the nature of ,earth to be carried in one certain direction4 ,light and heavy1 also1 are not discriminated by the heavenly revolution4 ,there are matters originally heavy1 and matters originally light3 the former are carried to the centre1 the latter to the circumference1 each by its own special motion4 ,even prior to the heavenly revolution there existed things intrinsically light and intrinsically heavy2 which are discriminated by certain attributes--a certain natural mode of motion and a certain place4 ,in infinite space1 there can be no upward and downward2 and it is by this 7local distinction7 that light and heavy are discriminated 7ss4 #ag1 #ah74 ,while most philosophers insist upon the causes just noticed why the ,earth remains stationary where it is1 there are others1 like ,anaximander1 among the ancients1 who say that it remains so because of its likeness or equality 7,greek3 dia tn o7moio_/tera--equal tendency in all directions74 ,that which is situated in the centre 7they say7 and which has like relation to the extreme parts 7i4e41 like to all the extreme parts7 ought not to be carried any more upward or downward or sideways2 and it cannot be moved in opposite directions at once2 so that it remains stationary by necessity 7s4 #ai74 ,this doctrine is ingenious1 but not true4 ,for the property affirmed is noway peculiar to the ,earth3 the affirmation is1 that every thing which is placed at the centre must of necessity remain there2 so that ,fire also would remain there at rest1 as well as ,earth4 ,but this necessity must be denied4 ,for it is shown by observation that the ,earth not only remains at the centre1 but is carried to the centre2 since each part of it is carried thither1 and1 whithersoever the parts are carried1 the whole is carried necessarily to the same point4 ,the peculiar property of the earth therefore is1 not 7as this hypothesis declares7 to have like relation to all the extreme parts--for that is common to all the elements--but to be carried towards the centre 7ss4 #bj1 #ba74 ,moreover1 it is absurd to investigate why the ,earth remains at the centre1 and not to investigate equally why ,fire remains at the extremity4 ,for1 if you explain this last by saying that ,fire has its natural place at the extremity1 the ,earth must have its natural place somewhere else4 ,if the centre be not the natural place of the ,earth1 and if the ,earth remains there through like tendency in all directions1 like the hair in equal tension or the man both hungry and thirsty between food and drink1 you must equally assign the reason why ,fire remains at the extremity4 ,it is singular too that you should try to explain only the remaining at rest 7,greek3 mons7 of the ,earth1 and not also seek to explain the natural current 7,greek3 phora_/7--why ,earth is carried downward1 and ,fire upward1 when there is no opposing force 7s4 #bb74 ,nor can it be admitted that the doctrine is true4 ,thus much indeed is true by accident--that every thing which has no greater obligation to be moved in this direction than in that1 must necessarily remain at the centre4 ,but this is true only so long as it remains a compact whole2 for1 according to the theory which we are discussing1 it will not remain stationary1 but will be moved3 not indeed as a whole1 but dispersed into parts 7s4 #bc3 ,greek3 a7lla mn ou7de a7lthe_/s e7sti to lego_/menon4 kata sumbebkos me_/ntoi touto_/ ge a7lthe_/s1 7s a7nagkaion me_/nein e7pi tou me_/sou pan1 7 mthen mallon deuro 7 deuro kineisthai pros_/kei4 a7lla dia_/ ge touton ton lo_/gon ou7 menei a7lla kinth_/setai2 ou7 me_/ntoi o7_/lon1 a7lla diespasme_/non4--,i understand ,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s to mean1 subject to the condition of its remaining a compact whole74 ,for the same reasoning would apply to ,fire as well as to ,earth3 it would prove that ,fire1 if placed at the centre1 will remain there just as much as ,earth1 because ,fire will have like relation to each point of the extreme periphery4 ,yet nevertheless it will 7not remain at the centre1 but will7 be carried away1 if not impeded1 as we observe that it is carried in fact1 to the periphery2 only not all to one and the same point of the periphery1 but corresponding portions of the ,fire to corresponding portions of the periphery3 ,i mean1 that the fourth part 7e4g47 of the ,fire will be carried to the fourth part of the periphery2 for a point is no real part of bodies 7,greek3 ou7then gar stigm tn sma_/tn e7sti_/n74 ,this is the only necessary consequence flowing from the principle of likeness of relation4 ,as1 if supposed to be put all together at the centre1 it would contract from a larger area into a smaller1 so1 when carried away from the centre to the different parts of the periphery1 it would become rarer and would expand from a smaller area into a larger4 ,in like manner the ,earth also would be moved away from the centre1 if you reason upon this principle of likeness of relation1 and if the centre were not the place belonging to it by nature 7s4 #bd74 ,,ch4 #ad4--;,having thus reported the suppositions of others respecting the figure1 place1 rest and motion1 of the ,earth1 ,i shall now deliver my own opinion1 first1 whether it is in motion or at rest2 for some philosophers1 as ,i have said1 regard it as one of the stars 7and therefore not in the centre1 but moving round the centre--the ,pythagorean theory72 others 7as ,plato71 though they place it in the centre1 consider it to be packed and moved round the middle of the axis of the ,kosmos 7,greek3 oi7 de e7pi tou me_/sou the_/ntes1 ei7leisthai kai kineisthai_/ phasi peri ton me_/son po_/lon74 ,that neither of these hypotheses is possible1 we shall perceive if we take as our point of departure--,that1 if the ,earth be carried round1 whether in the centre or apart from the centre1 such motion must necessarily be violent or contra-natural4 ,such motion does not belong naturally to the ,earth itself2 for1 if such were the fact1 it would belong equally to each portion of the ,earth1 whereas we see that all these portions are carried in a straight line to the centre4 ,being thus violent or contra-natural1 it cannot possibly be eternal4 ,but the order of the ,kosmos is eternal4 ,besides1 all the bodies which are carried round in a circular revolution 7all except the ,first or ,outermost ,sphere--the ,aplans7 appear to observation as lagging behind and as being moved in more than one current4 ,the like ought to happen with the ,earth1 if moved round1 whether on the centre or apart from the centre3 it ought to be moved in two currents2 and1 as a consequence thereof1 there ought to be side-motions and back-turnings of the stars fastened in their sphere4 ,but we see by observation that this does not happen2 and that the same stars always rise and set at the same places of the ,earth 7s4 #a74 ,farthermore1 the natural current both of the entire ,earth and of each of its parts is towards the middle of the universe3 this is the reason why it is at the centre1 even though it happens to be actually there at present 7,greek3 dia touto gar1 ka7n ei7 tugcha_/nei keime_/n nun e7pi tou ke_/ntrou--he means that though actually there1 it remains there not through any force of inertia or other cause1 but because it has a natural current towards the centre74 ,you might start a doubt1 indeed1 since the centre of the ,universe coincides with the centre of the ,earth1 to which of the two it is that the current of heavy bodies naturally tends3 whether they tend thereto because it is the centre of the ,universe1 or because it is the centre of the ,earth4 ,we must however necessarily suppose the former2 since ,fire and light bodies1 whose current is the contrary of the current of heavy bodies1 are carried to the extreme periphery of the ,universe1 or of that place which comprehends and surrounds the centre of the ,universe 7ss4 #b1 #c74 ,but it happens 7,greek3 sumbe_/bke3 it is an accompanying fact7 that the same point is centre of the ,universe and centre of the ,earth2 accordingly heavy bodies are carried by accident 7,greek3 kata sumbebko_/s--by virtue of this accompanying fact7 to the centre of the ,earth2 and the proof that they are carried to this same point is1 that their lines of direction are not parallel but according to similar angles 7s4 #d74 ,that the ,earth therefore is at the centre1 and that it is at rest1 we may see by the foregoing reasons1 as well as by the fact1 that stones thrown upwards to ever so great a height1 are carried back in the same line of direction to the same point 7s4 #e74 ,we may see farther the cause why the ,earth remains at rest4 ,for1 if its natural current be from all directions towards the centre1 as observation shows1 and that of ,fire from the centre to the periphery1--no portion of it can possibly be carried away from the centre1 except by violence4 ,for to one body belongs one current of motion1 and to a simple body a simple current--not the two opposite currents2 and the current from the centre is opposite to the current to the centre4 ,if1 therefore1 it be impossible for any portion of the ,earth to be carried in a direction away from the centre1 it is yet more impossible for the whole ,earth to be so2 for the natural current of each part is the same as that of the whole4 ,accordingly1 since the ,earth cannot be moved except by a superior force or violence1 it must necessarily remain stationary at the centre 7s4 #f74 ,the same conclusion is confirmed by what we learn from geometers respecting astronomy2 for all the phenomena of the ,heavens--the changes in figure1 order1 and arrangement of the stars--take place as if the ,earth were in the centre 7s4 #g74 ,the figure of the ,earth is necessarily spherical4 ,for each of its parts has gravity1 until it reaches the centre2 and the lesser part1 pushed forward by the greater1 cannot escape laterally1 but must become more and more squeezed together1 one part giving place to the other1 until the centre itself is reached4 ,we must conceive what is here affirmed as occurring in a manner like what some of the ancient physical philosophers tell us1 except that they ascribe the downward current to an extraneous force2 whereas we think it better to state the truth1 and to say that it occurs because by nature all heavy bodies are carried towards the centre4 ,since1 therefore1 the preliminary ,chaos or hotchpotch existed in power 7or with its inherent powers existing though not exercised71 the elements 7those which had gravity71 were carried from all sides equally towards the centre 7,greek3 e7n duna_/mei ou7n o7_/ntos tou mi_/gmatos1 ta diakrino_/mena e7phe_/reto o7moi_/s pa_/ntothen pros to me_/son--this is an allusion to the doctrine of ,anaxagoras72 indeed1 whether brought together at the centre equally from all the periphery or in any other manner1 the result will be the same4 ,if we suppose particles to be brought together at the centre equally from all sides1 it is plain that the mass so formed will be regular and spherical2 and1 even if not equally from all sides1 this will make no difference in the reasoning2 for1 since all portions of the mass have weight or tend to the centre1 the larger portions will necessarily push the lesser before them as far as the centre 7ss4 #h1 #i74 ,a difficulty here presents itself1 which may be solved upon the same principles4 ,the ,earth being spherical1 and at the centre1 suppose that a vast additional weight were applied to either of its hemispheres4 ,in that case1 the centre of the ,universe1 and the centre of the ,earth1 would cease to coincide3 either1 therefore1 the ,earth will not remain at the centre2 or1 if it would still remain at rest1 while not occupying the centre1 it is in its nature to be moved even now 7s4 #aj3 ,greek3 7_/ste 7 ou7 menei e7pi tou me_/sou1 7 ei7_/per 7rem_/sei ge kai m to me_/son e7_/chousa 71 pe_/phuke kineisthai kai nun7--i4e41 if the ,earth can be at rest when not at the centre1 we must infer that the centre is not its natural place1 and therefore that its nature will be to be moved from the centre towards that natural place wherever situated74 ,such is a statement of the difficulty2 but we shall see that it may be cleared up with a little attention4 ,we must distinguish what we mean when we affirm that every particle having weight is carried towards the centre4 ,we clearly do not mean that it will be so carried until the particles farthest from the centre shall touch the centre4 ,we mean that the greater mass must press with preponderating force 7,greek3 dei kratein to pleion e7_/s a7n la_/b t au7tou me_/s to me_/son7 until its centre grasps the centre of the universe2 up to this point its gravity will last2 and this is equally true about any clod of earth as about the whole earth3 large or small size makes no difference4 ,whether the whole ,earth were carried in a mass from any given position1 or whether it were carried in separate particles1 in either case it would be carried onward until it embraced the centre equally on all sides2 the smaller parts being equalized to the greater in gravitating tendency because they are pushed forward by the greater 7,greek3 a7nisazome_/nn tn e7latto_/nn u7po tn meizo_/nn t pro_/sei--s4 #aa74 ,if1 therefore1 the ,earth was ever generated1 it must have been generated in this manner1 and must thus acquire a spherical figure2 and1 even if it be ungenerable and stationary from everlasting1 we must conceive its figure to be that which it would have acquired1 if it had been generable and generated from the first 7,greek3 ei7_/te a7ge_/nntos a7ei me_/nousa1 ton au7ton tro_/pon e7_/chein1 o7_/nper ka7n ei7 gignome_/n to prton e7ge_/neto74 ,that it must be spherical1 we see not only from this reasoning1 but also because all heavy bodies are carried towards it1 not in parallel lines but1 in equal angles4 ,this is what naturally happens with what is either actually spherical1 or by nature spherical4 ,now we ought to call every thing such as it by nature wishes to become and to be3 we ought not to call it such as it is by force and contrary to nature 7s4 #ab74 ,the same conclusion is established by the sensible facts within our observation4 ,if the ,earth had been of any other than spherical figure1 the eclipses of the ,moon would not have projected on the ,sun the outlines which we now see4 ,the moon in her configurations throughout the month takes on every variety of outline--rectilinear1 double convex1 and hollow4 ,but in her eclipses the distinguishing line is always convex4 ,now this must necessarily be occasioned by the circumference of the ,earth being spherical1 since the eclipses of the ,moon arise from the interposition of the ,earth 7s4 #ac74 ,farthermore1 we see from the visible phenomena of the stars not only that the ,earth is spherical1 but also that its magnitude is not great4 ,for1 when we change our position a little as observers1 either to the north or to the south1 we find the celestial horizon to be manifestly different4 ,the stars at the zenith are greatly changed1 and the same stars do not appear3 some stars are visible in ,egypt and ,cyprus1 but become invisible when we proceed farther north2 and those which are constantly visible in the northern regions1 are found to be not constantly visible1 but to set1 when the observer is in ,egypt or ,cyprus4 ,the bulk of the ,earth must therefore be small1 when a small change of position is made so soon manifest to us 7s4 #ad74 ,hence those who hold that the regions near the pillars of ,herakles join on with ,india and that the ocean eastward and westward is one and the same1 must not be supposed to talk extravagantly 7,greek3 m li_/an u7polamba_/nein a7_/pista dokein73 they infer this from the presence of elephants alike at both extremities4 ,geometers who try to calculate the magnitude of the ,earth1 affirm that its circumference is #djj1jjj stadia4 ,it follows necessarily from all these reasonings1 that the body of the ,earth is not only of spherical form1 but also not large compared with the magnitude of the other ,stars 7ss4 #ae1 #af74 ,the remaining two books of the treatise known by the title ',de ,coelo1' while connected with the foregoing1 are still more closely connected with the two ,books composing the treatise entitled ',de ,generatione et ,corruptione4' ,the discussion carried on throughout the two treatises is in truth one2 but1 if anywhere broken1 it is at the end of ,book ,,ii4 ,de ,coelo1 as above4 ,from this point ,aristotle proceeds to consider 7in four ,books7 the particular phenomena presented by natural bodies--phenomena of ,generation and ,destruction 7in the widest sense of these words7--dependent on the opposition of the upward and downward motions2 bodies1 thus light or heavy1 being thence seen to be ultimately reducible to four elements variously combined4 ,treating of the ,kosmos in its larger aspects1 the first two ,books of ,de ,coelo1 here abstracted1 are obviously those that alone correspond strictly to the name of the treatise4 ,v4 ,,epikurus ,our information from ,epikurean writers respecting the doctrines of their sect is much less copious than that which we possess from ,stoic writers in regard to ,stoic opinions4 ,we have no ,epikurean writer on philosophy except ,lucretius2 whereas respecting the ,stoical creed under the ,roman ,empire1 the important writings of ,seneca1 ,epictetus1 and ,marcus ,antoninus1 afford most valuable evidence4 ,the standard of ,virtue and ,vice is referred by ,epikurus to ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,pain is the only evil1 ,pleasure is the only good4 ,virtue is no end in itself1 to be sought2 vice is no end in itself1 to be avoided4 ,the motive for cultivating virtue and banishing vice arises from the consequences of each1 as the means of multiplying pleasures and averting or lessening pains4 ,but to the attainment of this purpose1 the complete supremacy of ,reason is indispensable2 in order that we may take a right comparative measure of the varieties of pleasure and pain1 and pursue the course that promises the least amount of suffering4 ,this theory 7taken in its most general sense1 and apart from differences in the estimation of particular pleasures and pains71 had been proclaimed long before the time of ,epikurus4 ,it is one of the various theories of ,plato2 for in his dialogue called ,protagoras 7though in other dialogues he reasons differently7 we find it explicitly set forth and elaborately vindicated by his principal spokesman1 ,sokrates1 against the ,sophist ,protagoras4 ,it was also held by ,aristippus 7companion of ,sokrates along with ,plato7 and by his followers after him1 called the ,kyrenaics4 ,lastly1 it was maintained by ,eudoxus1 one of the most estimable philosophers contemporary with ,aristotle4 ,epikurus was thus in no way the originator of the theory2 but he had his own way of conceiving it1 his own body of doctrine physical1 cosmological1 and theological1 with which it was implicated1 and his own comparative valuation of pleasures and pains4 ,bodily feeling1 in the ,epikurean psychology1 is prior in order of time to the mental element2 the former is primordial1 while the latter is derived from it by repeated processes of memory and association4 ,but1 though such is the order of sequence and generation1 yet when we compare the two as constituents of happiness to the formed man1 the mental element much outweighs the bodily1 both as pain and as pleasure4 ,bodily pain or pleasure exists only in the present2 when not felt1 it is nothing4 ,but mental feelings involve memory and hope1 embrace the past as well as the future1 endure for a long time1 and may be recalled or put out of sight1 to a great degree1 at our discretion4 ,this last point is one of the most remarkable features of the ,epikurean mental discipline4 ,epikurus deprecated the general habit of mankind in always hankering after some new satisfaction to come2 always discontented with the present1 and oblivious of past comforts as if they had never been4 ,these past comforts ought to be treasured up by memory and reflection1 so that they might become as it were matter for rumination1 and might serve1 in trying moments1 even to counterbalance extreme physical suffering4 ,the health of ,epikurus himself was very bad during the closing years of his life4 ,there remains a fragment of his last letter1 to an intimate friend and companion1 ,idomeneus3--,i write this to you on the last day of my life1 which1 in spite of the severest internal bodily pains1 is still a happy day1 because ,i set against them in the balance all the mental pleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you4 ,take care of the children left by ,metrodorus1 in a manner worthy of your demeanour from boyhood towards me and towards philosophy4 ,bodily pain might thus be alleviated1 when it occurred2 it might be greatly lessened in occurrence1 by prudent and moderate habits2 lastly1 even at the worst1 if violent1 it never lasted long2 if not violent1 it might be patiently borne1 and was at any rate terminated1 or terminable at pleasure1 by death4 ,in the view of ,epikurus1 the chief miseries of life arose1 not from bodily pains1 but partly from delusions of hope and exaggerated aspirations for wealth1 honours1 power1 c41 in all which the objects appeared most seductive from a distance1 inciting man to lawless violence and treachery1 while in the reality they were always disappointments and generally something worse2 partly1 and still more1 from the delusions of fear4 ,of this last sort1 were the two greatest torments of human existence--fear of ,death and of eternal suffering after death1 as announced by prophets and poets1 and fear of the ,gods4 ,epikurus1 who did not believe in the continued existence of the soul separate from the body1 declared that there could never be any rational ground for fearing death1 since it was simply a permanent extinction of consciousness4 ,death was nothing to us 7he said73 when death comes1 we are no more1 either to suffer or to enjoy4 ,yet it was the groundless fear of this nothing that poisoned all the tranquillity of life1 and held men imprisoned even when existence was a torment4 ,whoever had surmounted that fear was armed at once against cruel tyranny and against all the gravest misfortunes4 ,next1 the fear of the gods was not less delusive1 and hardly less tormenting1 than the fear of death4 ,it was a capital error 7,epikurus declared7 to suppose that the gods employed themselves as agents in working or superintending the march of the ,kosmos2 or in conferring favour on some men1 and administering chastisement to others4 ,the vulgar religious tales1 which represented them in this character1 were untrue and insulting as regards the gods themselves1 and pregnant with perversion and misery as regards the hopes and fears of mankind4 ,epikurus believed sincerely in the gods2 reverenced them as beings at once perfectly happy1 immortal1 and unchangeable2 and took delight in the public religious festivals and ceremonies4 ,but it was inconsistent with these attributes1 and repulsive to his feelings of reverence1 to conceive them as agents4 ,the idea of agency is derived from human experience3 we1 as agents1 act with a view to supply some want1 to fulfil some obligation1 to acquire some pleasure1 to accomplish some object desired but not yet attained--in short1 to fill up one or other of the many gaps in our imperfect happiness3 the gods already have all that agents strive to get1 and more than agents ever do get2 their condition is one not of agency1 but of tranquil1 self-sustaining1 fruition4 ,accordingly1 ,epikurus thought 7as ,aristotle#a had thought before him7 that the perfect1 eternal1 and imperturbable well-being and felicity of the gods excluded the supposition of their being agents4 ,he looked upon them as types of that unmolested safety and unalloyed satisfaction which was what he understood by pleasure or happiness1 as objects of reverential envy1 whose sympathy he was likely to obtain by assimilating his own temper and condition to theirs as far as human circumstances allowed4 ,footnote #a3 ,aristot4 ,de ,coelo1 ,,ii4 xii4 p4 #bib1 a4 #bb-;b4 #g3 ,greek3 e7_/oike gar t men a7_/rista e7_/chonti u7pa_/rchein to eu7 a7_/neu pra_/xes1 t d' e7ggu_/tata dia o7li_/gs kai mias1 tois de por7r7ta_/t dia pleio_/nn1--t d' 7s a7_/rista e7_/chonti ou7then dei pra_/xes2 e7_/sti gar au7to to ou7 e7_/neka1 7 de praxis a7ei_/ e7stin e7n dusi_/n1 o7_/tan kai ou7 e7_/neka 7 kai to tou_/tou e7_/neka4 c4 ,ibid4 iii4 p4 #bhf1 a4 #i3 ,greek3 theou d' e7ne_/rgeia a7thanasi_/a2 touto d' e7sti z a7i_/dos1 c4 ,in the ,ethica1 ,aristotle assigns theorizing contemplation to the gods1 as the only process worthy of their exalted dignity and supreme felicity4 ,these theological views were placed by ,epikurus in the foreground of his ethical philosophy1 as the only means of dispelling 9999those fears of the gods that the current fables instilled into every one1 and that did so much to destroy human comfort and security4 ,he proclaimed that beings in immortal felicity neither suffered vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others2 neither showed anger nor favour to particular persons4 ,the doctrine that they were the working managers in the affairs of the ,kosmos1 celestial and terrestrial1 human and extra-human1 he not only repudiated as incompatible with their attributes1 but declared to be impious1 considering the disorder1 sufferings1 and violence1 everywhere visible4 ,he disallowed all prophecy1 divination1 and oracular inspiration1 by which the public around him believed that the gods were perpetually communicating special revelations to individuals1 and for which ,sokrates had felt so peculiarly thankful4 ,it is remarkable that ,stoics and ,epikureans1 in spite of their marked opposition in dogma or theory1 agreed so far in practical results1 that both declared these two modes of uneasiness 7fear of the gods and fear of death7 to be the great torments of human existence1 and both strove to remove or counterbalance them4 ,so far the teaching of ,epikurus appears confined to the separate happiness of each individual1 as dependent upon his own prudence1 sobriety1 and correct views of ,nature4 ,but this is not the whole of the ,epikurean ,ethics4 ,the system also considered each man as in companionship with others3 the precepts were shaped accordingly1 first as to ,justice1 next as to ,friendship4 ,in both1 these1 the foundation whereon ,epikurus built was ,reciprocity--not pure sacrifice to others1 but partnership with others1 beneficial to all4 ,he kept the ideas of self and of others inseparably knit together in one complex association3 he did not expel or degrade either1 in order to give exclusive ascendancy to the other4 ,the dictate of ,natural ,justice was1 that no man should hurt another3 each was bound to abstain from doing harm to others2 each1 on this condition1 was entitled to count on security and relief from the fear that others would do harm to him4 ,such double aspect1 or reciprocity1 was essential to social companionship3 those that could not1 or would not1 accept this covenant1 were unfit for society4 ,if a man does not behave justly towards others1 he cannot expect that they will behave justly towards him2 to live a life of injustice1 and expect that others will not find it out1 is idle4 ,the unjust man cannot enjoy a moment of security4 ,epikurus laid it down explicitly1 that just and righteous dealing was the indispensable condition to every one's comfort1 and was the best means of attaining it4 ,the reciprocity of ,justice was valid towards all the world2 the reciprocity of ,friendship went much farther3 it involved indefinite and active beneficence1 but could reach only to a select few4 ,epikurus insisted emphatically on the value of friendship1 as a means of happiness to both the persons so united4 ,he declared that a good friend was another self1 and that friends ought to be prepared1 in case of need1 to die for each other4 ,yet he declined to recommend an established community of goods among the members of his fraternity1 as prevailed in the ,pythagorean brotherhood3 for such an institution 7he said7 implied mistrust4 ,he recommended efforts to please and to serve1 and a forwardness to give1 for the purpose of gaining and benefiting a friend1 and he even declared that there was more pleasure in conferring favours than in receiving them2 but he was no less strenuous in inculcating an intelligent gratitude on the receiver4 ,no one except a wise man 7he said7 knew how to return a favour properly4#b ,footnote #b3 ,seneca1 ,epist4 p4 #ha4 ,these exhortations to active friendship were not unfruitful4 ,we know1 even by the admission of witnesses adverse to the ,epikurean doctrines1 that the harmony among the members of the sect1 with common veneration for the founder1 was more marked and more enduring than that exhibited by any of the other philosophical sects4 ,epikurus himself was a man of amiable personal qualities3 his testament1 still remaining1 shows an affectionate regard both for his surviving friends1 and for the permanent attachment of each to the others as well as of all to the school4 ,diogenes ,laertius tells us--nearly #bjj years after ,christ1 and #dej years after the death of ,epikurus--that the ,epikurean sect still continued its numbers and dignity1 having outlasted its contemporaries and rivals4 ,the harmony among the ,epikureans may be explained1 not merely from the temper of the master1 but partly from the doctrines and plan of life that he recommended4 ,ambition and love of power were discouraged2 rivalry among the members for success1 either political or rhetorical1 was at any rate a rare exception2 all were taught to confine themselves to that privacy of life and love of philosophical communion which alike required and nourished the mutual sympathies of the brotherhood4 ,in regard to politics1 ,epikurus advised quiet submission to established authority1 without active meddling beyond what necessity required4 ,virtue and happiness1 in the theory of ,epikurus1 were inseparable4 ,a man could not be happy until he had surmounted the fear of death and the fear of gods instilled by the current fables1 which disturbed all tranquillity of mind2 until he had banished those factitious desires that pushed him into contention for wealth1 power1 or celebrity2 nor unless he behaved with justice to all1 and with active devoted friendship towards a few4 ,such a mental condition1 which he thought it was in every man's power to acquire by appropriate teaching and companionship1 constituted virtue2 and was the sure as well as the only precursor of genuine happiness4 ,a mind thus undisturbed and purified was sufficient to itself4 ,the mere satisfaction of the wants of life1 and the conversation of friends1 became then felt pleasures3 if more could be had without preponderant mischief1 so much the better2 but ,nature1 disburthened of her corruptions and prejudices1 required no more to be happy4 ,this at least was as much as the conditions of humanity admitted3 a tranquil1 undisturbed1 innocuous1 non-competitive fruition1 which approached most nearly to the perfect happiness of the ,gods4 ,when we read the explanations given by ,epikurus and ,lucretius of what the ,epikurean theory really was1 and compare them with the numerous attacks upon it made by opponents1 we cannot but remark that the title and formula of the theory was ill-chosen1 and really a misnomer4 ,what ,epikurus meant by ,pleasure was not what most people meant by it1 but something very different--a tranquil and comfortable state of mind and body2 much the same as what ,demokritus had expressed before him by the phrase ,greek3 eu7thumi_/a4 ,this last phrase would have expressed what ,epikurus aimed at1 neither more nor less4 ,it would at least have preserved his theory from much misplaced sarcasm and aggressive rhetoric4 ,the ,physics of ,epikurus was borrowed in the main from the atomic theory of ,demokritus1 but modified by him in a manner subservient and contributory to his ethical scheme4 ,to that scheme it was essential that those celestial1 atmospheric1 or terrestrial phenomena which the public around him ascribed to agency and purposes of the gods1 should be understood as being produced by physical causes4 ,an eclipse1 an earthquake1 a storm1 a shipwreck1 unusual rain or drought1 a good or a bad harvest--and not merely these1 but many other occurrences far smaller and more unimportant1 as we may see by the eighteenth chapter of the ',characters' of ,theophrastus--were then regarded as visitations of the gods1 requiring to be interpreted by recognized prophets1 and to be appeased by ceremonial expiations4 ,when once a man became convinced that all these phenomena proceeded from physical agencies1 a host of terrors and anxieties would disappear from the mind2 and this ,epikurus asserted to be the beneficent effect and real recommendation of physical philosophy4 ,he took little or no thought for scientific curiosity as a motive per se1 which both ,demokritus and ,aristotle put so much in the foreground4 ,he composed a treatise called ',kanonicon' 7now lost71 which seems to have been a sort of ,logic of ,physics--a summary of the principles of evidence4 ,in his system1 ,psychology was to a great extent a branch--though a peculiar and distinct branch--of ,physics1 since the soul was regarded as a subtle but energetic material compound 7air1 vapour1 heat1 and another nameless ingredient71 with its best parts concentrated in the chest1 yet pervading and sustaining the whole body--still1 however1 depending for its support on the body1 and incapable of separate or disembodied continuance4 ,epikurus recognized1 as the primordial basis of the universe1 ,atoms1 ,vacuum1 and ,motion4 ,the atoms were material solid minima1 each too small to be apprehended separately by sense2 they had figure1 magnitude1 and gravity1 but no other qualities4 ,they were infinite in number1 and ever moving in an infinite vacuum4 ,their motions brought them into various coalitions and compounds1 resulting in the perceptible bodies of nature2 each of which in its combined state acquired new1 specific1 different qualities4 ,in regard to the primordial movements of the atoms1 out of which these endowed compounds grew1 ,epikurus differed from ,demokritus who supposed the atoms originally to move with an indefinite variety of directions and velocities1 rotatory as well as rectilineal2 whereas ,epikurus maintained that the only original movement common to all atoms was one and the same--in the direction of gravity straight down1 and all with equal velocity in the infinite void4 ,but it occurred to him that1 upon this hypothesis only1 there could never occur any collisions or combinations of the atoms--nothing but continued and unchangeable parallel lines4 ,accordingly he modified it by saying that the line of descent was not strictly rectilinear1 but that each atom deflected a little from the straight line1 each in its own direction and degree2 so that it became possible to assume collisions1 resiliences1 adhesions1 combinations1 among them1 as it had been possible under the variety of original movements ascribed to them by ,demokritus4 ,the opponents of ,epikurus derided this auxiliary hypothesis1 affirming that he invented the individual deflection of each atom without assigning any cause1 and only because he was perplexed by the mystery of man's freewill4 ,but ,epikurus was not more open to attack on this ground than other physical philosophers4 ,most of them 7except perhaps the most consistent of the ,stoic fatalists7 believed that some among the phenomena of the universe occurred in regular and predictable sequence1 while others were essentially irregular and unpredictable3 each philosopher devised his hypothesis1 and recognized some fundamental principle1 to explain the latter class of phenomena as well as the former2 thus1 ,plato admitted an invincible erratic necessity1 ,aristotle introduced ,chance and ,spontaneity1 ,demokritus multiplied indefinitely the varieties of atomic movements4 ,the hypothetical deflection alleged by ,epikurus was his way1 not more unwarranted than the others1 of providing a fundamental principle for the unpredictable phenomena of the universe4 ,among these are the volitional manifestations of men and animals2 but there are many others besides1 and there is no ground for believing that what is called the mystery of ,free-,will 7i4 e41 the question whether volition is governed by motives1 acting upon a given state of the mind and body7 was at all peculiarly present to his mind4 ,whatever theory may be adopted on this point1 it is certain that the movements of an individual man or animal are not exclusively determined by the general law of gravitation1 or by another cause extrinsic to himself2 but to a great degree by his own separate volition1 which is often imperfectly knowable beforehand and therefore not predictable4 ,for these and many other phenomena1 ,epikurus provided a fundamental principle in his supplementary hypothesis of atomic deflection2 and indeed not for these only1 but also for the questions of opponents1 how there could ever be any coalition between the atoms1 if all followed only one single law of movement--rectilineal descent with equal velocity4 ,epikurus rejected the inexorable and all-comprehensive fatalism contained in the theories of some ,stoics1 though seemingly not construed in its full application even by them4 ,he admitted a limited range of empire to ,chance1 or phenomena essentially irregular4 ,but he maintained that the will1 far from being among the phenomena essentially irregular1 is under the influence of motives2 for no man can insist more strenuously than he does 7see the letter to ,menoekeus7 on the complete power of philosophy--if the student could be made to feel its necessity and desire the attainment of it1 so as to meditate and engrain within himself sound views about the gods1 death1 and human life generally--to mould our volitions and character in a manner conformable to the exigencies of virtue and happiness4 ,all true belief1 according to ,epikurus1 rested ultimately upon the impressions of sense1 upon our internal feelings1 and upon our correct apprehension of the meaning of terms4 ,he did not suppose the significance of language to come by convention1 but to be an inspiration of ,nature1 different among different people4 ,the facts of sense were in themselves beyond all question4 ,but truth1 though founded upon these evidences1 included various inferences1 more than sense could directly testify4 ,even the two capital points of the ,epikurean physical philosophy--,atoms and ,void--were inferences from sense1 and not capable of direct attestation4 ,it was in these inferences1 and in the superstructure built upon sense1 that error was so frequently imposed upon us4 ,we ought to test all affirmations or dogmas by the evidence of sensible phenomena2 looking therein1 if possible1 for some positive grounds in support of them1 but at any rate assuring ourselves that there were no grounds in contradiction of them1 or1 if there were such1 rejecting the dogmas at once4 ,out of the particular impressions of sense1 when often repeated1 remembered1 and compared1 there grew certain general notions or anticipations 7,greek3 prol_/pseis71 which were applied to interpret or illustrate any new case when it arose4 ,these general notions were not inborn or intuitive1 but gradually formed 7as ,aristotle and the ,stoics also conceived them7 out of frequent remembrances and association4 ,besides those conclusions which could be fully proved by the evidentiary data just enumerated1 ,epikurus recognized admissible hypotheses1 which awaited farther evidence confirmative or refutative 7,greek3 to pro_/smenon71 and also other matters occult or as yet unexplained 7,greek3 ta a7_/dla74 ,along with the intermediate or half-explained class1 he reckoned those in which plurality of causes was to be invoked4 ,a given effect might result from any one out of two1 three1 or more different causes1 and there was often no counter-evidence of sense to exclude either of them in any particular case4 ,this plural explanation 7,greek3 to pleonachs7 was not so complete or satisfactory as the singular 7,greek3 to monachs72 but it was often the best that we could obtain1 and was quite sufficient1 by showing a possible physical agency1 to rescue the mind from those terrors of ignorance1 which drove men to imagine visitations of the gods4 ,epikurus agreed with ,demokritus in believing that external objects produced their impressions on our senses by projecting thin images1 outlines of their own shapes4 ,he thought that the air was peopled with such images1 which passed through it and still more through the infinite vacuum beyond it with prodigious velocity4 ,many of them became commingled1 dissipated1 recombined1 during the transit1 so that1 when they reached us1 the impressions produced were not conformable to any real object2 hence the phenomena of dreams1 madness1 and the various delusions of waking men4 ,in setting forth the criterion of truth1 ,epikurus insisted chiefly upon the fundamental groundwork--particular facts of sense1 as the data for proving or disproving general affirmations2 and he had the merit of calling attention to refutative data as well as to probative4 ,but1 respecting the process of passing from these particulars to true generalities and avoiding the untrue1 we can make out no clear idea from his writings that remain3 his great work on ,physical ,philosophy is lost4 ,it is certain that he disregarded the logical part of the process--the systematic study of propositions1 and their relations of consistency with one another--which had made so prodigious a stride during his early years under ,aristotle and ,theophrastus4 ,we can1 indeed1 detect in his remaining sentences one or two of those terms which ,aristotle had stamped as technical in ,logic2 but he discouraged as useless all the verbal teaching and discussion of his day--all grammar1 rhetoric1 and dialectic1 beyond the lowest minimum4 ,he disapproved of the poets as promulgators of mischievous fables and prejudices1 the rhetoricians as furnishing weapons for the misleading career of political ambition1 the dialecticians as wasting their time in useless puzzles4 ,none of them were serviceable in promoting either the tranquillity of the mind1 or the happiness of life1 or the acquisition of truth4 ,he himself composed a great number of treatises and epistles1 on subjects of ethics and philosophy2 but he is said to have written in haste1 without taking time or trouble to correct his compositions4 ,by the ,alexandrine critic1 ,aristophanes of ,byzantium1 his style was censured as unpolished2 yet it is declared to have been simple1 unaffected1 and easily understood4 ,this last predicate is hardly applicable to the three epistles which alone remain from his pen2 but those epistles are intended as brief abstracts of doctrine1 on topics which he had already treated at length in formal works2 and it is not easy to combine clearness with brevity4 ,,vi4 ,,the ,,stoics--,a ,,fragment4 ,the ,stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy recognized and conspicuous at ,athens during the three centuries preceding the ,christian era and during the century or more following4 ,among these four sects1 the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between the ,stoics and the ,epikureans4 ,the ,stoics agreed with the ,peripatetics 7anterior to ,epikurus1 not specially against him7 that the first principle of nature is 7not pleasure or relief from pain1 but7 ,self-preservation or ,self-love2 in other words1 the natural appetite or tendency of all creatures is1 to preserve their existing condition with its inherent capacities1 and to keep clear of destruction or disablement4 ,this appetite 7they said7 manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain is felt1 and is moreover a fundamental postulate1 pre-supposed in all desires of particular pleasures1 as well as in all aversions to particular pains4 ,we begin by loving our own vitality2 and we come1 by association1 to love what promotes or strengthens our vitality2 we hate destruction or disablement1 and come 7by secondary association7 to hate whatever produces that effect4 ,this doctrine associated1 and brought under one view1 what was common to man not merely with the animal1 but also with the vegetable world2 a plant was declared to have an impulse or tendency to maintain itself1 without feeling pain or pleasure4 ,aristotle 7in the tenth ,book of the ,ethica7 says that he will not determine whether we love life for the sake of pleasure1 or pleasure for the sake of life2 for he affirms the two to be essentially yoked together and inseparable3 pleasure is the consummation of our vital manifestations4 ,the ,peripatetics1 after him1 put pleasure down to a lower level1 as derivative and accidental4 ,the ,stoics went farther in the same direction--possibly from antithesis against the growing school of ,epikurus4 ,the primary officium 7in a larger sense than our word duty7 of man is 7they said7 to keep himself in the ,state of ,nature2 the second or derivative officium is to keep to such things as are according to nature1 and to avert those that are contrary to nature2 our gradually increasing experience enables as to discriminate the two4 ,the youth learns1 as he grows up1 to value bodily accomplishments1 mental cognitions and judgments1 good conduct towards those around him1--as powerful aids towards keeping up that state of nature4 ,when his experience is so far enlarged as to make him aware of the order and harmony of nature and human society1 and to impress upon him the comprehension of this great idal1 his emotions as well as his reason becomes absorbed by it4 ,he recognizes this as the only true ,bonum or ,honestum1 to which all other desirable things are referable2 as the only thing desirable for itself and in its own nature4 ,he drops or dismisses all these prima natur that he had begun by desiring4 ,he no longer considers any of them as worthy of being desired in itself1 or for its own sake4 ,while1 therefore1 7according to ,peripatetics as well as ,stoics7 the love of self and of preserving one's own vitality and activity is the primary element1 intuitive and connate1 to which all rational preference 7officium7 was at first referred1 they thought it not the less true that in process of time1 by experience1 association1 and reflection1 there grows up in the mind a grand acquired sentiment or notion1 a new and later light1 which extinguishes and puts out of sight the early beginning4 ,it was important to distinguish the feeble and obscure elements from the powerful and brilliant after-growth2 which indeed was fully realized only in chosen minds1 and in them hardly before old age4 ,this idea1 when once formed in the mind1 was ,the ,good--the only thing worthy of desire for its own sake4 ,the ,stoics called it the only good1 being sufficient in itself for happiness2 other things being not good1 nor necessary to happiness1 but simply preferable or advantageous when they could be had3 the ,peripatetics recognized it as the first and greatest good1 but said also that it was not sufficient in itself2 there were two other inferior varieties of good1 of which something must be had as complementary 7what the ,stoics called prposita or sumenda74#a ,thus the ,stoics said about the origin of the ,idea of ,bonum or ,honestum1 much the same as what ,aristotle says about ethical ,virtue4 ,it is not implanted in us by nature2 but we have at birth certain initial tendencies and capacities1 which1 if aided by association and training1 enable us 7and that not in all cases7 to acquire it4 ,footnote #a3 ,aristotle and the ,peripatetics held that there were tria genera bonorum3 7#a7 ,those of the mind 7mens sana72 7#b7 ,those of the body2 and 7#c7 ,external advantages4 ,the ,stoics altered this theory by saying that only the first of the three was bonum2 the others were merely prposita or sumenda4 ,the opponents of the ,stoics contended that this was an alteration in words rather than in substance4 ,the earlier ,stoics laid it down that there were no graduating marks below the level of wisdom3 all shortcomings were on a par4 ,good was a point1 ,evil was a point2 there were gradations in the prposita or sumenda 7none of which were good71 and in the rejecta or rejicienda 7none of which were evil71 but there was no more or less good4 ,a distinction was made by ,epictetus and other ,stoics between things in our power and things not in our power4 ,in our power are our opinions and notions about objects1 and all our affections1 desires1 and aversions3 not in our power are our bodies1 wealth1 honour1 rank1 authority1 c41 and their opposites2 though1 in regard to these last1 it is in our power to think of them as unimportant4 ,with this distinction we may connect the arguments between the ,stoics and their opponents as to what is now called the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,but we must first begin by distinguishing the two questions4 ,by things in our power1 the ,stoics meant things that we could do or acquire if we willed3 by things not in our power1 they meant things that we could not do or acquire if we willed4 ,in both cases1 the volition was assumed as a fact3 the question what determined it1 or whether it was non-determined1 i4 e41 self-determining1 was not raised in the antithesis4 ,but it was raised in other discussions between the ,stoic theorist ,chrysippus1 and various opponents4 ,these opponents denied that volition was determined by motives1 and cited the cases of equal conflicting motives 7what is known as the ,ass of ,buridan7 as proving that the soul includes in itself1 and exerts1 a special supervenient power of deciding action in one way or the other--a power not determined by any causal antecedent1 but self-originating1 and belonging to the class of agency that ,aristotle recognizes under the denomination of automatic1 spontaneous 7or essentially irregular and unpredictable74 ,chrysippus replied by denying not only the reality of this supervenient force said to be inherent in the soul1 but also the reality of all that ,aristotle called automatic or spontaneous agency generally4 ,chrysippus said that every movement was determined by antecedent motives2 that in cases of equal conflict the exact equality did not long continue1 because some new but slight motive slipped in unperceived and turned the scale on one side or the other4#b ,here1 we see1 the question now known as the ,freedom of the ,will is discussed1 and ,chrysippus declares against freedom1 affirming that volition is always determined by motives4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,plutarch1 ,de ,stoicorum ,repugnantiis1 xxiii4 p4 #ajde4 ,but we also see that1 while declaring this opinion1 ,chrysippus does not employ the terms ,necessity or ,freedom of the ,will2 neither did his opponents1 so far as we can see3 they had a different and less misleading phrase4 ,by freedom1 ,chrysippus and the ,stoics meant the freedom of doing what a man willed1 if he willed it4 ,a man is free as to the thing that is in his power1 when he wills it3 he is not free as to what is not in his power1 under the same supposition4 ,the ,stoics laid great stress on this distinction4 ,they pointed out how much it is really in a man's power to transform or discipline his own mind--in the way of controlling or suppressing some emotions1 generating or encouraging others1 forming new intellectual associations1 c42 how much a man could do in these ways1 if he willed it1 and if he went through the lessons1 habits of conduct1 and 9999meditations1 suitable to produce such an effect4 ,the ,stoics strove to create in a man's mind the volitions appropriate for such mental discipline1 by depicting the beneficial consequences resulting from it1 and the misfortune and shame inevitable1 if the mind were not so disciplined4 ,their purpose was to strengthen the governing reason of his mind1 and to enthrone it as a fixed habit and character1 which would control by counter suggestions the impulse arising at each special moment--particularly all disturbing terrors or allurements4 ,this1 in their view1 is a free mind2 not one wherein volition is independent of all motive1 but one wherein the susceptibility to different motives is tempered by an ascendant reason1 so as to give predominance to the better motive against the worse4 ,one of the strongest motives that they endeavoured to enforce1 was the prudence and dignity of bringing our volitions into harmony with the schemes of ,providence2 which 7they said7 were always arranged with a view to the happiness of the ,kosmos on the whole4 ,the bad man1 whose volitions conflict with these schemes1 is always baulked of his expectations1 and brought at last against his will to see things carried by an over-ruling force1 with aggravated pain and humiliation to himself3 while the good man1 who resigns himself to them from the first1 always escapes with less pain1 and often without any at all4 ,as a portion of their view concerning ,providence it may here be mentioned that the earlier ,stoics1 ,zeno and ,chrysippus1 entertained high reverence for the divination1 prophecy1 and omens that were generally current in the ancient world4 ,they considered that these were the methods whereby the gods were graciously pleased to make known beforehand revelations of their foreordained purposes4 ,herein lay one among the marked points of contrast between ,stoics and ,epikureans4 ,we have thus seen that in regard to the doctrine called in modern times the ,freedom of the ,will 7i4e41 that volitions are self-originating and unpredictable71 the ,stoic theorists not only denied it1 but framed all their ,ethics upon the assumption of the contrary4 ,this same assumption of the contrary1 indeed1 was made also by ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 and ,epikurus2 in short1 by all the ethical teachers of antiquity4 ,all of them believed that volitions depended on causes2 that1 under the ordinary conditions of men's minds1 the causes that volitions generally depended upon are often misleading and sometimes ruinous2 but that1 by proper stimulation from without and meditation within1 the rational causes of volition might be made to overrule the impulsive4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,epikurus1 not less than the ,stoics1 wished to create new fixed habits and a new type of character4 ,they differed1 indeed1 on the question what the proper type of character was2 but each of them aimed at the same general end--a new type of character1 regulating the grades of susceptibility to different motives4 ,and the purpose of all and each of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will1 i4e41 the theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable4 ,while the ,epikureans declined1 as much as possible1 interference in public affairs1 the ,stoic philosophers urged men to the duties of active citizenship4#c ,chrysippus even said that the life of philosophical contemplation 7such as ,aristotle preferred and accounted godlike7 was to be placed on the same level with the life of pleasure2 though ,plutarch observes that neither ,chrysippus nor ,zeno ever meddled personally with any public duty3 both of them passed their lives in lecturing and writing4 ,the truth is that both of them were foreigners residing at ,athens1 and at a time when ,athens was dependent on foreign princes4 ,accordingly1 neither ,zeno nor ,chrysippus had any sphere of political action open to them3 they were1 in this respect1 like ,epictetus afterwards1 but in a position quite different from ,seneca1 the preceptor of ,nero1 who might hope to influence the great imperial power of ,rome1 and from ,marcus ,antoninus1 who held that imperial power in his own hands4 ,footnote #c3 ,tacitus says of the ,stoics 7,ann4 xiv4 #eg73 ',stoicorum secta1 qu turbidos et negotiorum appetentes facit4' ,marcus ,antoninus--not only a powerful emperor1 but also the most gentle and amiable man of his day--talks of active beneficence both as a duty and a satisfaction4 ,but in the creed of the ,stoics generally1 active beneficence did not occupy a prominent place4 ,they adopted the four ,cardinal ,virtues--,wisdom1 or the ,knowledge of ,good and ,evil1 ,justice1 ,fortitude1 ,temperance--as part of their plan of the virtuous life1 the life according to ,nature4 ,justice1 as the social virtue1 was placed above all the rest4 ,but the ,stoics were not strenuous in requiring more than ,justice1 for the benefit of others beside the agent4 ,they even reckoned compassion for the sufferings of others as a weakness1 analogous to envy for the good fortune of others4 ,the ,stoic recognised the gods 7or ,universal ,nature1 equivalent expressions in his creed7 as managing the affairs of the world1 with a view to producing as much happiness as was attainable on the whole4 ,towards this end the gods did not want any positive assistance from him2 but it was his duty and his strongest interest1 to resign himself to their plans1 and to abstain from all conduct tending to frustrate them4 ,such refractory tendencies were perpetually suggested to him by the unreasonable appetites1 emotions1 fears1 antipathies1 c41 of daily life2 all claiming satisfaction at the expense of future mischief to himself and others4 ,to countervail these misleading forces by means of a fixed rational character built up through meditation and philosophical teaching1 was the grand purpose of the ,stoic ethical creed4 ,the emotional or appetitive self was to be starved or curbed1 and retained only as an appendage to the rational self2 an idea proclaimed before in general terms by ,plato1 but carried out into a system by the ,stoics1 though to a great extent also by the ,epikureans4 ,the ,stoic was taught to reflect how much that appears to be desirable1 terror-striking1 provocative1 c41 is not really so1 but is made to appear so by false and curable associations4 ,and1 while he thus discouraged those self-regarding emotions that placed him in hostility with others1 he learnt to respect the self of another man as well as his own4 ,epictetus advises to deal mildly with a man that hurts us either by word or deed2 and advises it upon the following very remarkable ground3--,recollect that in what he says or does1 he follows his own sense of propriety1 not yours4 ,he must do what appears to him right1 not what appears to you3 if he judges wrongly1 it is he that is hurt1 for he is the person deceived4 ,always repeat to yourself1 in such a case3 ,the man has acted on his own opinion4 ,the reason here given by ,epictetus is an instance1 memorable in ethical theory1 of respect for individual dissenting conviction1 even in an extreme case2 and it must be taken in conjunction with his other doctrine1 that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little or no damage1 except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by our irrational susceptibilities and associations4 ,we see that the ,stoic submerges1 as much as he can1 the pre-eminence of his own individual self1 and contemplates himself from the point of view of another1 as only one among many4 ,but he does not erect the happiness of others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit1 beyond the reciprocities of family1 citizenship1 and common humanity4 ,the ,stoic theorists agreed with ,epikurus in inculcating the reciprocities of ,justice between all fellow-citizens2 and they even went farther than he did1 by extending the sphere of such duties beyond the limits of city1 so as to comprehend all mankind4 ,but as to the reciprocities of individual ,friendship1 ,epikurus went beyond the ,stoics in the amount of self-sacrifice and devotion that he enjoined for the benefit of a friend4 ,,index4 ,a4 ,abduction 7,apagoge71 #bjb4 ,abstract1 and ,concrete1 appellatives not used by ,aristotle1 #fd4 ,abstraction1 belongs to the ,notic function1 #dhf1 #dhg1 #dib4 ,absurdum1 ,reductio ad1 see ,reductio4 ,accentuation1 ,fallacy of #che2 rare1 #djh4 ,accidens1 ,ens per c41 see ,accident1 ,ens4 ,accidentis ,fallacia1 #chf2 not understood among ,aristotle's scientific contemporaries1 #cij2 how to solve1 #daj4 ,accident1 ,ens by1 #fj1 #dbd1 #efa1 #eic2 modern definition of #fb2 an individual1 allowed by ,aristotle1 #fc2 no science of1 #ih2 one of the ,predicables1 #bgf2 thesis of1 easiest to defend1 hardest to upset1 #bhd1 #cec2 thirty-seven dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #bhe seq42 why no science of1 #dbe1 #eic1 #eid2 one1 cannot be accident of another1 #ehf2 opposed to the constant and the usual1 #eid2 ,chance1 principle or cause of1 #eid2 see ,concomitants4 ,action 7,agere71 ,category1 #fe1 #gc4 ,actuality1 as opposed to ,potentiality1 #abh1 #def1 #fae seq4 ,adoxa1 opposed to ,endoxa1 #bfi4 on1 of the ,heaven1 #fcf4 ther1 derivation of the name1 #fcb4 ,affirmation1 conjunction of predicate with subject1 #aaa2 constituents of1 #aah2 ,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses 7,theophrastus71 #abb1 #afi4 ,akroamatic books1 opposed to ,exoteric1 #ej4 ,alcuin1 followed ,aristotle on ,universals1 #efc4 ,alexander of ,macedon1 taught by ,aristotle from boyhood1 #e2 came to the throne1 and went on his first ,persian expedition1 #f2 his action towards ,athens1 #h2 correspondent1 protector1 patron1 of ,aristotle at ,athens1 #g1 #h2 later change in his character and alienation from ,aristotle1 #i2 his order for the recall of exiles throughout ,greece1 #aj2 his death1 #g1 #ab4 ,alexandrine1 literati1 their knowledge of ,aristotle1 #cd1 #ch1 #dj1 #db4 ,aliquid1 ,ad1 see ,relation2 ,hoc1 or the definite individual1 see ,essence4 ,alkmon1 his view of the soul1 #ddi4 ,ammonius1 put ,relation above all the ,categories1 #hd2 his opinion on last paragraph of ,de ,interpretatione1 #acd4 ,amphiboly1 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve1 #djg4 ,amyntas1 king of ,macedon1 #b4 ,analytica1 referred to in ,topica1 #ef2 presuppose contents of ,categori and ,de ,interpretatione1 #ef2 terminology of1 differs from that of ,de ,interpretatione1 #ada2 purpose of1 #ada4 ,analytica ,priora1 different sections of ,book ,i41 #aeg1 #afc2 relation of the two books of1 #aga4 ,analytica ,posteriora1 applies ,syllogism to ,demonstration1 #adb1 #bjg2 relation of1 to the ,metaphysica1 #dbb4 ,anaxagoras1 doctrine of1 inconsistent with ,maxim of ,contradiction1 #dbi1 #eib2 disregarded data of experience1 #dcf2 his view of the soul1 #ddi2 ,maxim of ,excluded ,middle defended by ,aristotle specially against1 #eha2 made intelligence dependent on sense1 #ehh2 doctrine of1 makes all propositions false1 #eib2 must yet admit an infinite number of true propositions1 #eib2 meant by his ,unum--,ens ,potenti1 and thus got partial hold of the idea of ,matter1 #fbj2 in his doctrine of the ,nos1 makes ,actuality prior to ,potentiality1 #fbc2 declares ,good to be the principle as ,movent1 #fbh2 called fire ther1 #fcb2 his reason for the stationariness of the ,earth1 #fdi4 ,anaximander1 his reason for stationariness of the ,earth1 #fej4 ,anaximenes1 his reason for stationariness of the ,earth1 #fdi4 ,andronikus of ,rhodes1 source of our ,aristotle1 #ce2 sorted and corrected the ,aristotelian ,,mss4 at ,rome1 #cg1 #ci2 ,peripatetic ,scholarch1 #ci2 difficulties of his task--the result appreciated1 #dc2 placed theological treatises first1 #ee2 put ,relation above all the ,categories1 #hd4 ,anim1 ,treatise de1 referred to in the ,de ,interpretatione1 #aji4 ,anonymus1 his catalogue of ,aristotle's works1 compared with that of ,diogenes and with the extant works1 #bi seq4 ,antipater1 friend and correspondent of ,aristotle1 #g1 #h2 victor in the ,lamian war1 occupied ,athens1 #ab2 letter to1 from ,aristotle at ,chalkis1 #af2 letter of1 in praise of ,aristotle1 #af2 executor under ,aristotle's ,will1 #ag4 ,antiphasis1 pair of contradictory opposites1 #aaa2 rule of1 as regards truth and falsity1 #aab1 #aac2 made up of one affirmation and one negation corresponding1 #aac2 does not hold for events particular and future1 because of irregularity in the ,kosmos1 #aac seq42 quaternions exhibiting each two related cases of1 #aah seq41 #agj2 forms of1 in ,modals1 #abg2 involves determination of quantity1 #ace2 not understood before ,aristotle1 #acf2 the two members of1 can neither be both true nor both false1 argued at length by ,aristotle in ,metaph99994 ,greek3 ,g41 ii4 #ehf-ib4 ,antisthenes1 declared contradiction impossible1 #acf1 #acg2 allowed definition only of compounds1 #faa4 ,antonius1 ,marcus1 authority for ,stoical creed1 #fed2 on active beneficence1 #ffb4 ,apagoge 7,abduction71 #bjb4 ,apellikon1 of ,teos1 a ,peripatetic1 bought ,aristotle's ,,mss41 c41 from heirs of ,neleus1 #cf2 exposed them at ,athens and had copies taken1 #cf2 wrote a biography of ,aristotle1 #cg2 library of1 composite1 #dc4 ,aplans1 exterior sphere of the ,kosmos1 #aad1 #fbc4 ,greek3 ,a7po_/phansis1 ,enunciation1 name for ,proposition in ,de ,interpretatione1 #ada4 ,appetite1 the direct producing cause of movement in animals1 #dib4 ,archytas1 made ,habere fifth ,category1 #hj4 ,arguments1 how to find1 for different theses1 #aeg4 ,arimnestus1 brother of ,aristotle1 #ai4 ,aristippus1 anticipated ,epikurus1 #fed4 ,aristomenes1 friend of ,aristotle1 #ag4 ,aristophanes1 of ,byzantium1 arranged dialogues of ,plato1 #cd2 on the style of ,epikurus1 #feh4 ',aristoteles ,pseudepigraphus1' work by ,v4 ,rose1 #cb4 ,aristotle1 birth and parentage1 #a1 #b2 opportunities for physiological study1 #b2 an orphan in youth1 became ward of ,proxenus1 #h2 discrepant accounts as to his early life1 #c2 medical practice1 #c2 under ,plato at ,athens1 #d2 went to ,atarneus1 on ,plato's death1 #d2 married ,pythias1 #e2 driven out to ,mitylene1 #e2 invited by ,philip of ,macedon to become tutor to ,alexander1 #e2 life in ,macedon1 #e2 re-founded ,stageira1 #f2 taught in the ,nymphum of ,mieza1 #f2 returned to ,athens1 and set up his school in the ,lykeium1 #g2 lecturing and writing1 #g1 #be2 correspondence1 #g2 relation to ,athenian polities1 #h2 protected and patronized at ,athens by ,alexander and ,antipater1 #h2 in spite of estrangement between him and ,alexander1 regarded always as unfriendly to ,athenian liberty1 #i1 #aj2 his relation to ,nikanor1 bearer of ,alexander's rescript to the ,greek cities1 #aa2 indicted for impiety in his doctrines and his commemoration of the eunuch ,hermeias1 #ab1 #ac2 retired to ,chalkis1 #ad2 died there1 before he could return to ,athens1 #ae2 wrote a defence against the charge of impiety1 #ae2 his judgment on ,athens and ,athenians1 #af2 his person1 habits1 manners1 c41 #af2 his second wife1 son1 and daughter1 #ag2 last testament1 #ag-ai2 his character as therein exhibited1 #ai2 reproaches against1 #bj2 his opposition to ,plato misrepresented by 9999,platonists1 #bj1 #ba2 a student and teacher of rhetoric1 #bb2 attacked ,isokrates1 #bd2 assailed by three sets of enemies1 #bf2 difficulty in determining the ,canon of his works as compared with ,plato's1 #bg2 extant works ascribed to1 #bg2 ancient authorities for his works1 #bh2 catalogue and extent of his works1 according to ,diogenes1 #bi2 according to ,anonymus1 #bi2 the catalogues compared with each other1 and with list of his extant works1 #bi1 #cj2 ancient encomiums on his style1 #cj2 his principal works unknown to ,cicero and others1 #ca1 #dj2 dialogues and other works of1 lost to us1 #ca2 works in the catalogue are declared by ,v4 ,rose not to belong to1 #cb2 different opinion of ,e4 ,heitz1 #cb2 allowance to be made for diversity of style1 subject1 c41 in the works of1 #cc2 works in the catalogue to be held as really composed by1 #cd2 extant works of1 whence derived1 #ce2 fate of his library and ,,mss4 on his death1 till brought to ,rome and cared for by ,andronikus1 #ce seq42 through ,andronikus1 became known as we know him1 #dj2 not thus known to the ,alexandrine librarians1 #db2 so-called ,exoteric works of1 #dd2 his own use of the phrase exoteric discourses1 #df seq42 had not two doctrines--the ,exoteric and ,esoteric1 #eb2 the order of his extant works uncertain1 #ed2 his merit in noting equivocation of terms1 #eg2 not free from fascination by particular numbers1 #gd2 first made logical analysis of ,ens1 #ig2 first to treat ,logic scientifically1 #acj2 what he did for theory of ,proposition1 #acf1 #aci2 claimed the theory of ,syllogism as his own work1 #adj1 #aec1 #bei1 #dbj2 his expository manner1 novel and peculiar1 #ada2 specialized the meaning of ,syllogism1 #adc2 first to ask if a proposition could be converted1 #add2 first used letters as symbols in exposition1 #adh2 proceeded upon1 but modified1 ,platonic antithesis of ,science and ,opinion1 #bjg1 #bfd2 specially claimed to be original in his theory of ,dialectic1 #bfb1 #dah2 attended to current opinion1 drew up list of proverbs1 #bgb1 #ddj2 started in his philosophy from the common habit of speech1 #dcd1 #ddj2 continued the work of ,sokrates1 #dci1 #dda2 devised a ,first ,philosophy conformable to the habits of common speech1 starting from the definite individual or ,hoc ,aliquid1 #dde2 psychology of1 must be compared with that of his predecessors1 #ddf2 rejected all previous theories on ,soul1 #deb2 advance made in the ,ontology of1 #efa2 his view of pleasure1 #ffj2 ethical purpose of1 #ffb4 ,arithmetic1 prcognita required in1 #bab2 abstracted from material conditions1 #bcd2 simpler1 and therefore more accurate1 than geometry1 #bcd4 ,art1 ,generation from1 #eih1 #fbj4 ,asklepiads1 traditional training of1 #b4 ,association of ,ideas1 principles of1 #dgg2 ,aristotle's account of1 perplexed by his sharp distinction of ,memory and ,reminiscence1 #dgh4 ,astronomy1 the mathematical science most akin to ,first ,philosophy1 #fbf4 ,atarneus1 ,aristotle there1 #d4 ,attalid kings of ,pergamus1 ,aristotle's library at ,skepsis buried1 to be kept hidden from1 #cf4 ,axioms1 assumed in ,demonstration1 #bab1 #bae1 #bbj2 a part of ,demonstration1 #bai2 not always formally enunciated1 #bba2 those common to all sciences1 scrutinized by ,dialectic1 #bba1 #ege2 and by ,first ,philosophy1 #bba1 #dbe1 #ege1 #ehd2 the common1 not alone sufficient for ,demonstration in the special sciences1 #bcf2 use of the word before1 and by1 ,aristotle1 #eff1 #ege1 #ehd4 ,b4 ,bees1 partake in ,nos1 #dhc1 #egf4 ,belief1 at variance with ,knowledge1 #ahb2 founded on evidence either syllogistic or inductive1 #ahg4 ,berlin edition of ,aristotle1 #bg1 #cj4 ,bernays1 his view of exoteric discourses1 #di1 #eb4 ,body1 animate and inanimate1 #def2 ,matter with ,aristotle may be1 but is not necessarily1 #def2 thorough-going implication of ,soul with1 in animated subject1 #deh seq42 has three and only three dimensions1 #fcj2 no infinite1 #fcc4 ,bothius1 translated ,aristotle's ,categori and defended its position1 #efc4 ,bothus the ,sidonian1 student of ,aristotle1 #ch2 his recommendation as to order of studying the works1 #ee4 ,bonitz1 his view of the canon of the ,metaphysica1 #ehc4 ,brain1 specially connected with the olfactory organ1 #dgj2 function of the1 #dhj4 ,brandis1 refers catalogue of ,diogenes to ,alexandrine literati1 #cd1 #dj2 his view of the canon of the ,metaphysica1 #ehc4 ,bryson1 his quadrature of the circle1 #cha4 ,c4 ,canon1 ,aristotelian1 see ,aristotle4 ,categori1 the treatise1 not mentioned in ,analytica or ,topica1 #ef2 subject of1 how related to that of ,de ,interpretatione1 #eg1 #ei1 #ajh1 #aji2 deals with ,ens in a sense that blends ,logic and ,ontology1 #fb1 #ajh2 difference of ,aristotle's procedure in1 compared with ,physica and ,metaphysica1 #fe1 #ajc2 probably an early composition1 #hj2 remained known1 when other works of ,aristotle were unknown or neglected1 #efc4 ,categories1 ,ten1 assumed in ,analytica and ,topica1 #ef2 led up to by a distinction of ,entia 7,enunciata71 #ei2 blending together ,logic and ,ontology1 #fb2 ,ens according to the1 #fa1 #dbe1 #eid seq4 7,metaph4 ,z41 ,greek3 472 enumerated1 #fe2 all embodied in ,first or ,complete ,ens1 #ff1 #eie2 each a ,summum ,genus1 and some wider still1 #ff2 not all mutually exclusive1 #ff1 #gc1 #ha1 #hi2 may be exemplified1 not defined1 #ff2 how arrived at1 #ff1 #gf seq42 joined by later logicians with the ,predicables1 #gc2 stress laid by ,aristotle upon the first four1 #gd2 why ,ten in number--might have been more1 #gd seq42 obtained by logical1 not metaphysical1 analysis1 #gf2 heads of information or answers respecting an individual1 #gg2 inference 9999as to true character of1 from case of ,habere and ,jacere1 #gi2 all1 even 9999the first1 involve ,relativity1 #hj seq42 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill on1 #ij n42 capital distinction between the first and all the rest1 #ia seq41 #efc1 #eid2 ,trendelenburg's view of their origin1 #ii1 likely and plausible1 #ii2 compared with ,categories of the ,stoics1 #ajj1 #efc1 of ,plotinus1 #ajb1 #efc1 of ,galen1 #ajc4 ,cause1 ,knowledge of1 distinguished from knowledge of ,fact1 #bbc2 knowledge of1 the perfection of cognition1 #bbd1 #bce2 one of the four heads of ,investigation1 #bch2 nature of the question as to1 #bci1 #fjh2 substantially the same enquiry with ,cur1 ,quid1 and the ,middle ,term1 #bdj1 #bdf2 four varieties of1 #bde1 #faa1 #fba2 relation among the varieties of1 #bdf2 how far reciprocal with the causatum1 #bdg1 #bed2 has an effect only one8 #bed2 the ,general ,notion viewed by ,aristotle as a1 #dbb4 ,chance1 source of irregularity in the ,kosmos1 #aad1 #bjf2 affects the rule of ,antiphasis1 #aae2 ,aristotle's doctrine of1 challenged1 #aaf2 objective correlate to the ,problematical ,proposition1 #acc1 #bje2 principle or cause of ,accidents1 #eid2 ,generations and ,constructions proceeding from1 #eih1 #fbj4 ,change1 four varieties of1 #fji4 ,chrysippus1 on the determination of will by motives1 #ffa2 his reverence for divination1 c41 #ffb2 a foreigner at ,athens1 without a sphere of political action1 #ffb4 ,cicero1 his encomium on ,aristotle's style1 #cj1 #da2 how far he knew ,aristotle's works1 #cj1 #ca1 #cc1 #dj1 #ej2 his use of the word exoteric1 #dd1 #ea4 ,claudian1 referred to1 #ac4 ,coelo1 ,treatise de1 connected with what other works1 #ed1 #fec4 ,colour1 object of vision1 action of1 #dff2 varieties of1 proceeding all from white and black1 #dfg4 ,common ,sense1 or ,opinion1 opposed to ,science in ,plato and ,aristotle1 #bjg2 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton on1 #efe2 legitimate meaning of1 #efg2 authoritative character of1 in one place allowed by ,aristotle1 #efi2 ,aristotle's conception of1 as devoid of scientific authority1 #egc1 #egd4 ,compound1 ,the 7,greek3 to su_/nolon71 of ,form and ,matter1 or the ,individual1 #dde1 #def1 #eii seq4 ,concealment1 how to be practised by dialectical questioner1 #cef4 ,conclusion1 of ,syllogism1 indicates ,figure1 #aeb1 #afd1 #afg2 when more than one1 #aga2 true1 from false premisses1 #agb use to demonstrate premisses1 #agc2 reversed to refute premisses1 #agd2 kinds of1 in ,demonstration1 compared1 #bca4 ,concomitants1 non-essential1 no demonstration of1 #bai2 no definition of1 #bbj2 near to ,non-,entia1 #efa2 little more than a name1 #eic2 see ,accident4 ,concrete1 and ,abstract1 appellatives not used by ,aristotle1 #fe2 the1 as compound of ,form and ,matter1 #def seq42 see ,compound4 ,conjunction1 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve1 #djh4 ,consequentis ,fallacia1 #chh2 not understood before ,aristotle1 #cij2 how to solve1 #dab4 ,construction1 kind of ,generation1 #eih4 ,contradiction1 ,maxim or ,axiom of1 depends upon knowledge of quantity and quality of propositions1 #acg1 #dda2 not self-evident1 #add2 among the prcognita of ,demonstration1 #bab1 #dbg2 not formally enunciated in any special science1 #bba2 discussion of1 belongs to ,first ,philosophy1 #dbb1 #dbe1 why1 #dbf1 #egi2 enunciated1 as highest and firmest of all principles1 #dbe1 #ehe2 controverted by ,aristotle's predecessors1 ,herakleitus1 ,anaxagoras1 c41 #dbg1 #dbi1 #dda2 ,aristotle's indirect proof of1 #dbg seq41 #ehe seq42 applied in the ,sokratic ,elenchus1 #dda2 remarks on ,aristotle's defence of1 #ddb2 can be supported only by an induction of particular instances1 #ddc2 enunciated both as a logical and as an ontological formula1 #egi2 defended by ,aristotle specially against ,herakleitus1 #egi4 ,contradictory ,opposites1 pair of1 make ,antiphasis1 #aaa2 distinguished from ,contrary ,opposites1 #aaa1 #abd1 #acd2 rule of1 as to truth and falsity1 #aab2 related pairs of1 set forth in quaternions1 #aah seq41 #agj2 distinction of from ,contrary1 fundamental in ,logic1 #acg2 see ,antiphasis4 ,contrariorum1 ,petitio1 in ,dialectic1 #cgb4 ,contrary ,opposites 7terms71 #ajd2 ,opposites 7propositions71 distinguished from ,contradictory1 #aaa1 #abd1 #acd2 rule of as to truth and falsity1 #aab4 ,conversion 7#a7 of ,propositions1 import of1 #add2 rules for1 with ,aristotle's defective proof thereof1 #add seq42 can be proved only by ,induction1 #adf1 #adg2 7#b7 of ,syllogism1 #agd4 ,copula1 ,est as1 #abg1 #eia4 ,courage1 definition of1 #ebe4 ,d4 ,debate1 four species of1 #cgg4 ,definition1 among the prcognita assumed in ,demonstration1 #bab1 #bad1 #bbj1 #bba2 propositions declaring1 attained only in ,first figure1 #bbd2 of ,essence that depends on extraneous cause1 #bdj-dd2 of ,essence without such middle ,term1 #bde2 three varieties of1 #bde2 how to frame a1 #bdi2 as sought through logical ,division1 #bej2 to exclude equivocation1 #bea2 one of the ,predicates1 according to ,aristotle1 #bgf2 thesis of1 easiest to attack1 hardest to defend1 #bhe1 #cec2 dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #cbi seq42 how open to attack or defence1 #ccj2 defects in the setting out of1 #ccj2 faults in the substance of1 #ccb-dh2 the genuine and perfect1 #ccc2 general rule for dialectically testing1 #cdi2 is primarily of ,essences1 of the other ,categories not directly1 #eig2 none1 of particular ,concretes1 #fjb1 #fjf2 is of the ,universal or ,form1 #fjc2 whence the unity of the1 #fjd1 #fab2 none1 of eternal ,essences1 #fjg2 analogy of1 to ,number1 #faa4 ,delboeuf1 ,prof41 on indemonstrable truths1 #bbi n4 ,demades1 with ,phokion at the head of the ,athenian administration under ,alexander1 #ab4 ,demochares1 nephew of ,demosthenes1 accuser of ,aristotle1 #ad4 ,demokritus1 disregarded experience1 #dcf2 his view of the soul1 #ddi2 made intelligence dependent on sense1 which is ever varying1 #ehh2 recognized one primordial body with three differences--figure1 position1 arrangement1 #fji2 got partial hold of the idea of ,ens ,potenti or ,matter1 #fbj2 atomic doctrine of1 #fcd2 his reason for the stationariness of the ,earth1 #fdi2 how followed by ,epikurus1 #fef-eh4 ,demonstrative ,science1 see ,demonstration4 ,demonstration1 ultimately reducible to two first modes of ,first figure1 #aee2 circular1 #agc1 #bae2 subject of ,analyt4 ,post4 #bjg2 how opposed to ,dialectic1 #bji1 #egc2 is teaching from prcognita assumed1 #baa1 #bad2 undemonstrable principles of1 #bae2 two doctrines of1 opposed by ,aristotle1 #bae1 #bbh2 necessary premisses of1 #baf2 conclusion of1 must be necessary1 #bah2 none1 of nonessential concomitants1 #bai2 the parts of1 #bai2 premisses of1 must be essential and appropriate1 #bbj2 requires admission of universal predicates1 #bba2 premisses for1 obtained only from ,induction1 #bbf1 #beh1 #bfj1 #egf2 implies some truths primary or ultimate1 #bbg1 #bcj2 the unit in1 #bca2 of the ,universal better than of the ,particular1 #bca2 ,affirmative better than ,negative1 #bcc2 ,direct better than ,indirect1 #bcd2 is of the necessary or customary1 not of the fortuitous1 #bce1 #fjf2 none1 through sensible perception1 #bce2 in default of direct observation1 #bcj2 relation of1 to ,definition1 #bdj2 principia of1 not innate1 #bef2 principia of1 how developed upon sensible perception1 #bef1 #ege4 ,demophilus1 joined in indicting ,aristotle for impiety1 #ab4 ,demosthenes1 reproached for conversing with the bearer of ,alexander's rescript to the ,greek cities1 #aa2 suicide of1 #ab4 ,desire1 see ,appetite4 ,dexippus1 vindicated ,aristotle's ,categories1#ajc1 #efc4 ,dialectic1 how related to ,science or ,philosophy1 #dg1 #baj1 #bgb1 #bgc2 form of putting questions in1 #abe1 #bge2 theses in1 variously liable to attack and defence1 #aef1 #bhe1 #ceb2 as conceived by ,plato1 #bjh1 #bfc2 by ,aristotle placed with ,rhetoric in the region of ,opinion1 #bjh1 #bff1 #egc2 opposed to ,demonstrative ,science and ,necessary ,truth1 #bji1 #egc2 concerned about the ,common ,axioms of all ,science1 #bba1 #bgb1 #egd1 #ehd2 ,aristotle claims to be specially original in his theory of1 #bfb1 #dah2 as conceived and practised by ,sokrates1 #bfc1 #dcf2 opposed by ,aristotle to ,didactic1 #bfd1 #cgg2 province of1 #bff1 #egc2 essentially contentious1 #bff1 #cgh1 #cig2 uses of1 #bga1 #egd2 propositions1 how classified in1 #bgf2 procedure of1 in contrast with that of ,philosophy1 #cec1 #ehd2 conditions and aims of the practice of1 #ced1 #cfa1 #cgh2 to be practised as a partnership for common intellectual profit1 #cee1 #cfg2 part of the questioner in1 #cee seq42 part of the respondent in1 #cfa seq42 respondent at fault in1 #cff2 questioner at fault in1 #cfg2 four kinds of false argument in1 #cgj2 outfit for practice of1 #cgb2 one of four species of debate1 #cgg2 when and why called eristic or sophistic by ,aristotle1 #cgi2 ,aristotle's distinction of ,sophistic from1 contested1 #chb1 #cic seq4 ,dialogues of ,aristotle lost1 #cj1 #cb1 #di4 ,diaphanous1 action of the1 in vision1 #dff4 ,dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter1,fallacia a1 #chf2 how to solve1 #dab4 ,didactic1 confounded by ,plato with ,dialectic1 #bfd2 distinguished from ,dialectic by ,aristotle1 #bfd1 #cgg2 species of ,debate1 #cgg2 scope and conditions4 ,of1 #cgg2 see also ,demonstration4 ,differences1 study of1 an organon of debate1 #bhj4 ,differentia1 not in1 but predicated of1 a ,subject1 #fh2 ranked with ,genus in ,aristotle's list of ,predicables1 #bgf2 discriminated from ,genus1 #cac2 definition of ,species through ,genus and1 #ccc1 #fja2 is ,form in the definition1 #fjd2 logically prior to the ,species1 #fjg4 ,diogenes of ,apollonia1 his view of the soul1 #ddi4 ,diogenes ,laertius1 his catalogue of ,aristotle's works1 #bh1 compared with that of ,anonymus1 #bi2 ignorant of the principal works of ,aristotle known to us1 #ca2 catalogue of1 probably of ,alexandrine origin1 #cd1 #da4 ,dionysius1 younger of ,syracuse1 visited by ,plato1 #d2 corresponded with ,plato1 #g4 ,dionysodorus1 the ,sophist1 #chc4 ,dioteles1 friend of ,aristotle1 #ag4 ,greek3 ,dio_/ti1 ,to_/1 the ,why1 knowledge of1 #bbc1 one of the four heads of ,investigation1 #bch2 in search for a middle term1 #bci2 relation of1 to the question ,quid1 #bci2 see ,cause4 ,disjunction1 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve1 #djh4 ,division ,logical1 weakness of1 #afc1 #bdb2 use of1 to obtain a definition1 #bej4 ,e4 ,ear1 structure of the1 #dfh4 ,earth1 opinions as to positions of1 #fdh2 opinions as to its state of motion or rest1 figure1 c41 #fdi seq42 at rest in the centre of the ,kosmos1 #feb2 necessarily spherical1 #feb4 #fec2 size of1 #fec4 ,eclipse1 lunar1 illustration of ,causation from1 #bed1 #faa4 ,education of the citizen1 #edc4 ,efficient ,cause1 #bde4 ,elenchus1 of ,sokrates1 #bfc1 #dcg2 in general1 #cgf2 the ,sophistical1 #cgf1 #djd directions for solving the ,sophistical1 #djd4 ,emotions1 not systematically treated by ,aristotle as part of ,psychology1 but in ,ethics and ,rhetoric1 #dib4 ,empedokles1 his disregard of experience1 #dcf2 his view of the soul1 #ddi2 criticized by ,aristotle1 #dea2 made intelligence dependent on sense1 #ehh2 got partial hold of the idea of ,ens ,potenti or ,matter1 #fbj2 his principle of ,friendship1 #fbc1 #fbh2 held the ,kosmos to be generated and destroyed alternately1 #fcg2 held the ,heaven to be kept in its place by extreme velocity of rotation1 #fci1 #fej4 ,end1 see ,final ,cause4 ,endoxa1 premisses of ,dialectic1 #bfi2 not equivalent to the ,probable1 #bgj2 collections to be made of1 #bge1 as an organon of debate1 #bgh4 ,energy1 see ,entelechy4 ,ens1 four kinds of1 viewed with reference to ,proposition1 and as introductory to the ,categories1 #ei2 quatenus ,ens1 subject of ,first ,philosophy1 #ei1 #dbb1 #ehc2 a homonymous1 equivocal1 or multivocal word1 #fj1 #dbd1 #eid2 not a ,summum ,genus1 but a ,summum ,analogon1 #fj1 #ehd2 four main aspects of1 in ,ontology1 #fj1 #dbd2 7#a7 ,per ,accidens1 #eic2 7#b7 in the sense of ,truth1 #ajh1 #eid1 #fah2 7#c7 ,potential and ,actual1 #fad-ah 7,metaph4 ,greek3 ,th72 7#d7 according to the ,categories1 #eid seq4 7,metaph4 ,z1 ,greek3 2 relation among the various aspects of1 #fa1 #dbd2 aspects 7#a7 and 7#b7 lightly treated in ,metaphysica1 belonging more to ,logic1 #fa2 in aspect 7#d7 ,logic and ,ontology blended1 #fb2 in the fullest sense1 #ff1 #fg1 #if2 first analyzed in its logical aspect by ,aristotle1 #ig2 as conceived in earliest ,greek thought1 #ig1 #dcf2 ,plato's doctrine of1 #eeb seq42 ,aristotle's doctrine of1 #efa4 ,enstasis 7,objection71 #bjb4 ,entelechy1 ,soul the first1 of a natural organized body1 #deh2 see ,actuality4 ,enthymeme1 ,the1 #bjb4 ,enunciative speech1 #aji2 see ,proposition4 ,epictetus1 authority for ,stoical creed1 #fed2 his distinction of things in1 and not in1 our power1 #ffa2 his respect for dissenting conviction1 #ffc4 ,epikurus1 doctrine of1 imperfectly reported1 #fed2 his standard of ,virtue and ,vice1 #fed2 ethical theory of1 anticipated1 #fed2 subordinated bodily pain and pleasure to mental1 #fed2 fragment of his last letter1 #fed2 his views on ,death and the ,gods1 #fee1 #feg2 founded ,justice and ,friendship upon ,reciprocity1 #fee2 specially inculcated ,friendship1 #fef2 duration and character of his sect1 #fef2 his theory misnamed1 and hence misunderstood1 #fef2 modified atomic theory of ,demokritus with an ethical purpose1 #feg2 his writings1 #feg1 #feh2 provided by atomic deflection 7not for ,freedom of ,will but7 for the unpredictable phenomena of nature1 #feh2 his view of the nature of ,truth1 #feh2 disregarded logical theory1 #feh4 ,equivocation1 of terms1 #eg2 detection of1 an organon of debate1 #bgi2 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve ,fallacy of1 #djg2 perhaps most frequent of all fallacies1 #dad4 ,eric1 of ,auxerre1 followed ,aristotle on ,universals1 #efc4 ,eristic1 given as one of the four ,species of ,debate1 #cgg2 really a variety or aspect of ,dialectic1 #cgg1 #cgi4 ,error1 liabilities to1 in 7the form of7 ,syllogism1 #agf2 in the matter of premisses1 #aha2 particular1 within knowledge of the universal1 #ahc2 three modes of1 #ahd1 modes of1 in regard to propositions as ,immediate or ,mediate1 #bbe4 ,esoteric doctrine1 as opposed to ,exoteric1 #eb4 ,essence 7,substance71 degrees of1 #fc1 #efa2 first and fundamental ,category1 #fe1 #fg2 ,first1 or ,hoc ,aliquid1 subject1 never predicate1 #fg1 #ah1 #efa2 ,second1 predicated of1 not in1 ,first1 #fh2 ,third1 #fh2 has itself no contrary1 but receives alternately contrary accidents1 #fi1 #hc2 relativity of1 as a subject for predicates1 #hc1 #ia seq42 ,first1 shades through ,second into quality1 #ia2 priority of1 as subject over predicate1 logical1 not real1 #ic2 treated in ,metaphys4 ,z1 #eie seq4 ,essence 7,quiddity71 propositions declaring1 attained only in ,first figure of ,syllogism1 #bbd2 one of the four qusita in ,science1 #bch2 nature of the question as to1 #bci2 how related to the question ,cur1 #bdj2 in all cases undemonstrable1 but declared through syllogism1 where it has an extraneous cause1 #bdd2 variously given in the ,definition1 #bde2 a variety of ,cause 7,formal7 #bde1 #faa2 treated in ,metaphys4 ,z1 #eie seq4 ,essential predication1 how distinguished by ,aristotle from ,non-,essential1 #fe4 ,est1 double meaning of1 #abf4 ,ethics1 ,aristotle's treatise on1 analyzed1 #die seq42 uncertainty and obscurity of the subject1 #dig2 ,ethical science the supreme good of the individual citizen1 #ejj2 fundamental defect in ,aristotle's theory1 #ead1 #eai2 first principles how acquired in1 #egh4 ,eubulides1 wrote in reproach of ,aristotle1 #bj4 ',eudmus1' ,dialogue of ,aristotle's1 #eb4 ,eudmus1 disciple of ,aristotle1 knew logical works of his now lost1 #ef2 wrote on logic1 #ef2 followed ,aristotle in treating ,modals1 #add2 his proof of the convertibility of ,universal ,negative1 #adf2 on the negative function of ,dialectic1 #bhd4 ,eudoxus1 anticipated ethical theory of ,epikurus1 #fed4 ,eumlus1 asserted that ,aristotle took poison1 #ae4 ,eurymedon1 the ,hierophant1 indicted ,aristotle for impiety1 #ab4 ,euthydemus1 the ,sophist1 #chc4 ,example1 the ,syllogism from1 #aia2 ,induction an exaltation of1 #aig2 results in ,experience1 #aih4 ,excluded ,middle1 ,maxim of1 not self-evident1 #add2 among the prcognita of ,demonstration1 #bab2 supplement or correlative of ,maxim of ,contradiction1 #dbf2 enunciated both as a logical1 and as an ontological1 formula1 #egi2 vindicated by ,aristotle specially against ,anaxagoras1 #eha1 #eij seq4 ,existence1 one of the four heads of ,investigation1 #bch4 ,exoteric1 the works so called1 how understood by ,cicero1 #dd2 how by the critics1 #de2 discourse1 meaning of in ,aristotle himself1 #df seq42 opposed to ,akroamatic1 #ej2 doctrine1 as opposed to ,esoteric1 #eb4 ,greek3 ,e7xterikoi lo_/goi1 allusions to1 in ,aristotle1 #df seq4 ,experience1 inference from ,example results in1 #aih2 place of1 in ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill's theory of ,ratiocination1 #aii2 basis of science1 #aii2 is of particular facts1 #egf4 ,expetenda1 dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #bif seq4 ,eye1 structure of the1 #dff4 ,f4 ,fact1 knowledge of1 distinguished from knowledge of ,cause1 #bbc1 #bce2 one of the four heads of ,investigation1 #bch2 nature of question as to1 #bci2 assumed in question as to ,cause1 #bci1 #fjh4 ,fallacies1 subject of ,sophistici ,elenchi1 #cgg2 incidental to the human 9999intellect1 often hard to detect1 not mere traps1 #chc1 #cie1 #djd2 operated through language1 #chd2 classified1 #che2 7#a7 ,dictionis or ,in ,dictione1 #che2 7#b7 ,extra ,dictionem #che seq42 may all be brought to ,ignoratio ,elenchi1 #cij2 current among ,aristotle's contemporaries1 #cia2 ,in ,dictione1 how to solve1 #dji seq4 ,extra ,dictionem1 how to solve1 #daj seq4 ,falsehood1 ,non-,ens in the sense of1 #fj2 c42 see ,truth and ,ens4 ,favorinus1 #ce4 ,figura ,dictionis1 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve1 #djh4 ,figure of ,syllogism1 #adh2 ,first1 #adh2 alternative ways of enunciating1 #adh2 ,modes of1 #adi2 valid modes of ,first1 #adi2 invalid modes of ,first1 how set forth by ,aristotle1 #aej2 ,second and its modes1 #aea2 ,third and its modes1 #aeb2 superiority of ,first1 #aeb1 #aec1 #bbd2 indicated by the ,conclusion1 #aec1 #afd1 #afg2 all ,demonstration ultimately reducible to two first modes of ,first1 #aed2 ,reduction of ,second and ,third1 #afh2 in ,second and ,third1 conclusion possible from contradictory premisses1 #age2 knowledge of ,cause1 also propositions declaring ,essence and ,definition1 attained in the first1 #bbd4 ,final ,cause1 #bdf1 #faa4 ,forchhammer1 his view of exoteric discourse1 #di4 ,form1 joint-factor with ,matter1 a variety of ,cause1 #bde1 #faa2 in the intellectual generation of the ,individual1 #dde1 #eih seq42 and ,matter1 distinction of1 a capital feature in ,aristotle's ,first ,philosophy1 #ded1 #eid seq4 7from ,metaph4 ,book ,z onwards72 relation of1 to ,matter1 #dee2 as the ,actual1 #dee1 #faf2 the ,soul is1 #deg1 #dfj2 the ,celestial ,body1 the region of1 #dhj4 ,fugienda1 dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #bif seq4 ,g4 ,galen1 his list of ,categories1 #ajc4 ,gellius1 ,a41 his distinction of ,exoteric and ,akroamatic books1 #ej4 ,generable1 the senses of1 #fcg4 ,generation1 the doctrine of1 #eih seq41 #fbj4 ,generatione et ,corruptione1 ,treatise de1 connected with what other works1 #ed1 #fec n4 ,genus1 is ,second ,essence1 #fc2 or more strictly ,third ,essence1 #fg2 in a ,demonstration1 #bai2 division of a1 #bej2 one of the ,predicables1 #bgf1 #bhd2 dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #cjb seq42 not often made subject of debate1 but important for ,definition1 #cjb2 distinguished from ,differentia1 #cab2 perfect definition through1 and ,differenti1 #ccc2 easier to attack than to defend1 #ceb2 is ,matter in a definition1 #fjd2 logically prior to the ,species1 #fjg4 ,geometry1 use of diagrams in1 #afg1 #fah2 prcognita required in1 #bab4 ,gorgias1 style of1 #bb4 ,gryllion1 sculptor named in ,aristotle's will1 #ai4 ,gymnastics1 as part of education1 #edd4 ,h4 ,habere1 ,category1 #ff1 #gc2 sometimes dropt by ,aristotle1 #gd1 #hj2 entitled with the others to a place1 #gh2 refers primarily to a ,man1 #gi2 is also understood more widely by ,aristotle1 #gi1 #ajc2 exclusively so by some ,aristotelians1 #hj2 ranked fifth by ,archytas1 #hj4 ,habitus and ,privatio1 case of ,opposita1 #ajd1 #aje4 ,hamilton1 ,sir ,w41 on ,modals in ,logic1 #acj1 #bjj2 wavers in his use of the term ,common ,sense1 #efe2 points on which he misrepresents ,aristotle1 #efe1 #eff2 real question between1 and the ,inductive ,school1 #efg2 the passages upon the strength of which he numbers ,aristotle among the champions of authoritative ,common ,sense1 examined seriatim1 #efh seq4 ,happiness1 ,aristotle's definition of1 examined1 #eja seq42 happiness of the individual and of society distinct1 #eag4 ,hearing1 operated through a medium1 #afg4 ,heart1 organ of ,sensation generally1 #dfd1 #dgb1 #dgd1 specially of ,touch1 #dgb4 ,heaven 7,kosmos71 always in action1 #fag2 uppermost place in1 assigned to the ,gods1 #fcb2 revolving in a circle1 cannot be infinite1 #fcc2 no body outside of1 #fcd1 #fcf2 there cannot be more than one1 #fcd2 different senses of1 #fcf2 ungenerated and indestructible1 #fcg-ci2 directions in the1 #fdj2 whence the number of revolutions in1 #fda2 necessarily spherical1 #faa1 #fde2 motion of1 uniform1 #fdb4 ,heavy1 distinguished from ,light1 #fca4 ,heitz1 ,emil1 takes ground against ,v4 ,rose on the catalogue of ,diogenes1 #cb2 refers it to ,alexandrine literati1 #cd1 #dj4 ,herakleitus1 philosophy of1 inconsistent with the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 #dbg1 #dbi1 #eib2 disregarded data of experience1 #dcf1 #ddd2 position of1 inexpugnable by general argument1 #ddc2 his view of the soul1 #ddi2 his view of the world of sense and particulars1 #eea2 not a dialectician1 #eea2 ,maxim of ,contradiction defended by ,aristotle specially against1 #egi2 the doctrine of1 makes all propositions true1 #eib2 must yet admit an infinite number of false propositions1 #eib2 held the ,kosmos to be generated and destroyed alternately1 #fcf4 ,hermeias1 despot of ,atarneus and ,assos1 friend of ,aristotle1 #d2 commemorated after death by ,aristotle in a hymn and epigram1 #e1 #ab1 #ac4 ,hermippus1 drew up catalogue of pupils of ,isokrates1 #ba2 probable author of the catalogue in ,diogenes1 #cd1 #ce4 ,herpyllis1 second wife of ,aristotle1 #ag1 #ah4 ,hipparchus1 friend of ,aristotle1 #ag4 ,hippokrates1 his quadrature of the circle1 #cha4 ,hobbes1 his definition of ,accident1 #fb4 ,homer1 made intelligence dependent on sense1 #ehh4 ,homo ,mensura1 doctrine of ,protagoras1 held by ,aristotle to be at variance with ,maxim of ,contradiction1 #dcj seq41 #ehj1 #ehg seq4 ,homonymous things1 #eg4 ,homonymy 7,equivocation71 ,fallacy of1 #che2 how to solve1 #djg4 ,hypereides1 executed1 #ab4 ,hypothesis1 ,syllogisms from1 #afj1 #afh2 as a principle of ,demonstration1 #bae1 #bba4 ,i4 ,iamblichus1 defended ,aristotle's ,categories1 #efc4 ,ideas1 ,platonic ,theory of1 not required for ,demonstration1 #bba2 as set forth by ,plato himself1 #eec2 psychological ground for1 #eed2 objections urged against1 in ,sophistes and ,parmenides1 #eef seq42 objections urged by ,aristotle against1 #eeh2 allusions to in books of the ,metaphysica1 #eie1 #eih1 #fjj1 #fjc1 #fjf1 #fjg1 #fab1 #fag1 #fai1 #fbj4 ,idem1 three senses of1 #bgg1 #cej2 a topic in ,first ,philosophy1 #ehd4 ,identity1 ,maxim of1 among the prcognita of ,demonstration1 #bab4 ,idomeneus1 letter to1 from ,epikurus1 #fed4 ,ignoratio ,elenchi1 ,fallacy of1 #chg2 all fallacies may be brought to1 #cij2 how to solve1 #dab4 ,immortality1 not of the individual1 #dfb1 #dhi1 #dij4 ,immoveable1 essence1 subject of ,ontology1 also of ,mathematics1 #dbc1 #eic1 #fai2 ,prime ,movent1 #fbd4 ,impossibile1 ,reductio ad1 see ,reductio4 ,impossible1 ,the1 senses of1 #fch2 differs from the ,false1 #fch4 ,induction1 sole proof of the rules for converting propositions1 #adf1 #adg2 everything believed through ,syllogism or upon1 #ahg1 #aid1 #bbf2 the ,syllogism from or out of1 #ahg seq42 the opposite of genuine ,syllogism1 #aij2 plainer and clearer to us1 than ,syllogism1 #aia2 ,aristotle's attempt to reduce1 to syllogistic form1 #aib1 #aic2 wanting in the first requisite of ,syllogism--necessity of sequence1 #aic1 #aig2 presupposed in ,syllogism1 #aid2 the antithesis of1 to ,syllogism1 obscured by ,aristotle's treatment1 #aih1 #aii2 as part of the whole process of ,scientific ,inference1 #aii1 #bja2 true character of1 apprehended by ,aristotle1 but not followed out1 #aii1 #bjj2 ,logic of1 neglected by the expositors after ,aristotle till modern times1 #bjj2 requisites to a ,logic of1 #bja2 supplies the premisses of ,demonstration1 starting from particulars of sense1 #bbf1 #beh1 #bei1 #efb1 #egf2 repeated and uncontradicted1 gives maximum of certainty1 #bfj2 process of1 culminates in the infallible ,nos1 #bei-fa2 procedure by way of1 in ,dialectic1 #ceh2 most suitable to a young beginner in ,dialectic1 #cgd4 ,inductive ,school1 exact question between the1 and ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 #efg4 ,infinite1 the1 exists only potentially1 not actually except in a certain way for our cognition1 #fae2 no body is1 #fcb seq4 ,intellect1 see ,nos4 ,intellectus ,agens1 relation of1 to the ,patiens1 #dhh1 #dhi2 eternal and immortal1 but not in the individual1 #dhh1 #dhi4 ,intellectus ,patiens1 relation to the ,agens1 #dhh1 #dhi2 belongs to and perishes with the individual1 #dhh1 #dhi4 ,interpretatione1 ,treatise de1 not named1 but its contents presupposed1 in ,analytica and ,topica1 #ef2 subject of1 how related to subject of ,categori1 #eg1 #ei1 #ajh1 #aji2 last section of1 out of connection1 #acd2 contains first positive theory of ,proposition1 #acf2 summary of1 #aci4 ,interrogation in ,dialectic and in ,science1 #bbb4 ,irregularity1 principle of1 in the ,kosmos1 see ,chance4 ,isokrates1 corresponded with ,nikokles1 #g1 #bc2 his rhetorical school1 #ba2 his style of composition and teaching1 #bb2 attacked by ,aristotle1 #bd2 defended by ,kephisodorus1 #bd4 ,j4 ,jacere1 ,category1 #ff1 #gc2 sometimes dropt by ,aristotle1 #gd1 #hj2 entitled with the others to a place1 #gh2 refers primarily to a ,man1 #gi4 ,justice1 definition of1 #eca2 view of the ,pythagoreans respecting1 #ecc4 ,k4 ,kallimachus of ,alexandria1 drew up tables of authors and their works1 #cd4 ,kallisthenes1 recommended by ,aristotle to ,alexander1 #i4 ,kallistratus1 his skolion on ,harmodius and ,aristogeiton1 #ac4 ,kassander1 pupil of ,aristotle1 #i4 ,kephisodorus1 defended ,isokrates against ,aristotle1 #bd1 #bgb n4 ,knowledge1 of the ,universal with error in particulars1 #ahb2 three modes of1 #ahd2 two grades of--,absolute1 ,qualified1 #bab2 of ,fact1 of ,cause1 #bbc2 proper1 is of the ,universal1 #bce2 versus ,opinion1 #bcf1 #egc4 ,kosmos1 principles of regularity and irregularity in1 #aad2 see ,heaven4 ,kratylus refrained from predication1 and pointed only with the finger1 #dbi n41 #ehj1 #eij4 ,l4 ,la ,mennais1 on ,common ,sense1 #efg4 ,lamian ,war1 #ab4 ,language1 significant by convention only1 #aji2 as subservient to the growth of intellect1 #dhd1 #egf4 ,leukippus1 affirmed motion to be eternal1 #fbc2 atomic doctrine of1 #fcd4 ,life1 defined1 #dec2 see ,soul4 ,light1 distinguished from ,heavy1 #fca4 ,light1 takes no time to travel1 #dff4 ,loci1 in ,dialectic1 nature of1 #bhc2 distribution of1 according to the four ,predicables1 #bhd2 bearing on ,accident1 #bhe seq42 bearing on ,expetenda and ,fugienda as cases of ,accident1 #bif seq42 bearing on ,genus1 #cjb seq42 bearing on ,proprium1 #cac seq42 bearing on ,definition1 #cbi seq42 belonging to ,sophistic1 #chb1 #djc4 ,locomotion1 ,animal1 produced by ,nos and ,appetite1 #dic4 ,logic1 importance of ,aristotle's distinction of the ,equivocal in1 #eg2 deals with ,ens in what senses1 #fa2 blended with ,ontology in the ,categories1 #fb2 connection of1 with ,psychology1 #aaj2 deals with speech as ,enunciative1 #aaa2 first presented scientifically by ,aristotle1 #acj2 properly includes discussion of ,modals1 #acj seq42 distinction of ,contradictory and ,contrary fundamental in1 #acf2 use of examples in1 #afg2 ,aristotle's one-sided treatment of1 in subordinating ,induction1 #bjj2 as combining ,induction and ,deduction1 #bja2 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill's system of1 in relation to ,aristotle's1 #bja2 ,aristotle's claim to originality in respect of1 #dbj2 line between1 and ,ontology1 not clearly marked by ,aristotle1 #dbb2 ,sokrates first broke ground for1 #dbf2 subjective point of view chiefly taken by ,aristotle in1 #egh4 ,lucian1 uses word esoteric1 #eb4 ,lucretius1 only extant ,epikurean writer1 #fed4 ,m4 ,madvig1 his view of exoteric discourse1 #di4 ,mathematics1 theoretical science1 subject of1 #dbc1 #eic4 ,matter1 a variety of ,cause1 #bdf1 #faa2 joint-factor with ,form in the intellectual generation of the ,individual1 #dde1 #eih seq42 and ,form1 distinction1 of1 a capital feature in ,aristotle's ,first ,philosophy1 #ded1 #eie seq4 7from ,metaph4 ,book ,z onwards72 relation of1 to ,form1 #dee1 #def2 as the ,potential1 #dee1 #fae seq42 various grades of1 #def4 ,mechanics1 place of1 in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #ed4 ,megarics1 allowed no power not in actual exercise1 #fad4 ,memory1 ,tract on1 and ,reminiscence1 #dge2 nature of1 as distinguished from ,phantasy1 #dge2 distinguished from ,reminiscence1 #dgf2 phenomena of1 #dgg4 ,menedmus1 disallowed negative propositions1 #acf4 ,meno1 ,platonic1 question as to possibility of learning in1 #bab4 ,menoekeus1 letter to1 from ,epikurus1 #fed4 ,mentor1 ,persian general1 drove ,aristotle from ,mitylene1 #e4 ,metaphysics1 in modern sense1 covers ,aristotle's ,physica and ,metaphysica1 #dbb4 ,metaphysica1 name not used by ,aristotle1 #ed1 #ei2 relation of the1 to the ,physica1 #ed1 #dbb2 characteristic distinction of the1 #dbb4 ,meteorologica1 connected with what other works1 #ed4 ,metrodorus1 third husband of ,aristotle's daughter1 #bj4 ,middle term in ,syllogism1 literal signification of1 #adh2 how to find a1 #aeg seq42 the ,why of the conclusion in ,demonstration1 #bai2 power of swiftly divining a1 #bcg2 fourfold question as to1 in ,science1 #bci2 as ,cause1 #bdf4 ,mieza1 school of ,aristotle there1 #f4 ,mill1 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s41 on the ,ten ,categories1 #ij n42 his system of ,logic1 in relation to ,aristotle's1 #aih-bja2 on indemonstrable truths1 #bbi n4 ,milton1 his description of ,realism1 #eeb4 ,mitylene1 ,aristotle spent some time there1 #d4 ,modal ,propositions1 form of ,antiphasis in1 #abg2 excluded by ,hamilton and others from ,logic1 #acj2 place of1 in ,formal ,logic vindicated1 #aca2 ,aristotle's treatment of1 not satisfactory1 #acc1 #ach2 doctrine of1 related to ,aristotle's ,ontology and ,physics1 #acc2 disadvantageously mixed up with the ,assertory1 #ach1 #adc1 #aed2 in ,syllogism1 #bjd4 ,modes of ,figure1 #adi2 see ,figure4 ,moon1 spherical1 #fdf2 motions of1 #fdg4 ,motion1 ,zeno's argument against1 paradoxical1 #cfe2 the kinds of local1 #eic4 ,motus1 under ,opposita1 #ajd4 ,movent1 ,the ,immovable ,prime1 #fbd seq4 ,music1 necessary part of education1 #ede4 ,myrmex1 slave or pupil of ,aristotle1 #ai4 ,n4 ,nature1 sum of the constant tendencies and sequences within the ,kosmos1 #aad1 #aag2 objective correlate to the ,necessary ,proposition in ,logic1 #acc2 ,generation from1 #eih4 ,naturalia ,parva1 complementary to the ,de ,anim1 #ed4 ,necessary1 ,the1 as a mode affecting ,antiphasis1 #abf seq42 relation of1 to the ,possible1 #abg1 #bje2 a formal mode of ,proposition1 #aca2 why it may be given up as a ,mode1 #bjf4 ,necessity1 in what sense ,aristotle denies that all events happen by1 #aaf4 ,negation1 disjunction of subject and predicate1 #aaa2 through what collocations of the negative particle obtained strictly1 #aah seq41 #afi2 real and apparent1 #abb2 see ,contradictory1 ,antiphasis4 ,neleus1 inherited library of ,theophrastus1 and carried it away to ,skpsis1 #cf2 heirs of1 buried his library for safety1 #cf4 ,nikanor1 son of ,proxenus1 ward and friend of ,aristotle1 bore ,alexander's rescript to the ,greek cities1 #aa2 executor1 and chief beneficiary1 under ,aristotle's will1 #ag-bj2 married ,aristotle's daughter1 #bj4 ,nikokles1 correspondent of ,isokrates1 #g4 ,nikomachus1 father of ,aristotle1 medical author and physician to ,amyntas1 #b2 son of ,aristotle1 #ag1 #ah4 ,nominalism1 main position of1 clearly enunciated by ,aristotle1 #dha n42 scholastic formula of1 #eee4 ,non ,causa pro ,caus1 #chh2 how to solve1 #dac4 ,non-,ens1 in the sense of ,falsehood1 #fj1 #ajh2 ,accident borders on1 #ih1 #eic4 ,non per ,hoc1 the argument so called1 #agi2 ,fallacy of1 #chh4 ,notion1 the general1 as a cause and creative force1 #dbb4 ,notiora1 nobis v4 natur1 #aig1 #bae1 #bci1 #ccb4 ,noun1 function of the1 #aji1 #aaj1 #acj2 the indefinite1 #aah1 #abd4 ,nos1 the unit of ,demonstration or ,science1 #bca2 the principium of ,science or scientific ,cognition1 #bcf1 #bei2 unerring1 more so even than ,science1 #bei1 #dia1 #egg2 stands with ,aristotle as terminus and correlate to the process of ,induction1 #bfj1 #egh2 7,notic soul7 distinct from1 but implying1 the lower mental functions1 #dfa1 #dgi2 independent of special bodily organs1 #dgi1 #dha1 #dhg2 how related to the ,celestial ,body1 #dha1 #dhg2 the form or correlate of all cogitables--,form of ,forms1 #dhb1 #dhf2 limited in its function1 as joined with sentient and nutritive souls1 #dhb1 #dhd2 differently partaken of by man and animals1 #dhc2 growth of1 #dhd2 not clearly separated by ,aristotle from ,phantasy1 with which it is in its exercise bound up1 #dhe2 distinguished from ,sense1 #dhf2 of the ,soul1 an unlimited cogitative potentiality1 like a tablet not yet written on1 #dhg1 #dia2 function of1 in apprehending the ,abstract1 #dhh1 #dij2 has a formal aspect 7,intellectus ,agens7 and a material 7,patiens71 #dhi2 in what sense immortal1 #dhi2 in what sense the principia of ,science belong to1 #dia2 analysis1 selection1 and concentration of attention1 the real characteristics of1 #dib2 ,theoretical1 ,practical1 #dic2 cogitation and cogitatum are identical in1 #fbg4 ,number1 analogy of ,definition to1 #faa4 ,nutritive soul1 functions of1 #dfa2 origin of1 #dhj4 ,o4 ,objection 7,enstasis71 #bjb2 response to false1 in ,dialectic1 #cff4 ,ontology1 starts from classification of ,entia1 #ei1 #fa2 ,science of ,ens quatenus ,ens1 how named by ,aristotle1 #ei2 opposed as the universal science to particular sciences1 not to ,phenomenology1 #ei2 blended with ,logic in the ,categories1 #fb2 logical aspect of1 as set forth by ,aristotle1 #abg2 of ,aristotle's predecessors1 #ig1 #ajh1 #eea seq42 has ,dialectic as a tentative companion1 #bgc2 not clearly distinguished from ,logic and ,physics by ,aristotle1 #dbb2 highest of ,theoretical ,sciences1 subject of1 #dbc1 #eic2 treats of ,ens in two senses specially1 #dbd1 #dbe2 also critically examines highest generalities of ,demonstration1 #dbe1 #egi2 ,aristotle's advance in1 upon ,plato1 #dde1 #efa2 an objective science1 #egi4 ,opinion1 opposed to ,science1 in ,plato1 #bjg2 in ,aristotle1 #bjg1 #bcf1 #egc2 wanting to animals1 #dge4 ,opposita1 four modes of1 #ajd2 included under1 rather than including1 ,relativa1 #ajd2 should be called ,opposite-,relativa1 #aje4 ,opposition1 ,contradictory and ,contrary1 #aaa2 squares of1 ,scholastic and ,aristotelian1 #acg n4 ,oppositis1 ,treatise de1 by ,aristotle1 lost1 #acd4 ,organon1 ,the1 meaning of1 as applied to ,aristotle's logical treatises1 #ee2 what it includes1 #ef2 not so specified by ,aristotle1 #ef2 ,aristotle's point of view throughout1 #egh4 ,organa1 or ,helps to command of syllogisms in dialectical debate1 #bgh2 use of the1 #bhb2 relation of the1 to the ,loci1 #bhc4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ros1 ,term1 applied both to subject and to ,predicate in ,analytica1 #ada4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ti1 ,to_/1 see ,fact4 ,greek3 ,ou7si_/a1 #fg1 see ,essence4 ,p4 ,paradeigmatic inference1 #aih2 see ,example4 ,paradoxa1 a variety of ,adoxa1 #bfi4 ,paralogisms1 ,scientific1 #bfg1 #chj2 see ,fallacies4 ,parmenides1 eliminated ,non-,ens1 #acf2 uses equivocal names as univocal1 #dad2 his doctrine of ,absolute ,ens1 #dcf1 #eea2 not a dialectician1 #eea2 made intelligence vary with sense1 #ehh4 ,paronymous things1 #eg4 ,part1 relation of1 to ,whole1 with a view to ,definition1 #fja4 ,particular1 ,the1 notius nobis compared with the ,universal1 #aif2 inferiority of1 to the ,universal1 #bca4 ,passion1 ,pati1 ,category1 #fe1 #gc4 ,peirastic1 given as one of the four species of debate1 #cgg2 really a variety or aspect of ,dialectic1 #cgg1 #cgi4 ',peplus1' work of ,aristotle's1 #cb4 ,perception1 sensible1 see ,sensation4 ,pergamus1 kings of1 their library1 #cf4 ,peripatetics1 origin of the title1 #g4 ,phstis1 mother of ,aristotle1 #b2 directions for a bust to1 in ,aristotle's will1 #ai4 ,phanias1 disciple of ,aristotle1 knew logical works of his now lost1 #ef2 wrote on ,logic1 #ef4 ,phantasy1 nature of1 #dge2 distinguished from ,memory1 #dge2 indispensable to1 and passes by insensible degrees into1 ,cogitation1 #dgi1 #dhd1 #dhe4 ,philip of ,macedon1 chose ,aristotle as tutor to ,alexander1 #e2 destroyed ,stageira1 #f4 ,philosopher1 ,the1 distinguished from the ,dialectician1 #ced1 #ehd2 also from the ,sophist1 #ehd4 ,philosophy1 ,first1 usual name for ,science of ,ens quatenus ,ens1 #ei1 #dbb1 #ehd2 see ,ontology4 ,phokion1 at the head of the ,athenian administration under ,alexander1 #ab2 ineffectually opposed anti-,macedonian sentiment after ,alexander's death1 #ab4 ,physica1 relation of the1 to the ,metaphysica1 #ed1 #dbb4 ,physics1 theoretical science1 subject of1 #dbc1 #eic1 #fcj4 ,pindar1 subject of his ,odes1 #ac4 ,place1 in ,dialectic1 #bhc2 none outside of the ,heaven1 #fcf4 ,planets1 number of the spheres of1 #fbf2 do not twinkle1 why1 #fde2 see ,stars4 ,plato1 much absent from ,athens1 between #cfg-fj ,b4,c41 #d2 died1 #cdg ,b4,c41 #d2 corresponded with ,dionysius1 #g2 ,aristotle charged with ingratitude to1 #bj2 attacked with ,aristotle by ,kephisodorus1 #bd2 ancients nearly unanimous as to the list of his works1 #bg1 #db2 his exposure of equivocal phraseology1 #eh2 fascinated by particular numbers1 #gd2 on ,relativity1 #hd2 his theory of ,proposition and ,negation1 #ace1 #dbg2 called for1 but did not supply1 definitions1 #ada2 his use of the word ,syllogism1 #adc2 relied upon logical ,division for science1 #afb2 opposed ,science 7,dialectic7 to ,opinion 7,rhetoric71 #bjh1 #bfc2 explained learning from ,reminiscence1 #bab2 his view of ,nos as infallible1 #bfj2 character of his dialogues1 #bfd2 recognized ,didactic1 but as absorbed into ,dialectic1 #bfd2 his use of the word ,sophist1 #cgf2 his psychology 7in the ,timus71 #ddf-i1 #dea1 #dfa2 first affirmed ,realism1 #eeb2 his ,ontology and theory of ,ideas1 #eec seq41 see ,ideas2 held ,sophistic to be busied about ,non-,ens1 #eic2 his scale of ,essences1 #eie1 #fbj2 his assumption of a self-movent as principium1 #fbc2 held that the non-generable may be destroyed1 #fcg1 #fci2 on the position of the ,earth1 #fdi2 in his ,protagoras anticipated ,epikurus1 #fed2 admitted an invincible erratic necessity in ,nature1 #feg2 ethical purpose of1 #ffb4 ',plato and the other ,companions of ,sokrates1' subject of the work1 #a2 referred to1 on subject of the ,platonic ,canon1 #bg4 ,platonists1 their view of ,essences as ,numbers1 #faa2 see ,ideas4 ,plotinus1 censured ,categories of the ,stoics1 #ajj1 #efc2 his list of ,categories1 #ajb1 #efc4 ,plurium ,interrogationum ut ,unius1 ,fallacia1 #chi2 how to solve1 #dac4 ,plutarch does not appear to have known the chief ,aristotelian works1 #ca2 authority for story of the fate of ,aristotle's library1 #ce4 ,poetic1 place of1 in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #ed2 modes of speech entering into1 #aaa1 #acj4 ,greek3 ,poio_/n1 see ,quality4 ,political ,science1 the ,supreme ,science1 #ddi4 ,politics1 place of in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #ed2 ,aristotle's ,treatise on1 #eci2 founded on the ,republic of ,plato1 #eci2 his conception of a republic1 #eci4 ,porphyry1 disposed works of ,plotinus in ,enneads1 #dd2 his ,eisagoge1 #gc1 #aja1 #eeb2 rejected last paragraph of ,de ,interpretatione1 #acd2 his statement of the question as to ,universals1 #eeb1 #efd2 defended ,aristotle's ,categories against ,plotinus1 #efc4 ,greek3 ,poso_/n1 see ,quantity4 ,possible1 ,the1 as a ,mode affecting ,antiphasis1 #abg2 relation of1 to the ,necessary1 #abg1 #bje2 three meanings of1 given by ,aristotle1 #abh2 effective sense of1 #abi1 #acc1 #bje1 #fag1 #fch2 truly a ,formal ,mode of ,proposition1 #aca2 gradations in1 #bje4 ,poste1 ,mr41 upon ,aristotle's proof that ,demonstration implies indemonstrable truths1 #bbi2 on the ,theory of ,fallacies1 #chc4 ,posterius1 different senses of1 #aje2 as between parts and whole1 #fja-fjc4 ,post-prdicamenta1 #gi1 #hj1 #ajd4 ,postulate1 as a principle of ,demonstration1 #bbj4 ,potentiality 7,power7 as opposed to ,actuality1 #abh1 #def1 #fae seq42 varieties of1 #fac4 ,prdicament1 see ,categories4 ,predicables1 four in ,aristotle1 five in later logicians1 #bgf2 quadruple classification of1 how exhaustive1 #bgf2 come each under one or other of the ,categories1 #bgg4 ,predicate1 in a proposition1 #aji2 to be ,one1 #abj2 called ,term in ,analytica1 #ada4 ,predication1 essential and non-essential1 ,aristotle's mode of distinguishing1 #fc1 #fd4 ,premisses of ,syllogism1 #adh2 how to disengage for ,reduction1 #afd2 involving qualification1 #aff2 false1 yielding true conclusion1 #agb2 contradictory1 yielding a conclusion in ,second and ,third figures1 #age2 necessary character of1 in ,demonstration1 #bae2 in ,dialectic1 #bbg4 ,principles of ,science1 furnished only by ,experience1 #afb1 #beg2 knowable in themselves1 but not therefore innate1 #agh1 #bef2 what1 common to all1 #bab1 #bae2 maintained by ,aristotle to be indemonstrable1 #bae1 #bbh2 general and special1 #bcf1 #egh2 development of1 #bef2 known by ,nos upon ,induction from particulars1 #bei1 #efb1 #egg2 discussed by ,first ,philosopher1 and by ,dialectician1 #ege4 ,principii ,petitio1 ,fallacy of1 #aef1 #agf2 in ,dialectic1 #cfg1 #cga2 in ,sophistic1 #chh2 how to solve1 #dab4 ,prius1 different senses of1 in ,post-predicamenta1 #aje2 in ,metaphysica ,greek3 ,d1 #ajf2 ,aristotle often confounds the meanings of1 #ajf2 as between parts and whole1 #fja-fjc4 ,privatio and ,habitus1 case of ,opposita1 #ajd1 #aje4 ,greek3 ,proai_/resis1 definition of1 #ebf4 ,probabilities1 ,syllogism from1 #bjb4 ,probable1 ,the1 true meaning of1 in ,aristotle1 #bfi4 ,problematical proposition1 ,the1 a truly formal mode1 #aca4 ,problems1 for scientific investigation1 #bch2 identical1 #bec2 in ,dialectic1 #bgc4 ,prokles1 second husband of ,aristotle's daughter1 #bj4 ,proof 7,greek3 tekm_/rion7 distinguished from ,sign1 #bjc4 ,propositions1 subject of ,de ,interpretatione1 #eg1 #aji2 ,terms treated by ,aristotle with reference to1 #ei2 ,ens divided with reference to1 #ei2 defined1 #aji2 distinguished in signification from ,terms1 #aji1 #aaj1 also from other modes of significant speech1 #aaa1 #acj2 ,simple1 ,complex1 #aaa2 ,affirmative1 ,negative1 #aaa1 #abb2 ,contradictory 7pair of1 making ,antiphasis71 ,contrary1 #aaa1 #abd1 #acd2 ,universal1 ,singular1 #aaa2 about matters particular and future1 #aac2 in quaternions illustrative of real ,antiphasis1 #aah seq42 subject of1 and predicate of1 to be each ,one1 #abe2 function of copula in1 #abf2 ,simple ,assertory1 ,modal 7,possible or ,problematical and ,necessary71 #abg seq42 subjective and objective aspects of1 #aca2 ,aristotle's theory of1 compared with views of ,plato and others1 #ace2 summarized1 #aci2 how named in ,analytica1 #ada2 named either as declaring1 or as generating1 truth1 #ada2 formally classified according to ,quantity in ,analytica1 #adb2 ,universal1 double account of1 #adb2 ,conversion of1 taken singly1 #add2 rules for ,conversion of ,universal ,negative1 ,affirmative1 c41 #add seq42 comparison of1 as subjects of attack and defence1 #aef2 ,indivisible or ,immediate1 and ,mediate--modes of error with regard to1 #bbd seq42 as subject-matter of ,dialectic1 #bgc2 classified for purposes of ,dialectic1 #bgf4 ,proprium1 one of the ,predicables1 #bgf2 thesis of1 hardest1 after ,definition1 to defend1 #bhe1 #cec2 dialectical ,loci bearing on1 #cac seq42 ten different modes of1 #cba4 ,greek3 ,pro_/s ti1 see ,relation4 ,protagoras1 his doctrine1 ,homo ,mensura impugned by ,aristotle as adverse to the ,maxim of ,contradiction1 #dcj seq41 #ehg seq42 true force of his doctrine1 #dca2 misapprehended by ,aristotle and ,plato1 #dcb4 ,greek3 ,pro_/tasis1 name for ,proposition in ,analytica1 #ada4 ,proxenus1 of ,atarneus1 guardian of ,aristotle at ,stageira1 #c2 mentioned in ,aristotle's will1 #ai4 ,pseudographeme or ,scientific ,paralogism1 #bfg2 or pseudographic syllogism1 #chj4 ,psychology1 relation of1 to ,logic1 #aaj2 summary of ,aristotle's1 #dic4 ,pythagoras1 disregarded experience1 #dcf2 see ,pythagoreans4 ,pythagoreans had a two-fold doctrine--exoteric and esoteric1 #eb2 fascinated by particular numbers1 #gd2 their view of the soul1 #ddi2 went astray in defining from numbers1 #fjc2 ascribed perfection and beauty to results1 not to their originating principles1 #fbe2 said the ,universe and all things are determined by ,three1 #fcj2 recognized ,right and ,left in the ,heaven1 #faj2 erred in calling ours the upper hemisphere and to the right1 #fdj2 affirmed harmony of the spheres1 #fdf2 placed ,fire1 not ,earth1 at the centre of the ,kosmos1 #fdh2 made the ,earth and ,antichthon revolve each in a circle1 #fdh4 ,pythias1 wife of ,aristotle1 #e1 #ag1 #bj2 daughter of ,aristotle1 #ag-ai4 ,q4 ,qusita1 in science1 four heads of1 #bch2 order of1 #bci2 the four1 compared1 #bdj4 ,quality 7,quale799991 third ,category1 treated fourth1 #fe1 #gb2 varieties of1 #gb2 admits in some cases1 contrariety and graduation1 #gb2 foundation of ,similarity and ,dissimilarity1 #gc2 illustrated from ,relata1 #gc2 ,first ,essence shades through ,second into1 #ia2 to ,aristotle a mere predicate1 highest of substances to ,plato1 #ejc2 is hardly ,ens at all1 #eic4 ,quantity 7,quantum71 second4 ,category1 #fe2 ,continual1 ,discrete1 #gj2 has no contrary1 #gj2 a mere appendage to ,essence1 #eie1 #eif4 ,quiddity1 see ,essence4 ,r4 ,realism1 first affirmed by ,plato1 #eeb1 #eee2 problems of1 as set out by ,porphyry1 and discussed before and after1 #eeb2 scholastic formula of1 #eee2 objections1 urged against1 by ,plato himself in ,sophistes and ,parmenides1 #eej seq42 peculiarity in ,plato's doctrine of1 #eeg2 impugned by ,aristotle1 #eeh seq42 character of ,aristotle's objections to1 #ejj2 counter-theory to1 set up by ,aristotle1 #ejj1 #eja2 standard against1 raised by ,aristotle in his ,first 9999,category1 #ejb2 of ,plotinus1 #efc2 of ,j4 ,scotus ,erigena1 #efd2 of ,remigius1 #efd4 ,reciprocation1 among ,terms of ,syllogism1 #ahe4 ,reduction1 in ,syllogism1 #aec2 object and process of1 #afd seq4 ,reductio ad ,impossibile or ,absurdum1 used in proving modes of ,second figure1 #aeb2 nature of1 #aee1 #afj1 #afh2 a case of ,reversal of ,conclusion for refutation1 #age2 abuse of1 guarded against by the argument ,non per ,hoc1 #agi4 ,regularity1 principle of1 in the ,kosmos1 see ,nature4 ,relata1 defined1 #gj4 ,relation1 fourth ,category1 treated third1 #fe1 #gj2 admits1 in some cases1 contrariety and graduation1 #ga2 too narrowly conceived by ,aristotle1 #hj2 covers all predicates1 #hb2 covers even ,essence as ,subject1 #hc2 an ,universal comprehending and pervading all the ,categories1 rather than a ,category itself1 #hd2 understood at the widest by some of the ancients1 #hd2 comprehensiveness of1 conceded by ,aristotle himself1 #hd1 #hh4 ,relative-,opposita1 should rather stand ,opposite-,relativa1 #ajd1 #aje4 ,relativity1 or ,relation1 see ,relation2 of knowledge1 universal 7in the sense of ,protagoras71 impugned by ,aristotle1 #dcj seq41 #ehi seq42 allowed by ,aristotle to pervade all mind1 #dic4 ,remigius of ,auxerre1 went as far as ,plato in ,realism1 #efd4 ,reminiscence1 ,plato's doctrine of1 #bab1 #eed2 ,aristotle's ,tract on ,memory and1 #dge2 nature of1 as distinguished from ,memory1 #dgj2 phenomena of1 #dgf4 ,resemblances1 study of1 an organon of debate1 #bhj4 ,respiration1 organ and function of1 #djh4 ,reversal of ,conclusion1 #agd4 ,rhabanus ,maurus1 followed ,aristotle on ,universals1 #ejc4 ,rhetoric1 place of1 in ,aristotle's philosophy1 #ed2 modes of speech dealt with in1 #aaa1 #aca2 opposed by ,plato to ,dialectic1 #bjh1 #bjc2 opposed with ,dialectic to ,science by ,aristotle1 #bjh1 #bfe1 #bff2 developed before ,aristotle1 #dai4 ,rose1 ,valentine1 his view of the catalogue of ,diogenes1 #cb4 ,s4 ,sagacity1 in divining ,middle ,term1 #bcg4 ,sameness1 three senses of1 #bgg1 #cdi4 ,scholarchs1 ,peripatetic1 their limited knowledge of ,aristotle before ,andronikus1 #cj1 #ch4 ,science1 see ,knowledge4 ,sciences1 some prior and more accurate than others1 #baj1 #bcd1 #egh2 classified as ,theoretical1 ,practical1 ,constructive1 #dbc1 #eic2 ,theoretical subdivided1 #dbc1 #eic4 ,seneca1 authority for ,stoical creed1 #fed2 a ,stoic engaged in active politics1 #ffb4 ,sensation1 knowledge begins from the natural process of1 #bef1 #dhc1 #dib2 consciousness of1 explained1 #dgc4 ,senses1 the five1 #dfe seq42 cannot be more than five1 #dgb4 ,sentient soul1 involves functions of the ,nutritive with sensible perception besides1 #dfa2 distinguishes animals from plants1 #dfb2 receives the form of the perceptum without the matter1 as wax an impression from the signet2 #dfb2 communicated by male in generation1 and is complete from birth1 #dfc3 differs from the ,notic1 in communing with particulars and being dependent on stimulus from without1 #dfc seq41 #dhf2 grades of1 #dfc2 has a faculty of discrimination and comparison1 #dfd1 #dhc2 heart1 the organ of1 #dfd2 cannot perceive two distinct sensations at once1 #dgc2 at the lowest1 subject to pleasure and pain1 appetite and aversion1 #dgc2 ,phantasy belongs to the1 #dge2 ,memory belongs to the1 #dge4 ,sepulveda1 his use of exoteric1 #de4 ,signs1 ,syllogism from1 #bjb2 distinguished from ,proof 7,greek3 tekm_/rion71 #bjc2 in ,physiognomy1 #bjd4 ,simplikius1 defended ,aristotle's ,categories1 #efc4 ,simul1 meaning of1 #aje2 as between parts and whole1 #fjb4 ,skpsis1 ,aristotle's books and manuscripts long kept buried there1 #cf4 ,smell1 operated through a medium1 #dfg2 stands below sight and hearing1 #dfh2 action of1 #dfi2 organ of1 #dgj4 ,sokrates1 reference to his fate by ,aristotle1 #af2 his exposure of equivocal phraseology1 #eh2 called for1 but did not supply1 definitions1 #ada2 his conception and practice of ,dialectic1 to the neglect of ,didactic1 #bfc2 ,elenchus of1 #bfc1 #dcg1 #dda2 did nothing but question1 #dah2 ,greek philosophy before1 #dbf2 first broke ground for ,logic1 #dbf2 his part in the development of ,greek ,philosophy1 #dcf seq42 peculiarities of1 according to ,aristotle1 #dcg2 first inquired into the meaning of universal terms1 #eea1 #eeb4 ,sokrates1 the younger1 false analogy of1 in defining animal1 #fjd4 ,solecism1 sophistic charge of1 #che2 how to repel1 #dac4 ,sophist1 the1 as understood by ,aristotle1 #cgf1 #cgg1 #cha2 as understood by ,plato1 #cgf2 five ends ascribed to1 #chd2 not really distinguished by ,aristotle from the ,dialectician1 #chb1 #cic seq4 ,sophistes of ,plato1 theory of ,proposition in1 #ace4 ,sophistic1 busied about accidents1 #ih1 #eic2 as understood by ,aristotle1 #cgf1 #chb2 given as one of four species of debate1 #cgg2 ,aristotle's conception of1 both as to purpose and subject matter1 disallowed1 #chb1 #cic seq42 ,loci bearing on1 #djh2 debate1 difficulties in1 #daf2 borders on ,dialectic1 #dag4 ,sophistici ,elenchi1 last book of ,topica1 #ef1 #bfb2 subject of1 #cgf2 last chapter of1 #dag seq4 ,sorites1 what was afterwards so called1 #aef4 ,soul1 according to ,plato1 #ddf1 #ddi1 #dea1 #dfa2 ,alkmon1 #ddi2 ,herakleitus1 #ddi2 ,diogenes of ,apollonia1 #ddi2 ,anaxagoras1 #ddi2 ,empedokles1 #ddi2 ,pythagoreans1 #dej2 ,xenokrates1 criticized by ,aristotle1 #dej2 theory of ,empedokles criticized1 #dea2 theory of1 as pervading the whole ,kosmos1 #dea2 all the foregoing theories of1 rejected by ,aristotle1 #deb2 requisites of a good theory of1 #deb2 ,aristotle's point of view with regard to1 #dec2 the problem of1 stated to cover all forms of ,life1 #dec2 resolved by metaphysical distinction of ,form and ,matter1 #ded-g2 defined accordingly1 #deh2 not a separate entity in itself1 #deh2 not really1 but only logically1 separable from body1 #deh2 thoroughgoing implication of1 with ,matter1 #dei1 #dgh2 is ,form1 ,movent1 and ,final ,cause1 of the body as ,matter1 #dfj1 #dhj2 makes with body the ,living or ,animated ,body1 #dfj1 #dhj2 varieties of1 in an ascending scale1 #dfj1 #dha2 the lowest or ,nutritive1 #dfa2 the ,sentient 7also nutritive71 #dfb-gd1 see ,sentient2 higher functions of1 conditioned by lower1 #dgd2 ,phantastic department of1 #dgd2 the ,notic or ,cogitant1 #dgh1 see ,nos1 ,notic2 all varieties of1 proceed from the region of ,form or the ,celestial ,body1 #dhj2 ,nos of the1 #dhg2 not immortal1 even the ,notic1 in the individual1 #dhi2 is1 in a certain way1 all existent things1 #dic2 two parts of1 the rational and the irrational1 #eba4 ,sound1 cause of1 #dfg4 ,species1 is ,second ,essence1 #fc1 #fh2 one of the ,predicables in ,porphyry's1 not in ,aristotle's1 list1 #bgf2 logically posterior to ,genus and to ,differenti1 #fjg4 ,speech1 significant by convention only1 #aji1 #aaa2 ,enunciative1 and other modes of1 #aaa4 ,speusippus1 succeeded ,plato in the ,academy1 #g1 #ba2 books of1 at his death1 bought by ,aristotle1 #ce2 held it impossible to define anything without knowing everything1 #bdi2 his enumeration of ,essences1 #eie1 #fbi2 ascribed beauty and perfection to results1 not to their originating principles1 #fbe4 ,spinoza1 his definition of ,substance contrasted with ,aristotle's1 #ic4 ,spontaneity1 source of irregularity in the ,kosmos1 #aae1 #bje2 affects the rule of ,antiphasis1 #aae2 objective correlate to the ,problematical ,proposition1 #acc1 #bje2 ,generations and ,constructions from1 #eih1 #fbj4 ,stageira1 birthplace of ,aristotle1 #b2 destroyed by ,philip1 restored by ,aristotle1 #f4 ,stars1 in their nature eternal ,essences1 #fbf2 whence the heat and light of1 #fdd2 themselves at rest1 are carried round in their circles1 #fdd2 spherical in figure1 #fde1 #fdf2 7not planets7 twinkle1 why1 #fde2 rates of motion of 7planets71 as determined by their position1 #fdf2 irregular sequence of 7planets71 in respect of complexity of motions1 #fdf2 partakers of life and action1 #fdg2 why so many1 in the one single ,first ,current1 #fdh4 ,stilpon1 merely disputed on ,proposition1 #acf4 ,stoics1 ,categories of the1 #ajj1 #efc2 their doctrine copiously reported1 #fed2 points in which they agreed with the ,epikureans1 #fee1 #ffc2 fatalism of1 #feg2 held ,self-preservation to be the first principle of ,nature1 #ffj2 inculcated as primary officium1 to keep in the ,state of ,nature1 #ffj2 their idea of the ,good1 #ffj2 their distinction of things in our power1 and not in our power1 #ffa2 held the will to be always determined by motives1 #ffa2 their view of a free mind1 #ffa2 allowed an interposing ,providence1 #ffa2 ethical purpose of1#ffb2 urged to active life1 #ffb2 subordinated beneficence1 put justice highest1 #ffb1 #ffc2 their respect for individual conviction1 #ffc4 ,strabo1 authority for story of the fate of ,aristotle's library1 #ce1 #ch4 ,subject1 to be predicated of a1 distinguished from to be in a1 #ei1 #fb1 #fd2 which is never employed as predicate1 #fc1 #fh1 #aeg2 which may also be predicate1 #fc1 #aeg2 called ,term in ,analytica1 #ada4 ,substance1 see ,essence4 ,substratum1 #fg1 #eie2 see ,essence4 ,sun1 ever at work1 #fag2 whence the heat and light of1 #fdd2 why seen to move at rising and setting1 #fdd2 motions of1 #fdf4 ,sylla1 carried library of ,apellikon to ,rome1 #cg4 ,syllogism1 principle of1 indicated in ,categori1 #fe2 theory of1 claimed by ,aristotle as his own work1 #adj1 #aec2 defined1 #adc1 #dbf2 ,perfect and ,imperfect1 #adc2 meaning of1 in ,plato1 specialized in ,aristotle1 #adc2 conditions of valid1 #adh1 #aee2 ,premisses1 ,terms1 ,figures1 c41 of1 #adh seq42 ,reduction of1 #aec2 mediaeval abuse of1 #aec2 ,direct or ,ostensive1 and ,indirect1 #aee2 has two 7even number of7 propositions1 and three 7odd number of7 terms1 #aef2 how to construct a1 #aeg2 method of1 superior to logical ,division1 #afb2 from an ,hypothesis1 #afh2 plurality of conclusions from1 #aga2 inversion of1 #agc2 conversion of1 #agd2 liabilities to error in the use of1 #agf2 cases of ,reciprocation among terms of1 #ahe2 antithesis among terms of1 #ahe seq42 canons of1 common to ,demonstration1 ,dialectic1 ,rhetoric1 #ahf1 #baj1 #bfe2 the1 from ,induction1 #ahg2 prior and more effective as to cognition1 than ,induction1 #aia2 the1 from ,example1 #aia2 relation of1 to ,induction1 #aib seq42 varieties of ,abduction1 ,objection1 ,enthymeme1 c41 #bjb seq42 ,modal1 #bjd2 theory of1 applicable both to ,demonstration and ,dialectic1 #bjg1 #bfe2 the ,demonstrative or ,scientific1 #bae1 #bai1 #bfe2 of ,greek3 o7_/ti1 and of ,greek3 dio_/ti1 #bbc2 the unit in1 #bca2 scope and matter of the ,dialectical1 #bfe1 #bfg2 the ,eristic1 #bfh1 #chj2 the ,elenchus1 or ,refutative1 #cgf2 the ,pseudographic1 #chj2 inquiry into ,axioms of1 falls to ,first ,philosophy1 #dbf4 ,synonymous things1 #eg4 ,t4 ,taste1 operates through contact1 #dfi2 a variety of ,touch1 #dga2 organ of1 #dga4 ,tautology1 sophistic charge of1 #che2 how to repel1 #dac4 ,temperance1 definition of1 #eca4 ,greek3 ,tekm_/rion 7,proof71 distinguished from ,sign1 #bjc4 ,terms1 as such1 subject of ,categori1 #eg2 things denoted by1 distinguished as ,homonymous 7,equivocal71 ,synonymous 7,univocal71 ,paronymous--importance of the distinction1 #eg2 viewed by ,aristotle1 as constituents of a ,proposition1 #ei2 distinguished from ,proposition in signification1 #aji1 #aaj2 the word1 used instead of ,noun and ,verb in ,analytica1 #ada2 ,major1 ,middle1 and ,minor1 in ,syllogism1 #adh2 in ,syllogism1 are often masked1 #afe2 reciprocation of1 in ,syllogism1 #ahe2 equivocation of1 to be attended to in ,dialectic1 #bgh4 ,thales1 character of his philosophy1 #dce2 supposed the ,earth to float at rest on water1 #fdi4 ,themison1 correspondent of ,aristotle1 #g4 ,themistius1 speaks of an army of assailants of ,aristotle1 #bf2 on the order of the ,qusita in science1 #bch4 ,theodoras1 developed ,rhetoric1 #dai4 ,theology1 alternative name for ,first ,philosophy or ,ontology1 #ei1 #dbc4 ,theophrastus1 left in charge of ,aristotle's school and library1 #ae1 #ce2 directions to1 in ,aristotle's will1 #ag1 #ah2 bought as well as composed books1 #ce2 disposition of his library1 #ce1 #db2 wrote on ,logic1 #ef2 distinguished ,affirmation ,greek3 e7k metathe_/ses1 #abb1 #afi2 followed ,aristotle in treating of ,modals1 #add2 assumed convertibility of ,universal ,negative1 #adf4 ,theses1 how to find arguments for1 #aeg2 art of impugning and defending1 #ahj2 in ,dialectic1 how open to be impugned1 #bhd2 chiefly ,universal ,affirmative1 #bha2 comparison of1 as subjects of attack and defence1 #bhe1 #ceb1 #cjj4 ,thrasyllus1 canon of1 #bg1 #da2 tetralogies of1 #dd4 ,thrasymachus1 developed ,rhetoric1 #dai4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 his use of exoteric1 #de4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ 7n ei7nai1 ,to_/1 see ,essence 7,quiddity74 ,timus1 ,platonic1 summary of the psychological doctrine in the1 #ddf-i4 ,timarchus1 friend of ,aristotle1 #ag4 ,time1 none1 outside of the ,heaven1 #bgg4 ,tisias1 first writer on ,rhetoric1 #dai4 ,topica1 referred to in ,analytica1 #ef2 presupposes contents of ,categori and ,de ,interpretatione1 #ef2 part of one scheme with ,analytica1 #adb2 design of1 specially claimed by ,aristotle as original1 #bfb2 subject of1 #bfb1 #bfe2 ,first ,book of1 preliminary to the ,loci1 #bhc2 distribution of1 #bhd4 ,torstrick1 his view of exoteric discourse1 #di4 ,touch1 most wisely diffused sense1 #dfd2 operated through contact1 #dfh2 i4e41 apparently1 #dgb2 most developed in man1 #dga2 an aggregate of several senses1 #dga2 organ of1 #dga4 ,trans-,olfacient1 action of the1 in ,smell1 #dfg4 ,trans-,sonant1 action of the1 in ,hearing1 #dfg4 ,trendelenburg1 brings the ,categories into relation with parts of speech1 #ii4 ,truth1 ,ens in the sense of1 #fj1 c41 see ,ens2 a mental conjunction or disjunction of terms in conformity with fact1 #fj1 #aaa1 #eia1 #eid1 #fah2 embodied in the ,proposition or ,enunciative ,speech1 #aji1 #acj4 ,tyrannion studied ,aristotle's ,,mss4 ,at ,rome1 #cg-ci1 #dc4 ,u4 ,universal1 ,the1 knowledge of1 with error as to particulars1 #ahc2 knowledge of1 better than of the ,particular1 #bca2 not perceivable by sense1 #bce2 but cf4 #beh2 reveals the ,cause1 #bce2 generated by a process of ,induction from particulars1 #bfj2 controversy about1 began with ,sokrates and ,plato1 #eea2 questions as to1 set out by ,porphyry1 #eeb2 ,plato's statements as to1 collected1 #eec seq42 scholastic formulae of the different theories of1 #eee2 ,aristotle's objection to ,plato's ,realistic theory of1 #eeh seq42 ,aristotle's counter-theory as to1 #efj2 is to ,aristotle a predicate in or along with the ,particular1 #efa1 #fje2 later history of the question of1 till launched in the schools of the ,middle ,age1 #efb-d2 given as one of the varieties of ,essence1 #eie2 arguments against its being ,essence1 #fje4 ,universalia ,prima1 as premisses in ,demonstrative ,science1 #baf4 ,universe1 extends every way1 #fcj4 ,univocal terms1 #eg4 ,v4 ,vacuum1 exists potentially only1 #fae2 none1 outside of the ,heaven1 #fcf4 ,verb1 function of the1 #aji1 #aaj1 #acj2 the indefinite1 #aah1 #abd4 ,virtue1 ,aristotle's definition of1 examined1 #eba seq42 intellectual and ethical1 #eba2 is a medium between two extremes4 #ebd4 ,vision1 most perfect sense1 #dfe2 colours1 the object of1 #dfe2 effected through media having diaphanous agency1 #dff4 ,voice1 ,the1 #dfh4 ,voluntary and ,involuntary actions1 #ebe4 ,w4 ,waitz1 prints ,sophistici ,elenchi as last ,book of ,topica1 #ef4 ,when1 ,quando1 ,category1 #fe1 #gc4 ,where1 ,ubi1 ,category1 #fe1 #gc4 ,words1 subjective and objective aspects of1 #aji4 ,works of ,aristotle1 dates of1 uncertain1 #ed2 in what order to be studied1 #ee2 cross-references in the logical1 #ef4 ,wyttenbach1 started doubts as to ,platonic ,canon1 #bg4 ,x4 ,xenokrates1 fellow-pupil of ,aristotle1 accompanied him to ,atarneus1 #d2 head of the ,academy1 #g2 attached to ,athenian democracy1 #aj2 character of1 #be2 his view of the soul1 #dej4 ,xenophanes1 improved on by ,parmenides1 #eea2 his reason for the stationariness of the ,earth1 #fdi4 ,z4 ,zeller1 his view of exoteric discourse1 #di4 ,zeno1 the ,eleatic1 argument of1 against ,motion1 paradoxical1 #cfe2 uses equivocal names as univocal1 #dad2 defended the ,parmenidean theory dialectically1 #eea4 ,zeno1 the ,stoic1 a foreigner at ,athens1 without a sphere of political action1 #ffb4 ,zoological ,treatises1 place of the1 among the other works of ,aristotle1 #ed4 ,,london3 ,,printed ,,by ,,william ,,clowes ,,and ,,sons1 ,,stamford ,,street ,,and ,,charing ,,cross4 9999999999999999999999999999999999999999 9999999999999999999999999999999999 ,transcriber's ,note ,there are several references in this text to ,grote's previous book on ,plato1 ',plato and the ,other companions of ,sokrates'4 ,the #d-volume version of this book is available in ,project ,gutenberg3 ,vol4 #a - https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/ebooks_/#dj dce ,vol4 #b - https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/ebooks_/#dj dcf ,vol4 #c - https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/ebooks_/#dj dcg ,vol4 #d - https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/ebooks_/#dj dch4 ,unfortunately references in this text are to the #c-volume edition1 so page numbers differ and in almost all cases chapter numbers are #b less than in the #d-volume version--as the advertisement says ,in the present ,edition1 with a view to the distribution into four volumes1 there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement4 ,his concluding chapters 7,,xxxviii41 ,,xxxix471 entitled ,other ,companions of ,sokrates1 and ,xenophon1 are placed in the ,first ,volume1 as chapters ,,iii4 and ,,iv4 ,the text is based on versions made available by the ,internet ,archive4 ,for the ,greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used3 7 is for smooth breathing2 7 for hard2 for diaeresis2 _/ for acute accent2 for grave2 for circumflex2 for iota subscript4 ch is used for chi1 ph for phi1 ps for psi1 th for theta2 for eta and for omega2 u is used for upsilon in all cases4 ,corrections to the text1 indicated in text with 99993 ,location ,text of scan of #bnd edition ,correction ,preface1 after fn4 #d dialetical dialectical ,ch4 #a fn #e ad4 ad ,ch4 #a fn #aj mge_/an me_/gan ,ch4 #a fn #df a7lla7 a7lla ,ch4 #a fn #fa ,quintillian ,quintilian ,ch4 #b fn #ae ,art ,ar4 ,ch4 #b before fn4 #bb ,theopharstus ,theophrastus ,ch4 #b fn #dj a7utn au7tn ,ch4 #b fn #dj dia lektiks dialektiks ,ch4 #b fn #dj tn4 tn ,ch4 #b fn #da lar gar ,ch4 #c after fn #di e7te_/r_/n e7te_/rn ,ch4 #c fn #ed e7pistm e7pist_/m ,ch4 #c fn #aja tn tn ,ch4 #c before fn #aaa ,subiect ,subject ,ch4 #c fn #aab ou o ,ch4 #c fn #aab dja dj ,ch4 #c fn #aab ,voila dont ,voil donc ,ch4 #c fn #aba ad4 ad ,ch4 #c fn #aca le_/nos ge_/nos ,ch4 #c fn #aca ,stoic ,stoics ,ch4 #c fn #acb deu_/te_/ron deu_/teron ,ch4 #c fn #acb 4 1 ,ch4 #c fn #adb a7ntikei_/me_/na a7ntikei_/mena ,ch4 #c fn #adb o7then o7_/then ,ch4 #c after fn #adf if of ,ch4 #d fn #i ,scholian ,scholion ,ch4 #d after fn #be justis justus ,ch4 #d fn #bh 4 1 ,ch4 #d before fn #ch ,nons-,ens ,non-,ens ,ch4 #d fn #dh lxii-lxviii4 lxii4-lxviii4 ,ch4 #d fn #eb no superscript ,ch4 #e fn #cg ad4 ad ,ch4 #e fn #fj completly completely ,ch4 #e fn #fc-fe 2 3 ,ch4 #e before fn #ha faciliate facilitate ,ch4 #f before fn #d the the the ,ch4 #f fn #ad1 #bd no superscript ,ch4 #f after fn #ci suscessively successively ,ch4 #f fn #db ad4 ad ,ch4 #f fn #ee xxxiii4 xxiii4 ,ch4 #f fn #ee ,sir4 ,sir ,ch4 #f fn #eh 4 ,ch4 #f fn #ei ,lokik ,logik ,ch4 #f fn #fj e7pogls e7paggs ,ch4 #f fn #fj e7_/st e7_/sti ,ch4 #f fn #fa 4 1 ,ch4 #f fn #fe ,sir4 ,sir ,ch4 #f fn #fg 7twice7 1 4 ,ch4 #f fn #fg 3 2 ,ch4 #f fn #ga seq seq4 ,ch4 #f fn #gd ,induction ,induction ,ch4 #g fn #ac maximum maxim ,ch4 #g fn #ai tropon tro_/pon ,ch4 #g fn #ce 4 1 ,ch4 #g fn #ci 4 1 ,ch4 #g before fn #ga dialetical dialectical ,ch4 #g fn #ge 4 1 ch4 #g fn #hj 4 1 ,ch4 #h fn #b ,schl4 ,schol4 ,ch4 #h fn #b attibute attribute ,ch4 #h fn #ab jusqu' jusqu' ,ch4 #h fn #ah ou7de ou7de ,ch4 #h fn #cd a a4 ,ch4 #h fn #di lanthanousi lantha_/nousi ,ch4 #h fn #eb 4 1 ,ch4 #h fn #ef 4 1 ,ch4 #h fn #fb de de ,ch4 #h fn #gj primilibri primi libri ,ch4 #i fn #bg plei_/on' plei_/on ,ch4 #i fn #ci vii44 viii4 ,ch4 #i before fn #dd analgous analogous ,ch4 #i fn #ga to to ,ch4 #i before fn #aac usuage usage ,ch4 #i before fn #aeh is respecting is7 respecting ,ch4 #i before fn #afa more more more ,ch4 #i fn #baj lar gar ,ch4 #i fn #baa lar gar ,ch4 #i fn #baa dto to ,ch4 #i fn #bbi ei7rmenon ei7rme_/non ,ch4 #i before fn #bhc impunging impugning ,ch4 #i before fn #bih defininition definition ,ch4 #i fn #cfg poioume_/nois poioume_/nois ,ch4 #i fn #cfg dirthrtai_/ di_/rthrtai_/ ,ch4 #i fn #djh sugkrisin su_/gkrisin ,ch4 #i before fn #dcf revelant relevant ,ch4 #i before fn #ddd you you you ,ch4 #i fn #dfd gar gar ,ch4 #i fn #dfd proteinomenn proteinome_/nn ,ch4 #aj before fn #i predominence predominance ,ch4 #aj fn #he ,topic1 ,topica1 ,ch4 #aj fn #ih xxii4 xvii4 ,ch4 #aj fn #ih ,firman ,firmin ,ch4 #aj fn #aab b4 #ag2 b4 #ag72 ,ch4 #aj fn #aab a4 #aj14 a4 #aj74 ,ch4 #aj before fn #abi philosphers philosophers ,ch4 #aj before fn #ach tell tells ,ch4 #aa after fn #i confides confines ,ch4 #aa after fn #bh that that1 ,ch4 #ab after fn #e sperical spherical ,ch4 #ab after fn #bg most most most ,ch4 #ab fn #cf ad4 ad ,ch4 #ab fn #fi 4 1 ,ch4 #ab before fn #ge accept except ,ch4 #ab fn #abi and ad ,ch4 #ab fn #aci tn tn ,ch4 #ab after fn #add thoraic thoracic ,ch4 #ab fn #aef #hh #ah ,ch4 #ac endmonise eudmonise ,ch4 #ac perforance performance ,ch4 #ac 7#e times7 ii4 iii4 ,ch4 #ad commonweath commonwealth ,ch4 #ad indulgencies indulgences ,app4 ,i preceptions perceptions ,app4 ,i fn #h #cgj-cie #cbj-cie ,app4 ,,ii fn #f 7 ,app4 ,,iii 74 474 ,app4 ,,iii 47 74 ,app4 ,,iii 74 47 ,app4 ,,iii 4 47 ,app4 ,,iii ,according 7,according ,app4 ,,iii 74 47 ,app4 ,,iii 74 474 ,app4 ,,iii tni_/as e7ni_/as ,app4 ,,iii parts parts parts ,app4 ,,iii du_/na_/mis du_/namis ,app4 ,,iii duna_/neis duna_/meis ,app4 ,,iii 47 474 ,app4 ,,iii #b-jbe #bj-be ,app4 ,,iii 74 474 ,app4 ,,iii gar ga_/r ,app4 ,,iv stop omitted 4 ,app4 ,,iv from from from ,app4 ,iv contrifugal centrifugal ,app4 ,,iv their there ,app4 ,,iv a7ei a7ei ,app4 ,,iv 2 3 ,app4 ,,iv them-themselves themselves ,app4 ,,iv 74 47 ,app4 ,v the fears of those gods those fears of the gods ,app4 ,,vi medita-tations meditations ,index ,metaph ,metaph4 ,index ,platonist ,platonists ,index as as as ,index the the the ,index inteltellect intellect ,index 7 71 ,index ,categorie ,category