,,theism ,,being ,the ,baird ,lecture for #ahgf ,,by ,,robert ,,flint1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,professor ,,of ,,divinity ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,edinburgh ,,author ,,of ',,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,history ,,in ,,europe1' ,,etc4 ,,william ,,blackwood ,,and ,,sons ,,edinburgh ,,and ,,london ,,mdccclxxvii ,,prefatory ,,note4 ,the ,lectures in this volume have been delivered in ,glasgow1 ,st ,andrews1 and ,edinburgh1 in connection with the ,lectureship founded by the late ,mr ,james ,baird of ,auchmedden and ,cambusdoon4 ,they will be followed by a volume on ,anti-theistic ,theories1 containing the ,baird ,lectures for #ahgg4 ,the author has to thank the ,baird ,trustees for having twice appointed him ,lecturer1 and for much indulgence extended to him during his tenure of office4 ,his special thanks are due to ,james ,a4 ,campbell1 ,esq41 ,,ll4,d41 of ,stracathro1 for kindly revising the sheets of this volume1 and for suggesting many corrections and improvements4 ,,johnstone ,,lodge1 ,,craigmillar ,,park1 ,,edinburgh1 #bb;d ,august #ahgg4 ,,contents4 ,,lect4 ,,page ,i4 ,,issues ,,involved ,,in ,,the ,,question ,,to ,,be ,,discussed--,,whence ,,and ,,how ,,we ,,get ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,god1 #a ,,ii4 ,,general ,,idea ,,of ,,religion--,,comparison ,,of ,,polytheism ,,and ,,pantheism ,,with ,,theism--,,the ,,three ,,great ,,theistic ,,religions ,,compared--,,no ,,religious ,,progress ,,beyond ,,theism1 #cj ,,iii4 ,,the ,,nature1 ,,conditions1 ,,and ,,limits ,,of ,,theistic ,,proof1 #ei ,,iv4 ,,nature ,,is ,,but ,,the ,,name ,,for ,,an ,,effect ,,whose ,,cause ,,is ,,god1 #if ,v4 ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,order1 #aca ,,vi4 ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,order ,,examined1 #afi ,,vii4 ,,moral ,,argument--,,testimony ,,of ,,conscience ,,and ,,history1 #baj ,,viii4 ,,consideration ,,of ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,divine ,,wisdom1 ,,benevolence1 ,,and ,,justice1 #bcc ,,ix4 ,a ,,priori ,,theistic ,,proof1 #bfd ,x4 ,,mere ,,theism ,,insufficient1 #cjb ,,appendix4 ,,note ,,page ,i4 ,,natural ,,and ,,revealed ,,religion1 #cbc ,,ii4 ,,influence ,,of ,,religion ,,on ,,morality1 #cbi ,,iii4 ,,ethics ,,of ,,religious ,,inquiry1 #cce ,,iv4 ,,traditive ,,theory ,,of ,,religion1 #cch ,v4 ,,normal ,,development ,,of ,,society1 #cdj ,,vi4 ,,definition ,,and ,,classification ,,by ,,the ,,highest ,,type1 #cdb ,,vii4 ,,psychological ,,nature ,,of ,,religion1 #cdc ,,viii4 ,,argument ,e ,,consensu ,,gentium1 #cdh ,,ix4 ,,the ,,theistic ,,evidence ,,complex ,,and ,,comprehensive1 #cej ,x4 ,,intuition1 ,,feeling1 ,,belief1 ,,and ,,knowledge ,,in ,,religion1 #cee ,,xi4 ,,the ,,theological ,,inference ,,from ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,energy1 #cei ,,xii4 ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,tiological ,,argument1 #cfd ,,xiii4 ,,mathematics ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument1 #cfg ,,xiv4 ,,astronomy ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument1 #cfi ,,xv4 ,,chemistry ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument1 #cgc ,,xvi4 ,,geology1 ,,geography1 ,,etc41 ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument1 #cge ,,xvii4 ,,the ,,organic ,,kingdom ,,and ,,design1 #cgh ,,xviii4 ,,evidences ,,of ,,design ,,in ,,organisms1 #chj ,,xix4 ,,psychology ,,and ,,design1 #chc ,,xx4 ,,history ,,and ,,design1 #chf ,,xxi4 ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,teleological ,,argument1 #chg ,,xxii4 ,,creation ,,and ,,evolution1 #cij ,,xxiii4 ,,theological ,,inferences ,,from ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,spontaneous ,,generation1 #cid ,,xxiv4 ,,darwin ,,and ,,paley1 #cif ,,xxv4 ,,kant',s ,,moral ,,argument1 #cig ,,xxvi4 ,,dr ,,schenkel',s ,,view ,,of ,,conscience ,,as ,,the ,,organ ,,of ,,religion1 #djj ,,xxvii4 ,,chalmers ,,and ,,erskine ,,on ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,conscience1 #dja ,,xxviii4 ,,associationist ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,conscience1 #djc ,,xxix4 ,,chalmers ,,and ,,bain ,,on ,,the ,,pleasure ,,of ,,malevolence1 #djc ,,xxx4 ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,proof1 #djf ,,xxxi4 ,,defects ,,in ,,the ,,physical ,,world1 #dac ,,xxxii4 ,,no ,,best ,,possible ,,created ,,system1 #dag ,,xxxiii4 ,,defects ,,in ,,the ,,organic ,,world1 #dah ,,xxxiv4 ,,epicurean ,,dilemma1 #dbj ,,xxxv4 ,,god ,,and ,,duty1 #dbb ,,xxxvi4 ,,histories ,,of ,,the ,,theistic ,,proofs1 #dbc ,,xxxvii4 ,a ,,priori ,,proof ,,not ,,proof ,,from ,a ,,cause1 #dbd ,,xxxviii4 ,,some ,a ,,priori ,,arguments1 #dbe ,,theism4 ,,lecture ,i4 ,,issues ,,involved ,,in ,,the ,,question ,,to ,,be ,,discussed--,,whence ,,and ,,how ,,we ,,get ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,god4 ,i4 ,is belief in ,god a reasonable belief1 or is it not8 ,have we sufficient evidence for thinking that there is a self-existent1 eternal ,being1 infinite in power and wisdom1 and perfect in holiness and goodness1 the ,maker of heaven and earth1 or have we not8 ,is theism true1 or is some antagonistic1 some anti-theistic theory true8 ,this is the question which we have to discuss and to answer1 and it seems desirable to state briefly at the outset what issues are involved in answering it4 ,obviously1 the statement of these issues must not be so framed as to create prejudice for or against any particular answer4 ,its only legitimate purpose is to help us to realise aright our true relation to the question4 ,we can never in any investigation see too early or too clearly the true and full significance1 the general and special bearings1 of the question we intend to study2 but the more important and serious the question is1 the more incumbent on us is it not to prejudge what must be the answer4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is obvious1 then1 in the first place1 that the inquiry before us is one as to whether or not religion has any reasonable ground1 any basis1 in truth2 and if so1 what that ground or basis is4 ,religion1 in order to be reasonable1 must rest on knowledge of its object4 ,this is not to say that it is exclusively knowledge1 or that knowledge is its one essential element4 ,it is not to say that feeling and will are not as important constituents in the religious life as intellectual apprehension4 ,mere knowledge1 however clear1 profound1 and comprehensive it may be1 can never be religion4 ,there can be no religion where feeling and affection are not added to knowledge4 ,there can be no religion in any mind devoid of reverence or love1 hope or fear1 gratitude or desire--in any mind whose thinking is untouched1 uncoloured1 uninspired by some pious emotion4 ,and religion includes more even than an apprehension of ,god supplemented by feeling--than the love or fear of ,god based on knowledge4 ,it is unrealised and incomplete so long as there is no self-surrender of the soul to the object of its knowledge and affection--so long as the will is unmoved1 the character and conduct unmodified4 ,the importance of feeling and will in religion is thus in no respect questioned or denied when it is maintained that religion cannot be a reasonable process1 a healthy condition of mind1 if constituted by either feeling or volition separate from knowledge4 ,some have represented it as consisting essentially in the feeling of dependence1 others in that of love1 and others in fear2 but these are all feelings which must be elicited by knowledge1 and which must be proportional to knowledge in every undisordered mind4 ,we can neither love nor fear what we know nothing about4 ,we cannot love what we do not think worthy of love1 nor fear unless we think there is reason for fear4 ,we cannot feel our dependence upon what we do not know to exist4 ,we cannot feel trustful and confiding dependence on what we do not suppose to have a character which merits trust and confidence4 ,then1 however true it may be that short of the action of the will in the form of the self-surrender of the soul to the object of its worship the religious process is essentially imperfect1 this self-surrender cannot be independent of reason and yet reasonable4 ,in order to be a legitimate act it must spring out of good affections1--and these affections must be enlightened2 they must rest on the knowledge of an object worthy of them1 and worthy of the self-sacrifice to which they prompt4 ,unless there be such an object1 and unless it can be known1 all the feeling and willing involved in religion must be delusive--must be of a kind which reason and duty command us to resist and suppress4 ,but religion is certainly a very large phenomenon4 ,it is practically coextensive1 indeed1 with human life and history4 ,it is doubtful if any people1 any age1 has been without some religion4 ,and religion has not only in some form existed almost wherever man has existed1 but its existence has to a great extent influenced his whole existence4 ,the religion of a people colours its entire civilisation2 its action may be traced on industry1 art1 literature1 science1 and philosophy1 in all their stages4 ,and the question whether there is a ,god or not1 whether ,god can be known or not1 is1 otherwise put1 whether or not religious history1 and history so far as influenced by religion1 have had any root in reason1 any ground in fact4 ,if there be no ,god1 or if it be impossible to know whether there be a ,god or not1 history1 to the whole extent of its being religious and influenced by religion1 must have been unreasonable4 ,perhaps religion might still be conceived of1 although it is difficult to see how it could be so conceived of on consistent grounds1 as having done some good3 and one religion might be regarded as better than another1 in the sense of doing more good or less evil than another2 but no religion could be conceived of as true1 nor could one religion be conceived of as truer than another4 ,if there be no ,god to know1 or if ,god cannot be known1 religion is merely a delusion or mental disease--its history is merely the history of a delusion or disease1 and any science of it possible is merely a part of mental pathology4 ,further1 whether ,christianity be a reasonable creed or not obviously depends on whether or not certain beliefs regarding ,god are reasonable4 ,if there be no ,god1 if there be more ,gods than one1 if ,god be not the ,creator and ,upholder of the world and the ,father of our spirits1 if ,god be not infinite in being and perfection1 in power1 wisdom1 and holiness1 ,christianity cannot possibly be a thing to be believed4 ,it professes to be a revelation from ,god1 and consequently assumes that there is a ,god4 ,it demands our fullest confidence1 on the ground of being ,his word2 and consequently assumes that ,he is not a man that ,he should lie1 but ,one whose word may be trusted to the uttermost4 ,it professes to be a law of life1 and therefore assumes the holiness of its author2 to be a plan of salvation1 and therefore presupposes ,his love2 to be certain of final triumph1 and so presupposes ,his power4 ,it presents itself to us as the completion of a progressive process of positive revelation1 and therefore presupposes a heavenly ,father1 ,judge1 and ,king4 ,the books in which we have the record of this process--the books of the ,old and ,new ,testaments--therefore assume1 and could not but assume1 that ,god is1 and that ,he is all-powerful1 perfectly wise1 and perfectly holy4 ,they do not prove it1 but refer us to the world and our own hearts for the means and materials of proof4 ,they may draw away from nature1 and from before the eyes of men1 a veil which covers and conceals the proof2 they may be a record of facts which powerfully confirm and largely supplement what proof there is in the universe without and the mind within3 but they must necessarily imply1 and do everywhere imply1 that a real proof exists there4 ,if what they in this respect imply be untrue1 all that they profess to tell us of ,god1 and as from ,god1 must be rejected by us1 if we are to judge and act as reasonable beings4#a #a ,see ,appendix ,i4 ,for all men1 then1 who have religious beliefs1 and especially for all men who have ,christian beliefs1 these questions1 ,what evidence is there for ,god's existence8 and1 ,what is known of ,his nature8 are of primary importance4 ,the answers given to them must determine whether religion and ,christianity ought to be received or rejected4 ,there can be no use in discussing other religious questions so long as these fundamental questions have not been thoughtfully studied and distinctly answered4 ,it is only through their investigation that we can establish a right to entertain any religious belief1 to cherish any religious feeling1 to perform any religious act4 ,and the result to which the investigation leads us must largely decide what sort of a religious theory we shall hold1 and what sort of a religious life we shall lead4 ,almost all religious differences of really serious import may be traced back to differences in men's thoughts about ,god4 ,the idea of ,god is the generative and regulative idea in every great religious system and every great religious movement4 ,it is a true feeling which has led to the inclusion of all religious doctrines whatever in a science which bears the name of theology 7discourse about ,god1 ,greek3 logos peri tou theou71 for what is believed about ,god determines what will be believed about everything else which is included either under natural or revealed religion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the second place1 the moral issues depending on the inquiry before us are momentous4 ,an erroneous result must1 from the very nature of the case1 be of the most serious character4 ,if there be no ,god1 the creeds and rites and precepts which have been imposed on humanity in ,his name must all be regarded as a cruel and intolerable burden4 ,the indignation which atheists have so often expressed at the contemplation of religious history is quite intelligible--quite natural2 for to them it can only appear as a long course of perversion of the conscience and affections of mankind4 ,if religion be in its essence1 and in all its forms and phases1 false1 the evils which have been associated with it have been as much its legitimate effects as any good which can be ascribed to it2 and there can be no warrant for speaking of benefits as its proper effects1 or uses and mischiefs as merely occasioned by it1 or as its abuses4 ,if in itself false1 it must be credited with the evil as well as with the good which has followed it2 and all the unprofitable sufferings and useless privations--all the undefined terrors and degrading rites--all the corruptions of moral sentiment1 factitious antipathies1 intolerance1 and persecution--all the spiritual despotism of the few1 and the spiritual abjectness of the many--all the aversion to improvement and opposition to science1 c41 which are usually referred to false religion and to superstition1--must be attributed to religion in itself1 if there be no distinction between true and false in religion--between religion and superstition4 ,in that case1 belief in ,god must be regarded as really the root of all these evils4 ,it is only if we can separate between religious truth and religious error--only if we can distinguish religion itself from the perversions of religion--that we can possibly maintain that the evils which have flowed from religious error1 from the perversions of religion1 are not to be traced to the religious principle itself4#b ,on the other hand1 if there be a ,god1 he who denies ,his existence1 and1 in consequence1 discards all religious motives1 represses all religious sentiments1 and despises all religious practices1 assuredly goes morally far astray4 ,if there be a ,god--all-mighty1 all-wise1 and all-holy--the want of belief in ,him must be in all circumstances a great moral misfortune1 and1 wherever it arises from a want of desire to know ,him1 a serious moral fault1 necessarily involving1 as it does1 indifference to one who deserves the highest love and deepest reverence1 ingratitude to a benefactor whose bounties have been unspeakable1 and the neglect of those habits of trust and prayer by which men realise the presence of infinite sympathy and implore the help of infinite strength4 ,if there be a ,god1 the virtue which takes no account of ,him1 even if it were otherwise faultless1 must be most defective4 ,the performance of personal and social duty can in that case no more compensate for the want of piety than justice can excuse intemperance or benevolence licentiousness4 #b ,see ,appendix ,,ii4 ,besides1 if ,god exist--if piety1 therefore1 ought also to exist--it can scarcely be supposed that personal and social morality will not suffer when the claims of religion are unheeded4 ,it has seemed to some that morality rests on religion1 and cannot exist apart from it4 ,and almost all who believe that there are religious truths which men1 as reasonable beings1 are bound to accept1 will be found maintaining that1 although morality may be independent of religion for its mere existence1 a morality unsupported by religion would be insufficient to satisfy the wants of the personal and social life4 ,without religion1 they maintain1 man would not be able to resist the temptations and support the trials of his lot1 and would be cut off from the source of his loftiest thoughts1 his richest and purest enjoyments1 and his most heroic deeds4 ,without it nations1 they further maintain1 would be unprogressive1 selfish1 diseased1 corrupt1 unworthy of life1 incapable of long life4 ,they argue that they find in human nature and in human history the most powerful reasons for thinking thus2 and so much depends upon whether they are right or wrong1 that they are obviously entitled to expect that these reasons1 and also the grounds of religious belief1 will be impartially and carefully examined and weighed4 ,it will be denied1 indeed1 by no one1 that religious belief influences moral practice4 ,both reason and history make doubt on this point impossible4 ,the convictions of a man's heart as to the supreme object of his reverence1 and as to the ways in which he ought to show his reverence thereof1 necessarily affect for good or ill his entire mind and conduct4 ,the whole moral life takes a different colour according to the religious light which falls upon it4 ,as the valley of the ,rhone presents a different aspect when seen from a summit of the ,jura and from a peak of the ,alps1 so the course of human existence appears very different when looked at from different spiritual points of view4 ,atheism1 polytheism1 pantheism1 theism1 cannot regard life and death in the same way1 and cannot solve in the same way the problems which they present to the intellect and the heart4 ,these different theories naturally--yea1 necessarily--yield different moral results4 ,now1 doubt may be entertained as to whether or not we can legitimately employ the maxim1 ,by their fruits ye shall know them1 in attempting to ascertain the truth or falsity of a theory4 ,the endeavour to support religion by appealing to its utility has been denounced as moral bribery and subornation of the understanding4#c ,but no man1 ,i think1 however scrupulous or exacting1 can doubt that when one theory bears different moral and social fruits than another1 that fact is a valid and weighty reason for inquiring very carefully which of them is true and which false4 ,he who believes1 for example1 that there is a ,god1 and he who believes that there is no being in the universe higher than himself--he who believes that material force is the source of all things1 and he who believes that nature originated in an intelligent1 holy1 and loving ,will1--must look upon the world1 upon history1 and upon themselves so very differently--must think1 feel1 and act so very differently--that for every man it must be of supreme importance to know which of these beliefs he is bound in reason to accept and which to reject4 #c ,by ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 in the very essay in which he assailed religion by trying to show that the world had outgrown the need of it4 99 99 99 99 99 ,then1 in the third place1 the primary question in religion is immediately and inseparably connected with the ultimate question of science4 ,does the world explain itself1 or does it lead the mind above and beyond itself8 ,science cannot but suggest this question2 religion is an answer to it4 ,when the phenomena of the world have been classified1 the connections between them traced1 their laws ascertained1 science may1 probably enough1 have accomplished all that it undertakes--all that it can perform2 but is it certain that the mind can ascend no further8 ,must it rest in the recognition of order1 for example1 and reject the thought of an intelligence in which that order has its source8 ,or1 is this not to represent every science as leading us into a darkness far greater than any from which it has delivered us8 ,granting that no religious theory of the world can be accepted which contradicts the results established by the sciences1 are we not free to ask1 and even bound to ask--,do these results not1 both separately and collectively1 imply a religious theory of the world1 and the particular religious theory1 it may be1 which is called theism8 ,are these results not the expressions of a unity and order in the world which can only be explained on the supposition that material nature1 organic existences1 the mind and heart of man1 society and its history1 have originated in a power1 wisdom1 and goodness not their own1 which still upholds them1 and works in and through them8 ,the question is one which may be answered in various ways1 and to which the answer may be that it cannot be answered2 but be the answer that or another--be the answer what it may--obviously the question itself is a great one1--a greater than any science has ever answered--one which all science raises1 and in the answering of which all science is deeply interested4 ,no scientific man can be credited with much insight who does not perceive that religious theory has an intimate and influential bearing on science4 ,there are religious theories with which science cannot consistently coexist at all4 ,where fetichism or polytheism prevails1 you cannot have science with its pursuit of general laws4 ,a dualistic religion must1 with all the strength it possesses1 oppose science in the accomplishment of its task--the proof of unity and universal order4 ,even when the conception of ,one ,creative ,being is reached1 there are ways of thinking of ,his character and agency which science must challenge1 since they imperil its life and retard its progress4 ,the medieval belief in miracles and the modern belief in law cannot be held by the same mind1 and still less by the same society4 ,we have no reason1 however1 to complain at present that our scientific men are1 as a class1 wanting in the insight referred to1 or that the truth just indicated is imperfectly realised by them4 ,perhaps such complaint was never less applicable4 ,it is not long since it was the fashion among men of science to avoid all reference to religion--to treat religious theory and scientific theory as entirely separate and unconnected4 ,they either cared not or dared not to indicate how their scientific findings were rationally related to current religious beliefs4 ,but within the last few years there has been a remarkable change in this respect4 ,the attitude of indifference formerly assumed by so many of the representatives of science towards religion has been very generally exchanged for one of aggression or defence4 ,the number of them who seem to think themselves bound to publish to the world confessions of their faith1 declarations of the religious conclusions to which their scientific researches have led them1 is great1 perhaps1 beyond example in any age4 ,they are manifesting unmistakably the most serious interest in the inquiry into the foundation of religion1 and into the relationship of religion to science4 ,the change is certainly one for the better4 ,it is not wholly good only because scientific men in their excursions into the domain of religion are too frequently chargeable with a one-sidedness of view and statement which their scientific education might have been hoped to make impossible--only because they too seldom give to religious truths the patient and impartial consideration to which these are entitled4 ,but most deserving of welcome is every evidence on their part of the conviction that when science goes deep enough it cannot but raise the questions to which religion professes to be an answer2 so that the mind1 instead of getting free from religious reflection by advancing in scientific inquiry1 finds such reflection only the more incumbent on it the farther it advances--a conviction which falls short of1 indeed1 but is closely allied to1 the belief so aptly expressed by ,lord ,bacon1 that while a slight taste of philosophy may dispose the mind to indifference to religion1 deeper draughts must bring it back to it2 that while on the threshold of philosophy1 where second causes appear to absorb the attention1 some oblivion of the highest cause may ensue1 when the mind penetrates deeper1 and sees the dependence of causes and the works of ,providence1 it will easily perceive1 according to the mythology of the poets1 that the upper link of nature's chain is fastened to ,jupiter's throne4 ,men of science are simply exercising a right to which they are fully entitled when they judge of religion by what they find to be ascertained in science2 and no class of men is more likely than they are to open up the way to points of view whence religious truth will be seen with a clearness and comprehensiveness greater than any to which professional theologians could hope of themselves to attain4 ,he can be no wise theologian who does not perceive that to a large extent he is dependent on the researches of men of science for his data1 and who1 firm in the faith that ,god will never be disgraced by ,his works1 is not ready to accept all that is truly discovered about these works1 in order to understand thereby ,god's character4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the greatest issues1 then1 are involved in the investigation on which we enter4 ,can we think what these are1 or reflect on their greatness1 without drawing this inference1 that we ought1 in conducting it1 to have no other end before us than that of seeking1 accepting1 and communicating the truth8 ,this is here so important that everything beside it must be insignificant and unworthy4 ,any polemical triumphs which could be gained either by logical or rhetorical artifices would be unspeakably paltry4 ,nothing can be appropriate in so serious a discussion but to state as accurately as we can the reasons for our own belief in theism1 and to examine as carefully and impartially as we can the objections of those who reject that belief1 and their reasons for holding an opposite belief4 ,it can only do us harm to overrate the worth of our own convictions and arguments1 or to underrate the worth of those of others4 ,we must not dare to carry into the discussion the spirit of men who feel that they have a case to advocate at all hazards4 ,we must not try to conceal a weakness in our argumentation by saying hard things of those who endeavour to point it out4 ,there is no doubt that character has an influence on creed--that the state of a man's feelings determines to a considerable extent the nature of his beliefs--that badness of heart is often the cause of perversity of judgment2 but we have no right to begin any argument by assuming that this truth has its bright side--its side of promise--turned towards us1 and its dark and threatening side turned towards those who differ from us4 ,if we can begin by assuming our opponents to be wicked1 why should we not assume them at once to be wrong1 and so spare ourselves the trouble of arguing with them8 ,it will be better to begin by assuming only what no one will question--namely1 that it is a duty to do to others as we would have others do to us4 ,when a man errs1 it is a kindness to show him his error--and the greater the error1 the greater the kindness2 but error is so much its own punishment to every ingenuous nature1 that to convince a person of it is all that one fallible person ought to do to another4 ,the scoff and the sneer are out of place in all serious discussion2 especially are they out of place when our minds are occupied with thoughts of ,him who1 if ,he exist1 is the ,father and ,judge of us all1 who alone possesses the full truth1 and who has made us that we might love one another4#d #d ,see ,appendix ,,iii4 ,,ii4 ,theism is the doctrine that the universe owes its existence1 and continuance in existence1 to the reason and will of a self-existent ,being1 who is infinitely powerful1 wise1 and good4 ,it is the doctrine that nature has a ,creator and ,preserver1 the nations a ,governor1 men a heavenly ,father and ,judge4 ,it is a doctrine which has a long history behind it1 and it is desirable that we should understand how we are related to that history4 ,theism is very far from coextensive with religion4 ,religion is spread over the whole earth2 theism only over a comparatively small portion of it4 ,there are but three theistic religions--the ,mosaic1 the ,christian1 and the ,mohammedan4 ,they are connected historically in the closest manner--the idea of ,god having been transmitted to the two latter1 and not independently originated by them4 ,all other religions are polytheistic or pantheistic1 or both together4 ,among those who have been educated in any of these heathen religions1 only a few minds of rare penetration and power have been able to rise by their own exertions to a consistent theistic belief4 ,the ,god of all those among us who believe in ,god1 even of those who reject ,christianity1 who reject all revelation1 is the ,god of ,abraham1 ,isaac1 and ,jacob4 ,from these ancient ,jewish fathers the knowledge of ,him has historically descended through an unbroken succession of generations to us4 ,we have inherited it from them4 ,if it had not thus come down to us1 if we had not been born into a society pervaded by it1 there is no reason to suppose that we should have found it out for ourselves1 and still less that we should merely have required to open our eyes in order to see it4 ,rousseau only showed how imperfectly he realised the dependence of man on man1 and the extent to which tradition enters into all our thinking1 when he pretended that a human being born on a desert island1 and who had grown up without any acquaintance with other beings1 would naturally1 and without assistance1 rise to the apprehension of this great thought4 ,the ,koran well expresses a view which has been widely held when it says1 ,every child is born into the religion of nature2 its parents make it a ,jew1 a ,christian1 or a ,magian4 ,the view is1 however1 not a true one4 ,a child is born1 not into the religion of nature1 but into blank ignorance2 and1 left entirely to itself1 it would probably never find out as much religious truth as the most ignorant of parents can teach it4 ,it is doubtless better to be born into the most barbarous pagan society than it would be to be born on a desert island and abandoned to find out a religion for one's self4 ,the individual man left to himself is very weak4 ,he is strong only when he can avail himself of the strength of many others1 of the stores of power accumulated by generations of his predecessors1 or of the combined forces of a multitude of his contemporaries4 ,the greatest men have achieved what they have done only because they have had the faculty and skill to utilise resources vastly greater than their own4 ,nothing reaches far forward into the future which does not stretch far back into the past4 ,before a tragedy like ',hamlet1' for example1 could be written1 it was requisite that humanity should have passed through ages of moral discipline1 and should be in possession of vast and subtle conceptions such as could only be the growth of centuries1 of the appropriate language at the appropriate epoch of its development1 and of a noble style of literary workmanship4 ,we allow ourselves1 says ,mr ,froude1 to think of ,shakespeare1 or of ,raphael1 or of ,phidias as having accomplished their work by the power of their individual genius2 but greatness like theirs is never more than the highest degree of perfection which prevails widely around it1 and forms the environment in which it grows4 ,no such single mind in single contact with the facts of nature could have created a ,pallas1 a ,madonna1 or a ,lear4 ,what the historian has thus said as to art is equally true of all other forms of thinking and doing4 ,it is certainly true of religious thought1 which has never risen without much help to the sublime conception of one ,god4 ,it is1 in fact1 an indisputable historical truth that we owe our theism in great part to our ,christianity1--that natural religion has had no real existence prior to or apart from what has claimed to be revealed religion--and that the independence which it now assumes is that of one who has grown ashamed of his origin4 ,it does not in the least follow that we are to regard theism as merely or even mainly a tradition--as a doctrine received simply on authority1 and transmitted from age to age1 from generation to generation1 without investigation1 without reflection4 ,it does not follow that it is not a truth the evidence of which has been seen in some measure by every generation which has accepted it1 and into the depth and comprehensiveness and reasonableness of which humanity has obtained a constantly-growing insight4 ,there have1 it is true1 been a considerable number of theologians who have traced all religious beliefs to revelation1 and who have assigned to reason merely the function of passively accepting1 retaining1 and transmitting them4 ,they have conceived of the first man as receiving the knowledge of ,god by sensible converse with ,him1 and of the knowledge thus received as transmitted1 with the confirmation of successive manifestations1 to the early ancestors of all nations4 ,the various notions of ,god and a future state to be found in heathen countries are1 according to them1 broken and scattered rays of these revelations2 and all the religious rites of prayer1 purification1 and sacrifice which prevail among savage peoples1 are faint and feeble relics of a primitive worship due to divine institution4 ,this view was natural enough in the early ages of the ,christian ,church and in medieval times1 when the ,new ,world was undiscovered and a very small part of either ,asia or ,africa was known4 ,it was consonant also to the general estimate of tradition as a means of transmitting truth1 entertained by the ,roman ,catholic ,church2 but it is not consistent with the ,protestant rejection of tradition1 and it is wholly untenable in the light of modern science1 the geography1 ethnology1 comparative mythology1 c41 of the present day4 ,a man who should thus account for the phenomena of the religious history of heathen humanity must be now as far behind the scientific knowledge of his age regarding the subject on which he theorises1 as a man who should still ascribe1 despite all geological proofs to the contrary1 the occurrence of fossils in the ,silurian beds to the action of the ,noachian deluge4#e #e ,see ,appendix ,,iv4 ,theism has come to us mainly through ,christianity4 ,but ,christianity itself rests on theism2 it presupposes theism4 ,it could only manifest1 establish1 and diffuse itself in so far as theism was apprehended4 ,the belief that there is one ,god1 infinite in power1 wisdom1 and goodness1 has certainly not been wrought out by each one of us for himself1 but has been passed on from man to man1 from parent to child3 tradition1 education1 common consent1 the social medium1 have exerted great influence in determining its acceptance and prevalence2 but we have no right to conceive of them as excluding the exercise of reason and reflection4 ,we know historically that reason and reflection have not been excluded from the development of theistic belief1 but have been constantly present and active therein2 that by the use of his reason man has in some countries gradually risen to a belief in one ,god2 and that where this belief existed1 he has1 by the use of his reason1 been continuously altering1 and1 it may be hoped1 extending and improving his views of ,god's nature and operations4 ,we know that in ,greece1 for example1 the history of religion was not a merely passive and traditional process4 ,we know as a historical fact that reason there undermined the polytheism which flourished when ,homer sang2 that it discovered the chief theistic proofs still employed1 and attained in many minds nearly the same belief in ,god which now prevails4 ,the experience of the ancient classical world is insufficient to prove that a purely rational philosophy can establish theism as the creed of a nation2 but it is amply sufficient to prove that it can destroy polytheism1 and find out all the principal arguments for theism4 ,we know1 further1 that in no age of the history of the ,christian ,church has reason entirely neglected to occupy itself in seeking the grounds on which the belief of ,god can be rested4 ,we know that reason is certainly not declining that labour in the present day4 ,the theistic belief1 although common to the whole ,christian world1 is one which every individual mind may study for itself1 which no one is asked to accept without proof1 and which multitudes have doubtless accepted only after careful consideration4 ,it comes to us so far traditionally1 but not nearly so much so as belief in the law of gravitation4 ,for every one who has examined the evidences for belief in the law of gravitation1 thousands on thousands have examined the evidences for the existence of ,god4 ,tradition1 then1 does not necessarily exclude private judgment1 and private judgment does not necessarily imply the rejection of tradition--that is1 of transmitted belief4 ,the one does not even necessarily confine or restrict the activity of the other4 ,they are so far from being essentially antagonistic1 that they may co-operate1 may support and help each other2 nay1 they must do1 if religious development is to be natural1 easy1 peaceful1 and regular4 ,this is but saying in another form that religious development1 when true and normal1 must combine and harmonise conservatism and progress4 ,all development must do that1 or it will be of an imperfect and injurious kind4 ,in nature the rule of development is neither revolution nor reaction1 but evolution--a process which is at once conservative and progressive1 which brings the new out of the old by the continuous growth and elaboration of the germs of life into organic completeness4 ,all that is essential in the old is retained and perfected1 while the form is altered to accord with new circumstances and to respond to new wants4 ,it should not be otherwise in the moral and social worlds4 ,the only true progress there1 also1 is that continuous and consistent development which can only be secured through true conservatism--through retaining1 applying1 and utilising whatever truth and goodness the past has brought down to the present2 and the only true conservatism is that which secures against stagnation and death by continuous progress4 ,therefore it is that1 alike in matters of civil polity1 of scientific research1 and of religious life1 wisdom lies in combining the conservative with the progressive spirit1 the principle of authority with the principle of liberty1 due respect to the collective reason in history with due respect to the rights of the individual reason4 ,the man who has not humility enough to feel that he is but one among the living millions of men1 and that his whole generation is but a single link in the great chain of the human race--who is arrogant enough to fancy that wisdom on any great human interest has begun with himself1 and that he may consequently begin history for himself1--the man who is not conservative to the extent of possessing this humility1 and shrinking from this arrogance1 is no truly free man1 but the slave of his own vanity1 and the inheritance which his fathers have left him will be little increased by him4 ,the man1 on the other hand1 who always accepts what is as what ought to be2 who identifies the actual with the reasonable2 who would have to-morrow exactly like to-day2 who would hold fast what ,providence is most clearly showing ought to pass away1 or to pass into something better1--the man1 in a word1 who would lay an arrest on the germs of life and truth1 and prevent them from sprouting and ripening--is the very opposite of genuinely conservative--is the most dangerous of destructives4 ,there is nothing so conservative against decay and dissolution as natural growth1 orderly progress4 ,the truth just stated is1 as ,i have said1 of universal application4 ,but it is nowhere more applicable than in the inquiry on which we are engaged4 ,the great idea of ,god--the sublimest and most important of all ideas--has come to us in a wondrous manner through the minds and hearts of countless generations which it has exercised and sustained1 which it has guided in darkness1 strengthened in danger1 and consoled in affliction4 ,it has come to us by a long1 unbroken tradition2 and had it not come to us1 we should of a certainty not have found it out for ourselves4 ,we should have had to supply its place1 to fill the aching void within us caused by its absence1 with some far lower idea1 perhaps with some wild fiction1 some foul idol4 ,probably we cannot estimate too humbly the amount or worth of the religious knowledge which we should have acquired1 supposing we acquired any1 if we had been left wholly to our own unaided exertions--if we had been cut off from the general reason of our race1 and from the ,divine ,reason1 which has never ceased to speak in and to our race4 ,while1 however1 the idea of ,god has been brought to us1 and is not independently wrought out by us1 no man is asked to accept it blindly or slavishly2 no man is asked to forego in the slightest degree1 even before this the most venerable and general of the beliefs of humanity1 the rights of his own individual reason4 ,he is free to examine the grounds of it1 and to choose according to the result of his examination4 ,his acceptance of the idea1 his acquiescence in the belief1 is of worth only if it be the free acceptance of1 the loving acquiescence in1 what his reason1 heart1 and conscience testify to be true and good4 ,therefore1 neither in this idea or belief itself1 nor in the way in which it has come to us1 is there any restriction or repression of our mental liberty4 ,and the mere rejection of it is no sign1 as some seem to fancy1 of intellectual freedom1 of an independent judgment4 ,it is no evidence of a man's being freer from incredulity than the most superstitious of his neighbours4 ,to disbelieve is to believe1 says ,whately4 ,if one man believes there is a ,god1 and another that there is no ,god1 whichever holds the less reasonable of these two opinions is chargeable with credulity4 ,for the only way to avoid credulity and incredulity--the two necessarily going together--is to listen to1 and yield to the best evidence1 and to believe and disbelieve on good grounds4 ,these are wise words of ,dr ,whately4 ,whenever reason has been awakened to serious reflection on the subject1 the vast majority of men have felt themselves unable to believe that this mighty universe1 so wondrous in its adjustments and adaptations1 was the product of chance1 or dead matter1 or blind force--that the physical1 mental1 and moral order which they everywhere beheld implied no ,supreme ,intelligence and ,will2 and the few who can believe it1 have assuredly no right1 simply on the ground of such ability1 to assume that they are less credulous1 freer thinkers1 than others4 ,the disbelief of the atheist must ever seem to all men but himself to require more faith1 more credulity1 than the beliefs of all the legends of the ,talmud4#f #f ,see ,appendix ,v4 ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,,general ,,idea ,,of ,,religion--,,comparison ,,of ,,polytheism ,,and ,,pantheism ,,with ,,theism--,,the ,,three ,,great ,,theistic ,,religions ,,compared--,,no ,,religious ,,progress ,,beyond ,,theism4 ,i4 ,there are three great theistic religions4 ,all of them can scarcely be supposed to be perfect4 ,it is most unlikely that they should all be equal in rank and value4 ,but to determine the position and worth of a religion1 whether theistic or non-theistic1 it is indispensable that we have some notion of what religion is in itself4 ,it is very difficult to give a correct definition or accurate description of religion4 ,and the reason is that religion is so wide and diversified a thing4 ,it has spread over the whole earth1 and it has assumed an almost countless variety of forms4 ,some sense of an invisible power or powers ruling his destiny is manifested by man alike in the lowest stages of barbarism and in the highest stages of civilisation1 but the rude savage and the cultured thinker conceive very differently of the powers which they adore4 ,the aspects of religion are1 in fact1 numerous as the phases of human life and the steps of human progress4 ,it extends its sway over all lands1 ages1 and peoples1 and yet it is the same in no two countries1 no two generations1 no two men even4 ,there is1 accordingly1 of necessity a great difficulty in finding an expression which will comprehend and suit the vast variety of forms assumed by the religious life4 ,instead of trying to find an expression of the kind1 many1 ,i might almost say most1 theologians are content silently to substitute for religion the phases of it with which they are most familiar1 and instead of a definition of religion1 to give us1 say1 a definition of theism1 or even of ,christianity4 ,it is the rule and not the exception to find the same theologians who define religion as the communion of man with ,god1 or the self-surrender of the soul to ,god1 arguing that religion is common to all races and peoples4 ,of course1 this is self-contradictory4 ,their definitions identify religion with monotheism1 and their arguments assume it to include pantheism1 polytheism1 fetichism1 c4 ,belief in the one ,god and the worship of ,him are very far from being universal even at the present day4 ,if there be no other religion--if nothing short of that be religion--there are still vast continents and populous nations where religion is unknown4 ,a definition of religion must completely circumscribe religion2 it must not be applicable merely to one religion1 or at the most to several out of the vast host of religions which are spread over the earth2 it must draw a boundary line which includes all religions1 the lowest as well as the highest1 and which excludes all things else4#g ,a definition thus extensive cannot be1 in logical language1 very comprehensive2 to include all religions1 it must not tell us much about what any religion is2 in significance it can be neither rich nor definite4 ,perhaps if we say that religion is man's belief in a being or beings1 mightier than himself and inaccessible to his senses1 but not indifferent to his sentiments and actions1 with the feelings and practices which flow from such belief1 we have a definition of the kind required4 ,i fear at least that any definition less abstract and vague will be found to apply only to particular forms or special developments of religion4 ,religion is man's communion1 then1 with what he believes to be a god or gods2 his sense of relationship to1 and dependence on1 a higher and mysterious agency1 with all the thoughts1 emotions1 and actions which proceed therefrom4 ,the communion may be dark and gross1 and find expression in impure and bloody rites1 or it may be in spirit and in truth1 and expressed in ways which educate and elevate both mind and heart4 ,the belief may rest on wild delusions1 on authority blindly accepted1 or on rational grounds4 ,the god may be some personified power of nature1 some monstrous phantom of the brain1 some imaginary demon of lust or cruelty2 or it may be ,he in whom all truth1 wisdom1 goodness1 and holiness have their source4 ,but whatever be the form or character which religion presents1 it always and everywhere involves belief in a god or object of worship1 and feelings and actions corresponding to that belief4 ,it is always and everywhere a consciousness of relationship to a worshipped being4 #g ,see ,appendix ,,vi4 ,is there any truth which can be affirmed to belong universally to this consciousness8 ,if there be1 it will hold good universally of religion1 and the recognition of it will advance us a step in the knowledge of the nature of religion4 ,one such truth at least1 it appears to me1 there is--viz41 that the religious consciousness1 or the frame and condition of spiritual life distinctive and essential in religion1 is not peculiar to some one province of human nature1 but extends into all its provinces4 ,this truth has been often contradicted in appearance1 seldom in reality4 ,the seat of religion1 as ,i indicated in last lecture1 has been placed by some in the intellect1 by others in the affections1 and by others still in the will4 ,it has been represented as knowing1 or feeling1 or doing4 ,when we examine1 however1 the multitude of1 at first glance1 apparently very conflicting views which have originated in thus fixing upon some single mental faculty as the religious faculty1 the organ and seat of religion1 we soon find that they are not so discordant and antagonistic as they seem to be4 ,those who represent religion as essentially knowledge or belief1 do not really mean to affirm that anything entitled to be called religion is ever mere knowledge or mere belief2 on the contrary1 they proceed on the supposition that feeling and volition will correspond to the knowledge or belief4 ,they define religion as knowledge or belief1 and not as affection or volition1 because1 regarding religious knowledge or belief as the ground of religious feeling and willing1 they think they may treat the two latter1 not as constituents1 but as consequences of religion4 ,then1 although a few of those who have defined religion as feeling have written as if they supposed that the feeling rested upon no sort of apprehension or conviction1 they have been very few1 and they have never been able to explain what they meant4 ,in presence of the ,power which is manifested in the universe1 or of the moral order of the world1 they have felt an awe or joy1 it may be1 irresistibly raising them above themselves1 above the hampering details of earth1 and giving fulness and tone to their existence2 and being unaccustomed to analyse states of consciousness1 although familiar with the mechanics and chemistry of matter1 they have overlooked the obvious fact1 that but for an intellectual perception of the presence of an all-pervading ,power1 and all-embracing order1 the awe and joy could never have been excited4 ,mere feeling cannot tell us anything about what is out of ourselves1 and cannot take us out of ourselves4 ,mere feeling is1 in fact1 mere absurdity4 ,it is but what we should expect1 therefore1 that all those capable of reflecting in any measure on mental processes who have placed the essence of religion in feeling1 have always admitted that the religious feeling could not be wholly separated either from the power of cognition on the one hand1 or the exertion of will on the other4 ,men like ,schleiermacher and ,opzoomer argue strenuously that religion is feeling and not knowledge or practice2 but it is expressly on the ground that1 as there can be what is called religious knowledge and practice without piety1 the knowledge is a mere antecedent1 and the practice a mere consequent4 ,those1 again1 who make religion consist essentially in an act of will1 in the self-surrender of the soul to the object of its worship1 do so1 they tell us1 because pious feeling1 even though based on knowledge1 is only religiousness1 not religion--the capacity of being religious1 not actually being so2 and religion only exists as a reality1 a completed thing1 when the will of man submits itself to the ,divine ,will4 ,but this is to acknowledge1 you observe1 that both thought and feeling are present and presupposed wherever religion exists4 ,now1 if the facts be as ,i have just stated1 obviously the controversy as to whether religion is essentially knowing1 feeling1 or willing1 is mainly verbal4 ,it turns on an undefined use of the term essential4 ,thought1 feeling1 and will--knowledge1 affection1 and self-surrender--are admitted to be indissolubly united1 inseparably present1 in religion1 even by those who will not admit them to be all its equally essential constituents4 ,but in these circumstances1 they should carefully explain what they mean by essential and non-essential1 and tell us how we are to distinguish among inseparable states those which are essential from those which are non-essential4 ,this they never do2 this they cannot do4 ,all facts which always go together1 and are always equally found in any state or process1 are its equally essential components4 ,when we always find certain elements together1 and can neither discover nor imagine them apart1 we have no right to represent some of them as essential to the compound into which they enter1 and others as non-essential4 ,they are all essential4 ,the conclusion to which we are thus brought is1 that religion belongs exclusively to no one part or province1 no one disposition or faculty of the soul1 but embraces the whole mind1 the whole man4 ,its seat is the centre of human nature1 and its circumference is the utmost limit of all the energies and capacities of that nature4 ,at the lowest it has something alike of intellect1 affection1 and practical obedience in it4 ,at its best it should include all the highest exercises of reason1 all the purest and deepest emotions and affections1 and the noblest kind of conduct4 ,it responds to its own true nature only in the measure that it fills the whole intellect with light1 satisfies the reverence and love of the most capacious heart1 and provides an ideal and law for practical life in all its breadth4 ,there is1 then1 a general notion of religion which includes all religions1 and that notion both suggests to us that the various religions of the world are of very different values1 and points us to a standard by which we may determine their respective rank1 and estimate their worth4 ,the definition of religion1 in other words1 though not to be confounded with the type or ideal of religion1 is connected with it1 and indicates what it is4 ,the type is the normal and full development of what is expressed in the definition4 ,it is the type1 of course1 and not the definition1 which is the standard--the medium and measure of comparison4 ,and the type or ideal of religion is the complete surrender of the heart1 and strength1 and soul1 and mind of man to ,deity4 ,only a religion which admits of a full communion of the reason1 affection1 and will of the worshipper with the object of his worship--only a religion which presents an object of worship capable of eliciting the entire devotion of the worshipper's nature1 and at the same time of ennobling1 enlarging1 refining1 and satisfying that nature--fully realises the idea of religion1 or1 in other words1 can claim to be a perfect religion4#h #h ,see ,appendix ,,vii4 ,,ii4 ,applying the very general idea of religion which has now been reached1 it soon becomes apparent that no religion can possibly claim to conform to it which does not present to man as the true and supreme object of his adoration1 love1 and obedience1 the ,one ,infinite ,personal ,god--almighty1 all-wise1 and all-holy2 or1 in other words1 that it is only in a theistic religion that whatever in religion is fitted to satisfy the reason and affections of man1 and to strengthen and guide his will1 can find its proper development4 ,look at polytheism--the worship of more gods than one4 ,clearly religion can only be very imperfectly realised in any polytheistic form2 and still more clearly are most of the forms which polytheism has actually assumed unspeakably degrading4 ,think for a moment of a human being worshipping a stock or a stone1 a plant or a tree1 a fish or serpent1 an ox or tiger--of the negro of ,guinea beating his gods when he does not get what he wishes1 or the ,new ,zealander trying to frighten them by threatening to kill and eat them--of the car of ,juggernaut1 the fires of ,moloch1 the sacrifices to the ,mexican war-god1 the abominations ascribed to ,jupiter1 the licentious orgies so widely practised by the heathen in honour of their deities4 ,reflect on such a scene as is brought before us in the forty-fourth chapter of ,isaiah4 ,the language of the prophet is so graphic that one almost seems to see the man whom he depicts choosing his tree in the forest and hewing it down--to see the smith working at it with his tongs among the coals1 and hear the ring of his hammer--to see the carpenter with adze and line and compass shape it into an ugly monstrous shape1 bearing faint resemblance to the human--to see the workman with one part of the tree kindling a fire1 and baking bread1 and roasting roast1 and eating it1 and then going up to the ugly1 wooden1 human shape that he has fashioned out of another part of the same tree1 prostrating himself before it1 feeling awed in its presence1 and praying1 ,deliver me2 for thou art my god4 ,the prophet obviously painted from the life1 and his picture is still true to the life where polytheism prevails4 ,but what could be more calculated to inspire both horror and pity8 ,how awful is it that man should be able so to delude and degrade himself6 ,as a rule1 the gods of polytheists are such that1 even under the delusion that they are gods1 little improving communion with them is possible4 ,as a rule1 the religion of polytheists consists of vague1 dark1 wild imaginations1 instead of true and reasoned convictions--of coarse1 selfish desires1 fear and suspicion1 instead of love1 and trust1 and joy--and of arbitrary or even immoral rites and practices1 instead of spiritual worship1 and the conformity of the will to a righteous law4 ,then1 at the very best1 polytheism must be far from good1--at its highest1 it must be low4 ,were it much better than it has ever been--had it all the merits of ,greek polytheism1 without any of its faults1 save those which are inherent in the very nature of polytheism--it would still be but a poor religion1 for its essential and irremediable defects are such as to render it altogether incapable of truly satisfying the nature of man4 ,it is a belief in more gods than one4 ,this of itself is what reason cannot rest in--what reason is constantly finding out more clearly to be false4 ,the more the universe is examined and understood1 the more apparent does it become that it is a single1 self-consistent whole--a vast unity in which nothing is isolated or independent4 ,the very notion1 therefore1 of separate and independent deities1 and still more1 of course1 of discordant or hostile deities1 ruling over different departments of nature1 is opposed to the strivings and findings of reason4 ,the heart will no less vainly seek satisfaction in the belief of many gods4 ,its spiritual affections need a single ,divine object4 ,to distribute them among many objects is to dissipate and destroy them4 ,the reverence1 love1 and trust which religion demands are a whole-hearted1 absolute1 unlimited reverence1 love1 and trust1 such as can only be felt towards one ,god1 with no other beside ,him4 ,the will of man in like manner requires to be under not a number of independent wills1 but a single1 all-comprehensive1 perfectly consistent1 and perfectly righteous will4 ,it cannot serve many masters2 it can only reasonably and rightly serve one4 ,it can only yield itself up unreservedly to be guided by ,one ,supreme ,will4 ,if there be no such will in the universe1 but only a multitude of independent and co-ordinate wills1 that full surrender of the will of the worshipper to the object of his worship1 in which religion should find its consummation1 is impossible4 ,further1 polytheism is not only the belief in more gods than one1 but in gods all of which are finite4 ,there can be no true recognition of the infinity of ,god where there is no true recognition of ,his unity4 ,but the mind of man1 although finite itself1 cannot be satisfied with any object of worship which it perceives to be finite4 ,it craves an infinite object2 it desires to offer a boundless devotion2 it seeks an absolute blessedness4 ,the aim of the religious life is the communion of the finite with the infinite2 and every religion1 however otherwise excellent1 which suppresses the infinite1 and presents to the finite only the finite1 is a failure4 ,religion can no more attain to its proper development in pantheism than in polytheism4 ,for pantheism denies that the ,one ,infinite ,being is a person--is a free1 holy1 and loving intelligence4 ,it denies even that we ourselves are truly persons4 ,it represents our consciousness of freedom and sense of responsibility as illusions4 ,god1 according to pantheism1 alone is4 ,all individual existences are merely ,his manifestations1--all our deeds1 whether good or bad1 are ,his actions2 and yet1 while all is ,god and ,god is all1 there is no ,god who can hear us or understand us--no ,god to love us or care for us--no ,god able or willing to help us4 ,such a view of the universe may have its attractions for the poet and the philosopher in certain moods of mind1 but it assuredly affords little foundation for religion1 if religion be the communion of the worshipper and the worshipped4 ,what communion of reason can a man have with a being which does not understand him1 or of affection with a being which has no love1 or of will with a being which has no choice or freedom1 and is the necessary cause both of good and evil8 ,pantheism represents absorption in ,deity1 the losing of self in ,god1 as the highest good of humanity2 but this is a mere caricature of that idea of communion with ,god in which religion must find its realisation1 as pantheism leaves neither a self to surrender1 nor a personal ,god to whom to surrender it4 ,the absorption of the finite in the infinite which pantheism preaches is as different from that surrender of the self to ,god1 which is the condition of ,god dwelling in us and we in ,god1 as night is from day1 as death is from life4 ,we find ample historical confirmation of what has just been said in the very instructive fact1 that widespread as pantheism is1 it has never in itself been the religion of any people4 ,it has never been more than the philosophy of certain speculative individuals4 ,india is no exception1 for even there1 in order to gain and retain the people1 pantheism has had to combine with polytheism4 ,it is the personal gods of ,hindu polytheism and not the impersonal principle of ,hindu pantheism that the ,hindu people worship4 ,the ,sankhya and ,vedanta systems are no more religions than the systems of ,spinoza1 ,schelling1 or ,hegel4 ,they are merely philosophies4 ,buddhism has laid hold of the hearts of men to a wonderful extent2 not1 however1 in virtue of the pantheism1 scarcely dis-tinguishable from atheism1 which underlies it1 but because of the attractiveness of the character and teaching of the ,buddha ,sakyamuni himself1 of the man-god who came to save men4 ,the human heart cries out for a living personal ,god to worship1 and pantheism fails miserably as a religion because it wholly disregards1 yea1 despises that cry4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we are compelled to pass onwards1 then1 to theism4 ,and here1 applying the same view of religion as before1 it soon becomes obvious that of the three great theistic religions--,judaism1 ,christianity1 and ,mohammedanism--the last is far inferior to the other two1 and the first is a transition to and preparation for the second4 ,although the latest of the three to arise1 ,mohammedanism is manifestly the least developed1 the least matured4 ,instead of evolving and extending the theistic idea which it borrowed1 it has marred and mutilated it4 ,instead of representing ,god as possessed of all spiritual fulness and perfection1 it exhibits ,him as devoid of the divinest spiritual attributes4 ,although the ,suras of the ,koran are all1 with one exception1 prefaced by the formula1 ,in the name of ,allah1 the ,god of mercy1 the merciful1 there is extremely little in them of the spirit of mercy1 while they superabound in a fierce intolerance4 ,allah is set before us with clearness1 with force1 with intense sincerity1 as endowed with the natural attributes which we ascribe to ,god1 but only so as to exhibit very imperfectly and erroneously ,his moral attributes4 ,he is set before us as ,god alone1 beside whom there is none other2 as the first and the last1 the seen and the hidden2 as eternal and unchanging2 as omnipotent1 omnipresent1 and omniscient2 as the ,creator1 the ,preserver1 and the ,judge of all2--but ,he is not set before us as truly righteous or even as truly reasonable1 and still less as ,love4 ,he is set before us as an infinite and absolute arbitrary ,will1 the acts of which are right simply because they cannot be wrong1 and which ordains its creatures and instruments to honour or dishonour1 heaven or hell1 without love or hate1 without interest or sympathy1 and on no grounds of fitness or justice4 ,his infinite exaltation above ,his creatures is recognised1 but not ,his relationship to and interest in ,his creatures4 ,his almighty power is vividly apprehended1 but ,his infinite love is overlooked1 or only seen dimly and in stray and fitful glimpses4 ,his character is thus most imperfectly unveiled1 and even seriously defaced2 and1 in consequence1 a whole-hearted communion with ,him is impossible4 ,as an unlimited arbitrary ,will ,he leaves man with no true will to surrender to ,him4 ,inaccessible1 without sympathy1 jealous1 and egoistic1 ,his appropriate worship is servile obedience1 blind submission--not the enlightened reverence and loving affection of the true piety in which mind and heart fully accord2 unquestioning belief1 passionless resignation1 outward observances1 mere external works--not the free use of reason1 not the loving dependence of a child on its father1 not an internal life of holiness springing from a divine indwelling source4 ,god and man thus remain in this system1 theistic although it be1 infinitely separate from each other4 ,man is not made to feel that his whole spiritual being should live and rejoice in ,god2 on the contrary1 he is made to feel that he has scarcely any other relation to ,god than an inert instrument has to the hand which uses it4 ,submission to the will of ,god1 whatever it may be1 without recognition of its being the will of a ,father who seeks in all things the good of ,his children1 is the ,mussulman's highest conception either of religion or duty1 and consequently he ignores the central principle of religious communion and the strongest motive to moral action4 ,the theism of the ,old ,testament is incomparably superior to that of the ,koran4 ,it possesses every truth contained in ,mohammedanism1 while it gives due prominence to those aspects of the ,divine character which ,mohammedanism obscures and distorts4 ,the unity and eternity of ,god1 ,his omniscience1 omnipresence1 and inscrutable perfections1 the wonders of ,his creative power1 ,his glory in the heavens and on the earth1 are described by ,moses and the author of the ,book of ,job1 by the psalmists and the prophets1 in language so magnificent that all the intervening centuries have been unable to surpass it4 ,and yet far greater stress is justly laid by them on the moral glory of ,god1 which is reflected in so dim and broken and disproportionate a way through the visions of ,mohammed4 ,it is impossible to take a comprehensive view of the ,old ,testament dispensation without perceiving that its main aim1 alike in its ceremonial observances1 moral precepts1 and prophetic teaching1 was to open and deepen the sense of sin1 to give reality and intensity to the recognition of moral law1 to make known especially that aspect of ,god's character which we call ,his righteousness1 ,his holiness4 ,at the same time ,god is set forth as merciful1 long-suffering1 and gracious2 as healing our diseases1 redeeming our life1 and crowning us with loving-kindnesses2 as creating in us clean hearts1 and desiring not sacrifice but a broken spirit4 ,before the close of the ,old ,testament dispensation1 a view of ,god's character had been attained as complete as could be reached through mere spiritual vision and expressed through mere words4 ,the character of ,god was so disclosed that ,his people longed with their whole hearts for the blessedness of true spiritual communion with ,him1 and worthily apprehended what that communion ought to be4 ,but with the widening of their views and the deepening of their longings as to this the supreme good1 they realised the more how far they were from the attainment of it4 ,from the beginning ,judaism looked beyond itself and confessed its own preparatory and transitional character4 ,and this consciousness grew with its growth4 ,in the days of the later prophets men knew far better what spiritual communion with ,god ought to be than in the days of the patriarchs1 but they did not actually enjoy even the same measure of childlike communion with ,him4 ,the law had done its work2 it had made men feel more than ever the need of being in communion with ,god1 but it had made them realise also the distance between ,god and them1 and especially the awful width of the gulf between them caused by sin4 ,that gulf no mere spiritual vision of man could see across1 and no mere declarations of love and mercy even from ,god ,himself could bridge over4 ,the reason of man could only be enlightened--the heart of man could only be satisfied--as to how ,god would deal with sin and sinners1 by an actual self-manifestation of ,god in humiliation1 suffering1 and sacrifice1 which would leave men in no doubt that high and holy as ,god was1 ,he was also in the deepest and truest sense their ,father1 and that they were ,his ransomed and redeemed children4 ,it was only when this was accomplished that religion and theism were alike perfected4 ,then the character of ,god was unveiled1 the heart of ,god disclosed1 and in such a manner that the most childlike confidence in ,him could be combined with the profoundest sense of ,his greatness and righteousness4 ,perfect communion with ,him in trustful love no longer supposed1 as it did in earlier times1 an imperfect knowledge1 on the part of the worshipper1 either of ,god's character or of his own4 ,it required no overlooking of the evil of sin1 for it rested on the certainty that sin had been overcome4 ,only the life hid with ,god in ,christ can completely realise the idea of religion1 for only in ,christ can the heart of sinful man be sincerely and unreservedly yielded to a holy ,god4 ,i am the way1 the truth1 and the life2 no man cometh unto the ,father1 but by me1 are words of the ,lord ,jesus which can only be denied by those who do not understand what they mean--what the truth and the life are1 what fatherhood signifies1 and what is involved in coming to a ,father4 ,christian theism alone gives us a perfect representation of ,god4 ,it precedes and surpasses reason1 especially in the disclosure of the depths of fatherly love which are in the heart of the infinite ,jehovah2 but it nowhere contradicts reason--nay1 it incorporates all the findings of reason4 ,it presents as one great and brilliant light all the scattered sparks of truth which scintillated amidst the darkness of heathendom2 it combines into a living unity all the separate elements of positive truth which are to be found in systems like pantheism1 deism1 rationalism2 it excludes all that is false in views lower than or contrary to its own4 ,whenever it maintains a truth regarding ,god1 reason finds that it is defending a principle of ,christian theism2 whenever it refutes an error regarding ,him1 it finds itself assailing some one of the many enemies of ,christian theism4 ,,iii4 ,theism1 ,i argued in last lecture1 can never be reasonably rejected in the name of religious liberty4 ,i may now1 ,i think1 maintain that it can never be reasonably thrown off in the name of religious progress4 ,it can never be an onward step in the spiritual life to pass away from the belief which is distinctive and characteristic of theism4 ,the highest possible form of religion must be a theistic religion--a religion in which the one personal and perfect ,god is the object of worship4 ,fetichism1 nature-worship1 humanitarian polytheism1 and pantheism1 are all very much lower forms of religion1 and therefore to abandon theism for any of them is not to advance but to retrograde1 is not to rise but to fall4 ,we can turn towards any of them only by turning our back on the spiritual goal towards which humanity has been slowly but continuously moving through so many ages4 ,there is no hope or possibility of advance on the side of any of the old forms of heathendom4 ,shall we try1 then1 to get out of and beyond theism on that other side to which some moderns beckon us8 ,shall we suppose that as men have given up the lower for the higher forms of polytheism1 and then abandoned polytheism for theism1 so they may now surrender theism itself for systems like the positivism of ,comte or the new faith of ,strauss8 ,no4 ,and for two reasons4 ,first1 so far as there is any religion in these systems there is no advance on theism in them but the reverse4 ,comte strives to represent humanity1 and ,strauss to represent the universe1 as a god1 by imaginatively investing them with attributes which do not inherently and properly belong to them2 but with all their efforts they can only make of them fetich gods2 and ,europeans1 it is to be hoped1 will never fall down and worship fetiches1 however big these fetiches may be1 and whoever may be willing to serve them as prophets or priests4 ,humanity must be blind to its follies and sins1 insensible to its weakness and miseries1 and given over to the madness of a boundless vanity1 before it can raise an altar and burn incense to its own self4 ,man1 says an eloquent author1 is great is sublime1 with immortal hope in his heart and the divine aureole around his brow2 but that he may preserve his greatness let us leave him in his proper place4 ,let us leave to him the struggles which make his glory1 that condemnation of his own miseries which does him honour1 the tears shed over his faults which are the most unexceptionable testimony to his dignity4 ,let us leave him tears1 repentance1 conflict1 and hope2 but let us not deify him2 for no sooner shall he have said1 ',i am ,god1' than1 deprived that instant of all his blessings1 he shall find himself naked and spoiled4#i ,man1 ,i may add1 if his eyes be open and capable of vision1 can still less worship the universe than he can worship himself4 ,mind can never bow down to matter except under the influence of delusion4 ,man is greater than anything he can see or touch2 and those who believe only in what they can see and touch1 who have what ,strauss calls a feeling for the universe1 but no true feeling for what is spiritual and divine1 must either worship humanity or something even less worthy of their adoration4 ,there is thus no advance on this side either1 even if the systems which we are invited to adopt could be properly regarded as religious4 ,but1 secondly1 we may safely say that so far as they are theories based on science1 there is no religion in them2 and that1 consequently1 to give up a religion for them would be to give up not one form of religion for another1 a lower for a higher1 but would be to give up religion for what is not religion1 or1 in other words1 would be to cast off religion altogether4 ,and to cease to be religious can surely never be to advance in religion4 ,positivism and materialism are not stages beyond theism1 for they are not on the same road4 ,they are not phases in the development of religion2 they are forms of the denial of religion4 ,the grossest fetichism has more of religion in it than either of them can consistently claim on scientific grounds4 ,there is nothing in science1 properly so called1 which justifies the exaltation either of matter or man to the rank of gods even of the lowest fetich order4 #i ,e4 ,naville1 ',the ,heavenly ,father1' pp4 #bhc1 #bhd4 ,it is only1 then1 by keeping within the limits of theism that further religious progress is possible4 ,if we would advance in religion1 it must be1 not by getting rid of our belief in ,god1 but by getting deeper and wider views of ,his character and operations1 and by conforming our hearts and lives more sincerely and faithfully to our knowledge4 ,there is still ample room for religious progress of this kind4 ,i do not say1 ,i do not believe indeed1 that we shall find out any absolutely new truth about ,god4 ,were a man to tell me that he had discovered a ,divine attribute which had never previously been thought of1 ,i should listen to him with the same incredulous pity as if he were to tell me that he had discovered a human virtue which had escaped the notice of all other men4 ,in a real and important sense1 the revelation of ,god made in ,scripture1 and more particularly and especially the revelation of ,god in ,jesus ,christ1 is most justly to be regarded as complete1 and incapable of addition4 ,but there may be no limits to the growth of our apprehension and realisation of the idea of ,god there set before us perfectly as regards general features4 ,to perceive the mere general outline and general aspect of a truth is one thing1 and to know it thoroughly1 to realise it exhaustively--which is the only way thoroughly to know it--is another and very different thing2 and centuries1 yea1 millenniums without number1 may elapse between the former and the latter of these two stages1 between the beginning and the end of this process4 ,thousands of years ago there were men who said as plainly as could be done or desired that ,god was omnipotent2 but surely every one who believes in ,god will acknowledge1 that the discoveries of modern astronomy give more overwhelming impressions of ,divine power than either heathen sage or ,hebrew psalmist can be imagined as possessing4 ,it is ages since men ascribed perfect wisdom to ,god2 but all the discoveries of science which help us to understand how the earth is related to other worlds--how it has been brought into its present condition--how it has been stocked1 adorned1 and enriched with its varied tribes of plants and animals--and how these have been developed1 distributed1 and provided for1--must be accepted by every intelligent theist as enlarging and correcting human views as to ,god's ways of working1 and consequently as to ,his wisdom4 ,the righteousness of ,god has been the trust and support of men in all generations2 but history is a continuous unveiling of the mysteries of this attribute3 through the discipline of ,providence individuals and nations are ever being more thoroughly instructed in the knowledge of it4 ,i have1 indeed1 heard men say--,i have heard even teachers of theology say--that the knowledge of ,god is unlike all other knowledge1 in being unchanging and unprogressive4 ,to me it seems that of all knowledge the knowledge of ,god is1 or at least ought to be1 the most progressive4 ,and that for this simple reason1 that every increase of other knowledge1--be it the knowledge of outward nature1 or of the human soul1 or of history--be it the knowledge of truth1 or beauty1 or goodness1--ought also to increase our knowledge of ,him4 ,if it do not1 it has not been used aright2 and the reason why it has not been so used must be that we have looked upon ,god as if ,he were only one among many things1 instead of looking upon ,him as the ,one ,being of whom1 through whom1 and to whom are all things2 and that we have1 in consequence1 kept our knowledge of ,him wholly apart from our other knowledge1 instead of centring all our knowledge in it1 because we feel it to be the light of all our seeing1 as well as a lamp to our feet4 ,in other words1 our knowledge of ,god is in this case not a living1 all-diffusive knowledge4 ,only a dead knowledge of ,him is an unprogressive knowledge4 ,that1 ,i admit1 is unprogressive4 ,it may fade away and be effaced1 but it does not grow1 does not absorb and assimilate1 and thereby transmute and glorify all our other knowledge4 ,growth in the knowledge of ,god is a kind of progress which can have absolutely no end1 for the truth to be realised is infinite truth2 truth unlimited by time or space2 truth involved in all actual existence1 and containing the fulness of inexhaustible possibilities4 ,it is1 ,i shall conclude by adding1 a kind of progress which underlies and determines all other progress4 ,whenever our views of truth1 of righteousness1 of love1 of happiness rise above experience2 whenever we have ideals of existence and conduct which transcend the actual world and actual life2 whenever we have longings for a perfection and blessedness which finite things and finite persons cannot confer upon us1--our minds and hearts are really1 although it may be unconsciously1 feeling after ,god1 if haply they may find ,him4 ,it is only in and through ,god that there is anything to correspond to these ideals and longings4 ,if man be himself the highest and best of beings1 how comes it that all the noblest of his race should be haunted and possessed as they are by aspirations after what is higher and better than themselves--by visions of a truth1 beauty1 and holiness which they have not yet attained--by desires for a blessedness which neither earth nor humanity can bestow8 ,must not1 in that case1 his ideals be mere dreams--his longings mere delusions8 ,pessimists like ,schopenhauer and ,hartmann and their followers1 openly avow that they believe them to be so2 that the history of the world is but the series of illusions through which these ideals and longings have impelled humanity2 that our ideals never have been and never will be realised2 that our longings never have been and never will be satisfied1 for1 behold1 all is vanity4 ,i believe them to be quite logical in thinking so1 seeing that they have ceased to believe in ,god1 who is the ideal which alone gives meaning to all true ideals1 who can alone satisfy the deeper spiritual longings of the heart1 and likeness to whom is the goal of all mental1 moral1 and religious progress4 ,of course1 if the pessimists can persuade mankind that the sources of progress are not the truths and affections by which ,infinite ,goodness is drawing men to itself1 but mere fictions of their own brains and flatteries of their own hearts1 progress must soon cease4 ,when a delusion is seen through1 the power of it is gone4 ,but the pessimists will not1 we may trust1 succeed4 ,they will mislead for a time1 as they are now misleading1 certain unstable minds2 but the main result of their activity must be just the opposite of what they anticipate4 ,it must be that men will prize more the doctrines the most opposite to the dreary view of life and history which they propagate4 ,pessimism must send the philosophical few back with deepened reverence and quickened insight to ,plato1 in order to master more thoroughly1 and take to heart more seriously1 his great message to the world1 that the actual and the ideal meet and harmonise in ,god1 who is at once the ,first and the ,final ,cause1 the ,absolute ,idea1 the ,highest ,good2 and it must increase the gratitude of the many1 whether learned or unlearned1 for the ,gospel which has taught them that to glorify ,god is an end in which there is no illusion1 and to enjoy ,him a good which never disappoints4 ,god1 as the presupposition of all elevating ideals1 and the object of all ennobling desires1 is the primary source and the ultimate explanation of all progress4#aj #aj ,see ,appendix ,,viii4 ,,lecture ,,iii4 ,,the ,,nature1 ,,conditions1 ,,and ,,limits ,,of ,,theistic ,,proof4 ,i4 ,if we believe that there is one ,god--the ,creator1 ,preserver1 and ,ruler of all finite beings--we ought to have reasons or grounds for this belief4 ,we can have no right to believe it simply because we wish or will to believe it4 ,the grounds or reasons which we have for our belief must be to us proofs of ,god's existence4 ,those who affirm that ,god exists1 and yet deny that ,his existence can be proved1 must either maintain a position obviously erroneous1 or use the term proof in some extraordinary sense1 fitted only to perplex and mislead4 ,true and weighty1 therefore1 seem to me these words of one of the most distinguished of living ,german philosophers3 ,the proofs for the existence of ,god1 after having long played a great part in philosophy and theology1 have in recent times1 especially since ,kant's famous critique1 fallen into disrepute4 ,since then1 the opinion has been widely spread1 both among believers and unbelievers1 that the existence of ,god does not admit of being proved4 ,even theologians readily assent to this opinion1 deride the vain attempts1 and imagine that in so doing they are serving the faith which they preach4 ,but the proofs for the existence of ,god coincide with the grounds for the belief in ,god2 they are simply the real grounds of the belief established and expounded in a scientific manner4 ,if there be no such proofs1 there are also no such grounds2 and a belief which has no ground1 if possible at all1 can be no proper belief1 but an arbitrary1 self-made1 subjective opinion4 ,yes1 religious belief must sink to the level of the mere illusion or fixed idea of a mind which is insane1 if contradicted by all reality1 all facts scientifically established1 and the theory of the universe which such facts support and justify4#aa #aa ,ulrici1 ,gott und die ,natur1 i4 ,the proofs of ,god's existence must be1 in fact1 simply ,his own manifestations2 the ways in which ,he makes ,himself known2 the phenomena on which ,his power and character are imprinted4 ,they can neither be1 properly speaking1 our reasonings1 nor our analyses of the principles involved in our reasonings4 ,our reasonings are worth nothing except in so far as they are expositions of ,god's modes of manifestation2 and even when our reasonings are correct1 our analyses of them1 supposing we attempt to analyse them1 may be erroneous4 ,the facts1--the works and ways of ,god--which are the real evidences of ,his existence and the true indications of ,his character1--may raise countless minds to ,god which can give no general description of the process by which they are thus elevated1 and are still less capable of resolving it into its principles4 ,it is late in the history both of the individual mind and of the collective mind before they can so reflect on their own acts1 so distinguish them one from another1 and so discern the characteristics of each1 as to be able even to give a clear and correct account of them2 and it is much later before they can detect their conditions and laws4 ,the minds of multitudes may therefore readily be supposed to rise legitimately from perception of the visible universe to apprehension of the invisible personal ,creator1 although either wholly unconscious or only dimly and inaccurately aware of the nature of the transition1 and although1 if called on to indicate the conclusion at which they had arrived1 they would employ far weaker reasons in words than those by which they were actually convinced in thought4 ,the principles of the theistic inference may be very badly determined1 and yet the theistic inference itself may be perfectly valid4 ,if the real proofs of ,god's existence are all those facts which cannot be reasonably conceived of as other than the manifestations of ,god--,his glory in the heavens1 ,his handiwork on the earth1 ,his operations in the soul1 ,his ways among the nations--and if the task of the theist is to trace out these facts1 and to show that they cannot reasonably be denied to be marks or impressions of ,divine agency1 then must a theist1 when seeking or expounding the reasons for his belief1 feel that his mind is conversant not with mere thoughts of his own1 but with the manifested thoughts or acts of ,god ,himself4 ,he must carry into his inquiry the consciousness that he is not simply engaged in an intellectual process1 but is trying to apprehend and actually apprehending the ,divine ,being4 ,to him1 therefore1 the inquiry as to the ultimate source and reason of things must be an essentially solemn and awe-inspired one4 ,to the atheist it must1 of course1 be much less so2 but even he ought to feel it to be not only a most important inquiry1 but one which carries him into the presence of a vast1 eternal1 and mysterious power--a power in darkness shrouded1 yet on which hang all life and death1 all joy and woe4 ,according to the view just stated1 the evidences or proofs of ,god's existence are countless4 ,they are to be found in all the forces1 laws1 and arrangements of nature--in every material object1 every organism1 every intellect and heart4 ,at the same time1 they concur and coalesce into a single all-comprehensive argument1 which is just the sum of the indications of ,god given by the physical universe1 the minds of men1 and human history4 ,nothing short of that is the full proof4 ,there may be points in space and instants in time where creative and sustaining power appear to our narrow and superficial intellects to have been strangely limited1 but surely we ought not so to concentrate our attention on any such points or instants as to be unable to take in a general impression of the immeasurable power displayed throughout the realms of space and the ages of time4 ,it may be possible to show that many things which have been regarded as evidences of intelligence or wisdom are not really so1 and yet the universe may teem with the manifestations of these attributes4 ,faith in the righteousness and moral government of ,god must be able to look over and to look beyond many things calculated to produce doubt and disbelief4 ,no man can judge fairly as to whether or not there is a ,god1 who makes the question turn on what is the significance of a few particular facts1 who is incapable of gathering up into one general finding the results of innumerable indications4 ,a true religious view of the world must be a wide1 a comprehensive view of it1 such as demands an eye for the whole and not merely for a part--the faculties which harmonise and unify1 and not merely those which divide and analyse4 ,a part1 a point1 the eye of an insect1 the seed of a fruit1 may indeed be looked at religiously1 but it must be in the light of the universe as a whole1 in the light of eternity and infinity4 ,flower in the crannied wall1 ,i pluck you out of the crannies2 ,hold you here1 root and all1 in my hand1 ,little flower--but if ,i could understand ,what you are1 root and all1 and all in all1 ,i should know what ,god and man is4 ,in another respect the theistic proof is exceedingly complex and comprehensive4 ,it takes up into itself1 as it were1 the entire wealth of human nature4 ,the mind can only rise to the apprehension of ,god by a process which involves all that is most essential in its own constitution4 ,thus the will is presupposed4 ,theistic inference clearly involves the principle of causality4 ,god can only be thought of in the properly theistic sense as the cause of which the universe is the effect4 ,but to think of ,god as a cause--to apprehend the universe as an effect1--we must have some immediate and direct experience of causation4 ,and such experience we have only in the consciousness of volition4 ,when the soul wills1 it knows itself as an agent1 as a cause4 ,this is the first knowledge of causation which the mind requires1 and the most perfect knowledge thereof which it ever requires4 ,it is a knowledge which sheds light over all the regions of experience subsequently brought under the principle of causality1 which accompanies the reason in its upward search until it rests in the cognition of an ultimate cause1 and which enables us to think of that cause as the primary1 all-originating will4 ,if we did not know ourselves as causes1 we could not know ,god as a cause2 and we know ourselves as causes only in so far as we know ourselves as wills4 ,but the principle of causality alone or by itself is quite insufficient to lead the mind up to the apprehension of ,deity2 and an immediate and direct consciousness of far more within us than will is required to make that apprehension possible4 ,the evidences of intelligence must be combined with the evidences of power before we can be warranted to infer more from the facts of the universe than the existence of an ultimate force2 and no mere force1 however great or wonderful1 is worthy to be called ,god4 ,god is not only the ultimate ,cause1 but the ,supreme ,intelligence2 and as it is only in virtue of the direct consciousness of our volitions that we can think of ,god as a cause1 so is it only in virtue of the direct consciousness of our intellectual operations that we can think of ,him as an intelligence4 ,it is not from the mere occurrence of a change1 or the mere existence of a derivative phenomenon1 that we infer the change or phenomenon to be due to an intelligent cause1 but from the mode of the occurrence or the character of the phenomenon being such that any cause but an intelligent cause must be deemed an insufficient cause4 ,the inference supposes1 however1 that we already have some knowledge of what an intelligent cause is--that we have enough of knowledge of the nature of intelligence to convince us that it alone can fully account for order1 law1 and adjustment4 ,whence do we get this knowledge8 ,we have not far to seek it2 it is inherent in self-consciousness4 ,we know ourselves as intelligences1 as beings that foresee and contrive1 that can discover and apply principles1 that can originate order and adjustment4 ,it is only through this knowledge of the nature of intelligence that we can infer our fellow-men to be intelligent beings2 and not less is it an indispensable condition of our inferring ,god to be an intelligence4 ,then1 causality and design1 and the will and intelligence within us through which they are interpreted1 cannot1 even when combined1 enable us to think of the ,creative ,reason as righteous2 although obviously1 until so thought of1 that reason is by no means to be identified with ,god4 ,the greatest conceivable power and intelligence1 if united with hatred of righteousness and love of wickedness1 can yield us only the idea of a devil2 and if separated from all moral principle and character1 good or bad1 only that of a being far lower than man1 which might have reason for worshipping man1 but which man cannot worship without degrading himself4 ,the existence1 however1 of a moral principle within us1 of a conscience which witnesses against sin and on behalf of holiness1 is of itself evidence that ,god must be a moral being1 one who hates sin and loves holiness2 and the light of this1 the candle of the ,lord1 in the soul1 enables us to discover many other reasons for the same conclusion in the constitution of society and the course of history4 ,but if we had no moral perceptions on the contemplation of our own voluntary acts1 we certainly would not1 and could not1 invest the ,divine ,being with moral perfections because of ,his acts4 ,there is still another step to be taken in order to obtain an apprehension of ,god2 and it is one where the outward universe fails us1 where we are thrown entirely1 or nearly so1 on our internal resources4 ,the universe1 interpreted by the human mind in the manner which has been indicated1 may warrant belief in a ,being whose power is immense1 whose wisdom is inexpressibly wonderful1 and whose righteousness is to be held in profoundest admiration and reverence1 notwithstanding all the clouds and darkness which may in part conceal it from our view2 but not in a ,being whose existence is absolute1 whose power is infinite1 whose wisdom and goodness are perfect4 ,we cannot infer that the author of a universe which is finite1 imperfect1 and relative1 and all the phenomena of which are finite1 imperfect1 and relative1 must be1 in the true and strict sense of the terms1 infinite1 perfect1 and absolute4 ,we cannot deduce the infinite from the finite1 the perfect from the imperfect1 the absolute from the relative4 ,and yet it is only in the recognition of an absolute ,being of infinite power1 who works with perfect wisdom towards the accomplishment of perfectly holy ends1 that we reach a true knowledge of ,god1 or1 which is much the same thing1 a knowledge of the true ,god4 ,is there1 then1 any warrant in our own nature for thinking of ,god as infinite1 absolute1 and perfect1 since there seems to be little or none in outward nature8 ,yes1 there are within us necessary conditions of thought and feeling and ineradicable aspirations which force on us ideas of absolute existence1 infinity1 and perfection1 and will neither permit us to deny these perfections to ,god nor to ascribe them to any other being4 ,thus the mental process in virtue of which we have the idea of ,god comprehends and concentrates all that is most essential in human nature4 ,it is through bearing the image of ,god that we are alone able to apprehend ,god4 ,take any essential feature of that image out of a human soul1 and to apprehend ,god is made thereby impossible to it4 ,all that is divine in us meets1 unites1 co-operates1 to lay hold of what is divine without us4 ,hence the fuller and clearer the divine image is in any man1 the fuller and clearer will be his perception of the divine original4 ,hence what is more or less true everywhere1 is especially and emphatically true in religion1 that the eye sees only what it brings with it the power of seeing4 ,where the will1 for example1 is without energy--where rest is longed for as the highest good1 and labour deemed the greatest evil--where extinction is preferred to exertion1--the mind of a nation may be highly cultured1 and subtle and profound in speculation1 and yet may manifest a marked inability to think of ,god as a cause or will1 with a consequently inveterate tendency to pantheism4 ,the ,hindu mind1 and the systems of religion and philosophy to which it has given birth1 may serve as illustration and proof4 ,where the animal nature of man is strong1 and his moral and spiritual nature still undeveloped1 as is the case among all rude and undisciplined races1 he worships not the pure and perfect supreme ,spirit1 whose goodness1 truth1 and righteousness are as infinite as ,his power and knowledge1 but gods endowed in his imagination chiefly with physical and animal qualities4 ,recognition of ,nature1 says ,mr ,carlyle1 one finds to be the chief element of ,paganism2 recognition of ,man and his ,moral ,duty--though this1 too1 is not wanting--comes to be the chief element only in purer forms of religion4 ,here1 indeed1 is a great distinction and epoch in ,human ,beliefs2 a great landmark in the religious development of ,mankind4 ,man first puts himself in relation with ,nature and her ,powers1 wonders and worships over those2 not till a later epoch does he discern that all ,power is ,moral1 that the grand point is the distinction for him of ,good and ,evil1 of ,thou shalt1 and thou shalt not4 ,the explanation of the historical truth thus stated by ,mr ,carlyle is just that man is vividly alive to the wants and claims of his body and merely natural life during long ages in which he is almost dead to the wants and claims of his spirit or true self and the moral life4 ,so the ordinary mind is prone1 even at present1 in the most civilised countries of the world1 to think of ,god after the likeness of man1 or1 in other words1 as a vastly magnified man4 ,why8 ,because the ordinary mind is always very feebly and dimly conscious of those principles of reason which demand in ,god the existence of attributes neither to be found in the physical universe nor in itself4 ,some exercise in speculation1 some training in philosophy1 is needed to make us reflect on them2 and until we reflect on them we cannot be expected to do them justice in the formation of our religious convictions4 ,those who have never thought on what infinite and unconditioned mean1 and who have never in their lives grappled with a metaphysical problem1 will infer quite as readily as if they had spent their days in philosophical speculation that all the power and order in the universe1 and all the wisdom and goodness in humanity1 are the reflections of a far higher power1 wisdom1 and goodness in their source--the ,divine ,mind2 but they must realise much less correctly in what respects ,god cannot be imaged in ,his works3 they may do equal or even fuller justice to what is true in anthropomorphism1 but they cannot perceive as distinctly where anthropomorphism is false4 ,it is only through the activity of the speculative reason that religion is prevented from becoming a degrading anthropomorphism1 that the mind is compelled to think of ,god not merely as a ,father1 ,king1 and ,judge1 but as the ,absolute and ,infinite ,being4 ,this is1 perhaps1 the chief service which philosophy renders to religion2 and it ought not to be undervalued1 notwithstanding that philosophy has often1 in checking one error1 fallen into another as great1 or even greater1 denying that there is any likeness between ,god and man4 ,while the mental process which has been described--the theistic inference--is capable of analysis1 it is in itself synthetic4 ,the principles on which it depends are so connected that the mind can embrace them all in a single act1 and must include and apply them all in the apprehension of ,god4 ,will1 intelligence1 conscience1 reason1 and the ideas which they supply2 cause1 design1 goodness1 infinity1 with the arguments which rest on these ideas1--all coalesce into this one grand issue4 ,the inferences are as inseparable as the principles from which they spring4 ,a very large number of the objections to theism arise wholly from inattention to this truth4 ,men argue as if each principle involved in the knowledge of ,god were to be kept strictly by itself1 as if each argument brought forward as leading to a theistic conclusion were to be jealously isolated2 and then1 if the last result of the principle1 the conclusion of the argument1 be not an adequate knowledge of ,god1 they pronounce the principle altogether inapplicable1 and the argument altogether fallacious4 ,it is strange that this procedure should not be universally seen to be sophistical in the extreme--a kind of reasoning which1 if generally adopted1 would at once arrest all science and all business2 but obviously anti-theists think differently1 for they habitually have recourse to it4 ,if you argue1 for example1 that the universe is an event or effect which must have an adequate cause1 they will question your right to refer to the order which is in the universe as a proof that it is an event or effect1 because order implies another principle1 and is the ground of another argument4 ,they overlook that you are not making an abstract use of the principle of causality1 and that you are not arguing from the mere terms universe and event1 but from the universe itself2 and that in order to know whether it be an event or not--an effect or not--you must study it as it is1 and take everything into account which bears on the question4 ,they reason as if they supposed that a cause and an intelligence must be two different things1 and that a cause cannot be an intelligence1 nor an intelligence a cause4 ,similarly1 the arguments from the power1 order1 and goodness displayed in nature have often been objected to altogether1 have often been pronounced worthless1 because they do not in themselves prove ,god to be infinitely powerful1 wise1 and good4 ,they are brought forward to show that the ,author of the universe must have the power1 wisdom1 and goodness required to create and govern it2 and forthwith many oppose them by declaring that they do not show ,him to be infinite4 ,now1 no man who did not imagine nature to be infinite ever adduced them to prove ,god infinite4 ,their not proving that1 is therefore no reason for denying them to prove what they profess to prove4 ,no argument can stand if we may reject it because it does not prove more than it undertakes to prove4 ,it is clear that the evidences of design1 instead of being wholly distinct from the evidences of power1 and independent of the principle of causality1 are evidences of a kind of power and manifestations of a kind of causality--intelligent power and causality4 ,in like manner the evidences of goodness are also evidences of design1 for goodness is a form of design--morally1 beneficent design4 ,although causality does not involve design1 nor design goodness1 design involves causality1 and goodness both causality and design4 ,the proofs of intelligence are also proofs of power2 the proofs of goodness are proofs both of intelligence and power4 ,the principles of reason which compel us to think of the ,supreme ,moral ,intelligence as a self-existent1 eternal1 infinite1 and unchangeable ,being1 supplement the proofs from other sources1 and give self-consistency and completeness to the doctrine of theism4 ,the various theistic arguments are1 in a word1 but stages in a single rational process1 but parts of one comprehensive argument4 ,they are naturally1 and1 as it were1 organically related--they support and strengthen one another4 ,it is therefore an arbitrary and illegitimate procedure to separate them any farther than may be necessary for the purpose of clear and orderly exposition4 ,it is sophistry to attempt to destroy them separately by assailing each as if it had no connection with the other1 and as if each isolated fragmentary argument were bound to yield as large a conclusion as all the arguments combined4 ,a man quite unable to break a bundle of rods firmly bound together may be strong enough to break each rod separately4 ,but before proceeding to deal with the bundle in that way1 he may be required to establish his right to untie it1 and to decline putting forth his strength upon it as it is presented to him4#ab #ab ,see ,appendix ,,ix4 ,,ii4 ,the theistic inference1 although a complex process1 is not a difficult one4 ,it looks1 indeed1 long and formidable when analysed in books of evidences1 and elaborated with perverse ingenuity into series of syllogisms4 ,but numerous processes1 very simple and easy in themselves1 are toilsome and troublesome to analyse1 or describe1 or comprehend4 ,vision and digestion are1 in general1 not difficult bodily functions1 but they have been the subjects of a great many very large treatises2 and doubtless physiologists have not even yet found out all that is to be known about them4 ,as a rule1 the theistic process is as simple and easy an operation for the mind as vision or digestion for the body4 ,the multitude of books which have been written in explanation and illustration of it1 and the subtle and abstruse character of the researches and speculations contained in many of these books1 are not the slightest indications of its being other than simple and natural in itself4 ,the inferences which it involves are1 in fact1 like those which ,weber1 ,helmholtz1 and ,zllner have shown to be implied in the perceptions of sense1 involuntary and unconscious4 ,if not perfectly instantaneous1 they are so rapid and spontaneous as to have seemed to many intuitive4 ,and in a loose sense1 perhaps1 they may be considered so4 ,not1 however1 strictly and properly1 since the idea of ,deity is no simple idea1 but the most complex of ideas1 comprehending all that is great and good in nature and man1 along with perfections which belong to neither nature nor man2 and since the presence of ,deity is not seen without the intervention of any media--face to face1 eye to eye--but only as through a glass darkly4 ,the contemplation of nature1 and mind1 and history is an indispensable stage towards the knowledge of ,him4 ,physical and mental facts and laws are the materials or data of reason in its quest of religious truth4 ,there is a rational transition from the natural to the supernatural1 wherever the latter is reached4 ,our knowledge of ,god is obtained as simply and naturally as our knowledge of our fellow-men4 ,it is obtained1 in fact1 mainly in the same way4 ,in both cases we refer certain manifestations of will1 intelligence1 and goodness--qualities which are known to us by consciousness--to these qualities as their causes4 ,we have no direct or immediate knowledge--no intuitive or a priori knowledge--of the intelligence of our fellow-creatures1 any more than we have of the intelligence of our ,creator2 but we have a direct personal consciousness of intelligence in ourselves which enables us confidently to infer that the works both of ,god and of men can only have originated in intelligences4 ,we grow up into knowledge of the mind of ,god as we grow in acquaintance with the minds of men through familiarity with their acts4 ,the ,father in heaven is known just as a father on earth is known4 ,the latter is as unseen as the former4 ,no human being has really ever seen another4 ,no sense has will1 or wisdom1 or goodness for its object4 ,man must infer the existence of his fellow-men1 for he can have no immediate perception of it2 he must become acquainted with their characters through the use of his intelligence1 because character cannot be heard with the ear1 or looked upon with the eye1 or touched with the finger4 ,yet a child is not long in learning to know that a spirit is near it4 ,as soon as it knows itself1 it easily detects a spirit like its own1 yet other than itself1 when the signs of a spirit's activity are presented to it4 ,the process of inference by which it ascends from the works of man to the spirit which originates them is not more legitimate1 more simple1 or more natural1 than that by which it rises from nature to nature's ,god4 ,in saying this1 ,i refer merely to the process of inference in itself4 ,that is identical in the two cases4 ,in other respects there are obvious differences1 of which one important consequence is1 that while the scepticism which denies the existence of ,god is not unfrequently to be met with1 a scepticism which denies the existence of human beings is unknown4 ,the facts which prove that there are men1 are grouped together within limits of space and of time which allow of their being so easily surveyed1 and they are in themselves so simple and familiar1 that all sane minds draw from them their natural inference4 ,the facts which prove that there is a ,god need1 in order to be rightly interpreted1 more attention and reflection1 more comprehensiveness1 impartiality1 and elevation of mind4 ,countless as they are1 they can be overlooked1 and often have been overlooked4 ,clear and conspicuous as they are1 worldliness and prejudice and sin may blind the soul to their significance4 ,true1 the existence and possibility of atheism have often been denied1 but the testimony of history to the reality of atheism cannot be set aside4 ,although many have been called atheists unjustly and calumniously1 and although a few who have professed themselves to be atheists may have really possessed a religious belief which they overlooked or were averse to acknowledge1 we cannot reasonably refuse to take at their own word the majority of those who have inculcated a naked and undisguised atheism1 and claimed and gloried in the name of atheist4 ,incredible as it may seem that any intelligent being1 conscious of human wants and weaknesses1 should be able to look upon the wonders of the heavens and of the earth1 of the soul within him and of society around him1 and yet say that there is no ,god1 men have done so1 and we have no alternative but to accept the fact as we find it4 ,it is a fact which involves nothing inconsistent with the truth that the process by which the mind attains to a belief in ,god is of the same natural and direct1 yet inferential1 character as the process by which it attains to belief in the existence of finite minds closely akin to itself4 ,our entire spiritual being is constituted for the apprehension of ,god in and through ,his works4 ,all the essential principles of mental action1 when applied to the meditative consideration of finite things1 lead up from them to ,infinite ,creative ,wisdom4 ,the whole of nature external to us is a revelation of ,god2 the whole nature within us has been made for the reception and interpretation of that revelation4 ,what more would we have8 ,strange as it may seem1 there are many theists at the present day who represent it as insufficient1 or as even worthless1 and who join with atheists in denying that ,god's existence can be proved1 and in affirming that all the arguments for ,his existence are inconclusive and sophistical4 ,i confess ,i deem this a most erroneous and dangerous procedure4 ,such theists seem to me not only the best allies of atheists1 but even more effective labourers in the cause of unbelief than atheists themselves4 ,they shake men's confidence to a far greater extent in the reasonable grounds of faith in ,god's existence1 and substitute for these grounds others as weak and arbitrary as any atheist could possibly wish4 ,they pronounce illegitimate and invalid the arguments from effect to cause1 from order and arrangement to intelligence1 from history to providence1 from conscience to a moral governor1--an assertion which1 if true1 infallibly implies that the heavens do not declare the glory of ,god1 and that the earth does not show forth ,his handiworks--that the course of human events discloses no trace of ,his wisdom1 goodness1 or justice--and that the moral nature of man is wholly dissociated from a ,divine law and a ,divine lawgiver4 ,then1 in place of a universe revealing ,god1 and a soul made in ,his image1 and a humanity overruled and guided by ,him1 they present to us as something stronger and surer--an intuition or a feeling or an exercise of mere faith4 ,for it is a noticeable and certainly not a promising circumstance1 that there is no general agreement as to what that state of mind is on which the weight of the entire edifice of theism is proposed to be rested even among those who profess to possess it4 ,an intuition1 a feeling1 and a belief are very different things2 and not much dependence is to be put on the psychology which is unable to distinguish between them4 ,man1 say some1 knows ,god by immediate intuition2 he needs no argument for ,his existence1 because he perceives ,him directly--face to face--without any medium4 ,it is easy to assert this1 but obviously the assertion is the merest dogmatism4 ,not one man in a thousand who understands what he is affirming will dare to claim to have an immediate vision of ,god1 and nothing can be more likely than that the man who makes such a claim is self-deluded4 ,it is not difficult to see how he may be deluded4 ,there is so much that is intuitive involved in the apprehension of ,god that the apprehension itself may readily be imagined to be intuitive4 ,the intuitive nature of the conditions which it implies may arrest the attention1 and the fact that they are simply conditions may be overlooked4 ,the possibility1 however1 of analysing the apprehension into simpler elements--of showing that it is a complex act1 and presupposes conditions that can be indicated--is a conclusive proof that it is no intuition1 that our idea of ,god is no more or otherwise intuitive than our idea of a fellow-man4 ,besides1 what seem intuitions are often really inferences1 and not unfrequently erroneous inferences2 what seem the immediate dictates of pure reason1 or the direct and unclouded perceptions of a special spiritual faculty1 may be the conceits of fancy or the products of habit and association1 or the reflections of strong feeling4 ,a man must prove to himself1 and he must prove to others1 that what he takes to be an intuition is an intuition4 ,is that proof in this case likely to be easier or more conclusive than the proof of the ,divine existence8 ,the so-called immediate perception of ,god must be shown to be a perception and to be immediate2 it must be vindicated and verified3 and how this is to be done1 especially if there be no other reasons for believing in ,god than itself1 it is difficult to conceive4 ,the history of religion1 which is what ought to yield the clearest confirmation of the alleged intuition1 appears to be from beginning to end a conspicuous contradiction of it4 ,if all men have the spiritual power of directly beholding their ,creator--have an immediate vision of ,god--how happens it that whole nations believe in the most absurd and monstrous gods8 that millions of men are ignorant whether there be one god or thousands8 that even a people like the ,greeks could suppose the highest of their deities to have been born1 to have a body1 and to have committed the vilest actions8 ,a true power of intuition is little susceptible of growth1 and its testimonies vary within narrow limits2 any development of which it admits is only slightly due to external conditions1 and mainly the necessary consequence of internal activity1 of inherent expansibility4 ,it is thus1 for example1 with the senses of sight and hearing1 in so far as they are intuitive4 ,but it is manifestly very different with the religious nature4 ,its growth is mainly dependent1 not on the organic evolution of a particular faculty1 but on the general state of the soul1 on the one hand2 and on the influence of external circumstances--education1 example1 law1 c4--on the other hand4 ,it is this difference in the character of their development which explains why the deliverances of the senses are so uniform and nearly infallible1 while the most cursory survey of the religious world shows us the greatest want of uniformity and truthfulness in religious judgments4 ,the various phases of polytheism and pantheism are inexplicable1 if an intuition of ,god be universally inherent in human nature4 ,theism is perfectly explicable without intuition1 as the evidences for it are numerous1 obvious1 and strong4 ,the opinion that man has an intuition or immediate perception of ,god is untenable2 the opinion that he has an immediate feeling of ,god is absurd4 ,a man feels only in so far as he perceives and knows4 ,feeling is in consciousness essentially dependent on1 and necessarily subsequent to1 knowing4 ,mere feeling--feeling without knowing--is an utterly inconceivable and impossible experience4 ,admit1 however1 not only that there may be a mere feeling1 but that there is a mere feeling of ,god4 ,what worth can it have8 ,by supposition--by definition--no knowledge of ,god underlies and explains it4 ,but in that case1 how can any man pretend to get a knowledge of ,god out of it8 ,what right can any one have to represent it as a source of knowledge of ,god8 ,i am not aware that these questions have ever been answered except by the merest verbal jugglery4 ,the very men who tell us that we cannot know ,god1 but that we feel ,him1 tell us also that the feeling of ,him is an immediate consciousness of ,him1 and that immediate consciousness is its own self-evidence1 is absolute certainty1 or1 in other words1 the highest and surest knowledge4 ,we do not know ,god1 but we feel ,him2 however1 to feel ,him is to know ,him1--such is their answer more or less distinctly expressed1 or1 ,i should rather say1 more or less skilfully concealed4 ,it is at once a ,yes and a ,no1 the affirmation of what is denied and the denial of what is affirmed4 ,and it is this because it cannot be anything else--because mere feeling is an impossible experience--and because feeling1 so far as it is uncaused and unenlightened by knowledge1 testifies only to the folly or insanity of the being which feels4 ,if theism have no other basis than feeling1 it is a house which foolish men have built upon the sand4 ,the first storm will cast it down1 and no wise man will regret its fall4 ,whatever is founded on mere emotion--on emotion which is not itself explained and justified by reason--stands but by sufferance2 has no right to stand2 ought to be cast down and swept from the earth4 ,but the storms which have already in the course of the ages spent their force against theism with no other effect than to make its strength more conspicuous1 and to carry away what would have weakened or deformed it1 are sufficient to show us that it has been built on eternal truth by the finite human reasons which have been enlightened by ,infinite and ,divine ,reason4 ,the strangest of all theories as to the foundation of our belief in ,god is1 that it has no foundation at all--that it is a belief which rests upon itself1 an act of faith which is its own warrant4 ,we are told that we can neither know that ,god is nor what ,god is1 but that we can nevertheless believe in ,god1 and ought to believe in ,him1 and can and ought to act as if we knew ,his existence and character4 ,but surely belief without a reason must be arbitrary belief1 and either to believe or act as if we knew what we do not know1 can never be conduct to be justified1 much less commended4 ,faith which is not rational is faith which ought to be rejected4 ,we cannot believe what we do not know or think that we know4 ,we have no right to believe more than we know4 ,i know1 for example1 that the grass grows1 and consequently ,i believe1 and am justified in believing1 that it grows4 ,i do not know how the grass grows1 and ,i do not believe how it grows2 ,i can justify my believing about its growth nothing beyond what ,i know to be true4 ,this law of belief is as binding for the highest as for the lowliest objects4 ,if ,i have no reason for believing that there is a ,god1 ,i have no right to believe that there is a ,god4 ,if ,i do not know that ,god is infinite1 ,i am bound not to believe that ,he is infinite4 ,belief is inseparable from knowledge1 and ought to be precisely coextensive with knowledge4 ,those who deny this fundamental truth will always be found employing the words knowledge and belief in a capricious and misleading way4#ac #ac ,see ,appendix ,x4 ,,iii4 ,when man apprehends ,god as powerful1 wise1 and good--as possessed of will1 reason1 and righteousness--obviously he thinks of ,him as bearing some likeness to himself1 as having in an infinite or perfect measure qualities which human creatures have in a finite and imperfect measure4 ,this can be no stumbling-block to any one who believes that ,god made man in ,his image1 after ,his likeness4 ,if man be in some respects like ,god1 ,god must1 of course1 be in some respects like man4 ,power and freedom1 knowledge and wisdom1 love1 goodness1 and justice1 are1 according to this view1 finitely in man1 because they are infinitely in ,god4 ,but it is a view which excites in certain minds deep aversion4 ,there are men who protest1 in the name of religion1 in the name of ,god1 against this anthropomorphic theism1 as they call it4 ,according to them1 to attribute to ,god any human qualities1 even the highest and best1 is to limit and degrade ,him--is contrary to reason and contrary to piety--is idolatrous and profane4 ,the ,psalmist represents the ,lord as reproaching the wicked for supposing that ,he was like them in their wickedness--altogether such an one as themselves2 but the modern philosophers to whom ,i am referring are horrified at the thought that the most righteous man1 even in his righteousness1 has any likeness to ,god4 ,according to them1 to think of ,god as wise is to dishonour ,him1 and to declare ,him holy is to calumniate ,him4 ,to think of ,him as foolish1 and to pronounce ,him wicked1 are1 in their eyes1 only a little more irreverent and no more irrational4 ,we must not fall down and worship1 writes one of these philosophers1 as the source of our life and virtue1 the image which our own minds have set up4 ,why is such idolatry any better than that of the old wood and stone8 ,if we worship the creations of our minds1 why not also those of our hands8 ,the one is1 indeed1 a more refined self-adoration than the other2 but the radical error remains the same in both4 ,the old idolaters were wrong1 not because they worshipped themselves1 but because they worshipped their creation as if it were their creator2 and how can any anthropomorphic theory 'escape the same condemnation'8#ad ,the writer does not see that ,god can only be thought of as wise and righteous and free because the mind of man is ,his creation1 so that ,his being thus thought of can be no proof that ,he is its creation4 ,the fact that we can think of ,god as wise and righteous and free is no evidence that ,he is an image which our own minds have set up4 ,the man who draws such an inference from such a premiss can be no dispassionate reasoner4 ,and certainly the fact that we can think of ,god as possessed of intellectual and moral perfections is no reason for our not falling down and worshipping ,him1 and no evidence that our doing so is idolatry4 ,to fall down and worship any being whom we do not know to possess these characteristics is what would clearly be idolatry4 ,and this idolatry is what the philosophers to whom ,i refer are manifestly chargeable with encouraging4 ,when they have rejected the living1 personal1 righteous1 loving ,god1 in whom humanity has so long trusted1 they can only suggest as a substitute for ,him a mysterious ,power which is wholly unknown1 and even unknowable4 ,great is their simplicity if they fancy that they can persuade men to receive any such god as that1 or if they fancy that men would be any better for a faith so vague and empty4 ,to believe in we know not what1 is directly contrary to reason2 to worship it would be an idolatry no better than that of the old wood and stone4 ,what we know is often not the creation of our minds3 the unknowable is in itself nothing at all to us1 and1 as a thought1 is always the mere creation of our minds2 it is different for each creature1 each mind2 it is the mere result and reflection of our finiteness4 ,there can be no unknown or unknowable to an infinite mind4 ,to worship what is unknowable would be1 therefore1 simply to worship our own ignorance--one of the creations of our minds least worthy1 perhaps1 of being worshipped4 ,there is1 at least1 no kind of worship less entitled to escape condemnation1 even as anthropomorphic idolatry1 than the worship of the ,unknowable1--the god proposed to us by some as the alone true ,god1 belief in whom--perhaps ,i should rather say1 belief in which--is to be the final and perfect reconciliation of science and religion4 #ad ,barrett's ,physical ,ethics1 p4 #bbe4 ,all true theism implies a certain likeness between ,god and man4 ,it holds that ,god is not merely an all-pervading and all-sustaining ,power1 but an omniscient ,mind and perfectly holy ,will4 ,it refuses to think of ,him merely according to the analogies of the physical world1 as if human reason and human love were less worthy expressions of ,his perfections than mechanical or brute force4 ,it refers to ,him not only all the majesty of nature1 but all the humanity of man4 ,this truth--that there is a likeness between ,god and man--must1 however1 be combined with two other truths1 otherwise it will lead to the gravest errors4 ,the first is1 that while ,god and man are both like each other1 in that both possess certain excellences1 they are utterly unlike1 in that ,god possesses these excellences in all their perfection and in an infinite measure1 while man possesses them in a very small degree and violated with many flaws and faults4 ,the highest glory which a man can hope for is1 that he should be made wholly into the image of ,god2 but never can ,god be rightly thought of as mainly1 and still less as merely1 in the image of man4 ,it was the great error of classic heathendom that it thus conceived of the ,divine4 ,men1 says ,heraclitus1 are mortal gods1 and the gods immortal men4 ,and the gods of ,greece1 as represented by her poets and adored by her people1 were simply magnified and immortal men--a race closely akin to their worshippers in weaknesses and vices no less than in powers and virtues4 ,they were supposed to be born as men are1 to have voice and figure1 parts and passions1 and even at times to cheat and rail and lie4 ,they reflected all the tendencies of the ,greek mind1 both good and evil4 ,worshippers of the one ,god can scarcely fall into the same extravagance of error in this respect as the ,greeks and ,romans did1 as all polytheists do2 but they can1 and often do1 fall into the error1 and think of ,god as subject to limits and defects1 which are only in themselves4 ,for instance1 what is called deism1 as distinguished from theism1 rests wholly on the conception that the presence and power of ,god are limited1 and that ,he acts in the manner to which man as a finite creature is restricted4 ,the deist thinks of ,god as outside of and away from the universe2 he thinks of the universe as a mechanism which ,god has contrived1 and which ,he has endowed with certain powers1 in virtue of which it is able to sustain itself in existence1 and to perform its work so as to save ,god1 as it were1 all further trouble and labour concerning it4 ,it is a great gain for us to have a machine doing what we desire without our needing to pay any attention to it or even to be present where it is1 because we cannot give our attention to more than one object at one and the same instant of time1 and cannot be present at the same time in more places than one2 but those who liken ,god to man in this respect1 divest ,him of ,his omnipresence and omnipotence1 and represent ,him as characterised in some measure by their own impotency4 ,there is a truth which ,pantheism often claims as peculiarly and distinctively its own1--the truth that in ,god we and all things live1 and move1 and have our being--that of ,him1 and through ,him1 and to ,him1 are all things1--but which theism must sincerely and fully appropriate as one of its simplest and most certain elements1 otherwise the charge against it of being a false and presumptuous likening of ,god to man will be warranted4 ,we must not think of ,him as an absentee ,god1 sitting idle ever since the first ,sabbath1 at the outside of ,his universe1 and 'seeing it go'--as a ,god at hand but not afar off1 or afar off but not at hand--as here1 not there1 or there1 not here2 but we must think of ,him as everywhere present1 everywhere active--as at once the source of all order1 the spring of all life1 and the ground of all affection and thought4 ,we need to be still more on our guard against limiting ,his wisdom or righteousness or love1 as it is what we are still more prone to do4 ,these attributes of ,god are often thought of in the meanest and most unworthy ways2 and doubtless it has to a large extent been horror at the consequent degradation of the idea of ,god which has made some men refuse to assign to ,him any of the properties of humanity1 saying1 with ,xenophanes1 that if the animals could think1 they would imagine the ,deity to be in their likeness--and with ,spinoza1 that if a circle could think1 it would suppose ,his essence to be circularity4 ,but this is to flee from one extreme to another extreme1 from one error to a still more terrible error1 through utterly failing to distinguish between perfection and imperfection1 between what ought and what ought not to be ascribed to ,god4 ,circularity1 animal forms and dispositions1 human limitations--these are imperfections1 and we must not refer them to ,god2 but intelligence1 righteousness1 love--these are so little in their own nature imperfections that an intelligent being1 however feeble1 would be more excellent than an omnipotent and omnipresent being destitute of intelligence2 and righteousness and love are as much superior to mere intelligence as it is to mere power and magnitude4 ,to ascribe these to ,god1 if we only ascribe them to ,him in infinite perfection1 is no presumption1 no error2 not to ascribe them to ,him is the greatest presumption1 the most lamentable error4 ,the second truth necessary to be borne in mind1 whenever we affirm the likeness of ,god to man1 is1 that in whatever measure and to whatever extent ,god may be known1 our knowledge of ,him is1 and always must be1 very inadequate4 ,in these latter days of science we are proud of our knowledge of the universe2 and yet1 although we do know a little of far-away stars and systems1 what is this1 after all1 but1 as ,carlyle says1 the knowledge which a minnow in its native creek has of the outlying ocean8 ,and our knowledge of ,god must fall unspeakably farther short of being coextensive with its object4 ,to illustrate the disproportion there1 no comparison can be appropriate4 ,canst thou by searching find out ,god8 ,canst thou find out the ,almighty unto perfection8 ,it is high as heaven2 what canst thou do8 ,deeper than hell2 what canst thou know8 ,the measure thereof is longer than the earth1 and broader than the sea4 ,our idea of ,god may contain nothing which is not true of ,god1 and may omit nothing which it is essential for our spiritual welfare that we should know regarding ,him2 but it is impossible that it should be a complete and exhaustive idea of ,him4 ,we have scarcely a complete and exhaustive idea of anything1 and least of all can we have such an idea of the infinite and inexhaustible source of all being4 ,god alone can have a complete and exhaustive idea of ,himself4 ,there must be infinitely more in ,god than we have any idea of4 ,there must be many qualities1 powers1 excellences1 in ,divine nature1 which are wholly unknown to men1 or even wholly unknowable by them1 owing to their want of any faculties for their apprehension4 ,and even as to what we do know of ,god1 our knowledge is but partial and inadequate4 ,we know that ,god knows1 that ,he feels1 that ,he acts2 but as to how ,he knows1 feels1 and acts1 as to what is distinctive and characteristic of ,his knowing1 feeling1 and acting1 we have little or no notion4 ,we can apprehend certain attributes of ,god1 but we can comprehend1 or fully grasp1 or definitely image1 not one of them4 ,if we could find out ,god unto perfection in any respect1 then1 either we must be infinite or ,god must be finite in that respect4 ,the finite mind can never stretch itself out in any direction until it is coextensive with the ,infinite ,mind4 ,man is made in the image of ,god1 but he is not the measure of ,god4 ,,lecture ,,iv4 ,,nature ,,is ,,but ,,the ,,name ,,for ,,an ,,effect ,,whose ,,cause ,,is ,,god4 ,i4 ,we have now to consider the principle of causality so far as it is implied in the theistic inference1 and the theistic inference so far as it is conditioned by the principle of causality4 ,it is not necessary to discuss the nature of the principle of causality in itself or for its own sake2 it is even expedient1 ,i believe1 not to attempt to penetrate farther into its metaphysics and psychology than the work on hand imperatively requires4 ,we must of course go as far as those have gone who have maintained on metaphysical or psychological grounds that the principle of causality warrants no theistic inference2 we must show that their metaphysics and psychology are irrelevant when true1 and false when relevant2 but we may be content to stop when we have reached this result4 ,the truth of theism has been very generally represented1 both by those who admit and by those who deny the validity of the theistic inference1 as much more dependent than it really is on the truth or falsity of some one or other of the many views which have been entertained as to the nature of causation1 and the origin of the causal judgment4 ,we are constantly being warned by theists that unless we accept this or that particular notion of causation1 and account for it in this or that particular manner1 we cannot reasonably believe in the existence of ,god2 we are constantly being assured by anti-theists that belief in ,god is irrational1 because it assumes some erroneous view of causation1 or some erroneous explanation of the process by which causation is apprehended4 ,but it will be found that representations of this kind seldom prove more than one-sidedness and immaturity of thought in those who make them4 ,an accurate and comprehensive view of the nature of causation1 and of our apprehension of it1 will1 it is true1 have here as elsewhere great advantages over an erroneous and narrow one1 but hardly any of the theories which have been held on these points can be consistently argued by those who hold them to invalidate theistic belief4 ,even utterly inadequate statements and explanations of the principle of causality--as1 for example1 those of ,hume and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill--are not more incompatible with the theistic inference than they are with any other inference which is a real extension of knowledge4 ,unless they are understood and applied more rigidly than by those who propound them1 they allow us to draw the theistic inference2 if understood and applied so as to forbid our drawing it1 they logically disallow all scientific inference except such as is purely formal and deductive4 ,in a word1 if compatible with science they are compatible with theism1 and if incompatible with theism they are incompatible with science4 ,when we assume the principle of causality in the argument for the existence of ,god1 what precisely is it that we assume8 ,only this3 that whatever has begun to be1 must have had an antecedent1 or ground1 or cause which accounts for it4 ,we do not assume that every existence must have had a cause4 ,we have no right1 indeed1 to assume that any existence has had a cause until we have found reason to regard it as not an eternal existence1 but one which has had an origin4 ,whatever we believe1 however1 to have had an origin1 we at once believe also to have had a cause4 ,the theistic argument assumes that this belief is true4 ,it assumes that every existence1 once new1 every event or occurrence or change1 must have a cause4 ,this is certainly no very large assumption3 on the contrary1 if any assumption can claim to be self-evident1 it surely may4 ,thought implies the truth of it every moment4 ,sensation only gives rise to thought in virtue of it4 ,unless it were true there could be no such thing as thought4 ,to deny that the principle of causality1 understood as has been indicated1 is true1 would be to deny that reason is reason2 it would be equivalent to affirming that to seek for a reason is always and essentially an unreasonable process4 ,and1 in fact1 so understood1 the principle never has been denied4 ,hume even did not venture to deny it1 although he ought in consistency to have denied it1 and obviously desired to be able to deny it4 ,he did not1 however1 deny that every object which begins to exist must have a cause1--he did not venture to do more than deny that this is either intuitively or demonstratively certain1 and that any bond or tie can be perceived between what is called a cause and what is called an effect4 ,the inquiry which he instituted was not whether we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause or not1 but for what reason we pronounce it necessary4 ,he assumed that we pronounce it necessary1 and his elaborate investigation into the nature of causation was undertaken expressly and entirely to discover why we do so4 ,the conclusion to which he came--viz41 that the causal judgment is an offspring of experience engendered upon custom--was not only a very inadequate and erroneous one in itself1 but inconsistent with the reality of what it professed to explain3 still the admission which has been mentioned was what was professed to be explained4 ,now1 if it be true at all that every event1 whether it be a new existence or a change in an old existence1 presupposes an explanatory antecedent or cause1 there can of course be no accepting in all its breadth one of the propositions which ,hume urges most strenuously--viz41 that the mere study of an event can tell us nothing about its cause4 ,we may grant that it can tell us very little1--that ,hume performed an immense service in showing how extremely little we can know of the particular causes of particular events apart from the study of both in connection1 apart from observation1 experiment1 and induction1--but we cannot grant that the event itself teaches us absolutely nothing4 ,if every event must have a cause1 every event must have a sufficient cause4 ,for these two statements1 although verbally different1 are really identical4 ,the second seems to mean1 but does not actually mean1 more than the first4 ,the whole cause of the elevation of a weight of ten pounds a foot high cannot be also the whole cause of the elevation of twenty pounds to the same height1 for the simple reason that in the latter case the elevation of ten pounds--of half the weight--would be an event which had no cause at all4 ,and this is universally true4 ,if every event have not a sufficient cause1 some events have no cause at all4 ,this1 then1 ,i say1 we necessarily know that the efficient cause of every event is a sufficient cause1 however vague may be our knowledge of efficiency and sufficiency4 ,if every event--using this term as convenient to denote either a new existence or a change in some existence--must have a cause1 to prove that the universe must have had a cause we require to prove it to have been an event--to have had a commencement4 ,can this be done8 ,that is the question in the theistic argument from causality4 ,compared therewith1 all other questions which have been introduced into or associated with the argument are of very subordinate importance4 ,now there is only one way of reasonably answering the question1 and that is by examining the universe1 in order to determine whether or not it bears the marks of being an event--whether or not it has the character of an effect4 ,we have no right to assume it to be an event1 or to have had a beginning4 ,the entire argument for the ,divine existence1 which is at present under consideration1 can be no stronger than the strength of the proof which we can adduce in favour of its having had a beginning1 and the only valid proof of that which reason can hope to find must be derived from the examination of the universe itself4 ,what1 then1 is the result of such an examination8 ,an absolute certainty that all the things which are seen are temporal1--that every object in the universe which presents itself to the senses has had a beginning1--that the most powerful1 penetrating1 and delicate instruments devised to assist our senses reach no cause which is not obviously also an effect4 ,the progress of science has not more convincingly and completely disproved the once prevalent notion that the universe was created about six thousand years ago1 than it has convincingly and completely established that everything of which our senses inform us has had a commencement in time1 and is of a compound1 derivative1 and dependent nature4 ,it is not long since men had no means of proving that the rocks1 for example1 were not as old as the earth itself--no direct means of proving even that they were not eternal2 but science is now able to tell us with confidence under what conditions1 in what order1 and in what epochs of geological time they were formed4 ,we have probably a more satisfactory knowledge of the formation of the coal-measures than of the establishment of the feudal system4 ,we know that the ,alps1 although they look as if they might have stood for ever1 are not even old1 as geologists count age4 ,the morning and night1 the origin and disappearance of the countless species of living things which have peopled the earth from the enormously remote times when the rocks of the ,laurentian period were deposited down to the births and deaths of contemporaneous animals1 have been again brought into the light of day by the power of science4 ,the limits of research are not even there reached1 and with bold flight science passes beyond the confines of discovered life--beyond the epochs of formation even of the oldest rocks--to a time when there was no distinction of earth and sea and atmosphere1 as all were mingled together in nebulous matter1 in some sort of fluid or mist or steam2 yea1 onwards to a time when our earth had no separate existence1 and suns1 moons1 and stars were not yet divided and arranged into systems4 ,if we seek1 then1 after what is eternal1 science tells us that it is not the earth nor anything which it contains1 not the sea nor the living things within it1 not the moving air1 not the sun1 nor the moon1 nor the stars4 ,these things when interrogated all tell us to look above and beyond them1 for although they may have begun to be in times far remote1 yet it was within times to which the thoughts of finite beings can reach back4 ,there is no denying1 then1 that the universe is to a great extent an effect1 an event1 something which has begun to be1 a process of becoming4 ,science is1 day by day1 year by year1 finding out more and more that it is an effect4 ,the growth of science is in great part merely the extension of the proof that the universe is an effect4 ,but the scientific proof of the non-eternity of matter is as yet far from a complete one4 ,it leaves it possible for the mind to refer the phases through which the universe has passed1 and the forms which it has assumed1 to an underlying eternal source in nature itself1 and1 therefore1 not to ,god4 ,and this is by far the most plausible and forcible way of combating the argument we are employing4 ,it meets it with a direct counter-argument1 which every person must acknowledge to be relevant1 and which1 if sufficiently made out1 is obviously decisive4 ,that counter-argument we are bound1 therefore1 to dispose of4 ,it has been thus stated by ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill3 ,there is in nature a permanent element1 and also a changeable3 the changes are always the effects of previous changes2 the permanent existences1 so far as we know1 are not effects at all4 ,it is true we are accustomed to say not only of events1 but of objects1 that they are produced by causes1 as water by the union of hydrogen and oxygen4 ,but by this we only mean that when they begin to exist1 their beginning is the effect of a cause4 ,but their beginning to exist is not an object1 it is an event4 ,if it be objected that the cause of a thing's beginning to exist may be said with propriety to be the cause of the thing itself1 ,i shall not quarrel with the expression4 ,but that which in an object begins to exist1 is that in it which belongs to the changeable element in nature2 the outward form and the properties depending on mechanical or chemical combinations of its component parts4 ,there is in every object another and a permanent element--viz41 the specific elementary substance or substances of which it consists and their inherent properties4 ,these are not known to us as beginning to exist3 within the range of human knowledge they had no beginning1 and consequently no cause2 though they themselves are causes or non-causes of everything that takes place4 ,experience1 therefore1 affords no evidences1 not even analogies1 to justify our extending to the apparently immutable1 a generalisation grounded only on our observation of the changeable4#ae #ae ,three ,essays on ,religion1 pp4 #adb1 #adc4 ,on this ,i would remark1 first1 that mere experience does not take us to anything which we are entitled to call even apparently immutable4 ,it only takes us1 even when extended to the utmost by scientific instruments and processes1 to elements which we call simple because we have hitherto failed to analyse them into simpler elements4 ,it is a perfectly legitimate scientific hypothesis that all the substances recognised by chemists as elementary and intransmutable1 are in reality the modifications or syntheses of a single material element1 which have been produced under conditions that render them incapable of being affected by any tests or agencies which the analyst in his laboratory can bring to bear upon them4 ,indeed1 unless this hypothesis be true1 the theory of development1 so generally accepted at present1 can hardly be supposed to be of any very wide application1 seeing that at its very outset it has to affirm the existence of no fewer than sixty-four true untransformable species4 ,but suppose the so-called elementary substances of chemistry to be simple1 no one can reasonably suppose them as known to us to be ultimate4 ,in oxygen there may be no atoms which are not atoms of oxygen1 but we know by experience only oxygen1 not atoms of oxygen4 ,no man has ever been able to put himself in sensible contact with what alone can be immutable in oxygen1 if there be anything immutable in it1 its ultimate atoms4 ,no man has seen1 heard1 touched1 or tasted an ultimate atom of any kind of matter4 ,we know nothing of atoms--nothing of what is permanent in nature--from direct experience4 ,we must pass beyond such experience--beyond all testimony of the senses--when we believe in anything permanent in nature1 not less than when we believe in something beyond and above nature4 ,the atomic theory in chemistry demands a faith which transcends experience1 not less than the theistic theory in religion4 ,then1 secondly1 although we grant that there is a permanent element in the physical universe1 something in matter itself which is self-existent and eternal1 we still need1 in order to account for the universe which we know1 an ,eternal ,intelligence4 ,the universe1 regarded even only so far as it is admitted by all materialists no less than by theists and pantheists to be an effect1 cannot be explained1 as materialists think1 merely physically4 ,the atoms of matter are1 it is said1 eternal and immutable4 ,grant them to be so4 ,there are1 however1 countless millions of them1 and manifestly the universe is one1 is a single1 magnificent1 and complicated system1 is characterised by a marvellous unity in variety4 ,we must be informed how the universe came to be a universe1--how it came to have the unity which underlies its diversity1--if it resulted from a countless multitude of ultimate causes4 ,did the atoms take counsel together and devise a common plan and work it out8 ,that hypothesis is unspeakably absurd1 yet it is rational in comparison with the notion that these atoms combined by mere chance1 and by chance produced such a universe as that in which we live4 ,grant all the atoms of matter to be eternal1 grant all the properties and forces which with the smallest degree of plausibility can be claimed for them to be eternal and immutable1 and it is still beyond all expression improbable that these atoms with these forces1 if unarranged1 uncombined1 ununified1 unutilised by a presiding mind1 would give rise to anything entitled to be called a universe4 ,it is millions to one that they would never produce the simplest of the regular arrangements which we comprehend under the designation of course of nature1 or the lowest of vegetable or animal organisms2 millions of millions to one that they would never produce a solar system1 the earth1 the animal kingdom1 or human history4 ,no number of material atoms1 although eternal and endowed with mechanical force1 can explain the unity and order of the universe1 and therefore the supposition of their existence does not free us from the necessity of believing in a single intelligent cause--a ,supreme ,mind--to move and mould1 combine and adjust1 the ultimate atoms of matter into a single orderly system4 ,there at once rises the question1 ,is it really necessary to believe both matter and mind to be eternal8 ,no1 must be our answer4 ,the law of parsimony of causes directly forbids the belief1 unless we can show that one cause is insufficient to explain the universe4 ,and that we cannot do4 ,we can show that matter is insufficient1--that it cannot account of itself even for the physical universe1--but not that mind is insufficient1 not that mind cannot account for anything that is in matter4 ,on what grounds can it be shown that a mind possessed of sufficient power to originate the universe1 the ultimate elements of matter being given1 could not also have created these elements8 that the ,supreme ,intelligence1 which gave to each sun1 and planet1 and satellite its size1 and shape1 and position1 and motion1 could not have summoned into being their constituent particles8 ,on none whatever4 ,we may not understand how they could be created1 but we have no reason for thinking that they could not be created2 and it is surely far easier and far more reasonable to believe that they were created1 than that a countless number of inconceivably small indivisible particles of matter1 lying far beyond the range of any of our senses1 but extending through immeasurable fields of space1 should all1 inconceivably minute although they be1 be self-existent and eternal4 ,the man who asks us to accept the latter supposition1 asks us1 it seems to me1 to believe what is not only as mysterious as the self-existence of ,deity1 but millions of millions of times more mysterious4 ,i should require strong reasons for assigning infinitely great attributes to excessively little things1 and to an inconceivable number of them2 but ,i can in this instance find no reasons at all4 ,then1 in the third place1 any plausible conceptions we can form of the ultimate nature of matter lead to the belief that even that is an event or effect1 a something derivative and caused4 ,it must be admitted that the most plausible of these conceptions are vague and conjectural4 ,we have a practical and relative knowledge of matter which is both exact and trustworthy1--a knowledge of its properties from which we can mathematically deduce a multitude of remote consequences of an extremely precise character--but we are hardly entitled to characterise as knowledge at all any of the views which have been propounded as to what it is in itself4 ,it is only the unreflecting who fancy that matter in itself is something very clear and obvious1 which they may apprehend by merely opening their eyes and stretching out their hands4 ,those who have never reasoned on the subject are apt to imagine that the nature of matter is of all things the easiest to understand1 and they unhesitatingly invest it with their own sensations and perceptions4 ,that is the so-called commonsense view of matter2 but the slightest inquiry proves it to be delusive and nonsensical4 ,colour1 for example1 is just what is seen1 and sound just what is heard2 they are not qualities inherent in objects independent of the eye and ear3 the matter which is supposed to cause by its motions on our senses these and other perceptions of the material world1 we cannot see1 hear1 or apprehend by any sense4 ,change our senses and the universe will be thereby changed1 everything in it becoming something other than it was before1 green perhaps red1 the bitter sweet1 the loudest noise a gentle whisper1 the hardest substance soft4 ,as soon1 then1 as we thoughtfully ask ourselves1 ,what is matter8 we begin to discover that it is in itself something utterly mysterious4 ,the collection of phenomena which we call its properties are quite unlike the phenomena of mind in this most important respect1 that whatever they may be they are not what they appear to be4 ,a state of mind is what we feel it to be2 a state of matter is certainly not what we seem to ourselves to perceive it to be4 ,no one1 of course1 knew all this better than ,mr ,mill4 ,he1 as a philosopher1 had asked himself what matter is2 he had formed a theory in answer to the question4 ,and what is his theory8 ,just this1--that we cannot find a permanent element in matter2 that we have no right to suppose that there is a permanent real existence or actual substance in matter2 that all that we are warranted to affirm about the ultimate nature of matter is that it is a permanent possibility1--the permanent possibility of sensations4 ,that was the conclusion which he arrived at when he theorised on matter without any theological aim4 ,but he appears to have forgotten it when he came to criticise the argument for a first cause4 ,he could not otherwise have written as if it were quite certain that there was in matter a permanent element1 not an underlying possibility but an inherent real substance4 ,had he remembered what his own theory as to the nature of matter was1 he would have avoided as utterly untrue and misleading every expression which could suggest the notion of there being a permanent element in matter1 and would have admitted that very probably the permanent possibilities of sensation1 the causes of all material phenomena1 lay in the ,divine will1 since he had been unable to find anything else permanent in which they could be supposed to subsist4 ,that is a view which many profound thinkers have adopted4 ,they have been led to hold that matter is essentially force1 and nothing but force2 that the whole material world is ultimately resolvable into forces2 and that all its forces are but manifestations or outgoings of will-force4 ,if so1 the whole material world is not only dependent on1 but is1 the will of ,god1 and has no being of any kind apart from the will of ,god4 ,if so1 ,god's will is not only the cause and controlling power of nature1 but its substance1 its self4 ,and this view1 that what alone substantially underlies all the phenomena we designate material is an acting mind1 an energising will1 has not only been reached by mental philosophers and idealistic speculators1 but by those physicists who1 like ,boscovitch and ,faraday1 have found themselves forced to conclude that what is constitutive of matter is not indivisible particles1 even infinitesimally small1 but mere centres of force1 since force necessarily implies some sort of substance1 and1 therefore1 spirit where not matter4 ,but suppose the substratum of the universe to consist of a countless number of inconceivably small indivisible particles of matter1 and do we not even on this hypothesis reach by a single step the truth on which theism rests1 and on which only theism can be based8 ,none of the processes of nature1 says one of the most eminent of our physical philosophers1 since the time when nature began1 have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule4 ,we are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural4 ,on the other hand1 the exact quality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it1 as ,sir ,john ,herschel has well said1 the essential character of a manufactured article1 and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent4 ,thus we have been led1 along a strictly scientific path1 very near to the point at which science must stop4 ,not that science is debarred from studying the external mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces1 any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together4 ,but1 in tracing back the history of matter1 science is arrested when she assures herself1 on the one hand1 that the molecule has been made1 and on the other that it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural4#af ,i believe that no reply to these words of ,professor ,clark ,maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary view of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter4 ,they must suppose every atom1 every molecule1 to be of such a nature1 to be so related to others1 and to the universe generally1 that things may be such as we see them to be2 but this their fitness to be built up into the structure of the universe is a proof that they have been made fit1 and since natural forces could not have acted on them while not yet existent1 a supernatural power must have created them1 and created them with a view to their manifold uses4 ,every atom1 every molecule1 must even in what is ultimate in it bear the impress of a ,supernatural ,power and ,wisdom2 must1 from the very nature of the case1 reflect the glory of ,god and proclaim its dependence upon ,him4 #af ,president's ,address in ,transactions of the ,british ,association for the ,advancement of ,science1 #ahgj4 ,in like manner the latest speculation regarding the nature of matter--the vortex-atom theory of ,sir ,william ,thomson--seems1 so far from having any tendency to exclude creative action1 necessarily to imply it4 ,he supposes that the atoms may be small vortex-rings in the ether1 the rotating portions of a perfect fluid which fills all space4 ,but a perfect fluid can neither explain its own existence nor the commencement of rotation in any part of it4 ,rotation once commenced in a perfect or frictionless and incompressible fluid would continue for ever1 but it never could naturally commence4 ,there is nothing in a perfect fluid to account either for the origin or cessation of rotation1 and consequently nothing1 on the vortex-atom hypothesis1 to account either for the production or destruction of an atom of matter4 ,the origin and cessation of rotation in fluids are due to their imperfection1 their internal friction1 their viscosity4 ,the origin or cessation of rotation in a perfect fluid must be the effect of supernatural action2 in other words1 every vortex-atom must owe the rotation which gives it its individuality to a ,divine impulse4 ,a theist has certainly no need1 then1 to be afraid of researches into the ultimate nature of matter4 ,our knowledge thereof is exceedingly small and imperfect1 but all that we do know of it1 all that we can even rationally conceive of it1 leads to the inference that it is not self-existent1 but the work of ,god4 ,the farther research is pushed1 the more clearly1 we may be assured1 will this become apparent1 for the more wonderfully adapted will the ultimate constituents of matter be found for assuming countless forms and composing countless objects--the air1 the land1 the sea1 and starry heavens1 with all that in or on them is4 ,research has already shown us reason to believe that even chemical atoms are very complicated structures2 that an atom of pure iron is probably a vastly more complicated system than that of the planets and their satellites2 that each constituent of a chemical atom must go through an orbit in the millionth part of the twinkling of an eye1 in which it successively or simultaneously is under the influence of many other constituents1 or possibly comes into collision with them2 that each of these particles is1 as ,sir ,john ,herschel has beautifully said1 for ever solving differential equations which1 if written out in full1 might perhaps belt the earth4#ag ,now1 what does this mean1 if not that every ultimate atom of matter is full to the very heart of it with evidences of the power and wisdom of ,god1 and that every particle of dust or drop of water is crowded with traces of the action of the ,divine ,reason1 not less marvellous1 it may be1 than those which astronomy exhibits in the structure of the heavens and the evolutions of the heavenly bodies8 ,those who hoped that molecular science would help them to get rid of ,god have obviously made a profound mistake4 ,it has already shown far more clearly than ever was or could have been anticipated1 that every atom of matter points back beyond itself to the all-originating will of ,god1 and refuses to receive the idolatrous homage of those who would put it in the place of ,god4 #ag ,see ,w4 ,s4 ,jevons1 ,principles of ,science1 ii4 #deb1 #dec4 ,to these considerations it has to be added that some of our ablest physicists believe that in the present age a strictly scientific proof has been found of the position that the universe had a beginning in time4 ,according to ,sir ,w4 ,thomson's deductions from ,fourier's ,theory of ,heat1 we can trace down the dissipation of heat by conduction and radiation to an infinitely distant time when all things will be uniformly cold4 ,but we cannot similarly trace the heat-history of the universe to an infinite distance in the past4 ,for a certain negative value of the time the formul give impossible values1 indicating that there was some initial distribution of heat which could not have resulted1 according to known laws of nature1 from any previous distribution4 ,there are other cases in which a consideration of the dissipation of energy leads to the conception of a limit to the antiquity of the present order of things4#ah ,if this theory be true1 physical science1 instead of giving any countenance to the notion of matter having existed from eternity1 distinctly teaches that creation took place1 that the present system of nature and its laws originated at an approximately assignable date in the past4 ,the theory is supported by the most eminent physical philosophers of this country1 and if there be any oversight or error in the principles or calculations on which it is founded1 it would appear not to have been as yet detected4 ,it is a theory on which1 however1 only specialists are entitled to pronounce judgment2 and therefore1 although those who assume that matter was not created are bound to refute it1 ,i do not wish myself to lay any stress upon it--the more especially as ,i believe that apart from it there is amply sufficient evidence for holding that ,nature is but the name for an effect whose cause is ,god4#ai #ah ,jevons1 ,principles of ,science1 ii4 #dch4 #ai ,see ,appendix ,,xi4 ,,ii4 ,it seems to me1 then1 that the universe when examined must be concluded to be throughout--from centre to circumference--alike in what is most permanent and what is most changeable in it1--an event or effect1 and that its only adequate cause is a ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,it is only such a cause which is sufficient to explain the universe as we know it1 and that universe is what has to be explained4 ,the assertion of ,kant that the principle of causality cannot take us beyond the limits of the sensible world is only true if causality be confined to strictly material events which display no signs of law and order1 and the progress of science is one long uninterrupted proof that no such events are to be discovered2 that it is hopeless to look for them2 that matter and its changes are ordained1 arranged1 adjusted phenomena4 ,the assertion of ,kant is clearly false1 if we are not to exclude from the event anything which demands explanation2 if we are to reason from the universe itself and not from its name2 if we are to infer a particular cause from a knowledge of the nature of a given particular event4 ,this1 the so-called concrete use of the principle of causality1 is the only use of it which is legitimate1 the only use of it which is not extremely childish4 ,the opposite--the absurd--notion that the principle of causality is abstractly applied1 has led some to argue that it leads legitimately to nothing else than an infinite regress--an eternal succession of causes and effects4 ,but whatever it may lead to1 it certainly does not lead to that conclusion1 and has never led any human being1 either legitimately or illegitimately1 to that conclusion4 ,those even who have maintained that the principle of causality cannot lead to a first cause1 to an eternal self-existent cause1 but only to an eternal succession of causes and effects1 have all1 without a single exception1 allowed themselves to be led by it to a first cause and not to an eternal succession of causes4 ,they have all believed what they say they ought to have disbelieved2 they have all disbelieved what they say they ought to have believed4 ,they have all accepted as true that there is a first and self-existent cause1 although some have supposed it to be matter1 some mind1 some within the world1 some without the world4 ,they have differed as to what it is1 but not as to that it is4 ,none of them have adopted the conclusion to which they have said the argument founded on causation logically leads4 ,no man has ever adopted that conclusion4 ,the human mind universally and instantaneously rejects it as inconceivable1 unthinkable1 self-contradictory1 absurd4 ,we may believe either in a self-existent ,god or in a self-existent world1 and must believe in one or the other2 we cannot believe in an infinite regress of causes4 ,the alternatives of a self-existent cause and an infinite regress of causes are not1 as some would represent1 equally credible alternatives4 ,the one is an indubitable truth1 the other is a manifest absurdity4 ,the one all men believe1 the other no man believes4 ,this takes away1 it seems to me1 all force from the objection that the argument founded on the principle of causality when it infers ,god as the self-existent cause of the universe infers more than is strictly warranted1 a self-existent cause being something which does not in itself fall under the principle of causality4 ,that every event must have a cause will be valid1 it is said1 for an endless series of causes and effects2 but if you stop1 if you affirm the existence of what is uncaused1 of what is at once1 as it were1 cause and effect1 you may affirm what is true1 but you affirm also what is independent of the principle of causation4 ,you claim more than your argument entitles you to2 you are not developing a logical conclusion1 but concealing under a term which seems to express the same idea what is really the vaulting of the mind to a higher idea which cannot be expressed under the form efficient cause at all4 ,now1 of course1 a self-existent cause does not in itself come completely under the law of causality4 ,that law cannot inform us what self-existence is4 ,a self-existent cause1 however1 may be known as well as any other cause by its effects4 ,the mind may rise to it from its effects4 ,the principle of causality may lead up to it1 although it does not include within itself the proof of the self-existence of the cause4 ,it may at the last stage be attached to some other principle which compels the affirmation of the self-existence of the cause reached2 in other words1 the affirmation that the first cause is a self-existent cause1 may be a distinct mental act not necessitated by the principle of causality itself4 ,it may either be held that this mental necessity is the reason why we cannot entertain the thought of an infinite regress of causes1 or that the incapacity of the mind to regard the thought of an infinite regress of causes as other than self-contradictory1 is the explanation of its felt necessitation to affirm a self-existent cause2 in which latter case the principle of causality really necessitates a belief in the ungenerated and self-existent4 ,both of these views are plausible1 and which of them is true is an interesting subject of metaphysical investigation1 but it is one of no practical consequence in the inquiry on which we are engaged4 ,the principle of causality can lead us up from all things which have on them the marks of having begun to be1 and if we at length come to something which bears no such marks1 be it matter or be it mind1 no man can doubt1 or does doubt1 that something to be self-existent4 ,this difficulty about a self-existent cause not being able to be arrived at by the principle of causality1 will be worth attending to by the theist when it is attended to by any one else1--when any atheist or any anti-theist of any kind is prepared to deny that the last cause in the order of knowledge1 and the first in the order of existence1 must be a self-existent cause--but not until then2 and it is mere sophistry to represent it as of practical importance4 ,whenever we come to an existence which we cannot regard as an effect or thing generated in time1 we1 either in consequence of the very nature of the causal judgment1 or of some self-evident condition or conditions of knowledge necessarily attached thereto1 attribute to it self-existence and eternity4 ,we may dispute as to whether this is done in the one or the other of these two ways1 but that is a merely theoretical question2 that every one does1 and must1 as a reasonable being1 do it1 is what no man disputes1 or can dispute1--and this alone is of practical consequence4 ,another admission must be made by every man who reflects carefully on the nature of causation4 ,to say that the idea of cause can never demand belief in an uncaused cause1 sounds as self-evident2 to say that the idea of cause can find no satisfaction save in the belief of an uncaused cause1 sounds as a paradox2 but let a man meditate for a little with real thoughtfulness on the meaning of these two statements1 and he cannot fail to perceive that the former is an undeniable falsehood1 and the latter an undeniable truth4 ,an uncaused cause1 a first cause1 alone answers truly to the idea of a cause4 ,a secondary cause1 in so far as secondary1 in so far as caused1 is not a cause4 ,i witness some event--some change4 ,i am compelled as a rational being to seek its cause4 ,i reach it only to find that this cause was due to a prior cause4 ,what has happened8 ,the cause from which ,i have had to go back has ceased to be a cause2 the cause to which ,i have had to go back has become the cause of two effects1 but it will remain so only if ,i am not reasonably bound to seek a cause for it4 ,if ,i am1 its causality must pass over to its explanatory antecedent4 ,we may go back a hundred1 a thousand1 a million times1 but if the last cause reached be not truly a first cause1 an uncaused cause1 the idea of cause in our mind will be as unsatisfied at the end of our search as at the beginning1 and the whole process of investigation will be aimless and meaningless4 ,a true cause is one to which the reason not only moves but in which it rests1 and except in a first cause the mind cannot rest4 ,a first cause1 however1 is certainly not one which has been itself caused4 ,we are warranted1 then1 in looking upon the universe as an event or effect1 and we may be certain that it is not the last link of an infinite chain of causes and effects1 or of any series of causes and effects1 long or short1 suspended upon nothing4 ,no chain or series can be1 properly speaking1 infinite1 or without a first link or term4 ,the universe has a ,first ,cause4 ,and its ,first ,cause1 ,i must proceed to remark1 reason and observation alike lead us to believe must be one--a single cause4 ,when one ,first ,cause is sufficient to explain all the facts1 it is contrary to reason to suppose another or several4 ,we must prove that no one ,first ,cause could account for the universe before we can be entitled to ascribe it to more causes than one4 ,the ,first ,cause1 we shall further see afterwards1 must have attributes which no two or more beings can be supposed to possess1 which one being alone can possess4 ,then the character of the effect itself refers us back to a single cause4 ,a belief in more gods than one not only finds no support in the universe1 but1 as the very word universe indicates1 is contradicted by it4 ,for1 numerous and diverse as are the objects in nature1 they are so constituted and connected--so dependent on and related to one another--as to compose a whole which exhibits a marvellous unity in variety4 ,everything counteracts or balances or assists something else1 and thus all things proclaim their common dependence on ,one ,original4 ,co-ordinate things must all be derivative and secondary1 and all things in nature are co-ordinate parts of a stupendous system4 ,each one of us knows1 for example1 that a few years ago he was not1 and that in a few years hence the place which knows him now will know him no more2 and each one of us has been often taught by the failure of his plans1 and the disappointment of his hopes1 and the vanity of his efforts1 that there are stronger forces and more important interests in the world than his own1 and that he is in the grasp of a ,power which he cannot resist--which besets him behind and before1 and hems him in on all sides4 ,when we extend our view1 we perceive that this is as true of others as of ourselves1 and that it is true even1 in a measure1 of all finite things4 ,no man lives or dies to himself2 no object moves and acts absolutely from and for itself alone4 ,this reveals a single all-originating1 all-pervading1 all-sustaining principle4 ,these manifold mutually dependent existences imply one independent existence4 ,the limitations assigned to all individual persons and things point to a ,being which limits them all4 ,particular causes and secondary movements lead back to a cause of causes1 a first mover1 itself immovable1 yet making all things else to move4 ,the first cause must be far more truly and properly a cause than any secondary cause4 ,in fact1 as we have already seen1 a secondary cause is not strictly a cause2 so far as secondary1 it merely transmits to its consequent what it has received from its antecedent4 ,there may be a succession of a thousand such causes in a process1 yet the first cause is also the last1 and there is1 in fact1 all through1 but one cause2 the others merely convey and communicate its force4 ,a machine1 however numerous its parts and movements1 does not create the least amount of force2 on the contrary1 the most perfect machine wastes and absorbs some of the force which is imparted to it4 ,the universe1 so far as subject to mechanical laws1 is merely a machine which transmits a given quantity of force1 but which no more creates it than it creates itself4 ,the author of that force is the one true cause of all physical phenomena4 ,life is probably1 and mind is certainly1 not entirely explicable on mechanical principles2 but neither life nor mind can be maintained to do more than to determine the direction or application of the power implanted in them1 or rendered accessible to them1 through the working of the first cause4 ,all things must1 consequently1 live1 move1 and have their being therein4 ,it is at their end as well as at their origin2 it encompasses them1 all round2 it penetrates them1 all through4 ,the least things are not merely linked on to it through intermediate agencies which go back an enormous distance1 but are immediately present to it1 and filled to the limit of their faculties with its power4 ,it is in every ray of sunlight1 every breath of wind1 and blade of grass2 it is the source and life of all human minds and hearts4 ,the pantheist errs not so much in what he affirms of it1 as in what he denies to it4 ,this cause--the cause of causes--must1 it is further obvious1 be in possession of a power far beyond the comprehension of our reasons or imaginations4 ,all other power is derived from its power4 ,all the power which is distributed and distinguished in secondary causes must be combined and united in the first cause4 ,now1 think what an enormous power there is displayed even in this world4 ,in every half-ounce of coal there is stored up power enough1 if properly used1 to draw two tons a mile4 ,how vast1 then1 the power which ,god has deposited in the coal-beds of the world alone6 ,the inhabitants of this little island1 by availing themselves of the natural forces which ,providence has placed at their disposal1 annually accomplish more work than could by any possibility be effected by the inhabitants of the whole earth1 if they exerted merely the power which is in their own bodies1 the power of human bones and muscles4 ,and yet there can be little doubt that1 even in this country1 we make no use at all of many natural agents1 and only a wasteful use of any of them4 ,weigh the earth on which we dwell1 says an astronomer2 count the millions of its inhabitants that have come and gone for the last six thousand years2 unite their strength into one arm2 and test its power in an effort to move the earth4 ,it could not stir it a single foot in a thousand years2 and yet1 under the omnipotent hand of ,god1 not a minute passes that it does not fly far more than a thousand miles4 ,the earth1 however1 is but a mere atom in the universe4 ,through the vast abysses of space there are scattered countless systems1 at enormous distances1 yet all related2 glorious galaxies of suns1 planets1 satellites1 comets1 all sweeping onwards in their appointed courses4 ,how mighty the arm which impels and guides the whole6 ,god can do all that1 for ,he continually does it4 ,how much more ,he could do than ,he does1 we cannot know4 ,the power of no true cause1 of no free cause1 is to be measured by what it does4 ,it must be adequate to produce its actual effects1 but it may be able to produce countless merely possible effects4 ,it has power over its powers1 and is not necessitated to do all that it is capable of doing4 ,it is difficult1 perhaps1 to show that the universe is not infinite4 ,it is obviously unreasonable and presumptuous to deny that the power of its ,author may be infinite4 ,and yet we find men who do so4 ,for example1 the late ,mr ,john ,stuart ,mill1 for no better reasons than that nature sometimes drowns men1 and burns them1 and that childbirth is a painful process1 maintained that ,god could not possibly be infinite4 ,i shall not say what ,i think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed in such an argument4 ,what it proves is not the finiteness of ,god1 but the littleness of a human intellect4 ,the mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to measure the attributes and limit the greatness of its ,creator4 ,a first cause1 we have already seen1 must be a free cause4 ,it cannot have been itself caused4 ,it is absurd to look for it among effects4 ,but we never get out of the sphere of effects until we enter that of free agency2 until we emerge from the natural into the spiritual2 until we leave matter and reach mind4 ,the first cause must1 indeed1 be in--all through--the universe2 but it must also be out of the universe1 anterior to1 and above the universe4 ,the idea of cause is a delusion--the search for causes an inexplicable folly--if there be no first cause1 and if that first cause be not a free cause1 a ,will1 a ,spirit1 a ,person4 ,those who object to the causation argument1 that it does not take us beyond the world--does not lead us up to a personal cause of the world--have failed to apprehend what causation signifies4 ,secondary causes may not be true causes1 and yet reason be trustworthy1 for there is that behind them on which it can fall back2 but if there be no first cause1 or if the first cause be not free1 reason is throughout a lie4 ,reason1 if honest and consistent1 cannot in its pursuit of causes stop short of a rational will4 ,that alone answers to and satisfies its idea of a cause4 ,the most rapid glance at the universe powerfully confirms the conclusion that its first cause can only be a ,mind1 a ,reason4 ,the universe is a universe2 that is to say1 it is a whole1 a unity1 a system4 ,the first cause of it1 therefore1 in creating and sustaining it1 must comprehend1 act on1 and guide it as a systematic whole2 must have created all things with reference to each other2 and must continually direct them towards a preconceived goal4 ,the complex and harmonious constitution of the universe is the expression of a ,divine ,idea1 of a ,creative ,reason4 ,this thought brings me to my next argument and next lecture4#bj #bj ,see ,appendix ,,xii4 ,,lecture ,v4 ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,order4 ,i4 ,the prevalence of order in nature has already been referred to as contributing to prove that the universe is an event1 a generated existence1 a something which once began to be4 ,it will now be brought forward as in itself a manifestation of1 and consequently a ground for believing in1 a ,supreme ,mind4 ,where order meets us1 the natural and immediate inference is that there is the work of intelligence4 ,and order meets us everywhere in the universe4 ,it covers and pervades the universe4 ,it is obvious to the ordinary naked eye1 and spreads far beyond the range of disciplined vision when assisted by all the instruments and appliances which science and art have been able to invent4 ,it is conspicuous alike in the architecture of the heavens and the structure of a feather or a leaf4 ,it goes back through all the epochs of human history1 and all the ages of geological and astronomical time4 ,it is the common work of all the sciences to discover and explain the order in the universe4 ,there is no true science which is not constantly making new and fuller discoveries of the order in nature1--the order within us and without us2 not one which is not ever increasingly establishing that in order all things move and have their being4 ,what is maintained by the theist is1 that this order1 the proof of which is the grand achievement of science1 universally implies mind2 that all relations of order--all laws and uniformities--are evidences of an intelligent cause4 ,the order which science finds in nature may be described as either general or special1 although in strictness the difference between them is only a difference of degree1 the former being the more and the latter the less general1 or the former being the less and the latter the more special4 ,in what may be called general order1 that which strikes us chiefly is regularity2 in what may be called special order1 that which chiefly strikes us is adaptation or adjustment4 ,in inorganic nature general order is the more conspicuous2 in organic nature special order4 ,astronomy discloses to us relations of number and proportion so far-reaching that it almost seems as if nature were a living arithmetic in its development1 a realised geometry in its repose4 ,biology1 on the other hand1 impresses us by showing the delicacy and subtlety of the adjustment of part to part1 of part to whole1 and of whole to surroundings1 in the organic world4 ,there is1 perhaps1 sufficient difference between these two kinds of order to warrant their being viewed separately1 and as each furnishing the basis of an argument for the existence of ,god4 ,the argument from regularity has sometimes been kept apart from the argument from adjustment4 ,the former infers the universe to be an effect of mind because it is characterised by proportion or harmony1 which is held to be only explicable by the operation of mind4 ,the latter draws the same inference because the universe contains countless complex wholes1 of which the parts are so collocated and combined as to co-operate with one another in the attainment of certain results2 and this1 it is contended1 implies an intelligent purpose in the primary cause of these things4 ,while we may readily admit the distinction to be so far valid1 it is certainly not absolute4 ,regularity and adjustment are rather different aspects of order than different kinds of order1 and1 so far from excluding each other1 they will be found implying each other4 ,it is obvious that even the most specialised adjustments of organic structure and activity presuppose the most general and simple uniformities of purely physical nature4 ,such cases of adjustment comprehend in fact many cases of regularity4 ,it is less obvious1 but not less true1 that wherever regularity can be traced adjustment will also be found1 if the search be carried far enough4 ,the regularity disclosed by astronomy depends on adjustment as regards magnitude1 weight1 distance1 c41 in the celestial bodies1 just as the adjustments brought to light by biology depend on the general regularity of the course of nature4 ,there is no law of nature so simple as not to presuppose in every instance of its action at least two things related to one another in the manner which is meant when we speak of adjustment4 ,it being thus impossible to separate regularity from adjustment as regards the phenomena of the universe1 it seems unnecessary to attempt by abstraction to separate them in the theological argumentation1 while giving a rapid general glance at the phenomena which display them4 ,the physical universe has1 perhaps1 no more general characteristic than this1--its laws are mathematical relations4 ,the law of gravitation1 which rules all masses of matter1 great or small1 heavy or light1 at all distances1 is a definite numerical law4 ,the curves which the heavenly bodies describe under the influence of that law are the ellipse1 circle1 parabola1 and hyperbola--or1 in other words1 they all belong to the class of curves called conic sections1 the properties of which mathematicians had begun to investigate nearly twenty centuries before ,newton established that whatever was true of them might be directly transferred to the heavens1 since the planets revolve in ellipses1 the satellites of ,jupiter in circles1 and the comets in elliptical1 parabolic1 and hyperbolic orbits4 ,the law of chemical combination1 through which the whole world of matter has been built up out of a few elements1 always admits of precise numerical expression4 ,so does the law of the correlation of heat and gravitation4 ,each colour in the rainbow is due to a certain number of vibrations in a given time2 so is each note in the scale of harmony4 ,each crystal is a geometrical construction4 ,the pistils of flowers1 and the feathers in the wings and tails of birds1 are all numbered4 ,if nature had not thus been ruled by numerical laws1 the mathematical sciences might have existed1 but they would have had no other use than to exercise the intellect1 whereas they have been the great instruments of physical investigation4 ,they are the creations of a mental power which1 while occupied in their origination and elaboration1 requires to borrow little1 if anything1 from matter2 and yet1 it is only with their help that the constitution of the material universe has been displayed1 and its laws have been discovered1 with that high measure of success of which physicists are so proud4 ,but they could not have been applied to the universe at all unless its order had been of the exact numerical and geometrical kind which has been indicated2 unless masses had attracted each other1 and elements combined with each other1 in invariable proportions2 unless the waters had been measured as if in the hollow of a hand1 the heaven meted out as with a span1 the dust of the earth comprehended in a measure1 and the mountains weighed in scales and the hills in a balance4 ,now it is possible to deny that things have been thus weighed1 measured1 and numbered by a ,creative ,intelligence1 but not that they have been weighed1 measured1 and numbered4 ,if we are to give any credit to science1 there can be no doubt about the weights and measures and numbers4 ,this question1 then1 is alone left1--,could anything else than intelligence thus weigh1 measure1 and number8 ,could mere matter know the abstrusest properties of space and time and number1 so as to obey them in the wondrous way it does8 ,could what has taken so much mathematical knowledge and research to apprehend1 have originated with what was wholly ignorant of all quantitative relations8 ,or must not the order of the universe be due to a mind whose thoughts as to these relations are high above even those of the profoundest mathematicians1 as are the heavens above the earth8 ,if the universe were created by an intelligence conversant with quantitative truth1 it is easy to understand why it should be ruled by definitely quantitative laws2 but that there should be such laws in a universe which did not originate in intelligence1 is not only inexplicable but inconceivably improbable4 ,there is not merely in that case no discoverable reason why there should be any numerically definite law in nature1 but the probability of there being no law or numerical regularity of any kind is exceedingly great1 and of there being no law-governed universe incalculably great4 ,apart from the supposition of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 the chances in favour of disorder against order1 of chaos against cosmos1 of the numerically indefinite and inconstant against the definite and constant1 must be pronounced all but infinite4 ,the belief in a ,divine ,reason is alone capable of rendering rational the fact that mathematical truths are realised in the material world4#ba #ba ,see ,appendix ,,xiii4 ,the celestial bodies were among the earliest objects of science1 and before there was any science they stimulated religious thought and awakened religious feeling4 ,the sun and moon have given rise to so extraordinary a number of myths that some authors have referred to them the whole of heathen mythology4 ,there can be little doubt that the growth of astronomical knowledge contributed greatly to bring about the transition from polytheism to monotheism1 and that so soon as the heavens were clearly understood to be subject to law1 and the countless bodies which circle in them not to be independent agents but parts or members of a single mechanical or organic system1 the triumph of the latter was for ever secured4 ,no science1 indeed1 has hitherto had so much influence on man's religious beliefs as astronomy1 although there may now appear to be indications that chemistry and biology will rival it in this respect in the future4 ,and it has been thus influential chiefly because through its whole history it has been a continuous1 conspicuous1 and ever-advancing1 ever-expanding demonstration of a reign of law on the most magnificent scale1--a demonstration begun when with unassisted vision men first attempted roughly to distribute the stars into groups or constellations1 and far from yet ended when the same laws of gravitation1 light1 heat1 and chemical combination which rule on earth have been proved to rule on orbs so distant that their rays do not reach us in a thousand years4 ,the system of which our earth is a member is vast1 varied1 and orderly1 the planets and satellites of which it is composed being so adjusted as regards magnitude and mass1 distance1 rate1 and plane of direction1 c41 that the whole is stable and secure1 while part ministers to part as organ to organ in an animal body4 ,our own planet1 for example1 is so related to the sun and moon that seed-time and harvest never fail1 and the ebb and flow of the tides never deceive us4 ,and the solar system is but one of hundreds of millions of systems1 some of which are incalculably larger than it1 yet the countless millions of suns and stars thus profusely scattered o'er the void immense are so arranged and distributed in relation to one another and in accordance with the requirements of the profoundest mathematics as to secure the safety of one and all1 and to produce everywhere harmony and beauty4 ,each orb is affecting the orbit of every other--each is doing what1 if unchecked1 would destroy itself and the entire system--but so wondrously is the whole constructed that these seemingly dangerous disturbances are the very means of preventing destruction and securing the universal welfare1 being due to reciprocally compensating forces which in given times exactly balance one another4 ,is it1 ,i ask1 to be held as evidence of the power of the human mind that it should have been able after many centuries of combined and continuous exertion to compute with approximate accuracy the paths and perturbations of the planets which circle round our sun and the returns of a few comets1 but as no evidence even of the existence of mind in the ,first ,cause of things that the paths and perturbations of millions on millions of suns and planets and comets should have been determined with perfect precision for all the ages past and future of their existence1 so that1 multitudinous as they are1 each proceeds safely on its destined way1 and all united form a glorious harmony of structure and motion8#bb #bb ,see ,appendix ,,xiv4 ,a much more recent science than astronomy1 the science of chemistry1 undertakes to instruct us as to the composition of the universe1 and it is marvellous how much it can tell us even of the composition of the stars4 ,what1 then1 is its most general and certain result8 ,just this1 that order of the strictest kind1 the most definite proportions1 are wrought into the very structure of every world1 and of every compound object in the world1 air and water1 earth and mineral1 plant and animal4 ,the vast variety of visible substances are reducible to rather more than sixty constituent elements1 each of which has not only its own peculiar properties but its own definite and unvarying combining proportions with other elements1 so that amidst the prodigious number of combinations all is strictly ordered1 numerically exact4 ,there is no chemical union possible except when the elements bear to each other a numerically constant ratio4 ,different compounds are always the products of the combination of the elements in different yet strictly definite proportions1 there being no intermediate combinations1 no transitional compounds4 ,if each element did not admit of union with many others1 the world would be dead and poor1 its contents few and unvaried2 if their unions were not always regulated by law1 disorder would everywhere prevail4 ,how comes it that they are so made in relation to one another that their manifold unions are ever regulated by law1 and generate an endless variety of admirable products8 ,who made them thus8 ,did they make themselves8 or1 did any blind force make them8 ,reason answers that they must have been made by an intelligence which wanted them for its purposes4 ,when the proportions of the elementary constituents are altered1 the same elements produce the most diverse substances with the most dissimilar and even opposite properties1 charcoal and diamond1 a deadly poison or the breath of life1 theine or strychnine4 ,these powers all work together for good2 but if they worked even a very little differently--if the circumstances in which they work1 not to speak of the laws by which they work1 were altered--they would spread destruction and death through the universe4 ,the atmosphere is rather a mixture than a combination of chemical elements1 but it is a mixture in which the constituents are proportioned to each other in the only way which fits it to sustain the lives of plants and animals1 and to accomplish its many other important services2 and wonderful in the extreme is the provision made for the constant restoration of the due proportions amidst perpetual oscillations4 ,one of the chiefs of modern chemistry1 ,baron ,liebig1 points to what takes place when rain falls on the soil of a field adapted for vegetable growth as to something which effectually strikes all human wisdom dumb4 ,during the filtration of rain-water1 he says1 through the soil1 the earth does not surrender one particle of all the nutritive matter which it contains available for vegetable growth 7such as potash1 silicic acid1 ammonia1 c472 the most unintermittent rain is unable to abstract from it 7except by the mechanical action of floods7 any of the chief requisites for its fertility4 ,the particles of mould not only firmly retain all matter nutritive to vegetable growth1 but also immediately absorb such as are contained in the rain-water 7ammonia1 potash1 c474 ,but only such substances are completely absorbed from the water as are indispensable requisites for vegetable growth2 others remain either entirely or for the most part in a state of solution4 ,the laws and uses of light and heat1 electricity and magnetism1 and the adjustments which they presuppose1 all point not less clearly to the ordinances of a supremely profound and accurate mind4 ,in a word1 out of a few elements endowed with definite powers1 this world with its air and its seas1 its hills and valleys1 its vegetable forms and animal frames1 and other worlds innumerable1 have been built up by long-sustained and endlessly-varied processes of chemical synthesis mostly conducted under conditions so delicately adjusted to the requirements of each case1 that the ablest chemists1 with all their instruments and artifices1 cannot even reproduce them on any scale however small4 ,can these elements be reasonably thought of as having been unfashioned and unprepared1 or these processes as having been uninstituted and unpresided over by intelligence8#bc #bc ,see ,appendix ,,xv4 ,the sciences of geology and palontology disclose to us the history of our earth and of its vegetable and animal organisms4 ,they prove that for countless ages1 that from the inconceivably remote period of the deposition of the ,laurentian rocks1 light and heat1 air and moisture1 land and sea1 and all general physical forces have been so arranged and co-ordinated as to produce and maintain a state of things which secured during all these countless ages life and health and pleasure for the countless millions of individuals contained in the multitude of species of creatures which have contemporaneously or successively peopled the earth4 ,the sea1 with its winds and waves1 its streams and currents1 its salts1 its flora and fauna1 teems with adaptations no less than the land4 ,probably no one has studied it with more care or to more purpose than ,lieutenant ,maury1 and his well-known work on its physical geography proceeds throughout on the principle that he who would understand its phenomena must cease to regard it as a waste of waters1 and view it as the expression of ,one ,thought1 a unity with harmonies which ,one ,intelligence1 and ,one ,intelligence alone1 could utter2 while many of its pages might appropriately be read as a commentary on these lines of ,wordsworth1-- ,huge ocean shows1 within his yellow strand1 ,a habitation marvellously planned1 ,for life to occupy in love and rest4 ,the sciences referred to certify further1 that as regards the various forms of life there has been from the time when it can be first traced to the present day advance and progress in the main1 and that the history of the earth corresponds throughout with the history of life on the earth1 while each age prepares for the coming of another better than itself4 ,but advance and progress presuppose intelligence1 because they cannot be rationally conceived of apart from an ideal goal foreseen and selected4 ,volumes might be written to show how subtly and accurately external nature is adjusted to the requirements of vegetable and animal life1 and how vegetable and animal life are inter-related2 nay1 even on how well the earth is fitted for the development and happiness of man4 ,think of the innumerable points of contact and connection1 for example1 between physical geography and political economy1 which all indicate so many harmonies between the earth and man's economical condition1 capacities1 and history4#bd #bd ,see ,appendix ,,xvi4 ,the vegetable and animal kingdoms viewed generally1 are also striking instances of unity of plan1 of progressive order1 of elaborately adjusted system4 ,there are general principles of structure and general laws of development common to all organisms1 constituting a plan of organisation capable of almost infinite variation1 which underlies all the genera and orders of living creatures1 vegetable and animal4 ,it comprehends a number of subordinate plans which involve very abstract conceptions1 and which even the ablest naturalists still very imperfectly comprehend4 ,these higher plans would probably never have been thought of but for the detection of the numerous phenomena which seemed on a superficial view irreconcilable with the idea of purpose in creation4 ,just as it was those so-called disturbances in the planetary orbits1 which appeared at first to point to some disorder and error in the construction of the sidereal system1 that prompted ,lagrange to the investigations which resulted in establishing that the order of the heavens was of a sublimer and more remarkable character than had been imagined1 essentially including these apparent disturbances1 so it has been the seeming exceptions to plan which are witnessed in rudimentary and aborted organs 7such as the wing-bones in wingless birds1 the finger-bones in horses1 the legs below the skin in serpents1 the teeth which never cut the gums in whales1 c471 that have indicated to modern biologists a unity of organisation far more comprehensive and wonderful than had previously been suspected4 ,the larger and more ideal order thus brought to light as ruling in the organic world is one which could only have originated in a mind of unspeakable power and perfection4 ,and it not only thus testifies directly of itself in favour of a ,divine ,intelligence1 but the recognition of it1 while correcting in some respects earlier conceptions as to the place of utility in nature1 far from proving that utility has been disregarded or sacrificed1 shows that each organ has been formed1 not only with reference to its actual use in a given individual or species1 but to the capacity of being applied to use in countless other individuals and species4#be #be ,see ,appendix ,,xvii4 ,when we enter into the examination of organisation in itself1 adjustment becomes still more obvious in the processes of growth1 reproduction1 fructification1 c41 in plants and animals1 and in the provisions for locomotion1 for securing food and shelter1 for sight1 hearing1 c41 in the latter4 ,the great physician1 ,sir ,charles ,bell1 devoted a whole treatise to point out those which are to be found in the hand alone4 ,the arrangement of bones1 muscles1 joints1 and other parts in the limb of a tiger or the wing of an eagle are not less admirable4 ,the eye and ear are singularly exquisite structures1 the former being far the most perfect of optical1 and the latter far the most perfect of acoustic instruments4 ,instances of this sort are1 indeed1 so remarkable1 and so irresistibly convincing to most minds1 that some theists have consented to rest on them exclusively the inference of a designing intelligence4 ,they would grant that the evidences of purpose are only to be traced in organisation4 ,the limitation is inconsistent and untenable1 but not inexplicable4 ,the adjustment of parts to one another1 and their co-ordination as means to an end1 are not more certainly existent in fitting the eye to see and the ear to hear than in securing the stability of the solar system1 but they are more obviously visible because compressed into a compass easily grasped and surveyed2 because organ and function are the most specialised kinds of means and ends2 because organisms are the most curiously and conspicuously elaborate examples of order4 ,and as the telescope can show us no end of the simple and majestic order of the heavens1 so the microscope can show us no end of the exquisite and impressive order which discloses even-- ,in ,nature's most minute design1 ,the signature and stamp of power divine2 ,contrivance intricate1 expressed with ease1 ,where unassisted sight no beauty sees4 ,the shapely limb and lubricated joint ,within the small dimensions of a point2 ,muscle and nerve miraculously spun1 ,his mighty work1 who speaks and it is done4 ,the ,invisible1 in things scarce seen revealed1 ,to whom an atom is an ample field4--7,,cowper47#bf #bf ,see ,appendix ,,xviii4 ,the traces of a ,supreme ,reason crowd still more upon the vision when we come to the human mind1-- ,the varied scene of quick-compounded thought1 ,and where the mixing passions endless shift4 --7,,thomson47 ,the mere existence of originated minds necessarily implies the existence of an unoriginated mind4 ,what can be more absurd1 asks ,montesquieu1 than to imagine that a blind fatalistic force has produced intelligent beings8 ,the complicated and refined adjustments of the body to the mind1 and of the mind to the body1 are so numerous and interesting that their study has now become the task of a special class of scientific men4 ,a very little disorder in the organisation of the brain--such as even microscopic post-mortem examination may fail to detect--suffices to cause hallucinations of the senses1 to shake intellect from its throne1 to paralyse the will1 and to corrupt the sentiments and affections4 ,how precise and skilful must the adjustment be between the sound brain and sane mind6 ,who sufficiently realises the mystery of wisdom which lies in the familiar fact that the mind1 by merely willing to use the members of the body1 sets in motion instantaneously and unconsciously1 without effort and without failure1 cords and pulleys and levers1 joints and muscles1 of which it only vaguely1 if at all1 surmises the existence8 ,the laws of our various appetencies1 affections1 and emotions1 and their relations to their special ends or objects1 the nature of the several intellectual faculties and their subservience to mental culture1 and still more the general constitution of the mind as a system consisting of a multitude of powers under the government of reason and conscience1 present to us vast fields filled with the evidences of ,divine ,wisdom4#bg #bg ,see ,appendix ,,xix4 ,there are others no less extensive and inexhaustible in the principles which underlie and maintain human society1 and those which preside over the progressive development of humanity4 ,political economy is the department of social science which has been cultivated with most success4 ,what1 then1 is its most comprehensive and best established theorem8 ,this--that although the great majority of men are moved mainly by self-interest1 and few seek with much zeal or persistency the general good1 the result of their being left in perfect freedom to pursue their own advantage1 so long as they do not outwardly violate the rules of justice1 is far better for the whole society than if they conformed their conduct to any plan which human wisdom1 aiming directly at the general good1 could devise2 nature having provided in the principles of the human constitution and the circumstances of human life for the selfish plans and passions of individuals so neutralising one another1 so counteracting and counterpoising one another1 as to secure the social stability and welfare--as to leave general ideas and interests to rule with comparatively little resistance4 ,it is surely a natural inference from this that a ,supreme ,reason grasps all human reasons1 and uses them in order to realise a purpose grander and better than any which they themselves contemplate4 ,history viewed as a whole teaches the same truth on a wider scale4 ,an examination of it discloses a plan pervading human affairs from the origin of man until the present day--a progress which has proceeded without break or stoppage1 in accordance with laws which are as yet very imperfectly apprehended4 ,of the countless generations which have come and gone like the leaves of the forest1 for unknown thousands of years1 few have had the slightest glimpse of the order which connected them with their fellows1 and embraced their every action2 fewer still have sought to conform to it2 the immense majority have set before them only mean and narrow schemes for personal good2 all passions have raged and all vices prevailed in their turn2 there have been confusion and tumult and war2 and yet the order1 progress1 plan ,i speak of have been slowly and silently but surely built up4 ,in this evolution of order out of the chaos of millions on millions of conflicting human wills seeking merely their own pleasure1 there is1 perhaps1 even a more impressive proof of the operation of ,divine ,wisdom than in the origination and preservation of order among the multitudinous stars of heaven4 ,the philosophical historian who has most conclusively shown by the scrutiny of the chief events in the annals of humanity the existence of such a progressive plan1 is amply justified in arguing that it cannot have originated with man1 or matter1 or chance1 but must be the work of ,god4 ,we have passed in review1 he says1 all the theories imagined by philosophers and historians to explain the mysterious fact that there is in the life of man unfolded in history a succession1 a plan1 a development1 which cannot be referred to man himself4 ,some1 despairing from the outset to find a solution1 make of their ignorance a blind power which they call hazard4 ,evidently that is no solution4 ,hazard is a word1 and nothing more4 ,other writers--the majority of writers--say that this mysterious power is nature1 under the form of climate1 or races1 or the whole of the physical influences which act on the moral world4 ,but what is nature8 ,whence has it this power1 this foresight1 this intelligence1 which are so conspicuous in the course of our destinies8 ,if nature is matter1 and nothing but matter1 that too is no answer4 ,who will believe that matter acts with wisdom--with intelligence8 ,where there is intelligent action there must be an intelligent being2 therefore nature leads us to ,god4 ,finally1 there are those who substitute for nature general laws4 ,but do not laws suppose a legislator8 and who can this legislator be1 if not ,god8#bh #bh ,see ,appendix ,,xx4 ,there is1 then1 everywhere1 both in the physical and moral worlds1 order and adaptation1 proportion and co-ordination1 and there is very widely present progress--order which advances in a certain direction to a certain end1 which is until realised only an ideal4 ,this is the state of things which science discloses4 ,the question is1 ,is this state of things intelligible on any other supposition than that of a designing mind8 ,the theist holds that it is not2 that it directly and imperatively demands an intelligent cause2 that to assign it either to no cause1 or to any other than an intelligent cause1 is1 in the strictest and strongest sense of the term1 absurd4 ,if we deny that there is such order as ,i have indicated1 we set aside the entire teaching of all the sciences--we pronounce science to be from beginning to end a delusion and a lie4 ,men in the present day dare not do this4 ,if we deny that such order implies the agency of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 we contradict no express declaration of any of the sciences2 we may accept all that they have to tell us about order1 and they can tell us about nothing else4 ,but notwithstanding this1 it is far more reasonable1 far less absurd1 to deny that there is order in the universe1 than to admit it and deny that its ultimate cause is an intelligence4 ,further1 although we cannot be more certain of the cause than of the effect from which it is inferred1 and consequently cannot be more certain that an intelligence has produced the order which is in the universe than that there is order therein1 the theistic inference from the whole of that order may well be greatly stronger than the scientific proof of order in any particular instance4 ,men of science have probably never as good reasons for believing in the laws of order brought to light by their own special science1 as the theist has for believing in a ,supreme ,intelligence because of the order which is the common and concurrent result of all the sciences1 and which is obvious to every eye4 ,,ii4 ,the argument from order and adaptation is often spoken of as the argument from design4 ,the phrase is an unfortunate one4 ,the argument is not from but to design4 ,to assume design and then to affirm that every design must have a designer1 is manifestly not serious reasoning1 but a play upon words4 ,to assume design at all is to assume precisely what one is most bound to prove2 and to assume design in the universe is to assume what cannot be proved1 yea1 what the theist requires to show against the pantheist cannot be proved4 ,in any other than a very loose and metaphorical sense design has no existence except in mind4 ,there is no design in the sky1 or the sea1 or the land2 there are only law1 order1 and arrangement therein1 and these things are not designs although they imply designs4 ,what we can describe as the designs of the lower animals are given to them with their constitutions1 and are only a part of the instrumentality which fits them for their place in the world4 ,men have designs properly so called2 but the argument for the existence of ,god from the evidences of a ,supreme ,wisdom in the progressive evolution of human history1 instead of resting on these designs1 is based on the fact that what has actually been realised has far transcended them4 ,science as a mere exposition of the facts of the universe can never show us ,divine design1 for the good reason that there is no such design in these facts1 although1 had it not existed elsewhere1 they could never have been what they are4 ,while this is true1 it must in justice be added that most if not all of the advocates of theism who have presented the argument under consideration in the faulty form1--,design implies a designer2 the universe abounds in design2 therefore the universe1 so far as it abounds in design1 implies a designer1--have erred more in expression than in thought4 ,in reality they have not meant by design what is properly so called1 and consequently have not begun their argument by assuming what was denied and in need of proof4 ,in reality they have meant by design those characteristics of things which they hold to be the indications or evidences or correlatives of intelligence1 and which they might have designated by such terms as order1 adjustment1 adaptation1 fitness1 progress1 c4 ,all attempts to refute their reasoning1 therefore1 by a strict and literal interpretation of the phrase ,design implies a designer1 must be pronounced unfair4 ,censure of the phrase is warranted4 ,rejection of the argument on account of the phrase is superficial and unjust4 ,it has been held that the argument from order and adaptation is essentially different from the design argument4 ,the reason given for this has been that the design argument is based on the analogy or supposed analogy between the works of nature and the products of human art4 ,in this argument1 we are told1 we infer from the likeness which certain natural objects bear to artificial objects that there must be a likeness in their causes4 ,we know1 it is said1 that only intelligent beings frame such structures as houses1 ships1 and watches1 and seeing that there is in the mechanism of the heavens1 the circulation of the blood1 and the construction of the eye1 arrangements and adjustments of a similar kind1 we conclude that they also must have been framed by an intelligent being1 who must be as much greater than man as the works of nature are greater than the works of art1 for causes are proportional to their effects4 ,now this may be the design argument as some have presented it who had no particular wish to criticise it severely1 and it certainly is the way in which ,hume and ,kant wished it to be presented2 but it has no claim whatever to be considered the only proper form of the argument1 and is1 in fact1 a very bad form of it4 ,it is true that there is an analogy between the works of nature and the works of art1 and that on the strength of this analogy the two classes of works1 and also their causes1 may be compared1 but not true that the design argument when correctly stated either rests on such analogy or implies such comparison4 ,the analogy and comparison may be drawn into1 and1 as it were1 incorporated with the design argument1 but that is rather as a means of illustration than as a condition of inference4 ,when we infer from an examination of their construction that the eye and the ear have been designed by an intelligent being1 we are no more dependent on our knowledge that a watch or a telescope has been designed by an intelligent being than we are dependent on our knowledge of the eye and ear being the products of intelligence when we infer that the watch and the telescope are the products of intelligence4 ,there is an inference in both cases1 and an inference of precisely the same nature in both cases4 ,it is as direct and independent when the transition is to ,god from ,his works as when to our fellow-men from their works4 ,we are greatly mistaken if we suppose that we have an immediate knowledge of the intelligence of the beings who make watches1 houses1 and ships2 we only know that the beings who make these things are intelligent because such things could not be made without intelligence3 in a word1 we only know our fellow-creatures to be intelligent beings because they utter and arrange sounds so as to convey a meaning1 execute movements which tend to an end1 and construct machines4 ,we have no more a direct perception or a personal experience of the intelligence of our fellow-men than we have of the intelligence of ,god4 ,the mind which has given origin to the order and adjustments of the universe is not more absolutely inaccessible to sense and self-consciousness than the mind which gives origin to the order and adjustments of a watch4 ,it is therefore impossible that our knowledge of the former should be dependent on our knowledge of the latter4 ,in both cases the knowledge is inferential1--in both cases it is dependent on the immediate consciousness of intelligence in ourselves1--but the inference is in the former case neither longer nor less legitimate than in the latter4 ,we deny1 then1 that there is any truth in the statement that the design argument rests on the analogy between the works of nature and the products of art ,it rests directly on the character of the works of nature as displaying order and adjustment4 ,it is essentially identical with the argument which we have expounded4 ,it is not less objectionable to speak of the argument from order and adaptation as being an argument from final causes than to speak of it as being an argument from design1 unless the different significations of final cause be distinguished1 and those which are irrelevant and illegitimate be excluded4 ,for the expression final cause has various significations which are indeed intimately related1 yet which cannot be employed indifferently without leading to utter confusion4 ,these significations may be distributed into two classes4 ,each class contains three significations1 and every signification of the first class has a signification of the second class to correspond to it4 ,in fact1 the significations of the first class are simply so many aspects of order or adaptation1 and those of the second class so many aspects of design or intention2 the former are order and adaptation viewed with reference to the intrinsic1 the extrinsic1 and the ultimate ends of things1 and the latter are design and intention viewed with reference to the same three ends4 ,final cause sometimes means the intrinsic end of what is orderly and adjusted1 the realisation of the nature of anything which is considered as a whole1 a complex of order and adjustment4 ,the combined stability and movement of the solar system is in this sense the final cause of the arrangements by which that result is secured4 ,sight is in this sense the final cause of the eye1 because in sight the true nature of the eye manifests itself4 ,then1 final cause sometimes means not the intrinsic but the extrinsic end of what is orderly and adjusted2 not merely the realisation of the nature of anything1 but its relationship to other things1 its adaptations to their requirements1 its uses2 not merely the end of an arrangement regarded as a self-contained or completed whole1 but the end or ends which it serves as a system surrounded by1 connected with1 and included in other systems4 ,it is impossible to admit final cause in the sense of intrinsic end and to deny it in that of extrinsic end2 for the universe is not a mere aggregate of systems placed alongside of one another1 but otherwise unconnected--it is itself a system composed of an infinity of systems within systems4 ,nothing in nature stands alone2 nothing lives to itself nor dies to itself4 ,what is a whole with reference to something smaller than itself1 is a part with reference to something larger than itself4 ,the eye is a whole with reference to its own cords1 lenses1 fluids1 and membranes1 but it is a part with reference to the body2 sight is therefore not more certainly its end than the uses of sight ,how can a man admit final cause to be involved in the relationship between his stomach and bodily life1 but deny it to be involved in the relationship between his stomach and the vegetable and animal substances with which he satisfies its cravings8 ,clearly the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ends is a narrow one1 and exists not so much in the nature of things as in our way of looking at things4 ,we have but to elevate and extend our own view1 and what was before an extrinsic end is thereby changed into an intrinsic end4 ,admit1 in fact1 final cause anywhere1 and you must admit it everywhere2 admit anything to have an end1 and you must admit all things to have an end2 for the world is a grand and wondrous unity in which all objects depend on and serve one another1 and all forces contribute to the attainment of a single comprehensive issue4 ,once accept the principle of finality1 and there is no consistent stopping short of the conviction of ,aristotle1 that on it hang the whole heavens and earth4 ,it is only when the word final cause is used in one or other of these two senses that we can with any propriety speak of reasoning from final causes to the existence of ,god4 ,and these are just the senses in which the expression is now least used4 ,final cause is generally employed at present to signify design4 ,it means1 not the arrangement of causes and effects into systematic unities1 the parts of which have definite relations to one another and a common issue1 or the adaptation of these unities to support and serve one another1 but purpose or intention in the ,divine ,mind with respect to such arrangement or adaptation4 ,this sense of the word is so obviously general enough to refer both to intrinsic and extrinsic ends that it would be unnecessary to direct attention to the fact1 were it not that we are much more apt to fall into error regarding extrinsic than intrinsic ends1 and consequently1 regarding the intention or purpose which refers to them4 ,a thing has just one intrinsic end--namely1 the single conspicuous and all-comprehensive function or issue in virtue of which we can regard it as being a whole or unity1 and as possessed of a certain relative independence or completeness4 ,there is thus comparatively little possibility of error in determining what the intrinsic end is in a given instance1 and comparatively little danger of presumption in affirming it to have been the end contemplated by the ,divine ,mind4 ,there is no doubt1 for example1 that the eye is an instrument constructed in a way calculated to attain the intrinsic end--sight2 and there can be no presumption in affirming that ,god must have had that end in view in the construction of the eye4 ,if there be a ,god1 and if ,he have had anything to do with the making of the eye1 ,he must have designed that ,his creatures should see with their eyes4 ,it is different with extrinsic ends4 ,a thing has never merely one extrinsic end2 it has always a multitude of extrinsic ends1 for it is always related to a multitude of other things4 ,if we would speak of the extrinsic end of a thing we must mean thereby the whole of its adaptations to other things1 the entire circle of its external relationships1 the sum of its uses4 ,but men have always shown themselves prone in judging of the extrinsic ends of things to single out some particular adaptation or use1 or at least a few adaptations or uses1 and to ignore or exclude all others4 ,and especially have they shown themselves prone to judge of things merely from their relationship and utility to themselves1 as if their happiness was the chief if not sole end of all things4 ,this is1 of course1 an utterly erroneous method of judging1 and necessarily leads to ridiculous thoughts about things1 and to irreverent thoughts about ,god's designs in the creation of things4 ,it can1 as ,hegel tells us1 truly profit neither religion nor science1 if1 after considering the vine with reference to the well-known uses which it confers upon man1 we proceed to consider the cork-tree with reference to the corks which are cut from its bark to serve as stoppers for wine-bottles4 ,when we affirm1 then1 that final causes in the sense of intrinsic ends are in things1 we affirm merely that things are systematic unities1 the parts of which are definitely related to one another and co-ordinated to a common issue2 and when we affirm that final causes in the sense of extrinsic ends are in things1 we affirm merely that things are not isolated and independent systems1 but systems definitely related to other systems1 and so adjusted as to be parts or components of higher systems1 and means to issues more comprehensive than their own4 ,we cannot affirm that final causes in the sense of designs are in things2 they can only exist in a mind4 ,what do we mean when we hold that final causes in this sense truly are in the ,divine ,mind1 and with reference equally to intrinsic and extrinsic ends8 ,merely that such order and adjustment as may actually be seen in things and between things--seen with the naked eye it may be1 or only to be seen through the telescope or microscope--or which1 if they cannot be seen1 yet can by scientific induction be proved to be in and between things1--that that order and adjustment which actually exist1 were intended or designed by ,god to exist4 ,of course every theist who sees evidences of ,god's existence in the harmonies of nature1 must necessarily rise to final causes in this sense from final causes in the other senses which have been indicated2 he must pass from material arrangements to the ,divine ,intelligence which he believes to be manifested by them4 ,and there can be no shadow of presumption in any theist searching for final causes--,divine designs--in this sense and to this extent4 ,what ,descartes and others have said against doing so1 on the ground that it is arrogant for a man to suppose he can investigate the ends contemplated by the ,deity--can penetrate into the counsels of ,divine ,wisdom--has manifestly no force or relevancy1 so long as all that is maintained is that the order which actually exists was meant to exist4 ,the doubt or denial of that is irreverent4 ,to admit the existence of ,god1 and yet to refuse to acknowledge that ,he purposed and planned the adaptations and harmonies in nature1 is surely as presumptuous as it is inconsistent4 ,to assume that ,god is ignorant of the constitution and character of the universe1 and has had no share in the contrivance and management of it1 is to degrade ,him to the level of the dream-and-dread-begotten gods of ,democritus and ,epicurus4 ,better not to think of ,god at all1 than to think of ,him in such a way4 ,the final cause of a thing1 however1 may mean1 and with reference both to adjustment and design1 neither its intrinsic nor extrinsic1 but its ultimate end4 ,it may mean1 not merely that a thing is and was intended to be the mechanism or organism which science analyses and explains1 and to stand in the relationships and fulfil the uses which science traces1 but also that it will have1 and was intended to have1 a destination in the far future4 ,we may ask1 ,what is the goal towards which creation moves8 ,what will be the fate of the earth8 ,in what directions are vegetable and animal life developing8 ,what is the chief end of man8 ,whither is history tending8 ,what is the ideal of truth which science has before it1 and which it hopes to realise8 of beauty1 which art has before it8 of goodness1 which virtue has before it8 ,and although to most if not all of these questions probably no very definite and certain answer can be given1 to deny that they can in any measure be answered1 to pronounce all speculation regarding ultimate ends as wholly vain1 would justly be deemed the expression of a rash and thoughtless dogmatism4 ,science claims not only to explain the past but to foretell the future4 ,the power of prevision possessed by a science is the best criterion of its rank among the sciences when rank is determined by certitude4 ,and most significant is the boldness with which some of the sciences have of late begun to forecast the future4 ,thus1 with reference to the end of the world1 the spirit of prophecy1 which until very recently was almost confined to the most noted religious visionaries1 is now poured largely out upon our most distinguished physicists4 ,this we regard as a most significant and hopeful circumstance1 and trust that ere long the prophets of science will be far less discordant and conflicting in their predictions even of the remotest issues than they must be admitted to be at present4 ,while speculation as to final causes in the sense of ultimate ends is1 within certain limits1 as legitimate as it is natural1 its results are undoubtedly far too meagre and uncertain to allow of our reasoning from them to the existence or wisdom of ,god4 ,we must prove that there is a ,divine ,intelligence from what we actually perceive in things1 and not from what we can conjecture as to the final destinies of things4 ,in fact1 until we have ascertained that there is a ,divine ,intelligence1 and in some measure what are the principles on which that ,intelligence proceeds1 our chance of reaching truth through speculation as to the ultimate ends of things is1 in all probability1 exceedingly small4 ,it is on no hazardous speculations of this kind that we would rest an argument for the ,divine existence1 although questions have been raised as to the ,divine character and government which will1 at a later stage of the discussion1 involve us to some extent in the consideration of ultimate ends4 ,when final cause is employed to signify design in any reference1 be it to intrinsic1 extrinsic1 or ultimate ends1 ,i have nothing to object to ,bacon and ,descartes's condemnation of it as illegitimate and unprofitable in science4 ,i know of no science1 physical or moral1 in which1 while thus understood1 it can be of the slightest use as a principle of scientific discovery4 ,it is as much out of place in the world of organic as of inorganic nature4 ,it is quite incorrect to say that although it does not lead to the discovery of new truths in strictly physical science1 it does so in physiology for example1 or in psychology1 or in ethics4 ,it is only when it means merely the inherent order and adjustment of things--not when it means designs and purposes regarding them--that the search after it can possibly lead to scientific truth1 and1 when so understood1 it leads to truth in all sciences alike4 ,it was the suggestive principle in ,adams and ,leverrier's discovery of the planet ,neptune from certain unexplained perturbations of the planet ,uranus1 quite as much as in ,harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood from the observation of certain unexplained valves at the outlet of the veins and the rise of the arteries4 ,it is involved in the very nature of the inductive process1 and is only confirmed and enlarged by the progress of inductive research4 ,it stands in no opposition to the principle of efficient causes1 and is in no degree disproved by the discovery of such causes4 ,assertions to the effect that it has gradually been driven by the advance of knowledge from the simpler sciences into those which are complex and difficult1--that it is being expelled even out of biology and sociology--and that it always draws its confirmation1 not from phenomena which have been explained1 but from phenomena which await explanation1--are often made1 but they rest almost exclusively on the wishes of those who make them4 ,they have no real historical basis4#bi #bi ,see ,appendix ,,xxi4 ,,lecture ,,vi4 ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,order ,,examined4 ,i4 ,the universe is a system which comprehends countless subordinate systems4 ,it is full of combinations of parts which constitute wholes1 and of means which conspire to ends4 ,the natural and obvious explanation of the order and adjustments which it thus presents is that they are due to a mind or intelligence4 ,and this is the only rational explanation of them4 ,mind can alone account for order and adjustment1 for the co-ordination of parts into a whole1 or the adaptation of means to an end4 ,if we refer them to anything else1 the reference is essentially contrary to reason1 essentially irrational4 ,it may seem at the first superficial glance as if there were a variety of hypotheses as to the origin of the order we everywhere see around us1 all equally or nearly equally credible2 but adequate reflection cannot fail to convince us that they must be reduced to a single alternative--to two antagonistic theories4 ,our only choice is between reason and unreason1 between a sufficient and an insufficient cause1 between1 we may even say1 a cause and no cause4 ,this will be brought out by an examination of the various hypotheses which have been suggested by those who are unwilling to admit that the order of the world originated in mind4 ,they try their best to suggest some other alternative than that which ,i have said is inevitable2 but every suggestion they make only raises the alternative which they would avoid--mind or chance1 reason or unreason1 a sufficient explanation or an absurd one4 ,before proceeding to establish this1 however1 it may be necessary to remark on some direct objections which have been taken to the design argument1--objections which might be valid1 although no explanation of order could be given or were even attempted4 ,the inference which the theist requires to draw from the existence of order in the universe is merely the existence of an intelligence who produced that order4 ,it follows that it is an unfair objection to his argument to urge1 as has often been urged1 that it does not directly and of itself prove ,god to be the creator of the universe1 but only the former of it--not the author of matter1 but only of the collocations of matter4 ,this objection1 which men even like ,hume and ,kant and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 have thought worth employing1 is simply that the argument does not prove more than it professes to prove4 ,it does not pretend to make all other reasoning for the ,divine existence superfluous4 ,it is no condition of its validity that it should stand alone2 that it should contribute nothing to other arguments and receive nothing from them4 ,the objection is thus entirely irrelevant4 ,it may be a wise caution to those who would trust exclusively to it1 and neglect or depreciate other arguments4 ,it is no objection to its legitimacy4 ,it is remarkable1 too1 that those who have urged this objection have never felt that before employing it they were bound to satisfy themselves and to prove to others that order is a mere surface or superficial thing--outside of matter1 superimposed on it4 ,if order be something inherently and intrinsically in matter--be of its very essence--belong to what is ultimate in it2 if matter and its form be inseparable1--then the author of its order must have been also the author of itself2 and all that this objection shows us is1 that those who have employed it have had mistaken notions about the nature of matter4 ,now1 as ,i have already had to indicate1 modern science seems rapidly perfecting the proof of this4 ,the order in the heavens1 and in the most complicated animal organisms1 appears to be not more wonderful than the order in the ultimate atoms of which they are composed4 ,the balance of evidence is in favour of the view that order extends as far and penetrates as deep as matter itself does4 ,the human intellect is daily learning that it is foolish to fancy that there is anywhere in matter a sphere in which the ,divine ,wisdom does not manifest itself in and through order4 ,there is still another remark to be made on the objection under consideration4 ,the immediate inference from the order of the universe is to an intelligent former of the universe1 not to a creator4 ,but this does not preclude the raising of the question1 ,is it reasonable to believe the former of the world merely its former8 ,must not its former be also its creator8 ,on the contrary1 the inference that the order of the world must be the result of intelligent agency ought to suggest this question to every serious and reflective mind1 and it should even contribute something to its answer4 ,the order of the universe must have originated with intelligence4 ,what is implied in this admission8 ,clearly that the order of the universe cannot have originated with matter1--that matter is unintelligent1 and cannot account either for intelligence or the effects of intelligence4 ,but if so1 the intelligence which formed the universe must be an eternal intelligence4 ,the supposition that matter is eternal must in this case be supplemented by the admission that mind is eternal4 ,in other words1 the affirmation that the former of the world is merely its former--the denial that its former is also its creator--means dualism1 the belief in two distinct eternal existences1--an eternal mind and eternal matter4 ,whoever is not prepared to accept this hypothesis must abandon the affirmation and denial from which it necessarily follows4 ,and who can1 after due deliberation1 accept it8 ,the law of parsimony of causes absolutely forbids our assuming1 for the explanation of anything1 more causes than are necessary to account for it4 ,it forbids1 therefore1 our belief in an eternal matter and an eternal mind1 unless we can show reason for holding that one of them alone is not a sufficient cause of the universe4 ,now those who grant the inference from order to intelligence1 themselves admit that matter is not a sufficient ,first ,cause of the universe as it actually exists4 ,do they find any person admitting that mind would be an insufficient ,first ,cause8 ,do they themselves see any way of showing its insufficiency8 ,do they not even perceive that it would be foolish and hopeless to try to show that an eternal mind could not create a material universe1 and that all they could show would be1 the here quite irrelevant truth1 that the human mind is ignorant of the manner in which this could be done8 ,if the answers to these questions are what ,i believe they must be1 it must also be acknowledged that the former of the universe can only be rationally thought of as also its creator4 ,i turn to the consideration of another equally futile objection to the argument from order4 ,that argument1 it is said1 does not prove the ,divine ,intelligence to be infinite4 ,the universe1 as a system of order1 is finite1 and we have no right to conclude that its cause is in respect of intelligence1 or in any other respect1 infinite4 ,we must attribute to the cause the wisdom necessary to produce the effect1 but no more4 ,the obvious reply is1 that this is precisely what we do4 ,the argument is not employed to prove the infinity of the ,divine ,intelligence1 but to prove that the order and adaptations which everywhere abound in the universe must have had an intelligence capable of conceiving and producing them4 ,it is an obvious and legitimate argument to that extent1 and it is pushed no farther4 ,the inference that the world had an intelligent author is as simple1 direct1 and valid1 as that any statue1 painting1 or book had an intelligent author4 ,when ,mr ,spencer1 ,mr ,lewes1 and ,professor ,tyndall argue that the cause of the universe cannot be known to be intelligent1 because the reason of man1 being finite1 cannot comprehend the infinite1 they overlook that the reason of man has no need to comprehend the infinite in order to apprehend such manifestations of the infinite as come before it4 ,just as a person reading the works of the able men who urge this weak objection feels certain that these books must have had their origin in minds endowed with certain intellectual powers1 and cannot have been produced by chance1 or blind forces1 or bodies destitute of minds1 and this although much in their minds is and always must be inscrutable to him2 so1 when he studies the books of nature and of history1 he feels equally certain1 and in the same way certain1 that they are the compositions of a most amazing intellect2 and his certainty as to this need not be lessened1 clouded1 or in any degree affected1 by the great and indubitable1 but here irrelevant1 truth--that the mind of ,god is in itself1 in its essence1 inscrutable2 and in its greatness1 its infinity1 incomprehensible4 ,the argument from order must further be admitted sufficient to show1 if valid at all1 that the wisdom of the ,first ,cause is of the most wondrous character4 ,the more nature and mind and history are studied by any one who sees in them evidence of design at all1 the more wondrous must the wisdom displayed in them be felt to be4 ,whoever realises that that wisdom is at once guiding the countless hosts of heavenly bodies in all their evolutions through the boundless realms of space1 and fashioning and providing for the countless hosts of microscopic creatures dwelling on the leaf of a flower or in a drop of water1 everywhere accomplishing a multitude of ends by few and simple means1 or effecting single and definite purposes by the most elaborate and complex contrivances1 must feel that rash beyond all expression is the short-sighted mortal who can venture to affirm that it is not infinite4 ,if the ,lord by wisdom hath founded the earth1 and by understanding hath established the heavens1 ,his wisdom and ,his understanding are at least so great that we cannot measure them1 and have no right to pronounce them limited4 ,the adjustments and harmonies of the universe1 as we know it1 indicate a depth and richness of wisdom in its ,author which far pass our comprehension2 and the universe which we know is probably less in comparison with the universe which ,god has made1 than the leaf on which a host of animalcules live and die is in comparison with the vastest of primeval forests1 or an ant-hill with the solar system4 ,the universe which we see and know is a noble commentary on such words of ,scripture as these3 ,i wisdom dwell with prudence1 and find out knowledge of witty inventions4 ,the ,lord possessed me in the beginning of ,his way1 before ,his works of old4 ,i was set up from everlasting1 from the beginning1 or ever the earth was4 ,when ,he prepared the heavens1 ,i was there3 when ,he set a compass on the face of the depth3 when ,he established the clouds above3 when ,he strengthened the fountains of the deep3 when ,he gave to the sea his decree1 that the waters should not pass ,his commandment3 when ,he appointed the foundations of the earth3 then ,i was by ,him1 as one brought up with ,him2 and ,i was daily ,his delight1 rejoicing always before ,him4 ,but beyond the universe which we see and know1 extend illimitable fields of space and stretches of time which we do not see and do not know1 but which may be even more crowded with the works of ,divine ,intelligence than any which are within our range of bodily or mental vision4 ,the ingenious authors of the book entitled ',the ,unseen ,universe' suppose the entire visible universe to be but a local product and temporary phase of a far older and greater universe1 which itself again may be only an island in the ocean of a universe still more stupendous and refined4 ,whatever error may be mingled with this thought in the work mentioned1 there is1 ,i doubt not1 at least this much of truth also1 that the entire course of nature which science reveals is but a ripple1 a current1 in the ocean of ,god's universal action4 ,the man whose mind is duly open to the possibility of this will not venture to pronounce the intelligence of ,god to be finite4 ,the man who fails to recognise its possibility is very blind1 very thoughtless4 ,it is scarcely credible that the evidences of ,god's wisdom should have been argued to be proofs of ,his weakness4 ,and yet this has happened4 ,it is not too much to say1 wrote ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 that every indication of design in the ,kosmos is so much evidence against the omnipotence of the ,designer4 ,for what is meant by design8 ,contrivance3 the adaptation of means to an end4 ,but the necessity for contrivance--the need of employing means--is a consequence of the limitation of power4 ,who would have recourse to means if to attain his end his mere word was sufficient8 ,the very idea of means implies that the means have an efficacy which the direct action of the being who employs them has not4 ,otherwise they are not means1 but an encumbrance4 ,a man does not use machinery to move his arms4 ,if he did1 it could only be when paralysis had deprived him of the power of moving them by volition4 ,but if the employment of contrivance is in itself a sign of limited power1 how much more so is the careful and skilful choice of contrivances8 ,can any wisdom be shown in the selection of means when the means have no efficacy but what is given them by the will of him who employs them1 and when his will could have bestowed the same efficacy on any other means8 ,wisdom and contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties1 and there is no room for them in a being for whom no difficulties exist4 ,the evidences1 therefore1 of natural theology distinctly imply that the author of the ,kosmos worked under limitations4#cj #cj ,three ,essays on ,religion1 pp4 #agf1 #agg4 ,this1 it seems to me1 is very strange and worthless reasoning4 ,according to it1 the ability of ,god to form and execute a purpose is evidence not of power but of weakness4 ,i wonder if ,mr ,mill imagined that the inability of ,god to form and carry out a purpose would have been evidence not of ,his weakness but of ,his power4 ,or did he suppose1 perhaps1 that both ability and inability were signs of weakness1 and that1 consequently1 for once opposites were identical8 ,or did he not think on the subject at all1 and so reasoned very much at random8 ,i confess ,i cannot see how ability to contrive things is weakness1 or inability to contrive them power4 ,i hold to ,bacon's maxim that knowledge is power1 and refuse to admit that wisdom is weakness4 ,but ,god1 if omnipotent1 it is said1 did not need to contrive3 ,his mere word must have been sufficient4 ,yes1 is the obvious answer2 ,his mere word1 ,his mere will1 was sufficient to produce all ,his contrivances1 and has produced them all4 ,there is no shadow of reason for suspecting that anything was difficult to ,him or for ,him4 ,no such suspicion is entertained by those who employ the design argument2 and those who would rationally object to that argument must find something else to insist on than the power of ,god's mere will4 ,the will of ,god is everywhere as efficacious as ,he in ,his omnipotence and omniscience chooses that it should be4 ,at the same time1 if ,he desire certain ends1 ,his will cannot remain mere will and dispense with the contrivance of appropriate means4 ,if ,he wish to bestow happiness on human beings1 ,he must create human beings1 and contrive their bodies and minds4 ,to speak of ,his will as able to bestow the same efficacy on any means is no less contrary to reason than it would be to speak of it as able to make the part greater than the whole4 ,it is only in the world imagined by ,mr ,mill--one in which two and two might be five--that a sunbeam could serve the same purpose as a granite pillar or a steam-engine2 and such a world1 most people will assuredly hold1 even omnipotence could not create4 ,infinite power and wisdom must necessarily work under limitations when they originate and control finite things2 but the limitations are not in the infinite power and wisdom themselves--they are in their operations and effects4 ,according to ,mr ,mill's argument1 infinite power could not create a finite world at all3 only a finite power could do so4 ,that surely means that a finite power must be mightier than an infinite power2 and that1 again1 is surely a plain self-contradiction1 a manifest absurdity4 ,there is another objection which1 although in itself unworthy of answer1 has been urged so often and presented in so many forms1 some of which are rhetorically impressive1 that it cannot be wholly passed over4 ,the design argument has been censured as assuming that the genesis of the heavens and the earth was effected somewhat after the manner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture--as converting the ,power whose garment is seen in the visible universe into an ,artificer1 fashioned after the human model1 and acting as man is seen to act--as transforming the ,first ,cause into a magnified mechanist who constructs a work of art1 and then sits apart from it and observes how it goes1 c4 ,now the heavens and the earth are to such a wonderful extent exemplifications both of mechanical laws and sthetic principles1 that no man of sense1 ,i think1 will deny that they may most justly be compared to machines or works of art1 or even pronounced to be machines and works of art4 ,they are that1 although they are more than that4 ,an animal is a machine1 although an organism too4 ,every organism is a machine1 although every machine is not an organism4 ,art and nature are not antagonistic and exclusive4 ,man and all man's arts are included in nature1 and nature is the highest art4 ,while1 however1 it is legitimate and even necessary to illustrate the design argument by references to human inventions1 the numerous and immense differences between the works of man's art and the processes of nature must not be overlooked2 and there is no excuse for saying that they have been overlooked4 ,it is precisely because the universe is so above anything man has made or can make1 and because vegetable and animal organisms are so different from watches and statues1 that the argument in question leads us to a divine and not to a merely human intelligence4 ,it implies that both the works of ,god and the works of man are products of intelligence2 but it does not require that they should have anything else in common4 ,it recognises that the most elaborate and exquisite contrivances of man fall immeasurably below nature's most minute designs4 ,so far from requiring1 it forbids our carrying any of the limitations or peculiarities of human contrivance over to that which is divine4 ,besides1 the belief in design is held in conjunction with the belief in creation out of nothing4 ,the same persons who recognise that there is a divine wisdom displayed in the constitution and course of nature believe the universe to have been called into being by the mere volition of the ,almighty4 ,but among all theories of the genesis of the heavens and the earth1 that is the only one which does not represent the ,first ,cause as working like a man4 ,man never creates--he cannot create4 ,to produce anything he must have something to work on--he must have materials to mould and modify4#ca #ca ,see ,appendix ,,xxii4 ,,ii4 ,those who refuse to refer the order and adaptations in the universe to a designing intelligence are bound to account for them in some other way4 ,has this been done8 ,has any person succeeded in tracing them back to any other principle which can be reasonably regarded as their cause1 or as adequate to their production8 ,this is the question which we have now to consider4 ,matter1 some would have us believe1 is the origin of the order of the universe4 ,grant it1 and there is still the question--,what is the origin of matter8--to be disposed of4 ,we have seen that this is a question which we are bound to raise2 we have seen that there are strong reasons for holding that matter had an origin1 had a beginning in time1 and none whatever for regarding it as self-existent and eternal4 ,the very existence of order and system1 of mechanical adjustments and organic adaptations in the universe1 seems to prove that matter must have had a beginning4 ,if certain collocations of matter evince design1 and must have had a beginning1 the adaptation of the parts to form the collocation evinces design1 and implies a beginning4 ,and if matter had a beginning1 its cause can only have been mind4 ,to say that it originated with chance or necessity is plainly absurd4 ,chance and necessity are meaningless terms unless mind or matter be presupposed4 ,there can be no accidents where neither mind nor matter exists4 ,there can be no chance where there is no law4 ,chance or accident is what occurs when two or more independent series of phenomena meet1 without their meeting having been premeditated and provided for4 ,when one series of causes leads a man to pass a house at a given moment of a given day1 and another series of causes1 coexistent with but wholly independent of the former series1 determines that a heavy body shall fall from the roof of that house at that moment of that day and kill that man1 the consequence--his death--is what may be properly called an accident1 or matter of chance4 ,one who believes1 indeed1 in the omniscience and universal foreordination and government of ,god1 will hold that even in such a case the accident or chance is merely apparent2 but he will not deny the right of the atheist to speak of chance or accident in this way1 or to explain as matters of chance whatever he can4 ,the word chance1 or accident1 can have no intelligible sense1 however1 unless there be such independent series of phenomena--unless there be mental and material existences1 mental and material laws4 ,chance cannot be conceived of1 even by the atheist1 as the origin of existence4 ,the same may be said of necessity4 ,matter or mind may act necessarily1 but necessity cannot act without matter or mind4 ,if it be requisite1 therefore1 to seek a cause for matter1 mind alone can be assigned as its cause4 ,if we are justified in seeking for the origin of matter at all1 our choice of an answer lies between mind and absurdity1 between a real and sufficient cause and an imaginary and inconceivable cause4 ,besides1 how could matter of itself produce order1 even if it were self-existent and eternal8 ,it is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or constituents of matter produced of themselves1 without the action of a ,supreme ,mind1 this wonderful universe1 than that the letters of the ,english alphabet produced the plays of ,shakespeare1 without the slightest assistance from the human mind known by that famous name4 ,these atoms might1 perhaps1 now and then1 here and there1 at great distances and long intervals1 produce1 by a chance contact1 some curious collocation or compound2 but never could they produce order or organisation1 on an extensive scale or of a durable character1 unless ordered1 arranged1 and adjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate explanation4 ,to believe that their fortuitous and undirected movements could originate the universe1 and all the harmonies and utilities and beauties which abound in it1 evinces a credulity far more extravagant than has ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists4 ,yet no consistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance-hypothesis4 ,all the explanations of the order of the universe which materialists1 from ,democritus and ,epicurus to ,diderot and ,lange1 have devised1 rest on the assumption that the elements of matter1 being eternal1 must pass through infinite combinations1 and that one of these must be our present world--a special collocation among the countless millions of collocations1 past and future4 ,throw the letters of the ,greek alphabet1 it has been said1 an infinite number of times1 and you must produce the ,iliad and all ,greek books4 ,the theory of probabilities1 ,i need hardly say1 requires us to believe nothing so absurd4 ,throw letters together without thought through all eternity1 and you will never make them express thought4 ,all the letters in the ,iliad might have been tossed and jumbled together from morning to night by the hands of the whole human race1 from the beginning of the world until now1 and the first line of the ,iliad would have been still to compose1 had not the genius of ,homer been inspired to sing the wrath of ,achilles and the war around ,troy4 ,but what is the ,iliad to the hymn of creation1 and the drama of providence8 ,were these glorious works composed by the mere jumbling together of atoms1 which were not even prepared beforehand to form things1 as letters are to form words1 and which had to shake themselves into order without the help of any hand8 ,they may believe that who can4 ,it seems to me that it ought to be much easier to believe all the ,arabian ,nights4 ,to ascribe the origination of order to law is a manifest evasion of the real problem4 ,law is order4 ,law is the very thing to be explained4 ,the question is--,has law a reason1 or is it without a reason8 ,the unperverted human mind cannot believe it to be without a reason4 ,the existence of a law connecting and governing any class of phenomena implies a presiding intelligence which has preconceived and established the law4 ,the regulation of events by precise rules of time and space1 of number and measure1 is evidence of thought and mind4 ,so says ,dr ,whewell2 and the statement is amply justified by the fact1 that all laws and rules in the universe imply that existences are related to one another in a way of which intelligent adjustment alone is the adequate and ultimate explanation4 ,the existence of a law uniformly involves the coexistence of several conditions1 and that is a phenomenon which1 whenever the conditions and law are physically ultimate1 and consequently physically inexplicable1 clearly presupposes mind4 ,laws1 in a word1 are not the causes but the expressions of order4 ,they are themselves the results of delicately accurate adjustments1 which indicate the operation of a divine wisdom4 ,there are chemical laws1 for example1 simply because there are chemical elements endowed with affinities1 attractions1 or forces the most diverse1 yet so balanced and harmonised as to secure the welfare of the world4 ,besides1 laws do not act of themselves4 ,no law produces of itself any result4 ,it is the agents which act according to the law that produce results1 and the nature of the result produced depends on the number and character of the agents1 and how each is situated and circumstanced4 ,if the agents oppose each other1 or are inappropriately distributed1 they bring about disorder and disaster in conformity to law4 ,there is no calamity1 no evil1 no scene of confusion1 in the known world1 which is not the result of the action of agents which operate in strictest accordance to law4 ,the law of gravitation might rule every particle of matter1 and yet conflict and confusion and death would prevail throughout the entire solar system were harmony and stability and life not secured by very special arrangements4 ,matter might have all its present inherent and essential laws1 and yet remain for ever a chaos4 ,apart from a designing and superintending intelligence1 the chances in favour of chaos and against cosmos1 even allowing matter to have uncreated properties and laws1 were incalculable4 ,the obvious inference is that which ,professor ,jevons expresses in these words--,as an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an unlimited number of modes of distribution1 there must1 even granting matter to have had all its laws from eternity1 have been at some moment in time1 out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible1 that one choice and distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that now exists4 ,only out of rational choice can order have come4 ,the most common mode1 perhaps1 of evading the problem which order presents to reason1 is the indication of the process by which the order has been realised4 ,from ,democritus to the latest ,darwinian there have been men who supposed that they had completely explained away the evidences for design in nature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangements appealed to as evidences4 ,aristotle showed the absurdity of the supposition more than #bbjj years ago4 ,but those who deny final causes have gone on arguing in the same irrational manner down to the present time4 ,they cannot1 in fact1 do otherwise4 ,they are committed to a false position1 and they dare not abandon the sophism on which it rests4 ,nothing else can explain how any sane mind should infer that because a thing is conditioned it cannot have been designed4 ,the man who argues that the eye was not constructed in order to see because it has been so constructed as to be capable of seeing1 is clearly either unable to reason correctly1 or allows his reasoning faculty to be terribly perverted by prejudice4 ,that a result is secured by appropriate conditions can seem to no sound and unprejudiced intellect a reason for regarding it to have been undesigned4 ,and yet what other reason is involved in all the attempts to explain away final causes by means of the nebular1 ,darwinian1 and other development hypotheses8 ,m4 ,comte imagines that he has shown the inference of design1 from the order and stability of the solar system1 to be unwarranted1 when he has pointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stability are secured1 and the process by which they have been obtained4 ,he refers to the comparative smallness of the planetary masses in relation to the central mass1 the feeble eccentricity of their orbits1 the moderate mutual inclination of their planes1 and the superior mean density of their solid over their fluid constituents1 as the circumstances which render it stable and habitable1 and these characteristic circumstances1 as he calls them1 he tells us flow naturally and necessarily from the simple mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter4 ,when he has done this1 he supposes himself to have proved that the heavens declare no other glory than that of ,hipparchus1 of ,kepler1 and of ,newton4 ,now1 the assertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and the earth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simple mutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter1 is one which greatly requires proof1 but which has never received it4 ,in saying this1 we do not challenge the proof of the nebular theory itself4 ,that theory may or may not be true4 ,we are quite willing to suppose it true2 to grant that it has been scientifically established4 ,what we maintain is1 that even if we admit unreservedly that the earth1 and the whole system to which it belongs1 once existed in a nebulous state1 from which they have been gradually evolved into their present condition conformably to physical laws1 we are in no degree entitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which ,comte and others have drawn4 ,the man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the law of gravitation1 or any other physical law1 has of itself determined the course of cosmical evolution1 so that there is no need for believing in the existence and operation of a ,divine ,mind1 proves merely that he is not exempt from reasoning very illogically4 ,the solar system could only have been evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed a certain size1 mass1 form1 and constitution--if it was neither too rare nor too dense1 neither too fluid nor too tenacious2 if its atoms were all numbered1 its elements all weighed1 its constituents all disposed in due relation to each other--that is to say1 only if the nebula was in reality as much a system of order1 which intelligence alone could account for1 as the worlds which have been developed from it4 ,the origin of the nebula thus presents itself to the reason as a problem which demands solution no less than the origin of the planets4 ,all the properties and laws of the nebula require to be accounted for4 ,what origin are we to give them8 ,it must be either reason or unreason4 ,we may go back as far as we please1 but at every step and stage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the same question--the same alternative4 ,the argument of ,comte1 it is further obvious1 proceeds on the arbitrary and erroneous assumption that a process is proved to have been without significance or purpose when the manner in which it has been brought about is exhibited4 ,it is plain that on this assumption even those works of man which have cost most thought might be shown to have cost none4 ,a house is not built without considerable reflection and continuous reference to an end contemplated and desired1 but the end is only gradually realised by a process which can be traced from its origin onwards1 and through the concurrence or sequence of a multitude of conditions4 ,would a description of the circumstances on which the security and other merits of a house depend1--of the peculiarities in its foundation1 walls1 and roof1 in its configuration and materials1 which render it convenient and comfortable1 or of the processes by which these peculiarities were attained1--prove the house to have been unbuilt by man1 to have been developed without the intervention of an intelligent architect8 ,it would1 if ,comte's argument were good2 if it would not1 ,comte's argument must be bad4 ,but can any one fail to see that such an argument in such a case would be ridiculous8 ,the circumstances1 peculiarities1 and processes referred to are themselves manifest evidences of design and intelligence4 ,they are a part of what has to be explained1 and a part of it which can only be explained on the supposition of a contriving and superintending mind4 ,they entitle us to reject all hypotheses which would explain the construction of the house without taking into account the intelligence of its architect4 ,the circumstances1 peculiarities1 and process described by ,comte1 as rendering the earth an orderly system and the abode of life1 are no less among the evidences for the belief that intelligence has presided over the formation of the earth4 ,they require for their rational comprehension to be thought of as the means and conditions by which ends worthy of intelligence have been secured4 ,they require to be accounted for2 and they cannot be reasonably accounted for except on the supposition of having been designed4 ,if we reject that view we must accept this1 that the present system of things is a special instance of order which has occurred among innumerable instances of disorder1 produced by the interaction of the elements or atoms of matter in infinite time4 ,these elements or atoms we must imagine as affecting all possible combinations1 and falling at length1 after countless failures1 into a regular and harmonious arrangement of things4 ,now1 we can in a vague1 thoughtless way imagine this1 but we cannot justify our belief of it either by particular facts or general reasons4 ,it is an act of imagination wholly divorced from intelligence4 ,thus to refer the origin and explanation of universal order to chance1 is merely mental caprice4 ,if the evolution of the earth and the heavenly bodies from a nebula destroy neither the relevancy nor the force of the design argument1 the development of complex organisms from simple ones1 and the descent of all the plants and animals on earth from a very few living cells or forms1 will not remove or lessen the necessity for supposing an intelligence to have designed all the organisms1 simple and complex alike1 and to have foreordained1 arranged1 and presided over the course of their development4 ,were it even proved that life and organisation had been evolved out of dead and inorganic matter1 the necessity of believing in such an intelligence would still remain4 ,nothing of the kind has yet been proved4 ,on the contrary1 scientific experimentation has all tended to show that life proceeds only from life4 ,but had it been otherwise--had this break and blank in the development theory been filled up--matter would only have been proved to be more wonderful than it had been supposed to be4 ,the scientific confirmation of the hypothesis of what is called spontaneous generation would not relieve the mind from the necessity of referring the potency of life and all else that is wonderful in matter either to design or chance1 reason or unreason--it would not free it from the dilemma which had previously presented itself4#cb #cb ,see ,appendix ,,xxiii4 ,the development of higher from lower organisms1 of course1 still less frees us from the obligation to believe that a supreme intelligence presides over the development4 ,development is not itself a cause1 but a process1--it is a something which must have a cause2 and the only kinds of development which have yet been shown to be exemplified in the organic world demand intelligence as their ultimate cause4 ,i do not know that ,i can better prove that there is no opposition between development and design than by referring to an illustration which ,professor ,huxley made use of with a directly contrary view4 ,to show that the argument from final causes1 or what is often called the theological argument1 had1 as commonly stated1 received its death-blow from ,mr ,darwin1 he wrote as follows3 ,the theological argument runs thus--an organ or organism 7,a7 is precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose 7,b72 therefore it was specially constructed to perform that purpose4 ,in ,paley's famous illustration1 the adaptation of all the parts of the watch to the function or purpose of showing the time1 is held to be evidence that the watch was specially contrived to that end1 on the ground that the only cause we know of competent to produce such an effect as a watch which shall keep time is a contriving intelligence1 adapting the means directly to that end4 ,suppose1 however1 that any one had been able to show that the watch had not been made directly by any person1 but that it was the result of the modification of another watch which kept time but poorly1 and that this1 again1 had proceeded from a structure which could hardly be called a watch at all1 seeing that it had no figures on the dial1 and the hands were rudimentary1 and that1 going back and back in time1 we come at last to a revolving barrel as the earliest traceable rudiment of the whole fabric4 ,and imagine that it had been possible to show that all these changes had resulted first from a tendency in the structure to vary indefinitely1 and secondly from something in the surrounding world which helped all variations in the direction of an accurate time-keeper and checked all those in other directions1--then it is obvious that the force of ,paley's argument would be gone4 ,for it would be demonstrated that an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular purpose might be the result of a method of trial and error worked by unintelligent agents1 as well as of the direct application of the means appropriate to that end by an intelligent agent4#cc #cc ,lay ,sermons1 pp4 #ccj1 #cca4 ,our great comparative physiologist would probably not write so at present4 ,he may still not accept the design argument2 but he is now well aware that it has not got its death-blow1 nor even any serious wound1 from the theory of evolution4 ,he has since1 on more than one occasion1 shown the perfect compatibility of development with design4 ,he might1 perhaps1 in defence of his earlier and less considerate utterances1 maintain that no organ has been made with the precise structure which it at present possesses in order to accomplish the precise function which it at present fulfils2 but he admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume a primordial molecular arrangement1 of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences1 and is thereby at the mercy of the theologist1 who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe4 ,granting thus much1 he is logically bound to grant more4 ,if the entire evolution of the universe may have been intended1 the several stages of its evolution may have been intended2 and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the collective evolution or its final result4 ,if eyes and ears were contrived for a purpose1 the eyes and ears of each species of animals may have been made with the precise structure which they exhibit for the precise purposes which they fulfil1 although they may have been developed out of a different kind of eyes and ears1 and will1 in the lapse of ages1 be developed into still other kinds4 ,the higher theology1 the general designs1 which ,professor ,huxley admits evolution cannot touch1 is in no opposition to the lower theology1 the special designs1 which he strangely supposes it to have definitively discarded4 ,nothing can be more certain than that ,dr ,paley would have held the design argument to have been in no degree weakened by the theory of evolution1 and that he would have been very much astonished by ,professor ,huxley's remarks on that argument4 ,in referring to the mechanism of a watch as an evidence of intelligence in its maker1 ,dr ,paley pointed out that our idea of the greatness of that intelligence would be much increased if watches were so constructed as to give rise to other watches like themselves4 ,he must necessarily have admitted that the watch imagined by ,professor ,huxley was still more remarkable1 and implied a still greater intelligence in its contrivance4 ,the revolving barrel must have had wonderful capabilities1 which only intelligence could confer4 ,all the circumstances in which it was to be placed must have been foreseen1 and all the influences which were to act upon it must have been taken into account1 which could only be done by intelligence4 ,all that helped variations in the direction of an accurate time-keeper must have been brought into requisition1 and all that hindered it1 or favoured variations in other directions1 must have been detected and checked2 but no unintelligent agents can be conceived of as accomplishing such work1 or as more than the means of accomplishing it employed by a providential ,reason4 ,the greater the distance between the revolving barrel and the most elaborated watch--the greater the number of mechanisms between the first and the last of these two terms1 or between the commencing cause and the final result--the greater the necessity for a mind the most comprehensive and accurate1 to serve as an explanation of the entire series of mechanisms and the whole process of development4 ,mr ,darwin1 and a large number of those who are called ,darwinians1 profess to prove that all the order of organic nature may have been unintentionally originated by the mechanical operation of natural forces4 ,they think they can explain how1 from a few simple living forms1 or even from a single primordial cell1 the entire vegetable and animal kingdoms1 with all their harmonies and beauties1 have arisen wholly independent of any ordaining and presiding mind1 by means of the operation of the law of heredity that like produces like2 of variability from the action of the conditions of life1 and from use and disuse2 of over-production1 or a ratio of increase so high as to lead to a struggle for existence2 of natural selection1 or the survival and prevalence of the fittest1 and the disappearance and extinction of what is unsuited to its circumstances and inferior to its competitors2 and of sexual selection4 ,but the remarkable originality1 ingenuity1 and skill which they display in endeavouring to establish1 illustrate1 and apply these laws1 make all the more striking the absence of freshness and independence1 of force or relevancy1 in the reasonings by which they would attach to them an irreligious inference4 ,the same men who have adduced so many new facts1 and thrown so much new light on facts previously known1 in support of the real or alleged laws indicated1 have not adduced a single new reason1 and scarcely even set in a more plausible light a single old reason1 for the denial of design4 ,they assure us1 copiously and vehemently1 that the laws which they claim to have proved are in themselves a disproof of design2 but they somehow forget that it is incumbent on them to bestow the labour requisite to make this manifest4 ,they reason as if it were almost or wholly self-evident1 whereas a little more thought would show them that all their laws imply mind and purpose4 ,there is a law of heredity3 like produces like4 ,but why is there such a law8 ,why does like produce like8 ,why should not all nature have been sterile8 ,why should there have been any provision for the propagation of life in a universe ruled by a mere blind force8 ,and why should producer and produced be like8 ,why should offspring not always be as unlike their parents as tadpoles are unlike frogs8 ,the offspring of all the higher animals pass through various embryological stages in which they are extremely unlike their parents4 ,why should they ever become like to them8 ,physical science cannot answer these questions2 but that is no reason why they should not both be asked and answered4 ,i can conceive of no other intelligent answer being given to them than that there is a ,god of wisdom1 who designed that the world should be for ages the abode of life2 that the life therein should be rich and varied1 yet that variation should have its limits2 that there should be no disorder or confusion2 and who1 to secure this result1 decreed that plants should yield seeds1 and animals bring forth1 after their kind4 ,he who would disprove design must certainly not start with the great mystery of generation4 ,then1 the so-called law of variability is the expression of a purpose which must have ,reason at its beginning1 middle1 and end4 ,there is in no organism an absolutely indefinite tendency to vary4 ,every variation of every organism is in some measure determined by the constitution of the organism4 ,a whale1 as ,dr ,huxley says1 does not tend to vary in the direction of producing feathers1 nor a bird in the direction of producing whalebone4 ,but a tendency to definite variation is an indication of purpose4 ,if a man could make a revolving barrel with a tendency to develop into a watch1 he would have to be credited with having designed both the barrel and watch1 not less than if he had contrived and constructed the two separately4 ,further1 variation has proceeded in a definite direction4 ,darwin admits that there is no law of necessary advancement4 ,there is no more reason in the nature of the case for improvement than for deterioration4 ,apart from the internal constitution of an organism having been so planned1 and its external circumstances so arranged1 as to favour the one rather than the other1 its variations could not have been more towards self-perfection than self-destruction4 ,but variation1 according to the ,darwinians1 has taken place in one direction and not in another2 it has been forward1 not backward2 it has been a progression1 not a retrogression4 ,why8 ,only because of a continuous adjustment of organisms to circumstances tending to bring this about4 ,had there been no such adjustment1 there might have been only unsuitable variations1 or the suitable variations might have been so few and slight that no higher organisms would have been evolved4 ,natural selection might have had no materials1 or altogether insufficient materials1 to work with4 ,or the circumstances might have been such1 that the lowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle of life4 ,if the earth were covered with water1 fish would survive1 and higher creatures would perish4 ,natural selection cannot have made the conditions of its own action--the circumstances in the midst of which it must operate4 ,therefore1 there is more in progressive variation than it can explain3 there is what only an all-regulative intelligence can explain4 ,again1 there is a law of over-production1 we are told1 which gives rise to a struggle for existence4 ,well1 is this law not a means to an end worthy of ,divine ,wisdom8 ,in it we find the reason why the world is so wonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life4 ,what is called over-production is a productivity which is in excess of the means of subsistence provided for the species itself2 but no species exists merely for itself4 ,the ratio of the production of life is probably none too high for the wants of all the creatures which have to be supplied with food and enjoyment4 ,and the wants of all creatures are what have to be taken into account2 not the wants of any single species--not the wants of man alone4 ,if we adequately realised how vast is the number of guests which have constantly to be fed at the table of nature1 we would1 ,i have no doubt1 acknowledge that there is little1 if any1 real waste of life in the world4 ,then1 the struggle to which the rate of production gives rise is1 on the showing of the ,darwinians themselves1 subservient to the noblest ends4 ,although involving privation1 pain1 and conflict1 its final result is order and beauty4 ,all the perfections of sentient creatures are represented as due to it4 ,through it the lion has gained its strength1 the deer its speed1 the dog its sagacity4 ,the inference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained by it2 that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the advantages which it is actually seen to produce4 ,the suffering which the conflict involves may indicate that ,god has made even animals for some higher end than happiness--that ,he cares for animal perfection as well as for animal enjoyment2 but it affords no reason for denying that the ends which the conflict actually serves1 it was also intended to serve4 ,besides1 the conflict is clearly not a struggle for bare existence2 it is1 even as regards the animals1 a struggle for the largest amount of enjoyment which they can secure1 and for the free and full exercise of all their faculties4 ,it thus manifests1 not only indirectly but also directly1 what its ends are4 ,they are ends which can only be reasonably conceived of as having been purposed by an intelligence1 and which are eminently worthy of a ,divine intelligence4 ,but what of the law1 or so-called law1 of natural selection8 ,in itself1 and so far as physical science can either prove or disprove it1 it is simply an expression of the alleged fact1 that in the struggle of life1 any variation1 however caused1 which is profitable to the individuals of a species1 will tend to their preservation1 will have a chance of being transmitted to their offspring1 and will be of use to them likewise1 so that they will survive and multiply at the expense of competitors which are not so well endowed4 ,but natural selection thus understood is obviously in no opposition to design2 on the contrary1 it is a way in which design may be realised4 ,some might even hold that design cannot be conceived of as realised in any other natural way2 that if not thus realised1 it could only be miraculously realised4 ,but ,mr ,darwin1 and many of those who call themselves his followers1 tell us not only that there is natural selection1 but that blind forces and mechanical laws alone bring it about2 that intention and intelligence have nothing to do with it4 ,what proof do they give us8 ,alas6 the painful thing is that they give us none4 ,they point out the blind forces and the mechanical laws by which the selection is effected and its results secured2 they show how they are adapted to accomplish their work3 and then they assert that these forces and laws explain the whole matter2 that no underlying and all-embracing reason has prepared1 arranged1 and used them4 ,they see the physical agencies and the physical process by which order and beauty have been attained--they do not see intelligence and design2 and because they do not see them1 they conclude that they have no existence4 ,they describe the mechanism which their senses apprehend1 and affirm it to have made itself1 or at least to have been unmade1 and to work of itself1 because the mind which contrived it and directs it is inaccessible to sense4 ,all their reasoning resolves itself into a denial of what is spiritual because it is unseen4 ,the only instances of natural selection which have been adduced to show that blind forces may bring about results as remarkable1 and of the same kind1 as those which are accomplished by intelligent agents1 are manifestly irrelevant4 ,they are of such a nature that every teleologist must hold them to imply what they are intended to disprove4 ,when ,professor ,huxley points to the winds and waves of the ,bay of ,biscay as carefully selecting the particles of sea-sand on the coast of ,brittany1 and heaping them1 according to their size and weight1 in different belts along the shore2 to a frosty night selecting the hardy plants in a plantation from among the tender ones2 and to a hurricane transporting a sapling to a new seat in the soil1--he completely mistakes what the problem before him is4 ,fire and water can produce wonderful effects in a steam-engine2 but the man who should infer1 from there being no intelligence in the fire and water themselves1 that intelligence must have had nothing to do with their effects when they were brought into contact in a steam-engine1 would deserve no great credit for his reasoning4 ,it is precisely ,professor ,huxley's reasoning4 ,he looks at the fire and water separately1 and completely ignores the engine4 ,because in a world which is a system of order and law a certain collocation and combination of physical conditions and forces will produce an orderly result1 he infers that design and intelligence are not needed to produce such a result4 ,i submit that that is illegitimate and irrelevant reasoning4 ,it resolves itself into a denial of ,divine and intelligent agency1 because the senses apprehend merely physical elements and a physical process4 ,it assumes a selected adaptation1 which presupposes intelligence in order to get rid of intelligence4 ,it begs the whole question4 ,the so-called law of sexual selection1 if it be a law at all1 is obviously teleological in its nature4 ,its end is the production of beauty in form and colour4 ,can blind physical forces1 if not subservient to intelligence1 be conceived of as working towards so essentially ideal a goal as beauty8 ,i think enough has now been said to show that the researches and speculations of the ,darwinians have left unshaken the design argument4 ,i might have gone farther if time had permitted1 and proved that they had greatly enriched the argument4 ,the works of ,mr ,darwin are invaluable to the theologian1 owing to the multitude of beautiful contrivances and marvellous adjustments admirably described in them4 ,the treatises on the fertilisation of orchids and on insectivorous plants require only to have their legitimate conclusions deduced and applied in order to be transformed into treatises of natural theology4 ,if ,paley's famous work be now somewhat out of date1 it is not because ,mr ,darwin and his followers have refuted it1 but because they have brought so much to light which confirms its argument4#cd #cd ,see ,appendix ,,xxiv4 ,i have challenged the theology of ,mr ,darwin1 and those who follow his guidance in theology4 ,i have no wish to dispute his science4 ,i pass no judgment on his theories so far as they are scientific theories4 ,it may be safely left to the progress of scientific research to determine how far they are true and how far erroneous4 ,we ought not to assail them needlessly1 or to reject the truth which is in them1 under the influence of a senseless dread that they can hurt religion4 ,in so far as they are true1 they must be merely expressions of the way in which ,divine intelligence has operated in the universe4 ,instead of excluding1 they must imply belief in an all-originating1 all-foreseeing1 all-foreordaining1 all-regulative intelligence1 to determine the rise and the course and the goal of life1 as of all finite things4 ,that intelligence far transcends the comprehension of our finite minds1 yet we apprehend it as true intelligence4 ,it is no blind force1 but a ,reason which knows itself1 and knows us1 and knows all things1 and in the wisdom of which we may fully confide1 even when clouds and darkness hide from us the definite reasons of its operations4 ,we can see and know enough of its wisdom to justify faith where sight and knowledge are denied to us4 ,let us trust and follow it1 and1 without doubt1 it will lead us by a path which we knew not1 and make darkness light before us1 and crooked things straight4 ,,lecture ,,vii4 ,,moral ,,argument--,,testimony ,,of ,,conscience ,,and ,,history4 ,i4 ,,we have seen how the power manifest in the universe leads up to ,god as the ,first ,cause1 the all-originating ,will4 ,we have seen also how the order manifest in the universe leads up to ,him as the ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,but there is more in the universe than force and order2 there is force which works for good1 and a just and benevolent order2 there are moral laws and moral actions1 moral perceptions and moral feelings4 ,can anything be thence inferred as to whether ,god is1 and what ,he is8 ,i think we shall find that they clearly testify both as to ,his existence and character4 ,the moral law which reveals itself to conscience has seemed to certain authors so decisive a witness for ,god1 that all other witnesses may be dispensed with4 ,kant1 who exerted his great logical ability to prove that the speculative reason in searching after ,god inevitably loses itself in sophisms and self-contradictions1 believed himself to have found in the practical reason or moral faculty an assurance for the ,divine existence and government capable of defying the utmost efforts of scepticism4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton has also affirmed that the only valid arguments for the existence of ,god1 and for the immortality of the human soul1 rest on the ground of man's moral nature4 ,dr ,john ,newman has insisted that conscience is the creative principle of religion1 and has endeavoured to show how the whole doctrine of natural religion should be worked out from this central principle4 ,a well-known living theologian of ,germany1 ,dr ,schenkel1 has attempted to build up a complete theology on conscience as a basis1 starting from the position that conscience is the religious organ of the soul--the faculty through which alone we have an immediate knowledge of ,god4 ,these thinkers may have erred in relying thus exclusively on the moral argument--,i believe that they have--but the error1 if error there be1 shows only the more clearly how convincing that argument has seemed to certain minds1 and these assuredly not feeble minds4 ,there is1 besides1 valuable truth underlying any exaggerations into which they may have fallen on the subject4 ,there is probably no living practical belief in ,god which does not begin with the conscience4 ,it is not reasoning on a first cause1 nor even admiration of the wisdom displayed in the universe1 which makes the thought of ,god habitually and efficaciously present to the mind4 ,it is not any kind of thinking nor any kind of feeling excited by the physical universe or by the contemplation of society1 which gives us an abiding and operative sense of ,god's presence1 and of ,his relationship to us4 ,it is only in and through an awakened and active conscience that we realise our nearness to ,god--,his interest in us1 and our interest in ,him4 ,without a moral nature of our own1 we could not recognise the moral character and moral government manifested by ,him4 ,we might tremble before ,his power1 or we might admire ,his skill1 but ,his righteousness would be hidden from us1 ,his moral laws would be meaningless to us1 and their sanctions would be merely a series of physical advantages or physical disasters4 ,but a ,god without righteousness is no true ,god1 and the worship which has no moral element in it is no true worship4 ,as1 then1 it is only through the glass of conscience that the righteousness of ,god can be discerned1 and as that attribute alone can call forth1 in addition to the fear1 wonder1 and admiration evoked by power and intelligence1 the love1 the sense of spiritual weakness and want1 and the adoring reverence1 which are indispensable in true worship--such worship as ,god ought to receive and man ought to render--the significance of the moral principle in the theistic argumentation is vast indeed4 ,it follows1 however1 from the entire course of the reasoning in which we have been engaged1 that the moral argument is not to be exclusively relied on4 ,it is but a part of a whole from which it ought not to be severed4 ,it cannot be stated in any valid form which does not imply the legitimacy of the arguments from efficiency and order4 ,if other facts do not refer us back to a primary case1 neither will moral facts lead us to the primary moral agent4 ,if order is no evidence of intelligent purpose1 moral order can be no evidence of moral purpose4 ,the moral argument proves more1 but also less1 than the arguments which have been already expounded4 ,it shows us that ,god is endowed with the highest moral excellence1 and is the source of moral law and of moral government1 but it does not prove ,him to be the ,creator of the universe or the ,author of all order in the universe4 ,it contributes to the idea of ,god an essential element1 without which that idea would be lamentably defective1 but it supposes other elements also essential to be given by other arguments4 ,the office of bearing witness to the existence and character of ,god can be safely devolved on no one principle alone1 even although that principle be conscience4 ,it is a work in which all the principles of human nature are privileged to concur4 ,either all bear true testimony1 or all have conspired to deceive us4 ,the self-manifestation of ,god is addressed to the entire man1 and can only be rightly apprehended by the concurrent action of all the energies and capacities of the soul4#ce #ce ,see ,appendix ,,xxv4 ,it is1 perhaps1 especially important in conducting the moral argument to ask ourselves distinctly1 ,whence ought we to begin8 ,is there any point1 any fact or principle1 which we are in reason bound to start from8 ,inattention to this preliminary inquiry has caused many to try to look at moral facts en masse1 as it were1 and to endeavour to draw an inference from them in virtue of something common to them all4 ,this can only lead to confusion and error4 ,moral facts are of two radically distinct classes1 and cannot be comprehended under any higher generalisation1 which can be taken as the foundation of a theistic inference4 ,the facts need to be distributed and interpreted--to have their characters discriminated2 and we must begin with the principle by which this is done--that is1 with conscience itself4 ,we need no more attempt to judge of moral qualities without reference to our moral perceptions and feelings--to the information given us through conscience--than to pass a judgment on colours before seeing them1 or irrespective of how they appeared to us when we saw them4 ,if we look at the moral facts of the universe from any outside point of view--not from that of conscience--how can we escape ascribing the evil as well as the good to ,god1 and trying ,his character either from both or from the preponderance of the one over the other8 ,but if we do so1--if we seek to rise to ,god through an induction from all moral facts--we shall form a miserable notion of ,god1 and we shall1 besides1 ride rough-shod1 as it were1 over conscience4 ,for what is it that conscience declares most clearly about moral good and evil1 right and wrong8 ,is it not that they are radically antagonistic--irreconcilable and contradictory1--that they cannot have the same ultimate author--that if the one be the expression of ,god's will1 the other must be the expression of ,his aversion8 ,if conscience have any testimony to give about ,god at all1 it is that1 as the author of good1 ,he must be the enemy of evil4 ,the contemplation of the moral world may perplex us1 but conscience is an assurance that evil1 however perplexing1 is not to be referred to the same source as good4 ,the testimony of conscience on behalf of ,god has been presented in various ways1 and it need not surprise us to find some of them unsatisfactory4 ,i regard as unwarranted the view that conscience is the religious organ of the soul1 the sole faculty through which the human mind is in contact and communion with ,god4 ,there is no one specific power or organ of the mind in virtue of which exclusively man is a religious being4 ,it is by the whole make and constitution of his nature1 not by a particular faculty1 that he is framed for religion4 ,i more than question if we have a right even to ascribe to conscience an immediate intuition of ,god4 ,it brings us1 some have affirmed1 in a strict and positive sense into the real presence of ,god1 with nothing intervening between us and ,him--,he as the absolute personality standing sharply and distinctly over against our personality4 ,this doctrine has1 however1 one obvious and serious difficulty before it4 ,conscience--that is a word which has got in ordinary use a very clear and definite meaning4 ,we all know what conscience is as well as we know what the eye or the ear is1 and we all know what an act of conscience is as well as we know what seeing or hearing is4 ,it is not more certain that by the eye we see colours1 and that by the ear we hear sounds1 than that by conscience we discern good and evil4 ,when1 therefore1 any man comes and assures us that through conscience we have an immediate apprehension of ,god1 it is natural that we should answer at once1 ,you may as well assure us that through sight we immediately hear sounds or smell odours4 ,what we immediately apprehend through conscience is the right or wrong in actions1 and therefore not ,god4 ,morality is the direct object of conscience2 ,god can therefore only be the presupposition or postulate of conscience1--can only be given in conscience as implied in morality4 ,this1 ,i say1 is an obvious objection to the assertion that ,god is immediately known in conscience4 ,it is an objection which has not been got over1 and which1 ,i believe1 cannot be got over4#cf #cf ,see ,appendix ,,xxvi4 ,the argument from conscience1 like all the other theistic arguments1 is extremely simple4 ,it is the obvious inference from the most obvious facts of our moral consciousness4 ,it demands of us no subtle analysis of conscience4 ,it is not dependent on the truth of some one particular theory as to the origin of conscience4 ,it is based directly on what cannot be denied or disputed1--the existence of conscience1 the existence of certain moral judgments and feelings common to the experience of all men4 ,conscience exists4 ,it exists as a consciousness of moral law2 as an assertion of a rule of duty2 as a sense of responsibility4 ,when it pronounces an action right1 it does so because it recognises it to be conformed to law2 when it pronounces an action wrong1 it does so because it recognises it to fall short of or to transgress law4 ,it acts as the judge of all that we do1 and as such it accuses or excuses1 condemns or approves1 punishes or rewards us1 with a voice of authority1 which we may so far disregard1 but the legitimacy of which we cannot dispute4 ,it claims to rule over body and soul1 heart and mind1 all our appetites1 affections1 and faculties2 and the claim is implicitly admitted even by those who have most interest in denying it4 ,but it does not rule1 nor pretend to rule1 as an autocratic authority2 it does not give us1 nor pretend to give us1 a law of its own3 on the contrary1 it claims to rule in us only in virtue of recognising a law which is over us2 its authority is derived wholly from a law which it interprets and applies1 but does not create4 ,it thus speaks not of itself but as the deputy of another4 ,it unequivocally declares itself a delegated authority4 ,some may say that the law of conscience is set by man's own will1 and that the will is a law unto itself2 but this assertion cannot bear examination4 ,the will apart from reason and conscience is a mere force1 not a true will4 ,it has a rational law only through its connection with reason1 a moral law only through its connection with conscience4 ,whoever affirms that the will is its own law must grossly abuse language1 and signify by the term will what others mean by reason and will1 conscience and will4 ,he must do worse than this1 bad as it is4 ,he must contradict the plain dictates of his own consciousness4 ,the will and its law are distinctly felt to be not one but two4 ,the will is clearly realised in our moral experience as not legislative1 as not giving itself a law but as being under a law1 the law which conscience apprehends4 ,to identify the will and its law is to confound entirely distinct things4 ,for the will to rule the will1 it would need at once to command and to obey1 to be bond and free1 dependent and independent4 ,to be its own rule were for it to be without rule4 ,conscience claims to rule my will in virtue of a law which cannot be the expression of my will1 and which cannot be anything else than the expression of another will2 one often in antagonism to mine--one always better than mine--one which demands from me an unvarying and complete obedience4 ,it comes to me and speaks to me in defiance of my will2 when my will is set against hearing it1 and still more against obeying it2 when my will is bent on stifling and drowning its voice4 ,it warns1 threatens1 condemns1 and punishes me1 against my will1 and with a voice of authority as the delegate or deputy of a perfectly good and holy will which has an absolute right to rule over me1 to control and sway all my faculties2 which searches me and knows me2 which besets me behind and before4 ,whose is this perfect1 authoritative1 supreme will1 to which all consciences1 even the most erring1 point back8 ,whose1 if not ,god's8 ,those who object that this argument is a mere verbal inference1 or that it rests on a double meaning of the word law1 do not understand it1 simple as it is4 ,they may be honest enough disputants1 but their objection is strangely superficial4 ,in the utterly irrelevant criticism of a word they lose sight of a great fact1 and so necessarily fail to perceive its momentous significance4 ,from no mere word1 whether law or any other1 but from that consciousness of moral dependence which no moral creature can shake off1 which conscience implies in every exercise1 which reveals itself in a thousand ways in the hearts and lives of men1 do we conclude that there is ,one on whom we morally depend1 that we have a holy ,creator and ,judge to deal with4 ,reason takes no mere name1 but it takes the fact that man feels himself under a law of duty1 that he is conscious of obligation and responsibility1 that he has a conscience which does not counsel but which commands him to do what is right and to resist what is wrong2 and it finds this fact inexplicable1 this consciousness a delusion1 this conscience a false witness--unless there be a holy ,god1 a ,moral ,governor4 ,conscience reveals a purpose as well as declares a law4 ,its very existence is a proof of purpose4 ,the eye is not more certainly given us in order that we may see1 than conscience is given us in order that we may use all our powers in a righteous and beneficent manner4 ,is it conceivable that any other than a righteous ,god would have bestowed on us such a gift1 such a faculty8 ,would an intelligent but unrighteous ,god have made us to hate and despise what is characteristic of his own nature8 ,would he have made us better than himself8 ,the purpose which conscience reveals is certainly not our own purpose1 just as the law which it declares is not the law of our own will4 ,the purpose which finds its expression in conscience1 and our own purpose1 are often felt by us to be in direct antagonism4 ,our souls may be tortured by the conflict between them4 ,but in all phases of the conflict we are sensible that it is our purpose which ought to be abandoned2 that the purpose which we dislike is that which we are bound to accept and to obey4 ,in this way1 also1 conscience speaks to us of a righteous ,god by speaking in ,his name4 ,if the inference from effect to cause1 from manifestation of purpose to intelligence1 is good anywhere1 it is good here2 and it warrants us to believe that the ,first ,cause of conscience is a righteous ,being4#cg #cg ,see ,appendix ,,xxvii4 ,all the feelings1 emotions1 and affections which gather around the apprehension of right and wrong1 which accompany the sense of duty or conviction of obligation1 point to the same conclusion4 ,the consciousness of good or ill desert1 remorse and self-approval1 moral hopes and fears1 concur in referring to a holy ,god4 ,they imply that man is a person related not merely to things and laws1 but to another person who is his rightful and righteous ,judge4 ,the atheist himself1 when he grieves even for secret and private sins1 or enjoys the inner peace which only his own heart knoweth1 mourns and rejoices as if in the presence of a higher personal ,being--the ,god whom he denies4 ,neither his sorrow nor his satisfaction is fully intelligible if his soul have before it only an impersonal law or the abstract nature of things2 both presuppose that he has some kind of consciousness of being under the cognisance of a ,person possessed of moral attributes4 ,if men felt that they were responsible for their evil thoughts and words and deeds to no one higher than themselves or their fellows1 is it conceivable that the consciousness of guilt and the fear of retribution would have been what experience and history testify them to have been8 ,would prayers and penances and sacrifices have prevailed so widely1 if the law of right and wrong when broken had been merely felt to be broken--if there were no underlying sense of the existence of ,one behind the law whose righteousness must be satisfied1 and whose wrath must be turned away by the breaker of the law8 ,would there have been in that case any moral conflicts in the human heart akin to those which a ,sophocles or a ,shakespeare has delineated8 ,were there no ,god1 there ought to be no fear of ,god awakened even by crime2 but atheism itself cannot protect a criminal when alive to his guilt from being haunted and appalled by fears of a judgment and a justice more terrible than those of man4 ,when we are perfectly willing to bear any pain which the mere laws of nature attach to our sins1 and when our reason assures us that we have nothing to fear on account of them from the law or even the opinion of society1 why1 if our moral natures are not seared and deadened1 do we yet fear1 and fear most when most alone8 ,inanimate things1 says ,dr ,newman1 cannot stir our affections2 these are correlative with persons4 ,if1 as is the case1 we feel responsibility1 are ashamed1 are frightened1 at transgressing the voice of conscience1 this implies that there is ,one to whom we are responsible1 before whom we are ashamed1 whose claims upon us we fear4 ,if1 on doing wrong1 we feel the same tearful1 broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother2 if1 on doing right1 we enjoy the same seeming serenity of mind1 the same soothing1 satisfactory delight which follows on one receiving praise from a father1--we certainly have within us the image of some person to whom our love and veneration look1 in whose smile we find our happiness1 for whom we yearn1 towards whom we direct our pleadings1 in whose anger we are troubled and waste away4 ,these feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being2 we are not affectionate towards a stone1 nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog2 we have no remorse or compunction in breaking mere human law3 yet1 so it is1 conscience excites all these painful emotions1 confusion1 foreboding1 self-condemnation2 and1 on the other hand1 it sheds upon us a deep peace1 a sense of security1 a resignation1 and a hope1 which there is no sensible1 no earthly object to elicit4 ',the wicked flees1 when no one pursueth2' then why does he flee8 ,whence his terror8 ,who is it that he sees in solitude1 in darkness1 in the hidden chambers of his heart8 ,if the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world1 the ,object to which his perception is directed must be ,supernatural and ,divine2 and thus the phenomena of conscience1 as a dictate1 avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a ,supreme ,governor1 a ,judge1 holy1 just1 powerful1 all-seeing1 retributive4#ch #ch ,grammar of ,assent1 pp4 #ajf1 #ajg4 ,it will1 ,i need scarcely say1 be objected to the arguments which have now been presented1 that conscience is a product of association or a consequence of evolution2 that it has been developed either in the experience of individuals or in the course of ages1 out of sensations of pleasure and pain1 out of benefits and injuries2 and that the convictions and feelings implicated in it are due to the circumstances under which it has grown up and the causes which have combined to generate it4 ,but to this it may be answered either that conscience has not been shown to have grown up by association and development out of sensuous experiences1 or that even if this were proved the argument would continue good2 in other words1 either the truth or the relevancy of the objection may be denied4 ,all associationist and evolutionist theories of conscience seem to many of the most competent psychologists to have failed as regards their main object1 although they may admit them to contain important elements of truth4 ,this view ,i share4 ,it does not seem to me that even ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,prof4 ,bain1 ,mr ,spencer1 and ,mr ,darwin1 have been able to show that conscience contains in it nothing original4 ,but1 of course1 ,i am aware that the vindication of my dissent would require an adequate examination of associationism and evolutionism as explanations of the origin of conscience4 ,no such examination is here possible4 ,nor is it required2 on the contrary1 a discussion of the kind ought1 ,i believe1 to be avoided in an inquiry like the present4 ,no psychological investigation of a difficult and delicate nature is1 so far as ,i can judge1 essentially involved in the theistic argumentation at any stage4 ,it is certainly unnecessary in conducting the moral argument to engage in any scientific disquisition as to the origin of conscience4#ci ,for our second or alternative answer will suffice4 ,it does not matter1 so far as our present purpose is concerned1 whether conscience be primary or derivative4 ,it exists2 it bears a certain testimony2 it gives rise necessarily to the thoughts and feelings which ,i have mentioned4 ,are these thoughts and feelings true8 ,if not1 conscience is a delusion2 it utters lies2 the completest moral scepticism is justified4 ,if they are1 the argument stands4 ,the mode in which they have been acquired is in this reference a matter of indifference4 #ci ,see ,appendix ,,xxviii4 ,the argument from conscience1 ,i may add1 rests on the general and distinctive characteristics of our moral nature2 not on the truth of particular moral judgments or the purity of particular moral affections4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be affected by the fact that moral perceptions and emotions admit of variation and development1 and are sometimes false and depraved4 ,however important in other respects may be the circumstance that men's thoughts and sentiments as to right and wrong are not always identical or even accordant1 it is plainly irrelevant as an objection to any of the forms in which the argument for the ,divine existence from the constitution of our moral nature has just been stated4 ,it cannot be necessary to do more than merely indicate this1 although some who maintain the wholly derivative nature of conscience appear to believe that the moral differences to be traced among men disprove all inferences from the moral faculty which they feel disinclined to accept4 ,,ii4 ,is the testimony which conscience gives to the existence and character of ,god confirmed when we look out into the moral world8 ,no one will say that all is clear and unambiguous in that world--that it is nowhere shrouded in unpenetrated1 if not impenetrable1 darkness--that it contains no perplexing anomalies4 ,there is an enormous mass of sin on earth1 and the mere existence of sin is a mystery under the government of an omnipotent ,god who hates sin4 ,there is a vast amount of apparently prosperous sin1 and a vast amount of temporarily suffering virtue1 and these are often severe trials of faith in the justice and holiness of ,god4 ,pessimism may exaggerate the emptiness and the sadness of life1 but it has done service by exposing and discrediting the optimism which ignores the dark features and tragic elements of existence4 ,can an unprejudiced mind1 however1 even with all the sins and sufferings of the world before its view1 and although consciously unable to resolve the difficulties which they suggest1 refuse to acknowledge that the general testimony rendered by the moral world to the being and righteousness of its ,author is ample and unmistakable8 ,i think not4 ,the conclusion which we have drawn from the character of the sentiments inevitably excited by the contemplation of virtue and vice1 is also that which follows from the natural tendencies and issues of good and evil affections and actions4 ,virtue does not always meet with its due reward1 nor vice with its due punishment1 in any obvious outward shape2 if they did1 earth would cease to be a scene of moral discipline2 but internal moral laws of an essentially retributive nature are in incessant operation1 and show not obscurely or doubtfully what is the judgment of ,god both on character and conduct4 ,virtue is self-rewarding and vice is self-punishing4 ,virtue tends of its very nature to honour and life1 vice to dishonour and death4 ,there are outward bonds between virtue and happiness1 vice and misery1 which may be severed2 but there are also inward bonds which cannot be broken--relations of cause and effect as inflexible as any in the physical world4 ,virtue may be followed by no external advantages1 or may even involve the possessor of it in suffering2 but infallibly it ennobles and enriches1 elevates and purifies the soul itself1 and thus gradually and increasingly imparts a peace above all earthly dignities4 ,vice may outwardly prosper and meet only with honour from men1 but it cannot be said to be passing wholly unpunished so long as it weakens1 poisons1 and corrupts the spiritual constitution4 ,now this it always does1 and never more actively than when the individual who is guilty has silenced the voice of his conscience1 and when a depraved society encourages him in his wickedness4 ,the law--he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption--is never even for an instant suspended1 although the growth and ripening of the seed into its fruit may be unobserved4 ,in the very commission of sin the soul violates the conditions of its own welfare1 destroys its own best feelings1 impoverishes and ruins itself4 ,he that has light within his own clear breast1 ,may sit in the centre1 and enjoy bright day2 ,but he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts1 ,benighted walks under the mid-day sun-- ,himself is his own dungeon4#dj #dj ,see ,appendix ,,xxix4 ,when we look from individuals to societies1 we perceive the same truth confirmed on a more comprehensive and conspicuous scale4 ,it is true that in the social world there are bad triumphs and impious successes--that the victory of good over evil is often reached only after a long series of defeats4 ,but it is equally true that the welfare of society is dependent on a practical recognition of moral principles--that the laws of morality are conditions of the progress1 and even of the existence1 of society4 ,a cynical moralist of the eighteenth century maintained that private vices were public benefits2 but1 of course1 his sophisms were easily exposed3 he failed to convince any one of the correctness of his paradox4 ,no inductive truth can be easier to establish1 or better established1 than that righteousness exalteth a nation1 while sin lowers and destroys it4 ,the vicious affections which torment and debase isolated men1 equally disturb and degrade a tribe or nation4 ,the virtuous affections which diffuse peace and happiness in a single heart1 equally spread harmony and prosperity through the largest community4 ,thus the general conditions of social life testify that ,god loves virtue and hates vice4 ,then1 if we examine history as a whole1 we cannot but recognise that it has been in the main a process of moral progress1 of moral growth4 ,the children of the present day may be born with no better dispositions than those of five thousand years ago1 and men may be now as guilty1 as wilful sinners against what they know to be right1 as ever they were2 in that sense there may be no moral progress2 but of this there can be1 ,i think1 no reasonable doubt in the mind of any impartial student of history1 that the thoughts of men have been surely1 if slowly1 widened as to liberty1 chastity1 justice1 benevolence1 piety--and that their feelings have been correspondingly modified1 their manners refined1 and their laws and institutions improved4 ,there may be no such thing as the inheritance or transmission of virtue1 and every step of moral advance may have to be gained by the free exertion of each individual1 people1 and generation in succession2 but1 as a matter of fact1 our race does on the whole advance1 and not recede1 in the path towards good4 ,just as reason1 although it may be feebler than the passions in a short struggle1 can always conquer them if it get time to collect its energies--so virtue gains and vice loses advantages with the lapse of years2 for1 while the prejudices which opposed the former subside and its excellences become ever increasingly apparent1 as history flows onward1 those who leagued themselves in support of the latter quarrel among themselves1 its fascinations decay1 and its deformities become more manifest and repulsive4 ,age is linked to age1 and in the struggle of good and evil which pervades all the ages1 victory is seen slowly but steadily declaring itself for the good4 ,the vices die--the virtues never die4 ,some great evils which once afflicted our race have passed away4 ,what great good has ever been lost8 ,justice carries it over injustice in the end4 ,now1 whatever be the means by which moral progress is brought about1 the testimony which it involves as to the moral character of ,god is none the less certain4 ,the successful application of ,darwinian principles1 for example1 to the explanation of human progress1 would be no disproof of design in social evolution4 ,if a natural selection1 based on force1 were shown to have prepared the way for a natural selection based on craft1 which in its turn gave place to justice1 and that again to love1 ,god must none the less be credited with having contemplated the final result1 and that result must none the less be held to be an indication of ,his character4 ,when what is called the struggle for existence has been proved to lead1 not to the deterioration but to the improvement of life--to the greatest abundance of the highest kinds of life possible in the circumstances--it will have been vindicated and shown to have been a means to secure such ends as a wise and benevolent ,being would entertain4 ,when it has been proved to have constrained men gradually to recognise that the virtues are the conditions of the most desirable existence1 and that the vices are so many obstacles to the attainment of such an existence1 it will have been still further vindicated by having been thus shown to be the mode in which righteousness is realised in the world4 ,it matters little1 so far as the religious inference is concerned1 after what natural process and by what natural laws moral progress has been brought about2 for whatever the process and laws may be discovered to be1 they will be those which ,god has chosen1 and will be fitted to show forth the glory of ,his wisdom1 love1 and justice4#da #da ,see ,appendix ,,xxx4 ,,lecture ,,viii4 ,,consideration ,,of ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,divine ,,wisdom1 ,,benevolence1 ,,and ,,justice4 ,i4 ,conscience testifies that there is a ,god who is good and just2 and society and history1 on the whole1 confirm its testimony4 ,but there are a multitude of moral evils in the world1 and these may seem to warrant an opposite inference1 or at least so to counterbalance what has been adduced as evidence for the goodness and justice of ,god as to leave us logically unable to draw any inference regarding ,his moral character4 ,we must consider1 therefore1 whether these evils really warrant an anti-theistic conclusion2 and as they are analogous to1 and closely connected with1 those facts which have been argued to be defects in the physical constitution of the universe inconsistent with wisdom1 or at least with perfect wisdom1 in the ,creator1 it seems desirable to ask ourselves distinctly this general question1 ,are there such defects in the constitution and course of nature that it is impossible for us to believe that it is the work of a wise and holy ,god8 ,epicurus and ,lucretius imagined that the world was formed by a happy combination of atoms1 acting of themselves blindly1 and necessarily after innumerable futile conjunctions had taken place4 ,lange1 the most recent historian of materialism1 has revived the hypothesis1 and represented the world as an instance of success which had been preceded by milliards of entire or partial failures4 ,this is the theory of natural selection applied to account for the origin of worlds2 and no one1 ,i believe1 who combines the hypotheses of natural selection and atheism can consistently entertain any other conception of the origin of worlds4 ,but where are the milliards of mishaps which are said to have occurred8 ,where are the monstrous worlds which preceded those which constitute the cosmos8 ,we must1 of course1 have good evidence for their existence before we can be entitled to hold ,nature responsible for them2 we must not charge upon her the mere dreams of her accusers4 ,not a trace1 however1 of such worlds as1 according to the hypothesis1 were profusely scattered through space1 has been pointed out4 ,it would be a waste of time for us to argue with men who invent worlds in order to find fault with them4 ,we turn1 therefore1 to those who censure not imaginary worlds but the actual world4 ,comte1 following ,laplace1 has argued that there is no evidence of intelligence or design in the solar system1 because its elements and members are not disposed in the most advantageous manner4 ,the moon1 in particular1 we are assured1 should have been so placed that it would revolve round the earth in the same time that the earth revolved round the sun4 ,in that case she would appear every night1 and always at the full4 ,storms1 volcanoes1 earthquakes1 and deserts have been often argued to be defects which mar both the beauty and utility of creation4 ,changes in the polar regions1 in the physical character of ,africa1 in the position of the ,asiatic continent1 and in the ,pacific ,ocean1 have been suggested as improvements on the constitution of the world4 ,the actual climates of various countries have been maintained to be not the most favourable to life which are possible under the existing laws of nature4#db #db ,see ,appendix ,,xxxi4 ,a little reflection will enable us to assign its just value to such criticism of creation4 ,remark1 then1 in the first place1 that there may be abundant evidence of intelligence where there is not evidence of perfect intelligence4 ,although very considerable defects were clearly shown to exist in the constitution and arrangements of the physical world1 there might yet be ample and unmistakable proof of the vast wisdom of its ,author4 ,were it even true that science could show that the mechanism of the heavens1 and the distribution of land and sea1 heat and cold1 on earth1 were not in every respect the best1 that would not prove that there was no intelligence1 no design whatever1 involved therein4 ,the question1 ,did the earth and the solar system originate with intelligence8 is distinct from the question1 ,was the intelligence in which they originated perfect8 ,it is conceivable that the one question might have to be answered in the affirmative and the other in the negative4 ,it is obvious that the former question ought to be considered apart from and before the latter4 ,the theist proposes1 of course1 to prove in the end that there is a perfect intelligence1 but he is content to establish at first that there is an intelligence4 ,aware that whoever admits intelligence to be the first cause of the universe may be forced also to admit that the creative intelligence is perfect1 he is under no temptation himself to confound two entirely distinct questions1 and he is obviously entitled to protest against so illogical a procedure in others4 ,remark1 in the second place1 that we are plainly very incompetent critics of a system so vast as the universe4 ,we are only able to survey a small portion of it1 and the little that we perceive we imperfectly comprehend4 ,we see but an exceedingly short way before us into the future1 and can form only the vaguest and most general conception of the final goal to which creation1 as a whole1 is tending4 ,this need not1 and ought not1 to prevent us from recognising the evident indications of intelligence which fall within our range of apprehension2 but it may well cause us to hesitate before pronouncing that this or that peculiarity1 which appears to us a defect1 is an absolute error or evil4 ,there is no one who would not feel it very unwise to pronounce an apparent defect1 even in an elaborate human mechanism with which he was only imperfectly acquainted1 an unmistakable blunder1 and surely far more caution is required in a critic of the constitution of the universe2 for1 as ,bishop ,butler truly observes1 ,the most slight and superficial view of any human contrivance comes abundantly nearer to a thorough knowledge of it than that part which we know of the government of the world does to the general scheme and system of it4 ,all ,nature is one great whole1 and each thing in it has1 as ,i have previously had to insist1 a multitude of uses and relations1 with reference to all of which it must be viewed1 in order that a complete and definitive judgment regarding it may be formed4 ,has this fact been adequately realised by those who have criticised1 in the manner which has been indicated1 the wisdom displayed in the system of ,nature8 ,i think not4 ,in regard to the moon1 it would seem that1 even if that luminary were intended to serve no other purpose than to give light on earth1 it is not the ,maker of it who has blundered1 but ,comte and ,laplace4 ,the real consequences of their pretended improvement have been shown to be that the moon would give sixteen times less light than it does1 and be in constant danger of extinction4 ,in other words1 what they have demonstrated is1 that their own mathematical and mechanical knowledge was so inferior to that of the intelligence which placed the moon where it is1 that they could not appreciate the correctness of its procedure in the solution of a comparatively simple astronomical problem4 ,but even if the change which they suggested would really have rendered the moon a better lamp to the inhabitants of the earth1 they were not entitled to infer that it was an error to have placed it elsewhere1 unless they were warranted to assume that the moon was meant merely to be a lamp to the inhabitants of the earth4 ,but that they were clearly not entitled to assume4 ,to give light on earth is a use of the moon1 but it is foolish to imagine that this is its sole use4 ,it serves other known ends1 such as raising the tides1 and may serve many ends wholly unknown to us4 ,so in regard to volcanoes1 earthquakes1 c4 ,any single generation of men and beasts might well dispense1 perhaps1 with their existence1 and yet they may be most appropriate instrumentalities for securing order and welfare in the economy of the universe as a whole4 ,it is not by their relations to the present and local only1 but by their relations to all the past and future of the entire system of things1 that they are to be judged of4 ,if ,greenland were submerged1 and the ,asiatic and ,north ,american continents so altered that no large rivers should flow into the polar ocean1 the climate of ,iceland and ,canada might be greatly improved4 ,would the world thereby1 however1 be made better as a whole1 and throughout all its future history8 ,he must be either a very wise man or a very foolish one who answers this question by a decided affirmation2 and yet he who cannot so answer it has obviously no right to hold that the changes mentioned would really be improvements4 ,could we survey the whole universe1 and mark how all its several parts were related to each other and to the whole1 we might intelligently determine whether or not an apparent defect in it was real2 but we cannot do this with our present powers4 ,we can readily imagine that any one thing in the world1 looked at by itself or in relation to only a few other objects1 might be much better than it is1 but we cannot show that the general system of things would not be deranged and deteriorated thereby4 ,considered merely in reference to man1 the relative imperfections of the world may be real advantages4 ,a world so perfect that man could not improve it1 would probably be1 paradoxical as the statement may sound1 one of the most imperfect worlds men could be placed in4 ,an imperfect world1 or in other words1 a world which can be improved1 can alone be a fitting habitation for progressive beings4 ,scripture does not represent nature even before the ,fall as perfect and incapable of improvement1 but only as very good2 and still less does it require us to believe that the actual course of nature is perfect4 ,the true relation of man to nature can only be realised when the latter is perceived to be imperfect1--a thing to be ruled1 not to be obeyed--improved1 not imitated--and yet a thing which is essentially good relatively to the wants and powers of its inhabitants4 ,no created system1 it must further be remembered1 can be perfect in the sense of being the best possible4 ,none can be so good but that a better may be imagined4 ,what is created must be finite in its perfections1 and whatever is finite can be imagined to be increased and improved4 ,the ,creator ,himself--the absolutely perfect ,god--the ,highest ,good--is1 as ,plato and ,anselm so profoundly taught1 the only best possible ,being4 ,in ,him alone the actual is coincident and identical with the possible1 the real with the ideal4 ,whoever receives this truth as it ought to be received1 cannot fail to see that all speculations as to a best possible world1 and all judgments of the actual world based on such speculations1 are vain and idle imaginations4#dc #dc ,see ,appendix ,,xxxii4 ,i may add1 that when a man argues1 as ,comte does1 that we can know nothing of final causes1 nothing of the purposes which things are meant to accomplish1 and yet that they might have realised their final causes1 fulfilled their purposes1 better than they do1 he obviously takes up a very untenable and self-contradictory position4 ,if we can have no notion of the purpose of a thing1 we cannot judge whether it is fulfilling its purpose or not1 whether it is fulfilling it well or ill4 ,the denial of the possibility of knowing the ends of things is inconsistent with the assertion that things might have been constituted and arranged in a happier and more advantageous manner4 ,organic nature has been still more severely criticised than the inorganic world4 ,there have been pointed out a few fully developed organs1 as1 for example1 the spleen1 of which the uses are unknown1 and a multitude of organs so imperfectly developed as to be incapable of performing any serviceable functions4 ,even the most elaborate organisms have been maintained to have essential defects2 thus the eye has been argued by ,helmholtz to be not a perfect optical instrument1 and on the strength of the proof one writer at least has declared that if a human optician were to blunder as badly as the supposed author of eyes must have done1 he would be hissed out of his trade4 ,stress has been laid on the fact that abortions and monsters are not rare4 ,many seemingly intelligent contrivances1 we are reminded1 serve mainly to inflict pain and destruction4 ,and the inference has been drawn that the first cause of organic existences was not ,divine ,wisdom but mere matter and blind force4 ,the considerations which have already been brought forward should enable us to answer all reasonings of this kind4 ,an organ is not to be pronounced useless because its uses have not yet been discovered4 ,to the extent that evolutionism is true1 rudimentary and obsolete organs are accounted for1 and the wisdom displayed in them amply vindicated2 and if evolutionism be not true1 they can still be explained on the theory of types4 ,they are stages in the realisation of the ,divine conception2 indications of an order which comprehends and conditions the law of use and contrivance for use2 keys to the understanding of the ,divine plan4 ,theism cannot have much to fear from the fact that all human eyes are limited in their range and finite in their perfections1 or even from the fact that a great many persons have very bad eyesight4 ,whatever may be its imperfections1 the eye1 if viewed with a comprehensive regard to its manifold uses and possibilities1 must be admitted by every unprejudiced judge to be incomparably superior to every other optical instrument3 indeed it is the only real optical instrument2 all so-called optical instruments are merely aids and supplements to it4 ,if the eye had been absolutely perfect1 its modification or evolution could only have been deterioration1 artificial optical instruments would not have been needed1 and all man's relations to creation must have been essentially different from what they are4 ,who can rationally assure us that this was to be desired8 ,abortions and monsters are at least exceptions4 ,if mind were not what is ultimate in the universe--if nature worked blindly--if there were any truth in what ,lange and ,huxley have said of her procedure1 that it is like shooting a million or more loaded guns in a field to kill one hare1--this could not be the case2 the bullets which miss would then be incalculably more numerous than those which hit1 and the evidence of her failures ought to be strewn far more thickly around us than the remains of her successes2 there would be1 as it were1 no course of nature because of the multitude of deviations1 no rule in nature because of the multitude of exceptions4 ,but what are the facts8 ,these3 the lowest organisms are as perfectly adapted to their circumstances as the highest1 the earliest as the latest2 there is a vast amount of death and a vast amount of life in the world1 but1 whatever some men may thoughtlessly assert1 no man can show that there is too much of either1 any real waste1 if the wants of creation as a whole are to be provided for2 abortions and monsters1 which are the only things in nature which can be plausibly characterised as failures1 as bullets which have fallen wide of the mark1 are comparatively few and far between2 and the monsters1 even1 are not really exceptions to law and order1 are not strictly monsters4 ,the labours of teratologists have scientifically established the grand general result that there are no monsters in nature in the sense which ,empedocles imagined2 none except in the sense in which a man who gets his leg broken is a monster4 ,a monster is simply a being to whom an accident not fatal has happened in the womb4 ,why should an accident not occur there as well as elsewhere8 ,why should ,god not act by general laws there as well as elsewhere8 ,who is entitled to say that any result of ,his general laws is a failure2 that any so-called accident was not included in ,his plan2 that a world in which a child could not be born deformed nor a grown man have a leg broken1 would be1 were all things taken into account1 as good as the world in which we actually live8 ,huxley1 ,lange1 and those whom they represent1 have failed to show us any of nature's bullets which have missed the mark1 and have not sufficiently1 ,i think1 realised how imperfect might be their own perception of nature's target4 ,the contrivances for the infliction of pain and death displayed in the structure of animals of prey are none the less evidences of intelligence because they are not also1 at least immediately or directly1 evidences of beneficence4 ,intelligence is one thing1 benevolence is another1 and what conclusively disproved benevolence might conclusively prove intelligence4#dd #dd ,see ,appendix ,,xxxiii4 ,,ii4 ,let us pass on to the contemplation of greater difficulties2 to suffering1 which seems to conflict with the benevolence of ,god--and to sin1 which seems irreconcilable with ,his righteousness4 ,i cannot agree with those who think that there is no mystery in mere pain2 that it is sufficiently accounted for by moral evil1 and involves no separate problem4 ,the history of suffering began on our planet long before that of sin2 ages prior to the appearance of man1 earth was a scene of war and mutual destruction2 hunger and fear1 violence and agony1 disease and death1 have prevailed throughout the air1 the land1 and ocean1 ever since they were tenanted4 ,and what connection in reason can there be between the sin of men or the sin of angels and the suffering endured or inflicted by primeval saurians8 ,the suffering of the animals is1 in fact1 more mysterious than the suffering of man1 just because so little of the former and so much of the latter can be traced1 directly or indirectly1 to sin4 ,but every animal is made subject to suffering2 every animal appetite springs out of a want2 every sense and every faculty of every animal are so constituted as to be in certain circumstances sources of pain2 hosts of animals are so constructed that they can only live by rending and devouring other animals2 no large animal can move without crushing and killing numbers of minute yet sentient creatures4 ,how can all this be under the government of ,infinite ,goodness8 ,the human mind may very probably be unable fully to answer this question4 ,it can only hope truthfully to answer it even in a measure by studying the relevant facts1 the actual effects and natural tendencies of suffering2 general speculations are not likely to profit it much4 ,now1 among the relevant facts1 one of the most manifest is that pain serves to warn animals against what would injure or destroy them4 ,it has a preservative use4 ,were animals unsusceptible of pain1 they would be in continual peril4 ,bayle has ingeniously devised some hypotheses with a view to show that pain might have safely been dispensed with in the animal constitution1 but they are obviously insufficient4 ,it would be rash to affirm that pain is indispensable as a warning against danger1 but certainly no one has shown how it could be dispensed with1 or even plausibly imagined how it might be dispensed with4 ,for anything we can see or even conceive1 animal organisms could only be preserved in a world like ours by being endowed with a susceptibility to pain4 ,for anything we know or can even imagine1 the demand that there should be no pain is implicitly a demand that there should be no animal life and no world like the earth2--a most foolish and presumptuous demand4 ,but however this may be1 pain has1 as a fact1 plain reference to the prevention of physical injury4 ,painful sensations1 says ,professor ,le ,conte1 are only watchful vedettes upon the outposts of our organism to warn us of approaching danger4 ,without these1 the citadel of our life would be quickly surprised and taken4 ,now1 to the whole extent that what has just been said is true1 pain is not evil but good1 and justifies both itself and its author4 ,it is not an end in itself1 but a means to an end1 and its end is a benevolent one4 ,the character of pain itself is such as to indicate that its author must be a benevolent being1--one who does not afflict for his own pleasure1 but for his creatures' profit4 ,another fact makes this still more evident4 ,pain is a stimulus to exertion1 and it is only through exertion that the faculties are disciplined and developed4 ,every appetite originates in the experience of a want1 and the experience of a want is a pain2 but what would the animals be without their appetites and the activities to which these give rise8 ,would they be the magnificent and beautiful creatures so many of them are8 ,if the hare had no fear1 would it be as swift as it is8 ,if the lion had no hunger1 would it be as strong as it is8 ,if man had nothing to struggle with1 would he be as enterprising1 as ingenious1 as variously skilled and educated as he is8 ,pain tends to the perfection of the animals4 ,it has1 that is to say1 a good end2 an end which justifies its use2 one which would do so even if perfection should not be conducive to happiness4 ,perfection1 it seems to me1 is a worthy aim in itself1 and the pain which naturally tends to it is no real evil1 and needs no apology4 ,i fail to see that the nearest approximation to the ideal of animal life is the existence of a well-fed hog1 which does not need to exert itself1 and is not designed for the slaughter4 ,whatever pain is needed to make the animals so exercise their faculties as to improve and develop their natures1 has been wisely and rightly allotted to them4 ,we assign a low aim to ,providence when we affirm that it looks merely to the happiness even of the animals4 ,it would be no disproof of benevolence in the ,creator if pain in the creatures tended simply to perfection and not to happiness2 while it must be regarded as a proof of ,his benevolence if the means which lead to perfection lead also to happiness4 ,and this they do4 ,the pain which gives rise to exertion and the pain which is involved in exertion are1 as a rule1 amply rewarded even with pleasure4 ,perhaps susceptibility to pain is a necessary condition of susceptibility to pleasure2 perhaps the bodily organism could not be capable of pleasure and insensible to pain2 but whether this be the case or not1 it is a plain and certain matter of fact that the activities which pain originates are the chief sources of enjoyment throughout the animal creation4 ,this fact entitles us to hold that pain itself is an evidence of the benevolence of ,god4 ,the perfecting power of suffering is seen in its highest form not in the brute1 but in man2 not in its effects on the body1 but in its influence on the mind4 ,it is of incalculable use in correcting and disciplining the spirit4 ,it serves to soften the hard of heart1 to subdue the proud1 to produce fortitude and patience1 to expand the sympathies1 to exercise the religious affections1 to refine1 strengthen1 and elevate the entire disposition4 ,to come out pure gold1 the character must pass through the furnace of affliction4 ,and no one who has borne suffering aright has ever complained that he had been called on to endure too much of it4 ,on the contrary1 all the noblest of our race have learned from experience to count suffering not an evil but a privilege1 and to rejoice in it as working out in them1 through its purifying and perfecting power1 an eternal weight of glory4 ,in the measure that the theory of evolution can be established1 the wisdom and benevolence displayed in pain would seem to receive confirmation4 ,so far as that theory can be proved1 want1 the struggle for existence1 the sufferings which flow from it1 and death itself1 must1 it would appear1 be regarded as means to the formation1 improvement1 and adornment of species and races4 ,the afflictions which befall individuals will in this case be scientifically demonstrated to have a reference not merely to their own good1 but to the welfare of their kind in all future time4 ,the truth that nothing lives or dies to itself would thus receive remarkable verification4 ,but although it should never receive this verification1 although a strictly scientific proof of it shall never be forthcoming1 there is already sufficient evidence for it of an obvious and unambiguous kind4 ,every being1 and the animated certainly not less than the inanimate1 is adjusted1 as ,i have previously had occasion to show1 to every other4 ,all are but parts of one stupendous whole4 ,this is a truth which throws a kindly and cheering light on many an otherwise dark and depressing fact4 ,turn it even towards death4 ,can death itself1 when seen in the light of it1 be denied to be an evidence of benevolence8 ,i think not4 ,the law of animal generation makes necessary the law of animal death1 if the largest amount of animal happiness is to be secured4 ,if there had been less death there must have been also less life1 and what life there was must have been poorer and meaner4 ,death is a condition of the prolificness of nature1 the multiplicity of species1 the succession of generations1 the coexistence of the young and the old2 and these things1 it cannot reasonably be doubted1 add immensely to the sum of animal happiness4 ,such considerations as have now been indicated are sufficient to show that suffering is a means to ends which only a benevolent ,being can be conceived of as designing4 ,they show that pain and death are not what they would have been if a malevolent ,being had contrived them2 that they are characterised by peculiarities which only love and mercy can explain4 ,we do not need for any practical spiritual purpose to know more than this4 ,an objector may still ask1 ,could not ,god have attained all good ends without employing any painful means8 ,he may still confront us with the ,epicurean dilemma3 ,the ,deity is either willing to take away all evil1 but is not able to do so1 in which case ,he is not omnipotent2 or ,he is able to remove the evil1 but is not willing1 in which case ,he is not benevolent2 or ,he is neither willing nor able1 which is a denial of the ,divine perfections2 or ,he is both able and willing to do away with the evil1 and yet it exists4 ,but only superficial and immature minds will attach much weight to questionings and reasonings of this kind4 ,a slight tincture of inductive science will suffice to make any man aware that speculations as to what ,god can or can not do1 as to what the universe might or might not have been1 belong to a very different region from investigations into the tendencies of real facts and processes4 ,it would seem as if1 with our present faculties1 these speculations could lead us to no reliable conclusions4 ,we clearly perceive that pain and death serve many good ends2 but we should require a knowledge of ,god and of the universe far beyond that which we possess1 to be able to state1 even as an intelligent conjecture1 that these evils could be wisely dispensed with1 or that there is anything in them in the least inconsistent either with the power or the benevolence of ,god4#de #de ,see ,appendix ,,xxxiv4 ,a large amount of human suffering is accounted for by its connection with human sin4 ,whatever so-called physical evil is needed to prevent moral evil1 or to punish it1 or to cure it1 or to discipline in moral good1 is not really evil4 ,any earthly suffering which saves us from sin is to be classed among benefits4 ,there is nothing to perplex either mind or heart in the circumstance that sin causes a profound and widespread unhappiness4 ,it is strange that it should sometimes apparently produce so little misery2 only a dull conscience1 ,i think1 will be surprised that it produces so much4 ,it is merely in so far as physical evil is dissociated from moral evil that its existence is a problem and a perplexity4 ,but the very existence of moral evil is a most painful mystery4 ,the absence of physical evil while moral evil was present would be inconsistent with a moral government of the world2 whereas if moral evil were removed no real difficulty would be left4 ,physical evil may be a relative good1 which ,god can easily be conceived of as causing and approving2 moral evil is an unconditional evil1 and cannot be the work of any morally perfect being4 ,have we any reason1 however1 to suppose that sin is willed by ,god in the sense either of being caused or approved by ,him8 ,all the sin we know of on earth is willed by man1 and all the sin which ,scripture tells us of as existing elsewhere is said to be willed by evil spirits2 neither nature nor ,scripture informs us that there is any moral evil willed by ,god4 ,in other words1 there are no facts which refer us to ,god as the author of evil4 ,in the absence of facts1 we can1 it is true1 form conjectures1 and give expression to them in such questions as1 ,how could ,god make beings capable of sinning8 ,why did ,he not prevent them sinning8 ,wherefore has ,he permitted sin to endure so long and spread so widely8 ,but thoughtful searchers for truth1 at least after a certain age1 cannot feel much interested in1 or much perplexed by1 questions like these4 ,they will be quite willing to leave the discussion of them to debating societies4 ,they will resolutely refuse to assign the same value to conjectures as to facts4 ,sin is not ,god's work4 ,moral order may exist without moral disorder1 but moral disorder can only exist as rebellion against moral order4 ,the very notion of moral evil implies a moral good which it contravenes1 and a moral law by which it is condemned4 ,it can never be thought of as other than a something grafted on nature1 by which nature is perverted and depraved4 ,it is not natural1 but unnatural2 not primary and original1 but secondary and derivative2 not the law1 but the violation of the law4 ,the primal ,will1 innately good1 hath never ,swerved1 or from its own perfect self declined4 ,between this ,will and sin there are ever interposed created wills1 which are conscious of their power to choose good or evil1 obedience or disobedience to ,god's law4 ,god bestows on ,his creatures only good gifts1 but one of the best of all these gifts includes in its very nature ability to abuse and pervert itself and all things else4 ,freewill needs no vindication1 for it is the primary and indispensable condition of moral agency4 ,without it there might be a certain animal goodness1 but there could be no true virtue4 ,a virtuous being is one which chooses of its own accord to do what is right4 ,the notion of a moral creature being governed and guided without the concurrence and approval of its own will is a contradiction4 ,if ,god desired to have moral creatures in ,his universe ,he could only have them by endowing them with freewill1 which is the power to accept or reject ,his own will4 ,the determination to create moral beings was a determination to create beings who should be the causes of their own actions1 and who might set aside ,his own law4 ,it was a determination to limit ,his own will to that extent and in that manner4 ,hence1 when ,he created moral beings1 and these beings1 in the free exercise of their power1 violated ,his law1 sin entered into the world1 but not through ,his will4 ,it resulted from the exercise of an original good gift which ,he had bestowed on certain of ,his creatures1 who could abuse that gift1 but were not necessitated to abuse it4 ,their abuse of it was their own action1 and the action consisted not in conforming to1 but in contravening1 ,god's will4 ,thus1 ,god's character is not stained by the sins which ,his creatures have committed4 ,but1 it will be objected1 could not ,god have made moral creatures who would be certain always to choose what is right1 always to acquiesce in ,his own holy will8 and if ,he could do this1 why did ,he not8 ,why did ,he create a class of moral creatures whom ,he could not but foresee to be certain to abuse their power of choice between obedience and disobedience to ,his law8 ,well1 far be it from me to deny that ,god could have originated a sinless moral system4 ,if anything ,i have already said be understood to imply this1 it has been completely misunderstood4 ,i have no doubt that ,god has actually made many moral beings who are certain never to oppose their own wills to ,his2 or that ,he might1 if it had so pleased ,him1 have created only such angels as were sure to keep their first estate4 ,but if questioned as to why ,he has not done the latter1 ,i feel no shame in confessing my ignorance4 ,it seems to me that when you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into the question1 ,why has ,god not originated a moral universe in which the lowest moral being would be as excellent as the archangels are8 you have at once shown it to be speculatively incapable of solution and practically without importance4 ,the question is one which would obviously give rise to another1 ,why has ,god not created only moral beings as much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest ,australian aborigines8 and that to still another of the same kind1 and so on ad infinitum8 ,but no complete answer can be given to a question which may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is no end4 ,we have1 besides1 neither the facts nor the faculties requisite to answer such questions4 ,a merely imaginary universe is one on which we have no data to reason4 ,we who are so incompetent judges of the actual universe1 notwithstanding the various opportunities which we possess of studying it1 and the special adaptation of our organs and powers to the objects which it presents1 can have no right to affirm its inferiority to any universe which we can imagine as possible4 ,the best world1 we may be assured1 that our fancies can feign1 would in reality be far inferior to the world ,god has made1 whatever imperfections we may think we see in it4 ,we ought to be content if we can show that what ,god has done is wise and right1 and not perplex ourselves as to why ,he has not done an infinity of other things1 the propriety of which we cannot possibly estimate aright or as parts of any scheme unlimited in extent and eternal in duration4 ,sin1 then1 is not ,god's work1 and we are unable to prove that ,he ought to have prevented it4 ,can we go any farther than this8 ,yes2 we can show that the permission of it has been made subservient to the attainment of certain great ends4 ,man has the power to choose evil1 but ,god has also the power to overrule it--to cause it1 as it were1 to contradict itself1 to work out its own defeat and disgrace1 to promote what it threatens to hinder2 and the facts of experience and history show us that this is what ,he does4 ,there is thus developed in ,his human creatures a higher kind of virtue than that of mere innocence2 a virtue which can only be reached through suffering1 and conflict1 and conquest4 ,the struggle with moral evil1 still more than that with physical disadvantages and intellectual difficulties1 tests and exercises the soul1 teaches it its weakness and dependence on ,divine strength1 and elicits and trains its spiritual faculties4 ,successive battles with vice raise honest combatants to successive stages of virtue4 ,the type of character presented to us in the second ,adam is no bare restoration of that which was lost in the first ,adam1 but one immeasurably superior4 ,the humblest of true ,christians now aspires after a far grander moral ideal than that of an untested innocence4 ,is there not in this fact a vindication of ,god's wisdom and holiness worth more than volumes of abstract speculation8 ,due weight ought also to be given to the circumstance that the system of ,god's moral government of our race is only in course of development4 ,we can see but a small part of it1 for the rest is as yet unevolved4 ,history is not a whole1 but the initial or preliminary portion of a process which may be of vast duration1 and the sequel of which may be far grander than the past has been4 ,that portion of the process which has been already accomplished1 small though it be1 indicates the direction which is being taken2 it is1 on the whole1 a progressive movement2 a movement bearing humanity towards truth1 freedom1 and justice4 ,is it scientific1 or in any wise reasonable1 to believe that the process will not advance to its legitimate goal8 ,surely not4 ,the physical history of the earth affords abundant evidence of the realisation of the most comprehensive plans1 and no indication of failure4 ,we can have no right to imagine that it will be otherwise in the moral sphere2 that the ideals towards which history shows humanity to have been approaching in the past will not be reached even in the most distant future4 ,but if moral progress will1 no less than physical progress1 be carried on unto completion1 the future cannot fail to throw light on the past--cannot fail to some extent to justify the past4 ,the slowness of the progress may perplex us1 and yet1 perhaps1 it is just what we ought to expect1 both from ,god's greatness and our own littleness4 ,he is patient because eternal4 ,his plans stretch from everlasting to everlasting1 and a thousand years are in ,his sight but as yesterday when it is past4 ,we have not the faculties which fit us for rapid movements and vast achievements4 ,we need to be conducted by easy and circuitous courses4 ,lofty heights must be ascended by winding paths4 ,we have not wings1 we cannot soar1 ,but we have feet to scale and climb ,by slow degrees1 by more and more1 ,the cloudy summits of our time4 ,it must be added that whoever acknowledges ,christianity to be a revelation from ,god1 must see in it reasons which go far to explain the permission of sin4 ,there is1 it is true1 in the authoritative records of the ,christian religion1 the ,hebrew and ,greek ,scriptures1 no explanation of the origin of moral evil as a speculative problem4 ,the account of the first parents of the human race introducing sin into the world by yielding to the seduction of a being who had himself sinned1 is wholly of a historical character1 and can neither be compared nor contrasted with the theories of philosophers as to the nature1 possibility1 and cause of sin4 ,to measure the one by the others1 or to set the one over against the others1 is to do injustice both to ,scripture and philosophy4 ,but the whole scheme of ,christianity must seem to those who accept it the strongest possible of practical grounds for the ,divine permission of man's abuse of freewill4 ,the existence of sin has1 according to the ,christian view1 been the occasion and condition of a manifestation of the ,divine character far more glorious than that which had been given by the creation of the heavens and the earth4 ,it called forth a display of justice1 love1 and mercy before which all moral beings in the universe may well bow down in wonder and adoration1 and man especially with unspeakable gratitude4 ,if ,god has really manifested ,himself in ,christ for the reconciliation of the world to ,himself1 ,his permission of sin has certainly to all practical intents been amply justified4 ,but ,i must conclude4 ,let it be in leaving with you the lesson that belief in conscience and belief in ,god--belief in the moral order of the universe and belief in a moral ,governor and ,judge--are most intimately connected and mutually support each other4 ,many of you will remember how ,robertson of ,brighton1--when describing the crisis of the conflict between doubt and faith in the awful hour in which1 as he says1 life has lost its meaning1 and the grave appears to be the end of all1 and the sky above the universe is a dead expanse1 black with the void from which ,god has disappeared1--tells us that he knows but of one way in which a man may come forth from this agony scatheless--namely1 by holding fast to those things which are certain still1 the grand1 simple landmarks of morality4 ,in the darkest hour1 are his words1 through which a human soul can pass1 whatever else is doubtful1 this at least is certain1--,if there be no ,god1 and no future state1 even then1 it is better to be generous than selfish1 better to be chaste than licentious1 better to be brave than to be a coward4 ,blessed1 beyond all earthly blessedness1 is the man who in the tempestuous darkness of the soul has dared to hold fast to these venerable landmarks4 ,thrice blessed is he who1 when all is drear and cheerless within and without1 when his teachers terrify him and his friends shrink from him1 has obstinately clung to moral good4 ,thrice blessed1 because his night shall pass into clear bright day4 ,now there is a great truth1 a most sacred and solemn truth1 in these words4 ,but it is only a half truth1 and it should not be mistaken for the whole truth4 ,it is not less true1 and it is true1 perhaps1 of a far greater number of human souls1 that there are dark and dreadful hours when they are tempted to believe that virtue is but a name1 that generosity is not better than selfishness1 truth not better than falsehood1 and the courage which defends a post of dangerous duty not better than the cowardice which abandons it2 and in these hours ,i know not how the soul is to regain its trust in human goodness1 except by holding fast its faith in ,divine goodness2 or how it can be strengthened to cling to what is right1 except by cleaving to ,god4 ,it is as possible to doubt of the authority of conscience as to doubt of the existence of ,god4 ,there are few souls which have not their ,philippi1 when they are tempted to cry like ,brutus1 ,o virtue1 thou art but an empty name6 ,blessed in such an hour is he who1 feeling himself to be sinking in gloomy waters1 cries to that ,god who is able to rescue him from the abyss1 and clings to that justice in heaven which is the pledge that justice will be done on earth below4 ,thrice blessed1 because he will be guided through the darkness of a sea of doubts even thus terrible to a haven of light and safety4 ,faith in duty helps us to faith in ,god3 faith in ,god helps us to faith in duty4 ,duty and ,god1 ,god and duty1 that is the full truth4#df #df ,see ,appendix ,,xxxv4 ,,lecture ,,ix4 ,a ,,priori ,,theistic ,,proof4 ,i4 ,the arguments which we have been considering are not merely proofs that ,god is1 but indications of what ,he is4 ,they testify to the ,divine existence by exhibiting the ,divine character4 ,they are expressions of how ,he manifests ,himself1 and expositions of how we apprehend ,his self-manifestations4 ,we have seen that against each of them various objections have been urged1 but that these objections when examined do not approve themselves to reason2 they leave the arguments against which they have been thrown quite unshaken4 ,these arguments1 however1 although perfectly conclusive so far as they go1 do not1 even in combination1 yield us the full idea of ,god which is entertained wherever theism prevails4 ,they show ,him to be the ,first ,cause of the world--the ,source of all the power1 wisdom1 and goodness displayed therein4 ,they do not prove ,him to be infinite1 eternal1 absolute in being and perfection4 ,yet it cannot be questioned that the cultivated human mind thinks of ,god as the absolute1 infinite1 eternal1 perfect ,first ,cause1 and that no lower idea of ,god can satisfy it4 ,the intellect cannot accept1 and the heart also revolts against1 the thought that ,god is dependent on any antecedent or higher ,being2 that ,he is limited to a portion either of time or space2 or that ,he is devoid of any excellence1 deficient in any perfection4 ,such a thought is rejected as at once utterly unworthy of its object1 and inherently inconsistent4 ,are we1 then1 rationally warranted to assign to ,god those attributes which are called absolute or incommunicable8 ,this is the question we have now to answer4 ,what has been proved makes it comparatively easy to establish what is still unproved4 ,we have ascertained that there is a ,god1 the ,first ,cause of the universe1 the powerful1 wise1 good1 and righteous ,author of all things4 ,we are conscious1 also1 that we have ideas of infinity1 eternity1 necessary existence1 perfection1 c4 ,we may be doubtful as to whence we got these ideas--we may feel that there is very much which is vague and perplexing in them2 but we cannot question or deny that we have them4 ,having them1 no matter how or whence we have got them1 and knowing that ,god is1 as also in a measure what ,he is1 the remaining question for us is1 ,must these ideas apply to ,god or not8 ,must the ,first ,cause be thought of as eternal or not--as infinite or finite1 as perfect or imperfect8 ,reason1 after it has reached a certain stage of culture1 has never found this a difficult question4 ,indeed1 often even before freeing itself from polytheism1 it has been internally constrained to ascribe to some of the objects of adoration those very attributes of eternity1 infinity1 and perfection which polytheism implicitly denies4 ,once it has come to believe that the universe has its origin in a rational and righteous creative ,will1 it can hardly refuse to admit that that ,will must be infinite and eternal4 ,where it has rejected polytheism without accepting theism1 it has been forced to acknowledge the world itself to be infinite and eternal4 ,when it has risen beyond the world1 when it has reached an intelligent cause of the world1 it cannot1 of course1 refuse to that cause the perfections which it would have granted to the effect--to the ,creator what it would have attributed to the creation4 ,the first and ultimate ,being1 and not any derived and dependent ,being1 must obviously be the infinite1 eternal1 and perfect ,being4 ,the proof that ,god is absolute in being and perfection should1 it seems to me1 not precede but follow the proofs that there is a cause sufficiently powerful1 wise1 and good to account for physical nature1 the mind of man1 and the course of history4 ,the usual mode of conducting the theistic argumentation has been the reverse2 it has been to begin by endeavouring to prove1 from principles held to be intuitive and ideas held to be innate1 the necessary existence1 absolute perfection1 infinity1 and eternity of ,god2 or1 in other words1 with what is called the a priori or ontological arguments4 ,this mode of procedure seems to me neither judicious nor effective4 ,if we have not established that there is a ,god by reasoning from facts1 we must demonstrate ,his existence from ideas3 but to get from the ideal to the actual may be impossible1 and is certain to be difficult2 whereas1 if we have allowed facts to teach us all that they legitimately can about the existence1 power1 wisdom1 and righteousness of ,god1 it may be easy to show that our ideas of absolute being and perfection must apply to ,him1 and can only apply to ,him4 ,theism1 according to the view now expressed1 is not vitally interested in the fate of the so-called a priori or ontological arguments4 ,there may be serious defects in all these arguments1 considered as formal demonstrations1 and yet the conclusion which it is their aim to establish may be in no way compromised4 ,it may be that the principles on which they rest do not directly involve the existence of ,god1 and yet that they certainly1 although indirectly1 imply it1 so that whoever denies it is rationally bound to set aside the fundamental conditions of thought1 and to deem consciousness essentially delusive4 ,it may be that the a priori arguments are faulty as logical evolutions of the truth of the ,divine existence from ultimate and necessary conceptions1 and yet that they concur in manifesting that if ,god be not1 the human mind is of its very nature self-contradictory2 that ,god can only be disbelieved in at the cost of reducing the whole world of thought to a chaos4 ,whether this be the case or not1 some of the a priori proofs are so celebrated that ,i cannot pass them over in entire silence4#dg #dg ,see ,appendix ,,xxxvi4 ,there is a charge which has been very often brought against the a priori proofs1 but which may be at once set aside as incorrect4 ,it has been alleged that they proceed on forgetfulness of the truth that the ,divine existence is the first and highest reality1 and therefore cannot be demonstrated from anything prior to or higher than itself4 ,but in no case that ,i know of have those who adopted what they supposed to be the a priori line of argument been under the delusion that the ground of the existence of ,god was not in ,himself1 but in something outside of or above ,himself1 from which ,his existence could be deduced4 ,such a notion is1 in fact1 so self-contradictory1 that no sane mind could deliberately entertain it4 ,it would imply that theism could be founded on atheism4 ,whatever a priori proof of the ,divine existence may be1 it has certainly never been imagined by those who employed it to be demonstration from an antecedent necessary cause4#dh #dh ,see ,appendix ,,xxxvii4 ,a priori proof is proof which proceeds from primary and necessary principles of thought4 ,from its very nature it could only appear at a comparatively late period in the history of intelligence4 ,it is only a profound study of the constitution of thought1 only a refined reflective analysis of consciousness into its elements1 which can bring to light the principles which necessarily underlie and govern all intellectual activity2 and it is only on these principles that a priori proof is based4 ,as these principles never exist in an absolutely pure form1 as what is universal and necessary in thought is never found wholly apart from what is particular and contingent1 no absolutely pure a priori argumentation need be looked for1 and certainly none such can be discovered in the whole history of speculation4 ,plato was1 perhaps1 the first to attempt to prove the existence of ,god from the essential principles of knowledge4 ,he could not consistently reason from the impressions of sense or the phenomena of the visible world4 ,he denied that sense is knowledge1 and that visible things can be more than images and indications of truth4 ,he maintained1 however1 that besides the visible world there is an intelligible world1 with objects which reason sees and not sense4 ,these objects are either conceptions or ideas1 either hypothetical principles or absolute principles1 either scientific assumptions and definitions or necessary and eternal truths which have their reality and evidence in themselves4 ,the mathematical sciences deal with conceptions2 but their chief value1 according to ,plato1 is that they help the mind to rise to that absolute science--dialectics--which is conversant with ideas4 ,the apprehension of ideas is the apprehension of the common element in the manifold1 the universal in the individual1 the permanent in the mutable4 ,reason contemplates ideas1 and participates in ideas1 and ideas are at once the essences of things and the regulative principles of cognition4 ,by communion with them the reason reaches objective reality and possesses subjective certainty4 ,they are not isolated and unconnected1 but so related that each higher idea comprehends within it several lower ones1 and that all combined constitute a graduated series or articulated organism1 unified and completed by an idea which has none higher than itself1 which is ultimate1 which conditions all the others while it is conditioned by none4 ,the supreme idea1 which contains in itself all other ideas1 is absolute truth1 absolute beauty1 absolute good1 absolute intelligence1 and absolute being4 ,it is the source of all true existence1 knowledge1 and excellence4 ,it is ,god4 ,in this part of its course the dialectic of ,plato is simply a search for ,god4 ,it is a priori inasmuch as it rests on necessary ideas1 but a posteriori inasmuch as it proceeds from these ideas upwards to ,god in a manner which is essentially analytic and inductive4 ,only when ,god--the principle of principles--is reached1 can it become synthetic and deductive4 ,the question1 ,is the ,platonic proof of the ,divine existence substantially true8 is precisely equivalent to the question1 ,is the ,platonic philosophy substantially true8 ,of course1 ,i cannot here attempt to argue a theme so vast as ,spiritualism versus ,empiricism1 ,platonism versus ,positivism4 ,my belief1 however1 is1 that ,platonism is substantially true2 that the objections which the empiricism and positivism at present prevalent urge against its fundamental positions are superficial and insufficient2 that what is essential in its theory of ideas1 and in the theism inseparable from that theory1 must abide with our race for ever as a priceless possession4 ,the ,platonic argument--by which is meant not a particular argument incidentally employed by ,plato1 but the reasoning which underlies and pervades his entire philosophy as a speculative search for certainty--has been transmitted from age to age down to the present day by a long series of eminent thinkers4 ,augustine1 for example1 argues for the existence of ,god from the very nature of truth4 ,it is impossible to think that there is no truth4 ,if there were none1 to affirm that there was none would be itself true2 or1 in other words1 the denial of the existence of truth is a self-contradiction4 ,but what is truth8 ,it is not mere sensuous perception1 not a something which belongs to the individual mind and varies with its moods and peculiarities1 but a something which is unsensuous1 unchangeable1 and universal4 ,the human reason changes and errs in its judgments2 but ideas1 necessary truths1 are not the products1 but the laws and conditions1 of the human reason--they are over it1 and it is only through apprehending1 realising1 and obeying them1 that it enlightens and regulates our nature4 ,these ideas--the laws of our intellectual and moral constitution--cannot have their source in us1 but must be eternally inherent in an eternal1 unchangeable1 and perfect ,being4 ,this ,being--the absolute truth and ultimate ground of all goodness--is ,god4 ,anselm reasoned in altogether the same spirit and in nearly the same manner4 ,in one of his works he institutes an inquiry as to whether the goodness in good actions is or is not the same thing present in all2 and when he has convinced himself that it is the same thing1 he asks1 ,what is it8 and where has it a real existence8 ,ascending upwards by these stages1 ,good is2 ,good is perfect2 ,good is one2 the one perfect ,good is ,god1--he comes to the conclusion that the goodness constitutive of good actions has necessarily its source in ,god1 and that the absolutely and essentially good is identical with ,god4 ,in another of his works he similarly inquires whether there is any truth except mere actual existence4 ,he holds that there is1 and argues1 as he had done before in regard to the good1 that the absolute and ultimate truth must be ,god4 ,thomas ,aquinas was at one with ,anselm thus far4 ,the very nature of knowledge seemed to him to show that it was in man only through the dependence of the human intelligence on an underived and perfect intelligence4 ,among the many modern philosophers who have adopted and enforced the same doctrine ,i shall refer only to a few4 ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury1 the founder of ,english deism1 is very explicit on the subject4 ,he thought of the human mind as united in the closest and most comprehensive way to the ,divine mind through the universal notions of what he called the rational instinct4 ,these notions are the laws which every faculty is meant to conform to and obey--the laws of all thought1 affection1 and action4 ,as to nature and origin1 they are1 in ,herbert's view1 ,divine2 thoughts of ,god present in the mind of man2 true revelations of the ,father of spirits to ,his children4 ,in apprehending one of them we have truly an intuition of a ,divine attribute1 of some feature of the ,divine character4 ,it is through contact1 through communion with the ,divine ,intelligence1 ,love1 and ,will1 that we know and feel and act4 ,the ,divine is the root and the law of human thought1 emotion1 and conduct4 ,not afar off1 not to be realised by great stretch of intellect1 not separated by innumerable existences which intervene between ,him and us1 but close around us1 yea1 with nothing between ,him and our inmost souls1 is the ,being with whom we have to do4 ,in ,him1 really and without any figure of speech1 we live1 and move1 and have our being4 ,among the various metaphysical proofs of ,divine existence employed by ,cudworth1 one is in like manner founded on the very nature of knowledge4 ,knowledge1 it is argued1 is possible only through ideas which have their source in an eternal reason4 ,sense is not only not the whole of knowledge1 but is in itself not at all knowledge2 it is wholly relative and individual1 and not knowledge until the mind adds to it what is absolute and universal4 ,knowledge does not begin with what is individual1 but with what is universal4 ,the individual is known by being brought under a universal1 instead of the universal being gathered from a multitude of individuals4 ,and these universals or ideas which underlie all the knowledge of all men1 which originate it and do not originate in it1 have existed eternally in the only mode in which truths can be said to be eternal1 in an eternal mind4 ,they come to us from an eternal mind1 which is their proper home1 and of which human reason is an emanation4 ,from whence it cometh to pass1 that all minds1 in the several places and ages of the world1 have ideas or notions of things exactly alike1 and truths indivisibly the same4 ,truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them2 because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth4 ,as the same face may be reflected in several glasses2 and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it2 and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it3 so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things1 and understand the same truths1 it is but one and the same eternal light that is reflected in them all 7'that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world1'7 or the same voice of that one everlasting ,word that is never silent1 re-echoed by them4 ,malebranche's celebrated theory of seeing all things in ,god is but an exaggeration of the doctrine that ,god is the light of all our seeing4 ,it found a zealous ,english defender in ,john ,norris of ,bemerton4 ,according to ,malebranche and ,norris1 all objects are seen or understood through ideas1 which derive their existence neither from the senses nor from the operations of the mind itself but are created in us by the ,deity2 and which are not drawn from contemplation of the perfections of the soul1 but are inherent in the ,divine nature4 ,better guarded statements of the ,platonic argument from necessary ideas will be found in ,leibnitz1 and ,bossuet1 and ,fenelon4 ,in the hands of ,cousin more was again attempted to be deduced from it than it could legitimately yield4 ,we may reject1 however1 his opinion that reason is not individual or personal1 without rejecting with it the substance at least of what he has so eloquently said regarding the necessary ideas which govern the reason1 or the reasoning by which he seeks to show that truth is incomprehensible without ,god1 and that all thought implies a spontaneous faith in ,god4 ,the most recent defenders of theism employ in one form or another the same argument4 ,in the works of ,ulrici1 ,hettinger1 and ,luthardt1 of ,saisset and ,simon1 of ,thompson and ,tulloch1 it still holds a prominent place4 ,i pass from it to indicate the character of some other arguments1 which are of a much more formal nature1 but which have by no means commanded so wide an assent4 ,in fact1 the arguments to which ,i now refer have never laid hold of the common reason of men4 ,they are the ingenious constructions of highly-gifted metaphysicians1 and have awakened much interest in a certain number of speculative minds1 but they have not contributed in any considerable degree either to the maintenance or the diffusion of theistic belief1 and have had no lengthened continuous history4 ,they obviously stand1 therefore1 on a very different footing from the proofs which have already been adduced--proofs which are as catholic as the conclusions which they support1 or as any of the doctrines of the ,christian system4 ,the ,stoic philosopher ,cleanthes1 author of the famous ,hymn to ,zeus1 argued that every comparison1 in affirming or denying one thing to be better than another1 implied and presupposed the existence of a superlative or an absolutely good and perfect ,being4 ,centuries later1 ,boethius had recourse to nearly identical reasoning4 ,it is only1 he maintained1 through the idea of perfection that we can judge anything to be imperfect2 and the consciousness or perception of imperfection leads reason necessarily to believe that there is a perfect existence--one than whom a better cannot be conceived--,god4 ,cleanthes and ,boethius were thus the precursors of ,anselm1 who was1 however1 the first to endeavour to show that from the very idea of ,god as the highest ,being ,his necessary reality may be strictly deduced4 ,in consequence1 ,anselm was the founder of that kind of argumentation which1 in the opinion of many1 is alone entitled to be described as a priori or ontological4 ,he reasoned thus3 ,the fool may say in his heart1 ,there is no ,god2 but he only proves thereby that he is a fool1 for what he says is self-contradictory4 ,since he denies that there is a ,god1 he has in his mind the idea of ,god1 and that idea implies the existence of ,god1 for it is the idea of a ,being than which a higher cannot be conceived4 ,that than which a higher cannot be conceived cannot exist merely as an idea1 because what exists merely as an idea is inferior to what exists in reality as well as in idea4 ,the idea of a highest ,being which exists merely in thought1 is the idea of a highest ,being which is not the highest even in thought1 but inferior to a highest ,being which exists in fact as well as in thought4 ,this reasoning found unfavourable critics even among the contemporaries of ,anselm1 and has commended itself completely to few4 ,yet it may fairly be doubted whether it has been conclusively refuted1 and some of the objections most frequently urged against it are certainly inadmissible4 ,it is no answer to it1 for example1 to deny that the idea of ,god is innate or universal4 ,the argument merely assumes that he who denies that there is a ,god must have an idea of ,god4 ,there is also no force1 as ,anselm showed1 in the objection of ,gaunilo1 that the existence of ,god can no more be inferred from the idea of a perfect being1 than the existence of a perfect island is to be inferred from the idea of such an island4 ,there neither is nor can be an idea of an island which is greater and better than any other that can ever be conceived4 ,anselm could safely promise that he would make ,gaunilo a present of such an island when he had really imagined it4 ,only one being--an infinite1 independent1 necessary being--can be perfect in the sense of being greater and better than every other conceivable being4 ,the objection that the ideal can never logically yield the real--that the transition from thought to fact must be in every instance illegitimate--is merely an assertion that the argument is fallacious4 ,it is an assertion which cannot fairly be made until the argument has been exposed and refuted4 ,the argument is that a certain thought of ,god is found necessarily to imply ,his existence4 ,the objection that existence is not a predicate1 and that the idea of a ,god who exists is not more complete and perfect than the idea of a ,god who does not exist1 is1 perhaps1 not incapable of being satisfactorily repelled4 ,mere existence is not a predicate1 but specifications or determinations of existence are predicable4 ,now the argument nowhere implies that existence is a predicate2 it implies only that reality1 necessity1 and independence of existence are predicates of existence2 and it implies this on the ground that existence in re can be distinguished from existence in conceptu1 necessary from contingent existence1 self-existence from derived existence4 ,specific distinctions must surely admit of being predicated4 ,that the exclusion of existence--which here means real and necessary existence--from the idea of ,god does not leave us with an incomplete idea of ,god1 is not a position1 ,i think1 which can be maintained4 ,take away existence from among the elements in the idea of a perfect being1 and the idea becomes either the idea of a nonentity or the idea of an idea1 and not the idea of a perfect being at all4 ,thus1 the argument of ,anselm is unwarrantably represented as an argument of four terms instead of three4 ,those who urge the objection seem to me to prove only that if our thought of ,god be imperfect1 a being who merely realised that thought would be an imperfect being2 but there is a vast distance between this truism and the paradox that an unreal being may be an ideally perfect being4 ,the ,cartesian proofs have been much and keenly discussed4 ,the one which founds on the fact of our existence and its limitations is manifestly a posteriori4 ,the other two both proceed from the idea of a perfect being4 ,the first is1 that the idea of an all-perfect and unlimited being is involved in the very consciousness of imperfection and limitation4 ,the imperfect can only be seen in the light of the perfect2 the finite cannot be conceived of except in relation to the infinite4 ,but can a finite and imperfect cause--like the human mind or the outward world--be reasonably supposed to originate the idea of an infinite and perfect being8 ,descartes holds that it cannot2 that the idea of an infinite and perfect being can only be explained by the existence and operation of such a being4 ,was he correct in this judgment8 ,perhaps not2 but what has been urged in refutation of it is probably by no means conclusive4 ,it has been said that the ideas of infinity and perfection are mere generalisations from experience4 ,but this is a statement which can only be proved on the principles of sensationalism1 and never has been proved4 ,it has been likewise said that these ideas are purely subjective1 or1 in other words1 that there may be nothing whatever to correspond to them4 ,but this is a meaningless collocation of words4 ,no finite mind can conceive the infinite1 for example1 as within itself at all4 ,the human mind can only think of the infinite as without itself4 ,if the infinite be not objective1 the idea of the infinite is false and delusive4 ,the infinite1 it has been further objected1 means merely what is not finite2 and the perfect what is not imperfect4 ,so be it2 the argument is as valid if the words be taken in that sense as in any other4 ,only do not add1 as some do1 that the perfect and the imperfect1 the finite and the infinite1 are mere verbal correlatives4 ,such a proposition can be spoken1 but it cannot be thought2 and it is most undesirable to divorce thought from speech4 ,it has also been urged that all men have not the idea of perfection2 that different men have different ideas thereof2 and that in each man who possesses it the idea is constantly changing4 ,this must be granted2 but it does not affect the argument1 which is founded on the existence of the idea of a perfect being1 and not on the perfection of the idea itself4 ,the second form of the ,cartesian argument is1 that ,god cannot be thought of as a perfect ,being unless ,he be also thought of as a necessarily existent ,being2 and that1 therefore1 the thought of ,god implies the existence of ,god4 ,just as because1 for example1 the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle1 the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles2 so1 from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect ,being1 it ought manifestly to conclude that this all-perfect ,being exists4 ,kant met this argument thus3 ,it is a contradiction that there should be a triangle the three angles of which are not equal to two right angles1 or that there should be a ,god who is not necessarily existent4 ,i cannot in either case retain the subject and do away with the predicate4 ,if ,i assume a triangle1 ,i must take it with its three angles4 ,if ,i assume a ,god1 ,i must grant ,him to be necessarily existent4 ,but why should ,i assume either that there is a triangle or that there is a ,god8 ,i may annul the subject in both cases1 and then there will be no contradiction in annulling the predicate in both cases4 ,there may be no such thing as a triangle1 why should there be such a ,being as ,god8 ,this reasoning of ,kant has generally been accepted as conclusive4 ,it does not appear to me to be so4 ,he ought not merely to have asserted but to have shown that we can annul the subject in either of the cases mentioned4 ,we obviously cannot4 ,i can say there is no triangle1 but instead of annulling that implies the idea of a triangle1 and from the idea of a triangle it follows that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,in like manner ,i can say there is no ,god1 but that is not to annul but to imply the idea of ,god1 and it is from the idea of ,god that1 according to ,descartes1 the existence of ,god necessarily follows4 ,kant should have seen that the proposition there is no ,god could be no impediment to an argument the very purpose of which is to prove that that proposition is a self-contradiction4 ,it is futile to meet this by saying that existence ought not to be included in any mere conception1 for it is not existence but necessary existence which is included in the conception reasoned from1 and that ,god can be thought of otherwise than as necessarily existent requires to be proved1 not assumed4 ,to affirm that existence cannot be given or reached through thought1 but only through sense and sensuous experience1 can prove nothing except the narrowness of the philosophy on which such a thesis is based4 ,cudworth1 ,leibnitz1 and ,mendelssohn modified the ,cartesian argument last specified in ways which do not greatly differ from one another4 ,it may be doubted whether their modifications were improvements4 ,in the eighteenth century there were elaborated a great many proofs which claimed to be a priori theistic demonstrations based on the notions of existence and causality4 ,assuming that something is1 and that nothing cannot be the cause of something1 these arguments attempted to establish that there must be an unoriginated ,being of infinite perfection1 and possessed of the attributes which we ascribe to ,god4 ,the most famous of them was1 perhaps1 that of ,dr ,samuel ,clarke1 contained in the ,boyle ,lecture of #agjd4 ,but ,dr ,richard ,fiddes1 the ,rev4 ,colin ,campbell1 ,mr ,wollaston1 ,moses ,lowman1 the ,chevalier ,ramsay1 ,dean ,hamilton1 and many others1 devised ingenious demonstrations of a similar nature4 ,it is impossible for me to discuss here their merits and demerits4 ,probably not one of them has completely satisfied more than a few speculative minds4 ,they are certainly not fitted to carry conviction to the ordinary practical understanding4 ,yet it is not easy to detect flaws in some of them2 and the more carefully they are studied1 the more1 ,i am inclined to think1 will it be recognised that they are pervaded by a substantial vein of truth4 ,they attempted logically to evolve what was implied in certain primary intuitions or fundamental conditions of the mind1 and although they may not have accomplished all that they aimed at1 they have at least succeeded in showing that unless there exists an eternal1 infinite1 and unconditioned ,being1 the human mind is1 in its ultimate principles1 self-contradictory and delusive4#di #di ,see ,appendix ,,xxxviii4 ,there must1 for example1 unless consciousness and reason are utterly untrustworthy1 be an eternal ,being4 ,present existence necessarily implies to the human intellect eternal existence4 ,the man who says that a finite mind cannot rise to the idea of an eternal ,being talks foolishly1 for all the thinking of a finite mind implies belief in what he says is inaccessible to human thought4 ,no man can thoughtfully affirm his own existence1 or the existence even of a passing fancy of his mind1 or of a grain of sand1 without feeling that that affirmation as certainly implies that something existed from all eternity as any mathematical demonstration whatever implies its conclusion4 ,and this truth1 that the most transient thing cannot be conceived of as existing unless an eternal ,being exist1 may be syllogistically expressed and exhibited in a variety of ways1 because the contradictions involved in denying it are numerous4 ,this is what has been done by the authors above mentioned with much ingenuity1 and by some of them in a manner which never has been and never can be refuted4 ,it may be doubted whether they did wisely in throwing their arguments into syllogistic form2 but as nobody ventures to undertake the refutation of them1 they must be admitted to be substantially valid4 ,the reasonings of men like ,clarke and ,fiddes1 ,lowman and ,ramsay1 have sufficiently proved that whoever denies such propositions as these1--,something has existed from eternity2 ,the eternal ,being must be necessarily existent1 immutable1 and independent2 ,there is but one unoriginated ,being in the universe2 ,the unoriginated ,being must be unlimited or perfect in all its attributes1 c41--inevitably falls into manifest absurdities4 ,this1 it may be objected1 is not equivalent to a proof of the existence of an infinite and eternal ,being4 ,it leads merely to the alternative1 either an infinite and eternal ,being exists1 or the consciousness and reason of man cannot be trusted4 ,the absolute sceptic will rejoice to have the alternative offered to him2 that the human mind is essentially untrustworthy is precisely what he maintains4 ,i answer that ,i admit that the arguments in question do not amount to a direct positive proof1 but that they constitute a reductio ad absurdum1 which is just as good1 and that if they do not exclude absolute scepticism1 it is merely because absolute scepticism is willing to accept what is absurd4 ,i am not going to examine absolute scepticism at present4 ,i shall have something to say regarding it when ,i treat of antitheistic theories4 ,just now it is sufficient simply to point out that if disbelief in an infinite1 self-existent1 eternal ,being necessarily implies belief in the untrustworthiness of all our mental processes1 the absolute sceptic is the only man who can consistently disbelieve in ,god4 ,unless we are prepared to believe that no distinction can be established between truth and error--that there is no certainty that our senses and our understandings are not at every moment deceiving us--no real difference between our perceptions when we are awake and our visions when we are asleep--no ground of assurance that we are not as much deluded when following a demonstration of ,euclid as any have been who busied themselves in attempting to square the circle1--we must accept all arguments which show that disbelief of the existence of an infinite and eternal ,being logically involves a self-contradiction or an absurdity1 as not less valid than a direct positive demonstration of the existence of such a ,being4 ,if1 although ,i am constrained to conclude that there is an infinite and eternal ,being1 ,i may reject the conclusion on the supposition that reason is untrustworthy1 ,i am clearly bound1 in self-consistency1 to set aside the testimony of my senses also by the assumption that they are habitually delusive4 ,when any view or theory is shown to involve absolute scepticism it is sufficiently refuted1 for absolute scepticism effaces the distinction between reason and unreason1 and practically prefers unreason to reason4 ,,ii4 ,the a priori arguments have a value independent of their truth and of their power to produce conviction4 ,true or false1 persuasive or merely perplexing1 they are admirable means of disciplining the mind distinctly to apprehend certain ideas which experience cannot yield1 yet which must be comprehended in any worthy view taken of ,god4 ,they help us steadily to contemplate and patiently to consider such abstract and difficult thoughts as those of being1 absolute being1 necessary being1 cause1 substance1 perfection1 infinity1 eternity1 c42 and this is a service so great1 that it may safely be said--as some writer whose name ,i cannot recall has said--that they will never be despised so long as speculative thinking is held in repute4 ,while believing that several of these arguments on the whole accomplish what they undertake1 ,i am not prepared to maintain that any of them are faultless or even conclusive throughout4 ,they are all1 probably1 much too formal and elaborate1 so far as any directly practical purpose is concerned4 ,it ought to be constantly kept in view that they presuppose an immediate apprehension of the infinite1 and that their value consists entirely in establishing that that apprehension implies the reality and presence of ,god4 ,the simplest mode of doing this must be the best4 ,it may be thought that no reasoning at all is needed2 that the intuition does not require to be supplemented by any inference2 that if the infinite be apprehended1 the living ,god must be self-evidently present to the human mind4 ,but this is plainly a hasty view4 ,few atheists will deny that something is infinite1 or that they immediately apprehend various aspects of infinity4 ,what they refuse to acknowledge is1 that the apprehension of the infinite implies more than the boundlessness of space1 the eternity of time1 and the self-existence of matter4 ,there is certainly some reasoning needed in order to show that this interpretation of the intuition is inadequate4 ,but such reasoning cannot be too direct1 for otherwise the function of the intuition is almost certain to be obscured1 and argument is almost certain to be credited with accomplishing far more than it really effects4 ,according to the view of the theistic argumentation which has been given in the present course of lectures1 all that is now necessary to complete the theistic proof is very simple indeed4 ,the universe has been shown to have an inconceivably powerful and intelligent cause1 a ,supreme ,creator1 who has dealt bountifully with all ,his creatures1 who has given to men a moral law1 and who has abundantly manifested in history that ,he loveth righteousness and hateth iniquity4 ,we are further conscious of having ideas or intuitions of infinity1 eternity1 necessary existence1 and perfection4 ,we may dispute as to whence and how we have got them1 but we cannot deny that we possess them4 ,were any person1 for example1 to affirm that he did not believe that there is a self-existent or necessary being--a being which derived its existence from no other and depends upon no other but is what it is in and of itself alone--we should be entitled to tell him either that he did not know the meaning of what he said1 or that he did not himself believe what he said4 ,but if we undoubtedly possess these ideas1 they must1 unless they are wholly delusive--which is what we are unable to conceive--be predicable of some being4 ,the sole question for us is1 ,of what being8 ,and the whole of our previous argumentation has shut us up to one answer4 ,it must be1 ,of ,him who has been proved to be the ,first ,cause of all things--the ,source of all the power1 wisdom1 and goodness displayed in the universe4 ,it cannot be the universe itself1 for that has been shown to be but an effect--to have before and behind it a ,mind1 a ,person4 ,it cannot be ourselves or anything to which our senses can reach1 seeing that we and they are finite1 contingent1 and imperfect4 ,the author of the universe alone--the ,father of our spirits1 and the ,giver of every good and perfect gift--can be uncreated and unconditioned1 infinite and perfect4 ,this completes the idea of ,god so far as it can be reached or formed by natural reason4 ,and it gives consistency to the idea4 ,the conclusions of the a posteriori arguments fail to satisfy either mind or heart until they are connected with1 and supplemented by1 this intuition of the reason--infinity4 ,the conception of any other than an infinite ,god--a ,god unlimited in all perfections--is a self-contradictory conception which the intellect refuses to entertain4 ,the self-contradictions inherent in such a conception have been exposed times without number1 and in ways which cannot possibly be refuted4 ,the chief value of most of the a priori arguments lies in such demonstration2 and no theologian who has thoughtfully discussed either the immanent or the transitive attributes of ,god has been able to dispense with as much of a priori reasoning as necessary to establish that a denial of the eternity1 or immutability1 or omnipotence1 or ubiquity1 or omniscience1 or any other attribute implied in the infinity of the ,divine ,being1 logically leads to absurdity4 ,if the infinity or independence1 for example1 of the ,first ,cause be questioned1 whoever would maintain it must return some such answer as that which ,mr ,spencer1 although not assenting to it1 puts in these words3 ,if we go a step further1 and ask what is the nature of this ,first ,cause1 we are driven by an inexorable logic to certain further conclusions4 ,is the ,first ,cause finite or infinite8 ,if we say finite1 we involve ourselves in a dilemma4 ,to think of the ,first ,cause as finite is to think of it as limited4 ,to think of it as limited necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits3 it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded without conceiving a region surrounding its boundaries4 ,what now must we say of this region8 ,if the ,first ,cause is limited1 and there consequently lies something outside of it1 this something must have no ,first ,cause--must be uncaused4 ,but if we admit that there can be something uncaused1 there is no reason to assume a cause for anything4 ,if beyond that finite region over which the ,first ,cause extends there lies a region which we are compelled to regard as infinite1 over which it does not extend--if we admit that there is an infinite uncaused surrounding the finite caused--we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether4 ,thus it is impossible to consider the ,first ,cause as finite4 ,and if it cannot be finite it must be infinite4 ,another inference concerning the ,first ,cause is equally unavoidable4 ,it must be independent4 ,if it is dependent1 it cannot be the ,first ,cause2 for that must be the ,first ,cause on which it depends4 ,it is not enough to say that it is partially independent2 since this implies some necessity which determines its partial dependence1 and this necessity1 be it what it may1 must be a higher cause1 or the true ,first ,cause1 which is a contradiction4 ,but to think of the ,first ,cause as totally independent1 is to think of it as that which exists in the absence of all other existence2 seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary1 it must be partially dependent on that other existence1 and so cannot be the ,first ,cause4 ,it is impossible1 ,i think1 to show that we are justified in ascribing to ,god the attributes most essential to ,his nature without having recourse to a very considerable extent to reasoning of an a priori kind similar to that of which we have a specimen in the passage just quoted4 ,such reasoning may be perfectly legitimate and conclusive4 ,mr ,spencer1 ,i have said1 does not accept as valid the arguments cited4 ,but he admits that from their inferences there appears to be no escape1 characterises their logic as inexorable1 and makes not the slightest attempt directly to refute them4 ,on what grounds1 then1 does he withhold his assent from them8 ,one reason is1 that the very conclusions which such arguments yield1 lead1 he thinks1 by a logic as inexorable1 to self-contradictions as great as those found to be involved in the denial of the infinity1 independence1 c41 of ,god4 ,reasoning from which there appears to be no escape1 and in which no logical fallacy can be detected1 yields the conclusion that there is an infinite and absolute ,first ,cause2 but reasoning as faultless yields also the conclusion that an infinite and absolute ,first ,cause is a self-contradiction--that there is no infinite and absolute ,first ,cause4 ,in other words1 an inexorable logic proves both that there is an infinite and absolute ,first ,cause1 and that there is none4 ,therefore it proves nothing at all except the worthlessness of logic when applied to such an idea as that of a ,first ,cause4 ,most persons will probably be of opinion that a view like this is its own sufficient refutation2 that the reasoning which tries to prove that reasoning may be necessarily and essentially self-contradictory is self-condemned4 ,and they will be quite right in their opinion4 ,if for any proposition the proof and counter-proof be equally cogent--if for contradictories there may be perfect demonstrations--it is not ,god only1 but everything1 that we shall have to cease to believe in4 ,such a reductio ad absurdum of a proposition would be also a reductio ad absurdum of the reason itself1 leaving no inference1 no intuition1 no perception1 to be rationally trusted4 ,a scepticism more absolute and comprehensive than any human being has dared to advocate1 would be the only legitimate result4 ,our whole nature would have to be regarded as a lie4 ,but we need have no fear of reason thus terminating its existence by committing suicide4 ,if we are disposed to be afraid that the human mind is in danger of so terrible a calamity1 an examination of the reasoning by which it has been attempted to show that the idea of an infinite and absolute ,first ,cause involves a variety of contradictions ought speedily to reassure us4 ,few persons of ordinary reasoning powers1 if not committed to a foregone conclusion1 will regard as inexorable logic the argumentation by which ,mr ,mansel and ,mr ,spencer fancy that they show that one and the same ,being cannot be a cause1 infinite and absolute1 or its inferences as those from which there appears to be no escape4 ,on the contrary1 ninety-nine men in a hundred will deem them extremely weak1 and possessed of no other plausibility than that which they derive from an inaccurate and ambiguous use of language4 ,there are arguments proving that there is a ,first ,cause1 and that the ,first ,cause must be infinite and absolute1 in which no fallacy can be detected4 ,but the only arguments which have yet been invented to show that the ,first ,cause cannot without contradiction be thought of as infinite and absolute1 are good for little else than to exercise students of logic in the examination of fallacies4 ,the two sets of arguments are by no means of equal worth and weight4 ,they are also notably different in nature4 ,those which attempt to prove the ,first ,cause to be infinite and absolute imply no more than that the mind may conclude that such a cause is not finite1 dependent1 and imperfect4 ,in this there is nothing arrogant4 ,those which attempt to prove that the ,first ,cause cannot be infinite and absolute are of a much less humble character4 ,they imply that we have a positive and comprehensive knowledge of the ,first ,cause2 the infinite1 and the absolute2 that we can define1 compare1 and contrast them1 and thus find out that they are incompatible and contradictory4 ,but we may be quite unable to do anything of the kind1 and yet be fully entitled to hold that the ,first ,cause is not finite1 dependent1 or imperfect4 ,we may reason to the infinite1 if we only know what the finite is and is not1 without being justified in reasoning from the infinite1 as if we knew definitely1 not to say exhaustively1 its nature4 ,the idea of an infinite ,first ,cause--the idea of the infinite ,god--contains no self-contradiction2 on the contrary1 it solves certain otherwise inevitable self-contradictions of thought4 ,it is only by the apprehension of a ,being who passeth knowledge that knowledge can be rendered self-consistent2 only by the admission that all existence is not included within the conditions of the finite that thought can escape self-destruction4 ,but1 of course1 we may easily put contradictions into our idea of an infinite ,being1 by assuming that we know more about unoriginated existence1 primary causation1 infinity1 independence1 c41 than we really do1 and by defining or describing them in ways for which we have no warrant4 ,the idea of an infinite ,first ,cause is1 it must not be forgotten1 the idea of an incomprehensible ,being4 ,no sane mind can refuse to acknowledge that something is eternal and immense2 but we cannot comprehend eternity and immensity1 and when we reason as if we comprehended them1 we speedily find ourselves involved in absurdities4 ,we may know and believe that ,god is eternal and immense1 but if ,he be so1 we undoubtedly cannot comprehend ,him4 ,we cannot think of ,god otherwise than as self-existent1 yet we certainly cannot comprehend the nature of self-existence4 ,we can think of it negatively as unoriginated and independent existence1 and consequently as a positive1 most perfect1 and peculiar manner of existence1 unlike that which is characteristic of ourselves and other finite beings2 but we are ignorant wherein its peculiarities and perfections positively consist4 ,the incomprehensibleness of the ,divine perfections is no reasonable objection against their reality4 ,we do not comprehend the manner even of our own existence1 although we are quite certain that we do exist4 ,assent1 however1 has often been refused to a priori theistic argumentation1 not on the ground that it is illogical1 but on the ground that the conclusions inferred are incomprehensible4 ,thus the author of whom ,i have just been speaking urges in favour of the procedure which he adopts the following argument1 in addition to the one already specified3 ,self-existence necessarily means existence without a beginning2 and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning4 ,now by no mental effort can we do this4 ,to conceive existence through infinite past-time1 implies the conception of infinite past-time1 which is an impossibility4 ,those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe1 and who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe1 take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator4 ,the mystery which they recognise in this great fact surrounding them on every side1 they transfer to an alleged source of this great fact1 and then suppose that they have solved the mystery4 ,but they delude themselves4 ,self-existence is rigorously inconceivable2 and this holds true whatever be the nature of the object of which it is predicated4 ,whoever agrees that the atheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence1 must perforce admit that the theistic hypothesis is untenable if it contains the same impossible idea4 ,now1 that we can by no mental effort conceive existence without a beginning is certain1 if by conceive be meant to comprehend1 or definitely imagine1 or sensibly represent2 but that we not only conceive but cannot avoid conceiving such existence is equally certain1 if by conceive be simply meant to be conscious of1 to know to be true1 to be rationally convinced4 ,it is impossible seriously to doubt that existence was without beginning4 ,something is1 and something never sprang from nothing4 ,from nothing nothing ever came or can come4 ,something always was4 ,being was without beginning4 ,mr ,spencer can no more deliver himself from the sublime and awful necessity of acknowledging an eternal something--a self-existent reality--underlying the whole universe1 than any one else4 ,his own ,absolute is such a something1 such a reality2 and although1 in accordance with his peculiar use of the words know and conceive1 he denies that that ,absolute can be known or conceived1 he admits that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness4 ,further1 no intelligent theist argues that the atheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence4 ,on the contrary1 the theist1 far from objecting to the idea of self-existence as impossible1 admits it to be a necessary idea4 ,he recognises that the universe must be allowed to be self-existent until it is shown to be a creation or event4 ,it is only after an examination of its character--only after having convinced himself that it is an effect--that he transfers the attribute of self-existence to its cause or creator4 ,to say that in doing so he flees from one mystery to another as great1 is a statement which admits of no possible justification4 ,in a word1 ,mr ,spencer's account of the reasoning of the theist is an inexplicable caricature4 ,the a priori reasoning employed in the establishment of theism is independent of any particular theory as to the origin of our ideas of infinity4 ,it presupposes merely that these ideas are valid--are not delusive4 ,it is only as predisposing to1 or implying1 scepticism1 as to their truth or objective worth1 that a theory as to their origin has a bearing on their application4 ,such scepticism cannot be logically limited to the ideas in question4 ,if we do not accept these ideas as true and trustworthy1 absolute scepticism is rationally inevitable4 ,an examination of the nature and principles of scepticism will make this manifest1 but ,i cannot enter on that examination at present4 ,in conclusion1 ,i remark that the conception of any other than an infinite ,god--a ,god unlimited in all perfections--is not only a self-contradictory but an unworthy conception2 it not only perplexes the intellect but revolts the spiritual affections4 ,the heart can find no secure rest except on an infinite ,god4 ,if less than omnipotent1 ,he may be unable to help us in the hour of sorest need4 ,if less than omniscient1 ,he may overlook us4 ,if less than perfectly just1 we cannot unreservedly trust ,him4 ,if less than perfectly benevolent1 we cannot fully love ,him4 ,the whole soul can only be devoted to ,one who is believed to be absolutely good4 ,,lecture ,x4 ,,mere ,,theism ,,insufficient4 ,i4 ,i have endeavoured to show1 in the course of lectures which ,i am now bringing to a close1 that the light of nature and the works of creation and providence prove the existence1 and so far manifest the goodness1 wisdom1 and power of ,god4 ,this truth ought always to be combined with another--namely1 that the light of nature and the works of creation and providence are not sufficient to give that knowledge of ,god1 and of ,his will1 which is necessary unto salvation4 ,reason sends forth a true light which is to be trusted and followed so far as it extends1 but which is much more limited than the wants of human nature4 ,the deepest discoveries and the highest achievements of the unaided intellect need to be supplemented by truths which can only come to us through special revelation4 ,the natural knowledge of ,god which man can attain by the exercise of his own faculties is not sufficient to make him feel that the ,eternal bears to him fatherly love1 or to break the power of sin within him and over him1 or to sustain and develop his moral and spiritual life4 ,it falls far short of what is required to enable a human soul1 a religious and immortal being1 to accomplish its true destination4 ,it falls far short1 in other words1 of being what is necessary unto salvation1 in the broad and comprehensive sense which the term salvation bears throughout ,scripture4 ,there are those who1 instead of regarding theism as simply so much fundamental truth which ,christianity presupposes and applies1 would oppose theism to ,christianity1 and substitute theism for ,christianity4 ,they would rest in mere theism and would reject ,christianity4 ,they represent theism1 dissociated from ,christianity1 as all-sufficient1 and as the religion to which alone the future belongs4 ,in doing so1 these men--many of them most earnest and excellent men--seem to me to show great want of reflection1 great ignorance of the teachings of history1 and a very superficial acquaintance with human nature4 ,atheism1 polytheism1 and pantheism have always proved stronger than mere theism--more popular1 more influential on ordinary minds4 ,it is only in alliance with revelation that theism has been able to cope successfully with these foes4 ,in no land1 and in no age1 has a theism resting exclusively on the authority of reason gained and retained the assent of more than a small minority of the community4 ,its adherents may have been men who did credit to their creed--honourable1 high-minded1 cultivated men--but they have always been few4 ,in ,india1 in ,persia1 in ,greece1 in ,rome1 some specially gifted and religious minds reached1 or at least approached1 theism2 but1 on the whole1 the development of belief in all these countries was not towards but away from theism4 ,the ,israelites1 although authoritatively taught monotheism1 fell back again and again into polytheism4 ,mythology is not merely a disease of language1 but also a testimony to the fact that the minds and hearts of the mass of mankind cannot be satisfied with a ,deity who is only to be apprehended by abstract thought1--a proof that while a few speculative philosophers may rest content with the ,god discovered by pure reason1 the countless millions of their fellow-men are so influenced by sense1 imagination1 and feeling1 that they have ever been found to substitute for such a ,god deities whom they could represent under visible forms1 as subject to the limitations of space and time1 and as actuated by the passions of humanity4 ,pantheism has a powerful advantage over theism1 inasmuch as it can give a colouring of religion to what is virtually atheism1 and a semblance of reason even to the most wildly extravagant polytheism4 ,there is no logical necessity why a mere theist should become an atheist1 but the causes which tend to produce atheism are too strong to be counteracted by any force inherent in mere theism2 and hence1 as a matter of historical fact1 mere theism has always1 even in modern ,christendom1 largely given place to atheism4 ,all the powers of the world above1 and of the world to come1 are needed to oppose the powers of the world below1 and of the world which now is4 ,only a much fuller exhibition of the ,divine character than is presented to us by mere theism can make faith in ,god the ruling principle of human life4 ,mere theism might have sufficed us had we remained perfectly rational and perfectly sinless2 but those who fancy that it is sufficient for men as they are1 only make evident that they know not what men are4 ,in the state into which we have fallen1 we need a higher light to guide us than any which shines on sea or land2 we need the light which only shines from the gracious countenance of ,christ4 ,the world by wisdom knew not ,god4 ,the whole history of the heathen world testifies to the truth of this affirmation of ,st ,paul4 ,it is an indubitable historical fact that1 outside of the sphere of special revelation1 man has never obtained such a knowledge of ,god as a responsible and religious being plainly requires4 ,the wisdom of the heathen world1 at its very best1 was utterly inadequate to the accomplishment of such a task as creating a due abhorrence of sin1 controlling the passions1 purifying the heart1 and ennobling the conduct4 ,not one religion devised by man rested on a worthy view of the character of ,god2 not one did not substitute for the living and true ,god false and dead idols1 or represent ,him in a mean and dishonouring light4 ,we are apt to associate with the religion of ,greece and ,rome the religious philosophy of a few eminent ,greek and ,roman thinkers who rose above the religion of their age and country4 ,the religion itself was mainly the creation of imagination1 and in various respects was extremely demoralising in its tendencies4 ,the worshippers of ,jupiter and ,juno1 of ,mars and ,venus1 and the gods and goddesses who were supposed to be their companions1 must have been very often not the better but the worse for worshipping such beings4 ,certainly1 they could find no elevating ideal or correct and consistent rule of moral life among the capricious and unrighteous and impure objects of their adoration4 ,it was less from the religion1 the idolatrous polytheism1 of ,greece and ,rome that the human soul in these lands drew spiritual inspiration1 than from philosophy1 from reason apprehending those truths of natural religion which the positive religion concealed and disfigured and contradicted4 ,if salvation be deliverance from darkness to light1 from sin to holiness1 from love of the world to love of ,god1 no sane man will say that the ,greek or ,roman religion was the way to it1 or an indication of the way to it4 ,did1 then1 the philosophers discover the way8 ,there is no need that we should depreciate what they did4 ,men like ,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,aristotle1 among the ,greeks--like ,cicero1 ,epictetus1 and ,antoninus1 among the ,romans--obtained wonderful glimpses of ,divine truth1 and gave to the world noble moral instructions1 which are of inestimable value even to this day4 ,but they all failed to effect any deep and extensive reform4 ,they did not turn men from the worship of idols to the service of the true ,god4 ,they were unable to raise any effective barrier either to superstition or to vice4 ,they were insufficiently assured in their own minds1 and spoke as without authority to others4 ,they saw too clearly to be able to believe that the popular religion was true1 but not clearly enough to know what to put in its place4 ,in the systems and lives of the very greatest of them there were terrible defects1 and neither the doctrine nor the conduct of the majority of those who pretended to follow them1 the common specimens of philosophers1 was fitted to improve society4 ,philosophy found out many truths1 but not the truth4 ,it did not disclose the holiness and love of ,god--discovered no antidote for the poison of sin--showed the soul no fountain of cleansing1 healing1 and life4 ,the true character of the philosophical theism of antiquity has been admirably described by one of the ablest theologians of the present day4 ,theism was discussed as a philosophical1 not as a religious question1 as one rationale among others of the origin of the material universe1 but as no more affecting practice than any great scientific hypothesis does now4 ,theism was not a test which separated the orthodox philosopher from the heterodox1 which distinguished belief from disbelief2 it established no breach between the two opposing theorists2 it was discussed amicably as an open question3 and well it might be1 for of all questions there was not one which could make less practical difference to the philosopher1 or1 upon his view1 to anybody1 than whether there was or was not a ,god4 ,nothing would have astonished him more than1 when he had proved in the lecture-hall the existence of a ,god1 to have been told to worship ,him4 ',worship whom8' he would have exclaimed2 'worship what8 worship how8' ,would you picture him indignant at the polytheistic superstition of the crowd1 and manifesting some spark of the fire of ,st ,paul 'when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry1' you could not be more mistaken4 ,he would have said that you did not see a plain distinction2 that the crowd was right on the religious question1 and the philosopher right on the philosophical2 that however men might uphold in argument an infinite abstraction1 they could not worship it2 and that the hero was much better fitted for worship than the ,universal ,cause--fitted for it not in spite of1 but in consequence of1 his want of true divinity4 ,the same question was decided in the same way in the speculations of the ,brahmans4 ,there the ,supreme ,being figures as a characterless1 impersonal essence1 the mere residuum of intellectual analysis1 pure unity1 pure simplicity4 ,no temple is raised to him1 no knee is bended to him4 ,without action1 without will1 without affection1 without thought1 he is the substratum of everything1 himself a nothing4 ,the ,universal ,soul is the ,unconscious ,omnipresent ,looker-on2 the complement1 as coextensive spectator1 of the universal drama of nature2 the motionless mirror upon which her boundless play and sport1 her versatile postures1 her multitudinous evolutions are reflected1 as the image of the rich and changing sky is received into the passive bosom of the lake4 ,thus the idea of ,god1 so far from calling forth in the ancient world the idea of worship1 ever stood in antagonism with it3 the idol was worshipped because he was not ,god1 ,god was not worshipped because ,he was4 ,one small nation alone out of all antiquity worshipped ,god1 believed the universal ,being to be a personal ,being4 ,that nation was looked upon as a most eccentric and unintelligible specimen of humanity for doing so2 but this whimsical fancy1 as it appeared in the eyes of the rest1 was cherished by it as the most sacred deposit2 it was the foundation of its laws and polity2 and from this narrow stock this conception was engrafted upon the human race4#ej #ej ,canon ,mosley1 ,on ,miracles1 ,lect4 ,,iv4 ,it is historically certain1 then1 that the world by its unaided wisdom failed to know ,god4 ,of course1 it may be said that the experiment was incomplete2 that even if ,christianity had not appeared1 the human mind would have found out in process of time all the religious truth needed to satisfy the human heart1 guide human life1 and sustain human society4 ,but such an assertion is quite arbitrary4 ,history gives it no confirmation4 ,it was only after human wisdom had a lengthened and unembarrassed opportunity of showing what it could accomplish in the most favourable circumstances1 and after it had clearly displayed its insufficiency1 that ,christianity appeared4 ,christ did not come till it was manifest that reason was wandering farther and farther away from ,god--that religion had no inherent principle of self-improvement--that man had done his utmost with the unaided resources of his nature to devise a salvation1 and had failed4 ,there was no probability whatever that a new and higher civilisation would rise on the ruins of that which fell when the hordes of ,northern barbarians subdued and overran the ,roman empire1 had not ,christianity been present to direct the work of construction4 ,we need not1 however1 discuss what might or might not have happened1 supposing the sun of ,christianity had not appeared on the horizon when that of classical civilisation was hastening to its setting1 since it is obvious that the science and philosophy even of the present day1 dissevered from revelation1 can produce no religion capable of satisfying1 purifying1 and elevating man's spiritual nature4 ,they are far advanced beyond the stage which they had reached in the time of ,st ,paul4 ,knowledge has since received large accessions from all sides1 and reflection has been taught by a lengthened and varied process of correction and discipline valuable lessons4 ,in mathematical and physical science especially there has been enormous progress4 ,the human mind is now enriched not only with the intellectual wealth which it has inherited from ,greece and ,rome1 but with that of many ages not less fruitful than those in which they flourished4 ,can we accomplish1 then1 what the ,greeks and ,romans so signally failed to achieve8 ,can we1 with all our knowledge of nature and man1 devise a religion which shall be at once merely rational and thoroughly effective8 ,can we1 when we set aside ,christianity1 construct a creed capable of not only commanding the assent of the intellect1 but of attracting and changing the heart1 quickening and guiding the conscience1 and purifying and ennobling the conduct8 ,can we build a system worthy to be called a religion on any other foundation than that which has been laid in the ,gospel8 ,if science and philosophy cannot do anything of this kind even at the present day1 we are surely at length entitled to say that the world needs to know more about ,god than it can find out for itself4 ,in proof that they cannot1 we would appeal both to facts and reason--both to the character of what science and philosophy have actually done in this connection1 and to the nature of the task which their injudicious friends would impose on them4 ,what1 then1 even at the present day1 do the ablest of those who reject ,christianity propose to offer us instead8 ,comte would have us to worship humanity4 ,can we8 ,comte himself did not believe that we can in any but a very partial and insincere way4 ,if we could1 would our worship do either our minds or hearts more good than the worship of ,jupiter and ,juno did the ,greeks of old8 ,strauss would have us to revere the universe4 ,is that not to go back to fetichism8 ,might we not just as wisely and profitably adore a stock or stone8 ,herbert ,spencer would present to us for ,god the ,unknowable4 ,but what thoughts1 what feelings1 can we have about the ,unknowable8 ,might we not as well worship empty space1 the eternal no1 or the absolute nothing8 ,schopenhauer1 ,hartmann1 ,mainlander1 and others1 would have us to go back to ,buddhism and welcome annihilation4 ,but it is clear as the light that if the advice were acted on1 the springs of intellectual life and social progress would soon be dried up4 ,the philosophy and science on which they exclusively rely have enabled none of these men to find out ,god2 nay1 they have left them under the delusion that there is no ,god to find out1 except those strange gods to which ,i have referred4 ,and being without ,god in the world1 these philosophers1 with all their knowledge and accomplishments1 are also without any hope of a life beyond the grave4 ,no man need go to them with the question1 ,what shall ,i do to inherit eternal life8 ,among all their differences--and they are many and radical--on one point they are agreed1 and it is that eternal life is but a dream2 that the highest hope even of the best of mankind is to survive for a time as a memory and an influence in the minds and conduct of others1 after having ceased to be real and personal beings2 that the only form in which the aspiration after immortality can be rationally cherished is that which the greatest of contemporary novelists and among the greatest of contemporary poets has expressed in the words3-- ,o may ,i join the choir invisible ,of those immortal dead who live again ,in minds made better by their presence3 live ,in pulses stirred to generosity1 ,in deeds of daring rectitude1 in scorn ,for miserable aims that end with self1 ,in thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars1 ,and with their mild persistence urge man's search ,to vaster issues4444 ,this is life to come1 ,which martyred men have made more glorious ,for us who strive to follow4 ,it is as true1 then1 as ever it was1 that the world by wisdom knows not ,god4 ,the advantages which the eighteen ,christian centuries have brought us only make more manifest the world's inability by its own wisdom to know ,god4 ,the longer the trial has lasted1 the more manifest has it become that ,god's revelation of ,himself is indispensable--is what man can provide no substitute for4 ,the philosophy which sets itself in opposition to revelation--which professes to supply in another and better way the spiritual wants to which revelation responds--which aims at constructing a religion out of the conclusions of science--is a mournful failure4 ,the only religious constructions which it has been able to raise1 even with all the scientific resources of the nineteenth century at its command1 are simply monuments of human folly4 ,this is just what was to be expected2 for apart from special ,divine teaching1 apart from special ,divine revelation1 man cannot truly know ,god1 as a sinful being needs to know ,him4 ,apart1 for example1 from the revelation which ,god has made of ,himself in ,christ1 the mind cannot possibly attain to a sincere and well-grounded conviction even of that primary truth on which all the perfection of religion and all the happiness and hopes of mankind depend--the truth that ,god is really a ,father1 with all a ,father's love1 to the children of men4 ,there are manifold signs or evidences of ,god's goodness and bounty in creation and providence1 but1 unless seen in the light reflected on them from redemption1 they fall far short of a complete proof of ,god's cherishing fatherly love to sinful men4 ,in the light of the ,cross it is otherwise2 the man who looks at the works of creation in that light will unhesitatingly and with full reason say1 ,my ,father made them all1 and will easily and clearly trace in all the dealings of providence a ,father's hand guiding ,his children4 ,suppose1 however1 that blessed light not shining or shut out1 and that creation and providence are before us in no other light than their own1--what then8 ,what can creation and providence teach us about ,god8 ,substantially this only3 that ,he has vast power1 since ,he has created and sustains and controls the whole of this mighty universe2 wondrous wisdom1 since ,he has arranged everything so well and directs everything so well2 and a goodness corresponding to ,his power and wisdom1 since a beneficent purpose may be detected underlying all ,his works of creation and pervading the course of providence4 ,i cannot suppose that any one will seriously maintain that creation and providence teach us more than that ,god is thus powerful and wise and good2 and fully granting that they teach us all this1 if any one mean by ,god being the ,father of men no more than that ,he is as good as ,he is powerful and wise1 and that ,his power and wisdom have been so employed on behalf of men that good gifts meet them at every step1 ,i readily agree with him that creation and providence are sufficient to show ,god to be a ,father in that sense and to that extent4 ,but is there nothing more1 nothing higher than this1 implied in fatherhood among men8 ,unquestionably there is4 ,love in the form of mere goodness is far from the noblest and most distinctive quality in a human father's heart2 nay1 there is no true fatherliness of heart at all in a man in whom there is nothing better than that4 ,one can1 by an effort of imagination1 indeed1 conceive a man to have children so absolutely innocent and happy1 and so perfectly guarded from all possibility of evil and suffering1 that love in the form of goodness or kindness would be the only kind of love he could show them2 but would his fatherly love be ever really tested in that case8 ,could he ever show the deeper1 the truly distinctive feelings of a father's heart--those we so often see manifested in the toils1 the hardships1 the dangers1 the sacrifices of wealth1 comfort1 and even life1 which parents undertake and endure for their children8 ,certainly not4 ,apply this to ,god4 ,in what sense is ,he a ,father8 ,in what sense has ,he fatherly love8 ,among the angels this question could have no place1 for they were such perfectly innocent and happy children that love in the form of goodness was all they required--all that could be shown to them4 ,and it would have been the same with men also1 if they had not fallen4 ,but as soon as sin1 suffering1 and death invaded earth1 and seized on man's body and soul1 and help or healing there was none for him in any creature1 the most awful of questions for the human race came to be1 whether or not ,god was a ,father in the full meaning of that term1 or1 in other words1 whether or not ,he had a love which1 in order to save men1 would submit to humiliation1 suffering1 sacrifice8 ,now that is what ,i say creation and providence cannot prove4 ,point to anything in creation or to anything in ordinary providence which you can show to have cost ,god anything4 ,you can easily point to thousands and thousands of things and events which you may justly conclude to be signs or gifts of ,god's goodness2 but can you point to one thing in creation1 one event in ordinary providence1 which you can seriously maintain to come from a self-sacrificing love such as a father displays when he rushes into a house in flames1 or throws himself into a raging flood1 to save the life of his child at the risk of his own8 ,if you cannot1 you fail to prove ,god a ,father in the sense ,i mean4 ,and in that sense1 which is the true sense1 there seems to me no possibility of proving ,god a ,father from creation and providence1 apart from redemption4 ,wherein is it that both fail8 ,obviously in this1 that they can show no traces of sacrifice on ,god's part4 ,but it is just here that the revelation of redemption comes in4 ,god1 in the unspeakable gift of ,his ,son1 shows us a power of sacrifice infinitely above anything known among men--an intensity of tenderest fatherly affection of which the strongest fatherly affection on earth is but a pale and feeble reflection2 and ,christ in ,his incarnation1 life1 sufferings1 and death1 reveals to us not merely the power1 and wisdom1 and goodness of ,god1 but the very depths1 if we may so speak1 of ,his heart as a ,father1 enabling us to feel without a doubt that now indeed are we the sons of ,god4 ,nothing but a special revelation1 however1 could thus unveil and disclose ,god4 ,the natural reason could not thus discern ,him by its unaided power4 ,and yet it is only in the knowledge of ,god as a ,father that the soul can either discern or realise its true destiny4 ,there are many other precious truths set before us in the ,gospel which we might in like manner show to be at once most necessary for human guidance1 and inaccessible to unaided human research4 ,we shall not1 however1 dwell on them or even enumerate them4 ,the entire problem of our present and future salvation is beyond our powers of solution4 ,the light of nature and the works of creation and providence cannot show man a way of reconciliation to ,god4 ,no man by mere human wisdom1 by any searching into the secrets of nature or providence1 can find that out4 ,mere human wisdom is utter folly here2 and if man may be wise at all in this connection1 he must confess his natural folly1 the powerlessness of his own reason1 and must consent to be guided by the wisdom of ,god--or1 in other words1 to accept ,christ1 who is the wisdom of ,god to us for salvation1 who is ,god's solution of the problem of our salvation4 ,the only real wisdom possible to man must1 from the very nature and necessity of the case1 be the wisdom of renouncing his own wisdom4 ,if he say1 ,i shall solve this awful problem for myself1 without help from any one1 then he in his wisdom is a most manifest fool1 whose folly will ruin him2 but if he have the candour to confess his own folly1 to admit his own intellect powerless here1 and to acknowledge the wisdom of ,god and acquiesce in ,his plan of salvation1 then1 in the very act of confessing himself foolish he is made wise1 for ,christ is made wisdom unto him4 ,the oracle at ,delphi pronounced ,socrates the wisest of men4 ,socrates could not understand it1 and yet he was unwilling to disbelieve the oracle1 so he went about from one person reputed wise to another1 in order to be able to say1 here is a wiser man than ,i am1 or at least to find out what the oracle meant4 ,he went to many1 but he found that1 while they in reality knew almost nothing that was worth knowing1 they thought they knew a great deal1 and were angry with one who tried to convince them of their ignorance4 ,so that at last ,socrates came to recognise that there was a truth in what had been said about him2 to use nearly his own words1--,he left them1 saying to himself1 ,i am wiser than these men2 for neither they nor ,i1 it would seem1 know anything valuable3 but they1 not knowing1 fancy that they do know2 ,i1 as ,i really do not know1 so ,i do not think that ,i know4 ,i seem1 therefore1 to be in one small matter wiser than they4 ,now it is only the kind of spirit which in its degree and about less important matters was in ,socrates--it is precisely that kind of spirit about the things which concern eternal life and peace1 that can alone make a man wise unto salvation4 ,the most ignorant person1 provided he only know that he must renounce his own wisdom as foolishness--which on subjects pertaining to salvation it really is--and accept what is disclosed in ,christ as to salvation1 is infinitely wiser than the most able or learned man who trusts solely to his own wisdom apart from ,christ's revealed work and will4 ,both of them are foolish and ignorant2 but the one knows it1 and1 in consequence of knowing it1 accepts ,christ's plan of salvation1 and is made a partaker of infinite wisdom--the other does not know it1 and1 thinking that he is wise while he is a fool1 remains in his folly1 and must bear its punishment4 ,and now ,i bring this course of lectures to a close4 ,i trust that they may not have been found wholly without profit1 through the blessing of ,him who despises not even the smallest and most imperfect service1 if humbly rendered to ,him4 ,i should rejoice to think that ,i had helped any one to hold1 in such a time as the present1 with a firmer and more intelligent grasp1 the fundamental truth on which all religious faith must rest4 ,amen4 ,,appendix4 ,,note ,i41 page #f4 ,,natural ,,and ,,revealed ,,religion4 ,the ,hindus regard the ,vedas1 the ,parsees the ,zend-,avesta1 and the ,mohammedans the ,koran1 as having been immediately and specially inspired4 ,this means that they believe the spiritual truth contained in these books to belong to revealed religion1 although it in reality is merely a portion of natural religion4 ,the ,greeks and ,romans could not distinguish between nature and revelation1 reason and faith1 because ignorant of what we call revelation and faith4 ,without special revelation or inspiration the oriental and classical mind attained1 however1 to the possession of a very considerable amount of most precious religious truth4 ,in all ages of the ,christian ,church there have been theologians who have traced at least the germinal principles of such truth to written or unwritten revelation2 and probably few patristic or scholastic divines would have admitted that there was a knowledge of ,god and of ,his attributes and of ,his relations to the world which might be the object of a science distinct from1 and independent of1 revelation4 ,this is quite consistent with what is also a fact--namely1 that the vast majority of ,christian writers have always acknowledged that the light of nature and the works of creation and providence manifest the goodness1 wisdom1 and power of ,god1 and that this general revelation is implied in the special revelation made at sundry times and divers manners and recorded in the ,scriptures4 ,the ',theologia naturalis sive liber creaturum' of the ,spanish physician1 ,raymond de ,sebonde1 who taught theology in the ,university of ,toulouse during the earlier part of the fifteenth century1 was1 so far as ,i know1 the first work which1 proceeding on the principle that ,god has given us two books1 the book of nature and the book of ,scripture1 confined itself to the interpretation of the former1 merely indicating the mutual relations of natural and revealed religion4 ,faustus ,socinus was one of the first distinctly to maintain that there was no such thing as natural religion--no knowledge of ,god attainable except from ,scripture3 see his ',de ,auctoritate ,scriptur ,sacr4' ,a conviction of the importance of natural theology spread very rapidly in the seventeenth century4 ,this contributed to awaken an interest in the various religions of the world1 and thus led to the rise of what may be called ,comparative ,theology1 although more generally designated the ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,its origin is to be sought in the attempts made to prove that the principles of natural theology were to be found in all religions4 ,lord ,herbert of ,cherbury's ',de ,religione ,gentilium1' published in #affc1 was one of the earliest and most characteristic attempts of the kind4 ,from that time to the present the study of religions has proceeded at varying rates of progress1 but without interruption1 and has at length begun to be prosecuted according to the rules of that comparative method which has1 in the words of ,mr ,freeman1 carried light and order into whole branches of human knowledge which before were shrouded in darkness and confusion4 ,the eighteenth century was the golden age of natural theology4 ,the deists both of ,england and ,france endeavoured to exalt natural theology at the expense of positive theology by representing the former as the truth of which the latter was the perversion4 ,all religions in the world1 said ,diderot1 are merely sects of natural religion4 ,the prevalent opinion of the freethinkers of his time could not have been more accurately expressed4 ,it was just what his predecessors in ,england meant by describing ,christianity as a republication of natural religion1 and by maintaining that it was as old as the creation4 ,the wisest opponents of the deists1 and thoughtful ,christian writers in general--the adherents of the moderate and rational theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--strove1 on the other hand1 to show that natural theology was in reality presupposed by revelation1 and that it should carry the mind onwards to the acceptance of revelation4 ,but there were some who undertook to maintain that there was no such thing as natural theology2 that reason of itself can teach us absolutely nothing about ,god or our duties towards ,him4 ,the ,hutchinsonians1 for example1 whose best representatives1 besides the founder1 were ,bishop ,horne of ,norwich1 and ,william ,jones1 curate of ,nayland1 believed that all knowledge of religion and morals1 and even the chief truths of physical science1 ought to be drawn from the ,bible4 ,dr ,ellis1 in his treatise entitled ',the ,knowledge of ,divine ,things from ,revelation1 not from ,reason or ,nature' 7#agdc71 laboured to prove that neither the being of a ,god nor any other principle of religion could be legitimately deduced from the study of the phenomena of the universe4 ,he argued on the assumption that the senses are the only natural inlets to knowledge4 ,the late ,archbishop ,magee adopted his views on this subject4 ,one of the most widely known expositions and defences of the theory is that contained in the ',theological ,institutes' 7#ahbc7 of the eminent ,wesleyan divine1 ,richard ,watson4 ,in order to establish that all our religious knowledge is derived from special revelation1 he employs all the usual arguments of scepticism against the proofs of theism and the principles of reason on which they rest4 ,in the ,roman ,catholic ,church1 scepticism as to reason and the light of nature has often been combined with dogmatism as to the authority of revelation and the ,church4 ,in the system of what is called the theocratic school may be seen the result to which attempts to establish the certitude of authority by destroying the credit of human reason naturally lead4 ,it is a system of which ,i have endeavoured to give some account in my ',philosophy of ,history in ,france and ,germany1' pp4 #aci-aed4 ,the fact on which ,i have insisted in the latter part of the lecture--the fact that theism has come to mankind in and through revelation--has caused some altogether to discard the division of religion into natural and revealed4 ,they pronounce it to be a distinction without a difference1 and attribute to it sundry evil consequences4 ,it has led1 they think1 on the one hand1 to depreciation of revelation--and1 on the other1 to jealousy of reason3 some minds looking upon ,christianity as at best a republication of the religion of nature1 in which all that is most essential and valuable is as old as the creation2 while others see in natural religion a rival of revealed religion1 and would exclude reason from the religious sphere as much as possible4 ,the distinction is1 however1 real1 and the errors indicated are not its legitimate consequences4 ,if there be a certain amount of knowledge about ,god and spiritual things to be derived from nature--from data furnished by perception and consciousness1 and accessible to the whole human race1--while there is also a certain knowledge about ,him which can only have been communicated through a special illumination or manifestation--through prophecy1 or miracle1 or incarnation1--the distinction must be retained4 ,it is no real objection to it to urge that in a sense even natural religion may be regarded as revealed religion1 since in a sense the whole universe is a revelation of ,god1 a manifestation of ,his name1 a declaration of ,his glory4 ,that is a truth1 and1 in its proper place1 a very important truth1 but it is not relevant here3 it is perfectly consistent with the belief that ,god has not manifested ,himself merely in nature1 but also in ways which require to be carefully distinguished from the manifestation in nature4 ,in like manner1 the distinction is not really touched by showing that revealed religion has embodied and endorsed the truths of natural religion1 or by proving that even what is most special in revelation is in a sense natural4 ,these are both impregnable positions4 ,the ,bible is to a large extent an inspired republication of the spiritual truths which are contained in the physical creation1 and in the reason1 conscience1 and history of man4 ,but this does not disprove that it is something more4 ,the highest and most special revelation of ,god--,his revelation in ,jesus ,christ--was also the fullest realisation of the true nature of man4 ,but this is no reason why we should not distinguish between the general and the special in that revelation4 ,we can only efface the distinction by reducing ,christ to a mere man1 or confounding ,god with man in a pantheistic manner4 ,it has been further objected to the division of religion into natural and revealed that it is unhistorical1 that natural religion is only revealed religion disguised and diluted--,christianity without ,christ4 ,it never existed1 we are told1 apart from revelation1 and never would have existed but for revelation4 ,but this very objection1 it will be observed1 implies that natural religion is not identical with revealed religion--is not revealed religion pure and simple--is not ,christianity with ,christ4 ,why is this8 ,is it not because revealed religion contains more than natural religion--what reason cannot read in the physical universe or human soul8 ,besides1 while the principles of natural religion were presented in revelation in a much clearer form than in any merely human systems1 and while there can be no reasonable doubt that but for revelation our knowledge of them would be greatly more defective than it is1 to maintain that they had no existence or were unknown apart from revelation1 is manifestly to set history at defiance4 ,were there no truths of natural religion in the works of ,plato1 ,cicero1 and ,seneca8 ,is there any heathen religion or heathen philosophy in which there are not truths of natural religion8 ,the belief in a natural religion which is independent alike of special revelation and of positive or historical religions has been argued to have originated in the same condition of mind as the belief in a state of nature entertained by a few political theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries4 ,this can only be done by confounding natural religion with an imaginary patriarchal religion1 which is1 of course1 inexcusable4 ,natural religion is analogous1 not to the state of nature1 but to the law of nature of the jurists4 ,natural religion is the foundation of all theology1 as the law of nature is the foundation of all ethical and political science2 and just as belief in the law of nature is perfectly independent of the theory of a state of nature1 so the belief in natural religion has no connection whatever with any theory of patriarchal or primitive religion4 ,there is a well-known essay by ,professor ,jowett on the subject of this note in the second volume of his ',st ,paul's ,epistles1' c4 ,,note ,,ii41 page #i4 ,,influence ,,of ,,religion ,,on ,,morality4 ,the assertion of ,mr ,bentham and of ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill that much has been written on the truth but little on the usefulness of religion1 is quite inaccurate4 ,most of the apologists of religion have set forth the proof that it serves to sustain and develop personal and social morality2 and1 from the time of ,bayle downwards1 not a few of its assailants have undertaken to show that it is practically useless or even hurtful4 ,but ,bentham may have been the first who proposed to estimate the utility of religion apart from the consideration of its truth4 ,the notion was characteristically ,benthamite4 ,it was likewise far too irrational to be capable of being consistently carried out or applied4 ,the work compiled by ,mr ,grote from the papers of ,mr ,bentham1 and published under the name of ,philip ,beauchamp--',analysis of the ,influence of ,natural ,religion on the ,temporal ,happiness of ,mankind'--and ,mr ,mill's ',essay on the ,utility of ,religion1' are1 in almost every second page1 as well as in their general tenor1 attacks not merely on the utility but on the truth of religion4 ,the former of these works is an attempt to show that natural religion has done scarcely any good1 and produced no end of evils--inflicting1 so runs the indictment1 unprofitable suffering1 imposing useless privations1 impressing undefined terrors1 taxing pleasure by the infusion of preliminary scruples and subsequent remorse1 creating factitious antipathies1 perverting the popular opinion1 corrupting moral sentiment1 producing aversion to improvement1 disqualifying the intellectual faculties for purposes useful in this life1 suborning unwarranted belief1 depraving the temper1 and1 finally1 creating a particular class of persons incurably opposed to the interests of humanity4 ,the author makes out that religion is responsible for this catalogue of mischiefs1 by two simple devices4 ,first1 he defines religion as the belief in the existence of an almighty ,being1 by whom pains and pleasures will be dispensed to mankind during an infinite and future state of existence1 or1 in other words1 he so defines religion as to exclude from the idea of ,god the thought of moral goodness1 righteousness1 and holiness4 ,he even insists that the ,god of natural religion can only be conceived of as a capricious and insane despot1 and bases his argumentation on this assumption4 ,dr ,caselles1 who has translated the treatise into ,french1 and prefaced it by an interesting introduction1 informs us that the argumentation is not applicable to the new1 but only to the old theism4 ,it is historically certain1 however1 that the old theism of ,jeremy ,bentham and his friends never existed outside of their own imaginations4 ,it is likewise certain that a lamb would acquire a very bad character if it were by definition identified with a wolf1 and credited with all that creature's doings4 ,the second device is a declaration of open war against the principle of separating the abuses of a thing from its uses4 ,the only excuse which can be given for this declaration of a most unjust war is1 that ,mr ,bentham was able completely to misunderstand the obvious meaning of the principle which he assailed4 ,that a book so unfair and worthless should have produced on the mind of ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 even when a boy of sixteen1 the impression which he describes in his ,autobiography would have been inexplicable1 had we not known the character of his education4 ,mr ,mill's own essay is rather strange4 ,it begins with six pages of general observations1 which are meant to show that it is a necessary and very laudable undertaking to attempt to prove that the belief in religion1 considered as a mere persuasion apart from the question of its truth1 may be advantageously dispensed with1 any benefits which flow from the belief being local1 temporary1 and such as may be otherwise obtained1 without the very large amount of alloy always contained in religion4 ,yet we are told that an argument for the utility of religion is an appeal to unbelievers to induce them to practise a well-meant hypocrisy2 or to semi-believers to make them avert their eyes from what might possibly shake their unstable belief2 or1 finally1 to persons in general to abstain from expressing any doubts they may feel1 since a fabric of immense importance to mankind is so insecure at its foundations1 that men must hold their breath in its neighbourhood for fear of blowing it down4 ,an argument for the utility of religion is moral bribery4 ,an argument for its uselessness is highly to be commended4 ,mr ,mill further tells us that little has been written1 at least in the way of discussion or controversy1 concerning the usefulness of religion2 and likewise1 that religious writers have not neglected to celebrate to the utmost the advantage both of religion in general and of their own religious faith in particular4 ,the inference must be1 that what religious writers urge for the utility of religion is not to be reckoned as reasoning2 that only what writers like ,mr ,bentham and ,mr ,mill urge against its utility is to be thus regarded4 ,the charity of this view is capped by the assertion that the whole of the prevalent metaphysics of the present century is one tissue of suborned evidence in favour of religion2 an assertion which is made amusing by following a sentence in which ,mr ,mill speaks of the intolerant zeal of intuitionists4 ,after his general considerations1 he professes to inquire what religion does for society1 but in reality never enters on the investigation4 ,he devotes two pages to insisting on the enormous influence of authority on the human mind2 three to emphasising the tremendous power of education2 and ten to enlarging on the power of public opinion4 ,he might as relevantly have dwelt on the influence of reason1 speech1 the press1 machinery1 clothes1 marriage1 and thousands of other things which undoubtedly affect the intellectual and moral condition of society4 ,it is as unreasonable to infer that religion is useless because authority1 education1 and public opinion are powerful1 as it would be to infer that the fire in a steam-engine might be dispensed with because water is necessary4 ,any person who assumes1 as ,mr ,mill assumed1 that authority1 education1 or public opinion may be contrasted with religion--who does not see1 as ,mr ,mill did not see1 that all these powers are correlatives1 which necessarily intermingle with1 imply1 and supplement one another--is1 ipso facto1 unable intelligently to discuss the question1 ,what does religion do for society8 ,in the second part of his essay1 ,mr ,mill ought1 in order to have kept his promise1 to have considered what influence religion in the sense of belief in and love of ,god is naturally calculated to exert on the character and conduct of the individual2 but instead of this he applies himself to the very different task of attempting to prove that the idealisation of our earthly life1 the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made1 is capable of supplying a poetry1 and1 in the best sense of the word1 a religion1 equally fitted to exalt the feelings1 and 7with the same aid from education7 still better calculated to ennoble the conduct1 than any belief respecting the unseen powers4 ,he forgets to inquire whether there is any opposition between the idealisation of our earthly life and belief respecting the unseen powers1 or whether1 on the contrary1 religious belief is not the chief source of the idealisation of our earthly life4 ,that this logical error is as serious as it is obvious1 appears from the fact that ten years later ,mr ,mill himself confessed that it cannot be questioned that the undoubting belief of the real existence of a ,being who realises our own best ideas of perfection1 and of our being in the hands of that ,being as the ruler of the universe1 gives an increase of force to our aspirations after goodness beyond what they can receive from reference to a merely ideal conception 7,theism1 p4 #beb74 ,his proof that the worship of ,god is inferior to the religion of humanity rests mainly on these three assertions3 7#a7 ,that the former1 what now goes by the name of religion1 operates merely through the feeling of self-interest2 7#b7 ,that it is impossible that any one who habitually thinks1 and who is unable to blunt his inquiring intellect by sophistry1 should be able without misgiving to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants2 and 7#c71 ,that mankind can perfectly well do without the belief in a heaven4 ,it seems to me not only possible1 but probable1 that in a higher1 and1 above all1 a happier condition of human life1 not annihilation but immortality may be the burdensome idea2 and that human nature1 though pleased with the present1 and by no means impatient to quit it1 would find comfort and not sadness in the thought that it is not chained through eternity to a conscious existence which it cannot be assured that it will always wish to preserve4 ,on this last point more mature reflection brought him to a different and wiser conclusion 7see ,theism1 pp4 #bdi1 #bej74 ,those who wish to study the important subject of the relations of religion and morality will find the following references useful3 the last chapter of ,m4 ,janet's ',la ,morale2' the tude on ,la ,morale indpendante in ,m4 ,caro's ',problmes de ,morale ,sociale2' many articles and reviews in ,m4 ,renouvier's ',critique ,philosophique2' ,martensen's ',christian ,ethics1' #e-ad2 ,o4 ,pfleiderer's ',moral und ,religion2' ,luthardt's ',apologetic ,lectures on the ,moral ,truths of ,christianity2' and ,bradley's ',ethical ,studies1' pp4 #bgi-cje4 ,,note ,,iii41 page #ah4 ,,ethics ,,of ,,religious ,,inquiry4 ,much has been written regarding the spirit and temper in which religious truth should be pursued and defended4 ,in a large number of the general treatises both of apologetic and systematic theology1 the subject is considered1 and not a few essays1 lectures1 c41 have been specially devoted to it4 ,the greater portion of this literature may1 ,i believe1 be forgotten without loss1 but there is a part of it which will well repay perusal4 ,the ,oratio de recto ,theologi zelo in the first volume of the ',opuscula' of ,werenfels1 is worthy of that tolerant and philosophical divine4 ,archbishop ,leighton's ',exhortations to ,students' exhale from every line a heavenly ether and fragrance4 ,it will be long before ,herder's ',letters on the ,study of ,theology' are out of date4 ,dr ,chalmers attached high value to the distinction between the ethics of theology and the objects of theology1 and expatiated with great eloquence on the duty which is laid upon men by the probability or even the imagination of a ,god 7,nat4 ,theol41 ,b4 i4 ch4 i4 ii47 ,man is not to blame1 if an atheist1 because of the want of proof4 ,but he is to blame1 if an atheist1 because he has shut his eyes4 ,he is not to blame that the evidence for a ,god has not been seen by him1 if no such evidence there were within the field of his observation4 ,but he is to blame if the evidence have not been seen1 because he turned away his attention from it4 ,that the question of a ,god may be unresolved in his mind1 all he has to do is to refuse a hearing to the question4 ,he may abide without the conviction of a ,god1 if he so choose4 ,but this his choice is matter of condemnation4 ,to resist ,god after that ,he is known1 is criminality towards ,him2 but to be satisfied that ,he should remain unknown1 is like criminality towards ,him4 ,there is a moral perversity of spirit with him who is willing1 in the midst of many objects of gratification1 that there should not be one object of gratitude4 ,it is thus that1 even in the ignorance of ,god1 there may be a responsibility towards ,god4 ,the ,discerner of the heart sees whether1 for the blessings innumerable wherewith he has strewed the path of every man1 ,he be treated like the unknown benefactor who was diligently sought1 or like the unknown benefactor who was never cared for4 ,in respect at least of desire after ,god1 the same distinction of character may be observed between one man and another--whether ,god be wrapt in mystery1 or stand forth in full development to our world4 ,even though a mantle of deepest obscurity lay over the question of ,his existence1 this would not efface the distinction between the piety on the one hand which laboured and aspired after ,him1 and the impiety upon the other which never missed the evidence that it did not care for1 and so grovelled in the midst of its own sensuality and selfishness4 ,the eye of a heavenly witness is upon all these varieties2 and thus1 whether it be darkness or whether it be dislike which hath caused a people to be ignorant of ,god1 there is with ,him a clear principle of judgment that ,he can extend even to the outfields of atheism4--7,pp4 #gb1 #gc47 ,the ,rev4 ,alexander ,leitch1 in the ,first ,part of his ',ethics of ,theism' 7#ahfh71 discusses in a thoughtful and suggestive manner the following subjects3 the reality and universality of the antithesis between truth and error1 the legitimate dependence in all cases of belief on knowledge1 the responsibility of man for his whole system of belief1 the distinction between mystery and contradiction1 the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge1 the distinction between certainty and probability1 the standard of morality1 and the claims of reason and faith4 ,mr ,venn's ',hulsean ,lectures' for #ahfi are intended to illustrate1 explain1 and work out into some of their consequences1 certain characteristics by which the attainment of religious belief is prominently distinguished from the attainment of belief upon most other subjects4 ,these characteristics consist in the multiplicity of the sources from which the evidence for religious belief is derived1 and the fact that our emotions contribute their share towards producing conviction4 ,what ,i have said in the text ought not to be understood as implying any doubt that men are largely responsible for their beliefs4 ,this ,i accept as an indubitable truth1 although there is great room for difference of opinion as to the limits of the responsibility2 but it is a truth which no one party in a discussion has a right to urge as against another party4 ,it is a law over all disputants1 and is abused when severed from tolerance and charity4 ,perhaps it has never been better expounded and enforced than in ,dr ,pusey's ',responsibility of the ,intellect in ,matters of ,faith' 7#ahgc74 ,that religious belief is in a great measure conditioned and determined by character is implied in the whole argument of my third lecture4 ,in this fact lies the main reason why the highest evidence may not produce belief even where there is no conscious dishonesty in those who reject it4 ,a person desirous of working himself fully into the truth in this matter1 will find excellent thoughts and suggestions in ,dr ,newman's ',fifteen ,sermons preached before the ,university of ,oxford1 between ,a4,d4 #ahbf and #ahdc1' and in ,principal ,shairp's ',culture and ,religion4' ,,note ,,iv41 page #bc4 ,,traditive ,,theory ,,of ,,religion4 ,mr ,fairbairn makes the following remarks on the theory which traces religion to a primitive revelation3 ,although often advanced in the supposed interests of religion1 the principle it assumes is most irreligious4 ,if man is dependent on an outer revelation for his idea of ,god1 then he must have what ,schelling happily termed 'an original atheism of consciousness4' ,religion cannot1 in that case1 be rooted in the nature of man--must be implanted from without4 ,the theory that would derive man's religion from a revelation is as bad as the theory that would derive it from distempered dreams4 ,revelation may satisfy or rectify1 but cannot create1 a religious capacity or instinct2 and we have the highest authority for thinking that man was created 'to seek the ,lord1 if haply he might feel after and find ,him'--the finding being by no means dependent on a written or traditional word4 ,if there was a primitive revelation1 it must have been--unless the word is used in an unusual and misleading sense--either written or oral4 ,if written1 it could hardly be primitive1 for writing is an art1 a not very early acquired art1 and one which does not allow documents of exceptional value to be easily lost4 ,if it was oral1 then either the language for it was created or it was no more primitive than the written4 ,then an oral revelation becomes a tradition1 and a tradition requires either a special caste for its transmission1 becomes therefore its property1 or must be subjected to multitudinous changes and additions from the popular imagination--becomes1 therefore1 a wild commingling of broken and bewildering lights4 ,but neither as documentary nor traditional can any traces of a primitive revelation be discovered1 and to assume it is only to burden the question with a thesis which renders a critical and philosophic discussion alike impossible4--,studies in the ,philosophy of ,religion and ,history1 pp4 #ad1 #ae4 ,there is an examination of the same theory in the learned and able work of ,professor ,cocker of ,michigan on ',christianity and ,greek ,philosophy' 7#ahge74 ,he argues3 #a4 ,that it is highly improbable that truths so important and vital to man1 so essential to the wellbeing of the human race1 so necessary to the perfect development of humanity as are the ideas of ,god1 duty1 and immortality1 should rest on so precarious and uncertain a basis as tradition4 #b4 ,that the theory is altogether incompetent to explain the universality of religious rites1 and especially of religious ideas4 #c4 ,that a verbal revelation would be inadequate to convey the knowledge of ,god to an intelligence purely passive and utterly unfurnished with any a priori ideas or necessary laws of thought4--,pp4 #hf-if4 ,a good history of the traditive theory of the diffusion of religion is a desideratum in theological literature4 ,,note ,v41 page #bi4 ,,normal ,,development ,,of ,,society4 ,the truth that social development ought to combine and harmonise permanence and progress1 liberty and authority1 the rights of the individual and of the community1 has been often enforced and illustrated4 ,the earnestness with which ,comte did so in both of his chief works is well known4 ,a philosopher of a very different stamp1 ,f4 v4 ,baader1 has in various of his writings given expression to profound thoughts on the subject4 ,his essay entitled ',evolutionismus und ,revolutionismus des gesellschaftlichen ,lebens' merits to be specially mentioned4 ,alexander ,vinet has often been charged with a one-sided individualism1 and perhaps not altogether without justice2 but he always maintained that he was merely the advocate of individuality4 ,individualism and individuality are two sworn enemies2 the first being the obstacle and negation of all society--the second1 that to which society owes all it possesses of savour1 life1 and reality4 ,nowhere does individualism prosper more easily than where there is an absence of individuality2 and there is no more atomistic policy than that of despotism4 ,vinet has probably not held the balance exactly poised between the individual and society2 but his dissertations1 ',sur l'individualit et l'individualisme' and ',du rle de l'individualit dans une rforme sociale1' would have been far less valuable than they are if he had forgotten that1 although it is the individual who thinks1 the thought of the individual cannot form itself outside of society nor without its aid4 ,but he did not1 as words like the following sufficiently prove3--,it is better to connect ourselves with society than to learn to dispense with it1 or rather to persuade ourselves that we are able to dispense with it4 ,it is only given to the brute to suffice to itself4 ,man has been chained to man4 ,we hardly give more credit to spontaneous generation in the intellectual sphere than in the physical world2 the most individual work is to a certain point the work of all the world2 everywhere solidarity reappears1 without1 however1 any prejudice to liberty3 ,god has willed it so4 ,it is with the soul engaged in the life of religion1 or that of thought1 as with the vessel launched upon the waters1 and seeking beyond the ocean for the shores of a new world4 ,this ocean is society1 religious or civil4 ,it bears us just as the ocean does--fluid mass1 on which the vessel can indeed trace furrows1 but may nowhere halt4 ,the ocean bears the ship1 but the ocean may swallow it up1 and sometimes does so2 society swallows us up still more often1 but yet it is what upbears us2 nor can we arrive without being upborne by it1 for it is like the sea1 which1 less fluid than the air1 and less dense than the earth1 just yields to and resists us enough to sustain without impeding our progress towards the desired goal4 ,there are no finer pages in ,martensen's ',christian ,ethics' than those in which he treats of individualism and socialism1 liberty and authority in the development of society1 and conservatism and progress4 ,the most adequate historical proof and illustration of the truth in question as to the nature of social evolution will be found in the ,earl of ,crawford's ',progression by ,antagonism' and ',scepticism and the ,church of ,england4' ,,note ,,vi41 page #cb4 ,,definition ,,and ,,classification ,,by ,,the ,,highest ,,type4 ,dr ,whewell maintained that in natural history groups are fixed not by definition1 but by type4 ,the class1 he wrote1 is steadily fixed1 though not precisely limited2 it is given1 though not circumscribed2 it is determined not by a boundary-line without1 but by a central point within2 not by what it strictly excludes1 but by what it eminently includes2 by an example1 not by a precept2 in short1 instead of ,definition we have a ,type for our director4 ,a type is an example of any class--for instance1 a species of a genus--which is considered as eminently possessing the characters of the class4 ,all the species which have a greater affinity with this type-species than with any others form the genus1 and are ranged about it1 deviating from it in various directions and different degrees4--,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences1 vol4 i4 pp4 #dgf1 #dgg4 ,dr ,whewell1 it will be observed1 was more cautious in his language than the theologians to whom ,i have referred4 ,he did not speak of defining by type1 but only of classifying1 not by definition1 but by type4 ,his motive1 however1 for entertaining the view he laid down1 was obviously the same which has led so many theologians to give definitions of religion which are only applicable to its highest forms4 ,probably it was insufficient4 ,prof4 ,huxley 7,lay ,sermons1 pp4 #ij-ib7 very justly1 it seems to me1 argues that classification by type is caused by ignorance1 and that as soon as the mind gets a scientific knowledge of a class it defines4 ,nothing which is not precisely limited is steadily fixed2 nothing which is not circumscribed is exactly given3 if the boundary-line is not determined1 the central point cannot be accurately ascertained2 what is eminently included cannot be known so long as what is strictly excluded is unknown4 ,while assenting to the view of ,prof4 ,huxley in the passage indicated1 ,i may remark that he falls into one error which rather forcibly illustrates what is said in the page to which this note refers regarding the necessary poverty of the significance of a strictly scientific definition of an extensive class4 ,he instances as a definition which is of a truly scientific kind and rigorous enough for a geometrician1 the following3 ,mammalia are all animals which have a vertebrated skeleton and suckle their young4 ,but clearly this definition says too much if we are to criticise it rigorously4 ,were it true1 there would be no males among mammalia4 ,the definition is in strictness applicable to females only4 ,,note ,,vii41 page #ch4 ,,psychological ,,nature ,,of ,,religion4 ,in this note ,i shall briefly summarise three class lectures on the psychological nature of religion4 #a4 ,investigations into the psychological nature of religion date only from about the end of last century4 ,for ages previously men sought to know what religion was2 but they attempted to find an answer merely by reflection on positive or objective religion4 ,kant opened up to them a new path--that of investigation into the nature of religion as an internal or mental fact4 ,o4 ,pfleiderer's account 7,die ,religion1 pp4 #e-abd7 of the researches thus started characterised1 and criticised4 #b4 ,the testimony of consciousness is sufficient to establish the existence of religion as a subjective or mental state1 but cannot certify whether1 as such1 it be simple or complex1 primary or derivative1 coextensive with human consciousness1 or wider or narrower1 or whether there be anything objectively corresponding to it4 #c4 ,in order to analyse religion1 the ultimate genera of consciousness must be ascertained1 which has only been slowly done4 ,history of the process3 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 their followers1 ,descartes1 ,spinoza1 the ,english philosophers from ,bacon to ,dugald ,stewart1 ,kant and the ,german psychologists1 ,brown1 ,hamilton1 and ,bain4 ,establishment of the threefold division of mental phenomena into cognitions1 emotions1 and volitions4 ,difficulties of the division shown by the author in ',mind1' ,no4 ,v4 ,religion must be a state of intellect1 sensibility1 or will1 or some combination of two or all of these factors4 #d4 ,religion may be held to consist essentially and exclusively of knowledge2 but this mistake is too gross to have been frequently committed4 ,the ,gnostics1 the earlier and scholastic theologians1 the rationalists1 ,schelling and ,cousin1 have been charged with this error4 ,the grounds of the charge indicated4 ,shown to be in all these cases exaggerated4 #e4 ,schleiermacher refutes the theory by the consideration that the measure of our knowledge is not the measure of our religion4 ,vindication and illustration of his argument4 ,service rendered by ,schleiermacher to religion and theology in this connection4 #f4 ,hegel came nearest to the identification of religion and thought1 maintaining that sentiment was the lowest manifestation of religion1 while the comprehension of the absolute1 the highest knowledge1 was its complete realisation1 as also that religion was the self-consciousness of ,god through the mediation of the finite spirit4 ,exposition and criticism of this theory4 ,examination of ,vera's defence of it4 ,worship supposes two persons morally and spiritually as well as intellectually related4 #g4 ,while no mere intellectual act constitutes religion1 the exercise of reason is an essential part of religion4 ,the denial of this an error prevalent among the modern theologians of ,germany1 owing to their accepting ,kant's argumentation against the possibility of apprehending ,god by the speculative or pure reason as conclusive4 ,if religion have no rational foundation1 it has no real foundation4 ,reason does not apprehend merely what is finite4 ,true place of reason in religion4 #h4 ,religion has often been resolved into feeling or sentiment1 but erroneously1 since whatever feeling is fixed on requires some explanation of its existence1 and this can only be found in some act or exercise of intellect4 #i4 ,epicurus1 ,lucretius1 and ,hume have traced religion to fear4 #aj4 ,fear explains atheism better than it explains religion1 and in order even to be feared ,god must be believed in4 ,men fear a great many things4 ,mere fear founds nothing1 but only causes efforts to avoid the presence or thought of its object4 ,fear enters into religion1 and is filial in the higher1 and servile in the lower1 forms of religion4 #aa4 ,feuerbach resolves religion into desire--into an ignorant and illusive personification of man's own nature as he would wish it to be4 #ab4 ,this view presupposes the truth of atheism1 does not explain why man should refer to supramundane ends or objects1 and is contradicted by the historical facts1 which show that reason and conscience have at least co-operated with desire in the origination and development of religion4 #ac4 ,schleiermacher resolves religion into a feeling of absolute dependence--of pure and complete passiveness4 ,statement of his theory4 ,shown to rest on a pantheistic conception of the ,divine ,being4 ,his reduction of the ,divine attributes into power4 #ad4 ,no such feeling can exist1 the mind being incapable of experiencing a feeling of nothingness--a consciousness of unconsciousness4 #ae4 ,could it be supposed to exist1 it would have no religious character1 because wholly blind and irrational4 #af4 ,the theory of ,schleiermacher makes the moral and religious consciousness subversive of each other1 the former affirming and the latter denying our freedom and responsibility4 #ag4 ,mansel supposes the religious consciousness to be traceable to the feeling of dependence and the conviction of moral obligation2 but the latter feeling implies the perception of moral law1 and is not religious unless there be also belief in a moral lawgiver4 #ah4 ,schenkel represents conscience as 'the religious organ of the soul1' but this is not consistent with the fact that conscience is the faculty which distinguishes right from wrong4 ,schenkel's view of conscience shown to make its religious testimony contradict its ethical testimony4 #ai4 ,strauss combines the views of ,epicurus1 ,feuerbach1 and ,schleiermacher2 but three errors do not make a truth4 ,account of the criticism to which the ,straussian theory of religion has been subjected by ,vera1 ,ulrici1 and ,professor ,h4 ,b4 ,smith4 #bj4 ,although there can be no true religion without love1 and although to love the true ,god with the whole heart is the ideal of religion1 religion cannot be resolved exclusively into love2 since love presupposes knowledge1 and is not the predominant feeling1 if present at all1 in the lower forms of religion4 #ba4 ,religion includes will1 implying the free and deliberate surrender of the soul to ,god1--the making self an instrument where it might1 although wrongfully1 have been made an end1--but it is not merely will1 since all volition1 properly so called1 presupposes reason and feeling4 #bb4 ,kant made religion merely a sanction for duty1 and duty the expression of a will which is its own law1 and which is unaffected by feeling2 but this view rested on erroneous conceptions as to 7#a7 the relation of religion and morality1 7#b7 the nature of the will1 and 7#c7 the place of feeling in the mental economy4 ,religion and morality inseparable in their normal conditions2 but not to be identified1 religion being communion with ,god1 while morality is conformity to a law which is ,god's will but which may not be acknowledged to be ,his will1 so that they may and do exist in abnormal forms apart from each other4 ,the will has not its law in itself4 ,kant's errors on this subject4 ,feeling is the natural and universal antecedent of action4 ,kant's errors on this subject4 #bc4 ,dr ,brinton 7,religious ,sentiment1 c41 #ahgf7 analyses religion into emotion and idea--an effective and intellectual element--the latter of which arises necessarily from the law of contradiction and excluded middle4 ,merits and defects of his theory4 #bd4 ,the religious process is at once rational1 emotional1 and volitional4 ,its unity1 and the co-operation of knowing1 feeling1 and willing4 #be4 ,description of 7#a7 its essential contents1 7#b7 its chief forms1 7#c7 its principal moments or stages1 and 7#d7 its manifestations in spiritual worship and work4 ,,note ,,viii41 page #eh4 ,,argument ,e ,,consensu ,,gentium4 ,pessimism will be treated of along with other anti-theistic theories4 ,the fact that religion is a natural and universal phenomenon1 as widespread as humanity and as old as its history1 and the fact insisted on in the lecture1 that religion can only realise its proper nature in a theistic form1 give us1 when adequately established1 the modern and scientific statement of the old argument--e consensu gentium4 ,this argument1 which we already meet with in ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor41 i4 #ag2 ,tusc4 ,ques41 i4 #ac2 ,de ,leg41 i4 #h7 and ,seneca 7,epist4 #aag71 in ,clement of ,alexandria 7,strom41 v4 #ad7 and ,lactantius 7,div4 ,inst41 i4 #b71 has gradually grown into the science of comparative theology4 ,an instructive essay might be written on its development4 ,mr ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 who had obviously no suspicion that there had been any development of the kind1 criticised the argument in his essay on ,theism1 pp4 #aed-afj4 ,he was entirely mistaken in representing it as an appeal to authority--to the opinions of mankind generally1 and especially of some of its wisest men4 ,it has certainly very rarely--probably never--been advanced in a form which could justify such an account of it4 ,he was also mistaken in supposing that it had any necessary connection with the view which ascribes to men an intuitive perception1 or an instinctive sense1 of ,deity4 ,i agree with his objections to that view2 but the argument does not imply it4 ,if it prove that man's mental constitution is such that1 in the presence of the facts of nature and life1 religion necessarily arises1 and that the demands of reason1 heart1 and conscience1 in which it originates1 can only be satisfied by the worship and service of one ,god1 with the attributes which theism assigns to ,him1 it has accomplished all that can reasonably be expected from it4 ,mr ,mill was1 however1 it seems to me1 perfectly correct in holding that the mere prevalence of the belief in ,deity afforded no ground for inferring that the belief was native to the mind in the sense of independent of evidence4 ,in no form ought the argument from general consent to be regarded as a primary argument4 ,it is an evidence that there are direct evidences--and when kept in this its proper place it has no inconsiderable value--but it cannot be urged as a direct and independent argument4 ,this is a most important consideration1 which is in danger of being overlooked in the present day4 ,some authors would actually contrast the argument for theism or ,christianity derivable from the comparative study of religion with the ordinary or formal proofs1 and would substitute it for them1 not seeing that1 although powerful in connection with1 and dependence on1 these proofs1 it has little relevancy or weight when dissociated from them4 ,the two recent writers who have made most use of the argument are1 perhaps1 ,ebrard1 who has devoted to it the whole of the second volume of his ,apologetics1 and ,baumstark1 whose ',christian ,apologetics on an ,anthropological ,basis' has for its exclusive aim to prove that man has been made for religion1 and that the non-,christian religions do not1 while ,christianity does1 satisfy his religious cravings and needs4 ,in this country we ought not to forget the service which ,mr ,maurice rendered by his ',religions of the ,world1' and ,mr ,hardwicke by his ',christ and other ,masters4' ,the position maintained by ,sir ,john ,lubbock1 that religion is not a universal phenomenon1 and that advocated by ,comte1 that it is a temporary and transitional phenomenon1 will be examined in the volume on ,anti-theism4 ,,note ,,ix41 page #ge4 ,,the ,,theistic ,,evidence ,,complex ,,and ,,comprehensive4 ,cousin has said1 ,there are different proofs of the existence of ,god4 ,the consoling result of my studies is1 that these different proofs are more or less strict in form1 but they have all a depth of truth which needs only to be disengaged and put in a clear light1 in order to give incontestable authority4 ,everything leads to ,god4 ,there is no bad way of arriving at ,him1 but we go to ,him by different paths4 ,the truth1 that all the faculties of man's being must co-operate in the formation of the idea of ,god1 is well enforced and illustrated in an article on ,the ,origin of the ,concept of ,god1 by the ,rev4 ,george ,t4 ,ladd1 in the ',bibliotheca ,sacra1' vol4 xxxiv42 also in ,principal ,m',cosh's ',method of the ,divine ,government1' ,b4 i41 c4 i41 sec4 #a1 and ',intuitions of the ,mind1' ,pt4 iii41 ,b4 ii41 c4 v41 sec4 #b4 ,the following quotation from ,mr ,ladd's article is a statement of its central idea3 ,nothing is more necessary1 in the endeavour to understand how the concept under consideration originates1 than to hold correct views of the entire relation of man to truth4 ,the view which1 if not held as a theory1 is quite too frequently carried out in the practical search after knowledge1 seems to be this one--that truth is a product of mind wrought out by the skilful use of the ratiocinative faculties4 ,it follows1 then1 that the correct working of these faculties is almost the only important or necessary guarantee of truth4 ,but it is not any lone faculty or set of faculties which is concerned in man's reception of truth4 ,the truth becomes ours only as a gift from without4 ,all truth is of the nature of a revelation1 and demands that the organ through which the revelation is made should be properly adjusted4 ,the organ for the reception of truth is symmetrically cultured manhood1 rightly correlated action1 and balanced capabilities of man's different powers4 ,the attitude of him who would attain to truth is one of docility1 of receptiveness1 of control exercised upon all the powers of the soul1--so that none of them1 by abnormal development or activity1 interfere with the action of all the rest4444 ,if the statements just made are true with regard to human knowledge in general1 they are pre-eminently true with regard to such knowledge as is presented to the soul in the form of the concept of ,god4 ,the pure in heart shall see ,god2 they that obey shall know of the doctrine2 the things of the spirit are spiritually judged of4 ,these statements are as profound in their philosophic import as they are quickening in their practical tendencies4 ,this concept comes as ,god's revelation of ,himself within all the complex activities of the human soul4 ,it is adapted to man as man in the totality of his being and energies4 ,and the whole being of man must be co-operative in the reception of this self-revelation of ,god1 as well as met and filled by the form which the revelation takes1 in order that the highest truth concerning ,god may become known4444 ,in his work on ,mental ,physiology1 ,dr ,carpenter speaks of certain departments of science 'in which our conclusions rest1 not on any one set of experiences1 but upon our unconscious co-ordination of the whole aggregate of our experience2 not on the conclusions of any one train of reasoning1 but on the convergence of all our lines of thought toward one centre4' ,these words1 italicised by that author himself1 well represent the form in which the knowledge of ,god is given to the human soul4 ,it is the convergence of these lines of thought that run together from so many quarters which makes a web of argument far stronger to bind men than any single thread could be4 ,this is a form of proof which1 while it is1 when understood aright1 overwhelmingly convincing1 gives also to all the elements of our complex manhood their proper work to do in its reception4 ,in its reception it makes far greater difference1 whether the moral and religious sections of the whole channel through which the truth flows are open or not1 than whether the faculty of the syllogism is comparatively large or not4 ,nor is there any effort to disparage any intellectual processes involved1 in thus insisting upon the complete and co-ordinated activity of the soul1 as furnishing the organon for the knowledge of ,god4 ,all the strings of the harp must be in tune1 or there will be discord1 not harmony1 when the breath of the ,lord blows upon it4 ,that the power of apprehending ,god is conditioned by the character of man's nature as a whole1 was clearly seen and beautifully expressed by the ancient ,christian apologist1 ,theophilus4 ,if thou sayest1 show me thy ,god1 ,i answer1 show me first thy man1 and ,i will show thee my ,god4 ,show me first1 whether the eyes of thy soul see1 and the ears of thy heart hear4 ,for as the eyes of the body perceive earthly things1 light and darkness1 white and black1 beauty and deformity1 c41 so the ears of the heart and the eyes of the soul can perceive divine things4 ,god is seen by those who can see ,him1 when they open the eyes of their soul4 ,all men have eyes1 but the eyes of some are blinded that they cannot see the light of the sun4 ,but the sun does not cease to shine because they are blind2 they must ascribe it to their blindness that they cannot see4 ,this is thy case1 ,o man6 ,the eyes of thy soul are darkened by sin1 even by thy sinful actions4 ,like a bright mirror1 man must have a pure soul4 ,if there be any rust on the mirror1 man cannot see the reflection of his countenance in it2 likewise if there be any sin in man1 he cannot see ,god4--,ad ,autolycum1 i4 c4 #b4 ,there is an improper use of the fact that the emotional capacities as well as the intellectual faculties are concerned in the apprehension of ,god4 ,some persons express themselves as if there was an evidence for ,god in the feelings not only as well as in the intellect1 but distinct from1 and independent of1 the evidence on which the intellect has to decide4 ,they reason as if although the latter were necessarily and in its own nature inconclusive1 the former might still warrant belief1 or as if at least feelings might so supplement weak arguments as to allow of their conclusions being firmly held4 ,they virtually acknowledge that1 although it were incontestably proved that the theistic inference was such as could not reasonably be deemed trustworthy or sufficient by the intellect1 they would believe in the existence of ,god all the same in reliance on their feelings1 because the heart is as trustworthy as the head and as well entitled to be heard4 ,this is a very different doctrine from what ,i regard to be the true one--namely1 that neither the head nor the heart is a competent witness in the case under consideration when the one is dissociated from the other4 ,purity of heart and obedience to the will of ,god enable us to see ,god and to know ,his character and doctrine1 but they do not dispense with vision and knowledge1 nor do they create a vision and knowledge which are distinct from1 and independent of1 reason4 ,the heart must be appealed to and satisfied as well as the head1 but not apart from or otherwise than through the head1 or the appeal is sophistical and the satisfaction illegitimate4 ,our feelings largely determine whether we recognise and assent to reasons or not1 but they ought not to be substituted for reasons1 or even used to supplement reasons4 ,the sentimentalism which pleads feelings in deprecation of the rigid criticism of reasons1 or in order to retain a conviction which it cannot logically justify1 necessarily tends to scepticism1 and1 indeed1 is a kind of scepticism4 ,,note ,x41 page #hf4 ,,intuition1 ,,feeling1 ,,belief1 ,,and ,,knowledge ,,in ,,religion4 ,there are few who hold in a consistent manner that ,god is known by immediate intuition4 ,the great majority of those who profess to believe this1 so explain it as to show that they believe nothing of the kind4 ,dr ,charles ,hodge 7,systematic ,theology1 pt4 i4 ch4 i47 may be indicated as an example4 ,professing to hold that the knowledge of ,god is innate and intuitive1 he so explains and restricts these terms as would make our knowledge of our fellow-men as much innate and intuitive as our knowledge of ,god1 or even more so2 and even after all these qualifications finds that nothing more can be maintained than that a sense of dependence and accountability to a being higher than themselves exists in all minds--which is far from being equivalent to the conclusion that ,god is intuitively known4 ,cousin is sometimes represented as an advocate of the view in question1 but erroneously4 ,discounting a few inaccurate phrases1 his theory as to the nature of the theistic process is substantially identical with that expounded in the lecture4 ,its purport is not that reason directly and immediately contemplates the ,absolute ,being1 but that it is enabled and necessitated by the essential conditions of cognition1 the a priori ideas of causality1 infinity1 c41 to apprehend ,him in ,his manifestations4 ,to find intuitionists who in this connection really mean what they say1 we must go to ,hindu ,yogi1 ,plotinus and the ,alexandrian ,mystics1 ,schelling1 and a few of his followers--or1 in other words1 to those who have thought of ,god as a pantheistic unity or a ,being without attributes4 ,many ,german theologians1 unduly influenced by the authority of ,schleiermacher1 and destitute of a sound knowledge of psychology1 have rested religion on feeling--mere or pure feeling4 ,hegel opposed the attempt to do this1 with considerable effect1 although on erroneous principles4 ,krause exposed it1 however1 with far more thoroughness in his ',absolute ,religionsphilosophie4' ,it is on feeling that belief is rested by most of the advocates of what is called the faith philosophy4 ,with thinkers of this class a man like ,cousin must not be confounded1 although he maintained that religion begins with faith and not with reflection2 or like ,hamilton1 although he denied that the infinite can be known while affirming that it is1 must1 and ought to be1 believed4 ,cousin meant by faith nothing else than the consent of reason1 and ,hamilton meant by belief assent to the original data of reason4 ,the words faith and belief are used in a bewildering variety of senses4 ,a few remarks will make this apparent4 7a7 ,by belief or faith is sometimes meant reason as distinguished from understanding1 and sometimes reason as distinguished from reasoning4 ,these two senses are so very closely allied that we may allow them to count as but a single signification4 ,it is extraordinary that in either sense belief should be contrasted with reason1 as it is by those who tell us that the infinite is an object only of faith1 and that reason has to do exclusively with the finite1 or that first principles are inaccessible to reason but revealed to faith4 ,to create an appearance of conflict between reason and faith by identifying faith with reason in a special sense1 and reason with understanding or reasoning1 is unwarranted1 if not puerile4 ,what use can there be in telling us that ,god cannot be known--cannot be apprehended by reason--but is only an object of faith1 a ,being merely to be believed in1 when what is meant is that we have the same immediate certainty of ,his existence as of the truth of an axiom of geometry8 7b7 ,belief may be limited to apprehension1 and knowledge to comprehension4 ,it may be said that we have but faith1 we cannot know the unseen and infinite1 just as it is said that we believe that the grass grows but do not know how it grows4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that if apprehension be knowledge1 as it surely is1 we believe only what we know4 ,we know--i4e41 apprehend--the existence of ,god and the growth of the grass1 and we believe what we thus know4 ,we do not know--i4e41 comprehend--the nature of ,god or the nature of growth1 and what we do not thus know neither do we believe4 7c7 ,at other times faith or belief relates to probable1 as opposed to certain1 knowledge4 ,we do not know this1 but we believe it1 often means1 ,we are not sure of this1 but we think it likely4 ,it is not in this sense1 of course1 that any one except a religious sceptic will allow that the existence of ,god is a matter of faith4 ,a man may admit that religion and science differ as faith and knowledge1 but if he is willing to understand this as signifying that while science is certain1 religion is at the most merely probable1 he must necessarily be a doubter or an unbeliever4 7d7 ,faith or belief sometimes refers to the knowledge which rests on personal testimony1 ,divine or human4 ,such faith may be more certain than assent given to the evidence furnished by science4 ,it ought to be precisely proportioned to the evidence that there is such and such testimony1 and that the testimony is trustworthy4 7e7 ,by faith or belief is sometimes meant trust in a person or fidelity to a truth2 the yielding up of the heart and life to the object of faith4 ,faith or belief of this kind always involves preparedness to act upon what we affirm4 ,it does not appear to me that such preparedness is1 as ,professor ,bain maintains1 the genuine1 unmistakable criterion of belief in general4 ,this kind of faith1 like all other faith1 ought to rest on the assent of the intellect to evidence1 although what is characteristic of it is to be found not in the intellect but in the emotions and will4 ,since it constitutes and produces1 however1 spiritual experience1 it is a condition and source as well as a consequence of knowledge4 ,there can be1 in fact1 no profound religious knowledge1 because there can be no vital religion1 without it4 ,in religion1 as in every other department of thought and life1 man is bound to regulate his belief by the simple but comprehensive principle that evidence is the measure of assent4 ,disbelief ought to be regulated by the same principle1 for disbelief is belief2 not the opposite of belief1 but belief of the opposite4 ,unbelief is the opposite both of belief and disbelief4 ,ignorance is to unbelief what knowledge is to belief or disbelief4 ,the whole duty of man as to belief is to believe and disbelieve according to evidence1 and neither to believe nor disbelieve when evidence fails him4 ,,note ,,xi41 page #aah4 ,,the ,,theological ,,inference ,,from ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,energy4 ,a remarkably clear account of the chief theories as to the nature of matter will be found in ,professor ,tait's ',lectures on some ,recent ,advances in ,physical ,science1' ,lect4 ,,xii4 ,in ,thomson and ,tait's ',natural ,philosophy1' ,thomson's article on ,the ,age of the ,sun's ,heat 7',macmillan's ,magazine1' ,march #ahfb71 ,tait's ',thermodynamics1' ,helmholtz's ',correlation and ,conservation of ,forces1' ,balfour ,stewart's ',treatise on ,heat1' c41 the facts and theorems which seem to establish that the material universe is a temporary system will be found fully expounded4 ,i am not acquainted with any more effective criticism of the argumentation by which the eminent physicists mentioned support their conclusion than that of the ,rev4 ,stanley ,gibson2 and1 although it seems to me not to come to very much1 ,i feel bound in fairness to give it entire4 ,after an exposition of the theory of energy1 and of the reasoning founded on it by which we seem necessitated to infer that the universe tends at last to be a scene of rest1 coldness1 darkness1 and death1 he thus writes3 ,is this reasoning1 ,i ask1 open to any objection8 and if not1 does it bear out the theological conclusion here sought to be rested upon it8 ,in attempting to pass a verdict upon the question here raised1 we cannot but feel1 not only the grandeur of the subject before us1 but also the imminent risk of its being affected by considerations unknown to us4 ,we certainly need to judge with diffidence4 ,perhaps the first question which arises is1 ,are we to take the material universe to be infinite8 ,if it be1 and if its stores of energy1 potential and kinetic1 have no limit1 then it is no longer clear that the final stage of accumulation need have been reached1 however long its past history may have been2 nor yet1 ,i may add1 that it would ever be reached in the future4 ,i may be reminded that at present1 at all events1 only finite accumulations have arisen1 and that this is not consistent with an accumulation through a past eternity4 ,but this objection assumes that there never could have been more than some assignable degree of diffusion of matter4 ,why should this be8 ,if at any past period there was a certain degree of diffusion1 why may there not have been a greater degree at an earlier period8 ,and if so1 why may not this integrating1 as ,i should propose to call it1 have been going on for ever8 ,if1 on the other hand1 the universe be finite1 then1 according to the principle of the conservation of energy1 reflection of heat must take place from its boundaries1 and there may be reconcentration of energy on certain points1 according to the form of the bounding surface4 ,a second inquiry arises thus4 ,if it be impossible to imagine the present history of the universe continued backward indefinitely under its present code of laws1 are we therefore obliged to assume some anomalous interference8 ,we speak1 of course1 of these laws as they are known to us4 ,might there not be others1 yet unknown1 that would solve the difficulty8 ,the history of the universe1 as immediately known to us1 offers as its leading feature the falling together of small discrete bodies in enormous numbers and with great velocities1 or the condensation of very rare and diffused gases4 ,hence the formation of bodies1 some of vast size1 others smaller1 but all originally greatly heated4 ,this process seems to point to an earlier state of things1 in which such accumulations of matter1 though sparse even now1 were far less common--a state in which1 to use the expression which ,i have proposed1 matter was far less integrated4 ,it is quite true that the great change of which we thus obtain a glimpse is not a recurring process4 ,it is not therefore fitted for eternal repetition and continuance4 ,but it is a bold thing to say that this earlier state of things may not have followed from one still older by a natural process1 and this again from one before1 and so on through an indefinite regression4 ,we have seen what an important part the ether plays in the present process of the dissipation of energy4 ,the existence of that ether1 the separation of matter into two main forms1 may have sprung out of some previous condition of things wholly unknown to us4 ,and so also there may be forms and stores of energy as yet unknown4 ,mr ,proctor1 in his work on the sun1 has cautioned us how we speculate on the physical constitution of that body1 whilst we must feel uncertain how far the physical laws1 which we observe here1 will hold under the vastly different conditions obtaining there4 ,he supports his caution by referring to cases in which what had been confidently thought by many to be safe generalisations have been shown to fail in novel circumstances4 ,thus it was thought that the passage of a gas from the gaseous into the liquid form was always an abrupt change4 ,but it has been found that carbonic acid gas can be made to pass into the liquid state by insensible gradations4 ,again1 it had been thought that gas1 when incandescent1 always gave light whose spectrum was broken into thin lines2 but it has been shown that hydrogen1 under high pressure1 may be made to give forth light with a continuous spectrum4 ,now surely this caution1 which ,mr ,proctor enters in the case of which he speaks1 might still more wisely be entered when we come to consider a state of things so novel1 so remote from our experience1 as that which attended the origin of the universe1 or rather of that state of the universe with which we are acquainted4 ,we certainly must not be in haste to conclude that because the laws of nature1 as they are known to us1 will not explain what must have taken place at some very remote period1 therefore those events must have been altogether anomalous4--,religion and ,science1 pp4 #ga-gd4 ,it is here virtually--perhaps ,i may say expressly--conceded that if the matter and energy of the universe be finite and located in infinite space1 the reasoning by which the theorists of thermodynamics maintain that perpetual motion is incompatible with the transformation and dissipation of energy1 cannot be resisted4 ,unless matter and energy be infinite or space finite1 the known laws of nature must eventually abolish all differences of temperature and destroy all life--this is what is admitted4 ,to me it seems to amount to yielding all that is demanded2 because whoever seriously considers the difficulties involved in believing either matter infinite or space finite must1 ,i am persuaded1 come to regard it as equivalent to an acknowledgment that the world will have an end and must have had a beginning4 ,zoellner1 in his ingenious work on the nature of comets1 endeavours to avoid this inference by recourse to the hypotheses of ,riemann and others as to a space of n dimensions4 ,in such a space the shortest line would be a circle1 and a body might move for ever1 yet describe a limited course4 ,matter1 space1 and inferentially time1 would1 in fact1 according to this hypothesis1 be both finite and infinite4 ,it is to be hoped that few persons in the full possession of their intellects will ever accept a view like this4 ,the imaginary geometry may be thoroughly sound reasoning1 but it is reasoning from erroneous premises1 and it can only be useful so long as it is remembered that its premises are erroneous4 ,they have only to be assumed to be true to experience and reality1 and all science must be set aside in favour of nonsense4 ,logic ought not1 however1 to be confounded with truth4 ,caspari fancies that by representing the universe as not a mechanism but an organism1 he preserves the right to believe it eternal4 ,but surely the laws of heat apply to organisms no less than to mechanisms4 ,in an article concerning the cosmological problem1 published in the first number of the ',vierteljahrsschrift f4 ,wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1' ,professor ,wundt rejects the theory in question on extremely weak grounds4 ,it is easy to see1 he says1 that1 in the case of the ,english physicists at least1 the desire of harmonising the data of the exact sciences with theological conceptions has not been without influence on this limitation of the universe4 ,the rashness displayed by such a statement1 and the utter want of evidence or probability for it1 as regards men like ,thomson or ,tait1 need not be pointed out4 ,besides1 ,clausius and ,helmholtz are neither ,english physicists nor likely to be influenced by theological conceptions4 ,will it be believed that1 notwithstanding this charge against others1 ,professor ,wundt's own reasoning is not scientific1 but merely anti-theological8 ,such is the case4 ,if the ,thomsonian theory be admitted1 a place is left for creative action1 for miracle2 and this1 he argues1 is a contradiction of the principle of causality4 ,therefore the theory must be rejected4 ,it is to be regretted that so eminent a man of science should employ so unscientific an argument4 ,there is obviously a very widespread unwillingness to accept the ,thomsonian theory2 but1 so far as ,i am aware1 good reasons have not yet been given for its rejection4 ,the contrast between the reception which it has received and that which has been accorded to the ,darwinian theory is certainly curious1 and probably instructive4 ,,note ,,xii41 page #acj4 ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,tiological ,,argument4 ,the argument for the ,divine existence which proceeds on the principle of causality is generally called the cosmological argument1 but sometimes1 and perhaps more accurately1 the tiological argument4 ,the proof from order is not unfrequently termed cosmological4 ,it is impossible to keep the tiological argument entirely separate either from the ontological or cosmological argument4 tiological reasoning may be detected as a creative factor in the rudest religious creeds4 ,the search for causes began not with the origin of philosophy but with the origin of religion4 ,passages like ,ps4 xc4 #a1 #b1 cii4 #bf-bh2 ,rom4 i4 #ai1 #bj2 ,heb4 i4 #aj-ab--;have been referred to as anticipations of the argument4 ,wherever nature is spoken of in ,scripture1 it is as the work of an uncreated being1 of a free and sovereign mind4 ,aristotle gave a formal expression to the tiological argument by inferring from the motion of the universe the existence of a first unmoved mover--,phys41 vii4 #a1 #b1 viii4 #g1 #i1 #ae4 ,cicero repeated his reasoning1 and tells us it had been also employed by ,carneades1 ,de ,nat4 ,deor41 ii4 #i1 iii4 #ab1 #ac4 ,well known is ,st ,augustine's ,interrogavi terram1 et dixit3 non sum4 ,interrogavi mare et abyssos--et responderunt3 non sumus deus tuus1 qure super nos4 ,interrogavi coelum1 solem1 lunam1 stellas3 neque nos sumus deus1 quem quris1 inquiunt4 ,et dixi omnibus iis--dicite mihi de illo aliquid4 ,et exclamaverunt voce magna3 ipse fecit nos4 ,interrogavi mundi molem de ,deo meo et respondit mihi3 non ego sum1 sed ipse me fecit4--,conf41 x4 #f4 ,diodorus of ,tarsus 7,phot4 ,bib4 ,cod41 #bbc1 p4 #bji ,bekk471 and ,john of ,damascus 7,de ,fid4 ,orth41 i4 #c71 inferred the necessity of a creative unity from the mutability and corruptibility of worldly things4 ,thomas ,aquinas argued on the principle of causality in three ways--viz43 #a4 ,from motion to a first moving principle1 which is not moved by any other principle2 #b4 ,from effects to a first efficient cause2 and #c4 ,from the possible and contingent to what is in itself necessary4--,summa4 ,p4 i41 ,qu4 #b1 #c4 ,most of the theologians of the sixteenth1 seventeenth1 and eighteenth centuries who treat of the proofs of the ,divine existence1 employ in some form the argument from causation4 ,thus1 in ,pearson ',on the ,creed' and ,charnock's ',discourses on the ,existence and ,attributes of ,god' will be found good examples of how it was presented in this country in the seventeenth century4 ,hume's speculations on causation attracted attention to it4 ,the philosophers of the ,scottish school and their adherents among the theologians laboured to present it in a favourable light4 ,in ,germany1 ,leibnitz 7,thodice1 ,i4 c4 #g7 and ,wolff 7,rational ,thoughts of ,god1 #ibh7 laid stress on the accidental contingent character of the world and its contents1 and1 relying on the principle of the sufficient reason1 concluded that there must be a universal and permanent cause of all that is changing and transitory1 an absolute ground of all that is relative and derivative4 ,further1 ,wolff and his followers raised on this reasoning a large amount of metaphysical speculation as to the nature of a necessary cause1 the properties of an absolute ,being1 which was of a very questionable sort in itself1 and had no proper connection with the so-called cosmological argument4 ,to this argument1 as stated by ,wolff1 ,kant applied his transcendental criticism1 and proved1 as he thought1 that it was a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions4 ,his argumentation may be allowed to have had force against ,wolff1 but it is weak wherever it is relevant to the tiological proof rightly understood4 ,in fact1 his objections openly proceed on the assumption that the principle of causality is only applicable within the sphere of sense experience4 ,if this be true1 no objections1 of course1 are necessary4 ,as a rule1 the tiological argument is not skilfully or even carefully treated in the works of recent ,german theologians4 ,it has been expounded1 however1 with great philosophical ability and with a rare wealth of scientific knowledge1 by ,professor ,ulrici of ,halle1 in the work entitled ',gott und die ,natur4' ,a translation of this treatise would confer a real service both on the theology and philosophy of this country4 ,,note ,,xiii41 page #acg4 ,,mathematics ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument4 ,another science regarded as barren of religious applications1 and even as sometimes positively injurious1 is mathematics4 ,its principles are1 indeed1 of so abstruse a nature1 that it is not easy to frame out of them a religious argument that is capable of popular illustration4 ,but1 in fact1 mathematical laws form the basis of nearly all the operations of nature4 ,they constitute1 as it were1 the very framework of the material world4444 ,it seems1 then1 that this science forms the very foundation of all arguments for theism1 from the arrangements and operations of the material universe4 ,we do1 indeed1 neglect the foundation1 and point only to the superstructure1 when we state these arguments4 ,but suppose mathematical laws to be at once struck from existence1 and what a hideous case would the universe present6 ,what then would become of the marks of design and unity in nature1 and of the theist's argument for the being of a ,god8444 ,it is said1 however1 that mathematicians have been unusually prone to scepticism concerning religious truth4 ,if it be so1 it probably originates from the absurd attempt to apply mathematical reasoning to moral subjects2 or rather1 the devotees of this science often become so attached to its demonstrations1 that they will not admit any evidence of a less certain character4 ,they do not realise the total difference between moral and mathematical reasonings1 and absurdly endeavour to stretch religion on the ,procrustean bed of mathematics4 ,no wonder they become sceptics4 ,but the fault is in themselves1 not in this science1 whose natural tendencies1 upon a pure and exalted mind1 are favourable to religion4--,hitchcock's ,religion of ,geology1 pp4 #chg-chi4 ,nor can we fail to notice how frequently the law which men have invented proves to have been already known and used in nature4 ,the mathematician devises a geometric locus or an algebraic formula from a priori considerations1 and afterward discovers that he has been unwittingly solving a mechanical problem1 or explaining the form of a real phenomenon4 ,thus1 for example1 in ,peirce's ',integral ,calculus1' published in #ahdc1 is a problem invented and solved purely in the enthusiasm of following the analytic symbols2 but in #ahfc it proved to be a complete prophetic discussion and solution of the problem of two pendulums suspended from one horizontal cord4 ,thus also ,galileo's discussion of the cycloid proved1 long afterward1 to be a key to problems concerning the pendulum1 falling bodies1 and resistance to transverse pressure4 ,four centuries before ,christ1 ,plato and his scholars were occupied upon the eclipse as a purely geometric speculation1 and ,socrates seemed inclined to reprove them for their waste of time4 ,but in the seventeenth century after ,christ1 ,kepler discovers that the ,architect of the heavens had given us magnificent diagrams of the eclipse in the starry heavens2 and1 since that time1 all the navigation and architecture and engineering of the nineteenth century have been built on these speculations of ,plato4 ,equally remarkable is the history of the idea of extreme and mean ratio4 ,before the ,christian era geometers had invented a process for dividing a line in this ratio1 that they might use it in an equally abstract and useless problem--the inscribing a regular pentagon in a circle4 ,but it was not until the middle of the present century that it was discovered that this idea is embodied in nature4 ,it is hinted at in some animal forms1 it is very thoroughly and accurately expressed in the angles at which the leaves of plants diverge as they grow from the stem1 and it is embodied approximately in the revolutions of the planets about the sun4444 ,now1 in all these cases of the embodiment in nature of an idea which men have developed1 not by a study of the embodiment1 but by an a priori speculation1 there seems to us demonstrative evidence that man is made in the image of his ,creator2 that the thoughts and knowledge of ,god contain and embrace all possible a priori speculations of men4 ,it is true that ,god's knowledge is infinite1 and beyond our utmost power of conception4 ,but how can we compare the reasonings of ,euclid upon extreme and mean ratio with the arrangement of leaves about the stem1 and the revolutions of planets around the sun1 and not feel that these phenomena of creation express ,euclid's idea as exactly as diagrams or ,arabic digits could do2 and that this idea was1 in some form1 present in the creation8--,the ,natural ,foundations of ,theology4 ,by ,t4 ,hill1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,there is an ingenious and judicious little work by ,charles ,girdlestone1 ,m4,a41 published in #ahge1 and entitled ',number3 a ,link between ,divine ,intelligence and ,human4 ,an ,argument4' ,,note ,,xiv41 page #adj4 ,,astronomy ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument4 ,the design argument has always drawn some of its data from astronomy4 ,the order and beauty of the heavenly bodies1 the alternation of day and night1 the succession of the seasons1 and the dependence of living creatures on these changes1 are referred to as indications of ,god's character and agency in many passages of ,scripture4 ,thus1 to select only from the ,psalms3 ,when ,i consider ,thy heavens1 the work of ,thy fingers1 the moon and the stars1 which ,thou hast ordained2 what is man1 that ,thou art mindful of him8 and the son of man1 that ,thou visitest him8--viii4 #c1 #d4 ,the heavens declare the glory of ,god2 and the firmament showeth ,his handiwork4 ,day unto day uttereth speech1 and night unto night showeth knowledge4--xix4 #a1 #b4 ,he appointed the moon for seasons2 the sun knoweth his going down4 ,thou makest darkness1 and it is night3 wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth4444 ,the sun ariseth1 they gather themselves together1 and lay them down in their dens4 ,man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening4 ,o ,lord1 how manifold are ,thy works6 in wisdom hast ,thou made them all4--civ4 #ai-bd4 ,among classical writers1 ,cicero has presented the design argument as founded on the arrangements and movements of the heavenly bodies in a very striking manner1 when1 referring to the instrument by which ,posidonius had ingeniously represented them1 he asks whether1 if that instrument were carried into ,scythia or ,britain1 any even of the barbarians of these lands would doubt that it was the product of reason1 and rebukes those who would regard the wondrous system of which it was a feeble copy as the effect of chance4 ,quod si in ,scythiam aut in ,britanniam1 sphram aliquis tulerit hanc1 quam nuper familiaris noster effecit ,posidonius1 cujus singul conversiones idem efficiunt in sole1 et in lun1 et in quinque stellis errantibus1 quod efficitur in coelo singulis diebus et noctibus3 quis in ill barbarie dubitet1 quin ea sphra sit perfecta ratione8 ,hi autem dubitant de mundo1 ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia1 casune ipse sit effectus1 aut necessitate aliqu1 an ratione ac mente divin3 et ,archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphr conversionibus1 quam naturam in efficiendis1 prsertim cum multis partibus sint illa perfecta1 quam hc simulata1 sollertius4--,de ,nat4 ,deorum1 ii4 #cd1 #ce4 ,the ',astro-,theology' of ,wm4 ,derham1 published in #agad1 was perhaps the first work entirely devoted to the illustration of the design argument from astronomical facts and theories4 ,among comparatively recent works of a similar kind ,i may mention ,vince's ',confutation of ,atheism from the ,laws and ,constitution of the ,heavenly ,bodies1' ,whewell's ',bridgewater ,treatise1' ,dick's ',celestial ,scenery1' ,mitchell's ',planetary and ,stellar ,worlds1' and ,leitch's ',god's ,glory in the ,heavens4' ,they afford ample evidence of the erroneousness of ,comte's assertion that the opposition of science to theology is more obvious in astronomy than anywhere else1 and that no other science has given more terrible shocks to the doctrine of final causes4 ,kepler did not think so1 for he concludes his work on the ',harmony of ,worlds' with these devout words3 ,i thank ,thee1 my ,creator and ,lord1 that ,thou hast given me this joy in ,thy creation1 this delight in the works of ,thy hands4 ,i have shown the excellency of ,thy work unto men1 so far as my finite mind was able to comprehend ,thine infinity4 ,if ,i have said aught unworthy of ,thee1 or aught in which ,i may have sought my own glory1 graciously forgive it4 ,nor did ,newton1 for he wrote3 ,elegantissima hcce compages solis1 planetarum1 et cometarum 7et stellarum71 non nisi consilio et dominio ,entis cujusdam potentis et intelligentis oriri potuit4 ,and in our own times such men as ,herschel1 ,brewster1 ,mdler1 c41 have protested against the notion that astronomy tends to atheism4 ,the late ,professor ,de ,morgan demonstrated in his ',essay on ,probability1' when only eleven planets were known1 that the odds against chance1 to which in such a case intelligence is the only alternative1 being the cause of all these bodies moving in one direction round the sun1 with an inconsiderable inclination of the planes of their orbits1 were twenty thousand millions to one4 ,what prospect1 are his own words1 would there have been of such a concurrence of circumstances1 if a state of chance had been the only antecedent8 ,with regard to the sameness of the directions1 either of which might have been from west to east1 or from east to west1 the case is precisely similar to the following3 ,there is a lottery containing black and white balls1 from each drawing of which it is as likely a black ball shall arise as a white one3 what is the chance of drawing eleven balls all white8--answer #bjdg to one against it4 ,with regard to the other question1 our position is this3 ,there is a lottery containing an infinite number of counters1 marked with all possible different angles less than a right angle1 in such a manner that any angle is as likely to be drawn as another1 so that in ten drawings the sum of the angles drawn may be anything under ten right angles3 now1 what is the chance of ten drawings giving collectively less than one right angle8--answer #aj1jjj1jjj to one against it4 ,now1 what is the chance of both these events coming together8--answer1 more than #bj1jjj1jjj1jjj to one against it4 ,it is consequently of the same degree of probability that there has been something at work which is not chance in the formation of the solar system4 ,there are several departments of science as much1 or even more1 adapted than astronomy1 to furnish proofs of the wisdom of ,god2 but there is none which affords us such evidence of ,his power1 or so helps us to realise ,his omnipresence1 our own nothingness before ,him1 and the littleness of our earth in the system of ,his creation4 ,those who wish to have impressions of this kind deepened may be recommended to read the works of ,proctor and ,flammarion4 ,what is said in the paragraph to which this note refers must not be so understood as to be in consistent with the possibility or probability1 if not demonstrated certainty1 that the universe is not a perfectly conservative system1 but one which is tending surely although slowly to the destruction of the present condition of things4 ,this fact1 if it be a fact1 can no more affect the design argument in its relation to astronomy1 than the decay of plants and the death of animals can affect it in relation to vegetable and animal physiology4 ,,note ,,xv41 page #adc4 ,,chemistry ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument4 ,the history of chemistry is of itself sufficient to disprove the view of ,comte that the initial and conjectural stages of a science are those in which it affords most support to theology4 ,it was only after the definitive constitution of chemistry as a science1 only after the discovery of positive and precise chemical laws1 that the teleological argument for the ,divine existence began to be rested to a certain extent upon it4 ,the ,honourable ,robert ,boyle1 the founder of the ,boyle ,lectureship1 was one of the most distinguished chemists of his age1 a zealous defender of final causes1 and the author of several treatises intended to diffuse worthy views and sentiments as to the character and operations of the ,creator4 ,probably the two best ,english treatises on the relationship of chemistry to theism are the ,bridgewater ,treatise of ,dr ,prout1 ',chemistry1 ,meteorology1 and the ,function of ,digestion1 considered with reference to ,natural ,theology' 7#c;d ed41 #ahde71 and the ,actonian ,prize ,essay of ,professor ,fownes1 ',chemistry as exemplifying the ,wisdom and ,beneficence of ,god' 7#ahdd74 ,both writers were chemists of high reputation1 but they were not very conversant with theology or philosophy1 and have1 in consequence1 by no means fully utilised the excellent scientific materials which they collected4 ,this makes it all the more to be regretted that the late ,professor ,george ,wilson was not permitted to accomplish his design of writing a book corresponding to the ',religio ,medici' of ,sir ,thomas ,browne1 with the title ',religio ,chemici4' ,among the fragments comprised in the work published under that title after his death1 three essays--,chemistry and ,natural ,theology1 ,the ,chemistry of the ,stars1 and ,chemical ,final ,causes--are most interesting and suggestive4 ,the attempts of writers like ,moleschott and ,bchner to draw atheistic inferences from the theories or hypotheses of modern chemistry have given rise to a multitude of answers1 but it may be sufficient to refer to the ',antimaterialismus' of ,dr ,l4 ,weiss4 ,liebig in his ',chemical ,letters' manifests profound contempt for the materialistic and anti-theistic speculations attempted to be based on the science of which he was so illustrious a master4 ,,note ,,xvi41 page #ade4 ,,geology1 ,,geography1 ,,etc41 ,,and ,,the ,,design ,,argument4 ,the single fact that geology proves that every genus and species of organic forms which exist or have existed on the earth had a definite beginning in time1 gives to this science great importance in reference to theism4 ,it decides at once and conclusively what metaphysics might have discussed without result for ages4 ,its religious bearings are exhibited in ,buckland's ',geology and ,mineralogy considered in reference to ,natural ,theology1' ,hugh ,miller's ',footprints of the ,creator1' ,hitchcock's ',religion of ,geology1' and many other works4 ,lyell concludes both his ',elements of ,geology' and ',principles of ,geology' by affirming that geological research finds in all directions the clearest indications of creative intelligence2 that as we increase our knowledge of the inexhaustible variety displayed in nature1 and admire the infinite wisdom and power which it manifests1 our admiration is multiplied by the reflection1 that it is only the last of a great series of pre-existing creations1 of which we cannot estimate the number or limit in times past4 ,the numerous adaptations which exist between the terrestrial and celestial economies are dwelt on in detail by ,m',culloch in the second volume of his ',proofs and ,illustrations of the ,attributes of ,god from the ,facts and ,laws of the ,physical ,universe1' and by ,buchanan in ',faith in ,god and ,modern ,atheism1' vol4 i4 pp4 #acb-aef4 ,these two authors have also treated of the adaptations subsisting between the organic and inorganic worlds4 ,the ,bridgewater ,treatise of ,chalmers was on ',the ,adaptation of ,external ,nature to the ,moral and ,intellectual ,constitution of ,man2' and that of ,kidd1 on ',the ,adaptation of ,external ,nature to the ,physical ,constitution of ,man4' ,in ,ritter's ',geographical ,studies1' ,guyot's ',earth and ,man1' ,kapp's ',allgemeine ,erdkunde1' ,lotze's ',mikrokosmus1' ,b4 vi4 c4 #a1 ,duval's ',des ,rapports entre la ,gographie et l',economie ,politique1' ,cocker's ',theistic ,conception of the ,world1' ch4 vii41 c41 will be found a rich store of teleological data as to the fitness of the earth to be the dwelling-place and the schoolhouse of human beings4 ,of course1 those who attempt to prove this thesis require carefully to resist the temptation to conceive of the relation of nature to man as not one of cause and effect1 of action and reaction1 of mutual influence1 but as an immediate and inexplicable pre-established harmony like that which ,leibnitz supposed to exist between the body and the soul4 ,this was the theory which ,cousin set forth in a celebrated lecture on the part of geography in history4 ,regarding it ,i may quote the words which ,i have used elsewhere3 ,this notion is not only purely conjectural1 but inconsistent with the innumerable facts which manifest that nature does influence man1 and that man does modify nature4 ,it is impossible to hold1 either in regard to the body and soul1 or in regard to nature and man1 both the theory of mutual influence and of pre-established harmony4 ,all that1 in either case1 proves the former1 disproves the latter4 ,the belief in a pre-established harmony between man and nature is1 indeed1 considerably more absurd than in a pre-established harmony between the body and soul2 for when a body is born1 a soul is in it1 which remains in it till death1 and is never known to leave it in order to take possession of some other body3 but every country is not created with a people in it1 nor is every people permanently fixed to a particular country4 ,imagination may be deceived for a moment by an obvious process of association into this belief of certain peoples being suited for certain lands1 independently of the action of natural causes--the ,greeks1 let us say1 for ,greece1 the ,indian for the prairies and forests of ,america1 the ,malayan for the islands of the ,indian ,archipelago2 but a moment's thought on the fact that the ,turk has settled down where the ,greeks used to be--that mighty nations of ,english-speaking men are rising up where the ,indian roamed1 and that ,dutchmen are thriving in the lands of the ,malayan1 should suffice to disabuse us4 ,besides1 just as the dictum1 ',marriages are made in heaven1' is seriously discredited by the great number that are badly made1 so the kindred opinion that every country gets the people which suits it1 and every people the country1 as a direct and immediate consequence of their pre-established harmony1 is equally discredited by the prevalence of ill-assorted unions1 a great many worthless peoples living in magnificent lands1 while far better peoples have much worse ones4--,philosophy of ,history in ,france and ,germany1 pp4 #aia1 #aib4 ,,note ,,xvii41 page #adf4 ,,the ,,organic ,,kingdom ,,and ,,design4 ,the order and system in the vegetable and animal kingdoms are undeniable general facts1 whatever may have been the secondary agencies by which they have been produced2 and the inference of design from these facts is valid1 whatever may have been the mode of their production4 ,the characters and relationships of organic forms constitute a proof of intelligence1 whether their genera and species be the immediate and immutable expressions of the ideas of the ,divine ,mind1 or the slowly-reached results of evolution4 ,of course1 if there has been a process of evolution1 it must have been one exactly fitted to attain the result4 ,but the discovery or exhibition of such a process will be sufficient to cause a certain class of minds to believe that there has been no cause but the process--that the process completely explains both itself and the result1 and leaves no room for intelligence4 ,the character of the order and system in the organic world is so extremely abstruse1 subtle1 and comprehensive1 that all the attempts at classification in botany prior to ,de ,candolle1 and in zoology prior to ,cuvier1 were failures4 ,the labours of the great naturalists and biologists of the present century have1 doubtless1 accomplished much2 but the light reached is still but the feeble light of an early dawn4 ,yet that light is most pleasant and satisfying to the eye of the mind4 ,the reason sees in it a profound significance and a wonderful beauty4 ,how1 it may well be asked1 can a scheme of order which tasks to such an extent the powers of comprehension possessed by the human mind1 and yet which is perceived1 when discovered1 to be admirably rational1 be supposed to have originated elsewhere than in a ,mind8 ,i can only mention a few out of the multitude of books which treat of design in the organic world4 ,among general works on natural theology it may be sufficient to refer to those of ,paley1 ,buchanan1 and ,tulloch2 and among special works to ,professor ,balfour's ',phyto-,theology2 or1 ,botanical ,sketches1 intended to illustrate the ,works of ,god in the ,structure1 ,functions1 and ,general ,distribution of ,plants2' ,m',cosh's ',typical ,forms and ,special ,ends in ,creation2' ,agassiz's ',structure of ,animal ,life2 being ,six ,lectures on the ,power1 ,wisdom1 and ,goodness of ,god1 as manifested in ,his ,works2' ,kirby's ',power1 ,wisdom1 and ,goodness of ,god1 as manifested in the ,creation of ,animals2' ,roget's ',animal and ,vegetable ,physiology1 considered in reference to ,natural ,theology2' and ,sir ,charles ,bell's ',the ,hand1 its ,mechanism and ,vital ,endowments1 as evincing ,design4' ,the three last-mentioned works are ,bridgewater ,treatises4 ,it is a duty to call particular attention to the recent work of ,m4 ,janet1 ',les ,causes ,finales4' ,although ,m4 ,janet concedes1 perhaps1 too much to the opponents of finality1 his treatise contains the ablest and most adequate discussion of the various problems suggested by the indications which organic nature gives of design that has yet appeared4 ,it is eminently worthy of a careful study4 ,i am glad to know that a translation of this valuable work is in progress4 ,among the masters of biological science1 ,cuvier1 ,v4 ,baer1 ,agassiz1 and ,r4 ,owen may be named1 as among those who have set the highest value on the principle of finality4 ,the essay on ,classification of ,agassiz1 and the various essays which ,von ,baer has published at different times1 on what he calls ,zielstrebigkeit1 are specially important4 ,,note ,,xviii41 page #adh4 ,,evidences ,,of ,,design ,,in ,,organisms4 ,the savants are generally too much disposed to confound the doctrine of final cause with the hypothesis of an invisible force acting without physical means1 as a deus ex machin4 ,these two hypotheses1 far from reducing themselves the one to the other1 are in explicit contradiction2 for he who says design says at the same time means1 and1 consequently1 causes adapted to produce a certain effect4 ,to discover this cause is by no means to destroy the idea of design2 it is1 on the contrary1 to bring to light the condition1 sine qu non1 of the production of the end4 ,to make clear this distinction we cite a beautiful example1 borrowed from ,m4 ,claude ,bernard4 ,how does it happen1 says this eminent physiologist1 that the gastric juice1 which dissolves all aliments1 does not dissolve the stomach itself1 which is of precisely the same nature as the aliments with which it is nourished8 ,for a long time the vital force was supposed to intervene--that is to say1 an invisible cause which1 in some way1 suspended the properties of the natural agents1 to prevent their producing their necessary effects4 ,the vital force would1 by a sort of moral veto1 forbid the gastric juice to touch the stomach4 ,we see that this would be a real miracle4 ,everything is explained when we know that the stomach is lined with a coating or varnish which is not attacked by the gastric juice1 and which protects the walls which it covers4 ,who does not see that in refuting the omnipotence of the vital force1 very far from having weakened the principle of finality1 we have given to it a wonderful support8 ,what could the most perfect art have done to protect the walls of the stomach1 but invent a precaution similar to that which exists in reality8 ,and how surprising it is that an organ destined to secrete and use an agent most destructive to itself1 is found armed with a protective tunic1 which must have always coexisted with it1 since otherwise it would have been destroyed before having had time to procure for itself this defence--which excludes the hypothesis of long gropings and happy occurrences4--,janet1 ',final ,causes and ,contemporaneous ,physiology1' ,presb4 ,quart4 ,rev41 ,april #ahgf4 ,professor ,tyndall gives a very graphic description of the combination of remarkable arrangements by which the human ear is fitted to be an organ of hearing4 ,i quote from it the following words1 and connect with them some striking observations of ,max ,mller4 ,finally1 there is in the labyrinth a wonderful organ1 discovered by the ,marchese ,corti1 which is to all appearance a musical instrument1 with its chords so stretched as to accept vibrations of different periods1 and transmit them to the nerve-filaments which traverse the organ4 ,within the ears of men1 and without their knowledge or contrivance1 this lute of #cjjj strings has existed for ages1 accepting the music of the outer world1 and rendering it fit for reception by the brain4 ,each musical tremor which falls upon this organ selects from its tensioned fibres the one appropriate to its own pitch1 and throws that fibre into unisonant vibration4 ,and thus1 no matter how complicated the motion of the external air may be1 those microscopic strings can analyse it and reveal the constituents of which it is composed4--,on ,sound1 p4 #cbe4 ,what we hear when listening to a chorus or a symphony is a commotion of elastic air1 of which the wildest sea would give a very inadequate image4 ,the lowest tone which the ear perceives is due to about #cj vibrations in one second1 the highest to about #djjj4 ,consider1 then1 what happens in a presto1 when thousands of voices and instruments are simultaneously producing waves of air1 each wave crossing the other1 not only like the surface waves of the water1 but like spherical bodies1 and1 as it would seem1 without any perceptible disturbance2 consider that each tone is accompanied by secondary notes1 that each instrument has its peculiar timbre1 due to secondary vibrations2 and1 lastly1 let us remember that all this cross-fire of waves1 all this whirlpool of sound1 is moderated by laws which determine what we call harmony1 and by certain traditions or habits which determine what we call melody--both these elements being absent in the songs of birds--that all this must be reflected like a microscopic photograph on the two small organs of hearing1 and there excite not only perception1 but perception followed by a new feeling even more mysterious1 which we call either pleasure or pain2--and it will be clear that we are surrounded on all sides by miracles transcending all we are accustomed to call miraculous4--,science of ,language1 second series1 p4 #aae4 ,the structure of the eye has often been described as an evidence of design4 ,there is an extremely interesting comparison of it with the photographic camera in ,le ,conte's ',religion and ,science1' pp4 #bj-cc4 ,the whole reading public knows the masterly chapter on ,the ,machinery of ,flight in the ,duke of ,argyll's ',reign of ,law4' ,,note ,,xix41 page #adi4 ,,psychology ,,and ,,design4 ,the following writers treat at considerable length of the evidences of design to be traced in the constitution of the mind3 ,sir ,matthew ,hale in his ',primitive ,origination of ,mankind2' ,barrow in the seventh of his ',sermons on the ,creed2' ,bentley in the second sermon of his ',boyle ,lecture2' ,crombie in the second volume of his ',natural ,theology2' ,lord ,brougham in his ',discourse on ,natural ,theology1' sect4 iii41 pp4 #eb-hj2 ,turton's ',natural ,theology ,considered1' pp4 #fe-afj2 ,chalmers's ',natural ,theology1' ,book ,,iii42 ,buchanan's ',faith in ,god1' pp4 #bac-bca2 ,tulloch's ',theism1' pp4 #ahb-bdg2 and ,ulrici's ',gott und ,mensch4' ,the phenomena of animal instinct are of themselves an inexhaustible source of instruction as to the ,divine wisdom and goodness4 ,the spinning machinery which is provided in the body of a spider is not more accurately adjusted to the viscid secretion which is provided for it1 than the instinct of the spider is adjusted both to the construction of its web and also to the selection of likely places for the capture of its prey4 ,those birds and insects whose young are hatched by the heat of fermentation1 have an intuitive impulse to select the proper materials1 and to gather them for the purpose4 ,all creatures1 guided sometimes apparently by senses of which we know nothing1 are under like impulses to provide effectually for the nourishing of their young2 and it is most curious and instructive to observe that the extent of provision which is involved in the process1 and in the securing of the result1 seems very often to be greater as we descend in the scale of nature1 and in proportion as the parents are dissociated from the actual feeding or personal care of their offspring4 ,the mammalia have nothing to provide except food for themselves1 and have at first1 and for a long time1 no duty to perform beyond the discharge of a purely physical function4 ,birds have more to do--in the building of nests1 in the choice of sites for these1 and after incubation in the choice of food adapted to the period of growth4 ,insects1 much lower in the scale of organisation1 and subject to the wonderful processes of metamorphosis1 have to provide very often for a distant future1 and for successive stages of development not only in the young but in the nidus which surrounds them4 ,bees1 if we are to believe the evidence of observers1 have an intuitive guidance in the selection of food which has the power of producing organic changes in the bodies of the young1 even to the determination and development of sex1 so that1 by the administration of it1 under what may be called artificial conditions1 certain selected individuals can be made the mothers and queens of future hives4 ,these are but a few examples of facts of which the whole animal world is full1 presenting1 as it does1 one vast series of adjustments between bodily organs and corresponding instincts4 ,but this adjustment would be useless unless it were part of another adjustment--between the instincts and perceptions of animals and those facts and forces of surrounding nature which are related to them1 and to the whole cycle of things of which they form a part4 ,in those instinctive actions of the lower animals which involve the most distant and the most complicated anticipations1 it is certain that the prevision involved is a prevision which is not in the animals themselves4 ,they appear to be1 and beyond all doubt really are1 guided by some simple appetite1 by an odour or a taste1 and1 in all probability1 they have generally as little consciousness of the ends to be subserved as the suckling has of the processes of nutrition4 ,the path along which they walk is a path which they did not engineer4 ,it is a path made for them1 and they simply follow it4 ,but the propensities and tastes and feelings which make them follow it1 and the rightness of its direction towards the ends to be attained1 do constitute an adjustment which may correctly be called mechanical1 and is part of a unity which binds together the whole world of life1 and the whole inorganic world on which living things depend4--,duke of ,argyll on ,animal ,instinct 7,cont4 ,rev41 ,july #ahge74 ,instinctive actions will not be shown to be less evidences of ,divine purpose by its being proved that intelligence1 at least in the higher animals1 probably always co-operates in some degree with instinct1 or that much which is referred to instinct may be traced either directly to experience or to the hereditary transmission of qualities originally generated by experience4 ,,note ,,xx41 page #aeb4 ,,history ,,and ,,design4 ,the quotation is from the eighteenth--the concluding--volume of the ',etudes sur l',histoire de l',humanit1' by ,professor ,laurent of ,ghent4 ,i have given some account of his historical doctrine1 and endeavoured to defend the theistic inference which he has drawn from his laborious survey of historical facts against the objections of ,professor ,j4 ,b4 ,meyer1 in my ',philosophy of ,history in ,france and ,germany1' pp4 #cba-ccj4 ,bunsen1 in the work entitled ',god in ,history1' seeks to establish the same great thesis4 ,history1 says ,niebuhr1 shows1 on a hundred occasions1 an intelligence distinct from nature1 which conducts and determines those things which may seem to us accidental2 and it is not true that history weakens our belief in ,divine ,providence4 ,history is1 of all kinds of knowledge1 the one which tends most decidedly to that belief4--,lectures on the ,history of ,rome1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ei4 ,sssmilch's celebrated treatise1 ',gttliche ,ordnung in der ,vernderung des menschlichen ,geschlechtes1 c42' ,m',cosh's ',method of the ,divine ,government2' and ,gillett's ',god in ,human ,thought1' vol4 ii4 pp4 #gbd-gib1 may be consulted as regards the evidences of ,divine purpose to be found in the constitution of society4 ,,note ,,xxi41 page #afh4 ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,teleological ,,argument4 ,the proof of the ,divine existence from the order and adaptations of the universe is known as the physico-theological or teleological argument4 ,it has also been sometimes called the cosmological argument2 the very word cosmos1 like the ,latin mundus and our own universe1 implying order4 ,it is so obvious and direct that it has presented itself to the mind from very ancient times4 ,it is implied in such passages of ,scripture as ,job1 xxxvii4-xli42 ,ps4 viii41 xix41 civ42 ,isa4 xl4 #ba-bf2 ,matt4 vi4 #be-cb2 ,acts1 xiv4 #ae-ag1 xvii4 #bd-bh4 ,pythagoras laid great stress on the order of the world2 and it was mainly on that order that ,anaxagoras rested his belief in a ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,socrates developed the argument from the adaptation of the parts of the body to one another1 and to the external world1 with a skill which has never been surpassed4 ,his conversation with ,aristodemus1 as recorded in the ',memorabilia' of ,xenophon1 is of wonderful interest and beauty4 ,few will follow it even now without feeling constrained to join ,aristodemus in acknowledging that man must be the masterpiece of some great ,artificer1 carrying along with it infinite marks of the love and favour of ,him who thus formed it4 ,plato presents the argument specially in the ',timus1' and his whole philosophy is pervaded by the thought that ,god is the primary source and perfect ideal of all order and harmony4 ,aristotle expressly maintains that the appearance of ends and means is a proof of design1 and conceives of ,god as the ultimate ,final ,cause4 ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor41 ii4 c4 #cg7 puts into the mouth of ,balbus an elaborate exposition of the design argument4 ,the ',de ,usu ,partium' of ,galen is a treatise on natural theology1 teaching design in the structure of the body4 ,this proof is found more frequently than any other in the writings of the fathers and scholastics4 ,when we see a vessel1 says ,theophilus1 spreading her canvas1 and majestically riding on the billows of the stormy sea1 we conclude that she has a pilot on board2 thus1 from the regular course of the planets1 the rich variety of creatures1 we infer the existence of the ,creator4--,ad ,autol41 #e4 ,minucius ,felix 7c4 #ah7 compares the universe to a house1 and ,gregory of ,nazianzum 7,orat41 xxviii4 #f7 compares it to a lyre1 in illustrating the same argument4 ,ambrose1 ,athanasius1 ,augustine1 ,basil the ,greek1 ,chrysostom1 c41 employ it4 ,so do ,albertus ,magnus1 ,thomas ,aquinas1 c4 ,the opposition of ,bacon and ,descartes to final causes had no influence in preventing theologians from insisting on their existence4 ,from ,boyle and ,derham to ,paley and the ,bridgewater ,treatises1 an enormous literature appeared in ,england devoted to this end4 ,germany1 also1 in the second half of the eighteenth century1 was almost as much overflooded with ,lithotheologies1 ,hydrotheologies1 ,phytotheologies1 ,insectotheologies1 c41 as it at present is with works on ,darwinism4 ,in ,france1 ,fenelon in his ',dmonstration de l',existence de ,dieu1' and ,bernardin de ,saint ,pierre in his ',etudes' and ',harmonies de la ,nature1' eloquently1 although not perhaps very solidly or cautiously1 reasoned from the wonders of nature to the wisdom of ,god4 ,hume and ,kant1 by their criticisms of the design argument1 rendered to it the great service of directing attention to the principles on which it proceeds4 ,theologians had previously gone on merely accumulating illustrative instances and instituting minute investigations into the constitutions of the complex objects which they selected with this view4 ,attention was thus distracted from what really needed argument4 ,hume and ,kant showed men the real point at issue4 ,although ,kant rejected the argument1 he speaks of it in these terms3 ,this proof deserves to be mentioned at all times with respect4 ,it is the oldest1 the clearest1 and the most suited to the ordinary understanding4 ,it animates the study of nature1 because it owes its existence to thought1 and ever receives from it fresh force4 ,it brings out reality and purpose where our observation would not of itself have discovered them1 and extends our knowledge of nature by exhibiting indications of a special unity whose principle is beyond nature4 ,this knowledge1 moreover1 directs us to its cause--namely1 the inducing idea1 and increases our faith in a supreme originator to an almost irresistible conviction4 ,i must refer to the ,notes from ,,xiii4 to ,,xx4 inclusive1 for the titles of recent works on the design argument4 ,the assertion appears to be quite unfounded that1 as science advances from point to point1 final causes recede before it1 and disappear one after the other4 ,the principle of design changes its mode of application1 indeed1 but it loses none of its force4 ,we no longer consider particular facts as produced by special interpositions2 but we consider design as exhibited in the establishment and adjustment of the laws by which particular facts are produced4 ,we do not look upon each particular cloud as brought near to us that it may drop fatness on our fields2 but the general adaptation of the laws of heat and air and moisture to the promotion of vegetation does not become doubtful4 ,we do not consider the sun as less intended to warm and vivify the tribes of plants and animals because we find that1 instead of revolving round the earth as an attendant1 the earth1 along with other planets1 revolves round him4 ,we are rather1 by the discovery of the general laws of nature1 led into a scene of wider design1 of deeper contrivance1 of more comprehensive adjustments4 ,final causes1 if they appear driven farther from us by such extension of our views1 embrace us only with a vaster and more majestic circuit4 ,instead of a few threads connecting some detached objects1 they become a stupendous network1 which is wound round and round the universal frame of things4--,whewell1 ',history of ,scientific ,ideas1' vol4 ii4 pp4 #bec1 #bed4 ,,note ,,xxii41 page #ahb4 ,,creation ,,and ,,evolution4 ,creation is the only theory of the origin of the universe4 ,evolution assumes either the creation or the self-existence of the universe4 ,the evolutionist must choose between creation and non-creation4 ,they are opposites4 ,there is no intermediate term4 ,the attempt to introduce one--the ,unknowable--can lead to no result2 for unless the ,unknowable is capable of creating1 it can account for the origin of nothing4 ,all attempts to explain even the formation of the universe1 either by the evolution of the ,unknowable or by evolution out of the ,unknowable1 must be of a thoroughly delusive character4 ,the evolution of what is known can alone have significance either to the ordinary or scientific mind4 ,nothing can be conceived of as subject to evolution which is not of a finite and composite nature4 ,nothing can be evolved out of a finite and composite existence which was not previously involved in it4 ,and what gives to anything its limits and constitution must be more perfect than itself4 ,greek3 ,to prton ou sperma estin1 alla to teleion4 ,as many philosophers as adopt the supposition--such as the ,pythagoreans and ,spensippus--that what is best and most fair is not to be found in the principle of things1 from the fact that though the first principles both of plants and animals are causes1 yet what is fair and perfect resides in created things as results from these1--persons1 ,i say1 who entertain these sentiments1 do not form their opinions correctly4 ,for seed arises from other natures that are antecedent and perfect1 and seed is not the first thing1 whereas that which is perfect is4--,aristotle1 ',metaphysics1' xi4 #g4 ,it is manifest by the light of nature that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and entire cause as in its effect2 for whence can the effect draw its reality if not from its cause8 ,and how could the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed it in itself8 ,and hence it follows1 not only that what is cannot be produced by what is not1 but likewise that the more perfect--in other words1 that which contains in itself more reality--cannot be the effect of the less perfect4--,descartes1 ',meditations1' iii4 ,in not a few of the progressionists the weak illusion is unmistakable1 that1 with time enough1 you may get everything out of next-to-nothing4 ,grant us1 they seem to say1 any tiniest granule of power1 so close upon zero that it is not worth begrudging--allow it some trifling tendency to infinitesimal increment--and we will show you how this little stock became the kosmos1 without ever taking a step worth thinking of1 much less constituting a case for design4 ,the argument is a mere appeal to an incompetency in the human imagination1 in virtue of which1 magnitudes evading conception are treated as out of existence2 and an aggregate of inappreciable increments is simultaneously equated1--in its cause to nothing1 in its effect to the whole of things4 ,you manifestly want the same causality1 whether concentrated on a moment or distributed through incalculable ages2 only1 in drawing upon it1 a logical theft is more easily committed piecemeal than wholesale4 ,surely it is a mean device for a philosopher thus to crib causation by hair's-breadths1 to put it out at compound interest through all time1 and then disown the debt4--,martineau1 ',essays ,philosophical and ,theological1' pp4 #ada1 #adb4 ,think of it6 ,an endless evolution1 an eternal working1 an infinite causation1 and yet an effect so finite4 ,nature has been working upward from eternity1 and has just passed the long-armed ape who begat prognathus1 as prognathus begat the troglodyte homo4 ,what becomes of our doctrine of progress8 ,as sure as mathematics1 it should have been all evolved1 all that we now have1 over and over again--all out1 or far more out than has come out1 incalculable ages ago4 ,an eternal ante-past of progressive working4 ,to what a height should it have arisen6 ,it should have transcended all our ideals4 ,the most exalted finite being should have been reached1 the most exalted that our minds can conceive1 instead of this creature man1 so poor1 so low2 for you will bear in mind that ,i am speaking of him as measured by no higher scale of value than that afforded by this physical hypothesis--man evolved from nebular gas--man just coming out of darkness1 and so soon to return to darkness again--e tenebris in tenebras4 ,this all comes from that hideous ,greek3 hysteron proteron1 that inversion of all necessary thinking4 ,nature first1 it says--matter first1 an impalpable nebulous nihilism first1 the lowest and most imperfect first2 life1 thought1 reason1 idea1 their junior products1 and ,god1 therefore1 the last product1 if there be a ,god at all1 or anything to which such a name can possibly be given4 ,and we are asked to adopt this1 and call it grand1 whilst rejecting as narrow and soul-contracting the revelation which makes ,god first1 reason first1 idea first1 the perfect first1--as has been said before--the imperfect and the finite ever a departure from it1 whether in the scale of order or of time1 whether as exhibited in processes of lapse and deterioration or the contrary seeming of recovery and restoration in cyclical rounds4 ,the two schemes have two entirely different modes of speech4 ,says the mere physical hypothesis3 ,in the beginning was the nebula1 and all things were in the nebula1 and all things were self-evolved from the nebula--even life1 thought1 consciousness1 idea1 reason itself1 having no other source4 ,the other speaks to us in language like this3 ,greek3 ,en arch n ho ,logos1 ,in the beginning was the ,word1 the ,greek3 ,logos1 the ,reason1 and the ,word was with ,god1 and the ,word was ,god4 ,all things came into being by ,him4 ,in ,him was life1 ,greek3 ,z1 and from this life--not from motions1 or molecules1 or correlated forces1 or the vibration of fibres1 or the arrangements of nebular atoms1 but from this life of the ,logos1 the eternal ,reason--came the light of men--the mind1 reason1 conscience of humanity--even the light that lighteth every rational being coming into the cosmos4--,prof4 ,lewis1 ',the ,kingdom of ,god' 7,dickinson's ,theological ,quarterly1 ,no4 #f74 ,,note ,,xxiii41 page #aie4 ,,theological ,,inferences ,,from ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,spontaneous ,,generation4 ,an eloquent preacher exclaims1 ,great ought to be our compassion for the weak brother whose faith in ,god would be shaken because a chemist should succeed next year in producing vital cells out of a hermetically-sealed vessel containing only the elements of protoplasm4--,rev4 ,e4 ,a4 ,abbott1 ,d4,d41 ',cambridge ,sermons1' p4 #cc4 ,it must be admitted1 however1 that many who certainly cannot be fairly described as weak brethren1 entertain very strongly that fear of the doctrine of spontaneous generation which ,dr ,abbott deprecates4 ,i quote1 from the ',presbyterian ,quarterly' of ,january #ahgd1 the words of ,president ,barnard of ,columbia ,college1 ,new ,york1 expressing an entirely opposite sentiment4 ,i do so without criticism or comment1 as ,i shall have to consider the relation of materialistic theories of the origin of life to theism in next volume4 ,to the philosopher1 the demonstration of the theory of spontaneous generation1 should it ever be demonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt or cavil1 cannot but be a matter of the deepest interest4 ,but to the man who finds himself compelled to receive it1 this interest1 it seems to me1 must be no less painful than it is deep4 ,nor is this the only theory which the investigators of our time are urging upon our attention1 of which ,i feel compelled to make the same remark4 ,there are1 at least1 two besides which impress me with a similar feeling2 and the three together constitute a group which1 though to a certain extent independent of each other1 are likely in the end to stand or fall together4 ,these are1 the doctrine of spontaneous generation1 the doctrine of organic evolution1 and the doctrine of the correlation of mental and physical forces4 ,if these doctrines are true1 the existence of an intelligence separate from organised matter is impossible1 and the death of the human body is the death of the human soul4 ,if these doctrines are true1 the world becomes an enigma1 no less to the theist than it has always been to the atheist4 ,we are told1 indeed1 that the acceptance of these views need not shake our faith in the existence of an almighty ,creator4 ,it is beautifully explained to us how they ought to give us more elevated and more worthy conceptions of the modes by which ,he works ,his will in the visible creation4 ,we learn that our complex organisms are none the less the work of ,his hands because they have been evolved by an infinite series of changes from microscopic gemmules1 and that these gemmules themselves have taken on their forms under the influence of the physical forces of light and heat and attraction acting on brute mineral matter4 ,rather1 it should seem1 we are a good deal more so4 ,this kind of teaching is heard in our day even from the theologians4 ,those sentinels on the watch-towers of the faith1 whose wont it has been for so many centuries to stand sturdily up in opposition to the science which was not1 in any proper sense1 at war with them1 now1 by a sudden and almost miraculous conversion1 accept with cheerful countenances1 and become in their turn the expounders and champions of the science which is4 ,but while they find the mystery of the original creation thus satisfactorily cleared up in their minds1 they seem to have taken very little thought as to what is going to come of the rest of their theology4 ,it is1 indeed1 a grand conception which regards the ,deity as conducting the work of ,his creation by means of those all-pervading influences which we call the forces of nature2 but it leaves us profoundly at a loss to explain the wisdom or the benevolence which brings every day into life such myriads of sentient and intelligent beings only that they may perish on the morrow of their birth4 ,but this is not all4 ,if these doctrines are true1 all talk of creation or methods of creation becomes absurdity2 for just as certainly as they are true1 ,god ,himself is impossible4 ,if intelligence presupposes a material organism1 of which it is a mode of action1 then ,god must be a material organism or there is no ,god4 ,but it is the law of all living organisms that they grow1 mature1 and perish2 and since ,god cannot perish1 ,he cannot be an organism4 ,,note ,,xxiv41 page #bjh4 ,,darwin ,,and ,,paley4 ,to the two treatises of ,mr ,darwin mentioned in the lecture1 there must now be added another equally rich in fact suggesting theological inferences--',the ,different ,forms of ,flowers on ,plants of the same ,species4' ,a multitude of books have been written on ,darwinism and ,teleology4 ,most of those published between #ahei and #ahge will be found named in the list of works on ,darwinism appended to ,seidlitz's ',darwin'sche ,theorie4' ,there are two good popular accounts of the controversy3 ',what is ,darwinism8' by ,dr ,charles ,hodge of ,princetown1 and ',die ,darwin'schen ,theorien' of ,rudolf ,schmid4 ,as to ,paley1 it gives one pleasure to quote the following passage from ,sir ,william ,thomson's address to the ,british ,association in #ahga2 because the foolish writing which is so frequently met with in books and journals about the mechanical ,god of ,paley1 about ,paley representing ,deity as outside of the universe1 or as a ,god who makes the world after the manner that a watchman manufactures a watch1 c41 can only be explained by utter ignorance of ,paley's views3 ,i feel profoundly convinced that the argument of design has been greatly too much lost sight of in recent zoological speculations4 ,reaction against the frivolities of teleology1 such as are to be found1 not rarely1 in the notes of the learned commentators on ,paley's ',natural ,theology1' has1 ,i believe1 had a temporary effect of turning attention from the solid irrefragable argument so well put forward in that excellent old book4 ,but overpowering proof of intelligence and benevolent design lies all around us2 and if ever perplexities1 whether metaphysical or scientific1 turn us away from them for a time1 they come back upon us with irresistible force1 showing to us through nature the influence of a free will1 and teaching us that all living beings depend upon one ever-acting ,creator and ,ruler4 ,,note ,,xxv41 page #bad4 ,,kant',s ,,moral ,,argument4 ,the unsatisfactoriness of the position that conscience can supply the place of reason1 and can do without its help1 in the search after ,god1 is clearly seen in the case of the thinker who undertook with most deliberation to maintain that position4 ,when ,kant said1--,although all other arguments for the existence of ,god are delusive1 still conscience gives us a feeling of responsibility and a sense of freedom which compel us to believe in ,one through whom virtue and fortune1 duty and inclination1 will be reconciled1 and in whom the will will be free to do all that it ought1--he saw that he would be met with the retort and reproach that the same process by which he pretended to have demolished the other arguments was just as applicable to this new one2 that the ideas of freedom and responsibility might be as delusive when supposed to assure us of reality1 as those of causation and design2 that if the latter were mere forms of human thought1 the former might be held to be so likewise with equal reason1 and to be equally incapable of affording a warrant to belief in ,god ,himself2 and consequently1 that the final religious result of his philosophy was1 not that there is a ,god1 but that there is an idea of ,god1 which1 although we cannot get rid of it1 is full of contradictions1 and wholly incapable of justification or verification4 ,he saw all this as clearly as man could do1 and it is marvellous that so many authors should have written as if he had not seen it2 but certainly he might as well not have seen it1 for all that he was able to do in the way of repelling the objection4 ,his reply amounted merely to reaffirming that we are under the necessity of associating the idea of a ,supreme ,being with the moral law1 and then qualifying the statement by the admission that we can know1 however1 nothing about that ,being2 that as soon as we try to know anything about ,him we make a speculative1 not a practical1 use of reason1 and fall back into the realm of sophistry and illusion from which the ,critical ,philosophy was designed to deliver us4 ,in other words1 what he tells us is1 that the argument is good1 but only on the conditions that it is not to be subjected to rational scrutiny1 and that no attempt is to be made to determine what its conclusion signifies4 ,it seems to me that1 on these conditions1 he might have found any argument good4 ,such conditions are inconsistent with the whole spirit and very existence of a critical philosophy4 ,and it is not really ,god that ,kant reaches by his argument3 it is a mere moral ideal--a dead1 empty1 abstract assumption1 which is regarded as practically useful1 although rationally baseless--a necessary presupposition of moral action1 but one which tells us nothing about the nature of its object4 ,fichte was only consistent when he refused to speak of that object as a ,will or ,person1 and affirmed that ,god exists only as the ,moral ,order of the universe1 and that we can neither know nor conceive of any other ,god4 ,he was also1 only following out the principles of his master when he represented that order as the creation of the individual mind1 the form of the individual conscience1 a mode of mental action4 ,kant has expounded his argument1 and discussed its bearings fully and minutely1 in his ',kritik der ,urtheilskraft1' sec4 #hf-ij1 and ',kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 ,zweites ,buch1 ,zweites ,hauptstck1' v4-viii4 ,m4 ,renouvier1 in an article entitled ,de la ,contradiction reproche la doctrine de ,kant 7,la ,critique ,philosophique1 #c;ieme4 ,anne1 ,no4 #bi71 has exposed some errors on the subject which are common in ,france1 and equally common in ,england4 ,,note ,,xxvi41 page #bag4 ,,dr ,,schenkel',s ,,view ,,of ,,conscience ,,as ,,the ,,organ ,,of ,,religion4 ,dr ,schenkel has fully set forth his reasons for holding that conscience is the religious organ of the soul1 in the ninth chapter of the first volume of his ',christliche ,dogmatik4' ,he endeavours to meet the objection urged in the text by representing what is truly the primary and distinctive function of conscience as a secondary and derivative function4 ,its primary activity is1 according to him1 religious2 it unites with ,god--it is conscious communion with ,him4 ,its ethical activity is only elicited when this communion is disturbed and broken2 its source is the religious want occasioned by the rupture of communion4 ,that is felt to be a something abnormal and unsatisfactory1 and awakens a desire after the restoration of the lost communion with ,god4 ,the conscience is cognisant of a moral law only when1 its communion with ,god being disturbed1 it seeks its re-establishment ,dr ,schenkel thus1 as he thinks1 accounts for conscience having an ethical function as well as a religious function4 ,but clearly the result at which he arrives is in direct contradiction to the position from which he starts4 ,the affirmation of conscience as religious is represented as being that man is in direct communion with ,god2 and the affirmation of conscience as ethical is represented as being that man is not in direct communion with ,god1 but desires to be so4 ,these are1 however1 contrary declarations2 and to describe conscience in the way ,schenkel does1 as a synthesis of the ethical and religious factor1 is to represent it as a synthesis of self-contradictory elements--a compound of yes and no4 ,we cannot be conscious both of communion with ,god and of non-communion with ,him4 ,and1 on ,dr ,schenkel's own showing1 the evidence for immediate communion with ,him is but small4 ,the consciousness of moral law he affirms to be consciousness of the want or need of communion with ,god1 not the consciousness of enjoying it4 ,but is conscience ever independent of the consciousness of moral law8 ,if not1 it can never1 according to the hypothesis1 be a consciousness of ,god4 ,if it be independent thereof1 the fact would require to be better proved than by the misinterpretation of a few texts of ,scripture4 ,solidly proved it never1 ,i believe1 can be4 ,a conscience not conscious of a moral law is simply no conscience at all4 ,,note ,,xxvii41 page #bba4 ,,chalmers ,,and ,,erskine ,,on ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,conscience4 ,the moral argument was1 as was to be expected1 a very favourite one with ,dr ,chalmers1 and his way of stating it was as remarkable for its simplicity and directness as for its eloquence4 ,had ,god1 he asks1 been an unrighteous ,being ,himself1 would ,he have given to the obviously superior faculty in man so distinct and authoritative a voice on the side of righteousness8 ,would ,he have so constructed the creatures of our species as to have planted in every breast a reclaiming witness against ,himself8 ,would ,he have thus inscribed on the tablet of every heart the sentence of ,his own condemnation2 and is this not just as likely1 as that ,he should have inscribed it in written characters on the forehead of each individual8 ,would ,he so have fashioned the workmanship of ,his own hands2 or1 if a ,god of cruelty1 injustice1 and falsehood1 would ,he have placed in the station of master and judge that faculty which1 felt to be the highest in our nature1 would prompt a generous and high-minded revolt of all our sentiments against the ,being who formed us8 ,from a ,god possessed of such characteristics1 we should surely have expected a differently-moulded humanity2 or1 in other words1 from the actual constitution of man1 from the testimonies on the side of all righteousness1 given by the vicegerent within the heart1 do we infer the righteousness of the ,sovereign who placed it there4--,natural ,theology1 vol4 i4 pp4 #cbc1 #cbd4 ,this argument of ,dr ,chalmers1 like all other arguments from conscience1 implies the soundness of the reasoning by which ,god has been attempted to be shown to be the intelligent cause or author of the universe2 and1 on that perfectly legitimate presupposition1 it seems to me as irresistible as it is simple4 ,an intelligent but unrighteous ,god would never have made a creature better than himself and endowed with admiration of what is most opposite to himself1 the reverse and counterpart of his own character4 ,the argument as stated by the late ,mr ,thomas ,erskine of ,linlathen1 is no less simple and direct3 ,when ,i attentively consider what is going on in my conscience1 the chief thing forced on my notice is1 that ,i find myself face to face with a purpose--not my own1 for ,i am often conscious of resisting it--but which dominates me and makes itself felt as ever present1 as the very root and reason of my being4444 ,this consciousness of a purpose concerning me that ,i should be a good man--right1 true1 and unselfish--is the first firm footing ,i have in the region of religious thought3 for ,i cannot dissociate the idea of a purpose from that of a ,purposer1 and ,i cannot but identify this ,purposer with the ,author of my being and the ,being of all beings2 and further1 ,i cannot but regard ,his purpose towards me as the unmistakable indication of ,his own character4--',the ,spiritual ,order1 and other ,papers1' pp4 #dg1 #dh4 ,,note ,,xxviii41 page #bbe4 ,,associationist ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,conscience4 ,i have indicated to some extent my reasons for regarding this theory as unsatisfactory in an article entitled ,associationism and the ,origin of ,moral ,ideas1 in ',mind1' ,no4 ,,iii4 7,july #ahgf74 ,in the treatise of ,m4 ,carrau1 ',la ,morale ,utilitaire1' the various forms of the theory are examined with fairness and penetration4 ,,note ,,xxix41 page #bbi4 ,,chalmers ,,and ,,bain ,,on ,,the ,,pleasure ,,of ,,malevolence4 ,dr ,chalmers devotes a chapter of his ',natural ,theology' to the illustration of the inherent pleasure of the virtuous1 and misery of the vicious affections4 ,i do not think the psychological doctrine of that chapter unexceptionable2 but1 at the same time1 ,i cannot understand on what ground ,prof4 ,bain imagines that it implies doubts as to the genuineness of the pleasures of malevolence1 and virtually denies that the feeling of gratified vengeance is a real and indisputable pleasure4--,see ,emotions and the ,will1 pp4 #ahg-ahi4 ,the very passage which ,prof4 ,bain quotes is quite inconsistent with this view4 ,it is as follows3 ,the most ordinary observer of his own feelings1 however incapable of analysis1 must be sensible1 even at the moment of wreaking the full indulgence of his resentment on the man who has provoked or injured him1 that all is not perfect within2 but that in this1 and indeed in every other malignant feeling1 there is a sore burden of disquietude1 an unhappiness tumultuating in the heart1 and visibly pictured in the countenance4 ,the ferocious tyrant who has only to issue forth his mandate1 and strike dead at pleasure the victim of his wrath1 with any circumstance too of barbaric caprice and cruelty which his fancy1 in the very waywardness of passion unrestrained and power unbounded1 might suggest to him--he may be said through life to have experienced a thousand gratifications1 in the solaced rage and revenge which1 though ever breaking forth on some new subject1 he can appease again every day of his life by some new execution4 ,but we mistake it if we think otherwise than that1 in spite of these distinct and very numerous1 nay1 daily gratifications1 if he so choose1 it is not a life of fierce internal agony notwithstanding4 ,the sentence which precedes these words leaves no doubt that ,prof4 ,bain's interpretation of them is incorrect4 ,true1 it is inseparable from the very nature of a desire1 that there must be some enjoyment or other at the time of its gratification2 but1 in the case of these evil affections1 it is not unmixed enjoyment4 ,the following passage is1 however1 still more explicit3 ,there is a certain species of enjoyment common to all our affections4 ,it were a contradiction in terms to affirm otherwise2 for it were tantamount to saying1 that an affection may be gratified without the actual experience of a gratification4 ,there must be some sensation or other of happiness at the time when a man attains that which he is seeking for2 and if it be not a positive sensation of pleasure1 it will at least be the sensation of a relief from pain1 as when one meets with the opportunity of wreaking upon its object that indignation which had long kept his heart in a tumult of disquietude4 ,we therefore would mistake the matter if we thought that a state even of thorough and unqualified wickedness was exclusive of all enjoyment1 for even the vicious affections must share in that enjoyment which inseparably attaches to every affection at the moment of its indulgence4 ,and thus it is that even in the veriest ,pandemonium might there be lurid gleams of ecstasy and shouts of fiendish exultation--the merriment of desperadoes in crime1 who send forth the outcries of their spiteful and savage delight when some deep-laid villany has triumphed1 or when1 in some dire perpetration of revenge1 they have given full satisfaction and discharge to the malignity of their accursed nature4 ,the assertion1 therefore1 may be taken too generally1 when it is stated that there is no enjoyment whatever in the veriest hell of assembled outcasts2 for even there1 might there be many separate and specific gratifications4 ,and we must abstract the pleasure essentially involved in every affection at the instant of its indulgence1 and which cannot possibly be disjoined from it1 ere we see clearly and distinctively wherein it is that1 in respect of enjoyment1 the virtuous and vicious affections differ from each other4 ,for it is true that there is a common resemblance between them2 and that1 by the universal law and nature of affection1 there must be some sort of agreeable sensation in the act of their obtaining that which they are seeking after4 ,yet it is no less true that1 did the former affections bear supreme rule in the heart1 they would brighten and tranquillise the whole of human existence2 whereas1 had the latter the entire and practical ascendancy1 they would distemper the whole man1 and make him as completely wretched as he was completely worthless4 ,dr ,chalmers1 then1 did not call in question the pleasures of malevolence4 ,,note ,,xxx41 page #bcb4 ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,proof4 ,conscience has from the earliest times and among the rudest peoples exercised great influence in the formation of religious belief4 ,moral reasons weighed with men in their origination and elaboration of religion long before they expressed them in abstract propositions and logical forms4 ,the historical proof of this truth is so ample that it would require a volume to do it justice3 all literatures might be made to yield contributions to it4 ,the simplest form of the moral argument1 and the one which has been most generally employed1 is that of an inference from the moral law to a moral lawgiver4 ,closely associated with it are those forms which rest on the emotions involved in or accompanying virtue and guilt4 ,these are the directest modes of exhibiting what ,chalmers calls the theology of conscience1 which is not only of wider diffusion but of far more practical influence than the theology of academic demonstration4 ,raymond of ,sebonde1 in a work which ,i have previously had occasion to mention1 was perhaps the first to present it in a more artificial form4 ,he argues thus3 ,man is a responsible being who can neither reward nor punish himself1 and who must consequently be under a superior being who will reward and punish him1 unless his life is to be regarded as vain and purposeless--unless even the whole of external nature1 which is subject to man and exists for his sake1 is to be pronounced aimless and useless4 ,external nature1 however1 is seen to be throughout orderly and harmonious2 how can we suppose the moral world to be disorderly and chaotic8 ,as the eye corresponds to things visible1 the ear to things audible1 the reason to things intelligible1 so conscience must correspond to a judgment which implies some one to pronounce it1 and to a retribution which implies some one to inflict it4 ,but this some one must be absolutely just2 he must be omniscient1 as possessing a perfect knowledge of all human actions1 and a thorough insight into their moral character2 omnipotent1 to execute his judgments2 and1 in a word1 must be the most perfect of all beings--i4e41 ,god4 ,kant's argument is thus summarised by the ,archbishop of ,york3 ,the highest good of man consists of two parts1 the greatest possible morality and happiness4 ,the former is the demand of his spiritual1 the latter of his animal nature4 ,the former only1 his morality1 is within his own power2 and while1 by persevering virtue1 he makes this his personal character1 he is often compelled to sacrifice his happiness4 ,but since the desire of happiness is neither irrational nor unnatural1 he justly concludes either that there is a ,supreme ,being who will so guide the course of things 7the natural world1 not of itself subject to moral laws7 as to render his holiness and happiness equal1 or that the dictates of his conscience are unjust and irrational4 ,but the latter supposition is morally impossible2 and he is compelled1 therefore1 to receive the former as true4 ,akin to this argument are those which are based on man's desire of good4 ,proclus1 in his ',theology of ,plato1' argues to the following effect3 ,all beings desire the good2 but this good cannot be identical with the beings which desire it1 for then these beings would be themselves the good1 and would not desire what they already possessed4 ,the good is antecedent1 therefore1 to all the beings who desire it4 ,since the time of ,proclus to the present many have argued that there must be a ,god because the heart demands one to satisfy its desire of love1 or holiness1 or happiness2 few1 perhaps1 have done so with more ingenuity of logic or fervour of belief than ,john ,norris in ,contemplation and ,love1 or the ,methodical ,ascent of the ,soul to ,god by steps of ,meditation1 and in ,an ,idea of ,happiness 7',collection of ,miscellanies'74 ,a contemporary theologian1 ,principal ,pirie of ,aberdeen1 has laid great stress on an argument which we may assign to this class4 ,no argument1 he says1 can be valid which founds on innate ideas1 or which embraces considerations so entirely beyond the range of human apprehension that we cannot positively be assured whether they be true or false4 ,yet we have no hesitation in saying that there is an argument a priori for the existence and attributes of a ,god1 which is involved in the very nature of our feelings1 and which therefore tells upon the faith of the whole human race1 even when they are altogether ignorant of it logically1 as existing in the form of a proposition4 ,it makes no appeal1 however1 to profound metaphysical speculations1 and is consequently plain and intelligible to any one capable of exercising reason at all4 ,it rests on the principle which both our feelings and our experience demonstrate to be true1 that every primary and essential desire of the human mind has a co-relative--or1 in other words1 a something to gratify it--existing in the nature of things4 ,the mode in which the development of this principle constitutes an argument a priori for the existence and attributes of a ,god we now proceed to explain4 ,every human being feels from the moment in which he comes into existence1 and through his whole subsequent history1 that he is in himself a weak1 helpless creature4 ,as we have said1 this feeling begins from the very beginning of our conscious existence4 ,the appeals of the infant for aid are made continually4444 ,as we advance to childhood1 youth1 and manhood1 our sense of power gradually increases4 ,we are conscious that under certain circumstances we can do something for ourselves4 ,yet this capability1 we are also conscious in its very exercise1 does not depend on us for its continuance4 ,we cannot preserve to ourselves fortune1 health1 or even life1 for a single moment4 ,yet all these things we desire1 and desire with the utmost earnestness1 and desire as a primary tendency of our minds4 ,we may not indeed always clothe such desire in words--we may not put it into the form of a proposition2 but that it exists in every mind as a feeling1 and practically operates upon every individual1 is as certain as our existence itself1 and is indeed manifest every moment in the efforts which we make to preserve these and all other forms of what we believe to involve happiness4 ,in this desire1 consequently1 we have the voice of nature speaking1 and commanding us to use such efforts4 ,of ourselves we know that they would be insufficient4 ,the results depend upon causes over which we have no control4 ,our own efforts1 we are conscious1 are only means which nature has appointed us to employ1 but their success depends on circumstances altogether beyond our power4 ,it is1 as has been said1 the voice of nature telling us that each of our desires has a co-relative1 through which it may be fully gratified by the use of the proper means4 ,this co-relative1 in the case of intense and permanent happiness1 can only be found in the existence of a ,god1 omnipotent1 omniscient1 true1 just1 benevolent1 and eternal1 in whom we repose entire confidence4 ,no other assumption could by possibility satisfy our desire for the highest and permanent happiness now and for ever4 ,for to realise thoroughly the argument1 it is to be observed that our desire is for the highest and permanent happiness4 ,it is not imperfect or temporary happiness merely which we desire1 though we may be compelled to be content with this1 if we cannot procure more4 ,it is the highest happiness possible for our natures1 and that without end4 ,now1 if such happiness is to be attained at all1 it can only be obtained through a ,god possessed of the attributes which we have enumerated4--,natural ,theology1 pp4 #ga-gd4 ,prof4 ,wace1 in the second course of his ,boyle ,lectures--,christianity and ,morality 7#ahgf7--;has exhibited1 with considerable detail1 and in an ingenious and eloquent manner1 the testimony which conscience bears to a personal ,god1 a moral ,creator1 and a moral ,governor4 ,a glimpse of his general idea may be obtained from the following words3 ,in our endeavour to trace in the conscience1 and in the personal experience of individuals1 the roots of our faith in a ,god of infinite power1 wisdom1 and goodness1 we have now advanced two considerable steps beyond our first and simplest sense of right and wrong4 ,we have seen that this sense1 when allowed to speak with its full imperative and personal force1 arouses in us1 as it aroused in the ,psalmist1 a sense of our being in contact with a personal and righteous ,will4 ,this conviction necessarily involves1 as it involved in the writer of the #acith ,psalm1 the further belief that an authority which has this claim upon our obedience in every particular of our conduct1 in all our thoughts and acts1 must at the same time be the author and source of our whole constitution2 that the righteous eyes which now penetrate1 whether through darkness or through light1 to the very depths of our souls1 must also have seen our 'substance1 yet being imperfect1' and that in their book must all our members have been written4 ,if it be the imperative and paramount law of our nature to obey our conscience1 and to make moral perfection1 or spiritual excellence1 our ultimate aim1 we cannot but conclude that our whole nature1 and the whole order of things in which we are placed1 is in the hands of a moral power2 and that1 as we are fearfully and wonderfully made for righteous and reasonable ends1 it must be by a righteous and reasonable ,will that we are made4 ,the conscience of man must never be omitted from our view of the design of man2 and it is only when we contemplate the adjustment of his whole nature to the purposes of the loftiest moral development1 that the argument from design acquires its full strength4444 ,the apprehension of a ,power which establishes righteousness as the law of life1 involves also the conviction that it is able to enforce that law1 and to render it finally and everywhere supreme4 ,the conviction1 indeed1 is one of faith and not of demonstration2 and the ,scriptures1 no less than life1 are full of instances in which this faith is tried by the bitterest experience4 ,even prophets1 as ,i have before observed1 are at times driven to the cry that 'the law is slacked1 and that judgment doth never go forth4' ,but the deepest instincts and necessities of conscience forbid the toleration of any such instinct of despair4 ,if right were not essentially and ultimately might1 ,i do not say--,god forbid--that it would not still claim the supreme allegiance of the soul2 but life would be a bitter mockery and an inexplicable cruelty4 ,not merely to be under an imperative law to pursue that which cannot be realised1 but to be bound to such a fruitless pursuit by every noble and lovely influence--to be condemned in moral and spiritual realities to the torments of a ,tantalus--this is a conception of human life against which the whole soul rebels4 ,accordingly1 a ,god of all righteousness must of necessity be regarded as a ,god of all power4444 ,that 'categorical imperative' of the conscience1 on which the ,german philosopher insisted1 is imperative in demanding not only a ,god1 but an ,almighty ,god4 ,,note ,,xxxi41 page #bce4 ,,defects ,,in ,,the ,,physical ,,world4 ,lucretius 7ii4 #agg-v4 #aif7 has dwelt on the arrangements which render one zone of the earth torrid and others frigid--on the extent of barren heaths and rocks1 of sands and seas--on the prevalence of unseasonable weather1 storms1 and tempests--and on the abundance of noxious herbs and destructive animals1 c4--as evidences that the earth was faulty and ill made1 and could not be the work of a ,divine ,intelligence4 ,whether it was well or ill made appears to have been a favourite subject of dispute between the ,epicureans and ,stoics4 ,lactantius 7,de ,ira ,dei1 c4 xiii47 reports1 and attempts to answer1 the objections which the ,epicureans and ,academics were accustomed to urge against the constitution of the physical world4 ,in ,cudworth's ',intellectual ,system1' vol4 iii41 pp4 #dfd-h1 ,bentley's ',folly of ,atheism1' pt4 i41 ,serm4 #h2 ,derham's ',astro-,theology1' book vii41 c4 #b1 c41 such objections are discussed4 ,in the remarks which ,i made on the subject in the lecture1 ,i have had chiefly in view the opinions of ,comte1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 and ,j4 ,j4 ,murphy 7,scientific ,bases of ,faith1 c4 xvi47 ,mr ,mill's charges against nature are very vigorously and graphically expressed4 ,next to the greatness of these cosmic forces1 the quality which most forcibly strikes every one who does not avert his eyes from it1 is their perfect and absolute recklessness4 ,they go straight to their end1 without regarding what or whom they crush on the road4 ,optimists1 in their attempts to prove that 'whatever is1 is right1' are obliged to maintain1 not that ,nature ever turns one step from her path to avoid trampling us into destruction1 but that it would be very unreasonable in us to expect that she should4 ,pope's ',shall gravitation cease when you go by8' may be a just rebuke to any one who should be so silly as to expect common human morality from ,nature4 ,but if the question were between two men1 instead of between a man and a natural phenomenon1 that triumphant apostrophe would be thought a rare piece of impudence4 ,a man who should persist in hurling stones or firing cannon when another man 'goes by1' and1 having killed him1 should urge a similar plea in exculpation1 would very deservedly be found guilty of murder4 ,in sober truth1 nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another1 are ,nature's everyday performances4 ,killing1 the most criminal act recognised by human laws1 ,nature does once to every being that lives1 and in a large proportion of cases after protracted tortures1 such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow-creatures4 ,if1 by an arbitrary reservation1 we refuse to account anything murder but what abridges to a certain term supposed to be allotted to human life1 ,nature also does this to all but a small percentage of lives1 and does it in all the modes1 violent or insidious1 in which the worst human beings take the lives of one another4 ,nature impales men1 breaks them as if on the wheel1 casts them to be devoured by wild beasts1 burns them to death1 crushes them with stones like the first ,christian martyr1 starves them with hunger1 freezes them with cold1 poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations1 and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve1 such as the ingenious cruelty of a ,nabis or a ,domitian never surpassed4 ,all this ,nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice1 emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst--upon those who are engaged in the highest and worthiest enterprises1 and often as the direct consequence of the noblest acts1--and it might almost be imagined as a punishment for them4 ,she mows down those on whose existence hangs the wellbeing of a whole people1 perhaps the prospects of the human race for generations to come1 with as little compunction as those whose death is a relief to themselves1 or a blessing to those under their noxious influence4 ,such are ,nature's dealings with life4 ,even when she does not intend to kill1 she inflicts the same tortures in apparent wantonness4 ,in the clumsy provision which she has made for that perpetual renewal of animal life1 rendered necessary by the prompt termination she puts to it in every individual case1 no human being ever comes into the world but another human being is literally stretched on the rack for hours or days1 not unfrequently issuing in death4 ,next to taking life 7equal to it1 according to a high authority7 is taking the means by which we live2 and ,nature does this1 too1 on the largest scale and with the most callous indifference4 ,a single hurricane destroys the hopes of a season2 a flight of locusts1 or an inundation1 desolates a district2 a trifling chemical change in an edible root starves a million of people4 ,the waves of the sea1 like banditti1 seize and appropriate the wealth of the rich and the little all of the poor with the same accompaniments of stripping1 wounding1 and killing1 as their human antitypes4 ,everything1 in short1 which the worst men commit either against life or property1 is perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents4 ,nature has noyades more fatal than those of ,carrier2 her explosions of fire-damp are as destructive as human artillery2 her plague and cholera far surpass the poison-cups of the ,borgias4 ,even the love of 'order1' which is thought to be a following of the ways of ,nature1 is1 in fact1 a contradiction of them4 ,all which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' and its consequences1 is precisely a counterpart of ,nature's ways4 ,anarchy and the ,reign of ,terror are overmatched in injustice1 ruin1 and death1 by a hurricane and a pestilence4--,three ,essays1 pp4 #bh-ca4 ,the opinion that the world would be either physically or morally improved were gravitation to cease when men went by1 were fire not always to burn and were water occasionally to refuse to drown1 were laws few and miracles numerous1 may safely be left to refute itself4 ,therefore1 let me simply set over against ,mr ,mill's censure of ,nature ,wordsworth's praise3-- ,nature never did betray ,the heart that loved her2 'tis her privilege1 ,through all the years of this our life1 to lead ,from joy to joy2 for she can so inform ,the mind that is within us1 so impress ,with quietness and beauty1 and so feed ,with lofty thoughts1 that neither evil tongues1 ,rash judgments1 nor the sneers of selfish men1 ,nor greetings where no kindness is1 nor all ,the dreary intercourse of daily life1 ,shall e'er prevail against us1 or disturb ,our cheerful faith1 that all which we behold ,is full of blessings4 ,therefore1 let the moon ,shine on thee in thy solitary walk2 ,and let the misty mountain winds be free ,to blow against thee3 and1 in after years1 ,when these wild ecstasies shall be matured ,into a sober pleasure1 when thy mind ,shall be a mansion for all lovely forms1 ,thy memory be as a dwelling-place ,for all sweet sounds and harmonies2 oh then1 ,if solitude1 or fear1 or pain1 or grief1 ,should be thy portion1 with what healing thoughts ,of tender joy wilt thou remember me ,and these my exhortations6 ,,note ,,xxxii41 page #bda4 ,,no ,,best ,,possible ,,created ,,system4 ,dante has given magnificent expression to the truth that no created system can be absolutely perfect3-- ,colui che volse il sesto ,allo stremo del mondo1 e dentro ad esso ,distinse tanto occulto e manifesto1 ,non poteo suo valor si fare impresso ,in tutto l'universo1 che il suo verbo ,non rimanesse in infinito eccesso4 ,e ci fa certo1 che il primo ,superbo1 ,che fu la somma d'ogni creatura1 ,per non aspettar lume1 cadde acerbo3 ,e quinci appar ch' ogni minor natura corto recettacolo a quel bene ,che non ha fine1 e se in se misura4 ,dunque nostra veduta1 che conviene ,essere alcun de' raggi della mente ,di che tutte le cose son ripiene1 ,non pu di sua natura esser possente ,tanto1 che suo principio non discerna ,molto di l1 da quel ch' egli 1 parvente4 ,per nella giustizia sempiterna ,la vista che riceve il vostro mondo1 ,com' occhio per lo mare1 entro s' interna2 ,che1 bench dalla proda veggia il fondo1 ,in pelago nol vede2 e nondimeno ,egli 2 ma cela lui l'esser profondo4 --,del ,paradiso1 cant4 xix4 #dj-fc4 ,he his compasses who placed ,at the world's limit1 and within the line ,drew beauties1 dimly or distinctly traced-- ,could not upon the universe so write ,the impress of his power1 but that ,his ,word ,must still be left in distance infinite3 ,and hence 'tis evident that he in heaven ,created loftiest his fate incurred ,because he would not wait till light was given4 ,and hence are all inferior creatures shown ,scant vessels of that ,goodness unconfined ,which nought can measure save ,itself alone4 ,therefore our intellect--a feeble beam1 ,struck from the light of the ,eternal ,mind1 ,with which all things throughout creation teem1-- ,must by its nature be incapable1 ,save in a low and most remote degree1 ,of viewing its exalted principle4 ,wherefore the heavenly ,justice can no more ,by mortal ken be fathomed than the sea3 ,for though the eye of one upon the shore ,may pierce its shallows1 waves unfathomed bound ,his further sight1 yet under them is laid ,a bottom1 viewless through the deep profound4 --,,wright4 ,,note ,,xxxiii41 page #bde4 ,,defects ,,in ,,the ,,organic ,,world4 ,the objections to final causes from alleged defects in the organic world have been answered with wisdom and success by ,m4 ,janet1 in his ',causes ,finales1' pp4 #cac-cdh4 ,the views of ,professor ,helmholtz as to the defects of the eye will be found stated at length in his popular lectures on scientific subjects4 ,the chief defects enumerated are3 #a4 ,chromatic aberration1 connected with #b4 ,spherical aberration and defective centring of the cornea and lens1 together producing the imperfection known as astigmatism2 #c4 ,irregular radiation round the images of illuminated points2 #d4 ,defective transparency2 #e4 ,floating corpuscles1 and #f4 ,the blind spot with other gaps in the field of vision4 ,the eye has every possible defect that can be found in an optical instrument1 and even some which are peculiar to itself4 ,it is not too much to say that if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument which had all these defects1 ,i should think myself quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms1 and giving him back his instrument4 ,of course ,i shall not do this with my eyes1 and shall be only too glad to keep them as long as ,i can--defects and all4 ,still1 the fact that1 however bad they may be1 ,i can get no others1 does not at all diminish their defects1 so long as ,i maintain the narrow but indisputable position of a critic on purely optical grounds4 ,helmholtz himself1 however1 points out that the defects of the eye are all so counteracted1 that the inexactness of the image which results from their presence very little exceeds1 under ordinary conditions of illumination1 the limits which are set to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the retinal cones2 that the adaptation of the eye to its function is most complete1 and is seen in the very limits which are set to its defects4 ,in fact1 were the eye more perfect as an instrument of optical precision1 it would be less perfect as an eye4 ,its absolute defects are practical merits4 ,to be a useful eye it must be neither a perfect telescope nor a perfect microscope1 but a something which can readily serve many purposes1 and which can be supplemented by many instruments4 ,the delicate finish of a razor renders it unfit for cutting wood4 ,all man's senses and organs are inferior to those possessed by some of the lower animals1 but the inferiority is of a kind which is a real and vast advantage4 ,it is of a kind which allows them to be put to a greater variety of uses than could more perfect senses and organs4 ,it is the very condition of their capacity to be utilised in manifold directions by an inventive and progressive reason4 ,further1 no man can see at all merely with a so-called perfect optical instrument4 ,he must have in addition the imperfect instrument1 composed of a soft1 watery1 animal substance1 and designated the eye4 ,there is that in the eye which immeasurably transcends all mere physics and chemistry1 all human mechanism and contrivance2 there is life2 there is vision4 ,,note ,,xxxiv41 page #beb4 ,,epicurean ,,dilemma4 ,the ,epicurean dilemma has been often dealt with4 ,i shall content myself with quoting ,mr ,bowen's remarks on the subject3 ,omnipotence and benevolence are apparently very simple and very comprehensive terms1 though few are more vaguely used4 ,the former means a power to do everything2 but this does not include the ability to do two contradictory things at the same moment1 or to accomplish any metaphysical impossibility4 ,thus1 the ,deity cannot cause two and two to make five1 nor place two hills near each other without leaving a valley between them4 ,the impossibility in such cases does not argue a defect of power1 but an absurdity in the statement of the case to which the power is to be applied4 ,a statement which involves a contradiction in terms does not express a limitation of ability1 because in truth it expresses nothing at all2 the affirmation and the denial1 uttered in the same breath1 cancel each other1 and no meaning remains4 ,all metaphysical impossibilities can be reduced to the formula1 that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same moment1 as this would be an absurdity--that is1 an absurd or meaningless statement4 ,thus1 virtue cannot exist without free agency1 because a free choice between good and evil is involved in the idea of virtue1 so that the proposition means no more than this--that what contains freedom cannot be without freedom4 ,we cannot choose between good and evil1 unless good and evil are both placed before us--that is1 unless we know what these words mean2 and we cannot express our choice in action1 unless we are able to act--that is1 unless we have the power of doing either good or evil4 ,in the dilemma quoted from ,epicurus1 a contradiction in terms is held to prove a defect of power1 or to disprove omnipotence2 the dilemma1 therefore1 is a mere logical puzzle1 like the celebrated one of ,achilles and the tortoise4 ,the meaning of benevolence appears simple enough2 but it is often difficult to tell whether a certain act was or was not prompted by kind intentions4 ,strictly speaking1 of course1 benevolence is a quality of mind--that is1 of will 7bene volo7 or intention1 not of outward conduct4 ,an action is said to be benevolent only by metaphor2 it is so called1 because we infer from it1 with great positiveness1 that the agent must have had benevolent intentions4 ,we think that the motives are indicated by the act2 but we may be mistaken4 ,he who gives food to the hungry poor would be esteemed benevolent2 but he may do it with a view to poison them4 ,to strike for the avowed purpose of causing pain usually argues ill-will or a malignant design2 but the blow may come from the kindest heart in the world1 for the express purpose of benefiting him who receives it4 ,in the present argument1 ,epicurus assumes that the presence of evil--that is1 the outward fact--is enough to prove a want of benevolence1 or even a malignant design1 on the part of him who might have prevented it4 ,but if by evil is here meant mere pain or suffering1 whether proceeding from bodily or mental causes1 we may boldly deny the inference4 ,if pleasure or mere enjoyment is not the greatest good1 if sometimes it is even inconsistent with the possession of a higher blessing1 then a denial of it may be a proof of goodness instead of malice4--,metaphysical and ,ethical ,science1 pp4 #cfb1 #cfc4 ,,note ,,xxxv41 page #bfc4 ,,god ,,and ,,duty4 ,to such readers as have reflected on man's life2 who understand that for man's wellbeing ,faith is properly the one thing needful2 how with it martyrs1 otherwise weak1 can cheerfully endure the shame and the cross--and without1 worldlings puke up their sick existence by suicide in the midst of luxury3 to such it will be clear that for a pure moral nature the loss of religious belief is the loss of everything4 ,all wounds1 the crush of long-continued destitution1 the stab of false friendship and of false love1 all wounds in thy so genial heart1 would have healed again had not its life-warmth been withdrawn4 ,well mayest thou exclaim1 ',is there no ,god1 then2 but at best an absentee ,god1 sitting idle1 ever since the first ,sabbath1 at the outside of ,his universe and seeing it go8' ',has the word ,duty no meaning8 is what we call ,duty no ,divine messenger and guide1 but a false earthly phantasm made up of desire and fear8' ',is the heroic inspiration we name ,virtue but some passion2 some bubble of the blood1 bubbling in the direction others profit by8' ,i know not2 only this ,i know1 if what thou namest ,happiness be our true aim1 then are we all astray4 ',behold1 thou art fatherless1 outcast1 and the universe is--the ,devil's4'--,carlyle4 ,,note ,,xxxvi41 page #bfh4 ,,histories ,,of ,,the ,,theistic ,,proofs4 ,there are several histories of the proofs for the ,divine existence4 ,one of the earliest is ,ziegler's ',beitrge zur ,geschichte des ,glaubens an das ,dasein ,gottes' 7#agib74 ,the best known1 and perhaps the most interesting1 is ,bouchitt's ',histoire des ,preuves de l',existence de ,dieu' 7,mmoires de l',acadmie1 ,savants trangers1 i471 written from the ,krausean point of view4 ,the ',geschichte der ,beweise fr das ,dasein ,gottes bis zum #ad ,jahrhundert' 7#ahge71 by ,alfred ,tyszka1 and the ',geschichte der ,beweise fr das ,dasein ,gottes von ,cartesius bis ,kant' 7#ahgf71 by ,albert ,krebs1 supplement each other4 ,there are two very able articles--partly historical1 but chiefly critical--on these proofs by ,professor ,kstlin in the ',theol4 ,studien und ,kritiken1' ,h4 #d1 #ahge1 and ,h4 #a1 #ahgf4 ,the most conscientious1 useful1 and learned history of speculation regarding ,deity is1 so far as is known to me1 the four-volumed work of ,signor ,bobba1 ',storia della ,filosofia intorno all' ,idea di ,dio4' ,on the history of the a priori proofs there may be consulted the treatise of ,fischer1 ',der ontologische ,beweis f4 d4 ,dasein ,gottes u4 s4 ,geschichte1' #aheb1 and an article of ,seydel1 ,der gesch4 ,eintritt ontologischer ,beweisfhring1 c4 7,tr4 f4 ,ph4 ,h4 i4 #aheh74 ,in ,hase's ',life of ,anselm' 7of which there is an ,english translation7 there is a good account of ,anselm's argument4 ,there is also a translation of the ',proslogion1' with ,gaunilo's objections and ,anselm's reply1 in the ',bibliotheca ,sacra1' #ahea4 ,on the ,cartesian proofs there is a special work by ,huber1 ',die cartes4 ,beweise v4 ,dasein ,gottes' 7#ahed74 ,hegel's ',vorlesungen ber d4 ,beweise f4 d4 ,dasein ,gottes' are of great interest and value in various respects2 but his view of the historical succession of the proofs does not appear to me to be tenable4 ,,note ,,xxxvii41 page #bfi4 ,a ,,priori ,,proof ,,not ,,proof ,,from ,a ,,cause4 ,the philosophers and theologians who have supposed ,a ,,priori proof to be proof from a cause or antecedent existence1 have1 of course1 denied that there can be any a priori proof of the ,divine existence4 ,aristotle laid down as a rule that demonstration must proceed from things prior to and the causes of the things to be demonstrated1 and those who assented to this rule necessarily denied the possibility of demonstrating the existence of ,god4 ,the assertion of ,clemens of ,alexandria that ,god cannot be apprehended by any demonstrative science is indubitable1 if the view of demonstration on which he rests it be correct2 for such science is from things prior and more knowable1 whereas nothing can precede that which is uncreated4 ,it is a manifest contradiction to imagine that an eternal being is subsequent to any other being1 or a perfect being dependent on any other being4 ,even mathematical demonstration1 however1 is not from causes2 nor is there any reason for supposing that the order of knowledge is necessarily and universally the same as the order of existence4 ,it is by confounding demonstration erroneously understood in the manner indicated with proof in general that not a few persons have arrived at the conclusion that the existence of ,god cannot be proved at all1 and have deemed preposterous assertions like that of ,jacobi1 ,a ,god who can be proved is no ,god1 for the ground of proof is necessarily above the thing proved by it1 both profound and pious4 ,,note ,,xxxviii41 page #bhe4 ,,some ,a ,,priori ,,arguments4 ,i have treated of ,clarke's argument in the ',encyc4 ,brit4' art4 ,samuel ,clarke4 ,the demonstration of ,dr ,fiddes is contained in his ',theologia ,speculativa1 or a ,body of ,divinity1' #b vols41 #agah-bj4 ,it consists of six propositions3 #a4 ,something does now exist2 #b4 ,something has existed eternally2 #c4 ,something has been eternally self-existent2 #d4 ,what is self-existent must have all the perfections that exist anywhere or in any subject2 #e4 ,what is self-existent must have all possible perfections1 and every perfection1 in an infinite measure2 #f4 ,what has all possible perfections in an infinite measure is ,god4 ,he proves his fourth proposition thus3 ,since nothing can arise out of nothing1 and since there can be no perfection but what has some subject of inherence1 every perfection must have been eternally somewhere or other1 or in one subject or other1 into which it must be ultimately resolved1 or else it could never have been at all2 without admitting1 what of all things we are the best able to conceive1 an infinite progression of efficient causes--that is1 an infinite series of beings derived one from another1 without a beginning or any original cause at the head of the series4 ,so that whatever perfections we observe in any being must have been originally and eternally in the self-existent being4 ,on behalf of his fifth proposition he advances two arguments3 #a4 ,all properties essentially follow the nature and condition of the subject1 and must be commensurate to it4 ,for this reason we say that wisdom1 power1 and goodness being attributes of an infinite subject1 or one which is the substratum of one infinite attribute1 these and all the other perfections belonging to it must be infinite also4 ,otherwise the same subject1 considered as a subject1 would be infinite in one respect1 and yet finite in another2 which1 if it be not a contradiction1 seems to border so near upon one that we cannot comprehend the possibility of it4 #b4 ,a self-existent being as the subject of any perfection cannot limit itself2 because it must necessarily have existed from all eternity what it is1 and have been the same in all properties essentially inherent in it1 antecedently to any act or volition of its own4 ,nor can such a being be limited by anything external to it2 for1 besides that self-existence necessarily implies independence1 properties which are essential to any subject can admit of no increase or diminution or the least imaginable change1 without destroying the essence itself of the subject4 ,nor yet can it be said that there is any impossibility in the nature of the thing that the perfections inhering in an infinite subject should be in the highest or even in an infinite degree4 ,indeed it is scarce possible for us 7for the reasons already assigned7 to conceive how they should be otherwise4 ,neither can any such impossibility arise from the nature of the perfections themselves4 ,if1 then1 the perfections of a self-existent being cannot be limited by itself1 nor by anything external to it1 nor from any invincible repugnancy in the nature of the perfections themselves1 ,i conclude that the self-existent being must not only have all possible perfections1 but every perfection in an infinite degree4 ,the ',demonstration of the ,existence of ,god against ,atheists1' by the ,rev4 ,colin ,campbell1 ,minister of the ,parish of ,ardchattan1 #affg-agbf1 has been recently printed for private circulation from a ,,ms4 now deposited in the library of ,edinburgh ,university4 ,the editor has added to it a learned and admirable appendix4 ,mr ,campbell's manner of proving that there is one1 and but one1 infinite ,being1 is as follows3 ,as everything which hath a beginning forces confession of one who hath none--because to produce is an action1 and must presuppose an actor1--by the same force of reason1 we must confess that whatever is limited1 or made of such and such a limited nature1 is limited by something which did limit it to be such a thing1 and no other4 ,for limit is an action1 and confesseth an actor4 ,so that there must be a being anterior to all limited beings1 and1 consequently1 some being that is not at all limited1 to evite the absurd progress of running infinitely upwards unlimited beings1 without a single limiter4 ,now1 an unlimited being is the same as to say an infinite being4 ,and so1 by the force of reason1 we have a being which is eternal1 which is infinite4 ,there can be but one infinite1 because1 were there two or more1 the one would limit the other2 and so the infinite would be finite1 the unlimited would be limited4 ,therefore1 the unlimited1 or infinite1 must be one only2 and that one purely single and uncompounded1 else every part of the compound would limit the other parts1 so that all the parts would be limited4 ,and a whole whose parts are limited must be limited in the whole1 it being impossible that a compound or conjunction of finites can1 by addition1 produce an infinite1 unless you imagine this complex whole to consist partly of finites1 and also of some infinite4 ,but the one infinite part1 if infinite1 cannot leave place for any other finite to make it up1 it being itself unlimited and infinite2 and such an addition would speak it limited by the part which was added4 ,and a thousand like absurdities would follow4 ,wollaston's attempted demonstration is contained in the fifth section of his ',religion of ,nature ,delineated' 7#agbe74 ,this is a common book1 and the mere reference to it must suffice4 ,moses ,lowman's ',argument to prove the ,unity and ,perfection of ,god a priori' was published in #agce1 and reprinted1 with a preface by ,dr ,pye ,smith1 containing an account of the author and his works1 in the ,cabinet ,library of ,scarce and ,celebrated ,tracts 7#ahcf74 ,i reproduce the abstract which ,dr ,smith gave of this ingenious argument in his ',first ,lines of ,christian ,theology3' #a4 ,positive existence is possible1 for it involves no contradiction4 #b4 ,all possible existence is either necessary1 which must be1 and in its own nature cannot but be2 or contingent1 which may be or not be1 for in neither case is a contradiction involved4 #c4 ,some existence is necessary3 for1 if all existence were contingent1 all existence might not be as well as might be2 and that thing which might not be never could be without some other thing as the prior cause of its existence1 since every effect must have a cause4 ,if1 therefore1 all possible existence were contingent1 all existence would be impossible2 because the idea or conception of it would be that of an effect without a cause1 which involves a contradiction4 #d4 ,necessary existence must be actual existence3 for necessary existence is that which must be and cannot but be--that is1 it is such existence as arises from the nature of the thing in itself2 and it is an evident contradiction to affirm that necessary existence might not be4 #e4 ,necessary existence being such as must be and cannot but be1 it must be always and cannot but be always2 for to suppose that necessary existence could begin to be1 or could cease to be--that is1 that a time might be in which necessary existence would not be--involves a contradiction4 ,therefore1 necessary existence is without beginning and without end--that is1 it is eternal4 #f4 ,necessary existence must be wherever any existence is possible3 for all existence is either contingent or necessary2 all contingent existence is impossible without necessary existence being previously as its cause1 and wherever existence is possible it must be either of a necessary or a contingent being4 ,therefore1 necessary existence must be wherever existence is possible--that is1 it must be infinite4 #g4 ,there can be but one necessarily existent being2 for two necessarily existent beings could in no respect whatever differ from each other--that is1 they would be one and the same being4 #h4 ,the one necessarily existent being must have all possible perfections3 for all possible perfections must be the perfections of some existence2 all existence is either necessary or contingent2 all contingent existence is dependent upon necessary existence2 consequently1 all possible perfections must belong either to necessary existence or to contingent existence--that is1 to contingent beings1 which are caused by and are dependent upon necessary being4 ,therefore1 since there can be but one necessarily existent being1 that being must have all possible perfections4 #i4 ,the one necessarily existent being must be a free agent2 for contingent existence is possible1 as the conception of it involves no contradiction2 but necessary existence must be the cause or producing agent of contingent existence1 otherwise contingent existence would be impossible1 as an effect without a cause2 and necessary existence as the cause of contingent existence does not act necessarily1 for then contingent existence would itself be necessary1 which is absurd as involving a contradiction4 ,therefore necessary existence1 as the cause of contingent existence1 acts not necessarily but freely--that is1 is a free agent1 which is the same thing as being an intelligent agent4 #aj4 ,therefore1 there is one necessarily existent being1 the cause of all contingent existence--that is1 of all other existences besides himself2 and this being is eternal1 infinite1 possessed of all possible perfections1 and is an intelligent free agent--that is1 this ,being is ,god4 ,the demonstration of the ,divine existence given by the ,chevalier ,ramsay is contained in the ,first ,book of his ',philosophical ,principles of ,natural and ,revealed ,religion' 7#agdh74 ,it is as elaborately mathematical in form as the reasoning in ,spinoza's ',ethics1' and has continuous reference to that reasoning4 ,it is impossible to give any distinct conception of its nature by a brief description4 ,the argument of ,dr ,hamilton1 ,dean of ,armagh1 is fully set forth in his ',attempt to prove the ,existence and ,absolute ,perfection of the ,supreme ,unoriginated ,being1 in a ,demonstrative ,manner' 7#aghe74 ,it assumes the axiom that whatever is contingent1 or might possibly have been otherwise than it is1 had some cause which determined it to be what it is4 ,or in other words3 if two different or contrary things were each of them possible1 whichever of them took place1 or came to pass1 it must have done so in consequence of some cause which determined that it1 and not the other1 should take the place4 ,the propositions which he endeavours to demonstrate are these3 ,i4 ,there must be in the universe some one being1 at least1 whose non-existence is impossible--whose existence had no cause1 no beginning1 and can have no end4 ,,ii4 ,the whole nature of the unoriginated being1 or the aggregate of his attribute1 is uncaused1 and must be necessarily and immutably what it is2 so that he cannot have any attribute or modification of his attributes but such as were the eternal and necessary concomitants of his existence4 ,,iii4 ,whatever are the attributes of the unoriginated being1 he must possess each of them unlimitedly1 or in its whole extent1 such as it is when considered in the abstract4 ,,iv4 ,in whatever manner the unoriginated being exists or is present anywhere1 he must in the like manner exist or be present everywhere4 ,v4 ,the unoriginated being is one individual uncompounded substance identically the same everywhere1 and to which our ideas of whole and parts1 magnitude or quantity1 are not applicable4 ,,vi4 ,the unoriginated being must necessarily possess intelligence and power unlimited1 and all other natural attributes that are in themselves absolute perfections4 ,,vii4 ,there is in the universe but one unoriginated being1 who must therefore be the original fountain of all existence1 and the first cause of all things4 ,,viii4 ,all things owe their existence ultimately to the power of the first cause operating according to his free will4 ,,ix4 ,almighty ,god1 the first cause and author of all things1 must be a ,being of infinite goodness1 wisdom1 mercy1 justice1 and truth1 and all other moral perfections1 such as become the supreme author and governor of the universe4 ,,the ,,end4 ,,printed ,,by ,,william ,,blackwood ,,and ,,sons 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,notes ,variations in spelling1 punctuation and hyphenation have been retained except in obvious cases of typographical errors4 ,italics are shown thus italic4 #c;ieme4 indicates that the letters enclosed in curly brackets are superscripted4 ,the repetition of the title on the first two pages has been removed4