,dialogues ,concerning ,natural ,religion by ,david ,hume ,,pamphilus ,,to ,,hermippus ,it has been remarked1 my ,,hermippus1 that though the ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue1 this method of composition has been little practised in later ages1 and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it4 ,accurate and regular argument1 indeed1 such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers1 naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner2 where he can immediately1 without preparation1 explain the point at which he aims2 and thence proceed1 without interruption1 to deduce the proofs on which it is established4 ,to deliver a ,,system in conversation1 scarcely appears natural2 and while the dialogue-writer desires1 by departing from the direct style of composition1 to give a freer air to his performance1 and avoid the appearance of ,author and ,reader1 he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience1 and convey the image of ,pedagogue and ,pupil4 ,or1 if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good company1 by throwing in a variety of topics1 and preserving a proper balance among the speakers1 he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions1 that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated1 by all the graces of dialogue1 for the order1 brevity1 and precision1 which are sacrificed to them4 ,there are some subjects1 however1 to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted1 and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition4 ,any point of doctrine1 which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of dispute1 but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often inculcated1 seems to require some such method of handling it2 where the novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject2 where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept2 and where the variety of lights1 presented by various personages and characters1 may appear neither tedious nor redundant4 ,any question of philosophy1 on the other hand1 which is so ,,obscure and ,,uncertain1 that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it2 if it should be treated at all1 seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation4 ,reasonable men may be allowed to differ1 where no one can reasonably be positive4 ,opposite sentiments1 even without any decision1 afford an agreeable amusement2 and if the subject be curious and interesting1 the book carries us1 in a manner1 into company2 and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life1 study and society4 ,happily1 these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of ,,natural ,,religion4 ,what truth so obvious1 so certain1 as the being of a ,god1 which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged1 for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments8 ,what truth so important as this1 which is the ground of all our hopes1 the surest foundation of morality1 the firmest support of society1 and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations8 ,but1 in treating of this obvious and important truth1 what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of that ,divine ,being1 his attributes1 his decrees1 his plan of providence8 ,these have been always subjected to the disputations of men2 concerning these human reason has not reached any certain determination4 ,but these are topics so interesting1 that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them2 though nothing but doubt1 uncertainty1 and contradiction1 have as yet been the result of our most accurate researches4 ,this ,i had lately occasion to observe1 while ,i passed1 as usual1 part of the summer season with ,,cleanthes1 and was present at those conversations of his with ,,philo and ,,demea1 of which ,i gave you lately some imperfect account4 ,your curiosity1 you then told me1 was so excited1 that ,i must1 of necessity1 enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings1 and display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so delicate a subject as that of natural religion4 ,the remarkable contrast in their characters still further raised your expectations2 while you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of ,,cleanthes to the careless scepticism of ,,philo1 or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of ,,demea4 ,my youth rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes2 and that curiosity1 natural to the early season of life1 has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection of their arguments1 that1 ,i hope1 ,i shall not omit or confound any considerable part of them in the recital4 ,,part #a ,after ,i joined the company1 whom ,i found sitting in ,,cleanthes's library1 ,,demea paid ,,cleanthes some compliments on the great care which he took of my education1 and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his friendships4 ,the father of ,,pamphilus1 said he1 was your intimate friend3 ,the son is your pupil2 and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son1 were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every useful branch of literature and science4 ,you are no more wanting1 ,i am persuaded1 in prudence1 than in industry4 ,i shall1 therefore1 communicate to you a maxim1 which ,i have observed with regard to my own children1 that ,i may learn how far it agrees with your practice4 ,the method ,i follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient1 ,that students of philosophy ought first to learn logics1 then ethics1 next physics1 last of all the nature of the gods4 ,chrysippus apud ,plut3 de repug3 ,stoicorum ,this science of natural theology1 according to him1 being the most profound and abstruse of any1 required the maturest judgement in its students2 and none but a mind enriched with all the other sciences1 can safely be entrusted with it4 ,are you so late1 says ,,philo1 in teaching your children the principles of religion8 ,is there no danger of their neglecting1 or rejecting altogether those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course of their education8 ,it is only as a science1 replied ,,demea1 subjected to human reasoning and disputation1 that ,i postpone the study of ,natural ,theology4 ,to season their minds with early piety1 is my chief care2 and by continual precept and instruction1 and ,i hope too by example1 ,i imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the principles of religion4 ,while they pass through every other science1 ,i still remark the uncertainty of each part2 the eternal disputations of men2 the obscurity of all philosophy2 and the strange1 ridiculous conclusions1 which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of mere human reason4 ,having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self-diffidence1 ,i have no longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion2 nor apprehend any danger from that assuming arrogance of philosophy1 which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and opinions4 ,your precaution1 says ,,philo1 of seasoning your children's minds early with piety1 is certainly very reasonable2 and no more than is requisite in this profane and irreligious age4 ,but what ,i chiefly admire in your plan of education1 is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning1 which1 by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency1 have commonly1 in all ages1 been found so destructive to the principles of religion4 ,the vulgar1 indeed1 we may remark1 who are unacquainted with science and profound inquiry1 observing the endless disputes of the learned1 have commonly a thorough contempt for philosophy2 and rivet themselves the faster1 by that means1 in the great points of theology which have been taught them4 ,those who enter a little into study and inquiry1 finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest and most extraordinary1 think nothing too difficult for human reason2 and1 presumptuously breaking through all fences1 profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple4 ,but ,,cleanthes will1 ,i hope1 agree with me1 that1 after we have abandoned ignorance1 the surest remedy1 there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane liberty4 ,let ,,demea's principles be improved and cultivated3 ,let us become thoroughly sensible of the weakness1 blindness1 and narrow limits of human reason3 ,let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties1 even in subjects of common life and practice3 ,let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us2 the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems2 the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter1 cause and effect1 extension1 space1 time1 motion2 and in a word1 quantity of all kinds1 the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any certainty or evidence4 ,when these topics are displayed in their full light1 as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines2 who can retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime1 so abstruse1 so remote from common life and experience8 ,when the coherence of the parts of a stone1 or even that composition of parts which renders it extended2 when these familiar objects1 ,i say1 are so inexplicable1 and contain circumstances so repugnant and contradictory2 with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds1 or trace their history from eternity to eternity8 ,while ,,philo pronounced these words1 ,i could observe a smile in the countenance both of ,,demea and ,,cleanthes4 ,that of ,,demea seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered3 ,but1 in ,,cleanthes's features1 ,i could distinguish an air of finesse2 as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of ,,philo4 ,you propose then1 ,,philo1 said ,,cleanthes1 to erect religious faith on philosophical scepticism2 and you think1 that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of inquiry1 it will all retire to these theological doctrines1 and there acquire a superior force and authority4 ,whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend1 we shall learn by and by1 when the company breaks up3 ,we shall then see1 whether you go out at the door or the window2 and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity1 or can be injured by its fall2 according to popular opinion1 derived from our fallacious senses1 and more fallacious experience4 ,and this consideration1 ,,demea1 may1 ,i think1 fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics4 ,if they be thoroughly in earnest1 they will not long trouble the world with their doubts1 cavils1 and disputes3 ,if they be only in jest1 they are1 perhaps1 bad raillers2 but can never be very dangerous1 either to the state1 to philosophy1 or to religion4 ,in reality1 ,,philo1 continued he1 it seems certain1 that though a man1 in a flush of humour1 after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason1 may entirely renounce all belief and opinion1 it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism1 or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours4 ,external objects press in upon him2 passions solicit him2 his philosophical melancholy dissipates2 and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able1 during any time1 to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism4 ,and for what reason impose on himself such a violence8 ,this is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself1 consistently with his sceptical principles4 ,so that1 upon the whole1 nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient ,,pyrrhonians2 if in reality they endeavoured1 as is pretended1 to extend1 throughout1 the same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their schools1 and which they ought to have confined to them4 ,in this view1 there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the ,,stoics and ,,pyrrhonians1 though perpetual antagonists2 and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim1 ,that what a man can perform sometimes1 and in some dispositions1 he can perform always1 and in every disposition4 ,when the mind1 by ,stoical reflections1 is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue1 and strongly smit with any species of honour or public good1 the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty2 and it is possible1 perhaps1 by its means1 even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures4 ,if this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality1 much more may a philosopher1 in his school1 or even in his closet1 work himself up to such an enthusiasm1 and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can possibly conceive4 ,but how shall he support this enthusiasm itself8 ,the bent of his mind relaxes1 and cannot be recalled at pleasure2 avocations lead him astray2 misfortunes attack him unawares2 and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian4 ,i allow of your comparison between the ,,stoics and ,,skeptics1 replied ,,philo4 ,but you may observe1 at the same time1 that though the mind cannot1 in ,stoicism1 support the highest flights of philosophy1 yet1 even when it sinks lower1 it still retains somewhat of its former disposition2 and the effects of the ,stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life1 and through the whole tenor of his actions4 ,the ancient schools1 particularly that of ,,zeno1 produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present times4 ,vain ,wisdom all and false ,philosophy4 ,yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm ,pain1 for a while1 or anguish2 and excite ,fallacious ,hope1 or arm the obdurate breast ,with stubborn ,patience1 as with triple steel4 ,in like manner1 if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason1 he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects2 but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning1 ,i dare not say in his common conduct1 he will be found different from those1 who either never formed any opinions in the case1 or have entertained sentiments more favourable to human reason4 ,to whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism1 he must act1 ,i own1 and live1 and converse1 like other men2 and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason1 than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing4 ,if he ever carries his speculations further than this necessity constrains him1 and philosophises either on natural or moral subjects1 he is allured by a certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner4 ,he considers besides1 that every one1 even in common life1 is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy2 that from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning2 that the larger experience we acquire1 and the stronger reason we are endued with1 we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive2 and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind4 ,to philosophise on such subjects1 is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life2 and we may only expect greater stability1 if not greater truth1 from our philosophy1 on account of its exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding4 ,but when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies3 when we carry our speculations into the two eternities1 before and after the present state of things2 into the creation and formation of the universe2 the existence and properties of spirits2 the powers and operations of one universal ,spirit existing without beginning and without end2 omnipotent1 omniscient1 immutable1 infinite1 and incomprehensible3 ,we must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive1 that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties4 ,so long as we confine our speculations to trade1 or morals1 or politics1 or criticism1 we make appeals1 every moment1 to common sense and experience1 which strengthen our philosophical conclusions1 and remove1 at least in part1 the suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined4 ,but1 in theological reasonings1 we have not this advantage2 while1 at the same time1 we are employed upon objects1 which1 we must be sensible1 are too large for our grasp1 and of all others1 require most to be familiarised to our apprehension4 ,we are like foreigners in a strange country1 to whom every thing must seem suspicious1 and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse4 ,we know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject2 since1 even in common life1 and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them1 we cannot account for them1 and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them4 ,all sceptics pretend1 that1 if reason be considered in an abstract view1 it furnishes invincible arguments against itself2 and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance1 on any subject1 were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle1 that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience4 ,but it is evident1 whenever our arguments lose this advantage1 and run wide of common life1 that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them1 and is able to oppose and counterbalance them4 ,the one has no more weight than the other4 ,the mind must remain in suspense between them2 and it is that very suspense or balance1 which is the triumph of scepticism4 ,but ,i observe1 says ,,cleanthes1 with regard to you1 ,,philo1 and all speculative sceptics1 that your doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of common life4 ,wherever evidence discovers itself1 you adhere to it1 notwithstanding your pretended scepticism2 and ,i can observe1 too1 some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of certainty and assurance4 ,in reality1 would not a man be ridiculous1 who pretended to reject ,,newton's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow1 because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light2 a subject1 forsooth1 too refined for human comprehension8 ,and what would you say to one1 who1 having nothing particular to object to the arguments of ,,copernicus and ,,galileo for the motion of the earth1 should withhold his assent1 on that general principle1 that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind8 ,there is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism1 as you well observed1 which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily understand1 and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it4 ,this species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge1 not to religion2 since we find1 that those who make greatest profession of it1 give often their assent1 not only to the great truths of ,theism and natural theology1 but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to them4 ,they firmly believe in witches1 though they will not believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of ,euclid4 ,but the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature4 ,they push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science2 and their assent attends them in every step1 proportioned to the evidence which they meet with4 ,they are even obliged to acknowledge1 that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy4 ,light is in reality anatomised4 ,the true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained4 ,but the nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery4 ,the cohesion of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible4 ,these sceptics1 therefore1 are obliged1 in every question1 to consider each particular evidence apart1 and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs4 ,this is their practice in all natural1 mathematical1 moral1 and political science4 ,and why not the same1 ,i ask1 in the theological and religious8 ,why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason1 without any particular discussion of the evidence8 ,is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion8 ,our senses1 you say1 are fallacious2 our understanding erroneous2 our ideas1 even of the most familiar objects1 extension1 duration1 motion1 full of absurdities and contradictions4 ,you defy me to solve the difficulties1 or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them4 ,i have not capacity for so great an undertaking3 ,i have not leisure for it3 ,i perceive it to be superfluous4 ,your own conduct1 in every circumstance1 refutes your principles1 and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science1 morals1 prudence1 and behaviour4 ,i shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer ,l',arte de penser1 who says1 that the ,sceptics are not a sect of philosophers3 ,they are only a sect of liars4 ,i may1 however1 affirm 7,i hope without offence71 that they are a sect of jesters or raillers4 ,but for my part1 whenever ,i find myself disposed to mirth and amusement1 ,i shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature4 ,a comedy1 a novel1 or at most a history1 seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions4 ,in vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life1 or between one science and another4 ,the arguments employed in all1 if just1 are of a similar nature1 and contain the same force and evidence4 ,or if there be any difference among them1 the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion4 ,many principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning2 yet no man who has any pretensions to science1 even no speculative sceptic1 pretends to entertain the least doubt with regard to them4 ,the ,,copernican system contains the most surprising paradox1 and the most contrary to our natural conceptions1 to appearances1 and to our very senses3 yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to it4 ,and shall ,,philo1 a man of so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge1 entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious hypothesis1 which is founded on the simplest and most obvious arguments1 and1 unless it meets with artificial obstacles1 has such easy access and admission into the mind of man8 ,and here we may observe1 continued he1 turning himself towards ,,demea1 a pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences4 ,after the union of philosophy with the popular religion1 upon the first establishment of ,christianity1 nothing was more usual1 among all religious teachers1 than declamations against reason1 against the senses1 against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry4 ,all the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers2 and thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout ,christendom4 ,the ,reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning1 or rather declamation2 and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith1 were sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural reason4 ,a celebrated prelate ,monsr4 ,huet too1 of the ,romish communion1 a man of the most extensive learning1 who wrote a demonstration of ,christianity1 has also composed a treatise1 which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined ,,pyrrhonism4 ,,locke seems to have been the first ,christian who ventured openly to assert1 that faith was nothing but a species of reason2 that religion was only a branch of philosophy2 and that a chain of arguments1 similar to that which established any truth in morals1 politics1 or physics1 was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology1 natural and revealed4 ,the ill use which ,,bayle and other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and first reformers1 still further propagated the judicious sentiment of ,mr4 ,,locke3 ,and it is now in a manner avowed1 by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy1 that ,atheist and ,sceptic are almost synonymous4 ,and as it is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter principle1 ,i would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain the former4 ,don't you remember1 said ,,philo1 the excellent saying of ,,lord ,,bacon on this head8 ,that a little philosophy1 replied ,,cleanthes1 makes a man an ,atheist3 ,a great deal converts him to religion4 ,that is a very judicious remark too1 said ,,philo4 ,but what ,i have in my eye is another passage1 where1 having mentioned ,,david's fool1 who said in his heart there is no ,god1 this great philosopher observes1 that the ,atheists nowadays have a double share of folly2 for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no ,god1 but they also utter that impiety with their lips1 and are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence4 ,such people1 though they were ever so much in earnest1 cannot1 methinks1 be very formidable4 ,but though you should rank me in this class of fools1 ,i cannot forbear communicating a remark that occurs to me1 from the history of the religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us4 ,it appears to me1 that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair4 ,during ignorant ages1 such as those which followed the dissolution of the ancient schools1 the priests perceived1 that ,atheism1 ,deism1 or heresy of any kind1 could only proceed from the presumptuous questioning of received opinions1 and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing4 ,education had then a mighty influence over the minds of men1 and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and common understanding1 by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed4 ,but at present1 when the influence of education is much diminished1 and men1 from a more open commerce of the world1 have learned to compare the popular principles of different nations and ages1 our sagacious divines have changed their whole system of philosophy1 and talk the language of ,,stoics1 ,,platonists1 and ,,peripatetics1 not that of ,,pyrrhonians and ,,academics4 ,if we distrust human reason1 we have now no other principle to lead us into religion4 ,thus1 sceptics in one age1 dogmatists in another2 whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen1 in giving them an ascendant over mankind1 they are sure to make it their favourite principle1 and established tenet4 ,it is very natural1 said ,,cleanthes1 for men to embrace those principles1 by which they find they can best defend their doctrines2 nor need we have any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient4 ,and1 surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption1 that any set of principles are true1 and ought to be embraced1 than to observe that they tend to the confirmation of true religion1 and serve to confound the cavils of ,atheists1 ,libertines1 and ,freethinkers of all denominations4 ,,part #b ,i must own1 ,,cleanthes1 said ,,demea1 that nothing can more surprise me1 than the light in which you have all along put this argument4 ,by the whole tenor of your discourse1 one would imagine that you were maintaining the ,being of a ,god1 against the cavils of ,atheists and ,infidels2 and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion4 ,but this1 ,i hope1 is not by any means a question among us4 ,no man1 no man at least of common sense1 ,i am persuaded1 ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident4 ,the question is not concerning the being1 but the nature of ,god4 ,this1 ,i affirm1 from the infirmities of human understanding1 to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us4 ,the essence of that supreme ,mind1 his attributes1 the manner of his existence1 the very nature of his duration2 these1 and every particular which regards so divine a ,being1 are mysterious to men4 ,finite1 weak1 and blind creatures1 we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence2 and1 conscious of our frailties1 adore in silence his infinite perfections1 which eye hath not seen1 ear hath not heard1 neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive4 ,they are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity4 ,it is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities4 ,and1 next to the impiety of denying his existence1 is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence1 decrees and attributes4 ,but lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my philosophy1 ,i shall support my opinion1 if it needs any support1 by a very great authority4 ,i might cite all the divines1 almost1 from the foundation of ,christianity1 who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject3 ,but ,i shall confine myself1 at present1 to one equally celebrated for piety and philosophy4 ,it is ,father ,,malebranche1 who1 ,i remember1 thus expresses himself ,recherche de la ,verite4 ,liv4 #c4 ,chap4#i4 ,one ought not so much1 says he1 to call ,god a spirit1 in order to express positively what he is1 as in order to signify that he is not matter4 ,he is a ,being infinitely perfect3 ,of this we cannot doubt4 ,but in the same manner as we ought not to imagine1 even supposing him corporeal1 that he is clothed with a human body1 as the ,,anthropomorphites asserted1 under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any2 so1 neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of ,god has human ideas1 or bears any resemblance to our spirit1 under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind4 ,we ought rather to believe1 that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material4444 he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit1 in the manner we conceive spirit3 ,that his true name is1 ,he that is2 or1 in other words1 ,being without restriction1 ,all ,being1 the ,being infinite and universal4 ,after so great an authority1 ,,demea1 replied ,,philo1 as that which you have produced1 and a thousand more which you might produce1 it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment1 or express my approbation of your doctrine4 ,but surely1 where reasonable men treat these subjects1 the question can never be concerning the ,being1 but only the ,nature1 of the ,deity4 ,the former truth1 as you well observe1 is unquestionable and self-evident4 ,nothing exists without a cause2 and the original cause of this universe 7whatever it be7 we call ,god2 and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection4 ,whoever scruples this fundamental truth1 deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers1 to wit1 the greatest ridicule1 contempt1 and disapprobation4 ,but as all perfection is entirely relative1 we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine ,being1 or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature4 ,wisdom1 ,thought1 ,design1 ,knowledge2 these we justly ascribe to him2 because these words are honourable among men1 and we have no other language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him4 ,but let us beware1 lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections1 or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men4 ,he is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension2 and is more the object of worship in the temple1 than of disputation in the schools4 ,in reality1 ,,cleanthes1 continued he1 there is no need of having recourse to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you1 in order to come at this determination4 ,our ideas reach no further than our experience4 ,we have no experience of divine attributes and operations4 ,i need not conclude my syllogism4 ,you can draw the inference yourself4 ,and it is a pleasure to me 7and ,i hope to you too7 that just reasoning and sound piety here concur in the same conclusion1 and both of them establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the ,supreme ,being4 ,not to lose any time in circumlocutions1 said ,,cleanthes1 addressing himself to ,,demea1 much less in replying to the pious declamations of ,,philo2 ,i shall briefly explain how ,i conceive this matter4 ,look round the world3 contemplate the whole and every part of it3 ,you will find it to be nothing but one great machine1 subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines1 which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain4 ,all these various machines1 and even their most minute parts1 are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them4 ,the curious adapting of means to ends1 throughout all nature1 resembles exactly1 though it much exceeds1 the productions of human contrivance2 of human designs1 thought1 wisdom1 and intelligence4 ,since1 therefore1 the effects resemble each other1 we are led to infer1 by all the rules of analogy1 that the causes also resemble2 and that the ,author of ,nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man1 though possessed of much larger faculties1 proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed4 ,by this argument a posteriori1 and by this argument alone1 do we prove at once the existence of a ,deity1 and his similarity to human mind and intelligence4 ,i shall be so free1 ,,cleanthes1 said ,,demea1 as to tell you1 that from the beginning1 ,i could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the ,deity to men2 still less can ,i approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it4 ,what6 ,no demonstration of the ,being of ,god6 ,no abstract arguments6 ,no proofs a priori6 ,are these1 which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers1 all fallacy1 all sophism8 ,can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability8 ,i will not say that this is betraying the cause of a ,deity3 ,but surely1 by this affected candour1 you give advantages to ,atheists1 which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning4 ,what ,i chiefly scruple in this subject1 said ,,philo1 is not so much that all religious arguments are by ,,cleanthes reduced to experience1 as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind4 ,that a stone will fall1 that fire will burn1 that the earth has solidity1 we have observed a thousand and a thousand times2 and when any new instance of this nature is presented1 we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference4 ,the exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event2 and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after4 ,but wherever you depart1 in the least1 from the similarity of the cases1 you diminish proportionably the evidence2 and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy1 which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty4 ,after having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures1 we make no doubt that it takes place in ,,titius and ,,maevius4 ,but from its circulation in frogs and fishes1 it is only a presumption1 though a strong one1 from analogy1 that it takes place in men and other animals4 ,the analogical reasoning is much weaker1 when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals2 and those1 who hastily followed that imperfect analogy1 are found1 by more accurate experiments1 to have been mistaken4 ,if we see a house1 ,,cleanthes1 we conclude1 with the greatest certainty1 that it had an architect or builder2 because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause4 ,but surely you will not affirm1 that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house1 that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause1 or that the analogy is here entire and perfect4 ,the dissimilitude is so striking1 that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess1 a conjecture1 a presumption concerning a similar cause2 and how that pretension will be received in the world1 ,i leave you to consider4 ,it would surely be very ill received1 replied ,,cleanthes2 and ,i should be deservedly blamed and detested1 did ,i allow1 that the proofs of a ,deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture4 ,but is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance8 ,the economy of final causes8 ,the order1 proportion1 and arrangement of every part8 ,steps of a stair are plainly contrived1 that human legs may use them in mounting2 and this inference is certain and infallible4 ,human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting2 and this inference1 ,i allow1 is not altogether so certain1 because of the dissimilarity which you remark2 but does it1 therefore1 deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture8 ,good ,god6 cried ,,demea1 interrupting him1 where are we8 ,zealous defenders of religion allow1 that the proofs of a ,deity fall short of perfect evidence6 ,and you1 ,,philo1 on whose assistance ,i depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the ,divine ,nature1 do you assent to all these extravagant opinions of ,,cleanthes8 ,for what other name can ,i give them8 or1 why spare my censure1 when such principles are advanced1 supported by such an authority1 before so young a man as ,,pamphilus8 ,you seem not to apprehend1 replied ,,philo1 that ,i argue with ,,cleanthes in his own way2 and1 by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets1 hope at last to reduce him to our opinion4 ,but what sticks most with you1 ,i observe1 is the representation which ,,cleanthes has made of the argument a posteriori2 and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air1 you think it so disguised1 that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light4 ,now1 however much ,i may dissent1 in other respects1 from the dangerous principles of ,,cleanthes1 ,i must allow that he has fairly represented that argument2 and ,i shall endeavour so to state the matter to you1 that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it4 ,were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen1 he would be altogether incapable1 merely from his own ideas1 to determine what kind of scene the universe must be1 or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another4 ,for as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction1 every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing2 nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system1 and rejects the others which are equally possible4 ,again2 after he opens his eyes1 and contemplates the world as it really is1 it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event1 much less of the whole of things1 or of the universe4 ,he might set his fancy a rambling2 and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations4 ,these would all be possible2 but being all equally possible1 he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest4 ,experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon4 ,now1 according to this method of reasoning1 ,,demea1 it follows1 7and is1 indeed1 tacitly allowed by ,,cleanthes himself17 that order1 arrangement1 or the adjustment of final causes1 is not of itself any proof of design2 but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle4 ,for aught we can know a priori1 matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself1 as well as mind does2 and there is no more difficulty in conceiving1 that the several elements1 from an internal unknown cause1 may fall into the most exquisite arrangement1 than to conceive that their ideas1 in the great universal mind1 from a like internal unknown cause1 fall into that arrangement4 ,the equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed4 ,but1 by experience1 we find1 7according to ,,cleanthes71 that there is a difference between them4 ,throw several pieces of steel together1 without shape or form2 they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch4 ,stone1 and mortar1 and wood1 without an architect1 never erect a house4 ,but the ideas in a human mind1 we see1 by an unknown1 inexplicable economy1 arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house4 ,experience1 therefore1 proves1 that there is an original principle of order in mind1 not in matter4 ,from similar effects we infer similar causes4 ,the adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe1 as in a machine of human contrivance4 ,the causes1 therefore1 must be resembling4 ,i was from the beginning scandalised1 ,i must own1 with this resemblance1 which is asserted1 between the ,deity and human creatures2 and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the ,supreme ,being as no sound ,theist could endure4 ,with your assistance1 therefore1 ,,demea1 ,i shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the ,divine ,nature1 and shall refute this reasoning of ,,cleanthes1 provided he allows that ,i have made a fair representation of it4 ,when ,,cleanthes had assented1 ,,philo1 after a short pause1 proceeded in the following manner4 ,that all inferences1 ,,cleanthes1 concerning fact1 are founded on experience2 and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects1 and similar effects similar causes2 ,i shall not at present much dispute with you4 ,but observe1 ,i entreat you1 with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases4 ,unless the cases be exactly similar1 they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon4 ,every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event2 and it requires new experiments to prove certainly1 that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance4 ,a change in bulk1 situation1 arrangement1 age1 disposition of the air1 or surrounding bodies2 any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences3 ,and unless the objects be quite familiar to us1 it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance1 after any of these changes1 an event similar to that which before fell under our observation4 ,the slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here1 if any where1 are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar1 who1 hurried on by the smallest similitude1 are incapable of all discernment or consideration4 ,but can you think1 ,,cleanthes1 that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken1 when you compared to the universe houses1 ships1 furniture1 machines1 and1 from their similarity in some circumstances1 inferred a similarity in their causes8 ,thought1 design1 intelligence1 such as we discover in men and other animals1 is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe1 as well as heat or cold1 attraction or repulsion1 and a hundred others1 which fall under daily observation4 ,it is an active cause1 by which some particular parts of nature1 we find1 produce alterations on other parts4 ,but can a conclusion1 with any propriety1 be transferred from parts to the whole8 ,does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference8 ,from observing the growth of a hair1 can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man8 ,would the manner of a leaf's blowing1 even though perfectly known1 afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree8 ,but1 allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another1 for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin of the whole1 7which never can be admitted17 yet why select so minute1 so weak1 so bounded a principle1 as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet8 ,what peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought1 that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe8 ,our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions2 but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion4 ,so far from admitting1 continued ,,philo1 that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole1 ,i will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part1 if the latter be very remote from the former4 ,is there any reasonable ground to conclude1 that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought1 intelligence1 reason1 or any thing similar to these faculties in men8 ,when nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe1 can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe8 ,and if thought1 as we may well suppose1 be confined merely to this narrow corner1 and has even there so limited a sphere of action1 with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things8 ,the narrow views of a peasant1 who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms1 is in comparison a pardonable sophism4 ,but were we ever so much assured1 that a thought and reason1 resembling the human1 were to be found throughout the whole universe1 and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in this globe2 yet ,i cannot see1 why the operations of a world constituted1 arranged1 adjusted1 can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo state1 and is advancing towards that constitution and arrangement4 ,by observation1 we know somewhat of the economy1 action1 and nourishment of a finished animal2 but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb1 and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent4 ,nature1 we find1 even from our limited experience1 possesses an infinite number of springs and principles1 which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation4 ,and what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe1 we cannot1 without the utmost temerity1 pretend to determine4 ,a very small part of this great system1 during a very short time1 is very imperfectly discovered to us2 and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole8 ,admirable conclusion6 ,stone1 wood1 brick1 iron1 brass1 have not1 at this time1 in this minute globe of earth1 an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance2 therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement1 without something similar to human art4 ,but is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former8 ,is it a rule for the whole8 ,is a very small part a rule for the universe8 ,is nature in one situation1 a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former8 ,and can you blame me1 ,,cleanthes1 if ,i here imitate the prudent reserve of ,,simonides1 who1 according to the noted story1 being asked by ,,hiero1 ,what ,god was8 desired a day to think of it1 and then two days more2 and after that manner continually prolonged the term1 without ever bringing in his definition or description8 ,could you even blame me1 if ,i had answered at first1 that ,i did not know1 and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties8 ,you might cry out sceptic and railler1 as much as you pleased3 but having found1 in so many other subjects much more familiar1 the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason1 ,i never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures1 in a subject so sublime1 and so remote from the sphere of our observation4 ,when two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together1 ,i can infer1 by custom1 the existence of one wherever ,i see the existence of the other2 and this ,i call an argument from experience4 ,but how this argument can have place1 where the objects1 as in the present case1 are single1 individual1 without parallel1 or specific resemblance1 may be difficult to explain4 ,and will any man tell me with a serious countenance1 that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human1 because we have experience of it8 ,to ascertain this reasoning1 it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds2 and it is not sufficient1 surely1 that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance444 ,,philo was proceeding in this vehement manner1 somewhat between jest and earnest1 as it appeared to me1 when he observed some signs of impatience in ,,cleanthes1 and then immediately stopped short4 ,what ,i had to suggest1 said ,,cleanthes1 is only that you would not abuse terms1 or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings4 ,you know1 that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience1 even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence2 though it is found1 where that reason is properly analysed1 that it is nothing but a species of experience4 ,to prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind1 is not more contrary to common speech1 than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle4 ,and a caviller might raise all the same objections to the ,copernican system1 which you have urged against my reasonings4 ,have you other earths1 might he say1 which you have seen to move8 ,have444 ,yes6 cried ,,philo1 interrupting him1 we have other earths4 ,is not the moon another earth1 which we see to turn round its centre8 ,is not ,venus another earth1 where we observe the same phenomenon8 ,are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation1 from analogy1 of the same theory8 ,all the planets1 are they not earths1 which revolve about the sun8 ,are not the satellites moons1 which move round ,jupiter and ,saturn1 and along with these primary planets round the sun8 ,these analogies and resemblances1 with others which ,i have not mentioned1 are the sole proofs of the ,,copernican system2 and to you it belongs to consider1 whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory4 ,in reality1 ,,cleanthes1 continued he1 the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers1 and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education1 that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded4 ,it is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject1 who had the full force of prejudice to encounter1 and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing4 ,but if we peruse ,,galileo's famous ,dialogues concerning the system of the world1 we shall find1 that that great genius1 one of the sublimest that ever existed1 first bent all his endeavours to prove1 that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances4 ,the schools1 proceeding from the illusions of sense1 had carried this distinction very far2 and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable1 incorruptible1 unalterable1 impassable2 and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former4 ,but ,,galileo1 beginning with the moon1 proved its similarity in every particular to the earth2 its convex figure1 its natural darkness when not illuminated1 its density1 its distinction into solid and liquid1 the variations of its phases1 the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon1 their mutual eclipses1 the inequalities of the lunar surface1 c4 ,after many instances of this kind1 with regard to all the planets1 men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience2 and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other4 ,in this cautious proceeding of the astronomers1 you may read your own condemnation1 ,,cleanthes2 or rather may see1 that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry4 ,can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house1 and the generation of a universe8 ,have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements8 ,have worlds ever been formed under your eye2 and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon1 from the first appearance of order to its final consummation8 ,if you have1 then cite your experience1 and deliver your theory4 ,,part #c ,how the most absurd argument1 replied ,,cleanthes1 in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention1 may acquire an air of probability6 ,are you not aware1 ,,philo1 that it became necessary for ,copernicus and his first disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial matter2 because several philosophers1 blinded by old systems1 and supported by some sensible appearances1 had denied this similarity8 but that it is by no means necessary1 that ,theists should prove the similarity of the works of ,nature to those of ,art2 because this similarity is self-evident and undeniable8 ,the same matter1 a like form2 what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes1 and to ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention8 ,your objections1 ,i must freely tell you1 are no better than the abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied motion2 and ought to be refuted in the same manner1 by illustrations1 examples1 and instances1 rather than by serious argument and philosophy4 ,suppose1 therefore1 that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds1 much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach3 ,suppose1 that this voice were extended in the same instant over all nations1 and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect3 ,suppose1 that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning1 but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent ,being1 superior to mankind3 ,could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice8 and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose8 ,yet ,i cannot see but all the same objections 7if they merit that appellation7 which lie against the system of ,theism1 may also be produced against this inference4 ,might you not say1 that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience3 that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark1 and thence infer a man1 it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause3 but that this extraordinary voice1 by its loudness1 extent1 and flexibility to all languages1 bears so little analogy to any human voice1 that we have no reason to suppose any analogy in their causes3 and consequently1 that a rational1 wise1 coherent speech proceeded1 you know not whence1 from some accidental whistling of the winds1 not from any divine reason or intelligence8 ,you see clearly your own objections in these cavils1 and ,i hope too you see clearly1 that they cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other4 ,but to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe1 ,i shall make two suppositions1 which imply not any absurdity or impossibility4 ,suppose that there is a natural1 universal1 invariable language1 common to every individual of human race2 and that books are natural productions1 which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables1 by descent and propagation4 ,several expressions of our passions contain a universal language3 all brute animals have a natural speech1 which1 however limited1 is very intelligible to their own species4 ,and as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in the finest composition of eloquence1 than in the coarsest organised body1 the propagation of an ,iliad or ,aeneid is an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal4 ,suppose1 therefore1 that you enter into your library1 thus peopled by natural volumes1 containing the most refined reason and most exquisite beauty2 could you possibly open one of them1 and doubt1 that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence8 ,when it reasons and discourses2 when it expostulates1 argues1 and enforces its views and topics2 when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect1 sometimes to the affections2 when it collects1 disposes1 and adorns every consideration suited to the subject2 could you persist in asserting1 that all this1 at the bottom1 had really no meaning2 and that the first formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design8 ,your obstinacy1 ,i know1 reaches not that degree of firmness3 even your sceptical play and wantonness would be abashed at so glaring an absurdity4 ,but if there be any difference1 ,,philo1 between this supposed case and the real one of the universe1 it is all to the advantage of the latter4 ,the anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal of ,,livy or ,,tacitus2 and any objection which you start in the former case1 by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds1 the same objection has place on the supposition of our vegetating library4 ,choose1 then1 your party1 ,,philo1 without ambiguity or evasion2 assert either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause1 or admit of a similar cause to all the works of nature4 ,let me here observe too1 continued ,,cleanthes1 that this religious argument1 instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected by you1 rather acquires force from it1 and becomes more firm and undisputed4 ,to exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind1 is either affectation or madness4 ,the declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse1 remote1 and refined arguments2 to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature2 and to assent1 wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot1 without the greatest violence1 prevent it4 ,now the arguments for ,natural ,religion are plainly of this kind2 and nothing but the most perverse1 obstinate metaphysics can reject them4 ,consider1 anatomise the eye2 survey its structure and contrivance2 and tell me1 from your own feeling1 if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation4 ,the most obvious conclusion1 surely1 is in favour of design2 and it requires time1 reflection1 and study1 to summon up those frivolous1 though abstruse objections1 which can support ,infidelity4 ,who can behold the male and female of each species1 the correspondence of their parts and instincts1 their passions1 and whole course of life before and after generation1 but must be sensible1 that the propagation of the species is intended by ,nature8 ,millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe2 and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning1 than the curious adjustment of final causes4 ,to what degree1 therefore1 of blind dogmatism must one have attained1 to reject such natural and such convincing arguments8 ,some beauties in writing we may meet with1 which seem contrary to rules1 and which gain the affections1 and animate the imagination1 in opposition to all the precepts of criticism1 and to the authority of the established masters of art4 ,and if the argument for ,theism be1 as you pretend1 contradictory to the principles of logic2 its universal1 its irresistible influence proves clearly1 that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature4 ,whatever cavils may be urged1 an orderly world1 as well as a coherent1 articulate speech1 will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention4 ,it sometimes happens1 ,i own1 that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian2 not because they are obscure and difficult1 but because he never asks himself any question with regard to them4 ,whence arises the curious structure of an animal8 ,from the copulation of its parents4 ,and these whence8 ,from their parents8 ,a few removes set the objects at such a distance1 that to him they are lost in darkness and confusion2 nor is he actuated by any curiosity to trace them further4 ,but this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism1 but stupidity3 a state of mind very different from your sifting1 inquisitive disposition1 my ingenious friend4 ,you can trace causes from effects3 ,you can compare the most distant and remote objects3 and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention1 but from too luxuriant a fertility1 which suppresses your natural good sense1 by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections4 ,here ,i could observe1 ,,hermippus1 that ,,philo was a little embarrassed and confounded3 ,but while he hesitated in delivering an answer1 luckily for him1 ,,demea broke in upon the discourse1 and saved his countenance4 ,your instance1 ,,cleanthes1 said he1 drawn from books and language1 being familiar1 has1 ,i confess1 so much more force on that account3 but is there not some danger too in this very circumstance2 and may it not render us presumptuous1 by making us imagine we comprehend the ,deity1 and have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes8 ,when ,i read a volume1 ,i enter into the mind and intention of the author3 ,i become him1 in a manner1 for the instant2 and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while employed in that composition4 ,but so near an approach we never surely can make to the ,deity4 ,his ways are not our ways4 ,his attributes are perfect1 but incomprehensible4 ,and this volume of nature contains a great and inexplicable riddle1 more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning4 ,the ancient ,,platonists1 you know1 were the most religious and devout of all the ,pagan philosophers2 yet many of them1 particularly ,,plotinus1 expressly declare1 that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed to the ,deity2 and that our most perfect worship of him consists1 not in acts of veneration1 reverence1 gratitude1 or love2 but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation1 or total extinction of all our faculties4 ,these ideas are1 perhaps1 too far stretched2 but still it must be acknowledged1 that1 by representing the ,deity as so intelligible and comprehensible1 and so similar to a human mind1 we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality1 and make ourselves the model of the whole universe4 ,all the sentiments of the human mind1 gratitude1 resentment1 love1 friendship1 approbation1 blame1 pity1 emulation1 envy1 have a plain reference to the state and situation of man1 and are calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances4 ,it seems1 therefore1 unreasonable to transfer such sentiments to a supreme existence1 or to suppose him actuated by them2 and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a theory4 ,all our ideas1 derived from the senses1 are confessedly false and illusive2 and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence3 ,and as the ideas of internal sentiment1 added to those of the external senses1 compose the whole furniture of human understanding1 we may conclude1 that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence4 ,now1 as to the manner of thinking2 how can we make any comparison between them1 or suppose them any wise resembling8 ,our thought is fluctuating1 uncertain1 fleeting1 successive1 and compounded2 and were we to remove these circumstances1 we absolutely annihilate its essence1 and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason4 ,at least if it appear more pious and respectful 7as it really is7 still to retain these terms1 when we mention the ,supreme ,being1 we ought to acknowledge1 that their meaning1 in that case1 is totally incomprehensible2 and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the ,divine attributes4 ,,part #d ,it seems strange to me1 said ,,cleanthes1 that you1 ,,demea1 who are so sincere in the cause of religion1 should still maintain the mysterious1 incomprehensible nature of the ,deity1 and should insist so strenuously that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures4 ,the ,deity1 ,i can readily allow1 possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension3 ,but if our ideas1 so far as they go1 be not just1 and adequate1 and correspondent to his real nature1 ,i know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on4 ,is the name1 without any meaning1 of such mighty importance8 ,or how do you mystics1 who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the ,deity1 differ from ,sceptics or ,atheists1 who assert1 that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible8 ,their temerity must be very great1 if1 after rejecting the production by a mind1 ,i mean a mind resembling the human1 7for ,i know of no other17 they pretend to assign1 with certainty1 any other specific intelligible cause3 ,and their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed1 if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a ,god or ,deity2 and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you shall please to require of them4 ,who could imagine1 replied ,,demea1 that ,,cleanthes1 the calm philosophical ,,cleanthes1 would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname to them2 and1 like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age1 have recourse to invective and declamation1 instead of reasoning8 ,or does he not perceive1 that these topics are easily retorted1 and that ,anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious1 and implies as dangerous consequences1 as the epithet of ,mystic1 with which he has honoured us8 ,in reality1 ,,cleanthes1 consider what it is you assert when you represent the ,deity as similar to a human mind and understanding4 ,what is the soul of man8 ,a composition of various faculties1 passions1 sentiments1 ideas2 united1 indeed1 into one self or person1 but still distinct from each other4 ,when it reasons1 the ideas1 which are the parts of its discourse1 arrange themselves in a certain form or order2 which is not preserved entire for a moment1 but immediately gives place to another arrangement4 ,new opinions1 new passions1 new affections1 new feelings arise1 which continually diversify the mental scene1 and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable4 ,how is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true ,theists ascribe to the ,deity8 ,by the same act1 say they1 he sees past1 present1 and future3 ,his love and hatred1 his mercy and justice1 are one individual operation3 ,he is entire in every point of space2 and complete in every instant of duration4 ,no succession1 no change1 no acquisition1 no diminution4 ,what he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or diversity4 ,and what he is this moment he ever has been1 and ever will be1 without any new judgement1 sentiment1 or operation4 ,he stands fixed in one simple1 perfect state3 nor can you ever say1 with any propriety1 that this act of his is different from that other2 or that this judgement or idea has been lately formed1 and will give place1 by succession1 to any different judgement or idea4 ,i can readily allow1 said ,,cleanthes1 that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the ,supreme ,being1 to the extent in which you have explained it1 are complete ,mystics1 and chargeable with all the consequences which ,i have drawn from their opinion4 ,they are1 in a word1 ,atheists1 without knowing it4 ,for though it be allowed1 that the ,deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension1 yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential to him4 ,a mind1 whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive2 one1 that is wholly simple1 and totally immutable1 is a mind which has no thought1 no reason1 no will1 no sentiment1 no love1 no hatred2 or1 in a word1 is no mind at all4 ,it is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation2 and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure1 or of number without composition4 ,pray consider1 said ,,philo1 whom you are at present inveighing against4 ,you are honouring with the appellation of ,atheist all the sound1 orthodox divines1 almost1 who have treated of this subject2 and you will at last be1 yourself1 found1 according to your reckoning1 the only sound ,theist in the world4 ,but if idolaters be ,atheists1 as1 ,i think1 may justly be asserted1 and ,christian ,theologians the same1 what becomes of the argument1 so much celebrated1 derived from the universal consent of mankind8 ,but because ,i know you are not much swayed by names and authorities1 ,i shall endeavour to show you1 a little more distinctly1 the inconveniences of that ,anthropomorphism1 which you have embraced2 and shall prove1 that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the ,divine mind1 consisting of distinct ideas1 differently arranged1 in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute4 ,it is not easy1 ,i own1 to see what is gained by this supposition1 whether we judge of the matter by ,reason or by ,experience4 ,we are still obliged to mount higher1 in order to find the cause of this cause1 which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive4 ,if ,reason 7,i mean abstract reason1 derived from inquiries a priori7 be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect1 this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce1 ,that a mental world1 or universe of ideas1 requires a cause as much1 as does a material world1 or universe of objects2 and1 if similar in its arrangement1 must require a similar cause4 ,for what is there in this subject1 which should occasion a different conclusion or inference8 ,in an abstract view1 they are entirely alike2 and no difficulty attends the one supposition1 which is not common to both of them4 ,again1 when we will needs force ,experience to pronounce some sentence1 even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere1 neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular1 between these two kinds of worlds2 but finds them to be governed by similar principles1 and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations4 ,we have specimens in miniature of both of them4 ,our own mind resembles the one2 a vegetable or animal body the other4 ,let experience1 therefore1 judge from these samples4 ,nothing seems more delicate1 with regard to its causes1 than thought2 and as these causes never operate in two persons after the same manner1 so we never find two persons who think exactly alike4 ,nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time4 ,a difference of age1 of the disposition of his body1 of weather1 of food1 of company1 of books1 of passions2 any of these particulars1 or others more minute1 are sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought1 and communicate to it very different movements and operations4 ,as far as we can judge1 vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions1 nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles4 ,how1 therefore1 shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that ,being whom you suppose the ,author of ,nature1 or1 according to your system of ,anthropomorphism1 the ideal world1 into which you trace the material8 ,have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world1 or new intelligent principle8 ,but if we stop1 and go no further2 why go so far8 why not stop at the material world8 ,how can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum8 ,and1 after all1 what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression8 ,let us remember the story of the ,indian philosopher and his elephant4 ,it was never more applicable than to the present subject4 ,if the material world rests upon a similar ideal world1 this ideal world must rest upon some other2 and so on1 without end4 ,it were better1 therefore1 never to look beyond the present material world4 ,by supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself1 we really assert it to be ,god2 and the sooner we arrive at that ,divine ,being1 so much the better4 ,when you go one step beyond the mundane system1 you only excite an inquisitive humour which it is impossible ever to satisfy4 ,to say1 that the different ideas which compose the reason of the ,supreme ,being1 fall into order of themselves1 and by their own nature1 is really to talk without any precise meaning4 ,if it has a meaning1 ,i would fain know1 why it is not as good sense to say1 that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature4 ,can the one opinion be intelligible1 while the other is not so8 ,we have1 indeed1 experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves1 and without any known cause4 ,but1 ,i am sure1 we have a much larger experience of matter which does the same2 as1 in all instances of generation and vegetation1 where the accurate analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension4 ,we have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter which have no order2 of the first in madness1 of the second in corruption4 ,why1 then1 should we think1 that order is more essential to one than the other8 ,and if it requires a cause in both1 what do we gain by your system1 in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas8 ,the first step which we make leads us on for ever4 ,it were1 therefore1 wise in us to limit all our inquiries to the present world1 without looking further4 ,no satisfaction can ever be attained by these speculations1 which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human understanding4 ,it was usual with the ,,peripatetics1 you know1 ,,cleanthes1 when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded1 to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities2 and to say1 for instance1 that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty1 and senna purged by its purgative4 ,but it has been discovered1 that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of ignorance2 and that these philosophers1 though less ingenuous1 really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar1 who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena4 ,in like manner1 when it is asked1 what cause produces order in the ideas of the ,supreme ,being2 can any other reason be assigned by you1 ,anthropomorphites1 than that it is a rational faculty1 and that such is the nature of the ,deity8 ,but why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the order of the world1 without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on1 may be difficult to determine4 ,it is only to say1 that such is the nature of material objects1 and that they are all originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion4 ,these are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance2 nor has the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other1 except in its greater conformity to vulgar prejudices4 ,you have displayed this argument with great emphasis1 replied ,,cleanthes3 ,you seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it4 ,even in common life1 if ,i assign a cause for any event1 is it any objection1 ,,philo1 that ,i cannot assign the cause of that cause1 and answer every new question which may incessantly be started8 ,and what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule8 philosophers1 who confess ultimate causes to be totally unknown2 and are sensible1 that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena1 are still to them as inexplicable as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar4 ,the order and arrangement of nature1 the curious adjustment of final causes1 the plain use and intention of every part and organ2 all these bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author4 ,the heavens and the earth join in the same testimony3 ,the whole chorus of ,nature raises one hymn to the praises of its ,creator4 ,you alone1 or almost alone1 disturb this general harmony4 ,you start abstruse doubts1 cavils1 and objections3 ,you ask me1 what is the cause of this cause8 ,i know not2 ,i care not2 that concerns not me4 ,i have found a ,deity2 and here ,i stop my inquiry4 ,let those go further1 who are wiser or more enterprising4 ,i pretend to be neither1 replied ,,philo3 ,and for that very reason1 ,i should never perhaps have attempted to go so far2 especially when ,i am sensible1 that ,i must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer1 which1 without further trouble1 might have satisfied me from the beginning4 ,if ,i am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes1 and can absolutely give an explication of nothing1 ,i shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty1 which1 you acknowledge1 must immediately1 in its full force1 recur upon me4 ,naturalists indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes1 though these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable2 but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause1 which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself4 ,an ideal system1 arranged of itself1 without a precedent design1 is not a whit more explicable than a material one1 which attains its order in a like manner2 nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former4 ,,part #e ,but to show you still more inconveniences1 continued ,,philo1 in your ,anthropomorphism1 please to take a new survey of your principles4 ,like effects prove like causes4 ,this is the experimental argument2 and this1 you say too1 is the sole theological argument4 ,now1 it is certain1 that the liker the effects are which are seen1 and the liker the causes which are inferred1 the stronger is the argument4 ,every departure on either side diminishes the probability1 and renders the experiment less conclusive4 ,you cannot doubt of the principle2 neither ought you to reject its consequences4 ,all the new discoveries in astronomy1 which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of ,nature1 are so many additional arguments for a ,deity1 according to the true system of ,theism2 but1 according to your hypothesis of experimental ,theism1 they become so many objections1 by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance4 ,for1 if ,,lucretius,lib4 ,,ii4 #ajid1 even following the old system of the world1 could exclaim1 ,quis regere immensi summam1 quis habere profundi ,indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas8 ,quis pariter coelos omnes convertere8 et omnes ,ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces8 ,omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto8 ,if ,,tully ,de4 nat4 ,deor4 ,lib4 ,i esteemed this reasoning so natural1 as to put it into the mouth of his ,,epicurean3 ,quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester ,plato fabricam illam tanti operis1 qua construi a ,deo atque aedificari mundum facit8 quae molitio8 quae ferramenta8 qui vectes8 quae machinae8 qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt8 quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer1 ignis1 aqua1 terra potuerunt8 ,if this argument1 ,i say1 had any force in former ages1 how much greater must it have at present1 when the bounds of ,nature are so infinitely enlarged1 and such a magnificent scene is opened to us8 ,it is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention4 ,the discoveries by microscopes1 as they open a new universe in miniature1 are still objections1 according to you1 arguments1 according to me4 ,the further we push our researches of this kind1 we are still led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind1 or from any object of human experience and observation4 ,and what say you to the discoveries in anatomy1 chemistry1 botany8444 ,these surely are no objections1 replied ,,cleanthes2 they only discover new instances of art and contrivance4 ,it is still the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects4 ,add1 a mind like the human1 said ,,philo4 ,i know of no other1 replied ,,cleanthes4 ,and the liker the better1 insisted ,,philo4 ,to be sure1 said ,,cleanthes4 ,now1 ,,cleanthes1 said ,,philo1 with an air of alacrity and triumph1 mark the consequences4 ,first1 ,by this method of reasoning1 you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the ,deity4 ,for1 as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect1 and the effect1 so far as it falls under our cognisance1 is not infinite2 what pretensions have we1 upon your suppositions1 to ascribe that attribute to the ,divine ,being8 ,you will still insist1 that1 by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures1 we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis1 and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence4 ,secondly1 ,you have no reason1 on your theory1 for ascribing perfection to the ,deity1 even in his finite capacity1 or for supposing him free from every error1 mistake1 or incoherence1 in his undertakings4 ,there are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of ,nature1 which1 if we allow a perfect author to be proved a priori1 are easily solved1 and become only seeming difficulties1 from the narrow capacity of man1 who cannot trace infinite relations4 ,but according to your method of reasoning1 these difficulties become all real2 and perhaps will be insisted on1 as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance4 ,at least1 you must acknowledge1 that it is impossible for us to tell1 from our limited views1 whether this system contains any great faults1 or deserves any considerable praise1 if compared to other possible1 and even real systems4 ,could a peasant1 if the ,aeneid were read to him1 pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless1 or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit1 he1 who had never seen any other production8 ,but were this world ever so perfect a production1 it must still remain uncertain1 whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman4 ,if we survey a ship1 what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated1 useful1 and beautiful a machine8 ,and what surprise must we feel1 when we find him a stupid mechanic1 who imitated others1 and copied an art1 which1 through a long succession of ages1 after multiplied trials1 mistakes1 corrections1 deliberations1 and controversies1 had been gradually improving8 ,many worlds might have been botched and bungled1 throughout an eternity1 ere this system was struck out2 much labour lost1 many fruitless trials made2 and a slow1 but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making4 ,in such subjects1 who can determine1 where the truth2 nay1 who can conjecture where the probability lies1 amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed1 and a still greater which may be imagined8 ,and what shadow of an argument1 continued ,,philo1 can you produce1 from your hypothesis1 to prove the unity of the ,deity8 ,a great number of men join in building a house or ship1 in rearing a city1 in framing a commonwealth2 why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world8 ,this is only so much greater similarity to human affairs4 ,by sharing the work among several1 we may so much further limit the attributes of each1 and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge1 which must be supposed in one deity1 and which1 according to you1 can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence4 ,and if such foolish1 such vicious creatures as man1 can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan1 how much more those deities or demons1 whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect6 ,to multiply causes without necessity1 is indeed contrary to true philosophy3 but this principle applies not to the present case4 ,were one deity antecedently proved by your theory1 who were possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe2 it would be needless1 ,i own1 7though not absurd17 to suppose any other deity existent4 ,but while it is still a question1 ,whether all these attributes are united in one subject1 or dispersed among several independent beings1 by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy8 ,where we see a body raised in a scale1 we are sure that there is in the opposite scale1 however concealed from sight1 some counterpoising weight equal to it2 but it is still allowed to doubt1 whether that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies1 or one uniform united mass4 ,and if the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body1 the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural4 ,an intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe1 or1 to speak in the language of ancient philosophy1 so prodigious an animal exceeds all analogy1 and even comprehension4 ,but further1 ,,cleanthes3 men are mortal1 and renew their species by generation2 and this is common to all living creatures4 ,the two great sexes of male and female1 says ,,milton1 animate the world4 ,why must this circumstance1 so universal1 so essential1 be excluded from those numerous and limited deities8 ,behold1 then1 the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us4 ,and why not become a perfect ,anthropomorphite8 ,why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal1 and to have eyes1 a nose1 mouth1 ears1 c48 ,,epicurus maintained1 that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure2 therefore the gods must have a human figure4 ,and this argument1 which is deservedly so much ridiculed by ,,cicero1 becomes1 according to you1 solid and philosophical4 ,in a word1 ,,cleanthes1 a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert1 or conjecture1 that the universe1 sometime1 arose from something like design3 but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance2 and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis4 ,this world1 for aught he knows1 is very faulty and imperfect1 compared to a superior standard2 and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity1 who afterwards abandoned it1 ashamed of his lame performance3 it is the work only of some dependent1 inferior deity2 and is the object of derision to his superiors3 it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity2 and ever since his death1 has run on at adventures1 from the first impulse and active force which it received from him4 ,you justly give signs of horror1 ,,demea1 at these strange suppositions2 but these1 and a thousand more of the same kind1 are ,,cleanthes's suppositions1 not mine4 ,from the moment the attributes of the ,deity are supposed finite1 all these have place4 ,and ,i cannot1 for my part1 think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is1 in any respect1 preferable to none at all4 ,these suppositions ,i absolutely disown1 cried ,,cleanthes3 they strike me1 however1 with no horror1 especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you4 ,on the contrary1 they give me pleasure1 when ,i see1 that1 by the utmost indulgence of your imagination1 you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe1 but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it4 ,to this concession ,i adhere steadily2 and this ,i regard as a sufficient foundation for religion4 ,,part #f ,it must be a slight fabric1 indeed1 said ,,demea1 which can be erected on so tottering a foundation4 ,while we are uncertain whether there is one deity or many2 whether the deity or deities1 to whom we owe our existence1 be perfect or imperfect1 subordinate or supreme1 dead or alive1 what trust or confidence can we repose in them8 ,what devotion or worship address to them8 ,what veneration or obedience pay them8 ,to all the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless3 and even with regard to speculative consequences1 its uncertainty1 according to you1 must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory4 ,to render it still more unsatisfactory1 said ,,philo1 there occurs to me another hypothesis1 which must acquire an air of probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by ,,cleanthes4 ,that like effects arise from like causes3 this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion4 ,but there is another principle of the same kind1 no less certain1 and derived from the same source of experience2 that where several known circumstances are observed to be similar1 the unknown will also be found similar4 ,thus1 if we see the limbs of a human body1 we conclude that it is also attended with a human head1 though hid from us4 ,thus1 if we see1 through a chink in a wall1 a small part of the sun1 we conclude1 that1 were the wall removed1 we should see the whole body4 ,in short1 this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar1 that no scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity4 ,now1 if we survey the universe1 so far as it falls under our knowledge1 it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body1 and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion4 ,a continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder3 a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired3 the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system3 and each part or member1 in performing its proper offices1 operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole4 ,the world1 therefore1 ,i infer1 is an animal2 and the ,deity is the ,,soul of the world1 actuating it1 and actuated by it4 ,you have too much learning1 ,,cleanthes1 to be at all surprised at this opinion1 which1 you know1 was maintained by almost all the ,theists of antiquity1 and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings4 ,for though1 sometimes1 the ancient philosophers reason from final causes1 as if they thought the world the workmanship of ,god2 yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body1 whose organisation renders it subservient to him4 ,and it must be confessed1 that1 as the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance1 if our limited analogy could ever1 with any propriety1 be extended to the whole of nature1 the inference seems juster in favour of the ancient than the modern theory4 ,there are many other advantages1 too1 in the former theory1 which recommended it to the ancient theologians4 ,nothing more repugnant to all their notions1 because nothing more repugnant to common experience1 than mind without body2 a mere spiritual substance1 which fell not under their senses nor comprehension1 and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature4 ,mind and body they knew1 because they felt both3 an order1 arrangement1 organisation1 or internal machinery1 in both1 they likewise knew1 after the same manner3 and it could not but seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe2 and to suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval1 and to have1 both of them1 order and arrangement naturally inherent in them1 and inseparable from them4 ,here1 therefore1 is a new species of ,anthropomorphism1 ,,cleanthes1 on which you may deliberate2 and a theory which seems not liable to any considerable difficulties4 ,you are too much superior1 surely1 to systematical prejudices1 to find any more difficulty in supposing an animal body to be1 originally1 of itself1 or from unknown causes1 possessed of order and organisation1 than in supposing a similar order to belong to mind4 ,but the vulgar prejudice1 that body and mind ought always to accompany each other1 ought not1 one should think1 to be entirely neglected2 since it is founded on vulgar experience1 the only guide which you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries4 ,and if you assert1 that our limited experience is an unequal standard1 by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature2 you entirely abandon your own hypothesis1 and must thenceforward adopt our ,mysticism1 as you call it1 and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the ,divine ,nature4 ,this theory1 ,i own1 replied ,,cleanthes1 has never before occurred to me1 though a pretty natural one2 and ,i cannot readily1 upon so short an examination and reflection1 deliver any opinion with regard to it4 ,you are very scrupulous1 indeed1 said ,,philo3 were ,i to examine any system of yours1 ,i should not have acted with half that caution and reserve1 in starting objections and difficulties to it4 ,however1 if any thing occur to you1 you will oblige us by proposing it4 ,why then1 replied ,,cleanthes1 it seems to me1 that1 though the world does1 in many circumstances1 resemble an animal body2 yet is the analogy also defective in many circumstances the most material3 no organs of sense2 no seat of thought or reason2 no one precise origin of motion and action4 ,in short1 it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal1 and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the soul of the world4 ,but1 in the next place1 your theory seems to imply the eternity of the world2 and that is a principle1 which1 ,i think1 can be refuted by the strongest reasons and probabilities4 ,i shall suggest an argument to this purpose1 which1 ,i believe1 has not been insisted on by any writer4 ,those1 who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences1 though their inference wants not force1 may perhaps be refuted by considerations derived from the nature of human society1 which is in continual revolution1 between ignorance and knowledge1 liberty and slavery1 riches and poverty2 so that it is impossible for us1 from our limited experience1 to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be expected4 ,ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations2 and had these convulsions continued a little longer1 or been a little more violent1 we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a few centuries before us4 ,nay1 were it not for the superstition of the ,popes1 who preserved a little jargon of ,latin1 in order to support the appearance of an ancient and universal church1 that tongue must have been utterly lost2 in which case1 the ,western world1 being totally barbarous1 would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the ,,greek language and learning1 which was conveyed to them after the sacking of ,,constantinople4 ,when learning and books had been extinguished1 even the mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay2 and it is easily imagined1 that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later origin than the true one4 ,this vulgar argument1 therefore1 against the eternity of the world1 seems a little precarious4 ,but here appears to be the foundation of a better argument4 ,,lucullus was the first that brought cherry-trees from ,,asia to ,,europe2 though that tree thrives so well in many ,,european climates1 that it grows in the woods without any culture4 ,is it possible1 that throughout a whole eternity1 no ,,european had ever passed into ,,asia1 and thought of transplanting so delicious a fruit into his own country8 ,or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated1 how could it ever afterwards perish8 ,empires may rise and fall1 liberty and slavery succeed alternately1 ignorance and knowledge give place to each other2 but the cherry-tree will still remain in the woods of ,,greece1 ,,spain1 and ,,italy1 and will never be affected by the revolutions of human society4 ,it is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into ,,france1 though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them4 ,it is not three centuries since horses1 cows1 sheep1 swine1 dogs1 corn1 were known in ,,america4 ,is it possible1 that during the revolutions of a whole eternity1 there never arose a ,,columbus1 who might open the communication between ,,europe and that continent8 ,we may as well imagine1 that all men would wear stockings for ten thousand years1 and never have the sense to think of garters to tie them4 ,all these seem convincing proofs of the youth1 or rather infancy1 of the world2 as being founded on the operation of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society is governed and directed4 ,nothing less than a total convulsion of the elements will ever destroy all the ,,european animals and vegetables which are now to be found in the ,western world4 ,and what argument have you against such convulsions8 replied ,,philo4 ,strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole earth1 that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely covered with water4 ,and though order were supposed inseparable from matter1 and inherent in it2 yet may matter be susceptible of many and great revolutions1 through the endless periods of eternal duration4 ,the incessant changes1 to which every part of it is subject1 seem to intimate some such general transformations2 though1 at the same time1 it is observable1 that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever had experience1 are but passages from one state of order to another2 nor can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion4 ,what we see in the parts1 we may infer in the whole2 at least1 that is the method of reasoning on which you rest your whole theory4 ,and were ,i obliged to defend any particular system of this nature1 which ,i never willingly should do1 ,i esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an eternal inherent principle of order to the world1 though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations4 ,this at once solves all difficulties2 and if the solution1 by being so general1 is not entirely complete and satisfactory1 it is at least a theory that we must sooner or later have recourse to1 whatever system we embrace4 ,how could things have been as they are1 were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere1 in thought or in matter8 ,and it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference4 ,chance has no place1 on any hypothesis1 sceptical or religious4 ,every thing is surely governed by steady1 inviolable laws4 ,and were the inmost essence of things laid open to us1 we should then discover a scene1 of which1 at present1 we can have no idea4 ,instead of admiring the order of natural beings1 we should clearly see that it was absolutely impossible for them1 in the smallest article1 ever to admit of any other disposition4 ,were any one inclined to revive the ancient ,pagan ,theology1 which maintained1 as we learn from ,,hesiod1 that this globe was governed by #cj1jjj deities1 who arose from the unknown powers of nature3 you would naturally object1 ,,cleanthes1 that nothing is gained by this hypothesis2 and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals1 beings more numerous1 but less perfect1 to have sprung immediately from a like origin4 ,push the same inference a step further1 and you will find a numerous society of deities as explicable as one universal deity1 who possesses within himself the powers and perfections of the whole society4 ,all these systems1 then1 of ,scepticism1 ,polytheism1 and ,theism1 you must allow1 on your principles1 to be on a like footing1 and that no one of them has any advantage over the others4 ,you may thence learn the fallacy of your principles4 ,,part #g ,but here1 continued ,,philo1 in examining the ancient system of the soul of the world1 there strikes me1 all on a sudden1 a new idea1 which1 if just1 must go near to subvert all your reasoning1 and destroy even your first inferences1 on which you repose such confidence4 ,if the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables1 than to the works of human art1 it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the former than that of the latter1 and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation1 than to reason or design4 ,your conclusion1 even according to your own principles1 is therefore lame and defective4 ,pray open up this argument a little further1 said ,,demea1 for ,i do not rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed it4 ,our friend ,,cleanthes1 replied ,,philo1 as you have heard1 asserts1 that since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience1 the existence of a ,deity admits not of proof from any other medium4 ,the world1 says he1 resembles the works of human contrivance2 therefore its cause must also resemble that of the other4 ,here we may remark1 that the operation of one very small part of nature1 to wit man1 upon another very small part1 to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach1 is the rule by which ,,cleanthes judges of the origin of the whole2 and he measures objects1 so widely disproportioned1 by the same individual standard4 ,but to waive all objections drawn from this topic1 ,i affirm1 that there are other parts of the universe 7besides the machines of human invention7 which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world1 and which1 therefore1 afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system4 ,these parts are animals and vegetables4 ,the world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable1 than it does a watch or a knitting-loom4 ,its cause1 therefore1 it is more probable1 resembles the cause of the former4 ,the cause of the former is generation or vegetation4 ,the cause1 therefore1 of the world1 we may infer to be something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation4 ,but how is it conceivable1 said ,,demea1 that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation8 ,very easily1 replied ,,philo4 ,in like manner as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields1 and produces other trees2 so the great vegetable1 the world1 or this planetary system1 produces within itself certain seeds1 which1 being scattered into the surrounding chaos1 vegetate into new worlds4 ,a comet1 for instance1 is the seed of a world2 and after it has been fully ripened1 by passing from sun to sun1 and star to star1 it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every where surround this universe1 and immediately sprouts up into a new system4 ,or if1 for the sake of variety 7for ,i see no other advantage71 we should suppose this world to be an animal2 a comet is the egg of this animal3 and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand1 which1 without any further care1 hatches the egg1 and produces a new animal2 so444 ,i understand you1 says ,,demea3 ,but what wild1 arbitrary suppositions are these6 ,what data have you for such extraordinary conclusions8 ,and is the slight1 imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both8 ,objects1 which are in general so widely different1 ought they to be a standard for each other8 ,right1 cries ,,philo3 ,this is the topic on which ,i have all along insisted4 ,i have still asserted1 that we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony4 ,our experience1 so imperfect in itself1 and so limited both in extent and duration1 can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things4 ,but if we must needs fix on some hypothesis2 by what rule1 pray1 ought we to determine our choice8 ,is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared8 ,and does not a plant or an animal1 which springs from vegetation or generation1 bear a stronger resemblance to the world1 than does any artificial machine1 which arises from reason and design8 ,but what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk8 said ,,demea4 ,can you explain their operations1 and anatomise that fine internal structure on which they depend8 ,as much1 at least1 replied ,,philo1 as ,,cleanthes can explain the operations of reason1 or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends4 ,but without any such elaborate disquisitions1 when ,i see an animal1 ,i infer1 that it sprang from generation2 and that with as great certainty as you conclude a house to have been reared by design4 ,these words1 generation1 reason1 mark only certain powers and energies in nature1 whose effects are known1 but whose essence is incomprehensible2 and one of these principles1 more than the other1 has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature4 ,in reality1 ,,demea1 it may reasonably be expected1 that the larger the views are which we take of things1 the better will they conduct us in our conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects4 ,in this little corner of the world alone1 there are four principles1 reason1 instinct1 generation1 vegetation1 which are similar to each other1 and are the causes of similar effects4 ,what a number of other principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe1 could we travel from planet to planet1 and from system to system1 in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric8 ,any one of these four principles above mentioned1 7and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture17 may afford us a theory by which to judge of the origin of the world2 and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds operate4 ,were this principle more intelligible on that account1 such a partiality might be somewhat excusable3 ,but reason1 in its internal fabric and structure1 is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation2 and1 perhaps1 even that vague1 indeterminate word1 ,nature1 to which the vulgar refer every thing1 is not at the bottom more inexplicable4 ,the effects of these principles are all known to us from experience2 but the principles themselves1 and their manner of operation1 are totally unknown2 nor is it less intelligible1 or less conformable to experience1 to say1 that the world arose by vegetation1 from a seed shed by another world1 than to say that it arose from a divine reason or contrivance1 according to the sense in which ,,cleanthes understands it4 ,but methinks1 said ,,demea1 if the world had a vegetative quality1 and could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos1 this power would be still an additional argument for design in its author4 ,for whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design8 ,or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows8 ,you need only look around you1 replied ,,philo1 to satisfy yourself with regard to this question4 ,a tree bestows order and organisation on that tree which springs from it1 without knowing the order2 an animal in the same manner on its offspring2 a bird on its nest2 and instances of this kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order1 which arise from reason and contrivance4 ,to say1 that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from design1 is begging the question2 nor can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving1 a priori1 both that order is1 from its nature1 inseparably attached to thought2 and that it can never of itself1 or from original unknown principles1 belong to matter4 ,but further1 ,,demea2 this objection which you urge can never be made use of by ,,cleanthes1 without renouncing a defence which he has already made against one of my objections4 ,when ,i inquired concerning the cause of that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing2 he told me1 that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy4 ,we must stop somewhere1 says he2 nor is it ever within the reach of human capacity to explain ultimate causes1 or show the last connections of any objects4 ,it is sufficient1 if any steps1 so far as we go1 are supported by experience and observation4 ,now1 that vegetation and generation1 as well as reason1 are experienced to be principles of order in nature1 is undeniable4 ,if ,i rest my system of cosmogony on the former1 preferably to the latter1 it is at my choice4 ,the matter seems entirely arbitrary4 ,and when ,,cleanthes asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty1 ,i am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle4 ,these questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides2 and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement4 ,judging by our limited and imperfect experience1 generation has some privileges above reason3 for we see every day the latter arise from the former1 never the former from the latter4 ,compare1 ,i beseech you1 the consequences on both sides4 ,the world1 say ,i1 resembles an animal2 therefore it is an animal1 therefore it arose from generation4 ,the steps1 ,i confess1 are wide2 yet there is some small appearance of analogy in each step4 ,the world1 says ,,cleanthes1 resembles a machine2 therefore it is a machine1 therefore it arose from design4 ,the steps are here equally wide1 and the analogy less striking4 ,and if he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further1 and to infer design or reason from the great principle of generation1 on which ,i insist2 ,i may1 with better authority1 use the same freedom to push further his hypothesis1 and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason4 ,i have at least some faint shadow of experience1 which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject4 ,reason1 in innumerable instances1 is observed to arise from the principle of generation1 and never to arise from any other principle4 ,,hesiod1 and all the ancient mythologists1 were so struck with this analogy1 that they universally explained the origin of nature from an animal birth1 and copulation4 ,,plato too1 so far as he is intelligible1 seems to have adopted some such notion in his ,,timaeus4 ,the ,,brahmins assert1 that the world arose from an infinite spider1 who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels1 and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it1 by absorbing it again1 and resolving it into his own essence4 ,here is a species of cosmogony1 which appears to us ridiculous2 because a spider is a little contemptible animal1 whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe4 ,but still here is a new species of analogy1 even in our globe4 ,and were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders1 7which is very possible17 this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence1 as explained by ,,cleanthes4 ,why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain1 it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason4 ,i must confess1 ,,philo1 replied ,,cleanthes1 that of all men living1 the task which you have undertaken1 of raising doubts and objections1 suits you best1 and seems1 in a manner1 natural and unavoidable to you4 ,so great is your fertility of invention1 that ,i am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable1 on a sudden1 to solve regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me3 though ,i clearly see1 in general1 their fallacy and error4 ,and ,i question not1 but you are yourself1 at present1 in the same case1 and have not the solution so ready as the objection3 while you must be sensible1 that common sense and reason are entirely against you2 and that such whimsies as you have delivered1 may puzzle1 but never can convince us4 ,,part #h ,what you ascribe to the fertility of my invention1 replied ,,philo1 is entirely owing to the nature of the subject4 ,in subjects adapted to the narrow compass of human reason1 there is commonly but one determination1 which carries probability or conviction with it2 and to a man of sound judgement1 all other suppositions1 but that one1 appear entirely absurd and chimerical4 ,but in such questions as the present1 a hundred contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy2 and invention has here full scope to exert itself4 ,without any great effort of thought1 ,i believe that ,i could1 in an instant1 propose other systems of cosmogony1 which would have some faint appearance of truth1 though it is a thousand1 a million to one1 if either yours or any one of mine be the true system4 ,for instance1 what if ,i should revive the old ,,epicurean hypothesis8 ,this is commonly1 and ,i believe justly1 esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed2 yet ,i know not whether1 with a few alterations1 it might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability4 ,instead of supposing matter infinite1 as ,,epicurus did1 let us suppose it finite4 ,a finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions3 and it must happen1 in an eternal duration1 that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times4 ,this world1 therefore1 with all its events1 even the most minute1 has before been produced and destroyed1 and will again be produced and destroyed1 without any bounds and limitations4 ,no one1 who has a conception of the powers of infinite1 in comparison of finite1 will ever scruple this determination4 ,but this supposes1 said ,,demea1 that matter can acquire motion1 without any voluntary agent or first mover4 ,and where is the difficulty1 replied ,,philo1 of that supposition8 ,every event1 before experience1 is equally difficult and incomprehensible2 and every event1 after experience1 is equally easy and intelligible4 ,motion1 in many instances1 from gravity1 from elasticity1 from electricity1 begins in matter1 without any known voluntary agent3 and to suppose always1 in these cases1 an unknown voluntary agent1 is mere hypothesis2 and hypothesis attended with no advantages4 ,the beginning of motion in matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind and intelligence4 ,besides1 why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all eternity1 and the same stock of it1 or nearly the same1 be still upheld in the universe8 ,as much is lost by the composition of motion1 as much is gained by its resolution4 ,and whatever the causes are1 the fact is certain1 that matter is1 and always has been1 in continual agitation1 as far as human experience or tradition reaches4 ,there is not probably1 at present1 in the whole universe1 one particle of matter at absolute rest4 ,and this very consideration too1 continued ,,philo1 which we have stumbled on in the course of the argument1 suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony1 that is not absolutely absurd and improbable4 ,is there a system1 an order1 an economy of things1 by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation which seems essential to it1 and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which it produces8 ,there certainly is such an economy2 for this is actually the case with the present world4 ,the continual motion of matter1 therefore1 in less than infinite transpositions1 must produce this economy or order2 and by its very nature1 that order1 when once established1 supports itself1 for many ages1 if not to eternity4 ,but wherever matter is so poised1 arranged1 and adjusted1 as to continue in perpetual motion1 and yet preserve a constancy in the forms1 its situation must1 of necessity1 have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present4 ,all the parts of each form must have a relation to each other1 and to the whole2 and the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe2 to the element in which the form subsists2 to the materials with which it repairs its waste and decay2 and to every other form which is hostile or friendly4 ,a defect in any of these particulars destroys the form2 and the matter of which it is composed is again set loose1 and is thrown into irregular motions and fermentations1 till it unite itself to some other regular form4 ,if no such form be prepared to receive it1 and if there be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe1 the universe itself is entirely disordered2 whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first beginnings that is thus destroyed1 or the rotten carcass of one languishing in old age and infirmity4 ,in either case1 a chaos ensues2 till finite1 though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms1 whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a continued succession of matter4 ,suppose 7for we shall endeavour to vary the expression71 that matter were thrown into any position1 by a blind1 unguided force2 it is evident that this first position must1 in all probability1 be the most confused and most disorderly imaginable1 without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance1 which1 along with a symmetry of parts1 discover an adjustment of means to ends1 and a tendency to self-preservation4 ,if the actuating force cease after this operation1 matter must remain for ever in disorder1 and continue an immense chaos1 without any proportion or activity4 ,but suppose that the actuating force1 whatever it be1 still continues in matter1 this first position will immediately give place to a second1 which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the first1 and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions4 ,no particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered4 ,the original force1 still remaining in activity1 gives a perpetual restlessness to matter4 ,every possible situation is produced1 and instantly destroyed4 ,if a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment1 it is instantly hurried away1 and confounded1 by that never-ceasing force which actuates every part of matter4 ,thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder4 ,but is it not possible that it may settle at last1 so as not to lose its motion and active force 7for that we have supposed inherent in it71 yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance1 amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts8 ,this we find to be the case with the universe at present4 ,every individual is perpetually changing1 and every part of every individual2 and yet the whole remains1 in appearance1 the same4 ,may we not hope for such a position1 or rather be assured of it1 from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter2 and may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which is in the universe8 ,let us contemplate the subject a little1 and we shall find1 that this adjustment1 if attained by matter of a seeming stability in the forms1 with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts1 affords a plausible1 if not a true solution of the difficulty4 ,it is in vain1 therefore1 to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables1 and their curious adjustment to each other4 ,i would fain know1 how an animal could subsist1 unless its parts were so adjusted8 ,do we not find1 that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases1 and that its matter corrupting tries some new form8 ,it happens indeed1 that the parts of the world are so well adjusted1 that some regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter3 and if it were not so1 could the world subsist8 ,must it not dissolve as well as the animal1 and pass through new positions and situations1 till in great1 but finite succession1 it falls at last into the present or some such order8 ,it is well1 replied ,,cleanthes1 you told us1 that this hypothesis was suggested on a sudden1 in the course of the argument4 ,had you had leisure to examine it1 you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections to which it is exposed4 ,no form1 you say1 can subsist1 unless it possess those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence3 some new order or economy must be tried1 and so on1 without intermission2 till at last some order1 which can support and maintain itself1 is fallen upon4 ,but according to this hypothesis1 whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess8 ,two eyes1 two ears1 are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species4 ,human race might have been propagated and preserved1 without horses1 dogs1 cows1 sheep1 and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction and enjoyment4 ,if no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of ,,africa and ,,arabia1 would the world have been dissolved8 ,if no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful direction to the needle1 would human society and the human kind have been immediately extinguished8 ,though the maxims of ,nature be in general very frugal1 yet instances of this kind are far from being rare2 and any one of them is a sufficient proof of design1 and of a benevolent design1 which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe4 ,at least1 you may safely infer1 said ,,philo1 that the foregoing hypothesis is so far incomplete and imperfect1 which ,i shall not scruple to allow4 ,but can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature8 ,or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony1 that will be liable to no exceptions1 and will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of ,nature8 ,your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage1 even though you have run into ,anthropomorphism1 the better to preserve a conformity to common experience4 ,let us once more put it to trial4 ,in all instances which we have ever seen1 ideas are copied from real objects1 and are ectypal1 not archetypal1 to express myself in learned terms3 ,you reverse this order1 and give thought the precedence4 ,in all instances which we have ever seen1 thought has no influence upon matter1 except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it4 ,no animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its own body2 and indeed1 the equality of action and reaction seems to be an universal law of nature3 ,but your theory implies a contradiction to this experience4 ,these instances1 with many more1 which it were easy to collect1 7particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is eternal1 or1 in other words1 an animal ingenerable and immortal72 these instances1 ,i say1 may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each other1 and let us see1 that as no system of this kind ought ever to be received from a slight analogy1 so neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity4 ,for that is an inconvenience from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted4 ,all religious systems1 it is confessed1 are subject to great and insuperable difficulties4 ,each disputant triumphs in his turn2 while he carries on an offensive war1 and exposes the absurdities1 barbarities1 and pernicious tenets of his antagonist4 ,but all of them1 on the whole1 prepare a complete triumph for the ,sceptic2 who tells them1 that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects3 ,for this plain reason1 that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject4 ,a total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource4 ,and if every attack1 as is commonly observed1 and no defence1 among ,theologians1 is successful2 how complete must be his victory1 who remains always1 with all mankind1 on the offensive1 and has himself no fixed station or abiding city1 which he is ever1 on any occasion1 obliged to defend8 ,,part #i ,but if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori1 said ,,demea1 had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori1 which1 by offering to us infallible demonstration1 cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty8 ,by this argument1 too1 we may prove the infinity of the ,divine attributes1 which1 ,i am afraid1 can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic4 ,for how can an effect1 which either is finite1 or1 for aught we know1 may be so2 how can such an effect1 ,i say1 prove an infinite cause8 ,the unity too of the ,divine ,nature1 it is very difficult1 if not absolutely impossible1 to deduce merely from contemplating the works of nature2 nor will the uniformity alone of the plan1 even were it allowed1 give us any assurance of that attribute4 ,whereas the argument a priori 444 ,you seem to reason1 ,,demea1 interposed ,,cleanthes1 as if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity4 ,but it is first proper1 in my opinion1 to determine what argument of this nature you choose to insist on2 and we shall afterwards1 from itself1 better than from its useful consequences1 endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it4 ,the argument1 replied ,,demea1 which ,i would insist on1 is the common one4 ,whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence2 it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself1 or be the cause of its own existence4 ,in mounting up1 therefore1 from effects to causes1 we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession1 without any ultimate cause at all2 or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause1 that is necessarily existent3 ,now1 that the first supposition is absurd1 may be thus proved4 ,in the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects1 each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded2 but the whole eternal chain or succession1 taken together1 is not determined or caused by any thing2 and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason1 as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time4 ,the question is still reasonable1 why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity1 and not any other succession1 or no succession at all4 ,if there be no necessarily existent being1 any supposition which can be formed is equally possible2 nor is there any more absurdity in ,nothing's having existed from eternity1 than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe4 ,what was it1 then1 which determined ,something to exist rather than ,nothing1 and bestowed being on a particular possibility1 exclusive of the rest8 ,external causes1 there are supposed to be none4 ,chance is a word without a meaning4 ,was it ,nothing8 ,but that can never produce any thing4 ,we must1 therefore1 have recourse to a necessarily existent ,being1 who carries the ,,reason of his existence in himself1 and who cannot be supposed not to exist1 without an express contradiction4 ,there is1 consequently1 such a ,being2 that is1 there is a ,deity4 ,i shall not leave it to ,,philo1 said ,,cleanthes1 though ,i know that the starting objections is his chief delight1 to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning4 ,it seems to me so obviously ill-grounded1 and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion1 that ,i shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it4 ,i shall begin with observing1 that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact1 or to prove it by any arguments a priori4 ,nothing is demonstrable1 unless the contrary implies a contradiction4 ,nothing1 that is distinctly conceivable1 implies a contradiction4 ,whatever we conceive as existent1 we can also conceive as non-existent4 ,there is no being1 therefore1 whose non-existence implies a contradiction4 ,consequently there is no being1 whose existence is demonstrable4 ,i propose this argument as entirely decisive1 and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it4 ,it is pretended that the ,deity is a necessarily existent being2 and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting1 that if we knew his whole essence or nature1 we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist1 as for twice two not to be four4 ,but it is evident that this can never happen1 while our faculties remain the same as at present4 ,it will still be possible for us1 at any time1 to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist2 nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being2 in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four4 ,the words1 therefore1 necessary existence1 have no meaning2 or1 which is the same thing1 none that is consistent4 ,but further1 why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent ,being1 according to this pretended explication of necessity8 ,we dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter2 and for aught we can determine1 it may contain some qualities1 which1 were they known1 would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five4 ,i find only one argument employed to prove1 that the material world is not the necessarily existent ,being3 and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world4 ,any particle of matter1 it is said,dr4 ,clarke1 may be conceived to be annihilated2 and any form may be conceived to be altered4 ,such an annihilation or alteration1 therefore1 is not impossible4 ,but it seems a great partiality not to perceive1 that the same argument extends equally to the ,deity1 so far as we have any conception of him2 and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent1 or his attributes to be altered4 ,it must be some unknown1 inconceivable qualities1 which can make his non-existence appear impossible1 or his attributes unalterable3 ,and no reason can be assigned1 why these qualities may not belong to matter4 ,as they are altogether unknown and inconceivable1 they can never be proved incompatible with it4 ,add to this1 that in tracing an eternal succession of objects1 it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author4 ,how can any thing1 that exists from eternity1 have a cause1 since that relation implies a priority in time1 and a beginning of existence8 ,in such a chain1 too1 or succession of objects1 each part is caused by that which preceded it1 and causes that which succeeds it4 ,where then is the difficulty8 ,but the whole1 you say1 wants a cause4 ,i answer1 that the uniting of these parts into a whole1 like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom1 or several distinct members into one body1 is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind1 and has no influence on the nature of things4 ,did ,i show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter1 ,i should think it very unreasonable1 should you afterwards ask me1 what was the cause of the whole twenty4 ,this is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts4 ,though the reasonings which you have urged1 ,,cleanthes1 may well excuse me1 said ,,philo1 from starting any further difficulties1 yet ,i cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic4 ,it is observed by arithmeticians1 that the products of #i1 compose always either #i1 or some lesser product of #i1 if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed4 ,thus1 of #ah1 #bg1 #cf1 which are products of #i1 you make #i by adding #a to #h1 #b to #g1 #c to #f4 ,thus1 #cfi is a product also of #i2 and if you add #c1 #f1 and #i1 you make #ah1 a lesser product of #i4 ,to a superficial observer1 so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design3 but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity1 and demonstrates1 that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers4 ,is it not probable1 ,i ask1 that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity1 though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty8 ,and instead of admiring the order of natural beings1 may it not happen1 that1 could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies1 we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition8 ,so dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question6 and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis6 ,but dropping all these abstractions1 continued ,,philo1 and confining ourselves to more familiar topics1 ,i shall venture to add an observation1 that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing1 except to people of a metaphysical head1 who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning1 and who1 finding from mathematics1 that the understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity1 and1 contrary to first appearances1 have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place4 ,other people1 even of good sense and the best inclined to religion1 feel always some deficiency in such arguments1 though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies2 a certain proof that men ever did1 and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning4 ,,part #aj ,it is my opinion1 ,i own1 replied ,,demea1 that each man feels1 in a manner1 the truth of religion within his own breast1 and1 from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery1 rather than from any reasoning1 is led to seek protection from that ,being1 on whom he and all nature is dependent4 ,so anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life1 that futurity is still the object of all our hopes and fears4 ,we incessantly look forward1 and endeavour1 by prayers1 adoration1 and sacrifice1 to appease those unknown powers1 whom we find1 by experience1 so able to afflict and oppress us4 ,wretched creatures that we are6 what resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life1 did not religion suggest some methods of atonement1 and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented8 ,i am indeed persuaded1 said ,,philo1 that the best1 and indeed the only method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion1 is by just representations of the misery and wickedness of men4 ,and for that purpose a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument4 ,for is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself8 ,it is only necessary to make us feel it1 if possible1 more intimately and sensibly4 ,the people1 indeed1 replied ,,demea1 are sufficiently convinced of this great and melancholy truth4 ,the miseries of life2 the unhappiness of man2 the general corruptions of our nature2 the unsatisfactory enjoyment of pleasures1 riches1 honours2 these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages4 ,and who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience8 ,in this point1 said ,,philo1 the learned are perfectly agreed with the vulgar2 and in all letters1 sacred and profane1 the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and melancholy could inspire4 ,the poets1 who speak from sentiment1 without a system1 and whose testimony has therefore the more authority1 abound in images of this nature4 ,from ,homer down to ,dr4 ,young1 the whole inspired tribe have ever been sensible1 that no other representation of things would suit the feeling and observation of each individual4 ,as to authorities1 replied ,,demea1 you need not seek them4 ,look round this library of ,,cleanthes4 ,i shall venture to affirm1 that1 except authors of particular sciences1 such as chemistry or botany1 who have no occasion to treat of human life1 there is scarce one of those innumerable writers1 from whom the sense of human misery has not1 in some passage or other1 extorted a complaint and confession of it4 ,at least1 the chance is entirely on that side2 and no one author has ever1 so far as ,i can recollect1 been so extravagant as to deny it4 ,there you must excuse me1 said ,,philo3 ,,leibniz has denied it2 and is perhaps the first ,that sentiment had been maintained by ,dr4 ,king and some few others before ,leibniz2 though by none of so great a fame as that ,german philosopher who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion2 at least1 the first who made it essential to his philosophical system4 ,and by being the first1 replied ,,demea1 might he not have been sensible of his error8 ,for is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age8 ,and can any man hope by a simple denial 7for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning71 to bear down the united testimony of mankind1 founded on sense and consciousness8 ,and why should man1 added he1 pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals8 ,the whole earth1 believe me1 ,,philo1 is cursed and polluted4 ,a perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures4 ,necessity1 hunger1 want1 stimulate the strong and courageous3 ,fear1 anxiety1 terror1 agitate the weak and infirm4 ,the first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent3 ,weakness1 impotence1 distress1 attend each stage of that life3 and it is at last finished in agony and horror4 ,observe too1 says ,,philo1 the curious artifices of ,nature1 in order to embitter the life of every living being4 ,the stronger prey upon the weaker1 and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety4 ,the weaker too1 in their turn1 often prey upon the stronger1 and vex and molest them without relaxation4 ,consider that innumerable race of insects1 which either are bred on the body of each animal1 or1 flying about1 infix their stings in him4 ,these insects have others still less than themselves1 which torment them4 ,and thus on each hand1 before and behind1 above and below1 every animal is surrounded with enemies1 which incessantly seek his misery and destruction4 ,man alone1 said ,,demea1 seems to be1 in part1 an exception to this rule4 ,for by combination in society1 he can easily master lions1 tigers1 and bears1 whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey upon him4 ,on the contrary1 it is here chiefly1 cried ,,philo1 that the uniform and equal maxims of ,nature are most apparent4 ,man1 it is true1 can1 by combination1 surmount all his real enemies1 and become master of the whole animal creation3 but does he not immediately raise up to himself imaginary enemies1 the demons of his fancy1 who haunt him with superstitious terrors1 and blast every enjoyment of life8 ,his pleasure1 as he imagines1 becomes1 in their eyes1 a crime3 his food and repose give them umbrage and offence3 his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials to anxious fear3 and even death1 his refuge from every other ill1 presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes4 ,nor does the wolf molest more the timid flock1 than superstition does the anxious breast of wretched mortals4 ,besides1 consider1 ,,demea3 ,this very society1 by which we surmount those wild beasts1 our natural enemies2 what new enemies does it not raise to us8 ,what woe and misery does it not occasion8 ,man is the greatest enemy of man4 ,oppression1 injustice1 contempt1 contumely1 violence1 sedition1 war1 calumny1 treachery1 fraud2 by these they mutually torment each other2 and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed1 were it not for the dread of still greater ills1 which must attend their separation4 ,but though these external insults1 said ,,demea1 from animals1 from men1 from all the elements1 which assault us1 form a frightful catalogue of woes1 they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within ourselves1 from the distempered condition of our mind and body4 ,how many lie under the lingering torment of diseases8 ,hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet4 ,intestine stone and ulcer1 colic-pangs1 ,demoniac frenzy1 moping melancholy1 ,and moon-struck madness1 pining atrophy1 ,marasmus1 and wide-wasting pestilence4 ,dire was the tossing1 deep the groans3 despair ,tended the sick1 busiest from couch to couch4 ,and over them triumphant death his dart ,shook3 but delay'd to strike1 though oft invok'd ,with vows1 as their chief good and final hope4 ,the disorders of the mind1 continued ,,demea1 though more secret1 are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious4 ,remorse1 shame1 anguish1 rage1 disappointment1 anxiety1 fear1 dejection1 despair2 who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors8 ,how many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations8 ,labour and poverty1 so abhorred by every one1 are the certain lot of the far greater number2 and those few privileged persons1 who enjoy ease and opulence1 never reach contentment or true felicity4 ,all the goods of life united would not make a very happy man2 but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed2 and any one of them almost 7and who can be free from every one87 nay often the absence of one good 7and who can possess all87 is sufficient to render life ineligible4 ,were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world1 ,i would show him1 as a specimen of its ills1 a hospital full of diseases1 a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors1 a field of battle strewed with carcasses1 a fleet foundering in the ocean1 a nation languishing under tyranny1 famine1 or pestilence4 ,to turn the gay side of life to him1 and give him a notion of its pleasures2 whither should ,i conduct him8 to a ball1 to an opera1 to court8 ,he might justly think1 that ,i was only showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow4 ,there is no evading such striking instances1 said ,,philo1 but by apologies1 which still further aggravate the charge4 ,why have all men1 ,i ask1 in all ages1 complained incessantly of the miseries of life8444 ,they have no just reason1 says one3 these complaints proceed only from their discontented1 repining1 anxious disposition444,and can there possibly1 ,i reply1 be a more certain foundation of misery1 than such a wretched temper8 ,but if they were really as unhappy as they pretend1 says my antagonist1 why do they remain in life8444 ,not satisfied with life1 afraid of death4 ,this is the secret chain1 say ,i1 that holds us4 ,we are terrified1 not bribed to the continuance of our existence4 ,it is only a false delicacy1 he may insist1 which a few refined spirits indulge1 and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of mankind4 4 4 4 ,and what is this delicacy1 ,i ask1 which you blame8 ,is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life8 and if the man of a delicate1 refined temper1 by being so much more alive than the rest of the world1 is only so much more unhappy1 what judgement must we form in general of human life8 ,let men remain at rest1 says our adversary1 and they will be easy4 ,they are willing artificers of their own misery4 4 4 4 ,no6 reply ,i3 an anxious languor follows their repose2 disappointment1 vexation1 trouble1 their activity and ambition4 ,i can observe something like what you mention in some others1 replied ,,cleanthes3 but ,i confess ,i feel little or nothing of it in myself1 and hope that it is not so common as you represent it4 ,if you feel not human misery yourself1 cried ,,demea1 ,i congratulate you on so happy a singularity4 ,others1 seemingly the most prosperous1 have not been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains4 ,let us attend to the great1 the fortunate emperor1 ,,charles ,v1 when1 tired with human grandeur1 he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands of his son4 ,in the last harangue which he made on that memorable occasion1 he publicly avowed1 that the greatest prosperities which he had ever enjoyed1 had been mixed with so many adversities1 that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment4 ,but did the retired life1 in which he sought for shelter1 afford him any greater happiness8 ,if we may credit his son's account1 his repentance commenced the very day of his resignation4 ,,cicero's fortune1 from small beginnings1 rose to the greatest lustre and renown2 yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters1 as well as philosophical discourses1 contain8 ,and suitably to his own experience1 he introduces ,,cato1 the great1 the fortunate ,,cato1 protesting in his old age1 that had he a new life in his offer1 he would reject the present4 ,ask yourself1 ask any of your acquaintance1 whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life4 ,no6 but the next twenty1 they say1 will be better3 ,and from the dregs of life1 hope to receive ,what the first sprightly running could not give4 ,thus at last they find 7such is the greatness of human misery1 it reconciles even contradictions71 that they complain at once of the shortness of life1 and of its vanity and sorrow4 ,and is it possible1 ,,cleanthes1 said ,,philo1 that after all these reflections1 and infinitely more1 which might be suggested1 you can still persevere in your ,anthropomorphism1 and assert the moral attributes of the ,deity1 his justice1 benevolence1 mercy1 and rectitude1 to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures8 ,his power we allow is infinite3 whatever he wills is executed3 but neither man nor any other animal is happy3 therefore he does not will their happiness4 ,his wisdom is infinite3 ,he is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end3 ,but the course of ,nature tends not to human or animal felicity3 therefore it is not established for that purpose4 ,through the whole compass of human knowledge1 there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these4 ,in what respect1 then1 do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men8 ,,epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered4 ,is he willing to prevent evil1 but not able8 then is he impotent4 ,is he able1 but not willing8 then is he malevolent4 ,is he both able and willing8 whence then is evil8 ,you ascribe1 ,,cleanthes 7and ,i believe justly71 a purpose and intention to ,nature4 ,but what1 ,i beseech you1 is the object of that curious artifice and machinery1 which she has displayed in all animals8 ,the preservation alone of individuals1 and propagation of the species4 ,it seems enough for her purpose1 if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe1 without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it4 ,no resource for this purpose3 no machinery1 in order merely to give pleasure or ease3 no fund of pure joy and contentment3 no indulgence1 without some want or necessity accompanying it4 ,at least1 the few phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance4 ,our sense of music1 harmony1 and indeed beauty of all kinds1 gives satisfaction1 without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species4 ,but what racking pains1 on the other hand1 arise from gouts1 gravels1 megrims1 toothaches1 rheumatisms1 where the injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable8 ,mirth1 laughter1 play1 frolic1 seem gratuitous satisfactions1 which have no further tendency3 spleen1 melancholy1 discontent1 superstition1 are pains of the same nature4 ,how then does the ,divine benevolence display itself1 in the sense of you ,anthropomorphites8 ,none but we ,mystics1 as you were pleased to call us1 can account for this strange mixture of phenomena1 by deriving it from attributes1 infinitely perfect1 but incomprehensible4 ,and have you at last1 said ,,cleanthes smiling1 betrayed your intentions1 ,,philo8 ,your long agreement with ,,demea did indeed a little surprise me2 but ,i find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against me4 ,and ,i must confess1 that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition and controversy4 ,if you can make out the present point1 and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted1 there is an end at once of all religion4 ,for to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the ,deity1 while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain8 ,you take umbrage very easily1 replied ,,demea1 at opinions the most innocent1 and the most generally received1 even amongst the religious and devout themselves3 and nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic like this1 concerning the wickedness and misery of man1 charged with no less than ,atheism and profaneness4 ,have not all pious divines and preachers1 who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject2 have they not easily1 ,i say1 given a solution of any difficulties which may attend it8 ,this world is but a point in comparison of the universe2 this life but a moment in comparison of eternity4 ,the present evil phenomena1 therefore1 are rectified in other regions1 and in some future period of existence4 ,and the eyes of men1 being then opened to larger views of things1 see the whole connection of general laws2 and trace with adoration1 the benevolence and rectitude of the ,deity1 through all the mazes and intricacies of his providence4 ,no6 replied ,,cleanthes1 ,no6 ,these arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted1 contrary to matter of fact1 visible and uncontroverted4 ,whence can any cause be known but from its known effects8 ,whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena8 ,to establish one hypothesis upon another1 is building entirely in the air2 and the utmost we ever attain1 by these conjectures and fictions1 is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion2 but never can we1 upon such terms1 establish its reality4 ,the only method of supporting ,divine benevolence1 and it is what ,i willingly embrace1 is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man4 ,your representations are exaggerated2 your melancholy views mostly fictitious2 your inferences contrary to fact and experience4 ,health is more common than sickness2 pleasure than pain2 happiness than misery4 ,and for one vexation which we meet with1 we attain1 upon computation1 a hundred enjoyments4 ,admitting your position1 replied ,,philo1 which yet is extremely doubtful1 you must at the same time allow1 that if pain be less frequent than pleasure1 it is infinitely more violent and durable4 ,one hour of it is often able to outweigh a day1 a week1 a month of our common insipid enjoyments2 and how many days1 weeks1 and months1 are passed by several in the most acute torments8 ,pleasure1 scarcely in one instance1 is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture2 and in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude4 ,the spirits evaporate1 the nerves relax1 the fabric is disordered1 and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness4 ,but pain often1 good ,god1 how often6 rises to torture and agony2 and the longer it continues1 it becomes still more genuine agony and torture4 ,patience is exhausted1 courage languishes1 melancholy seizes us1 and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause1 or another event1 which is the sole cure of all evil1 but which1 from our natural folly1 we regard with still greater horror and consternation4 ,but not to insist upon these topics1 continued ,,philo1 though most obvious1 certain1 and important2 ,i must use the freedom to admonish you1 ,,cleanthes1 that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue1 and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential articles of natural and revealed theology4 ,what6 no method of fixing a just foundation for religion1 unless we allow the happiness of human life1 and maintain a continued existence even in this world1 with all our present pains1 infirmities1 vexations1 and follies1 to be eligible and desirable6 ,but this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience3 ,it is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert4 ,no decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority2 nor is it possible for you to compute1 estimate1 and compare1 all the pains and all the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals3 ,and thus1 by your resting the whole system of religion on a point1 which1 from its very nature1 must for ever be uncertain1 you tacitly confess1 that that system is equally uncertain4 ,but allowing you what never will be believed1 at least what you never possibly can prove1 that animal1 or at least human happiness1 in this life1 exceeds its misery1 you have yet done nothing3 ,for this is not1 by any means1 what we expect from infinite power1 infinite wisdom1 and infinite goodness4 ,why is there any misery at all in the world8 ,not by chance surely4 ,from some cause then4 ,is it from the intention of the ,deity8 ,but he is perfectly benevolent4 ,is it contrary to his intention8 ,but he is almighty4 ,nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning1 so short1 so clear1 so decisive2 except we assert1 that these subjects exceed all human capacity1 and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them2 a topic which ,i have all along insisted on1 but which you have1 from the beginning1 rejected with scorn and indignation4 ,but ,i will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment1 for ,i deny that you can ever force me in it4 ,i will allow1 that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the ,deity1 even in your sense of these attributes3 ,what are you advanced by all these concessions8 ,a mere possible compatibility is not sufficient4 ,you must prove these pure1 unmixed1 and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena1 and from these alone4 ,a hopeful undertaking6 ,were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed1 yet being finite1 they would be insufficient for that purpose4 ,how much more1 where they are also so jarring and discordant6 ,here1 ,,cleanthes1 ,i find myself at ease in my argument4 ,here ,i triumph4 ,formerly1 when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design1 ,i needed all my sceptical and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp4 ,in many views of the universe1 and of its parts1 particularly the latter1 the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force1 that all objections appear 7what ,i believe they really are7 mere cavils and sophisms2 nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them4 ,but there is no view of human life1 or of the condition of mankind1 from which1 without the greatest violence1 we can infer the moral attributes1 or learn that infinite benevolence1 conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom1 which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone4 ,it is your turn now to tug the labouring oar1 and to support your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience4 ,,part #aa ,i scruple not to allow1 said ,,cleanthes1 that ,i have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite1 which we meet with in all theological writers1 to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy2 and that any purposes of reasoning1 and even of religion1 would be better served1 were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions4 ,the terms1 admirable1 excellent1 superlatively great1 wise1 and holy2 these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men2 and any thing beyond1 besides that it leads into absurdities1 has no influence on the affections or sentiments4 ,thus1 in the present subject1 if we abandon all human analogy1 as seems your intention1 ,,demea1 ,i am afraid we abandon all religion1 and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration4 ,if we preserve human analogy1 we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes2 much less can we ever prove the latter from the former4 ,but supposing the ,author of ,nature to be finitely perfect1 though far exceeding mankind1 a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil1 and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted4 ,a less evil may then be chosen1 in order to avoid a greater2 inconveniences be submitted to1 in order to reach a desirable end2 and in a word1 benevolence1 regulated by wisdom1 and limited by necessity1 may produce just such a world as the present4 ,you1 ,,philo1 who are so prompt at starting views1 and reflections1 and analogies1 ,i would gladly hear1 at length1 without interruption1 your opinion of this new theory2 and if it deserve our attention1 we may afterwards1 at more leisure1 reduce it into form4 ,my sentiments1 replied ,,philo1 are not worth being made a mystery of2 and therefore1 without any ceremony1 ,i shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject4 ,it must1 ,i think1 be allowed1 that if a very limited intelligence1 whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe1 were assured1 that it were the production of a very good1 wise1 and powerful ,being1 however finite1 he would1 from his conjectures1 form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience2 nor would he ever imagine1 merely from these attributes of the cause1 of which he is informed1 that the effect could be so full of vice and misery and disorder1 as it appears in this life4 ,supposing now1 that this person were brought into the world1 still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent ,being2 he might1 perhaps1 be surprised at the disappointment2 but would never retract his former belief1 if founded on any very solid argument2 since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance1 and must allow1 that there may be many solutions of those phenomena1 which will for ever escape his comprehension4 ,but supposing1 which is the real case with regard to man1 that this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence1 benevolent1 and powerful1 but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things2 this entirely alters the case1 nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion4 ,he may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding2 but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers1 since he must form that inference from what he knows1 not from what he is ignorant of4 ,the more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance1 the more diffident you render him1 and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties4 ,you are obliged1 therefore1 to reason with him merely from the known phenomena1 and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture4 ,did ,i show you a house or palace1 where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable2 where the windows1 doors1 fires1 passages1 stairs1 and the whole economy of the building1 were the source of noise1 confusion1 fatigue1 darkness1 and the extremes of heat and cold2 you would certainly blame the contrivance1 without any further examination4 ,the architect would in vain display his subtlety1 and prove to you1 that if this door or that window were altered1 greater ills would ensue4 ,what he says may be strictly true3 ,the alteration of one particular1 while the other parts of the building remain1 may only augment the inconveniences4 ,but still you would assert in general1 that1 if the architect had had skill and good intentions1 he might have formed such a plan of the whole1 and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner1 as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences4 ,his ignorance1 or even your own ignorance of such a plan1 will never convince you of the impossibility of it4 ,if you find any inconveniences and deformities in the building1 you will always1 without entering into any detail1 condemn the architect4 ,in short1 ,i repeat the question3 ,is the world1 considered in general1 and as it appears to us in this life1 different from what a man1 or such a limited being1 would1 beforehand1 expect from a very powerful1 wise1 and benevolent ,deity8 ,it must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary4 ,and from thence ,i conclude1 that however consistent the world may be1 allowing certain suppositions and conjectures1 with the idea of such a ,deity1 it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence4 ,the consistence is not absolutely denied1 only the inference4 ,conjectures1 especially where infinity is excluded from the ,divine attributes1 may perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence1 but can never be foundations for any inference4 ,there seem to be four circumstances1 on which depend all1 or the greatest part of the ills1 that molest sensible creatures2 and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable4 ,we know so little beyond common life1 or even of common life1 that1 with regard to the economy of a universe1 there is no conjecture1 however wild1 which may not be just2 nor any one1 however plausible1 which may not be erroneous4 ,all that belongs to human understanding1 in this deep ignorance and obscurity1 is to be sceptical1 or at least cautious1 and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever1 much less of any which is supported by no appearance of probability4 ,now1 this ,i assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil1 and the circumstances on which it depends4 ,none of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable2 nor can we suppose them such1 without the utmost license of imagination4 ,the first circumstance which introduces evil1 is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation1 by which pains1 as well as pleasures1 are employed to excite all creatures to action1 and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation4 ,now pleasure alone1 in its various degrees1 seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose4 ,all animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment3 but when urged by any of the necessities of nature1 such as thirst1 hunger1 weariness2 instead of pain1 they might feel a diminution of pleasure1 by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence4 ,men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain2 at least they might have been so constituted4 ,it seems1 therefore1 plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain4 ,why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation8 ,if animals can be free from it an hour1 they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it2 and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling1 as to endow them with sight1 hearing1 or any of the senses4 ,shall we conjecture1 that such a contrivance was necessary1 without any appearance of reason8 and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth8 ,but a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain1 were it not for the second circumstance1 viz4 the conducting of the world by general laws2 and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect ,being4 ,it is true1 if everything were conducted by particular volitions1 the course of nature would be perpetually broken1 and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life4 ,but might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience8 ,in short1 might not the ,deity exterminate all ill1 wherever it were to be found2 and produce all good1 without any preparation1 or long progress of causes and effects8 ,besides1 we must consider1 that1 according to the present economy of the world1 the course of nature1 though supposed exactly regular1 yet to us appears not so1 and many events are uncertain1 and many disappoint our expectations4 ,health and sickness1 calm and tempest1 with an infinite number of other accidents1 whose causes are unknown and variable1 have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the prosperity of public societies2 and indeed all human life1 in a manner1 depends on such accidents4 ,a being1 therefore1 who knows the secret springs of the universe1 might easily1 by particular volitions1 turn all these accidents to the good of mankind1 and render the whole world happy1 without discovering himself in any operation4 ,a fleet1 whose purposes were salutary to society1 might always meet with a fair wind4 ,good princes enjoy sound health and long life4 ,persons born to power and authority1 be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions4 ,a few such events as these1 regularly and wisely conducted1 would change the face of the world2 and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature1 or confound human conduct1 than the present economy of things1 where the causes are secret1 and variable1 and compounded4 ,some small touches given to ,,caligula's brain in his infancy1 might have converted him into a ,,trajan4 ,one wave1 a little higher than the rest1 by burying ,,caesar and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean1 might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind4 ,there may1 for aught we know1 be good reasons why ,providence interposes not in this manner2 but they are unknown to us2 and though the mere supposition1 that such reasons exist1 may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the ,divine attributes1 yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that conclusion4 ,if every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws1 and if animals be rendered susceptible of pain1 it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter1 and the various concurrence and opposition of general laws2 but this ill would be very rare1 were it not for the third circumstance1 which ,i proposed to mention1 viz4 the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being4 ,so well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals1 and so well fitted to their preservation1 that1 as far as history or tradition reaches1 there appears not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe4 ,every animal has the requisite endowments2 but these endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an economy1 that any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature4 ,wherever one power is increased1 there is a proportional abatement in the others4 ,animals which excel in swiftness are commonly defective in force4 ,those which possess both are either imperfect in some of their senses1 or are oppressed with the most craving wants4 ,the human species1 whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity1 is of all others the most necessitous1 and the most deficient in bodily advantages2 without clothes1 without arms1 without food1 without lodging1 without any convenience of life1 except what they owe to their own skill and industry4 ,in short1 nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures2 and1 like a rigid master1 has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities4 ,an indulgent parent would have bestowed a large stock1 in order to guard against accidents1 and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances4 ,every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices1 that the least departure from the true path1 by mistake or necessity1 must involve us in misery and ruin4 ,some reserve1 some fund1 would have been provided to ensure happiness2 nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy4 ,the ,author of ,nature is inconceivably powerful3 his force is supposed great1 if not altogether inexhaustible3 nor is there any reason1 as far as we can judge1 to make him observe this strict frugality in his dealings with his creatures4 ,it would have been better1 were his power extremely limited1 to have created fewer animals1 and to have endowed these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation4 ,a builder is never esteemed prudent1 who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish4 ,in order to cure most of the ills of human life1 ,i require not that man should have the wings of the eagle1 the swiftness of the stag1 the force of the ox1 the arms of the lion1 the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros2 much less do ,i demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim4 ,i am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul4 ,let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour2 a more vigorous spring and activity of mind2 a more constant bent to business and application4 ,let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection2 and the most beneficial consequences1 without any allay of ill1 is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment4 ,almost all the moral1 as well as natural evils of human life1 arise from idleness2 and were our species1 by the original constitution of their frame1 exempt from this vice or infirmity1 the perfect cultivation of land1 the improvement of arts and manufactures1 the exact execution of every office and duty1 immediately follow2 and men at once may fully reach that state of society1 which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated government4 ,but as industry is a power1 and the most valuable of any1 ,nature seems determined1 suitably to her usual maxims1 to bestow it on men with a very sparing hand2 and rather to punish him severely for his deficiency in it1 than to reward him for his attainments4 ,she has so contrived his frame1 that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour2 and she employs all his other wants to overcome1 at least in part1 the want of diligence1 and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him4 ,here our demands may be allowed very humble1 and therefore the more reasonable4 ,if we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement1 of a more delicate taste of beauty1 of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and friendship2 we might be told1 that we impiously pretend to break the order of ,nature2 that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of being2 that the presents which we require1 not being suitable to our state and condition1 would only be pernicious to us4 ,but it is hard2 ,i dare to repeat it1 it is hard1 that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities1 where almost every being and element is either our foe or refuses its assistance 444 we should also have our own temper to struggle with1 and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils4 ,the fourth circumstance1 whence arises the misery and ill of the universe1 is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature4 ,it must be acknowledged1 that there are few parts of the universe1 which seem not to serve some purpose1 and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole4 ,the parts hang all together2 nor can one be touched without affecting the rest1 in a greater or less degree4 ,but at the same time1 it must be observed1 that none of these parts or principles1 however useful1 are so accurately adjusted1 as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility consists2 but they are1 all of them1 apt1 on every occasion1 to run into the one extreme or the other4 ,one would imagine1 that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker2 so little finished is every part1 and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed4 ,thus1 the winds are requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe1 and to assist men in navigation3 but how oft1 rising up to tempests and hurricanes1 do they become pernicious8 ,rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth3 but how often are they defective8 how often excessive8 ,heat is requisite to all life and vegetation2 but is not always found in the due proportion4 ,on the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal3 but the parts perform not regularly their proper function4 ,what more useful than all the passions of the mind1 ambition1 vanity1 love1 anger8 ,but how oft do they break their bounds1 and cause the greatest convulsions in society8 ,there is nothing so advantageous in the universe1 but what frequently becomes pernicious1 by its excess or defect2 nor has ,nature guarded1 with the requisite accuracy1 against all disorder or confusion4 ,the irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species2 but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery4 ,on the concurrence1 then1 of these four circumstances1 does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend4 ,were all living creatures incapable of pain1 or were the world administered by particular volitions1 evil never could have found access into the universe3 and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties1 beyond what strict necessity requires2 or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium2 there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present4 ,what then shall we pronounce on this occasion8 ,shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary1 and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe8 ,this decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant4 ,let us be more modest in our conclusions4 ,let us allow1 that1 if the goodness of the ,deity 7,i mean a goodness like the human7 could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori1 these phenomena1 however untoward1 would not be sufficient to subvert that principle2 but might easily1 in some unknown manner1 be reconcilable to it4 ,but let us still assert1 that as this goodness is not antecedently established1 but must be inferred from the phenomena1 there can be no grounds for such an inference1 while there are so many ills in the universe1 and while these ills might so easily have been remedied1 as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject4 ,i am ,sceptic enough to allow1 that the bad appearances1 notwithstanding all my reasonings1 may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose2 but surely they can never prove these attributes4 ,such a conclusion cannot result from ,scepticism1 but must arise from the phenomena1 and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena4 ,look round this universe4 ,what an immense profusion of beings1 animated and organised1 sensible and active6 ,you admire this prodigious variety and fecundity4 ,but inspect a little more narrowly these living existences1 the only beings worth regarding4 ,how hostile and destructive to each other6 ,how insufficient all of them for their own happiness6 ,how contemptible or odious to the spectator6 ,the whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind ,nature1 impregnated by a great vivifying principle1 and pouring forth from her lap1 without discernment or parental care1 her maimed and abortive children6 ,here the ,,manichaean system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty3 and no doubt1 in some respects1 it is very specious1 and has more probability than the common hypothesis1 by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life4 ,but if we consider1 on the other hand1 the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe1 we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being4 ,there is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures3 but are not all the operations of ,nature carried on by an opposition of principles1 of hot and cold1 moist and dry1 light and heavy8 ,the true conclusion is1 that the original ,source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles2 and has no more regard to good above ill1 than to heat above cold1 or to drought above moisture1 or to light above heavy4 ,there may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe3 that they are endowed with perfect goodness2 that they have perfect malice2 that they are opposite1 and have both goodness and malice2 that they have neither goodness nor malice4 ,mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles2 and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third4 ,the fourth1 therefore1 seems by far the most probable4 ,what ,i have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral1 with little or no variation2 and we have no more reason to infer1 that the rectitude of the ,supreme ,being resembles human rectitude1 than that his benevolence resembles the human4 ,nay1 it will be thought1 that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments1 such as we feel them2 since moral evil1 in the opinion of many1 is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good4 ,but even though this should not be allowed1 and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice1 yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe1 it will very much puzzle you ,anthropomorphites1 how to account for it4 ,you must assign a cause for it1 without having recourse to the first cause4 ,but as every effect must have a cause1 and that cause another1 you must either carry on the progression in infinitum1 or rest on that original principle1 who is the ultimate cause of all things444 ,hold6 hold6 cried ,,demea3 ,whither does your imagination hurry you8 ,i joined in alliance with you1 in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the ,divine ,being1 and refute the principles of ,,cleanthes1 who would measure every thing by human rule and standard4 ,but ,i now find you running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels1 and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused4 ,are you secretly1 then1 a more dangerous enemy than ,,cleanthes himself8 ,and are you so late in perceiving it8 replied ,,cleanthes4 ,believe me1 ,,demea1 your friend ,,philo1 from the beginning1 has been amusing himself at both our expense2 and it must be confessed1 that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule4 ,the total infirmity of human reason1 the absolute incomprehensibility of the ,divine ,nature1 the great and universal misery1 and still greater wickedness of men2 these are strange topics1 surely1 to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors4 ,in ages of stupidity and ignorance1 indeed1 these principles may safely be espoused2 and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition1 than such as encourage the blind amazement1 the diffidence1 and melancholy of mankind4 ,but at present444 ,blame not so much1 interposed ,,philo1 the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen4 ,they know how to change their style with the times4 ,formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain1 that human life was vanity and misery1 and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men4 ,but of late years1 divines1 we find1 begin to retract this position2 and maintain1 though still with some hesitation1 that there are more goods than evils1 more pleasures than pains1 even in this life4 ,when religion stood entirely upon temper and education1 it was thought proper to encourage melancholy2 as indeed mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition4 ,but as men have now learned to form principles1 and to draw consequences1 it is necessary to change the batteries1 and to make use of such arguments as will endure at least some scrutiny and examination4 ,this variation is the same 7and from the same causes7 with that which ,i formerly remarked with regard to ,scepticism4 ,thus ,,philo continued to the last his spirit of opposition1 and his censure of established opinions4 ,but ,i could observe that ,,demea did not at all relish the latter part of the discourse2 and he took occasion soon after1 on some pretence or other1 to leave the company4 ,,part #ab ,after ,,demea's departure1 ,,cleanthes and ,,philo continued the conversation in the following manner4 ,our friend1 ,i am afraid1 said ,,cleanthes1 will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse1 while you are in company2 and to tell truth1 ,,philo1 ,i should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting4 ,your spirit of controversy1 joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition1 carries you strange lengths1 when engaged in an argument2 and there is nothing so sacred and venerable1 even in your own eyes1 which you spare on that occasion4 ,i must confess1 replied ,,philo1 that ,i am less cautious on the subject of ,natural ,religion than on any other2 both because ,i know that ,i can never1 on that head1 corrupt the principles of any man of common sense2 and because no one1 ,i am confident1 in whose eyes ,i appear a man of common sense1 will ever mistake my intentions4 ,you1 in particular1 ,,cleanthes1 with whom ,i live in unreserved intimacy2 you are sensible1 that notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation1 and my love of singular arguments1 no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind1 or pays more profound adoration to the ,divine ,being1 as he discovers himself to reason1 in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature4 ,a purpose1 an intention1 a design1 strikes every where the most careless1 the most stupid thinker2 and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems1 as at all times to reject it4 ,that ,nature does nothing in vain1 is a maxim established in all the schools1 merely from the contemplation of the works of ,nature1 without any religious purpose2 and1 from a firm conviction of its truth1 an anatomist1 who had observed a new organ or canal1 would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention4 ,one great foundation of the ,copernican system is the maxim1 ,that ,nature acts by the simplest methods1 and chooses the most proper means to any end2 and astronomers often1 without thinking of it1 lay this strong foundation of piety and religion4 ,the same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy3 ,and thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent ,author2 and their authority is often so much the greater1 as they do not directly profess that intention4 ,it is with pleasure ,i hear ,,galen reason concerning the structure of the human body4 ,the anatomy of a man1 says he ,de formatione foetus1 discovers above #fjj different muscles2 and whoever duly considers these1 will find1 that1 in each of them1 ,nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances1 in order to attain the end which she proposed2 proper figure1 just magnitude1 right disposition of the several ends1 upper and lower position of the whole1 the due insertion of the several nerves1 veins1 and arteries3 ,so that1 in the muscles alone1 above #fjjj several views and intentions must have been formed and executed4 ,the bones he calculates to be #bhd3 ,the distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each1 above forty4 ,what a prodigious display of artifice1 even in these simple and homogeneous parts6 ,but if we consider the skin1 ligaments1 vessels1 glandules1 humours1 the several limbs and members of the body2 how must our astonishment rise upon us1 in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted6 ,the further we advance in these researches1 we discover new scenes of art and wisdom3 ,but descry still1 at a distance1 further scenes beyond our reach2 in the fine internal structure of the parts1 in the economy of the brain1 in the fabric of the seminal vessels4 ,all these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal1 with wonderful variety1 and with exact propriety1 suited to the different intentions of ,nature in framing each species4 ,and if the infidelity of ,,galen1 even when these natural sciences were still imperfect1 could not withstand such striking appearances1 to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained1 who can now doubt of a ,supreme ,intelligence6 ,could ,i meet with one of this species 7who1 ,i thank ,god1 are very rare71 ,i would ask him3 ,supposing there were a ,god1 who did not discover himself immediately to our senses1 were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence1 than what appear on the whole face of ,nature8 ,what indeed could such a ,divine ,being do1 but copy the present economy of things2 render many of his artifices so plain1 that no stupidity could mistake them2 afford glimpses of still greater artifices1 which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions2 and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures8 ,now1 according to all rules of just reasoning1 every fact must pass for undisputed1 when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of2 even though these arguments be not1 in themselves1 very numerous or forcible3 ,how much more1 in the present case1 where no human imagination can compute their number1 and no understanding estimate their cogency6 ,i shall further add1 said ,,cleanthes1 to what you have so well urged1 that one great advantage of the principle of ,theism1 is1 that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete1 and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the world4 ,the comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance1 is so obvious and natural1 and is justified by so many instances of order and design in ,nature1 that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions1 and procure universal approbation4 ,whoever attempts to weaken this theory1 cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate3 ,it is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties2 and by remote and abstract views of things1 reach that suspense of judgement1 which is here the utmost boundary of his wishes4 ,but1 besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory1 it can never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis4 ,a false1 absurd system1 human nature1 from the force of prejudice1 is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance3 ,but no system at all1 in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason1 by natural propensity1 and by early education1 ,i think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend4 ,so little1 replied ,,philo1 do ,i esteem this suspense of judgement in the present case to be possible1 that ,i am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy1 more than is usually imagined4 ,that the works of ,nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art1 is evident2 and according to all the rules of good reasoning1 we ought to infer1 if we argue at all concerning them1 that their causes have a proportional analogy4 ,but as there are also considerable differences1 we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes2 and in particular1 ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause1 than any we have ever observed in mankind4 ,here then the existence of a ,,deity is plainly ascertained by reason3 and if we make it a question1 whether1 on account of these analogies1 we can properly call him a mind or intelligence1 notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds2 what is this but a mere verbal controversy8 ,no man can deny the analogies between the effects3 ,to restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible4 ,from this inquiry1 the legitimate conclusion is1 that the causes have also an analogy3 ,and if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a ,,god or ,,deity1 but desire to vary the expression2 what can we call him but ,,mind or ,,thought1 to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance8 ,all men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes1 which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries2 and it is found1 that the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions1 from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument1 and from the strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed4 ,but there is a species of controversy1 which1 from the very nature of language and of human ideas1 is involved in perpetual ambiguity1 and can never1 by any precaution or any definitions1 be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision4 ,these are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance4 ,men may argue to all eternity1 whether ,,hannibal be a great1 or a very great1 or a superlatively great man1 what degree of beauty ,,cleopatra possessed1 what epithet of praise ,,livy or ,,thucydides is entitled to1 without bringing the controversy to any determination4 ,the disputants may here agree in their sense1 and differ in the terms1 or vice versa2 yet never be able to define their terms1 so as to enter into each other's meaning3 ,because the degrees of these qualities are not1 like quantity or number1 susceptible of any exact mensuration1 which may be the standard in the controversy4 ,that the dispute concerning ,theism is of this nature1 and consequently is merely verbal1 or perhaps1 if possible1 still more incurably ambiguous1 will appear upon the slightest inquiry4 ,i ask the ,theist1 if he does not allow1 that there is a great and immeasurable1 because incomprehensible difference between the human and the divine mind3 ,the more pious he is1 the more readily will he assent to the affirmative1 and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference3 ,he will even assert1 that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified4 ,i next turn to the ,atheist1 who1 ,i assert1 is only nominally so1 and can never possibly be in earnest2 and ,i ask him1 whether1 from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world1 there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of ,nature1 in every situation and in every age2 whether the rotting of a turnip1 the generation of an animal1 and the structure of human thought1 be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other3 ,it is impossible he can deny it3 ,he will readily acknowledge it4 ,having obtained this concession1 ,i push him still further in his retreat2 and ,i ask him1 if it be not probable1 that the principle which first arranged1 and still maintains order in this universe1 bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature1 and1 among the rest1 to the economy of human mind and thought4 ,however reluctant1 he must give his assent4 ,where then1 cry ,i to both these antagonists1 is the subject of your dispute8 ,the ,theist allows1 that the original intelligence is very different from human reason3 ,the ,atheist allows1 that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it4 ,will you quarrel1 ,gentlemen1 about the degrees1 and enter into a controversy1 which admits not of any precise meaning1 nor consequently of any determination8 ,if you should be so obstinate1 ,i should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides2 while the ,theist1 on the one hand1 exaggerates the dissimilarity between the ,supreme ,being1 and frail1 imperfect1 variable1 fleeting1 and mortal creatures2 and the ,atheist1 on the other1 magnifies the analogy among all the operations of ,nature1 in every period1 every situation1 and every position4 ,consider then1 where the real point of controversy lies2 and if you cannot lay aside your disputes1 endeavour1 at least1 to cure yourselves of your animosity4 ,and here ,i must also acknowledge1 ,,cleanthes1 that as the works of ,nature have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance1 than to those of our benevolence and justice1 we have reason to infer1 that the natural attributes of the ,deity have a greater resemblance to those of men1 than his moral have to human virtues4 ,but what is the consequence8 ,nothing but this1 that the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than his natural abilities4 ,for1 as the ,supreme ,being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect1 whatever differs most from him1 departs the furthest from the supreme standard of rectitude and perfection4 ,it seems evident that the dispute between the ,skeptics and ,dogmatists is entirely verbal1 or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning2 and such disputes are commonly1 at the bottom1 verbal1 and admit not of any precise determination4 ,no philosophical ,dogmatist denies that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science1 and that these difficulties are in a regular1 logical method1 absolutely insolvable4 ,no ,skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity1 notwithstanding these difficulties1 of thinking1 and believing1 and reasoning1 with regard to all kinds of subjects1 and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security4 ,the only difference1 then1 between these sects1 if they merit that name1 is1 that the ,sceptic1 from habit1 caprice1 or inclination1 insists most on the difficulties2 the ,dogmatist1 for like reasons1 on the necessity4 ,these1 ,,cleanthes1 are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject2 and these sentiments1 you know1 ,i have ever cherished and maintained4 ,but in proportion to my veneration for true religion1 is my abhorrence of vulgar superstitions2 and ,i indulge a peculiar pleasure1 ,i confess1 in pushing such principles1 sometimes into absurdity1 sometimes into impiety4 ,and you are sensible1 that all bigots1 notwithstanding their great aversion to the latter above the former1 are commonly equally guilty of both4 ,my inclination1 replied ,,cleanthes1 lies1 ,i own1 a contrary way4 ,religion1 however corrupted1 is still better than no religion at all4 ,the doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals1 that we never ought to abandon or neglect it4 ,for if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect1 as we daily find2 how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal8 ,how happens it then1 said ,,philo1 if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society1 that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs8 ,factions1 civil wars1 persecutions1 subversions of government1 oppression1 slavery2 these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men4 ,if the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration1 we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it4 ,and no period of time can be happier or more prosperous1 than those in which it is never regarded or heard of4 ,the reason of this observation1 replied ,,cleanthes1 is obvious4 ,the proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men1 humanise their conduct1 infuse the spirit of temperance1 order1 and obedience2 and as its operation is silent1 and only enforces the motives of morality and justice1 it is in danger of being overlooked1 and confounded with these other motives4 ,when it distinguishes itself1 and acts as a separate principle over men1 it has departed from its proper sphere1 and has become only a cover to faction and ambition4 ,and so will all religion1 said ,,philo1 except the philosophical and rational kind4 ,your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts4 ,the inference is not just1 because finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great influence1 that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater4 ,consider1 ,i beseech you1 the attachment which we have to present things1 and the little concern which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain4 ,when divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world1 they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable 7which indeed it is72 and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it1 and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests4 ,yet these same divines1 when they refute their speculative antagonists1 suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful1 that1 without them1 it were impossible for civil society to subsist2 nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction4 ,it is certain1 from experience1 that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct1 than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems4 ,a man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him2 it is for ever present to the mind1 and mingles itself with every view and consideration3 whereas religious motives1 where they act at all1 operate only by starts and bounds2 and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind4 ,the force of the greatest gravity1 say the philosophers1 is infinitely small1 in comparison of that of the least impulse3 yet it is certain1 that the smallest gravity will1 in the end1 prevail above a great impulse2 because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation4 ,another advantage of inclination3 ,it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind2 and when set in opposition to religious principles1 seeks every method and art of eluding them3 ,in which it is almost always successful4 ,who can explain the heart of man1 or account for those strange salvos and excuses1 with which people satisfy themselves1 when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty8 ,this is well understood in the world2 and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man1 because they hear1 that from study and philosophy1 he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects4 ,and when we have to do with a man1 who makes a great profession of religion and devotion1 has this any other effect upon several1 who pass for prudent1 than to put them on their guard1 lest they be cheated and deceived by him8 ,we must further consider1 that philosophers1 who cultivate reason and reflection1 stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals2 and that the vulgar1 who alone may need them1 are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the ,deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour4 ,the recommendations to the ,divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances1 or rapturous ecstasies1 or a bigoted credulity4 ,we need not run back into antiquity1 or wander into remote regions1 to find instances of this degeneracy4 ,amongst ourselves1 some have been guilty of that atrociousness1 unknown to the ,egyptian and ,grecian superstitions1 of declaiming in express terms1 against morality2 and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the ,divine favour1 if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it4 ,but even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality2 the very diverting of the attention1 the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit1 the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame1 must have the most pernicious consequences1 and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity4 ,such a principle of action likewise1 not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct1 acts only by intervals on the temper2 and must be roused by continual efforts1 in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct1 and make him fulfil his devotional task4 ,many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour1 where the heart1 at the time1 feels cold and languid3 ,a habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted2 and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle4 ,hence the reason of that vulgar observation1 that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy1 so far from being inconsistent1 are often or commonly united in the same individual character4 ,the bad effects of such habits1 even in common life1 are easily imagined2 but where the interests of religion are concerned1 no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot4 ,the sacredness of the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it4 ,the steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation1 is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections1 and beget a narrow1 contracted selfishness4 ,and when such a temper is encouraged1 it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence4 ,thus1 the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct2 nor is their operation favourable to morality1 in the instances where they predominate4 ,is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible1 than that both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very narrow limits2 and that the civil magistrate ought1 for ever1 to keep his fasces and axes from such dangerous hands8 ,but if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society1 a contrary maxim ought to prevail4 ,the greater number of priests1 and their greater authority and riches1 will always augment the religious spirit4 ,and though the priests have the guidance of this spirit1 why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life1 and greater benevolence and moderation1 from persons who are set apart for religion1 who are continually inculcating it upon others1 and who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it8 ,whence comes it then1 that1 in fact1 the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions1 is1 as far as possible1 to make a saving game of it1 and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society8 ,every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences4 ,if he admits only one religion among his subjects1 he must sacrifice1 to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity1 every consideration of public liberty1 science1 reason1 industry1 and even his own independency4 ,if he gives indulgence to several sects1 which is the wiser maxim1 he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of them1 and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect2 otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes1 quarrels1 factions1 persecutions1 and civil commotions4 ,true religion1 ,i allow1 has no such pernicious consequences3 but we must treat of religion1 as it has commonly been found in the world2 nor have ,i any thing to do with that speculative tenet of ,theism1 which1 as it is a species of philosophy1 must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle1 and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience1 of being always confined to very few persons4 ,oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature2 but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion4 ,it is the solemnity and importance of the occasion1 the regard to reputation1 and the reflecting on the general interests of society1 which are the chief restraints upon mankind4 ,custom-house oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion2 and a ,quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person4 ,i know1 that ,,polybius ,lib4 vi4 cap4 #ed4 ascribes the infamy of ,,greek faith to the prevalency of the ,,epicurean philosophy3 but ,i know also1 that ,punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times as ,irish evidence has in modern2 though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason4 ,not to mention that ,greek faith was infamous before the rise of the ,epicurean philosophy2 and ,,euripides ,iphigenia in ,tauride1 in a passage which ,i shall point out to you1 has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation1 with regard to this circumstance4 ,take care1 ,,philo1 replied ,,cleanthes1 take care3 push not matters too far3 allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true4 ,forfeit not this principle1 the chief1 the only great comfort in life2 and our principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune4 ,the most agreeable reflection1 which it is possible for human imagination to suggest1 is that of genuine ,theism1 which represents us as the workmanship of a ,being perfectly good1 wise1 and powerful2 who created us for happiness2 and who1 having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good1 will prolong our existence to all eternity1 and will transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes1 in order to satisfy those desires1 and render our felicity complete and durable4 ,next to such a ,being himself 7if the comparison be allowed71 the happiest lot which we can imagine1 is that of being under his guardianship and protection4 ,these appearances1 said ,,philo1 are most engaging and alluring2 and with regard to the true philosopher1 they are more than appearances4 ,but it happens here1 as in the former case1 that1 with regard to the greater part of mankind1 the appearances are deceitful1 and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail above its comforts4 ,it is allowed1 that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness4 ,is not this a proof1 that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow8 ,but men1 when afflicted1 find consolation in religion1 replied ,,cleanthes4 ,sometimes1 said ,,philo3 but it is natural to imagine1 that they will form a notion of those unknown beings1 suitably to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper1 when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them4 ,accordingly1 we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions2 and we ourselves1 after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the ,deity1 fall into the flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect4 ,i shall venture to affirm1 that there never was a popular religion1 which represented the state of departed souls in such a light1 as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state4 ,these fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy4 ,for as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity1 that event is so shocking to ,nature1 that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond it2 and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of ,,cerberus and ,,furies2 devils1 and torrents of fire and brimstone4 ,it is true1 both fear and hope enter into religion2 because both these passions1 at different times1 agitate the human mind1 and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself4 ,but when a man is in a cheerful disposition1 he is fit for business1 or company1 or entertainment of any kind2 and he naturally applies himself to these1 and thinks not of religion4 ,when melancholy and dejected1 he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world1 and to plunge himself still deeper in affliction4 ,it may indeed happen1 that after he has1 in this manner1 engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought and imagination1 there may arrive a change of health or circumstances1 which may restore his good humour1 and raising cheerful prospects of futurity1 make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph4 ,but still it must be acknowledged1 that1 as terror is the primary principle of religion1 it is the passion which always predominates in it1 and admits but of short intervals of pleasure4 ,not to mention1 that these fits of excessive1 enthusiastic joy1 by exhausting the spirits1 always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection2 nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable4 ,but this state it is impossible to support1 where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty1 between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery4 ,no wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind1 and throws it into the utmost confusion4 ,and though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions2 yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper1 and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people4 ,it is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion whatsoever1 or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter1 by the freest use of our reason4 ,such a sentiment implies both an absurdity and an inconsistency4 ,it is an absurdity to believe that the ,deity has human passions1 and one of the lowest of human passions1 a restless appetite for applause4 ,it is an inconsistency to believe1 that1 since the ,deity has this human passion1 he has not others also2 and1 in particular1 a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior4 ,to know ,god1 says ,,seneca1 is to worship him4 ,all other worship is indeed absurd1 superstitious1 and even impious4 ,it degrades him to the low condition of mankind1 who are delighted with entreaty1 solicitation1 presents1 and flattery4 ,yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty4 ,commonly1 it depresses the ,deity far below the condition of mankind2 and represents him as a capricious ,,demon1 who exercises his power without reason and without humanity6 ,and were that ,divine ,being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals1 who are his own workmanship1 ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions4 ,nor would any of human race merit his favour1 but a very few1 the philosophical ,theists1 who entertain1 or rather indeed endeavour to entertain1 suitable notions of his ,divine perfections3 ,as the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical ,sceptics1 a sect almost equally rare1 who1 from a natural diffidence of their own capacity1 suspend1 or endeavour to suspend1 all judgement with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects4 ,if the whole of ,natural ,theology1 as some people seem to maintain1 resolves itself into one simple1 though somewhat ambiguous1 at least undefined proposition1 ,that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence3 ,if this proposition be not capable of extension1 variation1 or more particular explication3 ,if it affords no inference that affects human life1 or can be the source of any action or forbearance3 ,and if the analogy1 imperfect as it is1 can be carried no further than to the human intelligence1 and cannot be transferred1 with any appearance of probability1 to the other qualities of the mind2 if this really be the case1 what can the most inquisitive1 contemplative1 and religious man do more than give a plain1 philosophical assent to the proposition1 as often as it occurs1 and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it8 ,some astonishment1 indeed1 will naturally arise from the greatness of the object2 some melancholy from its obscurity2 some contempt of human reason1 that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question4 ,but believe me1 ,,cleanthes1 the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion1 is a longing desire and expectation that ,heaven would be pleased to dissipate1 at least alleviate1 this profound ignorance1 by affording some more particular revelation to mankind1 and making discoveries of the nature1 attributes1 and operations of the ,divine object of our faith4 ,a person1 seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason1 will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity3 ,while the haughty ,dogmatist1 persuaded that he can erect a complete system of ,theology by the mere help of philosophy1 disdains any further aid1 and rejects this adventitious instructor4 ,to be a philosophical ,sceptic is1 in a man of letters1 the first and most essential step towards being a sound1 believing ,christian2 a proposition which ,i would willingly recommend to the attention of ,,pamphilus3 ,and ,i hope ,,cleanthes will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil4 ,,cleanthes and ,,philo pursued not this conversation much further3 and as nothing ever made greater impression on me1 than all the reasonings of that day1 so ,i confess1 that1 upon a serious review of the whole1 ,i cannot but think1 that ,,philo's principles are more probable than ,,demea's2 but that those of ,,cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth4