,,essays ,,in ,,rationalism ,,by ,,charles ,,robert ,,newman 7,brother of ,cardinal ,newman47 ,,with ,,preface ,,by ,,george ,,jacob ,,holyoake4 ,,and ,,biographical ,,sketch ,,by ,j4 ,m4 ,,wheeler4 ,,london3 ,,progressive ,,publishing ,,company1 #bh ,stonecutter ,street1 ,e4,c4 #ahia ,,london3 ,,printed ,,and ,,published ,,by ,g4 ,w4 ,,foote1 #bh ,,stonecutter ,,street1 ,e4,c4 ,,essays ,,in ,,rationalism4 ,,publisher',s ,,note4 ,whether this little volume will find sufficient patrons to defray the cost of its production is at least doubtful4 ,the writer whose essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be popular4 ,but he possessed a fine intellect1 however frustrated by circumstances2 he belonged to an illustrious family2 and it is well to let the public have access to the opinions of a brother of ,cardinal ,newman and of ,professor ,newman1 a brother who took his own course1 as they did1 and thought out for himself an independent philosophy4 ,all ,charles ,robert ,newman's writings that are known to have been printed1 appeared in the ,reasoner1 edited by ,mr4 ,george ,jacob ,holyoake1 at various dates during #ahfj-fa4 ,with trifling exceptions they are all reprinted in this collection4 ,mr4 ,holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic ,newman1 and ,mr4 ,j4 ,m4 ,wheeler has gathered all the information that is obtainable as to his life and personality4 ,,biographical ,,sketch4 ,of ,charles ,robert ,newman1 until the death of his brother1 the ,cardinal1 almost nothing was known4 ,some reminiscences of him by ,mr4 ,thomas ,purnell and ,precentor ,edmund ,venables appeared in the ,athenum at the time of his death in #ahhd1 and these remain the chief sources of information concerning him4 ,mr4 ,g4 ,j4 ,holyoake also1 in his paper ,the ,present ,day1 wrote3 ,if the public come to know more of ,charles ,r4 ,newman1 it will be seen that all the brothers1 ,john ,henry1 ,francis ,william1 and ,charles ,r4 ,newman1 were men of unusual distinction of character1 and that while each held diverse views1 all had the family qualities of perspicacity1 candor and conscience4 ,but these notes attracted little attention4 ,most people were under the impression there were only two brothers1 who had long figured in the public eye as types of the opposite courses of modern thought towards ,romanism and ,rationalism4 ,yet the real type of antagonism to ,rome was to be found in ,charles ,robert1 who is dismissed by the ,rev4 ,thomas ,mozley with the words3 ,there was also another brother1 not without his share in the heritage of natural gifts4 ,in a notable passage on change of religion1 in his ,essay in ,aid of a ,grammar of ,assent1 chap4 vii41 ,cardinal ,newman seems to allude to the career of himself and his brothers4 ,he says3 ,thus of three ,protestants1 one becomes a ,catholic1 a second a ,unitarian1 and a third an unbeliever3 how is this8 ,the first becomes a ,catholic1 because he assented1 as a ,protestant1 to the doctrine of our ,lord's divinity1 with a real assent and a genuine conviction1 and because this certitude1 taking possession of his mind1 led him on to welcome the ,catholic doctrines of the ,real ,presence and of the ,theotocos1 till his ,protestantism fell off from him1 and he submitted himself to the ,church4 ,the second became a ,unitarian1 because1 proceeding on the principle that ,scripture was the rule of faith1 and that a man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation1 and finding that the doctrine of the ,nicene and ,athanasian ,creeds did not follow by logical necessity from the text of ,scripture1 he said to himself1 ',the word of ,god has been made of none effect by the traditions of men1' and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he considered primitive ,christianity and to become a ,humanitarian4 ,the third gradually subsided into infidelity1 because he started with the ,protestant dogma1 cherished in the depths of his nature1 that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the ,gospel4 ,first1 then1 he would protest against the sacrifice of the ,mass2 next he gave up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental principle2 then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on ,christian liberty as well as ,sacraments2 then came the question1 ,what after all was the use of teachers of religion8 ,why should any one stand between him and his ,maker8 ,after a time it struck him that this obvious question had to be answered by the ,apostles1 as well as by the ,anglican clergy2 so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of ,god to man is that which is written on the heart4 ,this did for a time1 and he remained a ,deist4 ,but then it occurred to him1 that this inward moral law was there within the breast1 whether there was a ,god or not1 and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law1 to say that it came from ,god and simply unnecessary1 considering it carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority1 as our feelings instinctively testified1 and when he turned to look at the physical world around him1 he really did not see what scientific proof there was of the ,being of ,god at all1 and it seemed to him as if all things would go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it2 so he dropped it1 and became a purus putus ,atheist4 ,i have transcribed this lengthy1 but remarkable passage1 not because ,i think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two brothers1 but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own nearest relatives4 ,charles ,robert ,newman1 younger brother of the ,cardinal and elder brother of the ,professor1 was born on ,june #af1 #ahjb1 being one year and four months the junior of the former1 and three years the senior of the latter4 #a ,their father1 a ,london man1 and friend of ,capel the eminent stockbroker1 from having been clerk in a bank1 became a partner1 though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial depression1 both in this business and as a brewer4 ,he was a ,freemason1 a musician1 and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste land and planting with trees4 ,in religion his views appear to have been of a broad cast approximating to those of ,benjamin ,franklin4 ,the mother1 whose maiden name was ,jemima ,fourdrinier1 was of ,hugenot family1 and of religious cast of mind4 ,there were six children1 equally divided as to sex4 ,harriet1 the eldest girl1 married the ,rev4 ,thomas ,mozley2 ,jemima1 the second1 married ,mr4 ,john ,mozley2 while ,mary1 the youngest1 died unmarried4 ,charles ,robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers1 ,john ,henry and ,francis ,william1 that of ,dr4 ,george ,nicholas at ,ealing1 ,middlesex4 ,of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what is known of his brothers4 ,john ,henry has told how1 in youth1 he read ,paine's tracts against the ,old ,testament--we presume he means the ,age of ,reason--and also boasted of reading ,hume1 though1 as he says1 this was possibly but by way of brag4 ,evidently1 though the family was brought up in the habit of ,bible reading1 there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of their studies4 ,while the father lived family prayer was unknown1 nor was there any inculcation of dogma4 ,we read1 says ,francis ,william1 the ,psalms appointed by the church every day1 and went to the parish church on ,sunday4 ,francis ,william ,newman1 in his ,contributions1 ,chiefly to the ,early ,history of ,cardinal ,newman1 says3 ,in opening life1 my brother ,c4 ,r4 ,n4 became a convert to ,robert ,owen1 the philanthropic ,socialist1 who was then an ,atheist4 #b ,but soon breaking loose from him1 ,charles tried to originate a ',new ,moral ,world' of his own1 which seemed to others absurd and immoral1 as well as very unamiable4 ,he disowned us all1 on my father's death1 as 'too religious for him4' ,to keep a friend1 or to act under a superior1 seemed alike impossible to him4 ,his brother 7the late ,cardinal7 humbled himself to beg a clerkship for him in the ,bank of ,england2 but ,charles thought it 'his duty' to write to the ,directors letters of advice1 so they could not keep him4 ,nor could he keep any place long4 ,he said he ought to take a literary degree at ,bonn3 his two brothers managed it for him1 but he came away without seeking the degree4 ,his brother-in-law1 the ,rev4 ,thomas ,mozley1 then took him up very liberally2 but after my sister ,harriet's death1 ,j4 ,h4 ,n4 and ,i bore his expenses to his dying day4 ,his meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic2 yet his moderation was exemplary1 and at last he undoubtedly won the respect of the mother and daughter who waited on him4 ,in this1 which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother1 it appears to me ,professor ,newman has either said too little or too much4 ,the title of his work did not necessitate any reference to ,charles ,robert2 but having said so much he should at least have explained further4 ,for instance1 in reference to the visit to ,bonn1 it was exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a degree1 since both his senior and junior had a college education4 ,that he did not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour his life4 ,mr4 ,meynell explains why he returned without seeking the degree4 ,he says3 ,but he came away without even offering himself for examination1 a step he explained by saying that the judges would not grant him a degree because he had given offence by his treatment of faith and morals it is a ,catholic who writes in an essay which they call teterrima4 ,charles may have acted with extreme imprudence1 both in regard to the bank directors and the ,bonn examiners2 but we should need to know the cases before we can determine whether he was actuated by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a higher than common standard of conduct4 ,each of the brothers had evidently exquisite sensitiveness of conscience1 though1 as proved by the ,professor's last book--that unique criticism of a brother who died at ninety by another aged eighty-five--they could not always enter into sympathy with each other4 ,of this we may be quite sure4 ,the life of one who had thought himself into ,atheism1 yet contemplated becoming a tutor1 must have been a most uncomfortable one4 ,the treatment he was likely to receive could not be calculated to evoke his better qualities4 ,finding everywhere his ,atheism a bar to his advancement1 whose is the fault if it resulted in a character of petulance and cynicism1 and in--what it evidently did result in--a largely wasted life8 ,the ,rev4 ,edward ,venables1 ,precentor of ,lincoln1 speaks of him as having been1 between #ahcd and #ahdd1 usher in a large school for farmers' sons1 kept by a ,mr4 ,allfree at ,windmill ,hill1 in the parish of ,herstmonceaux1 ,sussex1 where ,julius ,charles ,hare1 ,archdeacon of ,lewes1 was rector1 and ,john ,sterling for a short while curate4 ,mr4 ,venables says ,newman interested ,archdeacon ,hare very much1 and ,i have often heard him speak of the long conversations he had had with him on literary and philosophical subjects1 and of the remarkable mental power he displayed4 ,at that time the future ,cardinal's brother had entirely discarded the ,christian faith1 and declared himself an unbeliever in revelation4 ,there can be no doubt the tribute from ,hare1 a man of very superior culture1 was deserved1 though the archdeacon also expressed the opinion there was a screw loose somewhere4 ,the task of teaching the ,sussex rustics was1 as ,precentor ,venables remarks1 intolerably irksome to a man of ,newman's high intellectual power4 ,it was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor4 ,his relations with his principal became strained1 and a tussle between the usher and his class led to his dismissal4 ,at this time he was miserably poor4 ,precentor ,venables says3 ,to ,hare he lamented the narrow-mindedness of his brothers ,john and ,francis1 who1 as he asserted1 had entirely cast him off1 and left him to fight his way in the world unaided1 because of his professed infidelity1 in which the younger of the two1 then an ardent ,evangelical1 was before very long to follow him4 ,no reproach whatever is due to the younger brother on this account1 and the elder is probably as little blameworthy4 ,john ,henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one whose views upon faith and morals he considered unsound4 ,francis ,william had gone to ,bagdad with the object of assisting in a ,christian mission1 and intercourse with ,mohammedans and other studies were but gradually loosening his orthodoxy4 ,after his return1 and when his works and professorship at ,london ,university assured his position1 he put himself into regular monthly communication with his brother4 ,in the meantime he had been assisted by his sister ,harriet's husband4 ,but the iron had already entered his soul2 he was an ,atheist and an outcast4 ,forced to receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his opinions1 he seems to have resented their kindness as an attempt to bribe his intellectual conscience4 ,the world rang with the fame--as theologian1 historian1 poet1 and preacher--of the elder1 whose creed he had outgrown and despised2 while his convictions1 to the full as honest1 everywhere stood in his way1 and were contemned as an offence against faith and morals4 ,he had no contact with minds congenial to his own1 and doomed himself to the life of a recluse4 ,each of the brothers was of a retiring1 meditative disposition4 ,reading the ,apologia ,pro ,vita ,sua of the eldest1 one may see how this contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the ,catholic ,church4 ,the same disposition of mind may be traced in the ,phases of ,faith of the youngest1 equally impelling him from the evangelicalism of his surroundings and leading to the rejection of historic ,christianity1 and finally to the surrender of all belief in revelation4 ,in ,charles ,robert ,newman the same qualities were seen to excess1 removing him from contact with his fellows to the life of a solitary thinker in a quiet ,welsh watering-place4 ,from about #ahec1 he had a room in a small cottage on the ,marsh road1 ,tenby4 ,mr4 ,thomas ,purnell1 who says he had for years the inestimable privilege of enjoying his close intimacy1 remarks1 never before or since have ,i met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual equipment4 ,mr4 ,purnell thus describes his own first visit to the recluse3 ,he stood at the top of the topmost stair4 ,i cannot imagine a more distinguished head and face4 ,there was a touch of ,mephistopheles in him4 ,there was also a touch of ,jupiter ,olympius4 ,although dressed in ill-fitting clothes1 and with a sort of blanket over his shoulders1 he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace4 ,he bowed me without a word into his apartments4 ,this was in the roof of the building1 and the only light came from a window which opened with a notched iron bar4 ,the room was as meagrely furnished as ,goethe's study in ,weimar4 ,a bed1 a chest of drawers1 a table and two or three chairs1 with a few books1 constituted the whole goods and chattels4 ,mr4 ,purnell says his health1 means and inclination made him averse to society4 ,the rector called on him1 but was not admitted2 visitors to the town who had known his brothers would send in their cards1 but they received no response2 local medical men1 when they heard he was ill1 volunteered their services1 but they were declined with courteous thanks conveyed by letter4 ,it appears he but seldom left his house1 and when he went out he did not often enter the town1 but took his exercise in the road which led into the country4 ,dressed in a pea-jacket1 with a shawl or a rug thrown across his shoulders1 and with a sou'-wester over his head1 he marched erect1 looking neither to left nor right4 ,he wore shoes1 and1 as his trousers were short1 displayed an interval of white socks4 ,the lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with derision4 ,it was through ,mr4 ,purnell that he communicated the papers here reprinted to the ,reasoner4 ,although but of the character of fragments1 they bespeak an original mind4 ,the secret of the ,cardinal's great influence and strength was that what he spoke and wrote came not from books1 but forthright out of his own head and heart4 ,the topics with which his brother deals were those only needing the mind1 and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of an original intellect4 ,the ,reasoner ceased soon after the appearance of these papers1 and thus closed the one opening for his literary activity4 ,francis ,william ,newman was1 at least till the present year1 unaware that his arguments for ,theism were challenged by his own brother under the signature of ,a ,recluse4 ,he informs me that he had never heard that anyone would publish anything from his pen1 and that he heard that at his death1 in ,march1 #ahhd1 he left a box full of manuscripts1 which were destroyed as useless4 ,whether this was done by order of his relatives1 whether the landlady decided the question1 or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in1 will perhaps remain as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts4 ,the following specimens are all by which the latter question can be judged4 ,mr4 ,meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit from his eldest brother4 ,it must have been a strange meeting1 and one worthy the brush of a great artist4 ,surely in all ,england there were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two brothers whose lives were so diversified4 ,the one a saintly cardinal1 called by the ,pope the ,light of ,england1 who1 by his rare urbanity1 had gained the respect of all1 replete with all that should accompany old age--as honor1 love1 obedience1 troops of friends3 the other1 fallen1 too1 into the sere and yellow leaf1 and without them all--poor1 solitary1 unknown and despised1 a scorn and wonderment to his nearest neighbors4 ,and all from following his own thought that had made him a purus putus ,atheist4 ,j4 ,m4 ,wheeler4 ,,character ,,of ,,charles ,,newman4 ,there is little to say and less need to add anything to what ,mr4 ,wheeler writes1 whose industry and discernment collect together all the accessible facts of his subject4 ,my knowledge of ,charles ,robert ,newman is confined to his correspondence1 which1 with my present engagements1 ,i could not refer to and examine without delaying the printer longer than would be convenient to you1 as ,mr4 ,wheeler's article is in type4 ,the impression ,mr4 ,c4 ,r4 ,newman conveyed to me by his letters is1 ,i judge1 sufficient for the purpose in hand4 ,charles ,newman had an intermittent mind4 ,he would write with great force and clearness1 and in another letter1 which was confused in parts1 he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him1 as was its wont as ,i understood him1 and after a few months less or more1 it would return to him1 when he would write again4 ,in this manly frankness and strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers ,francis and ,john4 ,i trusted to his friend ,mr4 ,purnell1 who was the medium in communicating with me1 to send me further letters when ,mr4 ,charles was able or disposed to write them4 ,i expected to hear from him again4 ,much occupied with debates and otherwise at the time1 ,i neglected writing further to him myself4 ,afterwards thinking his disablement might have grown upon him with years1 disinclined me from asking him to resume his letters4 ,mr4 ,wheeler seems ignorant of ,charles ,newman's mental peculiarity1 and does not recognise what may be generous delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to it4 ,to do so would have subjected them to the imputation1 very frequent formerly1 of imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness4 ,even so liberal a preacher as ,w4 ,j4 ,fox accounted1 in #ahda1 for my disbelief in ,theism by conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency4 ,no doubt many persons with whom ,charles ,newman had dealings in offices he held1 would regard his ,atheism--which it was contrary to his nature to conceal--as a personal disqualification4 ,he avowed his opinions as naturally and as boldly as ,professor ,newman and the ,cardinal avowed theirs4 ,it is not conceivable that ,cardinal ,newman ever intermitted his aid--or ,professor ,newman either--on this account4 ,they were both incapable of personal intolerance4 ,they might deplore that their brother ,charles's opinions were so alien1 so contrary to theirs2 but this they would never make matter of reproach4 ,it was doubtless a great trial to them that their brother1 having fine powers like their own1 making no persistent effort for his own maintenance1 although he knew it must render independence impossible4 ,possibly the solitariness which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness of conduct1 not to say eccentricity1 to grow upon him--which they could not control or mitigate without an interference1 which might subject them to resentment and reproach4 ,charles no doubt inherited his father's sympathy for social improvement1 which led to his sharing ,robert ,owen's sociologic views4 ,but he did not acquire his ,atheism from ,robert ,owen--as ,professor ,newman has said--for ,robert ,owen was not an ,atheist--always believing in some ,great ,power4 ,professor ,newman has told me that in any further edition of his little book upon his brother1 the ,cardinal1 he will1 on my authority1 correct his description of ,robert ,owen as an ,atheist4 ,charles owed his ,atheism to himself1 as his brothers owed their opinions to their own conclusions and reflections4 ,charles not taking a degree was less likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him than to his intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment1 which produced satisfaction with the world1 with others1 and with himself4 ,george ,jacob ,holyoake4 ,,two ,,principles ,,of ,,order4 ,in my proof of the invalidity of that argument--it being indeed what is called the ,argument from ,design--,i point out that our experience simultaneously informs us of two modes of producing order1 otherwise called arrangement1 relation of parts to each other and to the whole direction of means towards some recognisable end2 or1 to describe the phenomenon in the most summary1 as well as the most practical1 way--two modes of producing effects identical with those that proceed from design4 ,i explain that1 of these two principles of order1 the one is ,design itself1 a modus operandi of intelligence 7such as we find it here below1 of which the human mind affords the best examples71 while the other is something to which no name has been assigned1 and which1 consequently1 we can only shortly describe by saying that it is not design4 ,it becomes necessary1 therefore1 to give a farther periphrastic account of it as follows3-- ,this nameless principle of order1 considered as a vague popular surmise1 is as familiar to our experience as design4 ,we all see1 for instance1 that water has a tendency to form a perfectly level and horizontal surface1 that heavy bodies fall to the earth perpendicularly1 that the plummet performs a straight line in just the same direction1 that dew-drops and soap-bubbles assume a globular shape1 that crystallisation observes similar artist-like rules1 and so on4 ,we are accustomed to say1 ,it is the nature of things1 and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this regularity of proceeding1 without generally attempting to explain it4 ,science comes to our help1 and shows us that this orderly action of things around us may be traced to1 and is the necessary result of1 the operation of certain powers or properties inherent in these natural things4 ,grant that the property called gravitation belongs to moving bodies1 and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be predicated as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence from this datum2 which same phenomena1 moreover1 intelligence is able coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way4 ,here1 then1 is a principle of order1 less popularly appreciated1 but not less certainly evidenced and known1 than design4 ,it is1 no doubt1 a principle infinitely inferior in dignity1 for it is blind and unintelligent1 while design sees and understands1 but this is not the question4 ,the question1 superseded by an answer derived from human experience1 is to this effect--that nature and natural things are1 with no less propriety1 assignable as the doers of a certain non-designing kind of order1 than man is assignable as the doer of the designing kind2 that we just as truly perceive that nature1 in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in her1 produces order in a dew-drop or in a crystal1 as that man1 in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in him1 produces order in a poem or in a cathedral1 and that1 consequently1 the argument from design1 based as it is on the assertion that our experience assures us of only one principle of order1 is invalid4 ,mr4 ,f4 ,w4 ,newman's argument is one of this erroneous class4 ,he points to ,animal ,instincts as an effect1 which1 owing to our knowing of no other agency by which it could have been produced1 can alone be accounted for by reference to a designer1 and consequently as manifesting the objective existence of that designer1 who could only be the theistic ,god4 ,the question that ,mr4 ,f4 ,newman's adduced instance required him to consider was1 whether the non-designing principle of order1 which1 we are aware1 is in many cases able to produce the same effects as the other1 could have been thus operative here1 and he had got to prove that it could not have been so1 that there was something in the nature of the case that forced us exclusively to have recourse to the intelligent principle of order1 and resisted any solution from the other principle4 ,the result of a proof so conducted would have been1 that ,mr4 ,f4 ,newman was entitled to conclude that 7granting our earthly experience was a sufficient test of the matter7 ,design must have been the sole worker of the debated phenomenon4 ,he would then have established his theistic argument4 ,instead of doing this1 he simplifies his proceeding by being incognisant of a notorious fact1 and ignoring the non-designing principle altogether4 #a4 ,the fact is1 that there is not one way only of producing the phenomena of design 7,i am here using an ordinary elliptical mode of speaking1 since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes cumbrous7--but there are two ways3 one1 the mind of a designer1 and the other 7whatever may be its nature1 which the present question does not call upon me to define7 not the mind of a designer4 #b4 ,the shortest way of proving this theorem1 is to state that there are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person4 ,one is to have your portrait taken1 and the other is to stand before a looking-glass1 and that of these two ways the former is that of design1 and the latter confessedly not design1 being the well-known necessary effect of certain so-called second causes1 whose operation in this instance is familiar to modern science4 #c4 ,consequently1 ,s4 ,d4 ,collet is incorrect in the principle which she makes the foundation of her argument at p4 #bg1 where it is said1 ,what the ,theist maintains is this1 that when we see the exercise of ,force in the direction of a purpose1 we1 by an inevitable inference1 attribute the phenomenon to some conscious agent4 #d4 ,force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a purpose--the purpose being that of producing similitude--with equal evidence in the two cases just compared2 for though the force exercised in said direction is less in the case of the painter than it is in that of the looking-glass 7for the resemblance produced by the former is in less degree a resemblance than that produced by the latter71 the evidence cannot be said to be less1 since it is no less able to convince4 ,we are as perfectly sure that the painter could not have produced that lesser similitude of a man1 and a particular man1 by chance 7the alternative of this supposition1 according to our experience1 being that he must have used design7 as we are that the looking-glass could not have produced that greater similitude of a man1 and a particular man1 by chance 7the alternative of this supposition1 according to our experience1 being that it must have used certain so-called laws of nature72 this collective experience of ours1 equally assuring us on the one hand1 that the only way of the painter's achieving these effects is by design1 and on the other1 that the only way of the looking-glass's doing so1 is by the natural agencies referred to4 #e4 ,the human experience on which the decision of this question must be founded--though not at the present era essentially different--may yet be said to be considerably so from what it was in certain former periods4 ,in no times could mankind think and observe without becoming aware of these two principles of order--whether you call them facts or inferences--as a portion of their familiar experience4 ,and so far as they might have compared them1 they must have abundantly seen that the natural one is more powerful than the artificial one1 and that the straight line or the circle must seek its perfection much rather from the plummet or the revolving radius1 than from the pencil of ,apelles4 #f4 ,thus the essential point of the existence of the two principles has always been known1 but the idea of their respective spheres and limits1 of the efficient prevalence of each within our experience1 has fluctuated in society4 ,art and handicraft are1 of course1 peculiarly competent to appreciate the artificial principle of order1 while physical science is especially conversant with the natural one4 ,as the ancients were equal to the moderns in the former pursuits1 but vastly inferior to them in the latter1 they must so far have had a tendency to think more of the designing principle1 and less of the other principle than we do4 ,but it must be remembered1 that one or other of these two principles1 or at least the arbitrament between them1 is the animating basis of all religion1 and of all religious sects and persuasions2 and further1 that of these two principles1 the religion founded on the artificial one1 which is the one traditionally derived to us1 is liable to be1 and is wont to be1 a far more powerful religion 7because it deals far more intensely in personification1 having reference singly to some supposed artist7 than either the religion that is constituted by the natural principle1 or that which results from a mixture of the two principles4 ,and indeed1 ,i will incidentally say that this last kind of religion seems to me to have much analogy on its side1 and that the old idea of the two principles might1 on several grounds besides the present one1 and in several respects1 perhaps1 be found to shadow forth a certain amount of most important truth and applicability4 #g4 ,to return4 ,by considering the state of religion and of religious belief in the times of ,socrates and ,cicero1 in connection with the state of art1 handicraft1 and science1 in the same time1 and coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment 7that at least of the kind which had in their era already been1 and much more since has been1 communicated from the east to the west7 is an incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion1 than reason and argument2 we shall have some of the principal data1 and in a main matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously in any inquiry we might make1 why it was that ,socrates and ,cicero1 having their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order and arrangement1 seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the natural one1 and why in consequence it was1 that the latter wrote to this effect3 ,he who can look up to the heavenly vault1 and doubt the existence of a one personal ,god1 the designer and governor of all things1 is equivalent to a madman2 and why1 further1 we1 spite of our vast physical science1 are prone to the same fallacy4 #h4 ,having thus proved that the argument of the ,theist generally1 as well as the particular one advanced by ,s4 ,d4 ,c4 at p4 #bg1 is1 by being based on the erroneous statement that there is only one means known to human experience1 of producing phenomena identical with those that are the product of design1 and that this one is design itself2 there being1 on the contrary1 two such means1 one of which is not design2 having1 ,i say1 proved that your argument1 by being so based1 is invalid1 ,i find ,i must fully agree with you1 that there is evidence of an unmistakable cosmical unity4 #i4 ,the true inquiry1 therefore1 is1 which of those two principles of order is1 in the agency inquired into1 the agent under these circumstances1 and whether both1 and how far1 under our ignorance of what may be 7a most important point that is carefully to be considered7 we are entitled to affirm as indubitable1 to denounce as contradictory1 to advance as probable1 to conjecture1 to surmise1 or to speculate on this question4 ,,the ,,truth ,,of ,,first ,,principles4 #a4 ,you ask my idea on the impossibility of proving the truth of ,first ,principles8 ,by truth you mean the ascertained existence of any idea or thing1 and the ascertained consistency of any statement with some such idea or thing4 ,by principles you mean not simply cardinal propositions1 but cardinal propositions that we have ascertained to be true4 ,by first principles you mean the indubitably true but unprovable elementary principles of all our knowledge4 ,you mean that these principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings2 all that we build upon them must1 in consequence of being so built1 admit of being proved whether we have built rightly--that is1 admit of being subjected to the test whether the reasoning is correct2 but these first principles are confessedly exempted from this test1 and yet are received as true1 no less than the others that have sustained this ordeal4 ,you ask the meaning of this privilege1 whether it is right2 and1 if so1 to what propriety or necessity of the case it is due8 #b4 ,you ask1 ,how is truth ascertained to be truth8 or1 in other words1 ,what is the criterion of truth8 ,with respect to the first query--,in accordance with the definition ,i have above given of truth1 it would seem that it must have two sources1 experience and reason1 experience who notifies the existence of certain ideas or things1 and reason1 who forms propositions suggested by them4 ,experience1 therefore1 acts the simple part of supplying all the materials of truth2 while reason1 besides his acknowledged office of judge of all truth1 exercises the quite different function of being himself the purveyor of a portion of it4 ,so indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only1 that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle2 while it appeals to the experience of those who agree with it1 as well as professes to be reasonable4 ,first principles must1 accordingly1 be of two kinds4 ,of those that are based upon experience1 ,i will give the following instances3--,i hear the chirping of a bird1 and ,i see an inkstand before me4 ,that ,i have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases1 are facts of which it is impossible ,i can doubt4 ,reason perceives that these are primary facts or first principles1 neither admitting nor requiring any proof1 testified by consciousness1 and self-evidently verified on that testimony4 ,by reason1 of course is meant the reason of all mankind--that is1 of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject4 ,so that any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own reason--in this or in any other matter1 presupposes a due comparison of my own reason with that of others1 nay1 in some cases1 a consideration of the supposably more enlightened reason of future times4 ,i discriminate first principles from derived ones thus3--,i see the sun1 is a first principle to me2 you see it1 is a first principle to you2 by comparing these two ideas1 each attains the derived principle that the other sees what he does1 and the further derived principle that the sun is an existence independent of both4 ,his own existence is1 indeed1 to every one the first principle1 by means of which he infers the existence of other things and beings4 ,in coming now to the other kind of first principles1 consisting of propositions formed by reason1 we perceive that these show symptoms of still further difference from the above1 than that which results from the difference of their source1 of difference that affects their philosophical character1 and their technical right to the name under which they present themselves to us4 ,in short1 the primary philosophy has not yet settled their title4 ,they are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called intuition4 ,not similarly1 however1 does our reason inform us that they really are first principles1 and our science is hitherto unequal to this inquiry4 ,take1 for instance1 the following celebrated thesis1 so often cited as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason1 insomuch as to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings2 which yet we are not sure is a first principle1 all that can be said in favor of its pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it to more primary elements3-- ,it is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be4 ,any one agreeing1 as every one must1 that this is true1 might still justly put the query1 ,why is it impossible8 thereby calling its assertion in question1 demanding its credentials of proof1 seeking some ground for its truth other than its own testimony1 and hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which it would be a derivative1 and by all and each of these proceedings1 rejecting its claim to be a first principle4 ,its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our ranking this and other similar propositions among our first principles4 ,but they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that the inability results from the nature of the case1 and not from our own incompetency4 ,this test is borne by the former description of first principles2 we are able to see that the instances ,i adduced1 such as the statements1 ,i see the sun1 ,i see an inkstand1 ,i hear a bird1 ,i am conscious that ,i exist1 evade our power of ordinary proving1 because they do not admit of such proof4 ,when we perceive that no one can answer this query1 we are prompted to another4 ,why cannot we answer it8 whence our inability8 what prevents us8 ,but here also we find ourselves completely in the dark1 which is somewhat strange1 considering that in every human pursuit1 whether of science or any other1 when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it1 we are generally able to specify some particular1 either of self-defect or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault4 ,but ,i imagine1 if the reader were to experiment on the specimen ,i have given1 he would not only find himself to fail in solving the problem1 ,why is it that a thing cannot at once be and not be8 but would not have a word to advance in the way of accounting for his failure4 ,these remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort4 ,euclid's axioms1 which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as possible1 and therefore may be said to aim to be first principles1 are confessedly1 under this aspect1 unsatisfactory to the learned4 ,things that are equal to the same are equal to each other4 ,every one is inclined to ask1 ,why8 ,a straight line is the shortest distance between two points4 ,again1 ,why8 ,the sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first principles1 is--#a4 ,that they have not made good their title1 and therefore are not to be accredited with it4 #b4 ,that there is a decided presumption against that title from the doubt and dissatisfaction with which it is met1 where want of candor and intelligence cannot be imputed1 especially when it is considered that the other1 the sensuous experimental kind of first principles1 have so frank an acceptance4 #c4 ,it seems to be absolutely provable1 and ,i suppose ,i have above incidentally proved it1 that they are not first principles4 #d4 ,the task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most satisfactory proof of all by bringing to light such propositions as would be perceived to underlie these so-called first principles1 and to be the real first principles to which the others would give precedence4 ,as regards their name1 it being so much in point1 excuses the old remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order in respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of acquiring it4 ,a first principle1 therefore1 means also a last one2 it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or to penetrate to the source of our knowledge1 but it becomes the first when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas4 ,the investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting one4 ,the sensible horizon of subjective vision can1 by no mediation1 be exalted into the real horizon of truth1 wherein the genuine first principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found4 ,it may be asked1 apart from the inquiry what first principles there are1 ,is there a necessity that some first principles should be8 ,so it seems from the data of the case4 ,it is patent to common observation that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that surround it4 ,the contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it apprehends1 must1 it would seem1 constitute first principles4 ,after it has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles1 but the original ones cannot be thus derived1 since there are none earlier from which to derive them4 ,again1 it is to be inquired1 ,does the mind1 in receiving its ideas1 possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates1 a copying faculty or a transforming faculty8 ,does it import them simply in their native character1 in the way a mirror does the object it reflects1 or does it manufacture1 cook1 and assimilate them1 so as to change them into something partaking of its own8 ,and1 if it changes them1 what is the extent of the change8 ,does it go so far only as the semi-idealism of ,locke1 or extend into the absolute idealism of the ,german school8 ,because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned1 or the public1 or both1 it does not follow that they are difficult4 ,i suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent audience4 ,as ,i am unprovided with proof1 although ,i suppose it is to be provable1 that first principles of reason must needs be1 ,i must speculate for a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form of two and two make four1 being derived from one of the form of ,i scent the rose1 for this seems to be the alternative of there being no first principles of reason4 ,evidently ,i must confess to having no grounds for pronouncing such a derivation impossible1 though ,i must grant it to be paradoxical4 ,our mal-cultivation of non-material science1 and the imperfection of our metaphysics1 is probably the only cause of the strange predicament4 ,no doubt ,m4 ,cousin1 and several other eminent teachers of youth1 to whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics1 have comprised ,first ,principles in their course of philosophy2 but as ,i have barely met with any of their writings1 ,i must confess such an ignorance of them1 as not even to know how far ,i am either adopting1 or evading their phraseology1 in discussing the same subjects4 ,mine1 however1 cannot be wrong1 since the term first principles1 that ,i have chosen1 is one of familiar popular use2 so that were this mode of speech1 as indeed it is1 peculiarly liable to ambiguity1 it would1 for that very reason1 be preferable to any other1 till such time as that ambiguity should have been explained1 and the wrong thinking1 of which it might have been the source1 exposed and obviated4 ,not till this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the current metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of speaking on these topics1 for though the veriest tyro in such investigations would be justified in objecting to some of its technicalities1 such as the invention of the word free-will1 for instance1 for the same reason that a beginner in zoology might object1 were such an attempt ever made1 to the introduction of the word sphynx or griffin into that branch of inquiry1 there can be no doubt that other of its speculations are more happily conceived4 ,hence ,i suppose it would be a decided mistake to imagine1 for example1 that no trouve whatever is to be elicited from the obscurities of ,kant1 but on the other hand1 one must as much take care to entertain sober conjectures of the possible value of such unsunned treasures1 as to keep in mind that quackery may be not unqualified with some merit1 and ,i might surmise that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous expectations in this direction1 that ,coleridge could not execute his long-meditated plan of elucidating that writer2 or rather1 perhaps--to speak more curtly--a spirit more differing from that which compounded the amalgam1 was necessary to resolve and detect it4 ,according to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies1 it would be expectable1 in regard to my present topic1 that almost all the materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or other in our books1 no great amount of ability being required to turn them to proper account3 an easily suppliable desideratum being thus left unsupplied1 the public indifference manifested thereby would seem to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault1 however apportioned between the many and the few1 not of the intellect1 but of the reason4 ,indeed1 it is held as a pretty general rule1 that where there is want of reform1 there is want of reason2 and ,bacon1 by implication1 thought the rule here applicable1 when1 in defending his new philosophy from the charge of arrogance1 he apologised by saying that a cripple in the right road would make better progress than a racehorse in the wrong4 ,that is1 he claimed for himself1 as he was bound logically to do1 the plain good sense of directing his supposably humble faculties with an obvious regard to the end he proposed and professed1 and he was ready to concede to his competitors all kinds of superiority but this4 ,the same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other great patriarch of the new philosophy1 in its sister branch4 ,the still debated point between the school of ,locke and the old philosophy was1 and is1 of such a form as may be figured by the following hypothetical1 and it may be1 well-founded statement4 ,locke seems to have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every one allows to be inferences1 should be acknowledged by philosophy to be such1 while the adherents of the old ideas maintained1 in opposition to him1 that ideas that every one allows to be inferences1 should not be acknowledged by philosophy to be such4 ,or1 in other words1 ,locke aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason1 which ,i shall have hereafter to consider1 which stands thus3--,that which it is1 while his opponents withstood this innovating pretension1 finding it fatal to their doctrine4 ,if the reader is somewhat startled at the statement ,i have just made1 ,i will remind him that it amounts to nothing more than saying that in the contest between the new and the old philosophy1 reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of the former1 an assertion which1 of course1 ,i must both think admits of being substantiated1 and must take myself1 in some degree1 to be able to aid in its being so4 ,the existing quarrel between the two philosophies might1 perhaps1 be personified through the medium of a principal champion on each side4 ,for the new ideas ,i could only choose ,locke1 since he is admitted to have had no equally eminent successor2 for the old ,i would choose ,m4 ,cousin1 both on account of his superior merit and popularity1 and also of his having made ,locke the subject of some elaborate strictures that ,i happen to have read4 ,on these1 when they come again to hand1 ,i should perhaps have something to remark2 meanwhile ,i must content myself with addressing myself to one of them in the following manner3-- ,in antiquity and the middle ages1 the schoolmaster and the philosopher were one and the same individual4 ,the new philosophy was the first to separate these two departments2 perceiving that the communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation1 and that that difference of office in each case necessitates a corresponding difference in the public1 that is the proper object of its exercise4 ,since1 moreover1 society may be discriminated into two sorts of mind1 admitting of being pictured as the childish and the adults1 it is evident that the instructor must find his audience more especially in the former1 while the investigator of truth must appeal exclusively to the latter4 ,this he must needs do1 to whichever of the sciences he ministers2 and not only so1 but he must more particularly address himself to a small and select portion of this itself selecter class1 constitute them the witnesses and judges of his proceedings1 and perceive that both his success in philosophy and the acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on their approbation4 ,as even in jockeyism and prize-fighting1 there are the knowing ones1 similar referees are1 by the nature of things1 required for the flourishing estate of any science2 and evidently in proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office1 false or imperfect science must be the result4 ,locke1 acting on this instinctive view1 communicated to the public certain observations he had made in mental philosophy1 and entitled his work1 ,an ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4 ,he properly called it an essay1 because a person who simply aims to investigate truth1 undertakes to do his best in the way of trial1 endeavor1 and experiment1 in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what he does4 ,the word moreover implies that the thing done1 though it is the writer's best1 is liable to be incomplete1 comparatively imperfect1 and1 indeed1 in the more difficult questions of philosophy1 as well as in the less advanced stages of philosophising1 is sure to be so4 ,locke accordingly1 having had his attention struck with certain phenomena of the human mind1 told the public just what he had observed1 and nothing else4 ,among the observations that he thus imparted1 was the process through which the mind seems to go in arriving at the sum of its ideas1 and especially the points from which it seems to start in this process4 ,m4 ,cousin1 having apparently no conception of a way of acting so proper to legitimate inquiry1 and having himself written a ,course of ,philosophy1 evidently thinks ,locke ought to have done the same2 for he says that ,locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy1 that he begins at the wrong end1 that instead of having told us as he has how the ideas arise in the mind1 he ought to have told us what the ideas are1 instead of describing their origin to have described their actuality1 to have given a list of the faculties of the mind1 and so on4 ,which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller who publishes his explorations in ,america1 ought instead to have gone to ,china4 ,i shall have to make some objections to ,locke1 but they will be of a nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the subject4 ,instead of accusing his principles ,i shall have to impute to him the not sufficiently carrying them out2 a fault due to his position as an early reformer1 and perfectly consistent with his high character as such4 ,i have the more reason to note this distinction between ,m4 ,cousin's department and the function exercised by ,locke1 because ,i am forced myself to take the benefit of it4 ,want of erudition would form very vulnerable points1 were ,i to be judged by the former standard4 ,in the little ,i have yet put forth on the subject of ,first ,principles1 ,i already find two or three errors of that sort1 which a greater amount of reading would no doubt have enabled me to escape4 ,my present letter may close with some correction of one of these4 ,preliminary1 ,i will venture to call ,that which is is1 a first principle of reason1 and ,two and two make four1 one of its derivatives1 leaving this topic for future explanation1 and then proceed thus3--,when in my last letter ,i represented first principles as bounding the horizon of human knowledge1 ,i left it to be inferred that both the kinds of first principles ,i had mentioned were thus describable in common4 ,i find1 however1 that this metaphysical character belongs exclusively to first principles of sensuous experience1 and no more belongs to first principles of reason than to first principles of grammar1 or to first principles of rhetoric4 ,that is1 first principles of reason are merely the result of one of those analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something absolutely simple1 and must there stop1 just as in the science of numbers we may thus arrive at unity4 ,having long ago defined ,first ,principles of sensuous experience1 ,i find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first principles derived from the various use of the word reason--which ,i will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding paragraph of my last letter4 ,locke1 in the #agth chapter of his fourth book1 confesses that this word1 in the proper use of the ,english language1 is liable to bear several senses4 ,due discrimination in such a case1 and a cautious avoidance of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed1 and has so amply incurred1 from this kind of source might1 above all1 have been1 expected from ,locke1 since he was the first who inculcated it1 and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts in this matter4 ,hence the charge ,i have now got to bring against him is a little surprising4 ,indeed1 it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his proceedings4 ,perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas4 ,his lapses1 indeed1 are not many1 but they are highly significant1 as ,i shall have occasion in more than one instance to show1 and among these must evidently be reckoned that ,i am now going to notice1 since it imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning4 ,in defining the word reason1 in its proper and specific sense wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the human mind--that is1 as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under this name1 as are certain weights and measures under those of pound1 gallon1 or mile1 he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it4 ,he confounds reason with reasoning--that is1 he emerges the entire faculty or modus operandi1 to which we give the name of reason1 in that partial exercise of its function to which we give the name of reasoning4 ,he says that1 in matters of certainty1 such as the proof of any of ,euclid's theorems1 the acts by which the mind ascertains the fit coherence of the several links in the chain of reasoning are acts of reason4 ,granted4 ,also1 that in weighing probabilities1 a similar coherence is similarly verified by reason4 ,granted--with liberty of comment that these arts of reason1 in either of the two cases have1 by the approved practice of language1 received the name of reasoning4 ,but he further signifies--that is1 he does not expressly affirm1 but1 with equivalent certification1 he implicitly asserts1 and inferentially states that1 in examining such a proposition as the following3--,what is1 is 7an examination to which confessedly no reasoning is attached71 the act by which the mind assents to the truth of this statement is not to be described as an act of reason4 ,he adopts a different phraseology1 and calls it intuition4 ,observe1 my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new name1 but that he disparages its old one4 ,i do not object to your calling a spade a shovel1 under a certain view of its use1 but it remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is1 in the full sense of the word1 a spade4 ,indeed1 ,i will incidentally remark that ,i suspect the word intuition has been a very good addition to our vocabulary1 and ,i suppose its proper import might be represented as follows3--,reason has two modes of his exercise1 the one is called reasoning1 and the other intuition4 ,intuition is the decision of reason on one single point2 reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing more than intuition looking not merely at one point1 but at several points successively4 ,so that intuition and reasoning would constitute the self-same function of reason1 and the difference in their meanings would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under which that function is exercised4 ,observe1 that ,i am here only venturing to speculate1 and am now returning from that digression4 ,whether or not ,locke is herein psychologically consistent with himself2 whether1 indeed1 his real theory is not that which ,i have just conjecturally intimated1 is another question1 which ,i shall defer to a future occasion2 but whether or not he herein opposes the ordinary1 prevailing1 and inveterate use of language1 which is what ,i am charging him with doing1 and whether or not he has justifiable ground for this innovation which ,i am denying that he has1 are points that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations4 ,how are we accustomed to speak8 ,how are we accustomed to write8 and what sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so8 ,in regard to the first of these tests1 the literature of all sects and parties has been accustomed to assert that1 both in matters of science and of worldly business1 reason is the judge of all truth whatever1 without exception4 ,locke1 on the other hand1 informs us that reason is the judge of demonstrative truth1 of logical truth1 of casuistical truth1 and of lawyers' truth1 and of these kinds of truth alone1 but is not the judge of intuitive or self-evident truth4 ,our writers would tell us that to deny what is1 is to be a true statement1 would be an offence against reason2 but we learn from ,locke that reason has no cognisance in this matter1 but intuition only has1 and consequently that the wrong committed would not be against reason1 but against intuition4 ,our current speech accords with our literature in this view of the meaning of the word reason2 whose efficiency1 moreover1 it endeavors to amplify1 by surrounding it with satellites of adjectives formed from it1 the principal of which are reasonable and unreasonable4 ,provided with this vocabulary1 we pronounce it to be unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly ascertained2 and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for the occasion of demonstrative truth1 and holding them inapplicable where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet1 that we account it1 if possible1 still more unreasonable to deny the latter than the former4 ,but if the nomenclature adopted by ,locke be the right one1 there ought to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing4 ,one who should reject the proofs of ,euclid1 would be unreasonable2 one who should maintain that ,thurtel or ,greenacre were innocent of murder1 would be unreasonable2 but1 one who should deny the truth of any self-evident proposition1 would not be unreasonable2 for to say this1 would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions1 whereas1 according to him1 it is expressly not reason1 but intuition that takes this office4 ,the words intuitional and unintuitional1 must be invented to supply the obvious need which the apparent gap discovers2 there seems no other way of supplying it4 ,lest ,i should be suspected of somewhat making up a case2 of having1 perhaps1 represented not so much what ,locke really means1 as what he seems to mean1 ,i will remind the reader that ,locke is undertaking the formal definition of a word1 and that on such a critical occasion1 it is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he seems to mean4 ,the passage which is my text1 will be found in the earlier part of the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book4 ,indeed1 ,i could at once prove my indictment by citing a few words from it1 accompanied by a comment of my own1 had ,i any right to impose on the reader a belief in the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy1 both of my extracts and my comment4 ,i will1 however1 venture on such a step2 ,i will suppose myself commenting on this passage1 and proceed thus3 ,locke1 it will be seen in this1 his foremost and professed definition of the word reason1 contrasts it with sense and intuition4 ,whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls the outward and the inward sense1 is not quite clear4 ,that1 however1 is not the question4 ,he says1 that these two faculties reach but a very little way2 for that the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas4 ,now1 reason1 he says1 may be defined to be that faculty1 whose specific office it is to find out and apply those intermediate ideas and deductions by which we obtain knowledge that consists of two kinds1 one that which exalts us into certainty1 the other that which1 though less generous diet for the mind1 we have constantly good ground for gladly acquiescing in1 and which we call probability4 ,so that1 says ,locke1 if you ask1 ,what room is there for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward perception8 ,i can abundantly reply1 ,very much4 ,i have shown you that without this demonstrative faculty1 our knowledge would be but a skeleton2 it would1 indeed1 not be properly speaking knowledge1 but mere rudiments of knowledge4 ,such is my interpretation of ,locke's definition of reason1 in the proper and specific sense of this word4 ,if it is strictly correct1 as ,i believe the intelligent reader will find by reference1 then it is ,locke confounds reason with reasoning1 mistakes a part for the whole1 and the whole for a part1 and acts similarly--to borrow his own way of illustration--to the representing a gallon to be a quart1 or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign4 ,it is to be observed1 too1 that it is entirely in behalf of the more showy kind of knowledge1 that the mistake is made4 ,the respected name of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating4 ,good sense1 good feeling1 just instinct1 if they stand alone1 have no claim to it2 they are put on an inferior footing2 true1 they are intuition2 but what then8 they are not reason4 ,now1 the century introduced by ,locke is accused by the present1 and it is generally admitted1 with some degree of justice1 of having materialistic tendencies4 ,we may see1 then1 how ,locke's doctrine1 as just described1 founded though it is only on nomenclature1 hinging merely on definition1 incurring whatever wrongness it implicates from no other lapse than that of confounding a word with its derivative1 doing nothing1 in short1 but annul the difference of meaning between the two words1 reason and reasoning2 we may see how this apparently harmless experiment might tend to supplying these materialistic tendencies with a ground1 a rationale1 a principle1 and thus to exalt their authority1 and how1 indeed6 it just smacks of their spirit4 ,it may be seen1 too1 how1 from a few slips1 such as this on the part of the champion of the new philosophy1 competing schools of the present age might be able to make up a case1 specious enough to gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against both--with how great futility1 ,i believe1 would appear1 if the accusations were weighed by a competent tribunal4 ,and1 finally1 it might be expected1 that the undue exaltation of the demonstrative department of reason1 should issue in a reaction into a contrary extreme1 and that some ,mr4 ,carlyle might be found to inveigh against logic1 to sneer at analysis1 to denounce cause and effect philosophy and to praise mysticism4 ,i have already assumed that the third test that ,i promised1 goes against ,locke1 and requires no examination1 simply because he has not advanced it in his behalf4 ,he has assigned no ground for changing the meaning of the word reason1 and it is presumable that none is assignable4 ,the question1 ,what is the ,criterion of ,truth8--that is1 ,what are the proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is asserted to be true is so or not8 claims immediate notice1 because such a criterion exists1 and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes before the public1 while it has shown with what effect it can do so1 in the case of those of its branches--namely1 the purely material and the mathematical1 that flourish in society4 ,premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs1 and which they have always1 to some extent1 instinctively transferred to their judgments in philosophy1 and that it is the only possible general and summary criterion of truth1 ,i may describe it as consisting in the unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought competent to pronounce concerning it4 ,viewed in connection with the thing it verifies1 and the parties who use it1 the criterion may be thus represented3 ,any idea1 assertion1 or opinion1 must1 by any inquirer1 be found true1 when he perceives it to be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably competent judges of the kind of truth to which it refers4 ,so that those who use this criterion1 and are convinced of the truth of anything through its medium--a proceeding which ,i have represented as common and habitual to mankind--in thereby pronouncing certain supposed persons to be judges of truth in the said matter1 claim themselves to be also judges of it in the matter of so pronouncing4 ,the acts of judgment they thus tacitly challenge to themselves may be said to be to the following effect3--#a4 ,they assign the qualifications that constitute competency for a certain function4 #b4 ,they decide that there are persons in the community answering to this character4 #c4 ,they opine that the view such persons take or would take1 imports an assertion of the truth of the idea in question4 #d4 ,they accredit that view with being strictly one1 supposing that all qualified to arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same4 #e4 ,they attribute to themselves a similar unanimity4 #f4 ,they assume the sufficiency of their own judgment to make all the above conclusions4 ,these assumptions on their part1 so complicated in description1 are simple enough in performance4 ,it is plain that mankind--more properly here to be called the public--simply attach themselves to some opinion which they find current in society2 while1 however1 the assumptions ,i have just described are1 in their full measure1 but a necessary consequence of their so doing1 doubtless their so doing must itself have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them1 but this may1 to any degree1 have been vague1 undetermined1 partial1 and imperfect4 ,the rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained4 ,in reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain portion of the community better able to judge than the rest4 ,hence it becomes clearly the part of the latter1 if they wish to be rightly informed1 to defer to the opinion of those confessedly better judges--confessed to be such from the general opinion to that effect4 ,thus a second set of judges perforce1 in addition to those that were originally conceived by choice1 is implicated in this transaction4 ,for the primary sort ,i must seek a name from the ,french language1 which calls them experts1 the ,english supplying1 ,i believe1 none1 except a very vernacular one1 the knowing ones2 the others have already got a well-known name--the public4 ,the public1 in deciding on the occasions in question1 what are the qualifications that constitute experts may be said to choose them1 thereby1 however1 choosing persons in idea1 and not bodily4 ,the relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is the same as that of the constituencies to the members of ,parliament1 in the point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen1 with a common object in view4 ,i suppose1 to stop the current of my discourse1 and adjourn its topic1 for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed to the test of exemplification1 would have its want of logical harmony excused by its being desiderated by the reader4 ,i had undertaken to prove that this principle--which1 for distinction's sake1 ,i will call the unanimity principle--is the proper and only criterion of scientific truth to the great non-scientific world1 and consequently that modern philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes before the public4 ,what ,i had thus taken upon myself to do1 obviously was--first1 to display and explicate the principle by definition1 and this ,i had already done2 and next--to describe it theoretically by showing its manner of existing1 and this ,i was engaged in doing4 ,leaving this inquiry in the midst1 ,i am now going to deviate into the practical phase of its description1 by showing1 not how it is1 but how it acts4 ,this seems necessary for the satisfaction of the reader1 as being the only way of securing him from any1 even were it but temporary1 misapprehension as to the working value of the principle for which his attention is demanded4 ,i therefore select the six following examples1 the two first homely1 and the four last philosophical1 of its ordinary use by the public4 ,they will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for its main characteristics the two facts--first1 that mankind habitually use it1 and have always done so2 and next1 that propositions thus warranted are universally accepted as established truth1 and that no one thinks of calling them in question4 #a4 ,thus no one doubts1 when coming to the intersection of two roads1 he sees a sign-post1 on one of whose pointers is written ,to ,london1 and on the other ,to ,windsor1 no one hesitates to believe that the information thus conveyed to him is true2 because he is aware that those who give it are competent to do so1 and that none similarly competent will gainsay it4 #b4 ,again1 no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in every twenty-four hours2 no one doubts that he so rose and set yesterday4 ,every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two facts1 but very few can do so1 in any great degree1 from their own experience2 but they help the lack of this by that of their neighbors4 ,neither is it necessary that they should have any near1 nor even the most remote1 idea of the personality of those on whose testimony they thus implicitly rely2 it suffices they are sure1 whoever they may be1 they have the right qualifications for testifying in the way they do1 and that no one so qualified can contradict their evidence1 or dream of doing so4 ,the above are examples of the criterion of truth1 applied to the ideas and proceedings of ordinary life4 ,it will be seen therefrom1 first that mankind have in all ages been educated in an acceptance of its principle1 according to my definition of it1 the principle1 namely1 of an indubitable certainty of truth1 resulting from the unanimous assent to some idea of all who are thought by self and neighbors competent to pronounce thereon2 possibly too they may be said to have been educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of this principle4 ,it will secondly be seen therefrom1 that the two kinds of unanimity which ,i have predicated as essential to the proper use and results of this criterion1 an unanimity1 namely1 on the part of the supposed good judges of certain descriptions of truth1 who may be called the adepts or knowing ones imagined by the public2 and again an unanimity on the part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting their opinion2 it will be seen1 ,i say1 that this double unanimity is perfectly attainable1 nay1 perfectly attained1 and that too so extensively1 as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all manner of occasions of daily life4 ,i will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing their judgments on philosophical questions4 #c4 ,very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of the theorems of ,euclid1 yet there is none of them who would think of seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book1 the ground of their confidence being solely their knowledge of the fact1 that the learned in these matters have unanimously so decided4 ,every one1 again1 believes in certain facts that are asserted by navigators1 explorers1 and geographers1 respecting the existence1 position1 and products of various countries of the globe4 ,every one1 further1 believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by naturalists1 geologists1 astronomers1 and so forth4 ,the belief is owing to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent authorities2 but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves1 the public withholds its entire belief1 and either doubts or disbelieves the things asserted4 ,thus the public is at this day doubtful and divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent4 ,similarly the public is dubious--for it must needs be so if any section of it is so--whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent out about a dozen years ago conjointly by the ,french ,government and ,institute1 was1 in any degree1 justified in bringing home the account he did of there being a tribe of men in the interior of ,africa having tails1 whether this unexpected information is1 in any important particular1 true4 ,the two last examples have been furnished by material science4 ,i will now draw one from the other department1 with the view of indicating that in non-material science also1 numerous propositions circulate among the public that are franked by the same principle to pass as undoubted truth4 ,such is the maxim of heathen philosophy1 recorded by ,cicero in his ,officiis3 ,do not to another what you would not he should do to you2 or the same maxim1 in its modified form1 as given in the ,new ,testament1 with the characteristic omission of the negative4 ,the truth of this moral maxim is universally admitted1 because it is supposed that no person of presumable moral judgment has ever been known to call it in question4 ,it would seem1 then1 that this criterion of truth is--what confessedly1 or from easy proof1 it is predicable that no other criterion of truth is--a general criterion of truth4 ,i will1 however1 restrict this pretension to the statement--to be hereafter more largely explained--that it is a general criterion of truth to the public as such1 to the public considered as a public2 for1 indeed1 it is not properly usable at all by anyone except in the character of a member of the public4 ,this means that it is a general criterion of truth in the following way3 it is applicable to the verification of all truth1 so far as it admits of being verified before the public1 and made the common property of the community4 #f4 ,for even where at first sight you might think it most out of place1 ,i mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence is the consciousness of the individual1 so that the competent witness of truth is necessarily but one person1 there is oneness of opinion1 there is unanimity1 and the testimony of the one competent witness is not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably competent4 ,when1 for instance1 ,i am conscious of the sensation of seeing an inkstand before me1 no one seeing reason to doubt my assertion to that effect1 all presumably competent testimony on the subject must needs be concentrated in myself2 and the fact of my seeing an inkstand1 though for my own conviction verified in a way independent of any such argument1 is1 for the conviction of others1 only pronounceable as true1 because all presumably competent authority is of one mind in alleging its truth4 ,in thus far exemplifying the use of this principle1 ,i have exhibited it in the exercise of its primary office only1 which1 however1 is not that which1 on behalf of philosophy1 ,i am here demanding from it4 ,i have shown it1 namely1 as used by the public to establish truth positively1 and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish truth comparatively4 ,but it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion of truth1 an arbiter between the true and the false1 an indicator of both1 and more especially of what has the character of ascertained truth1 and what has not2 and this1 it will be remembered1 was the office ,i sought from it1 and constituted the ultimate purpose of my taking up the consideration of the subject4 ,having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose1 explained the nature of the principle in question1 and its use by society at large1 it now only remains that ,i should explain that purpose itself1 by theory and example4 ,what ,i am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one by philosophy1 is a purely critical act1 comparable to that of the rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of thinking which have long since been practised by mankind1 and shows what therein is approvable--all the rest being liable to censure4 ,it was the universal conviction of ,european ,christendom1 during many centuries1 that the ,church1 which was popularly supposed to be represented by the ,pope1 enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which made it an infallible judge of truth4 ,this idea was thought to be warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons1 and the denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit1 as well as contrary to common sense4 ,we now know the entire futility of this assumption1 and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power of judging such subjects4 ,hence in discussing the unanimity principle the question presents itself1 ,how came the public thus wrongly to apply it8 ,what error did they commit in so doing8 ,when the revival of learning and the consequent rise of ,protestantism had exposed the error in that form of it1 it was still continued under the new social regimes2 so that even ,locke1 the boldest advocate of the rights of man that was tolerated even in his time1 stigmatised the dissentients from certain ,protestant tenets in the same unjust way that ,popery had done to the dissentients from certain ,popish ones2 speaking of them in two or three places of his essay as persons at once notoriously disreputable in character and weak in intellect2 consistently with which estimate he came to the conclusion that the reigning theology was established truth1 as being accredited by all those whose opinion was worth taking account of4 ,later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption against the new race of dissentients4 ,no one will say that ,goethe and ,neibuhr 7to mention only two7 must count for nothing on questions wherein they were as likely to be well informed as their opponents4 ,so that ,locke's side1 instead of being warranted by the decisive verdict he imagines1 is but one of two suitors in an undetermined cause1 neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole jury1 and neither consequently yet occupying the position of ascertained truth4 ,giving everyone a fair hearing is that trial and test of competency which yields the only means of learning who said competent judges are4 ,a little consideration1 even in ,locke's time of less advanced thought1 might have informed an intelligent mind1 if free from prejudice1 that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less adverse to the free expression of people's sentiments than that averted state of the public mind of which they are one of the symptoms4 ,both from theory and experience we may collect that very much the same laws of supply and demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of food and raiment2 the tongue and the pen1 and the previous thought by which these are instructed1 must evidently hold back from offering to the public1 nay1 in a great measure from suggesting to the agent himself1 any such ideas as they know the public will not1 and must confine themselves to putting forth such only as they suppose it will understand1 appreciate1 and regard4 ,,the ,,rights ,,of ,,reason4 ,to the two queries you put to me1 ,what are first principles8 and ,what is the criterion of truth8 ,i find it suitable to append some preliminary remarks on ,the ,rights of ,reason4 ,the solution you expect is1 ,i presume1 a reasonable one4 ,you do not wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test of reason4 ,your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of non-material philosophy2 and1 possibly1 might have been1 in some measure1 prompted by this consideration4 ,that double-minded way of inquiring into truth1 which only in part reasons1 while it in part dogmatises1 imagines1 and assumes1 is1 it is obvious1 in morals1 metaphysics1 and religion1 one of our inheritances from former times4 ,the battle has been won in the material department1 but is still undecided on the other wing4 ,what1 then1 is ,reason1 and what are its ,rights8 ,every human inquiry that asks1 ,what is right1 proper1 or correct8 necessarily1 in doing so1 asks1 ,what is it reasonable to think1 believe1 or do8 in the points inquired into4 ,the faculty--whatever may be its nature--whereby we find ourselves able1 under certain circumstances1 to answer this question1 we call reason4 ,the rights of reason may be said to consist in the concession to it of a certain absolute power in the decision of truth1 divisible under two heads thus--a power of deciding what are the questions whereon it is able to decide1 and a power of deciding those questions4 ,one of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason is--openly or covertly to doubt or deny that morals1 metaphysics1 and religion1 are--in the full sense of the word--sciences4 ,this is to withdraw them from the empire of reason1 and to hand them over to some rival pretender4 ,no science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion must be made palatable to the public4 ,in any supposable code of the rights of reason1 one primary article would limit and define the functions of the public in the investigation of truth--a topic which1 together with the kindred inquiry1 ,who are the public8 is suggested by your second query4 ,mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason4 ,they have found ,reason1 in the work he affects1 dull1 in the help he furnishes1 deficient1 in the truth he unveils1 ugly1 in the rule he arrogates1 imperious4 ,barbarism1 in all its stages1 may be said to be founded1 not merely on ignorance1 but on a state of the inclinations that revolts from reason4 ,two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason2 authority or precedent1 and faith or conscience4 ,conscience1 early or late1 must receive almost all his light from authority2 and1 therefore1 in respect to opinion1 may generally be called the creature of authority4 ,yet1 in a moral aspect1 authority is confessedly of no account1 and conscience has a sole jurisdiction4 ,a large portion of mankind have1 in our times1 outgrown the error of resting their sense of duty on the mere dictate of other men4 ,the only legitimate directors of human conduct are now generally admitted to be conscience and reason2 the conscience must be exclusively one's own1 but the reason need not entirely--and1 indeed1 cannot in any great proportion--be one's own1 but may be partly that of one's neighbor4 ,the question of the division of power between these two potentates1 though not yet understood by the public1 does not seem to be more complicated than that analogous one just alluded to1 and of which they evidently understand the gist4 ,for authority1 as above intimated1 though the venerable instructor of conscience1 is yet morally subjected to him2 and1 not dissimilarly1 have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each other4 ,reason is the judge1 but he is bound1 under conscience1 to give a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience may have to offer1 and conscience is the pleader1 but he is bound1 under reason1 to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself competent to render4 ,if history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed a necessary sequence1 civilisation progresses in the following order3--,the general mind1 in becoming acquainted with its own powers1 first learns an evolution of conscience 7and this can only take place through the medium of religion71 and last learns to appreciate reason 7and this can only happen through the medium of science74 ,while the prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known1 authority usurped them1 and while the prerogatives of reason are insufficiently known1 authority and conscience conjointly usurp them4 ,the word conscience ,i here use in its proper sense1 wherein it means either an individual conscience1 or the united consciences of more than one supposed to be in accord together1 so as to make the acts resulting from this accord constitute single acts of conscience4 ,but the word has taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often used to signify one conscience claiming something in contravention of another conscience4 ,these two1 so different meanings of the word conscience1 are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them4 ,to the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power1 both in regulating the individual conscience1 and in solving the differences between opposing ones4 ,under what conditions1 and how far1 reason can exercise this office1 and what rule he is to follow in so doing1 would be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query4 ,having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime ministers respectively of conscience and reason1 ,i will pursue the subject a little further4 ,religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free conscience4 ,religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct2 but1 indeed1 has been wont1 by the mouth of her most strenuous ministers1 to assume that the aim at this is already included in that other aim4 ,but a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct1 involving the intent only to act morally1 without having of itself the least power to realise that intent4 ,knowledge1--that is1 science1 exclusively keeps the keys of this power4 ,such knowledge religion has not yet made one of her aims and ends either directly1 or by any coalition with those who have so aimed4 ,accordingly religion cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate of the rights of reason4 ,whatever good things she may have achieved in this cause have been incidental to her advocacy of the ,rights of ,conscience4 ,here reason was her weapon 7sharpened for this use1 and so far valued and treasured71 against authority4 ,her tendency meanwhile1 is to impel conscience to infringe on the rights of reason4 ,science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these rights4 ,but it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete and effectual till he allies himself with religion4 ,this alliance1 since it is persuaded by reason1 and not by passion1 can have science alone for its real mover4 ,the ,rights of ,reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries ago4 ,mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of that parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man1 which is found to be the result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human thoughts before his tribunal1 and seeing whether he has anything to object to them4 ,their idea has been that not only suggesting inspiration--7which it does not seem necessary that the advocate of the rights of reason should deny7--but guiding inspiration is given1 given too to some rather than to others1 and given in such a quality1 as to dispense with the supervision of reason4 ,a generation successive to many among whom this doctrine has been taught and believed1 will not be prone to any decided rejection of it4 ,pride of species inclining to exaggerated human pretensions above other earthly creatures1 and party pride inclining to exalt self and an associated confraternity into a superiority over the rest of mankind1 and supplied with a traditional store of modes of thought and practice adapted to such exclusive pretensions1 and other native tendencies of the human mind1 persuade in the same direction4 ,i have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the ,rights of ,reason1 and the opponents of them1 to an endeavor to answer your queries in a thoroughly reasonable way1 a way which cannot be said to be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical questions4 ,,notes #a ,wilfrid ,meynell1 in his ,john ,henry ,newman1 erroneously speaks of ,charles ,robert as the youngest son4 #b ,this is a mistake4 ,owen in #ahag renounced the religions of the world1 and proclaimed that man's character was formed for him not by him4 ,but he was not an ,atheist4