,absurdities of ,immaterialism1 ,or1 ,a ,reply to ,t4 ,w4 ,p4 ,taylder's ,pamphlet1 ,entitled1 ,the ,materialism of the ,mormons or ,latter-day ,saints1 ,examined and ,exposed4 ,by ,orson ,pratt1 ,one of the ,twelve ,apostles of the ,church of ,jesus ,christ of ,latter-,day ,saints4 ,what is truth8 ,this is a question which has been asked by many4 ,it is a question supposed to be of difficult solution4 ,mr4 ,taylder in his tract against materialism1 says1 ,it is a question which all the philosophers of the ,grecian and ,roman schools could not answer4 ,he seems to think the question was unanswerable until the introduction of the gospel2 since which time he considers that the veil is taken away1 and that we now enjoy the full blaze of truth4 ,he further confidently asserts1 that with the materials afforded us in that sacred book1 7meaning the ,new ,testament17 we are enabled satisfactorily to answer the question1 ,what is truth8 ,what does this author mean by the foregoing assertions8 ,does he mean1 that no truth was understood by the ,grecian and ,roman schools8 ,that no truth was discerned by the nations1 during the first four thousand years after the creation8 ,or1 does he mean1 that the gospel truths were not understood until they were revealed8 ,he certainly must mean the latter and not the former4 ,both the ,romans and ,grecians could1 without the least difficulty1 answer the question4 ,what is truth8 ,nothing is more simple than an answer to this question4 ,it is a truth1 that something exists in space1 and this truth was just as well perceived by all nations before the book called the ,new ,testament existed as afterwards4 ,it is a truth that1 the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,this was not learned from that sacred book--the ,bible4 ,we admit that the question1 what is gospel truth1 could not be answered by any one to whom the gospel had never been revealed4 ,dr4 ,good1 in his ,book of ,nature1 says1 general truth may be defined1 the connexion and agreement1 or repugnancy and disagreement1 of our ideas4 ,this definition we consider erroneous2 for it makes general truth depend on the existence of ideas4 ,now truth is independent of all ideas4 ,it is a necessary truth that1 space is boundless1 and that duration is endless1 abstract from all connexion and agreement of our ideas1 or even of our existence1 or the existence of any other being4 ,if neither the universe nor its ,creator existed1 these eternal unchangeable1 and necessary truths would exist1 unperceived and unknown4 ,truth is the relation which things bear to each other4 ,knowledge is the perception of truth4 ,truth may exist without knowledge1 but knowledge cannot exist without truth4 ,the ,new ,testament unfolds1 not all the truths which exist1 but some few truths of infinite importance4 ,the vast majority of truths of less importance were discovered independently of that book4 ,the followers of ,joseph ,smith1 says this author1 hold the doctrine of the materiality of all existence in common with the ancient academics4 ,this1 sir1 we admit4 ,our belief1 however1 in this doctrine1 is founded1 not on any modern supernatural revelation1 unfolding this doctrine1 as this author insinuates1 but on reason and common sense4 ,the doctrine of immaterialism1 in our estimation1 is false1 and in the highest degree absurd1 and unworthy the belief of any true ,christian philosopher4 ,the author of the treatise against materialism has stated his first proposition as follows3-- ,the ,philosophy of the ,mormons is ,,irrational4 ,what the author means by this proposition is1 that it is irrational to believe all substance material4 ,to substantiate this proposition he sets out in quest of proof4 ,an immaterial substance is the thing wanted4 ,no other proof will answer4 ,if he can prove the existence of an immaterial substance his point is gained1--his proposition established1 and the irrationality of the material theory will be demonstrated4 ,as we are about to launch forth into the wide field of existence in search of an immaterial substance1 it may be well to have the term correctly defined1 so as to be able to distinguish such a substance from matter4 ,it is of the utmost importance that every reasoner should clearly define the terms he employs4 ,two contending parties may use the same word in altogether different meanings2 and each draw correct conclusions from the meaning which he attaches to the same word2 hence arise endless disputes4 ,as we have no confidence in the immaterial theory1 we shall let the immaterialist define his own terms4 ,we shall give1 ,taylder's ,definition4--,what is meant by an immaterial substance is merely this1 that something exists which is not matter and is evidently distinct from matter1 which is not dependent on matter for its existence1 and which possesses properties and qualities entirely different from those possessed by matter4 7,taylder's ,tract against ,materialism4 ,page #ad47 ,this definition of an immaterial substance is ambiguous4 ,it needs another definition to inform us what he means4 ,does he mean that ,,all of the properties and qualities of an immaterial substance are entirely different from those possessed by matter2 and that it possesses ,,no properties in common with matter8 ,or does he mean that while it possesses ,,some properties and qualities entirely different from matter it inherits ,,others in common with matter8 ,if the latter be his meaning1 we see no reason for calling any substance immaterial4 ,iron possesses ,,some properties and qualities entirely different from all other kinds of matter1 and other properties it inherits in common with every other kind4 ,shall we therefore say that iron is not matter8 ,among the various kind of matter1 each has its distinct properties1 and its common properties2 and notwithstanding each possesses entirely different properties and qualities from all other kinds1 yet each is called matter because it possesses some properties in common with all other kinds4 ,hence the term matter should be given to all substances which possess any properties in common1 however wide they may differ in other respects4 ,a substance to be immaterial must possess ,,no properties or qualities in common with matter4 ,all its qualities must be entirely distinct and different4 ,it is to be regretted that our opponent has not defined an immaterial substance more clearly4 ,as he is ambiguous in his definition1 we shall presume that he entertains the same views as the modern advocates of immaterialism generally entertain4 ,that celebrated writer1 ,isaac ,taylor1 says1--a disembodied spirit1 or we should rather say1 an unembodied spirit1 or sheer mind1 is ,,nowhere4 ,place is a relation belonging to extension2 and extension is a property of matter2 but that which is wholly abstracted from matter1 and in speaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith1 can in itself be subjected to none of its conditions2 and we might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard1 heavy1 or red1 or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions1 as say that it is here or there4 ,it is only in a popular and improper sense that any such affirmation is made concerning the ,infinite ,spirit1 or that we speak of ,god as everywhere present4 99 99 99 ,using the term as we use them of ourselves1 ,god is not here or there4 99 99 99 ,when we talk of an absolute immateriality1 continues this author1 and wish to withdraw mind altogether from matter1 we must no longer allow ourselves to imagine that it is1 or can be1 in any place1 or that it has any kind of relationship to the visible and extended universe4 7,taylor's ,physical ,theory of ,another ,life4 ,chapter ,,ii47 ,dr4 ,good says1 ,the metaphysical immaterialists of modern times freely admit that the mind has ,,no ,,place of existence1 that it does exist ,,nowhere2 while at the same time they are compelled to allow that the immaterial ,creator or universal spirit exists ,,everywhere1 substantially as well as virtually4 7,good's ,book of ,nature1 ,series ,,iii41 ,lecture ,i47 ,dr4 ,abercrombie1 in speaking upon matter and mind1 says1 that in as far as our utmost conception of them extends1 we have no grounds for believing that they have anything in common4 7,abercrombie on the ,intellectual ,powers4 ,part ,i4 ,sec4 ,i47 ,with these definitions1 we shall follow our opponent in his researches after an immaterial substance4 ,after taking a minute survey of man1 he believes he has found in his composition1 and in connexion with his bodily organization1 something immaterial4 ,he says1 the spirit is the purely immaterial part1 which is capable of separation from the body1 and can exist independently of the body4 ,the body is that material part1 'formed out of the dust of the ground1' and is the medium through which the mind is manifested4 7,taylder's ,tract against ,materialism4 ,page #h47 ,that the mind or spirit1 is capable of separation from the body1 and can exist independently of the body1 we most assuredly believe2 but that it is immaterial we deny2 and it remains for ,mr4 ,taylder to prove its immateriality4 ,his first proof is founded on his own assertion1 that mind is simple1 not compounded4 ,if this assertion be admitted as true1 it affords not the least evidence for the immateriality of mind4 ,every material atom is simple1 not compounded4 ,is it1 therefore1 not matter8 ,must each simple1 uncompounded elementary atom be immaterial8 ,mr4 ,taylder next says1 ,mind is not perceivable to corporeal organs1 matter is so perceivable4 ,this assertion is altogether unfounded4 ,corporeal organs can perceive neither matter nor mind4 ,the mind alone can perceive3 corporeal organs are only the instruments of perception4 ,bishop ,butler1 in his ,analogy1 expressly says1 that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects1 in order to their being perceived1 in like matter as foreign matter does1 without affording any shadow of appearance1 that they themselves perceive4 7,butler's ,analogy4 ,part ,i4 ,chap4 ,i47 ,the mind clearly perceives its own existence as well as the existence of other matter4 ,perception1 then1 is a quality peculiar to that kind of matter called mind4 ,mr4 ,taylder further remarks1 that ,all the qualities of matter are not comparable with the more excellent qualities of mind1 such as power and intelligence4 ,we willing to admit that power and intelligence1 and some other qualities of mind1 are far superior to the qualities of other matter2 but we do not admit that the superiority of some of the qualities of a substance prove its immateriality4 ,the superiority of some qualities has nothing to do with the immateriality of the substance4 ,,oxygen possesses some qualities1 not only distinct from1 but superior to1 those qualities possessed by ,,barium1 ,,strontium1 ,,silicium1 ,,glucinium1 ,,zirconium1 and many other metals and material substances2 yet no one from this will draw the conclusion1 that oxygen is immaterial4 ,oxygen is material though it possesses some distinct and superior qualities to other matter2 so mind or spirit is material1 though it differs in the superiority of some of its qualities from other matter4 ,it is strange1 indeed1 to see the inconsistencies of this learned author3 he remarks1 ,mind thinks1 matter cannot think4 ,it is the existence of this thinking principle which clearly proves the immateriality of the mind or spirit4 ,this method of reasoning may be termed 7petitio principii71 begging the question4 ,first1 he assumes that matter cannot think2 and1 second1 draws the conclusion that a thinking substance is immaterial4 ,this conclusion is a legitimate one if the premises are granted2 but the premises are assumed1 therefore the conclusion is false4 ,prove that mind is not matter before you assume that matter cannot think4 ,it would seem from the assertions of this author1 that the quality of thinking is to be the touchstone--the infallible test--the grand distinguishing characteristic between material and immaterial substances4 ,it matters not1 in his estimation1 how many qualities different substances inherit in common1 if one can be found that thinks1 it must be immaterial4 ,there is no one substance out of the fifty or more substances discovered by chemists1 but what possesses some qualities entirely different from any of the rest2 therefore1 each substance1 when compared with others1 has equal claims with that of mind to be placed in the immaterial list4 ,in proving that mind is immaterial1 it is not enough to prove that it has some properties entirely distinct from other substances2 but it must be proved to have no properties in common with matter4 ,nothing short of this will agree with the modern notions of immateriality4 ,it must be shown that mind or spirit has no relation to duration or space--no locality--that it must exist ,,nowhere--that it has no extension--that it exists not ,now and ,then1 neither ,here nor ,there--that it cannot be moved from place to place--that it has no form or figure--no boundaries or limits of extension4 ,these1 according to the definitions of modern immaterialists1 are the negative conditions or qualities absolutely necessary to the existence of all immaterial substance4 ,while the opposite of these1 or the positive qualities or conditions are absolutely necessary to the existence of all material substance4 ,how do you distinguish1 inquires ,mr4 ,taylder1 between any two given substances1 such as1 that a block of stone is not a log of wood8 ,he answers1 ,because they possess different qualities4 ,and then declares1 ,so also you distinguish between mind and matter4 ,but the different qualities by which a block of stone is distinguished from a log of wood1 do not prove either the stone or the wood to be immaterial2 neither do the different qualities by which the substance called mind is distinguished from other substances1 prove either the mind or the other substances to be immaterial4 ,so far as the different qualities are evidences1 the mind has as good a claim to materiality as the stone or wood4 ,the properties of body1 continues our learned opponent1 are size1 weight1 solidity1 resistance1 c42 those of the mind are joy1 hope1 fear1 c42 but weight is not joy1 resistance is not hope1 size is not fear2 therefore1 as a block of stone is not a log of wood1 so mind is not matter4 ,that a stone possesses many different qualities from wood1 and that mind possesses many different qualities from other substances1 we by no means deny2 but that these different qualities prove stone1 or wood1 or mind1 or any other substance to be immaterial1 we do deny4 ,we care not how many different properties mind possesses over and above other substances2 that is altogether foreign from the question4 ,but is it destitute of any or of all the properties which other substances possess8 is the question4 ,is it destitute of size1 weight1 solidity1 resistance1 c8 ,if not1 then the mind possesses all the essential characteristics of matter1 though its peculiar and distinct properties should be multiplied to infinity4 ,this author calls weight one of the properties of matter4 ,what is weight8 ,it is nothing more nor less than force4 ,matter approaches to1 or presses on1 other matter with weight1 or force1 or power4 ,now matter either exerts this force of itself1 or else it is impelled either directly or indirectly by other substances1 possessing intelligence1 power1 and other properties of mind4 ,if matter exerts this power of itself1 then it exhibits one of the properties of mind2 but if the seat of this power is in that substance called mind1 then it is mind that exhibits the power called weight1 and not other substances4 ,mr4 ,taylder informs us that it is mind1 and mind alone1 which is the seat of power4 7,taylder against ,materialism4 ,page #ab47 ,if this be true1 7and we feel no disposition to deny it71 then weight is not the property of unintelligent matter1 but a property of mind4 ,and the same reasoning will apply to all other powers or forces which are generally ascribed to unintelligent matter4 ,they are only the powers or forces of mind1 or else other substances exhibit powers or forces which are common to mind3 in the latter case1 mind could not be immaterial3 in the former case1 unintelligent matter 7if such exist7 is deprived of every force usually ascribed to it4 ,it can have neither gravitation1 attraction1 repulsion1 chemical affinity1 nor any other conceivable force4 ,though deprived of all energy or force1 unintelligent matter would still be possessed of those inert qualities 7if1 indeed1 they may be called qualities7 essential to its existence4 ,these qualities1 or rather conditions necessary to its existence1 are duration1 extension or place1 solidity1 figure1 c4 ,an immaterial substance must have none of those conditions or qualities4 ,it is amusing to trace this author's process of reasoning4 ,he first assumes premises entirely false1 argues from the same1 shows the deductions to be absurd and triumphantly exclaims1 ,mind then is not matter4 ,we will quote the following specimen3 ,if the mind1 says this author1 be material and the brain nothing but a large gland1 secreting the various affections of thought1 hope1 joy1 memory1 c1 then all these affections or qualities are material1 and must be also little particles of matter1 of different forms and dimensions1 and perhaps of various colours1 ,then we might1 with the utmost propriety1 without the shadow of an absurdity1 logically say1 'the twentieth part of our belief1 the half of a hope1 the top of memory1 the corner of a fear1 the north side of a doubt1' c4 ,mind then is not matter4 7,taylder against ,materialism4 ,page #ae47 ,it will be perceived that this logical author1 in the foregoing quotation1 confounds affections or qualities with mind2 that is1 he supposes thought1 hope1 joy1 memory1 c4 all to be material as well as the mind2 he then introduces a material brain that secretes the material affections2 but what becomes of the material mind he does not tell us2 probably the material mind is stowed away in some extremity of the body--in the foot or big toe1 so as not to interfere with its material affections1 which are secreted in the material brain at the other extremity4 ,after imagining up such an unheard of being1 no wonder that he should discover some absurdities in its composition4 ,no wonder that in such a creature of his own invention1 there should be1 not only the corner of a fear1 and the north side of a doubt1 but a cubical imagination with horns to it4 ,no wonder that such frightful absurdities should cause as great a man as ,taylder to exclaim with the upper part of a five-cornered assurance1 that ,mind then is not matter4 ,it would be a logical conclusion from his logical absurdities1 founded on his material affections of a material mind4 ,but who does not know that thought1 hope1 joy1 memory1 and all other affections or qualities are not substances of any kind1 but merely different operations or states of the mind8 ,a material mind1 possessing the power to think1 to feel1 to reason1 to remember1 is not the brain1 nor secretions of the brain1 nor any other part of the fleshy tabernacle2 but it is the being that inhabits it1 that preserves its own identity1 whether in the body or out of it1 and remains unchangeable in its substance whatever changes may happen to the body4 ,this material spirit or mind existed before it entered the body1 exists in the body1 will exist after it leaves the body1 and will be reunited again with the body in the resurrection4 ,as another specimen of monstrous absurdities logically deduced from absurd premises1 we quote the following3--,materialism he remarks1 is not only relatively but absolutely absurd4 ,if mind be matter1 or matter mind1 then we may have the square or cube of joy or grief1 of pain or pleasure4 ,we may divide a great joy into a number of little joys1 or we may accumulate a great joy by heaping together the solid parts of several little joys4 ,we shall then have the color and shape of a thought4 ,it will be either white1 grey1 brown1 crimson1 purple1 or it may be a mixture of two or more colors4 ,then we shall have a dark grey hope1 a bright yellow sorrow1 a round brown tall pain1 and an octagonal green belief2 an inch of thought1 a mile of joy4 ,we do most cordially agree with ,mr4 ,taylder that these results would be not only relatively but absolutely absurd2 and only equalled by the absurdity of the premises from which they were deduced4 ,he has assumed that the several ,,states or ,,conditions of the mind1 such as joy1 grief1 pain1 pleasure1 thought1 c41 are material as well as the mind4 ,with the same propriety he might have assumed that ,,motion is material as well as the matter moved4 ,joy is no more a substance than motion1 both are merely the states or conditions of substance4 ,as great absurdities could be deduced from assuming that motion is material1 as there can be from ,mr4 ,taylder's assumption that joy is material4 ,as an illustration1 let us take this author's own words1 with the exception of substituting iron for mind1 motion for the affections of the mind2 it will then read thus3--,if iron be matter1 or matter iron1 then we may have the square or cube of a solid motion4 ,we may divide a great solid motion into a number of little solid motions1 or we may accumulate a great solid motion by heaping together the solid parts of several little solid motions4 ,we shall then have a color and shape of a motion4 ,it will be either white1 grey1 brown1 crimson1 purple1 or it may be a mixture of two or more colors4 ,then we shall have a dark grey motion a round1 brown1 tall motion2 an inch or a mile of solid motion1 c4 ,it is strange that ,mr4 ,taylder did not close his train of reasoning1 by saying1 ,mind1 therefore1 is not matter2 and then we could have completed the parallel by saying1 iron1 therefore1 is not matter4 ,if such reasoning proves mind immaterial1 similar reasoning will prove any other substance immaterial4 ,mr4 ,orson ,pratt1 observes our author1 calls matter into existence1 of which the world knows but little4 ,he has not only 'intelligent matter1' but 'all-wise1' and 'all-powerful' matter4 ,this matter is capable of division into parts2 for all matter has length1 breadth1 and thickness4 ,then we shall have the half of an intelligent atom of matter1 the eighth of an all-wise atom1 the thousandth part of an all-powerful atom c4 ,such are the absurdities which 'the ,latter-day ,saint' embraces4 ,here the author seems to have recovered partially from the wild absurd notions of applying the term material to the affections1 and is willing to apply it to substance where it belongs4 ,but he speaks of the division of atoms which does not accord with the general notions of modern philosophy4 ,the immortal ,newton says1 ,it seems probable that ,god1 in the beginning1 formed matter in solid1 masses1 hard1 impenetrable1 moveable particles4 ,this does not favor the divisibility of atoms4 ,newton further observes1 ,that nature may be lasting1 the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only in the various separations1 and new associations1 and motions of these permanent particles2 compound bodies being apt to break1 not in the midst of solid particles1 but where those particles are laid together1 and touch only in a few points4 ,these are the views entertained by philosophers generally at the present day1 with the exception of here and there an isolated individual who advocates the theory of the infinite divisibility of matter4 ,perhaps our author may be of that class2 for he speaks of the division of atoms4 ,it is admitted that substance is capable of division and subdivision until arriving at its ultimate atoms1 after which all further separation ceases4 ,this division of the same kind of substance does not alter or change the nature or properties of the respective parts2 if they possessed attraction when united1 they also possess it when separated or else attraction is the result of union and ceases with it4 ,so in relation to intelligent substance1 without regard to its materiality or immateriality2 if it is intelligent as a whole1 it is intelligent in its respective parts after division1 or else the intelligent power is the result of the union of unintelligent parts1 and ceases when the union ceases4 ,therefore if the intelligent substance1 called mind1 is intelligent1 as a whole1 it is intelligent in all its parts2 and there would be no more absurdity in speaking of the half1 the eighth1 or the thousandth part of an intelligent substance1 than there would be in speaking of the half1 the eighth1 or the thousandth part of an attracting substance4 ,and yet ,mr4 ,taylder exclaims1 ,such are the absurdities which the ',latter-day ,saint' embraces4 ,perhaps our author's immaterial mind or spirit will not suffer him to believe that the whole spirit of man is made up or consists of parts4 ,if the spirit of man is a substance1 as ,mr4 ,taylder admits1 though he denies its materiality1 then it must be either a simple uncompounded being or atom1 or a united collection of such beings or atoms4 ,bishop ,butler supposes the spirit of man to be a single1 simple1 indivisible being4 ,he remarks1 that since consciousness is a single and individual power1 it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too1 that is the conscious being4 ,he further says1 ,that we have no way of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself2 and yet1 7continues he71 till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter1 which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve1 there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it1 of the living being1 even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible4 7,butler's ,analogy4 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,i47 ,our author seems to be a little more positive than ,butler1 and asserts apparently without any doubt1 that mind is simple not compounded4 7,taylder against ,materialism4 ,page #ad47 ,here1 then1 according to both ,butler and ,taylder1 we have a simple1 uncompounded1 indivisible1 little atom of conscious substance1 or1 in other words1 an intelligent atom4 ,the terms atoms and being are synonymous when applied to a simple indivisible substance so small that ,butler intimates that its bulk has not been determined to exceed the solid elementary particles of matter4 ,if the spirit of one man is a little atom of intelligent substance having bulk1 the spirit of every other man is a similar atom2 hence in the human bodies now living on the earth1 there must exist nearly one thousand million of intelligent atoms1 each conscious of its own existence1 and capable of originating motion independently of the others4 ,mr4 ,taylder says this intelligent atom or spirit is capable of separation from the body1 and can exist independently of the body4 ,this being admitted1 then there must be many thousand million of intelligent atoms which once inhabited bodies but now exist independently of them4 ,this is the legitimate result of the theory which assumes that the spirit of a man is a little conscious being--a substance1 simple1 uncompounded and indivisible1 capable of existing either in or out of a body4 ,where1 then1 ,mr4 ,taylder1 is the absurdity in believing as the ,saints do1 in the existence of immense numbers of intelligent atoms8 ,it agrees most perfectly with the results of your own theory--the only difference is in the name4 ,you call these little indivisible substances immaterial1 we call them material4 ,you apply to them the same powers that we do4 ,you believe them to be conscious1 intelligent1 and thinking atoms as well as we4 ,the name of a substance does not alter its nature2 as for instance some call one of the constituent elements of the atmosphere azote1 others call it nitrogen1 but all admit that it possesses the same nature and properties4 ,if this indivisible conscious being1 or atom of substance1 possesses bulk1 as ,bishop ,butler intimates1 then in this respect it is like the atoms of all other substances1 and therefore it must be matter4 ,if some atoms can possess various degrees of intelligence1 wisdom1 and power1 whether in the body or out of it1 then there is no absurdity in the theory that there are other atoms which are all-wise and all-powerful4 ,mr4 ,taylder admits that there must be a ,god1 and that he is an all-wise and all-powerful being or substance1--that substance must be either a simple uncompounded indivisible being or atom1 or a collection of such beings or atoms4 ,if it be an indivisible being or atom1 it would prove the existence of one all-wise and all-powerful being or atom3 if it be a collection of such beings or atoms1 then the theory of all-wise and all-powerful atoms of substance is established4 ,all theistical writers admit the existence of such a substance4 ,it is not the existence of the substance that is questioned1 but it is its nature4 ,one class calls it immaterial1 another material4 ,mr4 ,taylder has undertaken to prove that it is immaterial1 but as yet he has not furnished us with even the most distant shadow of an evidence1 unless1 indeed1 his own assertions are evidence4 ,indeed1 he has nowhere attempted to prove that the spiritual substance of either man or the ,deity possesses no properties in common with other substance admitted to be matter4 ,as another specimen of ,taylder's logic we quote the following3-- ,there is another conclusion equally absurd1 if the existence of an immaterial substance be denied1 and thinking be ascribed to matter1 and that is1 the mind must always think in the same way1 in the same direction4 ,as a proof of this assumption our author refers to the writings of ,priestly1 as follows3--,if man1 says ,dr4 ,priestly1 be a material being1 and the power of thinking the result of a certain organization of the brain1 does it not follow1 that all his functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism1 and that1 of consequence1 all his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity8 ,the doctrine of necessity1 continues ,priestly1 is the immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man2 for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism4 ,we are willing to admit that an irresistible necessity would be the inevitable consequence of assuming that the power of thinking is the ,,result of a ,,certain ,,organization of the ,,brain4 ,but this is a most absurd assumption2 for if the power of thinking be the result of a certain organization of the brain1 then1 when that organization ceases1 the power of thinking would cease also1 and there could be no separate existence for the mind or spirit4 ,but we believe that the power of thinking is not the ,,result of a brain organization1 but the original property of that substance called spirit or mind1 which can exist independently of a brain organization1 and entirely separate and apart from the body4 ,priestly asserts that mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism4 ,but this is a baseless assertion4 ,mechanism implies the incapability of acting only according to the laws of ,mechanism1 as it is acted upon3 hence1 an irresistible necessity characterizes all of its movements4 ,but not so with an intelligent thinking substance3 it can originate its own motions1 and act according to its own will1 independently of the laws of mechanism3 hence a perfect freedom characterizes all of its movements4 ,before ,priestly or any other man can logically assert that mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism1 he must first prove that matter cannot think1 and will1 and move1 or1 in other words1 he must prove that mind is not matter4 ,our author endeavours to overthrow materialism because of the absurdities which ,darwin advocated4 ,he quotes the words of that author as follows3--,ideas are material things3 they are contractions1 motions1 or configurations of the fibres of the organs of sense4 ,here1 exclaims ,mr4 ,taylder1 is the real perfection of materialism6 ,it destroys man's accountability to ,god6 ,there is then no such thing as praise or blame1 fear or hope1 reward or punishment1 and1 consequently1 no religion4 ,how1 inquires our author1 can the ,mormons reconcile this conclusion with their religious fabric1 built on revelations and visions8 ,if their ,god be a material being1 he must necessarily act mechanically4 ,we reply that we do not wish to reconcile our religious fabric with ,darwin's absurdities4 ,darwin has assumed that ideas1 contractions1 motions1 or configurations1 are all material4 ,what man1 disencumbered of a strait waistcoat1 could ever believe in such ridiculous nonsense6 ,it is only equalled by ,taylder's material joys and sorrows1 of which we have already had occasion to speak4 ,the substance of the ,deity1 nor no other intelligent substance1 is dependent on the contractions1 motions1 or configurations of organical fibres for its actions1 but it is a self-moving substance1 not subject to the law of necessity or mechanism like unintelligent matter4 ,the last consideration1 says this immaterialist author1 which it is necessary to advance for the real existence of mind1 is consciousness4 7,taylder's ,tract against ,materialism4 ,page #ah47 ,the real existence of mind is not doubted by us4 ,mr4 ,taylder has strayed entirely from the question4 ,the question is not whether mind has a real existence1 but whether it is immaterial4 ,it is generally considered1 remarks this author1 that in a few years our bodies are entirely changed4 ,how1 then1 on the material scheme1 can a ,mormon tell that he is the same person now that he was twenty years since1 or shall be ten years hence8 ,we reply that it is only the substance of the material body that is constantly changing1 while the material spirit which inhabits the body1 remains unchangeable4 ,personal identity consists1 not in the identity of a changeable body1 but in the identity of an unchangeable substance called spirit1 which feels1 thinks1 reasons1 and remembers4 ,the ,athenian galley1 which was sent every year to ,delos for a thousand years1 had been repaired so often that every part of its materials had been changed more than once1 therefore it did not remain the same identical substance during that period of time2 but if a certain unchangeable diamond had been carried within this galley for one thousand years1 it would be the same identical substance still1 though the galley that carried it had been changed ever so often2 so likewise let the material body meet with an entire change every few years1 the unchangeable material spirit which it carries within will remain the same identical substance still4 ,indeed1 if ,bishop ,butler's intimation be correct1 that the spirit of man is a small indivisible being or atom1 whose bulk has not been determined to exceed the size of small elementary particles of matter1 then it would be impossible for such a small conscious indivisible atom to change its substance in the least degree1 and therefore it must preserve its entire identity under all possible circumstances4 ,our author next inquires1 ,how can spiritual matter occupy the same space with the matter of which the body consists8 ,we answer that it cannot occupy the same identical space with other matter1 for this is in all cases an absolute impossibility4 ,it can only occupy its own space in union with the matter of which the body consists4 ,every particle of the body occupies a distinct space of its own1 and no two particles of the body can exist in the same space at the same time1 neither can any atom of spirit occupy the same space at the same time with any other atom or substance4 ,all substances are porous4 ,it can be proved that the component particles of all known substances are not in absolute contact1 for all bodies composed of these particles can be compressed1 and their dimensions reduced without diminishing their mass4 ,all organized substances are porous in a high degree1 that is their volume consists partly of material particles and partly of interstitial spaces1 which spaces are either absolutely void and empty1 or filled by some substance of a different species from the body in question4 7,lardner's ,scientific ,lectures4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,lecture #a47 ,the material body being porous1 there is room for the material spirit to exist in close connexion with its component parts1 and this too without infringing upon the impenetrability of substances4 ,if the material spirit be as small as ,bishop ,butler intimates1 it will not occupy much room in the body4 ,many millions of millions of such spirits1 if not larger in bulk than the elementary particles of bodies1 could occupy much less room that a cubic inch of space4 ,we have now examined all of ,mr4 ,taylder's arguments 7if1 indeed1 they may be called arguments7 which have been adduced in support of his first proposition1 which it will be recollected1 was stated in these words--,the philosophy of the ,mormons is ,,irrational8 or1 in other words1 it is irrational to believe in the materiality of all substance4 ,how far he has supported this proposition our readers can judge for themselves4 ,he has not brought forth the least shadow of evidence to prove that such a thing as an immaterial substance exists4 ,he has1 indeed1 argued1 that such a thing as mind or spirit has a real existence--that it thinks1 and feels1 and is conscious4 ,in all these things he agrees with us1 without the least variation4 ,he argues that the substance called mind1 possesses many different and superior qualities to all other substance2 his views in this respect do not differ in the least from ours4 ,he has clearly exhibited the absurdities of ,priestly1 ,darwin1 and various other writers1 who have made mind the result of the motions of the brain or of its organization4 ,we agree with him most perfectly in the rejection of such absurdities1 but in no place has he brought forward argument1 reason1 or evidence to prove that the substance called mind possesses no properties in common with other substances2 therefore he has utterly failed in establishing his proposition4 ,as no immaterialist can1 from experiment1 reason1 or any other process whatsoever1 glean the least shadow of evidence in favour of the immateriality of any substance1 therefore we shall now on our part show-- ,i4--,,that ,,immaterialism ,,is ,,irrational1 ,,opposed ,,to ,,true ,,philosophy4 ,,ii4--,,that ,,an ,,immaterial ,,substance ,,cannot ,,exist4 ,i4--,immaterialism is absurd1 and opposed to true ,philosophy4 #a4 ,the immaterialist assumes that ,god consists of an immaterial substance1 indivisible in its nature1 whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere4 ,the indivisibility of a substance implies impenetrability2 that is1 two substances cannot exist in the same space at the same time2 hence1 if an indivisible substance exist everywhere1 as it cannot be penetrated1 it will absolutely exclude the existence of all other substances4 ,such a substance would be a boundless1 infinite solid1 without pores1 incapable of condensation1 or expansion1 or motion1 for there would be no empty space left to move to4 ,observation teaches us that this is not the case2 therefore an infinitely extended1 indivisible1 immaterial substance is absurd in the highest degree1 and opposed to all true philosophy4 #b4 ,the immaterialist teaches that the godhead consists of three persons of one substance1 and that each of these persons can be everywhere present4 ,now in order to be everywhere present1 each of these persons must be infinitely extended1 or else each must be susceptible of occupying two or more places at the same time4 ,if a substance be infinitely extended it ceases to be a person2 for to all persons there are limits of extension called figure2 but that which is not limited can have no figure1 and therefore cannot be a person4 ,therefore1 it is absolutely necessary that a person should be included in a finite extent4 ,now that which is limited within one finite extent1 cannot be included within some other extent at the same time2 therefore it is utterly impossible for a person to be in two or more places at the same time1 hence immaterialism is totally absurd and unphilosophical4 #c4 ,the immaterialist teaches that the substance of the ,deity is not only omnipresent and indivisible1 but that all other substances are contained in his substance and perform all their motions in it without any mutual action or resistance4 ,the profound and illustrious ,newton1 in the ,scholium at the end of the ,principia1 has fallen into this error2 he says1 ,god is one and the same ,god always and everywhere4 ,he is omnipresent1 not by means of his virtue alone1 but also by his substance1 for virtue cannot subsist without substance4 ,in him all things are contained1 and move1 but without mutual passions ,god is not acted upon by motions of the bodies2 and they suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of ,god4 ,here we have an omnipresent substance1 which is said by immaterialists to be so compact as to be indivisible1 with worlds moving in it without suffering any resistance3 this is the climax of absurdity4 ,all masses of substance with which we are acquainted1 are susceptible of division1 yet even in these1 bodies cannot move without being resisted2 how much more impossible it would be for worlds to exist and move in an indivisible substance without resistance1 yet this is the absurdity of the immaterial hypothesis4 ,there is nothing too ridiculous or too unphilosophical to be incorporated in an immaterial substance when its existence has been once assumed4 ,the reflecting mind turns away from such fooleries with the utmost disgust1 and feels to pity those men who have degraded the great and all-wise ,creator and ,governor of the universe by applying to him such impossible1 unheard of1 and contradictory qualities4 ,the heathen1 in their wildest imaginations never fancied up a god that could begin to compare with the absurd qualities ascribed to the immaterialists' god4 ,,ii4--,,an ,,immaterial ,,substance ,,cannot ,,exist4 #a4 ,we shall first endeavour to show what is absolutely essential to the existence of all substance4 ,it will be generally admitted that space is essential to existence4 ,space1 being boundless1 all substances must exist in space4 ,space is not the property of substance1 but the place of its existence4 ,infinite space has no qualities or properties of any description excepting divisibility4 ,some eminent philosophers have supposed extension to be a property of space1 but such a supposition is absurd4 ,extension is space itself1 and not a property of space4 ,as well might we say that azote is a property of nitrogen1 whereas they are only two different names given to the same substance1 as to say that extension is a property of space4 ,infinite space is divisible1 but otherwise it cannot possibly be described1 for it has no other properties or qualities by which to describe it4 ,it has no boundaries--no figure--no other conceivable properties of any description4 ,it has a variety of names such as space1 extension1 volume1 magnitude1 distance1 c41 all of which are synonymous terms4 #b4 ,duration is also essential to the existence of substance4 ,there can be no such thing as existence without duration4 ,duration1 like infinite space1 is divisible1 but otherwise it has no properties or qualities of any description4 ,like space we can call it by different names1 as duration1 time1 period1 c2 but to give it any other kind of description would be absolutely impossible4 ,infinite space can only be distinguished from duration by certain imaginary qualities1 which can be assigned to finite portions of it1 but which cannot be assigned to duration4 ,we can conceive of cubical1 prismatical and spherical portions of space1 but we cannot conceive of portions of duration under any kind of shape4 ,both space and duration are entirely powerless1 being immovable1 yet both are susceptible of division to infinity4 ,to assist us in our future remarks we shall give the following definitions3-- ,definition #a4--,,space is magnitude1 susceptible of division4 ,definition #b4--;,a ,,point is the negative of space1 or the zero at which a magnitude begins or terminates2 it is not susceptible of division4 ,definition #c4--;,,duration is not magnitude1 but time susceptible of division4 ,definition #d4--;,,an ,,instant is the negative of duration1 or the zero at which duration begins or terminates2 it is not susceptible of division4 ,definition #e4--,,matter is something that occupies space between any two instants1 and is susceptible of division and of being removed from one portion of space to another4 ,definition #f4--,,nothing is the negative of space1 of duration1 and of matter2 it is the zero of all existence4 #c4 ,modern immaterialists freely admit1 as we have already shown1 that a disembodied spirit is ,,nowhere4 ,we must no longer allow ourselves to imagine1 says the immaterialist1 that it is or can be1 in any place4 7,taylor's ,physical ,theory of another ,life4 ,chapter ,,ii47 ,but that which does not occupy any place or space1 has no magnitude1 and is not susceptible of division2 therefore it must be an unextended point or nothing--7see definitions #b and #f17 the negative of both space and matter1 that is1 the negative of all existence4 ,immateriality is a representative of nothing3 immaterial substance is only another name for no substance2 therefore such a substance does not1 and cannot exist4 #d4 ,having shown that an immaterial substance can have no existence1 because it has no relation to space1 we shall next show that it can have no existence1 because it has no relation to duration4 ,isaac ,taylor says1 that which is wholly abstracted from matter1 and in speaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith1 can in itself be subjected to none of its ,,conditions4 ,one of the conditions absolutely essential to the existence of matter is duration or time4 7,see definition #e47 ,that which is not subjected to the condition of duration1 must be subjected to the condition of an instant1 which is the negative of duration2 but nothing is also the negative of duration and of substance2 7see definition #d and #f27 therefore that which has no duration is nothing1 and cannot be a substance2 hence an immaterial substance cannot exist4 ,there are many truths which may be called ,,first ,,truths1 or self-evident truths1 which cannot be demonstrated1 because there are no truths of a simpler nature that can be adduced to establish them4 ,such truths are the foundation of all reasoning4 ,they must be admitted without demonstration1 because they are self-evident4 ,that space and duration are essential conditions to the existence of all substance1 may be denominated a self-evident truth2 if so1 it is useless to undertake to prove it4 ,and in this case1 the foregoing need not be considered as a demonstration1 but merely different forms of expression representing the same self-evident truth4 ,,immaterialists ,,are ,,atheists4 ,there are two classes of ,atheists in the world4 ,one class denies the existence of ,god in the most positive language3 the other denies his existence in duration or space4 ,one says1 ,there is no ,god2 the other says1 ,god is not here or there1 any more than he exists now and then4 7,isaac ,taylor's ,physical ,theory of ,another ,life ,chap4 ,,ii47 ,the infidel says1 ,god does not exist anywhere4 ,the ,immaterialist says1 ,he exists ,nowhere4 7,good's ,book of ,nature47 ,the infidel says1 ,there is no such substance as ,god4 ,the ,immaterialist says1 ,there is such a substance as ,god1 but it is without ,parts4 7,first of the ,thirty ,nine ,articles2 also ,i ,art4 ,methodist ,discipline47 ,the ,atheist says1 ,there is no such substance as ,spirit4 ,the ,immaterialist says1 ,a ,spirit1 though he lives and acts1 occupies no room1 and fills no space1 in the same way and after the same manner as matter1 not even so much as does the minutest grain of sand4 7,rev4 ,david ,james on the ,trinity1 in ,unitarianism ,confuted4 ,lec4 ,,vii41 page #chb47 ,the ,atheist does not seek to hide his infidelity3 but the ,immaterialist1 whose declared belief amounts to the same thing as the ,atheist's endeavours to hide his infidelity under the shallow covering of a few words4 ,the thinking principle1 says ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown1 is essentially one1 not extended and divisible1 but incapable by its very nature1 of any subdivision into integral parts4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lec4 ,,xcvii47 ,what is this but the rankest kind of infidelity couched in a blind1 plausible form4 ,that which is not extended and not divisible and without parts1 cannot be anything else than nothing4 ,take away these qualities and conditions1 and no power of language can give us the least idea of existence4 ,the very idea conveyed by the term existence is something extended1 divisible1 and with parts4 ,take these away1 and you take away existence itself4 ,it cannot be so much as the negative of space1 or1 what is generally called1 an indivisible point1 for that has a relation to the surrounding spaces4 ,it cannot be so much as the negative of duration1 or1 what is generally called1 an indivisible instant1 for that has a relation to the past and future4 ,therefore1 it must be the negative of all existence1 or what is called absolutely ,,nothing4 ,nothing1 and nothing only1 is a representative of that which has no relation to space or time--that is1 unextended1 indivisible1 and without parts4 ,therefore1 the immaterialist is a religious ,atheist2 he only differs from the other classes of ,atheists1 by clothing an indivisible unextended ,,nothing with the powers of a god4 ,one class believes in no ,god2 the other class believes that ,,nothing is god1 and worships it as such4 ,there is no twisting away from this4 ,the most profound philosopher in all the ranks of modern ,christianity1 cannot extricate the ,immaterialists from atheism4 ,he cannot show the least difference between the idea represented by the word nothing1 and the idea represented by that which is unextended1 indivisible1 and without parts1 having no relation to space or time4 ,all the philosophers of the universe could not give a better or more correct definition of ,nothing4 ,and yet this is the god worshipped by the ,church of ,england--the ,methodists--and millions of other atheistical idolaters1 according to their own definitions1 as recorded in their respective articles of faith4 ,an open ,atheist is not so dangerous as the ,atheist who couches his atheistical doctrines under the head of ,,articles ,,of ,,religion4 ,the first stands out with open colours and boldly avows his infidelity2 the latter1 under the sacred garb of religion1 draws into his yawning vortex1 the unhappy millions who are persuaded to believe in1 and worship an unextended indivisible nothing without parts1 deified into a god4 ,a pious ,atheist is much more serviceable in building up the kingdom of darkness than one who openly1 and without any deception1 avows his infidelity4 ,no wonder that this modern god has wrought no miracles and given no revelations since his followers invented their ,articles of ,religion4 ,a being without parts must be entirely powerless1 and can perform no miracles4 ,nothing can be communicated from such a being2 for1 if nothing give nothing1 nothing will be received4 ,if1 at death1 his followers are to be made like him1 they will enjoy1 with some of the modern ,pagans1 all the beauties of annihilation4 ,to be made like him6 ,admirable thought6 ,how transcendently sublime to behold an innumerable multitude of unextended nothings1 casting their crowns at the feet of the great1 unextended1 infinite ,nothing1 filling all space1 and yet without parts6 ,there will be no danger of quarrelling for want of room2 for the ,rev4 ,david ,james says1 ,ten thousand spirits might be brought together into the smallest compass imaginable1 and there exist without any inconvenience for want of room4 ,as materiality1 continues he1 forms no property of a spirit1 the space which is sufficient for one1 must be amply sufficient for myriads1 yea1 for all that exist4 7,rev4 ,david ,james on the ,trinity1 in ,unitarianism ,confuted4 ,lec4 ,,vii41 page #chb47 ,according to this1 all the spirits that exist1 could be brought together into the smallest compass imaginable1 or1 in other words into no compass at all2 for1 he says1 a spirit occupies no room1 and fills no space4 ,what an admirable description of ,nothing6 ,nothing occupies no room1 and fills no space6 ,if myriads of ,nothings were brought together into the smallest compass imaginable1 they would there exist without any inconvenience for want of room4 ,everything which the ,immaterialist says1 of the existence of ,spirit1 will apply without any variation1 to the existence of ,nothing4 ,if he says that his god cannot exist ,here or ,there1 the same is true of ,nothing4 ,if he affirms that he cannot exist ,now and ,then1 the same can1 in all truth1 be affirmed of ,nothing4 ,if he declares1 that he is unextended1 so is ,nothing4 ,if he asserts that he is indivisible and without parts1 so is ,nothing4 ,if he declares that a spirit occupies no room and fills no space1 neither does ,nothing4 ,if he says a spirit is ,nowhere1 so is ,nothing4 ,all that he affirms of the one1 can1 in like manner1 and1 with equal truth1 be affirmed of the other4 ,indeed1 they are only two words1 each of which express precisely the same idea4 ,there is no more absurdity in calling ,nothing a substance1 and clothing it with ,almighty powers1 than there is in making a substance out of that which is precisely like nothing1 and imagining it to have ,almighty powers4 ,therefore1 an immaterial god is a deified ,nothing1 and all his worshippers are atheistical idolators4 ,a ,,spiritual ,,substance ,,is ,,material4 ,that spirit or mind has a relation to space1 is evident from the fact of its location in the body4 ,the body itself exists in space1 therefore every particle of substance which it contains must exist in space4 ,no point can be assumed in the body but what has a relation to the surrounding space or extension4 ,therefore spirit must have a relation to extension or it cannot exist in the body4 ,all unextended points have a relation to space1 though they are no part of space1 and do not occupy space2 but an unextended substance to have no relation to space cannot be as much as a point4 ,a point is a located nothing1 but an unextended substance is nothing1 having no location4 ,what can be more unphilosophical1 contradictory1 and absurd1 than to assume that something can exist that is unextended1--that occupies no room1 fills no space1--has no parts8 ,we ask our readers to pause for a moment1 and endeavour to conceive of a substance that has no parts4 ,grasp it if you can in your imaginations4 ,think of its existing where there is no space4 ,conceive1 if you can in your imaginations4 ,think of its existing where there is no space4 ,conceive1 if you can1 of a locality outside of the bounds of a boundless space4 ,do not your judgments1 and every power of your minds revolt at the absolute absurdities and palpable contradictions8 ,by this time1 perhaps1 you are ready to inquire1 can it be possible that any man in all the world could believe in such impossibilities8 ,yes1 it is possible4 ,these very absurdities now stand in bold relief1 not only in the most approved philosophical works of modern times1 but incorporated in the very ,articles of ,religion which millions have received as their rule of faith4 ,that spirit or mind has a relation to duration is manifest in the act of remembering4 ,through the memory the mind perceives itself to be the same conscious being now1 that it was1 an hour1 a day1 a year ago2 it perceives that itself has existed through a certain period of duration4 ,there is as much certainty of its own relations to duration as there is of any such relation in any other substance whatever4 ,if there is no certainty that mind has a relation to duration1 there is no certainty that any other substance has such a relation2 hence all would be uncertainty1 even our own existence4 ,bishop ,berkeley denied the existence of the material world1 and the first ,article of his religion swept away the immaterial world from space2 and the modern immaterialist sweeps it away from all relation to time4 ,so between them all1 space and time are pretty well cleaned out2 not so much as a nest egg left to replenish the great infinite void4 ,mind1 like all other matter1 is susceptible of being moved from place to place4 ,we see this exemplified in the movements of the mind through the medium of the body which conveys it from place to place on the surface of the earth4 ,but though man was stationary upon the earth's surface1 the earth itself with all its inhabitants1 is moving with the rapid velocity of nineteen miles every second1 which proves to a demonstration that mind is capable of being moved from place to place with a velocity far exceeding that of a cannon ball4 ,but motion involves the ideas of both space and time4 ,mind cannot be moved without being moved in space2 it cannot pass from point to point instantaneously4 ,however rapid the velocity1 time is an essential ingredient to all motion4 ,that eminent and profound philosopher1 the late ,professor ,robison of ,edinburgh1 says1 ,in motion we observe the successive appearance of the thing moved in different parts of space4 ,therefore1 in our idea of motion are involved the ideas or conceptions of space and time4 ,all things are placed in space1 in the order of situation4 ,all events happen in time1 in the order of succession4 ,no motion can be conceived as instantaneous4 ,for1 since a moveable1 in passing from the beginning to the end of its path1 passes through the intermediate points2 to suppose the motion along the most minute portion of the path instantaneous1 is to suppose the moveable in every intervening point at the same instant4 ,this is inconceivable and absurd4 7,robison's ,mechanical ,philosophy4 ,vol ,i4 ,introduction47 ,the motion of mind1 therefore is another positive proof that it has a relation to both space and duration4 ,extension and resistance1 says ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown1 are the complex elements of what we term matter2 and nothing is matter to our conception1 or a body1 to use the simpler synonymous term which does not involve these elements4 ,figure1 magnitude1 divisibility1 are only different modifications of extension4 ,solidity1 liquidity1 viscidity1 hardness1 softness1 roughness1 smoothness1 are different modifications of resistance4 ,all these terms are only extension and resistance1 modified in a certain degree1 and under other names4 ,our notion of extension is supposed by ,dr4 ,brown to be acquired from our notion of time as successive1 involving length and divisibility4 ,our notion of resistance he supposes to be obtained through our muscular organs4 ,these organs are first exerted1 and then excited by something without1 and in their turn excite the mind with a feeling of resistance4 ,the feeling of resistance combined with the feeling of extension gives us the notion of matter4 ,if ,dr4 ,brown's views be correct1 no one can acquire a notion of matter1 by seeing1 hearing1 tasting1 smelling1 or simple touch4 ,either or all of these will only produce certain feelings in the mind without giving us any notion of an external extended resistance4 ,a muscular effort opposed by some substance or foreign body is the only possible way1 according to his theory1 for the infant mind to obtain a notion of extended solidity or resistance4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,from the ,,xx to the ,,xxix ,lecture inclusive47 ,if solidity and extension then are the essential characteristics of matter2 and if the resistance of a muscular effort be the only possible way of learning these characteristics2 it may be asked1 how did ,dr4 ,brown learn that the rays of light are material8 ,he has frequently in his philosophy called light material4 ,has light in any way resisted his muscular efforts8 ,have the muscular organs ever been able to grasp a ray of light8 ,have the particles of light either singly or collectively ever acted upon our muscular organs in such manner as to give us a notion of extension and resistance8 ,have they ever affected the mind in any way only to impart to it the feeling of color8 ,does not ,dr4 ,brown himself repeatedly affirm1 that light can only impart the sensation of color2 and that extension1 magnitude1 figure1 solidity1 can never be known by the sense of seeing8 ,does he not assert1 that nothing is matter to our conception which does not involve these elements8 ,why then does he assume light to be material8 ,if1 then1 light can be ranked as a material substance without exhibiting the least resistance to the muscular organs1 why not mind or spirit be considered material also8 ,why believe that light consists of inconceivably small vibratory or emanating particles of matter from the mere affection of mind called color1 and yet be unwilling to believe that the mind affected is material8 ,if that which produces a sensation or feeling be regarded a solid extended substance1 independently of muscular resistance1 where is the impropriety1 in regarding that which receives the sensation or feeling1 as a solid extended substance also8 ,dr4 ,brown1 and all other immaterialists1 universally believe that the sensation of smell is produced by small material particles1 acting upon our olfactory nerves4 ,but we ask1 how is ,dr4 ,brown or any other person to determine those odorous particles to be material8 ,it may be said1 that we determine them to be solid and extended by tracing them to the substances from which they emanate4 ,but can it be proved that they constitute any part of the solid extended substance from which they emanate1 any more than light is a part of the substance from which it emanates8 ,we know a rose to be solid and extended1 not from the sensation of vision or smell1 but from the sensation of resistance which it offers to our muscular organs when we attempt to grasp it4 ,but because a rose is solid and extended1 that does not prove that light and fragrance1 by which we discern its color and smell1 are any part of the rose4 ,if ,dr4 ,brown's theory be true1 it is absolutely impossible to prove that the odoriferous particles which affect us with the sensation of fragrance1 are a solid extended substance4 ,these particles of odour appear1 indeed1 to have been connected in some way with bodies from which they emanate2 but there is no possible means for the muscular powers to determine them to be parts of those bodies1 any more than the colored light or the heat which are also transmitted from them4 ,no one in speaking of a rose would think of classifying heat and light as a portion of its solid substance2 yet both heat and light1 like the particles of odour1 are intimately connected with it1 and are constantly being thrown off from it4 ,what is there1 inquires ,dr4 ,brown1 which we can discover in the mere sensation of fragrance1 that is itself significant of solidity1 extension1 or whatever we may regard as essential to the existence of things without8 ,as a mere change in the form of our being1 it may suggest to us the necessity of some cause or antecedent of the change4 ,but it is far from implying the necessity of a corporeal cause2--any more than such a direct corporeal cause is implied in any other modification of our being1 intellectual or moral--in our belief1 for example1 of the most abstract truth1 at which we may have arrived by a slow development of proposition after proposition in a process of internal reflective analysis1 or in the most refined and sublime of our emotions1 when1 without thinking of any one of the objects around1 we have been meditating on the divinity who formed them--himself the purest of spiritual existences4 ,our belief of a system of external things1 then1 does not1 as far as we can judge from the nature of the feelings1 arise from our sensations of smell1 more than from any of our internal pleasures or pains4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,xx47 ,odorous particles1 then1 have never been submitted to ,dr4 ,brown's only test of materiality1 and yet he1 and all other immaterialists1 without any hesitation1 pronounce them to be matter4 ,the spirit1 like these particles of odour1 can exist in connexion with the body or separate from it2 and yet it forms no part of the fleshy tabernacle4 ,if like the particles of odour1 it really eludes the grasp of the muscular organs1 and if neither these odoriferous particles1 nor the spirit1 can be proved by any muscular effort to have solidity and extension2 why1 then1 should one be called material1 and the other immaterial8 ,if the mind be unextended1 how can it receive any sensations from things without8 ,it could not act upon bodily organs1 for they are extended4 ,neither could bodily organs act upon it4 ,philosophers have endeavoured to invent numberless hypothesis to account for the action of matter on the mind1 which they have assumed to be immaterial4 ,the old ,peripatetic doctrine of perception1 by species or phantasms1 which for so many centuries held so unlimited a sway in the philosophic world1 was probably originated to connect material with immaterial substances4 ,when this absurdity slowly died away1 other hypothesis1 no less erroneous1 immediately supplied its place4 ,des ,cartes1 seeing no possibility of any reciprocal action between matter and something that was inextended1 invented his system of occasional causes1 and represented the external world entirely incapable of affecting the mind in any way whatever4 ,he ascribed all the sensations and affections of the mind to the immediate agency of the ,deity1 virtually rendering external objects entirely useless to the mind4 ,this conjecture has been modified by succeeding philosophers without1 however1 removing its absurdities4 ,it is useless to revert to all the absurd theories which have from time to time distracted the metaphysical world1 and which have been originated for no other purpose than to uphold the still greater absurdity of immaterialism4 ,philosophers of ancient times imagined the existence of an immaterial substance1 unextended in its nature1 like nothing4 ,to support this wild and vague imagination1 learned metaphysicians have given birth to innumerable conjectures1 in order to connect this imaginary substance with the material world4 ,dr4 ,brown1 however1 being a little more wise than the immaterialists who preceded him1 does not attempt to connect the mutual affections1 existing between matter and mind1 by substituting some conjectural intervening causes4 ,instead of this1 he advocates the direct affection of the mind by the presence of material objects--that the change of state in the one is produced by the change of state in the other1 independently of intervening causes4 ,now this1 in our view1 is really what happens4 ,we believe that matter can only act upon mind because mind is an extended material substance4 ,but ,dr4 ,brown supposes there is no absurdity in matter acting upon that which is unextended4 ,he endeavours to substantiate the possibility of the direct mutual affections of mind and matter1 by referring to some examples of matter acting upon matter as in gravitation4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,xxx47 ,but we do not conceive these cases to be in the least analogous2 for there is no absurdity in supposing one extended substance to act upon another which is also extended4 ,but for extended substances with parts to act upon unextended substances is without a parallel1 and inconceivably absurd4 ,indeed there could be no action at all2 an immaterial mind could not act upon an immaterial mind any more than nothing could act upon nothing4 ,to talk about matter affecting that which is inextended and without parts1 is to talk about matter affecting nothing4 ,the very fact of the external organs affecting the mind without any intervening cause1 the same as other matter affects other matter1 is an argument of the strongest kind in favour of the materiality of mind4 ,a piece of iron is affected in a certain manner by introducing into its presence a loadstone1 so the mind is affected in a certain manner by the presence of light upon the retina1 or by the presence or odour upon the olfactory nerve4 ,if1 then1 mind can be directly affected by other substances1 the same as matter directly affects matter1 why should it be called an immaterial substance8 ,if resistance to our muscular efforts1 as ,dr4 ,brown supposes1 be our only test of solidity and extension1 and consequently of matter1 then mind itself has the greatest claims to materiality4 ,a muscular effort is nothing more than an effort of the mind4 ,without the mind the muscles are incapable of any effort whatsoever4 ,two men stretch out their arms1 press their hands together1 and resist each other with great force4 ,in this example as it is commonly said1 the muscular efforts of the one are resisted by the muscular efforts of the other2 but as the muscles have no power of themselves1 the facts of the case are1 that the mind of the one truly resists the mind of the other through the medium of their respective muscles4 ,if that which causes resistance then be material1 mind must be material4 ,if two bodies of iron of equal size were moving with equal velocities towards each other1 upon meeting they would destroy each others motion1 and the next moment1 though in contact1 there would be no signs of resistance2 not so with the resistance which mind offers to mind through the medium of the muscular organs2 the resistance can be continued at the option of the two resisting minds2 hence mind exhibits resistance in a greater degree than other substances1 and should1 therefore1 according to ,dr4 ,brown's test1 be considered material in preference to all other substances4 ,no two atoms of spirit or any other matter can occupy two or more places at the same time4 ,we have never known of a circumstance of the spirit of man residing in the body and out of it at the same time4 ,no particles of light1 odour1 heat1 electricity1 can occupy two places at once4 ,these substances can only be extensively diffused by being extensive in quantity4 ,the particles of light which enter the right eye are not the same which enter the left eye4 ,though their qualities may be exactly alike1 yet they are separate individual substance1 as much so as if they were millions of miles asunder4 ,the same is true of the atoms of spirit and all other substances4 ,,of ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,substances4 ,philosophers of modern times have asserted that we know nothing of the essence of bodies4 ,it is affirmed that all that can be known of mind or matter1 are merely its properties4 ,dr4 ,abercrombie1 says1 ,we talk1 indeed1 about matter1 and we talk about mind2 we speculate concerning materiality and immateriality1 until we argue ourselves into a kind of belief that we really understand something of the subject4 ,the truth is1 we understand nothing4 ,matter and mind are known to us by certain properties3 but in regard to both it is entirely out of the reach of our faculties to advance a single step beyond the facts which are before us4 ,whether in their substratum or ultimate essence1 they are the same1 or whether they are different we know not1 and never can know in our present state of being4 7,abercrombie on the ,intellectual ,powers4 ,part ,i4 ,sec4 ,i47 ,there are many truths which we ascertain by reflection1 independently in a great measure of our senses4 ,we are assured and know in our own minds that duration must be endless1 and that space must be boundless1 not because we have learned these truths directly through the medium of our senses1 or have been able to demonstrate them by any process of reasoning4 ,in the same way we know concerning the essence of bodies4 ,instead of being entirely ignorant on the subject1 as modern philosophers assert1 it is directly the opposite2 we know the essence of all substances4 ,solidity is the only essence in existence4 ,although the ultimate atoms of matter cannot come under the cognizance of our senses1 and we cannot demonstrate their solidity by any process of reasoning1 yet we are none the less assured of their solidity4 ,we believe that they are solid because it is impossible for us to believe otherwise4 ,we are as certain that the ultimate atoms of all substances are solid1 as we are that they exist4 ,what we mean by solidity is1 that all substances completely fill a certain amount of space1 and that it is impossible for them ever to fill a greater or less amount of space4 ,the amount of absolute space occupied by any substance is constant1 that is the elementary atoms cannot be increased or decreased in magnitude in the least degree4 ,particles may be divided1 but their respective parts occupy the same amount of space when separated as when united4 ,condensation or expansion is not a property of the ultimate atoms of bodies1 but merely the relation which these atoms sustain to each other4 ,when a collection of atoms called body are forced into a closer connexion with each other1 the body is said to be condensed4 ,when their relative distances are increased the body is expanded4 ,the maximum of density excludes all pores4 ,in such a condition the space is wholly occupied--any further condensation is absolutely impossible4 ,a bar of iron varies its dimensions with its temperature1 while the atoms of which the bar consists remain unchangeable in size4 ,the pores of the iron increase in the same proportion as the bar increases1 and diminish as the bar diminishes4 ,solidity is universally supposed to be a property of atoms1 but this is an error4 ,solidity is not a property1 but only another name for the essence4 ,a property must be a property of something2 but solidity is not a property of anything--it is the essence itself--the thing that exists1 aside from all properties and powers4 ,if we suppose solidity to be a property1 then it is evident that there must be a distinction between atoms as possessors1 and solidity as the thing or property possessed2 but we find it impossible to conceive of atoms separate and apart from solidity4 ,deprive atoms of solidity1 and they are deprived not of a property1 but of existence itself1 and nothing remains4 ,solidity is associated with existence1 and we cannot conceive of the one independently of the other4 ,solidity1 then1 is the essence to which all qualities belong--taste1 smell1 colour1 weight1 c41 are the affections of solids4 ,every feeling or thought is the feeling or thought of solids4 ,all the powers of the universe1 from the almighty powers of ,jehovah down to the most feeble powers that operate1 are the powers of solid atoms4 ,we can conceive of solid atoms existing without powers1 but we cannot conceive of atoms existing without solidity2 therefore the very essence of all substance is solidity4 ,love1 joy1 and all other affections are only the different states of this essence4 ,when the essence or solidity of substance is considered by itself1 independently of its powers1 there cannot possibly be any difference in atoms only in their magnitude and form4 ,the essence of all substance is precisely alike when the essence alone is considered4 ,substances can only differ in their magnitude1 form1 and susceptibilities1 but not in their essences1 for they are and must be alike4 ,,the ,,immaterialists ,,only ,,possible ,,argument ,,refuted4 ,the only possible argument which the immaterialist pretends to bring forward in support of the inextension and indivisibility of a thinking substance1 and consequently of its immateriality--is founded on the self-consciousness of such substance4 ,a thinking substance is conscious of its own individual unity3 it is conscious that itself is not many beings1 but one4 ,mankind universally feel their own individual unity when each contemplates himself4 ,each one is certain that it is the same being that rejoiced yesterday who remembers to-day--that all past and present affections are the affections of one being1 and not of many4 ,the absolute oneness of a thinking being is supposed to be inconsistent with a plurality of parts4 ,to avoid this supposed inconsistency the immaterialist assumes that such a substance is without parts4 ,dr4 ,brown says that the very notion of plurality and division is as inconsistent with the notion of self as the notions of existence and nonexistence4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,xcvi47 ,that by the term plurality1 he means the plurality of parts1 as well as a plurality of atoms1--is very evident from the whole tenor of his reasoning4 ,if the materialist1 as ,dr4 ,brown again says1 assert thought to be the affection of a single particle1 a monade2 he must remember that if what he chooses to term a single particle1 be a particle or matter1 it too must still admit of division2 it must have a top and bottom1 a right side and a left2 it must1 as it is demonstrable in geometry1 admit of being cut in different points1 by an infinite number of straight lines2 and all the difficulty of the composition of thought1 therefore1 remains precisely as before4 ,if it be supposed1 continues he1 so completely divested of all the qualities of matter1 as not to be extended1 nor consequently divisible1 it is then mind which is asserted under another name1 and every thing which is at all important in the controversy is conceded4 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,xcvi47 ,a unity of substance1 consisting of parts1 is supposed by ,dr4 ,brown and other immaterialists to be1 not only relatively1 but absolutely absurd4 ,but this supposed absurdity is only imaginary1 and is founded wholly on supposition and false reasoning1 and not on our self-consciousness4 ,self-consciousness teaches us the unity of self1 but it does not teach us that a unity of self is inconsistent with a plurality of parts1 and consequently inextended4 ,the absolute oneness or unity of a thinking being can1 by no means1 be denied4 ,every man in all the world1--the savage as well as the philosopher1--is conscious that what he calls himself is not many but one2 but no man is conscious that the thinking substance called self does not consist of a plurality of parts--no one is conscious that self is inextended4 ,indeed1 in the very notion of unity is involved the notion of a plurality of parts4 ,in abstract numbers themselves a unit consists of an unlimited number of fractional parts4 ,a unit of time is composed of innumerable parts called moments4 ,a unit of space embraces a countless number of fractional spaces4 ,a unit of substance is composed of an immense number of fractional parts4 ,without a plurality of parts we can form no notion whatsoever of unity4 ,if consciousness1 therefore1 teaches us of the unity of self1 it must teach us of a unity consisting of parts2 otherwise it teaches us nothing4 ,the unity of the thinking being1 then1 proves to a demonstration that it consists of parts1 and consequently must be extended4 ,the term unity when applied to time1 space1 or substance1 is entirely indefinite as to quantity4 ,any quantity1 either great or small1 may be assumed as a unit4 ,in a multitude of human beings a man2 in a bodily organ a molecule of any compounded substance which enters into its composition2 and1 in a molecule1 an atom may be assumed as the unit4 ,in an atom there is an indefinite number of parts1 either of which may be chosen as a unit4 ,but when we descend the scale still farther1 and speak of that which has no parts1 we can form no possible conception of a unit of inextension4 ,the term nothing1 instead of unity1 is the only applicable term for that which is inextended4 ,to think of unity in reference to external things1 we think of something that has parts2 so likewise to feel the unity of the mind is to feel that it has parts4 ,if the unity or oneness of the mind is any evidence in favor of its being inextended and without parts1 the unity or oneness of all other substances is equal evidence of their inextension4 ,all the atoms of every substance in the immensity of space1 when considered separately and apart1 are units1 that is each atom is not many substances1 but one4 ,therefore1 if the unity of substance necessarily implies the inextension of substance1 every atom in the universe must be inextended and without parts1 and consequently immaterial4 ,if it be said that the universe contains no substances that can be called units1 but that each atom is a plurality of substances1 this would not obviate the difficulty in the least2 it would only be adding absurdity to absurdity2 for a plurality to exist without the possibility of a unity's existing1 is inconceivable nonsense4 ,a plural number1 without a singular1 or many substances to co-exist without the possibility of the existence of any single one1 is as grossly absurd as immaterialism itself4 ,hence unity implies parts as much as plurality4 ,therefore1 wherever a unity or plurality of substance exists1 there matter exists1 with all its essential characteristics4 ,no doubt but that the immaterialist absurdity was invented principally to combat the gross errors which have been embraced by some materialists1 both of ancient and modern times4 ,the great majority of materialists have contended that thought and feeling are the results of organization1 beginning and ceasing with it4 ,hobbes1 ,spinosa1 ,priestley1 ,darwin1 and numerous other individuals1 have strenuously advocated this inconsistency4 ,they have asserted that particles of matter have no susceptibilities of thought and feeling when unorganized1 but as soon as they were brought together into a certain system1 the result of such union is thought and feeling4 ,dr4 ,brown1 in combating this vague conjecture1 has clearly shown that a system of particles can have no properties as a whole which it does not possess in its individual parts2 and1 consequently1 that a thought1 or a joy1 or a fear1 or any other affections of the mind1 cannot possibly be the affections resulting from a plurality1 but in all cases must be the affections or feelings of every part of a substance4 ,we most cordially believe with ,dr4 ,brown1 that a system of particles cannot possibly possess a property which the individuals composing the system do not possess4 ,had this great philosopher and metaphysician stopped here1 his reasoning would have been amply sufficient to have overthrown the errors of ,priestly1 ,darwin1 and others who have supposed thought to begin and end with organization4 ,but by supposing an individual unity to be inconsistent with extension and parts1 he has advocated an absurdity still more glaring than the one which a part of his reasoning has so successfully overthrown4 ,there is another gross error of a very different nature from the one advocated by ,priestley and his followers1 which ,dr4 ,brown also very clearly exposes4 ,this error consists in assuming thought1 hope1 fear1 joy1 sorrow1 desire1 and all other affections to be little particles of matter4 ,we are not aware1 however1 that there was ever a human being so void of common sense as to advocate this palpable inconsistency4 ,it is very evident that this error is not necessarily incorporated with that absurd notion which supposes thought and other affections to be a property of an organized system of particles1 but not a property of each individual particle4 ,the two errors are widely different3 the one supposes a thought or feeling to be a property1 not of a single particle1 but of a collection of particles2 the other supposes a thought or feeling to be a little particle of matter itself1 and not a property of either a particle or collection of particles4 ,the former error has had numerous advocates in such men as ,priestley1 ,darwin1 c42 but the latter1 so far as we are aware1 has had no advocates4 ,dr4 ,brown1 however1 has attacked not only the former1 but the latter error1 as though it really had an existence in some popular theory4 ,if thought be little particles of matter1 ,dr4 ,brown justly argues1 that it will be not more absurd to talk of the twentieth part of an affirmation1 or the quarter of a hope1 of the top of a remembrance1 and the north and east corners of a comparison1 than of the twentieth part of a pound1 or of the different points of the compass in reference to any part of the globe of which we may be speaking4 ,we agree with him most perfectly in saying1 that with every effort of attention which we can give to our mental analysis1 we are as incapable of forming any conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt1 or the half of a belief1 as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a central point1 or of a square without a single angle4 ,dr4 ,brown also endeavours to bring this mode of reasoning to bear against the absurdity which supposes thought to be a quality of a collection of particles arranged in the form of an organ1 but not a quality of single particles4 ,but it is evident that the arguments which entirely demolish one error1 leave the other entirely untouched4 ,the weakness of ,dr4 ,brown's argument1 when wrongfully applied against the last-named error1 will more fully appear by reference to his own words which read as follows3-- ,even though it were admitted1 however1 in opposition to one of the clearest truths in science1 that an organ is something more than a mere name for the separate and independent bodies which it denotes1 and that our various feelings are states of the sensorial organ1 it must still be allowed that1 if two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt1 the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles1 as they exist in this state at the moment of that particular feeling1 would form halves of a doubt2 that all the truths of arithmetic would be predicable of each separate thought1 if it were a state of a number of particles4 ,by a little reflection it will be seen that ,dr4 ,brown's inference is entirely unfounded4 ,if two hundred particles existing in a certain state form a doubt1 it does not necessarily follow that the division of these into two equal aggregates of the particles1 would form halves of a doubt4 ,if two hundred pounds weight attached to a certain machine will produce a result called motion1 it does not necessarily follow that one hundred pounds will produce a result called half of a motion4 ,if exactly two hundred particles organized in a certain form1 were requisite to produce a certain thought1 then it is evident that to alter in the least either the number or organization would be a complete destruction of that particular thought1 instead of forming fractions of it4 ,this is what ,priestley and his followers assert4 ,they say that thought begins and ends with the organization1 and that the single individuals entering into the system1 form no thought nor fractions of a thought4 ,this absurdity1 therefore1 remains untouched by this argument of ,dr4 ,brown4 ,it is effectually demolished1 however1 by another species of argument1 used by him to which we have already referred4 ,he has proved ,priestley's theory to be false1 not by supposing that the fractions of a doubt could be made to result from it1 but by clearly showing that an organ is only a name for a collection of many substances1 which cannot possibly possess any property as a whole1 which the individuals do not possess when existing singly4 ,he has also proved the theory which asserts that a thought or a feeling is a little particle of matter1 to be false1 because it involves the absurdity of fractional thoughts1 hopes1 fears1 c4 ,but there is one more theory which we venture to propose1 that we believe to be impregnable1 which no philosopher or metaphysician ever has or ever can refute4 ,this theory may be stated as follows3-- ,a thought1 hope1 fear1 joy1 or any other feeling is not a little particle of matter1 nor the result or quality of a collection of particles1 called an organ or a system or organs1 but it is the state or affection of a single individual substance1 having extension and parts1 and all the essential characteristics belonging to all other matter4 ,there is no absurdity in speaking of the half1 or of a quarter1 or of any other fractional part of this substance1 but there would be a great absurdity in speaking of the fractional parts of its mere states or affections4 ,the half or a thousandth part of a thinking substance is as reasonable as the half or a thousandth part of an attracting substance2 but the top or bottom of a thought would be as absurd as the top or bottom of attraction4 ,the north or east side of a substance which remembers1 is just as correct as the north or east corners of a substance which possesses a chemical affinity2 but the north side of a remembrance would be as inconsistent as the north side of a chemical affinity4 ,hence1 none of the arguments which are so successfully brought to bear against the other two theories1 will in the least affect this4 ,it is invulnerable in every point at which it may be assailed4 ,every conceivable part of this substance1 however minute1 possesses the same property as the whole4 ,a thought1 or any other state of feeling is1 therefore1 perceived by every possible part of which a whole consists4 ,a unity of substance1 as we have already had occasion to remark1 consists of an immense number of fractional parts4 ,these1 in order to constitute unity1 must be so closely connected with1 and related to each other1 that whatever state or affection one may happen to be in1 all the rest must immediately be notified of the same4 ,if one part be affected with pain1 every other part most be conscious of it4 ,if one part rejoices1 hopes1 or fears1 the whole must1 by sympathy1 rejoice1 hope1 or fear in the same manner4 ,but if one part could suffer1 while another part was unconscious of such suffering2 or if the affection of one part had no tendency to affect another1 then the individual unity would be destroyed1 and the substance would be as many distinct1 thinking1 feeling beings as there were parts unconscious of the affections of the others4 ,it is not necessary that a thinking substance should be limited to magnitudes or quantities that are exceedingly minute in order to constitute a unity4 ,large amounts of substance are as consistent with unity as small ones4 ,but in all cases1 whether the quantity be large or small1 it is necessary that the parts should bear that relation to each other1 that when one is affected every other should be affected also2 otherwise1 it could not be a unity4 ,the feeling or thinking substance of an elephant or whale is as much an individual unity as the feeling substance or spirit of a gnat or animalcul1 though the magnitude of the former far exceeds that of the latter4 ,it is the peculiar organization or relation of parts in such a manner as to be all conscious of each other's affection which constitutes the unity1 without any regard to the size or amount of substance organized4 ,when the several parts are so organized as to think1 remember1 hate1 love1 and feel alike1 under the different circumstances to which the organization may be exposed1 the whole is one individual unity or being4 ,if the mind or spirit be of the same magnitude as the body1 then the impressions received through the various organs of a human body would only have to be transferred to the distance of about five feet1 in order that every part of the mind might be alike conscious of such impressions4 ,let the velocity be ever so rapid1 time would be an essential ingredient to the transfer of these communications from part to part4 ,if they were communicated with the velocity of sound1 those parts of the mind the most distant from the one first affected1 would receive the impression in the two hundredth part of a second4 ,if the transfer were as rapid as light1 the impression would be conveyed to the most distant extremities of the mind in the two hundred millionth part of a second4 ,these inconceivably minute portions of time would be altogether imperceptible to the mind4 ,hence1 whenever any part of the mind is affected through its sensorial organs1 every other part seems to be affected in the same instant1 whereas1 in reality1 the affection is conveyed successively from part to part1 the same as sound or light is conveyed from a sounding or a luminous body4 ,the conveyance of internal thoughts or emotions of any kind form one part of the mind to the other1 is probably equal in velocity to the transfer of the various notions gained by sensation4 ,therefore1 in consequence of the inconceivable velocity with which all thoughts and sensations are conveyed from one extremity of the mind to another1 it is impossible for one part of the mind to have a thought1 sensation1 or feeling of any kind which the other parts of the mind can1 during any term of time that is appreciable1 be ignorant of4 ,it is for this reason that the whole of the mind thinks1--the whole of the mind loves1--the whole of the mind hates1--the whole of the mind wills1 c4 ,if the term of time were of any appreciable length in which thoughts and feelings are conveyed from one part of the perceptive mind to the other1 then1 while one part of the mind was hating an object1 another part of the same mind might be loving it because of newly discovered qualities2 and while a part of the mind in one foot was suffering intense pain1 caused by treading upon hot iron1 another part of the mind in the other foot1 not having had time to receive the information1 would venture also into the same danger4 ,were it possible for the different parts of the mind to feel and think without being able to communicate their respective feelings to each other1 then every part that thus thought and felt1 would be a distinct individual1 as much so as if it were separated for miles from all the rest1 or1 as if it were a separate organization4 ,in this case1 the whole being or mind which we before termed ,i1 would cease its individual unity2 and each part which thought and felt independently1 could appropriate to itself the term ,i1 and with the greatest propriety could apply the term ,,you to every other part which thought and felt distinctly and differently from itself4 ,it is1 therefore1 because all parts of the mind seem to be affected in the same way1 and apparently at the same time1 that it is felt to be a single individual mind4 ,it is this1 and this only1 that constitutes the unity of a thinking being1 and not1 as the immaterialist asserts1 a something without parts1 which from its very nature could constitute neither a unity1 nor a plurality1 nor any thing else1 but nothing4 ,if the human spirit be nearly the same form and magnitude as the fleshly tabernacle in which it dwells1 it must be composed of an immense number of particles1 each of which is susceptible of almost an infinite variety of thoughts1 emotions1 and feelings4 ,whence originated these susceptibilities8 ,are they the results of organization8 ,did each particle obtain its susceptibilities by being united with others8 ,this would be impossible2 for if a particle were entirely destitute of the capacity of thinking and feeling1 no possible organization could impart to it that power4 ,the power to think and feel1 is not1 nor can not be derived from any arrangement of particles4 ,if they have not this power before organization1 they can never have it afterwards4 ,it follows then1 that if ever there were a time when the particles of the human spirit existed in a disorganized state1 each particle so existing1 must have had all the susceptibilities of feeling and thought that it now has2 and1 consequently1 each particle must have been a separate independent being of itself4 ,therefore1 under such circumstances1 one particle would have been no more affected with the state or condition of others1 than one man is affected with the pleasures or pains of others with whom he is not associated4 ,how1 then1 it may be asked1 can these separate independent beings1 be so united as to form but one being1 possessing the same susceptibilities as each of the individuals of which it is composed8 ,the answer to this question may be more clearly understood by the following illustration4 ,let a certain number of iron filings exist in a scattered condition1 widely separated from each other4 ,it is evident that each possesses the susceptibility of magnetism4 ,such as are brought within the influence of a loadstone or magnet1 under favourable circumstances1 will exhibit all the magnetic phenomena1 while others unconnected and at a distance1 will remain entirely unaffected4 ,but let all these filings be firmly united together into one bar of iron1 and be exposed to the influence of a magnet or loadstone1 and they will then be affected alike4 ,those which were before the union distinct individual particles1 exhibiting at the same time different susceptibilities and qualities1 according to the different circumstances in which they were placed1--are1 by their union1 consolidated into one mass4 ,in this condition1 if one part be magnetized1 the whole will be magnetized2 if one part be moved1 the whole will be moved4 ,therefore the particles in this bar1 though distinct parts of the same substance1 can no longer be considered distinct individuals1 because they are no longer affected differently1 but alike4 ,so it is with the human spirit3 its particles previous to the organization1 are1 as above stated1 separate and distinct beings1 and the affections of each are entirely independent of the state of the others4 ,but when organized into a person1 all particles must from henceforth be subject to the same influences2 and though they are distinct parts of the same substance1 yet they are one in all their thoughts and feelings2 and it is this which constitutes individuality in all intelligent organizations4 ,if a bar of iron1 weighing one pound1 had the power of expressing its different qualities1 it could with the greatest propriety say1 ,i am heavy--,i am magnetized--,i move4 ,the term ,i would represent the whole bar1 consisting of an infinite number of parts1--all affected precisely in the same moment and in the same manner4 ,now no one would for a moment suppose the pound of iron to be immaterial and without parts1 because the term ,i was representative of a single individual bar4 ,so likewise in the expressions1 ,i think1--,i feel1--,i remember2 the term ,i is a representative of the whole being1 every part of which thinks1 feels1 and remembers in the same moment and in the same manner4 ,the arguments which ,dr4 ,brown has used 7,brown's ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,xcvi47 against the materiality of the mind1 would apply with the same force against the materiality of iron or any other substance2 for if thought or feeling prove the unity and inextension of mind1--weight1 magnetism1 or motion will1 with as much reason1 prove the unity and inextension of iron4 ,mr4 ,taylder has asserted that ,the ,materialism of the ,mormons is not only unscriptural1 but anti-scriptural4 7,taylder against ,materialism1 page #ba47 #a4--;,he undertakes to show that it is unscriptural1 by asserting that it is in opposition to the spirituality of the ,divinity4 7,taylder against ,materialism1 page #bb47 ,we readily admit that any system which is in opposition to the spirituality of the ,divinity1 is not only unscriptural but dangerously false4 ,that the ,spirits of the ,father and the ,son1 as well as the ,holy ,spirit1 consist of a substance purely spiritual1 can by no means be denied by any believer in the sacred scriptures4 ,it is a doctrine firmly believed by us and all the ,latter-day ,saints4 ,it is a doctrine most definitely expressed and advocated in our pamphlet on the ,kingdom of ,god1 and that1 too1 on the very page from which ,mr4 ,taylder makes copious extracts4 ,it is there that we have definitely spoken of the ,,spirits of the ,father and ,son3 it is there that we speak of the ,holy ,,spirit3 it there that we have expressly said that ,god is a ,,spirit4 ,and yet in the face of all these declarations ,mr4 ,taylder has had the hardihood to say that our theory is in opposition to the spirituality of the ,divinity4 ,instead of this1 it is the material theory alone that establishes the very existence1 of ,spirit4 ,take away the materiality of ,spirit1 and you at once destroy its very existence1 as we have abundantly shown in the foregoing pages4 ,the immaterialists have aimed a deadly blow at the foundation of all spiritual existence1 by denying it extension and parts4 ,we1 in opposition to this unphilosophic1 unscriptural1 and atheistical doctrine1 have most clearly expressed our belief in a real tangible substance called ,spirit1 which has extension and parts1 like all other matter4 ,in the case of the angels' visit to ,abraham1 and of their partaking of food1 who1 inquiries ,mr4 ,taylder1 would conclude they must have fleshy bodies8 7,taylder against ,materialism1 page #bd47 ,we answer that a fleshly body and a spiritual body are entirely different things4 ,one is a body of material flesh2 the other is a body of material spirit--they are entirely different kinds of matter1 as much so as iron and oxygen4 ,jesus says1 ,god is a ,spirit2 and again he says1 a ,spirit hath not flesh and bones4 ,from these sayings of ,jesus1 we can see that spiritual matter and fleshy or bony matter are distinct substances4 ,these passages are sometimes quoted as a supposed proof of immateriality4 ,but everyone knows that there are millions of substances that are not flesh and bones4 ,a house1 a stone1 or a tree1 hath not flesh and bones1 any more than a spirit2 shall we therefore say that all these substances are immaterial8 ,if a spirit must be immaterial because it hath not flesh and bones1 then every substance in the universe1 except flesh and bones1 must be immaterial4 ,mr4 ,taylder supposes that the persons who appeared to ,abraham1 and ate1 and walked1 and conversed with him1 were only bodily forms1 assumed in mercy to man4 ,but1 we ask1 how does our author know but what these bodily forms were the real1 true1 substantial forms of these beings1 instead of assumed ones8 ,he seems to think that it might be assumed1 with equal propriety1 that the ,divine ,being is 'a rock1' 'a fortress1' 'a tower1' 'a shield1' 'a buckler1' because he is so styled in the bible4 ,but did he ever appear in the form of a rock1 or a fortress1 to any person anciently8 ,did he ever appear to ,abraham1 to ,jacob1 to ,moses1 to the ,seventy ,elders of ,israel1 to ,micaiah1 to ,isaiah1 or to the ,jewish nation1 when he walked among them1 in the flesh1 as a tower1 a shield1 or a buckler8 ,no3 he appeared to them all as a person4 ,if the three persons whom ,abraham saw had appeared like a shield1 or any other inanimate thing1 they would not have been called men4 ,it was because they resembled the human species that they were thus called4 ,mr4 ,taylder says1 this scheme contradicts itself2 for if ,christ were possessed of a body of flesh and blood1 how could he become incarnate8 ,the ,mormons believe1 continues he1 in the incarnation1 but this contradicts it4 ,their doctrine implies that he had a body before he was incarnate1 or he had a body before he had a body1 or he had a body and had not a body at the same time4 7,taylder's ,tract1 page #bf47 ,this author must be very ignorant of our doctrine if he supposes that we think that ,christ had a body of flesh and blood before his incarnation4 ,christ1 before his incarnation1 was a spiritual body1 and not a body of flesh and bones4 ,it was the body of his spirit and not a fleshly body that was with the ,father in the beginning1 when ,god said1 let us make man in our likeness and in our image4 ,whenever he appeared before he dwelt in flesh1 it was the pure spiritual matter only that was seen4 ,the spiritual body of ,christ has hands1 face1 feet1 and all other members1 the same as his body of flesh and bones4 ,the spiritual bodies of all men were in the likeness of the spiritual body of ,christ when they were first created4 ,that spiritual bodies are capable of condensation1 is evident from the fact of their occupying the small bodies of infants4 ,the spirits of just men1 who have departed from the fleshly tabernacle1 have been seen by the inspired writers2 and from their description of them1 we should not only judge them to be of the same form1 but likewise of about the same size as man in this life4 ,these departed spirits1 then1 which are about the same magnitude as men in the flesh1 once occupied infant bodies4 ,there are only two methods by which to account for their increase in magnitude2 one is by an additional quantity of spiritual matter1 being gradually and continually incorporated in the spiritual body1 by which its magnitude is increased in the same way and in the same proportion as the fleshly body is increased4 ,and the other is by its elasticity or expansive properties by which it increases in size1 as the tabernacle of flesh and bones increases1 until it attains to its natural magnitude1 or until its expansive and cohesive properties balance each other1 or are in a state of equilibrium4 ,the latter method seems to be in accordance with scripture4 ,the spiritual body of ,christ1 when seen previous to his incarnation1 is not represented as an infant in stature1 but as a man1 and consequently his spirit must have been of the size of a man4 ,therefore1 when he came and dwelt in the infant tabernacle of flesh1 born of a virgin1 his spirit must have been greatly condensed2 and did not completely regain its former magnitude until the fleshly tabernacle had attained its full growth4 ,as a further evidence of the condensation of spiritual matter1 we read of seven devils beings cast out of ,mary ,magdalene1 and of a legion of others inhabiting one man1 and which1 after being cast out1 entered a large herd of swine4 ,now these devils were once angels who kept not their first estate4 ,those angels who kept their first estate1 that have been seen1 appear about the size and of the form of men1 insomuch that they are frequently called men in the scriptures3 and it is reasonable to suppose that those angels who fell did not1 to any great extent1 alter their size and form4 ,therefore1 they must have been very much condensed and crowded when a legion of them entered one body4 ,that the different particles of a spirit are not all in actual contact is very evident from the fact that a spiritual body can alter its dimensions by condensation or expansion4 ,it is also evident from the fact of its entering into union with flesh and bones1 and also withdrawing itself at death4 ,if the particles were in contact1 and inseparably connected1 there would be no possibility of getting in and out of a fleshly body1 unless by entirely dissolving its parts4 ,but1 as it is1 each refined particle of the spirit can1 like heat or electricity1 pass between the fleshly particles2 and thus the whole body of spiritual particles can liberate themselves2 and by their own self-moving powers and free will1 can still preserve and maintain their own organization4 ,here is manifested the great superiority of spiritual matter to all other matter2 each particle has the power of self-motion4 ,the whole mass of particles have power to preserve themselves in an organized form as long as they please4 ,should they1 by any contingency1 be disarranged1 as in passing in or out of a body1 they can with the greatest ease1 resume their former position1 and maintain their bodily organization either in or out of a fleshly tabernacle4 ,mr4 ,taylder1 in speaking of the seven devils which possessed ,mary ,magdalene1 says1 if they were material they must have condensed themselves into a very small space4 ,he then remarks1 ,no doubt the reader questions the possibility of any sane person1 first embracing and then calmly propagating such errors4 7,taylder's ,tract1 page #bh47 ,but we calmly ask ,mr4 ,taylder1 which would be the most reasonable and philosophic1--to believe that seven substances could all occupy the same space at the same time1 or to believe1 as we do1 in the condensation of substance8 ,the former is an admitted absurdity1 but the latter is something that is constantly taking place in a great variety of substances4 ,none could believe the former1 unless his mental vision was obscured and his eyes blinded by the absurd insane notions of priestcraft and false tradition2 but any man of sound sense1 who dares think for himself1 could believe the latter1 because it does not involve an absurdity4 ,the ,holy ,ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon the ,saviour1 and like as cloven tongues of fire on the apostles4 ,how can a dove1 inquires ,mr4 ,taylder1 extend through all space and intermingle with all the matter8 ,it is 7he asserts7 a clear impossibility4 ,we readily admit that a dove or a cloven tongue of fire cannot be omnipresent4 ,it is1 as ,mr4 ,taylder says1 a clear impossibility4 ,and it is likewise just as impossible for a person to be everywhere present1 as it is for a dove4 ,why should our author suppose it possible for a person to be everywhere present1 when he admits that a dove could not be in such a condition8 ,the cloven tongues of fire that appeared unto the disciples on the day of pentecost1 were only parts of that all-wise substance which extends through space4 ,the cloven tongue of fire which rested upon one man1 was not the same that rested upon all the others2 hence there was a plurality of them that appeared4 ,the prophet ,joel informs us1 that in the last days the ,spirit shall be poured out upon all flesh4 ,no two persons can receive the same identical particles of this ,spirit at the same instant2 a part therefore of the ,holy ,spirit will rest upon one man1 and another part will rest upon another4 ,if the ,spirit rests upon all flesh at the same time1 then there will be as many parts of the ,spirit as there are distinct individuals in whom it dwells4 ,no one of these parts of the ,spirit can be everywhere present any more than a dove4 ,each part can occupy only one place at a time4 ,if the whole be infinite in quantity1 it can extend through infinite space2 if it be finite in quantity1 it can only occupy finite space4 ,that different parts of this spirit can assume different shapes1 is evident from its appearing as a dove at one time1 and as cloven tongues of fire at another4 ,it is also evident from the fact of the ,saviour's speaking of the ,holy ,spirit as a personage4 ,howbeit1 when he the ,spirit of truth1 is come1 ,,he will guide you into all truth2 for ,,he shall not speak of himself1 but whatsoever ,,he shall hear1 that shall ,,he speak3 and ,,he will shew you things to come4 7,john1 xvi41 #ac47 ,there is no more inconsistency in one part of the ,holy ,spirit existing in the form of a person1 than there is in another part existing in the form of a dove1 and several other parts existing in the form of cloven tongues of fire4 ,that the all-powerful matter called the ,holy ,spirit is very widely diffused1 is evident from the fact that the time will come when it will be poured out upon all flesh4 ,it is very certain that the ,psalmist had some idea of the immense quantities of this substance1 and of its extensive diffusion1 when he exclaims1 ,whither shall ,i go from thy ,spirit8 c4 ,the ,spirit of ,god moved upon the face of the deep1 and by his ,spirit the heavens were garnished4 ,when we speak of the ,spirit of ,god1 extending through all space1 we do not mean that it absolutely fills every minute portion of space1 for if this were the case1 there would be no room for any other matter4 ,a substance1 to absolutely fill all space1 would be an infinite solid1 without pores and immovable in all its parts2 therefore1 the ,spirit exists in different parts of space in greater or less degrees of density1 like heat1 light1 or electricity4 ,it is this glorious and all-powerful substance that governs and controls all other substances by its actual presence1 producing all the phenomena ascribed to the laws of nature2 in it we exist1 we live1 we move1 and by it we receive wisdom and knowledge1 and are guided into truth in proportion as we permit it to dwell within us and receive its heavenly teachings4 #b4--,the next consideration1 says our author1 is their denial of the infinity1 perfection1 and omnipresence of the ,godhead4 7,taylder's ,tract1 page #ca47 ,under this head he quotes many passages of scripture to show that the presence of ,god fills heaven and earth1 and that the heaven of heavens cannot contain him4 ,all these things we freely admit4 ,the ,holy ,spirit is called ,god in the scriptures1 as well as the ,father and ,son4 ,this1 we presume1 ,mr4 ,taylder will admit4 ,it is ,god1 the ,holy ,spirit1 then1 that is everywhere1 substantially and virtually4 ,the ,holy ,spirit is infinitely perfect and wise1 one in substance1 but one in wisdom1 power1 glory1 and goodness4 ,jesus prayed that all his disciples might be made one1 as he and his ,father are one4 ,if ,jesus and the ,father are one person1 then all the disciples must1 according to the prayer of ,jesus1 lose their individual identity and become one person3 this would be perfect nonsense4 ,therefore1 ,jesus and the ,father are two persons or two substances1 the same in kind but not the same in identity--in the same sense that his disciples are different persons3 and1 consequently1 distinct substances4 ,his disciples are to be made one with him1 and with each other1 the same as ,jesus and the ,father are one2 that is1 they are to be one in wisdom1 power1 and glory1 but not in person and substance4 ,the substance of the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost are three distinct substances1 as much as the substance of three men are distinct4 ,these three substances act in concert in the same way that all the innumerable millions of his disciples1 after they are glorified1 will act in concert4 ,the disciples will then be like him4 ,their glorified bodies will be similar to that of ,christ's but not the same as ,christ's3 they will all maintain their separate individualities1 like the ,father and ,son4 ,the one-ness of the ,godhead may be in some measure illustrated by two gallons of pure water1 existing in separate vessels1 representing the ,father and ,son1 and an ocean of pure water1 representing the ,holy ,spirit4 ,no one would say of these three portions of water that they were identically the same4 ,every portion would be a separate substance of itself1 but yet the separate portions would be one in kind--one in quality1 but three in separate distinct identities4 ,so it is with the ,godhead so far as the spiritual matter is concerned4 ,there is the same power1 wisdom1 glory1 and goodness in every part1 and yet every part has its own work to perform1 which accords in the most perfect harmony with the mind and will of every other part4 ,each atom of the ,holy ,spirit is intelligent1 and like all other matter has solidity1 form1 and size4 ,it is because each acts in the most perfect unison with all the rest that the whole is considered one ,holy ,spirit4 ,all these innumerable atoms are considered one ,holy ,spirit in the same sense that the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,spirit are considered one ,god4 ,the immense number of atoms1 though each is all-wise and all-powerful1 is1 by virtue of their perfect concord and agreement1 but one ,holy ,spirit1 the same as the intelligent particles of a man's spirit are1 by their peculiar union1 but one human spirit4 ,their unity or oneness does not consist in that inexplicable1 incomprehensible1 imaginary something without extension or parts1 as taught in the first of the ,thirty-nine ,articles1 but it consists in a unity or oneness of wisdom1 power1 and glory1 each part performing its own splendid works and operations in union with the mind and will of every other part4 ,no one part can perform any work but what is the mind of the whole4 ,therefore1 in this sense it is the same mind--the same will--the same wisdom that pervades the whole4 ,mr4 ,taylder1 in order to establish his views of a god without parts1 quotes from the theological works of a very celebrated writer on the omnipresence of ,god1 which reads as follows3-- ,the essential presence is without any division of himself4 ,i fill heaven and earth1 not part in heaven and part in earth3 ,i fill one as well as the other4 ,one part of his essence is not in one place1 and another part of his essence in another place2 he would then be changeable1 for that part of his essence which was now in this place he might alter to another1 and place that part of his essence which were in another place to this2 but he is undivided everywhere4 ,it is impossible that one part of his essence can be separated from another3 for he is not a body1 to have one part separable from another4 ,the light of the sun cannot be cut into parts2 it cannot be shut into any place1 and kept there2 it is entire in every place3 shall not ,god1 who gives the light that power1 be much more present himself8 ,whatsoever hath parts is finite1 but ,god is infinite2 therefore1 hath no parts of his essence4 ,besides1 if there were such a division of his being1 he would not be the most simple and uncompounded being1 but would be made up of various parts2 he would not be a spirit1 for parts are evidences of composition1 and it could not be said that ,god is here or there1 but only a part of ,god is here and a part of ,god is there4 ,but he fills heaven and earth2 he is as much a ,god in the earth beneath as he is in heaven above4 ',the ,lord he is ,god in heaven above and upon the earth beneath2 there is none else4'--,deut4 iv4 #ci4 ,entirely in all places1 not by scraps and fragments of his essence4 7,charnock on the ,omnipresence of ,god47 ,of all the absurdities ever imagined up by mortal man in relation to ,god1 the above caps the climax4 ,one part of his essence1 says ,charnock1 is not in one place and another part of his essence in another place4 ,how does he exist8 ,according to this theologian1 the whole of the essence of ,god entire must exist in every place4 ,the whole of his essence1 not a part1 must exist in every cubic inch of space4 ,in one cubic foot of space1 according to ,charnock1 there would be seventeen hundred and twenty eight cubic inches1 each containing the whole of the essence of ,god4 ,as each cubic inch of space is susceptible of being divided into an infinite number of fractional spaces1 each fractional space must contain the whole of the essence of ,god2 hence the whole of his essence would be repeated an infinite number of times in every cubic inch4 ,therefore1 if the whole of the essence of ,god constitutes ,god1 we shall have an infinite number of gods in every cubic inch of space4 ,but the absurdity does not stop here4 ,charnock admits the omnipresence of ,god2 he supposes his essence to fill the infinity of space4 ,now the whole of this infinitely extended essence must exist in the smallest fractional space that can be imagined1 and must be repeated an infinite number of times in all finite spaces1 in order that the whole of his essence may be in every possible space4 ,it is impossible1 says ,charnock1 that one part of his essence can be separated from another4 ,but1 we ask1 are not the different parts of space separated from each other8 ,and if he fills all space1 then his essence that is in one part of space must be separate from his essence in another part of space4 ,if the whole of his essence occupies a cubic foot of space on the earth1 and the whole of his essence occupies another cubic foot of space at the distance of the sun1 how is it that these essences at this great distance are not separate from each other8 ,but does not every school-boy know that the whole of any essence cannot be in two separate places at the same instant8 ,and does not every one know that the whole of an essence1 infinitely extended1 cannot possibly exist in a finite space4 ,charnock endeavours to illustrate his absurdities by referring to the rays of light4 ,the light of the sun1 he says1 cannot be cut into parts1--it is entire in every place4 ,what does this great theologian mean by this8 ,does he mean that the light of the sun is without parts like his god8 or that the whole light of the sun is in every place8 ,does the whole light of the sun enter our eyes or only a part of his rays8 ,if the whole light of the sun is entire in every place1 then the intensity of his light must be equal in all places4 ,if this be the case1 philosophers must be entirely mistaken1 for they say that light varies in intensity inversely as the square of the distance from the luminous body2 they inform us that a body situated at twice or three times the distance of the earth from the sun will enjoy only one-fourth or one-ninth of the amount of light that we enjoy2 but how could this be possible1 if the whole light of the sun1 instead of part1 is entire in every place8 ,it takes light over eight minutes to come from the sun to the earth4 ,charnock says1 ,the light of the sun cannot be cut into parts4 ,this is not true2 for if an opaque body1 one million of miles in diameter1 were to be placed at any given instant half way between the earth and sun1 the light of the sun would still continue to be seen for upwards of four minutes after the intervention of this body4 ,the rays of light between the earth and the opaque body would be entirely cut off from the rays on the opposite side of the body4 ,it matters not whether the corpuscular or the undulatory theory of light be adopted--whether the particles of light emanate from the sun or merely vibrate2 each atom is separate from every other atom1 and each is only a part of the great whole4 ,an infinite number of parts enter into the vast assemblage of luminous atoms4 ,light radiates from the sun in all directions1 and fills the surrounding spaces by a part being in one space and a part in another1 and not1 like ,mr4 ,charnock's god1 the whole being repeated in every part of space4 ,that part of the essence of light which is in one place1 cannot by any possibility be in any other place at the same instant4 ,in one sense it may be said to be one light1 or the same light1 because the properties are alike4 ,each particle is a distinct1 separate essence from every other particle1 but the qualities of each are alike or similar4 ,therefore1 in this sense we may speak of the light of the sun as one light1 though it possesses an infinite number of parts1 the same as we speak of ,god being one ,god1 though the parts of his essence are infinite in number4 ,mr4 ,charnock says1 ,whatsoever hath parts is finite1 but ,god is infinite1 and1 therefore1 hath not parts of his essence4 ,space likewise is infinite1 and therefore1 according to this gentleman's logic1 it can have no parts4 ,duration is infinite1 and1 therefore1 it also must be without parts4 ,what would a cubic inch of space be8 ,any man that was not insane would at once say that it is a part of space4 ,therefore1 if an infinite space or an infinite duration can have parts1 why not an infinite essence have parts8 ,the ,lord he is ,god in heaven above and upon the earth beneath2 there is none else4--,deut4 iv4 #ci4 ,such a passage when referring to the person of ,god1 should be understood the same as we would understand a similar expression concerning any earthly ruler3 for instance1 it can be said of her ,majesty1 she is queen in ,great ,britain and also in ,canada1 and there is none else2 that is1 there is none else that is queen in these two places4 ,this would have no reference to her person being in these two places at the same time2 it only shows that she should be the only acknowledged queen in these two places4 ,but when ,god says1 ,i fill heaven and earth1 he has reference to his ,holy ,spirit1 a part of which fills heaven1 and another part fills the earth4 ,that part which fills the earth has the same wisdom1 knowledge1 glory1 and power as the part that fills the heaven2 hence1 though distinct and separate essences1 their perfections and attributes are one4 ,one wisdom--one glory--one power1 pervade every part of this glorious essence4 ,this oneness is such that the part which fills the earth will never act contrary to the will of the part which fills the heavens4 ,the essence possesses a plurality of parts1 but the wisdom possesses no divisibility of parts2 it is infinite wisdom in every part4 ,wisdom cannot be divided into parts any more than love1 hope1 joy1 or fear4 ,a truth is identically the same truth whether possessed by one or a million of persons1 and is not susceptible of being divided into fractions4 ,the ,holy ,spirit is called ,the ,spirit of ,truth4 ,though the essence that possesses this truth may be divided into an infinite number of parts1 occupying an infinite number of separate spaces1 yet the truth that pervades them all is ,,one truth4 ,it is the indivisibility and unity of these perfections or qualities that constitute the oneness of the ,godhead4 #c4--,mr4 ,taylder supposes my assertion that there is no such thing as moral image1 to be unscriptural1 and that it denies in some respects the moral perfections of the ,godhead4 7,taylder's ,tract1 page #cc47 ,we still maintain that there cannot be any such thing as moral image independently of an essence or substance to which it belongs4 ,and this is the only sense which we intended to convey in our tract on the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god4 ,indeed1 it is there expressly said1 that ,morality is a property of some being or substance4 ,a property without a substance or being to which it appertains is inconceivable4 ,a property can never have figure1 shape1 or image of any kind4 ,this is a truth admitted by all philosophers4 ,sir ,isaac ,newton in the ,scholium1 at the end of the principia1 in speaking of ,god says1 ,he is omnipresent1 not by means of his virtue alone1 but also by his substance1 for virtue cannot subsist without substance4 ,virtue or morality cannot subsist without substance2 hence it can have no image without substance4 ,substance alone can have an image4 ,such an image may have the property of virtue1 or of morality1 and by reason of this property may be called a virtuous image1 or a moral image4 ,it is in this sense alone that the apostle ,paul applies the term image to the new man4 ,ye have put on the new man1 which is renewed in knowledge1 after the image of him that created him4 ,col4 iii4 #aj4 ,ye have put on the new man1 which after ,god is created in righteousness and true holiness4 ,eph4 iv4 #bd4 ,now what is this new man8 ,it is the spirit of man renewed in its properties1 but not changed in its substance or essence4 ,this substance previously to the renewal of its qualities was immoral1 after the renewal it became moral or virtuous1 possessing the same quality in a degree as the substance or image of the ,deity4 ,the substance of the ,deity may be termed a moral substance or image1 the same as the substance of gold is called a yellow substance1 or yellow image1 if it resembles a person4 ,the yellowness of gold could not be an image independently of the substance1 neither could the morality of the ,deity be an image independently of his essence4 ,the spiritual substance of man was formed in the beginning after the same image as the spiritual substance of the persons of the ,father and ,son4 ,previously to the fall these spirits were all moral in their nature2 by the fall the spirits of men lost their morality and virtue1 but not their essence--that continued the same2 by the new birth man regains his morality and virtue1 while the essence remains the same2 it now becomes a moral virtuous image1 whereas the same substance was before immoral4 ,paul1 in speaking of the resurrection1 says1 ,as we have borne the image of the earthly1 we shall also bear the image of the heavenly4 ,i ,cor4 xv4 #di4 ,this cannot mean a heavenly image without substance2 for when man rises from the dead1 he certainly will rise with flesh and bones4 ,the immortal bodies of the saints when they rise from the grave will be fashioned1 as ,paul says1 like unto the glorious body of ,jesus ,christ4 ,as ,jesus ascended into heaven with a body of flesh and bones1 so will his saints bear the same image1 having flesh and bones after the image of the heavenly4 ,that these glorious bodies of immortal flesh and immortal bones will be moral images1 in the sense above stated1 there is no doubt4 ,but such a thing as a moral image in the sense that the immaterialists use the term1 is a clear impossibility4 ,such an image1 as we remarked in our treatise on the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god1 never can and never will have an existence only in the brains of modern idolaters4 #d4--,mr4 ,taylder falsely accuses us of denying the personality of each person in the ,trinity1 making each to be only a part in the ,godhead4 7,taylder's ,tract1 page #cd47 ,this author very well knows that the personalities in the godhead are not denied by us4 ,it will be seen on the very pages to which he has so frequently referred1 that we believe the ,father and ,son to be two separate distinct personages1 as much so as fathers and sons of the human race2 it will there be seen that we also believe the ,holy spirit to be a separate distinct substance from the two substances of the ,father and ,son4 ,that all may see that this author has wrongfully accused us of denying the personality of each person in the ,trinity1 we make the following extract from our treatise on the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god4 ,the ,godhead consists of the ,father1 the ,son1 and the ,holy ,spirit4 ,the ,father is a material being4 ,the substance of which he is composed is wholly material4 ,it is a substance widely different in some respects from the various substances with which we are more immediately acquainted4 ,in other respects it is precisely like all other materials4 ,the substance of his person occupies space the same as other matter4 ,it has solidity1 length1 breadth1 and thickness1 like all other matter4 ,the elementary materials of his body are not susceptible of occupying1 at the same time1 the same identical space with other matter4 ,the substance of his person1 like other matter1 cannot be in two places at the same instant4 ,it also requires time for him to transport himself from place to place4 ,it matters not how great the velocity of his movements1 time is an essential ingredient to all motion1 whether rapid or slow4 ,it differs from other matter in the superiority of its powers1 being intelligent1 all-wise1 and possessing the power of self-motion to a far greater extent than the coarser materials of nature4 ,god is a spirit4 ,but that does not make him an immaterial being--a being that has no properties in common with matter4 ,the expression1 an immaterial being1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,immateriality is only another name for nothing4 ,it is the negative of all existence4 ,a spirit is as much matter as oxygen or hydrogen4 ,it has many properties in common with all other matter4 ,chemists have discovered between fifty and sixty kinds of matter2 and each kind has some properties in common with all other matter1 and some properties peculiar to itself which the others do not inherit4 ,now1 no chemist in classifying his substances would presume to say1 this substance is material1 but that one is immaterial1 because it differs in some respects from the first4 ,he would call them all material1 though they in some respects differed widely4 ,so the substance called spirit is material1 though it differs in a remarkable degree from other substances4 ,it is only the addition of another element of a more powerful nature than any yet discovered4 ,he is not a being without parts1 as modern idolators teach2 for every whole is made up of parts4 ,the whole person of the ,father consists of innumerable parts2 and each part is so situated as to bear certain relations of distance to every other part4 ,there must also be1 to a certain degree1 a freedom of motion among these parts1 which is an essential condition to the movements of his limbs1 without which he could only move as a whole4 ,all the foregoing statements in relation to the person of the ,father1 are equally applicable to the person of the ,son4 ,the ,holy ,spirit being one part of the ,godhead1 is also a material substance1 of the same nature and properties in many respects1 as the spirits of the ,father and ,son4 ,it exists in vast immeasurable quantities1 in connexion with all material worlds4 ,this is called ,god in the ,scriptures1 as well as the ,father and ,son4 ,god the ,father and ,god the ,son cannot be everywhere present2 indeed they cannot be even in two places at the same instant3 but ,god the ,holy ,spirit is omnipresent--it extends through all space1 intermingling with all other matter1 yet no one atom of the ,holy ,spirit can be in two places at the same instant1 which in all cases is an absolute impossibility4 ,it must exist in inexhaustible quantities1 which is the only possible way for any substance to be omnipresent4 ,all the innumerable phenomena of universal nature are produced in their origin by the actual presence of this intelligent all-wise and all-powerful material substance called the ,holy ,spirit4 ,it is the most active matter in the universe1 producing all its operations according to fixed and definite laws enacted by itself1 in conjuction with the ,father and the ,son4 ,what are called the laws of nature are nothing more nor less than the fixed method by which this spiritual matter operates4 ,each atom of the ,holy ,spirit is intelligent1 and like other matter has solidity1 form1 and size1 and occupies space4 ,two atoms of this spirit cannot occupy the same space at the same time4 ,in all these respects it does not differ in the least from all other matter4 ,its distinguishing characteristics from other matter are its almighty powers and infinite wisdom1 and many other glorious attributes which other materials do not possess4 ,if several of the atoms of this ,spirit should exist united together in the form of a person1 then this person of the ,holy ,spirit would be subject to the same necessity as the other two persons of the ,godhead1 that is1 it could not be everywhere present4 ,no finite number of atoms can be omnipresent4 ,an infinite number of atoms is requisite to be everywhere in infinite space4 ,two persons receiving the gift of the ,holy spirit1 do not each receive at the same time the same identical particles1 though they each receive a substance exactly similar in kind4 ,it would be as impossible for each to receive the same identical atoms at the same instant1 as it would be for two men at the same time to drink the same identical pint of water4 7,kingdom of ,god4 ,part ,i1 page #d47 ,from this extract it will be perceived that the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,spirit1 are believed by us to be three distinct material substances1 the same in kind1 but not the same in identity4 ,the person of the ,father is a body of ,spirit1 consisting of parts4 ,mr4 ,taylder enquires1 ,what does the author mean by 'the elementary materials of his body8' ,is his body a compounded substance1 capable of being reduced to original and simple elements8 ,we answer that the elements of his body are the different parts of which it consists4 ,the whole1 being compounded of elementary parts4 ,the ,godhead may be further illustrated by a council1 consisting of three men--all possessing equal wisdom1 knowledge1 and truth1 together with equal qualifications in every other respect4 ,each person would be a separate distinct person or substance from the other two1 and yet the three would form but ,,one council4 ,each alone possesses1 by supposition1 the same wisdom and truth that the three united or the ,,one council possesses4 ,the union of the three men in one council would not increase the knowledge or wisdom of either4 ,each man would be one part of the council when reference is made to his person2 but the wisdom and truth of each man would be the whole wisdom and truth of the council1 and not a part4 ,if it were possible to divide truth1 and other qualities of a similar nature into fractions1 so that the ,father should have the third part of truth1 the third part of wisdom1 the third part of knowledge1 the third part of love1 while the ,son and the ,holy ,spirit possessed the other two-thirds of these qualities or affections1 then neither of these persons could make one ,god1 but only a part of a ,god4 ,but because the divisibility of wisdom1 truth1 or love is impossible1 the whole of these qualities dwell in the ,father--the whole dwells in the ,son--the whole is possessed by the ,holy ,spirit4 ,the ,holy ,spirit is one part of the ,godhead in essence2 the whole of ,god in wisdom1 truth1 and other similar qualities4 ,if a truth could become three truths1 distinct from each other1 by dwelling in three persons or substances1 then there would be three ,gods instead of one4 ,but as it is1 the ,trinity is three in essence but one in truth and other similar principles4 ,the oneness of the ,godhead1 as described in the ,scriptures1 never was intended to apply to the essence1 but only to the perfections and other attributes4 ,if the ,father possess infinite wisdom and knowledge1 why1 some may ask1 can he not get along with his work without the assistance of the ,son and ,holy ,spirit8 ,we answer1 the ,son is necessary to reconcile fallen man to the ,father3 the ,holy ,spirit is necessary to sanctify and purify the affections of men1 and also to dwell in them as a teacher of truth4 ,immense quantities of this substance are also necessary in order to be present in connexion with all other substances1 to control and govern them according to fixed and definite laws that good order and harmony may obtain in every department of the universe4 ,the ,father and ,son govern the immensity of creation1 not by their own actual presence1 but by the actual presence of the ,spirit4 ,the union of the three does not give any additional wisdom and knowledge to either1 but by the union1 they are able to carry on certain works which could not be carried on by one singly4 ,one singly1 as for instance the ,father1 could have power to do all things not inconsistent with his perfections and attributes1 that is1 he could act where he was present1 but without the assistance of the ,holy ,spirit or some other being1 he being a person1 could not act where he is not present4 ,by the union of the three1 each is able to act in all places through the assistance of the others4 ,the persons of the ,father and ,son can be in heaven1 and yet1 through the agency of the spirit1 act upon the earth4 ,an omnipresent person is impossible1 but an omnipresent substance1 diffused through space1 is not only consistent1 but reasonable4 ,persons through the medium of such an all-wise and all-powerful substance1 can exercise ,almighty power1 at the same time in the most distant departments of creation4 ,without such a substance with which they were in union1 they could not carry on the grand and powerful operations of universal nature2 for no substance can act where it is not present4 ,perhaps the objector may refer to matter attracting matter as a proof that it can act where it is not present4 ,but we are bold to affirm that such a thing as attraction cannot possibly exist4 ,for matter to draw distant matter towards itself1 and consequently act where it is not present1 would be as utterly impossible as it would be for a person to be in two or more places at the same time4 ,all the phenomena of universal gravitation can be accounted for upon principles infinitely more simple and consistent1 than to ascribe to matter the impossible power of acting where it is not present4 ,the author may1 at some future time1 give his views with regard to the powers of nature1 and the laws by which it is governed4 ,but to enter in this work into a full development of our theory in relation to those intricate though sublime subjects1 would be a digression foreign to the objects we have in view in this treatise4 ,no doubt many apparent objections to our views of the ,godhead will arise in the minds of many who nave been traditionated in the absurd doctrines of immaterialism4 ,not long since a series of questions were propounded to the ,latter-day ,saints by the ,rev4 ,f4 ,austin1 a ,roman ,catholic minister1 a few of which1 relating to the nature of ,god1 we insert here together with our answers4 7,the whole series of questions1 together with the answers1 will be published in the ,millenial ,star47 ,question4--,if the ,god of the ,mormonites be like a man in figure1 we must suppose the organs of the senses to have the same uses1 and to be dependent on the same sources for information2 his ears1 in consequence1 for hearing must be dependent on the transmission of sound4 ,how1 then1 can he hear his people praying to him in ,europe when he is in ,america8 ,answer4--,because the figure of two substances are alike1 that is no evidence that the qualities of the two substances are alike4 ,a wax figure may be in the shape of a man1 and yet1 we all know1 that it has not the qualities of a man4 ,a wise man may have the figure of a foolish man1 and yet be far superior to him in the qualities of wisdom1 knowledge and understanding4 ,god may have the figure of a man1 and yet have many qualities and susceptibilities which man has not got4 ,the resemblance of figure1 then1 has nothing to do1 as to whether other qualities shall be alike or unlike4 ,the spiritual body of the ,deity is altogether a different kind of substance from the fleshly body of man1 yet they may resemble each other in figure4 ,the substances are entirely different1 therefore1 though the figures should resemble each other1 this is no evidence that all the qualities must be alike4 ,the ear of the fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of our atmosphere2 the ear of a spiritual body may be affected in an entirely different manner1 and yet their figures may resemble each other4 ,the ear of the fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of many elastic substances besides the atmosphere4 ,sound is conveyed through various mediums with different degrees of velocity4 ,the ear of the spiritual body may be affected1 not only by the atmosphere and other elastic mediums which affect the ear of flesh1 but it also may be affected by a vast number of other more subtle and refined mediums1 which may transfer sound with a velocity immensely superior to any motion with which we are acquainted4 ,a refined medium which would convey sound with no greater velocity than that of light1 would carry information from ,europe to ,america in less than the sixtieth part of a second4 ,but if ,god foreknows all things1 he must have foreknown all about our prayers millions of ages before we were born1 and must also have foreknown the precise time when we would pray1 and the kind of spirit or feeling1 and the degree of faith that would accompany each prayer2 and if he knew all these things before they come to pass1 he must certainly know them the moment they do come to pass2 and1 therefore1 with a foreknowledge of all things1 there would be no necessity for his receiving information of our prayers by the transmission of sound2 he would know and understand our prayers the moment they were offered up1 the same as he knew them and understood them in ages before they were offered up4 ,he that formed the ear shall he not hear4 ,because ,god knows the nature of music1 that is no reason why he may not rejoice in hearing music4 ,one use1 then1 of the ears of his spiritual body is1 no doubt1 to hear and rejoice in delightful music1 not that it increases his knowledge1 but it is joyful to his ear4 ,the ear of man serves a double purpose2 it is not only a medium of information1 but a medium of sounds that are delightful to the mind4 ,the ear of the ,lord may be delighted with sounds1 though he receive no additional knowledge by those sounds4 ,question--,if he be like man1 his legs must be the organs of motion2 if not1 what purpose do they serve8 ,if they are1 are they good for walking through the air as well as on land8 ,or has he wings1 or how8 or some organ of motion we have not got8 ,and if we have not sot this organ1 how can we be created to his image and likeness1 supposing the resemblance in every thing8 ,answer4--,the resemblance between man and ,god has reference1 as we have already observed1 to the shape or figure2 other qualities may or may not resemble each other4 ,man has legs1 so has ,god1 as is evident from his appearance to ,abraham4 ,man walks with his legs1 so does ,god sometimes1 as is evident from his going with ,abraham towards ,sodom4 ,god can not only walk1 but he can move up or down through the air without using his legs as in the process of walking4 7,see ,gen4 xvii4 #bb2 also xi4 #e2 also xxxv4 #ac47--;,a man wrestled with ,jacob until the breaking of day2 after which1 ,jacob says--,i have seen ,god face to face1 and my life is preserved4--,gen4 xxxii4 #bd-cj4 ,that this person had legs is evident from his wrestling with ,jacob4 ,his image and likeness was so much like man's1 that ,jacob at first supposed him to be a man4--7,see #bdth verse47 ,god1 though in the figure of a man1 has many powers that man has not got4 ,he can go upwards through the air4 ,he can waft himself from world to world by his own self-moving powers4 ,these are powers not possessed by man only through faith1 as in the instances of ,enoch and ,elijah4 ,therefore1 though in the figure of a man1 he has powers far superior to man4 ,question--,when ,god appears surrounded with glory1 is this glory essential to him or not8 ,if essential1 how can he lay it aside1 as he seems to have done when he appeared to ,abraham8 ,if his appearing so does not prove it essential1 how does his appearance in the form of a man prove that form essential to him8 ,answer--,the glory of ,god is essential to him under all circumstances1 whether his person is visible or invisible--whether man is permitted to behold that glory or not4 ,he never lays aside his glory1 though he may not always render it visible to mortals4 ,the ,god of glory1 says the martyr ,stephen1 appeared unto our father ,abraham when he was in ,mesopotamia1 before he dwelt in ,charran--,acts1 vii4 #b4 ,but because he showed ,abraham his person1 it did not necessarily follow that he must also show him his glory4 ,the person of ,god is one thing1 and his glory is another2 they are inseparably connected4 ,he cannot divest his person of his glory1 nor lay it aside1 but he can hide his glory from the gaze of man1 or he can reveal it and his person also1 or he can reveal his person and not his glory4 ,the visibility or the invisibility of the glory of ,god does not render it non-essential to him4 ,the glory is just as essential as his image and likeness1 and his image or likeness1 resembling that of man's1 is as essential as his glory--neither can be laid aside1 though one or both may be rendered visible or invisible4 ,question4--,if his presence do not extend beyond his size1 that is1 the size of a man1 how could he divide the waters of the sea--how could he hold them up8 ,if they were a solid mass1 it might be conceived2 but all the strength in the world won't hold up water2 and it must be remembered that a person must be present where he acts4 ,answer4--,he could divide the waters of the sea1 and hold them up by the actual presence of his ,holy ,spirit which not only moves upon the face of the waters1 but is likewise in and through the waters1 governing them and controlling all the elements according to the mind of ,god4 ,it is the actual presence of this ,spirit that produces all the phenomena ascribed to the laws of nature1 as well as many of the deviations from those laws1 commonly called miracles2 it extends1 like the golden rays of the bright luminary of heaven1 through all extent2 it spreads life and happiness through all the varied species of animated beings1 and gilds the starry firmament with a magnificent splendor1 celestial1 immortal1 and eternal4 #ae1 ,wilton ,street1 ,liverpool1 ,july #cast1 #ahdi4 ---- ,r4 ,james1 ,printer1 #ci1 ,south ,castle ,street1 ,liverpool4 ,transcriber's ,note ,this ebook aims to reproduce the #ahdi ,liverpool edition4 ,signature ,books very kindly gave permission for the ,mormon ,texts ,project to use the text of ,absurdities of ,immaterialism they originally published in ,the ,essential ,orson ,pratt 7as made available on their website7 as a basis for this work4 ,this text was compared to scans of the pamphlet that ,google has helpfully made available4 ,the end of the pamphlet1 which was not in the ,signature ,books text1 was produced based off the ,google scans1 and the rest of the text was carefully compared to the scans and in a few cases edited to conform more closely4 ,footnote citations in the original have been converted to parenthetical form to improve readability4 ,some unmatched quotation marks have been corrected in cases where the correct placement could be established4 ,a few typographical errors 7wont for won't1 actua for actual7 have been corrected4