,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,morality ,,by ,,arthur ,,schopenhauer ,translated with ,introduction and ,notes by ,,arthur ,,brodrick ,,bullock1 ,,ma4 ,,trinity ,,college1 ,,cambridge ,,london ,,swan ,,sonnenschein ,,co41 ,,limited ,,paternoster ,,square #aijc ,,prize ,,essay ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,morality ,,not ,,approved ,,by ,,the ,,danish ,,royal ,,society ,,of ,,sciences ,,copenhagen1 #cj ,january1 #ahdj4 ,to preach ,morality is easy1 to found it difficult4-- 7,,schopenhauer3 ,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur2 p4 #abh7 ,,matri ,,carissimae4 ,,contents4 ,,translator',s ,,preface ,,translator',s ,,introduction ,,the ,,question ,,part ,i4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,,the ,,problem ,,ii4 ,,general ,,retrospect ,,part ,,ii4 ,,critique ,,of ,,kant',s ,,basis ,,of ,,ethics4 ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,remarks ,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,imperative ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics ,,iii4 ,,on ,,the ,,assumption ,,of ,,duties ,,towards ,,ourselves ,,in ,,particular ,,iv4 ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics4 ,,note4 ,v4 ,,on ,,the ,,leading ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics ,,vi4 ,,on ,,the ,,derived ,,forms ,,of ,,the ,,leading ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics ,,vii4 ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,of ,,conscience ,,viii4 ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,op ,,the ,,intelligible ,,and ,,empirical ,,character1 ,,theory ,,of ,,freedom ,,note ,,ix4 ,,fichte',s ,,ethics ,,as ,a ,,magnifying ,,glass ,,for ,,the ,,errors ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,part ,,iii4 ,,the ,,founding ,,of ,,ethics4 ,i4 ,,conditions ,,of ,,the ,,problem ,,ii4 ,,sceptical ,,view ,,iii4 ,,antimoral ,,incentives ,,iv4 ,,criterion ,,of ,,actions ,,of ,,moral ,,worth ,v4 ,,statement ,,and ,,proof ,,of ,,the ,,only ,,true ,,moral ,,incentive ,,vi4 ,,the ,,virtue ,,of ,,justice ,,vii4 ,,the ,,virtue ,,of ,,loving-,,kindness ,,viii4 ,,the ,,proof ,,now ,,given ,,confirmed ,,by ,,experience ,,ix4 ,,on ,,the ,,ethical ,,difference ,,of ,,character4 ,,part ,,iv4 ,,on ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,primal ,,ethical ,,phaenomenon4 ,i4 ,,how ,,this ,,appendix ,,must ,,be ,,understood ,,ii4 ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,groundwork ,,judicium ,,regiae ,,danicae ,,scientiarum ,,societatis ,,translator',s ,,preface4 ,this translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many ,english-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial interest in ethical research1 but who may not read ,german with sufficient ease to make them care to take up the original4 ,the present ,essay is one of the most important contributions to ,ethics since the time of ,kant1 and1 as such1 is indispensable to a thorough knowledge of the subject4 ,moreover1 from whatever point of view it be regarded1--whether the reader find1 when he closes the book1 that his conviction harmonises with the conclusion reached1 or not2 it would be difficult to find any treatise on ,moral ,science more calculated to stimulate thought1 and lift it out of infantile imitation of some prescribed pattern4 ,the believer in the ,kantian1 or any other1 basis of ,ethics1 could hardly measure the strength or the weakness of his own position more surely than by comparing it with the ,schopenhauerian2 while he who is yet in search of a foundation will find much in the following pages to claim his attention4 ,those acquainted with the luminous imagery1 the subtle irony1 the brusque and penetrating vigour of the ,german1 will doubtless admit that it is no easy task to reduce ,schopenhauer to adequate ,english prose2 and if this has been attempted by the present writer1 no one can be more conscious than he of the manifold shortcomings discoverable4 ,but such as it is1 the work is heartily offered to all who still follow the true student's rule1 ,gladig wolde he lerne und gladig teche1 with the single hope that it may help1 however slightly1 to widen their knowledge1 and ripen their judgment4 ,my friend1 ,r4 ,e4 ,candy1 ,esq41 ,i4,c4,s41 has kindly given me information concerning several ,indian names4 ,,rome3 ,june1 #aijb4 ,,translator',s ,,introduction4 1 4 --,theognis3 #afi4 ,in #ahcg the ,danish ,royal ,society of ,sciences propounded1 as subject for a prize competition1 the question with which this treatise opens2 and ,schopenhauer1 who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming better known1 prepared1 and sent to ,copenhagen1 the earliest form of ,the ,basis of ,morality4 ,in ,january1 #ahdj1 the work was pronounced unsuccessful1 though there was no other candidate4 ,in ,september of the same year it was published by the author1 with only a few unimportant additions1 but preceded by a long introduction1 which1 cast in the form of an exceedingly caustic philippic1 is1 in its way1 a masterpiece4 ,in #ahfj1 7only a month before ,schopenhauer's death17 the second edition was printed with many enlargements and insertions1 the short preface1 dated ,august being one of the last things he wrote4#a ,the reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek1 and need not detain us4 ,at that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with ,hegel1 and1 to a certain extent1 with ,fichte2 hence it is easy to imagine with what ruffled1 not to say1 scandalised feelings the ,academy must have risen from its perusal of the work4 ,moreover1 putting ,hegel and ,fichte out of the question1 the position advanced was in #ahdj so new1 indeed so paradoxical 7as ,schopenhauer himself admits72 there is at times such an aggressiveness in the style2 the whole essay is so much more calculated to startle than to conciliate2 that we cannot feel much surprise at the official decision4 ,in the ,judgment published by the ,society three reasons are given for its unfavourable attitude4 ,the second is declared to be not only dissatisfaction with the mode of discussion 7ipsa disserendi forma71 but also inability to see that ,schopenhauer proves his case4 ,as the third is alleged the unseemly language employed in connection with certain summi philosophi 7,hegel and ,fichte74 ,these two objections are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate1 and how far the ,academy was right or wrong may be left for the reader to determine4 ,but the first reason stated is of a different kind1 and affords as neat an instance of self-stultification proceeding ex cathedra as can well be found4 ,it is true that the question is worded vaguely enough1 but if it means anything1 it asks where the philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum--the foundation of moral science--is to be sought for1 i4e41 where it is to be found4 ,turning to the ,judgment we read3 ,he 7,schopenhauer7 has omitted to deal with the essential part of the question1 apparently thinking that he was required to establish some fundamental principle of ,ethics3 which he was required to do1 unless the ,society's ,latin is borrowed from 4 ,and then it goes on to declare that he treated as secondary1 indeed as an opus supererogationis1 the very thing which the ,academy intended should occupy the first place1 namely1 the connection between ,metaphysics and ,ethics4#b ,but the metaphysicae et ethicae nexus1 so far from being formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered1 is not even mentioned6 ,the ,society thus denies having asked what it actually did ask1 while the discussion1 which it asserts was specially indicated1 is not suggested by a single word4 ,its embarrassment is sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting1 to enlarge upon which would here be out of place4#c ,it is not intended to offer any criticism either on ,schopenhauer's main position in this essay1 or on the various side-issues involved4 ,the reader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of his philosophy1 as contained in ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 and is invited to be the critic himself4 ,but perhaps a few remarks on the structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss4 ,after preliminary considerations1 partly to show the difficulty of the subject1 partly to clear the ground 7,part ,i471 the treatise opens with a searching critique of ,kant's ,ethical ,basis1 of the ,leading ,principle of his system1 and of its derived forms4 7,part ,,ii41 ,chapters ,i4-,,vi47#d ,schopenhauer's conclusion is that the ,categorical ,imperative is a very cleverly woven web1 yet in reality nothing but the old theological basis in disguise1 the latter being the indispensable1 if invisible1 clothes' peg for the former2 and that ,kant's tour de main of deducing his ,moral ,theology from ,ethics is like inverting a pyramid4 ,the theory of ,conscience is next discussed 7,chapter ,,vii474 ,the half-supernatural element which ,kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court of justice holding secret session in the breast1 is examined1 and eliminated2 and ,conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of ourselves through our acts4 ,but if1 so far1 the result obtained is distinctly unfavourable to ,kant1 ,schopenhauer is glad to agree with him on one point1 namely1 the theory of ,freedom1 to a brief notice of which he now passes 7,chapter ,,viii474 ,he points out that the solution of this question is found in the doctrine of the co-existence of ,liberty and ,necessity3 according to which the basis of our nature1 the so-called ,intelligible ,character1 that lies outside the forms attaching to phaenomena1 namely1 ,time1 ,space1 and ,causality1 is transcendentally free2 while the ,empirical ,character1 together with the whole person1 being1 as a phaenomenon1 the transient objectivation of the ,intelligible ,character1 under the laws of the principium individuationis1 is strictly determined4#e ,part ,,ii4 closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of ,fichte 7,chapter ,,ix474 ,his proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying glass for ,kant4 ,by means of this powerful human lens we can see the monstrous shapes into which the ,kantian pet creations are capable of developing4 ,thus we find the ,categorical ,imperative become a ,despotic ,imperative1 the ,absolute ,ought grown into a fathomless inscrutable 1 etc4 ,with ,part ,,iii4 we reach the positive part of the work4 ,schopenhauer begins 7,chapter ,i47 by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis for ,ethics that appeals1 not to the intellect1 but to the intuitive perception4 ,such 7he says7 can never be any artificial formula1 which surely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life2 rather must it be something springing out of the heart of things1 and therefore lying at the root of man's nature4 ,but is there1 he asks 7,chapter ,,ii471 after all1 such a thing as natural morality8 ,is anything good ever done absolutely without an egoistic motive8 ,the conclusion arrived at is that1 although much may be1 and has been1 at all times1 said in favour of the ,sceptical ,view1 and although this view is in fact true as regards the greater number of apparently unselfish acts1 yet there can be no doubt that truly moral conduct does occur1 that deeds of justice and loving-kindness are occasionally performed without the smallest hope of reward1 or fear of punishment involved in their omission4 ,the last paragraph of chis chapter is important because it puts in the clearest light what1 according to ,schopenhauer1 is the end of ,ethics4 ,its aim1 he says1 is not to treat of that which people ought to do 7for ought has no place except in theological ,morals1 whether explicit1 or implicit72 but to point out all the varied moral lines of human conduct2 to explain them2 and to trace them to their ultimate source4 ,this definition1 which assigns no educative function to ,ethics1 strictly agrees with the doctrine of the unchangeableness of character4 7,v4 ,chapter ,,ix4 of this ,part47 ,our philosopher then proceeds to show 7,chapter ,,iii47 that there are two fundamental antimoral incentives in man's nature3 ,egoism and ,malice4 ,be it1 however1 here remarked that a still simpler classification would reduce these two to one4 ,malice may well be regarded as nothing but ,egoism carried to its extreme1 developed to gigantic proportions4 ,it is a distinct source of gratification to certain natures to witness the suffering of another2 because a diminution of the latter's capacity for action1 whether effected by itself1 or not1 is regarded by an ego of this kind as an increase of its own power to do as it likes1--as an enhancement of its own glorification4 ,in ,chapter ,,iv4 the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to be the absence of all egoistic motivation2 and in ,chapters ,v4-,,vii41 by a process of careful reasoning1 every human act is traced to one of three original springs1 namely1 7#a7 ,egoism1 7#b7 ,malice1 and 7#c7 ,compassion2 or to a combination of 7#a7 and 7#c71 or 7#a7 and 7#b74f ,of these the third is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first and second1 and in fact the sole source of the two cardinal virtues1 justice and loving-kindness1 which are explained as the manifestation of ,compassion in a lower1 and a higher1 degree1 respectively4 ,in the course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is legitimate comes incidentally under discussion2 as also the theory of ,duty2 duties being defined as actions1 the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong4 7,cf4 ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,iii47 ,the position now reached1 namely1 that ,compassion is the one and only fount of true morality1 because it is the sole non-egoistic source of action1 is 7says ,schopenhauer7 a strange paradox2 hence the testimony of experience and of universal human sentiment is appealed to1 in confirmation of it1 under nine different considerations 7,chapter ,,viii474 ,they are as follows3-- 7#a7 ,an imaginary case4 7#b7 ,cruelty1 which means the maximum deficiency in ,compassion1 is the mark of the deepest moral depravity4 ,therefore the real moral incentive must be ,compassion4 7#c7 ,compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct4 7#d7 ,limitless ,compassion for all living things is the surest and most certain token of a really good man4 7#e7 ,the evidence of separate matters of detail4 7#f7 ,compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power2 it is more obviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice4 7#g7 ,compassion does not stop short with men2 it includes all living beings4 7#h7 ,considered simply from the empirical point of view1 ,compassion is the best possible antidote to ,egoism1 no less than the most soothing balsam for the world's inevitable suffering4 7#i7 ,rousseau's testimony is quoted1 as well as passages from the ,paa-tantra1 ,pausanias1 ,lucian1 ,stobaeus1 and ,lessing2 and reference is made to ,chinese ,ethics and ,hindu customs4 ,part ,,iii4 closes 7,chapter ,,ix47 with an inquiry into the ,ethical ,difference of ,character4 ,the theory that this difference is innate and immutable is supported by numerous extracts from various writers of all periods1 and illustrated in many ways4 ,but all the evidence accumulated hardly amounts to more than so many hints and indications1 and the matter 7says ,schopenhauer7 was only satisfactorily explained by ,kant's doctrine of the ,intelligible and ,empirical ,character4 7,cf4 ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,viii47 ,according to this1 the ethical difference between man and man is an original and ultimate datum1 caused by the transcendentally free act of the ,intelligible ,character1 that is1 the ,will1 as ,thing in itself1 outside phaenomena2 the ,empirical ,character being1 so to say1 the reflection of the ,intelligible1 mirrored through the functions of our perceptive faculty1 namely1 ,time1 ,space1 and ,causality4 ,hence the former1 while manifested in plurality and difference of acts1 yet necessarily always wears the same unchangeable features1 inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form of the unity behind4 ,if the reader asks why the essential constitution of the ,thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon is so enormously different in different individuals1 it can only be said that our intellect1 conditioned1 as it is1 by the laws of ,causality1 ,space1 and ,time1 has no power to deal with noumena1 its range being limited to phaenomena2 and that therefore this question is one of those which have no conceivable answer4 7,cf4 ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 vol4 ii41 chap4 #ej41 ,epiphilosophie47#g ,the discussion now terminated points to the conclusion that nine-tenths1 or perhaps nineteen-twentieths1 of what we do is1 more or less1 due to ,egoism1 conscious or unconscious2 while acts of real morality1 that is1 of unselfish justice and pure loving-kindness 7admitting that they occur7 are to be attributed to ,compassion1 that is1 the sense of suffering with another4 ,nor is the principle of ,altruism new4 ,it is as old as man himself4 ,all the rare and sensitive natures in the world have given utterance to it1 each in his own way4 ,like a golden thread it runs from the earliest ,indian literature to ,george ,eliot1 to ,tolsto2 and every day1 for unnumbered ages1 from youth to eld1 from sire to son1 in lowly dwellings and in princes' palaces1 it has been unawares translated into action4 ,and if we may forecast the future from the past1 it would appear that in all the stormy seas yet to be traversed by the human race1 before its little day is spent1 ,compassion will ever be the surest guide to better things2 and that the light of knowledge illuminating the path1 whereby the world may become relatively happier1 will always vary directly as man's susceptibility to its promptings3 for ,durch ,mitleid wissend is not truer of ,parsifal than of all other saviours4 ,in the fourth ,part of the treatise ,schopenhauer attempts the metaphysical explanation of ,compassion1 which for those1 who still think that ,metaphysics is something more than a pseudo-science of the past--like ,alchemy or ,astrology--will have special interest4 ,it should be observed 7as is pointed out in our author's ,preface to the first edition7 that the line of thought followed does not belong to any particular metaphysical school1 but to many2 being in fact a principle at the root of the oldest systems in the world1 and traceable in one form or another down to ,kant4 ,as in the dawn of history it was our own ,aryan forefathers1 who divined with subtle intuition the ideality of ,time and ,space2 so in the fulness of the ages it was reserved for another ,aryan of ,scotch descent to formulate the same in exact language4 ,now1 by the vast majority of men the ideality of the principium individuationis is undoubtedly either not consciously realised at all1 or else but dimly perceived under the form of allegories and mythologies4 ,yet1 if this theory be true1 if individuation be only a phaenomenon depending on the subjectivity of ,time and ,space1 then ,compassion1 and its external expression1 the that is greater than ,faith and ,hope1 receive their final explanation4 ,and every 2 every word that vibrates in harmony with the inspired rhapsody of #a ,corinthians xiii42 every act of genuine justice1 or of true loving-kindness1 done by man to man1 as well as the uplifting emotion which stirs our hearts at the sight of such conduct3--all these things become fraught with a new and luminous significance3 the secret writing is interpreted1 its deepest meaning disclosed4 ,moreover1 the thou shalt1 and the thou shalt not1 no less of the various theologies than of the ,categorical ,imperative1 may from this point of view be accounted for1 on the ground of the identity of man1 so far as he is noumenal1 with the transcendental ,reality behind phaenomena4 ,the crude threats of punishment and promises of reward1 the stern ,moral ,law1 poised in mid air1--these hypotheses1 and all their varieties 7whose function is in reality nothing else but to check ,egoism71 are seen to be due to the intellect's imperfect comprehension of1 or rather1 its vague groping after1 the transcendental unity of life1 however individualised and differentiated as a phaenomenon in ,time and ,space4#h ,it thus becomes apparent that the position developed by ,schopenhauer in the third and fourth parts of the ,essay is not so much destructive1 as explanatory1 of the usual theories1 which1 if once the former be fully grasped1 lose themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of day4 ,they are at once interpreted1 and shown to be no longer of importance4 ,similarly1 all the religions of the world1 which are the ,metaphysics of the people1 find their raison d'tre in the same doctrine4 ,the theory of an external takes its place as the natural mode of denoting1 in children's language1 the internal metaphysical ,entity1 whose appearance-form1 in terms of our consciousness1 is called the ,universe4 ,the circle is completed2 the discords vanish1 and an ultimate harmony is reached4 ,and so over the thrice-tangled skein of phaenominal existence a simplifying and integrating light is shed1 showing that the is but the reflection of the 1 under the forms of our faculty of perception1 namely1 ,time1 ,space1 and ,causality--forms1 which necessarily imply plurality and change1 on which1 again1 in the last resort the ,welt-,schmerz depends4 ,the ,one remains1 the many change and pass2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,life1 like a dome of many-coloured glass1 ,stains the white radiance of ,eternity1 ,until ,death tramples it to fragments4 ,what an unspeakable gain1 says ,richard ,wagner1#i we should bring to those who are terrified by the threats of the ,church1 and1 on the other hand1 to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists1 if we could quicken the noble edifice of ',love1 ,faith1 and ,hope1' with a clear consciousness of the ideality of the world1 conditioned by the laws of ,space and ,time1 which form the sole basis of our perceptive capacity6 ,in that case all anxious inquiries as to a ',where' and ',when' of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a blissful smile4 ,for1 if there is a solution to these questions1 which seem of such boundless importance1 our philosopher has given it with incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence1 which1 to a certain extent1 is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality of ,time and ,space3 ',peace1 ,rest1 and ,bliss dwell only there where there is no where1 and no when4' 7,v4 ,schopenhauer3 ,parerga and ,paralipomena1 vol4 ii41 chap4 #c1 #cj bis47 #a ,he died ,september #bast4 #b ,it should be noticed that this essential part of the question1 a few lines before1 is said to have been passed over altogether 7omisso enim eo1 quod potissimum postulabatur74 #c ,any one who cares to see how this ,judgment1 the ,danish ,royal ,society of ,sciences1 ,hegel1 ,fichte1 and ,professors of ,philosophy in general1 are all pulverised together under our sage's withering wrath and trenchant irony1 should read his ,introduction to each ,edition4 #d ,incidentally 7,chapter ,,iii471 duties towards ourselves1 properly so called1 are shown to be non-existent from the ,schopenhauerian standpoint4 ,cf4 the definition of ,duty in ,part ,,iii41 ,chapter ,,vi4 #e ,schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his ,essay on ,the ,freedom of the ,will1 which1 written immediately before1 and more fortunate than1 the present treatise1 was awarded the prize by the ,royal ,norwegian ,society of ,sciences in ,january1 #ahci4 #f ,if1 as above suggested1 ,malice be taken as a form of ,egoism1 we may simplify as follows3-- ,egoism4 ,compassion4 7a7 ,lower power3 seen in 7a7 ,lower power3 seen in selfishness1 covetousness1 etc4 justice4 7b7 ,higher power3 seen in 7d7 ,higher power3 seen in malice1 cruelty1 etc4 loving-kindness4 ,egoism 7not in its higher power7 may be simultaneously operative with ,compassion in every possible proportion4 #g ,v4 ,also the ,neue ,paralipomena1 chap4 vii42 ,zur ,ethik1 #bdh1 where ,schopenhauer calls this the hardest of all problems4 ,on the one hand1 we have the metaphysical unity of the ,will1 as ,thing in itself1 which1 as the ,intelligible ,character1 is present1 whole and undivided1 in all phaenomena1 in every individual2 on the other hand1 we find1 as a fact of experience1 the widest possible difference in the ,empirical ,character1 no less of animals than of men4 ,that is to say1 difference must be predicated of the ,thing in itself6 ,it is obvious that we here touch a contradiction1 which1 for the rest1 lies at the root of the ,schopenhauerian doctrine of the ,will4 #h ,the reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of this view of things1 which ,goethe with intuitive perception gives in the ,faust1 ,part ,i41 where the ,erdgeist says3 ,so schaff' ich am sausenden ,,webstuhl ,,der ,,zeit1 ,und wirke ,,der ,,gottheit ,,lebendiges ,,kleid4 #i ,v4 ,gesammelte ,schriften und ,dichtungen von ,richard ,wagner4 ,zweite ,auflage1 vol4 x4 ,was ntzt diese ,erkenntnis8 p4 #cfa3--,welchen unsglichen ,gewinn wrden wir aber den einerseits von den ,drohungen der ,kirche ,erschreckten1 andererseits den durch unsere ,physiker zur ,verzweiflung ,gebrachten zufhren1 wenn wir dein erhabenen ,gebude von ,liebe1 ,glaube und ,hoffnung eine deutliche ,erkenntnis der1 durch die unserer ,wahrnehmung einzig zu ,grunde liegenden ,gesetze des ,raumes und der ,zeit bedingten1 ,idealitt der ,welt einfgen knnten1 durch welche dann alle die ,fragen des bengstigten ,gemthes nach einem ,wo und ,wann der anderen ,welt als nur durch ein seliges ,lcheln beantwortbar erkannt werden mssten8 ,denn1 giebt es auf diese1 so grenzenlos wichtig dnkenden ,fragen eine ,antwort1 so hat sie unser ,philosoph1 mit unbertrefflicher ,przision und ,schnheit1 mit diesem1 gewissermaassen nur der ,definition der ,idealitt von ,zeit und ,raum beigegebenen ,ausspruche ertheilt3 ,frieda1 ,ruhe1 und ,glckseligkeit wohnt allein da1 wo es ,,kein ,,wo ,,und ,,kein ,,wann giebt4 ,,the ,,question ,the question advanced by the ,royal ,society1 together with the considerations leading up to it1 is as follows3-- ,quum primitiva1'1 moralitatis idea1 sive de summa lege morali principalis notio1 sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate1 turn in ea disciplina appareat1 cui propositum est cognitionem explicare1 turn in vita1 partim in conscientiae judicio de nostris actionibus1 partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum hominum2 quumque complures1 quae ab illa ider inseparables sunt1 eamque tanquam originem respiciunt1 notiones principales ad spectantes1 velut officii notio et imputationis1 eadem necessitate eodemque ambitu vim suam exserant1--et tamen inter eos cursus viasque1 quas nostrae aetatis meditatio philosophica persequitur1 magni momenti esse videatur1 hoc argumentum ad disputationem revocare1--cupit ,societas1 ut accurate haec quaestio perpendatur et pertractetur3 ,philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum utrum in idea moralitatis1 quae immediate conscientia contineatur1 et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus1 quae ex illa prodeant1 explicandis quaerenda sunt1 an in alio cognoscendi principio8 7,the original idea of morality1 or the leading conception of the supreme moral law1 occurs by a necessity which seems peculiar to the subject1 but which is by no means a logical one1 both in that science1 whose object it is to set forth the knowledge of what is moral1 and also in real life1 where it shows itself partly in the judgment passed by conscience on our own actions1 partly in our moral estimation of the actions of others2 moreover1 most of the chief conceptions in ,ethics1 springing as they do out of that idea1 and inseparable from it 7as1 for instance1 the conception of duty1 and the ascription of praise or blame7 assert themselves with the same necessity1 and under the same conditions4 ,in view of these facts and because it appears highly desirable1 considering the trend of philosophic investigation in our time1 to submit this matter to further scrutiny2 the ,society desires that the following question be carefully considered and discussed3-- ,is the fountain and basis of ,morals to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness 7or conscience71 and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise from it8 or is it to be found an some other source of knowledge87 ,,part ,i4 ,,introduction4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,problem4 ,why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of ,morals1 but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they deduce from those principles8 ,this is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by the ,royal ,society of ,holland at ,harlem1 #ahaj1 and solved by ,j4,c4,f4 ,meister2 and in comparison with the task before us1 the inquiry presented no extraordinary difficulty4 ,for3-- 7#a7 ,the present question of the ,royal ,society has to do with nothing less important than the objectively true basis of morals1 and consequently of morality4 ,it is an ,academy1 be it observed1 which invites this inquiry2 and hence1 from its position1 it has no practical purpose in view2 it asks for no discourse inculcating the exercise of uprightness and virtue1 with arguments based on evidence1 of which the plausibility is dwelt on1 and the sophistry evaded1 as is done in popular manuals4 ,rather1 as its aim is not practical1 but only theoretical1 it desires nothing but the purely philosophical1 that is1 the objective1 undisguised1 and naked exposition of the ultimate basis of all good moral conduct1 independent of every positive law1 of every improved assumption1 and hence free from all groundwork1 whether metaphysical or mythical4 ,this1 however1 is a problem whose bristling difficulties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in every age and land have blunted their wits on it1 and still more by the fact that all gods1 oriental and occidental1 actually derive their existence therefrom4 ,should therefore this opportunity serve to solve it1 assuredly the ,royal ,society will not have expended its money amiss4 7#b7 ,apart from this1 a peculiar disadvantage will be found to attach to any theoretical examination of the basis of morals1 because such an investigation is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine1 and occasion the collapse of1 the structure itself4 ,the fact is1 that in this matter we are apt to so closely associate practical aims with theory1 that the well-meant zeal of the former is with difficulty restrained from ill-timed intervention4 ,nor is it within the power of every one to clearly dissociate the purely theoretical search for objective truth1 purged of all interest1 even of that of morality as practised1 from a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions4 ,therefore he1 who here puts his hand to the plough1 must1 for his encouragement1 ever bear in mind that from the doings and affairs of the populace1 from the turmoil and bustle of the market-place1 nothing is further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary of the ,academy1 where no noise of the world may enter1 and where the only god raised on a pedestal is ,truth1 in solitary1 naked sublimity4 ,the conclusion from these two premises is that ,i must be allowed complete freedom of speech1 as well as the right of questioning everything2 and furthermore1 that if ,i succeed in really contributing something1 however small1 to this subject1 then that contribution will be of no little importance4 ,but there are still other difficulties obstructing my path4 ,the ,royal ,society asks for a short monograph setting forth the basis of ,ethics entirely by itself2 which means to say1 independent of its connection with the general system1 i4e41 the actual metaphysics of any philosophy4 ,such a demand must not only render the accomplishment of the task more difficult1 but necessarily make it imperfect4 ,long ago ,christian ,wolff1 in his ,philosophia ,practica 7,p4 ,,ii41 #bh7 observed3 ,tenebrae in philosophia practica non dispelluntur1 nisi luce metaphysica effulgente 7,darkness in practical philosophy is only dispersed1 when the light of metaphysics shines on it27 and ,kant in the ,preface to his ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten remarks3 ,metaphysics must precede1 and is in every case indispensable to1 moral philosophy4 ,for1 just as every religion on earth1 so far as it prescribes morality1 does not leave the latter to rest on itself1 but backs it by a body of dogmas 7the chief end of which is precisely to be the prop of the moral sense72 so with philosophy1 the ethical basis1 whatever it be1 must itself attach to1 and find its support in1 one system of metaphysics or another1 that is to say1 in a presupposed explanation of the world1 and of existence in general4 ,this is so1 because the ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential nature of the ,universe must necessarily be closely connected with that touching the ethical significance of human action2 and because1 in any case1 that which is presented as the foundation of morality1 if it is not to be merely an abstract formula1 floating in the clouds1 and out of contact with the real world1 must be some fact or other discoverable either in the objective kosmos1 or else in man's consciousness2 but1 as such1 it can itself be only a phaenomenon2 and consequently1 like all other phaenomena1 it requires a further explanation2 and this explanation is supplied by ,metaphysics4 ,philosophy indeed is such a connected whole that it is impossible to exhaustively discuss any one part without all the others being involved4 ,thus ,plato says quite correctly3 s o o 1 2 7,phaedr41 p4 #cga1 ,ed4 ,bip47 7,do you think then it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of the soul1 without at the same time understanding the nature of the ,whole1 i4e41 the totality of things87 ,the metaphysics of nature1 the metaphysics of morals1 and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually presuppose each other1 and only when taken as connected together do they complete the explanation of things as they really are1 and of existence in general4 ,so that whoever should exactly trace one of these three to its ultimate origin1 would be found to have necessarily brought the others into his solution of the problem2 just as an absolutely clear and exhaustive understanding of any single thing in the world would imply a perfect comprehension of everything else4 ,now if we were to start from a given system of metaphysics1 which is assumed to be true1 we should reach synthetically a basis of morals1 and this basis1 being1 so to say1 built up from below1 would provide the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation4 ,but in the present case1 since the terms of the question enforce the separation of ethics from all metaphysics1 there remains nothing but the analytic method1 which proceeds from facts either of external experience1 or of consciousness4 ,it is true that thus the ultimate origin of the latter may be traced back to the human spirit1 a source which then1 however1 must be taken as a fundamental fact1 a primary phaenomenon1 underivable from anything else1 with the result that the whole explanation remains simply a psychological one4 ,at best its connection with any general metaphysical standpoint can only be described as accessory4 ,on the other hand1 the fundamental datum1 the primary phaenomenon of ,ethics1 so found in man's nature1 could itself in its turn be accounted for and explained1 if we might first treat of metaphysics1 and then by the synthetic method deduce ,ethics from it4 ,this would mean1 however1 nothing less than the construction of a complete system1 of philosophy1 whereby the limits of the given question would be far exceeded4 ,i am1 therefore1 compelled to answer it within the lines which its own isolated narrowness has laid down4 ,and lastly1 there is the following consideration4 ,the basis on which it is here intended to place ,ethics will prove to be a very small one2 and the consequence is that of the many lawful1 approvable1 and praiseworthy actions of mankind1 only the minority will be found to spring from purely moral motives1 while the majority will have to be attributed to other sources4 ,this gives less satisfaction1 has not such a specious glitter as1 let us say1 a ,categorical ,imperative1 which always stands ready for commands1 only that itself in its turn may command what ought to be done1 and what ought to be left undone2#a not to mention other foundations that are entirely material4 ,i can only1 therefore1 remind the reader of the saying in ,ecclesiastes 7iv4 #f73 ,better is an handful with quietness1 than both the hands full with travail and vexation of spirit4 ,in all knowledge the genuine1 proof-resisting1 indestructible coefficient is never large2 just as in the earth's metallic strata a hundredweight of stone hides but a few ounces of gold4 ,but whether others will prefer--as ,i do--the assured to the bulky possession1 the small quantity of gold which remains in the crucible to the big lump of matter that was brought along with it2 or whether ,i shall rather be charged with having removed from ,ethics its basis1 instead of providing one1 in so far as ,i prove that the lawful and commendable actions of mankind often do not contain a particle of pure moral worth1 and in most cases only a very little1 resting1 as they do1 otherwise on motives1 the sufficiency of which must ultimately be referred to the egoism of the doer2 all this ,i must leave undecided2 and ,i do so1 not without anxiety1 nay1 rather with resignation1 because ,i have long since been of the same mind as ,johann ,georg von ,zimmermann1 when he said3 ,rest assured until your dying day1 that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge4 7,ueber die ,einsamkeit2 ,pt4 ,i41 ,ch4 iii41 p4 #ic47 ,for all true and voluntary righteousness1 for all loving-kindness1 for all nobleness1 wherever these qualities may be found1 my theory can only point to a very small foundation2 whereas my opponents confidently construct broad bases for ,morals1 which are made strong enough for every possible burden1 and are at the same time thrust upon every doubter's conscience1 accompanied with a threatening side-glance at his own morality4 ,as contrasted with these1 my own position is indeed in sore and sorry plight4 ,it is like that of ,cordelia before ,king ,lear1 with her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection1 compared with the effusive protestations of her more eloquent sisters4 ,so that there seems to be need of a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim taken from intellectual hunting grounds1 such as1 ,magna est vis veritatis1 et praevalebit4 7,great is the strength of truth1 and it will prevail47 ,but to a man who has lived and laboured even this fails to give much encouragement4 ,meanwhile1 ,i will for once make the venture with truth on my side2 and what opposes me will at the same time oppose truth4 #a ,that is1 the ,categorical ,imperative appears at first as your obedient humble servant1 ready to perform any useful service1 e4g41 the solving of ethical riddles2 while it ends by gaining the upper hand1 and commanding4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,general ,,retrospect4 ,for the people morality comes through1 and is founded on1 theology1 as the express will of ,god4 ,on the other hand1 we see philosophers1 with few exceptions1 taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of foundation2 indeed1 so they may but avoid it1 they prefer even to find a refuge in sophistry4 ,whence comes this antithesis8 ,assuredly no more efficient basis for ,ethics can be imagined than the theological2 for who would be so bold as to oppose the will of the ,almighty and the ,omniscient8 ,unquestionably1 no one2 if only this will were proclaimed in an authentic1 official manner 7if one may say so71 whereby no possible room for doubt could be left4 ,this1 however1 is precisely the condition which does not admit of being realised4 ,it is rather the inverse process which is attempted4 ,the law declared to be the will of ,god men try to accredit as such1 by demonstrating its agreement with our own independent1 and hence1 natural moral views1 and an appeal is consequently made to these as being more direct and certain4 ,but this is not all4 ,we perceive that an action performed solely through threat of punishment and promise of reward would be moral much more in appearance than in reality2 since1 after all1 it would have its root in ,egoism1 and in the last resort the scale would be turned by the greater or less amount of credulity evinced in each case4 ,now it was none other than ,kant who destroyed the foundations of ,speculative ,theology1 which up to his time were accounted unshakable4 ,speculative ,theology had hitherto sustained ,ethics1 and in order to procure for the former an existence of some sort1 if only an imaginary one1 his wish was to proceed inversely1 and make ,ethics sustain ,speculative ,theology4 ,so that it is now more than ever impossible to think of basing ,ethics on ,theology2 for no one knows any longer which of the two is to be the supporter1 and which the supported1 and the consequence is a circulus vitiosus4 ,it is precisely through the influence of ,kant's philosophy2 through the contemporaneous effect of the unparalleled progress made in all the natural sciences1 with regard to which every past age in comparison with our own appears childish2 and lastly1 through the knowledge of ,sanskrit literature1 and of those most ancient and widest spread faiths1 ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 which1 as far as time and space go1 are the most important religions systems of mankind1 and1 as a matter of fact1 are the original native religions of our own race1 now well known to be of ,asiatic descent--our race1 to which in its new strange home they once more send a message across the centuries2--it is because of all this1 ,i say1 that the fundamental philosophical convictions of learned ,europe have in the course of the last fifty years undergone a revolution1 which perhaps many only reluctantly admit1 but which cannot be denied4 ,the result of this change is that the old supports of ,ethics have been shown to be rotten1 while the assurance remains that ,ethics itself can never collapse2 whence the conviction arises that for it there must exist a groundwork different from any hitherto provided1 and adaptable to the advanced views of the age4 ,the need of such is making itself felt more and more1 and in it we undoubtedly find the reason that has induced the ,royal ,society to make the present important question the subject of a prize essay4 ,in every age much good morality has been preached2 but the explanation of its raison d'tre has always been encompassed with difficulties4 ,on the whole we discern an endeavour to get at some objective truth1 from which the ethical injunctions could-be logically deduced2 and it has been sought for both in the nature of things1 and in the nature of man2 but in vain4 ,the result was always the same4 ,the will of each human unit was found to gravitate solely towards its own individual welfare1 the idea of which in its entirety is designated by the term blissfulness 7,glckseligkeit72 and this striving after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very1 different to the one morality would fain point out4 ,the endeavour was next made now to identify blissfulness with virtue1 now to represent it as virtue's consequence and effect4 ,both attempts have always failed2 and this for no want of sophistry4 ,then recourse was had to artificial formulas1 purely objective and abstract1 as well a posteriori as a priori1 from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly admitted of being deduced4 ,but there was nothing found in man's nature to afford these a footing1 whereby they might have availed to guide the strivings of his volition1 in face of its egoistic tendency4 ,it appears to me superfluous to verify all this by describing and criticising every hitherto existing foundation of morality2 not only because ,i share ,augustine's opinion1 non est pro magno habendum quid homines senserint1 sed quae sit rei veritas 7,it is the truth about a thing1 not men's opinions thereon1 that is of importance72 but also because it would be like ',a 7i4e41 carrying coals to ,newcastle72 for previous attempts to give a foundation to ,ethics are sufficiently well-known to the ,royal ,society1 and the very question proposed shows that it is also convinced of their inadequateness4 ,any reader less well-informed will find a careful1 if not complete1 presentment of the attempts hitherto made1 in ,garve's ,uebersicht der vornehmsten ,principien der ,sittenlehre1 and again1 in ,studlin's ,geschichte der ,moralphilosophie4 ,it is of course very disheartening to reflect that ,ethics1 which so directly concerns life1 has met with the same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of ,metaphysics1 and that its first principle1 though perpetually sought for ever since the time of ,socrates1 has still to be found4 ,moreover1 we must remember that in ,ethics1 much more than in any other science1 what is essential is contained in its fundamental propositions2 the deductions are so simple that they come of themselves4 ,for all are capable of drawing a conclusion1 but few of judging4 ,and this is exactly the reason why lengthy text-books and dissertations on ,morals are as superfluous as they are tedious4 ,meantime1 if ,i may postulate an acquaintance with all the former foundations of ,ethics1 my task will be lightened4 ,whoever observes how ancient as well as modern philosophers 7the ,church creed sufficed for the middle ages7 have had recourse to the most diverse and extraordinary arguments1 in order to provide for the generally recognised requirements of morality a basis capable of proof1 and how notwithstanding they admittedly failed2 he will be able to measure the difficulty of the problem1 and estimate my contribution accordingly4 ,and he who has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto struck on lead to the goal1 will be the more willing to tread with me a very different path from these--a path which up to now either has not been noticed1 or else has been passed over with contempt2 perhaps because it was the most natural one4#a ,as a matter of fact my solution of the question will remind many of ,columbus' egg4 ,it is solely to the latest attempt at giving1 a basis to ,ethics--,i mean the ,kantian--that a critical examination will be devoted4 ,i shall make it all the more exhaustive1 partly because the great ethical reform of ,kant gave to this science a foundation having a real superiority to previous ones and partly because it still remains the last important pronouncement in this domain2 for which reason it has obtained general acceptance up to the present day1 and is universally taught1 although differently garnished by certain changes in the demonstration and in the terminology4 ,it is the ethical system of the last sixty years1 which must be removed ere we enter on another path4 ,furthermore1 my criticism of the ,kantian basis will give me occasion to examine and discuss most of the fundamental conceptions of ,ethics1 and the outcome of this investigation ,i shall later on be able to postulate4 ,besides1 inasmuch as opposites illustrate each other1 it is exactly this course which will be the best preparation and guide1 indeed the direct way1 to my own position1 which in its essential points is diametrically opposed to ,kant's4 ,it would therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip the following criticism1 and turn at once to the positive part of my exposition1 which then would remain only half intelligible4 ,in any case the time has assuredly arrived for once to cite ,ethics before the bar of a searching scrutiny4 ,during more than half a century it has been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which ,kant arranged for it--the cushion of the ,categorical ,imperative of ,practical ,reason4 ,in our day this ,imperative is mostly introduced to us under a name which1 being smoother and less ostentatious1 has obtained more currency4 ,it is called the ,moral ,law2 and thus entitled1 with a passing bow to reason and experience1 it slips through unobserved into the house4 ,once inside1 there is no end to its orders and commands2 nor can it ever afterwards be brought to account4 ,it was proper1 indeed inevitable1 that ,kant1 as the inventor of the thing1 should remain satisfied with his creation1 particularly as he shelved by its means errors still more glaring4 ,but to be obliged to look on and see asses disporting themselves on the comfortable cushion which he prepared1 and which since his time has been more and more trampled on and flattened out--this truly is hard4 ,i allude to the daily hackney compilers1 who1 with the ready confidence born of stupidity1 imagine that they have given a foundation to ,ethics1 if they do but appeal to that ,moral ,law which ,is alleged to be inherent in our reason2 and then they complacently weave upon this such a confused and wide-reaching tissue of phrases that they succeed in rendering unintelligible the clearest and simplest relations of life3 and all this1 without ever once seriously asking themselves whether in point of fact there really does exist such a ,moral ,law1 as a convenient code of morality1 graven in our heads or hearts4 ,hence ,i admit the especial pleasure ,i feel in proceeding to remove from ,ethics its broad cushion of repose1 and ,i unreservedly declare my intention of proving that ,kant's ,practical ,reason and ,categorical ,imperative are completely unwarrantable1 baseless1 and fabricated assumptions2 and ,i shall further show that ,kant's whole system1 like those of his predecessors1 is in want of a solid foundation4 ,consequently ,ethics will again be consigned to its former entirely helpless condition1 there to remain1 until ,i come to demonstrate the true moral principle of human nature--a principle which is incontestably efficient1 and has its root in our very being4 ,the latter1 however1 has no such broad basis to offer as the above-mentioned cushion2 so that1 doubtless1 those who are accustomed to take things easily1 will not abandon their comfortable old seat1 before they are thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which it stands is undermined4 #a ,io dir non vi saprei per qual sventura1 ,o piuttosto per qual fatalit1 ,da noi credito ottien pi l'impostura1 ,che la semplice e nuda verit4 ,,casti4 ,i cannot tell what mischief sly1 ,or rather what fatality1 ,leads man to credit more the lie ,than truth in naked purity4 7,translator7 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,critique ,,of ,,kant',s ,,basis ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,remarks4 ,it is ,kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all ,eudaemonism4 ,with the ancients1 ,ethics was a doctrine of ,eudaemonism2 with the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation4 ,the former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical2 but this was like having two figures which never coincide with each other1 no matter how they may be placed4 ,the latter have endeavoured to connect the two1 not by the principle of identity1 but by that of causation1 thus making happiness the result of virtue2 but to do this1 they were obliged to have recourse to sophisms1 or else to assume the existence of a world beyond any possible perception of the senses4 ,among the ancients ,plato alone forms an exception3 his system is not eudaemonistic2 it is mystic1 instead4 ,even the ,ethics of the ,cynics and ,stoics is nothing but a special form of ,eudaemonism1 to prove which1 there is no lack of evidence and testimony1 but the nature of my present task forbids the space4#a ,the ancients1 then1 equally with the moderns1 ,plato being the single exception1 agree in making virtue only a means to an end4 ,indeed1 strictly speaking1 even ,kant banished ,eudaemonism from ,ethics more in appearance than in reality1 for between virtue and happiness he still leaves a certain mysterious connection2--there is an obscure and difficult passage in his doctrine of the ,highest ,good1 where they occur together2 while it is a patent fact that the course of2 virtue runs entirely counter to that of happiness4 ,but1 passing over this1 we may say that with ,kant the ethical principle appears as something quite independent of experience and its teaching2 it is transcendental1 or metaphysical4 ,he recognises that human conduct possesses a significance that oversteps all possibility of experience1 and is therefore actually the bridge leading to that which he calls the intelligible#b world1 the mundus noumenn1 the world of ,things in themselves4 ,the fame1 which the ,kantian ,ethics has won1 is due not only to this higher level1 which it reached1 but also to the moral purity and loftiness of its conclusions4 ,it is by the latter that most people have been attracted1 without paying much attention to the foundation1 which is propounded in a very complex1 abstract and artificial form2 and ,kant himself required all his powers of acumen and synthesis to give it an appearance of solidity4 ,fortunately1 he separated his ,ethics from the exposition of its basis1 devoting to the latter a special work entitled the ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten1 the theme of which will be found to be precisely the same as that of our prize essay4 ,for on page xiii of the preface he says3 ,the present treatise is nothing else but an attempt to find out and establish the supreme principle of morality4 ,this is an investigation1 whose scope is complete in itself1 and which should be kept apart from all other moral researches44 ,it is in this book that we find the basis1 that is to say1 the essentials of his ,ethics set forth with an acute penetration and systematic conciseness1 as in no other of his writings4 ,it has1 moreover1 the great advantage of being the first of ,kant's moral works1 appearing1#c as it did1 only four years later than the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 and consequently it dates from the period when1 although he was sixty-one1 the detrimental effect of old age on his intellect was not yet perceptible4 ,on the other hand1 this is distinctly traceable in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 which was published in #aghh1 or one year later than the unhappy remodelling of the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft in the second edition1 whereby the latter1 his immortal master-piece1 was obviously marred4 ,an analysis of this question is to be found in the preface to the new edition by ,rosenkranz1#d from which my own investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent4 ,the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft contains in its essentials the same material as the above-mentioned--,grundlegung2 only the latter has a more concise and rigorous form1 while in the former the subject is handled with greater prolixity1 interspersed with digressions and even padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric1 to heighten the impression4 ,when ,kant wrote it1 he had at last1 and late in life1 become deservedly famous2 hence1 being certain of boundless attention1 he allowed greater play to the garrulity of old age4 ,but the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft contains two sections which are peculiar to itself4 ,first3 the exposition of the relation between ,freedom and ,necessity 7pp4 #afi-agi of the fourth edition1 and pp4 #bbc-bca in ,rosenkranz74 ,this passage is above all praise1 and undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life1 as it is entirely in harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft 7pp4 #efj-ehf2 ,rosenkranz1 p4 #dch1 sqq474 ,and secondly3 the ,moraltheologie1 which will more and more come to be recognised as the real object ,kant had in view4 ,in his ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,tugendlehre this pendant to the deplorable ,rechtslehre1 written in #agig1 the debility of old age is at length fully pre-ponderant4 ,for all these reasons the present criticism will mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned1 viz41 the ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten1 and the reader will please understand that all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it4 ,both the other works will only be considered as accessory and secondary4 ,for a proper comprehension of the present criticism1 which1 in probing the ,kantian ,ethics to its depths1 bears directly and principally on this ,grundlegung1 it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read through again1 so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh presentment of what it contains4 ,it is but a matter of #abh and xiv pages 7in ,rosenkranz only #ajj pages altogether74 ,i shall quote from the third edition of #agib1 adding the page number of the new complete publication by ,rosenkranz1 with an ,r4 prefixed4 #a ,for a complete demonstration v4 ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 ,vol4 ,i41 #af1 p4 #ajc1 sqq41 and ,vol4 ,,ii41 ,chap4 #af1 p4 #aff1 sqq4 of the third edition4 ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 that is1 ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea2 ,idea being used much as sometimes is 7cf4 ,xen4 ,sym41 #d1 #ba71 in the sense of an image in the mind1 a mental picture4--7,translator47 #b ,it seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a cumbrous periphrasis4 ,the meaning is perfectly clear4 ,the sensibilia 7phaenomena7 are opposed to the intelligibilia 7noumena71 which compose the transcendental world4 ,so the individual1 in so far as he is a phaenomenon1 has an empirical character2 in so far as he is a noumenn1 his character is intelligible 7intelligibilis74 ,the mundus intelligibilis1 or mundus noumenn is the of ,new ,platonism4--7,translator47 #c ,it was published in #aghe3 ,the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 first edition1 in #agha4--7,translator47 #d ,his analysis is really derived from myself1 but in this place ,i am speaking incognito4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,imperative ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics4 ,kant's 7first false step7 lies in his conception of ,ethics itself1 and this is found very clearly expressed on page #fb 7,r41 p4 #ed73 ,in a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned with adducing reasons for that which takes place1 but with formulating laws regarding that which ought to take place1 even if it never does take place4 ,this is at once a distinct petitio principii4 ,who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct ought to be subject8 ,who tells you that that ought to take place1 which in fact never does take place8 ,what justification have you for making this assumption at the outset1 and consequently for forcing upon us1 as the only possible one1 a system of ,ethics couched in the imperative terms of legislation8 ,i say1 in contradistinction to ,kant1 that the student of ,ethics1 and no less the philosopher in general1 must content himself with explaining and interpreting that which is given1 in other words1 that which really is1 or takes place1 so as to obtain an understanding of it1 and ,i maintain furthermore that there is plenty to do in this direction1 much more than has hitherto been done1 after the lapse of thousands of years4 ,following the above petitio principii1 ,kant straightway1 without any previous investigation1 assumes in the preface 7which is entirely devoted to the subject71 that purely moral laws exist2 and this assumption remains thenceforth undisturbed1 and forms the very foundation of his whole system4 ,we1 however1 prefer first of all to examine the conception denoted by the word law4 ,the true and original meaning of the term is limited to law as between citizens2 it is the lex1 1 of the ,romans and ,greeks1 a human institution1 and depending on human volition4 ,it has a secondary1 derived1 figurative1 metaphorical meaning1 when applied to ,nature1 whose operations1 partly known a priori1 partly learnt by experience1 and which are always constant1 we call natural laws4 ,only a very small portion of these natural laws can be discerned a priori1 and with admirable acuteness1 ,kant set them apart1 and classed them under the name ,metaphysics of ,nature4 ,there is also undoubtedly a law for the human will1 in so far as man belongs to ,nature2 and this law is strictly provable1 admits of no exception1 is inviolable1 and immovable as the mountains1 and does not1 like the ,categorical ,imperative1 imply a quasi-necessity1 but rather a complete and absolute one4 ,it is the law of motivation1 a form of the law of causation2 in other words1 it is the causation which is brought about by the medium of the understanding4 ,it is the sole demonstrable law to which the human will as such is subject4 ,it means that every action can only take place in consequence of a sufficient motive4 ,like causality in general1 it is a natural law4 ,on the other hand1 moral laws1 apart from human institution1 state ordinance1 or religious doctrine1 cannot rightly be assumed as existing without proof4 ,kant1 therefore1 by taking such laws for granted1 is guilty of a petitio principii1 which is all the bolder1 in that he at once adds 7page vi of the preface7 that a moral law ought to imply absolute necessity4 ,but absolute necessity is everywhere characterised by an inevitable chain of consequence2 how1 then1 can such a conception be attached to these alleged moral laws 7as an instance of which he adduces thou shalt not lie#a78 ,every one knows1 and he himself admits1 that no such consecution for the most part takes place2 the reverse1 indeed1 is the rule4 ,in scientific ,ethics before we admit as controlling the will other laws besides that of motivation-laws which are original and independent of all human ordinance--we must first prove and deduce their existence2 that is1 provided in things ethical we are concerned not merely with recommending honesty1 but with practising it4 ,until that proof be furnished1 ,i shall recognise only one source to which is traceable the importation into ,ethics of the conception ,law1 ,precept1 ,obligation4 ,it is one which is foreign to philosophy4 ,i mean the ,mosaic ,decalogue4 ,indeed the spelling du sollt#b in the above instance of a moral law1 the first put forward by ,kant1 navely betrays this origin4 ,a conception1 however1 which can point to no other source than this1 has no right1 without undergoing further scrutiny1 thus to force its way into philosophical ,ethics4 ,it will be rejected1 until introduced by duly accredited proof4 ,thus on the threshold of the subject ,kant makes his first petitio principii1 and that no small one4 ,our philosopher1 then1 by begging the question in his preface1 simply assumes the conception of ,moral ,law as given and existing beyond all doubt2 and he treats the closely related conception of ,duty 7page #h1 ,r41 p4 #af7 exactly in the same way4 ,without subjecting it to any further test1 he admits it forthwith as a proper appurtenance of ,ethics4 ,but here1 again1 ,i am compelled to enter a protest4 ,this conception1 equally with the kindred notions of ,law1 ,command1 ,obligation1 etc41 taken thus unconditionally1 has its source in theological morals1 and it will remain a stranger to philosophical morals1 so long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn either from man's nature1 or from the objective world4 ,till then1 ,i can only recognise the ,decalogue as the origin of all these connected conceptions4 ,since the rise of ,christianity there is no doubt that philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics4 ,and since the latter is essentially dictatorial1 the former appears in the shape of precepts and inculcation of ,duty1 in all innocence1 and without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for this rle2 rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural form4 ,it is true that all peoples1 ages1 and creeds1 and indeed all philosophers 7with the exception of the materialists proper7 have undeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is a metaphysical one1 in other words1 that it stretches out beyond this phaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity2 but it is equally true that the presentment of this fact in terms of ,command and ,obedience1 of ,law and ,duty1 is no part of its essence4 ,furthermore1 separated from the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung1 these conceptions lose in reality all meaning1 and to attempt a substitute for the former by talking with ,kant of absolute obligation and of unconditioned duty1 is to feed the reader with empty words1 nay more1 is to give him a contradictio in adjecto#c to digest4 ,every obligation derives all sense and meaning2 simply and solely from its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward4 ,hence1 long before ,kant was thought of1 ,locke says3 ,for since it would be utterly in vain1 to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man1 without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will2 we must1 wherever we suppose a law1 suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law4 7,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 ,bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 #cc1 #f74 ,what ought to be done is therefore necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward2 consequently1 to use ,kant's language1 it is essentially and inevitably hypothetical1 and never1 as he maintains1 categorical4 ,if we think away these conditions1 the conception of obligation becomes void of sense2 hence absolute obligation is most certainly a contradictio in adjecto4 ,a commanding voice1 whether it come from within1 or from without1 cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising4 ,consequently obedience to it1 which may be wise or foolish according to circumstances1 is yet always actuated by selfishness1 and therefore morally worthless4 ,the complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an unconditioned obligation1 which lies at the root of the ,kantian ,ethics1 appears later in the system itself1 namely in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft3 just as some concealed poison in an organism cannot remain hid1 but sooner or later must come out and show itself4 ,for this obligation1 said to be so unconditioned1 nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background2 it assumes a rewarder1 a reward1 and the immortality of the person to be rewarded4 ,this is of course unavoidable1 if one really makes ,duty and ,obligation the fundamental conception of ,ethics2 for these ideas are essentially relative1 and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty or the promised reward4 ,the guerdon which is assumed to be in store for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works for nothing4 ,it is1 however1 put forward modestly veiled1 under the name of the ,highest ,good1 which is the union of ,virtue and ,happiness4 ,but this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that derives its origin from ,happiness1 which means1 a morality resting on selfishness4 ,in other words1 it is ,eudaemonism1 which ,kant had solemnly thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder1 only to let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the ,highest ,good4 ,this is how the assumption of unconditioned absolute obligation1 concealing as it does a contradiction1 avenges itself4 ,conditioned obligation1 on the other hand1 cannot of course be any first principle for ,ethics1 since everything done out of regard for reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction1 and as such is without any real moral value4 ,all this makes it clear that a nobler and wider view of ,ethics is needed1 if we are in earnest about our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct--a significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal4 ,as all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition1 so also is all duty4 ,both conceptions are very closely related1 indeed almost identical4 ,the only difference between them might be said to be that obligation in general may rest on mere force1 whereas duty involves the sense of obligation deliberately undertaken1 such as we see between master and servant1 principal and subordinate1 rulers and the ruled4 ,and since no one undertakes a duty gratis1 every duty implies also a right4 ,the slave has no duties1 because he has no rights2 but he is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force4 ,in the following ,part ,i shall explain the only meaning which the conception ,duty has in ,ethics4 ,if we put ,ethics in an imperative form1 making it a ,doctrine of ,duties1 and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct as the fulfilment or violation of duties1 we must remember that this view of ,duty1 and of ,obligation in general1 is undeniably derived solely from theological ,morals1 and primarily from the ,decalogue1 and consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the assumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands and announces reward or punishment4 ,but the more the assumption of such a will is in ,theology positive and precise1 the less should it be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical ,morals4 ,hence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the imperative ,form1 the ordaining of commands1 laws1 and duties is an essential and a matter of course2 and it is a very poor shift to substitute the word absolute or categorical for the external condition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by their very nature3 for this gives rise1 as explained above1 to a contradictio in adjecto4 ,kant1 then1 without more ado or any close examination1 borrowed this imperative ,form of ,ethics from theological ,morals4 ,the hypotheses of the latter 7in other words1 ,theology7 really lie at the root of his system1 and as these alone in point of fact lend it any meaning or sense1 so they cannot be separated from1 indeed are implicitly contained in1 it4 ,after this1 when he had expounded his position the task of developing in turn a ,theology out of his ,morals--the famous ,moraltheologie--was easy enough4 ,for the conceptions which are implicitly involved in his ,imperative1 and which lie hidden at the base of his ,morals1 only required to be brought forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of ,practical ,reason4 ,and so it was that1 to the world's great edification1 a ,theology appeared depending simply on ,ethics1 indeed actually derived therefrom4 ,but this came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed theological hypotheses4 ,i mean no derisive comparison1 but in its form the process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise for us1 when he lets us find something where he had previously employed his art to place it4 ,described in the abstract1 ,kant's procedure is this3 what ought to have been his first principle1 or hypothesis 7viz41 ,theology7 he made the conclusion1 and what ought to have been deduced as the conclusion 7viz41 the ,categorical ,command7 he took as his hypothesis4#d ,but after he had thus turned the thing upside down1 nobody1 not even he himself1 recognised it as being what it really was1 namely the old well-known system of theological ,morals4 ,how this trick was accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of the present ,part4 ,ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form1 and treated as a doctrine of duties also in pre-,kantian philosophy2 but it was always then based upon the will of a ,god whose existence had been otherwise proved1 and so there was no inconsequence4 ,as soon1 however1 as the attempt was made1 as ,kant attempted1 to give a foundation to ,ethics independent of this will1 and establish it without metaphysical hypotheses1 there was no longer any justification for taking as its basis the words thou shalt1 and it is thy duty 7that is1 the imperative form71 without first deducing the truth thereof from some other source4 #a ,du sollt 7sic7 nicht lgen4 #b ,sollt is the old form for sollst4 ,cf4 ,eng41 shalt3 ,icel2 skalt--7,translator47 #c ,a contradiction in the adjective4 ,this occurs when the epithet applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning4--7,translator47 #d ,like the converse of a geometrical proposition1 this ,kantian inversion is not necessarily true2 its validity1 in fact1 depends on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis4 --7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,on ,,the ,,assumption ,,of ,,duties ,,towards ,,ourselves ,,in ,,particular4 ,this form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to ,kant1 and in working out his position he left it untouched2 for1 like his predecessors1 along with the duties towards others he ranged also duties towards ourselves4 ,i1 however1 entirely reject this assumption1 and1 as there will be no better opportunity1 ,i shall here incidentally explain my view4 ,duties towards ourselves must1 just as all others1 be based either on right or on love4 ,duties towards ourselves based on right are impossible1 because of the self-evident fundamental principle volenti non fit injuria 7where the will assents1 no injury is done74 ,for what ,i do is always what ,i will2 consequently also what ,i do to myself is never anything but what ,i will1 therefore it cannot be unjust4 ,next1 as regards duties towards ourselves based on love4 ,ethics here finds her work already done1 and comes too late4 ,the impossibility of violating the duty of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of ,christian ,morals3 ,love thy neighbour as thyself4 ,according to this1 the love which each man cherishes for himself is postulated as the maximum1 and as the condition of all other love2 while the converse1 ,love thyself as thy neighbour is never added2 for every one would feel that the latter does not claim enough4 ,moreover1 self-love would be the sole duty regularly involving an opus supererogationis4 ,kant himself says in the ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde zur ,tugendlehre1 p4 #ac 7,r41 p4 #bcj73 ,that which each man inevitably wills of himself1 does not belong to the conception of ,duty4 ,this idea of duties towards ourselves is nevertheless still held in repute1 indeed it enjoys for the most part special favour2 nor need we feel surprise4 ,but it has an amusing effect in cases where people begin to show anxiety about their persons1 and talk quite earnestly of the duty of self-preservation2 the while it is sufficiently clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough1 and that they have no need of any law of duty to help them along4 ,first among the duties towards ourselves is generally placed that of not committing suicide1 the line of argument taken being extremely prejudiced and resting on the shallowest basis4 ,unlike animals1 man is not only a prey to bodily pain limited to the passing moment1 but also to those incomparably greater mental sufferings1 which1 reaching forwards and backwards1 draw upon the future and the past2 and nature1 by way of compensation1 has granted to man alone the privilege of being able to end his life at his own pleasure1 before she herself sets a term to it2 thus1 while animals necessarily live so long as they can1 man need only live so long as he will4 ,whether he ought on ethical grounds to forego this privilege is a difficult question1 which in any case cannot be decided by the usual superficial reasoning4 ,the arguments against suicide which ,kant does not deem unworthy of adducing 7p4 #ec1 ,r41 p4 #dh and p4 #fg1 ,r41 p4 #eg71 ,i cannot conscientiously describe as other than pitiable1 and quite undeserving of an answer4 ,it is laughable indeed to suppose that reflections of such a kind could have wrested the dagger from the hands of ,cato1 of ,cleopatra1 of ,cocceius ,nerva 7,tac4 ,ann41 vi4 #bf7 or of ,arria the wife of ,paetus 7,plin41 ,ep41 iii4 #af74 ,if real moral motives for not committing suicide actually exist1 it is certain that they lie very deep1 and cannot be reached by the plummet of ordinary ,ethics4 ,they belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable even to the standpoint of the present treatise4#a ,that which generally comes next on the rubric of duties towards ourselves may be divided partly into rules of worldly wisdom1 partly into hygienic prescriptions2 but neither class belongs to ,morals in the proper sense4 ,last on the catalogue comes the prohibition of unnatural lust--onanism1 paederastia1 and bestiality4 ,of these onanism is mainly a vice of childhood1 and must be fought against much more with the weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics2 hence we find that the authors of books directed against it are physicians 7e4g41 ,tissot and others7 rather than moralists4 ,after dietetics and hygiene have done their work1 and struck it down by irrefutable reasoning1 if ,ethics desires to take up the matter1 she finds little left for her to do4 ,bestiality1 again1 is of very rare occurrence2 it is thoroughly abnormal and exceptional1 and1 moreover1 so loathsome and foreign to human nature1 that itself1 better than all arguments of reason1 passes judgment on itself1 and deters by sheer disgust4 ,for the rest1 as being a degradation of human nature1 it is in reality an offence against the species as such1 and in the abstract2 not against human units4 ,of the three sexual perversions of which we are speaking it is consequently only with paederastia that ,ethics has to do1 and in treating of ,justice this vice finds its proper place4 ,for ,justice is infringed by it1 in face of which fact1 the dictum volenti non fit injuria is unavailing4 ,the injustice consists in the seduction of the younger and inexperienced person1 who is thereby ruined physically and morally4 #a ,there are ascetic reasons1 which may be found in the ,fourth ,book1 ,vol4 ,i41 #fi1 of my chief work 7,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung74 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics4 ,with the imperative ,form of ,ethics1 which in ,chapter ,,ii4 we proved to be a petitio principii1 is directly connected a favourite idea of ,kant's1 that may be excused1 but cannot be adopted4 ,sometimes we see a physician1 after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous success1 henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases2 to such a one ,kant may be likened4 ,by separating the a priori from the a posteriori in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and pregnant discovery that ,metaphysics can boast of4 ,what wonder then that thereafter he should try to apply this method1 this sundering of the two forms1 everywhere1 and should consequently make ,ethics also consist of two parts1 a pure1 i4e4 an a priori knowable part1 and an empirical8 ,the latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the purpose of founding ,ethics4 ,to trace out the former and2 exhibit it by itself is his purpose in the ,grundlegung der ,metaphysik der ,sitten1 which he accordingly represents as a science purely a priori1 exactly in the same way as he sets forth the ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,naturwissenschaft4 ,he asserts in fact that the ,moral ,law1 which without warrant1 without deduction1 or proof of any sort1 he postulates as existing1 is furthermore a ,law knowable a priori and independent of all internal or external experience2 it rests 7he says7 solely on conceptions of pure ,reason2 and is to be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori 7,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft3 p4 #ef of fourth ,edition2 ,r41 p4 #adb74 ,but from this definition the implication immediately follows that such a ,law can only be formal1 like everything else known a priori1 and consequently has only to do with the ,form of actions1 not with their ,essence4 ,let it be thought what this means6 ,he emphatically adds 7p4 vi of the preface to the ,grundlegung2 ,r41 p4 #e7 that it is useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature1 or objectively in the accidents of the external world1 and 7preface of the same1 page vii2 ,r41 p4 #f7 that nothing whatever connected with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man1 i4e41 from anthropology4 ,on page #ei 7,r41 p4 #eb7 he repeats1 ,that one ought on no account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of morality from the special constitution of human nature2 and again1 on page #fj 7,r41 p4 #eb71 he says that1 ,everything derived from any natural disposition peculiar to man1 or from certain feelings and propensities1 or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature1 and not necessarily to be taken as the ,will of every rational being1 is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law4 ,this shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that ,kant does not represent the alleged moral law as a fact of consciousness1 capable of empirical proof--which is how the later would-be philosophers1 both individually and collectively1 wish to pass it off4 ,in discarding every empirical basis for ,morals1 he rejects all internal1 and still more decidedly all external1 experience41 ,accordingly he founds--and ,i call special attention to this--his moral principle not on any provable fact of consciousness1 such as an inner natural disposition1 nor yet upon any objective relation of things in the external world4 ,no6 ,that would be an empirical foundation4 ,instead of this1 pure conceptions a priori1 i4e41 conceptions1 which so far contain nothing derived from internal or external experience1 and thus are simply shells without kernels--these are to be made the basis of ,morals4 ,let us consider the full meaning of such a position4 ,human consciousness as well as the whole external world1 together with all the experience and all the facts they comprise1 are swept from under our feet4 ,we have nothing to stand upon4 ,and what have we to hold to8 ,nothing but a few entirely abstract1 entirely unsubstantial conceptions1 floating in the air equally with ourselves4 ,it is from these1 or1 more correctly1 from the mere form of their connection with judgments made1 that a ,law is declared to proceed1 which by so-called absolute necessity is supposed to be valid1 and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on the surging throng of human desires1 on the storm of passion1 on the giant might of egoism4 ,we shall see if such be the case4 ,with this preconceived notion that the basis of ,morals must be necessarily and strictly a priori1 and entirely free from everything empirical1 another of ,kant's favourite ideas is closely connected4 ,the moral principle that he seeks to establish is1 he says1 a synthetic proposition a priori1 of merely formal contents1 and hence exclusively a matter of ,pure ,reason2 and accordingly1 as such1 to be regarded as valid not only for men1 but for all possible rational beings2 indeed he declares it to hold good for man on this account alone1 i4e41 because per accidens man comes under the category of rational beings4 ,here lies the cause of his basing the ,moral principle not on any feeling1 but on pure ,reason 7which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its antithesis74 ,so that this pure ,reason is taken1 not as it really and exclusively is--an intellectual faculty of man--but as a self-existent hypostatic essence1 yet without the smallest authority2 the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being sufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day4 ,indeed1 this view of ,morals as existing not for men1 as men1 but for all rational beings1 as such1 is with ,kant a principle so firmly established1 an idea so favourite1 that he is never tired of repeating it at every opportunity4 ,i1 on the contrary1 maintain that we are never entitled to raise into a genus that which we only know of in a single species4 ,for we could bring nothing into our idea of the genus but what we had abstracted from this one species2 so that what we should predicate of the genus could after all only be understood of the single species4 ,while1 if we should attempt to think away 7without any warrant7 the particular attributes of the species1 in order to form our genus1 we should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining attributes1 hypostatised as a genus1 are made possible4 ,just as we recognise intelligence in general to be an attribute of animal beings alone1 and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as existing outside1 and independent1 of animal nature2 so we recognise ,reason as the exclusive attribute of the human race1 and have not the smallest right to suppose that ,reason exists externally to it1 and then proceed to set up a genus called ,rational ,beings1 differing from its single known species ,man2 still less are we warranted in laying down laws for such imaginary rational beings in the abstract4 ,to talk of rational beings external to men is like talking of heavy beings external to bodies4 ,one cannot help suspecting that ,kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim1 or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the reader4 ,in any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an anima rationalis1 which as being entirely different from the anima sensitiva1 and the anima vegetativa1 is supposed to persist after death1 and then to be indeed nothing else but rationalis4 ,but in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft ,kant himself has expressly and elaborately made an end of this most transcendent hypostasis4 ,nevertheless1 in his ethics generally1 and in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft especially1 there seems always to hover in the background the thought that the inner and eternal essence1 of man consists of ,reason4 ,in this connection1 where the matter only occurs incidentally1 ,i must content myself with simply asserting the contrary4 ,reason1 as indeed the intellectual faculty as a whole1 is secondary1 is an attribute of phaenomena1 being in point of fact conditioned by the organism2 whereas it is the ,will in man which is his very self1 the only part of him which is metaphysical1 and therefore indestructible4 ,the success with which ,kant had applied his method to the theoretical side of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical4 ,here also he endeavoured to separate pure a priori from empirical a posteriori knowledge4 ,for this purpose he assumed that just as we know a priori the laws of ,space1 of ,time1 and of ,causality1 so in like manner1 or at any rate analogously1 we have the moral plumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience1 and revealed in a ,categorical ,imperative1 an absolute ,ought4 ,but how wide is the difference between this alleged moral law a priori1 and our theoretical knowledge a priori of ,space1 ,time1 and ,causality6 ,the latter are nothing but the expression of the forms1 i4e41 the functions of our intellect1 whereby alone we are capable of grasping an objective world1 and wherein alone it can be mirrored2 so that the world 7as we know it7 is absolutely conditioned by these forms1 and all experience must invariably and exactly correspond to them--just as everything that ,i see through a blue glass must appear blue4 ,while the former1 the so-called moral law1 is something that experience pours ridicule on at every step2 indeed1 as ,kant himself says1 it is doubtful whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single occasion4 ,how completely unlike are the things which are here classed together under the conception of apriority6 ,moreover1 ,kant overlooked the fact that1 according to his own teaching1 in theoretical philosophy1 it is exactly the ,apriority of our knowledge of ,time1 ,space1 and ,causality--independent as this is of experience--that limits it strictly to phaenomena1 i4e41 to the picture of the world as reflected in our consciousness1 and makes it entirely invalid as regards the real nature of things1 i4e41 as regards whatever exists independently of our capacity to grasp it4 ,similarly1 when we turn to practical philosophy1 his alleged moral law1 if it have an a priori origin in ourselves1 must also be only phaenomenal1 and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of things4 ,only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction as much to the facts themselves1 as to ,kant's view of them4 ,for it is precisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere 7e4g41 ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 p4 #age2 ,r41 p4 #bbh7 represents as being in the closest connection with the real essence of things1 indeed1 as directly in contact with it2 and in all passages in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 where the mysterious ,thing in itself comes forward a little more clearly1 it shows itself as the moral principle in us1 as ,will4 ,but of this he failed to take account4 ,in ,chapter ,,ii4 of this ,part1 ,i explained how ,kant took over bodily from theological ,morals the imperative form of ,ethics1 i4e41 the conception of obligation1 of law1 and of duty2 and how at the same time he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm of theology alone lends force and significance to these ideas4 ,but he felt the need of some basis for them1 and accordingly went so far as to require that the conception of duty itself should be also the ground of its fulfilment2 in other words1 that it should itself be its own enforcement4 ,an action1 he says 7p4 #aa2 ,r41 p4 #ah71 has no genuine moral worth1 unless it be done simply as a matter of duty1 and for duty's sake1 without any liking for it being felt2 and the character only begins to have value1 if a man1 who has no sympathy in his heart1 and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings1 and who is not by nature a lover of his kind1 is nevertheless a doer of good actions1 solely out of a pitiful sense of duty4 ,this assertion1 which is revolting to true moral sentiment2 this apotheosis of lovelessness1 the exact opposite1 as it is1 of the ,christian doctrine of ,morals1 which places love before everything else1 and teaches that without it nothing profiteth 7#a ,cor4 xiii4 #c72 this stupid moral pedantry has been ridiculed by ,schiller in two apposite epigrams1 entitled ,gewissensskrupel 7,scruples of ,conscience7 and ,entscheidung 7,decision74#a ,it appears that some passages in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 which exactly suit this connection1 were the immediate occasion of the verses4 ,thus1 for instance1 on p4 #aej 7,r41 p4 #baa7 we find3 ,obedience to the moral law1 which a man feels incumbent on him1 is based not on voluntary inclination1 nor on endeavour willingly put forth1 without any authoritative command1 but on a sense of duty4 ,yes1 it must be commanded6 ,what slavish morality6 ,and again on p4 #bac 7,r41 p4 #beg73 ,feelings of compassion1 and of tender-hearted sympathy would be actually troublesome to persons who think aright1 because through such emotions their well weighed maxims would become confused1 and so the desire would grow up to be rid of them1 and to be subject solely to the lawgiver--,reason4 ,now ,i maintain without hesitation that what opens the hand of the above-described 7p4 #aa2 ,r41 p4 #ah7 loveless doer of good1 who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people1 cannot 7provided he have no secondary motives7 be anything else than a slavish 7fear of the gods71 equally whether he calls his fetich ,categorical ,imperative or ,fitzlipuzli4#b ,for what but fear can move a hard heart8 ,furthermore1 on p4 #ac 7,r41 p4 #ai71 in accordance with the above view1 we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie1 by no means in the intention which led to it1 but in the maxim which was followed4 ,whereas ,i1 on the contrary1 ask the reader to reflect that it is the intention alone which decides as to the moral worth1 or worthlessness1 off an action1 so that the same act may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which determined it4 ,hence it is that1 whenever men discuss a proceeding to which some moral importance is attached1 the intention is always investigated1 and by this standard alone the matter is judged2 as1 likewise1 it is in the intention alone that every one seeks justification1 if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse1 if its consequence be mischievous4 ,on p4 #ad 7,r41 p4 #bj7 we at last reach the definition of ,duty1 which is the fundamental conception of ,kant's entire ethical system4 ,it is3 ,the necessity of an action out of respect for the law4 ,but what is necessary takes place with absolute certainty while conduct based on pure duty generally does not come off at all4 ,and not only this2 ,kant himself admits 7p4 #be2 ,r41 p4 #bh7 that there are no certain instances on record of conduct determined solely by pure duty2 and on p4 #bf 7,r41 p4 #bi7 he says3 ,it is utterly impossible to know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really been one single case in which an action1 however true to duty1 has rested simply on its idea4--,and similarly on p4 #bh 7,r41 p4 #cj7 and p4 #di 7,r41 p4 #ej74 ,in what sense then can necessity be attributed to such an action8 ,as it is only fair always to put the most favourable interpretation on an author's words1 we will suppose him to mean that an act true to duty is objectively necessary1 but subjectively accidental4 ,only it is precisely this that is more easily said than thought for where is the ,object of this objective necessity1 the consequence of which for the most part1 perhaps indeed always1 fails to be realised in objective reality6 ,with every wish to be unbiassed1 ,i cannot but think that the expression--necessity of an action--is nothing but an artificially concealed1 very forced paraphrase of the word ought4#c ,this will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the word ,achtung 7respect7 is employed1 where ,gehorsam 7obedience7 is meant4 ,similarly in the note on p4 #af 7,r41 p4 #bj7 we read3 ,achtung signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law4 ,the direct determination of the will by a law1 and the consciousness that it is so determined--this is what is denoted by ,achtung ,in what language8 ,in ,german the proper term is ,gehorsam4 ,but the word ,achtung1 so unsuitable as it is1 cannot without a reason have been put in place of the word ,gehorsam4 ,it must serve some purpose2 and this is obviously none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form1 and of the conception of duty1 from theological ,morals2 just as we saw above that the expression necessity of an action1 which is such a forced and awkward substitute for the word shall1 was only chosen because shall is the exact language of the ,decalogue4 ,the above definition3 ,duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law1 would therefore read in natural1 undisguised1 plain language3 ,duty signifies an action which ought to be done out of obedience to a law4 ,this is the real form of the poodle4#d ,but now as to the ,law1 which is the real foundation stone of the ,kantian ,ethics4 ,what does it contain8 ,and where is it inscribed8 ,this is the chief point of inquiry4 ,in the first place1 be it observed that we have two questions to deal with3 the one has to do with the ,principle1 the other with the ,basis of ,ethics--two entirely different things1 although they are frequently1 and sometimes indeed intentionally1 confused4 ,the principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest and most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes1 or1 if it have no imperative form1 of the line of conduct to which it attaches real moral worth4 ,it thus contains1 in the general terms of a single enunciation1 the direction for following the path of virtue1 which is derived from that system3 in other words1 it is the 1#e of virtue4 ,whereas the ,basis of any theory of ,ethics is the #f of virtue1 the reason of the obligation enjoined1 of the exhortation or praise given1 whether it be sought in human nature1 or in the external conditions of the world1 or in anything else4 ,as in all sciences1 so also in ,ethics the 1 must be clearly distinguished from the 4 ,but most teachers of ,morals wilfully confound this difference3 probably because the 1 is so easy1 the so exceedingly difficult1 to give4 ,they are therefore glad to try to make up for the poverty on the one hand1 by the riches on the other1 and to bring about a happy marriage between 7poverty7 and 7plenty71 by putting them together in one proposition4#g ,this is generally done by taking the familiar 1 out of the simple form in which it can be expressed1 and forcing it into an artificial formula1 from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of given premises2 and the reader is led by this performance to feel as if he had grasped not only the thing1 but its cause as well4 ,we may easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most familiar principles of ,morals4 ,as1 however1 in what follows ,i have no intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort1 but purpose proceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness1 ,i cannot make the principle of ,ethics equivalent to its basis1 but must keep the two quite separate4 ,accordingly1 this 1--i4e41 the principle1 the fundamental proposition--as to which in its essence all teachers of ,morals are really at one1 however much they may clothe it in different costumes1 ,i shall at once express in the form which ,i take to be the simplest and purest possible1 viz43 ,neminem laede1 immo omnes1 quantum potes1 juva4 7,do harm to no one2 but rather help all people1 as far as lies in your power47 ,this is in truth the proposition which all ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account for4 ,it is the common result of their manifold and widely differing deductions2 it is the 1 for which the is still sought after2 the consequence1 the cause of which is wanting4 ,hence it is itself nothing but the ,datum 7the thing given71 in relation to which the ,quaesitum 7the thing required7 is the problem of every ethical system1 as also of the present prize essay4 ,the solution of this riddle will disclose the real foundation of ,ethics1 which1 like the philosopher's stone1 has been searched for from time immemorial4 ,that the ,datum1 the 11 the principle is most purely expressed by the enunciation ,i have given1 can be seen from the fact that it stands to every other precept of ,morals as a conclusion to given premises1 and therefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain2 so that all other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases1 as indirect or disguised statements1 of the above simple proposition4 ,this is true1 for instance1 even of that trite and apparently elementary maxim3 ,quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris#h 7,do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself47 ,the defect here is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law1 not those required by virtue2--a thing which can be easily remedied by the omission of non and ne4 ,thus changed1 it really means nothing else than3 ,neminem laede1 immo omnes1 quantum potes1 juva4 ,but as this sense is only reached by a periphrasis1 the formula gains the appearance of having also revealed its own ultimate foundation1 its 2 which1 however1 is not the case1 because it does not in the least follow that1 if ,i am unwilling that something be done to myself1 ,i ought not to do it to others4 ,the same is true of every other principle or leading proposition of ,ethics that has hitherto been put forward4 ,if we now return to the above question3--how does the law read1 in obeying which1 according to ,kant1 duty consists8 and on what is it based8--we shall find that our philosopher1 like most others1 has in an extremely artificial manner closely connected the principle of ,morals with its basis4 ,i again call attention to what ,i have already examined at the outset--,i mean1 the ,kantian claim that the principle of ,ethics must be purely a priori and purely formal1 indeed an a priori synthetical proposition1 which consequently may not contain anything material1 nor rest upon anything empirical1 whether objectively in the external world1 or subjectively in consciousness1 such as any feeling1 inclination1 impulse1 and the like4 ,kant was perfectly aware of the difficulty of this position2 for on p4 #fj 7,r41 p4 #ec7 he says3 ,it will be seen that philosophy has here indeed reached a precarious standpoint1 which yet is to be immovable1 notwithstanding that it is neither dependent on1 nor supported by1 anything in heaven or on earth4 ,we shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity await the solution of the problem he has set himself1 namely1 how something is to arise out of nothing1 that is1 how out of purely a priori conceptions1 which contain nothing empirical or material1 the laws of material human action are to grow up4 ,this is a process which we may find symbolised in chemistry1 where out of three invisible gases 7,azote1 ,hydrogen1 and ,chlorine#i71 and thus in apparently empty space1 solid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes4 ,i will1 however1 explain1 more clearly than ,kant either would or could1 the method whereby he accomplishes this difficult task4 ,the demonstration is all the more necessary because what he did appears to be seldom properly understood4 ,almost all ,kant's disciples have fallen into the mistake of supposing that he presents his ,categorical ,imperative directly as a fact of consciousness4 ,but in that case its origin would be anthropological1 and1 as resting on experience1 although internal1 it would have an empirical basis3 a position which runs directly counter to the ,kantian view1 and which he repeatedly rejects4 ,thus on p4 #dh 7,r41 p4 #dd7 he says3 ,it cannot be empirically determined whether any such ,categorical ,imperative exists everywhere2 and again1 on p4 #di 7,r41 p4 #de73 ,the possibility of the ,categorical ,imperative must be investigated entirely on a priori grounds1 because here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to its reality4 ,even ,reinhold1 his first pupil1 missed this point2 for in his ,beitrage zur ,uebersicht der ,philosophie am ,anfange des #ai4 ,jahrhunderts1 ,no4 #b1 p4 #ba1 we find him saying3 ,kant assumes the moral law to be a direct and certain reality1 an original fact of the moral consciousness4 ,but if ,kant had wished to make the ,categorical ,imperative a fact of consciousness1 and thus give it an empirical foundation1 he certainly would not have failed at least to put it forward as such4 ,and this is precisely what he never does4 ,as far as ,i know1 the ,categorical ,imperative appears for the first time in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft 7p4 #hjb of the first1 and p4 #hcj of the fifth edition71 entirely ex nunc 7unexpectedly71 without any preamble1 and merely connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether unjustifiable therefore42 ,it is only in the ,grundlage zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten--a book to which we here devote especial attention--that it is first introduced expressly and formally1 as a deduction from certain concepts4 ,whereas in ,reinhold's ,formula concordiae des ,kriticismus1#aj we actually read on p4 #abb the following sentence3 ,we distinguish moral self-consciousness from the experience with which it1 as an original fact transcending all knowledge1 is bound up in the human consciousness2 and we understand by such self-consciousness the direct consciousness of duty1 that is1 of the necessity we are under of admitting the legitimacy--whether pleasurable or the reverse--of the will1 as the stimulus and as the measure of its own operations4 ,this would of course be a charming thesis1 with a very pretty hypothesis to boot4#aa ,but seriously3 into what an outrageous petitio principii do we find ,kant's moral law here developed6 ,if that were true1 ,ethics would indubitably have a basis of incomparable solidity1 and there would be no need of any questions being set for prize essays1 to encourage inquiry in this direction4 ,but the greatest marvel would be1 that men had been so slow in discovering such a fact of consciousness1 considering that for the space of thousands of years a basis for ,morals has been sought after with zealous patient toil4 ,how ,kant himself is responsible for this deplorable mistake1 ,i shall explain further on2 nevertheless1 one cannot but wonder at the undisputed predominance of such a radical error among his disciples4 ,have they never1 whilst writing all their numberless books on the ,kantian philosophy1 noticed the disfigurement which the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft underwent in the second edition1 and which made it an incoherent1 self-contradictory work8 ,it seems that this has only now come to light2 and1 in my opinion1 the fact has been quite correctly analysed in ,rosenkranz's preface to the second volume of his complete edition of ,kant's works4 ,we must1 however1 remember that many scholars1 being unceasingly occupied as teachers and authors1 find very little time left for private and exact research4 ,it is certain that docendo disco 7,i learn by teaching7 is not unconditionally true2 sometimes indeed one is tempted to parody it by saying3 semper docendo nihil disco 7by always teaching ,i learn nothing72 and even what ,diderot puts into the mouth of ,rameau's nephew is not altogether without reason3 ',and as for these teachers1 do you suppose they understand the sciences they give instruction in8 ,not a bit of it1 my dear sir1 not a bit of it4 ,if they possessed sufficient knowledge to be able to teach them1 they would not do so4' ',why8' ',because they would have devoted their lives to the study of them4'--7,goethe's translation1 p4 #ajd47 ,lichtenberg too says3 ,i have rather observed that professional people are often exactly those who do not know best4 ,but to return to the ,kantian ,ethics3 most persons1 provided only the conclusion reached agrees with their moral feelings1 immediately assume that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation2 and if the process of deduction looks difficult1 they do not trouble themselves much about it1 but are content to trust the faculty4 ,thus the foundation which ,kant gave to his moral law by no means consists in its being proved empirically to be a fact of consciousness2 neither does he base it on an appeal to moral feeling1 nor yet on a petitio principii1 under its fine modern name of an absolute ,postulate4 ,it is formed rather of a very subtle process of thought1 which he twice advances1 on p4 #ag and p4 #ea 7,r41 p4 #bb1 and p4 #df71 and which ,i shall now proceed to make clear4 ,kant1 be it observed1 ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will1 and began by removing everything1 whether subjective or objective1 on which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based4 ,the consequence is1 that he has nothing left for the substance of his law but simply its ,form4 ,now this can only be the abstract conception of lawfulness4 ,but the conception of lawfulness is built up out of what is valid for all persons equally4 ,therefore the substance of the law consists of the conception of what is universally valid1 and its contents are of course nothing else than its universal validity4 ,hence the formula will read as follows3 ,act only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a general law for all rational beings4 ,this1 then1 is the real foundation--for the most part so greatly misunderstood--which ,kant constructed for his principle of ,morals1 and therefore for his whole ethical system4 ,compare also the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 p4 #fa 7,r41 p4 #adg72 the end of ,note #a4 ,i pay ,kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the great acumen he displayed in carrying out this dexterous feat1 but ,i continue in all seriousness my examination of his position according to the standard of truth4 ,i will only observe--and this point ,i shall take up again later on--that here reason1 because1 and in so far as1 it works out the above explained special ratiocination1 receives the name of practical reason4 ,now the ,categorical ,imperative of ,practical ,reason is the law which results from this process of thought4 ,consequently ,practical ,reason is not in the least what most people1 including even ,fichte1 have regarded it--a special faculty that cannot be traced to its source1 a qualitas occulta1 a sort of moral instinct1 like ,hutcheson's moral sense2 but it is 7as ,kant himself in his preface1 p4 xii4 ,r41 p4 #h1 and elsewhere1 often enough declares7 one and the same with theoretical reason--is1 in fact1 theoretical reason itself1 in so far as the latter works out the ratiocinative process ,i have described4 ,it is noticeable that ,fichte calls the ,categorical ,imperative of ,kant an absolute ,postulate 7,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 ,tbingen1 #ahjb1 p4 #bdj1 ,note74 ,this is the modern1 more showy1 expression for petitio principii1 and thus we see that he1 too1 regularly accepted the ,categorical ,imperative1 and consequently must be included among those who have fallen into the mistake above criticised4 ,the objection1 to which this ,kantian basis of ,morals is at once and directly exposed1 lies in the fact that such an origin of a moral law in us is impossible1 because of its assumption that man would quite of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for1 and inquiring after1 a law to which his will should be subject1 and which should shape its actions4 ,this procedure1 however1 cannot possibly occur to him of itself2 at best it could only be after another moral2 stimulus had supplied the first impulse and motive thereto2 and such a stimulus would have to be positively operative1 and real2 and show itself to be such1 as well as spontaneously influence1 indeed force its presence upon1 the mind4 ,but anything of this sort would run counter to ,kant's assumption1 which1 according to the chain of reasoning above described1 is to be regarded as itself the origin of all moral conceptions--in fact1 the punctum saliens of ,morality4 ,consequently1 as long as there is no such antecedent incentive 7because1 ex hypothesi1 there exists no other moral stimulus but the process of thought already explained71 so long ,egoism alone must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct1 as the guiding thread of the law of motivation2 so long the entirely empirical and egoistic motives of the moment1 alone and unchecked1 must determine1 in each separate case1 the conduct of a man2 since1 on this assumption1 there is no voice to arrest him1 neither does any reason whatever exist1 why he should be minded to inquire after1 to say nothing of anxiously searching for1 a law which should limit and govern his will4 ,and yet it is only possible on this supposition that he should think out the above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain4 ,it matters not how far we may care to put a strict and exact interpretation on this ,kantian process1 or whether we choose to tone it down to some dim1 obscurely felt operation of thought4 ,no modification of it can attack the primary truths that out of nothing1 nothing comes1 and that an effect requires a cause4 ,the moral stimulus1 like every motive that effects the will1 must in all cases make itself felt spontaneously1 and therefore have a positive working1 and consequently be real4 ,and because for men the only thing which has reality is the empirical1 or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical existence1 therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but be empirical1 and show itself as such of its own accord2 and without waiting for us to begin our search1 it must come and press itself upon us1 and this with such force that it may1 at least possibly1 overcome the opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength4 ,for ,ethics has to do with actual human conduct1 and not with the a priori building of card houses--a performance which yields results that no man would ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life1 and which1 in face of the storm of our passions1 would be about as serviceable as a syringe in a great fire4 ,i have already noticed above how ,kant considered it a special merit of his moral law that it is founded solely on abstract1 pure a priori conceptions1 consequently on pure reason2 whereby its validity obtains 7he says7 not only for men1 but for all rational beings as such4 ,all the more must we regret that pure1 abstract conceptions a priori1 without real contents1 and without any kind of empirical basis can never move1 at any rate1 men2 of other rational beings ,i am of course incapable of speaking4 ,the second defect1 then1 in ,kant's ethical basis is its lack of real substance4 ,so far this has escaped notice1 because the real nature of his foundation has in all probability been thoroughly understood only by an exceedingly small number of those who were its enthusiastic propagandists4 ,the second fault1 ,i repeat1 is entire want of reality1 and hence of possible efficacy4 ,the structure floats in the air1 like a web of the subtlest conceptions devoid of all contents2 it is based on nothing1 and can therefore support nothing1 and move nothing4 ,and yet ,kant loaded it with a burden of enormous weight1 namely1 the hypothesis of the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,in spite of his oft declared conviction that freedom in human action has absolutely no place2 that theoretically not even its possibility is thinkable 7,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 p4 #afh2 ,r41 p4 #bbc72 that1 if the character of a man1 and all the motives which work on him were exactly known1 his conduct could be calculated as certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon 7ibidem1 p4 #agg2 ,r41 p4 #bcj73 he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom 7although only idealiter1 and as a postulate7 by his celebrated conclusion3 ,you can1 because you ought2 and this on the strength of his precious ethical basis1 which1 as we see1 floats in the air incorporeal4 ,but if it has once been clearly recognised that a thing is not1 and cannot be1 what is the use of all the postulates in the world8 ,it would be much more to the purpose to cast away that on which the postulate is based1 because it is an impossible supposition2 and this course would be justified by the rule a non posse ad non esse valet consequentia2#ab and by a reductio ad absurdum1 which would at the same time be fatal to the ,categorical ,imperative4 ,instead of which one false doctrine is built up on the other4 ,the inadmissibility of a basis for ,morals consisting of a few entirely abstract and empty conceptions must have been apparent to ,kant himself in secret4 ,for in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 where 7as ,i have already said7 he is not so strict and methodical in his work1 and where we find him becoming bolder on account of the fame he had gained1 it is remarkable how the ethical basis gradually changes its nature1 and almost forgets that it is a mere web of abstract ideas2 in fact1 it seems distinctly desirous of becoming more substantial4 ,thus1 for instance1 on p4 #ha 7,r41 p4 #afc7 of the above work are the words3 ,the ,moral ,law in some sort a fact of ,pure ,reason4 ,what is one to think of this extraordinary expression8 ,in every other place that which is fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason4 ,similarly on p4 #hc 7,r41 p4 #afd7 we read of a ,reason which directly determines the ,will2 and so on4 ,now let us remember that in laying his foundation ,kant expressly and repeatedly rejects every anthropological basis1 everything that could prove the ,categorical ,imperative to be a fact of consciousness1 because such a proof would be empirical4 ,nevertheless1 his successors were so emboldened by incidental utterances like the above that they went to much greater lengths4 ,fichte in his work1 ,system der ,sittenlehre1 p4 #di1 warns us expressly not to allow ourselves to be misled into trying to explain1 and derive from external sources1 the consciousness that we have duties1 because this would be detrimental to the dignity and absoluteness of the law4 ,a very nice excuse6 ,again on p4 #ff he says3 ,the principle of ,morality is a thought which is based on the intellectual intuition of the absolute activity of the intelligence1 and which is directly conceived by the pure intelligence of its own accord4 ,what a fine flourish to conceal the helplessness of this clap-trap6 ,whoever may like to convince himself how ,kant's disciples1 little by little1 totally forgot and ignored the real nature of the foundation and derivation which their master originally gave to the moral law1 should read a very interesting essay in ,reinhold's ,beitrage zur ,uebersicht der ,philosophie im ,anfange des #ai4 ,jahrhunderts1 ,no4 #b1 #ahja4 ,in it1 on pp4 #aje and #ajf1 it is maintained that in the ,kantian philosophy ,autonomy 7which is the same thing as the ,categorical ,imperative7 is a fact of consciousness1 and cannot be traced further back1 inasmuch as it declares itself by means of a direct consciousness4 ,but in this case1 it would have an anthropological1 and consequently empirical1 foundation--a position which is diametrically opposed to ,kant's explicit and repeated utterances4 ,again1 on p4 #ajh we find3 ,both in the practical philosophy of criticism1 and in the whole of the purified or higher transcendental philosophy1 ,autonomy is that which is founded1 and which founds1 by itself alone2 and which is neither capable of1 nor requires1 any other foundation2 it is that which is absolutely original1 true and certain per se2 the primal truth2 the prius ' 7par excellence72 the absolute principle4 ,whoever1 therefore1 imagines1 requires1 or seeks any basis for this ,autonomy external to itself1 can only be regarded by the ,kantian ,school as wanting in moral consciousness2#ac or else as failing to interpret this consciousness correctly1 through the employment of false first principles in his speculations4 ,the ,school of ,fichte and ,schelling declares him to be afflicted with a dulness of intellect that renders him incapable of being a philosopher1 and forms the characteristic of the unholy canaille1 and the sluggish brute1 or 7to use ,schelling's more veiled expression7 of the profanum vulgus and the ignavum pecus4 ,every one will understand how much truth there can be in a doctrine which it is sought to uphold by such defiant and dogmatic rhetoric4 ,meanwhile1 we must doubtless explain by the respect that this language inspired1 the really childish credulity with which ,kant's followers accepted the ,categorical ,imperative1 and at once treated it as a matter beyond dispute4 ,the truth is that in this case any objections raised to a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded with moral obliquity2 so that every one1 although he had no very clear idea in his own mind of the ,categorical ,imperative1 yet preferred to be silent1 believing1 as he did1 in secret1 that others were probably better off1 and had succeeded in evolving a clearer and more definite mental picture of it4 ,for no one likes to turn his conscience inside out4 ,thus in the ,kantian ,school ,practical ,reason with its ,categorical ,imperative appears more and more as a hyperphysical fact1 as a ,delphian temple in the human soul1 out of whose dark recesses proceed oracles that infallibly declare not1 alas6 what will1 but what ought to1 happen4 ,this doctrine of ,practical ,reason1 as a direct and immediate fact1 once it had been adopted1 or rather introduced by artifice combined with defiance1 was unhappily later on extended also to ,theoretical ,reason2 and not unnaturally3 for ,kant himself had often said that both are but one and the same ,reason 7e4g41 ,preface1 p4 xii2 ,r41 p4 #h74 ,after it had been once admitted that in the domain of the ,practical there is a ,reason which dictates ex tripode1#ad it was an easy step to concede the same privilege to ,theoretical ,reason also1 closely related as the latter is to the former--indeed1 consubstantial with it4 ,the one was thus pronounced to be just as immediate as the other1 the advantage of this being no less immense than obvious4 ,then it was that all philosophasters and fancy-mongers1 with ,j4,h4 ,jacobi--the denouncer of atheists--at their head1 came crowding to this postern which was so unexpectedly opened to them4 ,they wanted to bring their small wares to market1 or at least to save what they most valued of the old heirlooms which ,kant's teaching threatened to pulverise4 ,as in the life of the individual a single youthful mistake often ruins the whole career2 so when ,kant made that one false assumption of a ,practical ,reason furnished with credentials exclusively transcendent1 and 7like the supreme courts of appeal7 with powers of decision without grounds1 the result was that out of the austere gravity of the ,critical ,philosophy was evolved a teaching utterly heterogeneous to it4 ,we hear of a ,reason at first only dimly surmising1 then clearly comprehending the ,supersensuous1 and at last endowed with a perfect intellectual intuition of it4 ,every dreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks as the absolute1 i4e41 officially issued1 deliverances1 and revelations of this ,reason4 ,nor need we be surprised if the new privilege was fully taken advantage of4 ,here1 then1 is the origin of that philosophical method which appeared immediately after ,kant1 and which is made up of clap-trap1 of mystification1 of imposture1 of deception1 and of throwing dust in the eyes4 ,this era will be known one day in the ,history of ,philosophy as ,the ,period of ,dishonesty4 ,for it was signalised by the disappearance of the characteristic of honesty1 of searching after truth in common with the reader1 which was well marked in the writings of all previous philosophers4 ,the philosophaster's object was not to instruct1 but to befool his hearers1 as every page attests4 ,at first ,fichte and ,schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch2 to be followed by the man who is quite unworthy even of them1 and greatly their inferior in point of talent--,i mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan ,hegel4 ,the ,chorus is composed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy1 who in solemn fashion discourse to their public about the ,endless1 the ,absolute1 and many other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing4 ,as a stepping-stone to raise ,reason to her prophetic throne a wretched jeu d'esprit was actually dragged in1 and made to serve4 ,it was asserted that1 as the word ,vernunft 7,reason7 comes from vernehmen 7to comprehend71 therefore ,vernunft means a capacity to comprehend the so-called ,supersensuous1 i4e41 1#ae or ,cloud-cuckoo-town4 ,this pretty notion met with boundless1 approval1 and for the space of thirty years was constantly repeated in ,germany with immense satisfaction2 indeed1 it was made the foundation of philosophic manuals4 ,and yet it is as clear as noon-day that of course ,vernunft 7,reason7 comes from4 vernehmen 7to comprehend71 but only because ,reason makes man superior to animals1 so that he not only hears1 but also comprehends 7vernimmt7--by no means1 what is going on in ,cloud-cuckoo-town--but what is said1 as by one reasonable person to another1 the words spoken being comprehended 7vernommen7 by the listener2 and this capacity is called ,reason 7,vernunft74 ,such is the interpretation that all peoples1 ages1 and languages have put on the word ,reason4 ,it has always been understood to mean the possession of general1 abstract1 non-intuitive ideas1 named concepts1 which are denoted and fixed by means of words4 ,this faculty alone it is which in reality gives to men their advantage over animals4 ,for these abstract ideas1 or concepts1 that is1 mental impressions formed of the sum of many separate things1 are the condition of language and through it of actual thought2 through which again they determine the consciousness not only of the present 7which animals also have71 but of the past and the future as such2 whence it results that they are the modulus1 so to say1 of clear recollection1 of circumspection1 of foresight1 and of intention2 the constant factor in the evolution of systematic co-operation1 of the state1 of trades1 arts1 sciences1 religions1 and philosophies1 in short1 of everything that so sharply distinguishes human from animal life4 ,beasts have only intuitive ideas1 and therefore also only intuitive motives2 consequently the dependence of their volition on motives is manifest4 ,with man this dependence is no less a fact2 he1 too 7with due allowance for individual character71 is affected by motives under the strictest law of necessity4 ,only these are for the most part not intuitive but abstract ideas1 that is1 conceptions1 or thoughts1 which nevertheless are the result of previous intuitions1 hence of external influences4 ,this1 however1 gives him a relative freedom--relative1 that is1 as compared with an animal4 ,for his action is not determined 7as it is in all other creatures7 by the surroundings of the moment as intuitively perceived1 but by the thoughts he has derived from experience1 or gained by instruction4 ,consequently the motive1 by which he1 too1 is necessarily swayed1 is not always at once obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the act2 it lies concealed in the brain4 ,it is this that lends to all his movements1 as well as to his conduct and work as a whole1 a character manifestly different from that observable in the habits of beasts4 ,he seems as though guided by finer1 invisible threads2 whence all his acts bear the stamp of deliberation and premeditation1 thus gaining an appearance of independence1 which sufficiently distinguishes them from those of animals4 ,all these great differences1 however1 spring solely out of the capacity for abstract ideas1 concepts4 ,this capacity is therefore the essential part of ,reason1 that is1 of the faculty peculiar to man1 and it is called 1#af 1 ratio1 la ragione1 il discorso1 raison1 reason1 discourse of reason4 ,if ,i were asked what the distinction is between it and ,verstand1 1 intellectus1 entendement1 understanding2 ,i should reply thus3 ,the latter is that capacity for knowledge which animals also possess in varying degrees1 and which is seen in us at its highest development2 in other words1 it is the direct consciousness of the law of ,causality--a consciousness which precedes all experience1 being constituted by the very form of the understanding1 whose essential nature is1 in fact1 therein contained4 ,on it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of the external world2 for the senses by themselves are only capable of impression1 a thing which is very far from being intuitive perception2 indeed1 the former is nothing but the material of the latter3 1 1 ' 4 7,the mind sees1 the mind hears2 everything else is deaf and blind47 ,intuitive perception is the result of our directly referring the impressions of the sense-organs to their cause1 which1 exactly because of this act of the intelligence1 presents itself as an external object under the mode of intuition proper to us1 i4e41 in space4 ,this is a proof that the ,law of ,causality is known to us a priori1 and does not arise from experience1 since experience itself1 inasmuch as it presupposes intuitive perception1 is only possible through the same law4 ,all the higher qualities of the intellect1 all cleverness1 sagacity1 penetration1 acumen are directly proportional to the exactness and fulness with which the workings of ,causality in all its relations are grasped2 for all knowledge of the connection of things1 in the widest sense of the word1 is based on the comprehension of this law1 and the clearness and accuracy with which it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another in understanding1 shrewdness1 cunning4 ,on the other hand1 the epithet reasonable has at all times been applied to the man who does not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions1 but by thoughts and conceptions1 and who therefore always sets to work logically after due reflection and forethought4 ,conduct of this sort is everywhere known as reasonable4 ,not that this by any means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows4 ,on the contrary1 it is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way1 that is1 according to conclusions scientifically deduced1 and weighed with the nicest exactitude2 and yet to follow the most selfish1 unjust1 and even iniquitons maxims4 ,so that never before ,kant did it occur to any one to identify just1 virtuous1 and noble conduct with reasonable2 the two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated1 and kept apart4 ,the one depends on the kind of motivation2 the other on the difference in fundamental principles4 ,only after ,kant 7because he taught that virtue has its source in ,pure ,reason7 did the virtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing1 despite the usage of these words which all languages have adopted--a usage which is not fortuitous1 but the work of universal1 and therefore uniform1 human judgment4 ,reasonable and vicious are terms that go very well together2 indeed great1 far-reaching crimes are only possible from their union4 ,similarly1 unreasonable and noble-minded are often found associated2 e4g41 if ,i give to-day to the needy man what ,i shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he2 or1 if ,i am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum which my creditor is waiting for2 and such cases could be multiplied indefinitely4 ,we have seen that this exaltation of ,reason to be the source of all virtue rests on two assertions4 ,first1 as ,practical ,reason1 it is said to issue1 like an oracle1 peremptory ,imperatives purely a priori4 ,secondly1 taken in connection with the false explanation of ,theoretical ,reason1 as given in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned with the ,unconditioned1 as manifested in three alleged ,ideas#ag 7the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises a priori74 ,and we found that this position1 as an exemplar vitiis imitabile1#ah led our muddy-headed philosophers1 ,jacobi at their head1 from bad to worse4 ,they talked of ,reason 7,vernunft7 as directly comprehending 7vernehmend7 the ,supersensuous1 and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has to do essentially with things transcending all experience1 i4e41 with metaphysics2 and that it perceives directly and intuitively the ultimate causes of all things1 and of all ,being1 the ,supersensuous1 the ,absolute1 the ,divine1 etc4 ,now1 had it been wished to use ,reason1 instead of deifying it1 such assertions as these must long ago have been met by the simple remark that1 if man1 by virtue of a special organ1 furnished by his ,reason1 for solving the riddle of the world1 possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development2 in that case there would have to be just as complete agreement on metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry2 and this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the earth a large number of radically different religions1 and a still larger number of radically different systems of philosophy4 ,indeed1 we may rather suppose that1 if any one were found to differ from the rest in his religious or philosophical views1 he would be at once regarded as a subject for mental pathology4 ,nor would the following plain reflection have failed to present itself4 ,if we discovered a species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting1 or building1 or for any other purpose2 we should immediately admit that it was endowed with ,reason4 ,on the other hand1 if we meet with savages destitute of all metaphysics1 or of all religion 7and there are such72 it does not occur to us to deny them ,reason on that account4 ,the ,reason that proves its pretended supersensuous knowledge was duly brought back to bounds by ,kant's critique2 but ,jacobi's wonderful ,reason1 that directly comprehends the supersensuous1 he must indeed have thought beneath all criticism4 ,meanwhile1 a certain imperious and oracular ,reason of the same kind is still1 at the ,universities1 fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth4 ,,note4 ,if we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of ,practical ,reason1 we must trace its descent a little further back4 ,we shall find that it is derived from a doctrine1 which ,kant totally confuted1 but which nevertheless1 in this connection1 lies secretly 7indeed he himself is not aware of it7 at the root of his assumption of a ,practical ,reason with its ,imperatives and its ,autonomy--a reminiscence of a former mode of thought4 ,i mean the so-called ,rational ,psychology1 according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous substances--the material body1 and the immaterial soul4 ,plato was the first to formulate this dogma1 and he endeavoured to prove it as an objective truth4 ,but it was ,descartes who1 by working it out with scientific exactness1 perfectly developed and completed it4 ,and this is just what brought its fallacy to light1 as demonstrated by ,spinoza1 ,locke1 and ,kant successively4 ,it was demonstrated by ,spinoza2 because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his master's twofold dualism1 and because he entirely and expressly denied the two ,substances of ,descartes1 and took as his main principle the following proposition3 ,substantia cogitans et substantia externa una eademque est substantia1 quae jam sub hoc1 jam sub illo attribute comprehenditur4#ai ,it was demonstrated by ,locke2 for he combated the theory of innate ideas1 derived all knowledge from the sensuous1 and taught that it is not impossible that ,matter should think4 ,and lastly1 it was demonstrated by ,kant1 in his ,kritik der ,rationalen ,psychologie1 as given in the first edition4 ,leibnitz and ,wolff were the champions on the bad side2 and this brought ,leibnitz the undeserved honour of being compared to the great ,plato1 who was really so unlike him4 ,but to enter into details here would be out of place4 ,according to this ,rational ,psychology1 the soul was originally and in its essence a perceiving substance1 and only as a consequence thereof did it become possessed of volition4 ,according as it carried on these two modes of its activity1 ,perception and ,volition1 conjoined with the body1 or incorporeal1 and entirely per se1 so it was endowed with a lower or higher faculty of perception1 and of volition in like kind4 ,in its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself1 and without co-operation of the body4 ,in this case it was intellectus purus1 being composed of concepts1 belonging exclusively to itself1 and of the corresponding acts of will1 both of which were absolutely spiritual1 and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being derived from the body4#bj ,so that it perceived nothing else but pure ,abstracts1 ,universals1 innate conceptions1 aeternae veritates1 etc42 wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely spiritual ideas like these4 ,on the other hand1 the soul's lower faculty of ,perception and ,volition was the result of its working in concert and close union with the various organs of the body1 whereby a prejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity4 ,here1 i4e41 to this lower faculty1 was supposed to belong every intuitive perception1 which consequently would have to be obscure and confused1 while the abstract1 formed by separating from objects their qualities1 would be clear6 ,the will1 which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned1 formed the lower ,volition1 and it was for the most part bad2 for its acts were guided by the impulse of the senses2 while the other will 7the higher7 was untrammelled1 was guided by ,pure ,reason1 and appertained only to the immaterial soul4 ,this doctrine of the ,cartesians has been best expounded by ,de la ,forge1 in his ,tractatus de ,mente ,humana1 where in chap4 #bc we read3#ba ,non nisi eadem voluntas est1 quae appellatur appetitus sensitivus1 quando excitatur per judicia1 quae formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum2 et quae appetitus rationalis nominatur1 cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis1 independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis1 quae inclinationum ejus sunt causae4444 ,id1 quod occasionem dedit1 ut duae istae diversae voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur1 est1 quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur1 quia propositum1 quod mens superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus1 non semper consentit cum cogitationibus1 quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur1 per quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum1 dum ratio ejus earn aliud optare facit4 ,out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose ,kant's doctrine of the ,autonomy of the ,will1 which1 as the mouth-piece of ,pure1 ,practical ,reason1 lays down the law for all rational beings as such1 and recognises nothing but formal motives1 as opposed to material2 the latter determining only the lower faculty of desires1 to which the higher is hostile4 ,for the rest1 this whole theory1 which was not really systematically set forth till the time of ,descartes1 is nevertheless to be found as far back as ,aristotle4 ,in his ,de ,anima ,i4 #a1 it is sufficiently clearly stated2 while ,plato in the ,phaedo 7pp4 #ahh and #ahi1 edit4 ,bipont47 had already paved the way1 with no uncertain hints4 ,after being elaborated to great perfection by the ,cartesian doctrine1 we find it a hundred years later waxed bold and strong1 and occupying the foremost place2 but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature4 ,an excellent rsum of the view which then prevailed is presented in ,muratori's ,della ,forza della ,fantasia1 chaps4 #a-d and #ac4 ,in this work the imagination is regarded as a purely material1 corporeal organ of the brain 7the lower faculty of perception71 its function being to intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses2 and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking1 reflecting1 and determining4 ,it must have been felt how obviously this position involves the whole subject in doubt4 ,for if ,matter is capable of the intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity1 it is inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this intuition2 wherefrom everything else would follow4 ,abstraction is of course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to things which are not necessary for general purposes1 in other words1 the individual and special differences4 ,for instance1 if ,i disregard1 or abstract1 that which is peculiar to the sheep1 ox1 stag1 camel1 etc41 ,i reach the conception of ruminants4 ,by this operation the ideas lose their intuitiveness1 and as merely abstract1 non-intuitive notions or concepts1 they require words to fix them in the consciousness1 and allow of their being adequately handled4 ,all this shows that ,kant was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time doctrine1 when he propounded his ,practical ,reason with its ,imperatives4 #a ,these epigrams form the close of ,schiller's poem ,die ,philosophen1 which is worth reading in this connection--7,translator47 #b ,more correctly1 ,huitzilopochtli3 a ,mexican deity4 #c ,or shall1 as in the thou shall1 of the ,decalogue --7,translator47 #d ,des ,pudels ,kern2 ,v4 ,goethe's ,faust1 ,part ,i4 ,studirzimmer4 ,schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the real meaning out of ,kant's language1 just as ,faust by his exorcism compels ,mephistopheles1 who was in the form of a poodle1 to resume his true form4--7,translator47 #e 13 i4e41 the what a thing is2 its principle1 or essence4--7,translator47 #f 3 i4e41 the wherefore of a thing2 its raison d'tre1 its underlying cause4--7,translator47 #g ,schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth in ,plato's ,symposium ,chap4 #bc 7,teubner's edition1 ,leipzig1 #ahge71 where ,eros is represented as the offspring of and 1 who on the birthday of ,aphrodite were united in the garden of ,zeus4--7,translator47 #h ,hugo ,grotius attributes it to the ,emperor ,severus4 #i ,azote,nitrogen4 ,the formula for ,ammonium ,chloride or ,sal-ammoniac is ,,nh#d;,cl4--7,translator74 #aj ,to be found in the fifth number of the ,beitrge zur ,uebersicht der ,philosophie am ,anfange des #ai4 ,jahrhunderts--a journal of the greatest importance for critical philosophy4 #aa ,einen erklecklichen ,,satz1 ja1 und der auch was ,,setzt4 ,,schiller4 #ab ,to argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid--i4e4 the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe conclusion4--7,translator47 #ac ,dacht' ich's doch6 ,wissen sie nichts ,vernnftiges mehr zu erwidern1 ,schieben sie's ,einem geschwind in das ,gewissen hinein4 --,,schiller1 ,die ,philosophen4 ,just as ,i thought6 ,can they give no more any answer of reason1 ,quickly the ground is changed3 ,conscience1 they say1 is at fault4 --7,translator47 #ad ,as from the ,pythian tripod3 i4e41--with official authority1 ex cathedra4 #ae ,v4 ,aristoph41 ,aves1 #hai et alibi4--7,translator47 #af means remarkable1 being never used in the sense of rational4 ,t logikn is perhaps a possible expression2 the right word is 4--7,translator47 #ag ,the three ,ideas are3 7#a7 ,the ,psychological2 7#b7 ,the ,cosmological2 7#c7 ,the ,theological4 ,v4 ,the ,paralogisms of ,pure ,reasons1 in the ,dialectics3 ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 ,part ,i4--7,translator47 #ah ,an example easy to be imitated in its faults4 ,v4 ,horace1 ,ep4 ,lib4 ,i41 xix4 #ag4--7,translator47 #ai ,the thinking substance1 and substance in extension are one and the self-same substance1 which is contained now under the latter attribute 7i4e41 extension71 now under the former 7i4e41 the attribute of thinking74--,ethica1 ,part ,,ii41 ,prop4 #g4 ,corollary4 #bj ,intellectio pura est intellectio1 quae circa nullas imagines corporeas versatur4 7,pure intelligence is intelligence that has nothing to do with any bodily forms47--,cart41 ,medit41 p4 #ahh4 #ba ,it is nothing but one and the same will1 which at one time is called sensuous desire1 when it is stimulated by acts of judgment1 formed in consequence of perceptions of the senses2 and which at another time is called rational desire 7i4e4 desire of the reason71 when the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper ideas1 independently of the thoughts belonging to1 and mixed up with1 the senses2 which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies4444 ,that these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the one is opposed to the other1 because the intention1 which is built up by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions1 does not always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by the body's disposition2 whereby it 7the mind7 is often constrained to will something1 while its reason makes it choose something different4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,on ,,the ,,leading ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics4 ,after having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of ,kant's ,ethics1 ,i now turn to that which rests on it--his leading principle of ,morals4 ,the latter is very closely connected with the former2 indeed1 in a certain sense1 they both grew up together4 ,we have seen that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows3 ,act only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a general law for all rational beings4 ,it is a strange proceeding for a man1 who ex hypothesi is seeking a law to determine what he should do1 and what he should leave undone1 to be instructed first to search for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings2 but we will pass over that4 ,it is sufficient only to notice the fact that in the above guiding rule1 as put forth by ,kant1 we have obviously not reached the moral law itself1 but only a finger-post1 or indication where it is to be looked for4 ,the money1 so to say1 is not yet paid down1 but we hold a safe draft for it4 ,and who1 then1 is the cashier8 ,to say the truth at once3 a paymaster in this connection surely very unexpected1 being neither more nor less than ,egoism1 as ,i shall now demonstrate4 ,the precept1 it is said1 which ,i can wish were the guide of all men's conduct1 is itself the real moral principle4 ,that which ,i can wish is the hinge on which the given direction turns4 ,but what can ,i truly wish1 and what not8 ,clearly1 in order to determine what ,i can wish in the matter under discussion1 ,i require yet another criterion2 for without such ,i could never find the key to the instruction which comes to me like a sealed order4 ,where1 then1 is this criterion to be discovered8 ,certainly nowhere else but in my ,egoism1 which is the nearest1 ever ready1 original1 and living standard of all volition1 and which has at any rate the jus primi occupantis before every moral principle4 ,the direction for finding the real moral law1 which is contained in the ,kantian rule1 rests1 as a matter of fact1 on the tacit assumption that ,i can only wish for that which is most to my advantage4 ,now because1 in framing a precept to be generally followed1 ,i cannot regard myself as always active1 but must contemplate my playing a passive part eventualiter and at times2 therefore from this point of view my egoism decides for justice and loving-kindness2 not from any wish to practise these virtues1 but because it desires to experience them4 ,we are reminded of the miser1 who1 after listening to a sermon on beneficence1 exclaims3 ,wie grndlich ausgefhrt1 wie schn6-- ,fast mcht' ich betteln gehn4 7,how well thought out1 how excellent6-- ,almost ,i'd like to beg47 ,this is the indispensable key to the direction in which ,kant's leading principle of ,ethics is embedded2 nor can he help supplying it himself4 ,only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding his precept1 lest we should feel shocked4 ,it is found further on in the text1 at a decent distance1 so as to prevent the fact at once leaping to light1 that here1 after all1 in spite of his grand a priori edifice1 ,egoism is sitting on the judge's seat1 scales in hand4 ,moreover1 it does not occur1 till after he has decided1 from the point of view of the eventualiter passive side1 that this position holds good for the active rle as well4 ,thus1 on p4 #ai 7,r41 p4 #bd7 we read3 ,that ,i could not wish for a general law to establish lying1 because people would no longer believe me1 or else pay me back in the same coin4 ,again on p4 #ee 7,r41 p4 #di73 ,the universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what he likes1 without any intention of keeping his word1 would make the promise itself1 together with the object in view1 whatever that might be1 impossible2 for no one would believe it4 ,on p4 #ef 7,r41 p4 #ej71 in connection with the maxim of hard-heartedness1 we find the following3 ,a will1 which should determine this1 would contradict itself2 for cases can occur1 in which a man needs the love and sympathy of others1 and in which he1 by virtue of such a natural law1 evolved from his own will1 would deprive himself of all hope of the help1 which he desires4 ,similarly in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft 7,part ,i41 vol4 i41 chap4 #b1 p4 #abc2 ,r41 p4 #aib73 ,if every one were to regard others' distress with total indifference1 and you were to belong to such an order of things2 would you be there with the concurrence of your will8 ,quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam6#a one could reply4 ,these passages sufficiently show in what sense the phrase1 to be able to wish1 in ,kant's formula is to be understood4 ,but it is in the ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,tugendlehre1 that this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated4 ,in #cj we read3 ,for every one wishes to be helped4 ,if1 however1 a man were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others1 all people would be justified in refusing him assistance4 ,thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself4 ,would be justified1 he says1 would be justified6 ,here1 then1 it is declared1 as explicitly as anything can be1 that moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed reciprocity2 consequently it is utterly selfish1 and only admits of being interpreted by egoism1 which1 under the condition of reciprocity1 knows how to make a compromise cleverly enough4 ,such a course would be quite in place if it were a question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation1 but not1 when we come to construct those of ethics4 ,in the ,grundlegung1 p4 #ha 7,r41 p4 #fg71 the following sentence occurs3 ,the principle of always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish were universally established as law--this is the only condition under which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself4 ,from what has been said above1 it will be apparent that the true meaning of the word antagonism may be thus explained3 if a man should sanction the precept of injustice and hard-heartedness1 he would subsequently1 in the event of his playing a passive part1 recall it1 and so his will would contradict itself4 ,from this analysis it is abundantly clear that ,kant's famous leading principle is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a categorical1 but in reality a hypothetical ,imperative2 because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be established for what ,i do--inasmuch as ,i make it universal--shall also be a law for what is done to me2 and because ,i1 under this condition1 as the eventualiter non-active party1 cannot possibly wish for injustice and hard-heartedness4 ,but if ,i strike out this proviso1 and1 trusting perhaps to my surpassing strength of mind and body1 think of myself as always active1 and never passive2 then1 in choosing the precept which is to be universally valid1 if there exists no basis for ethics other than ,kant's1 ,i can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness should be the general rule1 and consequently order the world ,upon the simple plan1 ,that they should take1 who have the power1 ,and they should keep1 who can4 --7,,wordsworth47 ,in the foregoing chapter we showed that the ,kantian leading principle of ,ethics is devoid of all real foundation4 ,it is now clear that to this singular defect must be added1 notwithstanding ,kant's express assertion to the contrary1 its concealed hypothetical nature1 whereby its basis turns out to be nothing else than ,egoism1 the latter being the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains4 ,furthermore1 regarding it solely as a formula1 we find that it is only a periphrasis1 an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known rule3 ,quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris 7do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself72 if1 that is1 by omitting the non and ne1 we remove the limitation1 and include the duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law4 ,for it is obvious that this is the only precept which ,i can wish should regulate the conduct of all men 7speaking1 of course1 from the point of view of the possibly passive part ,i may play1 where my ,egoism is touched74 ,this rule1 ,quod tibi fieri1 etc41 is1 however1 in its turn1 merely a circumlocution for1 or1 if it be preferred1 a premise of1 the proposition which ,i have laid down as the simplest and purest definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical systems2 namely1 ,neminem laede1 immo omnes1 quantum potes1 juva 7do harm to no one2 but rather help all people1 as far as lies in your power74 ,the true and real substance of ,morals is this1 and never can be anything else4 ,but on what is it based8 ,what is it that lends force to this command8 ,this is the old and difficult problem with which man is still to-day confronted4 ,for1 on the other side1 we hear ,egoism crying with a loud voice3 ,neminem juva1 immo omnes1 si forte conducit1 laede 7help nobody1 but rather injure all people1 if it brings you any advantage72 nay more1 ,malice gives us the variant3 ,immo omnes1 quantum potes1 laede 7but rather injure all people as far as you can74 ,to bring into the lists a combatant equal1 or rather superior to ,egoism and ,malice combined--this is the task of all ,ethics4 ,heic ,rhodus1 heic salta6#b ,the division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised1 and no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself4 ,we have4 7#a7 the duties ordained by law 7otherwise called the--perfect1 obligatory1 narrower duties71 and 7#b7 those prescribed by virtue 7otherwise called imperfect1 wider1 meritorious1 or1 preferably1 the duties taught by love74 ,on p4 #eg 7,r41 p4 #fj7 we find ,kant desiring to give a further confirmation to the moral principle1 which he propounded1 by undertaking to derive this classification from it4 ,but the attempt turns out to be so forced1 and so obviously bad1 that it only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his position4 ,for1 according to him1 the duties laid down by statutes rest on a precept1 the contrary of which1 taken as a general natural law1 is declared to be quite unthinkable without contradiction2 while the duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim1 the opposite of which can 7he says7 be conceived as a general natural law1 but cannot possibly be wished for4 ,i beg the reader to reflect that the rule of injustice1 the reign of might instead of right1 which in the ,kantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law1 is in reality1 and in point of fact1 the dominant order of things not only in the animal kingdom1 but among men as well4 ,it is true that an attempt has been made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by means of all the machinery of state government2 but as soon as this1 wherever1 or of whatever kind1 it be1 is suspended or eluded1 the natural law immediately resumes its sway4 ,indeed between nation and nation it never ceases to prevail2 the customary jargon about justice is well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style2 the real arbiter is brute force4 ,on the other hand1 genuine1 i4e41 voluntary1 acts of justice1 do occur beyond all doubt1 but always only as exceptions to the rule4 ,furthermore3 wishing to give instances by way of introducing the above-mentioned classification1 ,kant establishes the duties prescribed by law first 7p4 #ec2 ,r41 p4 #dh7 through the so-called duty towards oneself1--the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily1 if the pain outweigh the pleasure4 ,accordingly1 the rule of suicide is held to be not even thinkable as a general natural law4 ,i1 on the contrary1 maintain that1 since here there can be no intervention of state control1 it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an actually existing1 unchecked natural law4 ,for it is absolutely certain 7as daily experience attests7 that men in the vast majority of cases turn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate instinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great suffering4 ,to suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have a deferring effect1 after the fear of death1 which is so strong and so closely bound up with the nature of every living thing1 has shown itself powerless2 in other words1 to suppose that there is a thought still mightier than this fear--is a daring assumption1 all the more so1 when we see1 that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the moralists are not yet able to determine it with precision4 ,in any case1 it is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward by ,kant in this connection 7p4 #ec3 ,r41 p4 #dh1 and p4 #fg2 ,r41 p4 #eg7 have never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment4 ,thus a natural law1 which incontestably exists1 and is operative every day1 is declared by ,kant to be simply unthinkable without contradiction1 and all for the sake of making his ,moral ,principle the basis of the classification of duties6 ,at this point it is1 ,i confess1 not without satisfaction that ,i look forward to the groundwork which ,i shall give to ,ethics in the sequel4 ,from it the division of ,duty into what is prescribed by law1 and what is taught by love1 or1 better1 into justice and loving-kindness1 results quite naturally though a principle of separation which arises from the nature of the subject1 and which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation2 so that the foundation of ,morals1 which ,i shall present1 has in fact ready to hand that confirmation1 to which ,kant1 with a view to support his own position1 lays a completely groundless claim4 #a ,how rashly do we sanction an unjust law1 which will come home to ourselves6--7,hor41 ,sat41 ,lib4 ,i41 iii4 #fg47 #b ,here is ,rhodes1 here make your leap6 ,i4e41 ,here is the place of trial1 here let us see what you can do6 ,this ,latin proverb is derived from one of ,aesop's fables4 ,a braggart boasts of having once accomplished a wonderful jump in ,rhodes1 and appeals to the evidence of the eye-witnesses4 ,the bystanders then exclaim3 ,friend1 if this be true1 you have no need of witnesses2 for this is ,rhodes1 and your leap you can make here4 ,the words are3 '1 1 t 1 o t ',r 4 ,v4 ,fabulae ,aesopicae ,collectae4 ,edit4 ,halm1 ,leipzig3 ,teubner4 #ahge4 ,nr4 #bjc;b1 p4 #ajb4 ,the other version of the fable 7,nr4 #bjc1 p4 #aja7 gives3 otos1 e lths o stin1 odn de soi martyrn do 1 do ka 4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,on ,,the ,,derived ,,forms ,,of ,,the ,,leading ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,ethics4 ,it is well known that ,kant put the leading principle of his ,ethics into another quite different shape1 in which it is expressed directly2 the first being indirect1 indeed nothing more than an indication as to how the principle is to be sought for4 ,beginning at p4 #fc 7,r41 p4 #ee71 he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very strange1 ambiguous1 not to say distorted1#a definitions of the conceptions ,end and ,means1 which may be much more simply and correctly denoted thus3 an ,end is the direct motive of an act of the ,will1 a ,means the indirect3 simplex sigillum veri 7simplicity is the seal of truth74 ,kant1 however1 slips through his wonderful enunciations to the statement3 ,man1 indeed every rational being1 exists as an end in himself4 ,on this ,i must remark that to exist as an end in oneself is an unthinkable expression1 a contradictio in adjecto4#b ,to be an end means to be an object of volition4 ,every end can only exist in relation to a will1 whose end1 i4e41 7as above stated71 whose direct motive it is4 ,only thus can the idea1 end have any sense1 which is lost as soon as such connection is broken4 ,but this relation1 which is essential to the thing1 necessarily excludes every in itself4 ,end in oneself is exactly like saying3 ,friend in oneself2--enemy in oneself2--uncle in oneself2--north or east in itself2--above or below in itself2 and so on4 ,at bottom the end in itself is in the same case as the absolute ought2 the same thought--the theological--secretly1 indeed1 unconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition4 ,nor is the absolute worth1 which is supposed to be attached to this alleged1 though unthinkable1 end in itself1 at all better circumstanced4 ,it also must be characterised1 without pity1 as a contradictio in adjecto4 ,every worth is a valuation by comparison1 and its bearing is necessarily twofold4 ,first1 it is relative1 since it exists for some one2 and secondly1 it is comparative1 as being compared with something else1 and estimated accordingly4 ,severed from these two conditions1 the conception1 worth1 loses all sense and meaning1 and so obviously1 that further demonstration is needless4 ,but more3 just as the phrases end in itself and absolute worth outrage logic1 so true morality is outraged by the statement on p4 #fe 7,r41 p4 #ef71 that irrational beings 7that is1 animals7 are things1 and should therefore be treated simply as means1 which are not at the same time ends4 ,in harmony with this1 it is expressly declared in the ,metaphysische ,anfanggrnde der ,tugendlehre1 #af3 ,a man can have no duties towards any being1 except towards his fellow-men2 and then1 #ag1 we read3 ,to treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man towards himself2 because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for them in their sufferings1 and thus weakens a natural tendency which is very serviceable to morality in relation to other men4 ,so one is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice1 and they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train one's sympathy with men6 ,in common with the whole of ,asia that is not tainted by ,islm 7which is tantamount to ,judaism71 ,i regard such tenets as odious and revolting4 ,here1 once again1 we see withal how entirely this philosophical morality1 which is1 as explained above1 only a theological one in disguise1 depends in reality on the biblical ,ethics4 ,thus1 because ,christian morals leave animals out of consideration 7of which more later on72 therefore in philosophical morals they are of course at once outlawed2 they are merely things1 simply means to ends of any sort2 and so they are good for vivisection1 for deer-stalking1 bull-fights1 horse-races1 etc41 and they may be whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts4 ,shame on such a morality which is worthy of ,pariahs1 ,chandalas and ,mlechchas#c2 which fails to recognise the ,eternal ,reality immanent in everything that has life1 and shining forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that see the sun6 ,this is a morality which knows and values only the precious species that gave it birth2 whose characteristic--reason--it makes the condition under which a being may be an object of moral regard4 ,by this rough path1 then1--indeed1 per fas et nefas 7by fair means and by foul71 ,kant reaches the second form in which he expresses the fundamental principle of his ,ethics3 ,act in such a way that you at all times treat mankind1 as much in your own person1 as in the person of every one else1 not only as a ,means1 but also as an ,end4 ,such a statement is a very artificial and roundabout way of saying3 ,do not consider yourself alone1 but others also2 this in turn is a paraphrase for3 ,quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris 7do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself72 and the latter1 as ,i have said1 contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion1 which is the true and final goal of all morals and of all moralising2 ,neminem laede1 immo omnes1 quantum potes juva 7do harm to no one2 but rather help all people as far as lies in your power74 ,like all beautiful things1 this proposition looks best unveiled4 ,be it only observed that the alleged duties towards oneself are dragged into this second ,kantian edict intentionally and not without difficulty4 ,some place of course had to be found for them4#d ,another objection that could be raised against the formula is that the malefactor condemned to be executed is treated merely as an instrument1 and not as an end1 and this with perfectly good reason2 for he is the indispensable means of upholding the terror of the law by its fulfilment1 and of thus accomplishing the law's end--the repression of crime4 ,but if this second definition helps nothing towards laying a foundation for ,ethics1 if it cannot even pass muster as its leading principle1 that is1 as an adequate and direct summary of ethical precepts2 it has nevertheless the merit of containing a fine aperu of moral psychology1 for it marks egoism by an exceedingly characteristic token1 which is quite worth while being here more closely considered4 ,this egoism1 then1 of which each of us is full1 and to conceal which1 as our partie honteuse1 we have invented politeness1 is perpetually peering through every veil cast over it1 and may especially be detected in the fact that our dealings with all those1 who come across our path1 are directed by the one object of trying to find1 before everything else1 and as if by instinct1 a possible means to any of the numerous ends with which we are always engrossed4 ,when we make a new acquaintance1 our first thought1 as a rule1 is whether the man can be useful to us in some way4 ,if he can do nothing for our benefit1 then as soon as we are convinced of this1 he himself generally becomes nothing to us4 ,to seek in all other people a possible means to our ends1 in other words1 to make them our instruments1 is almost part of the very nature of human eyes2 and whether the instrument will have to suffer more or less in the using1 is a thought which comes much later1 sometimes not at all4 ,that we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown in many ways2 e4g41 by the fact that1 when we ask any one for information or advice1 we lose all confidence in his words directly we discover that he may have some interest in the matter1 however small or remote4 ,for then we immediately take for granted that he will make us a means to his ends1 and hence give his advice not in accordance with his discernment1 but with his desire1 and this1 no matter how exact the former may be1 or how little the latter seem involved2 since we know only too well that a cubic inch of desire weighs much more than a cubic yard of discernment4 ,conversely1 when we ask in such cases3 ,what ought ,i to do8 as a rule1 nothing else will occur to our counsellor1 but how we should shape our action to suit his own ends2 and to this effect he will give his reply immediately1 and as it were mechanically1 without so much as bestowing a thought on our ends2 because it is his ,will that directly dictates the answer1 or ever the question can come before the bar of his real judgment4 ,hence he tries to mould our conduct to his own benefit1 without even being conscious of it1 and while he supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance of his discernment1 in reality he is nothing but the mouth-piece of his own desire2 indeed1 such self-deception may lead him so far as to utter lies1 without being aware of it4 ,so greatly does the influence of the ,will preponderate that of the ,intelligence4 ,consequently1 it is not the testimony of our own consciousness1 but rather1 for the most part1 that of our interest1 which avails to determine whether our language be in accordance with what we discern1 or what we desire4 ,to take another case4 ,let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies and in danger of life1 meets a pedlar and inquires for some by-way of escape2 it may happen that the latter will answer him by the question3 ,do you need any of my wares8 ,it is not of course meant that matters are always like this4 ,on the contrary1 many a man is found to show a direct and real participation in another's weal and woe1 or 7in ,kant's language7 to regard him as an end and not as a means4 ,how far it seems natural1 or the reverse1 to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the way as an end1 instead of 7as usual7 a means1--this is the criterion of the great ethical difference existing between character and character2 and that on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in the last resort will be the true basis of ,ethics1 and will form the subject of the third part of this ,essay4 ,thus1 in his second formula1 ,kant distinguishes ,egoism and its opposite by a very characteristic trait2 and this point of merit ,i have all the more gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated1 because in other respects there is little in the groundwork of his ,ethics that ,i can admit4 ,the third and last form in which ,kant put forward his ,moral ,principle is the ,autonomy of the ,will3 ,the ,will of every rational being is universally legislative for all rational beings4 ,this of course follows from the first form4 ,as a consequence of the third1 however1 we are asked to believe 7see p4 #ga2 ,r41 p4 #fj7 that the specific characteristic of the ,categorical ,imperative lies in the renunciation of all interest by the ,will when acting from a sense of duty4 ,all previous moral principles had thus 7he says7 broken down1 because the latter invariably attributed to human actions at bottom a certain interest1 whether originating in compulsion1 or in pleasurable attraction--an interest which might be one's own1 or another's 7p4 #gc2 ,r41 p4 #fb74 7,another's3 let this be particularly noticed47 ,whereas a universally legislative ,will must prescribe actions which are not based on any interest at all1 but solely on a feeling of duty4 ,i beg the reader to think what this really means4 ,as a matter of fact1 nothing less than volition without motive1 in other words1 effect without cause4 ,interest and ,motive are interchangeable ideas2 what is interest but quod mea interest1 that which is of importance to me8 ,and is not this1 in one word1 whatever stirs and sets in motion my ,will8 ,consequently1 what is an interest other than the working of a motive upon the ,will8 ,therefore where a motive moves the ,will1 there the latter has an interest2 but where the ,will is affected by no motive1 there in truth it can be as little active1 as a stone is able to leave its place without being pushed or pulled4 ,no educated person will require any demonstration of this4 ,it follows that every action1 inasmuch as it necessarily must have a motive1 necessarily also presupposes an interest4 ,kant1 however1 propounds a second entirely new class of actions which are performed without any interest1 i4e41 without motive4 ,and these actions are--all deeds of justice and loving-kindness6 ,it will be seen that this monstrous assumption1 to be refuted1 needed only to be reduced to its real meaning1 which was concealed through the word interest being trifled with4 ,meanwhile ,kant celebrates 7p4 #gd sqq42 ,r41 p4 #fb7 the triumph of his ,autonomy of the ,will by setting up a moral ,utopia called the ,kingdom of ,ends1 which is peopled with nothing but rational beings in abstracto4 ,these1 one and all1 are always willing1 without willing any actual thing 7i4e41 without interest73 the only thing that they will is that they may all perpetually will in accordance with one maxim 7i4e41 ,autonomy74 ,difficile est satiram non scribere#e 7it is difficult to refrain from writing a satire74 ,but there is something else to which ,kant is led by his autonomy of the will2 and it involves more serious consequences than the little innocent ,kingdom of ,ends1 which is perfectly harmless and may be left in peace4 ,i mean the conception of human dignity4 ,now this dignity is made to rest solely on man's autonomy1 and to lie in the fact that the law which he ought to obey is his own work1 his relation to it thus being the same as that of the subjects of a constitutional government to their statutes4 ,as an ornamental finish to the ,kantian system of morals such a theory might after all be passed over4 ,only this expression ,human ,dignity1 once it was uttered by ,kant1 became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists4 ,for behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack1 not to say1 of a real ethical basis1 but of any basis at all which was possessed of an intelligible meaning2 supposing cleverly enough that their readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a dignity that they would be quite satisfied4#f ,let us1 however1 look at this conception a little more carefully1 and submit it to the test of reality4 ,kant 7p4 #gi2 ,r41 p4 #ff7 defines dignity as an unconditioned1 incomparable value4 ,this is an explanation which makes such an effect by its magnificent sound that one does not readily summon up courage to examine it at close quarters2 else we should find that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole1 within which there lurks like a gnawing worm1 the contradictio in adjecto4 ,every value is the estimation of one thing compared with another2 it is thus a conception of comparison1 and consequently relative2 and this relativity is precisely that which forms the essence of the idea4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,book ,,vii41 chap4 #ajf71g this was already correctly taught by the ,stoics4 ,he says3 n 1 1 4#h ,an incomparable1 unconditioned1 absolute value1 such as dignity is declared by ,kant to be1 is thus1 like so much else in ,philosophy1 the statement in words of a thought which is really unthinkable2 just as much as the highest number1 or the greatest space4 ,doch eben wo ,begriffe fehlen1 ,da stellt ein ,,wort zu rechter ,zeit sich ein4 7,but where conceptions fail1 ,just there a ,,word comes in to fill the blank47 ,so it was with this expression1 ,human ,dignity4 ,a most acceptable phrase was brought into currency4 ,thereon every system of ,morals1 that was spun out through all classes of duty1 and all forms of casuistry1 found a broad basis2 from which serene elevation it could comfortably go on preaching4 ,at the end of his exposition 7p4 #abd2 ,e41 p4 #ig71 ,kant says3 ,but how it is that ,pure ,reason without other motives1 that may have their derivation elsewhere1 can by itself be practical2 that is1 how1 without there being any object for the ,will to take an antecedent interest in1 the simple principle of the universal validity of all the precepts of ,pure ,reason1 as laws1 can of itself provide a motive and bring about an interest which may be called purely moral2 or1 in other words1 how it is that ,pure ,reason can be practical2--to explain this problem1 all human reason is inadequate1 and all trouble and work spent on it are vain4 ,now it should be remembered that1 if any one asserts the existence of a thing which cannot even be conceived as possible1 it is incumbent on him to prove that it is an actual reality2 whereas the ,categorical ,imperative of ,practical ,reason is expressly not put forward as a fact of consciousness1 nor otherwise founded on experience4 ,rather are we frequently cautioned not to attempt to explain it by having recourse to empirical anthropology4 7,cf4 e4g41 p4 vi4 of the preface2 ,r41 p4 #e2 and pp4 #ei1 #fj2 ,r41 p4 #eb74 ,moreover1 we are repeatedly 7e4g41 p4 #dh2 ,r41 p4 #dd7 assured that no instance can show1 and consequently there can be no empirical proof1 that an ,imperative of this sort exists everywhere4 ,and further1 on p4 #di 7,r41 p4 #de71 we read1 that the reality of the ,categorical ,imperative is not a fact of experience4 ,now if we put all this together1 we can hardly avoid the suspicion that ,kant is jesting at his readers' expense4 ,but although this practice may be allowed by the present philosophical public of ,germany1 and seem good in their eyes1 yet in ,kant's time it was not so much in vogue2 and besides1 ,ethics1 then1 as always1 was precisely the subject that least of all could lend itself to jokes4 ,hence we must continue to hold the conviction that what can neither be conceived as possible1 nor proved as actual1 is destitute of all credentials to attest its existence4 ,and if1 by a strong effort of the imagination1 we try to picture to ourselves a man1 possessed1 as it were1 by a daemon1 in the form of an absolute ,ought1 that speaks only in ,categorical ,imperatives1 and1 confronting his wishes and inclinations1 claims to be the perpetual controller of his actions2 in this figure we see no true portrait of human nature1 or of our inner life2 what we do discern is an artificial substitute for theological ,morals1 to which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one4 ,our conclusion1 therefore1 is1 that the ,kantian ,ethics1 like all anterior systems1 is devoid of any sure foundation4 ,as ,i showed at the outset1 in my examination of its imperative ,form1 the structure is at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological ,morals1 cloaked in very abstract formulae of an apparently a priori origin4 ,that this disguise was most artificial and unrecognisable is the more certain1 from the fact that ,kant1 in all good faith1 was actually himself deceived by it1 and really believed that he could establish1 independently of all theology1 and on the basis of pure intelligence a priori1 those conceptions of the ,law and of the hests of ,duty1 which obviously have no meaning except in theological ,ethics2 whereas ,i have sufficiently proved that with him they are destitute of all real foundation1 and float loosely in mid air4 ,however1 the mask at length falls away in his own workshop1 and theological ,ethics stands forth unveiled1 as witness his doctrine of the ,highest ,good1 the ,postulates of ,practical ,reason2 and lastly1 his ,moral ,theology4 ,but this revelation freed neither ,kant nor the public from their illusion as to the real state of things2 on the contrary1 both he and they rejoiced to see all those precepts1 which hitherto had been sanctioned by ,faith1 now ratified and established by ,ethics 7although only idealiter1 and for practical purposes74 ,the truth is that they1 in all sincerity1 put the effect for the cause1 and the cause for the effect1 inasmuch as they failed to perceive that at the root of this system of ,morals there lay1 as absolutely necessary assumptions1 however tacit and concealed1 all the alleged consequences that had been drawn from it4 ,at the end of this severe investigation1 which must also have been tiring to my readers1 perhaps ,i may be allowed1 by way of diversion1 to make a jesting1 indeed frivolous comparison4 ,i would liken ,kant1 in his self-mystification1 to a man who at a ball has been flirting the whole evening with a masked beauty1 in hopes of making a conquest2 till at last1 throwing off her disguise1 she reveals herself--as his wife4 #a ,to keep the play of words in geschrobene1 verschrobene1 we may perhaps render them3 twisted 444 mistwisted4--7,translator47 #b ,a contradiction in that which is added4 ,a term applied to two ideas which cannot be brought into a thinkable relationship4--7,translator47 #c ,a ,chala 7or ala7 means one who is born of a ,brahman woman by a dra husband1 such a union being an abomination4 ,hence it is a term applied to a low common person4 ,mlechcha 7or ,mleha7 means a foreigner2 one who does not speak ,sanskit1 and is not subject to ,hindu institutions4 ,the transition from a a barbarian to a bad or wicked man1 is easy4--7,translator47 #d ,these so-called duties have been discussed in ,chapter ,,iii4 of this ,part4 #e ,juvenal1 ,sat4 ,i4 #cj4 #f ,it appears that ,g4 ,w4 ,block in his ,neue ,grundlegung der ,philosophie der ,sitten1 #ahjb1 was the first to make ,human ,dignity expressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of ,ethics1 which he then built up entirely on it4 #g ,v4 ,diogenes ,laertius1 de ,clarorum ,philosophorum ,vitis1 etc41 edit4 ,o4 ,gabr4 ,cobet4 ,paris2 ,didot1 #ahfb4 ,in this edition the passage quoted is in chap4 #aje ad fin411 p4 #ahb4--7,translator47 #h ,they teach that worth is the equivalent value of a thing which has been tested1 whatever an expert may fix that value to be2 as1 for instance1 to take wheat in exchange for barley and a mule4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,of ,,conscience4 ,the alleged ,practical ,reason with its ,categorical ,imperative1 is manifestly very closely connected with ,conscience1 although essentially different from it in two respects4 ,in the first place1 the ,categorical ,imperative1 as commanding1 necessarily speaks before the act1 whereas ,conscience does not till afterwards4 ,before the act ,conscience can at best only speak indirectly1 that is1 by means of reflection1 which holds up to it the recollection of previous cases1 in which similar acts after they were committed received its disapproval4 ,it is on this that the etymology of the word ,gewissen 7,conscience7 appears to me to rest1 because only what has already taken place is gewiss#a 7certain74 ,undoubtedly1 through external inducement and kindled emotion1 or by reason of the internal discord of bad humour1 impure1 base thoughts1 and evil desires rise up in all people1 even in the best4 ,but for these a man is not morally responsible1 and need not load his conscience with them2 since they only show what the genus homo1 not what the individual1 who thinks them1 would be capable of doing4 ,other motives1 if not simultaneously1 yet almost immediately1 come into his consciousness1 and confronting the unworthy inclinations prevent them from ever being crystallised into deeds2 thus causing them to resemble the out-voted minority of an acting committee4 ,by deeds alone each person gains an empirical knowledge no less of himself than of others1 just as it is deeds alone that burden the conscience4 ,for1 unlike thoughts1 these are not problematic2 on the contrary1 they are certain 7gewiss71 they are unchangeable1 and are not only thought1 but known 7gewusst74 ,the ,latin conscientia1#b and the ,greek #c have the same sense4 ,conscience is thus the knowledge that a man has about what he has done4 ,the second point of difference between the alleged ,categorical ,imperative and ,conscience is1 that the latter always draws its material from experience2 which the former cannot do1 since it is purely a priori4 ,nevertheless1 we may reasonably suppose that ,kant's ,doctrine of ,conscience will throw some light on this new conception of an absolute ,ought which he introduced4 ,his theory is most completely set forth in the ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde zur ,tugendlehre1 #ac1 and in the following criticism ,i shall assume that the few pages which contain it are lying before the reader4 ,the ,kantian interpretation of ,conscience makes an exceedingly imposing effect1 before which one used to stand with reverential awe1 and all the less confidence was felt in demurring to it1 because there lay heavy on the mind the ever-present fear of having theoretical objections construed as practical1 and1 if the correctness of ,kant's view were denied1 of being regarded as devoid of conscience4 ,i1 however1 cannot be led astray in this manner1 since the question here is of theory1 not of practice2 and ,i am not concerned with the preaching of ,morals1 but with the exact investigation of the ultimate ethical basis4 ,we notice at once that ,kant employs exclusively ,latin legal terminology1 which1 however1 would seem little adapted to reflect the most secret stirrings of the human heart4 ,yet this language1 this judicial way of treating the subject1 he retains from first to last1 as though it were essential and proper to the matter4 ,and so we find brought upon the stage of our inner self a complete ,court of justice1 with indictment1 judge1 plaintiff1 defendant1 and sentence2--nothing is wanting4 ,now if this tribunal1 as portrayed by ,kant1 really existed in our breasts1 it would be astonishing if a single person could be found to be1 ,i do not say1 so bad1 but so stupid1 as to act against his conscience4 ,for such a supernatural assize1 of an entirely special kind1 set up in our consciousness1 such a secret court--like another ,fehmgericht#d--;held in the dark recesses of our inmost being1 would inspire everybody with a terror and fear of the gods strong enough to really keep him from grasping at short transient advantages1 in face of the dreadful threats of superhuman powers1 speaking in tones so near and so clear4 ,in real life1 on the contrary1 we find1 that the efficiency of conscience is generally considered such a vanishing quantity that all peoples have bethought themselves of helping it out by means of positive religion1 or even of entirely replacing it by the latter4 ,moreover1 if ,conscience were indeed of this peculiar nature1 the ,royal ,society could never have thought of the question put for the present ,prize ,essay4 ,but if we look more closely at ,kant's exposition1 we shall find that its imposing effect is mainly produced by the fact that he attributes to the moral verdict passed on ourselves1 as its peculiar and essential characteristic1 a form which in fact is not so at all4 ,this metaphorical bar of judgment is no more applicable to moral self-examination than it is to every other reflection as regards what we have done1 and might have done otherwise1 where no ethical question is involved4 ,for it is not only true that the same procedure of indictment1 defence1 and sentence is occasionally assumed by that obviously spurious and artificial conscience which is based on mere superstition2 as1 for instance1 when a ,hindu reproaches himself with having been the murderer of a cow1 or when a ,jew remembers that he has smoked his pipe at home on the ,sabbath2 but even the self-questioning which springs from no ethical source1 being indeed rather unmoral than moral1 often appears in a shape of this sort1 as the following case may exemplify4 ,suppose ,i1 good-naturedly1 but thoughtlessly1 have made myself surety for a friend1 and suppose there comes with evening the clear perception of the heavy responsibility ,i have taken on myself--a responsibility that may easily involve me in serious trouble1 as the wise old saying1 ' 6#e predicts2 then at once there rise up within me the ,accuser and the ,counsel for the defence1 ready to confront each other4 ,the latter endeavours to palliate my rashness in giving bail so hastily1 by pointing out the stress of circumstance or of obligation1 or1 it may be1 the simple straightforwardness of the transaction2 perhaps he even seeks excuse by commending my kind heart4 ,last of all comes the ,judge who inexorably passes the sentence3 ,a fool's piece of work6 and ,i am overwhelmed with confusion ,so much for this judicial form of which ,kant is so fond2 his other modes of expression are1 for the most part1 open to the same criticism4 ,for instance1 that which he attributes to conscience1 at the beginning of the paragraph1 as its peculiar property1 applies equally to all other scruples of an entirely different sort4 ,he says3 ,it 7conscience7 follows him like his shadow1 try though he may to escape4 ,by pleasures and distractions he may be stupefied and billed to sleep1 but he cannot avoid occasionally waking up and coming to himself2 and then he is immediately aware of the terrible voice1 etc4 ,obviously1 this may be just as well understood1 word for word1 of the secret consciousness of some person of private means1 who feels that his expenses far exceed his income1 and that thus his capital is being affected1 and will gradually melt away4 ,we have seen that ,kant represents the use of legal terms as essential to the subject1 and that he keeps to them from beginning to end2 let it now be noted how he employs the same style for the following finely devised sophism4 ,he says3 ,that a person accused by his conscience should be identified with the judge is an absurd way of portraying a court of justice2 for in that case the accuser would invariably lose4 ,and he adds1 by way of elucidating this statement1 a very ambiguous and obscure note4 ,his conclusion is that1 if we would avoid falling into a contradiction1 we must think of the judge 7in the judicial conscience-drama that is enacted in our breasts7 as different from us1 in fact1 as another person2 nay more1 as one that is an omniscient knower of hearts1 whose hests are obligatory on all1 and who is almighty for every purpose of executive authority4#f ,he thus passes by a perfectly smooth path from conscience to superstition1 making the latter a necessary consequence of the former2 while he is secretly sure that he will be all the more willingly followed because the reader's earliest training will have certainly rendered him familiar with such ideas1 if not have made them his second nature4 ,here1 then1 ,kant finds an easy task1--a thing he ought rather to have despised2 for he should have concerned himself not only with preaching1 but also with practising truthfulness4 ,i entirely reject the above quoted sentence1 and all the conclusions consequent thereon1 and ,i declare it to be nothing but a shuffling trick4 ,it is not true that the accuser must always lose1 when the accused is the same person as the judge2 at least not in the court of judgment in our hearts4 ,in the instance ,i gave of one man going surety for another1 did the accuser lose8 ,or must we in this case also1 if we wish to avoid a contradiction1 really assume a personification after ,kant's fashion1 and be driven to view objectively as another person that voice whose deliverance would have been those terrible words3 ,a fool's piece of work68 ,a sort of ,mercury1 forsooth1 in living flesh8 ,or perhaps a prosopopoeia of the 7cunning7 recommended by ,homer 7,il4 xxiii4 #cac sqq478#g ,but thus we should only be landed1 as before1 on the broad path of superstition1 aye1 and pagan superstition too4 ,it is in this passage that ,kant indicates his ,moral ,theology1 briefly indeed1 yet not without all its vital points4 ,the fact that he takes care1 not to attribute to it any objective validity1 but rather to present it merely as a form subjectively unavoidable1 does not free him from the arbitrariness with which he constructs it1 even though he only claims its necessity for human consciousness4 ,his fabric rests1 as we have seen1 on a tissue of baseless assumptions4 ,so much1 then1 is certain4 ,the entire imagery--that of a judicial drama--whereby ,kant depicts conscience is wholly unessential and in no way peculiar to it2 although he keeps this figure1 as if it were proper to the subject1 right through to the end1 in order finally to deduce certain conclusions from it4 ,as a matter of fact it is a sufficiently common form1 which our thoughts easily take when we consider any circumstance of real life4 ,it is due for the most part to the conflict of opposing motives which usually spring up1 and which are successively weighed and tested by our reflecting reason4 ,and no difference is made whether these motives are moral or egoistic in their nature1 nor whether our deliberations are concerned with some action in the past1 or in the future4 ,now if we strip from ,kant's exposition its dress of legal metaphor1 which is only an optional dramatic appendage1 the surrounding nimbus with all its imposing effect immediately disappears as well1 and there remains nothing but the fact that sometimes1 when we think over our actions1 we are seized with a certain self-dissatisfaction1 which is marked by a special characteristic4 ,it is with our conduct per se that we are discontented1 not with its result1 and this feeling does not1 as in every other case in which we regret the stupidity of our behaviour1 rest on egoistic grounds4 ,for on these occasions the cause of our dissatisfaction is precisely because we have been too egoistic1 because we have taken too much thought for ourselves1 and not enough for our neighbour2 or perhaps even because1 without any resulting advantage1 we have made the misery of others an object in itself4 ,that we may be dissatisfied with ourselves1 and saddened by reason of sufferings which we have inflicted1 not undergone1 is a plain fact and impossible to be denied4 ,the connection of this with the only ethical basis that can stand an adequate test we shall examine further on4 ,but ,kant1 like a clever special pleader1 tried by magnifying and embellishing the original datum to make all that he possibly could of it1 in order to prepare a very broad foundation for his ,ethics and ,moral ,theology4 #a ,both words are1 of course1 derived from wissen scire 4--7,translator47 #b ,cf4 ,horace's conscire sibi1 pallescere culpa3 ,epist4 ,i4 #a1 #fa4 ,to be conscious of having done wrong1 to turn pale at the thought of the crime4 #c consciousness 7of right or wrong done74--7,translator47 #d ,the celebrated ,secret ,tribunal of ,westphalia1 which came into prominence about ,a4,d4 #abbj4 ,in ,a4,d4 #acce the ,archbishop of ,cologne was appointed head of all the ,fehme benches in ,westphalia by the ,emperor ,charles ,,iv4 ,the reader will remember the description of the trial scene in ,scott's ,anne of ,geierstein4 ,perhaps the ,court of ,star ,chamber comes nearest to it in ,english ,history4--7,translator47 #e ,if you give a pledge1 be sure that ,ate 7the goddess of mischief7 is beside you2 i4e41 beware of giving pledges4--,thales ap4 ,plat4 ,charm4 #afe ,a4 #f ,kant leads up to this position with great ingenuity1 by having recourse to the theory of the two characters coexistent in man--the noumenal 7or intelligible7 and the empirical2 the one being in time1 the other1 timeless2 the one1 fast bound by the law of causality1 the other free4--7,translator47 #g ,greek3 ' 1 1 1 444 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible#a ,,and ,,empirical ,,character4 ,,theory ,,of ,,freedom4 ,the attack ,i have made1 in the cause of truth1 on ,kant's system of ,morals1 does not1 like those of my predecessors1 touch the surface only1 but penetrates to its deepest roots4 ,it seems1 therefore1 only just that1 before ,i leave this part of my subject1 ,i should bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he nevertheless rendered to ethical science4 ,i allude to his doctrine of the co-existence of ,freedom and ,necessity4 ,we find it first in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft 7pp4 #ecc-eed of the first1 and pp4 #efa-ehb of the fifth1 edition72 but it is still more clearly expounded in the ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft 7fourth edition1 pp4 #afi-agi2 ,r41 pp4 #bbd-bca74 ,the strict and absolute necessity of the acts of ,will1 determined by motives as they arise1 was first shown by ,hobbes1 then by ,spinoza1 and ,hume1 and also by ,dietrich von ,holbach in his ,systme de la ,nature2 and lastly by ,priestley it was most completely and precisely demonstrated4 ,this point1 indeed1 has been so clearly proved1 and placed beyond all doubt1 that it must be reckoned among the number of perfectly established truths1 and only crass ignorance could continue to speak of a freedom1 of a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae 7a free and indifferent choice7 in the individual acts of men4 ,nor did ,kant1 owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors1 hesitate to consider the ,will as fast bound in the chains of ,necessity1 the matter admitting1 as he thought1 of no further dispute or doubt4 ,this is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from the theoretical standpoint4 ,nevertheless1 it is true that our actions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original initiative1 which makes us recognise them as our own work1 and every one with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author of his conduct1 and morally responsible for it4 ,but since responsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise1 which possibility means freedom in some sort or manner2 therefore in the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also the consciousness of freedom4 ,the key to resolve the contradiction1 that thus arises out of the nature of the case1 was at last found by ,kant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen1 between phaenomena and the ,thing in itself 7das ,ding an sich74 ,this distinction is the very core of his whole philosophy1 and its greatest merit4 ,the individual1 with his immutable1 innate character strictly determined in all his modes of expression by the law of ,causality1 which1 as acting through the medium of the intellect1 is here called by the name of ,motivation1--the individual so constituted is only the phaenomenon 7,erscheinung74 ,the ,thing in itself which underlies this phaenomenon is outside of ,time and ,space1 consequently free from all succession and plurality1 one1 and changeless4 ,its constitution in itself is the intelligible character1 which is equally present in all the acts of the individual1 and stamped on every one of them1 like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals4 ,the empirical character of the phaenomenon--the character which manifests itself in time1 and in succession of acts--is thus determined by the intelligible character2 and consequently1 the individual1 as phaenomenon1 in all his modes of expression1 which are called forth by motives1 must show the invariableness of a natural law4 ,whence it results that all his actions are governed by strict necessity4 ,now it used to be commonly maintained that the character of a man may be transformed by moral admonitions and remonstrances appealing to reason2 but when the distinction between the intelligible and empirical character had once been drawn1 it followed that the unchangeableness1 the inflexible rigidity of the empirical character1 which thinking people had always observed1 was explained and traced to a rational basis1 and consequently accepted as an established fact by ,philosophy4 ,thus the latter was so far harmonised with experience1 and ceased to stand abashed1 before popular wisdom1 which long before had spoken the words of truth in the ,spanish proverb3 ,lo que entra con el capillo1 sale con la mortaja 7that which comes in with the child's cap1 goes out with the winding-sheet72 or3 ,lo que en la leche se mama1 en la mortaja se derrama 7what is imbibed with the milk1 is poured out again in the winding-sheet74 ,this doctrine of the co-existence of ,freedom and ,necessity ,i regard as the greatest of all the achievements of human sagacity4 ,with the ,transcendental ,aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the crown of ,kant's fame1 which will never pass away4 ,in his ,treatise on ,freedom1 ,schelling obviously served up the ,kantian teaching in a paraphrase1 which by reason of its lively colouring and graphic delineation1 is for many people more comprehensible4 ,the work would deserve praise if its author had had the honesty to say that he is drawing on ,kant's wisdom1 not on his own4 ,as it is1 a certain part of the philosophic public still credits him with the entire performance4 ,the theory itself1 and the whole question regarding the nature of ,freedom1 can be better understood if we view them in connection with a general truth1 which ,i think1 is most concisely expressed by a formula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings3 ,operari sequitur esse4#b ,in other words1 everything in the world operates in accordance with what it is1 in accordance with its inherent nature1 in which1 consequently1 all its modes of expression are already contained potentially1 while actually they are manifested when elicited by external causes2 so that external causes are the means whereby the essential constitution of the thing is revealed4 ,and the modes of expression so resulting form the empirical character2 whereas its hidden1 ultimate basis1 which is inaccessible to experience1 is the intelligible character1 that is1 the real nature per se of the particular thing in question4 ,man forms no exception to the rest of nature2 he too has a changeless character1 which1 however1 is strictly individual and different in each case4 ,this character is of course empirical as far as we can grasp it1 and therefore only phaenomenal2 while the intelligible character is whatever may be the real nature in itself of the person4 ,his actions one and all1 being1 as regards their external constitution1 determined by motives1 can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the unchangeable individual character4 ,as a man is1 so he his bound to act4 ,hence for a given person in every single case1 there is absolutely only one way of acting possible3 ,operari sequitur esse#c ,freedom belongs only to the intelligible character1 not to the empirical4 ,the operari 7conduct7 of a given individual is necessarily determined externally by motives1 internally by his character2 therefore everything that he does necessarily takes place4 ,but in his esse 7i4e41 in what he is71 there1 we find ,freedom4 ,he might have been something different2 and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is4 ,all that he does follows from what he is1 as a mere corollary4 ,through ,kant's doctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting ,necessity with esse 7what one is71 and ,freedom with operari 7what one does72 we become aware that this is a misplacement of terms1 and that exactly the inverse arrangement is the true one4 ,hence it is clear that the moral responsibility of a man1 while it1 first of all1 and obviously1 of course1 touches what he does1 yet at bottom touches what he is2 because1 what he is being the original datum1 his conduct1 as motives arise1 could never take any other course than that which it actually does take4 ,but1 however strict be the necessity1 whereby1 in the individual1 acts are elicited by motives1 it yet never occurs to anybody--not even to him who is convinced of this necessity--to exonerate himself on that account1 and cast the blame on the motives2 for he knows well enough that1 objectively considered1 any given circumstance1 and its causes1 perfectly admitted quite a different1 indeed1 a directly opposite course of action2 nay1 that such a course would actually have taken place1 if only he had been a different person4 ,that he is precisely such a one as his conduct proclaims him to be1 and no other--this it is for which he feels himself responsible2 in his esse 7what he is7 lies the vulnerable place1 where the sting of conscience penetrates4 ,for ,conscience is nothing but acquaintance with one's own self--an acquaintance that arises out of one's actual mode of conduct1 and which becomes ever more intimate4 ,so that it is the esse 7what one is7 which in reality is accused by conscience1 while the operari 7what one does7 supplies the incriminating evidence4 ,since we are only conscious of ,freedom through the sense of responsibility2 therefore where the latter lies the former must also be2 in the esse 7in one's being74 ,it is the operari 7what one does7 that is subject to necessity4 ,but we can only get to know ourselves1 as well as others empirically2 we have no a priori knowledge of our character4 ,certainly our natural tendency is to cherish a very high opinion of it1 because the maxim3 ,quisque praesumitur bonus1 donec probetur contrarium 7every one is presumed to be good1 until the contrary is proved71 is perhaps even more true of the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals4 ,,note4 ,he who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought1 though clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with1 will see1 as ,i do1 that this ,kantian doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by ,plato4 ,the difference is1 that with ,kant it is sublimated to an abstract clearness2 with ,plato it is treated mythically1 and connected with metempsychosis1 because1 as he did not perceive the ideality of ,time1 he could only represent it under a temporal form4 ,the identity of the one doctrine with the other becomes exceedingly plain1 if we read the explanation and illustration of the ,platonic myth1 which ,porphyrius has given with such clear exactitude1 that its agreement with the abstract language of ,kant comes out unmistakably4 ,in the second book of his ,eclogues1 chap4 #h1 #cg-dj1d ,stobaeus has preserved for us in extenso that part of one of ,porphyrius' lost writings which specially comments on the myth in question1 as ,plato gives it in the second half of the tenth book of the ,republic4#e ,the whole section is eminently worth reading4 ,as a specimen ,i shall quote the short #ci1 in the hope of inducing any one who cares for these things to study ,stobaeus for himself4 ,it will then immediately become apparent that this ,platonic myth is nothing less than an allegory of the profound truth which ,kant stated in its abstract purity1 as the doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character1 and consequently that the latter had been reached1 in its essentials1 by ,plato thousands of years ago4 ,indeed1 this view seems to go back much further still1 for ,porphyrins is of opinion that ,plato took it from the ,egyptians4 ,certainly we already find the same theory in the ,brahmanical doctrine of metempsychosis1 and it is from this ,indian source that the ,egyptian priests1 in all probability1 derived their wisdom4 #ci is as follows3-- ' 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 7 ' ai 1 74 ,kake eo1 1 4 1 a 1 1 ' ai 1 ' 1 ' 1 4 eo o 1 1 4#f #a ,v4 ,note on intelligible in ,chapter ,i4 of this ,part4--7,translator7 #b ,i4e41 what is done is a consequence of that which is4 #c ,i4e41 his acts are a consequence of what he is4 #d ,v4 ,joannes ,stobaeus4 ,eclogae ,physicae et ,ethicae1 edit4 ,curtius ,wachsmuth et ,otto ,hense2 ,weidmann1 ,berlin1 #ahhd4 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #afc-afh4--7,translator47 #e ,v4 ,plat41 ,rep41 edit4 ,stallbaum1 #fad sqq4 ,it is the oos 4--7translator47 #f ,to sum up4 ,what ,plato meant seems to be this4 ,souls 7he said7 have free power1 before passing into bodies and different modes of being1 to choose this or that form of life1 which they will pass through in a certain kind of existence1 and in a body adapted thereto4 7,for a soul may choose a lion's1 equally with a man's1 mode of being47 ,but this free power of choice is removed simultaneously with entrance into one or other of such forms of life4 ,for when once they have descended into bodies1 and instead of unfettered souls have become the souls of living things1 then they take that measure of free power which belongs in each case to the organism of the living thing4 ,in some forms this power is very intelligent and full of movement1 as in man2 in some it has but little energy1 and is of a simple nature1 as in almost all other creatures4 ,moreover1 this free power depends on the organism in such a way that while its capability of action is caused by itself alone1 its impulses are determined by the desires which have their origin in the organism4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,fichte',s ,,ethics ,,as ,a ,,magnifying ,,glass ,,for ,,the ,,errors ,,of ,,the ,,kantian4 ,just as in ,anatomy and ,zoology1 many things are not so obvious to the pupil in preparations and natural products as in engravings where there is some exaggeration2 so if there is any one who1 after the above criticism1 is still not entirely satisfied as to the worthlessness of the ,kantian foundation of ,ethics1 ,i would recommend him ,fichte's ,system der ,sittenlehre1 as a sure means of freeing him from all doubt4 ,in the old ,german ,marionnettes a fool always accompanied the emperor1 or hero1 so that he might afterwards give in his own way a highly coloured version of what had been said or done ,in like manner behind the great ,kant there stands the author of the ,wissenschaftslehre1#a a true ,wissenschaftsleere#b4 ,in order to secure his own1 and his family's welfare1 ,fichte formed the idea of creating a sensation by means of subtle mystification4 ,it was a very suitable and reasonable plan1 considering the nature of the ,german philosophic public1 and he executed it admirably by outdoing ,kant in every particular4 ,he appeared as the latter's living superlative1 and produced a perfect caricature of his philosophy by magnifying all its salient points4 ,nor did the ,ethics escape similar treatment8 ,in his ,system der ,sittenlehre1 we find the ,categorical ,imperative grown into a ,despotic ,imperative2 while the absolute ,ought1 the law-giving ,reason1 and the ,hest of ,duty have developed into a moral ,fate1 an unfathomable ,necessity1 requiring mankind to act strictly in accordance with certain maxims4 ,to judge 7pp4 #cjh1 #cji7 from the pompous show made1 a great deal must depend on these formulae1 although one never quite discovers what4 ,so much only seems clear4 ,as in bees there is implanted an instinct to build cells and a hive for life in common1 so men 7it is alleged7 are endowed with an impulse leading them to play in common a great1 strictly moral1 world-embracing ,comedy1 their part being merely to figure as puppets--nothing else4 ,but there is this important difference between the bees and men4 ,the hive is really brought to completion2 while instead of a moral ,world-,comedy1 as a matter of fact1 an exceedingly immoral one is enacted4 ,here1 then1 we see the imperative form of the ,kantian ,ethics1 the moral ,law1 and the absolute ,ought pushed further and further till a system of ethical ,fatalism is evolved1 which1 as it is worked out1 lapses at times into the comic4#c ,if in ,kant's doctrine we trace a certain moral pedantry2 with ,fichte this pedantry reaches the absurd1 and furnishes abundant material for satire4 ,let the reader notice1 for example 7pp4 #djg-dji71 how he decides the well-known instance of casuistry1 where of two human lives one must be lost4 ,we find indeed all the errors of ,kant raised to the superlative4 ,thus1 on p4 #aii1 we read3 ,to act in accordance with the dictates of sympathy1 of compassion1 and of loving-kindness is distinctly unmoral2 indeed this line of conduct1 as such1 is contrary to morality4 ,again1 on p4 #djb3 ,the impulse that makes us ready to serve others must never be an inconsiderate good-nature1 but a clearly thought-out purpose2 that1 namely1 of furthering as much as possible the causality of ,reason4 ,however1 between these sallies of ridiculous pedantry1 ,fichte's real philosophic crudeness peeps out clearly enough1 as we might only expect in the case of a man whose teaching left no time for learning4 ,he seriously puts forward the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae 7a free and indifferent choice71 giving as its foundation the most trivial and frivolous reasons4 7,pp4 #afj1 #agc1 #bje1 #bjh1 #bcg1 #bei1 #bfa47 ,there can be no doubt that a motive1 although working through the medium of the intelligence1 is1 nevertheless1 a cause1 and consequently involves the same necessity of effect as all other causes2 the corollary being that all human action is a strictly necessary result4 ,whoever remains unconvinced of this1 is still1 philosophically speaking1 barbarous1 and ignorant of the rudiments of exact knowledge4 ,the perception of the strict necessity governing man's conduct forms the line of demarcation which separates philosophic heads from all others2 arrived at this limit ,fichte clearly showed that he belonged to the others4 ,moreover1 following the footsteps of ,kant 7p4 #cjc71 he proceeds to make various statements which are in direct contradiction to the above mentioned passages2 but this inconsistency1 like many more in his writings1 only proves that he1 being one who was never serious in the search for truth1 possessed no strong convictions to build on2 as indeed for his purpose they were not in the least necessary4 ,nothing is more laughable than the fact that this man has received so much posthumous praise for strictly consequential reasoning2 his pedantic style full of loud declamation about trifling matters being actually mistaken for such4 ,the most complete development of ,fichte's system of moral ,fatalism is found in his last work3 ,die ,wissenschaftslehre in ihrem ,allgemeinen ,umrisse ,dargestellt1 ,berlin1 #ahaj4 ,it has the advantage of being only forty-six pages 7duodecimo7 long1 while it contains his whole philosophy in a nutshell4 ,it is therefore to be recommended to all those who consider their time too precious to be wasted on his larger productions1 which are framed with a length and tediousness worthy of ,christian ,wolff1 and with the intention1 in reality1 of deluding1 not of instructing the reader4 ,in this little treatise we read on p4 #cb3 ,the intuitive perception of a phaenomenal world only came about1 to the end that in such a world the ,ego as the absolute ,ought might be visible to itself4 ,on p4 #cc we actually find3 ,the ought1 7i4e41 the moral necessity17 of the ,ought's visibility2 and on p4 #cf3 ,an ought1 7i4e41 a moral necessity17 of the perception that ,i ought4 ,this1 then1 is what we have come to so soon after ,kant6 ,his imperative ,form1 with its unproved ,ought1 which it secured as a most convenient 7standpoint71 is indeed an exemplar vitiis imitabile6 ,for the rest1 all that ,i have said does not overthrow the service ,fichte rendered4 ,kant's philosophy1 this late masterpiece of human sagacity1 in the very land where it arose1 he obscured1 nay1 supplanted by empty1 bombastic superlatives1 by extravagances1 and by the nonsense which is found1 in his ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 appearing under the disguise of profound penetration4 ,his merit was thus to show the world unmistakably what the capacity of the ,german philosophical public is2 for he made it play the part of a child who is coaxed into giving up a precious gem in exchange for a ,nrnberg toy4 ,the fame he obtained in this fashion still lives on credit2 and still ,fichte is always mentioned in the same breath with ,kant as being another such k 6#d ,indeed his name is often placed above the latter's4#e ,it was1 of course1 ,fichte's example that encouraged his successors in the art of enveloping the ,german people1 in philosophic fog4 ,these were animated by the same spirit1 and crowned with the same prosperity4 ,every one knows their names2 nor is this the place to consider them at length4 ,needless to say1 their different opinions1 down to the minutest details1 are still set forth1 and seriously discussed1 by the ,professors of ,philosophy2 as if one had really to do with philosophers6 ,we must1 then1 thank ,fichte for lucid documents now existing1 which will have to be revised one day before the ,tribunal of posterity1 that ,court of ,appeal from the verdicts of the present1 which--like the ,last ,judgment looked forward to by the ,saints--at almost all periods1 has been left to give to true merit its just award4 #a ,i4e4 ,scientific ,doctrine4 #b ,i4e4 ,scientific ,blank4 ,perhaps we might translate3--,scientific ,instruction and ,scientific ,misinstruction4--7,translator47 #c ,as evidence of the truth of my words1 space prevents me from quoting more than a few passages4 ,p4 #aif3 ,the moral instinct is absolute1 and its requirements are peremptory1 without any object outside itself4 ,p4 #bcb3 ,in consequence of the ,moral ,law1 the empirical ,being in ,time must be an exact copy of the original ,ego4 ,p4 #cjh3 ,the whole man is a vehicle of the ,moral ,law4 ,p4 #cdb3 ,i am only an instrument1 a mere tool of the ,moral ,law1 not in any sense an end4 ,p4 #cdc3 ,the end laid before every one is to be the means of realising ,reason3 this is the ultimate purpose of his existence2 for this alone he has his being1 and if this end should not be attained1 there is not the least occasion for him to live4 ,p4 #cdg3 ,i am an instrument of the ,moral ,law in the phaenomenal world4 ,p4 #cfj3 ,it is an ordinance of the ,moral ,law to nourish one's body1 and study one's health2 this of course should be done in no way1 and for no other purpose1 except to provide an efficient instrument for furthering the end decreed by ,reason1 i4e41 its realisation1--7cf4 p4 #cga47 ,p4 #cgf3 ,every human body is an instrument for furthering the end decreed by ,reason1 i4e41 its realisation2 therefore the greatest possible fitness of each instrument must constitute for me an end3 consequently ,i must take thought for every one4--,this is ,fichte's derivation of loving-kindness6 ,p4 #cgg3 ,i can and dare take thought for myself1 solely because1 and is so far as ,i am1 an instrument of the ,moral ,law4 ,p4 #chh3 ,to defend a hunted man at the risk of one's own life1 is an absolute duty2 whenever the life of another human being is in danger1 you have no right to think of the safety of your own4 ,p4 #dbj3 ,in the province of the ,moral ,law there is no way whatever of regarding my fellow-man except as an instrument of ,reason4 #d ,i4e41 ,hercules and an ape4 ,a ,greek proverb denoting the juxtaposition of the sublime and the ridiculous4 ,v4 ,greg4 ,cypr4 ,m4#c1 #ff2 ,macar4 #d1 #ec2 ,luc4 pisc4 #cg2 and ,schol4 ,bachm4 ,an4 #b1 #ccb4--7,translator47 #e ,my proof for this is a passage from the latest philosophical literature4 ,herr ,feuerbach1 an ,hegelian 7c'est tout dire67 in his book1 ,pierre ,bayle3 ,ein ,beitrag zur ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #ahch1 p4 #hj1 writes as follows3 ,but still more sublime than ,kant's are ,fichte's ideas as expressed in his ,doctrine of ,morals and elsewhere4 ,christianity has nothing in sublimity that could bear comparison with them4 ,,part ,,iii4 ,,the ,,founding ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,conditions ,,of ,,the ,,problem4 ,thus the foundation which ,kant gave to ,ethics1 which for the last sixty years has been regarded as a sure basis1 proves to be an inadmissible assumption1 and merely theological ,morals in disguise2 it sinks therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of philosophic error1 which perhaps will never be filled up4 ,that the previous attempts to lay a foundation are still less satisfactory1 ,i take for granted1 as ,i have already said4 ,they consist1 for the most part1 of unproved assertions1 drawn from the impalpable world of dreams1 and at the same time--like ,kant's system itself--full of an artificial subtlety dealing with the finest distinctions1 and resting on the most abstract conceptions4 ,we find difficult combinations2 rules invented for the purpose2 formulae balanced on a needle's point2 and stilted maxims1 from which it is no longer possible to look down and see life as it really is with all its turmoil4 ,such niceties are doubtless admirably adapted for the lecture-room1 if only with a view to sharpening the wits2 but they can never be the cause of the impulse to act justly and to do good1 which is found in every man2 as also they are powerless to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to injustice and hardness of heart4 ,neither is it possible to fasten the reproaches of conscience upon them2 to attribute the former to the breaking of such hair-splitting precepts only serves to make the same ridiculous4 ,in a word1 artificial associations of ideas like these cannot possibly--if we take the matter seriously--contain the true incentive to justice and loving-kindness4 ,rather must this be something that requires but little reflection1 and still less abstraction and complicated synthesis2 something that1 independent of the training of the understanding14 speaks to every one1 even to the rudest1--a something resting simply on intuitive perception1 and forcing its way home as a direct emanation from the reality of things4 ,so long as ,ethics cannot point to a foundation of this sort1 she may go on with her discussions1 and make a great display in the lecture-rooms2 but real life will only pour contempt upon her4 ,i must therefore give our moralists the paradoxical advice1 first to look about them a little among their fellow-men4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,sceptical ,,view4 ,but when we cast a retrospect over the attempts made1 and made in vain1 for more than two thousand years1 to find a sure basis for ,ethics1 ought we not perhaps to think that after all there is no natural morality1 independent of human institution8 ,shall we not conclude that all moral systems are nothing but artificial products1 means invented for the better restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men2 and further1 that1 as they have no internal credentials and no natural basis1 they would fail in their purpose1 if without the support of positive religion8 ,the legal code and the police are not sufficient in all cases2 there are offences1 the discovery of which is too difficult2 some1 indeed1 where punishment is a precarious matter2 where1 in short1 we are left without public protection4 ,moreover1 the civil law can at most enforce justice1 not loving-kindness and beneficence2 because1 of course1 these are qualities as regards which every one would like to play the passive1 and no one the active1 part4 ,all this has given rise to the hypothesis that morality rests solely on religion1 and that both have the same aim--that of being complementary to the necessary inadequacy of state machinery and legislation4 ,consequently1 there cannot be 7it is said7 a natural morality1 i4e41 one based simply on the nature of things1 or of man1 and the fruitless search of philosophers for its foundation is explained4 ,this view is not without plausibility2 and we find it as far back as the ,pyrrhonians3 1 o 1 1 ,t#a --,sext4 ,emp4 adv4 ,math41 ,,xi41 #adj4 ,also in modern times distinguished thinkers have given their adherence to it4 ,a careful examination therefore it deserves2 although the easier course would be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the consciences of those in whom such a theory could arise4 ,we should fall into a great1 a very childish blunder1 if we believed all the just and legal actions of mankind to have a moral origin4 ,this is far from being the case4 ,as a rule1 between the justice1 which men practise1 and genuine singleness of heart1 there exists a relation analogous to that between polite expressions1 and the true love of one's neighbour1 which1 unlike the former1 does not ostensibly overcome ,egoism1 but really does so4 ,that honesty of sentiment1 everywhere so carefully exhibited1 which requires to be regarded as above all suspicion2 that deep indignation1 which is stirred by the smallest sign of a doubt in this direction1 and is ready to break out into furions anger2--to what are we to attribute these symptoms8 ,none but the inexperienced and simple will take them for pure coin1 for the working of a fine moral feeling1 or conscience4 ,in point of fact1 the general correctness of conduct which is adopted in human intercourse1 and insisted on as a rule no less immovable than the hills1 depends principally on two external necessities2 first1 on legal ordinance1 by virtue of which the rights of every man are protected by public authority2 and secondly1 on the recognised need of possessing civil honour1 in other words1 a good name1 in order to advance in the world4 ,this is why the steps taken by the individual are closely watched by public opinion1 which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives even a single false move or slip1 but remembers it against the guilty person as an indelible blot1 all his life long4 ,as far as this goes1 public opinion is wise enough2 for1 starting from the fundamental principle3 ,operari sequitur esse 7what one does is determined by what one is71 it shows its conviction that the character is unchangeable1 and that therefore what a man has once done1 he will assuredly do again1 if only the circumstances be precisely similar4 ,such are the two custodians that keep guard on the correct conduct of people1 without which1 to speak frankly1 we should be in a sad case1 especially with reference to property1 this central point in human life1 around which the chief part of its energy and activity revolves4 ,for the purely ethical motives to integrity1 assuming that they exist1 cannot as a rule be applied1 except very indirectly1 to the question of ownership as guaranteed by the state4 ,these motives1 in fact1 have a direct and essential bearing only on natural right2 with positive right their connection is merely indirect1 in so far as the latter is based on the former4 ,natural right1 however1 attaches to no other property than that which has been gained by one's own exertion2 because1 when this is seized1 the owner is at the same time robbed of all the efforts he expended in acquiring it4 ,the theory of preoccupancy ,i reject absolutely1 but cannot here set forth its refutation4#b ,now of course all estate based on positive right ought ultimately and in the last instance 7it matters not how many intermediate links are involved7 to rest on the natural right of possession4 ,but what a distance there is1 in most cases1 between the title-deeds1 that belong to our civil life1 and this natural right--their original source6 ,indeed their connection with the latter is generally either very difficult1 or else impossible1 to prove4 ,what we hold is ours by inheritance1 by marriage1 by success in the lottery2 or if in no way of this kind1 still it is not gained by our own work1 with the sweat of the brow1 but rather by shrewdness and bright ideas 7e4g41 in the field of speculation71 yes1 and sometimes even by our very stupidity1 which1 through a conjunction of circumstances1 is crowned and glorified by the ,deus eventus4 ,it is only in a very small minority of cases that property is the fruit of real labour and toil2 and even then the work is usually mental1 like that of lawyers1 doctors1 civilians1 teachers1 etc42 and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but little effort4 ,now1 when wealth is acquired in any such fashion1 there is need of considerable education before the ethical right can be recognised and respected out of a purely moral impulse4 ,hence it comes about that not a few secretly regard the possessions of others as held merely by virtue of positive right4 ,so1 if they find means to wrest from another man his goods1 by using1 or perhaps by evading1 the laws1 they feel no scruples2 for in their opinion he would lose what he holds1 in the same way in which he had previously obtained it1 and they consequently regard their own claims as equal to his4 ,from their point of view1 the right of the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right of the cleverer4 ,incidentally we may notice that the rich man often shows an inflexible correctness of conduct4 ,why8 ,because with his whole heart he is attached to1 and rigidly maintains1 a rule1 on the observance of which his entire wealth1 and all its attendant advantages1 depend4 ,for this reason his profession of the principle3 ,suum cuique 7to each his own71 is thoroughly in earnest1 and shows an unswerving consistency4 ,no doubt there is an objective loyalty to sincerity and good faith1 which avails to keep them sacred2 but such loyalty is based simply on the fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation of all free intercourse among men2 of good order2 and of secure ownership4 ,consequently they very often benefit ourselves1 and with this end in view they must be preserved even at some cost3 just as a good piece of land is worth a certain outlay4 ,but integrity thus derived is1 as a rule1 only to be met with among wealthy people1 or at least those who are engaged in a lucrative business4 ,it is an especial characteristic of tradesmen2 because they have the strongest conviction that for all the operations of commerce the one thing indispensable is mutual trust and credit2 and this is why mercantile honour stands quite by itself4 ,on the other hand1 the poor man1 who cannot make both ends meet1 and who1 by reason of the unequal division of property1 sees himself condemned to want and hard work1 while others before his eyes are lapped in luxury and idleness1 will not easily perceive that the raison d'tre of this inequality is a corresponding inequality of service and honest industry4 ,and if he does not recognise this1 how is he to be governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness1 which should keep him from stretching out his hand to grasp the superfluity of another8 ,generally1 it is the order of government as established by law that restrains him4 ,but should ever the rare occasion present itself when he discovers that he is beyond the reach of the police1 and that he could by a single act throw off the galling burden of penury1 which is aggravated by the sight of others' opulence2 if he feels this1 and realises that he could thus enter into the possession and enjoyment of all that he has so often coveted3 what is there then to stay his hand8 ,religions dogmas8 ,it is seldom that faith is so firm4 ,a purely moral incentive to be just and upright8 ,perhaps in a few isolated cases4 ,but in by far the greater number there is in reality nothing but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good name1 his civil honour--a thing that touches closely even those in humble circumstances4 ,he knows the imminent danger incurred of having to pay for dishonest conduct by being expelled from the great ,masonic ,lodge of honourable people who live correct lives4 ,he knows that property all over the world is in their hands1 and duly apportioned among themselves1 and that they wield the power of making him an outcast for life from good society1 in case he commit a single disgraceful action4 ,he knows that whoever takes one false step in this direction is marked as a person that no one trusts1 whose company every one shuns1 and from whom all advancement is cut off2 to whom1 as being a fellow that has stolen1 the proverb is applied3 ,he who steals once is a thief all his life4 ,these1 then1 are the guards that watch over correct behaviour between man and man1 and he who has lived1 and kept his eyes open1 will admit that the vast majority of honourable actions in human intercourse must be attributed to them2 nay1 he will go further1 and say that there are not wanting people who hope to elude even their vigilance1 and who regard justice and honesty merely as an external badge1 as a flag1 under the protection of which they can carry out their own freebooting propensities with better success4 ,we need not therefore break out into holy wrath1 and buckle on our armour1 if a moralist is found to suggest that perhaps all integrity and uprightness may be at bottom only conventional4 ,this is what ,holbach1 ,helvetius1 d',alembert1 and others of their time did2 and1 following out the theory1 they endeavoured with great acumen to trace back all moral conduct to egoistic motives1 however remote and indirect4 ,that their position is literally true of most just actions1 as having an ultimate foundation centred in the ,self1 ,i have shown above4 ,that it is also true to a large extent of what is done in kindness and humanity1 there can be no doubt2 acts of this sort often arise from love of ostentation1 still oftener from belief in a retribution to come1 which may be dealt out in the second or even the third power2#c or they can be explained by other egoistic motives4 ,nevertheless1 it is equally certain that there occur actions of disinterested good-will and entirely voluntary justice4 ,to prove the latter statement1 ,i appeal only to the facts of experience1 not to those of consciousness4 ,there are isolated1 yet indisputable cases on record1 where not only the danger of legal prosecution1 but also all chance of discovery1 and even of suspicion has been excluded1 and where1 notwithstanding1 the poor man has rendered to the rich his own4 ,for example1 things lost1 and found1 have been given back without any thought or hope of reward2 a deposit made by a third person has been restored after his death to the rightful owner2 a poor man1 secretly intrusted with a treasure by a fugitive1 has faithfully kept1 and then returned1 it4 ,instances of this sort can be found1 beyond all doubt2 only the surprise1 the emotion1 and the high respect awakened1 when we hear of them1 testify to the fact that they are unexpected and very exceptional4 ,there are in truth really honest people3 like four-leaved clover1 their existence is not a fiction4 ,but ,hamlet uses no hyperbole when he says3 ,to be honest1 as this world goes1 is to be one man pick'd out of ten thousand4 ,if it be objected that1 after all1 religious dogmas1 involving rewards and penalties in another world1 are at the root of conduct as above described2 cases could probably be adduced where the actors possessed no religions faith whatever4 ,and this is a thing by no means so infrequent as is generally maintained4 ,those who combat the sceptical view appeal specially to the testimony of conscience4 ,but conscience itself is impugned1 and doubts are raised about its natural origin4 ,now1 as a matter of fact1 there is a conscientia spuria 7false conscience71 which is often confounded with the true4 ,the regret and anxiety which many a man feels for what he has done is frequently1 at bottom1 nothing but fear of the possible consequences4 ,not a few people1 if they break external1 voluntary1 and even absurd rules1 suffer from painful searchings of heart1 exactly similar to those inflicted by the real conscience4 ,thus1 for instance1 a bigoted ,jew1 if on ,saturday he should smoke a pipe at home1 becomes really oppressed with the sense of having disobeyed the command in ,exodus xxxv4 #c3 ,ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations upon the ,sabbath day4 ,how often it happens that a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach1 because on some occasion or other he has not properly complied with that fools' codex1 which is called knightly honour6 ,nay more3 there are many of this class1 who1 if they see the impossibility of merely doing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-named code--to say nothing of keeping their pledged word of honour--are ready to shoot themselves4 7,instances of both have come under my knowledge47 ,and this1 while the self-same man would with an easy mind break his promise every day1 if only the shibboleth ,honour be not involved4 ,in short1 every inconsequent1 and thoughtless action1 all conduct contrary to our prejudices1 principles1 or convictions1 whatever these may be2 indeed1 every indiscretion1 every mistake1 every piece of stupidity rankles in us secretly1 and leaves its sting behind4 ,the average individual1 who thinks his conscience such an imposing structure1 would be surprised1 could he see of what it actually consists3 probably of about one-fifth1 fear of men2 one-fifth1 superstition2 one-fifth1 prejudice2 one-fifth1 vanity2 and one-fifth1 habit4 ,so that in reality he is no better than the ,englishman1 who said quite frankly3 ,i cannot afford to keep a conscience4 ,religious people of every creed1 as a rule1 understand by conscience nothing else than the dogmas and injunctions of their religion1 and the self-examination based thereon2 and it is in this sense that the expressions coercion of conscience and liberty of conscience are used4 ,the same interpretation was always given by the theologians1 schoolmen1 and casuists of the middle ages and of later times4 ,whatever a man knew of the formulae and prescriptions of the ,church1 coupled with a resolution to believe and obey it1 constituted his conscience4 ,thus we find the terms a doubting conscience1 an opinionated conscience1 an erring conscience1 and the like2 and councils were held1 and confessors employed1 for the special purpose of setting such irregularities straight4 ,how little the conception of conscience1 just as other conceptions1 is determined by its own object2 how differently it is viewed by different people2 how wavering and uncertain it appears in books2 all this is briefly but clearly set forth in ,studlin's ,geschichte der ,lehre vom ,gewissen4 ,these facts taken in conjunction are not calculated to establish the reality of the thing2 they have rather given rise to the question whether there is in truth a genuine1 inborn conscience4 ,i have already had occasion in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,viii41 where the theory of ,freedom is discussed1 to touch on my view of conscience1 and ,i shall return to it below4 ,all these sceptical objections added together do not in the least avail to prove that no true morality exists1 however much they may moderate our expectations as to the moral tendency in man1 and the natural basis of ,ethics4 ,undoubtedly a great deal that is ascribed to the ethical sense can be proved to spring from other incentives2 and when we contemplate the moral depravity of the world1 it is sufficiently clear that the stimulus for good cannot be very powerful1 especially as it often does not work even in cases where the opposing motives are weak1 although then the individual difference of character makes itself fully felt4 ,it should be observed that this moral depravity is all the more difficult to discern1 because its manifestations are checked and cloaked by public order1 as enforced by law2 by the necessity of having a good name2 and even by ordinary polite manners4 ,and this is not all4 ,people commonly suppose that in the education of the young their moral interests are furthered by representing uprightness and virtue as principles generally followed by the world4 ,later on1 it is often to their great harm that experience teaches them something else2 for the discovery1 that the instructors of their early years were the first to deceive them1 is likely to have a more mischievous effect on their morality than if these persons had given them the first example of ingenuous truthfulness1 by saying frankly3 ,the world is sunk in evil1 and men are not what they ought to be2 but be not misled thereby1 and see that you do better4 ,all this1 as ,i have said1 increases the difficulty of recognising the real immorality of mankind4 ,the state --this masterpiece1 which sums up the self-conscious1 intelligent egoism of all--consigns the rights of each person to a power1 which1 being enormously superior to that of the individual1 compels him to respect the rights of all others4 ,this is the leash that restrains the limitless egoism of nearly every one1 the malice of many1 the cruelty of not a few4 ,the illusion thus arising is so great that1 when in special cases1 where the executive power is ineffective1 or is eluded1 the insatiable covetousness1 the base greed1 the deep hypocrisy1 or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent in all their ugliness1 we recoil with horror1 supposing that we have stumbled on some unheard-of monster3 whereas1 without the compulsion of law1 and the necessity of keeping an honourable name1 these sights would be of every day occurrence4 ,in order to discover what1 from a moral point of view1 human beings are made of1 we must study anarchist records1 and the proceedings connected with criminals4 ,the thousands that throng before our eyes1 in peaceful intercourse each with the other1 can only be regarded as so many tigers and wolves1 whose teeth are secured by a strong muzzle4 ,let us now suppose this muzzle cast off1 or1 in other words1 the power of the state abolished2 the contemplation of the spectacle then to be awaited would make all thinking people shudder2 and they would thus betray the small amount of trust they really have in the efficiency either of religion1 or of conscience1 or of the natural basis of ,morals1 whatever it be4 ,but if these immoral1 antinomian forces should be unshackled and let loose1 it is precisely then that the true moral incentive1 hidden before1 would reveal its activity1 and consequently be most easily recognised4 ,and nothing would bring out so clearly as this the prodigious moral difference of character between man and man2 it would be found to be as great as the intellectual1 which is saying much4 ,the objection will perhaps be raised that ,ethics is not concerned with what men actually do1 but that it is the science which treats of what their conduct ought to be4 ,now this is exactly the position which ,i deny4 ,in the critical part of the present treatise ,i have sufficiently demonstrated that the conception of ought1 in other words1 the imperative form of ,ethics1 is valid only in theological morals1 outside of which it loses all sense and meaning4 ,the end which ,i place before ,ethical ,science is to point out all the varied moral lines of human conduct2 to explain them2 and to trace them to their ultimate source4 ,consequently there remains no way of discovering the basis of ,ethics except the empirical4 ,we must search and see whether we can find any actions to which we are obliged to ascribe genuine moral worth3 actions1 that is1 of voluntary justice1 of pure loving-kindness1 and of true nobleness4 ,such conduct1 when found1 is to be regarded as a given phaenomenon1 which has to be properly accounted for2 in other words1 its real origin must be explored1 and this will involve the investigation and explanation of the peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically distinct from all others1 that they form a class by themselves4 ,these motives1 together with a responsive susceptibility for them1 will constitute the ultimate basis of morality1 and the knowledge of them will be the foundation of ,ethics4 ,this is the humble path to which ,i direct the ,science of ,morals4 ,it contains no construction a priori1 no absolute legislation for all rational beings in abstracto2 it lacks all official1 academic sanction4 ,therefore1 whoever thinks it not sufficiently fashionable1 may return to the ,categorical ,imperative2 to the ,shibboleth of ,human ,dignity2 to the empty phrases1 the cobwebs1 and the soap-bubbles of the ,schools2 to principles on which experience pours contempt at every step1 and of which no one1 outside the lecture-rooms knows anything1 or has ever had the least notion4 ,on the other hand1 the foundation which is reached by following my path is upheld by experience2 and it is experience which daily and hourly delivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory4 #a ,i4e41 there is nothing either good or bad by nature1 but these things are decided by human judgment1 as ,timon says4 ,v4 ,sexti ,empirici ,opera ,quae ,exstant3 ,adversus ,mathematicos2 p4 #dfb ,a ad fin4 ,aurelianae3 ,petrus et ,jacobus ,chout1 #afba4 ,v4 also3 ,sexti ,empirici ,opera1 edit4 ,jo4 ,albertus ,fabricius3 ,lipsiae1 #agah1 ,lib4 ,,xi41 #adj1 p4 #gaf4 #b ,see ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 ,vol ,i41 #fb1 p4 #cif sqq41 and ,vol4 ,,ii41 chap4 #dg1 p4 #fhb4 #c ,in other words3 ,if a be a given offence1 or virtuous act1 and x the punishment1 or reward1 proportional to it2 then the punishment1 or reward1 actually inflicted1 instead of being x1 may be x#b or x#c4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,antimoral#a ,,incentives4 ,the chief and fundamental incentive in man1 as in animals1 is ,egoism1 that is1 the urgent impulse to exist1 and exist under the best circumstances4 ,the ,german word ,selbstsucht 7self-seeking7 involves a false secondary idea of disease 7,sucht74#b ,the term ,eigennutz 7self-interest7 denotes ,egoism1 so far as the latter is guided by reason1 which enables it1 by means of reflection1 to prosecute its purposes systematically2 so that animals may be called egoistic1 but not self-interested 7eigennutzig74 ,i shall therefore retain the word ,egoism for the general idea4 ,now this ,egoism is1 both in animals and men1 connected in the closest way with their very essence and being2 indeed1 it is one and the same thing4 ,for this reason all human actions1 as a rule1 have their origin in ,egoism1 and to it1 accordingly1 we must always first turn1 when we try to find the explanation of any given line of conduct2 just as1 when the endeavour is made to guide a man in any direction1 the means to this end are universally calculated with reference to the same all-powerful motive4 ,egoism is1 from its nature1 limitless4 ,the individual is filled with the unqualified desire of preserving his life1 and of keeping it free from all pain1 under which is included all want and privation4 ,he wishes to have the greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence1 and every gratification that he is capable of appreciating2 indeed1 he attempts1 if possible1 to evolve fresh capacities for enjoyment4 ,everything that opposes the strivings of his ,egoism awakens his dislike1 his anger1 his hate3 this is the mortal enemy1 which he tries to annihilate4 ,if it were possible1 he would like to possess everything for his own pleasure2 as this is impossible1 he wishes at least to control everything4 ,all things for me1 and nothing for others is his maxim4 ,egoism is a huge giant overtopping the world4 ,if each person were allowed to choose between his own destruction and that of the rest of mankind1 ,i need not say what the decision would be in most cases4 ,thus1 it is that every human unit makes himself the centre of the world1 which he views exclusively from that standpoint4 ,whatever occurs1 even1 for instance1 the most sweeping changes in the destinies of nations1 he brings into relation first and foremost with his own interests1 which1 however slightly and indirectly they may be affected1 he is sure to think of before anything else4 ,no sharper contrast can be imagined than that between the profound and exclusive attention which each person devotes to his own self1 and the indifference with which1 as a rule1 all other people regard that self1--an indifference precisely like that with which he in turn looks upon them4 ,to a certain extent it is actually comic to see how each individual out of innumerable multitudes considers himself1 at least from the practical point of view1 as the only real thing1 and all others in some sort as mere phantoms4 ,the ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that every one is directly conscious of himself1 but of others only indirectly1 through his mind's eye2 and the direct impression asserts its right4 ,in other words1 it is in consequence of the subjectivity which is essential to our consciousness that each person is himself the whole world2 for all that is objective exists only indirectly1 as simply the mental picture of the subject2 whence it comes about that everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-consciousness4 ,the only world which the individual really grasps1 and of which he has certain knowledge1 he carries in himself1 as a mirrored image fashioned by his brain2 and he is1 therefore1 its centre4 ,consequently he is all in all to himself2 and since he feels that he contains within his ego all that is real1 nothing can be of greater importance to him than his own self4#c ,moreover this supremely important self1 this microcosm1 to which the macrocosm stands in relation as its mere modification or accident1--this1 which is the individual's whole world1 he knows perfectly well must be destroyed by death2 which is therefore for him equivalent to the destruction of all things4 ,such1 then1 are the elements out of which1 on the basis of the ,will to live1 ,egoism grows up1 and like a broad trench it forms a perennial separation between man and man4 ,if on any occasion some one actually jumps across1 to help another1 such an act is regarded as a sort of miracle1 which calls forth amazement and wins approval4 ,in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,vi41 where ,kant's principle of ,morals is discussed1 ,i had the opportunity of describing how ,egoism behaves in everyday life1 where it is always peering out of some corner or other1 despite ordinary politeness1 which1 like the traditional fig-leaf1 is used as a covering4 ,in point of fact1 politeness is the conventional and systematic disavowal of ,egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse1 and is1 of course1 a piece of recognised hypocrisy4 ,gentle manners are expected and commended1 because that which they conceal--,egoism--is so odious1 that no one wishes to see it1 however much it is known to be there2 just as people like to have repulsive objects hidden at least by a curtain4 ,now1 unless external force 7under which must be included every source of fear whether of human or superhuman powers71 or else the real moral incentive is in effective operation1 it is certain that ,egoism always pursues its purposes with unqualified directness2 hence without these checks1 considering the countless number of egoistic individuals1 the bellum omnium contra omnes#d would be the order of the day1 and prove the ruin of all4 ,thus is explained the early construction by reflecting reason of state government1 which1 arising1 as it does1 from a mutual fear of reciprocal violence1 obviates the disastrous consequences of the general ,egoism1 as far as it is possible to do by negative procedure4 ,where1 however1 the two forces that oppose ,egoism fail to be operative1 the latter is not slow to reveal all its horrible dimensions1 nor is the spectacle exactly attractive4 ,in order to express the strength of this antimoral power in a few words1 to portray it1 so to say1 at one stroke1 some very emphatic hyperbole is wanted4 ,it may be put thus3 many a man would be quite capable of killing another1 simply to rub his boots over with the victim's fat4 ,i am only doubtful whether this1 after all1 is any exaggeration4 ,egoism1 then1 is the first and principal1 though not the only1 power that the moral ,motive has to contend against2 and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter1 in order to enter the lists against such an opponent1 must be something more real than a hair-splitting sophism or an a priori soap-bubble4 ,in war the first thing to be done is to know the enemy well2 and in the shock of battle1 now impending1 ,egoism1 as the chief combatant on its own side1 is best set against the virtue of ,justice1 which1 in my opinion1 is the first and original cardinal virtue4 ,the virtue of loving-kindness1 on the other hand1 is rather to be matched with ill-will1 or spitefulness1 the origin and successive stages of which we will now consider4 ,ill-will1 in its lower degrees1 is very frequent1 indeed1 almost a common thing2 and it easily rises in the scale4 ,goethe is assuredly right when he says that in this world indifference and aversion are quite at home4--7,wahlverwandtschaften1 ,part ,i41 chap4 #c47 ,it is very fortunate for us that the cloak1 which prudence and politeness throw over this vice1 prevents us from seeing how general it is1 and how the bellum omnium contra omnes is constantly waged1 at least in thought4 ,yet ever and anon there is some appearance of it3 for instance1 in the relentless backbiting so frequently observed2 while its clearest manifestation is found in all out-breaks of anger1 which1 for the most part1 are quite disproportional to their cause1 and which could hardly be so violent1 had they not been compressed--like gunpowder--into the explosive compound formed of long cherished brooding hatred4 ,ill-will usually arises from the unavoidable collisions of ,egoism which occur at every step4 ,it is1 moreover1 objectively excited by the view of the weakness1 the folly1 the vices1 failings1 shortcomings1 and imperfections of all kinds1 which every one more or less1 at least occasionally1 affords to others4 ,indeed1 the spectacle is such1 that many a man1 especially in moments of melancholy and depression1 may be tempted to regard the world1 from the aesthetic standpoint1 as a cabinet of caricatures2 from the intellectual1 as a madhouse2 and from the moral1 as a nest of sharpers4 ,if such a mental attitude be indulged1 misanthropy is the result4 ,lastly1 one of the chief sources of ill-will is envy2 or rather1 the latter is itself ill-will1 kindled by the happiness1 possessions1 or advantages of others4 ,no one is absolutely free from envy2 and ,herodotus 7,,iii4 #hj7 said long ago3 7envy is a natural growth in man from the beginning74 ,but its degrees vary considerably4 ,it is most poisonous and implacable when directed against personal qualities1 because then the envious have nothing to hope for4 ,and precisely in such cases its vilest form also appears1 because men are made to hate what they ought to love and honour4 ,yet so the world wags1 even as ,petrarca complained3 ,di lor par pi1 che d'altri1 invidia s'abbia1 ,che per se stessi son levati a volo1 ,uscendo fuor della commune gabbia4 7,for envy fastens most of all on those1 ,who1 rising on their own strong wings1 escape ,the bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd47 ,the reader is referred to the ,parerga1 vol4 ii41 #aad1 for a more complete examination of envy4 ,in a certain sense the opposite of envy is the habit of gloating over the misfortunes of others1 ,at any rate1 while the former is human1 the latter is diabolical4 ,there is no sign more infallible of an entirely bad heart1 and of profound moral worthlessness than open and candid enjoyment in seeing other people suffer4 ,the man in whom this trait is observed ought to be for ever avoided3 ,hic niger est1 hunc tu1 ,romane1 caveto4#e ,these two vices are in themselves merely theoretical2 in practice they become malice and cruelty4 ,it is true that ,egoism may lead to wickedness and crime of every sort2 but the resulting injury and pain to others are simply the means1 not the end1 and are therefore involved only as an accident4 ,whereas malice and cruelty make others' misery the end in itself1 the realisation of which affords distinct pleasure4 ,they therefore constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude4 ,the maxim of ,egoism1 at its worst is3 ,neminem juva1 immo omnes1 si forte conducit 7thus there is always a condition71 laede 7help no body1 but rather injure all people1 if it brings you any advantage74 ,the guiding rule of malice is3 ,omnes1 quantum potes1 laede 7injure all people as far as you can74 ,as malicious joy is in fact theoretical cruelty1 so1 conversely1 cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put into practice2 and the latter is sure to show itself in the form of cruelty1 directly an opportunity offers4 ,an examination of the special vices that spring from these two primary antimoral forces forms no part of the present treatise3 its proper place would be found in a detailed system of ,ethics4 ,from ,egoism we should probably derive greed1 gluttony1 lust1 selfishness1 avarice1 covetousness1 injustice1 hardness of heart1 pride1 arrogance1 etc42 while to spitefulness might be ascribed disaffection1 envy1 ill-will1 malice1 pleasure in seeing others suffer1 prying curiosity1 slander1 insolence1 petulance1 hatred1 anger1 treachery1 fraud1 thirst for revenge1 cruelty1 etc4 ,the first root is more bestial1 the second more devilish2 and according as either is the stronger2 or according as the moral incentive1 to be described below1 predominates1 so the salient points for the ethical classification of character are determined4 ,no man is entirely free from some traces of all three4 ,here ,i bring to an end my review of these terrible powers of evil2 it is an array reminding one of the ,princes of ,darkness in ,milton's ,pandemonium4 ,but my plan1 which in this respect of course differs from that of all other moralists1 required me to consider at the outset this gloomy side of human nature1 and1 like ,dante1 to descend first to ,tartarus4 ,it will now be fully apparent how difficult our problem is4 ,we have to find a motive capable of making a man take up a line of conduct directly opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply ingrained in his nature2 or1 given such conduct as a fact of experience1 we must search for a motive capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial explanation of it4 ,the difficulty1 in fact1 is so great that1 in order to solve it1 for the vast majority of mankind1 it has been everywhere necessary to have recourse to machinery from another world4 ,gods have been pointed to1 whose will and command the required mode of behaviour was said to be1 and who were represented as emphasising this command by penalties and rewards either in this1 or in another world1 to which death would be the gate4 ,now let us assume that belief in a doctrine of this sort took general root 7a thing which is certainly possible through strenuous inculcation at a very early age72 and let us also assume that it brought about the intended effect1--though this is a much harder matter to admit1 and not nearly so well confirmed by experience2 we should then no doubt succeed in obtaining strict legality of action1 even beyond the limits that justice and the police can reach2 but every one feels that this would not in the least imply what we mean by morality of the heart4 ,for obviously1 every act arising from motives like those just mentioned is after all derived simply from pure ,egoism4 ,how can ,i talk of unselfishness when ,i am enticed by a promised guerdon1 or deterred by a threatened punishment8 ,a recompense in another world1 thoroughly believed in1 must be regarded as a bill of exchange1 which is perfectly safe1 though only payable at a very distant date4 ,it is thus quite possible that the profuse assurances1 which beggars so constantly make1 that those1 who relieve them1 will receive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the next world1 may lead many a miser to generous alms-giving2 for such a one complacently views the matter as a good investment of money1 being perfectly convinced that he will rise again as a ,croesus4 ,for the mass of mankind1 it will perhaps be always necessary to continue the appeal to incentives of this nature1 and we know that such is the teaching promulgated by the different religions1 which are in fact the metaphysics of the people4 ,be it1 however1 observed in this connection that a man is sometimes just as much in error as to the true motives that govern his own acts1 as he is with regard to those of others4 ,hence it is certain that many persons1 while they can only account to themselves for their noblest actions by attributing them to motives of the kind above described1 are1 nevertheless1 really guided in their conduct by far higher and purer incentives1 though the latter may be much more difficult to discover4 ,they are doing1 no doubt1 out of direct love of their neighbour1 that which they can but explain as the command of their ,god4 ,on the other hand1 ,philosophy1 in dealing with this1 as with all other problems1 endeavours to extract the true and ultimate cause of the given phaenomena from the disclosures which the nature itself of man yields1 and which1 freed as they must be from all mythical interpretation1 from all religious dogmas1 and transcendent hypostases1 she requires to see confirmed by external or internal experience4 ,now1 as our present task is a philosophical one1 we must entirely disregard all solutions conditioned by any religion2 and ,i have here touched on them merely in order to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the difficulty4 #a ,i venture to use this word although irregularly formed1 because antiethical would not here give an adequate meaning4 ,sittlich 7in accordance with good manners7 and unsittlich 7contrary to good manners71 which have lately come into vogue1 are bad substitutes for moralisch 7moral7 and unmoralisch 7immoral73 first1 because moralisch is a scientific conception1 which1 as such1 requires to be denoted by a ,greek or ,latin term1 for reasons which may be found in ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 vol4 ii41 chap4 #ab1 p4 #acd sqq42 and secondly1 because sittlich is a weaker and tamer expression1 difficult to distinguish from sittsam 7modest7 which in popular acceptation means zimperlich 7simpering74 ,no concessions must be made to this extravagant love of germanising6 #b ,in ,sucht 7siech sick7 and ,selbst-sucht 7suchen seek7 there is an apparent confusion between the two bases ,,suk 7seuka7 to be ill1 and ,s,,kyan1 to seek4 ,v4 ,skeat's ,etymological ,dictionary4--7,translator47 #c ,it should be noticed that while from the subjective side a man's self assumes these gigantic proportions1 objectively it shrinks to almost nothing--namely1 to about the one-thousand-millionth part of the human race4 #d ,the war of all against all4 ,hobbes uses this expression4 --7,translator47 #e ,this man is black2 of him shalt thou1 ,o ,roman1 beware4 ,v4 ,horace1 ,sat41 ,lib4 ,i4 #d4 #he4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,criterion ,,of ,,actions ,,of ,,moral ,,worth4 ,there is first the empirical question to be settled1 whether actions of voluntary justice and unselfish loving-kindness1 which are capable of rising to nobleness and magnanimity1 actually occur in experience4 ,unfortunately1 this inquiry cannot be decided altogether empirically1 because it is invariably only the act that experience gives1 the incentives not being apparent4 ,hence the possibility always remains that an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining a just or good deed4 ,in a theoretical investigation like the present1 ,i shall not avail myself of the inexcusable trick of shifting the matter on to the reader's conscience4 ,but ,i believe there are few people who have any doubt about the matter1 and who are not convinced from their own experience that just acts are often performed simply and solely to prevent a man suffering from injustice4 ,most of as1 ,i do not hesitate to say1 are persuaded that there are persons in whom the principle of giving others their due seems to be innate1 who neither intentionally injure any one1 nor unconditionally seek their own advantage1 but in considering themselves show regard also for the rights of their neighbours2 persons who1 when they undertake matters involving reciprocal obligations1 not only see that the other party does his duty1 but also that he gets his own1 because it is really against their will that any one1 with whom they have to do1 should be shabbily treated4 ,these are the men of true probity1 the few aequi 7just7 among the countless number of the iniqui 7unjust74 ,such people exist4 ,similarly1 it will be admitted1 ,i think1 that many help and give1 perform services1 and deny themselves1 without having any further intention in their hearts than that of assisting another1 whose distress they see4 ,when ,arnold von ,winkelried exclaimed3 ,trwen1 lieben ,eidgenossen1 wullt's minem ,wip und ,kinde gedenken1#a and then clasped in his arms as many hostile spears as he could grasp2 can any one believe that he had some selfish purpose8 ,i cannot4 ,to cases of voluntary justice1 which cannot be denied without deliberate and wilful trifling with facts1 ,i have already drawn attention in ,chapter ,,ii4 of this ,part4 ,should any one1 however1 persist in refusing to believe that such actions ever happen1 then1 according to his view1 ,ethics would be a science without any real object1 like ,astrology and ,alchemy1 and it would be waste of time to discuss its basis any further4 ,with him1 therefore1 ,i have nothing to do1 and address myself to those who allow that we are dealing with something more than an imaginary citation4 ,it is1 then1 only to conduct of the above kind that genuine moral worth can be ascribed4 ,its special mark is that it rejects and excludes the whole class of motives by which otherwise all human action is prompted3 ,i mean the self-interested motives1 using the word in its widest sense4 ,consequently the moral value of an act is lowered by the disclosure of an accessory selfish incentive2 while it is entirely destroyed1 if that incentive stood alone4 ,the absence of all egoistic motives is thus the ,criterion of an action of moral value4 ,it may1 no doubt1 be objected that also acts of pure malice and cruelty are not selfish4#b ,but it is manifest that the latter cannot be meant1 since they are1 in kind1 the exact opposite of those now being considered4 ,if1 however1 the definition be insisted on in its strict sense1 then we may expressly except such actions1 because of their essential token--the compassing of others' suffering4 ,there is also another characteristic of conduct having real moral worth1 which is entirely internal and therefore less obvious4 ,i allude to the fact that it leaves behind a certain self-satisfaction which is called the approval of conscience3 just as1 on the other hand1 injustice and unkindness1 and still more malice and cruelty1 involve a secret self-condemnation4 ,lastly1 there is an external1 secondary1 and accidental sign that draws a clear line between the two classes4 ,acts of the former kind win the approval and respect of disinterested witnesses3 those of the latter incur their disapproval and contempt4 ,those actions that bear the stamp of moral value1 so determined1 and admitted to be realities1 constitute the phaenomenon that lies before us1 and which we have to explain4 ,we must accordingly search out what it is that moves men to such conduct4 ,if we succeed in our investigation1 we shall necessarily bring to light the true moral incentive2 and1 as it is upon this that all ethical science must depend1 our problem will then be solved4 #a ,comrades1 true and loyal to our oath1 care for my wife and child in remembrance of this4 #b ,acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications of the ego1 and are therefore1 in a certain sense1 selfish4 ,v4 ,introduction1 pp4 xvi4 and xvii4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,statement ,,and ,,proof ,,of ,,the ,,only ,,true ,,moral ,,incentive4 ,the preceding considerations1 which were unavoidably necessary in order to clear the ground1 now enable me to indicate the true incentive which underlies all acts of real moral worth4 ,the seriousness1 and indisputable genuineness1 with which we shall find it is distinguished1 removes it far indeed from the hair-splittings1 subtleties1 sophisms1 assertions formulated out of airy nothings1 and a priori soap-bubbles1 which all systems up to the present have tried to make at once the source of moral conduct and the basis of ,ethics4 ,this incentive ,i shall not put forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or rejected1 as one pleases2 ,i shall actually prove that it is the only possible one4 ,but as this demonstration requires several fundamental truths to be borne in mind1 the reader's attention is first called to certain propositions which we must presuppose1 and which may properly be considered as axioms2 except the last two1 which result from the analysis contained in the preceding chapter1 and in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,iii4 7#a7 ,no action can take place without a sufficient motive2 as little as a stone can move without a sufficient push or pull4 7#b7 ,similarly1 no action can be left undone1 when1 given the character of the doer1 a sufficient motive is present2 unless a stronger counter-motive necessarily prevents it4 7#c7 ,whatever moves the ,will1--this1 and this alone1 implies the sense of weal and woe1 in the widest sense of the term2 and conversely1 weal and woe signify that which is in conformity with1 or which is contrary to1 a ,will4 ,hence every motive must have a connection with weal and woe4 7#d7 ,consequently every action stands in relation to1 and has as its ultimate object1 a being susceptible of weal and woe4 7#e7 ,this being is either the doer himself2 or another1 whose position as regards the action is therefore passive2 since it is done either to his harm1 or to his benefit and advantage4 7#f7 ,every action1 which has to do1 as its ultimate object1 with the weal and woe of the agent himself1 is egoistic4 7#g7 ,the foregoing propositions with regard to what is done apply equally to what is left undone1 in all cases where motive and counter-motive play their parts4 7#h7 ,from the analysis in the foregoing chapter1 it results that ,egoism and the moral worth of an action absolutely exclude each other4 ,if an act have an egoistic object as its motive1 then no moral value can be attached to it2 if an act is to have moral value1 then no egoistic object1 direct or indirect1 near or remote1 may be its motive4 7#i7 ,in consequence of my elimination in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,iii41 of alleged duties towards ourselves1 the moral significance of our conduct can only lie in the effect produced upon others2 its relation to the latter is alone that which lends it moral worth1 or worthlessness1 and constitutes it an act of justice1 loving-kindness1 etc41 or the reverse4 ,from these propositions the following conclusion is obvious3 ,the weal and woe1 which 7according to our third axiom7 must1 as its ultimate object1 lie at the root of everything done1 or left undone1 is either that of the doer himself1 or that of some other person1 whose rle with reference to the action is passive4 ,conduct in the first case is necessarily egoistic1 as it is impelled by an interested motive4 ,and this is not only true when men--as they nearly always do--plainly shape their acts for their own profit and advantage2 it is equally true when from anything done we expect some benefit to ourselves1 no matter how remote1 whether in this or in another world4 ,nor is it less the fact when our honour1 our good name1 or the wish to win the respect of some one1 the sympathy of the lookers on1 etc41 is the object we have in view2 or when our intention is to uphold a rule of conduct1 which1 if generally followed1 would occasionally be useful to ourselves1 for instance1 the principle of justice1 of mutual succour and aid1 and so forth4 ,similarly1 the proceeding is at bottom egoistic1 when a man considers it a prudent step to obey some absolute command issued by an unknown1 but evidently supreme power2 for in such a case nothing can be the motive but fear of the disastrous consequences of disobedience1 however generally and indistinctly these may be conceived4 ,nor is it a whit the less ,egoism that prompts us when we endeavour to emphasise1 by something done or left undone1 the high opinion 7whether distinctly realised or not7 which we have of ourselves1 and of our value or dignity2 for the diminution of self-satisfaction1 which might otherwise occur1 would involve the wounding of our pride4 ,lastly1 it is still ,egoism that is operative1 when a man1 following ,wolff's principles1 seeks by his conduct to work out his own perfection4 ,in short1 one may make the ultimate incentive to an action what one pleases2 it will always turn out1 no matter by how circuitous a path1 that in the last resort what affects the actual weal and woe of the agent himself is the real motive2 consequently what he does is egoistic1 and therefore without moral worth4 ,there is only a single case in which this fails to happen3 namely1 when the ultimate incentive for doing something1 or leaving it undone1 is precisely and exclusively centred in the weal and woe of some one else1 who plays a passive part2 that is to say1 when the person on the active side1 by what he does1 or omits to do1 simply and solely regards the weal and woe of another1 and has absolutely no other object than to benefit him1 by keeping harm from his door1 or1 it may be1 even by affording help1 assistance1 and relief4 ,it is this aim alone that gives to what is done1 or left undone1 the stamp of moral worth2 which is thus seen to depend exclusively on the circumstance that the act is carried out1 or omitted1 purely for the benefit and advantage of another4 ,if and when this is not so1 then the question of weal and woe which incites to1 or deters from1 every action contemplated1 can only relate to the agent himself2 whence its performance1 or non-performance is entirely egoistic1 and without moral value4 ,but if what ,i do is to take place solely on account of some one else2 then it follows that his weal and woe must directly constitute my motive2 just is1 ordinarily1 my own weal and woe form it4 ,this narrows the limits of our problem1 which may now be stated as follows3 ,how is it possible that another's weal and woe should influence my will directly1 that is1 exactly in the same way as otherwise my own move it8 ,how can that which affects another for good or bad become my immediate motive1 and actually sometimes assume such importance that it more or less supplants my own interests1 which are1 as a rule1 the single source of the incentives that appeal to me8 ,obviously1 only because that other person becomes the ultimate object of my will1 precisely as usually ,i myself am that object2 in other words1 because ,i directly desire weal1 and not woe1 for him1 just as habitually ,i do for myself4 ,this1 however1 necessarily implies that ,i suffer with him1 and feel his woe1 exactly as in most cases ,i feel only mine1 and therefore desire his weal as immediately as at other times ,i desire only my own4 ,but1 for this to be possible1 ,i must in some way or other be identified with him2 that is1 the difference between myself and him1 which is the precise raison d'tre of my ,egoism1 must be removed1 at least to a certain extent4 ,now1 since ,i do not live in his skin1 there remains only the knowledge1 that is1 the mental picture1 ,i have of him1 as the possible means whereby ,i can so far identify myself with him1 that my action declares the difference to be practically effaced4 ,the process here analysed is not a dream1 a fancy floating in the air2 it is perfectly real1 and by no means infrequent4 ,it is1 what we see every day1--the phaenomenon of ,compassion2 in other words1 the direct participation1 independent of all ulterior considerations1 in the sufferings of another1 leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove them2 whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all well-being and happiness depend4 ,it is this ,compassion alone which is the real basis of all voluntary justice and all genuine loving-kindness4 ,only so far as an action springs therefrom1 has it moral value2 and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever has none4 ,when once compassion is stirred within me1 by another's pain1 then his weal and woe go straight to my heart1 exactly in the same way1 if not always to the same degree1 as otherwise ,i feel only my own4 ,consequently the difference between myself and him is no longer an absolute one4 ,no doubt this operation is astonishing1 indeed hardly comprehensible4 ,it is1 in fact1 the great mystery of ,ethics1 its original phaenomenon1 and the boundary stone1 past which only transcendental speculation may dare to take a step4 ,herein we see the wall of partition1 which1 according to the light of nature 7as reason is called by old theologians71 entirely separates being from being1 broken down1 and the non-ego to a certain extent identified with the ego4 ,i wish for the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation of this enigma untouched1 and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice and true loving-kindness really arise from it4 ,if so1 our problem will be solved1 for we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality1 and shown that it lies in human nature itself4 ,this foundation1 however1 in its turn cannot form a problem of ,ethics1 but rather1 like every other ultimate fact as such1 of ,metaphysics4 ,only the solution1 that the latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon1 lies outside the limits of the question put by the ,danish ,royal ,society1 which is concerned solely with the basis2 so that the transcendental explanation can be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix4 ,but before ,i turn to the derivation of the ,cardinal virtues from the original incentive1 as here disclosed1 ,i have still to bring to the notice of the reader two observations which the subject renders necessary4 7#a7 ,for the purpose of easier comprehension ,i have simplified the above presentation of compassion as the sole source of truly moral actions1 by intentionally leaving out of consideration the incentive of ,malice1 which while it is equally useless to the self as compassion1 makes the pain of others its ultimate purpose4 ,we are now1 however1 in a position1 by including it1 to state the above proof more completely1 and rigorously1 as follows3-- ,there are only three fundamental springs of human conduct1 and all possible motives arise from one or other of these4 ,they are3 7a7 ,egoism2 which desires the weal of the self1 and is limitless4 7b7 ,malice2 which desires the woe of others1 and may develop to the utmost cruelty4 7c7 ,compassion2 which desires the weal of others1 and may rise to nobleness and magnanimity4 ,every human act is referable to one of these springs2 although two of them may work together4 ,now1 as we have assumed that actions of moral worth are in point of fact realities2 it follows that they also must proceed from one of these primal sources4 ,but1 by the eighth axiom1 they cannot arise from the first1 and still less from the second2 since all conduct springing from the latter is morally worthless1 while the offshoots of the former are in part neither good nor bad in themselves4 ,hence they must have their origin in the third incentive2 and this will be established a posteriori in the sequel4 7#b7 ,direct sympathy with another is limited to his sufferings1 and is not immediately awakened by his well-being3 the latter per se leaves us indifferent4 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau in his mile 7,bk4 ,,iv47 expresses the same view3 ,premire maxime3 il n'est pas dans le cur humain1 de se mettre la place des gens1 qui sont plus heureux que nous1 mais seulement de ceux1 qui sont plus plaindre1#a etc4 ,the reason of this is that pain or suffering1 which includes all want1 privation1 need1 indeed every wish1 is positive1 and works directly on the consciousness4 ,whereas the nature of satisfaction1 of enjoyment1 of happiness1 and the like1 consists solely in the fact that a hardship is done away with1 a pain lulled3 whence their effect is negative4 ,we thus see why need or desire is the condition of every pleasure4 ,plato understood this well enough1 and only excepted sweet odours1 and intellectual enjoyment4 7,de ,rep41 ,,ix41 p4 #bfd sq41 edit4 ,bipont47#b ,and ,voltaire says3 ,il n'est pas de vrais plaisirs1 qu'avec de vrais besoins4#c ,pain1 then1 is positive1 and makes itself known by itself3 satisfaction or pleasure is negative--simply the removal of the former4 ,this principle explains the fact that only the suffering1 the want1 the danger1 the helplessness of another awakens our sympathy directly and as such4 ,the lucky or contented man1 as such1 leaves us indifferent--in reality because his state is negative2 he is without pain1 indigence1 or distress4 ,we may of course take pleasure in the success1 the well-being1 the enjoyment of others3 but if we do1 it is a secondary pleasure1 and caused by our having previously sorrowed over their sufferings and privations4 ,or else we share the joy and happiness of a man1 not as such1 but because1 and in so far as1 he is our child1 father1 friend1 relation1 servant1 subject1 etc4 ,in a word1 the good fortune1 or pleasure of another1 purely as such1 does not arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly elicited by his misfortune1 privation1 or misery1 purely as such4 ,if even on our own behalf it is only suffering 7under which must be reckoned all wants1 needs1 wishes1 and even ennui7 that stirs our activity2 and if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence and lazy repose2 why should it not be the same when others are concerned8 ,for 7as we have seen7 our sympathy rests on an identification of ourselves with them4 ,indeed1 the sight of success and enjoyment1 purely as such1 is very apt to raise the envy1 to which every man is prone1 and which has its place among the antimoral forces enumerated above4 ,in connection with the exposition of ,compassion here given1 as the coming into play of motives directly occasioned by another's calamity1 ,i take the opportunity of condemning the mistake of ,cassina1#d which has been so often repeated4 ,his view is that compassion arises from a sudden hallucination1 which makes us put ourselves in the place of the sufferer1 and then imagine that we are undergoing his pain in own own person4 ,this is not in the least the case4 ,the conviction never leaves us for a moment that he is the sufferer1 not we2 and it is precisely in his person1 not in ours1 that we feel the distress which afflicts us4 ,we suffer with him1 and therefore in him2 we feel his trouble as his1 and are not under the delusion that it is ours2 indeed1 the happier we are1 the greater the contrast between our own state and his1 the more we are open to the promptings of ,compassion4 ,the explanation of the possibility of this extraordinary phaenomenon is1 however1 not so easy2 nor is it to be reached by the path of pure psychology1 as ,cassina supposed4 ,the key can be furnished by ,metaphysics alone2 and this ,i shall attempt to give in the last ,part of the present treatise4 ,i now turn to consider the derivation of actions of real moral worth from the source which has been indicated4 ,the general rule by which to test such conduct1 and which1 consequently1 is the leading principle of ,ethics1 ,i have already enlarged upon in the foregoing ,part1 and enunciated as follows3 ,neminem laede2 immo omnes1 quantum potes1 juva4 7,do harm to no one2 but rather help all people1 as far as lies in your power47 ,as this formula contains two clauses1 so the actions corresponding to it fall naturally into two classes4 #a ,first maxim3 it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves with those who are happier than we are1 but only with those who are less happy4 #b ,stallbaum3 p4 #ehd1 sq4--7,translator47 #c ,there are no real pleasures1 without real needs4 #d ,v4 his ,saggio ,analitico sulla ,compassione1 #aghh2 ,german translation by ,pockels1 #agij4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,virtue ,,of ,,justice4 ,if we look more closely at this process called ,compassion1 which we have shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon1 we remark at once that there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may become directly my motive1 that is1 may urge me to do something1 or to leave it undone4 ,the first degree of ,compassion is seen when1 by counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives1 it keeps me from bringing pain on another1 and from becoming myself the cause of trouble1 which so far does not exist4 ,the other higher degree is manifested1 when it works positively1 and incites me to active help4 ,the distinction between the so-called duties of law and duties of virtue1 better described as justice and loving-kindness1 which was effected by ,kant in such a forced and artificial manner1 here results entirely of itself2 whence the correctness of the principle is attested4 ,it is the natural1 unmistakable1 and sharp separation between negative and positive1 between doing no harm1 and helping4 ,the terms in common use--namely1 the duties of law1 and the duties of virtue1 7the latter being also called duties of love1 or imperfect duties17 are in the first place faulty because they co-ordinate the genus with the species2 for justice is one of the virtues4 ,and next1 they owe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to the idea ,duty2 which ,i shall reduce to its proper limits below4 ,in place1 therefore1 of these duties ,i put two virtues2 the one1 justice1 and the other1 loving-kindness2 and ,i name them cardinal virtues1 since from them all others not only in fact proceed1 but also may be theoretically derived4444 ,both have their root in natural ,compassion4 ,and this ,compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness1 is an essential part of it1 and does not depend on assumptions1 conceptions1 religions1 dogmas1 myths1 training1 and education4 ,on the contrary1 it is original and immediate1 and lies in human nature itself4 ,it consequently remains unchanged under all circumstances1 and reveals itself in every land1 and at all times4 ,this is why appeal is everywhere confidently made to it1 as to something necessarily present in every man2 and it is never an attribute of the strange gods4 #a ,as he1 who appears to be without compassion1 is called inhuman2 so humanity is often used as its synonyme4 ,the first degree1 then1 in which this natural and genuine moral incentive shows itself is only negative4 ,originally we are all disposed to injustice and violence1 because our need1 our desire1 our anger and hate pass into the consciousness directly1 and hence have the ,jus primi occupantis4 7,the right of the first occupant47 ,whereas the sufferings of others1 caused by our injustice and violence1 enter the consciousness indirectly1 that is1 by the secondary channel of a mental picture1 and not till they are understood by experience4 ,thus ,seneca 7,ep4 #ej7 says3 ,ad neminem ante bona mens venit1 quam mala4 7,good feelings never come before bad ones47 ,in its first degree1 therefore1 ,compassion opposes and baffles the design to which ,i am urged by the antimoral forces dwelling within me1 and which will bring trouble on a fellow-being4 ,it calls out to me3 ,stop6 and encircles the other as with a fence1 so as to protect him from the injury which otherwise my egoism or malice would lead me to inflict on him4 ,so arises out of this first degree of compassion the rule3 ,neminem laede4 7,do harm to no one47 ,this is the fundamental principle of the virtue of justice1 and here alone is to be found its origin1 pure and simple1--an origin which is truly moral1 and free from all extraneous admixture4 ,otherwise derived1 justice would have to rest on ,egoism1--a reductio ad absurdum4 ,if my nature is susceptible of ,compassion up to this point1 then it will avail to keep me back1 whenever ,i should like to use others' pain as a means to obtain my ends2 equally1 whether this pain be immediate1 or an after-consequence1 whether it be effected directly1 or indirectly1 through intermediate links4 ,i shall therefore lay hands on the property as little as on the person of another1 and avoid causing him distress1 no less mental than bodily4 ,i shall thus not only abstain from doing him physical injury1 but also1 with equal care ,i shall guard against inflicting on him the suffering of mind1 which mortification and calumny1 anxiety and vexation so surely work4 ,the same sense of ,compassion will check me from gratifying my desires at the cost of women's happiness for life1 or from seducing another man's wife1 or from ruining youths morally and physically by tempting them to paederastia4 ,not that it is at all necessary in each single case that ,compassion should be definitely excited2 indeed it would often come too late2 but rather the rule3 ,neminem laede1 is formed by noble minds out of the knowledge1 gained once for all1 of the injury which every unjust act necessarily entails upon others1 and which is aggravated by the feeling of having to endure wrong through a force majeure4 ,such natures are led by reflecting reason to carry out this principle with unswerving resolution4 ,they respect the rights of every man1 and abstain from all encroachment on them2 they keep themselves free from self-reproach1 by refusing to be the cause of others' trouble2 they do not shift on to shoulders not their own1 by force or by trickery1 the burdens and sorrows of life1 which circumstances bring to every one2 they prefer to bear themselves the portions allotted to them1 so as not to double those of their neighbours4 ,for although generalising formulae1 and abstract knowledge of whatever kind1 are not in the least the cause1 or the real basis of morality2 these are nevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life4 ,they are the cistern or reservoir1 in which the habit of mind1 that springs from the fount of all morality 7a fount not at all moments flowing71 may be stored up1 thence to be drawn off1 as occasion requires4 ,there is thus an analogy between things moral and things physiological2 among many instances of which we need only mention that of the gall-bladder1 which is used for keeping the secretion of the liver4 ,without firmly held principles we should inevitably be at the mercy of the antimoral incentives1 directly they are roused to activity by external influences2 and self-control lies precisely in steadfast adherence and obedience to such principles1 despite the motives which oppose them4 ,in general1 the feminine half of humanity is inferior to the masculine in the virtue of justice1 and its derivatives1 uprightness1 conscientiousness1 etc42 the explanation is found in the fact that1 owing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the former is much less capable than the latter of understanding and holding to general laws1 and of taking them as a guiding thread4 ,hence injustice and falseness are women's besetting sins1 and lies their proper element4 ,on the other hand1 they surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness2 because usually the stimulus to this is intuitive1 and consequently appeals directly to the sense of ,compassion1 of which females are much more susceptible than males4 ,for the former nothing but what is intuitive1 present1 and immediately real has a true existence2 that which is knowable only by means of concepts1 as for instance1 the absent1 the distant1 the past1 the future1 they do not readily grasp4 ,we thus find compensation here1 as in so much else2 justice is more the masculine1 loving-kindness more the feminine virtue4 ,the mere idea of seeing women sitting on the judges' bench raises a smile2 but the sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity4 ,now animals1 as they have no power of gaining knowledge by reason1 that is1 of forming abstract ideas1 are entirely incapable of fixed resolutions1 to say nothing of principles2 they consequently totally lack self-control1 and are helplessly given over to external impressions and internal impulses4 ,this is why they have no conscious morality2 although the different species show great contrasts of good and evil in their characters1 and as regards the highest races these are traceable even in individuals4 ,from the foregoing considerations we see that in the single acts of the just man ,compassion works only indirectly through his formulated principles1 and not so much actu as potenti2 much in the same way as in statics the greater length of one of the scale-beams1 owing to its greater power of motion1 balances the smaller weight attached to it with the larger on the other side1 and works1 while at rest1 only potenti1 not actu2 yet with the same efficiency4 ,nevertheless1 ,compassion is always ready to pass into active operation4 ,therefore1 whenever1 in special cases1 the established rule shows signs of breaking down1 the one incentive 7for we exclude of course those based on ,egoism71 which is capable of infusing fresh life into it1 is that drawn from the fountain-head itself--,compassion4 ,this is true not only where it is a question of personal violence1 but also where property is concerned1 for instance1 when any one feels the desire to keep some valuable object which he has found4 ,in such cases1--if we set aside all motives prompted by worldly wisdom1 and by religion--nothing brings a man back so easily to the path of justice1 as the realisation of the trouble1 the grief1 the lamentation of the loser4 ,it is because this is felt to be true1 that1 when publicity is given to the loss of money1 the assurance is so often added that the loser is a poor man1 a servant1 etc4 ,it is hoped that these considerations have made it clear that1 however contrary appearances may be at first sight1 yet undoubtedly justice1 as a genuine and voluntary virtue has its origin in ,compassion4 ,but if any one should suppose such a soil too barren and meagre to bear this great cardinal virtue1 let him reflect on what is said above1 and remember how small is the amount of true1 spontaneous1 unselfish1 unfeigned justice among men2 how the real thing only occurs as a surprising exception1 and how1 to its counterfeit1--the justice that rests on mere worldly wisdom and is everywhere published abroad--it is related1 both in quality and quantity1 as gold is to copper4 ,i should like to call the one 7common1 ordinary justice71 the other 7heavenly justice74#b ,for the latter is she1 who1 according to ,hesiod1#c leaves the earth in the iron age1 to dwell with the celestial gods4 ,to produce such a rare exotic as this the root we have indicated is surely vigorous enough4 ,it will now be seen that injustice or wrong always consists in working harm on another4 ,therefore the conception of wrong is positive1 and antecedent to the conception of right1 which is negative1 and simply denotes the actions performable without injury to others2 in other words1 without wrong being done4 ,that to this class belongs also whatever is effected with no other object than that of warding off from oneself meditated mischief is an easy inference4 ,for no participation in another's interests1 and no sympathy for him1 can require me to let myself be harmed by him1 that is1 to undergo wrong4 ,the theory that right is negative1 in contradistinction to wrong as positive1 we find supported by ,hugo ,grotius1 the father of philosophical jurisprudence4 ,the definition of justice which he gives at the beginning of his work1 ,de ,jure ,belli et ,pacis 7,bk4 ,i41 chap4 #a41 #c71 runs as follows3--,jus hic nihil aliud1 quam quod justum est1 significant1 idque negante magis sensu1 quam aiente1 ut jus sit1 quod injustum non est4#d ,the negative character of justice is also established1 little as it may appear1 even by the familiar formula3 ,give to each one his own4 ,now1 there is no need to give a man his own1 if he has it4 ,the real meaning is therefore3 ,take from none his own4 ,since the requirements of justice are only negative1 they may be effected by coercion2 for the ,neminem laede can be practised by all alike4 ,the coercive apparatus is the state1 whose sole raison d'tre is to protect its subjects1 individually from each other1 and collectively from external foes4 ,it is true that a few ,german would-be philosophers of this venal age wish to distort the state into an institution for the spread of morality1 education1 and edifying instruction4 ,but such a view contains1 lurking in the background1 the ,jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom and individual development1 and of making men mere wheels in a huge ,chinese governmental and religious machine4 ,and this is the road that once led to ,inquisitions1 to ,autos-da-f1 and religious wars4 ,frederick the ,great showed that he at least never wished to tread it1 when he said3 ,in my land every one shall care for his own salvation1 as he himself thinks best4 ,nevertheless1 we still see everywhere 7with the more apparent than real exception of ,north ,america7 that the state undertakes to provide for the metaphysical needs of its members4 ,the governments appear to have adopted as their guiding principle the tenet of ,quintus ,curtius3 ,nulla res efficacius multitudinem regit1 quam superstitio3 alioquin impotens1 saeva1 mutabilis2 ubi vana religione capta est1 melius vatibus1 quam ducibus suis paret4#e ,we have seen that wrong and right are convertible synonymes of to do harm and to refrain from doing it1 and that under right is included the warding off of injury from oneself4 ,it will be obvious that these conceptions are independent of1 and antecedent to1 all positive legislation4 ,there is1 therefore1 a pure ethical right1 or natural right1 and a pure doctrine of right1 detached from all positive statutes4 ,the first principles of this doctrine have no doubt an empirical origin1 so far as they arise from the idea of harm done1 but per se they rest on the pure understanding1 which a priori furnishes ready to hand the axiom3 causa causae est causa effectus4 7,the cause of a cause is the cause of the effect47 ,taken in this connection the words mean3 if any one desires to injure me1 it is not ,i1 but he1 that is the cause of whatever ,i am obliged to do in self-defence2 and ,i can consequently oppose all encroachments on his part1 without wronging him4 ,here we have1 so to say1 a law of moral repercussion4 ,thus it comes about that the union of the empirical idea of injury done with the axiom supplied by the pure understanding1 gives rise to the fundamental conceptions of wrong and right1 which every one grasps a priori1 and learns by actual trial to immediately adopt4 ,the empiric1 who denies this1 and refuses to accept anything but the verdict of experience1 may be referred to the testimony of the savage races1 who all distinguish between wrong and right quite correctly1 often indeed with nice precision2 as is strikingly manifested when they are engaged in bartering and other transactions with ,europeans1 or visit their ships4 ,they are bold and self-assured1 when they are in the right2 but uneasy1 when they know they are wrong4 ,in disputes a just settlement satisfies them1 whereas unjust procedure drives them to war4 ,the ,doctrine of ,eight is a branch of ,ethics1 whose function is to determine those actions which may not be performed1 unless one wishes to injure others1 that is1 to be guilty of wrong-doing2 and here the active part played is kept in view4 ,but legislation applies this chapter of moral science conversely1 that is1 with reference to the passive side of the question1 and declares that the same actions need not be endured1 since no one ought to have wrong inflicted on him4 ,to frustrate such conduct the state constructs the complete edifice of the law1 as positive ,right4 ,its intention is that no one shall suffer wrong2 the intention of the ,doctrine of ,moral ,right is that no one shall do wrong4#f ,if by unjust action ,i molest some one1 whether in his person1 his freedom1 his property1 or his honour1 the wrong as regards quality remains the same4 ,but with respect to quantity it may vary very much4 ,this difference in the amount of wrong effected appears not to have been as yet investigated by moralists1 although it is everywhere recognised in real life1 because the censure passed is always proportional to the harm inflicted4 ,so also with just actions1 the right done is constant in quality1 but not in quantity4 ,to explain this better3 he1 who when dying of starvation steals a loaf1 commits a wrong2 but how small is this wrong in comparison with the act of an opulent proprietor1 who1 in whatever way1 despoils a poor man of his last penny6 ,again3 the rich person who pays his hired labourer1 acts justly2 but how insignificant is this piece of justice when contrasted with that of a penniless toiler1 who voluntarily returns to its wealthy owner a purse of gold which he has found6 ,the measure1 however1 of this striking difference in the quantity of justice1 and injustice 7the quality being always constant71 is not direct and absolute1 as on a graduated scale2 it is indirect and relative1 like the ratio of sines and tangents4 ,i give therefore the following definition3 the amount of injustice in my conduct varies as the amount of evil1 which ,i thereby bring on another1 divided by the amount of advantage1 which ,i myself gain2 and the amount of justice in my conduct varies as the amount of advantage1 which injury done to another brings me1 divided by the amount of harm which he thereby suffers4 ,we have further to notice a double form of injustice which is specifically different from the simple kind1 be it never so great4 ,this variety may be detected by the fact that the amount of indignation shown by disinterested witnesses1 which is always proportional to the amount of wrong inflicted1 never reaches the maximum except when it is present4 ,we then see how the deed is loathed1 as something revolting and heinous1 as an 7i4e41 abomination71 before which1 as it were1 the gods veil their faces4 ,double injustice occurs when some one1 after definitely undertaking the obligation of protecting his friend1 master1 client1 etc41 in a special way1 not only is guilty of non-fulfilment of that duty 7which of itself would be injurious to the other1 and therefore a wrong72 but when1 in addition1 he turns round1 and attacks the man1 and strikes at the very spot which he promised to guard4 ,instances are3 the appointed watch1 or guide1 who becomes an assassin2 the trusted caretaker1 who becomes a thief2 the guardian1 who robs his ward of her property2 the lawyer1 who prevaricates2 the judge1 who is corruptible2 the adviser1 who deliberately gives some fatal counsel4 ,all such conduct is known by the name of treachery1 and is viewed with abhorrence by the whole world4 ,hence ,dante puts traitors in the lowest circle of ,hell1 where ,satan himself is found 7,inferno3 xi1 #fa-fj74 ,as we have here had occasion to mention the word obligation1 this is the place to determine the conception of ,duty1 which is so often spoken of both in ,ethics and in real life1 but with too wide an extension of meaning4 ,we have seen that wrong always signifies injury done to another1 whether it be in his person1 his freedom1 his property1 or his honour4 ,the consequence appears to be that every wrong must imply a positive aggression1 and so a definite act4 ,only there are actions1 the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong2 and these are ,duties4 ,this is the true philosophic definition of the conception ,duty1--a term which loses its characteristic note1 and hence becomes valueless1 if it is used 7as hitherto it has been in ,moral ,science7 to designate all praiseworthy conduct4 ,it is forgotten that ,duty#g necessarily means a debt which is owing1 being thus an action1 by the simple omission of which another suffers harm1 that is1 a wrong comes about4 ,clearly in this case the injury only takes place through the person1 who neglects the duty1 having distinctly pledged or bound himself to it4 ,consequently all duties depend on an obligation which has been entered into4 ,this1 as a rule1 takes the form of a definite1 if sometimes tacit1 agreement between two parties3 as for instance1 between prince and people1 government and its servants1 master and man1 lawyer and client1 physician and patient2 in a word1 between any and every one who undertakes to perform some task1 and his employer in the widest sense of the word4 ,hence every duty involves a right2 since no one undertakes an obligation without a motive1 which means1 in this case1 without seeing some advantage for himself4 ,there is only one obligation that ,i know of which is not subject to an agreement1 but arises directly and solely through an act2 this is because one of the persons with whom it has to do was not in existence when it was contracted4 ,i refer to the duty of parents towards their children4 ,whoever brings a child into the world1 has incumbent on him the duty of supporting his offspring1 until the latter is able to maintain himself2 and should this time never come1 owing to incapacity from blindness1 deformity1 cretinism1 and the like1 neither does the duty ever come to an end4 ,it is clear that merely by failing to provide for the needs of his son1 that is1 by a simple omission1 the father would injure him1 indeed jeopardise his life4 ,children's duty towards their parents is not so direct and imperative4 ,it rests on the fact that1 as every duty involves a right1 parents also must have some just claim on their issue4 ,this is the foundation of the duty of filial obedience1 which1 however1 in course of time ceases simultaneously with the right out of which it sprang4 ,it is replaced by gratitude for that which was done by father and mother over and above their strict duty4 ,nevertheless1 although ingratitude is a hateful1 often indeed a revolting vice1 gratitude cannot be called a duty2 because its omission inflicts no injury on the other side1 and is therefore no wrong4 ,otherwise we should have to suppose that in his heart of hearts the benefactor aims at making a good bargain4 ,it should be noticed that reparation made for harm done may also be regarded as a duty arising directly through an action4 ,this1 however1 is something purely negative1 as it is nothing but an attempt to remove and blot out the consequences of an unjust deed1 as a thing that ought never to have taken place4 ,be it also observed that equity#h is the foe of justice1 and often comes into harsh collision with it2 so that the former ought only to be admitted within certain limits4 ,the ,german is a friend of equity1 while the ,englishman holds to justice4 ,the law of motivation is just as strict as that of physical causality1 and hence involves the same irresistible necessity4 ,consequently wrong may be compassed not only by violence1 but also by cunning4 ,if by violence ,i am able to kill or rob another1 or compel him to obey me1 ,i can equally use cunning to accomplish the same ends2 that is1 ,i can place false motives before his intellect1 by reason of which he must do what otherwise he would not4 ,these false motives are effected by lies4 ,in reality lies are unjustifiable solely in so far as they are instruments of cunning1 in other words1 of compulsion1 by means of motivation4#i ,and this is precisely their function1 as a rule4 ,for1 in the first place1 ,i cannot tell a falsehood without a motive1 and this motive will certainly be1 with the rarest exceptions1 an unjust one2 namely1 the intention of holding others1 over whom ,i have no power1 under my will1 that is1 of coercing them through the agency of motivation4 ,also in mere exaggerations and untruthful bombast there is the same purpose at work2 for1 by employing such language1 a man tries to place himself higher in the sight of others than is his due4 ,the binding force of a promise or a compact is contained in the fact that1 if it be not observed1 it is a deliberate lie1 pronounced in the most solemn manner1--a lie1 whose intention 7that of putting others under moral compulsion7 is1 in this case1 all the clearer1 because its motive1 the desired performance of something on the other side1 is expressly declared4 ,the contemptible part of the fraud is that hypocrisy is used to disarm the victim before he is attacked4 ,the highest point of villainy is reached in treachery1 which1 as we have seen1 is a double injustice1 and is always1 regarded with loathing4 ,it is1 then1 obvious that1 just as ,i am not wrong1 that is1 right in resisting violence by violence1 so where violence is not feasible1 or it appears more convenient1 ,i am at liberty to resort to cunning2 accordingly1 whenever ,i am entitled to use force1 ,i may1 if ,i please1 employ falsehood2 for instance1 against robbers and miscreants of every sort1 whom in this way ,i entice into a trap4 ,hence a promise which is extorted by violence is not binding4 ,but1 as a matter of fact1 the right to avail myself of lies extends further4 ,it occurs whenever an unjustifiable question is asked1 which has to do with my private1 or business affairs1 and is hence prompted by curiosity2 for to answer it1 or even to put it off by the suspicion-awakening words1 ,i can't tell you1 would expose me to danger4 ,here an untruth is the indispensable weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness1 whose motive is hardly ever a well-meaning one4 ,for1 just as ,i have the right to oppose the apparent bad will of another1 and to anticipate with physical resistance1 to the danger of my would-be aggressor1 the physical violence presumably thence resulting2 so that1 for instance1 as a precaution1 ,i can protect my garden wall with sharp spikes1 let loose savage dogs in my court at night1 and even1 if circumstances require it1 set man-traps and spring-guns1 for the evil consequences of which the burglar has only himself to thank3--if ,i have the right to do this1 then ,i am equally authorised in keeping secret1 at any price1 that which1 if known1 would lay me bare to the attack of others4 ,and ,i have good reason for acting thus1 because1 in moral1 no less than in physical1 relations1 ,i am driven to assume that the bad will of others is very possible1 and must therefore take all necessary preventive measures beforehand4 ,whence ,ariosto says3-- ,quantunque il similar sia le pi volte ,ripreso1 e dia di mala mente indict1 ,si trova pure in molte cose e molte ,avere fatti evidenti benefici1 ,e danni e biasmi e morti avere tolte3 ,che non conversiam' sempre con gli amici1 ,in questa assai pi oscura che serena ,vita mortal1 tutta d'invidia piena#aj --,orl4 ,fur41 ,,iv41 #a4 ,i may1 then1 without any injustice match cunning with cunning1 and anticipate all crafty encroachments on me1 even if they be only probable2 and ,i need neither render an account to him who unwarrantably pries into my personal circumstances1 nor by replying3 ,i cannot answer this1 show him the spot where ,i have a secret1 which perilous to me1 and perhaps advantageous to him1 in any case puts me in his power1 if divulged3 ,scire volunt secreta domus1 atque inde timeri4 7,they wish to know family secrets1 and thus become feared47 ,on the contrary1 ,i am justified in putting him off with a lie1 involving danger to himself1 in case he is thereby led into a mistake that works him harm4 ,indeed1 a falsehood is the only means of opposing inquisitive and suspicious curiosity2 to meet which it is the one weapon of necessary self-defence4 ,ask me no questions1 and ,i'll tell you no lies is here the right maxim4 ,for among the ,english1 who regard the reproach of being a liar as the deepest insult1 and who on that account are really more truthful than other nations1 all unjustifiable questions1 having to do with another's affairs1 are looked upon as a piece of ill-breeding1 which is denoted by the expression1 to ask questions4 ,certainly every sensible person1 even when he is of the strictest rectitude1 follows the principle above set forth4 ,suppose1 for instance1 such a one is returning from a remote spot1 where he has raised a sum of money2 and suppose an unknown traveller joins him1 and after the customary whither and whence gradually proceeds to inquire what may have taken him to that place2 the former will undoubtedly give a false answer in order to avoid the danger of robbery4 ,again3 if a man be found in the house of another1 whose daughter he is wooing2 and he is asked the cause of his unexpected presence2 unless he has entirely lost his head1 he will not give the true reason1 but unhesitatingly invent a pretext4 ,and the cases are numberless in which every reasonable being tells an untruth1 without the least scruple of conscience4 ,it is this view of the matter alone that removes the crying contradiction between the morality which is taught1 and that which is daily practised1 even by the best and most upright of men4 ,at the same time1 the restriction of a falsehood to the single purpose of self-defence must be rigidly observed2 for otherwise this doctrine would admit of terrible abuse1 a lie being in itself a very dangerous instrument4 ,but just as1 even in time of public peace1 the law allows every one to carry weapons and to use them1 when required for self-defence1 so ,ethics permits lies to be employed for the same purpose1 and--be it observed--for this one purpose only4 ,every mendacious word is a wrong1 excepting only when the occasion arises of defending oneself against violence or cunning4 ,hence justice requires truthfulness towards all men4 ,but the entirely unconditional and unreserved condemnation of lies1 as properly involved in their nature1 is sufficiently refuted by well known facts4 ,thus1 there are cases where a falsehood is a duty1 especially for doctors2 and there are magnanimous lies1 as1 for instance1 that of the ,marquis ,posa in ,don ,carlos#aa or that in the ,gerusalemme ,liberata1 ,,ii41 #bb2ab they occur1 indeed1 whenever a man wills to take on himself the guilt of another2 and lastly1 ,jesus ,christ himself is reported 7,john vii4 #h2 cf4 ver4 #aj7 on one occasion to have intentionally told an untruth4 ,the reader will remember that ,campanella1 in his ,poesie ,filosofiche 7,delia ,bellezza3 ,madr4 #i71 does not hesitate to say3 ,bello il mentir1 se a fare gran ben' si trova4#ac ,on the other hand1 the current teaching as regards necessary falsehoods is a wretched patch on the dress of a poverty-stricken morality4 ,kant is responsible for the theory found in many text-books1 which derives the unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of speech2 but the arguments are so tame1 childish and absurd that one might well be tempted1 if only to pour contempt on them1 to join sides with the devil1 and say with ,talleyrand3 l'homme a reu la parole pour pouvoir cacher sa pense#ad4 ,the unqualified and boundless horror shown by ,kant for falsehoods1 whenever he has the opportunity1 is due either to affectation1 or to prejudice4 ,in the chapter of his ,tugendlehre1 dealing with lies1 he loads them with every kind of defamatory epithet1 but does not adduce a single adequate reason for their condemnation2 which would have been more to the point4 ,declamation is easier than demonstration1 and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere4 ,kant would have done better to open the vials of his wrath on that vice which takes pleasure in seeing others suffer2 it is the latter1 and not a falsehood1 which is truly fiendish4 ,for malignant joy is the exact opposite of ,compassion1 and nothing else but powerless cruelty1 which1 unable itself to bring about the misery it so gladly beholds others enduring1 is thankful to for having done so instead4 ,according to the code of knightly honour1 the reproach of being a liar is of extreme gravity1 and only to be washed out with the accuser's blood4 ,now this obtains1 not because the lie is wrong in itself1 since1 were such the reason1 to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would certainly be regarded as equally outrageous1--which is not the case1 as every one knows2 but it is due to that principle of chivalry1 which in reality bases right on might2 so that whoever1 when trying to work mischief1 has recourse to falsehood1 proves that he lacks either power1 or the requisite courage4 ,every untruth bears witness of his fear2 and this is why a fatal verdict is passed on him4 #a ,thus1 when the first gleam of ,mitleid stole into her heart1 ,brnhilde could no longer remain a ,walkre2 and ,wotan's end comes1 when by the same solvent he is at length set free from the delusion of the principium individuationis4--7,translator47 #b ,there is here an allusion to the and ,o in ,plato's ,symposium4 ,v4 ,chap4 #h1 sq4 ,edit4 ,schmelzer3 ,weidmann1 ,berlin1 #ahhb4--7,translator47 #c ,v4 ,hesiod1 ,opera et ,dies1 #agd-bja4--7,translator47 #d ,justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just1 and this1 rather in a negative than in a positive sense2 so that what is not unjust is to be regarded as justice4 #e ,there is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses than superstition4 ,without this they have no self-control2 they are brutish2 they are changeable2 but once they are caught by some vain form of religion1 they lend a more willing ear to its soothsayers than to their own leaders4 #f ,the ,doctrine of ,eight in detail may be found in ,die ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 vol4 i41 #fb4 #g ,duty le devoir ,pflicht cf4 plight1 ,o4 ,h4 ,g4 plegan4--7,translator47 #h ,the word here translated equity 7,billigkeit3 ,lat4 aequitas7 means the sense of fairness1 or of natural justice which determines what is fitting and due in all human relations1 as opposed to justice 7,gerechtigkeit7 taken as positive written law4--7,translator47 #i ,motivation is defined in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,viii41 as the law of ,causality acting through the medium of the intellect4 ,it is thus the law of the determination of conduct by motives4--7,translator47 #aj ,however much we're won't to blame a lie1 ,as index of a mind estranged from right1 ,yet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results ,of good most evident2 disgrace and loss1 ,it chang'd2 e'en death it cheated4 ,for with friends1 ,alas6 not always in this mortal life1 ,where envy fills all hearts1 and gloom prevails ,much more than light1 are we in converse join'd4 --7,translator47 #aa ,vide1 ,schiller's ,don ,carlos3 ,act ,v41 ,sc4 #c4--7,translator47 #ab ,magnanima menzogna1 or quando il vero ,si hello che si possa a te preporre8 ,cf4 also the ,horatian splendid mendax4 ,carm4 ,,iii41 #aa1 #ce4--7,translator47 #ac ',tis well to lie1 an there result much good therefrom4 ,vide1 ,opere di ,tommaso ,campanella1 da ,alessandro d',ancona1 ,torino1 #ahed4--7,translator47 #ad ,man has received the gift of language1 so as to be able to conceal his thoughts4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,virtue ,,of ,,loving-,,kindness4 ,thus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal virtue4 ,ancient philosophers recognised it as such1 but made it co-ordinate with three others unsuitably chosen4#a ,loving-kindness 7caritas1 7 was not as yet ranked as a virtue4 ,plato himself1 who rises highest in moral science1 reaches only so far as voluntary1 disinterested justice4 ,it is true that loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice and in fact2 but it was reserved for ,christianity1--whose greatest service is seen in this--to theoretically formulate1 and expressly advance it not only as a virtue1 but as the queen of all2 and to extend it even to enemies4 ,we are thinking of course only of ,europe4 ,for in ,asia1 a thousand years before1 the boundless love of one's neighbour had been prescribed and taught1 as well as practised3 the ,vedas#b are full of it2 while in the ,dharma-stra1#c ,itihsa1#d and ,purna#e it constantly recurs1 to say nothing of the preaching of akya-muni1 the ,buddha4 ,and to be quite accurate we must admit that there are traces to be found among the ,greeks and ,romans of a recommendation to follow loving-kindness2 for instance1 in ,cicero1 ,de ,finibus1 ,v41 #bc2f and also in ,pythagoras1 according to ,iamblichus1 ,de vita ,pythagorae1 chap4 #cc4g ,my task is now to give a philosophical derivation of this virtue from the principle ,i have laid down4 ,it has been demonstrated in ,chapter ,v4 of this ,part1 that the sense of ,compassion1 however much its origin is shrouded in mystery1 is the one and sole cause whereby the suffering ,i see in another1 of itself1 and as such1 becomes directly my motive2 and we have seen that the first stage of this process is negative4 ,the second degree is sharply distinguished from the first1 through the positive character of the actions resulting therefrom2 for at this point ,compassion does more than keep me back from injuring my neighbour2 it impels me to help him4 ,and according as1 on the one hand1 my sense of direct participation is keen and deep1 and1 on the other hand1 the distress is great and urgent1 so shall ,i be constrained by this motive1 which 7be it noted7 is purely and wholly moral1 to make a greater or less sacrifice in order to meet the need or the calamity which ,i observe2 and this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my bodily or mental powers1 the loss of my property1 freedom1 or even life4 ,so that in this direct suffering with another1 which rests on no arguments and requires none1 is found the one simple origin of loving-kindness1 caritas1 a in other words1 that virtue whose rule is3 ,omnes1 quantum potes1 juva 7help all people1 as far as lies in your power72 and from which all those actions proceed which are prescribed by ,ethics under the name of duties of virtue1 otherwise called duties of love1 or imperfect duties4 ,it is solely by direct and1 as it were1 instinctive participation in the sufferings which we see1 in other words1 by ,compassion1 that conduct so defined is occasioned2 at least when it can be said to have moral worth1 that is1 be declared free from all egoistic motives1 and when on that account it awakens in us that inward contentment which is called a good1 satisfied1 approving conscience1 and elicits from the spectator 7not without making him cast a humiliating glance at himself71 that remarkable commendation1 respect1 and admiration which are too well-known to be denied4 ,but if a beneficent action have any other motive whatever1 then it must be egoistic1 if not actually malicious4 ,for as the fundamental springs of all human conduct 7v4 ,chapter ,v4 of this ,part71 are three1 namely1 ,egoism1 ,malice1 ,compassion2 so the various motives which are capable of affecting men may be grouped under three general heads3 7#a7 one's own weal2 7#b7 others' woe2 7#c7 others' weal4 ,now if the motive of a kind act does not belong to the third class1 it must of course be found in the first or second4 ,to the second it is occasionally to be ascribed2 for instance1 if ,i do good to some one1 in order to vex another1 to whom ,i am hostile2 or to make the latter's sufferings more acute2 or1 it may be1 to put to shame a third person1 who refrained from helping2 or lastly1 to inflict a mortification on the man whom ,i benefit4 ,but it much more usually springs from the first class4 ,and this is the case whenever1 in doing some good1 ,i have in view my own weal1 no matter how remote or indirect it may be2 that is1 whenever ,i am influenced by the thought of reward whether in this1 or in another1 world1 or by the hope of winning high esteem1 and of gaining a reputation for nobleness of character2 or again1 when ,i reflect that the person1 whom ,i now aid1 may one day be able to assist me in return1 or otherwise be of some service and benefit2 or when1 lastly1 ,i am guided by the consideration that ,i must keep the rules of magnanimity and beneficence1 because ,i too may on some occasion profit thereby4 ,in a word1 my motive is egoistic as soon as it is anything other than the purely objective desire of simply knowing1 without any ulterior purpose1 that my neighbour is helped1 delivered from his distress and need1 or freed from his suffering4 ,if such an aim--shorn1 as it is1 of all subjectivity--be really mine1 then1 and then only1 have ,i given proof of that loving-kindness1 caritas1 1 which it is the great and distinguishing merit of ,christianity to have preached4 ,it should be observed1 in this connection1 that the injunctions which the ,gospel adds to its commandment of love1 e4g41 1 7let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth71 and the like1 are1 in point of fact1 based on a consciousness of the conclusion ,i have here reached1--namely1 that another's distress1 of itself alone1 without any further consideration1 must be my motive1 if what ,i do is to be of moral value4 ,and in the same place 7,matth4 vi4 #b7 we find it stated with perfect truth that ostentations almsgivers 4 7,get in full--exhaust their reward47 ,although1 in this respect too1 the ,vedas shed on us the light of a higher teaching4 ,they repeatedly declare that he1 who desires any sort of recompense for his work1 is still wandering in the path of darkness1 and not yet ripe for deliverance4 ,if any one should ask me what he gets from a charitable act1 my answer in all sincerity would be3 ,this1 that the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much the lighter2 otherwise absolutely nothing4 ,if you are not satisfied1 and feel that such is not a sufficient end1 then your wish was not to give alms1 but to make a purchase2 and you have effected a bad bargain4 ,but if the one thing you are concerned with is that he should feel the pressure of poverty less2 then you have gained your object2 you have diminished his suffering1 and you see exactly how far your gift is requited4 ,now1 how is it possible that trouble which is not mine1 and by which ,i am untouched1 should become as direct a motive to me as if it were my own1 and incite me to action8 ,as already explained1 only through the fact that1 although it comes before me merely as something outside myself1 by means of the external medium of sight or hearing2 ,i am1 nevertheless1 sensible of it with the sufferer2 ,i feel it as my own1 not indeed in myself1 but in him ,and so what ,calderon said comes to pass3 que entre el ver ,padecer y el padecer ,ninguna distancia habia4 7,no ,siempre lo ,peor es ,cierto4 ,jorn4 ,,ii41 ,esc4 #i47h ,this1 however1 presupposes that to a certain extent ,i have become identified with the other1 and consequently that the barrier between the ego and the non-ego is1 for the moment1 broken down4 ,it is then1 and then only1 that ,i make his interests1 his need1 his distress1 his suffering directly my own2 it is then that the empirical picture ,i have of him vanishes1 and ,i no longer see the stranger1 who is entirely unlike myself1 and to whom ,i am indifferent2 but ,i share his pain in him1 despite the certainty that his skin does not enclose my nerves4 ,only in this way is it possible for his woe1 his distress to become a motive for me2 otherwise ,i should be influenced solely by my own4 ,this process is1 ,i repeat1 mysterious4 ,for it is one which ,reason can give no direct account of1 and its causes lie outside the field of experience4 ,and yet it is of daily occurrence4 ,every one has often felt its working within himself2 even to the most hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown4 ,each day that passes brings it before our eyes1 in single acts1 on a small scale2 whenever a man1 by direct impulse1 without much reflection1 helps a fellow-creature and comes to his aid1 sometimes even exposing himself to the most imminent peril for the sake of one he has never seen before1 and this1 without once thinking of anything but the fact that he witnesses another's great distress and danger4 ,it was manifested on a large scale1 when after long consideration1 and many a stormy debate1 the noble-hearted ,british nation gave twenty millions of pounds to ransom the negroes in its colonies1 with the approbation and joy of a whole world4 ,if any one refuses to recognise in ,compassion the cause of this deed1 magnificent as it is in its grand proportions1 and prefers to ascribe it to ,christianity2 let him remember that in the whole of the ,new ,testament not one word is said against slavery1 though at that time it was practically universal2 and further1 that as late as ,a4,d4 #ahfj1 in ,north ,america1 when the question was being discussed1 a man was found who thought to strengthen his case by appealing to the fact that ,abraham and ,jacob kept slaves6 ,what will be in each separate case the practical effect of this mysterious inner process may be left to ,ethics to analyse1 in chapters and paragraphs entitled ,duties of ,virtue1 ,duties of ,love1 ,imperfect ,duties1 or whatever other name be used4 ,the root1 the basis of all these is the one here indicated2 for out of it arises the primary precept3 ,omnes1 quantum potes1 juva2 from which in turn everything else required can very easily be deduced2 just as out of the ,neminem laede--the first half of my principle--all duties of justice are derivable4 ,ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences4 ,and this is only to be expected1 since it is incumbent on each person to construct it for himself1 and himself form the rule for every case1 as it occurs1 out of the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart2 for few have leisure and patience enough to learn a ready-made system of ,morals4 ,from justice and loving-kindness spring all the other virtues2 for which reason these two may properly be called cardinal1 and the disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone of ,moral ,science4 ,the entire ethical content of the ,old ,testament is justice2 loving-kindness being that of the ,new4 ,the latter is the 7the new commandment ,john xiii4 #cd71 which according to ,paul 7,romans xiii4 #h-aj7 includes all ,christian virtues4 #a ,plato taught that ,justice 77 includes in itself the three other virtues of ,wisdom 771 ,fortitude 717 and ,temperance 774 ,with ,aristotle1 too1 ,justice is the chief of virtues2 while the ,stoic doctrine is that ,virtue is manifested in four leading co-ordinate forms3 ,wisdom1 ,justice1 ,fortitude1 and ,temperance4--7,translator47 #b ,there are four ,vedas3 the ,big-,veda1 ,yajur-,veda1 ,sma-,veda1 and ,atharva-,veda4--7,translator47 #c ,dharma-stra 7a law book73 the body or code of ,hindu law4--7,translator47 #d ,itihsa 7iti-ha-sa1 so indeed it is73 talk1 legend1 traditional accounts of former events1 heroic history2 e4g41 the ,mah-bhrata4--7,translator47 #e ,purna 7ancient1 legendary73 the name given to certain well-known sacred works1 eighteen in number1 comprising the whole body of modern ,hindu mythology4 ,v4 ,monier ,williams' ,sanskrit ,dictionary4--7,translator47 #f ,ipsa ,,caritas generis humani1 quae nata a primo satu1 quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur1 et tota domus conjugio et stirpe conjungitur1 serpit sensim foras1 cognationibus primum1 tum affinitatibus1 deinde amicitiis1 post vicinitatibus tum civibus et iis1 qui publice socii atque amici sunt1 deinde ,,totius ,,complexu ,,gentis ,,humanae4 #g ,this chapter describes the ,pythagorean 1 which comes very near to loving-kindness4 ,it contains also certain 4--7,translator47 #h ,for between the view ,of pain1 and pain itself1 ,i never knew ,a distance lie4 ,it is not ,always the ,worst that is ,certain3 ,act ,,ii41 ,sc4 #i4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,proof ,,now ,,given ,,confirmed ,,by ,,experience4 ,the truth ,i have here laid down1 that ,compassion is the sole non-egoistic stimulus1 and therefore the only really moral one1 is a strange1 indeed almost incomprehensible paradox4 ,i shall hope1 therefore1 to render it less extraordinary to the reader1 if ,i show that it is confirmed by experience1 and by the universal testimony of human sentiment4 7#a7 ,for this purpose ,i shall1 in the first place1 state an imaginary case1 which in the present investigation may serve as an experimentum crucis#a 7a crucial test74 ,but not to make the matter too easy1 ,i shall take no instance of loving-kindness1 but rather a breach of lawful right1 and that of the worse kind4 ,let us suppose two young people1 ,caius and ,titus1 to be passionately in love1 each with a different girl1 and that both are completely thwarted by two other men who are preferred because of certain external circumstances4 ,they have both resolved to put their rivals out of the way1 and are perfectly secure from every chance of detection1 even from all suspicion4 ,but when they come to actually prepare for the murder1 each of them1 after an inward struggle1 draws back4 ,they are now to give us a truthful and clear account of the reasons why they abandoned their project4 ,as for ,caius1 ,i leave it entirely to the reader to choose what motive he likes4 ,it may be that religions grounds checked him2 for instance1 the thought of the ,divine ,will1 of future retribution1 of the judgment to come1 etc4 ,or perhaps he may say3 ,i reflected that the principle ,i was going to apply in this case would not be adapted to provide a rule universally valid for all possible rational beings2 because ,i should have treated my rival only as a means1 and not at the same time as an end4 ,or1 following ,fichte1 he may deliver himself as follows3 ,every human life is a means towards realising the moral law2 consequently1 ,i cannot1 without being indifferent to this realisation1 destroy a being ordained to do his part in effecting it4--7,sittenlehre1 p4 #cgc47 7,this scruple1 be it observed in passing1 he might well overcome by the hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral law1 when once in possession of his beloved47 ,or1 again1 he may speak after the fashion of ,wollaston3 ,i considered that such an action would be the expression of a false tenet4 ,or like ,hutcheson3 ,the ,moral ,sense1 whose perceptions1 equally with those of every other sense1 admit of no final explanation1 forbade me to commit such a deed4 ,or like ,adam ,smith3 ,i foresaw that my act would awaken no sympathy with me in the minds of the spectators4 ,or his language may be borrowed from ,christian ,wolff3 ,i recognised that ,i should thereby advance neither the work of making myself perfect1 nor the same process in any one else4 ,or from ,spinoza3 ,homini nihil utilius homine3 ergo hominem interimere nolui4 7,to man nothing is more useful than man3 therefore ,i was unwilling to destroy a man47 ,in short1 he may say what one pleases4 ,but ,titus1 whose explanation is supplied by myself1 will speak as follows3 ,when ,i came to make arrangements for the work1 and so1 for the moment1 had to occupy myself not with my own passion1 but with my rival2 then for the first time ,i saw clearly what was going to happen to him4 ,but simultaneously ,i was seized with compassion and pity2 sorrow for him laid hold upon me1 and overmastered me3 ,i could not strike the blow4 ,now ,i ask every honest and unprejudiced reader3 ,which of these two is the better man8 ,to which would he prefer to entrust his own destiny8 ,which is restrained by the purer motive8 ,consequently1 where does the basis of morality lie8 7#b7 ,there is nothing that revolts our moral sense so much as cruelty4 ,every other offence we can pardon1 but not cruelty4 ,the reason is found in the fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of ,compassion4 ,when we hear of intensely cruel conduct1 as1 for instance1 the act1 which has just been recorded in the papers1 of a mother1 who murdered her little son of five years1 by pouring boiling oil into his throat1 and her younger child1 by burying it alive2 or what was recently reported from ,algiers3 how a casual dispute between a ,spaniard and an ,algerine ended in a fight2 and how the latter1 having vanquished the other1 tore out the whole of his lower jaw bone1 and carried it off as a trophy1 leaving his adversary still alive2--when we hear of cruelty like this1 we are seized with horror1 and exclaim3 ,how is it possible to do such a thing8 ,now1 let me ask what this question signifies4 ,does it mean3 ,how is it possible to fear so little the punishments of the future life8 ,it is difficult to admit this interpretation4 ,then perhaps it intends to say3 ,how is it possible to act according to a principle which is so absolutely unfitted to become a general law for all rational beings8 ,certainly not4 ,or1 once more3 ,how is it possible to neglect so utterly one's own perfection as well as that of another8' ,this is equally unimaginable4 ,the sense of the question is assuredly nothing but this3 ,how is it possible to be so utterly bereft of compassion8 ,the conclusion is that when an action is characterised by an extraordinary absence of compassion1 it bears the certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loathsomeness4 ,hence ,compassion is the true moral incentive4 7#c7 ,the ethical basis1 or the original moral stimulus1 which ,i have disclosed1 is the only one that can be justly said to have a real and extended sphere of effective influence4 ,no one will surely venture to maintain as much of all the other moral principles that philosophers have set up2 for these are composed of abstract1 sometimes even of hair-splitting propositions1 with no foundation other than an artificial combination of ideas2 such that their application to actual conduct would often incline to the comic4 ,a good action1 inspired solely by ,kant's ,moral ,principle1 would be at bottom the work of philosophic pedantry2 or else would lead the doer into self-deception1 through his reason interpreting conduct1 which had other1 perhaps nobler1 incentives1 as the product of the ,categorical ,imperative1 and of the conception of ,duty1 which1 as we have seen1 rests on nothing4 ,but not only is it true that the philosophic moral principles1 purely theoretical as they are1 have seldom any operative power2 of those established by religion1 and expressly framed for practical purposes1 it is equally difficult to predicate any marked efficiency4 ,the chief evidence of this lies in the fact that in spite of the great religious differences in the world1 the amount of morality1 or rather of immorality1 shows no corresponding variation1 but in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere4 ,only it is important not to confound rudeness and refinement with morality and immorality4 ,the religion of ,hellas had an exceedingly small moral tendency1--it hardly went further than respect for oaths4 ,no dogma was taught1 and no system of ,ethics publicly preached2 nevertheless1 all things considered1 it does not appear that the ,greeks were morally inferior to the men of the ,christian era4 ,the morality of ,christianity is of a much higher kind than that of any other religion which previously appeared in ,europe4 ,but if any one should believe for this reason that ,european morals have improved proportionally1 and that now at any rate they surpass what obtains elsewhere1 it would not be difficult to demonstrate that among the ,mohammedans1 ,gnebres1 ,hindus1 and ,buddhists1 there is at least as much honesty1 fidelity1 toleration1 gentleness1 beneficence1 nobleness1 and self-denial as among ,christian peoples4 ,indeed1 the scale will be found rather to turn unfavourably for ,christendom1 when we put into the balance the long list of inhuman cruelties which have constantly been perpetrated within its limits and often in its name4 ,we need only recall for a moment the numerous religious wars2 the crusades that nothing can justify2 the extirpation of a large part of the ,american aborigines1 and the peopling of that continent by negroes1 brought over from ,africa1 without the shadow of a right1 torn from their families1 their country1 their hemisphere1 and1 as slaves1 condemned for life to forced labour2#b the tireless persecution of heretics2 the unspeakable atrocities of the ,inquisition1 that cried aloud to heaven2 the ,massacre of ,st4 ,bartholomew2 the execution of #ah1jjj persons in the ,netherlands by the ,duke of ,alva2 and these are but a few facts among many4 ,speaking generally1 however1 if we compare with the performances of its followers the excellent morality which ,christianity1 and1 more or less1 every creed preaches1 and then try to imagine how far theory would become practice1 if crime were not impeded by the secular arm of the state2 nay more1 what would probably happen1 if1 for only one day all laws should be suspended2 we shall be obliged to confess that the effect of the various religions on ,morals is in fact very small4 ,this is of course due to weakness of faith4 ,theoretically1 and so long as it is only a question of piety in the abstract1 every one supposes his belief to be firm enough4 ,only the searching touch-stone of all our convictions is--what we do4 ,when the moment for acting arrives1 and our faith has to be tested by great self-denial and heavy sacrifices1 then its feebleness becomes evident4 ,if a man is seriously planning some evil1 he has already broken the bounds of true and pure morality4 ,thenceforward the chief restraint that checks him is invariably the dread of justice and the police4 ,should he be so hopeful of escaping detection as to cast such fears aside1 the next barrier that meets him is regard for his honour4 ,if this second rampart be crossed1 there is very little likelihood1 after both these powerful hindrances are withdrawn1 that any religious dogma will appeal to him strongly enough to keep him back from the deed4 ,for if he be not frightened by near and immediate dangers1 he will hardly be curbed by terrors which are distant1 and rest merely on belief4 ,moreover1 there is a positive objection that may be brought against all good conduct proceeding solely from religions conviction2 it is not purged of self-interest1 but done out of regard for reward and punishment1 and hence can have no purely moral value4 ,this view we find very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated ,grand-,duke of ,weimar1 ,karl ,august4 ,he writes3 ,baron ,weyhers was himself of opinion that he1 who is good through religion1 and not by natural inclination1 must be a bad fellow at heart4 ,in vino veritas4#c--7,letters to ,j4 ,h4 ,merck2 ,no4 #bbi47 ,but now let us turn to the moral incentive which ,i have disclosed4 ,who ventures for a moment to deny that it displays a marked and truly wonderful influence at all times1 among all peoples1 in all circumstances of life2 even when constitutional law is suspended1 and the horrors of revolutions and wars fill the air2 in small things and in great1 every day and every hour8 ,who will refuse to admit that it is constantly preventing much wrong1 and calling into existence many a good action1 often quite unexpectedly1 and where there is no hope of reward8 ,is there any one who will gainsay the fact that1 where it and it alone has been operative1 we all with deep respect and emotion unreservedly recognise the presence of genuine moral worth8 7#d7 ,boundless compassion for all living beings is the surest and most certain guarantee of pure moral conduct1 and needs no casuistry4 ,whoever is filled with it will assuredly injure no one1 do harm to no one1 encroach on no man's rights2 he will rather have regard for every one1 forgive every one1 help every one as far as he can1 and all his actions will bear the stamp of justice and loving-kindness4 ,on the other hand1 if we try to say3 ,this man is virtuous1 but he is a stranger to ,compassion2 or3 he is an unjust and malicious man1 yet very compassionate2 the contradiction at once leaps to light4 ,in former times the ,english plays used to finish with a petition for the ,king4 ,the old ,indian dramas close with these words3 ,may all living beings be delivered from pain4 ,tastes differ2 but in my opinion there is no more beautiful prayer than this4 7#e7 ,also from separate matters of detail it may be inferred that the original stimulus of true morality is ,compassion4 ,for instance1 to make a man lose a hundred thalers1 by legal tricks involving no danger1 is equally unjust1 whether he be rich or poor2 but in the latter case the rapping of conscience is much louder1 the censure of disinterested witnesses more emphatic4 ,aristotle was well aware of this1 and said3 1 1 4 7,it is worse to injure a man in adversity than one who is prosperous47--7,probl4 xxix4 #b47 ,if the man have wealth1 self-reproach is proportionally faint1 and grows still fainter1 if it be the treasury that has been overreached2 for state coffers can form no object of ,compassion4 ,it thus appears that the grounds for self-accusation as well as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly by the infringement of the law1 but chiefly by the suffering thereby brought upon others4 ,the violation of right1 by itself and as such1 which is involved in cheating the exchequer1 7to take the above instance17 will be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor and witness2 but only because1 and in so far as1 the rule of respecting every right1 which forms the sine qua non of all honourable conduct1 is in consequence broken4 ,the stricture passed will1 in fact1 be indirect and limited4 ,if1 however1 it be a confidential employ in the service that commits the fraud1 the case assumes quite another aspect2 it then has all the specific attributes of1 and belongs to1 that class of actions described above1 whose characteristic is a double injustice4 ,the analysis here given explains why the worst charge which can ever be brought against rapacious extortioners and legal sharpers is1 that they appropriate for themselves the goods of widows and orphans4 ,the reason appears in the fact that the latter1 more than others1 owing to their helplessness1 might be expected to excite ,compassion in the most callous heart4 ,hence we conclude that the entire absence of this sense is sufficient to lower a man to the last degree of villainy4 7#f7 ,compassion is the root no less of justice than of loving-kindness2 but it is more clearly evidenced in the latter than in the former4 ,we never receive proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of others1 so long as we are in all respects prosperous4 ,the happy man may1 no doubt1 often hear the words of good-will on his relations' and friends' lips2 but the expression of that pure1 disinterested1 objective participation in the condition and lot of others1 which loving-kindness begets1 is reserved for him who is stricken with some sorrow or suffering1 whatever it be4 ,for the fortunate as such we do not feel sympathy2 unless they have some other claim on us1 they remain alien to our hearts3 habeant sibi sua4 7,they may keep their own affairs1 pleasures1 etc41 to themselves47 ,nay1 if a man has many advantages over others1 he will easily become an object of envy1 which is ready1 should he once fall from his height of prosperity1 to turn into malignant joy4 ,nevertheless this menace is1 for the most part1 not fulfilled2 the ,sophoclean ' 7his enemies laugh7 does not generally become an actual fact4 ,as soon as the day of ruin comes to one of fortune's spoiled children1 there usually takes place a great transformation in the minds of his acquaintances1 which for us in this connection is very instructive4 ,in the first place this change clearly reveals the real nature of the interest that the friends of his happiness took in him3 diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici4 7,when the casks are drained to the dregs1 one's friends run away47#d ,on the other hand1 the exultation of those who envied his prosperity1 the mocking laugh of malicious satisfaction1 which he feared more than adversity itself1 and the contemplation of which he could not face1 are things usually spared him4 ,jealousy is appeased1 and disappears with its cause2 while ,compassion which takes its place is the parent of loving-kindness4 ,those who were envious of1 and hostile to1 a man in the full tide of success1 after his downfall1 have not seldom become his friends1 ready to protect1 comfort1 and help4 ,who has not1 at least in a small way1 himself experienced something of the sort8 ,where is the man1 who1 when overtaken by some calamity1 of whatever nature1 has not noticed with surprise how the persons that previously had displayed the greatest coldness1 nay1 ill-will towards him1 then came forward with unfeigned sympathy8 ,for misfortune is the condition of ,compassion1 and ,compassion the source of loving-kindness4 ,when our wrath is kindled against a person1 nothing quenches it so quickly1 even when it is righteous1 as the words3 ,he is an unfortunate man4 ,and the reason is obvious3 ,compassion is to anger as water to fire4 ,therefore1 whoever would fain have nothing to repent of1 let him listen to my advice4 ,when he is inflamed with rage1 and meditates doing some one a grievous injury1 he should bring the thing vividly before his mind1 as a fait accompli2 he should clearly picture to himself this other fellow-being tormented with mental or bodily pain1 or struggling with need and misery2 so that he is forced to exclaim3 ,this is my work6 ,such thoughts as these1 if anything1 will avail to moderate his wrath4 ,for ,compassion is the true antidote of anger2 and by practising on oneself this artifice of the imagination1 one awakes beforehand1 while there is yet time1 la piti1 dont la voix1 ,alors qu'on est veng1 fait entendre ses lois4#e --7,voltaire1 ,smiramis1 ,v4 #f47 ,and in general1 the hatred we may cherish for others is overcome by nothing so easily as by our taking a point of view whence they can appeal to our ,compassion4 ,the reason indeed why parents1 as a rule1 specially love the sickly one of their children is because the sight of it perpetually stirs their ,compassion4 7#g7 ,there is another proof that the moral incentive disclosed by me is the true one4 ,i mean the fact that animals also are included under its protecting aegis4 ,in the other ,european systems of ,ethics no place is found for them1--strange and inexcusable as this may appear4 ,it is asserted that beasts have no rights2 the illusion is harboured that our conduct1 so far as they are concerned1 has no moral significance1 or1 as it is put in the language of these codes1 that there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals4 ,such a view is one of revolting coarseness1 a barbarism of the ,west1 whose source is ,judaism4 ,in philosophy1 however1 it rests on the assumption1 despite all evidence to the contrary1 of the radical difference between man and beast1--a doctrine which1 as is well known1 was proclaimed with more trenchant emphasis by ,descartes than by any one else3 it was indeed the necessary consequence of his mistakes4 ,when ,leibnitz and ,wolff1 following out the ,cartesian view1 built up out of abstract ideas their ,rational ,psychology1 and constructed a deathless anima rationalis 7rational soul72 then the natural claims of the animal kingdom visibly rose up against this exclusive privilege1 this human patent of immortality1 and ,nature1 as always in such circumstances1 entered her silent protest4 ,our philosophers1 owing to the qualms of their intellectual conscience1 were soon forced to seek aid for their ,rational ,psychology from the empirical method2 they accordingly tried to reveal the existence of a vast chasm1 an immeasurable gulf between animals and men1 in order to represent them1 in the teeth of opposing testimony1 as existences essentially different4 ,these efforts did not escape the ridicule of ,boileau2 for we find him saying3 ,les animaux ont-ils des universits8 ,voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facults8#f ,such a supposition would end in animals being pronounced incapable of distinguishing themselves from the external world1 and of having any self-consciousness1 any ego6 ,as answer to such absurd tenets1 it would only be necessary to point to the boundless ,egoism innate in every animal1 even the smallest and humblest2 this amply proves how perfectly they are conscious of their self1 as opposed to the world1 which lies outside it4 ,if any one of the ,cartesian persuasion1 with views like these in his head1 should find himself in the claws of a tiger1 he would be taught in the most forcible manner what a sharp distinction such a beast draws between his ego and the non-ego4 ,corresponding to these philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar sophism in the speech of many peoples1 especially the ,germans4 ,for the commonest matters connected with the processes of life1--for food1 drink1 conception1 the bringing forth of young2 for death1 and the dead body2 such languages have special words applicable only to animals1 not to men4 ,in this way the necessity of using the same terms for both is avoided1 and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under verbal differences4 ,now1 since the ancient tongues show no trace of such a dual mode of expression1 but frankly denote the same things by the same words2 it follows that this miserable artifice is beyond all doubt the work of ,european priestcraft1 which1 in its profanity1 knows no limit to its disavowal of1 and blasphemy against1 the ,eternal ,reality that lives in every animal4 ,thus was laid the foundation of that harshness and cruelty towards beasts which is customary in ,europe1 and on which a native of the ,asiatic uplands could not look without righteous horror4 ,in ,english this infamous invention is not to be found2 assuredly because the ,saxons1 when they conquered ,england1 were not yet ,christians4 ,nevertheless the ,english language shows something analogous in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the neuter gender1 the pronoun it being employed for them1 just as if they were lifeless things4 ,this idiom has a very objectionable sound1 especially in the case of dogs1 monkeys1 and other ,primates1 and is unmistakably a priestly trick1 designed to reduce beasts to the level of inanimate objects4 ,the ancient ,egyptians1 who dedicated all their days to religion1 were accustomed to place in the same vault with a human mummy that of an ibis1 a crocodile1 etc42 in ,europe it is a crime1 an abomination to bury a faithful dog beside the resting-place of his master1 though it is there perhaps that he1 with a fidelity and attachment unknown to the sons of men1 awaited his own end4 ,to a recognition of the identity1 in all essentials1 of the phaenomena which we call man and beast1 nothing leads more surely than the study of zoology and anatomy4 ,what shall we say then1 when in these days 7#ahci7 a canting dissector has been found1 who presumes to insist on an absolute and radical difference between human beings and animals1 and who goes so far as to attack and calumniate honest zoologists that keep aloof from all priestly guile1 eye-service1 and hypocrisy1 and dare to follow the leading of nature and of truth8 ,those persons must indeed be totally blind1 or else completely chloroformed by the foetor ,judaicus 7,jewish stench71 who do not discern that the truly essential and fundamental part in man and beast is identically the same thing4 ,that which distinguishes the one from the other does not lie in the primary and original principle1 in the inner nature1 in the kernel of the two phaenomena 7this kernel being in both alike the ,will of the individual72 it is found in what is secondary1 in the intellect1 in the degree of perceptive capacity4 ,it is true that the latter is incomparably higher in man1 by reason of his added faculty of abstract knowledge1 called ,reason2 nevertheless this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral development1 in other words1 to the corporeal difference1 which is quantitative1 not qualitative1 of a single part1 the brain4 ,in all other respects the similarity between men and animals1 both psychical and bodily1 is sufficiently striking4 ,so that we must remind our judaised friends in the ,west1 who despise animals1 and idolise ,reason1 that if they were suckled by their mothers1 so also was the dog by his4 ,even ,kant fell into this common mistake of his age1 and of his country1 and ,i have already administered the censure#g which it is impossible to withhold4 ,the fact that ,christian morality takes no thought for beasts is a defect in the system which is better admitted than perpetuated4 ,one's astonishment is1 however1 all the greater1 because1 with this exception1 it shows the closest agreement with the ,ethics of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 being only less strongly expressed1 and not carried to the last consequences imposed by logic4 ,on the whole1 there seems little room for doubting that1 in common with the idea of a god become man1 or ,avatar1#h it has an ,asiatic origin1 and probably came to ,judaea by way of ,egypt2 so that ,christianity would be a secondary reflection of the primordial light that shone in ,india1 which1 falling first on ,egypt1 was unhappily refracted from its ruins upon ,jewish soil4 ,an apt symbol of the insensibility of ,christian ,ethics to animals1 while in other points its similarity to the ,indian is so great1 may be found in the circumstance that ,john the ,baptist comes before us in all respects like a ,hindu ,sannyasin1#i except that he is clothed in skins3 a thing which would be1 as is well known1 an abomination in the eyes of every follower of ,brahmanism or ,buddhism4 ,the ,royal ,society of ,calcutta only received their copy of the ,vedas on their distinctly promising that they would not have it bound in leather1 after ,european fashion4 ,in silken binding1 therefore1 it is now to be seen on the shelves of their library4 ,again3 the ,gospel story of ,peter's draught of fishes1 which the ,saviour blesses so signally that the boats are overladen1 and begin to sink 7,luke v4 #a-aj71 forms a characteristic contrast to what is related of ,pythagoras4 ,it is said that the latter1 initiated as he was in all the wisdom of the ,egyptians1 bought the draught from the fishermen1 while the net was still under water1 in order to at once set at liberty the captive denizens of the sea4 7,apuleius3 ,de ,magia1 p4 #cf3 edit4 ,bipont47#aj ,compassion for animals is intimately connected with goodness of character1 and it may be confidently asserted that he1 who is cruel to living creatures1 cannot be a good man4 ,moreover1 this compassion manifestly flows from the same source whence arise the virtues of justice and loving-kindness towards men4 ,thus1 for instance1 people of delicate sensitiveness1 on realising that in a fit of ill-humour1 or anger1 or under the influence of wine1 they punished their dog1 their horse1 their ape undeservedly1 or unnecessarily1 or excessively1 are seized with the same remorse1 feel the same dissatisfaction with themselves1 as when they are conscious of having done some wrong to one of their fellows4 ,the only difference--a purely nominal one--is that in the latter case this remorse1 this dissatisfaction is called the voice of conscience rising in rebuke4 ,i remember having read of an ,englishman1 who1 when hunting in ,india1 had killed a monkey1 that he could not forget the dying look which the creature cast on him2 so that he never fired at these animals again4 ,another sportsman1 ,william ,harris by name1 a true ,nimrod1 has much the same story to tell4 ,during the years #ahcf-g he travelled far into the heart of ,africa1 merely to indulge his passion for the chase4 ,a passage in his book1 published at ,bombay in #ahch1 describes how he shot his first elephant1 a female4 ,next morning on going to look for his game1 he found that all the elephants had fled from the neighbourhood1 except a young one which had spent the night beside its dead mother4 ,seeing the huntsmen1 it forgot all fear1 and came to meet them1 with the clearest and most lively signs of disconsolate grief1 and put its tiny trunk about them1 as if to beg for help4 ,then1 says ,harris1 ,i was filled with real remorse for what ,i had done1 and felt as if ,i had committed a murder4 ,the ,english nation1 with its fine sensibility1 is1 in fact1 distinguished above all others for extraordinary compassion towards animals1 which appears at every opportunity1 and is so strong that1 despite the cold superstition which otherwise degrades them1 these ,anglo-,saxons have been led through its operation to fill up by legislation the lacuna that their religion leaves in morality4 ,for this gap is precisely the reason why in ,europe and ,america there is need of societies for the protection of animals1 which are entirely dependent on the law for their efficiency4 ,in ,asia the religions themselves suffice1 consequently no one there ever thinks of such associations4 ,meanwhile ,europeans are awakening more and more to a sense that beasts have rights1 in proportion as the strange notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown1 that the animal kingdom came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man4 ,this view1#aa with the corollary that non-human living creatures are to be regarded merely as things1 is at the root of the rough and altogether reckless treatment of them1 which obtains in the ,west4 ,to the honour1 then1 of the ,english be it said that they are the first people who have1 in downright earnest1 extended the protecting arm of the law to animals3 in ,england the miscreant1 that commits an outrage on beasts1 has to pay for it1 equally whether they are his own or not4 ,nor is this all4 ,there exists in ,london the ,society for the ,prevention of ,cruelty to ,animals1 a corporate body voluntarily formed1 which1 without state assistance1 and at great cost1 is of no small service in lessening the tale of tortures inflicted on animals4 ,its emissaries are ubiquitous1 and keep secret watch in order to inform against the tormentors of dumb1 sensitive creatures2 and such persons have therefore good reason to stand in fear of them4#ab ,at all the steep bridges in ,london this ,society stations a pair of horses1 which without any charge is attached to heavy freight-waggons4 ,is not this admirable8 ,does it not elicit our approval1 as unfailingly as any beneficent action towards men8 ,also the ,philanthropic ,society of ,london has done its part4 ,in #ahcg it offered a prize of #cj for the best exposition of the moral reasons which exist to keep men from torturing animals4 ,the line of argument1 however1 had to be taken almost exclusively from ,christianity1 whereby the difficulty of the task was1 of course1 increased2 but two years later1 in #ahci1 ,mr4 ,macnamara was the successful competitor4 ,at ,philadelphia there is an ,animals' ,friends' ,society1 having the same aims2 and it is to the ,president of the latter that a book called ,philozoia2 or1 ,moral ,reflections on the ,actual ,condition of ,animals1 and the ,means of ,improving the ,same 7,brussels1 #ahci71 has been dedicated by its author1 ,t4 ,forster4 ,it is original and well written4 ,mr4 ,forster earnestly commends to his readers the humane treatment of animals4 ,as an ,englishman he naturally tries to strengthen his position by the support of the ,bible2 but he is on slippery ground1 and meets with such poor success that he ends by catching at the following ingenious position3 ,jesus ,christ 7he says7 was born in a stable among oxen and asses2 which was meant to indicate symbolically that we ought to regard the beasts as our brothers1 and treat them accordingly4 ,all that ,i have here adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord1 of which we are speaking1 is now at length beginning to vibrate also in the ,west4 ,for the rest1 we may observe that compassion for sentient beings is not to carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh1 like the ,brahmans4 ,this is because1 by a natural law1 capacity for pain keeps pace with the intelligence2 consequently men1 by going without animal food1 especially in the ,north1 would suffer more than beasts do through a quick death1 which is always unforeseen2 although the latter ought to be made still easier by means of chloroform4 ,indeed without meat nourishment mankind would be quite unable to withstand the rigours of the ,northern climate4 ,the same reasoning explains1 too1 why we are right in making animals work for us2 it is only when they are subjected to an excessive amount of toil that cruelty begins4 7#h7 ,it is perhaps not impossible to investigate and explain metaphysically the ultimate cause of that ,compassion in which alone all non-egoistic conduct can have its source2 but let us for the moment put aside such inquiries1 and consider the phaenomenon in question1 from the empirical point of view1 simply as a natural arrangement4 ,now if ,nature's intention was to soften as much as possible the numberless sufferings of every sort1 to which our life is exposed1 and which no one altogether escapes2 if she wished to provide some counterbalance for the burning ,egoism1 which fills all beings1 and often develops into malice2 it will at once strike every one as obvious that she could not have chosen any method more effectual than that of planting in the human heart the wonderful disposition1 which inclines one man to share the pain of another1 and from which proceeds the voice that bids us1 in tones strong and unmistakable1 take thought for our neighbour2 calling1 at one time1 ,protect6 at another1 ,help6 ,assuredly1 from the mutual succour thus arising1 there was more to be hoped for1 towards the attainment of universal well-being1 than from a stern ,command of duty1 couched in general1 abstract terms1--the product of certain reasoning processes1 and of artificial combinations of conceptions4 ,from such an ,imperative1 indeed1 all the less result could be expected because to the rough human unit general propositions and abstract truths are unintelligible1 the concrete only having some meaning for him4 ,and it should be remembered that mankind in its entirety1 a very small part alone excepted1 has always been rude1 and must remain so1 since the large amount of bodily toil1 which for the race as a whole is inevitable1 leaves no time for mental culture4 ,whereas1 in order to awaken that sense1 which has been proved to be the sole source of disinterested action1 and consequently the true basis of ,morals1 there is no need of abstract knowledge1 but only of intuitive perception1 of the simple comprehension of a concrete case4 ,to this ,compassion is at once responsive1 without the mediation of other thoughts4 7#i7 ,the following circumstance will be found in complete accord with the last paragraph4 ,the foundation1 which ,i have given to ,ethics1 leaves me without a forerunner among the ,school ,philosophers2 indeed1 my position is paradoxical1 as far as their teaching goes1 and many of them1 for instance1 the ,stoics 7,seneca1 ,de ,clementia1 ,,ii41 #e71 ,spinoza 7,ethica1 ,,iv41 prop4 #ej71 and ,kant 7,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft1 p4 #bac2 ,r4 p4 #beg7 only notice the motive of ,compassion to utterly reject and contemn it4 ,on the other hand1 my basis is supported by the authority of the greatest moralist of modern times2 for such1 undoubtedly1 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau is1--that profound reader of the human heart1 who drew his wisdom not from books1 but from life1 and intended his doctrine not for the professorial chair1 but for humanity2 he1 the foe of all prejudice1 the foster-child of nature1 whom alone she endowed with the gift of being able to moralise without tediousness1 because he hit the truth and stirred the heart4 ,i shall therefore venture here to cite some passages from his works in support of my theory1 observing that1 so far1 ,i have been as sparing as possible with regard to quotations4 ,in the ,discours sur l',origine de l',ingalit1 p4 #ia 7edit4 ,bipont471 he says3 ,il y a un autre principe1 que ,hobbes n'a point aperu1 et qui ayant t donn l'homme pour adoucir1 en certaines circonstances1 la frocit de son amour-propre1 tempre l'ardeur qu'il a pour son bien-tre par une ,r,,pugnance ,,inn,e ,,voir ,,souffrir ,,son ,,semblable4 ,je ne crois pas avoir aucune contradiction craindre en accordant l'homme la ,,seule ,,vertu ,,naturelle qu'ait t forc de reconnatre le dtracteur le plus outr des vertus humaines4 ,je parle ,,de ,,la ,,piti1 etc4#ac ,p4 #ib3 ,mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes n'eussent jamais t que des monstres1 si la nature ne leur eut donn ,,la ,,piti l'appui de la raison3 mais il n'a pas vu1 que ,,de ,,cette ,,seule ,,qualit ,,decoulent ,,toutes ,,les ,,vertus ,,sociales1 qu'il veut disputer aux hommes4 ,en effet1 qu'est-ce que la gnrosit1 la clmence1 l'humanit1 sinon ,,la ,,piti1 applique aux faibles1 aux coupables1 ou a l'espce humaine en gnral8 ,la bienveillance et l'amiti mme sont1 le bien prendre1 des productions d'une piti constante1 fixe sur un objet particulier2 car dsirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point1 qu'est-ce autre chose1 que dsirer qu'il soit heureux8444 ,la commisration sera d'autant plus nergique1 que ,l',,animal ,,spectateur ,s',,identifiera plus intimement avec ,l',,animal ,,souffrant4#ad ,p4 #id3 ,il est donc bien certain1 que la piti est un sentiment naturel1 qui1 modrant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-mme1 concourt la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espce4 ,c'est elle1 qui dans l'tat de nature1 tient lieu de lois1 de murs1 et de vertus1 avec cet avantage1 que nul ne sera tent de dsobir sa douce voix3 c'est elle1 qui dtournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever un faible enfant1 ou un vieillard infirme1 sa subsistence acquise avec peine1 si lui mme espre pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs3 c'est elle qui1 au lieu de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonne3 ,fais autrui comme tu veux qu'on te fasse2 inspire tous les hommes cette autre maxime de bont naturelle1 bien moins parfaite1 mais plus utile peut-tre que la prcdente3 ,fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est possible4 ,c'est1 en un mot1 ,,dans ,,ce ,,sentiment ,,naturel ,,plut,t1 ,,que ,,dans ,,les ,,arguments ,,subtils1 qu'il faut chercher la cause de la repugnance qu'prouverait tout homme mal faire1 mme indpendamment des maximes de l'ducation4#ae ,let this be compared with what he says in mile1 ,bk4 ,,iv41 pp4 #aae-abj 7edit4 ,bipont471 where the following passage occurs among others3-- ,en effet1 comment nous laissons-nous mouvoir la piti1 si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous et en nous ,,identifiant ,,avec ,l',,animal ,,souffrant3 ,,en ,,quittant1 pour ainsi dire1 ,,notre ,,tre1 ,,pour ,,prendre ,,le ,,sien8 ,nous ne souffrons qu'autant que nous jugeons qu'il souffre3 ,,ce ,n',,est ,,pas ,,dans ,,nous1 ,c',,est ,,dans ,,lui1 que nous souffrons 444 offrir au jeune homme des objets1 sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de son cur1 qui le dilatent1 qui l'tendent sur les autres tres1 qui le fassent partout ,,se ,,retrouver ,,hors ,,de ,,lui3 carter avec soin ceux1 qui le resserrent1 le concentrent1 et tendent le ressort ,,du ,,moi ,,humain1 etc4#af ,inside the pale of the ,schools1 as above remarked1 there is not a single authority in favour of my position2 but outside1 ,i have other testimony to cite1 in addition to ,rousseau's4 ,the ,chinese admit five cardinal virtues 7,tschang71 of which the chief is ,compassion 799,sin74 ,the other four are3 justice1 courtesy1 wisdom1 and sincerity4#ag ,similarly1 among the ,hindus1 we find that on the tablets placed to the memory of dead chieftains1 compassion for men and animals takes the first place in the record of their virtues4 ,at ,athens there was an altar to ,compassion in the ,agora1 as we know from ,pausanias1 ,i4 #ag3 1 1 -1 4#ah ,lucian also mentions this altar in the ,timon1 #ii4ai ,a phrase of ,phocion1 preserved by ,stobaeus1 describes ,compassion as the most sacred thing in human life3 n 1 4#bj ,in the ,sapientia ,indorum1 the ,greek translation of the ,paa-tantra1 we read 7,section #c1 p4 #bbj73 1 4#ba ,it is clear1 then1 that the real source of morality has been distinctly recognised at all times and in all countries2 ,europe alone excepted1 owing to the foetor ,judaicus 7,jewish stench71 which here pervades everything1 and is the reason why the ,western races require for the object of their obedience a command of duty1 a moral law1 an imperative1 in short1 an order and decree4 ,they remain wedded to this habit of thought1 and refuse to open their eyes to the fact that such a view is1 after all1 based upon nothing but ,egosim4 ,of course1 now and then1 isolated individuals of fine perception have felt the truth1 and given it utterance3 such a one was ,rousseau2 and such1 ,lessing4 ,in a letter written by the latter in #agef we read3 ,the best man1 and the one most likely to excel in all social virtues1 in all forms of magnanimity1 is he who is most compassionate4 #a ,this term appears to have been first used by ,newton and ,boyle4 ,the sense is undoubtedly derived from ,bacon's phrase instantia crucis1 which is one of his ,prerogative ,instances4 ,vide1 ,novum ,organum3 ,lib4 ,,ii41 xxxvi41 where it is explained as follows3 ,inter ,praerogativas ,instantiarum ponemus loco decimo quarto ,,instantias ,,crucis2 translate vocabulo a ,crucibus1 quae erectae in ,biviis1 indicant et signant viarum separationes4 ,has etiam ,instantias ,decisorias et ,judiciales1 et in ,casibus nonnullis ,instantias ,oraculi et ,mandati1 appellare consuevimus1 etc4--7,translator47 #b ,according to ,buxton 7,the ,african ,slave-trade1 #ahci71 their number is even now yearly increased by about #aej1jjj freshly imported2 and to these more than #bjj1jjj must be added1 who perish miserably at the time of their capture1 or on the voyage4 #c ,i4e41 under the influence of wine one speaks the truth4 ,cf4 ,pliny1 ,nat4 ,hist1 xiv41 chap4 #bb1 #bh1 #ada1 edit4 ,teubner2 vulgoque ,,veritas jam attributa ,,vino est4 ,gk4 4 ,v4 ,paroemiographi1 edit4 ,gaisford4--7,translator47 #d ,hor41 ,carm41 ,i41 #ce1 #bf4--7,translator4 7 #e ,compassion1 who with no uncertain tone1 ,the work of vengeance done1 her laws makes known4 #f ,have beasts1 forsooth1 their universities1 ,endowed1 like ours1 with all four faculties8 #g ,v4 ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,vi4 #h ,avatra 7ava-t to descend71 descent of a deity from heaven2 e4g41 the ten incarnations of ,vishu4 ,v4 ,monier ,williams' ,sanskrit ,dictionary4--7,translator47 #i ,sannysin 7one who lays down1 or resigns71 an ascetic2 a religious mendicant1 or ,brhman of the fourth order4 ,v4 ,monier ,williams' ,sanskrit ,dictionary4--7,translator47 #aj ,v4 ,apuleius3 ,apologia sive ,de ,magia ,liber 7,lipsiae1 ,teubner1 #aijj3 page #da1 chap1 xxxi73 ,pythagoram 444 memoriae prodiderunt1 cum animaduertisset proxime ,metapontum in litore ,italiae suae1 quam subsiciuam ,graeciam fecerat1 a quibusdam piscatoribus euerriculum trahi1 fortunam iactus eius emisse et pretio dato iussisse1 ilico piscis eos qui capti tenebantur solui retibus et reddi profundo4--7,translator47 #aa ,in ,vol4 ,,ii4 of my ,parerga1 #agg1 ,i have shown that its origin can be traced to the ,old ,testament4 #ab ,how seriously the matter is being taken up may be seen from the following case which is quite recent4 ,i quote from the ,birmingham ,journal of ,december1 #ahci4 ,arrest of a company of eighty-four abettors of dog-fights4--,it had come to the knowledge of the ,society of ,animals' ,friends that the ,square in ,fox ,street1 ,birmingham1 was yesterday to be the scene of a dog-fight4 ,measures were accordingly taken to secure the assistance of the police1 and a strong detachment of constables was sent to the spot4 ,at the right moment all the persons present were arrested4 ,these precious conspirators were then handcuffed together in pairs1 and the whole party was made fast by a long rope passing between each couple4 ,in this fashion they were marched off to the ,police ,station1 where mayor and magistrate were sitting in readiness for them4 ,the two ringleaders were condemned to pay1 each1 a fine of #a1 and #hs4 #f;d4 costs2 in default1 to undergo #ad days' hard labour4 ,the coxcombs whose habit is never to miss noble sport of this sort1 must have looked somewhat crestfallen in the midst of the procession4 ,but the ,times of ,april #f1 #ahee1 p4 #f1 supplies a still more striking instance from the present day2 and here we find the paper itself assuming judicial functions1 and imposing the right punishment4 ,it recounts the case of a very wealthy ,scotch baronet's daughter4 ,the matter had been brought before the law1 and the evidence showed that the girl had used a cudgel and knife on her horse with the greatest cruelty2 for which she was ordered to pay a fine of #e4 ,but for one in her position such a sum means nothing1 and she would practically have got off scot-free1 had not the ,times intervened to inflict on her a proper correction1 such as she would really feel4 ,it twice mentions the young lady's name in full1 printing it in large type1 and concludes as follows3 ,we cannot help saying that a few months' imprisonment with the addition of an occasional whipping administered in private1 but by the most muscular woman in ,hampshire1 would have been a much more suitable penalty for ,miss ,m4 ,n4 ,a wretched being of this sort has forfeited all the consideration and the privileges that attach to her sex2 we cannot regard her any longer as a woman4 ,these newspaper paragraphs ,i would especially recommend to the notice of the associations now formed in ,germany against cruelty to animals2 for they show what lines should be adopted1 in order to reach some solid result4 ,at the same time ,i desire to express my cordial appreciation of the praiseworthy zeal shown by ,herrn ,hofrath ,perner1 of ,munich1 who has entirely devoted himself to this branch of well-doing1 and succeeded in arousing interest in it all over the country4 ,it should be observed that the first portion of this note belongs to the earliest edition of the work1 published ,september1 #ahdj2 the latter part was written for the second edition1 which appeared in ,august1 #ahfj4 ,this explains why ,schopenhauer says that the first instance1 dated #ahci1 is quite recent1 and that the second1 dated #ahee1 is taken from the present day4--7,translator47 #ac ,there is another principle which ,hobbes did not perceive at all4 ,it was implanted in man in order to soften1 in certain circumstances1 the fierceness of his self-love1 and it moderates the ardour1 which he feels for his own well-being1 by producing a certain innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's suffering4 ,in attributing to man the only natural virtue1 which even the most advanced scepticism has been forced to recognise1 ,i stand1 assuredly1 in no fear of any contradiction4 ,i allude to compassion1 etc4 #ad ,mandeville was right in thinking that with all their systems of morality1 men would never have been anything but monsters1 if nature had not given them compassion to support their reason2 but he failed to see that from this one quality spring all the social virtues1 which he was unwilling to credit mankind with4 ,in reality1 what is generosity1 clemency1 humanity1 if not compassion1 applied to the weak1 to the guilty1 or to the human race1 as a whole8 ,even benevolence and friendship1 if we look at the matter rightly1 are seen to result from a constant compassion1 directed upon a particular object2 for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing else than to desire that he should be happy4444 ,the more closely the living spectator identifies himself with the living sufferer1 the more active does pity become4 #ae ,it is1 then1 quite certain that compassion is a natural feeling1 which checking1 as it does1 the love of self in each individual1 helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race4 ,this it is1 which in the state of nature1 takes the place of laws1 customs1 and virtues1 with the added advantage that no one will be tempted to disobey its gentle voice2 this it is1 which will restrain every able-bodied savage1 provided he hope to find his own livelihood elsewhere1 from robbing a weak child1 or depriving an infirm old man of the subsistence won by hard toil2 this it is1 which inspires all men1 not indeed with that sublime maxim of reasoned justice3 ,do to others as you would they should do unto you2 but with another rule of natural goodness1 no doubt less perfect1 but perhaps more useful1 namely3 ,do what is good for yourself with the least possible harm to others4 ,in a word1 it is in this natural feeling rather than in subtle arguments that we must look for the reason of the repugnance with which every one is accustomed to view bad conduct1 quite independently of the principles laid down by education4 #af ,in fact1 how is it that we let ourselves be moved to pity1 if not by getting out of our own consciousness1 and becoming identified with the living sufferer2 by leaving1 so to say1 our own being1 and entering into his8 ,we do not suffer1 except as we suppose he suffers2 it is not in us1 it is in him1 that we suffer 444 offer a young man objects1 on which the expansive force of his heart can act2 objects such as may enlarge his nature1 and incline it to go out to other beings1 in whom he may everywhere find himself again4 ,keep carefully away those things which narrow his view1 and make him self-centred1 and which tighten the strings of the human ego4 7,tendent le ressort 7stretch the spring7 du moi humain3 i4e41 stimulate the egoistic tendency47--7,translator47 #ag ,journal ,asiatique1 ,vol4 ix41 p4 #fb4 ,cf4 ,meng-,tseu 7otherwise called ,mencius71 edited by ,stanislas ,julien1 #ahbd1 ,bk4 ,i1 #de2 also ,meng-,tseu in the ,livres ,sacrs de l',orient1 by ,panthier p4 #bha4 ,v4 ,dictionnaire ,franais--,latin--,chinois1 par ,paul ,perny 7,didot ,frres1 ,paris1 #ahfi72 where the five cardinal virtues 7image7 are transliterated ou chng4 ,v4 also3 ,a ,syllabic ,dictionary of the ,chinese ,language2 by ,s4 ,wells ,williams1 ,,ll4,b4 7,shanghai3 #ahgd72 where ,sin 7,sin71 i4e41 humanity1 love of one's neighbour1 is written ,sin'4--7,translator47 #ah ,the ,athenians have an altar in their ,agora to ,compassion2 for this deity1 they believe1 is of all the gods the most helpful in human life1 and its vicissitudes4 ,they are the only ,greeks who have instituted this cultus4--7,translator47 #ai ,v4 ,lucian1 ,timon1 chap4 #db 7,ausgewhlte ,schriften des ,lucian1 edit4 ,julius ,sommerbrodt2 ,weidmann1 ,berlin1 #ahgb1 p4 #ge73 4 ,v4 also ,apollodorus 7edit4 ,j4 ,bekker72 #b1 #h1 #a4 #c1 #g1 #a4 ,dem4 7edit4 ,reisk471 #eg4 ,scholiast on ,soph4 d4 ,col41#beh4--7,translator47 #bj ,a temple must not be despoiled of its altar1 nor human nature of compassion4 ,v4 ,joannis ,stobaei ,anthologium1 edit4 ,curtius ,wachsmuth et ,otto ,hense2 ,weidmann1 ,berlin1 #ahid2 ,vol4 ,,iii41 p4 #bj1 ,nr4 #eb4--7,translator47 #ba ,the chief of virtues is said to be ,compassion4 ,the ,paa-tantra is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables in five 7paan7 books or chapters 7tantra71 from which the author of the ,hitopadea drew a large portion of his materials4 ,v4 ,monier ,williams' ,sanskrit ,dictionary4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,on ,,the ,,ethical ,,difference ,,of ,,character4 ,there still remains a question to be resolved1 before the basis which ,i have given to ,ethics can be presented in all its completeness4 ,it is this4 ,on what does the great difference in the moral behaviour of men rest8 ,if ,compassion be the original incentive of all true1 that is1 disinterested justice and loving-kindness2 how comes it that some are1 while others are not1 influenced thereby8 ,are we to suppose that ,ethics1 which discloses the moral stimulus1 is also capable of setting it in motion8 ,can ,ethics fashion the hard-hearted man anew1 so that he becomes compassionate1 and1 as a consequence1 just and humane8 ,certainly not4 ,the difference of character is innate1 and ineradicable4 ,the wicked man is born with his wickedness as much as the serpent is with its poison-fangs and glands1 nor can the former change his nature a whit more than the latter4#a ,velle non discitur 7to use one's will is not a thing that can be taught7 is a saying of ,nero's tutor4 ,in the ,meno1 ,plato minutely investigates the nature of virtue1 and inquires whether it can1 or cannot1 be taught4 ,he quotes a passage from ,theognis3 ' 4 7,but thou wilt ne'er1 ,by teaching make the bad man virtuous47 and finally reaches this conclusion3 o 1 o 1 1 1 4#b ,here the terms and 1 form a distinction1 in my opinion1 much the same as that between physical and metaphysical4 ,socrates1 the father of ,ethics1 if we may trust ,aristotle1 declared that o ' 1 4#c 7,moralia ,magna1 i4 #i47 ,moreover1 ,aristotle himself expresses the same view2 ' 1 1 a y 4#d 7,eth4 ,nicom4 vi4 #ac47 ,we find also a similar conviction very decidedly expressed in the fragments attributed to the ,pythagorean ,archytas1 and preserved by ,stobaeus in the ,florilegium 7,chap4 i4 #gg74e ,if not authentic1 they are certainly very old4 ,orelli gives them in his ,opuscula ,graecorum ,sententiosa et ,moralia4 ,there 7,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #bdj7 we read in the ,dorian dialect as follows3-- 1 1 1 ' 1 1 4#f ,on examining the virtues and vices1 as summarised by ,aristotle in the ,de ,virtutibus et ,vitiis1 it will be found that all of them1 without exception1 are not properly thinkable unless assumed to be inborn qualities1 and that only as such can they be genuine4 ,if1 in consequence of reasoned reflection1 we take them as voluntary1 they are then seen to lose their reality1 and pass into the region of empty forms2 whence it immediately follows that their permanence and resistance under the storm and stress of circumstance could not be counted on4 ,and the same is true of the virtue of loving-kindness1 of which ,aristotle1 in common with all the ancients1 knows nothing4 ,montaigne keeps1 of course1 his sceptical tone1 but he practically agrees with the venerable authorities above quoted1 when he says3 ,serait-il vrai1 que pour tre bon tout fait1 il nous le faille tre par occulte1 naturelle et universelle proprit1 sans lot1 sans raison1 sans exemple8#g--7,liv4 ,,ii41 chap4 #aa47 ,lichtenberg hits the mark exactly in his ,vermischte ,schriften1 7v4 ,moralische ,bemerkungen74 ,he writes3 ,all virtue arising from premeditation is not worth much4 ,what is wanted is feeling or habit4 ,lastly1 it should be noted that ,christianity itself1 in its original teaching1 recognises1 and bears witness to this inherent1 immutable difference between character and character4 ,in the ,sermon on the ,mount we find the allegory of the fruit which is determined by the nature of the tree that bears it 7,luke vi4 #dc1 #dd2 cf4 ,matthew vii4 #af-ah72 and then in the following verse 7,luke vi4 #de71 we read3 o 4#h 7,cf4 ,matthew xii4 #ce47 ,but it was ,kant who first completely cleared up this important point through his profound doctrine of the empirical and intelligible#i character4 ,he showed that the empirical character1 which manifests itself in time and in multiplicity of action1 is a phaenomenon2 while the reality behind it is the intelligible character1 which1 being the essential constitution of the ,thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon1 is independent of time1 space1 plurality1 and change4 ,in this way alone can be explained what is so astonishing1 and yet so well known to all who have learnt life's lessons1--the fixed unchangeableness of human character4 ,there are certain ethical writers1 whose aim is the moral improvement of men1 and who talk of progress made in the path of virtue2 but their assurances are always met and victoriously confuted by the irrefragable facts of experience1 which prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot be inculcated4 ,the character is an original datum1 immutable1 and incapable of any amelioration through correction by the intellect4 ,now1 were this not so2 and further3 if 7as the above-mentioned dull-headed preachers maintain7 an improvement of the character1 and hence a constant advance towards the good were possible by means of moral instruction2 then1 unless we are prepared to suppose that all the various religious institutions1 and all the efforts of the moralists fail in their purpose1 we should certainly expect to find that the older half of mankind1 at least on an average1 is distinctly better than the younger4 ,this1 however1 is so far from being the case1 that it is not to the old1 who have1 as we see1 grown worse by experience1 but to the young that we look for something good4 ,it may happen that in his old age one man appears somewhat better1 another worse1 than he was in his youth4 ,but the reason is not far to seek4 ,it is simply because with length of days the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper1 and hence the character stands out in purer and clearer shape2 while early life is a prey to ignorance1 mistakes1 and chimeras1 which now present false motives1 and now veil the real4 ,for a fuller explanation ,i would refer the reader to the principles laid down in ,chapter ,,iii4 of the preceding ,essay1 on ,the ,freedom of the ,will4#aj ,it is true that among convicts the young have a large majority2 but this is because1 when a tendency to crime exists in the character1 it soon finds a way of expressing itself in acts1 and of reaching its goal--the galleys1 or the gibbet2 while he1 whom all the inducements to wrong doing1 which a long life offers1 have failed to lead astray1 is not likely to fall at the eleventh hour4 ,hence the respect paid to age is1 in my opinion1 due to the fact that the old are considered to have passed through a test of sixty or seventy years1 and kept their integrity unsullied2 for this of course is the sine qua non of the honour accorded them4 ,these things are too well known for any one1 in real life1 to be misled by the promises of the moralists we have spoken of4 ,he who has once been proved guilty of evil-doing1 is never again trusted1 just as the noble nature1 of which a man has once given evidence1 is always confidently believed in1 whatever else may have changed4 ,operari sequitur esse 7what one does follows from what one is7 forms1 as we have seen in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,viii41 a pregnant tenet of the ,schoolmen4 ,everything in the world works according to the unchangeable constitution of which its being1 its essentia is composed4 ,and man is no exception4 ,as the individual is1 so will he1 so must he1 act3 and the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae 7free and indifferent choice7 is an invention of philosophy in her childhood1 long since exploded2 although there are some old women1 in doctor's academicals1 who still like to drag it about with them4 ,the three fundamental springs of human action--,egoism1 ,malice1 ,compassion--are inherent in every one in different and strangely unequal proportions4 ,their combination in any given case determines the weight of the motives that present themselves1 and shapes the resulting line of conduct4 ,to an egoistic character egoistic motives alone appeal1 and those1 which suggest either compassion or malice1 have no appreciable effect4 ,thus1 a man of this type will sacrifice his interests as little to take vengeance on his foes1 as to help his friends4 ,another1 whose nature is highly susceptible to malicious motives1 will not shrink from doing great harm to himself1 so only he may injure his neighbour4 ,for there are characters which take such delight in working mischief on others1 that they forget their own loss1 which is perhaps1 equal to what they inflict4 ,one may say of such3 ,dum alteri noceat sui negligens#aa 7disregarding himself so long as he injures the other74 ,these are the people that plunge with passionate joy into the battle in which they expect to receive quite as many wounds as they deal2 indeed1 experience not seldom testifies that they are ready deliberately1 first to kill the man who thwarts their purposes1 and then themselves1 in order to escape the penalty of the law4 ,on the other hand1 goodness of heart consists of a deeply felt1 all-embracing ,compassion for everything that has breath1 and especially for man2 because1 in proportion as the intelligence develops1 capacity for pain increases2 and hence1 the countless sufferings of human beings1 in mind and body1 have a much stronger claim to ,compassion than those of animals1 which are only physical1 and in any case less acute4 ,this goodness of heart1 therefore1 in the first place restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to others1 and1 next1 it bids him give succour whenever and wherever he sees distress4 ,and the path of ,compassion may lead as far in one direction as ,malice does in the other4 ,certain rare characters of fine sensibility take to heart the calamities of others more than their own1 so that they make sacrifices1 which1 it may be1 entail on themselves a greater amount of suffering than that removed from those they benefit4 ,nay1 in cases where several1 or1 perhaps1 a large number of persons1 at one time1 can be helped in this way1 such men do not1 if need be1 flinch from absolute self-effacement4 ,arnold von ,winkelried was one of these4 ,so was ,paulinus1 ,bishop of ,nola1 in the fifth century1 when the ,vandals crossed over from ,africa and invaded ,italy4 ,of him we read in ,johann von ,mller's ,weltgeschichte 7,bk4 ,x41 chap4 #aj7 that in order to ransom some of the prisoners1 he had already disposed of all the church plate1 his own and his friends' private property4 ,then1 on seeing the anguish of a widow1 whose only son was being carried off1 he offered himself for servitude in the other's stead4 ,for whoever was of suitable age1 and had not fallen by the sword1 was taken captive to ,carthage4 ,there is1 then1 an enormous difference between character and character4 ,being original and innate1 it measures the responsiveness of the individual to this or that motive1 and those alone1 to which he is specially sensitive1 will appeal to him with anything like compelling force4 ,as in chemistry1 with unchangeable certainty1 one substance reacts only upon acids1 another only upon alkalies1 so1 with equal invariableness1 different natures respond to different stimuli4 ,the motives suggesting loving-kindness1 which stir so deeply a good disposition1 can1 of themselves1 effect nothing in a heart that listens only to the promptings of ,egoism4 ,if it be wished to induce the egoist to act with beneficence and humanity1 this can be done but in one way3 he must be made to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering will1 somehow or other1 surely turn out to his own advantage4 ,what1 indeed1 are most moral systems but attempts of different kinds in this direction8 ,but such procedure only misleads1 does not better1 the will4 ,to make a real improvement1 it would be necessary to transform the entire nature of the individual's susceptibility for motives4 ,thus1 from one we should have to remove his indifference to the suffering of others as such2 from another1 the delight which he feels in causing pain2 from a third1 the natural tendency which makes him regard the smallest increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing all other motives1 that the latter become as dust in the balance4 ,only it is far easier to change lead into gold than to accomplish such a task4 ,for it means the turning round1 so to say1 of a man's heart in his body1 the remoulding of his very being4 ,in point of fact1 all that can be done is to clear the intellect1 correct the judgment1 and so bring him to a better comprehension of the objective realities and actual relations of life4 ,this effected1 the only result gained is that his will reveals itself more logically1 distinctly1 and decidedly1 with no false ring in its utterance4 ,it should be noted that just as many a good act rests at bottom on false motives1 on well-meant1 yet illusory representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby in this1 or another1 world2 so not a few misdeeds are due solely to an imperfect understanding of the conditions of human life4 ,it is on this latter truth that the ,american penitentiary system is based4 ,here the aim is not1 to improve the heart1 but simply1 to educate the head of the criminal1 so that he may intellectually come to perceive that prosperity is more surely1 indeed more easily1 reached by work and honesty than by idleness and knavery4 ,by the proper presentment of motives legality may be secured1 but not morality4 ,it is possible to remodel what one does1 but not what one wills to do2 and it is to the will alone that real moral worth belongs4 ,it is not possible to change the goal which the will strives after1 but only the path expected to lead thither4 ,instruction may alter the selection of means1 but not the choice of the ultimate object which the individual keeps before him in all he does2 this is determined by his will in accordance with its original nature4 ,it is true that the egoist may be brought to understand that1 if he gives up certain small advantages1 he will gain greater2 and the malicious man may be taught that by injuring others he will injure himself still more4 ,but ,egoism itself1 and ,malice itself1 will never be argued out of a person2 as little as a cat can be talked out of her inclination for mice4 ,similarly with goodness of heart4 ,if the judgment be trained1 if the relations and conditions of life become understood1 in a word1 if the intellect be enlightened2 the character dominated by loving-kindness will be led to express itself more consistently and completely than it otherwise could4 ,this happens when we perceive the remoter consequences which our conduct has for others3 the sufferings1 perhaps1 that overtake them indirectly1 and only after lapse of time1 through one act or another of ours1 which we had no idea was so harmful4 ,it occurs1 too1 when we come to discern the evil results of many a well-meant action1 as1 for instance1 the screening of a criminal2 and it is especially true when we realise that the ,neminem laede 7injure no one7 has in all cases precedence over the ,omnes juva 7help all men74 ,in this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing as a moral education1 an ethical training capable of making men better4 ,but it goes only as far as ,i have indicated1 and its limits are quickly discovered4 ,the head is filled with the light of knowledge2 the heart remains unimproved4 ,the fundamental and determining element1 in things moral1 no less than in things intellectual1 and things physical1 is that which is inborn4 ,art is always subordinate1 and can only lend a helping hand4 ,each man is1 what he is1 as it were1 by the grace of ,god1 jure divino1 1 1 7by divine dispensation74 ,du bist am ,ende--,,was ,,du ,,bist4 ,setz' dir ,perrcken auf von ,millionen ,locken1 ,setz' deinen ,fuss auf ellenhohe ,socken3 ,,du ,,bleibst ,,doch ,,immer ,,was ,,du ,,bist4#ab ,but the reader1 ,i am sure1 has long been wishing to put the question3 ,where1 then1 does blame and merit come in8 ,the answer is fully contained in ,part ,,il1 ,chapter ,,viii41 to which ,i therefore beg to call particular attention4 ,it is there that the explanation1 which otherwise would now follow1 found a natural place2 because the matter is closely connected with ,kant's doctrine of the co-existence of ,freedom and ,necessity4 ,our investigation led to the conclusion that1 once the motives are brought into play1 the ,operari 7what1 is done7 is a thing of absolute necessity2 consequently1 ,freedom1 the existence of which is betokened solely by the sense of responsibility1 cannot but belong to the ,esse 7what one is74 ,no doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do1 in the first place1 and ostensibly1 with our acts1 but through these they1 in reality1 reach down to what we are2 for what we do is the only indisputable index of what we are1 and reflects our character just as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady4 ,hence it is to this ,esse1 to what we are1 that blame and merit must ultimately be attributed4 ,whatever we esteem and love1 or else despise and hate1 in others1 is not a changeable1 transient appearance1 but something constant1 stable1 and persistent2 it is that which they are4 ,if we find reason to alter our first opinion about any one1 we do not suppose that he is changed1 but that we have been mistaken in him4 ,in like manner1 when we are pleased or displeased with our own conduct1 we say that we are satisfied or dissatisfied with ourselves1 meaning1 in reality1 with that which we are1 and are unalterably1 irreversibly2 and the same is true with regard to our intellectual qualities1 nay1 it even applies to the physiognomy4 ,how is it possible1 then1 for blame and merit to lie otherwise than in what we are8 ,as we saw in ,part ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,vii41 ,conscience is that register of our acts1 which is always growing longer1 and therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which every day becomes more complete4 ,conscience concerns itself directly with all that we do2 when1 at one time1 actuated by ,egoism1 or perhaps ,malice1 we turn a deaf ear to ,compassion1 which bids us at least refrain from harming others1 if we will not afford them help and protection2 or when again1 at another time1 we overcome the first two incentives1 and listen to the voice of the third4 ,both cases measure the distinction we draw between ourselves and others4 ,and on this distinction depends in the last resort the degree of our morality or immorality1 that is1 of our justice and loving-kindness1 or the reverse4 ,little by little the number of those actions1 whose testimony is significant on this point1 accumulates in the storehouse of our memory2 and thus the lineaments of our character are depicted with ever greater clearness1 and a true knowledge of ourselves is nearer attainment4 ,and out of such knowledge there springs a sense of satisfaction1 or dissatisfaction with ourselves1 with that which we are1 according as we have been ruled by ,egoism1 by ,malice1 or else by ,compassion2 in other words1 according as the difference we have made between ourselves and others is greater or smaller4 ,and when we look outside ourselves1 it is by the same standard that we judge those about us2 and we become acquainted with their character--less perfectly indeed--yet by the same empirical method as we employ with reference to our own4 ,in this case our feelings take the form of praise1 approval1 respect1 or1 on the other hand1 of reproach1 displeasure1 contempt1 and they are the objective translation1 so to say1 of the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction 7the latter deepening perhaps into remorse71 which arises in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves4 ,lastly1 there is the evidence of language4 ,we find certain constantly occurring forms of speech which bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the blame we cast upon others is in reality directed against their unchangeable character1 touching but superficially what they do2 that virtue and vice are practically1 if tacitly1 regarded as inherent unalterable qualities4 ,the following are some of these expressions3 ,jetzt sehe ich1 wie du bist6 7,now ,i know your nature67 ,in dir habe ich mich geirrt4 7,i was mistaken in you47 ,now ,i see what you are6 ,voil donc1 comme tu es6 7,this1 then1 is what you are67 ,so bin ich nicht6 7,i am not a person of that sort67 ,ich bin nicht der ,mann1 der fhig wre1 ,sie zu hintergehen4 7,i am not the man to impose upon you47 ,also3 les mes bien nes 7persons well-born1 i4e41 noble-minded71 the ,spanish bien nacido2 7properly well-born71 7properly nobility of birth7 used for virtuous and virtue2 generosioris animi amicus 7a friend of lofty mind4 ,generosus3 lit4 of noble birth71 etc4 ,reason is a necessary condition for conscience1 but only because without the former a clear and connected recollection is impossible4 ,from its very nature conscience does not speak till after the act2 hence we talk of being arraigned before its bar4 ,strictly speaking1 it is improper to say that conscience speaks beforehand2 for it can only do so indirectly2 that is1 when the remembrance of particular cases in the past leads us1 through reflection1 to disapprove of some analogous course of action1 while yet in embryo4 ,such is the ethical fact as delivered by consciousness4 ,it forms of itself a metaphysical problem1 which does not directly belong to the present question1 but which will be touched on in the last part4 ,conscience1 then1 is nothing else than the acquaintance we make with our own changeless character through the instrumentality of our acts4 ,a little consideration will show that this definition harmonises perfectly with1 and hence receives additional confirmation from1 what ,i have here specially emphasised3 namely1 the fact that susceptibility for the motives of ,egoism1 of ,malice1 and of ,compassion1 which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals1 and on which the whole moral value of a man depends1 cannot be interpreted by anything else1 nor be gained1 or removed1 by instruction1 as if it were something born in time1 and therefore variable1 and subject to chance4 ,on the contrary1 we have seen that it is innate and fixed1 an ultimate datum1 admitting of no further explanation4 ,thus an entire life1 with the whole of its manifold activity1 may be likened to a clock-dial1 that marks every movement of the internal works1 as they were made once for all2 or it resembles a mirror1 wherein alone1 with the eye of his intellect1 each person sees reflected the essential nature of his own ,will1 that is1 the core of his being4 ,whoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think out what has been put forward here1 and in ,part4 ,,ii41 ,chapter ,,viii41 will discover in the foundation given by me to ,ethics a logical consecution1 a rounded completeness1 wanting to all other theories2 to say nothing of the consonance of my view with the facts of experience1--a consonance which he will look for in vain elsewhere4 ,for only the truth can uniformly and consistently agree with itself and with nature2 while all false principles are internally at variance with themselves1 and externally contradict the testimony of experience1 which at every step records its silent protest4 ,i am perfectly aware that the truths advanced in this ,essay1 and particularly here at the close1 strike directly at many deeply rooted prejudices and mistakes1 and especially at those attaching to a certain rudimentary system of morals1 now much in vogue1 and suitable for elementary schools4 ,but ,i cannot own to feeling any penitence or regret4 ,for1 in the first place1 ,i am addressing neither children1 nor the profanum vulgus1 but an ,academy of light and learning4 ,their inquiry is a purely theoretical one1 concerned with the ultimate fundamental verities of ,ethics2 and to a most serious question a serious answer is undoubtedly expected4 ,and secondly1 in my opinion1 there can be no such thing as harmless mistakes1 still less privileged or useful ones4 ,on the contrary1 every error works infinitely more evil than good4 ,if1 however1 it is wished to make existing prepossessions the standard of truth1 or the boundary beyond which its investigation is not to go1 then it would be more honest to abolish philosophical ,faculties and ,academies altogether4 ,for where no reality exists1 there also no semblance of it should be4 hr classr#e _/ #a ,cf4 ,jeremiah xiii4 #bc4--7,translator47 #b ,virtue would appear not to come naturally 7i4e41 through the physical order of things71 nor can it be taught2 but in whomsoever it dwells1 there it is present1 apart from the intellect1 under divine ordinance4 ,v4 ,platonis ,opera1 edit4 ,didot1 ,paris1 #ahef2 ,vol4 ,i4 ,meno1 #if and #ii1 ad fin4-- 7,translator47 #c ,it is not in our power to be either good or bad4 #d ,for it appears that the different characters of all men are in some way implanted in them by nature2 if we are just1 and temperate1 and otherwise virtuous1 we are so straightway from our birth4 #e ,v4 ,joannis ,stobaei ,florilegium1 edit4 ,meineke1 publ4 ,lipsiae1 ,teubner1 #ahee2 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #cc1a4 #ad1 sqq4--7,translator47 #f ,for the so-called virtues1 that require reasoning and demonstration1 ought to be called sciences4 ,by the term virtue we mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of the soul's unreasoning part4 ,this disposition determines the character which we show1 and in accordance with which we are called generous1 just1 or temperate4 #g ,are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly good by virtue of a certain occult1 natural1 and universal faculty1 without law1 without reason1 without precedent8 #h ,the good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good2 and the evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil4 #i ,v4 ,note on intelligible1 ,part4 ,,ii41 ,chapter ,i4--7translator47 #aj ,die ,freiheit des ,willens and the present treatise were published by ,schopenhauer together1 under the title of ,die ,beiden ,grundprobleme der ,ethik4 ,v4 ,introduction1 p4 xv41 note4--7,translator47 #aa ,seneca1 ,de ,ira1 ,i4 #a4 #ab ,in spite of all1 thou art still--what thou art4 ,though wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be1 ,though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet3 ,unchang'd thou e'er remainest what thou art4 ,v4 ,goethe's ,faust1 ,part ,i41 ,studirzimmer4--7,translator47 ,,part ,,iv4 ,,on ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,primal ,,ethical ,,phaenomenon4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,how ,,this ,,appendix ,,must ,,be ,,understood4 ,in the foregoing pages the moral incentive 7,compassion7 has been established as a fact1 and ,i have shown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness1 and that on these two cardinal virtues all the rest depend4 ,now1 for the purpose of supplying ,ethics with a foundation1 this is sufficient1 in a certain sense2 that is1 in so far as ,moral ,science necessarily requires to be supported by some actual and demonstrable basis1 whether existing in the external world1 or in the consciousness4 ,the only alternative is to tread in the footsteps that so many of my predecessors have left1 in other words1 to choose arbitrarily some proposition or other1--some bare and abstract formula--and make it the source of all that morality prescribes2 or1 like ,kant1 to sublimate a mere idea1 that of law1 into the key-stone of the ethical arch4 ,but1 dismissing this method for the reasons discussed above1 in the ,second ,part1 the investigation proposed by the ,royal ,society appears to me now completed4 ,for their question1 as it stands1 deals only with the foundation of ,ethics2 as to a possible metaphysical explanation of this foundation nothing whatever is asked4 ,nevertheless1 at the point we have reached1 ,i am very sensible that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction1 no real repose4 ,as in all branches of practical research1 so also in ,ethical ,science1 when all is said1 man is inevitably confronted with an ultimate phaenomenon1 which while it renders an account of everything that it includes1 and everything deducible from it1 remains itself an unexplained riddle4 ,so that here1 as elsewhere1 the want is felt of a final interpretation 7which1 obviously1 cannot but be metaphysical7 of the ultimate data1 as such1 and through these1--if they be taken in their entirety--of the world4 ,and here1 too1 this want finds utterance in the question3 ,how is it that1 what is present to our senses1 and grasped by our intellect1 is as it is1 and not otherwise8 ,and how does the character of the phaenomenon1 as manifest to us1 shape itself out of the essential nature of things8 ,indeed1 in ,moral ,science the need of a metaphysical basis is more urgent than in any other1 because all systems1 philosophical no less than religious1 are at one in persistently attaching to conduct not only an ethical1 but also a metaphysical significance1 which1 passing beyond the mere appearance of things1 transcends every possibility of experience1 and therefore stands in the closest connection with human destiny and with the whole cosmic process4 ,for if life 7it is averred7 have a meaning1 then the supreme goal to which it points is undoubtedly ethical4 ,nor is this view a bare unsupported theory2 it is sufficiently established by the undeniable fact that1 as death draws nigh1 the thoughts of each individual assume a moral trend1 equally whether he be credulous of religious dogmas1 or not2 he is manifestly anxious to wind up the affairs of his life1 now verging to its end1 entirely from the moral standpoint4 ,in this particular the testimony of the ancients is of special value1 standing1 as they do1 outside the pale of ,christian influence4 ,i shall therefore here quote a remarkable passage preserved by ,stobaeus1 in his ,florilegium 7chap4 #dd1 4 #bj74 ,it has been attributed to the earliest ,hellenic lawgiver1 ,zaleucus1 though1 according to ,bentley and ,heyne1 its source is ,pythagorean4 ,the language is graphic and unmistakable4 1 4 1 1 4#a ,furthermore1 to come to an historical personage1 we find ,pericles1 on his death-bed1 unwilling to hear anything about his great achievements1 and only anxious to know that he had never brought trouble on a citizen4 7,plutarch1 ,life of ,pericles47 ,turning to modern times1 if a very different case may be placed beside the preceding1 ,i remember having noticed in a report of depositions made before an ,english jury the following occurrence4 ,a rough negro lad1 fifteen years old1 had been mortally injured in some brawl on board a ship4 ,as he was dying1 he eagerly begged that all his companions might be fetched in haste3 he wanted to ask if he had ever vexed or insulted any one of them1 and after hearing that he had not1 his mind appeared greatly relieved4 ,it is indeed the uniform teaching of experience that those near death wish to be reconciled with every one before they pass away4 ,but there is evidence of another kind that ,ethics can only be finally explained by ,metaphysics4 ,it is well known that1 while the author of an intellectual performance1--even should it be a supreme masterpiece--is quite willing to take whatever remuneration he can get1 those1 on the other hand1 who have done something morally excellent1 almost without exception1 refuse compensation for it4 ,the latter fact is specially observable where conduct rises to the heroic4 ,for instance1 when a man at the risk of his life has saved another1 or perhaps many1 from destruction1 as a rule1 he simply declines all reward1 poor though he may be2 because he instinctively feels that the metaphysical value of his act would be thereby impaired4 ,at the end of ,brger's song1 ,the ,brave ,man1 we find a poetical presentment of this psychological process4 ,nor does the reality1 for the most part1 differ at all from the ideal1 as ,i have frequently noticed in ,english papers4 ,conduct of this kind occurs in every part of the world1 and independently of all religious differences4 ,in human beings there is an undeniable ethical tendency1 rooted 7however unconsciously7 in ,metaphysics1 and without an explanation of life on these lines1 no religion could gain standing-ground2 for it is by virtue of their ethical side that they all alike keep their hold on the mind4 ,every religion makes its body of dogmas the basis of the moral incentive which each man feels1 but which he does not1 on that account1 understand2 and it unites the two so closely1 that they appear to be inseparable4 ,indeed the priests take special pains to proclaim unbelief and immorality as one and the same thing4 ,the reason is thus apparent1 why believers regard unbelievers as identical with the vicious1 and why expressions such as godless1 atheistic1 unchristian1 heretic1 etc41 are used as synonymes for moral depravity4 ,the religions have1 in fact1 a sufficiently easy task4 ,faith is the principle they start from4 ,hence they are in a position to simply insist on its application to their dogmas1 and this1 even to the point of employing threats4 ,but philosophy has no such convenient instrument ready to hand4 ,if the different systems be examined1 it will be found that the situation is beset with difficulties1 both as regards the foundation to be provided for ,ethics1 and in relation to the point of connection discoverable in any such foundation with the given metaphysical theory4 ,and yet1--as ,i have emphasised in the introduction1 with an appeal to the authority of ,wolff and ,kant--we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining from ,metaphysics a support for ,moral ,science4 ,now1 of all the problems that the human intellect has to grapple with1 that of ,metaphysics is by far the hardest2 so much so that it is regarded by many thinkers as absolutely insoluble4 ,apart from this1 in the present case1 ,i labour under the special disadvantage which the form of a detached monograph involves4 ,in other words1 ,i am not at liberty to start from some definite metaphysical system1 of which ,i may be an adherent2 because1 if ,i did1 either it would have to be expounded in detail1 which would take too much space2 or else there would be the necessity of supposing it granted and unquestioned1--an exceedingly precarious proceeding4 ,the consequence is that ,i am as little able to use the synthetic method here as in the foregoing ,part4 ,analysis alone is possible3 that is1 ,i must work backwards from the effects to their cause1 and not vice vers4 ,this stern obligation1 however1 of having at the outset no previous hypothesis1 no standpoint other than the commonly accepted one1 made the discovery of the ethical basis so laborious that1 as ,i look back upon the task1 ,i seem to have accomplished some wondrous feat of dexterity1 not unlike that of a man who executes with subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only done on a solid support4 ,but now that we have come to the question whether there can be given a metaphysical explanation of the foundation obtained1 the difficulty of proceeding without any assumption becomes so enormous1 that but one course appears to me open1 namely1 to attempt nothing beyond a general sketch of the subject4 ,i shall1 therefore1 indicate rather than elaborate the line of thought3 ,i shall point out the way leading to the goal1 but not follow it thither2 in short1 ,i shall present but a very small part of what1 under other circumstances1 could be adduced4 ,in adopting this attitude for the reasons stated1 ,i wish1 before beginning1 to emphatically remark1 that in any case the actual problem put forward has now been solved2 consequently1 that what ,i here add is an opus supererogationis1 an appendix to be given and taken entirely at will4 #a ,we ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from living4 ,because all who are about to die are seized with repentance1 remembering1 as they do1 their unjust deeds1 and being filled with the wish that they had always acted justly4-- ,erlsung4 ,v4 ,joannes ,stobeaus1 ,florilegium1 edit4 ,meineke2 publ4 ,lipsiae3 ,teubner1 #ahee4 ,vol4 ii41 p4 #afd1 l4 #g sqq4--7,translator47 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,groundwork4 ,so far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of experience4 ,but at this point it fails us1 and the solid earth sinks from under our feet1 as we press forward in our search after a final theoretical satisfaction1 there1 where no experience can ever by any possibility penetrate2 and happy shall we be1 if perchance we gain one hint1 one transient gleam1 that may bring us a certain measure of content4 ,what1 however1 shall not desert us is the honesty that has hitherto attended our procedure4 ,we shall not make shift with dreams1 and serve up fairy tales1 after the fashion of the so-called post-,kantian philosophers2 nor shall we1 like them1 seek1 by a wordy exuberance1 to impose upon the reader1 and cast dust in his eyes4 ,a little is all we promise2 but that little will be presented in perfect sincerity4 ,the principle1 which we discovered to be the final explanation of ,ethics1 now in turn itself requires explaining2 so that our present problem has to deal with that natural ,compassion1 which in every man is innate and indestructible1 and which has been shown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct1 this kind alone being of real moral worth4 ,now many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of ,good and ,bad as simple1 that is1 as neither needing1 nor admitting any elucidation1 and then they go on1 for the most part1 to talk very mysteriously and devoutly of an ,idea of the ,good1 out of which they make a pedestal for their moral system1 or at least a cloak for their poverty4#a ,hence ,i am obliged in this connection to point out parenthetically1 that these conceptions are anything but simple1 much less a priori2 that they in fact express a relation1 and are derived from the commonest daily experience4 ,whatever is in conformity with the desires of any individual will1 is1 relatively to it1 termed good2 for instance1 good food1 good roads1 a good omen2 the contrary is called bad1 and1 in the case of living beings1 malicious4 ,and so one1 who by virtue of his character1 has no wish to oppose what others strive after1 but rather1 as far as he reasonably may1 shows himself favourable and helpful to them2 one1 who1 instead of injuring1 assists his neighbours1 and promotes their interests1 when he can2 is named by the latter1 in respect to themselves1 a good man2 the term good being applied to him in the sense of the above definition1 and from their own point of view1 which is thus relative1 empirical1 and centred in the passive subject4 ,now1 if we examine the nature of such a man1 not only as it affects others1 but as it is in itself1 we are enabled by the foregoing exposition to perceive that the virtues of justice and loving-kindness1 which he practises1 are due to a direct participation in weal and woe external to himself2 and we have learnt that the source of such participation is ,compassion4 ,if1 further1 we pause to consider what is the essential part in this type of character1 we shall certainly find it to lie in the fact that such a person draws less distinction between himself and others than is usually done4 ,in the eyes of the malicious individual this difference is so great that he takes direct delight in the spectacle of suffering1--a delight1 which he accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit to himself1 nay1 sometimes1 even to his own hurt4 ,from the egoist's point of view the same difference is still large enough to make him bring much trouble on his neighbours1 in order to obtain a small personal advantage4 ,hence for both of these1 between the ego1 which is limited to their own persons1 and the non-ego1 which includes all the rest of the world1 there is fixed a great gulf1 a mighty abyss3 ,pereat mundus1 dum ego salvus sim 7the world may perish1 provided ,i be safe71 is their maxim4 ,for the good man1 on the contrary1 this distinction is by no means so pronounced2 indeed1 in the case of magnanimous deeds1 it appears to become a vanishing quantity1 because then the weal of another is advanced at the cost of the benefactor1 the self of another placed on an equality with his own4 ,and when it is a question of saving a number of fellow-beings1 total self-obliteration may be developed1 the one giving his life for many4 ,the inquiry now presents itself1 whether the latter way of looking at the relation subsisting between the ego and the non-ego1 which forms the mainspring of a good man's conduct1 is mistaken and due to an illusion2 or whether the error does not rather attach to the opposite view1 on which ,egoism and ,malice are based4 ,no doubt the theory lying at the root of ,egoism is1 from the empirical standpoint1 perfectly justified4 ,from the testimony of experience1 the distinction between one's own person and that of another appears to be absolute4 ,i do not occupy the same space as my neighbour1 and this difference1 which separates me from him physically1 separates me also from his weal and woe4 ,but in the first place1 it should be observed that the knowledge we have ,of our own selves is by no means exhaustive and transparent to its depths4 ,by means of the intuition1 which the brain constructs out of the data supplied by the senses1 that is to say1 in an indirect manner1 we recognise our body as an object in space2 through an inward perception1 we are aware of the continuous series of our desires1 of our volitions1 which arise through the agency of external motives2 and finally1 we come to discern the manifold movements1 now stronger1 now weaker1 of our will itself1 to which all feelings from within are ultimately traceable4 ,and that is all3 for the perceiving faculty is not in its turn perceived4 ,on the contrary1 the real substratum of our whole phaenomenal nature1 our inmost essence in itself1 that which wills and perceives1 is not accessible to us4 ,we see only the outward side of the ego2 its inward part is veiled in darkness4 ,consequently1 the knowledge we possess of ourselves is in no sort radical and complete1 but rather very superficial4 ,the larger and more important part of our being remains unknown1 and forms a riddle to speculate about2 or1 as ,kant puts it3 ,the ego knows itself only as a phaenomenon2 of its real essence1 whatever that may be1 it has no knowledge4 ,now1 as regards that side of the self which falls within our ken1 we are1 undoubtedly1 sharply distinguished1 each from the other2 but it does not follow therefrom that the same is true of the remainder1 which1 shrouded in impenetrable obscurity1 is yet1 in fact1 the very substance of which we consist4 ,there remains at least the possibility that the latter is in all men uniform and identical4 ,what is the explanation of all plurality1 of all numerical diversity of existence8 ,time and ,space4 ,indeed it is only through the latter that the former is possible3 because the concept many inevitably connotes the idea either of succession 7time71 or of relative position 7space74 ,now1 since a homogeneous plurality is composed of ,individuals1 ,i call ,space and ,time1 as being the conditions of multiplicity1 the principium individuationis 7the principle of individuation72 and ,i do not here pause to consider whether this expression was exactly so employed by the ,schoolmen4 ,if in the disclosures which ,kant's wonderful acumen gave to the world there is anything true beyond the shadow of a doubt1 this is to be found in the ,transcendental ,aesthetics1 that is to say1 in his doctrine of the ideality of ,space and ,time4 ,on such solid foundations is the structure built that no one has been able to raise even an apparent objection4 ,it is ,kant's triumph1 and belongs to the very small number of metaphysical theories which may be regarded as really proved1 and as actual conquests in that field of research4 ,it teaches us that ,space and ,time are the forms of our own faculty of intuition1 to which they consequently belong1 and not to the objects thereby perceived2 and further1 that they can in no way be a condition of things in themselves1 but rather attach only to their mode of appearing1 such as is alone possible for us who have a consciousness of the external world determined by strictly physiological limits4 ,now1 if to the ,thing in itself1 that is1 to the ,reality underlying the kosmos1 as we perceive it1 ,time and ,space are foreign2 so also must multiplicity be4 ,consequently that which is objectivated in the countless phaenomena of this world of the senses cannot but be a unity1 a single indivisible entity1 manifested in each and all of them4 ,and conversely1 the web of plurality1 woven in the loom of ,time and ,space1 is not the ,thing in itself1 but only its appearance-form4 ,externally to the thinking subject1 this appearance-form1 as such1 has no existence2 it is merely an attribute of our consciousness1 bounded1 as the latter is1 by manifold conditions1 indeed1 depending on an organic function4 ,the view of things as above stated1--that all plurality is only apparent1 that in the endless series of individuals1 passing simultaneously and successively into and out of life1 generation after generation1 age after age1 there is but one and the same entity really existing1 which is present and identical in all alike2--this theory1 ,i say1 was of course known long before ,kant2 indeed1 it may be carried back to the remotest antiquity4 ,it is the alpha and omega of the oldest book in the world1 the sacred 99,vedas1 whose dogmatic part1 or rather esoteric teaching1 is found in the 99,upanishads4#b ,there1 in almost every page this profound doctrine lies enshrined2 with tireless repetition1 in countless adaptations1 by many varied parables and similes it is expounded and inculcated4 ,that such was1 moreover1 the fount whence ,pythagoras drew his wisdom1 cannot be doubted1 despite the scanty knowledge we possess of what he taught4 ,that it formed practically the central point in the whole philosophy of the ,eleatic ,school1 is likewise a familiar fact4 ,later on1 the ,new ,platonists were steeped in the same1 one of their chief tenets being3 u m 4 7,all souls are one1 because all things form a unity47 ,in the ninth century we find it unexpectedly appearing in ,europe4 ,it kindles the spirit of no less a divine than ,johannes ,scotus ,erigena1 who endeavours to clothe it with the forms and terminology of the ,christian religion4 ,among the ,mohammedans we detect it again in the rapt mysticism of the 99,sfi4#c ,in the ,west ,giordano ,bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud2 but his reward is a death of shame and torture4 ,and at the same time we find the ,christian ,mystics losing themselves in it1 against their own will and intention1 whenever and wherever we read of them6#d ,spinoza's name is identified with it4 ,lastly1 in our own days1 after ,kant had annihilated the old dogmatism1 and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins1 the same teaching was revived in ,schelling's eclectic philosophy4 ,the latter took all the systems of ,plotinus1 ,spinoza1 ,kant1 and ,jacob ,boehm1 and mixing them together with the results of modern ,natural ,science1 speedily served up a dish sufficient to satisfy for the moment the pressing needs of his contemporaries2 and then proceeded to perform a series of variations on the original theme4 ,the consequence is that in the learned circles of ,germany this line of thought has come to be generally accepted2 indeed even among people of ordinary education1 it is almost universally diffused4#e ,a solitary exception is formed by the ,university philosophers of the present day4 ,they have the hard task of fighting what is called ,pantheism4 ,being brought through the stress of battle into great embarrassment and difficulty1 they anxiously catch now at the most pitiful sophisms1 now at phrases of choicest bombast1 so only they may patch together some sort of respectable disguise1 wherein to dress up the favourite petticoat ,philosophy1 that has duly received official sanction4 ,in a word1 the #f has been in all ages the laughing-stock of fools1 for the wise a subject of perpetual meditation4 ,nevertheless1 the strict demonstration of this theory is only to be obtained from the ,kantian teaching1 as ,i have just shown4 ,kant himself did not carry it out2 after the fashion of clever orators1 he only gave the premises1 leaving to his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion4 ,now if plurality and difference belong only to the appearance-form2 if there is but one and the same ,entity manifested in all living things3 it follows that1 when we obliterate the distinction between the ego and the non-ego1 we are not the sport of an illusion4 ,rather are we so1 when we maintain the reality of individuation1--a thing the ,hindus call 99,my1#g that is1 a deceptive vision1 a phantasma4 ,the former theory we have found to be the actual source of the phaenomenon of ,compassion2 indeed ,compassion is nothing but its translation into definite expression4 ,this1 therefore1 is what ,i should regard as the metaphysical foundation of ,ethics1 and should describe it as the sense which identifies the ego with the non-ego1 so that the individual directly recognises in another his own self1 his true and very being4 ,from this standpoint the profoundest teaching of theory pushed to its furthest limits may be shown in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules of justice and loving-kindness1 as exercised2 and conversely1 it will be clear that practical philosophers1 that is1 the upright1 the beneficent1 the magnanimous1 do but declare through their acts the same truth as the man of speculation wins by laborious research1 by the loftiest flights of intellect4 ,meanwhile moral excellence stands higher than all theoretical sapience4 ,the latter is at best nothing but a very unfinished and partial structure1 and only by the circuitous path of reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches in one step4 ,he who is morally noble1 however deficient in mental penetration1 reveals by his conduct the deepest insight1 the truest wisdom2 and puts to shame the most accomplished and learned genius1 if the latter's acts betray that his heart is yet a stranger to this great principle1--the metaphysical unity of life4 ,individuation is real4 ,the principium individuationis1 with the consequent distinction of individuals1 is the order of things in themselves4 ,bach living unit is an entity radically different from all others4 ,in my own self alone ,i have my true being2 everything outside it belongs to the non-ego1 and is foreign to me4 ,this is the creed to the truth of which flesh and bone bear witness3 which is at the root of all egoism1 and which finds its objective expression in every loveless1 unjust1 or malicious act4 ,individuation is merely an appearance1 born of ,space and ,time2 the latter being nothing else than the forms under which the external world necessarily manifests itself to me1 conditioned as they are by my brain's faculty of perception4 ,hence also the plurality and difference of individuals is but a phaenomenon1 that is1 exists only as my mental picture4 ,my true inmost being subsists in every living thing1 just as really1 as directly as in my own consciousness it is evidenced only to myself4 ,this is the higher knowledge3 for which there is in ,sanskrit the standing formula1 tat tvam asi1 that art thou4#h ,out of the depths of human nature it wells up in the shape of ,compassion1 and is therefore the source of all genuine1 that is1 disinterested virtue1 being1 so to say1 incarnate in every good deed4 ,it is this which in the last resort is invoked1 whenever we appeal to gentleness1 to loving-kindness2 whenever we pray for mercy instead of justice4 ,for such appeal1 such prayer is in reality the effort to remind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are all one and the same entity4 ,on the other hand1 ,egoism and its derivatives1 envy1 hatred1 the spirit of persecution1 hardness of heart1 revenge1 pleasure at the sight of suffering1 and cruelty1 all claim support from the other view of things1 and seek their justification in it4 ,the emotion and joy we experience when we hear of1 still more1 when we see1 and most of all1 when we ourselves do1 a noble act1 are at bottom traceable to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives1 that1 beyond all plurality and distinction of individuals1 which the principium individuationis1 like a kaleidoscope1 shows us in ever-shifting evanescent forms1 there is an underlying unity1 not only truly existing1 but actually accessible to us2 for lo6 in tangible1 objective form1 it stands before our sight4 ,of these two mental attitudes1 according as the one or the other is adopted1 so the 7,love7 or the 7,hatred7 of ,empedocles appears between man and man4 ,if any one1 who is animated by 1 could forcibly break in upon his most detested foe1 and compel him to lay bare the inmost recesses of his heart2 to his surprise1 he would find again in the latter his very self4 ,for just as in dreams1 all the persons that appear to us are but the masked images of ourselves2 so in the dream of our waking life1 it is our own being which looks on us from out our neighbours' eyes1--though this is not equally easy to discern4 ,nevertheless1 tat tvam asi4 ,the preponderance of either mode of viewing life not only determines single acts2 it shapes a man's whole nature and temperament4 ,hence the radical difference of mental habit between the good character and the bad4 ,the latter feels everywhere that a thick wall of partition hedges him off from all others4 ,for him the world is an absolute non-ego1 and his relation to it an essentially hostile one2 consequently1 the key-note of his disposition is hatred1 suspicion1 envy1 and pleasure in seeing distress4 ,the good character1 on the other hand1 lives in an external world homogeneous with his own being2 the rest of mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego2 he thinks of it rather as myself once more4 ,he therefore stands on an essentially amicable footing with every one3 he is conscious of being1 in his inmost nature1 akin to the whole human race1#i takes direct interest in their weal and woe1 and confidently assumes in their case the same interest in him4 ,this is the source of his deep inward peace1 and of that happy1 calm1 contented manner1 which goes out on those around him1 and is as the presence of a good diffused4 ,whereas the bad character in time of trouble has no trust in the help of his fellow-creatures4 ,if he invokes aid1 he does so without confidence3 obtained1 he feels no real gratitude for it2 because he can hardly discern therein anything but the effect of others' folly4 ,for he is simply incapable of recognising his own self in some one else2 and this1 even after it has furnished the most incontestible signs of existence in that other person3 on which fact the repulsive nature of all unthankfulness in reality depends4 ,the moral isolation1 which thus naturally and inevitably encompasses the bad man1 is often the cause of his becoming the victim of despair4 ,the good man1 on the contrary1 will appeal to his neighbours for assistance1 with an assurance equal to the consciousness he has of being ready himself to help them4 ,as ,i have said3 to the one type1 humanity is a non-ego2 to the other1 myself once more4 ,the magnanimous character1 who forgives his enemy1 and returns good for evil1 rises to the sublime1 and receives the highest meed of praise2 because he recognises his real self even there where it is most conspicuously disowned4 ,every purely beneficent act all help entirely and genuinely unselfish1 being1 as such1 exclusively inspired by another's distress1 is1 in fact1 if we probe the matter to the bottom1 a dark enigma1 a piece of mysticism put into practice2 inasmuch as it springs out of1 and finds its only true explanation in1 the same higher knowledge that constitutes the essence of whatever is mystical4 ,for how1 otherwise than metaphysically1 are we to account for even the smallest offering of alms made with absolutely no other object than that of lessening the want which afflicts a fellow-creature8 ,such an act is only conceivable1 only possible1 in so far as the giver knows that it is his very self which stands before him1 clad in the garments of suffering2 in other words1 so far as he recognises the essential part of his own being1 under a form not his own4#aj ,it now becomes apparent1 why in the foregoing part ,i have called ,compassion the great mystery of ,ethics4 ,he1 who goes to meet death for his fatherland1 has freed himself from the illusion which limits a man's existence to his own person4 ,such a one has broken the fetters of the principium individuationis4 ,in his widened1 enlightened nature he embraces all his countrymen1 and in them lives on and on4 ,nay1 he reaches forward to1 and merges himself in the generations yet unborn1 for whom he works2 and he regards death as a wink of the eyelids1 so momentary that it does not interrupt the sight4 ,we may here sum up the characteristics of the two human types above indicated4 ,to the ,egoist all other people are uniformly and intrinsically strangers4 ,in point of fact1 he considers nothing to be truly real1 except his own person1 and regards the rest of mankind practically as troops of phantoms1 to whom he assigns merely a relative existence1 so far as they may be instruments to serve1 or barriers to obstruct1 his purposes2 the result being an immeasurable difference1 a vast gulf between his ego on the one side1 and the non-ego on the other4 ,in a word1 he lives exclusively centred in his own individuality1 and on his death-day he sees all reality1 indeed the whole world1 coming to an end along with himself4#aa ,whereas the ,altruist discerns in all other persons1 nay1 in every living thing1 his own entity1 and feels therefore that his being is commingled1 is identical with the being of whatever is alive4 ,by death he loses only a small part of himself4 ,patting off the narrow limitations of the individual1 he passes into the larger life of all mankind1 in whom he always recognised1 and1 recognising1 loved1 his very self2 and the illusion of ,time and ,space1 which separated his consciousness from that of others1 vanishes4 ,these two opposite modes of viewing the world are probably the chief1 though not indeed the sole cause of the difference we find between very good and exceptionally bad men1 as to the manner in which they meet their last hour4 ,in all ages ,truth1 poor thing1 has been put to shame for being paradoxical2 and yet it is not her fault4 ,she cannot assume the form of ,error seated on his throne of world-wide sovereignty4 ,so then1 with a sigh1 she looks up to her tutelary god1 ,time1 who nods assurance to her of future victory and glory1 but whose wings beat the air so slowly with their mighty strokes1 that the individual perishes or ever the day of triumph be come4 ,hence ,i1 too1 am perfectly aware of the paradox which this metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical phaenomenon must present to ,western minds1 accustomed1 as they are1 to very different methods of providing ,morals with a basis4 ,nevertheless1 ,i cannot offer violence to the truth4 ,all that is possible for me to do1 out of consideration for ,european blindness1 is to assert once more1 and demonstrate by actual quotation1 that the ,metaphysics of ,ethics1 which ,i have here suggested1 was thousands of years ago the fundamental principle of ,indian wisdom4 ,and to this wisdom ,i point back1 as ,copernicus did to the ,pythagorean cosmic system1 which was suppressed by ,aristotle and ,ptolemaeus4 ,in the ,bhagavadgt 7,lectio ,,xiii42 #bg1 #bh71 according to ,a4 ,w4 von ,schlegel's translation1 we find the following passage3 ,eundem in omnibus animantibus consistentem summum dominum1 istis pereuntibus kaud pereuntem qui cernit1 is vere cernit4 ,eundem vero cernens ubique praesentem dominum1 non violat semet ipsum sua ipsius culpa3 exinde pergit ad summum iter4#ab ,with these hints towards the elaboration of a metaphysical basis for ,ethics ,i must close1 although an important step still remains to be taken4 ,the latter would presuppose a further advance in ,moral ,science itself2 and this can hardly be made1 because in the ,west the highest aim of ,ethics is reached in the theory of justice and virtue4 ,what lies beyond is unknown1 or at any rate ignored4 ,the omission1 therefore1 is unavoidable2 and the reader need feel no surprise1 if the above slight outline of the ,metaphysics of ,ethics does not bring into view--even remotely--the corner-stone of the whole metaphysical edifice1 nor reveal the connection of all the parts composing the ,divina ,commedia4 ,such a presentment1 moreover1 is involved neither in the question set1 nor in my own plan4 ,a man cannot say everything in one day1 and should not answer more than he is asked4 ,he who tries to promote human knowledge and insight is destined to always encounter the opposition of his age1 which is like the dead weight of some mass that has to be dragged along3 there on the ground it lies1 a huge inert deformity1 defying all efforts to quicken its shape with new life4 ,but such a one must take comfort from the certainty that1 although prejudices beset his path1 yet the truth is with him4 ,and ,truth does but wait for her ally1 ,time1 to join her2 once he is at her side1 she is perfectly sure of victory1 which1 if to-day delayed1 will be won to-morrow4 #a ,the conception of the ,good1 in its purity1 is an ultimate one1 an absolute ,idea1 whose substance loses itself in infinity4--7,bouterweek3 ,praktische ,aphorismen1 p4 #ed47 ,it is obvious that this writer would like to transform the familiar1 nay1 trivial conception ,good into a sort of 1 to be set up as an idol in his temple4 lit41 fallen from ,zeus2 and so heaven-sent1 a thing of divine origin4 ,cf4 ,horn41 ,il44 ,,xvi1 #agd2 ,od44 ,,iv4 #dgg4 ,eur41 ,bacch41 #abfh4--7,translator47 #b ,the genuineness of the ,oupnek'hat has been disputed on the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by ,mohammedan copyists1 and then interpolated in the text1 it has1 however1 been fully established by the ,sanskrit scholar1 ,f4 ,h4 ,h4 ,windischmann 7junior7 in his ,sancara1 sive de ,theologumenis ,vedanticorum1 #ahcc1 p4 xix2 and also by ,bochinger in his book ,de la ,vie ,contemplative chez les ,indous1 #ahca1 p4 #ab4 ,the reader though ignorant of ,sanskrit1 may yet convince himself that ,anquetil ,duperron's word for word ,latin translation of the ,persian version of the ,upanishads made by the martyr of this creed1 the ,sultan ,dr-,shukoh1 is based on a thorough and exact knowledge of the language4 ,he has only to compare it with recent translations of some of the ,upanishads by ,rammohun ,boy1 by ,poley1 and especially with that of ,colebrooke1 as also with ,rer's1 7the latest74 ,these writers are obviously groping in obscurity1 and driven to make shift with hazy conjectures1 so that without doubt their work is much less accurate4 ,more will be found on this subject in ,vol4 ,,ii4 of the ,parerga1 chap4 #af1 #ahd4 ,v4 ,the ,upanishads1 translated by ,max ,mller1 in ,the ,sacred ,books of the ,east1 ,vols4 ,i4 and ,,xv4 ,cf4 also ,max ,mller1 ,the ,science of ,language1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #aga4 ,now that an adequate translation of the original exists1 the ,oupnek'hat has only an historical interest4 ,the value which ,schopenhauer attached to the ,upanishads is very clearly expressed also in the ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung1 ,preface to the first ,edition2 and in the ,parerga1 ,,ii41 chap1 xvi41 #ahd4--7,translator47 #c ,for the ,sfi1 more correctly 99,sfy a sect which appeared already in the first century of the ,hijrah1 the reader is referred to3 ,tholuck's ,blthensammlung aus der ,morgenlndischen ,mystik 7,berlin1 #ahbe72 ,tholuck's ,sfismus1 sive ,theosophia ,persarum ,pantheistica 7,berlin1 #ahba72 ,kremer's ,geschichte der ,herrschenden ,ideen des ,islms 7,leipzig1 #ahfh72 ,palmer's ,oriental ,mysticism 7,london1 #ahfg72 ,gobineau's ,les ,religions et les ,philosophies dans l',asie ,centrale 7#bnd edit4 ,paris1 #ahff72 ,a ,dictionary of ,islm1 by ,t4 ,p4 ,hughes 7,london1 #ahhe71 p4 #fjh sqq4--7,translator47 #d ,this is too well-known to need verification by references4 ,the ,cantico del ,sole by ,st4 ,francis of ,assisi sounds almost like a passage from the ,upanishads or the 99,bhagavadgt4--7,translator47 #e3 ,on ne peut assez longtemps1 chez notre espce1 ,fermer la porte la ,raison4 ,mais1 ds qu'elle entre avec adresse1 ,elle reste dans la maison1 ,et bientt elle en est matresse4 --7,voltaire47 7,we men may1 doubtless1 all our lives ,to ,reason bar the door4 ,but if to enter she contrives1 ,the house she leaves no more1 ,and soon as mistress there presides47 #f the eternal ,reality outside ,time and ,space ,t the phaenomenal universe4--7,translator47 #g ,my is the delusive reflection of the true eternal ,entity4--7,translator47 #h ,this expression is used in the ,brahmanical philosophy to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole and its individualised parts4 ,v4 ,a4 ,e4 ,gough1 ,philosophy of the ,upanishads1 #ahhb4--7,translator47 #i ,homo sum3 humani nil a me alienum puto4 ,terence1 ,heaut41 ,i4 #a1 #be4--7,translator47 #aj ,it is probable that many1 perhaps1 most cases of truly disinterested ,compassion--when they really occur--are due not to any conscious knowledge of this sort1 but to an unconscious impulse springing from the ultimate unity of all living things1 and acting1 so to say1 automatically4--7,translator47 #aa ,cf4 ,richard ,wagner3 ,jesus von ,nazareth2 pp4 #gi-ij4--7,translator47 #ab ,that man is endowed with true insight who sees that the same ruling power is inherent in all things1 and that when these perish1 it perishes not4 ,for if he discerns the same ruling power everywhere present1 he does not degrade himself by his own fault3 thence he passes to the highest path4--,for the ,bhagavadgt the reader is referred to ,vol4 ,,viii4 of ,the ,sacred ,books of the ,east 7,oxford3 ,clarendon ,press71 where 7p4 #aje7 this passage is translated as follows3--,he sees 7truly7 who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities1 and not destroyed though they are destroyed4 ,for he who sees the lord abiding everywhere alike1 does not destroy himself99 by himself1 and then reaches the highest goal4 99,not to have true knowledge1 is equivalent to self-destruction4 ,cf4 ,fauche ,le ,mah-bhrata3 ,paris1 #ahfg2 ,vol4 ,,vii41 p4 #abh3-- ,celui-l possde une vue nette des choses1 qui voit ce principe souverain en tous les tres d'une manire gale1 et leur survivre1 quand ils prissent4 ,il ne se fait aucun tort soi-mme par cette vue d'un principe qui subsiste galement partout3 puis1 aprs cette vie1 il entre dans la voie suprieure4 ,the obscurity of ,schlegel's ,latin in the second sentence is sufficiently removed by these more recent translations4--7,translator47 ,,judicium ,,regiae ,,danicae ,,scientiarum ,,societatis4 ,quaestionem anno #ahcg propositam1 utrum philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea moralitatis1 quae immediate conscientia contineatur1 et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus1 quae ex ilia prodeant1 explicandis quaerenda sint1 an in alio cognoscendi principio1 unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est1 cujus commentationem1 germanico sermone compositam1 et his verbis notatam3 ,,moral ,,predigen ,,ist ,,leicht1 ,,moral ,,begr,,nden ,,ist ,,schwer1 praemio dignam judicare nequivimus4 ,omisso enim eo1 quod potissimum postulabatur1 hoc expeti putavit1 ut principium aliquod ethicae conderetur1 itaqae eam partem commentationis suae1 in qua principii ethicae a se propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit1 appendices loco habuit1 in qua plus quam postulatum esset praestaret1 quum tamen ipsum thema ejusmodi disputationem flagitaret1 in qua vel praecipuo loco metaphysicae et ethicae nexus consideraretur4 ,quod autem scriptor in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus est1 neque ipsa disserendi forma nobis satisfecit1 neque reapse1 hoc fundamentum sufficere1 evicit2 quin ipse contra esse confiteri coactus est4 ,neque reticendum videtur1 plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos tam indecenter commemorari1 ut justam et gravem offensionem habeat4 ,,judgment ,,of ,,the ,,danish ,,royal ,,society ,,of ,,sciences4 ,in #ahcg the following question was set as subject for a ,prize ,essay3 ,is the fountain and basis of ,morals to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness 7or conscience71 and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise from it8 ,or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge8 ,there was only one competitor2 but his dissertation1 written in ,german1 and bearing the motto3 ,to preach ,morality is easy1 to found it is difficult#a we cannot adjudge worthy of the ,prize4 ,he has omitted to deal with the essential part of the question1 apparently thinking that he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of ,ethics4 ,consequently1 that part of the treatise1 which explains how the moral basis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics1 we find relegated to an appendix1 as an opus supererogationis1 although it was precisely the connection between ,metaphysics and ,ethics that our question required to be put in the first and foremost place4 ,the writer attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of morality2 but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us1 nor has he1 in point of fact1 succeeded in proving that such a foundation is adequate4 ,indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it is not4#b ,lastly1 the ,society cannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing in an unseemly manner1 such as to justly occasion serions offence4 #a ,the ,academy has been good enough to insert the second is on its own account1 by way of proving the truth of ,longinus' theory 7,v4 ,de ,sublimitate3 chap4 #ci1 ad fin471 that the addition or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient to destroy the whole force of a sentence4 7,p4 ,longinus3 ,de ,sublimitate ,libellus2 edit4 ,joannes ,vablen1 ,bonnae1 #ahhg47--7,translator7 #b ,i suppose this is the meaning of contra esse confiteri4--7,translator47