,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,war              
,,the    ,,reality ,,of ,,war      ,a   
,,companion    ,,to ,,clausewitz        
,,by    ,,major ,,stewart ,l4 ,,murray  
,,late ,,gordon ,,highlanders           
,,popular ,,edition ,,edited ,,by    ,a4
 ,,hilliard ,,atteridge      ,,london   
,,hodder ,,and ,,stoughton    ,,warwick 
,,square1 ,e4,c4      ,,hugh ,,rees1    
,,ltd4    #e ,,regent ,,street1 ,s4,w4  
,reprinted in #aiad          ,,editor',s
 ,,preface      ,great books1 the       
masterpieces of the special branch of   
knowledge with  which they deal1 are    
often very big books2 and busy men1 who 
have not  unlimited time for reading1   
find it helpful to have some one who    
will  give them a general summary of a  
famous writer's teaching1 and point  out
 the most important passages in which   
the author himself embodies  the very   
essence of his argument4    ,this is    
what ,major ,murray has done for the    
most important work on war  that was    
ever written4 ,he does not give a mere  

dry summary of its  contents4 ,he sets  
forth1 in language so plain that even   
the civilian  reader or the youngest    
soldier can read it with interest1 the  
essence  of the teaching of ,clausewitz1
 and he embodies in his book the most   
striking passages of the original work4 
,he adds to each section of his  subject
 some useful criticisms1 and at the end 
of the book he sums up  the effect of   
recent changes on the practice of war4  
,the book is a popular manual of the    
realities of war1 which should be  read 
not only by soldiers1 but by every one  
who takes an intelligent  interest in   
the great events of our time4    ,as to 
the practical value of the writings of  
,clausewitz1 it may be  well to quote   
here the words of ,mr4 ,spenser         
,wilkinson1 the ,professor  of ,military
 ,history at ,oxford1 from his          
introduction to the original  edition of
 ,major ,murray's work3    ,clausewitz  
was a ,prussian officer who first saw   
fighting as a boy in  #agic1 and whose  

experience of war lasted until #ahae1   
when the great  war ended4 ,he was then 
thirty-five and spent the next fifteen  
years in  trying to clear his mind on   
the subject of war1 which he did by     
writing  a number of military histories 
and a systematic treatise ',on ,war4'   
,at  the age of fifty he tied his       
manuscripts into a parcel1 hoping to    
work  at them again on the conclusion of
 the duties for which he was ordered    
from home4 ,a little more than a year   
later he died at ,breslau of  cholera1  
and the papers1 to which he had never   
put the finishing touch1  were          
afterwards published by his widow4      
,part of the value of his work is due to
 the exceptional opportunities  which he
 enjoyed4 ,when the war of #ahjf began  
he had long been the  personal adjutant 
of one of the ,prussian princes1 and an 
intimate  friend of ,scharnhorst1 who   
was probably the greatest of ,napoleon's
  contemporaries4 ,in the period of     
reorganization which followed  the      

,peace of ,tilsit he made the           
acquaintance of ,gneisenau1 and of      
almost all the officers who made their  
mark in the subsequent wars  of         
liberation4 ,during the years of        
preparation he was ,scharnhorst's       
assistant1 first in the ,ministry of    
,war and then on the ,general ,staff4   
,during the campaign of #ahab he served 
with the ,russian army as a  staff      
officer4 ,thus his experience during the
 four years of the ,wars  of ,liberation
 was that of one who was continually    
behind the scenes1  always in touch with
 the ,governments and ,generals1 and    
therefore better  able than any one not 
so favourably placed to see everything  
in its  proper perspective1 and to      
follow and appreciate the considerations
  which directed the decisions both of  
statesmen and of the commanders  of     
armies4 ,his personal character was of  
the finest mould1 and his  writings have
 the sincerity1 the absence of which    
makes it so difficult  to rely upon     

those of ,napoleon4    ,the ultimate    
test of the value of books is time4     
,when ,clausewitz  died1 the two books  
on war which were thought the best were 
those of  the ,archduke ,charles of     
,austria and ,general ,jomini4 ,to-day  
the book  of ,clausewitz1 ',on ,war1'   
easily holds the first place4 ,it is the
  least technical of all the great books
 on war2 from beginning to end  it is   
nothing but common sense applied to the 
subject1 but for that  reason it is the 
hardest to digest1 because common sense 
or a man's  natural instinctive judgment
 on any subject is exceedingly hard to  
analyse and put into words4 ,an         
exceptionally gifted man can go through 
this process1 but few can follow it for 
any length of time without a  distinct  
effort4    ,almost every good           
institution has arisen out of the effort
 to provide  a remedy for some evil1 but
 in the imperfection of human nature    
nearly  every institution brings with it
 fresh evils1 which in their turn have  

to be counteracted4 ,the modern spirit1 
with its hatred of nepotism  and its    
belief in knowledge1 has grafted the    
examination system upon  every form of  
education from the lowest to the        
highest4 ,the ,british  army shares in  
the benefits and in the disadvantages of
 the system1  of which1 in the case of  
an officer1 the danger to be guarded    
against  is that it tends to accustom a 
man to rely rather on his memory than   
his intelligence1 and to lean more on   
other people's thinking than on  his    
own4 ,clausewitz aimed at producing the 
very opposite result4 ,he  does not     
offer specific solutions of the various 
problems of war lest  officers1 in      
moments when their business is to decide
 and to act1  should be trying to recall
 his precepts instead of using their    
eyes and  their wits4 ,his purpose      
rather is to enable them to understand  
what war  is4 ,he believed that if a man
 had accustomed himself to think of war 
as  it really is1 had got to know the   

different elements which go to make  it 
up1 and to distinguish those that are   
important from those that are           
comparative trifles1 he would be more   
likely to know of himself what  to do in
 a given situation1 and would be much   
less likely to confuse  himself by      
trying to remember what some general1   
long since dead1 did  on some occasion  
in which after all the position was by  
no means the  same as that in which he  
finds himself4    ,what is said here of 
the soldier actually engaged in war1 is 
true also  even of the onlooker who     
takes a patriotic interest in the       
progress of  a war in which his country 
is involved4 ,unless he has a clear idea
 of  the real character of modern war1  
and the principles on which success  or 
failure depend1 he will be utterly      
unable to grasp the significance  of the
 events of which he reads each day4 ,and
 it is of real importance  that in time 
of war every citizen should judge       
soundly the course of  events1 for      

opinion influences action1 and public   
opinion is made up of  the ideas of the 
units who compose the public4 ,in this  
connection it is  well to bear in mind a
 point that is often overlooked1 a point
 on which  ,clausewitz insists in a     
singularly convincing passage--namely1  
the fact  that one of the main objects  
of a nation waging war is to force the  
enemy's population into a state of mind 
favourable to submission4 ,this  fact is
 sufficient proof of the importance of  
public opinion being  well informed not 
only as to the course of events1 but    
also as to the  principles that give to 
these events their real significance4   
,,contents        ,,chapter ,i          
,,page    ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,clausewitz
                      #c                
,,chapter ,,ii      ,,the ,,influence   
,,of ,,clausewitz ,,on ,,modern         
,,policy ,,and ,,war                    
#aa        ,,chapter ,,iii      ,,the   
,,writings ,,of ,,clausewitz            
#bc        ,,chapter ,,iv      ,,the    

,,theory ,,and ,,the ,,practice ,,of    
,,war         #cc        ,,chapter ,v   
,,the ,,magnitude ,,of ,,the ,,effort   
,,required      ,,in ,a ,,modern        
,,national ,,war                 #dg    
,,chapter ,,vi      ,,public ,,opinion  
,,in ,,war                      #fe     
,,chapter ,,vii      ,,the ,,nature ,,of
 ,,war                          #gi     
,,chapter ,,viii      ,,war ,,as        
,,policy                                
#aai        ,,chapter ,,ix              
,,strategy                              
#acg        ,,chapter ,x      ,,the     
,,execution ,,of ,,strategy             
#afa        ,,chapter ,,xi              
,,tactics                               
#agg        ,,chapter ,,xii             
,,changes ,,since ,,the ,,days ,,of     
,,clausewitz      #bac                  
,,chapter ,i    ,,the ,,life ,,of       
,,clausewitz      ,in an endeavour1 such
 as the present1 to interest the        
,british public in  even the greatest   
military writer1 the first necessity is 

to show that  he was not a mere theorist
 or bookworm4 ,the wide and varied      
experience  which the ,british officer  
gradually gains in so many different    
parts  of the world shows up the weak   
points of most theories1 and produces  a
 certain distrust of them4 ,also a      
distrust of theory is undoubtedly  one  
of our national characteristics4 ,hence1
 in order to appeal to the  ,british    
officer or civilian1 a writer must be a 
practical soldier4    ,such was ,general
 ,clausewitz3 a practical soldier of    
very great  experience in the long      
series of wars #agic to #ahae1 and one  
present  throughout that most awful of  
all campaigns1 ,napoleon's ,russian     
campaign in #ahab4    ,general ,karl von
 ,clausewitz was born near ,magdeburg in
 #aghj1 and  entered the ,prussian army 
as ,fahnenjunker in #agib4 ,he served in
 the  campaigns of #agic-agid on the    
,rhine4 ,in #ahja he entered the        
military  school at ,berlin as an       
officer1 and remained there till #ahjc4 

,he here  attracted the notice of       
,scharnhorst4 ,in the campaign of #ahjf 
he served  as aide-de-camp to ,prince   
,augustus of ,prussia1 was present at   
the  battle of ,jena1 and saw that awful
 retreat which ended a fortnight  later 
in the surrender at ,prentzlau4 ,being  
wounded and captured1 he  was sent into 
,france as a prisoner till the end of   
the war4 ,on his  return 7in ,november1 
#ahjg7 he was placed on ,general        
,scharnhorst's  staff1 and employed on  
the work then going on for the          
reorganization  of the ,prussian army4  
,in #ahab ,clausewitz entered the       
,russian service1  was employed on the  
general staff1 and was thus able to gain
 much  experience in the most gigantic  
of all the struggles of his time4 ,in   
the spring campaign of #ahac 7battles of
 ,lutzen1 ,bautzen1 etc471 he1 as  a    
,russian officer1 was attached to       
,blucher's staff2 during the winter     
campaign he found employment as         
chief-of-the-staff to ,count ,walmoden1 

who fought against ,davoust on the      
,lower ,elbe1 and the splendid action   
of the ,goerde was entirely the result  
of his able dispositions4 ,in #ahae  he 
again entered the ,prussian service1 and
 was chief-of-the-staff to  the ,,iii4  
,army ,corps 7,thielman71 which at      
,ligny formed the left of the  line of  
battle1 and at ,wavre covered the rear  
of ,blucher's army4 ,in  addition to    
this1 we may say1 considerable practical
 training 7note1  enormous and varied   
indeed compared to any obtainable in the
 present  day71 he also possessed a     
comprehensive and thorough knowledge of 
military history1 and also an uncommonly
 clear perception of general  history   
7,von ,caemmerer74 ,after the ,peace he 
was employed in a command  on the       
,rhine4 ,in #ahah he became             
major-general1 and was made ,director of
  the ,military ,school at ,berlin4     
,here he remained for some years4 ,this 
was the chief period of his writings4   
,as ,general von ,caemmerer1 in his     

,development of ,strategical ,science1  
puts it3 ,this practical and            
experienced1 and at the same time highly
 cultured soldier1 feels now1  in       
peaceful repose1 as he himself          
confesses1 the urgent need to develop   
and systematize the whole world of      
thought which occupies him1 yet also    
resolves to keep secret till his death  
the fruit of his researches1 in  order  
that his soul1 which is thirsting for   
,truth1 may be safely and  finally      
spared all temptations from subordinate 
considerations4    ,in #ahcj he was     
appointed ,director of ,artillery at    
,breslau1 and1 having  no more time for 
writing1 sealed up and put away his     
papers1 unfinished  as they were4 ,in   
the same year he was appointed          
chief-of-the-staff to  ,field-,marshal  
,gneisenau's army4 ,in the winter of    
that year war with  ,france was         
considered imminent1 and ,clausewitz had
 prospects of acting  as chief of the   
general staff of the                    

,commander-in-,chief ,gneisenau4 ,he    
then drew up two plans for war with     
,france1 which bear the stamp of  that  
practical knowledge of war and          
adaptation of means to ends which       
distinguish his writings4    ,in the    
same year the war scare passed away1 the
 army of ,gneisenau was  disbanded1 and 
,clausewitz returned to ,breslau1 where 
after a few days  he was seized with    
cholera1 and died in ,november1 #ahca1  
aged only #ea4    ,his works were       
published after his death by his widow4 
,,chapter ,,ii    ,,the ,,influence ,,of
 ,,clausewitz ,,on ,,modern ,,policy    
,,and ,,war      ,from the day of their 
publication until now the influence of  
the  writings of ,clausewitz has been   
steadily growing1 till to-day it is     
impossible to over-estimate the extent  
of that influence upon modern  military 
and political thought1 especially in    
,germany4 ,as ,general von  ,caemmerer1 
in his ,development of ,strategical     
,science1 says3 ,karl  von ,clausewitz1 

the pupil and friend of ,scharnhorst and
 the confidant  of ,gneisenau1 is in    
,germany generally recognized as the    
most prominent  theorist on war1 as the 
real philosopher on war1 to whom our    
famous  victors on the more modern      
battlefields owe their spiritual        
training4    ,field-,marshal ,moltke was
 his most distinguished pupil1 and      
adapted  the teaching of ,clausewitz to 
the conditions of to-day4    ,general   
von der ,goltz1 in the introduction to  
his great work1 ,the  ,nation in ,arms1 
thus describes the veneration which he  
inspires3 ,a  military writer who1 after
 ,clausewitz1 writes upon the subject of
 war1  runs the risk of being likened to
 a poet who1 after ,goethe1 attempts a  
,faust1 or1 after ,shakespeare1 a       
,hamlet4 ,everything important that  can
 be told about the nature of war can be 
found stereotyped in the  works which   
that great military genius has left     
behind him4 ,although  ,clausewitz has  
himself described his book as being     

something as yet  incomplete1 this      
remark of his must be taken to mean that
 he1 too1  was subject to the fate of   
all aspiring spirits1 and was forced to 
feel that all he attained lay far       
beneath his ideal4 ,for us1 who knew    
not what that ideal was1 his labours are
 a complete work4 ,i have1  accordingly1
 not attempted to write anything new1 or
 of universal  applicability about the  
science of warfare1 but have limited    
myself to  turning my attention to the  
military operations of our own day4 ,one
  can hardly imagine a stronger tribute 
of admiration4    ,and1 as ,moltke was  
,clausewitz's most distinguished pupil1 
so also  are all those trained in the   
school of ,moltke pupils of ,clausewitz1
  including the most eminent of modern  
,german military writers1 such as       
,general von ,blume1 in his ,strategy2  
,von der ,goltz1 in his ,nation in      
,arms and ,the ,conduct of ,war1 who    
trained the ,turkish ,general ,staff    
for the campaign of #ahig against       

,greece and the battle of ,pharsalia1   
etc42 ,general von ,boguslawski2        
,general von ,verdy du ,vernois1 the    
father of the study of ,applied         
,tactics2 ,general von ,schlichting1 in 
his  ,tactical and ,strategical         
,principles of the ,present2 ,general   
,meckel1  who trained the ,japanese     
,staff1 etc41 etc4    ,we all remember  
the telegram sent to ,general ,meckel by
 ,marshal ,oyama  after the battle of   
,liao-yang3 ,we hope you are proud of   
your pupils4    ,some time ago1 when    
asked to give a lecture at ,aldershot to
 the  officers of the #bnd ,division on 
,clausewitz1 it struck me that it would 
be very interesting1 anxious as we all  
were then to know the causes  of the    
wonderful ,japanese efficiency and      
success1 if ,i could obtain a           
pronouncement from ,general ,meckel how 
far he had been influenced in his       
teaching by ,clausewitz4 ,my friend     
,herr von ,donat did me the favour to   
write to ,general von ,caemmerer and ask

 him if he could procure me such  a     
pronouncement which ,i might publish4   
,general ,meckel1 whose death both      
,japan and ,germany have since had to   
mourn1 most kindly consented1 and  ,i   
esteem it a great honour to be allowed  
to quote part of his letter4  ,he said3 
,i1 like every other ,german officer1   
have1 consciously or  unconsciously1    
instructed in the spirit of ,clausewitz4
 ,clausewitz is  the founder of that    
theory of war which resulted from the   
,napoleonic4  ,i maintain that every one
 who nowadays either makes or teaches   
war  in a modern sense1 bases himself   
upon ,clausewitz1 even if he is not     
conscious of it4 ,this opinion of       
,general ,meckel1 to whose training of  
the ,japanese ,general ,staff the       
success of the ,japanese armies must be 
largely attributed1 is most interesting4
 ,it is not possible to give a  stronger
 or more up-to-date example of the      
magnitude of the influence  of          
,clausewitz4    ,in this connection ,i  

should like to make a short quotation   
from ,the  ,war in the ,far ,east1 by   
the ,times military correspondent4 ,in  
his  short but suggestive chapter on    
,clausewitz in ,manchuria he says3 ,but 
as all save one of the great battles in 
,manchuria have been waged by  the      
,japanese in close accordance with the  
spirit and almost the letter  of        
,clausewitz's doctrine1 and as the same 
battles have been fought by  the        
,russians in absolute disregard of them 
7though his works had been  translated  
into ,russian by ,general ,dragomiroff  
long before the war71  it is certainly  
worth showing how reading and reflection
 may profit  one army1 and how the      
neglect of this respectable practice may
 ruin  another4 ,clausewitz in          
,manchuria6 ,that brings us up to date4 
,it is a  far cry for his influence to  
have reached1 and triumphed4            
,,reflections    ,clausewitz wrote his  
book expressly for statesmen as well as 
soldiers4  ,we may be sure1 therefore1  

that the influence of ,clausewitz on the
  ,continent has penetrated the realm of
 policy little less widely than  the    
realm of war4 ,from this thought arise  
many reflections4 ,it will be           
sufficient here to suggest one4 ,i would
 suggest that we should regard  every   
foreign statesman1 especially in        
,germany1 as1 consciously or            
unconsciously1 a disciple of            
,clausewitz4 ,that is to say1 we should 
regard him as a man who1 underneath     
everything else1 underneath the  most   
pacific assurances for the present1     
considers war an unalterable  part of   
policy4 ,he will regard war as part of  
the ordinary intercourse  of nations1   
and occasional warlike struggles as     
inevitable as  commercial struggles4 ,he
 will consider war also as an instrument
  of policy1 which he himself may have  
to use1 and to be studied  accordingly4 
,he will consider it not as a thing     
merely for speeches1  but for practical 
use in furthering or defending the      

interests of his  ,state4 ,he will      
regard war as the means by which some   
day his nation  shall impose its will   
upon another nation4 ,he will be        
prepared to wait  and wait1 to make     
every imaginable preparation1 and       
finally to let  loose war in its most   
absolute and ruthless character1 war    
carried out  with the utmost means1 the 
utmost energy1 and the utmost effort of 
a  whole nation-in-arms1 determined to  
achieve its political object and  compel
 submission to its will by force4    ,to
 talk to such a man of the evils of war1
 or of the burden of  armaments2 or to  
propose to him disarmament or reduction 
of  armed forces1 and so forth can only 
appear to him as the result of          
imperfect knowledge4 ,he will not say   
so1 but he will think so1 and  act      
accordingly4 ,to the partially          
instructed opponent of such a man  one  
can only say1 ,let him that thinketh he 
standeth take heed lest he  fall4       
,,chapter ,,iii    ,,the ,,writings ,,of

 ,,clausewitz      ,the writings of     
,clausewitz are contained in nine       
volumes1 published  after his death in  
#ahca1 but his fame rests chiefly on his
 three  volumes ,on ,war1 which have    
been translated by ,colonel ,j4 ,j4     
,graham  7the last edition edited by    
,colonel ,f4 ,n4 ,maude1 and published  
by  ,messrs4 ,kegan ,paul1 ,london74    
,clausewitz calls them a collection of  
materials1 a mass of conceptions not    
brought into form1 and states  that he  
intended to revise1 and throw the whole 
into more complete  shape4    ,we must  
lament that he did not live to complete 
his revision4 ,but1  on the other hand1 
it is perhaps possible that this        
unfinished  state is really an          
advantage1 for it leaves us free to     
apply his  great maxims and principles  
and mode of thought to the ever-varying 
conditions of the present and future1   
unhampered by too complete a            
crystallization of his ideas written    
before more modern conditions of        

railways1 telegraphs1 and rapid         
long-ranging arms of precision1 etc41   
arose4 ,it is perhaps this unfinished   
state which renders ,clausewitz  so     
essentially in touch with1 and a part   
of1 the onward movement and  evolution  
of military thought4 ,for his great aim 
was the truth1 the  whole truth1 and    
nothing but the truth1 without          
preconception or  favour1 as far as he  
could go--essentially a realist of      
war--and what  better aim can we set    
before ourselves8    ,as ,sir ,arthur   
,helps has so well put it in his        
,friends in ,council1  every man needs a
 sort of central stem for his reading   
and culture4 ,i  wish here to say why ,i
 think that ,clausewitz is admirably    
adapted to  form such a main stem in the
 military culture of ,british officers4 
,in the first place there is a lofty    
sort of tone about his writings  which  
one gradually realizes as one reads     
them1 and which ,i will not  attempt to 
describe further than by saying that    

they stamp themselves  as the writings  
of a gentleman of fine character4    ,in
 the second place it is a book which any
 fellow can read1 for  there is nothing 
to put one off1 nothing abstruse or     
mathematical or  formal1 no formul or   
lines and angles and technical terms1   
such as in  other writers1 ,jomini1     
,hamley1 etc4 ,clausewitz is free from  
all such  pedantries1 which for my part1
 and ,i dare say for the part of many   
others1 often put one off a book1 and   
made one instinctively feel  that there 
was something wrong1 something          
unpractical about it1 which  rendered it
 hardly worth the sacrifice of time     
involved in its study4  ,there is in    
,clausewitz nothing of that kind at all4
 ,all those lines and  angles and formul
 he dismisses in a few pages as of      
little practical  importance4    ,in the
 third place ,clausewitz only goes in   
for experience and the  practical facts 
of war4 ,as he somewhat poetically puts 
it1 ,the  flowers of ,speculation       

require to be cut down low near the     
ground of  ,experience1 their proper    
soil4#a ,he is the great apostle of     
human  nature and character as being    
everything in war4 ,all war supposes    
human weakness1 and against that it is  
directed4#b ,i believe that the         
,british officer will find himself in   
sympathy with the great thinker  on war1
 who asserts that ,of all military      
virtues ,energy in the  conduct of      
,operations has always conduced most to 
glory and success of  arms4#c    ,in the
 fourth place1 to the practical mind    
will appeal his denunciation  of all    
elaborate plans1 because ,time is       
required for all elaborate              
combinations1 and ,time is just the one 
thing that an active enemy  will not    
give us1--and his consequent deduction  
that all plans must  be of the simplest 
possible form4 ,his famous sentence1 ,in
 war all  things are simple1 but the    
simple are difficult1#d gives the key   
to his writings1 for to overcome those  

simple yet great difficulties  he       
regards as the art of war1 which can    
only be done by the military  virtues of
 perseverance1 energy1 and boldness4    
,in the fifth place he does not want men
 to be bookworms1 for he says3          
,theory is nothing but rational         
reflection upon all the situations  in  
which we can be placed in war4#e ,and we
 can all reflect1 without  reading too  
many books4 ,also he says3 ,much reading
 of history is  not required for the    
above object4 ,the knowledge of a few   
separate  battles1 in their details1 is 
more useful than a general knowledge of 
several campaigns4 ,on this account it  
is more useful to read detailed         
narratives and journals than regular    
works of history4#f ,he wants  history  
in detail1 not a general smattering and 
a loose application  thereof1 which     
fault he strongly denounces4 ,and he    
expressly states  that the history of   
the very latest war is the most useful4 
,all of  which is very practical1 and in

 accord with what we feel to be true4   
,as he pictures war1 the struggle       
between the spiritual and moral  forces 
on both sides is the centre of all1#g   
and to this aspect  of the subject he   
gives much more attention than ,jomini  
and most of  ,jomini's disciples4 ,he   
has freed us once for all from all      
formalism4  ,the formation of character1
 careful1 practical1 detailed study1 and
  thorough preparation in peace1 the    
simplest plans carried out with the     
utmost perseverance1 resolution1 energy1
 and boldness in war--these are  the    
practical fruits of his teaching4       
,therefore1 ,i say again1 that ,i do not
 think that the ,british officer  could 
possibly find a more interesting or a   
better guide for the main  stem of his  
reading than ,clausewitz1 nor any one   
that will appeal  to his practical      
instincts of what is ,true half so well4
 ,i do not  believe that he could       
possibly do better than with ,clausewitz
 as  main stem1 and a detailed study of 

the latest campaigns and modern         
technicalities as the up-to-date        
addition required to transform          
knowledge into action4 ,i trust that    
every reader of ,clausewitz will  agree 
with me in this4          ,,chapter ,,iv
    ,,the ,,theory ,,and ,,the          
,,practice ,,of ,,war      ,moltke1 the 
most gifted pupil of ,clausewitz1       
,moltke1 who knew  ,clausewitz's book   
well1 and often liked to describe him as
 the  theoretical instructor4 ,as       
,chaucer would say1 ,what needeth wordes
  more8    ,clausewitz has treated      
practically every chief branch of       
strategy  and tactics 7except1 of       
course1 the present-day developments of 
railways1 telegraphs1 quick-firing guns1
 smokeless powder1 universal  service   
armies1 etc474 ,the whole of his bulky  
work ,on ,war is full  of interesting   
and sometimes eloquent and almost       
poetical passages1  of concentrated1    
pregnant1 and far-reaching thoughts on  
every  subject4 ,through all these it   

is1 of course1 impossible to follow  him
 in any introduction4 ,one can really do
 no more than urge all to  read         
,clausewitz for themselves1 to go to the
 fountain-head1 to the  master-work     
itself4 ,in the short space to which ,i 
have restricted  myself1 ,i propose1    
therefore1 to concentrate on a few of   
his leading  ideas1 reluctantly leaving 
out many others which are really almost 
just  as good4      ,,theory ,,and      
,,practice    ,one of the things for    
which we are most deeply indebted to    
,clausewitz  is that he has shown us    
clearly the proper place of theory in   
relation  to practice4 ,it should       
educate the mind of the future leader in
  war1 or1 rather1 guide him in his     
self-instruction1 but not  accompany him
 on to the battlefield2 just as a       
sensible tutor forms  and enlightens the
 opening mind of a youth without        
therefore keeping  him in               
leading-strings all his life4#h ,again1 
,in real action most  men are guided by 

the tact of judgment1 which hits the    
object more or  less accurately1        
according as they possess more or less  
genius4 ,this  is the way in which all  
great generals have acted1 and therein  
partly  lay their greatness and their   
genius1 in that they always hit upon    
what  was right by this tact4 ,thus also
 it will always be in action1 and  so   
far this tact is amply sufficient4 ,but 
when it is a question not of  acting    
one's self1 but of convincing others in 
consultation1 then  all depends upon    
clear conceptions and demonstrations and
 the inherent  relations2 and so little 
progress has been made in this respect  
that  most deliberations are merely a   
contention of words1 resting on no  firm
 basis1 and ending either in every one  
retaining his own opinion1  or in a     
compromise from mutual considerations of
 respect1 a middle  course really       
without any value4 ,clear ideas on these
 matters are not1  therefore1 wholly    
useless4#i    ,how true this is any one 

will admit who reflects for a moment    
upon  the great diversity of opinions on
 almost every subject held in our  army1
 just because of this want of a central 
theory common to all4 ,in  the domain of
 tactics it is evident that this holds  
good even as in  strategy1 for a common 
central theory of war will produce a    
more or  less common way of looking at  
things1 from which results more or less 
common action towards the attainment of 
the common object4      ,,rejection ,,of
 ,,set ,,and ,,geometrical ,,theories   
,it should educate the mind of the      
future leader in war is what            
,clausewitz demands from a useful       
theory2 but he most expressly and       
unreservedly rejects every attempt at a 
method by which definite  plans for wars
 or campaigns are to be given out all   
ready made as if  from a machine4#aj ,he
 mocks at ,blow's including at first in 
the  one term base all sorts of things1 
like the supply of the army1 its        
reinforcements and equipments1 the      

security of its communications with  the
 home country1 and lastly the security  
of its line of retreat1 and  then fixing
 the extent of the base1 and finally    
fixing an angle for the  extent of that 
base3 ,and all this was done merely to  
obtain a pure  geometrical result       
utterly useless 7,von ,caemmerer74      
,for the same reason ,jomini's principle
 of the ,inner ,line does not  satisfy  
him1 owing to its mere geometrical      
nature1 although he right  willingly    
acknowledges that it rests on a sound   
foundation1 on  the truth that the      
combat is the only effectual means in   
war 7,von  ,caemmerer74 ,all such       
attempts at theory seem to him therefore
 perfectly  useless1 because they strive
 to work with fixed quantities1 while in
  war everything is uncertain1 and all  
considerations must reckon with  all    
kinds of variable quantities2 because   
they only consider material  objects1   
while every action in war is saturated  
with moral forces and  effects2 lastly1 

because they deal only with the action  
of one party1  while war is a constant  
reciprocal effect of both parties 7,von 
,caemmerer74    ,pity the warrior1 says 
,clausewitz1 who is contented to crawl  
about  in this beggardom of rules4 ,pity
 the theory which sets itself in        
opposition to the mind#aa 7note1 the    
moral forces74      ,a ,,theory ,,to    
,,be ,,practically ,,useful             
,clausewitz insists that a useful theory
 cannot be more than a thorough         
knowledge of military history and       
reflection upon all the situations  in  
which we can be placed in war4 ,what    
genius does must be just the  best of   
all rules1 and theory cannot do better  
than to show just how  and why it is so4
 ,it is an analytical investigation of  
the subject  which leads to exact       
knowledge3 and if brought to bear on the
 results  of experience1 which in our   
case would be military history1 to a    
thorough familiarity with it4 ,if theory
 investigates the subjects  which       

constitute war2 if it separates more    
distinctly that which at  first sight   
seems amalgamated2 if it explains fully 
the properties of  the means2 if it     
shows their probable effects2 if it     
makes evident the  nature of objects2 if
 it brings to bear all over the field of
 war the  light of essentially critical 
investigation1--then it has fulfilled   
the chief duties of its province4 ,it   
becomes then a guide to him who  wishes 
to make himself acquainted with war from
 books2 it lights up the  whole road for
 him1 facilitates his progress1 educates
 his judgment1  and shields him from    
error4#ab      ,,knowledge ,,must ,,be  
,,thorough    ,this ,clausewitz         
considers most important4 ,he says that 
,knowledge of  the conduct of war 444   
must pass completely into the mind1 and 
almost  cease to be something objective4
 ,for in war ,the moral reaction1 the   
ever-changing form of things makes it   
necessary for the chief actor  to carry 
in himself the whole mental apparatus of

 his knowledge1 in  order that anywhere 
and at every pulse-beat he may be       
capable of giving  the requisite        
decision from himself4 ,knowledge must1 
by this complete  assimilation with his 
own mind and life1 be converted into    
real power4           99       99       
99       99       99    ,so much for    
,clausewitz1 therefore1 as the greatest 
yet the simplest and  least theoretical 
of theorists on war4 ,mark well his     
comforting dictum  that ,theory is      
nothing but rational reflection upon all
 the situations  in which we can be     
placed in war4 ,that is a task which we 
have all  more or less attempted4       
,therefore we are all more or less      
theorists4  ,the only question is that  
of comparative thoroughness in our      
reflections4 ,and it is essentially this
 thoroughness in investigation  and     
reflection towards which ,clausewitz    
helps us4 ,like every other  habit1 the 
habit of military reflection gradually  
grows with use2  till1 fortified and    

strengthened by detailed knowledge1 it  
gradually  becomes ,power4              
,,reflections    ,the theory of war is  
simple1 and there is no reason why any  
man who  chooses to take the trouble to 
read and reflect carefully on one or    
two of the acknowledged best books      
thereon1 should not attain to a  fair   
knowledge thereof4 ,he may with         
reasonable trouble attain to such       
knowledge of the theory of war as will  
enable him to follow with  intelligent  
appreciation the discussions of         
experienced soldier or  soldiers4 ,such 
knowledge as will prevent his           
misunderstanding the  experienced       
soldier's argument from pure ignorance1 
and such knowledge  as will enable him  
to understand the military reasons put  
forward and  the military object        
proposed4 ,to the opinion of such a man 
all respect  will be due4 ,thus1 and    
thus only4    ,it is indeed the plain   
duty of all who aspire to rule either   
thus to  qualify themselves to          

understand1 or else to abstain from     
interference  with1 the military        
interests of the ,state4                
,,chapter ,v    ,,the ,,magnitude ,,of  
,,the ,,effort ,,required ,,in ,a       
,,modern ,,national ,,war      ,this    
point is here illustrated with more     
detail from ,clausewitz than  may seem  
necessary to some1 because it is        
precisely the point regarding  modern   
war which is least understood in this   
country4    ,the complete overthrow of  
the enemy is the natural end of the art 
of  war4 ,as this idea must apply to    
both the belligerent parties1 it  must  
follow1 that there can be no suspension 
in the military act1 and  peace cannot  
take place until one or other of the    
parties concerned is  completely        
overthrown4 ,this is what ,clausewitz   
means by ,absolute ,war1  that is war   
carried to its absolute and logical     
conclusion with the  utmost force1 the  
utmost effort and the utmost energy4 ,he
 then proceeds  to show that war1 owing 

to all the natural inertia and friction 
of its  parts1 the whole of the         
inconsistency1 the vagueness and        
hesitation 7or  timidity7 of the human  
mind1 usually takes a weaker or less    
absolute  form according to             
circumstances4 ,all this1 theory must   
admit1 but it  is its duty to give the  
foremost place to the absolute form of  
war1 and  to use that form as a general 
point of direction4 ,he then proceeds to
  show that war finally took its        
absolute form under ,napoleon4 ,to-day  
we  may say that war takes its absolute 
form in the modern great national  war1 
which is waged by each belligerent with 
the whole concentrated  physical and    
mental power of the nation-in-arms4     
,this requires to be gone into a little 
more in detail1 for it is a  most       
important point4    ,clausewitz in ,book
 ,,viii4 approaches this part of his    
subject by an  historical survey of war 
from the time of the ,roman ,empire to  
that  of ,napoleon4 ,he shows how as the

 feudal system gradually merged into    
the later monarchical ,states of        
,europe1 armies gradually became less   
and less national1 more and more        
mercenary4 ,omitting this1 we arrive  at
 the seventeenth century4 ,he says3 ,the
 end of the seventeenth  century1 the   
time of ,louis ,,xiv41 is to be regarded
 as the point in  history at which the  
standing military power1 such as it     
existed in the  eighteenth century1     
reached its zenith4 ,that military force
 was based  on enlistment and money4    
,states had organized themselves into   
complete  unities2 and the governments1 
by commuting the personal services of   
their subjects into money payments1 had 
concentrated their whole power  in their
 treasuries4 ,through the rapid strides 
in social improvements1  and a more     
enlightened system of government1 this  
power had become very  great in         
comparison with what it had been4       
,france appeared in the field  with a   
standing army of a couple of hundred    

thousand men1 and the other  ,powers in 
proportion4    ,armies were supported   
out of the ,treasury1 which the         
sovereign regarded  partly as his privy 
purse1 at least as a resource belonging 
to the  ,government1 and not to the     
people4 ,relations with other ,states1  
except  with respect to a few commercial
 subjects1 mostly concerned only the    
interests of the ,treasury or of the    
,government1 not those of the  people2  
at least ideas tended everywhere in that
 way4 ,the ,cabinets  therefore looked  
upon themselves as the owners and       
administrators  of large estates1 which 
they were continually seeking to        
increase1  without the tenants on those 
estates being particularly interested in
  this improvement4    ,the people1     
therefore1 who in the ,tartar invasions 
were everything in  war1 who in the old 
republics and in the ,middle ,ages were 
of great  consequence1 were in the      
eighteenth century absolutely nothing   
directly4    ,in this manner1 in        

proportion as the ,government separated 
itself more  from the people1 and       
regarded itself as the ,state1 war      
became more and  more exclusively a     
business of the ,government1 which it   
carried on  by means of the money in its
 coffers and the idle vagabonds it could
  pick up in its own and neighbouring   
countries4 ,the army was a ,state       
property1 very expensive1 and not to be 
lightly risked in battle4  ,in its      
signification war was only diplomacy    
somewhat intensified1 a  more vigorous  
way of negotiating1 in which battles and
 sieges were  substituted for diplomatic
 notes4    ,plundering and devastating  
the enemy's country were no longer in   
accordance with the spirit of the age4  
,they were justly looked upon  as       
unnecessary barbarity4 ,war1 therefore1 
confined itself more and  more1 both as 
regards means and ends1 to the army     
itself4 ,the army1  with its fortresses 
and some prepared positions1 constituted
 a ,state in  a ,state1 within which the

 element of war slowly consumed itself4 
,all  ,europe rejoiced at its taking    
this direction1 and held it to be the   
necessary consequence of the spirit of  
progress4    ,so think many in this     
country to-day4 ,they are only a hundred
 years  behind the times4    ,the plan  
of a war on the part of the ,state      
assuming the offensive in  those times  
consisted generally in the conquest of  
one or other of the  enemy's provinces2 
the plan of the defender was to prevent 
this4 ,the  plan of campaign was to take
 one or other of the enemy's fortresses1
 or  to prevent one of our own being    
taken2 it was only when a battle became 
unavoidable for this purpose that it was
 sought for and fought4 ,whoever  fought
 a battle without this unavoidable      
necessity1 from mere innate  desire of  
gaining a victory1 was reckoned a       
general with too much  daring4 ,for     
armies were too precious to be lightly  
risked4 ,winter  quarters1 in which the 
mutual relations of the two parties     

almost  entirely ceased1 formed a       
distinct limit to the activity which was
  considered to belong to one campaign4 
,as long as war was universally         
conducted in this manner1 all was       
considered to be in the most regular    
order4 ,thus there was eminence and     
perfection of every kind1 and  even     
,field-,marshal ,daun1 to whom it was   
chiefly owing that ,frederick  the      
,great completely attained his object1  
and ,maria ,theresa completely  failed  
in hers1 notwithstanding that could     
still pass for a great  general4        
,beyond this stage of military thought1 
many in this country have not  yet      
advanced4           99       99       99
       99       99    ,thus matters     
stood when the ,french ,revolution broke
 out2 ,austria  and ,prussia tried their
 diplomatic art of war2 this very soon  
proved  insufficient4 ,whilst1 according
 to the usual way of seeing things1  all
 hopes were placed on a very limited    
military force in #agic1 such  a force  

as no one had any conception of made its
 appearance4 ,war had  suddenly become  
again an affair of the people1 and that 
of a people  numbering thirty millions1 
every one of whom regarded himself as a 
citizen of the ,state4 ,by this         
participation of the people in the  war1
 instead of a cabinet and an army1 a    
whole nation with its natural  weight   
came into the scale4 ,henceforth the    
means available--the efforts  which     
might be called forth--had no longer any
 definite limits2 the  energy with which
 the war itself might be conducted had  
no longer any  counterpoise1 and        
consequently the danger to the adversary
 had risen to  the extreme4    ,if only 
our politicians could learn this old    
lesson of the ,french  ,revolution6 ,for
 many1 too many1 of them appear to      
derive their ideas of  war to-day from  
some dim reminiscent recollections of   
school histories  of the wars in the    
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries4   
,to continue3 ,after all this was       

perfected by the hand of ,bonaparte1    
this military power based on the        
strength of the whole nation1 marched   
over ,europe1 smashing everything in    
pieces so surely and certainly1  that   
where it only encountered the           
old-fashioned armies the result was  not
 doubtful for a moment4    ,a reaction1 
however1 awoke in due time4 ,in ,spain  
the war became of  itself an affair of  
the people4 ,in ,austria4 ,in ,russia4  
,in ,germany  ,prussia rose up the      
first1 made the war a national cause1   
and without  either money or credit1 and
 with a population reduced one-half1    
took  the field with an army twice as   
strong as in #ahjf4 ,the rest of        
,germany  followed the example of       
,prussia sooner or later4 ,thus it was  
that  ,germany and ,russia1 in the years
 #ahac and #ahad1 appeared against      
,france  with about a million of men4   
,under these circumstances the energy   
thrown into the conduct of war  was     
quite different4 ,in eight months the   

theatre of war was removed  from the    
,oder to the ,seine4 ,proud ,paris had  
to bow its head for the  first time2 and
 the redoubtable ,bonaparte lay fettered
 on the ground4    ,therefore1 since the
 time of ,bonaparte1 war1 through being1
 first on  one side1 then again on the  
other1 an affair of the whole nation1   
has  assumed quite a new nature1 or     
rather it has approached much nearer  to
 its real nature1 to its absolute       
perfection4 ,the means then called      
forth had no visible limit1 the limit   
losing itself in the energy  and        
enthusiasm of the ,government and its   
subjects4 ,by the extent of  the means1 
and the wide field of possible results1 
as well as by  the powerful excitement  
of feeling which prevailed1 energy in   
the  conduct of war was immensely       
increased2 the object of its action was 
the downfall of the foe2 and not until  
the enemy lay powerless on  the ground  
was it supposed to be possible to stop1 
or to come to any  understanding with   

regard to the mutual objects of the     
contest4    ,thus1 therefore the element
 of war1 freed from all conventional    
restrictions1 broke loose with all its  
natural force4 ,the cause was the       
participation of the people in this     
great affair of ,state1 and this        
participation arose partly from the     
effects of the ,french ,revolution on   
the internal affairs of other countries1
 partly from the threatening  attitude  
of the ,french towards all nations4     
,now1 whether this will be the case     
always in future1 whether all wars      
hereafter in ,europe will be carried on 
with the whole power of the  ,states1   
and1 consequently1 will only take place 
on account of great  interests closely  
affecting the people1 would be a        
difficult point to  settle4 ,but every  
one will agree with us that1 at least1  
,whenever  great interests are in       
dispute1 mutual hostility will discharge
 itself  in the same manner as it has   
done in our times4      ,,reflections   

,this is so true1 that every war since  
the days of ,clausewitz has made  its   
truth more apparent4 ,since he wrote1   
the participation of the  people in war 
has become1 not a revolutionary fact1   
but an organized  fact1 an ordinary fact
 in the everyday life of nations4       
,to-day every  ,state except ,great     
,britain1 securely based on the system  
of the  universal training of its sons  
to arms1 stands ready to defend its     
interests with the whole concentrated   
power1 physical1 intellectual1  and     
material1 of its whole manhood4         
,consequently1 ,european war1  as       
,clausewitz foresaw1 will only take     
place on account of great  interests    
closely affecting the people4 ,the      
character of such war  will be absolute1
 the object of its action will be the   
downfall of the  foe1 and not till the  
foe 7be it ,great ,britain or not7 lies 
powerless  on the ground will it be     
supposed possible to stop4 ,in the      
prosecution  of such a national war the 

means available1 the energy and the     
effort  called forth1 will be without   
limits4 ,such must be the conflicts of  
nations-in-arms4    ,yet1 even now1 so  
many years after ,clausewitz wrote1 in  
the hope1 as he  himself stated1 to iron
 out many creases in the heads of       
strategists  and statesmen1 the great   
transformation in the character of      
modern  war1 due to the participation of
 the people therein1 has not yet been   
adequately realized by many men in this 
country who ought to know4  ,it is      
earnestly to be hoped that they will    
endeavour to adjust their  minds1 as    
regards war1 to the fact that we are    
living1 not in the  eighteenth century1 
but in the twentieth1 and that they will
 consider  that war has once for all    
become an affair of the people1 that our
  opponents will be a people-in-arms1   
using the uttermost means of their      
whole manhood to crush us1 and that     
disaster can only be prevented by a     
like utmost effort on our part1 by an   

effort regardless of everything  except 
self-preservation4          ,,chapter   
,,vi    ,,public ,,opinion ,,in ,,war   
,war belongs1 not to the province of    
arts and sciences1 but to the  province 
of social life4 ,it is a conflict of    
great interests which is  settled by    
bloodshed1 and only in that respect is  
it different from  others4 ,it would be 
better1 instead of comparing it with any
 art1 to  liken it to trade1 which is   
also a conflict of human interests and  
activities2 and it is still more like   
state policy1 which again1 on  its part1
 may be looked upon as a kind of trade  
on a great scale4  ,besides1 state      
policy is the womb in which war is      
developed1 in which  its outlines lie   
hidden in a rudimentary state1 like the 
qualities of  living creatures in their 
germs4#ac    ,these conflicts of        
interest can bring about gradually such 
a state of  feeling that even the most  
civilized nations may burn with         
passionate  hatred of each other4 ,it is

 an unpleasant fact for the philosopher1
  for the social reformer1 to           
contemplate1 but history repeats and    
repeats the lesson4 ,still more1 ,it is 
quite possible for such a state  of     
feeling to exist between two ,states    
that a very trifling political  motive  
for war may produce an effect quite     
disproportionate--in fact1 a  perfect   
explosion4    ,war is a wonderful       
trinity1 composed of the original       
violence of its  elements--hatred and   
animosity--which may be looked upon as  
blind  instinct2 of the play of         
probabilities and chance1 which make it 
a free  activity of the soul2 and of the
 subordinate nature of a political      
instrument1 by which it belongs purely  
to the reason4    ,the first of these   
three phases concerns more the people2  
the second1  more the general and his   
army2 the third more the ,government4   
,the  passions which break forth in war 
must already have a latent existence  in
 the peoples4    ,these three tendencies

 are deeply rooted in the nature of the 
subject4  ,a theory which would leave   
any one of them out of account would    
immediately become involved in such a   
contradiction with the reality1  that it
 might be regarded as destroyed at once 
by that alone4#ad    ,clausewitz is the 
great thinker1 the great realist1 the   
great  philosopher of war4 ,his aim was1
 free from all bias1 to get at the      
truth of things4 ,his view of war as a  
social act1 as part of the  intercourse 
of nations1 so that occasional warlike  
struggles can no  more be avoided than  
occasional commercial struggles1 is a   
view which  requires to be most         
carefully pondered over by every        
statesman4 ,it  is based upon the       
essential fundamental characteristics of
 human  nature1 which do not alter4 ,it 
is not to be lightly set aside by       
declamation about the blessings of      
peace1 the evils of war1 the burden  of 
armaments1 and such-like sophistries4   
,to submit without a struggle  to       

injustice or to the destruction of one's
 vital interests is not in  passionate  
human nature4 ,nor will it ever be in   
the nature of a virile  people4 ,it is  
indeed to be most sincerely hoped that  
arbitration  will be resorted to more   
and more as a means of peacefully       
settling  all non-vital causes of       
dispute4 ,but arbitration has its       
limits4 ,for  no great nation will ever 
submit to arbitration any interest that 
it regards as absolutely vital4 ,the    
view of war1 therefore1 as a  social    
act1 as part of the intercourse of      
nations1 with all that it  implies1     
appears to be the only one which a      
statesman1 however much he  may regret  
the fact1 can take4 ,it has1 therefore1 
been brought forward  here at once1 as  
it underlies the whole subject and is   
essential to all  clear thought thereon4
    ,so much for the influence of       
,public ,opinion in producing war4 ,now 
for  its influence in and during war4   
,there are three principal objects in   

carrying on war1 says ,clausewitz4      
7a7 ,to conquer and destroy the enemy's 
armed force4      7b7 ,to get possession
 of the material elements of aggression1
    and of the other sources of         
existence of the hostile army4      7c7 
,to gain ,public ,opinion4#ae    ,to    
attain the first of these objects1 the  
chief operation must be  directed       
against the enemy's principal army1 for 
it must be beaten  before we can follow 
up the other two objects with success4  
,in order to seize the material forces1 
operations are directed against  those  
points at which those resources are     
chiefly concentrated3  principal towns1 
magazines1 great fortresses4 ,on the    
road to these the  enemy's principal    
force1 or a considerable part of his    
army1 will be  encountered4    ,public  
,opinion is ultimately gained by great  
victories1 and by the  possession of the
 enemy's capital4#af    ,this almost    
prophetic 7as it was in his day7        
recognition by ,clausewitz  of the vast 

importance of gaining ,public ,opinion  
as one of the  three great aims in war1 
is fundamental4 ,it is just one of those
  instances of his rare insight into the
 principles and development of  modern  
national war which make his book of such
 great and enduring  value to us4 ,for  
since his day ,europe has become        
organized into great  industrial        
nations1 democracy and popular passion  
have become more  and more a force to be
 reckoned with1 and the gaining and     
preserving  of ,public ,opinion in war  
has become more and more important4 ,it 
has1  in fact1 become the statesman's   
chief business during a great modern    
national war4 ,it has become necessary  
for him to study intently war in  its   
relation to industry1 and to the        
industrial millions over whom he        
presides1 or over whom he may preside4  
,,reflections    7#a7 ,in the time of   
,clausewitz we in ,britain were a nation
 of  #ah1jjj1jjj1 practically           
self-supporting1 and governed by an     

aristocracy4 ,to-day we are a crowded   
nation of #dc1jjj1jjj dependent  upon   
over-sea sources for three-fourths of   
our food1 for our raw  materials1 for   
our trade1 for our staying power1 and we
 are governed  by a democracy4 ,in a    
modern democratic ,state it will only be
 possible  to carry on the most just and
 unavoidable war so long as the         
hardships  brought on the democracy by  
the war do not become intolerable4 ,to  
prevent these hardships from thus       
becoming intolerable to the people1  to 
,public ,opinion1 will be the task of   
the modern statesman during war1  and   
this can only be done by wise prevision 
and timely preparation4 ,it  requires   
the internal organization of the        
,industrial ,state for war4    ,it      
appears to the writer that internal     
organization can be subdivided  as      
follows3--    ,i4 ,an adequate gold     
reserve4    ,,ii4 ,the protection of our
 ships carrying raw material1 food1 and 
exports during their passage on the high

 seas from the places of  origin to the 
consumers3 7,a7 by the few available    
cruisers which could  be spared from the
 fighting fleets1 assisted by a         
thoroughly well  thought out and        
prepared scheme of national indemnity   
7vide ,blue ,book  thereon72 7,b7 by    
insuring the distribution to the        
consumers of food  and raw material1    
after it has arrived in the country1 by 
preparing a  thorough organization which
 would deal with the blocking of any of 
the  principal ports of arrival1 and by 
guarding the vulnerable points of  our  
internal lines of communications to and 
from the shipping centres4    ,,iii4    
,organization of ,poor ,law system to   
bring immediate relief by  selling at   
peace price food to those unable to pay 
war prices owing to  7,a7 normal poverty
 7#g1jjj1jjj to #h1jjj1jjj souls71 7,b7 
out-of-works1  due to effect of war on  
trade4    ,work and wages the ,state    
must guarantee during modern war1 and   
before the ,state can guarantee these1  

it is absolutely necessary  that it     
should satisfy itself that the above    
preparations are actually  in being4    
,this pre-supposes a more earnest study 
of the industrial  effects of a great   
national war than has yet been given to 
the subject  by our political leaders4  
,for in the warfare of the present and  
future  the importance of gaining and   
preserving ,public ,opinion1 as pointed 
out by ,clausewitz1 cannot be           
over-estimated4 ,it is as fundamentally 
important to safeguard our own ,public  
,opinion as it is to attack1  weaken1   
and gain over that of the enemy4 ,this  
has not yet passed  the stage of        
thought4 ,but good thoughts are no      
better than good dreams  unless they be 
put into action4 ,we are waiting for the
 statesman to ,,do  it4 ,there is no    
great difficulty4    7#b7 ,in arousing  
the national spirit to the requisite    
height of  patriotic self-denial and    
self-sacrifice1 in elevating1           
preserving1 and  safe-guarding ,public  

,opinion during a great national        
struggle1 much  may be hoped for from   
the patriotism of our ,press4 ,only in  
fairness to  those whose patriotism is  
self-originating and spontaneous1 it    
must  be made compulsory upon ,,all1 so 
that no journal may suffer loss of      
circulation or pecuniary injury thereby4
    7#c7 ,there lies a practical task   
immediately to the hand of our          
statesmen if they will seriously set    
themselves to the task of  improving the
 moral of our nation by reforming our   
education  curriculum1 on the leading   
principle that the moral is to the      
physical as three to one in life1 and   
that therefore character-building  must 
be its chief aim4 ,then they will do    
much towards strengthening  us for war1 
towards carrying out ,clausewitz's idea 
of the gaining and  preserving of our   
,public ,opinion in ,war4               
,,chapter ,,vii    ,,the ,,nature ,,of  
,,war      ,it is necessary for us to   
commence with a glance at the nature of 

the  whole1 because it is particularly  
necessary that1 in the consideration  of
 any of the parts1 the whole should be  
kept constantly in view4 ,we  shall not 
enter into any of the abstruse          
definitions of war used by  ,publicists4
 ,we shall keep to the element of the   
thing itself1 to a  duel4 ,war is       
nothing but a duel on an extensive      
scale4 ,if we would  conceive as a unit 
the countless numbers of duels which    
make up a  war1 we shall do so best by  
supposing two wrestlers4 ,each strives  
by physical force to throw his          
adversary1 and thus to render him       
incapable of further resistance4        
,violence arms itself with the          
inventions of arts and science in  order
 to contend against violence4           
,self-imposed restrictions1 almost      
imperceptible1 and hardly worth         
mentioning1 termed usages of            
,international ,law1 accompany it       
without essentially impairing its       
power4    ,violence1 that is to say     

physical force1 is therefore the ,means2
  the compulsory submission of the enemy
 to our will is the ultimate  object4   
,in order to attain this object fully   
the enemy must first be  disarmed3 and  
this is1 correctly speaking1 the real   
aim of hostilities  in theory4#ag       
,now1 philanthropists may easily imagine
 that there is a skilful  method of     
disarming and overcoming an adversary   
without causing great  bloodshed1 and   
that this is the proper tendency of the 
art of war4  ,however plausible this may
 appear1 still it is an error which must
  be extirpated1 for in such dangerous  
things as war the errors which  proceed 
from a spirit of benevolence are just   
the worst4 ,as the  use of physical     
power to the utmost extent by no means  
excludes the  co-operation of the       
intelligence1 it follows that he who    
uses force  unsparingly without         
reference to the quantity of bloodshed1 
,,must  obtain a superiority if his     
adversary does not act likewise4 ,to    

introduce into the philosophy of war    
itself a principle of moderation  would 
be an absurdity4 ,we therefore repeat   
our proposition1 that ,war  is an act of
 violence which in its application knows
 no bounds4      ,,the ,,political      
,,nature ,,of ,,war    ,in endeavouring 
briefly to describe ,clausewitz's method
 of looking at  war1 one is continually 
confronted by the difficulty of         
selecting  a few leading ideas out of so
 many profound thoughts and pregnant    
passages4 ,however1 a selection must be 
made4    ,i assign the first place to   
his conception of war as a part of      
policy1  because that is fundamentally  
necessary to understand his practical   
way of looking at things4 ,this point of
 view is as necessary for  the          
strategist as for the statesman1 indeed 
for every man who would  understand the 
nature of war4 ,for otherwise it is     
impossible to  understand the military  
conduct of many campaigns and battles1  
in which  the political outweighed the  

military influence1 and led to action   
incomprehensible almost from a purely   
military point of view4 ,history  is    
full of such examples4    ,clausewitz   
clearly lays down3 ,war is only a       
continuation of ,state  policy by other 
means4 ,this point of view being adhered
 to will  introduce much more unity into
 the consideration of the subject1 and  
things will be more easily disentangled 
from each other4#ah ,it  is only thus   
that we can obtain a clear conception of
 war1 for the  political view is the    
object1 war is the means1 and the means 
must always include the object in our   
conception4 ,each 7nation or            
government7 strives by physical force to
 compel the other to submit to  its     
will4#ai    ,owing to the great         
importance of this point of view1 so    
little  understood in this country1 ,i  
have devoted the next chapter to it     
alone1 so as to bring out ,clausewitz's 
view more in detail4 ,we can1           
therefore1 pass on for the present4     

,,the ,,culminating ,,point ,,of        
,,victory    ,secondly1 ,i select his   
doctrine of the culminating point of    
victory1  because that is essential in  
order to understand his division of all 
wars into two classes1 according to how 
far the attack is likely to be  able to 
extend into the hostile country before  
reaching its culminating  point1 where  
reaction may set in4#bj    ,the         
conqueror in a war is not always in a   
condition to subdue his  adversary      
completely4 ,often1 in fact almost      
universally1 there is a  culminating    
point of victory4 ,experience shows this
 sufficiently4#ba  ,as the attack or    
invasion progresses it becomes weaker   
even from its  successes1 from sieges or
 corps left to observe fortified places1
 from  the troops required to guard the 
territory gained1 and the lengthening   
line of communications1 from the fact   
that we are removing further  from our  
resource while the enemy is falling back
 upon and drawing  nearer to his1 from  

the danger of other ,states joining in  
to prevent  the utter destruction of the
 defeated nation1 from the rousing of   
the whole nation in extremity to save   
themselves by a people's war1  from the 
slackening of effort in the victorious  
army itself1 etc41  etc4 ,leoben1       
,friedland1 ,austerlitz1 ,moscow1 are   
instances of such a  culminating point1 
and probably in the late                
,russo-,japanese war ,harbin  would have
 proved so1 too1 if peace had not       
intervened4    ,clausewitz continues3   
,it is necessary to know how far it 7our
  preponderance7 will reach1 in order   
not to go beyond that point and1        
instead of fresh advantage1 reap        
disaster4 ,he defines it as ,the  point 
at which the offensive changes into the 
defensive1 and says1  to overstep this  
point is more than simply a useless     
expenditure of  power yielding no       
further results1 it is a destructive    
step which  causes reaction1 and the    
reaction is1 according to all           

experience1  productive of most         
disproportionate effects4#bb ,the reader
 will find  it an interesting exercise  
to search for this culminating point of 
victory in historical campaigns1 and    
mark the result where it has been       
overstepped and where it has not been   
overstepped4      ,,the ,,two ,,classes 
,,of ,,wars    ,from this consideration 
of the culminating point of victory     
follow the  two classes into which      
,clausewitz divides all wars4    ,the   
two kinds of war are1 first1 those in   
which the object is the  complete       
overthrow of the enemy1 whether it be   
that we aim at his  destruction         
politically1 or merely at disarming him 
and forcing him to  conclude peace on   
our terms2 and1 next1 those in which our
 aim is  merely to make some conquests  
on the frontiers of his country1 either 
for the purpose of retaining them       
permanently1 or of turning them to      
account as matters for exchange in the  
settlement of ,peace4#bc    ,all wars1  

therefore1 are wars for the complete    
destruction of the  enemy1 i4e4         
unlimited object1 or wars with a limited
 object4  ,in the plan of a war it is   
necessary to settle which it is to be in
  accordance with our powers and        
resources of attack compared with  the  
enemy's resources for defence1 and where
 our culminating point  of victory is   
likely to be1 on this side of the       
enemy's capital or  beyond it4 ,if the  
former--then the plan should be one with
 a limited  object1 such as the ,crimea1
 ,manchuria1 etc42 if the latter--then  
the  plan should aim at the enemy's     
total destruction1 such as most of      
,napoleon's campaigns1 or the ,allies in
 #ahac1 #ahad1 #ahae1 or as #ahff1  or  
#ahgj4 ,as ,clausewitz says3 ,now1 the  
first1 the grandest1 and most  decisive 
act of judgment which the statesman and 
general exercises1 is  rightly to       
understand in this respect the war in   
which he engages1  not to take it for   
something or to wish to make of it      

something which1  by the nature of its  
relations1 it is impossible for it to   
be4 ,this1  therefore1 is the first and 
most comprehensive of all strategical   
questions4#bd    ,in ,clausewitz's two  
plans for war with ,france in #ahca1be  
this  difference is plain4 ,in the first
 plan1 he considered ,prussia1 ,austria1
  the ,german ,confederation1 and ,great
 ,britain united as allies against      
,france1--and with this great           
superiority of numbers he plans an      
attack  by two armies1 each of #cjj1jjj 
men1 one marching on ,paris from        
,belgium1  one on ,orleans from the     
,upper ,rhine4 ,in the second plan the  
political  conditions had meanwhile     
changed2 ,austria and ,great ,britain   
were  doubtful1 and ,clausewitz held it 
accordingly dubious if ,prussia and  the
 ,german ,confederation alone could     
appear before ,paris in sufficient      
strength to guarantee victory in a      
decisive battle1 and with which it      
would be permissible to venture even    

beyond ,paris4 ,so he proposed to  limit
 the object to the conquest of ,belgium1
 and to attack the ,french  vigorously  
the moment they entered that country4   
,which strict limitation of the object  
within the means available to  attain it
 is characteristic of ,clausewitz's     
practical way of looking  at things4 ,in
 each plan1 however1 a vigorous         
offensive aiming at a  decisive victory 
was to be adopted4      ,,preparation   
,,for ,,war    ,the third place1 in     
respect to its present-day importance1  
,i assign to  ,clausewitz's clear       
statement that--    ,if we have clearly 
understood the result of our            
reflections1 then  the activities       
belonging to war divide themselves into 
two principal  classes1 into such as are
 only preparations for war and into the 
war  itself4 ,this distinction must also
 be made in theory4    ,nothing could be
 more clearly stated than this1 or place
 in greater  honour peace preparations4 
,like his doctrine of the importance of 

gaining public opinion in war1 it is one
 of those almost prophetic  utterances  
which make ,clausewitz the germ of      
modern military evolution4              
,clausewitz1 unlike ,jomini who did not1
 foresaw to a certain extent  7probably 
owing to his employment in organizing   
the new ,prussian  short-service army   
after #ahjf7 the nation-in-arms of the  
present day4  ,and1 since his time1 the 
greater the forces which have to be     
prepared1  the greater has become the   
value of preparation for war4 ,it has   
been  continually growing1 till to-day  
it has obtained such overwhelming       
importance that one may almost say that 
a modern war is practically 7or  nearly 
so7 decided before war breaks out1      
according to which nation  has made the 
greatest and most thorough peace        
preparations4    ,clausewitz elsewhere  
speaks of every imaginable preparation4 
,we may  nowadays almost go so far as to
 say that preparation is war1 and that  
that nation which is beaten in          

preparation is already beaten ,,before  
the war breaks out4    ,a failure to    
understand this fact is a fundamental   
error at the root  of the idea of war as
 held by civilians1 for many of them    
think that  speeches are a substitute   
for preparations4    ,it is plain that  
these three ideas of ,clausewitz        
regarding the nature  of war1 its       
political nature1 the distinction       
between wars with an  unlimited object  
and a limited object1 and preparations  
in peace-time1  are as much matters for 
the statesman as for the soldier1 and   
require  study and reflection on the    
part of the former as much as on the    
part  of the latter4      ,,friction    
,,in ,,war    ,i place friction here    
before the more detailed consideration  
of actual  war1 of war in itself1       
because it is that which distinguishes  
war  on paper from real war1 the        
statesman's and soldier's part from the 
part of the soldier only1 and is        
therefore to be fitly treated midway    

between the two4    ,friction in war is 
one of ,clausewitz's most characteristic
 ideas4 ,he  always looks at everything 
from that point of view1 and as friction
  and the fog of war1 and their         
influence on human nature will always be
  the chief characteristic of real war  
as distinguished from theoretical  war  
or war on paper1 it is chiefly this     
habit or mode of thought which  makes   
his writings of such great and permanent
 value4 ,it is also a  habit which we   
ought sedulously to cultivate in        
ourselves4    ,in war everything is very
 simple1 but the simplest thing is      
difficult1#bf runs his famous saying4   
,why is the simplest thing  difficult8  
,because of the friction of war4 ,and   
how can that friction  be minimized8    
,only by force of character1 and the    
military virtues of  discipline1        
perseverance1 resolution1 energy1 and   
boldness4 ,hence the  great emphasis    
which he always and everywhere lays upon
 character and  these military virtues  

as the deciding factors in war4         
,friction is the only conception which  
in a general way corresponds to  that   
which distinguishes real war from war on
 paper1 he says4 ,each  individual of   
the army keeps up his own friction in   
all directions4  ,the danger which war  
brings with it1 the bodily exertions    
which it  requires1 augment this evil so
 much that they may be regarded as the  
greatest causes of it4#bg ,this enormous
 friction is everywhere  brought into   
contact with chance1 and thus facts take
 place  upon which it was impossible to 
calculate1 their chief origin being     
chance4 ,as an instance of one such     
chance take the weather4 ,here the  fog 
prevents the enemy from being discovered
 in time1--a battery from  firing1 or a 
report from reaching the general4 ,the  
rain 7mud7 prevents  a battalion from   
arriving1--or the cavalry from charging 
effectively1  because it had stuck fast 
in the heavy ground4 ,and so on4        
,consider  for examples the foggy       

mornings of ,jena or ,austerlitz1 of    
,eylau1 the  ,katzbach1 ,grosbeeren1    
,dennewitz1 ,pultusk1 ,dresden1 ,sadowa2
 or the mud  of ,poland1 the snow of    
,russia1 or1 latest1 the mud of         
,manchuria4    ,activity in war is      
movement in a resistant medium4 ,the    
knowledge  of friction is a chief part  
of that so often talked of experience in
  war1 which is required in a good      
general4 ,it is therefore this  friction
 which makes that which appears easy in 
war so difficult in  reality4#bh ,in    
considering any situation in war we must
 therefore  always add to the known     
circumstances--friction4      ,,war     
,,itself    ,in ,clausewitz's way of    
looking at war itself ,i assign at once 
the first  place to his doctrine1 ,the  
destruction of the enemy's military     
force  is the leading principle of war1 
and for the whole chapter of positive   
action the direct way to the aim4#bi    
,this dictum1 repeated in  many         
different forms1 underlies his whole    

conception of war4 ,all the  old        
theoretical ideas about threatening by  
manoeuvring1 conquering by  manoeuvring1
 forcing the enemy to retreat by        
manoeuvring1 and so forth1  in which his
 predecessors entangled strategy1 and   
from which even the  ,archduke ,charles 
and ,jomini had not completely freed    
themselves1 he  brushes aside by our    
assertion is that ,,only great tactical 
results can  lead to great strategical  
results4#cj ,thus he leads and          
concentrates  our thoughts in strategy  
on the central idea of victory in       
battle1  and frees us once for all from 
the obscuring veil of lines and angles  
and geometrical forms by which other    
writers have hidden that truth4         
,philanthropists may easily imagine that
 there is a skilful method of           
overcoming and disarming an adversary   
without causing great bloodshed1  and   
that this is the proper tendency of the 
art of war4 ,however  plausible this may
 appear1 it is an error which must be   

extirpated1  for1 in such dangerous     
things as war1 the errors which spring  
from a  spirit of benevolence are just  
the worst4#ca ,for he who uses force    
unsparingly without reference to the    
quantity of bloodshed1 must  obtain the 
superiority if his adversary does not   
act likewise4 ,and the  worst of all    
errors in wars is still the idea of war 
too commonly  held by civilians in this 
country1 as witness the outcries which  
greeted every loss during the ,south    
,african war1 which shows how much      
,clausewitz is needed as a tonic to     
brace their minds to the reality4       
,war is an act of violence which in its 
application knows ,,no bounds4  ,let us 
not hear of generals who conquer without
 bloodshed2 if a bloody  slaughter be a 
horrible sight1 then that is a ground   
for paying more  respect to war 7for    
avoiding unnecessary war71 but not for  
making the  sword we wear blunt and     
blunter by degrees from feelings of     
humanity1  till some one steps in with a

 sword that is sharp1 and lops off the  
arm from our body4      ,,simple ,,plans
    ,the second place ,i assign to his  
doctrine of the simplest plans1  because
 time is required for the completion of 
complicated evolutions1  but a bold1    
courageous1 resolute enemy will not let 
us have time  for wide-reaching skilful 
combination4#cb ,by this it appears to  
us  that the advantage of simple and    
direct results over those that are      
complicated is conclusively shown4      
,we must not lift the arm too far for   
the room given to strike1 or the        
opponent will get his thrust in first4  
,whenever this is the case1 we must     
ourselves choose the shorter4           
,therefore1 far from making it our aim  
to gain upon the enemy by  complicated  
plans1 we must always rather endeavour  
to be beforehand  with him by the       
simplest and shortest4      ,,strategic 
,,lines    ,the salient and re-entrant  
frontiers1 the subtle distinctions      
between  the numerous kinds of strategic

 lines1 and lines of operation1  and    
lines of manoeuvre1 etc41 etc41 etc41   
which in ,jomini and his  predecessors  
and followers play so great1 so         
pedantic1 and so confusing  a part1--for
 these ,clausewitz has little respect4  
,in his chapter on  ,the ,geometrical   
,element1#cc he says1 ,we therefore do  
not hesitate  to regard it as an        
established truth that in strategy more 
depends  upon the number and magnitude  
of the victorious battles than on the   
form of the great lines by which they   
are connected4#cd ,of course  he does   
not altogether leave out such           
considerations1 but the above  sentence 
shows how he regards them as only of    
minor importance4 ,he  therefore frees  
us from a great deal of pedantry1 and   
takes us back to  the heart of things4  
,,friction    has been already dealt    
with1 so no more need be said here1     
except about  its components4           
,,danger    ,an ordinary character never
 attains to complete coolness in danger4

  ,danger in war belongs to its         
friction1 and a correct idea of it is   
necessary for truth of perception1 and  
therefore it is brought under  notice   
here4#ce      ,,bodily ,,exertion       
,clausewitz says that bodily exertion   
and fatigue in war put fetters on  the  
action of the mind1 and wear out in     
secret the powers of the soul4  ,like   
danger1 they belong to the fundamental  
causes of friction4#cf    ,to one who1  
like ,clausewitz1 had seen the retreat  
from ,moscow1 the  awful passage of the 
,beresina1 and the battle of the nations
 round  ,leipzig1 bodily exertion could 
not be overlooked4 ,had he not seen     
bodily exertion and hardship break up   
the ,grand ,army into a small horde  of 
stragglers1 and destroy the army of     
,kutusoff in almost an equal  measure1  
in #ahab1 as well as practically ruin   
the spirit1 and largely  break up the   
great army of ,napoleon in #ahac8    ,as
 for the effects of bodily exertion on  
the mind1 purpose1 and  resolution of   

the general1 compare ,benningsen at     
,eylau after thirty-six  hours in the   
saddle1 or ,napoleon at ,dresden1 by    
which he lost all the  results of his   
victory4      ,,information ,,in ,,war  
,the foundation of all our ideas and    
actions1 but in a few words1  most      
reports are false4 ,when in the thick of
 war itself one  report follows hard    
upon the heels of another1 it is        
fortunate if  these reports in          
contradicting each other show a certain 
balance of  probability4 ,in another    
passage1 in order to illustrate this    
perpetual  uncertainty under which all  
decisions in war have to be made1 he    
compares two opposing commanders to two 
men fighting in a dark room and  groping
 uncertainly for one another4    ,these 
things which as elements meet together  
in the atmosphere of war  and make it a 
resistant medium for every activity1 we 
have designated  danger1 bodily         
exertion1 information1 and friction4#cg 
,he never loses  sight of this2 it      

pervades everything he writes4          
,,the ,,moral ,,and ,,physical    ,and  
therefore the most of the subjects which
 we shall go through in  this book are  
composed half of physical1 half of moral
 causes and  effects1 and we might say  
that the physical are almost no more    
than  the wooden handle1 whilst the     
moral are the noble metal1 the real     
bright polished weapon4#ch ,pages might 
be filled with extracts  showing his    
opinion that the moral is everything in 
war1 but the reader  is already         
convinced of that4 ,compare ,napoleon's 
in war1 ,the moral  is to the physical  
as three to one4 ,clausewitz regards all
 military  questions from this point4   
,his psychological attitude is what     
chiefly  characterizes ,clausewitz from 
all writers who came before him1 and    
which makes his deductions so realistic1
 so interesting and so valuable  for all
 who come after him4      ,,tension     
,,and ,,rest ,,in ,,war    ,in order not
 to weary the reader ,i will bring this 

chapter to a  conclusion with one or two
 extracts relating to tension and rest2 
the suspension of the act in warfare4   
,this is explanatory of those  frequent 
halts which take place in a campaign1   
which appear at first  sight            
contradictory to the absolute theory of 
war4 ,these halts are  due to many      
causes1 such as preparations1           
exhaustion1 uncertainty1  irresolution1 
friction1 waiting for reinforcements1   
etc4    ,in this connection one must    
remember that war is a chain of battles 
all strung together1 one of which always
 brings on another4 ,but they  seldom   
follow each other immediately2 there is 
usually a certain  pause between4 ,as   
soon as one battle is gained1 strategy  
makes new  combinations in accordance   
with the altered circumstances to win   
the  next4 ,whilst these new            
combinations are being developed1 or    
perhaps  considered1 there may be a     
greater or less suspension of the act1 a
  longer or shorter halt in the forward 

movement4 ,then another spring  forward4
 ,clausewitz has a great many           
interesting things to say on this       
subject4#ci    ,if there is a suspension
 of the act in war1 that is to say1 if  
neither  party for the moment wills     
anything positive1 there is rest1 and   
for  the moment equilibrium4444 ,as soon
 as ever one of the parties proposes  to
 himself a new positive object1 and     
commences active steps towards  it1 even
 if it is only by preparations1 and as  
soon as the enemy  opposes this1 there  
is tension of the powers2 this lasts    
until the  decision takes place4444     
,this decision1 the foundation of which 
lies  always in the battle-combinations 
which are made on each side1 444 is     
followed by a movement in one or other  
direction4    ,it may so happen that    
both parties1 at one and the same time1 
not only  feel themselves too weak to   
attack1 but are so in reality4    ,wild 
as is the nature of war it still wears  
the claims of human  weakness1 and the  

contradiction we see here1 that man     
seeks and creates  dangers which he     
fears at the same time1 will astonish no
 one4    ,if we cast a glance at        
military history in general1 there we   
find  so much the opposite of an        
incessant advance towards the aim1 that 
standing still and doing nothing is     
quite plainly the normal  condition of  
an army in the midst of war1 acting the 
exception4  ,this must almost raise a   
doubt as to the correctness of our      
conception4  ,but if military history   
has this effect by the great body of its
  events1 so also the latest series of  
wars redeem the view4 ,the war of  the  
,french ,revolution shows only too      
plainly its reality1 and only  proves   
too plainly its necessity4 ,in that war1
 and especially in the  campaigns of    
,bonaparte1 the conduct of war attained 
to that unlimited  degree of energy     
which we have represented as the natural
 law of the  element4 ,this degree is   
therefore possible1 and if it is        

possible then  it is necessary4         
,,reflections    7#a7 ,hardly worth     
mentioning6 ,so that is how ,clausewitz 
regards  ,international ,law1           
,clausewitz to whom in ,germany our most
 famous  victors on the more modern     
battlefields owe their spiritual        
training1  and on whom everybody who    
to-day either makes or teaches modern   
war  bases himself1 even if he is not   
conscious of it4 ,and we must regard    
nearly every foreign statesman as1      
consciously or unconsciously1 a         
disciple of ,clausewitz4 ,it is1        
therefore1 high time that we should     
cease to pin our faith on ,international
 ,law1 or think that it can in  any way 
protect us1 if we neglect strongly to   
protect ourselves4 ,power  and          
expediency are the only rules that the  
practical politicians of  foreign       
countries recognize1 and the only       
question they ask themselves  is1 ,have 
we got sufficient power to do this1 and 
if so1 ,is it  expedient to do it8      

7#b7 ,treaties1 too1 what reliance can  
we place upon them for any length  of   
time8 ,none whatever4 ,for treaties are 
only considered binding as  long as the 
interests of both contracting parties   
remain the same4  ,directly             
circumstances change1 and they change   
constantly1 the most  solemn treaties   
are torn up1 as ,russia tore up the     
,treaty of ,paris1 or  as ,austria tore 
up the ,treaty of ,berlin4 ,all history 
is full of torn-up  treaties4 ,and as it
 has been so it will be4 ,the ,european 
waste-paper  basket is the place to     
which all treaties eventually find their
 way1  and a thing which can any day be 
thrown into a waste-paper basket  is1   
indeed1 a poor thing on which to hang   
our national safety4 ,only  in ourselves
 can we trust4 ,therefore no treaties at
 present existing  should be allowed in 
any way to alter or lessen our          
preparations to  enable us to fight     
alone when necessary4    7#c7 ,it cannot
 be too often repeated1 or too much     

insisted on1 that the  success or       
failure of a ,state policy is dependent 
upon the amount of  armed force behind  
it4 ,for upon the amount of armed force 
behind a  policy depends the greater or 
less amount of resistance1 of friction1 
which that policy will meet with on the 
part of other nations4 ,the  prestige of
 a nation depends upon the general      
belief in its strength4  ,the less its  
prestige1 the more it will be checked   
and foiled by its  rivals1 till at last 
perhaps it is goaded into a war which   
would have  been prevented if its       
prestige1 or armed force1 had been      
greater4 ,on  the other hand1 the       
greater its prestige1 its armed force1  
the more  reasonable and inclined to a  
fair compromise are its rivals found4   
,so  that the greater the prestige1 the 
armed force1 of our nation is1 the  more
 likely is it that all our negotiations 
will be settled by peaceful  compromise1
 and the longer we shall enjoy peace4   
,therefore1 under this consideration1   

those who would reduce our  national    
forces are deeply mistaken1 for such    
action would imperil our  prestige1     
imperil our negotiations1 imperil our   
peace1 and perhaps lead  eventually to a
 war that we might otherwise have       
avoided4 ,therefore  no such deeply     
mistaken economy for us4 ,a few hundred 
thousand pounds  saved would be dear    
economy indeed if it led1 as well it    
might1 to the  payment before many years
 of a ,war ,indemnity of #hjj1jjj1jjj or
 so4  ,better the evils we know than the
 far greater evils we know not of4      
7#d7 ,surprise in war is what we have to
 fear4 ,there are two sorts of  national
 surprise that we must consider4 ,these 
are 7,a7 the surprise  by actual        
hostilities taking place before the     
actual declaration of  war1 such as the 
,japanese surprise and practical        
destruction of the  fighting force of   
the ,russian fleet at ,port ,arthur2    
7,b7 the surprise  by superior          
preparation1 silently carried out till  

all is ready for a  decisive blow1      
whilst we are not ready for equally     
efficient defence1  and then a          
declaration of war before we have time  
to get properly  ready1 as the surprise 
in this sense of ,france by ,germany in 
#ahgj4    7,a7 ,every successful example
 is always copied1 and usually on a     
larger  scale4 ,we may be quite certain 
that our rivals have taken to heart  the
 lesson of ,port ,arthur4 ,it is        
possible that our next war will open    
with a similar night attack on our      
fleet1 either just before1 or           
simultaneously with the declaration of  
war4 ,if it is successful1 or  even     
partially successful1 it may produce the
 most grave results1 as in  the         
,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,it may render   
possible a naval action with  almost    
equal forces1 in which our opponents    
might be victorious4 ,the  invasion of  
this country on a gigantic scale by     
#cjj1jjj men or more  would then follow 
as a certainty4 ,this is not a          

probability1 but a  possibility which   
requires to be kept in our view4    7,b7
 ,the surprise by superior preparation1 
as ,i term it1 for want  of a better    
name1 is a danger to which we are       
peculiarly liable4 ,as  ,lord ,salisbury
 said1 ,the ,british constitution is a  
bad fighting  machine1 and it is made an
 infinitely worse fighting machine by   
the lack of interest which our          
politicians appear to take in all  that 
appertains to war4 ,hence they are      
always liable to oppose1 as  excessive1 
preparations which are in reality the   
minimum consistent  with national       
safety4 ,consequently our preparations  
for war1 controlled  as they are by     
those who have no special knowledge of  
war1 are always  apt to be insufficient1
 as were those of ,france in #ahgj4 ,in 
former  days this did not perhaps so    
very much matter1 although it resulted  
in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of  
thousands of ,british lives and         
hundreds of millions of ,british        

treasure4 ,but still we were able1 at   
this somewhat excessive price1 to muddle
 through1 owing to the heroic  efforts  
of our soldiers and sailors to make     
bricks without straw and  retrieve the  
mistakes of our policy4 ,for our        
opponents then conducted  war in such a 
slow way as to give us time to repair   
after the  outbreak of war our lack of  
preparation before it4 ,but opposed to a
  modern nation-in-arms1 guided by      
statesmen and led by generals brought   
up in the school of ,napoleon1          
,clausewitz1 and ,moltke--all will be   
different4 ,in such a war the national  
forces brought into play are so  immense
 that it is only possible to do so      
efficaciously if everything  has been   
most carefully prepared and organized   
beforehand4 ,it is not  possible to     
improvise such organization of national 
force after  the war has begun1 for     
there cannot be sufficient time4 ,if our
 rival  makes adequate preparation      
before the war to bring to bear in that 

war the whole of its national force1    
material1 moral1 and physical1  while we
 only prepare to bring to bear a small  
portion thereof1 then  there will be no 
time afterwards for us to repair our    
negligence4 ,the  war will be conducted 
with the utmost energy1 and the aim will
 be to  utilize to the utmost the       
superiority obtained by superior        
preparation1  so as to make the decision
 as rapid as possible before we have    
time to  recover from the effects of our
 surprise4 ,that is the danger we have  
to  fear1 and to keep ever in mind4     
,,chapter ,,viii    ,,war ,,as ,,policy 
,war1 says ,clausewitz1 is only a       
continuation of ,state policy by  other 
means4 ,the first question that at once 
arises in the mind is  what is meant by 
,policy4 ,we may safely lay down that   
,state policy is  the defence and       
furtherance of the interests of the     
nation as a whole  amidst the play of   
the conflicting tendencies towards rest 
and towards  acquisition1 and that its  

instruments are the pen and the sword4  
,there  can1 of course1 be any degree of
 consistency or fickleness1 of strength 
or weakness1 of success or failure1 in  
the policy of a ,state4    ,clausewitz  
expressly stated that he hoped to iron  
out many creases  in the heads of       
strategists and statesmen1 such1 for    
instance1 as  the idea that it is       
possible to consider either policy or   
war as  independent of the other4    ,it
 is only possible to obtain a proper    
conception of policy if we  regard it as
 continuous both in peace and war1 using
 sometimes peace  negotiations1         
sometimes war negotiations1 as          
circumstances require1 to  attain the   
political object4    ,war is only a part
 of policy1 a continuance of the        
previous  negotiations2 but the         
instrument is now the sword and not the 
pen4 ,as  ,clausewitz says1 ,in one     
word1 the art of war1 in its highest    
point  of view1 is policy2 but no doubt 
a policy which fights battles instead   

of writing notes4 ,war is merely a means
 whereby a nation attempts  to impose   
its will upon another nation in order to
 attain a political  object4 ,this      
object is settled by policy1 which also 
orders the war1  determines what sort of
 war it is to be1 with what means and   
resources  and expenditure it is to be  
waged1 when its object has been         
attained1  and when it is to cease4 ,in 
fact1 policy prepares1 leads up to1     
orders1  supports1 guides1 and stops the
 war4 ,as ,clausewitz said1 ,all the    
leading outlines of a war are always    
determined by the ,cabinet--that  is1 by
 a political1 not a military            
functionary4    ,unity of thought is    
only to be obtained by the conception   
that  war is only a part of political   
intercourse1 therefore by no means  an  
independent thing in itself4 ,and how   
can we conceive it to be  otherwise8    
,does the cessation of diplomatic notes 
stop the political  relations between   
different nations and governments8 ,is  

not war  merely another kind of writing 
and language for political thoughts8    
,accordingly war can never be separated 
from political intercourse2  and if1 in 
the consideration of the matter1 this is
 done in any way1  all the threads of   
the different relations are1 to a       
certain extent1  broken1 and we have    
before us a senseless thing without an  
object4    ,if war belongs to policy1 it
 will naturally take its character from 
policy4 ,if the policy is grand and     
powerful1 so will also be the war1  and 
this may be carried to the point at     
which war attains to its  absolute form4
 ,only through this kind of view war    
recovers unity2  only by it can we see  
all wars of one kind1 and it is only    
through  it that the judgment can obtain
 the true and perfect basis and point of
  view from which great plans may be    
traced out and determined upon4         
,there is upon the whole nothing more   
important in life than to find  out the 
right point of view from which things   

should be looked at and  judged of1 and 
then to keep to that point2 for we can  
only apprehend  the mass of events in   
their unity from one standpoint2 and it 
is only  the keeping to one point of    
view that guards us from inconsistency4 
,we can only look at policy here as the 
representative of the interests         
generally of the whole community1 and   
wars are in reality only the            
expressions or manifestations of policy 
itself4    ,to the student of history   
this unity of conception is equally     
necessary1 for it supplies the key to   
many a military puzzle4 ,without  it we 
can never understand1 for instance1     
,napoleon's conduct in  #ahab1 #ahac1   
#ahad2 nor without it can we see the    
compelling reason of  many battles1     
apparently fought against military      
judgment1 such1 for  instance1 as       
,borodino1 ,leipzig1 ,sedan1 etc4 ,we   
have to remember that  these and many   
other battles1 as1 for instance1        
,ladysmith1 were fought  from a         

political1 not a military1 motive4 ,it  
is a well-known fact that  the          
strategist frequently has to alter and  
adapt his plans so as to  suit          
overmastering political necessity4 ,yet 
many people have failed to  draw        
therefrom the generalization of         
,clausewitz that war is only a          
continuation of ,state policy by other  
means4 ,but having got it now1  let us  
hold fast to it1 with all its           
consequences4      ,,some ,,knowledge   
,,of ,,war ,,necessary ,,for ,,statesmen
    ,from this point of view there is no
 longer in the nature of things  a      
necessary conflict between the political
 and military interests1  and where it  
appears it is therefore to be regarded  
as imperfect  knowledge only4 ,that     
policy makes demands upon the war which 
it  cannot respond to1 would be contrary
 to the supposition that it knows  the  
instrument it is going to use1 therefore
 contrary to a natural and              
indispensable supposition4    ,none of  

the principal plans which are required  
for a war can be made  without an       
insight into the political relations2   
and in reality when  people speak1 as   
they often do1 of the prejudicial       
influence of policy  on the conduct of a
 war1 they say in reality something very
 different  to what they intend4 ,it is 
not this influence1 but the policy      
itself  which should be found fault     
with4 ,if policy is right1 if it        
succeeds  in hitting the object1 then it
 can only act on the war also with      
advantage2 and if this influence of     
policy causes a divergence from the     
object1 the cause is to be looked for in
 a mistaken policy4    ,it is only when 
policy promises itself a wrong effect   
from certain  military means and        
measures1 an effect opposed to their    
nature1 that it  can exercise a         
prejudicial effect on war by the course 
it prescribes4  ,just as a person in a  
language with which he is not conversant
  sometimes says what he does not       

intend1 so policy1 when intending       
right1 may often order things which do  
not tally with its own views4    ,this  
has happened times without end1 and it  
shows that a certain  knowledge of the  
nature of war is essential to the       
management of  political intercourse4   
,,the ,,war ,,minister    ,before going 
further we must guard ourselves against 
a false  interpretation of which this is
 very susceptible4 ,we do not mean to   
say that this acquaintance with the     
nature of war is the principal          
qualification for a war minister4       
,elevation1 superiority of mind1        
strength of character1 these are the    
principal qualifications which he  must 
possess2 a knowledge of war may be      
supplied in one way or another4         
,,policy ,,and ,,the ,,means ,,to       
,,carry ,,out ,,that ,,policy ,,must    
,,harmonize    ,if war is to harmonize  
entirely with the political views1 and  
policy  to accommodate itself to the    
means available for war1 there is only  

one alternative to be recommended when  
the statesman and soldier are  not      
combined in one person 7note1 as        
,william of ,orange1 ,frederick  the    
,great1 or ,napoleon71 which is to make 
the chief commander an  ex-officio      
member of the ,cabinet1 that he may take
 part in its  councils and decisions on 
important occasions4    ,the influence  
of any military man except the          
general-in-chief in the  ,cabinet is    
extremely dangerous2 it very seldom     
leads to able1 vigorous  action4        
,,reflections    ,we shall conclude this
 chapter with a few reflections on the  
preceding  dicta of ,clausewitz1 with   
which it is hoped that the reader will  
agree4    ,firstly1 then1 it is clearly 
apparent that war is subordinate to     
policy1 is an instrument of policy1 is a
 part of policy1 just as much  as       
diplomatic negotiations are a part of   
policy4    ,secondly1 a statesman1      
however good at peaceful administration 
he may  be1 who is ignorant of war is1  

therefore1 ignorant of one part of  his 
profession2 that part which deals with  
the preparing1 ordering1  guiding1 and  
controlling of war4 ,as ,clausewitz     
says1 it is an  indispensable           
supposition that policy knows the       
instrument it is  going to use4 ,it is a
 mistake to suppose1 when diplomatic    
relations  between two ,states cease1   
and war breaks out1 that therefore the  
political negotiations cease1 for they  
do not1 but are merely continued  in    
another form--in the form of war4 ,the  
statesman still retains  control1 and   
uses the military events as they occur  
to attain his  object4 ,he is still     
responsible for the success of the      
warlike1 as well  as of the peaceful1   
policy of the nation4    ,thirdly1 it is
 a disputed point how far the influence 
of policy is  theoretically allowable   
during the course of actual operations1 
i4e4  after the war has actually begun4 
,moltke's opinion was that policy       
should only act at the beginning and at 

the end of a war1 and should  keep clear
 during the actual operations4          
,clausewitz1 however1 holds  that the   
two are so intimately related that the  
political influence  cannot be lost     
sight of even during actual operations4 
,between two  such authorities we may   
well hesitate to give a definite        
opinion1 and  must seek for the middle  
way4 ,undoubtedly1 in history policy    
often  has really affected the actual   
operations1 as in #ahab1 #ahac1 #ahad1  
#ahfd1 ,macmahon's march to ,sedan1 or  
,bismarck's interference to hurry  on   
the siege of ,paris in #ahgj1 or        
,ladysmith in the ,boer ,war1 and in    
many other cases4 ,that1 we must admit4 
,we must also admit that its            
interference frequently produces a      
weakening effect on the operations4     
,clausewitz says that that only occurs  
when the policy itself is  wrong4       
,perhaps4 ,but the safest middle way    
rule appears to be this1  that policy   
should be dominant at the beginning and 

end of a war1 but  during actual        
operations the statesman should exercise
 the greatest  possible restraint1 and  
avoid all interference1 except when     
demanded by  overwhelming political     
necessity4    ,fourthly1 a politician is
 bound to study war4 ,he is bound to    
study war  as well as diplomacy1 his two
 instruments4 ,if he only studies how to
  use one of his two instruments1 he    
will be a poor statesman indeed4  ,it is
 plain that he ,,must study war1 so that
 he may not try to use an  instrument of
 which he knows nothing4 ,it is not     
meant1 of course1  that a politician    
should study all the details of naval   
and military  matters1 but only that he 
should study the general principles of  
war1  and the means1 resources1 and     
forces required to attain the political 
object of war1 through the submission of
 the enemy4    ,fifthly1 in order that  
the object and the means of policy may  
harmonize1 it is necessary that the one 
to whom the national interests  are     

entrusted should study the principles of
 war1 so that he may keep  his policy   
proportionate to the means of enforcing 
it4 ,that is to say1  he must not       
propose or commit the nation to a policy
 which is likely  to be strongly opposed
 by another ,power1 unless he has from  
careful  study and enquiry made certain 
that he has sufficient armed force at   
his disposal1 in case the opposing      
nation suddenly challenges his  policy  
and declares war4 ,he should not even   
consider a policy without  at the same  
time considering with his military and  
naval advisers the  nation's means of   
enforcing that policy if challenged to  
do so4 ,he must  not think of embarking 
upon a war1 or of provoking another     
nation to do  so1 till he has carefully 
provided sufficient armed force to give 
a  reasonable prospect1 if not a        
certainty1 of success4 ,otherwise1      
,sixthly1 as our next contest will be   
with a nation-in-arms1 as the war  will 
be in its character absolute1 as its    

object will be the downfall  of the foe1
 as not until the foe 7whether it be    
,great ,britain or not7  lies powerless 
upon the ground will it be supposed     
possible to stop1 as  we shall have to  
contend against the utmost means1 the   
utmost energy1  the utmost efforts of a 
whole people-in-arms1--these points     
deserve the  most serious consideration 
of every politician who aspires to guide
 the  destinies of the ,anglo-,saxon    
,race4          ,,chapter ,,ix          
,,strategy      ,clausewitz defines     
strategy as the use of the battle to    
gain the  object of the war4 ,war is a  
chain of battles all strung together1   
one of which always brings on           
another4#dj ,the great thing in strategy
  is to win these battles one after the 
other till the enemy submits4  ,the best
 strategy is always to be very strong1  
first1 generally2  secondly1 at the     
decisive point4#da    ,in such an aspect
 we grant that the superiority of       
numbers is the  most important factor in

 the result of a battle1 only it must be
  sufficiently great to be a            
counterpoise to all the other           
co-operating  circumstances4 ,the direct
 result of all this is that the greatest
  possible number of troops should be   
brought into action at the decisive     
point4#db ,whether the troops thus      
brought up are sufficient or not1  we   
have then done in this respect all that 
our means allowed4 ,this is  the first  
great principle of strategy1 as well    
suited for ,greeks or  ,persians1 or for
 ,englishmen1 or ,mahrattas1 as for     
,french or ,germans4    ,it sounds so   
simple1 and yet how many times has it   
not been done4 ,how  many generals have 
been ruined in consequence6             
,,superiority ,,in ,,numbers ,,what ,,is
 ,,required ,,for ,,strategic           
,,certainty    ,clausewitz says1 ,it is 
a fact that we may search modern        
military  history in vain for a battle  
7except ,leuthen or ,rosbach7 in which  
an  army has beaten another double its  

own strength1 an occurrence by no  means
 uncommon in former times4 ,bonaparte1  
the greatest general of  modern days1 in
 all his great victorious battles1 with 
one exception1  that of ,dresden #ahac1 
had managed to assemble an army superior
 in  numbers1 or at least very little   
inferior1 to that of his opponent1 and  
when it was impossible for him to do so1
 as at ,leipzig1 ,brienne1 ,laon1       
,waterloo1 he was beaten4#dc ,from this 
we may infer1 in the present  state of  
,europe1 that it is very difficult for  
the most talented  general to gain a    
victory over an enemy double his        
strength4 ,now1 if  we see that double  
numbers are such a weight in the scale  
against even  the greatest generals1 we 
may be sure that in ordinary cases1 in  
small  as well as in great combats1 an  
important superiority of numbers1 but   
which need not be over two to one1 will 
be sufficient to ensure the  victory1   
however disadvantageous other           
circumstances may be4#dd    ,the double 

superiority of numbers at the decisive  
point is1 therefore1  the ideal of      
strategy4 ,the superiority of numbers   
is1 therefore1 to  be regarded as the   
fundamental idea1 always to be aimed at1
 before  all1 and as far as possible4   
,if strategy has done this1 then it has 
done its utmost duty4 ,it is then for   
the tactician to make the most  of this 
superiority thus provided by strategy1  
and win the victory4  ,strategy then    
repeats the operation with new          
combinations suited to  the altered     
circumstances to win the next battle1   
and so on1 till the  hostile armed force
 is destroyed4    ,this superiority of  
numbers in battle as the first principle
 of  strategy we require1 on all        
occasions in season and out of season1  
to  repeat and repeat4 ,at present we   
have not the numbers we shall want4 ,we 
must get them4 ,otherwise we are bound  
to be inferior in numbers1 and  the best
 strategy will be possible for our      
enemies and impossible for  us4 ,this   

rests with our statesmen4      ,,the    
,,decisive ,,point    ,if the double    
superiority1 or as near the double as   
possible1 at the  decisive point is the 
ideal of strategy 444 what is the       
decisive point8    ,here we owe another 
debt to ,clausewitz4 ,jomini1 even after
 ,napoleon1  confuses us with three     
different sorts of decisive points in a 
theatre  of war1 but ,clausewitz clears 
the air by asserting only one4    ,but  
whatever may be the central point of the
 enemy's power against  which we are to 
direct our ultimate operations1 still   
the conquest and  destruction of his    
army is the surest commencement and1 in 
all cases1  the most essential4#de      
,here we have it in a nutshell2 wherever
 the enemy's main force is ,,there  is  
the decisive point1 against which we    
must concentrate ,,all our forces4      
,there are1 said ,napoleon1 many good   
generals in ,europe1 but they  see too  
many things at one time4 ,as for me1 ,i 
see only one thing1 the  enemy's chief  

army1 and ,i concentrate all my efforts 
to destroy it4      ,,the ,,simultaneous
 ,,use ,,of ,,all ,,the ,,forces    ,the
 rule1 says ,clausewitz1 which we have  
been endeavouring to set  forth is1     
therefore1 that all the forces which are
 available and  destined for a strategic
 object should be simultaneously applied
  to it4 ,and this application will be  
all the more complete the more          
everything is compressed into one act   
and one moment4#df ,this he  calls the  
law of the simultaneous employment of   
the forces in  strategy4#dg ,in strategy
 we can never employ too many forces4#dh
  ,what can be looked upon in tactics as
 an excess of force must be  regarded in
 strategy as a means of giving expansion
 to success4  ,no troops should be kept 
back as a strategic reserve1 but every  
available man hurried up to the first   
battlefield1 fresh levies being         
meanwhile formed in rear4 ,as an        
instance of what not to do1 ,prussia1 in
  #ahjf1 kept back #de1jjj men in       

,brandenburg and ,east ,prussia2 they   
might1  if present at ,jena1 have turned
 defeat into victory1 but they were     
useless afterwards4#di ,a fault so often
 made may be made again4                
,,concentration    ,it is impossible to 
be too strong at the decisive point1    
said  ,napoleon4 ,to concentrate every  
available man and gun at the decisive   
point so as to attain superiority there1
 is not an easy thing1 for the  enemy   
will be making a similar attempt4 ,the  
calculation of time and  space appears  
the most essential thing to this end4   
,but the calculation  of time and space1
 though it lies universally at the      
foundation of  strategy1 and is to a    
certain extent its daily bread1 is still
 neither  the most difficult nor the    
most decisive one4 ,much more frequently
  the relative superiority1 that is the 
skilful assemblage of superior  forces  
at the decisive point1 has its          
foundation in the right  appreciation of
 those points1 in the judicious         

distribution which by  that means has   
been given to the forces from the very  
first1 and in  the resolution to        
sacrifice the unimportant to the        
advantage of the  important4 ,in this   
respect ,frederick the ,great and       
,bonaparte are  especially              
characteristic4#ej    ,there is no      
simpler and more imperative rule for    
strategy than to  keep all the forces   
concentrated4 ,no portion to be         
separated from the  main body unless    
called away by some urgent necessity4   
,on this maxim  we stand firm1 and look 
upon it as a fact to be depended        
upon4#ea    ,the concentration of the   
whole force 7i4e4 within supporting     
distance7 should be the rule1 and every 
separation or division is an  exception 
which must be justified4#eb ,of course1 
this does not  mean that all the troops 
are to be kept concentrated in one mass 
upon  one road1 but within supporting   
distance1 for he expressly states1 ,it  
is sufficient now if the concentration  

takes place during the course of  the   
action4#ec ,this doctrine1 qualified by 
the last sentence1 makes  ,clausewitz   
the germ of modern military thought1 for
 the last sentence  leaves room for all 
the modern developments of new roads1   
railways1  telegraphs1 wire and         
wireless1 and so forth4    ,therefore in
 war1 according to ,clausewitz1         
concentration1  concentration1          
concentration1 and every division or    
detachment is an  evil which can only be
 justified by urgent necessity4 ,here   
again we  find a simple truth1 which1   
however1 the history of all wars shows  
us  to be very difficult to carry out4  
,hence the value of keeping such an     
imperative maxim always in our minds4   
,,the ,,first ,,pitched ,,battle    ,the
 more a general takes the field in the  
true spirit of war1 as  well as of every
 other contest1 that he must and will   
conquer1 the  more will he strive to    
throw every weight into the scale in the
 first  battle1 and hope and strive to  

win everything by it4 ,napoleon hardly  
ever entered upon a war without thinking
 of conquering his enemy at  once in the
 first battle4#ed    ,at the very outset
 of war we must direct all our efforts  
to gain the  first battle1 because an   
unfavourable issue is always a          
disadvantage  to which no one would     
willingly expose himself1 and also      
because the  first decision1 though not 
the only one1 still will have the more  
influence on subsequent events the      
greater it is in itself4#a    ,the law  
of the simultaneous use of the forces in
 strategy lets the  principal result    
7which need not be the final one7 take  
place almost  always at the commencement
 of the great act4#ee ,a great victory  
thus  won at the outset will upset all  
the enemy's plan of campaign and allow  
us to carry out our own4 ,the first     
pitched battle is1 therefore1 the       
crisis of the rival strategies1 and     
towards its favourable decision  all our
 preparations1 all our forces1 and all  

our energies should be  directed4 ,this 
is a point that civilians seem to find  
hard to grasp4  ,witness all our        
history1 with inadequate forces at the  
beginning of  every war1 as even in the 
latest of our wars--that in ,south      
,africa4 ,it  is a point which our      
statesmen should very seriously         
consider4    ,the difficulty of         
concentrating superior numbers for the  
first battle  is that the enemy will be1
 or should be1 of the same opinion1 and 
will  be making equal efforts to win the
 first battle4 ,so1 then1 the crisis    
will be all the more acute1 the battle  
greater1 and the result greater4    ,we 
would not avoid showing at once that the
 bloody solution of the  crisis1 the    
effort for the destruction of the       
enemy's main force1 is  the first-born  
son of war4#ef    ,till this is done1   
the first great victory gained1 strategy
 should  think of nothing else4         
,then1 and only then1 a further         
combination in accordance with the      

altered circumstances to win the next4  
,for we maintain that1 with few         
exceptions1 the victory at the  decisive
 point will carry with it the decision  
on all minor  points#eg over the whole  
theatre of war4 ,therefore nothing else 
matters for long1 and to victory in the 
first great battle everything  else must
 be sacrificed4 ,for concentration can  
only be obtained by  sacrifice4         
,,pursuit    ,once the great victory is 
gained1 the next question is not about  
rest1 not about taking breath1 not about
 re-organizing1 etc41 but only  of      
pursuit1 of fresh blows wherever        
necessary1 of the capture of the        
enemy's capital1 of the attack of the   
armies of his allies1 or whatever  else 
appears as a rallying point for the     
enemy4#eh    ,clausewitz points out that
 this is very difficult1 and that to    
compel  his exhausted troops vigorously 
to pursue till nightfall requires       
,,great  force of ,,will on the part of 
the equally exhausted commander4 ,we    

need  only remember that ,napoleon      
himself at the supreme crisis of his    
fate1  being physically tired1 failed to
 pursue the allies after his victory  at
 ,dresden1 #ahac1 whereby he lost all   
the fruits of his victory1 and  indeed  
his last chance of ultimate success4    
,,summary ,,of ,,strategic ,,principles 
,leaving out1 for the sake of shortness1
 the rest of his strategical  thoughts1 
,i hasten to conclude this sketch with a
 glance at  ,clausewitz's admirable     
summary#ei of strategic principles3--   
,the first and most important maxim     
which we can set before ourselves  is to
 employ ,,all the forces which we can   
make available with the  ,,utmost       
,,energy4 ,even if the result is        
tolerably certain in itself1 it  is     
extremely unwise not to make it         
perfectly certain4    ,the second       
principle is to concentrate our forces  
as much as possible  at the point where 
the ,,decisive blow is to be struck4    
,the success at  that point will        

compensate for all defeats at secondary 
points4    ,the third principle is not  
to lose time4 ,rapidity and surprise are
  the most powerful elements of victory4
    ,lastly1 the fourth principle is to 
,,follow ,,up ,,the ,,success we gain   
with the ,,utmost ,,energy4 ,the pursuit
 of the enemy when defeated is the  only
 means of gathering up the fruits of    
victory4    ,the first of these         
principles is the foundation of all the 
others4 ,if  we have followed the first 
principle1 we can venture any length    
with  regard to the three others without
 risking our all4 ,it gives the means   
of continually creating new forces      
behind us1 and with new forces  every   
disaster may be repaired4 ,in this1 and 
not in going forward  with timid steps1 
lies that prudence which may be called  
wise4    ,these great principles are    
everything in war1 and due regard being 
paid to these principles1 the form 7i4e4
 the geometrical element7  in which the 
operations are carried on is in the end 

of little  consequence4    ,therefore ,i
 am perfectly convinced that whoever    
calls forth all his  powers to appear   
incessantly with new masses1 whoever    
adopts every  imaginable means of       
preparation1 whoever concentrates his   
force at  the decisive point1 whoever   
thus armed pursues a great object with  
resolution and energy1 has done all that
 can be done in a general  way for the  
strategical conduct of the war1 and     
that1 unless he is  altogether          
unfortunate in battle1 will undoubtedly 
be victorious in the  same measure that 
his adversary has fallen short of this  
exertion and  energy4      ,,reflections
    ,when we have got these great simple
 leading principles of strategy  firmly 
into our heads1 the next question is how
 to make use of  our knowledge4 ,for    
principles are no use unless we apply   
them4 ,on  consideration it appears that
 there are three ways in which we can   
all  apply these principles with        
advantage4    ,i4 ,it will prove a very 

interesting and strengthening mental    
exercise  to apply these few leading    
principles to every campaign we read    
about1  to search for indications of    
their application in the strategy of    
each  belligerent1 how far each         
commander succeeded1 and how far failed 
to  carry them out in their entirety1   
and where1 when1 and why he succeeded   
or failed1 and the results of doing or  
not doing so4 ,also to search  for the  
interaction of the political motive of  
the war on the military  operations1 and
 to see how far the belligerent         
statesmen gained or  failed to gain     
their political object1 according to the
 comparative  degree of preparation they
 had made for it1 and the magnitude of  
effort which they made or did not make  
to support it with the whole  means of  
the nation1 material1 moral and         
physical4 ,also to see how  far the     
national spirit was aroused or not1 and 
the causes thereof1  and to note the    
greater or less energy1 resolution and  

boldness which  was consequently infused
 into the war4 ,also to note how the    
thorough  application of these great    
simple principles of strategy shortens  
the  war and thereby reduces its cost   
7#ahff to #ahgj71 and how the neglect of
  them by statesmen1 despite their      
fortitude afterwards1 lengthens a war   
and adds to its cost enormously 7,south 
,africa1 etc474 ,used thus1 these       
principles give us a theoretically      
correct ground for criticism4    ,,ii4  
,these principles also give us a        
theoretically correct ground for        
anticipating what the action of our     
opponents in any future war will  be1   
the measure of the forces they will     
bring to bear1 how they will  direct    
those forces1 and the amount of energy1 
resolution1 and boldness  with which    
they will use them against us4 ,it is an
 axiom always to  assume that the enemy 
will do the best and wisest thing1 and  
to prepare  accordingly4    ,,iii4      
,these principles also give us a        

theoretically correct ground for  our   
own counter-preparations4 ,we require to
 take the most dangerous war  which is  
probable or possible1 and make every    
imaginable preparation to  carry out    
these principles therein4    ,in such a 
case how are we going to render it      
possible for our generals  to win1 and  
thus save the nation from the           
irreparable consequences  and the huge  
war indemnity of #hjj1jjj1jjj or so1    
which would follow  defeat8 ,how are we 
going to do it8 ,how are we going to    
render it  possible for our generals to 
employ the best strategy8 ,the ideal of 
strategy1 always to be aimed at1 is the 
double superiority of numbers4  ,how are
 we going to give our generals that8 ,if
 we cannot do that1  how are we going to
 give them even any superiority at all1 
so that  they may be able to carry out  
the first principle of strategy8 ,how8  
,or are we going to make ,,no adequate  
preparations for these three            
eventualities1 and when one of them     

suddenly comes ask our generals to  save
 us from the fate we have brought upon  
ourselves1 by performing the            
impossible8 ,it is in this way that a   
statesman should use these few  great   
simple principles of strategy in order  
to attain his political  object and     
safeguard the interests of the nation4  
,,chapter ,x    ,,the ,,execution ,,of  
,,strategy      ,now1 as ,clausewitz    
teaches it1 the theory of war is easy   
enough to  understand4 ,there is no     
reason--one might almost say no         
excuse--why  every one1 soldier or      
statesman1 should not know it fairly    
well4 ,the  great leading principles of 
strategy are few and simple4 ,there is  
no  reason why every one1 soldier and   
statesman1 should not understand  and   
know these few simple principles        
thoroughly1 and have them at his  finger
 ends ready to apply them to the        
consideration of any military  question1
 past1 present1 or future4 ,so far all  
is easy4 ,but when it  is a question of 

carrying out in actual war this easy    
theory1 these  simple strategical       
principles1 then it is ,,quite a        
different matter1  then it is a matter  
of the very greatest difficulty4 ,this  
is a  difference which the mind always  
finds very hard to grasp1 as witness    
the denunciations with which any failure
 in execution by a general1 no  matter  
how great the real difficulties with    
which he had to contend1  is nearly     
always greeted4 ,observers rarely make  
allowances for these  difficulties1 very
 largely probably because they do not   
understand  them4 ,the present chapter  
is devoted to these difficulties of     
execution  in war4      ,,the ,,genius  
,,for ,,war    ,in ,clausewitz's great  
chapter on the genius for war#fj he sets
 forth  the difficulties which confront 
a general1 the character and genius1    
the driving and animating force1        
required to overcome the friction of    
war4 ,it is impossible to abstract it   
adequately2 ,i can only advise all  to  

read it for themselves4 ,but ,i will    
endeavour to give an idea of it4        
,after discussing the various sorts of  
courage required by a general1  physical
 before danger and moral before         
responsibility1 the strength  of body   
and mind1 the personal pride1 the       
patriotism1 the enthusiasm1  etc41 he   
comes to the unexpected4    ,war1 he    
says1 is the province of uncertainty4   
,three-fourths of  those things upon    
which action in war must be calculated  
are hidden  more or less in the clouds  
of great uncertainty4 ,here1 then1 above
  all other1 a fine and penetrating mind
 is called for1 to grope out the  truth 
by the tact of its judgment4 ,mark this 
point1 that three-fourths  of the things
 that we as critics ,,after the event   
know1 when all  information of the      
situation has been collected and        
published1 were  unknown to the general 
who had to decide1 or only dimly guessed
 at from  a number of contradictory     
reports4    ,from this uncertainty of   

all intelligence and suppositions1 this 
continual interposition of chance4 ,now1
 if he is to get safely  through this   
perpetual conflict with the unexpected1 
two qualities  are indispensable2 in the
 first place an understanding which1    
even  in the midst of this intense      
obscurity1 is not without some traces   
of inner light1 which lead to the truth1
 and then the courage to  follow this   
faint light4 ,the first is expressed by 
the ,french phrase  coup d'oeil2 the    
second is resolution4    ,resolution is 
an act of courage in face of            
responsibility4 ,the  forerunner of     
resolution is an act of the mind making 
plain the  necessity of venturing and   
thus influencing the will4 ,this quite  
peculiar direction of the mind1 which   
conquers every other fear in man  by the
 fear of wavering or doubting1 is what  
makes up resolution in  strong minds4   
,the vital importance of firmness and   
resolution1 so strongly urged  by       
,clausewitz1 will be apparent to all if 

we reflect how even the  strongest      
characters have been ruined by a        
temporary fit of vacillation  in war4   
,compare1 for instance1 ,york v4        
,wartenburg's masterly  exposition of   
,napoleon's ruinous1 suicidal           
vacillation in #ahac at  ,dresden4      
,also there is required the power of    
listening to reason in the midst  of the
 most intense excitement1 in the storm  
of the most violent  passions4    ,but  
to keep to the result of by-gone        
reflections in opposition to the  stream
 of opinions and phenomena which the    
present brings with it1 is  just ,,the  
difficulty4 ,here nothing else can help 
us but an imperative  maxim which1      
independent of reflection1 at once      
controls it3 that maxim  is1 in all     
doubtful cases to adhere to the first   
opinion and not to  give it up till a   
clear conviction forces us to do so4    
,but as soon as difficulties arise1 and 
that must always happen  when great     
results are at stake1 then the machine1 

the army itself1  begins to offer a sort
 of passive resistance1 and to overcome 
this  the commander must have great     
force of will4 ,driving power1 such as  
,napoleon's4 ,and also the heart-rending
 sight of the bloody sacrifice1  which  
the commander has to contend with in    
himself4    ,these are the weights which
 the courage and intelligent faculties  
of  the commander have to contend with  
and ,,overcome1 if he is to make his    
name illustrious4 ,if he is to prevent  
the downfall of his country4            
,,reflections    7#a7 ,in connection    
with these difficulties ,i would like to
 put forward a  suggestion as to        
criticism of a general's action in war1 
which though  not exactly ,clausewitz's1
 is a corollary from ,clausewitz4 ,it is
 this4  ,in reading a war with the      
clearness and after-knowledge of history
  nearly all defeats are easily seen to 
be due to the non-observance of  one or 
other of the few leading principles of  
strategy referred to in  the previous   

chapter4 ,but we must assume that the   
defeated general was  familiar with that
 principle1 and that his will was to    
carry it  out4 ,what1 then1 were the    
difficulties1 the friction1 which1 on   
any  particular day or days1 overcame   
his will and made him sacrifice the     
principle8 ,this is where most critics  
fail us4 ,here seems the matter  to     
search for4 ,and could a stronger       
resolution have enabled him to  overcome
 those difficulties1 that friction8 ,and
 if so1 how and by what  means8 ,but we 
must first discover the difficulties and
 uncertainties  of the particular day   
when his will gave way4 ,take the       
,manchurian  campaign as an instance4   
,if we could only have a military       
history of  the campaign of #ahgj or    
that of ,manchuria1 written in the form 
of a  series of appreciations of the    
situation1 so that we know nothing but  
what the general knew at the time as we 
read1 and if the true state of  affairs 
could be withheld from us till the end1 

this1 ,i think1 would  be very          
instructive and helpful4 ,it would be a 
more difficult way of  writing a        
military history1 but ,i think that the 
extra trouble would be  repaid by the   
extra value4 ,so at least it appears4   
7#b7 ,if we reflect upon the enormous   
difficulties1 so strikingly  brought out
 by ,clausewitz1 which our generals have
 to contend with  and overcome in actual
 war1 it should surely teach us to curb 
our  criticism4 ,it should surely also  
make us resolve in future to try to  aid
 them as far as is in our power at home1
 and not thoughtlessly to  increase     
their already stupendous burdens4 ,in   
the past we at home have  much to accuse
 ourselves of1 much to regret4 ,in the  
past often have  we added to the        
difficulties of our generals1 often have
 we greatly  weakened their chances1 and
 increased those of their opponents1    
often  have we1 unintentionally1 through
 ignorance cast a weight into the  scale
 against our country4    7#c7 ,the      

ignorance of the public regarding the   
conduct of war  constitutes for us a    
very serious national danger4 ,if this  
ignorance  were less pronounced1 if our 
statesmen understood the vast importance
  of information to the enemy1 and the  
equal importance to our generals  that  
this information the enemy should ,,not 
obtain1 then the public  craving for    
information regarding every detail of   
what occurs in  the field1 and the      
demand for the wide publication thereof1
 would  certainly be repressed4 ,nothing
 occurs in any of our campaigns which   
is not immediately made known2 reports  
of actions with the fullest  details as 
to the troops engaged1 and the          
casualties that have befallen  them1    
appear in the columns of the ,press     
within a few hours of their  occurrence4
 ,any efforts1 therefore1 of our        
generals in the field  to maintain      
secrecy as to strength1 intentions1 and 
movements are  deliberately1 though     
probably unintentionally1 counteracted  

by  their own countrymen4 ,this is due  
to pure ignorance of war1 no doubt1  but
 the effect of this ignorance is as bad 
as if it were due to evil  intention4   
,in fairness1 however1 we must admit    
that1 in the past1 the  immense value of
 reticence has not been fully           
appreciated by some of  our soldiers    
themselves1 and it were well if1 in the 
future1 more  attention were directed to
 the importance of secrecy4    ,the     
results of such almost criminal         
stupidity may not be apparent  when we  
are fighting with a savage foe1 but if  
we ever have1 as we  undoubtedly some   
day shall have1 the misfortune to find  
ourselves  engaged with a civilized     
,power1 we may be certain that not only 
will  the operations be indefinitely    
prolonged1 and their cost enormously    
increased1 but their successful issue   
will be for us highly  problematical4   
,in this connection it must be          
remembered that every ,great ,power has 
secret agents in every country1         

including ,great ,britain1 and that it  
will be easy for such a secret agent to 
telegraph in cypher or in  some agreed  
code to an agent in a neutral ,state all
 war information  published here1 who   
will telegraph it on at once to the     
hostile  general1 who will thus get1    
within a very short time of its         
publication  in ,london1 perhaps just   
exactly the information he requires to  
clear up  the strategical or tactical   
situation for him1 and enable him to    
defeat  the combinations of our         
generals4 ,as a case in point1 take     
,macmahon's  march on ,sedan to relieve 
,metz in #ahgj1 where secrecy was       
absolutely  necessary for success1 but  
which became known to the ,germans by   
the  ,english newspapers4--,result1     
,sedan4    ,that this cannot be allowed 
is plain4 ,it is believed that the      
patriotism of our ,press will welcome   
any necessary measure to this end  if it
 is made compulsory upon ,,all4#fa      
,,chapter ,,xi    ,,tactics      ,some  

will probably feel inclined to ask what 
,clausewitz1 who wrote more  than eighty
 years ago1 can possibly have to say    
about tactics which can  be valuable in 
the twentieth century4    ,it was said  
by ,napoleon that tactics change every  
ten years1 according1  of course1 to the
 progress of technicalities1 etc4       
,weapons indeed  change1 but there is   
one thing that never changes1 and that  
is human  nature4 ,the most important   
thing in tactics1 the man behind the    
gun1  never alters2 in his heart and    
feelings1 his strength and weakness1 he 
is always much the same4    ,therefore1 
,clausewitz's tactical deductions1      
founded on the immense  and varied data 
supplied by the desperate and           
long-continued fighting  of the         
,revolutionary and ,napoleonic wars1    
permeated as they are by his            
all-pervading psychological or moral    
view1 can never lose their value  to us4
    ,it is true1 no doubt1 that our     
rifles of to-day can be used with       

effect at a distance ten times as great 
as the old smooth bores of              
,clausewitz's day1 our shrapnel five    
times as far as his cannon1 and  that   
cover and ground play a far more        
important part now than then1 and  so   
on4 ,all these things1 of course1       
considerably modify the tactics of      
,clausewitz4 ,not so much1 however1 as  
some text-books would lead us to        
suppose1 which always seem to assume    
clear ground and clear weather4  ,for1  
after all1 how many combats are fought  
on ground where there is  a very        
restricted field of fire 7vide          
,herbert's ,defence of ,plevna1  etc471 
or at night8 ,how many battles are      
fought during rain1 or snow1  or mist1  
or fog1 which destroys all long range8  
,compare the tremendous  fighting with  
bullets1 bayonets1 swords1              
hand-grenades1 and even  fists1 of      
,nogi's attempt to cut the ,russian line
 of retreat at ,mukden1  with the       
hand-to-hand fighting of ,eylau1        

,friedland1 ,borodino1 or with  the     
desperate efforts of the ,french in     
#ahab to open their line of  retreat    
through ,maro-,jaroslawitz1 where all   
day the masses of troops  fought        
hand-to-hand in the streets1 the town   
was taken and retaken  seven times1 and 
the rival nations fought with the       
bayonet in the midst  of the burning    
houses 7,alison74    ,when it comes to  
push of pike1 as in all great decisions 
between  equally resolute adversaries it
 is bound to do1 the difference between 
the fighting of ,clausewitz's day and   
ours is but small4 ,the most recent     
instances of all1 the hand-to-hand      
fighting in ,manchuria1 take us back  to
 the ,napoleonic struggles4             
,therefore1 despite the eighty years    
that have intervened1 the writings  of  
,clausewitz are still valuable from a   
tactical point of view1 always          
considering of course the difference in 
weapons1 because of the human  heart in 
battle4    ,his ideas on tactics have   

largely filtered through his ,german    
pupils  into our textbooks1 minus the   
psychological or moral note1 so that it 
is not necessary to go at length into   
the subject1 or give a number of        
extracts4 ,it would be wearisome4 ,i    
will1 however1 give a few passages  at  
haphazard as illustrations4      ,,flank
 ,,attacks    ,the endeavour to gain the
 enemy's line of retreat1 and protect   
our own1  on which so much learned      
erudition has been spent by various     
writers1  he regards as a ,,natural     
instinct1 which will ,,always produce   
itself both  in generals and subalterns4
    ,from this arises1 in the whole     
conduct of war1 and especially in great 
and small combats1 a ,,perfect          
,,instinct1 which is the security of our
  own line of retreat and the seizure of
 the enemy's2 this follows from  the    
conception of victory1 which1 as we have
 seen1 is something beyond  mere        
slaughter4 ,in this effort we see1      
therefore1 the ,,first immediate        

purpose in the combat1 and one which is 
quite universal4 ,no combat  is         
imaginable in which this effort1 either 
in its double or single  form1 is not to
 go hand in hand with the plain and     
simple stroke of  force4 ,even the      
smallest troop will not throw itself    
upon the enemy  without thinking of its 
line of retreat1 and in most cases it   
will have  an eye upon that of the      
enemy4#fb ,this is a great natural law  
of  the combat1 and so becomes the pivot
 upon which ,,all strategical and       
tactical manoeuvres turn4               
,,reserves--,,destructive ,,and         
,,decisive ,,act    ,the combat he      
regards as settled by whoever has the   
preponderance of  moral force at the    
end2 that is1 in fresh or only partly   
used up troops4    ,the combat itself he
 divides into a destructive and a       
decisive act4  ,during the long         
destructive act1 or period of fire      
preparation1 the  troops engaged        
gradually wear each other out1 and      

gradually almost  cease to count as     
factors in the decision4 ,after a fire  
combat of  some hours' duration1 in     
which a body of troops has suffered     
severe  losses--for instance1 a quarter 
or one-third of its numbers--the  dbris 
may for the time be looked upon as a    
heap of cinders4 ,for the  men are      
physically exhausted2 they have spent   
their ammunition2 many  have left the   
field with the wounded1 though not      
themselves wounded  7compare1 for       
instance1 ,eylau and the #ahgj battles72
 the rest think  they have done their   
part for the day1 and if they get beyond
 the  sphere of danger1 do not willingly
 return to it4 ,the feeling of courage  
with which they originally started has  
had the edge taken off1 the  longing for
 the fight is satisfied1 the original   
organization is partly  destroyed1 and  
the formations broken up4    ,so that   
the amount of moral force lost may be   
estimated by the amount  of the         
,reserves used up1 almost as with a foot

 rule4#fc    ,this goes on till1 ,in all
 probability1 only the untouched reserve
 and  some troops which1 though they    
have been in action1 have suffered very 
little1 are in reality to be regarded as
 serviceable1 and the remainder         
7perhaps four-sixths7 may be looked upon
 for the present as a caput  mortuum4   
,therefore the art of the commander he  
regards as economy of force  during the 
destructive period2 that is1 to employ  
as few troops as  possible1 by taking   
advantage of ground1 cover1 etc41 to use
 a smaller  number of men in the combat 
with firearms than the enemy employs1 so
  that a smaller proportionate number of
 his own are reduced to a heap  of      
cinders and more are left1 more moral   
force1 for the decision4    ,hundreds of
 times1 he says1 a line of fire has     
maintained its own  against one twice   
its strength 7e4g4 the ,boers74    ,to  
do this and yet obtain a good           
fire-effect demands very skilful        
handling of the troops1 both on the part

 of the chief and subordinate  leaders4 
,with the preponderance thus obtained   
the commander at last starts the        
decision4 ,towards the close of a battle
 the line of retreat is always  regarded
 with increased jealousy1 therefore a   
threat against that  line is always a   
potent means of bringing on the decision
 7,liao-yang1  ,mukden74 ,on that       
account1 when circumstances permit1 the 
plan of battle  will be aimed at that   
point from the very first4 ,or1 ,if this
 wear and  tear and exhaustion of the   
forces has reached a certain pitch1 then
 a  rapid advance in concentrated masses
 on one side against the line of  battle
 of the other 7i4e4 the ,napoleonic     
breaking the centre1 of  recent years   
thought almost hopeless1 but revived in 
,manchuria with  success1 in the case of
 ,nodzu breaking the centre at ,mukden74
    ,from what precedes it is evident   
that1 as in the preparatory acts1 the   
utmost economy of forces must prevail1  
so in the decisive act to win  the      

mastery through numbers must be the     
ruling idea4    ,just as in the         
preparatory acts endurance1 firmness and
 coolness are  the first qualities1 so  
in the decisive act boldness and fiery  
spirit  must predominate4    ,the       
difference between these two acts will  
never be completely lost as  respects   
the whole4    ,this is the way in which 
our view is to be understood2 then1 on  
the  one hand1 it will not come short of
 the reality1 and on the other  it will 
direct the attention of the leader of a 
combat 7be it great  or small1 partial  
or general7 to giving each of the two   
acts of  activity its due share1 so that
 there may be neither precipitation nor 
negligence4    ,precipitation there will
 be if space and time are not allowed   
for the destructive act4 ,negligence in 
general there will be if  a complete    
decision does not take place1 either    
from want of moral  courage or from a   
wrong view of the situation4#fd         
,,duration ,,of ,,the ,,combat    ,even 

the resistance of an ordinary division  
of #h1jjj or #aj1jjj men  of all arms1  
even if opposed to an enemy considerably
 superior in  numbers1 will last several
 hours1 if the advantages of country are
 not  too preponderating4 ,and if the   
enemy is only a little or not at all    
superior in numbers1 the combat will    
last half a day4 ,a corps of three  or  
four divisions will prolong it to double
 that time2 an army of  #hj1jjj or      
#ajj1jjj men to three or four times4    
,these calculations are  the result of  
experience4#fe    ,as ,general von      
,caemmerer points out1 if these         
calculations were adhered  to in        
present-day ,german manoeuvres1 as they 
are now in all war games1  tactical     
exercises1 and staff rides1 the         
dangerous dualism of their  training1   
the difference between theory and       
manoeuvre practice1 would  cease4       
,,attack ,,and ,,defence    ,i have left
 to the last the consideration of three 
or four disputed  points in ,clausewitz4

 ,in considering these ,i shall quote a 
good deal  from ,general von            
,caemmerer's ,development of            
,strategical ,science1  as in such      
matters it is best to quote the most    
recent authors of  established          
reputation4    ,the most important of   
these1 and the most disputed1 is        
,clausewitz's  famous dictum that the   
defensive is the stronger form of making
 war4  ,the defence is the stronger form
 of war with a negative object2 the     
attack is the weaker form with a        
positive object4#ff    ,general von     
,caemmerer says1 ,it is strange1 we     
,germans look upon  ,clausewitz as      
indisputably the deepest and acutest    
thinker upon the  subject of war2 the   
beneficial effect of his intellectual   
labours is  universally recognized and  
highly appreciated2 but the more or less
  keen opposition against this sentence 
never ceases4 ,and yet that  sentence   
can as little be cut out of his work    
',on ,war' as the heart out  of a man4  

,our most distinguished and prominent   
military writers are  here at variance  
with ,clausewitz4    ,now1 of course1 ,i
 do not here propose to go into such a  
controversy4  ,i only wish to point out 
that ,clausewitz1 in saying this1 only  
meant  the defensive-offensive1 the form
 in which he always regards it1 both    
strategically and technically1 in       
oft-repeated explanations all through   
his works4 ,for instance--    ,it is a  
,,first maxim ,,never to remain         
perfectly passive1 but to fall  upon the
 enemy in front and flank1 even when he 
is in the act of making  an attack upon 
us4#fg    ,and again--    ,a swift and  
vigorous assumption of the              
offensive--the flashing sword  of       
vengeance--is the most brilliant point  
in the defensive4 ,he who  does not at  
once think of it at the right moment1 or
 rather he who  does not from the first 
include this transition in his idea of  
the  defensive1 will never understand   
its superiority as a form of war4#fh    

,von ,caemmerer comments thus3 ,and this
 conception of the defence  by          
,clausewitz has become part and parcel  
of our army--everywhere1  strategically 
and tactically1 he who has been forced  
into a defensive  attitude at once      
thinks how he can arrange a             
counter-attack4 ,i am thus  unable to   
see how the way in which ,clausewitz has
 contrasted ,attack  and ,defence could 
in any way paralyse the spirit of       
enterprise4 ,von  ,caemmerer also justly
 remarks that1 as ,clausewitz always    
insisted  both in strategy and tactics1 
neither ,attack nor ,defence is pure1   
but  oscillates between the two forms2  
and as the ,attack is frequently        
temporarily reduced to defend itself1   
and also as no nation can be sure  of   
never being invaded by a superior       
coalition1 it is most desirable  to     
encourage a belief in the strength of   
the ,defence1 if properly used4  ,in    
this ,i think that ,wellington would    
probably have agreed4 ,certainly        

,austerlitz and ,waterloo were examples 
of battles such as ,clausewitz          
preferred4    ,still1 one must admit    
that ,clausewitz's chapter on ,the      
,relations  of the ,offensive and       
,defensive to each other in ,tactics1   
,book ,,vii4  ,chapter #b1 is the least 
convincing chapter of his work4         
,strategically1 the argument is         
stronger4 ,it always seems to me that we
  must remember that ,clausewitz had    
taken part in the defensive-offensive   
in its strongest1 most absolute and     
unlimited form1 on the greatest         
possible scale--the ,moscow campaign and
 the ruin 7consummated before  a single 
flake of snow fell7 of the ,grand ,army4
 ,if he had lived to  complete the      
revision of his works1 it always seems  
to me that he  would have made his      
theory undeniable by stating that the   
defensive is  the strongest form of war1
 if unlimited by space4 ,what1 for      
instance1  would have happened if the   
,japanese had tried to march through    

,siberia  on to ,st4 ,petersburg8       
,but1 after all1 which of the two is    
absolutely the stronger form of  war1   
attack or defence1 is merely a          
theoretical abstraction1 for1           
practically1 the choice is always       
settled for us by the pressing          
necessity of circumstances4 ,and1 in    
this connection1 let us always bear  in 
mind ,clausewitz's dictum3 ,a swift and 
vigorous assumption of the              
offensive--the flashing sword of        
vengeance--is the most brilliant point  
in the defensive4      ,,the ,,inner    
,,line    ,a second disputed point is   
,clausewitz's alleged preference1 as a  
rule1  for the ,inner ,line in strategy4
 ,but it is necessary to remember that  
that was only due to the conditions of  
his time1 before railways and           
telegraphs1 when it was difficult to    
communicate between columns acting  on  
concentric lines4 ,and he is not in any 
way wedded to the ,inner ,line1  like   
,jomini1 but only when circumstances are

 favourable4 ,he has many  sentences    
from which we may infer that1 had he    
lived in railway and  telegraph days1   
his strategy1 like ,moltke's1 his most  
distinguished  pupil1 would have aimed  
at envelopment as a rule4 ,for to bring 
up  troops rapidly by several railways  
necessitates a broad strategic  front1  
and ,clausewitz especially lays down    
rapidity as his second great  principle1
 and says--    ,if the concentration of 
the forces would occasion detours and   
loss  of time1 and the danger of        
advancing by separate lines is not too  
great1 then the same may be justifiable 
on these grounds2 for to  effect an     
unnecessary concentration of the forces 
would be contrary  to the second        
principle we have laid down 7i4e4 'to   
act as swiftly  as possible'74#fi ,also3
 ,such separation into several columns  
as is  absolutely necessary must be made
 use of for the disposition of the      
tactical attack in the enveloping form1 
for that form is natural to  the attack1

 and must not be disregarded without    
good reason4#gj  ,also3 ,it is          
sufficient now if the concentration     
takes place during  the action4 ,so that
 while the conditions of his time led   
,clausewitz  to prefer close            
concentration and the ,inner ,line1 like
 ,napoleon1  yet his reflections led him
 to propound the germ of the strategy of
  ,moltke4 ,substitute for ,clausewitz's
 close concentration this3 ,as  close   
concentration1 the combined movements   
regulated by telegraph1  as is          
compatible with the utmost use of the   
railways and the greatest  rapidity 7as 
he would certainly have said71 and we   
arrive at ,moltke's  strategy4          
,,frontal ,,attacks    ,a third disputed
 point is his belief in the superior    
tactical  efficiency1 under favourable  
circumstances1 of the ,napoleonic method
  of breaking the enemy's line in the   
centre4 ,breaking the line by a  frontal
 attack was1 of course1 much easier in  
,clausewitz's ,napoleonic  day than it  

is with the long-ranging arms of our    
day1 and it is only  natural that       
,clausewitz in his writings should give 
it the full  tactical importance which  
it then deserved4 ,his book would not be
 true  to the tactical conditions of his
 day had he not done so1 with ,rivoli1  
,austerlitz1 ,salamanca1 ,eckmuhl1 etc41
 before his mind4 ,but it seems  hardly 
correct to accuse him of over-partiality
 to frontal attacks1 for  he has        
examined both frontal and enveloping    
attacks most fairly1 giving  to each    
their relative advantages and           
disadvantages1 and concluding3  ,the    
envelopment may lead directly to the    
destruction of the enemy's  army1 if it 
is made with very superior numbers and  
succeeds4 ,if it  leads to victory the  
early results are in every case greater 
than  by breaking the enemy's line4     
,breaking the enemy's line can only lead
  indirectly to the destruction of the  
enemy's army1 and its effects  are      
hardly shown so much on the first day1  

but rather strategically  afterwards1#ga
 by forcing apart on different lines of 
retreat the  separated fragments of the 
beaten army4    ,the breaking through   
the hostile army by massing our         
principal force  against one point1     
supposes an excessive length of front on
 the part  of the enemy2 for in this    
form of attack the difficulty of        
occupying  the remainder of the enemy's 
force with few troops is greater1       
because  the enemy's forces nearer to   
the principal point of attack can easily
  join in opposing it4 ,now in an attack
 upon the centre there are such  forces 
on both sides of the attack2 in an      
attack upon a flank1 only  on one side4 
,the consequence of this is that such a 
central attack  may easily end in a very
 disadvantageous form of combat1 through
 a  convergent counter-attack4 ,which is
 exactly our modern difficulty4  ,the   
choice between these two forms of attack
 must therefore be made  according to   
the existing conditions of the moment4  

,length of front1  the nature and       
direction of the line of retreat1 the   
military qualities  of the enemy's      
troops1 and the characteristics of their
 general1  lastly the ground must       
determine the choice4    ,speaking      
generally he regards the concentric     
enveloping form of  tactical attack     
aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as
 the most  efficacious and natural4 ,on 
the field of battle itself 444 the      
enveloping form must always be          
considered the most effectual4#gb ,and  
the eccentric or frontal counter-attack 
at the extended enveloping  attack as   
the most efficacious and natural form of
 the defence1 such as  ,napoleon's      
counter-attacks at ,austerlitz or       
,dresden1 or ,wellington's  at          
,salamanca4 ,and we think that one means
 is at least as good as the  other4#gc  
99       99       99       99       99  
,now ,i think that these extracts       
sufficiently defend ,clausewitz from the
  imputation of too great a belief in   

frontal attacks1 and considering  the   
frequent success of such ,napoleonic    
attacks in his day1 he gives  a very    
fair summing up of the relative         
advantages and disadvantages  thereof1  
and indeed such as might be written in  
the present day4  ,indeed the quite     
abnormal conditions of the ,boer war    
produced such a  feeling against frontal
 attacks1 and so much loose talk of     
their being  extinct1 that it is very   
useful to turn to ,clausewitz for a     
reminder  that breaking the centre1     
whenever the condition he postulates1   
namely  over-extension of front on the  
enemy's part1 is present1 will  always  
remain one of the two great forms of    
decisive attack open to a  commander4   
,and as in our day the forces are so    
enormous that to reach the hostile      
flank becomes more difficult1 and the   
extension of front becomes so  gigantic 
7a front of several armies on a line of 
forty to seventy miles  perhaps71 it is 
well to consider whether breaking the   

enemy's centre  will not again offer the
 most advantageous form for the final   
decisive  act1 coupled of course1 as    
,clausewitz says it ,,always ,,must be1 
with a  strong flank attack4 ,and in    
these gigantic battles of the future1   
such  as ,liao-yang and ,mukden1 which  
we must consider typical of the future1 
battles which must take several days1   
during which the troops in the  first   
line become utterly exhausted and used  
up1--a decisive attack  on the centre   
can well be imagined after the hostile  
reserves have  been decoyed away over a 
day's march by a strong flank attack4   
,as1 for  example1 ,nogi's flank attack 
round ,mukden followed by ,nodzu's      
decisive  breaking the centre and       
capture of ,mukden itself4    ,so that  
far from thinking ,clausewitz's remarks 
about frontal attacks  and breaking the 
line to be obsolete1 it rather appears  
from the great  ,russo-,japanese battles
 that they are worthy of close study in 
view of  the future4      ,,tactical    

,,versus ,,strategical ,,envelopment    
,a fourth disputed point is the         
preference of ,clausewitz1 owing to his 
insistence on the greatest concentration
 possible with proper regard  for the   
circumstances1 for the tactical         
envelopment arranged on or  near the    
field to strategical envelopment with   
divided forces arranged  beforehand4 ,in
 this matter ,i will again quote        
,general v4 ,caemmerer1  who disagrees  
with him1 and says3 ,clausewitz         
proclaims the oblique  front as the most
 effective strategic form of attack1 444
 that is to  say1 when the whole army   
with one united front falls upon the    
strategic  flank of the enemy1 and1 if  
victorious1 cuts him from his line of   
retreat4 ,but where such a situation    
cannot be brought about1 where our      
advance has brought us before the       
strategic front of the enemy1 then  he  
sees in the tactical envelopment1 in the
 formation of an offensive  flank1 the  
proper means of effectively preparing to

 push the enemy  from his line of       
retreat1 and he distinctly explains that
 tactical  envelopment need not at all  
be the consequence of strategical       
envelopment1 and need not at all be     
prepared long beforehand by a           
corresponding advance of divided forces4
    ,clausewitz says1 ,the consequence  
of this is that battles fought with     
enveloping lines1 or even with an       
oblique front1 which should properly    
result from an advantageous relation of 
the lines of communication1  are        
commonly the result of a moral and      
physical preponderance4#gd  ,also he    
should therefore only advance with his  
columns on such a width  of front as    
will admit of their all coming into     
action together4  ,such separation into 
several columns should be made use of   
for the  disposition of the tactical    
attack in the enveloping form 7i4e4 by  
troops within a day's march of each     
other74 ,but it must be only of a       
tactical nature1 for a strategic        

envelopment1 when a great blow is to  be
 struck1 is a complete waste of power4  
,general v4 ,caemmerer comments3 ,he is 
thus of opinion that the lateral        
movement of part of the army against the
 flank of the enemy could  without any  
difficulty still be carried out as      
initiated by the plan of  battle2 and in
 order to understand this idea we must  
again bear in mind  the difference      
between the fire-effect of then and now4
 ,in those days a  comparatively short  
movement made it still possible for a   
considerable  portion of the army to    
gain the defenders' flank2 to-day a     
lengthy  and troublesome operation would
 be necessary for the same object1 and  
its successful execution would only be  
counted upon if the defender  remained  
entirely passive1 and would neither     
think of a counter-stroke  nor of a     
corresponding movement of his forces to 
the threatened flank4    ,without going 
into this controversy ,i will1 however1 
quote the  excellent reason given by    

,clausewitz for his preference for      
tactical as  opposed to strategical     
envelopment3 ,one peculiarity of the    
offensive  battle is the uncertainty1 in
 most cases1 as to the position 7note1  
and  strength7 of the enemy2 it is a    
complete groping about amongst things   
that are unknown 7,austerlitz1 ,wagram1 
,hohenlinden1 ,jena1 ,katzbach74  ,the  
more this is the case the more          
concentration of forces becomes         
paramount1 and turning a flank to be    
preferred to surrounding4#ge    ,it is  
also well to recollect how many famous  
generals had been ruined  in            
,clausewitz's experience through        
over-extension or dispersion of  their  
forces4 ,the crushing defeats of        
,napoleon's marshals in the winter  of  
#ahac1 ,macdonald at the ,katzbach1     
,oudinot at ,gros ,beeren1 ,ney at      
,dennewitz1 which neutralized           
,napoleon's great victory at ,dresden   
and  began his ruin1 were all chiefly   
owing to this cause4    ,and the weather

 may1 again1 have as great influence in 
shortening  resistance and allowing     
troops to be overwhelmed before the     
too-distant  reinforcements arrive1 as  
it had in those battles4 ,if the weather
 then  prevented the old muskets going  
off1 and enabled the attack to rush  the
 defence1 so now a fog1 rain1 mist1 or  
snow1 by restricting the  field of view 
and fire1 may produce the same results4 
,when one thinks  of the number of great
 battles fought in such weather1 as they
 may  well be again1 one sees an        
additional reason for carefully         
considering  ,clausewitz's warning4 ,far
 from relegating his preference for the 
tactical as opposed to the strategical  
envelopment to the region of  the       
obsolete1 because of our improved       
armament1 it seems right to give  it    
full weight as a corrective to a        
perceivable tendency to elevate         
strategical envelopment 7after          
,kniggrtz7 into a formula for victory4  
,if in the past many great generals have

 been ruined by over-extension1  so may 
they be again4 ,against this tendency   
,clausewitz will for ever  lift his     
voice4    ,also it remains to be        
considered1 with the huge armies of     
to-day and  the future1 such armies as  
at ,liao-yang and ,mukden1 such armies  
as  may possibly one day join issue in  
,afghanistan1 whether strategical       
envelopment will be practicable1 or     
whether tactical envelopment1  such as  
,general ,kuroki's tactical enveloping  
movement on ,yentai1 and  the ,russian  
line of retreat at ,liao-yang1 or       
,general ,nogi's tactical  enveloping   
dash northward on ,hsinminting and the  
railway at ,mukden1  will not be        
preferable4    ,perhaps1 as a           
compromise1 one might call such a       
movement  strategical-tactical1 and so  
avoid the dispute by jugglery of words4 
,i have not attempted to do more than   
roughly indicate that the solution  of  
these four disputed tactical questions  
in ,clausewitz is to be sought  in a    

study of the latest campaign1 as he     
would have said himself2 that  is1 the  
campaign in ,manchuria4 ,for1 as the    
,times correspondent in the  ,x,l,vth   
,chapter1 ,clausewitz in ,manchuria1 of 
his book ,the ,war in the  ,far ,east1  
observes1 ,it will be abundantly clear  
to any one who has  followed the great  
battles in ,manchuria that the spirit of
 ,clausewitz  has presided over         
,japanese victories and wept over       
,russian defeats4          ,,chapter    
,,xii    ,,changes ,,since ,,the ,,days 
,,of ,,clausewitz      ,in reading      
,clausewitz it is1 first1 the great     
principles of the nature  of war founded
 on human nature1 which alter not2 and1 
secondly1 it  is his spirit and         
practical way of looking at things that 
we want to  assimilate and apply to     
,,the ,,problems ,,of ,,to-,,day1 to    
which end it is  necessary to read him  
always with the changed conditions of   
to-day in  our minds1 and think what he 
would have said under the circumstances4

  ,these changes are chiefly3--         
7#a7 ,the improved net-work of roads4   
7#b7 ,railways4      7#c7 ,telegraphs1  
wire and wireless4      7#d7 ,improved  
arms4      7#e7 ,aviation      7#f7     
,universal service armies4      ,,the   
,,improved ,,net-,,work ,,of ,,roads    
,the improved net-work of roads in      
,europe 7not1 of course1 in ,manchuria1 
or in ,afghanistan where we have to     
consider our future strategy1 but in    
,europe71 as ,general v4 ,caemmerer puts
 it1 now offers to the movements  of    
armies everywhere a whole series of     
useful roads where formerly one  or two 
only were available1 easier gradients1  
good bridges instead of  unreliable     
ones1 etc4 ,so that the march-discipline
 of that day when  concentrated for     
battle1 artillery and train on the      
roads1 infantry  and cavalry by the side
 of the roads1 has disappeared4 ,such   
close  concentration is therefore now   
not possible1 as we move all arms on    
the road1 and an army corps with train1 

or two without1 is the most  that we can
 now calculate on bringing into action  
in one day on one  road4      ,,railways
    ,railways have1 above all1          
completely altered the term 'base1'     
remarks  ,v4 ,caemmerer4 ,railways carry
 in a few days men1 horses1 vehicles1   
and materials of all kinds from the     
remotest district to any desired  point 
of our country1 and nobody would any    
longer think of accumulating  enormous  
supplies of all kinds at certain        
fortified points on his  own frontier   
with the object of basing himself on    
those points4 ,one  does not base one's 
self any longer on a distinct district  
which is  specially prepared for that   
object1 but upon the whole country1     
which  has become one single magazine1  
with separate store-rooms4 ,so the term 
'base' has now to be considered in this 
light4    ,it is only when operating in 
savage or semi-savage countries1 where  
there are no railways1 that the old idea
 of a base applies4    ,as we penetrate 

deeper and further from our own country 
into the  enemy's1 and as a small       
raiding party can demolish the railway  
line so  as to stop all traffic for days
 or weeks1 it becomes far more necessary
  than it ever was in ,clausewitz's day 
to guard our communications4  ,and      
armies become more and more sensitive to
 any attack upon their  communications4 
,also such a line cannot easily be      
changed1 and consequently those         
celebrated changes of the line of       
communication in an enemy's country     
which ,napoleon himself1 on some        
occasion1 declared to be the ablest     
manoeuvre in the art of war1 could      
scarcely be carried out any more  7,v4  
,caemmerer74    ,also concentration by  
means of several railways demands a     
broad  strategic front1 which produces  
that separation of corps or armies      
which prepares the way for strategical  
envelopment1 and so on4    ,general von 
der ,goltz1 in his ,conduct of ,war1    
says3 ,the more recent  treatises on the

 conduct of war on a large scale are    
principally taken  up with the          
mobilization and strategical            
concentration of armies1 a  department  
of strategy which only began to play an 
important part in  modern times4 ,it is 
the result of a dense net-work of       
railways in  ,western ,europe which has 
rendered it possible to mass large      
bodies  of troops in a surprisingly     
brief time4 ,each ,power tries to outdo 
its neighbours in this respect1 444     
which gives an opportunity to  the      
strategical specialist to show off his  
brilliant qualities4444  ,consequently  
it is now frequently assumed that the   
whole conduct of  war is comprised in   
this one section of it4 ,this           
over-estimate is of  course an error1   
which1 however1 requires to be pointed  
out4      ,,telegraphs    ,the telegraph
 has very greatly reduced the danger of 
separation4  ,the great advantage of the
 inner line in the day of ,napoleon and 
of  ,clausewitz was that separated      

forces could only communicate by mounted
  messengers1 so if the enemy got       
between them they could not communicate 
at all1 nor act in concert4 ,this the   
telegraph has completely altered1  for  
as the field telegraph can now be laid  
as quickly as an army can  advance1 the 
most widely separated bodies of troops  
can every day  arrange combined         
operations by telegraph through1 if     
necessary1  a point one hundred or four 
hundred miles in rear4 ,so that to-day  
the chief advantage of the inner line   
has gone1 while its chief  disadvantage1
 the possibility of being surrounded1   
remains4      ,,maps    ,we now possess 
complete detailed ,ordnance maps of     
every country in  ,europe1 kept up to   
date by the latest alterations1 whereas 
in the days  of ,clausewitz maps were of
 the very roughest character1 and quite 
unreliable in comparison4               
,,improved ,,arms    ,smokeless powder1 
quick-firing and long-ranging artillery 
and rifles1  the infantry field of      

effective fire being ten times1 the     
artillery  five times what it was in    
,clausewitz's time1 have all to be borne
 in  mind when reading the tactical part
 of his writings4 ,in consequence1      
also1 cover and the tactical use of     
ground are of far greater  importance   
now than then1 etc41 etc41 etc4         
,,aviation    ,the recent wonderful     
developments in aviation will obviously 
almost  revolutionize ,information in   
,war4 ,to what extent1 it is as yet     
impossible to say4 ,each year will teach
 us more4      ,,the                    
,,nation-,,in-,,arms    ,the            
nation-in-arms as the common foundation 
of all armies 7except our  own71 brought
 up by railways1 vastly increases the   
numbers in a modern  battle from what   
they were in ,clausewitz's day4 ,compare
 ,austerlitz1  ,dresden1 ,leipzig and   
,waterloo1 with ,liao-yang and ,mukden4 
,it should be  so with us also1 for as  
,general von der ,goltz says in ,the    
,conduct of  ,war3 ,the ,,best military 

organization is that which renders      
available  ,,all the intellectual and   
material resources of the country in    
event of  war4 ,a ,state is not         
justified in trying to defend itself    
with only a  portion of its strength1   
when the existence of the whole is at   
stake4    ,in ,great ,britain the       
difference which the introduction of    
this  nation-in-arms principle has made 
in our military strength compared  with 
that of our future opponents1 a         
difference relatively ,,far ,,greater   
,,against ,,us than it was in           
,napoleon's and ,clausewitz's day1 is as
 yet  hardly realized by the people1 or 
by our statesmen4 ,people forget the    
wastage of war1 and the necessity for a 
constant flow of troops to  repair that 
wastage4 ,as ,von der ,goltz puts it3   
,it is characteristic  of the           
strategical offensive that the foremost 
body of troops of  an army1 the portion 
which fights the battles1 amounts to    
only a  comparatively small fraction1   

frequently only a quarter or even       
one-eighth1 of the total fighting       
strength employed1 whilst the fate  of  
the whole army throughout depends upon  
the success or failure of  this         
fraction4 ,attacking armies melt away   
like snow in the spring4  ,to condense  
his remarks3 ,in spite of the most      
admirable discipline1  the ,prussian    
,guard ,corps lost #ejjj to #fjjj men in
 the marches between  the attack on ,st4
 ,privat and the battle of ,sedan4      
,napoleon crossed  the ,niemen in #ahab 
with #ddb1jjj men1 but reached ,moscow  
only three  months later with only      
#ie1jjj4 ,in the spring of #ahaj1 the   
,french  crossed the ,pyrenees with     
#djj1jjj men1 but still ,marshal        
,massena in  the end only brought       
#de1jjj men up to the lines of ,torres  
,vedras1  near ,lisbon1 where the       
decision lay4 ,again1 in #ahbi1 the     
,russians  put #afj1jjj men in the      
field1 but had barely #bj1jjj left when1
 at  ,adrianople1 a skilfully concluded 

peace saved them before their  weakness 
became apparent and a reaction set in4  
,in #ahgh the ,russians  led #dfj1jjj   
across the ,danube1 but they only       
brought #ajj1jjj men--of  whom only     
#dc1jjj were effective1 the rest being  
sick--to the gates of  ,constantinople4 
,in #ahgj the ,germans crossed the      
,french frontier with  #cgb1jjj men1 but
 after only a six weeks' campaign       
brought but #aga1jjj  men to ,paris4    
,and so on4 ,the result of it all is    
simple--that a people  which is not     
based on the modern principle of the    
nation-in-arms cannot  for long rival or
 contend with one that is1 for it can   
neither put  an equal 7still less a     
superior7 army into the field at the    
outset  7vide ,clausewitz's first       
principle71 nor even maintain in the    
field  the inferior army it does place  
there1 because it cannot send the       
ever-required fresh supplies of trained 
troops4 ,sooner or later this  must     
tell4 ,sooner or later a situation must 

arise in which the nation  based on the 
obsolete voluntary system must go down  
before a nation  based on the           
nation-in-arms principle4 ,circumstances
 change with time1  and1 as wise ,lord  
,bacon said long ago1 ,he that will not 
adopt new  remedies must expect new     
evils4 ,may we adopt the remedy before  
we  experience the evil6      ,,the     
,,moral ,,and ,,spiritual ,,forces ,,in 
,,war    ,but though these changed      
conditions must1 of course1 modify      
,clausewitz's details in many important 
particulars1 still 7to complete  our    
circle and leave off where we started7  
,i repeat that1 as human  nature never  
changes1 and as the moral is to the     
physical as three  to one in war1       
,clausewitz1 as the great realistic and 
practical  philosopher on the actual    
nature of war1 as the chief exponent of 
the  moral and spiritual forces in war1 
will ever remain invaluable in the      
study of war4    ,consider what         
unsurpassed opportunities he had for    

observing and  reflecting on the        
influence of enthusiasm and passion1 of 
resolution  and boldness1 of vacillation
 and weakness1 of coolness and caution1 
of  endurance and hardship1 of          
patriotism and freedom1 of ambition and 
of  glory--on war1 either by his own    
experience or by conversation with      
other equally experienced soldiers1     
during that long period of almost       
endless wars between #agic and #ahae4   
,the fervour and enthusiasm and         
boundless energy of the ,revolution1    
which drove the ,french forward1        
smashing everything before them1 at  the
 beginning2 the ambition1 military      
glory1 plunder and greed1 which         
animated them later on2 the patriotism1 
religious and loyal devotion1  and stern
 endurance1 which nerved the ,russian   
hosts then as now2 that  awful ,moscow  
winter campaign1 when human nature rose 
to its highest and  sank to its lowest1 
when the extremes of heroic endurance   
and selfish  callousness were visible   

side by side2 the magnificent uprising  
of the  spirit of liberty and freedom   
from intolerable oppression in ,germany1
  which gave to the ,prussian recruits  
and ,landwehr the same driving  force   
that revolutionary enthusiasm had       
formerly given to the ,french2  the     
passing1 therefore1 in #ahac of the     
moral superiority1 the greater  driving 
force1 from the ,french to the allies4  
,clausewitz saw all this2  he conversed 
intimately with such men as ,scharnhorst
 and ,gneisenau1  who saw and guided it1
 too4 ,all his friends had seen it also4
 ,no  wonder1 then1 that such an        
unexampled series of warlike phenomena  
deeply impressed his reflective mind    
with the supreme importance of the      
moral and spiritual factors in war4     
,his opportunities for long-continued   
observation of warlike phenomena  were  
far greater than those of any writer    
since his day1 and it is to  be hoped   
they will remain so4 ,for we have no    
desire to see another  series of wars   

such as the ,napoleonic4 ,it is         
fortunate for us that  there was then   
such a man as ,clausewitz to sum up for 
us so simply and  so clearly the        
accumulated experiences of those long1  
long years of  carnage and devastation4 
,printed by ,hazell1 ,watson  ,viney1   
,ld41 ,london and ,aylesbury4           
,,footnotes3    #a ,book ,,iv4 ,chap4   
#aj4    #b ,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #c4    #c 
,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #c4    #d ,book ,i4  
,chap4 #h4    #e ,summary of            
,instruction to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown    
,prince4    #f ,summary of ,instruction1
 p4 #abj4    #g ,book ,,ii4 ,chap4 #f4  
#h ,book ,,ii4 ,chap4 #b4    #i         
,prefatory ,notice by ,clausewitz4      
#aj ,book ,,ii4 ,chap4 #d4    #aa ,book 
,,ii4 ,chap4 #b4    #ab ,book ,,ii4     
,chap4 #b4    #ac ,book ,,ii4 ,chap4 #c4
    #ad ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #a4    #ae ,by 
gaining ,public ,opinion1 ,clausewitz   
means1 to force the enemy's  population 
into a state of mind favourable to      
submission4    #af ,summary of          

,instruction to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown    
,prince4    #ag ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #a4    
#ah ,author's ,introduction4    #ai     
,book ,i4 ,chap4 #a4    #bj ,book ,,vii4
 ,chap4 #e4    #ba ,book ,,vii4 ,chap4  
#ba4    #bb ,book ,,vii4 ,chap4 #ba4    
#bc ,book ,,viii4 ,chaps4 #g1 #h and #i4
    #bd ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #a4    #be     
,book ,,viii4 ,chap4 #i4    #bf ,book   
,i4 ,chap4 #g4    #bg ,book ,i4 ,chap4  
#h4    #bh ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #h4    #bi  
,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #a4    #cj ,book     
,,iv4 ,chap4 #c4    #ca ,book ,i4 ,chap4
 #a4    #cb ,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #c4      
#cc ,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #ae4    #cd     
,book ,,vii4 ,chap4 #ac4    #ce ,book   
,i4 ,chap4 #d4    #cf ,book ,i4 ,chap4  
#e4    #cg ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #g4    #ch  
,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #c4    #ci ,book    
,,iii4 ,chaps4 #af-ah4    #dj ,book     
,,ii4 ,chap4 #a4    #da ,book ,,iii4    
,chap4 #aa4    #db ,book ,,iii4 ,chap4  
#h4    #dc ,book ,v4 ,chap4 #c4    #dd  
,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #h4    #de ,book    
,,viii4 ,chap4 #d4    #df ,book ,,iii4  

,chap4 #ab4    #dg ,book ,,iii4 ,chap4  
#ac4    #dh ,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #ab4    
#di ,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #ac4    #ej     
,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #h4    #ea ,book    
,,iii4 ,chap4 #aa4    #eb ,book ,,vi4   
,chap4 #bh4    #ec ,book ,v4 ,chap4 #aj4
    #ed ,book ,i4 ,chap4 #a4    #ee     
,book ,,iii4 ,chap4 #ac4    #ef ,book   
,i4 ,chap4 #c4    #eg ,book ,,viii4     
,chap4 #i4    #eh ,book ,,viii4 ,chap4  
#i4    #ei ,summary of ,instruction to  
,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown ,prince4    #fj    
,book ,i4 ,chap4 #c4    #fa ,this       
warning as to the consequences of       
allowing information to be  published   
freely which would be helpful to an     
enemy was written five  years ago4 ,in  
the present war the prudent reticence of
 our ,press1 and  its loyal co-operation
 with the ,government in depriving the  
enemy of  any helpful information1 show 
that the lesson here insisted on has    
been  learned4--,editor's ,note4    #fb 
,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #d4    #fc ,book     
,,iv4 ,chap4 #d4    #fd ,guide to       

,tactics1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 pp4 #acf-adf4    
#fe ,book ,,iv4 ,chap4 #d4    #ff ,book 
,,vi4 ,chap4 #a4    #fg ,summary of     
,instruction to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,crown    
,prince4    #fh ,book ,,vi4 ,chap4 #e4  
#fi ,book ,,viii4 ,chap4 #i4    #gj     
,book ,,vii4 ,chap4 #ae4    #ga ,summary
 of ,instruction1 ,guide to ,tactics1   
par4 #ejj4    #gb ,book ,,vi4 ,chap4 #i4
    #gc ,book ,,vii4 ,chap4 #i4    #gd  
,book ,,vii4 ,chap4 #g4    #ge ,book    
,,vii4 ,chap4 #g4                       
,transcriber's ,notes3      ,punctuation
 and spelling were made consistent when 
a predominant  preference was found in  
this book2 otherwise they were not      
changed4    ,simple typographical errors
 were corrected2 occasional unbalanced  
quotation marks retained4    ,ambiguous 
hyphens at the ends of lines were       
retained4    ,page #acc3 ,paragraph ends
 with3 ,otherwise1 rather than with a   
period4