,every attempt has been made to         
replicate the original as printed4 ,some
 typographical errors have been         
corrected2 a list follows the text4     
,the footnotes follow the text4         
,index ,contents 7etext transcriber's   
note7                                   
,a ,,commentary                         
,,to                           ,,kant',s
 #8,,critique ,,of                      
,,pure ,,reason'                        
,,by                         ,,norman   
,,kemp ,,smith1 ,d4,,phil4              
,mc,c,o,s,h ,,professor ,,of            
,,philosophy1 ,,princeton ,,university  
,,author ,,of                           
#8,,studies ,,in ,,the ,,cartesian      
,,philosophy'                           
,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited      
,,st4 ,,martin',s ,,street1 ,,london    
#aiah                                   
,,copyright                             
,,to ,,the ,,memory                     
,,of                                    
,,robert ,,adamson                      

,,wise ,,in ,,counsel1 ,,in ,,friendship
 ,,unfailing                            
,,gratefully ,,dedicated     ,,preface  
,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is more 
obscure and difficult than even a       
metaphysical treatise has any right to  
be4 ,the difficulties are not merely due
 to defects of exposition2 they multiply
 rather than diminish upon detailed     
study2 and1 as ,i shall endeavour to    
show in this ,commentary1 are traceable 
to two main causes1 the composite nature
 of the text1 written at various dates  
throughout the period #aggb-aghj1 and   
the conflicting tendencies of ,kant's   
own thinking4  ,the ,commentary is both 
expository and critical2 and in         
exposition no less than in criticism ,i 
have sought to subordinate the treatment
 of textual questions and of minor      
issues to the systematic discussion of  
the central problems4 ,full use is made 
of the various selections from ,kant's  
private papers that have appeared1 at   
intervals1 since the publication of his 

,lectures on ,metaphysics in #ahba4     
,their significance has not hitherto    
been generally recognised in ,english   
books upon ,kant4 ,they seem to me to be
 of capital importance for the right    
understanding of the ,critique4  ,some  
apology is perhaps required for         
publishing a work of this character at  
the present moment4 ,it was completed1  
and arrangements made for its           
publication1 shortly before the outbreak
 of war4 ,the printers have1 ,i         
understand1 found in it a useful        
stop-gap to occupy them in the intervals
 of more pressing work2 and now that the
 type must be released1 ,i trust that in
 spite of1 or even because of1 the      
overwhelming preoccupations of the war1 
there may be some few readers to whom   
the volume may be not unwelcome4 ,that  
even amidst the distractions of actual  
campaigning metaphysical speculation can
 serve as a refuge and a solace is shown
 by the memorable example of ,general   
,smuts4 ,he has himself told us that on 

his raid into ,cape ,colony in the      
,south ,african ,war he carried with him
 for evening reading the ,critique of   
,pure ,reason4 ,is it surprising that   
our ,british generals1 pitted against so
 unconventional an opponent1 should have
 been worsted in the battle of wits8    
,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is a    
philosophical classic that marks a      
turning-point in the history of         
philosophy1 and no interpretation1 even 
though now attempted after the lapse of 
a hundred years1 can hope to be adequate
 or final4 ,some things are clearer to  
us than they were to ,kant's            
contemporaries2 in other essential ways 
our point of view has receded from his1 
and the historical record1 that should  
determine our judgments1 is far from    
complete4 ,but there is a further       
difficulty of an even more serious      
character4 ,the ,critique deals with    
issues that are still controversial1 and
 their interpretation is possible only  
from a definite standpoint4 ,the        

limitations of this standpoint and of   
the philosophical milieu in which it has
 been acquired unavoidably intervene to 
distort or obscure our apprehension of  
the text4 ,arbitrary and merely personal
 judgments ,i have1 however1 endeavoured
 to avoid4 ,my sole aim has been to     
reach1 as far as may prove feasible1 an 
unbiassed understanding of ,kant's great
 work4  ,among ,german commentators ,i  
owe most to ,vaihinger1 ,adickes1 ,b4   
,erdmann1 ,cohen1 and ,riehl1 especially
 to the first named4 ,the chief ,english
 writers upon ,kant are ,green1 ,caird1 
and ,adamson4 ,in so far as ,green and  
,caird treat the ,critical philosophy as
 a half-way stage to the ,hegelian      
standpoint ,i find myself frequently in 
disagreement with them2 but my          
indebtedness to their writings is much  
greater than my occasional criticisms of
 their views may seem to imply4 ,with   
,robert ,adamson ,i enjoyed the         
privilege of personal discussions at a  
time when his earlier view of ,kant's   

teaching was undergoing revision in a   
more radical manner than is apparent    
even in his posthumously published      
,university lectures4 ,to the stimulus  
of his suggestions the writing of this  
,commentary is largely due4  ,my first  
study of the ,critique was under the    
genial and inspiring guidance of ,sir   
,henry ,jones4 ,with characteristic     
kindliness he has read through my       
manuscript and has disclosed to me many 
defects of exposition and argument4 ,the
 same service has been rendered me by   
,professor ,g4 ,dawes ,hicks1 whose     
criticisms have been very valuable1     
particularly since they come from a     
student of ,kant who on many fundamental
 points takes an opposite view from my  
own4  ,i have also to thank my          
colleague1 ,professor ,oswald ,veblen1  
for much helpful discussion of ,kant's  
doctrines of space and time1 and of     
mathematical reasoning4  ,mr4 ,h4 ,h4   
,joachim has read the entire proofs1 and
 ,i have made frequent modifications to 

meet his very searching criticisms4 ,i  
have also gratefully adopted his        
revisions of my translations from the   
,critique4 ,similar acknowledgments are 
due to my colleague1 ,professor ,a4 ,a4 
,bowman1 and to my friend ,dr4 ,c4 ,w4  
,hendel4  ,i have in preparation a      
translation of the ,critique of ,pure   
,reason1 and am responsible for the     
translations of all passages given in   
the present work4 ,in quoting from      
,kant's other writings1 ,i have made use
 of the renderings of ,abbott1 ,bernard1
 and ,mahaffy2 but have occasionally    
allowed myself the liberty of           
introducing alterations4  ,should       
readers who are already well acquainted 
with the ,critique desire to use my     
,commentary for its systematic          
discussions of ,kant's teaching1 rather 
than as an accompaniment to their study 
of the text1 ,i may refer them to those 
sections which receive italicised       
headings in the table of contents4      
,,norman ,,kemp ,,smith4  ,,london1     

,january #aiah4     ,,contents          
,,introduction                          
,,page    ,i4 ,,textual--       ,kant's 
,method of composing the ,critique of   
,pure ,reason        xix   ,,ii4        
,,historical--       ,kant's ,relation  
to ,hume and to ,leibniz                
xxv  ,,iii4 ,,general--       #a4 ,the  
,nature of the a priori                 
xxxiii      #b4 ,kant's ,contribution to
 the ,science of ,logic                 
xxxvi      #c4 ,the ,nature of          
,consciousness                          
xxxix      #d4 ,phenomenalism1 ,kant's  
,substitute for ,subjectivism           
xlv      #e4 ,the ,distinction between  
,human and ,animal ,intelligence        
xlvii      #f4 ,the ,nature and         
,conditions of ,self-,consciousness     
l      #g4 ,kant's threefold            
,distinction between ,sensibility1      
,understanding1 and ,reason             
lii      #h4 ,the place of the ,critique
 of ,pure ,reason in         ,kant's    
,philosophical ,system                  

lv   ,,the ,,critique ,,of ,,pure       
,,reason#a  ,title                      
#a ,motto                               
#d ,dedication to ,freiherr von ,zedlitz
                                   #f   
,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition  
#h      ,comment on ,preface            
#aj     ,dogmatism1 ,scepticism1        
,criticism                              
#ac  ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second      
,,edition                               
#ag      ,the ,copernican ,hypothesis   
#bb  ,,introduction                     
#bf      ,comment upon the ,argument of 
,kant's ,introduction                #cc
     ,how are ,synthetic a priori       
,judgments possible8                #dc 
,the ,analytic and ,synthetic ,methods  
#dd     ,purpose and ,scope of the      
,critique                               
#ef     ,kant's relation to ,hume       
#fa     ,meaning of the term            
,transcendental                         
#gc   ,,the ,,transcendental ,,doctrine 
,,of ,,elements  ,part ,i4 ,,the        

,,transcendental ,,aesthetic            
#gi-aff      ,definition of ,terms      
#gi     ,kant's conflicting ,views of   
,space                               #hh
    ,section ,i4 ,,space                
#ii      ,kant's ,attitude to the       
,problems of ,modern ,geometry          
#aag    ,section ,,ii4 ,,time           
#abc      ,kant's ,views regarding the  
,nature of ,arithmetical ,science       
#abh     ,kant's conflicting ,views of  
,time                               #acd
     ,general ,observations on the      
,transcendental ,aesthetic              
#adc     ,the ,distinction between      
,appearance and ,illusion               
#adh     ,kant's ,relation to ,berkeley 
#aee     ,the ,paradox of ,incongruous  
,counterparts                           
#afa  ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,transcendental
 ,,logic                                
#afg    ,introduction                   
#afg           ,i4 ,logic in ,general   
#afg         ,,ii4 ,transcendental      
,logic                                  

#agj        ,,iii4 ,the ,division of    
,general ,logic into ,analytic          
and ,dialectic                          
#agb    ,division ,i4 ,,the             
,,transcendental ,,analytic             
#agd      ,book ,i4 ,,the ,,analytic    
,,of ,,concepts                         
#age        ,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,clue   
,,to ,,the ,,discovery ,,of ,,all ,,pure
 ,,concepts                  ,,of ,,the 
,,understanding                         
#age        ,section ,i4 ,the ,logical  
,use of the ,understanding              
#agf              ,comment on ,kant's   
,argument                               
#agf              ,stages in the        
,development of ,kant's                 
,metaphysical ,deduction                
#ahf        ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,logical
 ,function of the ,understanding        
in ,judgment                            
#aib        ,section ,,iii4 ,the        
,categories on ,pure ,concepts of the   
,understanding                          
#aid                 ,distinction       

between ,logical ,forms and ,categories 
#aie  ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,transcendental
 ,,logic--,continued4      ,chapter     
,,ii4 ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,pure     
,,concepts ,,of ,,the ,,understanding   
#bjb          ,analysis of the ,text3   
the ,four ,stages in the                
,development of ,kant's ,views          
#bjb-bcd            ,i4 ,enumeration of 
the ,four ,stages                       
#bjc           ,,ii4 ,detailed ,analysis
 of the ,four ,stages                   
#bjd              ,kant's ,doctrine of  
the ,transcendental ,object             
#bjd          ,,iii4 ,evidence yielded  
by the ,reflexionen and ,lose           
,bltter in ,support of the ,analysis of 
the              ,text                  
#bca           ,,iv4 ,connected         
,statement and ,discussion of ,kant's   
,subjective and ,objective ,deductions  
in the              ,first ,edition     
#bcd          ,distinction between the  
,subjective and the ,objective          
,deductions                             

#bce          ,the ,subjective          
,deduction in its initial empirical     
,stages                                 
#bde          ,objective ,deduction as  
given in the ,first ,edition            
#bdh          ,the later ,stages of the 
,subjective ,deduction                  
#bfc          ,the ,distinction between 
,phenomenalism and ,subjectivism        
#bgj          ,transcendental ,deduction
 of the ,categories in the              
,second ,edition                        
#bhd          ,the ,doctrine of ,inner  
,sense                                  
#bia          ,kant's ,refutations of   
,idealism                               
#bih          ,inner ,sense and         
,apperception                           
#cba    ,book ,,ii4 ,,the ,,analytic    
,,of ,,principles                       
#ccb      ,chapter ,i4 ,,the            
,,schematism ,,of ,,pure ,,concepts ,,of
                ,,the ,,understanding   
#ccd      ,chapter ,,ii4 ,,system ,,of  
,,all ,,principles ,,of ,,pure          

,,understanding       #cdb        #a4   
,the ,axioms of ,intuition              
#cdg        #b4 ,the ,anticipations of  
,perception                             
#cdi        #c4 ,the ,analogies of      
,experience                             
#cee          ,a4 ,first ,analogy       
#ceh          ,b4 ,second ,analogy      
#cfc            ,schopenhauer's         
,criticism of ,kant's ,argument         
#cfe            ,kant's ,subjectivist   
and ,phenomenalist ,views           of  
the ,causal ,relation                   
#cgc            ,reply to ,further      
,criticisms of ,kant's ,argument        
#cgg  ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,transcendental
 ,,logic--,continued4            ,c4    
,third ,analogy                         
#cha              ,schopenhauer's       
,criticism of ,kant's ,argument         
#chg          #d4 ,the ,postulates of   
,empirical ,thought in ,general         
#cia        ,chapter ,,iii4 ,,on ,,the  
,,ground ,,of ,,the ,,distinction       
,,of ,,all ,,objects ,,whatever ,,into  

,,phenomena ,,and ,,noumena             
#djd          ,relevant ,passages in the
 ,section on ,amphiboly                 
#daj          ,alterations in the       
,second ,edition                        
#dab          ,comment on ,kant's       
,argument                               
#dad        ,appendix4 ,the ,amphiboly  
of the ,concepts of ,reflection         
#dah    ,division ,,ii4 ,,the           
,,transcendental ,,dialectic            
#dbd          ,introductory ,comment    
upon the composite ,origin and          
conflicting ,tendencies of the          
,dialectic                     #dbe     
,the ,history and ,development of       
,kant's ,views in         regard to the 
,problems of the ,dialectic             
#dca      ,introduction                 
#dda         ,i4 ,transcendental        
,illusion                               
#dda        ,,ii4 ,pure ,reason as the  
,seat of ,transcendental ,illusion      
#ddb      ,book ,i4 ,,the ,,concepts    
,,of ,,pure ,,reason                    

#ddf        ,section ,i4 ,ideas in      
,general                                
#ddg        ,section ,,ii4 ,the         
,transcendental ,ideas                  
#dej        ,section ,,iii4 ,system of  
the ,transcendental ,ideas              
#dec      ,book ,,ii4 ,,the             
,,dialectical ,,inferences ,,of ,,pure  
,,reason               #dee             
,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,paralogisms ,,of   
,,pure ,,reason                         
#dee            ,first ,paralogism3 of  
,substantiality                         
#deg            ,second ,paralogism3 of 
,simplicity                             
#deh            ,third ,paralogism3 of  
,personality                            
#dfa            ,fourth ,paralogism3 of 
,ideality                               
#dfb          ,second ,edition          
,statement of the ,paralogisms          
#dff          ,is the ,notion of the    
,self a necessary ,idea of ,reason8     
#dgc        ,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the        
,,antinomy ,,of ,,pure ,,reason         

#dgh          ,section ,i4 ,system of   
the ,cosmological ,ideas                
#dgh          ,section ,,ii4 ,antithetic
 of ,pure ,reason                       
#dhj            ,comment on ,kant's     
,method of ,argument                    
#dha            ,first ,antinomy        
#dhc            ,second ,antinomy       
#dhh            ,third ,antinomy        
#dib            ,fourth ,antinomy       
#die  ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,transcendental
 ,,logic--,continued4  ,section ,,iii4  
,the ,interest of ,reason in this       
,self-,conflict            #dih         
,section ,,iv4 ,of the ,transcendental  
,problems of ,pure ,reason in so far as 
they absolutely must be capable of      
,solution                               
#dii  ,section ,v4 ,sceptical           
,representation of the ,cosmological    
,questions                              
#eja  ,section ,,vi4 ,transcendental    
,idealism as the ,key to the ,solution  
of the ,cosmological ,dialectic         
#ejc  ,section ,,vii4 ,critical         

,decision of the ,cosmological ,conflict
 of ,reason with itself                 
#ejd  ,section ,,viii4 ,the ,regulative 
,principle of ,pure ,reason in regard to
 the ,cosmological ,ideas               
#ejf  ,section ,,ix4 ,the ,empirical    
,employment of the ,regulative          
,principles of ,reason in regard to all 
,cosmological ,ideas                    
#ejh  ,solution of the ,first and       
,second ,antinomies                     
#ejh  ,remarks on the ,distinction      
between the                             
,mathematical-,transcendental and the   
,dynamical-,transcendental ,ideas       
#eaj  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               
#eaj  ,solution of the ,third ,antinomy 
#eab  ,possibility of harmonising       
,causality through ,freedom with the    
,universal ,law of ,natural ,necessity  
#eac  ,explanation of the ,relation of  
,freedom to ,necessity of ,nature       
#ead  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               

#eag  ,solution of the ,fourth ,antinomy
                                        
#eah  ,concluding ,note on the whole    
,antinomy of ,pure ,reason              
#eai  ,concluding ,comment on ,kant's   
,doctrine of the ,antinomies            
#eai  ,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,ideal ,,of
 ,,pure ,,reason                        
#ebb  ,sections ,i4 and ,,ii4 ,the      
,transcendental ,ideal                  
#ebb  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               
#ebd  ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,speculative 
,arguments in ,proof of the ,existence  
of a ,supreme ,being                    
#ebe  ,section ,,iv4 ,the ,impossibility
 of an ,ontological ,proof              
#ebg  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               
#ebh  ,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,transcendental
 ,,logic--,continued4  ,section ,v4 ,the
 ,impossibility of a ,cosmological      
,proof of the ,existence of ,god        
#eca  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               

#ecc  ,discovery and ,explanation of the
 ,transcendental ,illusion in all       
,transcendental ,proof of the ,existence
 of a necessary ,being                  
#ecd  ,comment on ,kant's ,method of    
,argument                               
#ece  ,section ,,vi4 ,the ,impossibility
 of the ,physico-,theological ,proof    
#ech  ,section ,,vii4 ,criticism of all 
,theology based on speculative          
,principles of ,reason                  
#eda  ,concluding ,comment              
#eda  ,,appendix ,,to ,,the             
,,transcendental ,,dialectic            
#edc  ,the ,regulative ,employment of   
the ,ideas of ,pure ,reason             
#edc  ,hypotheses not permissible in    
,philosophy                             
#edc  ,on the ,final ,purpose of the    
,natural ,dialectic of ,human ,reason   
#eeb  ,concluding ,comment on the       
,dialectic                              
#eeh  ,,appendix ,a4  ,,the             
,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of        
,,methods                               

#efc  ,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,discipline   
,,of ,,pure ,,reason                    
#efc  ,section ,i4 ,the ,discipline of  
,pure ,reason in its ,dogmatic          
,employment                             
#efc  ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,discipline of
 ,pure ,reason in its ,polemical        
,employment                             
#efg  ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,discipline  
of ,pure ,reason in regard to           
,hypotheses                             
#efh  ,section ,,iv4 ,the ,discipline of
 ,pure ,reason in regard to its ,proofs 
#efh  ,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,canon ,,of 
,,pure ,,reason                         
#efi  ,section ,i4 ,the ,ultimate ,end  
of the ,pure ,use of our ,reason        
#efi  ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,ideal of the 
,highest ,good1 as a ,determining       
,ground of the ,ultimate ,end of ,pure  
,reason                                 
#egj  ,section ,,iii4 ,opining1         
,knowing1 and ,believing                
#egf  ,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the             
,,architectonic ,,of ,,pure ,,reason    

#egi  ,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,history    
,,of ,,pure ,,reason                    
#ehb  ,,appendix ,b4  ,a more detailed  
,statement of ,kant's ,relations to his 
,philosophical ,predecessors            
#ehc  ,,index                           
#fjg     ,,note  ,in all references to  
the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft ,i    
have given the original pagings of both 
the first and second editions4          
,references to ,kant's other works are1 
whenever possible1 to the volumes thus  
far issued in the new ,berlin edition4  
,as the ,reflexionen ,kants zur ,kritik 
der reinen ,vernunft had not been       
published in this edition at the time   
when the ,commentary was completed1 the 
numbering given is that of ,b4          
,erdmann's edition of #ahhd4            
,,abbreviations  ,berlin edition of     
,kant's works                           
,w  ,pagings in the first edition of the
 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft   ,a      
,pagings in the second edition          
,b  ,adickes' edition of the ,kritik der

 reinen ,vernunft 7#ahhi7       ,k      
,,introduction     ,i4 ,,textual        
,,kant',s ,,method ,,of ,,composing     
,,the #8,,critique ,,of ,,pure ,,reason'
  ,seldom1 in the history of literature1
 has a work been more conscientiously   
and deliberately thought out1 or more   
hastily thrown together1 than the       
,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,the        
following is the account which ,kant in 
a letter to ,moses ,mendelssohn 7,august
 #af1 #aghc7 has given of its           
composition3       0,though the         
,critique is the outcome of reflection  
which had      occupied me for a period 
of at least twelve years1 ,i brought it 
to      completion in the greatest haste
 within some four to five months1       
giving the closest attention to the     
content1 but with little      thought of
 the exposition or of rendering it easy 
of comprehension      by the reader--a  
decision which ,i have never regretted1 
since      otherwise1 had ,i any longer 
delayed1 and sought to give it a more   

popular form1 the work would probably   
never have been completed at      all4  
,this defect can1 however1 be gradually 
removed1 now that the      work exists  
in a rough form40#b  ,these statements  
must be allowed the greater weight as   
,kant1 in another letter 7to ,garve1    
,august #g1 #aghc71 has given them in   
almost the same words3       8,i freely 
admit that ,i have not expected that my 
book should meet      with an immediate 
favourable reception4 ,the exposition of
 the      materials which for more than 
twelve successive years ,i had been     
carefully maturing1 was not composed in 
a sufficiently suitable      manner for 
general comprehension4 ,for the         
perfecting of its      exposition       
several years would have been required1 
whereas ,i      brought it to completion
 in some four to five months1 in the    
fear      that1 on longer delay1 so     
prolonged a labour might finally become 
burdensome1 and that my increasing years
 7,i am already in my      sixtieth     

year7 would perhaps incapacitate me1    
while ,i am still the      sole         
possessor of my complete system40#c     
,the twelve years here referred to are  
#agfi-aghj2 the phrase 8at least twelve 
years0 indicates ,kant's appreciation of
 the continuity of his mental           
development4 ,hume's first influence    
upon ,kant is probably to be dated prior
 to #agfj4 ,the choice1 however1 of the 
year #agfi is not arbitrary2 it is the  
year of ,kant's adoption of the         
semi-,critical position recorded in the 
,inaugural ,dissertation 7#aggj74d ,the 
8four to five months0 may be dated in   
the latter half of #aghj4 ,the printing 
of the ,critique was probably commenced 
in ,december or ,january #aghj-agha4    
,but the ,critique is not merely        
defective in clearness or popularity of 
exposition4 ,that is a common failing of
 metaphysical treatises1 especially when
 they are in the ,german language1 and  
might pass without special remark4 ,what
 is much more serious1 is that ,kant    

flatly contradicts himself in almost    
every chapter2 and that there is hardly 
a technical term which is not employed  
by him in a variety of different and    
conflicting senses4 ,as a writer1 he is 
the least exact of all the great        
thinkers4  ,so obvious are these        
inconsistencies that every commentator  
has felt constrained to offer some      
explanation of their occurrence4 ,thus  
,caird has asserted that ,kant opens his
 exposition from the non-,critical      
standpoint of ordinary consciousness1   
and that he discloses the final         
position1 towards which he has all along
 been working1 only through repeated    
modifications of his preliminary        
statements4 ,such a view1 however1      
cannot account either for the specific  
manner of occurrence or for the actual  
character of the contradictions of which
 the ,critique affords so many examples4
 ,these are by no means limited to the  
opening sections of its main divisions2 
and careful examination of the text     

shows that they have no such merely     
expository origin4 ,the publication of  
,kant's ,reflexionen and ,lose ,bltter1 
and the devoted labours of ,benno       
,erdmann1 ,vaihinger1 ,adickes1 ,reicke 
and others1 have1 indeed1 placed the    
issue upon an entirely new plane4 ,it   
can now be proved that the ,critique is 
not a unitary work1 and that in the five
 months in which1 as ,kant tells us1 it 
was 8brought to completion0 7zu ,stande 
gebracht71 it was not actually written1 
but was pieced together by the combining
 of manuscripts written at various dates
 throughout the period #aggb-aghj4      
,kant's correspondence in these years   
contains the repeated assertion that he 
expected to be able to complete the work
 within some three or six months4 ,this 
implies that it was already1 at least as
 early as #aggg1 in great part committed
 to writing4 ,in #aghj ,kant must       
therefore have had a large body of      
manuscript at his disposal4 ,the        
recently published ,lose ,bltter are1   

indeed1 part of it4 ,and as we shall    
have constant occasion to observe1 the  
,critique affords ample evidence of     
having been more or less mechanically   
constructed through the piecing together
 of older manuscript1 supplemented1 no  
doubt1 by the insertion of connecting   
links1 and modified by occasional       
alterations to suit the new context4    
,kant1 it would almost seem1 objected to
 nothing so much as the sacrifice of an 
argument once consecrated by committal  
to paper4 ,if it could be inserted1 no  
matter at what cost of repetition1 or   
even confusion1 he insisted upon its    
insertion4 ,thus the ,subjective and    
,objective ,deductions of the first     
edition can1 as we shall find1 be broken
 up into at least four distinct layers1 
which1 like geological strata1 remain to
 the bewilderment of the reader who     
naturally expects a unified system1 but 
to the enlightenment of the student1    
once the clues that serve to identify   
and to date them have been detected4 ,to

 cite another example3 in the ,second   
,analogy1 as given in the first edition1
 the main thesis is demonstrated in no  
less than five distinct proofs1 some of 
which are repetitions2 and when ,kant   
restated the argument in the second     
edition1 he allowed the five proofs to  
remain1 but superimposed still another  
upon them4 ,kant does1 indeed1 in the   
second edition omit some few passages   
from various parts of the ,critique2 but
 this is in the main owing to his desire
 to protect himself against serious     
misunderstanding to which1 as he found1 
he had very unguardedly laid himself    
open4 ,the alterations of the second    
edition are chiefly of the nature of    
additions4  ,adickes' theory#e that     
,kant in the 8four to five months0      
composed a brief outline of his entire  
argument1 and that it was upon the      
framework of this outline that the      
,critique was elaborated out of the     
older manuscript1 may possibly be       
correct4 ,it has certainly enabled      

,adickes to cast much light upon many   
textual problems4 ,but his own          
supplementary hypothesis in regard to   
the section on the ,antinomies1 namely1 
that it formed an older and separate    
treatise1 may very profitably be further
 extended4 ,surely it is unlikely that  
with the expectation1 continued over    
many years1 of completion within a few  
months1 ,kant did not possess1 at least 
for the ,aesthetic1 ,dialectic1 and     
,methodology1 a general outline1 that   
dated further back than #aghj4 ,and     
doubtless this outline was itself       
altered1 patched1 and recast1 in        
proportion as insight into the problems 
of the ,analytic1 the problems1 that is 
to say1 which caused publication to be  
so long deferred1 deepened and took     
final form4  ,the composite character of
 the ,critique is largely concealed by  
the highly elaborate1 and extremely     
artificial1 arrangement of its parts4   
,to the general plan1 based upon        
professedly logical principles1 ,kant   

has himself given the title1            
architectonic2 and he carries it out    
with a thoroughness to which all other  
considerations1 and even at times those 
of sound reasoning1 are made to give    
way4 ,indeed1 he clings to it with the  
unreasoning affection which not         
infrequently attaches to a favourite    
hobby4 ,he lovingly elaborates even its 
minor detail1 and is rewarded by a      
framework so extremely complicated that 
the most heterogeneous contents can be  
tidily arranged1 side by side1 in its   
many compartments4 ,by its uniformity   
and rigour it gives the appearance of   
systematic order even when such order is
 wholly absent4  ,but we have still to  
consider the chief reason for the       
contradictory character of the contents 
of the ,critique4 ,it is inseparably    
bound up with what may perhaps be       
regarded as ,kant's supreme merit as a  
philosophical thinker1 especially as    
shown in the first ,critique1--namely1  
his open-minded recognition of the      

complexity of his problems1 and of the  
many difficulties which lie in the way  
of any solution which he is himself able
 to propound4 ,kant's method of working 
seems to have consisted in alternating  
between the various possible solutions1 
developing each in turn1 in the hope    
that some midway position1 which would  
share in the merits of all1 might       
finally disclose itself4 ,when1 as      
frequently happened1 such a midway      
solution could not be found1 he         
developed his thought along the parallel
 lines of the alternative views4        
8,you know that ,i do not approach      
reasonable objections with the          
intention merely of refuting them1 but  
that in thinking them over ,i           
always weave them into my judgments1 and
 afford them the      opportunity of    
overturning all my most cherished       
beliefs4 ,i      entertain the hope that
 by thus viewing my judgments           
impartially      from the standpoint of 
others some third view that will improve

      upon my previous insight may be   
obtainable4444 ,long experience has     
taught me that insight into a subject   
which ,i am seeking to master      is   
not to be forced1 or even hastened1 by  
sheer effort1 but demands      a fairly 
prolonged period during which ,i return 
again and again to      the same        
concepts1 viewing them in all their     
aspects and in their      widest        
possible connections1 while in the      
intervals the sceptical      spirit     
awakens1 and makes trial whether my     
conclusions can      withstand a        
searching criticism40#f 8,in mental     
labour of so      delicate a character  
nothing is more harmful than            
preoccupation      with extraneous      
matters4 ,the mind1 though not          
constantly on the      stretch1 must    
still1 alike in its idle and in its     
favourable      moments1 lie            
uninterruptedly open to any chance      
suggestion which      may present       
itself4 ,relaxations and diversions must

 maintain its      powers in freedom and
 mobility1 so that it may be enabled to 
view      the object afresh from every  
side1 and so to enlarge its point of    
view from a microscopic to a universal  
outlook that it adopts in      turn     
every conceivable standpoint1 verifying 
the observations of      each by means  
of all the others40#g 8,i am not of the 
opinion of      the well-meaning writer 
who has recommended us never to allow   
doubts in regard to a matter upon which 
we have once made up our      minds4 ,in
 pure philosophy that is not feasible4  
,indeed the      understanding has in   
itself a natural objection to any such  
procedure4 ,we must consider            
propositions in all their various       
applications2 even when they may not    
seem to require a special      proof1 we
 must make trial of their opposites1 and
 in this way fight      for delay1 until
 the truth becomes in all respects      
evident40#h  ,that these are no mere    
pious expressions of good intention1 but

 represent ,kant's actual method of     
working1 is amply proved by the contents
 of the ,critique4 ,we find ,kant       
constantly alternating between opposed  
standpoints1 to no one of which he quite
 definitely commits himself1 and        
constantly restating his principles in  
the effort to remove the objections to  
which1 as he recognises1 they continue  
to lie open4 ,the ,critique1 as already 
stated1 is not the exposition of a      
single unified system1 but is the record
 of ,kant's manifold attempts to        
formulate and to solve his many-sided   
problems4 ,even those portions of the   
,critique which embody his latest views 
show that ,kant is still unwilling to   
sacrifice insight to consistency4 ,when 
he is guilty of special pleading--for he
 cannot be altogether absolved even from
 that charge--it is in the interests of 
his logical architectonic1 for which1 as
 ,i have said1 he cherishes a quite     
unreasoning affection1 and not of his   
central principles4 ,so far from        

concealing difficulties1 or unduly      
dwelling upon the favouring             
considerations1 ,kant himself emphasises
 the outstanding objections to which his
 conclusions remain subject4 ,if his    
teaching is on certain points very      
definite1 it is in other hardly less    
important respects largely tentative4   
,the value of ,kant's ,critique as an   
introduction to modern philosophy is    
greatly enhanced by this method of      
procedure4 ,the student who has steeped 
himself in the atmosphere of the        
,critique1 however dissatisfied he may  
perhaps be with many of its doctrines1  
has become familiar with the main       
requirements which a really adequate    
metaphysics must fulfil1 or at least    
will have acquired a due sense of the   
complexity of the problems with which it
 deals4  ,recognition of the composite  
nature of the text will safeguard us in 
two ways4 ,in the first place1 citation 
of single passages is quite             
inconclusive4 ,not only must all the    

relevant passages be collated2 they must
 be interpreted in the light of an      
historical understanding of the various 
stages in ,kant's development4 ,we must 
also be prepared to find that on certain
 main questions ,kant hesitates between 
opposed positions1 and that he nowhere  
definitively commits himself to any     
quite final expression of view4         
,secondly1 we cannot proceed on the     
assumption that ,kant's maturest        
teaching comes where1 had the ,critique 
been a unitary work1 composed upon a    
definite and previously thought out     
plan1 we should naturally expect to find
 it1 namely1 in its concluding portions4
 ,the teaching of much of the           
,dialectic1 especially in its account of
 the nature of the phenomenal world and 
of its relation to the knowing mind1 is 
only semi-,critical4 ,this is also true 
of ,kant's ,introduction to the         
,critique4 ,introductions are usually   
written last2 and probably ,kant's      
,introduction was written after the     

completion of the ,aesthetic1 of the    
,dialectic1 and of the ,analytic in its 
earlier forms4 ,but it bears all the    
signs of having been composed prior to  
the working out of several of his most  
characteristic doctrines in the central 
parts of the ,analytic4  ,thus both     
,kant's introductory statements of the  
aims and purposes of the ,critique1 and 
his application of his results in the   
solution of metaphysical problems1 fail 
to represent in any adequate fashion the
 new and revolutionary principles to    
which he very gradually but successfully
 worked his way4 ,the key to the        
,critique is given in the central       
portions of the ,analytic1 especially in
 the ,deduction of the ,categories4 ,the
 other parts of the ,critique reveal the
 ,critical doctrines only as gradually  
emerging from the entangling influence  
of pre-,critical assumptions4 ,their    
teaching has to be radically remodelled 
before they can be made to harmonise    
with what1 in view both of their        

intrinsic character and of the          
corresponding alterations in the second 
edition1 must be regarded as ,kant's    
maturest utterances4  ,this was a task  
which ,kant never himself attempted4    
,for no sooner had he attained to       
comparative clearness in regard to his  
new ,critical principles and briefly    
expounded them in the ,analytic of the  
first edition1 than he hastened to apply
 them in the spheres of morality1       
aesthetics1 and teleology4 ,when the    
,critique appeared in #agha he was      
fifty-seven years of age2 and he seems  
to have feared that if he allowed these 
purely theoretical problems1 which had  
already occupied his main attention for 
8at least twelve years10 to detain him  
longer1 he would be debarred from       
developing and placing on permanent     
record the new metaphysics of ethics    
which1 as the references in the first   
,critique show1 had already begun to    
shape itself in his mind4 ,to have      
expended further energy upon the        

perfecting of his theoretical philosophy
 would have endangered its own best     
fruits4 ,even the opportunity in #aghg  
of a second edition of the ,critique he 
used very sparingly1 altering or adding 
only where occasional current           
criticism--his puzzled contemporaries   
having still for the most part          
maintained a discreet silence--had      
clearly shown that his modes of         
exposition were incomplete or           
misleading4     ,,ii4 ,,historical      
,,kant',s ,,relation ,,to ,,hume ,,and  
,,to ,,leibniz  ,kant's manner of       
formulating his fundamental             
problem--,how are synthetic a priori    
judgments possible8--may well seem to   
the modern reader to imply an unduly    
scholastic and extremely rationalistic  
method of approach4 ,kant's reasons for 
adopting it have1 unfortunately1 been   
largely obscured1 owing to the mistaken 
interpretation which has usually been   
given to certain of his personal        
utterances4 ,they have been supposed to 

prove that the immediate occasion of the
 above formula was ,hume's discussion of
 the problem of causality in the        
,enquiry into the ,human ,understanding4
 ,kant1 it is argued1 could not have    
been acquainted with ,hume's earlier and
 more elaborate ,treatise on ,human     
,nature1 of which there was then no     
translation2 and his references to ,hume
 must therefore concern only the later  
work4  ,vaihinger has done valuable     
service in disputing this reading of    
,kant's autobiographical statements4    
,kant does not himself make direct      
mention of the ,enquiry1 and the        
passages in the ,critique and in the    
,prolegomena#i in which ,hume's teaching
 is under consideration seem rather to  
point to the wider argument of the      
,treatise4 ,this is a matter of no small
 importance2 for if ,vaihinger's view   
can be established1 it will enable us to
 appreciate1 in a manner otherwise      
impossible1 how ,kant should have come  
to regard the problem of a priori       

synthesis as being the most pressing    
question in the entire field of         
speculative philosophy4  ,the essential 
difference between the ,treatise and the
 ,enquiry1 from the standpoint of their 
bearing upon ,critical issues1 lies in  
the wider scope and more radical        
character of the earlier work4 ,the     
,enquiry discusses the problem of       
causality only in the form in which it  
emerges in particular causal judgments1 
i4e4 as to our grounds for asserting    
that this or that effect is due to this 
or that cause4 ,in the ,treatise1 ,hume 
raises the broader question as to our   
right to postulate that events must     
always be causally determined4 ,in other
 words1 he there questions the validity 
of the universal causal principle1 that 
whatever begins to exist must have a    
cause of existence2 and he does so on   
the explicit ground that it demands as  
necessary the connecting of two         
concepts1 that of an event and that of  
an antecedent cause1 between which no   

connection of any kind can be detected  
by the mind4 ,the principle1 that is to 
say1 is not self-evident2 it is         
synthetic4 ,the concept of an event and 
the concept of a cause are quite        
separate and distinct ideas4 ,events can
 be conceived without our requiring to  
think antecedent events upon which they 
are dependent4 ,nor is the principle    
capable of demonstration4 ,for if it be 
objected that in questioning its        
validity we are committing ourselves to 
the impossible assertion that events    
arise out of nothing1 such argument is  
only applicable if the principle be     
previously granted4 ,if events do not   
require a cause1 it is as little        
necessary to seek their source in a     
generation out of nothing as in anything
 positive4 ,similarly1 when it is argued
 that as all the parts of time and space
 are uniform1 there must be a cause     
determining an event to happen at one   
moment and in one place rather than at  
some other time or place1 the principle 

is again assumed4 ,there is no greater  
difficulty in supposing the time and    
place to be fixed without a cause than  
in supposing the existence to be so     
determined4 ,the principle1 ,hume       
concludes1 is non-rational in character4
 ,it is an instrument useful for the    
organisation of experience2 and for that
 reason nature has determined us to its 
formation and acceptance4 ,properly     
viewed1 it expresses a merely           
instinctive belief1 and is explicable   
only in the naturalistic manner of our  
other propensities1 as necessary to the 
fulfilling of some practical need4      
8,nature has determined us to judge as  
well as to breathe and feel40  ,from    
this naturalistic position ,hume makes a
 no less vigorous attack upon the       
empirical philosophies which profess to 
establish general principles by         
inductive inference from the facts of   
experience4 ,if the principles which lie
 at the basis of our experience are     
non-rational in character1 the same must

 be true of our empirical judgments4    
,they may correctly describe the        
uniformities that have hitherto occurred
 in the sequences of our sensations1 and
 may express the natural expectations to
 which they spontaneously give rise2 but
 they must never be regarded as capable 
of serving as a basis for inference4 ,in
 eliminating a priori principles1 and   
appealing exclusively to                
sense-experience1 the empiricist removes
 all grounds of distinction between     
inductive inference and custom-bred     
expectation4 ,and since from this       
standpoint the possibility of universal 
or abstract concepts--so ,hume          
argues--must also be denied1 deductive  
inference must likewise be eliminated   
from among the possible instruments at  
the disposal of the mind4 ,so-called    
inference is never the source of our    
beliefs2 it is our fundamental natural  
beliefs1 as determined by the           
constitution of our nature in its       
reaction upon external influences1 that 

generate those expectations which1      
however they may masquerade in logical  
costume1 have as purely natural a source
 as our sensations and feelings4 ,such1 
briefly and dogmatically stated1 is the 
sum and substance of ,hume's            
teaching4#aj  ,now it was these         
considerations that1 as it would seem1  
awakened ,kant to the problem of a      
priori synthesis4 ,he was1 and to the   
very last remained1 in entire agreement 
with ,hume's contention that the        
principle of causality is neither       
self-evident nor capable of logical     
demonstration1 and he at once realised  
that what is true of this principle must
 also hold of all the other principles  
fundamental to science and philosophy4  
,kant further agreed that inductive     
inference from the data of experience is
 only possible upon the prior acceptance
 of rational principles independently   
established2 and that we may not1       
therefore1 look to experience for proof 
of their validity4 ,thus with the       

rejection of self-evidence as a feature 
of the a priori1 and with the consequent
 admission of its synthetic character1  
,kant is compelled to acquiesce in the  
inevitableness of the dilemma which     
,hume propounds4 ,either ,hume's        
sceptical conclusions must be accepted1 
or we must be able to point to some     
criterion which is not subject to the   
defects of the rationalist and empirical
 methods of proof1 and which is adequate
 to determine the validity or invalidity
 of general principles4 ,is there any   
such alternative8 ,such is ,kant's      
problem as expressed in the formula3    
,how are synthetic a priori judgments   
possible8  ,it is a very remarkable     
historical fact that notwithstanding the
 clearness and cogency of ,hume's       
argument1 and the appearance of such    
competent thinkers as ,thomas ,reid in  
,scotland1 ,lambert and ,crusius in     
,germany1 no less than thirty years     
should have elapsed before ,hume found a
 single reader capable of appreciating  

the teaching of the ,treatise at its    
true value4#aa ,even ,kant himself was  
not able from his reading of the        
,enquiry in #agef-agfb to realise the   
importance and bearing of the main      
problem4#ab ,though in the ,enquiry the 
wider issue regarding the general       
principle of causality is not raised1   
the bearing of ,hume's discussion1 when 
interpreted in the light of ,kant's own 
teaching1 is sufficiently clear2 and    
accordingly we cannot be absolutely     
certain that it was not a re-reading of 
the ,enquiry or a recalling of its      
argument#ac that suggested to ,kant the 
central problem of his ,critical        
philosophy4 ,the probability1 however1  
is rather that this awakening took place
 only indirectly through his becoming   
acquainted with the wider argument of   
the ,treatise as revealed in ,james     
,beattie's extremely crude and          
unsympathetic criticism of ,hume's      
philosophy4#ad ,beattie had great       
natural ability1 and considerable       

literary power4 ,his prose writings have
 a lucidity1 a crispness1 and a felicity
 of illustration which go far to explain
 their widespread popularity in the     
latter half of the eighteenth century4  
,their literary quality is1 however1    
more than counterbalanced by the absence
 of any genuine appreciation of the     
deeper1 speculative implications and    
consequences of the problems discussed4 
,and this being so1 he is naturally at  
his worst in criticising ,hume4 ,in     
insisting1 as he does1 upon the absurd  
practical results#ae that would follow  
from the adoption of ,hume's sceptical  
conclusions1 he is merely exploiting    
popular prejudice in the philosophical  
arena4 ,that1 however1 may be forgiven  
him1 if1 as would seem to be the case1  
the quotations which he gives verbatim  
from ,hume's ,treatise really first     
revealed to ,kant the scope and         
innermost meaning of ,hume's analysis of
 the causal problem4  ,the evidence in  
support of this contention is entirely  

circumstantial4 ,the ,german translation
 of ,beattie's ,essay on the ,nature and
 ,immutability of ,truth was published  
at ,easter #aggb1 i4e4 in the year in   
which ,kant1 in the process of his own  
independent development1 came1 as is    
shown by his famous letter to ,herz1#af 
to realise the mysterious1 problematic  
character of a priori knowledge of the  
independently real4 ,he was then1       
however1 still entirely unconscious of  
the deeper problem which at once emerges
 upon recognition that a priori         
principles1 quite apart from all        
question of their objective validity1   
are synthetic in form4 ,we know that    
,kant was acquainted with ,beattie's    
work2 for he twice refers to ,beattie's 
criticism of ,hume4#ag ,what more       
probable than that he read the          
translation in the year of its          
publication1 or at least at some time   
not very long subsequent to the date of 
the letter to ,herz8 ,the passages which
 ,beattie quotes from the ,treatise are 

exactly those that were necessary to    
reveal the full scope of ,hume's        
revolutionary teaching in respect to the
 general principle of causality4 ,there 
seems1 indeed1 little doubt that this   
must have been the channel through which
 ,hume's influence chiefly acted4 ,thus 
at last1 by a circuitous path1 through  
the quotations of an adversary1 ,hume   
awakened philosophy from its dogmatic   
slumber1#ah and won for his argument    
that appreciation which despite its     
cogency it had for thirty years so      
vainly demanded4  ,let us now turn our  
attention to the rationalist philosophy 
in which ,kant was educated4 ,hume's    
contention that experience cannot by    
itself justify any inductive inference1 
forms the natural bridge over which we  
can best pass to the contrasting        
standpoint of ,leibniz4 ,hume and       
,leibniz find common ground in          
denouncing empiricism4 ,both agree in   
regarding it as the mongrel offspring of
 conflicting principles4 ,if rationalism

 cannot hold its own1 the alternative is
 not the finding of firm foothold in    
concrete experience1 but only such      
consolation as a sceptical philosophy   
may afford4#ai ,the overthrow of        
rationalism means the destruction of    
metaphysics in every form4 ,even        
mathematics and the natural sciences    
will have to be viewed as fulfilling a  
practical end1 not as satisfying a      
theoretical need4 ,but though ,leibniz's
 criticism of empiricism is1 in its main
 contention1 identical with that of     
,hume1 it is profoundly different both  
in its orientation and in the           
conclusions to which it leads4 ,while   
,hume maintains that induction must be  
regarded as a non-rational process of   
merely instinctive anticipation1        
,leibniz argues to the self-legislative 
character of pure thought4              
,sense-experience reveals reality only  
in proportion as it embodies principles 
derived from the inherent character of  
thought itself4 ,experience conforms to 

a priori principles1 and so can afford  
an adequate basis for scientific        
induction4  ,there is a passage in      
,hume's ,enquiry which may be employed  
to illustrate the boldly speculative    
character of ,leibniz's interpretation  
of the nature and function of human     
thought4 8,nothing 444 seems more       
unbounded than the thought of man1 which
 not only escapes all human power and   
authority1 but is not even restrained   
within the limits of nature and         
reality4444 ,while the body is confined 
to one planet1 along which it creeps    
with pain and difficulty1 the thought   
can in an instant transport us into the 
most distant regions of the universe4444
 ,what never was seen1 or heard of1 may 
yet be conceived2 nor is anything beyond
 the power of thought1 except what      
implies an absolute contradiction40     
,this passage in which ,hume means to   
depict a false belief1 already          
sufficiently condemned by the absurdity 
of its claims1 expresses for ,leibniz   

the wonderful but literal truth4        
,thought is the revealer of an eternal  
unchanging reality1 and its validity is 
in no way dependent upon its            
verification through sense4 ,when       
,voltaire in his ,ignorant ,philosopher 
remarks that 8it would be very singular 
that all nature1 all the planets1 should
 obey eternal laws1 and that there      
should be a little animal1 five feet    
high1 who1 in contempt of these laws1   
could act as he pleased1 solely         
according to his caprice10#bj he is     
forgetting that this same animal of five
 feet can contain the stellar universe  
in thought within himself1 and has      
therefore a dignity which is not        
expressible in any such terms as his    
size may seem1 for vulgar estimation1 to
 imply4 ,man1 though dependent upon the 
body and confined to one planet1 has the
 sun and stars as the playthings of his 
mind4 ,though finite in his mortal      
conditions1 he is divinely infinite in  
his powers4  ,leibniz thus boldly       

challenges the sceptical view of the    
function of reason4 ,instead of limiting
 thought to the translating of          
sense-data into conceptual forms1 he    
claims for it a creative power which    
enables it out of its own resources to  
discover for itself1 not only the actual
 constitution of the material world1 but
 also the immensely wider realm of      
possible entities4 ,the real1 he        
maintains1 is only one of the many      
kingdoms which thought discovers for    
itself in the universe of truth4 ,it is 
the most comprehensive and the most     
perfect1 but still only one out of      
innumerable others which unfold         
themselves to the mind in pure thought4 
,truth is not the abstracting of the    
universal aspects in things1 not a copy 
of reality1 dependent upon it for       
meaning and significance4 ,truth is     
wider than reality1 is logically prior  
to it1 and instead of being dependent   
upon the actual1 legislates for it4     
,leibniz thus starts from the possible1 

as discovered by pure thought1 to       
determine in an a priori manner the     
nature of the real4  ,this ,leibnizian  
view of thought may seem1 at first      
sight1 to be merely the re-emergence of 
the romantic1 rationalistic ideal of    
,descartes and ,malebranche4 ,so to     
regard it would1 however1 be a serious  
injustice4 ,it was held with full       
consciousness of its grounds and        
implications1 and reality was           
metaphysically reinterpreted so as to   
afford it a genuine basis4 ,there was   
nothing merely mystical and nothing     
undefined in its main tenets4 ,leibniz  
differs from ,malebranche in being      
himself a profound mathematician1 the   
co-discoverer with ,newton of the       
differential calculus4 ,he also differs 
from ,descartes in possessing an        
absorbing interest in the purely logical
 aspects of the problem of method2 and  
was therefore equipped in a supreme     
degree for determining in genuinely     
scientific fashion the philosophical    

significance and value of the           
mathematical disciplines4  ,hume and    
,leibniz are thus the two protagonists  
that dwarf all others4 ,they realised as
 neither ,malebranche1 ,locke1 nor      
,berkeley1 neither ,reid1 ,lambert1     
,crusius1 nor ,mendelssohn ever did1 the
 really crucial issues which must       
ultimately decide between the competing 
possibilities4 ,each maintained1 in the 
manner prescribed by his general        
philosophy1 one of what then appeared to
 be the only two possible views of the  
function of thought4 ,the alternatives  
were these3 7a7 ,thought is merely a    
practical instrument for the convenient 
interpretation of our human experience2 
it has no objective or metaphysical     
validity of any kind2 7b7 ,thought      
legislates universally2 it reveals the  
wider universe of the eternally         
possible2 and prior to all experience   
can determine the fundamental conditions
 to which that experience must conform4 
,or to interpret this opposition in     

logical terms3 7a7 ,the fundamental     
principles of experience are synthetic  
judgments in which no relation is       
discoverable between subject and        
predicate1 and which for that reason can
 be justified neither a priori nor by   
experience2 7b7 all principles are      
analytic1 and can therefore be justified
 by pure thought4  ,the problem of      
,kant's ,critique1 broadly stated1      
consists in the examination and critical
 estimate of these two opposed views4   
,there is no problem1 scientific1 moral1
 or religious1 which is not vitally     
affected by the decision which of these 
alternatives we are to adopt1 or what   
reconciliation of their conflicting     
claims we hope to achieve4 ,since       
,kant's day1 largely owing to the       
establishment of the evolution theory1  
this problem has become only the more   
pressing4 ,the naturalistic1            
instrumental view of thought seems to be
 immensely reinforced by biological     
authority4 ,thought would seem to be    

reduced to the level of sense-affection1
 and to be an instrument developed      
through natural processes for the       
practical purposes of adaptation4 ,yet  
the counter-view has been no less       
powerfully strengthened by the          
victorious march of the mathematical    
sciences4 ,they have advanced beyond the
 limits of ,euclidean space1 defining   
possibilities such as no experience     
reveals to us4 ,the ,leibnizian view has
 also been reinforced by the successes  
of physical science in determining what 
would seem to be the actual1 objective  
character of the independently real4    
,kant was a rationalist by education1   
temperament1 and conviction4            
,consequently his problem was to        
reconcile ,leibniz's view of the        
function of thought with ,hume's proof  
of the synthetic character of the causal
 principle4 ,he strives to determine how
 much of ,leibniz's belief in the       
legislative power of pure reason can be 
retained after full justice has been    

done to ,hume's damaging criticisms4    
,the fundamental principles upon which  
all experience and all knowledge        
ultimately rest are synthetic in nature3
 how is it possible that they should    
also be a priori8 ,such is the problem  
that was ,kant's troublous inheritance  
from his philosophical progenitors1     
,hume and ,leibniz4#ba     ,,iii4       
,,general   ,in indicating some of the  
main features of ,kant's general        
teaching1 ,i shall limit myself to those
 points which seem most helpful in      
preliminary orientation1 or which are   
necessary for guarding against the      
misunderstandings likely to result from 
the very radical changes in terminology 
and in outlook that have occurred in the
 hundred and thirty years since the     
publication of the ,critique4           
,statements which thus attempt to       
present in outline1 and in modern terms1
 the more general features of ,kant's   
philosophical teaching will doubtless   
seem to many of my readers dogmatic in  

form and highly questionable in content4
 ,they must stand or fall by the results
 obtained through detailed examination  
of ,kant's ipsissima verba4 ,such       
justification as ,i can give for them   
will be found in the body of the        
,commentary4   ,i4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of  
,,the ,a ,,priori  ,the fundamental     
presupposition upon which ,kant's       
argument rests--a presupposition never  
itself investigated but always          
assumed--is that universality and       
necessity cannot be reached by any      
process that is empirical in character4 
,by way of this initial assumption ,kant
 arrives at the conclusion that the a   
priori1 the distinguishing              
characteristics of which are            
universality and necessity1 is not given
 in sense but is imposed by the mind2 or
 in other less ambiguous terms1 is not  
part of the matter of experience but    
constitutes its form4 ,the matter of    
experience is here taken as equivalent  
to sensation2 while sensation1 in turn1 

is regarded as being the non-relational4
  ,the explanation of ,kant's failure   
either to investigate or to prove this  
assumption has already been indicated4  
,leibniz proceeds upon the assumption of
 its truth no less confidently than     
,hume1 and as ,kant's main task         
consisted in reconciling what he        
regarded as being the elements of truth 
in their opposed philosophies1 he very  
naturally felt secure in rearing his    
system upon the one fundamental         
presupposition on which they were able  
to agree4 ,it lay outside the field of  
controversy1 and possessed for ,kant1 as
 it had possessed for ,hume and for     
,leibniz1 that authoritative and        
axiomatic character which an            
unchallenged preconception tends always 
to acquire4  ,the general thesis1 that  
the universal and necessary elements in 
experience constitute its form1 ,kant   
specifies in the following determinate  
manner4 ,the form is fixed for all      
experience1 that is to say1 it is one   

and the same in each and every          
experience1 however simple or however   
complex4 ,it is to be detected in       
consciousness of duration no less than  
in consciousness of objects or in       
consciousness of self4 ,for1 as ,kant   
argues1 consciousness of duration       
involves the capacity to distinguish    
between subjective and objective        
succession1 and likewise involves       
recognition#bb with its necessary       
component self-consciousness4 ,or to    
state the same point of view in another 
way1 human experience is a temporal     
process and yet is always a             
consciousness of meaning4 ,as temporal1 
its states are ordered successively1    
that is1 externally to one another2 but 
the consciousness which they constitute 
is at each and every moment the         
awareness of some single unitary meaning
 by reference to which the contents of  
the successive experiences are          
organised4 ,the problem of knowledge may
 therefore be described as being the    

analysis of the consciousness of        
duration1 of objectivity1 and of        
self-consciousness1 or alternatively as 
the analysis of our awareness of        
meaning4 ,kant arrives at the conclusion
 that the conditions of all four are one
 and the same4#bc  ,kant thus teaches   
that experience in all its embodiments  
and in each of its momentary states can 
be analysed into an endlessly variable  
material and a fixed set of relational  
elements4 ,and as no one of the         
relational factors can be absent without
 at once nullifying all the others1 they
 together constitute what must be       
regarded as the determining form and    
structure of every mental process that  
is cognitive in character4 ,awareness1  
that is to say1 is identical with the   
act of judgment1 and therefore involves 
everything that a judgment1 in its      
distinction from any mere association of
 ideas1 demands for its possibility4    
,kant's position1 when thus stated1     
differs from that of ,leibniz only in   

its clearer grasp of the issues and     
difficulties involved1 and consequently 
in the more subtle1 pertinacious1 and   
thoroughgoing character of the argument 
by which it is established4 ,its        
revolutionary character first appears   
when ,kant further argues1 in extension 
of the teaching of ,hume1 that the      
formal1 relational elements are of a    
synthetic nature4 ,the significance and 
scope of this conclusion can hardly be  
exaggerated4 ,no other ,kantian tenet is
 of more fundamental importance4#bd     
,with it the main consequences of       
,kant's ,critical teaching are          
indissolubly bound up4 ,as the          
principles which lie at the basis of our
 knowledge are synthetic1 they have no  
intrinsic necessity1 and cannot possess 
the absolute authority ascribed to them 
by the rationalists4 ,they are          
prescribed to human reason1 but cannot  
be shown to be inherently rational in   
any usual sense of that highly ambiguous
 term4 ,they can be established only as 

brute conditions1 verifiable in fact    
though not demonstrable in pure theory  
7if there be any such thing71 of our    
actual experience4 ,they are conditions 
of sense-experience1 and that means of  
our knowledge of appearances1 never     
legitimately applicable in the          
deciphering of ultimate reality4 ,they  
are valid within the realm of           
experience1 useless for the construction
 of a metaphysical theory of things in  
themselves4 ,this conclusion is         
reinforced when we recognise that human 
experience1 even in its fundamental     
features 7e4g4 the temporal and the     
spatial71 might conceivably be          
altogether different from what it       
actually is1 and that its               
presuppositions are always1 therefore1  
of the same contingent character4 ,even 
the universality and necessity which    
,kant claims to have established for his
 a priori principles are of this nature4
 ,their necessity is always for us      
extrinsic2 they can be postulated only  

if1 and so long as1 we are assuming the 
occurrence of human sense-experience4   
,thus ,kant is a rationalist of a new   
and unique type4 ,he believes in1 and   
emphasises the importance of1 the a     
priori4 ,with it alone1 he contends1 is 
the ,critique competent to deal4 ,but it
 is an a priori which cannot be shown to
 be more than relative4 ,it does1       
indeed1 enable us to conceive the known 
as relative1 and to entertain in thought
 the possibility of an ,absolute2 but   
this it can do without itself possessing
 independent validity4 ,for though the  
proof of the a priori is not empirical  
in the sense of being inductive1 neither
 is it logical in the sense of being    
deduced from necessities of thought4    
,its 8transcendental0 proof can be      
executed only so long as experience is  
granted as actual2 and so long as the   
fundamental characteristics of this     
experience are kept in view4  ,lastly1  
the a priori factors are purely         
relational4 ,they have no inherent      

content from which clues bearing on the 
supersensible can be obtained4 ,their   
sole function is to serve in the        
interpretation of contents otherwise    
supplied4  ,the a priori1 then1 is      
merely relational1 without inherent     
content2 it is synthetic1 and therefore 
incapable of independent or metaphysical
 proof2 it is relative to an experience 
which is only capable of yielding       
appearances4 ,the a priori is as merely 
factual as the experience which it      
conditions4  ,even in the field of      
morality ,kant held fast to this        
conviction4 ,morality1 no less than     
knowledge1 presupposes a priori         
principles4 ,these1 however1 are never  
self-evident1 and cannot be established 
by any mere appeal to intuition4 ,they  
have authority only to the extent to    
which they can be shown to be the       
indispensable presuppositions of a moral
 consciousness that is undeniably       
actual4#be  ,that the a priori is of    
this character must be clearly          

understood4 ,otherwise the reader will  
be pursued by a feeling of the          
unreality1 of the merely historical or  
antiquarian significance1 of the entire 
discussion4 ,he may1 if he pleases1     
substitute the term formal or relational
 for a priori4 ,and if he bears in mind 
that by the relational ,kant is here    
intending those elements in knowledge   
which render possible the relations     
constitutive of meaning1 he will        
recognise that the ,critical discussion 
is by no means antiquated1 but still    
remains one of the most important issues
 in the entire field of philosophical   
enquiry4   #b4 ,,kant',s ,,contribution 
,,to ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,logic  ,the 
above conclusions have an important     
bearing upon logical doctrine4 ,just as 
modern geometry originates in a         
sceptical treatment of the axiom of     
parallels1 so modern1 idealist logic    
rests upon ,kant's demonstration of the 
revolutionary consequences of ,hume's   
sceptical teaching4 ,if principles are  

never self-evident1 and yet are not     
arrived at by induction from experience1
 by what alternative method can they be 
established8 ,in answer to this         
question1 ,kant outlines the position   
which is now usually entitled the       
,coherence theory of truth4#bf ,that    
theory1 though frequently ascribed to   
,hegel1 has its real sources in the     
,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,it         
expresses that modification in the      
,leibnizian rationalism which is        
demanded by ,hume's discovery of the    
synthetic character of the causal axiom4
 ,neither the deductive methods of the  
,cartesian systems nor the inductive    
methods of the ,english philosophies can
 any longer be regarded as correctly    
describing the actual processes of      
scientific proof4  ,general principles  
are either presuppositions or           
postulates4 ,if a priori1 they are      
presupposed in all conscious awareness2 
as above indicated1 they have a de facto
 validity within the experience which   

they thus make possible4 ,if more       
special in nature1 they are the         
postulates to which we find ourselves   
committed in the process of solving     
specific problems2 and they are         
therefore discovered by the method of   
trial and failure4#bg ,they are valid in
 proportion as they enable us to        
harmonise appearances1 and to adjudicate
 to each a kind of reality consistent   
with that assigned to every other4      
,proof of fact is similar in general    
character4 ,the term fact is eulogistic1
 not merely descriptive2 it marks the   
possession of cognitive significance in 
regard to some body of knowledge1 actual
 or possible4 ,it can be applied to     
particular appearances only in so far as
 we can determine their conditions1 and 
can show that as thus conditioned the   
mode of their existence is relevant to  
the enquiry that is being pursued4 ,the 
convergence of parallel lines is fact   
from the standpoint of psychological    
investigation2 from the point of view of

 their physical existence it is merely  
appearance4 ,ultimately1 of course1     
everything is real1 including what we   
entitle appearance2#bh but in the       
articulation of human experience such   
distinctions are indispensable1 and the 
criteria that define them are prescribed
 by the context in which they are being 
employed4  ,thus facts cannot be        
established apart from principles1 nor  
principles apart from facts4 ,the proof 
of a principle is its adequacy to the   
interpretation of all those appearances 
that can be shown to be in any respect  
relevant to it1 while the test of an    
asserted fact1 i4e4 of our description  
of a given appearance1 is its conformity
 to the principles that make insight    
possible4  ,though the method employed  
in the ,critique is entitled by ,kant   
the 8transcendental method10 it is      
really identical in general character   
with the hypothetical method of the     
natural sciences4 ,it proceeds by       
enquiring what conditions must be       

postulated in order that the admittedly 
given may be explained and accounted    
for4#bi ,starting from the given1 it    
also submits its conclusions to         
confirmation by the given4 ,considered  
as a method1 there is nothing           
metaphysical or high-flying about it    
save the name4 ,none the less1 ,kant is 
in some degree justified in adopting the
 special title4 ,in view of the unique  
character of the problem to be dealt    
with1 the method calls for very careful 
statement1 and has to be defended       
against the charge of inapplicability in
 the philosophical field4  ,the         
fundamental thesis of the ,coherence    
theory finds explicit formulation in    
,kant's doctrine of the judgment3 the   
doctrine1 that awareness is identical   
with the act of judging1 and that       
judgment is always complex1 involving   
both factual and interpretative         
elements4 ,synthetic1 relational factors
 are present in all knowledge1 even in  
knowledge that may seem1 on superficial 

study1 to be purely analytic or to      
consist merely of sense-impressions4    
,not contents alone1 but contents       
interpreted in terms of some specific   
setting1 are the sole possible objects  
of human thought4 ,even when1 by forced 
abstraction1 particulars and universals 
are held mentally apart1 they are still 
being apprehended through judgments1 and
 therefore through mental processes that
 involve both4 ,they stand in relations 
of mutual implication within a de facto 
system2 and together they constitute it4
  ,this is the reason why in modern     
logic1 as in ,kant's ,critique1 the     
theory of the judgment receives so much 
more attention than the theory of       
reasoning4 ,for once the above view of  
the judgment has been established1 all  
the main points in the doctrine of      
reasoning follow of themselves as so    
many corollaries4 ,knowledge starts     
neither from sense-data nor from general
 principles1 but from the complex       
situation in which the human race finds 

itself at the dawn of                   
self-consciousness4 ,that situation is  
organised in terms of our mental        
equipment2 and this already existing1   
rudimentary system is what has made     
practicable further advance2 to create a
 system ab initio is altogether         
impossible4 ,the starting-point does    
not1 however1 by itself alone determine 
our conclusions4 ,owing to the creative 
activities of the mind1 regulative      
principles are active in all            
consciousness2 and under their guidance 
the experienced order1 largely practical
 in satisfaction of the instinctive     
desires1 is transformed into a          
comprehended order1 controlled in view  
of ,ideal ends4 ,logic is the science of
 the processes whereby this             
transformation is brought about4 ,an    
essentially metaphysical discipline1 it 
cannot be isolated from the general body
 of philosophical teaching2 it is not   
formal1 but transcendental2 in defining 
the factors and processes that          

constitute knowledge1 its chief         
preoccupation is with ultimate issues4  
,in calling his new logic               
8transcendental0 ,kant1 it is true1 also
 intends to signify that it is          
supplementary to1 not a substitute for1 
the older logic1 which he professes to  
accept4#cj ,moreover his intuitional    
theory of mathematical science1 his     
doctrine of the 8pure concept10 his     
attributive view of the judgment--all of
 them survivals from his pre-,critical  
period#ca--;frequently set him at       
cross-purposes with himself4 ,his       
preoccupation1 too1 with the problem of 
the a priori leads him to underestimate 
the part played in knowledge by the     
merely empirical4 ,but despite all      
inconsistencies1 and notwithstanding his
 perverse preference for outlandish     
modes of expression1 he succeeds in     
enforcing with sufficient clearness the 
really fundamental tenets of the        
,coherence view4   #c4 ,,the ,,nature   
,,of ,,consciousness  ,i shall now      

approach ,kant's central position from  
another direction1 namely1 as an answer 
to the problem of the nature of         
consciousness4 ,we are justified1 ,i    
think1 in saying that ,kant was the     
first in modern times to raise the      
problem of the nature of awareness1 and 
of the conditions of its possibility4   
,though ,descartes is constantly        
speaking of consciousness1 he defines it
 in merely negative terms1 through its  
opposition to matter2 and when he       
propounds the question how material     
bodies can be known by the immaterial   
mind1 his mode of dealing with it shows 
that his real interest lies not in the  
nature of consciousness but in the      
character of the existences which it    
reveals4 ,his answer1 formulated in     
terms of the doctrine of representative 
perception1 and based on the supposed   
teaching of physics and physiology1 is  
that material bodies through their      
action on the sense-organs and brain    
generate images or duplicates of        

themselves4 ,these images1 existing not 
in outer space but only in              
consciousness1 are1 he asserts1 mental  
in nature2 and being mental they are1 he
 would seem to conclude1 immediately and
 necessarily apprehended by the mind4   
,thus ,descartes gives us1 not an       
analysis of the knowing process1 but    
only a subjectivist interpretation of   
the nature of the objects upon which it 
is directed4  ,quite apart1 then1 from  
the question as to whether ,descartes'  
doctrine of representative perception   
rests on a correct interpretation of the
 teaching of the natural sciences--,kant
 was ultimately led to reject the       
doctrine--it is obvious that the main   
epistemological problem1 i4e4 the       
problem how awareness is possible1 and  
in what it consists1 has so far not so  
much as even been raised4 ,descartes and
 his successors virtually assume that   
consciousness is an ultimate1           
unanalysable form of awareness1 and that
 all that can reasonably be demanded of 

the philosopher is that he explain what 
objects are actually presented to it1   
and under what conditions their         
presentation can occur4 ,on ,descartes' 
view they are conditioned by antecedent 
physical and physiological processes2   
according to ,berkeley they are due to  
the creative activity of a ,divine      
,being2 according to ,hume nothing      
whatsoever can be determined as to their
 originating causes4 ,but all three fail
 to recognise that even granting the    
objects to be of the character asserted1
 namely1 mental1 the further problem    
still remains for consideration1 how    
they come to be consciously apprehended1
 and in what such awareness consists4   
,certain interpretations of the nature  
of the knowing process are1 of course1  
to be found in the writings of          
,descartes and his successors4 ,but they
 are so much a matter of unexamined     
presupposition that they never receive  
exact formulation1 and alternate with   
one another in quite a haphazard        

fashion4 ,we may consider three typical 
views4  #a4 ,there is1 ,descartes       
frequently seems to imply--the same     
assumption is evident throughout        
,locke's ,essay--a self that stands     
behind all mental states1 observing and 
apprehending them4 ,consciousness is the
 power which this self has of           
contemplating both itself and its ideas4
 ,obviously this is a mere ignoring of  
the issue4 ,if we assume an observer1 we
 ipso facto postulate a process of      
observation1 but we have not explained  
or even defined it4  #b4 ,there is also 
in ,descartes a second1 very different1 
view of consciousness1 namely1 as a     
diaphanous medium analogous to light4   
,just as light is popularly conceived as
 revealing the objects upon which it    
falls1 so consciousness is regarded as  
revealing to us our inner states4 ,this 
view of consciousness1 for reasons which
 ,i shall indicate shortly1 is entirely 
inadequate to the facts for which we    
have to account4 ,it is no more tenable 

than the corresponding view of light4   
#c4 ,in ,hume we find this latter theory
 propounded in what may at first sight  
seem a more satisfactory form1 but is   
even less satisfactory4 ,sensations1    
images1 feelings1 he argues1 are states 
of consciousness1 one might almost say  
pieces of consciousness1 i4e4 they are  
conceived as carrying their own         
consciousness with them4 ,red1 for      
instance1 is spoken of as a sensation1  
and is consequently viewed both as being
 a sense-content1 i4e4 something sensed 
or apprehended1 and also at the same    
time as the sensing or awareness of it4 
,this view is unable to withstand       
criticism4 ,there is really no more     
ground for asserting that red colour    
carries with it consciousness of itself 
than for saying that a table does4 ,the 
illegitimacy of the assertion is        
concealed from us by the fact that      
tables appear to exist when there is no 
consciousness present1 whereas redness  
cannot be proved to exist independently 

of consciousness--it may or may not do  
so4 ,many present-day thinkers1         
continuing the tradition of the ,english
 associationists1 hold to this          
pre-,kantian view4 ,sensations1         
feelings1 etc41 are1 it is implied1     
pieces of consciousness1 forms of       
awareness2 through their varying        
combinations they constitute the complex
 experiences of the animal and human    
mind4  ,kant's teaching is developed in 
direct opposition to all such views4 ,if
 we discard his antiquated terminology1 
and state his position in current terms1
 we find that it amounts to the         
assertion that consciousness is in all  
cases awareness of meaning4 ,there is no
 awareness1 however rudimentary or      
primitive1 that does not involve the    
apprehension of meaning4 ,meaning and   
awareness are correlative terms2 each   
must be studied in its relation to the  
other4 ,and inasmuch as meaning is a    
highly complex object of apprehension1  
awareness cannot be regarded as ultimate

 or as unanalysable4 ,it can be shown to
 rest upon a complexity of generative   
conditions and to involve a variety of  
distinct factors4  ,there are thus1 from
 the ,kantian standpoint1 two           
all-sufficient reasons why the          
diaphanous view of consciousness1 i4e4  
any view which treats consciousness     
merely as a medium whereby the existent 
gets itself reported1 must be regarded  
as untenable4 ,in the first place1 as   
already remarked1 it is based on the    
false assumption that consciousness is  
an ultimate1 and that we are therefore  
dispensed from all further investigation
 of its nature4 ,kant claims to have    
distinguished successfully the many     
components which go to constitute it2   
and he also professes to have shown that
 until such analysis has been made1     
there can be no sufficient basis for a  
philosophical treatment either of the   
problems of sense-perception or of the  
logical problems of judgment and        
inference4 ,the diaphanous view1 with   

its mirror-like mode of representation1 
might allow of the side-by-sideness of  
associated contents2 it can never       
account for the processes whereby the   
associated contents come to be          
apprehended4  ,secondly1 the diaphanous 
view ignores the fundamental distinction
 between meaning and existence4         
,existences rest1 so to speak1 on their 
own bottom2 they are self-centred even  
at the very moment of their reaction to 
external influences4 ,meaning1 on the   
other hand1 always involves the         
interpretation of what is given in the  
light of wider considerations that lend 
it significance4 ,in the awareness of   
meaning the given1 the actually         
presented1 is in some way transcended1  
and this transcendence is what has      
chiefly to be reckoned with in any      
attempt to explain the conscious        
process4 ,kant is giving expression to  
this thesis when he contends that all   
awareness1 no matter how rudimentary or 
apparently simple1 is an act of         

judgment1 and therefore involves the    
relational categories4 ,not passive     
contemplation but active judgment1 not  
mere conception but inferential         
interpretation1 is the fundamental form1
 and the only form1 in which our        
consciousness exists4 ,this1 of course1 
commits ,kant to the assertion that     
there is no mode of cognition that can  
be described as immediate or            
unreflective4 ,there is an immediate    
element in all knowledge1 but our       
consciousness of it is always           
conditioned and accompanied by          
interpretative processes1 and in their  
absence there can be no awareness of any
 kind4  ,by way of this primary         
distinction between existence and       
meaning ,kant advances to all those     
other distinctions which characterise   
our human experience1 between appearance
 and reality1 between the real and the  
,ideal1 between that which is judged and
 the criteria which control and direct  
the judging process4 ,just because all  

awareness is awareness of meaning1 our  
human experience becomes intelligible as
 a purposive activity that directs      
itself according to ,ideal standards4   
,the contrast between the ,kantian and  
the ,cartesian views of consciousness   
can be defined in reference to another  
important issue4 ,the diaphanous view   
commits its adherents to a very definite
 interpretation of the nature of        
relations4 ,since they regard           
consciousness as passive and receptive1 
they have to maintain that relations can
 be known only in so far as they are    
apprehended in a manner analogous to the
 contents themselves4 ,i do not1 of     
course1 wish to imply that this view of 
relational knowledge is in all cases and
 in all respects illegitimate4 ,kant1 as
 we shall find1 has carried the opposite
 view to an impossible extreme1 assuming
 without further argument that what has 
been shown to be true of certain types  
of relation 7for instance1 of the causal
 and substance-attribute relations7 must

 be true of all relations1 even of those
 that constitute space and time4 ,it    
cannot be denied that1 as ,william      
,james and others have very rightly     
insisted1 such relations as the         
space-relations are in some degree or   
manner presentational4 ,this does not1  
however1 justify ,james in concluding1  
as he at times seems inclined to do1    
that all relations are directly         
experienced4 ,such procedure lays him   
open to the same charge of illegitimate 
reasoning4 ,but even if we could grant  
,james's thesis in its widest form1 the 
all-important ,critical question would  
still remain3 in what does awareness1   
whether of presented contents or of     
presented relations1 consist1 and how is
 it possible8 ,in answering this        
question ,kant is led to the conclusion 
that consciousness must be regarded as  
an activity1 and as supplying certain of
 the conditions of its own possibility4 
,its contribution is of a uniform and   
constant nature2 it consists1 as already

 noted1 of certain relational factors   
whose presence can be detected in each  
and every act of awareness4  ,there is  
one other respect in which ,kant's view 
of consciousness differs from that of   
his ,cartesian predecessors4#cb         
,consciousness1 he maintains1 does not  
reveal itself1 but only its objects4 ,in
 other words1 there is no awareness of  
awareness4 ,so far as our mental states 
and processes can be known at all1 they 
are known in the same objective manner  
in which we apprehend existences in     
space4#cc ,now if that be so1 a very    
important consequence follows4 ,if there
 is no awareness of awareness1 but only 
of meanings all of which are objective1 
there can be no consciousness of the    
generative1 synthetic processes that    
constitute consciousness on its         
subjective side4 ,for consciousness1    
being an act of awareness in which      
meaning is apprehended1 has a twofold   
nature1 and must be very differently    
described according to the aspect which 

at any one time we may have in view4    
,when we regard it on its objective side
 as awareness of meaning1 we are chiefly
 concerned with the various factors that
 are necessary to meaning and that enter
 into its constitution4 ,that is to say1
 our analysis is essentially logical4   
,when1 on the other hand1 we consider   
consciousness as an act of awareness1   
our problem is ontological or as it may 
be entitled 7though the term is in this 
reference somewhat misleading1 since the
 enquiry as defined by ,kant is         
essentially metaphysical7 psychological 
in character4 ,between these two aspects
 there is this very important           
difference4 ,the logical factors        
constitutive of meaning can be          
exhaustively known2 they are elements in
 the meanings which consciousness       
reveals2 whereas the synthetic processes
 are postulated solely in view of these 
constituent factors1 and in order to    
account for them4 ,the processes1 that  
is to say1 are known only through that  

which they condition1 and on ,kant's    
teaching we are entirely ruled out from 
attempting to comprehend even their     
possibility4#cd ,they must be thought as
 occurring1 but they cannot be known1   
i4e4 their nature cannot be definitely  
specified4 ,the postulating of them     
marks a gap in our knowledge1 and       
extends our insight only in the degree  
that it discloses our ignorance4 ,as    
consciousness rests upon1 and is made   
possible by1 these processes1 it can    
never be explained in terms of the      
objective world to which our            
sense-experience1 and therefore1 as     
,kant argues1 our specific knowledge1 is
 exclusively limited4 ,the mind can     
unfold its contents in the sunshine of  
consciousness1 only because its roots   
strike deep into a soil that the light  
does not penetrate4 ,these processes1   
thus postulated1 ,kant regards as the   
source of the a priori elements1 and as 
the agency through which the synthetic  
connections necessary to all            

consciousness are brought about4        
,according to ,kant's ,critical         
teaching1 therefore1 consciousness1     
though analysable1 is not such as can   
ever be rendered completely             
comprehensible4 ,when all is said1 it   
remains for us a merely de facto form of
 existence1 and has to be taken just for
 what it presents itself as being4 ,it  
is actually such as to make possible the
 logical processes of judgment and      
inference4 ,it is actually such as to   
render possible a satisfactory proof of 
the scientific validity1 within the     
field of sense-experience1 of the       
principle of causality1 and of such     
other principles as are required in the 
development of the positive sciences4   
,it is also such as to render           
comprehensible the controlling influence
 of ,ideal standards4 ,but when we come 
to the question1 how is consciousness of
 this type and form possible1 that is1  
to the question of its metaphysical     
significance and of the generative      

conditions upon which it rests1 we find1
 ,kant maintains1 that we have no data  
sufficient to justify any decisive      
answer4  ,the ontological1 creative1 or 
dynamical aspect of consciousness1 ,i   
may further insist1 must be constantly  
borne in mind if the ,critical          
standpoint is to be properly viewed4    
,the logical analysis is1 indeed1 for   
the purposes of the central portions of 
the ,critique much the more important1  
and alone allows of detailed1 exhaustive
 development2 but the other is no less  
essential for an appreciation of ,kant's
 attitude towards the more strictly     
metaphysical problems of the ,dialectic4
  ,hegel and his disciples have been the
 chief culprits in subordinating1 or    
rather in entirely eliminating1 this    
aspect of ,kant's teaching4 ,many of the
 inconsistencies of which they accuse   
,kant exist only if ,kant's teaching be 
first reduced to a part of itself4 ,to  
eliminate the ontological implications  
of his theory of consciousness is1 by   

anticipation1 to render many of his main
 conclusions entirely untenable1 and in 
particular to destroy the force of his  
fundamental distinction between         
appearance and reality4 ,if             
consciousness knows itself in its       
ultimate nature--and such is ,hegel's   
contention--one half of reality is taken
 out of the obscurity in which1 on      
,kant's reading of the situation1 it is 
condemned to lie hidden4 ,man is more   
knowable than nature1 and is the key to 
nature2 such is ,hegel's position1      
crudely stated4 ,contrast therewith the 
teaching of ,kant4 ,we can know nature  
more completely 7though still very      
incompletely7 than we can ever hope to  
comprehend the conditions that make     
possible and actual man's spiritual     
life4 ,the moral consciousness is an    
autonomously acting source of           
independent values1 and though a        
standing miracle1 must be taken for all 
that on independent and separate enquiry
 it is found to be4 ,hegel1 in his      

endeavour to establish an intellectual  
monism1 does violence to some of the    
highest interests which he professes to 
be safeguarding4 ,kant1 while outlining 
in ,idea a ,kingdom of ,ends1 remains   
satisfied with a pluralistic distinction
 between the intellectual and the moral 
categories4 ,the antithesis of the two  
philosophies is in some degree the      
ancient opposition between ,aristotle   
and ,plato1 restated in modern terms4   
#d4 ,,phenomenalism1 ,,kant',s          
,,substitute ,,for ,,subjectivism  ,the 
revolutionary character of the above    
conclusions is shown by the difficulty  
which ,kant himself found in breaking   
away from many of the presuppositions   
that underlie the views which he was    
renouncing2 and this is nowhere more    
evident than in his constant alternation
 throughout the ,critique between a     
subjectivism#ce that is thoroughly      
,cartesian--we might almost1 allowing   
for his rationalism1 say ,berkeleian--in
 character1 and a radically different   

position which may be entitled          
phenomenalism4 ,the latter is alone     
genuinely ,critical1 and presents       
,kant's teaching in its maturest form4  
,for though first formulated only in    
those portions of the ,analytic that are
 late in date of writing1 and in those  
passages of the second edition which    
supplement them1 it would seem to be the
 only logical outcome of ,kant's other  
main doctrines4  ,i have especially in  
mind ,kant's fundamental distinction    
between appearance and reality2 it has  
an all-important bearing upon the       
,cartesian opposition between the mental
 and the material1 and especially upon  
the question as to what view ought to be
 taken of our so-called subjective      
experiences4 ,the objective is for the  
,cartesians the independently real2 the 
subjective is asserted to have an       
altogether different kind of existence  
in what is named the field of           
consciousness4 ,kant's phenomenalist    
restatement of this distinction is too  

complex and subtle to be made           
intelligible in the brief space         
available in this ,introduction--it is  
expounded in the body of the            
,commentary#cf--;but its general        
character ,i may indicate in a few      
sentences4 ,all subjectivist modes of   
stating the problem of knowledge1 such  
as we find in ,hume and in ,leibniz no  
less than in ,descartes1 ,locke1 and    
,berkeley1 are1 ,kant finally concluded1
 illegitimate and question-begging4 ,our
 so-called subjective states1 whether   
they be sensations1 feelings1 or        
desires1 are objective in the sense that
 they are objects for consciousness4#cg 
,our mental states do not run parallel  
with the system of natural existences2  
nor are they additional to it4 ,they do 
not constitute our consciousness of     
nature2 they are themselves part of the 
natural order which consciousness       
reveals4 ,they compose the empirical    
self which is an objective existence1   
integrally connected with the material  

environment in terms of which alone it  
can be understood4 ,the subjective is   
not opposite in nature to the objective1
 but a sub-species within it4 ,while1   
however1 the psychical is thus to be    
regarded as a class of known            
appearances1 and as forming together    
with the physical a single system of    
nature1 this entire order is1 in ,kant's
 view1 conditioned by an underlying     
realm of noumenal existence2 and when   
the question of the possibility of the  
knowing1 that is1 of the experiencing of
 such a comprehensive natural system1 is
 raised1 it is to this noumenal sphere  
that we are referred4 ,everything       
experienced1 even a sensation or        
feeling1 is an event1 but the           
experiencing of it is an act of         
awareness1 and calls for an explanation 
of an altogether different kind4  ,thus 
the problem of knowledge1 stated in     
adequate ,critical terms1 is not how we 
can advance from the merely subjective  
to knowledge of the independently       

real1#ch but how1 if everything known   
forms part of a comprehensive natural   
system1 consciousness and the complex   
factors which contribute to its         
possibility are to be interpreted4 ,on  
this latter question1 as already        
indicated1 ,kant1 though debarring both 
subjectivism and materialism1 otherwise 
adopts a non-committal attitude4 ,so    
long as we continue within the purely   
theoretical domain1 there are a number  
of alternatives between which there are 
no sufficient data for deciding4 ,to    
debar subjectivism is not to maintain   
the illusory or phenomenal character of 
the individual self2 and to rule out    
materialism is not to assert that the   
unconscious may not generate and account
 for the conscious4 ,in other words1    
they are ruled out not for any ulterior 
reasons derived from their supposed     
metaphysical consequences1 but solely   
because they are based on palpable      
misinterpretations of the cognitive     
situation that generates those very     

problems to which they profess to be an 
answer4   #e4 ,,the ,,distinction       
,,between ,,human ,,and ,,animal        
,,intelligence  ,the inwardness of      
,kant's ,critical standpoint may perhaps
 be made clearer by a brief             
consideration of his view of animal     
intelligence4 ,we are accustomed        
nowadays to test a psychology of human  
consciousness by its capacity to render 
conceivable an evolution from lower     
forms4 ,how does ,kant's teaching emerge
 from such a test8  ,it may at once be  
admitted that ,kant has made no special 
study of animal behaviour1 and was by no
 means competent to speak with authority
 in regard to its conditions4 ,indeed it
 is evident that anything which he may  
have to say upon this question is       
entirely of the nature of a deduction   
from results obtained in the human      
sphere4 ,but when this has been         
admitted1 and we are therefore prepared 
to find the problems approached from the
 point of view of the difference rather 

than of the kinship between man and the 
animals1 we can recognise that1 so far  
as the independent study of human       
consciousness is concerned1 there is a  
certain compensating advantage in       
,kant's pre-,darwinian standpoint4 ,for 
it leaves him free from that desire     
which exercises so constant1 and        
frequently so deleterious an influence1 
upon many workers in the field of       
psychology1 namely1 to maintain at all  
costs1 in anticipation of conclusions   
not yet by any means established1 the   
fundamental identity of animal and human
 intelligence4 ,this besetting desire   
all too easily tends to the minimising  
of differences that may perhaps with    
fuller insight be found to involve no   
breach of continuity1 but which in the  
present state of our knowledge cannot   
profitably be interpreted save in terms 
of their differentiating peculiarities4 
,the current controversy between        
mechanism and vitalism enforces the     
point which ,i desire to make4          

,biological problems1 as many biologists
 are now urging1 can be most profitably 
discussed in comparative independence of
 ultimate issues1 entirely in view of   
their own domestic circumstances4 ,for  
only when the actual constitution of    
organic compounds has been more         
completely determined than has hitherto 
been possible can the broader questions 
be adequately dealt with4 ,in other     
words1 the differences must be known    
before the exact nature and degree of   
the continuity can be defined4 ,they    
cannot be anticipated by any mere       
deduction from general principles4  ,the
 value of ,kant's analysis of human     
consciousness is thus closely bound up  
with his frank recognition of its       
inherent complexity4 ,not               
simplification1 but specification1 down 
to the bedrock of an irreducible minimum
 of correlated factors1 is the governing
 motive of his ,critical enquiries4 ,his
 results have therefore the great       
advantage of being inspired by no       

considerations save such as are         
prescribed by the actual subject-matter 
under investigation4 ,as already noted1 
,kant maintains that human consciousness
 is always an awareness of meaning1 and 
that consequently it can find expression
 only in judgments which involve        
together with their other factors the   
element of recognition or               
self-consciousness4  ,this decides for  
,kant the character of the distinction  
to be drawn between animal and human    
intelligence4 ,as animals1 in his view1 
cannot be regarded as possessing a      
capacity of self-consciousness1 they    
must also be denied all awareness of    
meaning4 ,however complicated the       
associative organisation of their ideas 
may be1 it never rises to the higher    
level of logical judgment4 ,for the same
 reason1 though their ideas may be      
schematic in outline1 and in their      
bearing on behaviour may therefore have 
the same efficiency as general concepts1
 they cannot become universal in the    

logical sense4 8,animals have           
apprehensions1 but not apperceptions1   
and cannot1 therefore1 make their       
representations universal40#ci ,in      
support of this position ,kant might    
have pointed to the significant fact    
that animals are so teachable up to a   
certain point1 and so unteachable beyond
 it4 ,they can be carried as far as     
associative suggestion will allow1 but  
not a step further4 ,to this day it     
remains true--at least ,i venture the   
assertion--that no animal has ever been 
conclusively shown to be capable of     
apprehending a sign as a sign4 ,animals 
may seem to do so owing to the influence
 of associated ideas1 but are1 as it    
would appear1 debarred from crossing the
 boundary line which so sharply         
distinguishes associative suggestion    
from reflective knowledge4  ,but ,kant  
is committed to a further assertion4 ,if
 animals are devoid of all awareness of 
meaning1 they must also be denied       
anything analogous to what we must      

signify by the term consciousness4      
,their experience must fall apart into  
events1 that may1 perhaps1 be described 
as mental1 but cannot be taken as       
equivalent to an act of awareness4      
8,apprehensio bruta without             
consciousness10#dj such is ,kant's view 
of the animal mind4 ,its mental states1 
like all other natural existences1 are  
events in time1 explicable in the same  
naturalistic fashion as the bodily      
processes by which they are conditioned2
 they can not be equated with that human
 consciousness which enables us to      
reflect upon them1 and to determine the 
conditions of their temporal happening4 
,the distinction which ,kant desires to 
draw is ultimately that between events  
and consciousness of events4 ,even if   
events are psychical in character1      
consisting of sensations and feelings1  
there will still remain as fundamental  
the distinction between what is simply a
 member of the causal series of natural 
events and the consciousness through    

which the series is apprehended4 ,kant's
 most explicit statements occur in a    
letter to ,herz4#da ,he is referring to 
data of the senses which cannot be      
self-consciously apprehended3       8,i 
should not be able to know that ,i have 
them1 and they would      therefore be  
for me1 as a cognitive being1 absolutely
 nothing4      ,they might still 7if ,i 
conceive myself as an animal7 exist in  
me 7a      being unconscious of my own  
existence7 as representations 4441      
connected according to an empirical law 
of association1 exercising              
influence upon feeling and desire1 and  
so always disporting      themselves    
with regularity1 without my thereby     
acquiring the least      cognition of   
anything1 not even of these my own      
states40#db  ,as to whether ,kant is    
justified in maintaining that the       
distinction between animal and human    
consciousness coincides with the        
distinction between associative and     
logical or reflective thinking1 ,i am   

not concerned to maintain4 ,this        
digression has been introduced solely   
for the purpose of defining more        
precisely the central tenets of ,kant's 
,critical teaching4   #f4 ,,the ,,nature
 ,,and ,,conditions ,,of                
,,self-,,consciousness  ,we have still  
to consider what is perhaps the most    
serious of all the misunderstandings to 
which ,kant has laid himself open1 and  
which is in large part responsible for  
the widespread belief that his ,critical
 principles1 when consistently          
developed1 must finally eventuate in    
some such metaphysics as that of ,fichte
 and ,hegel4 ,i refer to the view that  
,kant in postulating synthetic processes
 as conditioning consciousness is       
postulating a noumenal self as          
exercising these activities1 and is     
therefore propounding a metaphysical    
explanation of the synthetic1 a priori  
factors in human experience4#dc  ,kant's
 language is frequently ambiguous4 ,the 
,leibnizian spiritualism1 to which in   

his pre-,critical period he had         
unquestioningly held1 continued to      
influence his terminology1 and so to    
prevent his ,critical principles from   
obtaining consistent expression4 ,this  
much can be said in support of the above
 interpretation of ,kant's position4    
,but in all other respects such a       
reading of his philosophy is little     
better than a parody of his actual      
teaching4 ,for ,kant is very well aware 
that the problem of knowledge is not to 
be solved in any such easy and          
high-handed fashion4 ,in the ,critique  
he teaches quite explicitly that to     
profess to explain the presence of a    
priori factors in human experience by   
means of a self assumed for that very   
purpose would be a flagrant violation1  
not only of ,critical principles1 but   
even of the elementary maxims of        
scientific reasoning4 ,in the first     
place1 explanation by reference to the  
activities of such a self would be      
explanation by faculties1 by the        

unknown2 it is a cause that will explain
 anything and everything equally well or
 badly4#dd ,self-consciousness has1     
indeed1 to be admitted as a fact2#de and
 from its occurrence ,kant draws        
important conclusions in regard to the  
conditions which make experience        
possible4 ,but1 in so doing1 ,kant never
 intends to maintain that we are        
justified in postulating as part of     
those conditions1 or as condition of    
those conditions1 a noumenal self4 ,the 
conditions which make experience        
possible1 whatever they may be1 are also
 the conditions which make              
self-consciousness possible4 ,since the 
self is known only as appearance1 it    
cannot be asserted to be the            
conditioning ground of appearance4      
,this first objection is not explicitly 
stated by ,kant1 but it is implied in a 
second argument which finds expression  
both in the ,deduction of the           
,categories and in the chapter on the   
,paralogisms4 ,the only self that we    

know to exist is the conscious self4    
,now1 as ,kant claims to have proved1   
the self can be thus conscious1 even of 
itself1 only in so far as it is         
conscious of objects4 ,consequently we  
have no right to assume that the self   
can precede such consciousness as its   
generating cause4 ,that would be to     
regard the self as existing prior to its
 own conditions1 working in darkness to 
create itself as a source of light4     
,but there is also a third reason why   
,kant's ,critical solution of the       
problem of knowledge must not be stated 
in spiritualist terms4                  
,self-consciousness1 as he shows1 is    
itself relational in character4 ,it is a
 fundamental factor in human experience1
 not because the self can be shown to be
 the agency to which relations are due1 
but solely because1 itself a case of    
recognition1 it is at the same time a   
necessary condition of recognition1 and 
recognition is indispensably presupposed
 in all consciousness of meaning4#df    

,awareness of meaning is the fundamental
 mystery1 and retains its profoundly    
mysterious character even when          
self-consciousness has been thus        
detected as an essential constituent4   
,for self-consciousness does not explain
 the possibility of meaning2 it is      
itself1 as ,i have just remarked1 only  
one case of recognition1 and so is      
itself only an instance1 though indeed  
the supreme and most important instance1
 of what we must intend by the term     
meaning4 ,all awareness1 not excepting  
that of the knowing self1 rests upon    
noumenal conditions whose specific      
nature it does not itself reveal4 ,only 
on moral grounds1 never through any     
purely theoretical analysis of cognitive
 experience1 can it be proved that the  
self is an abiding personality1 and that
 in conscious1 personal form it belongs 
to the order of noumenal reality4   #g4 
,,kant',s ,,threefold ,,distinction     
,,between ,,sensibility1                
,,understanding1 ,,and ,,reason  ,even  

so summary a statement of ,critical     
teaching as ,i am attempting in this    
,introduction would be very incomplete  
without some reference to ,kant's       
threefold distinction between the forms 
of sensibility1 the categories of the   
understanding1 and the ,ideas of        
,reason4  ,on investigating space and   
time ,kant discovers that they cannot be
 classed either with the data of the    
bodily senses or with the concepts of   
the understanding4 ,they are sensuous   
7i4e4 are not abstract but concrete1 not
 ways of thinking but modes of          
existence71 yet at the same time are a  
priori4 ,they thus stand apart by       
themselves4 ,each is unique in its kind1
 is single1 and is an infinite          
existence4 ,to describe them is to      
combine predicates seemingly            
contradictory4 ,in ,kant's own phrase1  
they are monstrosities 7,undinge71 none 
the less incomprehensible that they are 
undeniably actual4 ,to them1 primarily1 
are due those problems which have been a

 standing challenge to philosophy since 
the time of ,zeno the ,eleatic1 and     
which ,kant has entitled 8antinomies of 
,reason40  ,in contrast of sensibility  
,kant sets the intellectual faculties1  
understanding and ,reason4 ,in the      
understanding originate certain pure    
concepts1 or as he more usually names   
them1 categories4 ,the chief of these   
are the categories of                   
8relation0--substance1 causality and    
reciprocity4 ,they combine with the     
forms of sensibility and the manifold of
 sense to yield the consciousness of an 
empirical order1 interpretable in       
accordance with universal laws4  ,to the
 faculty of ,reason ,kant ascribes what 
he entitles ,ideas4 ,the ,ideas differ  
from space1 time1 and the categories in 
being not 8constitutive0 but            
8regulative40 ,they demand an           
unconditionedness of existence and a    
completeness of explanation which can   
never be found in actual experience4    
,their function is threefold4 ,in the   

first place1 they render the mind       
dissatisfied with the haphazard         
collocations of ordinary experience1 and
 define the goal for its scientific     
endeavours4 ,secondly1 they determine   
for us the criteria that distinguish    
between truth and falsity4#dg ,and      
thirdly1 in so doing1 they likewise make
 possible the distinction between       
appearance and reality1 revealing to us 
an irreconcilable conflict between the  
ultimate aims of science and the human  
conditions1 especially the spatial and  
temporal conditions under which these   
aims are realised4 ,the ,ideas of       
,reason are the second main factor in   
the 8antinomies40  ,the problem of the  
,critique1 the analysis of our awareness
 of meaning1 is a single problem1 and   
each of the above elements involves all 
the others4 ,kant1 however1 for reasons 
into which ,i need not here enter1 has  
assigned part of the problem to what he 
entitles the ,transcendental ,aesthetic1
 and another part to the ,transcendental

 ,dialectic4 ,only what remains is dealt
 with in what is really the most        
important of the three divisions1 the   
,transcendental ,analytic4 ,but as the  
problem is one and indivisible1 the     
discussions in all three sections are   
condemned to incompleteness save in so  
far as ,kant1 by happy inconsistency1   
transgresses the limits imposed by his  
method of treatment4 ,the ,aesthetic    
really does no more than prepare the    
ground for the more adequate analysis of
 space and time given in the ,analytic  
and ,dialectic1 while the problem of the
 ,analytic is itself incompletely stated
 until the more comprehensive argument  
of the ,dialectic is taken into         
account4#dh ,thus the statement in the  
,aesthetic that space and time are given
 to the mind by the sensuous faculty of 
receptivity is modified in the ,analytic
 through recognition of the part which  
the syntheses and concepts of the       
understanding must play in the          
construction of these forms2 and in the 

,dialectic their apprehension is further
 found to involve an ,idea of ,reason4  
,similarly1 in the concluding chapter of
 the ,analytic1 in discussing the       
grounds for distinguishing between      
appearance and reality1 ,kant omits all 
reference to certain important          
considerations which first emerge into  
view in the course of the ,dialectic4   
,yet1 though no question is more vital  
to ,critical teaching1 the reader is    
left under the impression that the      
treatment given in the ,analytic is     
complete and final4  ,partly as a       
consequence of this1 partly owing to    
,kant's inconsistent retention of       
earlier modes of thinking1 there are    
traceable throughout the ,critique two  
opposed views of the nature of the      
distinction between appearance and      
reality4 ,on the one view1 this         
distinction is mediated by the          
relational categories of the            
understanding1 especially by that of    
causality2 on the other view1 it is     

grounded in the ,ideas of ,reason4 ,the 
former sets appearance in opposition to 
reality2 the latter regards the         
distinction in a more tenable fashion1  
as being between realities less and more
 comprehensively conceived4#di  ,a      
similar defect is caused by ,kant's     
isolation of immanent from transcendent 
metaphysics4#ej ,the former is dealt    
with only in the ,analytic1 the latter  
only in the ,dialectic4 ,the former1    
,kant asserts1 is made possible by the  
forms of sensibility and the categories 
of the understanding2 the latter he     
traces to an illegitimate employment of 
the ,ideas of ,reason4 ,such a mode of  
statement itself reveals the            
impossibility of any sharp distinction  
between the immanent and the            
transcendent4 ,if science is conditioned
 by ,ideals which arouse the mind to    
further acquisitions1 and at the same   
time reveal the limitations to which our
 knowledge is for ever condemned to     
remain subject2 if1 in other words1     

everything known1 in being correctly    
known1 must be apprehended as appearance
 7i4e4 as a subordinate existence within
 a more comprehensive reality71 the     
distinction between the immanent and the
 transcendent falls within and not      
beyond the domain of our total          
experience4 ,the meaning which our      
consciousness discloses in each of its  
judgments is an essentially metaphysical
 one4 ,it involves the thought1 though  
not the knowledge1 of something more    
than what the experienced can ever      
itself be found to be4 ,the metaphysical
 is immanent in our knowledge2 the      
transcendent is merely a name for this  
immanent factor when it is falsely      
viewed as capable of isolation and of   
independent treatment4 ,by ,kant's own  
showing1 the task of the ,dialectic is  
not merely to refute the pretensions of 
transcendent metaphysics1 but to develop
 the above general thesis1 in           
confirmation of the positive conclusions
 established in the ,analytic4 ,the     

,critique will then supply the remedy   
for certain evils to which the human    
mind has hitherto been subject4         
8,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is a   
preservative against a malady      which
 has its source in our rational nature4 
,this malady is the      opposite of the
 love of home 7the home-sickness7 which 
binds us to      our fatherland4 ,it is 
a longing to pass out beyond our        
immediate      confines and to relate   
ourselves to other worlds40#ea   #h4    
,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the ,,critique ,,of
 ,,pure ,,reason ,,in ,,kant',s         
,,philosophical ,,system  ,the positive 
character of ,kant's conclusions cannot 
be properly appreciated save in the     
wider perspectives that open to view in 
the ,critique of ,practical ,reason and 
in the ,critique of ,judgment4 ,though  
in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason a     
distinction is drawn between theoretical
 and moral belief1 it is introduced in a
 somewhat casual manner1 and there is no
 clear indication of the far-reaching   

consequences that follow in its train4  
,unfortunately also1 even in his later  
writings1 ,kant is very unfair to       
himself in his methods of formulating   
the distinction4 ,his real intention is 
to show that scientific knowledge is not
 coextensive with human insight2 but he 
employs a misleading terminology1       
contrasting knowledge with faith1       
scientific demonstration with practical 
belief4  ,as already indicated1 the term
 knowledge has1 in the ,critical        
philosophy1 a much narrower connotation 
than in current speech4 ,it is limited  
to sense-experience1 and to such        
inferences therefrom as can be obtained 
by the only methods that ,kant is       
willing to recognise1 namely1 the       
mathematico-physical4 ,aesthetic1 moral 
and religious experience1 and even      
organic phenomena1 are excluded from the
 field of possible knowledge4  ,in      
holding to this position1 ,kant is1 of  
course1 the child of his time4 ,the     
absolute sufficiency of the ,newtonian  

physics is a presupposition of all his  
utterances on this theme4 ,newton1 he   
believes1 has determined in a quite     
final manner the principles1 methods and
 limits of scientific investigation4    
,for though ,kant himself imposes upon  
science a further limitation1 namely1 to
 appearances1 he conceives himself1 in  
so doing1 not as weakening ,newton's    
natural philosophy1 but as securing it  
against all possible objections4 ,and to
 balance the narrow connotation thus    
assigned to the term knowledge1 he has  
to give a correspondingly wide meaning  
to the terms faith1 moral belief1       
subjective principles of interpretation4
 ,if this be not kept constantly in     
mind1 the reader is certain to          
misconstrue the character and tendencies
 of ,kant's actual teaching4  ,but      
though the advances made by the sciences
 since ,kant's time have rendered this  
mode of delimiting the field of         
knowledge altogether untenable1 his     
method of defining the sources of       

philosophical insight has proved very   
fruitful1 and has many adherents at the 
present day4 ,what ,kant does--stated in
 broad outline--is to distinguish       
between the problems of existence and   
the problems of value1 assigning the    
former to science and the latter to     
philosophy4#eb ,theoretical philosophy1 
represented in his system by the        
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 takes as its
 province the logical values1 that is1  
the distinction of truth and falsity1   
and defining their criteria determines  
the nature and limits of our theoretical
 insight4 ,kant finds that these        
criteria enable us to distinguish       
between truth and falsity only on the   
empirical plane4 ,beyond making possible
 a distinction between appearance and   
reality1 they have no applicability in  
the metaphysical sphere4  ,the ,critique
 of ,practical ,reason deals with values
 of a very different character4 ,the    
faculty of ,reason1 which1 as already   
noted1#ec renders our consciousness a   

purposive agency controlled by ,ideal   
standards1 is also1 ,kant maintains1 the
 source of the moral sanctions4 ,but    
whereas in the theoretical field it     
subdues our minds to the discipline of  
experience1 and restrains our           
intellectual ambitions within the limits
 of the empirical order1 it here summons
 us to sacrifice every natural impulse  
and every secular advantage to the      
furtherance of an end that has absolute 
value4 ,in imposing duties1 it raises   
our life from the 8pragmatic0#ed level  
of a calculating expediency to the      
higher plane of a categorical           
imperative4  ,the categorical imperative
 at once humbles and exalts2 it         
discloses our limitations1 but does so  
through the greatness of the vocation to
 which it calls us4       8,this        
principle of morality1 just on account  
of the universality of      the         
legislation which makes it the formal   
supreme determining      principle of   
our will1 without regard to any         

subjective      differences1 is declared
 by the ,reason to be a law for all     
rational beings4444 ,it is1 therefore1  
not limited to men only1 but            
applies to all finite beings that       
possess ,reason and ,will2 nay1 it      
even includes the ,infinite ,being as   
the ,supreme ,intelligence40#ee         
,consequently1 in employing moral ends  
in the interpretation of the ,universe1 
we are not picturing the ,divine under  
human limitations1 but are discounting  
these limitations in the light of the   
one form of value that is known to us as
 absolute4       8,duty6 444 ,what      
origin is worthy of thee and where is to
 be found      the root of thy noble    
descent 444 a root to be derived from   
which      is the indispensable         
condition of the only worth that men can
 give      themselves40#ef  ,in his     
earlier years ,kant had accepted the    
current1 ,leibnizian view that human    
excellence consists in intellectual     
enlightenment1 and that it is therefore 

reserved for an lite1 privileged with   
the leisure and endowed with the special
 abilities required for its enjoyment4  
,from this arid intellectualism he was  
delivered through the influence of      
,rousseau4       8,i am by disposition  
an enquirer4 ,i feel the consuming      
thirst for      knowledge1 the eager    
unrest to advance ever further1 and the 
delights of discovery4 ,there was a time
 when ,i believed that this      is what
 confers real dignity upon human life1  
and ,i despised the      common people  
who know nothing4 ,rousseau has set me  
right4 ,this      imagined advantage    
vanishes4 ,i learn to honour men1 and   
should      regard myself as of much    
less use than the common labourer1 if ,i
      did not believe that my philosophy
 will restore to all men the      common
 rights of humanity40#eg  ,these common 
rights ,kant formulates in a purely     
individualist manner4 ,for here also1 in
 his lack of historic sense and in his  
distrust alike of priests and of        

statesmen1 he is the child of his time4 
,in the education and discipline of the 
soul he looks to nothing so artificial  
and humanly limited--,kant so regards   
them--as religious tradition and social 
institutions4 ,human rights1 he         
believes1 do not vary with time and     
place2 and for their enjoyment man      
requires no initiation and no equipment 
beyond what is supplied by ,nature      
herself4 ,it is from this standpoint    
that ,kant adduces1 as the twofold and  
sufficient inspiration to the rigours   
and sublimities of the spiritual life1  
the starry heavens above us and the     
moral law within4 ,they are ever-present
 influences on the life of man4 ,the    
naked eye reveals the former2 of the    
latter all men are immediately aware4   
,in their universal appeal they are of  
the very substance of human existence4  
,philosophy may avail to counteract     
certain of the hindrances which prevent 
them from exercising their native       
influence2 it cannot be a substitute for

 the inspiration which they alone can   
yield4  ,thus the categorical           
imperative1 in endowing the human soul  
with an intrinsic value1 singles it out 
from all other natural existences1 and  
strengthens it to face1 with equanimity1
 the cold immensities of the cosmic     
system4 ,for though the heavens arouse  
in us a painful feeling of our          
insignificance as animal existences1    
they intensify our consciousness of a   
sublime destiny1 as bearers of a rival1 
and indeed a superior1 dignity4  ,in one
 fundamental respect ,kant broke with   
the teaching of ,rousseau1 namely1 in   
questioning his doctrine of the natural 
goodness and indefinite perfectibility  
of human nature4#eh ,nothing1 ,kant     
maintains1 is good without qualification
 except the good will2 and even that1   
perhaps1 is never completely attained in
 any single instance4 ,the exercise of  
duty demands a perpetual vigilance1     
under the ever-present consciousness of 
continuing demerit4       8,i am willing

 to admit out of love of humanity that  
most of our      actions are indeed     
correct1 but if we examine them more    
closely we      everywhere come upon the
 dear self which is always              
prominent44440#ei 8,nothing but moral   
fanaticism and exaggerated              
self-conceit is infused into the mind by
 exhortation to actions as      noble1  
sublime and magnanimous4 ,thereby men   
are led into the      delusion that it  
is not duty1 that is1 respect for the   
law1 whose      yoke 444 they must bear1
 whether they like it or not1 that      
constitutes the determining principle of
 their actions1 and which      always   
humbles them while they obey it4 ,they  
then fancy that      those actions are  
expected from them1 not from duty1 but  
as pure      merit4444 ,in this way they
 engender a vain high-flying fantastic  
way of thinking1 flattering themselves  
with a spontaneous goodness      of     
heart that needs neither spur nor       
bridle1 nor any      command44440#fj    

,in asserting the goodness and          
self-sufficiency of our natural impulses
 ,rousseau is the spokesman of a        
philosophy which has dominated social   
and political theory since his day1 and 
which is still prevalent4 ,this         
philosophy1 in ,kant's view1 is         
disastrous in its consequences4 ,as a   
reading of human nature and of our moral
 vocation1 it is hardly less false than 
the ,epicurean teaching1 which finds in 
the pursuit of pleasure the motive of   
all our actions4 ,a naturalistic ethics1
 in either form1 is incapacitated1 by   
the very nature of its controlling      
assumptions1 from appreciating the      
distinguishing features of the moral    
consciousness4 ,neither the successes   
nor the failures of man's spiritual     
endeavour can be rightly understood from
 any such standpoint4 ,the human race1  
in its endurance and tenacity1 in its   
dauntless courage and in its soaring    
spirit1 reveals the presence of a       
prevenient influence1 non-natural in    

character2 and only if human nature be  
taken as including this higher1         
directive power1 can it assume to itself
 the eulogy which ,rousseau so          
mistakenly passes upon the natural and  
undisciplined tendencies of the human   
heart4 ,for as history demonstrates1    
while men are weak1 humanity is         
marvellous4       8,there is one thing  
in our soul which1 when we take a right 
view of      it1 we cannot cease to     
regard with the highest astonishment1   
and in      regard to which admiration  
is right and indeed elevating1 and that 
is our original moral capacity in       
general4444 ,even the                   
incomprehensibility of this capacity1#fa
 a capacity which      proclaims a      
,divine origin1 must rouse man's spirit 
to enthusiasm      and strengthen it for
 any sacrifices which respect for his   
duty may      impose on him40#fb  ,we   
are not here concerned with the detail  
of ,kant's ethical teaching1 or with the
 manner in which he establishes the     

freedom of the will1 and justifies      
belief in the existence of ,god and the 
immortality of the soul4 ,in many       
respects his argument lies open to      
criticism4 ,there is an unhappy contrast
 between the largeness of his           
fundamental thesis and the formal1      
doctrinaire manner in which it is       
developed4 ,indeed1 in the ,critique of 
,practical ,reason the individualist1   
deistic1 rationalistic modes of thinking
 of his time are much more in evidence  
than in any other of his chief writings2
 and incidentally he also displays a    
curious insensibility--again            
characteristic of his period--to all    
that is specific in the religious       
attitude4 ,but when due allowances have 
been made1 we can still maintain that in
 resting his constructive views upon the
 supreme value of the moral personality 
,kant has influenced subsequent         
philosophy in hardly less degree than by
 his teaching in the ,critique of ,pure 
,reason4#fc  ,the two ,critiques1 in    

method of exposition and argument1 in   
general outcome1 and indeed in the total
 impression they leave upon the mind1   
are extraordinarily different4 ,in the  
,critique of ,pure ,reason ,kant is     
meticulously scrupulous in testing the  
validity of each link in his argument4  
,constantly he retraces his steps2 and  
in many of his chief problems he halts  
between competing solutions4 ,kant's    
sceptical spirit is awake1 and it       
refuses to cease from its questionings4 
,in the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1
 on the other hand1 there is an austere 
simplicity of argument1 which advances1 
without looking to right or left1 from a
 few simple principles direct to their  
ultimate consequences4 ,the             
impressiveness of the first ,critique   
consists in its appreciation of the     
complexity of the problems1 and in the  
care with which their various1          
conflicting aspects are separately dealt
 with4 ,the second ,critique derives its
 force from the fundamental conviction  

upon which it is based4  ,such1 then1   
stated in the most general terms1 is the
 manner in which ,kant conceives the    
,critique of ,pure ,reason as           
contributing to the establishment of a  
humanistic philosophy4 ,it clears the   
ground for the practical ,reason1 and   
secures it in the autonomous control of 
its own domain4 ,while preserving to the
 intellect and to science certain       
definitely prescribed rights1 ,kant     
places in the forefront of his system   
the moral values2 and he does so under  
the conviction that in living up to the 
opportunities1 in whatever rank of life1
 of our common heritage1 we obtain a    
truer and deeper insight into ultimate  
issues than can be acquired through the 
abstruse subtleties of metaphysical     
speculation4  ,i may again draw         
attention to the consequences which     
follow from ,kant's habitual method of  
isolating his problems4 ,truth is a     
value of universal jurisdiction1 and    
from its criteria the judgments of moral

 and other values can claim no          
exemption4 ,existences and values do not
 constitute independent orders4 ,they   
interpenetrate1 and neither can be      
adequately dealt with apart from the    
considerations appropriate to the other4
 ,in failing to co-ordinate his         
problems1 ,kant has over-emphasised the 
negative aspects of his logical         
enquiries and has formulated his ethical
 doctrines in a needlessly dogmatic     
form4  ,these defects are1 however1 in  
some degree remedied in the last of his 
chief works1 the ,critique of ,judgment4
 ,in certain respects it is the most    
interesting of all ,kant's writings4    
,the qualities of both the earlier      
,critiques here appear in happy         
combination1 while in addition his      
concrete interests are more in evidence1
 to the great enrichment of his abstract
 argument4 ,many of the doctrines of the
 ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 especially 
those that bear on the problems of      
teleology1 are restated in a less       

negative manner1 and in their connection
 with the kindred problems of natural   
beauty and the fine arts4 ,for though   
the final decision in all metaphysical  
questions is still reserved to moral    
considerations1 ,kant now takes a more  
catholic view of the field of           
philosophy4 ,he allows1 though with     
characteristic reservations1 that the   
empirical evidence obtainable through   
examination of the broader features of  
our total experience is of genuinely    
philosophical value1 and that it can    
safely be employed to amplify and       
confirm the independent convictions of  
the moral consciousness4 ,the embargo   
which in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1
 in matters metaphysical1 is placed upon
 all tentative and probable reasoning is
 thus tacitly removed2 and the term     
knowledge again acquires the wider      
meaning very properly ascribed to it in 
ordinary speech4     ,a ,,commentary    
,,to ,,kant',s 8,,critique ,,of ,,pure  
,,reason0   ,,title3 ,,kritik ,,der     

,,reinen ,,vernunft   ,the term critique
 or criticism1 as employed by ,kant1 is 
of ,english origin4 ,it appears in      
seventeenth and eighteenth century      
,english1 chiefly in adjectival form1 as
 a literary and artistic term--for      
instance1 in the works of ,pope1 who was
 ,kant's favourite ,english poet4 ,kant 
was the first to employ it in ,german1  
extending it from the field of          
aesthetics to that of general           
philosophy4 ,a reference in ,kant's     
,logic#fd to ,home's ,elements of       
,criticism#fe would seem to indicate    
that it was ,home's use of the term     
which suggested to him its wider        
employment4 8,critique of pure reason10 
in its primary meaning1 signifies the   
passing of critical judgments upon pure 
reason4 ,in this sense ,kant speaks of  
his time as 8the age of criticism       
7,zeitalter der ,kritik740 ,frequently1 
however1 he takes the term more         
specifically as meaning a critical      
investigation leading to positive as    

well as to negative results4            
,occasionally1 especially in the        
,dialectic1 it also signifies a         
discipline applied to pure reason1      
limiting it within due bounds4 ,the     
first appearance of the word in ,kant's 
writings is in #agfe in the             
,nachricht#ff of his lectures for the   
winter term #agfe-agff4 ,kant seldom    
employs the corresponding adjective1    
critical 7kritisch74 ,his usual         
substitute for it is the term           
transcendental4  ,pure 7rein7 has here a
 very definite meaning4 ,it is the      
absolutely a priori4 ,negatively it     
signifies that which is independent of  
experience4 ,positively it signifies    
that which originates from reason       
itself1 and which is characterised by   
universality and necessity4#fg ,by 8pure
 reason0 ,kant therefore means reason in
 so far as it supplies out of itself1   
independently of experience1 a priori   
elements that as such are characterised 
by universality and necessity4  ,reason 

7,vernunft7 is used in the ,critique in 
three different meanings4 ,in the above 
title it is employed in its widest      
sense1 as the source of all a priori    
elements4 ,it includes what is a priori 
in sensibility as well as in            
understanding 7,verstand74 ,in its      
narrowest sense it is distinct even from
 understanding1 and signifies that      
faculty which renders the mind          
dissatisfied with its ordinary and      
scientific knowledge1 and which leads it
 to demand a completeness and           
unconditionedness which can never be    
found in the empirical sphere4          
,understanding conditions science2      
reason generates metaphysic4            
,understanding has categories2 reason   
has its ,ideas4 ,thirdly1 ,kant         
frequently employs understanding and    
reason as synonymous terms1 dividing the
 mind only into the two faculties1      
sensibility and spontaneity4 ,thus in ,a
 #a-b1 understanding and reason are used
 promiscuously1 and in place of reine   

,vernunft we find reiner ,verstand4 ,as 
already stated1 the term reason1 as     
employed in ,kant's title1 ought        
properly to be taken in its widest      
sense4 ,sensibility falls within reason 
in virtue of the a priori forms which it
 contains4 ,kant does not himself1      
however1 always interpret the title in  
this strict sense4 ,the triple use of   
the term is an excellent example of the 
looseness and carelessness with which he
 employs even the most important and    
fundamental of his technical terms4     
,only the context can reveal the        
particular meaning to be assigned in    
each case4  ,the phrase 8of pure reason0
 7der reinen ,vernunft7 has1 as         
,vaihinger points out1#fh a threefold   
ambiguity4 7#a7 ,sometimes it is a      
genitive objective4 ,the critical       
enquiry is directed upon pure reason as 
its object4 ,this corresponds to the    
view of the ,critique as merely a       
treatise on method4 7#b7 ,sometimes it  
is a genitive subjective4 ,the critical 

enquiry is undertaken by and executed   
through pure reason4 ,this expresses the
 view of the ,critique as itself a      
system of pure rational knowledge4 7#c7 
,at other times it has a reflexive      
meaning4 ,pure reason is subject and    
object at once4 ,it is both             
subject-matter and method or instrument4
 ,through the ,critique it attains to   
self-knowledge4 ,the ,critique is the   
critical examination of pure reason by  
itself4 ,the first view would seem to be
 the original and primary meaning of the
 title4 ,the second view very early took
 its place alongside it1 and appears in 
many passages4 ,the third view must be  
taken as representing ,kant's final     
interpretation of the title2 it is on   
the whole the most adequate to the      
actual content and scope of the         
,critique4 ,for the ,critique is not    
merely a treatise on method2 it is also 
a system of pure rational knowledge4 ,it
 professes to establish1 in an          
exhaustive and final manner1 the a      

priori principles which determine the   
possibility1 conditions1 and limits of  
pure rational knowledge4#fi     ,,motto 
,de nobis ipsis silemus3 ,de re autem1  
quae agitur1 petimus3 ut      homines   
eam non opinionem1 sed opus esse        
cogitent2 ac pro certo      habeant1 non
 sectae nos alicuius1 aut placiti1 sed  
utilitatis et      amplitudinis humanae 
fundamenta moliri4 ,deinde ut suis      
commodis      aequi 444 in commune      
consulant 444 et ipsi in partem veniant4
      ,praeterea ut bene sperent1 neque 
instaurationem nostram ut quiddam       
infinitum et ultra mortale fingant1 et  
animo concipiant2 quum      revera sit  
infiniti erroris finis et terminus      
legitimus4   ,this motto1 which was     
added in the second edition1 is taken   
from the preface to ,bacon's            
,instauratio ,magna1 of which the ,novum
 ,organum is the second part4 ,as the   
first part of the ,instauratio is       
represented only by the later1          
separately published1 ,de ,augmentis    

,scientiarum1 this preface originally   
appeared1 and is still usually given1 as
 introductory to the ,novum ,organum4   
,the complete passage 7in which ,i have 
indicated ,kant's omissions7 is rendered
 as follows in the translation of ,ellis
 and ,spedding3#gj       8,of myself ,i 
say nothing2 but in behalf of the       
business which is in      hand ,i       
entreat men to believe that it is not an
 opinion to be held1      but a work to 
be done2 and to be well assured that ,i 
am labouring      to lay the foundation1
 not of any sect or doctrine1 but of    
human      utility and power4 ,next1 ,i 
ask them to deal fairly by their own    
interests and laying aside all          
emulations and prejudices in favour     
of this or that opinion1 to join in     
consultation for the common      good2  
and being now freed and guarded by the  
securities and helps      which ,i offer
 from the errors and impediments of the 
way to come      forward themselves and 
take part in that which remains to be   

done4 ,moreover1 to be of good hope1 nor
 to imagine that this      ,instauration
 of mine is a thing infinite and beyond 
the power of      man1 when it is in    
fact the true end and termination of    
infinite      error40  ,the opening     
sentence of ,bacon's preface might also 
have served as a fitting motto to the   
,critique3       8,it seems to me that  
men do not rightly understand either    
their      store or their strength1 but 
overrate the one and underrate the      
other40  ,or again the following3       
8,i have not sought nor do ,i seek      
either to enforce or to ensnare         
men's judgments1 but ,i lead them to    
things themselves and the               
concordances of things1 that they may   
see for themselves what they      have1 
what they can dispute1 what they can add
 and contribute to      the common      
stock4444 ,and by these means ,i suppose
 that ,i have      established for ever 
a true and lawful marriage between the  
empirical and the rational faculty1 the 

unkind and ill-starred      divorce and 
separation of which has thrown into     
confusion all the      affairs of the   
human family40   ,,dedication  ,,to     
,,freiherr ,,von ,,zedlitz  ,karl       
,abraham1 ,freiherr von ,zedlitz had    
been entrusted1 as ,minister            
7#agga-aghh7 to ,frederick the ,great1  
with the oversight and direction of the 
,prussian system of education4 ,he held 
,kant in the highest esteem4#ga ,in     
,february #aggh we find him writing to  
thank ,kant for the pleasure he had     
found in perusing notes of his lectures 
on physical geography1 and requesting   
the favour of a complete copy4#gb ,a    
week later he invited ,kant to accept a 
professorship of philosophy in          
,halle1#gc which was then much the most 
important university centre in ,germany4
 ,upon ,kant's refusal he repeated the  
offer1 with added inducements1 including
 the title of ,hofrat4#gd ,again1 in    
,august of the same year1 he writes that
 he is attending1 upon ,mendelssohn's   

recommendation 7and doubtless also in   
the hope of receiving from this indirect
 source further light upon ,kant's own  
teaching in a favourite field71 the     
lectures on anthropology of ,kant's     
disciple and friend1 ,marcus ,herz4 ,the
 letter concludes with a passage which  
may perhaps have suggested to ,kant the 
appropriateness of dedicating his       
,critique to so wise and discerning a   
patron of true philosophy4              
8,should your inventive power extend so 
far1 suggest to me the means      of    
holding back the students in the        
universities from the bread and         
butter studies1 and of making them      
understand that their modicum of        
law1 even their theology and medicine1  
will be immensely more      easily      
acquired and safely applied1 if they are
 in possession of      more             
philosophical knowledge4 ,they can be   
judges1 advocates1      preachers and   
physicians only for a few hours each    
day2 but in      these and all the      

remainder of the day they are men1 and  
have need      of other sciences4 ,in   
short1 you must instruct me how this is 
to be      brought home to students4    
,printed injunctions1 laws1             
regulations--these are even worse than  
bread and butter study      itself40#ge 
,a ,minister of ,education who thus     
ranks philosophy above professional     
studies1 and both as more important than
 all academic machinery1 holds his      
office by divine right4     ,,preface   
,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition   ,detailed
 discussion of the ,prefaces is not     
advisable4 ,the problems which they     
raise can best be treated in the order  
in which they come up in the ,critique  
itself4 ,i shall dwell only on the minor
 incidental difficulties of the text1   
and on those features in ,kant's        
exposition which are peculiar to the    
,prefaces1 or which seem helpful in the 
way of preliminary orientation4 ,i shall
 first briefly restate the argument of  
the ,preface to the first edition1 and  

then add the necessary comment4  ,human 
reason is ineradicably metaphysical4 ,it
 is haunted by questions which1 though  
springing from its very nature1 none the
 less transcend its powers4 ,such a     
principle1 for instance1 as that of     
causality1 in carrying us to more and   
more remote conditions1 forces us to    
realise that by such regress our        
questions can never be answered4        
,however far we recede in time1 and     
however far we proceed in space1 we are 
still no nearer to a final answer to our
 initial problems1 and are therefore    
compelled to take refuge in postulates  
of a different kind1 such1 for instance1
 as that there must be a first          
unconditioned cause from which the      
empirical series of causes and effects  
starts1 or that space is capable of     
existing as a completed whole4 ,but     
these assumptions plunge reason in      
darkness and involve it in              
contradictions4 ,they are the sources of
 all the troubles of the warring        

schools4 ,error lies somewhere concealed
 in them--the more thoroughly concealed 
that they surpass the limits of possible
 experience4 ,until such error has been 
detected and laid bare1 metaphysical    
speculation must remain the idlest of   
all tasks4  ,in the latter part of the  
eighteenth century metaphysics had      
fallen1 as ,kant here states1 into      
disrepute4 ,the wonderful success with  
which the mathematical and natural      
sciences were being developed served    
only to emphasise by contrast the       
ineffectiveness of the metaphysical     
disciplines4 ,indifference to philosophy
 was the inevitable outcome1 and was    
due1 not to levity1 but to the matured  
judgment of the age1 which refused to be
 any longer put off with such pretended 
knowledge4 ,but since the philosophical 
sciences aim at that knowledge which1 if
 attainable1 we should be least willing 
to dispense with1 the failure of        
philosophy is really a summons to reason
 to take up anew the most difficult of  

all its tasks4 ,it must once and for all
 determine either the possibility or the
 impossibility of metaphysics4 ,it must 
establish       8444a tribunal which    
will assure to reason its lawful claims1
 and      which will also be able to    
dismiss all groundless pretensions1 not 
by despotic decrees1 but in accordance  
with its own eternal and                
unalterable laws4 ,this tribunal is no  
other than the ,critique of      ,pure  
,reason40#gf 8,our age is1 in especial  
degree1 the age of      criticism       
7,kritik71 and to such criticism        
everything must submit4      ,religion1 
through its sanctity1 and law-giving1   
through its      majesty1 may seek to   
exempt themselves from it4 ,but they    
then      awaken just suspicion1 and    
cannot claim the sincere respect which  
reason accords only to that which has   
been able to sustain the test      of   
free and open examination40#gg  ,as has 
already been emphasised in the preceding
 historical sketch1 ,kant had learnt to 

trust the use of reason1 and was a      
rationalist by education1 temperament1  
and conviction4 ,he here classifies     
philosophies as dogmatic and sceptical2 
and under the latter rubric he includes 
all empirical systems4 #8,empiricism'   
and #8scepticism' he interprets as      
practically synonymous terms4 ,the      
defect of the dogmatists is that they   
have not critically examined their      
methods of procedure1 and in the absence
 of an adequate distinction between     
appearance and reality have interpreted 
the latter in terms of the former4 ,the 
defect of the empiricists and sceptics  
is that they have misrepresented the    
nature of the faculty of reason1        
ignoring its claims and misreading its  
functions1 and accordingly have gone    
even further astray than their dogmatic 
opponents4 ,all knowledge worthy of the 
name is a priori knowledge4 ,it         
possesses universality and necessity1   
and as such must rest on pure reason4   
,wherever there is science1 there is an 

element of pure reason4 ,whether or not 
pure reason can also extend to the      
unconditioned is the question which     
decides the possibility of constructive 
metaphysics4 ,this is what ,kant means  
when he declares that the ,critique is a
 criticism of the power of reason1 in   
respect of all knowledge after which it 
may strive independently of experience4 
,pure reason is the subject-matter of   
the enquiry2 it is also the instrument  
through which the enquiry is made4#gh   
,nothing empirical or merely            
hypothetical has any place in it1 either
 as subject-matter or as method of      
argument4  ,from this position ,kant    
draws several important consequences4   
,first1 since pure reason means that    
faculty whereby we gain knowledge       
independently of all experience1 it can 
be isolated and its whole nature        
exhaustively determined4 ,indeed pure   
reason 7,kant seeks to prove7 is so     
perfect a unity that if 8its principle0 
should be found insufficient to the     

solution of a single one of all the     
questions which are presented to it by  
its own nature1 we should be justified  
in forthwith rejecting it as also       
incompetent to answer with complete     
certainty any one of the other          
questions4 ,in metaphysics it must be   
either all or nothing1#gi either final  
and complete certainty or else absolute 
failure4       8,while ,i am saying this
 ,i can fancy that ,i detect in the face
 of      the reader an expression of    
indignation mingled with contempt at    
pretensions seemingly so arrogant and   
vainglorious2 and yet they      are     
incomparably more moderate than the     
claims of all those writers      who on 
the lines of the usual programme profess
 to prove the simple      nature of the 
soul or the necessity of a first        
beginning of the      world40#hj  ,in so
 doing they pretend to define realities 
which lie beyond the limits of possible 
experience2 the ,critique seeks only to 
deal with that faculty of reason which  

manifests itself to us within our own   
minds4 ,formal logic shows how          
completely and systematically the simple
 acts of reason can be enumerated4      
,aristotle created this science of logic
 complete at a stroke4 ,kant professes  
to have established an equally final    
metaphysics2 and as logic is not a      
science proper1 but rather a            
propaedeutic to all science1            
metaphysics1 thus interpreted1 is the   
only one of all the sciences which can  
immediately attain to such completeness4
       8,for it is nothing but the      
inventory of all our possessions through
      pure reason1 systematically       
arranged4 ,in this field nothing can    
escape us4 ,what reason produces        
entirely out of itself cannot lie       
concealed1 but is brought to light by   
reason itself immediately the           
common principle has been               
discovered40#ha  ,secondly1 the         
,critique also claims certainty4 ,with  
the removal of everything empirical1 and

 the reduction of its subject-matter to 
pure reason1 all mere opinion or        
hypothesis is likewise eliminated4      
,probabilities or hypotheses can have no
 place in a ,critique of ,pure          
,reason4#hb ,everything must be derived 
according to a priori principles from   
pure conceptions in which there is no   
intermixture of experience or any       
special intuition4         99       99  
99       99       99  ,this ,preface to 
the first edition1 considered as        
introductory to the ,critique1 is       
misleading for two reasons4 ,first1     
because in it ,kant is preoccupied      
almost exclusively with the problems of 
metaphysics in the strict ontological   
sense1 that is to say1 with the problems
 of the ,dialectic4 ,the problems of the
 ,analytic1 which is the very heart of  
the ,critique1 are almost entirely      
ignored4 ,they are1 it is true1 referred
 to in ,a x-xi1 but the citation is     
quite externally intercalated2 it       
receives no support or extension from   

the other parts of the ,preface4 ,this  
results in a second defect1 namely1 that
 ,kant fails to indicate the more       
empirical features of his new ,critical 
standpoint4 ,since ultimate reality is  
supersensuous1 metaphysics1 as above    
conceived1 can have no instrument save  
pure reason4 ,the subjects of its       
enquiry1 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1
 if they are to be known at all1 can be 
determined only through a priori        
speculation4 ,this fact1 fundamental and
 all-important for ,kant1 was completely
 ignored in the popular eclectic        
philosophies of the time4 ,they         
professed to derive metaphysical        
conclusions from empirical evidence4    
,they substituted1 as ,kant has pointed 
out1#hc 8a physiology of the human      
understanding0 for the ,critical        
investigation of the claims of reason1  
and anthropology for ethics4 ,they were 
blind to the dogmatism of which they are
 thereby guilty4 ,they assumed those    
very points which most call for proof1  

namely1 that reason is adequate to the  
solution of metaphysical problems1 and  
that all existence is so fundamentally  
of one type that we can argue from the  
sensuous to the supersensuous1 from     
appearance to reality4 ,when they fell  
into difficulties1 they pleaded the     
insufficiency of human reason1 and yet  
were all the while unquestioningly      
relying upon it in the drawing of the   
most tremendous inferences4 ,such1 for  
instance1 are the assumptions which     
underlie ,moses ,mendelssohn's          
contention that since animals as well as
 men agree in the apprehension of space1
 it must be believed to be absolutely   
real4#hd ,these assumptions also        
determine ,priestley's assertion that   
though every event has its cause1 there 
is one causeless happening1 namely1 the 
creative act to which the existence of  
the world is due4#he ,on such terms1    
metaphysics is too patently easy to be  
even plausible4 8,indifference1 doubt1  
and1 in final issue1 severe criticism1  

are truer signs of a profound habit of  
thought40#hf ,the matter of experience  
affords no data for metaphysical        
inference4 ,in the a priori forms of    
experience1 and there alone1 can        
metaphysics hope to find a basis1 if any
 basis is really discoverable4  ,this is
 ,kant's reason for so emphatically     
insisting that the problem of the       
,critique is to determine 8how much we  
can hope to achieve by reason1 when all 
the material and assistance of          
experience is taken away40#hg ,but in   
keeping only this one point in view     
,kant greatly misrepresents the problems
 and scope of the ,critique4 ,throughout
 the ,preface he speaks the language of 
the ,aufklrung4 ,even in the very act of
 limiting the scope of reason1 he       
overstresses its powers1 and omits      
reference to its empirical conditions4  
,it is well to contrast this teaching   
with such a passage as the following3   
8,the position of all genuine idealists 
from the ,eleatics to      ,berkeley is 

contained in this formula3 #8,all       
cognition through the      senses and   
experience is nothing but mere illusion1
 and only in the      ideas of pure     
understanding and ,reason is there      
truth4' ,the      fundamental principle 
ruling all my idealism1 on the contrary1
 is      this3 #8,all cognition of      
things solely from pure understanding or
      pure ,reason is nothing but mere  
illusion1 and only in experience is     
there truth4'0#hh  ,but that passage is 
equally inadequate as a complete        
expression of ,kant's ,critical         
philosophy4 ,the truth lies midway      
between it and the teaching of the      
,preface to the first edition4 ,pure    
reason is as defective an instrument of 
knowledge as is factual experience4     
,though the primary aim of metaphysics  
is to determine our relation to the     
absolutely real1 and though that can    
only be done by first determining the   
nature and possible scope of a priori   
principles1 such principles are found on

 investigation to possess only empirical
 validity4 ,the central question of the 
,critique thus becomes the problem of   
the validity of their empirical         
employment4 ,the interrelation of these 
two problems1 that of the a priori and  
that of experience1 and ,kant's attitude
 towards them1 cannot be considered till
 later4 ,the defects of the ,preface to 
the first edition are in part corrected 
by the extremely valuable ,preface      
substituted in the second edition4 ,but 
some further points in this first       
,preface must be considered4            
,prescribed by the very nature of reason
 itself4#hi--,metaphysics exists as a   
8natural disposition10 and its questions
 are not therefore merely artificial4   
8,as natural disposition 7,naturanlage7 
444 metaphysics is real4      ,for human
 reason1 without being moved merely by  
the idle desire for      extent and     
variety of knowledge1 proceeds          
impetuously1 driven on      by an inward
 need1 to questions such as cannot be   

answered by any      empirical          
employment of reason1 or by principles  
thence derived4      ,thus in all men1  
as soon as their reason has become ripe 
for      speculation1 there has always  
existed and will always continue to     
exist some kind of metaphysics40#ij     
,hence results what ,kant entitles      
transcendental illusion4       8,the    
cause of this transcendental illusion is
 that there are      fundamental rules  
and maxims for the employment of        
,reason1      subjectively regarded as a
 faculty of human knowledge1 and that   
these rules and maxims have all the     
appearance of being objective           
principles4 ,we take the subjective     
necessity of a connection of our        
concepts1 i4e4 a connection necessitated
 for the advantage of the               
understanding1 for an objective         
necessity in the determination of       
things in themselves4 ,this is an       
illusion which can no more be           
prevented than we can prevent the sea   

from appearing higher at the            
horizon than at the shore1 since we see 
it through higher light      rays2 or to
 cite a still better example1 than the  
astronomer can      prevent the moon    
from appearing larger at its rising1    
although he      is not deceived by this
 illusion4444 ,there exists1 then1 a    
natural      and unavoidable dialectic  
of pure ,reason1 not one in which a     
bungler might entangle himself through  
lack of knowledge1 or one      which    
some sophist has artificially invented  
to confuse thinking      people1 but one
 which is inseparable from human        
,reason1 and which1      even after its 
deceiving power has been exposed1 will  
not cease to      play tricks with it   
and continually to entrap it into       
momentary      aberrations that will    
ever and again call for correction40#ia 
,dogmatism4#ib--;,according to ,kant    
there are three possible standpoints in 
philosophy--the dogmatic1 the sceptical1
 and the critical4 ,all preceding       

thinkers come under the first two heads4
 ,a dogmatist is one who assumes that   
human reason can comprehend ultimate    
reality1 and who proceeds upon this     
assumption4 ,he does not1 before        
proceeding to construct a metaphysics1  
enquire whether it is possible4         
,dogmatism expresses itself 7to borrow  
,vaihinger's convenient mode of         
definition#ic7 through three            
factors--rationalism1 realism1 and      
transcendence4 ,descartes and ,leibniz  
are typical dogmatists4 ,as rationalists
 they hold that it is possible to       
determine from pure a priori principles 
the ultimate nature of ,god1 of the     
soul1 and of the material universe4     
,they are realists in that they assert  
that by human thought the complete      
nature of objective reality can be      
determined4 ,they also adopt the        
attitude of transcendence4 ,through pure
 thought they go out beyond the sensible
 and determine the supersensuous4       
,scepticism 7,kant1 as above stated1#id 

regards it as being in effect equivalent
 to empiricism7 may similarly be defined
 through the three terms1 empiricism1   
subjectivism1 immanence4 ,a sceptic can 
never be a rationalist4 ,he must reduce 
knowledge to sense-experience4 ,for this
 reason also his knowledge is infected  
by subjective conditions2 through       
sensation we cannot hope to determine   
the nature of the objectively real4     
,this attitude is also that of          
immanence2 knowledge is limited to the  
sphere of sense-experience4 ,criticism  
has similarly its three constitutive    
factors1 rationalism1 subjectivism1     
immanence4 ,it agrees with dogmatism in 
maintaining that only through a priori  
principles can true knowledge be        
obtained4 ,such knowledge is1 however1  
subjective#ie in its origin1 and for    
that reason it is also only of immanent 
application2 knowledge is possible only 
in the sphere of sense-experience4      
,dogmatism claims that knowledge arises 
independently of experience and extends 

beyond it4 ,empiricism holds that       
knowledge arises out of sense-experience
 and is valid only within it4 ,criticism
 teaches that knowledge arises          
independently of particular experience  
but is valid only for experience4  ,the 
following passages in the ,methodology  
give ,kant's view of the historical and 
relative values of the two false        
methods3       8,the sceptic is the     
taskmaster who constrains the dogmatic  
reasoner      to develop a sound        
critique of the understanding and       
reason4 ,when      the latter has been  
made to advance thus far1 he need fear  
no      further challenge1 since he has 
learned to distinguish his real         
possessions from that which lies        
entirely beyond them1 and to which      
he can therefore lay no claim4444 ,thus 
the sceptical procedure      cannot of  
itself yield any satisfying answer to   
the questions of      reason1 but none  
the less it prepares the way by         
awakening its      circumspection1 and  

by indicating the radical measures which
 are      adequate to secure it in its  
legitimate possessions40#if 8,the       
first step in matters of pure reason1   
marking its infancy1 is      dogmatic4  
,the second step is sceptical1 and      
indicates that      experience has      
rendered our judgment wiser and more    
circumspect4      ,but a third step1    
such as can be taken only by fully      
matured      judgment1 is now           
necessary4444 ,this is not the          
censorship but the      critique of     
reason1 whereby not its present bounds  
but its      determinate and necessary  
limits1 not its ignorance on this or    
that point1 but in regard to all        
possible questions of a certain         
kind1 are demonstrated from principles1 
and not merely arrived at      by way of
 conjecture4 ,scepticism is thus a      
resting-place for human      reason1    
where it can reflect upon its dogmatic  
wanderings and make      survey of the  
region in which it finds itself1 so that

 for the      future it may be able to  
choose its path with more certainty4    
,but      it is no dwelling-place for   
permanent settlement4 ,that can be      
obtained only through perfect certainty 
in our knowledge1 alike of      the     
objects themselves and of the limits    
within which all our      knowledge of  
objects is enclosed40#ig                
,locke4#ih--;,cf4 ,a #hf  ,b #aai2 ,a   
#bgj  ,b #cbg2 ,b #abg4  ,on the        
unfavourable contrast between           
mathematics and metaphysics4#ii--;,cf4  
,ueber die ,deutlichkeit der ,grundstze 
7#agfd71 erste ,betrachtung1 and below1 
pp4 #dj1 #efc ff4  ,the age of          
criticism4#ajj--,kant considered himself
 as contributing to the further advance 
of the eighteenth century               
,enlightenment4#aja ,in view1 however1  
of the contrast between eighteenth and  
nineteenth century thought1 and of the  
real affiliations and ultimate          
consequences of ,kant's teaching1 it    
seems truer to regard the ,critical     

philosophy as at once completing and    
transcending the ,aufklrung4 ,kant      
breaks with many of its most fundamental
 assumptions4  ,the ,critique of ,pure  
,reason4#ajb--,kant here defines the    
,critique as directed upon pure         
reason4#ajc ,further1 it is a criticism 
of knowledge which is 8independent of   
all experience10 or1 as ,kant adds 8free
 from all experience40 ,such phrases1 in
 this context1 really mean transcendent4
 ,the ,critique is here taken as being a
 ,critical investigation of transcendent
 metaphysics1 of its sources1 scope1 and
 limits4#ajd  ,opinion or hypothesis not
 permissible4#aje--;,cf4 below1 p4 #edc 
ff4  ,i know no enquiries1              
etc4#ajf--,the important questions      
raised by this paragraph are discussed  
below1 p4 #bce ff4  ,jean ,terrasson    
7#afgj-agej74ajg--,the quotation is from
 his work posthumously published        
7#aged71 and translated from the ,french
 by ,frau ,gottsched under the title    
,philosophie nach ihrem allgemeinen     

,einflusse auf alle ,gegenstnde des     
,geistes und der ,sitten 7#agfb74       
,terrasson is also referred to by ,kant 
in his ,anthropologie1  #dd and #gg4    
,terrasson would seem to be the author  
of the ,trait de l'infini cr which has  
been falsely ascribed to ,malebranche4  
,i have translated this latter treatise 
in the ,philosophical ,review 7,july    
#aije74  ,such a system of pure         
speculative reason4#ajh--,the relation  
in which this system would stand to the 
,critique is discussed below1 pp4 #ga-b4
 ,speculative does not with ,kant mean  
transcendent1 but merely theoretical as 
opposed to practical4 ,cf4 ,b #be1 ,a   
#ae  ,b #bi1 ,a #hde  ,b #hgc4  ,under  
the title3 ,metaphysics of              
,nature4#aji--,no such work1 at least   
under this title1 was ever completed by 
,kant4 ,in the ,kantian terminology     
8nature0 signifies 8all that is40 ,cf4  
below1 p4 #ehj4     ,,preface ,,to ,,the
 ,,second ,,edition   ,i shall again    
give a brief explanatory paraphrase1    

before proceeding to detailed comment4  
,the main points of the preface of the  
first edition are repeated4             
8,metaphysics soars above all teaching  
of experience1 and rests on concepts    
only4 ,in it reason has to be her own   
pupil40#aaj ,but ,kant immediately      
proceeds to a further point4 ,that logic
 should have attained the secure method 
of science is due to its limitation to  
the mere a priori form of knowledge4    
,for metaphysics this is far more       
difficult1 since it 8has to deal not    
with itself alone1 but also with        
objects40#aaa  ,the words which ,i have 
italicised form a very necessary        
correction of the first edition preface1
 according to which the ,critique would 
seem to 8treat only of reason and its   
pure thinking40 ,a further difference   
follows4 ,the second edition preface1 in
 thus emphasising the objective aspect  
of the problem1 is led to characterise  
in a more complete manner the method to 
be followed in the ,critical enquiry4   

,how can the ,critique1 if it is        
concerned1 as both editions agree in    
insisting1 only with the a priori which 
originates in human reason1 solve the   
specifically metaphysical problem1 viz4 
that of determining the independently   
real8 ,how can an idea in us refer to1  
and constitute knowledge of1 an object8 
,the larger part of the preface to the  
second edition is devoted to the        
,critical solution of this problem4 ,the
 argument of the ,dialectic is no longer
 emphasised at the expense of the       
,analytic4  ,kant points out that as a  
matter of historical fact each of the   
two rational sciences1 mathematics and  
physics1 first entered upon the assured 
path of knowledge by a sudden           
revolution1 and by the adoption of a    
method which in its general             
characteristics is common to both4 ,this
 method consists1 not in being led by   
nature as in leading-strings1 but in    
interrogating nature in accordance with 
what reason produces on its own plan4   

,the method of the geometrician does not
 consist in the study of figures        
presented to the senses4 ,that would be 
an empirical 7in ,kant's view1          
sceptical7 method4 ,geometrical         
propositions could not then be regarded 
as possessing universality and          
necessity4 ,nor does the geometrician   
employ a dogmatic method1 that of       
studying the mere conception of a       
figure4 ,by that means no new knowledge 
could ever be attained4 ,the actual     
method consists in interpreting the     
sensible figures through conceptions    
that have been rigorously defined1 and  
in accordance with which the figures    
have been constructively generated4 ,the
 first discovery of this method1 by     
,thales or some other ,greek1 was 8far  
more important than the discovery of the
 passage round the celebrated ,cape of  
,good ,hope40#aab  ,some two thousand   
years elapsed before ,galileo formulated
 a corresponding method for physical    
science4 ,he relied neither on mere     

observation nor on his own conceptions4 
,he determined the principles according 
to which alone concordant phenomena can 
be admitted as laws of nature1 and then 
by experiment compelled nature to answer
 the questions which these principles   
suggest4 ,here again the method is      
neither merely empirical nor purely     
dogmatic4 ,it possesses the advantages  
of both4  ,metaphysics is ripe for a    
similar advance4 ,it must be promoted to
 the rank of positive science by the    
transforming power of an analogous      
method4 ,the fundamental and            
distinguishing characteristic of        
mathematical and physical procedure is  
the legislative power to which reason   
lays claim4 ,such procedure1 if         
generalised and extended1 will supply   
the required method of the new          
philosophy4 ,reason must be regarded as 
self-legislative in all the domains of  
our possible knowledge4 ,objects must be
 viewed as conforming to human thought1 
not human thought to the independently  

real4 ,this is the 8hypothesis0 to which
 ,kant has given the somewhat misleading
 title1 8,copernican40#aac ,the method  
of procedure which it prescribes is1 he 
declares1 analogous to that which was   
followed by ,copernicus1 and will be    
found to be as revolutionary in its     
consequences4 ,in terms of this         
hypothesis a complete and absolutely    
certain metaphysics1 valid now and for  
all time1 can be created at a stroke4   
,the earliest and oldest enterprise of  
the human mind will achieve a new       
beginning4 ,metaphysics1 the mother of  
all the sciences1 will renew her youth1 
and will equal in assurance1 as she     
surpasses in dignity1 the offspring of  
her womb4  ,from this new standpoint    
,kant develops phenomenalism on         
rationalist lines4 ,he professes to     
prove that though our knowledge is only 
of appearances1 it is conditioned by a  
priori principles4 ,his 8,copernican    
hypothesis10 so far from destroying     
positive science1 is1 he claims1 merely 

a philosophical extension of the method 
which it has long been practising4      
,since all science worthy of the name   
involves a priori elements1 it can be   
accounted for only in terms of the new  
hypothesis4 ,only if objects are        
regarded as conforming to our forms of  
intuition1 and to our modes of          
conception1 can they be anticipated by a
 priori reasoning4 ,science can be a    
priori just because1 properly           
understood1 it is not a rival of        
metaphysics1 and does not attempt to    
define the absolutely real4  ,but such a
 statement at once suggests what may at 
first seem a most fatal objection4      
,though the new standpoint may account  
for the a priori in experience and      
science1 it can be of no avail in       
metaphysics4 ,if the a priori concepts  
have a mental origin1 they can have no  
validity for the independently real4 ,if
 we can know only what we ourselves     
originate1 things in themselves must be 
unknown1 and metaphysics must be        

impossible4 ,but in this very           
consequence the new hypothesis first    
reveals its full advantages4 ,it leads  
to an interpretation of metaphysics     
which is as new and as revolutionary#aad
 as that which it gives to natural      
science4 ,transcendent metaphysics is   
indeed impossible1 but in harmony with  
man's practical and moral vocation1 its 
place is more efficiently taken by an   
immanent metaphysics on the one hand1   
and by a metaphysics of ethics on the   
other4 ,together these constitute the   
new and final philosophy which ,kant    
claims to have established by his       
,critical method4 ,its chief task is to 
continue 8that noblest enterprise of    
antiquity10#aae the distinguishing of   
appearances from things in themselves4  
,the unconditioned is that which alone  
will satisfy speculative reason2 its    
determination is the ultimate           
presupposition of metaphysical enquiry4 
,but so long as the empirical world is  
regarded as true reality1 totality or   

unconditionedness cannot possibly be    
conceived--is1 indeed1 inherently       
self-contradictory4 ,on the new         
hypothesis there is no such difficulty4 
,by the proof that things in themselves 
are unknowable1 a sphere is left open   
within which the unconditioned can be   
sought4 ,for though this sphere is      
closed to speculative reason1 the       
unconditioned can be determined from    
data yielded by reason in its practical 
activity4 ,the hypothesis which at first
 seems to destroy metaphysics proves on 
examination to be its necessary         
presupposition4 ,the 8,copernican       
hypothesis0 which conditions science    
will also account for metaphysics       
properly conceived4  ,upon this         
important point ,kant dwells at some    
length4 ,even the negative results of   
the ,critique are1 he emphasises1 truly 
positive in their ultimate consequences4
 ,the dogmatic extension of speculative 
reason really leads to the narrowing of 
its employment1 for the principles of   

which it then makes use involve the     
subjecting of things in themselves to   
the limiting conditions of sensibility4 
,all attempts to construe the           
unconditioned in terms that will satisfy
 reason are by such procedure ruled out 
from the very start4 ,to demonstrate    
this is the fundamental purpose and     
chief aim of the ,critique4 ,space and  
time are merely forms of sensuous       
intuition2 the concepts of understanding
 can yield knowledge only in their      
connection with them4 ,though the       
concepts in their purity possess a quite
 general meaning1 this is not sufficient
 to constitute knowledge4 ,the          
conception of causality1 for instance1  
necessarily involves the notion of      
time-sequence2 apart from time it is the
 bare1 empty1 and entirely unspecified  
conception of a sufficient ground4      
,similarly1 the category of substance   
signifies the permanent in time and     
space2 as a form of pure reason it has a
 quite indefinite meaning signifying    

merely that which is always a subject   
and never a predicate4 ,in the absence  
of further specification1 it remains    
entirely problematic in its reference4  
,the fact1 however1 that the categories 
of the understanding possess1 in        
independence of sensibility1 even this  
quite general significance is           
all-important4 ,originating in pure     
reason they have a wider scope than the 
forms of sense1 and enable us to        
conceive1 though not to gain knowledge  
of1 things in themselves4#aaf ,our dual 
nature1 as being at once sensuous and   
supersensuous1 opens out to us the      
apprehension of both4  ,kant illustrates
 his position by reference to the       
problem of the freedom of the will4 ,as 
thought is wider than sense1 and reveals
 to us the existence of a noumenal      
realm1 we are enabled to reconcile      
belief in the freedom of the will with  
the mechanism of nature4 ,we can        
recognise that within the phenomenal    
sphere everything without exception is  

causally determined1 and yet at the same
 time maintain that the whole order of  
nature is grounded in noumenal          
conditions4 ,we can assert of one and   
the same being that its will is subject 
to the necessity of nature and that it  
is free--mechanically determined in its 
visible actions1 free in its real       
supersensible existence4 ,we have1      
indeed1 no knowledge of the soul1 and   
therefore cannot assert on theoretical  
grounds that it possesses any such      
freedom4 ,the very possibility of       
freedom transcends our powers of        
comprehension4 ,the proof that it can at
 least be conceived without             
contradiction is1 however1              
all-important4 ,for otherwise no        
arguments from the nature of the moral  
consciousness could be of the least     
avail2 before a palpable contradiction  
every argument is bound to give way4    
,now1 for the first time1 the doctrine  
of morals and the doctrine of nature can
 be independently developed1 without    

conflict1 each in accordance with its   
own laws4 ,the same is true in regard to
 the existence of ,god and the          
immortality of the soul4 ,by means of   
the ,critical distinction between the   
empirical and the supersensible worlds1 
these conceptions are now for the first 
time rendered possible of belief4 8,i   
had to remove knowledge1 in order to    
make room for belief40#aag 8,this loss  
affects only the monopoly of the        
schools1 in no respect the interests of 
humanity40#aah  ,lastly1 ,kant          
emphasises the fact that the method of  
the ,critique must be akin to that of   
dogmatism4 ,it must be rational a       
priori4 ,to adopt any other method of   
procedure is 8to shake off the fetters  
of science altogether1 and thus to      
change work into play1 certainty into   
opinion1 philosophy into philodoxy40#aai
 ,and ,kant repeats the claims of the   
preface of the first edition as to the  
completeness and finality of his system4
 8,this system will1 as ,i hope1        

maintain through the future this same   
unchangeableness40#abj                  
,logic4#aba--;,for ,kant's view of the  
logic of ,aristotle as complete and     
perfect1 cf4 below1 pp4 #ahd-e4 ,kant   
compares metaphysics to mathematics and 
physics on the one hand1 and to formal  
logic on the other4 ,the former show the
 possibility of attaining to the secure 
path of science by a sudden and single  
revolution2 the latter demonstrates the 
possibility of creating a science       
complete and entire at a stroke4 ,thanks
 to the new ,critical method1           
metaphysics may be enabled1 ,kant       
claims1 to parallel both achievements at
 once4  ,theoretical and practical      
reason4#abb--,such comment as is        
necessary upon this distinction is given
 below4 ,cf4 p4 #efi ff4  ,hitherto it  
has been supposed that all knowledge    
must conform to the objects4#abc--,this 
statement is historically correct4 ,that
 assumption did actually underlie one   
and all of the pre-,kantian             

philosophies4 ,at the same time1 it is  
true that ,kant's phenomenalist         
standpoint is partially anticipated by  
,hume1 by ,malebranche and by ,leibniz1 
especially by the first named4 ,hume    
argues that to condemn knowledge on the 
ground that it can never copy or truly  
reveal any external reality is to       
misunderstand its true function4 ,our   
sense perceptions and our general       
principles are so determined by nature  
as to render feasible only a practical  
organisation of life4 ,when we attempt  
to derive from them a consistent body of
 knowledge1 failure is the inevitable   
result4#abd ,malebranche1 while         
retaining the absolutist view of        
conceptual knowledge1 propounds a       
similar theory of sense-perception4#abe 
,our perceptions are1 as he shows1      
permeated through and through1 from end 
to end1 with illusion4 ,such illusions  
justify themselves by their practical   
usefulness1 but they likewise prove that
 theoretical insight is not the purpose 

of our sense-experience4 ,kant's        
,copernican hypothesis consists in great
 part of an extension of this view to   
our conceptual1 scientific knowledge4   
,but he differs both from ,malebranche  
and from ,hume in that he develops his  
phenomenalism on rationalist lines4 ,he 
professes to show that though our       
knowledge is only of the phenomenal1 it 
is conditioned by a priori principles4  
,the resulting view of the distinction  
between appearance and reality has      
kinship with that of ,leibniz4#abf ,the 
phenomena of science1 though only       
appearances1 are none the less bene     
fundata4 ,our scientific knowledge1     
though not equivalent to metaphysical   
apprehension of the ultimately real1 can
 be progressively developed by          
scientific methods4  ,the two 8parts0 of
 metaphysics4#abg--,kant is here drawing
 the important distinction1 which is one
 result of his new standpoint1 between  
immanent and transcendent metaphysics4  
,it is unfortunate that he does not do  

so in a more explicit manner1 with full 
recognition of its novelty and of its   
far-reaching significance4 ,many        
ambiguities in his exposition here and  
elsewhere would then have been          
obviated4#abh  ,the unconditioned which 
,reason postulates in all things by     
themselves1 by necessity and by         
right4#abi--,points are here raised the 
discussion of which must be deferred4   
,cf4 below1 pp4 #dbi-ca1 #dcc-d1        
#eeh-fa4  ,the ,critique is a treatise  
on method1 not a system of the science  
itself4#acj--;,cf4 ,a xv42 ,b xxxvi42   
and especially ,a #aa  ,b #bd1 below pp4
 #ga-b4  ,the ,copernican               
hypothesis4#aca--,kant's comparison of  
his new hypothesis to that of           
,copernicus has generally been          
misunderstood4 ,the reader very         
naturally conceives the ,copernican     
revolution in terms of its main ultimate
 consequence1 the reduction of the earth
 from its proud position of central     
pre-eminence4 ,but that does not bear   

the least analogy to the intended       
consequences of the ,critical           
philosophy4 ,the direct opposite is     
indeed true4 ,kant's hypothesis is      
inspired by the avowed purpose of       
neutralising the naturalistic           
implications of the ,copernican         
astronomy4 ,his aim is nothing less than
 the firm establishment of what may     
perhaps be described as a ,ptolemaic1   
anthropocentric metaphysics4 ,such      
naturalistic philosophy as that of ,hume
 may perhaps be described as            
,copernican1 but the ,critical          
philosophy1 as humanistic1 has genuine  
kinship with the ,greek standpoint4     
,even some of ,kant's best commentators 
have interpreted the analogy in the     
above manner4#acb ,it is so interpreted 
by ,t4 ,h4 ,green#acc and by ,j4        
,hutchison ,stirling4#acd ,caird in his 
,critical ,philosophy of ,kant makes not
 the least mention of the analogy1      
probably for the reason that while      
reading it in the same fashion as       

,green1 he recognised the               
inappropriateness of the comparison as  
thus taken4 ,the analogy is stated in   
typically ambiguous fashion by          
,lange#ace and by ,hffding4#acf ,s4     
,alexander1 while very forcibly         
insisting upon the ,ptolemaic character 
of the ,kantian philosophy1 also        
endorses this interpretation in the     
following terms3       8,it is very     
ironical that ,kant himself signalised  
the revolution      which he believed   
himself to be effecting as a ,copernican
      revolution4 ,but there is nothing 
,copernican in it except that he        
believed it to be a revolution4 ,if     
every change is ,copernican which       
reverses the order of the terms with    
which it deals1 which declares      ,a  
to depend on ,b when ,b had before been 
declared to depend on ,a1      then     
,kant--who believed that he had reversed
 the order of      dependence of mind   
and things--was right in saying that he 
effected      a ,copernican revolution4 

,but he was not right in any other      
sense4      ,for his revolution1 so far 
as it was one1 was accurately           
anti-,copernican40#acg  ,as the second  
edition preface is not covered by the   
published volumes of ,vaihinger's       
,commentary1 the point has not been     
taken up by him4  ,now ,kant's own      
statements are entirely unambiguous and 
do not justify any such interpretation  
as that of ,green and ,alexander4 ,as it
 seems to me1 they have missed the real 
point of the analogy4 ,the              
misunderstanding would never have been  
possible save for our neglect of the    
scientific classics4 ,kant must have had
 first-hand acquaintance with           
,copernicus' ,de ,revolutionibus1 and   
the comparison which he draws assumes   
similar knowledge on the part of his    
readers4 ,copernicus by his proof of the
 8hypothesis0 7his own term7 of the     
earth's motion sought only to achieve a 
more harmonious ordering of the         
,ptolemaic universe4 ,and as thus merely

 a simplification of the traditional    
cosmology1 his treatise could fittingly 
be dedicated to the reigning ,pope4 ,the
 sun upon which our terrestrial life    
depends was still regarded as uniquely  
distinct from the fixed stars2 and our  
earth was still located in the central  
region of a universe that was conceived 
in the traditional manner as being      
single and spherical4 ,giordano ,bruno  
was the first1 a generation later1 to   
realise the revolutionary consequences  
to which the new teaching1 consistently 
developed1 must inevitably lead4 ,it was
 he who first taught what we have now   
come to regard as an integral part of   
,copernicus' revolution1 the doctrine of
 innumerable planetary systems side by  
side with one another in infinite space4
  ,copernicus' argument starts from the 
,aristotelian principle of relative     
motion4 ,to quote ,copernicus' exact    
words3       8,all apprehended change of
 place is due to movement either of the 
observed object or of the observer1 or  

to differences in movements      that   
are occurring simultaneously in both4   
,for if the observed      object and the
 observer are moving in the same        
direction with equal      velocity1 no  
motion can be detected4 ,now it is from 
the earth that      we visually         
apprehend the revolution of the heavens4
 ,if1 then1 any      movement is        
ascribed to the earth1 that motion will 
generate the      appearance of itself  
in all things which are external to it1 
though      as occurring in the opposite
 direction1 as if everything were       
passing across the earth4 ,this will be 
especially true of the daily            
revolution4 ,for it seems to seize upon 
the whole world1 and indeed      upon   
everything that is around the earth1    
though not upon the earth               
itself4444 ,as the heavens1 which       
contain and cover everything1 are       
the common locus of things1 it is not at
 all evident why it should      be to   
the containing rather than to the       

contained1 to the located      rather   
than to the locating1 that a motion is  
to be ascribed40#ach  ,the apparently   
objective movements of the fixed stars  
and of the sun are mere appearances1 due
 to the projection of our own motion    
into the heavens4       8,the first and 
highest of all the spheres is that of   
the fixed      stars1 self-containing   
and all-containing1 and consequently    
immobile1 in short the locus of the     
universe1 by relation to which      the 
motion and position of all the other    
heavenly bodies have to be              
reckoned40#aci  ,now it is this         
doctrine1 and this doctrine alone1 to   
which ,kant is referring in the passages
 before us1 namely1 ,copernicus'        
hypothesis of a subjective explanation  
of apparently objective motions4 ,and   
further1 in thus comparing his ,critical
 procedure to that of ,copernicus1 he is
 concerned more with the positive than  
with the negative consequences of their 
common hypothesis4 ,for it is chiefly   

from the point of view of the           
constructive parts of the ,aesthetic1   
,analytic1 and ,dialectic that the      
comparison is formulated4 ,by means of  
the ,critical hypothesis ,kant professes
 on the one hand to account for our     
scientific knowledge1 and on the other  
to safeguard our legitimate metaphysical
 aspirations4 ,the spectator projects   
his own motion into the heavens2 human  
reason legislates for the domain of     
natural science4 ,the sphere of the     
fixed stars is proved to be motionless2 
things in themselves are freed from the 
limitations of space and time4          
8,copernicus dared1 in a manner         
contradictory of the senses but yet     
true1 to seek the observed movements1   
not in the heavenly bodies1 but in the  
spectator40#adj  ,in view of ,kant's    
explicit elimination of all hypotheses  
from the ,critique#ada the employment of
 that term would seem to be             
illegitimate4 ,he accordingly here      
states that though in the ,preface his  

,critical theory is formulated as an    
hypothesis only1 in the ,critique itself
 its truth is demonstrated a priori4    
99       99       99       99       99  
,distinction between knowing and        
thinking4#adb--,since according to      
,critical teaching the limits of        
sense-experience are the limits of      
knowledge1 the term knowledge has for   
,kant a very limited denotation1 and    
leaves open a proportionately wide field
 for what he entitles thought4 ,though  
things in themselves are unknowable1    
their existence may still be recognised 
in thought4     ,,introduction   ,i     
shall first#adc give a restatement1     
partly historical and partly            
explanatory1 of ,kant's main argument as
 contained in the enlarged ,introduction
 of the second edition4  ,there were two
 stages in the process by which ,kant   
came to full realisation of the         
,critical problem4 ,there is first the  
problem as formulated in his letter of  
#aggb to ,herz3 how the a priori can    

yield knowledge of the independently    
real4#add ,this1 as he there states it1 
is an essentially metaphysical problem4 
,it is the problem of the possibility of
 transcendent metaphysics4 ,he became   
aware of it when reflecting upon the    
function which he had ascribed to       
intellect in the ,dissertation4 ,then1  
secondly1 this problem was immeasurably 
deepened1 and at the same time the      
proper line for its treatment was       
discovered1 through the renewed         
influence which ,hume at some date      
subsequent to ,february #aggb exercised 
upon ,kant's thought4#ade ,hume awakened
 ,kant to what may be called the        
immanent problem involved in the very   
conception of a priori knowledge as     
such4 ,the primary problem to be solved 
is not how we advance by means of a     
priori ideas to the independently real1 
but how we are able to advance beyond a 
subject term to a predicate which it    
does not appear to contain4 ,the problem
 is indeed capable of solution1 just    

because it takes this logical form4     
,here as elsewhere1 ontological         
questions are viewed by ,kant as soluble
 only to the extent to which they can be
 restated in logical terms4 ,now also   
the enquiry becomes twofold3 how and in 
what degree are a priori synthetic      
judgments possible1 first in their      
employment within the empirical sphere  
7the problem of immanent metaphysics7   
and secondly in their application to    
things in themselves 7the problem of    
transcendent metaphysics74 ,the outcome 
of the ,critical enquiry is to establish
 the legitimacy of immanent metaphysics 
and the impossibility of all            
transcendent speculation4  ,the argument
 of ,kant's ,introduction follows the   
above sequence4 ,it starts by defining  
the problem of metaphysical knowledge a 
priori1 and through it leads up to the  
logical problem of the a priori         
synthetic judgment4 ,in respect of time 
all knowledge begins with experience4   
,but it does not therefore follow that  

it all arises from experience4 ,our     
experience may be a compound of that    
which we receive through impressions1   
and of that which pure reason supplies  
from itself4#adf ,the question as to    
whether or not any such a priori        
actually exists1 is one that can be     
answered only after further enquiry4    
,the two inseparable criteria of the a  
priori are necessity and universality4  
,that neither can be imparted to a      
proposition by experience was ,kant's   
confirmed and unquestioned belief4 ,he  
inherited this view both from ,leibniz  
and from ,hume4 ,it is one of the       
presuppositions of his argument4        
,experience can reveal only co-existence
 or sequence4 ,it enables us only to    
assert that so far as we have hitherto  
observed1 there is no exception to this 
or that rule4 ,a generalisation1 based  
on observation1 can never possess a     
wider universality than the limited     
experience for which it stands4 ,if1    
therefore1 necessary and universal      

judgments can anywhere be found in our  
knowledge1 the existence of an a priori 
that originates independently of        
experience is ipso facto                
demonstrated4#adg  ,the contrast between
 empirical and a priori judgments1 as   
formulated from the dogmatic standpoint1
 is the most significant and striking   
fact in the whole range of human        
knowledge4 ,a priori judgments claim    
absolute necessity4 ,they allow of no   
possible exception4 ,they are valid not 
only for us1 but also for all           
conceivable beings1 however different   
the specific conditions of their        
existence1 whether they live on the     
planet ,mars or in some infinitely      
remote region of stellar space1 and no  
matter how diversely their bodily senses
 may be organised4 ,through these       
judgments a creature five feet high1 and
 correspondingly limited by temporal    
conditions1 legislates for all existence
 and for all time4 ,empirical judgments1
 on the other hand1 possess only a      

hypothetical certainty4 ,we recognise   
that they may be overturned through some
 addition to our present experience1 and
 that they may not hold for beings on   
other planets or for beings with senses 
differently constituted4 ,whereas the   
opposite of a rational judgment is not  
even conceivable1 the opposite of an    
empirical judgment is always possible4  
,the one depends upon the inherent and  
inalienable nature of our thinking2 the 
other is bound up with the contingent   
material of sense4 ,the one claims      
absolute or metaphysical truth3 the     
other is a merely tentative rsum of a   
limited experience4  ,the possibility of
 such a priori judgments had hitherto   
been questioned only by those who sought
 to deny to them all possible objective 
validity4 ,kant1 as a rationalist1 has  
no doubt as to their actual existence4  
,in the ,introduction to the second     
edition he bluntly asserts their de     
facto existence1 citing as instances the
 propositions of mathematics and the    

fundamental principles of physical      
science4 ,their possibility can be      
accounted for through the assumption of 
a priori forms and principles4#adh ,but 
with equal emphasis he questions the    
validity of their metaphysical          
employment4 ,for that is an entirely    
different matter4 ,we then completely   
transcend the world of the senses and   
pass into a sphere where experience can 
neither guide nor correct us4 ,in this  
sphere the a priori is illegitimately   
taken as being at once the source of our
 professed knowledge and also the sole  
criterion of its own claims4  ,this is  
the problem1 semi-,critical1            
semi-dogmatic1 which is formulated in   
the letter of #aggb to ,herz4#adi ,what 
right have we to regard ideas1 which as 
a priori originate from within1 as being
 valid of things in themselves8 ,in so  
doing we are assuming a pre-established 
harmony between our human faculties and 
the ultimately real2 and that is an     
assumption which by its very nature is  

incapable of demonstration4 ,the proofs 
offered by ,malebranche and by ,leibniz 
are themselves speculative1 and         
consequently presuppose the conclusion  
which they profess to establish4#aej ,as
 above stated1 ,kant obtained his answer
 to this problem by way of the logical  
enquiry into the nature and conditions  
of a priori judgment4  ,one of the chief
 causes1 ,kant declares1 why hitherto   
metaphysical speculation has passed     
unchallenged among those who practise   
it1 is the confusion of two very        
different kinds of judgment1 the        
analytic and the synthetic4 ,much the   
greater portion of what reason finds to 
do consists in the analysis of our      
concepts of objects4       8,as this    
procedure yields real knowledge a       
priori1 which      progresses in secure 
and useful fashion1 reason is so far    
misled as      surreptitiously to       
introduce1 without itself being aware of
 so      doing1 assertions of an        
entirely different order1 in which      

reason      attaches to given concepts  
others completely foreign to them--and  
moreover attaches them a priori4 ,and   
yet one does not know how      reason   
comes to do this4 ,this is a question   
which is never as much      as thought  
of40#aea  ,the concepts which are       
analytically treated may be either      
empirical or a priori4 ,when they are   
empirical1 the judgments which they     
involve can have no wider application   
than the experience to which they give  
expression2 and in any case can only    
reveal what has all along been thought1 
though confusedly1 in the term which    
serves as subject of the proposition4   
,they can never reveal anything         
different in kind from the contents     
actually experienced4 ,this limitation1 
to which the analysis of empirical      
concepts is subject1 was admitted by    
both empiricists and rationalists4 ,the 
latter sought1 however1 to escape its   
consequences by basing their metaphysics
 upon concepts which are purely a       

priori1 and which by their a priori     
content may carry us beyond the         
experienced4 ,but here also ,kant       
asserts a non possibile4 ,a priori      
concepts1 he seeks to show1 are in all  
cases purely logical functions without  
content1 and accordingly are as little  
capable as are empirical concepts of    
carrying us over to the supersensible4  
,this is an objection which holds quite 
independently of that already noted1    
namely1 that their objective validity   
would involve a pre-established harmony4
  ,what1 then1 is the nature and what   
are the generating conditions of        
synthetic judgments that are also a     
priori8 ,in all judgments there is a    
relation between subject and predicate1 
and that can be of two kinds4 ,either   
the predicate ,b belongs to the subject 
,a1 or ,b lies outside the sphere of the
 concept ,a though somehow connected    
with it4 ,in the former case the        
judgment is analytic2 in the latter it  
is synthetic4 ,the one simply unfolds   

what has all along been conceived in the
 subject concept2 the other ascribes to 
the concept of the subject a predicate  
which cannot be found in it by any      
process of analysis4 ,thus the judgment 
#8all bodies are extended' is analytic4 
,the concept of body already contains   
that of extension1 and is impossible    
save through it4 ,on the other hand1 the
 judgment #8all bodies are heavy' is    
synthetic4 ,for not body as such1 but   
only bodies which are in interaction    
with other bodies1 are found to develop 
this property4 ,bodies can very well be 
conceived as not influencing one another
 in any such manner4  ,there is no      
difficulty in accounting for analytic   
judgments4 ,they can all be justified by
 the principle of contradiction4 ,being 
analytic1 they can be established a     
priori4 ,nor1 ,kant here claims1 is     
there any difficulty in regard to       
synthetic judgments that are empirical4 
,though the predicate is not contained  
in the subject concept1 they belong to  

each other 7though accidentally7 as     
parts of a given empirical whole4       
,experience is the x which lies beyond  
the concept ,a1 and on which rests the  
possibility of the synthesis of ,b with 
,a4 ,in regard1 however1 to synthetic   
judgments which are likewise a priori1  
the matter is very different4 ,hitherto1
 both by the sensationalists and by the 
rationalists1 all synthetic judgments   
have been regarded as empirical1 and all
 a priori judgments as analytic4 ,the   
only difference between the opposed     
schools lies in the relative value which
 they ascribe to the two types of       
judgment4 ,for ,hume the only really    
fruitful judgments are the synthetic    
judgments a posteriori2 analytic        
judgments are of quite secondary value2 
they can never extend our knowledge1 but
 only clarify its existing content4 ,for
 ,leibniz1 on the other hand1 true      
knowledge consists only in the analysis 
of our a priori concepts1 which he      
regards as possessing an intrinsic and  

fruitful content2 synthetic judgments   
are always empirical1 and as such are   
purely contingent4#aeb  ,thus for       
pre-,kantian philosophy analytic is     
interchangeable with a priori1 and      
synthetic with a posteriori4 ,kant's    
,critical problem arose from the        
startling discovery that the a priori   
and the synthetic do not exclude one    
another4 ,a judgment may be synthetic   
and yet also a priori4 ,he appears to   
have made this discovery under the      
influence of ,hume1 through study of the
 general principle of causality--every  
event must have a cause4#aec ,in that   
judgment there seems to be no connection
 of any kind discoverable between the   
subject 7the conception of an event as  
something happening in time7 and the    
predicate 7the conception of another    
event preceding it as an originating    
cause72 and yet we not merely ascribe   
the one to the other but assert that    
they are necessarily connected4 ,we can 
conceive an event as sequent upon a     

preceding empty time2 none the less1 in 
physical enquiry1 the causal principle  
is accepted as an established truth4    
,here1 then1 is a new and altogether    
unique type of judgment1 of thoroughly  
paradoxical nature4 ,so entirely is it  
without apparent basis1 that ,hume1 who 
first deciphered its strange character1 
felt constrained to ascribe our belief  
in it to an unreasoning and merely      
instinctive1 #8natural' habit or custom4
  ,kant found1 however1 that the        
paradoxical characteristics of the      
causal principle also belong to         
mathematical and physical judgments4    
,this fact makes it impossible to accept
 ,hume's sceptical conclusion4 ,if even 
the assertion #g  #e  #ab is both       
synthetic and a priori1 it is obviously 
impossible to question the validity of  
judgments that possess these            
characteristics4 ,but they do not for   
that reason any the less urgently press 
for explanation4 ,such an enquiry might 
not1 indeed1 be necessary were we       

concerned only with scientific          
knowledge4 ,for the natural sciences    
justify themselves by their practical   
successes and by their steady unbroken  
development4 ,but metaphysical judgments
 are also of this type2 and until the   
conditions which make a priori synthetic
 judgment possible have been discovered1
 the question as to the legitimacy of   
metaphysical speculation cannot be      
decided4 ,such judgments are plainly    
mysterious1 and urgently call for       
further enquiry4  ,the problem to be    
solved concerns the ground of our       
ascription to the subject concept1 as   
necessarily belonging to it1 a predicate
 which seems to have no discoverable    
relation to it4 ,what is the unknown x  
on which the understanding rests in     
asserting the connection8 ,it cannot be 
repeated experience2 for the judgments  
in question claim necessity4 ,nor can   
such judgments be proved by means of a  
logical test1 such as the               
inconceivability of the opposite4 ,the  

absence of all apparent connection      
between subject and predicate removes   
that possibility4 ,these1 however1 are  
the only two methods of proof hitherto  
recognised in science and philosophy4   
,the problem demands for its solution   
nothing less than the discovery and     
formulation of an entirely novel method 
of proof4  ,the three main classes of a 
priori synthetic judgments are1 ,kant   
proceeds1 the mathematical1 the         
physical1 and the metaphysical4 ,the    
synthetic character of mathematical     
judgments has hitherto escaped          
observation owing to their being proved 
7as is required of all apodictic        
certainty7 according to the principle of
 contradiction4 ,it is therefrom        
inferred that they rest on the authority
 of that principle1 and are therefore   
analytic4 ,that1 however1 is an         
illegitimate inference2 for though the  
truth of a synthetic proposition can be 
thus demonstrated1 that can only be if  
another synthetic principle is first    

presupposed4 ,it can never be proved    
that its truth1 as a separate judgment1 
is demanded by the principle of         
contradiction4 ,that #g  #e must equal  
#ab does not follow analytically from   
the conception of the sum of seven and  
five4 ,this conception contains nothing 
beyond the union of both numbers into   
one2 it does not tell us what is the    
single number that combines both4 ,that 
five should be added to seven is no     
doubt implied in the conception1 but not
 that the sum should be twelve4 ,to     
discover that1 we must1 ,kant maintains1
 go beyond the concepts and appeal to   
intuition4 ,this is more easily         
recognised when we take large numbers4  
,we then clearly perceive that1 turn and
 twist our concepts as we may1 we can   
never1 by means of mere analysis of     
them1 and without the help of intuition1
 arrive at the sum that is wanted4 ,the 
fundamental propositions of geometry1   
the so-called axioms1 are similarly     
synthetic1 e4g4 that the straight line  

between two points is the shortest4 ,the
 concept #8straight' only defines       
direction2 it says nothing as to        
quantity4  ,as an instance of a         
synthetic a priori judgment in physical 
science ,kant cites the principle3 the  
quantity of matter remains constant     
throughout all changes4 ,in the         
conception of matter we do not conceive 
its permanency1 but only its presence in
 the space which it fills4 ,the opposite
 of the principle is thoroughly         
conceivable4  ,metaphysics is meant to  
contain a priori knowledge4 ,for it     
seeks to determine that of which we can 
have no experience1 as e4g4 that the    
world must have a first beginning4 ,and 
if1 as will be proved1 our a priori     
concepts have no content1 which through 
analysis might yield such judgments1    
these judgments also must be synthetic4 
,here1 then1 we find the essential      
problem of pure reason4 ,expressed in a 
single formula1 it runs3 ,how are       
synthetic a priori judgments possible8  

,to ask this question is to enquire1    
first1 how pure mathematics is possible2
 secondly1 how pure natural science is  
possible2 and thirdly1 how metaphysics  
is possible4 ,that philosophy has       
hitherto remained in so vacillating a   
state of ignorance and contradiction is 
entirely due to the neglect of this     
problem of a priori synthesis4 8,its    
solution is the question of life and    
death to metaphysics40 ,hume came       
nearest to realising the problem1 but he
 discovered it in too narrow a form to  
appreciate its full significance and its
 revolutionary consequences4            
8,greater firmness will be required if  
we are not to be deterred by      inward
 difficulties and outward opposition    
from endeavouring1      through         
application of a method entirely        
different from any      hitherto        
employed1 to further the growth and     
fruitfulness of a      science          
indispensable to human reason--a science
 whose every branch      may be cut away

 but whose root cannot be               
destroyed40#aed  ,these statements are  
decidedly ambiguous1 owing to ,kant's   
failure to distinguish in any uniform   
and definite manner between immanent and
 transcendent metaphysics4#aee ,the term
 metaphysics is used to cover both4     
,sometimes it signifies the one1        
sometimes the other2 while in still     
other passages its meaning is neutral4  
,but if we draw the distinction1 ,kant's
 answer is that a genuine and valid     
immanent metaphysics is for the first   
time rendered possible by his ,critique2
 its positive content is expounded in   
the ,analytic4 ,transcendent            
metaphysics1 on the other hand1 is      
criticised in the ,dialectic2 it is     
never possible4 ,the existing           
speculative sciences transgress the     
limits of experience and yield only a   
pretence of knowledge4 ,this            
determination of the limits of our      
possible a priori knowledge is the      
second great achievement of the         

,critique4 ,thus the ,critique serves a 
twofold purpose4 ,it establishes a new a
 priori system of metaphysics1 and also 
determines on principles equally a      
priori the ultimate limits beyond which 
metaphysics can never advance4 ,the two 
results1 positive and negative1 are     
inseparable and complementary4 ,neither 
should be emphasised to the neglect of  
the other4   ,,comment ,,on ,,the       
,,argument ,,of ,,kant',s ,,introduction
  ,this ,introduction1 though a document
 of great historical importance as being
 the first definite formulation of the  
generating problem of ,kant's new       
philosophy1 is extremely unsatisfactory 
as a statement of ,critical teaching4   
,the argument is developed in terms of  
distinctions which are borrowed from the
 traditional logic1 and which are not in
 accordance with the transcendental     
principles that ,kant is professing to  
establish4 ,this is1 indeed1 a criticism
 which may be passed upon the ,critique 
as a whole4 ,though ,kant was conscious 

of opening a new era in the history of  
philosophy1 and compares his task with  
that of ,thales1 ,copernicus1 ,bacon and
 ,galileo1 it may still be said that he 
never fully appreciated the greatness of
 his own achievement4 ,he invariably    
assumes that the revolutionary          
consequences of his teaching will not   
extend to the sphere of pure logic4     
,they concern1 as he believed1 only our 
metaphysical theories regarding the     
nature of reality and the determining   
conditions of our human experience4 ,as 
formal logic prescribes the axiomatic   
principles according to which all       
thinking must proceed1 its validity is  
not affected by the other philosophical 
disciplines1 and is superior to the     
considerations that determine their     
truth or falsity4 ,its distinctions may 
be securely relied upon in the pioneer  
labours of ,critical investigation4     
,this was1 of course1 a very natural    
assumption for ,kant to make2 and many  
present-day thinkers will maintain that 

it is entirely justified4 ,should that  
be our attitude1 we may approve of      
,kant's general method of procedure1 but
 shall be compelled to dissent from much
 in his argument and from many of his   
chief conclusions4 ,if1 on the other    
hand1 we regard formal logic as in any  
degree adequate only as a theory of the 
thought processes involved in the       
formation and application of the generic
 or class concept1#aef we shall be      
prepared to find that the equating of   
this highly specialised logic with logic
 in general has resulted in the adoption
 of distinctions which may be fairly    
adequate for the purposes in view of    
which they have been formulated1 but    
which must break down when tested over a
 wider field4 ,so far from condemning   
,kant for departing in his later        
teaching from these hard and fast       
distinctions1 we shall welcome every    
sign of his increasing independence4    
,kant was not1 of course1 so blind to   
the real bearing of his principles as to

 fail to recognise that they have       
logical implications4#aeg ,he speaks of 
the new metaphysics which he has created
 as being a transcendental logic4 ,it is
 very clear1 however1 that even while so
 doing he does not regard it as in any  
way alternative to the older logic1 but 
as moving upon a different plane1 and as
 yielding results which in no way       
conflict with anything that formal logic
 may teach4 ,indeed ,kant ascribes to   
the traditional logic an almost         
sacrosanct validity4 ,both the general  
framework of the ,critique and the      
arrangement of the minor subdivisions   
are derived from it4 ,it is supposed to 
afford an adequate account of discursive
 thinking1 and such supplement as it may
 receive is regarded as simply an       
extension of its carefully delimited    
field4 ,there are two logics1 that of   
discursive or analytic reasoning1 and   
that of synthetic interpretation4 ,the  
one is formal2 the other is             
transcendental4 ,the one was created by 

,aristotle1 complete at a stroke2 ,kant 
professes to have formulated the other  
in an equally complete and final manner4
  ,this latter claim1 which is expressed
 in the most unqualified terms in the   
,prefaces to the first and second       
editions1 is somewhat startling to a    
modern reader1 and would seem to imply  
the adoption of an ultra-rationalistic  
attitude1 closely akin to that of       
,wolff4       8,in this work ,i have    
made completeness my chief aim1 and ,i  
venture      to assert that there is not
 a single metaphysical problem which has
      not been solved1 or for the       
solution of which the key at least has  
not been supplied4 ,reason is1 indeed1  
so perfect a unity that if      its     
principle were insufficient for the     
solution of even a single      one of   
all the questions to which it itself    
gives birth1 we should      be justified
 in forthwith rejecting it as           
incompetent to answer1      with perfect
 certainty1 any one of the other        

questions40#aeh      8,metaphysics has  
this singular advantage1 such as falls  
to the lot      of no other science     
which deals with objects 7for logic is  
concerned only with the form of thought 
in general71 that should      it1       
through this ,critique1 be set upon the 
secure path of      science1 it is      
capable of acquiring exhaustive         
knowledge of its      entire field4 ,it 
can finish its work and bequeath it to  
posterity      as a capital that can    
never be added to4 ,for metaphysics has 
to      deal only with principles1 and  
with the limits of their employment     
as determined by these principles       
themselves4 ,since it is a              
fundamental science1 it is under        
obligation to achieve this              
completeness4 ,we must be able to say of
 it3 nil actum reputans1 si      quid   
superesset agendum40#aei  ,these        
sanguine expectations--by no means      
supported by the after-history of       
,kant's system--are not really due to   

,kant's immodest over-estimate of the   
importance of his work4 ,they would     
rather seem to be traceable1 on the one 
hand to his continuing acceptance of    
rationalistic assumptions proper only to
 the philosophy which he is displacing1 
and on the other to his failure to      
appreciate the full extent of the       
revolutionary consequences which his    
teaching was destined to produce in the 
then existing philosophical disciplines4
 ,kant1 like all the greatest reformers1
 left his work in the making4 ,both his 
results and his methods call for        
modification and extension in the light 
of the insight which they have          
themselves rendered possible4 ,indeed1  
,kant was himself constantly occupied in
 criticising and correcting his own     
acquired views2 and this is nowhere more
 evident than in the contrast between   
the teaching of this ,introduction and  
that of the central portions of the     
,analytic4 ,but even the later          
expressions of his maturer views reveal 

the persisting conflict4 ,they betray   
the need for further reconstruction1    
even in the very act of disavowing it4  
,not an additional logic1 but the       
demonstration of the imperative need for
 a complete revisal of the whole body of
 logical science1 is the first1 and in  
many respects the chief1 outcome of his 
,critical enquiries4  ,the broader      
bearings of the situation may perhaps be
 indicated as follows4 ,if our account  
of ,kant's awakening from his dogmatic  
slumber#afj be correct1 it consisted in 
his recognition that self-evidence will 
not suffice to guarantee any general    
principle4 ,the fundamental principles  
of our experience are synthetic4 ,that  
is to say1 their opposite is in all     
cases conceivable4 ,combining this      
conclusion with his previous conviction 
that they can never be proved by        
induction from observed facts1 he was   
faced with the task of establishing     
rationalism upon a new and altogether   
novel basis4 ,if neither empirical facts

 nor intuitive self-evidence may be     
appealed to1 in what manner can proof   
proceed8 ,and how can we make even a    
beginning of demonstration1 if our very 
principles have themselves to be        
established8 ,principles are never      
self-evident1 and yet principles are    
indispensable4 ,such was ,kant's        
unwavering conviction as regards the    
fundamental postulates alike of         
knowledge and of conduct4  ,this is only
 another way of stating that ,kant is   
the real founder of the ,coherence      
theory of truth4#afa ,he never himself  
employs the term ,coherence1 and he     
constantly adopts positions which are   
more in harmony with a ,correspondence  
view of the nature and conditions of    
knowledge4 ,but all that is most vital  
in his teaching1 and has proved really  
fruitful in its after-history1 would    
seem to be in line with the positions   
which have since been more explicitly   
developed by such writers as ,lotze1    
,sigwart1 ,green1 ,bradley1 ,bosanquet1 

,jones and ,dewey1 and which in their   
tenets all derive from ,hegel's         
restatement of ,kant's logical          
doctrines4 ,from this point of view     
principles and facts mutually establish 
one another1 the former proving         
themselves by their capacity to account 
for the relevant phenomena1 and the     
latter distinguishing themselves from   
irrelevant accompaniments by their      
conformity to the principles which make 
insight possible4 ,in other words1 all  
proof conforms in general type to the   
hypothetical method of the natural      
sciences4 ,kant's so-called             
transcendental method1 the method by    
which he establishes the validity of the
 categories1 is itself1 as we have      
already observed1#afb of this character4
 ,secondly1 the distinction between the 
empirical and the a priori must not be  
taken 7as ,kant himself takes it in his 
earlier1 and occasionally even in his   
later utterances7 as marking a          
distinction between two kinds of        

knowledge4 ,they are elements           
inseparably involved in all knowledge4  
,and lastly1 the contrast between       
analysis and synthesis becomes a        
difference not of kind but of degree4   
,nothing can exist or be conceived save 
as fitted into a system which gives it  
meaning and decides as to its truth4 ,in
 the degree to which it can be studied  
in relative independence of the         
supporting system analysis will suffice2
 in the degree to which it refers us to 
this system it calls for synthetic      
interpretation4 ,but ultimately the     
needs of adequate understanding must    
constrain us to the employment of both  
methods of enquiry4 ,nothing can be     
known save in terms of the wider whole  
to which it belongs4  ,there is1        
however1 one important respect in which 
,kant diverges in very radical fashion  
from the position of ,hegel4 ,the final 
whole to which all things must be       
referred is represented to us only      
through an 8,idea10 for which no        

corresponding reality can ever be found4
 ,the system which decides what is to be
 regarded as empirically real is the    
mechanical system of natural science4   
,we have no sufficient theoretical      
criterion of absolute reality4  ,these  
somewhat general considerations may be  
made more definite if we now endeavour  
to determine in what specific respects  
the distinctions employed in the        
,introduction fail to harmonise with the
 central doctrines of the ,analytic4    
,in the first place1 ,kant states his   
problem in reference only to the        
attributive judgment4 ,the other types  
of relational judgment are entirely     
ignored4 ,for even when he cites        
judgments of other relational types1    
such as the propositions of arithmetic  
and geometry1 or that which gives       
expression to the causal axiom1 he      
interprets them on the lines of the     
traditional theory of the categorical   
proposition4 ,as we shall find1#afc it  
is with the relational categories1 and  

consequently with the various types of  
relational judgment to which they give  
rise1 that the ,critique is alone       
directly concerned4 ,even the           
attributive judgment is found on        
examination to be of this nature4 ,what 
it expresses is not the inclusion of an 
attribute within a given group of       
attributes1 but the organisation of a   
complex manifold in terms of the dual   
category of substance and attribute4    
,secondly1 this exclusively attributive 
interpretation of the judgment leads    
,kant to draw1 in his ,introduction1 a  
hard and fast distinction between the   
analytic and the synthetic              
proposition--a distinction which1 when  
stated in such extreme fashion1 obscures
 the real implications of the argument  
of the ,analytic4 ,for ,kant here       
propounds#afd as an exhaustive division 
the two alternatives3 7a7 inclusion of  
the predicate concept within the subject
 concept1 and 7b7 the falling of the    
predicate concept entirely outside it4  

,he adds1 indeed1 that in the latter    
case the two concepts may still be in   
some way connected with one another2 but
 this is a concession of which he takes 
no account in his subsequent argument4  
,he leaves unconsidered the third       
possibility1 that every judgment is both
 analytic and synthetic4 ,if concepts   
are not independent entities1#afe as    
,kant1 in agreement with ,leibniz1 still
 continues to maintain1 but can function
 only as members of an articulated      
system1 concepts will be distinguishable
 from one another1 and yet will none the
 less involve one another4 ,in so far as
 the distinguishable elements in a      
judgment are directly related1 the      
judgment may seem purely analytic2 in so
 far as they are related only in an     
indirect manner through a number of     
intermediaries1 they may seem to be     
purely synthetic4 ,but in every case    
there is an internal articulation which 
is describable as synthesis1 and an     
underlying unity that in subordinating  

all differences realises more adequately
 than any mere identity the demand for  
connection between subject and          
predicate4 ,in other words1 all         
judgments will1 on this view1 be of the 
relational type4 ,even the attributive  
judgment1 as above noted1 is no mere    
assertion of identity4 ,it is always    
expressed in terms of the dual category 
of substance and attribute1 connecting  
by a relation contents that as contents 
may be extremely diverse4  ,this would  
seem to be the view to which ,kant's    
,critical teaching1 when consistently   
developed1 is bound to lead4 ,for in    
insisting that the synthetic character  
of a judgment need not render it        
invalid1 and that all the fundamental   
principles and most of the derivative   
judgments of the positive sciences are  
of this nature1 ,kant is really         
maintaining that the justification of a 
judgment is always to be looked for     
beyond its own boundaries in some       
implied context of coherent experience4 

,but though the value of his argument   
lies in clear-sighted recognition of the
 synthetic factor in all genuine        
knowledge1 its cogency is greatly       
obscured by his continued acceptance of 
the possibility of judgments that are   
purely analytic4 ,thus there is little  
difficulty in detecting the synthetic   
character of the proposition3 all bodies
 are heavy4 ,yet the reader has first   
been required to admit the analytic     
character of the proposition3 all bodies
 are extended4 ,the two propositions are
 really identical in logical character4 
,neither can be recognised as true save 
in terms of a comprehensive theory of   
physical existence4 ,if matter must     
exist in a state of distribution in     
order that its parts may acquire through
 mutual attraction the property of      
weight1 the size of a body1 or even its 
possessing any extension whatsoever1 may
 similarly depend upon specific         
conditions such as may conceivably not  
be universally realised4 ,we find the   

same difficulty when we are called upon 
to decide whether the judgment #g  #e   
#ab is analytic or purely synthetic4    
,kant speaks as if the concepts of #g1  
#e1 and #ab were independent entities1  
each with its own quite separate        
connotation4 ,but obviously they can    
only be formed in the light of the      
various connected concepts which go to  
constitute our system of numeration4    
,the proposition has meaning only when  
interpreted in the light of this        
conceptual system4 ,it is not1 indeed1 a
 self-evident identical proposition2 but
 neither is the connection asserted so  
entirely synthetic that intuition will  
alone account for its possibility4      
,that1 however1 brings us to the third  
main defect in ,kant's argument4  ,when 
,kant states#aff that in synthetic      
judgments we require1 besides the       
concept of the subject1 something else  
on which the understanding can rely in  
knowing that a predicate1 not contained 
in the concept1 nevertheless belongs to 

it1 he entitles this something x4 ,in   
the case of empirical judgments1 this x 
is brute experience4 ,such judgments1   
,kant implies1 are merely empirical4 ,no
 element of necessity is involved1 not  
even in an indirect manner2 in reference
 to empirical judgments there is no     
problem of a priori synthesis4 ,now in  
formulating the issue in this way1 ,kant
 is obscuring the essential purpose of  
his whole enquiry4 ,he may1 without     
essential detriment to his central      
position1 still continue to preserve a  
hard-and-fast distinction between       
analytic and synthetic judgments4 ,in so
 doing he is only failing to perceive   
the ultimate consequences of his final  
results4 ,but in viewing empirical      
judgments as lacking in every element of
 necessity1 he is destroying the very   
ground upon which he professes to base  
the a priori validity of general        
principles4 ,all judgments involve      
relational factors of an a priori       
character4 ,the appeal to experience is 

the appeal to an implied system of      
nature4 ,only when fitted into the      
context yielded by such a system can an 
empirical proposition have meaning1 and 
only in the light of such a presupposed 
system can its truth be determined4 ,it 
can be true at all1 only if it can be   
regarded as necessarily holding1 under  
the same conditions1 for all minds      
constituted like our own4 ,assertion of 
a contingent relation--as in the        
proposition3 this horse is white--is not
 equivalent to contingency of assertion4
 ,colour is a variable quality of the   
genus horse1 but in the individual horse
 is necessarily determined in some      
particular mode4 ,if a horse is         
naturally white1 it is necessarily      
white4 ,though1 therefore1 in the above 
proposition1 necessity receives no      
explicit verbal expression1 it is none  
the less implied4  ,in other words1 the 
distinction between the empirical and   
the a priori is not1 as ,kant           
inconsistently assumes in this          

,introduction1 a distinction between two
 kinds of synthesis or judgment1 but    
between two elements inseparably        
involved in every judgment4 ,experience 
is transcendentally conditioned4        
,judgment is in all cases the expression
 of a relation which implies an         
organised system of supporting          
propositions2 and for the articulation  
of this system a priori factors are     
indispensably necessary4  ,but the most 
flagrant example of ,kant's failure to  
live up to his own ,critical principles 
is to be found in his doctrine of pure  
intuition4 ,it represents a position    
which he adopted in the pre-,critical   
period4 ,it is prefigured in ,ueber die 
,deutlichkeit der ,grundstze 7#agfd71afg
 and in ,von dem ersten ,grunde des     
,unterschiedes der ,gegenden im ,raume  
7#agfh71afh and is definitely expounded 
in the ,dissertation 7#aggj74afi ,that  
,kant continued to hold this doctrine1  
and that he himself regarded it as an   
integral part of his system1 does not1  

of course1 suffice to render it         
genuinely ,critical4 ,as a matter of    
fact1 it is really as completely        
inconsistent with his ,critical         
standpoint as is the view of the        
empirical proposition which we have just
 been considering4 ,an appeal to our    
fingers or to points#agj is as little   
capable1 in and by itself1 of justifying
 any a priori judgment as are the       
sense-contents of grounding an empirical
 judgment4 ,even when ,kant is allowed  
the benefit of his own more careful     
statements1#aga and is taken as         
asserting that arithmetical propositions
 are based on a pure a priori intuition 
which can find only approximate         
expression in sensuous terms1 his       
statements run counter to the main      
tendencies of his ,critical teaching1 as
 well as to the recognised methods of   
the mathematical sciences4 ,intuition   
may1 as ,poincar and others have        
maintained1 be an indispensable element 
in all mathematical concepts2 it cannot 

afford proof of any general theorem4    
,the conceptual system which directs our
 methods of decimal counting is what    
gives meaning to the judgment #g  #e    
#ab2 it is also what determines that    
judgment as true4 ,the appeal to        
intuition in numerical judgments must be
 regarded only as a means of            
imaginatively realising in a concrete   
form the abstract relations of some such
 governing system1 or else as a means of
 detecting relations not previously     
known4 ,the last thing in the world     
which such a method can yield is        
universal demonstration4 ,this is       
equally evident in regard to geometrical
 propositions4 ,that a straight line is 
the shortest distance between two       
points1 cannot be proved by any mere    
appeal to intuition4 ,the judgment will 
hold if it can be assumed that space is 
,euclidean in character2 and to justify 
that assumption it must be shown that   
,euclidean concepts are adequate to the 
interpretation of our intuitional data4 

,should space possess a curvature1 the  
above proposition might cease to be     
universally valid4 ,space is not a      
simple1 unanalysable datum4 ,though     
intuitionally apprehended1 it demands   
for its precise determination the whole 
body of geometrical science4#agb  ,the  
comparative simplicity of ,kant's       
intuitional theory of mathematical      
science1 supported as it is by the      
seemingly fundamental distinction       
between abstract concepts of reflective 
thinking and the construction of        
concepts#agc in geometry and arithmetic1
 has made it intelligible even to those 
to whom the very complicated argument of
 the ,analytic makes no appeal4 ,it     
would also seem to be inseparably bound 
up with what from the popular point of  
view is the most striking of all ,kant's
 theoretical doctrines1 namely1 his view
 that space and time are given          
subjective forms1 and that the assertion
 of their independent reality must      
result in those contradictions to which 

,kant has given the title antinomy4 ,for
 these reasons his intuitional theory of
 mathematical science has received      
attention out of all proportion to its  
importance4 ,its pre-,critical character
 has been more or less overlooked1 and  
instead of being interpreted in the     
light of ,critical principles1 it has   
been allowed to obscure the sounder     
teaching of the ,analytic4 ,in this     
matter ,schopenhauer is a chief culprit4
 ,he not only takes the views of        
mathematical science expounded in the   
,introduction and ,aesthetic as being in
 line with ,kant's main teaching1 but   
expounds them in an even more           
unqualified fashion than does ,kant     
himself4  ,there are thus four main     
defects in the argument of this         
,introduction1 regarded as              
representative of ,critical teaching4   
7#a7 ,its problems are formulated       
exclusively in terms of the attributive 
judgment2 the other forms of relational 
judgment are ignored4 7#b7 ,it maintains

 that judgments are either merely       
analytic or completely synthetic4 7#c7  
,it proceeds in terms of a further      
division of judgments into those that   
are purely empirical and those that are 
a priori4 7#d7 ,it seems to assert that 
the justification for mathematical      
judgments is intuitional4 ,all these    
four positions are in some degree       
retained throughout the ,critique1 but  
not in the unqualified manner of this   
,introduction4 ,in the ,analytic1       
judgment in all its possible forms is   
shown to be a synthetic combination of a
 given manifold in terms of relational  
categories4 ,this leads to a fourfold   
conclusion4 ,in the first place1        
judgment must be regarded as essentially
 relational4 ,secondly1 the a priori and
 the empirical must not be taken as two 
separate kinds of knowledge1 but as two 
elements involved in all knowledge4     
,thirdly1 analysis and synthesis must   
not be viewed as co-ordinate processes2 
synthesis is the more fundamental2 it   

conditions all analysis4 ,and lastly1 it
 must be recognised that nothing is     
merely given2 intuitional experience1   
whether sensuous or a priori1 is        
conditioned by processes of conceptual  
interpretation4 ,though the consequences
 which follow from these conclusions1 if
 fully developed1 would carry us far    
beyond any point which ,kant himself    
reached in the progressive maturing of  
his views1 the next immediate steps     
would still be on the strict lines of   
the ,critical principles1 and would     
involve the sacrifice only of such      
pre-,critical doctrines as that of the  
intuitive character of mathematical     
proof4 ,such correction of ,kant's      
earlier positions is the necessary      
complement of his own final discovery   
that sense-intuition is incapable of    
grounding even the so-called empirical  
judgment4         99       99       99  
99       99  ,the ,introduction to the  
first edition bears all the signs of    
having been written previous to the     

central portions of the ,analytic4#agd  
,that it was not1 however1 written prior
 to the ,aesthetic seems probable4 ,the 
opening sections of the ,aesthetic      
represent what is virtually an          
independent introduction which takes no 
account of the preceding argument1 and  
which redefines terms and distinctions  
that have already been dwelt upon4 ,the 
extensive additions which ,kant made in 
recasting the ,introduction for the     
second edition are in many respects a   
great improvement4 ,in the first edition
 ,kant had not1 except when speaking of 
the possibility of constructing the     
concepts of mathematical science1       
referred to the synthetic character of  
mathematical judgments4 ,this is now    
dwelt upon in adequate detail4 ,kant's  
reason for not making the revision more 
radical was doubtless his unwillingness 
to undertake the still more extensive   
alterations which this would have       
involved4 ,had he expanded the opening  
statement of the second edition         

,introduction1 that even our empirical  
knowledge is a compound of the sensuous 
and the a priori1 an entirely new       
,introduction would have become         
necessary4 ,the additions made are      
therefore only such as will not markedly
 conflict with the main tenor of the    
argument of the first edition4   ,,how  
,,are ,,synthetic ,a ,,priori           
,,judgments ,,possible8  ,treatment of  
detailed points will be simplified if we
 now consider in systematic fashion the 
many difficulties that present          
themselves in connection with ,kant's   
mode of formulating his central problem3
 ,how are synthetic a priori judgments  
possible8 ,this formula is less definite
 and precise than would at first sight  
appear4 ,the central phrase #8synthetic 
a priori' is sufficiently exact 7the    
meaning to be attached to the a priori  
has already been considered#age71 but   
ambiguities of the most various kinds   
lurk in the seemingly innocent and      
simple terms with which the formula     

begins and ends3       ,a4 #8,how' has  
two very different meanings3       7a7  
,how possible  in what manner possible  
wie4       7b7 ,how possible  in how far
 possible1 i4e4 whether      possible   
ob4  ,in connection with these two      
meanings of the term #8how1' we shall   
have to consider the distinction between
 the synthetic method employed in the   
,critique and the analytic method       
employed in the ,prolegomena4       ,b4 
#8,possible' has a still wider range of 
application4      ,vaihinger#agf        
distinguishes within it no less than    
three pairs of      alternative         
meanings3       7a7 ,psychological and  
logical possibility4       7b7          
,possibility of explanation and         
possibility of existence4       7c7     
,real and ideal possibility4  ,a4 ,kant 
personally believed that the possibility
 of valid a priori synthetic judgment is
 proved by the existing sciences of     
mathematics and physics4 ,and that being
 so1 there were for ,kant two very      

different methods which could be        
employed in accounting for their        
possibility1 the synthetic or           
progressive1 and the analytic or        
regressive4 ,the synthetic method would 
start from given1 ordinary experience   
7in its simplest form1 as consciousness 
of time71 to discover its conditions1   
and from them to prove the validity of  
knowledge that is a priori4 ,the        
analytic method would start 8from the   
sought as if it were given10 that is1   
from the existence of a priori synthetic
 judgments1 and1 assuming them as valid1
 would determine the conditions under   
which alone such validity can be        
possible4 ,the precise formulation of   
these two methods1 the determination of 
their interrelations1 of their value and
 comparative scope1 is a matter of great
 importance1 and must therefore be      
considered at some length4  ,the        
synthetic method may easily be          
confounded with the analytic method4    
,for in the process of its argument it  

makes use of analysis4 ,by analysing    
ordinary experience in the form in which
 it is given1 it determines 7in the     
,aesthetic and in the ,analytic of      
,concepts7 the fundamental elements of  
which knowledge is composed1 and the    
generating conditions from which it     
results4 ,from these the validity of the
 a priori principles that underlie      
mathematics and physics can 7in the     
,analytic of ,principles7 be directly   
deduced4 ,the fundamental               
differentiating feature1 therefore1 of  
the so-called synthetic method is not   
its synthetic procedure1 since in great 
part1 in the solution of the most       
difficult portion of its task1 it       
employs an analytic method1 but only its
 attitude towards the one question of   
the validity of a priori synthetic      
knowledge4 ,it does not postulate this  
validity as a premiss1 but proves it as 
a consequence of conditions which are   
independently established4 ,by a        
preliminary regress upon the conditions 

of our de facto consciousness it        
acquires data from which it is enabled  
to advance by a synthetic1 progressive  
or deductive procedure to the           
establishment of the validity of        
synthetic a priori judgments4 ,the      
analytic method1 on the other hand1     
makes no attempt to prove the validity  
of a priori knowledge4 ,it seeks only to
 discover the conditions under which    
such knowledge1 if granted to exist1 can
 possess validity1 and in the light of  
which its paradoxical and apparently    
contradictory features can be viewed as 
complementary to one another4 ,the      
conditions1 thus revealed1 will render  
the validity of knowledge conceivable1  
will account for it once it has been    
assumed2 but they do not prove it4 ,the 
validity is a premiss2 the whole        
argument rests upon the assumption of   
its truth4 ,the conditions are only     
postulated as conditions2 and their     
reality becomes uncertain1 if the       
validity1 which presupposes them1 is    

itself called in question4 ,immediately 
we attempt to reverse the procedure1 and
 to prove validity from these           
conditions1 our argument must           
necessarily adopt the synthetic form2   
and that1 as has been indicated1        
involves the prior application of a very
 different and much more thorough       
process of analysis4 ,the distinction   
between the two methods may therefore be
 stated as follows4 ,in the synthetic   
method the grounds which are employed to
 explain a priori knowledge are such as 
also at the same time suffice to prove  
its validity4 ,in the analytic method   
they are grounds of explanation1 but not
 of proof4 ,they are themselves proved  
only in so far as the assumption of     
validity is previously granted4  ,the   
analytic procedure which is involved in 
the complete synthetic method ought1    
however1 for the sake of clearness1 to  
be classed as a separate1 third1 method4
 ,and as such ,i shall henceforth regard
 it4 ,it establishes by an independent  

line of argument the existence of a     
priori factors1 and also their objective
 validity as conditions necessary to the
 very possibility of experience4 ,so    
viewed1 it is the most important and the
 most fundamental of the three methods4 
,the argument which it embodies         
constitutes the very heart of the       
,critique4 ,it is1 indeed1 ,kant's new  
transcendental method2 and in the       
future1 in order to avoid confusion with
 the analytic method of the             
,prolegomena1 ,i shall refer to it      
always by this title4 ,it is because the
 transcendental method is an integral   
part of the complete1 synthetic method1 
but cannot be consistently made a part  
of the analytic method1 that the        
synthetic method alone serves as an     
adequate expression of the ,kantian     
standpoint4 ,this new transcendental    
method is proof by reference to the     
possibility of experience4 ,experience  
is given as psychological fact4 ,the    
conditions which can alone account for  

it1 as psychological fact1 also suffice 
to prove its objective validity2 but at 
the same time they limit that validity  
to the phenomenal realm4  ,we have next 
to enquire to what extent these methods 
are consistently employed in the        
,critique4 ,this is a problem over which
 there has been much controversy1 but   
which seems to have been answered in a  
quite final manner by ,vaihinger4 ,it is
 universally recognised that the        
,critique professes to follow the       
synthetic method1 and that the          
,prolegomena1 for the sake of a simpler 
and more popular form of exposition1    
adopts the analytic method4 ,how far    
these two works live up to their        
professions1 especially the ,critique in
 its two editions1 is the only point    
really in question4 ,vaihinger found two
 diametrically opposed views dividing   
the field4 ,paulsen1 ,riehl1 and        
,windelband maintain the view that ,kant
 starts from the fact that mathematics1 
pure natural science1 and metaphysics   

contain synthetic a priori judgments    
claiming to be valid4 ,kant's problem is
 to test these claims2 and his answer is
 that they are valid in mathematics and 
pure natural science1 but not in        
metaphysics4 ,paulsen1 and those who    
follow him1 further contend that in the 
first edition this method is in the main
 consistently held to1 but that in the  
second edition1 owing to the occasional 
employment 7especially in the           
,introduction7 of the analytic method of
 the ,prolegomena1 the argument is      
perverted and confused3 ,kant assumes   
what he ought first to have proved4     
,fischer1 on the other hand1 and in a   
kindred manner also ,b4 ,erdmann1       
maintain that ,kant never actually      
doubted the validity of synthetic a     
priori judgments2 starting from their   
validity1 in order to explain it1 ,kant 
discovers the conditions upon which it  
rests1 and in so doing is able to show  
that these conditions are not of such a 
character as to justify the professed   

judgments of metaphysics4               
,vaihinger#agg combines portions of both
 views1 while completely accepting      
neither4 ,hume's profound influence upon
 the development and formulation of     
,kant's ,critical problem can hardly be 
exaggerated1 but it ought not to prevent
 us from realising that this problem1 in
 its first form1 was quite independently
 discovered4 ,as the letter of #aggb to 
,herz clearly shows1#agh ,kant was      
brought to the problem1 how an idea in  
us can relate to an object1 by the inner
 development of his own views1 through  
reflection upon the view of thought     
which he had developed in the           
,dissertation of #aggj4 ,the conformity 
between thought and things is in that   
letter presented1 not as a sceptical    
objection1 but as an actual fact calling
 for explanation4 ,he does not ask      
whether there is such conformity1 but   
only how it should be possible4 ,even   
after the further complication1 that    
thought is synthetic as well as a       

priori1 came into view through the      
influence of ,hume1 the problem still   
continued to present itself to ,kant in 
this non-sceptical light4 ,and this     
largely determines the wording of his   
exposition1 even in passages in which   
the demands of the synthetic method are 
being quite amply fulfilled4 ,kant1 as  
it would seem1 never himself doubted the
 validity of the mathematical sciences4 
,but since their validity is not beyond 
possible impeachment1 and since         
metaphysical knowledge1 which is        
decidedly questionable1 would appear to 
be of somewhat similar type1 ,kant was  
constrained to recognise that1 from the 
point of view of strict proof1 such     
assumption of validity is not really    
legitimate4 ,though1 therefore1 the     
analytic method would have resolved     
,kant's own original difficulty1 only   
the synthetic method is fully adequate  
to the situation4  ,kant accordingly    
sets himself to prove that whether or   
not we are ready 7as he himself is7 to  

recognise the validity of scientific    
judgments1 the correctness of this      
assumption can be firmly established4   
,and being thus able to prove its       
correctness1 he for that very reason    
does not hesitate to employ it in his   
introductory statement4 ,the problem1 he
 says1 is that of #8understanding' how  
synthetic a priori judgments can be     
valid4 ,a #8difficulty1' a #8mystery1' a
 #8secret1' lies concealed in them4 ,how
 can a predicate be ascribed to a       
subject term which does not contain it8 
,and even more strangely 7if that be    
possible71 how can a priori judgments   
legislate for objects which are         
independent existences8 ,such judgments1
 even if valid beyond all disputing1    
would still call for explanation4 ,this 
is1 indeed1 ,kant's original and ground 
problem4 ,as already indicated1 no one1 
save only ,hume1 had hitherto perceived 
its significance4 ,plato1 ,malebranche1 
and ,crusius may have dwelt upon it1 but
 only to suggest explanations still     

stranger and more mystical than the     
mysterious fact itself4#agi  ,paulsen is
 justified in maintaining that ,kant1 in
 both editions of the ,critique1        
recognises the validity of mathematics  
and pure natural science4 ,the fact of  
their validity is less explicitly dwelt 
upon in the first edition1 but is none  
the less taken for granted4 ,the        
sections transferred from the           
,prolegomena to the ,introduction of the
 second edition make no essential       
change1 except merely in the emphasis   
with which ,kant's belief in the        
existence of valid a priori synthetic   
judgments is insisted upon4 ,as has     
already been stated1 only by virtue of  
this initial assumption is ,kant in     
position to maintain that there is an   
alternative to the strict synthetic     
method4 ,the problem from which he      
starts is common to both methods1 and   
for that reason the formulation used in 
the ,prolegomena can also be employed in
 the ,introduction to the ,critique4    

,only in their manner of solving the    
problem need they differ4#ahj ,kant's   
,critical problem first begins with this
 presupposition of validity1 and does   
not exist save through it4#aha ,he does 
not first seek to discover whether such 
judgments are valid1 and then to explain
 them4 ,he accepts them as valid1 but   
develops a method of argument which     
suffices for proof as well as for       
explanation4 ,the argument being        
directed to both points simultaneously1 
and establishing both with equal        
cogency1 it may legitimately be         
interpreted in either way1 merely as    
explanation1 or also as proof4 ,kant    
does not profess or attempt to keep     
exclusively to any one line of          
statement4 ,against the dogmatists he   
insists upon the necessity of explaining
 the validity of a priori synthetic     
judgments1 against the sceptics upon the
 possibility of proving their validity4 
,and constantly he uses ambiguous terms1
 such as #8justification'               

7,rechtfertigung71 #8possibility1' that 
may indifferently be read in either     
sense4 ,but though the fundamental      
demand which characterises the synthetic
 method in its distinction from the     
analytic thus falls into the background1
 and is only occasionally insisted upon1
 it is none the less fulfilled4 ,so far 
as regards the main argument of the     
,critique in either edition1 the        
validity of synthetic a priori judgments
 is not required as a premiss4 ,it is   
itself independently proved4  ,the      
manner in which ,kant thus departs from 
the strict application of the synthetic 
method may be illustrated by an analysis
 of his argument in the ,aesthetic4#ahb 
,only in the arguments of the first     
edition in regard to space and time is  
the synthetic method employed in its    
ideal and rigorous form4 ,for the most  
part1 even in the first edition1 instead
 of showing how the a priori character  
of pure and applied mathematics follows 
from conclusions independently          

established1 he assumes both pure and   
applied mathematics to be given as      
valid1 and seeks only to show how the   
independently established results of the
 ,aesthetic enable him to explain and   
render comprehensible their recognised  
characteristics4 ,this is not1 indeed1  
any very essential modification of the  
synthetic method2 for his independently 
established results suffice for deducing
 all that they are used to explain4 ,the
 validity of mathematics is not employed
 as a premiss4 ,kant's argument is1     
however1 made less clear by the above   
procedure4  ,further difficulty is      
caused by ,kant's occasional employment1
 even in the first edition1 of the      
analytic method4 ,he several times cites
 as an argument in support of his view  
of space the fact that it alone will    
account for the existing science of     
geometry4 ,that is to say1 he employs   
geometry1 viewed as valid1 to prove the 
correctness of his view of space4#ahc   
,starting from that science as given1 he

 enquires what are the conditions which 
can alone render it possible4 ,these    
conditions are found to coincide with   
those independently established4 ,now   
this is a valid argument when employed  
in due subordination to the main        
synthetic method4 ,it offers welcome    
confirmation of the results of that     
method4 ,it amounts in fact to this1    
that having proved 7by application of   
the transcendental method7 the          
mathematical sciences to be valid1      
everything which their validity         
necessarily implies must be granted4    
,kant's reasoning here becomes circular1
 but it is none the less valid on that  
account4 ,this further complication of  
the argument is1 however1 dangerously   
apt to mislead the reader4 ,it is in    
great part the cause of the above       
division among ,kant's commentators4    
,the method employed in the ,prolegomena
 is simply this form of argument        
systematised and cut free from all      
dependence upon the transcendental      

method of proof4#ahd  ,the whole matter 
is1 however1 still further complicated  
by the distinction1 which we have       
already noted1 between real and ideal   
possibility4 ,are the given synthetic a 
priori judgments valid8 ,that is one    
question4 ,can the ,critical philosophy 
discover1 completely enumerate1 and     
prove in a manner never before done1 all
 the possible synthetic a priori        
principles8 ,that is a very different   
problem1 and when raised brings us to   
the further discussion of ,kant's       
transcendental method4 ,the question at 
issue is no longer merely whether or not
 certain given judgments are valid1 and 
how1 if valid1 they are to be accounted 
for4 ,the question is now that of       
discovering and of proving principles   
which have not been established by any  
of the special sciences4 ,this shifting 
of the problem is concealed from ,kant  
himself by his omission to distinguish  
between the undemonstrated axioms of the
 mathematical sciences and their        

derivative theorems1 between the        
principles employed by the physicist    
without enquiry into their validity and 
the special laws based upon empirical   
evidence4  ,as regards the mathematical 
axioms1 the problem is fairly simple4   
,as we shall see later1 in the          
,aesthetic1 they do not require a       
deduction in the strict transcendental  
sense4 ,they really fall outside the    
application of the transcendental       
method4 ,they require only an           
8exposition40 ,but in regard to the     
fundamental principles of natural       
science we are presented with the       
problem of discovery as well as of      
proof4 ,unlike the axioms of the        
mathematician1 they are frequently left 
unformulated4 ,and many postulates1 such
 as that there is a lex continui in     
natura1 are current in general thought1 
and claim equal validity with the causal
 principle4 ,kant has thus to face the  
question whether in addition to those   
principles employed more or less        

explicitly by the scientist1 others1    
such as might go to form an immanent    
metaphysics of nature1 may not also be  
possible4  ,b4 7a7#ahe ,psychological   
and logical possibility4--,both have to 
be recognised and accounted for4 ,let us
 consider each in order4  7#a7          
,psychological possibility4--,what are  
the subjective conditions of a priori   
synthetic judgments8 ,through what      
mental faculties are they rendered      
possible8 ,kant replies by developing   
what may be called a transcendental     
psychology4 ,they depend upon space and 
time as forms of sensibility1 upon the a
 priori concepts of understanding1 and  
upon the synthetic activities by which  
the imagination schematises these       
concepts and reduces the given manifold 
to the unity of apperception4 ,this     
transcendental psychology is the        
necessary complement of the more purely 
epistemological analysis4#ahf ,but on   
this point ,kant's utterances are       
extremely misleading4 ,his ,critical    

enquiry has1 he declares1 nothing in    
common with psychology4 ,in the ,preface
 to the first edition we find the       
following passage3 8,this enquiry 444   
into the pure understanding itself1 its 
possibility and the cognitive faculties 
upon which it rests 4441 although of    
great importance for my chief purpose1  
does not form an essential part of      
it40#ahg ,the question1 he adds1 8how is
 the faculty of thought itself          
possible8444 is as it were a search for 
the cause of a given effect1 and        
therefore is of the nature of an        
hypothesis or #8mere opinion'1 though1  
as ,i shall show elsewhere1 this is not 
really so40 ,the concluding words of    
this passage very fairly express ,kant's
 hesitating and inconsistent procedure4 
,though he has so explicitly eliminated 
from the central enquiry of the         
,critique all psychological             
determination of the mental powers1     
statements as to their constitution are 
none the less implied1 and are involved 

in his epistemological justification    
alike of a priori knowledge and of      
ordinary experience4 ,if we bear in mind
 that ,kant is here attempting to       
outline the possible causes of given    
effects1 and that his conclusions are   
therefore necessarily of a more         
hypothetical character than those       
obtained by logical analysis1 we shall  
be prepared to allow him considerable   
liberty in their formulation4 ,but in   
certain respects his statements are     
precise and definite--the view1 for     
instance1 of sensations as non-spatial1 
of time as a form of inner sense1 of the
 productive imagination as              
pre-conditioning our consciousness1 of  
spontaneity as radically distinct from  
receptivity1 of the pure forms of       
thought as not acquired through sense1  
etc4 ,no interpretation which ignores or
 under-estimates this psychological or  
subjective aspect of his teaching can be
 admitted as adequate4#ahh  7#b7        
,logical or epistemological             

possibility4--,how can synthetic a      
priori judgments be valid8 ,this        
question itself involves a twofold      
problem4 ,how1 despite their synthetic  
character1 can they possess truth1 i4e4 
how can we pass from their subject terms
 to their predicates8 ,and secondly1    
how1 in view of their origin in our     
human reason1 can they be objectively   
valid1 i4e4 legislate for the           
independently real8 ,how can we pass    
beyond the subject-predicate relation to
 real things8 ,this latter is the       
,critical problem in the form in which  
it appears in ,kant's letter of #aggb to
 ,herz4#ahi ,the former is the problem  
of synthesis which was later discovered4
  7b7 7#a7 ,possibility of explanation  
and 7#b7 possibility of existence4--7#a7
 ,how can synthetic a priori judgments  
be accounted for8 ,how1 despite their   
seemingly inconsistent and apparently   
paradoxical aspects1 can their validity 
7their validity as well as their        
actuality being taken for granted7 be   

rendered comprehensible8 7#b7 ,the      
validity of such judgments has been     
called in question by the empiricists1  
and is likewise inexplicable even from  
the dogmatic standpoint of the          
rationalists4 ,how1 then1 can these     
judgments be possible at all8 ,these two
 meanings of the term #8possible'       
connect with the ambiguity1 above noted1
 in the term #8how4' ,the former problem
 can be solved by an analytic method2   
the latter demands the application of   
the more radical method of synthetic    
reconstruction4  7c7 ,real and ideal    
possibility4#aij--,we have to           
distinguish between the possible        
validity of those propositions which the
 mathematical and physical sciences     
profess to have established and the     
possible validity of those principles   
such as that of causality1 which are    
postulated by the sciences1 but which   
the sciences do not attempt to prove1   
and which in certain cases they do not  
even formulate4 ,the former constitute  

an actually existent body of scientific 
knowledge1 demonstrated in accordance   
with the demands of scientific method4  
,the latter are employed by the         
scientist1 but are not investigated by  
him4 ,the science into which they can be
 fitted has still to be created2 and    
though some of the principles composing 
it may be known1 others remain to be    
discovered4 ,all of them demand such    
proof and demonstration as they have    
never yet received4#aia ,this new and   
ideal science is the scientific         
metaphysics which ,kant professes to    
inaugurate by means of the ,critique4   
,in reference to the special sciences1  
possibility means the conditions of the 
actually given4 ,in reference to the new
 and ideal metaphysics1 possibility     
signifies the conditions of the         
realisation of that which is sought4 ,in
 view of this distinction1 the          
formula--,how are synthetic a priori    
judgments possible8--will thus acquire  
two very different meanings4 7#a7 ,how  

are the existing a priori synthetic     
judgments to be accounted for8 7#b7 ,how
 may all the really fundamental         
judgments of that type be exhaustively  
discovered and proved8 ,even in regard  
to immanent metaphysics ,kant interprets
 the formula in both ways4 ,this is due 
to his frequent confusion of immanent   
metaphysics with the principles of      
natural science4 ,its propositions are  
then regarded as given1 and only their  
general validity calls for proof4 ,it   
is1 however1 in the problem of ideal    
possibility that the essential problem  
of the ,critique lies2 and that is a    
further reason why it cannot be         
adequately dealt with1 save by means of 
the synthetic method4         99        
99       99       99       99           
,experience4--,throughout the           
,introduction the term experience#aib   
has 7even at times in one and the same  
sentence7 two quite distinct meanings1  
7#a7 as product of sense and            
understanding acting co-operatively1 and

 7#b7 as the raw material 7the          
impressions7 of sense4 ,considerable    
confusion is thereby caused4            
,understanding and reason#aic are here1 
as often elsewhere in the ,critique1    
used as equivalent terms4 ,throughout   
the entire two first sections of the    
,introduction to the second edition the 
term reason does not occur even once4   
,as first mentioned1#aid it is taken as 
the source of metaphysical judgments4   
,general 7a priori7 truths have an inner
 necessity and must be clear and certain
 by themselves4#aie--,these statements  
are not in accordance with ,kant's new  
,critical teaching4#aif ,they have      
remained uncorrected from a previous way
 of thinking4 ,this must be one reason  
for the recasting of this paragraph in  
the second edition4  ,even with 7unter7 
our experiences there is mingled        
knowledge which must be of a priori     
origin4#aig--,kant is here              
distinguishing the immanent a priori1   
such as that involved in any causal     

judgment1 from the transcendent a priori
 dwelt upon in the next paragraph4 ,the 
latter is expressed through metaphysical
 judgments1 such as #8,god exists1'     
#8the soul is immortal4'  ,original     
concepts and judgments derived from     
them4#aih--;,cf4 ,b #e-f4  ,pure4--,in  
the title of the section the term       
pure#aii 7rein7 is1 as the subsequent   
argument shows1 taken as exactly        
equivalent to a priori4 ,as ,vaihinger  
notes1 the adjective apriorisch had not 
yet been invented4 ,the opposite of pure
 is here empirical 7empirisch74#bjj     
,all our knowledge begins with          
experience4#bja--,this is a stronger    
statement than any in the corresponding 
paragraphs of the first edition4 ,had   
,kant proceeded to develop its          
consequences1 he would have had to      
recast the entire ,introduction1 setting
 the problem of empirical knowledge     
alongside that of the a priori4#bjb ,as 
it is1 he is forced#bjc to subdivide the
 absolutely a priori into the pure and  

the mixed4#bjd  ,by objects which affect
 7rhren7 our senses4 ,the raw material  
of sensuous impressions4#bje--,these    
incidental statements call for          
discussion4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #hj-h1      
#abj-a1 #bgd ff4  ,a knowledge of       
objects which we call                   
experience4#bjf--,kant does not keep to 
this definition4 ,the term experience is
 still used in its other and narrower   
sense1 as in the very next paragraph1   
when ,kant states that knowledge does   
not1 perhaps1 arise solely from         
experience 7 sense impressions74  ,in   
respect of time4#bjg--,this statement1  
taken as an account of ,kant's teaching 
in the ,critique1 is subject to two     
reservations4 ,in the ,aesthetic#bjh    
,kant sometimes claims a temporal       
antecedence for the a priori4 ,and      
secondly1 the a priori is not for ,kant 
merely logical4 ,it also possesses a    
dynamical priority4#bji  ,even          
experience itself is a                  
compound4#baj--,the 8even0 seems to     

refer to the distinction drawn in ,a #b 
between the immanent and the            
transcendent a priori4#baa  ,it is      
therefore a question whether there      
exists such knowledge independent of    
experience4#bab--,this question was not 
raised in the first edition4#bac ,the   
alternative methods1 analytic and       
synthetic1 are discussed above1 p4 #dd  
ff4  ,such knowledge is called a priori 
and is distinguished from empirical     
knowledge4#bad--,throughout the         
,introduction1 in both editions equally1
 ,kant fails to state the problems of   
the ,critique in a sufficiently         
comprehensive manner4 ,he speaks as if  
the ,critique dealt only with the       
absolutely a priori1 in its two forms1  
as immanent scientific knowledge and as 
transcendent speculation4 ,it also deals
 with the equally important and still   
more fundamental problem of accounting  
for the possibility of experience4#bae  
,our empirical knowledge involves an a  
priori element1 and may not therefore be

 opposed to a priori knowledge in the   
manner of the passage before us4  ,this 
term a priori is not yet definite       
enough4#baf--;,it is frequently employed
 in a merely relative sense4 ,thus we   
can say of a person who undermines the  
foundations of his house that he might  
have known a priori that it would       
collapse1 that is1 that he need not wait
 for the experience of its actual fall4 
,but still he could not know this       
entirely a priori2 he had first to learn
 from experience that bodies are heavy1 
and will fall when their supports are   
taken away4 ,but as dealt with in the   
,critique the term a priori is used in  
an absolute sense1 to signify that      
knowledge which is independent1 not of  
this or that experience only1 but of all
 impressions of the senses4 ,thus far   
,kant's position is comparatively clear2
 but he proceeds to distinguish two     
forms within the absolutely a priori1   
namely1 mixed and pure4 ,the absolutely 
a priori is mixed when it contains an   

empirical element1 pure when it does    
not4 78,pure0 is no longer taken in the 
meaning which it has in the title of the
 section4#bag ,it signifies not the a   
priori as such1 but only one subdivision
 of it47 ,thus after defining absolutely
 a priori knowledge as independent of   
all experience1 ,kant takes it in one of
 its forms as involving empirical       
elements4 ,the example which he gives of
 an absolutely a priori judgment1 which 
yet is not pure1 is the principle3 every
 change has its cause4 8,change0 is an  
empirical concept1 but the synthetic    
relation asserted is absolutely a       
priori4 ,in the next section#bah this   
same proposition is cited as a pure     
judgment a priori--8pure0 being again   
used in its more general meaning as     
synonymous with a priori4 ,this         
confusion results from ,kant's exclusive
 preoccupation with the a priori1 and   
consequent failure to give due          
recognition to the correlative problem  
of the empirical judgment4 ,the omitted 

factor retaliates by thus forcing its   
way into ,kant's otherwise clean-cut    
divisions4 ,also1 it is not true that   
the relative a priori falls outside the 
sphere of the ,critical enquiry4 ,such  
judgment expresses necessity or         
objectivity1 and for that reason demands
 a transcendental justification no less 
urgently than the absolutely a priori4  
,the finding of such justification is1  
indeed1 the central problem of the      
,analytic4#bai  ,the subdivisions of the
 a priori may be tabulated thus3        
,relative1 e4g4 every unsupported house 
must                        fall4   ,a  
priori knowledge           ,mixed1 e4g4 
every change has its cause4             
,absolute  ,pure1 e4g4 a straight line  
is the shortest                         
distance between two points4  ,the term 
pure 7rein7 thus acquires a second      
meaning distinct from that defined      
above4#bbj ,it is no longer employed as 
identical with a priori1 but as a       
subdivision of it1 meaning unmixed4 ,its

 opposite is no longer the empirical1   
but the impure or mixed4 ,owing1        
however1 to the fact that 8pure0 7in its
 first meaning7 is identical with the a 
priori1 it shares in all the different  
connotations of the latter1 and         
accordingly is also employed to denote  
that which is not relative4 ,but 8pure0 
has yet another meaning peculiar to     
itself4 ,the phrase 8independent of     
experience0 has in reference to 8pure0  
an ambiguity from which it does not     
suffer in its connection with 8a priori0
 7since mathematical knowledge1 whether 
pure or applied1 is always regarded by  
,kant as a priori74 ,it may signify     
either independence as regards content  
and validity1 or independence as regards
 scope4 ,the latter meaning is narrower 
than the former4 ,by the former meaning 
it denotes that which originates1 and   
can possess truth1 independently of     
experience4 ,by the latter it signifies 
that which is not only independent of   
sense but also applies to the           

non-sensuous4 ,in this latter meaning   
pure knowledge therefore signifies      
transcendent knowledge4 ,its opposite is
 the immanent4 ,the various meanings of 
8pure0 7four in number7 may be tabulated
 as follows3    7a7 7#a7 ,a priori3     
independent of experience as regards    
origin                 and validity4    
7,its opposite  empirical47             
7#b7 ,absolutely independent of         
experience4 7,its                       
opposite  relative47                    
7#c7 ,unmixed with experience4 7,its    
opposite                  impure or     
mixed47    7b7 7#d7 ,independent of     
experience as regards scope             
transcendent4                      7,its
 opposite  immanent47  ,all these varied
 meanings contribute to the ambiguity of
 the title of the ,critique4 ,kant      
himself employs the title in all of the 
following senses3  #a4 ,critique of     
absolutely pure a priori knowledge1     
determination of its sources1           
conditions1 scope and limits4  #b4      

,critique of all a priori knowledge1    
relative as well as absolute1 in so far 
as it depends upon a priori principles1 
determination1 etc4  #c4 ,critique of   
all knowledge1 whether a priori or      
empirical1 determination1 etc4  #d4     
,critique of transcendent knowledge1 its
 sources and limits4  ,further meanings 
could also be enumerated but can be     
formulated by the reader for himself in 
the light of the ambiguities just       
noted4#bba ,the special context in each 
case can alone decide how the title is  
to be understood4 ,if a really adequate 
definition of the purpose and scope of  
the ,critique is sought by the reader1  
he must construct it for himself4 ,the  
following may perhaps serve4 ,the       
,critique is an enquiry into the        
sources1 conditions1 scope and limits of
 our knowledge1 both a priori and       
empirical1 resulting in the construction
 of a new system of immanent            
metaphysics2 in the light of the        
conclusions thus reached1 it also yields

 an analysis and explanation of the     
transcendental illusion to which        
transcendent metaphysics1 both as a     
natural disposition and as a professed  
science1 is due4  ,kant further         
complicates matters by offering a second
 division of the absolutely a           
priori1#bbb viz4 into the original and  
the derivative4 ,also1 by implication1  
he classes relative a priori judgments  
among the propositions to be reckoned   
with by the ,critique2 and yet in ,b #d 
he speaks of the proposition1 all bodies
 are heavy1 as merely empirical4#bbc  ,a
 criterion4#bbd--,necessity and         
universality are valid criteria of the a
 priori 7 the non-empirical74 ,this     
follows from ,kant's view#bbe of the    
empirical as synonymous with the        
contingent 7zufllig74 ,experience gives 
only the actual2 the a priori alone     
yields that which cannot be otherwise4  
8,necessity and strict universality are 
thus safe criteria of a      priori     
knowledge1 and are inseparable from one 

another4 ,but since      in the         
employment of these criteria the        
empirical limitation of      judgments  
is sometimes more easily shown than     
their contingency1      or since1 as    
frequently happens1 their unlimited     
universality can      be more           
convincingly proved than their          
necessity1 it is advisable      to use  
the two criteria separately1 each being 
by itself      infallible40#bbf  ,now   
,kant is here1 of course1 assuming the  
main point to be established1 namely1   
that experience is incapable of         
accounting for such universality and    
necessity as are required for our       
knowledge1 both ordinary and scientific4
 ,we have already considered this       
assumption1#bbg and have also           
anticipated misunderstanding by noting  
the important qualifications to which1  
from ,kant's new ,critical standpoint1  
the terms #8necessity' and              
#8universality' become subject4#bbh ,the
 very specific meaning in which ,kant   

employs the term a priori must likewise 
be borne in mind4 ,though negatively the
 a priori is independent of experience1 
positively it originates in our human   
reason4 ,the necessity and universality 
which differentiate the a priori        
distinguish it only from the humanly    
accidental4 ,the a priori has no        
absolute validity4 ,from a metaphysical 
standpoint1 it is itself contingent4 ,as
 already stated1#bbi all truth is for   
,kant merely de facto4 ,the necessary is
 not that which cannot be conceived to  
be otherwise1 nor is it the             
unconditioned4 ,our reason legislates   
only for the world of appearance4 ,but  
as yet ,kant gives no hint of this      
revolutionary reinterpretation of the   
rationalist criteria4 ,one of the chief 
unfortunate consequences of the         
employment in this ,introduction of the 
analytic method of the ,prolegomena is  
that it tends to mislead the reader by  
seeming to commit ,kant to a logical a  
priori of the ,leibnizian type4  ,to    

show that1 if experience is to be       
possible1 pure a priori propositions are
 indispensable1 and so to prove their   
existence a priori4#bcj--;,at first     
sight ,kant would seem to be here       
referring to the alternative synthetic  
method of procedure1 i4e4 to the        
transcendental proof of the a priori4   
,the next sentence shows1 however1 that 
neither in intention nor in fact is that
 really so4 ,he argues only that a      
priori principles1 such as the principle
 of causality1 are necessary in order to
 give 8certainty0 to our experience2    
such a principle must be postulated if  
inductive inference is to be valid4     
,experience could have no scientific    
certainty1 8if all rules according to   
which it proceeds were themselves in    
turn empirical1 and therefore           
contingent4 ,they could hardly be       
regarded as first principles40 ,there is
 no attempt here to prove that empirical
 knowledge as such necessarily involves 
the a priori4 ,also the method of       

argument1 though it seeks to establish  
the necessity of the a priori1 is not   
transcendental or ,critical in          
character4 ,it is merely a repetition of
 the kind of argument which both ,hume  
and ,leibniz had already directed       
against the sensationalist position4#bca
 ,very strangely1 considering that these
 sentences have been added in the second
 edition1 and therefore subsequent to   
the writing of the objective deduction1 
,kant gives no indication of the deeper 
problem to which he finally penetrated4 
,the explanation is1 probably1 that to  
do so would have involved the recasting 
of the entire ,introduction4 ,even on   
the briefest reference1 the             
hard-and-fast distinction between the a 
priori and the empirical1 as two        
distinct and separate classes of        
judgment1 would have been undermined1   
and the reader would have been made to  
feel the insufficiency of the analysis  
upon which it is based4#bcb ,the        
existence of the deeper view is betrayed

 only through careless employment of the
 familiar phrase 8possibility of        
experience40 ,for1 as here used1 it is  
not really meant4 8,certainty of        
experience0--a very different matter--is
 the meaning that alone will properly   
fit the context4  ,reason and           
understanding4#bcc--,they are here      
distinguished1 having been hitherto1 in 
,a #a-b1 employed as synonymous4 ,the   
former carries us beyond the field of   
all possible experience2 the latter is  
limited to the world of sense4 ,thus    
both ,reason and understanding are here 
used in their narrowest meaning4  ,these
 inevitable problems of pure ,reason    
itself are ,god1 freedom1 and           
immortality4 ,the science which1 with   
all its methods1 is in its final        
intention directed solely to the        
solution of these problems1 is called   
metaphysics4#bcd--,these sentences are  
characteristic of the second edition    
with its increased emphasis upon the    
positive results of the ,critique on the

 one hand1 and with its attitude of     
increased favour towards transcendent   
metaphysics on the other4 ,the one      
change would seem to be occasioned by   
the nature of the criticisms passed upon
 the first edition1 as1 for instance1 by
 ,moses ,mendelssohn who describes ,kant
 as 8the all-destroyer0 7der alles      
zermalmende74 ,the other is due to      
,kant's preoccupation with the problems 
of ethics and of teleology4 ,the above  
statements are repeated with even       
greater emphasis in ,b #cie n4#bce ,the 
definition here given of metaphysics is 
not strictly kept to by ,kant4 ,as above
 noted1#bcf ,kant really distinguishes  
within it two forms1 immanent and       
transcendent4 ,in so doing1 however1 he 
still#bcg regards transcendent          
metaphysics as the more important4      
,immanent metaphysics is chiefly of     
value as contributing to the solution of
 the 8inevitable problems of pure       
,reason40  ,a #c-d  ,b #g-h4--,the      
reasons1 here cited by ,kant1 for the   

failure of philosophical thinking to    
recognise the difference between        
immanent and transcendent judgments are3
 7#a7 the misunderstood character1 and  
consequent misleading influence1 of a   
priori mathematical judgments2 7#b7 the 
fact that once we are beyond the        
sensible sphere1 experience can never   
contradict us2 7#c7 natural delight in  
the apparent enlargement of our         
knowledge2 7#d7 the ease with which     
logical contradictions can be avoided2  
7#e7 neglect of the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic a priori         
judgments4 ,vaihinger points out#bch    
that in the ,fortschritte#bci ,kant adds
 a sixth reason--confusion of the       
concepts of understanding with the      
,ideas of ,reason4 ,upon the first of   
the above reasons the best comment is   
that of the ,methodology4#bdj ,but the  
reader must likewise bear in mind that  
in ,b xvi ,kant develops his new        
philosophical method on the analogy of  
the mathematical method4 ,the latter is1

 he claims1 mutatis mutandis1 the true  
method of legitimate speculation1 i4e4  
of immanent metaphysics4 ,the one       
essential difference 7as noted by       
,kant#bda71 which has been overlooked by
 the dogmatists1 is that philosophy     
gains its knowledge from concepts1      
mathematics from the construction of    
concepts4  ,remain investigations       
only4#bdb--;,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #ce4    
,the analysis of our concepts of        
objects4#bdc--,vaihinger's              
interpretation1 that the concepts here  
referred to are those which we 8form a  
priori of things10#bdd seems            
correct4#bde ,the rationalists sought to
 deduce the whole body of rational      
psychology from the a priori conception 
of the soul as a simple substance1 and  
of rational theology from the a priori  
conception of ,god as the all-perfect   
,being4       ,analytic and synthetic   
judgments4#bdf--8;,all analytic         
judgments      depend wholly on the law 
of contradiction1 and are in their      

nature      a priori cognitions1 whether
 the concepts that supply them with     
matter be empirical or not4 ,for the    
predicate of an affirmative             
analytic judgment is already contained  
in the concept of the      subject1 of  
which it cannot be denied without       
contradiction4 ,in the      same way its
 opposite is necessarily denied of the  
subject in an      analytic1 but        
negative1 judgment by the same law of   
contradiction4444 ,for this very reason 
all analytic judgments are      a priori
 even when the concepts are empirical1  
as1 for example1      gold is a yellow  
metal2 for to know this ,i require no   
experience      beyond my concept of    
gold as a yellow metal3 it is1 in fact1 
the      very concept1 and ,i need only 
analyse it1 without looking beyond it   
elsewhere4444 ,synthetic judgments1 a   
posteriori and a priori      agree in   
this1 that they cannot possibly spring  
solely from the      principle of       
analysis1 the law of contradiction4     

,they require a      quite different    
principle4 ,from whatever they may be   
deduced1 the      deduction must1 it is 
true1 always be in accordance with the  
principle of contradiction4 ,for that   
principle must never be      violated4  
,but at the same time everything cannot 
be deduced from      it40#bdg  ,in ,a   
#eid  ,b #fbb analytic judgments are    
also spoken of as identical2 but in the 
,fortschritte#bdh this use of terms is  
criticised3       8,judgments are       
analytic if their predicate only        
represents clearly      7explicite7 what
 was thought obscurely 7implicite7 in   
the      concept of the subject1 e4g4   
all bodies are extended4 ,were we to    
call such judgments identical only      
confusion would result4 ,for            
identical judgments contribute nothing  
to the clearness of the      concept1   
and that must be the purpose of all     
judging4 ,identical      judgments are  
therefore empty1 e4g4 all bodies are    
bodily 7or to      use another term     

material7 beings4 ,analytic judgments   
do1 indeed1      ground themselves upon 
identity and can be resolved into it2   
but      they are not identical4 ,for   
they demand analysis and serve for the  
explanation of the concept4 ,in         
identical judgments1 on the other       
hand1 idem is defined per idem1 and     
nothing at all is      explained40      
,vaihinger#bdi cites the following      
contrasted examples of analytic and     
synthetic judgments3  ,analytic4--7a7   
,substance is that which exists only as 
subject in which qualities inhere4#bej  
7b7 ,every effect has a cause4#e 7c7    
,everything conditioned presupposes a   
condition4  ,synthetic4--7a7 ,substance 
is permanent4 7b7 ,every event has a    
cause4#bea 7c7 ,everything conditioned  
presupposes an unconditioned4  ,b       
#aa-ab4--,the first half of this        
paragraph is transcribed practically    
word for word from the ,prolegomena4#beb
 ,the second half is a close restatement
 of an omitted paragraph of the first   

edition4 ,the chief addition lies in the
 concluding statement1 that 8experience 
is itself a synthetic connection of     
intuitions40 ,this is in keeping with   
statements made in the deduction of the 
categories in the second edition1#bec   
and in the paragraph inserted in the    
proof of the second analogy in the      
second edition4#bed ,the x has strangely
 been omitted in the second edition in  
reference to empirical judgments1 though
 retained in reference to synthetic a   
priori judgments4  ,the proposition3    
everything which happens has its        
cause4#bee--;,as we have already        
observed1#bef ,hume influenced ,kant at 
two distinct periods in his             
philosophical development--in           
#agef-agfc1 and again at some time 7not 
quite definitely datable7 after         
,february #aggb4 ,the first influence   
concerned the character of concrete     
causal judgments2 the second related to 
the causal axiom4 ,though there are few 
distinctions which are more important   

for understanding the ,critique than    
that of the difference between these two
 questions1 it has nowhere been properly
 emphasised by ,kant1 and in several of 
the references to ,hume1 which occur in 
the ,critique and in the ,prolegomena1  
the two problems are confounded in a    
most unfortunate manner4 ,the passages  
in the ,introduction#beg are clear and  
unambiguous2 the influence exercised by 
,hume subsequent to ,february #aggb is  
quite adequately stated4 ,the causal    
axiom claims to be a priori1 and is1 as 
,hume asserts1 likewise synthetic4      
,consequently there are only two        
alternatives1 each decisive and         
far-reaching4 ,either valid a priori    
synthesis must1 contrary to all previous
 philosophical belief1 be possible1 or  
8everything which we call metaphysics   
must turn out to be a mere delusion of  
reason40 ,the solution of this problem  
is 8a question of life and death to     
metaphysics40 ,to this appreciation of  
,hume1 ,kant adds criticism4 ,hume did  

not sufficiently universalise his       
problem4 ,had he done so1 he would have 
recognised that pure mathematics        
involves a priori synthesis no less     
necessarily than do the metaphysical    
disciplines4 ,from denying the          
possibility of mathematical science 8his
 good sense would probably have saved   
him40 ,hume's problem1 thus viewed1     
finds its final and complete expression 
in the formula3 ,how are synthetic a    
priori judgments possible8  ,in ,a #gfj 
,b #ghh the account differs in two      
respects3 first1 it discusses the       
metaphysical validity of the causal     
axiom as well as its intrinsic          
possibility as a judgment2 and secondly1
 reference is made to the conception of 
causality as well as to the axiom4 ,the 
implied criticism of ,hume is           
correspondingly modified4 ,otherwise1 it
 entirely harmonises with the passages  
in the ,introduction4       8,hume dwelt
 especially upon the principle of       
causality1 and quite      rightly       

observed that its truth1 and even the   
objective validity of      the concept  
of efficient cause in general1 is based 
on no insight1      i4e4 on no a priori 
knowledge1 and that its authority cannot
      therefore be ascribed to its      
necessity1 but merely to its general    
utility in the course of experience and 
to a certain subjective      necessity  
which it thereby acquires1 and which he 
entitles custom4      ,from the         
incapacity of our reason to make use of 
this principle in      any manner that  
transcends experience he inferred the   
nullity of      all pretensions of      
reason to advance beyond the empirical40
  ,now so far1 in these references to   
,hume1 ,kant has had in view only the   
problems of mathematical and physical   
science and of metaphysics4 ,the        
problems involved in the possibility of 
empirical knowledge are left entirely   
aside4 ,his account of ,hume's position 
and of his relation to ,hume suffers    
change immediately these latter problems

 are raised4 ,and unfortunately it is a 
change for the worse4 ,the various      
problems treated by ,hume are then      
confounded together1 and the issues are 
somewhat blurred4 ,let us take the chief
 passages in which this occurs4 ,in ,a  
#gfd  ,b #gib ff4 ,kant gives the       
following account of ,hume's argument4  
,hume1 recognising the impossibility of 
predicting an effect by analysis of the 
concept of the cause1 or of discovering 
a cause from the concept of the effect1 
viewed all concrete causal judgments as 
merely contingent1 and therefrom        
inferred the contingency of the causal  
axiom4 ,in so doing ,hume1 ,kant argues1
 confuses the legitimate and purely a   
priori inference from a given event to  
some antecedent with the very different 
inference1 possible only through special
 experience1 to a specific cause4 ,now  
this is an entire misrepresentation of  
,hume's real achievement1 and may       
perhaps be explained1 at least in part1 
as being due to the fact that ,kant was 

acquainted with ,hume's ,treatise only  
through the indirect medium of          
,beattie's quotations4 ,hume committed  
no such blunder4 ,he clearly recognised 
the distinction between the problem of  
the validity of the causal axiom and the
 problem of the validity of concrete    
causal judgments4 ,he does not argue    
from the contingency of concrete causal 
laws to the contingency of the universal
 principle1 but shows1 as ,kant himself 
recognises1#beh that the principle is   
neither self-evident nor demonstrable a 
priori4 ,and as necessity cannot be     
revealed by experience1 neither is the  
principle derivable from that source4   
,consequently1 ,hume concludes1 it      
cannot be regarded as objectively valid4
 ,it must be due to a subjective        
instinct or natural belief4 7,the two   
problems are similarly confounded by    
,kant in ,a #bag  ,b #bfd47  ,in the    
,introduction to the ,prolegomena there 
is no such confusion of the two         
problems1 but matters are made even     

worse by the omission of all reference  
to ,hume's analysis of the causal axiom4
 ,only ,hume's treatment of the concept 
of causality is dwelt upon4 ,this is the
 more unfortunate1 and has proved the   
more misleading1 in that it is here that
 ,kant makes his most explicit          
acknowledgment of his indebtedness to   
,hume4 ,in  #bg ff4 of the ,prolegomena 
both problems reappear1 but are again   
confounded4 ,the section is preceded by 
sentences in which the problem of       
experience is emphasised2 and in keeping
 with these prefatory remarks1 ,kant    
represents 8,hume's crux metaphysicorum0
 as concerning only the concept of      
causality 7viewed as a synthetic1 and   
professedly a priori1 connection between
 concrete existences74 ,yet in  #cj the 
causal axiom is also referred to1 and   
together they are taken as constituting 
8,hume's problem40  ,now if we bear in  
mind that ,hume awakened ,kant to both  
problems--how a priori knowledge is     
possible1 and how experience is         

possible--this confusion can easily be  
understood4 ,kant had already in the    
early #8sixties studied ,hume with      
profound admiration and respect4#bei ,in
 the period subsequent to #aggb this    
admiration had only deepened2 and       
constantly1 as we may believe1 ,kant had
 returned with fresh relish to ,hume's  
masterly analyses of causality and of   
inductive inference4 ,it is not1        
therefore1 surprising that as the years 
passed1 and as the other elements in    
,hume's teaching revealed to him1       
through the inner growth of his own     
views1 their full worth and             
significance1 he should allow the       
contribution that had more specifically 
awakened him to fall into the           
background1 and should1 in vague        
fashion1 ascribe to ,hume's teaching as 
a whole the specific influence which was
 really due to one particular part4 ,by 
#aghc1 the date of the ,prolegomena1    
,kant's first enthusiasm over the       
discovery of the fundamental problem of 

a priori synthesis had somewhat abated1 
and the problem of experience had more  
or less taken its place4 ,this would    
seem to be the reason why in the        
,prolegomena he thus deals with both    
aspects of ,hume's problem1 and why in  
so doing he gives a subordinate place to
 ,hume's treatment of the causal axiom4 
,but though the misunderstanding may be 
thus accounted for1 it must none the    
less be deplored4 ,for the reader is    
seriously misled1 and much that is      
central to the ,critical philosophy is  
rendered obscure4 ,the influence which  
,kant in the ,prolegomena thus ascribes 
to ,hume was not that which really      
awakened him from his dogmatic slumber1 
but is in part that which he had        
assimilated at least as early as #agfc1 
and in part that which acted upon him   
with renewed force when he was          
struggling 7probably between #aggh and  
#aghj7 with the problems involved in the
 deduction of the categories4 ,it was   
,hume's treatment of the causal axiom1  

and that alone1 which1 at some time     
subsequent to ,february #aggb1 was the  
really effective influence in producing 
the ,copernican change4#bfj  ,purely a  
priori and out of mere                  
concepts4#bfa--,vaihinger's comment     
seems correct3 ,kant means only that    
neither actual experience nor pure      
intuition can be resorted to4 ,this does
 not contradict the complementary       
assertion1#bfb that the principle1      
everything which happens has its cause1 
can be known a priori1 not immediately  
from the concepts involved in it1 but   
only indirectly#bfc through the relation
 of these concepts to possible          
experience4 8,possible experience10 even
 though it stands for 8something purely 
contingent10 is itself a concept4       
,vaihinger#bfd quotes ,apelt upon this  
8mysterious0 type of judgment4          
8,metaphysics is synthetic knowledge    
from mere concepts1 not like            
mathematics from their construction in  
intuition1 and yet these      synthetic 

propositions cannot be known from bare  
concepts1 i4e4      not analytically4   
,the necessity of the connection in     
those      propositions is to be        
apprehended through thought alone1 and  
yet is      not to rest upon the form of
 thought1 the principle of              
contradiction4 ,the conception of a kind
 of knowledge which arises      from    
bare concepts1 and yet is synthetic1    
eludes our grasp4 ,the      problem is3 
,how can one concept be necessarily     
connected with      another1 without    
also at the same time being contained in
 it80  ,the paragraphs in ,b #ad to ,b  
#ag are almost verbal transcripts from  
,prolegomena1  #b c1 #b ff4             
,mathematical judgments are one and all 
7insgesammt7 synthetic4#bfe--,this      
assertion is carelessly made1 and does  
not represent ,kant's real view4 ,in ,b 
#af he himself recognises the existence 
of analytic mathematical judgments1 but 
unduly minimises their number and       
importance4  ,all mathematical          

conclusions proceed according to the    
principle of contradiction4#bff--,to the
 objection made by ,paulsen that ,kant1 
in admitting that mathematical judgments
 can be deduced from others by means of 
the principle of contradiction1 ought   
consistently to have recognised as      
synthetic only axioms and principles1   
,vaihinger replies as follows3#bfg      
8,the proposition--the angles of a      
triangle are together equal to      two 
right angles--,kant regards as          
synthetic4 ,it is indeed deduced        
from the axiom of parallels 7with the   
aid of auxiliary lines71 and      to    
that extent is understood in accordance 
with the principle of                   
contradiction4444 ,the angles in the    
triangle constitute a special      case 
of the angles in the parallel lines     
which are intersected by      other     
lines4 ,the principle of contradiction  
thus serves as vehicle      in the      
deduction1 because once the identity of 
,a and ,a is      recognised1 the       

predicate b1 which belongs to ,a1 must  
also be      ascribed to ,a4 ,but the   
proposition is not for that reason      
itself      analytic in the ,kantian    
sense4 ,in the analytic proposition the 
predicate is derived from the analysis  
of the subject concept4 ,but      that  
does not happen in this case4 ,the      
synthetic proposition can      never be 
derived in and by itself from the       
principle of      contradiction2 444 but
 only with the aid of that principle    
from      other propositions4 ,besides1 
in this deduction intuition must        
always be resorted to2 and that makes an
 essential difference4      ,without it 
the identity of ,a and ,a cannot become 
known40  ,pure                          
mathematics4#bfh--8,pure10 as thus      
currently used1 is opposed only to      
applied1 not to empirical4 ,kant here   
arbitrarily reads the latter opposition 
into it4 ,under this guise he begs the  
point in dispute4  #g  #e               
#ab4bfi--,though #g  #e  #ab expresses  

an identity or equality1 it is an       
equality of the objects or magnitudes1  
#g  #e and #ab1 not of the concepts     
through which we think them4#bgj        
,analysis of the concepts can never     
reveal this equality4 ,only by          
constructing the concepts in intuition  
can it be recognised by the mind4 ,this 
example has been already cited in the   
first edition4#bga ,it is further       
elaborated in the ,prolegomena1  #b c1  
and is here transcribed4 ,kant's mode of
 stating his position is somewhat       
uncertain4 ,he alternates between 8the  
representation of #g and #e10 8the      
representation of the combination of #g 
and #e10bgb and 8the concepts #g and    
#e40bgc ,his view would seem to be that 
there are three concepts involved4 ,for 
the concept of #g we must substitute the
 intuition of #g points1 for the concept
 of #e the intuition of #e points1 and  
for the concept of their sum the        
intuitive operation of addition4  ,call 
in the assistance of intuition1 for     

instance our five fingers4#bgd--,this   
statement1 repeated from the            
,prolegomena1#bge does not represent    
,kant's real position4 ,the views which 
he has expressed upon the nature of     
arithmetical science are of the most    
contradictory character1#bgf but to one 
point he definitely commits himself1    
namely1 that1 like geometrical science1 
it rests1 not 7as here asserted7 upon   
empirical1 but upon pure intuition4#bgg 
,except indirectly1 by the reference to 
larger numbers1 ,kant here ignores his  
own important distinction between image 
and schema4#bgh ,the above statement    
would also make arithmetic dependent    
upon space4  ,segner3 ,anfangsgrnde der 
,arithmetik1#bgi translated from the    
,latin1 second edition1 ,halle1 #aggc4  
,natural science 7physica7 contains     
synthetic a priori                      
judgments4#bhj--,there is here a        
complication to which ,vaihinger#bha has
 been the first to draw attention4 ,in  
the ,prolegomena#bhb ,kant emphasises   

the distinction between physics and pure
 or universal science of nature4#bhc    
,the latter treats only the a priori    
form of nature 7i4e4 its necessary      
conformity to law71 and is therefore a  
propaedeutic to physics which involves  
further empirical factors4 ,for two     
reasons1 however1 this universal natural
 science falls short of its ideal4      
,first1 it contains empirical elements1 
such as the concepts of motion1         
impenetrability1 inertia1 etc4          
,secondly1 it refers only to the objects
 of external sense1 and not1 as we      
should expect in a universal science1 to
 natural existences without exception1  
i4e4 to the objects of psychology as    
well as of physics4#bhd ,but among its  
principles there are1 ,kant adds1 a few 
which are purely a priori and possess   
the universality required3 e4g4 such    
propositions as that substance is       
permanent1 and that every event has a   
cause4 ,now these are the examples which
 ought to have been cited in the passage

 before us4 ,those actually given fall  
entirely outside the scope of the       
,critique4 ,they are treated only in the
 ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde4 ,they    
belong to the relatively1 not to the    
absolutely1 pure science of nature4 ,the
 source of the confusion ,vaihinger     
again traces to ,kant's failure to hold 
fast to the important distinction       
between immanent and transcendent       
metaphysics4#bhe ,his so-called pure or 
universal natural science 7nature1 as   
above noted1 signifying for ,kant 8all  
that is07 is really immanent            
metaphysics1 and the propositions in    
regard to substance and causality ought 
therefore to be classed as metaphysical4
 ,this1 indeed1 is how they are viewed  
in the earlier sections of the          
,prolegomena4 ,the distinction later    
drawn in  #ae is ignored4 ,pure natural 
science is identified with mathematical 
physics1 and the propositions which in  
#ae are spoken of as belonging to pure  
universal natural science are now       

regarded as metaphysical4 8,genuinely   
metaphysical judgments are one and all  
synthetic4444 ,for instance1 the        
proposition--everything which in things 
is substance is permanent--is a         
synthetic1 and properly metaphysical    
judgment40#bhf ,in  #e the principle of 
causality is also cited as an example of
 a synthetic a priori judgment in       
metaphysics4 ,but ,kant still omits to  
draw a distinction between immanent and 
transcendent metaphysics2 and as a      
consequence his classification of       
synthetic a priori judgments remains    
thoroughly confused4 ,they are taken as 
belonging to three spheres1 mathematics1
 physics 7in the relative sense71 and   
metaphysics4 ,the implication is that   
this threefold distinction corresponds  
to the threefold division of the        
,doctrine of ,elements into ,aesthetic1 
,analytic1 and ,dialectic4 ,yet1 as a   
matter of fact1 the propositions of     
mathematical physics1 in so far as they 
are examples of applied mathematics1 are

 dealt with in the ,aesthetic1 and in so
 far as they involve concepts of motion 
and the like fall entirely outside the  
scope of the ,critique1 while the       
,analytic deals with those metaphysical 
judgments 7such as the principle of     
causality7 which are of immanent        
employment4#bhg  ,as the new paragraphs 
in the ,introduction to the second      
edition are transferred without         
essential modification from the         
,prolegomena1 they are open to the same 
criticism4 ,to harmonise ,b #ag with the
 real teaching of the ,critique1 it must
 be entirely recast4 ,instead of        
8natural science0 7physica7 we must read
 8pure universal natural science        
immanent metaphysics10 and for the      
examples given we must substitute those 
principles of substance and causality   
which are dealt with in the ,analytic4  
,the next paragraph deals with          
metaphysics in its transcendent form1   
and accordingly states the problem      
peculiar to the ,dialectic4             

,metaphysics4#bhh--,this paragraph deals
 explicitly only with transcendent      
judgments1 but as the terms used are    
ambiguous1 it is possible that those of 
immanent metaphysics are also referred  
to4 ,the paragraph is not taken from the
 ,prolegomena4 ,the corresponding       
passage#bhi in the ,prolegomena deals   
only with the judgments of immanent     
metaphysics4  ,the real problem of pure 
reason is contained in the question3    
,how are synthetic a priori judgments   
possible8#bij--;,cf4 above1 pp4 #bf ff41
 #cc ff41 #dc ff4  ,david               
,hume4#bia--;,cf4 above1 pp4 #fa ff4  ,a
 theoretical knowledge4#bib--;i4e4 ,kant
 explicitly leaves aside the further    
problem1 whether such judgments may not 
also be possible in the practical       
7moral7 and other spheres4  ,how is pure
 natural science possible8#bic--,the    
note which ,kant appends shows that he  
is here taking natural science in the   
relative sense4#bid ,the same irrelevant
 instances are again cited4  ,as these  

sciences really exist4#bie--;,cf4 below1
 p4 #dd ff4  ,the poor progress which   
metaphysics has hitherto                
made4#bif--;,cf4 ,preface to the second 
edition2 ,prolegomena1  #d1 and ,a #age 
ff4  ,how is metaphysics as a science   
possible8#big--,we may now consider how 
this and the three preceding questions  
are related to one another and to the   
various divisions of the ,critique4#bih 
,the four subordinate questions within  
the main problem--,how are synthetic a  
priori judgments possible8--are here    
stated by ,kant as3  #a4 ,how is pure   
mathematics possible8  #b4 ,how is pure 
natural science possible8  #c4 ,how is  
metaphysics as natural disposition      
possible8  #d4 ,how is metaphysics as   
science possible8  ,there is little     
difficulty as regards #a and #b4 ,the   
first is dealt with in the ,aesthetic1  
and the second#bii in the ,analytic1    
though1 owing to the complexity of the  
problems1 the ,aesthetic and ,analytic  
are wider than either query1 and cannot 

be completely separated4 ,applied       
mathematics is dealt with in the        
,analytic as well as in the ,aesthetic1 
and in both the determination of the    
limits of scientific knowledge is       
equally important with that of          
accounting for its positive             
acquisitions4 ,the third and fourth     
questions raise all manner of           
difficulties4 ,notwithstanding the      
identical mode of formulation1 they do  
not run on all fours with the two       
preceding4 ,the first two are taken as  
referring to actually existing and valid
 sciences4 ,it is the ground of their   
objective validity that is sought4 ,but 
what is investigated in the third       
question falsely lays claim to the title
 of science2 we can enquire only as to  
the ground of its subjective            
possibility4 ,in the fourth question1   
the problem takes still another form4   
,kant now seeks to determine whether a  
new1 not yet existing1 science of       
metaphysics is possible1 and in what    

manner it can be validly constructed4   
,the manifoldness of the problems is    
thus concealed by the fixity of the     
common formula4#cjj ,now with what      
divisions of the ,critique are the two  
last questions connected8 ,it has been  
suggested#cja that the third question is
 dealt with in the ,dialectic and the   
fourth in the ,methodology1 the four    
questions thus corresponding to the four
 main divisions of the ,critique4 ,but  
this view is untenable1 especially in   
its view of the fourth question4 ,the   
division of the ,critique is by         
dichotomy into doctrine of elements and 
doctrine of methods1 the former         
including the ,aesthetic and ,logic1 and
 the ,logic being again divided into    
,analytic and ,dialectic4 ,its problems 
stand in an equally complex             
subordination2 they cannot be isolated  
from one another1 and set merely side by
 side4 ,secondly1 it has been           
maintained#cjb that the third question  
is dealt with in the introduction to the

 ,dialectic 7in its doctrine of ,ideas71
 and the fourth in the ,dialectic       
proper4 ,this view is fairly            
satisfactory as regards the third       
question1 but would involve the         
conclusion that the fourth question     
refers only to transcendent metaphysics1
 and that it therefore receives a       
negative answer4 ,but that is not       
,kant's view of metaphysics as a        
science4 ,the ,critique is intended to  
issue in a new and genuine body of      
metaphysical teaching4  ,the key to the 
whole problem of the four questions is  
not to be found in the ,critique4 ,this 
section is transcribed from  #d-e of the
 ,prolegomena1 and is consequently      
influenced by the general arrangement of
 the latter work4 ,this fourfold        
division was indeed devised for the     
purposes of the argument of the         
,prolegomena1 which is developed on the 
analytic method1 and for that reason it 
cannot be reconciled with the very      
different structure of the ,critique4   

,yet even the ,prolegomena suffers from 
confusion1 due#cjc to ,kant's failure to
 distinguish between universal and      
relative natural science on the one     
hand1 and between immanent and          
transcendent metaphysics on the other4  
,the four questions do not coincide with
 those of the ,critique4 ,instead of the
 third--how is metaphysics as natural   
disposition possible8--we find3 how is  
metaphysics in general possible8 ,in    
#d1 #e1 ,kant's argument is clear and   
straightforward4 ,pure mathematical     
science and mathematical physics are    
actually existing sciences4 ,the        
synthetic a priori judgments which they 
contain must be recognised as valid4    
,metaphysics makes similar claims4 ,but1
 as is sufficiently proved by the       
absence of agreement among philosophers1
 its professions are without ground4 ,it
 transgresses the limits of possible    
experience1 and contains only pretended 
knowledge4 ,this false transcendent     
metaphysics is refuted in the           

,dialectic4 ,kant was1 however1 equally 
convinced that an immanent metaphysics  
is possible1 and that its grounds and   
justification had been successfully     
given in the ,analytic4 ,his problem as 
formulated in the ,prolegomena is       
accordingly threefold3 7#a7 how are the 
existing rational sciences1 mathematical
 and physical1 possible8 7#b7 in the    
light of the insight acquired by this   
investigation1 what is the origin and   
explanation of the existing pretended   
sciences of transcendent metaphysics8   
and 7#c7 in what manner can we establish
 a positive metaphysics that will       
harmonise with reason's true vocation8  
,so far all is clear and definite4 ,but 
the unresolved difficulty1 as to the    
relation in which natural science and   
immanent metaphysics stand to one       
another1 brings confusion in its train4 
,as already noted1#cjd in  #ae natural  
science is displaced by immanent        
metaphysics 7though not under that      
name72 and as a result the fourth       

question reduces to the second1 and the 
above threefold problem has to be       
completely restated4 ,the ,prolegomena  
has1 however1 already been divided into 
four parts2 and in the last division    
,kant still continues to treat the      
fourth question as distinct from that   
which has been dealt with in the second 
division1 though1 as his answer shows1  
they are essentially the same4 ,the     
answer given is that metaphysics as a   
science is possible only in and through 
the ,critique1 and that though the whole
 ,critique is required for this purpose1
 the content of the new science is      
embodied in the ,analytic4  ,in the     
second edition of the ,critique the     
confusion between natural science and   
immanent metaphysics still persists1 and
 a new source of ambiguity is added     
through the reformulation of the third  
question4 ,it is now limited to the     
problem of the subjective origin of     
metaphysics as a natural disposition4   
,the fourth question has therefore to be

 widened1 so as to include transcendent 
as well as immanent1 the old as well as 
the new1 metaphysics4 ,but save for this
 one alteration the entire section is   
inspired by considerations foreign to   
the ,critique2 this section1 like ,b    
#ag1 must be recast before it will      
harmonise with the subsequent argument4 
,every kind of knowledge is called pure1
 etc4#cje--,these sentences are omitted 
in the second edition4 ,they have been  
rendered unnecessary by the further and 
more adequate definition of 8pure0 given
 in ,b #c ff4  ,reason is the faculty   
which supplies the principles of        
knowledge a priori4#cjf--,this statement
 should1 as ,vaihinger points out1 be   
interpreted in the light of ,a #bii  ,b 
#cee4       8,reason1 like              
understanding1 can be employed in a     
merely formal1      i4e4 logical manner1
 wherein it abstracts from all content  
of      knowledge4 ,but it is also      
capable of a real use1#cjg since it     
contains within itself the source of    

certain concepts and      principles1   
which it does not borrow either from the
 senses or from      the understanding40
  ,reason is taken in the first of the  
above meanings4 ,reason in its real use1
 when extended so as to include pure    
sensibility and understanding1#cjh is   
the pure reason referred to in the next 
sentence of the ,critique4 ,a priori is 
here used to signify the relatively a   
priori2 in the next sentence it denotes 
the absolutely a priori4  ,an ,organon  
of pure reason4#cji--,what follows1 from
 this point to the middle of the next   
section1 is a good example of ,kant's   
patchwork method of piecing together old
 manuscript in the composition of the   
,critique4 ,there seems to be no way of 
explaining its bewildering              
contradictions save by accepting        
,vaihinger's#caj conclusion that it     
consists of three separate accounts1    
written at different times1 and         
representing different phases in the    
development of ,kant's views4  ,i4 ,the 

first account1 beginning with the above 
words and ending with 8already a        
considerable gain0 7schon sehr viel     
gewonnen ist71 is evidently the oldest4 
,it reveals the influence of the        
,dissertation4 ,it distinguishes3    #a4
 ,critique of pure reason 7             
,propaedeutic74   #b4 ,organon of pure  
reason4   #c4 ,system of pure reason4   
#a4 ,critique is a critical examination 
7,beurtheilung7 of pure reason1 its     
sources and limits4 ,the implication    
7obscured by the direct relating of     
,critique to ,system7 is that it        
prepares the way for the ,organon4  #b4 
,organon comprehends all the principles 
by which pure knowledge can be acquired 
and actually established4  #c4 ,system  
is the complete application of such an  
,organon4  ,this classification is1 as  
,paulsen#caa was the first to remark1 an
 adaptation of the ,dissertation        
standpoint4  ,,ii4 ,the second account  
begins3 8,i entitle all knowledge       
transcendental10 but is broken by the   

third account--from 8,such a ,critique0 
to the end of the paragraph--which has  
been inserted into the middle of it4 ,it
 is then continued in the next section4 
,it distinguishes3  #a4 ,critique of    
pure reason4  #b4 ,transcendental       
philosophy4  #a4 ,critique contains the 
principles of all a priori synthetical  
knowledge1 tracing an architectonic plan
 which guarantees the completeness and  
certainty of all the parts4  #b4        
,transcendental philosophy contains     
their complete analytic development1 and
 is therefore the system of such        
knowledge4  ,,iii4 ,the third account   
78,such a ,critique0 to end of          
paragraph7 in its main divisions follows
 the first account3 #a4 ,critique1 #b4  
,organon or ,canon1 #c4 ,system4 ,but   
they are now defined in a different     
manner4 ,critique is a propaedeutic for 
the ,organon4 ,but ,organon1 which      
signifies the totality of the principles
 through which pure knowledge is        
attained and extended1#cab may not be   

possible4 ,in that case the ,critique is
 a preparation only for a ,canon1 i4e4  
the totality of the principles of the   
proper employment of reason4#cac ,the   
,organon or ,canon1 in turn1 will render
 possible a ,system of the philosophy of
 pure reason1 the former yielding a     
system in extension of a priori         
knowledge1 the latter a system which    
defines the limits of a priori          
knowledge4  ,it is impossible to reduce 
these divergencies to a single          
consistent view4 ,they illustrate the   
varying sense in which ,kant uses the   
term 8metaphysics40 ,in the first       
account1 even though that account is    
based on a distinction drawn in the     
,dissertation1 the system of metaphysics
 is immanent2 in the second it is also  
transcendent2 in the third it is        
neutral4#cad  ,propaedeutic4#cae--,that 
the ,critique is only propaedeutic to a 
,system of pure reason was later denied 
by ,kant in the following emphatic      
terms3       8,i must here observe that 

,i cannot understand the attempt to     
ascribe to me the view that ,i have     
sought to supply only a                 
,propaedeutic to transcendental         
philosophy1 not the ,system of this     
philosophy4 ,such a view could never    
have entered my thoughts1 for ,i        
have myself praised the systematic      
completeness 7das vollendete            
,ganze7 of the pure philosophy in the   
,critique of ,pure ,reason as      the  
best mark of its truth40#caf  ,kant thus
 finally1 after much vacillation in his 
use of the terms1 came to the conclusion
 that ,critique1 ,transcendental        
,philosophy1 and ,system all coincide4  
,meantime he has forgotten his own      
previous and conflicting utterances on  
this point4  ,as regards speculation    
negative only4#cag--8,speculation0 here 
signifies the theoretical1 as opposed to
 the practical4#cah ,the qualifying     
phrase is in line with other passages of
 the second edition1 in which it is     
emphasised that the conclusions of the  

,critique are positive in their         
practical 7moral7 bearing4#cai          
,transcendental--transcendent4#cbj--,kan
t was the first to distinguish between  
these two terms4 ,in the scholastic     
period1 in which they first appear1 they
 were exactly synonymous1 the term      
transcendent being the more usual4 ,the 
verb1 to transcend1 appears in          
,augustine in its widest metaphysical   
sense4 8,transcende et te ipsum40       
8,cuncta corpora transcenderunt         
,platonici quaerentes ,deum2 omnem      
animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus      
transcenderunt quaerentes summum        
,deum40#cba ,the first employment of the
 term in a more specific or technical   
sense occurs in a treatise1 ,de natura  
generis1 falsely ascribed to ,thomas    
,aquinas4 ,in this treatise ens1 res1   
aliquid1 unum1 bonum1 verum are entitled
 transcendentia4 ,to understand the     
meaning in which the word is here used1 
we have1 it would seem1#cbb to take     
account of the influence exercised upon 

,aquinas by a mystical work of ,arabian 
origin1 entitled ,de causis4 ,it        
contained reference to the              
,neo-,platonic distinction between the  
,aristotelian categories1 which the     
,neo-,platonists regarded as being      
derivative1 and the more universal      
concepts1 ens1 unum1 verum1 bonum4 ,to  
these latter concepts ,aquinas gave a   
theological application4 ,ens pertains  
to essence1 unum to the person of the   
,father1 verum to the person of the     
,son1 bonum to the person of the ,holy  
,ghost4 ,in the ,de natura generis the  
number of these supreme concepts is     
increased to six by the addition of res 
and aliquid1 and as just stated the     
title transcendentia is also now applied
 for the first time4 ,in this meaning   
the term transcendent and its synonym   
transcendental are of frequent          
occurrence in ,scholastic writings4 ,the
 transcendentia or transcendentalia are 
those concepts which so transcend the   
categories as to be themselves          

predicable of the categories4 ,they are 
the 8termini vel proprietates rebus     
omnibus cuiusque generis convenientes40 
,thus ,duns ,scotus speaks of ens as the
 highest of the 8transcendental0        
concepts4 ,the term also occurs in a    
more or less similar sense in the       
writings of ,campanella1 ,giordano      
,bruno1 ,francis ,bacon1 and ,spinoza4  
,the last named gives a psychological   
explanation of the 8termini             
,transcendentales 444 ut ,ens1 ,res1    
,aliquid0 as standing for ideas that are
 in the highest degree confused owing to
 the multiplicity of the images which   
have neutralised one another in the     
process of their generation4#cbc        
,berkeley also speaks of the            
8transcendental maxims0 which lie       
outside the field of mathematical       
enquiry1 but which influence all the    
particular sciences4#cbd ,evidently the 
term has become generalised beyond its  
stricter scholastic meaning4 ,lambert   
employs transcendent in an even looser  

sense to signify concepts which         
represent what is common to both the    
corporeal and the intellectual          
world4#cbe ,we may1 indeed1 assert that 
in ,kant's time the terms transcendent  
and transcendental1 while still         
remaining synonymous1 and though used on
 the lines of their original ,scholastic
 connotation1 had lost all definiteness 
of meaning and all usefulness of        
application4 ,kant took advantage of    
this situation to distinguish sharply   
between them1 and to impose upon each a 
meaning suitable to his new ,critical   
teaching4  8,transcendental0 is         
primarily employed by ,kant as a name   
for a certain kind of knowledge4        
,transcendental knowledge is knowledge  
not of objects1 but of the nature and   
conditions of our a priori cognition of 
them4 ,in other words1 a priori         
knowledge must not be asserted1 simply  
because it is a priori1 to be           
transcendental2 this title applies only 
to such knowledge as constitutes a      

theory or science of the a priori4#cbf  
,transcendental knowledge and           
transcendental philosophy must therefore
 be taken as coinciding2 and as thus    
coincident1 they signify the science of 
the possibility1 nature1 and limits of a
 priori knowledge4 ,the term similarly  
applies to the subdivisions of the      
,critique4 ,the ,aesthetic is           
transcendental in that it establishes   
the a priori character of the forms of  
sensibility2 the ,analytic in that it   
determines the a priori principles of   
understanding1 and the part which they  
play in the constitution of knowledge2  
the ,dialectic in that it defines and   
limits the a priori ,ideas of ,reason1  
to the perverting power of which all    
false metaphysics is due4 ,that this is 
the primary and fundamental meaning     
common to the various uses of the term  
is constantly overlooked by ,max ,mller4
 ,thus in ,a #ae  ,b #cj he translates  
transcendentale ,sinnenlehre 8doctrine  
of transcendental sense0 instead of as  

8transcendental doctrine of sense40 ,in 
transforming transcendentale            
,elementarlehre into 8elements of       
transcendentalism0 he avoids the above  
error1 but only by inventing a word     
which has no place in ,kant's own       
terminology4  ,but later in the         
,critique ,kant employs the term        
transcendental in a second sense1       
namely1 to denote the a priori factors  
in knowledge4 ,all representations which
 are a priori and yet are applicable to 
objects are transcendental4 ,the term is
 then defined through its distinction   
from the empirical on the one hand1 and 
from the transcendent on the other4 ,an 
intuition or conception is              
transcendental when it originates in    
pure reason1 and yet at the same time   
goes to constitute an a priori knowledge
 of objects4 ,the contrast between the  
transcendental and the transcendent1 as 
similarly determined upon by ,kant1 is  
equally fundamental1 but is of quite    
different character4 ,that is           

transcendent which lies entirely beyond 
experience2 whereas the transcendental  
signifies those a priori elements which 
underlie experience as its necessary    
conditions4 ,the transcendent is always 
unknowable4 ,the transcendental is that 
which by conditioning experience renders
 all knowledge1 whether a priori or     
empirical1 possible4 ,the direct        
opposite of the transcendent is the     
immanent1 which as such includes both   
the transcendental and the empirical4   
,thus while ,kant employs the term      
transcendental in a very special sense  
which he has himself arbitrarily        
determined1 he returns to the original  
etymological meaning of the term        
transcendent4 ,it gains a specifically  
,critical meaning only through being    
used to expound the doctrine that all   
knowledge is limited to                 
sense-experience4 ,the attempt to find  
some similar etymological justification 
for ,kant's use of the term             
transcendental has led ,schopenhauer and

 ,kuno ,fischer to assert that ,kant    
entitles his philosophy transcendental  
because it transcends both the dogmatism
 and the scepticism of all previous     
systems6#cbg ,another attempt has been  
made by ,stirling#cbh and ,watson1#cbi  
who assert1 at least by implication1    
that the transcendental is a species of 
the transcendent1 in that while the     
latter transcends the scope of          
experience1 the former transcends its   
sense-content4 ,kant himself1 however1  
nowhere attempts to justify his use of  
the term by any such argument4  ,a third
 meaning of the term transcendental     
arises through its extension from the a 
priori intuitions and concepts to the   
processes and faculties to which they   
are supposed to be due4 ,thus ,kant     
speaks of the transcendental syntheses  
of apprehension1 reproduction1 and      
recognition1 and of the transcendental  
faculties of imagination and            
understanding4 ,in this sense the       
transcendental becomes a title for the  

conditions which render experience      
possible4 ,and inasmuch as processes and
 faculties can hardly be entitled a     
priori1 ,kant has in this third         
application of the term departed still  
further from his first definition of    
it4#ccj  ,the distinction between the   
transcendental and the transcendent may 
be illustrated by reference to the      
,ideas of reason4 ,regarded as          
regulative only1 i4e4 merely as ideals  
which inspire the understanding in the  
pursuit of knowledge1 they are          
transcendental4 ,interpreted as         
constitutive1 i4e4 as representing      
absolute realities1 they are            
transcendent4 ,yet1 despite the         
fundamental character of this           
distinction1 so careless is ,kant in the
 use of his technical terms that he also
 employs transcendental as exactly      
equivalent in meaning to transcendent4  
,this is of constant occurrence1 but    
only two instances need here be cited4  
,in the important phrase 8transcendental

 ideality of space and time0 the term   
transcendental is used in place of the  
term transcendent4 ,for what ,kant is   
asserting is that judged from a         
transcendent point of view1 i4e4 from   
the point of view of the thing in       
itself1 space is only subjectively      
real4#cca ,the phrase is indeed easily  
capable of the orthodox interpretation1 
but1 as the context clearly shows1 that 
is not the way in which it is actually  
being used by ,kant4 ,another equally   
surprising example is to be found in the
 title 8transcendental dialectic40      
,though it is defined in ,a #fc-d  ,b   
#hh in correct fashion1 in ,a #big  ,b  
#ced and ,a #cjh-i  ,b #cfe-f it is     
interpreted as treating of the illusion 
involved in transcendent judgments1 and 
so virtually as meaning transcendent    
dialectic4#ccb  ,not a ,critique of     
books and systems4#ccc--,kant here      
inserts a statement from the omitted    
,preface to the first edition4#ccd ,he  
now adds that the ,critique will supply 

a criterion for the valuation of all    
other systems4  ,a #ac  ,b #bg4--,kant's
 reason for omitting the title of       
,section ,,ii in the second edition was 
no doubt its inconsistency with the     
assertion of its opening sentence1 viz4 
that the ,critique is not transcendental
 philosophy1 but only a preparation for 
it4 ,instead of it1 ,kant has introduced
 the more appropriate heading placed    
over the preceding paragraph4  ,the     
highest principles of morals do not     
belong to transcendental                
philosophy4#cce--;,cf4 ,a #hja  ,b #hbi4
 ,the alteration made in this passage in
 the second edition#ccf indicates a     
transition towards the opposite view    
which ,kant developed in the ,critique  
of ,practical ,reason4#ccg  ,the        
division of this science4#cch--,kant in 
this paragraph alternates in the most   
bewildering fashion between the         
,critique and ,transcendental           
,philosophy4 ,in this first sentence the
 ,critique seems to be referred to4     

,later it is ,transcendental ,philosophy
 that is spoken of4  ,doctrine of       
,elements and ,doctrine of              
,methods4#cci--;,cf4 ,a #gjg ff4  ,b    
#gce ff41 and below1 pp4 #dch1 #efc4    
,two stems1 sensibility and             
understanding1 which may perhaps spring 
from a common root4#cdj--,kant sometimes
 seems to suggest#cda that imagination  
is this common root4 ,it belongs both to
 sensibility and to understanding1 and  
is passive as well as spontaneous4 ,but 
when so viewed1 imagination is virtually
 regarded as an unknown supersensuous   
power1 8concealed in the depths of the  
soul40#cdb ,the supersensuous is the    
point of union of our disparate human   
faculties1 as well as of nature and     
freedom1 mechanism and teleology4  ,the 
transcendental doctrine of sense would  
necessarily constitute the first part of
 the ,science of                        
,elements4#cdc--8,necessarily constitute
 the first part0 translates zum ersten  
,theile gehren mssen4 ,this ,vaihinger  

explains as an archaic mode of          
expression1 equivalent to ausmachen4    
,the point is important because1 if     
translated quite literally1 it might    
seem to conflict with the division      
actually followed1 and to support the   
alternative division given in the       
,critique of ,practical ,reason4 ,the   
first ,critique is divided thus3    ,i4 
,doctrine of ,elements4     #a4         
,aesthetic4     #b4 ,logic4       7a7   
,analytic4       7b7 ,dialectic4        
,,ii4 ,doctrine of ,methods4  ,in the   
,critique of ,practical ,reason#cdd a   
much more satisfactory division is      
suggested3    ,i4 ,doctrine of          
,elements4     #a4 ,analytic4       7a7 
,aesthetic 7,sense74       7b7 ,logic   
7,understanding74     #b4 ,dialectic4   
,,ii4 ,doctrine of ,methods4  ,the first
 division rests on somewhat irrelevant  
distinctions derived from the           
traditional logic2 the other is more    
directly inspired by the distinctions   
which naturally belong to ,kant's own   

philosophical system4     ,,the         
,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of        
,,elements     ,,part ,i  ,,the         
,,transcendental ,,aesthetic   ,the     
,aesthetic opens with a series of       
definitions4 ,intuition 7,anschauung7 is
 knowledge 7,erkenntnis7 which is in    
immediate relation to objects 7sich auf 
,gegenstnde unmittelbar bezieht74 ,each 
term in this definition calls for       
comment4 ,anschauung etymologically     
applies only to visual sensation4 ,kant 
extends it to cover sensations of all   
the senses4 ,the current term was       
,empfindung4 ,kant's reason for         
introducing the term intuition in place 
of sensation was evidently the fact that
 the latter could not be made to cover  
space and time4 ,we can speak of pure   
intuitions1 but not of pure sensations4 
,knowledge is used in a very wide sense1
 not strictly consistent with ,a #ej-a  
,b #gd-e4cde ,the phrase sich bezieht is
 quite indefinite and ambiguous4 ,its   
meaning will depend upon the            

interpretation of its context4 ,object  
is used in its widest and most          
indefinite meaning4 ,it may be taken as 
signifying content 7,inhalt1 a term     
which does not occur in this passage1   
but which ,kant elsewhere employs#cdf74 
,that1 at least1 is the meaning which   
best fits the context4 ,for when ,kant  
adds that intuition relates itself to   
objects immediately1 it becomes clear   
that he has in mind its distinction from
 conception 7,begriff7 which as         
expressing the universal is related to  
objects only indirectly1 representing   
some one or more attributes of the given
 objects4 ,ultimately the whole content 
of conception must be given4#cdg ,the   
phrase 8relates itself to objects0 may1 
therefore1 be paraphrased 8has some     
content1 such as red or cold1 as its    
immediate object40 ,through the content 
of intuition the whole material of      
thought is supplied4 ,intuition in      
itself is blind1 but not empty4         
8,thoughts without content are empty2   

intuitions without concepts are         
blind40#cdh  ,but the phrase 8is in     
relation to objects0 has also for ,kant 
a second meaning1 implied in the above1 
but supplementary to it4 ,as he states  
in the very next sentence1 intuition can
 have an object1 meaning thereby a      
content1 only in so far as that content 
is given4 ,the material of thought must 
be supplied2 it cannot be invented4#cdi 
,the only mode1 however1 in which it can
 be supplied1 at least to the human     
mind1 is through the affecting of the   
mind by 8the object40 ,this is an       
excellent instance of ,kant's careless  
mode of expressing himself4 ,in the     
first part of the sentence object means 
object of intuition4 ,in the latter part
 it signifies the cause of intuition4   
,and on ,kant's view the two cannot     
coincide4 ,the object which affects the 
mind is independently real2 the         
immediate object of the intuition is a  
sense-content1 which ,kant1 following   
the universally accepted view of his    

time1 regards as purely subjective4 ,the
 term object is thus used in two quite  
distinct meanings within one and the    
same sentence4  ,kant's definition of   
intuition1 when stated quite explicitly1
 and cleared of all ambiguity1 is       
therefore as follows4 ,intuition is the 
immediate apprehension of a content     
which as given is due to the action of  
an independently real object upon the   
mind4 ,this definition is obviously not 
meant to be a description of intuition  
as it presents itself to introspection1 
but to be a reflective statement of its 
indispensable conditions4 ,also it has  
in view only empirical intuitions4 ,it  
does not cover the pure intuitions space
 and time4#cej ,though space and time   
are given1 and though each possesses an 
intrinsic content1 these contents are   
not due to the action of objects upon   
the sensibility4       8,an intuition is
 such a representation as immediately   
depends upon      the presence of the   
object4 ,hence it seems impossible      

originally      to intuit a priori      
because intuition would in that event   
take      place without either a former 
or a present object to refer to1 and    
by consequence could not be             
intuition40#cea  ,this interpretation is
 borne out by ,kant's answer to ,beck   
when the latter objected that only      
through subsumption under the categories
 can a representation become objective4 
,kant replies in a marginal note1 the   
meaning of which1 though difficult to   
decipher1 admits of a fairly definite   
interpretation4       8,the determining 
of a concept through intuition so as to 
yield      knowledge of the object falls
 within the province of the faculty of  
judgment1 but not the relation of the   
intuition to an object in      general  
i4e4 the view of it as having a content 
which is given      and which is        
therefore due to some object1 for that  
is merely the      logical use of the   
representation1 whereby it is thought as
 falling      within the province of    

knowledge4 ,on the other hand1 if this  
single      representation is related   
only to the subject1 the use is         
aesthetic      7feeling71 and the       
representation cannot be an act of      
knowledge40#ceb  ,mind 7,gemt7 is a     
neutral term without metaphysical       
implications4#cec ,it is practically    
equivalent to the term which is         
substituted for it in the next          
paragraph1 power of representation      
7,vorstellungsfhigkeit74 ,representation
 7,vorstellung7 ,kant employs in the    
widest possible meaning4 ,it covers any 
and every cognitive state4 ,the         
definition here given of                
sensibility--8the capacity 7receptivity7
 to obtain representations through the  
mode in which we are affected by        
objects0--is taken directly over from   
the ,dissertation4#ced ,in this         
definition1 as in that of intuition1    
,kant1 without argument or question1    
postulates the existence of             
independently existing objects4 ,the    

existence of given sensations           
presupposes the existence of things in  
themselves4 ,sensibility is spoken of as
 the source both of objects and of      
intuitions4 ,this is legitimate since   
object and intuition mutually imply one 
another2 the latter is the apprehension 
of the former4 ,by 8objects0 is         
obviously meant what in the third       
paragraph is called the matter of       
appearances1 i4e4 sensations in their   
objective aspect1 as qualities or       
contents4 ,the term 8object0 is         
similarly employed in the last line of  
this first paragraph4  ,understanding   
7,verstand7 is defined only in its      
logical or discursive employment4 ,kant 
wisely defers all reference to its more 
fundamental synthetic activities4 ,in us
 7bei uns7 is an indirect reference to  
the possibility of intellectual         
7non-sensuous7 intuition which is       
further developed in other parts of the 
,aesthetic4#cee ,sensuous intuition is  
due to affection by an object4 ,in      

intellectual intuition the mind must    
produce the object in the act of        
apprehending it4#cef  ,kant's definition
 of intuition applies1 as already noted1
 only to empirical intuition4 ,he       
proceeds#ceg to define the relation in  
which sensation 7,empfindung7 stands to 
empirical intuition4 ,what he here says 
amounts to the assertion that through   
sensation intuition acquires its object1
 i4e4 that sensation is the content of  
intuition4 ,and that being so1 it is    
also through sensation that empirical   
intuition acquires its relation to the  
object 7 thing in itself7 which causes  
it4 7,that would seem to be the meaning 
of the ambiguous second sentence2 but it
 still remains uncertain whether the    
opposition intended is to pure or to    
intellectual intuition47 ,if this       
interpretation of the paragraph be      
correct1 sensation is counted as        
belonging exclusively to the content    
side of subjective apprehension4 ,but   
,kant views sensation in an even more   

definite manner than he here indicates4 
,though sensation is given1 it likewise 
involves a reaction of the mind4        
8,whatever is sensuous in knowledge     
depends upon the subject's      peculiar
 nature1 in so far as it is capable of  
this or that      modification upon the 
presence of the object40#ceh  ,thus for 
,kant sensation is a modification or    
state of the subject1 produced by       
affection through an object4 ,the       
affection produces a modification or    
state of the subject1 and this          
subjective modification is the          
sensation4       8,sensation is a       
perception ,perception which relates    
itself      solely to the subject as the
 modification of its state40#cei  ,this 
view of sensation1 as subjective1 was   
universally held in ,kant's day4 ,he    
accepts it without argument or question4
 ,that it could possibly be challenged  
never seems to have occurred to him4 ,he
 is equally convinced that it           
establishes the existence of an actually

 present object4       8,sensation      
argues the presence of something1 but   
depends as to its      quality upon the 
nature of the subject40#cfj 8,sensation 
presupposes the actual presence of the  
object40#cfa  ,kant's view of sensation1
 as developed in the ,aesthetic1#cfb    
thus involves three points3 7#a7 ,it    
must be counted as belonging to the     
content side of mental apprehension4    
7#b7 ,though a quality or content1 it is
 purely subjective1 depending upon the  
nature of our sensibility4 7#c7 ,it is  
due to the action of some object upon   
the sensibility4  ,kant distinguishes   
between sensation 7,empfindung7 and     
feeling 7,gefhl74#cfc ,it had been usual
 to employ them as synonyms4       8,we 
understand by the word sensation an     
objective representation of      the    
senses2 and in order to preclude the    
danger of being      misunderstood1 we  
shall denote that which must always     
remain merely      subjective and can   
constitute absolutely no representation 

of an      object by the ordinary 7sonst
 blichen7 term feeling40#cfd            
,appearance 7,erscheinung7 is here      
defined as the undetermined object of an
 intuition4 ,by undetermined object is  
meant1 as we have seen1 the object in so
 far as it consists of the given sense  
contents4 ,when these contents are      
interpreted through the categories they 
become phenomena4       8,appearances so
 far as they are thought as objects     
according to the      unity of the      
categories are called phenomena40#cfe   
,but this distinction between appearance
 and phenomenon is not held to by ,kant4
 ,he more usually speaks of the         
categorised objects as appearances4 ,the
 term phenomenon is of comparatively    
rare occurrence in the ,critique4 ,this 
has been concealed from ,english        
readers1 as both ,meiklejohn and ,max   
,mller almost invariably translate      
,erscheinung phenomenon4 ,the statement 
that appearance is the object of an     
empirical intuition raises a very       

fundamental and difficult question1     
namely1 as to the relation in which     
representation stands to the            
represented4#cff ,frequently ,kant's    
argument implies this distinction1 yet  
constantly he speaks and argues as if it
 were non-existent4 ,we have to         
recognise two tendencies in ,kant1      
subjectivist and phenomenalist4#cfg     
,when the former tendency is in the     
ascendent1 he regards all appearances1  
all phenomena1 all empirical objects1 as
 representations1 modifications of the  
sensibility1 merely subjective4 ,when1  
on the other hand1 his thinking is      
dominated by the latter tendency1       
appearances gain an existence           
independent of the individual mind4     
,they are known through subjective      
representations1 but must not be        
directly equated with them4 ,they have a
 genuine objectivity4 ,to this          
distinction1 and its consequences1 we   
shall have frequent occasion to return4 
,the phenomenalist standpoint is        

dominant in these first two paragraphs  
of the ,aesthetic1 and it finds still   
more pronounced expression in the       
opening of the third paragraph4 8,that  
in the appearances which corresponds    
7correspondirt7 to sensation1 ,i call   
its matter40 ,this sentence1 through the
 use of the term corresponds1 clearly   
implies a distinction between sensation 
and the real object apprehended in and  
through it4 ,that1 in turn1 involves a  
threefold distinction1 between sensation
 as subjective content 7 appearance in  
the strict sense71 the real enduring    
object in space 7 phenomenon1 the       
categorised object1 appearance in its   
wider and more usual sense71 and the    
thing in itself4#cfh ,yet in the        
immediately following sentence ,kant    
says that 8the matter of all appearance 
is given a posteriori40 ,by 8matter of  
appearance0 ,kant must there mean       
sensations1 for they alone are given a  
posteriori4#cfi ,on this view the       
phenomena or empirical objects reduce   

to1 and consist of1 sensations4 ,the    
intermediate term of the above threefold
 distinction is eliminated4 ,the matter 
of appearance does not correspond to1   
but itself is1 sensation4 ,thus in these
 successive sentences the two           
conflicting tendencies of ,kant's       
teaching find verbal expression4 ,they  
intervene even in the preliminary       
definition of his terms4 ,this          
fundamental conflict cannot1 however1 be
 profitably discussed at this stage4    
,the manifold of appearance 7das        
,mannichfaltige der ,erscheinung74 ,the 
meaning to be assigned to this phrase   
must depend upon the settlement of the  
above question4#cgj ,but in this passage
 it allows only of a subjectivist       
interpretation1 whereby sensations are  
appearance4 ,the given sensations as    
such constitute a manifold2 as objects  
in space they are already ordered4      
,kant's more usual phrase is 8the       
manifold of intuition40 ,his adoption of
 the term 8manifold0 7the varia of the  

,dissertation7 expresses his conviction 
that synthesis is indispensable for all 
knowledge1 and also his correlative view
 that nothing absolutely simple can be  
apprehended in sense-experience4 ,by the
 manifold ,kant does not mean1 however1 
as some of his commentators would seem  
to imply1 the chaotic or disordered4    
,the emphasis is on manifoldness or     
plurality1 as calling for reduction to  
unity and system4 ,the unity has to be  
found in it1 not introduced into it     
forcibly from the outside4 ,the manifold
 has to be interpreted1 even though the 
principles of interpretation may        
originate independently of it4 ,though1 
for instance1 the manifold as given is  
not in space and time1 the specific     
space and time relations assigned by us 
are determined for us by the inherent   
nature of the manifold itself4#cga  ,the
 form of appearance is defined--if the  
definition given in the first edition be
 translated literally--as 8that which   
causes 7dasjenige1 welches macht dass7  

the manifold of appearance to be        
intuited as ordered in certain          
relations40 ,this phrase is employed by 
,kant in other connections1 and1 as     
,vaihinger points out1#cgb need not     
necessarily indicate activity4          
8,sensation is that in our knowledge    
which causes it to be called a          
posteriori knowledge40#cgc ,in the      
second edition ,kant altered the text   
from 8geordnet angeschaut wird0 to      
8geordnet werden kann40 ,the reason     
probably was that the first edition's   
wording might seem to imply that the    
form is 7as the ,dissertation taught7   
capable in and by itself of ordering the
 manifold4 ,throughout the second       
edition ,kant makes more prominent the  
part which understanding plays in the   
apprehension of space4#cgd  ,this       
distinction between matter and form is  
central in ,kant's system4#cge ,as he   
himself says3       8,these are two     
conceptions which underlie all other    
reflection1 so      inseparably are they

 bound up with all employment of the    
understanding4 ,the one matter signifies
 the determinable in      general1 the  
other form its determination40#cgf  ,on 
the side of matter falls the manifold1  
given1 empirical1 contingent material of
 sense2 on the side of form fall the    
unifying1 a priori1 synthetic1          
relational instruments of sensibility   
and thought4 ,for ,kant these latter are
 no mere abstractions1 capable of being 
distinguished by the mind2 they differ  
from the matter of experience in nature1
 in function1 and in origin4 ,upon this 
dualistic mode of conceiving the two    
factors depends the strength as well as 
the weakness of his position4 ,to its   
perverting influence most of the        
unsatisfactory features of his doctrine 
of space and time can be directly       
traced4 ,but to it is also due his      
appreciation of the new ,critical       
problems1 with their revolutionary      
consequences1 as developed in the       
,analytic4  ,kant proceeds to argue3 7a7

 that the distinction is between two    
elements of fundamentally different     
nature and origin4 ,the matter is given 
a posteriori in sensation2 the form1 as 
distinct from all sensation1 must lie   
ready a priori in the mind4 7b7 ,kant   
also argues that form1 because of its   
separate origin1 is capable of being    
contemplated apart from all sensation4  
,the above statements rest upon the     
unexpressed assumption that sensations  
have no spatial attributes of any       
kind4#cgg ,in themselves they have only 
intensive1 not extensive1 magnitude4#cgh
 ,kant assumes this without question1   
and without the least attempt at        
proof4#cgi ,the assumption appears in   
,kant's writings as early as #agfh as a 
self-evident principle2#chj and         
throughout the ,critique is treated as a
 premiss for argument1 never as a       
statement calling for proof4 ,the only  
kind of supporting argument which is    
even indirectly suggested by ,kant is   
that space cannot by itself act upon the

 senses4#cha ,this would seem to be his 
meaning when he declares#chb that it is 
no object1 but only an ens imaginarium4 
8,space is no object of the senses40#chc
 ,such argument1 however1 presupposes   
that space can be conceived apart from  
objects4 ,it is no proof that an        
extended object may not yield extended  
sensations4 ,kant completely ignores the
 possibility that formal relations may  
be given in and with the sensations4 ,if
 our sensibility1 in consequence of the 
action of objects upon it1 is able to   
generate qualitative sensations1 why1 as
 ,vaihinger very pertinently            
enquires1#chd should it be denied the   
power of also producing1 in consequence 
of these same causes1 impressions of    
quantitative formal nature8 ,sensations1
 on ,kant's view1 are the product of    
mind much more than of objects4 ,why1   
then1 may not space itself be           
sensational8#che ,from the point of view
 of empirical science there is no such  
radical difference between cause and    

effect in the latter case as exists in  
the former4 ,as ,herbert ,spencer has   
remarked1#chf ,kant makes the enormous  
assumption       8444that no differences
 among our sensations are determined by 
any      differences in the non-ego 7for
 to say that they are so      determined
 is to say that the form under which the
 non-ego exists      produces an effect 
upon the ego72 and as it similarly      
follows      that the order of          
coexistence and sequence among these    
sensations      is not determined by any
 order in the non-ego2 we are compelled 
to conclude that all these differences  
and changes in the ego are              
self-determined40  ,kant's argument in  
the ,dissertation is exactly of this    
nature4       8,objects do not strike   
the senses by their form4 ,in order1    
therefore1 that the various impressions 
from the object acting on      the sense
 may coalesce into some whole of        
representation1 there is      required  
an inner principle of the mind through  

which in accordance      with stable and
 innate laws that manifold may take on  
some      form40#chg  ,in the paragraph 
before us ,kant may1 at first sight1    
seem to offer an argument4 ,he is really
 only restating his premiss4 8,that     
wherein alone sensations can be arranged
 7sich ordnen#chh7 and placed in a      
certain form cannot itself again be     
sensation40 ,now1 of course1 if the term
 sensation is to be limited to the sense
 qualities1 i4e4 to content or matter1  
conceived as existing apart from all    
formal relations1 the formal elements   
cannot possibly be sensational4 ,the    
legitimacy of that limitation is1       
however1 the question at issue4 ,it     
cannot be thus decided by an arbitrary  
verbal distinction4       8,were the    
contention that the relations of        
sensations are not      themselves      
sensed correct1 the inference to the    
pure apriority of      the form of our  
perception would be inevitable4 ,for    
sensation is      the sole form of      

interaction between consciousness and   
reality4444      ,but that contention is
 false4 ,the relations of sensations1   
their      determined coexistence and   
sequence1 impress consciousness1 just as
      do the sensations4 ,we feel this  
impression in the compulsion which      
the determinateness of the empirical    
manifolds lays upon the      perceiving 
consciousness4 ,the mere affection of   
consciousness by      these relations   
does not1 indeed1 by itself suffice for 
their      apprehension2 but neither    
does it suffice for the apprehension of 
the sensation itself4 ,thus there is in 
these respects no difference            
between the matter and the form of      
appearance40#chi  ,in this way1 then1 by
 means of his definition of sensation1  
,kant surreptitiously introduces his    
fundamental assumption4 ,that assumption
 reappears as the conclusion that since 
the form of appearance cannot be        
sensation1 it does not arise through the
 action of the object1 and consequently 

must be a priori4 ,though the paragraph 
seems to offer an argument in support of
 the apriority of space and time1 it is 
found on examination merely to unfold a 
position adopted without the slightest  
attempt at proof4#cij  ,the form of     
appearance must lie ready in the        
mind4#cia--;,comment upon this1 in order
 to be adequate1 had best take the form 
of a systematic discussion of ,kant's   
views1 here and elsewhere1 of space as  
an a priori form of intuition4 ,as      
already stated1 the definition which    
,kant gives of intuition--as knowledge  
which stands in immediate relation to   
objects--applies only to empirical      
intuition4 ,though by the term object   
,kant1 in so far as he is definite1     
means content1 that content is such as  
can arise only through the action of    
some independent object upon the        
sensibility4 ,in other words1 the       
content apprehended must be sensuous4   
,now such a view of intuition obviously 
does not apply to pure intuition4 ,as   

the concluding line of the paragraph    
before us states1 pure intuition 8can be
 contemplated in separation from all    
sensation20 and as the next paragraph   
adds1 it exists in the mind 8without any
 actual object of the senses40 ,yet     
,kant does not mean to imply that it is 
without content of any kind4 8,this pure
 form of sensibility may also itself be 
called pure intuition40#cib 8,it can be 
known before all actual perception1 and 
for that reason is called pure          
intuition40#cic ,though1 therefore1 pure
 intuition has an intrinsic content1 and
 is the immediate apprehension of that  
content1 it stands in no relation to any
 actual independent object4 ,the content
 as well as the form is a priori4 ,that1
 however1 raises wider questions1 and   
these we must now discuss4  ,here1 as in
 most of his fundamental positions1     
,kant entertains divergent and mutually 
contradictory doctrines4 ,only in his   
later utterances does he in any degree  
commit himself to one consistent view4  

,the position to which he finally       
inclines must not1 however1 be allowed  
to dominate the interpretation of his   
earlier statements4 ,the ,aesthetic     
calls for its own separate exegesis1    
quite as if it formed by itself an      
independent work4 ,its problems are     
discussed from a standpoint more or less
 peculiar to itself4 ,the commentator   
has the twofold task of stating its     
argumentation both in its conflict with1
 and in its relation to1 the other parts
 of the ,critique4  ,one essential      
difference between ,kant's earlier and  
later treatments of space is that in his
 earlier utterances it is viewed almost 
exclusively as a psychological a priori4
 ,the logical aspect of the problem     
first receives anything like adequate   
recognition in the ,analytic4 ,if we    
keep this important fact in mind1 two   
distinct and contradictory views of the 
psychological nature of space intuition 
can be traced throughout the ,aesthetic4
 ,on one view1 it antedates experience  

as an actual1 completed1 conscious      
intuition4 ,on the other view1 it       
precedes experience only as a potential 
disposition4 ,we rule ourselves out from
 understanding ,kant's most explicit    
utterances if we refuse to recognise the
 existence of both views4 ,kant's       
commentators have too frequently shut   
their eyes to the first view1 and have  
then blamed ,kant for using misleading  
expressions4 ,it is always safer to take
 ,kant quite literally4 ,he nearly      
always means exactly what he says at the
 time when he says it4 ,frequently he   
holds views which run completely counter
 to present-day psychology1 and on      
several occasions he flatly contradicts 
what he has with equal emphasis         
maintained in other contexts4 ,the      
aspects of ,kant's problems are so      
complex and various1 and he is so       
preoccupied in doing complete justice to
 each in turn1 that the question of the 
mutual consistency of his results is    
much less considered than is ideally    

desirable4  ,the two views can be more  
explicitly formulated4 ,the first view  
alone is straightforward and            
unambiguous4 ,space lies ready 7liegt   
bereit7 in the mind1 i4e4 it does not   
arise4 ,prior even to sense-experience  
it exists as a conscious intuition4 ,for
 this reason it can be contemplated     
apart from all sensation4 ,it still     
remains when all sense content is       
thought away1 and yet is not a mere     
form4 ,in independence of the sensuous  
manifold it possesses a pure manifold of
 its own4 ,the ground thesis of the     
second view--that space1 prior to       
sense-experience1 exists only as a      
permanent endowment of the mind--is     
likewise unambiguous4 ,but in its       
development ,kant throws consistency to 
the winds4 ,the possible ways in which1 
on the second view1 consciousness of    
space may be gained1 can be tabulated as
 follows3       7a7 ,by reflection upon 
the activity of the mind in the         
construction of experience1 yielding the

 intuition of a pure      manifold2 or  
7b7 by reflection upon the space-endowed
 products of      experience4#cid ,the  
latter mode of reflection may reveal3   
77 ,a pure manifold distinct from the   
manifold of                      sense2 
or          77 ,space as a form of the  
sensuous manifold4     ,there are thus  
three different ways 7a1 1 7 in which   
the second view can be developed3 7a7   
represents the view of the ,dissertation
 7#aggj71 of the reply to ,eberhard     
7#agij71 and of those parts of the first
 edition's deduction of the categories  
which are of very early origin2 77      
represents the final standpoint of the  
,analytic2 771 the prevailing view of   
the present day1 is nowhere accepted by 
,kant4#cie  ,kant's utterances in the   
,aesthetic are all of them coloured by  
the first main view4 ,we can best       
approach them by way of the contrasted  
teaching of the ,dissertation of #aggj4 
,the teaching there formulated          
practically coincides1 as above stated1 

with 7a7 of the second main view4       
,space1 he maintains1 is neither innate 
nor acquired from sense-experience4     
8,certainly both conceptions of time and
 of space are undoubtedly      acquired1
 not indeed by abstraction from our     
sensations of objects      7for         
sensation gives the matter1 not the form
 of human cognition71      but from the 
mind's own action in co-ordinating its  
sensations in      accordance with      
unchanging laws4 ,each represents1 as it
 were1 an      immutable type1 and so   
can be known intuitively4 ,sensations   
excite      this act of mind but do not 
contribute to the intuition4 ,there is  
here nothing innate except this law of  
the mind according to which      it     
conjoins in a certain manner the        
sensations derived from the             
presence of some object40#cif  ,how this
 view is to be reconciled with the      
contention1 no less explicitly          
maintained1#cig that space is not only a
 form of intuition but itself a pure    

intuition1 ,kant does not make clear4   
,reflection upon an activity of the mind
 may yield the representation of space  
as a form2 it is difficult to comprehend
 how it should also yield an a priori   
content4  ,kant nowhere in the ,critique
 directly discusses the question whether
 the representation of space is innate  
or acquired4 ,such suggestions as occur 
refer 7with the solitary exceptions of  
,a #aif  ,b #bda and ,b #aff ff47#cih   
only to the categories1#cii or as in the
 ,prolegomena#djj to the ,ideas of      
reason4 ,but in #agij ,kant in his reply
 to ,eberhard#dja again formulates the  
view of the ,dissertation4 ,the         
,critique allows1 he there says1 of no  
innate representations4 ,all1 without   
exception1 are acquired4 ,but of certain
 representations there is an original   
acquisition 7ursprngliche ,erwerbung74  
,their ground 7,grund7 is inborn4 ,in   
the case of space this ground is the    
mind's peculiar capacity for acquiring  
sensations in accordance with its       

subjective constitution4#djb            
8,this first formal ground is alone     
inborn1 not the space                   
representation itself4 ,for it always   
requires impressions to      determine  
the faculty of knowledge to the         
representation of an      object 7which 
in every case is its own action74 ,thus 
arises the      formal intuition1 which 
we name space1 as an originally acquired
      representation 7the form of outer 
objects in general71 the ground      of 
which 7as mere receptivity7 is likewise 
inborn1 and the      acquisition of     
which long antedates the determinate    
conception of      things which are in  
accordance with this form40#djc  ,that  
last remark is confusing4 ,kant cannot  
mean that the representation of space is
 acquired prior to sense-experience1 but
 only that since the mind gains it by   
reflection upon its own activity1 it is 
among the first things to be            
apprehended--an extremely questionable  
assertion1 could the premisses be       

granted4 ,if 8the determinate conception
 of things0 comes late1 still later must
 come the determinate conception of     
anything so abstract as pure space4 ,the
 above passage thus repeats without     
essential modification the teaching of  
the ,dissertation1 and is open to the   
same objections4 ,this teaching         
coincides with that of ,leibniz in his  
,nouveaux ,essais2 and in formulating it
 in the ,dissertation ,kant was very    
probably influenced by ,leibniz4 ,though
 it is an improvement upon the more     
extreme forms of the ,cartesian doctrine
 of innate ideas1 it does not go        
sufficiently far4  ,now while ,kant thus
 in #aggj and in #agij so emphatically  
teaches that the representation of space
 is not innate1 he none the less1 in the
 intermediate period represented by the 
,aesthetic1 would seem to maintain the  
reactionary view4 ,space is no mere     
potential disposition4 ,as a conscious  
representation it lies ready in the     
mind4 ,what1 then1 were the causes which

 constrained ,kant to go back upon his  
own better views and to adopt so        
retrograde a position8 ,the answer must 
be conjectural1 but may perhaps be found
 in the other main point in which the   
teaching of the ,aesthetic is           
distinguished from that of the          
,dissertation4 ,throughout the ,critique
 ,kant insists that space is a form of  
receptivity4 ,it is given to the mind4  
,it has nothing to do with spontaneity  
or understanding1 and therefore cannot  
be acquired by reflection upon any      
activity of the mind4 ,but neither can  
it1 as a priori1 be acquired from       
without4 ,consequently it cannot be     
acquired at all4 ,but if given1 and yet 
not acquired1 it must as a              
representation lie ready in the mind    
from the very birth of consciousness4   
,constrained by such reasoning1 ,kant   
views it as given in all its            
completeness just as truly as is a      
sensation of colour or sound4 ,this     
conclusion may not be satisfactory4     

,kant's candid recognition of it is1    
however1 greatly preferable to the      
blurring of the issue by most of his    
commentators4  ,kant came1 no doubt1 to 
the more consistent position of the     
,aesthetic chiefly through further      
reflection upon the arguments of the    
,dissertation1#djd and especially by    
recognition of the fact that though     
reflection upon an activity of the mind 
may be regarded as yielding a form of   
intuition1 it can hardly be capable of  
yielding a pure manifold which can be   
substituted for1 and take the place of1 
the manifold of sense4 ,there are for   
,kant only two ways of escape from this 
unhappy quandary3 7a7 ,either he must   
return to the ,dissertation position1   
and admit that the mind is active in the
 construction of space4 ,this he does in
 the #agij reply to ,eberhard1 but only 
by misrepresenting his own teaching in  
the ,critique4 ,in order consistently to
 maintain that space is acquired by     
reflection upon an activity of the mind1

 he would have to recast the entire     
,aesthetic1 as well as much of the      
,analytic1 and to do so in ways which   
cannot genuinely harmonise with the main
 tendencies of his teaching4#dje 7b7 ,no
 such obstacle lay in the way of an     
alternative modification of his         
position4 ,kant might very easily have  
given up the contention that space is a 
pure intuition4 ,if he had been willing 
to recognise that the sole possible     
manifold of intuition is sensuous1 he   
could then have maintained that though  
space is innate as a potential form of  
receptivity1 it is acquired only through
 reflection upon the space-endowed      
products of sensibility4 ,so obvious are
 the advantages of this position1 so    
completely does it harmonise with the   
facts of experience and with the        
teaching of modern psychology1 and so   
obscure are the various passages in     
which ,kant touches on this central     
issue1 that many of his most competent  
commentators are prepared to regard it  

as being the actual teaching of the     
,critique4 ,the evidence#djf seems to   
me1 however1 to refute this             
interpretation of ,kant's position4 ,the
 traditional1 ,cartesian1 semi-mystical 
worship of mathematical truth1 as       
altogether independent of the           
contingencies of sense-experience1 and  
as a body of knowledge absolutely       
distinct in origin from the merely      
empirical sciences1 influences ,kant's  
thinking even at the very moment when he
 is maintaining1 in opposition to the   
,cartesians1 that its subject matter is 
a merely subjective intuition4 ,kant1 as
 it would seem1 still maintains that    
there is a pure manifold of intuition   
distinct from the manifold of sense2 and
 so by the inevitable logic of his      
thought is constrained to view space as 
innate in conscious form4 ,this is not1 
of course1 a conclusion which he could  
permanently stand by1 but its           
elimination would have involved a more  
radical revision of his whole view of   

pure intuition and of mathematical      
science than he was willing to          
undertake4 ,though in the ,analytic he  
has come to recognise#djg that it is    
acquired by reflection upon objects1 to 
the end he would seem to persist in the 
difficult contention that such          
reflection yields a pure manifold       
distinct from the manifold of sense4#djh
 ,his belief that mathematical science  
is based upon pure intuition prevented  
him from recognising that though space  
may be a pure form of intuition1 it can 
never by itself constitute a complete   
intuition4 ,its sole possible content is
 the manifold of sense4 ,but even apart 
from the fact that our apprehension of  
space is always empirically conditioned1
 ,kant's view of mathematical           
propositions as grounded in intuition   
is1 as already observed1 not itself     
tenable4 ,for though intuitions may     
perhaps be the ultimate subject matter  
of geometry1 concepts are its sole      
possible instruments4 ,intuitions yield 

scientific insight in exact proportion  
to our powers of restating their complex
 content in the terms of abstract       
thought4 ,until the evidence which they 
supply has been thus intellectually     
tested and defined1 they cannot be      
accepted as justifying even the simplest
 proposition4#dji  ,the complicated     
ambiguities of ,kant's treatment of     
space may be illustrated and further    
clarified by discussion of another      
difficulty4 ,is space a totum analyticum
 or a totum syntheticum8 ,does the whole
 precondition the parts1 or does it     
arise through combination of the parts8 
,or to ask another but connected        
question1 do we intuit infinitude1 or is
 it conceptually apprehended only as the
 presupposition of our limited          
intuitions8 ,to these questions         
diametrically opposite answers can be   
cited from the ,critique4 ,as we have   
above noted1 ,kant teaches in the       
,aesthetic that space is given as a     
whole1 and that the parts arise only by 

limitation of it4 ,but in ,a #afb  ,b   
#bjc we find him also teaching that a   
magnitude is to be entitled extensive   
8444when the representation of the parts
 makes possible1 and      therefore     
necessarily precedes1 the representation
 of the whole4 ,i      cannot represent 
to myself a line1 however small1 without
 drawing      it in thought1 i4e4       
generating from a point all its parts   
one      after another1 and thus for the
 first time recording this              
intuition40#daj  ,he adds in the second 
edition#daa that extensive magnitude    
cannot be apprehended save through a    
8synthesis of the manifold10 a          
8combination of the homogeneous40  ,the 
note which ,kant appends to ,b #acf is a
 very strange combination of both views4
 ,it first of all reaffirms the doctrine
 of the ,aesthetic that space and time  
are not concepts1 but intuitions within 
which as in a unity a multitude of      
representations are contained2 and then 
proceeds to argue that space and time1  

as thus composite1 must presuppose an   
antecedent synthesis4 ,in ,a #eje  ,b   
#ecc we find a similar attempt to       
combine both assertions4       8,the    
parts of a given appearance are first   
given through and in the      regress of
 decomposing synthesis 7decomponirenden 
,synthesis740  ,the clash of conflicting
 tenets which ,kant is striving to      
reconcile could hardly find more fitting
 expression than in this assertion of an
 analytic synthesis4 ,the same conflict 
appears1 though in a less violent form1 
in ,a #dch  ,b #dff4       8,space      
should properly be called not compositum
 but totum1      since its parts are    
possible only in the whole1 not the     
whole      through the parts4 ,it might1
 indeed1 be said to be a compositum     
that is ideale1 but not reale4 ,that1   
however1 is a mere      subtlety40#dab  
,the arguments by which ,kant proves    
space to be an a priori intuition rest  
upon the view that space is given as    
infinite1 and that its parts arise      

through limitation of this              
prior-existent whole4 ,but a principle  
absolutely fundamental to the entire    
,critique is the counter principle1 that
 all analysis rests upon and presupposes
 a previously exercised synthesis4      
,synthesis or totality as such can never
 be given4 ,only in so far as a whole is
 synthetically constructed can it be    
apprehended by the mind4 ,representation
 of the parts precedes and renders      
possible representation of the whole4   
,the solution of the dilemma arising out
 of these diverse views demands the     
drawing of two distinctions4 ,first1    
between a synthesised totality and a    
principle of synthesis2 the former may  
involve a prior synthesis2 the latter   
does not depend upon synthesis1 but     
expresses the predetermined nature of   
some special form of synthesis4         
,secondly1 it demands a distinction     
between the a priori manifolds of space 
and time and the empirical manifold     
which is apprehended in and through     

them4 ,this1 as we have already noted1  
is a distinction difficult to take quite
 seriously1 and is entirely unsupported 
by psychological evidence4 ,but it would
 seem to be insisted upon by ,kant1 and 
to have been a determining factor in the
 formulation of several of his main     
doctrines4  ,in terms of the first      
distinction we are compelled to         
recognise that the view of space which  
underlies the ,aesthetic is out of      
harmony with the teaching of the        
,analytic4 ,in the ,aesthetic ,kant     
interprets space not merely as a form of
 intuition but also as a formal         
intuition1 which is given complete in   
its totality1 and which is capable of   
being apprehended independently of its  
empirical contents1 and even prior to   
them4 ,that would seem to be the view of
 space which is presupposed in ,kant's  
explanation of pure mathematical        
science4 ,the passages from the         
,analytic1 quoted above1 are1 however1  
its express recantation4 ,space1 as the 

intuition of a manifold1 is a totum     
syntheticum1 not a totum analyticum4 ,it
 is constructed1 not given4 ,the        
divergence of views between the         
,aesthetic and the ,analytic springs out
 of the difficulty of meeting at once   
the logical demands of a world which    
,kant conceives objectively1 and the    
psychological demands which arise when  
this same world is conceived as         
subjectively conditioned4 ,in principle1
 the whole precedes the parts2 in the   
process of being brought into existence 
as an intuition1 the parts precede the  
whole4 ,the principle which determines  
our apprehension of any space1 however  
small or however large1 is that it      
exists in and through universal space4  
,this is the principle which underlies  
both the synthetic construction of space
 and also its apprehension once it is   
constructed4 ,in principle1 therefore1  
i4e4 in the order of logical thought1   
the whole precedes the parts4#dac ,the  
process1 however1 which this principle  

governs and directs1 cannot start with  
space as a whole1 but must advance to it
 through synthesis of smaller parts4    
,but ,kant does not himself recognise   
any conflict between this teaching and  
the doctrine of the ,aesthetic4 ,he     
seems to himself merely to be making    
more definite a position which he has   
consistently held all along2 and this   
was possible owing to his retention and 
more efficient formulation of the second
 of the two distinctions mentioned      
above1 viz4 that between the manifold of
 sense and the manifold of intuition4   
,this distinction enables him to graft  
the new view upon the old1 and so in the
 very act of insisting upon the         
indispensableness of the conceptual     
syntheses of understanding1 none the    
less to maintain his view of geometry as
 an intuitive science4#dad       8,space
 and time contain a manifold of pure a  
priori intuition1      but at the same  
time are conditions of the receptivity  
of our      mind--conditions under which

 alone it can receive representations   
of objects1 and which therefore must    
also affect the concept of      them4   
,but if this manifold is to be known1   
the spontaneity of our      thinking    
requires that it be gone through in a   
certain way1 taken      up1 and         
connected4 ,this action ,i name         
synthesis4444 ,such a      synthesis is 
pure1 if the manifold is not empirical1 
but is given      a priori1 as is that  
of space and of time40#dae  ,thus ,kant 
recognises that space1 as apprehended by
 us1 is constructed1 not given1 and so  
by implication that the infinitude of   
space is a principle of apprehension1   
not a given intuition4 ,but he also     
holds to the view that it contains a    
pure1 and presumably infinite1 manifold1
 given as such4#daf ,in what this pure  
manifold consists1 and how the          
description of it as a manifold1        
demanding synthesis for its             
apprehension1 is to be reconciled with  
its continuity1 ,kant nowhere even      

attempts to explain4 ,nor does he show  
what the simple elements are from which 
the synthesis of apprehension and       
reproduction in pure intuition might    
start4 ,the unity and multiplicity of   
space are1 indeed1 as he himself        
recognises1#dag inseparably involved in 
one another2 and recognition of this    
fact must render it extremely difficult 
to assign them to separate faculties4   
,for the same reason it is impossible to
 distinguish temporally1 as ,kant so    
frequently does1 the processes of       
synthesis and of analysis1 making the   
former in all cases precede the latter  
in time4 ,the very nature of space and  
time1 and1 as he came to recognise1 the 
very nature of all ,ideas of reason1 in 
so far as they involve the notion of the
 unconditioned1 conflict with such a    
view4  ,even when ,kant is dealing with 
space as a principle of synthesis1 he   
speaks with no very certain voice4 ,in  
the ,analytic it is ascribed to the     
co-operation of sensibility and         

understanding4 ,in the ,dialectic it is1
 by implication1 ascribed to ,reason2   
and in the ,metaphysical ,first         
,principles it is explicitly so         
ascribed4       8,absolute space cannot 
be object of experience2 for space      
without      matter is no object of     
perception1 and yet it is a necessary   
conception of ,reason1 and therefore    
nothing but a mere ,idea40#dah          
8,absolute space is not necessary as a  
conception of an actual      object1 but
 as an ,idea which can serve as         
rule44440#dai  ,kant's teaching in the  
,critique of ,judgment is a further     
development of this position4           
8,the mind listens to the voice of      
,reason which1 for every given          
magnitude--even for those that can never
 be entirely apprehended1      although 
7in sensible representation7 they are   
judged as entirely      given--requires 
totality4444 ,it does not even except   
the infinite      7space and past time7 
from this requirement2 on the contrary1 

it      renders it unavoidable to think 
the infinite 7in the judgment of        
common reason7 as entirely given 7in its
 totality74 ,but the      infinite is   
absolutely 7not merely comparatively7   
great4 ,compared      with it everything
 else 7of the same kind of magnitudes7  
is small4      ,but what is most        
important is that the mere ability to   
think it as      a whole indicates a    
faculty of mind which surpasses every   
standard of sense4444 ,the bare         
capability of thinking the given        
infinite without contradiction requires 
in the human mind a faculty      itself 
supersensible4 ,for it is only by means 
of this faculty and      its ,idea of a 
noumenon 444 that the infinite of the   
world of sense1      in the pure        
intellectual estimation of magnitude1   
can be      completely comprehended     
under one concept4444 ,nature is1       
therefore1 sublime in those of its      
phenomena1 whose intuition      brings  
with it the ,idea of its infinity4444   

,for just as imagination      and       
understanding1 in judging of the        
beautiful1 generate a      subjective   
purposiveness of the mental powers by   
means of their      harmony1 so         
imagination and ,reason do so by means  
of their      conflict40#dbj  ,kant has 
here departed very far indeed from the  
position of the ,aesthetic4#dba         
,,the ,,transcendental ,,aesthetic      
,,section ,i  ,,space  ,,metaphysical   
,,exposition ,,of ,,the ,,conception    
,,of ,,space#dbb       ,space3 ,first   
,argument4--8,space is not an empirical 
concept      7,begriff7 which has been  
abstracted from outer experiences4 ,for 
in order that certain sensations be     
related to something outside me         
7i4e4 to something in another region of 
space from that in which      ,i find   
myself71 and similarly in order that ,i 
may be able to      represent them as   
outside and alongside#dbc one another1  
and      accordingly as not only        
qualitatively different but as in       

different places1 the representation of 
space must be presupposed      7muss    
schon zum ,grunde liegen74 ,the         
representation of space      cannot1    
therefore1 be empirically obtained at   
second-hand from the      relations of  
outer appearance4 ,this outer experience
 is itself      possible at all only    
through that representation40#dbd  ,the 
first sentence states the thesis of the 
argument3 space is not an empirical     
concept abstracted from outer           
experiences4 ,the use of the term       
,begriff in the title of the section1   
and also in this sentence1 is an        
instance of the looseness with which    
,kant employs his terms4 ,it is here    
synonymous with the term representation 
7,vorstellung71 which covers intuitions 
as well as general or discursive        
concepts4 ,consequently1 the            
contradiction is only verbal1 not real1 
when ,kant proceeds to prove that the   
concept of space is an intuition1 not a 
concept4 ,but this double employment of 

the term is none the less misleading4   
,when ,kant employs it in a strict      
sense1 it signifies solely the general  
class concept4#dbe ,all true concepts   
are for ,kant of that single type4 ,he  
has not re-defined the term concept in  
any manner which would render it        
applicable to the relational categories4
 ,for unfortunately1 and very strangely1
 he never seems to have raised the      
question whether categories are not also
 concepts4 ,the application to the forms
 of understanding of the separate title 
categories seems to have contented him4 
,much that is obscure and even          
contradictory in his teaching might have
 been prevented had he recognised that  
the term concept is a generic title     
which includes1 as its sub-species1 both
 general notions and relational         
categories4  ,kant's limitation of the  
term concept to the merely generic1#dbf 
and his consequent equating of the      
categorical proposition with the        
assertion of the substance-attribute    

relation1#dbg would seem in large part  
to be traceable to his desire to        
preserve for himself1 in the pioneer    
labours of his ,critical enquiries1 the 
guiding clues of the distinctions drawn 
in the traditional logic4 ,kant insists 
on holding to them1 at least in outward 
appearance1 at whatever sacrifice of    
strict consistency4 ,critical doctrine  
is made to conform to the exigencies of 
an artificial framework1 with which its 
own tenets are only in very imperfect   
harmony4 ,appreciation of the ramifying 
influence1 and1 as regards the detail of
 exposition1 of the far-reaching        
consequences1 of this desire to conform 
to the time-honoured rubrics1 is indeed 
an indispensable preliminary to any     
adequate estimate whether of the        
strength or of the defects of the       
,critical doctrines4 ,as a separate and 
ever-present influence in the           
determining of ,kant's teaching1 this   
factor may conveniently and             
compendiously be entitled ,kant's       

logical architectonic4#dbh ,we shall    
have frequent occasion to observe its   
effects4#dbi  ,the second sentence gives
 expression to the fact through which   
,kant proves his thesis4 ,certain       
sensations1 those of the special senses 
as distinguished from the organic       
sensations1#dcj are related to something
 which stands in a different region of  
space from the embodied self1 and       
consequently are apprehended as         
differing from one another not only in  
quality but also in spatial position4   
,as is proved later in the ,analytic1   
thought plays an indispensable part in  
constituting this reference of          
sensations to objects4 ,kant here1      
however1 makes no mention of this       
further complication4 ,he postulates1 as
 he may legitimately do at this stage1  
the fact that our sensations are thus   
objectively interpreted1 and limits his 
enquiry to the spatial factor4 ,now the 
argument1 as ,vaihinger justly points   
out1#dca hinges upon the assumption     

which ,kant has already embodied#dcb in 
his definition of the 8form0 of sense1  
viz4 that sensations are non-spatial1   
purely qualitative4 ,though this is an  
assumption of which ,kant nowhere       
attempts to give proof1 it serves none  
the less as an unquestioned premiss from
 which he draws all-important           
conclusions4 ,this first argument on    
space derives its force entirely from   
it4  ,the proof that the representation 
of space is non-empirical may therefore 
be explicitly stated as follows4 ,as    
sensations are non-spatial and differ   
only qualitatively1 the representation  
of space must have been added to them4  
,and not being supplied by the given    
sensations1 it must1 as the only        
alternative1 have been contributed by   
the mind4 ,the representation of space1 
so far from being derived from external 
experience1 is what first renders it    
possible4 ,as a subjective form that    
lies ready in the mind1 it precedes     
experience and co-operates in generating

 it4 ,this proof of the apriority of    
space is thus proof of the priority of  
the representation of space to every    
empirical perception4  ,in thus         
interpreting ,kant's argument as proving
 more than the thesis of the first      
sentence claims1 we are certainly       
reading into the proof more than ,kant  
has himself given full expression to4   
,but1 as is clearly shown by the        
argument of the next section1 we are    
only stating what ,kant actually takes  
the argument as having proved1 namely1  
that the representation of space is not 
only non-empirical but is likewise of   
subjective origin and precedes          
experience in temporal fashion4  ,the   
point of view which underlies and       
inspires the argument can be defined    
even more precisely4 ,kant's conclusion 
may be interpreted in either of two     
ways4 ,the form of space may precede    
experience only as a potentiality4      
,existing as a power of                 
co-ordination1#dcc it will come to      

consciousness only indirectly through   
the addition which it makes to the given
 sensations4 ,though subjective in      
origin1 it will be revealed to the mind 
only in and through experience4 ,this   
view may indeed be reconciled with the  
terms of the proof4 ,but a strictly     
literal interpretation of its actual    
wording is more in keeping with what1 as
 we shall find1 is the general trend of 
the ,aesthetic as a whole4 ,we are then 
confronted by a very different and      
extremely paradoxical view1 which may   
well seem too naive to be accepted by   
the modern reader1 but which we seem    
forced1#dcd none the less1 to regard as 
the view actually presented in the text 
before us4 ,kant here asserts1 in the   
most explicit manner1 that the mind1 in 
order to construe sensations in spatial 
terms1 must already be in possession of 
a representation of space1 and that it  
is in the light of this representation  
that it apprehends sensations4 ,the     
conscious representation of space       

precedes in time external experience4   
,such1 then1 would seem to be ,kant's   
first argument on space4 ,it seeks to   
establish a negative conclusion1 viz4   
that space is not derived from          
experience4 ,but1 in so doing1 it also  
yields a positive psychological         
explanation of its origin4  ,those      
commentators#dce who refuse to recognise
 that ,kant's problem is in any degree  
psychological1 or that ,kant himself so 
regards it1 and who consequently seek to
 interpret the ,aesthetic from the point
 of view of certain portions of the     
,analytic1 give a very different        
statement of this first argument4 ,they 
state it in purely logical terms4#dcf   
,its problem1 they claim1 is not that of
 determining the origin of our          
representation of space1 but only its   
logical relation to our specific        
sense-experiences4 ,the notion of space 
in general precedes1 as an indispensable
 logical presupposition1 all particular 
specification of the space relation4    

,consciousness of space as a whole is   
not constructed from consciousness of   
partial spaces2 on the contrary1 the    
latter is only possible in and through  
the former4  ,such an argument does of  
course represent a valuable truth2 and  
it alone harmonises with much in ,kant's
 maturer teaching2#dcg but we must not  
therefore conclude that it is also the  
teaching of the ,aesthetic4 ,the        
,critique contains too great a variety  
of tendencies1 too rich a complexity of 
issues1 to allow of such simplification4
 ,it loses more than it gains by such   
rigorous pruning of the luxuriant       
secondary tendencies of its exposition  
and thought4 ,and above all1 this       
procedure involves the adoption by the  
commentator of impossible               
responsibilities1 those of deciding what
 is essential and valuable in ,kant's   
thought and what is irrelevant4 ,the    
value and suggestiveness of ,kant's     
philosophy largely consist in his       
sincere appreciation of conflicting     

tendencies1 and in his persistent       
attempt to reduce them to unity with the
 least possible sacrifice4 ,but in any  
case the logical interpretation         
misrepresents this particular argument4 
,kant is not here distinguishing between
 space in general and its specific      
modifications4 ,he is maintaining that  
no space relation can be revealed in    
sensation4 ,it is not only that the     
apprehension of any limited space       
presupposes the representation of space 
as a whole4 ,both partial and infinite  
space are of mental origin2 sensation1  
as such1 is non-spatial1 purely         
subjective4 ,and lastly1 the fact that  
,kant means to assert that space is not 
only logically presupposed but is       
subjectively generated1 is sufficiently 
borne out by his frequent employment    
elsewhere in the ,aesthetic of such     
phrases as 8the subjective condition of 
sensibility10 8lying ready in our       
minds10 and 8necessarily preceding as   
the form of the subject's receptivity   

all intuitions of objects40  ,second    
,argument4--,having proved by the first 
argument that the representation of     
space is not of empirical origin1 ,kant 
in the second argument proceeds to      
establish the positive conclusion that  
it is a priori4#dch ,the proof1 when all
 its assumptions are rendered explicit1 
runs as follows4 ,thesis3 ,space is a   
necessary representation1 and           
consequently is a priori4 ,proof3 ,it is
 impossible to imagine the absence of   
space1 though it is possible to imagine 
it as existing without objects to fill  
it4 ,a representation which it is       
impossible for the mind to be without is
 a necessary representation4 ,but       
necessity is one of the two criteria of 
the a priori4 ,the proof of the         
necessary character of space is         
therefore also a proof of its being a   
priori4  ,the argument1 more freely     
stated1 is that what is empirically     
given from without can be thought away1 
and that since space cannot be thus     

eliminated1 it must be grounded in our  
subjective organisation1 i4e4 must be   
psychologically a priori4 ,the argument1
 as stated by ,kant1 emphasises the     
apriority1 not the subjectivity1 of     
space1 but none the less the asserted   
apriority is psychological1 not logical 
in character4 ,for the criterion        
employed is not the impossibility of    
thinking otherwise1 but our incapacity  
to represent this specific element as   
absent4 ,the ground upon which the whole
 argument is made to rest is the merely 
brute fact 7asserted by ,kant7 of our   
incapacity to think except in terms of  
space4  ,the argument is1 however1      
complicated by the drawing of a further 
consequence1 which follows as a         
corollary from the main conclusion4     
,from the subjective necessity of space 
follows its objective necessity4 ,space 
being necessary a priori1 objects can   
only be apprehended in and through it4  
,consequently it is not dependent upon  
the objects apprehended1 but itself     

underlies outer appearances as the      
condition of their possibility4 ,this   
corollary is closely akin to the first  
argument on space1 and differs from it  
only in orientation4 ,the first argument
 has a psychological purpose4 ,it       
maintains that the representation of    
space precedes external experience1     
causally conditioning it4 ,the corollary
 has a more objective aim4 ,it concludes
 that space is a necessary constituent  
of the external experience thus         
generated4 ,the one proves that space is
 a necessary subjective antecedent2 the 
other that it is a necessary objective  
ingredient4#dci  ,to consider the proof 
in detail4 ,the exact words which ,kant 
employs in stating the nervus probandi  
of the argument are that we can never   
represent 7eine ,vorstellung davon      
machen7 space as non-existent1 though we
 can very well think 7denken7 it as     
being empty of objects4 ,the terms      
,vorstellung and denken are vague and   
misleading4 ,kant himself recognises    

that it is possible to conceive that    
there are beings who intuit objects in  
some other manner than in space4 ,he    
cannot therefore mean that we are unable
 to think or conceive space as          
non-existent4 ,he must mean that we     
cannot in imagination intuit it as      
absent4 ,it is the necessary form of all
 our intuitions1 and therefore also of  
imagination1 which is intuitive in      
character4 ,our consciousness is        
dependent upon given intuitions for its 
whole content1 and to that extent space 
is a form with which the mind can never 
by any possibility dispense4 ,pure      
thought enables it to realise this de   
facto limitation1 but not to break free 
from it4 ,even in admitting the         
possibility of other beings who are not 
thus constituted1 the mind still        
recognises its own ineluctable          
limitations4  ,kant offers no proof of  
his assertion that space can be intuited
 in image as empty of all sensible      
content2 and as a matter of fact the    

assertion is false4 ,doubtless the use  
of the vague term ,vorstellung is in    
great part responsible for ,kant's      
mistaken position4 ,so long as          
imagination and thought are not clearly 
distinguished1 the assertion is         
correspondingly indefinite4 ,pure space 
may possibly be conceived1 but it can   
also be conceived as altogether         
non-existent4 ,if1 on the other hand1   
our imaginative power is alone in       
question1 the asserted fact must be     
categorically denied4 ,with the         
elimination of all sensible content     
space itself ceases to be a possible    
image4 ,kant's proof thus rests upon a  
misstatement of fact4  ,in a second     
respect ,kant's proof is open to        
criticism4 ,he takes the impossibility  
of imagining space as absent as proof   
that it originates from within4 ,the    
argument is valid only if no other      
psychological explanation can be given  
of this necessity1 as for instance      
through indissoluble association or     

through its being an invariable element 
in the given sensations4 ,kant's        
ignoring of these possibilities is due  
to his unquestioning belief that        
sensations are non-spatial1 purely      
qualitative4 ,that is a presupposition  
whose truth is necessary to the cogency 
of the argument4  ,third                
,argument4--,this argument1 which was   
omitted in the second edition1 will be  
considered in its connection with the   
transcendental exposition into which it 
was then merged4  ,fourth 7in second    
edition1 ,third7 ,argument4--,the next  
two arguments seek to show that space is
 not a discursive or general concept but
 an intuition4 ,the first proof falls   
into two parts1 7a7 ,we can represent   
only a single space4 ,for though we     
speak of many spaces1 we mean only parts
 of one and the same single space4      
,space must therefore be an intuition4  
,for only intuition is thus directly    
related to a single individual4 ,a      
concept always refers indirectly1 per   

notas communes1 to a plurality of       
individuals4 7b7 ,the parts of space    
cannot precede the one all-comprehensive
 space4 ,they can be thought only in and
 through it4 ,they arise through        
limitation of it4 ,now the parts 7i4e4  
the attributes7 which compose a concept 
precede it in thought4 ,through         
combination of them the concept is      
formed4 ,space cannot1 therefore1 be a  
concept4 ,consequently it must1 as the  
only remaining alternative1 be an       
intuition4 ,only in an intuition does   
the whole precede the parts4 ,in a      
concept the parts always precede the    
whole4 ,intuition stands for            
multiplicity in unity1 conception for   
unity in multiplicity4  ,the first part 
of the argument refers to the extension1
 the second part to the intension of the
 space representation4 ,in both aspects 
it appears as intuitional4#ddj  ,kant1  
in repeating his thesis as a conclusion 
from the above grounds1 confuses the    
reader by an addition which is not      

strictly relevant to the argument1 viz4 
by the statement that this intuition    
must be non-empirical and a priori4     
,this is simply a recapitulation of what
 has been established in the preceding  
proofs4 ,it is not1 as might at first   
sight appear1 part of the conclusion    
established by the argument under       
consideration4 ,the reader is the more  
apt to be misled owing to the fact that 
very obviously arguments for the        
non-empirical and for the a priori      
character of space can be derived from  
proof 7b74 ,that space is non-empirical 
would follow from the fact that         
representation of space as a whole is   
necessary for the apprehension of any   
part of it4 ,empirical intuition can    
only yield the apprehension of a limited
 space4 ,the apprehension of the        
comprehensive space within which it     
falls must therefore be non-empirical4  
8,as we intuitively apprehend           
7anschauend erkennen7 not only the      
space of the object which affects our   

senses1 but the whole space1      space 
cannot arise out of the actual affection
 of the senses1 but      must precede it
 in time 7vor ihr vorhergehen740#dda    
,but in spite of its forcibleness this  
argument is nowhere presented in the    
,critique4  ,similarly1 in so far as    
particular spaces can be conceived only 
in and through space as a whole1 and in 
so far as the former are limitations of 
the one antecedent space1 the intuition 
which underlies all external perception 
must be a priori4 ,this is in essentials
 a stronger and more cogent mode of     
formulating the second argument on      
space4 ,but again1 and very strangely1  
it is nowhere employed by ,kant in this 
form4  ,the concluding sentence1        
ambiguously introduced by the words so  
werden auch1 is tacked on to the        
preceding argument4 ,interpreted in the 
light of  #ae ,c of the                 
,dissertation1#ddb and of the           
corresponding fourth#ddc argument#ddd on
 time1 it may be taken as offering      

further proof that space is an          
intuition4 ,the concepts of line and    
triangle1 however attentively           
contemplated1 will never reveal the     
proposition that in every triangle two  
sides taken together are greater than   
the third4 ,an a priori intuition will  
alone account for such apodictic        
knowledge4 ,this concluding sentence    
thus really belongs to the              
transcendental exposition2 and as such  
ought1 like the third argument1 to have 
been omitted in the second edition4     
,kant's proof rests on the assumption   
that there are only two kinds of        
representation1 intuitions and concepts1
 and also in equal degree upon the      
further assumption that all concepts are
 of one and the same type4#dde          
,intuition is1 for ,kant1 the           
apprehension of an individual4          
,conception is always the representation
 of a class or genus4 ,intuition is     
immediately related to the individual4  
,conception is reflective or discursive2

 it apprehends a plurality of objects   
indirectly through the representation of
 those marks which are common to them   
all4#ddf ,intuition and conception      
having been defined in this manner1 the 
proof that space is single or           
individual1 and that in it the whole    
precedes the parts1 is proof conclusive 
that it is an intuition1 not a          
conception4 ,owing1 however1 to the     
narrowness of the field assigned to     
conception1 the realm occupied by       
intuition is proportionately wide1 and  
the conclusion is not as definite and as
 important as might at first sight      
appear4 ,by itself1 it amounts merely to
 the statement1 which no one need       
challenge1 that space is not a generic  
class concept4 ,incidentally certain    
unique characteristics of space are1    
indeed1 forcibly illustrated2 but the   
implied conclusion that space on account
 of these characteristics must belong to
 receptivity1 not to understanding1 does
 not by any means follow4 ,it has not1  

for instance1 been proved that space and
 time are radically distinct from the   
categories1 i4e4 from the relational    
forms of understanding4  ,in #aggj1     
while ,kant still held to the           
metaphysical validity of the pure forms 
of thought1 the many difficulties which 
result from the ascription of           
independent reality to space and time   
were1 doubtless1 a sufficient reason for
 regarding the latter as subjective and 
sensuous4 ,but upon adoption of the     
,critical standpoint such argument is no
 longer valid4 ,if all our forms of     
thought may be subjective1 the existence
 of antinomies has no real bearing upon 
the question whether space and time do  
or do not have a different constitution 
and a different mental origin from the  
categories4 ,the antinomies1 that is to 
say1 may perhaps suffice to prove that  
space and time are subjective2 they     
certainly do not establish their        
sensuous character4  ,but though        
persistence of the older1 un-,critical  

opposition between the intellectual and 
the sensuous was partly responsible for 
,kant's readiness to regard as radical  
the very obvious differences between a  
category such as that of substance and  
attribute and the visual or tactual     
extendedness with which objects are     
endowed1 it can hardly be viewed as the 
really decisive influence4 ,that would  
rather seem to be traceable to ,kant's  
conviction that mathematical knowledge  
is unique both in fruitfulness and in   
certainty1 and to his further belief    
that it owes this distinction to the    
content character of the a priori forms 
upon which it rests4 ,for though the    
categories of the physical sciences are 
likewise a priori1 they are exclusively 
relational1#ddg and serve only to       
organise a material that is empirically 
given4 ,to account for the superiority  
of mathematical knowledge ,kant         
accordingly felt constrained to regard  
space and time as not merely forms in   
terms of which we interpret the matter  

of sense1 but as also themselves        
intuited objects1 and as therefore      
possessing a character altogether       
different from anything which can be    
ascribed to the pure understanding4 ,the
 opposition between forms of sense and  
categories of the understanding1 in the 
strict ,kantian mode of envisaging that 
opposition1 is thus inseparably bound up
 with ,kant's doctrine of space and time
 as being not only forms of intuition1  
but as also in their purity and         
independence themselves intuitions4     
,even the sensuous subject matter of    
pure mathematics--so ,kant would seem to
 contend--is a priori in nature4 ,if    
this latter view be questioned--and to  
the modern reader it is indeed a stone  
of stumbling--much of the teaching of   
the ,aesthetic will have to be modified 
or at least restated4  ,fifth 7in second
 edition1 ,fourth7 ,argument4--,this    
argument is quite differently stated in 
the two editions of the ,critique1      
though the purpose of the argument is   

again in both cases to prove that space 
is an intuition1 not a general concept4 
,in the first edition this is proved by 
reference to the fact that space is     
given as an infinite magnitude4 ,this   
characteristic of our space             
representation cannot be accounted for  
so long as it is regarded as a concept4 
,a general conception of space which    
would abstract out those properties and 
relations which are common to all       
spaces1 to a foot as well as to an ell1 
could not possibly determine anything in
 regard to magnitude4 ,for since spaces 
differ in magnitude1 any one magnitude  
cannot be a common quality4 ,space is1  
however1 given us as determined in      
magnitude1 namely1 as being of infinite 
magnitude2 and if a general conception  
of space relations cannot determine     
magnitude1 still less can it determine  
infinite magnitude4 ,such infinity must 
be derived from limitlessness in the    
progression of intuition4 ,our          
conceptual representations of infinite  

magnitude must be derivative products1  
acquired from this intuitive source4    
,in the argument of the second edition  
the thesis is again established by      
reference to the infinity of space4 ,but
 in all other respects the argument     
differs from that of the first edition4 
,a general conception1 which abstracts  
out common qualities from a plurality of
 particulars1 contains an infinite      
number of possible different            
representations under it2 but it cannot 
be thought as containing an infinite    
number of representations in it4 ,space 
must1 however1 be thought in this latter
 manner1 for it contains an infinite    
number of coexisting parts4#ddh ,since1 
then1 space cannot be a concept1 it must
 be an intuition4  ,the definiteness of 
this conclusion is somewhat obscured by 
the further characterisation of the     
intuition of space as a priori1 and by  
the statement that it is the original   
7ursprngliche7 representation which is  
of this intuitive nature4 ,the first    

addition must here1 again1 just as in   
the fourth argument1 be regarded as     
merely a recapitulation of what has     
already been established1 not a         
conclusion from the present argument4   
,the introduction of the word           
#8original' seems to be part of ,kant's 
reply to the objections which had       
already been made to his admission in   
the first edition that there is a       
conception as well as an intuition of   
space4 ,it is the original given        
intuition of space which renders such   
reflective conception possible4  ,the   
chief difficulty of these proofs arises 
out of the assertion which they seem to 
involve that space is given as actually 
infinite4 ,there are apparently1 on this
 point1 two views in ,kant1 which were  
retained up to the very last1 and which 
are closely connected with his two      
representations of space1 on the one    
hand as a formal intuition given in its 
purity and in its completeness1 and on  
the other hand as the form of intuition1

 which exists only so far as it is      
constructed1 and which is dependent for 
its content upon given matter4  ,third  
,argument1 and ,transcendental          
,exposition of ,space4--,the distinction
 between the metaphysical and the       
transcendental expositions1 introduced  
in the second edition of the            
,critique1#ddi is one which ,kant seems 
to have first made clear to himself in  
the process of writing the              
,prolegomena4#dej ,it is a genuine      
improvement1 marking an important       
distinction4 ,it separates out two      
comparatively independent lines of      
argument4 ,the terms in which the       
distinction is stated are not1 however1 
felicitous4 ,kant's reason for adopting 
the title metaphysical is indicated in  
the ,prolegomena3#dea       8,as        
concerns the sources of metaphysical    
cognition1 its very      concept implies
 that they cannot be empirical4444 ,for 
it must not      be physical but        
metaphysical knowledge1 i4e4 knowledge  

lying      beyond experience4444 ,it is 
therefore a priori knowledge1 coming    
from pure understanding and pure        
,reason40  ,the metaphysical exposition1
 it would therefore seem1 is so entitled
 because it professes to prove that     
space is a priori1 not empirical1 and to
 do so by analysis of its concept4#deb  
,now by ,kant's own definition of the   
term transcendental1 as the theory of   
the a priori1 this exposition might     
equally well have been named the        
transcendental exposition4 ,in any case 
it is an essential and chief part of the
 ,transcendental ,aesthetic4 ,such      
division of the ,transcendental         
,aesthetic into a metaphysical and a    
transcendental part involves a twofold  
use1 wider and narrower1 of one and the 
same term4 ,only as descriptive of the  
whole ,aesthetic is transcendental      
employed in the sense defined4          
,exposition 7,errterung1 ,lat4          
expositio7 is ,kant's substitute for the
 more ordinary term definition4         

,definition is the term which we should 
naturally have expected2 but as ,kant   
holds that no given concept1 whether a  
priori or empirical1 can be defined in  
the strict sense1#dec the substitutes   
the term exposition1 using it to signify
 such definition of the nature of space 
as is possible to us4 ,to complete the  
parallelism ,kant speaks of the         
transcendental enquiry as also an       
exposition4 ,it is1 however1 in no sense
 a definition4 ,kant's terms here1 as so
 often elsewhere1 are employed in a more
 or less arbitrary and extremely inexact
 manner4  ,the distinction between the  
two expositions is taken by ,kant as    
follows4 ,the metaphysical exposition   
determines the nature of the concept of 
space1 and shows it to be a given a     
priori intuition4 ,the transcendental   
exposition shows how space1 when viewed 
in this manner1 renders comprehensible  
the possibility of synthetic a priori   
knowledge4  ,the omission of the third  
argument on space from the second       

edition1 and its incorporation into the 
new transcendental exposition1 is       
certainly an improvement4 ,in its       
location in the first edition1 it breaks
 in upon the continuity of ,kant's      
argument without in any way contributing
 to the further definition of the       
concept of space4 ,also1 in emphasising 
that mathematical knowledge depends upon
 the construction of concepts1#ded ,kant
 presupposes that space is intuitional2 
and that has not yet been established4  
,the argument follows the strict1       
rigorous1 synthetic method4 ,from the   
already demonstrated a priori character 
of space1 ,kant deduces the apodictic   
certainty of all geometrical principles4
 ,but though the paragraph thus expounds
 a consequence that follows from the a  
priori character of space1 not an       
argument in support of it1 something in 
the nature of an argument is none the   
less implied4 ,the fact that this view  
of the representation of space alone    
renders mathematical science possible   

can be taken as confirming this         
interpretation of its nature4 ,such an  
argument1 though circular1 is none the  
less cogent4 ,consideration of ,kant's  
further statements1 that were space     
known in a merely empirical manner we   
could not be sure that in all cases only
 one straight line is possible between  
two points1 or that space will always be
 found to have three dimensions1 must   
meantime be deferred4#dee  ,in the new  
transcendental exposition ,kant adopts  
the analytic method of the ,prolegomena1
 and accordingly presents his argument  
in independence of the results already  
established4 ,he starts from the        
assumption of the admitted validity of  
geometry1 as being a body of synthetic a
 priori knowledge4 ,yet this1 as we have
 already noted1 does not invalidate the 
argument2 in both the first and the last
 paragraphs it is implied that the a    
priori and intuitive characteristics of 
space have already been proved4 ,from   
the synthetic character of geometrical  

propositions ,kant argues#def that space
 must be an intuition4 ,through pure    
concepts no synthetic knowledge is      
possible4 ,then from the apodictic      
character of geometry he infers that    
space exists in us as pure and a        
priori2#deg no experience can ever      
reveal necessity4 ,but geometry also    
exists as an applied science2 and to    
account for our power of anticipating   
experience1 we must view space as       
existing only in the perceiving subject 
as the form of its sensibility4 ,if it  
precedes objects as the necessary       
subjective condition of their           
apprehension1 we can to that extent     
predetermine the conditions of their    
existence4  ,in the concluding paragraph
 ,kant says that this is the only       
explanation which can be given of the   
possibility of geometry4 ,he does not   
distinguish between pure and applied    
geometry1 though the proof which he has 
given of each differs in a fundamental  
respect4 ,pure geometry presupposes only

 that space is an a priori intuition2   
applied geometry demands that space be  
conceived as the a priori form of       
external sense4 ,only in reference to   
applied geometry does the ,critical     
problem arise3--viz4 how we can form    
synthetic judgments a priori which yet  
are valid of objects2 or1 in other      
words1 how judgments based upon a       
subjective form can be objectively      
valid4 ,but any attempt1 at this point1 
to define the nature and possibility of 
applied geometry must anticipate a      
result which is first established in    
,conclusion b4#deh ,though1 therefore1  
the substitution of this transcendental 
exposition for the third space argument 
is a decided improvement1 ,kant1 in     
extending it so as to cover applied as  
well as pure mathematics1 overlooks the 
real sequence of his argument in the    
first edition4 ,the employment of the   
analytic method1 breaking in1 as it     
does1 upon the synthetic development of 
,kant's original argument1 is a further 

irregularity4#dei  ,it may be noted that
 in the third paragraph ,kant takes the 
fact that geometry can be applied to    
objects as proof of the subjectivity of 
space4#dfj ,he refuses to recognise the 
possibility that space may be subjective
 as a form of receptivity1 and yet also 
be a mode in which things in themselves 
exist4 ,this1 as regards its conclusion1
 though not as regards its argument1 is 
therefore an anticipation of ,conclusion
 a4 ,in the last paragraph ,kant is     
probably referring to the views both of 
,leibniz and of ,berkeley4              
,,conclusions ,,from ,,the ,,above      
,,concepts#dfa  ,conclusion a4--,thesis3
 ,space is not a property of things in  
themselves1#dfb nor a relation of them  
to one another4 ,proof3 ,the properties 
of things in themselves can never be    
intuited prior to their existence1 i4e4 
a priori4 ,space1 as already proved1 is 
intuited in this manner4 ,in other      
words1 the apriority of space is by     
itself sufficient proof of its          

subjectivity4  ,this argument has been  
the subject of a prolonged controversy  
between ,trendelenburg and ,kuno        
,fischer4#dfc ,trendelenburg was able to
 prove his main point1 namely1 that the 
above argument is quite inconclusive4   
,kant recognises only two alternatives1 
either space as objective is known a    
posteriori1 or being an a priori        
representation it is subjective in      
origin4 ,there exists a third           
alternative1 namely1 that though our    
intuition of space is subjective in     
origin1 space is itself an inherent     
property of things in themselves4 ,the  
central thesis of the rationalist       
philosophy of the ,enlightenment was1   
indeed1 that the independently real can 
be known by a priori thinking4 ,even    
granting the validity of ,kant's later  
conclusion1 first drawn in the next     
paragraph1 that space is the subjective 
form of all external intuition1 that    
would only prove that it does not belong
 to appearances1 prior to our           

apprehension of them2 nothing is thereby
 proved in regard to the character of   
things in themselves4 ,we anticipate by 
a priori reasoning only the nature of   
appearances1 never the constitution of  
things in themselves4 ,therefore space1 
even though a priori1 may belong to the 
independently real4 ,the above argument 
cannot prove the given thesis4          
,vaihinger contends#dfd that the reason 
why ,kant does not even attempt to argue
 in support of the principle1 that the a
 priori must be purely subjective1 is   
that he accepts it as self-evident4     
,this explanation does not1 however1    
seem satisfactory4 ,but ,vaihinger      
supplies the data for modification of   
his own assertion4 ,it was1 it would    
seem1 the existence of the antinomies   
which first and chiefly led ,kant to    
assert the subjectivity of space and    
time4#dfe ,for as he then believed that 
a satisfactory solution of the          
antinomies is possible only on the      
assumption of the subjectivity of space 

and time1 he regarded their subjectivity
 as being conclusively established1 and 
accordingly failed to examine with      
sufficient care the validity of his     
additional proof from their apriority4  
,this would seem to be confirmed by the 
fact that when later1#dff in reply to   
criticisms of the arguments of the first
 edition1 he so far modified his        
position as to offer reasons in support 
of the above general principle1 even    
then he nowhere discussed the principle 
in reference to the forms of sense4 ,all
 his discussions concern only the       
possible independent reality of the     
forms of thought4#dfg ,to the very last 
,kant would seem to have regarded the   
above argument as an independent1 and by
 itself a sufficient1 proof of the      
subjectivity of space4  ,the refutation 
of ,trendelenburg's argument which is   
offered by ,caird#dfh is inconclusive4  
,caird assumes the chief point at issue1
 first by ignoring the possibility that 
space may be known a priori in reference

 to appearances and yet at the same time
 be transcendently real2 and secondly by
 ignoring the fact that to deny spatial 
properties to things in themselves is as
 great a violation of ,critical         
principles as to assert them4 ,one      
point1 however1 in ,caird's reply to    
,trendelenburg calls for special        
consideration1 viz4 ,caird's contention 
that ,kant did actually take account of 
the third alternative1 rejecting it as  
involving the 8absurd0 hypothesis of a  
pre-established harmony4#dfi            
,undoubtedly ,kant did so4 ,but the     
contention has no relevancy to the point
 before us4 ,the doctrine of            
pre-established harmony is a            
metaphysical theory which presupposes   
the possibility of gaining knowledge of 
things in themselves4 ,for that reason  
alone ,kant was bound to reject it4 ,a  
metaphysical proof of the validity of   
metaphysical judgments is1 from the     
,critical point of view1 a contradiction
 in terms4 ,as the validity of all      

speculations is in doubt1 a proof which 
is speculative cannot meet our          
difficulties4 ,and also1 as ,kant       
himself further points out1 the         
pre-established harmony1 even if        
granted1 can afford no solution of the  
,critical problem how a priori judgments
 can be passed upon the independently   
real4 ,the judgments1 thus guaranteed1  
could only possess de facto validity2 we
 could never be assured of their        
necessity4#dgj ,it is chiefly in these  
two inabilities that ,kant locates the  
8absurdity0 of a theory of              
pre-established harmony4 ,the refutation
 of that theory does not1 therefore1    
amount to a disproof of the possibility 
which we are here considering4          
,conclusion b4--,the next paragraph     
maintains two theses3 7a7 that space is 
the form of all outer intuition2 7b7    
that this fact explains what is         
otherwise entirely inexplicable and     
paradoxical1 namely1 that we can make a 
priori judgments which yet apply to the 

objects experienced4 ,the first thesis1 
that the pure intuition of space is only
 conceivable as the form of appearances 
of outer sense1 is propounded in the    
opening sentence without argument and   
even without citation of grounds4 ,the  
statement thus suddenly made is not     
anticipated save by the opening         
sentences of the section on space4#dga  
,it is an essentially new doctrine4     
,hitherto ,kant has spoken of space only
 as an a priori intuition4 ,the further 
assertion that as such it must          
necessarily be conceived as the form of 
outer sense 7i4e4 not only as a formal  
intuition but also as a form of         
intuition71 calls for the most definite 
and explicit proof4 ,none1 however1 is  
given4 ,it is really a conclusion from  
points all too briefly cited by ,kant in
 the general ,introduction1 namely1 from
 his distinction between the matter and 
the form of sense4 ,the assertions there
 made1 in a somewhat casual manner1 are 
here1 without notification to the       

reader1 employed as premisses to ground 
the above assertion4 ,his thesis is not1
 therefore1 as by its face value it     
would seem to profess to be1 an         
inference from the points established in
 the preceding expositions4 ,it         
interprets these conclusions in the     
light of points considered in the       
,introduction2 and thereby arrives at a 
new and all-important interpretation of 
the nature of the a priori intuition of 
space4  ,the second thesis employs the  
first to explain how prior to all       
experience we can determine the         
relations of objects4 ,since 7a7 space  
is merely the form of outer sense1 and  
7b7 accordingly exists in the mind prior
 to all empirical intuition1 all        
appearances must exist in space1 and we 
can predetermine them from the pure     
intuition of space that is given to us a
 priori4 ,space1 when thus viewed as the
 a priori form of outer sense1 renders  
comprehensible the validity of applied  
mathematics4  ,as we have already       

noted1#dgb ,kant in the second edition  
obscures the sequence of his argument by
 offering in the new transcendental     
exposition a justification of applied as
 well as of pure geometry4 ,in so doing 
he anticipates the conclusion which is  
first drawn in this later paragraph4    
,this would have been avoided had ,kant 
given two separate transcendental       
expositions4 ,first1 an exposition of   
pure mathematics1 placed immediately    
after the metaphysical exposition2 for  
pure mathematics is exclusively based   
upon the results of the metaphysical    
exposition4 ,and secondly1 an exposition
 of applied mathematics1 introduced     
after ,conclusion b4 ,the explanation of
 applied geometry is really the more    
essential and central of the two1 as it 
alone involves the truly ,critical      
problem1 how judgments formed a priori  
can yet apply to objects4 ,conclusion b 
constitutes1 as ,vaihinger rightly      
insists1#dgc the very heart of the      
,aesthetic4 ,the arrangement of ,kant's 

argument diverts the reader's attention 
from where it ought properly to centre4 
,the use which ,kant makes of the       
,prolegomena in his statement of the new
 transcendental exposition is one cause 
of the confusion4 ,the exposition is a  
brief summary of the corresponding      
,prolegomena#dgd sections4 ,in          
introducing this summary into the       
,critique ,kant overlooked the fact that
 in referring to applied mathematics he 
is anticipating a point first           
established in ,conclusion b4 ,the real 
cause1 however1 of the trouble is common
 to both editions1 namely ,kant's       
failure clearly to appreciate the       
fundamental distinction between the view
 that space is an a priori intuition and
 the view that it is the a priori form  
of all external intuition1 i4e4 of outer
 sense4 ,he does not seem to have fully 
realised how very different are those   
two views4 ,in consequence of this he   
fails to distinguish between the        
transcendental expositions of pure and  

applied geometry4#dge  ,third           
paragraph4--,kant proceeds to develop   
the subjectivist conclusions which      
follow from a and b4       8,we may say 
that space contains all things which can
 appear to us      externally1 but not  
all things in themselves1 whether       
intuited or      not1 nor again all     
things intuited by any and every        
subject40#dgf  ,this sentence makes two 
assertions3 7a7 space does not belong to
 things in and by themselves2 7b7 space 
is not a necessary form of intuition for
 all subjects whatsoever4  ,the grounds 
for the former assertion are not here   
considered1 and that is doubtless the   
reason why the oder nicht is excised in 
,kant's private copy of the ,critique4  
,as we have seen1 ,kant does not        
anywhere in the ,aesthetic even attempt 
to offer argument in support of this    
assertion4 ,in defence of 7a7 ,kant     
propounds for the first time the view of
 sensibility as a limitation4 ,space is 
a limiting condition to which human     

intuition is subject4 ,whether the      
intuitions of other thinking beings are 
subject to the same limitation1 we have 
no means of deciding4 ,but for all human
 beings1 ,kant implies1 the same        
conditions must hold universally4#dgg   
,in the phrase 8transcendental ideality 
of space0#dgh ,kant1 it may be noted1   
takes the term ideality as signifying   
subjectivity1 and the term              
transcendental as equivalent to         
transcendent4 ,he is stating that judged
 from a transcendent point of view1 i4e4
 from the point of view of the thing in 
itself1 space has a merely subjective or
 8empirical0 reality4 ,this is an       
instance of ,kant's careless use of the 
term transcendental4 ,space is          
empirically real1 but taken             
transcendently1 is merely ideal4#dgi    
,,kant',s ,,attitude ,,to ,,the         
,,problems ,,of ,,modern ,,geometry     
,this is an appropriate point at which  
to consider the consistency of ,kant's  
teaching with modern developments in    

geometry4 ,kant's attitude has very     
frequently been misrepresented4 ,as he  
here states1 he is willing to recognise 
that the forms of intuition possessed by
 other races of finite beings may not   
coincide with those of the human        
species4 ,but in so doing he does not   
mean to assert the possibility of other 
spatial forms1 i4e4 of spaces that are  
non-,euclidean4 ,in his pre-,critical   
period ,kant had indeed attempted to    
deduce the three-dimensional character  
of space as a consequence of the law of 
gravitation2 and recognising that that  
law is in itself arbitrary1 he concluded
 that ,god might1 by establishing       
different relations of gravitation1 have
 given rise to spaces of different      
properties and dimensions4       8,a    
science of all these possible kinds of  
space would undoubtedly      be the     
highest enterprise which a finite       
understanding could      undertake in   
the field of geometry40#dhj  ,but from  
the time of ,kant's adoption1 in #aggj1 

of the ,critical view of space as being 
the universal form of our outer sense1  
he seems to have definitely rejected all
 such possibilities4 ,space1 to be space
 at all1 must be ,euclidean2 the        
uniformity of space is a presupposition 
of the a priori certainty of geometrical
 science4#dha ,one of the criticisms    
which in the ,dissertation#dhb he passes
 upon the empirical view of mathematical
 science is that it would leave open the
 possibility that 8a space may some time
 be discovered endowed with other       
fundamental properties1 or even perhaps 
that we may happen upon a two-sided     
rectilinear figure40 ,this is the       
argument which reappears in the third   
argument on space in the first edition  
of the ,critique4#dhc ,the same examples
 are employed with a somewhat different 
wording4       8,it would not even be   
necessary that there should be only one 
straight line between two points1 though
 experience invariably      shows this  
to be so4 ,what is derived from         

experience has only      comparative    
universality1 namely1 that which is     
obtained through      induction4 ,we    
should therefore only be able to say    
that1 so far as      hitherto observed1 
no space has been found which has more  
than      three dimensions40  ,but that 
,kant should have failed to recognise   
the possibility of other spaces does not
 by itself point to any serious defect  
in his position4 ,there is no essential 
difficulty in reconciling the           
recognition of such spaces with his     
fundamental teaching4 ,he admits that   
other races of finite beings may perhaps
 intuit through non-spatial forms of    
sensibility2 he might quite well have   
recognised that those other forms of    
intuition1 though not ,euclidean1 are   
still spatial4 ,it is in another and    
more vital respect that ,kant's teaching
 lies open to criticism4 ,kant is       
convinced that space is given to us in  
intuition as being definitely and       
irrevocably ,euclidean in character4    

,both our intuition and our thinking1   
when we reflect upon space1 are1 he     
implies1 bound down to1 and limited by1 
the conditions of ,euclidean space4 ,and
 it is in this positive assumption1 and 
not merely in his ignoring of the       
possibility of other spaces1 that he    
comes into conflict with the teaching of
 modern geometry4 ,for in making the    
above assumption ,kant is asserting that
 we definitely know physical space to be
 three-dimensional1 and that by no      
elaboration of concepts can we so       
remodel it in thought that the axiom of 
parallels will cease to hold4 ,euclidean
 space1 ,kant implies1 is given to us as
 an unyielding form that rigidly resists
 all attempts at conceptual             
reconstruction4 ,being quite independent
 of thought and being given as complete1
 it has no inchoate plasticity of which 
thought might take advantage4 ,the      
modern geometer is not1 however1        
prepared to admit that intuitional space
 has any definiteness or preciseness of 

nature apart from the concepts through  
which it is apprehended2 and he         
therefore allows1 as at least possible1 
that upon clarification of our concepts 
space may be discovered to be radically 
different from what it at first sight   
appears to be4 ,in any case1 the        
perfecting of the concepts must have    
some effect upon their object4 ,but     
even--as the modern geometer further    
maintains--should our space be          
definitely proved1 upon analytic and    
empirical investigation1 to be          
,euclidean in character1 other          
possibilities will still remain open for
 speculative thought4 ,for though the   
nature of our intuitional data may      
constrain us to interpret them through  
one set of concepts rather than through 
another1 the competing sets of          
alternative concepts will represent     
genuine possibilities beyond what the   
actual is found to embody4  ,thus the   
defect of ,kant's teaching1 in regard to
 space1 as judged in the light of the   

later teaching of geometrical science1  
is closely bound up with his untenable  
isolation of the a priori of sensibility
 from the a priori of understanding4#dhd
 ,space1 being thus viewed as           
independent of thought1 has to be       
regarded as limiting and restricting    
thought by the unalterable nature of its
 initial presentation4 ,and             
unfortunately this is a position which  
,kant continued to hold1 despite his    
increasing recognition of the part which
 concepts must play in the various      
mathematical sciences4 ,in the deduction
 of the first edition we find him       
stating that synthesis of apprehension  
is necessary to all representation of   
space and time4#dhe ,he further         
recognises that all arithmetical        
processes are syntheses according to    
concepts4#dhf ,and in the               
,prolegomena#dhg there occurs the       
following significant passage4          
8,do these laws of nature lie in space1 
and does the understanding      learn   

them by merely endeavouring to find out 
the fruitful meaning      that lies in  
space2 or do they inhere in the         
understanding and in      the way in    
which it determines space according to  
the conditions of      the synthetical  
unity towards which its concepts are all
 directed8      ,space is something so  
uniform and as to all particular        
properties      so indeterminate1 that  
we should certainly not seek a store of 
laws      of nature in it4 ,that which  
determines space to the form of a       
circle or to the figures of a cone or a 
sphere1 is1 on the      contrary1 the   
understanding1 so far as it contains the
 ground of      the unity of these      
constructions4 ,the mere universal form 
of      intuition1 called space1 must   
therefore be the substratum of all      
intuitions determinable to particular   
objects1 and in it1 of      course1 the 
condition of the possibility and of the 
variety of      these intuitions lies4  
,but the unity of the objects is solely 

determined by the understanding1 and    
indeed in accordance with               
conditions which are proper to the      
nature of the understanding44440        
,obviously ,kant is being driven by the 
spontaneous development of his own      
thinking towards a position much more   
consistent with present-day teaching1   
and completely at variance with the hard
 and fast severance between sensibility 
and understanding which he had          
formulated in the ,dissertation and has 
retained in the ,aesthetic4 ,in the     
above ,prolegomena passage a plasticity 
is being allowed to space1 sufficient to
 permit of essential modification in the
 conceptual processes through which it  
is articulated4 ,but1 as ,i have just   
stated1 that did not lead ,kant to      
disavow the conclusions which he had    
drawn from his previous teaching4  ,this
 defect in ,kant's doctrine of space1 as
 expounded in the ,aesthetic1 indicates 
a further imperfection in his argument4 
,he asserts that the form of space      

cannot vary from one human being to     
another1 and that for this reason the   
judgments which express it are          
universally valid4 ,now1 in so far as   
,kant's initial datum is consciousness  
of time1#dhh he is entirely justified in
 assuming that everything which can be  
shown to be a necessary condition of    
such consciousness must be uniform for  
all human minds4 ,but as his argument is
 not that consciousness of ,euclidean   
space is necessary to consciousness of  
time1 but only that consciousness of the
 permanent in space is a required       
condition1 he has not succeeded in      
showing the necessary uniformity of the 
human mind as regards the specific mode 
in which it intuits space4 ,the         
permanent might still be apprehended as 
permanent1 and therefore as yielding a  
possible basis for consciousness of     
sequence1 even if it were apprehended in
 some four-dimensional form4         99 
99       99       99       99  ,fourth  
,paragraph4--,the next paragraph raises 

one of the central problems of the      
,critique1 namely1 the question as to   
the kind of reality possessed by        
appearances4 ,are they subjective1 like 
taste or colour8 ,or have they a reality
 at least relatively independent of the 
individual percipient8 ,in other words1 
is ,kant's position subjectivism or     
phenomenalism8 ,kant here alternates    
between these positions4 ,this fourth   
paragraph is coloured by his            
phenomenalism1 whereas in the           
immediately following fifth paragraph   
his subjectivism gains the upper hand4  
,the taste of wine1 he there states1 is 
purely subjective1 because dependent    
upon the particular constitution of the 
gustatory organ on which the wine acts4 
,similarly1 colours are not properties  
of the objects which cause them4        
8,they are only modifications of the    
sense of sight which is      affected in
 a certain manner by the light4444 ,they
 are connected      with the appearances
 only as effects accidentally added by  

the      particular constitution of the 
sense organs40#dhi  ,space1 on the other
 hand1 is a necessary constituent of the
 outer objects4 ,in contrast to the     
subjective sensations of taste and      
colour1 it possesses objectivity4 ,this 
mode of distinguishing between space and
 the matter of sense implies that       
extended objects are not mere ideas1 but
 are sufficiently independent to be     
capable of acting upon the sense organs1
 and of thereby generating the          
sensations of the secondary qualities4  
,kant1 it must be observed1 refers only 
to taste and colour4 ,he says nothing in
 regard to weight1 impenetrability1 and 
the like4 ,these are revealed through   
sensation1 and therefore on his view    
ought to be in exactly the same position
 as taste or colour4 ,but if so1 the    
relative independence of the extended   
object can hardly be maintained4 ,kant's
 distinction between space and the sense
 qualities cannot1 indeed1 be made to   
coincide with the ,cartesian distinction

 between primary and secondary          
qualities4  ,a second difference1 from  
,kant's point of view1 between space and
 the sense qualities is that the former 
can be represented a priori1 in complete
 separation from everything empirical1  
whereas the latter can only be known a  
posteriori4 ,this1 as we have seen1 is a
 very questionable assertion4 ,the      
further statement that all              
determinations of space can be          
represented in the same a priori fashion
 is even more questionable4 ,at most the
 difference is only between a           
homogeneous subjective form yielded by  
outer sense and the endlessly varied and
 consequently unpredictable contents    
revealed by the special senses4 ,the    
contention that the former can be known 
apart from the latter implies the       
existence of a pure manifold additional 
to the manifold of sense4  ,fifth       
,paragraph4--,in the next paragraph     
,kant emphasises the distinction between
 the empirical and the transcendental   

meanings of the term appearance4 ,a     
rose1 viewed empirically1 as a thing    
with an intrinsic independent nature1   
may appear of different colour to       
different observers4       8,the        
transcendental conception of appearances
 in space1 on the      other hand1 is a 
,critical reminder that nothing intuited
 in space      is a thing in itself1    
that space is not a form inhering in    
things      in themselves 444 and that  
what we call outer objects are nothing  
but mere representations of our         
sensibility1 the form of which is       
space40  ,in other words1 the           
distinction drawn in the preceding      
paragraph between colour as a subjective
 effect and space as an objective       
existence is no longer maintained4      
,kant1 when thus developing his position
 on subjectivist lines1 allows no kind  
of independent existence to anything in 
the known world4 ,objects as known are  
mere ,ideas 7blosse ,vorstellungen      
unserer ,sinnlichkeit71 the sole        

correlate of which is the unknowable    
thing in itself4 ,but even in this      
paragraph both tendencies find          
expression4 8,colour1 taste1 etc41 must 
not rightly be regarded as properties of
 things1 but only as changes in the     
subject40 ,this implies a threefold     
distinction between subjective          
sensations1 empirical objects in space1 
and the thing in itself4 ,the material  
world1 investigated by science1 is      
recognised as possessing a relatively   
independent mode of existence4          
,substituted ,fourth ,paragraph of      
second edition4--,in preparing the      
second edition ,kant himself evidently  
felt the awkwardness of this abrupt     
juxtaposition of the two very different 
points of view2 and he accordingly      
adopts a non-committal attitude1        
substituting a logical distinction for  
the ontological4 ,space yields synthetic
 judgments a priori2 the sense qualities
 do not4 ,only in the concluding        
sentence does there emerge any definite 

phenomenalist implication4 ,the sense   
qualities1 8as they are mere sensations 
and not intuitions1 in themselves reveal
 no object1 least of all an object a    
priori40#dij ,the assertion that the    
secondary qualities have no ideality    
implies a new and stricter use of the   
term ideal than we find anywhere in the 
first edition--a use which runs counter 
to ,kant's own constant employment of   
the term4 ,on this interpretation it is 
made to signify what though subjective  
is also a priori4 ,here1 as in many of  
the alterations of the second edition1  
,kant is influenced by the desire to    
emphasise the points which distinguish  
his idealism from that of ,berkeley4    
,,the ,,transcendental ,,aesthetic      
,,section ,,ii  ,,time  ,,metaphysical  
,,exposition ,,of ,,the ,,conception    
,,of ,,time  ,time3 ,first              
,argument4--,this argument is in all    
respects the same as the first argument 
on space4 ,the thesis is that the       
representation#dia of time is not of    

empirical origin4 ,the proof is based on
 the fact that this representation must 
be previously given in order that the   
perception of coexistence or succession 
be possible4 ,it also runs on all fours 
with the first argument in the          
,dissertation4       8,the idea of time 
does not originate in1 but is           
presupposed by the      senses4 ,when a 
number of things act upon the senses1 it
 is only by      means of the idea of   
time that they can be represented       
whether as      simultaneous or as      
successive4 ,nor does succession        
generate the      conception of time2   
but stimulates us to form it4 ,thus the 
notion      of time1 even if acquired   
through experience1 is very badly       
defined      as being a series of actual
 things existing one after another4     
,for ,i can understand what the word    
after signifies only if ,i      already 
know what time means4 ,for those things 
are after one      another which exist  
at different times1 as those are        

simultaneous which exist at one and the 
same time40#dib  ,second                
,argument4--,kant again applies to time 
the argument already employed by him in 
dealing with space4 ,the thesis is that 
time is given a priori4 ,proof is found 
in the fact that it cannot be thought   
away1 i4e4 in the fact of its subjective
 necessity4 ,from this subjective       
necessity follows its objective         
necessity1 so far as all appearances are
 concerned4 ,in the second edition ,kant
 added a phrase--8as the general        
condition of their possibility0--which  
is seriously misleading4 ,the concluding
 sentence is thereby made to read as if 
,kant were arguing from the objective   
necessity of time1 i4e4 from its        
necessity as a constituent in the       
appearances apprehended1 to its         
apriority4 ,it is indeed possible that  
,kant himself regarded this objective   
necessity of time as contributing to the
 proof of its apriority4 ,but no such   
argument can be accepted4 ,time may be  

necessary to appearances1 once          
appearances are granted4 ,this does not1
 however1 prove that it must therefore  
precede them a priori4 ,this alteration 
in the second edition is an excellent1  
though unfortunate1 example of ,kant's  
invincible carelessness in the          
exposition of his thought4 ,it has      
contributed to a misreading by ,herbart 
and others of this and of the           
corresponding argument on space4        
8,let us not talk of an absolute space  
as the presupposition of all      our   
constructed figures4 ,possibility is    
nothing but thought1 and it      arises 
only when it is thought4 ,space is      
nothing but possibility1      for it    
contains nothing save images of the     
existent2 and absolute      space is    
nothing save the abstracted general     
possibility of such      constructions1 
abstracted from it after completion of  
the      construction4 ,the necessity of
 the representation of space ought      
never to have played any rle in         

philosophy4 ,to think away space is     
to think away the possibility of that   
which has been previously      posited  
as actual4 ,obviously that is           
impossible1 and the opposite      is    
necessary40#dic  ,were ,kant really     
arguing here and in the second argument 
on space solely from the objective      
necessity of time and space1 this       
criticism would be unanswerable4 ,but   
even taking the argument in its first   
edition form1 as an argument from the   
psychological necessity of time1 it lies
 open to the same objection as the      
argument on space4 ,it rests upon a     
false statement of fact4 ,we cannot     
retain time in the absence of all       
appearances of outer and inner sense4   
,with the removal of the given manifold1
 time itself must vanish4  ,fourth      
,argument4#did--,this argument differs  
only slightly1 and mainly through       
omissions1#die from the fourth#dif of   
the arguments in regard to space2 but a 
few minor points call for notice4 7a7   

,in the first sentence1 instead of      
intuition1 which alone is under         
consideration in its contrast to        
conception1 ,kant employs the phrase    
8pure form of intuition40 7b7 ,in the   
third sentence ,kant uses the quite     
untenable phrase 8given through a single
 object 7,gegenstand740 ,time is not    
given from without1 nor is it due to an 
object4 7c7 ,the concluding sentences   
properly belong to the transcendental   
exposition4 ,they are here introduced1  
not in the ambiguous manner of the      
fourth#a argument on space1 but         
explicitly as a further argument in     
proof of the intuitive character of     
time4 ,the synthetic proposition which  
,kant cites is taken neither from the   
science of motion nor from arithmetic4  
,it expresses the nature of time itself1
 and for that reason is immediately     
contained in the intuition of time4     
,fifth ,argument4--,this argument       
differs fundamentally from the          
corresponding argument on space1 whether

 of the first or of the second edition1 
and must therefore be independently     
analysed4 ,the thesis is again that time
 is an intuition4 ,proof is derived from
 the fact that time is a representation 
in which the parts arise only through   
limitation1 and in which1 therefore1 the
 whole must precede the parts4 ,the     
original 7ursprngliche7                 
time-representation1 i4e4 the           
fundamental representation through      
limitation of which the parts arise as  
secondary products1 must be an          
intuition4  ,to this argument ,kant     
makes two explanatory additions4 7a7 ,as
 particular times arise through         
limitation of one single time1 time must
 in its original intuition be given as  
infinite1 i4e4 as unlimited4 ,the       
infinitude of time is not1 therefore1 as
 might seem to be implied by the        
prominence given to it1 and by analogy  
with the final arguments of both the    
first and the second edition1 a part of 
the proof that it is an intuition1 but  

only a consequence of the feature by    
which its intuitive character is        
independently established4 ,the unwary  
reader1 having in mind the corresponding
 argument on space1 is almost inevitably
 misled4 ,all reference to infinitude   
could1 so far as this argument is       
concerned1 have been omitted4 ,the mode 
in which the argument opens seems indeed
 to indicate that ,kant was not himself 
altogether clear as to the              
cross-relations between the arguments on
 space and time respectively4 ,the real 
parallel to this argument is to be found
 in the second part of the fourth#a     
argument on space4 ,that part was       
omitted by ,kant in his fourth argument 
on time1 and is here developed into a   
separate argument4 ,this is1 of course1 
a further cause of confusion to the     
reader1 who is not prepared for such    
arbitrary rearrangement4 ,indeed it is  
not surprising to find that when ,kant  
became the reader of his own work1 in   
preparing it for the second edition1 he 

was himself misled by the intricate     
perversity of his exposition4 ,in       
re-reading the argument he seems to have
 forgotten that it represents the second
 part of the fourth#dig argument on     
space4 ,interpreting it in the light of 
the fifth#dih argument on space which he
 had been recasting for the second      
edition1 it seemed to him possible1 by a
 slight alteration1 to bring this       
argument on time into line with that new
 proof4#dii ,this unfortunately results 
in the perverting of the entire         
paragraph4 ,the argument demands an     
opposition between intuition in which   
the whole precedes the parts1 and       
conception in which the parts precede   
the whole4 ,in order to bring the       
opposition into line with the new       
argument on space1 according to which a 
conception contains an infinite number  
of parts1 not in it1 but only under it1 
,kant substitutes for the previous      
parenthesis the statement that 8concepts
 contain only partial representations10 

meaning1 apparently1 that their         
constituent elements are merely         
abstracted attributes1 not real concrete
 parts1 or in other words1 not strictly 
parts at all1 but only partial          
representations4 ,but this does not at  
all agree with the context4 ,the point  
at issue is thereby obscured4  7b7 ,the 
main argument rests upon and presupposes
 a very definite view as to the manner  
in which alone1 according to ,kant1     
concepts are formed4 ,only if this view 
be granted as true of all concepts      
without exception is the argument       
cogent4 ,this doctrine#ejj of the       
concept is accordingly stated by ,kant  
in the words of the parenthesis4 ,the   
partial representations1 i4e4 the       
different properties which go to        
constitute the object or content        
conceived1 precede the representation of
 the whole4 8,the aggregation of        
co-ordinate attributes 7,merkmale7      
constitutes the totality of the         
concept40#eja ,upon the use which ,kant 

thus makes of the traditional doctrine  
of the concept1 and upon its lack of    
consistency with his recognition of     
relational categories1 we have already  
dwelt4#ejb  ,third ,argument and the    
,transcendental ,exposition4--,the third
 argument ought to have been omitted in 
the second edition1 and its substance   
incorporated in the new transcendental  
exposition1 as was done with the        
corresponding argument concerning space4
 ,the excuse which ,kant offers for not 
making the change1 namely1 his desire   
for brevity1 is not valid4 ,by insertion
 in the new section the whole matter    
could have been stated just as briefly  
as before4  ,the purpose of the         
transcendental exposition has been      
already defined4 ,it is to show how     
time1 when viewed in the manner required
 by the results of the metaphysical     
deduction1 as an a priori intuition1    
renders synthetic a priori judgments    
possible4  ,this exposition1 as it      
appears in the third argument of the    

first edition1 grounds the apodictic    
character of two axioms in regard to    
time#ejc on the proved apriority of the 
representation of time1 and then by     
implication finds in these axioms a     
fresh proof of the apriority of time4   
,the new transcendental exposition      
extends the above by two further        
statements3 7a7 that only through the   
intuition of time can any conception of 
change1 and therewith of motion 7as     
change of place71 be formed2 and 7b7    
that it is because the intuition of time
 is an a priori intuition that the      
synthetic a priori propositions of the  
8general doctrine of motion0 are        
possible4 ,to take each in turn4 7a7    
,save by reference to time the          
conception of motion is                 
self-contradictory4 ,it involves the    
ascription to one and the same thing of 
contradictory predicates1 e4g4 that an  
object both is and is not in a certain  
place4 ,from this fact1 that time makes 
possible what is not possible in pure   

conception1 ,kant1 in his earlier       
rationalistic period1 had derived a     
proof of the subjectivity of time4#ejd  
7b7 ,in #aghf in the ,metaphysical      
,first ,principles of ,natural ,science 
,kant had developed the fundamental     
principles of the general science of    
motion4 ,he takes the opportunity of the
 second edition 7#aghg7 of the ,critique
 to assign this place to them in his    
general system4 ,the implication is that
 the doctrine of motion stands to time  
in the relation in which geometry stands
 to space4 ,kant is probably here       
replying1 as ,vaihinger has             
suggested1#eje to an objection made by  
,garve to the first edition1 that no    
science1 corresponding to geometry1 is  
based on the intuition of time4 ,for two
 reasons1 however1 the analogy between  
mechanics and geometry breaks down4 ,in 
the first place1 the conception of      
motion is empirical2 and in the second  
place1 it presupposes space as well as  
time4#ejf  ,kant elsewhere explicitly   

disavows this view that the science of  
motion is based on time4 ,he had already
 done so in the preceding year 7#aghf7  
in the ,metaphysical ,first ,principles4
 ,he there points out#ejg that as time  
has only one dimension1 mathematics is  
not applicable to the phenomena of inner
 sense4 ,at most we can determine in    
regard to them 7in addition1 of course1 
to the two axioms already cited7 only   
the law that all these changes are      
continuous4 ,also in ,kant's ,ueber     
,philosophie berhaupt 7written some time
 between #aghj and #agij1 and very      
probably in or about the year #aghi7 we 
find the following utterance3           
8,the general doctrine of time1 unlike  
the pure doctrine of space              
7geometry71 does not yield sufficient   
material for a whole      science40#ejh 
,why1 then1 should ,kant in #aghg have  
so inconsistently departed from his own 
teaching8 ,this is a question to which  
,i can find no answer4 ,apparently      
without reason1 and contrary to his more

 abiding judgment1 he here repeats the  
suggestion which he had casually thrown 
out in the ,dissertation#eji of #aggj3  
8,pure mathematics treats of space in   
geometry and of time in pure            
mechanics40  ,but in the ,dissertation  
the point is only touched upon in       
passing4 ,the context permits of the    
interpretation that while geometry deals
 with space1 mechanics deals with time  
in addition to space4   ,,kant',s       
,,views ,,regarding ,,the ,,nature ,,of 
,,arithmetical ,,science  ,in the       
,dissertation1 and again in the chapter 
on ,schematism in the ,critique itself1 
still another view is suggested1 namely1
 that the science of arithmetic is also 
concerned with the intuition of time4   
,the passage just quoted from the       
,dissertation proceeds as follows3      
8,pure mathematics treats of space in   
geometry and of time in pure            
mechanics4 ,to these has to be added a  
certain concept which is in      itself 
intellectual1 but which demands for its 

concrete      actualisation 7actuatio7  
the auxiliary notions of time and space 
7in the successive addition and in the  
juxtaposition of a      plurality74     
,this is the concept of number which is 
dealt with in      ,arithmetic40#eaj    
,this view of arithmetic is to be found 
in both editions of the ,critique4      
,arithmetic depends upon the synthetic  
activity of the understanding2 the      
conceptual element is absolutely        
essential4       8,our counting 7as is  
easily seen in the case of large        
numbers7 is a      synthesis according  
to concepts1 because it is executed     
according      to a common ground of    
unity1 as1 for instance1 the decade     
7,dekadik740#eaa 8,the pure image 444 of
 all objects of the senses      in      
general is time4 ,but the pure schema of
 quantity1 in so far as      it is a    
concept of the understanding1 is number1
 a representation      which combines   
the successive addition of one to one   
7homogeneous74      ,thus number is     

nothing but the unity of the synthesis  
of the      manifold of a homogeneous   
intuition in general1 whereby ,i        
generate      time itself in the        
apprehension of the intuition40#eab     
,this is also the teaching of the       
,methodology4#eac ,now it may be        
observed that in none of these passages 
is arithmetic declared to be the science
 of time1 or even to be based on the    
intuition of time4 ,in #aghc1 however1  
in the ,prolegomena1 ,kant expresses    
himself in much more ambiguous terms1   
for his words imply that there is a     
parallelism between geometry and        
arithmetic4       8,geometry is based   
upon the pure intuition of space4       
,arithmetic      produces its concepts  
of number through successive addition of
      units in time1 and pure mechanics 
especially can produce its      concepts
 of motion only by means of the         
representation of      time40#ead  ,the 
passage is by no means explicit2 the    
8especially0 7vornehmlich7 seems to     

indicate a feeling on ,kant's part that 
the description which he is giving of   
arithmetic is not really satisfactory4  
,unfortunately this casual statement1   
though never repeated by ,kant in any of
 his other writings1 was developed by   
,schulze in his ,erluterungen4          
8,since geometry has space and          
arithmetic has counting as its object   
7and counting can only take place by    
means of time71 it is evident      in   
what manner geometry and arithmetic1    
that is to say pure      mathematics1 is
 possible40#eae  ,largely1 as it would  
seem1#eaf through ,schulze1 whose       
,erluterungen did much to spread ,kant's
 teaching1 this view came to be the     
current understanding of ,kant's        
position4 ,the nature of arithmetic1 as 
thus popularly interpreted1 is expounded
 by ,schopenhauer in the following      
terms3       8,in time every moment is  
conditioned by the preceding4 ,the      
ground      of existence1 as law of the 
sequence1 is thus simple1 because time  

has only one dimension1 and no          
manifoldness of relations can be        
possible in it4 ,every moment is        
conditioned by the preceding2 only      
through the latter can we attain to the 
former2 only because the      latter    
was1 and has elapsed1 does the former   
now exist4 ,all      counting rests upon
 this nexus of the parts of time2 its   
words      merely serve to mark the     
single steps of the succession4 ,this is
      true of the whole of arithmetic1  
which throughout teaches nothing        
but the methodical abbreviations of     
counting4 ,every number      presupposes
 the preceding numbers as grounds of its
 existence2 ,i      can only reach them 
through all the preceding1 and only by  
means of      this insight into the     
ground of its existence do ,i know that1
 where      ten are1 there are also     
eight1 six1 four40#eag  ,schulze was at 
once challenged to show that this was   
really ,kant's teaching1 and the passage
 which he cited was ,kant's definition  

of the schema of number1 above          
quoted4#eah ,it is therefore advisable  
that we should briefly discuss the many 
difficulties which this passage         
involves4 ,what does ,kant mean by      
asserting that in the apprehension of   
number we generate time8 ,does he merely
 mean that time is required for the     
process of counting8 ,counting is a     
process through which numerical         
relations are discovered2 and it        
undoubtedly occupies time4 ,but so do   
all processes of apprehension1 in the   
study of geometry no less than of       
arithmetic4 ,that this is not ,kant's   
meaning1 and that it is not even what   
,schulze1 notwithstanding his seemingly 
explicit mode of statement1 intends to  
assert1 is clearly shown by a letter    
written by ,kant to ,schulze in         
,november #aghh4 ,schulze1 it appears1  
had spoken of this very matter4         
8,time1 as you justly remark1 has no    
influence upon the properties      of   
numbers 7as pure determinations of      

quantity71 such as it may      have upon
 the nature of those changes 7of        
quantity7 which are      possible only  
in connection with a specific property  
of inner sense      and its form 7time74
 ,the science of number1 notwithstanding
 the      succession which every        
construction of quantity demands1 is a  
pure      intellectual synthesis which  
we represent to ourselves in thought4   
,but so far as quanta are to be         
numerically determined1 they must       
be given to us in such a way that we can
 apprehend their intuition      in      
successive order1 and such that their   
apprehension can be      subject to     
time44440#eai  ,no more definite        
statement could be desired of the fact  
that though in arithmetical science as  
in other fields of study our processes  
of apprehension are subject to time1 the
 quantitative relations determined by   
the science are independent of time and 
are intellectually apprehended4  ,but if
 the above psychological interpretation 

of ,kant's teaching is untenable1 how is
 his position to be defined8 ,we must   
bear in mind the doctrine which ,kant   
had already developed in his            
pre-,critical period1 that mathematical 
differs from philosophical knowledge in 
that its concepts can have concrete     
individual form4#ebj ,in the ,critique  
this difference is expressed in the     
statement that the mathematical sciences
 alone are able to construct their      
concepts4 ,and as they are pure         
mathematical sciences1 this construction
 is supposed to take place by means of  
the a priori manifold of space and of   
time4 ,now though ,kant had a fairly    
definite notion of what he meant by the 
construction of geometrical figures in  
space1 his various utterances seem to   
show that in regard to the nature of    
arithmetical and algebraic construction 
he had never really attempted to arrive 
at any precision of view4 ,to judge by  
the passage already quoted#eba from the 
,dissertation1 ,kant regarded space as  

no less necessary than time to the      
construction or intuition of number4    
0,the intellectual concept of number    
demands for its concrete actualisation  
the auxiliary notions of time and space 
7in the successive addition and in the  
juxtaposition of a plurality70 ,a       
similar view appears in the ,critique in
 ,a #adj  ,b #agi and in ,b #ae4 ,in    
conformity1 however1 with the general   
requirements of his doctrine of         
,schematism1 ,kant defines the schema of
 number in exclusive reference to time2 
and1 as we have noted1 it is to this    
definition that ,schulze appeals in     
support of his view of arithmetic as the
 science of counting and therefore of   
time4 ,it at least shows that ,kant     
perceived some form of connection to    
exist between arithmetic and time4 ,but 
in this matter ,kant's position was     
probably simply a corollary from his    
general view of the nature of           
mathematical science1 and in particular 
of his view of geometry1 the            

8exemplar0#ebb of all the others4       
,mathematical science1 as such1 is based
 on intuition2#ebc therefore arithmetic1
 which is one of its departments1 must  
be so likewise4 ,no attempt1 however1 is
 made to define the nature of the       
intuitions in which it has its source4  
,sympathetically interpreted1 his       
statements may be taken as suggesting   
that arithmetic is the study of series  
which find concrete expression in the   
order of sequent times4 ,the following  
estimate1 given by ,cassirer1#ebd does  
ample justice both to the true and to   
the false elements in ,kant's doctrine4 
0,even discounting ,kant's insistence   
upon the conceptual character      of   
arithmetical science1 and allowing that 
he derives arithmetical      concepts   
and propositions from the pure intuition
 of time1 this      teaching1 to        
whatever objections it may lie open1 has
 certainly not      the merely          
psychological meaning which the majority
 of its      critics have ascribed to   

it4 ,if it contained only the trivial   
thought1 that the empirical act of      
counting requires time1 it would      be
 completely refuted by the familiar     
objection which ,b4 ,beneke has         
formulated3 #8,the fact that time       
elapses in the process of counting      
can prove nothing2 for what is there    
over which time does not      flow8' ,it
 is easily seen that ,kant is only      
concerned with the                      
#8transcendental' determination of the  
concept of time1 according to      which
 it appears as the type of an ordered   
sequence4 ,william      ,rowan          
,hamilton1 who adopts ,kant's doctrine1 
has defined algebra      as #8science of
 pure time or order in progression4'    
,that the whole      content of         
arithmetical concepts can really be     
obtained from the      fundamental      
concept of order in unbroken            
development1 is      completely         
confirmed by ,russell's exposition4 ,as 
against the      ,kantian theory it     

must1 of course1 be emphasised1 that it 
is not      the concrete form of time   
intuition which constitutes the         
ground of the concept of number1 but    
that on the contrary the      pure      
logical concepts of sequence and of     
order are already      implicitly       
contained and embodied in that concrete 
form40  ,much of the unsatisfactoriness 
of ,kant's argument is traceable to his 
mode of conceiving the                  
8construction0#ebe of mathematical      
concepts4 ,all concepts1 he seems to    
hold1 even those of geometry and        
arithmetic1 are abstract class          
concepts--the concept of triangle       
representing the properties common to   
all triangles1 and the concept of seven 
the properties common to all groups that
 are seven4 ,mathematical concepts      
differ1 however1 from other concepts in 
that they are capable of a priori       
construction1 that is1 of having their  
objects represented in pure intuition4  
,now this is an extremely unfortunate   

mode of statement4 ,it implies that     
mathematical concepts have a dual mode  
of existence1 first as abstracted1 and  
secondly as constructed4 ,such a        
position is not tenable4 ,the concept of
 seven1 in its primary form1 is not     
abstracted from a variety of particular 
groups of seven2 it is already involved 
in the apprehension of each of them as  
being seven4 ,nor is it a concept that  
is itself constructed4 ,it may perhaps  
be described as being the representation
 of something constructed2 but that     
something is not itself4 ,it represents 
the process or method generative of the 
complex for which it stands4 ,thus      
,kant's distinction between the         
intuitive nature of mathematical        
knowledge and the merely discursive     
character of conceptual knowledge is at 
once inspired by the very important     
distinction between the product of      
construction and the product of         
abstraction1 and yet at the same time is
 also obscured by the quite inadequate  

manner in which that latter distinction 
has been formulated4 ,kant has again    
adhered to the older logic even in the  
very act of revising its conclusions2   
and in so doing he has sacrificed the   
,critical doctrines of the ,analytic to 
the pre-,critical teaching of the       
,dissertation and ,aesthetic4           
,mathematical concepts are of the same  
general type as the categories2 their   
primary function is not to clarify      
intuitions1 but to make them possible4  
,they are derivable from intuition only 
in so far as they have contributed to   
its constitution4 ,if intuition contains
 factors additional to the concepts     
through which it is interpreted1 these  
factors must remain outside the realm of
 mathematical science1 until such time  
as conceptual analysis has proved itself
 capable of further extension4  ,i may  
now summarise this general discussion4  
,though ,kant in the first edition of   
the ,critique had spoken of the         
mathematical sciences as based upon the 

intuition of space and time1 he had not1
 despite his constant tendency to       
conceive space and time as parallel     
forms of existence1 based any separate  
mathematical discipline upon time4 ,his 
definition of number1 in the chapter on 
,schematism1 had recognised the         
essentially conceptual character of     
arithmetic1 and had connected it with   
time only in a quite indirect manner4 ,a
 passage in the ,prolegomena is the one 
place in all ,kant's writings in which  
he would seem to assert1 though in brief
 and quite indefinite terms1 that       
arithmetic is related to time as        
geometry is related to space4 ,no such  
view of arithmetic is to be found in the
 second edition of the ,critique4 ,in   
the transcendental exposition of time1  
added in the second edition1 only pure  
mechanics is mentioned4 ,this would seem
 to indicate that ,kant had made the    
above statement carelessly1 without due 
thought1 and that on further reflection 
he found himself unable to stand by it4 

,the omission is the more significant in
 that ,kant refers to arithmetic in the 
passages added in the second edition    
,introduction4 ,the teaching of these   
passages1 apart from the asserted       
necessity of appealing to fingers or    
points1#ebf harmonises with the view so 
briefly outlined in the ,analytic4      
,arithmetic is a conceptual science2    
though it finds in ordered sequence its 
intuitional material1 it cannot be      
adequately defined as being the science 
of time4   ,,conclusions ,,from ,,the   
,,preceding ,,concepts#ebg  ,these      
,conclusions do not run parallel with   
the corresponding ,conclusions in regard
 to space4 ,in the first paragraph there
 are two differences4 7a7 ,kant takes   
account of a view not considered under  
space1 viz4 that time is a self-existing
 substance4 ,he rejects it on a ground  
which is difficult to reconcile with his
 recognition of a manifold of intuition 
as well as a manifold of sense1 namely  
that it would then be something real    

without being a real object4 ,in ,a #ci 
,b #eg and ,b #gj ,kant describes space 
and time1 so conceived1 as unendliche   
,undinge4 7b7 ,kant introduces into his 
first ,conclusion the argument#ebh that 
only by conceiving time as the form of  
inner intuition can we justify a priori 
synthetic judgments in regard to        
objects4  ,second ,paragraph            
7,conclusion b74--,this latter statement
 is repeated at the opening of the      
second ,conclusion4 ,the emphasis is no 
longer1 however1 upon the term 8form0   
but upon the term 8inner02 and ,kant    
proceeds to make assertions which by no 
means follow from the five arguments1   
and which must be counted amongst the   
most difficult and controversial tenets 
of the whole ,critique4 7a7 ,time is not
 a determination of outer appearances4  
,for it belongs neither to their shape  
nor to their position--and prudently at 
this point the property of motion is    
smuggled out of view under cover of an  
etc4 ,time does not determine the       

relation of appearances to one another1 
but only the relation of representations
 in our inner state4#ebi ,it is the form
 only of the intuition of ourselves and 
of our inner state4#ecj ,obviously these
 are assertions which ,kant cannot      
possibly hold to in this unqualified    
form4 ,in the very next paragraph they  
are modified and restated4 7b7 ,as this 
inner intuition supplies no shape       
7,gestalt71 we seek to make good this   
deficiency by means of analogies4 ,we   
represent the time-sequence through a   
line progressing to infinity in which   
the manifold constitutes a series of    
only one dimension4 ,from the properties
 of this line1 with the one exception   
that its parts are simultaneous whereas 
those of time are always successive1 we 
conclude to all the properties of time4 
,the wording of the passage seems to    
imply that such symbolisation of time   
through space is helpful but not        
indispensably necessary for its         
apprehension4 ,that it is indispensably 

necessary is1 however1 the view to which
 ,kant finally settled down4#eca ,but he
 has not yet come to clearness on this  
point4 ,the passage has all the signs of
 having been written prior to the       
,analytic4 ,though ,kant seems to have  
held consistently to the view that time 
has1 in or by itself1 only one          
dimension1#ecb the difficulties involved
 drove him to recognise that this is    
true only of time as the order of our   
representations4 ,it is not true of the 
objective time apprehended in and       
through our representations4 ,when later
 ,kant came to hold that consciousness  
of time is conditioned by consciousness 
of space1 he apparently also adopted the
 view that1 by reference to space1 time 
indirectly acquires simultaneity as an  
additional mode4 ,the objective spatial 
world is in time1 but in a time which   
shows simultaneity as well as           
succession4 ,in the ,dissertation#ecc   
,kant had criticised ,leibniz and his   
followers for neglecting simultaneity1  

8the most important consequence of      
time40       8,though time has only one 
dimension1 yet the ubiquity of time 7to 
employ ,newton's term71 through which   
all things sensuously      thinkable are
 at some time1 adds another dimension to
 the      quantity of actual things1 in 
so far as they hang1 as it were1 upon   
the same point of time4 ,for if we      
represent time by a straight line       
extended to infinity1 and simultaneous  
things at any point of time      by     
lines successively erected perpendicular
 to the first line1      the surface    
thus generated will represent the       
phenomenal world      both as to        
substance and as to accidents40         
,similarly in ,a #ahb  ,b #bbf of the   
,critique ,kant states that simultaneity
 is not a mode of time1#ecd since none  
of the parts of time can be             
simultaneous1 and yet also teaches in ,a
 #agg  ,b #bai that1 as the order of    
appearances1 time possesses in addition 
to succession the two modes1 duration   

and simultaneity4 ,the significance of  
this distinction between time as the    
order of our inner states1 and time as  
the order of objective appearances1 we  
shall consider immediately4  ,a         
connected question is as to whether or  
not ,kant teaches the possibility of    
simultaneous apprehension4 ,in the      
,aesthetic and ,dialectic he certainly  
does so4 ,space is given as containing  
coexisting parts1 and#ece can be        
intuited as such without successive     
synthesis of its parts4 ,in the         
,analytic1 on the other hand1 the       
opposite would seem to be implied4#ecf  
,the apprehension of a manifold can only
 be obtained through the successive     
addition or generation of its parts4    
7c7 ,lastly1 ,kant argues that the fact 
that all the relations of time can be   
expressed in an outer intuition is proof
 that the representation of time is     
itself intuition4 ,but surely if1 as    
,kant later taught1 time can be         
apprehended at all only in and through  

space1 that1 taken alone1 would rather  
be a reason for denying it to be itself 
intuition4 ,in any case it is difficult 
to follow ,kant in his contention that  
the intuition of time is similar in     
general character to that of space4#ecg 
,third ,paragraph 7,conclusion          
c74--,kant now reopens the question as  
to the relation in which time stands to 
outer appearances4 ,as already noted1 he
 has argued in the beginning of the     
previous paragraph that it cannot be a  
determination of outer appearances1 but 
only of representations in our inner    
state4 ,external appearances1 however1  
as ,kant recognises1 can be known only  
in and through representations4 ,to that
 extent they belong to inner sense1 and 
consequently 7such is ,kant's argument7 
are themselves subject to time4 ,time1  
as the immediate condition of our       
representations1 is also the mediate    
condition of appearances4 ,therefore1   
,kant concludes1 8all appearances1 i4e4 
all objects of the senses1 are in time1 

and necessarily stand in                
time-relations40  ,now quite obviously  
this argument is invalid if the         
distinction between representations and 
their objects is a real and genuine one4
 ,for if so1 it does not at all follow  
that because our representations of     
objects are in time that the objects    
themselves are in time4 ,in other words1
 the argument is valid only from the    
standpoint of extreme subjectivism1     
according to which objects are1 in      
,kant's own phraseology1 blosse         
,vorstellungen4 ,but the argument is    
employed to establish a realist         
conclusion1 that outer objects1 as      
objects1 stand in time-relations to one 
another4 ,in contradiction of the       
previous paragraph he is now maintaining
 that time is a determination of outer  
appearances1 and that it reveals itself 
in the motion of bodies as well as in   
the flux of our inner states4  ,the     
distinction between representations and 
their objects also makes it possible for

 ,kant both to assert and to deny that  
simultaneity is a mode of time4 8,no two
 years can be coexistent4 ,time has only
 one dimension4 ,but existence 7das     
,dasein71 measured through time1 has two
 dimensions1 succession and             
simultaneity40 ,there are1 for ,kant1   
two orders of time1 subjective and      
objective4 ,recognition of the latter   
7emphasised and developed in the        
,analytic7#ech is1 however1             
irreconcilable with his contention that 
time is merely the form of inner sense4 
,we have here one of the many objections
 to which ,kant's doctrine of time lies 
open4 ,it is the most vulnerable tenet  
in his whole system4 ,a mere list of the
 points which ,kant leaves unsettled    
suffices to show how greatly he was     
troubled in his own mind by the problems
 to which it gives rise4 7#a7 ,the      
nature of the a priori knowledge which  
time yields4 ,kant ascribes to this     
source sometimes only the two axioms in 
regard to time1 sometimes pure          

mechanics1 and sometimes also           
arithmetic4 7#b7 ,whether time only     
allows of1 or whether it demands1       
representation through space4 ,sometimes
 ,kant makes the one assertion1         
sometimes the other4 7#c7 ,whether it is
 possible to apprehend the coexistent   
without successive synthesis of its     
parts4 ,this possibility is asserted in 
the ,aesthetic and ,dialectic1 denied in
 the ,analytic4 7#d7 ,whether           
simultaneity is a mode of time4 7#e7    
,whether1 and in what manner1           
appearances of outer sense are in time4 
,kant's answer to #d and to #e varies   
according as he identifies or           
distinguishes representations and       
empirical objects4  ,the manifold       
difficulties to which a theory of time  
thus lies open are probably the reason  
why ,kant1 in the ,critique1 reverses   
the order in which he had treated time  
and space in the ,dissertation4#eci ,but
 the placing of space before time is    
none the less unfortunate4 ,it greatly  

tends to conceal from the reader the    
central position which ,kant has        
assigned to time in the ,analytic4      
,consciousness of time is the           
fundamental fact1 taken as bare fact1 by
 reference to which ,kant gains his     
transcendental proof of the categories  
and principles of understanding4#edj ,in
 the ,analytic space1 by comparison1    
falls very much into the background4 ,a 
further reason for the reversal may have
 been ,kant's ,newtonian view of        
geometry as the mathematical science par
 excellence4#eda ,in view of his        
formulation of the ,critical problem as 
that of accounting for synthetic a      
priori judgments1 he would then         
naturally be led to throw more emphasis 
on space4  ,to sum up our main          
conclusions4 ,kant's view of time as a  
form merely of inner sense1 and as      
having only one dimension1 connects with
 his subjectivism4 ,his view of it as   
inhering in objects1 and as having      
duration and simultaneity as two of its 

modes1 is bound up with his             
phenomenalism4 ,further discussion of   
these difficulties must therefore be    
deferred until we are in a position to  
raise the more fundamental problem as to
 the nature of the distinction between a
 representation and its object4#edb     
,motion is not an inner state4 ,yet it  
involves time as directly as does the   
flow of our feelings and ideas4 ,kant's 
assertion that 8time can no more be     
intuited externally than space can be   
intuited as something in us10#edc if    
taken quite literally1 would involve    
both the subjectivist assertion that    
motion of bodies is non-existent1 and   
also the phenomenalist contention that  
an extended object is altogether        
distinct from a representation4  ,the   
fourth and fifth paragraphs call for no 
detailed analysis4#edd ,time is         
empirically real1 transcendentally      
ideal--these terms having exactly the   
same meaning and scope as in reference  
to space4#ede ,the fourth sentence in   

the fifth paragraph is curiously        
inaccurate4 ,as it stands1 it would     
imply that time is given through the    
senses4 ,in the concluding sentences    
,kant briefly summarises and applies the
 points raised in these fourth and fifth
 paragraphs4   ,,elucidation  ,first and
 ,second ,paragraphs4--,kant here       
replies to a criticism which1 as he     
tells us in his letter of #aggb to      
,herz1 was first made by ,pastor        
,schulze and by ,lambert4#edf ,in that  
letter the objection and ,kant's reply  
are stated as follows4       8,in       
accordance with the testimony of inner  
sense1 changes are      something real4 
,but they are only possible on the      
assumption of      time4 ,time is1      
therefore1 something real which belongs 
to the      determinations of things in 
themselves4 ,why1 said ,i to myself1 do 
we not argue in a parallel manner3      
#8,bodies are real1 in accordance       
with the outer senses4 ,but bodies are  
possible only under the      condition  

of space4 ,space is1 therefore1         
something objective and      real which 
inheres in the things themselves4' ,the 
cause of this      differential         
treatment of space and of time is the   
observation      that in respect to     
outer things we cannot infer from the   
reality of      representations the     
reality of their objects1 whereas in    
inner      sense the thought or the     
existing of the thought and of myself   
are      one and the same4 ,herein lies 
the key to the difficulty4              
,undoubtedly ,i must think my own state 
under the form of time1 and      the    
form of the inner sensibility           
consequently gives me the               
appearance of changes4 ,now ,i do not   
deny that changes are something         
real any more than ,i deny that bodies  
are something real1 but ,i      thereby 
mean only that something real           
corresponds to the      appearance4 ,i  
may not even say the inner appearance   
undergoes      change 7verndere sich71  

for how could ,i observe this change    
unless it appeared to my inner sense8   
,to the objection that this      leads  
to the conclusion that all things in the
 world objectively      and in          
themselves are unchangeable1 ,i would   
reply that they are      neither        
changeable nor unchangeable4 ,as        
,baumgarten states in  #ah      of his  
,metaphysica1 the absolutely impossible 
is hypothetically      neither possible 
nor impossible1 since it cannot be      
mentally      entertained under any     
condition whatsoever2 so in similar     
manner      the things of the world are 
objectively or in themselves neither    
in one and the same state nor in        
different states at different           
times1 for thus understood viz4 as      
things in themselves they are      not  
represented in time at all40#edg  ,thus 
,kant's contention1 both in this letter 
and in the passage before us1 is that   
even our inner states would not reveal  
change if they could be apprehended by  

us or by some other being apart from the
 subjective form of our inner sense4 ,we
 may not say that our inner states      
undergo change1 or that they succeed one
 another1 but only that to us they      
necessarily appear as so doing4#edh     
,time is no more than subjectively      
real4#edi ,as ,krner writes to          
,schiller3 8,without time man would     
indeed exist but not appear4 ,not his   
reality but only his appearance is      
dependent upon the condition of time40  
8,man is not1 but only appears1 when he 
undergoes change40#eej ,the objects of  
inner sense stand in exactly the same   
position as those of outer sense4 ,both 
are appearances1 and neither can be     
identified with the absolutely real4 ,as
 ,kant argues later in the              
,critique1#eea inner processes are not  
known with any greater certainty or     
immediacy than are outer objects2 the   
reality of time as subjective proves its
 unreality in relation to things in     
themselves4 ,the statement that the     

constitution of things in themselves is 
8problematic0 is an exceptional mode of 
expression for ,kant4 ,usually--as      
indeed throughout the whole context of  
this passage#eeb--;he asserts that      
though things in themselves are         
unknowable1 we can with absolute        
certainty maintain that they are neither
 in space nor in time4 ,upon this point 
we have already dwelt in discussing     
,trendelenburg's controversy with       
,fischer4#eec  ,third ,paragraph4--,the 
third and fourth paragraphs of this     
section ought to have had a separate    
heading4 ,they summarise the total      
argument of the ,aesthetic in regard to 
space as well as time1 distinguish its  
tenets from those of ,newton and of     
,leibniz1 and draw a general conclusion4
 ,the summary follows the strict        
synthetic method4 ,the opening sentences
 illustrate ,kant's failure to          
distinguish between the problems of pure
 and of applied mathematics1 and also   
show how completely he tends to conceive

 mathematics as typified by geometry4   
,the criticism of alternative views     
traverses the ground of the famous      
controversy between ,leibniz and        
,clarke4 ,their ,streitschriften were1  
as we have good circumstantial grounds  
for believing1#eed a chief influence in 
the development of ,kant's own views4   
,kant1 who originally held the          
,leibnizian position1 was by #agfheee   
more or less converted to the ,newtonian
 teaching1 and in the ,dissertation of  
#aggj developed his subjectivist        
standpoint with the conscious intention 
of retaining the advantages while       
remedying the defects of both           
alternatives4#eef ,for convenience we   
may limit the discussion to space4 7a7  
,the view propounded by ,newton1 and    
defended by ,clarke1 is that space has  
an existence in and by itself1          
independent alike of the mind which     
apprehends it and of the objects with   
which it is filled4 7b7 ,the view held  
by ,leibniz is that space is an         

empirical concept abstracted from our   
confused sense-experience of the        
relations of real things4#eeg  ,the     
criticism of 7a7 is twofold4 ,first1 it 
involves belief in an eternal and       
infinite ,unding4 ,secondly1 it leads to
 metaphysical difficulties1 especially  
in regard to the existence of ,god4 ,if 
space is absolutely real1 how is it to  
be reconciled with the omnipresence of  
,god8 ,newton's view of space as the    
sensorium ,dei can hardly be regarded as
 satisfactory4  ,the objection to 7b7 is
 that it cannot account for the         
apodictic certainty of geometry1 nor    
guarantee its application to experience4
 ,the concept of space1 when regarded as
 of sensuous origin1 is something that  
may distort 7and according to the       
,leibnizian teaching does actually      
distort7 what it professes to represent1
 and is something from which            
restrictions that hold in the natural   
world have been omitted4#eeh ,as        
empirical1 it cannot serve as basis for 

the universal and necessary judgments of
 mathematical science4#eei  ,the first  
view has1 however1 the advantage of     
keeping the sphere of appearances open  
for mathematical science4 ,as space is  
infinite and all-comprehensive1 its laws
 hold universally4 ,the second view has 
the advantage of not subjecting reality 
to space conditions4 ,these advantages  
are retained1 while the objections are  
removed1 by the teaching of the         
,aesthetic4  ,kant further criticises   
the former view in ,a #df ff4  ,b #fd   
ff4 ,there is no possibility of         
accounting for the a priori synthetic   
judgments of geometry save by assuming  
that space is the pure form of outer    
intuition4 ,for though the ,newtonian   
view will justify the assertion that the
 laws of space hold universally1 it     
cannot explain how we come to know them 
a priori4 ,and assuming1 as ,kant       
constantly does1 that space cannot be   
both an a priori form of intuition and  
also independently real1 he concludes   

that it is the former only4  ,in ,b #ga 
,kant also restates the metaphysical    
difficulties to which the ,newtonian    
view lies open4 ,in natural theology we 
deal with an existence which can never  
be the object of sensuous intuition1 and
 which has to be freed from all         
conditions of space and time4 ,this is  
impossible if space is so absolutely    
real that it would remain though all    
created things were annihilated4        
,fourth ,paragraph4--,space and time are
 the only two forms of sensibility2 all 
other concepts belonging to the senses1 
such as motion and change1 are          
empirical4#efj ,as ,kant has himself    
stated1 no reason can be given why space
 and time are the sole forms of our     
possible intuition3       8,other forms 
of intuition than space and time1 444   
even if they      were possible1 we     
cannot render in any way conceivable and
      comprehensible to ourselves1 and  
even assuming that we could do so1      
they still would not belong to          

experience1 the only kind of            
knowledge in which objects are given to 
us40#efa  ,the further statement1#efb   
frequently repeated in the ,critique1   
that time itself does not change1 but   
only what is in time1#efc indicates the 
extent to which ,kant has been          
influenced by the ,newtonian receptacle 
view4 ,as ,bergson very justly points   
out1 time1 thus viewed as a homogeneous 
medium1 is really being conceived on the
 analogy of space4 8,it is merely the   
phantom of space obsessing the          
reflective consciousness40#efd          
,,general ,,observations ,,on ,,the     
,,transcendental ,,aesthetic  ,i4 ,first
 ,paragraph4--8,to avoid all            
misapprehension0 ,kant proceeds to state
 8as clearly as possible0 his view of   
sensuous knowledge4 ,with this end in   
view he sets himself to enforce two main
 points3 7a7 that as space and time are 
only forms of sensibility1 everything   
apprehended is only appearance2 7b7 that
 this is not a mere hypothesis but is   

completely certain4 ,kant expounds 7a7  
indirectly through criticism of the     
opposing views of ,leibniz and of       
,locke4 ,but before doing so he makes in
 the next paragraph a twofold statement 
of his own conclusions4  ,second        
,paragraph4--,this paragraph states 7a7 
that through intuition we can represent 
only appearances1 not things in         
themselves1 and 7b7 that the appearances
 thus known exist only in us4 ,both     
assertions have implications1 the       
discussion of which must be deferred to 
the ,analytic4 ,the mention of the      
8relations of things by themselves0 may1
 as ,vaihinger suggests1#efe be a       
survival from the time when 7as in the  
,dissertation#eff7 ,kant sought to      
reduce spatial to dynamical relations4  
,the assertion that things in themselves
 are completely unknown to us goes      
beyond what the ,aesthetic can establish
 and what ,kant here requires to prove4 
,his present thesis is only that no     
knowledge of things in themselves can be

 acquired either through the forms of   
space and time or through sensation2    
space and time are determined solely by 
our pure sensibility1 and sensations by 
our empirical sensibility4 ,failure to  
recognise this is1 in ,kant's view1 one 
of the chief defects of the ,leibnizian 
system4  ,third and ,fourth ,paragraphs4
 ,criticism of the ,leibniz-,wolff      
,interpretation of ,sensibility and of  
,appearance4--,leibniz vitiates both    
conceptions4 ,sensibility does not      
differ from thought in clearness but in 
content4 ,it is a difference of         
kind4#efg ,they originate in different  
sources1 and neither can by any         
transformation be reduced to the other4 
8,even if an appearance could become    
completely transparent to us1      such 
knowledge would remain toto coelo       
different from knowledge      of the    
object in itself40#efh 8,through        
observation and analysis of             
appearances we penetrate to the secrets 
of nature1 and no one can      say how  

far this may in time extend4444 ,but    
however far we      advance1 we shall   
never be able by means of so ill-adapted
 an      instrument of investigation as 
our sensibility to find anything        
except still other appearances1 the     
non-sensuous cause of which we      yet 
long to discover40#efi  ,we should still
 know only in terms of the two          
inalienable forms of our                
sensibility4#egj ,the dualism of thought
 and sense can never be transcended by  
the human mind4 ,by no extension of its 
sphere or perfecting of its insight can 
sensuous knowledge be transformed into a
 conceptual apprehension of purely      
intelligible entities4  ,leibniz's      
conception of appearances as things in  
themselves confusedly apprehended is    
equally false1 and for the same         
reasons4#ega ,appearance and reality are
 related as distinct existences1 each of
 which has its own intrinsic character  
and content4 ,through the former there  
can be no hope of penetrating to the    

latter4 ,appearance is subjective in    
matter as well as in form4 ,for ,leibniz
 our knowledge of appearances is a      
confused knowledge of things in         
themselves4 ,properly viewed1 it is the 
apprehension1 whether distinct or       
confused1 of objects which are never    
things in themselves4 ,sense-knowledge1 
such as we obtain in the science of     
geometry1 has often the highest degree  
of clearness4 ,conceptual apprehension  
is all too frequently characterised by  
obscurity and indistinctness4  ,this    
criticism of ,leibniz1 as expounded in  
these two paragraphs1 is thoroughly     
misleading if taken as an adequate      
statement of ,kant's view of the        
relations between sense and             
understanding1 appearance and reality4  
,these paragraphs are really a          
restatement of a passage in the         
,dissertation4       8,it will thus be  
seen that we express the nature of the  
sensuous      very inappropriately when 
we assert that it is the more           

confusedly known1 and the nature of the 
intellectual when we      describe it as
 the distinctly known4 ,for these are   
merely logical      distinctions1 and   
obviously have nothing to do with the   
given facts      which underlie all     
logical comparison4 ,the sensuous may be
      absolutely distinct1 and the      
intellectual extremely confused4 ,that  
is shown on the one hand in geometry1   
the prototype of sensuous               
knowledge1 and on the other in          
metaphysics1 the instrument of all      
intellectual enquiry4 ,every one knows  
how zealously metaphysics has           
striven to dispel the mists of confusion
 which cloud the minds of      men at   
large and yet has not always attained   
the happy results of      the former    
science4 ,nevertheless each of these    
kinds of knowledge      preserves the   
mark of the stock from which it has     
sprung4 ,the      former1 however       
distinct1 is on account of its origin   
entitled      sensuous1 while the       

latter1 however confused1 remains       
intellectual--as e4g4 the moral         
concepts1 which are known not      by   
way of experience1 but through the pure 
intellect itself4 ,i      fear1 however1
 that ,wolff by this distinction between
 the sensuous      and the intellectual1
 which for him is merely logical1 has   
checked1      perhaps wholly 7to the    
great detriment of philosophy71 that    
noblest      enterprise of antiquity1   
the investigation of the nature of      
phenomena and noumena1 turning men's    
minds from such enquiries to      what  
are very frequently only logical        
subleties40#egb  ,the paragraphs before 
us give expression only to what is      
common to the ,dissertation and to the  
,critique1 and do so entirely from the  
standpoint of the ,dissertation4 ,thus  
the illustration of the conception of   
8right0 implies that things in          
themselves can be known through the     
understanding4 ,the conception1 as ,kant
 says1 represents 8a moral property     

which belongs to actions in and by      
themselves40 ,similarly1 in             
distinguishing the sensuous from 8the   
intellectual10 he says that through the 
former we do not apprehend things in    
themselves1 thus implying that things in
 themselves can be known through the    
pure intellect4 ,the view developed in  
the ,analytic1 alike of sensibility and 
of appearance1 is radically different4  
,sensibility and understanding may have 
a common source2 and both are           
indispensably necessary for the         
apprehension of appearance4 ,neither can
 function save in co-operation with the 
other4 ,appearance does not differ from 
reality solely through its sensuous     
content and form1 but also in the       
intellectual order or dispensation to   
which it is subject4 ,but in the very   
act of thus deepening the gulf between  
appearance and reality by counting even 
understanding as contributing to the    
knowledge only of the former1 he was    
brought back to a position that has     

kinship with the ,leibnizian view of    
their interrelation4 ,since             
understanding is just as essential as   
sensibility to the apprehension of      
appearances1 and since understanding    
differs from sensibility in the         
universality of its range1 it enables us
 to view appearances in their relation  
to ultimate reality1 and so to apprehend
 them as being1 however subjective or   
phenomenal1 ways in which the thing in  
itself presents itself to us4 ,such a   
view is1 however1 on ,kant's principles1
 quite consistent with the further      
contention1 that appearance does not    
differ from reality in a merely logical 
manner4 ,factors that are peculiar to   
the realm of appearance have intervened 
to transform the real2 and in           
consequence even completed knowledge of 
the phenomenal--if such can be conceived
 as possible--would not be equivalent to
 knowledge of things in themselves4     
,fifth ,paragraph4 ,criticism of        
,locke's ,view of ,appearance4--,this   

paragraph discusses ,locke's            
doctrine#egc that the secondary         
qualities are subjective1 and that in   
the primary qualities we possess true   
knowledge of things in themselves4 ,the 
distinction is drawn upon empirical     
grounds1 namely1 that while certain     
qualities are uniform for more than one 
sense1 and belong to objects under all  
conditions1 others are peculiar to the  
different senses1 and arise only through
 the accidental relation of objects to  
the special senses4#egd ,this           
distinction is1 ,kant says1 entirely    
justified from the physical             
standpoint4#ege ,a rainbow is an        
appearance of which the raindrops       
constitute the true empirical reality4  
,but ,locke and his followers interpret 
this distinction wrongly4 ,they ignore  
the more fundamental transcendental     
7i4e4 metaphysical7 distinction between 
empirical reality and the thing in      
itself4 ,from the transcendental        
standpoint the raindrops are themselves 

merely appearance4 ,even their round    
shape1 and the very space in which they 
fall2 are only modifications of our     
sensuous intuition4 ,the                
#8transcendental object'#egf remains    
unknown to us4  ,when ,kant thus        
declares that the distinction between   
primary and secondary qualities is      
justified 7richtig7 from the physical   
standpoint1 he is again#egg speaking    
from a phenomenalist point of view4 ,and
 it may be noted that in developing his 
transcendental distinction he does not  
describe the raindrops as mere          
representations4 ,his phrase is much    
more indefinite4 ,they are              
8modifications or fundamental forms     
7,grundlagen7 of our sensuous           
intuition40  ,kant does not here        
criticise the view of sensibility which 
underlies ,locke's view of appearance4  
,but he does so in ,a #bga  ,b #cbg1    
completing the parallel and contrast    
between ,leibniz and ,locke4            
8,leibniz intellectualised appearances1 

just as ,locke1 according      to his   
system of noogony 7if ,i may be allowed 
these expressions71      sensualised all
 concepts of the understanding1 i4e4    
interpreted      them as simply         
empirical or abstracted concepts of     
reflection4      ,instead of            
interpreting understanding and          
sensibility as two quite      different 
sources of representations1 which yet   
can supply      objectively valid       
judgments of things only in conjunction 
with      each other1 each of these     
great men holds only to one of the two1 
viewing it as in immediate relation to  
things in themselves4 ,the      other   
faculty is regarded as serving only to  
confuse or to order      the            
representations which this selected     
faculty yields40#egh  ,proof that the   
above ,view of ,space and ,time is not a
 mere ,hypothesis1 but completely       
certain4#egi--,the proof1 which as here 
recapitulated and developed follows the 
analytic method1 has already been       

considered in connection with ,a #ci  ,b
 #ef4 ,it proceeds upon the assumption  
that space cannot be both an a priori   
form of intuition and also independently
 real4 ,the argument as a whole lacks   
clearness owing to ,kant's failure to   
distinguish between the problems of pure
 and applied geometry1 between pure     
intuition and form of intuition4 ,this  
is especially obvious in the very       
unfortunate and misleading second       
application of the triangle             
illustration4#ehj ,kant's tendency to   
conceive mathematical science almost    
exclusively in terms of geometry is     
likewise illustrated4       8,there is  
in regard to both space and time a large
 number of a      priori apodictic and  
synthetic propositions4 ,this is        
especially      true of space1 which for
 this reason will be our chief          
illustration      in this enquiry40#eha 
,,ii4 ,paragraphs added in the ,second  
,edition4#ehb--,kant proceeds to offer  
further proof of the ideality of the    

appearances 7a7 of outer and 7b7 of     
inner sense4 ,such proof he finds in the
 fact that these appearances consist    
solely of relations4 7a7 ,outer         
appearances reduce without remainder to 
relations of position in intuition 7i4e4
 of extension71 of change of position   
7motion71 and to the laws which express 
in merely relational terms the motive   
forces by which such change is          
determined4 ,what it is that is thus    
present in space1 or what the dynamic   
agencies may be to which the motion is  
due1 is never revealed4 ,but a real     
existent 7,sache an sich7 can never be  
known through mere relations4 ,outer    
sense consequently reveals through its  
representations only the relation of an 
object to the subject1 not the intrinsic
 inner nature of the object in itself   
7,object an sich74 ,kant's avoidance of 
the term ,ding an sich may be noted4#ehc
  7b7 ,the same holds true of inner     
sense1 not only because the             
representations of outer sense          

constitute its proper 7eigentlichen7    
material1 but also because time1 in     
which these are set1 contains only      
relations of succession1 coexistence1   
and duration4 ,this time 7which as      
consisting only of relations can be     
nothing but a form#ehd7 is itself1 in   
turn1 a mere relation4 ,it is only the  
manner in which through its own activity
 the mind is affected by itself4 ,but in
 order to be affected by itself it must 
have receptivity1 in other words1       
sensibility4 ,time1 consequently1 must  
be regarded as the form of this inner   
sense4  ,that everything represented in 
time1 like that which is represented in 
space1 consists solely of relations1    
,kant does not1 however1 attempt to     
prove4 ,he is satisfied with repeating  
the conclusion reached in the first     
edition of the ,aesthetic1 that1 as time
 is the object of a sense1 it must of   
necessity be appearance4 ,this1 like    
everything which ,kant wrote upon inner 
sense1 is profoundly unsatisfactory4    

,the obscurities of his argument are not
 to be excused on the ground that 8the  
difficulty1 how a subject can have an   
internal intuition of itself1 is common 
to every theory40 ,for no great         
thinker1#ehe except ,locke1 has         
attempted to interpret inner            
consciousness on the analogy of the     
senses4 ,discussion of the doctrine must
 meantime be deferred4#ehf  ,,iii4 ,b   
#fi4--,kant here formulates the         
important distinction between appearance
 7,erscheinung7 and illusion 7,schein74 
,the main text is clear so far as it    
goes2 but the appended note is          
thoroughly confused4 ,together they     
contain no less than three distinct and 
conflicting views of illusion4#ehg      
,according to the main text1 ,schein    
signifies a representation1 such as may 
occur in a dream1 to which nothing real 
corresponds4 ,erscheinung1 on the other 
hand1 is always the appearance of a     
given object2 but since the qualities of
 that object depend solely on our mode  

of intuition1 we have to distinguish the
 object as appearance from the object as
 thing in itself4       0,every         
appearance has two sides1 the one by    
which the object is      viewed in and  
by itself1 444 the other by which the   
form of the      intuition of the object
 is taken into account44440#ehh         
,obviously1 when illusion is defined in 
the above manner1 the assertion that    
objects in space are mere appearances   
cannot be taken as meaning that they are
 illusory4  ,but this view of illusion  
is peculiar to the passage before us and
 to ,a #ch  ,b #ee4 ,it occurs nowhere  
else1 either in the ,critique or in the 
,prolegomena2 and it is not1 as ,kant   
has himself admitted1#ehi really        
relevant to the purposes of the         
,critique4 ,the issues are more         
adequately faced in the appended note1  
which1 however1 at the same time1 shows 
very clearly that ,kant has not yet     
properly disentangled their various     
strands4 ,the above definition of       

appearance is too wide4 ,it covers      
illusory sense perception as well as    
appearance proper4 ,the further         
qualification must be added1 that the   
predicates of appearance are constant   
and are inseparable from its            
representation4 ,thus the space         
predicates can be asserted of any       
external object4 ,redness and scent can 
be ascribed to the rose4 ,all of these  
are genuine appearances4 ,if1 on the    
other hand1 the two handles1 as observed
 by ,galileo1 are attributed to ,saturn1
 roundness to a distant square tower1   
bentness to a straight stick inserted in
 water1 the result is mere illusion4    
,the predicates1 in such cases1 do not  
stand the test of further observation or
 of the employment of other senses4     
,only in a certain position of its      
rings1 relatively to the observer1 does 
,saturn seem 7scheint7 to have two      
handles4 ,the distant tower only seems  
to be round4 ,the stick only seems to be
 bent4 ,but the rose is extended and is 

red4 ,obviously ,kant is no longer      
viewing ,schein as equivalent to a      
merely mental image4 ,it now receives a 
second meaning4 ,it is illusion in the  
modern1 psychological sense4 ,it        
signifies an abnormal perception of an  
actually present object4 ,the           
distinction between appearance and      
illusion is now reduced to a merely     
relative difference in constancy and    
universality of appearance4 ,saturn     
necessarily appears to ,galileo as      
possessing two handles4 ,a square tower 
viewed from the distance cannot appear  
to the human eye otherwise than round4  
,a stick inserted in water must appear  
bent4 ,if1 however1 ,saturn be viewed   
under more favourable conditions1 if the
 distance from the tower be diminished1 
if the stick be removed from the water1 
the empirical object will appear in a   
manner more in harmony with the possible
 or actual experiences of touch4 ,the   
distinction is practical1 rather than   
theoretical1 in its justification4 ,it  

says only that certain sets of          
conditions may be expected to remain    
uniform2 those1 for instance1 physical1 
physiological1 and psychical1 which     
cause a rose to appear red4 ,other sets 
of conditions1 such as those which cause
 the stick to appear bent1 are          
exceptional1 and for that reason the    
bentness may be discounted as illusion4 
,among the relatively constant are the  
space and time properties of bodies4 ,to
 employ the terms of the main text1 it  
is not only by illusion that bodies seem
 to exist outside me2 they actually are 
there4  ,so long as we keep to the      
sphere of ordinary experience1 and      
require no greater exactitude than      
practical life demands1 this distinction
 is1 of course1 both important and      
valid4 ,but ,kant1 by his references to 
,saturn1 raises considerations which1 if
 faced1 must complicate the problem and 
place it upon an entirely different     
plane4 ,if1 in view of scientific       
requirements1 the conditions of         

observation are more rigorously         
formulated1 and if by artificial        
instruments of scientific precision we  
modify the perceptions of our human     
senses1 what before was ranked as       
appearance becomes illusion2 and no     
limit can be set to the transformations 
which even our most normal human        
experiences may thus be made to undergo4
 ,even the most constant perceptions    
then yield to variation4 ,the most that 
can be asserted is that throughout all  
change in the conditions of observation 
objects still continue to possess1 in   
however new and revolutionary a fashion1
 some kind of space and time predicates4
 ,the application of this more rigorous 
scientific standard of appearance thus  
leads to a fourfold distinction between 
ultimate reality1 scientific            
appearances1 the appearances of ordinary
 consciousness1 and the illusions of    
ordinary consciousness4 ,the appearances
 of practical life are the illusions of 
science1 and the appearances of science 

would similarly be illusions to any     
being who through #8intuitive           
understanding' could apprehend things in
 themselves4  ,but if the distinction   
between appearance and illusion is thus 
merely relative to the varying nature of
 the conditions under which observation 
takes place1 it can afford no sufficient
 answer to the criticisms which ,kant is
 here professing to meet4 ,kant has in  
view those critics 7such as ,lambert1   
,mendelssohn1 and ,garve7 who had       
objected that if bodies in space are    
representations existing1 as he so often
 asserts1 only 8within us10 their       
appearing to exist 8outside us0 is a    
complete illusion4 ,these critics have1 
indeed1 found a vulnerable point in     
,kant's teaching4 ,the only way in which
 he can effectively meet it is by frank 
recognition and development of the      
phenomenalism with which his            
subjectivism comes into so frequent     
conflict4#eij ,that certain perceptions 
are more constant than others does not  

prove that all alike may not be classed 
as illusory4 ,the criticism concerns    
only the reality of extended objects4   
,from ,kant's own extreme subjectivist  
position they are illusions of the most 
thoroughgoing kind4 ,if1 as ,kant so    
frequently maintains1 objects are       
representations and exist only 8within  
us10 their existence 8outside us0 must  
be denied4 ,the criticism can be met    
only if ,kant is prepared consistently  
to formulate and defend his own         
alternative teaching1 that sensations   
arise through the action of external    
objects upon the sense-organs1 and that 
the world of physical science has       
consequently a reality not reducible to 
mere representations in the individual  
mind4  ,it may be objected that ,kant   
has in the main text cited one essential
 difference between his position and    
that which is being ascribed to him4    
,extended objects1 though mere          
representations1 are yet due to1 and    
conditioned by1 things in themselves4   

,they are illusory only in regard to    
their properties1 not in regard to their
 existence4 ,but this distinction is not
 really relevant4 ,the criticism1 as    
just stated1 is directed only against   
,kant's view of space4 ,the fact that   
the spatial world is a grounded and     
necessary illusion is not strictly      
relevant to the matter in dispute4 ,kant
 has1 indeed1 elsewhere1 himself        
admitted the justice of the criticism4  
,in ,a #ghj  ,b #hjh he cites as a      
possible hypothesis1 entirely in harmony
 with his main results1 though not in   
any degree established by them1 the view
       8that this life is an appearance 
only1 that is1 a sensuous               
representation of purely spiritual life1
 and that the whole      sensible world 
is a mere image 7ein blosses ,bild7     
which hovers      before our present    
mode of knowledge1 and like a dream has 
in      itself no objective reality40   
,kant's reply is thus really only       
verbal4 ,he claims that illusion1 if    

constant1 has earned the right to be    
called appearance4 ,he accepts the      
criticism1 but restates it in his own   
terms4 ,the underlying phenomenalism    
which colours the position in his own   
thoughts1 and for which he has not been 
able to find any quite satisfactory     
formulation1 is the sole possible       
justification1 if any such exists1 for  
his contention that the criticism does  
not apply4 ,such phenomenalism crops out
 in the sentence1 already partially     
quoted3       8,if ,i assert that the   
quality of space and time1 according to 
which1 as a condition of their          
existence1 ,i posit both external       
objects and my own soul1 lies in my mode
 of intuition and not in      these     
objects in themselves1 ,i am not saying 
that only by illusion      do bodies    
seem to exist outside me or my soul to  
be given in my                          
self-consciousness40#eia  ,but1 so far1 
,i have simplified ,kant's argument by  
leaving out of account a third and      

entirely different view of illusion     
which is likewise formulated in the     
appended note4 ,in the middle of the    
second sentence1 and in the last        
sentence1 illusion is defined as the    
attribution to the thing in itself of   
what belongs to it only in its relation 
to the senses4 ,illusion lies not in the
 object apprehended1 but only in the    
judgment which we pass upon it4 ,it is  
due1 not to sense1 but to               
understanding4#eib ,viewing illusion in 
this way1 ,kant is enabled to maintain  
that his critics are guilty of 8an      
unpardonable and almost intentional     
misconception10#eic since this is the   
very fallacy which he himself has been  
most concerned to attack4 ,as he has    
constantly insisted1 appearance is      
appearance just because it can never be 
a revelation of the thing in itself4    
,now the introduction of this third view
 reduces the argument of the appended   
note to complete confusion4 ,its first  
occurrence as a parenthesis in a        

sentence which is stating an opposed    
view would seem to indicate that the    
note has been carelessly recast4        
,originally containing only a statement 
of the second view1 ,kant has connected 
therewith the view which he had already 
formulated in the first edition and in  
the ,prolegomena4 ,but the two views    
cannot be combined4 ,by the former      
definition1 illusion is necessitated but
 abnormal perception2 according to the  
latter1 it is a preventable error of our
 conscious judgment4 ,the opposite of   
illusion is in the one case appearance1 
in the other truth4 ,the retention of   
the reference to ,saturn1 in the        
statement of the third view at the end  
of the note1 is further evidence of     
hasty recasting4 ,while the rose and the
 extended objects are there treated as  
also things in themselves1 ,saturn is   
taken only in its phenomenal existence4 
,in view of the general confusion1 it is
 a minor inconsistency that ,kant should
 here maintain1 in direct opposition to 

,a #bh-i1 that secondary qualities can  
be attributed to the empirical object4  
,this passage from the second edition is
 a development of ,prolegomena1  #ac1   
iii4 ,kant there employs the term       
appearance in a quite indefinite manner4
 ,for the most part he seems to mean by 
it any and every sense-experience1      
whether normal or abnormal1 and even to 
include under it dream images4 ,but it  
is also employed in the second of the   
above meanings1 as signifying those     
sense-perceptions which harmonise with  
general experience4 ,illusion is        
throughout employed in the third of the 
above meanings4 ,kant's illustration1   
that of the apparently retrograde       
movements of the planets1 necessitates a
 distinction between apparent and real  
motion in space1 and consequently leads 
to the fruitful distinction noted above4
 ,kant gives1 however1 no sign that he  
is conscious of the complicated problems
 involved4  ,in the interval between the
 ,prolegomena 7#aghc7 and the second    

edition of the ,critique 7#aghg7        
,mendelssohn had published 7#aghe7 his  
,morgenstunden4 ,in its introduction1   
entitled ,vorerkenntniss von ,wahrheit1 
,schein und ,irrthum1#eid he very       
carefully distinguishes between illusion
 7,sinnenschein7 and error of judgment  
7,irrthum74 ,this introduction ,kant had
 read4 ,in a letter to ,schtz#eie he    
cites it by title1 and praises it as    
8acute1 original1 and of exemplary      
clearness40 ,it is therefore the more   
inexcusable that he should again in the 
second edition of the ,critique have    
confused these two so radically         
different meanings of the term ,schein4 
,mendelssohn1 however1 drew no          
distinction between ,schein and         
,erscheinung4 ,they were then used as   
practically synonymous1#eif though of   
course ,schein was the stronger term4   
,kant seems to have been the first to   
distinguish them sharply and to attempt 
to define the one in opposition to the  
other4 ,but the very fact that          

,erscheinung and ,schein were currently 
employed as equivalent terms1 and that  
the distinction1 though one of his own  
drawing1 had been mentioned only in the 
most cursory manner in the first edition
 of the ,critique1#eig removes all      
justification for his retort upon his   
critics of 8unpardonable misconception40
 ,his anger was really due1 not to the  
objection in itself1 but to the implied 
comparison of his position to that of   
,berkeley4 ,such comparison never failed
 to arouse ,kant's wrath4 ,for however  
much this accusation might be justified 
by his own frequent lapses into         
subjectivism of the most extreme type1  
even its partial truth was more than he 
was willing to admit4 ,berkeley         
represents in his eyes1 not merely a    
subjectivist interpretation of the outer
 world1 but the almost diametrical      
opposite of everything for which he     
himself stood4 ,discussion of ,kant's   
relation to ,berkeley had best1 however1
 be introduced through consideration of 

the passage immediately following in    
which ,kant refers to ,berkeley by name4
  ,,iii4 7,second ,part7 ,b #gj4--,kant 
urges that his doctrine of the ideality 
of space and time1 so far from reducing 
objects to mere illusion1 is the sole   
means of defending their genuine        
reality4 ,if space and time had an      
independent existence1 they would have  
to be regarded as more real than the    
bodies which occupy them4 ,for on this  
view space and time would continue to   
exist even if all their contents were   
removed2 they would be antecedent       
necessary conditions of all other       
existences4 ,but space and time thus    
interpreted are impossible              
conceptions4#eih ,the reality of bodies 
is thereby made to depend upon ,undinge4
 ,if this were the sole alternative1    
8the good ,bishop ,berkeley could not be
 blamed for degrading bodies to mere    
illusion40 ,we should1 ,kant maintains1 
have to proceed still further1 denying  
even our own existence4 ,for had        

,berkeley taken account of time as well 
as of space1 a similar argument1        
consistently developed in regard to     
time1 would have constrained him to     
reduce the self to the level of mere    
illusion4 ,belief in the reality of     
things in themselves1 whether spiritual 
or material1 is defensible only if space
 and time be viewed as subjective4 ,in  
other words1 ,berkeley's idealism is an 
inevitable consequence of a realist view
 of space4 ,but it is also its reductio 
ad absurdum4       8,berkeley in his    
dogmatic idealism maintains that space1 
with all      the things of which it is 
the inseparable condition1 is something 
impossible in itself1 and he therefore  
regards the things in space      as     
merely imaginary entities               
7,einbildungen74 ,dogmatic idealism is  
inevitable if space be interpreted as a 
property which belongs to      things in
 themselves4 ,for1 when so regarded1    
space1 and everything      to which it  
serves as condition1 is a non-entity    

7,unding74 ,the      ground upon which  
this idealism rests we have removed in  
the      ,transcendental                
,aesthetic40#eii  ,the term ,schein is  
not employed throughout this passage in 
either of the two meanings of the       
appended note1 but in that of the main  
text4 ,it signifies a representation1 to
 which no existence corresponds4        
,,kant',s ,,relation ,,to ,,berkeley    
,by idealism#fjj ,kant means any and    
every system which maintains that the   
sensible world does not exist in the    
form in which it presents itself to us4 
,the position is typified in ,kant's    
mind by the ,eleatics1 by ,plato1 and by
 ,descartes1 all of whom are            
rationalists4 ,with the denial of       
reality to sense-appearances they       
combine a belief in the possibility of  
rationally comprehending its            
supersensible basis4 ,failing to        
appreciate the true nature of the       
sensible1 they misunderstand the        
character of geometrical science1 and   

falsely ascribe to pure understanding a 
power of intellectual intuition4 ,kant's
 criticisms of ,berkeley show very      
clearly that it is this more general    
position which he has chiefly in view4  
,to ,berkeley ,kant objects that only in
 sense-experience is there truth1 that  
it is sensibility1 not understanding1   
which possesses the power of a priori   
intuition1 and that through pure        
understanding1 acting in independence of
 sensibility1 no knowledge of any kind  
can be acquired4 ,in other words1 ,kant 
classes ,berkeley with the rationalists4
 ,and1 as we have already seen1 he even 
goes the length of regarding ,berkeley's
 position as the reductio ad absurdum of
 the realist view of space4 ,kant does1 
indeed1 recognise#fja that ,berkeley    
differs from the other idealists1 in    
holding an empirical view of space1 and 
consequently of geometry1 but this does 
not prevent ,kant from maintaining that 
,berkeley's thinking is influenced by   
certain fundamental implications of the 

realist position4 ,berkeley's           
insight--such would seem to be ,kant's  
line of argument--is perverted by the   
very view which he is attacking4        
,berkeley appreciates only what is false
 in the ,cartesian view of space2 he is 
blind to the important element of truth 
which it contains4 ,empiricist though he
 be1 he has no wider conception of the  
function and powers of sensibility than 
have the realists from whom he separates
 himself off2 and in order to comprehend
 those existences to which alone he is  
willing to allow true reality1 he has   
therefore1 like the rationalists1 to    
fall back upon pure reason4#fjb  ,that  
,kant's criticism of ,berkeley should be
 extremely external is not1 therefore1  
surprising4 ,he is interested in        
,berkeley's positive teaching only in so
 far as it enables him to illustrate the
 evil tendencies of a mistaken idealism1
 which starts from a false view of the  
functions of sensibility and of         
understanding1 and of the nature of     

space and time4 ,the key to the true    
idealism lies1 he claims1 in the        
,critical problem1 how a priori         
synthetic judgments can be possible4    
,this is the fundamental problem of     
metaphysics1 and until it has been      
formulated and answered no advance can  
be made4       8,my so-called           
7,critical7 idealism is thus quite      
peculiar in that it      overthrows     
ordinary idealism1 and that through it  
alone a priori      cognition1 even that
 of geometry1 attains objective reality1
 a      thing which even the keenest    
realist could not assert till ,i had    
proved the ideality of space and        
time40#fjc  ,in order to make ,kant's   
account of ,berkeley's teaching really  
comprehensible1 we seem compelled to    
assume that he had never himself        
actually read any of ,berkeley's own    
writings4 ,kant's acquaintance with the 
,english language was most imperfect1   
and we have no evidence that he had ever
 read a single ,english book4#fjd ,when 

he quotes ,pope and ,addison1 he does so
 from ,german translations4#fje         
,subsequent to #agha he could1 indeed1  
have had access to ,berkeley's          
,dialogues between ,hylas and           
,philonous#fjf in a ,german translation2
 but in view of the account which he    
continues to give of ,berkeley's        
teaching1 it does not seem likely#fjg   
that he had availed himself of this     
opportunity4 ,as to what the indirect   
sources of ,kant's knowledge of         
,berkeley may have been1 we cannot      
decide with any certainty1 but amongst  
them must undoubtedly be reckoned       
,hume's statements in regard to         
,berkeley in the ,enquiry1#fjh and very 
probably also the references to         
,berkeley in ,beattie's ,nature of      
,truth4#fji ,from the former ,kant would
 learn of ,berkeley's empirical view of 
space and also of the sceptical         
tendencies of his idealist teaching4    
,from it he might also very naturally   
infer that ,berkeley denies all reality 

to objects4 ,by ,beattie ,kant would be 
confirmed in this latter view1 and also 
in his contention that ,berkeley is     
unable to supply a criterion for        
distinguishing between reality and      
dreams4 ,kant may also have received    
some impressions regarding ,berkeley    
from ,hamann4  ,to take ,kant's         
criticisms of ,berkeley more in detail4 
,in the first edition of the            
,critique#faj ,kant passes two          
criticisms1 without1 however1 mentioning
 ,berkeley by name3 first1 that he      
overlooks the problem of time1 and1 like
 ,descartes1 ascribes complete reality  
to the objects of inner sense4 ,this is 
the cause of a second error1 namely1    
that he views the objects of outer sense
 as mere illusion 7blosser ,schein74    
,proceeding1 ,kant argues that inner and
 outer sense are really in the same     
position4 ,though they yield only       
appearances1 these appearances are      
conditioned by things in themselves4    
,through this relation to things in     

themselves they are distinguished from  
all merely subjective images4 ,berkeley 
is again referred to in the fourth      
,paralogism4#faa ,his idealism is       
distinguished from that of ,descartes4  
,the one is dogmatic2 the other is      
sceptical4 ,the one denies the existence
 of matter2 the other only doubts       
whether it is possible to prove it4     
,berkeley claims1 indeed1 that there are
 contradictions in the very conception  
of matter2 and ,kant remarks that this  
is an objection which he will have to   
deal with in the section on the         
,antinomies4 ,but this promise ,kant    
does not fulfil2 and doubtless for the  
reason that1 however unwilling he may be
 to make the admission1 on this point   
his own teaching1 especially in the     
,dialectic1 frequently coincides with   
that of ,berkeley4 ,so little1 indeed1  
is ,kant concerned in the first edition 
to defend his position against the      
accusation of subjectivism1 that in this
 same section he praises the sceptical  

idealist as a 8benefactor of human      
reason40       8,he compels us1 even in 
the smallest advances of ordinary       
experience1 to keep on the watch1 lest  
we consider as a well-earned            
possession what we perhaps obtain only  
in an illegitimate manner4      ,we are 
now in a position to appreciate the     
value of the objections      of the     
idealist4 ,they drive us by main force1 
unless we mean to      contradict       
ourselves in our commonest assertions1  
to view all our      perceptions1       
whether we call them inner or outer1 as 
a      consciousness only of what is    
dependent on our sensibility4 ,they     
also compel us to regard the outer      
objects of these perceptions not      as
 things in themselves1 but only as      
representations1 of which1 as      of   
every other representation1 we can      
become immediately conscious1      and  
which are entitled outer because they   
depend on what we call      #8outer     
sense' whose intuition is space4 ,space 

itself1 however1 is      nothing but an 
inner mode of representation in which   
certain      perceptions are connected  
with one another40#fab  ,these          
criticisms are restated in ,a #dia-b  ,b
 #eai-bj1 with the further addition that
 in denying the existence of extended   
beings 8the empirical idealist0 removes 
the possibility of distinguishing       
between reality and dreams4 ,this is a  
new criticism4 ,kant is no longer       
referring to the denial of unknowable   
things in themselves4 ,he is now        
maintaining that only the ,critical     
standpoint can supply an immanent       
criterion whereby real experiences may  
be distinguished from merely subjective 
happenings4 ,this point is further      
insisted upon in the ,prolegomena1#fac  
but is nowhere developed with any direct
 reference to ,berkeley's own personal  
teaching4 ,kant assumes as established  
that any such criterion must rest upon  
the a priori2 and in this connection    
,berkeley is conveniently made to figure

 as a thoroughgoing empiricist4  ,the   
,critique1 on its publication1 was at   
once attacked1 especially in the        
,garve-,feder review1 as presenting an  
idealism similar to that of ,berkeley4  
,as ,erdmann has shown1 the original    
plan of the ,prolegomena was largely    
modified in order to afford opportunity 
for reply to this 8unpardonable and     
almost intentional misconception40#fad  
,kant's references to ,berkeley1 direct 
and indirect1 now for the first time    
manifest a polemical tone1 exaggerating 
in every possible way the difference    
between their points of view4 ,only the 
transcendental philosophy can establish 
the possibility of a priori knowledge1  
and so it alone can afford a criterion  
for distinguishing between realities and
 dreams4 ,it alone will account for the 
possibility of geometrical science2     
,berkeley's idealism would render the   
claims of that science wholly illusory4 
,the ,critical idealism transcends      
experience only so far as is required to

 discover the conditions which make     
empirical cognition possible2           
,berkeley's idealism is #8visionary' and
 #8mystical4'#fae ,even sceptical       
idealism now comes in for severe        
handling4 ,it may be called 8dreaming   
idealism02 it makes things out of mere  
representations1 and like idealism in   
its dogmatic form it virtually denies   
the existence of the only true reality1 
that of things in themselves4 ,sceptical
 idealism misinterprets space by making 
it empirical1 dogmatic idealism by      
regarding it as an attribute of the     
real4 ,both entirely ignore the problem 
of time4 ,for these reasons they        
underestimate the powers of sensibility 
7to which space and time belong as a    
priori forms71 and exaggerate those of  
pure understanding4       8,the position
 of all genuine idealists from the      
,eleatics to      ,berkeley is contained
 in this formula3 #8,all cognition      
through the      senses and experience  
is nothing but mere illusion1 and only  

in the      ideas of pure understanding 
and ,reason is there truth4' ,the       
fundamental principle ruling all my     
idealism1 on the contrary1 is      this3
 #8,all cognition of things solely from 
pure understanding or      pure ,reason 
is nothing but mere illusion and only in
 experience is      there truth4'0#faf  
,this is an extremely inadequate        
statement of the ,critical standpoint1  
but it excellently illustrates ,kant's  
perverse interpretation of ,berkeley's  
teaching4  ,to these criticisms ,kant   
gives less heated but none the less     
explicit expression in the second       
edition of the ,critique4 ,he is now    
much more careful to avoid subjectivist 
modes of statement4 ,his phenomenalist  
tendencies are reinforced1 and come to  
clearer expression of all that they     
involve4 ,the fourth ,paralogism with   
its sympathetic treatment of empirical  
idealism is omitted1 and in addition to 
the above passage ,kant inserts a new   
section1 entitled ,refutation of        

,idealism1 in which he states his       
position in a much more adequate manner4
  ,,iv4 ,b #ga4--,kant continues the    
argument of ,a #ci4fag ,if space and    
time condition all existence1 they will 
condition even divine existence1 and so 
must render ,god's omniscience1 which as
 such must be intuitive1 not discursive1
 difficult of conception4 ,upon this    
point ,kant is more explicit in the     
,dissertation4#fah       8,whatever is1 
is somewhere and sometime1 is a spurious
 axiom4444      ,by this spurious       
principle all beings1 even though they  
be known      intellectually1 are       
restricted in their existence by        
conditions of      space and time4      
,philosophers therefore discuss every   
form of idle      question regarding the
 locations in the corporeal universe of 
substances that are immaterial--and of  
which for that very reason      there   
can be no sensuous intuition nor any    
possible spatial      representation--or
 regarding the seat of the soul1 and the

 like4      ,and since the sensuous     
mixes with the intellectual about as    
badly      as square with round1 it     
frequently happens that the one         
disputant      appears as holding a     
sieve into which the other milks the    
he-goat4      ,the presence of          
immaterial things in the corporeal world
 is      virtual1 not local1 although it
 may conveniently be spoken of as       
local4 ,space contains the conditions of
 possible interaction only      when it 
is between material bodies4 ,what1      
however1 in immaterial      substances  
constitutes the external relations of   
force between them      or between them 
and bodies1 obviously eludes the human  
intellect4444 ,but when men reach the   
conception of a highest and             
extra-mundane ,being1 words cannot      
describe the extent to which they       
are deluded by these shades that flit   
before the mind4 ,they picture      ,god
 as present in a place3 they entangle   
,him in the world where ,he      is     

supposed to fill all space at once4     
,they hope to make up for the           
spatial limitation they thus impose by  
thinking of ,god's place      per       
eminentiam1 i4e4 as infinite4 ,but to be
 present in      different places at the
 same time is absolutely impossible1    
since      different places are mutually
 external to one another1 and           
consequently what is in several places  
is outside itself1 and is      therefore
 present to itself outside itself--which
 is a      contradiction in terms4 ,as  
to time1 men have got into an           
inextricable maze by releasing it from  
the laws that govern sense              
knowledge1 and what is more1            
transporting it beyond the confines of  
the world to the ,being that dwells     
there1 as a condition of ,his      very 
existence4 ,they thus torment their     
souls with absurd      questions1 for   
instance1 why ,god did not fashion the  
world many      centuries earlier4 ,they
 persuade themselves that it is easily  

possible to conceive how ,god may       
discern present things1 i4e4      what  
is actual in the time in which ,he is4  
,but they consider that      it is      
difficult to comprehend how ,he should  
foresee the things      about to be1    
i4e4 the actual in the time in which ,he
 is not yet4      ,they proceed as if   
the existence of the ,necessary ,being  
descended      successively through all 
the moments of a supposed time1 and     
having      already exhausted part of   
,his duration1 foresaw the eternal life 
that still lies before ,him together    
with the events which will      occur   
simultaneously with that future life of 
,his4 ,all these      speculations      
vanish like smoke when the notion of    
time has been      rightly discerned40  
,the references in ,b #ga-b to the      
intuitive understanding are among the   
many signs of ,kant's increased         
preoccupation1 during the preparation of
 the second edition1 with the problems  
which it raises4 ,such understanding is 

not sensuous1 but intellectual2 it is   
not derivative1 but original2 the object
 itself is created in the act of        
intuition4 ,or1 as ,kant's position may 
perhaps be more adequately expressed1   
all of ,god's activities are creative1  
and are inseparable from the            
non-sensuous intuition whereby both they
 and their products are apprehended by  
,him4 ,kant's reason for again raising  
this point may be ,mendelssohn's        
theological defence of the reality of   
space in his ,morgenstunden4#fai        
,mendelssohn has there argued that just 
as knowledge of independent reality is  
confirmed by the agreement of different 
senses1 and is rendered the more certain
 in proportion to the number of senses  
which support the belief1 so the        
validity of our spatial perceptions is  
confirmed in proportion as men are found
 to agree in this type of experience    
with one another1 with the animals1 and 
with angelic beings4 ,such inductive    
inference will culminate in the proof   

that even the ,supreme ,being apprehends
 things in this same spatial manner4#fbj
 ,kant's reply is that however general  
the intuition of space may be among     
finite beings1 it is sensuous and       
derivative1 and therefore must not be   
predicated of a ,divine ,being4 ,for    
obvious reasons ,kant has not felt      
called upon to point out the inadequacy 
of this inductive method to the solution
 of ,critical problems4 ,in ,a #db      
,kant1 arguing that our forms of        
intuition are subjective1 claims that   
they do not necessarily belong to all   
beings1 though they must belong to all  
men4#fba ,he is quite consistent in now 
maintaining#fbb that their              
characteristics1 as sensuous and        
derivative1 do not necessarily preclude 
their being the common possession of all
 finite beings4   ,,the ,,paradox ,,of  
,,incongruous ,,counterparts  ,the      
purpose1 as already noted1 of the above 
sections ,,ii4 to ,,iv41 as added in the
 second edition1 is to afford           

#8confirmation' of the ideality of space
 and time4 ,that being so1 it is        
noticeable that ,kant has omitted all   
reference to an argument embodied1 for  
this same purpose1 in  #ac of the       
,prolegomena4 ,the matter is of         
sufficient importance to call for       
detailed consideration4#fbc  ,as the    
argument of the ,prolegomena is somewhat
 complicated1 it is advisable to        
approach it in the light of its history 
in ,kant's earlier writings4 ,it was to 
his teacher ,martin ,knutzen that ,kant 
owed his first introduction to ,newton's
 cosmology2 and from ,knutzen he        
inherited the problem of reconciling    
,newton's mechanical view of nature and 
absolute view of space with the orthodox
 ,leibnizian tenets4 ,in his first      
published work#fbd ,kant seeks to prove 
that the very existence of space is due 
to gravitational force1 and that its    
three-dimensional character is a        
consequence of the specific manner in   
which gravity acts4 ,substances1 he     

teaches1 are unextended4 ,space results 
from the connection and order           
established between them by the         
balancing of their attractive and       
repulsive forces4 ,and as the law of    
gravity is merely contingent1 other     
modes of interaction1 and therefore     
other forms of space1 with more than    
three dimensions1 must be recognised as 
possible4       8,a science of all these
 possible kinds of space would          
undoubtedly      be the highest         
enterprise which a finite understanding 
could      undertake in the field of    
geometry40#fbe  ,in the long interval   
between #agdg and #agfh ,kant continued 
to hold to some such compromise1        
retaining ,leibniz's view that space is 
derivative and relative1 and rejecting  
,newton's view that it is prior to1 and 
pre-conditions1 all the bodies that     
exist in it4 ,but in that latter year he
 published a pamphlet#fbf in which1     
following in the steps of the           
mathematician1 ,euler1#fbg he drew      

attention to certain facts which would  
seem quite conclusively to favour the   
,newtonian as against the ,leibnizian   
interpretation of space4 ,the three     
dimensions of space are primarily       
distinguishable by us only through the  
relation in which they stand to our     
body4 ,by relation to the plane that is 
at right angles to our body we          
distinguish #8above' and #8below'2 and  
similarly through the other two planes  
we determine what is #8right' and       
#8left1' #8in front' and #8behind4'     
,through these distinctions we are      
enabled to define differences which     
cannot be expressed in any other manner4
 ,all species of hops--so ,kant         
maintains--wind themselves around their 
supports from left to right1 whereas all
 species of beans take the opposite     
direction4 ,all snail shells1 with some 
three exceptions1 turn1 in descending   
from their apex downwards1 from left to 
right4 ,this determinate direction of   
movement1 natural to each species1 like 

the difference in spatial configuration 
between a right and a left hand1 or     
between a right hand and its reflection 
in a mirror1 involves in all cases a    
reference of the given object to the    
wider space within which it falls1 and  
ultimately to space as a whole4 ,only so
 can its determinate character be       
distinguished from its opposite         
counterpart4 ,for as ,kant points out1  
though the right and the left hand are  
counterparts1 that is to say1 objects   
which have a common definition so long  
as the arrangement of the parts of each 
is determined in respect to its central 
line of reference1 they are none the    
less inwardly incongruent1 since the one
 can never be made to occupy the space  
of the other4 ,as he adds in the        
,prolegomena1 the glove of one hand     
cannot be used for the other hand4 ,this
 inner incongruence compels us to       
distinguish them as different1 and this 
difference is only determinable by      
location of each in a single absolute   

space that constrains everything within 
it to conform to the conditions which it
 prescribes4 ,in three-dimensional space
 everything must have a right and a left
 side1 and must therefore exhibit such  
inner differences as those just noted4  
,spatial determinations are not1 as     
,leibniz teaches1 subsequent to1 and    
dependent upon1 the relations of bodies 
to one another2 it is the former that   
determine the latter4       8,the reason
 why that which in the shape of a body  
exclusively      concerns its relation  
to pure space can be apprehended by us  
only      through its relation to other 
bodies1 is that absolute space is not   
an object of any outer sensation1 but a 
fundamental conception      which makes 
all such differences possible40#fbh     
,kant enforces his point by arguing that
 if the first portion of creation were a
 human hand1 it would have to be either 
a right or a left hand4 ,also1 a        
different act of creation would be      
demanded according as it was the one or 

the other4 ,but if the hand alone       
existed1 and there were no pre-existing 
space1 there would be no inward         
difference in the relations of its      
parts1 and nothing outside it to        
differentiate it4 ,it would therefore be
 entirely indeterminate in nature1 i4e4 
would suit either side of the body1     
which is impossible4  ,this adoption of 
the ,newtonian view of space in #agfh   
was an important step forward in the    
development of ,kant's teaching1 but    
could not1 in view of the many          
metaphysical difficulties to which it   
leads1 be permanently retained2 and in  
the immediately following year--a year  
which1 as he tells us1#fbi 8gave great  
light0--he achieved the final synthesis 
which enabled him to combine all that he
 felt to be essential in the opposing   
views4 ,though space is an absolute and 
preconditioning source of differences   
which are not conceptually resolvable1  
it is a merely subjective form of our   
sensibility4  ,now it is significant    

that when ,kant expounds this view in   
the ,dissertation of #aggj1 the argument
 from incongruous counterparts is no    
longer employed to establish the        
absolute and pre-conditioning character 
of space1 but only to prove that it is a
 pure non-conceptual intuition4         
8,which things in a given space lie     
towards one side1 and which lie         
towards the other1 cannot by any        
intellectual penetration be             
discursively described or reduced to    
intellectual marks4 ,for in      solids 
that are completely similar and equal1  
but incongruent1 such      as the right 
and the left hand 7conceived solely in  
terms of their      extension71 or      
spherical triangles from two opposite   
hemispheres1      there is a diversity  
which renders impossible the coincidence
 of      their spatial boundaries4 ,this
 holds true1 even though they can be    
substituted for one another in all those
 respects which can be      expressed in
 marks that are capable of being made   

intelligible to      the mind through   
speech4 ,it is therefore evident that   
the      diversity1 that is1 the        
incongruity1 can only be apprehended by 
some species of pure intuition40#fcj    
,there is no mention of this argument in
 the first edition of the ,critique1 and
 when it reappears in the ,prolegomena  
it is interpreted in the light of an    
additional premiss1 and is made to yield
 a very different conclusion from that  
drawn in the ,dissertation1 and a       
directly opposite conclusion from that  
drawn in #agfh4 ,instead of being       
employed to establish either the        
intuitive character of space or its     
absolute existence1 it is cited as      
evidence in proof of its subjectivity4  
,as in #agfh1 it is spoken of as strange
 and paradoxical1 and many of the       
previous illustrations are used4 ,the   
paradox consists in the fact that bodies
 and spherical figures1 conceptually    
considered1 can be absolutely identical1
 and yet for intuition remain diverse4  

,this paradox1 ,kant now maintains#fca  
in opposition to his #agfh argument1    
proves that such bodies and the space   
within which they fall are not          
independent existences4 ,for were they  
things in themselves1 they would be     
adequately cognisable through the pure  
understanding1 and could not therefore  
conflict with its demands4 ,being       
conceptually identical1 they would      
necessarily be congruent in every       
respect4 ,but if space is merely the    
form of sensibility1 the fact that in   
space the part is only possible through 
the whole will apply to everything in   
it1 and so will generate a fundamental  
difference between conception and       
intuition4#fcb ,things in themselves    
are1 as such1 unconditioned1 and cannot1
 therefore1 be dependent upon anything  
beyond themselves4 ,the objects of      
intuition1 in order to be possible1 must
 be merely ideal4  ,now the new premiss 
which differentiates this argument from 
that of #agfh1 and which brings ,kant to

 so opposite a conclusion1 is one which 
is entirely out of harmony with the     
teaching of the ,critique4 ,in this     
section of the ,prolegomena ,kant has   
unconsciously reverted to the dogmatic  
standpoint of the ,dissertation1 and is 
interpreting understanding in the       
illegitimate manner which he so         
explicitly denounces in the section on  
,amphiboly4       8,the mistake 444 lies
 in employing the understanding contrary
 to      its vocation transcendentally  
i4e4 transcendently and in making       
objects1 i4e4 possible intuitions1      
conform to concepts1 not      concepts  
to possible intuitions1 on which alone  
their objective      validity           
rests40#fcc  ,the question why no       
mention of this argument is made in the 
second edition of the ,critique is      
therefore answered4 ,kant had meantime1 
in the interval between #aghc and       
#aghg1fcd become aware of the           
inconsistency of the position4 ,so far  
from being a paradox1 this assumed      

conflict rests upon a false view of the 
function of the understanding4#fce ,the 
relevant facts may serve to confirm the 
view of space as an intuition in which  
the whole precedes the parts2#fcf but   
they can afford no evidence either of   
its absoluteness or of its ideality4 ,in
 #agfh they seem to ,kant to prove its  
absoluteness1 only because the other    
alternative has not yet occurred to him4
 ,in #aghc they seem to him to prove its
 ideality1 only because he has not yet  
completely succeeded in emancipating his
 thinking from the dogmatic rationalism 
of the ,dissertation4  ,as already      
noted1#fcg ,kant's reason for here      
asserting that space is intuitive in    
nature1 namely1 that in it the parts are
 conditioned by the whole1 is also his  
reason for elsewhere describing it as an
 ,idea of ,reason4 ,the further         
implication of the argument of the      
,prolegomena1 that in the noumenal      
sphere the whole is made possible only  
by its unconditioned parts1 raises      

questions the discussion of which must  
be deferred4 ,the problem recurs in the 
,dialectic in connection with ,kant's   
definition of the ,idea of the          
unconditioned4 ,in the ,ideas of ,reason
 ,kant comes to recognise the existence 
of concepts which do not conform to the 
reflective type analysed by the         
traditional logic1 and to perceive that 
these ,ideas can yield a deeper insight 
than any possible to the discursive     
understanding4 ,the above rationalistic 
assumption must not1 therefore1 pass    
unchallenged4 ,it may be that in the    
noumenal sphere all partial realities   
are conditioned by an unconditioned     
whole4         99       99       99     
99       99  ,concluding                
,paragraph4#fch--,the wording of this   
paragraph is in keeping with the        
increased emphasis which in the         
,introduction to the second edition is  
given to the problem1 how a priori      
synthetic judgments are possible4 ,kant 
characteristically fails to distinguish 

between the problems of pure and applied
 mathematics1 with resulting            
inconsecutiveness in his argumentation4 
,,the ,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of  
,,elements     ,,part ,,ii  ,,the       
,,transcendental ,,logic                
,,introduction  ,i4 ,concerning ,logic  
in ,general4--,this ,introduction#fci   
which falls into four divisions1 is     
extremely diffuse1 and contributes      
little that is of more than merely      
architectonic value4 ,it is a repetition
 of the last section of the general     
,introduction1 and of the introductory  
paragraphs of the ,aesthetic1 but takes 
no account of the definitions given in  
either of those two places4 ,it does    
not1 therefore1 seem likely that it     
could have been written in immediate    
sequence upon the ,aesthetic4 ,it is    
probably later than the main body of the
 ,analytic4#fdj ,in any case it is      
externally tacked on to it2 as ,adickes 
has noted1#fda it is completely ignored 
in the opening section of the           

,analytic4#fdb  ,in treating of         
intuition in the first sentence1 ,kant  
seems to have in view only empirical    
intuition4#fdc ,yet he at once proceeds 
to state that intuition may be pure as  
well as empirical4#fdd ,also1 in        
asserting that 8pure intuition contains 
only the form under which something is  
intuited10 ,kant would seem to be       
adopting the view that it does not yield
 its own manifold1 a conclusion which he
 does not1 however1 himself draw4  ,in  
defining sensibility1#fde ,kant again   
ignores pure intuition4 ,sensuous       
intuition1 it is stated1 is the mode in 
which we are affected by objects4#fdf   
,understanding1 in turn1 is defined only
 in its opposition to sensibility1 in   
the ordinary meaning of that term4      
,understanding is the faculty which     
yields thought of the object to which   
sense-affection is due4 ,it is 8the     
power of thinking the object of sensuous
 intuition02 and acts1 it is implied1 in
 and through pure concepts which it     

supplies out of itself4       8,without 
sensibility objects would not be given  
to us i4e4 the      impressions1 in     
themselves merely subjective contents1  
through      which alone independent    
objects can be revealed to us1 would be 
wanting2 without understanding they     
would not be thought by us      i4e4    
they would be apprehended only in the   
form in which they      are given1 viz4 
as subjective modes of our sensibility40
  ,kant has not yet developed the thesis
 which the central argument of the      
,analytic is directed to prove1 namely1 
that save through the combination of    
intuition and conception no             
consciousness whatsoever is possible4   
,in these paragraphs he still implies   
that though concepts without intuition  
are empty they are not meaningless1 and 
that though intuitions without concepts 
are blind they are not empty4#fdg ,their
 union is necessary for genuine         
knowledge1 but not for the existence of 
consciousness as such4       8,it is    

just as necessary to make our concepts  
sensuous1 i4e4 to      add to them their
 object in intuition1 as to make our    
intuitions      intelligible1 i4e4 to   
bring them under concepts40  ,kant's    
final ,critical teaching is very        
different from this4 ,concepts are not  
first given in their purity1 nor is     
8their object0 added in intuition4 ,only
 through concepts is apprehension of an 
object possible1 and only in and through
 such apprehension do concepts come to  
consciousness4 ,nor are intuitions 8made
 intelligible0 by being 8brought under  
concepts40 ,only as thus conceptually   
interpreted can they exist for          
consciousness4 ,the co-operation of     
concept and intuition is necessary for  
consciousness in any and every form1    
even the simplest and most indefinite4  
,consciousness of the subjective is     
possible only in and through            
consciousness of the objective1 and vice
 versa4 ,the dualistic separation of    
sensibility from understanding persists1

 however1 even in ,kant's later         
utterances2 and1 as above stated1#fdh to
 this sharp opposition are due both the 
strength and the weakness of ,kant's    
teaching4 ,intuition and conception     
must1 he here insists1 be carefully     
distinguished4 ,aesthetic is the        
8science of the rules of sensibility in 
general40 ,logic is the 8science of the 
rules of understanding in general40     
,kant's classification of the various   
kinds of logic#fdi may be exhibited as  
follows3                     pure       
general  applied   ,logic  special      
transcendental  ,adickes#fej criticises 
,kant's classification as defective1    
owing to the omission of the            
intermediate concept #8ordinary4'       
,adickes therefore gives the following  
table3                   ,logic         
transcendental        ordinary          
special   general                       
pure  applied                           
,general logic is a logic of elements1  
i4e4 of the absolutely necessary laws of

 thought1 in abstraction from all       
differences in the objects dealt with1  
i4e4 from all content1 whether empirical
 or transcendental4 ,it is a canon of   
the understanding in its general        
discursive or analytic employment4 ,when
 it is pure1 it takes no account of the 
empirical psychological conditions under
 which the understanding has to act4    
,when it is developed as an applied     
logic1 it proceeds to formulate rules   
for the employment of understanding     
under these subjective conditions4 ,it  
is then neither canon1 nor organon1 but 
simply a catharticon of the ordinary    
understanding4 ,special logic is the    
organon of this or that science1 i4e4 of
 the rules governing correct thinking in
 regard to a certain class of objects4  
,only pure general logic is a pure      
doctrine of reason4 ,it alone is        
absolutely independent of sensibility1  
of everything empirical1 and therefore  
of psychology4 ,such pure logic is a    
body of demonstrative teaching1         

completely a priori4 ,it stands to      
applied logic in the same relation as   
pure to applied ethics4       8,some    
logicians1 indeed1 affirm that logic    
presupposes      psychological          
principles4 ,but it is just as          
inappropriate to      bring principles  
of this kind into logic as to derive the
 science      of morals from life4 ,if  
we were to take the principles from     
psychology1 that is1 from observations  
on our understanding1 we      should    
merely see how thought takes place1 and 
how it is      affected by the manifold 
subjective hindrances and conditions2 so
      that this would lead only to the  
knowledge of contingent laws4      ,but 
in logic the question is not of         
contingent1 but of      necessary laws2 
not how we do think1 but how we ought to
 think4      ,the rules of logic1 then1 
must not be derived from the            
contingent1 but from the necessary use  
of the understanding      which without 
any psychology a man finds in himself4  

,in logic we do      not want to know   
how the understanding is and thinks1 and
 how it      has hitherto proceeded in  
thinking1 but how it ought to proceed in
      thinking4 ,its business is to     
teach us the correct use of reason1     
that is1 the use which is consistent    
with itself40#fea  ,by a canon ,kant    
means a system of a priori principles   
for the correct employment of a certain 
faculty of knowledge4#feb ,by an organon
 ,kant means instruction as to how      
knowledge may be extended1 how new      
knowledge may be acquired4 ,a canon     
formulates positive principles through  
the application of which a faculty can  
be directed and disciplined4 ,a canon is
 therefore a discipline based on        
positive principles of correct use4 ,the
 term discipline is1 however1 reserved  
by ,kant#fec to signify a purely        
negative teaching1 which seeks only to  
prevent error and to check the tendency 
to deviate from rules4 ,when a faculty  
has no correct use 7as1 for instance1   

pure speculative reason71 it is subject 
only to a discipline1 not to a canon4 ,a
 discipline is thus 8a separate1        
negative code10 8a system of caution and
 self-examination40 ,it is further      
distinguished from a canon by its taking
 account of other than purely a priori  
conditions4 ,it is related to a pure    
canon much as applied is related to     
general logic4 ,as a canon supplies     
principles for the directing of a       
faculty1 its distinction from an organon
 obviously cannot be made hard and fast4
 ,but here as elsewhere ,kant1 though   
rigorous and almost pedantic in the     
drawing of distinctions1 is             
correspondingly careless in their       
application4 ,he describes special logic
 as the organon of this or that         
science4#fed ,we should expect from the 
definition given in the preceding       
sentence that it would rather be viewed 
as a canon4 ,in ,a #df  ,b #fc ,kant    
speaks of the ,aesthetic as an organon4 
,,ii4 ,concerning ,transcendental       

,logic4--,it is with the distinction    
between general and transcendental logic
 that ,kant is chiefly concerned4 ,it is
 a distinction which he has himself     
invented1 and which is of fundamental   
importance for the purposes of the      
,critique4 ,transcendental logic is the 
new science which he seeks to expound in
 this second main division of the       
,doctrine of ,elements4 ,the            
distinction1 from which all the         
differences between the two sciences    
follow1 is that while general logic     
abstracts from all differences in the   
objects known1 transcendental logic     
abstracts only from empirical content4  
,on the supposition1 not yet proved by  
,kant1 but asserted in anticipation1    
that there exist pure a priori concepts 
which are valid of objects1 there will  
exist a science distinct in nature and  
different in purpose from general logic4
 ,the two logics will agree in being a  
priori1 but otherwise they will differ  
in all essential respects4  ,the        

reference in ,a #ee  ,b #gi to the forms
 of intuition is somewhat ambiguous4    
,kant might be taken as meaning that in 
transcendental logic abstraction is made
 not only from everything empirical but 
also from all intuition4 ,that is not1  
however1 ,kant's real view1 or at least 
not his final view4 ,in sections ,a     
#gf-g  ,b #ajb1 ,a #acj-a  ,b #agj1 and 
,a #ace-f  ,b #agd-e1 which are probably
 all of later origin1 he states his     
position in the clearest terms4         
,transcendental logic1 he there         
declares1 differs from general logic in 
that it is not called upon to abstract  
from the pure a priori manifolds of     
intuition4#fee ,this involves1 it may be
 noted1 the recognition1 so much more   
pronounced in the later developments of 
,kant's ,critical teaching1 of space and
 time as not merely forms for the       
apprehension of sensuous manifolds but  
as themselves presenting to the mind    
independent manifolds of a priori       
nature4  ,as the term transcendental    

indicates1 the new logic will have as   
its central problems the origin1 scope1 
conditions and possibility of valid a   
priori knowledge of objects4 ,none of   
these problems are treated in general   
logic1 which deals only with the        
understanding itself4 ,the question     
which it raises is1 as ,kant says in his
 ,logic1#fef ,how can the understanding 
know itself8 ,the question dealt with by
 transcendental logic we may formulate  
in a corresponding way3 ,how can the    
understanding possess pure a priori     
knowledge of objects8 ,it is a canon of 
pure understanding in so far as that    
faculty is capable of synthetic1        
objective knowledge a priori4#feg       
,general logic involves1 it is true1 the
 idea of reference to objects1#feh but  
the possibility of such reference is not
 itself investigated4 ,in general logic 
the understanding deals only with       
itself4 ,it assumes indeed that all     
objects must conform to its laws1 but   
this assumption plays no part in the    

science itself4  ,a further point1 not  
here dwelt upon by ,kant1 calls for     
notice1 namely1 that the activities of  
understanding dealt with by general     
logic are its merely discursive         
activities1--those of discrimination and
 comparison2 whereas those dealt with by
 transcendental logic are the           
originative activities through which it 
produces a priori concepts from within  
itself1 and through which it attains1   
independently of experience1 to an a    
priori determination of objects4        
,otherwise stated1 general logic deals  
only with analytic thinking1            
transcendental logic with the synthetic 
activities that are involved in the     
generation of the complex contents which
 form the subject matter of the analytic
 procedure4  ,,iii4 ,concerning the     
,division of ,general ,logic into       
,analytic and ,dialectic4#fei--,the     
following passage from ,kant's          
,logic#ffj forms an excellent and       
sufficient comment upon the first four  

paragraphs of this section3       8,an  
important perfection of knowledge1 nay1 
the essential and      inseparable      
condition of all its perfection1 is     
truth4 ,truth is      said to consist in
 the agreement of knowledge with the    
object4      ,according to this merely  
verbal definition1 then1 my knowledge1  
in      order to be true1 must agree    
with the object4 ,now ,i can only       
compare the object with my knowledge by 
this means1 namely by      having       
knowledge of it4 ,my knowledge1 then1 is
 to be verified by      itself1 which is
 far from being sufficient for truth4   
,for as the      object is external to  
me1 ,i can only judge whether my        
knowledge of      the object agrees with
 my knowledge of the object4 ,such a    
circle in      explanation was called by
 the ancients ,diallelos4 ,and1 indeed1 
the      logicians were accused of this 
fallacy by the sceptics1 who            
remarked that this account of truth was 
as if a man before a      judicial      

tribunal should make a statement1 and   
appeal in support of      it to a       
witness whom no one knows1 but who      
defends his own      credibility by     
saying that the man who had called him  
as a witness      is an honourable man4 
,the charge was certainly well-founded4 
,the      solution of the problem       
referred to is1 however1 absolutely     
impossible for any man4       8,the     
question is in fact this3 whether and   
how far there is a      certain1        
universal1 and practically applicable   
criterion of truth4      ,for this is   
the meaning of the question1 ,what is   
truth8444       8,a universal material  
criterion of truth is not possible2 the 
phrase is indeed self-contradictory4    
,for being universal it would           
necessarily abstract from all           
distinction of objects1 and yet being   
a material criterion1 it must be        
concerned with just this                
distinction in order to be able to      
determine whether a cognition           

agrees with the very object to which it 
refers1 and not merely with      some   
object or other1 by which nothing would 
be said4 ,but      material truth must  
consist in this agreement of a cognition
 with      the definite object to which 
it refers4 ,for a cognition which is    
true in reference to one object may be  
false in reference to other             
objects4 ,it is therefore absurd to     
demand a universal material             
criterion of truth1 which is at once to 
abstract and not to      abstract from  
all distinction of objects4       8,but 
if we ask for a universal formal        
criterion of truth1 it is      very easy
 to decide that there may be such a     
criterion4 ,for formal      truth       
consists simply in the agreement of the 
cognition with itself      when we      
abstract from all objects whatever1 and 
from every      distinction of objects4 
,and hence the universal formal criteria
 of      truth are nothing but universal
 logical marks of agreement of          

cognitions with themselves1 or1 what is 
the same thing1 with the      general   
laws of the understanding and the       
,reason4 ,these formal      universal   
criteria are certainly not sufficient   
for objective      truth1 but yet they  
are to be viewed as its conditio sine   
qua      non4 ,for before the question1 
whether the cognition agrees with       
the object1 must come the question1     
whether it agrees with itself      7as  
to form74 ,and this is the business of  
logic40#ffa  ,the remaining             
paragraphs#ffb of ,section ,,iii4 may   
similarly be compared with the following
 passage from an earlier section of     
,kant's ,logic3#ffc       8,analytic    
discovers1 by means of analysis1 all the
 activities of      reason which we     
exercise in thought4 ,it is therefore an
 analytic of      the form of           
understanding and of ,reason1 and is    
justly called the      logic of truth1  
since it contains the necessary rules of
 all      7formal7 truth1 without which 

truth our knowledge is untrue in        
itself1 even apart from its objects4 ,it
 is therefore nothing more      than a  
canon for deciding on the formal        
correctness of our      knowledge4      
8,should we desire to use this merely   
theoretical and general      doctrine as
 a practical art1 that is1 as an        
organon1 it would      become a         
dialectic1 i4e4 a logic of semblance    
7ars sophistica      disputatoria71     
arising out of an abuse of the analytic1
 inasmuch      as by the mere logical   
form there is contrived the semblance of
      true knowledge1 the characters of 
which must1 on the contrary1 be         
derived from agreement with objects1 and
 therefore from the      content4       
8,in former times dialectic was studied 
with great diligence4 ,this      art    
presented false principles in the       
semblance of truth1 and      sought1 in 
accordance with these1 to maintain      
things in semblance4      ,amongst the  
,greeks the dialecticians were advocates

 and      rhetoricians who could lead   
the populace wherever they chose1       
because the populace lets itself be     
deluded with semblance4      ,dialectic 
was therefore at that time the art of   
semblance4 ,in      logic1 also1 it was 
for a long time treated under the name  
of the      art of disputation1 and     
during that period all logic and        
philosophy was the cultivation by       
certain chatterboxes of the art      of 
semblance4 ,but nothing can be more     
unworthy of a philosopher      than the 
cultivation of such an art4 ,dialectic  
in this form1      therefore1 must be   
altogether suppressed1 and instead of it
 there      must be introduced into     
logic a critical examination of this    
semblance4       8,we should then have  
two parts of logic3 the analytic1 which 
will      treat of the formal criteria  
of truth1 and the dialectic1 which      
will contain the marks and rules by     
which we can know that      something   
does not agree with the formal criteria 

of truth1      although it seems to     
agree with them4 ,dialectic in this form
 would      have its use as a cathartic 
of the understanding40  ,dialectic is   
thus interpreted in a merely negative   
sense4 ,it is1 ,kant says1 a            
catharticon4 ,so far from being an      
organon1 it is not even a canon4 ,it is 
merely a discipline4#ffd ,by this manner
 of defining dialectic ,kant causes some
 confusion4 ,it does not do justice to  
the scope and purpose of that section of
 the ,critique to which it gives its    
name4#ffe  ,,iv4 ,concerning the        
,division of ,transcendental ,logic into
 ,transcendental ,analytic and          
,dialectic4--,the term object#fff is    
used throughout this section in two     
quite distinct senses4 ,in the second   
and third sentences it is employed in   
its wider meaning as equivalent to      
content or matter4 ,in the fourth       
sentence it is used in the narrower and 
stricter sense1 more proper to the term1
 namely1 as meaning #8thing4' ,again1 in

 the fifth sentence content 7,inhalt7   
would seem to be identified with object 
in the narrower sense1 while in the     
sixth sentence matter 7,materie1 a      
synonym for content7 appears to be      
identified with object in the wider     
sense4 ,transcendental ,dialectic1 in   
accordance with the above account of its
 logical correlate1 is defined in a     
manner which does justice only to the   
negative side of its teaching4 ,its     
function is viewed as merely that of    
protecting the pure understanding       
against sophistical illusions4#ffg      
,,the ,,transcendental ,,logic          
,,division ,i  ,,the ,,transcendental   
,,analytic   ,the chief point of this   
section#ffh lies in its insistence that1
 as the ,analytic is concerned only with
 the pure understanding1 the a priori   
concepts with which it deals must form a
 unity or system4 ,understanding is     
viewed as a separate faculty1 and       
virtually hypostatised4 ,as a separate  
faculty1 it must1 it is implied1 be an  

independent unity1 self-containing and  
complete4 ,its concepts are determined  
in number1 constitution1 and            
interrelation1 by its inherent          
character4 ,they originate independently
 of all differences in the material     
which they are employed to organise4    
,,book ,i  ,,the ,,analytic ,,of        
,,concepts   ,introductory              
,paragraph4--,kant's view of the        
understanding as a separate faculty is  
in evidence again in this paragraph4#ffi
 ,the ,analytic is a 8dissection of the 
faculty of the understanding40 ,a priori
 concepts are to be sought nowhere but  
in the understanding itself1 as their   
birthplace4 ,there 8they lie ready till 
at last1 on the occasion of experience1 
they become developed40 ,but such       
statements fail to do justice to ,kant's
 real teaching4 ,they would seem to     
reveal the persisting influence of the  
pre-,critical standpoint of the         
,dissertation4     ,,chapter ,i  ,,the  
,,clue ,,to ,,the ,,discovery ,,of ,,all

 ,,pure ,,concepts ,,of ,,the           
,,understanding   ,that the             
understanding is 8an absolute unity0 is 
repeated4 ,from this assertion1 thus    
dogmatically made1 without even an      
attempt at argument1 ,kant deduces the  
important conclusion that the pure      
concepts1 originating from such a       
source1 8must be connected with each    
other according to one concept or idea  
7,begriff oder ,idee740 ,and he adds the
 equally unproved assertion3       8,but
 such a connection supplies a rule by   
which we are enabled to      assign its 
proper place to each pure concept of the
 understanding      and by which we can 
determine in an a priori manner their   
systematic completeness4 ,otherwise we  
should be dependent in these            
matters on our own discretionary        
judgment or merely on chance40  ,in the 
next section he sets himself to discover
 from an examination of analytic        
thinking what this rule or principle    
actually is1 and in so doing he for the 

first time discloses1 in any degree at  
all adequate1 the real nature of the    
position which he is seeking to develop4
 ,he connects the required principle    
with the nature of the act of judging1  
considered as a function of unity4      
,section ,i4 ,the ,logical ,use of the  
,understanding4--,this section1#fgj     
viewed as introductory to the           
metaphysical deduction of the           
categories1 is extremely unsatisfactory4
 ,it directs attention to the wrong     
points1 and conceals rather than defines
 ,kant's real position4 ,its            
argumentation is also contorted and     
confused1 and only by the most patient  
analysis can it be straightened out4    
,the commentator has presented to him a 
twofold task from which there is no     
escape4 ,he must render the argument    
consistent by such modification as will 
harmonise it with ,kant's later and more
 deliberate positions1 and he must      
explain why ,kant has presented it in   
this misleading manner4  ,the title of  

the section would seem to imply that    
only the discursive activities of       
understanding are to be dealt with4     
,that is1 indeed1 in the main true4     
,confusion results1 however1 from the   
clashing of this avowed intention with  
the ultimate purpose in view of which   
the argument is propounded4 ,kant is    
seeking to prove that we can derive from
 the more accessible procedure of the   
discursive understanding a clue         
sufficient for determining those        
pre-logical activities which have to be 
postulated in terms of his new          
,copernican hypothesis4 ,but though that
 is the real intention of this section1 
it has1 unfortunately1 not been         
explicitly recognised1 and can be       
divined by the reader only after he has 
mastered the later portions of the      
,analytic4 ,kant's argument has also the
 further defect that no sufficient      
statement is given either of the nature 
of the discursive concept or of its     
relation to judgment4 ,these lacunae we 

must fill out as best we can from his   
utterances elsewhere4 ,i shall first    
state ,kant's view of the distinction   
between discursive and synthetic        
thinking1 and then examine his treatment
 of the nature of the concept and of its
 relation to judgment4  ,as already     
noted1#fga the distinction between      
transcendental and general logic marks  
for ,kant all-important differences in  
the use of the understanding4 ,in the   
one employment the understanding1 by    
creative synthetic activities1 generates
 from the given manifold the complex    
objects of sense-experience4 ,in so     
doing it interprets and organises the   
manifold through concepts which         
originate from within itself4 ,by the   
other it discriminates and compares1 and
 thereby derives from the content of    
sense-experience the generic concepts of
 the traditional logic4 ,now ,kant would
 seem to argue in this section that if  
the difference in the origin of the     
concepts in those two cases be left out 

of account1 and if we attend only to the
 quite general character of their       
respective activities1 they will be     
found to agree in one fundamental       
feature1 namely1 that they express      
functions of unity4 ,each is based on   
the spontaneity of thought--on the      
spontaneity of synthetic interpretation 
on the one hand1 of discrimination and  
comparison on the other4 ,this feature  
common to the two types of activity can 
be further defined as being the unity of
 the act whereby a multiplicity is      
comprehended under a single             
representation4 ,in the judgment 8every 
metal is a body0 the variety of metals  
is reduced to unity through the concept 
body4 ,in an analogous manner the       
synthetic understanding organises a     
manifold of intuition through some such 
form of unity as that of substance and  
attribute4 ,that is the category which  
underlies the above proposition1 and    
which renders possible the specific     
unity of the total judgment4 ,to quote  

the sentence with which in a later      
section ,kant introduces his table of   
categories3       8,the same            
understanding1 and by the same          
operations by which in      concepts1 by
 means of analytic unity1 it has        
produced the logical      form of a     
judgment1 introduces1 by means of the   
synthetic unity of      the manifold in 
intuition in general1 a transcendental  
element into      its                   
representations44440#fgb  ,now ,kant's  
exposition is extremely misleading4 ,as 
his later utterances show1 his real     
argument is by no means that which is   
here given4 ,we shall have occasion to  
observe that ,kant is unable to prove1  
and does not ultimately profess to      
prove1 that it is 8the same             
understanding10 and still less that it  
is 8the same operations10 which are     
exercised in discursive and in creative 
thinking4 ,but this is a criticism which
 it would be premature to introduce at  
this stage4 ,we must proceed to it by   

way of preliminary analysis of the above
 exposition4 ,kant's argument does not  
rest upon any such analogy as that just 
drawn1 between the concepts formed by   
consciously comparing contents and the  
concepts which originate from within the
 understanding itself4 ,both1 it is     
true1 are functions of unity1 but       
otherwise there is1 according to ,kant's
 own teaching1 not the least resemblance
 between them4 ,a generic or abstract   
concept expresses common qualities found
 in each of a number of complex         
contents4 ,it is itself a content4 ,a   
category1 on the other hand1 is always a
 function of unity whereby contents are 
interpreted4 ,it is not a content1 but a
 form for the organisation of           
content4#fgc ,it can gain expression    
only in the total act of judging1 not in
 any one element such as the discursive 
concept4 ,but though the analogy drawn  
by ,kant thus breaks down1 his argument 
is continued in a new and very different
 form4 ,it is no longer made to rest on 

any supposed resemblance between        
discursive and creative thinking1       
regarded as co-ordinate and independent 
activities4 ,it now consists in the     
proof that the former presupposes and is
 conditioned by the latter4 ,through    
study of the understanding in its more  
accessible discursive procedure1 we may 
hope to discover the synthetic forms    
according to which it has proceeded in  
its pre-logical activities4 ,when we    
determine the various forms of analytic 
judgment1 the categories which are      
involved in synthetic thinking reveal   
themselves to consciousness4  ,thus in  
spite of ,kant's insistence upon the    
conceptual predicate1 and upon the unity
 to which it gives expression1          
immediately he proceeds to the deduction
 of the categories1 the emphasis is     
shifted to the unity which underlies the
 judgment as a whole4 ,what constitutes 
such propositions as 8all bodies are    
divisible10 8every metal is a body10 a  
unique and separate type of judgment is 

not the character of the predicate1 but 
the category of substance and attribute 
whereby the predicate is related to the 
subject4 ,to that category they owe     
their specific form2 and it is a        
function of unity for which the         
discursive understanding can never      
account4 ,as ,kant states in the        
,prolegomena1 if genuine judgments1 that
 is1 judgments that are 8objectively    
valid10 are analysed1       8444it will 
be found that they never consist of mere
 intuitions      connected only 7as is  
commonly believed7 by comparison in a   
judgment4 ,they would be impossible were
 not a pure concept of the              
understanding superadded to the concepts
 abstracted from      intuition4 ,the   
abstract concepts are subsumed under a  
pure concept1      and in this manner   
only can they be connected in an        
objectively      valid judgment40#fgd   
,thus the analogy between discursive and
 a priori concepts is no sooner drawn   
than it is set aside as irrelevant4     

,though generic concepts rest upon      
functions of unity1 and though 7as we   
shall see immediately7 they exist only  
as factors in the total act of judging1 
there is otherwise not the least        
resemblance between them and the        
categories4#fge ,the clue to the        
categories is not to be found in the    
inherent characteristics of analytic    
thinking1 or of its specific products   
7namely1 concepts71 but solely in what1 
after all abstraction1 it must still    
retain from the products which synthetic
 thinking creates4 ,each type of        
analytic judgment will be found on      
examination to involve some specific    
function whereby the conceptual factors 
are related to1 and unified with1 the   
other elements in the judgment4 ,this   
function of unity is in each case an a  
priori category of the understanding4   
,that is the thesis which underlies the 
concluding sentence of this section4    
8,the functions of the understanding    
i4e4 the a priori concepts      of      

understanding can be discovered in their
 completeness1 if it is      possible to
 state exhaustively the functions of    
unity i4e4 the      forms of relation in
 judgments40  ,the adoption of such a   
position involves1 it may be noted1 the 
giving up of the assertion1 which is so 
emphatically made in the passage above  
quoted1 that it is by the same          
activities that the understanding       
discursively forms abstract concepts and
 creatively organises the manifold of   
sense4 ,that is in no respect true4     
,there is no real identity--there is not
 even analogy--between the processes of 
comparison and abstraction on the one   
hand and those of synthetic             
interpretation on the other4 ,the former
 are merely reflective3 the latter are  
genuinely creative4 ,discursive         
activities are conscious processes1 and 
are under our control3 the synthetic    
processes1 are non-conscious2 only their
 finished products appear within the    
conscious field4 ,this1 however1 is to  

anticipate a conclusion which was among 
the last to be realised by ,kant        
himself1 namely that there is no proof  
that these two types of activity are    
ascribable to one and the same source4  
,the synthetic activities--as he himself
 finally came to hold--are due to a     
faculty of imagination4                 
8,synthesis in general 444 is the mere  
result of the power of      imagination1
 a blind but indispensable function of  
the soul1      without which we should  
have no knowledge whatsoever1 but of    
which      we are scarcely ever         
conscious40#fgf  ,this sentence occurs  
in a passage which is undoubtedly a     
later interpolation4#fgg ,the 8scarcely 
ever0 7selten nur einmal7 indicates     
,kant's lingering reluctance to         
recognise this fundamental fact1        
destructive of so much in his earlier   
views1 even though it completes and     
reinforces his chief ultimate           
conclusions4 ,with this admission ,kant 
also gives up his sole remaining ground 

for the contention that there must be a 
complete parallelism between discursive 
and creative thinking4 ,if they arise   
from such different sources1 we have no 
right to assume1 without specific proof1
 that they must coincide in the forms of
 their activity4 ,this is a point to    
which we shall return in discussing     
,kant's formulation of the principle    
which is supposed to guarantee the      
completeness of the table of categories4
  ,this unavowed change in point of view
 is the main cause of confusion in this 
section4 ,its other defects are chiefly 
those of omission4 ,kant fails to       
develop in sufficient detail his view of
 the nature of the discursive concept1  
or to make sufficiently clear the       
grounds for his assertion that          
conception as an activity of the        
understanding is identical with         
judgment4 ,to take the former point     
first4 ,kant's mode of viewing the      
discursive concept finds expression in  
the following passage in the            

,introduction to his ,logic3#fgh        
8,human knowledge is on the side of the 
understanding discursive2      that is1 
it takes place by means of ideas which  
make what is common      to many things 
the ground of knowledge3 and hence by   
means of      attributes as such4 ,we   
therefore cognise things only by means  
of      attributes4 ,an attribute is    
that in a thing which constitutes part  
of our cognition of it2 or1 what is the 
same1 a partial conception      so far  
as it is considered as a ground of      
cognition of the whole      conception4 
,all our concepts1 therefore1 are       
attributes1 and all      thought is     
nothing but conception by means of      
attributes40  ,the limitations of       
,kant's view of the concept could hardly
 find more definite expression4 ,the    
only type of judgment which receives    
recognition is the categorical1         
interpreted in the traditional          
manner4#fgi       8,to compare something
 as a mark with a thing1 is called #8to 

judge4'      ,the thing itself is the   
subject1 the mark or attribute is the   
predicate4 ,the comparison is expressed 
by the word #8is1' 444 which      when  
used without qualification indicates    
that the predicate is a      mark or    
attribute of the subject1 but when      
combined with the sign      of negation 
states that the predicate is a mark     
opposed to the      subject40#fhj       
,kant's view of analytic thinking is    
entirely dominated by the               
substance-attribute teaching of the     
traditional logic4 ,a concept must1 in  
its connotation1 be an abstracted       
attribute1 and in its denotation        
represent a class4 ,relational thinking1
 and the concepts of relation1 are      
ignored4 ,thus1 in the ,aesthetic1 as we
 have already noted1#fha ,kant maintains
 that since space and time are not      
generic class concepts they must be     
intuitions4 ,this argument1 honestly    
employed by ,kant1 shows how completely 
unconscious he was of the revolutionary 

consequences of his new standpoint4     
,even in the very act of insisting upon 
the relational character of the         
categories1 he still continues to speak 
of the concept as if it must necessarily
 conform to the generic type4 ,in this1 
as in so many other respects1           
transcendental logic is not1 as he would
 profess1 supplementary to general      
logic2 it is its tacit recantation4     
,modern logic1 as developed by ,lotze1  
,sigwart1 ,bradley1 and ,bosanquet1 is1 
in large part1 the recasting of general 
logic in terms of the results reached by
 ,kant's transcendental enquiries4      
,meantime1 sufficient has been said to  
indicate the strangely limited character
 of ,kant's doctrine of the logical     
concept4  ,but on one fundamental point 
,kant breaks entirely free from the     
traditional logic4 ,the following       
passage occurs in the above-quoted      
pamphlet on ,the ,mistaken ,subtlety of 
the ,four ,syllogistic ,figures3        
8,it is clear that in the ordinary      

treatment of logic there is a           
serious error in that distinct and      
complete concepts are treated           
before judgments and ratiocinations1    
although the former are only            
possible by means of the latter40 8,i   
say1 then1 first1 that a      distinct  
concept is possible only by means of a  
judgment1 a      complete concept only  
by means of a ratiocination4 ,in fact1  
in      order that a concept should be  
distinct1 ,i must clearly recognise     
something as an attribute of a thing1   
and this is a judgment4 ,in      order  
to have a distinct concept of body1 ,i  
clearly represent to      myself        
impenetrability as an attribute of it4  
,now this      representation is nothing
 but the thought1 #8a body is           
impenetrable4' ,here it is to be        
observed that this judgment is not      
the distinct concept itself1 but is the 
act by which it is      realised2 for   
the idea of the thing which arises after
 this act is      distinct4 ,it is easy 

to show that a complete concept is only 
possible by means of a ratiocination3   
for this it is sufficient to      refer 
to the first section of this essay4 ,we 
might say1 therefore1      that a       
distinct concept is one which is made   
clear by a judgment1      and a complete
 concept one which is made distinct by a
      ratiocination4 ,if the            
completeness is of the first degree1 the
      ratiocination is simple2 if of the
 second or third degree1 it is      only
 possible by means of a chain of        
reasoning which the      understanding  
abridges in the manner of a sorites4444 
,secondly1 as      it is quite evident  
that the completeness of a concept and  
its      distinctness do not require    
different faculties of the mind 7since  
the same capacity which recognises      
something immediately as an             
attribute in a thing is also employed to
 recognise in this      attribute       
another attribute1 and thus to conceive 
the thing by      means of a remote     

attribute71 so also it is evident that  
understanding and reason1 that is1 the  
power of cognising      distinctly and  
the power of forming ratiocinations1 are
 not      different faculties4 ,both    
consist in the power of judging1 but    
when      we judge mediately we         
reason40#fhb  ,in the section before us 
this same standpoint is maintained1 but 
is expressed in a much less satisfactory
 manner4 ,concepts are no longer spoken 
of as complete judgments4 ,in the above 
passages ,kant always speaks of the     
concept as the subject of the           
proposition2 it is now treated only as a
 predicate4#fhc ,this difference is     
significant4 ,the concept as subject can
 represent the judgment as a whole 7or  
at least it does so from the traditional
 standpoint to which ,kant holds72 the  
concept as predicate is merely one      
element1 even though it be a unifying   
element1 in the total act of judging4   
,this falling away from his own maturer 
standpoint would seem to be due to      

,kant's lack of clearness as to the     
nature of the analogy which he is here  
drawing between analytic and synthetic  
thinking4 ,it is connected with his     
mistaken1 and merely temporary1         
comparison of a priori with discursive  
concepts4 ,his position in #agfb alone  
harmonises with his essential teaching4 
,now1 as then1 he is prepared to view   
judgment as the sole ultimate activity  
of the understanding1 and therefore to  
define understanding as the faculty of  
judging4  ,but the new ,critical        
standpoint compels ,kant to reinterpret 
this definition in a manner which       
involves a still more radical           
transformation of the traditional       
doctrine4 ,the categories constitute a  
unique type of concept1 and condition   
the processes of discursive thought4    
,they are embodied in the complex       
contents from which analytic thinking   
starts2 and however far the processes of
 discursive comparison and abstraction  
be carried1 one or other of these       

categories must still persist1          
determining the form which the analytic 
judgment is to take4 ,the categorical   
judgment can formulate itself only by   
means of the a priori concept of subject
 and attribute1 the hypothetical only by
 means of the pure concept of ground and
 consequence1 and so with the others4   
,and there are in consequence just as   
many categories as there are forms of   
the analytic judgment4 ,this is how the 
principle of the metaphysical deduction 
must be interpreted when the later and  
deeper results of the transcendental    
deduction are properly taken into       
account4 ,in deducing the forms of the  
understanding from the modes of         
discursive judgment ,kant is virtually  
maintaining that analytic judgment      
involves the same problems as does      
judgment of the synthetic type4 ,the    
categories can be derived from the forms
 of discursive judgment only because    
they are the conditions in and through  
which it becomes possible4  ,but though 

,kant1 both here and in the central     
portions of the ,analytic1 seems to be  
on the very brink of this conclusion1 it
 is never explicitly drawn4 ,as we shall
 see1#fhd it would have involved the    
further admission that there is no      
absolute guarantee of the completeness  
of the table of categories1 and no      
satisfactory method of determining their
 interrelations4 ,to the very last      
general logic is isolated from          
transcendental logic4 ,the ,critical    
enquiry is formulated as if it concerned
 only such judgments as are explicitly  
synthetic4 ,the principle of the        
metaphysical deduction is not1          
therefore1 stated by ,kant himself in   
the above manner2 and we have still to  
decide the difficult question as to what
 the principle employed by ,kant in the 
deduction actually is4  ,kant makes a   
twofold demand upon the principle4 ,it  
must enable us to discover the          
categories1 and it must also in so doing
 enable us to view them as together     

forming a systematic whole1 and so as   
having their completeness guaranteed by 
other than merely empirical             
considerations4 ,the principle is stated
 sometimes in a broader and sometimes in
 a more specific form2 for on this point
 also ,kant speaks with no very certain 
voice4#fhe ,the broader formulation of  
the principle is that all acts of       
understanding are judgments1 and that   
therefore the possible ultimate a priori
 forms of understanding are identical   
with the possible ultimate forms of the 
judgment4#fhf ,the more specific and    
correct formulation is that to every    
form of analytic judgment there         
corresponds a pure concept of           
understanding4 ,the first statement of  
the principle is obviously inadequate4  
,it merely reformulates the problem as  
being a problem not of conception but of
 judgment4 ,if a principle is required  
to guarantee the completeness of our    
list of a priori concepts1 it will      
equally be required to guarantee the    

completeness of our list of judgments4  
,even if the above principle be more    
explicitly formulated1 as in the        
,prolegomena1#fhg where judging is      
defined as the act of understanding     
which comprises all its other acts1 it  
will not enable us to guarantee the     
completeness of any list of the forms of
 judgment or to determine their         
systematic interrelation4 ,we are       
therefore thrown back upon the second   
view4 ,this1 however1 only brings us    
face to face with the further question1 
what principle guarantees the           
completeness of the table of analytic   
judgments4 ,and to that query ,kant has 
absolutely no answer4 ,the reader's     
questionings break vainly upon his      
invincible belief in the adequacy and   
finality of the classification yielded  
by the traditional logic4  ,the fons et 
origo of all the confusions and         
obscurities of this section are thus    
traceable to ,kant's attitude towards   
formal logic4 ,he might criticise it for

 ignoring the interdependence of        
conception1 judgment1 and reasoning2 he 
might reject the second1 third1 and     
fourth syllogistic figures2 and he might
 even admit that its classification of  
the forms of judgment is not as explicit
 as might be desired2 but however many  
provisos he made and defects he         
acknowledged1 they were to him merely   
minor matters1 and he accepted its      
teaching as complete and final4 ,this   
unwavering faith in the fundamental     
distinctions of the traditional logic   
was indeed1 as we shall have constant   
occasion to observe1 an ever present    
influence in determining alike the      
general framework and much of the detail
 of ,kant's ,critical teaching4 ,the    
defects of the traditional logic were   
very clearly indicated in his own       
transcendental logic4 ,he showed that   
synthetic thinking is fundamental2 that 
by its distinctions the forms and       
activities of analytic thought are      
predetermined2 that judgment in its     

various forms can be understood only by 
a regress upon the synthetic concepts to
 which these forms are due2 that notions
 are not merely of the generic type1 but
 that there are also categories of      
relation4 ,none the less1 to the very   
last1 ,kant persisted in regarding      
general logic as a separate discipline1 
and as quite adequate in its current    
form4 ,he continued to ignore the fact  
that the analytic judgment1 no less than
 the synthetic judgment1 demands a      
transcendental justification4  ,the     
resulting situation is strangely        
perverse4 ,in the very act of           
revolutionising the traditional logic1  
,kant relies upon its prestige and upon 
the assumed finality of its results to  
make good the shortcomings of the logic 
which is to displace it4 ,by ,kant's own
 admission transcendental logic is      
incapable of guaranteeing that          
completeness upon which1 throughout the 
whole ,critique1 so great an emphasis is
 laid4 ,general logic is allowed an     

independent status1 sufficient to       
justify its authority being appealed to2
 and the principle which is supposed to 
guarantee the completeness of the table 
of categories is so formulated as to    
contain no suggestion of the dependence 
of discursive upon synthetic thinking4  
,formal logic1 ,kant would seem to hold1
 can supply a criterion for the         
classification of the ultimate forms of 
judgment just because its task is       
relatively simple1 and is independent of
 all epistemological views as to the    
nature1 scope1 and conditions of the    
thought process4 ,since formal logic is 
a completed and perfectly a priori      
science1 which has stood the test of    
#bjjj years1 and remains practically    
unchanged to the present day1 its       
results can be accepted as final1 and   
can be employed without question in all 
further enquiries4 ,analytic thinking is
 scientifically treated in general      
logic2 the ,critique is concerned only  
with the possibility and conditions of  

synthetic judgment4 ,the table of       
analytic judgments therefore supplies a 
complete and absolutely guaranteed list 
of the possible categories of the       
understanding4 ,but the perverseness of 
this whole procedure is shown by the    
manner in which1 as we shall find1 ,kant
 recasts1 extends1 or alters1 to suit   
his own purposes1 the actual teaching of
 the traditional logic4  ,as noted      
above1#fhh the asserted parallelism of  
analytic and synthetic judgment rests   
upon the further assumption that        
discursive thinking and synthetic       
interpretation are the outcome of one   
and the same faculty of understanding4  
,it is implied1 in accordance with the  
attitude of the pre-,critical           
,dissertation1 that understanding1      
viewed as the faculty to which all      
thought processes are due1 has certain  
laws in accordance with which it        
necessarily acts in all its operations1 
and that these must therefore be        
discoverable from analytic no less than 

from synthetic thinking4 ,the mingling  
of truth and falsity in this assumption 
has already been indicated4 ,such truth 
as it contains is due to the fact that  
analytic thinking is not co-ordinate    
with1 but is dependent upon1 and        
determined by1 the forms of synthetic   
thinking4 ,its falsity consists in its  
ignoring of what thus gives it partial  
truth4 ,the results of the              
transcendental deduction call for a     
complete recasting of the entire        
argument of the metaphysical deduction4 
,and when this is done1 there is no     
longer any ground for the contention    
that the number of the categories is    
determinable on a priori grounds4 ,on   
,kant's own fundamental doctrine of the 
synthetic1 and therefore merely de      
facto1 character of all a priori        
principles1 the necessity of the        
categories is only demonstrable by      
reference to the contingent fact of     
actual experience4 ,the possible        
conceptual forms are relative to actual 

and ultimate differences in the         
contingent sensuous material2 and being 
thus relative1 they cannot possibly be  
systematised on purely a priori grounds4
 ,this ,kant has himself admitted in a  
passage added in the second edition1#fhi
 though apparently without full         
consciousness of the important          
consequences which must follow4         
8,this peculiarity of our understanding 
that it can produce a      priori unity 
of apperception solely by means of the  
categories1      and only by such and so
 many1 is as little capable of further  
explanation as why we have just these   
and no other functions of      judgment1
 or why space and time are the only     
forms of our possible      intuition40  
,,stages ,,in ,,the ,,development ,,of  
,,kant',s ,,metaphysical ,,deduction    
,the character of the metaphysical      
deduction will be placed in a clearer   
light if we briefly trace the stages1 so
 far as they can be reconstructed1      
through which it passed in ,kant's mind4

 ,we may start from the ,dissertation of
 #aggj4 ,kant there modifies his earlier
 ,wolffian standpoint1 developing it1   
probably under the direct influence of  
the recently published ,nouveaux        
,essais1 on more genuinely ,leibnizian  
lines4       8,the use of the intellect 
444 is twofold4 ,by the one use         
concepts1      both of things and of    
relations1 are themselves given4 ,this  
is      the real use4 ,by the other use 
concepts1 whencesoever given1 are       
merely subordinated to each other1 the  
lower to the higher 7the      common    
attributes71 and compared with one      
another according to the      principle 
of contradiction4 ,this is called the   
logical use4444      ,empirical         
concepts1 therefore1 do not become      
intellectual in the      real sense by  
reduction to greater universality1 and  
do not pass      beyond the type of     
sensuous cognition4 ,however high the   
abstraction      be carried1 they must  
always remain sensuous4 ,but in dealing 

with      things strictly intellectual1 
in regard to which the use of the       
intellect is real1 intellectual concepts
 7of objects as well as      of         
relations71 are given by the very nature
 of the intellect4 ,they      are not   
abstracted from any use of the senses1  
and do not contain      any form of     
sensuous knowledge as such4 ,we must    
here note the      extreme ambiguity of 
the word abstract4444 ,an intellectual  
concept abstracts from everything       
sensuous2 it is not      abstracted from
 things sensuous4 ,it would perhaps be  
more      correctly named abstracting   
than abstract4 ,it is therefore         
preferable to call the intellectual     
concepts pure ideas1 and      those     
which are given only empirically        
abstract ideas40#fij 8,i      fear1     
however1 that ,wolff1 by this           
distinction between the sensuous        
and the intellectual1 which for him is  
merely logical1 has checked1            
perhaps wholly 7to the great detriment  

of philosophy71 that noblest            
enterprise of antiquity1 the            
investigation of the nature of          
phenomena and noumena1 turning men's    
minds from such enquiries to      what  
are very frequently only logical        
subtleties4 ,philosophy1 in so      far 
as it contains the first principles of  
the use of the pure      intellect1 is  
metaphysics4444 ,as empirical principles
 are not to      be found in            
metaphysics1 the concepts to be met with
 in it are not      to be sought in the 
senses but in the very nature of the    
pure      intellect4 ,they are not      
connate concepts1 but are abstracted    
from laws inherent in the mind 7legibus 
menti insitis71 and are      therefore  
acquired4 ,such are the concepts of     
possibility1      existence1 necessity1 
substance1 cause1 etc4 with their       
opposites      or correlates4 ,they     
never enter as parts into any sensuous  
representation1 and therefore cannot in 
any fashion be abstracted      from such

 representations40#fia  ,the etcetera1  
with which in that last passage ,kant   
concludes his list of pure intellectual 
concepts1 indicates a problem that must 
very soon have made itself felt4 ,that  
it did so1 appears from his letter to   
,herz 7,february #ba1 #aggb74 ,he there 
informs his correspondent1 that1 in     
developing his                          
,transcendentalphilosophie 7the first   
occurrence of that title in ,kant's     
writings71 he has       8444sought to   
reduce all concepts of completely pure  
reason to a      fixed number of        
categories this term also appearing for 
the first      time1 not in the manner  
of ,aristotle1 who in his ten           
predicaments      merely set them side  
by side in a sort of order1 just as he  
might      happen upon them1 but as they
 distribute themselves of themselves    
according to some few principles of the 
understanding40#fib  ,though in this    
same letter ,kant professes to have     
solved his problems1 and to be in a     

position to publish his ,critique of    
,pure ,reason 7this title is already    
employed7 8within some three months10   
the phrase 8some few principles0 clearly
 shows that he has not yet developed the
 teaching embodied in the metaphysical  
deduction4 ,for its keynote is          
insistence upon the necessity of a      
single principle1 sufficient to reduce  
them not merely to classes but to       
system4 ,the difficulty of discovering  
such a principle must have been one of  
the causes which delayed completion of  
the ,critique4 ,the only data at our    
disposal for reconstructing the various 
stages through which ,kant's views may  
have passed in the period between       
,february #aggb and #agha are the       
,reflexionen1 but they are sufficiently 
ample to allow of our doing so with     
considerable definiteness4#fic  ,in the 
,dissertation ,kant had traced the      
concepts of space and time1 no less than
 the concepts of understanding1 to      
mental activities4       8,both concepts

 space and time are undoubtedly         
acquired4 ,they are      not1 however1  
abstracted from the sensing of objects  
7for sensation      gives the matter1   
not the form of human cognition74 ,as   
immutable      types they are           
intuitively apprehended from the        
activity whereby      the mind          
co-ordinates its sensuous data in       
accordance with      perpetual          
laws40#fid  ,now the ,dissertation is   
quite vague as to how the 8mind0        
7animus71 active in accordance with laws
 generative of the intuitions space and 
time1 differs from 8understanding0      
7intellectus71 active in accordance with
 laws generative of pure concepts4      
,kant's reasons1 apart from the         
intuitive character of space and time1  
for contrasting the former with the     
latter1 as the sensuous with the        
intellectual1 were the existence of the 
antinomies and his belief that through  
pure concepts the absolutely real can be
 known4 ,when1 however1 that belief was 

questioned by him1 and he had come to   
regard the categories as no less        
subjective than the intuitional forms1  
the antinomies ceased to afford any     
ground for thus distinguishing between  
them4 ,the intuitional nature of space  
and time1 while certainly peculiar to   
them1 is in itself no proof that they   
belong to the sensuous side of the      
mind4#fie  ,a difficulty which          
immediately faced ,kant1 from the new   
,critical standpoint1 was that of       
distinguishing between space and time1  
on the one hand1 and the categories on  
the other4 ,this is borne out by the    
,reflexionen and by the following       
passage in the ,prolegomena4#fif        
8,only after long reflection1 expended  
in the investigation of the      pure   
non-empirical elements of human         
knowledge1 did ,i at last      succeed  
in distinguishing and separating with   
certainty the pure      elementary      
concepts of sensibility 7space and time7
 from those of      the understanding40 

,the first stage in the development of  
the metaphysical deduction would seem to
 have consisted in the attempt to view  
the categories as acquired by reflection
 upon the activities of the             
understanding in 8comparing1 combining1 
or separating02#fig and among the       
notiones rationales1 notiones           
intellectus puri1 thus gained1 the idea 
of space is specially noted4 ,the       
following list is also given3           
8,the concepts of existence 7reality71  
possibility1 necessity1      ground1    
unity and plurality1 parts1 all1 none1  
composite and      simple1 space1 time1 
change1 motion1 substance and accident1 
power      and action1 and everything   
that belongs to ontology proper40#fih   
,in ,reflexionen1 ii4 #ejg and #eji1 the
 fundamental feature of such rational   
concepts is found in their relational   
character4 ,they all agree in being     
concepts of form4#fii  ,quite early1    
however1 ,kant seems to have developed  
the view1 which has created so many more

 difficulties than it resolves1 that    
space and time are given to             
consciousness through outer and inner   
sense4 ,though still frequently spoken  
of as concepts1 they are definitely     
referred to the receptive1              
non-spontaneous1 side of the mind4 ,this
 is at once a return to the             
,dissertation standpoint1 and a decided 
modification of its teaching4 ,it holds 
to the point of view of the             
,dissertation in so far as it regards   
them as sensuous1 and departs from it in
 tracing them to receptivity4#gjj  ,the 
passage quoted from the letter of #aggb 
to ,herz may perhaps be connected with  
the stage revealed in the ,reflexionen  
already cited4 8,comparing1 combining1  
and separating0 may be the 8some few    
principles of the understanding0 there  
referred to4 ,that1 however1 is         
doubtful1 for the next stage in the     
development likewise resulted in a      
threefold division4 ,this second stage  
finds varied expression in ,reflexionen1

 ii4 #dhc1 #ebb1 #ebh1 #eef-fc4 ,these1 
in so far as they agree1 distinguish    
three classes of categories--of thesis1 
of analysis1 and of synthesis4 ,the     
first covers the categories of quality  
and modality1 the second those of       
quantity1 the third those of relation4  
,reflexionen1 ii4 #ebh is as follows3   
,thesis      8,the metaphysical concepts
 are1 first1 absolute3                  
possibility and existence2 secondly1    
relative3                 7a7 ,unity and
 plurality3 omnitudo and particularitas4
    ,analysis   7b7 ,limits3 the first1 
the last3 infinitum1 finitum4           
,anticipates the later category of      
limitation4                   7c7       
,connection3 co-ordination3 whole and   
part   ,synthesis       anticipates the 
later category of reciprocity1          
simple and compound2 subordination3     
7#a7 ,subject and predicate4            
7#b7 ,ground and consequence4  ,this1   
and the connected ,reflexionen          
enumerated above1 are of interest as    

proving that ,kant's table of categories
 was in all essentials complete before  
the idea had occurred to him of further 
systematising it or of guaranteeing its 
completeness by reference to the logical
 classification of the forms of         
judgment4 ,they also justify us in the  
belief that when ,kant set himself to   
discover such a unifying principle the  
above list of categories and the        
existing logical classifications must   
have mutually influenced one another1   
each undergoing such modification as    
seemed necessary to render the          
parallelism complete4 ,this1 as we shall
 find1 is what actually happened4 ,the  
logical table1 for instance1 induced    
,kant to distinguish the categories of  
quality from those of modality1 while   
numerous changes were made in the       
logical table itself in order that it   
might yield the categories required4    
,but the most important alteration1 the 
introduction of the threefold division  
of each sub-heading1 is not thus        

explicable1 as exclusively due to one or
 other of the two factors4 ,the adoption
 of this threefold arrangement in place 
of the dichotomous divisions of the     
logical classification and of the       
haphazard enumerations of ,kant's own   
previous lists1 seems to be due to the  
twofold circumstance that he had already
 distinguished three categories of      
synthesis or relation 7always the most  
important for ,kant71 and that this     
sufficiently harmonised with the logical
 distinction between categorical1       
hypothetical1 and disjunctive judgments4
 ,he then sought to modify the logical  
divisions by addition in each case of a 
third1 and finding that this helped him 
to obtain the categories required1 the  
threefold division became for him 7as it
 remained for ,hegel7 an almost mystical
 dogma of transcendental philosophy4#gja
 ,in so far as it involved recognition  
that the hard and fast opposites of the 
traditional logic 7such as the universal
 and the particular1 the affirmative and

 the negative7 are really aspects       
inseparably involved in every judgment  
and in all existence1 it constituted an 
advance in the direction both of a      
deeper rationalism and of a more genuine
 empiricism4 ,but in so far as it was   
due to the desire to guarantee          
completeness on a priori grounds1 and so
 was inspired by a persistent           
overestimate of our a priori powers1 it 
has been decidedly harmful4 ,much of the
 useless 8architectonic0 of the         
,critique is due to this scholastic     
prejudice4  ,this fundamental alteration
 in the table of logical judgments is   
introduced with the naive assertion that
 8varieties of thought in judgments10   
unimportant in general logic1 8may be of
 importance in the field of its pure a  
priori knowledge40 ,in the ,critique of 
,judgment#gjb we find the following     
passage3       8,it has been made a     
difficulty that my divisions in pure    
philosophy      have almost always been 
threefold4 ,but this lies in the nature 

of      the case4 ,if an a priori       
division is to be made1 it must be      
either analytic1 according to the       
principle of contradiction1 and         
then it is always twofold 7quodlibet ens
 est aut ,a aut non ,a72 or      else   
synthetic4 ,and if in this latter case  
it is derived from a      priori        
concepts 7not as in mathematics from the
 a priori      intuition corresponding  
to the concept7 the division must       
necessarily be a trichotomy4 ,for       
according to what is requisite for      
synthetic unity in general1 there must  
be 7#a7 a condition1 7#b7 a             
conditioned1 and 7#c7 the concept which 
arises from the union of      these     
two40  ,the last stage1 as expressed in 
the ,critique1 was1 as we have already  
noted1 merely an application of his     
earlier position that all thinking is   
judging4 ,this appreciation of the      
inseparable connection of the categories
 with the act of judging is sound in    
principle1 and is pregnant with many of 

the most valuable results of the        
,critical teaching4 ,but these fruitful 
consequences follow only upon the lines 
developed in the transcendental         
deduction4 ,they are bound up with      
,kant's fundamental ,copernican         
discovery that the categories are forms 
of synthesis1 and accordingly express   
functions or relations4 ,the categories 
can no longer be viewed1 in the manner  
of the ,dissertation1#gjc as yielding   
concepts of objects4 ,the view of the   
concept which we find in the            
,dissertation is1 indeed1 applied in the
 ,critique to space and time--they are  
taken as in themselves intuitions1 not  
as merely forms of intuition--but the   
categories are recognised as being of an
 altogether relational character4       
,though a priori1 they are not1 in and  
by themselves1 complete objects of      
consciousness1 and accordingly can      
reveal no object4 ,they are functions1  
not contents4 ,that1 however1 is to     
anticipate4 ,we must first discharge1 as

 briefly as possible1 the ungrateful    
task of dwelling further upon the       
laboured1 arbitrary1 and                
self-contradictory character of the     
detailed working out of the metaphysical
 deduction4 ,the deduction is given in  
,sections ,,ii4 and ,,iii4   ,section   
,,ii4 ,the ,logical ,function of the    
,understanding in                       
,judgment4#gjd--,kant's introductory    
statement may here be noted4 ,if1 he    
says1 we leave out of consideration the 
content of any judgment1 and attend only
 to the mere form1 we 8find0 that the   
function of thought in a judgment 8can0 
be brought under four heads1 each with  
three subdivisions4 ,but ,kant himself1 
in this same section1 recognises in the 
frankest and most explicit manner1 that 
the necessary distinctions are only to  
be obtained by taking account of the    
matter as well as of the form of        
judgments4 ,and even after this         
contradiction is discounted1 the term   
8find0 may be allowed as legitimate only

 if the word 8can0 is correspondingly   
emphasised4 ,the distinctions were not  
derived from any existing logic4 ,they  
were reached only by the freest possible
 handling of the classifications        
currently employed4 ,examination of the 
table of judgments1 and comparison of it
 with the table of categories1 supply   
conclusive evidence that the former has 
been rearranged1 in highly artificial   
fashion1 so as to yield a more or less  
predetermined list of required          
categories4  #a4 ,quantity4--,kant here 
frankly departs from the classification 
of judgments followed in formal logic2  
and the reason which he gives for so    
doing is in direct contradiction to his 
demand that only the form of judgment   
must be taken into account4 ,the        
8quantity of knowledge0 here referred to
 is determinable1 not from the form1 but
 only from the content of the judgment4 
,also1 the statement that the singular  
judgment stands to the universal as     
unity to infinity 7,unendlichkeit7 is   

decidedly open to question4 ,the        
universal is itself a form of unity1 as 
,kant virtually admits in deriving1 as  
he does1 the category of unity from the 
universal judgment4  #b4                
,quality4--,kant makes a similar        
modification in the logical treatment of
 quality1 by distinguishing between     
affirmative and infinite judgments4 ,the
 proposition1 ,a is not-,b1 is to be    
viewed as neither affirmative nor       
negative4 ,as the content of the        
predicate includes the infinite number  
of things that are not-,b1 the judgment 
is infinite4 ,kant1 in a very artificial
 and somewhat arbitrary manner1         
contrives to define it as limitative in 
character1 and so as sharing            
simultaneously in the nature both of    
affirmation and of negation4 ,the way is
 thus prepared for the 8discovery0 of   
the category of limitation4  #c4        
,relation4--,wolff1 ,baumgarten1 ,meier1
 ,baumeister1 ,reimarus1 and ,lambert1  
with very minor differences1 agree in   

the following division3#gje             
,simple  ,categorical                   
,judgments         ,copulative 7i4e4    
categorical with more                   
than one subject or more than one       
,complex  predicate74                   
,hypothetical4                          
,disjunctive4  ,kant omits the          
copulative judgment1 and by ignoring the
 distinction between simple and complex 
judgments 7which in ,reimarus1 and also 
less definitely in ,wolff1 is connected 
with the distinction between conditional
 and unconditional judgments7 contrives 
to bring the remaining three types of   
judgment under the new heading of       
8relation40 ,they had never before been 
thus co-ordinated1 and had never before 
been subsumed under this particular     
title4 ,it is by no means clear why such
 distinctions as those between simple   
and complex1 conditioned and            
unconditioned1 should be ignored1 and   
why the copulative judgment should not  
be recognised as well as the            

hypothetical4 ,kant's criterion of      
importance and unimportance in the      
distinctions employed by the logicians  
of his day was wholly personal to       
himself2 and1 though hard to define1 was
 certainly not dictated by any logic    
that is traceable to ,aristotelian      
sources4 ,his exposition is throughout  
controlled by foreknowledge of the      
particular categories which he desires  
to 8discover40  #d4 ,modality4--,neither
 ,wolff nor ,reimarus gives any account 
of modality4#gjf ,baumgarten classifies 
judgments as pure or modal 7existing in 
four forms1 necessity1 contingency1     
possibility1 impossibility74 ,baumeister
 and ,thomasius also recognise four     
forms of modality4 ,meier distinguishes 
between pure judgment 7judicium purum7  
and impure judgment 7judicium modale1   
modificatum1 complexum qua copula71 but 
does not classify the forms of modality4
 ,lambert alone#gjg classifies judgments
 as 8possible1 actual 7wirklich71       
necessary1 and their opposite40 ,but    

when ,kant adopts this threefold        
division1 the inclusion of actuality    
renders the general title 8modality0    
inapplicable in its traditional sense4  
,the expression of actuality in the     
assertoric judgment involves no         
adverbial modification of the predicate4
 ,also1 in its 8affirmative0 and        
8categorical0 forms it has already been 
made to yield two other categories4     
,kant speaks of the problematic1 the    
assertoric1 and the apodictic forms of  
judgment as representing the stages     
through which knowledge passes in the   
process of its development4             
8,these three functions of modality are 
so many momenta of thought      in      
general40  ,this statement has been     
eulogised by ,caird1#gjh as being an    
anticipation of the ,hegelian dialectic4
 ,as a matter of fact1 ,kant's remark is
 irrelevant and misleading4 ,the advance
 from consciousness of the problematic1 
through determination of it as actual to
 its explanation as necessary1          

represents only a psychological order in
 the mind of the individual4 ,logically1
 knowledge of the possible rests on and 
implies prior knowledge of the actual   
and of the necessities that constitute  
the actual4#gji   ,section ,,iii4#gaj   
,the ,categories or ,pure ,concepts of  
the ,understanding4--,the first three   
pages of this section1 beginning        
8,general logic abstracts10 and         
concluding with the word 8rest on the   
understanding10 would seem to be a later
 interpolation4 ,embodying1 as they do1 
some of the fundamental ideas of the    
transcendental deduction1 they express  
,kant's final method of distinguishing  
between general and transcendental      
logic4 ,but they are none the less out  
of harmony with the other sections of   
the metaphysical deduction4 ,they are of
 the nature of an after-thought1 even   
though that afterthought represents a   
more mature and adequate standpoint4 ,in
 ,a #ee-g1 where ,kant defines the      
distinction between general and         

transcendental logic1 the latter is     
formulated in entire independence of all
 reference to pure intuition4#gaa ,kant1
 indeed1 argues#gab that just as there  
are both pure and empirical intuitions1 
so there are both pure and empirical    
concepts4 ,but there is no indication   
that he has yet realised the close      
interdependence of the two types of a   
priori elements4 ,even when he proceeds 
in ,a #fb to remark that the empirical  
employment of pure concepts is          
conditioned by the fact that objects are
 given in intuition1 no special         
reference is made to 8the manifold of   
pure a priori intuition40 ,now1 however1
 ,kant emphasises1 as the fundamental   
characteristic of transcendental logic1 
its possession of a pure manifold       
through reference to which its pure     
concepts gain meaning4 ,thus not only   
does transcendental logic not abstract  
from the pure a priori concepts1 it     
likewise possesses an a priori          
material4#gac ,it is in this twofold    

manner that it is now regarded as       
differing from formal logic4  ,the      
accounts given of the metaphysical      
deduction by ,cohen1#gad ,caird1#gae    
,riehl1#gaf and ,watson#gag are vitiated
 by failure to remark that this latter  
standpoint is a late development1 and is
 out of keeping with the rest of the    
deduction4 ,riehl's exposition has1     
however1 the merit of comparative       
consistency4 ,he explicitly recognises  
the important consequence which at once 
follows from acceptance of this later   
view1 namely1 that it is by their       
implying space and time that the        
categories differ from the notions which
 determine the forms of judgment2 in    
other words1 that the categories are    
actualised only as schemata4 ,the       
category of substance1 for instance1    
differs from the merely logical notion  
of a propositional subject1 in being the
 concept of that which is always a      
subject1 and never a predicate2 and such
 a conception has specific meaning for  

us only as the permanent in time4       
,logical subjects and predicates1       
quantitative relations apart1 are       
interchangeable4 ,the relation between  
them is the analytic relation of        
identity4 ,the concept of subject1 on   
the other hand1 transcendentally viewed1
 that is1 as a category1 is the         
apprehension of what is permanent1 in   
synthetic distinction from1 and relation
 to1 its changing attributes4 ,in other 
words1 the transcendental distinction   
between substance and accidents is      
substituted for that of subject and     
predicate4 ,similarly the logical       
relation of ground and consequence1     
conceived as expressive of logical      
identity1 gives way to the synthetic    
temporal relation of cause and effect4  
,and so with all the other pure forms4  
,as categories1 they are schemata4 ,kant
 has virtually recognised this by the   
names which he gives to the categories  
of relation4 ,but the proper recognition
 of the necessary interdependence of the

 intuitional and conceptual forms came  
too late to prevent him from            
distinguishing between categories and   
schemata1 and so from creating for      
himself the artificial difficulties of  
the section on schematism4  ,in ,a #hb  
,kant states that he intentionally omits
 definitions of the categories4 ,he had 
good reason for so doing4 ,the attempt  
would have landed him in manifold       
difficulties1 since his views were not  
yet sufficiently ripe to allow of his   
perceiving the way of escape4 ,in ,a    
#bda 7omitted in second edition7 ,kant  
makes1 however1 the directly counter    
statement that definition of the        
categories is not possible1 giving as   
his reason that1 in isolation from the  
conditions of sensibility1 they are     
merely logical functions1 8without the  
slightest indication as to how they can 
possess meaning and objective           
validity40#gah  ,it cannot be too often 
repeated that the ,critique is not a    
unitary work1 but the patchwork record  

of twelve years of continuous           
development4 ,certain portions of the   
transcendental deduction1 of which ,a   
#gf-i is one1 represent the latest of   
all the many stages2 and their teaching1
 when accepted1 calls for a radical     
recasting of the metaphysical deduction4
 ,the bringing of the entire ,critique  
into line with its maturest parts would 
have been an ,herculean task2 and it was
 one to which ,kant1 then fifty-seven   
years of age1 was very rightly unwilling
 to sacrifice the time urgently needed  
for the writing of his other ,critiques4
 ,the passage before us is one of the   
many interpolations by which ,kant      
endeavoured to give an external unity to
 what1 on close study1 is found to be   
the plain record of successive and      
conflicting views4 ,meantime1 in dealing
 with this passage1 we are concerned    
only to note that if this later mode of 
defining transcendental logic be        
accepted1 far-reaching modifications in 
,kant's ,critical teaching have to be   

made4 ,the other points developed in ,a 
#gf-i we discuss below#gai in their     
proper connection4  ,the same ,function1
 etc4#gbj--,this passage has already    
been sufficiently commented upon4#gba   
,kant here expresses in quite inadequate
 fashion the standpoint of the          
transcendental deduction4 ,the          
implication is that analytic and        
synthetic thinking are co-ordinate1 one 
and the same faculty exercising1 on     
these two levels1 the same operations4  
,the true ,critical teaching is that    
synthetic thinking is alone fundamental1
 and that only by a regress upon it can 
judgments be adequately accounted for4  
,this passage1 like the preceding1 may  
be of later origin than the main        
sections of the metaphysical deduction4 
,term 8,categories0#gbb borrowed from   
,aristotle4--,cf4 below1 p4 #aih4       
,table of ,categories4 ,quantity4--,kant
 derives the category of unity from the 
universal1#gbc and that of totality     
7,allheit7#gbd from the singular4 ,these

 derivations are extremely artificial4  
,in ,reflexionen1 ii4 #efc1 ,kant takes 
the more natural line of identifying    
totality with the universal1 and unity  
with the singular4 ,probably#gbe the    
reason of ,kant's change of view is the 
necessity of obtaining totality by      
combining unity with multiplicity4 ,that
 can only be done if universality is    
thus equated with unity4 ,watson's      
explanation1#gbf that ,kant has reversed
 the order of the categories1 seems to  
be erroneous4  ,quality4--,cf4 above1 p4
 #aib4  ,relation4--,the correlation of 
the categorical judgment with the       
conception of substance and attribute is
 only possible#gbg owing to ,kant's     
neglect of the relational judgment and  
to the dominance in his logical teaching
 of the ,aristotelian                   
substance-attribute view of predication4
 ,the correlation is also open to       
question in that the relation of subject
 and predicate terms in a logical       
judgment is a reversible one4 ,it is a  

long step from the merely grammatical   
subject to the conception of that which 
is always a subject and never a         
predicate4  ,kant's identification of   
the category of community or reciprocity
 with the disjunctive judgment1 though  
at first sight the most arbitrary of    
all1 is not more so than many of the    
others4 ,its essential correctness has  
been insisted upon in recent logic by   
,sigwart1 ,bradley1 and ,bosanquet4 ,in 
,kant's own personal view#gbh           
co-ordination in the form of            
co-existence is only possible through   
reciprocal interaction4 ,the relation of
 whole and part 7the parts in their     
relations of reciprocal exclusion       
exhausting and constituting a genuine   
whole7 thus becomes1 in its application 
to actual existences1 that of reciprocal
 causation4 ,the reverse likewise holds2
 interaction is only possible between   
existences which together constitute a  
unity4#gbi ,kant returns to this point  
in ,note #c1 added in the second        

edition4#gcj ,the objection which ,kant 
there considers has been very pointedly 
stated by ,schopenhauer4       8,what   
real analogy is there between the       
problematical determination      of a   
concept by disjunctive predicates and   
the thought of      reciprocity8 ,the   
two are indeed absolutely opposed1 for  
in the      disjunctive judgment the    
actual affirmation of one of the two    
alternative propositions is also        
necessarily the negation of the         
other2 if1 on the other hand1 we think  
of two things in the      relation of   
reciprocity1 the affirmation of one is  
also necessarily      the affirmation of
 the other1 and vice versa40#gca  ,the  
answer to this criticism is on the lines
 suggested by ,kant4 ,the various       
judgments which constitute a disjunction
 do not1 when viewed as parts of the    
disjunction1 merely negate one another2 
they mutually presuppose one another in 
the total complex4 ,schopenhauer also   
fails to observe that in locating the   

part of a real whole in one part of     
space1 we exclude it from all the       
others4#gcb  ,modality4--,the existence 
of separate categories of modality seems
 highly doubtful4 ,the concepts of the  
possible and of the probable may be     
viewed as derivative2 the notion of     
existence does not seem to differ from  
that of reality2 and necessity seems in 
ultimate analysis to reduce to the      
concept of ground and consequence4      
,these are points which will be         
discussed later4#gcc  ,aristotle's ten  
categories#gcd are enumerated by ,kant  
in ,reflexionen1 ii4 #ebb1gce as3 7#a7  
substantia1 accidens1 7#b7 qualitas1    
7#c7 quantitas1 7#d7 relatio1 7#e7      
actio1 7#f7 passio1 7#g7 quando1 7#h7   
ubi1 7#i7 situs1 7#aj7 habitus2 and the 
five post-predicaments as3 oppositum1   
prius1 simul1 motus1 habere4            
,eliminating quando1 ubi1 situs1 prius1 
and simul as being modes of sensibility2
 actio and passio as being complex and  
derivative2 and also omitting habitus   

7condition7 and habere1 as being too    
general and indefinite in meaning to    
constitute separate categories2 we are  
then left with substantia1 qualitas1    
quantitas1 relatio1 and oppositum4 ,the 
most serious defect in this reduced     
list1 from the ,kantian point of view1  
is its omission of causality4 ,it is1   
however1 a curious coincidence that when
 substance is taken as a form of        
relatio1 and oppositum as a form of     
quality1 we are left with the three     
groups1 quality1 quantity1 relation4    
,only modality is lacking to complete   
,kant's own fourfold grouping4 ,none the
 less1 as the study of ,kant's          
,reflexionen sufficiently proves1#gcf it
 was by an entirely different route that
 ,kant travelled to his metaphysical    
deduction4 ,watson does not seem to have
 any ground for his contention#gcg that 
the above modified list of ,aristotle's 
categories 8gave ,kant his              
starting-point40 ,it was there indeed1  
as the reference to ,aristotle in his   

letter of #aggb to ,herz shows1 that he 
first looked for assistance1 only1      
however1 to be disappointed in his      
expectations4  ,derivative              
concepts4#gch--;,cf4 above1 pp4 #ff1    
#ga-b4  ,i reserve this task for another
 occasion4#gci--;,cf4 ,a #bjd  ,b #bdi2 
,a #ac2 above1 p4 #ff ff41 and below1   
pp4 #cgi-hj4  ,definitions of categories
 omitted4#gdj--;,cf4 above1 pp4 #aie-f1 
and ,a #bda there cited2 also below1 pp4
 #cci-db1 #djd-e4  ,note #a4gda--,on    
this distinction between mathematical   
and dynamical categories cf4 below1 pp4 
#cde-g1 #eaj-aa4  ,note #b4gdb--,this   
remark is inserted to meet a criticism  
which had been made by ,johann          
,schulze1#gdc and to which ,kant in     
,february #aghd had replied in terms    
almost identical with those of the      
present passage4       8,the third      
category certainly springs from the     
connection of the      first and second1
 not1 indeed1 from their mere           
combination1 but      from a connection 

the possibility of which constitutes a  
concept      that is a special category4
 ,for this reason the third category may
      not be applicable in instances in 
which the other two apply3 e4g4      one
 year1 many years of future time1 are   
real concepts1 but the      totality of 
future years1 that is1 the collective   
unity of a      future eternity1        
conceived as entire 7so to say1 as      
completed71 is      something that      
cannot be thought4 ,but even in those   
cases in which      the third category  
is applicable1 it always contains       
something more      than the first and  
the second taken separately and         
together1 namely      the derivation of 
the second from the first1 a process    
which is      not always practicable4   
,necessity1 for example1 is nothing else
      than existence1 in so far as it   
can be inferred from possibility4       
,community is the reciprocal causality  
of substances in respect      of their  
determinations4 ,but that determinations

 of one substance      can be produced  
by another substance1 is something that 
we may not      simply assume2 it is one
 of those connections without which     
there      could be no reciprocal       
relation of things in space1 and        
therefore      no outer experience4 ,in 
a word1 ,i find that just as the        
conclusion      of a syllogism          
indicates1 in addition to the operations
 of      understanding and judgment in  
the premisses1 a special operation      
peculiar to reason 4441 so also the     
third category is a special1      and in
 part original1 concept4 ,for instance1 
the concepts1      quantum1 compositum1 
totum1 come under the categories unity1 
plurality1 totality1 but a quantum      
thought as compositum would      not    
yield the concept of totality unless the
 concept of the      quantum is thought 
as determinable through the composition1
 and      in certain quanta1 such as    
infinite space1 that cannot be          
done40#gdd  ,kant's assertion that in   

certain cases the third category is not 
applicable is misleading4 ,his proof of 
the validity of the category of         
reciprocity in the third ,analogy really
 consists in showing that it is         
necessary to the apprehension of spatial
 co-existence2#gde and if1 as ,kant     
maintains1 consciousness of space is    
necessary to consciousness of time1 it  
is thereby proved to be involved in each
 and every act of consciousness4 ,it is 
presupposed in the apprehension even of 
substantial existence and of causal     
sequence4 ,his proof that it is a unique
 category1 distinct from the mere       
combination of the categories of        
substance and causality1 does not1      
therefore1 assume what his words in the 
above letter would seem to imply1 that  
it is only occasionally employed4 ,the  
same remark holds in regard to totality2
 it is presupposed even in the          
apprehension of a single year4 ,kant's  
references1 both here and in other parts
 of the ,critique1#gdf to totality in   

its bearing upon the conception of      
infinitude1 reveal considerable lack of 
clearness as to the relation in which it
 stands to the ,idea of the             
unconditioned4 ,sometimes1 as in this   
letter1 he would seem to be identifying 
them2 elsewhere this confusion is       
avoided4 ,in ,b #aaa totality is defined
 as multiplicity regarded as unity1 and 
in ,a #adb-c  ,b #ahb its schema is     
defined as number4 7,the identification 
of totality with number has led ,kant to
 say in ,b #aaa that number is not      
applicable in the representation of the 
infinite1 a much more questionable      
assertion than that of the letter above 
quoted47 ,the statement that necessity  
is existence in so far as it can be     
inferred from possibility1 or that it is
 existence given through possibility1 is
 similarly misleading4 ,kant's true     
position is that all three are necessary
 to the conception of any one of the    
three4  ,thus ,kant's reply to ,schulze1
 alike in his letter and in ,note #b1   

fails to indicate with any real adequacy
 the true bearing of ,critical teaching 
in this matter2 and consequently fails  
to reveal the full force of his         
position4 ,only in terms of totality can
 unity and plurality be apprehended2    
only through the reciprocal relations   
which determine co-existence can we     
acquire consciousness of either         
permanence or sequence2 only in terms of
 necessity can either existence or      
possibility be defined4 ,the third      
category is not derived from a prior    
knowledge of the subordinate categories4
 ,it represents in each case a higher   
complex within which alone the simpler  
relations defined by the simpler        
concepts can exist or have meaning4  ,b 
#aac-af1  #ab4--,this section1 of no    
intrinsic importance1 is an example of  
,kant's loving devotion to this         
8architectonic40 ,his reasoning is      
extremely artificial1 especially in its 
attempt to connect 8unity1 truth1 and   
perfection0 with the three categories of

 quantity4 ,the ,reflexionen show how   
greatly ,kant was preoccupied with these
 three concepts1 seeking either to base 
a table of categories upon them 7,b4    
,erdmann's interpretation71 or to reduce
 them to categories 7,adickes'          
interpretation74 ,for some time ,kant   
himself ranked with those who#gdg       
8incautiously made these criteria of    
thought to be properties of the things  
in themselves40 ,in ,reflexionen1 ii4   
#ijc1gdh we find the following          
statement3 8,unity 7connection1         
agreement71 truth 7quality71            
completeness 7quantity740 ,in ii4       
#iafgdi ,kant makes trial to connect    
them1 as conceptions of possibility1    
with the categories of relation4 ,in ii4
 #iaa and #iab the later view1 that they
 are logical in character and function1 
appears1 but leads to their being set in
 relation to the three faculties of     
understanding1 judgment1 and reason4    
,this is conjectured by ,b4 ,erdmann to 
have been ,kant's view at the time of   

the first edition4 ii4 #iae1 #iai1 #ibj 
present the view expounded in the       
section before us4#gej ,erdmann#gea     
remarks that in this section ,kant 8is  
settling accounts with certain thoughts 
which in the 'seventies had yielded     
suggestions for the transformation of   
ontology into the transcendental        
analytic40     ,,chapter ,,ii           
,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,pure ,,concepts
 ,,of ,,the ,,understanding   ,first    
edition ,subjective and ,objective      
,deductions4--,in dealing with the      
transcendental deduction1 as given in   
the first edition1 we can make use of   
the masterly and convincing analysis    
which ,vaihinger#geb 7building upon     
,adickes' previous results1 but         
developing an independent and quite     
original interpretation7 has given of   
its inconsecutive and strangely         
bewildering argumentation4 ,vaihinger's 
analysis is an excellent example of     
detective genius in the field of        
scholarship4 ,from internal evidence1   

circumstantially supported by the       
,reflexionen and ,lose ,bltter1 he is   
able to prove that the deduction is     
composed of manuscripts1 externally     
pieced together1 and representing no    
less than four distinct stages in the   
slow and gradual development of ,kant's 
views4 ,like geological deposits1 they  
remain to record the processes by which 
the final result has come to be4 ,though
 they do not in their present setting   
represent the correct chronological     
order1 that may be determined once the  
proper clues to their disentanglement   
have been duly discovered4 ,that        
discovery is itself1 however1 no easy   
task2 for the unexpected1 while lending 
colour and incident to the commentator's
 enterprise1 baffles his natural        
expectations at every turn4 ,the first  
stage is one in which ,kant dispenses   
with the categories1 and in which1 when 
they are referred to1 they are taken as 
applying to things in themselves4 ,the  
last stage1 worked out1 as there is     

ground for believing1 in the haste and  
excitement of the final revision1 is not
 represented in the ,prolegomena or in  
the second edition of the ,critique1 the
 author retracing his steps and resuming
 the standpoint of the stage which      
preceded it4 ,the fortunate accident of 
,kant's having jotted down upon the back
 of a dated paper the record of his     
passing thought 7one of the few ,lose   
,bltter that are thus datable7 is the   
culminating incident in this            
philosophical drama4 ,it felicitously   
serves as a keystone in the body of     
evidence supported by general reasoning4
  ,before becoming acquainted with      
,vaihinger's analysis ,i had observed   
,kant's ascription to empirical concepts
 of the functions elsewhere allotted to 
the categories1 but had been hopelessly 
puzzled as to how such teaching could be
 fitted into his general system4        
,vaihinger's view of it as a            
pre-,critical survival would seem to be 
the only possible satisfactory solution4

 ,for the view which ,i have taken of   
,kant's doctrine of the transcendental  
object as also pre-,critical1 and for   
its employment as a clue to the dating  
of passages1 ,i am myself alone         
responsible4  ,the order of my          
exposition will be as follows3#gec  ,i4 
,enumeration1 in chronological order1 of
 the four stages which compose the      
deduction of the first edition1 and     
citation of the passages which represent
 each separate stage4  ,,ii4 ,detailed  
analysis1 again in chronological order1 
of each successive stage1 with          
exposition of the views which it        
embodies4  ,,iii4 ,examination of the   
evidence yielded by the ,reflexionen and
 ,lose ,bltter in support of the above  
analysis4  ,,iv4 ,connected statement   
and discussion of the total argument of 
the deduction4   ,i4 ,enumeration of the
 ,four ,stages  7#a7 ,,first ,,stage3   
,,that ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental      
,,object1 ,,without ,,co-,,operation    
,,of ,,the ,,categories4--,this stage is

 represented by#ged3 7a7 ,,ii4 #c 7from 
beginning of the third paragraph to end 
of #c7  ,a #ajd-aj2 7b7 ,i4  #ac 7the   
entire section7  ,a #hd-ib 7retained in 
second edition as ,b #aaf-bd74 a        
discusses the problem of the reference  
of sensations to an object1 b that of   
the objective validity of the           
categories4 b is therefore transitional 
to the second stage4  7#b7 ,,second     
,,stage3 ,,that ,,of ,,the ,,categories1
 ,,without ,,co-,,operation ,,of ,,the  
,,productive ,,imagination4--,this stage
 is represented by3 7a7 ,i4  #ad 7with  
the exception of its concluding         
paragraph7  ,a #ib-d 7retained in second
 edition as ,b #abd-g72 7b7 ,,ii4 7the  
first four paragraphs7  ,a #ie-g2 7c7   
,,ii4 #d 7the entire section7  ,a       
#aaj-ad4  7#c7 ,,third ,,stage3 ,,that  
,,of ,,the ,,productive ,,imagination1  
,,without ,,mention ,,of ,,the          
,,threefold ,,transcendental            
,,synthesis4--,this stage is represented
 by 7a7 ,,iii4  7from beginning of      

seventh paragraph to end of twelfth7  ,a
 #aai-bc2 7b7 ,,iii4  7from beginning of
 third paragraph to end of sixth7  ,a   
#aaf-ai2 7c7 ,i4  #ad 7,concluding      
paragraph7  ,a #id-e2 7d7 ,,iii4  7from 
beginning of sixteenth paragraph to end 
of section preceding summary7  ,a       
#abf-h2 7e7 ,s7ummary7 7in conclusion to
 ,,iii47  ,a #abh-cj2 7f7 ,,iii4  7from 
beginning of thirteenth paragraph to end
 of fifteenth7  ,a #abc-f2 7g7          
,i7ntroduction7 7from beginning of      
section to end of second paragraph7  ,a 
#aae-af2 7h7  #aj ,t7ransitional to the 
fourth stage7  ,a #gf-i 7retained as ,b 
#ajb-d74  7#d7 ,,fourth ,,stage3 ,,that 
,,of ,,the ,,threefold ,,transcendental 
,,synthesis4--,this stage is represented
 by3 7a7 ,,ii4 #a-c 7from opening of #a 
to end of second paragraph in #c7  ,a   
#ih-ajd2 7b7 ,,ii4 7the two paragraphs  
immediately preceding a7  ,a #ig-h4     
,,ii4 ,detailed ,analysis of the ,four  
,stages  ,first ,stage4--,a #ajd-aj2 ,a 
#hd-ib 7,b #aaf-bd74  ,a #ajd-aj2 ,,ii4 

#c4--,this is the one passage in the    
,critique in which ,kant explicitly     
defines his doctrine of the             
8transcendental object02 and careful    
examination of the text shows that by it
 he means the thing in itself1 conceived
 as being the object of our             
representations4 ,such teaching is1 of  
course1 thoroughly un-,critical2 and as 
,i shall try to show1 this was very     
early realised by ,kant himself4 ,the   
passages in which the phrase            
8transcendental object0 occurs are1 like
 the section before us1 in every        
instance of early origin4 ,it is        
significant that the transcendental     
object is not again referred to in the  
deduction of the first edition4#gee     
,though it reappears in the chapter on  
phenomena and noumena1 it does so in a  
passage which ,kant excised in the      
second edition4 ,the paragraphs which he
 then substituted make no mention of it4
 ,the doctrine is of frequent occurrence
 in the ,dialectic1 and combines with   

other independent evidence to show that 
the larger part of the ,dialectic is of 
early origin4 ,that the doctrine of the 
transcendental object is thus a         
pre-,critical or semi-,critical survival
 has1 so far as ,i am aware1 not        
hitherto been observed by any writer    
upon ,kant4 ,it has invariably been     
interpreted in the light of the sections
 in which it does not occur1 and1 as    
thus toned down and tempered to         
something altogether different from what
 it really stands for1 has been taken as
 an essential and characteristic tenet  
of the ,critical philosophy4 ,it was in 
the course of an attempt to interpret   
,kant's entire argument in the light of 
his doctrine of the transcendental      
object that ,i first came to detect its 
absence from all his later utterances4  
,but it is important to recognise that  
the difficulties which would result from
 its retention are quite insuperable1   
and would by themselves1 even in the    
absence of all external evidence of     

,kant's rejection of it1 compel us to   
regard it as a survival of pre-,critical
 thinking4 ,as ,vaihinger does not seem 
to have detected the un-,critical       
character of this doctrine1 it is the   
more significant that he should1 on     
other grounds1 have felt constrained to 
regard the passage in which it is       
expounded as embodying the earliest     
stage in the development of the         
deduction4 ,he would seem to continue in
 the orthodox view so far as to hold    
that though the doctrine of the         
transcendental object is here stated in 
pre-,critical terms1 it was permanently 
retained by ,kant in altered form4  ,the
 doctrine of the transcendental object1 
as here expounded1 is as follows3       
8,appearances are themselves nothing but
 sensuous representations      which    
must not be taken as capable of existing
 in themselves 7an      sich7 with      
exactly the same character 7in          
ebenderselben ,art7      outside our    
power of representation40#gef  ,these   

sense-representations are our only      
possible representations1 and when we   
speak of an object corresponding to     
them1 we must be conceiving an object in
 general1 equal to x4       8,they have 
their object1 but an object which can   
never be intuited      by us1 and which 
may therefore be named the              
non-empirical1 i4e4      transcendental 
object  x40#geg  ,this object is        
conceived as being that which prevents  
our representations from occurring at   
haphazard1 necessitating their order in 
such manner that1 manifold and varied as
 they may be1 they can yet be           
self-consistent in their several        
groupings1 and so possess that unity    
which is essential to the concept of an 
object4       8,the pure concept of this
 transcendental object1 which in fact   
throughout all our knowledge is always  
one and the same1 is that      which can
 alone confer upon all our empirical    
concepts relation in      general to an 
object1 i4e4 objective reality40#geh    

,what renders this doctrine impossible  
of permanent retention was that it      
allowed of no objective existence       
mediate between the merely subjective   
and the thing in itself4 ,on such       
teaching there is no room for the       
empirical object2 and immediately upon  
the recognition of that latter          
phenomenal form of existence in space1  
,kant was constrained to recognise that 
it is in the empirical object1 not in   
the thing in itself1 that the contents  
of our representations are grounded and 
unified4 ,any other view must involve   
the application of the categories1      
especially those of substance and       
causality1 to the thing in itself4 ,the 
entire empirical world has still to be  
conceived as grounded in the            
non-empirical1 but that is a very       
different contention from the thesis    
that the thing in itself is the object  
and the sole object of our              
representations4 ,the doctrine of the   
transcendental object has thus a twofold

 defect3 it advocates an extreme        
subjectivism1 and yet at the same time  
applies the categories to the thing in  
itself4  ,but the latter consequence is 
one which could not1 at the stage       
represented by this section1 be         
appreciated by ,kant4 ,for1 as we shall 
find1 he is endeavouring to solve the   
problem of the reference of             
sense-representation to an object       
without assumption of a priori          
categories4 ,it is in empirical         
concepts1 conditioned only by a         
transcendental apperception1 that he    
professes to discover the grounds and   
conditions of this objective reference4 
,let us follow ,kant's argument in      
detail4 ,the section opens#gei with what
 may be a reference to the ,aesthetic1  
and proceeds to deal with the first of  
the two problems cited in the #aggb     
letter to ,herz#gfj--;how               
sense-representations stand related to  
their object4 ,the exact terms in which 
this question was there formulated      

should be noted4       8,i propounded to
 myself this question3 on what ground   
rests the      relation of that in us   
which we name representation            
7,vorstellung7      to the object4 ,if  
the representation contains only the    
mode in      which the subject is       
affected by the object1 it is easily    
understood how it should accord 7gemss  
sei7 with that object as      an effect 
with its cause1 and how therefore this  
determination of      our mind should be
 able to represent something1 i4e4 have 
an      object4 ,the passive or sensuous
 representations have thus a            
comprehensible 7begreifliche7 relation  
to objects1 and the      principles1    
which are borrowed from the nature of   
our soul1 have a      comprehensible    
validity for all things in so far as    
they are to be      objects of the      
senses40#gfa  ,thus in #aggb there was  
here no real problem for ,kant4 ,the    
assumed fact1 that our representations  
are generated in us by the action of    

independent existences1 is taken as     
sufficient explanation of their being   
referred to objects4  ,the section of   
the ,critique under consideration shows 
that ,kant had come to realise the      
inadequacy of this explanation quite    
early1 indeed prior to his solution of  
the second and further question which in
 that same letter is spoken of as 8the  
key to the whole secret0 of metaphysics4
 ,on what grounds1 he now asks1 is a    
subjective idea1 even though it be a    
sense impression1 capable of yielding   
consciousness of an object8 ,in the     
letter to ,herz the use of the term     
representation 7,vorstellung7           
undoubtedly helped to conceal this      
problem4 ,it is now emphasised that     
appearances are nothing but sense       
representations1 and must never be      
regarded as objects capable of existing 
in themselves1 with exactly the same    
character1 outside our power of         
representation4 ,now also ,kant employs1
 in place of the phrase 8in accord      

with10 the much more definite term      
8corresponding to40 ,he points out that 
when we speak of an object corresponding
 to our knowledge1 we imply that it is  
distinct from that knowledge4           
,consciousness of such an object must   
therefore be acquired from some other   
source than the given impressions4 ,in  
other words1 ,kant is now prepared to   
withdraw his statement that 8the passive
 or sensuous representations have an    
easily comprehensible relation to       
objects40 ,in and by themselves they are
 purely subjective1 and can involve no  
such concept4 ,the latter is a thought  
7,gedanke71 a concept 7,begriff71       
additional to1 and distinct from1 the   
given impressions4 ,its possibility1 as 
regards both origin#gfb and validity1   
must be 8deduced40  ,there then results 
this first and very peculiar form of the
 transcendental deduction4 ,that part of
 it which persists in the successive    
stages rests upon an explicitly         
developed distinction between empirical 

and transcendental apperception4 ,kant  
teaches1 in agreement with ,hume1       
though1 as we may believe1 independently
 of his direct influence1 that there is 
no single empirical state of the self   
which is constant throughout            
experience4#gfc       8,the             
consciousness of the self1 according to 
the determinations of      our state in 
inner perception1 is merely empirical1  
and always in      process of change4444
 ,that which has to be represented as of
      necessity numerically identical   
cannot be thought as such through       
empirical data4 ,there must be a        
condition which precedes all            
experience1 and renders experience      
itself possible1 if a                   
transcendental pre-supposition of this  
kind is to be rendered      valid4444   
,this pure1 original1 unchangeable      
consciousness ,i shall      name        
transcendental apperception40#gfd  ,kant
 would seem to have first developed this
 view in a quite crude form4 ,the       

consciousness of the self1 he seems to  
have held1 consists in its awareness of 
its own unceasing activities4 ,as       
consciousness of activity1 it is        
entirely distinct in nature and in      
origin from all apprehension of sense   
impressions4#gfe ,this teaching is a    
natural extension of the doctrine of the
 ,dissertation1#gff that such pure      
notions as those of possibility1        
existence1 necessity1 substance1 cause1 
are 8acquired by attending to the       
actions of the mind on the occasion of  
experience40 ,kant would very naturally 
hold that consciousness of the identity 
and unity of the self is obtained in a  
similar manner4 ,such1 indeed1 is the   
teaching of the section before us4      
8,no knowledge can take place in us 444 
without that unity of      consciousness
 which precedes all data of intuitions1 
and in      relation to which all       
representation of objects is alone      
possible40#gfg 8,it is precisely this   
transcendental apperception      that   

constructs out of 7macht aus7 all       
possible appearances1      which are    
capable of coexisting in one experience1
 a connection of      all these         
representations according to laws4 ,for 
this unity of      consciousness would  
be impossible if the mind could not     
become      conscious1 in the knowledge 
of the manifold1 of the identity of the 
function whereby it combines it         
synthetically in one knowledge4         
,thus the mind's original and necessary 
consciousness of the      identity of   
itself is at the same time a            
consciousness of an      equally        
necessary unity of the synthesis of all 
appearances      according to concepts1 
i4e4 according to rules4444 ,for the    
mind      could not possibly think the  
identity of itself in the manifold of   
its representations1 and indeed a       
priori1 if it did not have      before  
its eyes the identity of its            
action44440#gfh  ,that is to say1 the   
self is the sole source of all unity4   

,as a pure and original unity it        
precedes experience2 to its synthetic   
activities all conceptual unity is due2 
and by reflection upon the constancy of 
these activities it comes to            
consciousness of its own identity4      
8444even the purest objective unity1    
namely that of the a priori             
concepts 7space and time71 is possible  
only through relation of      the       
intuitions to transcendental            
apperception4 ,the numerical      unity 
of this apperception is therefore the a 
priori condition of      all concepts1  
just as the manifoldness of space and of
 time is of      the intuitions of      
sensibility40#gfi  ,to this             
consciousness of the abiding unity of   
the self ,kant also traces the notion of
 the transcendental object4 ,the latter1
 he would seem to argue1 is formed by   
analogy from the former4       8,this   
object is nothing else than the         
subjective representation 7of      the  
subject7 itself1 but made general1 for  

,i am the original of all               
objects40#ggj 8,the mind1 through its   
original and underived      thinking1 is
 itself the pattern 7,urbild7 of such a 
synthesis40#gga 8,i would not represent 
anything as outside me1 and      so make
 subjective appearances into objective  
experience if the      representations  
were not related to something which is  
parallel to      my ego1 and so in that 
way referred by me to another           
subject40#ggb  ,these quotations from   
the ,lose ,bltter would seem to contain 
the key to ,kant's extremely enigmatic  
statement in ,a #aje1 that 8the unity   
which the object makes necessary can be 
nothing else than the formal unity of   
consciousness in its synthesis of the   
manifold of its representations10 and   
again in ,a #aji1 that 8this relation of
 representations to an object is nothing
 else than the necessary unity of       
consciousness40#ggc  ,but this does not 
complete the sum-total of the functions 
which ,kant is at this stage prepared to

 assign to apperception4 ,it mediates   
our consciousness of the transcendental 
object in still another manner1 namely1 
by rendering possible the formation of  
the empirical concepts which unify and  
direct its synthetic activities4 ,this  
is1 indeed1 the feature in which this   
form of the deduction diverges most     
radically from all later positions4     
,space and time are1 it would seem1     
regarded as being the sole a priori     
concepts4#ggd ,the instruments through  
which the unity of apperception acts1   
and through which the thought of an     
object becomes possible1 are empirical  
concepts4 ,such general concepts as     
8body0 or 8triangle0 serve as rules     
constraining the synthetic processes of 
apprehension and reproduction to take   
place in such unitary fashion as is     
required for unitary consciousness4 ,the
 notion of objectivity is specified in  
terms of the necessities which these    
empirical concepts thus impose4         
8,we think a triangle as object in so   

far as we are conscious of the          
combination of three straight lines     
according to a rule by which      such  
an intuition can at all times be        
generated4 ,this unity of rule          
determines the whole manifold and limits
 it to conditions which      make the   
unity of apperception possible2 and the 
concept of this      unity of rule is   
the representation of the object4444    
,all      knowledge demands a concept1  
444 and a concept is always1 as         
regards its form1 something general1    
something that serves as a      rule4   
,thus the concept of body serves as a   
rule to our knowledge of      outer     
appearances1 in accordance with the     
unity of the manifold      which is     
thought through it4444 ,the concept of  
body necessitates 444 the representation
 of extension1 and therewith of         
impenetrability1 shape1 etc40#gge  ,such
 is the manner in which ,kant accounts  
for our concept of the transcendental   
object4 ,it consists of two main        

elements3 first1 the notion of an       
unknown x1 to which representations may 
be referred2 and secondly1 the          
consciousness of this x as exercising   
compulsion upon the order of our        
thinking4 ,the former notion is framed  
on the pattern of the transcendental    
subject2 it is conceived as another but 
unknown subject4 ,the consciousness of  
it as a source of external necessity is 
mediated by the empirical concepts which
 transcendental apperception also makes 
possible4 ,and from this explanation of 
the origin of the concept of the        
transcendental object ,kant derives the 
proof of its validity4#ggf ,it is       
indispensable for the realisation by the
 unitary self of a unitary              
consciousness4       8,this relation of 
representations to an object is nothing 
else      than the necessary unity of   
consciousness1 and therefore also of    
the synthesis of the manifold1 by a     
common 7gemeinschaftlich7               
functioning of the mind1 which unites it

 in one      representation40#ggg       
,through instruments empirical in       
origin1 and subjectively necessary1 the 
notion of an objective necessity is     
rendered possible to the mind4  ,it is  
not surprising that ,kant did not       
permanently hold to this view of the    
empirical concept4 ,the objections are  
obvious4 ,such a view of the function of
 general concepts renders unintelligible
 their own first formation4 ,for as they
 are empirical1 they can only be        
acquired by conscious processes that do 
not involve them4 ,that is to say1      
consciousness of objects follows upon a 
prior consciousness in and through which
 concepts1 such as that of body1 are    
discovered and formed4 ,yet1 as the     
argument claims1 general concepts are   
the indispensable conditions of unitary 
consciousness4 ,how through a           
consciousness that is not yet unified   
can general concepts be formed8 ,also it
 is difficult to see how empirical      
concepts can be viewed as directly      

conditioned by1 and as immediately due  
to1 anything so general as pure         
apperception4 ,these objections ,kant   
must have come very quickly to          
recognise4 ,this was the first part of  
his teaching to be modified4 ,in the    
immediately succeeding stage1#ggh so far
 as the stages can be reconstructed from
 the survivals in the ,critique1 the    
empirical concepts are displaced once   
and for all by the a priori categories4 
,the only sentences which can be        
regarded as possibly conflicting with   
the above interpretation are those two  
7in the second last and in the last     
paragraphs7 in which the phrase 8rules a
 priori0 occurs4 ,even granting 7what is
 at least questionable as regards the   
first7 that the words are meant to be   
taken together1 it does not follow that 
,kant is here speaking of categories4   
,for contrary to his usual teaching he  
speaks of the concept of body as a      
source of necessity4 ,if so1 it may     
well1 with equal looseness1 be spoken of

 as a priori4 ,that is indeed done1 by  
implication1 in the second and third    
paragraphs1 where he speaks of a rule   
7referring to 8body and triangle07 as   
making the synthesis of reproduction 8a 
priori necessary40 ,such assertions are 
completely inconsistent with ,kant's    
,critical teaching1 but so is the entire
 section4  ,the setting in which the    
passage before us occurs has its own    
special interest4#ggi ,when ,kant1 as it
 would seem1 on the very eve of the     
publication of the ,critique1 developed 
the doctrine of a threefold synthesis   
culminating in a 8synthesis of          
recognition in the concept10 he must    
have bethought himself of this earlier  
position1 and have completed his        
subjective deduction by incorporation1  
probably with occasional alterations of 
phrasing1 of the older manuscript4 ,this
 procedure has bewildered even the most 
discerning among ,kant's readers2 but   
now1 thanks to ,vaihinger's convincing  
analysis1 it may be welcomed as of      

illuminating interest in the historical 
study of ,kant's development4  ,i may   
here draw attention to the two important
 respects in which the positions        
revealed in this section continued to   
influence ,kant's later teaching3       
namely1 in the emphasis laid upon the   
transcendental unity of apperception1   
and in the view of objectivity as       
involving the thought of the thing in   
itself4  ,the excessive emphasis which  
in this first stage is laid upon the    
transcendental unity of apperception    
persists throughout the later forms of  
the deduction1 and1 as ,i shall try to  
show1 does so to the detriment of the   
argument4 ,though its functions are     
considerably diminished1 they are still 
exaggerated2 this is perhaps in part due
 to its having been in this early stage 
regarded as in and by itself the sole   
ultimate ground of unitary experience4  
,there were1 however1 two other         
influences at work4 ,kant continued to  
employ the terminology of his earlier   

view1 and in his less watchful moments  
was betrayed thereby into conflict with 
his considered teaching4 ,but even more 
important was the influence of his      
personal convictions4 ,he was           
irrevocably committed in his own private
 thinking to a belief in the spiritual  
and abiding character of the self2 and  
this belief frequently colours1 in      
illegitimate ways1 the expression of his
 views4 ,this is especially evident in  
some of the alterations#ghj of the      
second edition1 written as they were at 
a time when he was chiefly preoccupied  
with moral problems4  ,as regards the   
other factor1 the view adopted in regard
 to the nature of objectivity1 there is 
ample evidence that even after the      
empirical concepts had been displaced by
 the categories ,kant still continued   
for some time 7possibly for several     
years in the earlier and middle         
'seventies7 to hold to his doctrine of  
the transcendental object4 ,passages    
which expound it in this later form     

occur in the ,note on ,amphiboly and    
throughout the ,dialectic4#gha ,that    
this may not be taken for his final     
teaching is equally certain4 ,the entire
 first layer of the deduction of the    
first edition1 all the relevant passages
 in the chapter on phenomena and        
noumena1 and some of those in the       
,dialectic1 were omitted in the second  
edition2 and nowhere1 either in the     
other portions of the deduction of the  
first edition1 or in the deduction of   
the second edition1 or in any passages  
added elsewhere in the second edition1  
is such teaching to be found4  ,a brief 
statement of ,kant's doctrine of the    
transcendental object in its later form 
seems advisable at this point2 it is    
required in order to complete and to    
confirm the interpretation which ,i have
 given of the earlier exposition4 ,at   
the same time ,i shall endeavour to show
 that the sections in which the doctrine
 occurs1 though later than the first    
layer of the deduction of the first     

edition1 are all of comparatively early 
origin1 and that they reveal not the    
least trace of ,kant's more mature1     
phenomenalist view of the empirical     
world in space4  ,we may begin with the 
passages in the chapter on phenomena and
 noumena4 ,the meaning in which the term
 transcendental is employed is there    
made sufficiently clear4       8,the    
transcendental employment of a concept  
in any principle      consists in its   
being referred to things in general and 
in      themselves40#ghb  ,that is to   
say1 the term transcendental1 as used in
 the phrase transcendental object1 is   
not employed in any sense which would   
oppose it to the transcendent4 ,in so   
far as the thought of the thing in      
itself is a necessary ingredient in the 
concept of objectivity1 it is a         
condition of apperception1 and therefore
 of possible experience2 in other words1
 the thought of a transcendent object is
 one of the transcendental conditions of
 our experience4 ,as ,kant is constantly

 interchanging the terms transcendent   
and transcendental1 such an explanation 
of the phrase is perhaps superfluous2   
but if any is called for1 the above     
would seem to suffice4 ,as we shall have
 occasion to observe1#ghc other factors 
besides the a priori must be reckoned   
among the conditions of experience2 and 
to both types of conditions ,kant       
applies the epithet transcendental4  ,in
 the chapter on phenomena and noumena   
,kant enquires at considerable length   
whether the categories 7meaning1 of     
course1 the pure forms of understanding1
 not their schematised correlates7 allow
 of transcendental 7i4e4 transcendent7  
employment4 ,the passages in which this 
discussion occurs#ghd would seem1       
however1 to be highly composite2 many   
paragraphs1 or portions of paragraphs1  
are of much later date than others4 ,we 
may therefore limit our attention to    
those in which the phrase transcendental
 object is actually employed1 i4e4 to   
those which appear only in the first    

edition4       8,all our representations
 are referred by the understanding to   
some      object2 and since appearances 
are merely representations1 the         
understanding refers them to a something
 as the object of      sensuous         
intuition4 ,but this something1 thus    
conceived 7in so      fern71 is only the
 transcendental object2 and by that is  
meant a      something  x1 of which we  
know1 and with the present constitution 
of our understanding can know1 nothing  
whatsoever1 but which1 as a             
correlate of the unity of apperception1 
can serve only for the      unity of the
 manifold in sensuous intuition4 ,by    
means of this      unity the            
understanding combines the manifold into
 the concept of      an object4 ,this   
transcendental object cannot be         
separated from the      sense data1 for 
nothing then remains over through which 
it might be      thought4 ,consequently 
it is not in itself an object of        
knowledge1      but only the            

representation of appearances under the 
concept of an      object in general    
which is determinable through the       
manifold of      those appearances4     
,precisely for this reason also the     
categories do      not represent a      
special object given to the             
understanding alone1      but only serve
 to specify the transcendental object   
7the concept of      something in       
general7 through that which is given in 
sensibility1      in order thereby to   
know appearances empirically under      
concepts of      objects40#ghe 8,the    
object to which ,i relate appearance in 
general      is the transcendental      
object1 i4e4 the completely             
indeterminate      thought of something 
in general4 ,this cannot be entitled the
      noumenon i4e4 the thing in itself 
more specifically determined      as    
being the object of a purely            
intelligible intuition2#ghf for ,i      
know nothing of what it is in itself1   
and have no concept of it      save as  

the object of a sensuous intuition in   
general1 and so as      being one and   
the same for all appearances40#ghg      
,otherwise stated1 ,kant's teaching is  
as follows4 ,the thought of the thing in
 itself remains altogether              
indeterminate2 it does not specify its  
object1 and therefore yields no         
knowledge of it2 none the less it is a  
necessary ingredient in the concept of  
objectivity as such4 ,the object as     
specified in terms of sense is mere     
representation2 the object as genuinely 
objective can only be thought4 ,the     
correlate of the unity of apperception  
is the thought of the thing in itself4  
,this is what ,kant is really asserting1
 though in a hesitating manner which    
would seem to indicate that he is       
himself already more or less conscious  
of its unsatisfactory and un-,critical  
character4  ,the phrase transcendental  
object occurs once in the second        
,analogy#ghh and twice in the ,note on  
,amphiboly4#ghi ,the passage in the     

second ,analogy may very well1 in view  
of the kind of subjectivism which it    
expounds1 be of early date of writing4  
,by transcendental object ,kant there   
quite obviously means the thing in      
itself4 ,from the first reference in the
 ,note on ,amphiboly no definite        
conclusions can be drawn4 ,the argument 
is too closely bound up with his        
criticism of ,leibniz to allow of his   
own independent standpoint being        
properly developed4 ,there is1 however1 
nothing in it which compels us to regard
 it as of late origin2 and quite        
evidently ,kant here means by the       
transcendental object the thing in      
itself4 ,the phrase substantia          
phaenomenon is not1 as might at first   
sight seem1 equivalent to the empirical 
object of ,kant's phenomenalist         
teaching4 ,it is an adaptation of       
,leibnizian phraseology4#gij ,the second
 reference in the ,note on ,amphiboly   
occurs in a passage which may perhaps be
 of later origin2#gia but the           

transcendental object is there mentioned
 only in order to afford opportunity for
 the statements that it cannot be       
thought through any of the categories1  
that we are completely ignorant whether 
it is within or without us1 and whether 
if sensibility were removed it would    
vanish or remain1 and that it can       
therefore serve only as a limiting      
concept4 ,we here observe it in the very
 process of being eliminated4 ,as we    
shall find1 ,kant's teaching is         
ill-expressed in the sections on        
,amphiboly2 so much so that they could  
not be recast without seriously         
disturbing the balance of his           
architectonic4 ,they were therefore     
allowed to remain unaltered in the      
second edition4  ,we may now pass to the
 ,dialectic4 ,the subjectivist doctrine 
of the transcendental object is there   
expressed in a much more uncompromising 
manner4 ,let us first consider the      
references to the transcendental object 
in the ,paralogisms and in the          

subsequent ,reflection4 ,the phrase     
transcendental object occurs twice in   
the second ,paralogism1 once in the     
third1 twice in the fourth1 and three   
times in the ,reflection2#gib and in all
 these cases there is not the least     
uncertainty as to its denotation4 ,it is
 taken as equivalent to the thing in    
itself1 and is expounded as a necessary 
ingredient in the consciousness of our  
subjective representations as noumenally
 grounded4       8,what matter may be as
 a thing in itself 7transcendental      
object7 is      completely unknown to   
us1 though1 owing to its being          
represented as      something external1 
its permanence as appearance can indeed 
be      observed40#gic 8,we can indeed  
admit that something1 which may be      
7in the transcendental#gid sense7       
#8outside us1' is the cause of      our 
outer intuitions1 but this is not the   
object of which we are      thinking in 
the representations of matter and of    
corporeal things1      for these are    

merely appearances1 i4e4 mere kinds of  
representation which are never to be met
 with save in us1 and whose             
actuality depends on immediate          
consciousness just as does the          
consciousness of my own thoughts4 ,the  
transcendental object is      equally   
unknown in respect to inner and to outer
 intuition40#gie  ,here ,kant at one and
 the same time distinguishes between1   
and confounds together1 representation  
and its empirical object4 ,what is alone
 clear is that by the transcendental    
object he means simply the thing in     
itself viewed as the cause of our       
sensations4 ,in ,a #ceh it is used in a 
wider sense as also comprehending the   
noumenal conditions which underlie the  
conscious subject4       8444this       
something which underlies the outer     
appearances and which      so affects   
our sense that it obtains the           
representations of space1      matter1  
shape1 etc41 this something viewed as   
noumenon 7or better      as             

transcendental object7 might also at the
 same time be the      subject that does
 our thinking44440  ,similarly in ,a    
#cgi-hj3       8,though the ,i1 as      
represented through inner sense in time1
 and      objects in space outside me1  
are specifically quite distinct         
appearances1 they are not for that      
reason thought as being      different  
things4 ,neither the transcendental     
object which underlies      outer       
appearances1 nor that which underlies   
inner intuition1 is in      itself      
either matter or a thinking being1 but  
is a ground 7to us      unknown7 of the 
appearances which supply to us the      
empirical      concepts of the former as
 well as of the latter kind40  ,the     
references in the ,reflection on the    
,paralogisms are of the same general    
character and are equally definite4#gif 
,a #cij-a has special interest in that  
it explicitly states that to            
appearances1 taken as ,kant invariably  
takes them throughout the ,paralogisms  

in the first edition as mere subjective 
representations1 the category of        
causality1 and therefore by implication 
the category of substance1 is           
inapplicable4       8,no one could dream
 of asserting that that which he has    
once come      to recognise as mere     
representation is an outer cause40  ,we 
may now turn to the passages in the     
chapter on the ,antinomies4       8,the 
non-sensuous cause of our               
representations is completely           
unknown to us1 and therefore we cannot  
intuit it as object4444 ,we      may1   
however1 entitle the purely intelligible
 cause of appearances      in general   
the transcendental object4444 ,to this  
transcendental      object we can       
ascribe the whole extent and connection 
of our      possible                    
perceptions44440#gig  ,appearances can  
be regarded as real only to the extent  
to which they are actually experienced4 
,otherwise they exist only in some      
unknown noumenal form of which we can   

acquire no definite concept1 and which  
is therefore really nothing to us4      
,this1 ,kant declares1 is true even of  
that immemorial past of which we are    
ourselves the product4       8444all the
 events which have taken place in the   
immense periods      that have preceded 
my own existence mean really nothing but
 the      possibility of extending the  
chain of experience from the present    
perception back to the conditions which 
determine it in time40#gih  ,in other   
words1 we may not claim that such       
events1 empirically conceived1 have ever
 actually existed in any such empirical 
form4 ,a similar interpretation is given
 to the assertion of the present reality
 of what has never been actually        
experienced4       8,moreover1 in       
outcome it is a matter of indifference  
whether ,i say      that in the         
empirical progress in space ,i can meet 
with stars a      hundred times farther 
removed than the outermost now          
perceptible to      me1 or whether ,i   

say that they are perhaps to be met with
 in      cosmical space even though no  
human being has ever perceived or       
ever will perceive them4 ,for though    
they might be given as things      in   
themselves1 without relation to possible
 experience1 they are      still nothing
 for me1 and therefore are not objects1 
save in so far      as they are         
contained in the series of the empirical
 regress40#gii      8,the cause of the  
empirical conditions of this process1   
that which      determines what members 
,i shall meet with and how far by means 
of      such members ,i can carry out   
the regress1 is transcendental and is   
therefore necessarily unknown to        
me40#hjj  ,such is the form in which    
,kant's pre-,critical doctrine of the   
transcendental object survives in the   
,critique4#hja ,it contains no trace of 
the teaching of the objective deduction 
of the first and second edition or of   
the teaching of the refutation of       
idealism in the second edition4 ,it     

closely resembles ,mill's doctrine of   
the permanent possibilities of          
sensation1 and is almost equally        
subjectivist in character4 ,as already  
noted1#hjb it also lies open to the     
further objection that it involves an   
illegitimate application of the         
categories to things in themselves4 ,as 
,kant started from the nave and natural 
assumption that reference of            
representations to objects must be their
 reference to things in themselves1 he  
also took over the current ,cartesian   
view that it is by an inference in terms
 of the category of causality that we   
advance from a representation to its    
cause4 ,the thing in itself is regarded 
as the sole true substance and as the   
real cause of everything which happens  
in the natural world4 ,appearances1     
being representations merely1 are wholly
 transitory and completely              
inefficacious4 ,not only1 therefore1 are
 the categories regarded as valid of    
things in themselves1 they are also     

declared to have no possible application
 to phenomena4 ,sense appearances do    
not1 on this view1 constitute the       
mechanical world of the natural         
sciences2 they have a purely subjective1
 more or less epi-phenomenal1 existence 
in the mind of each separate observer4  
,it was very gradually1 in the process  
of developing his own ,critical         
teaching1 that ,kant came to realise the
 very different position to which he was
 thereby committed4 ,the categories1    
including that of causality1 are        
pre-empted for the empirical object     
which is now regarded as immediately    
apprehended2 and the function of        
mediating the reference of phenomena to 
things in themselves now falls to the   
,ideas of ,reason4 ,the distinction     
between appearance and reality is no    
longer that between representations and 
their noumenal causes1 but between the  
limited and relative character of the   
entire world in space and time and the  
unconditioned demanded by ,reason4 ,but 

these are questions whose discussion    
must meantime be deferred4#hjc  ,i may  
now briefly summarise the evidence in   
favour of the view that the doctrine of 
the transcendental object is a          
pre-,critical or semi-,critical survival
 and must not be taken as forming part  
of ,kant's final and considered         
position4 7,i7 ,of the six sections in  
which the phrase transcendental object  
occurs1 three#hjd were omitted in the   
second edition1 and in the passages     
which were substituted for them it      
receives no mention4 ,there are various 
reasons which can be suggested in       
explanation of the retention of the     
other three#hje in the second edition4  
,the ,note on ,amphiboly was too        
unsatisfactory as a whole to encourage  
,kant to improve upon it in detail4 ,the
 other two are outside the limit at     
which ,kant thought good to terminate   
all attempts to improve1 whether in     
major or in minor matters1 the text of  
the first edition4#hjf ,to have recast  

the ,antinomies as he had recast the    
,paralogisms would have involved        
alterations much too extensive4 ,also1  
there were no outside polemical         
influences--or at least none acting     
quite directly--such as undoubtedly     
reinforced his other reasons for        
revising the ,paralogisms4 7#b7         
,secondly1 the transcendental object is 
not mentioned in the later layers of the
 deduction of the first edition1 nor in 
the deduction of the second edition1 nor
 in any passage or note added in the    
second edition4 ,that ,kant should thus 
suddenly cease to employ a phrase to    
which he had accustomed himself is the  
more significant in view of his         
conservative preference for the adapting
 of familiar terminology to new uses4   
,it can only be explained as due to his 
recognition of the completely untenable 
character of the teaching to which it   
had given expression4 ,as the object of 
knowledge is always empirical1 it can   
never legitimately be called            

transcendental4 7#c7 ,thirdly1 the      
general teaching of the passages in     
which the phrase transcendental object  
occurs is by itself sufficient proof of 
their early origin4 ,they reveal not the
 least trace of the deepened insight of 
his final standpoints4 ,as we know1 it  
was certain difficulties involved in the
 working out of the objective deduction 
that delayed the publication of the     
,critique for so many years2 and the    
sections which deal with these          
difficulties contain ,kant's maturest   
teaching4 ,in them he seems to withdraw 
definitely from the positions to which  
he had unwarily committed himself by his
 un-,critical doctrine of the           
transcendental object4 ,i now pass to   
the second section constitutive of the  
first stage4  ,a #hd-ib;,b #aaf-bd1 ,i4 
#ac4--;,just as in ,,ii4  #c ,kant deals
 solely with the first of the two       
questions formulated in the letter of   
#aggb to ,herz--the reference of        
sense-representations to an object1--so 

in ,i4  #ac he raises only the          
second--that of the objective validity  
of intellectual representations 7now    
spoken of as pure concepts of           
understanding1 or pure a priori         
concepts1 and only in one sentence as   
categories74 ,and just as in the former 
section he carries the problem a step   
further1 yet without attaining to the   
true ,critical position1 so in this     
latter he still assumes that it is the  
application of these pure concepts to   
real independent objects1 i4e4 to things
 in themselves1 which calls for         
justification4 ,we must again consider  
the exact terms in which this problem is
 formulated in the letter to ,herz4#hjg 
8,similarly1 if that in us which is     
called a representation1 were           
active in relation to the object1 that  
is to say1 if the object      itself    
were produced by the representation 7as 
on the view that the      ideas in the  
,divine ,mind are the archetypes of     
things71 the      conformity of         

representations with objects might be   
understood4 ,we      can thus render    
comprehensible at least the possibility 
of two      kinds of intelligence--of an
 intellectus archetypus1 on whose       
intuition the things themselves are     
grounded1 and of an      intellectus    
ectypus which derives the data of its   
logical      procedure from the sensuous
 intuition of things4 ,but our          
understanding 7leaving moral ends out of
 account7 is not the cause      of the  
object through its representations1 nor 
is the object the      cause of its     
intellectual representations 7in sensu  
reali74      ,hence1 the pure concepts  
of the understanding cannot be          
abstracted      from the data of the    
senses1 nor do they express our capacity
 for      receiving representations     
through the senses4 ,but1 whilst they   
have      their sources in the nature of
 the soul1 they originate there         
neither as the result of the action of  
the object upon it1 nor as              

themselves producing the object4 ,in the
 ,dissertation ,i was      content to   
explain the nature of these intellectual
 representations      in a merely       
negative manner1 viz4 as not being      
modifications of the      soul produced 
by the object4 ,but ,i silently passed  
over the further      question1 how such
 representations1 which refer to an     
object and      yet are not the result  
of an affection due to that object1 can 
be      possible4 ,i had maintained that
 the sense representations represent    
things as they appear1 the intellectual 
representations things as      they are4
 ,but how then are these things given to
 us1 if not by the      manner in which 
they affect us8 ,and if such            
intellectual      representations are   
due to our own inner activity1 whence   
comes the      agreement which they are 
supposed to have with objects1 which yet
      are not their products8 ,how comes
 it that the axioms of pure reason      
about these objects agree with the      

latter1 when this agreement has      not
 been in any way assisted by experience8
 ,in mathematics such      procedure is 
legitimate1 because its objects only are
 quantities      for us1 and can only be
 represented as quantities1 in so far as
 we      can generate their             
representation by repeating a unit a    
number of      times4 ,hence the        
concepts of quantity can be             
self-producing1 and      their          
principles can therefore be determined a
 priori4 ,but when      we ask how the  
understanding can form to itself        
completely a      priori concepts of    
things in their qualitative             
determination1      with which these    
things must of necessity agree1 or      
formulate in      regard to their       
possibility principles which are        
independent of      experience1 but with
 which experience must exactly          
conform1--we      raise a question1 that
 of the origin of the agreement of our  
faculty of understanding with the things

 in themselves1 over which              
obscurity still hangs40#hjh  ,the       
section before us represents the same   
general standpoint as that given in the 
above letter4 ,here1 too1 it is the     
validity of the a priori concepts in    
reference to things in themselves that  
is under consideration4 ,the implication
 of ,kant's argument is that the        
categories1 being neither determinable  
nor discoverable by means of experience1
 will only apply to appearances if they 
determine1 or rather reveal1 the actual 
non-experienced nature of things in     
themselves4 ,these pure concepts1 it is 
implied1 owing to their combined a      
priori and intellectual characteristics1
 make this inherent claim4 ,either they 
are altogether empty and illusory1 or   
such unlimited validity must be granted 
to them4 ,kant1 that is to say1 still   
holds1 as in the ,dissertation1 that    
sense-representations reveal things as  
they appear1 intellectual               
representations things as they are4     

8,we have either to surrender completely
 all claims to judgments of      pure   
reason1 in the most esteemed of all     
fields1 that which extends      beyond  
the limits of all possible experience1  
or we must bring this      ,critical    
investigation to perfection40#hji  ,the 
pure concepts1 unlike space1 8apply to  
objects generally1 apart from the       
conditions of sensibility40#haj ,but    
here also1 as in the letter to ,herz1   
the strange and problematic character of
 such knowledge is clearly recognised4  
,kant's discussion of the concept of    
causality in ,a #ij may seem to conflict
 with the above contention--that it is  
its applicability to things in          
themselves which ,kant is considering4  
,but this difficulty vanishes if we bear
 in mind that here1 as in the           
,dissertation1 there is no such         
distinction as we find in ,kant's later 
more genuinely phenomenalist position1  
between the objects causing our         
sensations and things in themselves4#c  

,the purely intelligible object1        
supposed to remain after elimination of 
the empirical and a priori sensory      
factors1 is the thing in itself4 ,the   
objects apprehended through sense are   
real1 only not in their sensuous form4  
,there are two connected facts which    
together may perhaps be taken as        
evidence that ,i4  #ac is later than    
,,ii4 #c b4 ,intellectual concepts are  
reinstated alongside the a priori       
concepts of space and time4 ,kant has   
evidently in the meantime given up the  
attempt to construe the former as       
empirical in origin4 ,that that attempt 
was earlier in time would seem to be    
proved by the further fact1 that the a  
priori concepts are here viewed as      
performing the same kind of function as 
that ascribed in ,,ii4 #c b to concepts 
that are empirical4 ,they are conditions
 of the 8synthetic unity of             
thought40#haa ,this view of the function
 of concepts is certainly fundamental   
and important1 and ,kant permanently    

retained it from his previous abortive  
method of #8deduction4' ,but it was a   
long step from the discovery of the     
distinction between empirical and a     
priori concepts to its fruitful         
application4 ,that involved appreciation
 of the further fact that the two       
problems1 separately stated in the      
letter to ,herz and separately dealt    
with in ,,ii4 #c b and in ,i4  #ac--the 
problem of the relation of              
sense-representations1 and the problem  
of the relation of intellectual         
representations1 to an object1--are     
indeed one and the same1 soluble from   
one and the same standpoint1 by one and 
the same method of deduction1 namely1 by
 reference to the possibility of        
experience4 ,only in and through        
relation to an object can               
sense-representations be apprehended2   
and only as conditions of such          
sense-experience are the categories     
objectively valid4 ,relation to an      
object is constituted by the categories1

 and is necessary in reference to       
sense-representations1 because only     
thereby is consciousness of any kind    
possible at all4  ,that this truly      
,critical position had not been attained
 when ,i4  #ac was written1#hab is shown
 not only by its concentration on the   
single problem of the validity of a     
priori concepts1 but also by its        
repeated assertion that representations 
can be consciously apprehended          
independently of all relation to the    
faculty of understanding4 ,the directly 
counter assertion appears1 however1 in  
the sections 7,i4  #ad1 ,,ii43 first    
four paragraphs7 which immediately      
follow in the text of the               
,critique--indicating that in the period
 represented by these latter the        
revolutionary discovery1 the truly      
,copernican hypothesis1 had at last been
 achieved4 ,they constitute the second  
stage1 and to it we may now proceed4    
,second ,stage4--,a #ib-d  ,b #abd-g2 ,a
 #ie-g2 ,a #aaj-ad4  ,a #ib-d1 ,i4  #ad 

7with the exception of the concluding   
classification of mental powers74--,this
 section makes a fresh start2 it stands 
in no necessary relation to any         
preceding section4 ,the problem is still
 formulated1 in its opening sentences1  
in terms reminiscent of the letter to   
,herz2 but otherwise the standpoint is  
entirely new1 and save for the wording  
of a single sentence 7,a #ic3 8if not   
intuited1 yet071 is genuinely ,critical4
 ,the phrase 8possibility of experience0
 now appears1 and is at once assigned   
the central rle4 ,the words 8if not     
intuited1 yet0 in ,a #ic may possibly   
have been inserted later in order to    
tone down the flagrant contradiction    
with the preceding paragraphs4 ,in any  
case1 even this qualification is        
explicitly retracted in ,a #id4  ,a     
#ie-g4--,the same standpoint appears in 
the first three paragraphs of ,section  
,,ii4 ,the categories are 8the a priori 
conditions on which the possibility of  
experience depends40#hac ,by the        

categories alone 8can an object be      
thought40#had ,the further important    
point that only in their empirical      
employment do the categories have use   
and meaning is excellently developed4   
8,an a priori concept not referring to  
experience would be the      logical    
form only of a concept1 but not the     
concept itself by which      something  
is thought40#hae  ,a #aaj-ad1 ,,ii4     
#d4--;,in this section also the argument
 starts afresh1 indicating 7if such     
evidence were required7 that1 like ,i4  
#ad1 it must have been written          
independently of its present context4   
,but the argument is now advanced one   
step further4 ,the categories are       
recognised as simultaneously            
conditioning both unity of consciousness
 and objectivity4       8,there is but  
one experience 444 as there is but one  
space and one      time44440 8,the a    
priori conditions of a possible         
experience are      at the same time    
conditions of the possibility of objects

 of      experience0#haf 8444the        
necessity of these categories rests on  
the      relation which our whole       
sensibility1 and with it also all       
possible      appearances1 have to the  
original unity of apperception44440#hag 
,now also it is emphasised that save in 
and through a priori concepts no        
representations can exist for           
consciousness4       8,they would then  
belong to no experience1 would be       
without an      object1 a blind play of 
representations1 less even than a       
dream40#hah ,they 8would be to us the   
same as nothing40#hai  ,the wording is  
still not altogether unambiguous1 but   
the main point is made sufficiently     
clear4  ,these paragraphs are the       
earliest in which traces of a genuine   
phenomenalism can be detected4 ,the     
transcendental object1 one and the same 
for all our knowledge1 is not referred  
to4 #8,objects' 7in the plural7 is the  
term which is used wherever the context 
permits4 ,the empirical object is thus  

made to intervene between the thing in  
itself and the subjective               
representations4 ,but the distinction   
between empirical objects and subjective
 representations on the one hand1 and   
between empirical objects and things in 
themselves on the other1 is not yet     
drawn in any really clear and definite  
manner4  ,a similar phenomenalist       
tendency crops out in ,kant's           
distinction#hbj between objective       
affinity and subjective association4    
8,the ground of the possibility of the  
association of the manifold1      so far
 as it lies in the object1 is named the 
affinity of the      manifold40  ,none  
the less ,kant's subjectivism finds one 
of its most decided expressions in ,a   
#aad4  ,third ,stage4--,a #aai-bc       
,,iii4 2 ,a #aaf-ai  ,,iii4 2 ,a #id-e  
,i4  #ad ,c7oncluding paragraph72 ,a    
#abf-h  ,,iii4 2 ,a #abh-cj  ,s7ummary72
 ,a #abc-f  ,,iii4 2 ,a #aae-af  ,,iii4 
,i7ntroduction72 ,a #gf-i 7,b #ajb-d7   
#aj ,t7ransition to fourth stage74  ,a  

#aai-bc1 ,,iii4  7from the beginning of 
the seventh paragraph to the end of the 
twelfth74 ,the doctrine of objective    
affinity already developed in the above 
sections is now made to rest upon a new 
faculty1 the productive imagination4 ,as
 ,vaihinger remarks1 the wording of this
 section would seem to indicate that it 
is ,kant's first attempt at formulating 
that new doctrine4 ,he has not as yet   
got over his own surprise at the        
revolutionary nature of the conclusions 
to which he feels himself driven by the 
exigencies of ,critical teaching4 ,he   
finds that it is deepening into         
consequences which may lead very far    
from the current psychology and from his
 own previous views regarding the nature
 and conditions of the knowing process  
and of personality4 ,as evidence that   
this section was not written            
continuously with ,,ii4 #d1a we have the
 further fact that though the doctrine  
of objective affinity is dwelt upon1 it 
is described afresh1 with no reference  

to the preceding account4 ,also1 the    
empirical processes of apprehension and 
reproduction1 already mentioned in ,a   
#ajd-aj1 are now ascribed to the        
empirical imagination which is carefully
 distinguished from the productive4     
,,iii4  repeats 8from above0 the        
argument given in ,,iii4  8from below40 
,it insists upon the close connection   
between the categories 7first introduced
 in ,,ii4 #dhba7 with the productive    
imagination of ,,iii4 4  ,vaihinger     
places ,,iii4  next in order1 on account
 of the connection of its argument with 
,,iii4 4#hbb ,but it dwells only upon   
the chief outcome of the total argument1
 viz4 that the orderliness of nature is 
due to understanding4 ,that productive  
imagination is not mentioned1 is taken  
by ,vaihinger to signify ,kant's        
recognition that it can be postulated   
only hypothetically1 and that as        
doctrine it is not absolutely essential 
to the strict deduction4  ,s summarises 
the entire argument1 and in it 8pure    

imagination0 receives mention4  ,within 
this third stage ,,iii4  is subsequent  
to the above four sections4 ,for it     
carries the doctrine of productive      
imagination one step further4 ,in ,,iii4
 1 ,,iii4 1 and ,s1 productive          
imagination has been treated merely as  
an auxiliary function of pure           
understanding4       8,the unity of     
apperception in relation to the         
synthesis of      imagination is the    
understanding2 and the same unity with  
reference to the transcendental         
synthesis of the imagination is the     
pure understanding40#hbc  ,it is now    
treated as a separate and distinct      
faculty4 ,so far from being a function  
of understanding1 its synthesis 8by     
itself1 though carried out a priori1 is 
always sensuous40#hbd ,it is       8one 
of the fundamental faculties of the     
human soul4444 ,the two      extreme    
ends1 sensibility and understanding1    
must be brought into      connection    
with each other by means of this        

transcendental function      of         
imagination40#hbe  ,in this section     
there also appears a new element which  
would seem to connect it with the next  
following stage1 namely1 the addition to
 the series1 apprehension1 association1 
and reproduction1 of the further        
process1 recognition4 ,as here          
introduced it is extremely ambiguous in 
character4 ,it is counted as being      
empirical1 and yet as containing a      
priori concepts4 ,this decidedly hybrid 
process would seem to represent ,kant's 
first formulation of the even more      
ambiguous process1 which corresponds to 
it in the fourth stage4  ,in ,,iii4 ,i  
recognition is again mentioned1 but this
 time in a form still more akin to its  
treatment in the fourth stage4 ,it is   
not recognition through categories1 but1
 as a form in apperception1 is the      
8empirical consciousness of the identity
 of the reproductive                    
representations with the appearances by 
which they were      given40#hbf  ,in   

all other respects1 however1 the above  
six sections agree 7along with ,i4  #ad 
,c7 in holding to a threefold division  
of mental powers3 sensibility1          
imagination1 and apperception4 ,this    
third stage is thereby marked off       
sufficiently clearly from the second    
stage in which pure imagination is      
wanting1 and from the fourth stage in   
which it is dissolved into a threefold a
 priori synthesis4  ,in both ,i4  #ad ,c
 and in ,,iii4 ,i the classification    
which underlies the third stage is      
explicitly formulated4 ,their statements
 harmoniously combine to yield the      
following tabular statement3  #a4 ,the  
synopsis of the manifold--a priori      
through sense1 i4e4 in pure intuition4  
#b4 ,the synthesis of this              
manifold--through pure transcendental   
imagination4  #c4 ,the unity of this    
synthesis--through pure original        
transcendental apperception4  ,at this  
point ,vaihinger adds to the above      
section the earlier passage  #aj ,t4#hbg

 ,it is even more definitely than ,,iii4
  and ,,iii4 ,i transitional to the     
fourth stage4 ,it must be classed within
 the third stage1 as it holds to the    
above threefold classification4 ,but it 
modifies that classification in two     
respects4 ,first1 in that it does not   
employ the term synopsis1 but only      
speaks of pure intuition as required to 
yield us a manifold4 ,the term synopsis1
 as used by ,kant1 is1 however1         
decidedly misleading4#hbh ,his          
invariable teaching is that all         
connection is due to synthesis4 ,by     
synopsis1 therefore1 which he certainly 
does not employ as synonymous with      
synthesis1 can be meant only            
apprehension of external                
side-by-sideness4 ,it never signifies   
anything except apprehension of the     
lowest possible order4 ,kant's omission 
of the term1 therefore1 tends to        
clearness of statement4 ,secondly1 the  
classification is also modified by the  
substitution of understanding for the   

unity of apperception4 ,apperception is1
 however1 so obscurely treated in all of
 the above sections1 that this cannot be
 regarded as a vital alteration4 ,what  
is new in this section1 and seems to    
connect it in a curious and interesting 
manner with sections in the fourth      
stage1 is its doctrine of       8a      
manifold of a priori sensibility40      
8,space and time contain a      manifold
 of pure a priori intuition40#hbi  ,that
 is1 in this connection1 an entirely new
 doctrine4 ,in all the previous sections
 of the deduction 7previous in the      
assumed order of original writing7 the  
manifold supplied through intuition is  
taken as being empirical1 and as        
consisting of sensations4 ,kant here    
also adds that the manifold1 8whether   
given empirically or a priori10#hcj must
 be synthesised before it can be known4 
8,the spontaneity of our thought        
requires that this manifold of      pure
 a priori intuition should be run       
through in a certain      manner1 taken 

up1 and connected1 in order that a      
knowledge may be      formed out of it4 
,this action ,i call synthesis40        
,fourth ,stage4--,a #ih-ajd2 ,a         
#ig-h4--;,as already noted1 there are in
 ,kant two persistent but conflicting   
interpretations of the nature of the    
synthetic processes exercised by        
imagination and understanding1 the      
subjectivist and the phenomenalist4#hca 
,now1 on the former view1 imagination is
 simply understanding at work4 ,in other
 words1 imagination is merely the active
 synthesising side of a faculty whose   
complementary aspect appears in the     
logical unity of the concept4 ,from this
 point of view the transcendental and   
the empirical factors may be taken as   
forming a single series4 ,the           
transcendental and the empirical        
processes will vary together1 some form 
of transcendental activity corresponding
 to every fundamental form of empirical 
activity and vice versa4 ,such an       
inference only follows if the           

subjectivist standpoint be accepted to  
the exclusion of the phenomenalist point
 of view4 ,but since ,kant constantly   
alternates between them1 and never quite
 definitely formulates them in their    
distinction and opposition2 since1 in   
fact1 they were rather of the nature of 
obscurely felt tendencies than of       
formulated standpoints1 it is quite     
intelligible that an inference derived  
from the one should be drawn even at the
 very time when the other is being more 
explicitly developed4 ,this1 it would   
seem1 is what actually happened4 ,when  
we come to consider the evidence        
derivable from the ,reflexionen and     
,lose ,bltter1 we shall find support for
 the view that after ,january #aghj1 on 
the very eve of the publication of the  
,critique1 while the revolutionary1     
phenomenalist consequences of the       
,critical hypothesis were becoming      
clearer to him1 he unguardedly allowed  
the above inference to lead him to      
recast his previous views in a decidedly

 subjectivist manner4 ,the view that    
transcendental imagination has a special
 and unique activity altogether         
different in type from any of its       
empirical processes1 namely1 the        
8productive10 is now allowed to drop2   
and in place of it ,kant develops the   
view that transcendental functions run  
exactly parallel with the empirical     
processes of apprehension1 reproduction1
 and recognition4 ,accordingly1 in place
 of the classification presented in the 
third stage1 we find a new and radically
 different one introduced into the text1
 without the least indication that      
,kant's standpoint has meantime changed4
 ,it is given in ,a #ig3  ,a4 ,synopsis 
of the manifold through sense4  ,b4     
,synthesis4      #a4 ,synthesis of      
apprehension of representations in inner
 intuition4     #b4 ,synthesis of       
reproduction of representations in      
imagination4     #c4 ,synthesis of      
recognition of representations in the   
concept4  ,and ,kant adds in explanation

 that 8these point to three subjective  
sources of knowledge which make the     
understanding itself possible1 and which
 in so doing make all experience        
possible1 in so far as it is an         
empirical product of the understanding40
 ,what1 now1 are these three subjective 
sources of knowledge8 ,they certainly   
are not those classified in the table of
 the third stage4 ,a roughly coincides  
with its first member2 consequently ,b  
#a is left without proper correlate4 ,b 
#b is altogether different from the     
previous synthesis of imagination1 for  
in the earlier table transcendental     
imagination is regarded as being solely 
productive1 never reproductive4#hcb ,it 
is now asserted to be reproductive--a   
contradiction of one of his own most    
emphatic contentions1 which can only be 
accounted for by some such explanation  
as we are here stating4 ,nothing is     
lacking as regards explicitness in the  
statement of this new position4 8444the 
reproductive synthesis of imagination   

belongs to the transcendental acts of   
the soul1 and1 in reference to it viz4  
to the reproductive synthesis1 we will  
call this power too the transcendental  
power of the imagination40#hcc ,lastly1 
even ,b #c does not coincide with the   
pure apperception of the other table4 ,b
 #c is more akin to the recognition     
which in the third stage is declared to 
be always empirical4 ,in any case1 it is
 recognition in the concept2 and though 
that may ultimately involve and         
condition transcendental apperception1  
it remains1 in the manner in which it is
 here developed by ,kant1 something very
 different4 ,but this is a point to     
which we shall return4 ,there is an     
added complication1 running through this
 entire stage1 which first requires to  
be disentangled4 ,the transcendental    
syntheses are declared to condition the 
pure representations of space and time  
no less than those of sense-experience4 
8,this synthesis of apprehension also   
must be executed a priori1      i4e4 in 

reference to representations which are  
not empirical4 ,for      without it we  
could not have the a priori             
representations either      of space or 
of time1 since these can be generated   
only through the      synthesis of the  
manifold which sensibility presents in  
its      original receptivity4 ,thus we 
have a pure synthesis of                
apprehension0#hcd 8444if ,i draw a line 
in thought or desire to      think of   
the time from one noon to another1 or   
merely represent to      myself a       
certain number1 ,i must1 firstly1       
apprehend these manifold                
representations one after the other4    
,but if the preceding                   
representations 7the first parts of the 
line1 the antecedent parts      of time 
or the units serially represented7 were 
always to drop out      of my thought1  
and were not reproduced when ,i advance 
to those that      follow1 no complete  
representation1 and none of all the     
aforementioned thoughts1 not even the   

purest and first basal                  
representations of space and time1 could
 ever arise40#hce  ,this1 as ,vaihinger 
remarks1 is a point of sufficient       
importance to justify separate          
treatment4 ,but it is introduced quite  
incidentally by ,kant1 and obscures     
quite as much as it clarifies the main  
argument4  ,it is convenient to start   
with the second synthesis4 ,kant's      
argument is much clearer in regard to it
 than in regard to the other two4 ,he   
distinguishes between empirical and     
transcendental reproduction4            
,reproduction in ordinary experience1 in
 accordance with the laws of            
association1 is merely empirical4 ,the  
de facto conformity of appearances to   
rules is what renders such empirical    
reproduction possible2                  
8444otherwise our faculty of empirical  
imagination would never find      any   
opportunity of action suited to its     
capacities1 and would      remain hidden
 within the mind as a dead1 and to us   

unknown      power40#hcf  ,kant proceeds
 to argue1 consistently with his        
doctrine of objective affinity1 that    
empirical reproduction is itself        
transcendentally conditioned4 ,the form1
 however1 in which this argument is     
developed is peculiar to the section    
before us1 and is entirely new4         
8,if we can show that even our purest a 
priori intuitions yield no              
knowledge1 save in so far as they       
contain such connection of the          
manifold as will make possible a        
thoroughgoing synthesis of              
reproduction1 this synthesis of the     
imagination must be grounded1      prior
 to all experience1 on a priori         
principles2 and since      experience   
necessarily presupposes that appearances
 can be      reproduced1 we shall have  
to assume a pure transcendental         
synthesis      of the imagination as    
conditioning even the possibility of all
      experience40#hcg  ,in the         
concluding paragraph ,kant makes clear  

that he regards this transcendental     
activity as being exercised in a twofold
 manner3 in relation to the empirically 
given manifold as well as in relation to
 the a priori given manifold4 ,how this 
transcendental activity is to be        
distinguished from the empirical is not 
further explained4 ,i discuss this point
 below4#hch  ,the argument of the       
section on the synthesis of             
apprehension1 to which we may now turn  
back1 suffers from serious ambiguity4   
,it is not clear whether a distinction1 
analogous to that between empirical and 
transcendental reproduction1 is being   
made in reference to apprehension4 ,the 
actual wording of its two last          
paragraphs would lead to that           
conclusion4 ,that1 however1 is a view   
which would seem to be excluded by the  
wider context4 ,kant is dealing with the
 synthesis of apprehension in inner     
intuition1 i4e4 in time4 ,by the        
fundamental principles of his teaching  
such intuition must always be           

transcendental4 ,empirical apprehension 
can only concern the data of the special
 senses4 ,the process of apprehension   
referred to in the middle paragraph must
 therefore itself be transcendental4    
,but it is in dealing with the synthesis
 of recognition that the argument is    
most obscure4 ,it is idle attempting to 
discover any possible distinction       
between an empirical and a              
transcendental process of recognition4  
,for the transcendental process here    
appears as being the consciousness that 
what we are thinking now is the same as 
what we thought a moment before2 and it 
is illustrated not by reference to the  
pure intuitions of space and time1 but  
only by the process of counting4 ,it may
 be argued that empirical recognition is
 mediated by transcendental factors--by 
pure concepts and by apperception4 ,but 
unless we are to take transcendental    
recognition as synonymous with          
transcendental apperception1 which      
,kant's actual teaching does not seem to

 justify us in doing1 such              
considerations will not enable us to    
distinguish two forms of recognition4   
,apart1 however1 from this difficulty1  
there is the further one that the       
concepts in and through which the       
recognition is executed are here        
described as being empirical4 ,the only 
key that will solve the mystery of this 
extraordinary section1 hopelessly       
inexplicable when viewed as a single    
continuous whole1 is1 it would seem1 the
 theory of ,vaihinger1 namely1#hci that 
from the third paragraph onwards        
7already dealt with as forming the first
 stage of the deduction7 ,kant is making
 use of manuscript which represents the 
earliest form in which his explanation  
of the consciousness of objects was     
developed1 with the strange result that 
this section is a combination of the    
latest and of the earliest forms of the 
deduction4 ,while seeking to make out a 
parallelism between the empirical1      
conscious activities of imagination and 

understanding on the one hand1 and its  
transcendental functions on the other1  
he must have bethought himself of the   
earlier attempt to explain consciousness
 of objects through empirical concepts  
conditioned by transcendental           
apperception1 and so have attempted to  
expound the third form of synthesis by  
means of it4 ,as thus extended it       
involves a distinction between          
transcendental and empirical            
apperception1 and upon that the         
discussion1 so far as it concerns       
anything akin to recognition1 altogether
 turns4 ,but there is not the least     
further mention of recognition itself4  
,as transcendental1 it cannot be taken  
as the equivalent of empirical          
apperception2 and as a synthesis through
 concepts1 can hardly coincide with pure
 apperception4 ,the title of the        
section1 8the synthesis of recognition  
in the concept10 is thus no real        
indication of the astonishing fare      
prepared for the reader4 ,the doctrine  

of a threefold synthesis seems to have  
occurred to ,kant on the very eve of the
 publication of the ,critique4 ,the     
passage expounding it may well have been
 hurriedly composed1 and when unforeseen
 difficulties accumulated1 especially in
 regard to recognition as a             
transcendental process1 ,kant must have 
resolved simply to close the matter by  
inserting the older manuscript4   ,,iii4
 ,evidence yielded by the 8,reflexionen0
 and 8,lose ,bltter0 in support of the  
above analysis4  ,the evidence1 derived 
by ,vaihinger from the ,reflexionen and 
,lose ,bltter1 briefly outlined1 is as  
follows4#hdj 7#a7 ,in the ,reflexionen  
zur ,anthropologie relevant passages are
 few in number1 and represent a         
standpoint very close to that of the    
#aggj ,dissertation4 ,imagination is    
treated only as an empirical            
faculty4#hda ,recognition1 which is only
 once mentioned1#hdb is also viewed as  
merely empirical4 ,the understanding is 
spoken of as the faculty through which  

objects are thought4#hdc ,the categories
 are not mentioned1 and it is stated    
that the understanding yields only ideas
 of reflection4 8,all knowledge of      
things is derived1 as regards its       
matter1 from sensation--the             
understanding gives only ideas of       
reflection40#hdd ,so far1 these         
,reflexionen would seem to coincide1    
more or less1 with the first stage of   
the deduction4 ,they contain1 however1  
no reference to transcendental          
apperception2 and are therefore regarded
 by ,vaihinger as representing a still  
earlier standpoint4  7#b7 ,in the       
,reflexionen zur ,kritik der reinen     
,vernunft there is a very large and     
valuable body of relevant passages4 ,no4
 #ibe must be of the same date as the   
letter of #aggb to ,herz2 it formulates 
its problem in practically identical    
terms4#hde ,nos4 #idf-eb and #iee may   
belong to the period of the first stage4
 ,for though the doctrine of the        
transcendental object as the opposite   

counterpart of the transcendental       
subject is not mentioned1 the           
spiritualist view of the self is        
prominent4 ,in ,no4 #idf it is asserted 
that the representation of an object is 
8made by us through freedom40           
8,free actions are already given a      
priori1 namely our own40#hdf      8,to  
pass universal objective judgments1 and 
to do so apodictically1      reason must
 be free from subjective grounds of     
determination4 ,for      were it so     
determined the judgment would be merely 
accidental1      namely in accordance   
with its subjective cause4 ,thus reason 
is      conscious a priori of its       
freedom in objectively necessary        
judgments in so far as it apprehends    
them as exclusively grounded            
through their relation to the           
object40#hdg 8,transcendental freedom   
is the necessary hypothesis of all      
rules1 and therefore of all             
employment of the understanding40#hdh   
8,appearances are      representations  

whereby we are affected4 ,the           
representation of our      free         
self-activity does not involve          
affection1 and accordingly is      not  
appearance1 but apperception40#hdi  ,it 
is significant that the categories      
receive no mention4  ,almost all the    
other ,reflexionen would seem to have   
originated in the period of the second  
stage of the deduction2 but they still  
betray a strong spiritualist bias4      
8,impressions are not yet               
representations1 for they must be       
related      to something else which is 
an action4 ,now the reaction of the mind
      is an action which relates to the 
impression1 and which if taken          
alone#hej may in its special forms      
receive the title      categories40#hea 
8,we can know the connection of things  
in the      world only if we produce it 
through a universal action1 and so out  
of a principle of inner power 7aus einem
 ,prinzip der inneren      ,potestas73  
substance1 ground1 combination40#heb    

,these ,reflexionen recognise only the  
categories of relation1#hec and must    
therefore be prior to the twelvefold    
classification4 ,there is not the least 
trace of the characteristic doctrines of
 the third and fourth stages of the     
deduction1 viz4 of the transcendental   
function of the imagination or of a     
threefold transcendental synthesis4 ,the
 nature of apprehension is also most    
obscure4 ,it is frequently equated with 
apperception4  7#c7 ,the ,lose ,bltter  
aus ,kants ,nachlass 7,heft ,i47        
contains fragments which also belong to 
the second stage of the deduction1 but  
which would seem to be of somewhat      
earlier date than the above             
,reflexionen4#hed ,they have interesting
 points of contact with the first stage4
 ,thus though the phrase transcendental 
object does not occur in them1 the      
object of knowledge is equated with x1  
and is regarded in the manner of the    
first stage as the opposite counterpart 
of the unity of the self4#hee ,these    

fragments belong1 however1 to the second
 stage in virtue of their recognition of
 the a priori categories of relation4   
,there is also here1 as is in the       
,reflexionen1 great lack of clearness   
regarding the nature of apprehension2   
and there is still no mention of the    
transcendental faculty of imagination4  
,fragment #h is definitely datable4 ,it 
covers the free spaces of a letter of   
invitation dated ,may #bj1 #agge4hef    
,fragment ,b #abheg belongs to a        
different period from the above4 ,this  
is sufficiently evident from its        
contents2 but fortunately the paper upon
 which it is written--an official       
document in the handwriting of the      
,rector of the ,philosophical ,faculty  
of ,knigsberg--enables us to decide the 
exact year of its origin4 ,it is dated  
,january #bj1 #aghj4 ,the fragment must 
therefore be subsequent to that date4   
,now in it transcendental imagination   
appears as a third faculty alongside    
sensibility and understanding1 and a    

distinction is definitely drawn between 
its empirical and its transcendental    
employment4 ,the former conditions the  
synthesis of apprehension2 the latter   
conditions the synthetic unity of       
apperception4 ,it further distinguishes 
between reproductive and productive     
imagination1 and ascribes the former    
exclusively to the empirical            
imagination4 ,in all these respects it  
stands in complete agreement with the   
teaching of the third stage of the      
deduction4 ,the fact that this fragment 
is subsequent to ,january #aghj would   
seem to prove that even at that late    
date ,kant was struggling with his      
deduction4#heh ,but the most interesting
 of all ,vaihinger's conclusions has    
still to be mentioned4 ,he points out   
that at the time when this fragment was 
composed ,kant had not yet developed the
 doctrine characteristic of the fourth  
stage1 namely1 of a threefold           
transcendental synthesis4 ,moreover1 as 
he observes1 the statement which it     

explicitly contains1 that reproductive  
imagination is always empirical1 is     
inconsistent with any such doctrine4    
,the teaching of the fourth stage must  
consequently be ascribed to an even     
later date4#hei  7#d7 ,the ,lose ,bltter
 7,heft ,,ii471 though almost           
exclusively devoted to moral and legal  
questions1 contain in ,e #fghfj a       
relevant passage which ,reicke regards  
as belonging to the #8eighties1 but     
which ,adickes and ,vaihinger agree in  
dating 8shortly before #agha40 ,on      
,vaihinger's view it is a preliminary   
study for the passages of the fourth    
stage of the deduction4 ,but such exact 
dating is not essential to ,vaihinger's 
argument4 ,it is undoubtedly quite late1
 and contains the following sentence3   
8,all representations1 whatever their   
origin1 are yet ultimately as           
representations modifications of inner  
sense1 and their unity must      be     
viewed from this point of view4 ,a      
spontaneity of synthesis                

corresponds to their receptivity3 either
 of apprehension as      sensations or  
of reproduction as images               
7,einbildungen7 or of      recognition  
as concepts40  ,this is the doctrine    
from which the deduction of the first   
edition starts2 it was1 it would seem1  
the last to be developed4#hfa ,that we  
find no trace of it in the ,prolegomena1
 and that it is not only eliminated from
 the second edition1 but is expressly   
disavowed1#hfb would seem to indicate   
that it had been hastily adopted on the 
very eve of publication1 and that upon  
reflection ,kant had felt constrained   
definitively to discard it4 ,the        
threefold synthesis can be verified on  
the empirical level1 but there is no    
evidence that there exist corresponding 
transcendental activities4   ,,iv4      
,connected ,statement and ,discussion of
 ,kant's ,subjective and ,objective     
,deductions in the ,first ,edition      
,such are the varying and conflicting   
forms in which ,kant has presented his  

deduction of the categories4 ,we may now
 apply our results to obtain a connected
 statement of the essentials of his     
argument4 ,the following exposition1    
which endeavours to emphasise its main  
broad features1 to distinguish its      
various steps1 and to disentangle its   
complex and conflicting tendencies1     
will1 ,i trust1 yield to the reader such
 steady orientation as is necessary in  
so bewildering a labyrinth4 ,in the     
meantime ,i shall take account only of  
the deductions of the first edition1#hfc
 and from them shall strive to construct
 the ideal statement to which they      
severally approximate4 ,any single      
relatively consistent and complete      
deduction that is thus to serve as a    
standard exposition must1 like the      
root-languages of philology1 be typical 
or archetypal1 representing the argument
 at which ,kant aimed2 it cannot be one 
of the alternative expositions which he 
himself gives4 ,such reconstruction of  
an argument which ,kant has failed to   

express in a final and genuinely        
adequate form must1 of course1 lie open 
to all the dangers of arbitrary and     
personal interpretation4 ,it is an      
extremely adventurous undertaking1 and  
will have to be carefully guarded by    
constant reference to ,kant's ipsissima 
verba4 ,proof of its historical validity
 will consist in its capacity to render 
intelligible ,kant's own departures from
 it1 and in its power of explaining the 
reasons of his so doing4 ,its expository
 value will be in proportion to the     
assistance which it may afford to the   
reader in deciphering the actual texts4 
,our first task is to make clear the    
nature of the distinction which ,kant   
draws between the 8subjective0 and the  
8objective0 deductions4 ,this is a      
distinction of great importance1 and    
raises issues of a fundamental          
character4 ,in regard to it students of 
,kant take widely different views4 ,for 
it brings to a definite issue many of   
the chief controversies regarding       

,critical teaching4 ,kant has made some 
very definite statements in regard to   
it2 and one of the opposing schools of  
interpretation finds its chief and      
strongest arguments in the words which  
he employs4 ,but for reasons which will 
appear in due course1 adherence to the  
letter of the ,critique would in this   
case involve the commentator in great   
difficulties4 ,we have no option except 
to adopt the invidious position of      
maintaining that we may now1 after the  
interval of a hundred years and the     
labours of so many devoted students1    
profess to understand ,kant better than 
he understood himself4 ,for such        
procedure we may indeed cite his own    
authority4       8,not infrequently1    
upon comparing the thoughts which an    
author has      expressed in regard to  
his subject1 whether in ordinary        
conversation or in writing1 we find that
 we can understand him      better than 
he understood himself4 ,as he has not   
sufficiently      determined his        

concept1 he has sometimes spoken1 or    
even thought1      in opposition to his 
own intention40#hfd  ,let us1 then1     
consider first the distinction between  
the two types of deduction in the form  
in which it is drawn by ,kant4 ,in the  
,preface to the first edition1#hfe ,kant
 states that his transcendental         
deduction of the categories has two     
sides1 and assigns to them the titles   
subjective and objective4       8,this  
enquiry1 which is somewhat deeply       
grounded1 has two sides4      ,the one  
refers to the objects of pure           
understanding1 and is      intended to  
expound and render intelligible the     
objective validity      of its a priori 
concepts4 ,it is therefore essential to 
my      purposes4 ,the other seeks to   
investigate the pure understanding      
itself1 its possibility and the         
cognitive faculties upon which it       
rests4 ,although this latter exposition 
is of great importance for      my chief
 purpose1 it does not form an essential 

part of it4 ,for the      chief question
 is always simply this1--what and how   
much can the      understanding and     
,reason know apart from all experience8 
not--how      is the faculty of thought 
itself possible8 ,the latter is as it   
were      a search for the cause of a   
given effect2 and therefore is of the   
nature of an hypothesis 7though1 as ,i  
shall show elsewhere1 this is      not  
really so72 and ,i would appear to be   
taking the liberty simply      of       
expressing an opinion1 in which case the
 reader would be free to      express a 
different opinion4#hff ,for this reason 
,i must forestall      the reader's     
criticism by pointing out that the      
objective      deduction1 with which ,i 
am here chiefly concerned1 retains its  
full      force even if my subjective   
deduction should fail to produce that   
complete conviction for which ,i        
hope44440  ,the subjective deduction    
seeks to determine the subjective       
conditions which are required to render 

knowledge possible1 or to use less      
ambiguous terms the generative processes
 to whose agency human knowledge is due4
 ,it is consequently psychological in   
character4 ,the objective deduction1 on 
the other hand1 is so named because it  
deals not with psychological processes  
but with questions of objective         
validity4 ,it enquires how concepts     
which are a priori1 and which as a      
priori must be taken to originate in    
pure reason1 can yet be valid of        
objects4 ,in other words1 the objective 
deduction is logical1 or1 to use a      
post-,kantian term1 epistemological in  
character4  ,it is indeed true1 as ,kant
 here insists1 that the subjective      
deduction does not concern itself in any
 quite direct fashion with the ,critical
 problem--how a priori ideas can relate 
to objects4 8,although of great         
importance for my chief purpose1 it does
 not form an essential part of it40     
,this1 no doubt1 is one reason why ,kant
 omitted it when he revised the         

,critique for the second edition4#hfg   
,none the less it is1 as he here says1  
important2 and what exactly that        
importance amounts to1 and whether it is
 really true that it has such minor     
importance as to be rightly describable 
as unessential1 is what we have to      
decide4  ,though empirical psychology1  
in so far as it investigates the        
temporal development of our experience1 
is1 as ,kant very justly claims1        
entirely distinct in aim and method from
 the ,critical enquiry1 the same cannot 
be said of a psychology which1 for      
convenience1 and on the lines of ,kant's
 own employment of terms1 may be named  
transcendental4#hfh ,for it will deal1  
not with the temporal development of the
 concrete and varied aspects of         
consciousness1 but with the more        
fundamental question of the generative  
conditions indispensably necessary to   
consciousness as such1 i4e4 to          
consciousness in each and every one of  
its possible embodiments4 ,in the       

definition above given of the objective 
deduction1 ,i have intentionally        
indicated ,kant's unquestioning         
conviction that the a priori originates 
independently of the objects to which it
 is applied4 ,this independent origin is
 only describable in mental or          
psychological terms4 ,the a priori      
originates from within2 it is due to the
 specific conditions upon which human   
thinking rests4 ,now this interpretation
 of the a priori renders the teaching   
contained in the subjective deduction   
much more essential than ,kant is       
himself willing to recognise4 ,the      
conclusions arrived at may be highly    
schematic in conception1 and extremely  
conjectural in detail2 they are none the
 less required to supplement the results
 of the more purely logical analysis4   
,for though in the second edition the   
sections devoted to the subjective      
deduction are suppressed1 their         
teaching1 and the distinctions which    
they draw between the different mental  

processes1 continue to be employed in   
the exposition of the objective         
deduction1 and indeed are presupposed   
throughout the ,critique as a whole4    
,they are indispensably necessary in    
order to render really definite many of 
the contentions which the objective     
deduction itself contains4 ,to eliminate
 the subjective deduction is not to cut 
away these presuppositions1 but only to 
leave them in the obscure region of the 
undefined4 ,they will still continue to 
influence our mode of formulating and of
 solving the ,critical problem1 but will
 do so as untested and vaguely outlined 
assumptions1 acting as unconscious      
influences rather than as established   
principles4 ,for these reasons the      
omission of the subjective deduction is 
to be deplored4 ,the explicit statement 
of the implied psychological conditions 
is preferable to their employment       
without prior definition and analysis4  
,the deduction of the second edition    
rests throughout upon the initial and   

indispensable assumption1 that though   
connection or synthesis can never be    
given1 it is yet the generative source  
of all consciousness of order and       
relation4 ,factors which are            
transcendental in the strict or logical 
meaning of the term rest upon processes 
that are transcendental in a            
psychological sense4  ,this last phrase1
 #8transcendental in a psychological    
sense1' calls for a word of             
justification4 ,the synthetic processes 
generative of experience are not1 of    
course1 transcendental in the strict    
sense4 ,for they are not a priori in the
 manner of the categories4 ,none the    
less they are discoverable by the same  
transcendental method1 namely1 as being1
 like the categories1 indispensably     
necessary to the possibility of         
experience4 ,they differ from the       
categories in that they are not immanent
 in experience1 constituent of it1 and  
cannot therefore be known in their      
intrinsic nature4 ,as they fall outside 

the field of consciousness1 they can    
only be hypothetically postulated4 ,none
 the less1 formal categories and        
generative processes1 definable elements
 and problematic postulates1 alike agree
 in being conditions sine qua non of    
experience4 ,and further1 in terms of   
,kant's presupposed psychology1 the     
latter are the source to which the      
former are due4 ,there would thus seem  
to be sufficient justification for      
extending the term transcendental to    
cover both2 and in so doing we are      
following the path which ,kant himself  
willingly travelled4 ,for such would    
seem to have been his unexpressed       
reasons for ascribing1 as he does1 the  
synthetic generative processes to what  
he himself names transcendental         
faculties4  ,this disposes of ,kant's   
chief reason for refusing to recognise  
the subjective deduction as a genuine   
part of the ,critical enquiry1 namely1  
the contention upon which he lays such  
emphasis in the prefaces both of the    

first and of the second edition1#hfi    
that in transcendental philosophy       
nothing hypothetical1 nothing in any    
degree dependent upon general reasoning 
from contingent fact1 can have any      
place4 ,that contention proves untenable
 even within the domain of his purely   
logical analyses4 ,the very essence of  
his transcendental method consists in   
the establishment of a priori elements  
through proof of their connection with  
factual experience4 ,kant is here       
revealing how greatly his mind is still 
biased by the ,leibnizian rationalism   
from which he is breaking away4 ,his a  
priori cannot establish itself save in  
virtue of hypothetical reasoning4#hgj   
,his transcendental method1 rightly     
understood1 does not differ in essential
 nature from the hypothetical method of 
the natural sciences2 it does so only in
 the nature of its starting-point1 and  
in the character of the analyses which  
that starting-point prescribes4 ,and if 
hypothetical reasoning may be allowed in

 the establishment of the logical a     
priori1 there is no sufficient reason   
why it may not also be employed for the 
determination of dynamical factors4 ,the
 sole question is as to whether the     
hypotheses conform to the logical       
requirements and so raise themselves to 
a different level from mere opinion and 
conjecture4#hga ,as ,kant himself       
says1#hgb though his conclusions in the 
subjective deduction may seem to be     
hypothetical in the illegitimate sense1 
they are not really so4 ,from the       
experience in view of which they are    
postulated they receive at once the     
proof of their actuality and the        
material for their specification4  ,we  
may now return to the question of the   
nature of the two deductions4 ,the      
complex character of their              
interrelations may be outlined as       
follows3  #a4 ,though the subjective    
deduction is in its later stages        
coextensive with its objective          
counterpart1 in its earlier stages it   

moves wholly on what may be called the  
empirical level4 ,the data which it     
analyses and the conditions which it    
postulates are both alike empirical4    
,the objective deduction1 on the other  
hand1 deals from start to finish with   
the a priori4  #b4 ,the later stages of 
the subjective deduction are based upon 
the results of the objective deduction4 
,the existence and validity of a priori 
factors having been demonstrated by     
transcendental1 i4e4 logical1 analysis1 
the subjective deduction can be extended
 from the lower to the higher level1 and
 can proceed to establish for the a     
priori elements what in its earlier     
stages it has determined for empirical  
consciousness1 namely1 the nature of the
 generative processes which require to  
be postulated as their ground and       
origin4 ,when the two deductions are    
properly distinguished the objective    
deduction has1 therefore1 to be placed  
midway between the initial and the final
 stages of the subjective deduction4    

#c4 ,the two deductions concentrate upon
 different aspects of experience4 ,in   
the subjective deduction experience is  
chiefly viewed as a temporal process in 
which the given falls apart into        
successive events1 which1 in and by     
themselves1 are incapable of            
constituting a unified consciousness4   
,the fundamental characteristic of human
 experience1 from this point of view1 is
 that it is serial in character4 ,though
 it is an apprehension of time1 it is   
itself also a process in time4 ,in the  
objective deduction1 on the other hand1 
the time element is much less prominent4
 ,awareness of objects is the           
subject-matter to which analysis is     
chiefly devoted4 ,this difference very  
naturally follows from the character of 
the two deductions4 ,the subjective     
enquiry is mainly interested in the     
conditions generative of experience1 and
 finds its natural point of departure in
 the problem by what processes a unified
 experience is constructed out of a     

succession of distinct happenings4 ,the 
objective deduction presents the logical
 problem of validity in its most        
striking form1 in our awareness of      
objects2 the objective is contrasted    
with the subjective as being that which 
is universally and necessarily the same 
for all observers4 ,ultimately each of  
the two deductions must yield an        
analysis of both types of               
consciousness--awareness of time and    
awareness of objects2 a priori factors  
are involved in the former no less than 
in the latter1 and both are conditioned 
by generative processes4 ,unfortunately 
the manner in which this is done in the 
,critique causes very serious           
misunderstanding4 ,the problem of the   
psychological conditions generative of  
consciousness of objects is raised#hgc  
before the logical analysis of the      
objective deduction has established the 
data necessary for its profitable       
discussion4 ,the corresponding defect in
 the objective deduction is of a        

directly opposite character1 but is even
 more unfortunate in its effects4 ,the  
results obtained from the analysis of   
our awareness of objects are not1 within
 the limits of the objective deduction1 
applied in further analysis of our      
consciousness of time4 ,that is first   
done1 and even then by implication      
rather than by explicit argument1 in the
 ,analytic of ,principles4 ,this has the
 twofold evil consequence1 that the     
relations holding between the two       
deductions are very greatly obscured1   
and that the reader is not properly     
prepared for the important use to which 
the results of the objective deduction  
are put in the ,analytic of ,principles4
 ,for it is there assumed--a quite      
legitimate inference from the objective 
deduction1 but one whose legitimacy     
,kant has nowhere dwelt upon and        
explained--that to be conscious of time 
we must be conscious of it as existing  
in two distinct orders1 subjective and  
objective4 ,to be conscious of time we  

must be conscious of objects1 and to be 
conscious of objects we must be able to 
distinguish between the order of our    
ideas and the order of the changes 7if  
any7 in that which is known by their    
means4  ,thus the two deductions1       
properly viewed in their full scope1    
play into one another's hands4 ,the     
objective deduction is necessary to     
complete the analysis of                
time-consciousness given in the         
subjective deduction1 and the extension 
of the analysis of object-consciousness 
to the explanation of time-consciousness
 is necessary in order to make quite    
definite and clear the full significance
 of the conclusions to which the        
objective enquiry has led4#hgd  ,one    
last point remains for consideration4   
,experience is a highly ambiguous term1 
and to fulfil the rle assigned to it by 
,kant's transcendental method--that of  
establishing the reality of the         
conditions of its own possibility--its  
actuality must lie beyond the sphere of 

all possible controversy4 ,it must be   
itself a datum1 calling indeed for      
explanation1 but not itself making      
claims that are in any degree subject to
 possible challenge4 ,now if we abstract
 from all those particularising factors 
which are irrelevant in this connection1
 we are left with only three forms of   
experience--experience of self1         
experience of objects1 and experience of
 time4 ,the two former are open to      
question4 ,they may be illusory1 as     
,hume has argued4 ,and as their         
validity1 or rather actuality1 calls for
 establishment1 they cannot fulfil the  
demands which the transcendental method 
exacts from the experience whose        
possibility is to yield proof of its    
discoverable conditions4 ,consciousness 
of time1 on the other hand1 is a fact   
whose actuality1 however problematic in 
its conditions1 and however mysterious  
in its intrinsic nature1 cannot1 even by
 the most metaphysical of subtleties1 be
 in any manner or degree challenged4 ,it

 is an unquestioned possession of the   
human mind4 ,whether time itself is real
 we are not metaphysically certain1 but 
that1 whatever be its reality or        
unreality1 we are conscious of it in the
 form of change1 is beyond all manner of
 doubt4 ,consciousness of time is the   
factual experience1 as conditions of    
whose possibility the a priori factors  
are transcendentally proved4 ,in so far 
as they can be shown to be its          
indispensable conditions1 its mere      
existence proves their reality4 ,and    
such in effect is the ultimate character
 of ,kant's proof of the objective      
validity of the categories4 ,they are   
proved in that it is shown that only in 
and through them is consciousness of    
time possible4  ,the argument gains     
immeasurably in clearness when this is  
recognised2#hge and the deduction of the
 first edition of the ,critique1 in     
spite of its contorted character1       
remains in my view superior to that of  
the second edition owing to this more   

explicit recognition of the temporal    
aspect of consciousness and to          
employment of it as the initial         
starting-point4 ,analysis at once       
reveals that though consciousness of    
time is undeniably actual1 it is        
conditioned in complex ways1 and that   
among the conditions indispensably      
necessary to its possibility are both   
consciousness of self and consciousness 
of an objective order of existence4     
,starting from the undeniable we are    
thus brought to the problematic2 but    
owing to the factual character of the   
starting-point we can substantiate what 
would otherwise remain open to question4
  ,as this method of formulating ,kant's
 argument gives greater prominence to   
the temporal factor than ,kant himself  
does in his statement of the deductions1
 the reader may very rightly demand     
further evidence that ,i am not1 by this
 procedure1 setting the deductions in a 
false or arbitrary perspective4 ,any    
statement of ,kant's position in other  

than his own ipsissima verba is         
necessarily1 in large part1 a matter of 
interpretation1 and proof of its        
correctness must ultimately consist in  
the success with which it can be applied
 in unravelling the manifold strands    
that compose his tortuous and many-sided
 argument2 but the following special    
considerations may be cited in advance4 
,those parts of the ,critique1 such as  
the chief paragraphs of the subjective  
deduction and the chapter on            
,schematism1 which are demonstrably late
 in date of writing1 agree in assigning 
greater prominence to the temporal      
aspect of experience4 ,this is also true
 of those numerous passages added in the
 second edition which deal with inner   
sense4 ,all of these show an increasing 
appreciation of the central rle which   
time must play in the ,critical         
enquiries4 ,secondly1 proof of the      
validity of specific categories is      
given1 as we shall find1#hgf not in the 
objective deduction of the ,analytic of 

,concepts1 but only in the ,analytic of 
,principles4 ,what ,kant gives in the   
former is only the quite general        
demonstration that forms of unity1 such 
as are involved in all judgment1 are    
demanded for the possibility of         
experience4 ,now when proof of the      
specific categories does come1 in the   
,analytic of ,principles1 it is         
manifestly based on the analysis of     
time-experience4 ,in the three          
,analogies1 for example1 ,kant's        
demonstration of the objective validity 
of the categories of relation consists  
in the proof that they are necessary    
conditions of the possibility of our    
time-consciousness4 ,that is to say1 the
 transcendental method of proof1 when   
developed in full detail1 in reference  
to some specific category1 agrees with  
the formulation which ,i have given of  
the subjective and objective deductions4
 ,in the third place1 ,kant started from
 a spiritualist standpoint1 akin to that
 of ,leibniz1#hgg and only very         

gradually broke away from the many      
illegitimate assumptions which it       
involves4 ,but this original            
starting-point reveals its persisting   
influence in the excessive emphasis     
which ,kant continued to lay upon the   
unity of apperception4 ,he frequently   
speaks#hgh as if it were an ultimate    
self-justifying principle1 by reference 
to which the validity of all presupposed
 conditions can be established4 ,but    
that1 as ,i have already argued1 is a   
legitimate method of procedure only if  
it has previously been established that 
self-consciousness is involved in all   
consciousness1 that is1 involved even in
 consciousness of sequence and duration4
 ,and as just stated1 the deductions of 
specific categories1 given in the       
,analytic of ,principles1 fulfil these  
requirements of complete proof4 ,they   
start from the time-consciousness1 not  
from apperception4  ,i shall now        
summarise these introductory discussions
 in a brief tabulated outline of the    

main steps in the argument of the two   
deductions1 and shall add a concluding  
note upon their interconnection4        
,subjective ,deduction4--#a4            
,consciousness of time is an experience 
whose actuality cannot be questioned2 by
 its actuality it will therefore        
establish the reality of everything that
 can be proved to be its indispensable  
condition4  #b4 ,among the conditions   
indispensably necessary to all          
consciousness of time are synthetic     
processes whereby the contents of       
consciousness1 occurring in successive  
moments1 are combined and unified4      
,these processes are processes of       
apprehension1 reproduction1 and         
recognition4  #c4 ,recognition1 in turn1
 is conditioned by self-consciousness4  
#d4 ,as no consciousness is possible    
without self-consciousness1 the         
synthetic processes must have completed 
themselves before such                  
self-consciousness is possible1 and     
consequently are not verifiable by      

introspection but only by hypothetical  
construction4  #a1 #b1 #c1 and #d are   
steps which can be stated independently 
of the argument of the objective        
deduction4  #e4 ,self-consciousness     
presupposes consciousness of objects1   
and consciousness of objects presupposes
 the synthetic activities of productive 
imagination whereby the matter of sense 
is organised in accordance with the     
categories4 ,these productive activities
 also are verifiable only by conjectural
 inference1 and only upon their         
completion can consciousness of any kind
 make its appearance4  #f4              
,consciousness of self and consciousness
 of objects thus alike rest upon a      
complexity of non-phenomenal conditions4
 ,for anything that critical analysis   
can prove to the contrary1 consciousness
 and personality may not be ultimates4  
,they may be resultants due to realities
 fundamentally different from           
themselves4  #e is a conclusion obtained
 only by means of the argument of the   

objective deduction4 #f is a further    
conclusion1 first explicitly drawn by   
,kant in the ,dialectic4  ,objective    
,deduction4--#a4 ,the starting-point    
coincides with that of the subjective   
deduction4 ,consciousness of time is an 
experience by whose actuality we can    
establish the reality of its            
indispensable conditions4  #b4 ,among   
the conditions necessary to all         
consciousness of time is                
self-consciousness4  #c4                
,self-consciousness1 in turn1 is itself 
conditioned by consciousness of objects4
  #d4 ,consciousness of objects is      
possible only if the categories have    
validity within the sphere of           
sense-experience4  #e4                  
,conclusion4--,the empirical validity of
 the categories1 and consequently the   
empirical validity of our consciousness 
alike of the self and of objects1 must  
be granted as a conditio sine qua non of
 our consciousness of time4 ,they are   
the indispensable conditions of that    

fundamental experience4  ,as above      
stated1#hgi the preliminary stages of   
the subjective deduction prepare the way
 for the argument of the objective      
deduction1 while the results obtained by
 the latter render possible the         
concluding steps of the former4 ,that is
 to say1 the objective deduction has to 
be intercalated midway between the      
opening and the concluding stages of the
 subjective deduction4 ,it may also be  
observed that whereas the objective     
deduction embodies the main positive    
teaching of the ,analytic1 in that it   
establishes the possibility of natural  
science and of a metaphysics of         
experience1 the subjective deduction is 
more directly concerned with the        
subject-matter of the ,dialectic1       
reinforcing1 as it does1 the more       
negative consequences which follow from 
the teaching of the objective           
deduction--the impossibility of         
transcendent speculation4 ,it stands in 
peculiarly close connection with the    

teaching of the section on the          
,paralogisms4 ,we may now proceed to a  
detailed statement of the argument of   
the two deductions4   ,,the ,,subjective
 ,,deduction ,,in ,,its ,,initial       
,,empirical ,,stages  ,in the opening of
 the subjective deduction ,kant is      
careful to give due prominence to the   
temporal aspect of our human experience4
       8444all the contents of our      
knowledge are ultimately subject to the 
formal condition of inner sense1 that   
is1 to time1 as that wherein      they  
must all be ordered1 connected1 and     
brought into relation to      one       
another4 ,this is a general remark which
 the reader must bear in      mind as   
being a fundamental presupposition of my
 entire      argument40#hhj             
,consciousness of time is thus the      
starting-point of the deduction4        
,analysis reveals it as highly complex2 
and the purpose of the deduction is to  
discover1 and1 as far as may be         
possible1 to define its various         

conditions4 ,the argument can best be   
expounded by reference to a single      
concrete example--say1 our experience of
 a series of contents1 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1
 as in succession to one another and as 
together making up the total six4 ,in   
order that such an experience may be    
possible the successive members of the  
series must be held together            
simultaneously before the mind4         
,obviously1 if the earlier members      
dropped out of consciousness before the 
mind reached f1 f could not be          
apprehended as having followed upon     
them4 ,there must be a synthesis of     
apprehension of the successive items4   
,such a synthesis of apprehension is1   
however1 only possible through          
reproduction of the earlier experiences4
 ,if when the mind has passed from a to 
f1 f is apprehended as having followed  
upon a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 such consciousness  
is only possible in so far as these     
earlier contents are reproduced in      
image4 ,synthesis of apprehension is    

conditioned by synthesis of reproduction
 in imagination4       8,but if the     
preceding representations 7the first    
parts of a line1      the earlier       
moments of time or the units represented
 in sequent      order7 were always to  
drop out of my thought1 and were not    
reproduced when ,i advance to those that
 follow1 no complete                    
representation1 and none of all the     
aforementioned thoughts1 not      even  
the purest and first basal              
representations of space and time1      
could ever arise40#hha  ,in order1      
however1 that the reproduced images may 
fulfil their function1 they must be     
recognised as standing for or           
representing contents which the self has
 just experienced4       8,without the  
consciousness that what we are thinking 
is the same as      what we thought a   
moment before1 all reproduction in the  
series of      representations would be 
in vain40#hhb  ,each reproduced image   
would in its present state be a new     

experience1 and would not help in the   
least towards gaining consciousness of  
order or number in the succession of our
 experiences4 ,recognition is1          
therefore1 a third form of synthesis1   
indispensably necessary to consciousness
 of time4 ,but further1 the recognition 
is recognition of a succession as       
forming a unity or whole1 and that unity
 is always conceptual4       8,the word 
concept 7,begriff7 might of itself have 
suggested this      remark4 ,for it is  
this unitary consciousness which unites 
into a      single representation a     
manifold that has been successively     
intuited and then subsequently          
reproduced40#hhc 8,if in counting ,i    
forgot that the units 444 have been     
added to one another in      succession1
 ,i should never recognise what the     
sum-total is that is      being produced
 through the successive addition of unit
 to unit2 and      so would remain      
ignorant of the number4 ,for the concept
 of this      number is nothing but the 

consciousness of this unity of          
synthesis40#hhd  ,the synthesis of      
recognition is thus a synthesis which   
takes place in and through empirical    
concepts4 ,in the instance which we have
 chosen1 the empirical concept is that  
of the number six4  ,the analysis1      
however1 is not yet complete4 ,just as  
reproduction conditions apprehension and
 both rest on recognition1 so in turn   
recognition presupposes a still further 
condition1 namely1 self-consciousness4  
,for it is obvious1 once the fact is    
pointed out1 that the recognition of    
reproduced images as standing for past  
experiences can only be possible in so  
far as there is an abiding self which is
 conscious of its identity throughout   
the succession4 ,such an act of         
recognition is1 indeed1 merely one      
particular form or concrete instance of 
self-consciousness4 ,the unity of the   
empirical concept in and through which  
recognition takes place finds its       
indispensable correlate in the unity of 

an empirical self4 ,thus an analysis of 
our consciousness1 even though conducted
 wholly on the empirical level1 that is1
 without the least reference to the a   
priori1 leads by simple and cogent      
argument to the conclusion that it is   
conditioned by complex synthetic        
processes1 and that these syntheses in  
turn presuppose a unity which finds     
twofold expression for itself1          
objectively through a concept and       
subjectively in self-consciousness4  ,so
 far ,i have stated the argument solely 
in reference to serial consciousness4   
,kant renders his argument needlessly   
complex and diminishes its force by at  
once extending it so as to cover the    
connected problem1 how we become aware  
of objects4 ,this occurs in the section 
on the synthesis of reproduction4 ,an   
analysis of our consciousness of        
objects1 as distinct from consciousness 
of the immediately successive1 forces us
 to postulate further empirical         
conditions4 ,since the reproductive     

imagination1 to whose agency the        
apprehension of complex unitary         
existences is psychologically due1 acts 
through the machinery of association1 it
 presupposes constancy in the           
apprehended manifold4       8,if        
cinnabar were sometimes red1 sometimes  
black1 sometimes light1      sometimes  
heavy1 if a man changed sometimes into  
this and sometimes      into that animal
 form1 if the country on the longest day
 were      sometimes covered with       
fruits1 sometimes with ice and snow1 my 
empirical imagination would never even  
have occasion when      representing red
 colour to bring to mind heavy          
cinnabar44440#hhe  ,this passage may be 
compared with the one which occurs in   
the section on the synthesis of         
recognition4 ,our representations1 in   
order to constitute knowledge1 must have
 the unity of some concept2 the manifold
 cannot be apprehended save in so far as
 this is possible4       8,all knowledge
 demands a concept1 though that concept 

may be quite      imperfect or obscure4 
,but a concept is always1 as regards its
 form1      something general which     
serves as a rule4 ,the concept of body1 
for      instance1 as the unity of the  
manifold which is thought through it1   
serves as a rule to our knowledge of    
outer appearances4444 ,it               
necessitates in the perception of       
something outside us the                
representation of extension1 and        
therewith the representations of        
impenetrability1 form1 etc40#hhf  ,so   
far the deduction still moves on the    
empirical level4 ,when ,kant1 however1  
proceeds to insist#hhg that this        
empirical postulate itself rests upon a 
transcendental condition1 the argument  
is thrown into complete confusion1 and  
the reader is bewildered by the sudden  
anticipation of one of the most         
difficult and subtle conclusions of the 
objective deduction4 ,the same confusion
 is also caused throughout these        
sections as a whole by ,kant's          

description of the various syntheses as 
being transcendental4#hhh ,they cannot  
properly be so described4 ,the concepts 
referred to as unifying the syntheses1  
and the self-consciousness which is     
proved to condition the syntheses1 are  
all empirical4 ,they present themselves 
in concrete form1 and presuppose        
characteristics due to the special      
contingent nature of the given manifold2
 as ,kant states in so many words in the
 second edition4       8,whether ,i can 
become empirically conscious of the     
manifold as      simultaneous or as     
successive depends on circumstances or  
empirical      conditions4 ,the         
empirical unity of consciousness1       
through      association of             
representations1 therefore itself       
relates to an      appearance1 and is   
wholly contingent40#hhi  ,the argument  
in these preliminary stages of the      
subjective deduction1 in so far as it is
 employed to yield proof that all       
consciousness involves the unity of     

concepts and the unity of               
self-consciousness1 is independent of   
any reference to the categories1 and    
consequently to transcendental          
conditions4 ,in accordance with the plan
 of exposition above stated1 we may now 
pass to the objective deduction4        
,,objective ,,deduction ,,as ,,given    
,,in ,,the ,,first ,,edition  ,the      
transition from the preliminary stages  
of the subjective deduction to the      
objective deduction may be made by      
further analysis either of the objective
 unity of empirical concepts or of the  
subjective unity of empirical           
self-consciousness4 ,it is the former   
line which the argument of the first    
edition follows4 ,kant is asking what is
 meant by an object corresponding to our
 representations1#hij and answers by his
 objective deduction4 ,he substitutes   
the empirical for the transcendental    
object1#hia and in so doing propounds   
one of the central and most             
revolutionary tenets of the ,critical   

philosophy4 ,existence takes a          
threefold1 not a merely dual form4      
,besides representations and things in  
themselves1 there exist the objects of  
our representations--the extended world 
of ordinary experience and of science4  
,such a threefold distinction is        
prefigured in the ,leibnizian           
metaphysics1 and is more or less native 
to every philosophy that is genuinely   
speculative4 ,kant himself claims ,plato
 as his philosophical progenitor4 ,the  
originality is not in the bare thesis1  
but in the fruitful1 tenacious1 and     
consistent manner in which it is        
developed through detailed analysis of  
our actual experience4  ,in its first   
stages the argument largely coincides   
with the argument of the paragraphs     
which deal with the transcendental      
object4 ,when we examine the objective1 
we find that the primary characteristic 
distinguishing it from the subjective is
 that it lays a compulsion upon our     
minds1 constraining us to think about it

 in a certain way4 ,by an object is     
meant something which will not allow us 
to think at haphazard4 ,cinnabar is an  
object which constrains us to think it  
as heavy and red4 ,an object is thus the
 external source of a necessity to which
 our thinking has to conform4 ,the two  
arguments first begin to diverge when   
,kant sets himself to demonstrate that  
our consciousness of this external      
necessity is made possible by categories
 which originate from within4  ,for this
 conclusion ,kant prepares the way by an
 analysis of the second main            
characteristic constitutive of an       
object1 viz4 its unity4 ,this unity is  
of a twofold nature1 involving either   
the category of substance and attribute 
or the category of cause and effect4    
,the two categories are ultimately      
inseparable1 but lead us to conceive the
 object in two distinct modes4 ,when we 
interpret an object through the a priori
 concept of substance and attribute1 we 
assert that all the contents of our     

perceptions of it are capable of being  
regarded as qualities of one and the    
same identical substance4 ,no one of its
 qualities can be incongruent with any  
other1 and all of them together1 in     
their unity1 must be expressive of its  
substantial nature4  ,the causal        
interpretation of the object is1        
however1 the more important1 and is that
 which is chiefly emphasised by ,kant4  
,it is1 indeed1 simply a further and    
more adequate mode of expressing the    
substantial unity of the object4 ,all   
the qualities must be causally bound up 
with one another in such a way that the 
nature of each is determined by the     
nature of all the others1 and that if   
any one quality be changed all the      
others must undergo corresponding       
alterations4 ,viewed in this manner1 in 
terms of the category of causality1 an  
object signifies a necessitated         
combination of interconnected qualities 
or effects4 ,but since no such form of  
necessitation can be revealed in the    

manifold of sense1 our consciousness of 
compulsion cannot originate from        
without1 and must be due to those a     
priori forms which1 though having their 
source within1 control and direct our   
interpretation of the given4 ,though the
 objective compulsion is not itself due 
to the mind1 our consciousness of it has
 this mental a priori source4 ,the      
concept of an object consists in the    
thought of a manifold so determined in  
its specific order and groupings as to  
be interpretable in terms of the        
categories of substance and causality4  
,but the problem of the deduction proper
 is not yet raised4 ,on the one hand1   
,kant has defined what the concept of   
the objective must be taken as          
involving1 and on the other1 has pointed
 out that since the given as given is an
 unconnected manifold1 any categories   
through which it may be interpreted must
 be of independent origin2 but it still 
remains to be proved that the above is a
 valid as well as a possible mode of    

construing the given appearances4 ,the  
categories1 as a priori concepts1       
originate from within4 ,by what right   
may we assert that they not only relate 
to an object1 but even constitute the   
very concept of it8 ,are appearances    
legitimately interpretable in any such  
manner8 ,it was1 we may believe1 in the 
process of answering this question that 
,kant came to realise that the objects  
of our representations must no longer be
 regarded as things in themselves4 ,for1
 as he finds1 a solution is possible    
only on the further assumption that the 
mind is legislating merely for the world
 of sense-experience1 and is making no  
assertion in regard to the absolutely   
and independently real4 ,kant's method  
of proof is the transcendental1 i4e4 he 
seeks to demonstrate that this          
interpretation of the given is          
indispensably necessary as being a sine 
qua non of its possible apprehension4   
,this is achieved by means of the       
conclusion already established through  

the preliminary steps of the subjective 
deduction1 namely1 that all             
consciousness involves                  
self-consciousness4 ,kant's proof of the
 objective validity of the categories   
consists in showing that only by means  
of the interpretation of appearances as 
empirically objective is                
self-consciousness possible at all4     
,the self-consciousness of the          
subjective deduction1 in the preliminary
 form above stated1 is1 however1 itself 
empirical4 ,kant1 developing on more    
strictly ,critical lines the argument   
which had accompanied his earlier       
doctrine of the transcendental object1  
now proceeds to maintain in what is at  
once the most fruitful and the most     
misleading of his tenets1 that the      
ultimate ground of the possibility of   
consciousness and therefore also of     
empirical self-consciousness is the     
transcendental unity of apperception4   
,such apperception1 to use ,kant's      
ambiguous phraseology1 precedes         

experience as its a priori condition4   
,the interpretation of given appearances
 through a priori categories is a       
necessity of consciousness because it is
 a condition of self-consciousness2 and 
it is a condition of self-consciousness 
because it alone will account for the   
transcendental apperception upon which  
all empirical self-consciousness        
ultimately depends4  ,one chief reason  
why ,kant's deduction is found so       
baffling and illusive is that it rests  
upon an interpretation of the unity of  
apperception which is very definitely   
drawn1 but to which ,kant himself gives 
only the briefest and most condensed    
expression4 ,i shall therefore take the 
liberty of restating it in more explicit
 terms4 ,the true or transcendental self
 has no content of its own through which
 it can gain knowledge of itself4 ,it is
 mere identity1 ,i am ,i4 ,in other     
words1 self-consciousness is a mere form
 through which contents that never      
themselves constitute the self are yet  

apprehended as being objects to the     
self4 ,thus though the self in being    
conscious of time or duration must be   
conscious of itself as identical        
throughout the succession of its        
experiences1 that identity can never be 
discovered in those experiences2 it can 
only be thought as a condition of them4 
,the continuity of memory1 for instance1
 is not a possible substitute for       
transcendental apperception4 ,as the    
subjective deduction demonstrates1      
self-consciousness conditions memory1   
and cannot therefore be reduced to or be
 generated by it4#hib ,when1 however1   
such considerations are allowed their   
due weight1 the necessity of postulating
 a transcendental unity becomes only the
 more evident4 ,though it can never     
itself be found among appearances1 it is
 an interpretation which we are none the
 less compelled to give to appearances4 
,to summarise before proceeding4 ,we    
have obtained two important conclusions3
 first1 that all consciousness involves 

self-consciousness2 and secondly1 that  
self-consciousness is a mere form1 in   
terms of which contents that do not     
constitute the self are apprehended as  
existing for the self4 ,the first leads 
up to the second1 and the second is     
equivalent to the assertion that there  
can be no such thing as a pure          
self-consciousness1 i4e4 a consciousness
 in which the self is aware of itself   
and of nothing but itself4              
,self-consciousness1 to be possible at  
all1 must at the same time be a         
consciousness of something that is      
not-self4 ,only one further step is now 
required for the completion of the      
deduction1 namely1 proof that this      
not-self1 consciousness of which is     
necessary to the possibility of         
self-consciousness1 must consist in     
empirical objects apprehended in terms  
of the categories4 ,for proof ,kant     
again appeals to the indispensableness  
of apperception4 ,as no intuitions can  
enter consciousness which are not       

capable of being related to the self1   
they must be so related to one another  
that1 notwithstanding their variety and 
diversity1 the self can still be        
conscious of itself as identical        
throughout them all4 ,in other words1 no
 intuition can be related to the self   
that is incapable of being combined     
together with all the other intuitions  
to form a unitary consciousness4 ,i may 
here quote from the text of the second  
edition3#hic       8444only in so far as
 ,i can grasp the manifold of the       
representations in one consciousness1 do
 ,i call them one and all      mine4    
,for otherwise ,i should have as        
many-coloured and diverse a      self as
 ,i have representations of which ,i am 
conscious to myself40  ,or as it is     
stated in the first edition3#hid        
8,we are a priori aware of the complete 
identity of the self in      respect of 
all representations which belong to our 
knowledge 444 as      a necessary       
condition of the possibility of all     

representations40  ,these are the       
considerations which lead ,kant to      
entitle the unity of apperception       
transcendental4 ,he so names it for the 
reason that1 though it is not itself a  
priori in the manner of the categories1 
we are yet enabled by its means to      
demonstrate that the unity which is     
necessary for possible experience can be
 securely counted upon in the manifold  
of all possible representations1 and    
because 7as he believed7 it also enables
 us to prove that the forms of such     
unity are the categories of the         
understanding4  ,to the argument        
supporting this last conclusion ,kant   
does not give the attention which its   
importance would seem to deserve4 ,he   
points out that as the given is an      
unconnected manifold1 its unity can be  
obtained only by synthesis1 and that    
such synthesis must conform to the      
conditions prescribed by the unity of   
apperception4 ,that these conditions    
coincide with the categories he does    

not1 however1 attempt to prove4 ,he     
apparently believes that this has been  
already established in the metaphysical 
deduction4#hie ,the forms of unity      
demanded by apperception1 he feels      
justified in assuming1 are the          
categories4 ,they may be regarded as    
expressing the minimum of unity         
necessary to the possibility of         
self-consciousness4 ,if sensations      
cannot be interpreted as the diverse    
attributes of unitary substances1 if    
events cannot be viewed as arising out  
of one another1 if the entire world in  
space cannot be conceived as a system of
 existences reciprocally interdependent1
 all unity must vanish from experience1 
and apperception will be utterly        
impossible4#hif  ,the successive steps  
of the total argument of the deduction1 
as given in the first edition1 are      
therefore as follows3 ,consciousness of 
time involves empirical                 
self-consciousness2 empirical           
self-consciousness is conditioned by a  

transcendental self-consciousness2 and  
such transcendental self-consciousness  
is itself1 in turn1 conditioned by      
consciousness of objects4 ,the argument 
thus completed becomes the proof of     
mutual interdependence4                 
,self-consciousness and consciousness of
 objects1 as polar opposites1 mutually  
condition one another4 ,only through    
consciousness of both simultaneously can
 consciousness of either be attained4   
,only in and through reference to an    
object can an idea be related to a self1
 and so be accompanied by that          
self-consciousness which conditions     
recognition1 and through recognition all
 the varying forms in which our         
consciousness can occur4 ,from the point
 of view1 however1 of a ,critical       
enquiry apperception is the more        
important of the two forms of           
consciousness4 ,for though each is the  
causa existendi of the other1           
self-consciousness has the unique       
distinction of being the causa          

cognoscendi of the objective and a      
priori validity of the forms of         
understanding4       8,the synthetic    
proposition1 that all the variety of    
empirical      consciousness must be    
combined in a single self-consciousness1
 is      the absolutely first and       
synthetic principle of our thought in   
general40#hig  ,we may at this point    
consider ,kant's doctrine of 8objective 
affinity40 ,it excellently enforces the 
main thesis which he is professing to   
establish1 namely1 that the conditions  
of unitary consciousness are the        
conditions of all consciousness4 ,the   
language1 however1 in which the doctrine
 is expounded is extremely obscure and  
difficult2 and before commenting upon   
,kant's own methods of statement1 it    
seems advisable to paraphrase the       
argument in a somewhat free manner1 and 
also to defer consideration of the      
transcendental psychology which ,kant   
has employed in its exposition4#hih     
,association can subsist only between   

ideas1 both of which have occurred      
within the same conscious field4 ,now   
the fundamental characteristic of       
consciousness1 the very condition of its
 existing at all1 is its unity2 and     
until this has been recognised1 there   
can be no understanding of the          
associative connection which arises     
under the conditions which consciousness
 supplies4 ,to attempt to explain the   
unity of consciousness through the      
mechanism of association is to explain  
an agency in terms of certain of its own
 effects4 ,it is to explain the         
fundamental in terms of the derivative1 
the conditions in terms of what they    
have themselves made possible4 ,kant's  
argument is therefore as follows4 ,ideas
 do not become associated merely by     
co-existing4 ,they must occur together  
in a unitary consciousness2 and among   
the conditions necessary to the         
possibility of association are therefore
 the conditions of the possibility of   
experience4 ,association is             

transcendentally grounded4 ,so far from 
accounting for the unity of             
consciousness1 it presupposes the latter
 as determining the conditions under    
which alone it can come into play4      
8444how1 ,i ask1 is association itself  
possible8444 ,on my principles      the 
thorough-going affinity of appearances  
is easily explicable4      ,all possible
 appearances belong as representations  
to the totality      of a possible      
self-consciousness4 ,but as this        
self-consciousness is      a            
transcendental representation1 numerical
 identity is inseparable      from it   
and is a priori certain4 ,for nothing   
can come to our      knowledge save in  
terms of this original apperception4    
,now1 since      this identity must     
necessarily enter into the synthesis of 
all the      manifold of appearances1 so
 far as the synthesis is to yield       
empirical knowledge1 the appearances are
 subject to a priori      conditions1   
with which the synthesis of their       

apprehension must be      in complete   
accordance4444 ,thus all appearances    
stand in a      thorough-going          
connection according to necessary laws1 
and      therefore in a transcendental  
affinity of which the empirical is a    
mere consequence40#hii  ,in other words1
 representations must exist in          
consciousness before they can become    
associated2 and they can exist in       
consciousness only if they are          
consciously apprehended4 ,but in order  
to be consciously apprehended1 they must
 conform to the transcendental          
conditions upon which all consciousness 
rests2 and in being thus apprehended    
they are set in thoroughgoing unity to  
one another and to the self4 ,they are  
apprehended as belonging to an objective
 order or unity which is the correlate  
of the unity of self-consciousness4     
,this is what ,kant entitles their      
objective affinity2 it is what          
conditions and makes possible their     
associative or empirical connection4    

,this main point is very definitely     
stated in ,a #aja4       8,if we can    
show that even our purest a priori      
intuitions yield no      knowledge1 save
 in so far as they contain such a       
connection of the      manifold as will 
make possible a thoroughgoing synthesis 
of      reproduction1 this synthesis of 
the imagination0 which acts      through
 the machinery of association 8must be  
grounded1 prior to      all experience1 
on a priori principles1 and since       
experience      necessarily presupposes 
that appearances can be reproduced1 we  
shall have to assume a pure             
transcendental synthesis of the         
imagination0 i4e4 such synthesis as is  
involved in the unity of                
consciousness 8as conditioning even the 
possibility of all      experience40#ijj
  ,in ,a #aba-b ,kant expresses his     
position in a more ambiguous manner4 ,he
 may seem to the reader merely to be    
arguing that a certain minimum of       
regularity is necessary in order that   

representations may be associated1 and  
experience may be possible4#ija ,but the
 general tenor of the passage as a      
whole1 and especially its concluding    
sentences1 enforce the stronger1 more   
consistent1 thesis4       0,the         
subjective and empirical ground of      
reproduction according to      rules is 
named the association of                
representations4 ,if this unity of      
association did not also have an        
objective ground1 which makes it        
impossible that appearances should be   
apprehended by the      imagination     
except under the condition of a possible
 synthetic      unity of this           
apprehension1 it would be entirely      
accidental that      appearances should 
fit into a connected whole of human     
knowledge4      ,for even though we had 
the power of associating perceptions1 it
      would remain entirely undetermined
 and accidental whether they      would 
themselves be associable2 and should    
they not be associable1      there might

 exist a multitude of perceptions1 and  
indeed an entire      sensibility1 in   
which much empirical consciousness would
 arise in      my mind1 but in a state  
of separation1 and without belonging to 
one      consciousness of myself4 ,that1
 however1 is impossible4 ,for only in   
so far as ,i ascribe all perceptions to 
one consciousness 7original             
apperception71 can ,i say in all        
perceptions that ,i am conscious of     
them4 ,there must therefore be an       
objective ground 7that is1 one      that
 can be recognised a priori1            
antecedently to all empirical      laws 
of the imagination7 upon which may rest 
the possibility1 nay      the necessity1
 of a law that extends to all           
appearances44440  ,kant is not merely   
asserting that the associableness of    
ideas1 and the regularity of connection 
which that implies1 must be postulated  
as a condition of experience4 ,that     
would be a mere begging of the issue2   
the correctness of the postulate would  

not be independently proved4 ,kant is   
really maintaining the much more        
important thesis1 that the unity of     
experience1 i4e4 of consciousness1 is   
what makes association possible at all4 
,and since consciousness must be unitary
 in order to exist1 there cannot be any 
empirical consciousness in which the    
conditions of association1 and therefore
 of reproduction1 are not to be found4  
,a further misunderstanding is apt to be
 caused by ,kant's statement that       
associative affinity rests upon         
objective affinity4 ,this seems to      
imply1 in the same manner as the passage
 which we have just considered1 that    
instead of proving that appearances are 
subject to law and order1 he is merely  
postulating that an abiding ground of   
such regularity must exist in the       
noumenal conditions of the sense        
manifold4 ,but he himself again supplies
 the needful correction4       8,this   
objective ground of all association of  
appearances can      nowhere be found1  

except in the principle of the unity of 
apperception in respect of all forms of 
knowledge which can belong      to me4  
,in accordance with this principle all  
appearances must so      enter the mind1
 or be so apprehended1 that they fit    
together to      constitute the unity of
 apperception4 ,this would be impossible
      without synthetic unity in their  
connection1 and that unity is           
therefore also objectively necessary4   
,the objective unity of all             
empirical consciousness in one          
consciousness1 that of original         
apperception1 is therefore the necessary
 condition of all 7even of      all     
possible7 perception2 and the affinity  
of all appearances1      near or remote1
 is a necessary consequence of a        
synthesis in      imagination which is  
grounded a priori on rules40#ijb  ,the  
fundamental characteristic of           
consciousness is the unified form in    
which alone it can exist2 only when this
 unity is recognised as indispensably   

necessary1 and therefore as invariably  
present whenever consciousness exists at
 all1 can the inter-relations of the    
contents of consciousness be properly   
defined4  ,if this main contention of   
the ,critical teaching be accepted1     
,hume's associationist standpoint is no 
longer tenable4 ,association cannot be  
taken to be an ultimate and inexplicable
 property of our mental states4 ,nor is 
it a property which can be regarded as  
belonging to presentations viewed as so 
many independent existences4 ,it is     
conditioned by the unity of             
consciousness1 and therefore rests upon 
the 8transcendental0 conditions which   
,critical analysis reveals4 ,since the  
unity of consciousness conditions       
association1 it cannot be explained as  
the outcome and product of the mechanism
 of association4  ,in restating the     
objective deduction in the second       
edition1 ,kant has omitted all reference
 to this doctrine of objective affinity4
 ,his reasons for this omission were    

probably twofold4 ,in the first place1  
it has been expounded in terms of a     
transcendental psychology1 which1 as we 
shall find1 is conjectural in character4
 ,and secondly1 the phrase 8objective   
affinity0 is1 as ,i have already pointed
 out1 decidedly misleading4 ,it seems to
 imply that ,kant is postulating1       
without independent proof1 that noumenal
 conditions must be such as to supply an
 orderly manifold of sense data4 ,but   
though the doctrine of objective        
affinity is eliminated1 its place is to 
some extent taken#ijc by the proof that 
all apprehension is an act of judgment  
and therefore involves factors which    
cannot be reduced to1 or explained in   
terms of1 association4  ,there are a    
number of points in the deduction of the
 first edition which call for further   
explanatory and critical comment4 ,the  
first of these concerns the somewhat    
misleading character of the term a      
priori as applied to the categories4 ,it
 carries with it rationalistic          

associations to which the ,critical     
standpoint1 properly understood1 yields 
no support4 ,the categories are for     
,kant of merely de facto nature4 ,they  
have no intrinsic validity4 ,they are   
proved only as being the indispensable  
conditions of what is before the mind as
 brute fact1 namely1 conscious          
experience4 ,by the a priori is meant   
merely those relational factors which   
are required to supplement the given    
manifold in order to constitute our     
actual consciousness4 ,and1 as ,kant is 
careful to point out1 the experience1 as
 conditions of which their validity is  
thus established1 is of a highly        
specific character1 resting upon        
synthesis of a manifold given in space  
and time4 ,that is to say1 their        
indispensableness is proved only for a  
consciousness which in these fundamental
 respects is constituted like our       
own4#ijd ,and secondly1 the validity of 
the a priori categories1 even in our    
human thinking1 is established only in  

reference to that empirical world which 
is constructed out of the given manifold
 in terms of the intuitive forms1 space 
and time4 ,their validity is a merely   
phenomenal validity4 ,they are valid of 
appearances1 but not of things in       
themselves4 ,the a priori is thus doubly
 de facto3 first as a condition of brute
 fact1 namely1 the actuality of our     
human consciousness2 and secondly1 as   
conditioning a consciousness whose      
knowledge is limited to appearances4 ,it
 is a relative1 not an absolute a       
priori4 ,acceptance of it does not1     
therefore1 commit us to rationalism in  
the ordinary meaning of that term4 ,its 
credentials are conferred upon it by    
what is mere fact2 it does not represent
 an order superior to the actual and    
legislative for it4 ,in other words1 it 
is ,critical1 not ,leibnizian in        
character4 ,no transcendent metaphysics 
can be based upon it4 ,in formulating   
this doctrine of the a priori as        
yielding objective insight and yet as   

limited in the sphere of its            
application1 the ,critique of ,pure     
,reason marks an epoch in the history of
 scepticism1 no less than in the        
development of ,idealist teaching4      
,there is one important link in the     
deduction1 as above given1 which is     
hardly calculated to support the        
conclusions that depend upon it4 ,kant1 
as we have already noted1#ije asserts   
that the categories express the minimum 
of unity necessary for the possibility  
of apperception4 ,a contention so       
essential to the argument calls for the 
most careful scrutiny and a meticulous  
exactitude of proof4 ,as a matter of    
fact1 such proof is not to be found in  
any part of the deductions1 whether of  
the first or of the second editions4 ,it
 is attempted only in the later sections
 on the ,principles of ,understanding1  
and even there it is developed1 in any  
really satisfactory fashion1 only in    
regard to the categories of causality   
and reciprocity4#ijf ,this proof1       

however1 as there given1 is an argument 
which in originality1 subtlety and force
 goes far to atone for all shortcomings4
 ,it completes the objective deduction  
by developing in masterly fashion 7in   
spite of the diffuse and ill-arranged   
character of the text7 the central      
contention for which the deduction      
stands4 ,but in the transcendental      
deduction itself1 we find only such an  
argument--if it may be called an        
argument--as follows from the           
identification of apperception with     
understanding4       8,the unity of     
apperception1 in relation to the        
synthesis of      imagination1 is the   
understanding4444 ,in understanding     
there are      pure a priori forms of   
knowledge which contain the necessary   
unity of pure synthesis of imagination  
in respect of all possible              
appearances4 ,but these are the         
categories1 i4e4 pure concepts of       
understanding40#ijg  ,the point is again
 merely assumed in ,a #abe-f4 ,so also  

in ,a #abf3       8,although through    
experience we learn many laws1 these are
 only      special determinations of    
still higher laws1 of which the highest1
      under which all others stand1     
originate a priori in the               
understanding itself44440#ijh  ,again in
 ,a #abi it is argued that as we        
prescribe a priori rules to which all   
experience must conform1 those rules    
cannot be derived from experience1 but  
must precede and condition it1 and can  
do so only as originating from ourselves
 7aus uns selbst74       0,they precede 
all knowledge of the object as their    
intellectual      form1 and constitute a
 formal a priori knowledge of all       
objects      in so far as they are      
thought 7categories740  ,but this is    
only to repeat that such forms of unity 
as are necessary to self-consciousness  
must be realised in all synthesis4 ,it  
is no sufficient proof that those forms 
of relation coincide with the           
categories4 ,as we shall find in        

considering the deduction of the second 
edition1 ,kant to some extent came to   
recognise the existence of this gap in  
his argument and sought to supply the   
missing steps4 ,but his method of so    
doing still ultimately consists in an   
appeal to the results of the            
metaphysical deduction1 and therefore   
rests upon his untenable belief in the  
adequacy of formal logic4 ,it fails to  
obviate the objection in any            
satisfactory manner4  ,as regards the   
negative aspect of the conclusion       
reached--that the validity of the       
categories is established only for      
appearances--,kant maintains that this  
is a necessary corollary of their       
validity being a priori4 ,that things in
 themselves must conform to the         
conditions demanded by the nature of our
 self-consciousness is altogether       
impossible of proof4 ,even granting1    
what is indeed quite possible1 that     
things in themselves embody the pure    
forms of understanding1 we still cannot 

have any ground for maintaining that    
they must do so of necessity and will be
 found to do so universally4 ,for even  
if we could directly experience things  
in themselves1 and apprehend them as    
conforming to the categories1 such      
conformity would still be known only as 
contingent4 ,but when it is recognised  
that nature consists for us of nothing  
but appearances1 existing only in the   
mode in which they are experienced1 and 
therefore as necessarily conforming to  
the conditions under which experience is
 alone possible1 the paradoxical aspect 
of the apriority ascribed to the        
categories at once vanishes4 ,proof of  
their a priori validity presupposes the 
phenomenal character of the objects to  
which they apply4 ,they can be proved to
 be universal and necessarily valid of  
objects only in so far as it can be     
shown that they have antecedently       
conditioned and constituted them4 ,the  
sole sufficient reason for asserting    
them to be universally valid throughout 

experience is that they are             
indispensably necessary for rendering it
 possible4#iji ,the transcendental      
method of proof1 i4e4 proof by reference
 to the very possibility of experience1 
is for this reason1 as ,kant so justly  
emphasises1 the sole type of argument   
capable of fulfilling the demands which 
have to be met4 ,it presupposes1 and    
itself enforces1 the truth of the       
fundamental ,critical distinction       
between appearances and things in       
themselves4  ,kant entitles the unity of
 apperception original                  
7ursprnglich72#iaj and we may now       
consider how far and in what sense this 
title is applicable4#iaa ,from the point
 of view of method there is the same    
justification for employing the term    
#8original' as for entitling the unity  
of apperception transcendental4#iab     
,self-consciousness is more fundamental 
or original than consciousness of       
objects1 in so far as#iac it is only    
from the subjective standpoint which it 

represents that the objective deduction 
can demonstrate the necessity of        
synthesis1 and the empirical validity of
 the pure forms of understanding4 ,it is
 as a condition of the possibility of   
self-consciousness that the objective   
employment of the categories is proved  
to be legitimate4 ,in the development of
 the deduction self-consciousness is1   
therefore1 more original than           
consciousness of objects4 ,kant's       
employment of the term is1 however1     
extremely misleading4 ,for it would seem
 to imply that the self has been proved 
to be original or ultimate in an        
ontological sense1 as if it preceded    
experience1 and through its antecedent  
reality rendered objective experience   
possible of achievement4 ,such a view is
 undoubtedly reinforced by ,kant's      
transformation of apperception into a   
faculty--das ,radicalvermgen aller      
unsrer ,erkenntniss#iad--;and his       
consequent identification of it with the
 understanding4#iae ,it then seems as if

 he were maintaining that the           
transcendental ego is ultimate and is   
independent of all conditions1 and that 
to its synthetic activities the various 
forms of objective consciousness are    
due4#iaf  ,this unfortunate phraseology 
is directly traceable to the            
spiritualistic or ,leibnizian character 
of ,kant's earlier standpoint4 ,in the  
,dissertation the self is viewed as an  
ultimate and unconditioned existence1   
antecedent to experience and creatively 
generative of it4 ,we have already noted
 that a somewhat similar view is        
presented in the ,critique in those     
paragraphs which ,vaihinger identifies  
as embodying the earliest stage in the  
development of the argument of the      
deduction4 ,the self is there described 
as coming to consciousness of its       
permanence through reflection upon the  
constancy of its own synthetic          
activities4 ,our consciousness of a     
transcendental object1 and even the     
possibility of the empirical concepts   

through which such consciousness is1 in 
these paragraphs1 supposed to be        
mediated1 are traced to this same       
source4 ,to the last this initial excess
 of emphasis upon the unity of          
apperception remained characteristic of 
,kant's ,critical teaching2 and though  
in the later statements of his theory1  
its powers and prerogatives were very   
greatly diminished1 it still continued  
to play a somewhat exaggerated rle4 ,the
 early spiritualistic views were        
embodied in a terminology which he      
continued to employ2 and unless the     
altered meaning of his terms is         
recognised and allowed for1             
misunderstanding is bound to result4    
,the terms1 having been forged under the
 influence of the older views1 are but  
ill adapted to the newer teaching which 
they are employed to formulate4  ,there 
was also a second influence at work4    
,when ,kant was constrained in the light
 of his new and unexpected results to   
recognise his older views as lacking in 

theoretical justification1 he still held
 to them in his own personal thinking4  
,for there is ample evidence that they  
continued to represent his              
,privatmeinungen4#iag  ,only1 therefore1
 when these misleading influences1      
verbal1 expository1 and personal1 are   
discounted1 do the results of the       
deduction appear in their true          
proportions4 ,kant's ,critical          
philosophy does not profess to prove    
that it is self-consciousness1 or       
apperception1 or a transcendental ego1  
or anything describable in kindred      
terms1 which ultimately renders         
experience possible4 ,the most that we  
can legitimately postulate1 as          
noumenally conditioning experience1 are 
8syntheses0 7themselves1 in their       
generative character1 not definable7#iah
 in accordance with the categories4 ,for
 only upon the completion of such       
syntheses do consciousness of self and  
consciousness of objects come to exist4 
,consciousness of objects does1 indeed1 

according to the argument of the        
deduction1 involve consciousness of     
self2 self-consciousness is the form of 
all consciousness4 ,but1 by the same    
argument1 it is equally true that only  
in and through consciousness of objects 
is any self-consciousness possible at   
all4 ,consciousness of self and         
consciousness of objects mutually       
condition one another4 ,only through    
consciousness of both simultaneously can
 consciousness of either be attained4   
,self-consciousness is not demonstrably 
in itself any more ultimate or original 
than is consciousness of objects4 ,both 
alike are forms of experience which are 
conditioned in complex ways4 ,upon the  
question as to whether or not there is  
any such thing as abiding personality1  
the transcendental deduction casts no   
direct light4 ,indeed consciousness of  
self1 as the more inclusive and complex 
form of awareness1 may perhaps be       
regarded as pointing to a greater       
variety of contributory and generative  

conditions4  ,unfortunately ,kant1 for  
the reasons just stated1 has not        
sufficiently emphasised this more       
negative1 or rather noncommittal1 aspect
 of the results of the deduction4 ,but  
when later in the chapter on the        
,paralogisms he is brought face to face 
with the issue1 and has occasion to     
pronounce upon the question1 he speaks  
with no uncertain voice4 ,in the        
theoretical sphere there is1 he         
declares1 no sufficient proof of the    
spirituality1 or unitary and ultimate   
character1 of the self4 ,like everything
 else the unity of apperception must be 
noumenally conditioned1 but it cannot be
 shown that in itself1 as               
self-consciousness or apperception1 it  
represents any noumenal reality4 ,it may
 be a resultant1 resting upon1 and due  
to1 a complexity of generative          
conditions2 and these conditions may be 
fundamentally different in character    
from itself4 ,they may1 for all that we 
can prove to the contrary1 be of a      

non-conscious and non-personal nature4  
,there is nothing in our cognitive      
experience1 and no result of the        
,critical analysis of it1 which is      
inconsistent with such a                
possibility4#iai ,those commentators1   
such as ,cohen1 ,caird1 and ,watson1 who
 more or less follow ,hegel in his      
criticism of ,kant's procedure1 give an 
interpretation of the transcendental    
deduction which makes it inconsistent   
with the sceptical conclusions which the
 ,critique as a whole is made by its    
author to support4 ,unbiassed study of  
the ,analytic1 even if taken by itself  
in independence of the ,dialectic1 does 
not favour such a view4 ,the argument of
 the transcendental deduction itself    
justifies no more than ,kant is willing 
to allow in his discussion of the nature
 of the self in the section on the      
,paralogisms4 ,it may1 indeed1 as ,caird
 has so forcibly shown in his massive   
work upon the ,critical philosophy1 be  
developed upon ,hegelian lines1 but only

 through a process of essential         
reconstruction which departs very far   
from many of ,kant's most cherished     
tenets1 and which does so in a spirit   
that radically conflicts with that which
 dominates the ,critique as a whole4    
,,the ,,later ,,stages ,,of ,,the       
,,subjective ,,deduction  ,the reader   
will have noted that several of the     
factors in ,kant's exposition have so   
far been entirely ignored4 ,the time has
 now come for reckoning with them4 ,they
 constitute1 in my view1 the later      
stages of the subjective deduction4     
,that is to say1 they refer to the      
transcendental generative powers which  
,kant1 on the strength of the results   
obtained in the more objective enquiry1 
feels justified in postulating4         
,separate consideration of them tends to
 clearness of statement4 ,kant's        
constant alternation between the logical
 and the dynamical standpoints is one of
 the many causes of the obscurity in his
 argument4 ,in this connection we shall 

also find opportunity to discuss the    
fundamental conflict1 to which ,i have  
already had occasion to refer1 between  
the subjectivist and the phenomenalist  
modes of developing the ,critical       
standpoint4  ,the conclusions arrived at
 in the objective deduction compelled   
,kant to revise his previous            
psychological views4 ,hitherto he had   
held to the ,leibnizian theory that a   
priori concepts are obtained by         
reflection upon the mind's native and   
fundamental modes of action4 ,in the    
,dissertation he carefully distinguishes
 between the logical and the real       
employment of the understanding4        
,through the former empirical concepts  
are derived from concrete experience4   
,through the latter pure concepts are   
creatively generated4 ,logical and real 
thinking agree1 however1 ,kant there    
argues1 in being activities of the      
conscious mind4 ,both can be apprehended
 and adequately determined through the  
revealing power of reflective           

consciousness4 ,such a standpoint is no 
longer tenable for ,kant4 ,now that he  
has shown that the consciousness of self
 and the consciousness of objects       
mutually condition one another1 and that
 until both are attained neither is     
possible1 he can no longer regard the   
mind as even possibly conscious of the  
activities whereby experience is brought
 about4 ,the activities generative of   
consciousness have to be recognised as  
themselves falling outside it4 ,not even
 in its penumbra1 through some vague    
form of apprehension1 can they be       
detected4 ,only the finished products of
 such activities1 not the activities    
themselves1 can be presented to         
consciousness2 and only by general      
reasoning1 inferential of agencies that 
lie outside the conscious field1 can we 
hope to determine them4  ,now ,kant     
appears to have been unwilling to regard
 the #8understanding' as ever           
unconscious of its activities4 ,why he  
was unwilling1 it does not seem possible

 to explain2 at most his rationalist    
leanings and ,wolffian training may be  
cited as contributing causes4 ,to the   
end he continued to speak of the        
understanding as the faculty whereby the
 a priori is brought to consciousness4  
,in order to develop the distinctions   
demanded by the new ,critical attitude1 
he had therefore to introduce a new     
faculty1 capable of taking over the     
activities which have to be recognised  
as non-conscious4 ,for this purpose he  
selected the imagination1 giving to it  
the special title1 productive           
imagination4 ,the empirical reproductive
 processes hitherto alone recognised by 
psychologists are not1 he declares1     
exhaustive of the nature of the         
imagination4 ,it is also capable of     
transcendental activity1 and upon this  
the 8objective affinity0 of appearances 
and the resulting possibility of their  
empirical apprehension is made to rest4 
,the productive imagination is also     
viewed as rendering possible the        

understanding1 that is1 the conscious   
apprehension of the a priori as an      
element embedded in objective           
experience4 ,such apprehension is       
possible because in the pre-conscious   
elaboration of the given manifold the   
productive imagination has conformed to 
those a priori principles which the     
understanding demands for the           
possibility of its own exercise in      
conscious apprehension4 ,productive     
imagination acts in the manner required 
to yield experiences which are capable  
of relation to the unity of             
self-consciousness1 i4e4 of being found 
to conform to the unity of the          
categories4 ,why it should act in this  
manner cannot be explained2 but it is   
none the less1 on ,critical principles1 
a legitimate assumption1 since only in  
so far as it does so can experience1    
which de facto exists1 be possible in   
any form4 ,as a condition sine qua non  
of actual and possible experience1 the  
existence of such a faculty is1 ,kant   

argues1 a legitimate inference from the 
results of the transcendental deduction4
  ,though ,kant's insistence upon the   
conscious character of understanding    
compels him to distinguish between it   
and the imagination1 he has also to     
recognise their kinship4 ,if imagination
 can never act save in conformity with  
the a priori forms of understanding1    
some reason must exist for their        
harmony4 ,this twofold necessity of at  
once distinguishing and connecting them 
is the cause of the hesitating and      
extremely variable account which in both
 editions of the ,critique is given of  
their relation4 ,in several passages the
 understanding is spoken of as simply   
imagination which has attained to       
consciousness of its activities4#ibj    
,elsewhere he explicitly states that    
they are distinct and separate4 ,from   
this second point of view ,kant regards 
imagination as mediating between sense  
and understanding1 and1 though reducible
 to neither1 akin to both4  ,only on one

 point is ,kant clear and definite1     
namely1 that it is to productive        
imagination that the generation of      
unified experience is primarily due4 ,in
 it something of the fruitful and       
inexhaustible character of noumenal     
reality is traceable4 ,doubtless one    
chief reason for his choice of the title
 imagination is the creative character  
which in popular thought has always been
 regarded as its essential feature4 ,as 
,kant1 speaking of schematism1 which is 
a process executed by the imagination1  
states in ,a #ada3 8,this schematism 444
 is an art 7,kunst7 concealed in the    
depths of the human soul40#iba ,this    
description may perhaps be interpreted  
in the light of ,kant's account of the  
creative character of artistic genius in
 the ,critique of ,judgment1 for there  
also imagination figures as the truly   
originative or creative faculty of the  
human spirit4 ,to its noumenal character
 we may also trace its capacity of      
combining those factors of sense and    

understanding which in the realm of     
appearance remain persistently          
opposed4#ibb ,imagination differs from  
the understanding chiefly in that it is 
at once more comprehensive and also more
 truly creative4 ,it supplements the    
functional forms with a sensuous        
content1 and applies them dynamically in
 the generation of experience4  ,the    
schemata1 which the productive          
imagination is supposed to construct1   
are those generalised forms of temporal 
and spatial existence in which alone the
 unity of experience necessary to       
apperception can be realised4 ,they are 
8pure 7without admixture of anything    
empirical71 and yet are in one          
aspect intellectual and in another      
sensuous40#ibc  ,or as ,kant describes  
the process in the chapter before       
us3#ibd       8,we name the synthesis of
 the manifold in imagination            
transcendental1 if without distinction  
of intuitions it is directed            
exclusively to the a priori combination 

of the manifold2 and the      unity of  
this synthesis is entitled              
transcendental1 if it is                
represented as a priori necessary in    
relation to the original      unity of  
apperception4 ,as this unity of         
apperception conditions      the        
possibility of all knowledge1 the       
transcendental unity of the             
synthesis of imagination is the pure    
form of all possible      knowledge4    
,hence1 through it all objects of       
possible experience      must be        
represented a priori40  ,the schemata1  
thus transcendentally generated1 are    
represented by ,kant as limiting and    
controlling the empirical processes of  
apprehension1 reproduction1 and         
recognition4 ,as no experience is       
attainable save in terms of the         
schemata1 they enable us to determine1  
on a priori grounds1 the degree of      
constancy and regularity that can be    
securely counted upon in all experience4
 ,this is ,kant's psychological         

explanation of what he has entitled     
8objective affinity40#ibe ,the empirical
 ground of reproduction is the          
association of ideas2 its transcendental
 ground is an objective affinity which  
is 8a necessary consequence of a        
synthesis in imagination1 grounded a    
priori on rules40#ibf       0,the       
subjective and empirical ground of      
reproduction according to      rules is 
named the association of                
representations4 ,if this unity of      
association did not also have an        
objective ground1 which makes it        
impossible that appearances should be   
apprehended by the      imagination     
except under the condition of a possible
 synthetic      unity of this           
apprehension1 it would be entirely      
accidental that      appearances should 
fit into a connected whole of human     
knowledge4444 ,there might exist a      
multitude of perceptions1 and           
indeed an entire sensibility1 in which  
much empirical consciousness      would 

arise in my mind1 but in a state of     
separation1 and without      belonging  
to one consciousness of myself4 ,that1  
however1 is      impossible40 ,as the   
subjective and objective deductions have
      demonstrated1 where there is no   
self-consciousness there is no          
consciousness of any kind4 8,there must 
therefore be an objective      ground   
7that is1 one that can be determined a  
priori1      antecedently to all        
empirical laws of the imagination7 upon 
which      may rest the possibility1    
nay1 the necessity of a law that extends
      to all appearances--the law1      
namely1 that all appearances must be    
regarded as data of the senses which are
 associable in themselves      and      
subject to general rules of universal   
connection in their      reproduction4  
,this objective ground of all           
association of      appearances ,i      
entitle their affinity4444 ,the         
objective unity of      all empirical   
consciousness in one consciousness1 that

 of original      apperception1 is the  
necessary condition of all possible     
perception2 and the affinity of all     
appearances1 near or remote1 is      a  
necessary consequence of a synthesis in 
imagination which is      grounded a    
priori on rules40#ibg  ,this part of    
,kant's teaching is apt to seem more    
obscure than it is4 ,for the reader is  
not unnaturally disinclined to accept it
 in the very literal sense in which it  
is stated4 ,that ,kant means1 however1  
exactly what he says1 appears from the  
further consequence which he himself not
 only recognises as necessary1 but      
insists upon as valid4 ,the doctrine of 
objective affinity culminates in the    
conclusion#ibh that it is 8we ourselves 
who introduce into the appearances that 
order and regularity which we name      
nature40 ,the 8we ourselves0 refers to  
the mind in the transcendental          
activities of the productive            
imagination4 ,the conscious processes of
 apprehension1 reproduction1 and        

recognition necessarily conform to      
schemata1 non-consciously generated1    
which express the combined a priori     
conditions of intuition and             
understanding required for unitary      
consciousness4  ,many points in this    
strange doctrine call for consideration4
 ,it rests1 in the first place1 upon the
 assumption of a hard and fast          
distinction1 very difficult of          
acceptance1 between transcendental and  
empirical activities of the mind4       
,secondly1 ,kant's assertion1 that the  
empirical manifolds can be relied upon  
to supply a satisfactory content for the
 schemata1 calls for more adequate      
justification than he himself adduces4  
,it is upon independent reality that the
 fixity of empirical co-existences and  
sequences depends4 ,is not ,kant        
practically assuming a pre-established  
harmony in asserting that as the mind   
creates the form of nature it can       
legislate a priori for all possible     
experience8  ,as regards the first      

assumption ,kant would seem to have been
 influenced by the ambiguities of the   
term transcendental4 ,it means1 as we   
have already noted1#ibi either the      
science of the a priori1 or the a priori
 itself1 or the conditions which render 
experience possible4 ,even the two      
latter meanings by no means coincide4   
,the conditions of the possibility of   
experience are not in all cases a       
priori4 ,the manifold of outer sense is 
as indispensable a precondition of      
experience as are the forms of          
understanding1 and yet is not a priori  
in any valid sense of that term4 ,it    
does not1 therefore1 follow that because
 the activities of productive           
imagination 8transcendentally0 condition
 experience1 they must themselves be a  
priori1 and must1 as ,kant also         
maintains1#icj deal with a pure a priori
 manifold4 ,further1 the separation     
between transcendental and empirical    
activities of the mind must defeat the  
very purpose for which the productive   

imagination is postulated1 namely1 in   
order to account for the generation of a
 complex consciousness in which no one  
element can temporally precede any of   
the others4 ,if the productive          
imagination generates only schemata1 it 
will not account for that complex       
experience in which consciousness of    
self and consciousness of objects are   
indissolubly united4 ,the introduction  
of the productive imagination seems at  
first sight to promise recognition of   
the dynamical aspect of our temporally  
sequent experience1 and of that aspect  
in which as appearance it refers us     
beyond itself to non-experienced        
conditions4 ,as employed1 however1 in   
the doctrines of schematism and of      
objective affinity1 the imagination     
exhibits a formalism hardly less extreme
 than that of the understanding whose   
shortcomings it is supposed to make     
good4  ,in his second assumption ,kant1 
as so often in the ,critique1 is        
allowing his old-time rationalistic     

leanings to influence him in            
underestimating the large part which the
 purely empirical must always occupy in 
human experience1 and in exaggerating   
the scope of the inferences which can be
 drawn from the presence of the formal1 
relational factors4 ,but this is a point
 which we are not yet in a position to  
discuss4#ica  ,fortunately1 if          
,vaihinger's theory be accepted1#icb    
section ,a #ih-ajd enables us to follow 
the movement of ,kant's mind in the     
interval between the formulating of the 
doctrine of productive imagination and  
the publication of the ,critique4 ,he   
himself would seem to have recognised   
the unsatisfactoriness of dividing up   
the total conditions of experience into 
transcendental activities that issue in 
schemata1 and supplementary empirical   
processes which transform them into     
concrete1 specific consciousness4 ,the  
alternative theory which he proceeds to 
propound is at first sight much more    
satisfactory4 ,it consists in           

duplicating each of the various         
empirical processes with a              
transcendental faculty4 ,there are1 he  
now declares1 three transcendental      
powers--a transcendental faculty of     
apprehension1 a transcendental faculty  
of reproduction 7imagination71 and a    
transcendental faculty of recognition4  
,thus ,kant's previous view that        
transcendental imagination has a special
 and unique activity1 namely1 the       
productive1 altogether different in type
 from any of its empirical processes1 is
 now allowed to drop2 in place of it    
,kant develops the view that the        
transcendental functions run exactly    
parallel with the empirical             
processes4#icc ,but though such a       
position may at first seem more         
promising than that which it displaces1 
it soon reveals its unsatisfactoriness4 
,the two types of mental activity1      
transcendental and empirical1 no longer1
 indeed1 fall apart2 but the difficulty 
now arises of distinguishing in         

apprehension1 reproduction1 and         
recognition any genuinely transcendental
 aspect4#icd ,apprehension1             
reproduction1 and recognition are so    
essentially conscious processes that to 
view them as also transcendental does   
not seem helpful4 ,they contain elements
 that are transcendental in the logical 
sense1 but cannot be shown to presuppose
 in any analogous fashion mental powers 
that are transcendental in the dynamical
 sense4 ,this is especially evident in  
regard to recognition1 which is         
described as being 8the consciousness   
that what we are thinking is the same as
 what we thought a moment before40 ,in  
dealing with apprehension and           
reproduction the only real difference   
which ,kant is able to suggest1 as      
existing between their transcendental   
and their empirical activities1 is that 
the former synthesise the pure a priori 
manifolds of space and time1 and the    
latter the contingent manifold of sense4
 ,but even this unsatisfactory          

distinction he does not attempt to apply
 in the case of recognition4 ,nor can we
 hold that by the transcendental        
synthesis of recognition ,kant means    
transcendental apperception4 ,that is1  
of course1 the suggestion which at once 
occurs to the reader4 ,but however      
possible it might be to inject such a   
meaning into kindred passages elsewhere1
 it cannot be made to fit the context of
 this particular section4  ,vaihinger's 
theory seems to be the only thread which
 will guide us through this labyrinth4  
,kant1 on the eve of the publication of 
the ,critique1 recognising the          
unsatisfactoriness of his hard and fast 
separation of transcendental from       
empirical processes1 adopted the view   
that some form of transcendental        
activity corresponds to every           
fundamental form of empirical activity  
and vice versa4 ,hastily developing this
 theory1 he incorporated it into the    
,critique alongside his older doctrine4 
,it does not1 however1 reappear in the  

,prolegomena1 and its teaching is       
explicitly withdrawn in the second      
edition of the ,critique4 ,its          
plausibility had entrapped him into its 
temporary adoption1 but the defects     
which it very soon revealed speedily led
 him to reject it4  ,one feature of     
great significance calls for special    
notice4 ,the breakdown of this doctrine 
of a threefold transcendental synthesis 
did not1 as might naturally have been   
expected from what is stated in the     
prefaces to the ,critique regarding the 
unessential and seemingly conjectural   
character of the subjective deduction1  
lead ,kant to despair of developing a   
transcendental psychology4 ,though in   
the second edition he cuts away the     
sections containing the earlier stages  
of the subjective deduction1#ice and in 
recasting the other sections gives      
greater prominence to the more purely   
logical analyses1 the older doctrine of 
productive imagination is reinstated in 
full force1#icf and is again developed  

in#icg connection with the doctrine of  
pure a priori manifolds4 ,evidently1    
therefore1 ,kant was not disheartened by
 the various difficulties which lie in  
the path of a transcendental psychology1
 and it seems reasonable to conclude    
that there were powerful reasons        
inclining him to its retention4 ,i shall
 now attempt1 to the best of my powers1 
to explain--the task is a delicate and  
difficult one--what we may believe these
 reasons to have been4#ich   ,,the      
,,distinction ,,between ,,phenomenalism 
,,and ,,subjectivism  ,a wider set of   
considerations than we have yet taken   
into account must be borne in mind if   
certain broader and really vital        
implications of ,kant's enquiry are to  
be properly viewed4 ,the self has a     
twofold aspect4 ,it is at once animal in
 its conditions and potentially         
universal in its powers of apprehension4
 ,though man's natural existence is that
 of an animal organism1 he can have     
consciousness of the spatial world out  

of which his organism has arisen1 and of
 the wider periods within which his     
transitory existence falls4 ,ultimately 
such consciousness would seem to connect
 man cognitively with reality as a      
whole4 ,now it is to this universal or  
absolutist aspect of our consciousness1 
to its transcendence of the embodied and
 separate self1 that ,kant is seeking to
 do justice in his transcendental       
deductions1 especially in his doctrine  
of the transcendental unity of          
apperception4 ,for he views that        
apperception as conditioned by1 and the 
correlate of1 the consciousness of      
objectivity4 ,it involves the           
consciousness of a single cosmical time 
and of a single cosmical space within   
which all events fall and within which  
they form a whole of causally           
interdependent existences4 ,that is why 
he names it the objective unity of      
apperception4 ,it is that aspect in     
which the self correlates with a wider  
reality1 and through which it stands in 

fundamental contrast to the merely      
subjective states and to the individual 
conditions of its animal existence4 ,the
 transcendental self1 so far from being 
identical with the empirical self1 would
 seem to be of directly opposite nature4
 ,the one would seem to point beyond the
 realm of appearance1 the other to be in
 its existence merely natural4 ,the fact
 that they are inextricably bound up    
with one another1 and co-operate in     
rendering experience possible1 only     
makes the more indispensable the duty of
 recognising their differing characters4
 ,even should they prove to be          
inseparable aspects of sense-experience1
 without metaphysical implications1 that
 would not obviate the necessity of     
clearly distinguishing them4 ,the       
distinction remains1 whatever           
explanation may be adopted of its       
speculative or other significance4  ,now
 obviously in so fundamental an enquiry1
 dealing as it does with the most       
complicated and difficult problem in the

 entire field of metaphysics1 no brief  
and compendious answer can cover all the
 various considerations which are       
relevant and determining4 ,the problem  
of the deduction being what it is1 the  
section dealing with it can hardly fail 
to be the most difficult portion of the 
whole ,critique4 ,the conclusions at    
which it arrives rest not merely upon   
the argument which it contains but also 
upon the results more or less           
independently reached in the other      
sections4 ,the doctrine of the empirical
 object as appearance requires for its  
development the various discussions     
contained in the ,aesthetic1 in the     
sections on ,inner ,sense and on the    
,refutation of ,idealism1 in the        
chapters on ,phenomena and ,noumena and 
on the ,antinomies4 ,the metaphysical   
consequences and implications of ,kant's
 teaching in regard to the              
transcendental unity of apperception are
 first revealed in the chapter on the   
,paralogisms4 ,the view taken of        

productive imagination is expanded in   
the section on ,schematism4 ,in a word1 
the whole antecedent teaching of the    
,critique is focussed1 and the entire   
subsequent development of the ,critical 
doctrine is anticipated1 in this brief  
chapter4  ,but there are1 of course1    
additional causes of the difficulty and 
obscurity of the argument4 ,one such    
cause has already been noted1 namely1   
that the ,critique is not a unitary     
work1 developed from a previously       
thought-out standpoint1 but in large    
part consists of manuscripts of very    
various dates1 artificially pieced      
together by the addition of connecting  
links4 ,in no part of the ,critique is  
this so obvious as in the ,analytic of  
,concepts4 ,until this is recognised all
 attempts to interpret the text in any  
impersonal fashion are doomed to        
failure4 ,for this reason ,i have       
prefaced our discussion by a statement  
of ,vaihinger's analysis4 ,no one who   
can accept it is any longer in danger of

 underestimating this particular cause  
of the obscurity of ,kant's deduction4  
,but the chief reason is one to which ,i
 have thus far made only passing        
reference1 and to which we may now give 
the attention which its importance      
demands1 namely1 the tentative and      
experimental character of ,kant's own   
final solutions4 ,the arguments of the  
deduction are only intelligible if      
viewed as an expression of the          
conflicting tendencies to which ,kant's 
thought remained subject4 ,he sought to 
allow due weight to each of the         
divergent aspects of the experience     
which he was analysing1 and in so doing 
proceeded1 as it would seem1            
simultaneously along the parallel lines 
of what appeared to be the possible1    
alternative methods of explanation4 ,and
 to the end these opposing tendencies   
continued side by side1 to the confusion
 of those readers who seek for a single 
unified teaching1 but to the great      
illumination of those who are looking to

 ,kant1 not for clear-cut or final      
solutions1 but for helpful analysis and 
for partial disentanglement of the      
complicated issues which go to          
constitute these baffling problems4     
,the two chief tendencies which thus    
conflicted in ,kant's mind may be named 
the subjectivist and the phenomenalist  
respectively4 ,this conflict remained1  
so to speak1 underground1 influencing   
the argument at every point1 but seldom 
itself becoming the subject of direct   
discussion4 ,as we shall find1 it caused
 ,kant to develop a twofold view of     
inner sense1 of causality1 of the object
 of knowledge1 and of the unity of      
apperception4 ,one of the few sections  
in the ,critique where it seems on the  
point of emerging into clear            
consciousness is the section1 added in  
the second edition1 on the ,refutation  
of ,idealism4 ,but this section owes its
 origin to polemical causes4 ,it        
represents a position peculiar to the   
maturer portions of the ,analytic2 the  

rest of the ,critique is not rewritten  
so as to harmonise with it1 or to       
develop the consequences which          
consistent holding to it must involve4  
,i shall use the term subjectivism 7and 
its equivalent subjective idealism7 in  
the wide sense#ici which makes it       
applicable to the teaching of ,descartes
 and ,locke1 of ,leibniz and ,wolff1 no 
less than to that of ,berkeley and      
,hume4 ,a common element in all these   
philosophies is the belief that         
subjective or mental states1 8ideas0 in 
the ,lockean sense1 are the objects of  
consciousness1 and further are the sole 
possible objects of which it can have   
any direct or immediate awareness4      
,knowledge is viewed as a process       
entirely internal to the individual     
mind1 and as carrying us further only in
 virtue of some additional supervening  
process1 inferential1 conjectural1 or   
instinctive4 ,this subjectivism also    
tends to combine with a view of         
consciousness as an ultimate            

self-revealing property of a merely     
individual existence4#idj ,for          
,descartes consciousness is the very    
essence1 both of the mind and of the    
self4 ,it is indeed asserted to be      
exhaustive of the nature of both4       
,though the self is described as        
possessing a faculty of will as well as 
a power of thinking1 all its activities 
are taken as being disclosed to the mind
 through the revealing power of its     
fundamental attribute4 ,the individual  
mind is thus viewed as an existence in  
which everything takes place in the open
 light of an all-pervasive              
consciousness4 ,leibniz1 it is true1    
taught the existence of subconscious    
perceptions1 and so far may seem to have
 anticipated ,kant's recognition of     
non-conscious processes2 but as         
formulated by ,leibniz that doctrine has
 the defect which frequently vitiates   
its modern counterpart1 namely that it  
represents the subconscious as analogous
 in nature to the conscious1 and as     

differing from it only in the accidental
 features of intensity and clearness1 or
 through temporary lack of control over 
the machinery of reproductive           
association4 ,the subconscious1 as thus 
represented1 merely enlarges the private
 content of the individual mind2 it in  
no respect transcends it4  ,the         
genuinely ,critical view of the         
generative conditions of experience is  
radically different from this           
,leibnizian doctrine of petites         
perceptions4 ,it connects rather with   
,leibniz's mode of conceiving the origin
 of a priori concepts4 ,but even that   
teaching it restates in such fashion as 
to free it from subjectivist            
implications4 ,leibniz's contention that
 the mind is conscious of its           
fundamental activities1 and that it is  
by reflection upon them that it gains   
all ultimate a priori concepts1 is no   
longer tenable in view of the           
conclusions established in the objective
 deduction4 ,mental processes1 in so far

 as they are generative of experience1  
must fall outside the field of          
consciousness1 and as activities        
dynamically creative cannot be of the   
nature of ideas or contents4 ,they are  
not subconscious ideas but non-conscious
 processes4 ,they are not the submerged 
content of experience1 but its          
conditioning grounds4 ,their most       
significant characteristic has still1   
however1 to be mentioned4 ,they must no 
longer be interpreted in subjectivist   
terms1 as originating in the separate   
existence of an individual self4 ,in    
conditioning experience they generate   
the only self for which experience can  
vouch1 and consequently1 in the absence 
of full and independent proof1 must not 
be conceived as individually            
circumscribed4 ,the problem of          
knowledge1 properly conceived1 is no    
longer how consciousness1 individually  
conditioned1 can lead us beyond its own 
bounds1 but what a consciousness1 which 
is at once consciousness of objects and 

also consciousness of a self1 must imply
 for its possibility4 ,kant thus obtains
 what is an almost invariable           
concomitant of scientific and           
philosophical advance1 namely a more    
correct and scientific formulation of   
the problem to be solved4 ,the older    
formulation assumes the truth of the    
subjectivist standpoint2 the ,critical  
problem1 when thus stated1 is at least  
free from preconceptions of that        
particular brand4 ,assumptions which    
hitherto had been quite unconsciously   
held1 or else1 if reflected upon1 had   
been regarded as axiomatic and          
self-evident1 are now brought within the
 field of investigation4 ,kant thereby  
achieves a veritable revolution2 and    
with it many of the most far-reaching   
consequences of the ,critical teaching  
are closely bound up4  ,this new        
standpoint1 in contrast to subjective   
idealism1 may be named ,critical1 or to 
employ the term which ,kant himself     
applies both to his transcendental      

deduction and to the unity of           
apperception1 objective idealism4 ,but  
as the distinction between appearance   
and reality is no less fundamental to   
the ,critical attitude1 we shall perhaps
 be less likely to be misunderstood1 or 
to seem to be identifying ,kant's       
standpoint with the very different      
teaching of ,hegel1 if by preference we 
employ the title phenomenalism4  ,in the
 transcendental deduction ,kant1 as     
above noted1 is seeking to do justice to
 the universal or absolutist aspect of  
our consciousness1 to its transcendence 
of the embodied and separate self4 ,the 
unity of apperception is entitled       
objective1 because it is regarded as the
 counterpart of a single cosmical time  
and of a single cosmical space within   
which all events fall4 ,its objects are 
not mental states peculiar to itself1   
nor even ideal contents numerically     
distinct from those in other minds4 ,it 
looks out upon a common world of        
genuinely independent existence4 ,in    

developing this position ,kant is       
constrained to revise and indeed        
completely to recast his previous views 
both as to the nature of the synthetic  
processes1 through which experience is  
constructed1 and of the given manifold1 
upon which they are supposed to act4    
,from the subjectivist point of view the
 synthetic activities consist of the    
various cognitive processes of the      
individual mind1 and the given manifold 
consists of the sensations aroused by   
material bodies acting upon the special 
senses4 ,from the objective or          
phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic  
processes are of a noumenal character1  
and the given manifold is similarly     
viewed as being due to noumenal agencies
 acting1 not upon the sense-organs1     
which as appearances are themselves     
noumenally conditioned1 but upon what   
may be called 8outer sense40 ,these     
distinctions may first be made clear4   
,sensations1 ,kant holds1 have a twofold
 origin1 noumenal and mechanical4 ,they 

are due in the first place to the action
 of things in themselves upon the       
noumenal conditions of the self1 and    
also in the second place to the action  
of material bodies upon the sense-organs
 and the brain4 ,to take the latter     
first4 ,light reflected from objects1   
and acting on the retina1 gives rise to 
sensations of colour4 ,for such causal  
interrelations there exists1 ,kant      
teaches1 the same kind of empirical     
evidence as for the causal interaction  
of material bodies4#ida ,our sensational
 experiences are as truly events in time
 as are mechanical happenings in space4 
,in this way1 however1 we can account   
only for the existence of our sensations
 and for the order in which they make   
their appearance in or to consciousness1
 not for our awareness of them4 ,to     
state the point by means of an          
illustration4 ,the impinging of one     
billiard ball upon another accounts     
causally for the motion which then      
appears in the second ball4 ,but no one 

would dream of asserting that by itself 
it accounts for our consciousness of    
that second motion4 ,we may contend that
 in an exactly similar manner1 to the   
same extent1 no more and no less1 the   
action of an object upon the brain      
accounts only for the occurrence of a   
visual sensation as an event in the     
empirical time sequence4 ,a sensation   
just as little as a motion can carry its
 own consciousness with it4 ,to regard  
that as ever possible is ultimately to  
endow events in time with the capacity  
of apprehending objects in space4 ,in   
dealing with causal connections in space
 and time we do not require to discuss  
the problem of knowledge proper1 namely1
 how it is possible to have or acquire  
knowledge1 whether of a motion in space 
or of a sensation in time4 ,when we     
raise that further question we have to  
adopt a very different standpoint1 and  
to take into account a much greater     
complexity of conditions4  ,kant applies
 this point of view no less rigorously  

to feelings1 emotions1 and desires than 
to the sensations of the special senses4
 ,all of them1 he teaches1 are          
#8animal'#idb in character4 ,they are   
one and all conditioned by1 and         
explicable only in terms of1 the        
particular constitution of the animal   
organism4 ,they one and all belong to   
the realm of appearance4#idc  ,the term 
#8sensation' may also1 however1 be      
applied in a wider sense to signify the 
material of knowledge in so far as it is
 noumenally conditioned4 ,thus viewed1  
sensations are due1 not to the action of
 physical stimuli upon the bodily       
organs1 but to the affection by things  
in themselves of those factors in the   
noumenal conditions of the self which   
correspond to 8sensibility40 ,kant is   
culpably careless in failing to         
distinguish those two very different    
meanings of the phrase #8given          
manifold4' ,the language which he       
employs is thoroughly ambiguous4 ,just  
as he frequently speaks as if the       

synthetic processes were conscious      
activities exerted by the self1 so also 
he frequently uses language which       
implies that the manifold upon which    
these processes act is identical with   
the sensations of the special senses4   
,but the sensations of the bodily       
senses1 even if reducible to it1 can at 
most form only part of it4 ,the         
synthetic processes1 interpreting the   
manifold in accordance with the fixed   
forms1 space1 time1 and the categories1 
generate the spatial world within which 
objects are apprehended as causally     
interacting and as giving rise through  
their action upon the sense-organs to   
the various special sensations as events
 in time4 ,sensations1 as mechanically  
caused1 are thus on the same plane as   
other appearances4 ,they depend upon the
 same generating conditions as the      
motions which produce them4 ,as minor   
incidents within a more comprehensive   
totality they cannot possibly represent 
the material out of which the whole has 

been constructed4 ,to explain the       
phenomenal world as constructed out of  
the sensations of the special senses is 
virtually to equate it with a small     
selection of its constituent parts4     
,such professed explanation also commits
 the further absurdity of attempting to 
account for the origin of the phenomenal
 world by means of events which can     
exist only under the conditions which it
 itself supplies4 ,the manifold of the  
special senses and the primary manifold 
are radically distinct4 ,the former is  
due to material bodies acting upon the  
material sense-organs4 ,the latter is   
the product of noumenal agencies acting 
upon 8outer sense10 i4e4 upon those     
noumenal conditions of the self which   
constitute our 8sensibility02 it is much
 more comprehensive than the former2 it 
must contain the material for all modes 
of objective existence1 including many  
that are usually regarded as purely     
mental4#idd  ,to turn1 now1 to the other
 aspect of experience4 ,what are the    

factors which condition its form8 ,what 
must we postulate in order to account   
for the existence of consciousness and  
for the unitary form in which alone it  
can appear8 ,kant's answer is again     
ambiguous4 ,he fails sufficiently to    
insist upon distinctions which yet are  
absolutely vital to any genuine         
understanding of the new and            
revolutionary positions towards which he
 is feeling his way4 ,the synthetic     
processes which in the subjective and   
objective deductions are proved to      
condition all experience may be         
interpreted either as conscious or as   
non-conscious activities1 and may be    
ascribed either to the agency of the    
individual self or to noumenal          
conditions which fall outside the realm 
of possible definition4 ,now1 though    
,kant's own expositions remain          
thoroughly ambiguous1 the results of the
 ,critical enquiry would seem--at least 
so long as the fundamental distinction  
between matter and form is held to and  

the temporally sequent aspect of        
experience is kept in view--to be       
decisive in favour of the latter        
alternative in each case4 ,the synthetic
 processes must take place and complete 
themselves before any consciousness can 
exist at all4 ,and as they thus         
precondition consciousness1 they cannot 
themselves be known to be conscious2 and
 not being known to be conscious1 it is 
not even certain that they may          
legitimately be described as mental4 ,we
 have1 indeed1 to conceive them on the  
analogy of our mental processes1 but    
that may only be because of the         
limitation of our knowledge to the data 
of experience4 ,further1 we have no     
right to conceive them as the activities
 of a noumenal self4 ,we know the self  
only as conscious1 and the synthetic    
processes1 being the generating         
conditions of consciousness1 are also   
the generating conditions of the only   
self for which our experience can vouch4
 ,kant1 viewing as he does the temporal 

aspect of human experience as           
fundamental1 would seem to be justified 
in naming these processes 8synthetic40  
,for consciousness in its very nature   
would seem to involve the carrying over 
of content from one time to other times1
 and the construction of a more         
comprehensive total consciousness from  
the elements thus combined4 ,kant is    
here analysing in its simplest and most 
fundamental form that aspect of         
consciousness which ,william ,james has 
described in the ,principles of         
,psychology1#ide and which we may       
entitle the telescoping of earlier      
mental states into the successive       
experiences that include them4 ,they    
telescope in a manner which can never   
befall the successive events in a causal
 series1 and which is not explicable by 
any scheme of relations derivable from  
the physical sphere4  ,obviously1 what  
,kant does is to apply to the           
interpretation of the noumenal          
conditions of our conscious experience a

 distinction derived by analogy from    
conscious experience itself--the        
distinction1 namely1 between our mental 
processes and the sensuous material with
 which they deal4 ,the application of   
such a distinction may be inevitable in 
any attempt to explain human experience2
 but it can very easily1 unless         
carefully guarded1 prove a source of    
serious misunderstanding4 ,just as the  
synthetic processes which generate      
consciousness are not known to be       
themselves conscious1 so also the       
manifold cannot be identified with the  
sensations of the bodily senses4 ,these 
last are events in time1 and are effects
 not of noumenal but of mechanical      
causes4  ,kant's conclusion when        
developed on consistent ,critical lines1
 and therefore in phenomenalist terms1  
is twofold3 positive1 to the effect that
 consciousness1 for all that our        
analysis can prove to the contrary1 may 
be merely a resultant1 derivative from  
and dependent upon a complexity of      

conditions2 and negative1 to the effect 
that though these conditions may by     
analogy be described as consisting of   
synthetic processes acting upon a given 
material1 they are in their real nature 
unknowable by us4 ,even their bare      
possibility we cannot profess to        
comprehend4 ,we postulate them only     
because given experience is demonstrably
 not self-explanatory and would seem to 
refer us for explanation to some such   
antecedent generative grounds4  ,kant1  
as we have already emphasised1 obscures 
his position by the way in which he     
frequently speaks of the transcendental 
unity of apperception as the supreme    
condition of our experience4 ,at times  
he even speaks as if it were the source 
of the synthetic processes4 ,that       
cannot1 however1 be regarded as his real
 teaching4 ,self-consciousness 7and the 
unity of apperception1 in so far as it  
finds expression through                
self-consciousness7 rests upon the same 
complexity of conditions as does outer  

experience1 and therefore may be merely 
a product or resultant4 ,it is1 as he   
insists in the ,paralogisms1 the        
emptiest of all our concepts1 and can   
afford no sufficient ground for         
asserting the self to be an abiding     
personality4 ,we cannot by theoretical  
analysis of the facts of experience or  
of the nature of self-consciousness     
prove anything whatsoever in regard to  
the ultimate nature of the self4  ,now  
,kant is here giving a new1 and quite   
revolutionary1 interpretation of the    
distinction between the subjective and  
the objective4 ,the objective is for the
 ,cartesians the independently real2#idf
 the subjective is that which has an    
altogether different kind of existence  
in what is entitled the field of        
consciousness4 ,kant1 on the other hand1
 from his phenomenalist standpoint1     
views existences as objective when they 
are determined by purely physical       
causes1 and as subjective when they also
 depend upon physiological and          

psychological conditions4 ,on this      
latter view the difference between the  
two is no longer a difference of kind2  
it becomes a difference merely of       
degree4 ,objective existences1 owing to 
the simplicity and recurrent character  
of their conditions1 are uniform4       
,subjective existences resting upon     
conditions which are too complex to be  
frequently recurrent1 are by contrast   
extremely variable4 ,but both types of  
existence are objective in the sense    
that they are objects1 and immediate    
objects1 for consciousness4 ,subjective 
states do not run parallel with the     
objective system of natural existences1 
nor are they additional to it4 ,for they
 do not constitute our consciousness of 
nature2 they are themselves part of the 
natural order which consciousness       
reveals4 ,that they contrast with       
physical existences in being unextended 
and incapable of location in space is   
what ,kant would seem by implication to 
assert1 but he challenges ,descartes'   

right to infer from this particular     
difference a complete diversity in their
 whole nature4 ,sensations1 feelings1   
emotions1 and desires1 so far as they   
are experienced by us1 constitute the   
empirical self which is an objective    
existence1 integrally connected with the
 material environment1 in terms of which
 alone it can be understood4 ,in other  
words1 the distinction between the      
subjective and the objective is now made
 to fall within the system of natural   
law4 ,the subjective is not opposite in 
nature to the objective1 but is a       
subspecies within it4  ,the             
revolutionary character of this         
reformulation of ,cartesian distinctions
 may perhaps be expressed by saying that
 what ,kant is really doing is to       
substitute the distinction between      
appearance and reality for the          
,cartesian dualism of the mental and the
 material4 ,the psychical is a title for
 a certain class of known existences1   
i4e4 of appearances2 and they form      

together with the physical a single     
system4 ,but underlying this entire     
system1 conditioning both physical and  
psychical phenomena1 is the realm of    
noumenal existence2 and when the        
question of the possibility of          
knowledge1 that is1 of the experiencing 
of such a comprehensive natural system1 
is raised1 it is to this noumenal sphere
 that we are referred4 ,everything      
experienced1 even a sensation or desire1
 is an event2 but the experiencing of it
 is an act of awareness1 and calls for  
an explanation of an altogether         
different kind4  ,thus ,kant completely 
restates the problem of knowledge4 ,the 
problem is not how1 starting from the   
subjective1 the individual can come to  
knowledge of the independently real2 but
 how1 if a common world is alone        
immediately apprehended1 the inner      
private life of the self-conscious being
 can be possible1 and how such inner    
experience is to be interpreted4 ,how   
does it come about that though          

sensations1 feelings1 etc41 are events  
no less mechanically conditioned than   
motions in space1 and constitute with   
the latter a single system conformed to 
natural law1 they yet differ from all   
other classes of natural events in that 
they can be experienced only by a single
 consciousness4 ,to this question ,kant 
replies in terms of his fundamental     
distinction between appearance and      
reality4 ,though everything of which we 
are conscious may legitimately be       
studied in terms of the natural system  
to which it belongs1 consciousness      
itself cannot be so regarded4 ,in       
attempting to define it we are carried  
beyond the phenomenal to its noumenal   
conditions4 ,in other words1 it         
constitutes a problem1 the complete data
 of which are not at our disposal4 ,this
 is by itself a sufficient reason for   
our incapacity to explain why the states
 of each empirical self can never be    
apprehended save by a single            
consciousness1 or otherwise stated1 why 

each consciousness is limited1 as       
regards sensations and feelings1        
exclusively to those which arise in     
connection with some one animal         
organism4 ,it at least precludes us from
 dogmatically asserting that this is due
 to their being subjective in the       
dualistic and ,cartesian sense of that  
term--namely1 as constituting1 or being 
states of1 the knowing self4  ,a diagram
 may serve1 though very crudely1 to     
illustrate ,kant's phenomenalist        
interpretation of the cognitive         
situation4                              
,,nc,,ew                                
_/                                      
_/------------------_/------------------
---------              _/ ,the empirical
 world of our human consciousness       
_/  ------------       ---              
--------------                          
l                                       
,,es,a            ---           ,,es,b  
---                                     
x#a y#a z#a          m         x#b y#b  

z#b                                     
---                                     
-------------       ---                 
--------------                          
n                                       
---                       _/            
----------------------------------------
----------_/                         _/ 
_/                       _/             
_/                     _/               
_/                    ,v                
,v                   ,,nc,a             
,,nc,b              ,,es,a  ,empirical  
self of the conscious ,being ,a4        
,,es,b  ,empirical self of the conscious
 ,being ,b4              ,,nc,a         
,noumenal conditions of the conscious   
,being ,a4              ,,nc,b          
,noumenal conditions of the conscious   
,being ,b4              l1 m1 n         
,objects in space4              x#a1    
y#a1 z#a  ,sensations caused by objects 
l1 m1 n             acting on the       
sense-organs of the empirical self ,a4  
x#b1 y#b1 z#b ,sensations caused by #a1 

m1 n acting             on the          
sense-organs of the empirical self ,b4  
,,nc,,ew  ,noumenal conditions of the   
empirical world4  ,everything in this   
empirical world is equally open to the  
consciousness of both ,a and ,b1 save   
only certain psychical events that are  
conditioned by physiological and        
psychological factors4 x#a1 y#a1 z#a can
 be apprehended only by ,a2 x#b1 y#b1   
z#b can be apprehended only by ,b4      
,otherwise ,a and ,b experience one and 
the same world2 the body of ,b is       
perceived by ,a in the same manner in   
which he perceives his own body4 ,this  
is true a fortiori of all other material
 existences4 ,further1 these material   
existences are known with the same      
immediacy as the subjective states4 ,as 
regards the relation in which ,,nc,a1   
,,nc,b1 and ,,nc,,ew stand to one       
another1 no assertions can be made1     
save1 as above indicated1#idg such      
conjectural statements as may           
precariously be derived through argument

 by analogy from distinctions that fall 
within our human experience4#idh        
,kant's phenomenalism thus involves an  
objectivist view of individual selves   
and of their interrelations4 ,they fall 
within the single common world of space4
 ,within this phenomenal world they     
stand in external1 mechanical relations 
to one another4 ,they are apprehended as
 embodied1 with known contents1         
sensations1 feelings1 and desires1      
composing their inner experience4 ,there
 is1 from this point of view1 no problem
 of knowledge4 ,on this plane we have to
 deal only with events known1 not with  
any process of apprehension4 ,even the  
components of the empirical self1 the   
subject-matter of empirical psychology1 
are not processes of apprehension1 but  
apprehended existences4 ,it is only when
 we make a regress beyond the phenomenal
 as such to the conditions which render 
it possible1 that the problem of        
knowledge arises at all4 ,and with this 
regress we are brought to the real crux 

of the whole question--the              
reconciliation of this phenomenalism    
with the conditions of our              
self-consciousness4 ,for we have then to
 take into account the fundamental fact 
that each self is not only an animal    
existence within the phenomenal world1  
but also in its powers of apprehension  
coequal with it4 ,the self known is     
external to the objects known2 the self 
that knows is conscious of itself as    
comprehending within the field of its   
consciousness the wider universe in     
infinite space4  ,such considerations   
would1 at first sight1 seem to force us 
to modify our phenomenalist standpoint  
in the direction of subjectivism4 ,for  
in what other manner can we hope to     
unite the two aspects of the self1 the  
known conditions of its finite existence
 and the consciousness through which it 
correlates with the universe as a whole8
 ,in the one aspect it is a part of     
appearance2 in the other it connects    
with that which makes appearance        

possible at all4  ,quite frequently it  
is the subjectivist solution which ,kant
 seems to adopt4 ,objects known are     
8mere representations10 8states of the  
identical self40 ,everything outside the
 individual mind is real2 appearances   
are purely individual in origin4 ,but   
such a position is inconsistent with the
 deeper implications of ,kant's         
,critical teaching1 and would involve   
the entire ignoring of the many         
suggestions which point to a            
fundamentally different and much more   
adequate standpoint4 ,the individual is 
himself known only as appearance1 and   
cannot1 therefore1 be the medium in and 
through which appearances exist4 ,though
 appearances exist only in and through  
consciousness1 they are not due to any  
causes which can legitimately be        
described as individual4 ,from this     
standpoint ,kant would seem to          
distinguish between the grounds and     
conditions of phenomenal existence and  
the special determining causes of       

individual consciousness4               
,transcendental conditions generate     
consciousness of the relatively         
permanent and objective world in space  
and time2 empirical conditions within   
this space and time world determine the 
sensuous modes through which special    
portions of this infinite and uniform   
world appear diversely to different     
minds4  ,this1 however1 is a point of   
view which is only suggested1 and1 as we
 have already observed1#idi the form in 
which it is outlined suggests many      
objections and difficulties4            
,consciousness of the objective world in
 space and time does not exist complete 
with one portion of it more specifically
 determined in terms of actual          
sense-perceptions4 ,rather the          
consciousness of the single world in    
space and time is gradually developed   
through and out of sense experience of  
limited portions of it4 ,we have still  
to consider the various sections in the 
,analytic of ,principles 7especially the

 section added in the second edition on 
the ,refutation of ,idealism7 and in the
 ,dialectic1 in which ,kant further     
develops this standpoint4 ,but even     
after doing so1 we shall be forced to   
recognise that ,kant leaves undiscussed 
many of the most obvious objections to  
which his phenomenalism lies open4 ,to  
the very last he fails to state in any  
really adequate manner how from the     
phenomenalist standpoint he would regard
 the world described in mechanical terms
 by science as being related to the     
world of ordinary sense-experience1#iej 
or how different individual             
consciousnesses are related to one      
another4 ,the new form1 however1 in     
which these old-time problems here      
emerge is the best possible proof of the
 revolutionary character of ,kant's     
,critical enquiries4 ,for these problems
 are no longer formulated in terms of   
the individualistic presuppositions     
which govern the thinking of all ,kant's
 predecessors1 even that of ,hume4 ,the 

concealed presuppositions are now called
 in question1 and are made the subject  
of explicit discussion4 ,but further    
comment must meantime be deferred4#iea  
,,transcendental ,,deduction ,,of ,,the 
,,categories1 ,,in ,,the ,,second       
,,edition  ,the argument of the second  
edition transcendental deduction can be 
reduced to the following eight points3  
7#a7ieb ,it opens with the statement of 
a fundamental assumption which ,kant    
does not dream of questioning and of    
which he nowhere attempts to offer      
proof4 ,the representation of           
combination is the one kind of          
representation which can never be given 
through sense4 ,it is not so given even 
in the pure forms of space and time     
yielded by outer and inner sense4#iec   
,it is due to an act of spontaneity1    
which as such must be performed by the  
understanding4 ,as it is one and the    
same for every kind of combination1 it  
may be called by the general name of    
synthesis4 ,and as all combination1     

without exception1 is due to this       
source1 its dissolution1 that is1       
analysis1 which seems to be its         
opposite1 always presupposes it4        
7#b7ied ,besides the manifold and its   
synthesis a further factor is involved  
in the conception of combination1       
namely1 the representation of the unity 
of the manifold4 ,the combination which 
is necessary to and constitutes         
knowledge is representation of the      
synthetical unity of the manifold4 ,this
 is a factor additional to synthesis and
 to the manifold synthesised4 ,for such 
representation cannot arise out of any  
antecedent consciousness of synthesis4  
,on the contrary1 it is only through    
supervention upon the unitary synthesis 
that the conception of the combination  
becomes possible4 ,in other words1 the  
representation of unity conditions      
consciousness of synthesis1 and         
therefore cannot be the outcome or      
product of it4 ,this is an application1 
or rather generalisation1 of a position 

which in the first edition is developed 
only in reference to the empirical      
process of recognition4 ,recognition    
preconditions consciousness1 and        
therefore cannot be subsequent upon it4 
7#c7iee ,the unity thus represented is  
not1 however1 that which is expressed   
through the category of unity4 ,the     
consciousness of unity which is involved
 in the conception of synthesis is that 
of apperception or transcendental       
self-consciousness4 ,this is the highest
 and most universal form of unity1 for  
it is a presupposition of the unity of  
all possible concepts1 whether analytic 
or synthetic1 in the various forms of   
judgment4  7#d7ief ,a manifold though   
given is not for that reason also       
represented4 ,it must be possible for   
the #8,i think' to accompany it and all 
my other representations3       8444for 
otherwise something would be represented
 in me which could      not be thought  
at all2 and that is equivalent to saying
 that the      representation would be  

impossible or at least would be nothing 
to      me40#ieg  ,but to ascribe a     
manifold as my representations to the   
identical self is to comprehend them1 as
 synthetically connected1 in one        
apperception4#ieh ,only what can be     
combined in one consciousness can be    
related to the #8,i think4' ,the        
analytic unity of self-consciousness    
presupposes the synthetic unity of the  
manifold4  7#e7iei ,the unity of        
apperception is analytic or             
self-identical4 ,it expresses itself    
through the proposition1 ,i am ,i4 ,but 
being thus pure identity without content
 of its own1 it cannot be conscious of  
itself in and by itself4 ,its unity and 
constancy can have meaning only through 
contrast to the variety and             
changeableness of its specific          
experiences2 and yet1 at the same time1 
it is also true that such manifoldness  
will destroy all possibility of unity   
unless it be reconcileable with it4 ,the
 variety can contribute to the          

conditioning of apperception only in so 
far as it is capable of being combined  
into a single consciousness4 ,through   
synthetic unifying of the manifold the  
self comes to consciousness both of     
itself and of the manifold4  7#f7ifj    
,the transcendental original unity of   
apperception is an objective1 not a     
merely subjective1 unity4 ,its          
conditions are also the conditions in   
and through which we acquire            
consciousness of objects4 ,an object is 
that in the conception of which the     
manifold of given intuitions is         
combined4 7,this point1 though central  
to the argument1 is more adequately     
developed in the first than in the      
second edition47 ,such combination      
requires unity of consciousness4 ,thus  
the same unity which conditions         
apperception likewise conditions the    
relation of representations to an       
object4 ,the unity of pure apperception 
may therefore be described as an        
objective unity for two reasons3 first1 

because it can apprehend its own        
analytical unity only through discovery 
of unity in the given1 and secondly1 for
 the reason that such synthetical       
unifying of the manifold is also the    
process whereby representations acquire 
reference to objects4  7#g7ifa ,kant    
reinforces this conclusion1 and shows   
its further significance1 by analysis of
 the act of judgment4 ,the logical      
definition of judgment1 as the          
representation of a relation between two
 concepts1 has many defects4 ,these1    
however1 are all traceable to its       
initial failure to explain1 or even to  
recognise1 the nature of the assertion  
which judgment as such claims to make4  
,judgment asserts relations of a quite  
unique kind1 altogether different from  
those which exist between ideas         
connected through association4 ,if1 for 
instance1 on seeing a body the          
sensations of weight due to the attempt 
to raise it are suggested by            
association1 there is nothing but       

subjective sequence2 but if we form the 
judgment that the body is heavy1 the two
 representations are then connected     
together in the object4 ,this is what is
 intended by the copula #8is4' ,it is a 
relational term through which the       
objective unity of given representations
 is distinguished from the subjective4  
,it indicates that the representations  
stand in objective relation under the   
pure unity of apperception1 and not     
merely in subjective relation owing to  
the play of association in the          
individual mind4 8,judgment is nothing  
but the mode of bringing cognitions to  
the objective unity of apperception10   
i4e4 of giving to them a validity which 
holds independently of the subjective   
processes through which it is           
apprehended4 ,objective relations are   
not1 of course1 all necessary or        
universal2 and a judgment may1          
therefore1 assert a relation which is   
empirical and contingent4 ,none the less
 the fundamental distinction between it 

and any mere relation of association    
still persists4 ,the empirical relation 
is still in the judgment asserted to be 
objective4 ,the subject and the         
predicate are asserted1 in the          
particular case or cases to which the   
judgment refers1 to be connected in the 
object and not merely in the mind of the
 subject4 ,or otherwise stated1 though  
subject and predicate are not themselves
 declared to be necessarily and         
universally related to one another1     
their contingent relation has to be     
viewed as objectively1 and therefore    
necessarily1 grounded4 ,judgment always 
presupposes the existence of necessary  
relations even when it is not concerned 
to assert them4 ,judgment is the organ  
of objective knowledge1 and is therefore
 bound up1 indirectly when not directly1
 with the universality and necessity    
which are the sole criteria of          
knowledge4 ,the judgment expressive of  
contingency is still judgment1 and is   
therefore no less necessary in its      

conditions1 and no less objective in its
 validity1 than is a universal judgment 
of the scientific type4 ,to use ,kant's 
own terminology1 judgment acquires      
objective validity through participation
 in the necessary unity of apperception4
 ,in so doing it is made to embody those
 principles of the objective            
determination of all representations    
through which alone cognition is        
possible4  7#h7ifb ,as judgment is      
nothing but the mode of bringing        
cognitions to the objective unity of    
apperception1 it follows that the       
categories1 which in the metaphysical   
deduction have been proved to be the    
possible functions in judging1 are the  
conditions in and through which such    
pure apperception becomes possible4     
,apperception conditions experience1 and
 the unity which both demand for their  
possibility is that of the categories4  
99       99       99       99       99  
,before passing to the remaining        
sections of the deduction1#ifc which are

 supplementary rather than essential1 ,i
 may add comment upon the above points4 
,only 7#g7 and 7#h7 call for special    
consideration4 ,they represent a form of
 argument which has no counterpart in   
the first edition4 ,as we noted1#ifd the
 first edition argument is defective    
owing to its failure to demonstrate that
 the categories constitute the unity    
which is necessary to knowledge4 ,by    
introducing in the second edition this  
analysis of judgment1 and by showing the
 inseparable connection between pure    
apperception1 objective consciousness   
and judgment1 this defect is in some    
degree removed4 ,as the categories      
correspond to the possible functions of 
judgment1 their objective validity is   
thereby established4 ,by this means also
 the connection which in ,kant's view   
exists between the metaphysical and the 
transcendental deductions receives for  
the first time proper recognition4 ,the 
categories which in the former deduction
 are discovered and systematised through

 logical analysis of the form of        
judgment1 are in the latter deduction1  
through transcendental analysis of the  
function of judgment1 shown to be just  
those forms of relation which are       
necessary to the possibility of         
knowledge4 ,it must1 however1 be noted  
that the transcendental argument is     
brought to completion only through      
assumption of the adequacy of the       
metaphysical deduction4 ,no independent 
attempt is made to show that the        
particular categories obtained in the   
metaphysical deduction are those which  
are required1 that there are no others1 
or that all the twelve are              
indispensable4  7#g7 is a development of
 an argument which first appears in the 
,prolegomena4 ,the statement of it there
 given is1 however1 extremely confused1 
owing to the distinction which ,kant    
most unfortunately introduces#ife       
between judgments of experience and     
judgments of perception4 ,that          
distinction is entirely worthless and   

can only serve to mislead the reader4   
,it cuts at the very root of ,kant's    
,critical teaching4 ,judgments of       
perception involve1 ,kant says1 no      
category of the understanding1 but only 
what he is pleased to call the 8logical 
connection of perceptions in a thinking 
subject40 ,what that may be he nowhere  
explains1 save by adding#iff that in it 
perceptions are 8compared and conjoined 
in a consciousness of my state0 7also   
spoken of by ,kant as 8empirical        
consciousness071 and not 8in            
consciousness in general40       8,all  
our judgments are at first mere         
judgments of perception2 they      hold 
good merely for us 7that is1 for the    
individual subject71 and      we do not 
till afterwards give them a new         
reference1 namely1 to an      object4444
 ,to illustrate the matter3 that the    
room is warm1 sugar      sweet1 and     
wormwood bitter--these are merely       
subjectively valid      judgments4 ,i do
 not at all demand that ,i myself should

 at all      times1 or that every other 
person should1 find the facts to be what
      ,i now assert2 they only express a
 reference of two sensations to      the
 same subject1 to myself1 and that only 
in my present state of      perception4 
,consequently they are not intended to  
be valid of the      object4 ,such      
judgments ,i have named those of        
perception4 ,judgments      of          
experience are of quite a different     
nature4 ,what experience      teaches me
 under certain circumstances1 it must   
teach me always and      teach          
everybody1 and its validity is not      
limited to the subject or      to its   
state at a particular time40#ifg  ,the  
illegitimacy and the thoroughly         
misleading character of this distinction
 hardly require to be pointed out4      
,obviously ,kant is here confusing      
assertion of contingency and contingency
 of assertion4#ifh ,a judgment of       
contingency1 in order to be valid1 must 
itself be necessary4 ,even a momentary  

state of the self is referable to an    
object in judgment only if that object  
is causally1 and therefore necessarily1 
concerned in its production4#ifi  ,the  
distinction is repeated in  #bb as      
follows3       8,thinking is the        
combining of representations in one     
consciousness4      ,this combination is
 either merely relative to the subject1 
and is      contingent and subjective1  
or is absolute1 and is necessary or     
objective4 ,the combination of          
representations in one consciousness    
is judgment4 ,thinking1 therefore1 is   
the same as judging1 or the             
relating of representations to judgments
 in general4 ,judgments1      therefore1
 are either merely subjective1 or they  
are objective4      ,they are subjective
 when representations are related to a  
consciousness in one subject only1 and  
are combined in it alone4      ,they are
 objective when they are united in a    
consciousness in      general1 that is1 
necessarily40#igj  ,to accept this      

distinction is to throw the entire      
argument into confusion4 ,this ,kant    
seems to have himself recognised in the 
interval between the ,prolegomena and   
the second edition of the ,critique4    
,for in the section before us there is  
no trace of it4 ,the opposition is no   
longer between subjective and objective 
judgment1 but only between association  
of ideas and judgment which as such is  
always objective4 ,the distinction drawn
 in the ,prolegomena is only1 indeed1 a 
more definite formulation of the        
distinction which runs through the first
 edition of the ,critique between the   
indeterminate and the determinate object
 of consciousness4 ,the more definite   
formulation of it seems1 however1 to    
have had the happy effect of enabling   
,kant to realise the illegitimacy of any
 such distinction4         99       99  
99       99       99  ,we may now       
proceed to consider the remaining       
sections4#iga ,in section #baigb ,kant  
makes a very surprising statement4 ,the 

above argument1 which he summarises in a
 sentence1 yields1 he declares1 8the    
beginning of a deduction of the pure    
concepts of understanding40 ,this can   
hardly be taken as representing ,kant's 
real estimate of the significance of the
 preceding argument1 and would seem to  
be due to a temporary preoccupation with
 the problems that centre in the        
doctrine of schematism4 ,so far1 ,kant  
adds in explanation1 no account has been
 taken of the particular manner in which
 the manifold of empirical intuition is 
supplied to us4#igc ,the necessary      
supplement1 consisting of a very brief  
outline statement of the doctrine of    
schematism1 is given in section #bf4igd 
,it differs from the teaching of the    
special chapter devoted to schematism in
 emphasising space equally with time4   
,the doctrine of pure a priori manifolds
 is incidentally asserted4#ige ,section 
#bf concludes by consideration of the   
question why appearances must conform to
 the a priori categories4 ,it is no more

 surprising1 ,kant claims1 than that    
they should agree with the a priori     
forms of intuition4 ,the categories and 
the intuitional forms are relative to   
the same subject to which the           
appearances are relative2 and the       
appearances 8as mere representations are
 subject to no law of connection save   
that which the combining faculty        
prescribes40  ,the summary of the       
deduction given in section #bg discusses
 the three possible theories regarding  
the origin of pure concepts1 viz4 those 
of generatio aequivoca 7out of          
experience71 epigenesis1 and            
preformation4 ,the first is disproved by
 the deduction4 ,the second is the      
doctrine of the deduction and fulfils   
all the requirements of demonstration4  
,the proof that the categories are at   
once independent of experience and yet  
also universally valid for all          
experience is of the strongest possible 
kind1 namely1 that they make experience 
itself possible4 ,the third theory1 that

 the categories1 while subjective and   
self-discovered1 originate in faculties 
which are implanted in us by our        
,creator and which are so formed as to  
yield concepts in harmony with the laws 
of nature1 lies open to two main        
objections4 ,in the first place1 this is
 an hypothesis capable of accounting    
equally well for any kind of a priori   
whatsoever2 the predetermined powers of 
judgment can be multiplied without      
limit4 ,but a second objection is       
decisive1 namely1 that on such a theory 
the categories would lack the particular
 kind of necessity which is required4   
,they would express only the necessities
 imposed upon our thinking by the       
constitution of our minds1 and would not
 justify any assertion of necessary     
connection in the object4 ,kant might   
also have added1#igf that this          
hypothesis is metaphysical1 and         
therefore offers in explanation of the  
empirical validity of a priori concepts 
a theory which rests upon and involves  

their unconditioned employment4 ,that is
 a criticism which is reinforced by the 
teaching of the ,dialectic4  ,to return 
now to the omitted sections #bb to #be4 
,section #bb makes no fresh contribution
 to the argument of the first edition4  
,its teaching in regard to pure         
intuition and mathematical knowledge has
 already been commented upon4 ,in       
section #bc ,kant dwells upon an        
interesting consequence of the argument 
of the deduction4 ,the categories have a
 wider scope than the pure forms of     
sense4 ,since the argument of the       
deduction has shown that judgment is the
 indispensable instrument both for      
reducing a manifold to the unity of     
apperception and also for conferring    
upon representations a relation to an   
object1 it follows that the categories  
which are simply the possible functions 
of unity in judgment are valid for any  
and every consciousness that is         
sensuously conditioned and whose        
knowledge is therefore acquired through 

synthesis of a given manifold4 ,though  
such consciousness may not intuit in    
terms of space and time1 it must none   
the less apprehend objects in terms of  
the categories4 ,the categories thus    
extend to objects of sensuous intuition 
in general4 ,they are not1 however1     
valid of objects as such1 that is1 of   
things in themselves4 ,as empty         
relational forms they have meaning only 
in reference to a given matter2 and as  
instruments for the reduction of variety
 to the unity of apperception their     
validity has been proved only for       
conscious and sensuous experience4 ,even
 if the possibility of a non-sensuous   
intuitive understanding1 capable of     
apprehending things in themselves1 be   
granted1 we have no sufficient ground   
for asserting that the forms which such 
understanding will employ must coincide 
with the categories4#igg ,these are     
points which will come up for discussion
 in connection with ,kant's more        
detailed argument in the chapter on the 

distinction between phenomena and       
noumena4#igh  ,the heading to section   
#bd is decidedly misleading4 ,the phrase
 8objects of the senses in general0     
might be synonymous with 8objects of    
intuition in general0 of the preceding  
section4 ,to interpret it1 however1 by  
the contents of the section1 it means   
8objects of our senses40 ,this section  
ought1 therefore1 to form part of       
section #bf1 which in its opening       
sentences supplies its proper           
introduction4 7,it may also be noted    
that the opening sentences of section   
#bd are a needless repetition of section
 #bc4 ,this would seem to show that it  
was not written in immediate            
continuation of it47 ,the first three   
paragraphs of section #bd expound the   
same doctrine of schematism as that     
outlined in section #bf1 save that time 
alone is referred to4 ,the remaining    
paragraphs of section #bd deal with the 
connected doctrine of inner sense4      
,section #be deals with certain         

consequences which follow from that     
doctrine of inner sense4#igi   ,,the    
,,doctrine ,,of ,,inner ,,sense  ,we    
have still to consider a doctrine of    
great importance in ,kant's thinking1   
that of inner sense4 ,the significance  
of this doctrine is almost inversely    
proportionate to the scantiness and     
obscurity of the passages in which it is
 expounded and developed4 ,much of the  
indefiniteness and illusiveness of the  
current interpretations of ,kant would  
seem to be directly traceable to the    
commentator's failure to appreciate the 
position which it occupies in ,kant's   
system4 ,several of ,kant's chief       
results are given as deductions from it1
 while it itself1 in turn1 is largely   
inspired by the need for a secure basis 
upon which these positions may be made  
to rest4 ,the relation of the doctrine  
to its consequences is thus twofold4    
,kant formulates it in order to         
safeguard or rather to justify certain  
conclusions2 and yet these conclusions  

have themselves in part been arrived at 
owing to his readiness to accept such a 
doctrine1 and to what would seem to have
 been his almost instinctive feeling of 
its kinship 7notwithstanding the very   
crude form in which alone he was able to
 formulate it7 with ,critical teaching4 
,it was probably one of the earliest of 
the many new tenets which ,kant adopted 
in the years immediately subsequent to  
the publication of the inaugural        
,dissertation1 but it first received    
adequate statement in the second edition
 of the ,critique4 ,kant took advantage 
of the second edition to reply to       
certain criticisms to which his view of 
time had given rise1 and in so doing was
 compelled to formulate the doctrine of 
inner sense in a much more explicit     
manner4 ,hitherto he had assumed its    
truth1 but had not1 as it would seem1   
sufficiently reflected upon the various 
connected conclusions to which he was   
thereby committed4 ,this is one of the  
many instances which show how what is   

most fundamental in ,kant's thinking is 
frequently that of which he was himself 
least definitely aware4 ,like other     
thinkers1 he was most apt to discuss    
what he himself was inclined to question
 and feel doubt over4 ,the sources of   
his insight as well as the causes of his
 failure often lay beyond the purview of
 his explicitly developed tenets2 and   
only under the stimulus of criticism was
 he constrained and enabled to bring    
them within the circle of reasoned      
conviction4 ,we may venture the prophecy
 that if ,kant had been able to devote  
several years more to the maturing of   
the problems which in the face of so    
many difficulties he had brought thus   
far1 the doctrine of inner sense1 or    
rather the doctrines to which it gives  
expression1 would have been placed in   
the forefront of his teaching1 and their
 systematic interconnection1 both in the
 way of ground and of consequence1 with 
all his chief tenets would have been    
traced and securely established4  ,this 

would have involved1 however1 two very  
important changes4 ,in the first place1 
,kant would have had to recognise the   
unsatisfactory character of the supposed
 analogy between inner and outer sense4 
,as already remarked1#ihj no great      
thinker1 except ,locke1 has attempted to
 interpret inner consciousness on the   
analogy of the senses2 and the          
obscurities of ,kant's argument are not1
 therefore1 to be excused on the ground 
that 8the difficulty1 how a subject can 
have an internal intuition of itself1 is
 common to every theory40 ,secondly1    
,kant would have had to define the      
relation in which he conceived this part
 of his teaching to stand to his theory 
of consciousness4 ,but both these       
changes could have been made without    
requiring that he should give up the    
doctrines which are mainly responsible  
for his theory of inner sense1 namely1  
that there can be no awareness of       
awareness1 but only of existences which 
are objective1 and that there is        

consequently no consciousness of the    
generative1 synthetic processes#iha     
which constitute consciousness on its   
subjective side4 ,it is largely in      
virtue of these conclusions that ,kant's
 phenomenalism differs from the         
subjective idealism of his predecessors4
 ,if we ignore or reject them1 merely   
because of the obviously unsatisfactory 
manner in which alone ,kant has been    
able to formulate them1 we rule         
ourselves out from understanding the    
intention and purpose of much that is   
most characteristic of ,critical        
teaching4  ,the doctrine of inner sense1
 as expounded by ,locke1 suffers from an
 ambiguity which seems almost           
inseparable from it1 namely1 the        
confusion between inner sense1 on the   
one hand as a sense in some degree      
analogous in nature to what may be      
called outer sense1 and on the other as 
consisting in self-conscious reflection4
 ,this same confusion is traceable      
throughout the ,critique1 and is1 as we 

shall find1 in large part responsible   
for ,kant's failure to recognise1       
independently of outside criticism1 the 
central and indispensable part which    
this doctrine is called upon to play in 
his system4  ,the doctrine is stated by 
,kant as follows4 ,just as outer sense  
is affected by noumenal agencies1 and so
 yields a manifold arranged in terms of 
a form peculiar to it1 namely1 space1 so
 inner sense is affected by the mind    
itself and its inner state4#ihb ,the    
manifold thereby caused is arranged in  
terms of a form peculiar to inner sense1
 namely1 time4 ,the content thus        
arranged falls into two main divisions4 
,on the one hand we have feelings1      
desires1 volitions1 that is1 states of  
the mind in the strict sense1 subjective
 non-spatial existences4 ,on the other  
hand we have sensations1 perceptions1   
images1 concepts1 in a word1            
representations 7,vorstellungen7 of     
every possible type4 ,these latter all  
refer to the external world in space1   

and yet1 according to ,kant1 speaking   
from the limited point of view of a     
critique of knowledge1 form the proper  
content of inner sense4 8444the         
representations of the outer senses     
constitute the actual material with     
which we occupy our minds10#ihc 8the    
whole material of knowledge even for our
 inner sense40#ihd 7,these statements1  
it may be observed1 are first made in   
the second edition47 ,as ,kant explains 
himself in ,b #fg-h1 he would seem to   
mean that the mind in the process of    
8setting0 representations of outer sense
 in space affects itself1 and is        
therefore constrained to arrange the    
given representations likewise in time4 
,no new content1 additional to that of  
outer sense1 is thereby generated1 but  
what previously as object of outer sense
 existed merely in space is now also    
subjected to conditions of time4 ,the   
representations of outer sense are all  
by their very nature likewise           
representations of inner sense4 ,to     

outer sense is due both their content   
and their spatial form2 to inner sense  
they owe only the additional form of    
time2 their content remains unaffected  
in the process of being taken over by a 
second sense4 ,this yields such         
explanation as is possible of ,kant's   
assertion in ,a #cc that 8time can never
 be a determination of outer            
appearances40 ,he may be taken as       
meaning that time is never a            
determination of outer sense as such1   
but only of its contents as always      
likewise subject to the form of inner   
sense4#ihe  ,this is how ,kant          
formulates his position from the extreme
 subjectivist point of view which omits 
to draw any distinction between         
representation and its object1 between  
inner states of the self and appearances
 in space4 ,all representations1 he     
says1#ihf all appearances without       
exception1 are states of inner sense1   
modifications of the mind4 ,some exist  
only in time1 some exist both in space  

and in time2 but all alike are modes of 
the identical self1 mere representations
 7blosse ,vorstellungen74 ,though       
appearances may exist outside one       
another in space1 space itself exists   
only as representation1 merely 8in us40 
,now without seeking to deny that this  
is a view which we find in the second   
edition of the ,critique as well as in  
the first1#ihg and that even in passages
 which are obviously quite late in date 
of writing ,kant frequently speaks in   
terms which conform to it1 we must be no
 less insistent in maintaining that an  
alternative view more and more comes to 
the front in proportion as ,kant gains  
mastery over the conflicting tendencies 
that go to constitute his new ,critical 
teaching4 ,from the very first he uses  
language which implies that some kind of
 distinction must be drawn between      
representations and objects represented1
 between subjective cognitive states in 
the proper sense of the term and        
existences in space4       8,time can   

never be a determination of outer       
appearances4 ,it belongs      neither to
 form nor position1 etc4 ,on the other  
hand it determines      the relation of 
representations in our inner state40#ihh
  ,similarly in those very sentences in 
which he asserts all appearances to be  
blosse ,vorstellungen1 a distinction is 
none the less implied4       8,time is  
the formal a priori condition of all    
appearances in      general4 ,space1 as 
the pure form of all outer intuition1 is
 as a      priori condition limited     
exclusively 7bloss7 to outer            
appearances4 ,on the other hand as all  
representations1 whether      they have 
outer things as their object or not1    
still in themselves      belong1 as     
determinations of the mind1 to the inner
 state1 and this      inner state is    
subject to the formal condition of inner
 intuition1      that is of time1 time  
is an a priori condition of all         
appearance      whatever4 ,it is1       
indeed1 the immediate condition of the  

inner      appearance 7of our souls71   
and thereby mediately likewise of outer 
appearances40#ihi  ,as the words which  
,i have italicised show1 ,kant1 even in 
the very sentence in which he asserts   
outer representations to be inner       
states1 none the less recognises that   
appearances in space are not            
representations in the same meaning of  
that term as are subjective states4     
,they are the objects of representation1
 not representation itself4 ,the latter 
alone is correctly describable as a     
state of the mind4 ,the former may be   
conditioned by representation1 and may  
therefore be describable as appearances1
 but are not for that reason to be      
equated with representation4 ,but before
 the grounds and nature of this         
distinction can be formulated in the    
proper ,critical terms1 we must consider
 the reasons which induced ,kant to     
commit himself to this obscure and      
difficult doctrine of inner sense4 ,as  
,i shall try to show1 it is no mere     

excrescence upon his system2 on the     
contrary1 it is inseparably bound up    
with all his main tenets4  ,one of the  
chief influences which constrained ,kant
 to develop this doctrine is the        
conclusion1 so essential to his         
position1 that knowledge must always    
involve an intuitional manifold in      
addition to a priori forms and concepts4
 ,that being so1 he was bound to deny to
 the mind all power of gaining knowledge
 by mere reflection4 ,if our mental     
activities and states lay open to direct
 inspection1 we should have to recognise
 in the mind a non-sensuous intuitional 
power4 ,through self-consciousness or   
reflection we should acquire knowledge  
independently of sense4 ,such           
apprehension1 though limited to the     
mind's own operations and states1 would 
none the less be knowledge1 and yet     
would not conform to the conditions     
which1 as the transcendental deduction  
has shown1 are involved in all          
knowledge4 ,in ,kant's view the belief  

that we possess self-consciousness of   
this type1 a power of reflection thus   
conceived1 is wholly illusory4 ,to      
assume any such faculty would be to     
endow the mind with occult or mystical  
powers1 and would throw us back upon the
 ,leibnizian rationalism1 which traces  
to such reflection our consciousness of 
the categories1 and which rears upon    
this foundation the entire body of      
metaphysical science4#iij  ,the         
complementary negative conclusion of the
 transcendental deduction is a no less  
fundamental and constraining influence  
in compelling ,kant to develop a        
doctrine of inner sense4 ,if all        
knowledge is knowledge of appearances1  
or if1 as he states his position in the 
,analytic of ,principles1#iia our       
knowledge can extend no further than    
sense experience and inference from such
 experience1 either knowledge of our    
inner states must be mediated1 like our 
knowledge of outer objects1 by          
sensation1 or we can have no knowledge  

of them whatsoever4 ,on ,critical       
principles1 consistently applied1 there 
can be no middle course between         
acceptance of an indirect empirical     
knowledge of the mind and assertion of  
its unknowableness4 ,mental activities  
may perhaps be thought in terms of the  
pure forms of understanding1 but in that
 case their conception will remain as   
purely problematic and as indeterminate 
as the conception of the thing in       
itself4 ,it is impossible for ,kant to  
admit immediate consciousness of the    
mind's real activities and states1 and  
at the same time to deny that we can    
have knowledge of things in themselves4 
,the ,aesthetic1 in proving that        
everything in space and time is         
appearance1 implicitly assumes the      
impossibility of direct self-conscious  
reflection2 and the transcendental      
deduction in showing that all knowledge 
involves as correlative factors both    
sense and thought1 has reinforced this  
conclusion1 and calls for its more      

explicit recognition1 in reference to   
the more inward aspect of experience4   
,as we have already noted1#iib ,kant's  
doctrine of inner sense was probably    
adopted in the early 'seventies1 and    
though it is not itself definitely      
formulated in the first edition1 the    
chief consequence that follows from it  
is clearly recognised4 ,thus in the     
,aesthetic ,kant draws the conclusion   
that1 as time is the form of inner      
sense1 everything apprehended in time1  
and consequently all inner states and   
activities1 can be known only as        
appearances4 ,the mind 7meaning thereby 
the ultimate conditioning grounds of    
consciousness7 is as indirectly known as
 is any other mode of noumenal          
existence4 ,in the ,analytic1 whenever  
he is called upon to express himself    
upon this and kindred points1 he        
continues to hold to this position2 and 
in the section on the ,paralogisms all  
the main consequences that follow from  
its acceptance are drawn in the most    

explicit and unambiguous manner4 ,it is 
argued that as the inner world1 the     
feelings1 volitions and representations 
of which we are conscious1 is a world   
constructed out of a given manifold     
yielded by inner sense1 and is therefore
 known only as the appearance of a      
deeper reality which we have no power of
 apprehending1 it possesses no          
superiority either of certainty or of   
immediacy over the outer world of       
objects in space4 ,we have immediate    
consciousness of both alike1 but in both
 cases this immediate consciousness     
rests upon the transcendental synthetic 
processes whereby such consciousness is 
conditioned and generated4 ,the         
transcendental activities fall outside  
the field of empirical consciousness and
 therefore of knowledge4  ,thus ,kant   
would seem to be maintaining that the   
radical error committed by the          
subjective idealists1 and with which all
 the main defects of their teaching are 
inseparably bound up1 lies in their     

ascription to the mind of a power of    
direct self-conscious reflection1 and   
consequently in their confusion of the  
transcendental activities which         
condition consciousness with the inner  
states and processes which such         
consciousness reveals4 ,this has led    
them to ascribe priority and            
independence to our inner states1 and to
 regard outer objects as known only by  
an inference from them4 ,the ,critical  
teaching insists on the distinction     
between appearance and reality1 applies 
it to the inner life1 and so restores to
 our consciousness of the outer world   
the certainty and immediacy of which    
subjective idealism would profess to    
deprive it4 ,such are the important     
conclusions at which ,kant arrives in   
his various 8refutations of idealism02  
and it will be advisable to consider    
these refutations in full detail before 
attempting to complete our statement of 
his doctrine of inner sense4   ,,kant',s
 ,,refutations ,,of ,,idealism  ,kant   

has in a number of different passages   
attempted to define his ,critical       
standpoint in its distinction from the  
positions of ,descartes and ,berkeley4  
,consideration of these will enable us  
to follow ,kant in his gradual          
recognition of the manifold consequences
 to which he is committed by his        
substitution of inner sense for direct  
self-conscious intuition or reflection1 
or rather of the various congenial      
tenets which it gives him the right     
consistently to defend and maintain4 ,in
 ,kant's ,critical writings we find no  
less than seven different statements of 
his refutation of idealism3 7,i47 in the
 fourth ,paralogism of the first edition
 of the ,critique2 7,,ii47 in section   
#ac 7,anm4 ii4 and iii47 of the         
,prolegomena2 7,,iii47 in section #di of
 the ,prolegomena2 7,,iv47 in the second
 appendix to the ,prolegomena2 7,v47 in 
sections added in the second edition at 
the conclusion of the ,aesthetic 7,b #fi
 ff472 7,,vi47 in the 8refutation of    

idealism0 7,b #bgd-h71 in the           
supplementary section at the end of the 
section on the ,postulates 7,b #bia-d71 
and in the note to the new preface 7,b  
xxxix-xl72 7,,vii47 in the 8refutation  
of problematic idealism0 given in the   
,seven ,small ,papers which originated  
in ,kant's conversations with           
,kiesewetter4 ,consideration of these in
 the above order will reveal ,kant's    
gradual and somewhat vacillating        
recognition of the new and revolutionary
 position which alone genuinely         
harmonises with ,critical principles4   
,but first we must briefly consider the 
various meanings which ,kant at         
different periods assigned to the term  
idealism4 ,even in the ,critique itself 
it is employed in a great variety of    
diverse connotations4  ,in the          
pre-,critical writings#iic the term     
idealism is usually employed in what was
 its currently accepted meaning1 namely1
 as signifying any philosophy which     
denied the existence of an independent  

world corresponding to our subjective   
representations4 ,but even as thus used 
the term is ambiguous4#iid ,it may      
signify either denial of a corporeal    
world independent of our representations
 or denial of an immaterial world       
8corresponding to0 the represented      
material world1 i4e4 the denial of      
,dinge an sich4 ,for there are traceable
 in ,leibniz's writings two very        
different views as to the reality of the
 material world4 ,sometimes the monads  
are viewed as purely intelligible       
substances without materiality of any   
kind4 ,the kingdom of the extended is   
set into the representing subjects2 only
 the immaterial world of unextended     
purely spiritual monads remains as      
independently real4 ,at other times the 
monads1 though in themselves immaterial1
 are viewed as constituting through     
their coexistence an independent        
material world and a materially occupied
 space4 ,every monad has a spatial      
sphere of activity4 ,the material world 

is an objective existence due to        
external relations between the monads1  
not a merely subjective existence       
internal to each of them4 ,this         
alternation of standpoints enabled      
,leibniz's successors to deny that they 
were idealists2 and as the more daring  
and speculative aspects of ,leibniz's   
teaching were slurred over in the       
process of its popularisation1 it was   
the second1 less consistent view1 which 
gained the upper hand4 ,wolff1          
especially in his later writings1       
denounces idealism2 and in the current  
manuals1 sections in refutation of      
idealism became part of the recognised  
philosophical teaching4 ,idealism still1
 however1 continued to be used          
ambiguously1 as signifying indifferently
 either denial of material bodies or    
denial of things in themselves4 ,this is
 the dual meaning which the term        
presents in ,kant's pre-,critical       
writings4 ,in his ,dilucidatio          
7#agee7iie he refutes idealism by means 

of the principle that a substance cannot
 undergo changes unless it is a         
substance independent of other          
substances4 ,obviously this argument can
 at most prove the existence of an      
independent world1 not that it is       
spatial or material4 ,and as ,vaihinger 
adds1 it does not even rule out the     
possibility that changes find their     
source in a ,divine ,being4 ,in the     
,dreams of a ,visionseer 7#agff7iif     
,swedenborg is described as an idealist1
 but without further specification of   
the exact sense in which the term is    
employed4 ,in the inaugural             
,dissertation 7#aggj7iig idealism is    
again rejected1 on the ground that      
sense-affection points to the presence  
of an intelligible object or noumenon4  
,in ,kant's class lectures on           
metaphysics1#iih which fall1 in part at 
least1 between #aggj and #agha1 the term
 idealism is employed in a very         
different sense1 which anticipates its  
use in the ,appendix to the             

,prolegomena4#iii ,the teaching of the  
,dissertation1 that things in themselves
 are knowable1 is now described as      
dogmatic1 ,platonic1 mystical           
7schwrmerischer7 idealism4 ,he still    
rejects the idealism of ,berkeley1 and  
still entitles it simply idealism1      
without limiting or descriptive         
predicates4 ,but now also he employs the
 phrase 8problematic idealism0 as       
descriptive of his own new position4    
,this is1 of course1 contrary to his    
invariable usage elsewhere1 but is      
interesting as showing that about this  
time his repugnance to the term idealism
 begins to give way1 and that he is     
willing to recognise that the relation  
of the ,critical teaching to idealism is
 not one of simple opposition4 ,he now  
begins to regard idealism as a factor1  
though a radically transformed factor1  
in his own philosophy4  ,study of the   
,critique reinforces this conclusion4   
,in the ,aesthetic ,kant teaches the    
8transcendental ideality0 of space and  

time2 and in the ,dialectic 7in the     
fourth ,paralogism7 describes his       
position as idealism1 though with the   
qualifying predicate                    
transcendental4#ajjj ,but though this   
involves an extension of the previous   
connotation of the term idealism1 and   
might therefore have been expected to   
increase the existing confusion1 it has 
the fortunate effect of constraining    
,kant to recognise and discriminate the 
various meanings in which it may be     
employed4 ,this is done somewhat        
clumsily1 as if it were a kind of       
afterthought4 ,in the introductory      
syllogism of the fourth ,paralogism     
,descartes' position and his own are    
referred to simply as idealism and      
dualism respectively4 ,the various      
possible sub-species of idealism as     
presented in the two editions of the    
,critique and in the ,prolegomena may be
 tabulated as follows3                  
,material ,sceptical ,problematic 7the  
position of ,descartes74                

,sceptical in the stricter and more     
usual   ,idealism                       
sense 7the position of ,hume74          
,dogmatic 7the position of ,berkeley74  
,formal or ,critical or ,transcendental 
7,kant's own position74  ,the           
distinction between problematic idealism
 and idealism of the more strictly      
sceptical type is not clearly drawn by  
,kant4#ajja ,very strangely ,kant in    
this connection never mentions ,hume3   
the reference in ,b xxxix n4 is probably
 not to ,hume but to ,jacobi4           
,transcendental idealism is taken as    
involving an empirical realism and      
dualism1 and is set in opposition to    
transcendental realism which is         
represented as involving empirical      
idealism4 ,in ,b xxxix n4 ,kant speaks  
of 8psychological idealism10 meaning1 as
 it would seem1 material or             
non-,critical idealism4  ,in the second 
appendix to the ,prolegomena ,kant draws
 a further distinction1 in line with    
that already noted in his lectures on   

metaphysics4 ,tabulated it is as        
follows3            ,mystical1 in the   
sense of belief in and reliance on a    
supposed            human power of      
intellectual intuition4 ,it is described
 as   ,idealismidealism in the strict   
7eigentlich7 sense--the position of the 
,eleatics1 of ,plato and ,berkeley4     
,formal or ,critical--,kant's own       
position4  ,this latter classification  
can cause nothing but confusion4 ,the   
objections that have to be made against 
it from ,kant's own critical standpoint 
are stated below4#ajjb  ,let us now     
consider1 in the order of their         
presentation1 the various refutations of
 idealism which ,kant has given in his  
,critical writings4  ,i4 ,refutation of 
,idealism as given in ,first ,edition of
 8,critique0 7,a #cff-hj74--,this       
refutation is mainly directed against   
,descartes1 who is mentioned by name in 
,a #cfg4 ,kant1 as ,vaihinger suggests1 
was very probably led to recognise      
,descartes' position as a species of    

idealism in the course of a re-study of 
,descartes before writing the section on
 the ,paralogisms4 ,as already pointed  
out1 this involves the use of the term  
idealism in a much wider sense than that
 which was usually given to it in       
,kant's own day4 ,in the development of 
his argument ,kant also wavers between  
two very different definitions of this  
idealism1 as being denial of immediate  
certainty and as denial of all          
certainty4#ajjc ,the second             
interpretation1 which would make it     
apply to ,hume rather than to           
,descartes1 is strengthened in the minds
 of his readers by his further          
distinction#ajjd between dogmatic and   
sceptical idealism1 and the             
identification of the idealism under    
consideration with the latter4 ,the     
title problematic which ,kant in the    
second edition#ajje applies to          
,descartes' position suffers from this  
same ambiguity4 ,as a matter of fact1   
,kant's refutation applies equally well 

to either position4 ,the teaching of    
,berkeley1 which coincides with dogmatic
 idealism as here defined by ,kant1     
namely1 as consisting in the contention 
that the conception of matter is        
inherently contradictory1 is not dwelt  
upon1 and the appended promise of       
refutation is not fulfilled4            
,descartes' position is stated as       
follows3 only our own existence and     
inner states are immediately apprehended
 by us2 all perceptions are             
modifications of inner sense2 and the   
existence of external objects can       
therefore be asserted only by an        
inference from the inner perceptions    
viewed as effects4 ,in criticism1 ,kant 
points out that since an effect may     
result from more than one cause1 this   
inference to a quite determinate cause1 
viz4 objects as bodies in space1 is     
doubtfully legitimate4 ,the cause of our
 inner states may lie within and not    
without us1 and even if external1 need  
not consist in spatial objects4         

,further1 leaving aside the question of 
a possible alternative to the assumption
 of independent material bodies1 the    
assertion of the existence of such      
objects would1 on ,descartes' view1 be  
merely conjectural4 ,it could never have
 certainty in any degree equivalent to  
that possessed by the experiences of    
inner sense4       8,by an idealist1    
therefore1 we must not understand one   
who denies      the existence of outer  
objects of the senses1 but only one who 
does      not admit that their existence
 is known through immediate             
perception1 and who therefore concludes 
that we can never1 by way      of any   
possible experience1 be completely      
certain of their      reality40#ajjf    
,no sooner is the term idealist thus    
clearly defined than ,kant1 in keeping  
with the confused character of the      
entire section1 proceeds to the         
assertion 7a7 that there are idealists  
of another type1 namely1 transcendental 
idealists1#ajjg and 7b7 that the        

non-transcendental idealists sometimes  
also adopt a dogmatic position1 not     
merely questioning the immediacy of our 
knowledge of matter1 but asserting it to
 be inherently contradictory4 ,all this 
points to the composite origin of the   
contents of this section4               
,transcendental idealism is opposed to  
empirical idealism4 ,it maintains that  
phenomena are representations merely1   
not things in themselves4 ,space and    
time are the sensuous forms of our      
intuitions4 ,empirical idealism1 on the 
other hand1 goes together with          
transcendental realism4 ,it maintains   
that space and time are given as real in
 themselves1 in independence of our     
sensibility4 7,transcendental here1 as  
in the phrase 8transcendental           
ideality10#ajjh is exactly equivalent to
 transcendent47 ,but such a contention  
is inconsistent with the other main     
tenet of empirical idealism4 ,for if our
 inner representations have to be taken 
as entirely distinct from their objects1

 they cannot yield assurance even of the
 existence of these objects4 ,to the    
transcendental idealist no such         
difficulty is presented4 ,his position  
naturally combines with empirical       
realism1 or1 as it may also be entitled1
 empirical dualism4 ,material bodies in 
space1 being merely subjective          
representations1 are immediately        
apprehended4 ,the existence of matter   
can be established 8without our         
requiring to issue out beyond our bare  
self-consciousness or to assume anything
 more than the certainty of the         
representations in us1 i4e4 of the      
cogito ergo sum40#ajji ,though the      
objects thus apprehended are outside one
 another in space1 space itself exists  
only in us4       8,outer objects       
7bodies7 are mere appearances1 and are  
therefore      nothing but a species of 
my representations1 the objects of which
      are something only through these  
representations4 ,apart from them       
they are nothing4 ,thus outer things    

exist as well as ,i myself1 and         
both1 indeed1 upon the immediate witness
 of my      self-consciousness44440#ajaj
  ,the only difference is that the      
representation of the self belongs only 
to inner1 while extended bodies also    
belong to outer sense4 ,there is thus a 
dualism1 but one that falls entirely    
within the field of consciousness1 and  
which is therefore empirical1 not       
transcendental4 ,there is indeed a      
transcendental object which 8in the     
transcendental sense may be outside     
us10#ajaa but it is unknown and is not  
in question4 ,it ought not to be        
confused with our representations of    
matter and corporeal things4  ,from this
 point#ajab the argument becomes        
disjointed and repeats itself1 and there
 is much to be said in support of the   
contention of ,adickes that the         
remainder of the section is made up of a
 number of separate interpolations4#ajac
 ,first1 ,kant applies the conclusion   
established in the ,postulates of       

,empirical ,thought1 viz4 that reality  
is revealed only in sensation4 ,as      
sensation is an element in all outer    
perception1 perception affords immediate
 certainty of real existence1 ,kant next
 enters#ajad upon a eulogy of sceptical 
idealism as 8a benefactor of human      
reason40 ,it brings home to us the utter
 impossibility of proving the existence 
of matter on the assumption that spatial
 objects are things in themselves1 and  
so constrains us to justify the         
assertions which we are at every moment 
making4 ,and such justification is1     
,kant here claims1 only possible if we  
recognise that outer objects as mere    
representations are immediately known4  
,in the next paragraph we find a        
sentence which1 together with the above 
eulogistic estimate of the merits of    
idealism1 shows how very far ,kant1 at  
the time of writing1 was from feeling   
the need of differentiating his position
 from that of subjectivism4 ,the        
sentence is this3       8,we cannot be  

sentient of what is outside ourselves1  
but only of      what is in ourselves1  
and the whole of our self-consciousness 
therefore yields nothing save merely our
 own determinations40  ,it is probable1 
indeed1 that the paragraph in which this
 occurs is of very early origin1 prior  
to the development of the main body of  
the ,analytic2 for in the same paragraph
 we also find the assertion1 utterly at 
variance with the teaching of the       
,analytic and with that of the first and
 third ,paralogisms1 that 8the thinking 
ego0 is known phenomenally as           
substance4#ajae ,we seem justified in   
concluding that the various manuscripts 
which have gone to form this section on 
the fourth ,paralogism were written at  
an early date within the ,critical      
period4  ,we may note1 in passing1 two  
sentences in which1 as in that quoted   
above1 a distinction between            
representations and their objects is    
recognised in wording if not in fact4   
8,all outer perception furnishes        

immediate proof of something actual     
in space1 or rather is the actual       
itself4 ,to this extent empirical       
realism is beyond question1 i4e4 there  
corresponds to our outer                
perceptions something actual in         
space40#ajaf  ,again in ,a #cgg the     
assertion occurs that 8our outer senses1
 as regards the data from which         
experience can arise1 have their actual 
corresponding objects in space40        
,certainly these statements1 when taken 
together with the other passages in this
 section1 form a sufficiently strange   
combination of assertion and denial4    
,either there is a distinction between  
representation and its object or there  
is not2 if the former1 then objects in  
space are not merely representations2 if
 the latter1 then the 8correspondence0  
is merely that of a thing with          
itself4#ajag         99       99        
99       99       99  ,this refutation  
of idealism will not itself stand       
criticism4 ,for two separate reasons it 

entirely fails to attain its professed  
end4 ,in the first place1 it refutes the
 position of ,descartes only by         
virtually accepting the still more      
extreme position of ,berkeley4 ,outer   
objects1 ,kant argues1 are immediately  
known because they are ideas merely4    
,there is no need for inference1 because
 there is no transcendence of the domain
 of our inner consciousness4 ,in other  
words1 ,kant refutes the problematic    
idealism of ,descartes by means of the  
more subjective idealism of ,berkeley4  
,the 8dogmatic0 idealism of ,berkeley in
 the form in which ,kant here defines   
it1#ajah namely1 as consisting in the   
assertion that the notion of an         
independent spatial object involves     
inherent contradictions1 is part of his 
own position4 ,for that reason he was   
bound to fail in his promise#ajai to    
refute such dogmatic idealism4          
,fortunately he never even attempts to  
do so4 ,in the second place1 ,kant      
ignores the fact that he has himself    

adopted an 8idealist0 view of inner     
experience4 ,inner experience is not for
 him1 as it was for ,descartes1 the     
immediate apprehension of genuine       
reality4 ,as it is only appearance1 the 
incorporation of outer experience within
 it1 so far from establishing the       
reality of the objects of outer sense1  
must rather prove the direct contrary4  
,no more is really established than     
,descartes himself invariably assumes1  
namely1 the actual existence of mental  
representations of a corporeal world in 
space4 ,descartes' further assertion    
that the world of things in themselves  
can be inferred to be material and      
spatial1 ,kant1 of course1 refuses to   
accept4 ,on this latter point ,kant is  
in essential agreement with ,berkeley4  
,it is by no means surprising that      
,kant's first critics1#ajbj puzzled and 
bewildered by the obscurer and more     
difficult portions of the ,critique1    
should have based their interpretation  
of ,kant's general position largely upon

 the above passages2 and that in        
combining the extreme subjective        
idealism which ,kant there advocates    
with his doctrine that the inner life of
 ever-changing experiences is itself    
merely ideal1 should have come to the   
conclusion that ,kant's position is an  
extension of that of ,berkeley4         
,pistorius objected that in making outer
 appearances relative to an inner       
consciousness which is itself           
appearance1 ,kant is reducing everything
 to mere illusion4 ,hamann came to the  
somewhat similar conclusion1 that ,kant1
 notwithstanding his very different     
methods of argument1 is 8a ,prussian    
,hume10 in substantial agreement with   
his ,scotch predecessor4   ,,ii4        
8,prolegomena10 ,section #ac1 ,notes    
,,ii and ,,iii4--,in the ,prolegomena   
,kant replies to the criticism which the
 first edition of the ,critique had     
called forth1 that his position is an   
extension of the idealism of ,descartes1
 and even more thoroughgoing than that  

of ,berkeley4 ,idealism he redefines in 
a much narrower sense1 which makes it   
applicable only to ,berkeley            
8444as consisting in the assertion that 
there are none but thinking      beings1
 and that all other things which we     
suppose ourselves to      perceive in   
intuition are nothing but               
representations in the      thinking    
beings1 to which no object external to  
them corresponds in      fact40#ajba    
,in reply ,kant affirms his unwavering  
belief in the reality of ,dinge an sich 
8444which though quite unknown to us as 
to what they are in      themselves1 we 
yet know by the representations which   
their      influence on our sensibility 
procures us4444 ,can this be termed     
idealism8 ,it is the very               
contrary40#ajbb  ,kant adds that his    
position is akin to that of ,locke1     
differing only in his assertion of the  
subjectivity of the primary as well as  
of the secondary qualities4       8,i   
should be glad to know what my          

assertions ought to have been in        
order to avoid all idealism4 ,i suppose 
,i ought to have said1 not      only    
that the representation of space is     
perfectly conformable to      the       
relation which our sensibility has to   
objects 7for that ,i have      said71   
but also that it is completely similar  
to them--an assertion      in which ,i  
can find as little meaning as if ,i said
 that the      sensation of red has a   
similarity to the property of cinnabar  
which      excites this sensation in    
me40#ajbc  ,kant is here very evidently 
using the term idealism in the narrowest
 possible meaning1 as representing only 
the position of ,berkeley1 and as       
excluding that of ,descartes and        
,leibniz4 ,such employment of the term  
is at variance with his own previous    
usage4 ,though idealism here corresponds
 to the 8dogmatic idealism0 of ,a #cgg1 
it is now made to concern the assertion 
or denial of things in themselves1 not  
as previously the problem of the reality

 of material objects and of space4 ,kant
 is also ignoring the fact1 which he    
more than once points out in the        
,critique1 that his philosophy cannot   
prove that the cause of our sensations  
is without and not within us4 ,his use  
of 8body0#ajbd as a name for the thing  
in itself is likewise without           
justification4 ,this passage is mainly  
polemical2 it is hardly more helpful    
than the criticism to which it was      
designed to reply4  ,in ,section #ac1   
,note iii41 ,kant meets the still more  
extreme criticism 7made by ,pistorius71 
that his system turns all the things of 
the world into mere illusion 7,schein74 
,he distinguishes transcendental        
idealism from 8the mystical and         
visionary idealism of ,berkeley0 on the 
one hand1 and on the other from the     
,cartesian idealism which would convert 
mere representations into things in     
themselves4 ,to obviate the ambiguities 
of the term transcendental1 he declares 
that his own idealism may perhaps more  

fitly be entitled ,critical4 ,this      
distinction between mystical and        
,critical idealism connects with the    
contents of the second part of the      
,appendix1 treated below4  ,,iii4       
8,prolegomena10 ,section #di4--,this is 
simply a repetition of the argument of  
the fourth ,paralogism4 ,the ,cartesian 
idealism1 now 7as in ,b #bgd7 named     
material idealism1 is alone referred to4
 ,the ,cartesian idealism does nothing1 
,kant says1 but distinguish external    
experience from dreaming4 ,there is here
 again the same confusing use of the    
term 8corresponds40       8,that        
something actual without us not only    
corresponds but must      correspond to 
our external perceptions can likewise be
      proved44440#ajbe  ,,iv4           
8,prolegomena10 ,second ,part of the    
,appendix4--,kant here returns to the   
distinction1 drawn in ,section #ac1     
,note iii41 between what he now calls   
8idealism proper 7eigentlicher710#ajbf  
i4e4 visionary or mystical idealism1 and

 his own4       8,the position of all   
genuine idealists from the ,eleatics to 
,bishop      ,berkeley is contained in  
this formula3 #8,all cognition through  
the      senses and experience is       
nothing but mere illusion1 and only in  
the      ideas of pure understanding and
 ,reason is there truth4' ,the          
fundamental principle ruling all my     
idealism1 on the contrary1 is      this3
 #8,all cognition of things solely from 
pure understanding or      pure ,reason 
is nothing but mere illusion and only in
 experience is      there truth4'0#ajbg 
,this mode of defining idealism can1 in 
this connection1 cause nothing but      
confusion4 ,its inapplicability to      
,berkeley would seem to prove that ,kant
 had no first-hand knowledge of         
,berkeley's writings4#ajbh ,as ,kant's  
,note to the ,appendix to the           
,prolegomena#ajbi shows1 he also had    
,plato in mind4 ,but the definition     
given of 8the fundamental principle0 of 
his own idealism is almost equally      

misleading4 ,it omits the all-essential 
point1 that for ,kant experience itself 
yields truth only by conforming to a    
priori concepts4 ,as it is1 he proceeds 
to criticise ,berkeley for failure to   
supply a sufficient criterion of        
distinction between truth and illusion4 
,such criterion1 he insists1 is         
necessarily a priori4 ,the ,critical    
idealism differs from that of ,berkeley 
in maintaining that space and time1     
though sensuous1 are a priori1 and that 
in combination with the pure concepts of
 understanding they       8444prescribe 
a priori its law to all possible        
experience3 the      law which at the   
same time yields the sure criterion for 
distinguishing within experience truth  
from illusion4 ,my so-called            
idealism--which properly speaking is    
,critical idealism--is thus      quite  
peculiar in that it overthrows ordinary 
idealism1 and that      through it all a
 priori cognition1 even that of         
geometry1 now      attains objective    

reality1 a thing which even the keenest 
realist      could not assert till ,i   
had proved the ideality of space and    
time40#ajcj  ,v4 ,sections added in     
,second ,edition at the ,conclusion of  
the ,aesthetic4 7,b #fi ff47--,kant here
 again replies to the criticism of      
,pistorius that all existence has been  
reduced to the level of illusion        
7,schein74 ,his defence is twofold3     
first1 that in naming objects           
appearances he means to indicate that   
they are independently grounded1 or1 as 
he states it1 are 8something actually   
given40 ,if we misinterpret them1 the   
result is indeed illusion1 but the fault
 then lies with ourselves and not with  
the appearances as presented4 ,secondly1
 he argues that the doctrine of the     
ideality of space and time is the only  
secure safeguard against scepticism4    
,for otherwise the contradictions which 
result from regarding space and time as 
independently real will likewise hold of
 their contents1 and everything1        

including even our own existence1 will  
be rendered illusory4 8,the good        
,berkeley observing these contradictions
 cannot1 indeed1 be blamed for reducing 
bodies to mere illusion40 ,this last    
sentence may perhaps be taken as        
supporting the view that notwithstanding
 the increased popularity of ,berkeley  
in ,germany and the appearance of new   
translations in these very years1 ,kant 
has not been sufficiently interested to 
acquire first-hand knowledge of         
,berkeley's writings4#ajca ,the epithet 
employed is characteristic of the rather
 depreciatory attitude which ,kant      
invariably adopts in speaking of        
,berkeley4  ,,vi4 8,refutation of       
,idealism0 in ,second ,edition of the   
8,critique40 7,b #bgd-i1 supplemented by
 note to ,b xxxix474--,the refutation   
opens by equating idealism with material
 idealism 7so named in contradistinction
 to his own 8formal or rather ,critical0
 teaching74 ,within material idealism   
,kant distinguishes between the         

problematic idealism of ,descartes1 and 
the dogmatic idealism of ,berkeley4 ,the
 latter has1 he says1 been overthrown in
 the ,aesthetic4 ,the former alone is   
dealt with in this refutation4 ,this is 
the first occurrence in the ,critique of
 the expression 8problematic idealism03 
it is nowhere employed in the first     
edition4#ajcb ,problematic idealism     
consists in the assertion that we are   
incapable of having experience of any   
existence save our own2 only our inner  
states are immediately apprehended2 all 
other existences are determined by      
inference from them4 ,the refutation    
consists in the proof that we have      
experience1 and not mere imagination of 
outer objects4 ,this is proved by       
showing that inner experience1          
unquestioned by ,descartes1 is possible 
only on the assumption of outer         
experience1 and that this latter is as  
immediate and direct as is the former4  
,thesis4--,the empirically determined   
consciousness of my own existence proves

 the existence of objects in space      
outside me4#ajcc  ,proof4--,i am        
conscious of my own existence as        
determined in time4 ,time determination 
presupposes the perception of something 
permanent4 ,but nothing permanent is    
intuitable in the empirical self4 ,on   
the cognitive side 7i4e4 omitting       
feelings1 etc41 which in this connection
 are irrelevant71 it consists solely of 
representations2 and these demand a     
permanent1 distinct from ourselves1 in  
relation to which their changes1 and so 
my own existence in the time wherein    
they change1 may be determined4#ajcd    
,thus perception of this permanent is   
only possible through a thing outside1  
and not through the mere representation 
of a thing outside4 ,and the same must  
hold true of the determination of my    
existence in time1 since this also      
depends upon the apprehension of the    
permanent4 ,that is to say1 the         
consciousness of my existence is at the 
same time an immediate awareness of the 

existence of other things outside me4   
,in the note to the ,preface to the     
second edition#ajce occurs the following
 emphatic statement4                    
8,representation of something permanent 
in existence is not the same      as    
permanent representation4 ,for though   
the representation of the      permanent
 may be very changing and variable like 
all our other      representations1 not 
excepting those of matter1 it yet refers
 to      something permanent4 ,this     
latter must therefore be an external    
thing distinct from all my              
representations1 and its existence must 
be included in the determination of my  
own existence1 constituting      with it
 but a single experience such as would  
not take place even      internally if  
it were not also at the same time1 in   
part1 external4      ,how this should be
 possible we are as little capable of   
explaining      further as we are of    
accounting for our being able to think  
the      abiding in time1 the           

coexistence of which with the variable  
generates the conception of change40    
,the argument of this note varies from  
that of ,b #bgd ff4 only in its use of  
an ambiguous expression which is perhaps
 capable of being taken as referring to 
things in themselves1 but which does not
 seem to have that meaning4 8,i am just 
as certainly conscious that there are   
things outside me which relate to my    
sense44440  ,in ,b #bgg-h ,kant refers  
to the empirical fact that determination
 of time can be made only by relation to
 outer happenings in space1 such as the 
motion of the sun4 ,this is a point     
which is further developed in another   
passage which ,kant added in the second 
edition4       8444in order to          
understand the possibility of things in 
conformity      with the categories1 and
 so to demonstrate the objective reality
 of      the latter1 we need not merely 
intuitions1 but intuitions that are     
in all cases outer intuitions4 ,when1   
for instance1 we take the pure          

concepts of relation1 we find firstly   
that in order to obtain      something  
permanent in intuition corresponding to 
the concept of      substance1 and so to
 demonstrate the objective reality of   
this      concept1 we require an        
intuition in space 7of matter74 ,for    
space      alone is determined as       
permanent1 while time1 and therefore    
everything that is in inner sense1 is in
 constant flux4 ,secondly1      in order
 to exhibit change as the intuition     
corresponding to the      concept of    
causality1 we must take as our example  
motion1 i4e4      change in space4 ,only
 in this way can we obtain the intuition
 of      changes1 the possibility of    
which can never be comprehended through 
any pure understanding4 ,for change is  
combination of      contradictorily     
opposed determinations in the existence 
of one and      the same thing4 ,now how
 it is possible that from a given state 
of a      thing an opposite state should
 follow1 not only cannot be conceived   

by any reason without an example1 but is
 actually incomprehensible      to      
reason without intuition4 ,the intuition
 required is the      intuition of the  
movement of a point in space4 ,the      
presence of the      point in different 
spaces 7as a sequence of opposite       
determinations7 is what first yields to 
us an intuition of change4      ,for in 
order that we may afterwards make inner 
changes likewise      thinkable1 we must
 represent time 7the form of inner      
sense7      figuratively as a line1 and 
the inner change through the drawing of 
this line 7motion71 and so in this      
manner by means of outer      intuition 
make comprehensible the successive      
existence of      ourselves in different
 states4 ,the reason of this is that all
      change1 if it is indeed to be     
perceived as change1 presupposes        
something permanent in intuition1 and   
that in inner sense no      permanent   
intuition is to be met with4 ,lastly1   
the possibility of      the category of 

community cannot be comprehended through
 mere      reason alone4 ,its objective 
reality is not to be understood without 
intuition and indeed outer intuition in 
space40#ajcf  ,in this passage ,kant is 
modifying the teaching of the first     
edition in two very essential respects4 
,in the first place1 he is now asserting
 that consciousness of both space and   
motion is necessary to consciousness of 
time2#ajcg and in the second place1 he  
is maintaining that the categories can  
acquire meaning only by reference to    
outer appearances4 ,had ,kant made all  
the necessary alterations which these   
new positions involve1 he would1 as we  
shall find1#ajch have had entirely to   
recast the chapters on ,schematism and  
on the ,principles of ,understanding4   
,kant was not1 however1 prepared to make
 such extensive alterations1 and these  
chapters are therefore left practically 
unmodified4 ,this is one of the many    
important points in which the reader is 
compelled to reinterpret passages of    

earlier date in the light of ,kant's    
later utterances4 ,there is also a      
further difficulty4 ,does ,kant1 in     
maintaining that the categories can     
acquire significance only in reference  
to outer perception1 also mean to assert
 that their subsequent employment is    
limited to the mechanical world of the  
material sciences8 ,this is a point in  
regard to which ,kant makes no quite    
direct statement2 but indirectly he     
would seem to indicate that that was not
 his intention4#ajci ,he frequently     
speaks of the states of inner sense as  
mechanically conditioned4               
,sensations1#ajdj feelings1 and         
desires1#ajda are1 he would seem to     
assert1 integral parts of the unitary   
system of phenomenal existence4 ,such a 
view is not1 indeed1 easily reconcilable
 with his equating of the principle of  
substance with the principle of the     
conservation of matter4#ajdb ,there are 
here two conflicting positions which    
,kant has failed to reconcile3 the      

traditional dualistic attitude of       
,cartesian physics and the quite        
opposite implications of his ,critical  
phenomenalism4 ,when the former is being
 held to1 ,kant has to maintain that    
psychology can never become a           
science2#ajdc but his ,critical teaching
 consistently developed seems rather to 
support the view that psychology1       
despite special difficulties peculiar to
 its subject matter1 can be developed on
 lines strictly analogous to those of   
the material sciences4  ,we may now     
return to ,kant's main argument4 ,this  
new refutation of idealism in the second
 edition differs from that given in the 
fourth ,paralogism of the first edition1
 not only in method of argument but also
 in the nature of the conclusion which  
it seeks to establish4 ,indeed it proves
 the direct opposite of what is asserted
 in the first edition4 ,the earlier     
proof sought to show that1 as regards   
immediacy of apprehension and           
subjectivity of existence1 outer        

appearances stand on the same level as  
do our inner experiences4 ,the proof of 
the second edition1 on the other hand1  
argues that though outer appearances are
 immediately apprehended they must be   
existences distinct from the subjective 
states through which the mind represents
 them4 ,the two arguments agree1 indeed1
 in establishing immediacy1 but as that 
which is taken as immediately known is  
in the one case a subjective state and  
in the other is an independent          
existence1 the immediacy calls in the   
two cases for entirely different methods
 of proof4 ,the first method consisted  
in viewing outer experiences as a       
subdivision within our inner            
experiences4 ,the new method views their
 relation as not that of including and  
included1 but of conditioning and       
conditioned2 and it is now to outer     
experience that the primary position is 
assigned4 ,so far is outer experience   
from being possible only as part of     
inner experience1 that on the contrary  

inner experience1 consciousness of the  
flux of inner states1 is only possible  
in and through experience of independent
 material bodies in space4 ,a sentence  
from each proof will show how completely
 their conclusions are opposed4         
8,outer objects 7bodies7 are mere       
appearances1 and are therefore          
nothing but a species of my             
representations1 the objects of which   
are something only through these        
representations4 ,apart from them       
they are nothing40#ajdd 8,perception of 
this permanent is possible      only    
through a thing outside me1 and not     
through the mere      representation of 
a thing outside me40#ajde  ,the one     
sentence asserts that outer objects are 
representations2 the other argues that  
they must be existences distinct from   
their representations4 ,the one         
inculcates a subjectivism of a very     
extreme type2 the other results in a    
realism1 which though ultimately        
phenomenalist1 is none the less         

genuinely objective in character4 ,this 
difference is paralleled by the nature  
of the idealisms to which the two proofs
 are opposed and which they profess to  
refute4 ,the argument of the ,paralogism
 of the first edition is itself         
,berkeleian1 and refutes only the       
problematic idealism of ,descartes4 ,the
 argument of the second edition1 though 
formally directed only against          
,descartes1 constitutes a no less       
complete refutation of the position of  
,berkeley4 ,in its realism it has       
kinship with the positions of ,arnauld  
and of ,reid1 while1 in attempting to   
combine this realism with due           
recognition of the force and validity of
 ,hume's sceptical philosophy1 it breaks
 through all previous classifications1  
formulates a profoundly original        
substitute for the previously existing  
theories1 and inaugurates a new era in  
the theory of knowledge4  ,as already   
pointed out1#ajdf ,kant restates the    
distinction between the subjective and  

the objective in a manner which places  
the problem of knowledge in an entirely 
new light4 ,the subjective is not to be 
regarded as opposite in nature to the   
objective1 but as a subspecies within   
it4 ,it does not proceed parallel with  
the sequence of natural existences1 but 
is itself part of the natural system    
which consciousness reveals4            
,sensations1 in the form in which they  
are consciously apprehended by us1 do   
not constitute our consciousness of     
nature1 but are themselves events which 
are possible only under the conditions  
which the natural world itself          
supplies4#ajdg ,the ,cartesian dualism  
of the subjective and the objective is  
thus subordinated to the ,critical      
distinction between appearance and      
reality4 ,kant's phenomenalism is a     
genuine alternative to the ,berkeleian  
teaching1 and not1 as ,schopenhauer and 
so many others have sought to maintain1 
merely a variant upon it4  ,the striking
 contradiction between ,kant's various  

refutations of idealism has led some of 
,kant's most competent critics to give a
 different interpretation of the        
argument of the second edition from that
 given above4 ,these critics take the   
independent and permanent objects which 
are distinguished from our subjective   
representations to be things in         
themselves4 ,that is to say1 they       
interpret this refutation as based upon 
,kant's semi-,critical doctrine of the  
transcendental object 7in the form in   
which it is employed for the solution of
 the ,antinomies71 and so as agreeing   
with the refutation given in the        
,prolegomena4#ajdh ,kant is taken as    
rejecting idealism because of his belief
 in things in themselves4 ,this is the  
view adopted by ,benno ,erdmann1#ajdi   
,sidgwick1#ajej ,a4 ,j4 ,balfour4#ajea  
,as ,vaihinger1#ajeb ,caird1#ajec and   
,adamson#ajed have shown1 such an       
interpretation is at complete variance  
with the actual text4 ,this is1 indeed1 
so obvious upon unbiassed examination   

that the only point which repays        
discussion is the question1 why ,benno  
,erdmann and those who follow him should
 have felt constrained to place so      
unnatural an interpretation upon ,kant's
 words4 ,the explanation seems to lie in
 ,erdmann's convinced belief1 plainly   
shown in all his writings upon ,kant1   
that the ,critique expounds a single    
consistent and uniform standpoint4#ajee 
,if such belief be justified1 there is  
no alternative save to interpret ,kant's
 refutation of idealism in the manner   
which ,erdmann adopts4 ,for as the      
subjectivism of much of ,kant's teaching
 is beyond question1 consistency can be 
obtained only by sacrifice of all that  
conflicts with it4 ,thus1 and thus      
alone1 can ,erdmann's rendering of the  
refutation of the second edition be     
sustained2 the actual wording1 taken in 
and by itself1 does not support it4     
,kant here departs from his own repeated
 assertion1 in the second hardly less   
than in the first edition of the        

,critique1 of the subjectivity of outer 
appearances4 ,but1 as ,vaihinger justly 
contends1 ,kant was never greater than  
in this violation of self-consistency1  
8never more consistent than in this     
inconsistency40 ,tendencies1 previously 
active but hitherto inarticulate1 are at
 last liberated4 ,if the chrysalis stage
 of the intense brooding of the twelve  
years of ,critical thinking was         
completed in the writing of the first   
edition of the ,critique1 the philosophy
 which then emerged only attains to     
mature stature in those extensions of   
the ,critique1 scattered through it from
 ,preface to ,paralogisms1 which embody 
this realistic theory of the independent
 existence of material nature4 ,for this
 theory is no mere external accretion1  
and no mere reversal of subordinate     
tenets1 but a ripening of germinal ideas
 to which1 even in their more embryonic 
form1 the earlier ,critical teaching    
owed much of its inspiration1 and which1
 when consciously adopted and maturely  

formulated1 constitute such a deepening 
of its teaching as almost amounts to    
transformation4 ,the individual self is 
no longer viewed as being the bearer of 
nature1 but as its offspring and        
expression1 and as being1 like nature1  
interpretable in its twofold aspect1 as 
appearance and as noumenally grounded4  
,the bearer of appearance is not the    
individual subject1 but those           
transcendental creative agencies upon   
which man and nature alike depend4 ,both
 man and nature transcend the forms in  
which they are apprehended2 and nothing 
in experience justifies the giving of   
such priority to the individual mind as 
must be involved in any acceptance of   
subjectivist theory4 ,though man is     
cognisant of space and time1            
comprehending them within the limits of 
his consciousness1 and though in all    
experience unities are involved which   
cannot originate within or be explained 
by experience1 it is no less true that  
man is himself subject to the conditions

 of space and time1 and that the        
synthetic unities which point beyond    
experience do not carry us to a merely  
individual subject4 ,if man is not a    
part or product of nature1 neither is   
nature the product of man4 ,kant's      
transcendentalism1 in its maturest form1
 is genuinely phenomenalist in          
character4 ,that is the view which has  
already been developed above1 in the    
discussion of ,kant's transcendental    
deduction4 ,i shall strive to confirm it
 by comparison of the teaching of the   
two editions of the ,critique in regard 
to the reality of outer appearances4    
,schopenhauer1 to whom this new         
development of the ,critical teaching   
was altogether anathema1 the cloven hoof
 of the ,hegelian heresies1 denounced it
 as a temporary and ill-judged          
distortion of the true ,critical        
position1 maintaining that it is        
incapable of combination with ,kant's   
central teaching1 and that it finds no  
support in the tenets1 pure and         

unperverted1 of the first edition4      
,kant1 he holds1 is here untrue to      
himself1 and temporarily1 under the     
stress of polemical discussion1 lapses  
from the heights to which he had        
successfully made his way1 and upon     
which he had securely established1 in   
agreement with ,plato and in extension  
of ,berkeley1 the doctrine of all       
genuine philosophical thinking1 the     
doctrine of the ,welt als ,vorstellung4 
,we may agree with ,schopenhauer in     
regarding those sections of the first   
edition of the ,critique which were     
omitted in the second edition as being a
 permanently valuable expression of     
,kantian thought1 and as containing much
 that finds no equally adequate         
expression in the passages which were   
substituted for them2 and yet may       
challenge his interpretation of both    
editions alike4 ,if1 as we have already 
been arguing1 we must regard ,kant's    
thinking as in large degree tentative1  
that is1 as progressing by the          

experimental following out of divergent 
tendencies1 we may justly maintain that 
among the most characteristic features  
of his teaching are the readiness with  
which he makes changes to meet deeper   
insight1 and the persistency with which 
he strives to attain a position in which
 there will be least sacrifice or       
blurring of any helpful distinction1 and
 fullest acknowledgment of the manifold 
and diverse considerations that are     
really essential4 ,recognising these    
features1 we shall be prepared to       
question the legitimacy of              
,schopenhauer's opposition between the  
teaching of the two editions4 ,we shall 
rather expect to find that the two      
editions agree in the alternating       
statement and retraction of conflicting 
positions1 and that the later edition1  
however defective in this or that aspect
 as compared with the first edition1    
none the less expresses the maturer     
insight1 and represents a further stage 
in the development of ideas that have   

been present from the start4 ,it may    
perhaps for this very reason be more    
contradictory in its teaching2 it will  
at least yield clearer and more adequate
 formulation of the diverse consequences
 and conflicting implications of the    
earlier tenets4 ,it will be richer in   
content1 more open-eyed in its adoption 
of mutually contradictory positions1    
freer therefore from unconscious        
assumptions1 and better fitted to supply
 the data necessary for judgment upon   
its own defects4 ,only those critics who
 are blind to the stupendous            
difficulties of the tasks which ,kant   
here sets himself1 and credulous of     
their speedy and final completion1 can  
complain of the result4 ,philosophical  
thinkers of the most diverse schools in 
,germany1 ,france1 and ,england1 have   
throughout the nineteenth century       
received from the ,critique much of     
their inspiration4 ,the profound        
influence which ,kant has thus exercised
 upon succeeding thought must surely be 

reckoned a greater achievement than any 
that could have resulted from the       
constructing of a system so consistent  
and unified1 that the alternative would 
lie only between its acceptance and its 
rejection4 ,ultimately the value of a   
philosophy consists more in the richness
 of its content and the                 
comprehensiveness of its dialectic1 than
 in the logical perfection of its formal
 structure4 ,the latter quality is      
especially unfitted to a philosophy     
which inaugurated a new era1 and        
formulated the older problems in an     
altogether novel manner4 ,under such    
conditions fertility of suggestion and  
readiness to modify or even recast      
adopted positions1 openness to fuller   
insight acquired through the very       
solutions that may at first have seemed 
to satisfy and close the issues1 are    
more to be valued than the power to     
remove contradictions and attain        
consistency4 ,this is the point of view 
which ,i shall endeavour to justify in  

reference to the matters now before us4 
,in particular there are two points to  
be settled3 first1 whether and how far  
the argument of the second edition is   
prefigured in the first edition2 and    
secondly1 whether and to what extent it 
harmonises with1 and gives expression   
to1 all that is most central and        
genuinely ,critical in both editions4   
,in the first place we must observe that
 the fourth ,paralogism occurs in a     
section which bears all the signs of    
having been independently written and   
incorporated later into the main text4  
,it is certainly of earlier origin than 
those sections which represent the third
 and fourth layers of the deduction of  
the first edition1 and very possibly was
 composed in the middle 'seventies4     
,indeed1 apart from single paragraphs   
which may have been added in the process
 of adapting it to the main text1 it    
could quite well1 so far as its         
refutation of idealism is concerned1 be 
of even earlier date4 ,the question as  

to the consistency of the refutation of 
the second edition with the teaching of 
the first edition must therefore chiefly
 concern those parts of the ,analytic   
which connect with the later forms of   
the transcendental deduction1 that is to
 say1 with the transcendental deduction 
itself1 with the ,analogies and         
,postulates1 and with particular        
paragraphs that have been added in other
 sections4 ,we have already noted how   
,kant from the very first uses terms    
which involve the drawing of a          
distinction between representations and 
their objects4 ,passages in which this  
distinction occurs can be cited from    
both the ,aesthetic and the ,analytic1  
and two such occur in the fourth        
,paralogism itself4#ajef ,objects1 he   
says1 8correspond0 to their             
representations4 ,a variation in        
expression is found in such passages as 
the following3       8444the objects of 
outer perception also actually exist    
7auch      wirklich sind7 in that very  

form in which they are intuited in      
space44440#ajeg  ,such language is      
meaningless1 and could never have been  
chosen1 if ,kant had not1 even in the   
earlier stages of his thinking1         
postulated a difference between the     
existence of an object and the existence
 of its representation4 ,he must at     
least have distinguished between the    
representations and their content4      
,that1 however1 he could have done      
without advancing to the further        
assertion of their independent          
existence4 ,probably he was not at all  
clear in his own mind1 and was too      
preoccupied with the other complexities 
of his problem1 to have thought out his 
position to a definite decision4 ,when1 
however1 as in the fourth ,paralogism1  
he made any attempt so to do1 he would  
seem to have felt constrained to adopt  
the extreme subjectivist position4      
,expressions to that effect are         
certainly very much more common than    
those above mentioned4 ,this is what    

affords ,schopenhauer such              
justification1 certainly very strong1 as
 he can cite for regarding subjectivism 
as the undoubted teaching of the first  
edition4  ,when1 however1 we also take  
account of the very different teaching  
which is contained in the important     
section on the ,postulates of ,empirical
 ,thought1 the balance of evidence is   
decisively altered4 ,the                
counter-teaching1 which is suggested by 
certain of the conflicting factors of   
the transcendental deduction and of the 
,analogies1 here again receives clear   
and detailed expression4 ,this is the   
more significant1 as it is in this      
section that ,kant sets himself formally
 to define what is to be understood by  
empirical reality4 ,it thus contains    
his1 so to speak1 official declaration  
as to the mode of existence possessed by
 outer appearances4 ,the passage chiefly
 relevant is as follows3       8,if the 
existence of the thing is bound up with 
some perceptions      according to the  

principles of their empirical connection
 7the      ,analogies71 we can determine
 its existence antecedently to the      
perception of it1 and consequently1 to  
that extent1 in an a      priori manner4
 ,for as the existence of the thing is  
bound up with      our perceptions in a 
possible experience1 we are able in the 
series      of possible perceptions1 and
 under the guidance of the ,analogies1  
to make the transition from our actual  
perception to the thing in              
question4 ,thus we discover the         
existence of a magnetic matter          
pervading all bodies from the perception
 of the attracted iron      filings1    
although the constitution of our organs 
cuts us off from      all immediate     
perception of that matter4 ,for in      
accordance with the      laws of        
sensibility and the connection of our   
perceptions in a      single experience1
 we should1 were our senses more        
refined1      actually experience it in 
an immediate empirical intuition4 ,the  

grossness of our senses does not in any 
way decide the form of      possible    
experience in general40#ajeh  ,now it   
cannot1 of course1 be argued that the   
above passage is altogether unambiguous4
 ,we can1 if we feel sufficiently       
constrained thereto1 place upon it an   
interpretation which would harmonise it 
with ,kant's more usual subjectivist    
teaching1 namely as meaning that in the 
progressive construction of experience1 
or in the ideal completion which follows
 upon assumption of more refined        
sense-organs1 possible empirical        
realities are made to become1 or are    
assumed to become1 real1 but that until 
the possible experiences are thus       
realised in fact or in ideal hypothesis1
 they exist outwardly only in the form  
of their noumenal conditions4 ,and as a 
matter of fact1 this is how ,kant       
himself interprets the teaching of this 
section in the process of applying it in
 solution of the antinomies4            
8,accordingly1 if ,i represent to myself

 the aggregate of all objects      of   
the senses existing in all time and all 
places1 ,i do not set      them1        
antecedently to experience1 in space and
 time4 ,the      representation is      
nothing but the thought of a possible   
experience      in its absolute         
completeness4 ,since the objects are    
mere      representations1 only in such 
a possible experience are they given4   
,to say that they exist prior to all my 
experience1 can only be      taken as   
meaning that they will be met with1 if1 
starting from      actual perception1 ,i
 advance to that part of experience to  
which      they belong4 ,the cause of   
the empirical conditions of this advance
      7that which determines what       
members ,i shall meet with1 or how far  
,i      can meet with any such in my    
regress7 is transcendental1 and is      
therefore necessarily unknown to me4 ,we
 are not1 however1 concerned      with  
this transcendental cause1 but only with
 the rule of      progression in that   

experience in which objects1 that is to 
say1      appearances1 are given4       
,moreover1 in outcome it is a matter of 
indifference whether ,i say that in the 
empirical progress in space      ,i can 
meet with stars a hundred times farther 
removed than the      outermost now     
perceptible to me1 or whether ,i say    
that they are      perhaps to be met    
with in cosmical space even though no   
human being      has ever perceived or  
ever will perceive them4 ,for though    
they      might be given as things in   
themselves1 without relation to         
possible experience1 they are still     
nothing to me1 and therefore      are   
not objects1 save in so far as they are 
contained in the series      of the     
empirical regress40#ajei  ,but though   
this is a possible interpretation of the
 teaching of the ,postulates1 and though
 further it is ,kant's own              
interpretation in another portion of the
 ,critique1 it is not by any means      
thereby decided that this is what the   

section itself actually teaches4        
,unbiassed study of the section1 in     
independence of the use to which it is  
elsewhere put1 can find within it no    
such limitation to its assertion of the 
actual independent existence of         
non-perceived bodies4 ,we have to       
remember that the doctrine and solution 
of the ,antinomies was completed prior  
to the writing of the central portions  
of the ,critique4 ,the section treating 
of their solution seems1 indeed1 in     
certain parts to be later#ajfj than the 
other main portions of the chapter on   
the ,antinomies1 and must have been at  
least recast after completion of the    
,postulates4 ,but the subjectivist      
solution is so much simpler in          
statement1 so much more fully worked    
out1 and indeed so much more capable of 
definite formulation1 and also so much  
more at one with the teaching developed 
in the preceding chapter on the         
,paralogisms1 that even granting the    
doctrine expounded in the section on the

 ,postulates to be genuinely            
phenomenalist1 it is not surprising that
 ,kant should have been unwilling to    
recast his older and simpler solution of
 the ,antinomies4 ,in any case we are   
not concerned to argue that ,kant1 even 
after formulating the phenomenalist     
view1 yields to it an unwavering        
adherence4 ,as ,i have already insisted1
 his attitude continues to the very last
 to be one of alternation between two   
opposed standpoints4  ,but the most     
significant feature of ,kant's treatment
 of the argument of the ,postulates     
still remains for consideration4 ,it was
 in immediate succession to the         
paragraph above quoted#ajfa that ,kant1 
in the second edition1 placed his       
8,refutation of ,idealism0 with the     
emphatic statement that this 7not as in 
the first edition in connection with the
 ,paralogisms7 was its 8correct         
location40 ,it is required1 he says1 as 
a reply to an objection which the       
teaching of the ,postulates must at once

 suggest4 ,the argument of the second   
edition in proof of the independent     
reality of material bodies1 and in      
disproof of subjectivism1 is thus given 
by ,kant as a necessary extension and   
natural supplement of the teaching of   
the first edition4  ,there is therefore 
reason for concluding that the same     
preconception which has led to such     
radical misinterpretation of ,kant's    
,refutation of ,idealism has been at    
work in inducing a false reading of     
,kant's argument in the ,postulates1    
namely the belief that ,kant's teaching 
proceeds on consistent lines1 and that  
it must at all costs be harmonised with 
itself4 ,finding subjectivism to be     
emphatically and unambiguously          
inculcated in all the main sections of  
the ,critique1 and the phenomenalist    
views1 on the other hand1 to be stated  
in a much less definite and somewhat    
elusive manner1 commentators have       
impoverished the ,critical teaching by  
suppression of many of its most subtile 

and progressive doctrines4 ,kant's      
experimental1 tentative development of  
divergent tendencies is surely          
preferable to this artificial product of
 high-handed and unsympathetic          
emendation4   ,,inner ,,sense ,,and     
,,apperception  ,we are now in position 
to complete our treatment of inner      
sense4 ,when the inner world of         
feelings1 volitions1 and representations
 is placed on the same empirical level  
as the outer world of objects in space1 
when the two are correlated and yet also
 at the same time sharply distinguished1
 when1 further1 it is maintained that   
objects in space exist independently of 
their representations1 and that in this 
independence they are necessary for the 
possibility of the latter1 the whole    
aspect of the ,critical teaching        
undergoes a genial and welcome          
transformation4 ,instead of the         
forbidding doctrine that the world in   
space is merely my representation1 we   
have the very different teaching that   

only through consciousness of an        
independent world in space is           
consciousness of the inner subjective   
life possible at all1 and that as each  
is 8external0 to the other1 neither can 
be reduced to1 or be absorbed within1   
the other4 ,the inner representations do
 not produce or generate the spatial    
objects1 do not even condition their    
existence1 but are required only for the
 individual's empirical consciousness of
 them4 ,indeed the relations previously 
holding between them are now reversed4  
,it is the outer world which renders the
 subjective representations possible4   
,the former is prior to the latter2 the 
latter exist in order to reveal the     
former4 ,the outer world in space must1 
indeed1 be regarded as conditioned by1  
and relative to1 the noumenal conditions
 of its possibility2 but these1 on      
,kant's doctrine of outer and inner     
sense1 are distinct from all experienced
 contents and from all experienced      
mental processes4 ,this will at once be 

recognised as holding of the noumenal   
conditions of the given manifold4 ,but  
it is equally true1 ,kant maintains1 in 
regard to the noumenal conditions of our
 mental life4 ,we have no immediate     
knowledge of the transcendental         
syntheses that condition all            
consciousness1 and in our complete      
ignorance of their specific nature they 
cannot legitimately be equated with any 
individual or personal agent4 ,as the   
empirical self is only what it is known 
as1 namely1 appearance1 it cannot be the
 bearer of appearance4 ,this function   
falls to that which underlies both inner
 and outer appearances equally1 and     
which within experience gains twofold   
expression for itself1 in the conception
 of the thing in itself  x on the one   
hand1 and in the correlative conception 
of a transcendental subject1 likewise   
x1 on the other4  ,but with mention of  
the transcendental subject we are       
brought to a problem which in the second
 edition invariably accompanies ,kant's 

discussion of inner sense4 ,the #8,i    
think' of apperception can find         
expression only in an empirical         
judgment1 and yet1 so far from being the
 outcome of inner sense1 preconditions  
its possibility4 ,what then is its      
relation to inner sense8 ,does not its  
recognition conflict with ,kant's denial
 of the possibility of self-conscious   
reflection1 of direct intuitive         
apprehension by the self of itself8 ,the
 pure apperception1 #8,i think1' is     
equivalent1 ,kant declares1 to the      
judgment #8,i am1' and therefore        
involves the assertion of the subject's 
existence4#ajfb ,does not this conflict 
on the one hand with the ,critical      
doctrine that knowledge of existence is 
only possible in terms of sense1 and on 
the other with the ,critical limitation 
of the categories to the realm of       
appearance8 ,how are such assertions as 
that the #8,i think' of pure            
apperception refers to a non-empirical  
reality1 and that it predicates its     

existence1 to be reconciled with the    
doctrine of inner sense as above stated8
  ,as we have already observed1#ajfc    
,kant's early doctrine of the           
transcendental object was developed in a
 more or less close parallelism with    
that of the transcendental unity of     
apperception4 ,they were regarded as    
correlative opposites1 the dual centres 
of noumenal reference for our merely    
subjective representations4 ,kant's     
further examination of the nature of    
apperception1 as embodied in alterations
 in the second edition1 was certainly1  
as we shall find1 inspired by the       
criticisms which the first edition had  
called forth4 ,his replies1 however1 are
 merely more explicit statements of the 
distinction which he had already        
developed in the first edition between  
the transcendental and the empirical    
self1 and that distinction in turn was  
doubtless itself largely determined by  
his own independent recognition of the  
untenability of his early view of the   

transcendental object4 ,though it is    
much more difficult to differentiate    
between the empirical and the           
transcendental self than to distinguish 
between the empirical object and the    
thing in itself1 both distinctions are  
from a genuinely ,critical standpoint   
equally imperative1 and rest upon       
considerations that are somewhat similar
 in the two cases4  ,one of the chief   
and most telling criticisms directed    
against the teaching of the first       
edition was that ,kant's doctrine of a  
transcendental consciousness of the     
self's existence1 i4e4 of the existence 
of a noumenal being1 8this ,i or he or  
it 7the thing7 which thinks10#ajfd is   
inconsistent with the teaching of the   
,postulates of ,empirical ,thought4 ,in 
that section1 as also later in the      
section on the theological ,ideal1 ,kant
 had declared most emphatically that    
existence is never discoverable in the  
content of any mere concept4 ,it is     
revealed in perception1 and in          

perception alone1 in virtue of the      
element of sensation contained in the   
latter4       8444to know the actuality 
of things demands perception1 and       
therefore sensation4444 ,for that the   
concept precedes perception1            
signifies the concept's mere            
possibility2 the perception which       
supplies the content ,stoff to the      
concept1 is the sole      criterion     
,charakter of actuality40#ajfe  ,yet    
,kant had also maintained that the #8,i 
think' is equivalent to #8,i am1'#ajff  
and that in this form1 as an            
intellectual consciousness of the self's
 existence1 it precedes all experience4 
,the teaching of the ,postulates is1    
however1 the teaching of the ,critique  
as a whole1 and such critics as         
,pistorius seemed therefore to be       
justified in maintaining that ,kant1 in 
reducing the experiences of inner sense 
to mere appearance1 destroys the        
possibility of establishing reality in  
any form4 ,appearance1 in order to be   

appearance1 presupposes the reality not 
only of that which appears1 but also of 
the mental process whereby it is        
apprehended4 ,but if reality is given   
only in sensation1 and yet all          
experience that involves sensation is   
merely appearance1 there is no self by  
which appearance can be conditioned2 and
 only illusion 7,schein71 not appearance
 7,erscheinung71 is left4 ,to quote     
,pistorius' exact words3       0,if our 
inner representations are not things in 
themselves but      only appearances    
there will be nothing but illusion      
7,schein71      for nothing remains to  
which anything can appear40#ajfg  ,kant 
evidently felt the force of this        
criticism1 for in the second edition he 
replies to it on no less than seven     
different occasions4#ajfh ,in three of  
these passages#ajfi the term ,schein is 
employed1 and in the note to ,b xxxix   
the term ,erdichtung appears4 ,this     
shows very conclusively that it is such 
criticism as the above that ,kant has in

 mind4 ,the most explicit passage is ,b 
#dbh3       8,the proposition1 #8,i     
think1' or #8,i exist thinking1' is an  
empirical      proposition4 ,such a     
judgment1 however1 is conditioned by    
empirical      intuition1 and the object
 that is thought therefore underlies it 
as      appearance4 ,it would           
consequently seem that on our theory the
 soul      is completely transformed1   
even in thinking selbst im ,denken1     
into appearance1 and that in this way   
our consciousness itself1 as      being 
a mere illusion ,schein1 must refer in  
fact to nothing40  ,kant1 in his reply1 
is unyielding in the contention that the
 #8,i think1' even though it involves an
 empirical judgment1 is itself          
intellectual4 8,this representation is a
 thinking1 not an intuiting10#ajgj or as
 he adds1 8,the #8,i think' expresses   
the actus whereby ,i determine my       
existence40 ,existence is therefore     
already given thereby4#ajga ,kant also  
still maintains that the self thus      

revealed is not 8appearance and still   
less illusion40       8,i am conscious  
of myself 4441 not as ,i appear to      
myself1 nor as ,i      am in myself1 but
 only that ,i am40#ajgb 8,i thereby     
represent      myself to myself neither 
as ,i am nor as ,i appear to myself4 ,i 
think      myself only as ,i do any     
object in general from whose mode of    
intuition ,i abstract40#ajgc  ,kant's   
method of meeting the criticism1 while  
still holding to these positions1 is    
twofold4 ,it consists in the first place
 in maintaining that the #8,i think1'   
though intellectual1 can find expression
 only in empirical judgments--in other  
words1 that it is in and by itself      
formal only1 and presupposes as the     
occasion of its employment a given      
manifold of inner sense2 and secondly1  
by the statement that the #8existence'  
which is involved in the #8,i think' is 
not the category of existence4 ,let us  
take in order each of these two points4 
,kant's first method of reply itself    

appears in two forms1 a stronger and a  
milder4 ,the milder mode of             
statement#ajgd is to the effect that    
though the representation #8,i am'      
already immediately involves the thought
 of the existence of the subject1 it    
yields no knowledge of it4 ,knowledge   
would involve intuition1 namely1        
consciousness of inner determinations in
 time1 which in turn would itself       
presuppose consciousness of outer       
objects4 ,as a merely intellectual      
representation1       8444this #8,i' has
 not the least predicate of intuition   
which1 in its      character of         
permanence1 could1 somewhat after the   
manner of      impenetrability in the   
empirical intuition of matter1 serve as 
correlate of time determination in inner
 sense40#ajge  ,the stronger and more   
definite mode of statement is that the  
#8,i think' is an empirical             
proposition4#ajgf ,though it involves as
 one factor the intellectual            
representation1 #8,i think1' it is none 

the less empirical4       8,without some
 empirical representation supplying the 
material for      thought1 the actus1   
#8,i think1' would not take             
place44440#ajgg  ,the empirical is      
indeed 8only the condition of the       
application or employment of the pure   
intellectual faculty10 but as such is   
indispensable4 ,this is repeated in even
 clearer terms in ,b #dbi4       8,the  
proposition1 #8,i think1' in so far as  
it amounts to the      assertion1 #8,i  
exist thinking1' is no mere logical     
function but      determines the subject
 7which is then at the same time object7
 in      respect of existence1 and      
cannot take place without inner         
sense44440  ,this admission is the more 
significant in that it follows          
immediately upon a passage in which     
,kant has been arguing that thinking1   
taken in and by itself1 is a merely     
logical function4  ,the real crux lies  
in the question as to the legitimacy of 
,kant's application of the predicate    

existence to the transcendental subject4
 ,its employment in reference to the    
empirical self in time is part of the   
problem of the ,refutation of ,idealism 
in the second edition2 and the answer   
there given is clear and definite4      
,consciousness of the empirical self as 
existing in time involves consciousness 
of outer objects in space4 ,but as ,kant
 recognises that a transcendental ego1  
not in time1 is presupposed in all      
consciousness of the empirical self1 the
 question whether the predicate of      
existence is also applicable to the     
transcendental self cannot be altogether
 avoided1 and is indeed referred to in  
,b #bgg4 ,the attitude to be taken to   
this latter question is not1 however1   
defined in that section4  ,in the first 
edition ,kant has insisted that the     
categories as pure forms of the         
understanding1 in isolation from space  
and time1 are merely logical functions  
8without content40 ,interpreted         
literally1 this would signify that they 

are devoid of meaning1 and therefore are
 incapable of yielding the thought of   
any independent object or existence4 ,as
 merely logical forms of relation1 they 
presuppose a material1 and that is      
supplied only through outer and inner   
sense4 ,such is not1 however1 the way in
 which ,kant interprets his own         
statement4 ,it is qualified so as to    
signify only that they are without      
specific or determinate content4 ,they  
are taken as yielding the conception of 
object in general4 ,passages in plenty  
can be cited from the first             
edition#ajgh--passages allowed to remain
 in the second edition--in which ,kant  
teaches that the pure forms of          
understanding1 as distinct from the     
schematised categories1 yield the       
conception of things in themselves4     
,this view is1 indeed1 a survival from  
his earlier doctrine of the             
transcendental object4#ajgi ,in all     
passages added in the second edition the
 consequences of his argument are more  

rigorously drawn1 and the doctrine of   
the transcendental object is entirely   
eliminated4 ,it is now unambiguously    
asserted that the pure forms of         
understanding1 the 8modes of            
self-consciousness in thinking10#ajhj   
are not intellectual concepts of        
objects4 ,they 8yield no object         
whatsoever40 ,the only object is that   
given through sense4 ,and since in      
thinking the transcendental subject we  
do1 by ,kant's own account1 think an    
8object10 he is led to the conclusion1  
also explicitly avowed1 that the notion 
of existence involved in the #8,i think'
 is not the category of the same        
name4#ajha ,so also of the categories of
 substance and causality4       8,if ,i 
represent myself as subject of thoughts 
or as ground of      thinking1 these    
modes of representation do not signify  
the      categories of substance or of  
cause44440#ajhb  ,the notion of the     
self1 like the notion of things in      
themselves1 is a concept distinct from  

all the categories4#ajhc  ,this         
conclusion is reinforced by means of an 
argument which is employed in the       
section of the first edition on         
,paralogisms4 ,apperception is the      
ground of the possibility of the        
categories1 and these latter on their   
side represent only the synthetic unity 
which that apperception demands4        
,self-consciousness is therefore the    
representation of that which is the     
condition of all unity1 and which yet is
 itself unconditioned4       8444it does
 not represent itself through the       
categories1 but knows      the          
categories and through them all objects 
in the absolute unity      of           
apperception1 and so through itself4    
,now it is1 indeed1 very      evident   
that ,i cannot know as an object that   
which ,i must      presuppose in order  
to know any object44440#ajhd  ,this     
argument recurs in ,b #dbb4       8,the 
subject of the categories cannot by     
thinking the categories      acquire a  

conception of itself as an object of the
 categories4 ,for1      in order to     
think them1 its pure self-consciousness1
 which is what      was to be accounted 
for1 must itself be presupposed40  ,it  
is extremely difficult to estimate the  
value and cogency of this argument4#ajhe
 ,many objections or rather             
qualifications must be made before it   
can be either accepted or rejected4 ,if 
it be taken only as asserting that the  
unity of self-consciousness is not      
adequately expressible through any of   
the categories1 it is undoubtedly valid4
 ,if1 further1 the categories be        
identified with the schemata1 it is also
 true that they are not applicable in   
any degree or manner4 ,the schemata are 
applicable only to natural existences in
 space and time4 ,self-consciousness can
 never be reduced to a natural existence
 of that type4 ,on the other hand1 if it
 is not self-consciousness as such1 but 
the self-conscious subject1 which on    
,kant's view is always noumenal--8this  

,i or he or it 7the thing7 which        
thinks0#ajhf--that is referred to1 and  
if we distinguish between the categories
 strictly so called1 that is1 the pure  
forms of understanding1 and the         
schemata1 it is not at all evident that 
the self-conscious subject may not be   
described as being an existence that is 
always a subject and never a predicate1 
and as being related to experience as a 
ground or condition4 ,these indefinite  
assertions leave open alternative       
possibilities4 ,they do not even decide 
whether the self is 8,i or he or        
it40#ajhg ,in so far as they advance    
beyond the mere assertion that the self 
rests upon noumenal conditions they are1
 indeed1 incapable of proof1 but by no  
,critical principle can they be shown to
 be inapplicable4 ,when1 therefore1     
,kant may seem to extract a more        
definite conclusion from the above      
argument1#ajhh he advances beyond what  
it can be made to support4  ,kant is    
here influenced by the results of the   

ethical enquiries with which in the     
period subsequent to #agha he was       
chiefly preoccupied4 ,he believed       
himself to have proved that the self1 as
 a self-conscious being1 is a genuinely 
noumenal existence4 ,that being so1 he  
was bound to hold that the categories1  
even as pure logical forms1 are         
inadequate to express its real          
determinate nature4 ,but he confounds   
this position with the assertion that   
they are not only inadequate1 but in and
 by themselves are likewise             
inapplicable4 ,that is not a legitimate 
conclusion1 for even if the self is more
 than mere subject or mere ground1 it   
will at least be so much4 ,when ethical 
considerations are left out of account1 
the only proper conclusion is that the  
applicability of the categories to the  
self-conscious subject is capable       
neither of proof nor of disproof1 but   
that when the distinction between       
appearance and reality 7which as we     
shall find is ultimately based upon the 

,ideas of ,reason7 has been drawn1 the  
categories can be employed to define the
 possible difference between            
self-conscious experience and its       
unknown noumenal conditions4 ,any other 
conclusion conflicts with the teaching  
of the section on the ,paralogisms4  ,it
 is important to observe--a point       
ignored by such critics as ,caird and   
,watson--that in the sections under     
consideration#ajhi ,kant most explicitly
 declares self-consciousness to be      
merely 8the representation of that which
 is the condition of all unity40 ,he    
maintains that this representation1 as  
standing for 8the determining self 7the 
thinking71 is to be distinguished from  
the self which we are seeking to        
determine 7the subject which thinks7 as 
knowledge from its object10#ajij or in  
other words1 that1 without special      
proof1 unattainable on theoretical      
grounds1 8the unity of thought0 may not 
be taken as equivalent to the unity of  
the thinking subject4#ajia ,they may be 

as diverse as unity of representation   
and unity of object represented are     
frequently found to be4 ,we may never   
argue from simplicity in a              
representation to simplicity in its     
object4  ,but to return to the main     
thesis1 it may be observed that these   
arguments1 with the exception of that   
which we have just been considering from
 the nature of self-consciousness1 lead 
to the conclusion that the categories   
are as little applicable to the thing in
 itself as to the transcendental        
subject4 ,even the argument from the    
necessary and invariable presence of    
self-consciousness in each and every act
 of judgment is itself valid only from a
 point of view which regards            
self-consciousness in the manner of     
,kant's early semi-,critical view of the
 transcendental subject#ajib as an      
ultimate4 ,but if1 as is maintained in  
the section in which this argument      
occurs1 viz4 that on the ,paralogisms1  
self-consciousness may be complexly     

conditioned1 and may indeed have        
conditions similar in nature to those   
which underlie outer experience1 the    
categories may be just as applicable1 or
 as inapplicable1 to its noumenal nature
 as to the nature of the thing in       
itself4 ,it is noticeable that in the   
second edition1 doubtless under the     
influence of preoccupation with ethical 
problems1 some of ,kant's utterances    
betray a tendency to relax the rigour of
 his thinking1 and to bring his         
theoretical teaching into closer        
agreement with his ethical results than 
the theoretical analysis in and by      
itself at all justifies4 ,this tendency 
was1 of course1 reinforced by the       
persisting influence of that view of the
 transcendental subject which he had    
held in the middle 'seventies1 and from 
which he never completely emancipated   
either his language or his              
thinking4#ajic ,indeed in several of the
 passages added in the second           
edition#ajid ,kant even goes so far as  

to adopt language which if taken quite  
literally would mean that the #8,i      
think' is an immediate consciousness of 
the mind's purely intellectual          
activity--a view which1 as we have      
seen1#ajie is altogether alien to the   
,critical position4 ,it would1 as he    
argues so forcibly elsewhere1 involve a 
kind of experience which does not       
conform to ,critical requirements1 and  
which would lie open to the attacks of  
sceptics such as ,hume4  ,in ,b #aeg-h  
the difficulties of ,kant's position are
 again manifest4 ,speaking of the       
representation of the self1 he declares 
that 8,i am conscious of myself 4441 not
 as ,i appear to myself1 nor as ,i am in
 myself1 but only that ,i am40 ,this may
 seem to imply that existence is        
predicable of the transcendental self4  
,he adds that though the determination1 
i4e4 specification in empirical form1 of
 my existence 7mein eigenes ,dasein7 is 
possible only in inner sensuous         
intuition1 it is 8not appearance and    

still less mere illusion40 ,but in the  
appended note it is urged that my       
existence 7,dasein7 as self-active being
 is represented in purely indeterminate 
fashion4 ,only my existence as sensuous1
 and therefore as appearance1 can be    
known1 i4e4 can be made determinate4    
,the problem is more directly and       
candidly faced in the note to ,b #dbb4  
,that note is interesting for quite a   
number of reasons4 ,it reveals ,kant in 
the very act of recasting his position1 
and in the process of searching around  
for a mode of formulation which will    
enable him to hold to a transcendental  
consciousness of the self's existence   
and at the same time not to violate the 
definition of existence given in the    
,postulates1 i4e4 both to posit the     
transcendental self as actual and yet to
 deny the applicability to it of any of 
the categories4 ,after stating that the 
#8,i think' is an empirical proposition 
in which my existence is immediately    
involved1 he proceeds further to        

describe it as expressing 8an           
undetermined empirical intuition1 i4e4  
perception10 and so as showing that     
sensation underlies its assertion of    
existence4 ,kant does not1 however1 mean
 by these words that the existence      
asserted is merely that of the empirical
 self2 for he proceeds3                 
8444existence is here not a category1   
which as such does not apply      to an 
indeterminately-given object4444 ,an    
indeterminate perception      here      
signifies only something real that is   
given1 given indeed to      thought in  
general1 and so not as appearance1 nor  
as thing in      itself 7,noumenon71 but
 as something which actually in der     
,that exists1 and which in the          
proposition1 ,i think1 is denoted       
bezeichnet as such40  ,the phrases here 
employed are open to criticism on every 
side4 ,kant completely departs from his 
usual terminology when he asserts that  
through an 8indeterminate perception0   
the self is given1 and 8given to thought

 in general0 as 8something real40 ,the  
contention1 that the existence asserted 
is not a category1 is also difficult to 
accept4#ajif ,it is equally surprising  
to read that its reality is given       
8neither as appearance nor as thing     
,sache in itself 7,noumenon702 for      
hitherto no such alternative form of    
real existence has been recognised4     
,but to press such criticisms is to     
ignore the spirit for the sake of the   
letter4 ,kant here breaks free from all 
his habitual modes of expression for the
 very good and sufficient reason that he
 is striving to develop a position more 
catholic and comprehensive than any     
previously adopted4 ,he is seeking to   
formulate a position which1 without in  
any way justifying or encouraging the   
transcendent employment of the          
categories1 will yet retain for thought 
the capacity of self-limitation1 that   
is1 of forming concepts which will      
reveal the existence of things in       
themselves and so will enable the mind  

to apprehend the radical distinction    
between things in themselves and things 
experienced4 ,but he has not yet        
discovered that in so doing he is       
committing himself to the thesis that   
the distinction is mediated1 not by the 
understanding1 but by ,reason1 not by   
categories1 but by ,ideas4#ajig ,as ,i  
have already indicated1 this tendency is
 crossed by another derived from his    
preoccupation with moral problems1      
namely1 the desire to defend1 in a      
manner which his ,critical teaching does
 not justify1 the noumenal existence of 
the self as a thinking being4     ,,the 
,,transcendental ,,analytic     ,book   
,,ii  ,,the ,,analytic ,,of ,,principles
   ,the distinction which ,kant here    
introduces for the first time between   
understanding 7now viewed as the faculty
 only of concepts7 and the faculty of   
judgment 7,urtheilskraft7 is artificial 
and extremely arbitrary4#ajih ,as we    
have seen1#ajii his own real position   
involves a complete departure from the  

traditional distinction between         
conceiving1 judging1 and reasoning1 as  
separate processes4 ,all thinking       
without exception finds expression in   
judgment4 ,judgment is the fundamental  
activity of the understanding4 ,it is   
8an act which contains all its other    
acts40 ,kant is bent1 however1 upon     
forcing the contents of the ,critique   
into the external framework supplied by 
the traditional logic1 viewed as an     
architectonic2 and we have therefore no 
option save to take account of his      
exposition in the actual form which he  
has chosen to give to it4 ,since general
 logic develops its teaching under three
 separate headings1 as the logic of     
conception1 the logic of judgment1 and  
the logic of reasoning1 the ,critique   
has to be made to conform to this       
tripartite division4 ,the preceding book
 is accordingly described as dealing    
with concepts1 and this second book as  
dealing with judgments or principles2   
while understanding and the faculty of  

judgment1 now viewed as independent1 are
 redefined to meet the exigencies of    
this new arrangement1 the former as     
being 8the faculty of rules10 and the   
latter as being 8the faculty of         
subsuming under rules1 i4e4 of          
distinguishing whether something does or
 does not stand under a given rule      
7casus datae legis740  ,the reader need 
not strive to discover any deep-lying   
ground or justification for these       
definitions4#aajj ,architectonic1 that  
#8open sesame' for so many of the       
secrets of the ,critique1 is the        
all-sufficient spell to resolve the     
mystery4 ,as a matter of fact1 ,kant is 
here taking advantage of the popular    
meaning of the term judgment in the     
sense in which we speak of a man of good
 judgment2 and in order that judgment   
and understanding may be distinguished  
he then imposes an artificial limitation
 upon the meaning in which the latter   
term is to be employed4  ,as formal     
logic abstracts from all content1 it    

cannot1 ,kant maintains1 supply rules   
for the exercise of 8judgment40 ,it is  
otherwise with transcendental logic1    
which in the pure forms of sensibility  
possesses a content enabling it to      
define in an a priori manner the        
specific cases to which concepts must be
 applicable4 ,the ,analytic of          
,principles is thus able to supply 8a   
canon for the faculty of judgment1      
instructing it how to apply to          
appearances the concepts of             
understanding which contain the         
condition of a priori rules40#aaja ,this
 will involve 7#a7 the defining of the  
sensuous conditions under which the a   
priori rules may be applied--the problem
 of the chapter on schematism2 and 7#b7 
the formulating of the rules in their   
sensuous1 though a priori1              
concreteness--the problem of the chapter
 on 8the system of all principles of    
pure understanding40  ,such is ,kant's  
own very misleading account of the      
purposes of these two chapters4 ,there  

are other and sounder reasons why they  
should be introduced4 ,in the ,analytic 
of ,concepts1 as we have seen1#aajb the 
transcendental deduction only succeeds  
in proving that a priori forms of unity 
are required for the possibility of     
experience4 ,no proof is given that the 
various categories are just the         
particular forms required1 and that they
 are one and all indispensable4 ,this   
omission can be made good only by a     
series of proofs1 directed to showing1  
in reference to each separate category1 
its validity within experience and its  
indispensableness for the possibility of
 experience4 ,these proofs are given in 
the second of the two chapters4 ,the    
chapter on schematism is preparatory in 
character2 it draws attention to the    
importance of the temporal aspect of    
human experience1 and defines the       
categories in the form in which they    
present themselves in an experience thus
 conditioned by a priori intuition4     
,,chapter ,i  ,,the ,,schematism ,,of   

,,pure ,,concepts ,,of                  
,,understanding#aajc   ,the more        
artificial aspect of ,kant's argument   
again appears in the reason which he    
assigns for the existence of a problem  
of schematism1 namely1 that pure        
concepts1 and the sensuous intuitions   
which have to be subsumed under them1   
are completely opposite in nature4 ,no  
such explanation can be accepted4 ,for  
if category and sensuous intuition are  
really heterogeneous1 no subsumption is 
possible2 and if they are not really    
heterogeneous1 no such problem as ,kant 
here refers to will exist4 ,the         
heterogeneity which ,kant here asserts  
is merely that difference of nature     
which follows from the diversity of     
their functions4 ,the category is formal
 and determines structure2 intuition    
yields the content which is thereby     
organised4 ,accordingly1 the 8third     
thing10 which ,kant postulates as       
required to bring category and intuition
 together1 is not properly so           

describable2 it is simply the two       
co-operating in the manner required for 
the possibility of experience4 ,kant's  
method of stating the problem of        
schematism is1 however1 so completely   
misleading1 that before we can          
profitably proceed1 the various strands 
in his highly artificial argument must  
be further disentangled4 ,this is an    
ungrateful task1 but has at least the   
compensating interest of admirably      
illustrating the kind of influence which
 ,kant's logical architectonic is       
constantly exercising upon his statement
 of ,critical principles4  ,the         
architectonic has in this connection two
 very unfortunate consequences4 ,it     
leads ,kant to describe schematism as a 
process of subsumption1 and to speak of 
the transcendental schema as 8a third   
thing40 ,neither assertion is           
legitimate4 ,schematism1 properly       
understood1 is not a process of         
subsumption1 but1 as ,kant has already  
recognised in ,a #abd1 of synthetic     

interpretation4 ,creative synthesis1    
whereby contents are apprehended in     
terms of functional relations1 not      
subsumption of particulars under        
universals that are homogeneous with    
them1 is what ,kant must ultimately mean
 by the schematism of the pure forms of 
understanding4 ,a category1 that is to  
say1 may not be viewed as a predicate of
 a possible judgment1 and as being      
applied to a subject independently      
apprehended2 its function is to         
articulate the judgment as a whole4 ,the
 category of substance and attribute1   
for instance1 is the form of the        
categorical judgment1 and may not be    
equated with any one of its single      
parts4  ,thus the criticisms which we   
have already passed upon ,kant's mode of
 formulating the distinction between    
formal and transcendental logic1#aajd   
are no less applicable to the sections  
now before us4 ,the terminology which   
,kant is here employing is borrowed from
 the traditional logic1 and is out of   

harmony with his ,critical principles4  
,kant's description of the schema as a  
third thing1 additional to category and 
intuition1 and intermediate between     
them1 is also a result of his misleading
 mode of formulating his problem4 ,what 
,kant professes to do is to interpret   
the relation of the categories to the   
intuitional material as analogous to    
that holding between a class concept and
 the particulars which can be subsumed  
under it4 ,this is implied in his use of
 the plate and circle illustration4#aaje
 ,but as the relation holding between   
categories and the material of sense is 
that of form and matter1 structure and  
content1 the analogy is thoroughly      
misleading4 ,as all content1 strictly so
 called1 falls on the side of the       
intuitional material1 there is no       
content1 i4e4 no quality or attribute1  
which is common to both4 ,and thus it   
happens that the inappropriateness of   
the analogy which ,kant is seeking to   
enforce is ultimately the sole ground   

which he is able to offer in support of 
his description of the schema as 8a     
third thing40       8,now it is clear 6 
that there must be a third thing1 which 
is      homogeneous on the one hand with
 the category and on the other with     
the appearance1 and which thus makes the
 application of the one to      the     
other possible40#aajf  ,on the contrary1
 the true ,critical teaching is that    
category and intuition1 that is to say1 
form and content1 mutually condition one
 another1 and that the so-called schema 
is simply a name for the latter as      
apprehended in terms of the former4     
,but there is a further complication4   
,kant1 as we have already observed1#aajg
 defines judgment as being       8444the
 faculty of subsuming under rules1 i4e4 
of      distinguishing whether something
 does or does not stand under a         
given rule 7casus datae legis740  ,now  
this view of judgment really connects   
with the syllogism1 not with the        
proposition4#aajh ,as ,kant states in   

his ,logic1 there are       8444three   
essential elements in all inference3    
7#a7 a universal rule      which is     
entitled the major premiss2 7#b7 the    
proposition which      subsumes a       
cognition under the condition of the    
universal rule1 and      which is       
entitled the minor premiss2 and lastly1 
7#c7 the      conclusion1 the           
proposition which asserts or denies of  
the subsumed      cognition the         
predicate of the rule40#aaji  ,regarded 
in this way1 as the application of a    
rule1 subsumption is more broadly viewed
 and becomes a more appropriate analogy 
for the relation of category to content4
 ,and obviously it is this comparison   
that ,kant has chiefly in mind in these 
introductory sections4 ,for only when   
the subsumption is that of a particular 
instance under a universal rule1 can the
 necessity of a mediating condition be  
allowed4  ,such1 then1 are the straits  
to which ,kant is reduced in the        
endeavour to hold loyally to his        

architectonic4 ,he has to identify the  
two very different kinds of subsumption 
which find expression in the proposition
 and in the syllogism respectively2 and 
when his analogy between logical        
subsumption1 thus loosely interpreted1  
and synthetic interpretation1 proves    
inapplicable1 he uses the failure of the
 analogy as an argument to prove the    
necessity of 8a third thing40 ,on his   
own ,critical teaching1 as elsewhere    
expounded1 no such third thing need be  
postulated4 ,even the definitions which 
he proceeds to give of the various      
schemata do not really support this     
description of them4  ,but though       
,kant's method of introducing and       
expounding the argument of this chapter 
is thus misleading1 the contents        
themselves are of intrinsic value1 and  
have a threefold bearing3 7a7 on the    
doctrine of productive imagination2 7b7 
on the relation holding between image   
and concept2 and 7c7 on the nature of   
the categories in their distinction from

 the pure forms of understanding4  7a7  
,kant gives definite and precise        
expression to the two chief             
characteristics of the productive       
imagination1 namely1 that it deals with 
an a priori manifold of pure            
intuition#aaaj and that it exercises a  
8hidden art in the depths of the human  
soul40#aaaa ,kant's description of the  
schema as 8a third thing10 at once      
intellectual and sensuous1 seems to be  
in large part due to the transference to
 it of predicates already applied to the
 faculty which is supposed to be its    
source4 ,the distinction between the    
transcendental schema and the           
particularised image is also given as   
analogous to that between the pure and  
the empirical faculties of imagination4 
,in ,a #ada-b  ,b #ahj-a1 ,kant speaks  
of the empirical faculty of productive  
imagination1 and so is led1 to the great
 confusion of his exposition1 though    
also to the enrichment of his teaching1 
to allow of empirical as well as of     

transcendental schemata1 and thus       
contrary to his own real position to    
recognise schemata of such empirical    
objects as dog or horse--a view which   
empirical psychology has since adopted  
in its doctrine of the schematic image4 
,this passage was doubtless written at  
the time when he was inclining to the   
view that the empirical processes run   
parallel with the transcendental4#aaab  
,kant's final view is that empirical    
imagination is always reproductive4     
,this brings us1 however1 to our second 
main point4  7b7 ,kant makes a statement
 which serves as a valuable corrective  
of his looser assertions in other parts 
of the ,critique4#aaac ,five points set 
after one another1 thus1444441 form an  
image of the number five4 ,the schema of
 the number five is1 however1 of very   
different nature1 and must not be       
identified with any such image4 ,it is  
8444rather the representation of a      
method whereby a multiplicity      in   
this case five may be represented in an 

image in accordance      with a certain 
concept1 than this image                
itself44440#aaad  ,this becomes more    
evident in the case of large numbers1   
such as a thousand4 ,the thought or     
schema of the number remains just as    
clear and definite as in the case of    
smaller numbers1 but cannot be so       
adequately embodied and surveyed in a   
concrete image4       8,this            
representation of a general procedure of
 imagination in      providing its image
 for a concept1 ,i name the schema to   
this      concept40#aaae  ,but even in  
the simplest cases an image can never be
 completely adequate to the concept4    
,the image of a triangle1 for instance1 
is always some particular triangle1 and 
therefore represents only a part of the 
total connotation4 ,as the schema       
represents a universal rule of          
production in accordance with a concept1
 it resembles the concept in its        
incapacity to subsist in an objective   
form4 ,images become possible only      

through and in accordance with schemata1
 but can never themselves be identified 
with them4 ,schemata1 therefore1 and not
 images--such is the implied            
conclusion--form the true subject-matter
 of the mathematical sciences4 ,images  
are always particular2 schemata are     
always universal4 ,images represent     
existences2 schemata represent methods  
of construction4  ,there are three      
criticisms which must be passed upon    
this position4 ,in the first place1 the 
selection of the triangle as an         
illustration tends to obscure the main  
point of ,kant's argument4 ,as there are
 three very different species of        
triangle1 the concept triangle is a     
class concept in a degree and manner    
which is not to be found in the         
concepts1 say1 of the circle or of the  
number five4 ,so that while ,kant may   
seem to be chiefly insisting upon the   
inadequacy#aaaf of the image to         
represent more than a part of the       
connotation of the corresponding        

concept1 his real intention is to       
emphasise that the schema expresses the 
conceptual rule whereby1 even in images 
that cover the whole connotation1 the   
true meaning of the image can alone be  
determined4  ,secondly1 the above       
definition of the schema as being 8the  
representation of a general procedure of
 imagination in providing an image for a
 concept0 is obviously bound up with    
,kant's view of it as 8a third thing10  
additional to the concept1 and as       
intermediate between it and the         
image4#aaag ,but as we have already     
found occasion to note1 in discussing   
,kant's doctrine of the 8construction0  
of mathematical concepts1#aaah this     
threefold distinction is out of harmony 
with his ,critical principles4 ,it      
results from his retention of the       
traditional view of the concept as in   
all cases a mere concept1 i4e4 an       
abstracted or class concept4 ,in        
defining the schema ,kant is defining   
the true nature of the concept as       

against the false interpretation of it  
in the traditional class-theory2 he     
misrepresents the logic of his own      
standpoint when he interpolates a third 
kind of representation intermediate     
between the concept and the image4 ,the 
concept #8triangle1' as a concept1 is   
7to employ ,kant's own not very         
satisfactory terms7 the representation  
of the method of constructing a certain 
type of object2 and the only other mode 
of representing this kind of object is  
the image4 ,there may1 indeed1 as ,kant 
has himself suggested1 be a species of  
image that may be entitled schematic2   
but if that be identified with a blurred
 or indeterminate or merely symbolic    
form of representation1 it can have     
nothing in common with the              
transcendental or conceptual schema1    
save the name4  ,thirdly1 the entire    
discussion of the nature of the schemata
 of 8sensuous concepts0 and of their    
relation to the sense image1 is out of  
order in this chapter2 and however      

valuable in itself1 bewilders the reader
 who very properly assumes for it a     
relevancy which it does not possess4    
,the pure concepts of the understanding1
 whose schemata ,kant is endeavouring to
 define1 are altogether different in    
nature from sensuous representations1   
and can never be reduced in any form or 
degree to an image4 ,they are wholly    
transcendental1 representing pure       
syntheses unified through categories in 
accordance with the form of inner sense4
 ,this1 however1 brings us to our last  
main point4  7c7 ,kant's manner of      
employing the term category is a typical
 example of his characteristic          
carelessness in the use of his technical
 terms4 ,sometimes it signifies the pure
 forms of understanding4 ,but more      
frequently it stands for what he now1   
for the first time1 entitles schemata1  
namely1 the pure conceptual forms as    
modified through relation to time4 ,to  
take as examples the two chief          
categories of relation4 ,the first      

category of relation1 viewed as a form  
of the pure understanding1 is the merely
 logical conception of that which is    
always a subject and never a predicate4 
,the corresponding schema is the        
conception of that which has permanent  
existence in time2 it is not the logical
 notion of subject1 but the             
transcendental conception of substance4 
,the pure logical conception of ground  
and consequence is similarly            
distinguished from the transcendental   
schema of cause and effect4  ,this      
contrast is of supreme importance in the
 ,critical philosophy1 and ought        
therefore to have been marked by a      
careful distinction of terms4 ,had ,kant
 restricted the term category to denote 
the pure forms1 and invariably employed 
the term schemata to signify their more 
concrete counterparts1 many ambiguities 
and confusions would have been          
prevented4 ,the table of categories1 in 
its distinction from the table of       
logical forms1 would then have been     

named the table of schemata1 and the    
definitions given in this chapter would 
have been appended to it1 as the proper 
supplement to the metaphysical          
deduction1 completing it by a careful   
definition of each separate schema4 ,for
 what ,kant usually means when he speaks
 of the categories are the schemata2 and
 the chapter before us therefore        
contains their delayed definitions4#aaai
 ,as ,kant has constantly been          
insisting1 and as he again so           
emphatically teaches in this chapter1   
the pure forms of understanding1 taken  
in and by themselves1 apart from the    
forms of intuition1 have no relation to 
any object1 and are mere logical        
functions without content or determinate
 meaning4  ,from this point of view the 
misleading influence of ,kant's         
architectonic may again be noted4 ,it   
forces him to preface his argument by   
introductory remarks which run entirely 
counter to the very point which he is   
chiefly concerned to illustrate and     

enforce1 namely1 the inseparability of  
conception and intuition in all         
experience and knowledge4 ,he does1     
indeed1 draw attention to the fact that 
the conditions which serve to realise   
the pure concepts of understanding also 
at the same time restrict them1 but it  
is with their empirical employment that 
he is here chiefly concerned4           
,caird's#aabj mode of expounding ,kant's
 doctrine of schematism may serve as an 
example of the misleading influence of  
,kant's artificial method of introducing
 his argument4 ,as ,caird accepts       
,kant's initial statements at their face
 value1 he is led to read the entire    
chapter in accordance with them1 and so 
to interpret it as being a virtual      
recantation of the assumptions which    
underlie the statement of its problem4  
,the truer view would rather seem to be 
that the introduction is demanded by the
 exigencies of ,kant's architectonic1   
and therefore yields no true account    
either of the essential purpose of the  

chapter or of its actual contents4      
,cohen not unjustly remarks that        
8444recent writers are guilty of a very 
strange misreading of ,kant      when   
they maintain1 as if in opposition to   
him1 a thought to which      his        
doctrine of schematism gives profound   
expression1 namely1 that      intuition 
and conception do not function          
independently1 and that      thought1   
and still more knowledge1 is and must   
always be      intuitive40#aaba  ,cohen 
fails1 however1 to draw attention to the
 cause of the misunderstanding for which
 ,kant must certainly share the blame4  
,riehl1#aabb while adopting a somewhat  
similar view to that here given1 traces 
,kant's misleading mode of stating the  
problem to his holding a false view of  
the universality of the concept4 ,such  
criticism of ,kant1 like that passed by 
,caird1 is in many respects justified1  
but the occasion upon which the         
admonition is made to follow would none 
the less seem to be ill-chosen4  ,it may

 be asked why ,kant in this chapter so  
completely ignores space4 ,no really    
satisfactory answer seems to present    
itself4 ,it is true that time is the one
 universal form of all intuition1 of    
outer as well as of inner experience4   
,it is also true that1 as ,kant         
elsewhere shows1 consciousness of time  
presupposes consciousness of space for  
its own possibility1 and so to that     
extent may be regarded as including the 
latter form of consciousness within     
itself4 ,nevertheless ,kant's           
concentration on the temporal aspect of 
experience is exceedingly arbitrary1 and
 results in certain unfortunate         
consequences4 ,owing to the manner in   
which ,kant envisages his problem#aabc  
he is bound1 indeed1 to lay the greater 
emphasis upon time1 but that need not   
have involved so exclusive a recognition
 of its field and function4 ,possibly   
,kant's very natural preoccupation with 
his new and revolutionary doctrines of  
inner sense and productive imagination  

has something to do with the matter4    
,though the definitions given of the    
various schemata1 especially of those of
 reality and existence1 raise many      
difficulties1 consideration of them must
 be deferred4#aabd ,they can be properly
 discussed only in connection with the  
principles which ,kant bases upon them4 
,only one further point calls for       
present remark4 ,kant does not give a   
schema for each of the categories4 ,in  
the first two groups of pure conceptual 
forms1 those of quantity and of quality1
 he gives a schema only for the third   
category in each case4 ,number is       
strictly not the schema of quantity as  
such1 but of totality4 ,the schema of   
quality is a definition only of         
limitation4#aabe ,this departure from   
the demands of strict architectonic is  
made without comment or explanation of  
any kind4 ,kant delights to insist upon 
the confirmation given to his teaching  
by the fulfilment of architectonic      
requirements2 he is for the most part   

silent when they fail to correspond4    
,this architectonic was a hobby         
sufficiently serious to yield him keen  
pleasure in its elaboration1 but was not
 so vital to his main purposes as to    
call for stronger measures when         
shortcomings occurred4  ,in concluding  
this chapter ,kant draws attention to   
the fact that the sensuous conditions   
which serve to realise the pure concepts
 also at the same time restrict their   
meaning4 ,their wider meaning is1       
however1 of merely logical              
character4#aabf ,their function1 as pure
 concepts1 lies solely in establishing  
unity of representation2 they do not    
therefore suffice to yield knowledge of 
any object4 ,objective application      
8comes to them solely from sensibility40
 ,in these statements ,kant expounds one
 of his fundamental doctrines1 but in a 
manner which does less than justice to  
the independent value of pure thought4  
,as he elsewhere teaches1#aabg it is not
 sense that sets limits to              

understanding2 it is the pure forms of  
thought that enable the mind to         
appreciate the limited and merely       
phenomenal character of the world       
experienced4     ,,chapter ,,ii         
,,system ,,of ,,all ,,principles ,,of   
,,pure ,,understanding   ,the           
introductory remarks to this important  
chapter are again dictated by ,kant's   
architectonic1 and set its actual       
contents in an extremely false light4   
,kant would seem to imply that as the   
,analytic of ,concepts has determined   
all the various conceptual elements     
constitutive of experience1 and has     
proved that they serve as predicates of 
possible judgments1 it now remains to   
show in an ,analytic of ,principles what
 a priori synthetic judgments1 or in    
other words what principles1 can        
actually be based upon them4 ,though    
this is a quite misleading account of   
the relation holding between the two    
books of the ,analytic1 it has been     
accepted by many commentators4#aabh ,for

 several reasons it must be rejected4   
,the pure forms of understanding are not
 predicates for possible judgments4     
,they underlie judgment as a whole1     
expressing the relation through which   
its total contents are organised4 ,thus 
in the proposition 8cinnabar is heavy0  
the category of substance and attribute 
is not in any sense the predicate2 it   
articulates the entire judgment1        
interpreting the experienced contents in
 terms of the dual relation of substance
 and attribute4 ,judgment1 its nature   
and conditions1 is the real problem of  
the misnamed ,analytic of ,concepts4 ,as
 already indicated1#aabi the two main   
divisions of the ,analytic deal with one
 and the same problem4 ,but while doing 
so1 they differ in two respects4 ,in the
 first place1 as above noted1 the       
,analytic of ,concepts supplies no proof
 of the validity of particular          
categories1 but only a quite general    
demonstration that forms of unity1 such 
as are involved in all judgment1 are    

demanded for the possibility of         
apperception4 ,the proofs of the        
indispensableness of specific categories
 are first given in the ,analytic of    
,principles4 ,secondly1 in the ,analytic
 of ,concepts the temporal aspect of    
experience falls somewhat into the      
background1 whereas in the ,analytic of 
,principles it is emphasised4  ,from    
these two fundamental points of         
difference there arises a third         
distinguishing feature4 ,when the       
categories1 or rather schemata1 are     
explicitly defined1 and receive         
individual proof1 they are found to be  
just those principles that are demanded 
for the possibility of the positive     
sciences4 ,this is1 from ,kant's point  
of view1 no mere coincidence4           
,scientific knowledge is possible only  
in so far as experience is grounded on a
 priori conditions2 and the conditions  
of sense-experience are also the        
conditions of its conceptual            
interpretation4 ,but while the ,analytic

 of ,concepts deals almost exclusively  
with ordinary experience1 in the        
,analytic of ,principles the physical   
sciences receive their due share of     
consideration4  ,first and ,second      
,sections4 ,the ,highest ,principles of 
,analytic and ,synthetic                
,judgments4--,these two sections contain
 nothing not already developed earlier  
in the ,critique4 ,though the principle 
of non-contradiction is a merely        
negative test of truth1 it can serve as 
a universal and completely adequate     
criterion in the case of all judgments  
that are analytic of given concepts4    
,the principle of synthetic judgments1  
on the other hand1 is the principle     
whereby we are enabled to advance beyond
 a given concept so as to attach a      
predicate which does not stand to it in 
the relation either of identity or of   
contradiction4 ,this principle is the   
principle of the possibility of         
experience4 ,though a priori synthetic  
judgments cannot be logically           

demonstrated as following from higher   
and more universal propositions1#aacj   
they are capable of a transcendental    
proof1 that is1 as being conditions of  
sense-experience4       8,the           
possibility of experience is what gives 
objective reality to      all our a     
priori knowledge40#aaca 8,although we   
know a priori      in synthetic         
judgments a great deal regarding space  
in general and      the figures which   
productive imagination describes in it1 
and can      obtain such judgments      
without actually requiring any          
experience2      yet even this knowledge
 would be nothing but a playing with a  
mere      figment of the brain1 were it 
not that space has to be regarded as    
a condition of the appearances which    
constitute the material for      outer  
experience44440#aacb  ,in the first part
 of the last sentence1 as in the page   
which precedes it1 ,kant would seem to  
be inculcating his doctrine of a pure a 
priori manifold1 but the latter part of 

the statement would not be affected by  
the admission that space is not an      
independent intuition but only the form 
of outer sense4  ,third ,section4       
,systematic ,representation of all the  
,synthetic ,principles of               
,understanding4--,kant is not concerned 
in this section with the fundamental    
propositions of mathematical science1   
since1 on his view1 they rest upon the  
evidence of intuition4 ,he claims1      
however1 that their objective validity  
depends upon two principles1 which1     
though not themselves mathematical in   
the strict sense1 may conveniently be so
 described from the transcendental      
standpoint--the principle of the 8axioms
 of intuition10 and the principle of the
 8anticipations of experience40 ,the    
physicist1 who takes the legitimacy of  
applied mathematics for granted1 has no 
occasion to formulate these principles4 
,that he none the less presupposes them 
is shown1 however1 by his unquestioning 
assumption that nature conforms to the  

strict requirements of pure mathematics4
 ,and since the principles involve pure 
concepts1 the one embodying the schema  
of number1 and the other the schema of  
quality1 they fall outside the scope of 
the ,transcendental ,aesthetic1 and call
 for a deduction similar to that of the 
other categories4  ,as already          
indicated1 ,kant's procedure is         
extremely arbitrary1 and is due to the  
perverting influence of his             
architectonic4 ,proof of the validity of
 applied mathematics has already been   
given in the ,aesthetic#aacc of the     
first edition--a proof which is further 
developed in the ,prolegomena1#aacd and 
recast in the second edition so as to   
constitute a separate 8transcendental   
exposition40#aace ,as ,kant teaches in  
these passages1 the objective validity  
of applied mathematics rests upon proof 
that space and time are the a priori    
forms of outer and inner sense4 ,the new
 deductions of the schemata of number   
and quality1 which he now proceeds to   

formulate1 are quite unnecessary1 and   
also are by no means conclusive in the  
manner of their proof4 ,this1 however1  
is more than compensated by the         
extremely valuable proofs of the        
schematised categories of relation which
 he gives in the section on the         
,analogies of ,experience4 ,the section 
on the ,postulates of ,empirical        
,experience1 which deals with the       
principles of modality1 also contains   
matter of very real importance4  ,the   
principles with which this chapter has  
to deal can thus be arranged according  
to the fourfold division of the table of
 categories3 7#a7 ,axioms of ,intuition1
 7#b7 ,anticipations of ,perception1    
7#c7 ,analogies of ,experience1 7#d7    
,postulates of ,empirical ,thought4 ,and
 following the distinction already drawn
 in the ,analytic of ,concepts1#aacf    
,kant distinguishes between the ,axioms 
and ,anticipations on the one hand1 and 
the ,analogies and ,postulates on the   
other4 ,the former determine the        

conditions of intuition in space and    
time1 and may therefore be called       
mathematical and constitutive4 ,they    
express what is necessarily involved in 
every intuition as such4 ,the latter are
 dynamical4 ,they are principles        
according to which we must think the    
existence of an object as determined in 
its relation to others4 ,while1         
therefore1 the first set of principles  
can be intuitively verified1 the second 
set have only an indirect relation to   
the objects experienced4 ,whereas a     
relation of causality can never be      
intuited as holding between two events1 
but only thought into them1 spatial and 
temporal relations are direct objects of
 the mind4 ,similarly1 the relation of  
substance and attribute cannot be       
intuited2 it can only be thought into   
what is intuited4 ,the mathematical     
principles thus acquire an immediate    
7though1 be it remembered1 merely de    
facto7 evidence2 the a priori certainty1
 equally complete1 of the dynamical     

principles can be verified only through 
the circuitous channel of transcendental
 proof4  ,the composite constitution of 
these sections finds striking           
illustration in the duplicated account  
of this distinction which precedes and  
follows the table of principles4 ,the   
two accounts can hardly have been       
written in immediate succession to one  
another4 ,the earlier in location#aacg  
is probably the later in date4 ,it would
 seem to rest upon some such uncritical 
distinction as that drawn in the        
,prolegomena between judgments of       
perception and judgments of             
experience4#aach ,the second and briefer
 account#aaci is not open to this       
objection4  ,in ,a #agh-hj  ,b #bbj-c   
,kant develops a further point of       
difference between the mathematical and 
the dynamical principles1 or rather     
explains what he means by his all too   
brief and consequently ambiguous        
reference in the first of the above     
accounts to 8existence0 7,dasein74 ,the 

mathematical principles are             
constitutive2 the dynamical are         
regulative4 ,that is to say1 the        
mathematical principles lay down the    
conditions for the generation or        
construction of appearances4 ,the       
dynamical only specify rules whereby we 
can define the relation in which        
existences contingently given are       
connected4 ,as existence can never be   
constructed a priori1 we are limited to 
the determination of the interrelations 
between existences all of which must be 
given4 ,thus the principle of causality 
enables us to predict a priori that for 
every event there must exist some       
antecedent cause2 but only through      
empirical investigation can we determine
 which of the particular given          
antecedents may be so described4 ,that  
is to say1 the principle defines        
conditions to which experience must     
conform1 but does not enable us to      
construct it in advance4 ,this          
distinction is inspired by the contrast 

between mathematical and physical       
science1 and is valuable as defining the
 empirically regulative function of the 
a priori dynamical principles2 but its  
somewhat forced character#aadj becomes  
apparent when we bear in mind ,kant's   
previous distinction between the        
principles of pure mathematical science 
and the transcendental principles which 
justify their application to experience4
 ,those latter principles concern       
existence as apprehended through        
schematised categories1 and are         
consequently1 as regards certainty and  
method of proof1 in exactly the same    
position as the dynamical principles4   
,this is sufficiently evident from his  
own illustration of sunlight4#aada      
,there is as little possibility of      
8constructing0 its intensity as of      
determining a priori the cause of an    
effect4   ,i4 ,,the ,,axioms ,,of       
,,intuition  ,all appearances are in    
their intuition extensive magnitudes4   
,or as in the second edition3 ,all      

intuitions are extensive magnitudes4    
#8,extensive' is here used in a very    
wide sense to include temporal as well  
as spatial magnitude4 ,kant bases this  
principle upon the schema of number1 and
 the proof which he propounds in its    
support is therefore designed to show   
that apprehension of an object of       
perception1 whether spatial or temporal1
 is only possible in so far as we bring 
that schema into play4 ,but though this 
is the professed purpose of the         
argument1 number is itself never even   
mentioned2 and the reason for the       
omission is doubtless ,kant's           
consciousness of the obvious objections 
to any such position4 ,that aspect of   
the argument is therefore1 no doubt     
without explicit intention1 kept in the 
background4 ,but even as thus given1 the
 argument must have left ,kant with some
 feeling of dissatisfaction4 ,loyalty to
 his architectonic scheme prevents such 
doubt and disquietude from finding      
further expression4  ,the argument1 in  

its first-edition statement1 starts from
 the formulation of a view of space and 
time directly opposed to that of the    
,aesthetic3#aadb       8,i entitle a    
magnitude extensive when the            
representation of the      parts makes  
possible1 and therefore necessarily     
precedes1 the      representation of the
 whole4 ,i cannot represent to myself a 
line1      however small1 without       
drawing it in thought1 i4e4 generating  
from a point all its parts one after    
another1 and thus for the      first    
time recording this intuition40         
,similarly with even the smallest time4 
,and as all appearances are intuited in 
space or time1 every appearance1 so far 
as intuited1 is an extensive magnitude1 
that is to say1 can be apprehended only 
through successive generation of its    
parts4 ,all appearances are 8aggregates1
 i4e4 manifolds of antecedently given   
parts40  ,this definition of extensive  
magnitude involves an assumption which  
,kant also employs elsewhere in the     

,critique1#aadc but which he nowhere    
attempts to establish by argument2      
namely1 that it is impossible to        
apprehend a manifold save in succession4
 ,this assumption is1 of course1        
entirely false 7at least as applied to  
our empirical consciousness71 as has    
since been amply demonstrated by        
experimental investigation4 ,kant       
adopted it in the earlier subjectivist  
stage of his teaching1 before he had    
come to recognise that consciousness of 
space is involved in consciousness of   
time4 ,but even after he had done so1   
the earlier view still tended to gain   
the upper hand whenever the doctrines of
 inner sense and of productive          
imagination were under consideration4   
,for in regard to the transcendental    
activities of productive imagination1   
which are essentially synthetic1 ,kant  
continued to treat time as more         
fundamental than space4 ,but1 as already
 noted1#aadd a directly opposite view of
 the interrelations of space and time is

 expounded in passages added in the     
second edition4  ,the two central       
paragraphs are very externally connected
 with the main argument1 and are        
probably later interpolations4#aade ,in 
the first of these two paragraphs ,kant 
ascribes the synthetic activity involved
 in the 8generation of figures0 to the  
productive imagination1 and maintains   
that geometry is rendered possible by   
this faculty4 ,in the other paragraph   
,kant deals with arithmetic1 but makes  
no reference to the productive          
imagination4 ,its argument is limited to
 the contention that propositions       
expressive of numerical relation1 though
 synthetic1 are not universal4 ,they are
 not axioms1 but numerical formulae4    
,this distinction has no very obvious   
bearing on the present argument1 and    
serves only to indicate ,kant's         
recognition that no rigid parallelism   
can be established between geometry and 
arithmetic4 ,there are1 it would seem1  
no arithmetical axioms corresponding to 

the axioms of ,euclid4#aadf  ,the       
concluding paragraph is a restatement of
 the argument of the ,aesthetic and of  
#ac1 ,note i4 of the ,prolegomena4      
,appearances are not things in          
themselves4 ,they are conditioned by the
 pure intuitional forms1 and are        
therefore subject to pure mathematics   
8in all its precision40 ,were we        
compelled to regard the objects of the  
senses as things in themselves1 an      
applied science of geometry 7again      
taken1 in ,kant's habitual manner1 as   
typically representing the mathematical 
disciplines7 would not be possible4 ,the
 only new element in the argument is the
 reference to synthesis as presupposed  
in all apprehension4  ,the additional   
proof with which in the second edition  
,kant prefaces the entire argument calls
 for no special comment4 ,it may1       
however1 be noted that though in the    
argument of the first edition the need  
of synthesis in all apprehension is     
clearly taught1 the term synthesis is   

not itself employed except in the       
central and final paragraphs4 ,in the   
proof given in the second edition both  
the term and what it stands for are     
allowed due prominence4   #b4 ,,the     
,,anticipations ,,of ,,perception  ,in  
all appearances sensation and the real  
which corresponds to it in the object   
7realitas phaenomenon7 has an intensive 
magnitude or degree4 ,or as in the      
second edition3 ,in all appearances the 
real1 which is an object of sensation1  
has intensive magnitude or degree4  ,we 
may first analyse the total section4    
,the first paragraph#aadg explains the  
term anticipation4 ,the second and third
 paragraphs give a first proof of the   
principle4 ,paragraphs four to ten treat
 of continuity in space1 time and       
change1 and of the impossibility of     
empty space1 and also afford ,kant the  
opportunity to develop his dynamical    
theory of matter1 and so to indicate the
 contribution which transcendental      
philosophy is able to make towards a    

more adequate understanding of the      
principles of physical science4 ,the    
eleventh and twelfth paragraphs1        
evidently later interpolations1 give a  
second proof of the principle which in  
one important respect varies from the   
first proof4 ,in the second edition a   
third proof akin to this second proof1  
but carrying it a stage further1 is     
added in the form of a new first        
paragraph4  ,kant's reason for changing 
the formulation of the principle in the 
second edition is evidently the         
unsatisfactoriness of the phrase        
8sensation and the real40#aadh ,the     
principle1 properly interpreted1 applies
 not1 as the first edition title and    
also the second proof would lead us to  
expect1 to sensation itself1 but to its 
object1 realitas phaenomenon4 ,it is    
phenomenalist in its teaching4 ,the     
emphatic term 8anticipation0 is adopted 
by ,kant to mark that in this principle 
we are able in a priori fashion to      
determine something in regard to what in

 itself is purely empirical4 ,sensation 
as such1 being the matter of experience1
 can never be known a priori4 ,its      
quality1 as being a colour or a taste1  
depends upon factors which are for us1  
owing to the limitations of our         
knowledge1 wholly contingent4 ,none the 
less in one particular respect we can   
predetermine the object of all          
sensation1 and so can anticipate        
experience1 even in its material aspect4
  ,the first proof is as follows4       
,apprehension1 so far as it takes place 
through a sensation1 occupies only a    
single moment2 it does not involve any  
successive synthesis proceeding from    
parts to the complete representation4   
,that which is apprehended cannot1      
therefore1 possess extensive magnitude4 
,but1 as already stated in the chapter  
on ,schematism1 reality is that in      
appearance which corresponds to a       
sensation4 ,it is realitas phaenomenon4 
,the absence of it is negation  #j4 ,now
 every sensation is capable of          

diminution2 between reality in the      
appearance and negation there is a      
continuous series of many possible      
intermediate sensations1 the difference 
between any two of which is always      
smaller than the difference between the 
given sensation and zero4 ,that is to   
say1 the real in appearance has         
intensive magnitude or degree4 ,the     
argument is from capability of variation
 in the intensity of sensation to       
existence of degree in its object or    
cause4 ,for the most part this reality  
is spoken of as that which is           
apprehended in sensation1 but ,kant adds
 that if it be       8444viewed as cause
 either of sensation or of other reality
 in      appearance1 such as change1 the
 degree of its reality 444 is then      
entitled a moment1 as for instance the  
moment of gravity40  ,the obscurity of  
what in itself is a very simple and     
direct argument would seem to be        
traceable to the lack of clearness in   
,kant's own mind as to what is to be    

signified by reality4 ,the implied      
distinction between sensation and its   
object has not been clearly formulated4 
,definitions have1 indeed1 been given of
 reality in the chapter on              
,schematism2#aadi but they are extremely
 difficult to decipher4 ,kant never     
varies from the assertion that reality  
is 8that which corresponds to sensation 
in general40 ,our difficulty is with the
 additional qualifications4 ,this       
reality1 he further declares1 is        
8444that1 the concept of which in itself
 points to an existence      ,sein in   
time40#aaej  ,the words #8in time' would
 seem to show that what is referred to  
is reality in the realm of appearance1  
the realitas phaenomenon of the         
,anticipations4 ,but immediately below  
we find the following sentence3         
8,as time is only the form of intuition1
 and consequently of objects      as    
appearances1 what corresponds in them to
 sensation is the      transcendental   
matter of all objects as things in      

themselves1      thinghood ,sachheit1   
reality40#aaea  ,the teaching of the    
first sentence is phenomenalist2 that of
 the other is subjectivist4  ,now in the
 section on ,anticipations of           
,perception the phenomenalist tendencies
 of ,kant's thought are decidedly the   
more prominent4 ,the implied distinction
 is threefold1 between sensation as     
subjective state possessing intensive   
magnitude1 spatial realities that       
possess both intensive and extensive    
magnitude1 and the thing in itself4     
,objects as appearances are regarded as 
causes of sensation and as producing    
changes in one another4  ,the           
explanation of the phenomenalist        
character of this section is not far to 
seek4 ,kant's chief purpose in it1 as we
 shall find1 is to develop the dynamical
 theory of matter to which he had long  
held1 and which1 as he was convinced1   
would ultimately be substituted for the 
mechanistic view to which almost all    
physicists then adhered4 ,we can easily 

understand how in this endeavour the    
realist tendencies of his thinking      
should at once come to the surface1 and 
why he should have been constrained to  
develop a position more precise and less
 ambiguous than that expressed in the   
definitions of reality and degree given 
in the chapter on ,schematism4 ,with    
these preliminary explanations we may   
pass to ,kant's second proof of his     
principle4  ,a link of connection       
between the two proofs may be found in  
the reason which ,kant in the first     
proof gives for his assertion that      
sensation cannot possess extensive      
magnitude--the reason1 namely1 that as  
its apprehension takes place in a single
 moment1 it involves no element of      
synthesis4 ,in his second proof ,kant   
modifies this contention1 and maintains 
that we can abstract from the extensive 
magnitude of the appearance1 and yet can
 recognise a synthesis as being         
involved4       8,the real which        
corresponds to sensations in general1 as

 opposed to      negation  #j1          
represents only something the very      
conception of      which contains an    
existence ein ,sein1 and signifies      
nothing but      the synthesis in an    
empirical consciousness in              
general40#aaeb  ,kant adds that in a    
single moment we can represent to       
ourselves as involved in the bare       
sensation       8444a synthesis of the  
uniform progression from zero to the    
given      empirical consciousness40    
,these statements are far from clear2   
but it is hardly necessary to criticise 
them in detail4 ,since ,kant is         
endeavouring to prove that a schema1    
that of reality or limitation1 is       
involved in the apprehension of         
sensation1 he is bound in consistency to
 maintain1 in accordance with the       
teaching of his deduction of the        
categories1 that the application of the 
schema demands some species of          
synthesis4  ,the third proof1 added in  
the second edition1#aaec is somewhat    

more explicit1 and represents a further 
and last stage in ,kant's vain endeavour
 to harmonise the teaching of this      
section with his general principles4 ,in
 the empirical consciousness of         
sensation there is       8444a synthesis
 of the different quantities involved in
 the      generation of a sensation from
 its beginning in pure intuition  #j    
to its particular required magnitude40  
,or again1 apprehension of magnitude is 
apprehension       8444in which the     
empirical consciousness can in a certain
 time      increase from zero up to its 
given measure40  ,here1 again1 what     
,kant asserts as occurring in our       
awareness of sensation calls for much   
more rigorous demonstration4 ,like the  
argument of the second proof1 it is not 
independently established2 it is a mere 
corollary to the general principles of  
his deduction of the categories4  ,thus 
,kant's thesis1 that the apprehension of
 sense qualities as intensive magnitudes
 presupposes a synthesis according to an

 a priori schema1 is both obscure in    
statement1 and unconvincing in argument2
 and some of the assertions made1       
especially in reference to the          
occurrence of synthesis1 would seem to  
be hardly less arbitrary than the       
connection which ,kant professes to     
trace between logical 8quality10 as     
affirmation or negation1 and the        
dynamical intensity of sensuous         
qualities4 ,for1 as already             
indicated1#aaed logical 8quality0 and   
intensive magnitude have nothing in     
common save the name4  ,kant next       
proceeds to a discussion of the general 
problem of continuity4 ,the connection  
is somewhat forced4 ,but if we overlook 
the artificial ordering of the argument 
and are content to regard what is given 
as in the nature of parenthetical       
comment1 we find in the middle paragraph
 of this section an excellent statement 
of his view of the nature of continuity 
and a very clear statement of his       
dynamical theory of matter4  ,kant      

develops the conception of continuity   
7a7 in reference to space and time1 and 
7b7 in its application to the intensity 
of sensations and of their causes4  7a7 
,kant's own words require no comment3   
8,space and time are quanta continua    
because no part of them can      be     
given1 save as enclosed between limits  
7points or moments71 and      therefore 
as being itself a space or a time4      
,space therefore      consists only of  
spaces1 time only of times4 ,points and 
moments are      only limits1 i4e4 mere 
positions that limit space and time4    
,but      positions always presuppose   
the intuitions which they limit or are  
intended to limit2 and out of mere      
positions1 viewed as      constituents  
capable of being given prior to space   
and time1      neither space nor time   
can be constructed4 ,such magnitudes may
 also      be called flowing1 since the 
synthesis of productive imagination     
involved in their production is a       
progression in time1 and the            

continuity of time is ordinarily denoted
 by the expression      flowing40#aaee  
7b7 ,when ,kant proceeds to apply the   
principle of continuity to intensive    
magnitude1 his conclusion rests upon a  
somewhat different basis4 ,he argues    
that appearances must be continuous     
owing to the fact that they are         
apprehended in space and time4#aaef ,so 
far as they are extended in space and   
enduring in time that may perhaps be    
true2 but ,kant's assertion has a wider 
sweep4 ,it implies that sensations and  
the physical conditions of sensation1 as
 for instance the sensation of red or   
the force of gravity1 are capable of    
existing in every possible degree       
between zero and any given intensity4   
,this affords the key to his method of  
formulating his second and third proofs 
of the principle of ,anticipations of   
,perception1 which1 in the form in which
 he interprets it1 contains this further
 implication of continuity4 ,these      
proofs are inspired by the desire to    

make all apprehension1 even that of     
simple sensation1 a temporal process1   
and by that indirect means to establish 
for sensuous intensity and its objective
 conditions a continuity similar to that
 of space and time4 ,the proof is1      
however1 as we have seen1 inconclusive4 
,this application of continuity must be 
regarded as more in the nature of a mere
 hypothesis than ,kant is willing to    
recognise4 ,as regards sensations1 it   
would seem to have been positively      
disproved by the results of experimental
 psychology4  ,from his supposed proof  
of the continuity of all intensive      
magnitudes ,kant draws two further      
conclusions3 first1 that experience can 
never be made to yield proof of the void
 in either space or time4 ,for if all   
reality can exist in innumerable        
degrees1 and if each sense has a        
determinate degree of receptivity1 the  
complete absence of reality can never be
 itself experienced4 ,inference to such 
absence is also impossible for a second 

reason1 namely1 that one and the same   
extensive magnitude may be completely   
occupied by an infinite number of       
different intensive degrees1            
indefinitely approximating to1 and yet  
also indefinitely differing from1 zero4 
,kant is here referring to the dynamical
 theory of matter which he had long     
held1#aaeg and which he expounds in     
opposition to the current mechanistic   
view4#aaeh ,the mechanistic theory      
rests1 he contends1 upon an assumption  
purely metaphysical and therefore wholly
 dogmatic1 that the real in space has no
 internal differences1 but is uniform   
like the empty space in which it        
exists4#aaei ,in accordance with this   
assumption physicists infer that all    
qualitative differences in our          
sensations must be due to merely        
quantitative differences in their       
material causes1 and ultimately to      
differences in the number and           
distribution of the constituent parts of
 material bodies4 ,if two bodies of the 

same volume differ in weight or in      
inertia1 the variation must be traced to
 differences in the amount of matter1   
or1 otherwise stated1 to differences in 
the amount of unoccupied space1 in the  
two bodies4 ,to this view ,kant opposes 
his own hypothesis--for it is in this   
more modest form that it is presented in
 these paragraphs--namely1 that matter  
occupies space by intensity and not by  
mere bulk1 and that it may therefore be 
diminished indefinitely in degree       
without for that reason ceasing         
completely to fill the same extensive   
area4 ,thus an expanded force such as   
heat1 filling space without leaving the 
smallest part of it empty1 may be       
indefinitely diminished in degree1 and  
yet may still with these lesser degrees 
continue to occupy that space as        
completely as before4 ,this may not1    
,kant admits1 be the true explanation of
 physical differences1 but it at least  
has the merit of freeing the            
understanding from metaphysical         

preconceptions1 and of demonstrating the
 possibility of an alternative to the   
current view4 ,if matter has intensity  
as well as extensity1 and so can vary in
 quality as well as in quantity1        
physical science may perhaps be         
fruitfully developed on dynamical lines4
   #c4 ,,the ,,analogies ,,of           
,,experience  ,the principle of the     
,analogies is3 ,experience is possible  
only through the representation of a    
necessary connection of                 
perceptions4#aafj  ,kant introduces the 
three analogies with the statement of an
 underlying principle1 which corresponds
 to the central thesis of the           
transcendental deduction4 ,in the second
 edition this general principle is      
reformulated1 and a new proof is added4 
,these alterations do not seem1 however1
 to be of any special significance4 ,the
 two proofs repeat the main argument of 
the transcendental deduction1 but with  
special emphasis upon the temporal      
aspect of experience4 ,the categories of

 relation1 as schematised1 yield the    
,analogies1 which acquire objective     
validity in so far as they render       
experience possible4 ,the first proof   
7given in the second paragraph of the   
first edition7 maintains that they are  
indispensable for apperception1 and the 
second proof 7that of the second        
edition7 that they are indispensable for
 knowledge of objects4 ,the references  
to time in the second proof are too     
condensed to be intelligible save in the
 light of the more explicit arguments   
given in support of the three           
,analogies4  ,the first paragraph in the
 first edition must be a later          
interpolation1 as its assertion that    
simultaneity is a mode of time conflicts
 with the proof given of the first      
,analogy1 but agrees with what must be  
regarded as a later interpolated passage
 introductory to that proof4#aafa ,this 
paragraph is also peculiar in another   
respect4 ,hitherto ,kant has traced the 
existence of the three analogies to the 

three categories of relation1 each of   
which conditions a separate schema4 ,but
 in this paragraph he bases their       
threefold form on the fact that time has
 three modes1 duration1 sequence1#aafb  
and coexistence1 and that there is      
therefore a threefold problem3 first1   
what is involved in consciousness of    
duration2 secondly1 what is involved in 
consciousness of succession2 and        
thirdly1 what is involved in            
consciousness of coexistence4 ,this is  
not1 however1 a satisfactory mode of    
stating the matter1 for it might seem to
 imply that the three aspects of time   
can be separately apprehended1 and that 
each has its own independent conditions4
 ,what ,kant really proves is that all  
three involve one another4 ,we can only 
be conscious of duration in contrast to 
succession1 and of succession in        
contrast to the permanent1 while both   
involve consciousness of coexistence4   
,the three analogies thus treat of three
 aspects of the same problem1 the first 

connecting with the category of         
substance1 the second with that of      
causality1 and the third with that of   
reciprocity4  ,the only point that calls
 for further comment#aafc concerns      
,kant's adoption of the term ,analogy as
 a title for the three principles of    
8relation40 ,the term is employed in    
contra-distinction to constitutive      
principle or axiom2 and ,kant points out
 that this usage of the term must be    
carefully distinguished from the other  
or mathematical4 8,in philosophy analogy
 is not the likeness of two quantitative
 but of two qualitative relations40 ,in 
mathematical analogy a fourth term can  
be discovered from three given terms2   
but in an #8analogy of experience' we   
possess a rule that suffices only for   
the determination of the relation to a  
term not given1 never for knowledge of  
this term itself4 ,thus if we are       
informed that #ae is to x as #e is to   
#aj1 the value of x can be determined as
 #cj4 ,but if it be stated that a given 

event stands to an antecedent event as  
effect to cause1 only the relation      
holding between the events can be       
specified1 not the actual cause itself4 
,the principle of causality thus serves 
only as a regulative principle1         
directing us to search for the cause of 
an event among its antecedents4  ,riehl 
has suggested a very different          
explanation of the term1 namely1 as     
signifying that the categories of       
relation are employed only on the       
analogy of the corresponding1 pure      
logical forms4       8,in so far as ,i  
know matter in terms of its empirical   
properties as      the substance of     
outer experiences1 ,i do not gain       
knowledge of the      nature of matter  
but only of its relation to my thinking4
 ,in all      judgments upon outer      
things ,i employ matter as the subject4 
,that      knowledge is therefore       
nothing but an analogy to the conceptual
      relation of a subject to its      
predicates4 ,matter is related to its   

properties and effects in the realm of  
appearance as the subject of      a     
categorical judgment is related to its  
predicates4 ,in so far as      an       
antecedent is entitled the cause of an  
event1 we do not gain      knowledge of 
its nature but only of the analogy of   
the relation of      cause and effect   
with that of antecedent and consequent  
in a      hypothetical proposition2 the 
connection of the changes is            
analogous to the conceptual relation of 
ground and consequence2 the             
principle of the sufficient ground of   
changes is an analogy of                
experience40#aafd  ,this explanation may
 at first sight seem to be supported by 
,kant's own statement in the concluding 
paragraph of the section before us4     
8,through these principles we are       
justified in combining appearances      
only according to an analogy with the   
logical and general unity of            
concepts 4440#aafe  ,this assertion is1 
however1 incidental to ,kant's          

explanation that the analogies are not  
principles of 8transcendental0 7i4e4    
transcendent71 but only of empirical    
application--an explanation itself in   
turn occasioned by his desire to connect
 his present argument with the chapter  
on ,schematism4 ,this interpretation of 
the term analogy is probably1 therefore1
 of the nature of an afterthought4      
,having adopted the term on the grounds 
above stated in ,a #agi-hj  ,b #bbb1 he 
finds in it an opportunity to reinforce 
his previous assertion of the           
restricting character of the time       
condition through which categories are  
transformed into schemata4 ,the entire  
paragraph is probably1 as ,adickes      
remarks1 a later interpolation4 ,but    
there are further reasons why we cannot 
accept this passage as representing the 
real origin of the term analogy4 ,it    
would involve adoption of the           
subjectivist standpoint from which      
,riehl1 despite his otherwise realistic 
reading of ,kant1 interprets ,kant's    

phenomenalist doctrines4 ,for it implies
 that it is only in the noumenal1 and   
not also in the phenomenal sphere1 that 
substantial existences and genuinely    
dynamical activities are to be          
found4#aaff ,it would also seem to      
imply1 what is by no means ,kant's      
invariable position1 the absolute       
validity of the logical forms4 ,and     
lastly1 it would involve the priority of
 the logical to the real use of the     
categories1 a violation of ,critical    
principles of which ,kant is himself    
occasionally guilty1 but never1 as it   
would seem1 in this exaggerated form4   
,a4 ,first ,analogy4--,all appearances  
contain the permanent 7substance7 as the
 object itself1 and the changeable as   
its mere determination1 i4e4 as a mode  
in which the object exists4 ,or as in   
the second edition3 ,in all change of   
appearances substance is permanent2 its 
quantum in ,nature neither increases nor
 diminishes4  ,the second paragraph#aafg
 is of composite character4 ,its first  

part 7consisting of the first three     
sentences7 and its second part give     
separate proofs1 involving assertions   
directly contradictory of one another4  
,the one asserts change and simultaneity
 to be modes of time2 the other denies  
this4 ,they cannot1 therefore1 be of the
 same date4 ,the first would seem to be 
the later2 it connects with the first   
paragraph of the preceding section4  ,in
 the first edition the principle is     
defined as expressing the schema of the 
dual category of substance and          
attribute4 ,in the second edition it is 
reformulated in much less satisfactory  
form1 as being the scientific principle 
of the conservation 7i4e4               
indestructibility7 of matter4 ,this     
second formulation emphasises the weaker
 side of the argument of the first      
edition1 and is largely due to the      
perverting influence of ,kant's method  
of distinguishing between the ,analytic 
of ,concepts and the ,analytic of       
,judgments4 ,it reveals ,kant's growing 

tendency to contrast the two divisions  
of the ,analytic1 as dealing1 the one   
with ordinary experience1 and the other 
with its scientific reorganisation4#aafh
  ,the first proof in the first edition 
gives explicit expression to a          
presupposition underlying this entire   
section1 namely1 that all apprehension  
is necessarily successive1 or in other  
words that it is impossible to apprehend
 a manifold save in succession4#aafi    
,from this assumption it follows that if
 such succession is not only to occur   
but is to be apprehended as occurring1  
and if we are to be able to distinguish 
between the successive order of all our 
apprehensions and the order of          
coexisting independent existences1 a    
permanent must be thought into the      
succession1 that is to say1 the         
successive experiences must be          
interpreted into an objective order in  
terms of the category of abiding        
substance and changing attributes4 ,kant
 neither here nor elsewhere makes any   

attempt to explain how this position is 
to be reconciled with his doctrine that 
space can be intuited as well as time2  
and there is equal difficulty in        
reconciling it with the doctrine        
developed in his second proof 7in the   
second division of this same paragraph7 
that time itself does not change but    
only the appearances in it4  ,as above  
shown1#aagj there are two tendencies in 
,kant's treatment of time1 each of which
 carries with it its own set of         
connected consequences4 ,there is the   
view that consciousness of time as a    
whole preconditions consciousness of any
 part of it4 ,this tends to recognition 
of simultaneity as a mode of time and of
 the simultaneous as apprehended in a   
single non-successive act of            
apprehension4 ,on the other hand1 there 
is the counter-view that consciousness  
of time is only possible through the    
successive combination of its parts4    
,this leads to the assertion that       
simultaneity is not a mode of time1 and 

that time itself cannot be apprehended  
save as the result of synthesis in      
accordance with unifying categories4    
,through the categories there arises    
consciousness of objectivity1 and so for
 the first time consciousness of a      
distinction between the subjective which
 exists invariably and exclusively in   
succession1 and the objective which may 
exist either as successive or as        
permanent1 and in whose existence both  
elements are1 indeed1 inseparably       
involved4  ,to turn now to ,kant's      
second#aaga proof of the principle2#aagb
 it is as follows4 ,all our perceptions 
are in time1 and in time are represented
 as either coexistent or successive4    
,time itself cannot change1#aagc for    
only as in it can change be represented4
 ,time1 however1 cannot by itself be    
apprehended4 ,as such1 it is the mere   
empty form of our perceptions4 ,there   
must be found in the objects of         
perception some abiding substrate or    
substance which will represent the      

permanence of time in consciousness1 and
 through relation to which coexistence  
and succession of events may be         
perceived4 ,and since only in relation  
to this substrate can time relations be 
apprehended1 it must be altogether      
unchangeable1 and may therefore#aagd be 
called substance4 ,and being            
unchangeable it can neither increase nor
 diminish in quantity4 ,kant1 without   
further argument1 at once identifies    
this substance with matter4  ,this proof
 may be restated in briefer             
fashion4#aage ,the consciousness of     
events in time involves the dating of   
them in time4 ,but that is only possible
 in so far as we have a representation  
of the time in which they are to be     
dated4 ,time1 however1 not being by     
itself experienced1 must be represented 
in consciousness by an abiding substrate
 in which all change takes place1 and   
since1 as the substrate of all change1  
it will necessarily be unchangeable1 it 
may be called substance4  ,the argument1

 in both proofs1 is needlessly abstract1
 and as already remarked1#aagf the      
reason of this abstractness is that     
,kant here1 as in the chapter on        
,schematism1 unduly ignores space1      
limiting his analysis to inner sense4   
,he defines the schema of substance as  
the permanence of the real in time1 i4e4
 as the representation of the real which
 persists while all else changes4 ,as   
the second edition of the ,critique     
shows1#aagg ,kant himself came to       
recognise the inadequacy of this        
definition1 and therefore of the proof  
of the first ,analogy4 ,consciousness is
 only possible through the              
representation of objects in space4     
,only in outer sense is a permanent     
given in contrast to which change may be
 perceived4 ,the proof ought therefore  
to have proceeded in the following      
manner4 ,time can be conceived only as  
motion1 and motion is perceivable only  
against a permanent background in space4
 ,consciousness of time therefore       

involves consciousness of a permanent in
 space4 ,he might have added that       
consciousness of relative time involves 
consciousness of change in relation to  
something relatively permanent1 and that
 the scientific conception of all       
changes as taking place in a single     
absolute time involves the determining  
of change through relation to something 
absolutely permanent1 this ultimate     
standard being found in the heavenly    
bodies4 ,by the permanent is not meant  
the immovable1 but only that which is   
uniform and unchanging in its motions4  
,the uniform motions of the heavenly    
bodies constitute our ultimate standard 
of time4 ,the degree of their uniformity
 is the measure of our approximation to 
an absolute standard4 ,a marginal note  
upon this ,analogy in ,kant's private   
copy of the ,critique reveals ,kant's   
late awakened recognition of the        
necessity of this mode of restating the 
argument4       8,here the proof must be
 so developed as to apply only to       

substances      as phenomena of outer   
sense1 and must therefore be drawn from 
space1 which with its determinations    
exists at all times4 ,in space      all 
change is motion44440#aagh  ,that the   
new argument of the second edition still
 proceeds on the same lines as the      
second argument of the first edition is 
probably due1 as ,erdmann remarks1#aagi 
to ,kant's unwillingness to make the    
extensive alterations which would have  
been called for in the chapter on       
,schematism as well as in the statement 
of this ,analogy4  ,a second serious    
objection to ,kant's treatment of the   
first ,analogy follows at once from the 
above4 ,kant identifies the permanent   
which represents time in consciousness  
with matter1 and seeks to prove by means
 of this identification the principle of
 the conservation of matter4#aahj ,that 
principle is not really capable of      
transcendental proof4 ,it is not a      
presupposition of possible experience1  
but merely a generalisation empirically 

grounded4 ,kant is here confounding a   
particular theory as to the manner in   
which the element of permanence1        
necessary to possible experience1 is    
realised1 with the much more general    
conclusion which alone can be           
established by transcendental methods4  
,his argument also conflicts with his   
own repeated assertion that the notion  
of change1 in so far as it is distinct  
from that of temporal succession or of  
motion in space1 is empirical1 and      
consequently falls outside the scope of 
transcendental enquiry4 ,by the         
conservation of matter we mean the      
constancy of the weight of matter       
throughout all changes4 ,but the only   
permanent which can be postulated as    
necessary to render our actual          
consciousness of time possible1 consists
 of spatial objects sufficiently        
constant to act as a standard by        
comparison with which motions may be    
measured against one another4 ,and as   
this first ,analogy1 properly           

understood1 thus deals solely with      
spatial changes of bodies1 the principle
 of the conservation of matter has no   
real connection with it4  ,then thirdly1
 and lastly1 ,kant takes this first     
,analogy as showing the indispensable   
function performed in experience by the 
category of substance and attribute4    
,substance1 he argues1 corresponds to   
the time in which events happen1 and its
 attributes correspond to the changing  
events4 ,just as all events are only to 
be conceived as happening in time1 so   
too all changes are only to be conceived
 as changes in an abiding substance4    
,these1 he would seem to hold1 are      
simply two ways of making one and the   
same assertion4 ,now ,kant may perhaps  
be right in insisting that all change is
 change in1 and not of1 time4 ,unity of 
consciousness would seem to demand      
consciousness of a single time in which 
all events happen4 ,but this relation of
 time to its events does not justify the
 same assertion being made of substance4

 ,substance may be what corresponds to  
time in general1 and may represent it in
 consciousness1 but we cannot for that  
reason say that changes are also only in
 and not of it4 ,to regard the changes  
in this way as attributes inhering in   
substance directly contradicts the view 
developed in the second ,analogy4 ,for  
the notion of substance is there treated
 as an implication of the principle of  
causality4 ,substance1 ,kant there      
insists1 is not a bare static existence 
in which changes take place1 but a      
dynamic energy which from its very      
nature is in perpetual necessitated     
change4 ,change is not change in1 but   
change of1 substance4  ,even in the     
passage in which ,kant identifies the   
notion of the permanent in change with  
that of substance and attribute1 he     
shows consciousness of this difficulty4 
,we must not1 he says1 separate the     
substance from its accidents1 treating  
it as a separate existence4 ,the        
accidents are merely the special forms  

of its existence4 ,but all the same1 he 
adds1 withdrawing the words which he has
 just uttered1 such a separation of the 
changing accidents from the abiding     
substance is 8unavoidable1 owing to the 
conditions of the logical employment of 
our understanding40#aaha ,kant is here  
so hard pressed to account for the use  
of the category of substance and        
attribute in experience1 and to explain 
the contradictions to which it gives    
rise1 that the only way he sees out of  
the difficulty is to refer the          
contradictions involved in the category 
to the constitution of our understanding
 in its logical employment4 ,yet as such
 employment of understanding is1        
according to his own showing1 secondary 
to1 and dependent upon1 its 8real0      
employment1 the category of substance   
and attribute can hardly have originated
 in this way4  ,we must1 then1 conclude 
that ,kant offers no sufficient         
deduction or explanation of the category
 of substance and attribute1 and as he  

does so nowhere else1 we are driven to  
the further conclusion that he is unable
 to account for its use in experience1  
or at least to reconcile it in any      
adequate fashion with the principle of  
causality4  ,b4 ,second                 
,analogy4--,everything that happens1    
i4e4 begins to be1 presupposes something
 on which it follows according to a     
rule4 ,or as in the second edition3 ,all
 changes take place in conformity with  
the law of the connection of cause and  
effect4  ,this section1 as ,kant very   
rightly felt1 contains one of the most  
important and fundamental arguments of  
the entire ,critique2 and this would    
seem to be the reason why he has so     
multiplied the proofs which he gives of 
the ,analogy4 ,within the limits of the 
section no less than five distinct      
proofs are to be found1 and still       
another was added in the second edition4
 ,as ,adickes#aahb argues1 it is        
extremely unlikely that ,kant should    
have written five very similar proofs in

 immediate succession4 ,the probability 
is that they are of independent origin  
and were later combined to constitute   
this section2 or1 if we hold with       
,adickes that ,kant first composed a    
8brief outline10 we may conclude that he
 combined the one or more proofs1 which 
that outline contained1 with others of  
earlier or of later origin4 ,the first  
to the fourth paragraphs of the first   
edition contain a first proof2 the fifth
 to the seventh a second proof 7a       
repetition of the first proof but in    
indirect form72 the eighth to the tenth 
a third proof 7almost identical with the
 first72 the eleventh to the thirteenth 
a fourth proof 7different in character  
from all the others72 the fourteenth a  
fifth proof 7probably the latest in time
 of writing2 an anticipation of the     
argument in the second edition74 ,the   
paragraph added in the second edition   
7the second paragraph in the text of the
 second edition7 gives a sixth and last 
proof4  ,we may first state the central 

argument1 deferring treatment of such   
additional points as arise in connection
 with ,kant's varying formulations of it
 in his successive proofs4 ,the second  
,analogy1 though crabbedly1 diffusely1  
and even confusedly stated1 is one of   
the finest and most far-reaching pieces 
of argument in the whole ,critique4 ,it 
is of special historical importance as  
being ,kant's answer to ,hume's denial  
of the validity of the causal principle4
 ,hume had maintained that we can never 
be conscious of anything but mere       
succession4 ,kant in reply seeks to     
prove that consciousness of succession  
is only possible through consciousness  
of a necessity that determines the order
 of the successive events4  ,kant1 we   
must bear in mind1 accepts much of      
,hume's criticism of the category of    
causality4 ,the general principle that  
every event must have an antecedent     
cause is1 ,kant recognises1 neither     
intuitively certain nor demonstrable by 
general reasoning from more ultimate    

truths4 ,it is not to be accounted for  
by analytic thought1 but like all       
synthetic judgments a priori can only be
 proved by reference to the contingent  
fact of actual experience4 ,secondly1   
,kant makes no attempt1 either in this  
,analogy or elsewhere in the ,critique1 
to explain the nature and possibility of
 causal connection1 that is1 to show how
 one event1 the cause1 is able to give  
rise to another and different event1 the
 effect4 ,we can never by analysis of an
 effect discover any reason why it must 
necessarily be preceded by a cause4#aahc
 ,thirdly1 the principle of causality1  
as deduced by ,kant and shown to be     
necessarily involved in all             
consciousness of time1 is the quite     
general principle that every event must 
have some cause in what immediately     
precedes it4 ,what in each special case 
the cause may be1 can only be           
empirically discovered2 and that any    
selected event is really the cause can  
never be absolutely certain4 ,the       

particular causal laws are discovered   
from experience1 not by means of the    
general principle but only in accordance
 with it1 and are therefore neither     
purely empirical nor wholly a priori4   
,as even ,j4 ,s4 ,mill teaches1 the     
general principle is assumed in every   
inference to a causal law1 and save by  
thus assuming the general principle the 
particular inference to causal          
connection cannot be proved4 ,but at the
 same time1 since the proof of causal   
connection depends upon satisfaction of 
those empirical tests which ,mill       
formulates in his inductive methods1    
such special causal laws can be gathered
 only from experience4  ,the            
starting-point of ,kant's analysis is   
our consciousness of an objective order 
in time4 ,this is for ,kant a legitimate
 starting-point since he has proved in  
the ,transcendental ,deduction that only
 through consciousness of the objective 
is consciousness of the subjective in   
any form possible4 ,the independent     

argument by which it is here supported  
is merely a particular application of   
the general principle of that deduction4
 ,when we apprehend any very large      
object1 such as a house1 though we do so
 by successively perceiving the         
different parts of it1 we never think of
 regarding these successive perceptions 
as representing anything successive in  
the house4 ,on the other hand1 when we  
apprehend successive events in time1    
such as the successive positions of a   
ship sailing down stream1 we do regard  
the succession of our experiences as    
representing objective succession in    
what is apprehended4 ,kant therefore    
feels justified in taking as fact1 that 
we have the power of distinguishing     
between subjective and objective        
succession1 i4e4 between sequences which
 are determined by the order of our     
attentive experience and sequences which
 are given as such4 ,it is this fact    
which affords ,kant a precise method of 
formulating the problem of the second   

,analogy1 viz4 how consciousness of     
objective change1 as distinguished from 
subjective succession1 is possible8     
,schopenhauer1 owing to the prominence  
in his system of the principle of       
sufficient reason1 has commented upon   
this second ,analogy in considerable    
detail2#aahd and we may here employ one 
of his chief criticisms to define more  
precisely the general intention of      
,kant's argument4 ,the succession in our
 experiences of the parts of a house and
 of the positions of a ship is1         
,schopenhauer maintains1 in both cases  
of genuinely objective character4 ,in   
both instances the changes are due to   
the position of two bodies relatively to
 one another4 ,in the first example one 
of these bodies is the body of the      
observer1 or rather one of his bodily   
organs1 namely the eye1 and the other is
 the house1 in relation to the parts of 
which the position of the eye is        
successively altered4 ,in the second    
example the ship changes its position   

relatively to the stream4 ,the motion of
 the eye from roof to cellar is one     
event2 its motion from cellar to roof is
 a second event2 and both are events of 
the same nature as the sailing of the   
ship4 ,had we the same power of dragging
 the ship upstream that we have of      
moving the eye in a direction opposite  
to that of its first movement1 the      
positions of the ship could be reversed 
in a manner exactly analogous to our    
reversal of the perceptions of the      
house4  ,this criticism is a typical    
illustration of ,schopenhauer's entire  
failure to comprehend the central thesis
 of ,kant's ,critical idealism4#aahe    
,the ,analytic1 so far as the main      
argument of its objective deduction is  
concerned1 was to him a closed book2 and
 as this second analogy is little else  
than a special application of the       
results of the deduction1 he was equally
 at a loss in its interpretation4 ,kant 
was himself1 of course1 in large part   
responsible for the misunderstanding4   

,the distinction which would seem to be 
implied by ,kant's language between     
sequence that is objective and sequence 
that is merely subjective is completely 
inconsistent with ,critical             
principles1#aahf and is as thoroughly   
misleading as that other distinction    
which he so frequently employs between  
the a priori and the merely empirical4  
,schopenhauer1 however1 regarded these  
distinctions as valid1 and accordingly  
applies them in the interpretation of   
,kant's method of argument4 ,if inner   
and outer experience are to be          
contrasted as two kinds of experience1  
there is1 as ,schopenhauer rightly      
insists1 no sufficient ground for       
regarding changes due to movements of   
the eye as being subjective and those   
that are due to movements of a ship as  
being objective4 ,that is not1 however1 
,kant's intention in the employment of  
these illustrations4 ,he uses them only 
to make clear the fairly obvious fact   
that while in certain cases the order of

 our perceptions is subjectively        
initiated1 in other cases we apprehend  
the subjective order of our experiences 
as corresponding to1 and explicable only
 through1 the objective sequence of     
events4 ,in holding to this distinction 
,kant is not concerned to deny that even
 in the order which is determined by the
 subject's purposes or caprice objective
 factors are likewise involved4 ,the    
fact that the foundations of a house    
support its roof1 and will therefore    
determine what it is that we shall      
apprehend when we turn the eye upwards1 
does not render the order of our        
apprehensions any the less subjective in
 character4 ,but that this order is     
purely subjective1 ,kant could never    
have asserted4 ,his ,critical principles
 definitely commit him to the view that 
even sensations and desires are integral
 parts of the unitary system of natural 
law4 ,kant1 as we shall find1 is        
maintaining that some such distinction  
between subjective and objective        

sequence as is illustrated in the above 
contrasted instances must be present    
from the very start of our              
experience--must1 indeed1 be            
constitutive of experience as such4 ,out
 of a consciousness of the purely       
subjective the notion of the objective  
can never arise4#aahg ,or otherwise     
stated1 consciousness of a time order1  
even though subjective1 must ultimately 
involve the application of some         
non-subjective standard4       8,i shall
 be obliged 444 to derive the subjective
 sequence of      apprehension from the 
objective sequence of appearances1      
because      otherwise the former is    
entirely undetermined1 and does not     
distinguish any one appearance from any 
other40#aahh  ,we interpret the         
subjective order in terms of an         
objective system2 consciousness of the  
latter is the necessary presupposition  
of all awareness4 ,it is as necessary to
 the interpretation of what is          
apprehended through the rotating        

eyeballs as to the apprehension of a    
moving ship4 ,so far from refusing to   
recognise that the subjective order of  
our experiences is objectively          
conditioned1 ,kant is prepared to       
advance to the further assertion that it
 is only apprehensible when so          
conceived4  ,in the third ,analogy ,kant
 proceeds to the connected problem1 how 
we can apprehend the parts of a house as
 simultaneous notwithstanding the       
sequent relation of our perceptions of  
them1 and what justification we have for
 thus interpreting the subjectively     
sequent experiences as representing     
objective coexistence4 ,just as ,kant in
 this second ,analogy does not argue    
that irreversibility is by itself proof 
of causal relation1 but only that the   
consciousness of such irreversibility   
demands the employment of the conception
 of causality1 so in the third ,analogy 
he does not attempt to reduce the       
consciousness of coexistence to the     
consciousness of reversibility1 but to  

prove that only through the application 
of the conception of reciprocity can the
 reversibility be properly interpreted4 
,in each case the category conditions   
the empirical consciousness2 the latter 
is an apprehension of determinate order 
only in so far as it presupposes the    
category4 ,though ,kant's treatment of  
the third ,analogy has less historical  
importance1 and perhaps less intrinsic  
interest1 than the proof of the second  
,analogy1 it is even more significant of
 the kind of position which he is       
endeavouring to establish1 and ,i may   
therefore forewarn the reader that he   
must not spare himself the labour of    
mastering its difficult1 and somewhat   
illusive1 argument4 ,the doctrines which
 it expounds at once reinforce and      
extend the results of the second        
,analogy1 while the further difficulties
 which it brings to view1 but which it  
is not itself capable of meeting1       
indicate that the problems of the       
,analytic call for reconsideration in   

the light of certain wider issues first 
broached in the ,dialectic4  ,we may now
 return to ,kant's main argument4 ,his  
problem1 as we have found1 is how       
consciousness of objective change1 as   
distinguished from subjective           
succession1 is possible4 ,the problem1  
being formulated in this particular way1
 demands1 ,kant felt1 careful definition
 of what is meant by the term           
#8objective1' upon which so much        
depends4 ,to apply the illustration     
above used1 the house as apprehended is 
not a thing in itself but only an       
appearance to the mind4 ,what1 then1 do 
we mean by the house1 as distinguished  
from our subjective representations of  
it1 when that house is nothing but a    
complex 7,inbegriff7 of                 
representations8#aahi ,the question and 
,kant's answer to it are stated in      
subjectivist fashion1 in terms of his   
earlier doctrine of the transcendental  
object4 ,to contrast an object with the 
representations through which we        

apprehend it1 is only possible if these 
representations stand under a rule which
 renders necessary their combination in 
some one particular way1 and so         
distinguishes this one particular mode  
of representation as the only true mode 
from all others4 ,the origin1 therefore1
 of our distinction between the         
subjectively successive and the         
succession which is also objective must 
be due in the one case to the presence  
of a rule compelling us to combine the  
events in some particular successive    
order1 and in the other to the absence  
of such a rule4 ,our apprehension of the
 house1 for instance1 may proceed in any
 order1 from the roof downwards or vice 
versa1 and as the order may always be   
reversed there is no compulsion upon the
 mind to regard the order of its        
apprehension as representing objective  
sequence4 ,but since in our apprehension
 of an event ,b in time1 the            
apprehension of ,b follows upon the     
apprehension of a previous event ,a1 and

 we cannot reverse the order1 the mind  
is compelled to view the order of       
succession1 in terms of the category of 
causality1 as necessitated1 and         
therefore as objective4 ,the order is a 
necessary order not in the sense that ,a
 must always precede ,b1 that ,a is the 
cause of ,b1 but that the order1 if we  
are to apprehend it correctly1 must in  
this particular case be conceived as    
necessary4 ,the succession1 that is1    
need not be conceived as a causal one1  
but in order to be conceived as         
objective succession it must be         
conceived as rendered necessary by      
connections that are causal4  ,having1  
in this general fashion1 shown the      
bearing of his previous analysis of     
objective experience upon the problem in
 hand1 ,kant proceeds to develop from it
 his proof of the special principle of  
causality4 ,the schema of causality is  
necessary succession in time1 and it is 
through this1 its time aspect1 that     
,kant approaches the principle4 ,it has 

to do with the special case of change4  
,to be conscious of change we must be   
conscious of an event1 that is1 of      
something as happening at a particular  
point in time4 ,the change1 in other    
words1 requires to be dated1 and as we  
are not conscious of time in general1 it
 must be dated by reference to other    
events1 and obviously in this case in   
relation to the preceding events1 in    
contrast to which it is apprehended as  
change4 ,but according to the results of
 our analysis of what constitutes       
objective experience1 it can be fixed in
 its position in objective time only if 
it be conceived as related to the       
preceding events according to a         
necessary law2 and the law of necessary 
connection in time is the law of        
causality4 ,in order1 then1 that        
something which has taken place may be  
apprehended as having occurred1 that is1
 as being an objective change1 it must  
be apprehended as necessarily following 
upon that which immediately precedes it 

in time1 i4e4 as causally necessary4    
,the principle of causality thus        
conditions consciousness of objective   
succession1 and ,hume1 in asserting that
 we are conscious of the succession of  
events1 therefore admits all that need  
be assumed in order to prove the        
principle4 ,the reason why ,hume failed 
to recognise this1 is that he ignored   
the distinction between consciousness of
 the subjective order of our            
apprehensions and consciousness of the  
objective sequence of events4 ,yet that 
is a distinction upon which his own     
position rested4 ,for he teaches that   
determination of causal laws1           
sufficiently certain to serve the       
purposes alike of practical life and of 
natural science1 can be obtained through
 observation of those sequences which   
remain constant4 ,such is also the      
position of all empiricists4 ,they hold 
that causal relation is discovered by   
comparison of given sequences4 ,kant's  
contention is that the apprehension of  

change as change1 and therefore         
ultimately the apprehension even of an  
arbitrarily determined order of         
subjective succession1#aaij presupposes1
 and is only possible through1 an       
application of the category of          
causality4 ,the primary function of the 
understanding does not consist in the   
clarification of our representation of  
an event1 but in making such            
representation possible at all4#aaia    
,the primary field of exercise for the  
understanding lies not in the realm of  
reflective comparison1 but in the more  
fundamental sphere of creative          
synthesis4#aaib ,in determining the     
nature of the given it predetermines the
 principles to which all reflection upon
 the given must conform4 ,the discursive
 activities of scientific reflection are
 secondary to1 and conditioned by1 the  
transcendental processes which generate 
the experience of ordinary              
consciousness4 ,only an experience which
 conforms to the causal principle can   

serve as foundation either for the      
empirical judgments of sense experience1
 or for that ever-increasing body of    
scientific knowledge into which their   
content is progressively translated4    
,the principle of causality is          
applicable to everything experienced1   
for the sufficient reason that          
experience is itself possible only in   
terms of it4 ,this conclusion finds its 
most emphatic and adequate statement in 
the ,methodology4       8444through     
concepts of understanding pure reason   
establishes      secure principles1 not 
however directly from concepts1 but     
always      only indirectly through     
relation of these concepts to something 
altogether contingent1 namely1 possible 
experience4 ,for when such              
experience 7i4e4 something as object of 
possible experience7 is                 
presupposed1 the principles are         
apodictically certain1 though by        
themselves 7directly7 a priori they     
cannot even be recognised at      all4  

,thus no one can acquire insight into   
the proposition that      everything    
which happens has its cause1 merely from
 the concepts      involved4 ,it is not1
 therefore1 a dogma1 although from      
another      point of view1 namely1 from
 that of the sole field of its possible 
employment1 i4e4 experience1 it can be  
proved with complete      apodictic     
certainty4 ,but though it needs proof1  
it should be      entitled a principle1 
not a theorem1 because it has the       
peculiar character that it makes        
possible the very experience which      
is its own ground of proof1 and in this 
experience must always      itself be   
presupposed40#aaic  ,before making      
further comment upon ,kant's central    
argument1 it is advisable to consider   
the varying statements which ,kant has  
given of it4 ,we may take his successive
 proofs in the order in which they occur
 in the first edition4  ,first          
,proof4#aaid--,the argument is developed
 in terms of ,kant's early doctrine of  

the transcendental object4 ,the only    
points specially characteristic of the  
statement here given of that doctrine   
consist 7a7 in the emphasis with which  
it is asserted that representations can 
be experienced only in succession to one
 another1 and that they can never stand 
in the relation of coexistence1#aaie and
 7b7 in the almost complete ignoring of 
the transcendental object as source or  
ground of the rule in terms of which the
 successive representations are         
organised4 7a7 ,this is a point common  
to the arguments of all three           
,analogies4 ,in the first and third the 
problem is how1 from representations    
merely successive1 permanence and       
coexistence can be determined4 ,in the  
second ,analogy the problem is how from 
representations invariably successive a 
distinction can be drawn between the    
subjectively determined order of our    
apprehensions and the objective sequence
 of events4 ,or in other words3 how     
under such conditions we can recognise  

an order as given1 and so as prescribing
 the order in which it must be          
apprehended4 ,or to state the same point
 in still another manner3 how we can    
distinguish between an arbitrary or     
reversible order and an imposed or fixed
 order1 and so come to apprehend the    
subjective order of our apprehensions as
 in certain cases controlled by1 and    
explicable only through1 the objective  
sequence of events4#aaif  7b7 ,the      
reason why the transcendental object1 as
 source of the determinate and          
prescribed order of the given events1   
falls into the background in this       
passage is that ,kant is concerned only 
with the general principle or category  
by means of which the order is          
apprehended as necessary4 ,that         
principle has a subjective origin even  
though the particular sequences of      
concrete events have by means of that   
concept to be conceived as inexorably   
determined by their noumenal            
conditions4#aaig ,the principle accounts

 for the comprehension of the order as  
objective1 and that is the only point   
with which ,kant is here immediately    
concerned4 ,that the assertion of the   
subjective origin of the category is not
 inconsistent with recognition of the   
imposed order of the given has already  
been shown above4#aaih ,kant's own      
illustration1 in this section1 of the   
ship sailing down stream shows that he  
was prepared to assume without question 
that they are compatible4 ,his argument 
is1 however1 obscure1 owing to his      
failure to distinguish between the two  
senses in which the term #8rule' may be 
employed4 ,the term may signify either  
the universal and merely formal         
principle that every event must have a  
cause1 or it may be used to denote the  
fixed order in which concrete events are
 presented to sense-perception4 ,the    
latter order need not represent a series
 the members of which are causally      
connected with one another1 but only one
 that is due to causal necessities4     

,thus the successive positions of a ship
 sailing down stream are not            
interrelated as cause and effect1 and   
yet in order to be apprehended as       
objectively successive must be conceived
 as causally conditioned4 ,the term     
#8rule' has very different meanings in  
the two cases4 #8,rule' in the first    
sense is of subjective origin4 ,it is   
formal1 and can never be given4 ,it is  
read into the given4 #8,rule' in the    
second sense is given merely1 and being 
due to noumenal conditions constitutes  
the material element in natural science1
 the empirical content of some          
particular causal law4 ,owing to ,kant's
 failure explicitly to distinguish      
between these two very different        
connotations of the term1 such a        
sentence as the following is ambiguous3 
8,that in appearance which contains the 
condition of this necessary rule of     
apprehension is the object40 ,kant may  
mean that the prescribed order of the   
concrete events is due to the           

transcendental object2 but in that case 
it is not given as necessary4           
,necessity1 as he constantly insists1 is
 the one thing that can never be given4 
,the sentence is also misleading through
 its use of the term #8appearance4'     
,that term has no legitimate place in a 
passage inspired by the doctrine of the 
transcendental object2 there can be no  
such middle term between subjective     
representations and the thing in itself4
 ,as ,kant himself states1#aaii         
appearance defined in terms of that     
doctrine is 8nothing save a complex of  
representations40  ,there is a very     
essential difference in the view which  
,kant takes of the causal relation      
according as he is proceeding upon      
subjectivist or upon phenomenalist      
lines4 ,from the one point of view      
appearances are representations merely1 
and accordingly are entirely devoid of  
causal efficacy4 ,they are not causes   
and effects of one another4 ,they have  
not the independence or self-persistence

 necessary for the exercise of dynamical
 energy or even for the reception of    
modifications4 ,being 8states of the    
identical self10 all causal relation1   
dynamically conceived1 must lie solely  
in their noumenal conditions4 ,causality
 reduces to the thought of necessitated 
7not necessitating7 sequence4 ,it is1 as
 ,kant has suggested in ,a #aha  ,b     
#bbd1 a mere #8analogy' in terms of     
which we apply the logical relation of  
ground and consequence#abjj to the      
interpretation of our subjective        
representations1 and so view them as    
grounded not in one another but         
exclusively in the thing in itself4     
,causality in the strict sense1 i4e4    
dynamical agency1 can be looked for only
 in the noumenal sphere4  ,caird1 while 
adopting this explanation of the term   
#8analogy1'#abja is1 as might be        
expected from his ,hegelian standpoint1 
extremely indefinite and non-committal  
as to whether or not empirical objects  
can be genuine causes4 ,riehl1          

notwithstanding his professedly         
realistic interpretation of ,kant1      
adopts the above subjectivist view of   
natural causation4 ,so also do ,benno   
,erdmann and ,paulsen4 ,the latter#abjb 
speaks with no uncertain voice4         
8,causality in the phenomenal world     
signifies for ,kant1 as for ,hume1      
nothing but regularity in the sequence  
of phenomena4 ,real causal              
efficiency cannot of course occur here1 
for phenomena are      ideational       
products4 ,as such they can no more     
produce an effect      than concepts    
can40  ,the corresponding phenomenalist 
view of the causal relation receives no 
quite definite formulation either in    
this section or elsewhere in the        
,critique1 but may be gathered from the 
general trend of ,kant's phenomenalist  
teaching4#abjc ,it is somewhat as       
follows4 ,the term #8analogy' is viewed 
as having a meaning very different from 
that above suggested4 ,the causal       
relation is not a mere analogy from the 

logical relation of ground and          
consequence2 it is the representation of
 genuinely dynamical activities in the  
objects apprehended4 ,those objects are 
not mere states of the self1 subjective 
representations4 ,they are part of an   
independent order which in the form     
known to us is a phenomenalist          
transcript of a deeper reality4 ,if the 
causal relation is the analogy of       
anything distinguishable from itself1 it
 is an analogon or interpretation of    
dynamical powers exercised by things in 
themselves1#abjd not of the merely      
logical relation between premisses and  
conclusion4 ,the objects of             
representation may exercise powers which
 representations as such can never be   
conceived as possessing4 ,between the   
individual's subjective states and      
things in themselves stands the         
phenomenal world of the natural         
sciences4 ,its function1 whether as     
directly experienced through            
sense-perception or as conceptually     

reconstructed through scientific        
hypothesis1 is to stand as the          
representative in human consciousness of
 that noumenal realm in which all       
existence is ultimately rooted4 ,the    
causal interactions of material bodies  
in space are as essentially constitutive
 of those bodies as are any of their    
quantitative properties4 ,causal        
relation1 even in the phenomenal sphere1
 must not be identified with mere       
conformity to law4 ,the true and        
complete purpose of the natural sciences
 is not to be found in the ,berkeleian  
or sceptical ideal of simplification1   
but in the older and sounder conception 
of causal explanation4 ,that1 at least1 
is the view which ,kant invariably      
defends whenever he has occasion to     
discuss the principles of physical      
science4  ,second ,proof4#abje--,the    
argument of the first proof is here     
developed in indirect fashion4 ,in the  
absence of any rule prescribing         
necessary sequence1 no distinction can  

be made between subjective and objective
 succession4 ,the justification for such
 a rule lies therefore1 not in an       
inductive inference from repeated       
experience1 but in its necessity for the
 possibility of experience4 ,it is an   
expression of the synthetic unity in    
which experience consists4  ,third      
,proof4#abjf--,this is for the most part
 merely a restatement of the first      
proof4 ,it differs from it in making    
rather more explicit that the objective 
reference involved in the notion of the 
transcendental object is one that       
carries the mind beyond all             
representations to the thought of       
something which determines their order  
according to a rule4 ,otherwise the     
ambiguities of the terms employed are   
identical with those of the first proof4
 ,its concluding paragraph1 however1 is 
a much clearer statement of the         
difficult argument of ,a #aib-c  ,b     
#bch-i4  ,fourth ,proof4#abjg--,this    
proof differs from all the others4 ,it  

argues from the characteristics of pure 
time to the properties necessary to the 
empirical representation of the         
time-series4 ,as time cannot be         
experienced in and by itself1 all its   
essential characteristics must be       
capable of being represented in terms of
 appearance4 8,only in appearances can  
we empirically recognise continuity in  
the connection of times40 ,the primary  
function of the understanding is to make
 such recognition possible1 and it does 
so by 8transferring the time order to   
the appearances and their existence40   
,it is a necessary law of time that we  
can only advance to the succeeding      
through the preceding4 ,each moment of  
time is the indispensable condition of  
the existence of that which follows it4 
,we can pass to the year #aiae only by  
way of the preceding year #aiad4 ,and   
since1 as just noted1 time is not       
cognisable by itself but only as the    
form of our perceptions1 this law must  
be applicable to them4 ,we can only be  

conscious of all times as successively  
conditioning one another in one single  
time1 and that means in one single      
objective time1 if we are conscious of  
all the phenomena perceived as          
conditioning one another in their order 
in time4  ,it is somewhat difficult to  
understand how ,kant came to formulate  
the argument in this form4 ,the         
explanation may perhaps be found in his 
preoccupation#abjh with the doctrine of 
a transcendental activity of the        
productive imagination and with the     
connected doctrine of a pure a priori   
manifold4 ,for this proof would seem to 
rest upon the assumption that the       
characteristics of time are known purely
 a priori and therefore with complete   
certainty1 independently of sense       
experience4 ,the unusual and somewhat   
scholastic character of the proof also  
appears in ,kant's substitution of the  
principle of sufficient reason for the  
principle of causality4 ,but despite the
 artificial character of the standpoint1

 the argument serves to bring           
prominently forward ,kant's central     
thesis1 viz4 that the principle of      
causality is presupposed in all         
consciousness of time1 even of the      
subjectively successive4 ,also1 by      
emphasising that time in and by itself  
can never be 8an object of perception10 
and that the relating of appearances to 
8absolute time0 is possible only through
 the determining of them in their       
relations to one another1 it supplies   
the data for correction of its own      
starting-point4  ,fifth                 
,proof4#abji--,this proof is probably   
later than the preceding proofs4 ,though
 its essential content coincides with   
that of the opening proof1 its          
formulation would seem to be a first    
attempt at statement of the sixth proof1
 i4e4 of the argument which ,kant added 
in the second edition4 ,adickes         
considers this proof to be earlier in   
date than the first four proofs1 but the
 reason which he assigns for so         

regarding it1 viz4 that ,kant here      
postulates a synthesis of the           
imagination independent of the          
categories as preceding a synthesis of  
apprehension in terms of the categories1
 seems to be based upon a much too      
literal reading of ,kant's loose mode of
 statement4 ,the argument rather appears
 to be1 as in the sixth proof1 that     
synthesis of the imagination may be     
either subjective or objective2 and the 
term 8apprehension0 would seem to be    
used as signifying that the manifold    
synthesised is given to the imagination 
through actual sense experience1 and    
that as thus given it has a determinate 
order of its own4 ,the argument         
concludes with the statement 7more      
definite than any to be found in the    
preceding arguments71 that the proof of 
the principle of causality consists in  
its indispensableness as a condition of 
all empirical judgments1 and so of      
experience as such4 ,as a ground of the 
possibility of experience it must be    

valid of all the objects of experience4 
,sixth ,proof4#abaj--,the argument of   
the fifth proof is here more clearly    
stated4 ,all synthesis is due to 8the   
faculty of imagination which determines 
inner sense in respect of the time      
relation40 ,such synthesis may1 however1
 yield the consciousness either of      
subjective succession or of succession  
8in the object40 ,in the latter form it 
presupposes the employment of a pure    
concept of the understanding1 that of   
the relation of cause and effect4 ,and  
the conclusion reached is again that    
only so is empirical knowledge possible4
 ,this mode of stating the argument is  
far from satisfactory4 ,it tends to     
obscure ,kant's central thesis1 that    
only through consciousness of an        
objective order is consciousness of     
subjective sequence possible1 and that  
the principle of causality is therefore 
a conditioning factor of all            
consciousness4 ,the misleading          
distinction drawn in the ,prolegomena   

between judgments of perception and     
judgments of experience also crops out  
in ,kant's use of the phrase 8mere      
perception40#abaa         99       99   
99       99       99  ,we may again     
return to ,kant's central argument4 ,for
 we have still to consider certain      
objections to which it may seem to lie  
open1 and also to comment upon ,kant's  
further explanations in the remaining   
paragraphs of the section4#abab ,kant's 
imperfect statement of his position has 
suggested to ,hutchison ,stirling and   
others a problem which is largely       
artificial1 namely1 how the mind is     
enabled to recognise the proper         
occasions upon which to apply the       
category of causality4 ,on the one hand 
sequence as such cannot be the          
criterion1 since many sequences are not 
causal1 and on the other hand the       
absence of sequence does not appear to  
debar its application1 since cause and  
effect would frequently seem to be      
co-existent4 ,this difficulty arises    

from failure to appreciate the central  
thesis upon which ,kant's proof of the  
principle of causality ultimately rests4
 ,kant's diffuse and varying mode of    
statement may conceal but never         
conflicts with that thesis1 which       
consists in the contention that the     
category of causality is a necessary and
 invariable factor in all consciousness4
 ,nothing can be apprehended save in    
terms of it4#abac ,it prescribes an     
interpretation which the mind has no    
option save to apply in the             
consciousness of each and every event1  
of the coexistent no less than of the   
sequent4 ,whether two changes are       
coexistent or are successive1 each must 
be conceived as possessing an antecedent
 cause4 ,the only difference is that in 
the case of sequent events one of them  
7i4e4 the antecedent change7 may1 upon  
empirical investigation1 be found to be 
itself the cause of the second and      
subsequent event1 whereas with          
coexistent events this can never be     

possible4 ,as the principle of causality
 is that every event must have an       
antecedent cause1 it follows that where 
there is no sequence there can be no    
causation4 ,but when ,kant states that  
sequence is 8the sole empirical         
criterion0#abad of the causal relation1 
he does less than justice to the        
position he is defending4 ,the empirical
 criteria are manifold in number1 and   
are such as ,john ,stuart ,mill has     
attempted to formulate in his inductive 
methods4  ,schopenhauer has             
objected#abae that ,kant's argument     
proves too much1 since it would involve 
that all objective sequences1 such as   
that of night and day or of the notes in
 a piece of music1 are themselves causal
 sequences4 ,this criticism has been    
replied to by ,stadler#abaf in the      
following terms3       8,when           
,schopenhauer adduces the sequence of   
musical notes or of day      and night1 
as objective sequences which can be     
known without the      causal law1 we   

need only meet him with the question1   
,where in these      cases is the       
substance that changes8 ,so soon as he  
is forced to put      his objection into
 the form required to bring it into     
relation to      the question of the    
possibility of knowledge1 his error     
becomes      obvious4 ,his instances    
must then be expressed thus3--,the      
instrument      passes from one state of
 sound into another2 the earth changes  
from      the measure of enlightenment  
which makes day1 to that which makes    
night4 ,of such changes no one will say 
that they are not referred      to a    
cause4 ,and we may quote in this        
reference the appropriate      saying of
 ,kant himself1 #8,days are1 as it were1
 the children of      ,time1 since the  
following day with that which it        
contains is the      product of the     
previous day4'0  ,night and day1 in so  
far as they are sequent events1 must be 
conceived in terms of causality1 not in 
the sense that night causes day1 but as 

being determined by causes that account 
not only for each separately1 but also  
for the alternating sequence of the one 
upon the other4 ,such causes are found  
by the astronomer to lie in the changing
 positions of the earth relatively to   
the sun4  ,schopenhauer adds a further  
objection of a more subtle nature1 which
 has again been excellently stated and  
answered by ,stadler3                   
8,schopenhauer points out that what we  
call chance is just a      sequence of  
events which do not stand in causal     
connexion4 #8,i come      out of the    
house and a tile falls from the roof    
which strikes me2      in such a case   
there is no causal connexion between the
 falling of      the tile and my coming 
out of the house1 yet the succession of 
these two events is objectively         
determined in my apprehension of        
them4' ,how have we to criticise this   
case from the transcendental      point 
of view8 ,we know that successions      
become necessary1 i4e4      objective1  

for our consciousness1 when we regard   
them as changes of      a substance     
which are determined by a cause4 ,but it
 is shown here      that there are      
successions in which the single members 
are changes      of different           
substances4 ,if substance ,s changes its
 state ,a into ,b      on account of the
 cause ,x1 and substance ,s changes its 
state ,a      into ,b on account of the 
cause ,x1 and if ,i call the first      
change      ,v and the second ,v1 the   
question arises how the objectivity of  
the      succession ,v ,v is related to 
the law of causality4 ,sequences such   
as ,v ,v are very frequent1 and our     
consciousness of the objectivity      is
 certain4 ,do we owe this consciousness 
to the same rule as holds      good in  
other cases8 ,certainly4 ,the           
distinction is not qualitative1      but
 rests only on the greater complication 
of the change in      question4 ,the    
sequence ,v ,v can become objective only
 if ,i think it      as a necessary     

connexion4 ,it must be so determined    
that ,v can only      follow ,v in      
#8consciousness in general'2 there must 
be a ,u1 the      introduction of which 
is the cause that ,v follows ,v4 ,to be 
convinced of this1 ,i do not need       
actually to know ,u4 ,i know that on    
every occasion ,u causes the succession 
,v ,v4 ,of course1 this      presupposes
 that all data of the states considered1
 ,a and ,a1      remain identical4 ,but 
whether these data are very simple or   
endlessly complex1 whether they are     
likely to combine to the given          
result frequently or seldom1 is         
indifferent for the objectifying of     
the event2 it is not the perception of  
,u1 but the presupposition of      it1  
which makes the change necessary and so 
objective for      us40#abag  ,to turn  
now to the other difficulty which ,kant 
himself raises in ,a #bjb-c  ,b #bdg-h1 
viz4 that cause and effect would        
frequently seem to be coexistent1 and   
the 8sole empirical criterion0 to be    

therefore absent4 ,it may from this     
point of view be maintained that the    
great majority of causes occur          
simultaneously with their effects1 and  
that such time sequence as occurs is due
 solely to the fact that the cause      
cannot execute itself in one single     
instant4 ,kant has little difficulty in 
disposing of this objection4 ,causality 
concerns only the order1 not the lapse1 
of time2 and the sequence relation must 
remain even though there is no interval 
between the two events4 ,if a leaden    
ball lies upon a cushion it makes a     
depression in it4 ,the ball and the     
depression are coexistent4 ,none the    
less1 when viewed in their dynamical    
relation1 the latter must be regarded as
 sequent upon the former4 ,if the leaden
 ball is placed upon a smooth cushion a 
hollow is at once made1 but if a hollow 
exists in a cushion a ball need not     
appear4 ,in other words1 the criteria   
for the determination of specific causal
 relations are neither the presence nor 

the absence of sequence1 but are        
empirical considerations verifiable only
 upon special investigation4#abah ,the  
observer is called upon to disentangle  
the complicated web of given appearances
 under the guidance of the quite general
 and formal principle that every event  
is due to some antecedent cause4 ,he    
must do so as best he can through the   
application of his acquired insight1    
and1 when necessary1 by means of the    
requisite experimental variation of     
conditions4  ,in the two following      
paragraphs 7,a #bjd-e  ,b #bdi-ea7 ,kant
 raises points which he later discussed 
more fully in the ,metaphysical ,first  
,principles of ,natural ,science4#abai  
,as adequate explanation of the argument
 would be a very lengthy matter1 and not
 of any very real importance for the    
understanding of the general ,critical  
position1 we may omit all treatment of  
it4 ,in the sections of the             
,metaphysical ,first ,principles just   
cited1 the reader will find the         

necessary comment and explanation4 ,such
 bearing as these two paragraphs have   
upon ,kant's view of the nature of the  
causal relation has been noted          
above4#abbj  ,in the section on         
,anticipations of ,perception#abba ,kant
 has stated that the principle of the   
continuity of change involves empirical 
factors1 and therefore falls outside the
 limits of transcendental philosophy4   
,to this more correct attitude ,kant1   
unfortunately1 did not hold4 ,in ,a     
#bjg-aa  ,b #beb-f he professes to      
establish the principle in a priori     
transcendental fashion as a necessary   
consequence of the nature of time4 ,this
 proof is indeed thrice repeated with   
unessential variations1 thereby clearly 
showing that these paragraphs also are  
of composite origin4 ,the argument in   
all three cases consists in inferring   
from the continuity of time the         
continuity of all changes in time4 ,as  
the parts of time are themselves times1 
of which no one is the smallest1 so in  

all generation in time1 the cause must  
in its action pass through all the      
degrees of quantity from zero to that of
 the final effect4       8,every change 
has a cause which evinces its causality 
in the whole      time in which the     
change takes place4 ,this cause1        
therefore1 does      not engender the   
change suddenly 7at once or in one      
moment71 but in      a time1 so that1 as
 the time increases from its initial    
moment a      to its completion in b1   
the quantity of the reality 7b-a7 is in 
like manner generated through all lesser
 degrees which are      contained       
between the first and the last40#abbb   
,this argument is inconclusive4 ,as     
,kant himself recognises in regard to   
space1#abbc we may not without special  
proof assume that what is true of time  
must be true of the contents of time4   
,if time1 change1 and causation can be  
equated1 what is true of one will be    
true of all three4 ,but the assumption  
upon which the argument thus rests has  

not itself been substantiated4  ,in the 
third proof#abbd the argument is stated 
in extreme subjectivist terms which     
involve the further assumption that what
 is true of apprehension is ipso facto  
true of everything apprehended4 ,the    
possibility of establishing the law of  
dynamical continuity follows1 ,kant     
declares1 as a consequence of its being 
a law of our subjective apprehension4   
8,we anticipate only our own            
apprehension1 the formal condition of   
which1 inasmuch as it inheres in the    
mind prior to all given                 
appearances1 must certainly be capable  
of being known a      priori40#abbe     
,kant's attitude towards the physical   
principle of continuity underwent       
considerable change4 ,in his ,new       
,doctrine of ,motion and ,rest          
7#ageh7abbf he maintains that it cannot 
be proved1 and that physicists may      
rightly refuse to recognise it even as  
an hypothesis4 ,it is in the ,essay on  
,negative ,quantity 7#agfc7abbg that    

,kant first adopts the attitude of the  
,critique1 and rejects the 8speculative0
 objections raised against the          
mathematical conception of the          
infinitely small4 ,in the ,metaphysical 
,first ,principles of ,natural          
,science#abbh the principle of          
continuity is defended and developed1   
but only in its application to material 
existence1 not in its relation to the   
causal process4  ,c4 ,third             
,analogy4--,all substances1 in so far as
 they are coexistent1 stand in          
thoroughgoing communion1#abbi i4e4 in   
reciprocity with one another4 ,or1 as in
 the second edition3 ,all substances1 so
 far as they can be perceived to coexist
 in space1 are in thoroughgoing         
reciprocity4  ,this section contains    
four separate proofs4 ,the first three  
paragraphs in the text of the first     
edition contain the first proof4 ,the   
fourth paragraph supplies a second      
proof1 and the fifth paragraph a third4 
,in the second edition ,kant adds a     

fourth proof 7the first paragraph of the
 text of the second edition74  ,we may  
lead up to these proofs by first        
formulating 7a7 the fundamental         
assumption upon which they proceed1 and 
7b7 the thesis which they profess to    
establish4 7a7 ,the argument involves   
the same initial assumption as the      
preceding ,analogies1 viz4 that         
representations exist exclusively in    
succession1 or stated in phenomenalist  
terms1 that the objectively coexistent  
can be apprehended only in and through  
representations that are sequent to one 
another in time4#abcj ,upon this        
assumption the problem of the third     
,analogy is to explain how from         
representations all of which are in     
succession we can determine the         
objectively coexistent4 7b7 ,in the     
,dissertation#abca ,kant had maintained 
that though the possibility of dynamical
 communion of substances is not         
necessarily involved in their mere      
existence1 such interaction may be      

assumed as a consequence of their common
 origin in1 and dependence upon1 a      
,divine ,being4 ,in the ,critique no    
such metaphysical speculations are any  
longer in order1 and ,kant recognises   
that as regards things in themselves it 
is not possible to decide whether       
dynamical interaction is1 or is not1    
necessarily involved in coexistence4    
,the problem of this third ,analogy     
concerns only appearances1 which as such
 must be subject to the conditions of   
unitary experience2 and one such        
condition is that they be apprehended as
 belonging to a single objective order  
of nature1 and therefore as standing in 
reciprocal relations of interaction4    
,the apprehension of substances as      
reciprocally determining one another is1
 ,kant contends1 an indispensable       
condition of their being known even as  
coexistent4 ,such is ,kant's thesis4    
,the proof may first be stated in what  
may be called its typical or generic    
form4 ,kant's four successive proofs can

 then be related to it as to a common   
standard4  ,two things1 ,a and ,b1 can  
be apprehended as coexistent only in so 
far as we can experience them in either 
order1 i4e4 when the order of our       
perceptions of them is reversible4 ,if  
they existed in succession1 this could  
never be possible4 ,the earlier member  
of a time series is past when the       
succeeding member is present1 and what  
belongs to the past can never be an     
object of perception4 ,the fact that the
 order in which things can be perceived 
is reversible would thus seem to prove  
that they do not exist successively to  
one another in time4#abcb ,that1        
however1 is not the case4 ,by itself    
such experience does not really suffice 
to yield consciousness of coexistence4  
,it can yield only consciousness of an  
alternating succession4#abcc ,a further 
factor1 namely1 interpretation of the   
reversibility of our perceptions as due 
to their being conditioned by objects   
which stand in the relation of          

reciprocal determination1 must first be 
postulated4 ,if these objects mutually  
determine one another to be what they   
are1 no one of them can be antecedent to
 or subsequent upon the others2 and by  
their mutual reference each will date   
the others as simultaneous with itself4 
,in other words1 the perception of the  
coexistence of objects involves the     
conception of them as mutually          
determining one another4 ,the principle 
of communion or reciprocity conditions  
the experience of coexistence1 and is   
therefore valid for objects apprehended 
in that manner4  ,kant also maintains1  
more by implication than by explicit    
statement1 that as ,a and ,b need not   
stand in any direct relation1 the       
apprehension of them as coexistent      
involves the conception of an           
all-embracing order of nature within    
which they fall and which determines    
them to be what they are4 ,if any one of
 them1 even the most minute and         
insignificant1 were conceived as        

altered1 corresponding simultaneous     
variations would have to be postulated  
for all the others4 ,the unity of the   
phenomenal world is the counterpart of  
the unity of apperception4 ,unity of    
experience involves principles which    
prescribe a corresponding unity in the  
natural realm4 ,dynamical communion is  
the sufficient and necessary fulfilment 
of this demand4 ,it carries to          
completion the unity demanded by the    
preceding ,analogies of substance and   
causality4 ,kant sums up his position in
 a note to ,a #bah  ,b #bfe4       8,the
 unity of the world-whole1 in which all 
appearances have to be      connected1  
is evidently a mere consequence of the  
tacitly assumed      principle of the   
communion of all substances which are   
coexistent4      ,for if they were      
isolated1 they would not as parts       
constitute a      whole4 ,and if their  
coexistence alone did not necessitate   
their      connection 7the reciprocal   
action of the manifold7 we could not    

argue from the former1 which is a merely
 ideal relation1 to the      latter1    
which is a real relation4 ,we have1     
however1 in the proper      context1    
shown that communion is really the      
ground of the      possibility of an    
empirical knowledge of coexistence1 and 
that      therefore the actual inference
 is merely from this empirical          
knowledge to communion as its           
condition40  ,to turn now to ,kant's    
successive proofs4 ,the first#abcd calls
 for no special comment4 ,it coincides  
with the above4 ,the second#abce proof  
is an incompletely stated argument1     
which differs from the first only in its
 more concrete statement of the main    
thesis and in its limitation of the     
argument to spatial existences4         
,dynamical community is the             
indispensable condition of our          
apprehension of any merely spatial      
side-by-sideness4 ,kant now adds that it
 is the dynamical continuity of the     
spatial world which enables us to       

apprehend the coexistence of its        
constituents4 ,the important bearing of 
this argument we shall consider in its  
connection with the proof which ,kant   
added in the second edition4  ,the      
third#abcf proof is probably the        
earliest in date of writing4 ,it draws a
 misleading distinction between         
subjective and objective coexistence1   
and seems to argue that only the latter 
form of coexistence need presuppose the 
employment of the category of           
reciprocity4 ,that runs directly counter
 to the central thesis of the other     
proofs1 that only in terms of dynamical 
relation is coexistence at all          
apprehensible4 ,that the above          
distinction indicates an early date of  
writing would seem to be confirmed by   
the obscure phrase 8community of        
apperception0 which is reminiscent of   
the prominence given to apperception in 
,kant's earlier views1 and by the       
concluding sentence in which ,kant      
employs terms--inherence1 consequence1  

and composition--that are also          
characteristic of the earlier stages of 
his ,critical enquiries4#abcg  ,it is   
significant that in the new             
argument#abch of the second edition the 
space factor1 emphasised in the second  
proof of the first edition1 is again    
made prominent4#abci ,the principle is1 
indeed1 reformulated in such manner as  
to suggest its limitation to spatial    
existences4 8,all substances1 so far as 
they can be perceived to coexist in     
space1 are in thoroughgoing             
reciprocity40 ,now it is decidedly      
doubtful whether ,kant means to limit   
the category of reciprocity to spatial  
existences4 ,as we have already         
noted1#abdj he would seem to hold that  
though the category of causality can    
acquire meaning only in its application 
to events in space1 it may in its       
subsequent employment be extended to the
 states of inner sense4 ,the latter are 
effects dynamically caused1 and among   
their causal conditions are mechanical  

processes in space4 ,the extension of   
the category of reciprocity to include  
sensations and desires undoubtedly gives
 rise to much greater difficulties than 
those involved in the universal         
application of the causal principle4 ,on
 the other hand1 its limitation to      
material bodies must render the         
co-ordination of mental states and      
mechanical processes highly doubtful1   
and would carry with it all the         
difficulties of an epiphenomenal view of
 psychical existences4 ,the truth       
probably is that in this matter ,kant   
had not thought out his position in any 
quite definite manner2 and that owing to
 the influence1 on the one hand of the  
dualistic teaching of the traditional   
,cartesian physics1 and on the other of 
his increasing appreciation of the part 
which space must play in the definition 
and proof of the principles of          
understanding1 he limited the category  
of reciprocity to spatial existences1   
without considering how far such        

procedure is capable of being reconciled
 with his determinist view of the       
empirical self4 ,his procedure is also  
open to a second objection1 namely1 that
 while thus reformulating the principle1
 he fails to remodel his proof in a     
sufficiently thoroughgoing fashion4 ,the
 chief stress is still laid upon the    
temporal element2 and in order to obtain
 a proof of the principle that will     
harmonise with the prominence given to  
the space-factor1 we are thrown back    
upon such supplementary suggestions as  
we can extract from the second argument 
of the first edition4 ,it is there      
stated that 8without dynamical communion
 even spatial community 7communio       
spatii7 could never be known            
empirically40#abda ,that is an assertion
 which1 if true1 will yield a proof of  
the principle of reciprocity analogous  
to that which has been given of the     
principle of causality2 for it will show
 that just as the conception of         
causality is involved in1 and makes     

possible1 the awareness of time1 so the 
conception of reciprocity is involved   
in1 and makes possible1 the awareness of
 space4  ,the proof will be as follows4 
,the parts of space have to be conceived
 as spatially interrelated4 ,space is   
not a collection of independent spaces2 
particular spaces exist only in and     
through the spaces which enclose them4  
,in other words1 the parts of space     
mutually condition one another4 ,each   
part exists only in and through its     
relations1 direct or indirect1 to all   
the others2 the awareness of their      
coexistence involves the awareness of   
this reciprocal determination4 ,but     
space cannot1 any more than time1 be    
known in and by itself2#abdb and what is
 true of space must therefore hold of   
the contents1 in terms of the           
interrelations of which space can alone 
be experienced4 ,how1 then1 can the     
reciprocal determination of substances  
in space be apprehended by a            
consciousness which is subject in all   

its experiences to the conditions of    
time8 ,as ,kant has pointed out in ,a   
#baa  ,b #beh1abdc objective coexistence
 is distinguished from objective        
sequence by reversibility of the        
perceptions through which it is         
apprehended4 ,when ,a and ,b coexist1   
our perceptions can begin with ,a and   
pass to ,b1 or start from ,b and proceed
 to ,a4 ,there is also1 as ,kant        
observes in the second proof1 a further 
condition1 namely1 that the transition  
is in each case made through a          
continuous series of changing           
perceptions4       8,only the continuous
 influences in all parts of space can   
lead our      senses from one object to 
another4 ,the light1 which plays between
      our eye and the celestial bodies1 
produces a mediate communion            
between us and them1 and thereby        
establishes the coexistence of the      
latter4 ,we cannot empirically change   
our position 7perceive such a           
change71 unless matter in all parts of  

space makes the perception      of our  
position possible to us4 ,only by means 
of its reciprocal      influence can    
matter establish the simultaneous       
existence of its      parts1 and        
thereby1 though only mediately1 their   
coexistence with      even the most     
remote objects4 ,without communion1     
every perception      of an appearance  
in space is broken off from every other1
 and the      chain of empirical        
representations1 i4e4 experience1 would 
have      to begin entirely anew with   
every new object1 without the least     
connection with preceding               
representations1 and without standing to
      them in any relation of           
time40#abdd  ,but even such             
reversibility of continuous series does 
not by itself establish coexistence4    
,for in the imagination#abde we can     
represent such series1 without thereby  
acquiring the right to assert that they 
exist not as series but as simultaneous 
wholes4 ,and as ,kant might also have   

pointed out1 even in sense-perception we
 can experience reversible continuous   
series that do not in any way justify   
the inference to coexistence4 ,we may1  
for instance1 produce on a musical      
instrument a series of continuously     
changing sounds1 and then in immediate  
succession produce the same series in   
reverse order4 ,an additional factor is 
therefore required1 namely1 the         
interpretation of the reversibility of  
our perceptions as being grounded in    
objects which1 because spatially        
extended1 and spatially continuous with 
one another1 can yield continuous series
 of perceptions1 and which1 because of  
their thoroughgoing reciprocity1 make   
possible the reversing of these series4 
,to summarise the argument in a         
sentence3 as the objectively coexistent1
 if it is to be known at all1 can only  
be known through sequent                
representations1 the condition of its   
apprehension is the possibility of      
interpreting reversible continuous      

series as due to the reciprocal         
interaction of spatially ordered        
substances4  ,this argument has a       
twofold bearing4 ,its most obvious      
consequence is that all things          
apprehended as coexistent must be       
conceived as standing in relations of   
reciprocal interaction2 but by          
implication this involves the further   
consequence that the conceptual         
principle of reciprocity is an integral 
factor in all apprehension of space4    
,space1 though intuitive in character1  
has a meaning that demands this concept 
for its articulation4 ,just as          
consciousness of temporal sequence is   
only possible in terms of causation1 so 
consciousness of spatial coexistence is 
only possible through application of the
 category of reciprocity4 ,and since1 on
 ,kant's view1 awareness of space       
conditions awareness of time1 these     
conclusions carry the ,critical analysis
 of our consciousness of time a stage   
further4 ,in confirmation of the more   

general argument of the objective       
deduction1 reciprocity is added to the  
already large sum-total of the          
indispensable conditions of our         
time-consciousness2 while in regard to  
time itself it is shown that1 owing to  
its space-reference1 coexistence may be 
counted among its possible modes4  ,i   
have made occasional reference to the   
positions adopted by ,stout in his      
,manual of ,psychology1 and may here    
indicate their relation to the present  
argument4 ,stout cites four 8categories0
 or ultimate principles of unity which  
8belong even to rudimentary perceptual  
consciousness as a condition of its     
further development10#abdf namely1      
spatial unity1 temporal unity1 causal   
unity1 and the unity of different       
attributes as belonging to the same     
thing4 ,the criticism which1 from the   
standpoint of the ,analogies1 has to be 
passed upon this list1#abdg is that it  
ignores the category of reciprocity1    
i4e4 of systematic interconnection1 and 

that it fails to recognise the close    
relation in which the various principles
 stand to one another4 ,the temporal    
unity must not be isolated from causal  
unity1 nor either of them from the      
spatial unity1 with which the category  
of reciprocity is inseparably bound up4 
,further1 ,kant maintains that these    
principles are demanded1 not merely for 
the development of perceptual           
consciousness1 but for its very         
existence4  ,but ,kant's argument       
suggests many difficulties which we have
 not yet considered1 and we may again   
employ ,schopenhauer's criticisms to    
define the issues involved4       8,the 
conception of reciprocity ought to be   
banished from      metaphysics4 ,for ,i 
now intend1 quite seriously1 to prove   
that there      is no reciprocity in the
 strict sense1 and this conception1     
which      people are so fond of using1 
just on account of the indefiniteness   
of the thought1 is seen1 if more closely
 considered1 to be empty1      false1   

and invalid4444 ,it implies that both   
the states ,a and ,b are      cause and 
that both are effect of each other2 but 
this really      amounts to saying that 
each of the two is the earlier and also 
the      later2 thus it is an           
absurdity40#abdh  ,this criticism       
proceeds on the assumption that the     
category of reciprocity reduces to a    
dual application of the category of     
causality4 ,if that were the case1 there
 would1 of course1 be no separate       
category of reciprocity1#abdi and       
further it would1 as ,schopenhauer      
maintains1 be impossible to regard ,a   
and ,b as being at one and the same time
 both cause and effect of one another4  
,causality determines the order of the  
states of substances in the time series2
 reciprocity must be distinct from      
causality if it is to be capable of     
defining the order of their coexistent  
states in space4 ,a deduction from the  
dual application of the conception of   
causality has1 therefore1 no bearing    

upon the question of the possibility of 
this further category4 ,kant has laid   
himself open to this criticism by a     
passage which occurs in the first proof1
 and which shows that he was not quite  
clear in his own mind as to how         
reciprocity ought to be conceived4      
8,that alone can determine the position 
of anything else in time1      which is 
its cause or the cause of its           
determinations4 ,every      substance   
7inasmuch as only in its determinations 
can it be an      effect7 must therefore
 contain in itself the causality of     
certain      determinations in the other
 substance1 and at the same time the    
effects of the causality of that other1 
i4e4 they must stand in      dynamical  
communion 7immediately or mediately71 if
 their      coexistence is to be known  
in any possible experience40#abej  ,it  
should be noted that in the new         
proof#abea in the second edition ,kant  
is careful to employ the terms ground   
and influence in place of the terms     

cause and causality4  ,secondly1        
,schopenhauer argues that if the two    
states necessarily belong to each other 
and exist at one and the same time1 they
 will not be simultaneous1 but will     
constitute only one state4#abeb         
,schopenhauer is again refusing to      
recognise the conditions under which    
alone a special category of reciprocity 
is called for4 ,we can speak of         
simultaneity only if a multiplicity be  
given2 and if it be given1 its nature as
 simultaneous plurality cannot be       
comprehended through a causal law1      
which1 as such1 applies only to sequent 
order4  ,lastly1 ,schopenhauer          
endeavours to confirm his position by   
examination of the supposed instances of
 reciprocity4       0,in the continuous 
burning of a fire the combination of    
oxygen      with the combustible body is
 the cause of heat1 and heat1 again1 is 
the cause of the renewed occurrence of  
the chemical combination4      ,but this
 is nothing more than a chain of causes 

and effects1 the      links of which    
have alternately the same name4444 ,we  
see before      us only an application  
of the single and simple law of         
causality      which gives the rule to  
the sequence of states1 but never       
anything      which must be comprehended
 by means of a new and special function 
of the understanding40#abec             
,schopenhauer is again misled by his    
equating of reciprocity with causal     
action4 ,combustion is quite obviously a
 case of sequent processes4 ,instead of 
proving that coexistence does not       
involve reciprocity1 ,schopenhauer is   
only showing that cause and effect may  
sometimes1 as ,kant himself             
observes1#abed seem to be               
simultaneous4#abee ,action followed by  
reaction is not equivalent to what ,kant
 means by reciprocal determination4     
,schopenhauer also cites the instance of
 a pair of scales brought to rest by    
equal weights4       8,here there is no 
effect produced1 for there is no change2

 it is a      state of rest2 gravity    
acts1 equally divided1 as in every body 
which is supported at its centre of     
gravity1 but it cannot show its         
force by any effect40#abef  ,this       
example is more in line with what ,kant 
would seem to have in view1 but is still
 defined in reference to the problem of 
causation1 and not in reference to that 
of coexistence4 ,kant is not enquiring  
whether coexistent bodies are related as
 causes and effects1 though1 as we have 
already observed1 his language betrays  
considerable lack of clearness on this  
very point4 ,he is endeavouring to      
define the conditions under which we are
 enabled to recognise that bodies1      
external to one another in space and    
apprehensible only through sequent      
perceptions1 are none the less          
coexistent4 ,and the answer which he    
gives is that coexistence can only be   
determined by reference of each         
existence to the totality of systematic 
relations within which it is found1 its 

particular spatial location being one of
 the factors which condition this       
reference4 ,causal explanation in the   
most usual meaning of that highly       
ambiguous phrase1 namely1 as explanation
 of an artificially isolated event by   
reference to antecedents similarly      
isolated from their context1 may        
partially account for this event being  
of one kind rather than another1 but    
will not explain why it is to be found  
at this particular time in this         
particular place4 ,that is to say1 it   
will not answer the question which is   
asked when we are enquiring as to what  
events are coexistent with it4  ,but the
 considerations which thus enable us to 
dispose of ,schopenhauer's criticisms   
have the effect of involving us in new1 
and much more formidable1 difficulties4 
,indeed they disclose the incomplete1   
and quite inadequate1 character of      
,kant's proof of the third ,analogy4    
,for must not spatial co-existence be   
independently known if it is to serve as

 one of the factors determinant of      
reciprocity8 ,can the apprehension of   
extended bodies wait upon a prior       
knowledge of the system of nature to    
which they belong8  ,the mere           
propounding of these questions does not1
 however1 suffice to overthrow ,kant's  
contention4 ,for he is prepared--that is
 indeed the reason why the ,critique    
came to be written--to answer them in a 
manner that had never before been       
suggested1 save perhaps in the          
philosophies of ,plato and ,aristotle4  
,this answer first emerges in the       
,dialectic1 in the course of its        
treatment of the wider problem1 of which
 the above difficulties are only special
 instances1 how if conditioned parts can
 only be known in terms of an           
unconditioned whole1 any knowledge      
whatsoever can be acquired by us4 ,but  
though ,kant in the ,dialectic gives due
 prominence to this fundamental problem1
 the hard and fast divisions of his     
architectonic--and doubtless other      

influences which would be difficult to  
define--intervene to prevent him from   
recognising its full implications4 ,for 
the problem is viewed in the ,dialectic 
as involving considerations altogether  
different from those dwelt upon in the  
,analogies1 and as being without        
application to the matters of which they
 treat4  ,the situation thus created is 
very similar to that which is occasioned
 by ,kant's unfortunate separation of   
the problems of space and time in the   
,aesthetic from the treatment of the    
categories in the ,analytic4 ,in the    
,aesthetic space and time are asserted  
to be intuitive1 not conceptual1 in     
nature2 and yet in the ,analytic we find
 ,kant demonstrating that the principles
 of causality and reciprocity are       
indispensably involved in their         
apprehension4 ,but even more misleading 
is the separation of the problems of the
 ,aesthetic and ,analytic from those of 
the ,dialectic4 ,kant's primary and     
prevailing interest is in the           

metaphysics1 not in the mere            
methodology1 of experience2 and it is in
 the ,dialectic that the metaphysical   
principles which underlie and inspire   
all his other tenets first find adequate
 statement4 ,since the third ,analogy   
defines the criterion of coexistence in 
entire independence of all reference to 
the ,ideas of ,reason1 ,kant is thereby 
precluded from even so much as          
indicating the true grounds upon which  
his position1 if it is to be really     
tenable1 must be made to rest4 ,for as  
he ultimately came to recognise1 the    
intuition of space not only involves the
 conceptual category of reciprocal      
determination1 but likewise demands for 
its possibility an ,idea of ,reason4 ,in
 space the wider whole is always prior  
in thought to the parts which go to     
constitute it4 ,but though ,kant        
states#abeg that this characteristic of 
space justifies its being entitled an   
,idea of ,reason1 he nowhere takes      
notice of the obvious and very important

 bearing which this must have upon the  
problem1 how we are to formulate the    
criterion of coexistence4  ,the general 
character of time is analogous to that  
of space1 and our formulation of the    
criterion of causal sequence is         
therefore similarly affected4 ,the      
system of nature is not the outcome of  
natural laws which are independently    
valid2 natural laws are the expression  
of what this system prescribes2 they are
 the modes in which it defines and      
embodies its inherent necessities4  ,the
 situation which these considerations   
would seem to disclose may1 therefore1  
be stated as follows4 ,if the empirical 
criteria of truth are independent of the
 ,ideas of ,reason1 the ,analytic may be
 adequate to their discussion1 but will 
be unable to justify the assertion that 
there is a category of reciprocal or    
systematic connection distinct from that
 of causality4 ,if1 however1 it should  
be found that these criteria are merely 
special applications of standards       

metaphysical in character--and that     
would seem to be ,kant's final          
conclusion1--only in the light of the   
wider considerations first broached in  
the ,dialectic1 can we hope to define   
their nature and implications with any  
approach to completeness4   #d4 ,,the   
,,postulates ,,of ,,empirical ,,thought 
,,in ,,general  ,first                  
,postulate4--,that which agrees1 in     
intuition and in concepts1 with the     
formal conditions of experience is      
possible4  ,second ,postulate4--,that   
which is connected with the material    
conditions of experience 7that is1 with 
sensation7 is actual4  ,third           
,postulate4--,that which is determined1 
in its connection with the actual1      
according to universal conditions of    
experience is 7that is1 exists as7      
necessary4  ,in this section ,kant      
maintains that when the ,critical       
standpoint is accepted1 possibility1    
actuality and necessity can only be     
defined in terms of the conditions which

 render sense-experience possible4 ,in  
other words1 the ,critical position1    
that all truth1 even that of a priori   
principles1 is merely de facto1 involves
 acceptance of the view that the actual 
reduces to the experienced1 and that    
only by reference to the actual as thus 
given can possibility and necessity be  
defined4 ,the ,leibnizian view that     
possibility is capable of being defined 
independently of the actual1 and        
antecedently to all knowledge of it1    
must be rejected4  ,an analysis of the  
text can be profitably made only after a
 detailed examination of ,kant's general
 argument2 and to that task we may at   
once apply ourselves4 ,the section      
affords further illustration of the     
perverting influence of ,kant's         
architectonic1 as well as of the        
insidious manner in which the older     
rationalism continued to pervert his    
thinking in his less watchful moments4  
,first ,postulate4--,in the opening     
paragraphs ,kant uses 7as it would seem 

without consciousness of so doing7 the  
term possibility in two very different  
senses4#abeh ,when the possible is      
distinguished from the actual and the   
necessary1 it acquires the meaning      
defined in this first ,postulate2 it is 
8that which agrees with the formal      
conditions of experience40 ,but it is   
also employed in a much narrower sense  
to signify that which can have          
8objective reality1 i4e4 transcendental 
truth40#abei ,the possibility of the    
objectively real rests upon fulfilment  
of a threefold condition3 7#a7 that it  
agree with the formal conditions of     
experience2 7#b7 that it stand in       
connection with the material of the     
sensuous conditions of experience2 and  
7#c7 that it follow with necessity upon 
some preceding state in accordance with 
the principle of causality1 and so form 
part of a necessitated order of nature4 
,in other words1 it must be causally    
necessitated in order to be empirically 
actual2 and only the empirically actual 

is genuinely possible4 ,such is also the
 meaning that usually attaches to the   
term possible in the other sections of  
the ,critique4 ,a #8possible experience'
 is one that can become actual when the 
specific conditions1 all of which must  
themselves be possible1 are fulfilled4  
,an experience which is not capable of  
being actual has no right to be         
described even as possible4 ,as a term  
applicable to the objectively real1 the 
possible is not wider than the actual1  
but coextensive with it4 ,as ,kant      
himself remarks1 those terms refer      
exclusively to differences in the       
subjective attitude of the apprehending 
mind4  ,this ambiguity in the term      
#8possibility' has caused a             
corresponding ambiguity in ,kant's      
employment of the term #8actuality4' ,it
 leads him to endeavour to define the   
actual1 not in its connection with the  
conditions of possibility1 but in       
distinction from them4 ,the possible    
having been defined 7in the first       

,postulate7 solely in terms of the      
formal factors of experience1 he        
proceeds to characterise the actual in a
 similarly one-sided fashion1           
exclusively in terms of the material    
element of given sensation4 ,doubtless  
the element of sensation must play a    
prominent part in enabling us to decide 
what is or is not actually existent1 but
 no definition which omits to take      
account of relational factors can be an 
adequate expression of ,critical        
teaching4 ,indeed1 we only require to   
substitute the words #8sensuously given'
 for #8actual' in ,kant's definition of 
the third ,postulate 7i4e4 of the       
necessary7 in order to obtain a correct 
statement of the true ,critical view of 
actual existence3 it is 8that which is  
determined in its connection with the   
sensuously given according to universal 
conditions of experience40 ,for ,kant   
the actual and the necessary1           
objectively viewed1 coincide4 ,necessity
 is for the human mind always merely de 

facto2 and nothing can be objectively   
actual that is not causally determined4 
,as the empirically possible cannot1 in 
its objective reference1 be wider than  
the empirically necessary1 one and the  
same definition adequately covers all   
three terms alike4 ,while the           
distinctions between them will1 of      
course1 remain1 they will be applicable1
 not to objects1 but only to the        
subjective conditions of experience in  
so far as these may vary from one       
individual to another4 ,experiences     
capable of being actual for one         
individual may be merely possible for   
another4 ,and what is merely actual to  
one observer may by others be           
comprehended in its necessitating       
connections4 ,the terms will not denote 
differences in the real1 but only       
variations in the cognitive attitude of 
the individual4  ,thus in professing to 
show that the three ,postulates are     
transcendental principles1 ,kant does   
less than justice to his own teaching4  

,for though both here and in the opening
 sections of the chapter#abfj he speaks 
of them in this manner1 i4e4 as being   
conditions alike of ordinary and of     
scientific experience1 he has himself   
admitted in so many words the           
inappropriateness of such a description4
       8,the principles of modality are 
nothing more than explanations      not1
 it may be noted1 proofs of the concepts
 of possibility1      actuality and     
necessity1 in their empirical use1 and  
are therefore      at the same time     
restrictions of all the categories to   
this merely      empirical use1 ruling  
out and forbidding their transcendental 
transcendent employment40#abfa  ,that is
 to say1 these so-called principles are 
not really principles2 they merely      
embody explanatory statements designed  
to render the preceding results more    
definite1 and especially to guard       
against the illegitimate meanings which 
the ,leibnizian metaphysics had attached
 to certain of the terms involved4      

,these considerations bring us to the   
real source of ,kant's perverse         
argumentation1 namely1 the artificial   
7but none the less imperious7 demands of
 his architectonic4 ,he is constrained  
to provide a set of principles          
corresponding to the categories of      
modality4 ,the definitions of the modal 
categories have therefore to be called  
by that inappropriate name4 ,but that is
 not the end of the matter4 ,in order to
 meet the needs of his logical          
framework1 ,kant proceeds even further  
than he had ventured to do in the       
sections on the ,axioms of ,intuition   
and ,anticipations of ,perception4      
,there he fell so far short as to       
provide only a single principle in each 
case4 ,in dealing1 however1 with the    
categories of relation he has been able 
to define each of the three categories  
separately1 and to derive from each a   
separate principle4 ,many of the defects
 in his argument are1 indeed1 traceable 
to this source4 ,the close              

interrelations of the three principles  
are1 as we have had occasion to note1   
seriously obscured4 ,but still1 in the  
main1 separate treatment of each has    
proved feasible4 ,kant1 encouraged1 as  
we may believe1 by this successful      
fulfilment of architectonic             
requirements1 now sets himself to       
develop1 in similar fashion1 a separate 
principle for each modal category4 ,but 
for any such enterprise the conditions  
are less favourable than in the case of 
the categories of relation4 ,for1 as    
just indicated1 no one of the three can1
 on ,critical principles1 possess any   
genuine meaning save in its relation to 
the others4 ,before following out this  
line of criticism1 we must however note 
some further points in ,kant's argument4
  ,in ,a #bai  ,b #bff1 and again in ,a 
#bbe  ,b #bgb1 ,kant makes the statement
 that a concept can be complete prior to
 any decision as to its possibility1    
actuality1 or necessity4 ,this          
contention is capable of being          

interpreted in two quite independent    
ways1 and in only one of those ways is  
it tenable4 ,he may mean that the       
distinction between the possible1 the   
actual1 and the necessary1 does not     
concern the objectively real1 which as  
such is always both actual and          
necessary1 but only the subjective      
attitude of the individual towards the  
objects of his thought and experience4  
,from the ,critical standpoint1 as we   
have been arguing1 such a contention is 
entirely just4 ,but ,kant would seem in 
the above statement to be chiefly       
concerned to maintain that a conception 
may be complete and determinate1 even   
while we remain in doubt whether the    
existence for which it stands is even   
possible4#abfb ,such a view is merely a 
relic of the ,leibnizian rationalism    
from which he is striving to break away4
 ,all existences have their place in a  
systematic order of experience1 and no  
conception of them can be either        
complete or determinate which fails to  

specify the causal context to which they
 belong4 ,the process of specifying the 
detail of a concept is the only process 
whereby we can define its possibility1  
actuality1 or necessity4#abfc ,were it  
capable of complete statement without   
determination of its modal character1 it
 could never form part of a unified     
experience4 ,the examples of            
8fictitious0 concepts1 which ,kant      
cites1 are either so determinate as to  
be demonstrably inconsistent with       
experience1 and therefore empirically   
impossible1 or so indeterminate as to   
afford no sufficient means of deciding  
even as to their possibility4  ,there is
 a further objection to the definition  
given of possibility in the first       
,postulate4 ,after stating that the     
possible is what agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience1 ,kant         
proceeds1 on the one hand1 to argue that
 the forms of intuition and the         
categories of understanding may1 in     
accordance with this criterion1 be      

viewed as possible1 and1 on the other   
hand1 to maintain that no other concepts
 can be so regarded4#abfd ,that is to   
say1 the possible1 as thus interpreted1 
does not consist in something additional
 to1 and in harmony with1 the conditions
 of experience1 but reduces without     
remainder to those very forms4 ,now     
,kant is not betrayed merely by         
inadvertence into thus narrowing the    
sphere of the possible2 such limitation 
is an almost inevitable consequence of  
the one-sided manner in which he has    
treated the concept of the possible in  
this first ,postulate4 ,he professes to 
be proceeding in the light of the       
results obtained in the transcendental  
deduction1 and to be defining the       
possible in terms of the conditions     
which make sense-experience possible4   
,but the deduction has shown that       
experience is possible only in so far as
 the material factors co-operate with   
the formal4 ,and when this is           
recognised1 it becomes obvious that a   

definition of the possible in terms of  
sensation1--namely1 as that which is    
capable of being presented in           
sense-perception1--is equally           
legitimate1 and is indeed required in   
order to correct the deficiencies of the
 definition which ,kant has himself     
given4 ,as both factors are             
indispensable in all possible           
experience1 both must be reckoned with  
in defining the possible4  ,kant's      
argument in the fifth paragraph is      
somewhat obscured by its context4 ,he is
 contending that fictitious 7gedichtete7
 concepts1 elaborated from the contents 
presented in perception1 cannot be      
determined as possible4 ,as they involve
 sensuous contents1 the formal elements 
of experience do not suffice for proof  
of their possibility2 and since the     
contents are supposed to have been      
recombined in ways not supported by     
experience1 an empirical criterion is   
equally inapplicable4 ,obviously ,kant  
is here using the term #8possible' not  

in the meaning of the first ,postulate1 
but in its narrower connotation as      
signifying that which is capable of     
objective reality4 ,such fictitious     
concepts may completely fulfil all the  
demands prescribed by space1 time1 and  
the categories1 and yet1 as he here     
insists1 be none the less incapable of  
objective existence4  ,the argument is  
still further obscured by the character 
of the concrete examples which ,kant    
cites4 ,they involve modes of action or 
of intuition which contradict the very  
conditions of human experience1 and so  
for that reason alone fall outside the  
realm of the empirically possible4 ,that
 would not1 however1 seem to be ,kant's 
meaning in employing them4 ,assumed     
powers of anticipating the future or of 
telepathic communication with other     
minds are1 he says1 concepts            
8444the possibility of which is         
altogether groundless1 as they          
cannot be based on experience and its   
known laws1 and without such            

confirmation are arbitrary combinations 
of thoughts1 which1      although indeed
 free from contradiction1 can make no   
claim to      objective reality and so  
to the possibility of an object such as 
we      here profess to think40#abfe    
,the mathematical examples which ,kant  
gives in ,a #bbc  ,b #bgaabff are no    
less misleading4 ,the concept of a      
triangle can1 it is implied1 be         
determined as possible in terms of the  
first ,postulate1 since it harmonises   
with a formal condition of experience1  
namely1 space4 ,this is true only if it 
be granted that construction in space   
can be executed absolutely a priori1 in 
independence of all sense-experience4   
,such is1 of course1 ,kant's most usual 
view2 and to that extent the argument is
 consistent4 ,mathematical concepts will
 from this point of view represent the  
only possible exception to the general  
statement that the formal conditions of 
experience constitute a criterion of    
possibility for no concepts save        

themselves4 ,kant's final conclusion is 
clearly and explicitly stated in the    
following terms3       8,i leave aside  
everything the possibility of which can 
be derived      only from its reality in
 experience1 and have here in view only 
the      possibility of things through a
 priori concepts2 and ,i maintain       
the thesis that the possibility of such 
things can never be      established    
from such concepts taken in and by      
themselves1 but      only when they are 
viewed as formal and objective          
conditions of      experience in        
general40#abfg  ,we are now in a        
position to appreciate the reasons which
 have induced ,adickes to regard the    
text as of composite origin4#abfh       
,adickes argues that ,kant's original   
intention was to treat the three        
concepts together1 showing that they can
 be defined only in empirical terms1 and
 that their significance is consequently
 limited to the world of appearance4    
,such is the content of the first1      

second1 fourth 7excepting the first     
sentence71 and fifth paragraphs4 ,no    
attempt is made to separate the three   
,postulates1 and the term possibility is
 throughout employed exclusively as     
referring to objective reality4 7,in the
 third paragraph it is used in both     
senses47 ,the other paragraphs were1    
according to ,adickes' theory1 added    
later1 when ,kant unfortunately resolved
 to fulfil more exactly the requirements
 of his architectonic4 ,that involved   
the formulation of three separate       
,postulates1 with all the many evil     
consequences which that attempt carried 
in its train4 ,he must then have        
interpolated the third paragraph1 added 
the first sentence to the fourth        
paragraph1 corrected the too extensive  
sweep of the older paragraphs through   
the introduction of the sixth paragraph1
 further supplemented the exposition of 
the first ,postulate by the seventh     
paragraph1 and added independent        
treatments of the postulates of         

actuality and necessity4 ,this may seem 
a very complicated and hazardous        
hypothesis2 but careful examination of  
the text1 with due recognition of the   
confused character of the argument as it
 stands1 will probably convince the     
reader that ,adickes is in the right4   
,second ,postulate4#abfi--,perception is
 necessary to all determination of      
actuality4 ,the actual is either itself 
given in perception or can be shown1 in 
accordance with the ,analogies1 to stand
 within the unity of objective          
experience1 in connection with what is  
thus given4 ,so long as ,kant expresses 
himself in these terms his statements   
are entirely valid4 ,nothing which      
cannot be shown to be bound up with the 
contingent material of sense-experience 
can be admitted as actual4 ,he proceeds1
 however1 to give a definition of       
actuality which entirely omits all      
reference to the ,analogies1 and which  
is open to the same fundamental         
criticism as his characterisation of    

possibility in the first ,postulate4    
,though the earlier statements give due 
recognition both to the material content
 and to the relational forms            
constitutive of complete experience1    
,kant now contrasts the mere or bare    
7blosser7 concept and the given         
perception in a manner which suggests   
the unfortunate distinction drawn in the
 ,prolegomena1 and repeated in the      
second edition of the ,critique1 between
 judgments of perception and judgments  
of experience4#abgj ,kant's reference to
 8the mere concept of a thing0#abga is  
on the same lines as the opening        
paragraph of the section4 ,however      
complete the concept may be1 it yields  
not the least ground for deciding as to 
the existence of its object4  ,kant's   
thinking1 as ,i have already pointed    
out1 is here perverted by the continuing
 influence of the ,leibnizian           
rationalism4 ,he is forgetting that1 on 
,critical principles1 even the          
categories are meaningless except in    

their reference to the contingently     
given4 ,if that be true of the strictly 
a priori1 it must hold with even greater
 force of empirical concepts with       
sensuous content4 ,as the sole          
legitimate function of concepts1 whether
 a priori or empirical1 is to organise  
and unify the material of sense1 there  
can be no such thing as the mere or bare
 concept4 ,such a combination of words  
is without ,critical significance4 ,a   
concept as such must refer to1 and      
embody insight into1 the real4 ,only in 
proportion to its incompleteness1 that  
is1 to its indefiniteness1 can it remain
 without specific and quite determinate 
location within the context of unified  
experience4 ,it may1 indeed1 be found   
convenient to retain the phrase 8mere   
concept0 notwithstanding its misleading 
character and rationalistic origin4 ,it 
must1 however1 be used only to mark the 
indefiniteness1 indeterminateness1 or   
incompleteness which prevents it from   
adequately revealing the denotation to  

which through the nature of its content 
it necessarily refers4 ,meaning and     
existence1 connotation and denotation1  
are complementary the one to the other1 
and though not1 perhaps1 coextensive 7if
 that term has itself meaning in this   
connection71 are none the less          
inseparably conjoined4 ,when ,kant's    
utterances1 as frequently happens1 imply
 the contrary1 they may be taken as     
revealing the strength and insidious    
tenacity of the influences from which he
 was sufficiently courageous1 but not   
always sufficiently watchful1 to break  
away4  ,the doctrine of the 8mere       
concept0 finds its natural supplement in
 the equally un-,critical assertion that
       8444perception evidently employed
 in the less pregnant sense1 as         
signifying #8sensation accompanied by   
consciousness'1 which      supplies the 
material to the concept1 is the sole    
character of      actuality40#abgb      
,this same position is expressed equally
 strongly by ,kant in his ,reflexionen  

7ii4 #ajie74       8,possibility is     
thought without being given2 actuality  
is given      without being thought2    
necessity is given through being        
thought40  ,such statements are entirely
 out of harmony with ,kant's central    
teaching4 ,there is no lack of passages 
in the ,critique which inculcate the    
direct contrary4 ,though the element of 
sensation is a sine qua non of all      
experience of the actual1 the formal    
elements are no less indispensable4 ,in 
their absence the merely given would    
reduce to less than a dream2 for even in
 dreams images are interpreted and are  
referred to some connected context4 ,the
 given1 merely as such1 cannot enter the
 field of consciousness1 and is         
therefore 8for us as good as nothing40  
,as ,caird has pointed out1 we find in  
,kant       8444two apparently          
contradictory forms of expression--7#a7 
that the      understanding by means of 
its conceptions refers our preceptions  
to      objects1 and 7#b7 that          

conceptions are referred to objects only
      indirectly through perceptions4   
,the former mode of expression is       
preferred whenever ,kant has to show    
that #8perceptions without              
conceptions are blind'2 the latter when 
he has to show that      #8conceptions  
without perceptions are empty4'0#abgc   
8,we can      understand the possibility
 of ,kant's looking at the subject in   
these two opposite ways1 only if we     
remember the reciprocal                 
presupposition of perception and        
conception in the judgment of           
knowledge1 and the way in which ,kant   
tries to explain it1 now from      the  
point of view of perception1 and now    
from the point of view of               
conception4 ,the effect of this is1 no  
doubt1 a formal contradiction      which
 ,kant himself never disentangles1 but  
which we must      endeavour to         
disentangle1 if we would do justice to  
him40#abgd  ,the one-sidedness of       
,kant's definition of actuality is      

certainly due to the cause suggested by 
,caird4 ,the definition1 notwithstanding
 its misleading character1 serves to    
enforce against the older rationalism1  
with which ,kant throughout this section
 is almost exclusively concerned1 the   
central tenet through which the         
,critical teaching is distinguished from
 that of ,leibniz1 namely1 that neither 
existence1 possibility1 nor necessity1  
can be established save by reference to 
the contingent nature of the sensuously 
given4 ,proof by reference to the       
possibility of experience can establish 
only those conditions which can be shown
 to be de facto necessary in order that 
consciousness of time may be accounted  
for4 ,the formal conditions of          
experience1 which in and by themselves  
are determinable neither as actual nor  
as possible1 are established as actual1 
and so as necessary1 by reference to the
 merely given2 they are necessary only  
in this merely relative fashion1 as     
being indispensable to what can never   

itself be viewed as other than          
contingent4       8,our knowledge of the
 existence of things reaches1 then1 only
 so      far as perception and its      
continuation according to laws of nature
      can extend4 ,if we do not start   
from experience1 or do not proceed      
according to laws of the empirical      
connection of appearances1 our          
guessing or enquiring into the existence
 of anything will only be      an idle  
pretence40#abge  ,polemically1          
therefore1 ,kant's formulation of the   
second ,postulate is not without its    
advantages1 though from the inner       
standpoint of ,critical teaching it is  
altogether inadequate4  ,for comment    
upon ,a #bbf  ,b #bgc1 and upon the     
general teaching of this ,postulate in  
its important bearing upon ,kant's      
phenomenalism1 cf4 above1 pp4 #cah-ai4  
,b #bgd-i4--,refutation of ,idealism1   
cf4 above1 p4 #cjh ff4         99       
99       99       99       99  ,third   
,postulate4#abgf--;,in the opening      

sentence ,kant draws the distinction    
which was lacking in his treatment of   
the first ,postulate between #8material'
 and #8formal' modality4 7,no           
distinction1 however1 is drawn between  
the #8formal' possibility of the first  
,postulate and logical possibility1     
which consists in absence of            
contradiction47 ,it is with the former  
alone that we have to deal4 ,as         
existence cannot be determined          
completely a priori1 necessity can never
 be known from concepts1 but only by    
reference to the actually given1 in     
accordance with the universal principles
 that condition experience4 ,further1   
since such empirical necessity does not 
concern the existence of substances1 but
 only the existence of their states1    
viewed as dynamically caused1 the       
criterion of empirical necessity reduces
 to the second ,analogy1 viz4 that      
everything which happens is determined  
by an antecedent empirical cause4 ,this 
criterion does not extend beyond the    

field of possible experience1 and even  
within that field applies only to those 
existences which can be viewed as       
effects1 i4e4 as events which come into 
existence in time1 and of which         
therefore the causes are of the same    
temporal and conditioned character4 ,the
 necessity is a hypothetical necessity2 
given an empirical event1 it can always 
be legitimately viewed as necessitated  
by an antecedent empirical cause4  ,kant
 introduces1 reinterprets1 and in this  
altered form professes to justify1 four 
of the central principles of the        
,leibnizian metaphysics4 ,in mundo non  
datur casus gives expression to the     
above empirical principle4 ,non datur   
fatum may be taken as meaning that      
natural 7i4e4 empirical7 necessity is a 
conditioned and therefore comprehensible
 necessity1 and is consequently not     
rightly described as blind4 ,the other  
two principles1 non datur saltus1 and   
non datur hiatus connect with the       
principle of continuity already         

established in the ,anticipations of    
,perception and in the second ,analogy4 
,kant's further remarks reveal an uneasy
 feeling that he is neglecting to assign
 these principles to the pigeon-holes   
provided in his architectonic4 ,the     
reader1 he states1 may easily do so for 
himself4 ,that may be so1 but only if   
the reader be permitted the same        
high-handed methods of adjustment that  
are here illustrated in ,kant's location
 of non datur fatum with the principles 
of modality4#abgg  ,in the next         
paragraph 7,a #bcj  ,b #bhb7 ,kant      
suddenly1 without warning or            
explanation1 attaches to the term       
possibility a meaning altogether        
different from any yet assigned to it4  
,he now takes it as equivalent to the   
absolutely or metaphysically possible4  
,combining this with the meanings       
previously given to it by ,kant we      
obtain the following table3--           
,logical3 equivalent to absence of      
contradiction4              ,empirical3 

in the wider sense1 equivalent to       
agreement              with the formal  
conditions of experience2 in the        
narrower   ,possibilityor stricter      
sense1 involving in addition the        
capacity              of being presented
 in sense-experience4                   
,metaphysical3 equivalent to absolute   
possibility1 a conception               
not of understanding but of ,reason4    
,when this last meaning is given to the 
term1 an entirely new set of problems   
arises1 to the confusion of the reader  
who very properly continues to employ   
the term possibility in the empirical   
sense which1 as ,kant has been          
insisting1 is alone legitimate4 ,kant   
has temporarily changed over to the     
standpoint of the metaphysical view     
which he has been criticising1 and      
accordingly uses the term #8possibility'
 in the ,leibnizian sense4 ,is ,leibniz1
 he asks1 justified in maintaining that 
the field of the possible is wider than 
the realm of the actual1 and the latter 

in turn wider in extent than the        
necessary8 ,in reply ,kant accepts the  
metaphysical meaning assigned to the    
term #8possibility1' but restates the   
problem in ,critical fashion4 ,do all   
things belong as appearances to the     
context of a single experience1 or are  
other types of experience possible8 ,do 
other forms of intuition besides space  
and time1 other forms of understanding  
besides the discursive through concepts1
 come within the range of the possible8 
,these are questions which fall to be   
answered1 not by the mere understanding1
 the sole function of which is          
empirical1 but by ,reason1 which        
transcends the world of appearance4     
,kant introduces these questions1 as he 
is careful to state1#abgh only because  
they are currently believed to be within
 the competence of the understanding2   
and he now for the first time points out
 that possibility1 in this sense1 means 
absolute possibility1 that which is     
independent of all limiting conditions1 

a meaning ruled out by the preceding    
treatment of the modal categories4 ,like
 all other absolute conceptions1 it     
belongs to ,reason1 and must therefore  
await treatment in the ,dialectic4      
,these admissions come1 however1 only   
after the discussion has been completed4
 ,had ,kant reversed the order of the   
two paragraphs which constitute this    
digression1 and marked them off as being
 a digression1 he would have greatly    
assisted the reader in following the    
argument4  ,kant adds a refutation of   
the merely logical arguments by which   
,leibniz had professed to establish the 
priority and greater scope of the       
possible4 ,from the proposition1        
everything actual is possible1 we can   
infer by immediate inference that some  
possible things are actual4 ,that1      
however1 would seem to imply that part  
of the possible is not actual1 and that 
something must be added to the possible 
in order to constitute the actual4 ,but 
this1 ,kant replies1 is obviously an    

untenable view4 ,the something          
additional to the possible1 not being   
itself possible1 we should be           
constrained to regard as impossible4    
,for our understanding1#abgi the        
possible is that which connects with    
some perception in agreement with the   
formal conditions of experience4 7,kant 
here gives the correct ,critical        
definition of the possible1 by combining
 the two first postulates47 ,whether1   
and how far1 other existences beyond the
 field of sense experience are possible1
 we have no means of deciding4  ,b      
#bhh-bid4--,this second edition section 
emphasises the fact that possibility    
cannot be determined through the        
categories alone1 but only through the  
categories in their relation to         
intuition1 and indeed to outer          
intuition4 ,possibility is throughout   
taken as referring to objective reality4
 ,the section is chiefly important in   
connection with the problems bearing on 
the relation of inner and outer sense   

and on the nature of our consciousness  
of time4#abhj  ,in ,b #bhi-ia ,kant     
criticises those rationalistic arguments
 which rest upon the equating of        
necessity of thought with necessity of  
existence4 ,when it is sought by mere   
analysis of concepts to prove that all  
accidental existence has a cause1 the   
most that can be shown is that the      
existence of the accidental cannot be   
comprehended by us1 unless the existence
 of a cause be assumed4 ,but we may not 
argue that a condition of possible      
understanding is likewise a condition of
 possible existence4#abha ,what is or is
 not possible for thought is1 without   
special proof1 no sufficient criterion  
of what is or is not possible in the    
real4 ,if1 again1 the term accidental be
 taken as meaning that which can exist  
only as a consequence of some other     
existence1 the general principle becomes
 merely analytic1 and must not be taken 
as establishing the synthetic principle 
of causality4 ,the latter demands       

transcendental proof by reference to the
 possibility of contingent experience4  
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,on ,,the ,,ground    
,,of ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,all     
,,objects ,,whatever ,,into ,,phenomena 
,,and ,,noumena   ,this chapter1 as     
,kant himself states1#abhb can yield no 
new results4 ,it will serve merely to   
summarise those already established in  
the ,analytic1 showing how they one and 
all converge upon a conclusion of       
supreme importance for understanding the
 nature and scope of human              
experience--the conclusion1 that though 
the objective employment of the         
categories can be justified only within 
the realm of sense-experiences1 they    
have a wider significance whereby they  
define a distinction between appearances
 and things in themselves4 ,this is the 
conclusion which ,kant now sets himself 
to illustrate and enforce in somewhat   
greater detail4 ,it may be observed that
 the title of the chapter makes mention 
only of grounds for distinguishing      

between phenomena and noumena4 ,that    
things in themselves really exist1      
,kant1 as we shall find1 never seriously
 thought of questioning4  ,kant begins  
by recalling a main point in the        
preceding argument4 ,the categories     
apart from the manifold of sensibility  
are merely logical functions without    
content4#abhc ,though a priori1 they    
require to be supplemented through      
empirical intuition4       8,apart from 
this relation to possible experience    
they have no      objective validity of 
any sort1 but are a mere play of the    
imagination or the understanding with   
their respective                        
representations40#abhd  ,as evidence of 
the truth of this conclusion ,kant now  
adds a further argument1 namely1 the    
impossibility of defining the categories
 except in terms that involve reference 
to the conditions of sensibility4#abhe  
,when these conditions are omitted1 the 
categories are without relation to any  
object and consequently without meaning4

 ,they are no longer concepts of        
possible empirical employment1 but only 
of 8things in general40 ,when1 for      
instance1 the permanence of existence in
 time1 which is the condition of the    
empirical application of the concept of 
substance1 is omitted1 the category     
reduces merely to the notion of         
something that is always a subject and  
never a predicate4       8,but not only 
am ,i ignorant of all conditions under  
which this      logical pre-eminence may
 belong to anything1 ,i can neither put 
such      a concept to any use nor draw 
the least inference from it4 ,for       
under these conditions no object is     
determined for its employment1      and 
consequently we do not at all know      
whether it signifies      anything      
whatsoever40#abhf  ,in abstraction from 
sense-data1 the categories still remain 
as concepts or thoughts1 logically      
possible2 but that is not to be taken as
 signifying that they still continue to 
possess meaning1 i4e4 reference to an   

object4#abhg ,and in the absence of     
ascertainable meaning they cannot1 of   
course1 be defined4  ,in ,a #bddabhh    
,kant states his position in somewhat   
different fashion4 ,in abstraction from 
sense the categories have meaning1 but  
not determinate meaning2 they relate not
 to any specific object1 but only to    
things in general4 ,in this latter      
reference1 however1 they possess no     
objective validity1 since in the absence
 of intuition there is no means of      
deciding whether or not any real        
existence actually corresponds to them4 
,but whichever mode of statement be     
adopted1 the same conclusion follows4   
8,accordingly1 the transcendental       
,analytic has this important            
result1 that the most the understanding 
can achieve a priori is      to         
anticipate the form of a possible       
experience in general4 ,and      since  
that which is not appearance cannot be  
an object of      experience1 the       
understanding can never transcend those 

limits of      sensibility within which 
alone objects are given to us4 ,its     
principles are merely rules for the     
exposition of appearances2 and      the 
proud title of an ,ontology1 which      
presumptuously claims to      supply1 in
 systematic doctrinal form1 synthetic a 
priori      knowledge of things in      
general 7e4g4 the principle of          
causality71      must therefore give    
place to the modest claims of a mere    
,analytic      of pure                  
understanding40#abhi  ,a #bdh-iabij     
opens a new line of argument which      
starts from the results obtained in the 
,aesthetic4 ,the proof that space and   
time are subjective forms establishes   
the merely phenomenal character of      
everything which can be apprehended in  
and through them1 and is meaningless    
except on the assumption that things in 
themselves exist4 ,this assumption1     
,kant argues1 is already involved in the
 very word #8appearance1' and unless it 
be granted1 our thinking will revolve in

 a perpetual circle4#abia ,but1 he      
proceeds1 this conclusion may easily be 
misinterpreted4 ,it might be taken as   
proving the objective reality of        
noumena1 and as justifying us in        
maintaining a distinction between the   
sensible and the intelligible worlds1   
and therefore in asserting that whereas 
the former is the object of intuition1  
the latter is apprehended by the        
understanding in pure thought4 ,we      
should then be arguing that though in   
experience things are known only as they
 appear1 through pure understanding a   
nobler world than that of sense1 8eine  
,welt im ,geiste gedacht10 is opened to 
our view4  ,but any such interpretation1
 ,kant insists1 runs directly counter to
 the teaching of the ,analytic1 and is  
ruled out by the conclusions to which it
 has led4 ,categories yield only 8rules 
for the exposition of appearances10 and 
cannot be extended beyond the field of  
possible experience4 ,it is true that   
all our sense-representations are       

related by the understanding to an      
object that is 8transcendental40 ,but   
that object1 in its transcendental      
aspect1 signifies only a something  x4  
,it cannot be thought apart from the    
sense-data which are referred to it4    
,when we attempt to isolate it1 and so  
to conceive it in its independent       
nature1 nothing remains through which it
 can be thought4       8,it is not in   
itself an object of knowledge1 but only 
the      representation of appearances  
under the concept of an object in       
general1 viewed as determinable through 
the manifold of those      appearances40
  ,kant is here again expounding his    
early doctrine of the transcendental    
object4#abib ,evidently1 at the time at 
which this passage was written1 he had  
not yet come to realise that such       
teaching is not in harmony with his     
,critical principles4 ,it is1 as we have
 seen above1 a combination of           
subjectivism and of dogmatic            
rationalism4#abic ,the very point which 

he here chiefly stresses was bound1     
however1 when consistently followed out1
 to reveal the untenableness of the     
doctrine of the transcendental object2  
and in the second edition ,kant so      
recast this chapter on phenomena and    
noumena as to eliminate all passages in 
which the transcendental object is      
referred to4#abid  ,but to return to    
,kant's own argument3 the reason why the
 mind is 8not satisfied with this       
substrate of sensibility10#abie and     
therefore proceeds to duplicate the     
phenomenal world by a second world of   
noumena1 lies in the character of the   
agency whereby sensibility is limited4  
,sensibility is limited by the          
understanding2 and the understanding1   
overestimating its powers and           
prerogatives1 proceeds to transform the 
notion of the transcendental object  x  
into the concept of a noumenon1 viewed  
in a manner conformable to its          
etymological significance1 as something 
apprehended by reason or pure intuition1

 i4e4 as intuited in some non-sensuous  
fashion4 ,for only by postulating the   
possibility of a non-sensuous species of
 intuition1 can the notion of a         
noumenon1 thus positively conceived1 be 
saved from self-contradiction4          
,otherwise we should be asserting the   
apprehension of an object independently 
of appearances1 and yet at the same time
 denying the only means through which   
such apprehension is possible4          
,statement of the postulate suffices1   
however1 to reveal its unsupported      
character4 ,we have no such power of    
non-sensuous1 intuitive                 
apprehension2#abif nor can we in any way
 prove that such a power is possible    
even in a ,divine ,being4 ,though1      
therefore1 the concept of noumena is not
 self-contradictory1 it involves more   
than we have the right to assert2 the   
process whereby the empty notion of a   
transcendental object  x is transformed 
into the positive concept of a noumenon 
is easily comprehensible1#abig but it is

 none the less illegitimate4 ,we must1  
,kant insists1 keep strict hold of the  
central doctrine of ,critical teaching1 
namely1 that the categories are         
applicable only to the data of sense4   
,we can still employ them as pure       
logical functions1 yielding the notion  
of objects in general 7of the           
transcendental object  x74 ,but this    
does not widen the sphere of known      
existences4 ,it only enables us to      
comprehend the limited and merely       
phenomenal character of the world       
experienced4  ,at this point#abih       
,kant's argument takes a strange and    
misleading turn4 ,the concept of object 
in general 7the transcendental object   
x7 has been proved to be involved in the
 apprehension of appearances as         
appearances1 and in this capacity to be 
a limiting concept 7,grenzbegriff71     
which1 though negative in function1 is  
indispensably involved in the           
constitution of human experience4 ,now1 
however1 ,kant proceeds to ascribe this 

function to the concept of the noumenon4
 ,that concept is1 he repeats1 purely   
problematic4 ,even the mere possibility 
of its object1 presupposing as it does  
the possibility of an understanding     
capable through non-sensuous intuition  
of apprehending it1 we have no right to 
assert4 ,that the concept is not        
self-contradictory is the most that we  
can say of it4 ,none the less1 it is to 
this concept that ,kant here ascribes   
the indispensable limiting function4    
8,the concept of a noumenon is a merely 
limiting concept1 the      function of  
which is to curb the pretensions of     
sensibility2 and it      is therefore   
only of negative employment4 ,at the    
same time it is      no arbitrary       
invention1 and it is bound up with the  
limitation of      sensibility1 though  
it cannot affirm anything positive      
beyond the      field of                
sensibility40#abii  ,this confusion1    
between the concept of a noumenon and   
the less definite concept of object in  

general1 which is probably due to the   
combining of manuscripts of different   
dates1 is corrected in the second       
edition by means of a new distinction   
which ,kant introduces1 evidently for   
this very purpose4 ,the term noumenon   
may1 he there says1#acjj be used either 
positively or negatively4 ,taken        
positively1 it signifies 8an object of a
 non-sensuous intuition02 regarded      
negatively1 it means only 8a thing so   
far as it is not an object of our       
sensuous intuition40 ,only in its       
negative employment1 he states1 is it   
required as a limiting concept2 and it  
is then1 as he recognises1              
indistinguishable from the notion of the
 unknown thing in itself4  ,but despite 
this variation in mode of expression1 in
 the main ,kant holds consistently to   
his fundamental teaching4               
8444understanding is not limited through
 sensibility2 on the      contrary1 it  
itself limits sensibility by applying   
the term noumena      to things in      

themselves 7things not regarded as      
appearances74 ,but      in so doing it  
at the same time sets limits to itself1 
recognising      that it cannot know    
these noumena through any of the        
categories1      and that it must       
therefore think them only under the     
title of an      unknown                
something40#acja  ,or as ,kant adds in  
the concluding sentence of this chapter3
       8444the problematic thought which
 leaves open a place for                
intelligible objects1 serves only1 like 
an empty space1 for the      limitation 
of empirical principles1 without itself 
containing or      revealing any other  
object of knowledge beyond their        
sphere40  ,a sentence in ,a #beh  ,b    
#cad deserves special notice4           
8444we can never know whether such a    
transcendental or exceptional           
knowledge is possible under any         
conditions1 least of all if it is       
to be regarded as of the sort that      
stands under our ordinary               

categories40  ,this sentence clearly    
shows that ,kant was willing to         
recognise that the categories may be    
inapplicable1 not merely owing to lack  
of data for their specification1 but    
because of their inherent character4    
,they may be intrinsically inapplicable1
 expressing only the modi of our        
self-consciousness4 ,they may be merely 
the instruments of our human thinking1  
not forms necessary to knowledge as     
such4   ,,relevant ,,passages ,,in ,,the
 ,,section ,,on ,,amphiboly  ,before    
passing to consideration of the         
extensive alterations made in this      
chapter in the second edition1 it is    
advisable to take account of the two    
passages dealing with this problem in   
the first edition section on ,amphiboly3
 namely1 ,a #bgg-bhj  ,b #ccc-f1 and ,a 
#bhe-i  ,b #cdb-f4 ,the first of these  
passages is of great interest in other  
connections2#acjb its chief importance  
in reference to the present problem lies
 in its concluding paragraph4 ,kant     

there declares that the representation  
of an object 8as thing in general0 is   
not only1 in the absence of specific    
data1 insufficient for the determination
 of an object1 but is                   
self-contradictory4 ,for we must either 
abstract from all reference to an       
object1 and so be left with a merely    
logical representation2 or1 in assuming 
an object1 we must postulate a special  
form of intuition which we do not       
ourselves possess1 and which therefore  
we cannot employ in forming our concept 
of the object4 ,here again ,kant is     
substituting the concept of a noumenon  
for the less definite concept of the    
thing in itself4 ,this is still more    
explicitly done in the second passage4  
,the pure categories are1 ,kant there   
declares1 incapable of yielding the     
concept of an object4 ,apart from the   
data of sense they have no relation to  
any object4 ,as purely logical          
functions1 they are altogether lacking  
in content or meaning4 ,by objects as   

things in themselves we must therefore  
mean objects of a non-sensuous          
intuition4#acjc ,kant still1 indeed1    
continues to maintain that to them the  
categories do not apply1 and that we    
cannot1 therefore1 have any knowledge of
 them1 either intuitional or conceptual4
       8,even if we assume a            
non-sensuous form of intuition1 our     
functions      of thought would still   
have no meaning in reference to         
it40#acjd  ,but ,kant now insists that  
the notion of noumena1 viewed in the    
above manner1 differs from the notion of
 8objects in general0 7transcendental   
x7 in being a legitimate                
non-contradictory conception2 and he    
also insists that though more positive  
in content1 it is for that very reason  
less open to misunderstanding4 ,its     
function is not to extend our knowledge1
 but merely to limit it4       8,for it 
merely says that our species of         
intuition does not extend      to all   
things1 but only to objects of our      

senses2 that its      objective validity
 is consequently limited2 and that a    
place      therefore remains open for   
some other species of intuition1 and so 
for things as its objects40#acje  ,the  
concept of a noumenon1 as thus employed 
to signify the objects of a non-sensuous
 intuition1 is1 ,kant proceeds1 merely  
problematic4 ,as we have neither        
intuition nor 7it may be7 categories    
fitted for its apprehension1 it         
represents something upon the           
possibility or impossibility of which we
 are quite unable to pronounce4         
8444as the problematic concept of an    
object for a quite different            
intuition and a quite different         
understanding than ours1 it is          
itself a problem40  ,we may not         
therefore assert the existence of       
noumena1 but we must none the less form 
to ourselves the concept of them4 ,this 
concept is indispensably involved in the
 constitution of our empirical          
knowledge1 and is demanded for its      

proper interpretation4 ,only when viewed
 as a self-sufficient representation of 
an absolute existence does it become    
dogmatic and therefore illegitimate4 ,in
 its ,critical aspects it stands for a  
problem which human reason is           
constrained by its very nature to       
propound4       8,the concept of the    
noumenon is1 therefore1 not the concept 
of an      object1 but is a problem     
unavoidably bound up with the limitation
      of our sensibility--the problem1  
namely1 as to whether there may      not
 be objects entirely disengaged from our
 sensuous species of      intuition4    
,this is a question which can only be   
answered in an      indeterminate       
manner1 by saying that1 as sense        
intuition does not      extend to all   
things without distinction1 a place     
remains open for      other different   
objects2 and consequently that these    
latter must      not be absolutely      
denied1 though--since we are without a  
determinate concept of them 7inasmuch as

 no category can serve that             
purpose7--neither can they be asserted  
as objects for our                      
understanding40#acjf  ,the fact that    
these fundamental concepts have not yet 
been quite definitely and precisely     
formulated in ,kant's own mind1 appears 
very clearly from the immediately       
following paragraph4 ,for he there again
 introduces the concept of the          
transcendental object1 and adds that if 
8we are pleased to name it noumenon for 
the reason that its representation is   
not sensuous1 we are free so to         
do40#acjg ,the characterisation given in
 this paragraph of the transcendental   
object deserves special notice1 for in  
it ,kant goes further in the sceptical  
expression of his position1 though not  
indeed in the modification of it1 than  
in any other passage4       0,the       
understanding in limiting sensibility   
thinks for itself an      object in     
itself1 but only as transcendental      
object which is the      cause of       

appearance and therefore not itself     
appearance1 and which      can be       
thought neither as quantity nor as      
reality nor as substance1      etc4444  
,we are completely ignorant whether it  
is to be met with in      us or outside 
us1 whether it would be at once removed 
with the      cessation of sensibility1 
or whether in the absence of sensibility
      it would still remain40#acjh      
,this sentence reveals ,kant as at once 
holding unquestioningly to the existence
 of things in themselves1 and yet at the
 same time as teaching that they must   
not be conceived in terms of the        
categories1 not even of the categories  
of reality and existence4               
,,alterations ,,in ,,second ,,edition   
,in the second edition certain          
paragraphs of the chapter on ,phenomena 
and ,noumena are omitted1 and new       
paragraphs are inserted to take their   
place4 ,though these alterations do not 
give adequate expression to the         
,critical teaching in its maturest form1

 there are three important respects in  
which they indicate departures from the 
teaching of the first edition4 ,in the  
first place1 those paragraphs in which  
the doctrine of the transcendental      
object finds expression are entirely    
eliminated1 and the phrase              
#8transcendental object' is no longer   
employed4 ,this1 as we have already     
noted1 is in harmony with the changes   
similarly made in the second edition    
,transcendental ,deduction and          
,paralogisms4#acji  ,secondly1 ,kant is 
even more emphatic than in the first    
edition1 that the categories must not be
 employed save in reference to sense    
intuitions4 ,in the first edition he    
still allows that their application to  
things in themselves is logically       
possible1 though without objective      
validity4 ,in the second edition he goes
 much further4 ,save in their empirical 
employment the categories 8mean nothing 
whatsoever40#acaj       0,in the absence
 of sensibility their whole employment1 

and indeed      all their meaning       
entirely ceases2 for we have then no    
means of      determining whether things
 in harmony with the categories are even
      possible44440#acaa  ,in the third 
place1 ,kant1 as already noted1         
distinguishes between a negative and a  
positive meaning of the term noumenon4  
,noumenon in its negative sense is      
defined as being merely that which is   
not an object of sensuous intuition4 ,by
 noumenon in the positive sense1 on the 
other hand1 is meant an object of       
non-sensuous intuition4 ,kant now claims
 that it is the concept of noumenon in  
the negative sense1 as equivalent       
therefore simply to the thing in itself1
 that alone is involved1 as a           
,grenzbegriff1 in the 8doctrine of      
sensibility40 ,for its determination the
 categories cannot be employed2 that    
would demand a faculty of non-sensuous  
intuition1 which we do not possess1 and 
would amount to the illegitimate        
assertion of noumena in the positive    

sense4 ,the limiting concept1           
indispensably presupposed in human      
experience1 is therefore the bare notion
 of things in themselves4 ,and          
accordingly1 in modification of the     
conclusion arrived at in the first      
edition1 viz4 that 8the division of     
objects into phenomena and noumena 444  
is not in any way admissible10#acab     
,kant now adds to the term noumena the  
qualifying phrase 8in the positive      
sense40 ,in this way the assumption that
 things in themselves actually exist    
becomes quite explicit1 despite ,kant's 
greater insistence upon the             
impossibility of applying any of the    
categories to them4  ,but beyond thus   
placing in still bolder contrast the two
 counter assertions1 on the one hand    
that the categories must not be taken by
 us as other than merely subjective     
thought-functions1 and on the other that
 a limiting concept is indispensably    
necessary1 ,kant makes no attempt in    
these new passages to meet the          

difficulties involved4 ,with the        
assertion that the categories as such1  
and therefore by implication those of   
reality and existence1 are inapplicable 
to things in themselves1#acac he        
combines1 without any apparent          
consciousness of conflict1 the          
contention that things in themselves    
must none the less be postulated as     
actually existing4         99       99  
99       99       99  ,the teaching of  
this chapter must be regarded as only   
semi-,critical4 ,the fact that it is    
formulated in terms of the doctrine of  
the transcendental object1 itself       
suffices to determine the date at which 
it must have been composed as           
comparatively early2 and such changes as
 ,kant could make in the second edition 
were necessarily of a minor character4  
,more extensive alterations would have  
involved complete reconstruction of the 
entire chapter1 and indeed anticipation 
of the central teaching of the          
,dialectic4  ,kant is also hampered by  

the unfortunate location to which he has
 assigned this chapter4 ,at this point  
in the development of his argument1     
namely1 within the limits of the        
,analytic1 ,kant could really do no more
 than recapitulate the negative         
consequences which follow from the      
teaching of the transcendental          
deduction4 ,for though these might      
justify him in asserting that it is     
understanding that limits sensibility1  
he was not in a position to explain that
 the term understanding1 as thus        
employed1 has a very wide meaning1 and  
that within this faculty he is prepared 
to distinguish between understanding in 
the strict sense as the source of the   
categories1 and a higher power to which 
he gives the title ,reason1 and which he
 regards as originating a unique        
concept1 that of the unconditioned4 ,yet
 only when these distinctions1 and the  
considerations in view of which they are
 drawn1 have been duly reckoned with1   
can the problem before us be discussed  

in its full significance4  ,this placing
 of the chapter within the ,analytic1   
and therefore prior to the discussions  
first broached in the ,dialectic1 has   
indeed the unfortunate consequence of   
concealing not only from the reader1 but
 also1 as it would seem1 to some extent 
from ,kant himself1 the ultimate grounds
 upon which1 from the genuinely         
,critical standpoint1 the distinction   
between phenomena and noumena must be   
based4 ,for neither in this chapter1 nor
 in any other passage in the ,critique1 
has ,kant sought to indicate1 in any    
quite explicit manner1 the bearing which
 the important conclusions arrived at in
 the ,dialectic may have in regard to   
it4 ,like so many of the most important 
and fruitful of his tenets1 these       
consequences are suggested merely by    
implication2 or rather remain to be     
discovered by the reader's own          
independent efforts1 in proportion as he
 thinks himself into the distinctions   
upon which1 in other connections1 ,kant 

has himself insisted4 ,they are never   
actually formulated in and by           
themselves4  ,in seeking1 therefore1 to 
decide upon what basis the distinction  
between appearance and reality ought to 
be regarded as resting1 we are          
attempting to determine how the argument
 of this chapter would have proceeded   
had it been located at the close of the 
,dialectic4 ,the task is by no means    
easy1 but the difficulties are hardly as
 formidable as may at first sight       
appear4 ,the general outlines of the    
argument are fairly definitely          
prescribed by ,kant's treatment of      
kindred questions1 and may perhaps1 with
 reasonable correctness1 be             
hypothetically constructed in view of   
the following considerations4  ,just as 
,kant started from the natural          
assumption that reference of            
representations to objects must be their
 reference to things in themselves1 so  
he similarly adopted the current        
,cartesian view that it is by an        

inference1 in terms of the category of  
causality1 that we advance from a       
representation to its external ground4  
,it was very gradually1 in the process  
of developing his own ,critical         
teaching1 and especially his            
phenomenalist view of the empirical     
world in space1 that he came to realise 
the very different position to which he 
stood committed4#acad ,when the doctrine
 of the transcendental object is        
eliminated from his teaching1 and when  
the categories1 including that of       
causality1 are pre-empted for the       
empirical object1 and that object is    
regarded as directly apprehended1 the   
function of mediating the reference of  
phenomenal nature to a noumenal basis   
falls to the ,ideas of ,reason4 ,for the
 distinction is no longer between       
representations and their noumenal      
causes1 but between the limited and     
relative character of the entire world  
in space and time1 and the unconditioned
 reality which ,reason demands for its  

own satisfaction4 ,to regard the world  
in space as merely phenomenal1 because  
failing to satisfy our standards of     
genuine reality1 is to adopt an entirely
 different attitude from any to be found
 in ,descartes or ,locke4 ,the position 
may be outlined in the following manner1
 in anticipation of its more adequate   
statement in connection with the        
problems of the ,dialectic4  ,the       
concept1 whereby ,reason limits         
sensibility1 is not properly describable
 as being that of the thing in itself2  
it is the unique concept of the         
unconditioned4 ,our awareness of the    
conditioned as being conditioned        
presupposes1 over and above the         
categories1 an antecedent awareness of  
,ideal#acae standards2 and to that      
latter more fundamental form of         
consciousness all our criteria of truth 
and reality are ultimately due4 ,the    
criteria by means of which we           
empirically distinguish sense-appearance
 from sense-illusion1 when rigorously   

applied1 lead us to detect deficiencies 
in the empirical as such4 ,we have then 
no alternative save to conceive absolute
 reality in terms of the rational       
,ideals1 of which the empirical criteria
 are merely specialised forms4  ,there  
are thus two distinct1 but none the less
 interdependent1 elements involved in   
,kant's more mature teaching1           
phenomenalism1 and what may be called   
the ,idealist1 or absolutist1           
interpretation of the function of       
,reason4 ,each demands the other for its
 own establishment4 ,there must be a    
genuinely objective world1 by reflection
 upon which we may come to consciousness
 of the standards which are involved in 
our judgments upon it2 and we must      
possess a faculty through which our     
consciousness of these standards may be 
accounted for4 ,the standards of        
judgment cannot be acquired by means of 
judgments which do not already          
presuppose them2 the processes by which 
they are brought to clear consciousness 

cannot be the processes in which they   
originate4 ,they must be part of the a  
priori conditions of experience and     
combine with space1 time and the        
categories to render experience of the  
kind which we possess--self-transcending
 and self-limiting--actually possible4  
,from this point of view the distinction
 between appearance and reality is not a
 contrast between experience and the    
non-experienced1 but a distinguishing of
 factors1 which are essential to all    
experience1 and through which we come to
 consciousness of an irresolvable       
conflict between the ,ideals which      
inspire us in the acquisition of        
experience1 and the limiting conditions 
under which alone experience is         
attainable by us4 ,in the higher field  
of ,reason1 as in the lower field of    
understanding1 it is not through the    
given1 but only through the given as    
interpreted by conditioning forms of an 
,ideal nature1 that a meaningful reality
 can disclose itself to the mind4 ,the  

ultimate meaning of experience lies in  
its significance when tested by the     
standards which are indispensably       
involved in its own possibility4 ,that  
meaning is essentially metaphysical2    
more is implied in experience than the  
experienced can ever itself be found to 
be4#acaf  ,such is the central thesis of
 the ,critical philosophy1 when the     
teaching of the ,analytic is            
supplemented by that of the ,dialectic4 
,though the ,critique is1 indeed1 the   
record of the manifold ways in which    
,kant diverged from this position1 not a
 systematic exposition of its           
implications and consequences1 the above
 thesis represents the goal upon which  
his various lines of thought tend to    
converge4 ,it is the guiding motive of  
his devious and complex argument in the 
three main divisions of the ,dialectic4 
,on no other interpretation can the     
detail of his exposition be             
satisfactorily explained4  ,there are   
two chief reasons why ,kant failed to   

draw the above conclusions in any quite 
explicit manner4 ,one reason has already
 been sufficiently emphasised1 namely1  
that the thesis1 which ,i have just     
formulated1 rests upon a phenomenalist  
view of the natural world1 whereas the  
,dialectic is inspired by the earlier1  
subjectivist doctrine of the            
transcendental object4 ,upon the other  
main reason ,i shall have frequent      
occasion to insist4 ,as we shall find1  
,kant was unable to arrive at any quite 
definitive decision as to the nature of 
the ,ideals of ,reason4 ,he alternates  
between the sceptical and the absolutist
 view of their origin and function1 and 
in the process of seeking a             
comprehensive mid-way position which    
would do justice to all that is valid in
 the opposing arguments1 the further    
question as to the bearing of his       
conclusions upon the problem of the     
distinction between appearance and      
reality was driven into the background4 
,but we are anticipating matters the    

discussion of which must meantime be    
deferred4     ,,appendix  ,,the         
,,amphiboly ,,of ,,the ,,concepts ,,of  
,,reflection#acag   ,in this appendix   
,kant gives a criticism of the          
,leibnizian rationalism--a criticism    
already partially stated in the section 
on the ,postulates--and he does this in 
a manner which very clearly reveals the 
influence which that rationalism        
continued to exercise upon his own      
thinking4 ,thus ,kant speaks of the     
8mere concept10#acah and in doing so    
evidently means to imply that it exists 
in its own right1 with a nature         
determined solely by intrinsic factors  
of a strictly a priori character1 in    
complete independence of the specific   
material of sense-experience4 ,he       
denies1 it is true1 the objective       
validity of such concepts1 and maintains
 that in their empirical employment they
 are completely transformed through the 
addition of new factors4 ,none the less 
he allows to the concepts an intrinsic  

nature1 and practically maintains that  
from the point of view of the pure      
concept1 and therefore from the point of
 view of a logic based upon it1 the     
,leibnizian rationalism is the one true 
system of metaphysics4 ,for pure        
thought1 ,leibniz's system is the       
ultimate and only possible philosophy2  
and were thought capable of determining 
the nature of things in themselves1 we  
should be constrained to adopt it as    
metaphysically valid4 ,this is the      
standpoint which underlies much of      
,kant's argument in the ,dialectic4 ,it 
leads him to maintain that the self must
 necessarily1 in virtue of an           
unavoidable transcendental illusion1    
believe in its own independent          
substantial reality1 that the mind is   
constrained to conceive reality as an   
unconditioned unity1 and that the       
notions of ,god1 freedom1 and           
immortality are ,ideas necessarily      
involved in the very constitution of    
human thought4  ,but we must not regard 

,kant's doctrine of the pure concept    
merely as a survival from a standpoint  
which the ,critical teaching is destined
 to displace and supersede4 ,for ,kant  
is not led through inconsistency1 or    
through any mere lack of thoroughness in
 the development of his ,critical       
principles1 to retain this rationalistic
 doctrine4 ,to understand the really    
operative grounds of ,kant's            
argumentation1 and so to place the      
contents of this section in proper      
focus1 we must recall the fundamental   
antithesis1 developed in my             
introduction1#acai between the          
alternative positions1 which are        
represented for ,kant by the            
philosophies of ,hume and ,leibniz4     
,kant1 as already observed1 is          
profoundly convinced of the essential   
truth of the ,leibnizian position4 ,he  
holds to the ,leibnizian view of reason4
 ,human reason is essentially           
metaphysical2 its ultimate function is  
to emancipate us from the limiting      

conditions of animal existence2 it      
reveals its nature in those ,ideas of   
the unconditioned1 the discussion of    
which ,kant reserves for the ,dialectic4
  ,the chief defect in ,kant's criticism
 of ,leibniz1 as developed in this      
section1 is that the deeper issues1     
which determine the extent of his       
agreement with ,leibniz1 are not raised 
or even indicated4 ,consequently1 his   
references to pure thought1 and his     
assertion#acbj that from the point of   
view of pure thought ,leibniz is        
entirely justified in his teaching1     
bewilder the reader1 who has been made  
to adopt a ,critical standpoint1 and    
therefore to believe that thought can   
function only in connection with the    
data of sense-experience4 ,kant would   
seem1 indeed1 to have lapsed into the   
dogmatic standpoint of the              
,dissertation1 distinguishing between a 
sensible and an intelligible world1 and 
maintaining that pure thought is capable
 of determining the nature of the       

latter4 ,the only difference between his
 teaching here and in the ,dissertation 
consists in the admission that all      
knowledge is limited to                 
sense-experience1 and that we are       
therefore unable to determine whether   
this intelligible world which we must   
think1 and think in the precise manner  
defined by ,leibniz1 does or does not   
exist4  ,this section is1 indeed1 like  
the chapter on ,phenomena and ,noumena1 
wrongly located4 ,giving1 as it does1   
,kant's criticism of the ,leibnizian    
ontology1 it discusses problems of      
metaphysics2 and ought therefore to have
 found its place in the ,dialectic1 in  
natural connection with the             
corresponding examination of the        
metaphysical sciences of rational       
psychology1 cosmology1 and theology4    
,architectonic1 that ever-present source
 of so many of ,kant's idiosyncrasies1  
has again interposed its despotic       
mandate4 ,as there are only three forms 
of syllogism1 only three main divisions 

can be recognised in the ,dialectic2 and
 the criticism of ontology1 to its great
 detriment1 must therefore be located1  
where it does not in the least belong1  
in the concluding section of the        
,analytic4#acba  ,but we must follow    
,kant's argument as here given4 ,leibniz
 views thought as capable of            
prescribing1 antecedently to all        
experience1 the fundamental conditions  
to which reality must conform4 ,the     
possible is prior to1 and independent   
of1 the actual2 and can be adequately   
determined by pure reason from its own  
inherent resources4 ,kant does not here 
question this assertion of the          
independence and priority of pure       
thought4 ,he is content to maintain that
 what is valid for thought need not hold
 of those appearances which are the only
 possible objects of human knowledge1   
since in sense-experience conditions1   
unforeseen by pure thought1 partly      
limitative and partly extensive of its  
concepts1 intervene to modify the       

conclusions which from its own point of 
view are logically valid4 ,leibniz1     
through failure to realise the dual     
character of thought and sense1         
overlooked this all-important fact2 and1
 in asserting that what is true for pure
 thought is valid of the sensuously     
real1 fell victim to the fallacy which  
,kant entitles transcendental amphiboly4
  ,kant's clearest statement of the     
fallacy is in ,a #bhj  ,b #ccf4 ,it     
reduces1 formally stated1 to the fallacy
 of denying the antecedent4 ,in         
accordance with the dictum de omni et   
nullo1 we can validly assert that what  
belongs to or contradicts a universal   
concept1 belongs to or contradicts the  
particulars which fall under that       
concept4 ,leibniz employs the principle 
in a negative and invalid form4 ,he     
argues that what is not contained in a  
universal concept is also not contained 
in the particulars to which it applies4 
8,the entire intellectualist system of  
,leibniz is reared upon this latter     

principle40 ,and as ,kant points        
out1#acbb the reason why so acute and   
powerful a thinker succumbed to this    
obvious fallacy is to be found in his   
view of sense as merely confused        
thought2 or1 to state the same point in 
another way1 in his interpretation of   
appearances as being the confused       
representations of things in            
themselves4#acbc ,all differences       
between appearance and reality are1 on  
this view1 due merely to lack of        
clearness in our apprehension of the    
given4 ,sense1 when completely          
clarified1 reduces without remainder to 
pure thought2 and in the concepts1 which
 thought develops from within itself1   
lie the whole content alike of knowledge
 and of real existence4 ,owing to a     
metaphysical theory of the nature of the
 real1 itself due to a false            
interpretation of the nature and        
function of pure thought1 and ultimately
 traceable to an excessive preoccupation
 with knowledge of the strictly         

mathematical type1#acbd ,leibniz failed 
to do justice to the fundamental        
characteristics of our human experience1
 and in especial to the actual given    
nature of space1 time1 and dynamical    
causality4 ,his rationalistic           
metaphysics has its roots in the        
,cartesian philosophy1#acbe and is1 in  
,kant's view1 the perfected product of  
philosophical thinking1 when developed  
on dogmatic1 i4e4 non-,critical1 lines4 
,it is the opposite counterpart of the  
empirical or sceptical type of          
philosophy which in modern times found  
its first great supporter in ,locke1 and
 which1 as ,kant held1 obtained its     
perfected expression in the philosophy  
of ,hume4 ,while ,descartes and ,leibniz
 intellectualise appearances1 ,locke and
 ,hume regard the a priori concepts of  
understanding as merely empirical       
products of discursive reflection4 ,both
 commit the same fundamental error of   
failing to recognise that understanding 
and sensibility are two distinct sources

 of representations4#acbf ,both         
consequently strive1 in equally         
one-sided fashion1 to reduce the        
complexity of experience to one alone of
 its constituent elements4 ,this section
 of the ,critique ought to have         
developed the ,critical teaching in its 
opposition to both these alternative    
attitudes2 ,kant arbitrarily limits it  
to criticism of the ,leibnizian         
rationalism4  ,kant's method of         
introducing and arranging his criticism 
is artificial1 and need be no more than 
mentioned4 ,critical reflection upon the
 sources of our knowledge1 which ,kant1 
in order to distinguish it from         
reflection of the ordinary type1        
entitles transcendental reflection1 is1 
he states1 a duty imposed upon all who  
would profess to pass a priori judgments
 upon the real4 ,it will trace the      
concepts employed to their corresponding
 faculties1 intellectual and sensuous1  
and will reveal the independence and    
disparity of sensibility and            

understanding1 and so will effectually  
prevent that false locating of concepts 
to which transcendental amphiboly is    
due4 ,such reflection1 he further       
argues1 consists in a comparison of the 
representations with the faculty to     
which they are due1 and like ordinary   
comparison will determine the relations 
of 7#a7 identity and difference1 7#b7   
agreement and opposition1 7#c7 inner and
 outer1 7#d7 determinable and           
determining 7matter and form74 ,in this 
arbitrary but ingenious fashion ,kant   
contrives to obtain the four main       
headings required for his criticism of  
the ,leibnizian ontology4  7#a7 ,under  
the first heading he deals with the     
principle of the identity of            
indiscernibles4 ,it is1 ,kant maintains1
 a typical example of the fallacy of    
transcendental amphiboly4 ,leibniz      
argues that if no difference is         
discoverable in the concept of things1  
there can be none in the things         
themselves2 things which are identical  

in conception must be identical in all  
respects4 ,but this1 ,kant replies1 is  
true only so long as the concepts       
abstract from the sensuous conditions of
 existence4 ,thus no two cubic feet of  
space are alike4 ,they are              
distinguishable from one another by     
their spatial location2 and that is a   
difference which concerns the conditions
 of intuition2 it is not to be          
discovered in the pure concept4#acbg    
,spaces1 alike for thought1 are         
distinguishable for sense4 ,to take     
another of ,kant's illustrations3 two   
drops of water1 if indistinguishable in 
all their internal properties of quality
 or quantity1 are conceptually          
identical4 ,through differences of      
location in space1 irrelevant to their  
conception1 they can none the less be   
intuited as numerically different4 ,the 
principle of indiscernibles is not a law
 of nature1 but only an analytic rule   
for the comparison of things through    
mere concepts4#acbh  7#b7 ,a second     

principle of the ,leibnizian metaphysics
 is that realities can never conflict   
with one another4 ,this is supposed to  
follow from the fact that in pure       
thought the only form of opposition is  
logical negation4 ,realities1 being pure
 affirmations1 must necessarily         
harmonise with one another4 ,this       
principle ignores the altogether        
different conditions of sense-existence4
 ,space1 time1 and the resulting        
possibility of dynamical causality      
supply the conditions for real          
opposition4 ,two existences1 though     
equally real and positive1 may annul one
 another4 ,two forces acting upon a body
 may neutralise one another4 ,from the  
above logical principle ,leibniz's      
successors#acbi profess to obtain the   
far-reaching metaphysical conclusions1  
that all realities agree with one       
another1 that evil is merely negative1  
consisting exclusively in limitation of 
existence1 and that ,god1 without       
detriment to the unity of his being1 can

 be constituted of all possible         
realities4  7#c7 ,viewing space and     
time1 which condition external relation1
 as merely confused forms of            
apprehension1 ,leibniz further concluded
 that the reality of substance is purely
 internal4 ,and ruling out position1    
shape1 contact and motion1 all of which 
involve external relations1 he felt     
justified in endowing the monads with   
the sole remaining form of known        
existence1 namely consciousness4 ,the   
assertion that the monads are incapable 
of external relation leads to the       
further conclusion that they are        
incapable of interaction1 and stand in  
systematic relation to one another1     
solely in virtue of a pre-established   
harmony4  7#d7 ,from the point of view  
of pure thought matter must precede     
form4 ,the universal must precede the   
particular which is a specification of  
it4#accj ,unlimited reality is taken as 
being the matter of all possibility1 and
 its limitation or form as being due to 

negation4 ,substances must antecedently 
exist in order that external relations  
may have something upon which to ground 
themselves4 ,space and time must be     
interpreted as confused apprehensions of
 purely intellectual orders1 space      
representing a certain order in the     
reciprocal 7pre-established7            
correspondence of substances1 and time  
the dynamical sequence of their states4 
,on the other hand1 from the standpoint 
of sense and its intuitional forms the  
reverse holds4 ,the world of appearance 
is conditioned by the forms of space and
 time2 the objectively possible         
coincides with the actual2 and the      
substantia phaenomenon has no           
independent essence1 but reduces without
 remainder to external relations4 ,for  
pure thought this world of given        
appearance is an utterly paradoxical    
form of existence2 it is the direct     
opposite of everything that genuine     
reality ought to be4 ,in this strange   
conclusion the problems of the          

,dialectic1 in one of their most        
suggestive forms1 at once loom up before
 us4 ,as stated above1 this entire      
discussion is an anticipation of        
questions which cannot be adequately    
treated within the limits of the        
,analytic4  ,the text of this section is
 highly composite4 ,the entire content  
of the ,appendix is twice reintroduced  
and restated at full length in the      
accompanying ,note4 ,these successive   
expositions of one and the same argument
 were doubtless independently written1  
and then later pieced together in this  
external fashion4 ,a #bgg-h  ,b #ccc-d1 
on the nature of the substantia         
phaenomenon1 would by its references to 
the transcendental object seem to be of 
early origin4#acca ,it has already been 
commented upon4#accb ,a #bhe-i  ,b      
#cdb-f1 on the other hand1 which        
supplements the chapter on ,phenomena   
and ,noumena1#accc would seem to be of  
late origin4 ,it is so dated by         
,adickes1#accd owing to the reference to

 schemata in its opening sentence4  ,a  
#bhi-ia  ,b #cdf-i4 ,table of the       
division of the conception of           
nothing4--,this curious and ingenious   
classification of the various meanings  
of the term #8nothing' is chiefly of    
interest through its first division3    
8empty conception without object1 ens   
rationis40 ,the ens rationis can best be
 defined in its distinction from the    
fourth division3 8empty object without  
conception1 nihil negativum40 ,the      
former is a ,gedankending2 the latter is
 an ,unding4 ,the former indeed1 though 
not contradictory1 is mere fiction      
7bloss ,erdichtung71 and consequently   
must not be taken as falling within the 
field of the possible4 ,the latter is a 
concept which destroys itself1 and which
 therefore stands in direct conflict    
with the possible4 ,the ens rationis    
includes1 ,kant explicitly states1#acce 
the conception of noumena1 8which must  
not be reckoned among the possibilities1
 although they must not for that reason 

be declared to be also impossible40     
,kant must here be taking noumena in the
 positive sense4#accf ,as usual ,kant's 
attempt to obtain parallels for the four
 classes of category breaks down4 ,the  
so-called nihil privativum and the ens  
imaginarium do not properly come within 
the denotation of the term #8nothing4'  
,this is very evident in the examples   
which ,kant cites4 ,cold is as real as  
the opposite with which it is           
contrasted1 while pure space and pure   
time are not negative even in a         
conventional sense4     ,,transcendental
 ,,logic    ,,division ,,ii  ,,the      
,,transcendental ,,dialectic            
,,introductory ,,comment ,,upon ,,the   
,,composite ,,origin ,,and ,,conflicting
 ,,tendencies ,,of ,,the ,,dialectic4   
,we have had constant occasion to       
observe the composite origin and        
conflicting tendencies of the ,analytic4
 ,the ,dialectic is hardly less         
composite in character1 and is certainly
 not more uniform in its fundamental    

teaching4  ,the composite nature of the 
text1 though bewildering to the         
unsophisticated reader1 is not1 however1
 without its compensations4 ,the text1  
as it stands1 preserves the record of   
the manifold influences which presided  
over its first inception1 and of the    
devious paths by which ,kant travelled  
to his later conclusions4 ,it thus      
enables us to determine1 with           
considerable accuracy1 the successive   
stages through which it has passed in   
the process of settling into its present
 form4 ,as we shall find1 the sections  
on the antinomies contain the original  
argument1 out of which by varied        
processes of supplementation and        
modification the other parts have       
arisen4  ,the conflict of doctrine has  
also its counter-advantages4 ,the       
problems are impartially discussed from 
opposed standpoints2 the difficulties   
peculiar to each of the competing       
possible solutions are frankly          
recognised1 and indeed insisted upon2   

and the internal dialectic of ,kant's   
own personal thinking obtains dramatic  
expression4 ,we are thus the better     
enabled to appreciate the open-minded   
pertinacity with which ,kant set himself
 to do justice to every significant     
aspect of his many-sided problems1 and  
are consequently in less danger of      
simplifying his argument in any         
arbitrary manner1 or of ignoring the    
tentative character of the solutions at 
which he arrives4  ,i shall first define
 the main lines of conflict1 and shall  
then attempt to trace those conflicts to
 the considerations in which they have  
their source4 ,the two chief lines of   
thought traceable throughout the        
,dialectic are represented by its       
negative and by its positive tendencies 
respectively4 ,from one point of view1  
,reason is merely the understanding in  
its self-limiting1 self-regulative      
employment1 and the main purpose of the 
,dialectic is to guard against the      
delusive power of fictitious principles4

 ,from the other point of view1 ,reason 
is a faculty distinct from              
understanding1 and its problems run     
parallel with those of the ,analytic1   
forming no less important a subject of  
philosophical reflection1 and no less   
fruitful a source of positive teaching4 
,the one line of argument connects with 
,kant's more sceptical tendencies1 the  
other with his deep-rooted belief in the
 ultimate validity of the absolute      
claims of pure thought4  ,when we       
approach the ,dialectic from the        
standpoint of the ,analytic1 it is the  
negative aspect that is naturally most  
prominent4 ,in the ,analytic ,kant has  
proved that all knowledge is limited to 
sense-experience1 and that a            
metaphysical interpretation of reality  
is altogether impossible4 ,but as the   
human mind would seem to be possessed by
 an inborn need of metaphysical         
construction1 this conclusion cannot    
obtain its due influence until the      
sources of the metaphysical tendency    

have been detected and laid bare4 ,the  
,dialectic must yield a psychology of   
metaphysics as well as a logic of       
illusion4  ,but when1 on the other hand1
 the problems of the ,dialectic are     
viewed in their distinction from those  
of the ,analytic1 and their independent 
character is recognised1 they appear in 
a perspective which sets them in a very 
different light4 ,reason is a faculty   
co-ordinate with understanding1 and     
yields a priori concepts distinct in    
function1 no less than in nature1 from  
the categories4 ,to mark this           
distinction ,kant entitles the concepts 
of ,reason ,ideas4 ,they demand both a  
metaphysical and a transcendental       
deduction4 ,these requirements are      
fulfilled through their derivation from 
the three forms of syllogism1 and by the
 proof that they exercise an            
indispensable function1 at once limiting
 and directing the understanding4 ,as   
limiting concepts1 they condition the   
consciousness of those ,ideal standards 

through which the human mind is enabled 
to distinguish between appearance and   
things in themselves4 ,as regulative1   
they prescribe the problems which the   
understanding in its search for         
knowledge is called upon to solve4      
,these two tendencies1 sceptical and    
constructive1 are never1 indeed1 in     
complete opposition4 ,common to both1   
rendering possible the psychological    
explanation of the metaphysical impulse1
 which even the negative standpoint     
demands1 is the doctrine of the         
regulative function of ,ideal           
principles4 ,this doctrine1 which       
already appears in the ,dissertation of 
#aggj1 was later developed into the     
,critical theory of transcendental      
illusion2 and by means of that theory   
,kant succeeded in bringing the two     
standpoints into a very real and vital  
connection with one another4 ,at first  
sight it may seem to achieve their      
complete reconciliation1 accounting for 
their distinction while rendering them  

mutually complementary2 and ,kant's     
teaching may perhaps be so restated as  
to bear out that impression4 ,but the   
harmony is never completely attained by 
,kant4 ,here1 as in the ,analytic1 there
 is an equipoise of tendencies that     
persist in opposition4  ,kant's         
mediating doctrine of transcendental    
illusion may first be stated4 ,it rests 
upon a distinction between appearance   
and illusion4 ,appearance 7,erscheinung7
 is a transcript in phenomenal terms of 
some independent reality2 and of such   
appearances we can acquire what from the
 human point of view is genuine         
knowledge4 ,on the other hand1 all      
professed insight into the nature of the
 transcendent or non-empirical is sheer 
illusion 7,schein71 and purely          
subjective4 ,there are three species of 
illusion1 logical1 empirical and        
transcendental4 ,logical illusion stands
 apart by itself4 ,it is due merely to  
inattention or ignorance2 and vanishes  
immediately the attention is aroused4   

,empirical and transcendental illusion1 
on the other hand1 have a twofold point 
of agreement1 first1 in being           
unavoidable1 and secondly1 in that they 
originate in our practical needs4 ,we   
may know that the moon at its rising is 
no larger than in mid-heavens1 that the 
ocean is no higher in the distance than 
at the shore2 this makes not the least  
difference in the perceptions as they   
continue to present themselves4 ,that   
the illusions are adapted to our        
practical needs1 and are consequently   
beneficial1 is less often observed4     
,changes in the colour1 form1 and size  
of objects as they recede from us1 the  
seeing of the parallel sides of a street
 as converging1 enable us to achieve    
what would not otherwise be possible4   
,by their means we acquire the power of 
compressing a wide extent of landscape  
into a single visual field1 of          
determining distance1 and the like4     
,their practical usefulness is in almost
 exact proportion to the freedom with   

which they depart from the standards of 
the independently real4 ,kant argues    
that1 in these respects1 transcendental 
illusion is analogous to the empirical4 
,just as the illusory characteristics of
 our perceptions are to be understood   
only in terms of their practical        
function1 so the ,ideas of pure ,reason 
have always a practical bearing1 and can
 only be explained and justified in     
terms of the needs which they satisfy4  
,as theoretical enquirers1 we accept all
 that affords us orientation in the     
attainment of knowledge2 as moral       
agents1 we postulate the conditions     
which are necessary for the realisation 
of the moral imperative4 ,and as the    
,ideals of natural science are found    
7such is ,kant's contention7 to be in   
general form akin to those of the moral 
consciousness1 they thus acquire a      
twofold footing in the mental life1     
maintaining their place there quite     
independently of theoretical proof4     
,though illusory1 they are unavoidable2 

and though theoretically false1#accg    
they are from a practical point of view 
both legitimate and indispensable4      
,kant1 in developing this thesis1 might 
profitably have pointed to still another
 respect in which the analogy holds     
between sense-experience and            
transcendental beliefs4 ,the illusions  
of sense-perception come in the ordinary
 processes of experience to be detected 
as such by the mind4 ,from the          
theoretical standpoint of the outside   
observer who compares the situation of  
one percipient with that of another1 and
 so is enabled to cancel the differences
 which variety of situation carries with
 it1 the useful illusions of ordinary   
experience are reduced to the level of  
mere appearance4 ,in contradicting one  
another they reveal their subjective    
character1 and also at the same time    
afford data for determining the         
objective conditions to which their     
subjectively necessary existence is     
causally due4 ,in similar fashion the   

transcendental illusions result in      
contradictions1 which compel the mind to
 recognise that the ,ideals to which it 
is committed by its practical needs are 
of a merely subjective character1 and   
may never be legitimately interpreted as
 representing the actual nature of the  
independently real4  ,the chief         
transcendental illusion1 and ultimately 
the cause of all the others1 consists in
 the belief that the ,ideals of         
explanation which satisfy ,reason must  
in general outline represent the nature 
of ultimate reality4 ,what the          
individual seeks to discover he         
naturally believes to exist prior to the
 discovery4 ,as practical beings1 we    
regard the objects of sense-experience  
as absolute realities--they are the     
realities of practical life1 and we are 
practical rather than theoretical       
beings--and the existing empirical      
sciences1 conceived as ,ideally         
completed1 are therefore viewed as      
yielding an adequate representation of  

ultimate reality4 ,but such a belief    
involves us in contradictions4 ,the     
world of phenomena in space and time is 
endlessly relative4 ,it can have no     
outer bounds or first beginning1 and no 
smallest parts2 and in the series of    
causal antecedents there can be no      
member that is not effect as well as    
cause4 ,viewed as representing a        
pre-existent goal1 the ,ideas of ,reason
 are imaginary completions of the       
intrinsically and merely relative1 and  
are in their very notion                
self-contradictory4 ,all that is        
definite in their content conflicts with
 their absoluteness2 and yet1 as it     
would seem1 only in their empirical     
reference can they hope for objective   
verification4  ,such are the problems of
 the ,dialectic1 so far as they can be  
formulated in terms common to the two   
opposed standpoints4 ,their deeper      
significance1 and the grounds of ,kant's
 alternating treatment of them1 only    
appear when he raises the further       

questions1 what those ,ideals of        
explanation which ,reason prescribes    
really are1 and how1 if they conflict   
with the content of experience1 it is   
possible that they should be conceived  
at all4 ,to these questions ,kant       
propounds both a sceptical and an       
,idealist answer4 ,the former1 in bare  
outline1 may be stated as follows4 ,the 
so-called ,ideas are based upon         
experience and are derived from it4 ,the
 understanding removes the limitations  
to which its pure concepts are subject  
in sense-experience1 and proceeds to use
 them in their widest possible          
application1 i4e4 to things in general4 
,as thus employed1 they are without real
 significance1 and are indeed           
self-contradictory4 ,to form the ,idea  
of the unconditioned1 we have to omit   
all those conditions through which alone
 anything can be apprehended1 even as   
possible4 ,to construct the concept of  
absolute or unconditioned necessity1 we 
have similarly to leave aside the       

conditions upon which necessity1 as     
revealed in experience1 in all cases    
depends2 in eliminating conditions1 we  
eliminate necessity in the only forms in
 which it is conceivable by us4 ,such   
,ideas are1 indeed1 simply schematic    
forms1 whereby we body forth to         
ourselves1 in more or less metaphorical 
terms1 the concept of a maximum4 ,they  
are imaginary extensions1 in ,ideal     
form1 of the unity and system which     
understanding has discovered in actual  
experience1 and which1 under the        
inspiration of such ,ideals1 it seeks to
 realise in ever-increasing degree4 ,if 
the understanding1 as thus insisting    
upon ,ideal satisfaction1 be entitled   
,reason1 the ,ideas must be taken as    
expressing a subjective interest1 and as
 exhausting their legitimate employment 
in the regulation of the understanding4 
,their transcendental deduction will    
consist in the proof that they are      
necessary to the understanding for the  
perfecting of its experience4 ,they do  

not justify us in attempting to decide1 
in anticipation of actual experience1   
how far the contingent collocations and 
the inexhaustible complexities of brute 
experience are really reducible to a    
completely unified system2 but they     
quite legitimately demand that through  
all discouragements we persist in the   
endeavour towards their realisation4 ,in
 any case1 it is by experience that the 
degree of their reality has to be       
decided4 ,we judge of things by the     
standard of that for which they exist1  
and not vice versa4 ,as the sole        
legitimate function of the ,ideas is    
that of inspiring the understanding in  
its empirical employment1 they must     
never be interpreted as having          
metaphysical significance4 ,as the      
,ideas exist solely for the sake of     
experience1 it is they that must be     
condemned1 if the two really diverge4   
,we do not say 8that a man is too long  
for his coat1 but that the coat is too  
short for the man40#acch ,it is         

experience1 not ,ideas1 which forms the 
criterion alike of truth and of reality4
  ,kant's teaching1 when on ,idealist   
lines1 is of a very different character4
 ,reason is distinct from understanding1
 and yet is no less indispensably       
involved in the conditioning of         
experience4 ,all consciousness is       
consciousness of a whole which precedes 
and conditions its parts4 ,such         
consciousness cannot be accounted for by
 assuming that we are first conscious of
 the conditioned1 and then proceed      
through omission of its limitations to  
form to ourselves1 by means of the more 
positive factors involved in this       
antecedent consciousness1 an ,idea of an
 unconditioned whole4 ,the ,idea of the 
unconditioned is distinct in nature from
 all other concepts1 and cannot be      
derived from them4 ,it must be a pure a 
priori product of what may be named the 
faculty of ,reason4 ,its uniqueness is  
what causes its apparent                
meaninglessness4 ,as it is involved in  

all consciousness1 it conditions all    
other concepts2 and cannot1 therefore1  
be defined in terms of them4 ,its       
significance must not be looked for save
 in that ,ideal1 to which no experience1
 and no concept other than itself1 can  
ever be adequate4 ,that in this ,ideal  
form it has a very real and genuine     
meaning is proved by our capacity to    
distinguish between appearance and      
reality4 ,for upon it this distinction1 
in ultimate analysis1 is found to rest4 
,consciousness of limitation presupposes
 a consciousness of what is beyond the  
limit2 consciousness of the             
unconditioned is prior to1 and renders  
possible1 our consciousness of the      
contingently given4 ,the ,idea of the   
unconditioned must therefore be counted 
as being1 like the categories1 though in
 a somewhat different manner1 a         
condition of the possibility of         
experience4 ,with it our standards both 
of truth and of reality are inextricably
 bound up4#acci ,the ,ideas in which it 

specifies itself1 so far from depending 
upon empirical verification1 are the    
touchstone by which we detect the       
unreality of the sensible world1 and by 
which a truer reality1 such as would be 
adequate to the ,ideal demands of pure  
,reason1 is prefigured to the mind4     
,these two standpoints are extremely    
divergent in their consequences4 ,each  
leads to a very different interpretation
 of the content of the ,ideas1 of their 
function in experience1 and of their    
objective validity4 ,on the one view1   
their content is merely empirical1 and  
sense-experience is our sole criterion  
of truth and reality2 on the other1 they
 have to be recognised as containing a  
pure a priori concept1 and are          
themselves the standards by which even  
empirical truth can alone be determined4
 ,in the one case1 they are ,ideals     
projected by experience for its own     
empirical guidance2 they are built upon 
contingent experience1 and depend upon  
it alike for the content which makes    

them conceivable and for their validity4
 ,in the other1 they are presuppositions
 of experience1 at once conditioning its
 possibility and revealing its merely   
phenomenal character4 ,according to the 
sceptical view1 ,reason is concerned    
only with itself and its own subjective 
demands2 on the ,idealist view1 it is a 
metaphysical faculty1 and outlines      
possibilities that may perhaps be       
established by practical ,reason4       
,such1 in broad outline1 are the central
 doctrines of the ,dialectic4 ,they     
constitute an extraordinarily           
stimulating and suggestive body of      
,critical teaching4 ,in no other        
division of the ,critique do the power  
and originality of ,kant's thinking gain
 such abundant1 forceful and            
illuminating expression4 ,the           
accumulated results of the painstaking  
analyses of the earlier sections        
contribute a solidity and fulness of    
meaning1 which render the argument      
extremely impressive1 even to those who 

are out of sympathy with ,kant's        
ultimate purposes4 ,its persistent      
influence1 on sceptical no less than on 
,idealist lines1 and often conveyed by  
very devious channels1 can frequently be
 detected even in thinkers--,herbert    
,spencer is an instance--who would      
indignantly repudiate the charge of     
being indebted to such a source4   ,,the
 ,,history ,,and ,,development ,,of     
,,kant',s ,,views ,,in ,,regard ,,to    
,,the ,,problems ,,of ,,the             
,,dialectic#acdj  ,we may now proceed to
 consider the evidence in support of the
 early origin of the central portions of
 the ,dialectic--the sections on the    
antinomies4 ,as ,benno ,erdmann#acda has
 very conclusively shown1 preoccupation 
with the problem of antinomy was the    
chief cause of the revolution which took
 place in ,kant's views in #agfi1 and   
which found expression in his           
,dissertation of #aggj4 ,it was the     
existence of antinomy which led ,kant to
 recognise the subjectivity of space and

 time4 ,that is to say1 it led him to   
develop that doctrine of transcendental 
idealism which reappears in the         
concluding sections of the ,aesthetic1  
and which was recast and developed in   
the ,analytic4 ,already in the          
,dissertation it supplies the key for   
the solution of the problems concerning 
infinity4 ,the impossibility of         
completing the space1 time1 and causal  
series1 and the consequent impossibility
 of satisfying the demands of the mind  
for totality1 simplicity and            
unconditionedness1 do not1 it is there  
maintained1 discredit reason1 but only  
serve to establish the subjectivity of  
the sensuous forms to which the element 
of infinitude is in all cases due4      
,kant's thinking was1 of course1        
diverted into an entirely new channel   
7as his letter to ,herz of ,february    
#ba1 #aggb1acdb shows71 when he came to 
realise that the metaphysical validity  
or invalidity of thought must be decided
 prior to any attempt to discover a     

positive solution of such problems as   
are presented by the antinomies4 ,and   
when1 owing to the renewed influence of 
,hume1 at some time subsequent to the   
date of the letter to ,herz1 this new   
problem was recognised as being the     
problem of a priori synthesis1 all      
questions regarding the nature of the   
absolutely real were made to take       
secondary rank1 yielding precedence to  
those of logical theory4 ,when the      
antinomy problems re-emerge1 their      
discussion assumes ,critical form4  ,in 
three fundamental respects ,kant's      
treatment of the antinomies in the      
,dissertation differs from that of the  
,critique4 ,in the first place1 the     
demand for totality or absoluteness is  
not in the ,dissertation ascribed to a  
separate faculty4 ,indeed ,kant's words 
would seem to show that at times he had 
inclined to ascribe it merely to the    
free-ranging fancy or imagination4#acdc 
,secondly1 as the various antinomies    
were traced exclusively to the influence

 of space and time upon pure thought1   
they were treated together1 and no      
classification of them was attempted4   
,and lastly1 though ,kant's utterances  
are somewhat ambiguous1#acdd the        
illusory character of the antinomies was
 in the main viewed as being of a more  
or less logical nature4 ,that is to say1
 it was regarded as entirely preventable
 and as 8vanishing like smoke0#acde upon
 adoption of a true philosophical       
standpoint4  ,a number of the           
,reflexionen reveal the various         
tentative schemes1 by trial of which    
,kant worked his way toward a more      
genuinely ,critical treatment of the    
problems of infinity4 ,the intellectual 
factors receive fuller recognition1 and 
as a consequence a definite             
classification results4 ,at some time   
prior to the discovery of the table of  
categories1 ,kant adopted a threefold   
division of what he names first         
principles or                           
presuppositions--principles of          

substance-accident1 of                  
ground-consequence1 and of whole-part4  
,reflexion ii4 #egh is typical4         
8,three principia3 7#a7 in the field of 
the actual there is the      relation of
 substance to accident 7inhaerentia73   
7#b7 of ground to      consequence      
7dependentia73 7#c7 of parts and of     
composition      7compositio74 ,there   
are three presuppositions3 of the       
subject1 of      the ground1 and of the 
parts2 of insition ,kant's own term1 of 
subordination1 and of composition2      
therefore also three first              
principia3 7#a7 subject1 which is never 
a predicate2 7#b7 ground1      which is 
never a consequence2 7#c7 unity1 which  
is not itself      composite40  ,there  
are numerous other ,reflexionen to the  
same effect4#acdf ,the resulting        
conceptions are defined both as         
limits#acdg and as absolute totalities1 
and in ,reflexion ii4 #abeb are         
enumerated as follows3       8,the first
 subject2 the first ground2 the first   

part4 ,the subject      which holds     
everything in itself2 the ground which  
takes everything      under itself2 the 
whole which comprehends everything4 ,the
      totalitas absoluta of reality1 of 
series1 of co-ordination40  ,the        
introduction of the terms #8absolute'   
and #8totality' indicate that ,kant has 
also come to recognise the presence of a
 unique notion 7equivalent to the       
8unconditioned0 of the ,critique71      
distinct in content from any of the     
three enumerated principia1 but common  
to them all4 ,from the very first ,kant 
would seem to have appropriated for it  
the title ,idea4 ,reflexionen ii4 #abdc1
 #abdd1 and #abd may be quoted3         
8,the ,idea is single 7individuum71     
self-sufficient1 and eternal4      ,the 
divinity of our soul is its capacity to 
form the ,idea4 ,the      senses give   
only copies or rather apparentia40      
8,idea is the      representation of the
 whole in so far as it necessarily      
precedes      the determination of the  

parts4 ,it can never be empirically     
represented1 for the reason that in     
experience we proceed from the          
parts through successive syntheses to   
the whole4 ,it is the      archetype    
7,urbild7 of things1 for certain objects
 are only      possible through an      
,idea4 ,transcendental ,ideas are those 
in which      the absolute whole        
determines the parts in an aggregate or 
as      series40 8,metaphysics proper is
 the application of transcendental      
philosophy to concepts supplied by      
,reason and necessary to it1 to         
which1 however1 no corresponding objects
 can be given in      experience4 ,the  
concepts must therefore refer to the    
supersensible4      ,that1 however1 can 
be nothing but the unconditioned1 for   
that is      the sole theoretical ,idea 
of reason4 ,not italicised in the       
original4 ,metaphysics thus relates3    
7#a7 to that of which only the          
whole can be represented as absolutely  
unconditioned3 7#b7 to things      so   

far as they are in themselves sensuously
 unconditioned4 ,the      first part is 
cosmology1 the second rational doctrine 
of the soul1      pneumatology and      
theology40  ,at this stage1 therefore1  
,kant would seem to have held that there
 is but one ,idea strictly so called1   
and that the above three principia are  
merely specifications of it in terms of 
the concepts of substance-accident1     
ground-consequence1 and whole-part4 ,the
 classification thus obtained is in     
certain respects more satisfactory than 
that which is adopted in the ,critique4 
,it locates the cosmological argument   
with the causal category1 and so would  
enable the conceptions of freedom or    
causa sui1 and of ,divine ,existence1 to
 be dealt with in their natural         
connection with one another4 ,it also   
supplies1 in the category of whole and  
part1 a more fitting heading for those  
antinomy problems which deal with the   
unlimited and the limited1 the divisible
 and the indivisible1 the complex and   

the simple4 ,the classification would1  
however1 in separating the problem of   
the simple from that of substance1      
remain open to the same criticism as    
that of the ,critique4#acdh  ,this      
classification must1 as we have stated1 
be of a date prior to ,kant's discovery 
of the table of categories4 ,that is    
quite clear from its ignoring the       
category of reciprocity1 and from its   
combination of the other two categories 
of relation with the merely quantitative
 category of whole and part4 ,for though
 the last is also entitled composition  
and co-ordination1 it is conceived in   
these particular ,reflexionen in        
exclusively quantitative terms4 ,when   
,kant formulated the 8metaphysical0     
deduction of the categories he was1 of  
course1 compelled to recast the         
classification1 and did so in the only  
possible manner1 consistent with his    
architectonic1 by substituting the      
category of reciprocity for that of     
whole and part1#acdi and by taking the  

new heading1 obtained through           
combination of reciprocity with the     
,idea of the unconditioned1 as          
equivalent to the ,idea of ,divine      
,existence4 ,but this could not be done 
without dislocating the entire scheme4  
,the category of ground and consequence 
is deprived of its chief application1   
that expressed in the cosmological      
argument2 and in order to provide a new 
content for it1 ,kant is compelled to   
force upon it the problems previously   
classified under the displaced category 
of whole and part4 ,even so1 the problem
 of the causa sui cannot be eliminated1 
and reappears1 partly as the problem of 
freedom1 and partly as the modal problem
 of necessary existence4  ,the          
identification of the theological ,idea 
with the category of reciprocity has a  
further consequence4 ,it carries the    
problem of ,divine ,existence outside   
the sphere of the problems of infinity1 
and necessitates a very different       
treatment from that which it would      

naturally have received at ,kant's      
hands1 if developed in its connection   
with his own ,critical teaching4 ,he is 
driven to expound it in the extreme     
rationalistic form in which it had been 
formulated by ,leibniz and ,wolff1 as a 
doctrine of the ,ens realissimum4       
,prior to the rearrangement1            
necessitated by recognition of the      
category of reciprocity1 ,kant would    
seem to have expected to bring the      
entire body of ,wolffian metaphysics    
within the scope of a general doctrine  
of antinomy4 ,the problems of the       
divisible and the indivisible1 of the   
simple and the complex1 leading as they 
do to discussion of the presuppositions 
underlying the ,leibnizian monadology1  
concern spiritual as well as material   
substance4 ,similarly1 the main problems
 of theology would have been treated in 
connection with the cosmological        
inference to a first cause1 and with the
 discussion of the possibility of first 
beginnings in space and time4#acej  ,the

 sections in the ,critique devoted to   
the antinomies reveal1 in many ways1    
,kant's original design4 ,it is         
especially noticeable in his discussion 
of the third and fourth antinomies4 ,the
 problems of freedom and of necessary   
existence are by no means treated in    
merely cosmological fashion4 ,indeed    
,kant makes no pretence of concealing   
their psychological and theological     
implications4 ,even the first and second
 antinomies have obvious bearings of a  
similar character4 ,but it is in the    
section entitled ,the ,interest of      
,reason in this ,self-conflict#acea that
 the broader significance of the        
antinomies finds its fullest expression4
 ,in its suggestive contrast of the two 
possible types of philosophy1 ,epicurean
 and ,platonic1 the argument entirely   
transcends the bounds prescribed to it  
by its cosmological setting4 ,as we     
follow the comprehensive sweep of its   
argument1 we can hardly avoid regretting
 that ,kant failed to keep to his       

original plan1 as here unfolded1#aceb of
 expounding the self-conflict of ,reason
 in the form of a broad judicial        
statement of the grounds and claims of  
the two opposing authorities which      
divide the allegiance of the human      
spirit1 namely1 the intellectual and the
 moral1 science with its cognitive      
demands on the one hand1 the            
consciousness of duty with its no less  
imperious prescriptions on the other4   
,the materialist philosophies would then
 have been presented as inevitably      
arising when intellectual values are    
made supreme2 and the ,idealist         
philosophies as equally cogent when     
moral values are taken as primary and   
are allowed to determine speculative    
tenets4 ,against this background of     
conflicting dogmatisms the comprehensive
 and satisfying character of the        
,critical standpoint would have stood   
out the more clearly2 and its historical
 affiliations1 its debt to the sceptics 
and materialists1 no less than to the   

,idealists1 would have been depicted in 
more adequate terms4 ,as it is1 in the  
chapters on the ,paralogisms and the    
,ideal of ,pure ,reason there is almost 
entire failure to recognise the         
possibility of a naturalistic solution  
of the problems with which they deal1   
and ,kant so far succumbs to the outworn
 influences of his day and              
generation--the very influences from    
which the ,critical philosophy1         
consistently developed1 is a final      
breaking away--as to maintain1 almost in
 the manner of the ,english ,deists1 of 
,voltaire and ,rousseau1 that ,god1     
,freedom1 and ,immortality are          
conceptions which the mind must         
necessarily form1 and in the validity of
 which it must spontaneously believe4   
,kant is here1 indeed1 interpreting     
8natural reason0 in the light of his own
 personal history4 ,the ,christian      
beliefs1 in which he had been nurtured  
from childhood1 and their rationalist   
counterparts in the ,wolffian           

philosophy1 had become1 as it were1 a   
second nature to him2 and the           
resistance1 which in his own person they
 had offered to the development of      
,critical teaching1 he not unnaturally  
interpreted as evidence of their being  
imposed by the very structure of reason4
 ,he transforms the metaphysical        
sciences in their ,wolffian form into   
inevitable illusions of the human       
mind4#acec  ,there is evidence that the 
theological problems were the first to  
be withdrawn from the sphere of the     
8sceptical method10#aced peculiar to the
 antinomies4 ,thus ,reflexion ii4       
#abeacee states that 8metaphysics proper
 consists of cosmologia rationalis and  
theologia naturalis0--rational          
psychology being1 as it would seem1     
still included within cosmology4#acef   
,what the considerations were which     
induced ,kant to claim similarly        
independent treatment for rational      
psychology1 we can only conjecture4 ,for
 a time1 while still holding to the     

bipartite division1 he would seem to    
have made the further change of also    
separating psychology from cosmology1   
classing psychology and theology        
together as subdivisions of the rational
 science of soul4       0,metaphysics   
has two parts3 the first is cosmology1  
the second      rational doctrine of    
soul1 pneumatology and theology40#aceg  
,a main factor deciding ,kant in favour 
of a dogmatic1 non-sceptical treatment  
of rational psychology may have been the
 greater opportunity which it seemed to 
afford him of connecting its doctrines  
with the teaching of the ,analytic1 and 
especially with his central doctrine of 
apperception4 ,but to whatever cause the
 decision was due1 it resulted in the   
impoverishment of the second antinomy1  
through withdrawal of the more important
 half of its natural content4 ,this     
antinomy could no longer be made to     
comprehend a discussion of the logical  
bases of monadology1 and of its         
professed proofs of the simplicity and  

immortality of the soul4 ,nothing is    
left to it save the discussion of the   
monadistic theory of matter 7somatologia
 pura74#aceh ,this change has also1 as  
already noted1 the unfortunate effect of
 precluding ,kant from recognition of   
the physical application of the category
 of substance4 ,by the simple he means  
the substantial1 and yet he may not say 
so2 his architectonic forbids4  ,i may  
hazard the further suggestion that      
,kant's interpretation of rational      
psychology in terms of the ,critical    
doctrine of apperception is of earlier  
date than his doctrine of transcendental
 illusion4 ,for the chapter on the      
,paralogisms seems in its first form to 
have contained no reference to that     
latter doctrine4#acei ,the few passages 
which take account of it1 all bear      
evidence of being later intercalations4 
,this is the more remarkable in that the
 ,paralogisms can easily be shown to be 
typical examples of transcendental      
illusion4 ,indeed1 neither the          

antinomies nor the theological ,ideal   
conform to its definition in the same   
strict fashion4  ,the problem as to     
whether the doctrine of transcendental  
illusion and the deduction of the ,ideas
 from the three species of syllogism    
originated early or late1 is largely    
bound up with the question as to when   
,kant finally adopted the terms         
,analytic and ,dialectic as titles for  
the two main divisions of his           
,transcendental ,logic4 ,that ,kant was 
at first very uncertain as to what the  
main divisions of his system ought to   
be1 appears very clearly from the       
,reflexionen4#acfj ,to his teaching as a
 whole he usually applies the title     
,transcendental ,philosophy1 and in     
,reflexion ii4 #abc he enumerates the   
following subdivisions within it3       
,aesthetic1 ,logic1 ,critique1 and      
,architectonic4 ,by ,critique ,kant must
 here mean what in other ,reflexionen he
 names ,discipline1 and which he finally
 named ,dialectic4 ,as thus identified  

with the ,discipline1 the ,dialectic is 
at times viewed as a division of a      
,methodology or ,organon1 whose other   
divisions are entitled ,canon and       
,architectonic4#acfa ,this earlier      
scheme may therefore be represented as  
follows3                                
,aesthetic4                  ,doctrine  
of ,elements ,logic4   ,transcendental  
,philosophy                             
,critique  ,discipline corresponding    
,doctrine of ,methods  to the ,dialectic
                    7,methodology7      
of the ,critique4                       
,canon4                                 
,architectonic4  ,the terms ,analytic   
and ,dialectic do not occur in these    
,reflexionen1 and their adoption may    
therefore be inferred to synchronise    
with ,kant's later decision to include  
the treatment of the metaphysical       
sciences within his ,logic2 and that    
decision was probably an immediate      
result of his having developed meantime 
a doctrine of transcendental illusion4  

,the new scheme in its final form is    
therefore as follows3                   
,aesthetic4                  ,doctrine  
of                    ,elements         
,analytic of ,concepts4                 
,logic          of ,judgement4          
,transcendental                         
,dialectic--of ,reason4   ,philosophy   
or ,critique of    ,pure ,reason        
,discipline 7retained but given a new   
,doctrine of   and more general         
content74                  ,methods     
,canon4                  7,methodology7 
,architectonic4                         
,history4  ,in thus transferring        
,dialectic from the ,methodology to the 
,doctrine of ,elements1 ,kant stands    
committed to the view that it contains  
positive teaching of a character        
analogous to that of the ,analytic1 with
 which it is now co-ordinated4 ,as we   
have already noted1 the fundamental     
opposition which runs through the entire
 ,dialectic is due to the conflict      
between the older view of ,reason as    

merely understanding in its transcendent
 employment1 and this later view of it  
as a distinct faculty1 yielding concepts
 with a positive and indispensable      
function1 different from1 and yet also  
analogous to1 that exercised by the     
categories of the understanding4        
,adickes1 to whom students of ,kant are 
indebted for a convincing demonstration 
of the constant influence of ,kant's    
logical architectonic upon the content  
of the ,critical teaching1 would seem at
 this point to rely too exclusively upon
 that method of explanation4 ,he        
contends that ,kant's deduction of the  
,ideas of ,reason from the three species
 of syllogism is entirely traceable to  
this source1 and is without real        
philosophical significance4 ,that is    
perhaps in the main true4 ,but it need  
not prevent us from appreciating the    
importance of the doctrines which ,kant 
contrives to expound under guise of this
 logical machinery4 ,we have already    
observed that prior to the discovery of 

this deduction ,kant had recognised the 
connection between the concept of the   
unconditioned and the three ,ideas      
through which it finds expression4 ,as  
the forms of syllogism are              
differentiated in terms of the three    
categories of relation1 the deduction   
does not interfere with ,kant's         
retention of this classification of     
,ideas2 while in connecting ,reason as a
 faculty with reasoning as a logical    
process1 an excellent opportunity is    
found for explaining the grounds and    
significance of the demand for          
unconditionedness1 i4e4 for completeness
 of explanation4 ,this demand1 as he has
 also come to recognise1 lies open to   
question1 and therefore calls for more  
precise definition4  ,the artificial    
character of the metaphysical deduction 
lies not so much in this derivation of  
the three ,ideas of the                 
unconditioned--unconditioned substance1 
unconditioned causality1 unconditioned  
system--from the categorical1           

hypothetical1 and disjunctive forms of  
syllogism respectively1 as in the       
further equating of them with the ,ideas
 of the ,self1 the ,world1 and ,god4    
,the ,idea of unconditioned substance   
has many possible applications besides  
the use to which it is put in rational  
psychology4 ,the ,idea of an            
unconditioned causality may be conceived
 in psychological and theological as    
well as in cosmological terms2 and as a 
matter of fact ,kant himself frequently 
identifies it with the concept of       
freedom1 as in the third and fourth     
antinomies1 or when he enumerates the   
,ideas as being those of ,god1 ,freedom1
 and ,immortality4#acfb ,similarly1 the 
,idea of system is the inspiring        
principle of materialism1 and also finds
 in such philosophies as that of        
,spinoza much more adequate expression  
than in the ,ens realissimum of the     
,wolffian ,school4 ,but further comment 
is not1 at this stage1 really           
profitable4 ,these are questions which  

can best be discussed as they emerge in 
the course of the argument4#acfc  ,kant 
carried his logical architectonic one   
stage further4 ,not satisfied with      
connecting the three ,ideas of ,reason  
with the categories that underlie the   
three species of syllogism1 he also     
attempted to organise the various       
particular applications of each ,idea in
 terms of the fourfold division of the  
table of categories4 ,by the use of his 
usual high-handed methods he succeeded  
in doing so in the case of the          
psychological and cosmological ,ideas4  
,there are four paralogisms and four    
antinomies4 ,but when the attempt failed
 in regard to the theological ,idea1 he 
very wisely abstained from either       
apology or explanation4 ,that the       
failure was not due to lack of desire or
 perseverance appears from ,reflexion   
ii4 #aegc1 which would seem to be the   
record of an unavailing attempt to      
obtain a satisfactory articulation of   
the theological ,ideal4 ,doubtless1 had 

he been sufficiently bent upon it1 he   
could have worked out some sort of      
fourfold division2 but there were limits
 even to ,kant's devotion to the        
architectonic scheme4 ,it is difficult  
to see how any such arrangement could   
have been followed without serious      
perversion of the argument4  ,adickes   
has suggested#acfd that the distinction 
between the faculty of understanding and
 the faculty of judgment is subsequent  
to1 and suggested by1 ,kant's successful
 tracing of the ,ideas to a separate    
faculty of ,reason4 ,some such          
distinction was demanded in order that  
the parallelism of transcendental and   
formal logic might be complete4 ,this   
conjecture of ,adickes is probably      
correct4 ,it would seem to be supported 
by the internal evidence of the         
,analytic of ,principles4 ,as we have   
had occasion to note1#acfe the doctrine 
of schematism1 in terms of which the    
distinction between understanding and   
judgment is formulated1 is late in date 

of origin4#acff ,this distinction is of 
the same artificial character as that   
between understanding and ,reason2 and  
though1 like the latter distinction1 it 
supplies ,kant with a convenient        
framework for the arrangement of genuine
 ,critical material1 it also tends to   
conceal the simpler and more inward     
bonds of true relationship4             
,,transcendental ,,dialectic            
,,introduction   ,i4 ,transcendental    
,illusion  ,dialectic is a ,logic of    
,illusion4#acfg--,the meaning which     
,kant attaches to the term dialectic has
 already been considered4 ,the passage  
above quoted#acfh from his ,logic shows 
the meaning which he supposed the term  
historically to possess1 namely1 as     
being a sophistical art of disputation1 
presenting false principles in the guise
 of truth by means of a seeming         
fulfilment of the demands of strict     
logical proof4 ,the incorrectness of    
this historical derivation hardly needs 
to be pointed out4 ,kant professes#acfi 

to be following his contemporaries in   
thus using the term as a title for the  
treatment of false reasoning4 ,but even 
this statement must be challenged4      
,adickes1 after examination of a large  
number of eighteenth-century text-books1
 reports#acgj that in the six passages  
in which alone he has found it to occur 
it is never so employed4 ,in ,meier it  
is used as a title for the theory of    
probable reasoning1#acga and in         
,baumgarten it occurs only in adjectival
 form as equivalent to sophistical4     
,this last is the nearest approach to   
,kant's definition4 ,all historical     
considerations may therefore be swept   
aside4 ,we are concerned only with the  
specific meaning which ,kant thought    
good to attach to the term4 ,he adapts  
it in the freest manner to the needs of 
his system4 ,in ,a #fa  ,b #he1 as in   
his ,logic1 he has defined it in merely 
negative fashion4 ,he is now careful to 
specify the more positive aspects of the
 problems with which it deals4 ,though  

definable as the logic of illusion1 the 
deceptive inferences with which it      
concerns itself are of a quite unique   
and supremely significant character4    
,they must1 as above noted1#acgb be     
distinguished alike from logical and    
from empirical illusion4 ,they have     
their roots in the fundamental needs of 
the human mind1 and the recognition of  
their illusory character does not render
 unnecessary either a positive          
explanation of their occurrence or a    
,critical valuation of their practical  
function as regulative ideals4  ,a #bic 
,b #cdi4--,regarding the connection     
between illusion and error cf4 ,b #fi1  
and above1 pp4 #adh-ec4  ,a #bie  ,b    
#ceb4--,logical1 empirical1 and         
transcendental illusion4 ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #ac1 #dbg-i1 #dcg4  ,a #bif  ,b        
#ceb4--,kant here defines the terms     
transcendental and transcendent in a    
very unusual manner4 ,the two terms are 
not1 he states1 synonymous4 ,the        
principles of pure understanding are of 

merely empirical validity1 and          
consequently are not of transcendental  
employment beyond the limits of         
experience4 ,a principle is transcendent
 when it not only removes these limits1 
but prescribes the overstepping of them4
   ,,ii4 ,pure ,reason as the ,seat of  
,transcendental ,illusion#acgc  7a7     
,reason in ,general  ,reason1 like      
understanding1 is employed in two ways1 
formal or logical and real4 ,the logical
 use of ,reason consists in mediate     
inference1 the real in the generation of
 concepts and principles4 ,reason is    
thus both a logical and a transcendental
 faculty1 and we may therefore expect   
that its logical functions will serve as
 a clue to those that are               
transcendental4 ,the argument which     
follows is extremely obscure4 ,it is a  
foreshadowing in logical terms of a     
distinction which1 as ,kant himself     
indicates1 cannot at this stage be      
adequately stated4 ,the distinction may 
be extended and paraphrased as follows4 

,reason1 generically taken as including 
both activities1 is the faculty of      
principles1 in distinction from         
understanding which is the faculty of   
rules4#acgd ,principles1 properly       
so-called1 are absolutely a priori4     
,universals which imply the element of  
intuition must not1 therefore1 be ranked
 as principles in the strict sense4     
,they are more properly to be entitled  
rules4 ,a true principle is one that    
affords knowledge of the particulars    
which come under it1 and which does so  
from its own internal resources1 that is
 to say1 through pure concepts4 ,in     
other words1 it yields a priori         
synthetic knowledge1 and yet does so    
independently of all given experience4  
,now1 as the ,analytic has proved1      
knowledge obtained through              
understanding1 whether in mathematical  
or in physical science1 is never of this
 character4 ,its principles1 even though
 originating in pure intuition or in the
 pure understanding1 are valid only as  

conditions of possible experience1 and  
are applicable only to such objects as  
can occur in the context of a           
sense-perception4 ,that is to say1 the  
understanding can never obtain synthetic
 knowledge through pure concepts4       
,though1 for instance1 it prescribes the
 principle that everything which happens
 must have a cause1 that principle does 
not establish itself by means of the    
concepts which it contains1 but only as 
being a presupposition necessary to the 
possibility of sense-experience4 ,if1   
then1 principles in the strict sense    
actually exist1 they must be due to a   
faculty distinct from understanding1 and
 will call for a deduction of a         
different character from that of the    
categories4  ,in the last paragraph but 
one of the section ,kant indicates the  
doctrine which he is foreshadowing4 ,the
 rules of understanding apply to        
appearances1 prescribing the conditions 
under which the unity necessary to any  
and every experience can alone be       

attained4 ,the principles of ,reason do 
not apply directly to appearances1 but  
only to the understanding1 defining the 
standards to which its activities must  
conform1 if a completely unified        
experience is to be achieved4 ,whereas  
the rules of understanding are the      
conditions of objective existence in    
space and time1 principles in the strict
 sense are criteria for the attainment  
of such absoluteness and totality as    
will harmonise ,reason with itself4     
,reason1 determined by principles which 
issue from its own inherent nature1     
prescribes what the actual ought to be2 
understanding1 proceeding from rules    
which express the conditions of possible
 experience1 can yield knowledge only of
 what is found to exist in the course of
 sense-experience4 ,the unity of ,reason
 is ,ideal2 the unity of understanding  
is empirical4 ,principles are due to the
 self-determination of reason2 the rules
 of understanding express the           
necessitated determinations of sense4   

,the former demand a more perfect and   
complete unity than is ever attainable  
by means of the latter4 ,two passages   
from the ,lose ,bltter will help to     
define the distinction4       8,there is
 a synthesis prototypon and a synthesis 
ectypon4 ,the one 444 simpliciter1 a    
termino a priori1 444 the other secundum
      quid1 a termino a posteriori4444  
,reason advances from the      universal
 to the particular1 the understanding   
from the particular      to the         
universal4444 ,the first is absolute and
 belongs to the free      or            
metaphysical1 and also to the moral1    
employment of      ,reason40#acge 8,the 
principles of the synthesis of pure     
,reason are      all metaphysical4444   
,they are principles of the subjective  
unity      of knowledge through ,reason1
 i4e4 of the agreement of ,reason with  
itself40#acgf  ,the chief interest of   
this section lies in its clear          
indication of the dual standpoint to    
which ,kant is committing himself by the

 manner in which he formulates this     
distinction between rules and           
principles4 ,the indispensableness of   
the latter1 upon which ,kant is prepared
 to insist1 points to the ,idealist     
interpretation of their grounds and     
validity2 their derivation from mere    
concepts1 without reference to or basis 
in experience1 must1 on the other hand1 
in view of the teaching of the          
,analytic1 commit ,kant to a sceptical  
treatment of their objective validity4  
,in the above account1 suggestions of   
the ,idealist point of view are not     
entirely absent2 but1 on the whole1 it  
is the sceptical view that is dominant4 
,the ,ideas of ,reason can be justified 
as necessary only for the perfecting of 
experience1 not as conditions of        
experience as such4 ,they express a     
subjective interest in the attainment of
 unity1 not conditions of the           
possibility of objective existence4     
0,civil ,laws are only limitations      
imposed upon our freedom in      order  

that such freedom may completely        
harmonise with itself2 hence      they  
are directed to something which is      
entirely our own work1 and      of which
 we ourselves1 through these concepts1  
can be the cause4      ,but that objects
 in themselves1 the very nature of      
things1 should      stand under         
principles1 and should be determined    
according to mere      concepts1 is a   
demand which1 if not impossible1 is at  
least quite      contrary to common     
sense ,widersinnisches40#acgg   7b7 ,the
 ,logical ,use of ,reason#acgh  ,in this
 subsection ,kant introduces the        
distinction between understanding and   
judgment which he has sought to justify 
in ,a #acj ff4  ,b #afi ff4 ,by showing 
that inference determines the relation  
between a major premiss 7due to the     
understanding7 and the condition defined
 in the minor premiss 7due to the       
faculty of judgment71 he professes to   
obtain justification for classifying the
 possible forms of reasoning according  

to the three categories of relation4    
,the general remark is added that the   
purpose of ,reason1 in its logical      
employment as inference1 is to obtain   
the highest possible unity1 through     
subsumption of all multiplicity under   
the smallest possible number of         
universals4   7c7 ,the ,pure ,use of    
,reason#acgi  ,kant here states the     
alternatives between which the          
,dialectic has to decide4 ,is ,reason   
merely formal1 arranging given material 
according to given forms of unity1 or is
 it a source of principles which        
prescribe higher forms of unity than any
 revealed by actual experience8 ,further
 examination of its formal and logical  
procedure constrains us1 ,kant asserts1 
to adopt the latter position2 and at the
 same time indicates how those          
principles must be interpreted1 namely1 
as subjective laws that apply not to    
objects but only to the activities of   
the understanding4  ,in the first place1
 a syllogism is not directly concerned  

with intuitions1 but only with concepts 
and judgments4 ,this may be taken as    
indicating that pure ,reason relates to 
objects only mediately by way of        
understanding and its judgments4 ,the   
unity which it seeks is higher than that
 of any possible experience2 it is a    
unity which must be constructed and     
cannot be given4#achj  ,secondly1       
,reason in its logical use seeks the    
universal condition of its judgment2 and
 when such is not found in the major    
premiss proceeds to its discovery       
through a regressive series of          
prosyllogisms4 ,in so doing it is       
obviously determined by a principle     
expressive of the peculiar function of  
,reason in its logical employment1      
namely1 that for the conditioned        
knowledge of understanding the          
unconditioned unity in which that       
knowledge may find completion must be   
discovered4 ,such a principle is        
synthetic1 since from analysis of the   
conception of the conditioned we can    

discover its relation to a condition1   
but never its relation to the           
unconditioned4 ,that is a notion which  
falls entirely outside the sphere of the
 understanding1 and which therefore     
demands a separate enquiry4 ,how is the 
above a priori synthetic principle to be
 accounted for1 if it cannot be traced  
to understanding8 ,has it objective1 or 
has it merely subjective validity8 ,and 
lastly1 what further synthetic          
principles can be based upon it8 ,such  
are the questions to which ,critical    
,dialectic must supply an answer4 ,this 
,dialectic will be composed of two main 
divisions1 the doctrine of 8the         
transcendent concepts of pure ,reason0  
and the doctrine of 8transcendent and   
dialectical inferences of ,reason40     
,,book ,i  ,,the ,,concepts ,,of ,,pure 
,,reason#acha   ,the distinction here   
drawn between concepts obtained by      
reflection and concepts gained by       
inference is a somewhat misleading mode 
of stating the fact that1 whereas the   

categories of understanding condition   
experience and so make possible the     
unity of consciousness necessary to all 
reflection1 or1 in other words1 are     
conditions of the material supplied for 
inference1 the concepts of ,reason are  
,ideal constructions which though in a  
certain sense resting upon experience   
none the less transcend it4 ,the        
function of the ,ideas is to organise   
experience in its totality2 that of the 
categories is to render possible the    
sense-perceptions constitutive of its   
content4 ,the former refer to the       
unconditioned1 and though that is a     
conception under which everything       
experienced is conceived to fall1 it    
represents a type of knowledge to which 
no actual experience can ever be        
adequate4  ,conceptus                   
ratiocinati--conceptus ratiocinantes4   
,when such transcendent concepts possess
 8objective validity10 they are         
correctly inferred1 and may be entitled 
conceptus ratiocinati4 ,if1 on the other

 hand1 they are due to merely           
sophistical#achb reasoning1 they are    
purely fictitious1 conceptus            
ratiocinantes4 ,this distinction raises 
many difficulties4 ,kant's intention    
cannot be to deny that the conceptus    
ratiocinati are 8mere ,ideas0 7entia    
rationis7#achc--;for such is his avowed 
and constant contention--or that the    
inference to them is dialectical and is 
based upon a transcendental illusion4   
,two alternatives are open4 ,he may mean
 that they are only valid when the      
results of such inference are           
,critically reinterpreted1 and when the 
function of the ,ideas is realised to be
 merely regulative2 or his intention may
 be to mark off the ,ideas1 strictly    
so-called1 which are inevitable and     
beneficial products of ,reason1 from the
 many idle and superfluous inventions of
 speculative thought4 ,kant's concluding
 remark1 that the questions at issue can
 be adequately discussed only at a later
 stage1 may be taken as in the nature of

 an apology for the looseness of these  
preliminary statements1 and as a warning
 to the reader not to insist upon them  
too absolutely4 ,the participles        
ratiocinati and ratiocinantes#achd are  
of doubtful latinity4 ,the distinction  
of meaning here imposed upon them has   
not been traced in any other writer1 and
 is perhaps ,kant's own invention4#ache 
,,section ,i  ,,ideas ,,in              
,,general#achf  ,kant connects his use  
of the term ,idea with the meaning in   
which it is employed by ,plato4 ,he     
urges upon all true lovers of philosophy
 the imperative need of rescuing from   
misuse a term so indispensable to mark a
 distinction more vital than any other  
to the very existence of the            
philosophical disciplines4       0,for  
,plato ,ideas are the archetypes of the 
things themselves1 and      not1 like   
the categories1 merely keys to possible 
experiences4 ,in      his view they     
issued from the ,supreme ,reason1 and   
from that source      have come to be   

shared in by human ,reason4444 ,he very 
well realised      that our faculty of  
knowledge feels a much higher need than 
merely      to spell out appearances    
according to a synthetic unity1 in order
      to read them as experience4 ,he   
knew that our ,reason naturally         
exalts itself to forms of knowledge     
which so far transcend the      bounds  
of experience that no given empirical   
object can ever      coincide with them1
 but which must none the less be        
recognised as      having their own     
reality and which are by no means mere  
fictions of      the brain40#achg       
,plato found these ideas chiefly1 though
 not exclusively1 in the practical      
sphere4 ,when moral standards are in    
question1 experience is the mother of   
illusion4       8,for nothing can be    
more injurious or more unworthy of a    
philosopher than the vulgar appeal to   
so-called adverse experience4      ,such
 experience would never have existed at 
all1 if those      institutions had been

 established at the proper time in      
accordance      with ,ideas1 and if     
,ideas had not been displaced by crude  
conceptions which1 just because they    
have been derived from      experience1 
have nullified all good                 
intentions40#achh  ,even in the natural 
sphere ,ideas which are never themselves
 adequately embodied in the actual must 
be postulated in order to account for   
the actual4 ,certain forms of existences
 8are possible only according to        
,ideas40       8,a plant1 an animal1 the
 orderly arrangement of the             
cosmos--probably1 therefore1 the entire 
natural world--clearly show      that   
they are possible only according to     
,ideas1 and that though no      single  
creature in the conditions of its       
individual existence      coincides with
 the ,idea of what is most perfect in   
its kind--just      as little as does   
any individual man exactly conform to   
the ,idea of      humanity1 which he    
actually carries in his soul as the     

archetype of      his actions--yet these
 ,ideas are none the less completely    
determined in the ,supreme              
,understanding1 each as an individual   
and      each as unchangeable1 and are  
the original causes of things4 ,but     
only the totality of things1 in their   
interconnection as      constituting the
 universe1 is completely adequate to the
      ,idea40#achi  ,though ,kant avows 
the intention of adapting the term ,idea
 freely to the needs of his more        
,critical standpoint1 all these         
considerations contribute to the rich   
and varied meanings in which he employs 
it4  ,reflexionen and passages from the 
,lectures on ,metaphysics may be quoted 
to show the thoroughly ,platonic        
character of ,kant's early use of the   
term1 and to illustrate its gradual     
adjustment to ,critical demands4        
8,the ,idea is the unity of knowledge1  
through which the manifold      either  
of knowledge or of the object is        
possible4 ,in the former1      the whole

 of knowledge precedes its parts1 the   
universal precedes      the particular2 
in the latter1 knowledge of the objects 
precedes      their possibility1 as e4g4
 in objects that possess order and      
perfection40#acij 8,that an object is   
possible only through a form      of    
knowledge is a surprising statement2 but
 all teleological      relations are    
possible only through a form of         
knowledge i4e4 a      concept40#acia    
8,the ,idea is single 7individuum71     
self-sufficient1 and eternal4 ,the      
divinity of our soul is its             
capacity to form the ,idea4 ,the senses 
give only copies or rather              
apparentia40#acib 8,as the              
,understanding of ,god is the ground of 
all possibility1 archetypes1 ,ideas1 are
 in ,god4444 ,the divine      ,intuitus 
contains ,ideas according to which we   
ourselves are      possible2 cognitio   
divina est cognitio archetypa1 and ,his 
,ideas      are archetypes of things4   
,the corresponding forms of knowledge   

possessed by the human understanding we 
may also entitle 7in a      comparative 
sense7 archetypes or ,ideas4 ,they are  
those      representations of our       
understanding which serve for judgment  
upon      things40#acic 8,idea is the   
representation of the whole in so far   
as it necessarily precedes the          
determination of the parts4 ,it can     
never be empirically represented1       
because in experience we proceed        
from the parts through successive       
synthesis to the whole4 ,it is the      
archetype of things1 for certain objects
 are only possible through      an      
,idea4 ,transcendental ,ideas are those 
in which the absolute whole             
determines the parts in an aggregate or 
as series40#acid 8,the pure             
concepts of ,reason have no exemplaria2 
they are themselves      archetypes4    
,but the concepts of our pure ,reason   
have as their      archetypes this      
,reason itself and are therefore        
subjective1 not      objective40#acie   

8,the transcendental ,ideas serve to    
limit the      principles of experience1
 forbidding their extension to things in
      themselves1 and showing that what 
is never an object of possible          
experience is not therefore a non-entity
 ,unding1 and that      experience is   
not adequate either to itself or to     
,reason1 but      always refers us      
further to what is beyond itself40#acif 
8,the      employment of the concept of 
understanding was immanent1 that of     
the ,ideas as concepts of objects is    
transcendent4 ,but as regulative        
principles alike of the completion and  
of the limitation of our      knowledge1
 they are ,critically immanent40#acig   
8,the difficulties      of metaphysics  
all arise in connection with the        
reconciling of      empirical principles
 with ,ideas4 ,the possibility of the   
latter      cannot be denied1 but       
neither can they be made empirically    
intelligible4 ,the ,idea is never a     
conceptus dabilis2 it is not an         

empirically possible conception40#acih  
,kant#acii appends the following        
#8,stufenleiter' 7ladder-like7          
arrangement of titles for the various   
kinds of representation4 ,representation
 7,vorstellung7 is the term which he    
substitutes for the ,cartesian and      
,lockian employment of the term idea1   
now reserved for use in its true        
,platonic meaning4 ,to entitle such a   
representation as that of red colour an 
idea is1 in ,kant's view1 an intolerable
 and barbaric procedure2 that           
representation is not even a concept of 
the understanding4    ,representation   
7,vorstellung1    ,perception           
,repraesentatio7   ,representation      
---   with or without     with          
consciousness   consciousness           
----------------------------------------
---------------------------             
,idea 7,idee7 or concept of             
,reason formed1 ,kant here              
says1 from notions1 but                 
,pure  transcending the possibility     

of experience4     ,objective           
,concept              ,notion 7notio7   
category     ,knowledge                 
7,begriff7         of understanding4 -- 
7,erkenntnis7                           
,empirical4                             
,intuition 7,anschauung74               
,subjective  ,sensation 7,empfindung74  
,,section ,,ii  ,,the ,,transcendental  
,,ideas#adjj  ,this section completes   
the metaphysical deduction of the       
,ideas4 ,in the preceding sections on   
the logical and on the pure use of      
,reason1 ,kant has pointed out that     
,reason proceeds in accordance with the 
principle1 that for the conditioned     
knowledge of understanding the          
unconditioned1 in which it finds        
completion1 must be discovered4 ,this   
principle is synthetic1 involving a     
concept which transcends the            
understanding2 and as ,reason in its    
logical use is merely formal1 that      
concept must be due to ,reason in its   
creative or transcendental activity4 ,in

 the section before us ,kant deduces    
from the three kinds of syllogism the   
three possible forms in which such an   
,idea of ,reason can present itself4    
,the deduction is1 as already noted1    
wholly artificial1 and masks ,kant's    
real method of obtaining the ,ideas1    
namely1 through combination of the      
unique concept of the unconditioned with
 the three categories of relation4 ,the 
deduction is based upon an extremely    
ingenious analogy between the logical   
function of ,reason in deductive        
inference and its transcendental        
procedure in prescribing the ,ideal of  
unconditioned totality4 ,in the         
syllogism the predicate of the          
conclusion is shown to be connected with
 its subject in accordance with a       
condition which is stated in its        
universality in the major premiss4 ,thus
 if the conclusion be3 ,caius is mortal1
 in constructing the syllogism1 required
 to establish it1 we seek for a         
conception which contains the condition 

under which the predicate is given--in  
this case the conception 8man0--and we  
state that condition in its             
universality3 ,all men are mortal4      
,under this major premiss is then       
subsumed ,caius1 the object dealt with3 
,caius is a man4 ,and so indirectly1 by 
reference to the universal condition1 we
 obtain the knowledge that ,caius is    
mortal4 ,universality1 antecedently     
stated1 is restricted in the conclusion 
to a specific object4 ,now what         
corresponds in the synthesis of         
intuition to the universality           
7universalitas7 of a logical premiss is 
allness 7universitas7 or totality of    
conditions4 ,the transcendental concept 
of ,reason1 to which the logical        
procedure is to serve as clue1 can      
therefore be no other than that of the  
totality of conditions for any given    
conditioned4 ,and as totality of        
conditions is equivalent to the         
unconditioned1 this latter must be taken
 as the fundamental concept of ,reason2 

the unconditioned is conceived as being 
the ground of the synthesis of          
everything conditioned4 ,but there are  
three species of relation1 and          
consequently there are three forms in   
which the concept of ,reason seeks to   
realise its demand for the              
unconditioned3 7#a7 through categorical 
synthesis in one subject1 7#b7 through  
hypothetical synthesis of the members of
 a series1 and 7#c7 through disjunctive 
synthesis of the parts in one system4   
,to these three correspond the three    
species of syllogism1 categorical1      
hypothetical1 and disjunctive1 in each  
of which thought passes through a       
regressive series of prosyllogisms back 
to an unconditioned3 the first to a     
concept which stands for what is always 
a subject and never a predicate2 the    
second to a presupposition which itself 
presupposes nothing further2 and the    
third to such an aggregate of the       
members of the division as will make    
that division complete4 ,it may be      

observed that in this proof the         
threefold specification of the concept  
of the unconditioned is really obtained 
directly from the categories of         
relation1 or at least from the judgments
 of relation1 and not from the          
corresponding species of syllogism4     
,totality and unconditionedness1 when   
taken as equivalent1 become synonymous  
with the absolute4#adja ,this last term1
 however1 especially when taken as      
defining possibility and necessity1 is  
ambiguous4 ,the absolutely possible may 
signify either that which in itself1    
i4e4 so far as regards its internal     
content1 is possible2 or else that which
 is in every respect and in all         
relations possible4 ,the two meanings   
have come to be connected largely owing 
to the fact that the internally         
impossible is impossible in every       
respect4 ,otherwise1 however1 the two   
meanings fall completely apart4         
,absolute necessity and inner necessity 
are quite diverse in character4 ,we must

 not1 for instance1 argue that the      
opposite of what is absolutely necessary
 must be inwardly impossible1 nor       
consequently that absolute necessity    
must in the end reduce to an inner      
necessity4 ,examination will show that1 
in certain types of cases1 not the      
slightest meaning can be attached to the
 phrase #8inner necessity4' ,as we      
possess the terms inner and logical to  
denote the first form of necessity1     
there is no excuse for employing the    
term absolute in any but the wider      
sense4 ,that1 ,kant holds1 is its       
original and proper meaning4 ,the       
absolute totality to which the concept  
of ,reason refers is that form of       
completeness which is in every respect  
unconditioned4  ,in ,a #cbf  ,b #chc    
,kant's mode of statement emphasises the
 connection of the ,ideas with the      
categories of relation4 ,reason1 he     
claims1 8seeks to extend the synthetic  
unity1 which is thought in the category1
 to the absolutely unconditioned40 ,such

 positive content as the ,ideas can     
possess lies in the experience which    
they profess to unify2 in so far as they
 transcend experience and point to an   
,ideal completion that is not           
empirically attainable1 they refer to   
things of which the understanding can   
have no concept4 ,it is necessary1      
however1 that they should present       
themselves in this absolute and         
transcendent form1 since otherwise the  
understanding would be without stimulus 
and without guidance4 ,though mere      
,ideas1 they are neither arbitrary nor  
superfluous4 ,they regulate the         
understanding in its empirical pursuit  
of that systematic unity which it       
requires for its own satisfaction4  ,in 
,a #cbg-h  ,b #chc-d one and the same   
ground is assigned for entitling the    
,ideas transcendental and also          
transcendent1 namely1 that1 as they     
surpass experience1 no object capable of
 being given through the senses         
corresponds to them4 ,but a difference  

would none the less seem to be implied  
in the connotation of the two terms4 ,in
 being prescribed by the very nature of 
,reason1 they are transcendental2 as    
overstepping the limits of experience1  
they are transcendent4 ,kant's use of   
the terms subject and object in this    
passage is also somewhat puzzling4      
#8,object' is employed in the           
metaphysical sense proper only from the 
pre-,critical standpoint of the         
,dissertation1 as meaning an existence  
apprehended through pure thought4 ,the  
term #8subject' receives a              
correspondingly un-,critical            
connotation4 ,the further phrase 8the   
merely speculative use of ,reason0 is   
somewhat misleading1 even though we     
recognise that for ,kant speculative and
 theoretical are synonymous terms2 we   
should rather expect 8,reason in its    
legitimate or ,critical or directive    
function40 ,kant's intended meaning1    
however1 is sufficiently clear4 ,when we
 say that a concept of ,reason is an    

,idea merely1 we have in mind the degree
 to which it can be empirically         
verified4 ,we are asserting that it     
prescribes an ,ideal to which experience
 may be made to approach1 but which it  
can never attain4 ,it defines 8a problem
 to which there is no solution40 ,in the
 practical sphere of morals1 on the     
other hand1 the ,ideal of ,reason must  
never be so described4 ,though only     
partially realisable1 it is genuinely   
actual4 ,even those actions which       
imperfectly embody it none the less     
presuppose it as their indispensable    
condition4 ,in two respects1 therefore1 
as ,kant points out1 the statement that 
the transcendental concepts of ,reason  
are merely ,ideas calls for             
qualification4 ,in the first place they 
are by no means 8superfluous and void40 
,they supply a canon for the fruitful   
employment of understanding4 ,and       
secondly1 they may perhaps be found to  
make possible a transition from natural 
to moral concepts1 and so to bring the  

,ideas of practical ,reason into        
connection with the principles of       
speculative thought4 ,the reader may    
again note the genuinely ,platonic      
character of ,kant's use of the term    
,idea4  ,in ,a #ccj-a  ,b #chf-g ,kant  
returns to the problem of the           
metaphysical deduction1 and analyses the
 nature of syllogistic reasoning4 ,the  
analysis differs from that of ,a #cba   
ff4  ,c #cgg ff4 only in emphasising    
that when a conclusion is given as valid
 the totality of the premisses required 
for its establishment can be postulated 
as likewise given1 and that when        
completely stated in the implied        
prosyllogisms the premisses form a      
regressive series4 ,in this way ,kant   
contrives to bring the logical process  
into closer connection with the         
transcendental principle1 which he now  
definitively formulates as follows3     
,when the conditioned is given1 the     
series of conditions up to the          
unconditioned is likewise given4 ,the   

series of antecedent conditions may     
either have a first term or may be      
incapable of such4 ,in either case it   
has to be viewed as unconditioned1 in   
the one case in virtue of its           
unconditioned beginning1 in the other in
 its character as an unending and       
therefore unlimited series4 ,in one or  
other form ,reason demands that the     
unconditioned be recognised as          
underlying and determining everything   
conditioned4#adjb   ,,section ,,iii     
,,system ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental    
,,ideas#adjc  ,the three ,ideas of      
,reason1 as derived from the three kinds
 of syllogism1 are now brought into     
connection with the three possible      
relations in which representations are  
found to stand3 first1 to the thinking  
subject2 secondly1 to objects as        
appearances2 thirdly1 to objects of     
thought in general4 ,kant argues that   
the completed totalities towards which  
,reason strives are likewise three in   
number4 ,reason seeks3 7#a7 in regard to

 the subject known1 as constituting the 
fact of inner experience1 a             
representation of the self or soul that 
will render completely intelligible what
 is peculiar to the inner life2 7#b7 in 
regard to the object known1 a conception
 of the completed totality of the world 
of phenomena1 the cosmos2 7#c7 in regard
 to the ultimate synthesis of the       
subject known and the object known1 such
 a conception of all existing things as 
will render intelligible the            
co-operation of mind and external nature
 in one experience4 ,in this way ,kant  
professes to obtain transcendental      
justification for the threefold division
 of metaphysical science into rational  
psychology1 rational cosmology1 and     
rational theology4 ,the absolute unity  
of the thinking subject is dealt with by
 psychology1 the totality of all        
appearances by cosmology1 and the       
,being1 which contains the condition of 
the possibility of all that can be      
thought1 by theology4  ,in thus         

proceeding1 ,kant is assuming that the  
concepts of unconditioned substance and 
of unconditioned necessity can be       
interpreted only in spiritualist and    
theological terms4#adjd ,this assumption
 stands in direct conflict with what the
 history of philosophy records4 ,the    
,absolute has frequently been           
materialistically defined1 and1 as ,kant
 himself admits1 we cannot prove that   
the thinking subject may not be         
naturalistically conditioned4           
,architectonic is again exercising its  
baleful influence4 ,that the argument is
 lacking in cogency is indeed so evident
 that ,kant takes notice of the         
deficiency1#adje and promises that it   
will be remedied in the sequel4 ,this   
promise he is unable to fulfil4 ,such   
further reasons as he is able to offer  
are of the same external character4#adjf
  8,of these transcendental ,ideas1     
strictly speaking1 no objective         
deduction1 such as we were able to give 
of the categories1 is possible40#adjg   

,as ,kant indicates by use of the phrase
 #8strictly speaking1' this statement is
 subject to modification4 ,he himself   
formulates a transcendental deduction of
 the ,ideas1 as principles regulative of
 experience4#adjh ,the deduction from   
the three forms of syllogism1 which     
,kant here entitles subjective1 ought   
properly to be named                    
#8metaphysical4'#adji     ,,book ,,ii   
,,the ,,dialectical ,,inferences ,,of   
,,pure ,,reason#adaj     ,,chapter ,i   
,,the ,,paralogisms ,,of ,,pure         
,,reason#adaa   ,as rational psychology 
fails to distinguish between appearances
 and things in themselves1 it identifies
 mere apperception with inner sense2 the
 self in experiencing the succession of 
its inner states is supposed to acquire 
knowledge of its own essential nature4  
8,i1 as thinking1 am an object of inner 
sense1 and am entitled soul10 in        
contrast to the body which is an object 
of outer sense4 ,empirical psychology   
deals with the concrete detail of inner 

experience2 rational psychology         
abstracts from all such special         
experiences1 indeed from everything     
empirical1 professing to establish its  
doctrine upon the single judgment1 8,i  
think40 ,that judgment has already been 
investigated in its connection with the 
problem of the possibility1 within the  
field of experience1 of synthetic a     
priori judgments4 ,it has now to be     
considered as a possible basis for      
knowledge of the self as a thinking     
being 7ein denkend ,wesen7 or soul      
7,seele74  ,following the guiding thread
 of the table of categories1 but placing
 them in what he regards as being1 in   
this connection1 the most convenient    
order1 ,kant obtains a 8topic0 or       
classification of the possible rubrics  
for the doctrines of a rational         
psychology3 7#a7 the soul is substance2 
7#b7 is simple2 7#c7 is numerically     
identical2 7#d7 stands in relation to   
possible objects in space4 ,now all     
those four doctrines are1 ,kant holds1  

incapable of demonstration4 ,the proofs 
propounded by rational psychology are   
logically imperfect1 committing the     
logical fallacy which is technically    
named paralogism4#adab ,the fallacy is  
not1 however1 of merely logical         
character4 ,had that been the case1 it  
could never have gained such general    
currency4 ,certainly no metaphysical    
science1 widely accepted by profound    
thinkers1 could ever have come to be    
based upon it4 ,the paralogism is       
transcendental in character1 resting    
upon a transcendental ground4 ,it       
represents an illusion which from any   
non-,critical standpoint is altogether  
unavoidable4 ,its dialectic is a natural
 dialectic1 wrongly interpreted by the  
,schools1 but not capriciously invented 
by them4 ,the key to its proper         
treatment is first supplied by the      
results of the transcendental deduction4
 ,we are now called upon to apply these 
results in explanation of the occurrence
 of the paralogisms1 and in judgment    

upon their false claims4 ,little that is
 really new is to be found in this      
chapter2 but many of the established    
results of the ,analytic receive        
interesting illustration1 and are       
thereby set in a clearer light4  ,in    
rational psychology the 8,i think0 is   
taken in its universal1 or to use       
,kant's somewhat misleading term1       
problematic aspect1 that is to say1 not 
as a judgment expressive of the self's  
own existence but 8in its mere          
possibility10#adac as representing the  
self-consciousness of all possible      
thinking beings4 ,as we cannot gain a   
representation of thinking beings       
through outer experience1 we are        
constrained to think them in terms of   
our own self-consciousness4 ,the 8,i    
think0 is thus taken as a universal     
judgment1 expressing what belongs to the
 conception of thinking being in        
general4 ,the judgment is so interpreted
 by rational psychology1 8in order to   
see what predicates applicable to its   

subject 7be that subject actually       
existent or not7 may flow from so simple
 a judgment40  ,in summarising what is  
directly relevant in the argument of the
 transcendental deduction1 ,kant        
emphasises that the ,i1 as              
representation1 is altogether empty of  
content4#adad       8,we cannot even say
 that it is a conception1 but only that 
it is a      bare 7blosses7             
consciousness which accompanies all     
conceptions4      ,through this ,i or he
 or it 7the thing7 which thinks1 nothing
      further is represented than a     
transcendental subject of the           
thoughts  x44440  ,it is apprehended    
only in its relation to the thoughts    
which are its predicates2 apart from    
them we cannot form any conception      
whatever of it1 but can only revolve in 
a perpetual circle1 since any judgment  
upon it has already made use of its     
representation4#adae  ,the patchwork    
character of the ,critique1 the         
artificial nature of the connections    

between its various parts1 is nowhere   
more evident than in this section on the
 ,paralogisms4 ,according to the        
definition given of transcendental      
illusion1 we naturally expect ,kant's   
argument to show that the ,paralogisms  
rest upon a failure to distinguish      
between appearance and reality4 ,as a   
matter of fact1 the cause of their      
fallacy is traced in the first three    
,paralogisms solely to a failure to     
distinguish between the logical and the 
real application of the categories4 ,the
 argument can indeed be restated so as  
to agree with the introductory sections 
of the ,dialectic4 ,but ,kant's manner  
of expounding the ,paralogisms shows    
that this chapter must originally have  
been written independently of any       
intention to develop such teaching as   
that of the sections which in the       
ultimate arrangement of the ,critique   
are made to lead up to it4#adaf  ,first 
,paralogism3 of                         
,substantiality4#adag--,save for the    

phrase #8subject in itself1' there is1  
in ,kant's comment upon this            
,paralogism1 not a word regarding the   
necessity of a distinction between      
appearance and reality1 but only an     
insistence that the 8,i think0 yields no
 knowledge of the thinking self4        
,consciousness of the self and knowledge
 of its underlying substance are by no  
means identical4 ,the self1 so far as it
 enters into consciousness1 is a merely 
logical subject2 the underlying         
substrate is that to which this         
self-consciousness and all other        
thoughts are due4 ,it is in the light of
 this distinction that ,kant discusses  
the substantiality of the subject4 ,as  
expressive of the 8,i think10 the       
category of substance and attribute can 
be employed only to define the relation 
in which consciousness stands to its    
thoughts2 it expresses the merely       
logical relation of a subject to its    
predicates4 ,it tells us nothing        
regarding the nature of the 8,i10 save  

only that it is the invariable centre of
 reference for all thoughts4 ,in order  
to know the self as substance1 and so as
 capable of persisting throughout all   
change1 and as surviving even the death 
of the body1 we should require to have  
an intuition of it1 and of such         
intuition there is not the slightest    
trace in the 8,i think40 ,it 8signifies 
a substance only in ,idea1 not in       
reality40#adah ,as ,kant adds           
later1#adai the permanence and          
self-identity of the representation of  
the self justifies no argument to the   
permanence and self-identity of its     
underlying conditions4 ,inference from  
the nature of representation to the     
nature of the object represented is     
entirely illegitimate4 ,in the equating 
of the two1 and not1 as the introduction
 to the ,dialectic would lead us to     
expect1 in a failure to distinguish     
appearance from reality1 consists the   
paralogistic fallacy of this first      
syllogism4  ,second ,paralogism3 of     

,simplicity4#adbj--,we may follow       
,adickes#adba in his analysis of ,a     
#cea-fb4 7a7 ,the original criticism1   
parallel to that of the first           
,paralogism1 would seem to be contained 
in paragraphs five to nine4 7b7 ,the    
opening paragraphs1 and 7c7 the         
concluding paragraphs1 would seem1 for  
reasons stated below1 to be independent 
and later additions4  7a7 ,the argument 
of the central paragraphs runs almost   
exactly parallel with the criticism of  
the first ,paralogism1 applying the same
 line of thought1 in disproof of the    
assumed argument for the simplicity of  
the soul4 ,it may be noted1 in passing1 
that ,kant here departs from his table  
of categories4 ,there is no category of 
simplicity4 ,the connection which he    
seeks to establish between the concept  
of simplicity and the categories of     
quality is arbitrary4 ,it more naturally
 connects with the category of unity2   
but the category of unity is required   
for the third ,paralogism4 ,for         

explanation of the way in which he      
equates the concept of simplicity with  
the category of reality ,kant is        
satisfied to refer the reader to the    
section on the second antinomy in which 
this same identification occurs4#adbb   
,indeed the simplicity here dwelt upon  
seems hardly distinguishable from       
substantiality1 and therefore it is not 
surprising that ,kant's criticism of the
 second ,paralogism should be           
practically identical with that of the  
first4#adbc ,since the 8,i10 as logical 
subject of thought1 signifies only a    
something in general1 and embodies no   
insight into the constitution of this   
something1 it is for that reason empty  
of all content1 and consequently simple4
 8,the simplicity of the representation 
of a subject is not eo ipso a knowledge 
of the simplicity of the subject        
itself44440 ,the second ,paralogism     
thus1 in ,kant's view1 falsely argues   
from the merely logical unity of the    
subject in representation to the actual 

simplicity of the subject in itself4    
7b7 ,one reason for regarding the first 
four paragraphs as a later addition is  
their opening reference to the          
introductory sections of the ,dialectic1
 of which this chapter otherwise takes  
little or no account4 ,this ,paralogism 
is1 ,kant declares1 8the ,achilles of   
all the dialectical inferences in the   
pure doctrine of the soul10 meaning that
 it may well seem a quite invulnerable  
argument4#adbd       8,it is no mere    
sophistical play contrived by a         
dogmatist in order      to impart to his
 assertions a superficial plausibility  
7,schein71      but an inference which  
appears to withstand even the keenest   
scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact
 investigation40  ,the second paragraph 
is a very pointed restatement of a main 
supporting argument of this second      
,paralogism4 ,this argument well        
deserves the eulogy with which ,kant has
 ushered it in4 ,it is as follows4 ,the 
unity of consciousness can not be       

explained as due to the co-operative    
action of independent substances4 ,such 
a merely external effect as that of     
motion in a material body may be the    
resultant of the united motions of its  
parts4 ,but it is otherwise with        
thought4 ,for should that which thinks  
be viewed as composite1 and the         
different representations1 as1 for      
instance1 of the single words of a      
verse1 be conceived as distributed among
 the several parts1 a multiplicity of   
separate consciousnesses would result1  
and the single complex consciousness1   
that of the verse as a whole1 would be  
rendered impossible4 ,consciousness     
cannot therefore--such is the           
argument--inhere in the composite4 ,the 
soul must be a simple substance4#adbe   
,as there is no reference in this       
argument to the 8,i think10 the         
criticism cannot be that of the first   
,paralogism1 nor that of the central    
paragraphs of this second ,paralogism4  
,kant's reply--as given in the third and

 fourth paragraphs--is in effect to     
refer the reader to the results of the  
,analytic1 and is formulated in the     
manner of his ,introduction to the      
,critique4 ,the principle that          
multiplicity of representation          
presupposes absolute unity in the       
thinking subject can neither be         
demonstrated analytically from mere     
concepts1 nor derived from experience4  
,being a synthetic a priori judgment1 it
 can be established only by means of a  
transcendental deduction4 ,but in that  
form it will define only a condition    
required for the possibility of         
consciousness2 it can tell us nothing in
 regard to the noumenal nature of the   
thinking being4 ,and1 as ,kant argues in
 the third ,paralogism1#adbf there may  
be a possible analogy between thought   
and motion1 though of a different kind  
from that above suggested4  ,the entire 
absence of all connection between the   
argument of these paragraphs and the    
argument of those which immediately     

follow upon them1 at least suffices to  
show that this second ,paralogism has   
not been written as a continuous whole2 
and taken together with the fact that   
the problem is here formulated in terms 
of the ,introduction to the ,critique1  
would seem to show that this part of the
 section is of comparatively late       
origin4  7c7 ,the concluding paragraphs1
 which are of considerable intrinsic    
interest1 also reflect an independent   
line of criticism4 ,as the phrase 8the  
above proposition0#adbg seems to        
indicate1 they were not originally      
composed in this present connection4    
,they give expression to ,kant's partial
 agreement with the line of argument    
followed by the rationalists1 but also  
seek to show that1 despite such partial 
validity1 the argument does not lend    
support to any metaphysical extension of
 our empirical knowledge4 ,in ,a #ceh we
 have what may be a reference to the    
argument of the introductory sections of
 the ,dialectic4 ,the argument under    

criticism is praised as being 8natural  
and popular10 8occurring even to the    
least sophisticated understanding10 and 
as leading it to view the soul as an    
altogether different existence from the 
body4 ,the argument is as follows4 ,none
 of the qualities proper to material    
existence1 such as impenetrability or   
motion1 are to be discovered in our     
inner experience4 ,nor can feelings1    
desires1 thoughts1 etc41 be externally  
intuited4 ,in view of these differences1
 we seem justified in asserting that the
 soul cannot be an appearance in space1 
and cannot therefore be corporeal4 ,kant
 replies by drawing attention to the    
fundamental ,critical distinction       
between appearances and things in       
themselves4#adbh ,if material bodies1 as
 apprehended1 were things in themselves1
 the argument would certainly justify us
 in refusing to regard the soul and its 
states as of similar nature4 ,but since1
 as the ,aesthetic has shown1 bodies1 as
 known1 are mere appearances of outer   

sense1 the real question at issue is not
 that of the distinction between the    
soul and bodies in space1 but of the    
distinction between the soul and that   
something which conditions all outer    
appearances4       8444this something   
which underlies the outer appearances   
and which      so affects our sense that
 it obtains the representations of      
space1      matter1 shape1 etc41 this   
something1 viewed as noumenon 7or       
better1      as transcendental object71 
might yet also at the same time serve as
      the subject of our                
thoughts44440#adbi  ,thus the argument  
criticised serves only to enforce the   
very genuine distinction between inner  
and outer appearances2 it justifies no  
assertion1 either positive or negative1 
as to the nature of the soul or as to   
its relation to body in its noumenal    
aspect4 ,the monadistic1 spiritualist   
theory of material existence remains an 
open possibility1 though only as an     
hypothesis incapable either of proof or 

of disproof4 ,we cannot obtain1 by way  
of inference from the character of our  
apperceptive consciousness1 any genuine 
addition to our speculative insight4    
,third ,paralogism3 of                  
,personality4#adcj--,kant's criticism   
again runs parallel with that of the    
preceding ,paralogisms4 ,the fallacy    
involved is traced to a confusion       
between the numerical identity of the   
self in representation and the numerical
 identity of the subject in itself4 ,the
 logical subject of knowledge must1 as  
the transcendental deduction has proved1
 think itself as self-identical         
throughout all its experiences4 ,this is
 indeed all that the judgment 8,i think0
 expresses4 ,it is mere identity1 8,i am
 ,i40 ,but from the identity of         
representation we must not argue to     
identity of the underlying self4 ,so far
 as the unity of self-consciousness is  
concerned1 there is nothing to prevent  
the noumenal conditions of the self from
 undergoing transformation so complete  

as to involve the loss of identity1     
while yet supporting the representation 
of an identical self4       8,although  
the dictum of certain ancient ,schools1 
that everything in      the world is in 
a flux and nothing permanent and        
abiding1 cannot be      reconciled with 
the admission of substances1 it is not  
refuted by      the unity of            
self-consciousness4 ,for we are unable  
from our own      consciousness to      
determine whether1 as souls1 we are     
permanent or      not4 ,since we reckon 
as belonging to our identical self only 
that      of which we are conscious1 we 
must necessarily judge that we are      
one and the same throughout the whole   
time of which we are      conscious4 ,we
 cannot1 however1 claim that such a     
judgment would be      valid from the   
standpoint of an outside observer4 ,as  
the only      permanent appearance which
 we meet with in the soul is the        
representation #8,i' that accompanies   
and connects them all1 we are           

unable to prove that this #8,i1' a mere 
thought1 may not be in the      same    
state of flux as the other thoughts     
which are connected      together by its
 means40#adca  ,and ,kant adds an       
interesting illustration4#adcb          
8,an elastic ball which impinges on     
another similar ball in a      straight 
line communicates to the latter its     
whole motion1 and      therefore its    
whole state 7i4e4 if we take account    
only of the      positions in space74   
,if1 then1 in analogy with such bodies1 
we      postulate substances such that  
the one communicates to the other       
representations together with the       
consciousness of them1 we can           
conceive a whole series of substances of
 which the first transmits      its     
state together with its consciousness to
 the second1 the second      its own    
state with that of the preceding        
substance to the third1      and this in
 turn the states of all the preceding   
substances      together with its own   

consciousness and with their            
consciousness to      another4 ,the last
 substance would then be conscious of   
all the      states of the substances1  
which had undergone change before its   
own      change1 as being its own       
states1 because they would have been    
transferred to it together with the     
consciousness of them4 ,and yet      it 
would not have been one and the same    
person in all these      states40#adcc  
,the perversely ,hegelian character of  
,caird's and ,watson's manner of        
interpreting the ,critique is especially
 evident in their treatment of the      
,paralogisms4 ,they make not the least  
mention of this part of ,kant's         
teaching4  ,kant employs a further      
argument which would seem to show that  
at the time when these paragraphs were  
written the general tendency of his     
thought was predominantly subjectivist  
in character4 ,there are1 he implies1 as
 many different times as there are      
selves that represent time4#adcd ,the   

argument is as follows4 ,as the 8,i     
think0 is equivalent to 8,i am ,i10 we  
may say either that all time of which ,i
 am conscious is in me1 or that ,i am   
conscious of myself as numerically      
identical in each and every part of it4 
,in my individual consciousness1        
therefore1 identity of my person is     
unfailingly present4 ,but an observer1  
viewing me from the outside1#adce       
represents me in the time of his own    
consciousness2 and as the time in which 
he thus sets me is not that of my own   
thinking1 the self-identity of my       
consciousness1 even if he recognises its
 existence1 does not justify him in     
inferring the objective permanence of my
 self4  ,the two concluding paragraphs  
seem to have been independently         
composed4#adcf ,they contribute nothing 
of importance4  ,fourth ,paralogism3 of 
,ideality4#adcg--,the main argument of  
this ,paralogism1 which contains the    
first edition refutation of idealism1   
has already been considered above4#adch 

,we require1 therefore1 only to treat of
 it in its connection with the other    
,paralogisms1 and to note some few minor
 points that remain for consideration4  
,its argument differs from that of the  
other ,paralogisms in that the fallacy  
involved is traced1 in agreement with   
the requirements of the introductory    
sections of the ,dialectic1 to a failure
 to distinguish between appearances and 
things in themselves4 ,its connection   
with the table of categories is         
extremely artificial4 ,in ,a #cdd  ,b   
#djb the category employed is that of   
possibility1 in ,a #djd and ,a #cdd n4  
that of existence4#adci ,kant's attempt 
to combine the problem here treated with
 that of the other ,paralogisms can only
 be explained as due to the requirements
 of his architectonic4#addj ,this       
,paralogism does not concern itself with
 the nature of the soul4 ,it refers     
exclusively to the mode of existence to 
be ascribed to objective appearances4   
,none the less1 ,kant contrives to bring

 it within the range of rational        
psychology in the following manner4 ,he 
argues#adda that rational psychologists 
are one and all adherents of empirical  
idealism4 ,they confound appearances in 
space with things in themselves1 and    
therefore assert that our knowledge of  
their existence is inferential and      
consequently uncertain4 ,the errors of  
empirical idealism are thus bound up    
with the dogmatic assumptions of the    
rationalist position4 ,they are         
traceable to its failure to distinguish 
between appearances and things in       
themselves4 ,such dogmatism may take the
 form of materialism or of ontological  
dualism1 as well as of                  
spiritualism4#addb ,all three1 in       
professing to possess knowledge of      
things in themselves1 violate ,critical 
principles4 ,if the chief function of   
rational psychology consists in securing
 the conception of the soul against the 
onslaughts of materialism1#addc that can
 be much more effectively attained      

through transcendental idealism4        
8,for1 on ,critical teaching1 so        
completely are we freed from the        
fear that on the removal of matter all  
thought1 and even the very              
existence of thinking beings1 would be  
destroyed1 that on the      contrary it 
is clearly shown that if ,i remove the  
thinking subject      the whole         
corporeal world must at once vanish1    
since it is nothing      save appearance
 in the sensibility of our subject and a
 species of      its                    
representations40#addd  ,we do not1     
indeed1 succeed in proving that the     
thinking self is in its existence       
independent of the 8transcendental      
substrate0#adde of outer appearances4   
,but as both possibilities remain open1 
the admission of our ignorance leaves us
 free to look to other than speculative 
sources for proof of the independent and
 abiding existence of the self4         
,reflection on the ,whole of ,pure      
,psychology4#addf--,this section affords

 ,kant the opportunity of discussing    
certain problems which he desires to    
deal with1 but is unable to introduce   
under the recognised rubrics of his     
logical architectonic4#addg ,there are1 
,kant says1 three other dialectical     
questions1 essential to the purposes of 
rational psychology1 grounded upon the  
same transcendental illusion 7confusion 
of appearances with things in           
themselves71 and soluble in similar     
fashion3 7#a7 as to the possibility of  
the communion of soul and body1 i4e4 of 
the state of the soul during the life of
 the body2 7#b7 as to the beginning of  
this association1 i4e4 of the soul in   
and before birth2 7#c7 as to the        
termination of this association1 i4e4 of
 the soul in and after the death of the 
body4 ,kant treats these three problems 
from the extreme subjectivist           
standpoint1 inner and outer sense being 
distinguished and related in the manner 
peculiar to the first edition4 ,the     
contrast between mind and body is a     

difference solely between the           
appearances of inner and those of outer 
sense4 ,both alike exist only in and    
through the thinking subject1 though the
 latter       8444have this deceptive   
property that1 representing objects in  
space1 they as it were detach themselves
 from the soul and appear      to hover 
outside it40#addh  ,the problem1        
therefore1 of the association of soul   
and body1 properly understood1 is not   
that of the interaction of the soul with
 other known substances of an opposite  
nature1 but only       8444how in a     
thinking subject outer intuition1       
namely1 that of      space1 with its    
filling in of figure and motion1 is     
possible4 ,and      that is a question  
which no human being can possibly       
answer4 ,the      gap in our knowledge  
444 can only be indicated through the   
ascription of outer appearances to that 
transcendental object which      is the 
cause of this species of                
representations1 but of which we        

can have no knowledge whatsoever and of 
which we shall never      acquire any   
conception40#addi  ,the familiar problem
 of the association of mind and body is 
thus due to a transcendental illusion   
which leads the mind to hypostatise     
representations1 viewing them as        
independent existences that act upon the
 senses and generate our subjective     
states4 ,the motions in space1 which are
 merely the expression in terms of      
appearance of the influence of the      
transcendental object upon 8our         
senses10#adej are thus wrongly regarded 
as the causes of our sensations4 ,they  
themselves are mere representations1    
and1 as ,kant implies1 are for that     
reason incapable of acting as causes4   
,in this section1 it may be noted in    
passing1 there is not the least trace of
 the phenomenalist teaching1 according  
to which spatial objects are viewed as  
acting upon the bodily sense-organs4    
,kant here denies all interaction of    
mind and body1 and recognises only the  

interaction of their noumenal           
conditions4 ,appearances as such can    
never have causal efficacy4 ,the        
position represented is pure            
subjectivism1 and very significantly    
goes along with ,kant's earlier doctrine
 of the transcendental object4#adea     
,the dogmatic character of the          
interaction theory appears very clearly1
 as ,kant proceeds to point out1 in the 
objections which have been made to it1  
whether by those who substitute for it  
the theories of pre-established harmony 
and occasionalism1 or by those who adopt
 a sceptical non-committal attitude4    
,their objections rest upon exactly the 
same presupposition as the theory which 
they are attacking4 ,to demonstrate the 
impossibility of interaction1 they must 
be able to show that the transcendental 
object is not the cause of outer        
appearances2 and owing to the           
limitations of our knowledge that is    
entirely beyond our powers4 ,failing1   
however1 to draw a distinction between  

appearances and things in themselves1   
they have not realised the actual nature
 of the situation1 and accordingly have 
directed their objections merely to     
showing that mind and body1 taken as    
independent existences1 must not be     
viewed as capable of interaction4  ,the 
,critical standpoint also supplies the  
proper formulation for the other two    
problems--a formulation which in itself 
decides the degree and manner of our    
possible insight in regard to them4 ,the
 view that the thinking subject may be  
capable of thought prior to all         
association with the body should be     
stated as asserting       8444that prior
 to the beginning of that species of    
sensibility in      virtue of which     
something appears to us in space1 those 
transcendental objects1 which in our    
present state appear to us as           
bodies1 could have been intuited in an  
entirely different      manner40#adeb   
,the view that the soul1 upon the       
cessation of all association with the   

corporeal world1 may still continue to  
think1 will similarly consist in the    
contention       8444that if that       
species of sensibility1 in virtue of    
which      transcendental objects 7which
 in our present state are entirely      
unknown7 appear to us as a material     
world1 should cease1 all      intuition 
of them would not for that reason be    
removed2 but that      it would still be
 possible that those same unknown       
objects should      continue to be known
 sic by the thinking subject1 though no 
longer1 indeed1 in the quality of       
bodies40#adec  ,not the least ground1   
,kant claims1 can be discovered by means
 of speculation in support of such      
assertions4 ,even their bare possibility
 cannot be demonstrated4 ,but it is     
equally impossible to establish any     
valid objection to them4 ,since we      
cannot pretend to knowledge of things in
 themselves1 a modest acquiescence in   
the limitations of experience alone     
becomes us4  ,the remaining paragraphs  

7,a #cif-dje7 contain nothing that is   
new4 ,they merely repeat points already 
more adequately stated4 ,a #dja-b1 which
 deals with the nature of apperception  
and its relation to the categories1 has 
been considered above4#aded ,the        
argument that1 as the self must         
presuppose the thought of itself in     
knowing anything1 it cannot know itself 
as object1 is also commented upon       
above4#adee  ,the statement#adef that   
the determining self 7the thinking1 das 
,denken7 is to be distinguished from the
 determinable self 7the thinking        
subject7 as knowledge from its object1  
should be interpreted in the light of   
,kant's argument in the second and third
 ,paralogisms1 that the simplicity and  
self-identity of the representation of  
an object must not be taken as knowledge
 of simplicity or numerical identity in 
the object represented4  ,the analysis  
given in ,a #djb-c of the fallacy       
involved in the ,paralogisms is1 as     
,adickes has pointed out1#adeg confused 

and misleading4 ,kant here declares that
 in the major premiss of each syllogism 
the assertion is intended in the merely 
logical sense1 and therefore as         
applicable only to the subject in       
representation1 but in the minor premiss
 and conclusion is asserted of the      
subject as bearer of consciousness1 i4e4
 in itself4 ,but were that so1 the minor
 premiss would be a false assertion1 and
 the false conclusion would not be      
traceable to logical fallacy4 ,kant     
gives the correct statement of his      
position in ,b #daj-aa4adeh ,the        
attempted justification of the fourfold 
arrangement of the ,paralogisms with    
which the section concludes suffers from
 the artificiality of ,kant's logical   
architectonic4   ,,second ,,edition     
,,statement ,,of ,,the                  
,,paralogisms#adei  ,except for the     
introductory paragraphs1 which remain   
unaltered1 the chapter is completely    
recast in the second edition4 ,the      
treatment of the four ,paralogisms which

 in the first edition occupied          
thirty-three pages is reduced to five4  
,the problems of the mutual interaction 
of mind and body1 of its prenatal       
character and of its immortality1 the   
discussion of which in the first edition
 required some ten pages1 are now       
disposed of in a single paragraph 7,b   
#dbf-g74 ,the remaining twenty-two pages
 of the new chapter are almost entirely 
devoted to more or less polemical       
discussion of criticisms which had been 
passed upon the first edition4 ,these   
had been in great part directed against 
,kant's doctrine of apperception and of 
inner sense1 and so could fittingly be  
dealt with in connection with the       
problems of rational psychology4 ,as    
,benno ,erdmann has suggested1#adfj ,b  
#dji-ad and #dai-ba would seem to be    
directed against ,ulrichs'#adfa         
,leibnizian position and especially     
against his metaphysical interpretation 
of apperception4 ,b #dbh-cj treats of   
the difficulties raised by              

,pistorius#adfb in regard to the        
existence of the self4 ,b #dad-ae is    
similarly polemical1 but in this case   
,kant cites his opponent1 ,mendelssohn1 
by name4 ,throughout1 as in the         
alterations made in the chapter on      
,phenomena and ,noumena1 ,kant insists  
more strongly than in the first edition 
upon the unknowableness of the self1 and
 on the difference between thought and  
knowledge4 ,the pure forms of thought   
are not1 ,kant now declares1 concepts of
 objects1 that is1 are not              
categories1#adfc but 8merely logical    
functions40 ,though this involves no    
essential doctrinal change1 it indicates
 the altered standpoint from which ,kant
 now regards his problem4 ,its          
significance has already been dwelt     
upon4#adfd  ,in formulating the several 
arguments of the four ,paralogisms1     
,kant develops and places in the        
forefront a statement which receives    
only passing mention in ,a #ceb-c1 #cfb1
 #cff-g1 #cha-b1 namely1 that the truths

 contained in the judgments of rational 
psychology find expression in merely    
identical 7i4e4 analytic7 propositions4 
,this enables ,kant to formulate both   
the ,paralogisms and his criticisms     
thereof in much briefer and more pointed
 fashion4 ,in each case the ,paralogism1
 as he shows1 substitutes a synthetic a 
priori judgment1 involving an extension 
of our knowledge and a reference to the 
noumenal self1 for the given judgment   
which1 in so far as it is valid1 is     
always a merely analytic restatement of 
the purely formal 8,i think40 ,from the 
very start also1 ,kant introduces the   
distinctions of his own ,critical       
teaching1 especially that between       
thinking and intuiting1 and that between
 the determining and the determinable   
self4  ,first ,paralogism4--,that the ,i
 which thinks must always in thought be 
viewed as subject and not as mere       
predicate1 is an identical proposition4 
,it must not be taken as meaning that   
the subject which underlies thought is  

an abiding substance4 ,this latter      
proposition is of much wider scope1 and 
would involve such data 7in this case   
entirely lacking7 as are required for   
the establishment of a synthetic a      
priori judgment4  ,second               
,paralogism4--,that the ,i of           
apperception and so of all thought is   
single and cannot be resolved into a    
multiplicity of subjects1 is involved in
 the very conception of thought1 and is 
therefore an analytic proposition4 ,it  
must not be interpreted as signifying   
that the self is a simple substance4    
,for the latter assertion is again a    
synthetic proposition1 and presupposes  
for its possibility an intuition by the 
self of its own essential nature4 ,as   
all our intuitions are merely sensuous1 
that cannot be looked for in the 8,i    
think40       8,it would1 indeed1 be    
surprising if what in other cases       
requires so      much labour to         
discover--namely1 what it is1 of all    
that is      presented by intuition1    

that is substance1 and further1 whether 
this substance is simple 7e4g4 in the   
parts of matter7--should be      thus   
directly given me1 as if by revelation1 
in the poorest of all                   
representations40#adfe  ,we may here    
observe how the practice1 adopted by    
,caird1 of translating ,anschauung by   
#8perception' has misled him into       
serious misunderstanding of ,kant's     
teaching4 ,it has caused him#adff to    
interpret ,kant as arguing that we have 
no knowledge of the self because we can 
have no sensuous perception of it4      
,kant's argument rather is that as all  
human 8intuition0 is sensuous1 we are   
cut off from all possibility of         
determining our noumenal nature4 ,we are
 thrown back upon mere concepts which1  
as yielding only analytic propositions1 
cannot extend our insight beyond the    
limits of sense-experience4 ,the term   
#8intuition' is much broader in meaning 
than the term #8perception'2 it can also
 be employed as equivalent to the phrase

 #8immediate apprehension4'#adfg ,the   
grounds for ,kant's contention that we  
have no intuition or immediate knowledge
 of the self are embodied in1 and       
inspire1 his doctrine of inner          
sense4#adfh ,it may also be noted that  
in ,b #dab ,kant1 speaking of the       
necessity of intuition for knowledge of 
the self1 uses the unusual phrase #8a   
permanent intuition'--a phrase which1 so
 far as ,i have observed1 he nowhere    
employs in dealing with the intuition   
that conditions the sense perception of 
material bodies4#adfi ,its employment   
here may perhaps be due to the fact that
 its implied reference is not to a given
 sensuous manifold but to some form of  
immediate apprehension1 capable of      
revealing the permanent nature of the   
noumenal self4  ,third                  
,paralogism4--,that ,i am identical with
 myself throughout the consciousness of 
my manifold experiences1 is likewise an 
analytic proposition obtainable by mere 
analysis of the 8,i think40 ,and since  

that form of consciousness1 as stated in
 the criticism of the preceding         
,paralogism1 is purely conceptual1      
containing no element of intuition1 no  
judgment based solely upon it can ever  
be taken as equivalent to the synthetic 
proposition that the self1 as thinking  
being1 is an identical substance4       
,fourth ,paralogism4--,this ,paralogism 
is somewhat altered4 ,as noted          
above1#adgj the problem dealt with in   
the first edition concerns the outer    
world1 and only quite indirectly the    
nature of the self4 ,in the second      
edition that argument is restated1#adga 
and is more properly located within the 
,analytic4 ,the argument which now takes
 its place runs parallel with that of   
the three preceding ,paralogisms4 ,the  
assertion that ,i distinguish my own    
existence as a thinking being from other
 things outside me1 including thereunder
 my own body1 is an analytic            
proposition1 since by other things is   
meant things which ,i think as different

 from myself4       8,but ,i do not     
thereby learn whether this consciousness
 of myself      would be at all possible
 apart from things outside me through   
which      representations are given to 
me1 and whether1 therefore1 ,i can      
exist merely as thinking being 7i4e4    
without existing in human      form740  
,in ,b #dag-ah ,kant points out that    
rational psychology1 in asserting that  
the self can be conscious apart from all
 consciousness of outer things1 commits 
itself to the acceptance of problematic 
idealism4 ,if consciousness of outer    
objects is not necessary to             
consciousness of self1 there can be no  
valid method of proving their existence4
 ,in the fourth ,paralogism of the first
 edition1 the inter-dependence of       
rational psychology and empirical       
idealism is also dwelt upon1 but is     
there traced to a confusion of          
appearances with things in              
themselves4#adgb  ,b #daj-aa4--,the     
correct formulation is here given of    

what in the first edition#adgc is quite 
incorrectly stated4#adgd ,a paralogism  
is a syllogism which errs in logical    
form 7as contrasted with a syllogism    
erring in matter1 i4e4 the premisses of 
which are false74 ,in the paralogisms of
 ,rational ,psychology1 the logical     
fallacy committed is that of ambiguous  
middle1 or as ,kant names it1 the       
sophisma figurae dictionis4 ,in the     
major premiss the middle term is used as
 referring to real existence1 in the    
minor only as expressive of the unity of
 consciousness4  ,refutation of         
,mendelssohn's ,proof of the ,permanence
 of the ,soul4#adge--,mendelssohn's     
argument is that the soul1 as it does   
not consist of parts1#adgf cannot       
disappear gradually by disintegration   
into its constituent elements4 ,if1     
therefore1 it perishes1 it must pass out
 of existence suddenly2 at one moment it
 will exist1 at the next moment it will 
be non-existent4 ,but1 ,mendelssohn     
maintains1 for three closely connected  

reasons this would seem to be           
impossible4 ,in the first place1 the    
immediate juxtaposition of directly     
opposed states is never to be met with  
in the material world4 ,complete        
opposites1 such as day and night1 waking
 and sleeping1 never follow upon one    
another abruptly1 but only through a    
series of intermediate states4#adgg     
,secondly1 among the opposites which    
material processes thus bridge over1 the
 opposition of being and not-being is   
never to be found4 ,only by a miracle   
can a material existence be             
annihilated4#adgh ,if1 therefore1       
empirical evidence is to be allowed as  
relevant1 we must not assert of the     
invisible soul what is never known to   
befall the material existences of the   
visible world4 ,thirdly--the only part  
of ,mendelssohn's argument which ,kant  
mentions--the sudden cessation of the   
soul's existence would also violate the 
law of the continuity of time4#adgi     
,between any two moments there is always

 an intermediate time in which the one  
moment passes continuously into the     
other4  ,kant's reply to this third part
 of ,mendelssohn's argument is that     
though the soul must not be conceived as
 perishing suddenly1 it may pass out of 
existence by a continuous diminution    
through an infinite number of smaller   
degrees of intensive reality2 and in    
support of this view he maintains the   
very doubtful position that clearness   
and obscurity of representation are not 
features of the contents apprehended1   
but only of the intensity of the        
consciousness directed upon them4#adhj  
,b #dag-bb4--,kant here points out that 
rational psychology1 as above expounded1
 proceeds synthetically1 starting from  
the assertion of the substantiality of  
the soul and proceeding to the proof    
that its existence is independent of    
outer things4 ,but it may proceed in the
 reverse fashion1 analytically          
developing the implications supposed to 
be involved in the 8,i think10 viewed as

 an existential judgment1 i4e4 as       
signifying 8,i exist thinking40 ,kant   
restates the argument in this analytic  
form in order1 as it would seem1 to     
secure the opportunity of replying to   
those criticisms of his teaching in the 
first edition which concern his doctrine
 of apperception and his employment of  
the categories1 especially of the       
category of existence1 in relation to   
the self4 ,what is new and important in 
these pages1 and also in the connected  
passages in ,b #dbh-cj1 has been        
discussed above4#adha  ,b               
#dai-bj4--;,after remarking that        
simplicity or unity is involved in the  
very possibility of apperception1 ,kant 
proceeds to argue that it can never be  
explained from a strictly materialist   
standpoint1 since nothing that is real  
in space is ever simple4 ,points are    
merely limits1 and are not therefore    
themselves anything that can form part  
of space4 ,the passage as a whole would 
seem to be directed against the         

,leibnizian teaching of ,ulrichs4#adhb  
,b #dbf-g4--,kant makes a remark to     
which nothing in his argument yields any
 real support1 namely1 that the         
dialectical illusion in rational        
psychology is due to the substitution of
 an ,idea of reason for the quite       
indeterminate concept of a thinking     
being in general4 ,as is argued         
below1#adhc the assumption which he is  
here making that the concept of the self
 is an a priori and ultimate ,idea of   
pure ,reason1 cannot be regarded as a   
genuine part of his ,critical teaching4 
,b #dbg-h touches quite briefly upon    
questions more fully and adequately     
treated in the first edition4 ,the      
scanty treatment here accorded to them  
would seem to indicate1 as ,benno       
,erdmann remarks1#adhd that the problem 
of the interaction of mind and body     
which so occupied ,kant's mind from     
#agdg to #aggj has meantime almost      
entirely lost interest for him4 ,the    
problem of immortality remains central1 

but it is now approached from the       
ethical side4  ,in ,b #dba and ,b #dbc-f
 ,kant draws from his criticism of the  
,paralogisms the final conclusion that  
the metaphysical problems as to the     
nature and destiny of the self are      
essentially practical problems4 ,when   
approached from a theoretical           
standpoint1 as curious questions to be  
settled by logical dialectic1 their     
speculative proof       8444so stands   
upon the point of a hair1 that even the 
schools      preserve it from falling   
only so long as they keep it unceasingly
      spinning round like a top2 even in
 their own eyes it yields no            
abiding foundation upon which anything  
could be built40#adhe      8,rational   
psychology exists not as doctrine1 444  
but only as      discipline4 ,it sets   
impassable limits to speculative reason 
in      this field1 and thus keeps us1  
on the one hand1 from throwing          
ourselves into the arms of soulless     
materialism1 or1 on the other      hand1

 from losing ourselves in an            
unsubstantial spiritualism which        
can have no real meaning for us in this 
present life4 ,but though it            
furnishes no positive doctrine1 it      
reminds us that we should regard        
this refusal of ,reason to give         
satisfying response to our              
inquisitive probings into what is beyond
 the limits of this present      life as
 a hint from ,reason to divert our      
self-knowledge from      fruitless and  
extravagant speculation to its fruitful 
practical      employment40#adhf 8,the  
proofs which are serviceable for the    
world      at large preserve their      
entire value undiminished1 and indeed1  
upon      the surrender of these        
dogmatic pretensions1 gain in clearness 
and      in natural force4 ,for ,reason 
is then located in its own peculiar     
sphere1 namely the order of ends1 which 
is also at the same time an      order  
of nature2 and since it is in itself a  
practical faculty      which is not     

bound down to natural conditions1 it is 
justified in      extending the order of
 ends1 and therewith our own existence1 
beyond the limits of experience and of  
life40#adhg  ,then follows brief        
indication of the central teaching of   
the ,metaphysics of ,ethics and of the  
two later ,critiques4 ,through moral    
values that outweigh all considerations 
of utility and happiness1 we become     
conscious of an inner vocation which    
inspires feelings of sublimity similar  
to those which are aroused by           
contemplation of the starry firmament2  
and to the verities thus disclosed we   
can add the less certain but none the   
less valuable confirmation yielded by   
natural beauty and design1 and by the   
conformity of nature to our intellectual
 demands4       8,man's natural         
endowments--not merely his talents and  
the impulses      to employ them1 but   
above all else the ,moral ,law within   
him--go so      far beyond all utility  
and advantage which he may derive from  

them      in this present life1 that he 
learns thereby to prize the mere        
consciousness of a righteous will as    
being1 apart from all      advantageous 
consequences1 apart even from the       
shadowy reward of      posthumous fame1 
supreme over all other values2 and so   
feels an      inner call to fit himself1
 by his conduct in this world1 and by   
the      sacrifice of many of its       
advantages1 for being a citizen of a    
better world upon which he lays hold in 
,idea4 ,this powerful and               
incontrovertible proof is reinforced by 
our ever-increasing      knowledge of   
purposiveness in all that we see around 
us1 and by a      glimpse of the        
immensity of creation1 and therefore    
also by the      consciousness of a     
certain illimitableness in the possible 
extension of our knowledge and of a     
striving commensurate      therewith4   
,all this still remains to us1 though we
 must renounce      the hope of ever    
comprehending1 from the mere theoretical

 knowledge      of ourselves1 the       
necessary continuance of our            
existence40#adhh   ,,is ,,the ,,notion  
,,of ,,the ,,self ,a ,,necessary ,,idea 
,,of ,,reason8  ,one point of great     
importance must be dwelt upon before we 
pass from the ,paralogisms4 ,though the 
negative consequences which follow from 
the teaching of the objective deduction 
are here developed in the most explicit 
manner1 ,kant does not within the limits
 of this chapter1 in either edition1    
make any further reference to the       
doctrine expounded in the introductory  
sections of the ,dialectic1#adhi viz4   
that the notion of the self as an       
immortal being is a necessary ,idea of  
human ,reason4 ,the reader is therefore 
left under the impression that that     
doctrine is unaffected by the           
destructive criticism passed upon       
rational psychology1 and that it still  
survives as an essential tenet of the   
,critical philosophy4 ,and he is        
confirmed in this view when he finds the

 doctrine reappearing in the ,appendix  
to the ,dialectic and in the            
,methodology4 ,the ,idea of the self is 
there represented as performing a quite 
indispensable1 regulative function in   
the development of the empirical science
 of psychology4 ,now it is one thing to 
maintain the existence of ,ideal demands
 of ,reason for unity1 system and       
unconditionedness1 and to assert that it
 is in virtue of these demands that we  
are led1 in the face of immense         
discouragement and seeming              
contradictions1 to reduce the chance    
collocations and bewildering            
complexities of ordinary experience to  
something more nearly approximating to  
what ,reason prescribes4 ,but it is a   
very different matter when ,kant claims 
that in any one sphere1 such as that of 
psychology1 the unity and the           
unconditionedness must necessarily be of
 one predetermined type4 ,he is then    
injecting into the ,ideals that specific
 guidance which only the detail of      

experience is really capable of         
supplying4 ,he is proving false to his  
own ,critical empiricism1 in which no   
function is ascribed to ,reason that    
need in any way conflict with the       
autonomy of specialist research2 and he 
is also violating his fundamental       
principle that the a priori can never be
 other than purely formal4 ,indeed1 when
 ,kant discloses somewhat more in detail
 what he means by the regulative        
function of the ,idea of the self1 the  
ambiguity of his statements reveals the 
unconsidered character of this part of  
his teaching4 ,it is the expression only
 of a preconception1 and has eluded the 
scrutiny of his ,critical method largely
 because of the protective colouring    
which its admirable adaptation to the   
needs of his architectonic confers upon 
it4 ,if1 for instance1 we compare the   
three passages in which it is expounded 
in the ,appendix to the ,dialectic1 we  
find that ,kant himself alternates      
between the authoritative prescription  

to psychology of a spiritualist         
hypothesis and what in ultimate         
analysis1 when ambiguities of language  
are discounted1 amounts simply to the   
demand for the greatest possible        
simplification of its complex phenomena4
 ,the passages are as follows4          
8,in conformity with these ,ideas as    
principles we shall first1 in           
psychology1 connect in inner experience 
all appearances1 all      actions and   
receptivity of our mind1 as if 7als ob7 
the mind were      a simple substance   
which persists with personal identity   
7in this      life at least71 while its 
states1 to which those of the body      
belong      only as outer conditions1   
are in continual change40#adij          
8444in the human mind we have sensation1
 consciousness1      imagination1       
memory1 wit1 power of discrimination1   
pleasure1      desire1 etc4 ,now1 to    
begin with1 a logical maxim requires    
that we      should reduce1 so far as   
may be possible1 this seeming diversity1

      by comparing these with one       
another and detecting their hidden      
identity4 ,we have to enquire whether   
imagination combined with               
consciousness may not be the same thing 
as memory1 wit1 power of                
discrimination1 and perhaps even        
identical with understanding and        
,reason4 ,though logic is not capable of
 deciding whether a      fundamental    
power actually exists1 the ,idea of such
 a power is      the problem involved in
 a systematic representation of the     
multiplicity of powers4 ,the logical    
principle of ,reason calls upon      us 
to bring about such unity as completely 
as possible2 and the      more          
appearances of this or that power are   
found to be identical      with one     
another1 the more probable it becomes   
that they are simply      different     
manifestations of one and the same      
power1 which may be      entitled1      
relatively speaking1 their fundamental  
power4 ,the same      is done with the  

other powers4 ,the relatively           
fundamental powers      must in turn be 
compared with one another1 with a view  
to      discovering their harmony1 and  
so bringing them nearer to a single     
radical1 i4e4 absolutely fundamental1   
power4 ,but this unity of      ,reason  
is purely hypothetical4 ,we do not      
assert that such a power      must      
necessarily be met with1 but that we    
must seek it in the      interest of    
,reason1 that is1 of establishing       
certain principles for      the manifold
 rules which experience may supply to   
us4 ,we must      endeavour1 wherever   
possible1 to bring in this way          
systematic unity      into our          
knowledge40#adia  ,in the third of the  
,appendix passages these two views are  
confusedly combined4 ,kant is insisting 
that an ,idea never asserts1 even as an 
hypothesis1 the existence of a real     
thing4       0,an ,idea is only the     
schema of the regulative principle by   
which      ,reason1 so far as lies in   

its power1 extends systematic unity over
      the whole field of experience4    
,the first object of such an ,idea is   
the #8,i' itself1 viewed simply as      
thinking nature or soul4 ,if ,i am      
to investigate the properties with which
 a thinking being exists in      itself1
 ,i must interrogate experience4 ,i     
cannot even apply any one      of the   
categories to this object1 except in so 
far as its schema is      given in sense
 intuition4 ,but ,i never thereby attain
 to a      systematic unity of all      
appearances of inner sense4 ,instead1   
then1      of the empirical concept 7of 
that which the soul actually is71       
which cannot carry us far1 ,reason takes
 the concept of the      empirical unity
 of all thought2 and by thinking this   
unity as      unconditioned and         
original1 it forms from it a concept of 
,reason1      i4e4 the ,idea of a simple
 substance1 which1 unchangeable in      
itself 7personally identical71 stands in
 association with other      real things

 outside it2 in a word1 the ,idea of a  
simple      self-subsisting             
intelligence4 ,yet in so doing it has   
nothing in      view save principles of 
systematic unity in the explanation of  
the      appearances of the soul4 ,it is
 endeavouring to represent all          
determinations as existing in a single  
subject1 all powers1 so far      as     
possible1 as derived from a single      
fundamental power1 all change      as   
belonging to the states of one and the  
same permanent being1 and      all      
appearances in space as completely      
different from the actions      of      
thought4 ,the simplicity and other      
properties of substance are             
intended to be only the schema of this  
regulative principle1 and      are not  
presupposed as the real ground of the   
properties of the      soul4 ,for these 
may rest on altogether different grounds
 of which      we can know nothing4 ,the
 soul in itself could not be known      
through      these assumed predicates1  

not even if we regarded them as         
absolutely valid in regard to it4 ,for  
they constitute a mere ,idea      which 
cannot be represented in concreto4      
,nothing but advantage      can result  
from the psychological ,idea thus       
conceived1 if only we      take heed    
that it is not viewed as more than a    
mere ,idea1 and that      it is         
therefore taken as valid only in its    
bearing on the      systematic          
employment of ,reason in determining the
 appearances of      our soul4 ,for no  
empirical laws of bodily appearances1   
which are of      a totally different   
kind1 will then intervene in the        
explanation of      what belongs        
exclusively to inner sense4 ,no windy   
hypotheses of      generation1          
extinction1 and palingenesis of souls   
will be      permitted4 ,the            
consideration of this object of inner   
sense will      thus be kept completely 
pure and unmixed1 without employing     
heterogeneous properties4 ,also1        

,reason's investigations will be        
directed to reducing the grounds of     
explanation in this field1 so      far  
as may be possible1 to a single         
principle4 ,all this will be      best  
obtained 7indeed is obtainable in no    
other way7 through such a      schema1  
viewed as if 7als ob7 it were a real    
being4 ,the      psychological ,idea1   
moreover1 can signify nothing but the   
schema of      a regulative principle4  
,for were ,i to enquire whether the soul
 in      itself is of spiritual nature1 
the question would have no meaning4     
,in employing such a concept ,i not only
 abstract from corporeal      nature1   
but from nature in general1 i4e4 from   
all predicates of a      possible       
experience1 and therefore from all      
conditions for thinking      an object  
for such a concept3 yet only as related 
to an object can      it be said to have
 a meaning40#adib  ,the last passage    
would seem to indicate that ,kant has   
still another and only partially avowed 

reason for insisting upon a special and 
spiritualist ,idea1 as regulative of    
empirical psychology4 ,it is necessary1 
he would seem to argue1 in order to mark
 off the peculiar nature of its subject 
matter1 and to warn us against          
attempting to explain its phenomena in  
the mechanistic manner of physical      
science4 ,but if that is ,kant's        
intention1 he has failed to formulate   
the position in any really tenable way4 
,it is impossible to maintain1 as he    
here does1 that 8no empirical laws of   
bodily appearances can intervene in the 
explanation of what belongs exclusively 
to inner sense40#adic ,indeed1 in the   
immediately following sentences1 he very
 clearly indicates how completely such a
 position conflicts with his own real   
teaching4 ,to think away the corporeal  
is to think away all experience4        
,experience is not dualistically divided
 into separate worlds4 ,it is one and   
single1 and the principle of causality  
rules universally throughout1 connecting

 inner experiences of sense1 feeling1   
and desire1 with their outer conditions1
 organic and physical4#adid ,thus       
,kant's retention of the ,idea of the   
self is chiefly of interest as revealing
 the strength and tenacity of his       
spiritualist leanings4 ,we may judge of 
the disinterestedness and courage of his
 thinking by the contrary character of  
his pre-conceptions4 ,for even when they
 have been shown to be theoretically    
indemonstrable1 they continue to retain 
by honorific title the dignity from     
which they have been deposed4 ,the full 
force of the objections is none the less
 recognised4       8,the simplicity of  
substance 444 is not presupposed as the 
real      ground of the properties of   
the soul4 ,for these may rest on        
altogether different grounds of which we
 can know nothing40  ,that1 however1 is 
only ,kant's unbiassed estimate of the  
theoretical evidence2 it is not an      
expression of his own personal belief4  
,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the ,,antinomy ,,of   

,,pure ,,reason#adie   ,this            
introduction summarises the preceding   
argument1 and distinguishes the new     
problems of ,antinomy from those of the 
,paralogisms4 ,in rational psychology   
pure ,reason attains1 as it were1       
euthanasia2 in the antinomies an        
entirely different situation is         
disclosed4 ,for though rational         
cosmology is able to expound itself in a
 series of demonstrated theses1 its     
teaching stands in irreconcilable       
conflict with the actual nature of      
appearances1 as expressed through a     
series of antitheses which are          
demonstrable in an equally cogent       
manner4   ,,section ,i  ,,system ,,of   
,,the ,,cosmological ,,ideas#adif  ,the 
first eight paragraphs of this section  
are of great textual interest4 ,they    
must have been written at a time when   
,kant still intended to expound his     
entire criticism of metaphysical science
 in the form of a doctrine of antinomy4 
,for they define the ,ideas of ,reason  

as exclusively cosmological1#adig and   
give a very different explanation of    
their origin from that which has been   
expounded in the preceding chapters4    
,evidently1 therefore1 this part of the 
section must have been written prior to 
,kant's formulation of the metaphysical 
deduction from the three species of     
syllogism4 ,this is supported by the    
fact that the argument begins anew1 just
 as if the matter had not previously    
been discussed2 and that1 though a new  
view of the nature of ,reason is        
propounded1 there is not the least      
mention of the more ,idealist view which
 it displaces4 ,reason1 ,kant here      
teaches1 is not a faculty separate from 
the understanding1 and does not         
therefore produce any concept peculiar  
to itself4 ,reason is simply a name for 
the understanding in so far as it acts  
independently of sensibility1 and seeks1
 by means of its pure forms1 in         
abstraction from all empirical          
limitations1 to grasp the unconditioned4

 8,the transcendental ,ideas are in     
reality nothing but categories extended 
to the unconditioned40 ,the             
intelligible1 as thus conceived by the  
understanding1 expresses itself1 as he  
later shows1 in a series of theses2     
while the sensuous expresses its        
opposite and conflicting character in a 
series of antitheses4  ,yet not all     
categories yield a concept of the       
unconditioned4 ,that is possible only to
 those which concern themselves with a  
series of members conditioning and      
conditioned1 and in reference to which1 
therefore1 the postulate of an          
unconditioned would seem to be          
legitimate1 viz43 7#a7 unconditioned    
quantity in space and time2 7#b7        
unconditioned quality 7indivisibility   
and simplicity7 of reality in space     
7matter72 7#c7 unconditioned causality  
of appearances2 7#d7 unconditioned      
necessity of appearances4 ,as this      
arrangement is determined by the needs  
of ,kant's architectonic1 no detailed   

comment is here called for4 ,its        
consequences we shall have ample        
opportunity to consider later4 ,as      
already noted1 ,kant's statement in ,a  
#dad  ,b #dda1 that 8the category of    
substance and accident does not lend    
itself to a transcendental ,idea10 shows
 very clearly that1 at the time when he 
composed this passage1 he had not yet   
bethought himself of placing a separate 
and independent ,idea at the basis of   
rational psychology4 ,but as ,kant here 
strives to follow the fourfold          
arrangement of the categories1 the      
content of these paragraphs must either 
have been later recast or have been     
composed in the interval between his    
discovery of the metaphysical deduction 
of the categories and his formulation of
 the corresponding deduction of the     
,ideas from the three forms of          
syllogism4 ,it may also be observed that
 the derivation of the cosmological     
,idea from the hypothetical syllogism1  
which embodies only the category of     

causality1 clashes with the above       
specification of it in terms of all four
 rubrics of category4  ,the remaining   
paragraphs 7ninth to thirteenth7 of this
 section must be of later date1 as they 
are developed in view of the independent
 treatment of the theological           
,ideal4#adih 7,adickes1 in dating the   
ninth and tenth paragraphs with the     
preceding instead of with the concluding
 paragraphs1 would seem to have         
overlooked this fact47 ,in order to     
justify the treatment of the ,ideas of a
 first cause and of unconditioned       
necessity1 as cosmological1 ,kant now   
asserts that the antinomies concern only
 appearances--8our cosmical ,ideas being
 directed only to what is unconditioned 
among the appearances10#adii and not to 
noumena4#aejj ,his explanation of the   
nature of transcendental illusion1 and  
of the antinomies in particular1 as     
being due to a failure to distinguish   
between appearance and things in        
themselves1 is thus ruthlessly          

sacrificed to considerations of         
architectonic4 ,kant could not1 of      
course1 consistently hold to the        
position here adopted2 but it causes him
 from time to time1 especially in       
dealing with the third and fourth       
antinomies1 to make statements which    
tend seriously to obscure the argument  
and to bewilder the careful reader4     
,kant is far from clear as to the       
relation in which the concepts of the   
totality of conditions and of the       
unconditioned stand to one another4#aeja
 ,in ,a #cbb  ,b #cgi they would seem to
 be taken as exactly equivalent         
concepts4 ,in ,a #daf-ag  ,b #ddc-e they
 are apparently regarded as distinct1   
the former only leading up to the       
latter4 ,but discussion of this         
important point must meantime be        
deferred4#aejb   ,,section ,,ii         
,,antithetic ,,of ,,pure ,,reason#aejc  
0,antithetic is the conflict between two
 apparently dogmatic      judgments     
,erkenntnisse to neither of which can we

 ascribe any      superior claim to     
acceptance over the other1 i4e4 by      
,antithetic ,i      mean a thesis1      
together with an antithesis40           
8,transcendental      ,antithetic is an 
investigation of the antinomy of pure   
,reason1 its      causes and outcome40  
,the very existence of such antinomy    
presupposes a twofold condition3 first1 
that it does not refer to a gratuitous  
but to an inevitable problem of human   
,reason1 8one which it must necessarily 
encounter in its natural progress02 and 
secondly1 that the thesis and the       
antithesis together generate a 8natural 
and inevitable illusion10 which         
continues to persist even after its     
deceptive power has been clearly        
disclosed4 ,such conflict is caused by  
the fact that ,reason seeks a unity     
which transcends the understanding1 and 
which nevertheless is meant to conform  
to the conditions of the understanding4 
,if the unity is adequate to the demands
 of ,reason1 it is too great for the    

understanding2 if it is commensurate    
with the understanding1 it is too small 
for ,reason4#aejd ,the theses express   
the higher unity at which ,reason aims2 
the antitheses are the judgments to     
which the understanding is constrained  
by the nature of the appearances with   
which both it and ,reason profess to    
deal4 ,if we hold to ,reason1 we make   
assertions contradictory of the         
appearances2 while if we place reliance 
on the understanding1 ,reason condemns  
our conclusions4  ,this conflict is     
limited to those few problems above     
enumerated in which we are called upon  
to complete a given series4#aeje ,since 
totality1 whether in the form of a first
 beginning of the series or as an actual
 infinity of the whole series1 can never
 itself be experienced1 these are       
problems in regard to which experience  
can be of no assistance to us4 ,it can  
neither confirm nor refute any          
particular solution4 ,the only possible 
method of deciding between the competing

 claims is to watch or even to provoke  
the conflict1 in the hope that we may   
finally be able to detect some          
misunderstanding1 and so to resolve the 
conflict to the satisfaction of both the
 litigants4 ,such is ,kant's description
 of what he entitles his 8sceptical     
method40#aejf  ,without here attempting 
a full discussion of the subject1 it    
seems advisable to point out at the very
 start what ,kant's exposition seriously
 obscures1 namely1 the real character of
 the evidence upon which the theses and 
the antitheses respectively rest4 ,the  
latter are not correctly stated as      
transcending experience1 and as         
therefore incapable of confirmation by  
it4 ,the proofs which ,kant offers of   
them are1 indeed1 of a non-empirical a  
priori character4 ,they are formulated  
in terms of the dogmatic rationalism of 
the ,leibnizian position1 with a        
constant appeal to abstract principles4 
,but1 as a matter of fact1 they can be  
much more adequately established--in so 

far as they can be established at       
all--through analysis of the spatial and
 temporal conditions of material        
existence4 ,as space and time are       
continuous and homogeneous1 any         
assertion which is true of a space or   
time however small is likewise true of a
 space or time however large4 ,any space
 consists of spaces1 and must be        
regarded as itself part of a larger     
whole4#aejg ,any time consists of parts 
which are themselves times1 and is      
apprehensible only as following upon    
preceding times4 ,it is by such         
considerations as these that we are led 
to regard the material world as         
unlimited1 as infinitely divisible1 and 
as having no first state4  ,kant's      
method of demonstrating the theses--that
 the world is limited1 is finitely      
divisible1 and has a first state--is no 
less misleading4 ,here again his        
rationalistic arguments conceal the     
basis upon which the various theses     
really rest4 ,their true determining    

ground is the demand of ,reason for some
 more satisfactory form of              
unconditionedness than that which is    
found in the actual infinite4 ,it is    
this demand which has led philosophers  
to look around for proofs in support of 
the theses1 and to elaborate those      
rationalistic arguments which ,kant here
 reproduces4 ,thus the grounds of the   
antitheses are altogether different from
 those of the theses2 and in neither    
case are they properly represented by   
the arguments which ,kant employs4#aejh 
,the reasons why ,kant in his detailed  
statement of the antinomies has omitted1
 or at least subordinated1 the above    
considerations1 are complex and various4
 ,in the first place1 this doctrine of  
antinomy was in several of its main     
features already formulated prior to his
 development of the ,critical           
philosophy4 ,it forms part of his       
,dissertation of #aggj2 and at that time
 ,kant was still largely in fundamental 
sympathy with the ,leibnizian ontology4 

,secondly1 ,kant is here professing to  
criticise the science of rational       
cosmology1 and is therefore bound to    
expound it in more or less current form4
 ,and in the third place1 he teaches    
that the antinomies exist as antinomies 
only when viewed from the false         
standpoint of dogmatic rationalism4 ,had
 he eliminated the rationalistic proofs1
 the conflict of the antinomies1 in its 
strictly logical form1 as the conflict  
of direct contradictories1 would at once
 have vanished4 ,the general framework  
of this division of the ,dialectic      
demanded a rationalistic treatment of   
both theses and antitheses1 and ,kant   
believed that the rationalistic proofs  
which he propounds in their support are 
unanswerable1 so long as the dogmatic   
standpoint of ordinary consciousness and
 of ,leibnizian ontology is preserved4  
,but even when that important limitation
 is kept in view1 ,kant fails to justify
 this interpretation of the conflict1   
and we must therefore be prepared to    

find that his proofs1 whether of theses 
or of antitheses1 are in all cases      
inconclusive4 ,i shall append to each of
 his arguments a statement of the       
reasons which constrain us to reject    
them as unsound4 ,we shall then be in a 
position to consider his whole doctrine 
of antinomy in its broader aspects1 and 
in its connection with the teaching of  
the other main divisions of the         
,dialectic4   ,,first ,,antinomy        
,thesis4--7a7 ,the world has a beginning
 in time1 and 7b7 is also limited in    
regard to space4  ,thesis a4            
,proof4--,if we assume the opposite1    
namely1 that the world has no beginning 
in time1 and if we define the infinite  
as that which can never be completed by 
means of a successive synthesis1 we must
 conclude that the world-series can     
never complete itself4 ,but the entire  
series of past events elapses1 i4e4     
completes itself at each moment4 ,it    
cannot therefore be infinite4           
,criticism4--,this argument gains its   

plausibility from the illegitimate use  
of the term #8elapse' 7verfliessen7 as  
equivalent to #8complete itself4' ,if it
 be really correct to define the        
infinite as that which can never be     
completed1 the conclusion to be drawn is
 that the temporal series is always     
actually infinite1 and that no point or 
event in it is nearer to or further from
 either its beginning or its end4#aeji  
,we may select any point in the series  
as that from which we propose to begin a
 regress to the earlier members of the  
series1 but if the series is actually   
infinite1 it will be a regress without  
possibility of completion1 and one      
therefore which removes all             
justification for asserting that at the 
point chosen a series has completed     
itself4 ,it has no beginning1 and has no
 completion4 ,what it has done at each  
moment of the past it is still doing at 
each present moment1 namely1 coming out 
of an inexhaustible past and passing    
into an equally inexhaustible future4   

,time is by its given nature capable of 
being interpreted only as actually      
infinite1 alike in its past and in its  
future4 ,it cannot complete itself any  
more than it can begin itself4 ,the one 
would be as gross a violation of its    
nature as would the other4 ,the present 
exists only as a species of transition1 
unique in itself1 but analogous in      
nature to the innumerable other times   
that constitute time past4 ,it is a     
transition from the infinite through the
 infinite to the infinite4 ,that we     
cannot comprehend how1 from an          
infinitude that has no beginning1 the   
present should ever have been reached1  
is no sufficient reason for denying what
 by the very nature of time we are      
compelled to accept as a correct        
description of the situation which is   
being analysed4 ,the actual nature of   
time is such as to rule out from among  
the possibilities the thesis which ,kant
 is here professing to be able to       
establish2 time1 being such as it       

actually is1 can have no beginning4     
,what thus holds of time may likewise   
hold of events in time4 ,if time is     
actually infinite1 no proof can be      
derived from it in support of the       
assumption that the world has had a     
beginning in time4  ,the phrase 8by     
means of a successive synthesis0 gives a
 needlessly subjectivist colouring to   
,kant's method of proof4 ,the antinomy  
is professedly being stated from the    
realist standpoint1 and ought not       
therefore to be complicated by any such 
reference4 ,this objection applies1 as  
we shall find1 still more strongly to   
,kant's proof of the second part of the 
thesis4 ,the latter proof depends upon  
this subjectivist reference2 the present
 proof does not4  ,kant limits his      
problem to the past infinitude of time4 
,the reason for this lies1 of course1 in
 the fact that he is concerned with the 
problem of creation4 ,the limitation is1
 however1 misleading4  ,thesis b4--,the 
world is limited in regard to space4    

,proof4--,assume the opposite1 namely1  
that the world is an infinite1 given    
whole of coexisting parts4 ,a magnitude 
not given within the determinate limits 
of an intuition can only be thought     
through the synthesis of its parts1 and 
its totality through their completed    
synthesis4 ,in order1 therefore1 that we
 may be able to think as a single whole 
the world which fills all space1 the    
successive synthesis of the parts of an 
infinite world must be regarded as      
completed1 i4e4 an infinite must be     
regarded as having elapsed in the       
enumeration of all coexisting things4   
,this1 however1 is impossible4 ,an      
infinite aggregate of actual things     
cannot therefore be viewed as a given   
whole1 nor as being given as coexistent4
 ,consequently the world of spatial     
existences must be regarded as finite4  
,criticism4--,from the impossibility of 
traversing infinite space in thought by 
the successive addition of part to part1
 ,kant here argues that 8an infinite    

aggregate of actual things cannot be    
viewed as a given whole10 and           
consequently that the world cannot be   
infinitely extended in space4 ,that is1 
from a subjective impossibility of      
apprehension he infers an objective     
impossibility of existence4 ,but ,kant  
has himself defined the infinite as     
involving this subjective impossibility2
 for in the proof of thesis a he has    
stated that the infinitude of a series  
consists in the very fact that it can   
never be completed through successive   
synthesis4 ,kant is therefore           
propounding against the existence of the
 infinite the very feature which by     
definition constitutes its infinitude4  
,the implication would seem to be that  
the concept of the infinite is the      
concept of that which ex definitione    
cannot exist1 and that there is         
therefore a contradiction in the very   
idea of the actual infinite4  ,deferring
 for a moment the further objections to 
which such procedure lies open1 we may  

observe that ,kant1 in arguing from a   
subjective to an objective              
impossibility1 commits the fallacy of   
ignoratio elenchi4 ,for when the        
conditions of objective existence are   
recognised in their distinction from    
those of mental apprehension1 the       
supposed contradiction vanishes1 and the
 argument ceases to have any cogency4   
,the use of the words #8given' and      
#8whole' is misleading4 ,if space is    
infinite1 it is without bounds1 and     
cannot therefore exist as a whole in any
 usual meaning of that term4 ,for the   
same reason it must be incapable of     
being given as a whole4 ,its infinitude 
is a presupposition which analysis of   
actually given portions of it constrains
 us to postulate1 and has to be         
conceived in terms of the definition    
employed in thesis a4 ,the given must   
always be conceived as involving what is
 not itself given and what is not even  
capable of complete construction4 ,in   
terms of this presupposition an actual  

infinite1 not given and not capable of  
construction1 can be represented with   
entire consistency4  ,but to return to  
the main assumption upon which ,kant's  
proof would seem to rest3 it is         
all-important to observe that ,kant does
 not1 either in the ,critique or in any 
other of his writings1 assert that the  
concept of the actual infinite is       
inherently self-contradictory4 ,this is 
a matter in regard to which many of     
,kant's critics have misrepresented his 
teaching4 ,kant's argument may1 as we   
have just maintained1 be found on       
examination to involve the above        
assertion2 but this1 if clearly         
established1 so far from commending the 
argument to ,kant1 would have led him to
 reject it as invalid4 ,the passage in  
the ,dissertation#aeaj of #aggj1 which  
contains his most definite utterance on 
this point1 represents the view from    
which he never afterwards departed4 ,it 
may be quoted in full4       8,those who
 reject the actual mathematical infinite

 do so in a very      casual manner4    
,for they so construct their definition 
of the      infinite that they are able 
to extract a contradiction from it4     
,the infinite is described by them as a 
quantity than which none      greater is
 possible1 and the mathematical infinite
 as a      multiplicity--of an          
assignable unit--than which none greater
 is      possible4 ,since they thus     
substitute maximum for infinitum1 and   
a greatest multiplicity is impossible1  
they easily conclude against      this  
infinite which they have themselves     
invented4 ,or1 it may be1      they     
entitle an infinite multiplicity an     
infinite number1 and      point out that
 such a phrase is meaningless1 as is1   
indeed1      perfectly evident4 ,but    
again they have fought and overthrown   
only      the figments of their own     
minds4 ,if1 however1 they had conceived 
the mathematical infinite as a quantity 
which1 when related to      measure1 as 
its unity1 is a multiplicity greater    

than all number2      and if            
furthermore1 they had observed that     
measurability here      denotes only the
 relation of the infinite to the        
standards of the      human intellect1  
which is not permitted to attain to a   
definite      conception of multiplicity
 save by the successive addition of unit
      to unit1 nor to the sum-total     
7which is called number7 save by        
completing this progress in a finite    
time2 they would have      perceived    
clearly that what does not conform to   
the established law      of some subject
 need not on that account exceed all    
intellection4      ,an intellect may    
exist1 though not indeed a human        
intellect1 which      perceives a       
multiplicity distinctly in one intuition
 uno obtutu      without the successive 
application of a measure40  ,the        
concluding sentences of this            
,dissertation passage may be taken as   
,kant's own better and abiding judgment 
in regard to the question before us4 ,we

 must not argue from the impossibility  
of mentally traversing the infinite to  
the impossibility of its existence4     
,indeed the essentials of the above     
passage are restated in the             
#8,observation' on this thesis4#aeaa    
,thus the concept of the actual infinite
 is not only1 as a concept1 perfectly   
self-consistent1 it is also one which1  
in view of the nature of time and of    
space1 we are constrained to accept as a
 correct representation of the actually 
given4 ,the thesis of this first        
antinomy runs directly counter to       
admitted facts4 ,that ,kant is here     
arguing in respect to the world1 and not
 merely in respect to space and time1   
does not essentially alter the          
situation4 ,for if space and time are   
necessarily to be viewed as infinite1   
there can be no a priori proof--none1 at
 least1 of the kind here attempted--that
 the world-series may not be so         
likewise4  ,antithesis4--7a7 ,the world 
has no beginning in time2 7b7 has no    

limits in space4 ,in both these respects
 the world is infinite4  ,in these      
antitheses ,kant assumes that space and 
time are actually infinite1 and from    
that assumption advances to the proof   
that this is likewise true of the world 
in its spatial and temporal aspects4    
,this1 by itself1 ought to be sufficient
 evidence that ,kant does not regard the
 actual infinite as an inherently       
impossible conception4 ,as the          
antinomies are avowedly formulated from 
the realist1 dogmatic standpoint of     
ordinary consciousness1 ,kant is also   
enabled to assume that if the world     
begins to be1 it must have an antecedent
 cause determining it to exist at that  
moment rather than at another4          
,antithesis a4 ,proof4--,let us assume  
the opposite1 namely1 that the world has
 a beginning4 ,it will then be preceded 
by an empty time in which it was not4   
,but in an empty time no becoming is    
possible1 since in such a time no part  
possesses over any other any            

distinguishing condition of existence   
rather than of non-existence4 ,the world
 must therefore be infinite as regards  
past time4  ,criticism4--,in this       
argument everything depends upon what is
 to be meant by the term #8world4' ,if  
,kant means by it merely the material   
world1 the assumption of its            
non-existence does not leave only empty 
time and space4 ,other kinds of         
existence may be possible1 and in these 
a sufficient cause of its first         
beginning may be found4 ,the nature of  
creative action will remain mysterious  
and incomprehensible1 but that is no    
sufficient reason for denying its       
possibility4 ,if1 on the other hand1    
,kant means by the world #8all that is1'
 the assumption of its non-existence is 
likewise the assumption of the          
non-existence of all its possible       
causes4 ,that1 however1 is for ordinary 
consciousness a quite impossible        
assumption1 since it runs counter to the
 causal principle which is taken as     

universally valid4 ,from this point of  
view the argument consists in making an 
impossible assumption1 and in then      
pointing out the impossible consequence 
which must follow4 ,by such a mode of   
argument no conclusion can be reached4  
,kant's decision ought rather to have   
been that1 as time is actually infinite1
 the world may be so likewise1 but that 
though reality must in some form be     
eternally existent1 the material world  
cannot be proved to be so by any a      
priori proof of the kind here given4    
,antithesis b4 ,proof4--,let us assume  
the opposite1 namely1 that the world is 
finite1 existing in an empty limitless  
space4 ,there will then be not only a   
relation of things in space1 but also of
 things to space4 ,but as the world is a
 totality outside of which no object of 
intuition can be found1 the relation of 
the world to empty space is a relation  
to no object4 ,such a relation is       
nothing4 ,consequently the opposite     
holds2 the world must be infinitely     

extended4  ,criticism4--,that ,kant     
himself felt the inadequacy of this     
argument1 when taken from the dogmatic  
standpoint1 is indicated by the lengthy 
note which he has appended to it1 and   
which develops his own ,critical view of
 space as not a real independent object1
 but merely the form of external        
intuition4 ,from the standpoint of      
ordinary consciousness space is a       
self-existent entity1 and there is no   
insuperable difficulty in conceiving a  
relation as holding between it and its  
contents4 ,the introduction of the      
opposed standpoint of the ,aesthetic    
therefore runs directly counter to      
,kant's own intention of expounding the 
antinomies from the dogmatic standpoint 
which involves this realist view of     
space1 and of showing that they afford1 
in independence of the arguments of the 
,aesthetic1 an indirect proof of the    
untenableness of that belief4#aeab ,the 
conclusion which ought to have been     
drawn is analogous to that above        

suggested for thesis a4 ,as space is    
actually infinite1 the material world   
may be so likewise2 but that it actually
 is so1 cannot be established by an a   
priori argument of the kind here        
attempted4   ,,second ,,antinomy        
,thesis4--,every composite substance in 
the world consists of simple parts1 and 
nothing anywhere exists save the simple 
or what is composed of it4              
,proof4--,let us assume the opposite1   
namely1 that substances do not consist  
of simple parts4 ,if all composition be 
then removed in thought1 no composite   
part1 and 7as there are no simple parts7
 also no simple part1 and therefore     
nothing whatsoever1 will remain4        
,consequently no substance will be      
given4 ,either1 therefore1 it is        
impossible to remove in thought all     
composition1 or after its removal       
something that exists without           
composition1 i4e4 the simple1 must      
remain4 ,in the former case the         
composite would not itself consist of   

substances 7with them composition is a  
merely accidental relation1 and they    
must1 as self-persisting beings1 be able
 to exist independently of it74 ,as this
 contradicts our assumption1 only the   
latter alternative remains1 namely1 that
 the substantial compounds in the world 
consist of simple parts4                
,criticism4--,kant here assumes1 by his 
definition of terms1 the point which he 
professes to establish by argument4 ,the
 substance referred to1 though never    
itself mentioned by name1 is extended   
matter4 ,kant identifies it with        
#8composite substance4' ,substance1 he  
further dogmatically decides1 is that   
which is capable of independent         
existence1 and to which all relations of
 composition are therefore merely       
accidental4 ,if these assumptions be    
granted1 it at once follows that        
composition cannot be essential to      
matter1 and that when all composition is
 thought away1 its reality will be      
disclosed as consisting in simple parts4

 ,kant1 however1 makes no attempt to    
prove that extended matter can be       
defined in any such terms4 ,from the    
dogmatic point of view of ordinary      
consciousness1 though not from the      
sophisticated standpoint of ,leibniz1   
extension is of the very essence of     
matter2 and1 as ,kant himself           
believed1#aeac the continuity of        
extension is such as to exclude all     
possibility of elimination of the       
composite4 ,for he maintains that1      
however far division be carried1 the    
parts remain no less composite than the 
whole from which the regress has        
started4 ,on any such view the extended 
and the composite are not equivalent    
terms4 ,the opposite of the composite is
 the simple2 the opposite of the        
extended is the non-extended4 ,kant is  
here surreptitiously substituting a     
,leibnizian metaphysics in place of the 
empirical reality which is supposed to  
necessitate the argument4  ,in the      
,observation on this thesis ,kant shows 

consciousness of the defects of his     
argument4 ,it does not apply to space1  
time1 or change4       8,we ought not to
 call space a compositum but a totum1   
because      its parts are possible only
 in the whole1 not the whole through the
      parts40#aead  ,as ,kant further   
states1 he is speaking only of the      
simples of the ,leibnizian system4 ,this
 thesis is 8the dialectical principle of
 monadology40 ,again in the ,observation
 on the antithesis1 in commenting on the
 mathematical proof of the infinite     
divisibility of matter1 ,kant even goes 
so far as to declare that the argument  
of the thesis is based on an            
illegitimate substitution of things in  
themselves1 conceived by the pure       
understanding1 for the appearances with 
which alone the antinomy is             
concerned4#aeae       8444it is quite   
futile to attempt to overthrow1 by      
sophistical      manipulation of purely 
discursive concepts1 the manifest1      
demonstrated truth of mathematics40     

,antithesis4--,no composite thing in the
 world consists of simple parts1 and    
there nowhere exists in the world       
anything simple4  ,proof4--,let us      
assume the opposite1 namely1 that a     
composite thing 7as substance7 consists 
of simple parts4 ,as all external       
relation1 and therefore all composition 
of substances1 is only possible in      
space1 space must consist of as many    
parts as there are parts of the         
composite that occupies it4 ,space1     
however1 does not consist of simple     
parts1 but of spaces4 ,the simple must  
therefore occupy a space4 ,now as       
everything real which occupies a space  
contains in itself a manifold of        
constituents external to one another1   
and therefore is composite1 and as a    
real composite is not composed of       
accidents 7for without substance        
accidents could not be outside one      
another71 but of substances1 the simple 
would be a substantial composite1 which 
is self-contradictory4                  

,criticism4--,the ,leibnizian standpoint
 is here completely deserted4 ,instead  
of proceeding to demonstrate the direct 
opposite of the thesis1 ,kant in this   
argument deals with the extended bodies 
of empirical intuition4 ,the proof given
 ultimately reduces to an argument from 
the continuous nature of space to the   
continuous nature of the matter which   
occupies it4 ,but as the thesis and the 
antithesis thus refer to different      
realities1 the former to things in      
themselves conceived by pure            
understanding1 and the latter to the    
sensuous1 no antinomy has been shown to 
subsist4 ,antinomy presupposes that both
 the opposing assertions have the same  
reference4 ,kant1 as already noted1     
argues in the ,observation to this      
antithesis that all attempts 8made by   
the monadists0 to refute the            
mathematical proof of the infinite      
divisibility of matter are quite futile1
 and are due to their forgetting that in
 this discussion we are concerned only  

with appearances4       8,the monadists 
have1 indeed1 been sufficiently acute to
 seek to      avoid this difficulty by  
not treating space as a condition of the
      possibility of the objects of     
outer intuition 7bodies71 but by        
taking these and the dynamical relation 
of substances as the      condition of  
the possibility of space4 ,but we have a
 concept of      bodies only as         
appearances1 and as such they           
necessarily presuppose      space as the
 condition of the possibility of all    
outer      appearance40#aeaf  ,how      
,kant1 after writing these words1 should
 still have left standing the proof     
which he has given of the thesis may be 
partially explained as due to the       
continuing influence of his earlier     
view1#aeag according to which antinomy  
represents not a conflict between       
opposing views of the world of ordinary 
consciousness1 but between the demands  
of pure thought and the forms of        
sensuous existence4 ,that older view of 

antinomy here gains the upper hand1     
notwithstanding its lack of agreement   
with the general scheme of the          
,dialectic4  ,there is a further        
inconsistency in ,kant's procedure which
 may perhaps be taken as indicating the 
early origin of this portion of the     
,critique4 ,he presents the mathematical
 proof of the continuity of matter as   
conclusive4 ,yet in the ,metaphysical   
,first ,principles of ,natural ,science 
7#aghf7 he most emphatically states that
 8the infinite divisibility of matter is
 very far from being proved through     
proof of the infinite divisibility of   
space40#aeah  ,russell1#aeai in         
discussing the thesis and antithesis on 
their merits1 from the point of view of 
certain present-day mathematical        
theories1 makes the following criticism 
of ,kant's procedure4       8,here1     
again1 the argument applies to things in
 space and time1 and      to all        
collections1 whether existent or not4444
 ,and with this      extension#aebj the 

proof of the proposition must1 ,i think1
 be      admitted2 only that terms or   
concepts should be substituted for      
substances1 and that1 instead of the    
argument that relations      between    
substances are accidental 7zufllig71 we 
should content      ourselves with      
saying that relations imply terms and   
complexity      implies relations40     
,russell further argues that ,kant's    
assumption in the antithesis1 that      
8space does not consist of simple parts1
 but of spaces10 cannot be granted4 ,it 
8444involves a covert use of the axiom  
of finitude1 i4e4 the      axiom that1  
if a space does consist of points1 it   
must consist of      some finite number 
of points4 ,when once this is denied1 we
 may      admit that no finite number of
 divisions of a space will lead to      
points1 while yet holding every space to
 be composed of points4 ,a      finite  
space is a whole consisting of simple   
parts1 but not of any      finite number
 of simple parts4 ,exactly the same     

thing is true of      the stretch       
between #a and #b4 ,thus the antinomy is
 not specially      spatial1 and any    
answer which is applicable in           
,arithmetic is      applicable here     
also4 ,the thesis1 which is an essential
 postulate      of ,logic1 should be    
accepted1 while the antithesis should be
      rejected40  ,but1 as above        
observed1#aeba those mathematicians who 
adopt this view so alter the meaning of 
the term point that it would perhaps be 
equally true to say that the thesis1 as 
thus interpreted by ,russell1 coincides 
with what ,kant believes himself to be  
asserting in the antithesis4   ,,third  
,,antinomy  ,thesis4--,causality        
according to the laws of nature is not  
the only causality from which the       
appearances of the world can be deduced4
 ,there is also required for their      
explanation another1 that of freedom4   
,proof4--,let us assume the opposite4   
,in that case everything that happens   
presupposes a previous state upon which 

it follows according to a rule4 ,that   
previous state is itself caused in      
similar fashion1 and so on in infinitum4
 ,but if everything thus happens        
according to the mere laws of nature1   
there can never be a first beginning1   
and therefore no completeness of the    
series on the side of the derivative    
causes4 ,but the law of nature is that  
nothing happens without a cause         
sufficiently determined a priori4 ,if1  
therefore1 all causality is possible    
only according to the laws of nature1   
the principle contradicts itself when   
taken in unlimited universality4 ,such  
causality cannot therefore be the sole  
causality possible4 ,we must admit an   
absolute spontaneity1 whereby a series  
of appearances1 that proceed according  
to laws of nature1 begins by itself4    
,criticism4--,the vital point of this   
argument lies in the assertion that the 
principle of causality calls for a      
sufficient cause for each event1 and    
that such sufficiency is not to be found

 in natural causes which are themselves 
derivative or conditioned4 ,as the      
antecedent series of causes for an event
 can never be traced back to a first    
cause1 it can never be completed1 and   
can never1 therefore1 be sufficient to  
account for the event under             
consideration4 ,either1 therefore1 the  
principle of causality contradicts      
itself1 or some form of free            
self-originative causality must be      
postulated4 ,this argument cannot be    
accepted as valid4 ,each natural cause  
is sufficient to account for its effect4
 ,that is to say1 the causation is      
sufficient at each stage4 ,that the     
series of antecedent causes cannot be   
completed is due to its actual          
infinitude1 not to any insufficiency in 
the causality which it embodies4#aebb   
,to prove his point1 ,kant would have to
 show that the conception of the actual 
infinite is inherently                  
self-contradictory2 and that1 as we have
 already noted1 he does not mean to     

assert4 ,his argument here lies open to 
the same criticism as we have already   
passed upon his argument in proof of the
 thesis of the first antinomy4          
,antithesis4--,there is no freedom2     
everything in the world proceeds solely 
in accordance with laws of nature4      
,proof4--,let us assume the opposite4   
,free causality1 i4e4 the power of      
absolute origination1 presupposes the   
possibility of a state of the cause     
which has no causal connection with its 
preceding state1 and which does not     
follow from it4 ,but this is opposed to 
the law of causality1 and would render  
unity of experience impossible4 ,freedom
 is therefore an empty thought-entity   
7,gedankending71 and is not to be met   
with in any experience4                 
,criticism4--,we may first observe the  
strange relation in which the proof of  
the thesis stands to that of the        
antithesis4 ,according to the former1   
freedom must be postulated because      
otherwise the principle of causality    

would contradict itself4 ,according to  
the latter1 freedom is impossible1 and  
for the same reason4 ,now1 as ,erhardt  
has pointed out1#aebc a principle cannot
 be reconciled with itself through the  
making of an assumption which           
contradicts it4 ,that would only be the 
institution of a second contradiction1  
not the removal of the previous         
conflict4 ,if the proof of the thesis be
 correct1 that of the antithesis must be
 false2 if the proof of the antithesis  
be correct1 that of the thesis must be  
invalid4 ,for though the thesis and the 
antithesis may themselves contradict one
 another1 such conflict must not exist  
between the grounds upon which they     
establish themselves4 ,if the reasons   
cited in their support are contradictory
 of one another1 the total argument is  
rendered null and void4 ,the supporting 
proofs being contradictory of one       
another1 nothing whatsoever has been    
established4 ,there will remain as a    
pressing and immediate problem the task 

of distinguishing the truth from among  
the competing alternatives2 and until   
this has been done1 the argument cannot 
proceed4 ,the assumption of freedom     
either does or does not contradict the  
principle of causality4 ,antinomy is not
 the simple assertion that both ,a and  
not-,a are true1 but that ,a and not-,a1
 though contradictory of one another1   
can both be established by arguments in 
which such contradiction does not       
occur4#aebd  ,the proof given of the    
thesis would seem1 as already noted1 to 
be untenable4 ,the principle of natural 
causality is not self-contradictory4    
,what now is to be said regarding the   
proof of the antithesis8 ,if the        
principle of natural causality be       
formulated as asserting that every event
 has an antecedent cause determining it 
to exist1 then certainly free1          
spontaneous1 or self-originating        
causality is excluded4 ,here1 as in     
,kant's proof of the antithesis of the  
first antinomy1 everything depends upon 

definition of the terms employed4 ,it   
must be borne in mind that the          
antinomies are asserted to exist only on
 the dogmatic level4 ,critical          
considerations must not1 therefore1 be  
allowed to intervene4 ,now for ordinary 
consciousness the concept of causality  
has a very indefinite meaning1 and a    
very wide application4 ,causation may be
 spontaneous as well as mechanical1     
spiritual as well as material4 ,all     
possibilities lie open1 and no mere     
reference to the concept of causal      
dependence suffices to decide between   
them4 ,free causality1 so far as        
dogmatic analysis of the causal         
postulate can show to the contrary1 may 
or may not be possible4#aebe ,kant has  
failed to establish the antithesis save 
by the surreptitious introduction of    
conclusions which presuppose the truth  
of his ,critical teaching4 ,this is     
especially shown in the emphasis laid   
upon #8unity of experience4' ,the       
further statement#aebf that freedom     

means lawlessness is only true if       
,kant's teaching is mutilated by        
reduction merely to its assertion of the
 objective validity of the mechanistic  
principles of natural science4 ,kant is 
both running with the hare and hunting  
with the hounds4  ,though this antinomy 
is chiefly concerned with the problem of
 freedom1 i4e4 of spontaneous           
origination within the world1 the proof 
of the thesis refers only to the        
cosmological problem of a first         
cause4#aebg ,the reasons of this        
oscillation we shall have occasion to   
consider in dealing with the fourth     
antinomy4 ,the terms world and nature   
play the same ambiguous part as in the  
antithesis of the first antinomy2 they  
tend to be employed in the narrower1    
mechanistic sense of ,kant's own        
,critical teaching4   ,,fourth          
,,antinomy  ,as the proofs of the thesis
 and antithesis proceed on lines        
identical with those of the third       
antinomy1 ,i shall omit detailed        

statement of them4#aebh ,kant again     
argues from the fact that every change  
has a condition which precedes it in    
time4 ,there is no difference in the    
proofs themselves1 but only in the      
nature of the inference which they are  
made to support4 ,in the third antinomy 
they lead to the assertion and denial of
 free causality2 in the fourth antinomy 
they lead to the assertion and denial of
 an absolutely necessary being4 ,the    
assertion is required in order to save  
the principle of causality from         
self-contradiction2 the denial is also  
necessary1 and for the same reason4 ,the
 illegitimacy of this procedure has     
already been pointed out4#aebi ,though  
the thesis and the antithesis will1 if  
antinomy be assumed to represent an     
actual conflict1 contradict one another1
 no such conflict is allowable in the   
grounds which profess to establish them4
 ,we must not assert1 as argument1 that 
both ,a and not-,a are true4  ,in the   
,observation on the antithesis#aecj     

,kant has himself taken notice of this  
8strange0 situation4       8,from the   
same ground on which1 in the thesis1 the
 existence of an      original being was
 inferred1 its non-existence is         
inferred1 and      that with equal      
stringency40  ,a necessary being is     
inferred to exist1 because the past     
series of events cannot contain all the 
conditions of an event1 unless the      
unconditioned is to be found among them4
 ,a necessary being is denied to exist1 
because the series of merely conditioned
 events contains all the conditions that
 there are4 ,kant's defence of this     
procedure is as follows3                
8,nevertheless1 the method of argument  
in both cases is entirely in            
conformity even with ordinary human     
reason1 which frequently falls      into
 conflict with itself from considering  
its object from two      different      
points of view4 ,m4 de ,mairan#aeca     
regarded the      controversy between   
two famous astronomers1 which arose from

 a      similar difficulty in regard to 
choice of standpoint1 as a              
sufficiently remarkable phenomenon to   
justify his writing a special           
treatise upon it4 ,the one had argued   
that the moon revolves on its      own  
axis1 because it always turns the same  
side towards the earth4      ,the other 
drew the opposite conclusion that the   
moon does not      revolve on its own   
axis1 because it always turns the same  
side      towards the earth4 ,both      
inferences were correct1 according to   
the      point of view which each chose 
in observing the moon's motion40  ,this 
example is not really relevant4 ,in     
spite of ,kant's assertion to the       
contrary1 the point of view is one and  
the same in thesis and in antithesis4   
,in both cases the absolutely necessary 
being is viewed as the first of the     
changes in the world of sense4 ,to      
maintain that when thus viewed it both  
is and is not demanded by the law of    
causality1 is as impossible as to assert

 that in one and the same meaning of our
 terms the moon both does and does not  
revolve on its own axis4  ,that the     
proofs of the fourth antinomy are       
identical with those of the third is due
 to the fact that ,kant1 under the      
stress of his architectonic1#aecb is    
striving to construct four antinomies   
while only three are really             
distinguishable4 ,the third and fourth  
antinomies coincide as formulations of  
the problem whether or not the          
conditioned implies1 and originates in1 
the unconditioned4 ,the precise         
determination of this unconditioned1    
whether as free causality or as a       
necessary being1 or in any other way1 is
 a further problem1 and does not        
properly fall within the scope of the   
cosmological inquiries1 which are alone 
in place in this division of the        
,critique4  ,the manner in which ,kant1 
in treating of freedom1 makes the       
transition#aecc from the cosmological   
7or theological7 unconditioned to the   

psychological is significant4 ,the      
cosmological unconditioned is proved to 
exist by the argument of the thesis1 and
 its existence is at once interpreted as
 establishing at least in this one case 
the actuality of free spontaneous       
causality4 ,kant remarks that this      
8444transcendental ,idea of freedom does
 not by any means constitute      the   
entire content of the psychological     
concept of that name1 which      is     
mainly empirical1 but only that of      
absolute spontaneity of      action4444 
,the necessity of a first beginning1 due
 to freedom1 of a      series of        
appearances we have demonstrated only in
 so far as it is      required for the  
conceivability of an origin of the      
world4444 ,but      as1 after all1 the  
power of spontaneously originating a    
series in      time has thus been proved
 7though not understood71 it is now     
permissible for us to admit within the  
course of the world      different      
series as capable in their causality of 

beginning of      themselves1 and so to 
attribute to their substances a power of
      acting from freedom40  ,that each 
such successive series in the world can 
only have a relatively primary          
beginning1 and must always be preceded  
by some other state of things1 is no    
sufficient objection to such causality4 
8,for we are here speaking of an        
absolutely first beginning not in       
time1 but in causality4 ,if1 for        
instance1 ,i at this moment arise       
from my chair in complete freedom1      
without being necessarily               
determined thereto by the influence of  
natural causes1 a new      series1 with 
all its natural consequences in         
infinitum1 has its      absolute        
beginning in this event1 although the   
event itself is      only1 with regard  
to time1 the continuation of a preceding
 series40  ,thus ,kant's proof of       
freedom in the thesis of the third      
antinomy is merely a corollary from his 
proof of the existence of a cosmological

 or theological unconditioned2 and      
further1 this freedom is not1 like the  
cosmological unconditioned1 proved to   
exist1 but only to be 8admissible0 as a 
possibility4 ,similarly in the          
antithesis1 the only disproof of freedom
 is the disproof of unconditioned       
causality in general4 ,the antinomy     
deals with the general opposition and   
relation between the contingent and the 
unconditioned4  ,it is this same        
opposition exactly which constitutes the
 subject-matter of the fourth antinomy4 
,the terms used are different1 but their
 meanings are one and the same4 ,for    
though ,kant substitutes #8absolutely   
necessary being' for #8unconditioned    
causality1' the former is still         
conceived as belonging to the world of  
sense1 as the unconditioned origin of   
its changes4 ,and as ,kant is careful to
 add1 only the causal1 cosmological     
argument can be employed to establish   
the existence of an absolutely necessary
 being2 nothing can legitimately be     

inferred from the mere ,idea4 ,the      
verbal change is consequently verbal    
only2 the argument of the fourth        
antinomy coincides in result no less    
than in method of proof with the        
argument of the third4 ,it is impossible
 to define the unconditioned in any more
 specific fashion save by an enquiry    
which entirely transcends the scope of  
the argument that ,kant is here         
presenting4 ,kant's procedure also lies 
open to the further objection that the  
conception of an absolutely necessary   
being1 which he here introduces without 
preliminary analysis or explanation1 is 
later shown by him#aecd to be devoid of 
significance4 ,he employs it1 but       
precludes himself from either           
investigating it or from drawing any    
serviceable consequences from it4 ,the  
situation is not without the elements of
 comedy4 ,in order to seem to mark a    
real distinction between the fourth and 
the third antinomies1 ,kant has perforce
 to trespass upon the domain of         

theology2 but as he is aware that the   
trespass is forbidden1 he seeks to      
mitigate the offence by returning from  
the foray empty-handed4 ,to such unhappy
 straits is he again reduced by his     
over-fond devotion to architectonic4    
,,section ,,iii  ,,the ,,interest ,,of  
,,reason ,,in ,,this                    
,,self-,,conflict#aece  ,this section1  
though extremely important1 requires no 
lengthy comment4 ,it is lucid and       
straightforward4 ,it may be summarised  
as follows4 ,the theses and the         
antitheses rest upon diverse and        
conflicting interests4 ,the theses1     
though expressed in dry formulas1       
divested of the empirical features      
through which alone their true grandeur 
can be displayed1 represent the proud   
pretensions of dogmatic ,reason4 ,the   
antitheses give expression to principles
 of pure empiricism4 ,the former are    
supported by interests of a practical   
and popular character3 upon them morals 
and religion are based4 ,the latter1    

while conflicting with our spiritual    
interests1 far exceed the theses in     
their intellectual advantages4 ,this    
explains       8444the zelotic passion  
of the one party1 and the calm assurance
 of      the other1 and why the world   
hails the one with eager approval1 and  
is implacably prejudiced against the    
other40  ,no legitimate objection could 
be raised against the principles of the 
empirical philosopher1 if he sought only
 to rebuke the rashness and presumption 
of ,reason when it boasts of knowledge1 
and when it represents as speculative   
insight that which is grounded only in  
faith4       8,but when empiricism      
itself1 as frequently happens1 becomes  
dogmatic 4441 and confidently denies    
whatever lies beyond the      sphere of 
its intuitive knowledge1 it betrays the 
same lack of      modesty2 and that is  
all the more reprehensible owing to the 
irreparable injury which is thereby     
caused to the practical      interests  
of ,reason40  ,each party asserts more  

than it knows4 ,the one allows our      
practical interests to delude ,reason as
 to its inherent powers2 the other would
 so extend empirical knowledge as to    
destroy the validity of our moral       
principles4 ,kant regards the opposition
 as being historically typified by the  
contrasted systems of ,platonism and    
,epicureanism4 ,it befits us1 as        
self-reflecting beings1 to free         
ourselves1 at least provisionally1 from 
the partiality of those divergent       
interests1 and by application of 8the   
sceptical method10 unconcerned about    
consequences1 to penetrate to the       
primary sources of this perennial       
conflict4 ,as ,kant states in the next  
section1 the conflict is of such a      
character as to be genuinely resolvable4
  ,this section must have been written1 
or at least first sketched1 at the time 
when ,kant still intended to bring his  
whole criticism of the metaphysical     
sciences within the scope of his        
doctrine of antinomy4#aecf   ,,section  

,,iv  ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental       
,,problems ,,of ,,pure ,,reason1 ,,in   
,,so ,,far ,,as ,,they ,,absolutely     
,,must ,,be ,,capable ,,of              
,,solution#aecg  ,there are sciences the
 very nature of which requires that     
every question which can occur in them  
must be completely answerable from what 
can be presumed to be known4 ,this is   
true of the science of ethics4 ,when ,i 
ask to what course of action ,i am      
committed in moral duty1 the question   
must be answerable in terms of the      
considerations which have led to its    
being propounded4 ,for there can be no  
moral obligation in regard to that of   
which we cannot have knowledge4 ,we must
 not plead that the problem is          
unanswerable2 a solution must be found4 
,kant proceeds to argue that this is no 
less true of transcendental philosophy4 
8444it is unique among speculative      
sciences in that no question      which 
concerns an object given to pure ,reason
 is insoluble for this      same human  

,reason1 and that no excuse of an       
unavoidable ignorance1      or of the   
unfathomable depth of the problem1 can  
release us from      the obligation to  
answer it thoroughly and completely4    
,that very      concept which enables us
 to ask the question must also qualify  
us      to answer it1 since1 as in the  
case of right and wrong1 the object     
is not to be met with outside the       
concept40  ,the third and fourth        
paragraphs would seem to be later       
interpolations4 ,the section1 like      
,section ,,iii41 must have been written 
at the time when ,kant still regarded   
the doctrine of antinomy as covering the
 entire field of metaphysics4           
,transcendental philosophy is identified
 with cosmology1 as dealt with in the   
antinomies4 ,but in the third paragraph 
the former is taken as a wider term4    
,also1 in the first two paragraphs the  
problems of pure ,reason are regarded as
 soluble because their objects are not  
to be met with outside the concepts of  

them2 whereas in the third paragraph    
they are viewed as soluble because their
 object is given empirically4 ,again1 in
 the second paragraph transcendental    
philosophy has been taken as unique     
among speculative i4e4 theoretical      
sciences2 in the fourth paragraph       
mathematics is placed alongside it4     
,examination of this section as a whole 
7and the same is true of the immediately
 following section7 justifies the       
conclusion that at the time when it was 
written ,kant regarded the ,ideas of    
,reason as having a purely and          
exclusively regulative function1 and    
consequently as exhausting their        
inherent meaning in their empirical     
reference4 ,he regards them as entirely 
lacking in metaphysical significance4   
,they are invented by ,reason for       
,reason's own satisfaction1 and must    
therefore yield in their internal       
content the explanation of their        
existence1 and must also supply a       
complete and thorough answer to all     

problems which are traceable to them4 ,a
 dogmatic 7i4e4 ontological7 solution of
 the antinomies is1 as we have already  
found1 impossible2 the ,critical        
solution considers the question         
subjectively1       8444in accordance   
with the foundation of the knowledge    
upon which      it is based40#aech 8,for
 your object is only in your brain1 and 
cannot be given outside it2 so that you 
have only to take care to      be at one
 with yourself1 and to avoid the        
amphiboly which      transforms your    
,idea into a supposed representation of 
an object      which is empirically     
given and therefore to be known         
according to      the laws of           
experience40#aeci  ,kant's argument in  
proof of this purely subjective         
interpretation of the ,ideas consists in
 showing that they are not presented in 
any given appearances1 and are not even 
necessary to explain appearances4 ,the  
unconditioned1 whether of quantity1 of  
division1 or of origination1 has nothing

 to do with any experience1 whether     
actual or possible4       8,you would   
not1 for instance1 in any wise be able  
to explain the      appearances of a    
body better1 or even differently1 if you
 assumed      that it consists either of
 simple or of inexhaustibly composite   
parts2 for neither a simple appearance  
nor an infinite composition      can    
ever come before you4 ,appearances      
demand explanation only in so      far  
as the conditions of their explanation  
are given in perception1      and the   
unconditioned can never be so           
given40#aedj  ,this standpoint1 at once 
sceptical and empirical1 is further     
developed in the next section4          
,,section ,v  ,,sceptical               
,,representation ,,of ,,the             
,,cosmological ,,questions#aeda         
,applying the 8sceptical method10#aedb  
,kant argues that even supposing one or 
other party could conclusively establish
 itself through final refutation of the 
other1 no advantage of any kind would   

accrue4 ,the victory would be a         
fruitless one1 and the outcome 8mere    
nonsense40#aedc ,the sole validity of   
the ,ideas lies in their empirical      
reference2 and yet that reference is one
 which proves them to be1 when          
objectively interpreted1 entirely       
meaningless4 ,the cosmological ,idea is 
always either too large or too small for
 any concept of the understanding4 ,no  
matter what view is taken1 the only     
possible object 7viz4 that yielded by   
experience7 will not fit into it4 ,if   
the world has no beginning1 or is       
infinitely divisible1 or has no first   
cause1 the regress transcends all       
empirical concepts2 while if the world  
has a beginning1 is composed of simple  
parts1 and has a first cause1 it is too 
small for the concepts through which    
alone it can be experienced4 ,in other  
words1 the cosmological ,ideas are      
always either too large or too small for
 the empirical regress1 and therefore   
stand condemned by sense-experience1    

which can alone impart relation to an   
object1 i4e4 truth and meaning to any   
concept4 ,for1 as ,kant explicitly      
states1 we must not reverse this        
relation and condemn empirical concepts1
 as being in the one case too small1 and
 in the other case too large for the    
,idea4 ,experience1 not ,ideas1 is the  
criterion alike of reality and of truth4
       8,the possible empirical concept 
is1 therefore1 the standard by          
which we must judge whether the ,idea is
 mere ,idea and      thought-entity     
7,gedankending71 or whether it finds its
 object in      the world40#aedd  ,when 
two things are compared1 that for the   
sake of which the other exists is the   
sole proper standard4 ,we do not say    
8that a man is too long for his coat1   
but that the coat is too short for the  
man40#aede ,we are thus confirmed in the
 view that the antinomies rest upon a   
false view of the manner in which the   
object of the cosmological ,ideas can be
 given2 and are set upon the track1     

followed out in the next section1 of the
 illusion to which they are due4  ,this 
reduction of the ,ideas to mere         
thought-entities is one of the two      
alternative views which1 as we have     
already stated1#aedf compete with one   
another throughout the entire           
,dialectic4 ,we may1 for instance1      
compare the above explanation of the    
conflict between the ,ideas and         
experience with that given in ,a #dbb   
,b #dej4 ,in the latter passage the     
antinomies are traced to a conflict     
between ,reason and understanding4 ,if  
the unity is adequate to the demands of 
,reason1 it is too great for the        
understanding2 if it is adequate to the 
understanding1 it is too small for      
,reason4 ,kant does not here allow that 
the claims of ,reason are ipso facto    
condemned through the incapacity of     
experience to fulfil them4 ,on the      
contrary1 he implies that it is through 
the ,ideas that we come to realise the  
merely phenomenal character of          

everything experienced4  ,our task1 in  
this ,commentary1 is only to distinguish
 the passages in which those two        
conflicting tendencies appear1 and to   
trace the consequences which follow from
 ,kant's alternation between them4      
,discussion of their significance had   
best be deferred to the close of the    
,dialectic1 where ,kant dwells upon the 
regulative function of ,reason4 ,at     
present we need merely note that the    
main content of the above sections1 in  
which the sceptical view is expounded1  
is of early date1 prior to the working  
out of the ,paralogisms and of the      
,ideal4   ,,section ,,vi                
,,transcendental ,,idealism ,,as ,,the  
,,key ,,to ,,the ,,solution ,,of ,,the  
,,cosmological ,,dialectic#aedg  ,in    
this section subjectivism is dominant4  
,the type of transcendental idealism    
expounded is that earlier and less      
developed form which connects with the  
doctrine of the transcendental          
object4#aedh ,it shows no trace of      

,kant's maturer teaching4 ,no           
distinction is drawn between            
representation and the objects          
represented4 ,to the transcendental     
object1 the 8purely intelligible cause0 
of appearances in general1 and to it    
alone1 ,kant ascribes 8the whole extent 
and connection of our possible          
perceptions40#aedi ,appearances exist   
only in the degree to which they are    
constructed in experience4 ,as they are 
mere representations1 they cannot exist 
outside the mind4 ,independently of such
 construction1 they may indeed be said  
to be given in the transcendental       
object1 but they only become objects to 
us on the supposition that they can be  
reached through extension of the series 
of our actual perceptions4 ,it is in    
this form alone1 as conceived in a      
regressive series of possible           
perceptions1 and not as having existed  
in itself1 that even the immemorial past
 course of the world can be represented 
as real2       8444so that all events   

which have taken place in the immense   
periods that have preceded my own       
existence mean really nothing but       
the possibility of extending the chain  
of experience from the      present     
perception back to the conditions which 
determine it in      time40#aeej  ,a    
similar interpretation has to be given  
to all propositions which assert the    
present reality of that which has never 
been actually experienced4       8,in   
outcome it is a matter of indifference  
whether ,i say that in      the         
empirical progress in space ,i can meet 
with stars a hundred      times farther 
removed than the outermost now          
perceptible to me1 or      whether ,i   
say that they are perhaps to be met with
 in cosmical      space even though no  
human being has ever perceived or ever  
will      perceive them4 ,for even if   
they were given as things in themselves1
      without relation to possible      
experience1#aeea they are still         
nothing for me1 and therefore are not   

objects1 save in so far as      they are
 contained in the series of the         
empirical regress40#aeeb  ,the          
distinction between appearances and     
things in themselves must always1 ,kant 
observes1 be borne in mind when we are  
interpreting the meaning of our         
empirical concepts2 and this is         
especially necessary when those concepts
 are brought into connection with the   
cosmological ,idea of an unconditioned4 
,the antinomies are due to a failure to 
appreciate this fundamental distinction1
 and the key to their solution lies in  
its recognition4       8,it would be an 
injustice to ascribe to us that         
long-decried      empirical idealism    
which1 while it admits the genuine      
actuality of      space1 denies the     
existence of the extended beings in     
it44440#aeec  ,this is in line with the 
passages from the ,prolegomena commented
 upon above4#aeed   ,,section ,,vii     
,,critical ,,decision ,,of ,,the        
,,cosmological ,,conflict ,,of ,,reason 

,,with ,,itself#aeee  ,kant's argument  
is as follows4 ,the antinomies rest upon
 the principle that if the conditioned  
be given1 the entire series of all its  
conditions is likewise given4 ,if the   
objects of the senses were independently
 real1 there would be no escape from    
this assumption1 and the dialectical    
conflict would consequently be          
irresolvable4 ,transcendental idealism1 
as above stated1 reveals a way out of   
the dilemma4 ,as appearances are merely 
representations1 their antecedent       
conditions do not exist as appearances1 
save in the degree in which they are    
mentally constructed4 ,though the       
appearances are given1 their empirical  
conditions are not thereby given4 ,the  
most that we can say is that a regress  
to the conditions1 i4e4 a continued     
empirical synthesis in that direction1  
is commanded or required4 ,the          
cosmological argument can thus be shown 
to be logically invalid4 ,the syllogism1
 which it involves1 is as follows3  ,if 

the conditioned be given1 the entire    
series of all its conditions is likewise
 given4  ,the objects of the senses are 
given4  ,therefore the entire series of 
all their conditions is likewise given4 
,in the major premiss the concept of the
 conditioned is employed transcendently 
7,kant says transcendentally71 in the   
minor empirically4 ,but though the      
inference thus commits the logical      
fallacy of sophisma figurae dictionis1  
the ground of its occurrence1 and the   
reason why it is not at once detected1  
lie in a natural and inevitable illusion
 which leads us to accept the sensible  
world in space as being independently   
real4 ,only through ,critical           
investigation can the deceptive power of
 this illusion be overcome4 ,owing to   
its influence1 the above fallacy has    
been committed by dogmatists and        
empiricists alike4 ,it can be shown that
 in refuting each other  444 8they are  
really quarrelling about nothing1 and   
that a certain      transcendental      

illusion has caused them to see a       
reality where none      is to be        
found40#aeef  ,the existence of         
antinomy1 ,kant further argues1         
presupposes that theses and antitheses  
are contradictory opposites1 i4e4 that  
no third alternative is possible4 ,when 
opposed assertions are not              
contradictories but contraries1 the     
opposition1 to use ,kant's terms1 is not
 analytical but dialectical4 ,both may  
be false2 for the one does not merely   
contradict the other1 but makes1 in     
addition1 a further statement on its own
 account4 ,now examination of the       
illusion above described enables us to  
perceive that the opposites1 in         
reference to which antinomy occurs1 are 
of this dialectical character4 ,theses  
and antitheses are alike false4 ,since  
the world does not exist as a thing in  
itself1 it exists neither as an infinite
 whole nor as a finite whole1 but only  
in the degree in which it is constructed
 in an empirical regress4 ,we must not  

apply 8the ,idea of absolute totality1  
which is valid only as a condition of   
things in themselves10#aeeg to          
appearances4 7,the words which ,i have  
italicised mark the emergence of ,kant's
 non-sceptical1 non-empirical view of   
the nature and function of the ,ideas of
 ,reason47 ,thus antinomy1 rightly      
understood1 does not favour scepticism1 
but only the 8sceptical method10 and    
indeed yields an indirect proof of the  
correctness of ,critical teaching4 ,this
 proof may be presented in the form of a
 dilemma4 ,if the world is a whole      
existing in itself1 it is either finite 
or infinite4 ,but the former alternative
 is refuted by the proofs given of the  
antitheses1 and the latter alternative  
by the proofs of the theses4 ,therefore 
the world cannot be a whole existing in 
itself4 ,from this it follows that      
appearances are nothing outside our     
representations2 and that is what is    
asserted in the doctrine of             
transcendental idealism4  ,in ,a #dii   

,b #ebg ,kant uses ambiguous            
language1#aeeh which can be interpreted 
as asserting that in the regress there  
can be no lack of given conditions4     
,such a statement would presuppose      
positive knowledge regarding the unknown
 transcendental object4#aeei ,the       
opposite1 more correct1 view is given in
 ,a #ead-ae  ,b #edb-c and ,a #eag ff4  
,b #ede ff41 though in the latter       
passage with a reversion to the above   
position4#aefj  ,the earlier            
manuscripts1 which ,kant has so far been
 employing1 probably terminate either1  
as ,adickes suggests1#aefa at the end of
 this section1 or at the close of       
,section ,,viii41 which is of doubtful  
date4 ,section ,,ix4 is certainly from a
 later period2 it represents a more     
complex standpoint1 in which ,reason is 
no longer viewed as possessing a merely 
empirical function1 and in which        
consequently the theses and antitheses  
are no longer indiscriminately denounced
 as being alike false4 ,under the       

influence of his later1 more ,idealistic
 preoccupations1 ,kant so far modifies  
the above solution as to assert that in 
the ease of the last two antinomies both
 theses and antitheses are true1 when   
properly interpreted4   ,,section ,,viii
  ,,the ,,regulative ,,principle ,,of   
,,pure ,,reason ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,the
 ,,cosmological ,,ideas#aefb  ,the      
principle of pure ,reason1 correctly    
formulated1 is that when the conditioned
 is given a regress upon the totality of
 its conditions is set as a problem4 ,as
 such it is valid1       8444not indeed 
as an axiom 444 but as a problem for the
      understanding 4441 leading it to  
undertake and to continue1              
according to the completeness in the    
,idea1 the regress in the      series of
 conditions of any given                
conditioned40#aefc  ,it does not        
anticipate1 prior to the regress1 what  
actually exists as object1 but only     
postulates1 in the form of a rule1 how  
the understanding ought to proceed4 ,it 

does not tell us whether or how the     
unconditioned exists1 but how the       
empirical regress is to be carried out  
under the guidance of a mere ,idea4     
,such a rule can be regulative only1 and
 the ,idea of totality which it contains
 must never be invested with objective  
reality4 ,as the absolutely             
unconditioned can never be met with in  
experience1 we know1 indeed1 beforehand 
that in the process of the regress the  
unconditioned will never be reached4    
,but the duty of seeking it by way of   
such regress is none the less           
prescribed4  ,kant proceeds to give a   
somewhat bewildering account of the     
familiar distinction between progressus 
in infinitum and progressus in          
indefinitum1 and to draw a very doubtful
 distinction between the series in      
division of a given whole and the series
 in extension of it4#aefd ,the          
illustration from the series of human   
generations is an unfortunate one2 the  
discovery that it began at some one     

point in the past would not necessarily 
violate any demand of ,reason4 ,such a  
series is not comparable with those of  
space1 time1 and causality4#aefe ,the   
only important result of this digression
 is the conclusion that whatever demand 
be made1 whether of regress in infinitum
 or of regress in indefinitum1 in       
neither case can the series of          
conditions be regarded as being given as
 infinite in the object4       8,the    
question1 therefore1 is no longer how   
great this series of      conditions may
 be in itself1 whether finite or        
infinite1 for it is      nothing in     
itself2 but how we are to carry out the 
empirical      regress1 and how far we  
should continue it40#aeff  ,we have     
already noted#aefg ,kant's ambiguous    
suggestion in ,a #dii  ,b #ebg1 that in 
the empirical regress there can be no   
lack of given conditions4 ,the          
statement1 thus interpreted1 is         
illegitimate4 ,the most that he can     
claim is that1 were further sensations  

not forthcoming1 we should still have to
 conceive those last obtained as being  
preceded by empty space and time1 and as
 lacking in any experienced cause4      
,under such circumstances we should     
experience neither finitude nor         
unconditionedness1 but only incapacity  
to find a content suitable to the       
inexhaustible character of the spatial  
and temporal conditions of experience1  
or in satisfaction of our demand for    
causal antecedents4 ,in ,a #ead-ae  ,b  
#edb-c ,kant shows consciousness of this
 difficulty1 but in dealing with it     
adopts a half-way position which still  
lies open to objection4 ,he recognises  
that1 since no member of a series can be
 empirically given as absolutely        
unconditioned1 a higher member is always
 possible1 and that the search for it is
 therefore prescribed2 none the less he 
asserts that in regard to given wholes  
we are justified in taking up a very    
different position1 namely1 that the    
regress in the series of their internal 

conditions does not proceed1 as in the  
above case1 in indefinitum1 but in      
infinitum1 i4e4 that in this case more  
members exist and are empirically given 
than we can reach through the regress4  
,in given wholes we are commanded to    
find more members2 in serial extension  
we are justified only in inquiring for  
more4 ,this half-way position is a      
makeshift1 and is in no respect tenable4
 ,the evidence for the infinite         
extensibility of space and time is as   
conclusive as for their infinite        
divisibility4 ,and when we consider     
sensuous existence under these forms1 it
 is just as possible that the           
transcendental object may1 beyond a     
certain point1 fail to supply material  
for further division1 as that it may    
fail to yield data for further          
expansion4 ,what ,kant asserts of the   
latter1 that further advance must always
 remain as a possibility1 and for that  
,reason must always call for the open   
mind of further inquiry1 without any    

attempted anticipatory assertion either 
pro or contra1 alone represents the true
 ,critical standpoint4 ,the cessation of
 data may really1 however1 be due to an 
increase in the subtlety of the         
conditioning processes that             
incapacitates them from acting upon our 
senses2#aefh by indirect means this     
disability may be overcome4 ,reason1 in 
its conception of an unconditioned1     
prescribes to us a task that is         
inexhaustible in its demands4 ,we have  
no right to lay down our intellectual   
arms before any barrier however         
baffling1 or to despair before any chasm
 however empty and abrupt4   ,,section  
,,ix  ,,the ,,empirical ,,employment    
,,of ,,the ,,regulative ,,principle ,,of
 ,,reason ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,all      
,,cosmological ,,ideas#aefi  ,,solution 
,,of ,,the ,,first ,,and ,,second       
,,antinomies  ,statement4--,the         
fundamental fact upon which1 as ,kant   
has already stated1 the regulative      
principle of ,reason is based1 is that  

it is impossible to experience an       
absolute limit4 ,it is always possible  
that a still higher member of the series
 may be found2 and that being so1 it is 
our duty to search for it4 ,but as we   
are here dealing with possibilities     
only1 the regress is in indefinitum1 not
 in infinitum4       8444we must seek   
the concept of the quantity of the world
 only      according to the rule which  
determines the empirical regress in it4 
,this rule says no more than that       
however far we may have attained      in
 the series of empirical conditions1 we 
should never assume an      absolute    
limit1 but should subordinate every     
appearance1 as      conditioned1 to     
another as its condition1 and that we   
must then      advance to this          
condition4 ,this is the regressus in    
indefinitum1      which1 as it          
determines no quantity in the object1 is
 clearly      enough distinguishable    
from the regressus in infinitum40#aegj  
,we are acquainted only with the rule1  

and not with the whole object4 ,any     
assertion1 therefore1 which we can make1
 must be dictated solely by the rule1   
and be an expression of it4 ,neither the
 thesis nor the antithesis of the first 
antinomy is valid2 there is a third     
alternative4 ,the sensible world is     
neither finite nor infinite in extent2  
it is infinitely extensible1 in terms of
 the rule4  ,unfortunately ,kant is not 
content to leave his conclusion in this 
form4 ,he complicates his argument1 and 
bewilders the reader1 by maintaining    
that this is a virtual acceptance of the
 antithesis1 in that we assert          
negatively1 that an absolute limit in   
either time or space is empirically     
impossible2#aega and affirmatively1 that
 the regress goes on in indefinitum1 and
 consequently has no absolute quantity4 
,kant also repeats the argument of the  
preceding section in regard to given    
wholes4#aegb ,when the problem is that  
of subdivision1 the regress starts from 
a given whole1 and therefore from a     

whole whose conditions 7the parts7 are  
given with it4 ,the division is1        
therefore1 in infinitum1 and not merely 
in indefinitum4 ,this does not1 however1
 he argues1 mean that the given whole   
consists of infinitely many parts4 ,for 
though the parts are contained in the   
intuition of the whole1 yet the whole   
division arises only through the regress
 that generates it4 ,it is a quantum    
continuum1 not a quantum discretum4#aegc
 ,this argument has been criticised     
above4#aegd ,kant here ignores the      
possibility that the parts of matter1   
though extended1 may be physically      
indivisible1 or that they may be centres
 of force which control1 but do not     
occupy1 a determinate space4   ,,remarks
 ,,on ,,the ,,distinction ,,between     
,,the ,,mathematical-,,transcendental   
,,and ,,the ,,dynamical-,,transcendental
 ,,ideas#aege  ,statement4--,kant       
again#aegf introduces the distinction   
between the mathematical and the        
dynamical4 ,the mathematical ,ideas     

synthesise the homogeneous1 the         
dynamical may connect the heterogeneous4
 ,in employing the former we must       
therefore remain within the phenomenal2 
through the latter we may be able to    
transcend it4 ,the way is thus opened   
for propounding1 in regard to the third 
and fourth antinomies1 a solution in    
which the pretensions of ,reason no less
 than those of understanding may find   
satisfaction4 ,whereas both the theses  
and the antitheses of the first and     
second antinomies have to be declared   
false1 those of the third and fourth    
antinomies may both be true--the theses 
applying to the intelligible realm1 and 
the antitheses to the world of sense4   
,comment4--,when the distinction between
 the mathematical and the dynamical is  
thus extended from the categories to the
 ,ideas1 its validity becomes highly    
doubtful4 ,space and time are certainly 
themselves homogeneous1 and the         
categories of quality and quantity1 in  
so far as they are mathematically       

employed1 may perhaps be similarly      
described4 ,but when the term is still  
further extended1 to cover the pairs of 
correlative opposites with which the    
first two antinomies deal1 those1       
namely1 between the limited and the     
unlimited1 the simple and the infinitely
 divisible1 ,kant would seem to be      
making a highly artificial distinction4 
,the first two antinomies deal not with 
space and time as such1 but with the    
sensible world in space and time2 and   
within this sensible world1 even in its 
quantitative aspects1 qualitative       
differences have to be reckoned with4   
,common sense does1 indeed1 tend to     
assume that the unlimited and the simple
 must1 like that which they condition1  
be in space and time1 and so form with  
the conditioned a homogeneous series4   
,but this assumption ordinary           
consciousness is equally disposed to    
make in regard to a first cause and to  
the unconditionally necessary4  ,kant   
further attempts#aegg to distinguish    

between the mathematical and the        
dynamical by asserting that the         
dynamical antinomies are not concerned  
with the quantity of their object1 but  
only with its existence4 ,he admits1    
however1 that in all four cases a series
 arises which is either too large or too
 small for the understanding2 and that  
being so1 in each case the problem      
arises as to the existence of an        
unconditioned4  ,the artificiality of   
,kant's distinction becomes clear when  
we recognise that the opposed solutions1
 which he gives of the two sets of      
antinomies1 can be mutually             
interchanged4 ,as the sensible world    
rests upon intelligible grounds1 both   
the theses and the antitheses of the    
first two antinomies may be true1 the   
former in the intelligible realm and the
 latter in the sensuous4 ,similarly1    
both the theses and antitheses of the   
third and fourth antinomies may be      
false4 ,in the sensible world1 about    
which alone anything can be determined1 

the series of dynamical conditions forms
 neither a finite nor an infinite       
series4 ,there is a third alternative1  
akin to that of the antitheses1 but     
distinct in character from it1 namely1  
that the series is infinitely           
extensible4 ,kant's differential        
treatment of the two sets of antinomies 
is arbitrary1 and would seem to be due  
to his having attempted to superimpose1 
with the least possible modification1 a 
later solution of the antinomies upon   
one previously developed4 ,in the       
earlier view1 as we have already had    
occasion to observe1 ,reason has a      
merely empirical application4 ,its      
,ideas are taken as existing 8only in   
the brain40 ,only their empirical       
reference can substantiate them1 or     
indeed give them the least significance4
 ,and as they are by their very nature  
incapable of empirical embodiment1 all  
assertions which involve them must      
necessarily be false4 ,later1 ,kant came
 to regard ,reason as having its own    

independent rights4 ,encouraged by his  
successful establishment of the         
objective validity of the categories1   
progressively more and more convinced of
 the importance of the distinction1     
which that proof reinforced1 between    
appearances and things in themselves1   
and preoccupied with the problems of the
 spiritual life1 his old-time faith in  
the absolute claims of pure thought     
reasserted itself4 ,through ,reason we  
realise our kinship with noumenal       
realities1 and through its demands the  
nature of the unconditioned is          
foreshadowed to the mind4 ,the theses   
and antitheses1 which throughout the    
entire history of philosophy have       
competed with one another1 may both be  
true4 ,their perennial conflict         
demonstrates the need for some more     
catholic standpoint from which the two  
great authorities by which human life is
 controlled and directed1 the           
intellectual and the moral1 may be      
reconciled4 ,neither can be made to     

yield to the other2 each is supreme in  
its own field4 ,the distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves1   
recognition of which is the first step  
towards an adequate theory of knowledge1
 and without which the nature of the    
intellectual life remains               
self-contradictory and incomprehensible1
 itself affords the means of such a     
reconciliation4 ,the understanding is   
the sole key to the world of appearance1
 the moral imperative to the realm of   
things in themselves4 ,reason with its  
demand for the unconditioned mediates   
between them1 and enables us to realise 
our dual vocation4  ,this radical       
alteration of standpoint was bound to   
make the employment of manuscript       
representing the earlier and more       
sceptical attitude altogether           
unsatisfactory2 and only ,kant's        
constitutional unwillingness to         
sacrifice what he had once committed to 
paper can account for his retention of  
the older expositions4 ,he allows his   

previous treatment of the first two     
antinomies to remain in its sceptical   
form1 and1 by means of the distinction  
between the mathematical and the        
dynamical1 develops his newer1 more     
,idealist view exclusively in reference 
to the third and fourth antinomies4     
,that it is no less applicable to the   
others1 we have already seen4  ,though  
the ,idealist view1 as here expounded1  
may be thus described1 relatively to the
 sceptical view of ,reason1 as later1   
that is not to be taken as meaning that 
it represents the latest stage in the   
development of ,kant's ,critical        
teaching4 ,it seems to belong to the    
period prior to that in which the       
central sections of the ,analytic were  
composed4 ,the evidence#aegh for this   
consists chiefly in its subjectivist    
references to the nature of appearances4
 ,it would seem to be contemporary with 
,kant's doctrine of the transcendental  
object4   ,,solution ,,of ,,the ,,third 
,,antinomy#aegi  ,statement4--,as       

appearances are representations only1   
they must have a ground which is not    
itself an appearance2#aehj and though   
the effects of such an intelligible     
cause appear1 and accordingly are       
determined through other appearances1   
its causality is not itself similarly   
conditioned4 ,both it and its causality 
lie outside the empirical series2 only  
the effects fall within the realm of    
experience4 ,and that causality1 not    
being subject to time1 does not require 
to stand under another cause as its     
effect4 ,in this way ,kant derives from 
his transcendental idealism an          
explanation of the possibility of an    
action being at once free and causally  
determined4 ,this explanation he takes  
as applying either to a first cause of  
the whole realm of natural phenomena or 
to a finite being regarded as a free    
agent4 ,the proof of the possibility of 
this metaphysical1 or1 as ,kant entitles
 it1 8transcendental freedom10 removes  
what has always been the real difficulty

 that lay in the way of 8practical      
freedom40 ,the conception of freedom is 
a transcendental ,idea which can neither
 be derived from experience nor verified
 by it4 ,it is created by ,reason for   
itself2#aeha and reveals the possibility
 that in this third antinomy both thesis
 and antithesis may be true4 ,the       
alternatives--8every effect must arise  
from nature10 and 8every effect must    
arise from freedom0--are not exclusive  
of one another4 ,they may be true of one
 and the same event in different        
relations4#aehb ,the event may be free  
in reference to its intelligible cause1 
determined as an existence in space and 
time4 ,were appearances things in       
themselves1 freedom and causality would 
necessarily conflict3 by means of the   
above ontological distinction freedom   
can be asserted without any diminution  
in the scope allowed to the causal      
principle4 ,all events1 without a single
 possible exception1 are subject to the 
law of natural determination2 and yet   

every event may at the same time proceed
 from a free cause4   ,,possibility ,,of
 ,,harmonising ,,causality ,,through    
,,freedom ,,with ,,the ,,universal ,,law
 ,,of ,,natural ,,necessity#aehc        
,statement4--,the above conclusion is so
 seemingly paradoxical that ,kant       
devotes this and the following section  
to its further elucidation4 ,how can    
events be both free and determined8 ,the
 answer lies in recognition of the      
two-sided character of every natural    
existence4 ,it is1 in one aspect1 mere  
appearance2 in another1 it has at its   
foundation a transcendental object4 ,it 
is an appearance of the latter1 and for 
its complete comprehension this latter  
must be taken into account4 ,now there  
is nothing to prevent us from           
attributing to the transcendental object
 a causality which is not phenomenal4   
,such causality may make the appearance 
just that appearance which it is4 ,in   
the world of sense every efficient cause
 must have a specific empirical         

character1 since only so can it         
determine one effect rather than another
 according to the universal and         
invariable law expressive of its nature4
 ,we must similarly allow to the        
transcendental object an intelligible   
character1 and trace to it all those    
appearances which as members of the     
empirical series stand to one another in
 unbroken causal connection4 ,this      
transcendental object1 owing to its     
intelligible character1 is not in time4 
,its act does not either arise or       
perish1 and is not1 therefore1 subject  
to the law of empirical determination   
which applies only to the changeable1   
i4e4 to events subsequent upon previous 
states4 ,such supersensuous causality   
can find no place in the series of      
empirical conditions1 and though it can 
be conceived only in terms of the       
empirical character which is its        
outcome1 the difference between it and  
natural causality may be as complete as 
that which subsists between the         

transcendental and the empirical objects
 of knowledge4 ,in its empirical        
character the action is a part of       
nature1 and enters into a causal nexus  
which conforms to universal laws4#aehd  
,all its effects are inevitably         
determined by antecedent natural        
conditions4 ,in its intelligible        
character1 however1 this same active    
subject must be considered free from all
 influence of sensibility and from all  
determination through natural events4   
,in so far as it is a noumenon1 there   
can be no change in it1 and therefore   
nothing which is capable of explanation 
in terms of natural causes4 ,even its   
empirical effects are not traceable to  
it as events in time4 ,for as events    
these effects are always the results of 
antecedent empirical causes4 ,what is   
alone due to noumenal causality is that 
empirical character in virtue of which  
appearances are what they are1 and owing
 to which they stand in specific and    
necessary causal relations to one       

another4       8444the empirical        
character is permanent1 while its       
effects1      according to variation in 
the concomitant1 and in part limiting   
conditions1 appear in changeable        
forms40#aehe  ,empirical causality is   
itself in its specific nature           
conditioned by an intelligible          
cause4#aehf   ,,explanation ,,of ,,the  
,,relation ,,of ,,freedom ,,to          
,,necessity ,,of ,,nature#aehg          
,statement4--,no single appearance can  
be exempted from the law of natural     
causality4 ,for it would then be placed 
outside all possible experience1 and    
would be for us a fiction of the brain1 
or rather could not be conceived at all4
 ,nothing1 therefore1 in nature can act 
freely or spontaneously4 ,but while thus
 recognising that all events without    
exception are empirically conditioned1  
we may1 as already pointed out1 regard  
empirical causality as itself an effect 
of a non-empirical and intelligible     
power4#aehh ,in events there may be     

nothing but nature1 and yet nature      
itself1 or perhaps even some of the     
existences composing it1 may rest upon  
powers of a noumenal order4 ,kant       
proceeds to show that such an hypothesis
 is not only allowable1 but is          
indispensable for understanding the     
distinguishing features of human life in
 its practical aspect4  ,man is a       
natural existence1 and his activities   
are subject to empirical laws4 ,like all
 other objects of nature1 he has an     
empirical character1 and in virtue of it
 takes his place as an integral part of 
the system of nature4 ,but man is unique
 among all natural existences in that he
 not only knows himself as a sensible   
existence1 but also1 through pure       
apperception1 becomes aware of himself  
as possessing faculties of a strictly   
intelligible character4#aehi ,such are  
the faculties of understanding and      
,reason1 especially the latter in its   
practical employment4 ,the 8ought0 of   
the moral imperative expresses a kind of

 necessity and a form of causation which
 we nowhere find in the world of nature4
 ,the understanding can know in nature  
only what actually is1 has been1 or will
 be4 ,nothing natural can be other than 
it is in the particular relations in    
which it is found4 ,moral action        
transcends the natural in that it finds 
its cause1 not in an appearance or set  
of appearances1 but in an ,ideal of pure
 ,reason4 ,such action must indeed be   
possible under natural conditions1 but  
such conditions do not determine its    
rightness1 and consequently cannot      
determine its causality4       8,reason 
444 does not here follow the order of   
things as they      present themselves  
in appearance1 but frames to itself with
 perfect      spontaneity an order of   
its own according to ,ideas1 to which it
      adapts the empirical conditions1  
and according to which it declares      
actions to be necessary even although   
they have never yet taken      place1   
and perhaps never will take place4 ,and 

at the same time it      also           
presupposes that ,reason can have       
causality in regard to all      these   
actions1 since otherwise no empirical   
effects could be      expected from its 
,ideas40#aeij  ,if such action of pure  
,reason be admitted to be possible1 it  
will have to be viewed1 purely          
intelligible though it be1 as also      
possessing an empirical character1 i4e4 
as conforming to the system of nature4  
,its empirical consequences will be the 
effects of antecedent appearances1 and  
will empirically determine by natural   
necessity all subsequent acts4 ,in this 
empirical character1 therefore1 there   
can be no freedom4 ,were our knowledge  
of the circumstances sufficiently       
extensive1 every human action1 so far as
 it is appearance1 could be predicted   
and shown to be necessary4 ,how1 then1  
can we talk of actions as free1 when    
from the point of view of appearances   
they must in all cases be regarded as   
inevitable8 ,the solution is that which 

has already been given of the broader   
issue4 ,the entire empirical character1 
the whole system of nature1 is          
determined by the intelligible          
character4 ,and the former results from 
the latter1 not empirically1 and        
therefore not according to any temporal1
 causal law4 ,it does not arise or begin
 at a certain time4 ,the intelligible   
character conditions the empirical      
series as a series1 and not as if it    
were a first member of it4       8,thus 
what we have missed in all empirical    
series is disclosed as      possible1   
namely1 that the condition of a         
successive series of      events may    
itself be empirically                   
unconditioned40#aeia  ,the intelligible 
character lies outside the series of    
appearances4 8,reason is the abiding    
7beharrliche7 condition of all free     
actions44440#aeib ,freedom ought not1   
therefore1 to be conceived only         
negatively as independence of empirical 
conditions1 but also positively as the  

power of originating a series of events4
 ,the empirical series is in time4      
,reason1 which is its unconditioned     
condition1 admits of nothing antecedent 
to itself2 it knows neither before nor  
after4 ,the series is the immediate     
effect of a non-temporal reality4  ,in  
illustration of his meaning1 not1 as he 
is careful to add1 with the profession  
of thereby confirming its truth1 ,kant  
points out that moral judgment upon a   
vicious action is not determined in view
 of the inheritance1 circumstances and  
past life of the offender1 but is passed
 just as if he might in each action be  
supposed to begin1 quite by himself1 a  
new series of effects4 ,this1 in ,kant's
 view1 shows that practical ,reason is  
regarded as a cause completely capable1 
independently of all empirical          
conditions1 of determining the act1 and 
that it is present in all the actions of
 men under all conditions1 and is always
 the same4 ,to explain why the          
intelligible character should in any    

specific case produce just this         
particular empirical character1 good or 
bad1       8444transcends all the powers
 of our ,reason1 indeed all its rights  
of questioning1 just as if we were to   
ask why the transcendental      object  
of our outer sense-intuition yields     
intuition in space      only and no     
other40#aeic  ,in conclusion ,kant      
states that his intention has not been  
to establish the reality of freedom1 not
 even to prove its possibility4 ,freedom
 has been dealt with only as a          
transcendental ,idea2 and the only point
 established is that freedom is1 so to  
speak1 a possible possibility1 in that  
it is not contradicted either by        
experience or by anything that can be   
proved to be a presupposition of        
experience4  ,comment4--,adequate       
comment upon this section is difficult  
for many reasons4 ,the section is full  
of archaic expressions from the earlier 
stages of ,kant's ,critical teaching4   
,secondly1 the section anticipates a    

problem which is first adequately dealt 
with in the second ,critique4 ,and      
lastly1 but not least1 the discussion of
 freedom in connection with a           
cosmological antinomy leads ,kant to    
treat it in the same manner as the      
general antinomy1 and in so doing to    
ignore the chief difficulty to which    
human freedom1 as an independent problem
 with its own peculiar difficulties1    
lies open4 ,for it is comparatively easy
 to reconcile the universality of the   
causal principle with the               
unconditionedness of the transcendental 
ground upon which nature as a whole is  
made to rest4 ,it is a very different   
matter to reconcile the spontaneous     
origination of particular causal series1
 or the freedom of particular           
existences1 such as human beings1 with  
the singleness and uniformity of a      
natural system in which every part is   
determined by every other4              
,self-consciousness1 with the capacity  
which it confers of constructing        

rational ideals1 certainly1 as ,kant    
rightly contends1 creates a situation to
 which mechanical categories are by no  
means adequate4 ,but the mere reference 
to the conceivability of distinct causal
 series1 having each a pure conception  
as their intelligible ground1 does not  
suffice to meet the fundamental         
difficulty that1 on ,kant's own         
admission1 each such separate series    
must form an integral part of the       
unitary system of natural law4 ,in only 
one passage does ,kant even touch upon  
this difficulty4 ,speaking#aeid of      
,reason's power of originating a series 
of events1 he adds that while nothing   
begins in ,reason itself 7as it admits  
of no conditions antecedent to itself in
 time71 the new series must none the    
less have a beginning in the natural    
world4 ,but the proviso1 which he at    
once makes1 indicates that he is aware  
that this statement is untenable4 ,for  
he adds the qualification that though a 
beginning of the series1 it is never an 

absolutely first beginning4 ,in other   
words1 it is not a beginning in any real
 sense of the term4 ,as the argument of 
his next paragraph shows1 it is the     
entire system of nature1 and not any one
 series within it1 which can alone      
account1 in empirical terms1 for any one
 action4  ,it is open to ,kant to argue1
 as he has already done1#aeie that the  
transcendental object conditions each   
separate appearance as well as all      
appearances in their totality1 and that 
the specific empirical character of each
 causal series is therefore no less     
noumenally conditioned than is nature as
 a whole4 ,but this does not suffice to 
meet the difficulty--how1 if all natural
 phenomena constitute a single closed   
system in which everything is determined
 by everything else1 a moral agent1     
acting spontaneously1 can be free to    
originate a genuinely new series of     
natural events4 ,we seem constrained to 
conclude that ,kant has failed to       
sustain his position4 ,a solution is    

rendered impossible by the very terms in
 which he formulates the problem4 ,if   
the spiritual and the natural be opposed
 to one another as the timeless and the 
temporal1 and if the natural be further 
viewed as a unitary system1 individual  
moral freedom is no longer defensible4  
,only the 8transcendental freedom0 of   
the cosmological argument can be        
reckoned as among the open              
possibilities4  ,as regards the         
character of the ,critical doctrine     
which underlies this section1 we need   
only note that the statement in ,a      
#edf-g  ,b #egd-e1 that man knows       
himself through pure apperception as 8a 
purely intelligible object10#aeif does  
not conform to ,kant's final teaching4  
,the section can be dated through its   
unwavering adherence to the subjectivist
 doctrine of the transcendental         
object4#aeig   ,,solution ,,of ,,the    
,,fourth ,,antinomy#aeih                
,statement4--,the above solution is     
adopted4 ,both thesis and antithesis may

 be true1 the latter of the world of    
sense and the former of its             
non-empirical ground4 ,all things       
sensible are contingent1 but the        
contingent series in its entirety may   
nevertheless rest upon an               
unconditionally necessary being4 ,the   
unconditioned1 since it is outside the  
series1 does not require that any one   
link in the series should be itself     
unconditioned4 8,reason follows its own 
course in the empirical1 and again a    
peculiar course in its transcendental   
use10 i4e4 it limits itself by the law  
of causality in dealing with            
appearances1 lest in losing the thread  
of the empirical conditions it should   
fall into idle and empty speculations2  
while1 on the other hand1 it limits that
 law to appearances1 lest it should     
wrongly declare that what is useless for
 the explanation of appearances is      
therefore impossible in itself4 ,this   
does not prove that an absolutely       
necessary being is really possible1 but 

only that its impossibility must not be 
concluded from the necessary contingency
 of all things sensuous4                
,comment4--,kant's method of            
distinguishing#aeii this conclusion from
 that of the preceding antinomy is again
 artificial4 8,necessary being0 is not  
in conception more extramundanum than   
8unconditioned cause40 ,if ,kant's      
distinction were valid1 the argument of 
the fourth antinomy would no longer be  
cosmological2 it would coincide with the
 problem of the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason4
   ,,concluding ,,note ,,on ,,the       
,,whole ,,antinomy ,,of ,,pure          
,,reason#afjj  ,statement4--,when we    
seek the unconditioned entirely beyond  
experience1 our ,ideas cease to be      
cosmological2 they become transcendent4 
,they separate themselves off from all  
empirical use of the understanding1 and 
create to themselves an object1 the     
material of which is not taken from     
experience1 and which is therefore a    
mere thing of the mind 7blosses         

,gedankending74 ,none the less the      
cosmological ,idea of the fourth        
antinomy impels us to take this step4   
,when sensuous appearances1 as merely   
contingent1 require us to look for      
something altogether distinct in nature 
from them1 our only available           
instruments1 in so doing1 are those pure
 concepts of things in general which    
contingent experience involves4 ,we use 
them as instruments in such manner as   
may enable us to form1 through analogy1 
some kind of notion of intelligible     
things4 ,taken in abstraction from the  
forms of sense1 they yield that notion  
of an absolutely necessary ,being which 
is equivalent to the concept of the     
theological ,ideal4   ,,concluding      
,,comment ,,on ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,of
 ,,the ,,antinomies  ,we may now1 in    
conclusion1 briefly summarise the       
results obtained in this chapter4 ,kant 
fails to justify the assertion that on  
the dogmatic level there exist          
antinomies in which both the            

contradictory alternatives allow of     
cogent demonstration4 ,his proofs are in
 every instance invalid4 ,the real      
nature of antinomy must1 as he himself  
occasionally intimates1 be defined in a 
very different manner1 namely1 as a     
conflict between the demand of ,reason  
for unity and system1 and the specific  
nature of the conditions1 especially of 
the spatial and temporal conditions1    
under which the sensuous exists4 ,in    
this wider form it constitutes a genuine
 problem1 which demands for its solution
 the fundamental ,critical distinction  
between appearances and                 
things-in-themselves1 and also a more   
thoroughgoing discussion than has yet   
been attempted of the nature of ,reason 
and of the function of its ,ideas4 ,it  
is to these connected questions that    
,kant devotes his main attention in the 
remaining portions of the ,dialectic1 so
 that in passing to the ,ideal of ,pure 
,reason he is not proceeding to the     
treatment of a new set of problems1 but 

to the restatement and to the more      
adequate solution of the fundamental    
conflict between understanding and      
,reason4  ,the observations which closed
 our comment upon the ,paralogisms are  
thus again in order4 ,the teaching of   
the sections on the ,antinomies1 no less
 than that of those on the ,paralogisms1
 is incomplete1 and if taken by itself  
is bound to mislead4 ,the ,ideas of an  
unconditioned self and of an            
unconditioned ground of nature have thus
 far been taken as at least conceptually
 possible1 and as signifying what may   
perhaps be real existences4 ,these      
,ideas are in certain of the remaining  
sections of the ,dialectic called in    
question4 ,they are there declared to be
 without inherent meaning4 ,they are    
useful fictions--heuristische           
,fiktionen--and in their psychological  
nature are simply schemata of regulative
 principles4 ,their theoretical         
significance consists merely in their   
regulative and limitative functions4    

,they must not be regarded1 even        
hypothetically1 as representing real    
existences4 ,in the practical 7i4e4     
ethical7 sphere they do indeed acquire a
 very different standing4 ,but with that
 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is not  
directly concerned4 ,the reader may     
therefore be warned not to omit the     
chapter on the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason1 
on the supposition that it embodies only
 a criticism of the ,cartesian and      
teleological proofs of ,god's existence4
 ,it is an integral part of ,critical   
teaching1 and carries ,kant's entire    
argument forward to its final           
conclusions4 ,only in view of the new   
and deeper considerations1 which it     
brings to light1 can his treatment even 
of the ,antinomies be properly          
understood4 ,its main opening section   
7,section ,,ii47 is1 indeed1 among the  
most scholastically rationalistic in the
 entire ,critique2 but in the later     
sections it unfolds1 with a boldness and
 consistency to which we find no        

parallel in the treatment of the        
,paralogisms and of the ,antinomies1 the
 full consequences of the more sceptical
 of ,kant's alternating standpoints4 ,it
 disintegrates the concepts of the      
unconditioned1 which have hitherto been 
employed without analysis and without   
question2 and upon their elimination    
from among the legitimate instruments of
 ,reason1 the situation undergoes entire
 transformation1 the two points of view 
appearing for the first time in the full
 extent of their divergence and         
conflict4 ,for ,kant's ,idealist view of
 ,reason and of its ,ideas still        
continues to find occasional statement1 
showing that he has not been able       
decisively to commit himself to this    
more sceptical interpretation of the    
function of ,reason2 that he is         
conscious that the ,idealist view alone 
gives adequate expression to certain    
fundamental considerations which have to
 be reckoned with2 and that unless the  
two views can in some manner be         

reconciled with one another1 a really   
definitive and satisfactory solution of 
the problem has not been reached4 ,when1
 therefore1 we speak of ,kant's final   
conclusions1 we must be taken as        
referring to the twofold tendencies1    
sceptical and ,idealist1 which to the   
very last persist in competition with   
one another4 ,the greater adequacy of   
,kant's argument in the chapter on the  
,ideal of ,pure ,reason and in the      
important ,appendix attached to the     
,dialectic consists in its forcible and 
considered exposition of both attitudes4
 ,most of the sections on the           
,antinomies must1 as we have seen1 be   
dated as among the earliest parts of the
 ,critique4 ,their teaching is          
correspondingly immature4 ,the chapter  
on the ,ideal and the ,appendix1 on the 
other hand1 were among the latest to be 
written1 and contain1 together with the 
central portions of the ,analytic1 our  
most authoritative exposition of ,kant's
 ,critical principles4     ,,chapter    

,,iii  ,,the ,,ideal ,,of ,,pure        
,,reason   ,,sections ,i and ,,ii  ,,the
 ,,transcendental ,,ideal#afja  ,the    
statements of the first section cannot  
profitably be commented upon at this    
stage2 they are of a merely general     
character4#afjb ,i pass at once to      
,section ,,ii41 which1 as above stated1 
is quite the most archaic piece of      
rationalistic argument in the entire    
,critique4 ,it is not merely            
,leibnizian1 but ,wolffian in character4
 ,for ,kant the ,wolffian logic had an  
old-time flavour and familiarity that   
rendered it by no means distasteful2 and
 he is here1 as it were1 recalling1 not 
altogether without sympathy1 the lessons
 of his student years4 ,they enable him 
to render definite1 by way of contrast1 
the outcome of his own ,critical        
teaching4  ,as ,kant here restates the  
,wolffian notion of the ,ens realissimum
 in such fashion as is required to make 
it conform to his deduction of the      
theological ,idea from the disjunctive  

syllogism1 a preliminary statement of   
the more orthodox formulation will help 
to set ,wolff's doctrine in a clearer   
light4 ,in so doing1 ,i shall follow    
,baumgarten1 whose ,metaphysica ,kant   
used as a class text-book4 ,briefly     
summarised ,baumgarten's statement is as
 follows4#afjc ,the ,ens perfectissimum 
is that ,being which possesses as many  
predicates1 i4e4 perfections1 as can    
possibly exist together in a single     
thing1 and in which every one of its    
perfections is as great as is anywhere  
possible4 ,this most perfect ,being must
 be a real ,being1 and its reality must 
be the greatest possible4 ,it is that in
 which the most and the greatest        
realities are4 ,but all realities are   
affirmative determinations1 and no      
denial is a reality4 ,accordingly no    
reality can contradict another reality1 
and all realities can exist together in 
the same thing4 ,the ,ens               
perfectissimum1 in possessing all the   
realities that can exist together1 must 

therefore possess all realities without 
exception1 and every one of them in the 
highest degree4 ,the notion of an       
individual existence that is at once    
perfectissimum and also realissimum is  
thus determinable by pure ,reason from  
its internal resources4 ,it is the      
ground and condition of all other       
existences2 all of them arise through   
limitation of its purely positive       
nature4  ,kant seeks to justify his     
metaphysical deduction of the ,ideal    
from the disjunctive syllogism1 by      
recasting the above argument in the     
following manner4 ,since everything     
which exists is completely determined1  
it is subject to the principle of       
complete determination1 according to    
which one of each of the possible pairs 
of contradictory predicates must be     
applicable to it4 ,to be completely     
determined the thing must be compared   
with the sum total of all possible      
predicates4 ,although this idea of the  
sum total of all possible predicates1   

through reference to which alone any    
concept can be completely determined1   
seems itself indeterminate1 we find     
nevertheless on closer examination that 
it individualises itself a priori1      
transforming itself into the concept of 
an individual existence that is         
completely determined by the mere ,idea1
 and which may therefore be called an   
,ideal of pure ,reason4 ,that is proved 
as follows4 ,no one can definitely think
 a negation unless he founds it on the  
opposite affirmation4 ,a man completely 
blind cannot frame the smallest         
conception of darkness1 because he has  
none of light4 ,all negations are       
therefore derivative2 it is the         
realities which contain the material by 
which a complete determination of       
anything becomes possible4 ,the source1 
from which all possible predicates may  
be derived1 can be nothing but the sum  
total of reality4 ,and this concept of  
the omnitudo realitatis is the ,idea of 
a ,being that is single and individual4 

,as all finite beings derive the        
material of their possibility from it1  
they presuppose it1 and cannot1         
therefore1 constitute it4 ,they are     
imperfect copies 7ectypa71 of which it  
is the sole ,ideal4 ,the ,idea is also  
individual4 ,out of each possible pair  
of contradictory predicates1 that one   
which expresses reality belongs to it4  
,by these infinitely numerous positive  
predicates it is determined to absolute 
concreteness2 and as it therefore       
possesses all that has reality1 not only
 in nature but in man1 it must be       
conceived as a personal and intelligent 
,primordial ,being4 ,the logical ,ideal1
 thus determining itself completely by  
its own concept1 appears not only as    
ideal but also as real1 not only as     
logical but also as divine4  ,kant so   
far anticipates his criticism of the    
ontological argument as to give1 in the 
remaining paragraphs of this second     
section1 a preliminary criticism of this
 procedure4 ,for the purpose for which  

the ,ideal is postulated1 namely1 the   
determination of all finite and         
therefore limited existences1 ,reason   
does not require to presuppose an       
existence corresponding to it4 ,its mere
 ,idea will suffice4       8,all        
manifoldness of things is only a        
correspondingly varied mode      of     
limiting the concept of the highest     
reality which forms their      common   
substratum1 just as all figures are only
 possible as so many      different     
modes of limiting infinite space40#afjd 
,this relation is not1 however1 that of 
a real existence to other things but of 
an ,idea to concepts4 ,the ,idea is a   
mere fiction1 necessary for             
comprehending the limited1 not a reality
 that can be asserted1 even             
hypothetically1#afje as given along with
 the limited4 ,none the less1 owing to a
 natural transcendental illusion1 the   
mind inevitably tends to hypostatise it1
 and so generates the object of rational
 theology4  ,comment4--,the explanation 

of this illusion1 which ,kant proceeds  
to give in the two concluding           
paragraphs1 is peculiarly confusing4    
,though the concept of an               
all-comprehensive reality may1 he       
argues1 be required for the definition  
of sensible objects1 such a concept must
 not for that reason be taken as        
representing a real existence4 ,the     
teaching of the section on ,amphiboly is
 here entirely ignored2 and the reader  
is bewildered by the assumption1 which  
,kant apparently makes1 that something  
analogous to the ,leibnizian ,ideal is a
 prerequisite of possible experience4   
,these last remarks indicate the kind of
 criticism to which the argument of this
 section lays itself open4 ,in          
expounding the teaching of the          
,leibnizian science of rational         
theology1 ,kant strives to represent its
 ,ideal as being an inevitable ,idea of 
human ,reason2 and in order to make this
 argument at all convincing he is       
constrained to treat as valid the       

presupposed ontology1 though that has   
already been shown in the discussion of 
,amphiboly to be altogether             
untenable4#afjf ,limitation is not      
merely negative2 genuine realities may  
negate one another4 ,though the objects 
of sense presuppose the entire system to
 which they belong1 the form of this    
presupposition is in no respect         
analogous to that which ,wolff would    
represent as holding between finite     
existences and the ,ens realissimum4    
,the passage in the ,analytic#afjg in   
which ,kant directly controverts the    
above teaching is as follows3           
8,the principle1 that realities 7as pure
 assertions7 never logically            
contradict each other 444 has not the   
least meaning either in      regard to  
nature or in regard to any              
thing-in-itself4444 ,although      ,herr
 von ,leibniz did not1 indeed1 announce 
this proposition with      all the pomp 
of a new principle1 he yet made use of  
it for new      assertions1 and his     

followers expressly incorporated it in  
their      ,leibnizian-,wolffian system4
 ,according to this principle all evils1
      for instance1 are merely          
consequences of the limitations of      
created      beings1 i4e4 negations1    
because negations alone conflict with   
reality4444 ,similarly his disciples    
consider it not only possible1      but 
even natural1 to combine all reality1   
without fear of any      conflict1 in   
one being1 because the only conflict    
which they      recognise is that of    
contradiction1 whereby the concept of a 
thing      is itself removed4 ,they do  
not admit the conflict of reciprocal    
injury in which each of two real grounds
 destroys the effect of the             
other--a process which we can represent 
to ourselves only in terms      of      
conditions presented to us in           
sensibility40  ,thus the ,ideal which   
,kant here declares to be a necessary   
,idea of ,reason is denounced in the    
,analytic as based on false principles  

peculiar to the ,leibnizian philosophy1 
and as 8without the least meaning in    
regard either to nature or to any thing 
in itself40 ,the teaching of the        
,analytic will no more combine with this
 scholastic rationalism than oil with   
water4 ,the reader may safely absolve   
himself from the thankless task of      
attempting to render ,kant's            
argumentation in these paragraphs       
consistent with itself4 ,fortunately1 in
 the next section1 ,kant returns to the 
standpoint proper to the doctrine he is 
expounding1 and lays bare1 with         
remarkable subtlety and in a very       
convincing manner1 the concealed        
dialectic by which the conclusions of   
this metaphysical science are really    
determined4#afjh   ,,section ,,iii      
,,the ,,speculative ,,arguments ,,in    
,,proof ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,a  
,,supreme ,,being#afji                  
,statement4--,though the ,ideal is not  
arbitrary1 but is presupposed in every  
attempt to define completely a finite   

concept1 ,reason would feel hesitation  
in thus transforming what is merely a   
logical concept into a ,divine          
,existence1 were it not that it is      
impelled from another direction to      
derive reality from such a source4 ,all 
existences known in experience are      
contingent1 and so lead us 7owing to the
 constitution of our ,reason7 to assume 
an absolutely necessary ,being as their 
ground and cause4 ,now when we examine  
our various concepts1 to ascertain which
 will cover this notion of necessary    
existence1 we find that there is one    
that possesses outstanding claims1      
namely1 that ,idea which contains a     
therefore for every wherefore1 which is 
in no respect defective1 and which does 
not permit us to postulate any          
condition4 ,the concepts of the ,ideal  
and of the necessary alone represent the
 unconditioned2 and as they agree in    
this fundamental respect1 they must1 we 
therefore argue1 be identical4 ,and to  
this conclusion we are the more         

inclined1 in that1 by thus idealising   
reality1 we are at the same time enabled
 to realise our ,ideal4  ,this line of  
argument1 which starts from the         
contingent1 is as little valid as that  
which proceeds directly from the ,ideal4
 ,but since these arguments express     
certain tendencies inherent in the human
 mind1 they have a vitality which       
survives any merely forensic refutation4
 ,though the conclusions to which they  
lead are false1 they are none the less  
inevitably drawn4 ,our acceptance of    
them is due to a transcendental illusion
 which may be detected as such1 but     
which1 like the ingrained illusions of  
sense-experience1 must none the less    
persist4  ,the opening paragraph of     
,section ,v#afaj is the natural         
completion of the above analysis4 ,the  
ontological argument1 in starting from  
the concept of the ,ens realissimum1    
inverts the natural procedure4 ,it is 8a
 merely scholastic innovation10 and     
would never have been attempted save for

 the need of finding some necessary     
,being1 to which we may ascend from     
contingent existence4 ,it maintains that
 this necessary ,being must be          
unconditioned and a priori certain1 and 
accordingly looks for a concept capable 
of fulfilling this requirement4 ,such a 
concept is supposed to exist in the     
,idea of an ,ens realissimum1 and this  
,idea is therefore used to gain more    
definite knowledge of that which has    
been previously and independently       
recognised1 namely1 the necessary       
,being1       8,this natural procedure  
of ,reason was concealed from view1 and 
instead of ending with this concept1 the
 attempt was made to begin      with it1
 and so to deduce from it that necessity
 of existence which      it was only    
fitted to complete4 ,thus arose the     
unfortunate      ontological proof1     
which yields satisfaction neither to the
 natural      and healthy understanding 
nor to the more academic demands of     
strict proof40#afaa  ,to return to      

,section ,,iii43 ,kant breaks the       
continuity of his argument1 and         
anticipates his discussion of the       
cosmological proof1 by stopping to point
 out the illegitimacy of the assumption 
which underlies the first step in the   
above argument1 namely1 that a limited  
being cannot be absolutely necessary4   
,though the concept of a limited being  
does not contain the unconditioned1 that
 does not prove that its existence is   
conditioned4 ,indeed each and every     
limited being may1 for all their        
concepts show to the contrary1 be       
unconditionally necessary4#afab ,the    
above argument is consequently          
inconclusive1 and cannot be relied on to
 give us any concept whatever of the    
qualities of a necessary ,being4 ,but   
this is a merely logical defect1 and1 as
 already noted1 it is not really upon   
logical cogency that the persuasive     
force of the argument depends4  ,in     
conclusion ,kant points out that there  
are only three possible kinds of        

speculative 7i4e4 theoretical7 proofs of
 the existence of ,god3 7#a7 from       
definite experience and the specific    
nature of the world of sense as revealed
 in experience2 7#b7 from indefinite    
experience1 i4e4 from the fact that any 
existence at all is empirically given2  
7#c7 the non-empirical a priori proof   
from mere concepts4 ,the first is the   
physico-theological or teleological     
argument1 the second is the             
cosmological1 and the third is the      
ontological4 ,kant finds it advisable to
 reverse the order of the proofs1 and to
 begin by consideration of the          
ontological argument4 ,this would seem  
to indicate that the #8scholastic       
innovation' to which he traces the      
origin of the ontological proof has more
 justification than his remarks appear  
to allow4   ,,section ,,iv  ,,the       
,,impossibility ,,of ,,an ,,ontological 
,,proof#afac  ,statement4--,hitherto    
,kant has employed the concept of an    
absolutely necessary ,being without     

question4 ,he now recognises that the   
problem1 from which we ought to start1  
is not whether the existence of an      
absolutely necessary ,being can be      
demonstrated1 but whether1 and how1 such
 a ,being can even be conceived4 ,and   
upon analysis he discovers that the     
assumed notion of an absolutely         
necessary1 i4e4 unconditioned ,being is 
entirely lacking in intelligible        
content4 ,for in eliminating all        
conditioning causes--through which alone
 the understanding can conceive         
necessity of existence--we also remove  
this particular kind of necessity4 ,a   
verbal definition may1 indeed1 be given 
of the ,idea1 as when we say that it    
represents something the non-existence  
of which is impossible4 ,but this yields
 no insight into the reasons which make 
its non-existence inconceivable1 and    
such insight is required if anything at 
all is to be thought in the ,idea4      
8,the expedient of removing all those   
conditions which the      understanding 

indispensably requires in order to      
regard something      as necessary1     
simply through the introduction of the  
word      unconditioned1 is very far    
from sufficing to show whether ,i am    
still thinking anything1 or not rather  
perhaps nothing at all1 in      the     
concept of the unconditionally          
necessary40#afad  ,the untenableness of 
the concept has been in large part      
concealed through a confusion between   
logical and ontological necessity1 that 
is1 between necessity of judgment and   
necessity of existence4 ,the fact that  
every proposition of geometry must be   
regarded as absolutely necessary was    
supposed to justify this identification4
 ,it was not observed that logical      
necessity refers only to judgments1 not 
to things and their relations1 and that 
the absolute necessity of the judgment  
holds only upon the assumption that the 
conditioned necessity of the thing      
referred to has previously been granted4
 ,if there be any such thing as a       

triangle1 the assertion that it has     
three angles will follow with absolute  
necessity2 but the existence of a       
triangle or even of space in general is 
contingent4 ,in other words1 the        
asserted necessity is only a form of    
logical sequence1 not the unconditioned 
necessity of existence which is supposed
 to be disclosed in the ,idea of        
,reason4 ,all judgments1 so far as they 
refer to existence1 as distinct from    
mere possibility1 are hypothetical1 and 
serve to define a reality that is only  
contingently given4 ,in adopting this   
position1 ,kant is in entire agreement  
with ,hume4 ,the contradictory of a     
matter of fact is always thinkable4     
,there has1 ,kant claims1 been no more  
fruitful source of illusion throughout  
the whole history of philosophy than the
 belief in an absolute necessity that is
 purely logical4#afae ,in the           
ontological argument we have the most   
striking instance of such rationalistic 
exaggeration of the powers of thought4  

,comment4--,had this criticism of the   
,idea of unconditioned necessity been   
introduced at an earlier stage in       
,kant's argument1 much confusion would  
have been avoided4 ,it involves the     
thorough revisal of his criticism of the
 third and fourth antinomies1 as well as
 of the whole account hitherto given of 
the function of ,reason and of its      
metaphysical dialectic4 ,the principle1 
that if the conditioned be given1 the   
whole series of conditions up to the    
unconditioned is likewise given1 must no
 longer be accepted as a basis for      
argument4 ,indeed the very terms in     
which ,reason has so far been defined1  
as the faculty of the unconditioned1    
become subject to question4 ,in that    
definition the term unconditioned has   
tacitly been taken as equivalent to the 
unconditionally necessary1 and on       
elimination of the element of necessity1
 it will reduce merely to the concept of
 totality1 which is a pure form of the  
understanding4 ,those parts of the      

,dialectic1 which embody the view that  
,reason is simply the understanding     
transcendently employed1 will thus be   
confirmed2 the alternative view of      
,reason as a separate faculty will have 
to be eliminated4 ,but these are        
questions which ,kant himself proceeds  
to raise and discuss4#afaf ,meantime he 
applies the above results in criticism  
of the ontological argument4            
,statement4--,in an identical judgment  
it is contradictory to reject the       
predicate while retaining the subject4  
,but there is no contradiction if we    
reject subject and predicate alike1 for 
nothing is then left that can be        
contradicted4 ,if we assume that there  
is a triangle1 we are bound to recognise
 that it has three angles1 but there is 
no contradiction in rejecting the       
triangle together with its three angles4
 ,the same holds true of an absolutely  
necessary ,being4 #8,god is omnipotent' 
is an identical and therefore necessary 
judgment4 ,but if we say1 #8,there is no

 ,god1' neither the omnipotence nor any 
other attribute remains2 and there is   
therefore not the least contradiction in
 saying that ,god does not exist4 ,the  
only way of evading this conclusion is  
to argue that there are subjects which  
cannot be removed out of existence4     
,that1 however1 would only be another   
way of asserting that there exist       
absolutely necessary subjects1 and that 
is the very assertion which is now in   
question1 and which the ontological     
argument undertakes to prove4 ,our sole 
test of what cannot be removed is the   
contradiction which would thereby       
result2 and the only possible instance  
which can be cited is the concept of the
 ,ens realissimum4 ,it remains1         
therefore1 to establish the above       
criticism for this specific case4  ,at  
the start ,kant points out that absence 
of internal contradiction1 even if      
granted1 proves only that the ,ens      
realissimum is a logically possible     
concept 7as distinguished from the nihil

 negativum#afag72 it does not suffice to
 establish the possibility of the object
 of the concept4 ,but for the sake of   
argument ,kant allows this initial      
assumption to pass4 ,the argument to be 
disproved is that as reality comprehends
 existence1 existence is contained in   
the concept of ,ens realissimum1 and    
cannot therefore be denied of it without
 removing its internal possibility4 ,the
 really fundamental assumption of this  
argument is that existence is capable of
 being included in the concept of a     
possible being4 ,if that were so1 the   
assertion of its existence would be an  
analytic proposition1 and the proof     
could not be challenged4 7,the          
assumption is partly concealed by       
alternation of the terms reality and    
existence3 in their actual employment   
they are completely synonymous47 ,as the
 above assumption thus decides the      
entire issue1 ,kant sets himself to     
establish1 in direct opposition to it1  
the thesis1 that every proposition which

 predicates existence is synthetic1 and 
that in consequence its denial can never
 involve a logical contradiction4       
,existence can never form part of the   
content of a conception1 and therefore  
must not be regarded as a possible      
predicate4 ,what logically corresponds  
to it in a judgment is a purely formal  
factor1 namely1 the copula4 ,the        
proposition1 #8,god is omnipotent1'     
contains two concepts1 each of which has
 its object--,god and omnipotence4 ,the 
word #8is' adds no new predicate1 but   
only serves to posit the predicate in   
its relation to the subject4 ,similarly1
 when we take the subject together with 
all its predicates 7including that of   
omnipotence71 and say1 #8,god is' or    
#8there is a ,god1' we attach no new    
predicate to the concept of ,god1 but   
only posit the subject in itself with   
all its predicates as being an object   
that stands in relation to our concept4 
,in order that the proposition be true1 
the content of the object and of the    

concept must be one and the same4 ,if   
the object contained more than the      
concept1 the concept would not express  
the object1 and the proposition would   
assert a relation that does not hold4   
,or to state the same point in another  
way1 the real must not contain more     
content than the possible4 ,otherwise it
 would not be the possible1 but         
something different from the possible1  
which would then be taken as existing4  
,a hundred real thalers do not contain  
the least coin more than a hundred      
possible thalers4 ,though my financial  
position is very differently affected by
 a hundred real thalers than by the     
thought of them only1 a conceived       
hundred thalers are not in the least    
increased through acquiring existence   
outside my concept4  ,kant presents his 
argument in still another form4 ,if we  
think in a thing every kind of reality  
except one1 the missing reality is not  
supplied by my saying that this         
defective thing exists4 ,on the         

contrary1 it exists with the same defect
 with which ,i have thought it4 ,when1  
therefore1 ,i think a ,being as the     
highest reality1 without any defect1 the
 question still remains whether it      
exists or not4 ,for though1 in my       
concept1 nothing may be lacking of the  
possible real content of a thing in     
general1 something is still lacking in  
its relation to my whole state of       
thinking1 namely1 knowledge of its      
existence2 and such knowledge can never 
be obtained save in an a posteriori     
manner4 ,that is owing to the           
limitations imposed by the conditions of
 our sense-experience4 ,we never        
confound the existence of a sensible    
object with its mere concept4 ,the      
concept represents something that may or
 may not exist3 to determine existence  
we must refer to actual experience4 ,as 
,kant has already stated1 the actual is 
always for us the accidental1 and its   
assertion is therefore synthetic4 ,a    
possible idea and the idea of a possible

 thing are quite distinct4#afah ,a thing
 is known to be possible only when      
presented in some concrete experience1  
or when1 though not actually            
experienced1 it has been proved to be   
bound up1 according to empirical laws1  
with given perceptions4 ,it is not1     
therefore1 surprising that if we try1 as
 is done in the ontological argument1 to
 think existence through the pure       
category1 we cannot mention a single    
mark distinguishing it from a merely    
logical possibility4 ,the concept of a  
,supreme ,being is1 in many respects1 a 
valuable ,idea1 but just because it is  
an ,idea of pure ,reason1 i4e4 a mere   
,idea1 we can no more extend our        
knowledge of real existence by means of 
it1 than a merchant can better his      
position by adding a few noughts to his 
cash account4  ,there are many points of
 connection between this section and the
 first edition ,introduction2 and in    
view of these points of contact ,adickes
 has suggested#afai that the            

considerations which arose in the       
examination of the ontological argument 
may have been what brought ,kant to     
realise that the various problems of the
 ,critique can all be traced to the     
central problem of a priori synthesis4  
,,section ,v  ,,the ,,impossibility ,,of
 ,a ,,cosmological ,,proof ,,of ,,the   
,,existence ,,of ,,god#afbj             
,statement4--,kant1 as already noted1   
views the ontological proof as #8a mere 
innovation of scholastic wisdom' which  
restates1 in a quite unnatural form1 a  
line of thought much more adequately    
expressed in the cosmological proof4 ,to
 discover the natural dialectic of      
,reason we must therefore look to this  
latter form of argument4 ,it is composed
 of two distinct stages4 ,in the first  
stage it makes no use of specific       
experience3 if anything is given us as  
existing1 e4g4 the self1 there must     
exist an absolutely necessary ,being as 
its cause4 ,then1 in the second stage1  
it is argued that as such a ,being must 

be altogether outside experience1       
,reason must leave experience entirely  
aside1 and discover from among pure     
concepts what properties an absolutely  
necessary ,being ought to possess1 i4e4 
which among all possible things contains
 in itself the conditions of absolute   
necessity4 ,the requisite enlightenment 
is believed by ,reason to be derivable  
only from the concept of an ,ens        
realissimum1 and ,reason therefore at   
once concludes that this concept must   
represent the absolutely necessary      
,being4  ,now in that final conclusion  
the truth of the ontological argument is
 assumed4 ,if the concept of a ,being of
 the highest reality is so completely   
adequate to the concept of necessary    
existence that they can be regarded as  
identical1 the latter must be capable of
 being derived from the former1 and that
 is all that is maintained in the       
ontological proof4 ,to make this point  
clearer1 ,kant states it in scholastic  
form4 ,if the proposition be true1 that 

every absolutely necessary ,being is at 
the same time the most real ,being 7and 
this is the nervus probandi of the      
cosmological proof in so far as it is   
also theological71 it must1 like all    
affirmative propositions1 be capable of 
conversion1 at least per accidens4 ,this
 gives us the proposition that some     
,entia realissima are at the same time  
absolutely necessary ,beings4 ,one ,ens 
realissimum1 however1 does not differ   
from another1 and what applies to one   
applies to all4 ,in this case1          
therefore1 we must employ simple        
conversion1 and say that every ,ens     
realissimum is a necessary ,being4 ,thus
 the cosmological proof is not only as  
illusory as the ontological1 but also   
less honest4 ,while pretending to lead  
us by a new road to a sound conclusion1 
it brings us back1 after a short        
circuit1 into the old path4 ,if the     
ontological argument is correct1 the    
cosmological is superfluous2 and if the 
ontological is false1 the cosmological  

cannot possibly be true4  ,but the first
 stage of the cosmological argument1    
that by which it is distinguished from  
the ontological1 is itself fallacious4  
,a whole nest of dialectical assumptions
 lies hidden in its apparently simple   
and legitimate inference from the       
contingent to the necessary4 ,to advance
 from the contingent to the necessary1  
from the relative to the absolute1 from 
the given to the transcendent1 is just  
as illegitimate as the opposite process 
of passing from ,idea to existence4 ,the
 necessity of thought1 which is in both 
cases the sole ground of the inference1 
is found on examination to be of merely 
subjective character4 ,no less than     
three false assumptions are involved in 
this inference4 ,in the first place1 the
 principle that everything must have a  
cause1 which can be proved to be valid  
only within the world of sense1 is here 
applied to the sensible world as a      
whole2 and is therefore employed in the 
wider form which coincides with the     

fundamental principle of the higher     
faculty of ,reason4 ,we assume1 that if 
the conditioned be given1 the totality  
of its conditions up to the             
unconditioned is given likewise4 ,no    
such principle can be granted4 ,as it is
 synthetic1 it could be established only
 as a condition of the possibility of   
experience4 ,but no such proof is       
offered3 the principle is based upon a  
purely intellectual concept4 ,secondly1 
the inference to a first cause rests on 
the kindred assumption that an infinite 
series of empirical causes is           
impossible4 ,that conclusion can never  
be drawn1 even within the realm of      
experience4 ,how1 then1 can we rely upon
 it in advancing beyond experience8     
,certainly1 no one can prove that the   
empirical series is infinite1 but just  
as little can we establish the opposite4
 ,in discussing the third and fourth    
antinomies ,kant has shown that the     
existence of a first cause or of an     
absolutely necessary ,being1 though     

possible 7or rather1 possibly possible71
 is never demonstrable4 ,thirdly--as has
 been shown in ,a #eib-c  ,b #fbj-a--;in
 inferring to an unconditioned cause1 it
 is blindly assumed that the removal of 
all conditions does not at the same time
 remove the very concept of necessity4  
,our only notion of necessity is derived
 from experience1 and therefore depends 
on those finite conditions which the    
argument would deny to us4 ,the concept 
of unconditioned necessity is entirely  
null and void4  ,the fourth defect1     
which ,kant enumerates1 refers to the   
second stage of the cosmological        
argument1 and has already been          
considered4 ,he ought also to have      
mentioned a still further assumption    
underlying its first stage1 namely1 that
 a concept which represents a limited   
being1 as1 for instance1 that of matter1
 cannot represent necessary existence4  
,this also is an assumption which it    
cannot justify4 ,this objection ,kant   
has himself stated in ,a #ehf  ,b #fad  

and ,a #ehh  ,b #faf4afba               
,comment4--,we are apt to overlook the  
wider sweep which ,kant's criticism     
takes in this section1 owing to his     
omission to notify the reader that he is
 here calling in question a principle   
which he has hitherto been taking for   
granted1 namely1 the principle in terms 
of which he has in the opening sections 
of the ,dialectic defined the faculty of
 ,reason1 that if the conditioned be    
given the totality of conditions up to  
the unconditioned is given likewise4    
,the first step in his rejection of this
 principle occurs as merely incidental  
to his criticism of the ontological     
argument4 ,it is there shown that the   
concept of the unconditionally necessary
 is without meaning4 ,now1 in this      
present section1 he calls in question   
the principle itself4 ,it must be       
rejected not only1 as stated in the     
third of the above objections1 because  
the concept of the unconditioned1 which 
tacitly implies the factor of absolute  

necessity1 is without real significance1
 but also for two further reasons--those
 above cited in the first and second    
objections4 ,how very differently the   
problems of the ,dialectic appear1 and  
how very differently the ,ideas of      
,reason have to be regarded1 when this  
principle1 and also the concept of the  
unconditioned of which it is the        
application1 are thus called in         
question1 will be shown in the sequel4  
,,discovery ,,and ,,explanation ,,of    
,,the ,,transcendental ,,illusion ,,in  
,,all ,,transcendental ,,proofs ,,of    
,,the ,,existence ,,of ,a ,,necessary   
,,being#afbb  ,statement4--,we do not   
properly fulfil the task prescribed by  
,critical teaching in merely disproving 
the cosmological argument4 ,we must also
 explain its hold upon the mind4 ,if it 
is1 as ,kant insists1 more natural to   
the mind than the ontological1 and yet1 
as we have just seen1 is more           
fallacious2 if it has not been invented 
by philosophers1 but is the instinctive 

reasoning of the natural man1 it must   
rest1 like all dialectical illusion1    
upon a misunderstanding of the          
legitimate demands of pure ,reason4     
,reason demands the unconditioned1 and  
yet cannot think it4                    
8,unconditioned necessity1 which we so  
indispensably require as the      last  
bearer of all things1 is for human      
,reason the veritable      abyss4444 ,we
 can neither help thinking1 nor can we  
bear the      thought1 that a           
,being--even if it be the one which we  
represent to      ourselves as supreme  
amongst all ,beings--should1 as it were1
 say to      itself3 #8,i am from       
eternity to eternity1 and outside me    
there is      nothing save what is      
through my will2 but whence am ,i8' ,all
      support here fails us2 and supreme
 perfection1 no less than the      least
 perfection1 is unsubstantial and       
baseless for the merely      speculative
 ,reason44440#afbc  ,we are obliged to  
think something as necessary for all    

existence1 and yet at the same time are 
unable to think anything as in itself   
necessary--,god as little as anything   
else4  ,the explanation#afbd of this    
strange fact must be that which follows 
as a corollary from the limitation of   
our knowledge to sense-experience1      
namely1 that our concepts of necessity  
and contingency do not concern things in
 themselves1 and cannot therefore be    
applied to them in accordance with      
either of the two possible alternatives4
 ,each alternative must express a       
subjective principle of ,reason2 and the
 two together 7that something exists by 
necessity1 and that everything is only  
contingent7 must form complementary     
rules for the guidance of the           
understanding4 ,these rules will then be
 purely heuristic and regulative1       
relating only to the formal interests of
 ,reason1 and may well stand side by    
side4 ,for the one tells us that we     
ought to philosophise as if there were a
 necessary first ground for everything  

that exists1 i4e4 that we ought to be   
always dissatisfied with relativity and 
contingency1 and to seek always for what
 is unconditionally necessary4 ,the     
other warns us against regarding any    
single determination in things 7such1   
for instance1 as impenetrability or     
gravity7 as absolutely necessary1 and so
 bids us keep the way always open for   
further derivation4 ,in other words1    
,reason guides the understanding by a   
twofold command4 ,the understanding must
 derive phenomena and their existence   
from other phenomena1 just as if there  
were no necessary ,being at all2 while  
at the same time it must always strive  
towards the completeness of that        
derivation1 just as if such a necessary 
,being were presupposed4 ,it is owing to
 a transcendental illusion or subreption
 that we view the latter principle as   
constitutive1 and so think its unity as 
hypostatised in the form of an ,ens     
realissimum4 ,the falsity of this       
substitution becomes evident as soon as 

we consider that unconditioned          
necessity1 as a thing in itself1 cannot 
even be conceived1 and that the 8,idea0 
of it cannot1 therefore1 be ascribed to 
,reason save as a merely formal         
principle1 regulative of the            
understanding in its interpretation of  
given experience4#afbe  ,comment4--,the 
reader may observe that1 when ,kant is  
developing this sceptical view of the   
,ideal of ,reason1 the explanation of   
dialectical illusion in terms of        
transcendental idealism falls into the  
background4 ,the illusion is no longer  
traced to a confusion between           
appearances and things in themselves1   
but to the false interpretation of      
regulative principles as being          
constitutive4 ,when it is the           
cosmological problem with which we are  
dealing1 the two illusions do1 indeed1  
coincide4 ,if we view the objects of    
sense-experience as things in           
themselves1 we are bound to regard the  
,ideal completion of the natural        

sciences as an adequate representation  
of ultimate reality4 ,but in ,rational  
,theology1 which is professedly directed
 towards the definition of a ,being     
distinct from nature and conditioning   
all finite existence1 it is not failure 
to distinguish between appearance and   
things in themselves1 but the mistaking 
of a merely formal ,ideal for a         
representation of reality1 that is alone
 responsible for the conclusions drawn4 
,in ,a #fag-ah  ,b #fde-f ,kant makes   
statements which conflict with the      
teaching of ,a #ehf  ,b #fad and ,a #ehh
  ,b #faf4 ,in the latter passages he   
has argued that the concept of a limited
 being may not without specific proof be
 taken as contradictory of absolute     
necessity4 ,he now categorically        
declares that the philosophers of       
antiquity are in error in regarding     
matter as primitive and necessary2 and  
the reason which he gives is that the   
regulative principle of ,reason forbids 
us to view extension and                

impenetrability1 8which together        
constitute the concept of matter10 as   
ultimate principles of experience4 ,but 
obviously ,kant is here going further   
than his regulative principle will      
justify4 ,it demands only that we should
 always look for still higher principles
 of unity1 and so keep open the way for 
possible further derivation2 it does not
 enable us to assert that such will     
actually be found to exist4             
,notwithstanding the ,ideal demands of  
the regulative principle1 matter may be 
primordial and necessary1 and its       
properties of extension and             
impenetrability may not be derivable    
from anything more ultimate4  ,in this  
connection we may raise the more general
 question1 how far the ,ideal demand for
 necessity and unity in knowledge and   
existence can be concretely pictured4   
,kant gives a varying answer4           
,sometimes--when he is emphasising the  
limitation of our theoretical knowledge 
to sense-experience--he reduces the     

speculative ,idea of ,divine ,existence 
to a purely abstract maxim for the      
regulation of natural science4 ,when the
 ,ideal occupies the mind on its own    
account1 and so attracts our attention  
away from our sense-knowledge1 it is an 
unreality1 and perverts the             
understanding2 it yields genuine light  
and leading only as a quite general     
maxim within the sphere of natural      
science4 ,from this point of view       
necessary ,being1 even as an ,ideal1 can
 by no means be identified with a       
personal ,god4 ,it signifies only the   
highest possible system and unity of the
 endlessly varied natural phenomena in  
space and time1 and can be approximately
 realised in the most various ways4 ,its
 significance is entirely cosmological4 
,it is an ,ideal of positive science1   
and signifies only systematic unity in  
the object known4 ,in being transformed 
from a scientific ideal into a subject  
of theological enquiry1 it has          
inevitably given rise to dialectical    

illusion4 ,at other times1--when he is  
concerned to defend the concept of      
,divine ,existence as at least possible1
 and so to prepare the way for its      
postulation as implied in the moral law1
 or when he is seeking1 as in the       
,critique of ,judgment1 to render       
comprehensible the complete adaptation  
of phenomenal nature in its material    
aspect to the needs of our              
understanding--,kant insists that we are
 ultimately compelled1 by the nature of 
our faculties1 to conceive the ,ideal of
 ,reason as a personal ,god1 as an      
,intelligence working according to      
purposes4 ,only by such a personal ,god1
 he maintains1 can the demands of       
,reason be genuinely satisfied4  ,these 
two interpretations of the ,ideal of    
,reason are in conflict with one        
another2 and so far as the ,critique of 
,pure ,reason is concerned1 a very      
insufficient attempt is made to justify 
the frequent assertion that the ,idea of
 ,god is the ,ideal of ,reason1 and not 

merely one possible1 and highly         
problematic1 interpretation of it4 ,if  
the ,idea of ,god is a necessary ,idea1 
it cannot be adequately expressed       
through any merely regulative maxim4 ,it
 demands not only system in knowledge   
but also perfection in the nature of the
 known4 ,it is not a merely logical     
,ideal such as might be satisfied by any
 rational system1 but an ,ideal which   
concerns matter as well as form1 man as 
well as nature1 our moral needs as well 
as our intellectual demands4 ,if ,kant  
is to maintain that the only genuine    
function of theoretical ,reason is to   
guide the understanding in its          
scientific application1 he is debarred  
from asserting that a concrete          
interpretation of its regulative        
principles is unavoidable4 ,and he is   
also precluded by his own limitation of 
all knowledge to sense-experience from  
seeking to define by any positive       
predicate the transcendent nature of the
 thing in itself4  ,such justification  

as ,kant can offer in support of his    
assertion that the ,idea of ,god1 of    
,intelligent ,perfection1 is an         
indispensable ,idea of human ,reason1 is
 chiefly based upon the teleological    
aspect of nature which is dealt with in 
the physico-theological proof4          
,mechanical science implies only the    
cosmological ,idea3 teleological unity  
presupposes the theological ,ideal4     
,further enquiry1 then1 into the        
necessity of the ,idea of ,god as a     
regulative principle1 and its dangers as
 a source of dialectical illusion1 we   
must defer until we have examined the   
one remaining argument4#afbf   ,,section
 ,,vi  ,,the ,,impossibility ,,of ,,the 
,,physico-,,theological ,,proof#afbg    
,statement4--,the teleological proof    
starts from our definite knowledge of   
the order and constitution of the       
sensible world4 ,the actual world       
presents such immeasurable order1       
variety1 fitness1 and beauty1 that we   
are led to believe that here at least is

 sufficient proof of the existence of   
,god4 ,kant's attitude towards this     
argument is at once extremely critical  
and extremely sympathetic4 ,though he   
represents it as the oldest1 the        
clearest1 and the most convincing1 he is
 none the less prepared to show that it 
contains every one of the fallacies     
involved in the other two proofs1 as    
well as some false assumptions peculiar 
to itself4 ,it possesses overpowering   
persuasive force1 not because of any    
inherent logical cogency1 but because it
 so successfully appeals to feeling as  
to silence the intellect4 ,it would1    
,kant declares1 be not only comfortless1
 but utterly vain to attempt to diminish
 its influence4       0,the mind is     
aroused from the indecision of all      
melancholy      reflection1 as from a   
dream1 by one glance at the wonders of  
nature      and the majesty of the      
universe44440#afbh  ,meantime1 however1 
we are concerned with its merely logical
 force4 ,we have to decide whether1 as  

theoretical proof1 it can claim assent  
on its own merits1 requiring no favour1 
and no help from any other quarter4 ,on 
the basis of empirical facts the        
argument makes the following assertions4
 7#a7 ,there are everywhere in the world
 clear indications of adaptation to a   
definite end4 7#b7 ,as this adaptation  
cannot be due to the working of blind1  
mechanical laws1 and accordingly cannot 
be explained as originating in things   
themselves1 it must have been imposed   
upon them from without2 and there must  
therefore exist1 apart from the sensible
 world1 an intelligent ,being who has   
arranged it according to ideas          
antecedently formed4 7#c7 ,as there is  
unity in the reciprocal relations of the
 parts of the universe as portions of a 
single edifice1 and as the universe is  
infinite in extent and inexhaustible in 
variety1 its intelligent cause must be  
single1 all-powerful1 all-wise1 i4e4    
,god4  ,now1 even granting for the sake 
of argument the admissibility of these  

assertions1 they enable us to infer only
 an intelligent author of the purposive 
form of nature1 not of its matter1 only 
an architect who is very much hampered  
by the inadaptability of the material in
 which he has to work1 not a ,creator to
 whose will everything is due4 ,to prove
 the contingency of matter itself1 we   
should have to establish the truth of   
the cosmological proof4  ,but the       
assumptions implied even in the         
demonstration that ,god exists as a     
formative power1 are by no means beyond 
dispute4 ,why may not nature be regarded
 as giving form to itself by its blindly
 working forces8 ,can it really be      
proved that nature is a work of art that
 demands an artificer as certainly as   
does a house1 or a ship1 or a clock8    
,kant's argument is at this point       
extremely brief1 and ,i shall so far    
digress from the statement of it1 which 
he here gives1 as to supplement it from 
his other writings4 ,even so-called dead
 matter is not merely inert4 ,by its    

inherent powers of gravity and chemical 
attraction it spontaneously gives rise  
to the most wonderful forms4 ,when      
,clarke and ,voltaire1 in their first   
enthusiasm over ,newton's great         
discovery1 asserted that the planetary  
system must have been divinely created1 
each planet being launched in the       
tangent of its orbit by the finger of   
,god1 just as a wheel must be fixed into
 its place by the hand of the           
mechanician1 they under-estimated the   
organising power of blind inanimate     
nature4 ,as ,kant argued in his early   
treatise1#afbi the planetary system can 
quite well have arisen1 and1 as it would
 seem1 actually has come into existence1
 through the action of blindly working  
laws4 ,the mechanical principles which  
account for its present maintenance will
 also account for its origin and        
development4 ,but it is when we turn to 
animate nature1 which is the chief      
source from which arguments for design  
are derived1 that the insufficiency of  

the teleological argument becomes most  
manifest4 ,as ,kant points out in the   
,critique of ,judgment1 the differentia 
distinguishing the living from the      
lifeless1 is not so much that it is     
organised as that it is self-organising4
 ,when1 therefore1 we treat an organism 
as an analogon of art we completely     
misrepresent its essential nature4#afcj 
,in regarding it as put together by an  
external agent we are ignoring its      
internal self-developing power4 ,as     
,hume had previously maintained in his  
,dialogues on ,natural ,religion1#afca  
the facts of the organic world not only 
agree with the facts of the inorganic   
world in not supporting the argument of 
the teleological proof1 but are in      
direct conflict with it4  ,but to return
 to ,kant's immediate statement of the  
argument4 ,setting the above objection  
aside1 and granting for the present that
 nature may be regarded as the outcome  
of an external artificer1 we can argue  
only to a cause adequate to its         

production1 i4e4 to an extraordinarily  
wise and wonderfully powerful ,being4   
,even if we ignore the existence of evil
 and defect in nature1 the step from    
great power to omnipotence1 and from    
great wisdom to omniscience1 is one that
 can never be justified on empirical    
grounds4#afcb ,since the ,ideas of      
,reason1 and above all the completely   
determined1 individual ,ideal of        
,reason1 transcend experience1          
experience can never justify us in      
inferring their reality4 ,the           
teleological argument can1 indeed1 only 
lead us to the point of admiring the    
greatness1 wisdom1 and power of the     
author of the world4 ,in proceeding     
further it abandons experience          
altogether1 and reasons1 not from       
particular kinds and excellencies of    
natural design1 but from the contingency
 of all such adaptation to the existence
 of a necessary ,being1 exactly in the  
manner of the cosmological argument4    
,and it ends by assuming1 in agreement  

with the ontological proof1 that the    
only possible necessary ,being is the   
,ideal of ,reason4 ,thus after          
committing a number of fallacies on its 
own account1 the teleological argument  
itself endorses all those that are      
involved in the more a priori proofs4   
,the teleological argument rests on the 
cosmological1 and the cosmological on   
the ontological1 which therefore would  
be the only proof possible1 were the    
proof of a completely transcendent      
proposition ever possible at all4 ,the  
strange fact that the convincing force  
of the arguments thus varies inversely  
with their validity shows1 ,kant        
maintains1 that we are correct in       
concluding that they do not really      
depend upon their logical cogency1 and  
merely express1 in abstract terms1      
beliefs deep-rooted in the human spirit4
   ,,section ,,vii  ,,criticism ,,of    
,,all ,,theology ,,based ,,on           
,,speculative ,,principles ,,of         
,,reason#afcc  ,a #fca-c  ,b            

#fei-ff4--,on the distinction between   
8theist0 and 8deist10 cf4 ,encyclopdia  
,britannica1 vii4 p4 #icd3       8,the  
later distinction between #8theist' and 
#8deist1' which stamped      the latter 
word as excluding the belief in         
providence or in the      immanence of  
,god1 was apparently formulated in the  
end of the      eighteenth century by   
those rationalists who were aggrieved at
      being identified with the         
naturalists40  ,a #fcc-d  ,b            
#ffa-b4--,kant here does no more than   
indicate that by way of practical       
,reason it may be possible to postulate1
 though not theoretically to comprehend1
 a ,supreme ,being4 ,on the distinction 
between postulates and hypotheses1 cf4  
,a #gfi ff4  ,b #gig ff41 and below1 p4 
#edc ff4 ,cf4 also p4 #ega ff4  ,a #fcd 
,b #ffb4--,on relative necessity1 cf4   
below1 pp4 #eee1 #ega ff4  ,a #fce-i  ,b
 #ffc-g only summarises points already  
treated4  ,a #fci-db  ,b #ffg-gj4--,kant
 concludes by declaring that the ,ideal1

 in addition to its regulative function1
 possesses two further prerogatives4 ,in
 the first place1 it supplies a         
standard1 in the light of which any     
knowledge of ,divine ,existence1        
acquired from other sources1 can be     
purified and rendered consistent with   
itself4 ,for it is 8an ,ideal without a 
flaw10 the true crown and culmination of
 the whole of human knowledge4          
8,if there should be a moral theology   
444 transcendental theology 444 will    
then prove itself indispensable in      
determining its concept      and in     
constantly testing ,reason which is so  
often deceived by      sensibility1 and 
which is frequently out of harmony with 
its own      ,ideas40#afcd  ,and        
secondly1 though the ,ideal fails to    
establish itself theoretically1 the     
arguments given in its support suffice  
to show the quite insufficient          
foundations upon which all atheistic1   
deistic1 and anthropomorphic            
philosophies rest4  ,comment4--,these   

concluding remarks cannot be accepted as
 representing ,kant's true teaching4    
,the ,ideal1 by his own showing1 is by  
no means without a flaw4 ,in so far as  
it involves the concept of unconditioned
 necessity1 it is meaningless2 it is    
purely logical1 and therefore contains  
no indication of real content2 it       
embodies a false view of the nature of  
negation1 and therefore of the relation 
of realities to one another4 ,in short1 
it is constituted in accordance with the
 false1 un-,critical principles of      
,leibnizian metaphysics1 and is found on
 examination to be non-existent even as 
a purely mental entity4 ,reduced to its 
proper terms1 it becomes a mere schema  
regulative of the understanding in the  
extension of experience1 and does not   
yield even a negative criterion for the 
testing of our ideals of ,divine        
,existence4 ,the criterion1 which ,kant 
really so employs1 is not that of an    
,ens realissimum1 but the concept of an 
,intuitive ,understanding1 which1 as he 

has indicated in the chapter on         
,phenomena and ,noumena1#afce is our    
most adequate ,ideal of completed       
,perfection4 ,this latter is not itself1
 however1 a spontaneously formed concept
 of natural ,reason1 and does not       
justify the assertion that the ,idea of 
,god is a necessary ,idea of the human  
mind4 ,in attempting to defend such a   
thesis1 ,kant is unduly influenced by   
the almost universal acceptance of      
deistic beliefs in the ,europe of his   
time4#afcf ,his criticism of the ,ideal 
of ,reason and of rational theology is  
much more destructive1 and really allows
 that theology much less value1 even as 
natural dialectic1 than he is willing to
 admit4#afcg ,architectonic forbids that
 the extreme radical consequences of the
 teaching of the ,analytic should be    
allowed to show in their full force4    
,these shortcomings are1 however1 in    
great part remedied in the elaborate    
,appendix which ,kant has attached to   
the ,dialectic4     ,,appendix ,,to     

,,the ,,transcendental ,,dialectic      
,,the ,,regulative ,,employment ,,of    
,,the ,,ideas ,,of ,,pure ,,reason#afch 
,before we proceed to deal with this    
,appendix it will be of advantage to    
consider the section in the ,methodology
 on the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in 
regard to ,hypotheses4#afci ,that       
section affords a very illuminating     
introduction to the problems here       
discussed1 and is extremely important   
for understanding ,kant's view of       
metaphysical science as yielding either 
complete certainty or else nothing at   
all4 ,this is a doctrine which he from  
time to time suggests1 to the           
considerable bewilderment of the modern 
reader4#afdj ,in discussing it he starts
 from the obvious objection1 that though
 nothing can be known through ,reason in
 its pure a priori employment1          
metaphysics may yet be possible in an   
empirical form1 as consisting of        
hypotheses1 constructed in conjectural  
explanation of the facts of experience4 

,kant replies by defining the conditions
 under which alone hypotheses can be    
entertained as such4 ,there must always 
be something completely certain1 and not
 only invented or merely 8opined10      
namely1 the possibility of the object to
 which the hypothesis appeals4 ,once    
that is proved1 it is allowable1 on the 
basis of experience1 to form opinions   
regarding its reality4 ,then1 and only  
then1 can such opinions be entitled     
hypotheses4 ,otherwise we are not       
employing the understanding to explain2 
we are simply indulging the imagination 
in its tendency to dream4 ,now since the
 categories of the pure understanding do
 not enable us to invent a priori the   
concept of a dynamical connection1 but  
only to apprehend it when presented in  
experience1 we cannot by means of these 
categories invent a single object       
endowed with a new quality not          
empirically given2 and cannot1          
therefore1 base an hypothesis upon any  
such conception4       8,thus it is not 

permissible to invent any new original  
powers1 as1      for instance1 an       
understanding capable of intuiting its  
objects      without the aid of senses2 
or a force of attraction without any    
contact2 or a new kind of substance     
existing in space and yet not           
impenetrable4 ,nor is it legitimate to  
postulate any other form of             
communion of substances than that       
revealed in experience1 any             
presence that is not spatial1 any       
duration that is not temporal4 ,in      
a word our ,reason can employ as        
conditions of the possibility of        
things only the conditions of possible  
experience2 it can never1 as      it    
were1 create concepts of things1        
independently of those      conditions4 
,such concepts1 though not              
self-contradictory1 would be            
without an object40#afda  ,this does    
not1 however1 mean that the concepts of 
pure ,reason can have no valid          
employment4 ,they are1 it is true1      

,ideas merely1 with no object           
corresponding to them in any experience2
 but then it is also true that they are 
not hypotheses1 referring to imagined   
objects1 supposed to be possibly real4  
,they are purely problematic4 ,they are 
heuristic fictions 7heuristische        
,fiktionen71 the sole function of which 
is to serve as principles regulative of 
the understanding in its systematic     
employment4 ,used in any other manner   
they reduce to the level of merely      
mental entities 7,gedankendinge7 whose  
very possibility is indemonstrable1 and 
which cannot therefore be employed as   
hypotheses for the explanation of       
appearances4 ,given appearances can be  
accounted for only in terms of laws     
known to hold among appearances4 ,to    
explain natural phenomena by a          
transcendental hypothesis--mental       
processes by the assumption of the soul 
as a substantial1 simple1 spiritual     
being1 or order and design in nature by 
the assumption of a ,divine ,author--is 

never admissible4       8444that would  
be to explain something1 which in terms 
of known      empirical principles we do
 not understand sufficiently1 by        
something which we do not understand at 
all40#afdb  ,and ,kant adds that the    
wildest hypotheses1 if only they are    
physical1 are more tolerable than a     
hyperphysical one4 ,they at least       
conform to the conditions under which   
alone hypothetical explanation as such  
is allowable4 8,outside this field1 to  
form opinions1 is merely to play with   
thoughts44440#afdc  ,a further          
condition1 required to render an        
hypothesis acceptable1 is its adequacy  
for determining a priori all the        
consequences which are actually given4  
,if for that purpose supplementary      
hypotheses have to be called in1 the    
force of the main assumption is         
proportionately weakened4 ,thus we can  
easily explain natural order and design1
 if we are allowed to postulate a       
,divine ,author who is absolutely       

perfect and all-powerful4 ,but that     
hypothesis lies open to all the         
objections suggested by defects and     
evils in nature1 and can only be        
preserved through new hypotheses which  
modify the main assumption4 ,similarly  
the hypothesis of the human soul as an  
abiding and purely spiritual being1     
existing in independence of the body1   
has to be modified to meet the          
difficulties which arise from the       
phenomena of growth and decay4 ,but the 
new hypotheses1 then constructed1 derive
 their whole authority from the main    
hypothesis which they are themselves    
defending4  ,such is ,kant's criticism  
of metaphysics when its teaching is     
based on the facts of experience        
hypothetically interpreted4 ,in regard  
to transcendent metaphysics1 there are1 
in ,kant's view1 only two               
alternatives4#afdd ,either its          
propositions must be established        
independently of all experience in      
purely a priori fashion1 and therefore  

as absolutely certain2 or they must     
consist in hypotheses empirically       
grounded4 ,the first alternative has in 
the ,analytic and ,dialectic been shown 
to be impossible2 the second alternative
 he rejects for the above reasons4  ,but
 this does not close ,kant's treatment  
of metaphysical hypotheses4 ,he proceeds
 to develop a doctrine which1 in its    
fearless confidence in the truth of     
,critical teaching1 is the worthy       
outcome of his abiding belief in the    
value of a 8sceptical method40#afde ,as 
,reason is by its very nature           
dialectical1 outside opponents are not  
those from whom we have most to fear4   
,their objections are really derived    
from a source which lies in ourselves1  
and until these have been traced to     
their origin1 and destroyed from the    
root upwards1 we can expect no lasting  
peace4 ,our duty1 therefore1 is to      
encourage our doubts1 until by the very 
luxuriance of their growth they enable  
us to discover the hidden roots from    

which they derive their perennial       
vitality4       8,external tranquillity 
is a mere illusion4 ,the germ of these  
objections1 which lies in the nature of 
human ,reason1 must be      rooted out4 
,but how can we uproot it1 unless we    
give it freedom1      nay1 nourishment1 
to send out shoots so that it may       
discover itself      to our eyes1 and   
that we may then destroy it together    
with its      root8 ,therefore think out
 objections which have never yet        
occurred      to any opponent2 lend him1
 indeed1 your weapons1 or grant him the 
most favourable position which he could 
possibly desire4 ,you have      nothing 
to fear in all this1 but much to hope   
for2 you may gain for      yourselves a 
possession which can never again be     
contested40#afdf  ,in this campaign to  
eradicate doubt by following it out to  
its furthermost limits1 the hypotheses  
of pure ,reason1 8leaden weapons though 
they be1 since they are not steeled by  
any law of experience10 are an          

indispensable part of our equipment4    
,for though hypotheses are useless for  
the establishment of metaphysical       
propositions1 they are1 ,kant teaches1  
both admirable and valuable for their   
defence4 ,that is to say1 their true    
metaphysical function is not dogmatic1  
but polemical4 ,they are weapons of war 
to which we may legitimately resort for 
the maintenance of beliefs otherwise    
established4 ,if1 for instance1 we have 
been led to postulate the immaterial1   
self-subsistent nature of the soul1 and 
are met by the difficulty that          
experience would seem to prove that both
 the growth and the decay of our mental 
powers are due to the body1 we can      
weaken this objection by formulating the
 hypothesis that the body is not the    
cause of our thinking1 but only a       
restrictive condition of it1 peculiar to
 our present state1 and that1 though it 
furthers our sensuous and animal        
faculties1 it acts as an impediment to  
our spiritual life4 ,similarly1 to meet 

the many objections against belief in   
the eternal existence of a finite being 
whose birth depends upon contingencies  
of all kinds1 such as the food supply1  
the whims of government1 or even vice1  
we can adduce the transcendental        
hypothesis that life has neither        
beginning in birth nor ending in death1 
the entire world of sense being but an  
image due to our present mode of        
knowledge1 an image which like a dream  
has in itself no objective reality4     
,such hypotheses are not1 indeed1 even  
,ideas of ,reason1 but simply concepts  
invented to show that the objections    
which are raised depend upon the false  
assumption that the possibilities have  
been exhausted1 and that the mere laws  
of nature comprehend the whole field of 
possible existences4 ,these hypotheses  
at least suffice to reveal the uncertain
 character of the doubts which assail us
 in our practical beliefs4              
0,transcendental hypotheses are nothing 
but private opinions4                   

,nevertheless1 we cannot properly       
dispense with them as weapons           
against the misgivings which are apt to 
occur2 they are necessary      even to  
secure our inner tranquillity4 ,we must 
preserve to them      this character1   
carefully guarding against the          
assumption of their      independent    
authority or absolute validity1 since   
otherwise they      would drown ,reason 
in fictions and delusions40#afdg  ,we   
may now return to ,a #fdb-fh  ,b        
#fgj-if4 ,the teaching of this section  
is extremely self-contradictory1        
wavering between a subjective and an    
objective interpretation of the ,ideas  
of ,reason4 ,the probable explanation is
 that ,kant is here recasting older     
material1 and leaves standing more of   
his earlier solutions than is consistent
 with his final conclusions4 ,we can    
best approach the discussion by         
considering ,kant's statements in ,a    
#fde  ,b #fgc and in ,a #fej ff4  ,b    
#fgh ff4 ,they expound1 though          

unfortunately in the briefest terms1 a  
point of view which ,idealism has since 
adopted as fundamental4 ,kant himself1  
very strangely1 never develops its      
consequences at any great length4#afdh  
,the ,idea1 which ,reason follows in the
 exercise of its sole true function1 the
 systematising of the knowledge supplied
 by the understanding1 is that of a     
unity in which the thought of the whole 
precedes the knowledge of its parts1 and
 contains the conditions according to   
which the place of every part and its   
relation to the other parts are         
determined a priori4 ,this ,idea        
specialises itself in various forms1 and
 in all of them directs the             
understanding to a knowledge that will  
be that of no mere aggregate but of a   
genuine system4 ,such concepts are not  
derived from nature2 we interrogate     
nature according to them1 and consider  
our knowledge defective so long as it   
fails to embody them4 ,in ,a #fej  ,b   
#fgh ,kant further points out that this 

,idea of ,reason does not merely direct 
the understanding to search for such    
unity1 but also claims for itself       
objective reality4 ,and he adds1        
8444it is difficult to understand how   
there can be a logical      principle by
 which ,reason prescribes the unity of  
rules1 unless we      also presuppose a 
transcendental principle whereby such   
systematic      unity is a priori       
assumed to be necessarily inherent in   
the      objects40  ,for how could we   
treat diversity in nature as only       
disguised unity1 if we were also free to
 regard that unity as contrary to the   
actual nature of the real8              
8,reason would then run counter to its  
own vocation1 proposing as      its aim 
an ,idea quite inconsistent with the    
constitution of      nature40#afdi  ,nor
 is our knowledge of the principle      
merely empirical1 deduced from the unity
 which we find in contingent experience4
 ,on the contrary1 there is an inherent 
and necessary law of ,reason compelling 

us1 antecedently to all specific        
experience1 to look for such unity4     
8444without it we should have no ,reason
 at all1 and without ,reason      no    
coherent employment of the              
understanding1 and in the absence of    
this no sufficient criterion of         
empirical truth4 ,in order1             
therefore1 to secure an empirical       
criterion we are absolutely             
compelled to presuppose the systematic  
unity of nature as      objectively     
valid and necessary40#afej 8,it might be
 supposed that      this is merely an   
economical contrivance of ,reason1      
seeking to save      itself all possible
 trouble1 a hypothetical attempt1 which1
 if it      succeeds1 will1 through the 
unity thus attained1 impart probability 
to the presumed principle of            
explanation4 ,but such a selfish        
purpose can very easily be distinguished
 from the ,idea4 ,for in the      latter
 we presuppose that this unity of       
,reason is in conformity      with      

nature itself2 and that1 although we are
 indeed unable to      determine the    
limits of this unity1 ,reason does not  
here beg but      command40#afea  ,this 
last alternative1 that ,reason is here  
propounding a tentative hypothesis1 in  
order by trial to discover how far it   
can be empirically verified--an         
alternative which ,kant in the above    
passage rejects as unduly subjective1   
and as consequently failing to recognise
 the objective claims and a priori      
authority of the ,ideas of ,reason1--is 
yet a view which he himself adopts and  
indeed develops at considerable length  
in this same section4 ,this1 as already 
stated1 affords evidence of the         
composite character and varying origins 
of the material here presented4  ,the   
,dissertation of #aggj gives a purely   
subjectivist interpretation of the      
regulative principles1 among which1 from
 its pre-,critical standpoint1 it       
classes the principle of causality and  
the principle of the conservation of    

matter4       0,we adopt principles     
which delude the intellect into         
mistaking      them for arguments       
derived from the object1 whereas they   
are      commended to us only by the    
peculiar nature of the intellect1 owing 
to their convenience for its free and   
ample employment4 ,they      therefore  
444 rest on subjective grounds 444      
namely1 on the      conditions under    
which it seems easy and expeditious for 
the      intellect to make use of its   
insight4444 ,these rules of judging1 to 
which we freely submit and to which we  
adhere as if they were      axioms1     
solely for the reason that were we to   
depart from them      almost no judgment
 regarding a given object would be      
permissible to      our intellect1 ,i   
entitle principles of convenience4444   
,one of      these is the popularly     
received canon1 principia non esse      
multiplicanda praeter summam            
necessitatem1 to which we yield our     
adhesion1 not because we have insight   

into causal unity in the      world     
either by reason or by experience1 but  
because we seek it by      an impulse of
 the intellect1 which seems to itself to
 have advanced      in the explanation  
of phenomena only in the degree in which
 it is      granted to it to descend    
from a single principle to the greatest 
number of consequences40#afeb  ,this1 in
 essentials1 is the view which we find  
developed in ,a #fdf-i  ,b #fgd-h4      
,reason is the faculty of deducing the  
particular from the general4 ,when the  
general is admitted only as             
problematical1 as a mere idea1 while the
 particular is certain1 we determine the
 universality of the rule by applying it
 to the particulars1 and then upon      
confirmation of its validity proceed to 
draw conclusions regarding cases not    
actually given4 ,this ,kant entitles the
 hypothetical use of ,reason4 ,reason   
must never be employed constitutively4  
,it serves only for the introduction1 as
 far as may be found possible1 of unity 

into the particulars of knowledge4 ,it  
seeks to make the rule approximate to   
universality4#afec ,the unity which it  
demands       8444is a projected unity1 
to be regarded not as given in itself1  
but as a problem only4 ,this unity aids 
us in discovering a      principle for  
the manifold and special employment of  
the      understanding1 drawing its     
attention to cases which are not given1 
and thus rendering it more              
coherent40#afed  ,the unity is merely   
logical1 or rather methodological4#afee 
,to postulate1 in consequence of its    
serviceableness1 real unity in the      
objects themselves would be to transform
 it into a transcendental principle of  
,reason1 and to render       8444the    
systematic unity necessary1 not only    
subjectively and      logically1 as     
method1 but objectively also40#afef     
,the above paragraphs are intercalated  
between ,a #fde  ,b #fgc and ,a #fej-fc 
,b #fgh-ia1 in which1 as we have already
 seen1 the directly opposite view is    

propounded1 namely1 that such principles
 are not merely hypothetical1 nor merely
 logical4 ,in all cases they claim      
reality1 and rest upon transcendental   
principles2 they condition the very     
possibility of experience2 and may      
therefore be asserted to be a priori    
necessary and to be objectively valid4  
,to quote two additional passages3      
8444we can conclude from the universal  
to the particular1 only if              
universal qualities are ascribed to     
things as the foundation upon      which
 the particular qualities rest40#afeg   
8,the foundation of      these laws cf4 
below1 pp4 #eej-a is not due to any     
secret design      of making an         
experiment by putting them forward as   
merely tentative      suggestions4444   
,it is easily seen that they contemplate
 the      parsimony of fundamental      
causes1 the manifoldness of effects1 and
      the consequent affinity of the    
parts of nature1 as being in            
themselves both rational and natural4   

,hence these principles carry      their
 recommendation directly in themselves1 
and not merely as      methodological   
devices40#afeh  ,thus1 in direct        
opposition to the preceding view of     
,reason's function as hypothetical1     
,kant is now prepared to maintain that  
the maxims of ,reason are without       
meaning and without application save in 
so far as they can be grounded in a     
transcendental principle4#afei  ,let us 
follow ,kant's detailed exposition of   
this last thesis4 ,the logical maxim1 to
 seek for systematic unity1 rests upon  
the transcendental principle that the   
apparently infinite variety of nature   
does not exclude identity of species1   
that the various species are varieties  
of a few genera1 and these again of     
still higher genera4 ,this is the       
scholastic maxim3 entia praeter         
necessitatem non esse multiplicanda4    
,upon this principle rests the          
possibility of concepts1 and therefore  
of the understanding itself4 ,it is     

balanced1 however1 by a second          
principle1 no less necessary1 the       
transcendental law of specification1    
namely1 that there must be manifoldness 
and diversity in things1 that every     
genus must specify itself in divergent  
species1 and these again in sub-species4
 ,or as it is expressed in its          
scholastic form3 entium varietates non  
temere esse minuendas4 ,this principle  
is equally transcendental4 ,it expresses
 a condition no less necessary for the  
possibility of the understanding1 and   
therefore of experience4 ,as the        
understanding knows all that it knows by
 concepts only1 however far it may carry
 the division of genera1 it can never   
know by means of pure intuition1 but    
always again by lower concepts4 ,if1    
therefore1 there were no lower concepts1
 there could be no higher concepts2#affj
 the gap existing between individuals   
and genera could never be bridged2 or   
rather1 since neither individuals nor   
universals could then be apprehended1   

neither would exist for the mind4 ,as   
the higher concepts acquire all their   
content from the lower1 they presuppose 
them for their own existence4           
8,every concept may be regarded as a    
point which1 in so far as it            
represents the standpoint of a          
spectator1 has its own horizon4444      
,this horizon must be capable of        
containing an infinite number of        
points1 each of which again has its own 
narrower horizon2 that is1      every   
species contains sub-species1 according 
to the principle of      specification1 
and the logical horizon consists        
exclusively of      smaller horizons    
7sub-species71 never of points which    
possess no      extent                  
7individuals740#affa  ,combining these  
two principles1 that of homogeneity and 
that of specification1 we obtain a      
third1 that of continuity4 ,the logical 
law of the continuum formarum logicarum 
presupposes the transcendental law1 lex 
continui in natura4 ,it provides that   

homogeneity be combined with the        
greatest possible diversity by          
prescribing a continuous transition from
 every species to every other1 or in    
other words by requiring that between   
any two species or sub-species1 however 
closely related1 intermediate species be
 always regarded as possible4 7,the     
paragraph at the end of ,a #ffa  ,b     
#fhi1 with its proviso that we cannot   
make any definite empirical use of this 
law1 is probably of later origin2 it    
connects with the concluding parts of   
the section47 ,that this third law is   
also a priori and transcendental1 is    
shown by the fact that it is not derived
 from the prior discovery of system in  
nature1 but has itself given rise to the
 systematised character of our          
knowledge4#affb  ,the psychological1    
chemical1 and astronomical examples     
which ,kant employs to illustrate these 
laws call for no special comment4 ,they 
were taken from contemporary science1   
and in the advance of our knowledge have

 become more confusing than helpful4    
,the citation in ,a #fdf  ,b #fgd of the
 concepts of 8pure earth1 pure water1   
pure air0 as being 8concepts of ,reason0
 is especially bewildering4 ,they are1  
even in the use which ,kant himself     
ascribes to them1 simply empirical      
hypotheses1 formulated for the purposes 
of purely physical explanation2 they are
 in no genuine sense universal1         
regulative principles4  ,in passing to  
,a #ffc-h  ,b #fia-f we find still      
another variation in the substance of   
,kant's teaching4 ,he returns1 though   
with a greater maturity of statement1   
and with a very different and much more 
satisfactory terminology1 to the more   
sceptical view of ,a #fdf-i  ,b         
#fgd-g4affc ,the interest of the above  
principles1 ,kant continues to maintain1
 lies in their transcendentality4       
,despite the fact that they are mere    
,ideas for the guidance of              
understanding1 and can only be          
approached asymptotically1 they are     

synthetic a priori judgments1 and would 
seem to have an objective1 though       
indeterminate1 validity4 ,so far his    
statements are in line with the         
preceding paragraphs4 ,but he proceeds  
to add that this objective validity     
consists exclusively in their heuristic 
function4 ,they differ fundamentally    
from the dynamical1 no less than from   
the mathematical1 principles of         
understanding1 in that no schema of     
sensibility can be assigned to them4 ,in
 other words1 their object can never be 
exhibited in concreto2 it transcends all
 possible experience4 ,for this reason  
they are incapable of a transcendental  
deduction4#affd ,they are among the     
conditions indispensably necessary to   
the possibility1 not of each and every  
experience1 but only of experience as   
systematised in the interest of ,reason4
 ,in place of a schema they can possess 
only what may be called the analogon of 
a schema1 that is1 they represent the   
,idea of a maximum1 which the           

understanding in the subjective interest
 of ,reason--or1 otherwise              
expressed1#affe in the interest of a    
certain possible perfection of our      
knowledge of objects--is called upon to 
realise as much as possible4 ,thus they 
are at once subjective in the source    
from which they arise1 and also         
indeterminate as to the conditions under
 which1 and the extent to which1 they   
can obtain empirical embodiment4 ,the   
fact that in this capacity they         
represent a maximum1 does not justify   
any assertion either as to the degree of
 unity which experience on detailed     
investigation will ultimately be found  
to verify1 or as to the noumenal reality
 by which experience is conditioned4    
,in ,a #fdd-e  ,b #fgb-c ,kant employs  
certain optical analogies to illustrate 
the illusion which the ,ideas1 in the   
absence of ,critical teaching1          
inevitably generate4 ,when the          
understanding is regulated by the ,idea 
of a maximum1 and seeks to view all the 

lines of experience as converging upon  
and pointing to it1 it necessarily      
regards it1 focus imaginarius though it 
be1 as actually existing4 ,the illusion1
 by which objects are seen behind the   
surface of a mirror1 is indispensably   
necessary if we are to be able to see   
what lies behind our backs4 ,the        
transcendental illusion1 which confers  
reality upon the ,ideas of ,reason1 is  
similarly incidental to the attempt to  
view experience in its greatest possible
 extension4   ,,on ,,the ,,final        
,,purpose ,,of ,,the ,,natural          
,,dialectic ,,of ,,human ,,reason#afff  
,this section is thoroughly unified and 
consistent in its teaching4 ,its        
repetitious character is doubtless due  
to ,kant's personal difficulty either in
 definitively accepting or in altogether
 rejecting the constructive1 ,idealist  
interpretation of the function of       
,reason4 ,he at least succeeds in       
formulating a view which1 while not     
asserting anything more than is required

 in the scientific extension of         
experience1 indicates the many          
possibilities which such experience     
fails to exclude4 ,as the ,ideas of     
,reason are not merely empty            
thought-entities 7entia rationis        
ratiocinantis#affg71 but have a certain 
kind of objective validity 7i4e4 are    
entia rationis ratiocinatae#affh71 they 
demand a transcendental deduction4#affi 
,what this deduction is1 and how it     
differs from that of the categories1 we 
must now determine4 ,its discovery will1
 ,kant claims1 crown and complete our   
,critical labours4  ,kant begins by     
drawing a distinction between           
representing an object absolutely1 and  
representing an object in the ,idea4    
8,in the former case our concepts are   
employed to determine the      object1  
in the latter case there is in truth    
only a schema for      which no object1 
not even a hypothetical one1 is directly
 given1      and which only enables us  
to represent to ourselves indirectly    

other objects in their systematic unity1
 by means of their relation      to this
 ,idea40#afgj  ,an ,idea is only a      
schema 7,kant in terms of ,a #fee  ,b   
#fic ought rather to have said analogon 
of a schema7 whereby we represent to    
ourselves1 as for instance in the       
concept of a ,highest ,intelligence1 not
 an objective reality but only such     
perfection of ,reason as will tend to   
the greatest possible unity in the      
empirical employment of understanding4  
,with this introduction1 ,kant ushers in
 his famous 8als ob0 doctrine4 ,we must 
view the things of the world as if they 
derived their existence from a ,highest 
,intelligence4 ,that ,idea is heuristic 
only1 not expository4 ,its purpose is   
not to enable us to comprehend such a   
,being1 or even to think its existence1 
but only to show us how we should seek  
to determine the constitution and       
connection of the objects of experience4
 ,the three transcendental ,ideas do not
 determine an object corresponding to   

them1 but1 under the presupposition of  
such an object in the ,idea1 lead us to 
systematic unity of empirical knowledge4
 ,when they are thus strictly           
interpreted as merely regulative of     
empirical enquiry1 they will always     
endorse experience and never run counter
 to it4 ,reason1 which seeks            
completeness of explanation1 must       
therefore always act in accordance with 
them4 ,only thereby can experience      
acquire its fullest possible extension4 
,this is the transcendental deduction of
 which we are in search4 ,it establishes
 the indispensableness of the ,ideas of 
,reason for the completion of           
experience1 and their legitimacy as     
regulative principles4  ,we may here    
interrupt ,kant's exposition so far as  
to point out that this argument does not
 do justice to the full force of his    
position4 ,the true ,critical           
contention--and only if we interpret the
 passage in the light of this contention
 can the proof be regarded as           

transcendental in the strict sense--is  
that the ,ideas are necessary to the    
possibility of each and every           
experience1 involved together with the  
categories as conditions of the very    
existence of consciousness4 ,they are   
not merely regulative1 but are          
regulative of an experience which they  
also help to make possible4#afga ,they  
express the standards in whose light we 
condemn all knowledge which does not    
fulfil them2 and we have consequently no
 option save to endeavour to conform to 
their demands4 ,in other words1 they are
 not derivative concepts obtained by    
merely omitting the restrictions        
essential to our empirical              
consciousness1 but represent a          
presupposition necessarily involved in  
all consciousness4 ,some such           
restatement of the argument is demanded 
by the position which ,kant has himself 
outlined in ,a #fde  ,b #fgc and in ,a  
#fej ff4  ,b #fgh ff4 ,unfortunately he 
does not return to it4 ,the more        

sceptical view which he has meantime    
been developing remains dominant4 ,the  
deduction is left in this semi-,critical
 form4  ,a #fgb-f  ,b #gjj-d give a     
fuller statement of the 8als ob0        
doctrine4 ,in psychology we must proceed
 as if the mind were a simple substance 
endowed with personal identity#afgb 7in 
this life at least71 not in order to    
derive explanation of its changing      
states from the soul so conceived1 but  
to derive them from each other in       
accordance with the ,idea4 ,in cosmology
 and theology 7we may observe the       
straits to which ,kant is reduced in his
 attempt to distinguish them7 we ought  
to consider all phenomena both in their 
series and in their totality as if they 
were due to a highest and all-sufficient
 unitary ground4 ,in so doing we shall  
not derive the order and system in the  
world from the object of the ,idea1 but 
only extract from the ,idea the rule    
whereby the understanding attains the   
greatest possible satisfaction in the   

connecting of natural causes and        
effects4  ,in ,a #fgf-g  ,b #gjd-e ,kant
 resorts to still another               
distinction--between suppositio relativa
 and suppositio absoluta4 ,this         
distinction is suggested by the         
semi-objectivity of principles that are 
merely regulative4 ,though we have to   
recognise them as necessary1 such       
necessity does not justify the assertion
 of their independent validity4 ,when we
 admit a supreme ground as the source of
 the order and system which the         
principles demand1 we do so only in     
order to think the universality of the  
principles with greater definiteness4   
,such supposition is relative to the    
needs of ,reason in its empirical       
employment3 not absolute1 as pointing to
 the existence of such a being in       
itself4       8,this explains why1 in   
relation to what is given to the senses 
as      existing1 we require the ,idea  
of a primordial ,being necessary in     
itself1 and yet can never form the      

slightest concept of it or of      its  
absolute necessity40#afgc  ,this last   
statement leads to the further problem  
to which ,kant here gives his final     
solution1 how if1 as has been shown in  
the ,dialectic1 the concepts of absolute
 necessity and of unconditionedness are 
without meaning1 the ,ideas of ,reason  
can be entertained at all1 even         
mentally4 ,what is their actual content 
and how is it possible to conceive them8
 ,kant's reply is developed in terms of 
the semi-,critical subjectivist point of
 view which dominates this section4 ,the
 ,ideas are mere ,ideas4 ,they yield not
 the slightest concept either of the    
internal possibility or of the necessity
 of any object corresponding to them4   
,they only seem to do so1 owing to a    
transcendental illusion4 ,on examination
 we find that the concepts which we     
employ in thinking them as independently
 real1 are one and all derived from     
experience4 ,that is to say1 we judge of
 them after the analogy of reality1     

substance1 causality1 and necessity in  
the sensible world4#afgd       0,they   
are consequently analoga only of real   
things1 not real      things in         
themselves4 ,we remove from the object  
of the ,idea the      conditions which  
limit the concept of the understanding1 
but which      at the same time alone   
make it possible for us to have a       
determinate concept of anything4 ,what  
we then think is1 therefore1      a     
something of which1 as it is in itself1 
we have no concept      whatsoever1 but 
which we none the less represent to     
ourselves as      standing in a relation
 to the sum-total of appearances        
analogous to      that in which         
appearances stand to one another40#afge 
,they do not carry our knowledge beyond 
the objects of possible experience1 but 
only extend the empirical unity of      
experience4 ,they are the schemata of   
regulative principles4 ,in them ,reason 
is concerned with nothing but its own   
inherent demands2 and as their unity is 

the unity of a system which is to be    
sought only in experience1#afgf         
qualities derived from the sensible     
world can quite legitimately be employed
 in their specific determination4 ,they 
are not inherently dialectical2 their   
demands have the rationality which we   
have a right to expect in the ,ideals of
 ,reason4 ,when ,critically examined1   
they propound no problem which ,reason  
is not in itself entirely competent to  
solve4#afgg ,it is to their             
misemployment that transcendental       
illusion is due4 ,in the form in which  
they arise from the natural disposition 
of our ,reason they are good and        
serviceable4#afgh  ,to the question what
 is the most adequate form in which the 
regulative schema can be                
represented1#afgi ,kant gives an answer 
which shows how very far he is from     
regarding the ,leibnizian ,ens          
realissimum as the true expression of   
the ,ideal of ,reason4 ,it is through   
the employment of teleological concepts 

that we can best attain the highest     
possible form of systematic unity4      
8,the highest formal unity 444 is the   
purposive unity of things4      ,the    
speculative i4e4 theoretical interest of
 ,reason makes it      necessary to     
regard all order in the world as if it  
had      originated in the purpose of a 
,supreme ,reason4 ,such a principle     
opens out to our ,reason1 as applied in 
the field of experience1      altogether
 new views as to how the things of the  
world may be      connected according to
 teleological laws1 and so enables it to
      arrive at their greatest          
systematic unity4 ,the assumption of a  
,supreme ,intelligence1 as the one and  
only cause of the universe1      though 
in the ,idea alone1 can therefore always
 benefit ,reason and      can never     
injure it40#afhj  ,for so long as this  
assumption is employed only as a        
regulative principle1 even error cannot 
be really harmful4 ,the worst that can  
happen is that where we expected a      

teleological connection1 a merely       
mechanical or physical one is met with4 
,if1 on the other hand1 we leave the    
solid ground of experience1 and use the 
assumption to explain what we are unable
 to account for in empirical terms1 we  
sacrifice all real insight1 and confound
 ,reason by transforming a concept1     
which is anthropomorphically determined 
for the purposes of empirical           
orientation1 into a means of explaining 
order as non-natural and as imposed from
 without on the material basis of       
things4  ,this is a point of sufficient 
importance to call for more detailed    
statement4 ,hume in his ,dialogues      
points out that the main defect in the  
teleological proof of ,god's existence  
is its assumption that order and design 
are foreign to the inherent constitution
 of things1 and must be of non-natural  
origin4 ,the argument is therefore      
weakened by every advance in the natural
 sciences4 ,it also runs directly       
counter to the very phenomena1 those of 

animal life1 upon which it is chiefly   
based1 since the main characteristic of 
the organic in its distinction from the 
inorganic is its inner wealth of        
productive and reproductive powers4     
,with these criticisms ,kant is in      
entire agreement4 ,from them1 in the    
passage before us1 he derives an        
argument in support of a strictly       
regulative interpretation of his 8als   
ob0 doctrine4 ,the avowed intention of  
the teleological argument is to prove   
from nature the existence of an         
intelligent supreme cause4 ,if therefore
 its standpoint be held to with more    
consistency than its own defenders have 
hitherto shown1 it will be found to rest
 upon the regulative principle1 that we 
must study nature as if an inherent     
order were native to it1 and so seek to 
approach by degrees1 in proportion as   
such natural unity is empirically       
discovered1 the absolute perfection     
which inspires our researches4 ,but if  
we transform our ,ideal into an         

instrument of explanation1 beginning    
with what ought properly to be only our 
goal1 we delude ourselves with the      
belief that what can only be acquired   
through the slow and tentative labours  
of empirical enquiry is already in our  
possession4       8,if ,i begin with a  
supreme purposive ,being as the ground  
of all      things1 the unity of nature 
is really surrendered1 as being quite   
foreign and accidental to the nature of 
things1 and as not to be      known from
 its own general laws4 ,there thus      
arises a vicious      circle3 we are    
assuming just that very point which is  
mainly in      dispute40#afha  ,such a  
method of argument is self-destructive1 
since if we do not find order and       
perfection in the nature of things1 and 
therefore in their general and necessary
 laws1 we are not in a position to infer
 such a ,being as the source of all     
causality4  ,to the question whether we 
may not interpret natural order1 once it
 has been discovered by empirical       

investigation1 as due to the divine     
will1 ,kant replies that such procedure 
is allowable only on the condition that 
it is the same to us whether we say that
 ,god has wisely willed it or that      
nature has wisely arranged it4 ,we may  
admit the ,idea of a ,supreme ,being    
only in so far as it is required by     
,reason as the regulative principle of  
all investigation of nature2            
8444and we cannot1 therefore1 without   
contradicting ourselves1      ignore the
 general laws of nature in view of which
 the ,idea was      adopted1 and look   
upon the purposiveness of nature as     
contingent      and hyper-physical in   
its origin4 ,for we were not justified  
in      assuming above nature a ,being  
of those qualities1 but only in         
adopting the ,idea of it in order to be 
able to view the      appearances1      
according to the analogy of a causal    
determination1 as      systematically   
connected with one another40#afhb 8,thus
 pure      ,reason1 which at first      

seemed to promise nothing less than the 
extension of knowledge beyond all limits
 of experience1 contains1      if       
properly understood1 nothing but        
regulative      principles44440#afhc    
,,concluding ,,comment ,,on ,,the       
,,dialectic  ,i may now summarise       
,kant's answer to the three main        
questions of the ,dialectic3 7#a7       
,whether1 or in what degree1 the        
so-called ,ideas of ,reason are concepts
 due to a faculty altogether distinct   
from the understanding1 and how far1 as 
thus originating in pure ,reason1 they  
allow of definition2 7#b7 how far they  
are capable of a transcendental         
deduction2 7#c7 what kind of objective  
validity this deduction proves them to  
possess4  ,these questions are closely  
interconnected2 the solution of any one 
determines the kind of solution to be   
given to all three4 ,kant1 as we have   
found1 develops his final position      
through a series of very subtle         
distinctions by which he contrives to   

justify and retain1 though in a highly  
modified form1 the more crudely stated  
divisions between ,ideas and categories1
 between ,reason and understanding1 upon
 which the initial argument of the      
,dialectic is based4  ,the answer       
amounts in essentials to the conclusion 
that understanding1 in directing itself 
by means of ,ideals1 exercises a        
function so distinct from that whereby  
it conditions concrete and specific     
experience1 that it may well receive a  
separate title2 that the ,ideas in terms
 of which it constructs these ,ideals1  
though schematic 7i4e4 sensuous and     
empirical in content71 are not          
themselves empirical1 and so far from   
being merely extended concepts of       
understanding1 express transcendental   
conditions upon which all use of the    
understanding rests4  ,now if this      
position is to be justified1 ,kant ought
 to show that the fundamental ,idea of  
,reason1 that of the unconditioned1 is  
altogether distinct from any concept of 

the understanding1 and in particular    
that it must not be identified with the 
category of totality1 nor be viewed as  
being merely the concept of conditioned 
existence with its various empirical    
limitations thought away4 ,needless to  
say1 ,kant does not fulfil these        
requirements in any consistent manner4  
,the ,critique contains the material for
 a variety of different solutions2 it   
does not definitively commit itself to  
any one of them4  ,if the argument of ,a
 #fej ff4  ,b #fgh ff4 were developed we
 should be in possession of what may be 
called the ,idealist solution4 ,it would
 proceed somewhat as follows4           
,consciousness as such is always the    
awareness of a whole which precedes and 
conditions its parts4 ,such             
consciousness cannot be accounted for on
 the assumption that we are first       
conscious of the conditioned1 and then  
proceed to remove limitations and to    
form for ourselves1 by means of the more
 positive factors involved in this      

antecedent consciousness1 an ,idea of   
the totality within which the given     
falls4 ,the ,idea of the unconditioned1 
distinct from all concepts of           
understanding1 is one of the a priori   
conditions of possible experience1 and  
is capable of a transcendental deduction
 of equal validity with1 and of the same
 general nature as1 that of the         
categories4 ,it is presupposed in the   
possibility of our contingently given   
experience4  ,as this ,idea conditions  
all subordinate concepts1 it cannot be  
defined in terms of them4 ,that does    
not1 however1 deprive it of all meaning2
 its significance is of a unique kind2  
it finds expression in those ,ideals    
which1 while guiding the mind in the    
construction of experience1 also serve  
as the criteria through which experience
 is condemned as only phenomenal4  ,but 
this1 as we have found1 is not a line of
 argument which ,kant has developed in  
any detail4 ,the passages which point to
 it occur chiefly in the introductory   

portions of the ,dialectic2 in its later
 sections they are both brief and       
scanty4 ,when he sets himself1 as in the
 chapter on the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason 
and in the subsequent ,appendix1 to     
define his conclusions1 it is a much    
more empirical1 and indeed sceptical1   
line that he almost invariably follows4 
,there are1 he then declares1 strictly  
no pure1 a priori ,ideas4 ,the supposed 
,ideas of unconditionedness and of      
absolute necessity are discovered on    
examination to be without the least     
significance for the mind4 ,the ,ideas1 
properly defined1 are merely schemata of
 regulative principles1 and their whole 
content reduces without remainder to    
such categories as totality1 substance1 
causality1 necessity1 transcendently    
applied4 ,as ,ideas1 they are then      
without real meaning2 but they can be   
employed by analogy to define an ,ideal 
which serves an indispensable function  
in the extension of experience4 ,from   
this point of view1 the transcendental  

deduction of the ,ideas is radically    
distinct from that of the categories4   
,the proof is not that they are         
necessary for the possibility of        
experience1 but only that they are      
required for its perfect1 or at least   
more complete1 development4 ,and as     
,kant is unable to prove that such      
completion is really possible1 the      
objective validity of the ,ideas is left
 open to question4 ,they should be taken
 only as heuristic principles2 the      
extent of their truth1 even in the      
empirical realm1 cannot be determined by
 the a priori method that is alone      
proper to a ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 
,the first view is inspired by the      
fundamental teaching of the ,analytic1  
and is the only view which will justify 
,kant in retaining his distinction      
between appearance and things in        
themselves4 ,all that is positive in the
 second view can be combined with the   
first view2 but1 on the other hand1 the 
negative implications of the second view

 are at variance with its own positive  
teaching4 ,for when the ,ideas are      
regarded as empirical in origin no less 
than in function1 their entire authority
 is derived from experience1 and cannot 
be regarded as being transcendental in  
any valid sense of that term4 ,in       
alternating between these two           
interpretations of the function of      
,reason1 ,kant is wavering between the  
,idealist and the merely sceptical view 
of the scope and powers of pure thought4
 ,on the ,idealist interpretation       
,reason is a metaphysical faculty1      
revealing to us the phenomenal character
 of experience1 and outlining           
possibilities such as may perhaps be    
established on moral grounds4 ,from the 
sceptical standpoint1 on the other hand1
 ,reason gives expression to what may be
 only our subjective preference for     
unity and system in the ordering of     
experience4 ,according to the one1 the  
criteria of truth and reality are bound 
up with the ,ideas2 according to the    

other1 sense-experience is the standard 
by which the validity even of the ,ideas
 must ultimately be judged4 ,from the   
fact that ,kant should have continued   
sympathetically to develop two such     
opposite standpoints1 we would seem to  
be justified in concluding that he      
discerned1 or at least desiderated1 some
 more complete reconciliation of their  
teaching than he has himself thus far   
been able to achieve1 and that no       
solution which would either subordinate 
the ,ideal demands of thought1 or ignore
 the gifts of experience1 could ever    
have been definitively accepted by him  
as satisfactorily meeting the issues at 
stake4 ,the ,idealist solution is that  
to which his teaching as a whole most   
decisively points2 but he is as         
conscious of the difficulties which lie 
in its path as he is personally         
convinced of its ultimate truth4 ,his   
continuing appreciation of the value of 
sceptical teaching is a tacit admission 
that the ,idealist doctrines1 in the    

form which he has so far been able to   
give to them1 are not really adequate to
 the complexity of the problems4 ,as    
further confirmation of the tentative   
character of ,kant's conclusions in the 
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 we have his 
own later writings4 ,in the ,critique of
 ,judgment1 published nine years later1 
in teaching less sceptical and more     
constructive1 though still delicately   
balanced between the competing          
possibilities1 and always1 therefore1   
leaving the final decision to moral     
considerations1 ,kant ventures upon a   
restatement of the problems of the      
,dialectic4 ,to this restatement both of
 the above tendencies contribute        
valuable elements4     ,,appendix       
,a#afhd  ,,transcendental ,,doctrine    
,,of ,,methods     ,,chapter ,i  ,,the  
,,discipline#afhe ,,of ,,pure ,,reason  
,kant is neither an intellectualist nor 
an anti-intellectualist4 ,reason1 the   
proper duty of which is to prescribe a  
discipline to all other endeavours1     

itself requires discipline2 and when it 
is employed in the metaphysical sphere1 
independently of experience1 it demands 
not merely the correction of single     
errors1 but the eradication of their    
causes through 8a separate negative     
code10 such as a ,critical philosophy   
can alone supply4 ,in the               
,transcendental ,doctrine of ,elements  
this demand has been met as regards the 
materials or contents of the ,critical  
system2 we are now concerned only with  
its methods or formal conditions4#afhf  
,this distinction is highly artificial4 
,as already indicated1 it is determined 
by the requirements of ,kant's          
architectonic4 ,the entire teaching of  
the ,methodology has already been more  
or less exhaustively expounded in the   
earlier divisions of the ,critique4     
,,section ,i  ,,the ,,discipline ,,of   
,,pure ,,reason ,,in ,,its ,,dogmatic   
,,employment  ,in dealing with the      
distinction between mathematical and    
philosophical knowledge1 ,kant is here  

returning to one of the main points of  
his ,introduction to the ,critique4#afhg
 ,his most exhaustive treatment of it   
is1 however1 to be found in a treatise  
which he wrote as early as #agfd1 his   
,enquiry into the ,clearness of the     
,principles of ,natural ,theology and   
,morals4 ,the continued influence of the
 teaching of that early work is obvious 
throughout this section1 and largely    
accounts for the form in which certain  
of its tenets are propounded4           
8444one can say with ,bishop ,warburton 
that nothing has been more              
injurious to philosophy than            
mathematics1 that is1 than the          
imitation of its method in a sphere     
where it is impossible of               
application44440#afhh  ,so far from     
being identical in general nature1      
mathematics and philosophy are1 ,kant   
declares1 fundamentally opposed in all  
essential features4 ,for it is in their 
methods1 and not merely in their        
subject-matter1 that the essential      

difference between them is to be        
found4#afhi ,philosophical knowledge can
 be acquired only through concepts1     
mathematical knowledge is gained through
 the construction of concepts4#afij ,the
 one is discursive merely2 the other is 
intuitive4 ,philosophy can consider the 
particular only in the general2         
mathematics studies the general in the  
particular4#afia ,philosophical         
concepts1 such as those of substance and
 causality1 are1 indeed1 capable of     
application in transcendental synthesis1
 but in this employment they yield only 
empirical knowledge of the sensuously   
given2 and from empirical concepts the  
universal and necessary judgments       
required for the possibility of         
metaphysical science can never be       
obtained4  ,the exactness of mathematics
 depends on definitions1 axioms1 and    
demonstrations1 none of which are       
obtainable in philosophy4 ,to take each 
in order4  ,i4 ,definitions4--,to define
 in the manner prescribed by mathematics

 is to represent the complete concept of
 a thing4 ,this is never possible in    
regard to empirical concepts4 ,we are   
more certain of their denotation than of
 their connotation2 and though they may 
be explained1 they cannot be defined4   
,since new observations add or remove   
predicates1 an empirical concept is     
always liable to modification4          
8,what useful purpose could be served by
 defining an empirical      concept1    
such1 for instance1 as that of water8   
,when we speak of      water and its    
properties1 we do not stop short at what
 is thought      in the word water1 but 
proceed to experiments4 ,the word1 with 
the      few marks which are attached to
 it1 is more properly to be regarded    
as merely a designation than as a       
conception4 ,the so-called              
definition is nothing more than a       
determining of the word40#afib  ,exact  
definition is equally impossible in     
regard to a priori forms1 such as time  
or causality4 ,since they are not framed

 by the mind1 but are given to it1 the  
completeness of our analysis of them can
 never be guaranteed4 ,though they are  
known1 they are known only as problems4 
8,as ,augustine has said1 #8,i know well
 what time is1 but if any one      asks 
me1 ,i cannot tell4'0#afic              
,mathematical definitions make concepts2
 philosophical definitions only explain 
them4#afid ,philosophy cannot1          
therefore1 imitate mathematics by       
beginning with definitions4 ,in         
philosophy the incomplete exposition    
must precede the complete2 definitions  
are the final outcome of our enquiry1   
and not as in mathematics the only      
possible beginning of its proofs4       
,indeed1 the mathematical concept may be
 said to be given by the very process in
 which it is constructively defined2    
and1 as thus originating in the process 
of definition1 it can never be          
erroneous4#afie ,philosophy1 on the     
other hand1 swarms with faulty          
definitions1 which are none the less    

serviceable4       8,in mathematics     
definition belongs ad esse1 in          
philosophy ad      melius esse4 ,it is  
desirable to attain it1 but often very  
difficult4 ,jurists are still without a 
definition of their concept      of     
,right40#afif  ,,ii4 ,axioms4--,this    
paragraph is extremely misleading as a  
statement of ,kant's view regarding the 
nature of geometrical axioms4 ,in       
stating that they are self-evident1#afig
 he does not really mean to assert what 
that phrase usually involves1 namely1   
absolute a priori validity4 ,for ,kant  
the geometrical axioms are merely       
descriptions of certain de facto        
properties of the given intuition of    
space4 ,they have the merely            
hypothetical validity of all            
propositions that refer to the          
contingently given4 ,for even as a pure 
intuition1 space belongs to the realm of
 the merely factual4#afih ,this         
un-,critical opposition of the          
self-evidence of geometrical axioms to  

the synthetic character of such         
8philosophical0 truths as the principle 
of causality is bound up with ,kant's   
unreasoned conviction that space in     
order to be space at all1 must be       
,euclidean4#afii ,kant's reference in   
this paragraph to the propositions of   
arithmetic is equally open to criticism4
 ,for though he is more consistent in   
recognising their synthetic character1  
he still speaks as if they could be     
described as self-evident1 i4e4 as      
immediately certain4 ,the cause of this 
inconsistency is1 of course1 to be found
 in his intuitional theory of           
mathematical science4 ,mathematical     
propositions are obtained through       
intuition2 those of philosophy call for 
an elaborate and difficult process of   
transcendental deduction4 ,when modern  
mathematical theory rejects this        
intuitional view1 it is really extending
 to mathematical concepts ,kant's own   
interpretation of the function of the   
categories4 ,concepts condition the     

possibility of intuitional experience1  
and find in this conditioning power the 
ground of their objective validity4#agjj
 ,here1 as in the ,aesthetic1#agja ,kant
 fails adequately to distinguish between
 the problems of pure and applied       
mathematics4  ,,iii4                    
,demonstrations4--,kant again introduces
 his very unsatisfactory doctrine of the
 construction of concepts3#agjb and he  
even goes so far as to maintain1 in     
complete violation of his own doctrine  
of transcendental deduction1 that where 
there is no intuition1 there can be no  
demonstration4 ,apodictic propositions1 
he declares1 are either dogmata or      
mathemata2 and the former are beyond the
 competence of the human mind4 ,but no  
sooner has he made these statements than
 he virtually withdraws them by adding  
that1 though apodictic propositions     
cannot be established directly from     
concepts1 they can be indirectly proved 
by reference to something purely        
contingent1 namely1 possible experience4

 ,thus the principle of causality can be
 apodictically proved as a condition of 
possible experience4 ,though it may not 
be called a dogma1 it can be entitled a 
principle6 ,in explanation of this      
distinction1 which betrays a lingering  
regard for the self-evident maxims of   
rationalistic teaching1 ,kant adds that 
the principle of causality1 though a    
principle1 has itself to be proved4     
8444it has the peculiarity that it first
 makes possible its own      ground of  
proof1 namely1 experience44440#agjc     
,this1 as we have noted1#agjd is exactly
 what mathematical axioms must also be  
able to do1 if they are to establish    
their objective validity4   ,,section   
,,ii  ,,the ,,discipline ,,of ,,pure    
,,reason ,,in ,,its ,,polemical         
,,employment  ,this section contains an 
admirable defence of the value of       
scepticism4       8,even poisons have   
their use4 ,they serve to counteract    
other      poisons generated in our     
system1 and must have a place in every  

complete pharmacopeia4 ,the objections  
against the persuasions and             
complacency of our purely speculative   
,reason arise from the very      nature 
of ,reason itself1 and must therefore   
have their own good use      and        
purpose1 which ought not to be          
disdained4 ,why has ,providence         
placed many things which are closely    
bound up with our highest      interests
 so far beyond our reach1 that we are   
only permitted to      apprehend them in
 a manner lacking in clearness and      
subject to      doubt1 in such fashion  
that our enquiring gaze is more excited 
than      satisfied8 ,it is at least    
doubtful whether it serves any useful   
purpose1 and whether it is not1 indeed1 
perhaps even harmful to      venture    
upon bold interpretations of such       
uncertain appearances4      ,but there  
can be no manner of doubt that it is    
always best to grant      ,reason       
complete liberty1 both of enquiry and of
 criticism1 so that      it may be      

without hindrance in attending to its   
own proper      interests4 ,these       
interests are no less furthered by the  
limitation      than by the extension of
 its speculations2 and they will always 
suffer when outside influences intervene
 to divert it from its      natural     
path1 and to constrain it by what is    
irrelevant to its own      proper       
ends40#agje 8,whenever ,i hear that a   
writer of real ability      has         
demonstrated away the freedom of the    
human will1 the hope of a      future   
life1 and the existence of ,god1 ,i am  
eager to read the book1      for ,i     
expect him by his talents to increase my
 insight into these      matters40#agjf 
,,section ,,iv#agjg  ,,the ,,discipline 
,,of ,,pure ,,reason ,,in ,,regard ,,to 
,,its ,,proofs#agjh  ,this section      
merely restates the general nature and  
requirements of transcendental proof4   
,the exposition is much less            
satisfactory than that already given in 
the ,analytic and ,dialectic4 ,the only 

really new factor is the distinction    
between apagogical and direct proof4    
,the former may produce conviction1 but 
cannot enable us to comprehend the      
grounds of the truth of our conviction4 
,also1 outside mathematics1 it is       
extremely dangerous to attempt to       
establish a thesis by showing its       
contradictory to be impossible4#agji    
,this is especially true in the sphere  
of our ,critical enquiries1 since the   
chief danger to be guarded against is   
the confounding of the subjectively     
necessary with the independently real4  
,in this field of investigation it is   
never permissible to attempt to justify 
a synthetic proposition by refuting its 
opposite4 ,such seeming proofs can      
easily be secured1 and have been the    
favourite weapons of dogmatic thinkers4 
8,each must defend his position         
directly1 by a legitimate proof that    
carries with it transcendental deduction
 of the grounds upon which      it is   
itself made to rest4 ,only when this has

 been done1 are we in      a position to
 decide how far its claims allow of     
rational      justification4 ,if an     
opponent relies on subjective grounds1  
it is      an easy matter to refute him4
 ,the dogmatist cannot1 however1 profit 
by this advantage4 ,his own judgments   
are1 as a rule1 no less      dependent  
upon subjective influences2 and he can  
himself in turn be      similarly       
cornered4 ,but if both parties proceed  
by the direct      method1 either they  
will soon discover the difficulty1 nay1 
the      impossibility1 of showing      
reason for their assertions1 and will be
      left with no resort save to appeal
 to some form of prescriptive           
authority2 or the ,critique will the    
more easily discover the      illusion  
to which their dogmatic procedure is    
due2 and pure ,reason      will be      
compelled to relinquish its exaggerated 
pretensions in the      realm of        
speculation1 and to withdraw within the 
limits of its      proper               

territory--that of practical            
principles40#agaj     ,,chapter ,,ii    
,,the ,,canon#agaa ,,of ,,pure ,,reason 
,,section ,i  ,,the ,,ultimate ,,end    
,,of ,,the ,,pure ,,use ,,of ,,our      
,,reason#agab  ,the problems of the     
existence of ,god1 the freedom of the   
will1 and the immortality of the soul   
have1 ,kant declares1 little theoretical
 interest4 ,for1 as he has already      
argued1 even if we were justified in    
postulating ,god1 freedom1 and          
immortality1 they would not enable us to
 account for the phenomena of           
sense-experience1 the only objects of   
possible knowledge4 ,but the three      
problems are also connected with our    
practical interests1 and in that        
reference they constitute the chief     
subject of metaphysical enquiry4#agac   
,the practical is whatever is possible  
through freedom2 and the decision as to 
what we ought to do is the supreme      
interest of pure ,reason in its highest 
employment4       8444the ultimate      

intention of ,nature in her wise        
provision for us      has indeed1 in the
 constitution of our ,reason1 been      
directed to our      moral interests    
alone40#agad  ,this is the position     
which ,kant endeavours to establish in  
his ,foundations of the ,metaphysics of 
,morals1 and in the ,critique of        
,practical ,reason4 ,the very brief     
outline which he here gives of his      
argument is necessarily incomplete2 and 
is in consequence somewhat misleading4  
,he first disposes of the problem of    
freedom2 and does so in a manner which  
shows that he had not1 when this section
 was composed1 developed his ,critical  
views on the nature of moral freedom4   
,he is for the present content to draw a
 quite un-,critical distinction between 
transcendental and practical            
freedom4#agae ,the latter belongs to the
 will in so far as it is determined by  
,reason alone1 independently of sensuous
 impulses4 ,reason prescribes objective 
laws of freedom1 and the will under the 

influence of these laws overcomes the   
affections of sense4 ,such practical    
freedom can1 ,kant asserts1 be proved by
 experience to be a natural cause4      
,transcendental freedom1#agaf on the    
other hand1 i4e4 the power of making a  
new beginning in the series of          
phenomena1 is a problem which can never 
be empirically solved4 ,it is a purely  
speculative question with which ,reason 
in its practical employment is not in   
the least concerned4 ,the canon of pure 
,reason has therefore to deal only with 
the two remaining problems1 ,god and    
immortality4 ,comment upon these        
assertions can best be made in          
connection with the argument of the next
 section4#agag   ,,section ,,ii  ,,the  
,,ideal ,,of ,,the ,,highest ,,good1    
,,as ,a ,,determining ,,ground ,,of     
,,the ,,ultimate ,,end ,,of ,,pure      
,,reason#agah  ,reason in its           
speculative employment transcends       
experience1 but solely for the sake of  
experience4 ,in other words1 speculative

 ,reason has a purely empirical         
function4 7,this is the explanation of  
the somewhat paradoxical contention1 to 
which ,kant has already committed       
himself1 that the problems of ,god and  
immortality1 though seemingly           
speculative in character1 really        
originate in our practical interests47  
,but pure ,reason has also a practical  
use2 and it is in this latter employment
 that it first discloses the genuinely  
metaphysical character of its present   
constitution and ultimate aims4 ,the    
moral consciousness1 in revealing to us 
an ,ideal of absolute value1 places in  
our hands the only available key to the 
mysteries of existence4 ,as this moral  
consciousness represents the deepest    
reality of human life1 it may be        
expected to have greater metaphysical   
significance than anything else in human
 experience2 and since the ends which it
 reveals also present themselves as     
absolute in value1 and are indeed the   
only absolute values of which we can    

form any conception1 this conclusion    
would seem to be confirmed4  ,happiness 
has natural value2 morality1 i4e4 the   
being worthy to be happy1 has absolute  
value4 ,the means of attaining the      
former obtain expression in prudential  
or pragmatic laws that are empirically  
grounded4 ,the conditions of the latter 
are embodied in a categorical imperative
 of an a priori character4 ,the former  
advise us how best to satisfy our       
natural desire for happiness2 the latter
 dictates to us how we must behave in   
order to deserve happiness4  ,kant's    
further argument is too condensed to be 
really clear1 and if adequately         
discussed would carry us quite beyond   
the legitimate limits of this           
,commentary4 ,i shall therefore confine 
myself to a brief and free restatement  
of his general position4 ,the ,critical 
teaching can be described as resulting  
in a new interpretation of the function 
of philosophy4#agai ,the task of the    
philosopher1 properly viewed1 does not  

consist in the solution of speculative  
problems2 such problems transcend our   
human powers4 ,all that philosophy can  
reasonably attempt is to analyse and    
define the situations1 cognitive and    
practical1 in which1 owing to the       
specific conditions of human existence1 
we find ourselves to be placed4 ,upon   
analysis of the cognitive situation     
,kant discovers that while all          
possibilities are open1 the theoretical 
data are never such as to justify       
ontological assertions4#agbj ,when1     
however1 he passes to the practical     
situation1 wider horizons1 definitely   
outlined1 at once present themselves4   
,the moral consciousness is the key to  
the meaning of the entire universe as   
well as of human life4 ,its values are  
the sole ultimate values1 and enable us 
to interpret in moral terms 7even though
 we cannot comprehend in any genuinely  
theoretical fashion7 the meaning of the 
dispensation under which we live4 ,the  
moral consciousness1 like               

sense-experience1 discloses upon        
examination a systematic unity of       
presupposed conditions4 ,in the         
theoretical sphere this unity cannot be 
proved to be more than a postulated     
,ideal of empirical experience2 and it  
is an ,ideal which1 even if granted to  
have absolute validity1 is too          
indefinite to enable us to assert that  
ultimate reality is spiritual in        
character1 or is teleologically ordered4
 ,the underlying conditions1 on the     
other hand1 of practical experience have
 from the start a purely noumenal       
reference4 ,they have no other function 
than to define1 in terms of the moral   
consciousness1 the ultimate meaning of  
reality as a whole4 ,they postulate#agba
 a universe in which the values of      
spiritual experience are supported and  
conserved4  ,but the main difference in 
,kant's treatment of the two situations1
 cognitive and practical1 only emerges  
into view when we recognise the         
differing modes in which the            

transcendental method of proof is       
applied in the two cases4 ,the a priori 
forms of sensibility1 understanding1 and
 ,reason are proved by reference to     
possible experience1 as being its       
indispensable conditions4 ,in moral     
matters1 however1 we must not appeal to 
experience4 ,the actual is no test of   
the ,ideal2 8what is0 is no test of what
 ought to be4 ,and secondly1 the moral  
law1 if valid at all1 must apply not    
merely within the limits of experience1 
but with absolute universality to all   
rational beings4 ,the moral law1        
therefore1 can neither be given us in   
experience1 nor be proved as one of the 
conditions necessary to its possibility4
 ,its validity1 in other words1 can be  
established neither through experience  
nor through theoretical reason4  ,though
 such is ,kant's own method of          
formulating the issue1 it exaggerates   
the difference of his procedure in the  
two ,critiques1 and is very misleading  
as a statement of his real position4 ,in

 one passage1 in the ,critique of       
,practical ,reason1#agbb ,kant does1    
indeed1 assert that the moral law       
requires no deduction4 ,it is1 he       
claims1 a fact of which we are a priori 
conscious3 so far from itself requiring 
proof1 it enables us to prove the       
reality of freedom4 ,yet in the very    
same section he argues that the         
deduction of freedom from the moral law 
is a credential of the latter1 and is a 
sufficient substitute for all a priori  
justification4 ,according to the first  
statement we have an immediate          
consciousness of the validity of the    
moral law2 according to the second      
statement the moral law proves itself   
indirectly1 by serving as a principle   
for the deduction of freedom4 ,the      
second form of statement alone          
harmonises with the argument developed  
in the third section of the ,foundations
 of the ,metaphysics of ,morals1 and    
more correctly expresses the intention  
of ,kant's central argument in the      

,critique of ,practical ,reason4 ,for   
the difference between the two          
transcendental proofs in the two        
,critiques does not really consist in   
any diversity of method1 but solely in  
the differing character of the premisses
 from which each starts4 ,the ambiguity 
of ,kant's argument in the second       
,critique seems chiefly to be caused by 
his failure clearly to recognise that   
the moral law1 though a form of pure    
,reason1 exercises1 in the process of   
its transcendental proof1 a function    
which exactly corresponds to that which 
is discharged by possible experience in 
the first ,critique4 ,our consciousness 
of the moral law is1 like               
sense-experience1 a given fact4 ,it is  
de facto1 and cannot be deduced from    
anything more ultimate than itself4#agbc
 ,but as given1 it enables us to deduce 
its transcendental conditions4 ,this    
does not mean that our immediate        
consciousness of it as given guarantees 
its validity4 ,the nature of its        

validity is established only in the     
process whereby it reveals its necessary
 implications4 ,the objects of          
sense-experience are assumed by ordinary
 consciousness to be absolutely real2 in
 the process of establishing the        
transcendental conditions of such       
experience they are discovered to be    
merely phenomenal4 ,the pure principles 
of understanding thus gain objective    
validity as the conditions of a given   
experience which reveals only           
appearances4 ,ordinary consciousness    
similarly starts from the assumption of 
the absolute validity of the moral law4 
,but in this case the consciousness of  
the law is discovered on examination to 
be explicable1 even as a possibility1   
only on the assumption that it is due to
 the autonomous activity of a noumenal  
being4 ,by its existence it proves the  
conditions through which alone it is    
explicable4 ,its mere existence suffices
 to prove that its validity is objective
 in a deeper and truer sense than the   

principles of understanding4 ,the notion
 of freedom1 and therefore all the      
connected ,ideas of pure ,reason1 gain  
noumenal reality as the conditions of a 
moral consciousness which is incapable  
of explanation as illusory or even      
phenomenal4 ,since the consciousness of 
the moral law is thus noumenally        
grounded1 it has a validity with which  
nothing in the phenomenal world can     
possibly compare4 ,it is the one form in
 which noumenal reality directly        
discloses itself to the human mind4#agbd
  ,obviously the essential crux of      
,kant's argument lies in the proof that 
the moral consciousness is only         
explicable in this manner1 as the       
self-legislation of a noumenal being4   
,into the merits of his argument we     
cannot1 however1 here enter2 and ,i need
 only draw attention to the manner in   
which it conflicts with the statement of
 the preceding section1 that the        
possibility of transcendental freedom is
 a purely speculative question with     

which practical ,reason is not          
concerned4 ,the reality of freedom1 as a
 form of noumenal activity1 is the      
cardinal fact of ,kant's metaphysics of 
morals4 ,for though our consciousness of
 the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi 
of freedom1 transcendental freedom is   
the ratio essendi of the moral law4#agbe
       8,with this faculty of practical 
,reason1 transcendental freedom is      
also established2 freedom1 namely1 in   
that absolute sense in which            
speculative ,reason required it1 in its 
use of the concept of      causality1 in
 order to escape the antinomy into which
 it inevitably      falls1 when in the  
chain of cause and effect it tries to   
think the      unconditioned4444        
,freedom is the only one of all the     
,ideas of the      speculative ,reason  
of which we know the possibility a      
priori      7without1 however1          
understanding it71 because it is the    
condition      of the moral law which we
 know40#agbf 0,freedom is the only one  

of all the ,ideas of pure ,reason whose 
object is a thing of fact and      to be
 reckoned among the scibilia40#agbg 8,it
 is thus very      remarkable that of   
the three pure rational ,ideas1 ,god1   
freedom1 and      immortality1 that of  
freedom is the only concept of the      
supersensible which 7by means of the    
causality that is thought in      it7   
proves its objective reality in nature  
by means of the effects      it can     
produce there2 and thus renders possible
 the connection of      both the others 
with nature1 and of all three with one  
another so      as to form a            
,religion4444 ,the concept of freedom   
7as fundamental      concept of all     
unconditioned practical laws7 can extend
 ,reason      beyond those bounds within
 which every natural 7theoretical7      
concept must inevitably remain          
confined40#agbh  ,thus freedom is for   
,kant a demonstrated fact1 and in that  
respect differs from the ,ideas of ,god 
and immortality1 which are merely       

problematic conceptions1 and which can  
be postulated only as articles of       
8practical faith40  ,this brings us to  
the final question1 upon what grounds   
,kant ascribes validity to the ,ideas of
 ,god and immortality4 ,at this point in
 his argument ,kant introduces the      
conception of the ,summum ,bonum4       
,reason1 in prescribing the moral law1  
prescribes1 as the final and complete   
end of all our actions1 the ,summum     
,bonum1 i4e4 happiness proportioned to  
moral worth4 ,owing to the limitations  
of our faculties1 the complete          
attainment of this supreme end is       
conceivable by us only on the assumption
 of a future life wherein perfect       
worthiness may be attained1 and of an   
omnipotent ,divine ,being who will      
apportion happiness in accordance with  
merit4       0,this ,divine ,being must 
be omnipotent1 in order that the whole  
of      nature and its relation to      
morality 444 may be subject to his will2
      omniscient1 that he may know our  

innermost sentiments and their          
moral worth2 omnipresent1 that he may be
 immediately present for      the       
satisfying of every need which the      
highest good demands2      eternal1 that
 this harmony of nature and freedom may 
never fail1      etc40#agbi  ,the moral 
ideal thus supplies us with a           
ground#agcj for regarding the universe  
as systematically ordered according to  
moral purposes1 and also with a         
principle that enables us to infer the  
nature and properties of its ,supreme   
,cause4 ,in place of a demonology1 which
 is all that physical theology can      
establish1 we construct upon moral      
grounds a genuine theology4  ,the       
concepts thus obtained are1 however1    
anthropomorphic2 and for that reason    
alone must be denied all speculative    
value4 ,this is especially evident in   
regard to the ,idea of ,god4 ,owing to  
our incapacity to comprehend how moral  
merit can condition happiness1 we       
conceive them as externally combined    

through the intervention of a supreme   
,judge and ,ruler4 ,as ,kant            
indicates1#agca we must not assert that 
this represents the actual situation4   
,he himself seems to have inclined to a 
more mystical interpretation of the     
universe1 conceiving the relation of    
happiness to virtue as being grounded in
 a supersensuous but necessary order    
that may1 indeed1 be bodied forth in the
 inadequate symbols of the deistic      
creed1 but which in its true nature     
transcends our powers of understanding4 
,so far as the ,ideas of ,god and       
immortality are necessary to define the 
moral standpoint1 they have genuine     
validity for all moral beings2 but if   
developed on their own account as       
speculative dogmas1 they acquire a      
definiteness of formulation which is not
 essential to their moral function1 and 
which lays them open to suspicion even  
in their legitimate use4  ,these        
considerations also indicate ,kant's    
further reason for entitling the ,summum

 ,bonum1 ,god and immortality1 ,ideas of
 faith4 ,though they can be established 
as presuppositions of the moral         
situation in which we find ourselves1   
such demonstration itself rests upon the
 acceptance of the moral consciousness  
as possessing a supersensuous sanction2 
and that in turn is determined by       
features in the moral situation not     
deducible from any higher order of      
considerations4       8,belief in       
matters of faith is a belief in a pure  
practical point      of view1 i4e4 a    
moral faith1 which proves nothing for   
theoretical1 pure1 rational cognition1  
but only for that which is              
practical and directed to the fulfilment
 of its duties2 it in no      way       
extends speculation4444 ,if the supreme 
principle of all moral      laws is a   
postulate1 the possibility of its       
highest ,object 444 is      thereby     
postulated along with it40#agcb 8,so    
far1 as practical      ,reason has the  
right to yield us guidance1 we shall not

 look upon      actions as obligatory   
because they are the commands of ,god1  
but      shall regard them as divine    
commands because we have an inward      
obligation to them4444 ,moral theology  
is thus of immanent use only4      ,it  
enables us to fulfil our vocation in    
this present world by      showing us   
how to adapt ourselves to the system of 
all ends1 and by      warning us against
 the fanaticism and indeed the impiety  
of      abandoning the guidance of a    
morally legislative ,reason in the      
right conduct of our lives1 in order to 
derive guidance directly      from the  
,idea of the ,supreme ,being4 ,for we   
should then be making a                 
transcendent employment of moral        
theology2 and that1 like a              
transcendent use of pure speculation1   
must pervert and frustrate      the     
ultimate ends of ,reason40#agcc         
,,section ,,iii  ,,opining1 ,,knowing1  
,,and ,,believing#agcd  ,kant first     
distinguishes between conviction        

7,ueberzeugung7 and persuasion          
7,ueberredung74 ,a judgment which is    
objectively grounded1 and which is      
therefore valid for all other rational  
beings1 is affirmed with conviction4    
,when the affirmation is due only to the
 peculiar character of the subject1 the 
manner in which it is asserted may be   
entitled persuasion4 ,persuasion is     
therefore 8a mere illusion40#agce       
,conviction exists in three degrees1    
opinion1 belief1 and knowledge4 ,in     
opinion we are conscious that the       
judgment is insufficiently grounded1 and
 that our conviction is subjectively    
incomplete4 ,in belief the subjective   
conviction is complete1 but is          
recognised as lacking in objective      
justification4 ,in knowledge the        
objective grounds and the subjective    
conviction are alike complete4  ,after  
pointing out that opinion is not        
permissible in judgments of pure        
,reason1#agcf ,kant develops the further
 distinction between pragmatic or       

doctrinal belief and moral belief4 ,when
 a belief is contingent 7i4e4 is        
affirmed with the consciousness that on 
fuller knowledge it may turn out to be  
false71 and yet nevertheless supplies a 
ground for the employment of means to   
certain desired ends1 it may be called  
pragmatic belief4 ,such belief admits of
 degree1 and can be tested by wager or  
by oath4#agcg ,what may be called       
doctrinal belief is analogous in        
character1 and is taken by ,kant1 in    
somewhat misleading fashion1 as         
describing our mode of accepting such   
doctrines as the existence of ,god and  
the immortality of the soul4#agch ,they 
are adopted as helpful towards a        
contingent but important end1 the       
discovery of order in the system of     
nature4 ,this account of the nature of  
,ideas is in line with ,kant's early    
view of them as merely regulative4      
,taken in connection with his repeated  
employment of the term #8moral          
sentiments' 7moralische ,gesinnungen71  

it tends to prove that this section is  
early in date of writing4  ,in moral    
belief the end1 the ,summum ,bonum1 is  
absolutely necessary1 and as there is   
only one condition under which we can   
conceive it as being realised1 namely1  
on the assumption of the existence of   
,god and of a future life1 the belief in
 ,god and immortality possesses the same
 certainty as the moral sentiments4     
8,the belief in a ,god and another world
 is so interwoven with my      moral    
sentiment that as there is little danger
 of my losing the      latter1 there is 
equally little cause for fear that the  
former can      ever be taken from      
me40#agci  ,as ,i have just suggested1  
this basing of moral belief upon        
subjective sentiments1 which1 as ,kant  
very inconsistently proceeds to suggest1
 may possibly be lacking in certain men1
 marks this section as being of early   
origin4 ,but in concluding the section1 
in reply to the objection that1 in thus 
tracing such articles of faith to our   

8natural interest0 in morality1         
philosophy admits its powerlessness to  
advance beyond the ordinary             
understanding1 ,kant propounds one of   
his abiding convictions1 namely1 that in
 matters which concern all men without  
distinction nature is not guilty of any 
partial distribution of her gifts1 and  
that in regard to the essential ends of 
human nature the highest philosophy     
cannot advance beyond what is revealed  
to the common understanding4#agdj ,the  
reverence which ,kant ever cherished for
 the memory of his parents1 and for the 
religion which was so natural to them1  
must have predisposed him to a          
recognition of the widespread sources of
 the spiritual life4 ,but ,kant has     
himself placed on record his sense of   
the great debt which in this connection 
he also owed to the teaching of         
,rousseau4       8,i am by disposition  
an enquirer4 ,i feel the consuming      
thirst for      knowledge1 the eager    
unrest to advance ever further1 and the 

delights of discovery4 ,there was a time
 when ,i believed that this      is what
 confers real dignity upon human life1  
and ,i despised the      common people  
who know nothing4 ,rousseau has set me  
right4 ,this      imagined advantage    
vanishes4 ,i learn to honor men1 and    
should      regard myself as of much    
less use than the common labourer1 if ,i
      did not believe that my philosophy
 will restore to all men the      common
 rights of humanity40#agda  ,the        
sublimity of the starry heavens and the 
imperative of the moral law are ever    
present influences on the life of man2  
and they require for their apprehension 
no previous initiation through science  
and philosophy4 ,the naked eye reveals  
the former2 of the latter all men are   
immediately aware4#agdb ,in their       
universal appeal they are of the very   
substance of human existence4           
,philosophy may avail to counteract the 
hindrances which prevent them from      
exercising their native influence2 it   

cannot be a substitute for the          
inspiration which they alone can yield4 
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,architectonic  
,,of ,,pure ,,reason#agdc               
,adickes#agdd very justly remarks that  
8this is a section after ,kant's own    
heart1 in which there is presented1     
almost unsought1 the opportunity1 which 
he elsewhere so frequently creates for  
himself1 of indulging in his favourite  
hobby40 ,the section is of slight       
scientific importance1 and is chiefly of
 interest for the light which it casts  
upon ,kant's personality4 ,moreover the 
distinctions which ,kant here draws are 
for the most part not his own           
philosophical property1 but are taken   
over from the ,wolffian system4  ,the   
distinctions may be exhibited in tabular
 form as follows3#agde                  
,,knowledge                             
----------------------------------------
-----------------------------------     
,historical                             
or                                      

empirical                  ,rational    
7cognitio ex principiis7                
7cognitio                               
ex datis7                               
----------------------------------------
---------------------                   
-----------,mathe- ,philosophical#agdf  
7based on pure concepts73--meta-        
matics1 physics in the widest sense4    
,empi-,empi-based                       
----------------------------------------
---------------   ricalricalon the      
,prop- ,system of pure reason1 both     
practical and                           
phys-anth-constr-aedeu-speculative3     
metaphysics in the wider sense4         
iolo-ropo-uction tic3                   
----------------------------------------
--------   gy   logy of con-,cri-       
,metaph-,metaphysics 7in a more limited 
sense7 of             cepts4 tique4ysics
   nature1#agdg i4e4 of all that is4    
of                                      
mor-------------------------------------
----                          als1      

i4e4,trans- ,physiology of pure reason4 
of all cend-                            
--------------------------------        
ought  ental    ,immanent4              
,transcendent4                          
to be4 phil-                            
-------------------------------         
osophy ,rat- ,rat-  ,cosmology ,theology
                                 of     
pureionalional                          
reason3phy- psych-    ----------        
ontol- sics4ology4,metaphysics in the   
ogy4#agdh          most limited sense4  
----------------------------------------
-----------------------------------     
,kant further distinguishes between the 
8scholastic0 and the 8universal0 or     
traditional meaning of the term         
philosophy4#agdi ,in the former sense   
philosophy is viewed from the point of  
view of its logical perfection1 and the 
philosopher appears as an artist of     
,reason4#agej ,philosophy in the broader
 and higher sense is 8the science of the
 relation of all knowledge to the       

essential ends of human ,reason40#agea  
,the philosopher then appears as the    
lawgiver of human ,reason4 ,of the      
essential ends1 the ultimate end is     
man's moral destiny2 to this the other  
essential ends of human ,reason are     
subordinate means4 ,for though the      
legislation of human ,reason concerns   
nature as well as freedom1 and has      
therefore to be dealt with by a         
philosophy of nature1 i4e4 of all that  
is1 as well as by a philosophy of       
morals1 i4e4 of that which ought to be1 
the former is subordinate to the latter 
in the same degree in which in human    
life knowledge is subordinate to moral  
action4 ,whereas speculative metaphysics
 serves rather to ward off errors than  
to extend knowledge1#ageb in the        
metaphysics of morals 8all culture      
,kultur of human ,reason0#agec finds its
 indispensable completion4  ,empirical  
psychology is excluded from the domain  
of metaphysics4 ,it is destined to form 
part of a complete system of            

anthropology1 the pendant to the        
empirical doctrine of nature4#aged      
,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the ,,history ,,of    
,,pure ,,reason#agee   ,this title1 as  
,kant states1 is inserted only to mark  
the place of the present chapter in a   
complete system of pure reason4 ,the    
very cursory outline1 which alone ,kant 
here attempts to give1 merely repeats   
the main historical distinctions of     
which the ,critique has made use4 ,the  
contrast between the sensationalism of  
,epicurus and the intellectualism of    
,plato has been developed in ,a #dfe ff4
  ,b #dic ff4#agef ,the contrast between
 ,locke and ,leibniz is dwelt upon in ,a
 #dc ff4  ,b #fj ff4 and ,a #bgj ff4  ,b
 #cbf ff4 ,under the title #8naturalist 
of pure ,reason' ,kant is referring to  
the #8common sense' school1 which is    
typically represented by ,beattie4#ageg 
,in his ,logic#ageh ,kant gives a fuller
 account of his interpretation of the   
history of philosophy4     ,,appendix ,b
  ,a ,,more ,,detailed ,,statement ,,of 

,,kant',s ,,relations ,,to ,,his        
,,philosophical ,,predecessors#agei     
,the development of philosophy1 prior to
 ,kant1 had rendered two problems       
especially prominent--the problem of    
sense-perception and the problem of     
judgment4 ,the one raises the question  
of the interrelation of mind knowing and
 objects known2 the other treats of the 
connection holding between subject and  
predicate in the various forms of       
judgment4 ,the one enquires how it is   
possible to know reality2 the other     
seeks to determine the criterion of     
truth4 ,these two problems are1 as ,kant
 discovered1 inseparable from one       
another2 and the logical is the more    
fundamental of the two4 ,indeed it was  
,hume's analysis of the judgment        
involved in the causal principle that   
enabled ,kant to formulate his ,critical
 solution of the problem of perception4 
,in this ,appendix ,i propose to follow 
these problems as they rise into view in
 the systems of ,descartes and his      

successors4  ,galileo's revolutionary   
teaching regarding the nature of motion 
was the immediate occasion of           
,descartes' restatement of the problem  
of perception4 ,that teaching           
necessitated an entirely new view of the
 nature of matter1 and consequently of  
the interrelation of mind and body4     
,questions never before seriously       
entertained now became pressing4 ,the   
solutions had to be as novel as the     
situation which they were designed to   
meet4  ,these new problems arose in the 
following manner4 ,according to the     
medieval view1 motion may properly be   
conceived on the analogy of human       
activity4 ,it comes into being1 exhausts
 itself in exercise1 and ceases to be4  
,it is a fleeting activity2 only its    
8material0 and 8formal0 conditions have 
any permanence of existence4 ,according 
to ,galileo's teaching1 on the other    
hand1 motion is as different from human 
activity as matter is from mind4 ,it is 
ingenerable and indestructible4 ,we know

 it only through the effect which in    
some incomprehensible fashion it        
produces in those bodies into which it  
enters1 namely1 their translation from  
one part of space to another4 ,that this
 translatory motion is called by the    
same name as the power which generates  
it1 doubtless in some degree accounts   
for the fact that our understanding of  
the one tends to conceal from us our    
entire ignorance of the other4#agfj ,we 
have only to reflect1 however1 in order 
to realise that motion is completely    
mysterious in its intrinsic dynamical   
nature4 ,we cannot1 for instance1       
profess to comprehend1 even in the least
 degree1 how motion1 though incapable of
 existing apart from matter1 should yet 
be sufficiently independent to be able  
to pass from one body to another4       
,descartes1 following out some of the   
chief consequences of this new teaching1
 concluded that matter is passive and   
inert1 that it is distinguished neither 
by positive nor by negative properties  

from the space which it fills1 and that 
it is to motion that all the articulated
 organisation of animate and inanimate  
nature is due4 ,descartes failed1       
indeed1 to appreciate the dynamical     
character of motion1 and by constantly  
speaking as if it were reducible to the 
translatory motion1 in which it         
manifests itself1 he represented it as  
known in all its essential features4    
,none the less1 the rles previously     
assigned to matter and motion are1 in   
,descartes' system1 completely reversed4
 ,matter is subordinated to motion as   
the instrument to the agency by which it
 is directed and shaped4 ,on the older  
view1 material bodies had1 through the  
possession of formative and vital       
forces1 all manner of intrinsic powers4 
,by the new view these composite and    
nondescript existences are resolved into
 two elements1 all the properties of    
which can be quantitatively             
defined--into a matter which is uniform 
and homogeneous1 and into motion whose  

sole effect is the translation of bodies
 in space4 ,matter is the passive and   
inert substance out of which motion1 by 
its mere mechanical powers1 can produce 
the whole range of material forms4      
,this revolutionary change in the       
physical standpoint involved restatement
 of the philosophical issues4 ,but the  
resulting difficulties were found       
thoroughly baffling4 ,though ,descartes 
and his successors were willing to adopt
 any hypothesis1 however paradoxical1   
which the facts might seem to demand1   
their theories1 however modified and    
restated1 led only deeper into a        
hopeless impasse4 ,the unsolved problems
 of the ,cartesian systems formed the   
discouraging heritage to which ,kant    
fell heir4 ,if matter is always purely  
material1 and motion is its sole        
organising power1 there can be no real  
kinship between body and mind4 ,the     
formative and vital forces1 which in the
 ,scholastic philosophy and in popular  
thought serve to maintain the appearance

 of continuity between matter and mind1 
can no longer be credited4 ,motion1     
which alone is left to mediate between  
the opposites1 is purely mechanical1 and
 7on ,descartes' view7 is entirely      
lacking in inner or hidden powers4 ,the 
animal body is exclusively material1 and
 is therefore as incapable of feeling or
 consciousness as any machine made by   
human hands4 ,the bodily senses are not 
#8sensitive'2 the brain cannot think4   
,mental experiences do1 of course1      
accompany the brain-motions4 ,but why a 
sensation should thus arise when a      
particular motion is caused in the      
brain1 or how a mental resolution can be
 followed by a brain state1 are         
questions to which no satisfactory      
answer can be given4 ,the mental and the
 material1 the spiritual and the        
mechanical1 fall entirely apart4  ,the  
difficulties arising out of this        
incomprehensibility of the causal       
interrelations of mind and body are not1
 however1 in themselves a valid argument

 against a dualistic interpretation of  
the real4 ,the difficulties of          
accounting for the causal relation are1 
in essential respects1 equally great    
even when the interaction is between    
homogeneous existences4 ,the            
difficulties are due to the nature of   
causal action as such1 not to the       
character of the bodies between which it
 holds4 ,this1 indeed1 was clearly      
recognised by ,descartes1 and was       
insisted upon by his immediate          
successors4 ,the transference of motion 
by impact is no less incomprehensible   
than the interaction of soul and body4  
,if motion can exist only in matter1    
there is no possible method of          
conceiving how it can make the          
transition from one discrete portion of 
matter to another4 ,causal action is    
thus a problem which no philosophy can  
pretend to solve1 and which every       
philosophy1 whether monistic or         
dualistic1 must recognise as            
transcending the scope of our present   

knowledge4  ,it is in another and more  
special form that ,descartes' dualism   
first reveals its fatal defects1 namely1
 in its bearing upon the problem of     
sense-perception4 ,descartes can solve  
the problem of knowledge only by first  
postulating the doctrine of             
representative perception4 ,that        
doctrine is rendered necessary by the   
dualism of mind and body4 ,objects can  
be known only mediately by means of     
their action upon the sense-organs1 and 
through the sense-organs upon the brain4
 ,the resulting brain states are in     
themselves merely forms of motion4 ,they
 lead1 however1 in a manner which       
,descartes never professes to           
explain1#agfa to the appearance of      
sensations in the mental field4 ,out of 
these sensations the mind then          
constructs mental images of the distant 
bodies2 and it is these mental images   
alone which are directly apprehended4   
,material bodies are invisible and      
intangible2 they are knowable only      

through their mental duplicates4 ,thus1 
according to the doctrine of            
representative perception1 each mind is 
segregated in a world apart4 ,it looks  
out upon a landscape which is as mental 
and as truly inward as are its feelings 
and desires4 ,the apparently ultimate   
relation of mind knowing and object     
known is rendered complex and           
problematic through the distinction     
between mental objects and real things4 
,mental objects are in all cases images 
merely4 ,they exist only so long as they
 are apprehended2 and they are          
numerically and existentially distinct  
in each individual mind4 ,real things   
are not immediately perceived2 they are 
hypothetically inferred4 ,to ordinary   
consciousness the body which acts on the
 sense-organ is the object known2 when  
reflective consciousness is             
philosophically enlightened1 the object 
immediately known is recognised as a    
merely mental image1 and the external   
object sinks to the level of an assumed 

cause4  ,the paradoxical character of   
this doctrine is accentuated by         
,galileo's distinction between primary  
and secondary qualities4#agfb ,those    
physical processes1 which are entitled  
light and heat1 bear no resemblance to  
the sensations through which they become
 known4 ,the many-coloured world of     
ordinary consciousness is an illusory   
appearance which can exist only in the  
human mind4 ,we must distinguish between
 the sensible world which1 though purely
 mental1 appears1 through an unavoidable
 illusion1 to be externally real1 and   
that very different world of matter and 
motion which reveals its independent    
nature only to reflective thinking4 ,in 
the latter world the rich variety of    
sensuous appearance can find no place4  
,there remain only the quantitative1    
mechanical properties of extension1     
figure and motion2 and even these have  
to be interpreted in the revolutionary  
fashion of physical science4  ,the      
doctrine of representative perception   

cannot1 however1 defend successfully the
 positions which it thus involves4 ,it  
wavers in unstable equilibrium4 ,the    
facts1 physical and physiological1 upon 
which it is based1 are in conflict with 
the conclusions in which it results4    
,this has been very clearly demonstrated
 by many writers in recent times4#agfc  
,the conflict manifested itself in the  
period between ,descartes and ,kant only
 through the uneasy questionings of     
,locke and ,berkeley4 ,the problem1     
fundamental though it be1 is almost     
completely ignored by ,spinoza1         
,leibniz1 and ,wolff4  ,stated in modern
 terms1 the inherently contradictory    
character of the doctrine consists in   
its unavoidable alternation between the 
realist attitude to which it owes its   
origin1 and the idealist conclusion in  
which it issues4 ,such oscillation is   
due to the twofold simultaneous relation
 in which it regards ideas as standing  
to the objects that they are supposed to
 represent4 ,the function of sensations 

is cognitive2 their origin is           
mechanical4 ,as cognitive they stand to 
objects in a relation of inclusion2 they
 reveal the objects1 reduplicating them 
in image before the mind4 ,yet in their 
origin they are effects1 mechanically   
generated by the action of material     
bodies upon the sense-organs and brain4 
,as they are effects mechanically       
generated1 there is no guarantee that   
they resemble their causes2 and if we   
may argue from other forms of mechanical
 causation1 there is little likelihood  
that they do4 ,they stand to their first
 causes in a relation of exclusion1     
separated from them by a large number of
 varying intermediate processes4 ,there 
is thus a conflict between the function 
of sensations and their origin4 ,their  
origin in the external objects is       
supposed to confer upon them a          
representative power2 and yet the very  
nature of this origin invalidates any   
such claim4  ,this irreconcilability of 
the subjectivist consequences of the    

doctrine with its realist basis was     
seized upon by ,berkeley4 ,to remove the
 contradiction1 he denied the facts from
 which the doctrine had been developed4 
,that is to say1 starting from its      
results he disproved its premisses4     
,arguing from the physical and          
physiological conditions of perception  
,descartes had concluded that only      
sensations can be directly apprehended  
by the mind4 ,berkeley starts from this 
conclusion1 and virtually adopts it as  
an assumption which cannot be           
questioned1 and which does not call for 
proof4 ,since1 he contends1 we know only
 sensations1 the assertion that they are
 due to material causes is mere         
hypothesis1 and is one for which there  
may be no valid grounds4 ,as ,descartes 
himself had already suggested1 there is 
a second possible method of interpreting
 the relevant facts4 ,there may exist an
 all-powerful ,being who produces the   
sensations in our minds from moment to  
moment2 and provided that they are      

produced in the same order as now1 the  
whole material world might be           
annihilated without our being in the    
least aware that so important an event  
had taken place4 ,since we can          
experience only sensations1 any         
hypothesis which will account for the   
order of their happening is equally     
legitimate4 ,the whole question becomes 
one of relative simplicity in the       
explanation given4 ,the simpler         
analysis1 other things being equal1 must
 hold the field4  ,berkeley reinforces  
this argument by pointing to the many   
embarrassing consequences to which      
,descartes' dualism must lead4 ,we      
postulate bodies in order to account for
 the origin of our sensations1 and yet  
are unable to do so by their means4 ,the
 dualistic theory creates more          
difficulties than it solves1 without a  
single counter-advantage1 save          
perhaps--so ,berkeley argues--that it   
seems to harmonise better with the      
traditional prejudices of the           

philosophic consciousness4  ,if we grant
 ,berkeley his premisses1 the main lines
 of his argument are fairly cogent1     
however unconvincing may be his own     
positive views4 ,the crux1 however1 of  
the ,berkeleian idealism lies almost    
exclusively in the establishment of its 
fundamental assumption1 that only ideas 
7i4e4 images7 can be known by the mind4 
,this assumption ,berkeley1 almost      
without argument1 takes over from his   
predecessors4 ,it was currently         
accepted1 and from it1 therefore1 he    
believed that he could safely argue4 ,it
 rests1 however1 upon the assumption of 
facts which he himself questions4 ,in   
rejecting the ,cartesian dualism he     
casts down the ladder by which alone it 
is possible to climb into his position4 
,for save through the facts of physics  
and physiology there seems to be no     
possible method of disproving the belief
 of ordinary consciousness1 that in     
perception we apprehend independent     
material bodies4 ,and until that belief 

can be shown to be false and ungrounded1
 the ,berkeleian idealism is without    
support4 ,it cannot establish the       
fundamental assumption upon which its   
entire argument proceeds4 ,thus1 though 
,berkeley convincingly demonstrates the 
internal incoherence of the doctrine of 
representative perception--the          
inconsistency of its conclusions with   
the physical and physiological facts    
upon which alone it can be based--he    
cannot himself solve the problem in     
answer to which that doctrine was       
propounded4 ,his services1 like those of
 so many other reformers1 were such as  
he did not himself foresee4 ,in         
simplifying the problem1 he prepared the
 way for the more sceptical treatment of
 its difficult issues by ,hume4  ,at    
this point1 in the philosophy of ,hume1 
the problem of perception comes into the
 closest possible connection with the   
logical problem1 referred to above4 ,the
 question1 how mind knowing is related  
to the objects known1 is found to depend

 upon the question1 how in certain      
crucial cases predicates may            
legitimately be referred to their       
subject4 ,this logical problem arises in
 two forms1 a narrower and a wider4 ,the
 narrower issue concerns only the       
principle of causality4 ,with what right
 do we assert that every event must have
 a cause8 ,what is the ground which     
justifies us in thus predicating of     
events a causal character8 ,obviously1  
this logical question is fundamental1   
and must be answered before we can hope 
to solve the more special problem1 as to
 our right to interpret sensations as   
effects of material bodies4 ,hume was   
the first to emphasise the vital        
interconnection of these two lines of   
enquiry4  ,the wider issue is the       
generating problem of ,kant's ,critique3
 ,how in a judgment can a predicate be  
asserted of a subject in which it is not
 already involved8 ,in other words1 what
 is it that in such a case justifies us 
in connecting the predicate with the    

subject8 ,though this problem was never 
directly raised by any pre-,kantian     
thinker1 not even by ,hume1 it is       
absolutely vital to all the pre-,kantian
 systems4 ,thus ,descartes' philosophy  
is based upon a distinction1 nowhere    
explicitly drawn but everywhere silently
 assumed1 between abstract and fruitful 
ideas4 ,the former contain just so much 
content and no more2 this content may be
 explicitly unfolded in a series of     
judgments1 but no addition is thereby   
made to our knowledge4 ,the latter1 on  
the other hand1 are endowed with an     
extraordinary power of inner growth4 ,to
 the attentive mind they disclose a     
marvellous variety of inner meaning4    
,the chief problem of scientific method 
consists1 according to ,descartes1 in   
the discovery of these fruitful ideas1  
and in the separation of them from the  
irrelevant accompaniments which prevent 
them from unfolding their inner content4
 ,once they are discovered1 the steady  
progress of knowledge is assured4 ,they 

are the springs of knowledge1 and from  
them we have only to follow down the    
widening river of truth4  ,descartes    
professed to give a complete list of the
 possible fruitful ideas4 ,they are1 he 
claimed1 better known than any other    
concepts4 ,they lie at the basis of all 
experience1 and no one can possibly be  
ignorant of them2 though1 owing to their
 simplicity and omnipresence1 their     
philosophical importance has been       
overlooked4 ,when1 however1 ,descartes  
proceeded to classify them1 he found    
that while such ideas as space1         
triangle1 number1 motion1 contain an    
inexhaustible content that is           
progressively unfolded in the           
mathematical sciences1 those ideas1 on  
the other hand1 through which we        
conceive mental existences1--the notions
 of mind1 thought1 self--do not by any  
means prove fruitful upon attentive     
enquiry4 ,as ,malebranche later         
insisted1 we can define mind only in    
negative terms2 its whole meaning is    

determined through its opposition to the
 space-world1 which alone is truly      
known4 ,though it is the function of    
mind to know1 it cannot know itself4    
,and when we remove from our list of    
ideas those which are not really        
fruitful1 we find that only mathematical
 concepts remain4#agfd ,they alone have 
this apparently miraculous property of  
inexhaustibly developing before the     
mind4 ,scientific knowledge is limited  
to the material world2 and even there1  
the limits of our mathematical insight  
are the limits of our knowledge4        
,malebranche believed no less thoroughly
 than ,descartes in the asserted power  
and fruitfulness of mathematical        
concepts4 ,under the influence of this  
belief1 he developed1 as so many other  
thinkers from ,plato onwards have done1 
a highly mystical theory of scientific  
knowledge4 ,it is a revelation of       
eternal truth1 and yet is acquired by   
inner reflection1 not laboriously built 
up by external observation4 ,it comes by

 searching of the mind1 not by          
exploration of the outer world4 ,but    
,malebranche was not content1 like      
,descartes1 merely to accept this type  
of knowledge4 ,he proceeded to account  
for it in metaphysical terms4 ,the      
fruitfulness of mathematical ideas is   
due1 he claimed1 to the fundamental     
concept of extension in which they all  
share4 ,this idea1 representing1 as it  
does1 an infinite existence1 is too     
great to be contained within the finite 
mind4 ,through it the mind is widened to
 the apprehension of something beyond   
itself2 we know it through consciousness
 of its archetype in the mind of ,god4  
,it is the one point at which           
consciousness transcends its subjective 
limits4 ,its fruitfulness is due to1 and
 is the manifestation of1 this divine   
source4 ,the reason why we are condemned
 to remain ignorant of everything beyond
 the sphere of quantity is that         
extension alone holds this unique       
position4 ,it is the only fruitful idea 

which the mind possesses1 and other     
concepts1 such as triangle1 circle1 or  
number1 are fruitful only in proportion 
as they share in it4 ,we can acquire no 
genuine knowledge even of the nature of 
the self4 ,being ignorant of mind1 we   
cannot comprehend the self which is one 
of its modes4 ,it is as if we sought to 
comprehend the nature of a triangle1 in 
the absence of any conception of space4 
,were we in possession of the archetypal
 idea of mind1 we should not only be    
able to deduce from it those various    
feelings and emotions which we have     
already experienced1 and those          
sensations of the secondary qualities   
which we falsely ascribe to the         
influence of external objects1 but we   
should also be able to discover by pure 
contemplation innumerable other emotions
 and qualities1 which entirely transcend
 our present powers4 ,and all of these  
would then be experienced in their ideal
 nature1 and not1 as now1 merely through
 feeble and confused feeling4 ,if       

mathematicians destroy their bodily     
health through absorption in the        
progressive clarification of the        
mysteries of space1 what might not      
happen if the archetypal idea of mind   
were revealed to us8 ,could we attend to
 the preservation of a body which would 
incessantly distract us from the        
infinite and overwhelming experiences of
 our divine destiny8  ,this romantic    
conception of the possibilities of      
rational science reveals more clearly   
than any other ,cartesian doctrine the  
real bearing and perverse character of  
the rationalistic preconceptions which  
underlie the ,cartesian systems4 ,the   
,cartesians would fain make rational    
science1 conceived on the analogy of the
 mathematical disciplines1 coextensive  
with the entire realm of the real4 ,this
 grotesque enterprise is conceived as   
abstractly possible even by so cautious 
a thinker as ,john ,locke4 ,his reason  
for condemning the physical sciences as 
logically imperfect is that they fail to

 conform to this rationalistic ideal4   
,hence those sentences which sound so   
strangely in the mouth of ,locke1 the   
sensationalist4       8,it is the       
contemplation of our abstract ideas that
 alone is able      to afford us general
 knowledge40#agfe 8,the true method of  
advancing knowledge is by considering   
our abstract ideas40#agff      0,did we 
know the real essence of gold it would  
be no more      necessary that gold     
should exist1 and that we should make   
experiments upon it1 than it is         
necessary for the knowing of the        
properties of a triangle1 that a        
triangle should exist in any            
matter3 the idea in our minds would     
serve for the one as well as      for   
the other40#agfg 8,in the knowledge of  
bodies1 we must be      content to glean
 what we can from particular            
experiments1 since we      cannot1 from 
a discovery of their real essences1     
grasp at a time      whole sheaves1 and 
in bundles comprehend the nature and the

      properties of whole species       
together40#d  ,locke's empirical        
doctrine of knowledge is thus based upon
 a rationalistic theory of the real4 ,it
 is not1 he holds1 the constitution of  
reality1 but the de facto limitations of
 our human faculties which make         
empirical induction the only practicable
 mode of discovery in natural science4  
,indeed1 ,locke gives more extreme      
expression than even ,descartes does1 to
 the mystically conceived mathematical  
method4 ,being ignorant of mathematics1 
and not over well-informed even in the  
physical sciences1 ,locke was not       
checked by any too close acquaintance   
with the real character and necessary   
limits of this method2 and he           
accordingly makes statements in that    
unqualified fashion which seldom fails  
to betray the writer who is expounding  
views which he has not developed for    
himself by first-hand study of the      
relevant facts4  ,but though the unique 
character of mathematical knowledge thus

 forced itself upon the attention of all
 the ,cartesian thinkers1 and in the    
above manner led even the most          
level-headed of ,descartes' successors  
to dream strange dreams1 no real attempt
 was made 7save in the neglected        
writings of ,leibniz7 to examine1 in a  
sober spirit1 the grounds and conditions
 of its possibility4 ,in the ,english   
,school1 ,locke's eulogy of abstract    
ideas served only to drive his immediate
 successors to an opposite extreme4     
,both ,berkeley and ,hume attempted to  
explain away1 in an impossible manner1  
those fundamental differences1 which1   
beyond all questioning1 profoundly      
differentiate mathematical from         
empirical judgments4#agfh ,it is not    
surprising that ,kant1 who had no direct
 acquaintance with ,hume's ,treatise1   
should have asserted that had ,hume     
realised the bearing of his main        
teaching upon the theory of mathematical
 science1 he would have hesitated to    
draw his sceptical conclusions4 ,such1  

however1 was not the case4 ,hume's      
theory of mathematical reasoning        
undoubtedly forms the least satisfactory
 part of his philosophy4 ,he did1       
however1 perceive the general bearing of
 his central teaching4 ,it was in large 
degree his ignorance of the mathematical
 disciplines that concealed from him the
 thorough unsatisfactoriness of his     
general position1 and which prevented   
him from formulating the logical problem
 in its full scope--the problem1 namely1
 how judgments which make additions to  
our previous knowledge1 and yet do not  
rest upon mere sensation1 are possible4 
,he treated it only as it presents      
itself in those judgments which involve 
the concept of causality4#agfi ,but this
 analysis of causal judgments awoke     
,kant from his dogmatic slumber1 and so 
ultimately led to the raising of the    
logical problem in its widest form3--how
 synthetic a priori judgments1 whether  
mathematical1 physical1 or metaphysical1
 are possible4  ,hume discussed the     

causal problem both in regard to the    
general principle of causality and in   
its bearing upon our particular         
judgments of causal relation4 ,the      
problems concerned in these two         
discussions are essentially distinct4   
,the first involves immensely wider     
issues1 and so far as can be judged from
 the existing circumstantial            
evidence1#aggj it was this first        
discussion1 not as has been so often    
assumed by ,kant's commentators the     
second and more limited problem1 which  
exercised so profound an influence upon 
,kant at the turning-point of his       
speculations4 ,in stating it1 it will be
 best to take ,hume's own words4        
8,to begin with the first question      
concerning the necessity of a           
cause3 #8,tis a general maxim in        
philosophy1 that whatever begins to     
exist1 must have a cause of existence4  
,this is commonly taken for      granted
 in all reasonings1 without any proof   
given or demanded4      #8,tis supposed 

to be founded on intuition1 and to be   
one of those      maxims1 which though  
they may be deny'd with the lips1 #8tis 
impossible for men in their hearts      
really to doubt of4 ,but if we          
examine this maxim by the idea of       
knowledge above explain'd we      shall 
discover in it no mark of any such      
intuitive certainty2 but      on the    
contrary shall find1 that #8tis of a    
nature quite foreign to      that       
species of conviction40#agga  ,the      
principle that every event must have a  
cause1 is neither intuitively nor       
demonstratively certain4 ,so far from   
there existing a necessary connection   
between the idea of an event as         
something happening in time and the idea
 of a cause1 no connection of any kind  
is discoverable by us4 ,we can conceive 
an object to be non-existent at this    
moment1 and existent the next1 without  
requiring to conjoin with it the        
altogether different idea of a          
productive source4  ,this had been      

implicitly recognised by those few      
philosophers who had attempted to give  
demonstrations of the principle4 ,by so 
doing1 however1 they only reinforce     
,hume's contention that it possesses no 
rational basis4 ,when ,hobbes argues    
that as all the points of time and place
 in which we can suppose an object to   
begin to exist1 are in themselves equal1
 there must be some cause determining an
 event to happen at one moment rather   
than at another1 he is assuming the very
 principle which he professes to prove4 
,there is no greater difficulty in      
supposing the time and place to be fixed
 without a cause1 than in supposing the 
existence to be so determined4 ,if the  
denial of a cause is not intuitively    
absurd in the one case1 it cannot be so 
in the other4 ,if the first demands a   
proof1 so likewise must the second4     
,similarly with the arguments advanced  
by ,locke and ,clarke4 ,locke argues    
that if anything is produced without a  
cause1 it is produced by nothing1 and   

that that is impossible1 since nothing  
can never be a cause any more than it   
can be something1 or equal to two right 
angles4 ,clarke's contention that if    
anything were without a cause1 it would 
produce itself1 i4e4 exist before it    
existed1 is of the same character4      
,these arguments assume the only point  
which is in question4       8,when we   
exclude all causes we really do exclude 
them1 and neither      suppose nothing  
nor the object itself to be the causes  
of the      existence1 and consequently 
can draw no argument from the absurdity 
of these suppositions to prove the      
absurdity of that      exclusion40#aggb 
,the remaining argument1 that every     
effect must have a cause1 since this is 
implied in the very idea of an effect1  
is 8still more frivolous40       8,every
 effect necessarily presupposes a cause2
 effect being a      relative term1 of  
which cause is the correlative4 ,but    
this does not      prove that every     
being must be preceded by a cause2 no   

more than it      follows1 because every
 husband must have a wife1 that         
therefore      every man must be        
married40#aggc  ,the far-reaching       
conclusion1 that the principle of       
causality has no possible rational      
basis1 ,hume extends and reinforces     
through his other doctrines1 viz4 that  
synthetic reason#aggd is merely         
generalised belief1 and that belief is  
in all cases due to the ultimate        
instincts and propensities which de     
facto constitute our human nature4 ,the 
synthetic principles which lie at the   
basis of our experience are non-rational
 in character4 ,each is due to a #8blind
 and powerful instinct1' which1         
demanding no evidence1 and ignoring     
theoretical inconsistency for the sake  
of practical convenience1 necessitates  
belief4       8,nature by an absolute   
and uncontrollable necessity has        
determined      us to judge as well as  
to breathe and feel40#agge 8,all these  
operations are a species of natural     

instincts1 which no reasoning      or   
process of the thought and understanding
 is able either to      produce or to   
prevent40#aggf  ,reason is 8nothing but 
a wonderful and unintelligible instinct 
in our souls40#aggg ,it justifies itself
 by its practical uses1 but can afford  
no standard to which objective reality  
must conform4  ,it is from this point of
 view that ,hume states his answer to   
the problem of perception4 ,our natural 
belief in the permanence and identity of
 objects1 as expressed through the      
principle of substance and attribute1   
leads us to interpret the objects of    
sense-perception as independent         
realities4 ,we interpret our subjective 
sensations as being qualities of        
independent substances4 ,our other      
natural belief1 in the dynamical        
interdependence of events1 as expressed 
through the principle of causality1     
leads1 however1 to the opposite         
conclusion1 that the known objects are  
merely mental4 ,for by it we are        

constrained to interpret sensations1 not
 as objective qualities1 but only as    
subjective effects1 expressive of the   
reactions of our psycho-physical        
organism4 ,the ,cartesian problems owe  
their origin to the mistaken attempt to 
harmonise1 in a theoretical fashion1    
these two conflicting principles4 ,the  
conflict is inevitable and the antinomy 
is insoluble1 so long as the two        
principles are regarded as objectively  
valid4 ,the only satisfactory solution  
comes through recognition that reason is
 unable to account1 save in reference to
 practical ends1 even for its own       
inevitable demands4 ,the principle of   
substance and attribute and the         
principle of causality co-operate in    
rendering possible such organisation of 
our sense-experience as is required for 
practical life4 ,but when we carry this 
organisation further than practical life
 itself demands1 the two principles at  
once conflict4  ,kant shows no interest 
in this constructive part of ,hume's    

philosophy2 and must1 indeed1 have been 
almost entirely ignorant of it1 since it
 finds only very imperfect expression in
 the ,enquiry1 and is ignored in        
,beattie's ,nature of ,truth4           
,accordingly1 ,kant does not regard     
,hume as offering a positive explanation
 of knowledge1 but rather as            
representing the point of view of       
thoroughgoing scepticism4 ,but even had 
he been acquainted at first hand with   
,hume's ,treatise1 he would undoubtedly 
have felt little sympathy with ,hume's  
naturalistic view of the function of    
reason4 ,his training in the            
mathematical sciences would have enabled
 him to detect the inadequacy of ,hume's
 treatment of mathematical knowledge1   
and his strong moral convictions would  
have led him to rebel against the       
naturalistic assumptions which underlie 
,hume's entire position4 ,the           
,berkeley-,hume comedy is thus repeated 
with reversed rles4 ,just as ,berkeley's
 anti-materialistic philosophy was      

mainly influential as a step towards the
 naturalism of ,hume1 and as such still 
survives in the philosophies of ,john   
,stuart ,mill1 ,herbert ,spencer1       
,huxley1 ,mach and ,karl ,pearson1 so in
 turn ,hume's anti-metaphysical theory  
of knowledge was destined to be one of  
the chief contributory sources of the   
,german speculative movement4  ,we may  
now turn to ,hume's treatment of the    
narrower problem--that of justifying our
 particular causal judgments4 ,hume's   
attitude towards this question is       
predetermined by the more fundamental   
argument1 above stated1 which precedes  
it in the ,treatise1 but which is       
entirely omitted from the corresponding 
chapters of the ,enquiry4 ,as the       
general principle of causality is of an 
irrational character1 the same must be  
true of those particular judgments which
 are based upon it4 ,much of ,hume's    
argument on this question is1 indeed1   
merely a restatement of what had already
 been pointed out by his predecessors4  

,there is no necessary connection       
discoverable between any cause and its  
effect4 ,this is especially evident as  
regards the connection between brain    
states and mental experiences4 ,no      
explanation can be given why a motion in
 the brain should produce sensations in 
the mind1 or why a mental resolution    
should produce movements in the body4   
,such sequences may be empirically      
verified2 they cannot be rationally     
understood4 ,that this likewise holds1  
though in less obvious fashion1 of the  
causal interrelations of material       
bodies1 had been emphasised by          
,geulincx1 ,malebranche1 ,locke1 and    
,berkeley4 ,the fact that one billiard  
ball should communicate motion to       
another by impact is1 when examined1    
found to be no less incomprehensible    
than the interaction of mind and body4  
,hume1 in the following passage1 is only
 reinforcing this admitted fact1 in     
terms of his own philosophy4       8,we 
fancy that were we brought on a sudden  

into this world we could      at first  
have inferred that one billiard ball    
would communicate      motion to another
 upon impulse2 and that we needed not to
 have      waited for the event1 in     
order to pronounce with certainty upon  
it4      ,such is the influence of      
custom1 that1 where it is strongest1 it 
not only covers our natural ignorance1  
but even conceals itself1      and seems
 not to take place merely because it is 
found in the      highest degree40#aggh 
,nor are we conscious of any causal     
power within the self4 ,when ,berkeley  
claims that mind has the faculty of     
producing images at will1 he is really  
ascribing to it creative agency4 ,and   
such creation1 as ,malebranche had      
already pointed out1 is not even        
conceivable4       8,i deny that my will
 produces in me my ideas1 for ,i cannot 
even      conceive how it could produce 
them1 since my will1 not being able     
to act or will without knowledge1       
presupposes my ideas and does not       

make them40#aggi 8,is there not here10  
,hume asks1 8either in a      spiritual 
or material substance1 or both1 some    
secret mechanism or      structure of   
parts1 upon which the effect depends1   
and which1 being      entirely unknown  
to us1 renders the power or energy of   
the will      equally unknown and       
incomprehensible80#aghj  ,but the fact  
that ,hume thus restates conclusions    
already emphasised by his predecessors  
will not justify us in contending 7as   
certain historians of philosophy seem   
inclined to do7 that in his treatment of
 the causal problem he failed to make   
any important advance upon the teaching 
of the ,occasionalists4 ,hume was the   
first to perceive the essential falsity 
of the ,cartesian1 rationalistic view of
 the causal nexus4 ,for ,descartes1 an  
effect is that which can be deduced with
 logical necessity from the concept of  
its cause4 ,the ,occasionalists         
similarly argued that because natural   
events can never be deduced from one    

another they must in all cases be due to
 supernatural agency2 like ,descartes1  
they one and all failed to comprehend   
that since by an effect we mean that    
which follows in time upon its cause1   
and since1 therefore1 the principle of  
causality is the law of change1 the     
nature of causality cannot be expressed 
in logical terms4 ,hume was the first to
 appreciate the significance of this    
fundamental fact2 and an entirely new   
set of problems at once came into view4 
,if causal connection is not1 as        
previous thinkers had believed1 logical 
in character1 if it does not signify    
logical dependence of the so-called     
effect upon its cause1 its true         
connotation must lie elsewhere2 and     
until this has been traced to its hidden
 source1 any attempted solution of      
metaphysical problems is certain to     
involve many false assumptions4 ,the    
answer that is given to the problem of  
the origin and content of the causal    
concept must determine our              

interpretation alike of sense-experience
 and of pure thought4  ,the problem     
presents on examination1 however1 a most
 paradoxical aspect4 ,as ,hume has      
already shown1 every effect is an event 
distinct from its cause1 and there is   
never any connection1 beyond that of    
mere sequence1 discoverable between     
them4 ,we observe only sequence2 we     
assert necessary connection4 ,what1     
then1 is in our minds when this latter  
assertion is made8 ,and how1 if the     
notion of necessitated connection cannot
 be gained through observation of the   
external events1 is it acquired by us8  
,hume again propounds a naturalistic    
solution4 ,causation1 i4e4 necessitated 
sequence in time1 is not in any sense a 
conception2 it is not a comprehended    
relation between events1 but a          
misunderstood feeling in our minds4 ,we 
cannot form any1 even the most remote1  
conception of how one event can produce 
another4 ,neither imagination nor pure  
thought1 however freely they may act1   

are capable of inventing any such       
notion4 ,but nature1 by the manner in   
which it has constituted our minds1     
deludes us into the belief that we are  
in actual possession of this idea4 ,the 
repeated sequence of events1 in fixed   
order1 generates in us the feeling of a 
tendency to pass from the perception or 
idea of the one to the idea of the      
other4 ,this feeling1 thus generated by 
custom1 and often in somewhat confused  
fashion combined with the feeling of    
#8animal nisus1' which is experienced in
 bodily effort1 is mistaken by the mind 
for a definite concept of force1        
causality1 necessary connection4 ,as    
mere feeling it can afford no insight   
into the relation holding between       
events1 and as merely subjective can    
justify no inference in regard to that  
relation4 ,the terms force1 causality1  
necessitated sequence in time1 have a   
practical value1 as names for our       
instinctive1 natural expectations2 but  
when employed as instruments for the    

theoretical interpretation of           
experience1 they lead us off on a false 
trail4  ,this is one of the fundamental 
points upon which ,hume reveals a deeper
 speculative insight than either        
,malebranche1 ,geulincx1 or ,locke4     
,though these latter insist upon our    
ignorance of the relation holding       
between events1 they still assume that  
causation and natural necessity are     
concepts which have a quite intelligible
 meaning2 and in consequence they fail  
to draw the all-important conclusion1   
that the general principle of causality 
has neither intuitive nor demonstrative 
validity4 ,for that is the revolutionary
 outcome of ,hume's analysis of the     
notion of necessitated connection4 ,the 
principle of causality is a synthetic   
judgment in which no connection is      
discoverable between its subject and its
 predicate4 ,that is the reason why it  
is neither self-evident nor capable of  
being established upon more ultimate    
grounds4  ,as has already been stated1  

the wider problem concerning the        
principle of causality is developed only
 in the ,treatise2 the problem regarding
 the concept of causality is discussed  
both in the ,treatise and in the        
,enquiry4 ,an appreciation of the wider 
problem is required1 however1 in order  
to set this second problem in its true  
light1 for it is only through its       
connection with the wider issue that    
,hume's reduction of the concept of     
causality to a merely instinctive1      
non-rational expectation acquires its   
full significance4 ,hume's analysis then
 amounts1 as ,kant was the first to     
realise1 to an attack upon the objective
 validity of all constructive thinking4 
,not only rationalism1 but even such    
metaphysics as may claim to base its    
conclusions upon the teaching of        
experience1 is thereby rendered         
altogether impossible4 ,the issue is    
crucial1 and must be honestly faced1    
before metaphysical conclusions1 no     
matter what their specific character may

 be1 whether a priori or empirical1 can 
legitimately be drawn4 ,if we may not   
assert that an event must have some     
cause1 even the right to enquire for a  
cause must first be justified4 ,and if  
so fundamental a principle as that of   
causality is not self-evident1 are there
 any principles which can make this     
claim8  ,the account which we have so   
far given of ,hume's argument covers    
only that part of it which is directed  
against the rationalist position1 and   
which was therefore so influential in   
turning ,kant on to the line of his     
,critical speculations4 ,but ,hume      
attacked with equal vigour the          
empiricist standpoint2 and as this      
aspect of his teaching1 constituting as 
it did an integral part of ,kant's own  
philosophy1 must undoubtedly have helped
 to confirm ,kant in his early          
rationalist convictions1 we may         
profitably dwell upon it at some length4
 ,in opposition to the empiricists1     
,hume argues that experience is         

incapable of justifying any inference in
 regard to matters of fact4 ,it cannot  
serve as a basis from which we can      
inductively extend our knowledge of     
facts beyond what the senses and memory 
reveal4 ,inductive inference1 when so   
employed1 necessarily involves a petitio
 principii2 we assume the very point we 
profess to have proved4  ,the argument  
by which ,hume establishes this         
important contention is as follows4 ,all
 inductive reasoning from experience    
presupposes the validity of belief in   
causal connection4 ,for when we have no 
knowledge of causes1 we have no         
justification for asserting the         
continuance of uniformities4 ,now it has
 been shown that we have no experience  
of any necessary relation between       
so-called causes and their effects4 ,the
 most that experience can supply are    
sequences which repeat themselves4 ,in  
regarding the sequences as causal1 and  
so as universally constant1 we make an  
assertion for which experience gives no 

support1 and to which no amount of      
repeated experience1 recalled in memory1
 can add one jot of real evidence4 ,to  
argue that because the sequences have   
remained constant in a great number of  
repeated experiences1 they are therefore
 more likely to remain constant1 is to  
assume that constancy in the past is a  
ground for inferring it in the future2  
and that is the very point which demands
 proof4 ,in drawing the conclusion we   
virtually assume that there is a        
necessary connection1 i4e4 an absolutely
 constant relation1 between events4 ,but
 since no single experience of causal   
sequence affords ground for inferring   
that the sequence will continue in the  
future1 no number of repeated           
experiences1 recalled in memory1 can    
contribute to the strengthening of the  
inference4 ,it is meaningless to talk   
even of likelihood or probability4 ,the 
fact that the sun has without a single  
known exception arisen each day in the  
past does not 7if we accept the argument

 disproving all knowledge of necessary  
connection7 constitute proof that it    
will rise to-morrow4       8,none but a 
fool or a madman will be unaffected in  
his expectations      or natural beliefs
 by this constancy1 but he is no        
philosopher who      accepts this as in 
the nature of evidence40#agha  ,since1  
for all that we know to the contrary1   
bodies may change their nature and mode 
of action at any moment1 it is vain to  
pretend that we are scientifically      
assured of the future because of the    
past4       8,my practice1 you say1     
refutes my doubts4#aghb ,but you mistake
 the      purport of my question4 ,as an
 agent1 ,i am quite satisfied in the    
point2 but as a philosopher1 who has    
some share of curiosity1 ,i      will   
not say scepticism1 ,i want to learn the
 foundation of this      inference4 ,no 
reading1 no enquiry has yet been able to
 remove my      difficulty or give me   
satisfaction in a matter of such        
importance4      ,can ,i do better than 

propose the difficulty to the public1   
even      though1 perhaps1 ,i have small
 hopes of obtaining a solution8 ,we     
shall at least1 by this means1 be       
sensible of our ignorance1 if we      do
 not augment our knowledge40#aghc  ,kant
 was the first1 after thirty years1 to  
take up this challenge4 ,experience is  
no source of evidence until the causal  
postulate has been independently proved4
 ,only if the principle of causality can
 be established prior to all specific   
experience1 only if we can predetermine 
experience as necessarily conforming to 
it1 are empirical arguments valid at    
all4 ,hume's enquiry thus directly leads
 to the later1 no less than to the      
earlier form of ,kant's epoch-making    
question4#aghd ,in its earlier          
formulation it referred only to a priori
 judgments2 in its wider application it 
was found to arise with equal cogency in
 connection with empirical judgments4   
,and as thus extended1 it generated the 
problem3 ,how is sense-experience1      

regarded as a form of knowledge1        
possible at all8#aghe ,by showing that  
the principle of causality has neither  
intuitive nor demonstrative validity1   
,hume cuts the ground from under the    
rationalists2 by showing that           
sense-experience cannot by itself yield 
conclusions which are objectively valid1
 he at the same time destroys the       
empiricist position4 ,in this latter    
contention ,kant stands in complete     
agreement with ,hume4 ,that the         
sensuously given is incapable of        
grounding even probable inferences1 is a
 fundamental presupposition 7never      
discussed1 but always explicitly        
assumed7 of the ,critical philosophy4   
,it was by challenging the sufficiency  
of ,hume's other line of argument1 that 
which is directed against the           
rationalists1 that ,kant discovered a   
way of escape from the sceptical        
dilemma4 ,the conditions of experience  
can be proved by a transcendental       
method1 which1 though a priori in       

character1 does not lie open to ,hume's 
sceptical objections4 ,each single      
experience involves rational principles1
 and consequently even a single         
empirical observation may suffice to    
justify an inductive inference4         
,experience conforms to the demands of  
pure a priori thought2 and can          
legitimately be construed in accordance 
with them4  ,we may now pass to the     
philosophy in which ,kant was educated4 
,it gave to his thinking that           
rationalist trend1 to which1 in spite of
 all counter-influences1 he never ceased
 to remain true4#aghf ,it also          
contributed to his philosophy several of
 its constructive principles4 ,only two 
rationalist systems need be considered1 
those of ,leibniz and of ,wolff4 ,kant1 
by his own admission1#aghg had been     
baffled in his attempts 7probably not   
very persevering7 to master ,spinoza's  
philosophy4 ,it was with ,wolff's system
 that he was most familiar2 but both    
directly and indirectly1 both in his    

early years and in the 'seventies1 the  
incomparably deeper teaching of ,leibniz
 must have exercised upon him a         
profoundly formative influence4 ,in     
defining the points of agreement and of 
difference between ,hume and            
,leibniz1#aghh we have already outlined 
,leibniz's general view of the nature   
and powers of pure thought1 and may     
therefore at once proceed to the        
relevant detail of his main tenets4     
,upon two fundamental points ,leibniz   
stands in opposition to ,spinoza4 ,he   
seeks to maintain the reality of the    
contingent or accidental4 ,these terms  
are indeed1 as he conceives them1       
synonymous with the actual4 ,necessity  
rules only in the sphere of the         
possible4 ,contingency or freedom is the
 differentiating characteristic of the  
real4 ,this point of view is bound up   
with his second contention1 namely1 that
 the real is a kingdom of ends4 ,it is  
through divine choice of the best among 
the possible worlds that the actual     

present order has arisen4 ,there are    
thus two principles which determine the 
real3 the principle of contradiction    
which legislates with absolute          
universality1 and the principle of the  
best1 or1 otherwise formulated1 of      
sufficient reason1 which differentiates 
reality from truth1 limiting thought1 in
 order that1 without violating logic1 it
 may freely satisfy the moral needs4    
,leibniz thus vindicates against        
,spinoza the reality of freedom and the 
existence of ends4  ,though ,leibniz    
agrees with ,spinoza that the           
philosophically perfect method would be 
to start from an adequate concept of the
 ,divine ,being1 and to deduce from ,his
 attributes the whole nature of finite  
reality1 he regards our concept of ,god 
as being too imperfect to allow of such 
procedure4 ,we are compelled to resort  
to experience1 and by analysis to search
 out the various concepts which it      
involves4 ,by the study of these        
concepts and their interrelations1 we   

determine1 in obedience to the law of   
contradiction1 the nature of the        
possible4 ,the real1 in                 
contradistinction from the possible1    
involves1 however1 the notion of ends4  
,the existence of these ends can never  
be determined by logical1 but only by   
moral considerations4 ,the chief problem
 of philosophical method is1 therefore1 
to discover the exact relation in which 
the logical and the teleological1 the   
necessary and the contingent1 stand to  
one another4  ,the absence of           
contradiction is in itself a sufficient 
guarantee of possibility1 i4e4 even of  
the possibility of real existence4 ,how 
very far ,leibniz is willing to go on   
this line is shown by his acceptance of 
the ontological argument4 ,the whole    
weight of his system rests1 indeed1 upon
 this proof4 ,the notion of ,god is1 he 
maintains1 the sole concept which can   
determine itself in a purely logical    
manner not only as possible but also as 
real4 ,if we are to avoid violating the 

principle of contradiction1 the ,ens    
perfectissimum must be regarded as      
possessing the perfection of real       
existence4 ,and since ,god is perfect in
 moral as in all other attributes1 ,his 
actions must be in conformity with moral
 demands4 ,in creating the natural order
 ,god must therefore have chosen that   
combination of possibilities which      
constitutes the best of all possible    
worlds4 ,by means of this conceptual    
bridge we are enabled to pass by pure a 
priori thinking from the logically      
possible to the factually real4  ,pure  
logical thinking is thus an instrument  
whereby ultimate reality can be defined 
in a valid manner4 ,pure thought is     
speculative and metaphysical in its very
 essence4 ,it uncovers to us what no    
experience can reveal1 the wider        
universe which exists eternally in the  
mind of ,god4 ,every concept 7whether   
mathematical1 dynamical1 or moral71     
provided only that it is not            
self-contradictory1 is an eternal       

essence1 with the intrinsic nature of   
which even ,god must reckon in the      
creation of things4 ,when1 therefore1 we
 are determining the unchanging nature  
of the eternally possible1 there is no  
necessary reference to ,divine          
existence4 ,the purely logical criterion
 suffices as a test of truth4 ,every    
judgment which is made in regard to such
 concepts must express only what their  
content involves4 ,all such judgments   
must be analytic in order to be true4   
,when1 however1 we proceed from the     
possible to the real1 that is to say1   
from the necessary to the contingent1   
the logical test is no longer           
sufficient2 and only by appeal to the   
second principle1 that of sufficient    
reason1 can judgments about reality be  
logically justified4 ,whether or not the
 principle of sufficient reason is      
deducible1 as ,wolff sought to maintain1
 from the principle of contradiction1 is
 a point of quite secondary importance4 
,that is a question which does not      

deserve the emphasis which has been laid
 upon it4 ,what is chiefly important is 
that for ,leibniz1 as for ,wolff1 both  
principles are principles of analysis4  
,the principle of sufficient reason is  
not an instrument for determining       
necessary relations between independent 
substances4 ,the sufficient ground of a 
valid predicate must in all cases be    
found in the concept of the subject to  
which it is referred4 ,the difference   
between the two principles lies         
elsewhere1 namely1 in the character of  
the connection established between      
subject and predicate4 ,in the one case 
the denial of the proposition involves a
 direct self-contradiction4 ,in the     
other the opposite of the judgment is   
perfectly conceivable2 our reason for   
asserting it is a moral 7employing the  
term in the eighteenth-century sense71  
not a logical ground4 ,the subject is so
 constituted1 that in the choice of     
ends1 in pursuit of the good1 it must by
 its very nature so behave4 ,the        

principle of sufficient reason1 which   
represents in our finite knowledge the  
divine principle of the best1 compels us
 to recognise the predicate as involved 
in the subject--as involved through a   
ground which inclines without           
necessitating4 ,often the analysis      
cannot be carried sufficiently far to   
enable us thus to transform a judgment  
empirically given into one which is     
adequately grounded4 ,none the less1 in 
recognising it as true1 we postulate    
that the predicate is related to the    
subject in this way4 ,there are not for 
,leibniz two methods of establishing    
truth1 sense-perception to reveal       
contingent fact1 and general reasoning  
to establish necessary truth4 ,a        
proposition can be accepted as true only
 in so far as we can at least postulate1
 through absence of contradiction and   
through sufficient reason1 its analytic 
character4 ,it must express some form of
 identity4 ,the proposition1 ,caesar    
crossed the ,rubicon1 is given us as    

historical fact4 ,the more complete our 
knowledge of ,caesar and of his time1   
the further we can carry the analysis2  
and that analysis if completely executed
 would displace the merely factual      
validity of the judgment by insight into
 its metaphysical truth4 ,thus          
experience1 with its assertions of the  
here and now about particulars          
inexhaustibly concrete1 sets to rational
 science an inexhaustible task4 ,we can 
proceed in our analysis indefinitely1   
pushing out the frontiers of thought    
further and further into the empirical  
realm4 ,only by the ,divine ,mind can   
the task be completed1 and all things   
seen as ordered in complete obedience to
 the two principles of thought4         
,leibniz1 in propounding this view1     
develops a genuinely original conception
 of the relation holding between        
appearance and reality4 ,only monads1   
that is1 spiritual beings1 exist4 ,apart
 from the representative activity of the
 monads there are no such existences as 

space and time1 as matter and motion4   
,the mathematical and physical sciences1
 in their present forms1 therefore1     
cannot be interpreted as revealing      
absolute existences4 ,but1 if ideally   
developed1 they would emancipate        
themselves from mechanical and sensuous 
notions2 and would consist of a body of 
truths1 which1 as thus perfected1 would 
be discovered to constitute the very    
being of thought4 ,pure thought or      
reason consists in the apprehension of  
such truths4 ,to discover and to prove  
them thought does not require to issue  
out beyond itself4 ,it creates this     
conceptual world in the very act of     
apprehending it2 and as this realm of   
truth thus expresses the necessary      
character of all thought1 whether divine
 or human1 it is universal and          
unchanging4 ,each mind apprehends the   
same eternal truth2 but owing to        
imperfection each finite being          
apprehends it with some degree of       
obscurity and confusion1 fragmentarily1 

in terms of sense1 and so falls prey to 
the illusion that the self stands in    
mechanical relations to a spatial and   
temporal world of matter and motion4    
,leibniz supports this doctrine by his  
theory of sense-experience as           
originating spontaneously from within   
the individual mind4 ,thereby he is only
 repeating that pure thought generates  
its whole content from within itself4   
,sense-experience1 in its intrinsic     
nature1 is nothing but pure thought4    
,such thought1 owing to the             
inexhaustible wealth of its conceptual  
significance1 so confuses the mind which
 thus generates it1 that only by        
prolonged analysis can larger and larger
 portions of it be construed into the   
conceptual judgments which have all     
along constituted its sole content4 ,and
 in the process1 space1 time1 and motion
 lose all sensuous character1 appearing 
in their true nature as orders of       
relation which can be adequately        
apprehended only in conceptual terms4   

,they remain absolutely real as objects 
of thought1 though as sensible          
existences they are reduced to the level
 of mere appearance4 ,such is the view  
of thought which is unfolded in         
,leibniz's writings1 in startling       
contrast to the naturalistic teaching of
 his ,scotch antagonist4  ,as already   
indicated1 ,kant's first-hand knowledge 
of ,leibniz's teaching was very limited4
 ,he was acquainted with it chiefly     
through the inadequate channel of       
,wolff's somewhat commonplace exposition
 of its principles4 ,but even from such 
a source he could derive what was most  
essential1 namely1 ,leibniz's view of   
thought as absolute in its powers and   
unlimited in its claims4 ,how closely   
,wolff holds to the main tenet of       
,leibniz's system appears from his      
definition of philosophy as 8the science
 of possible things1 so far as they are 
possible40 ,he thus retains1 though     
without the deeper suggestiveness of    
,leibniz's speculative insight1 the view

 that thought precedes reality and      
legislates for it4 ,by the possible is  
not meant the existentially or          
psychologically possible1 but the       
conceptually necessary1 that which1     
prior to all existence1 has objective   
validity1 sharing in the universal and  
necessary character of thought itself4  
,as ,riehl has very justly pointed      
out1#aghi ,wolff's philosophy had1 prior
 even to the period of ,kant's earliest 
writings1 been displaced by empirical1  
psychological enquiries and by eclectic1
 popular philosophy4 ,owing to the      
prevailing lack of thoroughness in      
philosophical thinking1                 
8,problemlosigkeit0 characterised the   
whole period4 ,the two exclusively      
alternative views of the function of    
thought stood alongside one another     
within each of the competing systems1   
quite unreconciled and in their mutual  
conflict absolutely destructive of all  
real consistency and thoroughness of    
thought4 ,it was ,kant who restored     

rationalism to its rightful place4 ,he  
reinvigorated the flaccid tone of his   
day by adopting in his writings1 both   
early and late1 the strict method of    
rational science1 and by insisting that 
the really crucial issues be boldly     
faced4 ,in essentials ,kant holds to    
,wolff's definition of philosophy as    
8the science of possible things1 so far 
as they are possible40 ,as ,i have just 
remarked1 the possible is taken in an   
objective sense1 and the definition     
consequently gives expression to the    
view of philosophy upon which ,kant so  
frequently insists1 as lying wholly in  
the sphere of pure a priori thought4    
,its function is to determine prior to  
specific experience what experience must
 be2 and obviously that is only possible
 by means of an a priori1 purely        
conceptual method4 ,his ,critique1 as   
its title indicates1 is a criticism of  
pure reason by pure reason4 ,nothing    
which escapes definition through pure a 
priori thinking can come within its     

sphere4 ,the problem of the 8possibility
 of experience0 is the problem of       
discovering the conditions which        
necessarily determine experience to be  
what it is4 ,kant1 of course1 radically 
transforms the whole problem1 in method 
of treatment as well as in results1 when
 in defining the subject-matter of      
enquiry he substitutes experience for   
things absolutely existent4 ,this       
modification is primarily due to the    
influence of ,hume4 ,but the constant   
occurrence in ,kant's philosophy of the 
term 8possibility0 marks his continued  
belief in the ,idealist view of thought4
 ,though pure thought never by itself   
amounts to knowledge--therein ,kant     
departs from the extreme rationalist    
position--only through it is any        
knowledge1 empirical or a priori1       
possible at all4 ,philosophy1 in order  
to exist1 must be a system of a priori  
rational principles4 ,nothing empirical 
or hypothetical can find any place in   
it4#agij ,yet at the same time it is the

 system of the a priori conditions only 
of experience1 not of ultimate reality4 
,such is the twofold relation of        
agreement and difference in which ,kant 
stands to his rationalist predecessors4 
,,index   ,absolute4 ,see ,unconditioned
  ,absolutist aspect of human           
consciousness1 xxx-xxxiii1 liii1 liv-lv1
 lvi-lvii1     #bgj-a1 #bgd1 #bhb1      
#bhe-g1 #cca n41 #dbc n4  ,actuality1   
#cia ff4  ,adamson1 ,r41 #ch1 #caa1 #cad
  ,addison1 #aef  ,adickes1 ,e41 xx-xxi1
 #gf1 #aff1 #bjj1 #bae n41 #bcc n41     
#bcd1 #cjd1 #cfc1      #cgf1 #cig1 #djf 
n41 #dbc1 #dci-dj1 #dda1 #dfd n41 #dff1 
#dgi1      #egi n41 #fja n4  ,affinity1 
objective1 #bbd1 #bec-g1 #bff-g  8,als  
ob0 doctrine1 #ebd1 #eec ff4  ,analogy1 
,kant's use of the term1 #cef-h         
,analytic and synthetic judgment1 xxv   
ff41 xxxv-xxxvi1 xxxviii1     #bh ff41  
#cg ff41 #ei-fj1 #fe2   existential     
judgment1 #ecj-a2   distinction perhaps 
suggested by examination of ontological 
argument1 #eca4   ,see ,judgment        

,analytic and synthetic methods1 #dd    
ff41 #aaa1 #aag n4   ,see               
,transcendental method  ,analytic1      
distinguished from the ,dialectic1      
#agb-d1 #dch-db  ,anthropologie1        
,kant's1 #ha n41 #ajj n4  ,antinomies1  
lii1 liii1 #dcb1 #dgh ff41 #eai-bj      
,appearance1 ,kant's views regarding1   
xxxvii1 xlvi-xlvii1 liii-liv1 #ah-bb1   
#hc-e1     #abj-b1 #adg ff41 #bje ff41  
#bae ff41 #bgi-bhd1 #bic ff41 #cja ff41 
#cab ff41 #cba     ff41 #ccj-a1 #cgb-c1 
#djd ff41 #dbg ff42  criticism of       
,leibnizian view of1 #adc-f2  criticism 
of ,locke's view of1 #adf-g2  ideality  
of1 #adg ff42  outer and inner          
appearances reduce to relations1 #adg-h2
  appearance and illusion1 #adh ff42    
causal efficacy of appearances1 #baf1   
#bag-ah1 #cea1 #cgc-d2  distinction     
between appearance and reality based not
 on     categories of understanding but 
on ,ideas of ,reason1     liii-liv1     
#bag-ah1 #cbf n41 #cca1 #cij-a1 #dad-ag1
 #dbf-ca1     #dgc-g1 #eaa-ab1 #eai-ba1 

#eda-b1 #eeh-fa  ,apperception1 and     
memory1 #bea2   in what sense original1 
xxxiv1 xliii-xlv1 l-lii1 #bfj-c1 #dfa-b1
 #dgb-g2   transcendental unity of1     
l-lii1 #bjg ff41 #bab1 #bej-c1 #bfj-c1  
#bgj1 #bgg-i1 #cbb     ff41 #dee ff41   
#dgc-g2   absent from the animal mind1  
xlvii-l2   objective unity of1 #bgj-a1  
#bgd1 #bhb1 #bhe-g2   and inner sense1  
#bie-h1 #cba ff41 #eab n4   ,see ,self  
,a priori1 ,kant's views regarding the1 
xxvi-xxviii1 xxxiii-xxxvi1     lii-lv1  
#a-b1 #ci-dj1 #db1 #ed ff42   problem of
 a priori synthetic judgment1 #bf ff41  
#ci-dj1 #dc ff42   its validity merely  
de facto1 xxxv-xxxvi1 xliv1 #cj1 #eg1   
#aah1 #adb1 #ahe-f1     #beg-i1 #bia1   
#cia-b1 #cic1 #djj-a1 #daa2   the       
faculties in which it originates1       
xliii-xlv1 l-lii1 #a-b1 #ej-a1 #bcg-h1  
#bfc ff41 #cia-b1 #cic1 #cih1 #efc-e2   
semi-,critical view of the1 #ahh-i1     
#bcb1 #bfc-d4   ,see ,understanding1    
,reason  ,aquinas1 #gc  ,architectonic1 
xxii1 #ajj1 #ahd1 #ccb-f1 #cdj-a1 #cdb1 

#cdc1 #cde1 #cdg1 #cij1 #cib1 #cid1     
#dai ff41 #dcd1 #dcg1 #ddj1 #dci-dj1    
#ded1 #dfc1 #dfd1 #dgd1 #dgi-hj1 #dif1  
#dih1 #edb1     #efc1 #egi  ,aristotle1 
xlv1 #aif1 #aih1 #cij4 ,see ,logic      
,arithmetic1 #cb1 #dj-a1 #fe-f1 #abh    
ff41 #ccg-h1 #cdg1 #eff  ,association1  
and judgment1 xxxiv-xxxv1 xlviii-l2     
and consciousness1 xli-xlii2 rests on   
objective affinity1 #bec-g1 #bff-g      
,attributive judgment1 ,kant's exclusive
 emphasis upon1 #cg-h1 #ahj-a1 #aig     
,augustine1 ,st41 #gc1 #aaj1 #efe       
,avenarius1 #ehg n4  ,axioms1 ,kant's   
view of1 #ej1 #abg1 #cdh1 #efe-g        
,bacon1 ,francis1 #d-e1 #gd  ,bain1 ,a41
 #hf n4  ,balfour1 ,a4 ,j41 #cad        
,baumgarten1 #aib-c1 #dda1 #ebb         
,beantwortung der ,frage3 ,was heisst   
,aufklrung8 ,kant's1 #ae  ,beattie1     
,james1 xxviii-xxix1 xxxi n41 #bjg1     
#ehb1 #eie1 #fjj n4  ,beck1 #hj         
,belief1 ,kant's view of1 lv ff41 #egf-g
  ,beloselsky1 ,frst von1 xlix          
,bergson1 #hf1 #adb1 #cei-fj n41 #ehg n4

  ,berkeley1 xxxii1 xl1 xlvi1 #aab1     
#aec-d1 #aee ff41 #bgb1 #bih ff41       
#ehg-h1 #eib1 #eie1     #eif  ,borowski1
 #fc1 #aef  ,bosanquet1 ,b41 #cf1 #aha1 
#aig  ,bradley1 ,f4 ,g41 #cf1 #aha1 #aig
  ,bruno1 ,giordano1 #gd  ,blffinger1   
#aee   ,caird1 ,e41 xx1 #a n41 #bc1 #ea1
 #ajb n41 #aad1 #aag1 #ahc1 #aid1       
#aie1 #bfb1 #bif1 #cad1 #cbh1 #cdj1 #ceg
 n41 #cei n41 #cgc1 #cgh1 #cii1 #dfb1   
#dfh  ,campanella1 #gd  ,canon1 #gb1    
#afi-gj1 #agd1 #ccb-c1 #dch1 #efi ff4   
,cassirer1 ,e41 #acb  ,categorical      
imperative1 xxxvi1 lvi-lviii1 #ega ff4  
,categories1 distinction from generic   
concept1 #agh ff42   de facto nature of 
the1 xxxv-xxxvi1 xxxviii1 xliv1 #cj1    
#eg1 #ahe-f1 #beg-h1     #bia1 #cia-b1  
#cih1 #djj-a1 #daa2   definition of the1
 #aie-f1 #aih1 #cci-db1 #djd-e2         
semi-,critical view of the1 #ahh-i1     
#bag-ah1 #bcb1 #bfc-d2   merely logical 
forms1 xxxv-xxxvi1 xxxviii1 #cj n41 #cb1
 #ci1 #ajh1 #agf ff41      #ahe-f1 #aia1
 #aie-aif1 #beg-h1 #bij-a1 #cbe ff41    

#cci-dj1 #cih1 #djd-e1 #dji-aj1         
#dac-ad1 #dfg2   valid only for         
appearances1 #bei-fj2   and schemata1   
#aie-f1 #caa1 #ccc1 #cci-cdb1 #dfg n42  
metaphysical deduction of the1 #ahc ff41
 #aib ff41 #bhg-h2   transcendental     
deduction of the1 #bcd ff41 #bhg-h2     
all categories involved in every act of 
consciousness1 xli-xlv1 liii-liv        
#aii-bjj1 #cef1 #cfh1 #cgj1 #cgg1       
#chg-ia2   have wider scope than the    
forms of sense1 lv-lvi1 #bj1 #be1       
#bij-a1      #cca1 #djd ff42            
restricted by time and space1 #cdb1     
#ceg2   in relation to outer and inner  
experience1 #caa-ab2   how far          
predicable of the #8,i think1' #cbe ff42
   how far applicable to sensations1    
desires1 etc41 xlvi n41 #bge-f1 #bgi    
ff41     #cab ff41 #chd-e1 #dgf2   proof
 of specific1 #bdb-c1 #beb-c1 #beh-i1   
#bhg-h1 #ccc1 #cdc-d2   determinate and 
indeterminate application of the1 #cbe  
ff41 #dje ff42   may be intrinsically   
inapplicable to things in themselves1   

#bij1      #dji-aj1 #dac-ad2   category 
of existence1 #cbb1 #dae n42   category 
of totality and ,idea of the            
unconditioned1 #aii-bjj1 #dcc1 #dea1    
#dhj1     #ebi2   mathematical and      
dynamical1 #aih1 #cde-g1 #eaj-aa4   ,see
 ,a priori1 ,understanding              
,catharticon1 #afi1 #agd  ,causality1   
,kant influenced by ,hume's teaching    
regarding1 xxv ff41      #fa-d1 #cfd    
ff41 #eic-fjj2   ,kant's treatment of   
the principle of1 #cfc ff42   ,kant's   
subjectivist and phenomenalist views of1
 #baf1 #bag-ah1      #cah-ba1 #cea1     
#cgc-d2   sensations1 feelings1 etc4    
subject to principle of1 xlvi n41 #bge1 
#bgi-hb1     #cab1 #chd-e2   category   
of1 involved in consciousness of time1  
liii-liv1 #cfe ff41 #cgg ff41     #chg2 
and freedom1 #dib ff4   ,see ,hume      
,clarke1 #adj1 #eci1 #eid  ,cohen1 ,h41 
#ea1 #ajb n41 #aie1 #bfb1 #cdj          
,coherence theory of truth1 xxxvi-xxxix1
 #cf ff41 #agc n42   criterion of truth 
bound up with the ,ideas of ,reason1    

#bag-ah1 #cbf n41 #cca1     #cij-a1     
#dad-ag1 #dbf-ca1 #dgc-g1 #eaa-ab1      
#eai-ba1 #eda-b1 #eeh-fa  ,concept1     
,kant's generic or class view of the1   
#ii-ajj1 #aje-g1 #aah-ai1 #abf1 #acb-c  
1 #agg-hd1 #cch-i1 #cgj-a1 #cgg-hd1     
#cij-a2   intuition and conception1     
#ch-db1 #ic-d1 #aje-i1 #aah-bj1 #abf1   
#abh-acd1 #afe-f1     #afg-h1 #aid1     
#cgj1 #cij-a1 #efd-f2   construction of 
concepts1 #da1 #aca-c1 #cch-i1 #dah ff41
 #efd-f2   concepts and images1 #ccg-i2 
,kant's doctrine of the pure concept1   
xxxix1 #cid-djj1 #dah ff4   ,see        
,understanding  ,concerning the         
,advances1 made1 etc4   ,see            
,fortschritte  ,consciousness1 ,kant's  
views regarding1 xxxiv-xxxv1 xxxix-xlv1 
xliii-xlvii1 l-lii2   and the animal    
mind1 xlvii-l2   may be a resultant1    
xxxiv1 xliii-xlv1 l-lii1 #bfa-c1 #bgg-i1
 #cbg1      #dei-fb1 #dgc-g2   no       
immediate consciousness of mind's own   
activities1 xliii-xlv1 l-lii1 #bfc      
ff41 #bgc ff41 #bic1 #bie ff41 #cbb ff42

   consciousness of time ,kant's datum1 
xxxiv1 #abj1 #bda ff41 #cfe ff41 #cha   
ff42   absolutist aspect of1 xxx-xxxiii1
 liii1 lvi-lvii1 #bgj-a1 #bgd1          
#bhb1 #bhe-g1 #cca n4   ,see            
,apperception1 ,judgment  ,contingency1 
assertion of1 #ci ff41 #ee1 #bhf-i      
,continuity1 ,kant's views regarding1   
#ceb-cee1 #dhh ff41 #eji2   principle   
of1 #chj-a2   transcendental principle  
of1 #eea  ,copernicus1 #ah-ai1 #bb-e    
,cosmological ,argument1 #eca ff4       
,criterion of truth4 ,see ,coherence    
theory of truth  ,criticism1 ,kant's use
 of term1 #a1 #i1 #ac-ad1 #ba2   ,age   
of1 #ae  ,critique of ,practical        
,reason1 lvi1 lvii1 lx1 #gg-h1 #efi ff41
 #egb  ,critique of ,judgment1 lxi1 #gg1
 #hc1 #ig-h1 #aia1 #bfe1 #ecg1 #eci1    
#efa1 #efi n41     #egd1 #ege n41 #egf1 
#egg n4  ,crusius1 xxviii1 xxxii1 #dg   
,curtius1 ,e41 #ccf   ,deduction of     
categories1 distinction between         
subjective and objective1      xliv n41 
#bce ff42   subjective1 #bde ff41 #bfc  

ff42 objective1 #bdh ff42               
metaphysical1 #age ff41 #aib ff42       
stages in ,kant's development of        
metaphysical1 #ahf ff4   ,see           
,transcendental method of proof         
,deduction of ,ideas1 metaphysical1     
#dbf1 #dcc ff41 #dej-d1 #dgh-hj1 #ebb-c2
   transcendental1 #dbf1 #dcj1 #dcf1    
#ded1 #eeb-d1 #egb ff4   ,see ,ideas of 
,reason  ,definition1 ,kant's view of1  
#efd-e  ,deist1 as contrasted with      
,theist1 #eda2   ,kant's deistic        
interpretation of the ,ideas of ,reason1
 #dah1 #dcf1 #dci-dj1 #ded1     #dgc-g1 
#ebj-a1 #ecg1 #edb1 #ege4   ,see        
,idealist view of ,reason4  ,democritus1
 #ced n4  ,demonstration1 ,kant's view  
of1 #eff-g  ,descartes1 xxxi1           
xxxix-xliii1 xlvi1 #aee1 #aeg1 #bgb-c1  
#bgi ff41 #bih ff41      #ced n41 #dba1 
#ddi1 #ehc-g1 #ehi-ij1 #eig  ,desires1  
,kant's view of the1 xlvi n41 #bgf1     
#bgi-hb1 #cab1 #chd-e  ,dewey1 ,j41 #cf 
,dialectic1 distinguished from the      
,analytic1 #agb-d1 #dch-db2   the       

problems of the1 #dbe ff42   development
 of ,kant's views regarding the1 #dca   
ff4  ,dilucidatio ,principiorum         
primorum1 etc41 ,kant's1 #aee1 #bii     
,discipline1 #agj1 #agd1 #dch1 #efc ff4 
,dissertation1 ,kant's ,inaugural1 xx1  
#bf1 #dj1 #df1 #ha1 #hf1 #hg1 #hi ff41  
#if1 #ii1     #aja1 #aag1 #abc1 #abh1   
#aca1 #ace1 #acg1 #adj-a1 #add-e1 #adg1 
#aei-fj1 #afc-e1 #ahe1     #ahf-i1 #bjh1
 #bfj1 #bfc1 #bii1 #chb1 #dai1 #dbg1    
#dcb1 #dhb1 #dhf1 #dhi n41 #edh  ,divine
 ,existence1 in relation to space and   
time1 #aei-fa2   and intuitive          
understanding1 #afj2   ,idea of1 #dcd-g2
   how far can be concretely pictured1  
#ecf-g1 #eda-b1 #eef ff4   ,see ,god    
,dogmatism1 as distinguished from       
,criticism1 #i1 #ac-ad1 #ba  ,dreams of 
a ,visionseer1 ,kant's1 #aee n41 #bii   
,duns ,scotus1 #gc-d   ,eberhard1       
,kant's reply to1 #ij ff41 #adc n4      
,ego1 transcendental4 ,see ,apperception
  ,eleatics1 the1 #aei  ,emotions1      
,kant's view of the1 xlvi n41 #bgf1     

#bgi-hb1 #cab1 #chd-e  ,empirical1      
relation to the a priori1 #cf ff42      
problem of empirical knowledge1 #ci-dj1 
#ec2   empirical object intermediate    
between subjective representations and  
thing     in itself1 #bjf ff41 #bbc1    
#bgj ff41 #cjh ff4   ,see ,experience   
,enquiry into the ,clearness of the     
,principles of ,natural ,theology and   
,morals1     ,kant's1 #ae1 #dj1 #efc ff4
  ,ens realissimum1 #ebb ff41 #ebi-cj1  
#ecb1 #ecd1 #eda-b1 #eef  ,epicurus1    
lix1 #dcf1 #dii1 #ehb  ,erdmann1 ,b41   
xx1 xxviii n41 #df1 #adb n41 #aeh1 #afa1
 #afc1 #bjj-a1      #bjh n41 #bid n41   
#cad1 #cgc1 #chb n41 #dab1 #dca-b1 #dga1
 #fja n4  ,erhardt1 ,f41 #dhd n41 #did  
,error1 ,see ,appearance1 ,illusion     
,euler1 #afb  ,existence1 and the 8,i   
think10 #cbb ff42   judgment of1 always 
synthetic1 #ebg ff42   necessary        
existence1 #ecc-g  ,experience1 proof by
 reference to the possibility of1 xxxvi1
 xxxvii-xxxviii1     #de1 #bch-i1       
#bda-c1 #bei-fj1 #cdd1 #dbf1 #dcj1 #ded1

 #eeb-d1 #egb ff42   meaning of term1   
#eb2 problem of1 #eg-h2   as datum is   
equivalent to consciousness of time1    
xxxiv1 #abj1      #bda ff41 #cfe ff41   
#cha ff4  ,exposition1 ,kant's use of   
term1 #aji-aj   ,faith1 ,kant's view of1
 lv-lvi1 lxi1 #ega ff41 #ege-f          
,feeling1 ,kant's use of term1 #hb-c2   
,kant's view of1 xlvi n41 #bgf1 #bgi-hb1
 #cab1 #chd-e  ,fichte1 l  ,fischer1    
,k41 #df1 #ge1 #aac-ad1 #adj1 #fja n4   
,form and matter1 importance of         
distinction between1 xxxiii-xxxiv1      
xxxvi1 #he ff4  ,forms of the           
understanding4 ,see ,categories         
,fortschritte1 ,welches sind die        
wirklichen1 etc41 ,kant's1 li n41 #ei1  
#fj1 #hd1     #egh n41 #ehj n4          
,foundations of the ,metaphysics of     
,morals1 ,kant's1 lviii1 lix1 #efi1 #egb
  ,fragmente aus dem ,nachlasse1        
,kant's1 lvii1 #egh  ,freedom of the    
will1 problem of1 #bj-a1 #dce1 #eab ff41
 #efi-gj2   and causality1 #dib ff42    
transcendental and practical freedom1   

#dig1 #eab-ac1 #eag-ah1 #efi-gj1 #egc-d 
,galileo1 #ah1 #ehc-d1 #ehf  ,garve1    
xix1 #aej2 ,garve-,feder review1 #aeh   
,gedanken von der wahren ,schtzung der  
lebendigen ,krfte1 ,kant's1 #aag1 #afa-b
  ,geometry1 the fundamental            
mathematical science1 #if n42   pure and
 applied1 #aaa-ab1 #adg1 #cdi1 #efe-f2  
,kant's attitude to modern1 #aag ff4    
,geulincx1 #eif1 #eih  ,god1 ontological
 proof of existence of1 #ebg ff42       
cosmological proof1 #eca ff42           
physico-theological proof1 #ech ff42    
problem of ,god's existence1 #efi ff42  
how far an indispensable ,idea of       
,reason1 #dci-dj1 #ecf-g1 #eda-b1 #eef  
ff4  ,green1 ,t4 ,h41 l n41 #bc1 #cf    
,groos1 ,k41 xxviii n4   ,hamann1 #aeg1 
#eci-dj n42   describes ,kant as 8a     
,prussian ,hume10 #cje  ,hegel1 xxxvii1 
xlv1 l1 #cf1 #aij1 #aid1 #bgd1 #eed n4  
,herbart1 #hf n41 #abd  ,herz1 ,marcus1 
xxii-xxiii1 xxix1 xlix1 #f1 #bf1 #bh1   
#df1 #ea1 #aad n41 #ach1 #ahg1     #ahi1
 #aih1 #bjf-g1 #bai-bb1 #dcb  ,hicks1   

,g4 ,dawes1 #dae n4  ,hobbes1 #eic      
,hffding1 ,h41 #bc  ,home1 ,henry1 #a   
,homogeneity1 transcendental principle  
of1 #eej-a  ,hume1 date of first        
influence on ,kant1 xx1 xxviii2         
,kant's relation to1 xxv-xxxiii1 xxxv1  
xxxvii1 xlvi2   his view of             
consciousness1 xl-xliii2   anticipates  
,kant's phenomenalism1 #ba-b2           
maintains that experience cannot prove  
universality or necessity1 #bg1 #eg-h2  
shows causal axiom to be synthetic1     
#cj-a2   ,hume's problem a deepening of 
,kant's earlier problem1 #df2   ,kant's 
relation to1 #fa-d2   on the self1 #bjg 
n42   his subjectivism1 #bgb-c1 #bhd1   
#cjj2   ,kant 8a ,prussian ,hume10 #cje2
   much of ,hume's teaching in regard to
 causality accepted by ,kant1 #cfd2     
,kant's reply to ,hume1 #cfi-ga2        
,hume's philosophy the perfected        
expression of the empirical      and    
sceptical position1 #dba2   influence on
 ,kant1 #dcb2   on existential judgment1
 #ebh2   influence on ,kant of ,hume's  

,dialogues on ,natural ,religion1       
#eci-edj1 #eeg1     #efg n42   influence
 on ,kant1 #ehc2   the philosophical    
teaching of1 #ehh-fja2   influence on   
,kant1 #fjf  ,humility1 lvi1 lviii-lix1 
#eed n4  ,hypotheses1 and postulates1   
xxxvii-xxxviii1 #eda1 #edc ff41 #ega    
ff42   how far valid in metaphysics1    
lxi1 #i-ab1 #edc ff4  ,hypothetical     
employment of ,reason1 #edi-ej          
,idealism1 objective or ,critical1 #bgd2
   ,kant's refutations of subjective    
idealism4 #bih ff41 #dfb-c2             
transcendental idealism as key to       
solution of the antinomies1 #ejc ff4    
,see ,phenomenalism and subjectivism    
,ideal of ,reason1 #ebb ff41 #ecf-g1    
#eda-b1 #eed n41 #eef-fa  ,idealist view
 of ,reason1 xxxviii-xxxix1 xliv1 liii1 
#ig-h1 #ajb1 #cca-b1 #cij-a1            
#dad-ag1 #dbf ff41 #dcc ff41 #ddg ff41  
#dgc-g1 #dgh ff41 #ejj-f1 #eaa-ab1      
#eai-ba1 #edg ff41 #eeb ff41 #eeh-fa    
,ideality1 of space and time1 #gf1 #aaa1
 #aaf-ag1 #ach1 #adg1 #aed1 #cjh  ,ideas

 of ,reason1 ,kant's sceptical and      
,idealist views of the1 xxxviii-xxxix1  
xliii1 xliv1 lii-lv1 lvi ff41 #ccj-a1   
#cij-a1 #dad-ag4 #dbf ff41 #dcc ff41    
#ddf ff41 #dgc-g1 #dgh ff41 #ejj-f1     
#eaa-ab1 #ebj-a1 #edg ff41 #eeh-fa2     
involved in consciousness of space and  
time1 liii-liv1 #if-h1 #ajb n41 #afe-f1 
#cij-a2   ,kant's deistic interpretation
 of the1 #dah1 #dcf1 #dci-dj1 #ded1     
#dgc-dgg1 #ebj-a1     #ecg1 #ege2   as  
limiting concepts1 #djh1 #dac-ag1 #dbf  
ff42   as regulative1 xxxviii-xxxix1    
xliii1 liii1 #dgc-g1 #ejj ff41 #edg ff42
   and categories of relation1 #dea-b2  
distinction between mathematical and    
dynamical1 #eaj-aa2   ,kant's criticism 
of ,idea of unconditioned necessity1    
#ebg ff41 #ecc-g1 #eda-b2   metaphysical
 and practical validity of the ,ideas1  
#egj-f2   concluding comments on ,kant's
 views of the1 #eeh-fa2   condition     
distinction between appearance and      
reality1 liii-liv1 #bag-ah1 #cbf     n41
 #cca1 #cia1 #dad-ag1 #dbf-ca1 #dgc-g1  

#eaa-ab1 #eai-ba1 #eda-b1 #eeh-fa4      
,see ,deduction of ,ideas  ,illusion1   
and appearance1 #adh ff42   ,berkeley   
regards objects of outer sense as1 #aeg1
 #cjg-h2   inner experience not         
illusory1 #cbc-d2   transcendental1 #ac1
 #dbg-i1 #dcg1 #def ff41 #dhj1 #eeb1    
#eee  ,imagination1 may be the common   
root of sensibility and understanding1  
#gg1 #bbe1     #bfe2   productive1 #bbd 
ff41 #bfd ff41 #ccg1 #cdh1 #cge-f       
,immanent and transcendent metaphysics4 
,see ,metaphysics  ,immortality1 problem
 of1 #efi ff4  ,incongruous             
counterparts1 #afa ff4  ,infinitude1 of 
space1 #aje ff42   of time1 #abd ff42   
,kant's view of1 #dhc ff42   distinction
 between in infinitum and in            
indefinitum1 #ejg ff4  ,inner ,sense1   
xliii n41 #adh1 #bia ff41 #cfj1 #dfd1   
#dfh-i2   and apperception1 #cba ff4    
,intuition1 ,kant's doctrine of pure1   
#dj ff41 #gi-hj1 #aah-bj1 #abh ff41     
#afg-h1 #dfh-i2   intuition and         
conception1 #ch-db1 #ic-ih1 #aje-i1     

#aah-bj1 #abf1 #abh-cd1 #afe-aff1       
#afg-h1 #aid1 #cij-a1 #efd-f2   formal  
intuition and form of intuition1 #aji1  
#aad-af  ,intuitive understanding1      
,kant's view of1 #afj1 #bia1 #djh ff41  
#dfh n4 #edb   ,jacobi1 #cjj  ,jakob1   
xxviii n4  ,james1 ,w41 #hf1 #bgg-h1    
#dei n41 #dfa n4  ,janitsch1 #aee1 #aef 
,jones1 ,sir ,henry1 #cf  ,judgment1    
,kant's doctrine of the1 xxxiv-xxxv1    
xxxviii1 xli-xliv1 xlviii-l1 #agg       
ff41 #aib ff41 #bhf ff42   the          
fundamental activity of the             
understanding1 xxxiv-xxxv1 xxxviii1     
xli-xlii1     #acc1 #aha-b1 #bhh1 #ccb1 
#cgj2   a priori and empirical1 #bg-h2  
analytic and synthetic1 xxv ff41 #bh    
ff41 #cg ff41 #ei-fj2   judgment #g  #e 
#ab1 #fe2   relational types ignored by 
,kant1 #cg ff42   ,kant's attributive   
view of1 #cg-ch1 #ahj-a1 #aig2   as     
assertion of contingency1 #ci ff41 #ee1 
#bhf-i2   ,kant's distinction between   
judgments of perception and judgments of
      experience1 #bhh-i2   existential1

 #ebg-ca  ,knowing and thinking1        
distinction between1 lv-lvi1 #bj1 #be1  
#bij-a1 #cca1 #djd ff4   ,see           
,categories  ,knowledge1 the narrow     
meaning assigned to term by ,kant1      
lv-lvi1 lxi1 #be  ,kntzen1 #afa         
,lambert1 xx1 xxviii1 xxxii1 #gd1 #ach1 
#aej1 #aic  ,lange1 ,f41 #bc  ,lectures 
on ,metaphysics1 ,kant's1 #bfa1 #bge n41
 #bii1 #ddh-i1 #dge n4  ,lectures on the
 ,philosophy of ,religion ,kant's1 #bfa 
,leibniz1 ,kant's relation to1          
xxx-xxxiii1 xxxv1 xxxvii1 xlvi1 l1 lvii2
   his absolutist view of thought1      
xxx-xxxii2   anticipates ,kant's        
phenomenalism1 #ba-b2   his rejection of
 empiricism1 #bg1 #eh2   his            
pre-established harmony1 #bh2   regards 
synthetic judgments as always empirical1
 #cj2   his conceptual atomism1 #ch2    
,kant probably influenced by the        
,nouveaux ,essais of1 #ib1 #ahf2        
referred to by ,kant1 #aab2   ,kant's   
relation to1 #adj-a2   ,kant's criticism
 of his interpretation of sensibility   

and appearance1 #adc-f2   his view of   
space1 #afa ff42   ,kant influenced by  
the spiritualism of1 #bjh-i1 #bdc1      
#bfj-a1 #bfc2   his subjectivism and    
doctrine of petites perceptions1 #bgb-c1
 #bih-i1 #cjf2   his alternative views  
of the reality of the material world1   
#bih-i2   continuing influence of his   
rationalism on ,kant1 #cid-e1 #cih-i1   
#dah ff42   his view of the possible as 
wider than the actual1 #dja-b2          
antinomies formulated by ,kant from the 
standpoint of the ,leibnizian           
rationalism1 #dha ff42   ,kant's        
formulation of the ontological argument 
,leibnizian1 #ebb ff41 #eef2   contrast 
between ,locke and1 #adf-g1 #dba1 #ehb2 
on mathematical method1 #eib2   the     
philosophical teaching of1 #fja-f2   on 
the nature of sense-experience1 #fjd-e2 
influence on ,kant1 #fje-f  ,limiting   
concepts1 ,ideas as1 #djh1 #dac-ag1 #dbf
 ff4   ,see ,ideas of ,reason  ,locke1  
xxxii1 xl1 xlvi1 #ae2   ,kant's         
criticism of his view of appearance1    

#adf-g2   ,kant's restatement of his    
distinction between primary and         
secondary      qualities1 #abj-b1 #adf1 
#adi ff41 #cjf2   subjectivism of1 #bgb1
 #cjf2   on inner sense1 #adh1 #bib-c2  
contrast between ,leibniz and1 #adf-g1  
#dba1 #ehb2   his use of term idea      
rejected by ,kant1 #ddi2   on primary   
and secondary qualities1 #ehf n42       
rationalism of1 #eia-b2   his proof of  
causal axiom1 #eid2   on the causal     
relation1 #eif1 #eih  ,logic1 ,kant's   
contribution to the science of1         
xxxvi-xxxix2   ,kant's view of the      
traditional1 #aj1 #ba1 #cc-f1 #ajj1     
#aha1 #ahc1 #ahd-f1      #bei1 #ccb2    
the various kinds of1 #afg ff42         
distinction between general and         
transcendental1 xxxix1 #agj ff41        
#agf ff41 #agh     n41 #aha1 #ahc1      
#ahd-e1 #aid-e1 #aif1 #cce  ,logic1     
,kant's1 #a1 #aaj1 #agj ff41 #ahj-a1    
#egf n41 #egg n41      #ehj n41 #eha n41
 #ehb  ,lose ,bltter aus ,kant's        
,nachlass1 xx-xxi1 #aab n41 #bjb-c1     

#bji1 #baa n41 #bcb-d1 #bfa  ,lotze1 #a 
n41 #cf1 #aha   ,mach1 ,e41 #eif        
,mairan1 ,j4 ,j4 ,dortous de1 #dif      
,malebranche1 xxxi1 xxxii1 xliii n41    
#ae1 #bh1 #dg2   ,kant's phenomenalism  
anticipated by1 #ba-b2   rationalism of1
 #eij-a2   on the causal relation1      
#eif-h  ,manifolds1 of appearance1      
#hd-e2   empirical1 #bfg1 #bgd ff42     
pure a priori1 #hh-ij1 #ib ff41 #ie1    
#if-g1 #acd1 #adb n41 #adh n41          
#aga1 #aid-e1 #bbf1 #bbh-i1 #bfg1       
#bfi-gj1 #bhi1 #ccg1 #cdd1 #cge1 #che n4
  ,mathematics1 methods of1 #ag-ah2     
judgments in1 not all synthetic1 #fd2   
principle of contradiction in           
mathematical reasoning1 #fj1 #fd-e1     
#cdd2   ,kant's intuitional view of1    
#dj-a1 #fe-f2   distinction between     
mathematical and philosophical          
knowledge1 #ae1 #efc ff42   pure and    
applied1 #fh1 #aaa-ab1 #aad-ae1 #adj1   
#aff1 #eff2   use of schemata in1       
#ccg-i4   ,see ,arithmetic1 ,geometry   
,matter1 ,kant's dynamical theory of1   

#ced-e2   principle of conservation of1 
#cfa-b  ,meier1 #dda  ,mendelssohn1     
,moses1 xix1 xxxii1 #f1 #aa1 #eh1 #ach  
n41 #aci n41      #aej1 #aec1 #afj-a1   
#deh-i n41 #dfg1 #dgj-a  ,metaphysical  
,first ,principles of ,natural ,science1
 ,kant's1 #ef n41 #ff1 #ig1     #abg-h1 
#afd-e n41 #cab n41 #ced n41 #cfa n41   
#chj-a1      #chd n41 #dia1 #egi n4     
,metaphysics1 distinction between       
immanent and transcendent1      liv-lv1 
#ae1 #ai1 #bb1     #bf-g1 #cc1 #ej1 #eb1
 #ec1 #ee-f1 #eh-i1 #ff-gj1 #bdd-e1     
#beg-h1      #ede1 #ehj-a2 in disrepute1
 #h-i2   ,kant professes to establish a 
quite final1 #aj1 #ce1 #edc ff42        
8,copernican hypothesis0 and1 #ah ff42  
as natural disposition1 #ab-ac1 #fh ff42
   as science1 #fh ff42   hypotheses not
 valid in1 #edc ff42   the problems of1 
#efi-gf1 #egi-ha  ,method1 the          
sceptical1 #ede-f2   mathematical1      
#efc-g4   ,see ,analytic and ,synthetic 
,methods  ,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 #hf1 #cfd-e1  
#cgg1 #eif  ,mind1 ,kant's use of term1 

#ha  ,mistaken ,subtlety of the ,four   
,syllogistic ,figures1 ,kant's1 #aha-b  
,modality1 #cia ff4  ,monadologia       
physica1 ,kant's1 #ced  ,moral attitude1
 the1 xxxvi1 xlv1 lv ff41 #eae-af1 #ega 
ff4  ,moral belief1 lvi ff41 #egg       
,moral law1 consciousness of the1 de    
facto1 xxxvi1 xlv1 #egb-c  ,motion1     
doctrine of1 #abg-i1 #acc2   ,galileo's 
revolutionary doctrine of1 #ehc-d       
,mller1 ,max1 #ge   ,natural ,science1  
pure1 #ff-h2   and immanent metaphysics1
 #gj4 ,see ,metaphysics  ,nature1 means 
8all that is10 #af  ,necessity1 and     
universality1 #ef-g2   definition of1   
#cia ff42   of thought and of existence1
 #djb-c1 #ebg1 #ecc1 #ecf2   limited    
being may exist by unconditioned1 #ebg1 
#ecc1 #ecf2   absolute necessity not    
purely logical1 #ebh2   unconditioned1  
,idea of1 #ebg ff41 #ecc-g1 #eda-b1     
#eee1 #eeh-fa2   and contingency1       
concepts of1 not applicable to things in
 themselves1 #ece2   relative1 #eda1    
#eee1 #ega ff4  ,negative ,quantity1    

,kant's essay on1 #cha1 #djc n4  ,new   
,doctrine of ,motion and ,rest1 ,kant's1
 #ced1 #cha n4  ,newton1 his influence  
on ,kant1 lv-lvi1 #if n41 #adj-b1 #afa  
ff41 #ced n42   ,kant modifies ,newton's
 cosmology1 #eci  ,noumenon1 positive   
and negative conception of1 #djh ff41   
#dac4   ,see ,appearance  ,number1      
schema of1 #cdg-h4 ,see ,arithmetic     
,object1 ,kant's use of term1 #gi-ha1   
#afg n41 #agd2   transcendental1 #bjc   
ff42   empirical1 #bjf ff41 #bbc1 #bgj  
ff41 #cjh ff4  ,objective1 not the      
opposite of the subjective1 #bgi ff41   
#cac-ad2   validity of ,ideas1 #eeh-fa  
,occasionalism1 #dfe1 #eif-g1 #eih  ,on 
the ,radical ,evil in ,human ,nature1   
,kant's treatise1 lviii1 lix            
,ontological argument1 #ebg ff4         
,opinion1 ,kant's use of term1 #edc1    
#egf-g  ,organon1 #ga-b1 #afi-gj1 #agd  
,oswald1 xxviii n4  ,outer ,sense1 #adg1
 #bgf1 #bic ff41 #cfj   ,paralogisms1   
#dee ff42   nature of fallacy of the1   
#dff1 #dgj  ,paulsen1 #df-g1 #fd1 #cgc1 

#fja n4  ,pearson1 ,k41 #eif  ,perpetual
 ,peace1 ,kant's treatise on1 lvii n4   
,phenomenalism and subjectivism1 xxxix  
ff41      xlv-xlvii1 #hb-d1 #abj-b1     
#acf-h1 #ach-i1 #adj1 #aej-d1           
#aee-i1 #bbc1 #bbg1 #bgj ff41 #cab ff41 
#cdi-ea1      #ceg-h1 #cgc-d1 #djg n41  
#dad-ag  ,phenomenon1 distinction       
between appearance and1 #hc4   ,see     
,appearance  ,philosophy1 causes of     
failure of1 #ei2   ,kant reinterprets   
its function and aims1 lvi1 #ega-f1     
#egg-h2   the domains of1 #egi-ha2      
,kant's view of history of1 #ehb        
,physico-theological argument1 #ech ff4 
,physics1 method of1 #ag-ah2   ,kant's  
views regarding1 #ced-e1 #cfa-b1 #cgi-ha
  ,pistorius1 #cje1 #cjg-h1 #cbc1 #dfg  
,plato1 xlv1 #dg1 #aeh1 #cja1 #cij1     
#dcf1 #dif1 #ehb  ,pope1 #aef           
,possibility1 ,kant's definition of1    
#cia ff4  ,postulates4 ,see ,hypotheses 
,practical employment of ,reason1       
lvi-lix1 #efi ff4  ,pragmatic belief1   
lvi1 #egg  ,prantl1 #gc                 

,pre-established harmony1 #bh1 #dg1     
#aad1 #ada-b1 #bfg-h1 #bij1 #dfe1 #eij  
,priestley1 ,j41 xxviii n41 #aa1 #efg n4
  ,primary and secondary qualities1 #hb1
 #abj-b1 #adf1 #adi ff41 #cjf           
,principles never self-evident1         
xxvi-xxviii1   xxxv-xxxviii1 #cf ff41   
#ec1 #ahe-f1 #cdj4   ,see ,a priori     
,probabilities1 inference from4 ,see    
,hypotheses  ,prolegomena to ,every     
,future ,metaphysics1 ,kant's1 xxv1     
xxviii n41 xxix n41     #ab1 #ac1 #df1  
#dg1 #di1 #ei-fj1 #fa-d1 #fe1 #ff-g1 #fh
 ff41      #hj1 #hd1 #ia1 #ajf1 #aji-aa1
 #aaf1 #aba1 #abi1 #adf1 #adi1          
#aeb1 #aec1 #aee1 #aef1 #aeh1 #aei1     
#afa1 #afc1 #afe1 #agh-i1      #ahd1    
#ahh1 #bcd1 #bhh-i1 #bii1 #cjj-a1       
#cje-h1 #cdf1      #cfa n41 #cgf-g      
,psychology1 ,kant's views regarding1   
xliii-xlvii1 #ej-a1      #bce ff41 #bfc 
ff41 #bfi-bgj1 #caa n41 #cab n41 #chd-e1
      #dee ff41 #dgc-g1 #ehj-a  ,pure1  
,kant's use of term1 #a-b1 #ed-f1 #fd   
,quality1 and intensive magnitude1 #ceb4

   ,see ,primary and secondary qualities
   ,rationalism1 ,kant's type of1       
xxxv-xxxvi1 #beg-h2   relation to the   
rationalism of ,leibniz1 #dah ff4   ,see
 ,a priori  ,reason1 meanings of the    
term1 liii-lv1 lvi1 #b-c1 #ga1 #dbf ff41
 #ebj-a1 #eeh-fa2   ineradicably        
metaphysical1 liii-lv1 lvi1 #h2         
condition of free actions1 #eae-af2   as
 practical1 lvi ff41 #eae-ag2   as      
causing antinomy1 liii1 #eai ff42       
hypothetical employment of1 #edi-ej2    
,ideal of1 #eef ff4   ,see ,idealist and
 sceptical views of ,reason1 ,ideas of  
,reason  ,rechtslehre1 ,kant's1 #aij    
,reciprocity1 category of1 #aig1 #cha   
ff41 #dcd-e1 #dci-dj1 #dea-d            
,reflexionen ,kants zur ,kritik der     
reinen ,vernunft1 xx1      xxiii1 xlix1 
lv1 #he1     #hf1 #ajf1 #abg1 #ahb1 #ahh
 ff41 #aif1 #aig1 #aih1 #bjj-a1 #bjb-c  
1 #bjh1 #bca-b1 #bfa1 #ccd n41 #cii1    
#dcc-dj1 #ddh-i1 #edc  ,regulative4 ,see
 ,ideas of ,reason  ,reicke1 xx4 ,see   
,lose ,bltter  ,reimarus1 #aic          

,representation1 ,kant's use of term1   
#ha1 #ajd2   distinction between        
representation and its object1 #ace1    
#acf-g1 #bgb ff41 #cjh     ff41 #cag-ah1
 #cfe4   ,see ,phenomenalism and        
subjectivism  ,representative           
perception1 doctrine of1 xxxix-xliii1   
xlvi1 #bgb ff41 #bih ff41     #ehe-h    
,riehl1 ,a41 xliv n41 #df1 #ea1 #hh1    
#ajb n41 #aie1 #cjc-d1      #cag-ah1    
#cdj-a1 #cdb1 #ceg-h1 #cgb n41 #cgc1    
#fja n41 #fje  ,rousseau1 lvii1         
lviii-lix1 #dcf1 #efg n41 #egh  ,rule1  
two kinds of1 #cgb  ,russell1 ,b41      
#dia-b1 #efh n4   ,sceptical method1    
,kant's1 #dha1 #ede-f  ,sceptical view  
of ,reason1 #dha1 #ejj-c1 #eaa-ab1      
#eai-ba1 #ebh-i1 #ecc-g1 #eda-b1 #edg   
ff41 #eeh-fa  ,scepticism1 #i1 #ac-ae1  
#ede-f1 #efg  ,schematism1 #aie-f1      
#bfe-g1 #bhi1 #caa1 #ccc1 #ccd ff41 #dfg
 n42   and images1 #ccg-i               
,schopenhauer1 #ge1 #aig1 #cae-af1      
#cfe-g1 #cgg-i1 #chg-i1 #djg n41 #dhb-c 
n41 #dic     n41 #die n4  ,schulze1     

,johann1 #abi-ca1 #ach1 #aih-i1 #dhj n4 
,schtz1 #aec  ,segner1 #ff  ,self1      
,kant's semi-,critical1 spiritualist    
view of the1 l1      #bjg-i1 #bab1 #bdc1
 #bfj-c1 #cbg-h1 #dgc-g1 #eae2   may not
 be an ultimate form of existence1      
l-lii1 #bfj-c1      #bgg-i1 #cbg1       
#dei-fb1     #dgc-g2   ,idea of the1    
#dci-dj1 #dee-fb1 #dga1 #dgb-g1 #eed2   
,kant's view of nature and destiny of1  
#dgb-g4   ,see ,apperception1 ,soul     
,self-consciousness4 ,see ,apperception1
 ,consciousness  ,self-evidence1 ,kant's
 rejection of1 xxvi-xxviii1             
xxxv-xxxviii1      #cf1 #ec1 #aah1 #adb1
 #ahe-f1 #efc-d1 #efe-f4   ,see ,a      
priori  ,sensation1 ,kant's views of1   
#ha-b1 #hd-h1 #bgd-g1 #cdi-eb2          
non-spatial1 #he-h1 #ajj-a1 #aje2       
required for determining actuality1 #cia
 ff42   sensations1 feelings1 etc41     
subject to law of causality1      xlvi  
n41 #bge1 #bgi-hb1 #caa-ab1 #cac-ad1    
#chd-e  ,sensibility1 may have a common 
root with understanding1 #gg2           

definition of1 #ha1 #afg-h2   as a      
limitation1 #aaf2   criticism of        
,leibniz's view of1 #adc-f2   ,kant's   
view of1 #bgd-g  ,seven ,small ,papers1 
,kant's1 #bih  ,sidgwick1 ,h41 #cad     
,sigsbee1 ,r4 ,a41 #aa  ,sigwart1 #cf1  
#aha1 #aig  ,simultaneity4 ,see ,time   
,soul1 and body1 ,kant's view of their  
relation1 #bge-f1      #bgi-hd1 #cab    
ff41 #chd-e1     #dfd-f1 #dfg1 #dga1    
#dgf4   ,see ,apperception1 ,self       
,space1 ,kant's views of1 xxxv-xxxvi1   
lii1 #he ff41 #ahh2   involves an ,idea 
of ,reason1 liii-liv1 #if-h1 #ajb n41   
#afe-f1 #cij-a2   metaphysical          
exposition of1 #ii ff41 #aji-aj1 #aab   
ff41 #acd ff42   transcendental         
exposition of1 #aji ff41 #cdd-e2   not a
 property of things in themselves1 #aab 
ff42   is the form of outer sense1      
#aad-af2   transcendental ideality of1  
#gf1 #aaf-ag2   uniform for all human   
beings1 #aaf-ah1 #abj1 #bda-b1 #beg2    
possibility of other spaces1 #aag ff42  
criticism of ,newtonian and ,leibnizian 

views of1 #adj-b2   merely de facto     
character of1 #eg1 #aah1 #adb1 #ahe-f1  
#beg2   as ,unding1 #aed2   in relation 
to ,divine ,existence1 #aei-fa2   and   
incongruous counterparts1 #afa ff42     
involved in consciousness of time1 #cji 
ff41 #chd-f1 #cij-a2   ignored by ,kant 
in doctrine of schematism1 #cda1 #cdh1  
#cfj2   involves category of            
reciprocity1 liii-liv1 #che-g1 #cij-a2  
and antinomy1 #dhj ff4   ,see ,geometry 
,specification1 transcendental principle
 of1 #eja-b  ,spencer1 ,herbert1 #hg1   
#ehd n41 #eif  ,spinoza1 #gd1 #bgc n41  
#ddj1 #ehg1 #fja-b  ,stadler1 #aig1     
#cgh-i1 #chi n4  ,stirling1 ,j4         
,hutchison1 #bc1 #ge1 #cff n41 #cgg     
,stout1 ,g4 ,f41 #hg1 #cfg n41 #chg     
,subconscious1 the1 ,kant's view of1    
#bfc ff41 #bgc-d  ,subjectivism1 in     
,kant's doctrine of the transcendental  
object1 xxxix ff41 xlv-xlvii1 #bjf ff41 
#bag-ah4   ,see ,phenomenalism and      
subjectivism1 ,idealism  ,substance and 
attribute1 category of1 #cfb-c  ,sulzer1

 xxviii n4  ,summum ,bonum1 #ege1 #egg  
,swedenborg1 #aee n41 #aeh n41 #bii     
,swift1 ,benjamin1 #gd  ,synthetic1     
problem of knowledge a priori and1 xxv  
ff41      xxxv-xxxvi1 xxxviii1     #bh  
ff41 #cg ff41 #ei ff42   knowledge from 
mere concepts1 #fd2   decomposing       
synthesis1 #ie2   ambiguities in ,kant's
 formulation of problem of a priori     
synthetic judgments1 #dc ff42           
processes1 xliii-xlv1 l-lii1 #bde-h1    
#bfa-b1 #bfc ff41      #bgg-h1 #bic1    
#bie ff41 #cbb1     #cbg ff4   ,see     
,analytic and synthetic judgments1 and  
methods  ,system of pure reason1 #ga-c1 
#egi-hj   ,teleological argument1       
#ecf-g1 #ech-db1 #eef-h  ,terrasson1    
,jean1 #ae  ,tetens1 #hb1 #adh1 #bid n41
 #dge  ,thales1 #ah  ,theist1 as        
contrasted with deist1 #eda  ,things in 
themselves1 ,kant's first use of phrase1
 #aab n42   transcendental object       
equivalent to thing in itself1 #bjd ff4 
,see ,appearance  ,thinking1 discursive 
and creative4 ,see ,understanding       

,thomasius1 #aic  ,time1 consciousness  
of1 ,kant's datum1 xxxiv1 #abj1 #bda-b2 
metaphysical exposition of1 #abc ff42   
as infinite1 #abe2   transcendental     
exposition of1 #abf ff41 #cdd-e2   as   
form of inner sense1 #acd-e1 #bic ff42  
axioms of1 #abg2   not a determination  
of outer appearance1 #acd ff42   merely 
de facto character of1 xxxv-xxxvi1 lii1 
#adb1 #efe-g2   simultaneity not a mode 
of1 #ace ff41 #cef1 #ceh-i2   and       
simultaneous apprehension1 #ace-f1 #cdh1
 #ceh-i1 #cfg-h1 #cga-b1 #cha-b2   and  
reality of inner changes1 #ach-dj2      
transcendental ideality of1 #gf1 #ach2  
,kant's view of1 not a mere hypothesis1 
#adg2   space involved in consciousness 
of1 #acd-f1 #cji ff41 #cda1 #cdg-h2     
subjective and objective order of1 #ceh 
ff41 #cfe ff41 #cha ff42   time         
relations determined by the given1      
#cd-e1 #bfg-h1 #cfg1 #cgj1 #cga-b1 #cgg2
   does not itself change1 #adb1        
#cei-fj2   category of causality        
involved in consciousness of1 liii-liv1 

#cfe ff41 #cgg     ff41 #chg2   cannot  
be experienced in and by itself1 #cge-f2
   category of reciprocity involved in  
consciousness of1 #cha-ia2   ,idea of   
,reason involved in consciousness of1   
liii-liv1 #if-h1 #cij-a2   infinitude   
and infinite divisibility of1 #cij-a1   
#dha1 #dhc ff4  ,totality4 ,see         
,unconditioned  ,transcendent4 ,see     
,transcendental and ,metaphysics        
,transcendental1 meaning of term1 #gc-f1
 #aaf-ag1 #cjb2 illusion1 #ac1 #dbg-i1  
#eeb1     #eee2   method of proof1 xxxv1
 xxxvii-xxxviii1 #de1 #bch-i1 #bda-c1   
#bei-fj1 #cdd1 #efh1     #egb ff42      
ideality of space and time1 #gf1        
#aaf-ag1 #ach2   exposition of space and
 time1 #aji ff41 #abf ff41 #cdd-e2      
object1 ,kant's doctrine of1 xlvi n41   
#bjc1 #bjd ff41 #cbb1 #cbh1 #cga-c1     
#djf-g1     #dab1 #dad1 #dae1 #eac-ad1  
#eah2   unity of apperception1 ,kant's  
pre-,critical view of1 #bjg ff41 #bab2  
unity of apperception1 ,kant's doctrine 
of1 l-lii1 #bej-c1 #bfj-c1 #bgj1 #bgg-i1

     #cbb ff41 #dee ff41 #dgc-g2        
psychology1 xliii-xlvii1 l-lii1 #ej-a1  
#bce ff41 #bec1 #bfc ff42 ,ideal1 #ebb  
ff42   principles of ,reason1 #eej-a2   
illusion1 #ac1 #dbg-i1 #dcg1 #def ff41  
#dhj1 #eeb1 #eee4   ,see ,deduction of  
,categories and of ,ideas  ,transition  
from the ,metaphysical ,first           
,principles of ,natural      ,science to
 ,physics1 ,kant's treatise1 #bge n41   
#bhc n41      #dhb n41 #ead n4          
,trendelenburg1 #aac-ad1 #adj  ,truth4  
,see ,coherence theory of truth   ,ueber
 das ,organ der ,seele1 ,kant's1 #ha n41
 #bge n4  ,ueber eine ,entdeckung1 etc41
 ,kant's reply to ,eberhard1 #ij ff41   
#adc n4  ,ueber ,philosophie berhaupt1  
,kant's1 #hc n41 #abh  ,ulrichs1 #dfg1  
#dga  ,unconditioned1 ,idea of the1 its 
relation to category of totality1       
#aii-bjj1 #dcc-d1 #dea1 #dhj1 #ebi1     
#eei-fj2   our awareness of the         
conditioned presupposes the1 #daf-ag1   
#dbi ff42   in connection with ,kant's  
view of the self1 #dgc-g2   ,kant's     

criticism of the ,idea of the1 #dih1    
#ebg ff41 #ecc-g1      #eda-b1 #eee1    
#eeh-fa4   ,see ,idealist and ,sceptical
 views of ,reason  ,understanding1 and  
,reason1 lii-lv1 #b1 #eb2   defined1    
#ha2   may have common root with        
sensibility1 #gg2   distinction between 
its discursive and its originative      
activities1 #agb1 #agf     ff41 #ahb-c1 
#bfc ff41 #bgg-h1 #ccd-e1 #cgj1 #cgg2   
viewed by ,kant as a unity1 #agd ff41   
#ahe-f2   its primary function1         
xxxiv-xxxv1 xxxviii1 xli-xlii1 #ic-id1  
#acc1 #aha-b1 #bhh-i1 #ccb1 #cgj1 #cgg2 
as intuitive1 #afj1 #bia1 #djh ff41 #dfh
 n41 #edb4   ,see ,concept  ,universal  
,natural ,history and ,theory of the    
,heavens1 ,kant's1 #eci  ,untersuchung  
ber die ,deutlichkeit der ,grundstze1   
,kant's1 #aaj n41 #aca   ,vaihinger1    
,hans1 xx1 xxv1 xxviii n41 xliv n41 #b1 
#ac1 #bc1 #dc1      #de ff41 #eb1       
#ec1 #ei1 #fj1 #fd1 #fe1 #ff1 #ha1 #hg1 
#ajd1 #aje1 #aji1 #aab1 #aac1 #aag1     
#abg1 #acj1 #aci1 #adj1 #adc1 #adg1     

#adh1 #aef1 #afa1 #afb1 #bjb ff41       
#bfa1 #bfh-i1 #bih-i1 #cja1 #cad-cae1   
#egi n41 #fja n4  ,value1 problems of1  
lvi1 lx-lxi  ,void1 ,kant's doctrine of 
the1 #ced-e  ,voltaire1 xxxi1 #dcf1 #eci
  ,von dem ersten ,grunde des           
,unterschiedes der ,gegenden im ,raume1 
,kant's1 #dj1     #hf n41 #adj1 #afb    
,watson1 ,j41 #a n41 #bc n41 #ge1 #ajb  
n41 #aag1 #ahc1 #aie1 #aif1 #aih1 #bfb1 
#cbh1     #dfb1 #dfh n41 #efd           
,windelband1 #df  ,wolff1 #aib-c1 #bgb1 
#dcf1 #ddj1 #ebb1 #egi1 #ehg1 #fja-f    
,zedlitz1 ,freiherr von1 #f-g  ,,the    
,,end  ,printed by ,r4  ,r4 ,,clark1    
,,limited1 ,edinburgh4         99       
99       99       99       99           
,,footnotes3  #a ,headings not in       
,kant's ,table of ,contents are printed 
in italics4  #b ,w4 x4 p4 #cbc4  #c ,w4 
x4 p4 #caf4  #d ,cf4 ,kant's letter to  
,lambert1 ,september #b1 #aggj3 ,w4 x4  
p4 #ic4  #e ,embodied in his edition of 
the ,kritik 7#ahhi74  #f ,from letter to
 ,marcus ,herz1 ,june #g1 #aggg3 ,w4 x4 

pp4 #aaf-ag4  #g ,from letter to ,marcus
 ,herz1 ,february #ba1 #aggb3 ,w4 x4 p4 
#abg4  #h ,reflexionen ii4 #e4  #i      
,these passages are by no means         
unambiguous1 and are commented upon     
below1 p4 #fa ff4  #aj ,for             
justification of this interpretation of 
,hume ,i must refer the reader to my    
articles on 8,the ,naturalism of ,hume0 
in ,mind1 vol4 xiv4 ,n4,s4 pp4 #adi-gc1 
#cce-dg4  #aa ,to this fact ,kant       
himself draws attention3 8,but the      
perpetual hard fate of metaphysics would
 not allow ,hume to be understood4 ,we  
cannot without a certain sense of pain  
consider how utterly his opponents1     
,reid1 ,oswald1 ,beattie1 and even      
,priestley1 missed the point of the     
problem4 ,for while they were ever      
assuming as conceded what he doubted1   
and demonstrating with eagerness and    
often with arrogance what he never      
thought of disputing1 they so overlooked
 his inclination towards a better state 
of things1 that everything remained     

undisturbed in its old                  
condition40--,prolegomena1 p4 #f2       
,mahaffy and ,bernard's trans4 p4 #e4   
#ab ,sulzer's translation of ,hume's    
,essays 7including the ,enquiries7      
appeared in #aged-ef4  #ac ,the word    
which ,kant uses is ,erinnerung 7cf4    
below1 p4 xxix1 n4 #d74 ,there are two  
main reasons for believing that ,kant   
had not himself read the ,treatise4 ,he 
was imperfectly acquainted with the     
,english language1 and there was no     
existing ,german translation4 7,jakob's 
translation did not appear till         
#agij-ia4 ,on ,kant's knowledge of      
,english1 cf4 ,erdmann3 ,archiv fr      
,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,bd4 i4   
7#ahhh7 pp4 #fb ff41 #baf ff42 and ,k4  
,groos3 ,kant-,studien1 ,bd4 v4 7#aijj7 
p4 #agg ff43 and below1 p4 #aef47 ,and1 
secondly1 ,kant's statements reveal his 
entire ignorance of ,hume's view of     
mathematical science as given in the    
,treatise4  #ad ,cf4 ,vaihinger1        
,commentary1 i4 p4 #cdd ff4 ,beattie    

does1 indeed1 refer to ,hume's view of  
mathematical science as given in the    
,treatise1 but in so indirect and casual
 a manner that ,kant could not possibly 
gather from the reference any notion of 
what that treatment was4 ,cf4 ,beattie's
 ,essay on the ,nature and ,immutability
 of ,truth 7sixth edition71 pp4 #ach1   
#adb1 #bfi4  #ae ,these ,hume had       
himself pointed out both in the         
,treatise and in the ,enquiry2 and      
because of them he rejects scepticism as
 a feasible philosophy of life4 ,kant's 
statement above quoted that ,hume's     
critics 7among whom ,beattie is cited7  
8were ever assuming what ,hume doubted1 
and demonstrating with eagerness and    
often with arrogance what he never      
thought of disputing10 undoubtedly refer
 in a quite especial degree to ,beattie4
  #af ,werke1 x4 p4 #abc ff4 ,it is     
dated ,february #ba1 #aggb4 ,cf4 below1 
pp4 #bai-bj4  #ag ,in ,prolegomena1 p4  
#f 7above quoted1 p4 xxviii1 n4 #a71 and
 p4 #h 7trans4 p4 #f73 8,i should think 

,hume might fairly have laid as much    
claim to sound sense as ,beattie1 and   
besides to a critical understanding     
7such as the latter did not possess740  
#ah ,cf4 ,prolegomena1 p4 #h3 8,i       
honestly confess that my recollection of
 ,david ,hume's teaching 7die           
,erinnerung des ,david ,hume7 was the   
very thing which many years ago ,kant is
 writing in #aghc first interrupted my  
dogmatic slumber1 and gave my           
investigations in the field of          
speculative philosophy quite a new      
direction40 ,kant's employment of the   
term ,erinnerung may perhaps be         
interpreted in view of the indirect     
source of his knowledge of ,hume's main 
position4 ,he would bring to his reading
 of ,beattie's quotations the memory of 
,hume's other sceptical doctrines as    
expounded in the ,enquiry4  #ai ,kant1  
it should be noted1 classifies          
philosophies as either dogmatic 7       
rationalistic7 or sceptical4 ,empiricism
 he regards as a form of scepticism4    

#bj ,quoted by ,beattie 7op4 cit41 sixth
 edition1 p4 #bie71 who1 however        
incapable of appreciating the force of  
,hume's arguments1 was at least awake to
 certain of their ultimate consequences4
  #ba ,for a more detailed statement of 
,kant's relation to his philosophical   
predecessors1 cf4 below1 ,appendix ,b1  
p4 #ehc ff4  #bb ,the term 8recognition0
 is employed by ,kant in its widest     
sense1 as covering1 for instance1       
recognition of the past as past1 or of  
an object as being a certain kind of    
object4  #bc ,consciousness of time1    
consciousness of objects in space1      
consciousness of self1 are the three    
modes of experience which ,kant seeks to
 analyse4 ,they are found to be         
inseparable from one another and in     
their union to constitute a form of     
conscious experience that is equivalent 
to an act of judgment--i4e4 to be a form
 of awareness that involves relational  
categories and universal concepts4  #bd 
,as we have noted 7above1 pp4           

xxvi-xxvii71 it was ,hume's insistence  
upon the synthetic1 non-self-evident    
character of the causal axiom that      
awakened ,kant from his dogmatic        
slumber4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #fa ff41 #eic  
ff4  #be ,cf4 below1 pp4 lvi ff41 #ega  
ff4  #bf ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cf-g4  #bg    
,cf4 below1 p4 #edc ff4  #bh ,cf4 below1
 pp4 liii-iv4  #bi ,cf4 below1 pp4 #de1 
#bch-dc4  #cj ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cc-f1    
#aha1 #ahc-f4  #ca ,cf4 below1 pp4      
#cc-db1 #cid-e1 #cih4  #cb ,with the    
sole exception of ,malebranche1 who on  
this point anticipated ,kant4  #cc ,this
 is the position that ,kant endeavours  
to expound in the very unsatisfactory   
form of a doctrine of 8inner sense40    
,cf4 below1 pp4 l-ii1 #bia ff4  #cd     
,this was ,kant's chief reason for      
omitting the so-called 8subjective      
deduction of the categories0 from the   
second edition4 ,the teaching of the    
subjective deduction is1 however1       
preserved in almost unmodified form     
throughout the ,critique as a whole1 and

 its 8transcendental psychology0 forms1 
as ,i shall try to show1 an essential   
part of ,kant's central teaching4 ,in   
this matter ,i find myself in agreement 
with ,vaihinger1 and in complete        
disagreement with ,riehl and the        
majority of the neo-,kantians4 ,the     
neo-,kantian attempt to treat           
epistemology in independence of all     
psychological considerations is bound to
 lead to very different conclusions from
 those which ,kant himself reached4 ,cf4
 below1 pp4 #bcg ff41 #bfc-gj4  #ce     
,this subjectivism finds expression in  
,kant's doctrine of the 8transcendental 
object0 which1 as ,i shall try to prove1
 is a doctrine of early date and only   
semi-,critical4 ,that doctrine is       
especially prominent in the section on  
the ,antinomies4 ,see below p4 #bjd ff4 
#cf ,cf4 pp4 #bgj ff41 #bih ff41        
#cjh-ba1 #cgc-d1 #dad-ag4  #cg ,that    
this statement holds of feelings and    
desires1 and therefore of all the       
emotions1 as well as of our             

sense-contents1 is emphasised by ,kant  
in the ,critique of ,practical ,reason4 
,cf4 below1 pp4 #bgf1 #bgi-hj1 #cab1    
#chd-e4  #ch ,the connection of this    
teaching with ,kant's theory of         
consciousness may be noted4 ,if         
consciousness in all its forms1 however 
primitive1 is already awareness of      
meaning1 its only possible task is to   
define1 modify1 reconstruct1 and develop
 such meaning1 never to obtain for bare 
contents or existences objective or     
other significance4 ,cf4 above1 pp4     
xli-ii1 xliv4  #ci ,reflexionen zur     
,anthropologie1 #bjg4  #dj ,in sketch of
 a letter 7summer #agib7 to ,frst von   
,beloselsky 7,w4 xi4 p4 #cca74  #da ,may
 #bf1 #aghi 7,w4 xi4 p4 #eb74  #db ,that
 ,kant has not developed a terminology  
really adequate to the statement of his 
meaning1 is shown by a parenthesis which
 ,i have omitted from the above         
quotation4  #dc ,this interpretation of 
,kant appears in a very crude form in   
,james's references to ,kant in his     

,principles of ,psychology4 ,it appears 
in a more subtle form in ,lotze and     
,green4 ,caird and ,watson1 on the other
 hand1 have carefully guarded themselves
 against this view of ,kant's teaching1 
and as ,i have maintained 7pp4 xliii-v71
 lie open to criticism only in so far as
 they tend to ignore those aspects of   
,kant's teaching which cannot be stated 
in terms of logical implication4  #dd   
,it may be objected that this is        
virtually what ,kant is doing when he   
postulates synthetic activities as the  
source of the categories4 ,kant would   
probably have replied that he has not   
attempted to define these activities    
save to the extent that is absolutely   
demanded by the known character of their
 products1 and that he is willing to    
admit that many different explanations  
of their nature are possible4 ,they may 
be due to some kind of personal or      
spiritual agency1 but also they may not4
 ,on the whole question of the          
legitimacy of ,kant's general method of 

procedure1 cf4 below1 pp4 #bce-i1 #bfc  
ff41 #bgc-d1 #bgg ff41 #dfa-b1 #dgc-g4  
#de ,cf4 ,concerning the ,advances made 
by ,metaphysics since ,leibniz and      
,wolff 7,werke 7,hartenstein71 viii4    
#ecj-a73 8,i am conscious to myself of  
myself--this is a thought which contains
 a twofold ,i1 the ,i as subject and the
 ,i as object4 ,how it should be        
possible that ,i1 the ,i that thinks1   
should be an object 444 to myself1 and  
so should be able to distinguish myself 
from myself1 it is altogether beyond our
 powers to explain4 ,it is1 however1 an 
undoubted fact 444 and has as a         
consequence the complete distinguishing 
of us off from the whole animal kingdom1
 since we have no ground for ascribing  
to animals the power to say ,i to       
themselves40  #df ,cf4 above1 p4 xxxiv2 
below1 pp4 #bej-c1 #bfj-c1 #bhe-f4  #dg 
,cf4 ,a #fea  ,b #fgi3 8,the law of     
,reason1 which requires us to seek for  
this unity1 is a necessary law1 as      
without it we should have no ,reason at 

all1 and without ,reason no coherent    
employment of the understanding1 and in 
the absence of this no sufficient       
criterion of empirical truth40 ,cf4 also
 below1 pp4 #cij-a1 #dad-ag1 #dbi-ca1   
#eai-ba1 #eeh-fa4  #dh ,regarding a     
further complication1 due to the fact   
that the ,dialectic was written before  
the teaching of the ,analytic was       
properly matured1 cf4 above1 p4 xxiv4   
#di ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cca1 #cij-a1       
#dad-ag4  #ej ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bb1 #cc1 
#ef1 #ff ff4  #ea ,reflexionen 7,b4     
,erdmann's edition7 ii4 #bjd4  #eb ,for 
an alternative and perhaps more adequate
 method of describing ,kant's general   
position1 cf4 below1 p4 #ega ff4  #ec   
,above1 pp4 xxxviii-ix1 xlii1 xliv4  #ed
 ,cf4 below1 p4 #egg4  #ee ,critique of 
,practical ,reason1 ,w4 v4 p4 #cb2      
,abbott's trans4 pp4 #abj-a4  #ef ,op4  
cit4 p4 #hf2 ,abbott's trans4 p4 #ahj4  
#eg ,fragmente aus dem ,nachlasse       
7,werke 7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #fbd74 
,cf4 below1 pp4 #egg-h4 ,kant claims for

 all men equality of political rights1  
and in his treatise on ,perpetual ,peace
 maintains that wars are not likely to  
cease until the republican form of      
government is universally adopted4 ,he  
distinguishes1 however1 between         
republicanism and democracy4 ,by the    
former he means a genuinely             
representative system2 the latter he    
interprets as being the 7in principle7  
unlimited despotism of majority rule4   
,kant accordingly contends that the     
smaller the staff of the executive1 and 
the more effective the representation of
 minorities1 the more complete will be  
the approximation to the ideal          
constitution4 ,in other words1 the less 
government we can get along with1 the   
better4  #eh ,on the ,radical ,evil in  
,human ,nature1 ,w4 vi4 p4 #bj2         
,abbott's trans4 p4 #cbf4 8,this opinion
 that the world is constantly advancing 
from worse to better is certainly not   
founded on experience if what is meant  
is moral good or evil 7not              

civilisation71 for the history of all   
times speaks too powerfully against it4 
,probably it is merely a good-natured   
hypothesis 444 designed to encourage us 
in the unwearied cultivation of the germ
 of good that perhaps lies in us44440   
#ei ,foundations of the ,metaphysics of 
,morals1 ,w4 iv4 p4 #djg2 ,abbott's     
trans4 p4 #bd4  #fj ,critique of        
,practical ,reason1 ,w4 v4 pp4 #hd-e2   
,abbott's trans4 pp4 #agh-i4  #fa ,cf4  
,foundations of the ,metaphysics of     
,morals1 ,w4 iv4 p4 #dfc2 ,abbott's     
trans4 p4 #hd3 8,while we do not        
comprehend the practical unconditional  
necessity of the moral imperative1 we   
yet comprehend its incomprehensibility1 
and this is all that can be fairly      
demanded of a philosophy which strives  
to carry its principles up to the very  
limit of human reason40  #fb ,on the    
,radical ,evil in ,human ,nature1 ,w4   
vi4 pp4 #di-ej2 ,abbott's trans4 pp4    
#ceg-h4  #fc ,cf4 ,pringle-,pattison3   
,the ,idea of ,god in the ,light of     

,recent ,philosophy1 p4 #be ff4  #fd    
,einleitung1 i4  #fe ,henry ,home1 ,lord
 ,kames1 published his ,elements of     
,criticism in #agfb4  #ff ,w4 ii4 p4    
#caa4 ,in referring to his course in    
logic1 ,kant states that he will        
consider the training of the power of   
sound judgment in ordinary life1 and    
adds that 8in the ,kritik der ,vernunft 
the close kinship of subject-matter     
gives occasion for casting some glances 
upon the ,kritik des ,geschmacks1 i4e4  
upon ,aesthetics40 ,this passage serves 
to confirm the conjecture that the term 
,kritik was borrowed from the title of  
,home's work4  #fg ,for ,kant's other   
uses of the term pure1 cf4 below1 p4    
#ee4  #fh ,commentar zu ,kants ,kritik  
der reinen ,vernunft1 i4 pp4 #aag-bj4   
#fi ,for a definition1 less exclusively 
titular1 and more adequate to the actual
 scope of the ,critique1 cf4 below1 p4  
#ef4 ,reason1 when distinguished from   
understanding1 ,i shall hereafter print 
with a capital letter1 to mark the very 

special sense in which it is being      
employed4  #gj ,philosophical ,works of 
,francis ,bacon 7edited by ,j4 ,m4      
,robertson1 #aije71 p4 #bdg4  #ga ,for  
,zedlitz's severe strictures 7,dec4     
#agge7 upon the teaching in ,knigsberg  
,university1 and his incidental         
appreciative reference to ,kant1 cf4    
,schubert's edition of ,kant's ,werke1  
xi4 pt4 ii4 pp4 #ei-fa4  #gb ,cf4 ,w4 x4
 p4 #bjg4  #gc ,op4 cit4 pp4 #bab-ac4   
#gd ,cf4 op4 cit4 pp4 #bjh-i4  #ge ,op4 
cit4 p4 #bai4  #gf ,a v4-vi4  #gg ,a v4 
n4  #gh ,cf4 above on title1 pp4 #b-c4  
#gi ,cf4 below1 pp4 #edc1 #egf-g4  #hj  
,a vii4-viii4  #ha ,a xiv4  #hb ,cf4    
below1 pp4 #edc ff4  #hc ,cf4 ,a #hf  ,b
 #aah-ai4  #hd ,morgenstunden2          
,gesammelte ,schriften1 #ahfc edition1  
ii4 pp4 #bdf1 #bhh4 ,cf4 below1 pp4     
#afj-a4  #he ,cited by ,r4 ,a4 ,sigsbee1
 ,philosophisches ,system ,joseph       
,priestleys 7#aiab71 p4 #cc4  #hf ,a v4 
n4  #hg ,a viii4  #hh ,prolegomena1     
,anhang1 ,trans4 of ,mahaffy and        

,bernard1 p4 #adg4  #hi ,a #a4  #ij ,b  
#ba4 ,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #fj ff41 and   
below1 pp4 #dbg-i1 #eeb4  #ia ,a #big-h 
,b #cec-e4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #dbg-i4  #ib 
,a iii4  #ic i4 p4 #ej4  #id ,p4 #i4    
#ie ,this statement1 as we shall find1  
calls for modification4 ,kant's         
,critical position is more correctly    
described as phenomenalism than as      
subjectivism4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 xlv-vii2  
below1 p4 #bgj ff4  #if ,a #gfi  ,b     
#gig4  #ig ,a #gfa  ,b #ghi-ij4 ,cf4    
,sections ,i4-,,iii4 in the             
,methodology4  #ih ,a iii4  #ii ,a v4 n4
  #ajj ,a v4 n4  #aja ,cf4 ,kant's      
,beantwortung der ,frage3 ,was heist    
,aufklrung8 #aghd4  #ajb ,a v4  #ajc    
,cf4 above1 pp4 #b-c4  #ajd ,cf4 above1 
pp4 xliv-v2 below1 pp4 #ai1 #cc1 #ef1   
#ff ff4  #aje ,a ix4  #ajf ,a x4-xi4    
#ajg ,a xii4-xiii4  #ajh ,a xv4  #aji ,a
 xv4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ff-g4  #aaj ,b    
xiv4  #aaa ,b ix4  #aab ,b xi4  #aac    
,cf4 below1 pp4 #bb-e4  #aad ,cf4 above1
 p4 lvi2 below1 p4 #ega ff4  #aae       

,dissertation1  #g4  #aaf ,all these    
assertions call for later modification  
and restatement4  #aag ,b xxx4  #aah ,b 
xxxii4  #aai ,b xxxvii4  #abj ,b        
xxxviii4  #aba ,b vii4  #abb ,b viii4   
#abc ,b xvi4  #abd ,cf4 above1 pp4      
xxvi-vii2 below1 pp4 #eid-e4  #abe ,cf4 
8,malebranche's ,theory of the          
,perception of ,distance and            
,magnitude10 in ,british ,journal of    
,psychology 7#aije71 i4 pp4 #aia-bjd4   
#abf ,cf4 below1 pp4 #adc ff41 #fjd4    
#abg ,b xviii4-xix4  #abh ,cf4 below1   
pp4 #cc1 #ef1 #ff ff4  #abi ,b xx4  #acj
 ,b xxii4  #aca ,b xvi42 ,b xxii4 n4    
#acb ,watson's ,the ,philosophy of ,kant
 ,explained 7p4 #cg7 is the only work in
 which ,i have found correct and        
unambiguous indication of the true      
interpretation of ,kant's analogy4  #acc
 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 bk i4 ch4 i4  
#aa4  #acd ,text-,book to ,kant 7#ahha71
 p4 #bi4  #ace ,history of ,materialism1
 ,eng4 transl41 ii4 pp4 #aef1 #aeh1     
#bcg4  #acf ,geschichte der neueren     

,philosophie 7#ahif71 ii4 p4 #fd4  #acg 
,hibbert ,journal1 ,october #aiaj1 p4   
#di4  #ach ,de ,revolutionibus1 ,i4 v4  
#aci ,ibid4 ,i4 x4  #adj ,b xxii4 n4    
#ada ,cf4 below1 p4 #edc ff4  #adb ,b   
xxvi4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 lv-vi1 #bj2 below1
 pp4 #bij-a1 #cca1 #cdb1 #djd ff4  #adc 
,this restatement will continue up to p4
 #cc4 ,in pp4 #cc-dc ,i shall then give 
general comment on the ,introduction as 
a whole4 ,in p4 #dc ff4 ,i add the      
necessary detailed treatment of special 
points4  #add ,cf4 below1 p4 #bai ff4   
#ade ,cf4 above1 p4 xxv ff42 below1 pp4 
#fa ff41 #eic ff4  #adf ,this statement 
is first made in the ,introduction to   
the second edition4 ,it is really out of
 keeping with the argument of the       
,introduction in either edition4 ,cf4   
below1 pp4 #ci-dj1 #eg1 #he1 #afh1 #bbb1
 #bde ff4 7especially pp4 #bgh1 #bhh74  
#adg ,this is the argument of the       
,introduction to the second edition4 ,in
 the first edition ,kant assumes without
 question the existence of the a priori4

 ,he enquires only whether it is also   
valid in its metaphysical employment    
beyond the field of possible experience4
  #adh ,the argument of the first       
edition1 though briefer1 is             
substantially the same4  #adi ,quoted   
below1 pp4 #bai-bj4  #aej ,cf4 below1   
pp4 #aad1 #bij1 #eij4  #aea ,a #f  ,b   
#aj4 ,i here follow the wording of the  
second edition4  #aeb ,kant's view of   
the a priori differs from that of       
,leibniz in two respects4 ,for ,kant a  
priori concepts are merely logical      
functions1 i4e4 empty2 and secondly1 are
 always synthetic4 ,cf4 above1 pp4      
xxxiii-vi1 #ahf1 #aie-f1 #beg-h1 #bij-a1
 #djd ff4  #aec ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxv-vii2
 below1 pp4 #fa ff41 #eic ff4  #aed ,b  
#bd4  #aee ,cf4 above1 pp4 xliv-xlv1    
#bb2 below1 pp4 #eb-c1 #ee-f1 #ff ff4   
#aef ,needless to say1 this             
8,aristotelian0 logic1 in the           
traditional form in which alone ,kant   
was acquainted with it1 diverges very   
widely from ,aristotle's actual         

teaching4  #aeg ,cf4 above1 pp4         
xxxvi-ix2 below1 pp4 #cf1 #aha1 #ahd-f4 
#aeh ,a vii4  #aei ,b xxiii-iv4  #afj   
,above1 pp4 xxv-vii1 #bf2 below1 p4 #eic
 ff4  #afa ,cf4 above1 p4 xxxvi ff4     
#afb ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxxvii-viii2 below1
 pp4 #bch-db4  #afc ,cf4 below1 pp4 #agf
 ff41 #aha1 #aia1 #beg4  #afd ,a #f  ,b 
#aj4  #afe ,leibniz's interpretation of 
the judgment seems to result in an      
atomism which is the conceptual         
counterpart of his metaphysical monadism
 7cf4 ,adamson1 ,development of ,modern 
,philosophy1 i4 p4 #gg ff42 and my      
,studies in the ,cartesian ,philosophy1 
p4 #afj ff42 also below1 p4 #fjc74 ,each
 concept is regarded as having exclusive
 jurisdiction1 so to speak1 over a      
content wholly internal to itself4 ,the 
various concepts are like sovereign     
states with no mediating tribunals      
capable of prescribing to them their    
mutual dealings4 ,cf4 below1 pp4        
#cid-djj1 #dah ff4  #aff ,a #i  ,b #ac4 
#afg ,erste ,betrachtung1  #b1 #c2      

dritte ,betrachtung1  #a4  #afh ,cf4    
below1 p4 #afb4  #afi  #ab1 #ae ,c4     
#agj ,cf4 ,b #ae-af4  #aga ,cf4 below1  
p4 #abh ff41 on ,kant's views regarding 
arithmetical science4  #agb ,cf4 below1 
p4 #aag ff41 on ,kant and modern        
geometry1 and p4 #abh ff41 on ,kant's   
views regarding arithmetical science4   
#agc ,cf4 below1 pp4 #aca-c1 #cch-i1    
#dah ff4  #agd ,that certain parts of   
the ,introduction were written at       
different dates is shown below1 pp4     
#ga-b4 ,that other parts may be of      
similarly composite origin is always    
possible4 ,there is1 however1 no        
sufficient evidence to establish this   
conclusion4 ,adickes' attempt to do so  
7,k4 pp4 #ce-g n47 is not convincing4   
#age ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxxiii ff41 #a-b1  
#bf ff4  #agf i4 pp4 #cag and #dej ff4  
#agg i4 p4 #dab ff42 cf4 p4 #chh ff4    
#agh ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bai-bj4  #agi ,cf4
 ,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #cid4 ,cf4 above1 p4 
#bh4  #ahj ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4 pp4      
#dae-ag4  #aha ,paulsen objects that if 

synthetic a priori judgments are valid  
without explanation1 they do not need   
it4 ,for two reasons the objection does 
not hold4 7a7 ,without this explanation 
it would be impossible to repel the     
pretensions of transcendent metaphysics 
7cf4 ,a #bji  ,b #bed-e2 ,a #bhc  ,b    
#bhe74 7b7 ,this solution of the        
theoretical problem has also1 as above  
stated1 its own intrinsic interest and  
value4 ,without such explanation the    
validity of these judgments might be    
granted1 but could not be understood4   
7,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #d-e and  #ab at   
the end4 ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #cid47  
#ahb ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4 #ccf4 ,the 
argument of the ,analytic1 which is     
still more complicated1 will be         
considered later4  #ahc ,cf4 ,a #df-i   
,b #fd-f4 ,the corresponding sections of
 the ,prolegomena1 ,vaihinger contends1 
were developed from this first edition  
passage1 and the transcendental         
exposition of space in the second       
edition from the argument of the        

,prolegomena4  #ahd ,the synthetic      
method of argument is1 as we shall see  
later1 further extended in the ,analytic
 by being connected with the problem of 
the validity of ordinary experience4    
,but as the mathematical sciences are   
proved to have the same conditions      
as--neither more nor less than--the     
consciousness of time1 this also allows 
of a corresponding extension of the     
analytic method4 ,the mathematical      
sciences can be substituted for the de  
facto premiss by which these conditions 
are proved4  #ahe ,cf4 above1 p4 #dc4   
#ahf ,what follows should be read along 
with p4 #bce ff4 below1 in which this   
distinction between the 8subjective0 and
 8objective0 deductions is discussed in 
greater detail4  #ahg ,a x-xi4  #ahh    
,this is a criticism to which ,cohen1   
,caird1 and ,riehl lay themselves open4 
#ahi ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bai-bj4  #aij ,cf4
 above1 pp4 #di-ej4  #aia ,cf4          
,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #dje4 ,the existing   
sciences can1 as ,vaihinger says1 be    

treated en bloc1 whereas each of the    
principles of the new philosophy must be
 separately established4  #aib ,a #a4   
#aic ,a #a-b4  #aid ,b #f  ,a #b4  #aie 
,a #b4  #aif ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxxv1 #cf  
ff42 below1 pp4 #efe-g4  #aig ,a #b4    
#aih ,a #b4  #aii ,b #a4  #bjj ,cf4     
below1 p4 #ee4  #bja ,b #a4  #bjb ,cf4  
below1 p4 #ed4  #bjc ,b #b-c4  #bjd ,cf4
 below1 p4 #ee4  #bje ,b #a4  #bjf ,b   
#a4  #bjg ,b #a4  #bjh ,cf4 below1 p4   
#hh ff4  #bji ,cf4 below1 p4 #bcg ff4   
#baj ,b #a4  #baa ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ee-f4
  #bab ,b #b4  #bac ,cf4 above1 p4 #bg  
n4  #bad ,b #b4  #bae ,cf4 above1 pp4   
#ci ff41 #ec2 below1 pp4 #eg-h1 #bbb    
ff41 #bda1 #bhf-i4  #baf ,b #b-c4  #bag 
,cf4 above1 p4 #ec4  #bah ,a #i-aj  ,b  
#ac4  #bai ,cf4 above1 p4 #ci ff41 and  
below1 pp4 #bhf-i4  #bbj ,p4 #ec2 cf4   
also pp4 #a-b4  #bba ,cf4 also above1   
pp4 #b-c4  #bbb ,b #c4  #bbc ,cf4       
,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde1 ,hauptstck
 ii4 ,lehrs4 #h1 ,zus4 #b1 in which     
elasticity and gravity are spoken of as 

the only universal properties of matter 
which can be apprehended a priori4  #bbd
 ,b #c-d4  #bbe ,cf4 above1 p4 #bg ff4  
#bbf ,b #d4  #bbg ,cf4 above1 pp4       
xxxiii-iv1 #bg1 #eii ff4  #bbh ,cf4     
above1 pp4 xxxv-vi1 #cj2 below1 pp4     
#ahe-f1 #beg-i4  #bbi ,loc4 cit4  #bcj  
,b #e4  #bca ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxx1 #eii  
ff4  #bcb ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ci1 #ed4     
#bcc ,a #b  ,b #f4  #bcd ,b #g4  #bce   
,cf4 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1  #ia1  
,w4 v4 p4 #dgc4 ,fortschritte1 ,werke   
7,hartenstein71 viii4 pp4 #egb-c4  #bcf 
,cf4 above1 pp4 #bb1 #di-ej1 #eb4  #bcg 
,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #dj2 ,fortschritte1 
pp4 #egg-h4  #bch i4 p4 #bch4  #bci ,p4 
#egi4  #bdj ,a #gab ff4  ,b #gdj ff42   
cf4 also ,fortschritte1 p4 #ebb4  #bda  
,a #d  ,b #h2 cf4 below1 p4 #efc ff4    
#bdb ,a #d  ,b #h4  #bdc ,a #e  ,b #i4  
#bdd ,cf4 ,b #ah4  #bde ,cf4 above1 p4  
#bi4  #bdf ,a #f ff4  ,b #aj ff4  #bdg  
,prolegomena1  #b1 b1 c2 ,eng4 trans1   
pp4 #ae-af4 ,on the connection of       
mathematical reasoning with the         

principle of contradiction1 cf4 below1  
pp4 #fd-e4  #bdh ,p4 #ehb2 cf4 ,logik1  
#cg4  #bdi ii4 p4 #beg4  #bej           
,prolegomena1  #d4  #bea ,cf4 ,b #bij4  
#beb  #b1 c4  #bec ,b #afa4  #bed ,b    
#bah4  #bee ,a #i  ,b #ac4  #bef ,cf4   
above1 pp4 xxv ff41 #bf2 below1 p4 #eic 
ff42 cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #cdj ff4     
#beg ,a #i  ,b #ac1 ,b #aa1 ,b #ai4     
#beh ,in ,a #i  ,b #ac1 ,b #aa1 ,b #ai4 
#bei ,cf4 ,borowski's ,darstellung des  
,lebens und ,charakters ,im4 ,kants     
7,hoffmann's edition1 #aijb71 p4 #beb4  
,the ,german translation of ,hume's     
,enquiry concerning the ,human          
,understanding appeared in #agee1 and   
,kant probably made his first           
acquaintance with ,hume through it4 ,cf4
 above1 p4 xxviii2 below1 p4 #aef4  #bfj
 ,cf4 below1 ,appendix ,b1 p4 #eic ff4  
#bfa ,a #i  ,b #ac4  #bfb ,a #gcc  ,b   
#gfa4  #bfc ,a #gcg  ,b #gfd4  #bfd i4  
p4 #bia4  #bfe ,b #ad4  #bff ,b #ad4    
,cf4 above1 pp4 #ei-fj4  #bfg i4 p4     
#bid4  #bfh ,b #ae4  #bfi ,b #ae4 ,cf4  

above1 p4 #da4  #bgj ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4
 p4 #bif4  #bga ,a #afd4  #bgb ,a #afd4 
#bgc ,in ,prolegomena and in second     
edition4  #bgd ,b #ae4  #bge  #b c4     
#bgf ,cf4 below1 p4 #abh ff4  #bgg ,cf4 
,a #gac  ,b #gda4  #bgh ,a #adj  ,b     
#agi4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #ccg ff4  #bgi ,b  
#ae4  #bhj ,b #ag4  #bha i4 p4 #cjd ff4 
#bhb  #ae4  #bhc ,this latter ,kant     
developed in his ,metaphysische         
,anfangsgrnde 7#aghf74  #bhd ,cf4 ,a    
#hdj  ,b #hfi4 8,nature0 means1 in the  
,kantian terminology1 8all that is40    
#bhe ,cf4 above1 pp4 xliv-v1 #ai1 #bb1  
#cc1 #eb-c1 #ee-f4  #bhf  #d4  #bhg ,the
 propositions of pure natural science   
are not separately treated in  #d of the
 ,prolegomena1 though the subsequent    
argument implies that this has been     
done4 ,vaihinger's inference 7i4 p4     
#caj7 that a paragraph1 present in      
,kant's manuscript1 has been dropped out
 in the process of printing the fourth  
section 7the section which contains the 
paragraphs transposed from the end of   

#b7 seems unavoidable4 ,the missing     
paragraph was very probably that which  
is here given in ,b #ag4  #bhh ,b #ah4  
#bhi ,in  #d 7at end of paragraphs      
transposed from  #b74  #bij ,b #ai4     
#bia ,b #ai4  #bib ,b #bj4  #bic ,b #bj4
  #bid ,cf4 ,b #ag4  #bie ,b #bj4  #bif 
,b #ba4  #big ,b #bb4  #bih ,vaihinger's
 analysis 7i4 p4 #cga ff47 is           
invaluable4 ,i follow it throughout4    
#bii ,when corrected as above1 pp4      
#ea-b1 #ff-g4  #cjj ,cf4 above1 p4 #ch  
ff4  #cja ,by ,j4 ,erdmann 7cited by    
,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #cga74  #cjb ,by ,b4  
,erdmann1 ,kriticismus1 p4 #ahc4  #cjc  
,as above noted1 pp4 #ff-g4  #cjd       
,above1 p4 #ff4  #cje ,a #aa4  #cjf ,a  
#aa  ,b #bd4  #cjg ,cf4 ,dissertation1  
#bc3 usus logicus--usus realis4  #cjh   
,cf4 above1 p4 #b4  #cji ,a #aa  ,b #bd4
  #caj i4 p4 #dei ff4  #caa             
,entwickelungsgeschichte der ,kantischen
 ,erkenntnistheorie1 p4 #aac4  #cab ,cf4
 ,a #gie  ,b #hbc4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #agj1
 #agd4  #cac ,cf4 ,a #gif  ,b #hbd4     

#cad ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4 pp4 #dfa-b for 
the very varied meanings in which ,kant 
8capriciously0 employs the terms        
,organon1 ,canon1 ,doctrine1 and        
,discipline4  #cae ,a #aa  ,b #be4  #caf
 ,erklrung in ,beziehung auf ,fichte's  
,wissenschaftslehre 7#agii71 ,werke     
7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #fjj4  #cag ,b 
#be4  #cah ,cf4 ,a xv4  #cai ,cf4 ,b    
xxiv4  #cbj ,a #aa  ,b #be4  #cba ,de   
vera religione1 #gb2 ,de civitate ,dei1 
viii4 #f4 ,cited by ,eisler1 ,wrterbuch1
 p4 #aeba4  #cbb ,cf4 ,prantl1          
,geschichte der ,logik im ,abendlande1  
iii4 pp4 #aad1 #bdd-e4  #cbc ,ethica    
7,vloten and ,land71 ii4 prop4 xl4      
schol4 #a4  #cbd ,principles of ,human  
,knowledge1 cxviii4 ,the above citations
 are from ,eisler1 loc4 cit4 pp4        
#aebd-e4 ,i have also myself come upon  
the term in ,swift's ,gulliver's        
,travels 7,dent1 #ahig1 p4 #aff73 8,and 
as to #8ideas1 entities1 abstractions1  
and transcendentals1' ,i could never    
drive the least conception into their   

heads40  #cbe ,organon1 i4 #dhd1 cited  
by ,eucken in ,geschichte der           
philosophischer ,terminologie1 p4 #bje4 
#cbf ,a #aa  ,b #be1 ,a #ef  ,b #hj4    
#cbg ,cited by ,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #dfh4  
#cbh ,cf4 ,text-,book to ,kant1 p4 #ac4 
#cbi ,cf4 ,kant ,explained1 p4 #hi4     
#ccj ,cf4 below1 p4 #bch4  #cca ,cf4    
below1 pp4 #aaf-ag1 #cjb4  #ccb ,adickes
 has taken the liberty in his edition of
 the ,critique of substituting in ,a    
#big  ,b #ced transcendental for        
transcendent4 ,the ,berlin edition very 
rightly retains the original reading4   
#ccc ,b #bg4  #ccd ,a vi4  #cce ,a      
#ad-ae  ,b #bh4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #egjn4   
#ccf ,this alteration is not given in   
,max ,mller's translation4  #ccg ,cf4   
the corresponding alteration made in the
 second edition at end of note to ,a #ba
  ,b #ce4  #cch ,a #ae  ,b #bi4  #cci   
,loc4 cit4  #cdj ,loc4 cit4 ,cf4 ,a #hce
  ,b #hfc4  #cda ,cf4 ,a #abd1 ,b       
#aea-b1 and below1 pp4 #bbe1 #bfe4  #cdb
 ,cf4 ,a #ada  ,b #ahj-a4 ,cf4 ,critique

 of ,judgment1  #eg3 8,thus here in the 
,critique of ,aesthetic ,judgment1 as   
also in the ,critique of ,practical     
,reason1 the antinomies force us against
 our will to look beyond the sensible   
and to seek in the supersensible the    
point of union for all our a priori     
faculties2 because no other expedient is
 left to make our ,reason harmonious    
with itself40 ,cf4 also below1 p4 #dgc  
ff41 in comment on ,a #fdi  ,b #fgg4    
#cdc ,a #af  ,b #cj4  #cdd ,introduction
 7,w4 v4 p4 #af74 ,cf4 below1 p4 #dch4  
#cde ,cf4 also above1 p4 #be4  #cdf ,cf4
 ,a #ea  ,b #ge4  #cdg ,that thought    
finds in intuition its sole possible    
content is1 of course1 a conclusion     
first established in the ,analytic4     
,kant is here defining his terms in the 
light of his later results4  #cdh ,a #ea
  ,b #ge4  #cdi ,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #ab1
 ,remark ii4 at the beginning4  #cej    
,cf4 below1 p4 #hh ff42 ,b #adf-g4  #cea
 ,prolegomena1  #h 7,eng4 trans4 p4     
#cc74  #ceb ,quoted by ,vaihinger1 ii4  

p4 #d4  #cec ,cf4 ,ueber das ,organ der 
,seele 7#agif7 and ,anthropologie1  #bb4
  #ced  #c4  #cee ,a #bg  ,b #dc1 ,a #cd
  ,b #ea1 ,a #db  ,b #ei1 ,a #ea  ,b    
#ge4  #cef ,cf4 ,b #gb4  #ceg ,in the   
second paragraph1 ,a #bj  ,b #cd4  #ceh 
,dissertation1  #d4  #cei ,a #cbj  ,b   
#cgf4  #cfj ,dissertation1  #d4  #cfa ,a
 #ej  ,b #gd4  #cfb ,this view1 as ,i   
shall endeavour to show1 is only        
semi-,critical1 and is profoundly       
modified by the more revolutionary      
conclusions to which ,kant finally      
worked his way4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #bgd ff4 
#cfc ,in this he was anticipated by     
,tetens1 ,philosophische ,versuche ber  
die menschliche ,natur1 ,bd4 i4 7#aggg71
 ,versuch ,x4 v4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #bid4   
#cfd ,critique of ,judgment1  #c 7,eng4 
trans1 p4 #di74 ,kant was the first to  
adopt the threefold division of mental  
powers--8the faculty of knowledge1 the  
feeling of pleasure and pain1 and the   
faculty of desire40 ,this threefold     
division is first given in his ,ueber   

,philosophie berhaupt 7,hartenstein1 vi4
 p4 #cgi71 which was written some time  
between #aghj and #agij1 being          
originally designed as an ,introduction 
to the ,critique of ,judgment4  #cfe ,a 
#bdh 7occurs in a lengthy section       
omitted in ,b74  #cff ,this distinction 
between intuition and appearance        
practically coincides with that above   
noted between intuition and its object4 
#cfg ,for statement of the precise      
meaning in which these terms are here   
employed1 cf4 above1 pp4 xlv-vii2 below1
 pp4 #bgj ff41 #cab ff4  #cfh ,this     
would harmonise with the view developed 
in ,a #aff 7in its formulation of the   
principle of the ,anticipations71 ,a    
#cgd ff41 ,b #bgd ff41 ,a #gbc  ,b #gea4
  #cfi ,cf4 ,a #ej  ,b #gd3 8,we may    
name sensation the matter of sensuous   
knowledge40 ,similarly in ,a #db  ,b    
#ei2 ,prolegomena1  #aa2 ,fortschritte1 
7,hartenstein1 viii4 p4 #ebg74  #cgj    
,cf4 below1 p4 #bgd ff4  #cga ,cf4      
below1 pp4 #cff-g1 #cgj-b1 #cgg4  #cgb  

ii4 p4 #ei4  #cgc ,a #db  ,b #fj4  #cgd 
,cf4 ,reflexionen1 ii4 note to #dfi2    
also note to #ceg4  #cge ,cf4 above1 p4 
xxxiii ff4  #cgf ,a #bff  ,b #cbb4  #cgg
 ,in discussing a and b we may for the  
present identify form with space4 ,the  
problem has special complications in    
reference to time4  #cgh ,cf4 ,b #bjg4  
#cgi ,herbart's doctrine of space1      
,lotze's local sign theory1 also the    
empiricist theories of the ,mills and   
,bain1 all rest upon this same          
assumption4 ,it was first effectively   
called in question by ,william ,james4  
,cf4 ,bergson3 ,les ,donnes immdiates1  
pp4 #gj-ga1 ,eng4 trans4 pp4 #ib-c3     
8,the solution given by ,kant does not  
seem to have been seriously disputed    
since his time3 indeed1 it has forced   
itself1 sometimes without their         
knowledge1 on the majority of those who 
have approached the problem anew1       
whether nativists or empiricists4       
,psychologists agree in assigning a     
,kantian origin to the nativistic       

explanation of ,johann ,mller2 but      
,lotze's hypothesis of local signs1     
,bain's theory1 and the more            
comprehensive explanation suggested by  
,wundt1 may seem at first sight quite   
independent of the ,transcendental      
,aesthetic4 ,the authors of these       
theories seem indeed to have put aside  
the problem of the nature of space1 in  
order to investigate simply by what     
process our sensations come to be       
situated in space and to be set1 so to  
speak1 alongside one another3 but this  
very question shows that they regard    
sensations as inextensive1 and make a   
radical distinction1 just as ,kant did1 
between the matter of representation and
 its form4 ,the conclusion to be drawn  
from the theories of ,lotze and ,bain1  
and from ,wundt's attempt to reconcile  
them1 is that the sensations by means of
 which we come to form the notion of    
space are themselves unextended and     
simply qualitative3 extensity is        
supposed to result from their synthesis1

 as water from the combination of two   
gases4 ,the empirical or genetic        
explanations have thus taken up the     
problem of space at the very point where
 ,kant left it3 ,kant separated space   
from its contents3 the empiricists ask  
how these contents1 which are taken out 
of space by our thought1 manage to get  
back again40 ,bergson proceeds to argue 
that the analogy of chemical combination
 is quite inapplicable1 and that some   
8unique act very like what ,kant calls  
an a priori form0 must still be appealed
 to4 ,with the ,kantian standpoint in   
this matter ,bergson does not1 of       
course1 agree4 ,he is merely pointing   
out what the consequences must be of    
this initial assumption of inextensive  
sensations4  #chj ,cf4 ,von dem ersten  
,grunde des ,unterschiedes der ,gegenden
 im ,raume1 in its penultimate          
paragraph4  #cha ,cf4 ,dissertation1    
last sentence of  #d1 quoted below1 p4  
#hg4  #chb ,a #bia  ,b #cdg2 ,a #dbi  ,b
 #deg4  #chc ,reflexionen1 ii4 #ccd4    

#chd ii4 p4 #gc4  #che ,cf4 ,stout3     
,manual of ,psychology 7#crd edition71  
pp4 #dfe-f4 8,we find that the definite 
apprehension of an order of coexistence1
 as such1 arises and develops only in   
connection with that peculiar aspect of 
sense-experience which we have called   
extensity1 and more especially the      
extensity of sight and touch4 ,two      
sounds or a sound and a smell may be    
presented as coexistent in the sense of 
being simultaneous2 but taken by        
themselves apart from association with  
experiences of touch and sight1 they are
 not apprehended as spatially juxtaposed
 or separated by a perceived spatial    
interval or as having perceived spatial 
direction and distance relatively to    
each other4 ,such relations can only be 
perceived or imagined1 except perhaps in
 a very rudimentary way1 when the       
external object is determined for us as 
an extensive whole by the extensity of  
the same presentation through which we  
apprehend it40  #chf ,principles of     

,psychology1  #cii1 cited by ,vaihinger4
  #chg  #d4  #chh ,sich ordnen has here1
 in line with common ,german usage1 the 
force of a passive verb4  #chi ,riehl3  
,kriticismus 7#ahgf-ahgi7 ii4 ,erster   
,theil1 p4 #ajd4 ,as already noted1     
,kant tacitly admits this in regard to  
time relations of coexistence and       
sequence4 ,he continues1 however1 to    
deny it in regard to space relations4   
#cij ,cf4 below1 pp4 #aja-b1 #aje4  #cia
 ,a #bj  ,b #cd4  #cib ,a #bj  ,b #cd4  
#cic ,a #db  ,b #fj4 ,cf4 ,dissertation1
  #ab3 8,space and time1 the objects of 
pure mathematics1 are not only formal   
principles of all intuition1 but        
themselves original intuitions40  #cid  
,a #aif  ,b #bda2 ,a #bic  ,b #cdi4     
#cie ,that is to say1 in his published  
writings4 ,it finds expression in one1  
and only one1 of the ,reflexionen 7ii4  
#daj3 8,both space and time are nothing 
but combinations of sensuous            
impressions074  #cif  #ae1 ,coroll4 at  
the end4  #cig ,cf4  #ab1 quoted above1 

p4 #hi n4 #b4  #cih ,there also ,kant   
teaches that the representation of space
 is gained from the space-endowed       
objects of experience4  #cii ,cf4 ,b #a4
  #djj  #dc4  #dja ,ueber eine          
,entdeckung nach der alle neue ,kritik  
der reinen ,kritik durch eine ltere     
entbehrlich gemacht werden soll4  #djb  
,op4 cit4 ,w4 viii4 pp4 #bba-b4  #djc   
,loc4 cit4 p4 #bbb4  #djd ,especially   
those which he had offered in support of
 the contention that pure mathematical  
science is intuitive1 not merely        
conceptual4  #dje ,cf4 below1 p4 #bia   
ff41 on ,kant's reasons for developing  
his doctrine of inner sense4  #djf ,as  
no one passage can be regarded as quite 
decisively proving ,kant's belief in a  
pure manifold of intuition1 the question
 can only be decided by a collation of  
all the relevant statements in the light
 of the general tendencies of ,kant's   
thinking4  #djg ,this at least would    
seem to be implied in the wording of his
 later positions2 it is not explicitly  

avowed4  #djh ,cf4 ,a #gf-g  ,b #ajb4   
#dji ,cf4 above1 pp4 xlii1 #ch-db2      
below1 pp4 #aah-bj1 #abh-cd4  #daj ,the 
last statement may be more freely       
translated3 8,only in this way can ,i   
get the intuition before me in visible  
form40 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ace-f1 #cdg-h1  
#cei4  #daa ,b #bjb-c4  #dab ,cf4       
,reflexionen1 ii4 #cic1 #dji1 #dfe1     
#fcj1 #fdi4  #dac ,this1 indeed1 is     
,kant's reason for describing space as  
an ,idea of reason4 ,cf4 below1 pp4     
#ig-h4  #dad ,geometry is for ,kant the 
fundamental and chief mathematical      
science 7cf4 ,a #ci  ,b #ef and         
,dissertation1  #ae c74 ,in this respect
 he is a disciple of ,newton1 not a     
follower of ,leibniz4 ,his neglect to   
take adequate account of arithmetic and 
algebra is due to this cause4 ,just as  
in speaking of the manifold of sense he 
almost invariably has sight alone in    
view1 so in speaking of mathematical    
science he usually refers only to       
geometry and the kindred discipline of  

pure mechanics4  #dae ,a #gf-g  ,b #ajb4
 ,cf4 ,b #afj-a n4  #daf ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #ij1 #ib ff42 below1 pp4 #aga1 #bbf-i1 
#bfg-gj1 #ccg4  #dag ,cf4 ,b #afj4  #dah
 ,metaphysical ,first ,principles1 ,w4  
iv4 p4 #eei1 cf4 p4 #dha4  #dai ,op4    
cit4 p4 #efj4  #dbj ,critique of        
,judgment1  #bf-g1 ,eng4 trans4 pp4     
#aae-af and #aba4  #dba ,cf4 below1 pp4 
#ajb n41 #afe-f1 #cij-a4  #dbb ,the     
title of this section1 and the points   
raised in the opening paragraph1 are    
commented upon below4 ,cf4 pp4 #aaj1    
#aad-ae1 #acd ff4 ,i pass at once to the
 first space argument4  #dbc ,added in  
second edition4  #dbd ,this argument is 
an almost verbal repetition of the first
 argument on space in the ,dissertation1
  #ae4  #dbe ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ajf-g1    
#abf1 #acb-c1 #agg-hd1 #cch-i4  #dbf    
,cf4 above1 p4 #cg ff42 below1 p4 #agh  
ff4  #dbg ,that is particularly obvious 
in ,kant's formulation of his problem in
 the ,introduction4 ,for that is the    
assumption which underlies his mode of  

distinguishing between analytic and     
synthetic judgments4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #cg4
  #dbh ,cf4 above1 p4 xxii4  #dbi ,cf4  
especially1 pp4 #ahd1 #ccb-f1 #dai1     
#dgd1 #dgi4  #dcj ,i here use the more  
modern terms4 ,kant1 in ,anthropologie1 
#ad1 distinguishes between them as      
,organenempfindungen and                
,vitalempfindungen4  #dca ii4 p4 #afe4  
#dcb ,cf4 above1 pp4 #he-h4  #dcc ,cf4  
,dissertation1  #ae ,d3 8,space is not  
anything objective and real4 ,it is     
neither substance1 nor accident1 nor    
relation1 but is subjective and ideal1  
proceeding by a fixed law from the      
nature of the mind1 and being1 as it    
were1 a schema for co-ordinating1 in the
 manner which it prescribes1 all        
external sensations whatsoever40 ,and   
#ae1 corollary at end3 8,action of the  
mind co-ordinating its sensations in    
accordance with abiding laws40  #dcd    
,especially in view of the third and    
fourth arguments on space1 and of       
,kant's teaching in the transcendental  

exposition4  #dce ,e4g4 ,cohen1 ,riehl1 
,caird1 ,watson4  #dcf ,cf4 ,watson1    
,the ,philosophy of ,kant explained1 p4 
#hc3 8,kant1 therefore1 concludes from  
the logical priority of space that it is
 a priori40  #dcg ,upon it ,kant bases  
the assertion that space is an ,idea of 
reason2 cf4 above1 pp4 #if-h1 and below1
 pp4 #afe-f1 #cij-a4  #dch ,this second 
argument is not in the ,dissertation4   
#dci ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 pp4 #aif-g4   
,the corresponding argument on time1 in 
the form in which it is given in the    
second edition1 is1 as we shall find1   
seriously misleading4 ,it has caused    
,herbart and others to misinterpret the 
connection in which this corollary      
stands to the main thesis4 ,herbart's   
interpretation is considered below1 p4  
#abd4  #ddj ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4     
#bbj4  #dda ,reflexionen1 ii4 #djc4     
#ddb 8,that in space there are no more  
than three dimensions1 that between two 
points there can be but one straight    
line1 that in a plane surface from a    

given point with a given straight line a
 circle is describable1 cannot be       
inferred from any universal notion of   
space1 but can only be discerned in     
space as in the concrete40 ,cf4 also    
,prolegomena1  #ab4  #ddc ,in the second
 edition1 the third4  #ddd ,for a       
different view cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4   
#bcc4  #dde ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ii-ajj2    
below1 pp4 #abf1 #ahj-a1 #ahd1 #cch-i4  
#ddf ,cf4 below1 p4 #ahj4  #ddg ,cf4    
above1 p4 xxxvi2 below1 pp4 #agf ff41   
#aia1 #aie-f1 #beg1 #bij-a1 #djd ff41   
#dac4  #ddh ,this statement occurs in a 
parenthesis2 it has already been dwelt  
upon in the fourth 7third7 argument4    
#ddi ,it has led ,kant to substitute    
errtern for betrachten in ,a #bc  ,b    
#ch4  #dej ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4 #aea4
  #dea  #a 7,eng4 trans1 p4 #ac74 ,cf4  
above1 p4 #fd4  #deb ,this is1 no doubt1
 one reason why ,kant employs1 in       
reference to space1 the unfortunate and 
confusing term concept 7,begriff7 in    
place of the wider term representation  

7,vorstellung74 ,cf4 ,b #cg1 and above1 
p4 #fd4  #dec ,cf4 ,a #gbi  ,b #geg3    
8,in place of the term definition ,i    
should prefer to employ the term        
exposition4 ,for that is a more guarded 
expression1 the claims of which the     
critic may allow as being in a certain  
degree valid even though he entertain   
doubts as to the completeness of the    
analysis40 ,cf4 ,logic1  #ii ff41 #aje4 
,cf4 also ,untersuchung ber die         
,deutlichkeit der ,grundstze1 ,w4 ii4   
pp4 #ahc-d3 8,augustine has said1 #8,i  
know well what time is1 but if any one  
asks me1 ,i cannot tell4'0  #ded ,for   
explanation of the phrase 8construction 
of concepts0 cf4 below1 pp4 #acb-c4     
#dee ,cf4 below1 p4 #aag4 ff4  #def ,cf4
 conclusion of fourth argument on space4
  #deg ,a priori is here employed in its
 ambiguous double sense1 as a priori in 
so far as it precedes experience 7as a  
representation71 and in so far as it is 
valid independently of experience 7as a 
proposition74 ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4   

#bfh4  #deh ,cf4 below1 p4 #aad ff4     
#dei ,cf4 below1 pp4 #aae-af4  #dfj ,cf4
 ,lose ,bltter1 i4 p4 #ah3 8,this is a  
proof 7,beweis7 that space is a         
subjective condition4 ,for its          
propositions are synthetic and through  
them objects can be known a priori4     
,this would be impossible if space were 
not a subjective condition of the       
representation of these objects40 ,cf4  
,reflexionen1 ii4 p4 #cif1 in which this
 direct proof of the ideality of space  
is distinguished from the indirect proof
 by means of the antinomies4  #dfa ,by  
8concepts0 ,kant seems to mean the five 
arguments1 though as a matter of fact   
other conclusions and presuppositions   
are taken into account1 and quite new   
points are raised4  #dfb ,this1         
according to ,vaihinger 7ii4 p4 #bhg71  
is the first occurrence of the phrase   
,dinge an sich in ,kant's writings4     
#dfc ,cf4 ,vaihinger's analysis of this 
discussion1 ii4 pp4 #bij-cac4  #dfd ii4 
pp4 #bhi-ij4  #dfe ,cf4 below1 pp4 #dae 

ff41 #eae ff41 #eeh ff4  #dff ,in ,b    
#aff ff4  #dfg ,this is likewise true of
 the references in the letter to ,herz1 
#bast ,feb4 #aggb4 ,cf4 below1 pp4      
#bai-bj4  #dfh ,the ,critical           
,philosophy of ,kant1 i4 pp4 #cjf-i4    
#dfi ,cf4 letter to ,herz1 ,w4 x4 p4    
#abf4 ,it is1 ,kant there says1 the most
 absurd explanation which can be offered
 of the origin and validity of our      
knowledge1 involving an illegitimate    
circulus in probando1 and also throwing 
open the door to the wildest            
speculations4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #bh2 below1
 pp4 #ada-b1 #bij1 #eij4  #dgj ,cf4 ,b  
#afg-h4  #dga ,that is1 in the first    
edition4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #he ff42 and    
below1 p4 #aaf4  #dgb ,above1 pp4       
#aaa-ab4  #dgc ii4 p4 #cce4  #dgd       
#f-aa4  #dge ,this identification of the
 two is especially clear in ,a #ci  ,b  
#ef4  #dgf ,a #bg  ,b #dc4  #dgg ,cf4   
above1 p4 xxxv2 below1 pp4 #aag-bj1     
#adb1 #ahe-f1 #bda-b1 #beg1 #bij-a4     
#dgh ,a #bh  ,b #dd1 cf4 ,a #ce  ,b #eb4

  #dgi ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 i4 pp4 #cea-d2  
and above1 p4 #gf2 below1 p4 #cjb4 ,cf4 
,caird1 ,the ,critical ,philosophy1 i4  
pp4 #bih-i1 #cja2 and ,watson1 ,kant    
,explained1 p4 #ia4  #dhj ,gedanken von 
der wahren ,schtzung der lebendigen     
,krfte 7#agdg71  #aj4  #dha ,this       
important and far-reaching assertion we 
cannot at this point discuss4 ,kant's   
reasoning is really circular in the bad 
sense4 ,kant may legitimately argue from
 the a priori character of space to the 
apodictic character of pure mathematical
 science2 but when he proceeds similarly
 to infer the apodictic character of    
applied mathematics1 he is constrained  
to make the further assumption that     
space is a fixed and absolutely uniform 
mode in which alone members of the human
 species can intuit objects4 ,that1 as  
we point out below 7p4 #abj71 is an     
assumption which ,kant does not really  
succeed in proving4 ,in any case the    
requirements of the strict synthetic    
method preclude him from arguing1 as he 

does both in the ,dissertation 7 #ae7   
and in the third space argument of the  
first edition1 that the a priori        
certitude of applied mathematics affords
 proof of the necessary uniformity of   
all space4  #dhb  #ae ,d4  #dhc ,cf4    
above1 p4 #aaa4  #dhd ,cf4 above1 pp4   
#dj-b1 #ic-d2 below1 pp4 #aca-c1 #cch-i1
 #dah ff4  #dhe ,a #ii-ajj4  #dhf ,a #gh
  ,b #ajd4 ,cf4 ,a #aei  ,b #aih1 ,b    
#adg4  #dhg  #ch1 ,eng4 trans1 p4 #ha4  
#dhh ,cf4 p4 #bda ff4  #dhi ,a #bh-i4   
,cf4 ,b #a2 ,prolegomena1  #ac1 ,remark 
,,ii4 at the end3 8,cinnabar excites the
 sensation of red in me40 ,cf4 above1   
pp4 #hj-h2 below1 pp4 #adf ff41 #bgd ff4
  #dij ,kant continues the discussion of
 this general problem in ,a #de ff4  ,b 
#fb ff4  #dia ,kant himself again uses  
the confusing term conception4  #dib    
#ad1 #a4  #dic ,herbart1 ,werke1 ii4    
#cj4 ,quoted by ,vaihinger1 iii4 p4     
#aih4  #did ,the third argument on time 
will be considered below in its         
connection with the transcendental      

exposition4  #die ,the chief omission   
goes1 as we shall see1 to form the      
concluding argument on time4  #dif ,in  
the second edition1 the third4  #dig ,in
 the second edition1 the third4  #dih   
,in the second edition1 the fourth4     
#dii ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 pp4 #chj-a4   
#ejj ,cf4 second part of fourth 7third7 
argument on space4  #eja ,kant's ,logik1
 ,einleitung1  #h1 ,eng4 trans1 p4 #di4 
#ejb ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ii-ajj4  #ejc     
,these axioms are3 7#a7 time has only   
one dimension2 7#b7 different times are 
not simultaneous but successive4 ,in the
 fourth argument the synthetic character
 of these axioms is taken as further    
evidence of the intuitive nature of     
time4 ,this passage also is really part 
of the transcendental exposition4 ,that 
exposition has to account for the       
synthetic character of the axioms as    
well as for their apodictic character2  
and as a matter of fact the intuitive   
and consequent synthetic character of   
the a priori knowledge which arises from

 time is much more emphasised in the    
transcendental exposition than its      
apodictic nature4  #ejd ,cf4            
,reflexionen1 ii4 #cgd ff4  #eje        
,vaihinger1 ii4 p4 #chg4  #ejf ,cf4 ,a  
#da  ,b #eh3 8,motion which combines    
both space and time presupposes         
something empirical40  #ejg ,w4 iv4 p4  
#dga4  #ejh ,ueber ,philosophie berhaupt
 7,hartenstein1 vi4 p4 #cie74  #eji     
#ab4  #eaj ,loc4 cit4  #eaa ,a #gh  ,b  
#ajd4  #eab ,a #adb-c  ,b #ahb4 ,it     
should be observed that in ,kant's view 
schemata 8exist nowhere but in thought0 
7,a #ada  ,b #ahj74 ,it may also be     
noted that time is taken as conditioning
 the schemata of all the categories4    
#eac ,a #gag ff4  ,b #gde ff4  #ead     
#aj4  #eae ,erluterungen ber des ,herrn 
,professor ,kant ,critik der reinen     
,vernunft 7,knigsberg1 #aghd71 p4 #bd4  
,johann ,schulze 7or ,schultz7 was      
professor of mathematics in ,knigsberg4 
,he was also ,hofprediger1 and is       
frequently referred to as ,pastor       

,schulze4 ,kant has eulogised him 7,w4  
x4 p4 #abh7 as 8the best philosophical  
head that ,i am acquainted with in our  
part of the world40 ,in preparing the   
,erluterungen1 which is a paraphrase or 
simplified statement of the argument of 
the ,critique1 with appended comment1   
,schulze had the advantage of ,kant's   
advice in all difficulties4 ,kant also  
read his manuscript1 and suggested a few
 modifications 7op4 cit4 pp4 #cbi1      
#cdc74  #eaf ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 pp4   
#chh-i4  #eag ,werke 7,frauenstdt's ed41
 #ahgc71 i4 p4 #acc4  #eah ,p4 #abi4    
#eai ,w4 x4 p4 #ecj4 ,italics not in    
,kant4  #ebj ,untersuchung ber die      
,deutlichkeit der ,grundstze3 ,erste    
,betrachtung1  #b1 #c2 dritte           
,betrachtung1  #a2 ,dissertation1  #ab1 
#ae ,c4  #eba ,p4 #abh4  #ebb           
,dissertation1  #ae ,c4  #ebc ,cf4      
above1 pp4 #dj-b1 #aah-bj2 below1 pp4   
#cch-i4  #ebd ,kant und die moderne     
,mathematik in ,kant-,studien1 xii4     
7#aijg7 p4 #cd n4  #ebe ,cf4 ,a #gac ff4

  ,b #gda ff42 ,a #d  ,b #h2 ,b #ae-af2 
,a #bd2 ,a #dg-h  ,b #fd-e4  #ebf ,cf4  
below1 pp4 #ccg-h4  #ebg ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #aab n4 #d4  #ebh ,the content of the  
second ,conclusion in regard to space4  
#ebi ,this expresses the matter a little
 more clearly than ,kant himself does4  
,the term representation is ambiguous4  
,in the first paragraph it is made to   
cover the appearances as well as their  
representation4  #ecj ,cf4              
,dissertation1  #ae ,coroll43 8,space   
properly concerns the intuition of the  
object2 time the state1 especially the  
representative state40  #eca ,cf4 below1
 pp4 #cji ff41 #cdg-h1 #cei4  #ecb ,cf4 
,reflexionem1 ii4 #cfe ff4  #ecc  #ad1  
#e and note to #e4  #ecd ,the opposite  
is1 however1 asserted in ,b #fg4  #ece  
,cf4 ,a #dbg-h n4  ,b #def n4  #ecf ,a  
#ii4 ,cf4 ,a #afb  ,b #bjc3 8,i cannot  
represent to myself a line1 however     
small1 without drawing it in thought1   
i4e4 generating from a point all its    
parts one after another40 ,cf4 pp4 #id1 

#cdg-h4  #ecg ,cf4 ,lose ,bltter1 i4    
#ed3 8,without space time itself would  
not be represented as quantity 7,grsse71
 and in general this conception would   
have no object40 ,cf4 ,dissertation1    
#ad4 #e4  #ech ,cf4 below1 p4 #cfe ff4  
#eci ,in the ,dissertation time is      
treated before space4  #edj ,cf4 above1 
pp4 xxxiv1 #abj2 below1 pp4 #bda-b1     
#cfe1 #cfg-gj1 #cij-a4  #eda ,cf4       
,dissertation1  #ae ,c4  #edb ,cf4      
below1 pp4 #bgb ff41 #bid-e1 #cjh ff41  
#cfe ff4  #edc ,a #bc  ,b #cg4  #edd    
,they correspond to the third paragraph 
dealing with space4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #aaf4
  #ede ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aaf-ag4  #edf   
,cf4 ,w4 x4 p4 #ajb4 ,mendelssohn had   
also protested2 cf4 op4 cit4 x4 p4 #aaj4
  #edg ,w4 x4 pp4 #abh-i4 ,italics not  
in ,kant4 ,kant is entirely justified in
 protesting against the view that in    
denying things in themselves to be in   
time he is asserting that they remain   
eternally the same with themselves4 ,to 
make a dancer preserve one and the same 

posture is not to take him out of time1 
but to bring home to him the reality of 
time in an extremely unpleasant manner4 
,duration is one of the modes of time4  
#edh ,this is ,kant's reply to          
,mendelssohn's objection 7,december     
#aggj1 ,w4 x4 p4 #aaj73 8,succession is 
at least a necessary condition of the   
representations of finite spirits4 ,now 
the finite spirits are not only subjects
 but also objects of representations1   
both for ,god and for our fellow-men4   
,the succession must therefore be       
regarded as something objective40  #edi 
,cf4 ,a #bgg  ,b #ccc3 8,it is not given
 to us to observe even our own mind with
 any intuition but that of our inner    
sense40  #eej ,quoted by ,vaihinger1 ii4
 p4 #djf4  #eea ,in the fourth          
,paralogism1 ,a #cff1 and in the        
,refutation of ,idealism1 ,b #bgd4  #eeb
 ,cf4 ,a #db  ,b #ei4  #eec ,above1 pp4 
#aac-ad4  #eed ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 p4  
#aad4  #eee ,the date of ,kant's ,von   
dem ersten ,grunde des ,unterschiedes   

der ,gegenden im ,raume4  #eef ,cf4     
below1 p4 #afa ff4  #eeg ,cf4           
,dissertation1  #ae ,d3 8,those who     
defend the reality of space conceive it 
either as an absolute and immense       
receptacle of possible things--a view   
which appeals not only to the ,english  
thinkers but to most geometricians--or  
they contend that it is nothing but a   
relation holding between existing       
things1 which must vanish when the      
things are removed1 and which is        
thinkable only in actual things4 ,this  
latter is the teaching of ,leibniz and  
of most of our countrymen40 ,that the   
account of ,leibniz's teaching given in 
the paragraphs under consideration is   
not altogether accurate1 need hardly be 
pointed out4 ,kant1 following his usual 
method in the discussion of opposing    
systems1 is stating what he regards as  
being the logical consequences of       
certain of ,leibniz's tenets1 rather    
than his avowed positions4  #eeh ,cf4 ,a
 #bge-f  ,b #cca-b3 8,leibniz conceived 

space as a certain order in the         
community of substances1 and time as the
 dynamical sequence of their states4    
,but that which both seem to possess as 
proper to themselves1 in independence of
 things1 he ascribed to the confused    
character of their concepts1 asserting  
this confusion to be the reason why what
 is a mere form of dynamical relations  
has come to be regarded as a special    
intuition1 self-subsistent and          
antecedent to the things themselves4    
,thus space and time were for ,leibniz  
the intelligible form of the connection 
of things 7substances and their states7 
in themselves40 ,cf4 also ,prolegomena1 
#ac1 ,anm4 i4  #eei ,kant has stated    
that both views conflict with 8the      
principles of experience40 ,but his     
criticisms are not altogether on that   
line4 ,the statement strictly applies   
only to his criticism of the ,leibnizian
 view4 ,cf4 ,dissertation1  #ae ,d3     
8,that first inane invention of reason1 
assuming as it does the existence of    

true infinite relations in the absence  
of all interrelated entities1 belongs to
 the realm of fable4 ,but those who     
adopt the other view fall into a much   
worse error4 ,for whereas the former    
place an obstacle in the way only of    
certain rational concepts1 i4e4 concepts
 that concern noumena1 and which also in
 themselves are extremely obscure       
bearing upon questions as to the        
spiritual world1 omnipresence1 etc41 the
 latter set themselves in direct        
antagonism to the phenomena themselves  
and to geometry1 the most faithful      
interpreter of all phenomena4 ,for--not 
to dwell upon the obvious circle in     
which they necessarily become involved  
in defining space--they cast geometry   
down from its position at the highest   
point of certitude1 and throw it back   
into the class of those sciences the    
principles of which are empirical4 ,for 
if all modifications of space are       
derived only through experience from    
external relations1 geometrical axioms  

can have only comparative universality1 
like that acquired through induction1 in
 other words1 such as extends only as   
far as observation has gone4 ,they      
cannot lay claim to any necessity save  
that of being in accordance with the    
established laws of nature1 nor to any  
precision except of the artificial sort1
 resting upon assumptions4 ,and as      
happens in matters empirical1 the       
possibility is not excluded that a space
 endowed with other original            
modifications1 and perhaps even a       
rectilineal figure enclosed by two      
lines1 may sometime be discovered40 ,cf4
 above1 p4 #aad2 below1 p4 #bij4  #efj  
,in ,b #aee n4 ,kant distinguishes      
between motion of an object in space1   
and motion as generation of a           
geometrical figure4 ,the former alone   
involves experience2 the latter is a    
pure act of the productive imagination1 
and belongs not only to geometry but    
also to transcendental philosophy4 ,this
 note1 as ,erdmann has pointed out      

7,kriticismus1 pp4 #aae1 #afh71 was     
introduced by ,kant into the second     
edition as a reply to a criticism of    
,schtz4 ,the distinction as thus drawn  
is only tenable on the assumption of a  
pure manifold distinct from the manifold
 of sense4  #efa ,a #bcj  ,b #bhc4 ,cf4 
above1 pp4 #eg1 #aah2 below1 pp4 #ahe-f1
 #beg4  #efb ,a #da  ,b #eh4  #efc ,cf4 
below1 pp4 #cei-fj4  #efd ,les ,donnes  
,immdiates1 p4 #ge4  #efe ii4 p4 #ddf4  
#eff  #d and #bg4  #efg ,cf4 ,ueber eine
 ,entdeckung1 etc43 ,w4 viii4 p4 #bbj4  
#efh ,a #dd  ,b #fa4  #efi ,a #bgg  ,b  
#ccd4 ,cf4 ,a #bgh-i  ,b #cce-f4  #egj  
,when ,kant says that the distinction is
 not logical 7that of relative clearness
 and obscurity7 but transcendental1 the 
latter term is taken as practically     
equivalent to epistemological4 ,it does 
not mean #8relating to the a priori1'   
but relating to transcendental          
philosophy1 just as logical here means  
relating to logic4 ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ii4 
p4 #deb4  #ega ,cf4 ,a #bgj ff4  ,b #cbf

 ff4  #egb  #g 7,i read autem for       
autor74 ,cf4 below1 p4 #ahg4  #egc ,cf4 
,prolegomena1  #ac1 ,remark ,,ii4  #egd 
,cf4 above1 pp4 #abj-a4  #ege ,cf4 ,a   
#beg  ,b #cac4  #egf ,a #df  ,b #fc4    
,this is the first occurrence in the    
,critique of the phrase transcendental  
object4 ,transcendental is employed as  
synonymous with transcendent4 ,cf4      
below1 p4 #bjd ff4  #egg ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #abj-b4  #egh ,a #bga  ,b #cbg4  #egi  
,a #df-i  ,b #fc-f4  #ehj ,a #dh  ,b    
#fe-f4 ,vaihinger 7ii4 pp4 #dgj-b7 gives
 what appears to be a sufficient        
explanation of what ,kant had in mind in
 its employment4  #eha ,a #df  ,b #fd4  
,cf4 ,dissertation1  #ae ,c4 ,in the    
concluding sentence of the first        
edition's ,aesthetic1 ,kant for the     
first time uses the singular ,ding an   
sich in place of the more usual ,dinge  
an sich and also refers to it in        
problematic terms as what may underlie  
appearances4  #ehb ,b #ff-gc4  #ehc a   
does not contain anything not to be     

found elsewhere in the first edition4   
,it is a restatement of ,a #bfe ff4  ,b 
#cba ff41 ,a #bgd  ,b #ccj1 ,a #bgg ff4 
,b #ccc ff41 ,a #bhc-e  ,b #cci-da4     
#ehd ,an assertion1 it may be noted1    
which conflicts with ,kant's view of it 
as a pure manifold4  #ehe ,kant was     
probably influenced by ,tetens4 ,cp4    
below1 p4 #bid4  #ehf ,cf4 below1 p4    
#bia ff4 b together with ,b #aeb-h is a 
more explicit statement of the doctrine 
of inner sense than ,kant had given in  
the first edition4  #ehg ,vaihinger 7ii4
 p4 #dhf ff471 who has done more than   
any other commentator to clear up the   
ambiguities of this passage1            
distinguishes only two views4  #ehh ,a  
#ch  ,b #ee4  #ehi ,cf4 ,prolegomena1   
,w4 iv4 p4 #cgf n41 ,eng4 trans4 p4     
#adi3 8,the reviewer often fights his   
own shadow4 ,when ,i oppose the truth of
 experience to dreaming1 he never       
suspects that ,i am only concerned with 
the somnium objective sumtum of ,wolff's
 philosophy1 which is merely formal1 and

 has nothing to do with the distinction 
of dreaming and waking1 which indeed has
 no place in any transcendental         
philosophy40  #eij ,cf4 below1 p4 #bgj  
ff4  #eia ,b #fi4 ,for explanation of   
the references to time and              
self-consciousness1 cf4 below1 pp4 #cjh1
 #cbc4  #eib ,this view of illusion     
likewise appears in ,a #bic  ,b #cdi1 ,a
 #cgg-h1 ,a #cif1 and ,prolegomena1     
#ac1 ,,iii41 at the beginning4  #eic    
,prolegomena1 loc4 cit4  #eid ,cf4 in   
the #ahfc edition1 ,bd4 ii4 #bfg ff4    
,the examples of illusion employed by   
,mendelssohn are reflection in a mirror 
and the rainbow4  #eie ,w4 x4 p4 #dje4  
#eif ,schein is so used by ,kant himself
 7,w4 x4 p4 #aje7 in a letter to        
,lambert in #aggj4  #eig ,a #ch4  #eih  
,cf4 above1 ,a #ci  ,b #eg4 ,this is1   
however1 merely asserted by implication2
 it is not proved4 ,as already noted1   
,kant does not really show that space   
and time1 viewed as absolute realities1 
are 8inconsistent with the principles of

 experience40 ,nor does ,kant here      
supply sufficient grounds for his       
description of space and time as        
,undinge4 ,kant1 it must be observed1   
does not regard the conception of the   
actual infinite as in itself            
self-contradictory4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #dhf4
  #eii ,b #bge4  #fjj ,cf4 below1 p4    
#bih ff41 on ,kant's ,refutations of    
,idealism4 ,this is also the meaning in 
which ,kant employs the term in his     
pre-,critical writings4 ,cf4            
,dilucidatio 7#agee71 prop4 xii4 usus2  
,trume eines ,geistersehers 7#agff71 ii4
 #b1 ,w4 ii4 p4 #cfd4 ,these citations  
are given by ,janitsch 7,kant's         
,urtheile ber ,berkeley1 #ahgi1 p4 #bj71
 who also points out that the term is   
already used in this sense by ,blffinger
 as early as #agbe1 ,dilucidationes     
philos4 ,this is also the meaning in    
which the term is employed in ,b xxxiv4 
,cf4 ,a #bh  ,b #dd4  #fja ,prolegomena2
 ,anhang4 ,w4 iv4 pp4 #cgd-e4  #fjb ,in 
his ,kleine ,aufstze 7#c4 ,refutation of

 ,problematic ,idealism1 ,hartenstein1  
v4 p4 #ejb7 ,kant would seem very       
inconsistently to accuse ,berkeley of   
maintaining a solipsistic position4     
8,berkeley denies the existence of all  
things save that of the being who       
asserts them40 ,this is probably1       
however1 merely a careless formulation  
of the statement that thinking beings   
alone exist4 ,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #ac1   
,anm4 ii4  #fjc ,prolegomena1 ,w4 iv4 p4
 #cge2 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #adh4  #fjd      
,borowski 7,darstellung des ,lebens und 
,charakters ,immanuel ,kant1 in         
,hoffman's ed4 #aijb1 p4 #bdh ff47 gives
 a list of ,english writers with whom   
,kant was acquainted4 ,they were1       
according to ,janitsch 7loc4 cit4 p4    
#ce71 accessible in translation4 ,cf4   
above1 pp4 xxviii n4 #c1 #fc n4 #a4     
#fje ,cf4 ,w4 i4 pp4 #cah1 #cbb4 ,when  
,kant cites ,hume in the ,prolegomena   
7,introduction71 the reference is to the
 ,german translation4  #fjf ,this was   
the first of ,berkeley's writings to    

appear in ,german4 ,the translation was 
published in ,leipzig in #agha4  #fjg   
,cf4 below1 pp4 #cjg-h4 ,the opposite   
view has1 however1 been defended by     
,vaihinger3 ,philos4 ,monatshefte1      
#ahhc1 p4 #eja ff4  #fjh ,enquiry       
,concerning the ,human ,understanding   
7sec4 xii4 pt4 ii4 at the end74  #fji   
,sixth edition1 pp4 #acb1 #bad1 #bdc ff4
  #faj ,a #ch4  #faa ,a #cgg4  #fab ,a  
#cgg-h4 ,though ,kant here distinguishes
 between perceptions and their 8outer   
objects10 the latter are none the less  
identified with mental representations4 
#fac ,cf4 below1 p4 #cje ff4  #fad      
,prolegomena1  #ac1 ,remark ,,iii42 and 
,anhang 7,w4 iv4 p4 #cgd74  #fae ,kant's
 description of ,berkeley's idealism as 
visionary and mystical is doubtless     
partly due to the old-time association  
of idealism in ,kant's mind with the    
spiritualistic teaching of ,swedenborg  
7,w4 ii4 p4 #cgb74 ,this association of 
ideas was further reinforced owing to   
his having classed ,berkeley along with 

,plato4  #faf ,prolegomena1 ,anhang1 ,w4
 iv4 p4 #cgd2 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #adg4     
#fag ,cf4 above1 pp4 #adj-a4  #fah  #bg4
 ,in translating ,kant's somewhat       
difficult ,latin ,i have found helpful  
the ,english translation of the         
,dissertation by ,w4 ,j4 ,eckoff 7,new  
,york1 #ahid74  #fai ,besides the       
internal evidence of the passage before 
us1 we also have ,kant's own mention of 
,mendelssohn in this connection in notes
 7to ,a #dc and ,a #ff7 in his private  
copy of the first edition of the        
,critique4 ,cf4 ,erdmann's ,nachtrge zu 
,kant's ,kritik1 xx4 and xxxii42 and    
above1 p4 #aa4  #fbj ,cf4               
,morgenstunden1 ,bd4 ii4 of ,gesammelte 
,schriften 7#ahfc71 pp4 #bdf1 #bhh4     
#fba ,cf4 above1 p4 #aaf4  #fbb ,b #gb4 
#fbc ,upon this subject cf4 ,vaihinger's
 exhaustive discussion in ii4 p4 #eah   
ff4  #fbd ,gedanken von der wahren      
,schtzung der lebendigen ,krfte 7#agdg74
  #fbe ,op4 cit4  #aj4 ,cf4 above1 p4   
#aag ff4  #fbf ,von dem ersten ,grunde  

des ,unterschiedes der ,gegenden im     
,raume4  #fbg ,euler1 ,rflexions sur    
l'espace et le temps 7#agdh74 ,vaihinger
 7ii4 p4 #ecj7 points out that ,kant may
 also have been here influenced by      
certain passages in the controversy     
between ,leibniz and ,clarke4  #fbh     
,loc4 cit41 at the end4  #fbi ,in the   
,dorpater manuscript1 quoted by ,erdmann
 in his edition of the ,prolegomena1 p4 
xcvii n4  #fcj  #ae ,c4  #fca ,so also  
in the ,metaphysical ,first ,principles 
of ,natural ,science 7#aghf71 ,erstes   
,hauptstck1 ,erklrung #b1 ,anmerkung #c4
  #fcb ,cf4 above1 p4 #aje4  #fcc ,a    
#bhi  ,b #cde4  #fcd ,more exactly      
between the writing of the ,metaphysical
 ,first ,principles 7in which as above  
noted the argument of the ,prolegomena  
is endorsed7 and #aghg4  #fce ,cf4 ,a   
#bfj ff4  ,b #caf ff4 on the ,amphiboly 
of ,reflective ,concepts4  #fcf ,the    
,dissertation cites the argument only   
with this purpose in view4 ,and yet it  
is only from the ,dissertation          

standpoint that the wider argument of   
the ,prolegomena can be legitimately    
propounded4  #fcg ,above1 pp4 #if-h1    
#ajb n4 #d2 below1 pp4 #cij-a4  #fch ,b 
#gc4  #fci ,a #ej  ,b #gd4  #fdj ,cf4   
below1 p4 #agf n4 #a4  #fda ,k4 p4 #ii  
n4  #fdb ,a #fd  ,b #hi4  #fdc ,the     
definition of intuition given in ,a #ai 
,b #cc also applies only to empirical   
intuition4  #fdd ,for discussion of     
,kant's view of sensation as the matter 
of sensuous intuition1 cf4 above1 p4 #hj
 ff4  #fde ,second paragraph1 ,a #ea  ,b
 #ge4  #fdf ,object 7,gegenstand7 is    
here used in the strict sense and no    
longer as merely equivalent to content  
7,inhalt74  #fdg ,cf4 above1 p4 #gi ff4 
#fdh ,p4 #he4  #fdi ,third paragraph1 ,a
 #eb  ,b #gg4  #fej ,k4 p4 #ajj4  #fea  
,kant's ,logik3 ,einleitung1 i4         
7,abbott's trans4 p4 #d74  #feb ,cf4 ,a 
#gif  ,b #hbd2 ,a #acj  ,b #afi2 also   
above1 pp4 #ga-b4  #fec ,a #gji  ,b     
#gcg4  #fed ,logik3 ,einleitung1 i4     
7,eng4 trans4 p4 #c74  #fee ,cf4 below1 

p4 #aid4  #fef ,einleitung1 i4 7,eng4   
trans4 p4 #d74  #feg ,cf4 ,a #gif  ,b   
#hbd4  #feh ,logik3 ,einleitung1 i4     
7,eng4 trans4 p4 #e74  #fei ,a #eg  ,b  
#ha4  #ffj ,einleitung1 vii4 7,eng4     
trans4 p4 #dj ff474  #ffa ,kant might   
have added that transcendental logic    
defines further conditions1 those of    
possible experience1 and that by        
implication it refers us to coherence as
 the ultimate test even of material     
truth4  #ffb ,a #fj-b  ,b #hd-f4  #ffc  
,einleitung1 ii4 7,eng4 trans4 pp4      
#f-g74  #ffd ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ga-b1     
#agj2 below1 pp4 #dch1 #efc4  #ffe ,cf4 
below1 p4 #dbe ff4  #fff ,kant employs  
,gegenstand and ,object as synonymous   
terms4  #ffg ,cf4 below1 p4 #dbf4  #ffh 
,a #fd  ,b #hi4  #ffi ,a #fe  ,b #ij4   
#fgj ,the opening statement1 ,a #fg  ,b 
#ib1 that hitherto understanding has    
been defined only negatively1 is not    
correct1 and would seem to prove that   
this section was written prior to the   
introduction to the ,analytic1 cf4      

above1 p4 #afg4  #fga ,see above1 pp4   
#agj-a4  #fgb ,a #gi  ,b #aje4          
#8,element' translates the misleading   
term #8,inhalt4'  #fgc ,kant's          
definition of transcendental logic as   
differing from general logic in that it 
does not abstract from a priori content 
must not be taken as implying that the  
categories of understanding are         
contents1 though of a priori nature4 ,as
 we shall find1 though that is ,kant's  
view of the forms of sense1 it is by no 
means his view of the categories4 ,they 
are1 he repeatedly insists1 merely      
functions1 and are quite indeterminate  
in meaning save in so far as a content  
is yielded to them by sense4 ,in ,a     
#gf-g  ,b #ajb1 in distinguishing       
between the two logics1 ,kant is careful
 to make clear that the a priori content
 of transcendental logic consists       
exclusively of the a priori manifolds of
 sense4  #fgd  #bj1 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #eh4
  #fge ,the view of the two as          
co-ordinate reappears in the            

,prolegomena 7 #bj7 in a section the    
general tendency of which runs directly 
counter to any such standpoint4  #fgf ,a
 #gh  ,b #ajc4  #fgg ,cf4 below1 pp4    
#aif1 #bjd1 #bbf4  #fgh ,einleitung1    
viii41 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #dh4  #fgi ,cf4  
above1 pp4 #cg-h4  #fhj ,the ,mistaken  
,subtlety of the ,four ,syllogistic     
,figures 7#agfb74 ,w4 ii4 p4 #dg1 ,eng4 
trans4 p4 #gi4  #fha ,cf4 above1 pp4    
#ii-ajj1 #ajf-g4  #fhb ,w4 ii4 pp4      
#eh-i1 ,eng4 trans4 pp4 #ib-c4  #fhc    
,cf4 ,reflexionen1 ii4 #eii4  #fhd      
,below1 pp4 #ahe-f4  #fhe ,the same     
indefiniteness of statement is          
discernible in ,caird's 7i4 p4 #cbb ff47
 and ,watson's 7,kant ,explained1 pp4   
#aba-b7 discussions of the principle    
supposed to be involved4  #fhf ,cf4 ,a  
#hj  ,b #ajf4  #fhg  #ci4  #fhh ,p4 #agf
 ff4  #fhi ,b #ade-f4 ,cf4 above1 pp4   
xxxv-vi1 xliv1 #eg1 #adb2 below1 pp4    
#beg1 #bia4  #fij  #e-f4  #fia  #g-h4   
,cf4 above1 pp4 #add-e4  #fib ,w4 x4 p4 
#abf4 ,italics not in ,kant4  #fic ,the 

relevant ,reflexionen have been         
carefully discussed by ,adickes 7,kant's
 ,systematik1 p4 #ba ff474 ,in what     
follows ,i have made extensive use of   
his results1 though not always arriving 
at quite the same conclusions4  #fid    
#ae1 ,coroll4  #fie ,in his later       
writings ,kant recognises that the      
representations of space and time       
involve an ,idea of ,reason4 ,cf4 above1
 pp4 #ig-h2 below1 pp4 #cij-a4  #fif    
#ci4  #fig ,reflexionen1 ii4 #eac1 cf4  
#ejb1 #ebe-g4  #fih ,op4 cit4 ii4 #eac4 
#fii ,cf4 op4 cit4 ii4 #ecg4  #gjj ,cf4 
above1 p4 #ij ff4  #gja ,only in one    
passage1 ,rechtslehre1 i41 ,anhang #c1  
#b1 cited by ,adickes1 op4 cit4 p4 #ac1 
does ,kant so far depart from his own   
orthodoxy as to speak of the possibility
 of an a priori tetrachotomy4 ,but he   
never wavers in the view that the       
completeness of a division cannot be    
guaranteed on empirical grounds4  #gjb  
,introduction1  #i n4 ,eng4 trans4 p4   
#da4  #gjc  #d-f1 #i4  #gjd ,a #gj-f  ,b

 #ie-aja4  #gje ,cf4 ,adickes1 ,kant's  
,systematik1 p4 #cf ff4  #gjf ,cf4      
,adickes1 op4 cit4 p4 #hi ff4  #gjg     
,organon1  #acg4 ,cited by ,adickes4    
#gjh i4 p4 #cdc ff4  #gji ,cf4 below1 p4
 #cia ff4  #gaj ,a #gf-gi  ,b #ajb-e4   
#gaa ,cf4 above1 p4 #aga4  #gab ,a #ee4 
#gac ,cf4 also ,b #afj4  #gad ,kant's   
,theorie der ,erfahrung1 #bnd ed4 p4    
#beg ff4  #gae ,the ,critical           
,philosophy of ,kant1 i4 p4 #cbg ff4    
#gaf ,philosophischer ,kriticismus1 #bnd
 ed4 i4 p4 #dhd ff4  #gag ,kant         
explained1 p4 #abd ff4  #gah ,cf4 below1
 p4 #aih4  #gai ,p4 #bbf4  #gbj ,a #gi  
,b #aje4  #gba ,cf4 above1 p4 #agg ff4  
#gbb ,a #gi-hj4  #gbc ,cf4 above1 p4    
#aib4  #gbd ,cf4 ,b #aaa4  #gbe ,cf4    
,adickes1 ,systematik1 pp4 #db-c4  #gbf 
,kant ,explained1 p4 #abh4  #gbg ,cf4   
above1 p4 #cg4  #gbh ,cf4 ,dissertation1
  #af to #bh1 and below1 p4 #cha ff4    
#gbi ,cf4 ,reflexionen1 ii4 #gie4  #gcj 
,b #aaa-ac4  #gca ,world as ,will and   
,idea1 ,werke 7,frauenstdt71 ii4 p4     

#edd2 ,eng4 trans4 ii4 p4 #fa4  #gcb    
,cf4 ,stadler1 ,grundstze der reinen    
,erkenntnisstheorie7#ahgf71 p4 #abb4    
,cf4 also below1 pp4 #chg-i4  #gcc ,cf4 
below1 p4 #cia ff4  #gcd ,a #ha4  #gce  
,cf4 ,prolegomena1  #ci4  #gcf ,cf4     
above1 p4 #ahf ff4  #gcg ,kant          
,explained1 p4 #abj4  #gch ,a #ha4  #gci
 ,a #hb4  #gdj ,a #hb4  #gda ,b #aaj4   
#gdb ,b #aaj-aa4  #gdc ,cf4 below1 pp4  
#aii-bjj4  #gdd ,w4 x4 p4 #cdd-e4  #gde 
,cf4 below1 p4 #chb ff4  #gdf ,cf4      
below1 pp4 #dcc-d1 #dea1 #dhj1 #ebi1    
#eei-fj4  #gdg ,b #aad4  #gdh ,cf4      
#ijd-e4  #gdi ,cf4 #ijg-aj4  #gej ,cf4  
,b4 ,erdmann1 ,mittheilungen in ,phil4  
,monatshefte1 #ahhd1 p4 #hj1 and        
,adickes1 ,systematik1 pp4 #ee-i4  #gea 
,reflexionen1 ii4 p4 #beb n4  #geb 8,die
 transcendentale ,deduktion der         
,kategorien0 in the ,gedenkschrift fr   
,rudolf ,haym4 ,published separately in 
#aijb4  #gec ,readers who are not       
immediately interested in the analysis  
of the text or in the history of ,kant's

 earlier semi-,critical views may omit  
pp4 #bjc-cd1 with exception of pp4      
#bjd-ai1 on ,kant's doctrine of the     
transcendental object1 which should be  
read4  #ged ,the reader is recommended  
to mark off the passages in a copy of   
the ,critique4  #gee ,its first         
occurrence in the ,critique is in the   
,aesthetic ,a #df  ,b #fc4 ,it there    
signifies the thing in itself4  #gef ,a 
#ajd4  #geg ,a #aji4  #geh ,a #aji4     
#gei ,a #ajd4  #gfj ,cf4 above1 p4 #bh2 
below1 pp4 #bai-bj4  #gfa ,w4 x4 pp4    
#abd-e4  #gfb ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bji-aj4  
#gfc ,hume's view of the self is not    
developed in the ,enquiry1 and is not   
mentioned by ,beattie4  #gfd ,a #ajg4   
#gfe ,cf4 ,reflexionen1 ii4 #ieb        
7belonging1 as ,erdmann notes1 to the   
earliest ,critical period73             
8,appearances are representations       
whereby we are affected4 ,the           
representation of our free self-activity
 7,selbstttigkeit7 does not involve     
affection1 and accordingly is not       

appearance1 but apperception40 ,cf4     
below1 p4 #bif4  #gff  #h4 ,cf4 above1  
pp4 l-ii2 below1 pp4 #bdc1 #bfj-c1      
#bgb-c1 #cbg-h1 #dgc-g1 #eae4  #gfg ,a  
#ajg4 ,it is significant that ,kant in  
,a #ajg uses1 in reference to           
apperception1 the very unusual phrase1  
8unwandelbares ,bewusstsein40  #gfh ,a  
#ajh4  #gfi ,a #ajg4  #ggj ,reicke1     
,lose ,bltter1 p4 #ai4 ,the bearing and 
date of this passage is discussed below1
 p4 #bcc4  #gga ,op4 cit4 p4 #bj4  #ggb 
,op4 cit4 p4 #bb 7written on a letter   
dated ,may #bj1 #agge74  #ggc ,this last
 statement cannot possibly be taken     
literally4 ,in view of the manner in    
which the transcendental object is      
spoken of elsewhere in this section1 and
 also in the ,dialectic1 we must regard 
it as standing for an independent       
existence1 and the relation of          
representations to it as being1         
therefore1 something else than simply   
the unity of consciousness4  #ggd ,it   
may be observed that when ,kant in ,a   

#ajg1 quoted above1 refers to 8a priori 
concepts10 he adds in explanation1 and  
within brackets1 8space and time40  #gge
 ,a #aje-f4  #ggf ,the actual nature of 
,kant's teaching as to the origin and   
constitution of the notion of the       
transcendental object is largely masked 
by the fact that he places this proof of
 its validity so prominently in the     
foreground4 ,the general nature of this 
proof is1 of course1 identical with that
 of his later positions4  #ggg ,a #aji4 
#ggh ,as in the ,lose ,bltter4 ,cf4     
below1 p4 #bcc4  #ggi ,cf4 below1 pp4   
#bbg1 #bcc-d1 #bfh-i4  #ghj ,cf4 below1 
pp4 #cbb-h2 also pp4 #bfj-c4  #gha ,as  
above noted 7p4 #bjd n47 it also occurs 
in the ,aesthetic 7,a #df  ,b #fc71 as  
signifying the thing in itself4  #ghb ,a
 #bch  ,b #bih4  #ghc ,cf4 below1 p4    
#bch4  #ghd ,a #bch ff4  ,b #bih ff4    
#ghe ,a #bej-a4  #ghf ,cf4 below1 p4    
#djg ff4  #ghg ,a #bec4  #ghh ,a #aia   
,b #bcf4  #ghi ,a #bgg-h  ,b #ccc-d2 ,a 
#bhh  ,b #cdd4  #gij ,cf4 mundus        

phaenomenon in ,a #bgb  ,b #cbh4  #gia  
,it is so dated by ,adickes 7,k4 p4 #bgb
 n471 owing to a single reference to    
schemata in ,a #bhf  ,b #cdb4  #gib ,a  
#ceh and ,a #cfa 7cf4 ,a #cee72 ,a #cff2
 ,a #cgb and ,a #cgi-hj2 ,a #cij-a1 ,a  
#cic1 and ,a #cid4  #gic ,a #cff4  #gid 
8,transcendental0 here means            
8transcendent40 ,cf4 ,a #cgi4  #gie ,a  
#cgb2 so also in ,a #fac-ad  ,b #fda-b4 
#gif ,the passage in ,a #cic is given   
below1 p4 #dfd4  #gig ,a #did  ,b #ebb4 
,cf4 ,a #dib  ,b #eba3 8,the true self  
7das eigentliche ,selbst7 as it exists  
in itself1 i4e4 the transcendental      
subject40  #gih ,a #die  ,b #ebc4  #gii 
,a #dif  ,b #ebd4  #hjj ,loc4 cit4  #hja
 ,cf4 also ,a #ech  ,b #eff2 ,a #edj  ,b
 #efh2 ,a #eeg  ,b #ehe2 ,a #efd  ,b    
#eib2 ,a #efe-f  ,b #eic-d2 ,a #fac  ,b 
#fda-b4  #hjb ,above1 p4 #bjf4  #hjc    
,cf4 above1 pp4 liii-v2 below1 pp4 #bhj1
 #cca1 #cgc-d1 #cij-a1 #dad-ag1 #dbi-ca1
 #eeh-fa4  #hjd ,viz4 the first layer of
 the deduction of the first edition1 the

 relevant sections in the chapter on    
phenomena and noumena 7,a #bej ff471 and
 the ,paralogisms with the subsequent   
,reflection4  #hje ,viz4 the ,note on   
,amphiboly1 the chapter on the          
,antinomies1 and the chapter on the     
,ideal4  #hjf ,to the statement that the
 alterations in the second edition cease
 at the close of the chapter on the     
,paralogisms1 there is only one single  
exception1 namely1 the very brief note  
appended to ,a #dia  ,b #eai4 ,this     
exception1 however1 supports our general
 thesis4 ,it is of polemical origin1    
referring to the nature of the          
distinction between transcendental and  
subjective idealism1 and was demanded by
 the new ,refutation of ,idealism which 
in the second edition he had attached to
 the ,postulates4  #hjg ,it follows     
immediately upon the passage quoted     
above1 p4 #bjf4  #hjh ,w4 x4 pp4 #abe-f4
  #hji ,a #hi  ,b #aba4 ,i adopt ,b4    
,erdmann's reading of auf for als4  #haj
 ,a #hh  ,b #abj4  #haa ,a #ij4  #hab   

,as we have already found 7above1 p4 #bg
 n4 #a71 it had not been attained at the
 time when the ,introduction to the     
first edition was written4  #hac ,a     
#ie-if4  #had ,a #ig4  #hae ,a4 #ie2 cf4
 ,a #if4  #haf ,a #aaa4  #hag ,loc4 cit4
  #hah ,a #aab4  #hai ,a #aaa4  #hbj ,a 
#aab-ad4  #hba ,a #aaj-ad4  #hbb ,i4    
#ad ,c ,vaihinger regards as            
intermediate in date1 but it is a       
comparatively unimportant paragraph1 and
 may for the present be left out of     
account4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bbe-f4  #hbc  
,a #aah-ai4  #hbd ,a #abd4  #hbe ,loc4  
cit4  #hbf ,a #aae4  #hbg ,a #gf-i  ,b  
#ajb-d4 ,not yet commented upon4  #hbh  
,cf4 ,vaihinger1 loc4 cit4 p4 #fc4  #hbi
 ,a #gg  ,b #ajb4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #if-g4
  #hcj ,loc4 cit4  #hca ,for explanation
 of the exact meaning in which these    
terms are employed and for discussion of
 the complicated issues involved1 cf4   
below1 p4 #bgj ff4  #hcb ,cf4 ,a #aah4  
#hcc ,a #ajb4  #hcd ,a #ii-ajj4  #hce ,a
 #ajb4  #hcf ,a #ajj4  #hcg ,a #aja4    

,cf4 below1 p4 #bee4  #hch ,pp4 #bch1   
#bfc ff4  #hci ,cf4 above1 p4 #baa4     
#hdj ,for ,vaihinger's own statement of 
it1 cf4 op4 cit4 pp4 #gi-ih4  #hda ,nos4
 #fd-e1 #aag1 #adj-e4  #hdb ,no4 #adf4  
#hdc ,nos4 #da1 #ha4  #hdd ,no4 #ajd4   
#hde ,cf4 ,nos4 #ifd-e4  #hdf ,no4 #idg4
  #hdg ,no4 #idh4  #hdh ,no4 #idi4  #hdi
 ,no4 #ieb4  #hej ,this is ,erdmann's   
reading4 ,vaihinger substitutes         
allgemein for allein1 but without reason
 given4  #hea ,no4 #ice4 ,the           
translation is literal4 ,kant in the    
last sentence changes from singular to  
plural4  #heb ,no4 #ifd4  #hec ,cf4 also
 ,nos4 #ieg1 #ifa4 ,the latter shows how
 ,kant already connected the categories 
of relation with the logical functions  
of judgment4  #hed ,reicke1 ,nos4 #g1   
#h1 #aj-ah 7pp4 #af-bf1 #bi-di74  #hee  
,the chief relevant passages have been  
quoted above1 p4 #bji4  #hef ,the letter
 is given in ,w4 x4 p4 #agc4  #heg      
,reicke1 pp4 #aac-af4  #heh ,according  
to ,adickes the ,critique was 8brought  

to completion0 in the first half of     
#aghj2 in ,vaihinger's view1 on the     
other hand1 ,kant was occupied with it  
from ,april to ,september4 ,cf4 above1  
p4 xx4  #hei ,in two respects1 however1 
fragment ,b #ab anticipates the teaching
 of the fourth stage3 7a7 in suggesting 
7p4 #aad7 the necessity of a pure       
synthesis of pure intuition1 and 7b7 in 
equating 7p4 #aae7 synthesis of         
apprehension with synthesis of          
imagination4  #hfj ,pp4 #bca-c4  #hfa   
,cf4 below1 pp4 #bfh-i4  #hfb ,in ,b    
#afj ,kant states that the synthesis of 
apprehension is only empirical2 and in  
,b #aeb we find the following emphatic  
sentence3 8,in so far as the faculty of 
imagination is spontaneously active ,i  
sometimes also name it i4e4 in addition 
to entitling it transcendental and      
figurative productive1 and thereby      
distinguish it from the reproductive    
imagination whose synthesis is subject  
only to empirical laws1 i4e4 those of   
association1 and which therefore        

contributes nothing in explanation of   
the possibility of a priori knowledge4  
,hence it belongs1 not to transcendental
 philosophy1 but to psychology40 ,cf4   
the directly counter statement in ,a    
#ajb3 8,the reproductive synthesis of   
the faculty of imagination must be      
counted among the transcendental actions
 of the mind40  #hfc ,though1 as we     
shall find1 the deduction of the second 
edition is in certain respects more     
mature1 it is in other respects less    
complete4  #hfd ,a #cad  ,b #cgj4  #hfe 
,a x-xi4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ej-a4  #hff   
,cf4 below1 pp4 #edc ff41 #egf-g4  #hfg 
,whether it was the chief reason is     
decidedly open to question4 ,the        
un-,critical character of its teaching  
as regards the function of empirical    
concepts and of the transcendental      
object1 and the unsatisfactoriness of   
its doctrine of a threefold synthesis1  
would of themselves account for the     
omission4 ,the passage in the chapter on
 phenomena and noumena 7,a #bej ff47 in 

which the doctrine of the transcendental
 object is again developed was likewise 
omitted in the second edition4  #hfh    
,cf4 below1 pp4 #bch1 #bfc ff4  #hfi    
,cf4 also in ,methodology1 below1 p4    
#edc ff4  #hgj ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxxvi1   
xxxvii-viii1 #cf2 below1 pp4 #bda-c4    
#hga ,cf4 below1 p4 #edc ff4  #hgb ,a   
xi4  #hgc ,a #ajj-a4  #hgd ,kant's      
failure either to distinguish or to     
connect the two deductions in any really
 clear and consistent manner is a defect
 which is accentuated rather than       
diminished in the second edition4       
,though the sections devoted to the     
subjective enquiry are omitted1 and the 
argument of the objective deduction is  
so recast as to increase the emphasis   
laid upon its more strictly logical     
aspects1 the teaching of the subjective 
deduction is retained and influences the
 argument at every point4 ,for the new  
deduction1 no less than that of the     
first edition1 rests throughout upon the
 initial assumption that though         

connection or synthesis can never be    
given1 it is yet the generative source  
of all consciousness of order and       
relation4  #hge ,it appears most clearly
 in ,kant's proof of the category of    
causality in the second ,analogy4 ,cf4  
below1 p4 #cfd ff4  #hgf ,cf4 below1 pp4
 #beb-c1 #beh1 #bhg1 #ccc1 #cdc4  #hgg  
,cf4 above1 p4 #bjh ff4  #hgh ,cf4      
above1 pp4 l-ii1 #bjg-ab2 below1 pp4    
#bfj-c1 #bgb-c1 #cbg-h1 #dgc-g1 #eae4   
#hgi ,p4 #bci4  #hhj ,a #ii4  #hha ,a   
#ajb4  #hhb ,a #ajc4  #hhc ,loc4 cit4   
#hhd ,loc4 cit4  #hhe ,a #ajj-a4  #hhf  
,a #ajf4  #hhg ,a #aja4  #hhh ,such     
statements are in direct conflict with  
his own repeated assertions in other    
passages that reproduction and          
recognition are always merely empirical4
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bbg-ca1 and below1 pp4
 #bfd1 #bfh-i4  #hhi ,b #aci-dj4  #hij  
,in the first edition the subjective and
 objective deductions shade into one    
another2 and this question is raised in 
the section on synthesis of recognition 

7,a #ajd71 where1 as above noted 7p4    
#bjd ff471 ,kant's argument is largely  
pre-,critical1 empirical concepts       
exercising the functions which ,kant    
later ascribed to the categories4 ,but  
as we have already considered the       
resulting doctrine of the transcendental
 object both in its earlier and in its  
subsequent form1 we may at once pass to 
the more mature teaching of the other   
sections4  #hia ,cf4 above1 p4 #bjd ff4 
#hib ,memory is only one particular mode
 in which recognition presents itself in
 our experience2 ,kant's purpose is to  
show that it is not more fundamental1   
nor more truly constitutive of          
apperception1 than is recognition in any
 of its other manifestations4 ,indeed   
the central contention of the objective 
deduction is that it is through         
consciousness of objects1 i4e4 through  
consciousness of objective meanings1    
that self-consciousness comes to be     
actualised at all4 ,only in contrast    
with1 and through relation to1 an       

objective system is consciousness of    
inner experience1 past or present1 and  
therefore self-consciousness in its     
contingent empirical forms1 possible to 
the mind4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 li-ii2 below1 
pp4 #bfj-c4  #hic ,b #acd4  #hid ,a     
#aaf4  #hie ,cf4 above1 p4 #bdb2 below1 
pp4 #beh1 #ccb-c4  #hif ,cf4 ,a #aaa4   
#hig ,a #aag n4  #hih ,this             
transcendental psychology is considered 
below 7p4 #bfc ff471 in its connection  
with the later stages of the subjective 
deduction4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #bch4  #hii ,a
 #aac-ad4  #ijj ,cf4 above1 p4 #bbi4    
#ija ,cf4 ,a #ajj-a4  #ijb ,a #abb-c4   
#ijc ,cf4 ,b #adj-c2 ,b #aea-b2 ,b      
#afd-e #e and below1 p4 #bhf4  #ijd     
,here again the second edition text is  
more explicit than the first3 8,this    
peculiarity of our understanding1 that  
it can produce a priori unity of        
apperception solely by means of the     
categories1 and only by such and so     
many1 is as little capable of further   
explanation as why we have just these   

and no other functions of judgment1 or  
why space and time are the sole forms of
 our possible intuition40--,b #ade-f4   
,cf4 above1 pp4 xxxiii-vi1 xliv1 #eg1   
#adb1 #ahf2 below1 pp4 #bia1 #daa4  #ije
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #beb-c4  #ijf ,the     
second ,analogy embodies the argument   
which is implied in1 and necessary to1  
the establishment of the assertions     
dogmatically made in ,a #aaa-ab4  #ijg  
,a #aai4  #ijh ,cf4 ,a #abh4 ,on this   
whole question cf4 above1 p4 #bdb2      
below1 pp4 #bhg-h4  #iji ,cf4 ,a #aac1  
#abe-i4  #iaj ,a #ajg1 #aaa4  #iaa ,the 
explanation given in the second edition 
7,b #acb7 is artificial1 and does not   
reveal ,kant's real reasons4 ,it is also
 obscure owing to its employment of     
dynamical terms to denote the relation  
of apperception to self-consciousness4  
#iab ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bea-c4  #iac ,cf4 
,a #aab1 #aac1 #abh4  #iad ,a #aad4     
#iae ,a #id1 #aae1 #aah4 ,cf4 also end  
of note to ,b #acd4  #iaf ,cf4 above1   
pp4 lii1 #bjg-ab1 #bdc2 below1 pp4      

#cbg-h1 #dgc-g1 #eae4  #iag ,this is    
shown1 not only by ,kant's ethical      
writings1 but also by his less formal   
utterances1 especially in his ,lectures 
on ,metaphysics and on ,religion1 in his
 ,reflexionen1 and in his ,lose ,bltter4
  #iah ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bgg-h4  #iai    
,cf4 above1 pp4 l-lii2 below1 pp4 #bgg  
ff41 #dfa-b1 #dgc-g4  #ibj ,in note to  
,b #afb they are indeed identified4     
#iba ,kant's vacillating attitude       
appears in the added phrase 8of whose   
activity we are hardly ever conscious40 
,cf4 ,a #gh3 it is a 8blind0 power4     
#ibb ,cf4 above1 p4 #bbe2 below1 p4     
#ccg4  #ibc ,a #ach  ,b #agg4  #ibd ,a  
#aah4  #ibe ,cf4 above1 p4 #bec ff4     
#ibf ,a #abc4  #ibg ,a #aba-c4  #ibh ,a 
#abe-f4  #ibi ,above1 pp4 #gd ff41 #bch1
 #beb4  #icj ,cf4 above1 pp4 #if-g4     
#ica ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cfg1 #cga-b4  #icb
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #baa1 #bbg1 #bcc-d4    
#icc ,in direct contradiction of his    
previous view of transcendental         
imagination as purely productive1 it is 

now stated that it is reproductive4 ,cf4
 ,a #ajb4  #icd ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bbe    
ff41 #bfd4  #ice ,it must be remembered 
that this was also rendered necessary by
 the archaic character of their teaching
 in regard to the transcendental object 
and the function of empirical concepts4 
#icf ,cf4 ,b #aea-b4 ,there is no       
mention1 however1 of objective affinity4
  #icg ,b #afj-a4 ,cf4 above1 pp4       
#bbf-i4  #ich ,in what follows ,i make  
use of an article1 entitled 8,the       
,problem of ,knowledge10 which ,i have  
contributed to the ,journal of          
,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and           
,scientific ,methods 7#aiab71 vol4 ix4  
pp4 #aac-bh4  #ici ,the same wide sense 
in which ,kant employs 8empirical       
idealism40  #idj ,cf4 above1 pp4        
xliii-v1 #bjh2 below1 pp4 #bie-f1 #bih  
ff4 ,hume and ,spinoza are the only     
pre-,kantian thinkers of whose position 
the last statement is not strictly      
descriptive1 but even they failed to    
escape its entangling influence4  #ida  

,cf4 ,a #bh-i2 also ,lectures on        
,metaphysics 7,plitz's edition1 #ahba71 
p4 #ahh ff4 ,in ,kant's posthumously    
published work1 his ,transition from the
 ,metaphysical ,first ,principles of    
,natural ,science to ,physics1 it is    
asserted in at least twenty-six distinct
 passages that sensations are due to the
 action of 8the moving forces of matter0
 upon the sense-organs4 ,cf4 below1 p4  
#bhc n4 #b4 ,in his ,ueber das ,organ   
der ,seele 7#agif7 7,hartenstein1 vi4 p4
 #deg ff471 ,kant agrees with ,smmerring
 in holding that the soul has virtual1  
i4e4 dynamical1 though not local1       
presence in the fluid contained in the  
cavity of the brain4  #idb ,cf4         
,critique of ,practical ,reason1 ,bk4 i4
 ch4 i4  iii4  #idc ,cf4 below1 pp4 #bgi
 ff41 #bic-f1 #cab ff41 #cba1 #cfa n4   
#c1 #chd-e1 #dfd-e1 #dgf4  #idd ,cf4    
below1 pp4 #bgi-hj1 and pp4 #bic-d1 on  
inner sense4  #ide i4 p4 #cci3 8,each   
pulse of cognitive consciousness1 each  
,thought1 dies away and is replaced by  

another4444 ,each later ,thought1       
knowing and including thus the ,thoughts
 which went before1 is the final        
receptacle--and appropriating them is   
the final owner--of all that they       
contain and own4 ,each ,thought is thus 
born an owner1 and dies owned1          
transmitting whatever it realized as its
 ,self to its own later proprietor4 ,as 
,kant says cf4 below1 pp4 #dfa-b1 it is 
as if elastic balls were to have not    
only motion but knowledge of it1 and a  
first ball were to transmit both its    
motion and its consciousness to a       
second1 which took both up into its     
consciousness and passed them to a      
third1 until the last ball held all that
 the other balls had held1 and realized 
it as its own40  #idf ,i here use       
8objective0 in its modern meaning3 ,i am
 not concerned with the special meaning 
which ,descartes himself attached to the
 terms objective and formaliter4  #idg  
,pp4 #bgg-h4  #idh ,on this whole matter
 cf4 above1 p4 xlv2 below1 pp4 #cab-ba  

on ,kant's ,refutation of ,idealism2 pp4
 #cgc-d on the ,second ,analogy2 pp4    
#djg ff41 #dad ff4 on ,phenomena and    
,noumena2 p4 #dfa ff4 on the            
,paralogisms2 and p4 #edf4 ,cf4 also ,a 
#bgg-h  ,b #ccd4  #idi ,p4 #bfg ff4     
#iej ,though the posthumously published 
work of ,kant's old age1 his ,transition
 from the ,metaphysical ,first          
,principles of ,natural ,science to     
,physics1 bears the marks of weakening  
powers1 and is much too incomplete and  
obscure to allow of any very assured    
deductions from its teaching1 it is none
 the less significant that it is largely
 occupied in attempting to define the   
relation in which the objective world of
 physical science stands to the sensible
 world of ordinary consciousness4 ,as   
above noted 7p4 #bge n471 it is there   
asserted in at least twenty-six distinct
 passages that sensations are due to the
 action of 8the moving forces of matter0
 upon the sense-organs4 ,what is even   
more significant is the adoption and    

frequent occurrence 7,altpreussische    
,monatsschrift 7#ahhb71 pp4 #bcf1 #bhg1 
#bhi1 #bij1 #bib1 #bid1 #bie-f1 #cjj1   
#cjh1 #dbi1 #dcf1 #dci7 of the phrase   
8,erscheinung von der ,erscheinung40    
,kant would seem to mean by             
8,erscheinung vom ersten ,range0 7op4   
cit4 p4 #dcf7 7i4e4 appearance as such71
 the objective world as determined by   
physical science2 and by 8,erscheinung  
vom zweiten ,range0 7i4e4 appearance of 
the appearance71 this same objective    
world as known in terms of the          
sensations which material bodies        
generate by acting on the sense-organs4 
,kant adds that the former is known     
directly1 and the latter                
indirectly--meaning1 apparently1 that   
the former is known through a priori    
forms native to the understanding1 and  
the latter only in terms of sense-data  
which are mechanically conditioned 7cf4 
loc4 cit4 pp4 #bhf1 #bib1 and #ddd n4   
,the terms latter and former on p4 #cjj 
have got transposed74  #iea ,cf4 below  

pp4 #cab-ba1 #cgc-d1 #dad ff41 #dbe ff41
 #eeh ff4  #ieb ,b #abi4  #iec ,b #afa  
n4  #ied ,b #acj-a4  #iee ,b #aca4  #ief
 ,b #aca-d4  #ieg ,b #aca4  #ieh ,cf4 ,b
 #ach4  #iei ,b #ace4  #ifj ,b #acf-dj4 
#ifa ,b #adj-b4  #ifb ,b #adc4  #ifc    
#ba-bg4  #ifd ,above1 pp4 #beb-c1 #beh1 
#bhg4  #ife ,prolegomena1  #ah4  #iff   
,op4 cit4  #bj4  #ifg ,op4 cit4  #ah-ai2
 ,eng4 trans4 pp4 #ed-e4  #ifh ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #ci-dj1 #bhf-g4  #ifi ,cf4   
below1 p4 #cgj4  #igj ,op4 cit4  #bb4   
,cf4 below1 p4 #caa n4 #d4  #iga  #ba-g4
  #igb ,b #adc4  #igc ,this leads on in 
the second paragraph of  #ba to further 
statements1 already commented upon      
above1 pp4 #ahf1 #beg-h4 ,cf4 also  #bc4
  #igd ,cf4 also  #bd4  #ige ,cf4 above1
 pp4 #ij ff41 #aga1 #bbf-i1 #bfg-gj2    
below1 p4 #ccg4  #igf ,cf4 above1 pp4   
#bh1 #dg1 #aad1 #ada-b4  #igg ,cf4  #ba1
 second paragraph4  #igh ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #afj1 #ahf1 #beg1 and below1 pp4       
#cbe-f1 #ccj-a1 #cij-a1 #djd ff4  #igi  
,cf4 below1 pp4 #cbd1 #cbi4  #ihj       

,above1 p4 #adh4  #iha ,cf4 above1 pp4  
xliii-v1 l-ii1 #bch1 #bfa-b1 #bfc ff41  
#bgc ff42 below1 pp4 #bie ff41 #cbb ff4 
#ihb ,cf4 ,b #fg-h2 ,a #cc  ,b #di4     
#ihc ,b #fg4  #ihd ,b xxxix n4  #ihe    
,kant very probably arrived at this view
 of inner sense under the influence of  
,tetens who teaches a similar doctrine  
in his ,philosophische ,versuche ber die
 menschliche ,natur und ihre            
,entwickelung4 ,cf4 ,bd4 i42 ,versuch i4
 #g1 #h4 ,the first volume of ,tetens'  
work was published in #aggg 7re-issued  
by the ,kantgesellschaft in #aiac71 and 
had been carefully read by ,kant prior  
to the final preparation of the         
,critique4 ,cf4 ,b4 ,erdmann1           
,kriticismus1 p4 #ea4  #ihf ,cf4 ,a4    
#abh-i4  #ihg ,as just noted1 it is in  
the second edition that the above view  
of the content of inner sense is first  
definitely formulated4  #ihh ,a #cc  ,b 
#di-ej4  #ihi ,a #cd  ,b #ej4  #iij ,cf4
 above1 pp4 #bjh-i1 #bea-b1 #bfj-d2     
below1 #caa n4 #d4 ,it may be observed  

that ,caird 7i4 pp4 #fbe-g7 interprets  
inner sense as equivalent to inner      
reflection4 ,this is one of the respects
 in which ,caird's ,hegelian standpoint 
has led him to misrepresent even ,kant's
 most central doctrines4  #iia ,cf4     
below1 pp4 #cii-djj1 and ,a #bgg-h  ,b  
#ccc-d4  #iib ,above1 p4 #bib4  #iic    
,cf4 above1 p4 #aee4  #iid ,cf4         
,vaihinger in ,strassburger             
,abhandlungen zur ,philosophie 7#ahhd71 
p4 #ajf ff4  #iie ,section ,,iii41      
,prop4 ,,xii ,usus4  #iif ,theil ,,ii4  
,hauptstck ,,ii4 ,w4 ii4 p4 #cfd4  #iig 
#aa4  #iih ,plitz's edition 7#ahba71 pp4
 #ajj-b4  #iii ,w4 iv4 p4 #cgc ff4      
#ajjj ,it may be noted that in the      
,aesthetic 7,a #ch  ,b #ee7 ,kant       
employs the term idealism1 without      
descriptive epithet1 in the same manner 
as in his pre-,critical writings1 as    
signifying a position that must be      
rejected4  #ajja ,cf4 below1 p4 #cja ff4
  #ajjb ,pp4 #cjg-h4  #ajjc ,cf4 ,a     
#cfh-i and #cgb4  #ajjd ,a #cgg3 a      

passage which bears signs of being a    
later interpolation4  #ajje ,b #bgd4    
#ajjf ,a #cfh-i4  #ajjg ,a #cfi4  #ajjh 
,a #bh  ,b #dd4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #gf1    
#aaf-ag4  #ajji ,a #cgj4  #ajaj ,loc4   
cit4  #ajaa ,a #cgb4  #ajab ,a #cgc3    
,weil indessen1 etc4  #ajac ,adickes    
regards them as later additions4 ,to    
judge by their content 7cf4 above1 pp4  
#bjd ff41 #bae-af1 on ,kant's doctrine  
of the transcendental object71 they are 
more probably of quite early origin4    
#ajad ,a #cgg-h4  #ajae ,adickes argues 
that this paragraph is subsequent to the
 main body of the ,analytic1 but that is
 in keeping with the tendency which he  
seems to show of dating passages1 which 
cannot belong to the 8,brief ,outline10 
later rather than earlier4  #ajaf ,a    
#cge4  #ajag ,the remaining passages in 
the fourth ,paralogism1 together with   
the corresponding passages in ,b #bgd   
ff41 in ,kant's note to ,b xxxix1 and in
 ,b #bia-c1 are separately dealt with   
below1 pp4 #cjh ff41 #cbb ff41 #dfb-c4  

#ajah ,a #cgg4  #ajai ,loc4 cit4  #ajbj 
,e4g4 ,garve4  #ajba  #ac1 ,w4 iv4 pp4  
#bhh-i3 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #db4  #ajbb     
,loc4 cit4  #ajbc ,op4 cit4 pp4 #bhi-ij3
 ,eng4 trans4 pp4 #dc-d4  #ajbd ,in     
,note ,,ii4  #ajbe  #di1 ,w4 iv4 #ccf3  
,eng4 trans4 p4 #ii4  #ajbf ,anhang1 ,w4
 iv4 p4 #cge n4  #ajbg ,w4 iv4 p4 #cgd3 
,eng4 trans4 p4 #adg4  #ajbh ,cf4 above1
 p4 #aee ff4  #ajbi ,w4 iv4 p4 #cge4    
#ajcj ,w4 iv4 p4 #cge3 ,eng4 trans4 p4  
#adg-h4  #ajca ,cf4 above1 p4 #aef4     
#ajcb ,as already noted above1 p4 #bii1 
it is employed by ,kant in his lectures 
on ,metaphysics4  #ajcc ,kant's phrase  
8in space outside me0 is on ,kant's     
principles really pleonastic4 ,cf4      
,prolegomena1  #di2 ,eng4 trans1 p4     
#aja3 8the notion #8outside me' only    
signifies existence in space40 ,cf4 ,a  
#cgc4  #ajcd ,cf4 text as altered by    
note to ,b xxxviii4  #ajce ,b xxxix4    
#ajcf ,b #bia-b4 ,the remaining points  
in ,b #bgd ff4 as well as in ,b xxxix n4
 are separately dealt with below1 p4    

#cbb ff4  #ajcg ,the nearest approach to
 such teaching in the first edition is  
in ,a #cc  ,b #ej4 ,cf4 above1 pp4      
#ace-h4  #ajch ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ccc1    
#cda1 #cfj1 #chd-e4  #ajci ,adamson     
7,development of ,modern ,philosophy1 i4
 p4 #bda7 takes the opposite view as to 
what is ,kant's intended teaching1 but  
remarks upon its inconsistency with     
,kant's own fundamental principles4     
8,now1 in truth1 ,kant grievously       
endangers his own doctrine by insisting 
on the absence of a priori elements from
 our apprehension of the mental life2   
for it follows from that1 if taken      
rigorously1 that according to ,kant     
sense and understanding are not so much 
sources which unite in producing        
knowledge1 as1 severally1 sources of    
distinct kinds of apprehension4 ,if we  
admit at all1 in respect to inner sense1
 that there is some kind of apprehension
 without the work of understanding1 then
 it has been acknowledged that sense is 
per se adequate to furnish a kind of    

apprehension40 ,as pointed out above 7p4
 #bif71 by the same line of reasoning   
,kant is disabled from viewing inner    
consciousness as merely reflective4 ,in 
other words it can neither be more      
immediate nor less sensuous than outer  
perception4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cfa1 n4 #c1
 #chd-e4  #ajdj ,above1 pp4 xlvi1       
#bge-hb2 below1 pp4 #cac-ad1 #chd-e4    
#ajda ,above1 pp4 #bgf1 #bgi-hj2 below1 
pp4 #cab1 #chd-e4  #ajdb ,cf4 below1 p4 
#cfa4  #ajdc ,cf4 ,metaphysical ,first  
,principles of ,natural ,science        
7#aghf71 ,w4 iv4 pp4 #dgj-a4 ,it should 
be observed1 however1 that the reasons  
which ,kant gives in this treatise for  
denying that psychology can ever become 
more than a merely historical or        
descriptive discipline are not that the 
objects of inner sense fall outside the 
realm of mechanically determined        
existence4 ,kant makes no assertion that
 even distantly implies any such view4  
,his reasons are--7#a7 that1 as time has
 only one dimension1 the main body of   

mathematical science is not applicable  
to the phenomena of inner sense and     
their laws2 7#b7 that such phenomena are
 capable only of a merely ideal1 not of 
an experimental1 analysis2 7#c7 that1 as
 the objects of inner sense do not      
consist of parts outside each other1    
their parts are not substances1 and may 
therefore be conceived as diminishing in
 intensity or passing out of existence  
without prejudice to the principle of   
the permanence of substance 7op4 cit4 p4
 #edb1 quoted below1 p4 #cfa1 n4 #b72   
7#d7 that inner observation is limited  
to the individual's own existence2 7#e7 
that the very act of introspection      
alters the state of the object observed4
  #ajdd ,a #cgj4  #ajde ,b #bge4 ,these 
two sentences are cited in this         
connection by ,vaihinger3 ,strassburger 
,abhandlungen zur ,philosophie 7#ahhd71 
p4 #aca4  #ajdf ,above1 pp4 xlv-vii1    
#bgi ff4  #ajdg ,cf4 also above1 pp4    
#bge-g4  #ajdh  #ac1 ,anmerkung ,,ii4   
#ajdi ,kriticismus1 p4 #aig ff4  #ajej  

,mind 7#ahgi71 iv4 p4 #djh ff42 7#ahhj71
 v4 p4 #aaa4  #ajea ,a ,defence of      
,philosophic ,doubt 7#ahgi71 p4 #ajg    
ff42 ,mind 7#ahgh71 iii4 p4 #dha2 iv4 p4
 #aae2 vi4 p4 #bfj4  #ajeb ,op4 cit4 p4 
#abh ff4  #ajec ,critical ,philosophy1  
i4 #fcb ff42 ,mind 7#ahgi71 iv4 pp4     
#aab1 #efj-a2 v4 p4 #aae4  #ajed ,the   
,philosophy of ,kant1 p4 #bdi ff4  #ajee
 ,the one fundamental question to which 
,erdmann would seem to allow that ,kant 
gives conflicting answers is as to      
whether or not categories can be        
transcendently employed4 ,the assumption
 of a uniform teaching is especially    
obvious in ,sidgwick's comments2 cf4    
,mind 7#ahhj71 v4 p4 #aac2 ,lectures on 
the ,philosophy of ,kant 7#aije71 p4    
#bh4  #ajef ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cjc-d4     
#ajeg ,a #dia  ,b #ebj4  #ajeh ,a #bbe-f
  ,b #bgc4  #ajei ,a #die-f  ,b #ebc-d4 
#ajfj ,cf4 below1 p4 #ejf4  #ajfa ,viz4 
,a #bbe-f  ,b #bgc4  #ajfb ,b #bgg4     
#ajfc ,above1 p4 #bjh ff4  #ajfd ,a #cdf
  ,b #djd4  #ajfe ,a #bbd-e  ,b #bgb-c4 

#ajff ,cf4 ,b #bgg4  #ajfg ,quoted by   
,b4 ,erdmann3 ,kriticismus1 p4 #ajg4    
#ajfh ,b xxxix n41 #fg-h1 #gj1 #aeg-h   
with appended note1 #bgf-h1 #dbb n41    
#dbg-i4  #ajfi ,b #gj1 #aeg1 #dbh4      
#ajgj ,b #aeg4  #ajga ,b #aeg n4        
,regarding the un-,critical character of
 ,kant's language in this passage1 and  
of the tendencies which inspire it1 cf4 
below1 p4 #cbi4  #ajgb ,b #aeg4  #ajgc  
,b #dbi4  #ajgd ,cf4 ,b #bgg-h and ,b   
#aeg4  #ajge ,b #bgh4  #ajgf ,b #dbj and
 ,b #dbb n4  #ajgg ,b #dbb n4  #ajgh    
,cf4 above1 pp4 #bjd ff41 #djd ff4      
#ajgi ,cf4 above1 p4 #bjd ff4  #ajhj ,b 
#djf4  #ajha ,b #dbb n4 ,though both    
concepts are denoted by the same term1  
they may not--such is the               
implication--be for that reason         
identified4  #ajhb ,b #dbi4 ,kant does  
not1 however1 even in the second        
edition1 hold consistently to this      
position4 ,in the sentence immediately  
preceding that just quoted he equates   
the transcendental self with the notion 

of 8object in general40 8,i represent   
myself to myself neither as ,i am nor as
 ,i appear to myself1 but think myself  
only as ,i do any object in general from
 whose mode of intuition ,i abstract40  
#ajhc ,the broader bearing of this view 
may be noted4 ,if consistently          
developed1 it must involve the assertion
 that noumenal reality is apprehended in
 terms of the ,ideas of reason1 for     
these are the only other concepts at the
 disposal of the mind4 ,cf4 above1 pp4  
liii-v1 #bag-ah2 below1 pp4 #cca1       
#cij-a1 #dad-ag1 #dbf ff41 #eeh-fa4     
#ajhd ,a #djb4  #ajhe ,it is doubtful   
whether ,a #dja-b represents a genuinely
 ,critical position4 ,several of its    
phrases seem reminiscent of ,kant's     
semi-,critical view of the nature of    
apperception4 ,this is especially true  
of the assertion that self-consciousness
 is 8itself unconditioned40  #ajhf ,a   
#cdf  ,b #djd4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #def1    
#dfa-b4  #ajhg ,cf4 ,a #cde4  #ajhh     
,that he does not really do so is clear 

from the context and also from the      
manner in which he restated this        
argument in the second edition 7,b      
#dba-b74  #ajhi ,a #dja-b1 ,b #dba-b2   
below1 pp4 #dfa-b4  #ajij ,a #djb2 cf4  
,b #djg4  #ajia ,cf4 ,b #dba-b4  #ajib  
,cf4 above1 pp4 l-ii1 #bjh-i1 #bfj-c4   
#ajic ,cf4 above1 loc4 cit4  #ajid ,cf4 
,b #aeg-h and #aeg n41 ,b #bgh1 ,b      
#dbh-i4  #ajie ,above1 pp4 #bie-f1 #caa 
n4 #d4  #ajif ,there is this difference 
between the category of existence and   
the categories of relation1 namely1 that
 it would seem to be impossible to      
distinguish between a determinate and an
 indeterminate application of it4       
,either we assert existence or we do    
not2 there is no such third alternative 
as in the case of the categories of     
substance and causality4 ,the category  
of substance1 determinately used1       
signifies material existence in space   
and time2 indeterminately applied it is 
the purely problematic and merely       
logical notion of something that is     

always a subject and never a predicate4 
,the determinate category of causality  
is the conception of events conditioning
 one another in time2 indeterminately   
employed it signifies only the quite    
indefinite notion of a ground or        
condition4 ,also1 ,kant's explicit      
teaching 7,a #eig ff4  ,b #fbe ff47 is  
that the notion of existence stands in  
an altogether different position from   
other predicates4 ,it is not an         
attribute constitutive of the concept of
 the subject to which it is applied1 but
 is simply the positing of the content  
of that concept as a whole4 ,nor1 again1
 is it a relational form for the        
articulation of content4 ,these would   
seem to be the reasons why no           
distinction is possible between a       
determinate and an indeterminate        
application of the notion of existence1 
and why1 therefore1 ,kant1 in defending 
the possible dual employment of it1 has 
difficulty in holding consistently to   
the doctrines expounded in the          

,postulates4 ,he is1 by his own explicit
 teaching1 interdicted from declaring   
that the notion of existence is both a  
category and not a category1 or1 in     
other words1 that it may vary in meaning
 according as empirical or noumenal     
reality is referred to1 and that only in
 the former case is it definite and     
precise4 ,yet such a view would1        
perhaps1 better harmonise with certain  
other lines of thought which first      
obtain statement in the ,dialectic4 ,for
 though it is in the ,dialectic that    
,kant expounds his grounds for holding  
that existence and content are separate 
and independent1 it is there also that  
he first begins to realise the part     
which the ,ideas of ,reason are called  
upon to play in the drawing of the      
distinction between appearance and      
reality4  #ajig ,in the ,fortschritte   
7,werke 7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #edh   
ff47 this final step is quite definitely
 taken4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cij-a1 #dad-ag1
 #dbf ff41 #eeh-fa4 ,we have1 as we     

shall find1 to recognise a second       
fundamental conflict in ,kant's         
thinking1 additional to that between    
subjectivism and phenomenalism4 ,he     
alternates between what may be entitled 
the sceptical and the ,idealist views of
 the function of ,reason and of its     
relation to the understanding1 or       
otherwise stated1 between the regulative
 and the absolutist view of the nature  
of thought4 ,but this conflict first    
gains explicit expression in the        
,dialectic4  #ajih ,for ,kant's use of  
the terms #8canon' and #8dialectic' cf4 
above1 pp4 #gb1 #gg-h1 #agc-d1 and      
below1 p4 #dbe ff4  #ajii ,above1 pp4   
#aha-b4  #aajj ,as we shall have        
occasion to observe below 7p4 #ccf71    
when ,kant defines judgment as 8the     
faculty of subsumption under rules10 he 
is really defining it in terms of the   
process of reasoning1 and thus violating
 the principle which he is professedly  
following in dividing the               
,transcendental ,logic into the         

,analytic of ,concepts1 the ,analytic of
 ,judgment1 and the ,dialectic of       
,reasoning4  #aaja ,a #acb  ,b #aga4    
#aajb ,pp4 #beb-c1 #beh-i1 #bhg-h4      
#aajc ,the passages that have gone to   
constitute this chapter are probably    
quite late in date of writing4 ,this    
would seem to be proved by the view     
taken of productive imagination1 and    
also by the fact that in the            
,reflexionen there is no mention of     
schematism4  #aajd ,cf4 above1 p4 #agf  
ff4  #aaje ,cf4 ,a #acg  ,b #agf4 8,the 
empirical concept of a plate is         
homogeneous with the pure geometrical   
concept of a circle1 since the roundness
 which is thought in the former can be  
intuited in the latter40  #aajf ,a #ach 
,b #agg4  #aajg ,above1 p4 #ccd4  #aajh 
,cf4 ,e4 ,curtius1 ,das                 
,schematismuskapitel in der ,kritik der 
reinen ,vernunft 7,kantstudien1 ,bd4    
xix4 p4 #cdh ff474  #aaji ,op4 cit4     
#eh4  #aaaj ,a #ach  ,b #agg4 ,cf4      
above1 pp4 #if-g4  #aaaa ,a #ada  ,b    

#ahj4  #aaab ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bfh-i4    
#aaac ,cf4 above1 pp4 #acc-d4  #aaad ,a 
#adj  ,b #agi4  #aaae ,loc4 cit4  #aaaf 
,cf4 ,e4 ,curtius1 op4 cit4 p4 #cef4    
#aaag ,kant's other definition of the   
schema as 8a rule for the determination 
of our intuition in accordance with a   
certain universal concept0 7,a #ada  ,b 
#ahj7 is open to similar objections4    
,when1 however1 ,kant states that       
8schemata1 and not images1 underlie our 
pure sensuous concepts10 he seems to be 
inclining to the truer view that the    
schema is the concept4  #aaah ,above1   
pp4 #aca-c4  #aaai ,cf4 ,riehl1 ,philos4
 ,krit4 #bnd ed4 i4 pp4 #dhh1 #ecc4 ,cf4
 above1 pp4 #aie-f1 #aih2 below1 pp4    
#djd-e4  #aabj ,critical ,philosophy1 i4
 bk4 i4 chap4 v41 especially pp4 #dcg   
and #ddj4  #aaba ,theorie der           
,erfahrung1 second edition1 p4 #chd4    
#aabb ,op4 cit4 p4 #ecb4  #aabc ,cf4    
above1 pp4 #bdj-c4  #aabd ,for comment  
upon the definition of number1 which    
,kant takes as being the schema of      

quantity1 and upon the view of          
arithmetic which this definition may    
seem to imply1 cf4 above1 p4 #abh ff4   
#aabe ,cf4 above1 p4 #aib4  #aabf ,cf4  
above1 pp4 #cci-dj1 and below1 pp4 #ceg1
 #djd ff4  #aabg ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bj1   
#be1 #bij-a2 below1 pp4 #djg1 #dab1     
#dad-ag4  #aabh ,e4g4 ,riehl1 ,philos4  
,krit4 #bnd ed4 i4 pp4 #ece-f4  #aabi   
,above1 pp4 #beh1 #ccb-c4  #aacj ,a #adh
  ,b #ahh4  #aaca ,a #aef  ,b #aie4     
#aacb ,a #aeg  ,b #aif4  #aacc ,a #bd4  
#aacd  #ac1 ,anmerkung i4  #aace ,b     
#dj-a4  #aacf ,b #aaj4  #aacg ,a #afj   
,b #aii-bjj4  #aach ,cf4 above1 pp4     
#bhh-i4  #aaci ,a #afa-b  ,b #bja-b4    
#aadj ,cf4 below1 pp4 #eaj-aa4  #aada ,a
 #agh-i  ,b #bba4  #aadb ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #id-e4  #aadc ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ceh-i1  
#cfg-h1 #cga-b1 #cha-b4  #aadd ,above1  
p4 #cji ff4  #aade ,cf4 ,adickes1 ,k4 p4
 #aij n4  #aadf ,cf4 above1 p4 #abg ff4 
#aadg ,that is to say1 in the first     
edition4  #aadh ,the phrase is followed1
 it may be observed1 by a verb in the   

irregular4  #aadi ,a #adc  ,b #ahb4     
#aaej ,loc4 cit4 in the chapter on      
,schematism4  #aaea ,loc4 cit4 ,italics 
not in ,kant4  #aaeb ,cf4 ,a #age  ,b   
#bag4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cej-a4  #aaec ,b 
#bag-ah4  #aaed ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aib1   
#cda4  #aaee ,a #afi-gj  ,b #baa-ab4    
,for comment upon ,kant's view of the   
point as a limit1 cf4 below1 p4 #dhi ff4
  #aaef ,though ,kant maintains in ,a   
#aga  ,b #bab-ac that owing to our      
dependence upon empirical data and our  
necessary ignorance of the nature of the
 causal relation we cannot similarly    
demonstrate the principle of the        
continuity of change1 he has himself1 in
 characteristically inconsistent        
fashion1 given three such               
demonstrations4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #chj-a4 
#aaeg ,cf4 ,kant's ,monadologia physica 
7#agef71 and ,new ,doctrine of ,motion  
and ,rest 7#ageh74 ,kant's final        
statement of this dynamical theory is   
given in his ,metaphysical ,first       
,principles of ,natural ,science        

7#aghf74  #aaeh ,in this matter ,kant   
regards himself as defending the        
,newtonian theory of an attractive      
gravitational force4 ,the mechanistic   
view admits only one form of action1    
viz4 transference of motion through     
impact and pressure4 8,from 444         
,democritus to ,descartes1 indeed up to 
our own day1 the mechanistic method of  
explanation 444 has1 under the title of 
atomism or corpuscular philosophy1      
maintained its authority with but slight
 modification2 and has continued to     
exercise its influence upon the         
principles of natural science4 ,its     
essential teaching consists in the      
assumption of the absolute              
impenetrability of primitive matter1 in 
the absolute homogeneity of its         
constitution 7difference of shape being 
the sole remaining difference71 and in  
the absolutely indestructible coherence 
of matter in its fundamental corpuscles0
 7,metaphysical ,first ,principles1 ,w4 
vol4 iv4 p4 #ecc2 ii4 ,allgemeine       

,anmerkung1 #d74  #aaei ,this is        
additional to its other correlative     
assumption of the absolute void4 8,the  
absolute void and the absolutely full   
are in the doctrine of nature very much 
what blind chance and blind fate are in 
metaphysical cosmology1 namely1 a       
barrier to the enquiring reason1 which  
either causes its place to be taken by  
arbitrary fictions1 or lays it to rest  
on the pillow of obscure qualities0     
7,metaphysical ,first ,principles1 ,w4  
vol4 iv4 p4 #ecb 7,i read forschende for
 herrschende774 8,there are only two    
methods of procedure 4443 the           
mechanistic1 through combination of the 
absolutely full with the absolute void1 
or an opposite dynamical method1 that of
 explaining all material differences    
through mere differences in the         
combination of the original forces of   
repulsion and attraction0 7loc4 cit474  
#aafj ,in the first edition ,kant       
formulates this principle in the light  
of his extremely misleading distinction 

between mathematical and dynamical      
principles 7cf4 above1 pp4 #cde-g73     
8,all appearances1 as regards their     
existence1 are subject a priori to rules
 determining their relation to one      
another in one time40  #aafa ,cf4 below1
 p4 #ceh4  #aafb ,in ,a #ahb  ,b #bbe   
the stronger term change 7,wechsel7 is  
employed4  #aafc ,a #agh-hj  ,b #bba-c  
7on the distinction between mathematical
 and dynamical principles7 has been     
commented upon above1 pp4 #cde-g4  #aafd
 ,philos4 ,krit4 #bnd ed4 i4 p4 #ede4   
,caird adopts a similar view1 i4 pp4    
#edj1 #ehj4  #aafe ,a #aha  ,b #bbd4    
#aaff ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cgc-d4  #aafg    
,that is to say1 in the first edition4  
#aafh ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ccb-c1 #cdc-d4   
#aafi ,cf4 above1 p4 #cdh2 below1 pp4   
#cfg-h1 #cga-b1 #cha-b4  #aagj ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #id1 #ace-h1 #cji ff41       
#cdg-h4  #aaga ,that is to say1 in the  
first edition4  #aagb ,the new proof    
added in the second edition calls for no
 special comment4 ,in all essentials it 

agrees with this second proof of the    
first edition4 ,it differs only in such 
ways as are called for by the mode of   
formulating the principle in the second 
edition4  #aagc ,this statement1 as     
,caird has pointed out 7i4 p4 #eda71 is 
extremely questionable4 8,it may be     
objected that to say that #8time itself 
does not change' is like saying that    
passing away does not itself pass away4 
,so far the endurance of time and the   
permanence of the changing might even   
seem to mean only that the moments of   
time never cease to pass away1 and the  
changing never ceases to change4 ,a     
perpetual flux would therefore          
sufficiently #8represent' all the       
permanence that is in time40 ,this is   
not1 however1 in itself a vital         
objection to ,kant's argument4 ,for he  
is here stating more than his argument  
really requires4 ,events are dated in a 
single time1 not in an unchanging time4 
,kant's statement betrays the extent to 
which1 as ,bergson has very justly      

pointed out1 ,kant spatialises time1    
i4e4 interprets it on the analogy of    
space4 ,it is based on 8the mixed idea  
of a measurable time1 which is space in 
so far as it is homogeneity1 and        
duration in so far as it is succession2 
that is to say1 at bottom1 the          
contradictory idea of succession in     
simultaneity0 7,les ,donnes immdiates1  
p4 #agc1 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #bbh74  #aagd  
,cf4 ,a #ahd  ,b #bbg3 8the proposition1
 that substance is permanent1 is        
tautological40  #aage ,cf4 ,a #ahh  ,b  
#bca4  #aagf ,above1 p4 #cda4  #aagg    
,cf4 above1 p4 #cji ff4  #aagh ,b4      
,erdmann's edition of the ,nachtrge1    
lxxx4 p4 #cb4 ,cited by ,caird1 i4 pp4  
#eda-b4  #aagi ,op4 cit4 pp4 #cc-d4     
#aahj ,that ,kant does not mean to imply
 that the category of substance has no  
application to the contents of inner    
sense is made clear by a curious        
argument in the ,metaphysical ,first    
,principles of ,natural ,science        
7#aghf71 ,w4 iv4 p4 #edb3 8,what in this

 proof essentially characterises        
substance1 which is possible only in    
space and under spatial conditions1 and 
therefore only as object of the outer   
senses1 is that its quantity cannot be  
increased or diminished without         
substance coming into being or ceasing  
to be4 ,for the quantity of an object   
which is possible only in space must    
consist of parts which are external to  
one another1 and these1 therefore1 if   
they are real 7something movable71 must 
necessarily be substances4 ,on the other
 hand1 that which is viewed as object of
 inner sense can1 as substance1 have a  
quantity which does not consist of parts
 external to one another4 ,its parts are
 therefore not substances1 and their    
coming into being and ceasing to be must
 not be regarded as creation or         
annihilation of a substance4 ,their     
increase or diminution is therefore     
possible without prejudice to the       
principle of the permanence of          
substance40 7,italics not in ,kant47    

,cf4 also ,prolegomena1  #di1 and below1
 pp4 #cfg1 #cgg n4 #c4  #aaha ,a #ahg   
,b #bcj4  #aahb ,k4 p4 #baa n4  #aahc   
,c4 ,a #bje-g  ,b #beb4  #aahd ,werke   
7,frauenstdt1 #ahgc71 i4 p4 #he ff4     
#aahe ,as evidence of this failure ,i   
may cite ,schopenhauer's comment upon ,a
 #cga and #cgb3 8,from these passages it
 is quite clear that for ,kant the      
perception of outer things in space is  
antecedent to all application of the    
causal law1 and that this law does not  
therefore enter into it as its element  
and condition3 mere sensation amounts in
 ,kant's view to perception0 7,werke1 i4
 p4 #ha74 ,even when1 as in the passages
 referred to1 ,kant is speaking in his  
most subjectivist vein1 he gives no     
justification for any such assertion4   
,schopenhauer1 notwithstanding his      
sincere admiration for ,kant--8,i owe   
what is best in my own system to the    
impression made upon me by the works of 
,kant1 by the sacred writings of the    
,hindoos1 and by ,plato0 7,world as     

,will and ,idea1 ,werke1 ii4 p4 #dic1   
,eng4 trans4 ii4 p4 #e7--;is one of the 
most unreliable of ,kant's critics4 ,his
 comments are extremely misleading1 and 
largely for the reason that he was      
interested in ,kant only as he could    
obtain from him confirmation of his own 
philosophical tenets4 ,several of these 
tenets he certainly derived directly    
from the ,critique2 but they are placed 
by him in so entirely different a       
setting that their essential meaning is 
greatly altered4 ,we have already noted 
7above1 p4 #da7 ,schopenhauer's         
exaggerated statement of ,kant's        
intuitive theory of mathematics4 ,kant's
 subjectivism is similarly expounded in 
a one-sided and quite unrepresentative  
manner 7cf4 below1 p4 #djg n474         
,hutchison ,stirling's criticisms of    
,kant in his ,text ,book to ,kant are   
vitiated by a similar failure to        
recognise the completely un-,critical   
character of the occasional passages in 
which ,kant admits a distinction between

 8judgments of perception0 and          
8judgments of experience0 7cf4 above1   
pp4 #bhh-i74 ,stirling 7cf4 below1 p4   
#cgg7 has amplified his criticism of    
,kant in ,princeton ,review 7,jan4      
#ahgi1 pp4 #agh-baj71 ,fortnightly      
,review 7,july #ahgb71 and in ,mind     
7ix41 #ahhd1 p4 #eca1 and x41 #ahhe1 p4 
#de74  #aahf ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bdj-b1    
#cfe1 and below1 p4 #cgg4  #aahg ,cf4   
,stout1 ,manual of ,psychology1 third   
edition1 pp4 #ddd-f3 8,unless we assume 
from the outset that the primitive mind 
treats a perceived change which         
challenges its interest and attention1  
not as something self-existent in       
isolation1 but as something conditioned 
by and conditioning other changes1 it   
seems hopeless to attempt to show how   
this causal point of view could have    
arisen through any extension of         
knowledge in accordance with ascertained
 psychological laws and conditions4444  
,there is good reason for denying that  
customary repetition is even required to

 furnish a first occasion or opportunity
 for the first emergence of the         
apprehension of causal relations4 ,for1 
as we have already insisted1 the process
 of learning by experience is from the  
first experimental4444 ,regularities are
 only found because they are sought4    
,but it is in the seeking that the      
category of causal unity is primarily   
involved40 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #cga-b4      
#aahh ,a #aic  ,b #bch4  #aahi ,a #aia  
,b #bcf4  #aaij ,by an 8arbitrary0 order
 ,kant does not1 of course1 mean an     
order of succession that is not         
determined1 but only one that is        
determined by subjectively conditioned  
direction of attention4 ,cf4 below1 p4  
#cgg4  #aaia ,cf4 ,a #aii  ,b #bdd1 and 
above1 pp4 #acc1 #bhh-i2 below1 p4 #cgg4
  #aaib ,cf4 ,a #aie-f  ,b #bdj-a1 and  
above1 pp4 #agb1 #agf ff41 #ahb-c1 #bfc 
ff41 #bgg-h4  #aaic ,a #gcf-g  ,b #gfe4 
,italics of last sentence not in ,kant4 
#aaid ,a #ahi-id  ,b #bcd-i3 first to   
fourth paragraphs 7first edition74      

#aaie ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cdh1 #ceh4  #aaif
 ,cf4 ,a #aib-c  ,b #bch-i4  #aaig ,cf4 
,riehl1 ,philosophischer ,kriticismus   
7second edition71 i4 pp4 #eea-b4 ,while 
recognising the above main point1 ,riehl
 seems to assert that empirical sequence
 determines the application of the      
causal concept4 ,it would be truer1 and 
more in accordance with the position    
which ,kant is endeavouring to          
establish1 to assert that appeal to     
constancy of sequence enables us to     
determine which antecedents of any given
 event are causal conditions4 ,the      
principle of causality is already       
applied when the sequent experiences are
 apprehended as sequent events4 ,this   
ambiguity1 however1 would seem to be due
 only to ,riehl's mode of expression4   
,for1 as he himself says 7p4 #eea71 the 
law of causality is a ground of         
experience1 and cannot therefore be     
derived from it4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bfg-h1
 #cfg4  #aaih ,pp4 #cfe-ga1 #cgg4  #aaii
 ,a #aia  ,b #bcf4 ,cf4 above1 pp4      

#baf-ah4  #abjj ,as pointed out above1  
this is really a secondary meaning which
 ,kant reads into the term analogy2 it  
is not the true explanation of his      
choice of the term4  #abja ,critical    
,philosophy of ,kant1 vol4 i4 pp4 #edj1 
#ehj4  #abjb ,kant1 p4 #aih3 trans4 by  
,creighton and ,lefevre1 p4 #aif4  #abjc
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bgj ff41 #cac-ba4     
#abjd ,kant1 of course1 recognises that 
we cannot make any such positive        
assertion2 to do so would be to         
transcend the limits imposed by         
,critical principles4 ,cf4 below1 p4    
#chb4  #abje ,a #aid-f  ,b #bci-da3     
fifth to seventh paragraphs 7first      
edition74  #abjf ,a #aif-i  ,b #bda-d3  
eighth to tenth paragraphs 7first       
edition74  #abjg ,a #aii-bja  ,b #bdd-f3
 eleventh to thirteenth paragraphs      
7first edition74  #abjh ,cf4 above1 pp4 
#bbd ff41 #bfd ff42 below1 #cgg4  #abji 
,a #bja-b  ,b #bdf-g3 fourteenth        
paragraph 7first edition74  #abaj ,b    
#bcc-d3 second paragraph 7second        

edition74  #abaa ,b #bcc-d4  #abab ,from
 ,a #bjb  ,b #bdg to the end4  #abac    
,kant's phenomenalist substitute for the
 ,cartesian subjectivism 7cf4 above1 pp4
 #bgj ff41 #cab ff47 enables him to     
develop this thesis in a consistent and 
thoroughgoing manner4 ,the subjective is
 a subspecies within the class of what  
is determined by natural law2 and the   
principle of causality is therefore     
applicable to subjective change in the  
same rigorous fashion as to the         
objectively sequent4  #abad ,a #bjd  ,b 
#bdi4  #abae ,w4 i4 pp4 #hg-ib4  #abaf  
,grundstze der reinen                   
,erkenntniss-,theorie1 p4 #aea4 ,quoted 
and translated by ,caird1 i4 p4 #egb4   
,caird sums up the matter in a sentence 
7p4 #ega73 8,kant is showing1 not that  
objective succession is always causal1  
but that the determination of a         
succession of perceptions as referring  
to a succession of states in an object1 
involves the principle of causality40   
#abag ,loc4 cit4  #abah ,the connected  

question how we can determine the ball  
and the cushion as objectively          
coexistent is the problem of the third  
,analogy4  #abai ,,iii4 ,erklrung #a and
 #b1 ,lehrsatz #a 7especially ,anmerkung
 thereto74 ,cf4 also ,,ii4 ,erklrung #a 
and #e1 and the last pages of the       
,allgemeine ,anmerkung4  #abbj ,pp4     
#cea1 #cgc-d4 ,cf4 pp4 #cah-ba4  #abba  
,a #agj-a  ,b #bab-ac1 above1 p4 #cec1  
n4 #b4  #abbb ,a #bjh  ,b #bec-d4  #abbc
 ,metaphysical ,first ,principles1 ,,ii4
 ,lehrsatz #d1 ,anmerkung #b4  #abbd ,a 
#bji-aj  ,b #bee-f4  #abbe ,a #baj  ,b  
#bef4  #abbf ,w4 ii4 p4 #bb4  #abbg ,w4 
ii4 p4 #afh4  #abbh ,loc4 cit4  #abbi   
,for lack of a more suitable ,english   
equivalent ,i have translated           
,gemeinschaft as 8communion40 ,as ,kant 
points out in ,a #bac  ,b #bfj1 the     
,german term is itself ambiguous1       
signifying commercium 7i4e4 dynamical   
interaction7 as well as communio4  #abcj
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cdh1 #ceh-i1 #cfg-h1  
#cga-b4  #abca  #ag ff4 ,cf4 ,nachtrge  

zu ,kants ,kritik1 lxxxvi1 with ,b4     
,erdmann's comment1 p4 #ce4  #abcb ,a   
#baa-ab  ,b #beh4 ,cf4 ,a #baa  ,b #beg4
  #abcc ,a #baa  ,b #beg4  #abcd ,a     
#baa-ac  ,b #beh-fj3 first three        
paragraphs 7first edition74  #abce ,a   
#bac-ad  ,b #bfj-a3 fourth paragraph    
7first edition74  #abcf ,a #bad-ae  ,b  
#bfa-b3 fifth paragraph 7first edition74
  #abcg ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ahi-ij1 #bjh   
ff4  #abch ,b #beg-h3 first paragraph   
7second edition74  #abci ,cf4 ,b #bia-c1
 partially quoted above1 pp4 #caj-aa4   
,in the ,metaphysical ,first ,principles
 7,,iii4 ,lehrsatz1 #d7 the principle   
that action and reaction are always     
equal is similarly limited to the outer 
relations of material bodies in space1  
and ,kant adds that all change in bodies
 is motion4 ,cf4 ,w4 xi4 p4 #bcd2 and   
above1 p4 #adg4  #abdj ,above pp4       
#caa-ab2 below1 pp4 #dgc-g4  #abda ,a   
#bac  ,b #bfj4  #abdb ,the inconsistency
 of ,kant's view of pure manifolds of   
time and space with the argument of the 

,analytic of ,principles is too obvious 
to call for detailed comment4  #abdc    
,cf4 ,b #beg4  #abdd ,a #bac-ad  ,b     
#bfj-a4  #abde ,b #beg4  #abdf ,third   
edition1 p4 #dch4  #abdg ,stout does not
 himself offer it as complete4  #abdh   
,world as ,will and ,idea1 ,w4 ii4 pp4  
#edd-e3 ,eng4 trans4 ii4 pp4 #fa-c4     
#abdi ,cf4 above1 p4 #aig4  #abej ,a    
#bab-ac  ,b #bei4  #abea ,b #beh4  #abeb
 ,op4 cit4 pp4 #ede-f3 ,eng4 trans4 p4  
#fc4  #abec ,op4 cit4 pp4 #edf-g3 ,eng4 
trans4 pp4 #fc-e4  #abed ,cf4 above1 p4 
#cgi4  #abee ,cf4 ,stadler1 ,grundstze1 
p4 #abd4  #abef ,op4 cit4 p4 #edf3 ,eng4
 trans4 p4 #fc4  #abeg ,cf4 above1 pp4  
#ig-h1 #ajb n41 #afe-f2 below1 pp4 #dbi 
ff41 #ddg ff41 #edg ff4  #abeh ,cf4     
,adickes1 ,k4 p4 #bcc n4  #abei ,a #bbb 
,b #bfi4 ,cf4 ,a #bbj  ,b #bfh4  #abfj  
,a #adh ff4  ,b #ahg ff4  #abfa ,a #bai 
,b #bff4  #abfb ,this1 by ,kant's own   
account 7,a #bcb-d  ,b #bhe-g71 is what 
led him to adopt the title              
#8postulates4' ,a geometrical postulate 

does not add anything to the concept of 
its object but only defines the         
conditions of its production4  #abfc    
,cf4 above1 pp4 #ch-i2 below1 pp4       
#cih-i1 #dah ff4  #abfd ,cf4 ,a #bbj-c  
,b #bfg-ga4  #abfe ,a #bbc  ,b #bgj4    
#abff ,cf4 ,a #bbj  ,b #bfh4  #abfg ,a  
#bbc  ,b #bgj-a4  #abfh ,k4 p4 #bbc n4  
#abfi ,a #bbd  ,b #bgb4  #abgj ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #bhh-i4  #abga ,a #bbe  ,b   
#bgb4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cid-f4  #abgb ,a 
#bbe  ,b #bgc4 ,italics not in ,kant4   
#abgc ,the ,critical ,philosophy of     
,kant1 i4 p4 #eia4  #abgd ,op4 cit4 p4  
#eie4  #abge ,a #bbf  ,b #bgc-d4  #abgf 
,a #bbf ff4  ,b #bgi ff4  #abgg ,a #bah 
,b #bha4  #abgh ,a #bcb  ,b #bhd4  #abgi
 ,a #bca  ,b #bhd4  #abhj ,cf4 above1 p4
 #cji ff4  #abha ,kant's argument in the
 note to ,b #bij is that of his early   
essay on ,negative ,quantity4 ,cf4      
below1 pp4 #ebg ff41 #ecc ff41 #ecf4    
#abhb ,a #bcf  ,b #bie4  #abhc ,cf4     
above1 pp4 xxxv-vi1 xxxviii1 #ahe-f1    
#aia1 #aie-f1 #beg-h1 #bij-a1 #cbe ff41 

#cci4  #abhd ,the mathematical          
illustrations which ,kant proceeds to   
give 7,a #bci  ,b #bii7 are peculiarly  
crude and off-hand in manner of         
statement4 ,cf4 per contra ,a #adj  ,b  
#agi for ,kant's real view of the       
distinction between image1 schema1 and  
concept4  #abhe ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aie-f1 
#aih1 #cci-db4  #abhf ,a #bdc  ,b #cja4 
#abhg ,a #bdb  ,b #cjb4  #abhh ,cf4 ,a  
#bdh  ,b #cje4  #abhi ,a #bdf-g  ,b     
#cjc-d4 ,a #bdg-h  ,b #cjd-e 7beginning 
8,thought is the action10 etc47 is      
merely a repetition of the preceding    
argument1 and probably represents a     
later intercalation4  #abij ,beginning  
8,appearances1 so far as 44410 which was
 omitted in the second edition4 ,it     
probably constitutes1 as ,adickes       
maintains 7,k4 p4 #bed n471 the original
 beginning of this chapter4 ,the 8as we 
have hitherto maintained0 of its second 
paragraph1 which obviously cannot apply 
to the pages which precede it in its    
present position1 must refer to the     

argument of the ,analytic4  #abia ,a    
#bdi1 #bea4  #abib ,above1 p4 #bjd ff4  
#abic ,in large part it represents the  
,critical position as understood by     
,schopenhauer1 who never succeeded in   
acquiring any genuine understanding of  
,kant's more mature teaching 7cf4 above1
 p4 #cff n474 ,schopenhauer is correct  
in maintaining that one chief ground of 
,kant's belief in the existence of      
things in themselves lies in his initial
 assumption that they must be postulated
 in order to account for the given      
manifold4 ,schopenhauer is also         
justified in stating that ,kant1 though 
starting from the dualistic ,cartesian  
standpoint1 so far modified it as to    
conclude that the origin of this        
manifold must be 8objective1 since there
 is no ground for regarding it as       
subjective0 7,parerga und ,paralipomena1
 #ahea ed41 p4 #gd ff474 ,but for two   
reasons this is a very incomplete1 and  
therefore extremely misleading1 account 
of ,kant's final teaching4 ,in the first

 place1 ,schopenhauer fails to take     
account of ,kant's implied distinction  
between the sensations of the special   
senses and the manifold of outer sense4 
,when ,kant recognises that the         
sensations of the special senses are    
empirically conditioned1 he is          
constrained in consistency to           
distinguish between them and the        
manifold which constitutes the matter of
 all experiences 7cf4 above1 p4 #bge    
ff474 ,things in themselves1 in         
accounting for the latter1 account also1
 but in quite indirect fashion1 for the 
former4 ,though sensations are          
empirically conditioned1 the entire     
natural world is noumenally grounded4   
,secondly1 ,kant's subjectivism         
undergoes a similar transformation on   
its inner or mental side4 ,the analysis 
of self-consciousness1 which is given   
both in the ,deductions and in the      
,paralogisms1 indicates with sufficient 
clearness ,kant's recognition that the  
form of experience is as little         

self-explanatory as its content1 and    
that it must not1 without such proof as1
 owing to the limitations of our        
experience1 we are debarred from giving1
 be regarded as more ultimate in nature4
 ,the realities which constitute and    
condition our mental processes are not  
apprehended in any more direct manner   
than the thing in itself4 ,when1        
therefore1 ,schopenhauer asserts in the 
,world as ,will and ,idea 7,werke1      
,frauenstdt1 ii4 p4 #did1 ,eng4 trans1  
ii4 p4 #f7 that ,kant proves the world  
to be merely phenomenal by demonstrating
 that it is conditioned by the          
intellect1 he is emphasising what is    
least characteristic in ,kant's         
teaching4 ,schopenhauer's occasional    
identification of the intellect with the
 brain--the nearest approximation in his
 writings to what may be described as   
phenomenalism--itself suffices to show  
how entirely he is lacking in any firm  
grasp of ,critical principles4  #abid   
,as we have noted 7above1 p4 #bjd ff471 

the doctrine of the transcendental      
object was entirely eliminated from     
those main sections that were rewritten 
or substantially altered in the second  
edition1 namely1 the chapters on the    
,transcendental ,deduction1 on          
,phenomena and ,noumena1 and on the     
,paralogisms4 ,that it remained in the  
section on ,amphiboly1 in the ,second   
,analogy1 and in the ,antinomies is     
sufficiently explained by ,kant's       
unwillingness to make the very extensive
 alterations which such further         
rewriting would have involved4  #abie ,a
 #bea4  #abif ,not even1 as ,kant       
teaches in his doctrine of inner sense1 
in the inner world of apperception1 cf4 
above1 p4 #bie ff4  #abig ,kant claims  
in the ,dialectic that this process is  
also unavoidable1 constituting what he  
calls 8transcendental illusion40  #abih 
,a #bed-g  ,b #caj-ab4  #abii ,a #bee   
,b #caj-aa4  #acjj ,cf4 below1 p4 #dab  
ff4  #acja ,a #bef  ,b #cab4 ,for ,a    
#beg  ,b #cab on the empirical manner of

 distinguishing between the sensuous and
 the intelligible1 cf4 above1 pp4 #adc  
ff41 #adi ff4  #acjb ,cf4 above1 pp4    
#adc-d1 #adg1 #bad-ae1 #bia ff4  #acjc  
,kant here 7,a #bhf  ,b #cdb7 speaks of 
this concept of the noumenon as an      
object of non-sensuous intuition as     
being 8merely negative40 ,this is apt to
 confuse the reader1 as he usually comes
 to it after having read the passage    
introduced into the chapter on          
,phenomena and ,noumena in the second   
edition1 in which1 as above noted 7p4   
#dji71 ,kant describes this meaning of  
the term as positive1 in distinction    
from its more negative meaning as       
signifying a thing merely so far as it  
is not an object of our sense-intuition4
 ,cf4 below1 p4 #dac4  #acjd ,kant's    
meaning here is not quite clear4 ,he may
 mean either that the categories as such
 are inapplicable to things in          
themselves1 or that1 as this form of    
intuition is altogether different from  
our own1 it will not help in giving     

meaning to the categories4 ,what follows
 would seem to point to the former view4
  #acje ,a #bhf  ,b #cdc4  #acjf ,a     
#bhg-h  ,b #cdd4  #acjg ,a #bhh  ,b     
#cde4  #acjh ,a #bhh  ,b #cdd4 ,kant    
allowed the section within which this   
passage occurs to remain1 without the   
least modification1 in the second       
edition4  #acji ,benno ,erdmann's       
explanation 7,kriticismus1 p4 #aid7 of  
,kant's omission of all references to   
the transcendental object1 namely1      
because of their being likely to conduce
 to a mistaken idealistic interpretation
 of his teaching1 we cannot accept4 ,as 
already argued 7above1 p4 #bjd ff471    
they represent a view which he had quite
 definitely and consciously outgrown4   
#acaj ,b #cjf4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bij-a4  
#acaa ,b #cjh4 ,this1 it may be noted1  
is in keeping with the passages above   
quoted from the section on ,amphiboly4  
#acab ,a #bee  ,b #caa4  #acac ,cf4     
above1 p4 #djd ff41 especially pp4      
#dji-aj2 also above1 p4 #cca4  #acad ,in

 order to form an adequate judgment upon
 ,kant's justification for              
distinguishing between appearance and   
reality the reader must bear in mind    
7#a7 the results obtained in the        
,transcendental ,deduction 7above1 p4   
#bgj ff472 7#b7 the discussions         
developed in the ,paralogisms 7below1 p4
 #deg ff472 7#c7 the treatment of       
noumenal causality1 that is of freedom1 
in the ,third and ,fourth ,antinomies2  
7#d7 the many connected issues raised in
 the ,ideal 7below1 pp4 #ecd-g1 #eda-b71
 and in the ,appendix to the ,dialectic 
7below1 p4 #edc ff474 ,professor ,dawes 
,hicks is justified in maintaining in   
his book1 die ,begriffe ,phnomenon und  
,noumenon in ihrem ,verhltniss zu       
einander bei ,kant 7,leipzig1 #ahig1 p4 
#afg7--;a work which unfortunately is   
not accessible to the ,english          
reader--that 8the thing in itself is by 
no means a mere excrescence or addendum 
of the ,kantian system1 but forms a     
thoroughly necessary completion to the  

doctrine of appearances4 ,at every turn 
in ,kant's thought the doctrine of the  
noumenon1 in one form or another1 plays 
an essential part40 ,indeed it may be   
said that to state ,kant's reasons for  
asserting the existence of things in    
themselves1 is to expound his philosophy
 as a whole4 ,upon this question there  
appears in ,kant the same alternation of
 view as in regard to his other main    
tenets4 ,on ,kant's discussion of the   
applicability of the category of        
existence to things in themselves1 cf4  
above1 p4 #cbb ff4 ,also1 on ,kant's    
extension of the concepts possibility   
and actuality to noumena1 cf4 above1 pp4
 #cia ff41 #dja-c4  #acae #8,ideal' and 
#8,idealist' are printed with capitals1 
to mark the very special sense in which 
these terms are being used4 ,as already 
noted 7above1 p4 #c71 the same remark   
applies to the term #8,reason4'  #acaf  
,cf4 above1 pp4 xli-ii1 xliv1 liii-v1   
#cca4  #acag ,a #bfj ff4  ,b #caf ff4   
#acah ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ch-i1 #aai1      

#aca-c1 #cch-i1 #cid-djj4  #acai ,above1
 p4 xxx ff41 and below1 p4 #fja ff4     
#acbj ,cf4 ,a #bfg  ,b #cbc4  #acba ,cf4
 ,adickes' ,systematik1 pp4 #fj1 #gj1   
#gb1 and #aaa-ab4  #acbb ,a #bgj  ,b    
#cbf4  #acbc ,cf4 ,a #bfd  ,b #cai1 and 
,a #bff  ,b #cbb4  #acbd ,cf4 below1 pp4
 #efc-e1 #ehi ff41 #fja ff4  #acbe ,i   
have dwelt upon this at length in my    
,studies in the ,cartesian ,philosophy4 
#acbf ,a #bga  ,b #cbg4  #acbg ,the     
un-,critical character of ,kant's       
doctrine of the pure concept has already
 been noted 7above1 pp4 #dah-ai71 and   
need not be further discussed4  #acbh ,a
 #bgb  ,b #cbh4  #acbi ,a #bgc  ,b #cbi4
  #accj ,this is ,leibniz's mode of     
stating the absolutist view of thought  
7cf4 above1 p4 xxx ff47 to which1 as we 
shall find1 ,kant gives much more       
adequate and incomparably deeper        
formulation in the ,dialectic4 ,cf4 pp4 
#dcj1 #edg ff41 #eeh ff4  #acca         
,adickes1 ,k4 p4 #bgb n41 allows that   
the passage may be of earlier origin    

than the passages which precede and     
follow it4  #accb ,pp4 #bad-ae4  #accc  
,as such it is commented on above1 p4   
#daj ff4  #accd ,loc4 cit4  #acce ,a    
#bij  ,b #cdg4  #accf ,cf4 above1 p4    
#dji ff4  #accg ,kant's commentators    
have frequently misrepresented this     
aspect of his teaching4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 
#dih1 #ebj-a1 #ebg-cg1 #eda-b1 #edc ff41
 #eee1 #eeh-fa4  #acch ,a #dij  ,b #eah4
  #acci ,cf4 above1 pp4 #daf-ag4  #acdj 
,those readers who are not already well 
acquainted with the argument of the     
,dialectic may be recommended to pass at
 once to p4 #dda4 ,what here follows    
presupposes acquaintance with the nature
 and purposes of the main divisions of  
the ,dialectic4  #acda ,introd4 to      
,reflexionen1 ,bd4 ii4  #acdb ,w4 x4 p4 
#abc ff4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bai-bj4  #acdc
 ,cf4 ,dissertation1  #bg n4  #acdd ,op4
 cit4 ,cf4  #bd with  #bg4  #acde ,op4  
cit4  #bg4  #acdf ,cf4 ii4 #efg1 #ega1  
#ehd1 #ehe4  #acdg ,cf4 ii4 #abea and   
#ehf4  #acdh ,cf4 below1 pp4 #deh1 #dhh 

ff4  #acdi ,in ,reflexionen ii4 #egc1   
#egf1 and #ehb we find ,kant in the very
 act of so doing4 ,compositio1          
co-ordinatio1 and commercium are treated
 as synonymous terms4  #acej ,the       
problem of freedom is first met with in 
,kant's ,lectures on ,metaphysics       
7,plitz1 edition of #ahba1 pp4 #hi1     
#ccj71 but is not there given as an     
antinomy1 and is treated as falling     
within the field of theology4 ,in       
,reflexion ii4 #ehe1 also1 it is equated
 in terms of the category of ground and 
consequence1 with the concept of ,divine
 ,existence1 the 8absolute or primum    
contingens 7libertas740 ,upon           
elimination of theology1 and therefore  
of the cosmological argument1 from the  
sphere of antinomy1 ,kant raised freedom
 to the rank of an independent problem4 
#acea ,a #dfb  ,b #dij4  #aceb ,cf4     
below1 pp4 #dih-i1 #ega ff4  #acec ,cf4 
below1 p4 #ded1 with references in n4   
#a4  #aced ,a #ejg  ,b #ece4 ,cf4 below1
 pp4 #dha1 #ede-f4  #acee ,cf4 ii4 #ic1 

#id1 #ie1 #abcc1 #abdg4  #acef ,this is 
the view represented in ,reflexionen ii4
 #id1 #ie4  #aceg ,cf4 ,reflexionen ii4 
#abd4  #aceh ,cf4 ,reflexionen ii4 #ie4 
#acei ,cf4 below1 p4 #deg4  #acfj ,cf4  
ii4 #hf ff4  #acfa ,cf4 ,reflexionen ii4
 #aad-ae4  #acfb ,b #cid n4 ,immortality
 is here taken as representing the ,idea
 of the soul as unconditioned substance4
  #acfc ,cf4 below1 p4 #ded1 with       
further references in n4 #a4  #acfd     
,systematik1 pp4 #aae-af4  #acfe ,above1
 p4 #ccd4  #acff ,this conclusion is    
supported by the evidence of the        
,reflexionen3 they contain not a single 
reference to schematism4  #acfg ,a #bic 
,b #cdi4  #acfh ,pp4 #agc-d4  #acfi ,cf4
 ,a #fa  ,b #he4  #acgj ,adickes1       
,systematik1 p4 #gg ff4  #acga ,cf4     
,kant's caveat in ,a #bic  ,b #cdi      
against identifying dialectic with the  
doctrine of probable reasoning4  #acgb  
,pp4 #dbg-h4  #acgc ,a #bih  ,b #cee4   
#acgd ,cf4 above1 p4 #ccb4  #acge       
,reicke1 i4 p4 #aje4  #acgf ,op4 cit4 i4

 pp4 #aji-aj4  #acgg ,a #cja-b  ,b #ceh4
  #acgh ,a #cjc  ,b #cei4  #acgi ,a #cje
  ,b #cfb4  #achj ,the wording of the   
concluding sentence of the third        
paragraph 7,a #cjg  ,b #cfc-d7 is so    
condensed as to be misleading4 8,it viz4
 the principle of causality makes the   
unity of experience possible1 and       
borrows nothing from the ,reason4 ,the  
latter1 if it were not for this its     
indirect reference through mediation of 
the understanding to possible           
experience1 could never of itself1 from 
mere concepts1 have imposed a synthetic 
unity of that kind40  #acha ,a #caj  ,b 
#cff4  #achb ,schein des ,schliessens   
would seem to be here used in that      
sense4  #achc ,cf4 above1 p4 #dbd4      
#achd ,cf4 also ,a #ffi  ,b #fig2 ,a    
#fhj  ,b #gji4  #ache ,cf4 ,vaihinger1  
8,kant--ein ,metaphysiker80 in          
,philosophische ,abhandlungen 7,sigwart 
,gedenkschrift71 p4 #add4  #achf ,a #cab
  ,b #cfh4  #achg ,a #cac  ,b #cgj4     
#achh ,a #caf-ag  ,b #cgc4 ,the context 

of this passage is a defence of ,plato's
 ,republic against the charge that it is
 ,utopian1 because unrealisable4  #achi 
,a #cag-ah  ,b #cgd-e4  #acij           
,reflexionen ii4 #abdj4 ,cf4            
,schopenhauer3 ,world as ,will and ,idea
 7,werke1 ii4 p4 #bgg3 ,eng4 trans4 i4  
p4 #cjc73 8,the ,idea is the unity that 
falls into multiplicity on account of   
the temporal and spatial form of our    
intuitive apprehension2 the concept1 on 
the contrary1 is the unity reconstructed
 out of multiplicity by the abstraction 
of our reason2 the latter may be defined
 as unitas post rem1 the former as      
unitas ante rem40  #acia ,lectures on   
,metaphysics 7,plitz1 #ahba71 p4 #gi4   
#acib ,reflexionen ii4 #abdc4  #acic    
,lectures on ,metaphysics1 pp4 #cjh-i4  
#acid ,reflexionen ii4 #abdd4  #acie    
,reflexionen ii4 #abed4  #acif          
,reflexionen ii4 #abeh4  #acig          
,reflexionen ii4 #abei4  #acih          
,reflexionen ii4 #abfj4  #acii ,a #cbj  
,b #cgf-g4  #adjj ,a #cba  ,b #cgg4     

#adja ,a #cbc-d  ,b #chj-a4 ,cf4 below1 
pp4 #dhj1 #ebi1 #eei-fj4  #adjb         
,regarding the progressive series from  
the conditioned to its consequences1 cf4
 ,a #ccf-g  ,b #cic-d1 ,a #daj-aa  ,b   
#dcg-h1 ,a #eaa  ,b #eci4  #adjc ,a #ccc
  ,b #cij4  #adjd ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dah1 
#dcf1 #dci-dj2 below1 pp4 #dgc-g1       
#ebj-a1 #ecg1 #edc ff41 #ege4  #adje    
,cf4 ,a #cce4  #adjf ,cf4 ,a #ccg-h  ,b 
#cid-f and note appended to ,b #cid4    
#adjg ,a #ccf  ,b #cic4  #adjh ,cf4 ,a  
#fga  ,b #fii2 above1 pp4 #dbf1 #dcj1   
#dcf2 below1 pp4 #eeb-d1 #egb ff4  #adji
 ,on the difference between the         
ascending and the descending series1 cf4
 ,a #cca-b  ,b #cch and ,a #daj-aa  ,b  
#dcg-h4  #adaj ,the questions raised in 
the two introductory paragraphs 7,a     
#ccf-dj  ,b #cif-h7 as to the content of
 the ,ideas1 their problematic          
character1 and their possibility as     
concepts1 are first adequately discussed
 in later chapters4 ,the three new terms
 here introduced1 ,paralogism1          

,antinomy1 and ,ideal1 can also best be 
commented upon in their own special     
context4  #adaa ,a #cda  ,b #cii4  #adab
 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #dff1 #dgj4  #adac ,a  
#cdg4  #adad ,a #cde-f  ,b #djc-d4      
#adae ,cf4 ,a #ced-e4  #adaf ,cf4 above1
 p4 #dcg4  #adag ,a #cdh4  #adah ,a     
#cea4  #adai ,a #cfc-d4  #adbj ,a #cea4 
#adba ,k4 #fhh n4  #adbb ,a similar     
criticism holds true of the conception  
of identity employed in the third       
,paralogism1 and arbitrarily equated    
with the categories of quantity4  #adbc 
,cf4 ,a #cee-f4  #adbd ,it is very      
forcibly developed in ,mendelssohn's    
8,phdon0 7#agfg7 7,gesammelte           
,schriften1 #ahdc1 ii4 p4 #aea ff474    
,this is a work with which ,kant was    
familiar4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #dgj4  #adbe   
,this is the argument which ,william    
,james has expounded in his             
characteristically picturesque style4   
8,take a sentence of a dozen words1 and 
take twelve men and tell to each one    
word4 ,then stand the men in a row or   

jam them in a bunch1 and let each think 
of his word as intently as he will2     
nowhere will there be a consciousness of
 the whole sentence0 7,principles of    
,psychology1 i4 p4 #afj74  #adbf ,a #cfc
 n4 ,cf4 below1 pp4 #dfa-b4  #adbg ,a   
#cef4 ,cf4 ,adickes1 ,k4 p4 #fhh n4     
#adbh ,the argument is here in harmony  
with ,kant's definition of              
transcendental illusion4  #adbi ,a #ceh4
  #adcj ,a #cfa4  #adca ,a #cfd4  #adcb 
,william ,james's psychological         
description of self-consciousness is    
simply an extension of this             
illustration4 ,cf4 ,principles of       
,psychology1 i4 p4 #cci2 quoted above1  
p4 #bgh n4  #adcc ,a #cfc n4  #adcd ,a  
#cfb-c and ,a #cfd4 ,we must also1      
however1 bear in mind that in this      
chapter ,kant occasionally argues in ad 
hominem fashion from the point of view  
of the position criticised4  #adce ,cf4 
,a #cec-d4  #adcf ,cf4 ,adickes1 ,k4 p4 
#fie n4  #adcg ,a #cff4  #adch ,p4 #cja 
ff4  #adci ,the note to ,a #cdd has     

evidently got displaced2 it must1 as    
,adickes points out1 belong to ,a #djd4 
#addj ,cf4 above1 pp4 #cbj1 #dee4  #adda
 ,a #cga-b4  #addb ,a #chj-a4  #addc    
,cf4 ,a #chc4  #addd ,a #chc4  #adde ,a 
#chc4  #addf ,a #cha4  #addg ,the first 
four paragraphs are probably a later    
intercalation 7,adickes1 ,k4 p4 #gjh    
n471 since they connect both with the   
introductory sections of the ,dialectic 
and with the ,introduction to the       
,critique4 ,also1 the opening words of  
the fifth paragraph seem to refer us not
 to anything antecedent in this section1
 but directly to the concluding passages
 of the fourth ,paralogism4  #addh ,a   
#che4  #addi ,a #cic4  #adej ,a #chg4   
#adea ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bae-af4  #adeb ,a
 #cic-d4  #adec ,a #cid4  #aded ,pp4    
#cbf-g4  #adee ,pp4 #cbg-h4  #adef ,a   
#djb4 ,cf4 ,b #djg4  #adeg ,k4 p4 #gag  
n4  #adeh ,cf4 below1 p4 #dgj4  #adei ,b
 #djf ff4  #adfj ,kriticismus1 p4 #bbg1 
cf4 p4 #ajf ff4  #adfa ,a4 ,h4 ,ulrichs1
 ,institutiones logicae et metaphysicae 

7#aghe74  #adfb ,in his review of       
,kant's ,prolegomena in the ,allgemeine 
,deutsche ,bibliothek 7#aghd74  #adfc   
,obviously by categories ,kant here     
really means schemata4 ,cf4 ,a #cdh1    
where ,kant states that 8pure categories
 444 have in themselves no objective    
meaning4444 ,apart from intuition they  
are merely functions of a judgment1     
without content40  #adfd ,above1 pp4    
#djd ff41 #dac ff4  #adfe ,b #djh4      
#adff ,critical ,philosophy1 ii4 p4 #cd4
 ,so also in ,watson's ,kant ,explained1
 p4 #bdd4  #adfg ,caird 7op4 cit4 p4    
#ce7 takes account of ,kant's conception
 of a possible intuitive understanding1 
but illegitimately assumes that by it he
 must mean a creative understanding4    
#adfh ,cf4 above1 p4 #bie ff4  #adfi    
,cf4 ,b #dae n4 ,in ,b xxxix4 n4 7at the
 end71 quoted above pp4 #cji-aj1 ,kant  
is careful to point out that the        
representation of something permanent is
 by no means identical with permanent   
representation4  #adgj ,p4 #dfc4  #adga 

,namely1 as ,refutation of ,idealism1 ,b
 #bgd ff4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #cjh ff4  #adgb
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #deg1 #dfb-c4  #adgc ,a
 #djb4  #adgd ,cf4 above1 p4 #dff4      
#adge ,b #dac-ae4  #adgf ,gesammelte    
,schriften1 ii4 p4 #aea ff4  #adgg ,op4 
cit4 p4 #aba ff4  #adgh ,op4 cit4 pp4   
#abh ff41 #afh4  #adgi ,op4 cit4 p4 #abe
 ff4  #adhj ,regarding the value of the 
hypotheses propounded by ,kant in his   
note to ,b #dae1 cf4 below1 p4 #edc ff4 
#adha ,p4 #cba ff4  #adhb ,cf4 above1 p4
 #dfg4  #adhc ,pp4 #dgc-g4  #adhd       
,kriticismus1 p4 #bbf4  #adhe ,b #dbd4  
#adhf ,b #dba4  #adhg ,b #dbd-e4  #adhh 
,b #dbe-f4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 lvi-lxi2     
below1 p4 #egj ff4  #adhi ,the only     
approach to such a reference is in ,b   
#dbf-g1 noted above1 p4 #dga4  #adij ,a 
#fgb  ,b #gjj4 ,cf4 below1 p4 #eed4     
#adia ,a #fdi  ,b #fgg-h4 ,tetens in his
 ,philosophische ,versuche 7#aggg7 had  
devoted an entire chapter to this       
question4 ,his term ,grundkraft is that 
which ,kant here employs4 ,cf4          

,philosophische ,versuche1 ,bd4 i41     
,elfter ,versuch3 8,concerning the      
fundamental power of the human soul40   
,incidentally ,tetens discusses         
,rousseau's suggestion that this        
fundamental power consists in man's     
capacity for perfecting himself4 ,cf4   
,kant's ,lectures on ,metaphysics       
7,plitz1 #ahba1 p4 #aib ff474  #adib ,a 
#fhb-d  ,b #gaj-ab4 ,a #gga-b  ,b #gii  
in the ,methodology is similarly        
ambiguous1 though tending to the        
spiritualist mode of formulation4  #adic
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #bge-f1 #bgi ff41 #cab 
ff41 #chd-e1 #dfd-e4  #adid ,cf4 end of 
,b xxxix4 n41 quoted above1 pp4 #cji-aj4
  #adie ,a #dje  ,b #dcb4  #adif ,a #djh
  ,b #dce4  #adig ,cf4 ,a #dad  ,b #dda1
 where it is stated that there is no    
transcendental ,idea of the substantial4
  #adih ,cf4 above1 p4 #dcd ff4  #adii  
,a #dai  ,b #ddg4  #aejj ,a #dbj  ,b    
#ddg4  #aeja ,a very curious sentence in
 ,kant's letter to ,schulze 7,w4 x4 pp4 
#cdd-e1 quoted above1 p4 #aii7 seems to 

be traceable to this source4  #aejb ,cf4
 below1 pp4 #ebi1 #eei-fj1 and above1   
pp4 #aii-bjj1 #dcc-d1 #dea4 ,for ,a     
#daj-aa  ,b #dci-dj on the difference   
between the ascending and descending    
series1 cf4 ,a #cca-b  ,b #chg-h and ,a 
#ccf-g  ,b #cic-d4  #aejc ,a #dbj  ,b   
#ddh4  #aejd ,cf4 per contra ,a #dhf  ,b
 #ead4  #aeje ,the limitation of ,kant's
 discussion to space1 time1 and         
causality is1 of course1 due to his     
acceptance of the current view that the 
concepts of infinity and continuity are 
derived from our intuitions of space and
 time4 ,as we have already noted in     
discussing his intuitional theory of    
mathematical reasoning 7above1 pp4      
#dj-a1 #aag ff41 #abh ff471 he fails to 
extend to mathematical concepts his own 
8transcendental0 view of the categories1
 namely1 as conditioning the possibility
 of intuitional experience4 ,such       
concepts as order1 plurality1 whole and 
part1 continuity1 infinity1 are prior to
 time and space in the logical order of 

thought2 and to be adequately treated   
must be considered in their widest      
application4  #aejf ,cf4 ,a #ejg  ,b    
#ece1 and above1 p4 #dca ff42 below1 pp4
 #eja1 #ede-f4  #aejg ,cf4 ,kant's      
posthumously published ,transition from 
the ,metaphysical ,first ,principles of 
,natural ,science to ,physics           
7,altpreussische ,monatsschrift1 #ahhb71
 pp4 #bgi-hj3 8,if we take in regard to 
space1 not its definition1 but only an a
 priori proposition1 e4g4 that space is 
a whole which must be thought only as   
part of a still greater whole1 it is    
clear 444 that it is an irrational      
magnitude1 measurable indeed1 but in its
 comparison with unity transcending all 
number40 8,if space is something        
objectively existent1 it is a magnitude 
which can exist only as part of another 
given magnitude40  #aejh ,cf4           
,schopenhauer1 ,world as ,will and ,idea
 7,werke1 ,frauenstdt1 ii4 pp4 #ehe-f2  
,eng4 trans1 ii4 pp4 #ajg-h74 8,i find  
and assert that the whole antinomy is a 

mere delusion1 a sham fight4 ,only the  
assertions of the antitheses really rest
 upon the forms of our faculty of       
knowledge1 i4e4 if we express it        
objectively1 on the necessary1 a priori 
certain1 most universal laws of nature4 
,their proofs alone are t herefore drawn
 from objective grounds4 ,on the other  
hand1 the assertions and proofs of the  
theses have no other than a subjective  
ground1 rest solely on the weakness of  
the reasoning individual2 for his       
imagination becomes tired with an       
endless regression1 and therefore he    
puts an end to it by arbitrary          
assumptions1 which he tries to smooth   
over as well as he can2 and his         
judgment1 moreover1 is in this case     
paralysed by early and deeply imprinted 
prejudices4 ,on this account the proof  
of the thesis in all the four conflicts 
is throughout a mere sophism1 while that
 of the antithesis is a necessary       
inference of the reason from the laws of
 the world as idea known to us a priori4

 ,it is1 moreover1 only with great pains
 and skill that ,kant is able to sustain
 the thesis1 and make it appear to      
attack its opponent1 which is endowed   
with native power4444 ,i shall show that
 the proofs which ,kant adduces of the  
individual theses are sophisms1 while   
those of the antitheses are quite fairly
 and correctly drawn from objective     
grounds40  #aeji ,cf4 ,f4 ,erhardt's    
,kritik der ,kantischen ,antinomienlehre
 7#ahhh71 a brief but excellent analysis
 of this section of the ,critique4      
#aeaj  #a n4  #aeaa ,cf4 ,a #dca-b  ,b  
#dfj-a3 8444the concept of the infinite 
is not the concept of a maximum2 by it  
we think only its relation to any       
assignable unit1 in respect to which it 
is greater than all number40  #aeab ,cf4
 ,kant's statement in the ,observation  
to this antithesis1 ,a #dca-c  ,b       
#dei-fa4  #aeac ,kant regarded the point
 as a limit1 i4e4 as a boundary         
7,dissertation1  #ad1 #d2  #ae1 ,c3     
8,the simple in space is not a part but 

a limit02 ,a #afi-gj  ,b #baa72 whereas 
certain modern mathematicians take the  
point as one of the undefined elements4 
,when the point is regarded in this     
latter manner1 space may perhaps be     
satisfactorily defined as a set of      
points4 ,in arguing for the antithesis1 
and in the passages just cited1 ,kant   
also assumes that1 in the case of space1
 the properties of the class are        
determined by the properties of its     
elements4 ,this questionable assumption 
is involved in his assertion that space 
can consist only of spaces4  #aead ,a   
#dch  ,b #dff4  #aeae ,a #dci-da  ,b    
#dfg-i4  #aeaf ,a #dda  ,b #dfi4  #aeag 
,developed in the ,dissertation 7#aggj74
  #aeah ,zweites ,hauptstck1 ,lehrsatz  
#d1 ,anmerkung #a4 ,cf4 also ,anmerkung 
#b4  #aeai ,principles of ,mathematics1 
i4 p4 #dfj4  #aebj ,cf4 above1 p4 #dha  
n4 #b4  #aeba ,p4 #dhi n4  #aebb ,cf4   
,schopenhauer1 ,world as ,will and ,idea
 7,werke1 ,frauenstdt1 ii4 p4 #eij2     
,eng4 trans4 ii4 pp4 #aaa-ab74 8,the    

argument for the third thesis is a very 
fine sophism1 and is really ,kant's     
pretended principle of pure reason      
itself entirely unadulterated and       
unchanged4 ,it tries to prove the       
finiteness of the series of causes by   
saying that1 in order to be sufficient1 
a cause must contain the complete sum of
 the conditions from which the          
succeeding state1 the effect1 proceeds4 
,for the completeness of the            
determinations present together in the  
state which is the cause1 the argument  
now substitutes the completeness of the 
series of causes by which that state    
itself was brought to actuality2 and    
because completeness presupposes the    
condition of being rounded off or closed
 in1 and this again presupposes         
finiteness1 the argument infers from    
this a first cause1 closing the series  
and therefore unconditioned4 ,but the   
juggling is obvious4 ,in order to       
conceive the state ,a as the sufficient 
cause of the state ,b1 ,i assume that it

 contains the sum of the necessary      
determinations from the coexistence of  
which the state ,b inevitably follows4  
,now by this my demand upon it as a     
sufficient cause is entirely satisfied1 
and has no direct connection with the   
question how the state ,a itself came to
 be2 this rather belongs to an entirely 
different consideration1 in which ,i    
regard the said state ,a no more as     
cause1 but as itself an effect2 in which
 case another state again must be       
related to it1 just as it was related to
 ,b4 ,the assumption of the finiteness  
of the series of causes and effects1 and
 accordingly of a first beginning1      
appears nowhere in this as necessary1   
any more than the presentness of the    
present moment requires us to assume a  
beginning of time itself40  #aebc ,op4  
cit4 p4 #bd4  #aebd ,for comment upon   
,kant's defence of his procedure cf4    
below1 p4 #dif4  #aebe ,cf4 ,kant's     
,observation on the thesis4  #aebf ,a   
#dea  ,b #dgi4  #aebg ,cf4 also ,a #dea 

,b #dgi4  #aebh ,cf4 ,schopenhauer1 op4 
cit4 p4 #eia2 ,eng4 trans4 p4 #aac4     
8,the fourth conflict is 444 really     
tautological with the third2 and the    
proof of the thesis is also essentially 
the same as that of the preceding one4  
,kant's assertion that every conditioned
 presupposes a complete series of       
conditions1 and therefore a series which
 ends with an unconditioned1 is a       
petitio principii which must simply be  
denied4 ,everything conditioned         
presupposes nothing but its condition2  
that this is again conditioned raises a 
new consideration which is not directly 
contained in the first40  #aebi ,above1 
p4 #did4  #aecj ,a #dei  ,b #dhg4  #aeca
 ,jean ,jacques ,dortous de ,mairan     
7#afgh-agga71 physicist and             
mathematician4 ,in #agdj he succeeded   
,fontenelle as perpetual ,secretary of  
the ,french ,academy of ,sciences4      
#aecb ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dce1 #die n4 #d4 
#aecc ,a #ddh-ej  ,b #dgf-h4  #aecd ,cf4
 above1 p4 #dbg ff42 below1 pp4 #ebj-a1 

#ebg-cg1 #eda ff4  #aece ,a #dfb  ,b    
#dij4  #aecf ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dcd ff41  
#dgi4  #aecg ,a #dgf  ,b #ejd4  #aech ,a
 #dhd  ,b #eab4  #aeci ,ibid4  #aedj ,a 
#dhc  ,b #eaa4  #aeda ,a #dhe  ,b #eac4 
#aedb ,cf4 above1 p4 #dha2 below1 pp4   
#ede-f4  #aedc ,kant is here playing on 
the double meaning of the ,german       
8sinnleeres0--8empty of sense0 and      
8non-sense40  #aedd ,a #dhi  ,b #eag4   
#aede ,a #dij  ,b #eah4  #aedf ,above1  
p4 #dbf ff4  #aedg ,a #dij  ,b #eah4    
#aedh ,cf4 above p4 #bjd ff4  #aedi ,a  
#did  ,b #ebb-c4  #aeej ,a #die  ,b     
#ebc4  #aeea ,cf4 ,a #did  ,b #ebb-c3   
8444we can say of the transcendental    
object that it is given in itself prior 
to all experience40  #aeeb ,a #dif  ,b  
#ebd4  #aeec ,a #dia  ,b #eai4  #aeed   
,pp4 #cjf-g4  #aeee ,a #dig  ,b #ebe4   
#aeef ,a #eja-b  ,b #ebi-cj4  #aeeg ,a  
#ejf  ,b #ecd4  #aeeh ,cf4 end of       
passage3 8,there can be no lack of      
conditions that are given through this  
regress40  #aeei ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ejg-h4

  #aefj ,cf4 below1 pp4 #ejg-i4  #aefa  
,k4 p4 #dad n4 ,the two last paragraphs 
of ,section ,,vii41 which correct its   
argument1 that of the ,transcendental   
,aesthetic1 are probably later          
additions4  #aefb ,a #ejh  ,b #ecf4     
#aefc ,loc4 cit4  #aefd ,as to the      
distinction between the ascending and   
the descending series1 cf4 above1 pp4   
#dec n41 #dhd4  #aefe ,cf4 ,a #ebb  ,b  
#edi-ej4  #aeff ,a #ead  ,b #edb4  #aefg
 ,above1 p4 #ejf4  #aefh ,cf4 ,a #ebb   
,b #eej4  #aefi ,a #eae  ,b #edc4  #aegj
 ,a #eai-bj  ,b #edg-h4  #aega ,when    
,kant adds 7,a #eba  ,b #edi71 8and     
therefore absolutely also10 he          
inconsistently reverts to the position  
ambiguously suggested in ,a #dii  ,b    
#ebg4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #ejf4  #aegb ,a    
#ebc-f  ,b #eea-d4  #aegc ,the assertion
 of infinite divisibility is not        
applicable1 ,kant states 7,a #ebf-g  ,b 
#eed-e71 to bodies as organised1 but    
only to bodies as mere occupants of     
space4 ,organisation involves           

distinction of parts1 and therefore     
discreteness4 ,how far organisation can 
go in organised bodies1 experience alone
 can show us4  #aegd ,p4 #ejh4  #aege ,a
 #ebh  ,b #eef4  #aegf ,cf4 above1 pp4  
#cde-g4  #aegg ,a #ece-f  ,b #efc-d4    
#aegh ,cf4 ,a #ecg  ,b #efd-e2 also ,a  
#edf  ,b #egd-e1 in which ,kant asserts 
that man knows himself not only through 
the senses but 8also through pure       
apperception1 and indeed in actions and 
inner determinations which cannot be    
reckoned as impressions of the senses40 
,such statements would seem to show     
that1 at the time of writing1 ,kant had 
not yet developed his doctrine of inner 
sense4  #aegi ,a #ecb  ,b #efj4  #aehj  
,a #ecf-g  ,b #efd-e4  #aeha ,a #ecc  ,b
 #efa4  #aehb ,a #ecf  ,b #efd4  #aehc  
,a #ech  ,b #eff4  #aehd ,cf4 ,kant's   
,uebergang von der metaph4 ,anfangsgrnde
 der ,naturwissenschaft zur ,physik     
7,altpreussische ,monatsschrift 7#ahhb71
 pp4 #bgb-c74  #aehe ,a #edi  ,b #egg4  
,italics not in ,kant4  #aehf ,in ,a    

#edj  ,b #efh a different and less      
satisfactory view finds expression4     
#aehg ,a #edb  ,b #egj4  #aehh ,a #edd  
,b #egb4  #aehi ,a #edf-g  ,b #egd-e4   
#aeij ,a #edh  ,b #egf4  #aeia ,a #eeb  
,b #ehj4  #aeib ,a #eec  ,b #eha4  #aeic
 ,a #eeg  ,b #ehe4  #aeid ,a #eec-d  ,b 
#eha-b4  #aeie ,cf4 ,a #ecg-da  ,b      
#efe-i and ,a #edd  ,b #egb4  #aeif ,cf4
 ,a #eff  ,b #eid4  #aeig ,cf4 above1 p4
 #bjd ff4  #aeih ,a #eei  ,b #ehg4      
#aeii ,a #efa  ,b #ehi4  #afjj ,a #efe  
,b #eic4  #afja ,a #efg  ,b #eic4  #afjb
 ,for ,kant's comparison of his ,ideas  
with those of ,plato1 cf4 above1 pp4    
#ddg-i4  #afjc  #hjc ff4 in #eth edition
 7,halle1 #agfc74  #afjd ,a #egh  ,b    
#fjf4  #afje ,a #ehj  ,b #fjh4  #afjf   
,cf4 above1 p4 #dah ff4  #afjg ,a #bgb-d
  ,b #cbh-cj4  #afjh ,cf4 ,kant's       
distinction between distributive and    
collective unity in ,a #ehb-c  ,b #faj  
with ,a #fdd  ,b #fgb4  #afji ,a #ehc   
,b #faa4  #afaj ,a #fjc  ,b #fca4  #afaa
 ,a #fjc-d  ,b #fca-b4  #afab ,cf4      

below1 pp4 #ecc1 #ecf4  #afac ,a #eib   
,b #fbj4  #afad ,a #eic  ,b #fba4  #afae
 ,cf4 ,a #d-e  ,b #h-i2 ,a #gce-h  ,b   
#gfc-f4  #afaf ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dbg-h1  
and references there given4  #afag ,cf4 
above1 p4 #dbd4  #afah ,cf4 above1 p4   
#cib ff4  #afai ,k4 p4 #dge n4  #afbj ,a
 #fjc  ,b #fca4  #afba ,cf4 above1 p4   
#ebg4 ,the concluding paragraphs ,a     
#fac-ad  ,b #fda-b can best be treated  
later in another connection4 ,cf4 below1
 p4 #ecf4  #afbb ,a #fad  ,b #fdb4      
#afbc ,a #fac  ,b #fda4  #afbd ,a #faf  
,b #fdd4  #afbe ,a #fai-bj  ,b #fdg-h4  
#afbf ,cf4 below1 pp4 #eda-b1 #eeb ff4  
#afbg ,a #fbj  ,b #fdh4  #afbh ,a #fbd  
,b #feb4  #afbi ,universal ,natural     
,history and ,theory of the ,heavens    
7#agee74  #afcj ,critique of ,judgment1 
#fd1 #fe4  #afca ,hamann completed his  
translation of ,hume's ,dialogues on    
,natural ,religion on ,august #g1 #aghj 
7cf4 ,hamann's ,werke1 vi4 #aed ff473   
and ,kant1 notwithstanding his being    
occupied in finishing the ,critique1    

read through the manuscript4 ,it is     
highly likely that this first perusal of
 ,hume's ,dialogues not only confirmed  
,kant in his negative attitude towards  
natural theology1 but also enabled him  
to define more clearly than he otherwise
 would have done1 the negative          
consequences of his own ,critical       
principles4 ,the chapter on the ,ideal1 
as we have already observed 7above1 pp4 
#dcd-e1 #ebg-i1 #eca71 was probably one 
of the last parts of the ,critique to be
 brought into final form4 ,it does not  
seem possible1 however1 to establish in 
any specific manner the exact influence 
which ,hume's ,dialogues may thus have  
exercised upon the argument of this     
portion of the ,critique4 ,when         
,schreiter's translation of the         
,dialogues appeared in #agha1 ,hamann1  
not unwilling to escape the notoriety of
 seeming to father so sceptical a work1 
withdrew his own translation4  #afcb    
,this is the main point of ,hume's      
argument in ,section ,,xi4 of his       

,enquiry concerning the ,human          
,understanding4  #afcc ,a #fca  ,b #fei4
  #afcd ,a #fda  ,b #ffi4  #afce ,cf4   
above1 p4 #djg ff41 and below1 p4 #eeb  
ff4  #afcf ,cf4 above1 p4 #ded1 with    
further references in n4 #a4  #afcg ,cf4
 above1 pp4 #ecf-g4  #afch ,a #fdb  ,b  
#fgj4  #afci ,a #gfi-hb  ,b #gig-haj4   
#afdj ,a xiv1 ,b xxiii-iv1 and          
,reflexionen ii4 #adea3 8,in metaphysics
 there can be no such thing as          
uncertainty40 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aj1 #ce4 
#afda ,a #ggj-a  ,b #gih-i4  #afdb ,a   
#ggb  ,b #hjj4  #afdc ,a #gge  ,b #hjc4 
#afdd ,cf4 ,a #gha-b  ,b #hji-aj4  #afde
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dha1 #eja4  #afdf ,a  
#ggg-h  ,b #hje-f4  #afdg ,a #ghb  ,b   
#haj4  #afdh ,cf4 above1 pp4 #ig-h1     
#ajb1 #cij-a1 #dbf ff41 #ddg ff4  #afdi 
,a #fea  ,b #fgi4  #afej ,loc4 cit4     
#afea ,a #fec  ,b #fha4  #afeb          
,dissertation1  #cj4  #afec ,the        
extremely un-,critical reason which     
,kant here 7,a #fdg  ,b #fge7 gives for 
its necessarily remaining hypothetical  

is the 8impossibility of knowing all    
possible consequences40 ,this use of the
 term hypothetical is also confusing in 
view of ,kant's criticism of the        
hypothetical employment of ,reason in ,a
 #gfi ff4  ,b #gig ff4  #afed ,a #fdg   
,b #fge4  #afee ,loc4 cit4 and ,a #fdi  
,b #fgg4  #afef ,a #fdh  ,b #fgf4  #afeg
 ,a #feb  ,b #fhj4  #afeh ,a #ffj-a  ,b 
#fhh-i4  #afei ,a #fef  ,b #fhd4  #affj 
,a #fef  ,b #fhd4  #affa ,a #feh  ,b    
#fhf4  #affb ,a #ffj  ,b #fhh4  #affc   
,the opening paragraphs of the section1 
,a #fdb-e  ,b #fgj-c1 may be of the same
 date as the concluding paragraphs4     
#affd ,cf4 per contra ,a #ffi-gj  ,b    
#fig-h4  #affe ,a #fff  ,b #fid4  #afff 
,a #ffi  ,b #fig4  #affg ,cf4 above1 pp4
 #ddf-g4  #affh ,cf4 ,a #fha  ,b #gji4  
#affi ,cf4 per contra ,a #ffc-d  ,b     
#fia-b4  #afgj ,a #fgj  ,b #fih4  #afga 
,i may here guard against               
misunderstanding4 ,though the ,ideas of 
,reason condition the experience which  
they regulate1 this must not be taken as

 nullifying ,kant's fundamental         
distinction between the regulative and  
the constitutive4 ,even when he is      
developing his less sceptical view1 he  
adopts1 in metaphysics as in ethics1 a  
position which is radically distinct    
from that of ,hegel4 ,though the moral  
ideal represents reality of the highest 
order1 it transcends all possible       
realisation of itself in human life4    
,though it conditions all our morality1 
it at the same time condemns it4 ,the   
,christian virtue of humility defines   
the only attitude proper to the human   
soul4 ,in an exactly similar manner1 the
 fact that the ,ideas of ,reason have to
 be regarded as conditioning the        
possibility of sense-experience need not
 prevent us from also recognising that  
they likewise make possible our         
consciousness of its limitations4  #afgb
 ,cf4 above1 pp4 #dgc-g4  #afgc ,a #fgi 
,b #gjg4  #afgd ,a #fgh  ,b #gjf4  #afge
 ,a #fgd  ,b #gjb4 ,cf4 ,a #fgh-i  ,b   
#gjf-g4  #afgf ,a #fhj  ,b #gjh4  #afgg 

,as above noted 7pp4 #dii ff471 when we 
find ,kant thus insisting upon the      
completely soluble character of all     
problems of pure ,reason1 the sceptical1
 subjectivist tendency is dominant4     
#afgh ,a #ffi  ,b #fig4  #afgi ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #ecf-g1 #eda-b4  #afhj ,a    
#fhf-g  ,b #gad-ae4  #afha ,a #fic  ,b  
#gba4  #afhb ,a #fii-gjj  ,b #gbg-h4    
#afhc ,a #gja  ,b #gbi4  #afhd ,nearly  
all the important points raised in the  
,methodology1 and several of its chief  
sections1 ,i have commented upon in     
their connection with the earlier parts 
of the ,critique4 ,also1 the            
,methodology is extremely diffuse4 ,for 
these reasons ,i have found it advisable
 to give such additional comment as     
seems necessary in the form of this     
,appendix4  #afhe ,on ,kant's use of the
 terms #8discipline' and #8canon1' cf4  
above1 pp4 #ga-b1 #agj1 #agd1 #dch4     
#afhf ,cf4 above1 p4 #dch4  #afhg ,a    
#d-e  ,b #h-i4  #afhh ,untersuchung3    
,zweite ,betrachtung1 ,w4 ii4 p4 #bhc4  

#afhi ,kant here disavows the position  
of the ,untersuchung in which 7,erste   
,betrachtung1  #d7 he had asserted that 
mathematics deals with quantity and     
philosophy with qualities4  #afij ,for  
comment upon this distinction1 cf4      
above1 pp4 #aca-c1 #cch-i4  #afia       
,untersuchung3 ,erste ,betrachtung1  #b4
  #afib ,a #gbh  ,b #gef4  #afic        
,untersuchung3 ,zweite ,betrachtung1 ,w4
 ii4 p4 #bhc4  #afid ,untersuchung3     
,erste ,betrachtung1  #a1 ,w4 ii4 p4    
#bgf3 8,mathematics proceeds to all its 
definitions by a synthetic procedure1   
philosophy by an analytic procedure40   
#afie ,in the ,untersuchung ,kant's     
statements are more cautious1 and also  
more adequate4 ,cf4 ,erste ,betrachtung1
  #c1 ,w4 ii4 p4 #bgi3 8,in mathematics 
there are only a few but in philosophy  
there are innumerable irresolvable      
concepts44440  #afif ,a #gca n4  ,b #gei
 n4  #afig ,the phrases which ,kant     
employs 7,a #gcb-c  ,b #gfj-a7 are3     
8unmittelbargewiss10 8evident10         

8augenscheinlich40 ,cf4 above1 pp4      
xxxv-vi1 #cf ff41 #ec4  #afih ,cf4      
above1 pp4 #aah1 #adb1 #ahe-f4  #afii   
,cf4 above1 p4 #aag ff4  #agjj ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #ch-db1 #ic-d1 #aah-bj1 #acc4
  #agja ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aaa-ab1        
#aad-ae4  #agjb ,cf4 above1 p4 #aca ff4 
#agjc ,a #gcg  ,b #gfe4  #agjd ,cf4     
above1 pp4 #cf ff41 #aag ff41 #abh ff41 
#efe-f4  #agje ,a #gdc-d  ,b #gga-b4    
#agjf ,a #gec  ,b #gha4 ,in ,a #gde  ,b 
#ggc ,kant's mention of ,hume can hardly
 refer to ,hume's ,dialogues 7cf4 above1
 pp4 #eci-dj n474 ,kant probably has in 
mind ,section ,,xi4 of the ,enquiry4    
,the important discussion of ,hume's    
position in ,a #gfj ff4  ,b #ghh ff4 has
 been commented upon above1 p4 #fa ff4  
,with ,priestley's teaching 7,a #gde-f  
,b #ggc-d7 ,kant probably became        
acquainted through some indirect source4
 ,the first of ,priestley's             
philosophical writings to appear in     
,german was his ,history of the         
,corruptions of ,christianity4 ,the     

translation was published in #aghb4 ,in 
,a #gdg-h  ,b #gge-f ,kant quite        
obviously has ,rousseau in mind4  #agjg 
,section ,,iii41 on ,the ,discipline of 
,pure ,reason in ,regard to ,hypotheses1
 has been commented on above1 pp4       
#edc-f4  #agjh ,a #ghb  ,b #haj4  #agji 
,even in mathematics the indirect method
 is not always available4 ,cf4 ,russell1
 ,principles of ,mathematics1 i4 p4 #ae4
  #agaj ,a #gid  ,b #hbb4  #agaa ,cf4   
above1 p4 #efc n4 #b4  #agab ,a #gig  ,b
 #hbe4  #agac ,cf4 ,critique of         
,judgment1 ,w4 v4 p4 #dgc2 ,bernard's   
trans4 p4 #daa3 8,god1 freedom1 and     
immortality are the problems at the     
solution of which all the preparations  
of ,metaphysics aim1 as their ultimate  
and unique purpose40  #agad ,a #hjj-a   
,b #hbi4  #agae ,the statement in ,a    
#hja  ,b #hbi that morals is a subject  
foreign to transcendental philosophy is 
in line with that of ,a #ad-ae  ,b #bh1 
and conflicts with the position later   
adopted in the ,critique of ,practical  

,reason4 ,cf4 above1 p4 #gg4  #agaf ,a  
#hjc  ,b #hca-b4  #agag ,cf4 below1 pp4 
#ega-e4  #agah ,a #hjd  ,b #hcb4  #agai 
,cf4 above1 p4 lvi4  #agbj ,these       
statements are subject to modification1 
if the distinction 7not clearly         
recognised by ,kant1 but really         
essential to his position7 between      
immanent and transcendent metaphysics is
 insisted upon4 ,cf4 above1 pp4 liv-v1  
#bb1 #ef1 #ff-gj4  #agba ,cf4 above1 p4 
#eda4  #agbb ,w4 v4 pp4 #dg-h2 ,abbott's
 trans4 7#crd edition7 p4 #acf4  #agbc  
,cf4 ,critique of ,practical ,reason1   
,w4 v4 pp4 #ca-g2 ,abbott's trans4 p4   
#abj4  #agbd ,cf4 ,critique of          
,practical ,reason1 ,w4 v4 p4 #dc2      
,abbott's trans4 p4 #acb3 8,the moral   
law1 although it gives no view1 yet     
gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable 
from any data of the sensible world1 or 
from the whole compass of our           
theoretical use of reason1 a fact which 
points to a pure world of the           
understanding1 nay1 even defines it     

positively1 and enables us to know      
something of it1 namely1 a law40  #agbe 
,cf4 ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 in
 note to ,preface4  #agbf ,op4 cit41    
,preface1 at the beginning1 ,abbott's   
trans4 pp4 #hg-h4 ,cf4 also the         
concluding pages of ,book ,i41 ,w4 v4   
pp4 #ajc-f1 ,abbott1 pp4 #aig-bjj4      
#agbg ,critique of ,judgment1 ,w4 v4 p4 
#dfh2 ,bernard's trans4 p4 #djf4  #agbh 
,op4 cit4 p4 #dgd2 ,bernard's trans4 p4 
#dac4  #agbi ,a #hae  ,b #hdc4  #agcj   
,cf4 ,critique of ,practical ,reason1   
,w4 v4 pp4 #adc-d n42 ,abbott's trans4  
p4 #bdb3 8,it is a duty to realise the  
,summum ,bonum to the utmost of our     
power1 therefore it must be possible1   
consequently it is unavoidable for every
 rational being in the world to assume  
what is necessary for its objective     
possibility4 ,the assumption is as      
necessary as the moral law1 in connexion
 with which alone it is valid40  #agca  
,cf4 ,critique of ,practical ,reason1   
,w4 v4 p4 #adb ff42 ,abbott's trans4 p4 

#bdj ff42 ,critique of ,judgment1 ,w4 v4
 pp4 #dfi-gj2 ,bernard's trans4 pp4     
#djf-h4  #agcb ,critique of ,judgment1  
,w4 v4 pp4 #cfi-gb2 ,bernard's trans4   
pp4 #djg-aj4 ,cf4 note in same section3 
8,it is a trust in the promise of the   
moral law2 not1 however1 such as is     
contained in it1 but such as ,i put into
 it1 and that on morally adequate       
grounds40  #agcc ,a #hai  ,b #hdg4      
#agcd ,a #hbj  ,b #hdh4  #agce ,the     
distinction is less harshly drawn in    
,kant's ,logic1 ,einleitung1 ix4        
7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #gc2 ,eng4     
trans1 p4 #fc3 8,conviction is opposed  
to persuasion4 ,persuasion is an assent 
from inadequate reasons1 in respect to  
which we do not know whether they are   
only subjective or are also objective4  
,persuasion often precedes conviction40 
#agcf ,cf4 above1 pp4 #aj1 #edc4 ,cf4   
,fortschritte2 ,werke 7,hartenstein71   
viii4 p4 #efa4  #agcg ,cf4 ,logic1 loc4 
cit4 ,cf4 ,foundations of the           
,metaphysics of ,morals1 ,w4 iv4 pp4    

#daf-ag3 ,abbott's trans4 pp4 #cc-cd4   
#agch ,regarding ,kant's distinction in 
,a #hbg  ,b #hee between ,ideas and     
hypotheses cf4 above1 p4 #edc ff4 ,cf4  
also ,critique of ,judgment1 ,w4 v4 pp4 
#cib ff41 #dfa ff42 ,bernard's trans4   
pp4 #cjb ff41 #cie ff4  #agci ,a #hbi   
,b #heg4  #agdj ,cf4 ,kant's ,preface to
 the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1   
,w4 v4 p4 #h n42 ,abbott's trans4 p4 #ic
 n4 8,a reviewer who wanted to find some
 fault with this work--the ,foundations 
of the ,metaphysics of ,morals--has hit 
the truth better1 perhaps1 than he      
thought1 when he says that no new       
principle of morality is set forth in   
it1 but only a new formula4 ,but who    
would think of introducing a new        
principle of all morality1 and making   
himself as it were the first inventor of
 it1 just as if all the world before him
 were ignorant what duty was1 or had    
been in thorough-going error8 ,but      
whoever knows of what importance to a   
mathematician a formula is1 which       

defines accurately what is to be done to
 work out a problem1 will not think that
 a formula is insignificant and useless 
which does the same for all duty in     
general40 ,cf4 ,fortschritte1 ,werke    
7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #efc4  #agda   
,fragmente aus dem ,nachlasse1 ,werke   
7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #fbd1 already  
quoted above1 p4 lvii4 ,cf4 also op4    
cit4 p4 #fcj4  #agdb ,cf4 ,critique of  
,practical ,reason1 ,conclusion1 ,w4 v4 
pp4 #afa-b2 ,abbott's trans4 p4 #bfj4   
#agdc ,a #hcb  ,b #hfj4  #agdd ,k4 p4   
#fcc n4 ,cf4 above1 p4 xxii4  #agde ,cf4
 ,adickes1 ,k4 p4 #fce n41 and          
,vaihinger1 i4 p4 #cjf4 ,in this table  
,critique is distinguished from the     
,system of pure ,reason 7cf4 above1 pp4 
#ga-b74 ,the transcendental philosophy  
of pure ,reason of this table           
corresponds to the ,analytic of the     
,critique1 and to 8pure natural science0
 in the absolute sense 7cf4 above1 pp4  
#ff-g74 ,the rational physics of this   
table corresponds to the ,metaphysical  

,first ,principles of ,natural ,science4
  #agdf ,when ,kant in ,a #hdj  ,b #hfh 
takes philosophy as including empirical 
knowledge he contradicts the spirit1    
though not the letter of his own        
preceding statements4 ,in his           
,introduction to ,logic 7,hartenstein1  
viii4 p4 #bb1 ,abbott's trans4 p4 #ab7  
the empirical is identified with the    
historical4  #agdg ,fortschritte1 ,werke
 7,hartenstein71 viii4 p4 #eed4  #agdh  
,op4 cit4 p4 #ebj4  #agdi ,i4e4 between 
the conception of philosophy as         
,schulbegriff and as ,weltbegriff       
7conceptus cosmicus74 ,he explains in a 
note to ,a #hci  ,b #hfh that he employs
 these latter terms as indicating that  
philosophy in the traditional or        
humanistic sense is concerned with 8that
 which must necessarily interest every  
one40 ,i have translated ,weltbegriff as
 #8universal concept4' ,by conceptus    
cosmicus ,kant means #8concept shared by
 the whole world1' or #8common to all   
mankind4'  #agej ,cf4 ,kant's ,logic1   

,introduction1  iii43 ,abbott's trans4  
pp4 #ad-ae3 8,in this scholastic        
signification of the word1 philosophy   
aims only at skill2 in reference to the 
higher concept common to all mankind1 on
 the contrary1 it aims at utility4 ,in  
the former aspect1 therefore1 it is a   
doctrine of skill2 in the latter a      
doctrine of wisdom2 it is the lawgiver  
of reason2 and hence the philosopher is 
not a master of the art of reason1 but a
 lawgiver4 ,the master of the art of    
reason1 or as ,socrates calls him1 the  
philodoxus1 strives merely for          
speculative knowledge1 without          
concerning himself how much this        
knowledge contributes to the ultimate   
end of human reason3 he gives rules for 
the use of reason for all kinds of ends4
 ,the practical philosopher1 the teacher
 of wisdom by doctrine and example1 is  
the true philosopher4 ,for philosophy is
 the ,ideal of a perfect wisdom1 which  
shows us the ultimate ends of all human 
reason40  #agea ,a #hci  ,b #hfg4  #ageb

 ,a #hea  ,b #hgi4  #agec ,a #hej  ,b   
#hgh4  #aged ,a #hdh-i  ,b #hgf-g4 ,cf4 
above1 pp4 #bcg1 #caa n41 #cab n41      
#chd-e1 #dgc-g1 #eed4  #agee ,a #heb  ,b
 #hhj4  #agef ,cf4 ,a #cac ff4  ,b #cgj 
ff41 above1 pp4 #dih-i4  #ageg ,cf4     
above1 pp4 xxviii-xxix4  #ageh          
,einleitung1  iv43 ,abbott's trans1 pp4 
#ag-bc4  #agei ,supplementary to pp4    
xxv-xxxiii4 ,throughout ,i shall make   
use of my ,studies in the ,cartesian    
,philosophy1 and may refer the reader to
 them for further justification of the  
positions adopted4  #agfj ,for          
recognition of this distinction1 cf4    
,herbert ,spencer1 ,principles of       
,psychology1 vol4 i41 #crd ed41 pp4     
#fbj-c4  #agfa ,cf4 ,studies in the     
,cartesian ,philosophy1 pp4 #hj-b1      
#ajf-g4  #agfb ,this distinction is due 
to ,galileo1 though the terms 8primary0 
and 8secondary0 were first employed by  
,locke4  #agfc ,i have dealt with       
,avenarius' criticism in 8,avenarius'   
,philosophy of ,pure ,experience0       

7,mind1 vol4 xv4 ,n4,s41 pp4 #ac-ca1    
#adi-afj72 with ,bergson's criticism in 
8,subjectivism and ,realism in ,modern  
,philosophy0 7,philosophical ,review1   
vol4 xvii4 pp4 #ach-adh72 and with the  
general issue as a whole in 8,the       
,problem of ,knowledge0 7,journal of    
,philosophy1 vol4 ix4 pp4 #aac-abh74    
#agfd ,on ,descartes' failure to        
distinguish between the mathematical and
 the dynamical aspects of motion1 cf4   
above1 p4 #ehd4  #agfe ,essay concerning
 ,human ,understanding1 ,,iv4 vi4 #af4  
#agff ,op4 cit4 ,,iv4 xii4 #g4  #agfg   
,op4 cit4 ,,iv4 vi4 #aa4  #agfh ,cf4    
above1 pp4 #bg-h4  #agfi ,though the    
concept of substance is also discussed  
by ,hume1 his treatment of it is quite  
perfunctory4  #aggj ,cf4 above1 pp4 xxv 
ff41 #fa ff4  #agga ,treatise on ,human 
,nature 7,green and ,grose71 i4 p4 #chj4
  #aggb ,op4 cit4 p4 #chc4  #aggc ,loc4 
cit4  #aggd ,for justification of the   
phrase 8synthetic reason10 ,i must refer
 to my articles in ,mind1 vol4 xiv4     

,n4,s4 pp4 #adi-gc1 #cce-dg1 on 8,the   
,naturalism of ,hume40  #agge ,treatise 
7,green and ,grose71 i4 pp4 #dgd-e4     
#aggf ,enquiry concerning ,human        
,understanding 7,green and ,grose71 p4  
#dj4  #aggg ,treatise1 p4 #dga4  #aggh  
,enquiry 7,green and ,grose71 pp4 #be-f4
  #aggi claircissement sur chap4 iii4   
pt4 ii4 liv4 vi4 de la ,recherche3 tome 
iv4 7#agab7 p4 #cha4  #aghj ,enquiry1 p4
 #eg4  #agha ,enquiry1 p4 #cb4  #aghb   
,this is the objection upon which       
,beattie chiefly insists4  #aghc ,op4   
cit4 pp4 #cc-d4  #aghd ,cf4 above1 pp4  
#ci ff41 #ed1 #bbb ff41 #bda1 #bhf-i4   
#aghe ,how far ,hume's criticism of     
empiricism really influenced ,kant in   
his appreciation of this deeper problem1
 it seems impossible to decide4 ,very   
probably ,kant proceeded to it by       
independent development of his own      
standpoint1 after the initial impulse   
received on the more strictly logical   
issue4  #aghf ,the assertion1 by ,kuno  
,fischer and ,paulsen1 of an empirical  

period in ,kant's development1 has been 
challenged by ,adickes1 ,b4 ,erdmann1   
,riehl1 and ,vaihinger4  #aghg ,cf4 ,b4 
,erdmann's ,kriticismus1 p4 #adg2       
,critique of ,judgment1 ,w4 v4 p4 #cia  
7,bernard's trans1 p4 #cja74  #aghh     
,above1 pp4 xxx-iii4  #aghi             
,philosophischer ,kriticismus1 #bnd ed4 
p4 #bji4  #agij ,cf4 above1 pp4 lv-vi1  
lxi1 #edc ff4         99       99       
99       99       99   ,typographical   
errors corrected by the etext           
transcriber3  ,the transcenedntal       
doctrine ,the transcendental doctrine pg
 #gg  non-commital non-committal pg #abb
  widersinnisches ,widersinnisches pg   
#ddd  ,erkenntniss ,erkenntnis pg #ddi  
themelves themselves pg #eje  which     
contain the the material which contain  
the material pg #ebc  it as valid it is 
valid pg #ege