,,an ,,enquiry ,,concerning ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,morals ,by ,david ,hume ,a #aiab ,reprint ,of ,the ,edition ,of #aggg ,information ,about ,this ,e-,text ,edition ,the following is an e-text of a #aiab reprint of the #aggg edition of ,david ,hume's ,an ,enquiry ,concerning the ,principles of ,morals4 ,each page was cut out of the original book with an ,x-acto knife and fed into an ,automatic ,document ,feeder ,scanner to make this e-text1 so the original book was disbinded in order to save it4 ,some adaptations from the original text were made while formatting it for an e-text4 ,italics in the original book are capitalized in this e-text4 ,the original spellings of words are preserved1 such as connexion for connection1 labour for labor1 etc4 ,original footnotes are put in brackets at the points where they are cited in the text4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,author',s ,,advertisement ,,contents ,,page ,,an ,,enquiry ,,concerning ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,morals ,,appendix ,,author',s ,,advertisement4 ,most of the principles1 and reasonings1 contained in this volume1 ,footnote3 ,volume ,,ii4 of the posthumous edition of ,hume's works published in #aggg and containing1 besides the present ,,enquiry1 ,a ,,dissertation ,,on ,,the ,,passions1 and ,,an ,,enquiry ,,concerning ,,human ,,understanding4 ,a reprint of this latter treatise has already appeared in ,the ,religion of ,science ,library 7,,no4 #de7 were published in a work in three volumes1 called ,a ,,treatise ,,of ,,human ,,nature3 ,a work which the ,author had projected before he left ,college1 and which he wrote and published not long after4 ,but not finding it successful1 he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early1 and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces1 where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression1 are1 he hopes1 corrected4 ,yet several writers who have honoured the ,author's ,philosophy with answers1 have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work1 which the author never acknowledged1 and have affected to triumph in any advantages1 which1 they imagined1 they had obtained over it3 ,a practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing1 and a strong instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ4 ,henceforth1 the ,author desires1 that the following ,pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles4 ,,contents ,,page ,i4 ,of the ,general ,principles of ,morals ,,ii4 ,of ,benevolence ,,iii4 ,of ,justice ,,iv4 ,of ,political ,society ,v4 ,why ,utility ,pleases ,,vi4 ,of ,qualities ,useful to ,ourselves ,,vii4 ,of ,qualities ,immediately ,agreeable to ,ourselves ,,viii4 ,of ,qualities ,immediately ,agreeable to ,others ,,ix4 ,conclusion ,,appendix4 ,i4 ,concerning ,moral ,sentiment ,,ii4 ,of ,self-love ,,iii4 ,some ,farther ,considerations with ,regard to ,justice ,,iv4 ,of ,some ,verbal ,disputes ,,an ,,enquiry ,,concerning ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,morals ,,section ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,general ,,principles ,,of ,,morals4 ,,disputes with men1 pertinaciously obstinate in their principles1 are1 of all others1 the most irksome2 except1 perhaps1 those with persons1 entirely disingenuous1 who really do not believe the opinions they defend1 but engage in the controversy1 from affectation1 from a spirit of opposition1 or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity1 superior to the rest of mankind4 ,the same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both2 the same contempt of their antagonists2 and the same passionate vehemence1 in inforcing sophistry and falsehood4 ,and as reasoning is not the source1 whence either disputant derives his tenets2 it is in vain to expect1 that any logic1 which speaks not to the affections1 will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles4 ,those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions1 may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants2 nor is it conceivable1 that any human creature could ever seriously believe1 that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone4 ,the difference1 which nature has placed between one man and another1 is so wide1 and this difference is still so much farther widened1 by education1 example1 and habit1 that1 where the opposite extremes come at once under our apprehension1 there is no scepticism so scrupulous1 and scarce any assurance so determined1 as absolutely to deny all distinction between them4 ,let a man's insensibility be ever so great1 he must often be touched with the images of ,right and ,wrong2 and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate1 he must observe1 that others are susceptible of like impressions4 ,the only way1 therefore1 of converting an antagonist of this kind1 is to leave him to himself4 ,for1 finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him1 it is probable he will1 at last1 of himself1 from mere weariness1 come over to the side of common sense and reason4 ,there has been a controversy started of late1 much better worth examination1 concerning the general foundation of ,morals2 whether they be derived from ,reason1 or from ,sentiment2 whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction1 or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense2 whether1 like all sound judgement of truth and falsehood1 they should be the same to every rational intelligent being2 or whether1 like the perception of beauty and deformity1 they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species4 ,the ancient philosophers1 though they often affirm1 that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason1 yet1 in general1 seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment4 ,on the other hand1 our modern enquirers1 though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue1 and deformity of vice1 yet have commonly endeavoured to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings1 and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding4 ,such confusion reigned in these subjects1 that an opposition of the greatest consequence could prevail between one system and another1 and even in the parts of almost each individual system2 and yet nobody1 till very lately1 was ever sensible of it4 ,the elegant ,lord ,shaftesbury1 who first gave occasion to remark this distinction1 and who1 in general1 adhered to the principles of the ancients1 is not1 himself1 entirely free from the same confusion4 ,it must be acknowledged1 that both sides of the question are susceptible of specious arguments4 ,moral distinctions1 it may be said1 are discernible by pure reason3 else1 whence the many disputes that reign in common life1 as well as in philosophy1 with regard to this subject3 the long chain of proofs often produced on both sides2 the examples cited1 the authorities appealed to1 the analogies employed1 the fallacies detected1 the inferences drawn1 and the several conclusions adjusted to their proper principles4 ,truth is disputable2 not taste3 what exists in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement2 what each man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment4 ,propositions in geometry may be proved1 systems in physics may be controverted2 but the harmony of verse1 the tenderness of passion1 the brilliancy of wit1 must give immediate pleasure4 ,no man reasons concerning another's beauty2 but frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions4 ,in every criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts alleged1 and deny the actions imputed to him3 the second to prove1 that1 even if these actions were real1 they might be justified1 as innocent and lawful4 ,it is confessedly by deductions of the understanding1 that the first point is ascertained3 how can we suppose that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other8 ,on the other hand1 those who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment1 may endeavour to show1 that it is impossible for reason ever to draw conclusions of this nature4 ,to virtue1 say they1 it belongs to be amiable1 and vice odious4 ,this forms their very nature or essence4 ,but can reason or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any subjects1 and pronounce beforehand1 that this must produce love1 and that hatred8 ,or what other reason can we ever assign for these affections1 but the original fabric and formation of the human mind1 which is naturally adapted to receive them8 ,the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty2 and1 by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue1 beget correspondent habits1 and engage us to avoid the one1 and embrace the other4 ,but is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclusions of the understanding1 which of themselves have no hold of the affections or set in motion the active powers of men8 ,they discover truths3 but where the truths which they discover are indifferent1 and beget no desire or aversion1 they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour4 ,what is honourable1 what is fair1 what is becoming1 what is noble1 what is generous1 takes possession of the heart1 and animates us to embrace and maintain it4 ,what is intelligible1 what is evident1 what is probable1 what is true1 procures only the cool assent of the understanding2 and gratifying a speculative curiosity1 puts an end to our researches4 ,extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue1 and all disgust or aversion to vice3 render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions2 and morality is no longer a practical study1 nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions4 ,these arguments on each side 7and many more might be produced7 are so plausible1 that ,i am apt to suspect1 they may1 the one as well as the other1 be solid and satisfactory1 and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions4 ,the final sentence1 it is probable1 which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious1 praise-worthy or blameable2 that which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy1 approbation or censure2 that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness1 and vice our misery2 it is probable1 ,i say1 that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling1 which nature has made universal in the whole species4 ,for what else can have an influence of this nature8 ,but in order to pave the way for such a sentiment1 and give a proper discernment of its object1 it is often necessary1 we find1 that much reasoning should precede1 that nice distinctions be made1 just conclusions drawn1 distant comparisons formed1 complicated relations examined1 and general facts fixed and ascertained4 ,some species of beauty1 especially the natural kinds1 on their first appearance1 command our affection and approbation2 and where they fail of this effect1 it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence1 or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment4 ,but in many orders of beauty1 particularly those of the finer arts1 it is requisite to employ much reasoning1 in order to feel the proper sentiment2 and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection4 ,there are just grounds to conclude1 that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species1 and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties1 in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind4 ,but though this question1 concerning the general principles of morals1 be curious and important1 it is needless for us1 at present1 to employ farther care in our researches concerning it4 ,for if we can be so happy1 in the course of this enquiry1 as to discover the true origin of morals1 it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature ,footnote3 ,see ,appendix ,i4 ,in order to attain this purpose1 we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method3 we shall analyse that complication of mental qualities1 which form what1 in common life1 we call ,personal ,merit3 we shall consider every attribute of the mind1 which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection1 or of hatred and contempt2 every habit or sentiment or faculty1 which1 if ascribed to any person1 implies either praise or blame1 and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners4 ,the quick sensibility1 which1 on this head1 is so universal among mankind1 gives a philosopher sufficient assurance1 that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue1 or incur any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation3 he needs only enter into his own breast for a moment1 and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him1 and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy4 ,the very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgement of this nature2 and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense1 and another in the opposite1 the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices1 without any reasoning1 to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men4 ,the only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides1 which are common to these qualities2 to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand1 and the blameable on the other2 and thence to reach the foundation of ethics1 and find those universal principles1 from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived4 ,as this is a question of fact1 not of abstract science1 we can only expect success1 by following the experimental method1 and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances4 ,the other scientific method1 where a general abstract principle is first established1 and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions1 may be more perfect in itself1 but suits less the imperfection of human nature1 and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects4 ,men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy1 and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience4 ,it is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions2 and reject every system of ethics1 however subtle or ingenious1 which is not founded on fact and observation4 ,we shall begin our enquiry on this head by the consideration of the social virtues1 ,benevolence and ,justice4 ,the explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for4 ,,section ,,ii4 ,,of ,,benevolence4 ,,part ,i4 ,it may be esteemed1 perhaps1 a superfluous task to prove1 that the benevolent or softer affections are estimable2 and wherever they appear1 engage the approbation and good-will of mankind4 ,the epithets ,,sociable1 ,,good-,,natured1 ,,humane1 ,,merciful1 ,,grateful1 ,,friendly1 ,,generous1 ,,beneficent1 or their equivalents1 are known in all languages1 and universally express the highest merit1 which ,,human ,,nature is capable of attaining4 ,where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities1 and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind1 they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank of ,,human ,,nature1 and make them approach in some measure to the divine4 ,exalted capacity1 undaunted courage1 prosperous success2 these may only expose a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public3 but as soon as the praises are added of humane and beneficent2 when instances are displayed of lenity1 tenderness or friendship2 envy itself is silent1 or joins the general voice of approbation and applause4 ,when ,pericles1 the great ,athenian statesman and general1 was on his death-bed1 his surrounding friends1 deeming him now insensible1 began to indulge their sorrow for their expiring patron1 by enumerating his great qualities and successes1 his conquests and victories1 the unusual length of his administration1 and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of the republic4 ,,you ,,forget1 cries the dying hero1 who had heard all1 ,,you ,,forget ,,the ,,most ,,eminent ,,of ,,my ,,praises1 ,,while ,,you ,,dwell ,,so ,,much ,,on ,,those ,,vulgar ,,advantages1 ,,in ,,which ,,fortune ,,had ,a ,,principal ,,share4 ,,you ,,have ,,not ,,observed ,,that ,,no ,,citizen ,,has ,,ever ,,yet ,,worne ,,mourning ,,on ,,my ,,account4 ,plut4 in ,pericle ,in men of more ordinary talents and capacity1 the social virtues become1 if possible1 still more essentially requisite2 there being nothing eminent1 in that case1 to compensate for the want of them1 or preserve the person from our severest hatred1 as well as contempt4 ,a high ambition1 an elevated courage1 is apt1 says ,cicero1 in less perfect characters1 to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity4 ,the more social and softer virtues are there chiefly to be regarded4 ,these are always good and amiable ,cic4 de ,officiis1 lib4 ,i4 ,the principal advantage1 which ,juvenal discovers in the extensive capacity of the human species1 is that it renders our benevolence also more extensive1 and gives us larger opportunities of spreading our kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation ,sat4 ,,xv4 #aci and seq44 ,it must1 indeed1 be confessed1 that by doing good only1 can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent4 ,his exalted station1 of itself but the more exposes him to danger and tempest4 ,his sole prerogative is to afford shelter to inferiors1 who repose themselves under his cover and protection4 ,but ,i forget1 that it is not my present business to recommend generosity and benevolence1 or to paint1 in their true colours1 all the genuine charms of the social virtues4 ,these1 indeed1 sufficiently engage every heart1 on the first apprehension of them2 and it is difficult to abstain from some sally of panegyric1 as often as they occur in discourse or reasoning4 ,but our object here being more the speculative1 than the practical part of morals1 it will suffice to remark1 7what will readily1 ,i believe1 be allowed7 that no qualities are more intitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity1 friendship and gratitude1 natural affection and public spirit1 or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others1 and a generous concern for our kind and species4 ,these wherever they appear seem to transfuse themselves1 in a manner1 into each beholder1 and to call forth1 in their own behalf1 the same favourable and affectionate sentiments1 which they exert on all around4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,we may observe that1 in displaying the praises of any humane1 beneficent man1 there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on1 namely1 the happiness and satisfaction1 derived to society from his intercourse and good offices4 ,to his parents1 we are apt to say1 he endears himself by his pious attachment and duteous care still more than by the connexions of nature4 ,his children never feel his authority1 but when employed for their advantage4 ,with him1 the ties of love are consolidated by beneficence and friendship4 ,the ties of friendship approach1 in a fond observance of each obliging office1 to those of love and inclination4 ,his domestics and dependants have in him a sure resource2 and no longer dread the power of fortune1 but so far as she exercises it over him4 ,from him the hungry receive food1 the naked clothing1 the ignorant and slothful skill and industry4 ,like the sun1 an inferior minister of providence he cheers1 invigorates1 and sustains the surrounding world4 ,if confined to private life1 the sphere of his activity is narrower2 but his influence is all benign and gentle4 ,if exalted into a higher station1 mankind and posterity reap the fruit of his labours4 ,as these topics of praise never fail to be employed1 and with success1 where we would inspire esteem for any one2 may it not thence be concluded1 that the utility1 resulting from the social virtues1 forms1 at least1 a ,,part of their merit1 and is one source of that approbation and regard so universally paid to them8 ,when we recommend even an animal or a plant as ,,useful and ,,beneficial1 we give it an applause and recommendation suited to its nature4 ,as1 on the other hand1 reflection on the baneful influence of any of these inferior beings always inspires us with the sentiment of aversion4 ,the eye is pleased with the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vine-yards2 horses grazing1 and flocks pasturing3 but flies the view of briars and brambles1 affording shelter to wolves and serpents4 ,a machine1 a piece of furniture1 a vestment1 a house well contrived for use and conveniency1 is so far beautiful1 and is contemplated with pleasure and approbation4 ,an experienced eye is here sensible to many excellencies1 which escape persons ignorant and uninstructed4 ,can anything stronger be said in praise of a profession1 such as merchandize or manufacture1 than to observe the advantages which it procures to society2 and is not a monk and inquisitor enraged when we treat his order as useless or pernicious to mankind8 ,the historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from his labours4 ,the writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad consequences ascribed to his manner of composition4 ,in general1 what praise is implied in the simple epithet ,,useful6 ,what reproach in the contrary6 ,your ,gods1 says ,cicero ,de ,nat4 ,deor4 lib4 i41 in opposition to the ,epicureans1 cannot justly claim any worship or adoration1 with whatever imaginary perfections you may suppose them endowed4 ,they are totally useless and inactive4 ,even the ,egyptians1 whom you so much ridicule1 never consecrated any animal but on account of its utility4 ,the sceptics assert ,sext4 ,emp4 adrersus ,math4 lib4 viii41 though absurdly1 that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the utility of inanimate objects1 as the sun and moon1 to the support and well-being of mankind4 ,this is also the common reason assigned by historians1 for the deification of eminent heroes and legislators ,diod4 ,sic4 passim44 ,to plant a tree1 to cultivate a field1 to beget children2 meritorious acts1 according to the religion of ,zoroaster4 ,in all determinations of morality1 this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view2 and wherever disputes arise1 either in philosophy or common life1 concerning the bounds of duty1 the question cannot1 by any means1 be decided with greater certainty1 than by ascertaining1 on any side1 the true interests of mankind4 ,if any false opinion1 embraced from appearances1 has been found to prevail2 as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs1 we retract our first sentiment1 and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil4 ,giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised2 because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent3 but when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery1 we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue4 ,tyrannicide1 or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes1 was highly extolled in ancient times2 because it both freed mankind from many of these monsters1 and seemed to keep the others in awe1 whom the sword or poniard could not reach4 ,but history and experience having since convinced us1 that this practice increases the jealousy and cruelty of princes1 a ,timoleon and a ,brutus1 though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times1 are now considered as very improper models for imitation4 ,liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence1 but when it occurs1 that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often thereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal1 we soon retract our heedless praises4 ,the regrets of a prince1 for having lost a day1 were noble and generous3 but had he intended to have spent it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers1 it was better lost than misemployed after that manner4 ,luxury1 or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life1 had not long been supposed the source of every corruption in government1 and the immediate cause of faction1 sedition1 civil wars1 and the total loss of liberty4 ,it was1 therefore1 universally regarded as a vice1 and was an object of declamation to all satirists1 and severe moralists4 ,those1 who prove1 or attempt to prove1 that such refinements rather tend to the increase of industry1 civility1 and arts regulate anew our ,,moral as well as ,,political sentiments1 and represent1 as laudable or innocent1 what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable4 ,upon the whole1 then1 it seems undeniable1 ,,that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree2 and ,,that a ,,part1 at least1 of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species1 and bestow happiness on human society4 ,we carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and disposition2 and whatever has so benign an influence1 and forwards so desirable an end1 is beheld with complacency and pleasure4 ,the social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies1 nor viewed as barren and unfruitful4 ,the happiness of mankind1 the order of society1 the harmony of families1 the mutual support of friends1 are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men4 ,how considerable a ,,part of their merit we ought to ascribe to their utility1 will better appear from future disquisitions2 ,footnote3 ,sect4 ,,iii4 and ,,iv4 as well as the reason1 why this circumstance has such a command over our esteem and approbation4 ,footnote3 ,sect4 ,v4 ,,section ,,iii4 ,,of ,,justice4 ,,part ,i4 ,,that ,justice is useful to society1 and consequently that ,,part of its merit1 at least1 must arise from that consideration1 it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove4 ,that public utility is the ,,sole origin of justice1 and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the ,,sole foundation of its merit2 this proposition1 being more curious and important1 will better deserve our examination and enquiry4 ,let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse ,,abundance of all ,,external conveniencies1 that1 without any uncertainty in the event1 without any care or industry on our part1 every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want1 or luxurious imagination wish or desire4 ,his natural beauty1 we shall suppose1 surpasses all acquired ornaments3 the perpetual clemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering3 the raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare2 the clear fountain1 the richest beverage4 ,no laborious occupation required3 no tillage3 no navigation4 ,music1 poetry1 and contemplation form his sole business3 conversation1 mirth1 and friendship his sole amusement4 ,it seems evident that1 in such a happy state1 every other social virtue would flourish1 and receive tenfold increase2 but the cautious1 jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed of4 ,for what purpose make a partition of goods1 where every one has already more than enough8 ,why give rise to property1 where there cannot possibly be any injury8 ,why call this object ,,mine1 when upon the seizing of it by another1 ,i need but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable8 ,justice1 in that case1 being totally useless1 would be an idle ceremonial1 and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues4 ,we see1 even in the present necessitous condition of mankind1 that1 wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance1 we leave it always in common among the whole human race1 and make no subdivisions of right and property4 ,water and air1 though the most necessary of all objects1 are not challenged as the property of individuals2 nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings4 ,in fertile extensive countries1 with few inhabitants1 land is regarded on the same footing4 ,and no topic is so much insisted on by those1 who defend the liberty of the seas1 as the unexhausted use of them in navigation4 ,were the advantages1 procured by navigation1 as inexhaustible1 these reasoners had never had any adversaries to refute2 nor had any claims ever been advanced of a separate1 exclusive dominion over the ocean4 ,it may happen1 in some countries1 at some periods1 that there be established a property in water1 none in land ,footnote3 ,genesis1 chaps4 xiii4 and xxi42 if the latter be in greater abundance than can be used by the inhabitants1 and the former be found1 with difficulty1 and in very small quantities4 ,again2 suppose1 that1 though the necessities of human race continue the same as at present1 yet the mind is so enlarged1 and so replete with friendship and generosity1 that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man1 and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows2 it seems evident1 that the use of justice would1 in this case1 be suspended by such an extensive benevolence1 nor would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of4 ,why should ,i bind another1 by a deed or promise1 to do me any good office1 when ,i know that he is already prompted1 by the strongest inclination1 to seek my happiness1 and would1 of himself1 perform the desired service2 except the hurt1 he thereby receives1 be greater than the benefit accruing to me8 in which case1 he knows1 that1 from my innate humanity and friendship1 ,i should be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent generosity4 ,why raise landmarks between my neighbour's field and mine1 when my heart has made no division between our interests2 but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and vivacity as if originally my own8 ,every man1 upon this supposition1 being a second self to another1 would trust all his interests to the discretion of every man2 without jealousy1 without partition1 without distinction4 ,and the whole human race would form only one family2 where all would lie in common1 and be used freely1 without regard to property2 but cautiously too1 with as entire regard to the necessities of each individual1 as if our own interests were most intimately concerned4 ,in the present disposition of the human heart1 it would1 perhaps1 be difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections2 but still we may observe1 that the case of families approaches towards it2 and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals1 the nearer it approaches2 till all distinction of property be1 in a great measure1 lost and confounded among them4 ,between married persons1 the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all division of possessions2 and has often1 in reality1 the force ascribed to it4 ,and it is observable1 that1 during the ardour of new enthusiasms1 when every principle is inflamed into extravagance1 the community of goods has frequently been attempted2 and nothing but experience of its inconveniencies1 from the returning or disguised selfishness of men1 could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and of separate property4 ,so true is it1 that this virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary ,,use to the intercourse and social state of mankind4 ,to make this truth more evident1 let us reverse the foregoing suppositions2 and carrying everything to the opposite extreme1 consider what would be the effect of these new situations4 ,suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries1 that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing1 and the whole from extreme misery2 it will readily1 ,i believe1 be admitted1 that the strict laws of justice are suspended1 in such a pressing emergence1 and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation4 ,is it any crime1 after a shipwreck1 to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of1 without regard to former limitations of property8 ,or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger2 can we imagine1 that men will see any means of preservation before them1 and lose their lives1 from a scrupulous regard to what1 in other situations1 would be the rules of equity and justice8 ,the use and tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness and security1 by preserving order in society3 but where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity1 no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice2 and every man may now provide for himself by all the means1 which prudence can dictate1 or humanity permit4 ,the public1 even in less urgent necessities1 opens granaries1 without the consent of proprietors2 as justly supposing1 that the authority of magistracy may1 consistent with equity1 extend so far3 but were any number of men to assemble1 without the tie of laws or civil jurisdiction2 would an equal partition of bread in a famine1 though effected by power and even violence1 be regarded as criminal or injurious8 ,suppose likewise1 that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians1 remote from the protection of laws and government2 what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation8 ,he sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail2 such a disregard to equity1 such contempt of order1 such stupid blindness to future consequences1 as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion1 and must terminate in destruction to the greater number1 and in a total dissolution of society to the rest4 ,he1 meanwhile1 can have no other expedient than to arm himself1 to whomever the sword he seizes1 or the buckler1 may belong3 ,to make provision of all means of defence and security3 ,and his particular regard to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or that of others1 he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone1 without concern for those who no longer merit his care and attention4 ,when any man1 even in political society1 renders himself by his crimes1 obnoxious to the public1 he is punished by the laws in his goods and person2 that is1 the ordinary rules of justice are1 with regard to him1 suspended for a moment1 and it becomes equitable to inflict on him1 for the ,,benefit of society1 what otherwise he could not suffer without wrong or injury4 ,the rage and violence of public war2 what is it but a suspension of justice among the warring parties1 who perceive1 that this virtue is now no longer of any ,,use or advantage to them8 ,the laws of war1 which then succeed to those of equity and justice1 are rules calculated for the ,,advantage and ,,utility of that particular state1 in which men are now placed4 ,and were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians1 who observed no rules even of war1 the former must also suspend their observance of them1 where they no longer serve to any purpose2 and must render every action or recounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors4 ,thus1 the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed1 and owe their origin and existence to that utility1 which results to the public from their strict and regular observance4 ,reverse1 in any considerable circumstance1 the condition of men3 ,produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity3 ,implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity1 or perfect rapaciousness and malice3 ,by rendering justice totally ,,useless1 you thereby totally destroy its essence1 and suspend its obligation upon mankind4 ,the common situation of society is a medium amidst all these extremes4 ,we are naturally partial to ourselves1 and to our friends2 but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct4 ,few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature2 but by art1 labour1 and industry1 we can extract them in great abundance4 ,hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society3 ,hence justice derives its usefulness to the public3 ,and hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation4 ,these conclusions are so natural and obvious1 that they have not escaped even the poets1 in their descriptions of the felicity attending the golden age or the reign of ,saturn4 ,the seasons1 in that first period of nature1 were so temperate1 if we credit these agreeable fictions1 that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with clothes and houses1 as a security against the violence of heat and cold3 ,the rivers flowed with wine and milk3 ,the oaks yielded honey2 and nature spontaneously produced her greatest delicacies4 ,nor were these the chief advantages of that happy age4 ,tempests were not alone removed from nature2 but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts1 which now cause such uproar1 and engender such confusion4 ,avarice1 ambition1 cruelty1 selfishness1 were never heard of3 ,cordial affection1 compassion1 sympathy1 were the only movements with which the mind was yet acquainted4 ,even the punctilious distinction of ,,mine and ,,thine was banished from among the happy race of mortals1 and carried with it the very notion of property and obligation1 justice and injustice4 ,this ,,poetical fiction of the ,,golden ,,age1 is in some respects1 of a piece with the ,,philosophical fiction of the ,,state ,,of ,,nature2 only that the former is represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition1 which can possibly be imagined2 whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual war and violence1 attended with the most extreme necessity4 ,on the first origin of mankind1 we are told1 their ignorance and savage nature were so prevalent1 that they could give no mutual trust1 but must each depend upon himself and his own force or cunning for protection and security4 ,no law was heard of3 ,no rule of justice known3 ,no distinction of property regarded3 ,power was the only measure of right2 and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men's untamed selfishness and barbarity4 ,footnote3 ,this fiction of a state of nature1 as a state of war1 was not first started by ,mr4 ,hobbes1 as is commonly imagined4 ,plato endeavours to refute an hypothesis very like it in the second1 third1 and fourth books de republica4 ,cicero1 on the contrary1 supposes it certain and universally acknowledged in the following passage4 ',quis enim vestrum1 judices1 ignorat1 ita naturam rerum tulisse1 ut quodam tempore homines1 nondum neque naturali neque civili jure descripto1 fusi per agros ac dispersi vagarentur tantumque haberent quantum manu ac viribus1 per caedem ac vulnera1 aut eripere aut retinere potuissent8 ,qui igitur primi virtute consilio praestanti extiterunt1 ii perspecto genere humanae docilitatis atque ingenii1 dissipatos unum in locum congregarunt1 eosque ex feritate illa ad justitiam ac mansuetudinem transduxerunt4 ,tum res ad communem utilitatem1 quas publicas appellamus1 tum conventicula hominum1 quae postea civitates nominatae sunt1 tum domicilia conjuncta1 quas urbes dicamus1 invento divino humano jure moenibus sepserunt4 ,atque inter hanc vitam1 perpolitam humanitate1 llam immanem1 nihil tam interest quam ,,jus atque ,,vis4 ,horum utro uti nolimus1 altero est utendum4 ,vim volumus extingui4 ,jus valeat necesse est1 idi est1 judicia1 quibus omne jus continetur4 ,judicia displicent1 ant nulla sunt4 ,vis dominetur necesse est4 ,haec vident omnes4' ,pro ,sext4 sec4 #db4 ,whether such a condition of human nature could ever exist1 or if it did1 could continue so long as to merit the appellation of a ,,state1 may justly be doubted4 ,men are necessarily born in a family-society1 at least2 and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and behaviour4 ,but this must be admitted1 that1 if such a state of mutual war and violence was ever real1 the suspension of all laws of justice1 from their absolute inutility1 is a necessary and infallible consequence4 ,the more we vary our views of human life1 and the newer and more unusual the lights are in which we survey it1 the more shall we be convinced1 that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory4 ,were there a species of creatures intermingled with men1 which1 though rational1 were possessed of such inferior strength1 both of body and mind1 that they were incapable of all resistance1 and could never1 upon the highest provocation1 make us feel the effects of their resentment2 the necessary consequence1 ,i think1 is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures1 but should not1 properly speaking1 lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them1 nor could they possess any right or property1 exclusive of such arbitrary lords4 ,our intercourse with them could not be called society1 which supposes a degree of equality2 but absolute command on the one side1 and servile obedience on the other4 ,whatever we covet1 they must instantly resign3 ,our permission is the only tenure1 by which they hold their possessions3 ,our compassion and kindness the only check1 by which they curb our lawless will3 ,and as no inconvenience ever results from the exercise of a power1 so firmly established in nature1 the restraints of justice and property1 being totally ,,useless1 would never have place in so unequal a confederacy4 ,this is plainly the situation of men1 with regard to animals2 and how far these may be said to possess reason1 ,i leave it to others to determine4 ,the great superiority of civilized ,europeans above barbarous ,indians1 tempted us to imagine ourselves on the same footing with regard to them1 and made us throw off all restraints of justice1 and even of humanity1 in our treatment of them4 ,in many nations1 the female sex are reduced to like slavery1 and are rendered incapable of all property1 in opposition to their lordly masters4 ,but though the males1 when united1 have in all countries bodily force sufficient to maintain this severe tyranny1 yet such are the insinuation1 address1 and charms of their fair companions1 that women are commonly able to break the confederacy1 and share with the other sex in all the rights and privileges of society4 ,were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual possessed within himself every faculty1 requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind3 ,were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man1 by the primary intention of the supreme ,creator3 ,it seems evident1 that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice1 as of social discourse and conversation4 ,where mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose1 they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man4 ,the headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences4 ,and as each man is here supposed to love himself alone1 and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and happiness1 he would1 on every occasion1 to the utmost of his power1 challenge the preference above every other being1 to none of which he is bound by any ties1 either of nature or of interest4 ,but suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature1 a family immediately arises2 and particular rules being found requisite for its subsistence1 these are immediately embraced2 though without comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions4 ,suppose that several families unite together into one society1 which is totally disjoined from all others1 the rules1 which preserve peace and order1 enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society2 but becoming then entirely useless1 lose their force when carried one step farther4 ,but again suppose1 that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage1 the boundaries of justice still grow larger1 in proportion to the largeness of men's views1 and the force of their mutual connexions4 ,history1 experience1 reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments1 and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice1 in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,if we examine the ,,particular laws1 by which justice is directed1 and property determined2 we shall still be presented with the same conclusion4 ,the good of mankind is the only object of all these laws and regulations4 ,not only is it requisite1 for the peace and interest of society1 that men's possessions should be separated2 but the rules1 which we follow1 in making the separation1 are such as can best be contrived to serve farther the interests of society4 ,we shall suppose that a creature1 possessed of reason1 but unacquainted with human nature1 deliberates with himself what rules of justice or property would best promote public interest1 and establish peace and security among mankind3 ,his most obvious thought would be1 to assign the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue1 and give every one the power of doing good1 proportioned to his inclination4 ,in a perfect theocracy1 where a being1 infinitely intelligent1 governs by particular volitions1 this rule would certainly have place1 and might serve to the wisest purposes3 ,but were mankind to execute such a law2 so great is the uncertainty of merit1 both from its natural obscurity1 and from the self-conceit of each individual1 that no determinate rule of conduct would ever result from it2 and the total dissolution of society must be the immediate consequence4 ,fanatics may suppose1 ,,that ,,dominion ,,is ,,founded ,,on ,,grace1 and ,,that ,,saints ,,alone ,,inherit ,,the ,,earth2 but the civil magistrate very justly puts these sublime theorists on the same footing with common robbers1 and teaches them by the severest discipline1 that a rule1 which1 in speculation1 may seem the most advantageous to society1 may yet be found1 in practice1 totally pernicious and destructive4 ,that there were ,,religious fanatics of this kind in ,england1 during the civil wars1 we learn from history2 though it is probable1 that the obvious ,,tendency of these principles excited such horror in mankind1 as soon obliged the dangerous enthusiasts to renounce1 or at least conceal their tenets4 ,perhaps the ,,levellers1 who claimed an equal distribution of property1 were a kind of ,,political fanatics1 which arose from the religious species1 and more openly avowed their pretensions2 as carrying a more plausible appearance1 of being practicable in themselves1 as well as useful to human society4 ,it must1 indeed1 be confessed1 that nature is so liberal to mankind1 that1 were all her presents equally divided among the species1 and improved by art and industry1 every individual would enjoy all the necessaries1 and even most of the comforts of life2 nor would ever be liable to any ills but such as might accidentally arise from the sickly frame and constitution of his body4 ,it must also be confessed1 that1 wherever we depart from this equality1 we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich1 and that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity1 in one individual1 frequently costs more than bread to many families1 and even provinces4 ,it may appear withal1 that the rule of equality1 as it would be highly ,,useful1 is not altogether ,,impracticable2 but has taken place1 at least in an imperfect degree1 in some republics2 particularly that of ,sparta2 where it was attended1 it is said1 with the most beneficial consequences4 ,not to mention that the ,agrarian laws1 so frequently claimed in ,rome1 and carried into execution in many ,greek cities1 proceeded1 all of them1 from a general idea of the utility of this principle4 ,but historians1 and even common sense1 may inform us1 that1 however specious these ideas of ,,perfect equality may seem1 they are really1 at bottom1 ,,impracticable2 and were they not so1 would be extremely ,,pernicious to human society4 ,render possessions ever so equal1 men's different degrees of art1 care1 and industry will immediately break that equality4 ,or if you check these virtues1 you reduce society to the most extreme indigence2 and instead of preventing want and beggary in a few1 render it unavoidable to the whole community4 ,the most rigorous inquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance2 and the most severe jurisdiction1 to punish and redress it4 ,but besides1 that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny1 and be exerted with great partialities2 who can possibly be possessed of it1 in such a situation as is here supposed8 ,perfect equality of possessions1 destroying all subordination1 weakens extremely the authority of magistracy1 and must reduce all power nearly to a level1 as well as property4 ,we may conclude1 therefore1 that1 in order to establish laws for the regulation of property1 we must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man2 must reject appearances1 which may be false1 though specious2 and must search for those rules1 which are1 on the whole1 most ,,useful and ,,beneficial4 ,vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient for this purpose2 where men give not way to too selfish avidity1 or too extensive enthusiasm4 ,who sees not1 for instance1 that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or industry ought1 for ever1 to be secured to him1 in order to give encouragement to such ,,useful habits and accomplishments8 ,that the property ought also to descend to children and relations1 for the same ,,useful purpose8 ,that it may be alienated by consent1 in order to beget that commerce and intercourse1 which is so ,,beneficial to human society8 ,and that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled1 in order to secure mutual trust and confidence1 by which the general ,,interest of mankind is so much promoted8 ,examine the writers on the laws of nature2 and you will always find1 that1 whatever principles they set out with1 they are sure to terminate here at last1 and to assign1 as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish1 the convenience and necessities of mankind4 ,a concession thus extorted1 in opposition to systems1 has more authority than if it had been made in prosecution of them4 ,what other reason1 indeed1 could writers ever give1 why this must be ,,mine and that ,,yours2 since uninstructed nature surely never made any such distinction8 ,the objects which receive those appellations are1 of themselves1 foreign to us2 they are totally disjoined and separated from us2 and nothing but the general interests of society can form the connexion4 ,sometimes the interests of society may require a rule of justice in a particular case2 but may not determine any particular rule1 among several1 which are all equally beneficial4 ,in that case1 the slightest analogies are laid hold of1 in order to prevent that indifference and ambiguity1 which would be the source of perpetual dissension4 ,thus possession alone1 and first possession1 is supposed to convey property1 where no body else has any preceding claim and pretension4 ,many of the reasonings of lawyers are of this analogical nature1 and depend on very slight connexions of the imagination4 ,does any one scruple1 in extraordinary cases1 to violate all regard to the private property of individuals1 and sacrifice to public interest a distinction which had been established for the sake of that interest8 ,the safety of the people is the supreme law3 ,all other particular laws are subordinate to it1 and dependent on it3 ,and if1 in the ,,common course of things1 they be followed and regarded2 it is only because the public safety and interest ,,commonly demand so equal and impartial an administration4 ,sometimes both ,,utility and ,,analogy fail1 and leave the laws of justice in total uncertainty4 ,thus1 it is highly requisite1 that prescription or long possession should convey property2 but what number of days or months or years should be sufficient for that purpose1 it is impossible for reason alone to determine4 ,,civil ,,laws here supply the place of the natural ,,code1 and assign different terms for prescription1 according to the different ,,utilities1 proposed by the legislator4 ,bills of exchange and promissory notes1 by the laws of most countries1 prescribe sooner than bonds1 and mortgages1 and contracts of a more formal nature4 ,in general we may observe that all questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil laws1 which extend1 restrain1 modify1 and alter the rules of natural justice1 according to the particular ,,convenience of each community4 ,the laws have1 or ought to have1 a constant reference to the constitution of government1 the manners1 the climate1 the religion1 the commerce1 the situation of each society4 ,a late author of genius1 as well as learning1 has prosecuted this subject at large1 and has established1 from these principles1 a system of political knowledge1 which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts1 and is not wanting in solidity4 ,footnote3 ,the author of ,l',,esprit ,,des ,,loix1 ,this illustrious writer1 however1 sets out with a different theory1 and supposes all right to be founded on certain ,,rapports or relations2 which is a system1 that1 in my opinion1 never will be reconciled with true philosophy4 ,father ,malebranche1 as far as ,i can learn1 was the first that started this abstract theory of morals1 which was afterwards adopted by ,cudworth1 ,clarke1 and others2 and as it excludes all sentiment1 and pretends to found everything on reason1 it has not wanted followers in this philosophic age4 ,see ,section ,i1 ,appendix ,i4 ,with regard to justice1 the virtue here treated of1 the inference against this theory seems short and conclusive4 ,property is allowed to be dependent on civil laws2 civil laws are allowed to have no other object1 but the interest of society3 ,this therefore must be allowed to be the sole foundation of property and justice4 ,not to mention1 that our obligation itself to obey the magistrate and his laws is founded on nothing but the interests of society4 ,if the ideas of justice1 sometimes1 do not follow the dispositions of civil law2 we shall find1 that these cases1 instead of objections1 are confirmations of the theory delivered above4 ,where a civil law is so perverse as to cross all the interests of society1 it loses all its authority1 and men judge by the ideas of natural justice1 which are conformable to those interests4 ,sometimes also civil laws1 for useful purposes1 require a ceremony or form to any deed2 and where that is wanting1 their decrees run contrary to the usual tenour of justice2 but one who takes advantage of such chicanes1 is not commonly regarded as an honest man4 ,thus1 the interests of society require1 that contracts be fulfilled2 and there is not a more material article either of natural or civil justice3 ,but the omission of a trifling circumstance will often1 by law1 invalidate a contract1 in foro humano1 but not in foro conscientiae1 as divines express themselves4 ,in these cases1 the magistrate is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right1 not to have altered the right4 ,where his intention extends to the right1 and is conformable to the interests of society2 it never fails to alter the right2 a clear proof of the origin of justice and of property1 as assigned above4 ,,what ,,is ,a ,,man',s ,,property8 ,anything which it is lawful for him1 and for him alone1 to use4 ,,but ,,what ,,rule ,,have ,,we1 ,,by ,,which ,,we ,,can ,,distinguish ,,these ,,objects8 ,here we must have recourse to statutes1 customs1 precedents1 analogies1 and a hundred other circumstances2 some of which are constant and inflexible1 some variable and arbitrary4 ,but the ultimate point1 in which they all professedly terminate1 is the interest and happiness of human society4 ,where this enters not into consideration1 nothing can appear more whimsical1 unnatural1 and even superstitious1 than all or most of the laws of justice and of property4 ,those who ridicule vulgar superstitions1 and expose the folly of particular regards to meats1 days1 places1 postures1 apparel1 have an easy task2 while they consider all the qualities and relations of the objects1 and discover no adequate cause for that affection or antipathy1 veneration or horror1 which have so mighty an influence over a considerable part of mankind4 ,a ,syrian would have starved rather than taste pigeon2 an ,egyptian would not have approached bacon3 ,but if these species of food be examined by the senses of sight1 smell1 or taste1 or scrutinized by the sciences of chemistry1 medicine1 or physics1 no difference is ever found between them and any other species1 nor can that precise circumstance be pitched on1 which may afford a just foundation for the religious passion4 ,a fowl on ,thursday is lawful food2 on ,friday abominable3 ,eggs in this house and in this diocese1 are permitted during ,lent2 a hundred paces farther1 to eat them is a damnable sin4 ,this earth or building1 yesterday was profane2 to-day1 by the muttering of certain words1 it has become holy and sacred4 ,such reflections as these1 in the mouth of a philosopher1 one may safely say1 are too obvious to have any influence2 because they must always1 to every man1 occur at first sight2 and where they prevail not1 of themselves1 they are surely obstructed by education1 prejudice1 and passion1 not by ignorance or mistake4 ,it may appear to a careless view1 or rather a too abstracted reflection1 that there enters a like superstition into all the sentiments of justice2 and that1 if a man expose its object1 or what we call property1 to the same scrutiny of sense and science1 he will not1 by the most accurate enquiry1 find any foundation for the difference made by moral sentiment4 ,i may lawfully nourish myself from this tree2 but the fruit of another of the same species1 ten paces off1 it is criminal for me to touch4 ,had ,i worn this apparel an hour ago1 ,i had merited the severest punishment2 but a man1 by pronouncing a few magical syllables1 has now rendered it fit for my use and service4 ,were this house placed in the neighbouring territory1 it had been immoral for me to dwell in it2 but being built on this side the river1 it is subject to a different municipal law1 and by its becoming mine ,i incur no blame or censure4 ,the same species of reasoning it may be thought1 which so successfully exposes superstition1 is also applicable to justice2 nor is it possible1 in the one case more than in the other1 to point out1 in the object1 that precise quality or circumstance1 which is the foundation of the sentiment4 ,but there is this material difference between ,,superstition and ,,justice1 that the former is frivolous1 useless1 and burdensome2 the latter is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of society4 ,when we abstract from this circumstance 7for it is too apparent ever to be overlooked7 it must be confessed1 that all regards to right and property1 seem entirely without foundation1 as much as the grossest and most vulgar superstition4 ,were the interests of society nowise concerned1 it is as unintelligible why another's articulating certain sounds implying consent1 should change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object1 as why the reciting of a liturgy by a priest1 in a certain habit and posture1 should dedicate a heap of brick and timber1 and render it1 thenceforth and for ever1 sacred4 ,footnote3 ,it is evident1 that the will or consent alone never transfers property1 nor causes the obligation of a promise 7for the same reasoning extends to both71 but the will must be expressed by words or signs1 in order to impose a tie upon any man4 ,the expression being once brought in as subservient to the will1 soon becomes the principal part of the promise2 nor will a man be less bound by his word1 though he secretly give a different direction to his intention1 and withhold the assent of his mind4 ,but though the expression makes1 on most occasions1 the whole of the promise1 yet it does not always so2 and one who should make use of any expression1 of which he knows not the meaning1 and which he uses without any sense of the consequences1 would not certainly be bound by it4 ,nay1 though he know its meaning1 yet if he use it in jest only1 and with such signs as evidently show1 that he has no serious intention of binding himself1 he would not lie under any obligation of performance2 but it is necessary1 that the words be a perfect expression of the will1 without any contrary signs4 ,nay1 even this we must not carry so far as to imagine1 that one1 whom1 by our quickness of understanding1 we conjecture1 from certain signs1 to have an intention of deceiving us1 is not bound by his expression or verbal promise1 if we accept of it2 but must limit this conclusion to those cases where the signs are of a different nature from those of deceit4 ,all these contradictions are easily accounted for1 if justice arise entirely from its usefulness to society2 but will never be explained on any other hypothesis4 ,it is remarkable that the moral decisions of the ,,jesuits and other relaxed casuists1 were commonly formed in prosecution of some such subtilties of reasoning as are here pointed out1 and proceed as much from the habit of scholastic refinement as from any corruption of the heart1 if we may follow the authority of ,mons4 ,bayle4 ,see his ,dictionary1 article ,loyola4 ,and why has the indignation of mankind risen so high against these casuists2 but because every one perceived1 that human society could not subsist were such practices authorized1 and that morals must always be handled with a view to public interest1 more than philosophical regularity8 ,if the secret direction of the intention1 said every man of sense1 could invalidate a contract2 where is our security8 ,and yet a metaphysical schoolman might think1 that1 where an intention was supposed to be requisite1 if that intention really had not place1 no consequence ought to follow1 and no obligation be imposed4 ,the casuistical subtilties may not be greater than the snbtilties of lawyers1 hinted at above2 but as the former are ,,pernicious1 and the latter ,,innocent and even ,,necessary1 this is the reason of the very different reception they meet with from the world4 ,it is a doctrine of the ,church of ,rome1 that the priest1 by a secret direction of his intention1 can invalidate any sacrament4 ,this position is derived from a strict and regular prosecution of the obvious truth1 that empty words alone1 without any meaning or intention in the speaker1 can never be attended with any effect4 ,if the same conclusion be not admitted in reasonings concerning civil contracts1 where the affair is allowed to be of so much less consequence than the eternal salvation of thousands1 it proceeds entirely from men's sense of the danger and inconvenience of the doctrine in the former case3 ,and we may thence observe1 that however positive1 arrogant1 and dogmatical any superstition may appear1 it never can convey any thorough persuasion of the reality of its objects1 or put them1 in any degree1 on a balance with the common incidents of life1 which we learn from daily observation and experimental reasoning4 ,these reflections are far from weakening the obligations of justice1 or diminishing anything from the most sacred attention to property4 ,on the contrary1 such sentiments must acquire new force from the present reasoning4 ,for what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any duty1 than to observe1 that human society1 or even human nature1 could not subsist without the establishment of it2 and will still arrive at greater degrees of happiness and perfection1 the more inviolable the regard is1 which is paid to that duty8 ,the dilemma seems obvious3 ,as justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society1 the sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency1 or like hunger1 thirst1 and other appetites1 resentment1 love of life1 attachment to offspring1 and other passions1 arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast1 which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes4 ,if the latter be the case1 it follows1 that property1 which is the object of justice1 is also distinguished by a simple original instinct1 and is not ascertained by any argument or reflection4 ,but who is there that ever heard of such an instinct8 ,or is this a subject in which new discoveries can be made8 ,we may as well expect to discover1 in the body1 new senses1 which had before escaped the observation of all mankind4 ,but farther1 though it seems a very simple proposition to say1 that nature1 by an instinctive sentiment1 distinguishes property1 yet in reality we shall find1 that there are required for that purpose ten thousand different instincts1 and these employed about objects of the greatest intricacy and nicest discernment4 ,for when a definition of ,,property is required1 that relation is found to resolve itself into any possession acquired by occupation1 by industry1 by prescription1 by inheritance1 by contract1 c4 ,can we think that nature1 by an original instinct1 instructs us in all these methods of acquisition8 ,these words too1 inheritance and contract1 stand for ideas infinitely complicated2 and to define them exactly1 a hundred volumes of laws1 and a thousand volumes of commentators1 have not been found sufficient4 ,does nature1 whose instincts in men are all simple1 embrace such complicated and artificial objects1 and create a rational creature1 without trusting anything to the operation of his reason8 ,but even though all this were admitted1 it would not be satisfactory4 ,positive laws can certainly transfer property4 ,it is by another original instinct1 that we recognize the authority of kings and senates1 and mark all the boundaries of their jurisdiction8 ,judges too1 even though their sentence be erroneous and illegal1 must be allowed1 for the sake of peace and order1 to have decisive authority1 and ultimately to determine property4 ,have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and juries8 ,who sees not1 that all these institutions arise merely from the necessities of human society8 ,all birds of the same species in every age and country1 built their nests alike3 ,in this we see the force of instinct4 ,men1 in different times and places1 frame their houses differently3 ,here we perceive the influence of reason and custom4 ,a like inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property4 ,how great soever the variety of municipal laws1 it must be confessed1 that their chief outlines pretty regularly concur2 because the purposes1 to which they tend1 are everywhere exactly similar4 ,in like manner1 all houses have a roof and walls1 windows and chimneys2 though diversified in their shape1 figure1 and materials4 ,the purposes of the latter1 directed to the conveniencies of human life1 discover not more plainly their origin from reason and reflection1 than do those of the former1 which point all to a like end4 ,i need not mention the variations1 which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination1 and from the subtilties and abstractions of law-topics and reasonings4 ,there is no possibility of reconciling this observation to the notion of original instincts4 ,what alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory1 on which ,i insist1 is the influence of education and acquired habits1 by which we are so accustomed to blame injustice1 that we are not1 in every instance1 conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of it4 ,the views the most familiar to us are apt1 for that very reason1 to escape us2 and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives1 we are apt likewise to continue mechanically1 without recalling1 on every occasion1 the reflections1 which first determined us4 ,the convenience1 or rather necessity1 which leads to justice is so universal1 and everywhere points so much to the same rules1 that the habit takes place in all societies2 and it is not without some scrutiny1 that we are able to ascertain its true origin4 ,the matter1 however1 is not so obscure1 but that even in common life we have every moment recourse to the principle of public utility1 and ask1 ,,what ,,must ,,become ,,of ,,the ,,world1 ,,if ,,such ,,practices ,,prevail8 ,,how ,,could ,,society ,,subsist ,,under ,,such ,,disorders8 ,were the distinction or separation of possessions entirely useless1 can any one conceive1 that it ever should have obtained in society8 ,thus we seem1 upon the whole1 to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here insisted on1 and can determine what degree of esteem or moral approbation may result from reflections on public interest and utility4 ,the necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue2 and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed1 we may conclude that this circumstance of usefulness has1 in general1 the strongest energy1 and most entire command over our sentiments4 ,it must1 therefore1 be the source of a considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity1 benevolence1 friendship1 public spirit1 and other social virtues of that stamp2 as it is the sole source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity1 justice1 veracity1 integrity1 and those other estimable and useful qualities and principles4 ,it is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy1 and even of common reason2 where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance1 to ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances4 ,this indeed is ,newton's chief rule of philosophizing ,footnote3 ,principia4 ,lib4 iii44 ,,section ,,iv4 ,,of ,,political ,,society4 ,had every man sufficient ,,sagacity to perceive1 at all times1 the strong interest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity1 and ,,strength ,,of ,,mind sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest1 in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage2 there had never1 in that case1 been any such thing as government or political society1 but each man1 following his natural liberty1 had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others4 ,what need of positive law where natural justice is1 of itself1 a sufficient restraint8 ,why create magistrates1 where there never arises any disorder or iniquity8 ,why abridge our native freedom1 when1 in every instance1 the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial8 ,it is evident1 that1 if government were totally useless1 it never could have place1 and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the ,,advantage1 which it procures to society1 by preserving peace and order among mankind4 ,when a number of political societies are erected1 and maintain a great intercourse together1 a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be ,,useful in that particular situation2 and accordingly take place under the title of ,laws of ,nations4 ,of this kind are1 the sacredness of the person of ambassadors1 abstaining from poisoned arms1 quarter in war1 with others of that kind1 which are plainly calculated for the ,,advantage of states and kingdoms in their intercourse with each other4 ,the rules of justice1 such as prevail among individuals1 are not entirely suspended among political societies4 ,all princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes2 and some1 no doubt1 without hypocrisy4 ,alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states1 which would only be so much waste of parchment1 if they were not found by experience to have ,,some influence and authority4 ,but here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals4 ,human nature cannot by any means subsist1 without the association of individuals2 and that association never could have place1 were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice4 ,disorder1 confusion1 the war of all against all1 are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct4 ,but nations can subsist without intercourse4 ,they may even subsist1 in some degree1 under a general war4 ,the observance of justice1 though useful among them1 is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals2 and the moral obligation holds proportion with the ,,usefulness4 ,all politicians will allow1 and most philosophers1 that reasons of state may1 in particular emergencies1 dispense with the rules of justice1 and invalidate any treaty or alliance1 where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial1 in a considerable degree1 to either of the contracting parties4 ,but nothing less than the most extreme necessity1 it is confessed1 can justify individuals in a breach of promise1 or an invasion of the properties of others4 ,in a confederated commonwealth1 such as the ,achaean republic of old1 or the ,swiss ,cantons and ,united ,provinces in modern times2 as the league has here a peculiar ,,utility1 the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredness and authority1 and a violation of them would be regarded as no less1 or even as more criminal1 than any private injury or injustice4 ,the long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their young2 and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed4 ,without such a ,,utility1 it will readily be owned1 that such a virtue would never have been thought of4 ,footnote3 ,the only solution1 which ,plato gives to all the objections that might be raised against the community of women1 established in his imaginary commonwealth1 is1 ,greek quotation here4 ,scite enim istud et dicitur et dicetur1 ,id quod utile sit honestum esse1 quod autem inutile sit turpe esse4 ,de ,rep lib v p #deg ex edit ,ser4 ,and this maxim will admit of no doubt1 where public utility is concerned1 which is ,plato's meaning4 ,and indeed to what other purpose do all the ideas of chastity and modesty serve8 ,nisi utile est quod facimus1 frustra est gloria1 says ,phaedrus4 ,greek quotation here1 says ,plutarch1 de vitioso pudore4 ,nihil eorum quae damnosa sunt1 pulchrum est4 ,the same was the opinion of the ,stoics ,greek quotation here2 from ,sept4 ,emp lib ,,iii cap #bj4 ,an infidelity of this nature is much more ,,pernicious in ,,women than in ,,men4 ,hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than over the other4 ,these rules have all a reference to generation2 and yet women past child-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those in the flower of their youth and beauty4 ,,general ,,rules are often extended beyond the principle whence they first arise2 and this in all matters of taste and sentiment4 ,it is a vulgar story at ,paris1 that1 during the rage of the ,mississippi1 a hump-backed fellow went every day into the ,rue de ,quincempoix1 where the stock-jobbers met in great crowds1 and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his hump as a desk1 in order to sign their contracts upon it4 ,would the fortune1 which he raised by this expedient1 make him a handsome fellow2 though it be confessed1 that personal beauty arises very much from ideas of utility8 ,the imagination is influenced by associations of ideas2 which1 though they arise at first from the judgement1 are not easily altered by every particular exception that occurs to us4 ,to which we may add1 in the present case of chastity1 that the example of the old would be pernicious to the young2 and that women1 continually foreseeing that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence1 would naturally advance that period1 and think more lightly of this whole duty1 so requisite to society4 ,those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of licence of this kind1 that nothing could prevent purity of manners1 were marriage allowed1 among the nearest relations1 or any intercourse of love between them ratified by law and custom4 ,incest1 therefore1 being ,,pernicious in a superior degree1 has also a superior turpitude and moral deformity annexed to it4 ,what is the reason1 why1 by the ,athenian laws1 one might marry a half-sister by the father1 but not by the mother8 ,plainly this3 ,the manners of the ,athenians were so reserved1 that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment1 even in the same family1 unless where he visited his own mother4 ,his step-mother and her children were as much shut up from him as the woman of any other family1 and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them4 ,uncles and nieces1 for a like reason1 might marry at ,athens2 but neither these1 nor half-brothers and sisters1 could contract that alliance at ,rome1 where the intercourse was more open between the sexes4 ,public utility is the cause of all these variations4 ,to repeat1 to a man's prejudice1 anything that escaped him in private conversation1 or to make any such use of his private letters1 is highly blamed4 ,the free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely checked1 where no such rules of fidelity are established4 ,even in repeating stories1 whence we can foresee no ill consequences to result1 the giving of one's author is regarded as a piece of indiscretion1 if not of immorality4 ,these stories1 in passing from hand to hand1 and receiving all the usual variations1 frequently come about to the persons concerned1 and produce animosities and quarrels among people1 whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive4 ,to pry into secrets1 to open or even read the letters of others1 to play the spy upon their words and looks and actions2 what habits more inconvenient in society8 ,what habits1 of consequence1 more blameable8 ,this principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good manners2 a kind of lesser morality1 calculated for the ease of company and conversation4 ,too much or too little ceremony are both blamed1 and everything1 which promotes ease1 without an indecent familiarity1 is useful and laudable4 ,constancy in friendships1 attachments1 and familiarities1 is commendable1 and is requisite to support trust and good correspondence in society4 ,but in places of general1 though casual concourse1 where the pursuit of health and pleasure brings people promiscuously together1 public conveniency has dispensed with this maxim2 and custom there promotes an unreserved conversation for the time1 by indulging the privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance1 without breach of civility or good manners4 ,even in societies1 which are established on principles the most immoral1 and the most destructive to the interests of the general society1 there are required certain rules1 which a species of false honour1 as well as private interest1 engages the members to observe4 ,robbers and pirates1 it has often been remarked1 could not maintain their pernicious confederacy1 did they not establish a pew distributive justice among themselves1 and recall those laws of equity1 which they have violated with the rest of mankind4 ,i hate a drinking companion1 says the ,greek proverb1 who never forgets4 ,the follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion1 in order to give full scope to the follies of the next4 ,among nations1 where an immoral gallantry1 if covered with a thin veil of mystery1 is1 in some degree1 authorized by custom1 there immediately arise a set of rules1 calculated for the conveniency of that attachment4 ,the famous court or parliament of love in ,provence formerly decided all difficult cases of this nature4 ,in societies for play1 there are laws required for the conduct of the game2 and these laws are different in each game4 ,the foundation1 ,i own1 of such societies is frivolous2 and the laws are1 in a great measure1 though not altogether1 capricious and arbitrary4 ,so far is there a material difference between them and the rules of justice1 fidelity1 and loyalty4 ,the general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the subsistence of the species2 and the public conveniency1 which regulates morals1 is inviolably established in the nature of man1 and of the world1 in which he lives4 ,the comparison1 therefore1 in these respects1 is very imperfect4 ,we may only learn from it the necessity of rules1 wherever men have any intercourse with each other4 ,they cannot even pass each other on the road without rules4 ,waggoners1 coachmen1 and postilions have principles1 by which they give the way2 and these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience4 ,sometimes also they are arbitrary1 at least dependent on a kind of capricious analogy like many of the reasonings of lawyers4 ,footnote3 ,that the lighter machine yield to the heavier1 and1 in machines of the same kind1 that the empty yield to the loaded2 this rule is founded on convenience4 ,that those who are going to the capital take place of those who are coming from it2 this seems to be founded on some idea of dignity of the great city1 and of the preference of the future to the past4 ,from like reasons1 among foot-walkers1 the right-hand entitles a man to the wall1 and prevents jostling1 which peaceable people find very disagreeable and inconvenient4 ,to carry the matter farther1 we may observe1 that it is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes1 and maxims1 and an idea of justice and honour4 ,war has its laws as well as peace2 and even that sportive kind of war1 carried on among wrestlers1 boxers1 cudgel-players1 gladiators1 is regulated by fixed principles4 ,common interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned4 ,,section ,v4 ,,why ,,utility ,,pleases4 ,,part ,i4 ,it seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise1 which we bestow on the social virtues1 that one would expect to meet with this principle everywhere in moral writers1 as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry4 ,in common life1 we may observe1 that the circumstance of utility is always appealed to2 nor is it supposed1 that a greater eulogy can be given to any man1 than to display his usefulness to the public1 and enumerate the services1 which he has performed to mankind and society4 ,what praise1 even of an inanimate form1 if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose6 ,and how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity1 if we can show the necessity of that particular construction for the use intended6 ,a ship appears more beautiful to an artist1 or one moderately skilled in navigation1 where its prow is wide and swelling beyond its poop1 than if it were framed with a precise geometrical regularity1 in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics4 ,a building1 whose doors and windows were exact squares1 would hurt the eye by that very proportion2 as ill adapted to the figure of a human creature1 for whose service the fabric was intended4 ,what wonder then1 that a man1 whose habits and conduct are hurtful to society1 and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourse with him1 should1 on that account1 be an object of disapprobation1 and communicate to every spectator the strongest sentiment of disgust and hatred4 ,footnote3 ,we ought not to imagine1 because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man1 that therefore it ought also1 according to this system1 to merit he appellation of ,,virtuous4 ,the sentiments1 excited by utility1 are1 in the two cases1 very different2 and the one is mixed with affection1 esteem1 approbation1 c41 and not the other4 ,in like manner1 an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure4 ,but can we ever be in love with the former8 ,there are a numerous set of passions and sentiments1 of which thinking rational beings are1 by the original constitution of nature1 the only proper objects3 and though the very same qualities be transferred to an insensible1 inanimate being1 they will not excite the same sentiments4 ,the beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are1 indeed1 sometimes called their ,,virtues2 but this is an effect of the caprice of language1 which out not to be regarded in reasoning4 ,for though there be a species of approbation attending even inanimate objects1 when beneficial1 yet this sentiment is so weak1 and so different from that which is directed to beneficent magistrates or statesman2 that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation4 ,a very small variation of the object1 even where the same qualities are preserved1 will destroy a sentiment4 ,thus1 the same beauty1 transferred to a different sex1 excites no amorous passion1 where nature is not extremely perverted4 ,but perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of usefulness1 or its contrary1 has kept philosophers from admitting them into their systems of ethics1 and has induced them rather to employ any other principle1 in explaining the origin of moral good and evil4 ,but it is no just reason for rejecting any principle1 confirmed by experience1 that we cannot give a satisfactory account of its origin1 nor are able to resolve it into other more general principles4 ,and if we would employ a little thought on the present subject1 we need be at no loss to account for the influence of utility1 and to deduce it from principles1 the most known and avowed in human nature4 ,from the apparent usefulness of the social virtues1 it has readily been inferred by sceptics1 both ancient and modern1 that all moral distinctions arise from education1 and were1 at first1 invented1 and afterwards encouraged1 by the art of politicians1 in order to render men tractable1 and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness1 which incapacitated them for society4 ,this principle1 indeed1 of precept and education1 must so far be owned to have a powerful influence1 that it may frequently increase or diminish1 beyond their natural standard1 the sentiments of approbation or dislike2 and may even1 in particular instances1 create1 without any natural principle1 a new sentiment of this kind2 as is evident in all superstitious practices and observances3 ,but that ,,all moral affection or dislike arises from this origin1 will never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer4 ,had nature made no such distinction1 founded on the original constitution of the mind1 the words1 ,,honourable and ,,shameful1 ,,lovely and ,,odious1 ,,noble and ,,despicable1 had never had place in any language2 nor could politicians1 had they invented these terms1 ever have been able to render them intelligible1 or make them convey any idea to the audience4 ,so that nothing can be more superficial than this paradox of the sceptics2 and it were well1 if1 in the abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics1 we could as easily obviate the cavils of that sect1 as in the practical and more intelligible sciences of politics and morals4 ,the social virtues must1 therefore1 be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness1 which1 at first1 antecedent to all precept or education1 recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind1 and engages their affections4 ,and as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance1 whence they derive their merit1 it follows1 that the end1 which they have a tendency to promote1 must be some way agreeable to us1 and take hold of some natural affection4 ,it must please1 either from considerations of self-interest1 or from more generous motives and regards4 ,it has often been asserted1 that1 as every man has a strong connexion with society1 and perceives the impossibility of his solitary subsistence1 he becomes1 on that account1 favourable to all those habits or principles1 which promote order in society1 and insure to him the quiet possession of so inestimable a blessing1 ,as much as we value our own happiness and welfare1 as much must we applaud the practice of justice and humanity1 by which alone the social confederacy can be maintained1 and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and assistance4 ,this deduction of morals from self-love1 or a regard to private interest1 is an obvious thought1 and has not arisen wholly from the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics4 ,to mention no others1 ,polybius1 one of the gravest and most judicious1 as well as most moral writers of antiquity1 has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue4 ,footnote3 ,undutifulness to parents is disapproved of by mankind1 ,greek quotation inserted here4 ,ingratitude for a like reason 7though he seems there to mix a more generous regard7 ,greek quotation inserted here ,lib4 vi cap4 #d4 7,ed4 ,gronorius47 ,perhaps the historian only meant1 that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened1 by our considering the similarity of our case with that of the person suffering2 which is a just sentiment4 ,but though the solid practical sense of that author1 and his aversion to all vain subtilties1 render his authority on the present subject very considerable2 yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority1 and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory4 ,we frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions1 performed in very distant ages and remote countries2 where the utmost subtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest1 or find any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so widely separated from us4 ,a generous1 a brave1 a noble deed1 performed by an adversary1 commands our approbation2 while in its consequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest4 ,where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue1 we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments1 which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind4 ,we praise1 perhaps1 with more alacrity1 where the generous humane action contributes to our particular interest3 ,but the topics of praise1 which we insist on1 are very wide of this circumstance4 ,and we may attempt to bring over others to our sentiments1 without endeavouring to convince them1 that they reap any advantage from the actions which we recommend to their approbation and applause4 ,frame the model of a praiseworthy character1 consisting of all the most amiable moral virtues3 ,give instances1 in which these display themselves after an eminent and extraordinary manner3 ,you readily engage the esteem and approbation of all your audience1 who never so much as enquire in what age and country the person lived1 who possessed these noble qualities3 ,a circumstance1 however1 of all others1 the most material to self-love1 or a concern for our own individual happiness4 ,once on a time1 a statesman1 in the shock and contest of parties1 prevailed so far as to procure1 by his eloquence1 the banishment of an able adversary2 whom he secretly followed1 offering him money for his support during his exile1 and soothing him with topics of consolation in his misfortunes4 ,,alas6 cries the banished statesman1 ,,with ,,what ,,regret ,,must ,i ,,leave ,,my ,,friends ,,in ,,this ,,city1 ,,where ,,even ,,enemies ,,are ,,so ,,generous6 ,virtue1 though in an enemy1 here pleased him3 ,and we also give it the just tribute of praise and approbation2 nor do we retract these sentiments1 when we hear1 that the action passed at ,athens1 about two thousand years ago1 and that the persons' names were ,eschines and ,demosthenes4 ,,what ,,is ,,that ,,to ,,me8 ,there are few occasions1 when this question is not pertinent3 ,and had it that universal1 infallible influence supposed1 it would turn into ridicule every composition1 and almost every conversation1 which contain any praise or censure of men and manners4 ,it is but a weak subterfuge1 when pressed by these facts and arguments1 to say1 that we transport ourselves1 by the force of imagination1 into distant ages and countries1 and consider the advantage1 which we should have reaped from these characters1 had we been contemporaries1 and had any commerce with the persons4 ,it is not conceivable1 how a ,,real sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known ,,imaginary interest2 especially when our ,,real interest is still kept in view1 and is often acknowledged to be entirely distinct from the imaginary1 and even sometimes opposite to it4 ,a man1 brought to the brink of a precipice1 cannot look down without trembling2 and the sentiment of ,,imaginary danger actuates him1 in opposition to the opinion and belief of ,,real safety4 ,but the imagination is here assisted by the presence of a striking object2 and yet prevails not1 except it be also aided by novelty1 and the unusual appearance of the object4 ,custom soon reconciles us to heights and precipices1 and wears off these false and delusive terrors4 ,the reverse is observable in the estimates which we form of characters and manners2 and the more we habituate ourselves to an accurate scrutiny of morals1 the more delicate feeling do we acquire of the most minute distinctions between vice and virtue4 ,such frequent occasion1 indeed1 have we1 in common life1 to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations1 that no object of this kind can be new or unusual to us2 nor could any ,,false views or prepossessions maintain their ground against an experience1 so common and familiar4 ,experience being chiefly what forms the associations of ideas1 it is impossible that any association could establish and support itself1 in direct opposition to that principle4 ,usefulness is agreeable1 and engages our approbation4 ,this is a matter of fact1 confirmed by daily observation4 ,but1 ,,useful8 ,for what8 ,for somebody's interest1 surely4 ,whose interest then8 ,not our own only3 ,for our approbation frequently extends farther4 ,it must1 therefore1 be the interest of those1 who are served by the character or action approved of2 and these we may conclude1 however remote1 are not totally indifferent to us4 ,by opening up this principle1 we shall discover one great source of moral distinctions4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy1 and the interest of each individual is1 in general1 so closely connected with that of the community1 that those philosophers were excusable1 who fancied that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for our own happiness and preservation4 ,they saw every moment1 instances of approbation or blame1 satisfaction or displeasure towards characters and actions2 they denominated the objects of these sentiments1 ,,virtues1 or ,,vices2 they observed1 that the former had a tendency to increase the happiness1 and the latter the misery of mankind2 they asked1 whether it were possible that we could have any general concern for society1 or any disinterested resentment of the welfare or injury of others2 they found it simpler to consider all these sentiments as modifications of self-love2 and they discovered a pretence1 at least1 for this unity of principle1 in that close union of interest1 which is so observable between the public and each individual4 ,but notwithstanding this frequent confusion of interests1 it is easy to attain what natural philosophers1 after ,lord ,bacon1 have affected to call the experimentum crucis1 or that experiment which points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity4 ,we have found instances1 in which private interest was separate from public2 in which it was even contrary3 ,and yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue1 notwithstanding this disjunction of interests4 ,and wherever these distinct interests sensibly concurred1 we always found a sensible increase of the sentiment1 and a more warm affection to virtue1 and detestation of vice1 or what we properly call1 ,,gratitude and ,,revenge4 ,compelled by these instances1 we must renounce the theory1 which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love4 ,we must adopt a more public affection1 and allow1 that the interests of society are not1 even on their own account1 entirely indifferent to us4 ,usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end2 and it is a contradiction in terms1 that anything pleases as means to an end1 where the end itself no wise affects us4 ,if usefulness1 therefore1 be a source of moral sentiment1 and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self2 it follows1 that everything1 which contributes to the happiness of society1 recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will4 ,here is a principle1 which accounts1 in great part1 for the origin of morality3 ,and what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems1 when there occurs one so obvious and natural8 ,,footnote3 ,it is needless to push our researches so far as to ask1 why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others4 ,it is sufficient1 that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature4 ,we must stop somewhere in our examination of causes2 and there are1 in every science1 some general principles1 beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general4 ,no man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others4 ,the first has a natural tendency to give pleasure2 the second1 pain4 ,this every one may find in himself4 ,it is not probable1 that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal1 whatever attempts may have been made to that purpose4 ,but if it were possible1 it belongs not to the present subject2 and we may here safely consider these principles as original2 happy1 if we can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous6 ,have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevolence8 ,or to conceive1 that the very aspect of happiness1 joy1 prosperity1 gives pleasure2 that of pain1 suffering1 sorrow1 communicates uneasiness8 ,the human countenance1 says ,horace ',uti ridentibus arrident1 ita flentibus adflent ,humani vultus1'--,hor41 borrows smiles or tears from the human countenance4 ,reduce a person to solitude1 and he loses all enjoyment1 except either of the sensual or speculative kind2 and that because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his fellow-creatures4 ,the signs of sorrow and mourning1 though arbitrary1 affect us with melancholy2 but the natural symptoms1 tears and cries and groans1 never fail to infuse compassion and uneasiness4 ,and if the effects of misery touch us in so lively a manner2 can we be supposed altogether insensible or indifferent towards its causes2 when a malicious or treacherous character and behaviour are presented to us8 ,we enter1 ,i shall suppose1 into a convenient1 warm1 well-contrived apartment3 ,we necessarily receive a pleasure from its very survey2 because it presents us with the pleasing ideas of ease1 satisfaction1 and enjoyment4 ,the hospitable1 good-humoured1 humane landlord appears4 ,this circumstance surely must embellish the whole2 nor can we easily forbear reflecting1 with pleasure1 on the satisfaction which results to every one from his intercourse and good-offices4 ,his whole family1 by the freedom1 ease1 confidence1 and calm enjoyment1 diffused over their countenances1 sufficiently express their happiness4 ,i have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy1 and can never consider the source of it1 without the most agreeable emotions4 ,he tells me1 that an oppressive and powerful neighbour had attempted to dispossess him of his inheritance1 and had long disturbed all his innocent and social pleasures4 ,i feel an immediate indignation arise in me against such violence and injury4 ,but it is no wonder1 he adds1 that a private wrong should proceed from a man1 who had enslaved provinces1 depopulated cities1 and made the field and scaffold stream with human blood4 ,i am struck with horror at the prospect of so much misery1 and am actuated by the strongest antipathy against its author4 ,in general1 it is certain1 that1 wherever we go1 whatever we reflect on or converse about1 everything still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery1 and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness4 ,in our serious occupations1 in our careless amusements1 this principle still exerts its active energy4 ,a man who enters the theatre1 is immediately struck with the view of so great a multitude1 participating of one common amusement2 and experiences1 from their very aspect1 a superior sensibility or disposition of being affected with every sentiment1 which he shares with his fellow-creatures4 ,he observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience1 and raised to a degree of enthusiasm1 which they cannot command in any solitary or calm moment4 ,every movement of the theatre1 by a skilful poet1 is communicated1 as it were by magic1 to the spectators2 who weep1 tremble1 resent1 rejoice1 and are inflamed with all the variety of passions1 which actuate the several personages of the drama4 ,where any event crosses our wishes1 and interrupts the happiness of the favourite characters1 we feel a sensible anxiety and concern4 ,but where their sufferings proceed from the treachery1 cruelty1 or tyranny of an enemy1 our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the author of these calamities4 ,it is here esteemed contrary to the rules of art to represent anything cool and indifferent4 ,a distant friend1 or a confident1 who has no immediate interest in the catastrophe1 ought1 if possible1 to be avoided by the poet2 as communicating a like indifference to the audience1 and checking the progress of the passions4 ,few species of poetry are more entertaining than ,,pastoral2 and every one is sensible1 that the chief source of its pleasure arises from those images of a gentle and tender tranquillity1 which it represents in its personages1 and of which it communicates a like sentiment to the reader4 ,sannazarius1 who transferred the scene to the sea-shore1 though he presented the most magnificent object in nature1 is confessed to have erred in his choice4 ,the idea of toil1 labour1 and danger1 suffered by the fishermen1 is painful2 by an unavoidable sympathy1 which attends every conception of human happiness or misery4 ,when ,i was twenty1 says a ,french poet1 ,ovid was my favourite3 ,now ,i am forty1 ,i declare for ,horace4 ,we enter1 to be sure1 more readily into sentiments1 which resemble those we feel every day3 ,but no passion1 when well represented1 can be entirely indifferent to us2 because there is none1 of which every man has not1 within him1 at least the seeds and first principles4 ,it is the business of poetry to bring every affection near to us by lively imagery and representation1 and make it look like truth and reality3 ,a certain proof1 that1 wherever that reality is found1 our minds are disposed to be strongly affected by it4 ,any recent event or piece of news1 by which the fate of states1 provinces1 or many individuals is affected1 is extremely interesting even to those whose welfare is not immediately engaged4 ,such intelligence is propagated with celerity1 heard with avidity1 and enquired into with attention and concern4 ,the interest of society appears1 on this occasion1 to be in some degree the interest of each individual4 ,the imagination is sure to be affected2 though the passions excited may not always be so strong and steady as to have great influence on the conduct and behaviour4 ,the perusal of a history seems a calm entertainment2 but would be no entertainment at all1 did not our hearts beat with correspondent movements to those which are described by the historian4 ,thucydides and ,guicciardin support with difficulty our attention2 while the former describes the trivial encounters of the small cities of ,greece1 and the latter the harmless wars of ,pisa4 ,the few persons interested and the small interest fill not the imagination1 and engage not the affections4 ,the deep distress of the numerous ,athenian army before ,syracuse2 the danger which so nearly threatens ,venice2 these excite compassion2 these move terror and anxiety4 ,the indifferent1 uninteresting style of ,suetonius1 equally with the masterly pencil of ,tacitus1 may convince us of the cruel depravity of ,nero or ,tiberius3 ,but what a difference of sentiment6 ,while the former coldly relates the facts2 and the latter sets before our eyes the venerable figures of a ,soranus and a ,thrasea1 intrepid in their fate1 and only moved by the melting sorrows of their friends and kindred4 ,what sympathy then touches every human heart6 ,what indignation against the tyrant1 whose causeless fear or unprovoked malice gave rise to such detestable barbarity6 ,if we bring these subjects nearer3 ,if we remove all suspicion of fiction and deceit3 ,what powerful concern is excited1 and how much superior1 in many instances1 to the narrow attachments of self-love and private interest6 ,popular sedition1 party zeal1 a devoted obedience to factious leaders2 these are some of the most visible1 though less laudable effects of this social sympathy in human nature4 ,the frivolousness of the subject too1 we may observe1 is not able to detach us entirely from what carries an image of human sentiment and affection4 ,when a person stutters1 and pronounces with difficulty1 we even sympathize with this trivial uneasiness1 and suffer for him4 ,and it is a rule in criticism1 that every combination of syllables or letters1 which gives pain to the organs of speech in the recital1 appears also from a species of sympathy harsh and disagreeable to the ear4 ,nay1 when we run over a book with our eye1 we are sensible of such unharmonious composition2 because we still imagine1 that a person recites it to us1 and suffers from the pronunciation of these jarring sounds4 ,so delicate is our sympathy6 ,easy and unconstrained postures and motions are always beautiful3 ,an air of health and vigour is agreeable3 ,clothes which warm1 without burthening the body2 which cover1 without imprisoning the limbs1 are well-fashioned4 ,in every judgement of beauty1 the feelings of the person affected enter into consideration1 and communicate to the spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure4 ,footnote3 ',decentior equus cujus astricta suntilia2 sed idem velocior4 ,pulcher aspectu sit athleta1 cujus lacertos execitatio expressit2 idem certamini paratior nunquam enim ,,species ab ,,utilitate dividitur4 ,sed hoc quidem discernere modici judicii est4'--,quintilian1 ,inst4 lib4 viii4 cap4 #c4 ,what wonder1 then1 if we can pronounce no judgement concerning the character and conduct of men1 without considering the tendencies of their actions1 and the happiness or misery which thence arises to society8 ,what association of ideas would ever operate1 were that principle here totally unactive4 ,footnote3 ,in proportion to the station which a man possesses1 according to the relations in which he is placed2 we always expect from him a greater or less degree of good1 and when disappointed1 blame his inutility2 and much more do we blame him1 if any ill or prejudice arise from his conduct and behaviour4 ,when the interests of one country interfere with those of another1 we estimate the merits of a statesman by the good or ill1 which results to his own country from his measures and councils1 without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals4 ,his fellow-citizens are the objects1 which lie nearest the eye1 while we determine his character4 ,and as nature has implanted in every one a superior affection to his own country1 we never expect any regard to distant nations1 where a competition arises4 ,not to mention1 that1 while every man consults the good of his own community1 we are sensible1 that the general interest of mankind is better promoted1 than any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species1 whence no beneficial action could ever result1 for want of a duly limited object1 on which they could exert themselves4 ,if any man from a cold insensibility1 or narrow selfishness of temper1 is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery1 he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue3 ,as1 on the other hand1 it is always found1 that a warm concern for the interests of our species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions2 a strong resentment of injury done to men2 a lively approbation of their welfare4 ,in this particular1 though great superiority is observable of one man above another2 yet none are so entirely indifferent to the interest of their fellow-creatures1 as to perceive no distinctions of moral good and evil1 in consequence of the different tendencies of actions and principles4 ,how1 indeed1 can we suppose it possible in any one1 who wears a human heart1 that if there be subjected to his censure1 one character or system of conduct1 which is beneficial1 and another which is pernicious to his species or community1 he will not so much as give a cool preference to the former1 or ascribe to it the smallest merit or regard8 ,let us suppose such a person ever so selfish2 let private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention2 yet in instances1 where that is not concerned1 he must unavoidably feel ,,some propensity to the good of mankind1 and make it an object of choice1 if everything else be equal4 ,would any man1 who is walking along1 tread as willingly on another's gouty toes1 whom he has no quarrel with1 as on the hard flint and pavement8 ,there is here surely a difference in the case4 ,we surely take into consideration the happiness and misery of others1 in weighing the several motives of action1 and incline to the former1 where no private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or advantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures4 ,and if the principles of humanity are capable1 in many instances1 of influencing our actions1 they must1 at all times1 have some authority over our sentiments1 and give us a general approbation of what is useful to society1 and blame of what is dangerous or pernicious4 ,the degrees of these sentiments may be the subject of controversy2 but the reality of their existence1 one should think1 must be admitted in every theory or system4 ,a creature1 absolutely malicious and spiteful1 were there any such in nature1 must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue4 ,all his sentiments must be inverted1 and directly opposite to those1 which prevail in the human species4 ,whatever contributes to the good of mankind1 as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires1 must produce uneasiness and disapprobation2 and on the contrary1 whatever is the source of disorder and misery in society1 must1 for the same reason1 be regarded with pleasure and complacency4 ,timon1 who probably from his affected spleen more than an inveterate malice1 was denominated the manhater1 embraced ,alcibiades with great fondness4 ,,go ,,on1 ,,my ,,boy6 cried he1 ,,acquire ,,the ,,confidence ,,of ,,the ,,people3 ,,you ,,will ,,one ,,day1 ,i ,,foresee1 ,,be ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,great ,,calamities ,,to ,,them ,footnote3 ,plutarch fit vita ,ale44 ,could we admit the two principles of the ,manicheans1 it is an infallible consequence1 that their sentiments of human actions1 as well as of everything else1 must be totally opposite1 and that every instance of justice and humanity1 from its necessary tendency1 must please the one deity and displease the other4 ,all mankind so far resemble the good principle1 that1 where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition1 we are always inclined1 from our natural philanthropy1 to give the preference to the happiness of society1 and consequently to virtue above its opposite4 ,absolute1 unprovoked1 disinterested malice has never perhaps place in any human breast2 or if it had1 must there pervert all the sentiments of morals1 as well as the feelings of humanity4 ,if the cruelty of ,nero be allowed entirely voluntary1 and not rather the effect of constant fear and resentment2 it is evident that ,tigellinus1 preferably to ,seneca or ,burrhus1 must have possessed his steady and uniform approbation4 ,a statesman or patriot1 who serves our own country in our own time1 has always a more passionate regard paid to him1 than one whose beneficial influence operated on distant ages or remote nations2 where the good1 resulting from his generous humanity1 being less connected with us1 seems more obscure1 and affects us with a less lively sympathy4 ,we may own the merit to be equally great1 though our sentiments are not raised to an equal height1 in both cases4 ,the judgement here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions2 in like manner1 as it preserves us from error1 in the several variations of images1 presented to our external senses4 ,the same object1 at a double distance1 really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk2 yet we imagine that it appears of the same size in both situations2 because we know that on our approach to it1 its image would expand on the eye1 and that the difference consists not in the object itself1 but in our position with regard to it4 ,and1 indeed1 without such a correction of appearances1 both in internal and external sentiment1 men could never think or talk steadily on any subject2 while their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects1 and throw them into such different and contrary lights and positions4 ,footnote3 ,for a little reason1 the tendencies of actions and characters1 not their real accidental consequences1 are alone regarded in our more determinations or general judgements2 though in our real feeling or sentiment1 we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose station1 joined to virtue1 renders him really useful to society1 then to one1 who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and benevolent affections4 ,separating the character from the furtone1 by an easy and necessary effort of thought1 we pronounce these persons alike1 and give them the appearance3 ,but is not able entirely to prevail our sentiment4 ,why is this peach-tree said to be better than that other2 but because it produces more or better fruit8 ,and would not the same praise be given it1 though snails or vermin had destroyed the peaches1 before they came to full maturity8 ,in morals too1 is not ,,the ,,tree ,,known ,,by ,,the ,,fruit8 ,and cannot we easily distinguish between nature and accident1 in the one case as well as in the other8 ,the more we converse with mankind1 and the greater social intercourse we maintain1 the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions1 without which our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other4 ,every man's interest is peculiar to himself1 and the aversions and desires1 which result from it1 cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree4 ,general language1 therefore1 being formed for general use1 must be moulded on some more general views1 and must affix the epithets of praise or blame1 in conformity to sentiments1 which arise from the general interests of the community4 ,and if these sentiments1 in most men1 be not so strong as those1 which have a reference to private good2 yet still they must make some distinction1 even in persons the most depraved and selfish2 and must attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct1 and of evil to the contrary4 ,sympathy1 we shall allow1 is much fainter than our concern for ourselves1 and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous2 but for this very reason it is necessary for us1 in our calm judgements and discourse concerning the characters of men1 to neglect all these differences1 and render our sentiments more public and social4 ,besides1 that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular1 we every day meet with persons who are in a situation different from us1 and who could never converse with us were we to remain constantly in that position and point of view1 which is peculiar to ourselves4 ,the intercourse of sentiments1 therefore1 in society and conversation1 makes us form some general unalterable standard1 by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners4 ,and though the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions1 nor regulates all its love and hatred by the universal abstract differences of vice and virtue1 without regard to self1 or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected2 yet have these moral differences a considerable influence1 and being sufficient1 at least for discourse1 serve all our purposes in company1 in the pulpit1 on the theatre1 and in the schools4 ,footnote3 ,it is wisely ordained by nature1 that private connexions should commonly prevail over univeral views and considerations2 otherwise our affections and actions would be dissopated and lost1 for want of a proper limited object4 ,thus a small benefit done to ourselves1 or our near friends1 excites more lively sentiments of love and approbation than a great benefit done to a distant commonwealth3 ,but still we know here1 as in all the senses1 to correct these inequalities by reflection1 and retain a general standard of vice and virtue1 founded chiefly on a general usefulness4 ,thus1 in whatever light we take this subject1 the merit1 ascribed to the social virtues1 appears still uniform1 and arises chiefly from that regard1 which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society4 ,if we consider the principles of the human make1 such as they appear to daily experience and observation1 we must1 ,a ,,priori1 conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures1 and not readily1 of himself1 to pronounce1 where nothing gives him any particular bias1 that what promotes their happiness is good1 what tends to their misery is evil1 without any farther regard or consideration4 ,here then are the faint rudiments1 at least1 or outlines1 of a ,,general distinction between actions2 and in proportion as the humanity of the person is supposed to increase1 his connexion with those who are injured or benefited1 and his lively conception of their misery or happiness2 his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour4 ,there is no necessity1 that a generous action1 barely mentioned in an old history or remote gazette1 should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration4 ,virtue1 placed at such a distance1 is like a fixed star1 which1 though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian1 is so infinitely removed as to affect the senses1 neither with light nor heat4 ,bring this virtue nearer1 by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons1 or even by an eloquent recital of the case2 our hearts are immediately caught1 our sympathy enlivened1 and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of friendship and regard4 ,these seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature1 as discovered in common life and practice4 ,again2 reverse these views and reasonings3 ,consider the matter a posteriori2 and weighing the consequences1 enquire if the merit of social virtue be not1 in a great measure1 derived from the feelings of humanity1 with which it affects the spectators4 ,it appears to be matter of fact1 that the circumstance of ,,utility1 in all subjects1 is a source of praise and approbation3 ,that it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions3 ,that it is the ,,sole source of that high regard paid to justice1 fidelity1 honour1 allegiance1 and chastity3 ,that it is inseparable from all the other social virtues1 humanity1 generosity1 charity1 affability1 lenity1 mercy1 and moderation3 ,and1 in a word1 that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals1 which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures4 ,it appears also1 that1 in our general approbation of characters and manners1 the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any regards to self-interest1 but has an influence much more universal and extensive4 ,it appears that a tendency to public good1 and to the promoting of peace1 harmony1 and order in society1 does always1 by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame1 engage us on the side of the social virtues4 ,and it appears1 as an additional confirmation1 that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments1 and have so powerful an influence1 as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause4 ,the present theory is the simple result of all these inferences1 each of which seems founded on uniform experience and observation4 ,were it doubtful1 whether there were any such principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others1 yet when we see1 in numberless instances1 that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of society1 is so highly approved of1 we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle2 since it is impossible for anything to please as means to an end1 where the end is totally indifferent4 ,on the other hand1 were it doubtful1 whether there were1 implanted in our nature1 any general principle of moral blame and approbation1 yet when we see1 in numberless instances1 the influence of humanity1 we ought thence to conclude1 that it is impossible1 but that everything which promotes the interest of society must communicate pleasure1 and what is pernicious give uneasiness4 ,but when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the same conclusion1 must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it8 ,it is however hoped1 that the progress of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the present theory1 by showing the rise of other sentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles4 ,,section ,,vi4 ,,of ,,qualities ,,useful ,,to ,,ourselves4 ,,part ,i4 ,,it seems evident1 that where a quality or habit is subjected to our examination1 if it appear in any respect prejudicial to the person possessed of it1 or such as incapacitates him for business and action1 it is instantly blamed1 and ranked among his faults and imperfections4 ,indolence1 negligence1 want of order and method1 obstinacy1 fickleness1 rashness1 credulity2 these qualities were never esteemed by any one indifferent to a character2 much less1 extolled as accomplishments or virtues4 ,the prejudice1 resulting from them1 immediately strikes our eye1 and gives us the sentiment of pain and disapprobation4 ,no quality1 it is allowed1 is absolutely either blameable or praiseworthy4 ,it is all according to its degree4 ,a due medium1 says the ,peripatetics1 is the characteristic of virtue4 ,but this medium is chiefly determined by utility4 ,a proper celerity1 for instance1 and dispatch in business1 is commendable4 ,when defective1 no progress is ever made in the execution of any purpose3 ,when excessive1 it engages us in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprises3 ,by such reasonings1 we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral and prudential disquisitions2 and never lose view of the advantages1 which result from any character or habit4 ,now as these advantages are enjoyed by the person possessed of the character1 it can never be ,,self-,,love which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us1 the spectators1 and prompts our esteem and approbation4 ,no force of imagination can convert us into another person1 and make us fancy1 that we1 being that person1 reap benefit from those valuable qualities1 which belong to him4 ,or if it did1 no celerity of imagination could immediately transport us back1 into ourselves1 and make us love and esteem the person1 as different from us4 ,views and sentiments1 so opposite to known truth and to each other1 could never have place1 at the same time1 in the same person4 ,all suspicion1 therefore1 of selfish regards1 is here totally excluded4 ,it is a quite different principle1 which actuates our bosom1 and interests us in the felicity of the person whom we contemplate4 ,where his natural talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation1 advancement1 a figure in life1 prosperous success1 a steady command over fortune1 and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings2 we are struck with such agreeable images1 and feel a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him4 ,the ideas of happiness1 joy1 triumph1 prosperity1 are connected with every circumstance of his character1 and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity4 ,footnote3 ,one may venture to affirm1 that there is no human nature1 to whom the appearance of happiness 7where envy or revenge has no place7 does not give pleasure1 that of misery1 uneasiness4 ,this seems inseparable from our make and constitution4 ,but they are only more generous minds1 that are thence prompted to seek zealously the good of others1 and to have a real passion for their welfare4 ,with men of narrow and ungenerous spirits1 this sympathy goes not beyond a slight feeling of the imagination1 which serves only to excite sentiments of complacency or ensure1 and makes them apply to the object either honorable or dishonorable appellations4 ,a griping miser1 for instance1 praises extremely ,,industry and ,,frugality even in others1 and sets them1 in his estimation1 above all the other virtues4 ,he knows the good that results from them1 and feels that species of happiness with a more lively sympathy1 than any other you could represent to him2 though perhaps he would not part with a shilling to make the fortune of the industrious man1 whom he praises so highly4 ,let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no manner of concern for his fellow-creatures1 but to regard the happiness and misery of all sensible beings with greater indifference than even two contiguous shades of the same colour4 ,let us suppose1 if the prosperity of nations were laid on the one hand1 and their ruin on the other1 and he were desired to choose2 that he would stand like the schoolman's ass1 irresolute and undetermined1 between equal motives2 or rather1 like the same ass between two pieces of wood or marble1 without any inclination or propensity to either side4 ,the consequence1 ,i believe1 must be allowed just1 that such a person1 being absolutely unconcerned1 either for the public good of a community or the private utility of others1 would look on every quality1 however pernicious1 or however beneficial1 to society1 or to its possessor1 with the same indifference as on the most common and uninteresting object4 ,but if1 instead of this fancied monster1 we suppose a ,,man to form a judgement or determination in the case1 there is to him a plain foundation of preference1 where everything else is equal2 and however cool his choice may be1 if his heart be selfish1 or if the persons interested be remote from him2 there must still be a choice or distinction between what is useful1 and what is pernicious4 ,now this distinction is the same in all its parts1 with the ,,moral ,,distinction1 whose foundation has been so often1 and so much in vain1 enquired after4 ,the same endowments of the mind1 in every circumstance1 are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and to that of humanity2 the same temper is susceptible of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other2 and the same alteration in the objects1 by their nearer approach or by connexions1 enlivens the one and the other4 ,by all the rules of philosophy1 therefore1 we must conclude1 that these sentiments are originally the same2 since1 in each particular1 even the most minute1 they are governed by the same laws1 and are moved by the same objects4 ,why do philosophers infer1 with the greatest certainty1 that the moon is kept in its orbit by the same force of gravity1 that makes bodies fall near the surface of the earth1 but because these effects are1 upon computation1 found similar and equal8 ,and must not this argument bring as strong conviction1 in moral as in natural disquisitions8 ,to prove1 by any long detail1 that all the qualities1 useful to the possessor1 are approved of1 and the contrary censured1 would be superfluous4 ,the least reflection on what is every day experienced in life1 will be sufficient4 ,we shall only mention a few instances1 in order to remove1 if possible1 all doubt and hesitation4 ,the quality1 the most necessary for the execution of any useful enterprise1 is discretion2 by which we carry on a safe intercourse with others1 give due attention to our own and to their character1 weigh each circumstance of the business which we undertake1 and employ the surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose4 ,to a ,cromwell1 perhaps1 or a ,de ,retz1 discretion may appear an alderman-like virtue1 as ,dr4 ,swift calls it2 and being incompatible with those vast designs1 to which their courage and ambition prompted them1 it might really1 in them1 be a fault or imperfection4 ,but in the conduct of ordinary life1 no virtue is more requisite1 not only to obtain success1 but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments4 ,the greatest parts without it1 as observed by an elegant writer1 may be fatal to their owner2 as ,polyphemus1 deprived of his eye1 was only the more exposed1 on account of his enormous strength and stature4 ,the best character1 indeed1 were it not rather too perfect for human nature1 is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind2 but alternately employs enterprise and caution1 as each is useful to the particular purpose intended4 ,such is the excellence which ,st4 ,evremond ascribes to ,mareschal ,turenne1 who displayed every campaign1 as he grew older1 more temerity in his military enterprises2 and being now1 from long experience1 perfectly acquainted with every incident in war1 he advanced with greater firmness and security1 in a road so well known to him4 ,fabius1 says ,machiavel1 was cautious2 ,scipio enterprising3 ,and both succeeded1 because the situation of the ,roman affairs1 during the command of each1 was peculiarly adapted to his genius2 but both would have failed1 had these situations been reversed4 ,he is happy1 whose circumstances suit his temper2 but he is more excellent1 who can suit his temper to any circumstances4 ,what need is there to display the praises of industry1 and to extol its advantages1 in the acquisition of power and riches1 or in raising what we call a ,,fortune in the world8 ,the tortoise1 according to the fable1 by his perseverance1 gained the race of the hare1 though possessed of much superior swiftness4 ,a man's time1 when well husbanded1 is like a cultivated field1 of which a few acres produce more of what is useful to life1 than extensive provinces1 even of the richest soil1 when over-run with weeds and brambles4 ,but all prospect of success in life1 or even of tolerable subsistence1 must fail1 where a reasonable frugality is wanting4 ,the heap1 instead of increasing1 diminishes daily1 and leaves its possessor so much more unhappy1 as1 not having been able to confine his expences to a large revenue1 he will still less be able to live contentedly on a small one4 ,the souls of men1 according to ,plato ,footnote3 ,phaedo41 inflamed with impure appetites1 and losing the body1 which alone afforded means of satisfaction1 hover about the earth1 and haunt the places1 where their bodies are deposited2 possessed with a longing desire to recover the lost organs of sensation4 ,so may we see worthless prodigals1 having consumed their fortune in wild debauches1 thrusting themselves into every plentiful table1 and every party of pleasure1 hated even by the vicious1 and despised even by fools4 ,the one extreme of frugality is avarice1 which1 as it both deprives a man of all use of his riches1 and checks hospitality and every social enjoyment1 is justly censured on a double account4 ,,prodigality1 the other extreme1 is commonly more hurtful to a man himself2 and each of these extremes is blamed above the other1 according to the temper of the person who censures1 and according to his greater or less sensibility to pleasure1 either social or sensual4 ,qualities often derive their merit from complicated sources4 ,honesty1 fidelity1 truth1 are praised for their immediate tendency to promote the interests of society2 but after those virtues are once established upon this foundation1 they are also considered as advantageous to the person himself1 and as the source of that trust and confidence1 which can alone give a man any consideration in life4 ,one becomes contemptible1 no less than odious1 when he forgets the duty1 which1 in this particular1 he owes to himself as well as to society4 ,perhaps1 this consideration is one ,,chief source of the high blame1 which is thrown on any instance of failure among women in point of ,,chastity4 ,the greatest regard1 which can be acquired by that sex1 is derived from their fidelity2 and a woman becomes cheap and vulgar1 loses her rank1 and is exposed to every insult1 who is deficient in this particular4 ,the smallest failure is here sufficient to blast her character4 ,a female has so many opportunities of secretly indulging these appetites1 that nothing can give us security but her absolute modesty and reserve2 and where a breach is once made1 it can scarcely ever be fully repaired4 ,if a man behave with cowardice on one occasion1 a contrary conduct reinstates him in his character4 ,but by what action can a woman1 whose behaviour has once been dissolute1 be able to assure us1 that she has formed better resolutions1 and has self-command enough to carry them into execution8 ,all men1 it is allowed1 are equally desirous of happiness2 but few are successful in the pursuit3 ,one considerable cause is the want of strength of mind1 which might enable them to resist the temptation of present ease or pleasure1 and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment4 ,our affections1 on a general prospect of their objects1 form certain rules of conduct1 and certain measures of preference of one above another3 and these decisions1 though really the result of our calm passions and propensities1 7for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary87 are yet said1 by a natural abuse of terms1 to be the determinations of pure ,,reason and reflection4 ,but when some of these objects approach nearer to us1 or acquire the advantages of favourable lights and positions1 which catch the heart or imagination2 our general resolutions are frequently confounded1 a small enjoyment preferred1 and lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us4 ,and however poets may employ their wit and eloquence1 in celebrating present pleasure1 and rejecting all distant views to fame1 health1 or fortune2 it is obvious1 that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder1 repentance and misery4 ,a man of a strong and determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions1 and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure1 nor terrified by the menaces of pain2 but keeps still in view those distant pursuits1 by which he1 at once1 ensures his happiness and his honour4 ,self-satisfaction1 at least in some degree1 is an advantage1 which equally attends the fool and the wise man3 ,but it is the only one2 nor is there any other circumstance in the conduct of life1 where they are upon an equal footing4 ,business1 books1 conversation2 for all of these1 a fool is totally incapacitated1 and except condemned by his station to the coarsest drudgery1 remains a useless burthen upon the earth4 ,accordingly1 it is found1 that men are extremely jealous of their character in this particular2 and many instances are seen of profligacy and treachery1 the most avowed and unreserved2 none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and stupidity4 ,dicaearchus1 the ,macedonian general1 who1 as ,polybius tells us ,footnote3 ,lib4 xvi4 ,cap4 #ce41 openly erected one altar to impiety1 another to injustice1 in order to bid defiance to mankind2 even he1 ,i am well assured1 would have started at the epithet of ,,fool1 and have meditated revenge for so injurious an appellation4 ,except the affection of parents1 the strongest and most indissoluble bond in nature1 no connexion has strength sufficient to support the disgust arising from this character4 ,love itself1 which can subsist under treachery1 ingratitude1 malice1 and infidelity1 is immediately extinguished by it1 when perceived and acknowledged2 nor are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that passion4 ,so dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpose or undertaking1 and of continued error and misconduct in life6 ,when it is asked1 whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable8 ,whether one1 that1 at first view1 penetrates far into a subject1 but can perform nothing upon study2 or a contrary character1 which must work out everything by dint of application8 ,whether a clear head or a copious invention8 ,whether a profound genius or a sure judgement8 ,in short1 what character1 or peculiar turn of understanding1 is more excellent than another8 ,it is evident1 that we can answer none of these questions1 without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world1 and carries him farthest in any undertaking4 ,if refined sense and exalted sense be not so ,,useful as common sense1 their rarity1 their novelty1 and the nobleness of their objects make some compensation1 and render them the admiration of mankind3 ,as gold1 though less serviceable than iron1 acquires from its scarcity a value which is much superior4 ,the defects of judgement can be supplied by no art or invention2 but those of memory frequently may1 both in business and in study1 by method and industry1 and by diligence in committing everything to writing2 and we scarcely ever hear a short memory given as a reason for a man's failure in any undertaking4 ,but in ancient times1 when no man could make a figure without the talent of speaking1 and when the audience were too delicate to bear such crude1 undigested harangues as our extemporary orators offer to public assemblies2 the faculty of memory was then of the utmost consequence1 and was accordingly much more valued than at present4 ,scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity1 who is not celebrated for this talent2 and ,cicero enumerates it among the other sublime qualities of ,caesar himself4 ,footnote3 ,fruit in ,illo ,ingenium1 ratio1 memoria1 literae1 cura1 cogitatio1 diligentia c4 ,phillip4 #b44 ,particular customs and manners alter the usefulness of qualities3 they also alter their merit4 ,particular situations and accidents have1 in some degree1 the same influence4 ,he will always be more esteemed1 who possesses those talents and accomplishments1 which suit his station and profession1 than he whom fortune has misplaced in the part which she has assigned him4 ,the private or selfish virtues are1 in this respect1 more arbitrary than the public and social4 ,in other respects they are1 perhaps1 less liable to doubt and controversy4 ,in this kingdom1 such continued ostentation1 of late years1 has prevailed among men in ,,active life with regard to ,,public ,,spirit1 and among those in ,,speculative with regard to ,,benevolence2 and so many false pretensions to each have been1 no doubt1 detected1 that men of the world are apt1 without any bad intention1 to discover a sullen incredulity on the head of those moral endowments1 and even sometimes absolutely to deny their existence and reality4 ,in like manner ,i find1 that1 of old1 the perpetual cant of the ,,stoics and ,,cynics concerning ,,virtue1 their magnificent professions and slender performances1 bred a disgust in mankind2 and ,lucian1 who1 though licentious with regard to pleasure1 is yet in other respects a very moral writer1 cannot sometimes talk of virtue1 so much boasted without betraying symptoms of spleen and irony4 ,but surely this peevish delicacy1 whence-ever it arises can never be carried so far as to make us deny the existence of every species of merit1 and all distinction of manners and behaviour4 ,besides ,,discretion1 ,,caution1 ,,enterprise1 ,,industry1 ,,assiduity1 ,,frugality1 ,,economy1 ,,good-,,sense1 ,,prudence1 ,,discernment2 besides these endowments1 ,i say1 whose very names force an avowal of their merit1 there are many others1 to which the most determined scepticism cannot for a moment refuse the tribute of praise and approbation4 ,,temperance1 ,,sobriety1 ,,patience1 ,,constancy1 ,,perseverance1 ,,forethought1 ,,considerateness1 ,,secrecy1 ,,order1 ,,insinuation1 ,,address1 ,,presence ,,of ,,mind1 ,,quickness ,,of ,,conception1 ,,facility ,,of ,,expression1 these1 and a thousand more of the same kind1 no man will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections4 ,as their merit consists in their tendency to serve the person1 possessed of them1 without any magnificent claim to public and social desert1 we are the less jealous of their pretensions1 and readily admit them into the catalogue of laudable qualities4 ,we are not sensible that1 by this concession1 we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies1 and cannot consistently hesitate any longer1 with regard to disinterested benevolence1 patriotism1 and humanity4 ,it seems1 indeed1 certain1 that first appearances are here1 as usual1 extremely deceitful1 and that it is more difficult1 in a speculative way1 to resolve into self-love the merit which we ascribe to the selfish virtues above mentioned1 than that even of the social virtues1 justice and beneficence4 ,for this latter purpose1 we need but say1 that whatever conduct promotes the good of the community is loved1 praised1 and esteemed by the community1 on account of that utility and interest1 of which every one partakes2 and though this affection and regard be1 in reality1 gratitude1 not self-love1 yet a distinction1 even of this obvious nature1 may not readily be made by superficial reasoners2 and there is room1 at least1 to support the cavil and dispute for a moment4 ,but as qualities1 which tend only to the utility of their possessor1 without any reference to us1 or to the community1 are yet esteemed and valued2 by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from self-love1 or deduce it from that favourite origin8 ,there seems here a necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not spectacles entirely indifferent to us2 but that the view of the former1 whether in its causes or effects1 like sunshine or the prospect of well-cultivated plains 7to carry our pretensions no higher71 communicates a secret joy and satisfaction2 the appearance of the latter1 like a lowering cloud or barren landscape1 throws a melancholy damp over the imagination4 ,and this concession being once made1 the difficulty is over2 and a natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will afterwards1 we may hope1 prevail among all speculative enquirers4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,it may not be improper1 in this place1 to examine the influence of bodily endowments1 and of the goods of fortune1 over our sentiments of regard and esteem1 and to consider whether these phenomena fortify or weaken the present theory4 ,it will naturally be expected1 that the beauty of the body1 as is supposed by all ancient moralists1 will be similar1 in some respects1 to that of the mind2 and that every kind of esteem1 which is paid to a man1 will have something similar in its origin1 whether it arise from his mental endowments1 or from the situation of his exterior circumstances4 ,it is evident1 that one considerable source of ,,beauty in all animals is the advantage which they reap from the particular structure of their limbs and members1 suitably to the particular manner of life1 to which they are by nature destined4 ,the just proportions of a horse1 described by ,xenophon and ,virgil1 are the same that are received at this day by our modern jockeys2 because the foundation of them is the same1 namely1 experience of what is detrimental or useful in the animal4 ,broad shoulders1 a lank belly1 firm joints1 taper legs2 all these are beautiful in our species1 because signs of force and vigour4 ,ideas of utility and its contrary1 though they do not entirely determine what is handsome or deformed1 are evidently the source of a considerable part of approbation or dislike4 ,in ancient times1 bodily strength and dexterity1 being of greater ,,use and importance in war1 was also much more esteemed and valued1 than at present4 ,not to insist on ,homer and the poets1 we may observe1 that historians scruple not to mention ,,force ,,of ,,body among the other accomplishments even of ,epaminondas1 whom they acknowledge to be the greatest hero1 statesman1 and general of all the ,greeks4 ,footnote3 ,,cum ,,alacribus1 ,,saltu2 ,,cumm ,,velocibus1 ,,cursu2 ,,cum ,,validis ,,recte ,,certabata4 ,sallust apud ,veget4 ,a like praise is given to ,pompey1 one of the greatest of the ,romans4 ,footnote3 ,diodorus ,siculus1 lib4 xv4 ,it may be improper to give the character of ,epaminondas1 as drawn by the historian1 in order to show the idea of perfect merit1 which prevailed in those ages4 ,in other illustrious men1 say he1 you will observe1 that each possessed some one shining quality1 which was the foundation of his fame3 ,in ,epaminondas all the ,,virtues are found united2 force of body4 eloquence of expression1 vigour of mind1 contempt of riches1 gentleness of disposition1 and what is chiefly to be regarded1 courage and conduct of war4 ,this instance is similar to what we observed above with regard to memory4 ,what derision and contempt1 with both sexes1 attend ,,impotence2 while the unhappy object is regarded as one deprived of so capital a pleasure in life1 and at the same time1 as disabled from communicating it to others4 ,,barrenness in women1 being also a species of ,,inutility1 is a reproach1 but not in the same degree3 of which the reason is very obvious1 according to the present theory4 ,there is no rule in painting or statuary more indispensible than that of balancing the figures1 and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper centre of gravity4 ,a figure1 which is not justly balanced1 is ugly2 because it conveys the disagreeable ideas of fall1 harm1 and pain4 ,footenote3 ,all men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness2 and may again recover health and ease4 ,these circumstances1 as they make no distinction between one man and another1 are no source of pride or humility1 regard or contempt4 ,but comparing our own species to superior ones1 it is a very mortifying consideration1 that we should all be so liable to diseases and infirmities2 and divines accordingly employ this topic1 in order to depress self-conceit and vanity4 ,they would have more success1 if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned to compare ourselves with others4 ,the infirmities of old age are mortifying2 because a comparison with the young may take place4 ,the king's evil is industriously concealed1 because it affects others1 and is often transmitted to posterity4 ,the case is nearly the same with such diseases as convey any nauseous or frightful images2 the epilepsy1 for instance1 ulcers1 sores1 scabs1 c4 ,a disposition or turn of mind1 which qualifies a man to rise in the world and advance his fortune1 is entitled to esteem and regard1 as has already been explained4 ,it may1 therefore1 naturally be supposed1 that the actual possession of riches and authority will have a considerable influence over these sentiments4 ,let us examine any hypothesis by which we can account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful2 we shall find none satisfactory1 but that which derives it from the enjoyment communicated to the spectator by the images of prosperity1 happiness1 ease1 plenty1 authority1 and the gratification of every appetite4 ,self-love1 for instance1 which some affect so much to consider as the source of every sentiment1 is plainly insufficient for this purpose4 ,where no good-will or friendship appears1 it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others2 though we naturally respect the rich1 even before they discover any such favourable disposition towards us4 ,we are affected with the same sentiments1 when we lie so much out of the sphere of their activity1 that they cannot even be supposed to possess the power of serving us4 ,a prisoner of war1 in all civilized nations1 is treated with a regard suited to his condition2 and riches1 it is evident1 go far towards fixing the condition of any person4 ,if birth and quality enter for a share1 this still affords us an argument to our present purpose4 ,for what is it we call a man of birth1 but one who is descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors1 and who acquires our esteem by his connexion with persons whom we esteem8 ,his ancestors1 therefore1 though dead1 are respected1 in some measure1 on account of their riches2 and consequently1 without any kind of expectation4 ,but not to go so far as prisoners of war or the dead1 to find instances of this disinterested regard for riches2 we may only observe1 with a little attention1 those phenomena which occur in common life and conversation4 ,a man1 who is himself1 we shall suppose1 of a competent fortune1 and of no profession1 being introduced to a company of strangers1 naturally treats them with different degrees of respect1 as he is informed of their different fortunes and conditions2 though it is impossible that he can so suddenly propose1 and perhaps he would not accept of1 any pecuniary advantage from them4 ,a traveller is always admitted into company1 and meets with civility1 in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune4 ,in short1 the different ranks of men are1 in a great measure1 regulated by riches2 and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors1 strangers as well as acquaintance4 ,what remains1 therefore1 but to conclude1 that1 as riches are desired for ourselves only as the means of gratifying our appetites1 either at present or in some imaginary future period1 they beget esteem in others merely from their having that influence4 ,this indeed is their very nature or offence3 they have a direct reference to the commodities1 conveniences1 and pleasures of life4 ,the bill of a banker1 who is broke1 or gold in a desert island1 would otherwise be full as valuable4 ,when we approach a man who is1 as we say1 at his ease1 we are presented with the pleasing ideas of plenty1 satisfaction1 cleanliness1 warmth2 a cheerful house1 elegant furniture1 ready service1 and whatever is desirable in meat1 drink1 or apparel4 ,on the contrary1 when a poor man appears1 the disagreeable images of want1 penury1 hard labour1 dirty furniture1 coarse or ragged clothes1 nauseous meat and distasteful liquor1 immediately strike our fancy4 ,what else do we mean by saying that one is rich1 the other poor8 ,and as regard or contempt is the natural consequence of those different situations in life1 it is easily seen what additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory1 with regard to all moral distinctions4 ,footnote3 ,there is something extraordinary1 and seemingly unaccountable in the operation of our passions1 when we consider the fortune and situation of others4 ,very often another's advancement and prosperity produces envy1 which has a strong mixture of hatred1 and arises chiefly from the comparison of ourselves with the person4 ,at the very same time1 or at least in very short intervals1 we may feel the passion of respect1 which is a species of affection or good-will1 with a mixture of humility4 ,on the other hand1 the misfortunes of our fellows often cause pity1 which has in it a strong mixture of good-will4 ,this sentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt1 which is a species of dislike1 with a mixture of pride4 ,i only point out these phenomena1 as a subject of speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral enquiries4 ,it is sufficient for the present purpose to observe in general1 that power and riches commonly cause respect1 poverty and meanness contempt1 though particular views and incidents may sometimes raise the passions of envy and of pity4 ,a man who has cured himself of all ridiculous pre-possessions1 and is fully1 sincerely1 and steadily convinced1 from experience as well as philosophy1 that the difference of fortune makes less difference in happiness than is vulgarly imagined2 such a one does not measure out degrees of esteem according to the rent-rolls of his acquaintance4 ,he may1 indeed1 externally pay a superior deference to the great lord above the vassal2 because riches are the most convenient1 being the most fixed and determinate1 source of distinction4 ,but his internal sentiments are more regulated by the personal characters of men1 than by the accidental and capricious favours of fortune4 ,in most countries of ,europe1 family1 that is1 hereditary riches1 marked with titles and symbols from the sovereign1 is the chief source of distinction4 ,in ,england1 more regard is paid to present opulence and plenty4 ,each practice has its advantages and disadvantages4 ,where birth is respected1 unactive1 spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence1 and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies3 the generous and ambitious seek honour and authority1 and reputation and favour4 ,where riches are the chief idol1 corruption1 venality1 rapine prevail3 arts1 manufactures1 commerce1 agriculture flourish4 ,the former prejudice1 being favourable to military virtue1 is more suited to monarchies4 ,the latter1 being the chief spur to industry1 agrees better with a republican government4 ,and we accordingly find that each of these forms of government1 by varying the utility of those customs1 has commonly a proportionable effect on the sentiments of mankind4 ,,section ,,vii4 ,,of ,,qualities ,,immediately ,,agreeable ,,to ,,ourselves4 ,whoever has passed an evening with serious melancholy people1 and has observed how suddenly the conversation was animated1 and what sprightliness diffused itself over the countenance1 discourse1 and behaviour of every one1 on the accession of a good-humoured1 lively companion2 such a one will easily allow that cheerfulness carries great merit with it1 and naturally conciliates the good-will of mankind4 ,no quality1 indeed1 more readily communicates itself to all around2 because no one has a greater propensity to display itself1 in jovial talk and pleasant entertainment4 ,the flame spreads through the whole circle2 and the most sullen and morose are often caught by it4 ,that the melancholy hate the merry1 even though ,horace says it1 ,i have some difficulty to allow2 because ,i have always observed that1 where the jollity is moderate and decent1 serious people are so much the more delighted1 as it dissipates the gloom with which they are commonly oppressed1 and gives them an unusual enjoyment4 ,from this influence of cheerfulness1 both to communicate itself and to engage approbation1 we may perceive that there is another set of mental qualities1 which1 without any utility or any tendency to farther good1 either of the community or of the possessor1 diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders1 and procure friendship and regard4 ,their immediate sensation1 to the person possessed of them1 is agreeable4 ,others enter into the same humour1 and catch the sentiment1 by a contagion or natural sympathy2 and as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleases1 a kindly emotion arises towards the person who communicates so much satisfaction4 ,he is a more animating spectacle2 his presence diffuses over us more serene complacency and enjoyment2 our imagination1 entering into his feelings and disposition1 is affected in a more agreeable manner than if a melancholy1 dejected1 sullen1 anxious temper were presented to us4 ,hence the affection and probation which attend the former3 the aversion and disgust with which we regard the latter4 ,footnote3 ,there is no man1 who1 on particular occasions1 is not affected with all the disagreeable passions1 fear1 anger1 dejection1 grief1 melancholy1 anxiety1 c4 ,but these1 so far as they are natural1 and universal1 make no difference between one man and another1 and can never be the object of blame4 ,it is only when the disposition gives a ,,propensity to any of these disagreeable passions1 that they disfigure the character1 and by giving uneasiness1 convey the sentiment of disapprobation to the spectator4 ,few men would envy the character which ,caesar gives of ,cassius3 ,he loves no play1 ,as thou do'st1 ,anthony3 he hears no music3 ,seldom he smiles2 and smiles in such a sort1 ,as if he mock'd himself1 and scorn'd his spirit ,that could be mov'd to smile at any thing4 ,not only such men1 as ,caesar adds1 are commonly ,,dangerous1 but also1 having little enjoyment within themselves1 they can never become agreeable to others1 or contribute to social entertainment4 ,in all polite nations and ages1 a relish for pleasure1 if accompanied with temperance and decency1 is esteemed a considerable merit1 even in the greatest men2 and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior rank and character4 ,it is an agreeable representation1 which a ,french writer gives of the situation of his own mind in this particular1 ,,virtue ,i ,,love1 says he1 ,,without ,,austerity3 ,,pleasure ,,without ,,effeminacy3 ,,and ,,life1 ,,without ,,fearing ,,its ,,end4 ,footnote3 ',j'aime la vertu1 sans rudesse2 ,j'aime le plaisir1 sans molesse2 ,j'aime la vie1 et n'en crains point la fin4'-,,st4 ,,evremont4 ,who is not struck with any signal instance of greatness of mind or dignity of character2 with elevation of sentiment1 disdain of slavery1 and with that noble pride and spirit1 which arises from conscious virtue8 ,the sublime1 says ,longinus1 is often nothing but the echo or image of magnanimity2 and where this quality appears in any one1 even though a syllable be not uttered1 it excites our applause and admiration2 as may be observed of the famous silence of ,ajax in the ,odyssey1 which expresses more noble disdain and resolute indignation than any language can convey ,footnote3 ,cap4 #i44 ,,were ,i ,alexander1 said ,parmenio1 ,i ,,would ,,accept ,,of ,,these ,,offers ,,made ,,by ,,darius4 ,,so ,,would ,i ,,too1 replied ,alexander1 ,,were ,i ,,parmenio4 ,this saying is admirable1 says ,longinus1 from a like principle4 ,footnote3 ,idem4 ,,go6 cries the same hero to his soldiers1 when they refused to follow him to the ,indies1 ,,go ,,tell ,,your ,,countrymen1 ,,that ,,you ,,left ,alexander ,,completing ,,the ,,conquest ,,of ,,the ,,world4 ',alexander1' said the ,prince of ,conde1 who always admired this passage1 'abandoned by his soldiers1 among barbarians1 not yet fully subdued1 felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire1 that he could not believe it possible that any one would refuse to obey him4 ,whether in ,europe or in ,asia1 among ,greeks or ,persians1 all was indifferent to him3 wherever he found men1 he fancied he should find subjects4' ,the confident of ,medea in the tragedy recommends caution and submission2 and enumerating all the distresses of that unfortunate heroine1 asks her1 what she has to support her against her numerous and implacable enemies4 ,,myself1 replies she2 ,,myself ,i ,,say1 ,,and ,,it ,,is ,,enough4 ,boileau justly recommends this passage as an instance of true sublime ,footnote3 ,reflexion #aj sur ,longin44 ,when ,phocion1 the modest1 the gentle ,phocion1 was led to execution1 he turned to one of his fellow-sufferers1 who was lamenting his own hard fate1 ,,is ,,it ,,not ,,glory ,,enough ,,for ,,you1 says he1 ,,that ,,you ,,die ,,with ,,phocion8 ,footnote3 ,plutarch in ,phoc4 ,place in opposition the picture which ,tacitus draws of ,vitellius1 fallen from empire1 prolonging his ignominy from a wretched love of life1 delivered over to the merciless rabble2 tossed1 buffeted1 and kicked about2 constrained1 by their holding a poniard under his chin1 to raise his head1 and expose himself to every contumely4 ,what abject infamy6 ,what low humiliation6 ,yet even here1 says the historian1 he discovered some symptoms of a mind not wholly degenerate4 ,to a tribune1 who insulted him1 he replied1 ,i ,,am ,,still ,,your ,,emperor4 ,footnote3 ,tacit4 hist4 lib4 iii4 ,the author entering upon the narration1 says1 ,,laniata ,,veste1 ,,foedum ,,specaculum ,,ducebatur1 ,,multis ,,increpantibus1 ,,nullo ,,inlacrimante3 deformatitas exitus misericordiam abstulerat4 ,to enter thoroughly into this method of thinking1 we must make allowance for the ancient maxims1 that no one ought to prolong his life after it became dishonourable2 but1 as he had always a right to dispose of it1 it then became a duty to part with it4 ,we never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character1 or a proper sense of what is due to one's self1 in society and the common intercourse of life4 ,this vice constitutes what we properly call ,,meanness2 when a man can submit to the basest slavery1 in order to gain his ends2 fawn upon those who abuse him2 and degrade himself by intimacies and familiarities with undeserving inferiors4 ,a certain degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite1 that the absence of it in the mind displeases1 after the same manner as the want of a nose1 eye1 or any of the most material feature of the face or member of the body4 ,footnote3 ,the absence of virtue may often be a vice2 and that of the highest kind2 as in the instance of ingratitude1 as well as meanness4 ,where we expect a beauty1 the disappointment gives an uneasy sensation1 and produces a real deformity4 ,an abjectness of character1 likewise1 is disgustful and contemptible in another view4 ,where a man has no sense of value in himself1 we are not likely to have any higher esteem of him4 ,and if the same person1 who crouches to his superiors1 is insolent to his inferiors 7as often happens71 this contrariety of behaviour1 instead of correcting the former vice1 aggravates it extremely by the addition of a vice still more odious4 ,see ,sect4 ,,viii4 ,the utility of courage1 both to the public and to the person possessed of it1 is an obvious foundation of merit4 ,but to any one who duly considers of the matter1 it will appear that this quality has a peculiar lustre1 which it derives wholly from itself1 and from that noble elevation inseparable from it4 ,its figure1 drawn by painters and by poets1 displays1 in each feature1 a sublimity and daring confidence2 which catches the eye1 engages the affections1 and diffuses1 by sympathy1 a like sublimity of sentiment over every spectator4 ,under what shining colours does ,demosthenes ,footnote3 ,de ,corona4 represent ,philip2 where the orator apologizes for his own administration1 and justifies that pertinacious love of liberty1 with which he had inspired the ,athenians4 ',i beheld ,philip1' says he1 'he with whom was your contest1 resolutely1 while in pursuit of empire and dominion1 exposing himself to every wound2 his eye gored1 his neck wrested1 his arm1 his thigh pierced1 what ever part of his body fortune should seize on1 that cheerfully relinquishing2 provided that1 with what remained1 he might live in honour and renown4 ,and shall it be said that he1 born in ,pella1 a place heretofore mean and ignoble1 should be inspired with so high an ambition and thirst of fame3 while you1 ,athenians1 c4' ,these praises excite the most lively admiration2 but the views presented by the orator1 carry us not1 we see1 beyond the hero himself1 nor ever regard the future advantageous consequences of his valour4 ,the material temper of the ,romans1 inflamed by continual wars1 had raised their esteem of courage so high1 that1 in their language1 it was called ,,virtue1 by way of excellence and of distinction from all other moral qualities4 ,,the ,suevi1 in the opinion of ,tacitus1 tus1 ,footnote3 ,de moribus ,germ4 ,,dressed ,,their ,,hair ,,with ,a ,,laudible ,,intent3 ,,not ,,for ,,the ,,purpose ,,of ,,loving ,,or ,,being ,,loves2 ,,they ,,dorned ,,themselves ,,only ,,for ,,their ,,enemies1 ,,and ,,in ,,order ,,to ,,appear ,,more ,,terrible4 ,a sentiment of the historian1 which would sound a little oddly in other nations and other ages4 ,the ,scythians1 according to ,herodotus1 ,footnote3 ,lib4 iv4 after scalping their enemies1 dressed the skin like leather1 and used it as a towel2 and whoever had the most of those towels was most esteemed among them4 ,so much had martial bravery1 in that nation1 as well as in many others1 destroyed the sentiments of humanity2 a virtue surely much more useful and engaging4 ,it is indeed observable1 that1 among all uncultivated nations1 who have not as yet had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence1 justice1 and the social virtues1 courage is the predominant excellence2 what is most celebrated by poets1 recommended by parents and instructors1 and admired by the public in general4 ,the ethics of ,homer are1 in this particular1 very different from those of ,fenelon1 his elegant imitator2 and such as were well suited to an age1 when one hero1 as remarked by ,thucydides ,lib4i41 could ask another1 without offence1 whether he were a robber or not4 ,such also very lately was the system of ethics which prevailed in many barbarous parts of ,ireland2 if we may credit ,spencer1 in his judicious account of the state of that kingdom4 ,footnote from ,spencer3 ,it is a common use1 says he1 amongst their gentlemen's sons1 that1 as soon as they are able to use their weapons1 they strait gather to themselves three or four stragglers or kern1 with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country1 taking only meat1 he at last falleth into some bad occasion1 that shall be offered2 which being once made known1 he is thenceforth counted a man of worth1 in whom there is courage4 ,of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed philosophical tranquillity1 superior to pain1 sorrow1 anxiety1 and each assault of adverse fortune4 ,conscious of his own virtue1 say the philosophers1 the sage elevates himself above every accident of life2 and securely placed in the temple of wisdom1 looks down on inferior mortals engaged in pursuit of honours1 riches1 reputation1 and every frivolous enjoyment4 ,these pretentious1 no doubt1 when stretched to the utmost1 are by far too magnificent for human nature4 ,they carry1 however1 a grandeur with them1 which seizes the spectator1 and strikes him with admiration4 ,and the nearer we can approach in practice to this sublime tranquillity and indifference 7for we must distinguish it from a stupid insensibility71 the more secure enjoyment shall we attain within ourselves1 and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the world4 ,the philosophical tranquillity may1 indeed1 be considered only as a branch of magnanimity4 ,who admires not ,socrates2 his perpetual serenity and contentment1 amidst the greatest poverty and domestic vexations2 his resolute contempt of riches1 and his magnanimous care of preserving liberty1 while he refused all assistance from his friends and disciples1 and avoided even the dependence of an obligation8 ,epictetus had not so much as a door to his little house or hovel2 and therefore1 soon lost his iron lamp1 the only furniture which he had worth taking4 ,but resolving to disappoint all robbers for the future1 he supplied its place with an earthen lamp1 of which he very peacefully kept possession ever after4 ,among the ancients1 the heroes in philosophy1 as well as those in war and patriotism1 have a grandeur and force of sentiment1 which astonishes our narrow souls1 and is rashly rejected as extravagant and supernatural4 ,they1 in their turn1 ,i allow1 would have had equal reason to consider as romantic and incredible1 the degree of humanity1 clemency1 order1 tranquillity1 and other social virtues1 to which1 in the administration of government1 we have attained in modern times1 had any one been then able to have made a fair representation of them4 ,such is the compensation1 which nature1 or rather education1 has made in the distribution of excellencies and virtues1 in those different ages4 ,the merit of benevolence1 arising from its utility1 and its tendency to promote the good of mankind has been already explained1 and is1 no doubt1 the source of a ,,considerable part of that esteem1 which is so universally paid to it4 ,but it will also be allowed1 that the very softness and tenderness of the sentiment1 its engaging endearments1 its fond expressions1 its delicate attentions1 and all that flow of mutual confidence and regard1 which enters into a warm attachment of love and friendship3 it will be allowed1 ,i say1 that these feelings1 being delightful in themselves1 are necessarily communicated to the spectators1 and melt them into the same fondness and delicacy4 ,the tear naturally starts in our eye on the apprehension of a warm sentiment of this nature3 our breast heaves1 our heart is agitated1 and every humane tender principle of our frame is set in motion1 and gives us the purest and most satisfactory enjoyment4 ,when poets form descriptions of ,elysian fields1 where the blessed inhabitants stand in no need of each other's assistance1 they yet represent them as maintaining a constant intercourse of love and friendship1 and sooth our fancy with the pleasing image of these soft and gentle passions4 ,the idea of tender tranquillity in a pastoral ,arcadia is agreeable from a like principle1 as has been observed above4 ,footnote3 ,sect4 v4 ,part #b4 ,who would live amidst perpetual wrangling1 and scolding1 and mutual reproaches8 ,the roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and displease us3 we suffer by contagion and sympathy2 nor can we remain indifferent spectators1 even though certain that no pernicious consequences would ever follow from such angry passions4 ,as a certain proof that the whole merit of benevolence is not derived from its usefulness1 we may observe1 that in a kind way of blame1 we say1 a person is ,,too ,,good2 when he exceeds his part in society1 and carries his attention for others beyond the proper bounds4 ,in like manner1 we say1 a man is too ,,high-,,spirited1 ,,too ,,intrepid1 ,,too ,,indifferent ,,about ,,fortune3 reproaches1 which really1 at bottom1 imply more esteem than many panegyrics4 ,being accustomed to rate the merit and demerit of characters chiefly by their useful or pernicious tendencies1 we cannot forbear applying the epithet of blame1 when we discover a sentiment1 which rises to a degree1 that is hurtful2 but it may happen1 at the same time1 that its noble elevation1 or its engaging tenderness so seizes the heart1 as rather to increase our friendship and concern for the person4 ,footnote3 ,cheerfulness could scarce admit of blame from its excess1 were it not that dissolute mirth1 without a proper cause or subject1 is a sure symptom and characteristic of folly1 and on that account disgustful4 ,the amours and attachments of ,harry the ,i,vth of ,france1 during the civil wars of the league1 frequently hurt his interest and his cause2 but all the young1 at least1 and amorous1 who can sympathize with the tender passions1 will allow that this very weakness1 for they will readily call it such1 chiefly endears that hero1 and interests them in his fortunes4 ,the excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility of ,charles the ,x,i,ith ruined his own country1 and infested all his neighbours2 but have such splendour and greatness in their appearance1 as strikes us with admiration2 and they might1 in some degree1 be even approved of1 if they betrayed not sometimes too evident symptoms of madness and disorder4 ,the ,athenians pretended to the first invention of agriculture and of laws3 and always valued themselves extremely on the benefit thereby procured to the whole race of mankind4 ,they also boasted1 and with reason1 of their war like enterprises2 particularly against those innumerable fleets and armies of ,persians1 which invaded ,greece during the reigns of ,darius and ,xerxes4 ,but though there be no comparison in point of utility1 between these peaceful and military honours2 yet we find1 that the orators1 who have writ such elaborate panegyrics on that famous city1 have chiefly triumphed in displaying the warlike achievements4 ,lysias1 ,thucydides1 ,plato1 and ,isocrates discover1 all of them1 the same partiality2 which1 though condemned by calm reason and reflection1 appears so natural in the mind of man4 ,it is observable1 that the great charm of poetry consists in lively pictures of the sublime passions1 magnanimity1 courage1 disdain of fortune2 or those of the tender affections1 love and friendship2 which warm the heart1 and diffuse over it similar sentiments and emotions4 ,and though all kinds of passion1 even the most disagreeable1 such as grief and anger1 are observed1 when excited by poetry1 to convey a satisfaction1 from a mechanism of nature1 not easy to be explained3 ,yet those more elevated or softer affections have a peculiar influence1 and please from more than one cause or principle4 ,not to mention that they alone interest us in the fortune of the persons represented1 or communicate any esteem and affection for their character4 ,and can it possibly be doubted1 that this talent itself of poets1 to move the passions1 this pathetic and sublime of sentiment1 is a very considerable merit2 and being enhanced by its extreme rarity1 may exalt the person possessed of it1 above every character of the age in which he lives8 ,the prudence1 address1 steadiness1 and benign government of ,augustus1 adorned with all the splendour of his noble birth and imperial crown1 render him but an unequal competitor for fame with ,virgil1 who lays nothing into the opposite scale but the divine beauties of his poetical genius4 ,the very sensibility to these beauties1 or a delicacy of taste1 is itself a beauty in any character2 as conveying the purest1 the most durable1 and most innocent of all enjoyments4 ,these are some instances of the several species of merit1 that are valued for the immediate pleasure which they communicate to the person possessed of them4 ,no views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation2 yet is it of a kind similar to that other sentiment1 which arises from views of a public or private utility4 ,the same social sympathy1 we may observe1 or fellow-feeling with human happiness or misery1 gives rise to both2 and this analogy1 in all the parts of the present theory1 may justly be regarded as a confirmation of it4 ,,section ,,viii4 ,,of ,,qualities ,,immediately ,,agreeable ,,to ,,others4 ,footnote3 ,it is the nature and1 indeed1 the definition of virtue1 that it is ,a ,,quality ,,of ,,the ,,mind ,,agreeable ,,to ,,or ,,approved ,,of ,,by ,,every ,,one ,,who ,,considers ,,or ,,contemplates ,,it4 ,but some qualities produce pleasure1 because they are useful to society1 or useful or agreeable to the person himself2 others produce it more immediately1 which is the case with the class of virtues here considered4 ,,as the mutual shocks1 in ,,society1 and the oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of ,,justice1 in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection3 in like manner1 the eternal contrarieties1 in ,,company1 of men's pride and self-conceit1 have introduced the rules of ,good ,manners or ,politeness1 in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds1 and an undisturbed commerce and conversation4 ,among well-bred people1 a mutual deference is affected2 contempt of others disguised2 authority concealed2 attention given to each in his turn2 and an easy stream of conversation maintained1 without vehemence1 without interruption1 without eagerness for victory1 and without any airs of superiority4 ,these attentions and regards are immediately ,,agreeable to others1 abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies3 they conciliate affection1 promote esteem1 and extremely enhance the merit of the person who regulates his behaviour by them4 ,many of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and casual2 but the thing expressed by them is still the same4 ,a ,spaniard goes out of his own house before his guest1 to signify that he leaves him master of all4 ,in other countries1 the landlord walks out last1 as a common mark of deference and regard4 ,but1 in order to render a man perfect ,,good ,,company1 he must have ,wit and ,ingenuity as well as good manners4 ,what wit is1 it may not be easy to define2 but it is easy surely to determine that it is a quality immediately ,,agreeable to others1 and communicating1 on its first appearance1 a lively joy and satisfaction to every one who has any comprehension of it4 ,the most profound metaphysics1 indeed1 might be employed in explaining the various kinds and species of wit2 and many classes of it1 which are now received on the sole testimony of taste and sentiment1 might1 perhaps1 be resolved into more general principles4 ,but this is sufficient for our present purpose1 that it does affect taste and sentiment1 and bestowing an immediate enjoyment1 is a sure source of approbation and affection4 ,in countries where men pass most of their time in conversation1 and visits1 and assemblies1 these ,,companionable qualities1 so to speak1 are of high estimation1 and form a chief part of personal merit4 ,in countries where men live a more domestic life1 and either are employed in business1 or amuse themselves in a narrower circle of acquaintance1 the more solid qualities are chiefly regarded4 ,thus1 ,i have often observed1 that1 among the ,french1 the first questions with regard to a stranger are1 ,,is ,,he ,,polite8 ,,has ,,he ,,wit8 ,in our own country1 the chief praise bestowed is always that of a ,,good-,,natured1 ,,sensible ,,fellow4 ,in conversation1 the lively spirit of dialogue is ,,agreeable1 even to those who desire not to have any share in the discourse3 hence the teller of long stories1 or the pompous declaimer1 is very little approved of4 ,but most men desire likewise their turn in the conversation1 and regard1 with a very evil eye1 that ,,loquacity which deprives them of a right they are naturally so jealous of4 ,there is a sort of harmless ,,liars1 frequently to be met with in company1 who deal much in the marvellous4 ,their usual intention is to please and entertain2 but as men are most delighted with what they conceive to be truth1 these people mistake extremely the means of pleasing1 and incur universal blame4 ,some indulgence1 however1 to lying or fiction is given in ,,humorous stories2 because it is there really agreeable and entertaining1 and truth is not of any importance4 ,eloquence1 genius of all kinds1 even good sense1 and sound reasoning1 when it rises to an eminent degree1 and is employed upon subjects of any considerable dignity and nice discernment2 all these endowments seem immediately agreeable1 and have a merit distinct from their usefulness4 ,rarity1 likewise1 which so much enhances the price of every thing1 must set an additional value on these noble talents of the human mind4 ,modesty may be understood in different senses1 even abstracted from chastity1 which has been already treated of4 ,it sometimes means that tenderness and nicety of honour1 that apprehension of blame1 that dread of intrusion or injury towards others1 that ,pudor1 which is the proper guardian of every kind of virtue1 and a sure preservative against vice and corruption4 ,but its most usual meaning is when it is opposed to ,,impudence and ,,arrogance1 and expresses a diffidence of our own judgement1 and a due attention and regard for others4 ,in young men chiefly1 this quality is a sure sign of good sense2 and is also the certain means of augmenting that endowment1 by preserving their ears open to instruction1 and making them still grasp after new attainments4 ,but it has a further charm to every spectator2 by flattering every man's vanity1 and presenting the appearance of a docile pupil1 who receives1 with proper attention and respect1 every word they utter4 ,men have1 in general1 a much greater propensity to overvalue than undervalue themselves2 notwithstanding the opinion of ,aristotle ,footnote3 ,ethic4 ad ,nicomachum44 ,this makes us more jealous of the excess on the former side1 and causes us to regard1 with a peculiar indulgence1 all tendency to modesty and self-diffidence2 as esteeming the danger less of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature4 ,it is thus in countries where men's bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency1 personal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of slenderness1 than in countries where that is the most usual defect4 ,being so often struck with instances of one species of deformity1 men think they can never keep at too great a distance from it1 and wish always to have a leaning to the opposite side4 ,in like manner1 were the door opened to self-praise1 and were ,montaigne's maxim observed1 that one should say as frankly1 ,i ,,have ,,sense1 ,i ,,have ,,learning1 ,i ,,have ,,courage1 ,,beauty1 ,,or ,,wit1 as it is sure we often think so2 were this the case1 ,i say1 every one is sensible that such a flood of impertinence would break in upon us1 as would render society wholly intolerable4 ,for this reason custom has established it as a rule1 in common societies1 that men should not indulge themselves in self-praise1 or even speak much of themselves2 and it is only among intimate friends or people of very manly behaviour1 that one is allowed to do himself justice4 ,nobody finds fault with ,maurice1 ,prince of ,orange1 for his reply to one who asked him1 whom he esteemed the first general of the age1 ,,the ,,marquis ,,of ,,spinola1 said he1 ,,is ,,the ,,second4 ,though it is observable1 that the self-praise implied is here better implied1 than if it had been directly expressed1 without any cover or disguise4 ,he must be a very superficial thinker1 who imagines that all instances of mutual deference are to be understood in earnest1 and that a man would be more esteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and accomplishments4 ,a small bias towards modesty1 even in the internal sentiment1 is favourably regarded1 especially in young people2 and a strong bias is required in the outward behaviour2 but this excludes not a noble pride and spirit1 which may openly display itself in its full extent1 when one lies under calumny or oppression of any kind4 ,the generous contumacy of ,socrates1 as ,cicero calls it1 has been highly celebrated in all ages2 and when joined to the usual modesty of his behaviour1 forms a shining character4 ,iphicrates1 the ,athenian1 being accused of betraying the interests of his country1 asked his accuser1 ,,would ,,you1 says he1 ,,have1 ,,on ,a ,,like ,,occasion1 ,,been ,,guilty ,,of ,,that ,,crime8 ,,by ,,no ,,means1 replied the other4 ,,and ,,can ,,you ,,then ,,imagine1 cried the hero1 that ,iphicrates ,,would ,,be ,,guilty8 ,footnote3 ,quinctil4 lib4 v4 cap4 #ab4--;,in short1 a generous spirit and self-value1 well founded1 decently disguised1 and courageously supported under distress and calumny1 is a great excellency1 and seems to derive its merit from the noble elevation of its sentiment1 or its immediate agreeableness to its possessor4 ,in ordinary characters1 we approve of a bias towards modesty1 which is a quality immediately agreeable to others3 the vicious excess of the former virtue1 namely1 insolence or haughtiness1 is immediately disagreeable to others2 the excess of the latter is so to the possessor4 ,thus are the boundaries of these duties adjusted4 ,a desire of fame1 reputation1 or a character with others1 is so far from being blameable1 that it seems inseparable from virtue1 genius1 capacity1 and a generous or noble disposition4 ,an attention even to trivial matters1 in order to please1 is also expected and demanded by society2 and no one is surprised1 if he find a man in company to observe a greater elegance of dress and more pleasant flow of conversation1 than when he passes his time at home1 and with his own family4 ,wherein1 then1 consists ,vanity1 which is so justly regarded as a fault or imperfection4 ,it seems to consist chiefly in such an intemperate display of our advantages1 honours1 and accomplishments2 in such an importunate and open demand of praise and admiration1 as is offensive to others1 and encroaches too far on their secret vanity and ambition4 ,it is besides a sure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind1 which is so great an ornament in any character4 ,for why that impatient desire of applause2 as if you were not justly entitled to it1 and might not reasonably expect that it would for ever at tend you8 ,why so anxious to inform us of the great company which you have kept2 the obliging things which were said to you2 the honours1 the distinctions which you met with2 as if these were not things of course1 and what we could readily1 of ourselves1 have imagined1 without being told of them8 ,decency1 or a proper regard to age1 sex1 character1 and station in the world1 may be ranked among the qualities which are immediately agreeable to others1 and which1 by that means1 acquire praise and approbation4 ,an effeminate behaviour in a man1 a rough manner in a woman2 these are ugly because unsuitable to each character1 and different from the qualities which we expect in the sexes4 ,it is as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties1 or a comedy in tragic4 ,the disproportions hurt the eye1 and convey a disagreeable sentiment to the spectators1 the source of blame and disapprobation4 ,this is that ,,indecorum1 which is explained so much at large by ,cicero in his ,offices4 ,among the other virtues1 we may also give ,cleanliness a place2 since it naturally renders us agreeable to others1 and is no inconsiderable source of love and affection4 ,no one will deny1 that a negligence in this particular is a fault2 and as faults are nothing but smaller vices1 and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation which it excites in others2 we may1 in this instance1 seemingly so trivial1 clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions1 about which the learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error4 ,but besides all the ,,agreeable qualities1 the origin of whose beauty we can1 in some degree1 explain and account for1 there still remains something mysterious and inexplicable1 which conveys an immediate satisfaction to the spectator1 but how1 or why1 or for what reason1 he cannot pretend to determine4 ,there is a manner1 a grace1 an ease1 a genteelness1 an ,i-know-not-what1 which some men possess above others1 which is very different from external beauty and comeliness1 and which1 however1 catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully4 ,and though this ,,manner be chiefly talked of in the passion between the sexes1 where the concealed magic is easily explained1 yet surely much of it prevails in all our estimation of characters1 and forms no inconsiderable part of personal merit4 ,this class of accomplishments1 therefore1 must be trusted entirely to the blind1 but sure testimony of taste and sentiment2 and must be considered as a part of ethics1 left by nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy1 and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions4 ,we approve of another1 because of his wit1 politeness1 modesty1 decency1 or any agreeable quality which he possesses2 although he be not of our acquaintance1 nor has ever given us any entertainment1 by means of these accomplishments4 ,the idea1 which we form of their effect on his acquaintance1 has an agreeable influence on our imagination1 and gives us the sentiment of approbation4 ,this principle enters into all the judgements which we form concerning manners and characters4 ,,section ,,ix4 ,,conclusion4 ,,part ,i4 ,,it may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age1 should find it requisite to prove1 by elaborate reasoning1 that ,personal ,merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities1 ,,useful or ,,agreeable to the ,,person ,,himself or to ,,others4 ,it might be expected that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude1 unpractised enquirers concerning morals1 and been received from its own evidence1 without any argument or disputation4 ,whatever is valuable in any kind1 so naturally classes itself under the division of ,,useful or ,,agreeable1 the ,,utile or the ,,dulce1 that it is not easy to imagine why we should ever seek further1 or consider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry4 ,and as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the ,,person ,,himself or to ,,others1 the complete delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun1 or an image is reflected upon water4 ,if the ground1 on which the shadow is cast1 be not broken and uneven2 nor the surface from which the image is reflected1 disturbed and confused2 a just figure is immediately presented1 without any art or attention4 ,and it seems a reasonable presumption1 that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding1 when a theory1 so simple and obvious1 could so long have escaped the most elaborate examination4 ,but however the case may have fared with philosophy1 in common life these principles are still implicitly maintained2 nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever recurred to1 when we employ any panegyric or satire1 any applause or censure of human action and behaviour4 ,if we observe men1 in every intercourse of business or pleasure1 in every discourse and conversation1 we shall find them nowhere1 except the schools1 at any loss upon this subject4 ,what so natural1 for instance1 as the following dialogue8 ,you are very happy1 we shall suppose one to say1 addressing himself to another1 that you have given your daughter to ,cleanthes4 ,he is a man of honour and humanity4 ,every one1 who has any intercourse with him1 is sure of ,,fair and ,,kind treatment4 ,footnote3 ,qualities useful to others4 ,i congratulate you too1 says another1 on the promising expectations of this son-in-law2 whose assiduous application to the study of the laws1 whose quick penetration and early knowledge both of men and business1 prognosticate the greatest honours and advancement4 ,footnote3 ,qualities useful to the person himself4 ,you surprise me1 replies a third1 when you talk of ,cleanthes as a man of business and application4 ,i met him lately in a circle of the gayest company1 and he was the very life and soul of our conversation3 so much wit with good manners2 so much gallantry without affectation2 so much ingenious knowledge so genteelly delivered1 ,i have never before observed in any one4 ,footnote3 ,qualities immediately agreeable to others1 ,you would admire him still more1 says a fourth1 if you knew him more familiarly4 ,that cheerfulness1 which you might remark in him1 is not a sudden flash struck out by company3 it runs through the whole tenor of his life1 and preserves a perpetual serenity on his countenance1 and tranquillity in his soul4 ,he has met with severe trials1 misfortunes as well as dangers2 and by his greatness of mind1 was still superior to all of them ,footnote3 ,qualities immediately agreeable to the person himself4 ,the image1 gentlemen1 which you have here delineated of ,cleanthes1 cried ,i1 is that of accomplished merit4 ,each of you has given a stroke of the pencil to his figure2 and you have unawares exceeded all the pictures drawn by ,gratian or ,castiglione4 ,a philosopher might select this character as a model of perfect virtue4 ,and as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is1 in common life1 allowed to be a part of personal merit2 so no other will ever be received1 where men judge of things by their natural1 unprejudiced reason1 without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion4 ,celibacy1 fasting1 penance1 mortification1 self-denial1 humility1 silence1 solitude1 and the whole train of monkish virtues2 for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense1 but because they serve to no manner of purpose2 neither advance a man's fortune in the world1 nor render him a more valuable member of society2 neither qualify him for the entertainment of company1 nor increase his power of self-enjoyment8 ,we observe1 on the contrary1 that they cross all these desirable ends2 stupify the understanding and harden the heart1 obscure the fancy and sour the temper4 ,we justly1 therefore1 transfer them to the opposite column1 and place them in the catalogue of vices2 nor has any superstition force sufficient among men of the world1 to pervert entirely these natural sentiments4 ,a gloomy1 hair-brained enthusiast1 after his death1 may have a place in the calendar2 but will scarcely ever be admitted1 when alive1 into intimacy and society1 except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself4 ,it seems a happiness in the present theory1 that it enters not into that vulgar dispute concerning the ,,degrees of benevolence or self-love1 which prevail in human nature2 a dispute which is never likely to have any issue1 both because men1 who have taken part1 are not easily convinced1 and because the phenomena1 which can be produced on either side1 are so dispersed1 so uncertain1 and subject to so many interpretations1 that it is scarcely possible accurately to compare them1 or draw from them any determinate inference or conclusion4 ,it is sufficient for our present purpose1 if it be allowed1 what surely1 without the greatest absurdity cannot be disputed1 that there is some benevolence1 however small1 infused into our bosom2 some spark of friendship for human kind2 some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame1 along with the elements of the wolf and serpent4 ,let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak2 let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body1 they must still direct the determinations of our mind1 and where everything else is equal1 produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind1 above what is pernicious and dangerous4 ,a ,,moral ,,distinction1 therefore1 immediately arises2 a general sentiment of blame and approbation2 a tendency1 however faint1 to the objects of the one1 and a proportionable aversion to those of the other4 ,nor will those reasoners1 who so earnestly maintain the predominant selfishness of human kind1 be any wise scandalized at hearing of the weak sentiments of virtue implanted in our nature4 ,on the contrary1 they are found as ready to maintain the one tenet as the other2 and their spirit of satire 7for such it appears1 rather than of corruption7 naturally gives rise to both opinions2 which have1 indeed1 a great and almost an indissoluble connexion together4 ,avarice1 ambition1 vanity1 and all passions vulgarly1 though improperly1 comprised under the denomination of ,,self-,,love1 are here excluded from our theory concerning the origin of morals1 not because they are too weak1 but because they have not a proper direction for that purpose4 ,the notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind1 which recommends the same object to general approbation1 and makes every man1 or most men1 agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it4 ,it also implies some sentiment1 so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind1 and render the actions and conduct1 even of the persons the most remote1 an object of applause or censure1 according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established4 ,these two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on4 ,the other passions produce in every breast1 many strong sentiments of desire and aversion1 affection and hatred2 but these neither are felt so much in common1 nor are so comprehensive1 as to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation4 ,when a man denominates another his ,,enemy1 his ,,rival1 his ,,antagonist1 his ,,adversary1 he is understood to speak the language of self-love1 and to express sentiments1 peculiar to himself1 and arising from his particular circumstances and situation4 ,but when he bestows on any man the epithets of ,,vicious or ,,odious or ,,depraved1 he then speaks another language1 and expresses sentiments1 in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him4 ,he must here1 therefore1 depart from his private and particular situation1 and must choose a point of view1 common to him with others2 he must move some universal principle of the human frame1 and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony4 ,if he mean1 therefore1 to express that this man possesses qualities1 whose tendency is pernicious to society1 he has chosen this common point of view1 and has touched the principle of humanity1 in which every man1 in some degree1 concurs4 ,while the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present1 it will never be wholly indifferent to public good1 nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and manners4 ,and though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition1 yet1 being common to all men1 it can alone be the foundation of morals1 or of any-general system of blame or praise4 ,one man's ambition is not another's ambition1 nor will the same event or object satisfy both2 but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one1 and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures4 ,but the sentiments1 which arise from humanity1 are not only the same in all human creatures1 and produce the same approbation or censure2 but they also comprehend all human creatures2 nor is there any one whose conduct or character is not1 by their means1 an object to every one of censure or approbation4 ,on the contrary1 those other passions1 commonly denominated selfish1 both produce different sentiments in each individual1 according to his particular situation2 and also contemplate the greater part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern4 ,whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity2 whoever expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me2 but as my name is known but to a small part of mankind1 there are few who come within the sphere of this passion1 or excite1 on its account1 either my affection or disgust4 ,but if you represent a tyrannical1 insolent1 or barbarous behaviour1 in any country or in any age of the world1 ,i soon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct1 and feel the sentiment of repugnance and displeasure towards it4 ,no character can be so remote as to be1 in this light1 wholly indifferent to me4 ,what is beneficial to society or to the person himself must still be preferred4 ,and every quality or action1 of every human being1 must1 by this means1 be ranked under some class or denomination1 expressive of general censure or applause4 ,what more1 therefore1 can we ask to distinguish the sentiments1 dependent on humanity1 from those connected with any other passion1 or to satisfy us1 why the former are the origin of morals1 not the latter8 ,whatever conduct gains my approbation1 by touching my humanity1 procures also the applause of all mankind1 by affecting the same principle in them2 but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me alone1 and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of mankind4 ,there is no circumstance of conduct in any man1 provided it have a beneficial tendency1 that is not agreeable to my humanity1 however remote the person2 but every man1 so far removed as neither to cross nor serve my avarice and ambition1 is regarded as wholly indifferent by those passions4 ,the distinction1 therefore1 between these species of sentiment being so great and evident1 language must soon be moulded upon it1 and must invent a peculiar set of terms1 in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation1 which arise from humanity1 or from views of general usefulness and its contrary4 ,virtue and ,vice become then known2 morals are recognized2 certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour2 such measures are expected from men in such situations4 ,this action is determined to be conformable to our abstract rule2 that other1 contrary4 ,and by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of self-love frequently controlled and limited4 ,footnote3 ,it seems certain1 both from reason and experience1 that a rude1 untaught savage regulates chiefly his love and hatred by the ideas of private utility and injury1 and has but faint conceptions of a general rule or system of behaviour4 ,the man who stands opposite to him in battle1 he hates heartedly1 not only for the present moment1 which is almost unavoidable1 but for ever after2 nor is he satisfied without the most extreme punishment and vengeance4 ,but we1 accustomed to society1 and to more enlarged reflections1 consider1 that this man is serving his own country and community2 that any man1 in the same situation1 would do the same2 that we ourselves1 in like circumstances1 observe a like conduct2 that2 in general1 human society is best supported on such maxims3 and by these suppositions and views1 we correct1 in some measure1 our ruder and narrower positions4 ,and though much of our friendship and enemity be still regulated by private considerations of benefit and harm1 we pay1 at least1 this homage to general rules1 which we are accustomed to respect1 that we commonly perver our adversary's conduct1 by imputing malice or injustice to him1 in order to give vent to those passions1 which arise from self-love and private interest4 ,when the heart is full of rage1 it never wants pretences of this nature2 though sometimes as frivolous1 as those from which ,horace1 being almost crushed by the fall of a tree1 effects to accuse of parricide the first planter of it4 ,from instances of popular tumults1 seditions1 factions1 panics1 and of all passions1 which are shared with a multitude1 we may learn the influence of society in exciting and supporting any emotion2 while the most ungovernable disorders are raised1 we find1 by that means1 from the slightest and most frivolous occasions4 ,solon was no very cruel1 though1 perhaps1 an unjust legislator1 who punished neuters in civil wars2 and few1 ,i believe1 would1 in such cases1 incur the penalty1 were their affection and discourse allowed sufficient to absolve them4 ,no selfishness1 and scarce any philosophy1 have there force sufficient to support a total coolness and indifference2 and he must be more or less than man1 who kindles not in the common blaze4 ,what wonder then1 that moral sentiments are found of such influence in life2 though springing from principles1 which may appear1 at first sight1 somewhat small and delicate8 ,but these principles1 we must remark1 are social and universal2 they form1 in a manner1 the ,,party of humankind against vice or disorder1 its common enemy4 ,and as the benevolent concern for others is diffused1 in a greater or less degree1 over all men1 and is the same in all1 it occurs more frequently in discourse1 is cherished by society and conversation1 and the blame and approbation1 consequent on it1 are thereby roused from that lethargy into which they are probably lulled1 in solitary and uncultivated nature4 ,other passions1 though perhaps originally stronger1 yet being selfish and private1 are often overpowered by its force1 and yield the dominion of our breast to those social and public principles4 ,another spring of our constitution1 that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiments1 is the love of fame2 which rules1 with such uncontrolled authority1 in all generous minds1 and is often the grand object of all their designs and undertakings4 ,by our continual and earnest pursuit of a character1 a name1 a reputation in the world1 we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review1 and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us4 ,this constant habit of surveying ourselves1 as it were1 in reflection1 keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong1 and begets1 in noble natures1 a certain reverence for themselves as well as others1 which is the surest guardian of every virtue4 ,the animal conveniencies and pleasures sink gradually in their value2 while every inward beauty and moral grace is studiously acquired1 and the mind is accomplished in every perfection1 which can adorn or embellish a rational creature4 ,here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted3 here is displayed the force of many sympathies4 ,our moral sentiment is itself a feeling chiefly of that nature1 and our regard to a character with others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with ourselves2 and in order to attain this end1 we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind4 ,but1 that we may accommodate matters1 and remove if possible every difficulty1 let us allow all these reasonings to be false4 ,let us allow that1 when we resolve the pleasure1 which arises from views of utility1 into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy1 we have embraced a wrong hypothesis4 ,let us confess it necessary to find some other explication of that applause1 which is paid to objects1 whether inanimate1 animate1 or rational1 if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and advantage of mankind4 ,however difficult it be to conceive that an object is approved of on account of its tendency to a certain end1 while the end itself is totally indifferent3 let us swallow this absurdity1 and consider what are the consequences4 ,the preceding delineation or definition of ,personal ,merit must still retain its evidence and authority3 it must still be allowed that every quality of the mind1 which is ,,useful or ,,agreeable to the ,,person ,,himself or to ,,others1 communicates a pleasure to the spectator1 engages his esteem1 and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit4 ,are not justice1 fidelity1 honour1 veracity1 allegiance1 chastity1 esteemed solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society8 ,is not that tendency inseparable from humanity1 benevolence1 lenity1 generosity1 gratitude1 moderation1 tenderness1 friendship1 and all the other social virtues8 ,can it possibly be doubted that industry1 discretion1 frugality1 secrecy1 order1 perseverance1 forethought1 judgement1 and this whole class of virtues and accomplishments1 of which many pages would not contain the catalogue2 can it be doubted1 ,i say1 that the tendency of these qualities to promote the interest and happiness of their possessor1 is the sole foundation of their merit8 ,who can dispute that a mind1 which supports a perpetual serenity and cheerfulness1 a noble dignity and undaunted spirit1 a tender affection and good-will to all around2 as it has more enjoyment within itself1 is also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle1 than if dejected with melancholy1 tormented with anxiety1 irritated with rage1 or sunk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy8 ,and as to the qualities1 immediately ,,agreeable to ,,others1 they speak sufficiently for themselves2 and he must be unhappy1 indeed1 either in his own temper1 or in his situation and company1 who has never perceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affability1 of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness of address and manner4 ,i am sensible1 that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to be positive or dogmatical on any subject2 and that1 even if excessive scepticism could be maintained1 it would not be more destructive to all just reasoning and inquiry4 ,i am convinced that1 where men are the most sure and arrogant1 they are commonly the most mistaken1 and have there given reins to passion1 without that proper deliberation and suspense1 which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities4 ,yet1 ,i must confess1 that this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light1 that ,i cannot1 at ,,present1 be more assured of any truth1 which ,i learn from reasoning and argument1 than that personal merit consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them1 or to others1 who have any intercourse with him4 ,but when ,i reflect that1 though the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated1 though the motions of the tides have been accounted for1 the order and economy of the heavenly bodies subjected to their proper laws1 and ,infinite itself reduced to calculation2 yet men still dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties4 ,when ,i reflect on this1 ,i say1 ,i fall back into diffidence and scepticism1 and suspect that an hypothesis1 so obvious1 had it been a true one1 would1 long ere now1 have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent of mankind4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,having explained the moral ,,approbation attending merit or virtue1 there remains nothing but briefly to consider our interested ,,obligation to it1 and to inquire whether every man1 who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare1 will not best find his account in the practice of every moral duty4 ,if this can be clearly ascertained from the foregoing theory1 we shall have the satisfaction to reflect1 that we have advanced principles1 which not only1 it is hoped1 will stand the test of reasoning and inquiry1 but may contribute to the amendment of men's lives1 and their improvement in morality and social virtue4 ,and though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society2 yet a man has but a bad grace1 who delivers a theory1 however true1 which1 he must confess1 leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious4 ,why rake into those corners of nature which spread a nuisance all around8 ,why dig up the pestilence from the pit in which it is buried8 ,the ingenuity of your researches may be admired1 but your systems will be detested2 and mankind will agree1 if they cannot refute them1 to sink them1 at least1 in eternal silence and oblivion4 ,truths which are pernicious to society1 if any such there be1 will yield to errors which are salutary and ,,advantageous4 ,but what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society1 than those here delivered1 which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms1 and makes us approach her with ease1 familiarity1 and affection8 ,the dismal dress falls off1 with which many divines1 and some philosophers1 have covered her2 and nothing appears but gentleness1 humanity1 beneficence1 affability2 nay1 even at proper intervals1 play1 frolic1 and gaiety4 ,she talks not of useless austerities and rigours1 suffering and self-denial4 ,she declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries and all mankind1 during every instant of their existence1 if possible1 cheerful and happy2 nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of their lives4 ,the sole trouble which she demands1 is that of just calculation1 and a steady preference of the greater happiness4 ,and if any austere pretenders approach her1 enemies to joy and pleasure1 she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers2 or1 if she admit them in her train1 they are ranked1 however1 among the least favoured of her votaries4 ,and1 indeed1 to drop all figurative expression1 what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of austerity and rigour8 ,or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose1 unless it can show1 by a particular detail1 that all the duties which it recommends1 are also the true interest of each individual8 ,the peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seems to be1 that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose4 ,that the virtues which are immediately ,,useful or ,,agreeable to the person possessed of them1 are desirable in a view to self-interest1 it would surely be superfluous to prove4 ,moralists1 indeed1 may spare themselves all the pains which they often take in recommending these duties4 ,to what purpose collect arguments to evince that temperance is advantageous1 and the excesses of pleasure hurtful1 when it appears that these excesses are only denominated such1 because they are hurtful2 and that1 if the unlimited use of strong liquors1 for instance1 no more impaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the use of air or water1 it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable8 ,it seems equally superfluous to prove1 that the ,,companionable virtues of good manners and wit1 decency and genteelness1 are more desirable than the contrary qualities4 ,vanity alone1 without any other consideration1 is a sufficient motive to make us wish for the possession of these accomplishments4 ,no man was ever willingly deficient in this particular4 ,all our failures here proceed from bad education1 want of capacity1 or a perverse and unpliable disposition4 ,would you have your company coveted1 admired1 followed2 rather than hated1 despised1 avoided8 ,can any one seriously deliberate in the case8 ,as no enjoyment is sincere1 without some reference to company and society2 so no society can be agreeable1 or even tolerable1 where a man feels his presence unwelcome1 and discovers all around him symptoms of disgust and aversion4 ,but why1 in the greater society or confederacy of mankind1 should not the case be the same as in particular clubs and companies8 ,why is it more doubtful1 that the enlarged virtues of humanity1 generosity1 beneficence1 are desirable with a view of happiness and self-interest1 than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeness8 ,are we apprehensive lest those social affections interfere1 in a greater and more immediate degree than any other pursuits1 with private utility1 and cannot be gratified1 without some important sacrifice of honour and advantage8 ,if so1 we are but ill-instructed in the nature of the human passions1 and are more influenced by verbal distinctions than by real differences4 ,whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the ,,selfish and ,,social sentiments or dispositions1 they are really no more opposite than selfish and ambitious1 selfish and revengeful1 selfish and vain4 ,it is requisite that there be an original propensity of some kind1 in order to be a basis to self-love1 by giving a relish to the objects of its pursuit2 and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence or humanity4 ,the goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or another3 the miser who accumulates his annual income1 and lends it out at interest1 has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice4 ,and it would be difficult to show why a man is more a loser by a generous action1 than by any other method of expense2 since the utmost which he can attain by the most elaborate selfishness1 is the indulgence of some affection4 ,now if life1 without passion1 must be altogether insipid and tiresome2 let a man suppose that he has full power of modelling his own disposition1 and let him deliberate what appetite or desire he would choose for the foundation of his happiness and enjoyment4 ,every affection1 he would observe1 when gratified by success1 gives a satisfaction proportioned to its force and violence2 but besides this advantage1 common to all1 the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendship1 humanity and kindness1 is sweet1 smooth1 tender1 and agreeable1 independent of all fortune and accidents4 ,these virtues are besides attended with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance1 and keep us in humour with ourselves as well as others2 while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and society4 ,and though all men show a jealousy of our success in the pursuits of avarice and ambition2 yet are we almost sure of their good-will and good wishes1 so long as we persevere in the paths of virtue1 and employ ourselves in the execution of generous plans and purposes4 ,what other passion is there where we shall find so many advantages united2 an agreeable sentiment1 a pleasing consciousness1 a good reputation8 ,but of these truths1 we may observe1 men are1 of themselves1 pretty much convinced2 nor are they deficient in their duty to society1 because they would not wish to be generous1 friendly1 and humane2 but because they do not feel themselves such4 ,treating vice with the greatest candour1 and making it all possible concessions1 we must acknowledge that there is not1 in any instance1 the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue1 with a view of self-interest2 except1 perhaps1 in the case of justice1 where a man1 taking things in a certain light1 may often seem to be a loser by his integrity4 ,and though it is allowed that1 without a regard to property1 no society could subsist2 yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted1 a sensible knave1 in particular incidents1 may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune1 without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy4 ,that ,,honesty ,,is ,,the ,,best ,,policy1 may be a good general rule1 but is liable to many exceptions2 and he1 it may perhaps be thought1 conducts himself with most wisdom1 who observes the general rule1 and takes advantage of all the exceptions4 ,i must confess that1 if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer1 it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing4 ,if his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims1 if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness1 he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue2 and we may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation4 ,but in all ingenuous natures1 the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counter-balanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage4 ,inward peace of mind1 consciousness of integrity1 a satisfactory review of our own conduct2 these are circumstances1 very requisite to happiness1 and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man1 who feels the importance of them4 ,such a one has1 besides1 the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves1 with all their pretended cunning and abilities1 betrayed by their own maxims2 and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy1 a tempting incident occurs1 nature is frail1 and they give into the snare2 whence they can never extricate themselves1 without a total loss of reputation1 and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind4 ,but were they ever so secret and successful1 the honest man1 if he has any tincture of philosophy1 or even common observation and reflection1 will discover that they themselves are1 in the end1 the greatest dupes1 and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character1 with themselves at least1 for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws4 ,how little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature8 ,and in a view to pleasure1 what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation1 society1 study1 even health and the common beauties of nature1 but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct2 what comparison1 ,i say1 between these and the feverish1 empty amusements of luxury and expense8 ,these natural pleasures1 indeed1 are really without price2 both because they are below all price in their attainment1 and above it in their enjoyment4 ,,appendix ,i4 ,,concerning ,,moral ,,sentiment ,,if the foregoing hypothesis be received1 it will now be easy for us to determine the question first started1 ,,footnote3 ,sect4 #a4 concerning the general principles of morals2 and though we postponed the decision of that question1 lest it should then involve us in intricate speculations1 which are unfit for moral discourses1 we may resume it at present1 and examine how far either ,,reason or ,,sentiment enters into all decisions of praise or censure4 ,one principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action1 it is evident that ,,reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind2 since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions1 and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor4 ,in many cases this is an affair liable to great controversy3 doubts may arise2 opposite interests may occur2 and a preference must be given to one side1 from very nice views1 and a small overbalance of utility4 ,this is particularly remarkable in questions with regard to justice2 as is1 indeed1 natural to suppose1 from that species of utility which attends this virtue ,footnote3 ,see ,app4 ,,ii44 ,were every single instance of justice1 like that of benevolence1 useful to society2 this would be a more simple state of the case1 and seldom liable to great controversy4 ,but as single instances of justice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency1 and as the advantage to society results only from the observance of the general rule1 and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in the same equitable conduct2 the case here becomes more intricate and involved4 ,the various circumstances of society2 the various consequences of any practice2 the various interests which may be proposed2 these1 on many occasions1 are doubtful1 and subject to great discussion and inquiry4 ,the object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions with regard to justice3 the debates of civilians2 the reflections of politicians2 the precedents of history and public records1 are all directed to the same purpose4 ,and a very accurate ,,reason or ,,judgement is often requisite1 to give the true determination1 amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities4 ,but though reason1 when fully assisted and improved1 be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions2 it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation4 ,utility is only a tendency to a certain end2 and were the end totally indifferent to us1 we should feel the same indifference towards the means4 ,it is requisite a ,,sentiment should here display itself1 in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies4 ,this ,,sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind1 and a resentment of their misery2 since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote4 ,here therefore ,,reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions1 and ,,humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial4 ,this partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment1 in all moral decisions1 seems clear from the preceding hypothesis4 ,but ,i shall suppose that hypothesis false3 it will then be requisite to look out for some other theory that may be satisfactory2 and ,i dare venture to affirm that none such will ever be found1 so long as we suppose reason to be the sole source of morals4 ,to prove this1 it will be proper t o weigh the five following considerations4 ,i4 ,it is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of truth1 while it keeps wholly in generals1 makes use of undefined terms1 and employs comparisons1 instead of instances4 ,this is particularly remarkable in that philosophy1 which ascribes the discernment of all moral distinctions to reason alone1 without the concurrence of sentiment4 ,it is impossible that1 in any particular instance1 this hypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible1 whatever specious figure it may make in general declamations and discourses4 ,examine the crime of ,,ingratitude1 for instance2 which has place1 wherever we observe good-will1 expressed and known1 together with good-offices performed1 on the one side1 and a return of ill-will or indifference1 with ill-offices or neglect on the other3 anatomize all these circumstances1 and examine1 by your reason alone1 in what consists the demerit or blame4 ,you never will come to any issue or conclusion4 ,reason judges either of ,,matter ,,of ,,fact or of ,,relations4 ,enquire then1 first1 where is that matter of fact which we here call crime2 point it out2 determine the time of its existence2 describe its essence or nature2 explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself4 ,it resides in the mind of the person who is ungrateful4 ,he must1 therefore1 feel it1 and be conscious of it4 ,but nothing is there1 except the passion of ill-will or absolute indifference4 ,you cannot say that these1 of themselves1 always1 and in all circumstances1 are crimes4 ,no1 they are only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed and displayed good-will towards us4 ,consequently1 we may infer1 that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual ,,fact2 but arises from a complication of circumstances1 which1 being presented to the spectator1 excites the ,,sentiment of blame1 by the particular structure and fabric of his mind4 ,this representation1 you say1 is false4 ,crime1 indeed1 consists not in a particular ,,fact1 of whose reality we are assured by reason2 but it consists in certain ,,moral ,,relations1 discovered by reason1 in the same manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra4 ,but what are the relations1 ,i ask1 of which you here talk8 ,in the case stated above1 ,i see first good-will and good-offices in one person2 then ill-will and ill-offices in the other4 ,between these1 there is a relation of ,,contrariety4 ,does the crime consist in that relation8 ,but suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices2 and ,i1 in return1 were indifferent towards him1 or did him good offices4 ,here is the same relation of ,,contrariety2 and yet my conduct is often highly laudable4 ,twist and turn this matter as much as you will1 you can never rest the morality on relation2 but must have recourse to the decisions of sentiment4 ,when it is affirmed that two and three are equal to the half of ten1 this relation of equality ,i understand perfectly4 ,i conceive1 that if ten be divided into two parts1 of which one has as many units as the other2 and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three1 it will contain as many units as that compound number4 ,but when you draw thence a comparison to moral relations1 ,i own that ,i am altogether at a loss to understand you4 ,a moral action1 a crime1 such as ingratitude1 is a complicated object4 ,does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other8 ,how8 ,after what manner8 ,specify the relation3 be more particular and explicit in your propositions1 and you will easily see their falsehood4 ,no1 say you1 the morality consists in the relation of actions to the rule of right2 and they are denominated good or ill1 according as they agree or disagree with it4 ,what then is this rule of right8 ,in what does it consist8 ,how is it determined8 ,by reason1 you say1 which examines the moral relations of actions4 ,so that moral relations are determined by the comparison of action to a rule4 ,and that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects4 ,is not this fine reasoning8 ,all this is metaphysics1 you cry4 ,that is enough2 there needs nothing more to give a strong presumption of falsehood4 ,yes1 reply ,i1 here are metaphysics surely2 but they are all on your side1 who advance an abstruse hypothesis1 which can never be made intelligible1 nor quadrate with any particular instance or illustration4 ,the hypothesis which we embrace is plain4 ,it maintains that morality is determined by sentiment4 ,it defines virtue to be ,,whatever ,,mental ,,action ,,or ,,quality ,,gives ,,to ,a ,,spectator ,,the ,,pleasing ,,sentiment ,,of ,,approbation2 and vice the contrary4 ,we then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact1 to wit1 what actions have this influence4 ,we consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree1 and thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments4 ,if you call this metaphysics1 and find anything abstruse here1 you need only conclude that your turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences4 ,,ii4 ,when a man1 at any time1 deliberates concerning his own conduct 7as1 whether he had better1 in a particular emergence1 assist a brother or a benefactor71 he must consider these separate relations1 with all the circumstances and situations of the persons1 in order to determine the superior duty and obligation2 and in order to determine the proportion of lines in any triangle1 it is necessary to examine the nature of that figure1 and the relation which its several parts bear to each other4 ,but notwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two cases1 there is1 at bottom1 an extreme difference between them4 ,a speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers the several known and given relations of the parts of these figures2 and thence infers some unknown relation1 which is dependent on the former4 ,but in moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects1 and all their relations to each other2 and from a comparison of the whole1 fix our choice or approbation4 ,no new fact to be ascertained2 no new relation to be discovered4 ,all the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid before us1 ere we can fix any sentence of blame or approbation4 ,if any material circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful1 we must first employ our inquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it2 and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment4 ,while we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not1 how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent8 ,but after every circumstance1 every relation is known1 the understanding has no further room to operate1 nor any object on which it could employ itself4 ,the approbation or blame which then ensues1 cannot be the work of the judgement1 but of the heart2 and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation1 but an active feeling or sentiment4 ,in the disquisitions of the understanding1 from known circumstances and relations1 we infer some new and unknown4 ,in moral decisions1 all the circumstances and relations must be previously known2 and the mind1 from the contemplation of the whole1 feels some new impression of affection or disgust1 esteem or contempt1 approbation or blame4 ,hence the great difference between a mistake of ,,fact and one of ,,right2 and hence the reason why the one is commonly criminal and not the other4 ,when ,oedipus killed ,laius1 he was ignorant of the relation1 and from circumstances1 innocent and involuntary1 formed erroneous opinions concerning the action which he committed4 ,but when ,nero killed ,agrippina1 all the relations between himself and the person1 and all the circumstances of the fact1 were previously known to him2 but the motive of revenge1 or fear1 or interest1 prevailed in his savage heart over the sentiments of duty and humanity4 ,and when we express that detestation against him to which he himself1 in a little time1 became insensible1 it is not that we see any relations1 of which he was ignorant2 but that1 for the rectitude of our disposition1 we feel sentiments against which he was hardened from flattery and a long perseverance in the most enormous crimes4 ,in these sentiments then1 not in a discovery of relations of any kind1 do all moral determinations consist4 ,before we can pretend to form any decision of this kind1 everything must be known and ascertained on the side of the object or action4 ,nothing remains but to feel1 on our part1 some sentiment of blame or approbation2 whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous4 ,,iii4 ,this doctrine will become still more evident1 if we compare moral beauty with natural1 to which in many particulars it bears so near a resemblance4 ,it is on the proportion1 relation1 and position of parts1 that all natural beauty depends2 but it would be absurd thence to infer1 that the perception of beauty1 like that of truth in geometrical problems1 consists wholly in the perception of relations1 and was performed entirely by the understanding or intellectual faculties4 ,in all the sciences1 our mind from the known relations investigates the unknown4 ,but in all decisions of taste or external beauty1 all the relations are beforehand obvious to the eye2 and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust1 according to the nature of the object1 and disposition of our organs4 ,euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the circle2 but has not in any proposition said a word of its beauty4 ,the reason is evident4 ,the beauty is not a quality of the circle4 ,it lies not in any part of the line1 whose parts are equally distant from a common centre4 ,it is only the effect which that figure produces upon the mind1 whose peculiar fabric of structure renders it susceptible of such sentiments4 ,in vain would you look for it in the circle1 or seek it1 either by your senses or by mathematical reasoning1 in all the properties of that figure4 ,attend to ,palladio and ,perrault1 while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar4 ,they talk of the cornice1 and frieze1 and base1 and entablature1 and shaft1 and architrave2 and give the description and position of each of these members4 ,but should you ask the description and position of its beauty1 they would readily reply1 that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar1 but results from the whole1 when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind1 susceptible to those finer sensations4 ,till such a spectator appear1 there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and proportions3 from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty4 ,again2 attend to ,cicero1 while he paints the crimes of a ,verres or a ,catiline4 ,you must acknowledge that the moral turpitude results1 in the same manner1 from the contemplation of the whole1 when presented to a being whose organs have such a particular structure and formation4 ,the orator may paint rage1 insolence1 barbarity on the one side2 meekness1 suffering1 sorrow1 innocence on the other4 ,but if you feel no indignation or compassion arise in you from this complication of circumstances1 you would in vain ask him1 in what consists the crime or villainy1 which he so vehemently exclaims against8 ,at what time1 or on what subject it first began to exist8 ,and what has a few months afterwards become of it1 when every disposition and thought of all the actors is totally altered or annihilated8 ,no satisfactory answer can be given to any of these questions1 upon the abstract hypothesis of morals2 and we must at last acknowledge1 that the crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation1 which can be the object of the understanding1 but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation1 which1 by the structure of human nature1 we unavoidably feel on the apprehension of barbarity or treachery4 ,,iv4 ,inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents2 though the former can never be the object of love or hatred1 nor are consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity4 ,a young tree1 which over-tops and destroys its parent1 stands in all the same relations with ,nero1 when he murdered ,agrippina2 and if morality consisted merely in relations1 would no doubt be equally criminal4 ,v4 ,it appears evident that--the ultimate ends of human actions can never1 in any case1 be accounted for by reason1 but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind1 without any dependance on the intellectual faculties4 ,ask a man ,,why ,,he ,,uses ,,exercise2 he will answer1 ,,because ,,he ,,desires ,,to ,,keep ,,his ,,health4 ,if you then enquire1 ,,why ,,he ,,desires ,,health1 he will readily reply1 ,,because ,,sickness ,,is ,,painful4 ,if you push your enquiries farther1 and desire a reason ,,why ,,he ,,hates ,,pain1 it is impossible he can ever give any4 ,this is an ultimate end1 and is never referred to any other object4 ,perhaps to your second question1 ,,why ,,he ,,desires ,,health1 he may also reply1 that ,,it ,,is ,,necessary ,,for ,,the ,,exercise ,,of ,,his ,,calling4 ,if you ask1 ,,why ,,he ,,is ,,anxious ,,on ,,that ,,head1 he will answer1 ,,because ,,he ,,desires ,,to ,,get ,,money4 ,if you demand ,,why8 ,,it ,,is ,,the ,,instrument ,,of ,,pleasure1 says he4 ,and beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason4 ,it is impossible there can be a progress ,,in ,,infinitum2 and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired4 ,something must be desirable on its own account1 and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection4 ,now as virtue is an end1 and is desirable on its own account1 without fee and reward1 merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys2 it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches1 some internal taste or feeling1 or whatever you may please to call it1 which distinguishes moral good and evil1 and which embraces the one and rejects the other4 ,thus the distinct boundaries and offices of ,,reason and of ,,taste are easily ascertained4 ,the former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood3 the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity1 vice and virtue4 ,the one discovers objects as they really stand in nature1 without addition and diminution3 the other has a productive faculty1 and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours1 borrowed from internal sentiment1 raises in a manner a new creation4 ,reason being cool and disengaged1 is no motive to action1 and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination1 by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery3 ,taste1 as it gives pleasure or pain1 and thereby constitutes happiness or misery1 becomes a motive to action1 and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition4 ,from circumstances and relations1 known or supposed1 the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown3 after all circumstances and relations are laid before us1 the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation4 ,the standard of the one1 being founded on the nature of things1 is eternal and inflexible1 even by the will of the ,supreme ,being3 the standard of the other arising from the eternal frame and constitution of animals1 is ultimately derived from that ,supreme ,will1 which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature1 and arranged the several classes and orders of existence4 ,,appendix ,,ii4 ,,of ,,self-,,love4 ,,there is a principle1 supposed to prevail among many1 which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment2 and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved disposition1 so in its turn it tends still further to encourage that depravity4 ,this principle is1 that all ,,benevolence is mere hypocrisy1 friendship a cheat1 public spirit a farce1 fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence2 and that while all of us1 at bottom1 pursue only our private interest1 we wear these fair disguises1 in order to put others off their guard1 and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations4 ,what heart one must be possessed of who possesses such principles1 and who feels no internal sentiment that belies so pernicious a theory1 it is easy to imagine3 and also what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a species whom he represents under such odious colours1 and supposes so little susceptible of gratitude or any return of affection4 ,or if we should not ascribe these principles wholly to a corrupted heart1 we must at least account for them from the most careless and precipitate examination4 ,superficial reasoners1 indeed1 observing many false pretences among mankind1 and feeling1 perhaps1 no very strong restraint in their own disposition1 might draw a general and a hasty conclusion that all is equally corrupted1 and that men1 different from all other animals1 and indeed from all other species of existence1 admit of no degrees of good or bad1 but are1 in every instance1 the same creatures under different disguises and appearances4 ,there is another principle1 somewhat resembling the former2 which has been much insisted on by philosophers1 and has been the foundation of many a system2 that1 whatever affection one may feel1 or imagine he feels for others1 no passion is1 or can be disinterested2 that the most generous friendship1 however sincere1 is a modification of self-love2 and that1 even unknown to ourselves1 we seek only our own gratification1 while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind4 ,by a turn of imagination1 by a refinement of reflection1 by an enthusiasm of passion1 we seem to take part in the interests of others1 and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish considerations3 but1 at bottom1 the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser1 the bravest hero and most abject coward1 have1 in every action1 an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare4 ,whoever concludes from the seeming tendency of this opinion1 that those1 who make profession of it1 cannot possibly feel the true sentiments of benevolence1 or have any regard for genuine virtue1 will often find himself1 in practice1 very much mistaken4 ,probity and honour were no strangers to ,epicurus and his sect4 ,atticus and ,horace seem to have enjoyed from nature1 and cultivated by reflection1 as generous and friendly dispositions as any disciple of the austerer schools4 ,and among the modern1 ,hobbes and ,locke1 who maintained the selfish system of morals1 lived irreproachable lives2 though the former lay not under any restraint of religion which might supply the defects of his philosophy4 ,an epicurean or a ,hobbist readily allows1 that there is such a thing as a friendship in the world1 without hypocrisy or disguise2 though he may attempt1 by a philosophical chymistry1 to resolve the elements of this passion1 if ,i may so speak1 into those of another1 and explain every affection to be self-love1 twisted and moulded1 by a particular turn of imagination1 into a variety of appearances4 ,but as the same turn of imagination prevails not in every man1 nor gives the same direction to the original passion2 this is sufficient even according to the selfish system to make the widest difference in human characters1 and denominate one man virtuous and humane1 another vicious and meanly interested4 ,i esteem the man whose self-love1 by whatever means1 is so directed as to give him a concern for others1 and render him serviceable to society3 as ,i hate or despise him1 who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments4 ,in vain would you suggest that these characters1 though seemingly opposite1 are at bottom the same1 and that a very inconsiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between them4 ,each character1 notwithstanding these inconsiderable differences1 appears to me1 in practice1 pretty durable and untransmutable4 ,and ,i find not in this more than in other subjects1 that the natural sentiments arising from the general appearances of things are easily destroyed by subtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these appearances4 ,does not the lively1 cheerful colour of a countenance inspire me with complacency and pleasure2 even though ,i learn from philosophy that all difference of complexion arises from the most minute differences of thickness1 in the most minute parts of the skin2 by means of which a superficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light1 and absorb the others8 ,but though the question concerning the universal or partial selfishness of man be not so material as is usually imagined to morality and practice1 it is certainly of consequence in the speculative science of human nature1 and is a proper object of curiosity and enquiry4 ,it may not1 therefore1 be unsuitable1 in this place1 to bestow a few reflections upon it4 ,footnote3 ,benevolence naturally divides into two kinds1 the ,,general and the ,,particular4 ,the first is1 where we have no friendship or connexion or esteem for the person1 but feel only a general sympathy with him or a compassion for his pains1 and a congratulation with his pleasures4 ,the other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue1 on services done us1 or on some particular connexions4 ,both these sentiments must be allowed real in human nature3 but whether they will resolve into some nice considerations of self-love1 is a question more curious than important4 ,the former sentiment1 to wit1 that of general benevolence1 or humanity1 or sympathy1 we shall have occasion frequently to treat of in the course of this inquiry2 and ,i assume it as real1 from general experience1 without any other proof4 ,the most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is1 that1 as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions1 there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox4 ,to the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity2 such affections as love1 friendship1 compassion1 gratitude4 ,these sentiments have their causes1 effects1 objects1 and operations1 marked by common language and observation1 and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish passions4 ,and as this is the obvious appearance of things1 it must be admitted1 till some hypothesis be discovered1 which by penetrating deeper into human nature1 may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter4 ,all attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless1 and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love of ,,simplicity which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy4 ,i shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject4 ,many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these systems4 ,and ,i shall take for granted what1 ,i believe1 the smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer4 ,but the nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption1 that no better system will ever1 for the future1 be invented1 in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections1 and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect simplicity4 ,the case is not the same in this species of philosophy as in physics4 ,many an hypothesis in nature1 contrary to first appearances1 has been found1 on more accurate scrutiny1 solid and satisfactory4 ,instances of this kind are so frequent that a judicious1 as well as witty philosopher1 ,footnote3 ,mons4 ,fontenelle4 has ventured to affirm1 if there be more than one way in which any phenomenon may be produced1 that there is general presumption for its arising from the causes which are the least obvious and familiar4 ,but the presumption always lies on the other side1 in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions1 and of the internal operations of the human mind4 ,the simplest and most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any phenomenon1 is probably the true one4 ,when a philosopher1 in the explication of his system1 is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined reflections1 and to suppose them essential to the production of any passion or emotion1 we have reason to be extremely on our guard against so fallacious an hypothesis4 ,the affections are not susceptible of any impression from the refinements of reason or imagination2 and it is always found that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties1 necessarily1 from the narrow capacity of the human mind1 destroys all activity in the former4 ,our predominant motive or intention is1 indeed1 frequently concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind1 from vanity or self-conceit1 is desirous of supposing more prevalent3 but there is no instance that a concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abstruseness and intricacy of the motive4 ,a man that has lost a friend and patron may flatter himself that all his grief arises from generous sentiments1 without any mixture of narrow or interested considerations3 but a man that grieves for a valuable friend1 who needed his patronage and protection2 how can we suppose1 that his passionate tenderness arises from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest1 which has no foundation or reality8 ,we may as well imagine that minute wheels and springs1 like those of a watch1 give motion to a loaded waggon1 as account for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections4 ,animals are found susceptible of kindness1 both to their own species and to ours2 nor is there1 in this case1 the least suspicion of disguise or artifice4 ,shall we account for all ,,their sentiments1 too1 from refined deductions of self-interest8 ,or if we admit a disinterested benevolence in the inferior species1 by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the superior8 ,love between the sexes begets a complacency and good-will1 very distinct from the gratification of an appetite4 ,tenderness to their offspring1 in all sensible beings1 is commonly able alone to counter-balance the strongest motives of self-love1 and has no manner of dependance on that affection4 ,what interest can a fond mother have in view1 who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child1 and afterwards languishes and dies of grief1 when freed1 by its death1 from the slavery of that attendance8 ,is gratitude no affection of the human breast1 or is that a word merely1 without any meaning or reality8 ,have we no satisfaction in one man's company above another's1 and no desire of the welfare of our friend1 even though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in it8 ,or what is it commonly1 that gives us any participation in it1 even while alive and present1 but our affection and regard to him8 ,these and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature1 where no ,,real interest binds us to the object4 ,and how an ,,imaginary interest known and avowed for such1 can be the origin of any passion or emotion1 seems difficult to explain4 ,no satisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered2 nor is there the smallest probability that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable success4 ,but farther1 if we consider rightly of the matter1 we shall find that the hypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence1 distinct from self-love1 has really more ,,simplicity in it1 and is more conformable to the analogy of nature than that which pretends to resolve all friendship and humanity into this latter principle4 ,there are bodily wants or appetites acknowledged by every one1 which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment1 and carry us directly to seek possession of the object4 ,thus1 hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end2 and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure1 which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination that is secondary and interested4 ,in the same manner there are mental passions by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects1 such as fame or power1 or vengeance without any regard to interest2 and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment ensues1 as the consequence of our indulged affections4 ,nature must1 by the internal frame and constitution of the mind1 give an original propensity to fame1 ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition1 or pursue it from motives of self-love1 and desire of happiness4 ,if ,i have no vanity1 ,i take no delight in praise3 if ,i be void of ambition1 power gives me no enjoyment3 if ,i be not angry1 the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me4 ,in all these cases there is a passion which points immediately to the object1 and constitutes it our good or happiness2 as there are other secondary passions which afterwards arise1 and pursue it as a part of our happiness1 when once it is constituted such by our original affections4 ,were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love1 that propensity could scarcely ever exert itself2 because we should1 in that case1 have felt few and slender pains or pleasures1 and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to pursue4 ,now where is the difficulty in conceiving1 that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship1 and that1 from the original frame of our temper1 we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good1 which1 by means of that affection1 becomes our own good1 and is afterwards pursued1 from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyments8 ,who sees not that vengeance1 from the force alone of passion1 may be so eagerly pursued1 as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease1 interest1 or safety2 and1 like some vindictive animals1 infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an enemy2 ,footnote3 ,animasque in vulnere ponunt4 ,,virg1 ,dum alteri noceat1 sui negligens says ,seneca of ,anger4 ,de ,ira1 ,i4 i4 and what a malignant philosophy must it be1 that will not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges which are undisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment2 such a philosophy is more like a satyr than a true delineation or description of human nature2 and may be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery1 but is a very bad one for any serious argument or reasoning4 ,,appendix ,,iii4 ,,some ,,farther ,,considerations ,,with ,,regard ,,to ,,justice4 ,the intention of this ,appendix is to give some more particular explication of the origin and nature of ,justice1 and to mark some differences between it and the other virtues4 ,the social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately by a direct tendency or instinct1 which chiefly keeps in view the simple object1 moving the affections1 and comprehends not any scheme or system1 nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence1 imitation1 or example of others4 ,a parent flies to the relief of his child2 transported by that natural sympathy which actuates him1 and which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like circumstances4 ,a generous man cheerfully embraces an opportunity of serving his friend2 because he then feels himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections1 nor is he concerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before actuated by such noble motives1 or will ever afterwards prove their influence4 ,in all these cases the social passions have in view a single individual object1 and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the person loved and esteemed4 ,with this they are satisfied3 in this they acquiesce4 ,and as the good1 resulting from their benign influence1 is in itself complete and entire1 it also excites the moral sentiment of approbation1 without any reflection on farther consequences1 and without any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of society4 ,on the contrary1 were the generous friend or disinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence1 this would rather enhance his value in our eyes1 and join the praise of rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits4 ,the case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity4 ,they are highly useful1 or indeed absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind3 but the benefit resulting from them is not the consequence of every individual single act2 but arises from the whole scheme or system concurred in by the whole1 or the greater part of the society4 ,general peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the possessions of others2 but a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently1 considered in itself1 be productive of pernicious consequences4 ,the result of the individual acts is here1 in many instances1 directly opposite to that of the whole system of actions2 and the former may be extremely hurtful1 while the latter is1 to the highest degree1 advantageous4 ,riches1 inherited from a parent1 are1 in a bad man's hand1 the instrument of mischief4 ,the right of succession may1 in one instance1 be hurtful4 ,its benefit arises only from the observance of the general rule2 and it is sufficient1 if compensation be thereby made for all the ills and inconveniences which flow from particular characters and situations4 ,cyrus1 young and unexperienced1 considered only the individual case before him1 and reflected on a limited fitness and convenience1 when he assigned the long coat to the tall boy1 and the short coat to the other of smaller size4 ,his governor instructed him better1 while he pointed out more enlarged views and consequences1 and informed his pupil of the general1 inflexible rules1 necessary to support general peace and order in society4 ,the happiness and prosperity of mankind1 arising from the social virtue of benevolence and its subdivisions1 may be compared to a wall1 built by many hands1 which still rises by each stone that is heaped upon it1 and receives increase proportional to the diligence and care of each workman4 ,the same happiness1 raised by the social virtue of justice and its subdivisions1 may be compared to the building of a vault1 where each individual stone would1 of itself1 fall to the ground2 nor is the whole fabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of its corresponding parts4 ,all the laws of nature1 which regulate property1 as well as all civil laws1 are general1 and regard alone some essential circumstances of the case1 without taking into consideration the characters1 situations1 and connexions of the person concerned1 or any particular consequences which may result from the determination of these laws in any particular case which offers4 ,they deprive1 without scruple1 a beneficent man of all his possessions1 if acquired by mistake1 without a good title2 in order to bestow them on a selfish miser1 who has already heaped up immense stores of superfluous riches4 ,public utility requires that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules2 and though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public utility1 it is impossible for them to prevent all particular hardships1 or make beneficial consequences result from every individual case4 ,it is sufficient1 if the whole plan or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society1 and if the balance of good1 in the main1 do thereby preponderate much above that of evil4 ,even the general laws of the universe1 though planned by infinite wisdom1 cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience in every particular operation4 ,it has been asserted by some1 that justice arises from ,human ,conventions1 and proceeds from the voluntary choice1 consent1 or combination of mankind4 ,if by ,,convention be here meant a ,,promise 7which is the most usual sense of the word7 nothing can be more absurd than this position4 ,the observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice1 and we are not surely bound to keep our word because we have given our word to keep it4 ,but if by convention be meant a sense of common interest1 which sense each man feels in his own breast1 which he remarks in his fellows1 and which carries him1 in concurrence with others1 into a general plan or system of actions1 which tends to public utility2 it must be owned1 that1 in this sense1 justice arises from human conventions4 ,for if it be allowed 7what is1 indeed1 evident7 that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals2 it follows that every man1 in embracing that virtue1 must have an eye to the whole plan or system1 and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour4 ,did all his views terminate in the consequences of each act of his own1 his benevolence and humanity1 as well as his self-love1 might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from those which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice4 ,thus1 two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common interest1 without any promise or contract2 thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange2 thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement4 ,whatever is advantageous to two or more persons1 if all perform their part2 but what loses all advantage if only one perform1 can arise from no other principle ,there would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct4 ,footnote3 ,this theory concerning the origin of property1 and consequently of justice1 is1 in the main1 the same with that hinted at and adopted by ,grotius1 ',hinc discimus1 quae fuerit causa1 ob quam a primaeva communione rerum primo mobilium1 deinde et immobilinm discessum est3 nimirum quod cum non contenti homines vesci sponte natis1 antra habitare1 corpore aut nudo agere1 aut corticibus arborum ferarumve pellibus vestito1 vitae genus exquisitius delegissent1 industria opus fuit1 quam singuli rebus singulls adhiberent4 ,quo minus autem fructus in commune conferrentur1 primum obstitit locorum1 in quae homines discesserunt1 distantia1 deinde justitiae et amoris defectus1 per quem fiebat1 ut nee in labore1 nee in consumtione fructuum1 quae debebat1 aequalitas servaretur4 ,simul discimus1 quomodo res in proprietatem iverint2 non animi actu solo1 neque enim scire alii poterant1 quid alil suum esse vellent1 ut eo abstinerent1 et idem velle plures poterant2 sed pacto quodam aut expresso1 ut per divisionem1 aut tacito1 ut per occupationem4' ,de jure belli et pacis4 ,lib4 ii4 cap4 #b4 sec4 #b4 art4 #d and #e4 ,the word ,,natural is commonly taken in so many senses and is of so loose a signification1 that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not4 ,if self-love1 if benevolence be natural to man2 if reason and forethought be also natural2 then may the same epithet be applied to justice1 order1 fidelity1 property1 society4 ,men's inclination1 their necessities1 lead them to combine2 their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible where each governs himself by no rule1 and pays no regard to the possessions of others3 and from these passions and reflections conjoined1 as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others1 the sentiment of justice1 throughout all ages1 has infallibly and certainly had place to some degree or other in every individual of the human species4 ,in so sagacious an animal1 what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural4 ,footnote3 ,natural may be opposed1 either to what is ,,unusual1 ,,miraculous or ,,artificial4 ,in the two former senses1 justice and property are undoubtedly natural4 ,but as they suppose reason1 forethought1 design1 and a social union and confederacy among men1 perhaps that epithet cannot strictly1 in the last sense1 be applied to them4 ,had men lived without society1 property had never been known1 and neither justice nor injustice had ever existed4 ,but society among human creatures had been impossible without reason and forethought4 ,inferior animals1 that unite1 are guided by instinct1 which supplies the place for reason4 ,but all these disputes are merely verbal4 ,among all civilized nations it has been the constant endeavour to remove everything arbitrary and partial from the decision of property1 and to fix the sentence of judges by such general views and considerations as may be equal to every member of society4 ,for besides1 that nothing could be more dangerous than to accustom the bench1 even in the smallest instance1 to regard private friendship or enmity2 it is certain1 that men1 where they imagine that there was no other reason for the preference of their adversary but personal favour1 are apt to entertain the strongest ill-will against the magistrates and judges4 ,when natural reason1 therefore1 points out no fixed view of public utility by which a controversy of property can be decided1 positive laws are often framed to supply its place1 and direct the procedure of all courts of judicature4 ,where these too fail1 as often happens1 precedents are called for2 and a former decision1 though given itself without any sufficient reason1 justly becomes a sufficient reason for a new decision4 ,if direct laws and precedents be wanting1 imperfect and indirect ones are brought in aid2 and the controverted case is ranged under them by analogical reasonings and comparisons1 and similitudes1 and correspondencies1 which are often more fanciful than real4 ,in general1 it may safely be affirmed that jurisprudence is1 in this respect1 different from all the sciences2 and that in many of its nicer questions1 there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on either side4 ,if one pleader bring the case under any former law or precedent1 by a refined analogy or comparison2 the opposite pleader is not at a loss to find an opposite analogy or comparison3 and the preference given by the judge is often founded more on taste and imagination than on any solid argument4 ,public utility is the general object of all courts of judicature2 and this utility too requires a stable rule in all controversies3 but where several rules1 nearly equal and indifferent1 present themselves1 it is a very slight turn of thought which fixes the decision in favour of either party4 ,footnote3 ,that there be a separation or distinction of possessions1 and that this separation be steady and constant2 this is absolutely required by the interests of society1 and hence the origin of justice and property4 ,what possessions are assigned to particular persons2 this is1 generally speaking1 pretty indifferent2 and is often determined by very frivolous views and considerations4 ,we shall mention a few particulars4 ,were a society formed among several independent members1 the most obvious rule1 which could be agreed on1 would be to annex property to ,,present possession1 and leave every one a right to what he at present enjoys4 ,the relation of possession1 which takes place between the person and the object1 naturally draws on the relation of property4 ,for a like reason1 occupation or first possession becomes the foundation of property4 ,where a man bestows labour and industry upon any object1 which before belonged to no body2 as in cutting down and shaping a tree1 in cultivating a field1 c41 the alterations1 which he produces1 causes a relation between him and the object1 and naturally engages us to annex it to him by the new relation of property4 ,this cause here concurs with the public utility1 which consists in the encouragement given to industry and labour4 ,perhaps too1 private humanity towards the possessor concurs1 in this instance1 with the other motives1 and engages us to leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour2 and what he has flattered himself in the constant enjoyment of4 ,for though private humanity can1 by no means1 be the origin of justice2 since the latter virtue so often contradicts the former2 yet when the rule of separate and constant possession is once formed by the indispensable necessities of society1 private humanity1 and an aversion to the doing a hardship to another1 may1 in a particular instance1 give rise to a particular rule of property4 ,i am much inclined to think1 that the right succession or inheritance much depends on those connexions of the imagination1 and that the relation to a former proprietor begetting a relation to the object1 is the cause why the property is transferred to a man after the death of his kinsman4 ,it is true2 industry is more encouraged by the transference of possession to children or near relations3 but this consideration will only have place in a cultivated society2 whereas the right of succession is regarded even among the greatest ,barbarians4 ,acquisition of property by accession can be explained no way but by having recourse to the relations and connexions of the imaginations4 ,the property of rivers1 by the laws of most nations1 and by the natural turn of our thoughts1 is attributed to the proprietors of their banks1 excepting such vast rivers as the ,rhine or the ,danube1 which seem too large to follow as an accession to the property of the neighbouring fields4 ,yet even these rivers are considered as the property of that nation1 through whose dominions they run2 the idea of a nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them1 and bear them such a relation in the fancy4 ,the accessions1 which are made to land1 bordering upon rivers1 follow the land1 say the civilians1 provided it be made by what they call alluvion1 that is1 insensibly and imperceptibly2 which are circumstances1 that assist the imagination in the conjunction4 ,where there is any considerable portion torn at once from one bank and added to another1 it becomes not his property1 whose land it falls on1 till it unite with the land1 and till the trees and plants have spread their roots into both4 ,before that1 the thought does not sufficiently join them4 ,in short1 we must ever distinguish between the necessity of a separation and constancy in men's possession1 and the rules1 which assign particular objects to particular persons4 ,the first necessity is obvious1 strong1 and invincible3 the latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous1 on the sentiment of private humanity and aversion to private hardship1 on positive laws1 on precedents1 analogies1 and very fine connexions and turns of the imagination4 ,we may just observe1 before we conclude this subject1 that after the laws of justice are fixed by views of general utility1 the injury1 the hardship1 the harm1 which result to any individual from a violation of them1 enter very much into consideration1 and are a great source of that universal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity4 ,by the laws of society1 this coat1 this horse is mine1 and ,,ought to remain perpetually in my possession3 ,i reckon on the secure enjoyment of it3 by depriving me of it1 you disappoint my expectations1 and doubly displease me1 and offend every bystander4 ,it is a public wrong1 so far as the rules of equity are violated3 it is a private harm1 so far as an individual is injured4 ,and though the second consideration could have no place1 were not the former previously established3 for otherwise the distinction of ,,mine and ,,thine would be unknown in society3 yet there is no question but the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to particular4 ,what injures the community1 without hurting any individual1 is often more lightly thought of4 ,but where the greatest public wrong is also conjoined with a considerable private one1 no wonder the highest disapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour4 ,,appendix ,,iv4 ,,of ,,some ,,verbal ,,disputes4 ,nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians2 and to engage in disputes of words1 while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern4 ,it was in order to avoid altercations1 so frivolous and endless1 that ,i endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of our present enquiry2 and proposed simply to collect1 on the one hand1 a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem1 and form a part of personal merit2 and on the other hand1 a catalogue of those qualities which are the object of censure or reproach1 and which detract from the character of the person possessed of them2 subjoining some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or blame4 ,on all occasions1 where there might arise the least hesitation1 ,i avoided the terms ,,virtue and ,,vice2 because some of those qualities1 which ,i classed among the objects of praise1 receive1 in the ,english language1 the appellation of ,,talents1 rather than of virtues2 as some of the blameable or censurable qualities are often called defects1 rather than vices4 ,it may now1 perhaps1 be expected that before we conclude this moral enquiry1 we should exactly separate the one from the other2 should mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents1 vices and defects2 and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction4 ,but in order to excuse myself from this undertaking1 which would1 at last1 prove only a grammatical enquiry1 ,i shall subjoin the four following reflections1 which shall contain all that ,i intend to say on the present subject4 ,first1 ,i do not find that in the ,english1 or any other modern tongue1 the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents1 vices and defects1 or that a precise definition can be given of the one as contradistinguished from the other4 ,were we to say1 for instance1 that the esteemable qualities alone1 which are voluntary1 are entitled to the appellations of virtues2 we should soon recollect the qualities of courage1 equanimity1 patience1 self-command2 with many others1 which almost every language classes under this appellation1 though they depend little or not at all on our choice4 ,should we affirm that the qualities alone1 which prompt us to act our part in society1 are entitled to that honourable distinction2 it must immediately occur that these are indeed the most valuable qualities1 and are commonly denominated the ,,social virtues2 but that this very epithet supposes that there are also virtues of another species4 ,should we lay hold of the distinction between ,,intellectual and ,,moral endowments1 and affirm the last alone to be the real and genuine virtues1 because they alone lead to action2 we should find that many of those qualities1 usually called intellectual virtues1 such as prudence1 penetration1 discernment1 discretion1 had also a considerable influence on conduct4 ,the distinction between the heart and the head may also be adopted3 the qualities of the first may be defined such as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling of sentiment2 and these alone may be called the genuine virtues3 but industry1 frugality1 temperance1 secrecy1 perseverance1 and many other laudable powers or habits1 generally stilled virtues are exerted without any immediate sentiment in the person possessed of them1 and are only known to him by their effects4 ,it is fortunate1 amidst all this seeming perplexity1 that the question1 being merely verbal1 cannot possibly be of any importance4 ,a moral1 philosophical discourse needs not enter into all these caprices of language1 which are so variable in different dialects1 and in different ages of the same dialect4 ,but on the whole1 it seems to me1 that though it is always allowed1 that there are virtues of many different kinds1 yet1 when a man is called virtuous1 or is denominated a man of virtue1 we chiefly regard his social qualities1 which are1 indeed1 the most valuable4 ,it is1 at the same time1 certain1 that any remarkable defect in courage1 temperance1 economy1 industry1 understanding1 dignity of mind1 would bereave even a very good-natured1 honest man of this honourable appellation4 ,who did ever say1 except by way of irony1 that such a one was a man of great virtue1 but an egregious blockhead8 ,but1 ,secondly1 it is no wonder that languages should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents1 vices and defects2 since there is so little distinction made in our internal estimation of them4 ,it seems indeed certain1 that the ,,sentiment of conscious worth1 the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character2 it seems certain1 ,i say1 that this sentiment1 which1 though the most common of all others1 has no proper name in our language1 ,footnote3 ,the term1 pride1 is commonly taken in a bad sense2 but this sentiment seems indifferent1 and may be either good or bad1 according as it is well or ill founded1 and according to the other circumstances which accompany it4 ,the ,french express this sentiment by the term1 ,,amour ,,propre1 but as they also express self-love as well as vanity by the same term1 there arises thence a great confusion in ,rochefoucault1 and many of their moral writers4 arises from the endowments of courage and capacity1 industry and ingenuity1 as well as from any other mental excellencies4 ,who1 on the other hand1 is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and dissoluteness1 and feels not a secret sting or compunction whenever his memory presents any past occurrence1 where he behaved with stupidity of ill-manners8 ,no time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish conduct1 or of affronts1 which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him4 ,they still haunt his solitary hours1 damp his most aspiring thoughts1 and show him1 even to himself1 in the most contemptible and most odious colours imaginable4 ,what is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than such blunders1 infirmities1 and meannesses1 or more dread to have exposed by raillery and satire8 ,and is not the chief object of vanity1 our bravery or learning1 our wit or breeding1 our eloquence or address1 our taste or abilities8 ,these we display with care1 if not with ostentation2 and we commonly show more ambition of excelling in them1 than even in the social virtues themselves1 which are1 in reality1 of such superior excellence4 ,good-nature and honesty1 especially the latter1 are so indispensably required1 that1 though the greatest censure attends any violation of these duties1 no eminent praise follows such common instances of them1 as seem essential to the support of human society4 ,and hence the reason1 in my opinion1 why1 though men often extol so liberally the qualities of their heart1 they are shy in commending the endowments of their head3 because the latter virtues1 being supposed more rare and extraordinary1 are observed to be the more usual objects of pride and self-conceit2 and when boasted of1 beget a strong suspicion of these sentiments4 ,it is hard to tell1 whether you hurt a man's character most by calling him a knave or a coward1 and whether a beastly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible1 as a selfish1 ungenerous miser4 ,give me my choice1 and ,i would rather1 for my own happiness and self-enjoyment1 have a friendly1 humane heart1 than possess all the other virtues of ,demosthenes and ,philip united3 but ,i would rather pass with the world for one endowed with extensive genius and intrepid courage1 and should thence expect stronger instances of general applause and admiration4 ,the figure which a man makes in life1 the reception which he meets with in company1 the esteem paid him by his acquaintance2 all these advantages depend as much upon his good sense and judgement1 as upon any other part of his character4 ,had a man the best intentions in the world1 and were the farthest removed from all injustice and violence1 he would never be able to make himself be much regarded1 without a moderate share1 at least1 of parts and understanding4 ,what is it then we can here dispute about8 ,if sense and courage1 temperance and industry1 wisdom and knowledge confessedly form a considerable part of ,,personal ,,merit3 if a man1 possessed of these qualities1 is both better satisfied with himself1 and better entitled to the good-will1 esteem1 and services of others1 than one entirely destitute of them2 if1 in short1 the ,,sentiments are similar which arise from these endowments and from the social virtues2 is there any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a ,,word1 or disputing whether they be entitled to the denomination of virtues8 ,it may1 indeed1 be pretended1 that the sentiment of approbation1 which those accomplishments produce1 besides its being ,,inferior1 is also somewhat ,,different from that which attends the virtues of justice and humanity4 ,but this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under different classes and appellations4 ,the character of ,caesar and that of ,cato1 as drawn by ,sallust1 are both of them virtuous1 in the strictest and most limited sense of the word2 but in a different way3 nor are the sentiments entirely the same which arise from them4 ,the one produces love1 the other esteem3 the one is amiable1 the other awful3 we should wish to meet the one character in a friend2 the other we should be ambitious of in ourselves4 ,in like manner the approbation1 which attends temperance or industry or frugality1 may be somewhat different from that which is paid to the social virtues1 without making them entirely of a different species4 ,and1 indeed1 we may observe1 that these endowments1 more than the other virtues1 produce not1 all of them1 the same kind of approbation4 ,good sense and genius beget esteem and regard3 wit and humour excite love and affection4 ,footnote3 ,love and esteem are nearly the same passion1 and arise from similar causes4 ,the qualities1 which produce both1 are such as communicate pleasures4 ,but where this pleasure is severe and serious2 or where its object is great1 and makes a strong impression1 or where it produces any degree of humility and awe2 in all these cases1 the passion1 which arises from the pleasure1 is more properly denominated esteem than love4 ,benevolence attends both2 but is connected with love in a more eminent degree4 ,there seems to be still a stronger mixture of pride in contempt than of humility in esteem2 and the reason would not be difficulty to one1 who studied accurately the passions4 ,all these various mixtures and compositions and appearances of sentiment from a very curious subject of speculation1 but are wide for our present purpose4 ,throughout this enquiry1 we always consider in general1 what qualities are a subject of praise or of censure1 without entering into all the minute differences of sentiment1 which they excite4 ,it is evident1 that whatever is contemned1 is also disliked1 as well as what is hated2 and we here endeavour to take objects1 according to their most simple views and appearances4 ,these sciences are but too apt to appear abstract to common readers1 even with all the precautions which we can take to clear them from superfluous speculations1 and bring them down to every capacity4 ,most people1 ,i believe1 will naturally1 without premeditation1 assent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet3 ,virtue 7for mere good-nature is a fool7 ,is sense and spirit with humanity4 ,footnote3 ,the ,art of preserving ,health4 ,book #d ,what pretensions has a man to our generous assistance or good offices1 who has dissipated his wealth in profuse expenses1 idle vanities1 chimerical projects1 dissolute pleasures or extravagant gaming8 ,these vices 7for we scruple not to call them such7 bring misery unpitied1 and contempt on every one addicted to them4 ,achaeus1 a wise and prudent prince1 fell into a fatal snare1 which cost him his crown and life1 after having used every reasonable precaution to guard himself against it4 ,on that account1 says the historian1 he is a just object of regard and compassion3 his betrayers alone of hatred and contempt ,footnote3 ,polybius1 lib4 iii4 cap4 #b4 ,the precipitate flight and improvident negligence of ,pompey1 at the beginning of the civil wars1 appeared such notorious blunders to ,cicero1 as quite palled his friendship towards that great man4 ,in the same manner1 says he1 as want of cleanliness1 decency1 or discretion in a mistress are found to alienate our affections4 ,for so he expresses himself1 where he talks1 not in the character of a philosopher1 but in that of a statesman and man of the world1 to his friend ,atticus4 ,lib4 ix4 epist4 #aj4 ,but the same ,cicero1 in imitation of all the ancient moralists1 when he reasons as a philosopher1 enlarges very much his ideas of virtue1 and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment of the mind1 under that honourable appellation4 ,this leads to the ,,third reflection1 which we proposed to make1 to wit1 that the ancient moralists1 the best models1 made no material distinction among the different species of mental endowments and defects1 but treated all alike under the appellation of virtues and vices1 and made them indiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings4 ,the prudence explained in ,cicero's ,offices ,footnote3 ,lib4 i4 cap4 #f4 is that sagacity1 which leads to the discovery of truth1 and preserves us from error and mistake4 ,,magnanimity1 ,,temperance1 ,,decency1 are there also at large discoursed of4 ,and as that eloquent moralist followed the common received division of the four cardinal virtues1 our social duties form but one head1 in the general distribution of his subject4 ,footnote3 ,the following passage of ,cicero is worth quoting1 as being the most clear and express to our purpose1 that any thing can be imagined1 and1 in a dispute1 which is chiefly verbal1 must1 on account of the author1 carry an authority1 from which there can be no appeal4 ',virtus autem1 quae est per se ipsa laudabilis1 et sine qua nihil laudari potest1 tamen habet plures partes1 quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior4 ,sunt enim aliae virtutes1 quae videntur in moribus hominum1 et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae3 aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate1 aut animi magnitudine ac robore4 ,nam clementia1 justitia1 benignitas1 fides1 fortitudo in periculis communibus1 jucunda est auditu in laudationibus4 ,omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis1 qui eas in se habent1 quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur4 ,sapientia et magnitude animi1 qua omnes res humanae tenues et pro nihilo putantur1 et in cogitando vis quaedam ingenii1 et ipsa eloquentia admirationis habet non minus1 jucunditatis minus4 ,ipsos enim magis videntur1 quos laudamus1 quam illos1 apud quos laudamus ornare ac tueri3 sed tamen in laudenda jungenda sunt eliam haec genera virtutum4 ,ferunt enim aures bominum1 cum ilia quae jucunda et grata1 tum etiam ilia1 quae mirabilia sunt in virtute1 laudari4' ,de orat4 lib4 ii4 cap4 #hd4 ,i suppose1 if ,cicero were now alive1 it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems2 or persuade him1 that no qualities were to be admitted as virtues1 or acknowledged to be a part of ,,personal ,,merit1 but what were recommended by ,the ,whole ,duty of ,man4 ,we need only peruse the titles of chapters in ,aristotle's ,ethics to be convinced that he ranks courage1 temperance1 magnificence1 magnanimity1 modesty1 prudence1 and a manly openness1 among the virtues1 as well as justice and friendship4 ,to ,,sustain and to ,,abstain1 that is1 to be patient and continent1 appeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all morals4 ,epictetus has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and compassion1 but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it4 ,the virtue of the ,stoics seems to consist chiefly in a firm temper and a sound understanding4 ,with them1 as with ,solomon and the eastern moralists1 folly and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue4 ,men will praise thee1 says ,david1 ,footnote3 ,psalm #dith4 when thou dost well unto thyself4 ,i hate a wise man1 says the ,greek poet1 who is not wise to himself ,footnote3 ,here1 ,hume quotes ,euripedes in ,greek4 ,plutarch is no more cramped by systems in his philosophy than in his history4 ,where he compares the great men of ,greece and ,rome1 he fairly sets in opposition all their blemishes and accomplishments of whatever kind1 and omits nothing considerable1 which can either depress or exalt their characters4 ,his moral discourses contain the same free and natural censure of men and manners4 ,the character of ,hannibal1 as drawn by ,livy1 ,footnote3 ,lib4 xxi4 cap4 #d is esteemed partial1 but allows him many eminent virtues4 ,never was there a genius1 says the historian1 more equally fitted for those opposite offices of commanding and obeying2 and it were1 therefore1 difficult to determine whether he rendered himself ,,dearer to the general or to the army4 ,to none would ,hasdrubal entrust more willingly the conduct of any dangerous enterprize2 under none did the soldiers discover more courage and confidence4 ,great boldness in facing danger2 great prudence in the midst of it4 ,no labour could fatigue his body or subdue his mind4 ,cold and heat were indifferent to him3 meat and drink he sought as supplies to the necessities of nature1 not as gratifications of his voluptuous appetites4 ,waking or rest he used indiscriminately1 by night or by day4--,these great ,virtues were balanced by great ,vices2 inhuman cruelty2 perfidy more than punic2 no truth1 no faith1 no regard to oaths1 promises1 or religion4 ,the character of ,alexander the ,sixth1 to be found in ,guicciardin1 ,footnote3 ,lib4 i4 is pretty similar1 but juster2 and is a proof that even the moderns1 where they speak naturally1 hold the same language with the ancients4 ,in this pope1 says he1 there was a singular capacity and judgement3 admirable prudence2 a wonderful talent of persuasion2 and in all momentous enterprizes a diligence and dexterity incredible4 ,but these ,,virtues were infinitely overbalanced by his ,,vices2 no faith1 no religion1 insatiable avarice1 exorbitant ambition1 and a more than barbarous cruelty4 ,polybius1 ,footnote3 ,lib4 xii4 reprehending ,timaeus for his partiality against ,agathocles1 whom he himself allows to be the most cruel and impious of all tyrants1 says3 if he took refuge in ,syracuse1 as asserted by that historian1 flying the dirt and smoke and toil of his former profession of a potter2 and if proceeding from such slender beginnings1 he became master1 in a little time1 of all ,sicily2 brought the ,carthaginian state into the utmost danger2 and at last died in old age1 and in possession of sovereign dignity3 must he not be allowed something prodigious and extraordinary1 and to have possessed great talents and capacity for business and action8 ,his historian1 therefore1 ought not to have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy2 but also what might redound to his ,praise and ,honour4 ,in general1 we may observe1 that the distinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral reasonings2 where they frequently treated the question as very doubtful1 ,,whether ,,virtue ,,could ,,be ,,taught ,,or ,,not ,vid4 ,plato in ,menone1 ,seneca de otio sap4 cap4 #ca4 ,so also ,horace1 ,virtutem doctrina paret1 naturane donet1 ,epist4 lib4 ,i4 ep4 #ah4 ,aeschines ,socraticus1 ,dial4 ,i48 ,they justly considered that cowardice1 meanness1 levity1 anxiety1 impatience1 folly1 and many other qualities of the mind1 might appear ridiculous and deformed1 contemptible and odious1 though independent of the will4 ,nor could it be supposed1 at all times1 in every man's power to attain every kind of mental more than of exterior beauty4 ,and here there occurs the ,,fourth reflection which ,i purposed to make1 in suggesting the reason why modern philosophers have often followed a course in their moral enquiries so different from that of the ancients4 ,in later times1 philosophy of all kinds1 especially ethics1 have been more closely united with theology than ever they were observed to be among the heathens2 and as this latter science admits of no terms of composition1 but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose1 without much regard to the phenomena of nature1 or to the unbiassed sentiments of the mind1 hence reasoning1 and even language1 have been warped from their natural course1 and distinctions have been endeavoured to be established where the difference of the objects was1 in a manner1 imperceptible4 ,philosophers1 or rather divines under that disguise1 treating all morals as on a like footing with civil laws1 guarded by the sanctions of reward and punishment1 were necessarily led to render this circumstance1 of ,,voluntary or ,,involuntary1 the foundation of their whole theory4 ,every one may employ ,,terms in what sense he pleases3 but this1 in the mean time1 must be allowed1 that ,,sentiments are every day experienced of blame and praise1 which have objects beyond the dominion of the will or choice1 and of which it behoves us1 if not as moralists1 as speculative philosophers at least1 to give some satisfactory theory and explication4 ,a blemish1 a fault1 a vice1 a crime2 these expressions seem to denote different degrees of censure and disapprobation2 which are1 however1 all of them1 at the bottom1 pretty nearly all the same kind of species4 ,the explication of one will easily lead us into a just conception of the others2 and it is of greater consequence to attend to things than to verbal appellations4 ,that we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even in the most vulgar system of morals2 and it must be of consequence to examine that duty1 in order to see whether it bears any affinity to that which we owe to society4 ,it is probable that the approbation attending the observance of both is of a similar nature1 and arises from similar principles1 whatever appellation we may give to either of these excellencies4