,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind4 ,,by ,,the ,,late ,,thomas ,,brown1 ,m4 ,d4 ,,professor ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,edinburgh4 ,,in ,,three ,,volumes4 ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,andover3 ,,published ,,by ,,mark ,,newman4 ,,flagg ,,and ,,gould1 ,,printers4 #ahbb4 ,,contents4 ,,lecture ,i4 ,,page4 ,introduction1 #i ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,relation of the ,philosophy of ,mind to the ,sciences in general1 #bj ,,lecture ,,iii4 ,relation of the ,philosophy of ,mind to the ,intellectual ,sciences and ,arts1 #ce ,,lecture ,,iv4 ,relation of the ,philosophy of ,mind to the ,cultivation of ,moral ,feeling1 #ej ,,lecture ,v4 ,on the ,nature of ,physical ,inquiry in general1 #fd ,,lecture ,,vi4 ,on the ,nature of ,physical ,inquiry in general1 #hj ,,lecture ,,vii4 ,on ,power1 ,cause1 and ,effect1 #ih ,,lecture ,,viii4 ,on ,hypothesis and ,theory1 #aac ,,lecture ,,ix4 ,recapitulation of the ,four preceding ,lectures1 #abi ,application of the ,laws of ,physical ,inquiry to the ,study of ,mind1 #ace ,,lecture ,x4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #add ,,lecture ,,xi4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #afb ,on the ,phenomena of ,mind in ,general1 #afg ,on ,consciousness1 #afi ,,lecture ,,xii4 ,on ,consciousness1 #agh ,on ,mental ,identity1 #ahj ,identity irreconcilable with the ,doctrine of ,materialism1 #ahj ,distinction between ,personal and ,mental ,identity1 #ahb ,shaftesbury's ,opinion of ,identity1 #ahd ,objections to the ,doctrine of ,mental ,identity1 #ahe ,,lecture ,,xiii4 ,on the ,direct ,evidence of ,mental ,identity1 #aib ,objections answered1 #bjd ,,lecture ,,xiv4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #bjg ,,lecture ,,xv4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #bbd ,opinion of ,mr ,locke respecting ,identity1 #bcj ,source of his ,paradox respecting it1 #bcd ,reflections suggested by his ,paradox1 #bce ,,lecture ,,xvi4 ,on the ,classification of the ,phenomena of ,mind1 #bci ,,lecture ,,xvii4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #bed ,on the ,external ,affections of ,mind1 in general1 #bfb ,on the less ,definite ,external ,affections1 #bfd ,,lecture ,,xviii4 ,on the more ,definite ,external ,affections1 #bfi ,,lecture ,,xix4 ,on the ,corporeal ,part of the ,process1 in ,sensation1 #bhc ,,lecture ,,xx4 ,particular ,consideration of our ,sensations1 #bih ,on ,smell1 #cjj ,on ,taste1 #cja ,on ,hearing1 #cje ,,lecture ,,xxi4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #cab ,on ,touch1 #cbf ,,lecture ,,xxii4 ,on the ,feelings ascribed to the ,sense of ,touch1 #cbh ,analysis of these ,feelings1 #ccj ,,lecture ,,xxiii4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #cde ,,lecture ,,xxiv4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #ceh ,,lecture ,,xxv4 ,on the ,distinction between ,sensation and ,perception1 #cgi ,on the ,primary and ,secondary ,qualities of ,matter1 #chd ,,lecture ,,xxvi4 ,on ,dr4 ,reid's supposed ,confutation of the ,ideal ,system1 #cie ,hypothesis of the ,peripatetics regarding ,perception1 #cif ,opinion of ,locke--,hobbes--,des ,cartes--,arnauld--,le ,clerc ,de ,crousaz1 regarding ,perception1 #cii ,,lecture ,,xxvii4 ,examination of ,dr ,reid's supposed ,confutation of ,idealism #daa ,,lecture ,,xxviii4 ,conclusion of the ,subject1 #dbg ,on ,vision1--,analysis of the ,feelings ascribed to it1 #dca ,,lecture ,,xxix4 ,continuation of the same ,subject1 #ddb ,,lecture ,,xxx4 ,history of ,opinions regarding ,perception1 #dei ,opinion of the ,peripatetics1 #dfb ---- of ,des ,cartes1 #dfd ---- of ,malebranche1 #dfi ---- of ,st ,austin1 #dgb ,,lecture ,,xxxi4 ---- of ,leibnitz1 #dgd ,on the ,external ,affections combined with ,desire1 #dgi ,attention1 #dhb ,,lecture ,,xxxii4 ,continuation of the ,same ,subject1 #dij ,on the ,internal ,affections of ,mind1 #dig ,on the ,classification of these ,affections1 #ejj ,,lecture ,,xxxiii4 ,on ,locke1 ,condillac1 and ,reid's ,classification of the ,mental ,phenomena1 #eje ,new ,classification of the ,internal ,affections1 #eah ,,lecture ,,xxxiv4 ,on ,simple ,suggestion1 #ebc ,advantages resulting from the ,principle of ,suggestion1 #ebf ,on ,mr ,hume's ,classification of the ,associating or ,suggesting ,principles1 #ecb ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind4 ,,lecture ,i4--7,,introduction47 ,,gentlemen1 ,the subject on which we are about to enter1 and which is to engage1 ,i trust1 a considerable portion of your attention for many months1 is the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1--not that speculative and passive philosophy only1 which inquires into the nature of our intellectual part1 and the mysterious connexion of this with the body which it animates1 but that practical science1 which relates to the duties1 and the hopes1 and the great destiny of man1 and which1 even in analyzing the powers of his understanding1 and tracing all the various modifications of which it is individually susceptible1 views it chiefly as a general instrument of good--an instrument by which he may have the dignity of co-operating with his beneficent ,creator1 by spreading to others the knowledge1 and virtue1 and happiness1 which he is qualified at once to enjoy1 and to diffuse4 8,philosophy10 says ,seneca1 8is not formed for artificial show or delight4 ,it has a higher office than to free idleness of its languor1 and wear away and amuse the long hours of a day4 ,it is that which forms and fashions the soul1 which gives to life its disposition and order1 which points out what it is our duty to do1 what it is our duty to omit4 ,it sits at the helm1 and in a sea of peril1 directs the course of those who are wandering through the waves40 8,non est philosophia populare artificium1 nec ostentationi paratum2 non in verbis sed in rebus est4 ,nec in hoc adhibetur ut aliqua oblectatione consumatur dies1 ut dematur otio nausea4 ,animum format et fabricat1 vitam disponit1 actiones regit1 agenda et omittenda demonstrat1 sedit ad gubernaculum1 et per ancipitia fluctuantium dirigit cursum40 ,ep4 #af4 ,such1 unquestionably1 is the great practical object of all philosophy4 ,if it increase the happiness and virtue of human kind1 it must be allowed to have fulfilled1 to human beings1 the noblest of earthly ends4 ,the greatness of this primary object1 however1 perhaps fixed too exclusively the attention of the moral inquirers of antiquity1 who1 in considering man as capable of virtue and happiness1 and in forming nice and subtle distinctions as to his supreme good1 and the means by which he might attain it1 seem almost to have neglected the consideration of his intellectual nature1 as an object of mere physical science4 ,hence it happens1 that1 while the systems of ancient philosophy exhibit1 in many instances1 a dignity of moral sentiment as high1 or almost as high1 as the unassisted reason of man could be supposed to reach1 and the defects of which we perhaps discover only by the aid of that purer light1 which was not indulged to them1 they can scarcely be said to have left us a single analysis of complex phenomena of thought and feeling4 ,by some of them1 indeed1 especially by the ,peripatetics and ,stoics1 much dialectic subtilty was employed in distinctions1 that may seem at first to involve such an analysis2 but even these distinctions were verbal1 or little more than verbal4 ,the analytical investigation of the mind1 in all its complexity of perceptions1 and thoughts1 and emotions1 was reserved to form almost a new science in the comprehensive philosophy of far later years4 ,if1 however1 during the flourishing periods of ,greek and ,roman letters1 this intellectual analysis was little cultivated1 the department of the philosophy of the mind1 which relates to practical ethics1 was enriched1 as ,i have said1 by moral speculations the most splendid and sublime4 ,in those ages1 indeed1 and in countries in which no revealed will of heaven had pointed out and sanctioned one unerring rule of right1 it is not to be wondered at1 that1 to those who were occupied in endeavouring to trace and ascertain such a rule in the moral nature of man1 all other mental inquiries should have seemed comparatively insignificant4 ,it is even pleasing thus to find the most important of all inquiries regarded as truly the most important1 and minds of the highest genius1 in reflecting on their own constitution1 so richly diversified and adorned with an almost infinite variety of forms of thought1 discovering nothing1 in all this splendid variety1 so worthy of investigation1 as the conduct which it is fitting for man to pursue4 ,but another period was soon to follow1 a period in which ages of long and dreary ignorance were to be followed by ages of futile labour1 as long and dreary4 ,no beautiful moral speculations were then to compensate the poverty of intellectual science4 ,but morality1 and even religion itself1 were to be degraded1 as little more than technical terms of a cold and unmeaning logic4 ,the knowledge of our mental frame was then1 indeed1 professedly cultivated with most assiduous zeal2 and if much technical phraseology1 and much contention1 were sufficient to constitute an elaborate science1 that assiduous zeal might well deserve to have been rewarded with so honourable a name4 ,but what reasonable hope of a progress truly scientific could be formed1 when to treat of the philosophy of mind was to treat of every thing but of the mind and its affections2 when some of the most important questions1 with respect to it1 were1 ,whether its essence were distinct from its existence8 whether its essence therefore might subsist1 when it had no actual existence8 and what were all the qualities inherent in it as a nonentity8 ,in morals1 whether ethics were an art or a science8 whether1 if the mind had freedom of choice1 this independent will be an entity or a quiddity8 and whether we should say1 with a dozen schoolmen1 that virtue is good1 because it has intrinsic goodness1 or1 with a dozen more1 that it has this intrinsic goodness1 because it is good8 ,in natural theology1 questions of equal moment were contested with equal keenness and subtilty2 but they related less to the ,deity1 of whose nature1 transcendent as it is1 the whole universe may be considered as in some degree a faint revelation1 than to those spiritual ministers of his power1 of whose very existence nature affords no evidence1 and of whom revelation itself may be said to teach us little but the mere existence4 ,whether angels pass from one point of space to another1 without passing through the intermediate points8 whether they can visually discern objects in the dark8 whether more than one can exist at the same moment in the same physical point8 whether they can exist in a perfect vacuum1 with any relation to the absolute incorporeal void8 and whether if an angel were in vacuo1 the void could still truly be termed perfect8--such1 or similar to these were the great inquiries in that department of ,natural ,theology1 to which1 as to a separate science1 was given the name of ,angelography3 and of the same kind were the principal inquiries with respect to the ,deity himself1 not so much an examination of the evidence which nature affords of his self-existence1 and power1 and wisdom1 and goodness1 those sublime qualities which even our weakness cannot contemplate without deriving some additional dignity from the very greatness which it adores1 as a solution of more subtile points1 whether he exist in imaginary space as much as in the space that is real8 whether he can cause a mode to exist without a substance8 whether1 in knowing all things1 he know universals1 or only things singular8 and whether he love a possible unexisting angel better than an actually existing insect8 8,indignandum de isto1 non disputandum est40--8,sed non debuit hoc nobis esse propositum arguta disserere1#a et philosophiam in has augustias ex sua majestate detrahere4 ,quanto satius est1 ire aperta via et recta1 quam sibi ipsi flexus disponere1 quos cum magna molestia debeas relegere80#b--8,why waste ourselves10 says the same eloquent moralist2 8why torture and waste ourselves in questions1 which there is more real subtilty in despising than in solving80-- 8,quid te troques et maceras1 in ea qustione quam subtilius est contempsisse quam solvere80#c ,from the necessity of such inquiries we are now fortunately freed4 ,the frivolous solemnities of argument1 which1 in the disputations of ,scotists and ,thomists1 and the long controversy of the believers and rejectors of the universal a parti rei1 rendered human ignorance so very proud of its temporary triumphs over human ignorance1 at length are hushed forever2 and1 so precarious is all that glory1 of which men are the dispensers1 that the most subtile works1 which for ages conferred on their authors a reverence more than praise1 and almost worship1 would now scarcely find a philosophic adventurer1 so bold1 as to avow them for his own4 ,the progress of intellectual philosophy may indeed1 as yet1 have been less considerable than was to be hoped under its present better auspices4 ,but it is not a little1 to have escaped from a labyrinth1 so very intricate1 and so very dark1 even though we should have done nothing more than advance into sunshine and an open path1 with a long journey of discovery still before us4 ,we have at last arrived at the important truth1 which now seems so very obvious a one1 that the mind is to be known best by observation of the series of changes which it presents1 and of all the circumstances which precede and follow these2 that1 in attempting to explain its phenomena1 therefore1 we should know what those phenomena are2 and that we might as well attempt to discover1 by logic1 unaided by observation or experiment1 the various coloured rays that enter into the composition of a sunbeam1 as to discover1 by dialectic subtilties1 a priori1 the various feelings that enter into the composition of a single thought or passion4 ,the mind1 it is evident1 may1 like the body to which it is united1 or the material objects which surround it1 be considered simply as a substance possessing certain qualities1 susceptible of various affections or modifications1 which1 existing successively as momentary states of the mind1 constitute all the phenomena of thought and feeling4 ,the general circumstances in which these changes of state succeed each other1 or1 in other words1 the laws of their succession1 may be pointed out1 and the phenomena arranged in various classes1 according as they may resemble each other1 in the circumstances that precede or follow them1 or in other circumstances of obvious analogy4 ,there is1 in short1 a science that may be termed mental physiology1 as there is another science relating to the structure and offices of our corporeal frame1 to which the term physiology is more commonly applied2 and as1 by observation and experiment1 we endeavour to trace those series of changes which are constantly taking place in our material part1 from the first moment of animation to the moment of death2 so1 by observation1 and in some measure also by experiment1 we endeavour to trace the series of changes that take place in the mind1 fugitive as these successions are1 and rendered doubly perplexing by the reciprocal combinations into which they flow4 ,the innumerable changes1 corporeal and mental1 we reduce1 by generalizing1 to a few classes2 and we speak1 in reference to the mind1 of its faculties or functions of perception1 memory1 reason1 as we speak1 in reference to the body1 of its functions of respiration1 circulation1 nutrition4 ,this mental physiology1 in which the mind is considered simply as a substance endowed with certain susceptibilities1 and variously affected or modified in consequence1 will demand of course our first inquiry2 and ,i trust that the intellectual analyses1 into which we shall be led by it1 will afford results that will repay the labour of persevering attention1 which they may often require from you4 ,in one very important respect1 however1 the inquiries1 relating to the physiology of mind1 differ from those which relate to the physiology of our animal frame4 ,if we could render ourselves acquainted with the intimate structure of our bodily organs1 and all the changes which take place1 in the exercise of their various functions1 our labour1 with respect to them1 might be said to terminate4 ,but though our intellectual analysis were perfect1 so that we could distinguish1 in our most complex thought or emotion1 its constituent elements1 and trace with exactness the series of simpler thoughts which have progressively given rise to them1 other inquiries1 equally1 or still more important1 would remain4 ,we do not know all which is to be known of the mind1 when we know all its phenomena1 as we know all which can be known of matter1 when we know the appearances which it presents1 in every situation in which it is possible to place it1 and the manner in which it then acts or is acted upon by other bodies4 ,when we know that man has certain affections and passions1 there still remains the great inquiry1 as to the propriety or impropriety of those passions1 and of the conduct to which they lead4 ,we have to consider1 not merely how he is capable of acting1 but also1 whether1 acting in the manner supposed1 he would be fulfilling a duty or perpetrating a crime4 ,every enjoyment which man can confer on man1 and every evil1 which he can reciprocally inflict or suffer1 thus become objects of two sciences--first of that intellectual analysis which traces the happiness and misery1 in their various forms and sequence1 as mere phenomena or states of the substance mind2--and secondly1 of that ethereal judgment1 which measures our approbation and disapprobation1 estimating1 with more than judicial scrutiny1 not merely what is done1 but what is scarcely thought in secrecy and silence1 and discriminating some element of moral good or evil1 in all the physical good and evil1 which it is in our feeble power to execute1 or in our still frailer heart1 to conceive and desire4 ,to this second department of inquiry belong the doctrines of general ethics4 ,but1 though man were truly impressed with the great doctrine of moral obligation1 and truly desirous1 in conformity with it1 of increasing1 as far as his individual influence may extend1 the sum of general happiness1 he may still err in the selection of the means which he employs for this benevolent purpose4 ,so essential is knowledge1 if not to virtue1 at least to all the ends of virtue1 that1 without it1 benevolence itself1 when accompanied with power1 may be as destructive and desolating as intentional tyranny2 and notwithstanding the great principles of progression in human affairs1 the whole native vigour of a state may be kept down for ages1 and the comfort1 and prosperity1 and active industry of unexisting millions be blasted by regulations1 which1 in the intention of their generous projectors1 were to stimulate those very energies which they repressed1 and to relieve that very misery which they rendered irremediable4 ,it therefore becomes an inquiry of paramount importance1 what are the means best calculated for producing the greatest amount of social good8 ,by what ordinances would public prosperity1 and all the virtues which not merely adorn that prosperity1 but produce it1 be most powerfully excited and maintained8 ,this political department of our science1 which is in truth only a subdivision1 though a very important one1 of general practical ethics1 comprehends1 of course1 the inquiries as to the relative advantages of different forms of government1 and the expediency of the various contrivances which legislative wisdom may have established1 or may be supposed to establish1 for the happiness and defence of nations4 ,the inquiries1 to which ,i have as yet alluded1 relate to the mind1 considered simply as an object of physiological investigation2 or to man1 considered in his moral relations to a community1 capable of deriving benefit from his virtues and knowledge1 or of suffering by his errors and his crimes4 ,but there is another more important relation in which the mind is still to be viewed1--that relation which connects it with the ,almighty ,being to whom it owes its existence4 ,is man1 whose frail generations begin and pass away1 but one of the links of an infinite chain of beings like himself1 uncaused1 and co-eternal with that self-existing world of which he is the feeble tenant8 or1 ,is he the offspring of an all creating ,power1 that adapted him to nature1 and nature to him1 formed together with the magnificent scene of things around him1 to enjoy its blessings1 and to adore1 with the gratitude of happiness1 the wisdom and goodness from which they flow8 ,what attributes1 of a ,being so transcendent1 may human reason presume to explore8 and1 ,what homage will be most suitable to his immensity1 and our nothingness8 ,is it only for an existence of a few moments1 in this passing scene1 that he has formed us8 or1 ,is there something within us1 over which death has no power1--something1 that prolongs and identifies the consciousness of all which we have done on earth1 and that1 after the mortality of the body1 may yet be a subject of the moral government of ,god8 ,when compared with these questions1 even the sublimest physical inquiries are comparatively insignificant4 ,they seem to differ1 as it has been said1 in their relative importance and dignity1 almost as philosophy itself differs from the mechanical arts that are subservient to it4 8,quantum inter philosophiam interest1--et cteras artes2 tantum interesse existimo in ipsa philosophia1 inter illam partem qu ad homines et hanc qu ad ,deos spectat4 ,altior est hc et animosior3 multum permisit sibi2 non fuit oculis contenta4 ,majus esse quiddam suspicata est1 ac pulchrius1 quod extra conspectum natura posuisset40#d ,it is when ascending to these sublimer objects1 that the mind seems to expand1 as if already shaking off its earthly fetters1 and returning to its source2 and it is scarcely too much to say1 that the delight which it thus takes in things divine is an internal evidence of its own divinity4 8,cum illa tetigit1 alitur1 crescit3 ac velut vinculis liberatus1 in originem redit4 ,et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis su1 quod illum divina delectant40 ,i have thus briefly sketched the various important inquiries1 which the philosophy of mind1 in its most extensive sense1 may be said to comprehend4 ,the nature of our spiritual being1 as displayed in all the phenomena of feeling and thought--the ties which bind us to our fellow-men1 and to our ,creator--and the prospect of that unfading existence1 of which life is but the first dawning gleam2 such are the great objects to which in the department of your studies committed to my charge1 it will be my office to guide your attention and curiosity4 ,the short period of the few months to which my course is necessarily limited1 will not1 indeed1 allow me to prosecute1 with such full investigation as ,i should wish1 every subject that may present itself in so various a range of inquiry4 ,but even these few months1 ,i flatter myself1 will be sufficient to introduce you to all which is most important for you to know in the science1 and to give such lights as may enable you1 in other hours1 to explore1 with success1 the prospects that here1 perhaps1 may only have opened on your view4 ,it is not1 ,i trust1 with the labours of a single season that such inquiries1 on your part1 are to terminate4 ,amid the varied occupations and varied pleasures of your future years1--in the privacy of domestic enjoyment1 as much as in the busier scenes of active exertion1--the studies on which you are about to enter must often rise to you again with something more than mere remembrance2 because there is nothing that can give you interest1 in any period or situation of your life1 to which they are not related4 ,the science of mind1 is the science of yourselves2 of all who surround you2 of every thing which you enjoy or suffer1 or hope or fear3 so truly the science of your very being1 that it will be impossible for you to look back on the feelings of a single hour1 without constantly retracing phenomena that have been here1 to a certain extent1 the subjects of your analysis and arrangement4 ,the thoughts and faculties of your own intellectual frame1 and all which you admire as wonderful in the genius of others1--the moral obligation1 which1 as obeyed or violated1 is ever felt by you with delight or with remorse1--the virtues1 of which you think as often as you think of those whom you love2 and the vices1 which you view with abhorrence1 or with pity1--the traces of divine goodness1 which never can be absent from your view1 because there is no object in nature which does not exhibit them1--the feeling of your dependence on the gracious ,power that formed you1--and the anticipation of a state of existence more lasting than that which is measured by the few beatings of a feeble pulse1--these in their perpetual recurrence1 must often recal to you the inquiries that1 in this place1 engaged your early attention4 ,it will be almost as little possible for you to abandon wholly such speculations1 as to look on the familiar faces of your home with a forgetfulness of every hour which they have made delightful1 or to lose all remembrance of the very language of your infancy1 that is every moment sounding in your ears4 ,though ,i shall endeavour1 therefore1 to give as full a view as my limits will permit of all the objects of inquiry which are to come before us1 it will be my chief wish to awake in you1 or to cherish1 a love of these sublime inquiries themselves4 ,there is a philosophic spirit which is far more valuable than any limited acquirements of philosophy2 and the cultivation of which1 therefore1 is the most precious advantage that can be derived from the lessons and studies of many academic years3--a spirit1 which is quick to pursue whatever is within the reach of human intellect2 but which is not less quick to discern the bounds that limit every human inquiry1 and which1 therefore1 in seeking much1 seeks only what man may learn3--which knows how to distinguish what is just in itself from what is merely accredited by illustrious names2 adopting a truth which no one has sanctioned1 and rejecting an error of which all approve1 with the same calmness as if no judgment were opposed to its own3--but which1 at the same time1 alive1 with congenial feeling1 to every intellectual excellence1 and candid to the weakness from which no excellence is wholly privileged1 can dissent and confute without triumph1 as it admires without envy2 applauding gladly whatever is worthy of applause in a rival system1 and venerating the very genius which it demonstrates to have erred4 ,such is that philosophic temper to which1 in the various discussions that are to occupy us1 it will be my principal ambition to form your minds2 with a view not so much to what you are at present1 as to what you are afterwards to become4 ,you are now1 indeed1 only entering on a science1 of which1 by many of you1 perhaps1 the very elements have never once been regarded as subjects of speculative inquiry4 ,you have much1 therefore1 to learn1 even in learning only what others have thought4 ,but ,i should be unwilling to regard you as the passive receivers of a system of opinions1 content merely to remember whatever mixture of truths and errors may have obtained your easy assent4 ,i cannot but look to you in your maturer character1 as yourselves the philosophers of other years2 as those who are1 perhaps1 to add to science many of its richest truths1 which as yet are latent to every mind1 and to free it from many errors1 in which no one has yet suspected even the possibility of illusion4 ,the spirit which is itself to become productive in you1 is therefore1 the spirit which ,i wish to cultivate2 and happy1 as ,i shall always be1 if ,i succeed in conveying to you that instruction which it is my duty to communicate1 ,i shall have still more happiness if ,i can flatter myself1 that1 in this very instruction1 ,i have trained you to habits of thought1 which may enable you to enrich1 with your own splendid discoveries1 the age in which you live1 and to be yourselves the instructors of all the generations that are to follow you4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,argutias serere4 ,lect4 var4 #b ,seneca1 ,ep4 #ajb4 #c ,ibid1 #di4 #d ,seneca ,nat4 ,qust4 ,lib4 #a4 ,prf4 ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,mind ,,to ,,the ,,sciences ,,in ,,general4 ,in my former ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i gave you a slight sketch of the departments into which the ,philosophy of ,mind divides itself1 comprehending1 in the first place1 ,the physiology of the mind1 considered as a substance capable of the various modifications1 or states1 which constitute1 as they succeed each other1 the phenomena of thought and feeling2 secondly1 ,the doctrines of general ethics1 as to the obligation1 under which man lies1 to increase and extend1 as widely as possible1 the happiness of all that live2 thirdly1 ,the political doctrines1 as to the means which enable him1 in society with his fellow men1 to furthermost successfully1 and with the least risk of future evil1 that happiness of all1 which it is the duty of each individually to wish and to promote2 and1 fourthly1 ,the doctrines of natural theology1 as to the existence and attributes of that greatest of ,beings1 under whose moral government we live1 and the foundations of our confidence that death is only a change of scene1 which1 with respect to our mortality indeed1 may be said to be its close2 but which1 with respect to the soul itself1 is only one of the events of a life that is everlasting4 ,of these great divisions of our subject1 the ,physiology of the ,mind1 or the consideration of the regular series of phenomena which it presents1 simply as states or affections of the mind1 is that to which we are first to turn our attention4 ,but1 before entering on it1 it may be useful to employ a few ,lectures in illustrating the advantages1 which the study of the mind affords1 and the principles of philosophizing1 in their peculiar application to it--subjects1 which1 though of a general kind1 will1 ,i trust1 leave an influence that will be felt in all the particular inquiries in which we are to be engaged2 preparing you1 both for appreciating better the importance of those inquiries1 and for prosecuting them with greater success4 ,one very obvious distinction of the physical investigations of mind and matter1 is1 that1 in intellectual science1 the materials on which we operate1 the instruments with which we operate1 and the operating agent1 are the same4 ,it is the mind1 endowed with the faculties of perception and judgment1 observing1 comparing1 and classifying the phenomena of the mind4 ,in the physics of matter1 it is1 indeed1 the mind which observes1 compares1 and arranges2 but the phenomena are those of a world1 which1 though connected with the mind by many wonderful relations of reciprocal agency1 still exists independently of it--a world that presents its phenomena only in circumstances1 over most of which we have no controul1 and over others a controul that is partial and limited4 ,the comparative facility1 as to all external circumstances1 attending the study of the mental phenomena1 is unquestionably an advantage of no small moment4 ,in every situation in which man can be placed1 as long as his intellectual faculties are unimpaired1 it is impossible that he should be deprived of opportunities of carrying on this intellectual study2 because1 in every situation in which he can be placed1 he must still have with him that universe of thought1 which is the true home and empire of the mind4 ,no costly apparatus is requisite--no tedious waiting for seasons of observation4 ,he has but to look within himself to find the elements which he has to put together1 or the compounds which he has to analyze1 and the instruments that are to perform the analysis or composition4 ,it was not1 however1 to point out to you the advantage which arises to the study of our mental frame1 from the comparative facility as to the circumstances attending it1 that ,i have led your attention to the difference1 in this respect1 of the physics of mind and matter4 ,it was to show1--what is of much more importance1--how essential a right view of the science of mind is to every other science1 even to those sciences1 which superficial thinkers might conceive to have no connexion with it2 and how vain it would be to expect1 that any branch of the physics of mere matter could be cultivated to its highest degree of accuracy and perfection1 without a due acquaintance with the nature of that intellectual medium1 through which alone the phenomena of matter become visible to us1 and of those intellectual instruments1 by which the objects of every science1 and of every science alike1 are measured1 and divided1 and arranged4 ,we might almost as well expect to form an accurate judgment1 as to the figure1 and distance1 and colour of an object1 at which we look through an optical glass1 without paying any regard to the colour and refractory power of the line itself4 ,the distinction of the sciences and arts1 in the sense in which these words are commonly understood1 is as just as it is familiar2 but it may be truly said1 that1 in relation to our power of discovery1 science is itself an art1 or the result of an art4 ,whether1 in this most beautiful of processes1 we regard the mind as the instrument or the artist1 it is equally that by which all the wonders of speculative1 or practical knowledge1 are evolved4 ,it is an agent operating in the production of new results1 and employing for this purpose the known laws of thought1 in the same manner as1 on other occasions1 it employs the known laws of matter4 ,the objects1 to which it may apply itself1 are indeed various1 and1 as such1 give to the sciences their different names4 ,but1 though the objects vary1 the observer and the instrument are continually the same4 ,the limits of the powers of this mental instrument1 are not the limits of its powers alone2 they are also the only real limits1 within which every science is comprehended4 ,to the extent which it allows1 all those sciences1 physical or mathematical1 and all the arts which depend on them1 may be improved2 but1 beyond this point1 it would be vain to expect them to pass2 or rather1 to speak more accurately1 the very supposition of any progress beyond this point would imply the grossest absurdity2 since human science can be nothing more than the result of the direction of human faculties to particular objects4 ,to the astronomer1 the faculty by which he calculates the disturbing forces that operate on a satellite of ,jupiter1 in its revolution round its primary planet1 is as much an instrument of his art1 as the telescope by which he distinguishes that almost invisible orb2 and it is as important1 and surely as interesting1 to know the real power of the intellectual instrument1 which he uses1 not for calculations of this kind only1 but for all the speculative and moral purposes of life1 as it can be to know the exact power of that subordinate instrument1 which he uses only for his occasional survey of the heavens4 ,to the philosophy of mind1 then1 every speculation1 in every science1 may be said to have relation as to a common centre4 ,the knowledge of the quality of matter1 in the whole wide range of physics1 is not itself a phenomenon of matter1 more than the knowledge of any of our intellectual or moral affections2 it is truly1 in all its stages of conjecture1 comparison1 doubt1 belief1 a phenomenon of mind2 or1 in other words1 it is only the mind itself existing in a certain state4 ,the inanimate bodies around us might1 indeed1 exhibit the same changes as at present1 though no mind had been created4 ,but science is not the existence of these inanimate bodies2 it is the principle of thought itself variously modified by them1 which1 as it exists in certain states1 constitutes that knowledge which we term ,astronomy2 in certain other states1 that knowledge which we term ,chemistry2 in other states our ,physiology1 corporeal or mental1 and all the other divisions and subdivisions of science4 ,it would surely be absurd to suppose1 that the mixture of acids and alkalies constitutes ,chemistry1 or that ,astronomy is formed by the revolution of planets round a sun4 ,such phenomena1 the mere objects of science1 are only the occasions on which ,astronomy and ,chemistry arise in the mind of the inquirer1 ,man4 ,it is the mind which perceives bodies1 which reasons on their apparent relations1 which joins them in thought as similar1 however distant they may be in sphere1 or separates them in thought as dissimilar1 though apparently contiguous4 ,these perceptions1 reasonings1 and classifications of the mind must1 of course be regulated by the laws of mind1 which mingle in their joint result with the laws of matter4 ,it is the object indeed which affects the mind when sentient2 but it is the original susceptibility of the mind itself1 which determines and modifies the particular affection1 very nearly1 if ,i may illustrate what is mental by so coarse an image1 as the impression which a seal leaves on melted wax depends1 not on the qualities of the wax alone1 or of the seal alone1 but on the softness of the one1 and the form of the other4 ,change the external object which affects the mind in any case1 and we all know1 that the affection of the mind will be different4 ,it would not be less so1 if1 without any change of object1 there could be a change in the mere feeling1 whatever it might be1 which would result from that different susceptibility becoming instantly as different1 as if not the mind had been altered1 but the object which it perceived4 ,there is no physical science1 therefore1 in which the laws of mind are not to be considered together with the laws of matter2 and a change in either set of laws would equally produce a change in the nature of the science itself4 ,if1 to take one of the simplest of examples1 the mind had been formed susceptible of all the modifications which it admits at present1 with the single exception of those which it receives on the presence of light1 of how many objects and powers in nature1 which we are now capable of distinguishing1 must we have remained in absolute ignorance6 ,but would this comparative ignorance of many objects be the only effect of such a change of the laws of mind1 as ,i have supposed8 ,or rather1 is it not equally certain1 that this simple change alone would be sufficient to alter the very nature of the limited science of which the mind would still be capable1 as much as it narrowed its extent8 ,science is the classification of relations2 varying1 too1 in every case1 as the relations observed are different2 and how very differently should we1 in such circumstances1 have classed the few powers of the few objects1 which might still have become known to us1 since we could no longer have classed them according to any of those visual relations1 which are always the most obvious and prominent4 ,it is even1 perhaps1 an extravagant supposition1 that a race of the blind1 unless endowed with some other sense to compensate the defect of sight1 could have acquired so much command of the common arts of life1 or so much science of any sort1 as to preserve themselves in existence4 ,but though all this1 by a very strong license of supposition1 were taken for granted1 it must surely be admitted1 that the knowledge which man could in those circumstances acquire1 would be not merely less in degree1 but would be as truly different from that which his powers at present have reached1 as if the objects of his science1 or the laws which regulate them1 had themselves been changed to an extent1 at least as great as the supposed change in the laws of mind4 ,the astronomy of the blind1 if the word might still be used to express a science so very different from the present1 would1 in truth1 be a sort of chemistry4 ,day and night1 the magnificent and harmonious revolution of season after season1 would be nothing more than periodical changes of temperature in the objects around2 and that great ,dispenser of the seasons1 the ,source of light1 and beauty1 and almost of animation1 at whose approach nature seems not merely to awake1 but to rise again1 as it was at first1 from the darkness of its original chaos1 if its separate existence could be at all inferred1 would probably be classed as something similar1 though inferior in power1 to that unknown source of heat1 which1 by a perilous and almost unknown process1 was fearfully piled and kindled on the household hearth4 ,so accustomed are we1 however1 to consider the nature and limits of the different sciences1 as depending on the objects themselves1 and not on the laws of the mind1 which classes their relations1 that it may be difficult for you at first to admit the influence of these mere laws of mind1 as modifying general physics1 at least to the extent which ,i have now stated4 ,but1 that a change in the laws of human thought1 whatever influence it might have in altering the very nature and limits of the physical sciences1 would at least affect greatly the state of their progress1 must be immediately evident to those who consider for a moment on what discovery depends2 the progress of science being obviously nothing more than a series of individual discoveries1 and the number of discoveries varying with the powers of the individual intellect4 ,the same phenomena which were present to the mind of ,newton1 had been present1 innumerable times before1 not to the understandings of philosophers only1 but to the very senses of the vulgar4 ,every thing was the same to him and to them1 except the observing and reasoning mind4 ,to him alone1 however1 they suggested those striking analogies1 by which on a comparison of all the known circumstances in both1 he ventured to class the force which retains the planets in their orbits1 with that which occasions the fall of a pebble to the earth4 8,have ye not listen'd1 while he bound the suns ,and planets to their spheres6 the unequal task ,of human kind till then4 ,oft had they roll'd ,o'er erring man the year1 and oft disgraced ,the pride of schools4 ----,he took his ardent flight ,through the blue infinite2 and every star ,which the clear concave of a winter's night ,pours on the eye1 or astronomic tube1 ,far-stretching1 snatches from the dark abyss1 ,or such as farther in successive skies ,to fancy shine alone1 at his approach ,blazed into suns1 the living centre each ,of an harmonious system2 all combined1 ,and ruled unerring by that single power1 ,which draws the stone projected to the ground40#e ,it is recorded of this almost superhuman ,genius1 whose powers and attainments at once make us proud of our common nature1 and humble us with our disparity1 that1 in acquiring the ,elements of ,geometry1 he was able1 in a very large proportion of cases1 to pass immediately from ,theorem to ,theorem1 by reading the mere enunciation of each1 perceiving1 as it were intuitively1 that latent evidence1 which others are obliged slowly to trace through a long series of ,propositions4 ,when the same ,theorem was enunciated1 or the same simple phenomenon observed1 the successions of thought1 in his mind1 were thus obviously different from the successions of thought in other minds2 but it is easy to conceive the original susceptibilities of all minds such1 as exactly to have corresponded with those of the mind of ,newton4 ,and if the minds of all men1 from the creation of the world1 had been similar to the mind of ,newton1 is it possible to conceive1 that the state of any science would have been1 at this moment1 what it now is1 or in any respect similar to what it now is1 though the laws which regulate the physical changes in the material universe1 had continued unaltered1 and no change occurred1 but in the simple original susceptibilities of the mind itself8 ,the laws of the observing and comparing mind1 then1 it must be admitted1 have modified1 and must always continue to modify1 every science1 as truly as the laws of that particular department of nature of which the phenomena are observed and compared4 ,but1 it may be said1 we are ,chemists1 we are ,astronomers1 without studying the philosophy of mind4 ,and true it certainly is1 that there are excellent ,astronomers1 and excellent ,chemists1 who have never paid any particular attention to intellectual philosophy4 ,the general principles of philosophizing1 which a more accurate intellectual philosophy had introduced1 have become familiar to them1 without study4 ,but those general principles are not less the effect of that improved philosophy of mind1 any more than astronomy and chemistry themselves have now a less title to be considered as sciences1--because1 from the general diffusion of knowledge in society1 those who have never professedly studied either science1 are acquainted with many of their most striking truths4 ,it is gradually1 and almost insensibly1 that truths diffuse themselves--at first admired and adopted by a few1 who are able to compare the present with the past1 and who gladly own them1 as additions to former knowledge1--from them communicated to a wider circle1 who receive them1 without discussion1 as if familiar and long known2 and at length1 in this widening progress1 becoming so nearly universal1 as almost to seem effects of a natural instinctive law of human thought3--like the light1 which we readily ascribe to the sun1 as it first flows directly from him1 and forces his image on our sight2 but which1 when reflected from object to object1 soon ceases to remind us of its origin1 and seems almost to be a part of the very atmosphere which we breathe4 ,i am aware1 that it is not to improvements in the mere philosophy of mind1 that the great reformation in our principles of physical inquiry is commonly ascribed4 ,yet it is to this source--certainly at least to this source chiefly1 that ,i would refer the origin of those better plans of philosophical investigation which have distinguished with so many glorious discoveries the age in which we live1 and the ages immediately preceding4 ,when we think of the great genius of ,lord ,bacon1 and of the influence of his admirable works1 we are too apt to forget the sort of difficulties which his genius must have had to overcome1 and to look back to his rules of philosophizing1 as a sort of ultimate truths1 discoverable by the mere perspicacity of his superior mind1 without referring them to those simple views of nature in relation to our faculties of discovery1 from which they were derived4 ,the rules which he gives us1 are rules of physical investigation2 and it is very natural for us1 therefore1 in estimating their value1 to think of the erroneous physical opinions which preceded them1 without paying sufficient attention to the false theories of intellect1 which had led to those very physical absurdities4 ,lord ,bacon1 if he was not the first who discovered that we were in some degree idolaters1 to use his own metaphor1 in our intellectual worship1 was certainly the first who discovered the extent of our idolatry4 ,but we must not forget1 that the temple which he purified1 was not the temple of external nature1 but the temple of the mind1--that in its inmost sanctuaries were all the idols which he overthrew1--and that it was not till these were removed1 and the intellect prepared for the presence of a nobler divinity1 that ,truth would deign to unveil herself to adoration2--as in the mysteries of those ,eastern religions1 in which the first ceremony for admission to the worship of the ,god is the purification of the worshipper4 ,in the course of our analysis of the intellectual phenomena1 we shall have frequent opportunities of remarking the influence1 which errors with respect to these mere phenomena of mind must have had1 on the contemporary systems of general physics1 and on the spirit of the prevailing plans of inquiry4 ,it may be enough to remark at present the influence of one fundamental error1 which1 as long as it retained its hold of the understanding1 must have rendered all its energies ineffectual1 by wasting them in the search of objects1 which it never could attain1 because in truth they had no real existence1--to the neglect of objects that would have produced the very advantage which was sought4 ,i allude to the belief of the schools1 in the separate existence1 or entity as they technically termed it1 of the various orders of universals1 and the mode in which they conceived every acquisition of knowledge in reasoning1 to take place1 by the intervention of certain intelligible forms or species1 existing separately in the intellect1 as the direct objects of thought1--in the same manner as they ascribed simple perception to the action of species of another order1 which they termed sensible species1--the images of things derived indeed from objects without1 but when thus derived1 existing independently of them4 ,when we amuse ourselves with inquiring into the history of human folly--that most comprehensive of all histories--which includes1 at least for many ages1 the whole history of philosophy2 or rather1 to use a word more appropriate than amusement1--when we read with regret the melancholy annals of genius aspiring to be pre-eminently frivolous1 and industry labouring to be ignorant1 we often discover absurdities of the grossest kind1 which almost cease to be absurdities1 on account of other absurdities1 probably as gross1 which accompany them2 and this is truly the case1 in the grave extravagance of the logic of the schools4 ,the scholastic mode of philosophizing1 ridiculous as it now seems1 was far from absurd1 when taken in connection with the scholastic philosophy4 ,it was indeed the only mode of procedure1 which that philosophy could consistently admit4 ,to those who believed that singular objects could afford no real knowledge1 singularium nullam dari scientiam3 and that this was to be obtained only from what they termed intelligible species1 existing not in external things1 but in the intellect itself1 it must have seemed as absurd to wander1 in quest of knowledge1 out of that region in which alone they supposed it to exist1 and to seek it among things singular1 as it would now1 to us1 seem hopeless and absurd1 to found a system of physical truths on the contemplation and comparison of universals4 ,while this false theory of the mental phenomena prevailed1 was it possible1 that the phenomena of matter should have been studied on sounder principles of investigation1 when any better plan must have been absolutely inconsistent with the very theory of thought8 ,it was in mind that the student of general nature was to seek his guiding light1 without which all then was darkness4 ,the intellectual philosopher1 if any such had then arisen1 to analyze simply the phenomena of thought1 without any reference to general physics1 would in truth have done more in that dark age1 for the benefit of every physical science1 than if he had discovered a thousand properties of as many different substances4 ,let us suppose1 for a moment1 that an accurate view of the intellectual process of abstraction could have been communicated to a veteran sage of the schools1 at the very moment when he was intently contemplating the tree of ,porphyry1 in all its branches of species and genera1 between the individual and the summum genus2 and when he was preparing perhaps1 by this contemplation of a few universals1 to unfold all the philosophy of colours1 or of the planetary movements1 would the benefit which he received from this clearer view of a single process of thought have terminated in the mere science of mind--or would not rather his new views of mind have extended with a most important influence to his whole wide views of matter8--,he must immediately have learned1 that1 in the whole tree of genera and species1 the individual at the bottom of his scale was the only real independent existence1 and that all the rest1 the result of certain comparisons of agreement or disagreement1 were simple modifications of his own mind1 not produced by any thing existing in his intellect but by the very constitution of his intellect itself2 the consideration of a number of individuals as of one species being nothing more than the feeling of their agreement in certain respects1 and the feeling of this agreement being as simple a result of the observation of them together1 as the perception of each1 individually1 was of its individual presence4 ,it would surely have been impossible for him1 with this new and important light1 to return to his transcendental inquiries1 into entities1 and quiddities1 and substantial forms2 and the simple discovery of a better theory of abstraction1 as a process of the mind1 would thus have supplied the place of many rules of philosophizing4 ,the philosophy of mind then1 we must admit1 did1 in former ages at least1 exercise an important influence on general science3--and are we to suppose that it has now no influence8 ,even though no other advantage were to be obtained from our present juster views of mind1 than the protection which they give1 from those gross errors of inquiry to which the philosophers of so long a series of ages were exposed1 this alone would surely be no slight gain4 ,but1 great as this advantage is1 are we certain1 that it is all which the nicest mental analysis can afford1--or rather1 is it not possible at least1 that we may still1 in our plans of physical investigation1 be suffering under the influence of errors from which we should be saved1 by still juster views of the faculties employed in every physical inquiry8 ,that we are not aware of any such influence1 argues nothing2 for to suppose us aware of it1 would be to suppose us acquainted with the very errors which mislead us4 ,aquinas and ,scotus1 it is to be presumed1 and all their contentious followers1 conceived themselves as truly in the right path of physical investigation1 as we do at this moment2 and1 though we are free from their gross mistakes1 there may yet be others of which we are less likely to divest ourselves1 from not having as yet the slightest suspicion of their existence4 ,the question is not1 ,whether our method of inquiry be juster than theirs8--for1 of our superiority in this respect1 if any evidence of fact were necessary1 the noble discoveries of these later years are too magnificent a proof to allow us to have any doubt1--but1 ,whether our plan of inquiry may not still be susceptible of improvements1 of which we have now as little foresight1 as the ,scotists and ,aquinists of the advantages which philosophy has received from the general prosecution of the inductive method8 ,there is1 indeed1 no reason now to fear1 that the observation of particular objects1 with a view to general science1 will be despised as incapable of giving any direct knowledge1 and all real science be confined to universals4 8,singularium datur scientia40 ,but1 though a sounder view of one intellectual process may have banished from philosophy much idle contention1 and directed inquiry to fitter objects1 it surely does not therefore follow1 that subsequent improvements in the philosophy of mind are to be absolutely unavailing4 ,on the contrary1 the presumption unquestionably is1 that if by understanding better the simple process of abstraction1 we have freed ourselves from many errors in our plans of inquiry1 a still clearer view of the nature and limits of all the intellectual processes concerned in the discovery of truth1 may lead to still juster views of philosophizing4 ,even at present1 ,i cannot but think that we may trace1 in no inconsiderable degree1 the influence of false notions1 as to some of the phenomena of the mind1 in misdirecting the spirit of our general philosophy4 ,i allude in particular1 to one very important intellectual process1--that by which we acquire our knowledge of the relation on which all physics may be said to be founded4 ,he must have paid little attention to the history of philosophy1 and even to the philosophy of his own time1 who does not perceive1 how much the vague and obscure notions entertained of that intermediate tie1 which is supposed to connect phenomena with each other1 have tended to favour the invention and ready admission of physical hypotheses1 which otherwise could not have been entertained for a moment2--hypotheses1 which attempt to explain what is known by the introduction of what is unknown2 as if successions of phenomena were rendered easier to be understood merely by being rendered more complicated4 ,this very unphilosophic passion for complexity1 7which1 unphilosophic as it is1 is yet the passion of many philosophers17 seems1 to me1 to arise1 in a great measure1 from a mysterious and false view of causation2 as involving always1 in every series of changes1 the intervention of something unobserved1 between the observed antecedent and the observed effect2--a view which may very naturally be supposed to lead the mind1 when it has observed no actual intervention1 to imagine any thing which is not absolutely absurd1 that it may flatter itself with the pleasure of having discovered a cause4 ,it is unnecessary1 however1 to enlarge at present on this subject1 as it must again come before us2 when you will perhaps see more clearly1 how much the general diffusion of juster views1 as to the nature and origin of our notion of the connection of events1 would tend to the simplification1 not of our theories of mind only1 but1 in a still higher degree1 of our theories of matter4 ,the observations already made1 ,i trust1 have shown how important1 to the perfection of every science1 is an accurate acquaintance with that intellectual medium1 through which alone the objects of every science become known to us1 and with those intellectual instruments1 by which1 alike in every science1 truth is to be detected and evolved4 ,on this influence1 which the philosophy of mind must always exercise on general philosophy1 ,i have dwelt the longer1 because1 important as the relation is1 it is one which we are peculiarly apt to forget2 and the more apt to forget it1 on account of that very excellence of the physical sciences1 to which it has itself essentially contributed4 ,the discoveries1 which reward our inquiry into the properties of matter1 as now carried on1 on principles better suited to the nature and limits of our powers of investigation1 are too splendid to allow us to look back to the circumstances which prepared them at a distance2 and we avail ourselves of rules1 that are the result of logical analysis1 without reflecting1 and almost without knowing1 that they are the result of any analysis whatever4 ,we are1 in this respect1 like navigators on the great ocean1 who perform their voyage successfully by the results of observations1 of which they are altogether ignorant2 who look1 with perfect confidence1 to their compass and chart1 and think of the stars as useful only in those early ages1 when the pilot1 if he ventured from shore1 had no other directors of his course4 ,it is only some more skilful mariner who is still aware of their guidance2 and who knows1 how much he is indebted to the satellites of ,jupiter for the accuracy of that very chart1 by which the crowds around him are mechanically directing their course4 ,the chief reason1 however1 for my dwelling so long on this central and governing relation1 which the philosophy of intellect bears to all other philosophy1 is1 that ,i am anxious to impress their relation strongly on your minds2 not so much with a view to the importance which it may seem to give to the particular science that is to engage us together1 as with a view to those other sciences in which you may already have been engaged1 or which may yet await you in the course of your studies4 ,the consideration of mind1 as universally present and presiding1--at once the medium of all the knowledge which can be acquired1 and the subject of all the truths of which that knowledge consists1--gives1 by its own unity1 a sort of unity and additional dignity to the sciences1 of which their scattered experiments and observations would otherwise be unsusceptible4 ,it is an unfortunate effect of physical inquiry1 when exclusively devoted to the properties of external things1 to render the mind1 in our imagination1 subordinate to the objects on which it is directed2 the faculties are nothing1 the objects every thing4 ,the very nature of such inquiry leads us perpetually without to observe and arrange1 and nothing brings us back to the observer and arranger within2 or1 if we do occasionally cast an inquisitive glance on the phenomena of our thought1 we bring back with us what ,bacon1 in his strong language1 calls 8the smoke and tarnish of the furnace20--the mind seems1 to us1 to be broken down to the littleness of the objects which it has1 been habitually contemplating2 and we regard the faculties that measure earth and heaven1 and that add infinity to infinity1 with a curiosity of no greater interest1 than that with which we inquire into the angles of a crystal1 or the fructification of a moss4 8,ludit istis animus10 says one of the most eloquent of the ancients1--8,ludit istis animus1 non proficit2 et philosophiam a fastigio deducit in planum40 ,to rest in researches of this minute kind1 indeed1 if we were absolutely to ,,rest in them1 without any higher and profounder views1 would truly be1 as he says1 to drag down philosophy from that pure eminence on which she sits1 to the very dust of the plain on which we tread4 ,to the inquirer1 however1 whose mind has been previously embued with this first philosophy1 and who has learned to trace1 in the wonders of every science1 the wonders of his own intellectual frame1 there is no physical research1 however minute its object1 which does not at once elevate the mind1 and derive elevation from it4 ,nothing is truly humble1 which can exercise faculties that are themselves sublime4 ----,search1 undismayed the dark profound1 ,where ,nature works in secret2 view the beds ,of mineral treasure1 and the eternal vault ,that bounds the hoary ocean2 trace the forms ,of atoms1 moving with incessant change1 ,their elemental round2 behold the seeds ,of being1 and the energy of life1 ,kindling the mass with ever active flame2 ,then to the secrets of the working mind ,attentive turn2 from dim oblivion call ,her fleet ideal band2 and bid them go ,break through time's barrier1 and o'ertake the hour ,that saw the heavens created2 then declare1 ,if ought were found in these external scenes ,to move thy wonder now4#f ,in the physics of the material universe1 there is1 it must be owned1 much that is truly worthy of our philosophic admiration1 and of the sublimest exertions of philosophic genius4 ,but even that material world will appear more admirable1 to him who contemplates it1 as it were1 from the height of his own mind1 and who measures its infinity with the range of his own limited but aspiring faculties4 ,he is unquestionably the philosopher most worthy of the name1 who unites to the most accurate knowledge of mind1 the most accurate knowledge of all the physical objects amid which he is placed2 who makes each science1 to each1 reciprocally a source of additional illumination2 and who learns1 from both1 the noblest of all the lessons which they can give1--the knowledge and adoration of that divine ,being1 who has alike created1 and adapted to each other1 with an order so harmonious1 the universe of matter1 and the universe of thought4 ,,footnotes3 #e ,thomson's ,poem on the ,death of ,sir ,isaac ,newton4 #f ,akenside's ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,i4 v4 #eab-ebf4 ,,lecture ,,iii4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,mind ,,to ,,the ,,sciences ,,and ,,arts ,,more ,,strictly ,,intellectual4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i illustrated1 at great length1 the relation which the ,philosophy of ,mind bears to all the other sciences1 as the common centre of each4 ,these sciences ,i represented1 as1 in their relation to the powers of discovery1 that are exercised in them1 truly arts1 in all the various intellectual processes of which1 the artist is the same1 and the instruments the same2 and as to the perfection of any of the mechanical arts1 it is essential1 that we know the powers of the instruments employed in it1 so1 in the inventive processes of science of every kind1 it seems essential to the perfection of the process1 that we should know1 as exactly as possible1 the powers and the limits of these intellectual instruments1 which are exercised alike in all1--that we may not waste our industry1 in attempting to accomplish with them what is impossible to be accomplished1 and at the same time may not despair of achieving with them any of the wonders to which they are truly adequate1 if skilfully and perseveringly exerted2 though we should have to overcome many of those difficulties which present themselves1 as obstacles to every great effort1 but which are insurmountable1 only to those who despair of surmounting them4 ,it was to a consideration of this kind1 as to the primary importance of knowing the questions to which our faculties are competent1 that we are indebted for one of the most valuable works in our science1 a work1 which none can read even now1 without being impressed with reverence for the great talents of its author2 but of which it is impossible to feel the whole value1 without an acquaintance with the verbal trifling1 and barren controversies1 that still perplexed and obscured intellectual science at the period when it was written4 ,the work to which ,i allude is the ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 to the composition of which ,mr ,locke1 in his preface1 states himself to have been led by an accidental conversation with some friends who had met at his chamber4 ,in the course of a discussion1 which had no immediate relation to the subject of the ,essay1 they found themselves unexpectedly embarrassed by difficulties that appeared to rise on every side1 when after many vain attempts to extricate themselves from the doubts which perplexed them1 it occurred to ,mr ,locke1 that they had taken a wrong course1--that the inquiry in which they were engaged was probably one which was beyond the reach of human faculties1 and1 that their first inquiry should have been1 into the nature of the understanding itself1 to ascertain what subjects it was fit to explore and comprehend4 8,when we know our own strength10 he remarks1 8we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success3 and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds1 and made some estimate what we may expect from them1 we shall not be inclined either to sit still1 and not set our thoughts on work at all1 in despair of knowing anything2 or1 on the other side1 question every thing1 and disclaim all knowledge1 because some things are not to be understood4 ,it is of great use to the sailor1 to know the length of his line1 though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean4 ,it is well he knows1 that it is long enough to reach the bottom1 at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage1 and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him4--,this was that which gave the first rise to this essay concerning the understanding4 ,for ,i thought1 that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries1 the mind of man was very apt to run into1 was to take a survey of our own understandings1 examine our own powers1 and see to what things they were adapted4 ,till that was done1 ,i suspected we began at the wrong end1 and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us1 while we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being1 as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings4--,thus men1 extending their inquiries beyond their capacities1 and letting their thoughts wander into those depths1 where they can find no sure footing1 it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes1 which1 never coming to any clear resolution1 are proper only to continue and increase their doubts1 and to confirm them1 at last1 in perfect scepticism2 whereas1 were the capacities of our understanding well considered1 the extent of our knowledge once discovered1 and the horizon found1 which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things1 between what is and what is not comprehensible by us1 men would perhaps1 with less scruple1 acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one1 and employ their thoughts and discourse1 with more advantage and satisfaction in the other40#g ,these observations of ,mr ,locke illustrate1 very happily1 the importance of a right view of the limits of our understanding1 for directing our inquiries to the objects that are truly within our reach4 ,it is not the waste of intellect1 as it lies torpid in the great multitude of our race1 that is alone to be regretted in relation to science1 which in better circumstances1 it might improve and adorn4 ,it is in many cases1 the very industry of intellect1 busily exerted1 but exerted in labours that must be profitless1 because the objects1 to which the labour is directed1 are beyond the reach of man4 ,if half the zeal1 and1 ,i may add1 even half the genius1 which1 during so many ages1 were employed in attempting things impossible1 had been given to investigations1 on which the transcendental inquirers of those times would certainly have looked down with contempt1 there are many names that are now mentioned only with ridicule or pity1 for which we should certainly have felt the same deep veneration1 which our hearts so readily offer to the names of ,bacon and ,newton2 or perhaps even the great names of ,bacon and ,newton might1 in comparison with them1 have been only of secondary dignity4 ,it was not by idleness that this high rank of instructors and benefactors of the world was lost1 but by a blind activity more hurtful than idleness itself4 ,to those who never could have thought of numbering the population of our own little globe1 it seemed an easy matter to number1 with precise arithmetical accuracy1 the tribes of angels1 and to assign to each order of spiritual beings its separate duties1 and separate dignities1 with the exactness of some heraldic pomp2 and1 amid all those visible demonstrations of the ,divinity which surround us wherever we turn our view1 there were minds that could think in relation to him1 of every thing but his wisdom and goodness2 as if ,he who created us1 and placed around us this magnificent system of things1 were an object scarcely worthy of our reverence1 till we had fixed his precise station in our logical categories1 and had determined1 not the majestic relations which he bears to the universe1 as created and sustained by his bounty1 but all the frivolous relations which he can be imagined to bear to impossibilities and nonentities4 ,o1 son of earth6 attempt ye still to rise1 ,by mountains pil'd on mountains1 to the skies6 ,heaven still1 with laughter1 the vain toil surveys1 ,and buries madmen in the heaps they raise4#h ,it is1 indeed1 then1 to borrow ,mr ,locke's metaphor1 of no slight importance to know the length of our line1 though we cannot1 with it1 fathom all the depths of the ocean4 ,with the knowledge1 that1 to a certain depth at least1 we may safely confide in it1 we shall not be corrupted1 by our fear1 to coast along the shore1 with such cautious timidity as to lose all the treasures which might be obtained by a more adventurous voyage2 nor tempted in the rashness of ignorance or despair1 to trust ourselves wildly to every wind1 though our course should be amidst rocks and quicksands4 ,the study of the natural limits of the faculties of the mind1 has1 indeed1 sometimes been misrepresented1 as favouring a tendency to vague and unlimited doubt on all subjects1 even on those most important to individual and social happiness2 as if the great names1 to which we have long given our admiration1 for the light which they have thrown on the powers and weaknesses of the human understanding1 were not also the very names which we have been accustomed1 not to admire merely1 but to venerate1 for excellence of a still nobler kind4 ,far from leading to general scepticism1 it is1 on the contrary1 a sound study of the principles of our intellectual and moral nature1 which alone can free from the danger of it4 ,if the sceptical philosophy be false1 as the assertors of this objection will allow that it most assuredly is1 it can be overcome and destroyed only by a philosophy that is true2 and the more deeply1 and the more early1 the mind is embued with the principles of truth1 the more confidently may we rely on its rejection of the errors that are opposed to them4 ,it is impossible for one1 who is not absolutely born to labour1 to pass through life without forming1 in his own mind1 occasionally1 some imperfect reflections on the faculties by which he perceives and reasons2 or without catching1 from those with whom he may associate1 some of those vague notions1 of a vague philosophy1 which pass unexamined from mind to mind1 and become current in the very colloquial language of the day4 ,the alternatives1 therefore1 7if we can1 indeed1 think of any other alternative when truth is one17 are not those of knowledge and absolute ignorance of the mental phenomena1 but of knowledge more or less accurate2 because absolute ignorance1 even though it were a state to be wished1 is beyond our power to preserve1 in one who enjoys1 in any respects1 the benefit of education and liberal society4 ,we might1 with much greater prospect of success1 attempt1 by merely keeping from his view all professed treatises on ,astronomy1 to prevent him from acquiring that slight and common acquaintance with the system of the heavenly bodies1 which is necessary for knowing that the sun does not go round the earth1 than we could hope to prevent him from forming1 or receiving1 some notions1 accurate or inaccurate1 as to the nature of mind2 and we surely cannot suppose1 that the juster those opinions are1 as to the nature and force of the principles of belief1 the feebler must the principles of belief appear4 ,it is not so1 that nature has abandoned us1 with principles which we must fear to examine1 and with truths and illusions which we must never dare to separate4 ,in teaching us what our powers are incapable of attaining1 she has at the same time1 taught us what truths they may attain2 and within this boundary1 we have the satisfaction of knowing1 that she has placed all the truths that are important for our virtue and happiness4 ,he1 whose eyes are the clearest to distinguish the bounding circle1 cannot surely1 be the dullest to perceive the truths that are within4 ,to know only to doubt1 is but the first step in philosophy2 and to rest at this first step1 is either imbecility or idleness4 ,it is not there that ,wisdom sees1 and compares1 and pronounces2 it is ,ignorance1 that1 with dazzled eyes1 just opening from the darkness of the night1 perceives that she has been dreaming1 without being able to distinguish1 in the sunshine1 what objects really existing are around4 ,he alone is the philosopher truly awake1 who knows both how to doubt1 and how to believe2 believing what is evident on the very same principles1 which lead him to doubt1 with various degrees of uncertainty1 where the evidence is less sure4 ,to conceive1 that inquiry must lead to scepticism1 is itself a species of scepticism1 as to the power and evidence of the principles to which we have given our assent1 more degrading1 because still more irrational1 than that open and consistent scepticism which it dreads4 ,it would1 indeed1 be an unworthy homage to truths1 which we profess to venerate1 to suppose1 that adoration can be paid to them only while we are ignorant of their nature2 and that to approach their altars would be to discover1 that the majestic forms1 which seem animated at a distance1 are only lifeless idols1 as insensible as the incense which we have offered to them4 ,the study of the powers and limits of the understanding1 and of the sources of evidence in external nature and ourselves1 instead of either forming or favouring a tendency to scepticism1 is then1 it appears1 the surest1 or rather the only mode1 of removing the danger of such a tendency4 ,that mind may soon doubt even of the most important truths1 which has never learned to distinguish the doubtful from the true4 ,but to know well the irresistible evidence on which truth is founded1 is to believe in it1 and to believe in it forever4 ,nor is it from the danger of scepticism only1 that a just view of the principles of his intellectual constitution tends to preserve the philosophic inquirer4 ,it saves him1 also1 from that presumptuous and haughty dogmatism1 which1 though free from doubt1 is not1 therefore1 necessarily free from error2 and which is1 indeed1 much more likely to be fixed in error than in truth1 where the inquiry1 that precedes conviction1 has been casual and incomplete4 ,a just view of our nature as intelligent beings1 at the same time that it teaches us enough of our strength to allow us to rest with confidence on the great principles1 physical1 moral1 and religious1 in which alone it is of importance for us to confide1 teaches us also enough of our weakness1 to render us indulgent to the weakness of others4 ,we cease to be astonished that multitudes should differ from us2 because we know well1 that while nature has made a provision for the universal assent of mankind to those fundamental physical truths1 which are essential to their very existence1 and those fundamental truths of another kind1 which are equally essential to their existence as subjects of moral government1 she has left them1 together with principles of improvement that ensure their intellectual progress1 a susceptibility of error1 without which there could be no progression2 and while we almost trace back the circumstances which have modified our own individual belief1 we cannot but be aware1 at the same time1 how many sources there are of prejudice1 and1 consequently1 of difference of opinion1 in the various situations in which the multitudes1 that differ from us1 have been placed4 ,to feel anger at human error1 says an ancient philosopher1 is the same thing as if we were to be angry with those who stumble in the dark1--with the deaf for not obeying our command1--with the sick1--with the aged1--with the weary4 ,that very dulness of discernment1 which excites at once our wonder and our wrath1 is but a part of the general frailty of mortality2 and the love of our errors is not less inherent in our constitution than error itself4 ,it is this general constitution which is to be studied by us1 that we may know with what mistakes and weaknesses we must have to deal1 when we have to deal with our fellow-men2 and the true art1 therefore1 of learning to forgive individuals1 is to learn first how much we have to forgive to the whole human race4 8,illud potius cogitabis1 non esse irascendum erroribus4 ,quid enim1 si quis irascatur in tenebris parum vestigia certa ponentibus8 ,quid si quis surdis1 imperia non exaudientibus8 ,quid si pueris1 quod neglecto dispectu officiorum1 ad lusus et ineptos qualium jocos spectent8 ,quid si illis irasci velis1 qui grotant1 senescunt1 fatigantur8 ,inter ctera mortalitatis incommoda1 et hc est1 caligo mentium3 nec tantum necessitas errandi1 sed errorum amor4 ,ne singulis irascaris1 universis ignoscendum3 generi humano venia tribuenda est40#i ,how much of the fury of the persecuting spirit of darker ages would have been softened and turned into moderation1 by juster views of the nature of man1 and of all the circumstances on which belief depends6 ,it appears to us so very easy to believe what we consider as true1--or1 rather1 it appears to us so impossible to disbelieve it1--that1 if we judge from our own momentary feelings only1 without any knowledge of the general nature of belief1 and of all the principles in our mental constitution by which it is diversified1 we very naturally look on the dissent of others as a sort of wilful and obstinate contrariety1 and almost as an insulting denial of a right of approbation1 which we consider ourselves1 in these circumstances1 as very justly entitled to claim4 ,the transition from this supposed culpability to the associated ideas of pains and penalties1 is a very natural one2 and there is1 therefore a sufficient fund of persecution in mere ignorance1 though the spirit of it were not1 as it usually is1 aggravated by degrading notions of the divine ,being1 and false impressions of religious duty4 ,very different are the sentiments which the science of mind produces and cherishes4 ,it makes us tolerant1 not merely by showing the absurdity of endeavouring to overcome1 by punishment1 a belief which does not depend on suffering2 but which may remain1 and even gather additional strength1 in imprisonment1 in exile1 under the axe1 and at the stake4 ,the absurdity of every attempt of this kind it shews indeed2 but it makes us feel1 still more intimately1 that injustice of it1 which is worse than absurdity1--by shewing our common nature1 in all the principles of truth and error1 with those whom we would oppress2 all having faculties that may lead to truth1 and tendencies of various kinds which may mislead to error1 and the mere accidental and temporary difference of power being1 if not the greatest1 at least the most obvious circumstance1 which1 in all ages1 has distinguished the persecutor from the persecuted4 ,let not this weak1 unknowing hand1 ,presume thy bolts to throw2 ,or deal damnation round the land1 ,on all ,i judge thy foe6 ,if ,i am right1--thy grace impart1 ,still in the right to stay2 ,if ,i am wrong1--,o1 teach my heart1 ,to find the better way4#aj ,such is the language of devout philosophy4 ,no proud assertion of individual infallibility1--no triumph over the consequences in others1 of a fallible nature1 which ourselves partake in common1--but the expression of feelings more suited to earthly weakness1--of a modest joy of belief1 which is not less delightful for the humility that tempers it2 and of a modest sorrow for the seeming errors of others1 to which the consciousness of our own nature gives a sympathy of warmer interest4 ,the more important the subject of difference1 the greater1 not the less1 will be the indulgence of him who has learned to trace the sources of human error1--of error1 that has its origin not in our weakness and imperfection merely1 but often in the most virtuous affections of the heart1--in that respect for age1 and admiration of virtue1 and gratitude for kindness received1 which make the opinions of those whom we love and honour seem to us1 in our early years1 as little questionable1 as the virtues which we love to contemplate1 or the very kindness which we feel at every moment beaming on our heart1 in the tender protection that surrounds us4 ,that the subjects on which we may differ from others1 are important to happiness1 of course implies1 that it is no slight misfortune to have erred2 and that the mere error1 therefore1 must be already too great an evil to require any addition from our individual contempt or indignation1 far less from the vengeance of public authority1--that may be right1 in the opinions which it conceives to be insulted by partial dissent2 but which must be wrong1 in the means which it takes to avenge them4 ,to be sincerely thankful for truths received1 is1 by the very nature of the feeling1 to be sensible how great a blessing those have lost who are deprived of the same enjoyment2 and to look down1 then1 with insolent disdain1 on the unfortunate victim of error1 is1 indeed to render contemptible1 7as far as it is in our feeble power to render it contemptible17 not the error which we despise1 but the truth which allows us to despise it4 ,the remarks which ,i have as yet made1 on the effects of acquaintance with the ,philosophy of ,mind1 relate to its influence on the general spirit of philosophical inquiry2 the advantages which must be derived1 in every science1 from a knowledge of the extent of the power of the intellectual instruments which we use for the discovery of truth2 the skill which we thence acquire in distinguishing the questions in which we may justly hope to discover truth1 from those questions of idle and endless controversy1 the decision of which is altogether beyond the reach of our faculties2 and the consequent moderation in the temper1 with which we look both to our own possible attainments1 and to the errors of others4 ,but beside these general advantages1 which the ,philosophy of ,mind extends to all the inquiries of which human genius is capable1 there are some advantages more peculiarly felt in certain departments of science or art4 ,it is not merely with the mind that we operate2 the subject of our operations is also often the mind itself4 ,in education1 in criticism1 in poetry1 in eloquence1 the mind has to act upon mind1 to produce in it either emotions that are temporary1 or affections and opinions that are permanent4 ,we have to instruct it1--to convince it1--to persuade it1--to delight it1--to soften it with pity1--to agitate it with terror or indignation2--and all these effects1 when other circumstances of genius are the same1 we shall surely be able to produce more readily1 if we know the natural laws of thought and emotion2 the feelings which are followed by other feelings2 and the thoughts1 which1 expanding into other thoughts1 almost of themselves produce the very passion1 or conviction1 which we wish to excite4 8,one considerable advantage10 says ,mr ,hume1 8which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy1 is its subserviency to the easy and humane2 which1 without the former1 can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments1 precepts1 or reasonings4 ,all polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations2 and inspire us with different sentiments of praise or blame1 admiration or ridicule1 according to the qualities of the object which they set before us4 ,an artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking2 who1 besides a delicate taste and quick apprehension1 possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric1 the operations of the understanding1 the workings of the passions1 and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue4 ,however painful this inward search or inquiry may appear1 it becomes1 in some measure1 requisite to those who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners4 ,the anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects2 but his science is highly useful to the painter in delineating even a ,venus or an ,helen4 ,while the latter employs all the richest colours of his art1 and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs1 he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body1 the position of the muscles1 the fabric of the bones1 and the use and figure of every part or organ4 ,accuracy is1 in every case1 advantageous to beauty1 and just reasoning to delicacy of sentiment2--in vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other40#aa ,there is a most striking passage to the same purport1 in that beautiful dialogue on ancient oratory1 which has been ascribed1 without any very satisfactory evidence1 to various authors1 particularly to ,quinctilian1 the younger ,pliny1 and ,tacitus1 and which is not unworthy of the most eminent of the names to which it has been ascribed4 ,after dwelling on the universal science and erudition of the great master of ,roman eloquence1 the chief speaker in the dialogue proceeds to show the peculiar advantage which oratory must derive from moral and intellectual science1 to the neglect of which fundamental study1 as superseded by the frivolous disputations of the rhetorical schools1 he ascribes the decay of eloquence in the age of which he speaks4 8,ita enim est1 optimi viri1 ita1 ex multa eruditione1 ex pluribus artibus1 et omnium rerum scientia1 exundat et exuberat illa admirabilis eloquentia4 ,neque oratoris vis et facultas1 sicut ceterarum rerum1 angustis et brevibus terminis eluditur2 sed is est orator1 qui de omni qustione pulchre1 et ornate1 et ad persuadendum apte dicere1 pro dignitate rerum ad utilitatem temporum1 cum voluptate audientium1 possit4 ,hc sibi illi veteres persuadebant4 ,ad hc efficienda intelligebant opus esse1 non ut ,rhetorum scholis declamarent1--sed ut his artibus pectus implerent1 in quibus de bonis ac malis1 de honesto ac turpi1 de justo et injusto disputatur2--de quibus copiose1 et varie1 et ornate1 nemo dicere potest1 nisi qui cognovit naturam humanam4--,ex his fontibus etiam illa profluunt1 ut facilius iram judicis vel instiget1 vel leniat1 qui scit quid ira1 promptius ad miserationem impellat qui scit quid sit misericordia1 et quibus animi motibus concitetur4 ,in his artibus exercitationibusque versatus orator1 sive apud infestos1 sive apud cupidos1 sive apud invidentes1 sive apud tristes1 sive apud timentes dicendum habuerit1 tenebit habenas animorum1 et prout cujusque natura postulabit1 adhibebit manum et temperabit orationem1 parato omni instrumento1 et ad usum reposito40#ab ,what is the whole art of criticism1 in its most important applications1 but the knowledge of the most natural successions of thought and feeling in the mind8 ,we judge of the perspicuity and order of a discourse1 by knowing the progress in which the mind1 by the developement of truth after truth1 may be made at last to see the full meaning of the most complex proposition4 ,we judge of the beauty of impassioned poetry or eloquence1 by knowing whether the figures1 the images1 the very feelings described1 be such as1 from our observation of the laws that regulate the internal series of changes in the mind1 we know to be consistent with that state of emotion1 in which a mind must exist that has been placed in the situation supposed4 ,if all other circumstances be equal1 he will undoubtedly be the best critic1 who knows best the phenomena of human thought and feeling2 and1 without this knowledge1 criticism can be nothing but a measurement of words1 or a repetition of the ever repeated and endless common places of rhetoric4 ,the knowledge of nature1--of the necessity of which critics speak so much1 and so justly1 and which is as essential to the critic himself1 as to the writer on whom he sits in judgment1--is only another name for the knowledge of the successive transitions of feeling of the mind1 in all the innumerable diversities in which it is capable of being modified1 by the variety of circumstances in which it maybe placed4 ,it is for this reason1 that1 with so great an abundance of the mere art1 or rather of the mere technical phrases of criticism1 we have so very little of the science of it2 because the science of criticism implies an acquaintance with the philosophy of thought and passion1 which few can be expected to possess2 and though nothing can be easier than to deliver opinions1 such as pass current in the drawing-room1 and even in the literary circle1 which the frivolous may admire as profound1 and the ignorant as erudite1 and which many voices may be proud to repeat2 though even the dull and pedantic are as able as the wise to say1 in fluent language1 that one passage of a work of genius is beautiful1 and another the reverse1--because one of them is in accordance with some technical rules1 or because ,homer and ,milton have passages similar to the one1 and not to the other3 it is far from being equally easy to show1 how the one passage is beautiful1 from its truth of character1 and the other1 though perhaps rich in harmony of rhythm and rhetorical ornament1 is yet faulty1 by its violation of the more important harmony of thought and emotion1--a harmony which nature observes as faithfully1 in the progress of those vehement passions that appear most wild and irregular1 as in the calmest successions of feeling of the most tranquil hours4 ,it would indeed1 be too much to say1 as in the well known couplet of ,pope1 8,let such teach others who themselves excel1 ,and censure freely1 who have written well20#ac for the critic requires only one of the two great talents1 which in the poet1 ought to exist together1 but which may yet exist separately4 ,in the poet1 there must be1 in the first place1 an inventive fancy to bring together thoughts and images which have never been combined before2 and with this inventive fancy1 a discriminating judgment1 which is to measure1 by the standard of nature1 the products of invention2 and to retain them1 only if they appear such1 as though perhaps never before combined1 might yet1 in conformity with the natural laws of thought1 have occurred to a mind1 in the circumstances represented1 as truly1 as the other thoughts or images1 which the works of other poets have rendered more familiar4 ,this latter talent1--the judgment which determines the intrinsic beauty and fidelity to general nature1--is all which is absolutely requisite to the critic1 who is not1 therefore1 under the necessity of being himself 8the great sublime0 which he draws4 ,yet1 though all the elements of excellence in the artist are not absolutely requisite for the judgment of the sage and discriminating admirer of the noble works which that excellence may have produced1 some of these elements unquestionably are requisite1--elements1 for which the critic may search in vain in all the rules of rhetoricians1 and even in the perusal of all the masterpieces of ancient and modern times1 unless1 to an acquaintance with these1 he add an accurate acquaintance with that intellectual and moral nature of man1 the beautiful conformity to which was the essential charm of all the pathos1 and all the eloquence1 which he has admired4 ,there is another art1 however1 to which knowledge of the intellectual and moral nature of man is still more important--that noble art1 which has the charge of training the ignorance and imbecility of infancy into all the virtue1 and power1 and wisdom of maturer manhood--of forming1 of a creature1 the frailest and feeblest perhaps which heaven has made1 the intelligent and fearless sovereign of the whole animated creation1 the interpreter1 and adorer1 and almost the representative of the ,divinity4 ,the art1 which performs a transformation so wondrous1 cannot but be admirable itself2 and it is from observation of the laws of mind1 that all which is most admirable in it is derived4 ,these laws we must follow indeed1 since they exist not by our contrivance1 but by the contrivance of that nobler wisdom1 from which the very existence of the mind has flowed2 yet1 if we know them well1 we can lead them1 in a great measure1 even while we follow them4 ,and1 while the helpless subject of this great moral art is every moment requiring our aid1--with an understanding that may rise1 from truth to truth1 to the sublimest discoveries1 or may remain sunk forever in ignorance1 and with susceptibilities of vice that may be repressed1 and of virtue that may be cherished1--can we know too well the means of checking what is evil1 and of fostering what is good8 ,it is too late to lie by1 in indolent indulgence of affection1 till vice be already formed in the little being whom we love1 and to labour then to remove it1 and to substitute the virtue that is opposite to it4 ,vice already formed1 is almost beyond our power4 ,it is only in the state of latent propensity1 that we can with much reason expect to overcome it by the moral motives which we are capable of presenting2 and to distinguish this propensity before it has expanded itself1 and even before it is known to the very mind in which it exists1--to tame those passions which are never to rage1 and to prepare1 at a distance1 the virtues of other years1--implies a knowledge of the mental constitution1 which can be acquired only by a diligent study of the nature1 and progress1 and successive transformations of feeling4 ,it is easy to know1 that praise or censure1 reward or punishment1 may increase or lessen1 the tendency to the repetition of any particular action2 and this1 together with the means of elementary instruction1 is all which is commonly termed education4 ,but the true science of education is something far more than this4 ,it implies a skilful observation of the past1 and that long foresight of the future1 which experience and judgment united afford4 ,it is the art of seeing1 not the immediate effect only1 but the series of effects which may follow any particular thought or feeling1 in the infinite variety of possible combinations--the art often of drawing virtue from apparent evil1 and of averting evil that may rise from apparent good4 ,it is1 in short1 the philosophy of the human mind applied practically to the human mind1--enriching it1 indeed1 with all that is useful or ornamental in knowledge1 but at the same time giving its chief regard to objects of yet greater moment--averting evil1 which all the sciences together could not compensate1 or producing good1 compared with which all the sciences together are as nothing4 ,,footnotes3 #g ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4--,introd4 sect4 #f1 #g4 #h ,pope's ,essay on ,man1 ,ep4 iv4 v4 #gc-gf4 #i ,seneca1 de ,ira1 lib4 ii4 cap4 #i4 #aj ,pope's ,universal ,prayer1 v4 #be-cb4 #aa ,inquiry concerning the ,human ,understanding1 sec4 ,i4 #ab ,tacitus1 edit4 ,lipsii1 p4 #dhd1 #e4 #ac ,essay on ,criticism1 v4 #ae1 #af4 ,,lecture ,,iv4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,mind ,,to ,,the ,,cultivation ,,of ,,moral ,,feeling4 ,we have already1 ,gentlemen1 considered the relation which the ,philosophy of ,mind bears to the ,sciences in general1 and its particular application to those sciences and arts1 in which the mind is not merely the instrument with which we carry on our intellectual operations1 but the very subject on which we operate1 as in the great arts of reasoning1 and persuading1 of delighting with all the charms of poetry and eloquence1 of judging of the degrees of excellence that have been attained in these delightful arts2 and1 still more1 its application to the noblest1 though1 in proportion to its value1 the least studied of all the arts1 the art of education4 ,it remains still1 to point out some moral effects which the study of the ,science of ,mind produces in the inquirer himself1 effects which may not be obvious at first sight1 but which result from it1 as truly as the intellectual advantages already pointed out4 ,one very powerful and salutary influence of moral science arises directly from the mere contemplation of the objects with which it is conversant--the benevolent affections1 the pleasure which attends these1 the sacrifices that are made by generous virtue1 and all the sublime admiration which they excite--the sordid and malevolent1 and joyless passions of the selfish--the fear and shame that attend the guilty in society1 and the horrors that1 with a certainty of constant return more dreadful than their very presence1 await them in their solitary hours4 ,it is good to have these often before us1 and to trace and contrast all the immediate1 and all the remote effects of vice and virtue1 even though we should form1 at the time1 no direct reference to our own past or future conduct4 ,without any such reference to ourselves1 we must still be sensible of the pleasure and serene confidence which attend the one1 and of the insecurity and remorse which forever hang over the other2 and the remaining impressions of love and disgust1 will have an influence on our future conduct1 of which we may probably be altogether unconscious at the time4 ,it is1 in truth1 like the influence of the example of those with whom we habitually associate1 which no one perceives at any particular moment1 though all are every moment subject to it2 and to meditate often on virtue and happiness1 is thus almost to dwell in a sort of social communion with the virtuous and happy4 ,the influence of moral conceptions has1 in this respect1 been compared to that of light1 which it is impossible to approach1 without deriving from it some faint colouring1 even though we should not sit in the very sunshine1--or to that of precious odours1 amid which we cannot long remain1 without bearing away with us some portion of the fragrance4 8,ea enim philosophi vis est1 ut non solum studentes1 sed etiam conversantes juvet4 ,qui in solem venit1 licet non in hoc venerit1 colorabitur3 qui in unguentaria taberna resederunt1 et paulo diutius commorati sunt1 odorem secum loci ferunt3 et qui apud philosophiam fuerunt1 traxerint aliquid necesse est1 quod prodesset etiam negligentibus40#ad ,the nature of the process1 by which this moral benefit arises from the mere contemplation of moral objects1 frequently repeated1 is far from obscure1 though it depends on a cause to which you may perhaps as yet have paid little attention1 but which1 in an after part of the course1 ,i shall have an opportunity of illustrating at length1--the influence of the associating principle in the mind1--of that principle1 by which ideas and other feelings1 that have often co-existed1 acquire1 forever after1 an almost indissoluble union4 ,it is not merely1 therefore1 by having traced1 more accurately than others1 the consequences of vice and virtue1 as affecting the general character1 that the lover of moral science strengthens his admiration of virtue1 and his abhorrence of vice4 ,but1 by the frequent consideration of virtue1 together with the happiness which it affords1 and of vice1 together with its consequent misery1 the notions of these become so permanently1 and so deeply associated1 that future virtue appears almost like happiness about to be enjoyed1 and future vice like approaching misery4 ,the dread of misery1 and the love of happiness1 which are essential principles of our very physical existence1 are thus transformed into principles of moral conduct1 that operate1 before reflection1 with the rapidity1 and almost with the energy of instincts1--and that1 after reflection1 add to our virtuous resolutions a force and stability1 which1 as results of mere reasoning1 they could not possess4 ,it is1 besides1 no small advantage of the abstract consideration of virtue1 as opposed to the miseries of vice1 that1 in considering these philosophically1 we regard them as stripped of every thing that can blind or seduce us2 and we behold them1 therefore1 truly as they are4 ,it is not in the madness of intemperate enjoyment1 that we see drunkenness in the goblet1 and disease in the feast4 ,under the actual seduction of a passion1 we see dimly1 if we see at all1 any of the evils to which it leads2 and if the feelings1 of which we are then conscious1 were those which were forever after to be associated with the remembrance of the passion1 it would appear to us an object1 not of disgust or abhorrence1 but of delight and choice1 and almost of a sort of moral approbation4 ,it is of importance1 then1 that we should consider the passion1 at other moments than these1 that the images associated with it may be not of that brief and illusive pleasure1 which stupifies its unfortunate victim1 but of its true inherent character1 of deformity1 and of the contempt and hatred which it excites in others4 ,such is the advantage of the point of view1 in which it is seen by the moral inquirer1 to whom it presents itself1 not under its momentary character of pleasure1 but under its lasting character of pain and disgust4 ,by habituating himself to consider the remote1 as well as the immediate results of all the affections and passions1 he learns to regard virtue1 not merely as good in itself1 at the moment in which it is called into exercise1 but as an inexhaustible source of good which is continually increasing2 and vice not merely as a temporary evil in itself1 but as a source of permanent and yet deeper misery and degradation4 ,every generous principle1 which nature has given him1 is thus continually deriving new strength1 from the very contemplation of the good which it affords2 and if1 in the frailty of mortality1 he should still be subject to the occasional influence of those very passions1 which1 in cooler moments1 he detests1 he yet does not fall1 thoroughly and hopelessly4 ,there are lingering associations of moral beauty and happiness in his mind1 which may save him still1--associations that must render it1 in some degree at least1 more difficult for him than for others1 to yield to seductions1 of which he has long known the vanity1 and which perhaps even may1 in some happier hour1 lead him back to that virtue1 of which he has never wholly forgotten the charms4 ,the charms of virtue1 indeed1 it is scarcely possible1 for him who has felt them1 wholly to forget4 ,there may be eyes that can look unmoved on the external beauty which once delighted them4 ,but who is there that has ever been alive to its better influence1 who can think of moral loveliness without a feeling of more than admiration1--without a conscious enjoyment1 in the possession of what is so truly admirable1 or a sigh at having lost the privilege of dwelling on it with delight1 and at being obliged to shrink from the very thought of what it once appeared8 8,for what can strive ,with virtue8 which of nature's regions vast ,can in so many forms produce to sight ,such powerful beauty8--,beauty1 which the eye ,of hatred cannot look upon secure2 ,which ,envy's self contemplates1 and is turn'd ,ere long to tenderness1 to infant smiles1 ,or tears of humblest love4 ,is ought so fair1 ,in all the dewy landscapes of the ,spring1 ,the ,summer's noontide groves1 the purple eve ,at harvest-home1 or in the frosty moon ,glittering on some smooth sea1 is aught so fair ,as virtuous friendship8 ,as the honour'd roof1 ,whither1 from highest heaven1 immortal love1 ,his torch etherial1 and his golden bow1 ,propitious brings1 and there a temple holds1 ,to whose unspotted service gladly vow'd1 ,the social bond of parent1 brother1 child1 ,with smiles1 and sweet discourse1 and gentle deeds1 ,adore his power8 ,what gift of richest clime ,e'er drew such eager eyes1 or prompted such ,deep wishes1 as the zeal1 that snatcheth back ,from ,slander's poisonous tooth a foe's renown1 ,or crosseth ,danger in his lion-walk1 ,a rival's life to rescue80 ,the study of moral science1 then1 we have seen1 has a direct tendency to strengthen our attachment to the virtues which we habitually contemplate4 ,another most important advantage derived from it1 relates to us in our higher character of beings capable of religion1 increasing our devotion and gratitude to the ,divinity1 by the clearest manifestation which it gives us of his provident goodness in the constitution and government of the moral world4 ,the external universe1 indeed1 though our study were confined to the laws which regulate its phenomena1 would afford1 in itself1 abundant proof of the power and wisdom by which it was created4 ,but power and wisdom alone excite admiration only1 not love2 which1 though it may be feigned in the homage that is universally paid to power1 is yet1 as an offering of the heart1 paid to it only when it is combined with benevolence4 ,it is the splendid benevolence1 therefore1 of the ,supreme ,being1 which is the object of our grateful adoration2 and1 to discover this benevolence1 we must look to creatures that have not existence merely1 like inanimate things1 but a capacity of enjoyment1 and means of enjoyment4 ,it is in man1--or in beings capable of knowledge and happiness1 like man1--that we find the solution of the wonders of the creation2 which would otherwise1 with all its regularity and beauty1 be but a solitary waste1 like the barren magnificence of rocks and deserts4 ,god1 says ,epictetus1 has introduced man into the world1 to be the spectator of his works1 and of their divine ,author2 and not to be the spectator only1 but to be the announcer and interpreter of the wonders which he sees and adores4 -- 4#ae 8,hc qui contemplatur10 says another ancient ,stoic1 with a little of the bold extravagance of his school1--8,hc qui contemplatur1 quid ,deo prstat8 ,ne tanta ejus opera sine teste sint40--8,curiosum nobis natura ingenium dedit2 et artis sibi ac pulchritudinis suae conscia1 spectatores nos tantis rerum spectaculis genuit1 perditura fructum sui1 si tam magna1 tam clara1 tarn subtiliter ducta1 tam nitida1 et non uno genere formosa solitudini ostenderet40#af ,in the study of what might be considered as the very defects of our moral nature1 how pleasing is it1 to the philosophic inquirer1 to discover that provident arrangement of a higher ,power1 which has rendered many of the most striking of the apparent evils of life subservient to the production of a general utility1 that had never entered into the contemplation of its remote authors4 ,he who has never studied the consequences of human actions1 perceives1 in the great concourse of mankind1 only a multitude of beings consulting each his own peculiar interest1 or the interest of the very small circle immediately around him1 with little1 if any1 apparent attention to the interests of others4 ,but he who has truly studied human actions and their consequences1 sees1 in the prosecution of all these separate interests1 that universal interest which is their great result2 and the very principle of self-regard thus contributing to social happiness1--unconsciously indeed1 but almost as surely as the principle of benevolence itself4 ,each individual seeks a several goal1 ,but ,heaven's great view is one1 and that the whole4 ,that counterworks each folly and caprice2 ,that disappoints the effect of every vice2-- ,all ,virtue's ends from ,vanity's can raise2 ,which seeks no interest1 no reward but praise2 ,and build on wants1 and on defects of mind1 ,the joy1 the peace1 the glory of mankind4#ag ,i have already1#ah--when treating of the influence of just views of the extent and limits of our faculties1 in fixing the proper tone of inquiry1 and lessening equally the tendency to the opposite extremes of dogmatism and scepticism1--stated some important moral advantages that arise from this very moderation of the tone of inquiry1 particularly with respect to the temper with which it prepares us to receive dissent from our opinions without anger1 or insolent disdain1 or even astonishment4 ,so much of the intercourse of human society consists in the reciprocal communication of opinions which must often be opposed to each other1 that this preparation of the temper1 whether for amicable and equal discussion1 or for mutual silent forbearance1 is not to be lightly appreciated as an element in the sum of human happiness4 ,on this point1 however1 and on its relation to the still greater advantages1 or still greater evils1 of national or legislative tolerance or intolerance1 ,i before offered some remarks1 and therefore merely allude to it at present4 ,the tolerance with which we receive the opinions of others is a part1 and an indispensable part1 of that general refinement of manners to which we give the name of politeness4 ,but politeness itself1 in all its most important respects1--indeed in every respect1 in which it is to be separated from the mere fluctuating and arbitrary forms and ceremonies of the month or year1--is nothing more than knowledge of the human mind directing general benevolence4 ,it is the art of producing the greatest happiness1 which1 in the mere external courtesies of life1 can be produced1 by raising such ideas or other feelings in the minds of those with whom we are conversant1 as will afford the most pleasure1 and averting1 as much as possible1 every idea which may lead to pain4 ,it implies1 therefore1 when perfect1 a fine knowledge of the natural series of thoughts1 so as to distinguish1 not merely the thought which will be the immediate or near effect of what is said or done1 but those which may arise still more remotely2 and he is the most successful in this art of giving happiness1 who sees the future at the greatest distance4 ,it is this foresight acquired by attentive observation of the various characters of mankind in a long intercourse with society1 which is the true knowledge of the world2 for the knowledge of the mere forms and ceremonies of the world1 which is of far easier acquisition1 is scarcely worthy of being called a part of it4 ,the essential1 and the only valuable part of politeness then1 is as truly the result of study of the human mind1 as if its minutest rules had formed a regular part of our systems of intellectual and moral philosophy4 ,it is the philosophy indeed of those1 who scarcely know that they are philosophizing2 because philosophy1 to them1 implies something which has no other ornaments than diagrams and frightful algebraic characters1 laid down in systems1 or taught in schools and universities1 with the methodical tediousness of rules of grammar2 and they are conscious1 that all1 or the greatest part of what they know1 has been the result of their own observation1 and acquired in the very midst of the amusements of life4 ,but he1 who knows the world1 must have studied the mind of man1 or at least--for it is only a partial view of the mind which is thus formed--must have studied it in some of its most striking aspects4 ,he is a practical philosopher1 and1 therefore1 a speculative one also1 since he must have founded his rules of action on certain principles1 the results of his own observation and reflection4 ,these results are1 indeed1 usually lost to all but to the individual3 and the loss is not to be considered as slight1 merely because the knowledge1 which thus perishes1 has been usually applied by its possessor to frivolous purposes1 and sometimes perhaps to purposes still more unworthy4 ,when we read the maxims of ,la ,rochefoucauld1 which1 false as they would be1 if they had been intended to give us a faithful universal picture of the moral nature of man1 were unfortunately too faithful a delineation of the passions and principles that immediately surrounded their author1 and met his daily view1 in the splendid scenes of vanity and ambitious intrigue to which his observation was confined1--it is impossible not to feel1 that1 acute and subtle as they are1 many of these maxims must have been only the expression of principles1 which were floating1 without being fixed in words1 in the minds of many of his fellow courtiers2 and the instruction1 which might be received from those who have been long conversant with mankind1 in situations favourable to observation1 if1 by any possibility1 it could be collected and arranged1 would probably furnish one of the most important additions which could be made to moral science4 ,how much politeness consists in knowledge of the natural succession of thoughts and feelings1 and a consequent ready foresight of the series of thoughts1 which it is in our power indirectly to excite or avert1 must have presented itself in a very striking manner to every one1 whose professional duties1 or other circumstances1 have led him to pay attention to the lower orders of society4 ,the most benevolent of the poor1 in situations too in which their benevolence is most strongly excited1 as in the sickness of their relations or friends1 and in which they exert themselves to relieve obvious pain1 with an assiduity of watching and fatigue1 after all the ordinary fatigues of the day1 that is truly honourable to their tenderness1 have yet little foresight of the mere pains of thought2 and while in the same situation1 the rich and better educated1 with equal1 or perhaps even with less benevolence of intention1 carefully avoid the introduction of any subject1 which might suggest1 indirectly to the sufferer the melancholy images of parting life1 the conversation of the poor1 around the bed of their sick friend1 is such as can scarcely fail to present to him every moment1 not the probability merely1 but almost the certainty of approaching death4 ,it is impossible to be present1 in these two situations1 without remarking the benefit of a little knowledge of the human mind1 without which1 far from fulfilling its real wishes1 benevolence itself may be the most cruel of torturers4 ,the same species of foresight which is essential to the refinements of social intercourse1 is equally essential in the active occupations of life1 to that knowledge of times and circumstances1 which is so important to success2 and though this knowledge may be too often abused1 to unworthy purposes1 by the sordid and the servile1 it is not the less necessary to those who pursue only honourable plans1 and who avail themselves only of honourable means4 ,such is the nature of society1 that the most generous and patriotic designs still require some conduct to procure for them authority2 and1 at least in the public situations of life1 without a knowledge of the nature both of those who are to govern1 and of those who are to be governed1 though it may be very easy to wish well to society1 the hardest of all tasks will be the task of doing it good4 ,may ,i not add1 as another salutary moral effect of the ,science of ,mind1 the tendency which the study of the general properties of our common nature has to lessen that undue veneration1 which1 in civilized society1 must always attend the adventitious circumstances of fortune1 and to bring this down1 at least some degrees1 nearer to that due respect which is indispensable for the tranquillity and good order of a state1 and which no wise and patriotic moralist1 therefore1 would wish to see diminished4 ,it is only in the tumultuous phrenzy of a revolution1 however1 or in periods of great and general discontent1 that the respect of the multitude for those who are elevated above them1 in rank and fortune1 is likely to fall beneath this salutary point4 ,so many of the strongest principles of our nature1 favour the excess of it1 that1 in the ordinary circumstances of society1 it must always pass far beyond the point of calm respect2 so far beyond it1 indeed1 that the lesson which the people require most frequently to be taught1 is1 not to venerate the very guilt and folly of the rich and powerful1 because they are the guilt and folly of the rich and powerful4 ,it is to the objects of the idolatry themselves1 however1 that the study of a science1 which considers them as stripped of every adventitious distinction1 and possessing only the common virtues and talents of mankind1 must be especially salutary4 ,in the ordinary circumstances of a luxurious age1 it is scarcely possible for the great to consider themselves as what they truly are2 and though1 if questioned as to their belief of their common origin with the rest of mankind1 they would no doubt think the question an absurd one1 and readily own their descent from the same original parentage2 there can be as little doubt1 that in the silence of their own mind1 and in those hours of vanity and ambition1 which1 to many of them1 are almost the whole hours of life1 this tie of common nature is rarely1 if ever felt4 ,it is impossible indeed1 that it should be often felt1 because1 in the circumstances in which they are placed1 there is every thing to remind them of a superiority1 of which their passions themselves are sufficiently ready to remind them1 and very little to remind them of an equality1 from the contemplation of which all their passions are as ready to turn away4 ,there are1 however1 some circumstances which are too strong for all these passions to overcome1 and which force in spite of them1 upon the mind that self-knowledge1 which in other situations1 it is easy to avoid4 ,in pain and sickness1 notwithstanding all the vain magnificence which the pride of grandeur spreads around the couch1 and the profusion of untasted delicacies1 with which officious tenderness strives to solicit an appetite that loathes them1 he who lies upon the couch within1 begins to learn his own nature1 and sees through the splendour that seems to surround him1 as it were1 without touching him1 how truly foreign it is to that existence1 of which before it seemed to form a part4 ,the feeling that he is but a man1 in the true sense of that word1 as a frail and dependant being like those around him1 is one of the first feelings1 and perhaps not one of the least painful1 which arise in such a situation4 ,the impression1 however1 of this common nature1 is1 while it lasts1 a most salutary one2 and it is to be regretted only1 that health cannot return without bringing back with it all those flattering circumstances which offer the same seductions as before to his haughty superiority4 ,the sight of death1 or of the great home of the dead1 in like manner1 seldom fails to bring before us our common and equal nature4 ,in spite of all the little distinctions which a churchyard exhibits1 in mimic imitation1 and almost in mockery1 of the great distinctions of life1 the turf1 the stone with its petty sculptures1 and all the columns and images of the marble monument2 as we read the inscription1 or walk over the sod1 we think only of what lies beneath in undistinguishable equality4 ,there is scarcely any one on whom these two great equalizing objects1 sickness and the sight of death1 have not produced1 for a short time1 at least1 some salutary moral impression4 ,but these are objects which cannot often occur1 and which are accompanied with too many distressing circumstances1 to render it desirable that they should be of very frequent occurrence4 ,the study of the mind1 of our common moral and intellectual nature1 and of those common hopes which await us1 as immortal beings1 seems in some degree to afford the advantage1 without the mixture of evil3 for1 though in such speculative inquiries1 the impression may be less striking than when accompanied with painful circumstances1 it is more permanent1 because1 from the absence of those powerful circumstances1 it is more frequently and willingly renewed4 ,in the philosophy of mind1 all those heraldic differences which have converted mere human vanity into a science1 are as nothing4 ,it is man that is the object of investigation1 and man with no distinctions that are adventitious4 ,the feelings1 the faculties1 which we consider1 are endowments of the rich and powerful indeed2 but they are endowments also of the meanest of those on whom they look with disdain4 ,it is something1 then1 for those whose thoughts are continually directed by external circumstances1 to that perilous elevation on which they are placed1 to be led occasionally1 as in such inquiries they must be1 to measure themselves and others without regard to the accidental differences of the heights on which they stand1 and to see what it is in which they truly differ1 and what it is in which they truly agree4 ,in the remarks already made1 on the study of the ,science of ,mind1 we have considered its effects on the progress of the other sciences1 and on the moral dispositions4 ,but1 though the study had no effects of this kind1 moral or intellectual1 is not the mind itself a part of nature1 and as a mere physical object1 deserving of our profoundest and most intent investigation8 or shall it be said1 that while we strive1 not merely to measure the whole earth1 and to follow in our thought the revolutions of these great orbs1 whose majesty may almost be said to force from us this homage of admiration1 but to arrange1 in distinct tribes1 those animalcular atoms1 whose very existence we learn only from the glass through which we view them2 the observing and calculating mind itself is less an object of universal science1 than the antennae of an insect1 or the filaments of a weed8 ,would it be no reproach to man1 even though he knew all things besides1 that he yet knew far less accurately than he might know1 his own internal nature1--like voyagers who delight in visiting every coast of the most distant country1 without the slightest acquaintance1 perhaps1 with the interior of their own8 ,qui terr pelagique vias1 mundique per omnes ,articulos spatiatur ovans1 metasque suorum ,herculeas audet supra posuisse laborum1 ,neglectus jacet usque sibi1 dumque omnia qurit1 ,ipse sui qusitor abest2 incognita tellus ,solus nauta latet1 propiorque ignotior orbis4 ,would the lines which follow these1 if indeed there were any one to whom they were applicable in their full extent1 convey praise less high than that which might be given to the observer of some small nerve or membrane1 that had never been observed before1 or the discoverer of a new species of earth1 in some pebble before unanalyzed8 ,tu melior ,tiphys1 spreto jam ,phasidis auro1 ,in te vela paras1 animatos detegis orbes1 ,humanasque aperis ausis ingentibus oras4 ,jamque novos laxari sinus1 animque latentis ,arcanas reserare vias1 closque recessus ,fas aperire tibi1 totamque secludere mentem4 ,to the mind1 considered as a mere object of physical inquiry1 there is one circumstance of interest1 that is peculiar4 ,it is the part of our mixed nature which we have especially in view as often as we think of self1--that by which we began to exist1 and continue to exist1 by which in every moment of our being1 we have rejoiced1 and hoped1 and feared1 and loved2 or rather1 it is that which has been itself1 in all our emotions1 the rejoicer1 the hoper1 the fearer4 ,to inquire into the history of the mind1 therefore1 is in truth to look back1 as far as it is permitted to us to look back1 on the whole history of our life4 ,it is to think of those many pleasing emotions which delighted us when present1 or of those sadder feelings1 which when considered as past1 become delightful1 almost like the feelings that were in themselves originally pleasing1 and in many cases1 are reviewed with still greater interest4 ,we cannot attempt to think of the origin of our knowledge1 without bringing before us scenes and persons most tenderly familiar2 and though the effect of such remembrances is perhaps less powerful1 when the mind is prepared for philosophical investigation1 than in moments in which it is more passive1 still the influence is not wholly lost4 ,he must be a very cold philosopher indeed1 who1 even in intellectual analysis1 can retrace the early impressions of his youth1 with as little interest as that with which he looks back on the common occurrences of the past day4 ,but it is not any slight interest which it may receive from such peculiar remembrances1 that can be said to give value to the philosophy of mind4 ,it furnishes1 in itself1 the sublimest of all speculations1 because it is the philosophy of the sublimest of all created things4 8,there is but one object10 says ,st4 ,augustine1 8greater than the soul1 and that one is its ,creator40 8,nihil est potentius illa creatura qu mens dicitur rationalis1 nihil est sublimius4 ,quicquid supra illam est jam ,creator est40 ,when we consider the powers of his mind1 even without reference to the wonders which he has produced on earth1 what room does man afford for astonishment and admiration6 ,his senses1 his memory1 his reason1 the past1 the present1 the future1 the whole universe1 and1 if the universe have any limits1 even more than the whole universe1 comprised in a single thought2 and1 amid all these changes of feelings that succeed each other1 in rapid and endless variety1 a permanent and unchangeable duration1 compared with which1 the duration of external things is but the existence of a moment4 8,o what a patrimony this6 a being ,of such inherent strength and majesty1 ,not worlds possest can raise it2 worlds destroy'd ,not injure2#ai which holds on its glorious course1 ,when thine1 ,o ,nature1 ends60#bj ,such1 in dignity and grandeur1 is the mind considered1 even abstractedly4 ,but when1 instead of considering the mind itself1 we look to the wonders which it has performed--the cities1 the cultivated plains1 and all the varieties of that splendid scene to which the art of man has transformed the deserts1 and forests1 and rocks of original nature2 when we behold him1 not limiting the operations of his art to that earth to which he seemed confined1 but bursting through the very elements1 that appeared to encircle him as an insurmountable barrier--traversing the waves--struggling with the winds1 and making their very opposition subservient to his course2 when we look to the still greater transformations which he has wrought in the moral scene1 and compare with the miseries of barbarous life1 the tranquillity and security of a well ordered state2 when we see1 under the influence of legislative wisdom1 insurmountable multitudes obeying1 in opposition to their strongest passions1 the restraints of a power which they scarcely perceive1 and the crimes of a single individual marked and punished1 at the distance of half the earth2 is it possible for us to observe all these wonders1 and yet not to feel some curiosity to examine the faculties by which they have been wrought1 some interest in a being so noble1 that leads us to speculate on the future wonders which he may yet perform1 and on the final destiny which awaits him8 ,this interest we should feel1 though no common tie connected us with the object of our admiration2 and we cannot surely admit that the object of our admiration is less interesting to us1 or less sublime in nature1 because the faculties which we admire are those which ourselves possess1 and the wonders such as we are capable of achieving and surpassing4 ,,footnotes3 #ad ,seneca1 ,ep4 #ajh4 #ae ,dissertat4 ab ,arrian1 collect1 lib4 i4 c4 #f4--p4 #ce4 ,edit4 ,upton4 #af ,seneca de otio ,sapent4 c4 #cb4 #ag ,pope's ,essay on ,man1 ,ep4 ii4 v4 #bcg-bdj1 and #bde-bdh4 #ah ,lect4 ,,iii4 #ai ,can't injure4 ,orig4 #bj ,young's ,night ,thoughts1 ,,vi4 v4 #ece-eci4 ,,lecture ,v4 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,physical ,,inquiry ,,in ,,general4 ,the preceding ,lectures1 ,gentlemen1 have1 ,i trust1 sufficiently convinced you of the importance of the science on which we are to enter1--if1 indeed1 many of the advantages which we have considered were not of themselves so obvious1 as readily to have occurred to your own reflection1 or at least to require less illustration1 than1--in my desire to interest not your attention merely1 but your zealous ardour1 in a science which appears to me so truly to deserve it1--,i have thought necessary to give them4 ,we have seen1 how interesting the mind is1 as an object of study1 from its own intrinsic excellence1 even though it were to be considered in no other light1 than as a mere part of the universal system of things1 necessary1 therefore1 to be comprehended with every other existing substance1 in a system of general physics4 ,we have seen1 likewise1 in how many important respects1 the study of the science of ,mind is favourable to the growth of virtuous sentiment1 and to the refinement and happiness of society2 and1 above all1 how essential an acquaintance with it is1 to the proper conduct of our inquiries1--not merely in those sciences1 the objects of which are kindred or analogous1 but in every other science1 the various objects of which1 however independent1 and even remote from it they may seem1 must always be considered1 not as they exist in themselves1 but as they exist in relation to it2 since they can be known to us only through the medium of the mental affections1 or feelings1 excited by them1 which have laws peculiar to themselves1 and analyzed and arranged only by our mental faculties1 which have their own peculiar limits of extent and power4 ,the first great division of our course of inquiry is purely physiological4 ,it has for its object the mind1 considered as susceptible of various states or affections1 and constituting1 as it is thus variously affected1 the whole phenomena of thought and feeling1 which1 though expressed by a variety of terms1 of functions1 or faculties1 are still but the one mind itself existing in different states4 ,on retracing these states1 which form the whole progress of our sentient1 intellectual1 and moral life1 we have to inquire into the properties of the substance1 mind1 according to the same laws of investigation1 by which we inquire into the properties of external substances1--not by assuming principles1 from which the phenomena may be supposed to flow1 but by observing and generalizing1 till we arrive at those few simple principles or laws1 which1 however pompous the term laws may seem1 as if it denoted something different from the phenomena themselves1 and paramount to them1 are in truth1 nothing more than the expression of the most general circumstances1 in which the phenomena themselves have been felt by us to agree4 ,as we say of gold1 that it is that which is of a certain specific weight1 yellow1 ductile1 fusible at a certain temperature1 and capable of certain combinations1--because all these properties have been observed by ourselves or others1--so we say of the mind1 that it is that which perceives1 remembers1 compares1 and is susceptible of various emotions or other feelings2 because of all these we have been conscious1 or have observed them indirectly in others4 ,we are not entitled to state with confidence any quality1 as a property of gold1 which we do not remember to have observed ourselves1 or to have received on the faith of the observation of others1 whose authority we have reason to consider as indubitable2 and as little are we entitled to assert any quality1 or general susceptibility1 as belonging to the human mind1 of which we have not been conscious ourselves in the feelings resulting from it1 or for which we have not the authority of the indubitable consciousness of others4 ,the exact coincidence1 in this respect1 of the physics of mind and of matter1 it is important that you should have constantly before you1 that you may not be led to regard the comparative indistinctness and vagueness of the mental phenomena as a warrant for greater boldness of assertion1 and looseness of reasoning with respect to them4 ,there is1 on the contrary1 in such a case1 still greater reason to adhere rigidly to the strict rules of philosophizing2 because the less definite the phenomena are1 the greater danger is there of being misled in discriminating and classing them4 ,the laws of inquiry1 those general principles of the logic of physics1 which regulate our search of truth in all things1 external and internal1 do not vary with the name of a science1 or its objects or instruments4 ,they are not laws of one science1 but of every science1 whether the objects of it be mental or material1 clear or obscure1 definite or indefinite2 and they are thus universal1 because1 in truth1 though applicable to many sciences1 they are only laws of the one inquiring mind1 founded on the weakness of its powers of discernment1 in relation to the complicated phenomena on which those powers are exercised4 ,the sort of reasoning which would be false in chemistry1 would be false in astronomy1 would be false in the physiology of our corporeal or intellectual and moral nature1 and in all1 for the same reason2 because the mind is the inquirer in all alike1 and is limited1 by the very constitution of its faculties1 to a certain order of inquiry1 which it must1 in this case of supposed erroneous reasoning1 have transgressed4 ,on these general laws of inquiry1 as relating alike to the investigation of the properties of matter and of mind1 it is my intention to dwell1 for some time1 with full discussion2 for1 though the subject may be less pleasing1 and may require more severe and unremitting attention on your part1 than the greater number of the inquiries which await us1 it is still more important than any of these1 because it is1 in truth1 essential to them all4 ,the season of your life is not that which gathers the harvest2 it is that which prepares the soil1 by diligent cultivation1 for the fruits which are to adorn and enrich it2--or1 to speak without a metaphor1 you do not come here1 that you may make yourselves acquainted1 in a few months1 with all the phenomena of the universe1--as if it were only to look on the motions of the planets in an orrery1 or to learn a few names of substances and qualities1--but that you may acquire those philosophical principles1 which in the course of a long and honourable life1 are to enable you to render yourselves more familiar every day with the works of nature1 and with the sublime plans of its beneficent ,author3--and if without the knowledge of a single word of fact1 in matter or in mind1 it were possible for you to carry away from these walls a clear notion of the objects of inquiry1 and of the plan on which alone investigation can be pursued with advantage1 ,i should conceive1 that you had profited far more1 than if1 with confused notions of the objects and plan of investigation1 you carried with you the power of talking fluently1 of observations1 and experiments1 and hypotheses1 and systems1 and of using1 in their proper places1 all the hardest words of science4 ,i must remark1 however1 that ,i should not have thought it necessary1 thus to direct so much of your attention to the principles of scientific inquiry in general1 if ,i could have taken for granted1 that you had already enjoyed the benefit of the instruction of my illustrious colleague in another ,chair1 whose ,lectures on ,natural ,philosophy1 exemplifying that soundness of inquiry1 which ,i can only recommend1 would1 in that case1 have enlightened you more1 as to the principles of physical investigation1 than any mere rules1 of which it is possible to point out to you the utility and the excellence4 ,all physical science1 whatever may be the variety of objects1 mental or material1 to which it is directed1 is nothing more than the comparison of phenomena1 and the discovery of their agreement or disagreement1 or order of succession4 ,it is on observation1 therefore1 or on consciousness1 which is only another name for internal observation1 that the whole of science is founded2 because there can be no comparison1 without observation of the phenomena compared1 and no discovery of agreement or disagreement1 without comparison4 ,so far1 then1 as man has observed the phenomena of matter or of mind1 so far1 and no farther1 may he infer1 with confidence1 the properties of matter and of mind2 or1 in the words of the great primary aphorism of ,lord ,bacon1 which has been so often quoted1 and so often quoted in vain1 8,homo1 natur minister et interpres1 tantum facit et intelligit1 quantum de natur ordine re vel mente observaverit2 nec amplius scit aut potest40#ba ,what is it that we truly mean1 however1 when we say1 that we are about to inquire into the nature and properties of any substance8 ,the question is a most important one1 and is far from being so simple as it may at first appear4 ,from the mere misunderstanding of the import of this question1 the brightest talents of a long succession of ages1--talents1 which1 with clearer views of this single point1 might have anticipated all the discoveries of our own time1 and introduced us1 perhaps1 to discoveries still more brilliant and astonishing1 were wasted in inquiries as barren as the frivolous glory which attended them1--that produced indeed much contention1 and more pride1 but produced nothing more2 and1 without giving any additional knowledge1 took away from ignorance only its humility1 and its power of being instructed4 ,what is it that we truly have in view1 or should have in view1 when we inquire into the nature of a substance8 ,the material universe1 and all the separate substances which compose it1 may be considered in two lights1--either simply1 as composed of parts that co-exist1 and are to our feelings continuous1 so as to form1 of many separate and independent elements1 one apparent whole2 or of parts that change their relative positions1 constituting1 by this change of place1 all the physical events of the material system of the world2 and inquiry may have reference to a substance in both1 or either of those points of view4 ,what is this body8 may be inquired of us1 when any particular body is pointed out2 and the answer which we give will be very different according to the particular light in which we may have viewed it1 though it must always relate to it in one or other of these two aspects4 ,let us suppose1 for example1 the body1 concerning which the question is put1 to be a piece of glass2 ,i select intentionally a substance which is familiar to you all1 and of which many of you probably have sufficient chemical knowledge to be acquainted with the composition4 ,it may be asked of us1 then1 ,what is the substance termed glass8 and our answer will vary1 as ,i have said1 with the view which we take of it4 ,if we consider it merely as a continuous whole1 our answer will be1 that it is a compound of alkaline and siliceous matter--meaning that particles of alkali and flint co-exist1 and are apparently continuous1 in that mass of which we speak4 ,such is one of the answers which may be given to the question2 and this sort of answer is one which is very commonly given to such questions4 ,it is1 you will perceive1 nothing more than the enumeration of the constituent parts of the substance1 and considers the substance1 simply as it exists alone1 without regard to any other bodies that may exist around it1 or near it1 and without any allusion to change of any kind4 ,this sort of view1 however1 may be altogether reversed2 and1 instead of thinking of the parts that exist together in the substance1 without reference to any changes1 of which it is either the agent or the subject1 we may think only of such changes1 without reference to its constituent parts4 ,in this latter point of view1 we may say1 in answer to the question1 as to the nature of the substance termed glass1 that it is a transparent substance1 which1 according to the general laws of refraction1 bends the light that passes through it variously1 according to the different density of the medium through which the rays have immediately passed before arriving at it1 or of the medium1 through which they are to pass after penetrating it2 that it is a substance fusible at a certain temperature1 not dissolved by the common powerful acids1 but soluble in a particular acid termed the fluoric acid2 that1 when strongly rubbed1 by certain other substances1 it communicates1 for a time1 to various bodies1 the power of attracting or repelling other bodies2 and we may add to our description1 in like manner1 as many other qualities as there are various substances which produce in it any change1 or are in any way changed by it4 ,in all answers of this kind1 you will perceive that regard is uniformly had1 not to the mere substance1 concerning which the question is put1 but also to some other substance with which1 in consequence of some motion of one or other of the bodies1 at the time of the phenomenon of which we speak1 it has changed its relative position2 for1 if all the objects in nature remained constantly at rest1 it is very evident that we could have no notion of any property of matter whatever4 ,in the enumeration of the qualities of glass1 for example1 when we speak of its properties1 we suppose it to have changed1 in every case1 some relative position with the light that passes through it1 the heat that melts it1 the fluoric acid that dissolves it1 and the various bodies that excite in it1 or conduct from it1 electricity2 and all these bodies1 therefore1 we must have in view1 in our enumeration1 as much as the glass itself4 ,as there are only these two different aspects in which matter can be viewed1 all physical inquiry1 with respect to matter1 must1 as ,i have said1 have reference to one of them2 and if we think that we are inquiring further concerning it1 our inquiry is truly without an object1 and we know not what we seek4 ,we may consider it1 simply as it exists in space1 or as it exists in time4 ,any substance1 considered as it exists in space1 is the mere name which ourselves give to the co-existence of a multitude of bodies1 similar in nature1 or dissimilar1 in apparent continuity2 considered as it exists in time1 it is that which is affected by the prior changes of other bodies1 or which itself produces a change of some sort in other bodies4 ,as it exists in space1 therefore1 we inquire into its composition1 or1 in other words1 endeavour to discover what are the elementary bodies that co-exist in the space which it occupies1 and that are all which we truly consider1 when we think that we are considering the compound as one distinct body4 ,as it exists in time1 we inquire into its susceptibilities or its powers1 or1 in other words1 endeavour to trace all the series of prior and subsequent changes1 of which its presence forms an intermediate link4 ,this1 then1 is our meaning1 when we speak of inquiring into the nature of a substance4 ,we have one1 or both of two objects in view1 the discovery of the separate bodies that co-exist in the substance1 or rather that constitute the substance1 which is nothing more than the separate bodies themselves1 or the discovery of that series of changes1 of which the presence of this particular substance1 in some new relative position with respect to other bodies1 forms a part2 the changes which other bodies1 in consequence of this altered relative position1 occasion in it1 with the changes which it occasions in other bodies4 ,on these two different objects of physical investigation1 the co-existing elements of bodies1 and their successions of changes1 it may be of advantage to dwell a little more fully in elucidation of the method which we have to pursue in our own department of physical research2 for1 though it may perhaps at first appear to you1 that to treat of the principles of inquiry1 in the physics of matter1 is to wander from the intellectual and moral speculations which peculiarly concern us2 it is in truth only as they are illustrative of inquiries which we are to pursue in the physiology of the mind1 that ,i am led to make these general remarks4 ,the principles of philosophic investigation are1 as ,i have already said1 common to all the sciences4 ,by acquiring more precise notions of the objects of any one of them1 we can scarcely fail to acquire1 in some degree1 more precision in our notions of every other1 and each science may thus be said to profit indirectly by every additional light that is thrown upon each4 ,it is by this diffusive tendency of its spirit1 almost as much as by its own sublime truths1 and the important applications of these to general physics1 that the study of geometry has been of such inestimable advantage to science4 ,those precise definitions which insure to every word the same exact signification1 in the mind of every one who hears it pronounced1 and that lucid progress in the developement of truth after truth1 which gives1 even to ordinary powers1 almost the same facility of comprehension with the highest genius1 are unquestionably of the utmost benefit to the mathematical student1 while he is prosecuting his particular study1 without any contemplation of other advantages to be reaped from them4 ,but there can be no doubt that they are1 at the same time1 preparing his mind for excellence in other inquiries1 of which he has then no conception2 that he will ever after be less ready to employ1 and be more quicksighted than he would otherwise have been in detecting vague and indefinite phraseology1 and loose and incoherent reasoning2 and that a general spirit of exactness and perspicuity may thus at length be diffused in society1 which will extend its influence1 not to the sciences merely1 but1 in some faint degree1 also to works of elegant literature1 and even to the still lighter graces of conversation itself4 8,the spirit of geometrical inquiry10 says ,fontenelle1 8is not so exclusively attached to geometry1 as to be incapable of being applied to other branches of knowledge4 ,a work of morals1 of politics1 of criticism1 or even of eloquence1 will1 if all other circumstances have been the same1 be the more beautiful1 for having come from the hand of a geometrician4 ,the order1 the clearness1 the precision1 which1 for a considerable time1 have distinguished works of excellence on every subject1 have most probably had their origin in that mathematical turn of thought1 which is now more prevalent than ever1 and which gradually communicates itself even to those who are ignorant of mathematics4 ,it often happens that a single great man gives the tone to the whole age in which he lives2 and we must not forget1 that the individual who has the most legitimate claim to the glory of having introduced and established a new art of reasoning1 was an excellent geometer40#bb ,the philosopher to whom this improvement of the art of reasoning is ascribed1 is evidently ,descartes1 whose claim is certainly much less legitimate than that of our own illustrious countryman2 but the works of ,bacon were not very extensively studied on the continent1 at the time at which ,fontenelle wrote2 while especially in ,france1 the splendid reputation of the great geometer1 who shook1 as much with his own wild hypothesis1 as with the weight of his reasoning1 the almost idolatrous worship of the ,god of the ,schools1 seemed to sweep before it the glory of every other reformer4 ,the instance of ,descartes1 however1 is a still more happy one than his ingenious countryman1 who was himself a ,cartesian1 could have imagined it to be4 ,it is1 indeed1 impossible to conceive a more striking example of that diffusive influence of the general spirit of scientific inquiry1 which ,i wish to illustrate2 since1 in this instance1 it survived the very system by which it was diffused2 all that was sceptical in that mixed system of scepticism and dogmatism which constituted the philosophy of ,descartes1 having long continued1 and even now continuing1 to operate beneficially1 when scarcely a doctrine of his particular philosophy retains its hold4 ,you will not then1 ,i trust1 take for granted1 that precise notions as to the objects of inquiry1 in any science1 even in the department of external physics1 can be so absolutely without benefit to our plans of inquiry into mind1 which must be pursued on the same principles1 if it be pursued with any prospect of success2 and ,i may1 therefore1 safely solicit your attention to a little farther elucidation of the two objects which we have in view1 in general physical inquiry1 whether it be relative to matter or to mind4 ,to inquire into the composition of a substance1 is to consider as one1 many substances1 which have not the less an independent existence1 because they are in immediate proximity to each other4 ,what we term a body1 however minute1 is a multitude of bodies1 or to speak more exactly1 an infinite number of bodies1 which appear limited to us1 indeed1 but may perhaps appear1 in their true character of infinity1 to beings of a higher order1 who may be able to distinguish as infinite1 what our limited senses allow us to perceive only as finite4 ,they are one1 not in nature1 but in our thought2 as one thousand individuals1 that in nature must always be one thousand1 receive a sort of unity that is relative merely to our conception1 when ranked by us as a single regiment1 or as many regiments become one by forming together an army4 ,in the energies of external matter1 the innumerable separate bodies are thus regarded by us as one1 when the space which divides them is not measurable by our imperfect vision1 and as distinct or separate1 when the space can be measured by us4 ,the unity of the aggregate is here no absolute quality of the mass1 but is truly relative to the observer's power of distinguishing the component parts2 the mass being one or many1 as his senses are less or better able to distinguish these4 ,this whole globe of earth1 with its oceans1 and rivers1 and mountains1 and woods1 and with all the separate multitudes of its animated inhabitants1 may seem to some being of another species1 only one continuous and uniform mass2 as the masses1 that seem to us uniform and continuous1 may seem a whole world of separate and varied parts1 to the insect population that swarms upon its surface4 8,a single leaf of a tree10 to borrow an obvious illustration from a ,french writer1 8is a little world inhabited by invisible animals1 to whose senses it appears of immense extent1 who see in it mountains and abysses that are almost immeasurable1 and who1 from one side of the leaf to the other1 hold as little communication with the opposite animalcula1 who have their dwellings there1 as we do with our ,antipodes40#bc ,nothing can appear to our eyes more uniform than a piece of glass2 yet we know1 from its composition1 as a product of art1 that it is a congeries of bodies1 which have no similarity to each other1 and which truly exist separately from each other1 in the compound1 as they existed separately before the composition1 though the lines of space which divide them have now ceased to be visible to our weak organs2 and though1 instead of being composed of alkaline and siliceous matter1 which we know to be different in their qualities1 the beautiful transparent substance1 considered by us1 were1 as far as we know1 simple1 in the chemical sense of the term1 it would still be as truly an aggregate of many bodies1 not dissimilar1 indeed1 as in the former case1 but each similar in qualities to the aggregate itself4 ,the aggregate1 in short1 is1 in every case1 but a name invented by ourselves2 and what we term the constituent elements1 are all that truly exists4 ,to inquire into the composition of a body1 is1 therefore1 only to inquire what these separate bodies are which we have chosen to consider as one1 or rather which are ranked by us as one1 from their apparent continuity4 ,i have dwelt the longer on this point of the unity of an aggregate mass1 as derived from the mind of the observer only1 and not from its constituent bodies1 which are truly separate and independent of each other1 and must always be separate and independent1 whatever changes they may seem to undergo1 in the various processes of composition and decomposition1 because this is one of the most simple1 and1 at the same time1 one of the most convincing examples of a tendency of the mind1 which we shall often have occasion to remark in the course of our intellectual analysis1--the tendency to ascribe to substances without1 as if existing in them like permanent physical qualities1 the relations which ourselves have formed1 by the mere comparison of objects with objects1 and which1 in themselves1 as relations1 are nothing more than modifications of our own mind4 ,it is very difficult for us to believe1 that1 when we speak of a rock1 or a mountain1 or1 perhaps1 still more1 when we speak of a single leaf or blade of grass as one1 we speak of a plurality of independent substances1 which may exist apart1 as they now exist together1 and which have no other unity than in our conception4 ,it is the same with every other species of relation4 ,the tallness of a tree1 the lowness of a shrub or weed1 as these relative terms are used by us in opposition1 do not express any real quality of the tree1 or shrub1 or weed1 but only the fact that our mind has considered them together2 all which they express1 is the mere comparison that is in us1 not any quality in the external objects2 and yet we can scarcely bring ourselves to think1 but that independently of this comparison1 there is some quality1 in the tree1 which corresponds with our notion of tallness1 and some opposite quality in the shrub or weed1 which corresponds with our notion of shortness or lowness2 so that the tree would deserve the name of tall1 though it were the only object in existence1 and the shrub or weed1 in like manner1 the epithet of lowly1 though it alone existed1 without a single object with which it could be compared4 ,these instances1 as ,i have said1 are simple1 but they will not be the less useful1 in preparing your minds for considering the more important natures of relation in general1 that imply1 indeed1 always some actual qualities in the objects themselves1 the perception of which leads us afterwards to consider them as related1 but no actual quality in either of the objects that primarily and directly corresponds with the notion of the relation itself1 as there are qualities of objects that correspond directly with our sensations of warmth or colour1 or any other of the sensations excited immediately by external things4 ,the relation is1 in every sense of the word mental1 not merely as being a feeling of the mind1 for our knowledge of the qualities of external things is1 in this sense1 equally mental2 but1 as having its cause and origin directly in the very nature of the mind itself1 which cannot regard a number of objects1 without forming some comparison1 and investing them consequently with a number of relations4 ,i have already spoken of the intellectual medium1 through which external objects become known to us2 and the metaphor is a just one4 ,the medium1 in this case1 as truly as in the transmission of light1 communicates something of its own to that which it conveys2 and it is as impossible for us to perceive objects long or often together1 without that comparison which instantly invests them with certain relations1 as it would be for us to perceive objects1 for a single moment1 free from the tint of the coloured glass through which we view them4 8,omnes perceptiones10 says ,lord ,bacon1 using a similar figure1 8omnes perceptiones1 tam sensus quam mentis1 sunt ex analogia hominis1 non ex analogia universi2 estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inqualis ad radios rerum1 qui suam naturam natur rerum immiscet1 eamque distorquet et inficit40 ,but1 whatever may be thought of relations in general1 there can be no question1 at least1 as to the nature of that unity which we ascribe to bodies4 ,we have seen1 that the substance1 which1 in thought we regard as one1 is1 in truth1 not one1 but many substances1 to which our thought alone gives unity2 and that all inquiry1 therefore1 with respect to the nature of a substance1 as it exists in space1 is an inquiry into the nature of those separate bodies1 that occupy the space which we assign to the imaginary aggregate4 ,to dissipate this imaginary aggregate of our own creation1 and to show us those separate bodies which occupy its space1 and are all that nature created1 is the great office of the analytic art of ,chemistry1 which does for us only what the microscope does1 that enables us to see the small objects which are before us at all times1 without our being able to distinguish them4 ,when a chemist tells us1 that glass1 which appears to us one uniform substance1 is composed of different substances1 he tells us1 what1 with livelier perceptive organs1 we might have known1 without a single experiment2 since the siliceous matter and the alkali were present to us in every piece of glass1 as much before he told us of their presence1 as after it4 ,the art of analysis1 therefore1 has its origin in the mere imperfection of our senses1 and is truly the art of the blind1 whose wants it is always striving to remedy1 and always discovering sufficient proof of its inability to remedy them4 ,we boast1 indeed1 of the chemical discoveries which we have made of late1 with a rapidity of progress as brilliant1 as it is unexampled in the history of any other science2 and we boast justly1 because we have found1 what the generations of inquirers that have preceded us on our globe1--far from detecting1--had not even ventured to guess4 ,without alluding to the agency of the ,galvanic power1--by which all nature seems to be assuming before us a different aspect--we have seen fixed in the products of our common fires1 and in the drossy rust of metals1 the purest part of that ethereal fluid which we breathe1 and the air itself1 which was so long considered as simple1 ceasing to be an element4 ,yet whatever unsuspected similarities and diversities of composition we may have been able to trace in bodies1 all our discoveries have not created a single new particle of matter4 ,they have only shown these to exist1 where they always existed1 as much before our analysis as after it1--unmarked indeed1 but unmarked1 only because our senses alone were not capable of making the nice discrimination4 ,if man had been able to perceive1 with his mere organs of sense1 the different particles that form together the atmospheric air--if he had at all times seen the portion of these which unites with the fuel that warms him1 enter into this union1 as distinctly as he sees the mass of fuel itself1 which he flings into his furnace1 he could not have thought it a very great intellectual achievement1 to state in words so common and familiar a fact1--the mere well-known change of place of a few well-known particles2 and yet this is what1 in the imperfect state of his perceptive organs1 he so proudly terms his ,theory of ,combustion1 the developement of which was hailed by a wondering world1 and in these circumstances justly hailed by it1 as a scientific era4 ,to beings1 capable of perceiving and distinguishing the different particles1 that form by their aggregation1 those small masses1 which1 after the minutest mechanical division of which we are capable1 appear atoms to us1 the pride which we feel1 in our chemical analyses1 must seem as ludicrous1 as to us would seem the pride of the blind1 if one1 who had never enjoyed the opportunity of beholding the sun1 were to boast of having discovered1 by a nice comparison of the changing temperature of bodies1 that1 during certain hours of the day1 there passed over our earth some great source of heat4 ,the addition of one new sense to us1 who have already the inestimable advantages which vision affords1 might probably1 in a few hours1 communicate more instruction1 with respect to matter1 than all which is ever to repay and consummate the physical labours of mankind1--giving1 perhaps1 to a single glance1 those slow revelations of nature1 which1 one by one1 at intervals of many centuries1 are to immortalize the future sages of our race4 8,all philosophy10 says an acute foreign writer1 8is founded on these two things1--that we have a great deal of curiosity1 and very bad eyes4 ,in astronomy1 for example1 if our eyes were better1 we should then see distinctly1 whether the stars really are1 or are not1 so many suns1 illuminating worlds of their own2 and if1 on the other hand1 we had less curiosity1 we should then care a very little about this knowledge1 which would come pretty nearly to the same thing4 ,but we wish to know more than we see1 and there lies the difficulty4 ,even if we saw well the little which we do see1 this would at least be some small knowledge gained4 ,but we observe it different from what it is2 and thus it happens1 that a true philosopher passes his life1 in not believing what he sees1 and in labouring to guess what is altogether beyond his sight4 ,i cannot help figuring to myself10 continues the same lively writer1 8that nature is a great public spectacle1 which resembles that of the opera4 ,from the place at which we sit in the theatre1 we do not see the stage quite as it is4 ,the scenes and machinery are arranged1 so as to produce a pleasing effect at a distance2 and the weights and pullies1 on which the different movements depend1 are hid from us4 ,we therefore do not trouble our heads with guessing1 how this mechanical part of the performance is carried on4 ,it is perhaps only some mechanician1 concealed amid the crowd of the pit1 who racks his brain about a flight through the air1 which appears to him extraordinary1 and who is seriously bent on discovering by what means it has been executed4 ,this mechanic1 gazing1 and wondering1 and tormenting himself1 in the pit of the opera1 is in a situation very like that of the philosopher in the theatre of the world4 ,but what augments the difficulty to the philosopher1 is1 that1 in the machinery which nature presents1 the cords are completely concealed from him1--so completely indeed1 that the constant puzzle has been to guess1 what that secret contrivance is1 which produces the visible motions in the frame of the universe4 ,let us imagine all the sages collected at an opera1--the ,pythagorases1 ,platos1 ,aristotles1 and all those great names1 which now-a-days make so much noise in our ears4 ,let us suppose1 that they see the flight of ,phaeton1 as he is represented carried off by the winds2 that they cannot perceive the cords to which he is attached2 and that they are quite ignorant of every thing behind the scenes4 ,it is a secret virtue1 says one of them1 that carries off ,phaeton4 ,phaeton1 says another1 is composed of certain numbers1 which cause him to ascend4 ,a third says1 ,phaeton has a certain affection for the top of the stage4 ,he does not feel at his ease1 when he is not there4 ,phaeton1 says a fourth1 is not formed to fly2 but he likes better to fly1 than to leave the top of the stage empty1--and a hundred other absurdities of the kind1 that might have ruined the reputation of antiquity1 if the reputation of antiquity1 for wisdom could have been ruined4 ,at last1 come ,descartes1 and some other moderns1 who say1 ,phaeton ascends1 because he is drawn by cords1 and because a weight1 more heavy than he1 is descending as a counterpoise4 ,accordingly1 we now no longer believe1 that a body will stir1 unless it be drawn or impelled by some other body1 or that it will ascend1 or descend1 unless by the operation of some spring or counterpoise2 and thus to see nature1 such as it really is1 is to see the back of the stage at the opera40#bd ,in this exposition of the phenomena of the universe1 and of those strange 8follies of the wise10 which have been gravely propounded in the systems of philosophers concerning them1 there is much truth1 as well as happy pleasantry4 ,as far1 at least1 as relates to matter1 considered merely as existing in space1--the first of the two lights in which it may be physically viewed1--there can be no question1 that philosophy is nothing more than an endeavour to repair1 by art1 the badness of our eyes1 that we may be able to see what is actually before us at every moment4 ,to be fairly behind the scenes of the great spectacle of nature1 however1 is something more than this4 ,it is not merely to know1 at any one moment1 that there are many objects existing on the stage1 which are invisible where the spectators sit1 but to know them as pieces of machinery1 and to observe them operating in all the wonders of the drama4 ,it is1 in short1 to have that second view of nature1 as existing in time as well as space1 to the consideration of which ,i am to proceed in my next ,lecture4 ,,footnotes3 #ba ,nov4 ,org4 ,aph4 #a4 #bb ,preface aux ,eloges--uvres1 tom4 v4 p4 #h4 #bc ,fontenelle1 ,pluralit des ,mondes1 ,conversat4 #c4 #bd ,fontenelle1 ,pluralit des ,mondes1 ,conversat4 #a4 ,,lecture ,,vi4 ,,the ,,same ,,subject ,,continued4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i considered1 at some length1 the nature of ,physical ,inquiry in general1 and stated to you1 in particular1 the two lights1 in which objects may be physically viewed1 as existing simply in space1 or as existing in time1--the inquiries1 with respect to the one1 having regard to the composition of bodies2 the inquiries1 with respect to the other1 having regard to the changes1 of which they are either the subjects or occasions1 and consequently to their susceptibilities or their powers--their susceptibilities of being affected by other substances1 their powers of affecting other substances4 ,i use the word susceptibility1 you will perceive1 as1 in this case1 synonymous with what ,mr ,locke1 and some other writers1 have denominated passive power1 to avoid the apparent verbal contradiction1 or at least the ambiguity1 which may arise from annexing the term passive to a word1 which is generally employed to signify1 not the subject of change1 but the cause or occasion of change4 ,of these two points of view1 then1 in which an object may be regarded1 when the question is put1 ,what is it8 we have seen1 ,i hope1 sufficiently distinctly1 the nature of one4 ,if1 in answering the question1 we regard the object merely as it exists in space1 and say1 that it is a compound of certain substances1 we mean nothing more1 than that1 in the portion of space1 which we conceive to be occupied by this one imaginary aggregate1 there is truly a plurality of bodies1 which1 though seemingly contiguous1 have an existence1 as separate and independent of each other1 as if they were at the most remote distance2 the one aggregate being nothing more than a name for these separate bodies1 to which ourselves give all the unity which they have1 merely by considering them as one4 ,the necessity of inquiring into the nature of these separate elementary bodies1--which constitutes one of the two great departments of physical investigation1--we found to arise from the imperfection of our senses1 that are not sufficiently acute to discover1 of themselves1 the component parts of the masses1 which nature everywhere presents to us4 ,we are thus obliged to form to ourselves an art of analysis1 merely that we may perceive what is constantly before our eyes1 in the same manner1 as we are obliged to have recourse to the contrivances of the optician1 to perceive stars and planets1 that are incessantly shedding on us their light4 ,there is1 indeed1 something truly worthy of our astonishment1 in the sort of knowledge of the qualities of matter1 which1 with our very imperfect senses1 we are still able to attain4 ,what we conceive ourselves to know is an aggregate of many bodies1 of each of which1 individually1 we may be said1 in the strictest sense of the term1 to be absolutely ignorant2 and yet the aggregate1 which we know1 has no real existence1 but as that very multitude of bodies1 of which we are ignorant4 ,when water was regarded as a simple substance1 every one who looked upon a lake or river1 conceived that he knew as well what the liquid was which flowed in it1 as the chemist1 who now considers it as compound2 and the chemist1 who has learned to regard it as compound1 is perhaps as ignorant of the true nature of the separate bodies that exist in it1 as those who formerly regarded it as simple2 since one additional discovery may prove the very elements1 which he now regards as the ultimate constituents of water1 to be truly compounded of other elements1 still more minute1 and now altogether unknown to him4 ,that our only knowledge of matter should be of a multitude of bodies1 of the nature of each of which1 individually1 we are in absolute ignorance1 may seem1 at first sight1 to justify many of the most extravagant doubts of the sceptic3 and yet there is really no ground for such scepticism1 since1 though the coexisting bodies be separately unknown1 the effect1 which they produce when coexisting in the circumstances observed by us1 is not the less certain and definite2 and it is this joint effect of the whole1 thus certain and definite1 which is the true object of our knowledge2 not the uncertain effect1 which the minuter elements might produce1 if they existed alone4 ,the same aggregates1 whatever their elementary nature may be1 operate on our senses1 as often as they recur1 in the same manner2 the unknown elements which constitute an oak1 or a tower1 or the ivy that clings around it1 exciting in the mind those particular sensations1 to the external causes of which we continue to give the name of oak or tower or ivy2 and exciting these1 as precisely and uniformly1 as if we were acquainted with each minute element of the objects without4 ,our knowledge of nature must in this way1 indeed1 be confined to the mixed effects of the masses which it exhibits2 but it is not on that account less valuable1 nor less sure2 for to the certainty of this limited knowledge all which is necessary is uniformity of the mixed effects1 whatever their unknown coexisting causes may be4 ,it is with masses only1 not with elements that we are concerned1 in all the important purposes of life2 and the provident wisdom of the ,author of ,nature1 therefore1 has in this as in every other case1 adapted our powers to our necessities1--giving to all mankind the knowledge1 that is requisite for the purposes which all mankind must equally have in view1 and leaving to a few philosophic inquirers1 the curiosity of discovering what the substances around us truly are in their elementary state1 and the means of making continual progress1 in this never-ending analysis4 ,such then is the nature of one of the views1 in which physical inquiry may be directed to the discovery of elements1 that are existing together1 at the same moment4 ,but is not this species of inquiry1 it may be asked1 peculiar to matter1 or may it also be extended to mind8 ,it is easy to conceive that1 if matter always have extension1 and therefore necessarily be composed of parts1 an inquiry into its composition may form an important part of physical investigation2 but this sort of inquiry will seem to you altogether inadmissible in the philosophy of mind1 since the mind is not composed of parts that coexist1 but is simple and indivisible4 ,if1 indeed1 the term composition1 in this application of it1 be understood strictly in the same sense as when applied to matter1 it is very evident1 that there can be no inquiry into the composition of thoughts and feelings1 since every thought and feeling is as simple and indivisible as the mind itself2 being1 in truth1 nothing more than the mind itself existing at a certain moment in a certain state2 and yet1 in consequence of some very wonderful laws1 which regulate the successions of our mental phenomena1 the science of mind is1 in all its most important respects1 a science of analysis1 or at least a science which exhibits to our contemplation the same results as if it were strictly analytical2 and we inquire into the separate ideas or other feelings1 involved in one complex thought or emotion1 very nearly as we inquire into the corpuscular elements1 that coexist in one seemingly continuous mass4 ,the nature of this very wonderful application of analysis1 or at least of a process which is virtually the same as analysis1 to a substance1 that is necessarily at all times simple and indivisible1 will1 however1 be better understood by you1 after we have turned our attention to the other general division of physical inquiry1 which is still to be considered by us4 ,i need not ,i hope1 repeat1 after the remarks which ,i made in my last ,lecture1 that1 in leading your thoughts1 for so long a time1 to the subject of general science1 ,i have had constantly in view its application to the phenomena of our own department of it1 and that we are truly learning to study mind with accuracy1 when we are learning what it is1 which is to be studied in the great system of things4 ,there can be no question at least1 that he who has erroneous notions of the objects of physical investigation in the material universe1 will be very likely also to err1 or rather cannot fail to err1 in his notions of the objects of physical investigation1 as it relates to mind4 ,i proceed1 then1 to consider1 what it is which we truly have in view1 when we direct our inquiry1 not to the mere composition of objects existing continuously in space1 but to the succession of changes which they exhibit in time1--to their susceptibility of being affected by other substances1 or their power of affecting other substances4 ,the inquiry1 as you must perceive1 involves the consideration of some words about which a peculiar mystery has been very generally supposed to hang--causation1 power1 connexion of events4 ,but we shall perhaps find that what is supposed so peculiarly mysterious in them1 is not in the very simple notions themselves1 but in the misconceptions of those who have treated of them4 ,it is not in this case1 as in the former department of physical investigation1 the mere imperfection of our senses1 that produces the necessity of inquiry4 ,matter1 as existing in space1 is wholly before us1 and all which is necessary for perfect knowledge of it1 in this respect1 is greater delicacy of our perceptive organs1 that we may distinguish every element of the seemingly continuous mass4 ,to know the mere composition of a substance1 is to know only what is actually present at the very moment1 which we may imagine senses of the highest perfection to be capable of instantly perceiving2 but to know all the susceptibilities and powers of a substance1 the various modes in which it may affect or be affected by every other1 is to know it1 not merely as it exists before us in the particular circumstances of any one moment1 but as it might have existed1 or may exist1 in all possible circumstances of combination1--which our senses1 that are necessarily confined to the circumstances of the present moment1 never could teach us1 even though they were able to distinguish every atom of the minutest mass4 ,if1 indeed1 there were any thing1 in the mere appearance of a body1 which could enable us to predict the changes that would take place in it1 when brought into every possible variety of situation1 with respect to other bodies1 or the changes which it would then produce in those other bodies1 the two views1 into which ,i have divided physical inquiry1 would coincide exactly2 so that to know the continuous elements of any substance1 would be to know1 at the same time1 its susceptibilities and powers4 ,but there is nothing1 in the mere sensible qualities of bodies1 considered separately1 that can give us even the slightest intimation of the changes1 which1 in new circumstances of union1 they might reciprocally suffer or produce4 ,who could infer1 from the similar appearance of a lump of sugar and a lump of calcareous spar1 that the one would be soluble in water1 and the other remain unmelted2 or1 from the different aspect of gunpowder and snow1 that a spark would be extinguished1 if it fell upon the one1 and1 if it fell upon the other1 would excite an explosion that would be almost irresistable8 ,but for experience1 we should be altogether incapable of predicting any such effects1 from either of the objects compared2 or1 if we did know1 that the peculiar susceptibility belonged to one of the two1 and not the other1 we might as readily suppose1 that calcareous spar would melt in water as sugar1 and as readily1 that snow as that gunpowder would detonate1 by the contact of a spark4 ,it is experience alone1 which teaches us that these effects ever take place1 and that they take place1 not in all substances1 but only in some particular substances4 ,it has1 indeed1 been supposed by many ingenious philosophers1 that1 if we were acquainted with what they term the intimate structure of bodies1 we should then see1 not merely what corpuscular changes take place in them1 but why these changes take place in them2 and should thus be able to predict1 before experience1 the effects which they would reciprocally produce4 8,i doubt not10 says ,locke1 8but if we could discover the figure1 size1 texture1 and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies1 we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another1 as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle4 ,did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb1 hemlock1 opium1 and a man2 as a watch-maker does those of a watch1 whereby it performs its operations1 and of a file1 which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels2 we should be able to tell before-hand1 that rhubarb will purge1 hemlock kill1 and opium make a man sleep2 as well as a watch-maker can1 that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going1 till it be removed2 or that1 some small part of it being rubbed by a file1 the machine would quite lose its motion1 and the watch go no more4 ,the dissolving of silver in aquafortis1 and gold in aqua regia1 and not vice versa1 would be then perhaps no more difficult to know1 than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock1 and not the turning of another4 ,but while we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies1 and to give us ideas of the mechanical affections1 we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation2 nor can we be assured about them any farther1 than some few trials we make are able to reach4 ,but whether they will succeed again another time1 we cannot be certain4 ,this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies3 and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact4 8,and therefore ,i am apt to doubt1 that how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things1 scientifical will still be out of our reach2 because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us1 and most under our command4 ,those which we have ranked into classes under names1 and we think ourselves best acquainted with1 we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of4 ,distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have2 but adequate ideas1 ,i suspect1 we have not of any one among them4 ,and though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse1 yet while we want the latter1 we are not capable of scientifical knowledge2 nor shall ever be able to discover general1 instructive1 unquestionable truths concerning them4 ,certainty and demonstration are things we must not1 in these matters1 pretend to4 ,by the colour1 figure1 taste1 and smell1 and other sensible qualities1 we have as clear and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock1 as we have of a circle and a triangle2 but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants1 nor of other bodies which we would apply them to1 we cannot tell what effects they will produce2 nor when we see those effects1 can we so much as guess1 much less know1 their manner of production4 ,thus having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach1 we are ignorant of their constitutions1 powers1 and operations3 and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant1 not knowing so much as their very outward shapes1 or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions40#be ,the fallacy of the reasoning of this very eminent philosopher consists partly1 in the present case1 in a sort of petitio principii1 or1 at least1 a false assumption that is involved in the very phrase mechanical affections1 and in all the mechanical illustrations adduced4 ,if rhubarb purge1 and hemlock kill1 by qualities that can be said to be mechanical1 and if these qualities be ,,permanent1 there can be no question1 that to know accurately the mechanical qualities of these substances1 in relation to the human body1 would be to know1 that rhubarb must purge1 and hemlock kill1 as much as to know the mechanism of a watch would be to know1 that the watch must stop1 if a small part of it were rubbed by a file4 ,but the inquiry is still left1 whether it be thus1 by the mere principles of mechanical action1 that rhubarb and hemlock produce their peculiar effects on the animal system1 and that silver is dissolved in aqua fortis1 and gold in aqua regia2 and1 if there be no reason whatever to suppose this1 we must then surely admit that the prophecy would still be beyond our power1 though we were acquainted with 8the figure1 size1 texture1 and motion1 of the minute constituent parts0 of the different bodies4 ,in the same manner1 as1 in the mechanical division of a substance1 we must still come to other substances capable of further division1 so1 though we could reduce all the changes that appear to be wrought in the great masses around us1 to the changes wrought in their minute parts1 we must still come to certain ultimate changes as inexplicable as those which we see at present4 ,it is as difficult to predict1 without experience1 the motion of one atom to or from another atom1 as the motion of one mass of atoms to or from another mass of atoms4 ,that the globe of the earth should tend towards the sun1 which is at so great a distance from it1 and should thus be every moment arrested within that orbit1 from which1 if there were no such deflecting force1 it would every moment have a tendency to escape by flying off in a straight line1 is1 indeed1 most wonderful4 ,but precisely the same laws which operate on the whole globe of the earth1 operate on every particle of which the earth is composed1--since the earth itself is only these separate particles under another name2 and if it be wonderful that all of these should have a tendency to approach the sun1 it must be equally wonderful1 that each minute constituent particle should tend individually1 though1 to use ,mr ,locke's words1 we were accurately acquainted with the 8figure1 size1 texture1 and motion of each40 ,the same original mystery of gravitation1 then1 would remain1 though our senses enabled us to discover every gravitating particle in the intimate structure of the gravitating mass4 ,by knowing the intimate structure of bodies1 we should indeed1 know what were their elements mutually affected1 but not why these elements were mutually affected1 or were affected in one way rather than in another4 ,the chief error of ,mr ,locke1 in this respect1 evidently consisted1 as ,i have said1 in his assumption of the very thing to be proved1 by taking for granted1 that all the changes of bodies are the effects of their immediate contact and impulse1 and of a kind1 therefore1 which may be termed strictly mechanical1--an assumption1 indeed1 which harmonized with the mathematical chemistry and medicine of the age in which he lived1 but of the justness of which there is not the slightest evidence in the general phenomena1 chemical and nervous1 of which he speaks4 ,if1 instead of confining his attention to the action of bodies in apparent contact1 he had turned his thought to the great distant agencies of nature in the motions of the planetary world1 it is scarcely possible to conceive that he should not have discovered his mistake4 ,in another of his works1 his ,elements of ,natural ,philosophy1 he has stated very justly1 as a consequence of the law of gravitation1 that if the earth were the sole body in the universe1 and at rest1 and the moon were suddenly created at the same distance from the earth as at present1 the earth and the moon would instantly begin to move towards one another in a straight line4 ,what knowledge of the 8figure1 size1 and texture10 of the particles of the earth could have enabled its human inhabitants to predict this instant change8 and if the particles of gold and aqua regia1 and of hemlock1 rhubarb1 and opium1 which1 together with all the other particles of our globe1 would in the case supposed1 instantly begin to move towards the moon1--can thus attract and be attracted1 in gravitation1 with tendencies that are independent of every mechanical affection1 what authority can there be for supposing1 that the chemical and vital agencies of the same particles must be mechanical1 or that the one set of changes could have been predicted a priori1 if the other was confessedly beyond the power of philosophic divination8 ,but even with regard to the mechanical affections of matter themselves1 though all the changes which take place in nature were truly reducible to them1 we should still have ultimately the same difficulty in attempting to predict1 without experience1 the changes that would ensue from them4 ,the mechanical properties are indeed the most familiar to our thought1 because they are those which we are constantly witnessing in the great displays of human power that are most striking to our senses4 ,the house1 the bridge1 the carriage1 the vessel1 every implement which we use1 and the whole wide surface of the cultivated earth1 present to us1 as it were1 one universal trophy of the victories of the great mechanist1 man4 ,we cannot look back to the time when we were ignorant of the mechanical properties of matter2 but still there was a time when they first became known to us1 and became known by experience of the motions that resulted from them4 ,what can be simpler than the phenomena of impulse8 ,that a ball in motion1 when it meets another at rest1 should force this to quit its place1 appears now to be something which it required no skill or experience to predict2 and yet1 though our faculties were1 in every respect1 as vigorous as now1--if we could imagine this most common of all phenomena to be wholly unknown to us1--what reason should we be able to discover in the circumstances that immediately precede the shock1 for inferring the effect that truly results1 rather than any other effect whatever8 ,were the laws of motion previously unknown1 it would be in itself as presumable1 that the moving ball should simply stop when it reached the other1 or that it should merely rebound from it1 as that the quiescent ball should be forced by it to quit its state of rest1 and move forward in the same direction4 ,we know1 indeed1 that the effect is different1 but it is because we have witnessed it that we know it2 not because the laws of motion1 or any of the mechanical affections of matter whatever are qualities that might be inferred independently of observation4 ,experience1 then1 is necessary in every case1 for discovering the mutual tendencies of the elements of bodies1 as much as for determining the reciprocal affections of the masses4 ,but experience teaches us the past only1 not the future1 and the object of physical inquiry is1 not the mere solitary fact of a change which has taken place1 but the similar changes which will continually take place as often as the objects are again in the same circumstances1--not the phenomena only1 but the powers by which the phenomena are produced4 ,why is it1 then1 we believe that continual similarity of the future to the past1 which constitutes1 or at least is implied1 in our notion of power8 ,a stone tends to the earth1--a stone will always tend to the earth1--are not the same proposition2 nor can the first be said to involve the second4 ,it is not to experience1 then1 alone that we must have recourse for the origin of the belief1 but to some other principle1 which converts the simple facts of experience into a general expectation1 or confidence1 that is afterwards to be physically the guide of all our plans and actions4 ,this principle1 since it cannot be derived from experience itself1 which relates only to the past1 must be an original principle of our nature4 ,there is a tendency in the very constitution of the mind from which the expectation arises1--a tendency that1 in every thing which it adds to the mere facts of experience1 may truly be termed instinctive2 for though that term is commonly supposed to imply something peculiarly mysterious1 there is no more real mystery in it than in any of the simplest successions of thought1 which are all1 in like manner1 the results of natural tendency of the mind to exist in certain states1 after existing in certain other states4 ,the belief is1 a state or feeling of the mind as easily conceivable as any other state of it1--a new feeling1 arising in certain circumstances as uniformly as in certain other circumstances4 ,there arise other states or feelings of the mind1 which we never consider as mysterious2 those1 for example1 which we term the sensations of sweetness or of sound4 ,to have our nerves of taste or hearing affected in a certain manner1 is not1 indeed1 to taste or to hear1 but it is immediately afterwards to have those particular sensations2 and this merely because the mind was originally so constituted1 as to exist directly in the one state after existing in the other4 ,to observe1 in like manner1 a series of antecedents and consequents1 is not1 in the very feeling of the moment1 to believe in the future similarity1 but1 in consequence of a similar original tendency1 it is immediately afterwards to believe1 that the same antecedents will invariably be followed by the same consequents4 ,that this belief of the future is a state of mind very different from the mere perception or memory of the past1 from which it flows1 is indeed true2 but what resemblance has sweetness1 as a sensation of the mind1 to the solution of a few particles of sugar on the tongue1--or the harmonies of music1 to the vibration of particles of air8 ,all which we know1 in both cases1 is1 that these successions regularly take place2 and in the regular successions of nature1 which could not1 in one instance more than in another1 have been predicted without experience1 nothing is mysterious1 or every thing is mysterious4 ,it is wonderful1 indeed1--for what is not wonderful8--that any belief should arise as to a future which as yet has no existence2 and which1 therefore1 cannot1 in the strict sense of the word1 be an object of our knowledge4 ,but1 when we consider ,who it was who formed us1 it would1 in truth1 have been more wonderful1 if the mind had been so differently constituted that the belief had not arisen2 because1 in that case1 the phenomena of nature1 however regularly arranged1 would have been arranged in vain1 and that ,almighty ,being1 who1 by enabling us to foresee the physical events that are to arise1 has enabled us to provide for them1 would have left the creatures1 for whom he has been so bounteously provident1 to perish1 ignorant and irresolute1 amid elements that seemed waiting to obey them1--and victims of confusion1 in the very midst of all the harmonies of the universe4 ,mr ,hume1 indeed1 has attempted to show1 that the belief of the similarity of future sequences of events is reducible to the influence of custom1 without the necessity of any intuitive expectation2 but he has completely failed in the reasoning with which he has endeavoured to support this opinion4 ,custom may account for the mere suggestion of one object by another1 as a part of a train of images1 but not for that belief of future realities1 which is a very different state of mind1 and which1 perhaps1 does not follow every such suggestion1 however frequent and habitual4 ,the phenomenon ,a1 a stone has a thousand times fallen to the earth2 the phenomenon ,b1 a stone will always1 in the same circumstances1 fall to the earth2 are propositions that differ as much as the propositions1 ,a1 a stone has once fallen to the earth2 ,b1 a stone will always fall to the earth4 ,at whatever link of the chain we begin1 we must still meet with the same difficulty--the conversion of the past into the future4 ,if it be absurd to make this conversion at one stage of inquiry1 it is just as absurd to make it at any other stage2 and1 as far as our memory extends1 there never was a time at which we did not make the instant conversion1--no period1 however early1 at which we were capable of knowing that a stone had fallen1 and yet believed that1 in exactly the same circumstances1 there was no reason to suppose that it would fall again4 ,but on this particular error of ,mr ,hume1 the very narrow outline1 within which the present sketch is necessarily bounded1 will not permit me to enlarge4 ,i have examined it1 at considerable length1 in the third edition of the ,inquiry which ,i have published on the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect4 ,it is more immediately our present purpose to consider1 ,what it truly is which is the object of inquiry1 when we examine the physical successions of events1 in whatever manner the belief of their similarity of sequence may have arisen8 ,is it the mere series of regular antecedents and consequents themselves8 or1 ,is it any thing more mysterious1 which must be supposed to intervene and connect them by some invisible bondage8 ,we see1 in nature1 one event followed by another4 ,the fall of a spark on gunpowder1 for example1 followed by the deflagration of the gunpowder2 and1 by a peculiar tendency of our constitution1 which we must take for granted1 whatever be our theory of power1 we believe1 that as long as all the circumstances continue the same1 the sequence of events will continue the same2 that the deflagration of gunpowder1 for example1 will be the invariable consequence of the fall of a spark on it2--in other words1 we believe the gunpowder to be susceptible of deflagration on the application of a spark1--and a spark to have the power of deflagrating gunpowder4 ,there is nothing more1 then1 understood in the trains of events1 however regular1 than the regular order of antecedents and consequents which compose the train2 and between which1 if any thing else existed1 it would itself be a part of the train4 ,all that we mean1 when we ascribe to one substance a susceptibility of being affected by another substance1 is1 that a certain change will uniformly take place in it when that other is present2--all that we mean1 in like manner when we ascribe to one substance a power of affecting another substance1 is1 that1 when it is present a certain change will uniformly take place in that other substance4 ,power1 in short1 is significant not of any thing different from the invariable antecedent itself1 but of the mere invariableness of the order of its appearance in reference to some invariable consequent1--the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause1 the invariable consequent an effect4 ,to say1 that water has the power of dissolving salt1 and to say1 that salt will always melt when water is poured upon it1 are to say precisely the same thing2--there is nothing in the one proposition1 which is not exactly1 and to the same extent1 enunciated in the other4 ,it would1 indeed1 be a very different theory of causation1 if1 without taking into account the important circumstance of invariableness or the uniform certainty of being at all times followed by a particular event1 we were to say1 that power is mere antecedence2 for there can be no question1 that phenomena precede other phenomena1 which we never consider as having any permanent relation to them4 ,they are regarded as antecedents1 but not invariable antecedents1 and the reason of this is obvious4 ,innumerable events are constantly taking place together in the immense system of the universe4 ,there must1 therefore1 always be innumerable co-existing series1 the parts of each of which1 though permanently related to each other1 may have no permanent relation to the parts of the other series2 and one event of one series1 may thus precede1 not its own effect merely1 which is to be its constant and uniform attendant1 in all similar circumstances1 but the events also of other co-existing series1 which may never occur with it again at the same moment4 ,there is no superstition in believing that an eclipse may be followed by a pestilence1 or an unpleasant dream by some unforeseen calamity of the day1 though there would be much superstition in believing1 that these antecedents and consequents had any permanent relation to each other4 ,in ordinary and familiar cases1 at least1 every one knows sufficiently the distinction of what is thus casual only1 and what is invariable in the order of nature4 ,yet it is only by losing all sight of a distinction so very obvious1 and confounding invariable with casual consequences1 that ,dr ,reid1 and other eminent philosophers1 have been led into much laborious argumentation1 in the confidence of confuting one of the simplest and justest of metaphysical opinions4 ,to prove that power is more than invariable antecedence1 they prove that it is more than casual antecedence1 and that events do not follow each other1 loosely and confusedly1 as if antecedents could be invariable1 which had not consequents as invariable1 or1 as if an uniform series were not merely another name for a number of uniform antecedents and consequents4 ,a cause is1 perhaps1 not that which has merely once preceded an event2 but we give the name to that which has always been followed by a certain event1 is followed by a certain event1 and according to our belief1 will continue to be in future followed by that event1 as its immediate consequent2 and causation1 power1 or any other synonymous words which we may use1 express nothing more than this permanent relation of that which has preceded to that which has followed4 ,if this invariableness of succession1 past1 present1 and future1 be not that which constitutes one event the effect of another1 ,dr ,reid1 at least1 has not pointed out any additional circumstance which we must combine with it1 in our definition of an effect1 though he has shown1 indeed1 with most abundant evidence1 if any evidence at all were necessary1 that the antecedents and consequents are not the same2 that we use active and passive verbs1 in different senses1 applying1 as might well be supposed1 the one to the antecedent1 the other to the consequent2 that we speak of effects and causes as if truly different1 since it is unquestionably not the same thing to follow uniformly a certain change1 and to precede uniformly a certain change1 and that we never think of giving those names where we do not conceive that there is some permanent relation4 ,but1 though these distinctions might be allowed to have irresistible weight1 in opposition to the scepticism1 if such extravagant scepticism there ever were1 which affirmed the sequences of events to be altogether casual and irregular1 they are surely of no weight against that simple definition of power1 which affirms it to consist in the probability of the invariable sequence4 of some event as its immediate consequent2 since this very regularity of the sequences1 which is supposed by the definition1 must1 of itself1 have given occasion to all those distinctions of thought and language which ,dr ,reid has adduced4 ,that one event should invariably be followed by another event1 is indeed1 it will be allowed1 as every thing in nature is1 most wonderful1 and can be ascribed only to the infinite source of every thing wonderful and sublime2 the will of that divine ,being1 who gave the universe its laws1 and who formed these with a most beneficent arrangement for the happiness of his creatures1 who1 without a belief in the uniformity of these laws1 to direct their conduct1 could not have known how to preserve even their animal existence4 ,but the uniformity of succession is surely not rendered less wonderful1 by a mere change of name4 ,it is the same unaltered wonder still1 when we ascribe the term power to the prior of two events1 as when we ascribe to it the exactly synonymous phrase invariableness of antecedence2 each of these terms implying nothing more than that the one event cannot take place without being immediately followed by the other4 ,the permanence and uniformity of the relation are the essential circumstances4 ,to be that which cannot exist1 without being instantly followed by a certain event1 is to be the cause of the event1 as a correlative effect4 ,it is impossible for us to believe1 that the invariable antecedent is any thing but the cause1 or the cause any thing but the invariable antecedent2 as it is impossible for us to believe that homo is the ,latin synonime of man1 and yet that man is not the ,english synonime of homo4 ,to know the powers of nature1 is1 then1 nothing more than to know what antecedents are and will be invariable1 followed by what consequents2 for this invariableness1 and not any distinct existence1 is all which the shorter term power1 in any case1 expresses2 and this1 and this alone1 is the true object of physical inquiry1 in that second point of view1 in which we have considered it1 as directed to the successions of events4 ,whenever1 therefore1 the question is put1 as to any object1 ,what is it8 there are two answers1 and only two answers1 that can be given with meaning4 ,we may regard it as it exists in space1 and state the elements that co-exist in it1 or rather that constitute it2 or we may regard it1 as it exists in time1 and state1 in all the series of changes1 of which it forms an invariable part1 the objects to which it is related as antecedent or consequent4 ,to combine these two views of nature1 as it exists in space and time1 and to know1 with perfect accuracy1 every element of every aggregate1 and every series of changes1 of which each forms1 or can form1 a part1 would be to know every thing which can be physically known of the universe4 ,to extend our mere physical inquiry still farther into the phenomena of nature1 after this perfect knowledge1 would be to suppose erroneously1 that1 in the compounds before us1 of which we know every element1 there is some element1 not yet discovered1 or1 in the well-known successions of events1 some antecedent or consequent as yet unobserved2 or it would be to inquire without any real object of inquiry1--a sort of investigation1 which1 for two thousand years1 was almost the sole employment of the subtile and the studious1 and which is far from having perished1 with those venerable follies of the schools1 at which we know so well how to smile1 even while we are imitating them1 perhaps1 with similar errors of our own4 ,i cannot but think1 for example1 that1 on this very subject of the connexion of events1 the prevalent notions and doctrines1 even of very eminent philosophers1 are not far advanced beyond the verbal complexity of the four causes of which ,aristotle treats1 the material1 the formal1 the efficient1 and the final2 or ,plato's five causes1 which ,seneca1 in one of his ,epistles1 briefly defines the id ex quo1 the id a quo1 the id quo1 the id ad quod1 and the id propter quod1#bf and though there were no other evidence than this one subject affords1 it would still1 ,i fear1 prove sufficiently1 that1 with all our manifest improvements in our plans of philosophical investigation1 and all the splendid discoveries to which these improvements have led1 we have not wholly lost that great art1 which1 for so long a time1 supplied the place of the whole art of philosophizing--the art of inquiring assiduously1 without knowing what we are inquiring about4 ,it is an art1 indeed1 which1 there is too much reason to suppose1 will accompany philosophy1 though always1 it is to be hoped1 in less and less proportion1 during the whole course of its progress4 ,there will forever be points1 on which those will reason ill1 who may yet reason1 with perfect accuracy1 on other matters4 ,with all those sublime discoveries of modern times1 which do us so much honour1 and with that improved art of discovery1 which is still more valuable to us than the discoveries produced by it1 we must not flatter ourselves with exemption from the errors of darker ages--of ages truly worthy of the name of dark1 but to which we perhaps give the name1 with more readiness1 because it seems to imply1 that our own is an age of light4 ,our real comfort1 in comparing ourselves with the irrefragable and subtile doctors of other times1 is not that we do not sometimes reason as indefatigably ill as they1 and without knowing what we are truly reasoning about1 but that we do this much less frequently1 and are continually lessening the number of cases1 in which we reason as ill1 and increasing1 in proportion1 the number of cases1 in which we reason better1 and do truly know1 what objects we are seeking4 ,of all the cases1 however1 in which it is of importance1 that the mind should have precise notions of its objects of inquiry1 the most important are those which relate to the subject at present considered by us2 because the nature of power1 in the relation which it is impossible for us not to feel of events1 as reciprocally effects and causes1 must enter1 in a great measure1 into every inquiry which we are capable of making1 as to the successive phenomena1 either of matter or of mind4 ,it is of so much importance1 therefore1 to our future inquiries1 that you should know what this universal and paramount relation is1 that ,i have dwelt on it at a length1 which ,i fear must have already exhausted your patience2 since it is a discussion1 ,i must confess1 which requires considerable effort of attention2 and which has nothing1 ,i must also confess1 to recommend it1 but its dry utility4 ,i trust1 however1 that you are too well acquainted with the nature of science1 not to know1 that it is its utility which is its primary recommendation2 and that you are too desirous of advancing in it1 not to disregard the occasional ruggedness of a road1 which is far from being always rugged4 ,it may be allowed to him1 who walks only for the pleasure of the moment1 to turn away from every path1 in which he has not flowers and verdure beneath his feet1 and beauty wherever he looks around4 ,but what should we have thought of the competitor of the ,olympic course1 whose object was the glory of a prize1 contested by the proudest of his contemporary heroes1 if1 with that illustrious reward before him1--with strength and agility that might ensure him the possession of it1--and with all the assembled multitudes of ,greece to witness his triumph1 he had turned away1 from the contest1 and the victory1 because he was not to tread on softness1 and to be refreshed with fragrance1 as he moved along6 ,in that knowledge which awaits your studies1 in the various sciences to which your attention may be turned1 you have a much nobler prize before you2 and1 therefore1 ,i shall not hesitate to call forth occasionally all the vigour of your attention1 at the risk of a little temporary fatigue1 as often as it shall appear to me1 that1 by exciting you to more than ordinary intellectual activity1 ,i can facilitate your acquisition of a reward1 which the listless exertions of the indolent never can obtain1 and which is as truly the prize of strenuous effort1 as the ,palms of the ,circus or the ,course4 ,,footnotes3 #be ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 book iv4 c4 #c4 sec4 #be1 #bf4 #bf ,epist4 #fe4 ,,lecture ,,vii4 ,,on ,,power1 ,,cause1 ,,and ,,effect4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was chiefly employed in examining what it is1 which is the real object of inquiry1 when we consider the phenomena of nature as successive2 and we found1 that1 by an original principle of our constitution1 we are led1 from the mere observation of change1 to believe1 that1 when similar circumstances recur1 the changes1 which we observed1 will also recur in the same order1--that there is hence conceived by us to be a permanent relation of one event1 as invariably antecedent1 to another event1 as invariably consequent1--and that this permanent relation is all which constitutes power4 ,it is a word1 indeed1 of much seeming mystery2 but all which is supposed to be mysterious and perplexing in it vanishes1 when it is regarded in its true light as only a short general term1 expressive of invariable antecedence1 or1 in other words1 of that1 which cannot exist in certain circumstances1 without being immediately followed by a certain definite event1 which we denominate an effect1 in reference to the antecedent1 which we denominate a cause4 ,to express1 shortly1 what appears to me to be the only intelligible meaning of the three most important words in physics1 immediate invariable antecedence1 is power1--the immediate invariable antecedent1 in any sequence1 is a cause1--the immediate invariable consequent is the correlative effect4 ,the object of philosophic inquiry1 then1 in that second department of it1 which we considered with respect to the phenomena of nature as successive1 we have found not to be any thing different from the phenomena themselves1 but to be those very phenomena1 as preceding or following1 in certain regular series4 ,power is not any thing that can exist separately from a substance1 but is merely the substance itself1 considered in relation to another substance1--in the same manner1 as what we denominate form1 is not any thing separate from the elementary atoms of a mass1 but is merely the relation of a number of atoms1 as co-existing in apparent contact4 ,the sculptor at every stroke of his chisel1 alters the form of the block of marble on which he works1 not by communicating to it any new qualities1 but merely by separating from it a number of the corpuscles1 which were formerly included by us1 in our conception of the continuous whole2 and when he has given the last delicate touches that finish the ,jupiter1 or the ,venus1 or ,apollo1 the divine form which we admire1 as if it had assumed a new existence beneath the artist's hand1 is still in itself unaltered1--the same quiescent mass1 that slumbered for ages in the quarry of which it was a part4 ,quale fusc marmor in ,afric ,solo recisum1 sumere idoneum ,quoscunque vultus1 seu ,diana ,seu ,cythera magis placebit2 ,informis1 ater1 sub pedibus jacet1 ,donec politus ,phidiaca manu ,formosa tandem destinat ,induitur lapis ora div4 ,jam1 jamque poni duritiem placens1 ,et nunc ocelli1 et gratia mollium ,spirat genarum1 nunc labella et ,per nivium coma sparsa collum4 ,the form of bodies is the relation of their elements to each other in space1--the power of bodies is their relation to each other in time2 and both form and power1 if considered separately from the number of elementary corpuscles1 and from the changes that arise successively1 are equally abstractions of the mind1 and nothing more4 ,in a former ,lecture1 ,i alluded to the influence of errors with respect to the nature of abstraction1 as one of the principal causes that retard the progress of philosophy4 ,we give a name to some common quality of many substances2 and we then suppose1 that there is in it something real1 because we have given it a name1 and strive to discover1 what that is in itself1 which1 in itself1 has no existence4 ,the example1 which ,i used at that time1 was the very striking one1 of the genera1 and species1 and the whole classes of ascending and descending universals of the schools4 ,i might have found an example1 as striking1 in those abstractions of form and power1 which we are now considering1--abstractions1 that have exercised an influence on philosophy1 as injurious as the whole series of universals in ,porphyry's memorable tree1 and one of which1 at least1 still continues to exercise the same injurious influence1 when the tree of ,porphyry has been long disregarded1 and almost forgotten4 ,in the philosophy of ,aristotle1 form1 which all now readily allow to be a mere abstraction of the mind1 when considered separately from the figured substance1 was regarded as something equally real with matter itself2 and indeed1 matter1 which was supposed to derive from form all its qualities1 was rather the less important of the two4 ,of substantial forms1 however1 long so omnipotent1 we now hear1 only in those works which record the errors of other ages1 as a part of the history of the fallible being1 man1 or in those higher works of playful ridicule1 which convert our very follies into a source of amusement1 and find abundant materials1 therefore1 in what was once the wisdom of the past4 ,cramb1 the young companion of ,martinus ,scribblerus1 we are told1 8regretted extremely1 that substantial forms1 a race of harmless beings1 which had lasted for many years1 and afforded a comfortable subsistence to many poor philosophers1 should be now hunted down like so many wolves1 without the possibility of a retreat4 ,he considered that it had gone much harder with them1 than with essences1 which had retired from the schools1 into the apothecaries' shops1 where some of them had been advanced into the degree of quintessences4 ,he thought there should be a retreat for poor substantial forms among the ,gentlemen ,ushers at ,court1 and that there were indeed substantial forms1 such as forms of ,prayer and forms of ,government1 without which the things themselves could never long subsist40#bg ,the subject of this pleasantry is1 indeed1 it must be owned1 so absurd in itself1 as scarcely to require the aid of wit1 to render it ridiculous2 and yet this more than poetic personification of the mere figure of a body1 as itself a separate unity1 which appears to us too absurd almost to be feigned as an object of philosophic belief1 even to such a mind as that of ,cramb1 was what1 for age after age1 seemed to the most intelligent philosophers a complete explanation of all the wonders of the universe2 and substantial forms1 far from needing a retreat among ,gentlemen ,ushers at ,court1 had their place of highest honours amid ,doctors and ,disputants1 in every ,school and ,college1 where1 though they certainly could not give science1 they at least served the temporary purpose of rendering the want of it unfelt1 and of giving all the dignity which science itself could have bestowed4 ,the vague and obscure notions1 at present attached to the words power1 cause1 effect1 appear to me very analogous to the notions of the ,peripatetics1 and1 indeed1 of the greater number of the ancient philosophers1 with respect to form2 and1 ,i trust that as we have now universally learned to consider form1 as nothing in itself1 but only as the relation of bodies co-existing immediately in space1 so power will at length be as universally considered as only the relation which substances bear to each other in time1 according as their phenomena are immediately successive2 the invariable antecedent being the cause1 the invariable consequent the effect2 and the antecedent and consequent being all that are present in any phenomenon4 ,there are1 in nature1 only substances2 and all the substances in nature1 are every thing that truly exists in nature4 ,there is1 therefore1 no additional power1 separate1 or different from the antecedent itself1 more than there is form1 separate or different from the figured mass1 or any other quality1 without a substance4 ,in the beautiful experiment of the prismatic decomposition of light1 for example1 the refracting power of the prism is not any thing separate or separable from it1 more than its weight or transparency of colour4 ,there are not a prism and transparency1 but there is a prism giving passage to light4 ,in like manner1 there are not a prism1 and refracting power1 and coloured rays1 but there are a prism and rays of various colours1 which we have perceived to be deflected variously from their original line of direction1 when they approach and quit the lens1 and which we believe1 will1 in the same circumstances1 continually exhibit the same tendency4 ,it is the mere regularity of the successions of events1 not any additional and more mysterious circumstance1 which power may be supposed to denote1 that gives the whole value to our physical knowledge4 ,it is of importance for us to know1 what antecedents truly precede what consequents2 since we can thus provide for that future1 which we are hence enabled to foresee1 and can1 in a great measure1 modify1 and almost create1 the future to ourselves1 by arranging the objects over which we have command1 in such a manner1 as to form with them the antecedents1 which we know to be invariably followed by the consequents desired by us4 ,it is thus we are able to exercise that command over nature1 which ,he1 who is its only real ,sovereign1 has designed1 in the magnificence of ,his bounty1 to confer on us1 together with the still greater privilege of knowing that ,omnipotence to which all our delegated empire is so humbly subordinate4 ,it is a command which can be exercised by us1 only as beings1 who1 according to one of the definitions that have been given of man1 look both before and behind2 or1 in the words of ,cicero1 who join and connect the future with the present1 seeing things1 not in their progress merely1 but in the circumstances that precede them1 and the circumstances that follow them1 and being thus enabled to provide and arrange whatever is necessary for that life1 of which the whole course lies open before us4 8,homo autem 7quod rationis est particeps1 per quam consequentia cernit1 causas rerum videt1 earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat1 similitudines comparat1 et rebus prsentibus adjungit atque annectit futuras7 facile totius vit cursum videt1 ad eamque degendam prparat res necessarias40#bh ,that power is nothing more than the relation of one object or event as antecedent to another object or event1 though its immediate and invariable consequent1 may1 perhaps1 from the influence of former habits of thought1 or rather1 of former abuse of language1 at first appear to you an unwarrantable simplification2 for1 though you may never have clearly conceived1 in power1 any thing more than the immediate sequence of a certain change or event1 as its uniform attendant1 the mere habit of attaching to it many phrases of mystery1 may1 very naturally1 lead you to conceive1 that1 in itself1 independently of these phrases1 there must be something peculiarly mysterious4 ,but the longer you attend to the notion1 the more clearly will you perceive1 that all which you have ever understood in it1 is the immediate sequence of some change with the certainty of the future recurrence of this effect1 as often as the antecedent itself may recur in similar circumstances4 ,to take an example1 which ,i have already repeatedly employed1 when a spark falls upon gunpowder1 and kindles it into explosion1 every one ascribes to the spark the power of kindling the inflammable mass4 ,but let any one ask himself1 what it is which he means by the term1 and1 without contenting himself with a few phrases that signify nothing1 reflect1 before he give his answer1 and he will find1 that he means nothing more than that1 in all similar circumstances1 the explosion of gunpowder will be the immediate and uniform consequence of the application of a spark4 ,to take an example more immediately connected with our own science1 we all know1 that as soon as any one1 in the usual circumstances of health and freedom1 wills to move his arm1 the motion of his arm follows2 and we all believe1 that1 in the same circumstance of health1 and in the same freedom from external restraint1 the same will to move the arm1 will be constantly followed by the same motion4 ,if we knew and believed nothing more1 than that this motion of the arm would uniformly follow the will to move it1 would our knowledge of this particular phenomenon be less perfect1 than at present1 and should we learn any thing new1 by being told1 that the will would not merely be invariably followed by the motion of the arm1 but that the will would also have the power of moving the arm2 or would not the power of moving the arm be precisely the same thing1 as the invariable sequence of the motion of the arm1 when the will was immediately antecedent8 ,this test of identity1 as ,i have said in my ,essay on the subject1 appears to me to be a most accurate one4 ,when a proposition is true1 and yet communicates no additional information1 it must be of exactly the same import1 as some other proposition1 formerly understood and admitted4 ,let us suppose ourselves1 then1 to know all the antecedents and consequents in nature1 and to believe1 not merely that they have once or repeatedly existed in succession1 but that they have uniformly done so1 and will continue forever to recur in similar series1 so that1 but for the intervention of the ,divine will1 which would be itself1 in that case1 a new antecedent1 it will be absolutely impossible for any one of the antecedents to exist again1 in similar circumstances1 without being instantly followed by its original consequent4 ,if an effect be something more than what invariably follows a particular antecedent1 we might1 on the present supposition1 know every invariable consequent of every antecedent1 so as to be able to predict1 in their minutest circumstance1 what events would forever follow every other event1 and yet have no conception of power or causation4 ,we might know1 that the flame of a candle1 if we hold our hand over it1 would be instantly followed by pain and burning of the hand1--that1 if we ate or drank a certain quantity1 our hunger and thirst would cease3--we might even build houses for shelter1 sow and plant for sustenance1 form legislative enactments for the prevention or punishment of vice1 and bestow rewards for the encouragement of virtue2--in short1 we might do1 as individuals and citizens1 whatever we do at this moment1 and with exactly the same views1 and yet1 7on the supposition that power is something different from that invariable antecedence which alone we are supposed to know17 we might with all this unerring knowledge of the future1 and undoubting confidence in the results which it was to present1 have no knowledge of a single power in nature1 or of a single cause or effect4 ,to him who had previously kindled a fire1 and placed on it a vessel full of water1 with the certainty that the water1 in that situation1 would speedily become hot1 what additional information would be given1 by telling him that the fire had the power of boiling water1 that it was the cause of the boiling1 and the boiling its effect8 ,and1 if no additional information would in this case be given1 then1 according to the test of this identity of propositions1 before stated1 to know events as invariably antecedent and consequent1 is to know them as causes and effects2 and to know all the powers of every substance therefore1 would be only to know what changes or events would1 in all possible circumstances1 ensue1 when preceded by certain other changes or events4 ,it is only by confounding casual with uniform and invariable antecedence1 that power can be conceived1 to be something different from antecedence4 ,it certainly is something very different from the priority of a single moment2 but it is impossible to form any conception of it whatever1 except merely as that which is constantly followed by a certain effect4 ,such is the simple1 and1 as it appears to me1 the only intelligible view of power1 as discoverable in the successive phenomena of nature4 ,and yet1 how different from this simple view is the common1 or1 ,i may almost say1 the universal notion of the agencies1 which are supposed to be concerned in the phenomena that are the objects of philosophic inquiry4 ,it is the detection of the powers of nature1 to which such inquiry is supposed to lead1--but not of powers1 in the sense in which alone that phrase is intelligible1 as signifying the objects themselves which uniformly precede certain changes4 ,the powers which our investigation is to detect1 or which1 at least1 in all the phenomena that come under our observation1 we are to consider as the sole efficient1 though invisible producers of them1 are conceived by us to be something far more mysterious1--something that is no part of the antecedent1 and yet is a part of it1--or that intervenes between each antecedent and consequent1 without being itself any thing intermediate1--as if it were possible that any thing could intervene in a series1 without instantly becoming itself a part of the series1--a new link in the lengthened chain1--the consequent of the former antecedent1 and the antecedent of the former consequent4 ,to me1 indeed1 it appears so very obvious a truth1 that the substances which exist in nature--the world1 its living inhabitants1 and the adorable ,being who created them1--are all the real existences in nature1 and that1 in the various changes which occur1 therefore1 there can as little be any powers or susceptibilities different from the antecedents and consequents themselves1 as there can be forms different from the co-existing particles which constitute them1--that to labour thus to impress this truth upon your minds1 seems to me almost like an attempt to demonstrate a self-evident proposition4 ,an illusion1 however1 so universal1 as that which supposes the powers of nature1 to be something more1 than the mere series of antecedents themselves1 is not rashly1 or without very full inquiry1 to be considered as an illusion2 and1 at any rate1 in the case of a mistake1 so prevalent and so important in its consequences1 it cannot be uninteresting1 to inquire into the circumstances1 that appear most probably to have led to it4 ,indeed the more false1 and the more obviously false the illusion is1 the more must it deserve our inquiry1 what those circumstances have been which have so long obtained for it the assent1 not of common understanding merely1 but of the quick-sighted and the subtile4 ,for a full view of my opinions on this subject1 ,i must refer you to the work which ,i have published on the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect2 and the short abstract of them which ,i now offer1 as it would be superfluous for those who have read and understood that work1 is chiefly for the sake of those who may not have had an opportunity of perusing the volume itself4 ,one source of the general fallacy unquestionably is that influence of abstraction1 to which ,i before alluded1 as aided1 and in a great measure perpetuated1 by the use of language1 and the common unavoidable modes of grammatical construction4 ,we speak of the powers of a substance1 of substances that have certain power--of the figure of a body1 or of bodies that have a certain figure1 in the same manner as we speak of the students of a university1 or of a house that has a great number of lodgers2 and we thus learn to consider the power1 which a substance possesses1 as something different from the substance itself1 inherent in it indeed1 but inherent1 as something that may yet subsist separately4 ,in the ancient philosophy1 this error extended to the notions both of form and power4 ,in the case of form1 however1 we have seen1 that the illusion1 though it lasted for many ages1 did at length cease1 and that no one now regards the figure of a body1 as any thing but the body itself4 ,it is probable that the illusion1 with respect to power1 as something different from the substance that is said to possess it1 would1 in like manner1 have ceased1 and given place to juster views1 if it had not been for the cause1 which ,i am next to consider4 ,this cause is the imperfection of our senses1 the same cause which1 in the other department of physics before examined by us1--the department1 that relates to matter considered merely as existing in space1--we find to give occasion to all our inquiries into the compositions of bodies4 ,in this department of physics1 however1 which relates to the successions of phenomena in time1 the imperfection of our senses operates in a different way4 ,it is not that which gives occasion to the necessity of inquiry2 for we have seen1 that senses1 of the utmost accuracy and delicacy1 could not1 of themselves1 and without experience1 have enabled us to predict any one event1 in the innumerable series of phenomena that are constantly taking place around us4 ,but1 though senses of the nicest discrimination could not have rendered inquiry into the successions of events superfluous1 they would have saved us from much idle inquiry1 and have given far greater precision1 if not to our rules1 at least to our uniform practice1 of philosophizing4 ,as our senses are at present constituted1 they are too imperfect1 to enable us to distinguish all the elements1 that co-exist in bodies1 and of elements1 which are themselves unknown to us1 the minute changes which take place in them1 must of course be unknown4 ,we are hence1 from our incapacity of discovering these elements by our imperfect senses1 and imperfect analysis1 incapable of distinguishing the whole series of external changes that occur in them1--the whole progressive series of antecedents and consequents in a phenomenon that appears to our senses simple2 and1 since it is only between immediate antecedents and consequents1 that we suppose any permanent and invariable relation1 we are therefore constantly on the watch1 to detect1 in the more obvious changes that appear to us in nature1 some of those minuter elementary changes1 which we suspect to intervene4 ,these minute invisible changes1 when actually intervening1 are truly what connect the obvious antecedents with the obvious consequents2 and the innumerable discoveries1 which we are constantly making of these1 lead us habitually to suppose1 that1 amid all the visible changes perceived by us1 there is something latent which links them together4 ,he who for the first time listens to the delightful sounds of a violin1 if he be ignorant of the theory of sound1 will very naturally suppose that the touch of the strings by the bow is the cause of the melody which he hears4 ,he learns1 however1 that this primary impulse would be of little effect1 were it not for the vibrations excited by it in the violin itself2 and another discovery1 still more important1 shews him that the vibration of the instrument would be of no effect1 if it were not for the elastic medium1 interposed1 between his ear and it4 ,it is no longer to the violin1 therefore1 that he looks1 as the direct cause of the sensation of sound1 but to the vibrating air2 nor will even this be long considered by him as the cause1 if he turns his attention to the structure of the organ of hearing4 ,he will then trace effect after effect1 through a long series of complex and very wonderful parts1 till he arrive at the auditory nerve1 and the whole mass of the brain1--in some unknown state of which he is at length forced to rest1 as the cause or immediate antecedent1 of that affection of the mind1 which constitutes the particular sensation4 ,to inquire into the latent causes of events is thus to endeavour to observe changes which we suppose to be actually taking place before us unobserved1 very nearly in the same manner1 as to inquire into the composition of a substance is to strive to discover the bodies that are constantly before us1 without our being able to distinguish them4 ,it is quite impossible1 that this constant search1 and frequent detection of causes1 before unknown1 thus found to intervene between all the phenomena observed by us1 should not1 by the influence of the common principles of our mental constitution1 at length associate1 almost indissolubly1 with the very notion of changes as perceived by us1 the notion of something intermediate1 that as yet lies hid from our search1 and connects the parts of the series which we at present perceive4 ,this latent something1 supposed to intervene between the observed antecedent and the observed consequent1 being the more immediate antecedent of the change which we observe1 is of course regarded by us as the true cause of the change1 while the antecedent actually observed by us1 and known1 ceases1 for the same reason1 to be regarded as the cause1 and a cause is hence supposed by us1 to be something very mysterious2 since we give the name1 in our imagination1 to something of the nature of which we must be absolutely ignorant1 as we are1 by supposition1 ignorant of its very existence4 ,the parts of a series of changes1 which we truly observe1 are regarded by us as little more than signs of other intervening changes as yet undetected2 and our thought is thus constantly turned from the known to the unknown1 as often as we think of discovering a cause4 ,the expectation of discovering something intermediate and unknown between all known events1 it thus appears1 is very readily convertible into the common notion of power1 as a secret and invisible tie4 ,why does it do this8 or1 ,how does it produce this effect8 is the question which we are constantly disposed to put1 when we are told of any change which one substance occasions in another2 and the common answer1 in all such cases1 is nothing more than the statement of some intervening object1 or event1 supposed to be unknown to the asker1 but as truly a mere antecedent in the sequence1 as the more obvious antecedent which he is supposed to know4 ,how is it that we see objects at a distance--a tower1 for example1 on the summit of a hill1 on the opposite side of a river8 ,because rays of light are reflected from the tower to the eye4 ,the new antecedent appears to us a very intelligible reason4 ,and why do rays of light1 that fall in confusion from every body1 within our sphere of vision1 on every point of the surface of the eye1--from the wood1 the rock1 the bridge1 the river1 as well as the tower1--give distinct impressions of all these different objects8 ,because the eye is formed of such refracting power1 that the rays of light1 which fall confusedly on its surface1 converge within it1 and form distinct images of the objects from which they come1 on that part of the eye which is an expansion of the nerve of sight4 ,again we are told only of intervening events before unknown to us2 and again we consider the mere knowledge of these new antecedents as a very intelligible explanation of the event which we knew before4 ,this constant statement of something intermediate1 that is supposed to be unknown to us1 as the cause of the phenomena which we perceive1 whenever we ask1 how or why they take place8 continually strengthens the illusion1 which leads us to regard the powers of objects as something different from the perceived objects themselves2--and yet it is evident1 that to state intervening changes1 is only to state other antecedents1--not any thing different from mere antecedence1--and that whatever number of these intervening changes we may discover between the antecedent and the consequent1 which we at present know1 we must at length come to some ultimate change1 which is truly and immediately antecedent to the known effect4 ,we may say1 that an orator1 when he declaims1 excites the sensation of sound1 because the motion of his vocal organs excites vibrations in the intervening air1--that these vibrations of air are the cause of the sound1 by communicating vibration to parts of the ear1 and that the vibrations of these parts of the ear are the cause of the sound1 by affecting in a particular manner the nerve of hearing1 and the brain in general2--but1 when we come to the ultimate affection of the sensorial organ1 which immediately precedes the sensation of the mind1 it is evident1 that we cannot say of it1 that it is the cause of the sound1 by exciting any thing intermediate1 since it then could not itself be that by which the sound was immediately preceded4 ,it is the cause1 however2 exactly in the same manner as all the other parts of the sequence were causes1 merely by being the immediate and invariable antecedent of the particular effect4 ,if1 in our inability of assigning any thing intermediate1 we were to say1 that this last affection of the sensorial organ occasioned the sound1 because it had the power of occasioning sound1 we should say nothing more than if we had said at once1 that it occasioned the sound1 or1 in other words1 was that which could not exist in the same circumstances without the sound as its instant attendant4 8,what is there10 says ,malebranche1 8which ,aristotle cannot at once propose and resolve1 by his fine words of genus1 species1 act1 power1 nature1 form1 faculties1 qualities1 causa per se1 causa per accidens8 ,his followers find it very difficult to comprehend that these words signify nothing2 and that we are not more learned than we were before1 when we have heard them tell us1 in their best manner1 that fire melts metals1 because it has a solvent faculty2 and that some unfortunate epicure1 or glutton digests ill1 because he has a weak digestion1 or because the vis concoctrix does not perform well its functions40#bi ,we see only parts of the great sequences that are taking place in nature2 and it is on this account we seek for the causes of what we know in the parts of the sequences that are unknown4 ,if our senses had originally enabled us to discriminate every element of bodies1 and consequently1 all the minute changes which take place in these1 as clearly as the more obvious changes at present perceived by us2 in short1 if1 between two known events1 we had never discovered any thing intermediate and unknown1 forming a new antecedent of the consequent observed before1 our notion of a cause would have been very different from that mysterious unintelligible something which we now conceive it to be2 and we should then1 perhaps1 have found as little difficulty in admitting it to be what it simply and truly is1--only another name for the immediate invariable antecedent of any event1--as we now find in admitting the form of a body1 to be only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it4 ,but1--,i have said in my ,essay1--though the powers of created things be nothing more than their relation to certain events that invariably attend them1 is this definition consistent with the notion which we form of the power of the ,creator8 or1 ,is not his efficiency altogether different in nature1 as well as in degree8 ,the omnipotence of ,god1 it must1 indeed1 be allowed1 bears to every created power the same relation of awful superiority1 which his infinite wisdom and goodness bear to the humble knowledge and virtue of his creatures4 ,but as we know his wisdom and goodness1 only by knowing what that human wisdom and goodness are1 which1 with all their imperfection1 he has yet permitted to know and adore him1--so1 it is only by knowing created power1 weak and limited as it is1 that we can rise to the contemplation of his omnipotence4 ,in contemplating it1 we consider only his will1 as the direct antecedent of those glorious effects which the universe displays4 ,the power of ,god is not any thing different from ,god2 but is the ,almighty himself1 willing whatever seems to him good1 and creating or altering all things by his very will to create or alter4 ,it is enough for our devotion to trace every where the characters of the ,divinity1--of provident arrangement prior to this system of things1--and to know1 therefore1 that1 without that divine will as antecedent1 nothing could have been4 ,wherever we turn our eyes1--to the earth--to the heavens--to the myriads of beings that live and move around us--or to those more than myriads of worlds1 which seem themselves almost like animated inhabitants of the infinity through which they range1--above us1 beneath us1 on every side1 we discover1 with a certainty that admits not of doubt1 intelligence and design1 that must have preceded the existence of every thing which exists4 ,yet1 when we analyse those great1 but obscure1 ideas which rise in our mind1 while we attempt to think of the creation of things1 we feel1 that it is still only a sequence of events which we are considering1--though of events1 the magnitude of which allows us no comparison1 because it has nothing in common with those earthly changes which fall beneath our view4 ,we do not see any third circumstance existing intermediately1 and binding1 as it were1 the will of the ,omnipotent ,creator to the things which are to be2 we conceive only the divine will itself1 as if made visible to our imagination1 and all nature at the very moment rising around4 ,it is evident1 that in the case of the divine agency1 as well as in every other instance of causation1 the introduction of any circumstance1 as a bond of closer connexion1 would only furnish a new phenomenon to be itself connected2 but even though it were possible to conceive the closer connexion of such a third circumstance1 as is supposed to constitute the inexplicable efficiency between the will of the ,creator and the rise of the universe1 it would diminish1 indeed1 but it certainly cannot be supposed to elevate1 the majesty of the person1 and of the scene4 ,our feeling of his omnipotence is not rendered stronger by the elevation of the complicated process2 it is1 on the contrary1 the immediate succession of the object to the desire1 which impresses the force of the omnipotence on our mind2 and it is to the divine agency1 therefore1 that the representation of instant sequence seems peculiarly suited1 as if it were more emphatically powerful4 ,such is the great charm of the celebrated passage of ,genesis1 descriptive of the creation of light4 ,it is from stating nothing more than the antecedent and consequent1 that the majestic simplicity of the description is derived4 ,god speaks1 and it is done4 ,we imagine nothing intermediate4 ,in our highest contemplation of ,his power1 we believe only1 that1 when ,he willed creation1 a world arose2 and that1 in all future time1 ,his will to create cannot exist1 without being followed by the instant rise into being of whatever ,he may have willed2 that ,his will to destroy any thing1 will be1 in like manner1 followed by its non-existence2 and ,his will to vary the course of things1 by miraculous appearances4 ,the will is the only necessary previous change2 and that ,being has almighty power1 whose every will is immediately and invariably followed by the existence of its object4 ,,footnotes3 #bg ,mart4 ,scrib4 c4 #g4--,pope's ,works1 ,ed4 #ageg1 v4 vii4 p4 #eh1 #ei4 #bh ,cicero de ,officiis1 lib4 i4 c4 #d4 #bi ,recherche de la verit1 liv iv4 c4 ii4--,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #cbb4 ,,lecture ,,viii4 ,,on ,,hypothesis ,,and ,,theory4 ,the observations which ,i have already made on power1 ,gentlemen1 have1 ,i hope1 shown you1 both what it truly is1 and the sources of that illusion1 which leads us to regard it as something more mysterious4 ,the principal source of this illusion1 we found to be our incapacity of distinguishing the minute elements of bodies1--that leads us1 in a manner1 which it is unnecessary now to recapitulate1 to suspect constantly some intermediate and unobserved objects and events1 between the parts of sequences1 which we truly observe1 and1 by the influence of this habit1 to transfer1 at least1 the notion of power1 from the antecedent which we observe1 to the supposed more direct antecedent1 which we only imagine1 and to consider the causes of events as some unknown circumstances1 that exist between all the antecedents which we know1 and the consequents which we know1 and connect these together in mysterious union4 ,the same imperfection of our senses1 which1 from our incapacity of discovering all the minute elements1 and consequently all the minute elementary changes1 in bodies1 leads us to form erroneous notions of power and causation1 has tended1 in like manner1 to produce a fondness for hypotheses1 which1 without rendering the observed phenomena1 in any respect1 more intelligible1 only render them more complicated1 and increase the very difficulty1 which they are supposed to diminish4 ,of this tendency of the mind1 which is a very injurious one to the progress of sound philosophy1 ,i must request your attention to a little fuller elucidation4 ,to know well1 what hypotheses truly are in themselves1 and what it is which they contribute to the explanation of phenomena1 is1 ,i am convinced1 the surest of all preservatives against that too ready assent1 which you might otherwise be disposed to give to them2 and to guard you from the ready adoption of such loose conclusions1 in the reasonings of others1 and from the tendency to similar rashness of arrangement and inference1 in your own speculative inquiries1 is to perform for you the most important office that can be performed1 for the regulation1 both of your present studies1 and of those maturer investigations1 to which1 ,i trust1 your present studies are to lead4 ,i have also endeavoured to point out to you1 in what manner we are led to believe1 that we explain the sequence of two events1 by stating some intermediate event4 ,if asked1 ,how it is that we hear a voice at a distance1 or see a distant object8 we immediately answer1 ,because the primary vibration of the organs of speech is propagated in successive vibrations through the intervening air1 and because light is reflected or emitted from the distant object to the eye2 and he who hears this answer1 which is obviously nothing more than the statement of another effect1 or series of effects1 that takes place before that particular effect1 concerning which the question is put1 is perfectly satisfied1 for the time1 with the acquisition which he has made1 and thinks1 that he now knows1 how it is1 that we hear and see4 ,to know why a succession of events takes place1 is thus at length conceived by us1 to be the same thing1 as to know some other changes1 or series of changes1 which take place between them2 and1 with this opinion1 as to the necessary presence of some intervening and connecting link1 it is very natural1 that1 when we can no longer state or imagine any thing which intervenes1 we should feel as if the sequence itself were less intelligible1 though unquestionably1 when we can state some intervening circumstance1 we have merely found a new antecedent in the train of physical events1 so as to have now two antecedents and consequents1 instead of one simple antecedent and consequent1 and have thus only doubled our supposed mystery1 instead of removing it4 ,since it does appear to us1 however1 to remove the very mystery which it doubles1 it is the same thing1 with respect to our general practice of philosophizing1 as if it did remove it4 ,if we suppose the intervention of some unknown cause1 in every phenomenon which we perceive1 we must be equally desirous of discovering that unknown cause1 which we suppose to be intermediate1--and1 when this is not easily discoverable1 we must feel a strong tendency to divine what it is1 and to acquiesce1 more readily than we should otherwise have done1 in the certainty of what we have only imagined1--always1 of course1 imagining the cause1 which seems to have most analogy to the observed effect4 ,such is the nature of that illusion1 from which the love of hypotheses flows1--as seeming1 by the intervention of a new antecedent1 to render more intelligible the sequences of events that are obviously before us1--though all which is truly done1 is to double the number of antecedents2 and1 therefore1 to double1 instead of removing the difficulty1 that is supposed to be involved in the consideration of a simple sequence of events4 ,a stone tends to the ground--that it should have this tendency1 in consequence of the mere presence of the earth1 appears to us most wonderful2 and we think1 that it would be much less wonderful1 if we could discover the presence1 though it were the mere presence1 of something else4 ,we therefore1 in our mind1 run over every circumstance analogous1 to discover something which we may consider as present1 that may represent to our imagination the cause which we seek4 ,the effect of impulse1 in producing motion1 we know by constant experience2 and1 as the motion1 which it produces1 in a particular direction1 seems analogous to the motion of the stone in its particular direction1 we conceive1 that the motion of a stone1 in its fall to the earth1 is rendered more intelligible1 by the imagined intervention of some impelling body4 ,the circumstances1 which we observe1 however1 are manifestly inconsistent with the supposition of the impulse of any very gross matter4 ,the analogies of gross matter are accordingly excluded from our thoughts1 and we suppose the impulse to proceed from some very subtle fluid1 to which we give the name of ether1 or any other name1 which we may choose to invent for it4 ,the hypothesis is founded1 you will observe1 on the mere analogy of another species of motion1 and which would account for gravitation by the impulse of some fine fluid4 ,it is evident1 that there may be1 in this way1 as many hypotheses to explain a single fact1 as there have been circumstances analogous observed in all the various phenomena of nature4 ,accordingly1 another set of philosophers1 instead of explaining gravitation by the analogy of impulse1 have had recourse to another analogy1 still more intimately familiar to us--that of the phenomena of life3 ,we are able to move our limbs by our mere volition4 ,the mind1 therefore1 it is evident1 can produce motion in matter2 and it is hence some interposed spiritual agent1 which produces all the phenomena of gravitation4 ,every orb1 in its revolution on its axis1 or in its great journey through the heavens1 has1 according to this system of philosophical mythology1 some peculiar genius1 or directing spirit1 that regulates its course1 in the same manner as1 of old1 the universe itself was considered as one enormous animal1 performing its various movements by its own vital energies4 ,it is the influence of this analogy of our own muscular motions1 as obedient to our volition1--together with the mistaken belief of adding greater honour to the divine ,omnipotent1--which has led a very large class of philosophers to ascribe every change in the universe1 material or intellectual1 not to the original foresight and arrangement merely1--the irresistible evidence of which even the impiety1 that professes to question it1 must secretly admit1--but to the direct operation of the ,creator and ,sovereign of the world1-- 8,the mighty ,hand1 ,that1 ever busy1 wheels the silent spheres1 ,works in the secret deep2 shoots streaming thence ,the fair profusion that o'erspreads the spring2 ,flings from the sun direct the flaming day2 ,feeds every creature2 hurls the tempest forth2 ,and1 as on earth this grateful change revolves1 ,with transport touches all the springs of life40 ,so prone is the mind to complicate every phenomenon1 by the insertion of imagined causes1 in the simple sequences of physical events1 that one hypothesis may often be said to involve in it many other hypotheses1 invented for the explanation of that very phenomenon1 which is adduced in explanation of another phenomenon1 as simple as itself4 ,the production of muscular motion by the will1 which is the source of the hypothesis of direct spiritual agency1 in every production of motion1 or change1 in the universe1 has itself given occasion to innumerable speculations of this kind4 ,indeed1 on no subject has the imagination been more fruitful of fancies1 that have been strangely given to the world under the name of philosophy4 ,though you cannot be supposed to be acquainted with the minute nomenclature of anatomy1 you yet all know1 that there are parts termed muscles1 and other parts termed nerves1 and that it is by the contraction of our muscles that our limbs are moved4 ,the nerves1 distributing to the different muscles1 are evidently instrumental to their contraction2 since the destruction of the nerve puts an end to the voluntary contraction of the muscle1 and consequently to the apparent motion of the limb4 ,but what is the influence that is propagated along the nerve1 and in what manner is it propagated8 ,for explaining this most familiar of all phenomena1 there is scarcely any class of phenomena in nature1 to the analogy of which recourse has not been had1--the vibration of musical chords1--the coiling or uncoiling of springs1--the motion of elastic fluids1 electricity1 magnetism1 galvanism2--and the result of so many hypotheses1--after all the labour of striving to adapt them to the phenomena1 and the still greater labour of striving to prove them exactly adapted1 when they were far from being so--has been the return to the simple fact1 that muscular motion follows a certain state of the nerve2--in the same manner1 as the result of all the similar labour1 that has been employed to account1 as it has been termed1 for gravitation1 has been a return to the simple fact1 that1 at all visible distances observed1 the bodies in nature tend toward each other4 ,the mere sequence of one event after another event1 is1 however1 too easily conceived1 and has too little in it of that complication1 which at once busies and delights us1 to allow the mind to rest in it long4 ,it must forever have something to disentangle1 and1 therefore1 something which is perplexed2 for1 such is the strange nature of man1 that the simplicity of truth1 which might seem to be its essential charm1--and which renders it doubly valuable1 in relation to the weakness of his faculties1--is the very circumstance that renders it least attractive to him2 and though1 in his analysis of every thing that is compound in matter1 or involved in thought1 he constantly flatters himself1 that it is this very simplicity1 which he loves and seeks1 he yet1 when he arrives at absolute simplicity1 feels an equal tendency to turn away from it1 and gladly prefers to it any thing that is more mysterious1 merely because it is mysterious4 8,i am persuaded10 said one1 who knew our nature well1 8that1 if the majority of mankind could be made to see the order of the universe1 such as it is1 as they would not remark in it any virtues attached to certain numbers1 nor any properties inherent in certain planets1 nor fatalities1 in certain times and revolutions of these1 they would not be able to restrain themselves1 on the sight of this admirable regularity and beauty1 from crying out with astonishment1 ,what1 is this all80 ,for the fidelity of this picture1 in which ,fontenelle has so justly represented one of the common weaknesses of our intellectual nature1 we unfortunately need not refer to the majority of mankind alone1 to whom1 it may be said1 almost with equal truth1 that every thing is wonderful1 and that nothing is wonderful4 ,the feeling which it describes exists even in the most philosophic mind1 and had certainly no increased influence even on that mind which described it so truly1 when it employed all its great powers1 in still striving to support the cumbrous system of the ,vortices1 against the simple theory of attraction4 ,even ,newton himself1 whose transcendent intellect was so well fitted to perceive the sublimity1 which simplification adds to every thing that is truly great in itself1 yet1 showed1 by his query with respect to the agency of ether1 that he was not absolutely exempt from that human infirmity of which ,i speak2 and though philosophers may now be considered as almost unanimous with respect to gravitation1--in considering it as the mere tendency of bodies towards each other1 we yet1 in admiring this tendency which we perceive1 feel some reluctance to admit a mere fact1 that presents itself so simply to our conception1 and would be better pleased1 if any other mode could be pointed out1 by which1 with some decent appearance of reason on its side1 the same effect could seem to be brought about1 by a natural apparatus1 better suited to gratify our passion for the complicated and the wonderful4 ,though the theory of ,vortices can scarcely be said now to have any lingering defender left1 there is a constant tendency1 and a tendency which requires all our philosophy to repress it1--to relapse into the supposition of a great etherial fluid1 by the immense ocean1 or immense streams1 of which the phenomenon now asserted to gravitate1 may be explained1 and we have no objection1 to fill the whole boundless void of the universe1 with an infinite profusion of this invisible matter1 merely that we may think1 with more comfort1 that we know how a feather falls to the ground2--though the fall of the feather1 after this magnificent cast of contrivance1 would still be as truly inexplicable as at present2 and though many other difficulties must1 in that case1 be admitted in addition4 ,it is only in geometry1 that we readily allow a straight line1 to be the shortest that can be drawn between any two points4 ,in the physics of mind1 or of matter1 we are far from allowing this4 ,we prefer to it almost any curve that is presented to us by others1--and1 without all doubt1 any curve which we have described ourselves2 and we boldly maintain1 and1 which is yet more fairly believe1 that we have found out a shorter road1 merely because1 in our philosophical peregrination1 we have chosen to journey many miles about1 and in our delight of gazing on new objects1 have never thought of measuring the ground which we have trod4 ,i am aware1 indeed1 that1 in the consideration of the simple antecedents1 and consequents which nature exhibits1 it is not the mere complication of these1 by the introduction of new intervening substances or events1 which obtains from the mind so ready an adoption of hypotheses4 ,on the contrary1 there is a sort of false simplification in the introduction of hypotheses1 which itself aids the illusion of the mystery4 ,i term the simplification false1 because it is not in the phenomena themselves1 but in our mode of conceiving them4 ,it is certainly far more simple1 in nature1 that bodies should have a tendency toward each other1 than that there should be oceans of a subtle fluid1 circulating around them1 in vortices1--or streams of such a fluid1 projected continually on them from some unknown source1 merely to produce the same exact motions1 which would be the result of the reciprocal tendency in the bodies themselves4 ,but the interposition of all this immensity of matter1 to account for the fall of a feather or rain-drop1 cumbrous as the contrivance must be allowed to be1 is yet in one respect1 more simple to our conception1 because1 instead of two classes of phenomena1 those of gravitation and of impulse1 we have1 in referring all to impulse1 only one general class4 ,man loves what is simple much1 but he loves what is mysterious more2 and a mighty ocean of ether1 operating invisibly in all the visible phenomena of the universe1 has thus a sort of double charm1 by uniting the false simplification1 of which ,i have spoken1 with abundance of real mystery4 ,this mixture of the simple and the mysterious1 is1 in some measure1 like the mixture of uniformity with diversity1 that is so delightful in works of art4 ,however pleasing objects may separately be1 we are soon wearied with wandering over them1 when1 from their extreme irregularity1 we cannot group them in any distinct assemblage1 or discover some slight relation of parts to the whole2 and we are still sooner1 and more painfully fatigued1 when every object which we see is in exact symmetry with some other object4 ,in like manner1 the mind would be perplexed and oppressed1 if it were to conceive a great multitude of objects or circumstances1 concurring in the production of one observed event4 ,but it feels a sort of dissatisfaction also1 when the sequences of events which it observes1 are reduced to the mere antecedents and consequents of which they consist1 and must have a little more complication to flatter it with the belief1 that it has learned something which it is important to have learned4 ,to know that a withered leaf falls to the ground1 is to know1 what the very vulgar know1 as well as ourselves2 but an ocean of ether1 whirling it downward1 is something of which the vulgar have no conception1 and gives a kind of mysterious magnificence to a very simple event1 which makes us think1 that our knowledge is greater1 because we have given1 in our imagination1 a sort of cumbrous magnitude to the phenomenon itself4 ,that hypotheses1 in that wide sense of the word which implies every thing conjectural1 are without use in philosophy1 it would be absurd to affirm1 since every inquiry may1 in that wide sense1 be said to pre-suppose them1 and must always pre-suppose them if the inquiry have any object4 ,they are of use1 however1 not as superseding investigation1 but as directing investigation to certain objects1--not as telling us1 what we are to believe1 but as pointing out to us what we are to endeavour to ascertain4 ,an hypothesis1 in this view of it1 is nothing more than a reason for making one experiment or observation rather than another2 and it is evident1 that1 without some reason of this kind1 as experiment and observations are almost infinite1 inquiry would be altogether profitless4 ,to make experiments1 at random1 is not to philosophize2 it becomes philosophy1 only when the experiments are made with a certain view2 and to make them1 with any particular view1 is to suppose the presence of something1 the operation of which they will tend either to prove or disprove4 ,when ,torricelli1 for example1--proceeding on the observation previously made1 by ,galileo1 with respect to the limited height to which water could be made to rise in a pump1--that memorable observation1 which demonstrated1 at last1 after so many ages of errors1 what ought not for a single moment to have required to be demonstrated2 the absurdity of the horror of a void ascribed to nature--when1 proceeding in this memorable observation1 ,torricelli made his equally memorable experiment with respect to the height of the column of mercury supported in an inverted tube1 and found1 on comparison of their specific gravities1 the columns of mercury and water to be exactly equiponderant1 it is evident that he was led to the experiment with the mercury by the supposition1 that the rise of fluids in vacuo was occasioned by some counterpressure1 exactly equal to the weight supported1 and that the column of mercury1 therefore should be less in height than the column of water1 in the exact inverse ratio of their specific gravities1 by which the counterpressure was to be sustained4 ,to conceive the air1 which was then universally regarded as essentially light1 to be not light but heavy1 so as to press on the fluid beneath1 was1 at that time1 to make as bold a supposition as could be made4 ,it was indeed1 a temporary hypothesis1 even when it led to that experimental demonstration of the fact1 which proved it forever after not to be hypothetical4 ,an hypothesis1 then1 in the first stage of inquiry1 far from being inconsistent with sound philosophy1 may be said to be essential to it4 ,but it is essential only in this first stage1 as suggesting what is afterwards to be verified or disproved2 and1 when the experiments or observations to which it directs us do not verify it1 it is no longer to be entertained1 even as an hypothesis4 ,if we observe a phenomenon1 which we never have observed before1 it is absolutely impossible for us1 not to think of the analogous cases which we may have seen2 since they are suggested by a principal of association1 which is as truly a part of our constitution1 as the senses with which we perceived the phenomenon itself2 and1 if any of these analogies strike us as remarkably coincident1 it is equally impossible for us not to imagine1 that the cause1 which we knew in that former instance1 may also be present in this analogical instance1 and that they may1 therefore1 both be reduced to the same class4 ,to stop here1 and1 from this mere analogy1 to infer positive identity of the causes1 and to follow out the possible consequences in innumerable applications1 would be to do1 as many great artists in systematizing have done4 ,what a philosopher1 of sounder views1 however1 would do in such a case1 is very different4 ,he would assume1 indeed1 as possible or perhaps as probable1 the existence of the supposed cause4 ,but he would assume it1 only to direct his examination of its reality1 by investigating1 as far as he was able1 from past experience1 what the circumstances would have been1 in every respect1 if the cause supposed had been actually present2 and1 even if these were all found to be exactly coincident1 though he would think the presence of the cause more probable1 he would be very far from considering it as certain1 and would still endeavour to lessen the chances of fallacy1 by watching the circumstances1 should they again recur1 and varying them1 by experiment1 in every possible way4 ,this patience and caution1 however1 essential as they are to just philosophizing1 require1 it must be confessed1 no slight efforts of self-denial1 but of a self-denial which is as necessary to intellectual excellence as the various moral species of self-denial are to excellence and virtue4 8,mr ,locke1 ,i think10 says ,dr ,reid1 8mentions an eminent musician1 who believed that ,god created the world in six days1 and rested the seventh1 because there are but seven notes in music4 ,i myself10 he continues1 8knew one of that profession1 who thought that there could be only three parts in harmony1 to wit1 bass1 tenor1 and treble2 because there are but three persons in the ,trinity40#cj ,the minds that could be satisfied with analogies so very slight1 must1 indeed1 have been little acquainted with the principles of philosophic inquiry2 and yet how many systems have been advanced in different ages1 admired by multitudes1 who knew them only by name1 and still more revered by the philosophers1 who gloried in adopting them1 that have been founded on analogies almost as slight4 8,the philosophers who form hypothetical systems of the universe1 and of all its most secret laws10 says ,voltaire1 in one of his lively similes1 8are like our travellers that go to ,constantinople1 and think that they must tell us a great deal about the seraglio4 ,they pretend to know every thing which passes within it--the whole secret history of the ,sultan and his favourites1 and they have seen nothing but its outside walls40 ,in one respect1 however1 philosophers1 in their hypothetical systems1 far outdo the travellers to ,constantinople4 ,they not merely tell us secrets of nature1 which they have no opportunity of learning1 but they believe the very tales of their own fancy4 ,to see any usual phenomenon1 is1 indeed1 to wonder at it1 at first2 but to explain it1 is almost the very next step1 reason serving rather to defend the explanation1 when it is made1 than to assist greatly in making it2 and1 in many cases1 each philosopher has his separate explanation1 on which he is disposed to put as much reliance1 as on the certainty of the fact itself1 not abandoning the hypothesis1 even though the fact should prove to have been different1 but making it bend1 with a happy pliability1 to all the diversities discovered1 so as at last1 perhaps1 to account for circumstances the very reverse of those which it was originally invented to explain4 8,i have heard10 says ,condillac1 8of a philosopher1 who had the happiness of thinking that he had discovered a principle1 which was to explain all the wonderful phenomena of chemistry2 and who1 in the ardour of his self-congratulation1 hastened to communicate his discovery to a skilful chemist4 ,the chemist had the kindness to listen to him1 and then calmly told him1 that there was but one unfortunate circumstance for his discovery1 which was1 that the chemical facts were exactly the reverse of what he had supposed4 ,well then1 said the philosopher1 have the goodness to tell me what they are1 that ,i may explain them by my system40#ca ,to those who know that fondness for conjecture1 which may almost be said to be a sort of intellectual appetite1 there is nothing in all the wonders which ,swift tells us of his fabled ,houynhnhms1 that marks them more strongly as a different race from mankind1 than the total absence of hypothesis from their systems of knowledge4 8,i remember10 says ,gulliver1 8it was with extreme difficulty that ,i could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion1 or how a point could be disputable2 because reason taught us to affirm or deny only when we are certain2 and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either4 ,so that controversies1 wranglings1 disputes1 and positiveness1 in false or dubious propositions1 are evils unknown among the ,houynhnhms4 ,in the like manner1 when ,i used to explain to him our several systems of ,natural ,philosophy1 he would laugh1 that a creature pretending to reason1 should value itself upon the knowledge of other people's conjectures1 and in things1 where that knowledge1 if it were certain1 could be of no use4 ,wherein he agreed entirely with the sentiments of ,socrates1 as ,plato delivers them1 which ,i mention as the highest honour ,i can do that ,prince of philosophers4 ,i have often since reflected what destruction such a doctrine would make in the libraries of ,europe1 and how many paths to fame would be then shut up in the learned world40#cb ,while ,i wish to caution you against a fondness for hypotheses1 by shewing you1 not merely that they are liable to error1--for inquiry1 of every kind1 must be so in some degree1--but that1 in truth1 they leave the real difficulty of the succession of the observed consequents to the observed antecedents as great as before1 and only add1 to the supposed difficulty of explaining one sequence1 the necessity of explaining a sequence additional1--,i must remark1 at the same time1 that what is commonly termed theory1 in opposition to hypothesis1 is far from being so different from it as is commonly represented1--at least1 in the very wide application which is usually made of it4 ,we are told1 by those who lay down rules of philosophizing1 that the object of philosophy is1 to observe particulars1 and1 from these1 to frame general laws1 which may1 again1 be applied to the explanation of particulars2 and the view which is thus given of the real province of philosophy is undoubtedly a just one2--but there is an ambiguity in the language which may deceive you1 and with respect to which1 therefore1 it is necessary for you to be on your guard4 ,if1 by the term general law1 be meant the agreement in some common circumstances of a number of events observed1 there can be no question that we proceed safely in framing it1 and that what we have already found in a number of events1 must be applicable to that number of events2 in the same manner1 as1 after combining in the term animal the circumstances in which a dog1 a horse1 a sheep agree1 we cannot err in applying the term animal to a dog1 a horse1 a sheep4 ,but the only particular to which1 in this case1 we can1 with perfect confidence1 apply a general law1 are the very particulars that have been before observed by us4 ,if it be understood as more general than the circumstances observed1 and1 therefore1 capable of being applied with perfect certainty to the explanation of new phenomena1 we evidently1 to the extent in which the general law is applied beyond the circumstances observed1 proceed on mere supposition1 as truly1 as in any hypothesis which we could have framed2 and though the supposition may be more and more certain1 in proportion to the number of cases thus generalized1 and the absence of any circumstance which can be supposed1 in the new case1 to be inconsistent with it1 it never can amount to actual certainty4 ,let us take1 for example1 one of the most striking cases of this sort4 ,that bodies tend to each other1 in all circumstances1 with a force increasing directly as their quantities1 and inversely as the squares of their distances1 may seem in the highest degree probable indeed1 from the innumerable facts observed on our globe1 and in the magnificent extent of the planetary movements2 but it cannot be said to be certain at all distances1 in which we have never had an opportunity of making observations1--as it seems to be verified in the heights of our atmosphere1 and in the distances of the planets1 in their orbits1 from the sun1 and from each other4 ,it is not necessary1 however1 to refer1 for possible exceptions1 to spaces that are beyond our observation2 since1 on the surface of our own earth1 there is abundant evidence1 that the law does not hold universally4 ,every quiescent mass that is capable of greater compression1 and of which the particles1 therefore1 before that compression1 are not in absolute contact1 shews sufficiently1 that the principle of attraction1 which1 of itself1 would have brought them into actual contact1 must have ceased to operate1 while there was still a space between the particles that would have allowed its free operation2 and1 in the phenomena of elasticity1 and impulse in general1 it has not merely ceased1 but is actually reversed1--the bodies which1 at all visible distances1 exhibited a reciprocal attraction1 now exhibiting a reciprocal repulsion1 in consequence of which they mutually fly off1 as readily as they before approached1--that is to say1 the tendency of bodies to each other being converted into a tendency from each other1 by a mere change of distance1 so slight as to be almost inappreciable4 ,when a ball rebounds from the earth1 toward which it moved rapidly before1 and the gravitating tendency is thus evidently reversed1 without the intervention of any foreign force1 what eye1 though it be aided by all the nicest apparatus of optical art1 can discover the lines which separate those infinitesimal differences of proximity1 at which the particles of the ball still continue to gravitate toward the earth1 and are afterwards driven from it in an opposite direction2--yet the phenomenon itself is a sufficient proof1 that in these spaces1 which seem1 to our organs of sense1 so completely the same1 that it is absolutely impossible for us to distinguish them1 the reciprocal tendencies of the particles of the ball and of the earth are as truly opposite1 as if the laws of gravitation had1 at the moment at which the rebound begins1 been reversed through the whole system of the universe4 ,it is1 indeed1 scarcely possible to imagine a more striking proof of the danger of extending1 with too great certainty1 a general law1 than this instant conversion of attraction into repulsion1 without the addition of any new bodies1 without any change in the nature of the bodies themselves1 and a change of their circumstances so very slight1 as to be absolutely indistinguishable1 but for the opposite motions that result from it1 with a change of their circumstances4 ,after observing the gravity of bodies1 at all heights of our atmosphere1 and extending our survey through the wide spaces of our solar system1--computing the tendency of the planets to the sun1 and their disturbing forces1 as they operate on each other1--and finding the resulting motions exactly to correspond with those which we had predicted by theory2--in these circumstances1 after an examination so extensive1 if we had affirmed1 as an universal law of matter1 that1 at all distances1 bodies tend toward each other1 we should have considered the wideness of the induction1 as justifying the affirmation2 and yet1 even in this case1 we find1 on the surface of our earth1 in the mutual shocks of bodies1 and in their very rest1 sufficient evidence1 that1 in making the universal affirmation1 we should have reasoned falsely4 ,there is no theory1 then1 which1 if applied to the explanation of new phenomena1 is not1 to a certain degree1 conjectural2 because it must proceed on the supposition1 that what was true in certain circumstances1 is true also in circumstances that have not been observed4 ,it admits of certainty1 only when it is applied to the very substances observed1--in the very circumstances observed1--in which case1 it may be strictly said to be nothing more than the application of a general term to the particulars1 which we have before agreed to comprehend in it4 ,whatever is more than this is truly hypothetical1--the difference being1 that we commonly give the name of hypothesis to cases1 in which we suppose the intervention of some substance1 of the existence of which1 as present in the phenomenon1 we have no direct proof1 or of some additional quality of a substance before unobserved1--and the name of theory to cases1 which do not suppose the existence of any substance1 that is not actually observed1 or of any quality that has not been actually observed1 but merely the continuance1 in certain new circumstances1 of tendencies observed in other circumstances4 ,thus1 if a planet were discovered revolving in the space which separates the orbits of any two planets at present known1 were we to suppose of matter1 in this new situation1 that it would be subject to the same exact law of gravitation1 to which the other planets were known to be subject1 and to predict its place in the heavens1 at any time1 according to this law1 we should be said to form a theory of its motions2 as we should not take for granted1 any new quality of a substance1 or the existence of any substance1 which was not evidently present1 but only of tendencies observed before in other circumstances1--analogous indeed1 but not absolutely the same4 ,we should be said to form an hypothesis on the subject1 if1 making the same prediction1 as to its motions1 and place in the heavens1 at any given time1 we were to ascribe the centripetal tendency1 which confines it within its orbit1 to the impulse of ether1 or to any other mechanical cause4 ,the terms1 however1 ,i must confess1 though the distinction which ,i have now stated would be1 in all cases1 a very convenient one1 are used very loosely1 not in conversation merely1 but in the writings of philosophers1--an hypothesis often meaning nothing more than a theory1 to which we have not given our assent1--and a theory1 an hypothesis which we have adopted1 or still more1 one which we have formed ourselves4 ,a theory1 then1 even in that best sense1 to which ,i wish it accurately confined1 as often as it ventures a single hair-breadth beyond the line of former observation1 may be wrong1 as an hypothesis may be wrong4 ,but1 in a theory1 in this sense of it1 there are both less risk of error1 and less extensive evil from error1 than in an hypothesis4 ,there is less risk of error1 because we speak only of the properties of bodies1 that must be allowed actually to exist2 and the evil of error is1 for the same reason1 less extensive1 since it must be confined to this single point2 whereas1 if we were to imagine falsely the presence of some third substance1 our supposition might involve as many errors1 as that substance has qualities2 since we should be led to suppose1 and expect1 some or all of the other consequences1 which usually attend it1 when really present4 ,the practical conclusion to be drawn from all this very long discussion1 is1 that we should use hypotheses to suggest and direct inquiry1 not to terminate or supersede it2 and that1 in theorizing1--as the chance of error1 in the application of a general law1 diminishes1 in proportion to the number of analogous cases1 in which it is observed to hold1--we should not form any general proposition1 till after as wide an induction1 as it is possible for us to make2 and1 in the subsequent application of it to particulars1 should never content ourselves1 in any new circumstances1 with the mere probability1 however high1 which this application of it affords2 while it is possible for us to verify1 or disprove it1 by actual experiment4 ,,footnotes3 #cj ,on the ,powers of the ,human ,mind1 ,essay vi4 ,chap4 viii4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ccd4 #hvo4 edit4 #ca ,traite des ,systemes1 chap4 xii4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #cgb4 #cb ,travels1 ,part iv1 chap4 #h4 ,swift's ,works1 edit4 ,nichols1 ,vol4 ix4 p4 #cjj4 ,,lecture ,,ix4 ,,recapitulation ,,of ,,the ,,four ,,preceding ,,lectures2 ,,and ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,physical ,,inquiry ,,to ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,mind1 ,,commenced4 ,for several ,lectures1 ,gentlemen1 we have been employed in considering the objects that are to be had in view1 in ,physical ,inquiry in general1 a clear conception of which seems to me as essential to the ,philosophy of ,mind1 as to the ,philosophy of ,matter4 ,i should now proceed to apply these general remarks more particularly to our own science2 but1 before doing this1 it may be of advantage to retrace slightly our steps in the progress already made4 ,all inquiry1 with respect to the various substances in nature1 we have seen1 must regard them as they exist in space1 or as they exist in time1--the inquiry1 in the one case1 being into their composition2 the inquiry1 in the other case1 into the changes which they exhibit4 ,the first of these views we found to be very simple1 having1 for its object1 only the discovery of what is actually before us at the moment1--which1 therefore1 if we had been endowed with senses of greater delicacy and acuteness1 we might have known1 without any inquiry whatever4 ,it is the investigation of the elements1 or separate bodies1 that exist together1 in the substances which we considered1 or rather that constitute the substances which we considered1 by occupying the space which we assign to the one imaginary aggregate1 and are regarded by us as one substance1--not from any absolute unity which they have in nature1 since the elementary atoms1 however continuous or near1 have an existence as truly separate and independent1 as if they had been created at the distance of worlds1--but from a unity1 that is relative only to our incapacity of distinguishing them as separate4 ,it is to the imperfection of our senses1 then1 that this first division of ,physical ,inquiry owes its origin2 and its most complete results could enable us to discover only1 what has been before our eyes from the moment of our birth4 ,the second division of inquiry1--that which relates to the successions of phenomena in time1--we found1 however1 to have a different origin2 since the utmost perfection of our mere senses could show us only what is1 at the moment of perception1 not what has been1 nor what will be2 and there is nothing in any qualities of bodies perceived by us1 which1 without experience1 could enable us to predict the changes that are to occur in them4 ,the foundation of all inquiry1 with respect to phenomena as successive1 we found to be that most important law1 or original tendency1 of our nature1 in consequence of which we not merely perceive the changes exhibited to us at one particular moment1 but from this perception1 are led irresistibly to believe1 that similar changes have constantly taken place1 in all similar circumstances1 and will constantly take place1 as often as the future circumstances shall be exactly similar to the present4 ,we hence consider events1 not as casually antecedent and consequent1 but as invariably antecedent and consequent1--or1 in other words1 as causes and effects2 and we give the name of power to this permanent relation of the invariable antecedent to its invariable consequent4 ,the powers of substances1 then1 concerning which so many vague1 and confused1 and mysterious notions prevail1 are only another name for the substances themselves1 in relation to other substances1--not any thing separate from them and intermediate1--as the form of a body1 concerning which too1 for many ages1 notions as vague and mysterious prevailed1 is not any thing different from the body1 but is only the body itself1 considered according to the relative position of its elements4 ,form is the relation of immediate proximity1 which bodies bear to each other in space2--power is the relation of immediate and uniform proximity1 which events bear to each other in time2 and the relation1 far from being different1 as is commonly supposed1 when applied to matter and to spirit1 is precisely the same in kind1 whether the events1 of which we think1 be material or immaterial4 ,it is of invariable antecedence that we speak alike in both cases1 and of invariable antecedence only4 ,when we say1 that a magnet has the power of attracting iron1 we mean only1 that a magnet cannot be brought near iron1 without the instant motion of the iron towards it4 ,when we say1 in treating of mental influence1 that man1 in the ordinary circumstances of health1 and when free from any foreign restraint1 has the power of moving his hand1 we mean only1 that1 in these circumstances1 he cannot will to move his hand1 without its consequent motion4 ,when we speak of the omnipotence of the ,supreme of ,beings1--who is the fountain of all power1 as he is the fountain of all existence1--we mean only1 that the universe arose at his command1 as its instant consequence1 and that whatever he wills to exist or perish1 exists1 or is no more4 ,this simple view of power1 as the mere antecedent substance itself1 in its relation to its immediate and invariable consequences1 without the intervention of any mysterious tie1--since there surely can be nothing in nature1 but all the substances which exist in nature1--it was necessary to illustrate1 at great length1 in consequence of the very false notions1 that are generally1 or1 ,i may say1 universally prevalent on the subject4 ,the illustration1 ,i am aware1 must1 to many of you1 have appeared very tedious1 and a sufficient exemplification of that license of exhausting occasionally your attention1 and perhaps1 too1 your patience1 of which ,i claimed the right of exercise1 whenever it should appear to me necessary1 to make any important1 but abstract truth familiar to your mind4 ,i shall not regret1 however1 any temporary feeling of weariness which ,i may have occasioned1 by dwelling on this great fundamental subject1 if ,i have succeeded in making familiar to your minds1 the truths which ,i wished to impress on them1 and have freed you from those false notions of occult and unintelligible agency in causes1--as something different from the mere causes or antecedents themselves1--which appear to me to have retarded1 in a very singular degree1 the progress of philosophy1--not merely1 by habituating the mind to acquiesce in the use of language1 to which it truly affixes no meaning1 though even this evil is one of very serious injury in its general effects1--but by misdirecting its inquiries1 and leading it1 from the simplicity of nature1--in which every glance is truth1 and every step is progress1--to bewilder itself1 with the verbal mysteries of the schools1 where there is no refreshment of truth to the eye1 that is wearied with wandering only from shadow to shadow1--and where there is all the fatigue of continual progress1 without the advance of a single step4 ,even those philosophers1 who have had the wisdom to perceive1 that man can never discover any thing in the phenomena of nature1 but a succession of events1 that follow each other in regular series1--and who1 accordingly1 recommend the observation and arrangement of these regular antecedents and consequents1 as the only attainable objects of philosophy1 yet found this very advice1 on the distinction of what they have termed efficient causes1 as different from the physical causes1 or simple antecedents1 to which they advise us to devote our whole attention4 ,there are certain secret causes1 they say1 continually operating in the production of every change which we observe1 and causes which alone deserve the name of efficient2 but they are1 at the same time1 careful to tell us1 that1 although these causes are constantly operating before us1 and are all which are truly acting before us1 we must not hope1 that we shall ever be able to detect one of them2 and indeed1 the prohibition of every attempt to discover the efficient causes of phenomena1--repeated in endless varieties of precept or reproof1--is the foundation of all their rules of philosophizing2 as if the very information1--that what we are to consider exclusively1 in the phenomena of nature1 is far less important1 than what we are studiously to omit1--were not1 of itself1 more powerful1 in stimulating our curiosity to attempt the forbidden search1 than any prohibition could be in repressing it4 8,felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas40 ,this will forever be the feeling of the inquirer1 while he thinks that there are any causes1 more than those1 which he has already investigated4 ,even ,newton himself1 that sagest of observers and reasoners1 who could say1 with the simplicity of pure philosophy1 8,hypotheses non fingo40 yet showed1 as we have seen1 by one of the most hypothetical of his ,queries1 that he was not exempt from the error which he wished to discourage--that inordinate love of the unknown1 which must always lead those1 who believe that there is something intermediate and undiscovered truly existing between events1 to feel the anxious dissatisfaction of incomplete inquiry1 in considering the mere antecedents and consequents which nature exhibits1 and to turn1 therefore1 as if for comfort1 to any third circumstance1 which can be introduced1 without obvious absurdity1 as a sort of connecting link1 between the pairs of events4 ,to suppose that the mind should not have this disposition1 would1 indeed1 be to suppose it void of that principle of curiosity1 without which there can be no inquiry of any kind4 ,he who could believe1 that1 between all the visible phenomena1 there are certain invisible agencies continually operating1 which have as real an existence as all that he perceives1 and could yet content himself with numbering the visible phenomena1 and giving them names1 without any endeavour to discover the intervening powers1 by which he is constantly surrounded1 or at least to form some slight guess1 as to that universal machinery1 by which he conceived all the wonders of nature to be wrought1 must be a being as different from the common intellectual beings of this earth1 as the perfect sage of the ,stoics from the frail creatures1 of mingled vice and virtue1 that live and err around us4 ,that1 in considering the phenomena of nature1 we should confine our attention to the mere antecedents and consequents1 which succeed each other in regular series1 is unquestionably the soundest advice that can be given4 ,but it is sound advice1 for this reason more than any other1 that the regular series is1 in truth1 all that constitutes the phenomena1 and that to search for any thing more1 is not to have an unattainable object in view1 but to have no conceivable object whatever4 ,then only can the inquirer be expected to content himself with observing and classing the sequences1 which nature presents to us spontaneously1 or in obedience to our art1 when he is convinced1 that all the substances which exist in the universe--,god and the things which he has created--are every thing which truly exists in the universe1 to which nothing can be added1 which is not itself a new substance2 that there can be nothing in the events of nature1 therefore1 but the antecedents and consequents which are present in them2 and that these1 accordingly1 or nothing1 are the very causes and effects1 which he is desirous of investigating4 ,after this examination of the notions connected with the uniform successions of events1 our attention was next turned to the nature and origin of hypothetical inquiry1 which we found reason to ascribe to the imperfection of our senses1 that renders it impossible for us to know whether we have observed the whole train of sequences in any phenomenon1 from our inability to distinguish the various elements that may be the subjects of minute changes unobserved4 ,we are hence eager to supply1 by a little guess-work of fancy1 the parts unobserved1 and suppose deficiencies in our observation where there may truly have been none2 till at length1 by this habitual process1 every phenomenon becomes1 to our imagination1 the sign of something intermediate as its cause1 the discovery of which is to be an explanation of the phenomenon4 ,the mere succession of one event to another appears1 to us1 very difficult to be conceived1 because it wants that intervening something1 which we have learned to consider as a cause2 but there seems to be no longer any mystery1 if we can only suppose something intervening between them1 and can thus succeed in doubling the difficulty1 which we flatter ourselves with having removed2 since1 by the insertion of another link1 we must now have two sequences of events instead of one simple sequence4 ,this tendency of the imagination to form and rest on hypotheses1--or1 in other words1 to suppose substances present and operating1 of the existence of which we have no direct proof1--we found to be one great source of error in our practice of philosophizing4 ,another source of error1 we found to be the too great extension of what are termed general laws2 which though a less error in itself1 is yet1 in one respect1 more dangerous than the former2 because it is the error of better understandings1--of understandings that would not readily fall into the extravagant follies of hypotheses1 but acknowledge the essential importance of induction1 and think they are proceeding on it without the slightest deviation1 almost at the very moment when they are abandoning it for conjecture4 ,to observe the regular series of antecedents and consequents1 and to class these as similar or dissimilar1 are all which philosophers can do with complete certainty4 ,but there is a constant tendency in the mind1 to convert a general law into an universal law1--to suppose1 after a wide induction1 that what is true of many substances that have a very striking analogy1 is as certainly true of all that have this striking analogy1--and that what is true of them in certain circumstances1 is true of them in all circumstances1--or1 at least1 in all circumstances which are not remarkably different4 ,the widest induction which we can make1 however1 is still limited in its nature2 and1 though we may have observed substances in many situations1 there may be some new situations1 in which the event may be different1 or even1 perhaps1 the very reverse of that which we should have predicted1 by reasoning from the mere analogy of other circumstances4 ,it appeared to me necessary1 therefore1 in consequence of the very ambiguous manner in which writers on this higher branch of logic speak of reasoning from general laws to particulars1 to warn you1 that the application to particulars can be made with certainty1 only to the very particulars before observed and generalized1--and that1 however analogous other particulars may seem1 the application of the general law to them admits only of probability1 which may1 indeed1 as the induction has been wider1 and the circumstances of observed analogy more numerous1 approach more or less to certainty1 but must always be short of it1 even in its nearest approximation4 99 99 99 99 99 ,such1 then1 is physical inquiry1 both as to its objects1 and its mode of procedure1 particularly as it regards the universe without2 and the laws which regulate our inquiry in the internal world of thought are1 in every respect1 similar4 ,the same great objects are to be had in view1 and no other1--the analysis of what is complex1 and the observation and arrangement of the sequences of phenomena1 as respectively antecedent and consequent4 ,in this respect1 also1 ,i may remark1 the philosophy of matter and the philosophy of mind completely agree--that1 in both equally1 our knowledge is confined to the phenomena which they exhibit4 ,we give the name of matter to the unknown cause of various feelings1 which1 by the constitution of our nature1 it is impossible for us not to refer to something external as their cause4 ,what it is1 independent of our perception1 we know not2 but as the subject of our perception1 we regard it as that which is extended1 and consequently divisible1 impenetrable1 mobile2 and these qualities1 or whatever other qualities we may think necessary to include for expressing the particular substances that affect our senses variously1 constitute our whole definition of matter1 because1 in truth1 they constitute our whole knowledge of it4 ,to suppose us to know what it is in itself1 in absolute independence of our perception1 would be manifestly absurd3 since it is only by our perception1--that is to say1 by the feelings of our mind1--that it can be known to us at all2 and these mere feelings of the mind must depend1 at least1 as much on the laws of the mind affected1 as on the laws of the substance that affects it4 ,whatever knowledge we may acquire of it1 therefore1 is relative only1 and must be relative in all circumstances2 though1 instead of the few senses which connect us with it at present1 we were endowed with as many senses as there are1 perhaps1 qualities of matter1 the nature of which we are at present incapable of distinguishing2--the only effect of such increased number of senses being1 to render more qualities of matter known to us1 not to make matter known to us in its very essence1 as it exists without relation to mind4 8,tell me10 says ,micromegas1 an inhabitant of one of the planets of the ,dog ,star1 to the secretary of the ,academy of ,sciences in the planet ,saturn1 at which he had recently arrived in a journey through the heavens1--8,tell me1 how many senses have the men on your globe80--,i quote1 as perhaps the name has already informed you from an ingenious philosophic romance of ,voltaire1 who1 from various allusions in the work1 has evidently had ,fontenelle1 the illustrious secretary of the ,french ,academy of ,sciences1 in view1 in the picture which he gives of the ,saturnian secretary4--8,we have seventy-two senses10 answered the academician1 8and we are1 every day1 complaining of the smallness of the number4 ,our imagination goes far beyond our wants4 ,what are seventy-two senses6 and how pitiful a boundary1 even for beings with such limited perceptions1 to be cooped up within our ring1 and our five moons6 ,in spite of our curiosity1 and in spite of as many passions as can result from six dozen of senses1 we find our hours hang very heavily on our hands1 and can always find time enough for yawning40--8,i can very well believe it10 says ,micromegas1 8for1 in our globe1 we have very near one thousand senses2 and yet1 with all these1 we feel continually a sort of listless inquietude and vague desire1 which are forever telling us that we are nothing1 and that there are beings infinitely nearer perfection4 ,i have travelled a good deal in the universe4 ,i have seen many classes of mortals far beneath us1 and many as much superior2 but ,i have never had the good fortune to find any1 who had not always more desires than real necessities to occupy their life4--,and1 pray1 how long may you ,saturnians live with your few senses80 continued the ,sirian4--8,ah6 but a very short time1 indeed60 said the little man of ,saturn1 with a sigh4--8,it is the same with us10 said the traveller2 8we are forever complaining of the shortness of life4 ,it must be an universal law of nature40--8,alas60 said the ,saturnian1 8we live only five hundred great revolutions of the sun 7which is pretty much about fifteen thousand years of our counting47 ,you see well1 that this is to die almost the moment one is born4 ,our existence is a point--our duration an instant--our globe an atom4 ,scarcely have we begun to pick up a little knowledge1 when death rushes in upon us1 before we can have acquired any thing like experience4 ,as for me1 ,i cannot venture even to think of any project4 ,i feel myself but like a drop of water in the ocean2 and1 especially now1 when ,i look to you and to myself1 ,i really feel quite ashamed of the ridiculous appearance which ,i make in the universe40 8,if ,i did not know that you were a philosopher10 replied ,micromegas1 8,i should be afraid of distressing you1 when ,i tell you1 that our life is seven hundred times longer than yours4--,but what is even that8 and1 when we come to the last moment1 to have lived a single day1 and to have lived a whole eternity1 amount to the very same thing4 ,i have been in countries where they live a thousand times longer than with us2 and ,i have always found them murmuring1 just as we do ourselves4--,but you have seventy-two senses1 and they must have told you something about your globe4 ,how many properties has matter with you80--8,if you mean essential properties10 said the ,saturnian1 8without which our globe could not subsist1 we count three hundred1 extensive1 impenetrable1 mobile1 gravitation1 divisibility1 and so forth40--8,that small number10 replied the gigantic traveller1 8may be sufficient for the views which the ,creator must have had with respect to your narrow habitation4 ,your globe is little2 its inhabitants are so too4 ,you have few senses2 your matter has few qualities4 ,in all this1 ,providence has suited you most happily to each other40 8,the academician was more and more astonished with every thing which the traveller told him4 ,at length1 after communicating to each other a little of what they knew1 and a great deal of what they knew not1 and reasoning1 as well and as ill1 as philosophers usually do1 they resolved to set out together1 on a little tour of the universe40#cc ,that1 with the one thousand senses of the ,sirian1 or even the seventy-two senses of the inhabitant of ,saturn1 our notions of matter would be very different from what they are at present1 cannot be doubted2 since we should assign to it qualities1 corresponding with all the varieties of our six dozen or one thousand classes of sensations4 ,but1 even with all these sensations1 it is evident1 that we should still know as little of matter1 independent of the phenomena which it exhibits in relation to us1 as we know1 at this moment4 ,our definition of it would comprehend more phenomena2 but it would still be a definition of its phenomena only4 ,we might perhaps be able to fill up the ,saturnian catalogue of three hundred essential properties1 but these would be still only the relations of matter to our own perception4 ,a change in the mere susceptibility of our organs of sense1 or of our sentient mind1 would be relatively to us1 like a change in the whole system of things1 communicating1 as it were1 new properties to every object around us4 ,a single sense additional1 in man1 might thus be to external nature1 like the creation of the sun1 when he first burst upon it in splendour1 8like the god of the new world10 and pouring every where his own effulgency1 seemed to shed on it the very beauties which he only revealed4 ,if our knowledge of matter be relative only1 our knowledge of mind is equally so4 ,we know it only as susceptible of feelings that have already existed1 and its susceptibilities of feelings which have not arisen1 but which may1 in other circumstances1 arise1 we know as little1 as the blind can be supposed to know of colours1 or as we1 with all our senses1 know of the qualities which matter might exhibit to us1 if our own organization were different4 ,of the essence of mind1 then1 we know nothing1 but in relation to the states or feelings that form1 or have formed1 our momentary consciousness4 ,our knowledge is not absolute but relative2 though1 ,i must confess1 that the term relative is applied1 in an unusual manner1 when1 as in the present instance1 the relative and correlative are the same4 ,it is unquestionably the same individual mind1 which1 in intellectual investigation1 is at once the object and the observer4 ,but the noble endowment of memory1 with which our ,creator has blessed us1 solves all the mystery of this singular paradox4 ,in consequence of this one faculty1 our mind1 simple and indivisible as it truly is1 is1 as it were multiplied and extended1 expanding itself over that long series of sensations and emotions1 in which it seems to live again1 and to live with many lives4 ,but for memory1 there can be no question that the relation of thought to thought could not have been perceived2 and that hence there could have been no philosophy whatever1 intellectual or moral1 physical or metaphysical4 ,to this wonderful endowment1 then1 which gives us the past to compare with the present1 we owe that most wonderful of relations1 of which the same being is at once the object and the subject1 contemplating itself1 in the same manner1 as it casts its view on objects that are distant from it1 comparing thought with thought1 emotion with emotion1 approving its own moral actions1 with the complacency with which it looks on the virtues of those whom it admires and loves1 in the most remote nation or age1 or passing sentence on itself1 as if on a wretch whom it loathed1 that was trembling with conscious delinquency1 under the inquisition of a severe and all-knowing judge4 ,the past feelings of the mind1 then1 are1 as it were1 objects present to the mind itself1 and acquire1 thus truly1 a sort of relative existence1 which enables us to class the phenomena of our own spiritual being as we class the phenomena of the world without4 ,the mind is that which we know to have been susceptible of all the variety of feelings which we remember2 and it is only as it is susceptible of all these varieties of feeling1 that we can have any knowledge of it4 ,we define it therefore1 by stating its various susceptibilities1 including more or fewer of these1 in our definition1 as we may either have observed or remembered more or less1 or generalized more or less what we have observed and remembered2 precisely as in our definition of matter1 we include more or fewer qualities1 according to the extent of our previous observation and arrangement4 ,that we know matter1 only as relative to our own susceptibility of being affected by it1 does not lessen the value of the knowledge of it1 which we are able to acquire2 and1 indeed1 it is only as it is capable of affecting us1 that the knowledge of it can be of any direct and immediate utility4 ,it would1 indeed1 be the very absurdity of contradiction1 to suppose ourselves acquainted with qualities which cannot affect us4 ,but1 even though this were possible1 how profitless would the knowledge be1 compared with the knowledge of the qualities which are capable of affecting us2 like the knowledge of the seasons of the planet ,saturn1 or of the planets that have the ,dog ,star for their sun1 compared with the more important knowledge of the seasons of our own globe1 by which we have the comfort of anticipating1 in the labours of spring1 the abundance of autumn1 and gather in autumn the fruits1 which1 as products of vernal labour1 are truly fruits of the spring4 ,to know matter1 even relatively1 as our limited senses allow us to know it1 is to have knowledge which can scarcely be called limited4 ,nothing1 indeed1 can seem more narrow in extent1 if we think only of the small number of our senses1 by which alone the communication can be carried on4 ,but what infinity of objects has nature presented to each6 ,in the mere forms and colours that strike our eyes1 what splendid variety6 the proportion of all things that bloom or live1 the earth1 the ocean1 the universe1 and almost ,god himself appearing to our very senses1 in the excellence and beauty of the works which ,he has made6 ,it is the same1 with respect to the mind1 though we know it only by its susceptibilities of affection1 in the various feelings of our momentary consciousness1 and cannot hope to know it1 but as the permanent subject of all these separate consciousnesses2 to know thus relatively only1 the affections even of one single substance1 is to have a field of the most boundless and inexhaustible wonders ever present and open to our inquiry6 ,it may be said to comprehend every thing which we perceive1 and remember1 and imagine1 and compare1 and admire1 all those mysterious processes of thought1 which1 in the happy efforts of the philosopher and the poet1 are concerned in the production of their noblest results1 and which are not less deserving of our regard1 as they are every moment exercised by all1 in the humble intellectual functions of common life4 ,in analyzing and arranging the mental phenomena1 then1 we consider phenomena1 that are diversified1 indeed1 in individuals1 but1 as species1 are still common to all2 for there is no power possessed by the most comprehensive intellect1 which it does not share1 in some proportion1 with the dullest and rudest of mankind4 ,all men perceive1 remember1 reason1--all1 to a certain degree at least1 from their little theories1 both physical and metaphysical1 of the conduct of their fellow men1 and of the passing events of nature2 and all1 occasionally1 enliven their social intercourse1 or their solitary hours1 with inventions of fancy1 that last but for a moment indeed1 and are not worthy of lasting longer1 but which are products of the same species of intellectual energy1 that gave existence to those glorious works1 to which ages have listened with increasing reverence1 and which1 immortal as the spirits that produced them1 are yet to command the veneration of every future age4 ,when we see before us1 in its finished magnificence1 a temple1 appropriated to the worship of the ,supreme ,being1 and almost worthy of being filled with his presence1 we scarcely think that it is erected according to the same simple principles1 and formed of the same stone and mortar1 as the plain dwellings around us1 adapted to the hourly and humble uses of domestic life2 and by a similar illusion1 when we consider the splendid works of intellectual art1 we can scarcely bring ourselves to think1 that genius is but a form of general tendencies of association1 of which all partake2 and that its magnificent conceptions1 therefore1 rise1 according to the same simple laws which regulate the course of thought of the vulgar4 ,in this universality of diffusion as general tendencies1 that may be variously excited by varying circumstances1 our intellectual powers are similar to those other principles of our nature1--our emotions1 and whatever feelings more immediately connected with moral action have been usually distinguished by the name of our active powers4 ,in the philosophy of both we consider1 not a few distinguished individuals1 as possessed of principles essentially distinct in kind1 but the species man4 ,they are to be found1 wherever there is a human being2 and we do not infer with more certainty1 when we perceive the impression of a foot upon the sand1 that man has been there1 than we expect to find in him1 whatever may be his state of barbarism or civilization1 some form of the common powers1 and passions1 which1 though directed perhaps to different objects1 we have felt and witnessed in the society around us4 8,the two-legged animal10 says ,dr ,reid1 8that eats of nature's dainties what his taste or appetite craves1 and satisfies his thirst at the crystal fountain2 who propagates his kind as occasion and lust prompt2 repels injuries1 and takes alternate labour and repose2 is like a tree in the forest1 purely of nature's growth4 ,but this same savage has within him the seeds of the logician1 the man of taste and breeding1 the orator1 the statesman1 the man of virtue1 and the saint2 which seeds1 though planted in his mind by nature1 yet1 through want of culture and exercise1 must lie forever buried1 and be hardly perceivable1 by himself1 or by others40#cd ,even of those passions of a prouder kind1 which attract our attention only when they are on a theatre that allows their full display1 some vestiges are to be traced universally2 though in different individuals1 they may exist with very different degrees of influence1 and though their influence1 according to the degree of power possessed by the individual1 may be attended with very different consequences1 to the few1 or the many1 comprehended within the wide or narrow circle1 to which his power extends4 ----8,not kings alone1 ,each villager has his ambition to2 ,no sultan prouder than his fetter'd slave4 ,slaves build their little ,babylons of straw1 ,echo the proud ,assyrian in their hearts1 ,and cry1 ,behold the wonders of my might40#ce ,it is this universal diffusion of sympathies and emotions1 indeed1 which gives its whole force to morality1 as a universal obligation2 and renders ethics truly a science4 ,nature1 in requiring the fruits of virtue from all1 has not fixed the seeds of it1 only in a few breasts4 8,nulli prclusa virtus est1 omnibus patet1 omnes admittit1 omnes invitat1 ingenuos1 libertinos1 servos1 reges et exsules2 non eligit domum1 nec censum2 nudo homine contenta est40#cf ,virtue has no partial favours or exclusions4 ,she is open to all1 she admits all1 she invites all4 ,she asks no wealth nor ancestry2 but she asks the man1--the master or the slave1 the cottager and his lord1 the sovereign and the exile4 ,though we know mind1 then only relatively1 in the series of feelings1 of which we are conscious1 as we know matter relatively in the series of phenomena1 which it exhibits to our observation1 we have1 in this relative knowledge1 subjects worthy of the contemplation of beings permitted1 in these shadowings of a higher power1 to trace some faint image of the very majesty which formed them4 ,even of the humblest mind1 as we have seen1 the various affections1 sensitive1 intellectual1 and moral1 that arise in it as affections of our common nature1 are truly admirable2 and what an increase of sublimity do they acquire1 in minds of higher powers6 ,but still1 it must be remembered1 that even in minds the most sublime1 as much as in the most humble1 all which can be truly known is the successive phenomena which they exhibit1 not the essence of the spiritual substance itself2 and that1 even of these successive phenomena1 though we become gradually acquainted with more and more1 we probably never can arrive at any bound which is to limit their number4 ,the susceptibilities of the mind1 by which1 in different circumstances1 it may exist in different states1 are certainly as truly infinite as the space which surrounds us1 or as that eternity which1 in its progress1 measures the successions of our feelings1 and all the other changes in the universe4 ,every new thought1 or combination of thoughts1 is in truth a new state or affection1 or phenomenon of the mind1 and1 therefore1 a proof of the susceptibility of that new affection1 as an original quality of the mind2 and every rise in knowledge1 from age to age1 and from inquirer to inquirer1 is thus only the developement of susceptibilities1 which the mind possessed before1 though the circumstances which at last called them forth1 never existed till the moment of the developement4 ,what should we think of the half-naked savage of some barbarous island1 if1 in the pride of his ignorance1 he were to conceive his own thoughts and feelings1 to be the noblest of which the human intellect is capable8 and1 perhaps1 even the mind of a ,newton1 is but the mind of such a savage1 compared with what man is hereafter to become4 ,,footnotes3 #cc ,voltaire uvres1 tom4 xiv4 p4 #ii-aja4 #dto ,edit4 of #agga4 #cd ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 ,introd4 p4 #g4 #hvo4 ,edit4 #ce ,young's ,night ,thoughts1 vii4 v4 #cib-cig4 #cf ,seneca de ,beneficiis1 lib4 iii4 c4 #ah4 ,,lecture ,x4 ,,the ,,same ,,subject ,,continued4 ,gentlemen1 after laying down the general laws of physical inquiry1 ,i had begun1 in the conclusion of my last ,lecture1 to consider them1 more particularly in their relation to the study of mind4 ,one very important circumstance of agreement in the physical investigations of mind and matter1 we found to be1 that1 of both matter and mind1 the successive phenomena are all which we truly know1 though by the very constitution of our nature1 it is impossible for us not to ascribe these to some permanent subject4 ,matter is the permanent subject of certain qualities1 extension1 and its consequent divisibility1 attraction1 repulsion2 that is to say1 it is the permanent exhibiter to us of certain varying phenomena which we observe4 ,mind is the permanent subject of certain qualities or states or affections of a different class--perception1 memory1 reason1 joy1 grief1 love1 hate2 that is to say1 of certain varying phenomena of which we are conscious4 ,what matter is independent of our perception2 what mind is independent of its temporary variety of feeling1 it is impossible for us to discover2 since whatever new knowledge of matter we can suppose ourselves to acquire1 must be acquired by our perception1 and must1 therefore1 be relative to it2 and whatever new knowledge we can suppose ourselves to acquire of mind1 must be itself a state or affection of the mind1 and1 therefore1 only a new mental phenomenon to be added to those with which we were before acquainted1 as one of the many states in which the permanent substance mind is capable of existing4 ,since it is only by their relation to our own feelings1 then1 that substances can be known to us1 beyond these relations it would be vain for us to think of penetrating2 as vain1 at least1 as would be the attempts of the deaf to discover1 by a process of reasoning1 the nature of the sensations of sound1 or of the blind to determine1 not the lines of direction merely1 in which the various coloured rays of light pass after refraction1 for these they may optically determine1 but the various sensations1 corresponding with all the varieties of tint into which the sun-beams are broken by the drops of a falling shower4 ,the substance matter1 the substance mind1 are1 in this respect1 to the whole race of metaphysical inquirers1 what the rainbow1 as a series of colours1 is to opticians1 who have never seen4 ,the absurdity of such inquiries1 into any thing more than the mere phenomena1 if it be not sufficiently evident of itself1 may1 perhaps1 be rendered more apparent1 by a very easy supposition4 ,let us imagine the permanent unknown substance matter1 and the permanent unknown substance mind1 to be rendered1 by the same divine power which made them1 altogether different in their own absolute essence1 as they exist independently1 but to exhibit relatively1 precisely the same phenomena as at present1--that spring1 and summer1 and autumn1 and winter1 in every appearance that can affect our organs of perception1 succeed each other as now1 pouring out the same profusion of foliage1 and flowers1 and fruits1 and1 after the last gladness of the vintage and the harvest1 sweeping the few lingering blossoms1 with those desolating blasts1 which seem like the very destroyers of nature1 while they are only leading in1 with great freshness1 under the same benevolent eye of ,heaven1 the same delightful circle of beauty and abundance1--that1 in mind1 the same sensations are excited by the same objects1 and are followed by the same remembrances1 and comparisons1 and hopes1 and fears2--in these circumstances1 while all the phenomena which we observe1 and all the phenomena of which we are conscious1 continue exactly the same1 can we believe1 that we should be able to discover the essential change1 which1 according to this supposition1 had taken place1 in the permanent subjects of these unvaried phenomena6 ,and1 if1 as long as the external and internal phenomena continued exactly the same1 we should be incapable of discovering1 or even suspecting1 the slightest change1 where1 by supposition1 there had been a change so great1 how absurd is it to conceive that the changed or unchanged nature of the substance itself1 as it exists independently of the phenomenon1 ever can become known to us4 ,he1 indeed1 it may always safely be presumed1 knows least of the mind1 who thinks that he knows its substance best4 8,what is the soul80 was a question once put to ,marivaux4 8,i know nothing of it10 he answered1 8but that it is spiritual and immortal40 8,well10 said his friend1 8let us ask ,fontenelle1 and he will tell us what it is40 8,no10 cried ,marivaux1 8ask any body but ,fontenelle1 for he has too much good sense to know any more about it than we do40 ,it is to the phenomena only1 then1 that our attention is to be given1 not to any vain inquiries into the absolute nature of the substances which exhibit the phenomena4 ,this alone is legitimate philosophy1--philosophy which must forever retain its claim to our assent1 amid the rise and fall of all those spurious speculations1 to which our vanity is so fond of giving the names of theory and system4 ,whatever that may be1 in itself1 which feels1 and thinks1 and wills1--if our feelings1 and thoughts1 and volitions be the same--all which we can know1 and compare1 and arrange1 must be the same2 and1 while we confine our attention to these1 the general laws of their succession which we infer1 and the various relations which they seem to bear to each other1 may be admitted equally by those whose opinions1 as to the absolute nature of the feeling and thinking principle1 differ fundamentally4 ,it requires no peculiar supposition1 or belief1 as to the nature of the mind1 to know1 that its trains of thought are influenced1 by former habits1 or casual association2 and every fact1 which the immaterialist has accurately observed and arranged1 with respect to the influence of habit or association1 may thus1 with equal reason1 form a part of the intellectual and moral creed of the materialist also4 ,on these two systems it is not at present my intention to make any remarks2 all which ,i wish1 now1 is to explain to you1 how independent the real philosophy of the mind is1 of any fanciful conjectures1 which may be formed1 with respect to its essence4 ,it differs from these1 as ,mr4 ,stewart has well observed1 in the same manner 8as the inquiries of ,galileo1 concerning the laws of moving bodies1 differ from the disputes of the ancient ,sophists1 concerning the existence and the nature of motion10 or as the conclusions of ,newton1 with respect to the law of gravitation1 differ from his query concerning the mode in which he supposed that gravity might possibly be produced4 ,the hypothesis1 involved in the query1 you may admit or reject2 the conclusions1 with respect to the law of gravitation itself1 as far as relates to our planetary system1 are1 ,i may say1 almost beyond your power of rejecting4 ,the philosophy of mind then1 and the philosophy of matter1 agree1 in this respect1 that our knowledge is1 in both1 confined to the mere phenomena4 ,they agree also1 in the two species of inquiry which they admit4 ,the phenomena of mind1 in the same manner as we have seen in the case of matter1 may be considered as complex and susceptible of analysis1 or they may be considered as successive in a certain order1 and bearing1 therefore1 to each other the reciprocal relation of causes and effects4 ,that we can know the phenomena1 only as far as we have attended to their sequences1 and that1 without experiment1 therefore1 it would have been impossible for us to predict any of their successions1 is equally true1 in mind as in matter4 ,many of the successions1 indeed1 are so familiar to us1 that it may appear to you1 at first1 very difficult to conceive1 that we should not have been able1 at least with respect to them1 to predict1 originally1 what antecedents would have been followed by what consequents4 ,we may allow certainly1 that we should not have been able to foresee the pleasure which we receive from the finer works of imitative art--from the successions1 or co-existences1 in music1 of sounds1 that1 considered separately1 would scarcely be counted among the sources of delight--from the charm of versification1 that depends on circumstances1 so very slight1 as to be altogether destroyed1 and even converted into pain1 by the change of quantity of a single syllable4 ,but1 that the remembrance of pleasure should not be attended with desire of enjoying it again1 seems to us almost inconsistent with the very nature of the pleasing emotion4 ,in like manner1 we may allow1 that we could not have predicted the sympathy which we feel with the distresses of others1 when they arise from causes that cannot affect us1 and yet make1 for the time1 the agony1 which we merely behold1 a part of our own existence4 ,but we can scarcely think1 that we require any experience1 to know1 that the contemplation of pain1 which we may ourselves have to endure1 should be the cause of that painful feeling1 to which we give the name of fear1 or that the actual suffering should be accompanied with the desire of relief4 ,the truth is1 however1 that1 in all these cases1 and in all of them equally1--it would have been impossible1 but for experience1 to predict the consequent of any of the antecedents4 ,the pleasure1 which we feel1 in the contemplation of a work of art1 the pain1 which we feel1 at the sight of the misery of others1 are as much the natural effects of states of mind preceding them1 as the fear of pain is the effect of the consideration of pain as hanging over us4 ,our various feelings1 similar or dissimilar1 kindred or discordant1 are all mere states of the mind2 and there is nothing1 in any one state of the mind1 considered in itself1 which1 necessarily1 involves the succession of any other state of mind4 ,that particular state1 for example1 which constitutes the mere feeling of pain1 instead of being attended by that different state which constitutes the desire of being freed from pain1 might have continued1 as one uniform feeling1 or might have ceased1 and been succeeded by some other state1 though in the original adaptation of our mental frames1 by that ,creator's wisdom which planned the sequences of its phenomena1 the particular affection1 which constitutes desire1 had not been one of the innumerable varieties of affection1 of which the mind was forever to be susceptible4 ,what susceptibilities the mind has exhibited in the ordinary circumstances in which it has been placed1 we know1 and they have been limited to a certain number1 corresponding with the feelings which have arisen in these circumstances4 ,but the ,almighty ,power1 who fixed this particular number1 might have increased or lessened the number at ,his pleasure1 in the same manner1 as ,he might1 at ,his pleasure1 have multiplied or diminished the whole number of his animated creatures2 and1 where there has been no limit1 but the will of the ,limiter1 it is experience only which can give us any knowledge of the actual limitation4 ,we are always too much inclined to believe1 that we know what must have been1 because we know what is1--and to suppose ourselves acquainted1 not merely with the gracious ends which ,supreme ,goodness had in view1 in creating us1 but with the very object1 which each separate modification of our intellectual and moral constitution was intended to answer4 ,i would not1 indeed1 go so far as ,pope1 in that passage of the ,essay on ,man1 in which he seems to imply1 that our ignorance of the wise and harmonious intentions of ,providence1 in the constitution of our mind1 is like the ignorance of the inferior animals1 as to the motives which influence the follies and inconsistencies of their capricious master4 8,when the proud steed shall know1 why man restrains ,his fiery course1 or drives him o'er the plains1 ,when the dull ox1 why now he breaks the clod1 ,is now a victim1 and now ,egypt's ,god1-- ,then shall man's pride and dulness comprehend ,his action's1 passion's1 being's1 use and end2 ,why doing1 suffering1 check'd1 impell'd2 and why ,this hour a slave1 the next a deity40#cg ,our ,divine ,author has not left us1 even now1 to darkness like this4 ,we know1 in a great measure1 the use and end of our actions and passions1 because we know who it is who has formed us to do and to bear1--and who1 from ,his own moral excellence1 cannot have given us any susceptibility1 even that of suffering1 which does not tend1 upon the whole1 to strengthen virtue1 and to consecrate1 as in some purifying sacrifice1 the sufferer of a moment to affections more holy1 and happiness more divine4 ,yet1 though we know1 in this general sense1 our action's1 passion's1 being's1 use and end1 as subservient to the universal plan of ,infinite ,goodness1 we are not so well acquainted with the particular uses of each state of the mind1 as to have been able to predict it1 merely as a part or consequence of the plan4 ,the knowledge of every successive modification of our thought1 is still as much the result of experience1 as if the gracious plan1 to which all these successive modifications are instrumental1 were wholly unknown to us3--,yet1 such is the influence of habit1 in familiarizing us to phenomena1 that we think1 that experience is nothing1 only in those cases1 in which the power of experience has been most frequently and familiarly felt2 and while in the rarer successions of feelings1 we allow1 that there are phenomena of the mind1 which we could not have foreknown1 we find it difficult to imagine1 in the recurrences of the common mental phenomena1 that1 even originally1 it could have required any peculiar foresight to predict1 what we are now conscious of predicting with a readiness1 that seems to us almost like the instant glance of intuition4 ,in the philosophy of external matter1 the greater or less familiarity of events produces an illusion exactly similar4 ,there are certain phenomena1 which1 we readily admit1 could not1 of themselves1 and without experience1 have indicated to us1 either the changes which preceded them1 or the changes which were to follow2 while there are other phenomena1 more familiar1 which seem to us to require no experience1 for informing us1 both of their antecedents and consequents1--merely because they have been of such frequent occurrence1 that we do not remember the time1 when we were ignorant of them1 or of the circumstances1 by which they are usually preceded and followed4 ,that a magnetic needle should tend to the north1 rather than to any other point1--and that glass1 or amber1 rubbed in a certain manner1 should exhibit the very striking phenomena of electricity1 transmitting this power through certain substances1 and not transmitting it through others1 which have nothing peculiar in their sensible qualities1 to mark them as less or better fitted for this communication1 appear to us to be facts1 which we could not have known1 till we had actually witnessed them4 ,but that a stone1 rolled from the hand1 should continue to move in the same direction1 after quitting the hand1 seems a fact1 which it must have been easy for us to foresee4 ,we are not aware1 that it is only the more familiar occurrence of the one event1 than of the others1 which makes its sequence appear more obvious2 and that1 but for this greater familiarity1 we might as readily have supposed1 that a stone1 after quitting the hand which flung it1 should have remained in the air1 or fallen to the ground1 as that the needle1 without any tendency to the north1 would remain stationary1 to whatever point of the compass we might turn it4 ,such is the influence of early acquaintance with the more frequent and obvious events1 whether in mind or in matter4 ,we have become familiar with them1 and with their causes and consequences1 long before reflection2 and it is not very wonderful1 that we should conceive ourselves to have known always1 what we do not remember to have ever learned4 ,that to know1 in the series of mental phenomena1 what are the antecedents1 and what their consequents1 is one great branch of the ,philosophy of ,mind1 ,i surely need not attempt to demonstrate2 and it would be equally superfluous to demonstrate its importance1 especially after the remarks--if even these were necessary1--which ,i made in a former ,lecture2 since it is not merely1 as a very interesting branch of speculative knowledge1 that it is valuable1 but1 as ,i then showed1 still more valuable1 as the foundation of every intellectual art1 especially of those noble and almost divine arts1 which have1 for their immediate object1 the illumination and amendment of mankind--the art of training ignorance to wisdom1 and even wisdom itself to knowledge still more sublime1--of fixing youthful innocence in the voluntary practice of virtue1 that is as yet little more than an instinct of which it is scarcely conscious1--of breathing that moral inspiration1 which strengthens feeble goodness1 when it is about to fall1 tames even the wildest excesses of the wildest passions1 and leads back1 as if by the invisible power of some guardian spirit1 even ,guilt itself1 to the happiness which it had lost1 and the holier wishes1 which it rejoices to feel once more4 ,since the phenomena of the mind1 however1 are obviously successive1 like those of matter1 the consideration of the sequences of the mental phenomena1 and the arrangement of them in certain classes1 may appear to you sufficiently analogous to the consideration and arrangement of the sequences of the phenomena of the material world4 ,but that there should be any inquiries1 in the philosophy of mind1 corresponding with the inquiries into the composition of bodies1 may appear to you improbable1 or almost absurd2 since the mind1 and consequently its affections--which ,i use as a short general term for expressing all the variety of the modes in which it can be affected1 and which1 therefore1 are only the mind itself as it exists in different states1--must be always simple and indivisible4 ,yet1 wonderful1 or even absurd1 as it may seem1 notwithstanding the absolute simplicity of the mind itself1 and consequently of all its feelings or momentary states1--the ,science of ,mind is1 in its most important respects1 a source of analysis1 or of a process which ,i have said to be virtually the same as analysis2 and it is only1 as it is in this virtual sense analytical1 that any discovery1 at least that any important discovery1 can be expected to be made in it4 ,it is1 indeed1 scarcely possible to advance1 even a step in intellectual physics1 without the necessity of performing some sort of analysis1 by which we reduce to simpler elements1 some complex feeling that seems to us virtually to involve them4 ,in the mind of man1 all is in a state of constant and ever-varying complexity1 and a single sentiment may be the slow result of innumerable feelings4 ,there is not a single pleasure1 or pain1 or thought1 or emotion1 that may not1--by the influence of that associating principle1 which is afterwards to come under our consideration1--be so connected with other pleasures1 or pains1 or thoughts1 or emotions1 as to form with them1 forever after1 an union the most intimate4 ,the complex1 or seemingly complex1 phenomena of thought1 which result from the constant operation of this principle of the mind1 it is the labour of the intellectual inquirer to analyze1 as it is the labour of the chemist to reduce the compound bodies1 on which he operates1 however close and intimate their combination may be1 to their constituent elements4 ,the process1 and the instruments by which the analyses are carried on1 are1 indeed1 as different as matter is from mind1--cumbrous as matter1 in the one case1--in the other1 simple and spiritual as mind itself4 ,the aggregates of matter we analyze by the use of other matter1 adding substance after substance1 and varying manipulation after manipulation2--the complex mental phenomena we analyze virtually by mere reflection2 the same individual mind being the subject of analysis1 the instrument of analysis1 and the analysing inquirer4 ,when ,i speak1 however1 of the union of separate thoughts and feelings in one complex sentiment or emotion1 and of the analytic power of reflection or reason1 it must not be conceived1 that ,i use these words in a sense precisely the same as when they are applied to matter4 ,a mass of matter1 as we have seen1 is1 in truth1 not one body merely1 but a multitude of contiguous bodies2 all of which1 at the time1 may be considered as having a separate existence1 and as placed together more by accidental apposition1 than by any essential union2--and analysis is nothing more than what its etymology denotes1 a loosening of these from each other4 ,in strictness of language1 this composition and analysis cannot take place in mind4 ,even the most complex feeling is still only one feeling2 for we cannot divide the states or affections of our mind into separate self-existing fractions1 as we can divide a compound mass of matter into masses1 which are separate and self-existing1--nor distinguish half a joy or sorrow from a whole joy or sorrow4 ,the conception of gold1 and the conception of a mountain1 may separately arise1 and may be followed by the conception of a golden mountain2 which may be said to be a compound of the two1 in the sense in which ,i use that word1 to express merely1 that what is thus termed compound or complex is the result of certain previous feelings1 to which1 as if existing together1 it is felt to have the virtual relation of equality1 or the relation which a whole bears to the parts that are comprehended in it4 ,but the conception of a golden mountain is still as much one state or feeling of one simple mind1 as either of the separate conceptions of gold and of a mountain which preceded it4 ,in cases of this kind1 indeed1 it is the very nature of the resulting feeling to seem to us thus complex2 and we are led1 by the very constitution of our mind itself1 to consider what we term a complex idea1 as equivalent to the separate ideas from which it results1 or as comprehensive of them1--as being truly to our conception--though to our conception only--and1 therefore1 only virtually or relatively to us the inquirers--the same1 as if it were composed of the separate feelings co-existing1 as the elements of a body co-exist in space4 ,it is this feeling of the relation of certain states of mind to certain other states of mind1 which solves the whole mystery of mental analysis1 that seemed at first so inexplicable1--the virtual decomposition1 in our thought1 of what is by its very nature1 indivisible4 ,the mind1 indeed1 it must be allowed1 is absolutely simple in all its states2 every separate state or affection of it must therefore1 be absolutely simple2 but in certain cases1 in which a feeling is the result of other feelings preceding it1 it is its very nature to appear to involve the union of those preceding feelings2 and to distinguish the separate sensations1 or thoughts1 or emotions1 of which1 on reflection1 it thus seems to be comprehensive1 is to perform an intellectual process1 which1 though not a real analysis1 is an analysis at least relatively to our conception4 ,it may still1 indeed1 be said with truth1 that the different feelings1--the states or affections of mind which we term complex1--are absolutely simple and indivisible1 as much as the feelings or affections of mind which we term simple4 ,of this there can be no doubt4 ,but the complexity with which alone we are concerned is not absolute but relative1--a seeming complexity1 which is involved in the very feeling of relation of every sort4 ,that we are thus impressed with certain feelings of relation of conceptions to conceptions1 no one can doubt who knows1 that all science has its origin in these very feelings2 and equivalence1 or equality1 is one of those relations1 which1 from its very constitution1 it would be as impossible for the mind in certain circumstances1 not to feel1 as it would be impossible for it1 in certain other circumstances1 not to have those simple feelings which it compares4 ,with perfect organs of vision1 and in the full light of day1 it is not possible for us to look on a tree1 or a rock1 without perceiving it2 but it is not more possible for us to form a conception of two trees1 without regarding this state of mind1 simple though it truly is1 when absolutely considered as virtually involving1 or as equal to1 two of those separate feelings1 which constituted the conception of a single tree4 ,on this mere feeling of virtual equivalence1 is founded all the demonstration of those sciences1 which claim the glory of being peculiarly demonstrative2 our equations and proportions of abstract number and quantity involving continually this analytic valuation of notions1 as reciprocally proportional4 ,our conception of an angle of forty-five degrees is one state or affection of mind1--one state of one simple indivisible substance2--such1 too1 is our conception of a right angle4 ,our notion of four or eight is as much one affection of mind1 as our notion of a simple unit4 ,but1 in reflecting on the separate states of mind which constitute these notions1 we are impressed with certain relations which they seem1 to us1 reciprocally to bear1 and we consider the angle of forty-five degrees as equal to half the angle of ninety degrees1 and our notion of eight as involving or equal to two of four4 ,if one state of mind1 which constitutes the notion of a certain abstract number or quantity1 had not been considered in this sort of virtual comprehensiveness1 as bearing the relation of equality1 or proportion1 to other states of mind1 which constitute other abstract notions of the same species1 mathematics would not merely have lost their certainty1 but there could not1 in truth1 have been any such science as mathematics4 ,the intellectual analysis1 which appears to me to constitute so important a part of the science of mind1 is nothing more than the successive developement1 in application to the various mental phenomena1 of this feeling of equivalence1 or comprehensiveness1 which is not confined to the mathematical notions of number and quantity1 7though1 from the greater simplicity of these1 their equality or proportion may be more accurately distinguished17 but extends to every thought and feeling which we regard as complex1 that is to say1 to almost every thought and feeling of which the mind is susceptible4 ,we compare virtue with virtue1 talent with talent1 not1 indeed1 with the same precision1 but certainly in the same manner1 and with the same feeling of proportion1 as we compare intellectually one angle with another2 and we ask what ideas are involved in our complex notions of religion and government1 with as strong a feeling that a number of ideas are virtually involved or comprehended in them1 as when we ask1 how often the square of two is repeated in the cube of six4 ,analysis1 then1 in the ,science of ,mind1 you will perceive1 is founded wholly on the feeling of relation which one state of mind seems to us to bear to other states of mind1 as comprehensive of them2 but1 while this seeming complexity is felt1 it is the same thing to our analysis1 as if the complexity1 instead of being virtual and relative only1 were absolute and real4 ,it may be objected to the application of the term analysis to the ,science of ,mind1 that it is a term which1 its etymology shews1 as ,i have already admitted1 to be borrowed from matter1 and to convey1 as applied to the mind1 a notion in some degree different from its etymological sense4 ,but this is an objection which may be urged1 with at least equal force1 against every term1 or almost every term1 of our science4 ,in our want of a peculiar metaphysical language1 we are obliged in this1 as in every other case1 to borrow a metaphysical language from the material world2 and we are very naturally led to speak of mental composition and analysis1 since to the mind which feels the relation of equivalence or comprehensiveness1 it is precisely the same thing as if our ideas and emotions1 that result from former ideas and emotions1 and are felt by us as if involving these in one complex whole1 could be actually divided into the separate elements which appear to us thus virtually or relatively to be comprehended in them4 ,it is from having neglected this branch of the physical investigation of the mind1--by far the more important of the two1--and having fixed their attention solely on the successions of its phenomena1 that some philosophers have been led to disparage the science as fruitless of discovery1 and even to deride the pretensions or the hopes of those who do not consider it as absolutely exhausted2--,i will not say now merely1 in the present improved state of the science1 but as not exhausted almost before philosophy began1 in the rude consciousness of the rudest savage1 who saw1 and remembered1 and compared1 and hoped1 and feared2 and must1 therefore1 it is said1 have known what it is to see1 and remember1 and compare1 and hope1 and fear4 ,if the phenomena of the mind were to be regarded merely as successive1--which is one only of the two lights in which they may be physically viewed1--it might1 indeed1 be said1 with a little more appearance of truth1 that this mere succession must be as familiar to the unreflecting mind as to the mind of the philosopher2 though1 even in this limited sense1 the remark is far from being accurate4 ,but the phenomena have other relations1 as well as those of succession1--relations which are not involved in the mere consciousness of the moment1 but are discoverable by reflection only1--and to the knowledge of which1 therefore1 addition after addition may be made by every new generation of reflecting inquirers4 ,from the very instant of its first existence1 the mind is constantly exhibiting phenomena more and more complex1--sensations1 thoughts1 emotions1 all mingling together1 and almost every feeling modifying1 in some greater or less degree1 the feelings that succeed it2--and as1 in chemistry1 it often happens1 that the qualities of the separate ingredients of a compound body are not recognizable by us1 in the apparently different qualities of the compound itself1--so1 in this spontaneous chemistry of the mind1 the compound sentiment1 that results from the association of former feelings1 has1 in many cases1 on first consideration1 so little resemblance to these constituents of it1 as formerly existing in their elementary state1 that it requires the most attentive reflection to separate1 and evolve distinctly to others1 the assemblages which even a few years may have produced4 ,indeed1 so complex are the mental phenomena1 and so difficult of analysis1--even in those most common cases1 which may be said to be familiar to all1--that it is truly wonderful that the difficulty of this analysis1 and the field of inquiry which this very difficulty opens1 should not have occurred to the disparagers of intellectual discovery1 and made them feel1 that what they were not able to explain could not be so well known to all mankind as to be absolutely incapable of additional illustration4 ,the savage1 they will tell us1 is conscious of what he feels in loving his country1 as well as the sage2 but1 does he know as well1 or can even the sage himself inform us with precision1 what the various elementary feelings have been1 that have successively modified1 or rather1 that have constituted this local attachment8 ,the peasant1 indeed1 may have the feeling of beauty1 like the artist who produces it1 or the speculative inquirer1 who analyses this very complex emotion-- 8,ask the swain1 ,who journeys homeward1 from a summer day's ,long labour1 why1 forgetful of his toils ,and due repose1 he loiters to behold ,the sunshine gleaming1 as through amber clouds1 ,o'er all the western sky8 ,full soon1 ,i ween1 ,his rude expression1 and untutor'd airs1 ,beyond the power of language1 will unfold ,the form of ,beauty smiling at his heart1 ,how lovely1 how commanding60#ch ,but the mere emotion which beauty produces1 is not the knowledge of the simpler feelings that have composed or modified it2 and though the pleasure and admiration were to continue exactly the same1 the peasant would surely have learned something1 if he could be made to understand1 that beauty was more than the form and colour which his eye perceived4 ,what is thus true of beauty as differently understood by the peasant and the philosopher1 is true1 in like manner1 of all the other complex mental phenomena4 ,it would1 indeed1 be as reasonable to affirm1 that1 because we all move our limbs1 we are all equally acquainted with the physiology of muscular motion2 or1 to take a case still more exactly appropriate1 that we know all the sublimest truths of arithmetic and geometry1 because we know all the numbers and figures of the mere relations of which these are the science1--as that we are all acquainted with the physiology of the mind1 and the number of elements which enter into our various feelings1 because we all perceive1 and remember1 and love1 and hate4 ,it is1 it will be allowed1 chiefly1 or perhaps1 wholly1 as it is analytical1 that the science of mind admits of discovery2 but1 as a science of analysis1 in which new relations are continually felt on reflection1 it presents us with a field of discovery as rich1 and1 ,i may say1 almost as inexhaustible in wonders1 as that of the universe without4 8,it is thus10 ,i have elsewhere remarked1 8even in phenomena1 which seem so simple as scarcely to have admitted combination1 what wonders have been developed by scientific inquiry6 ,perception itself1 that primary function of the mind1 which was surely the same before ,berkeley examined the laws of vision as at present1 is now regarded by us very differently1 in relation to the most important of its organs2 and it would not be easy to find1 amid all the brilliant discoveries of modern chemistry1 and even in the whole range of the physics of matter1 a proposition more completely revolting to popular belief1 than that1 which it is now the general faith of philosophers1 that the sense of sight1 which seems to bring the farthest hills of the most extended landscape1 and the very boundlessness of space before our view1 is1 of itself1 incapable of shewing us a single line of longitudinal distance40#ci ,if1 as has been strongly affirmed1 the science of mind be a science that is1 by its very nature1 insusceptible of improvement by discovery1 it must have been so1 before the time of ,berkeley as now1 and it might have been a sufficient answer to all the arguments which he adduced in support of his theory of vision1 that the phenomena which he boasted to have analysed1 were only the common and familiar phenomena of a sense that had been exercised by all mankind4 8,the vulgar10 ,i have said1 8would gaze with astonishment1 were they to perceive an electrician inflame gunpowder with an icicle2 but they would not be less confounded by those dazzling subtleties with which metaphysicians would persuade them1 that the very actions which they feel to be benevolent and disinterested1 had their source in the same principle of selfishness1 which makes man a knave or a tyrant4 ,that this particular doctrine is false1 is of no consequence2 the whole theory of our moral sentiment presents results which are nearly as wonderful2 and1 indeed1 the falseness of any metaphysical doctrine1 if rightly considered1 is itself one of the strongest proofs that the science of mind is a science which admits of discovery2 for1 if all men had equal knowledge of all the relations of all the phenomena of their mind1 no one could advance an opinion on the subject1 with real belief of it1 which another could discover to be erroneous4 ,in the different stages of the growth of a passion1 what a variety of appearances does it assume2 and how difficult is it often to trace1 in the confusion and complication of the paroxysm1 those calm and simple emotions1 in which1 in many cases1 it originated6--,the love of domestic praise1 and of the parental smile of approbation1 which gave excellence to the first efforts of the child1 may expand1 with little variation1 into the love of honest and honourable fame2 or1 in more unhappy circumstances1 may shoot out from its natural direction1 into all the guilt and madness of atrocious ambition2--and can it truly be maintained1 or even supposed1 for a moment1 that all this fine shadowing of feelings into feelings1 is known as much to the rudest and most ignorant of mankind1 as it is to the profoundest intellectual inquirer8 ,how different is the passion of the miser1 as viewed by himself1 by the vulgar1 and by philosophers6 ,he is conscious1 however1 only of the accuracy of his reasonings on the probabilities of future poverty1 of a love of economy1 and of temperance1 and certain too of strict and rigid justice4 ,to common observers1 he is only a lover of money4 ,they content themselves with the passion1 in its mature state2 and it would not be easy to convince them1 that the most self-denying avarice involves as its essence1 or at least originally involved1 the love of those very pleasures and accommodations1 which are now sacrificed to it without the least apparent reluctance40#dj 8,this light and darkness1 in our chaos join'd1 ,what shall divide8 ,the ,god within the mind40 ,there is1 indeed1 a chaos1 in the mind4 ,but there is a spirit of inquiry1 which is forever moving over it1 slowly separating all its mingled elements4 ,it is only when these are separated1 that the philosophy of mind can be complete1 and incapable of further discovery4 ,to say that it is now complete1 because it has in it every thing which can be the subject of analysis1 is as absurd1 as it would be to suppose that the ancient chaos1 when it contained merely the elements of things1 before the spirit of ,god moved upon the waters of the abyss1 was already that world of life1 and order1 and beauty1 which it was after to become4 ,the difficulty which arises in the physical investigation of the mind1 from the apparent simplification of those thoughts and feelings which1 on more attentive reflection1 are felt to be as if compounded of many other thoughts and feelings1 that have previously existed together1 or in immediate succession1 is similar to the difficulty which we experience in the physics of matter1 from the imperfection of our senses1 that allows us to perceive masses only1 not their elemental parts1 and thus leads us to consider as simple bodies1 what a single new experiment may prove to be composed of various elements4 ,in the intellectual world1 the slow progress of discovery arises1 in like manner1 from the obstacles which our feeble power of discrimination presents to our mental analysis4 ,but1 in mind1 as well as in matter1 it must be remembered1 that it is to this very feebleness of our discriminating powers1 the whole analytic science owes its origin4 ,if we could distinguish instantly and clearly in our complex phenomena of thought1 their constituent elements--if1 for example1 in that single and apparently simple emotion1 which we feel1 on the sight of beauty1 as it lives before us1 or in the contemplation of that ideal beauty1 which is reflected from works of art1 we could discover1 as it were1 in a single glance1 all the innumerable feelings1 which1 perhaps1 from the first moment of life1 have been conspiring together1 and blending in the production of it--we should then feel as little interest in our theories of taste1 as in a case formerly supposed1 we should have done in our theories of combustion1 if the most minute changes that take place in combustion had been at all times distinctly visible4 ,the mysteries of our intellect1 the 8alt penetralia mentis10 would then lie for ever open to us2 and what was said poetically of ,hobbes1 in the beautiful verses addressed to him on his work ,de ,natura ,hominis1 would be applicable to all mankind1 not poetically1 but in the strictness of philosophic truth4 8,qu magna cli mnia1 et tractus maris1 ,terrque fines1 siquid aut ultra est1 capit1 ,mens ipsa tandem capitur2 ,omnia hactenus ,qu nosse potuit1 nota jam primum est sibi4 8,consultor audax1 et ,promethei potens ,facinoris animi6 quis tibi dedit deus ,hc intueri sculis longe abdita1 ,oculosque luce tinxit ambrosia tuos8 ,tu mentis omnis1 at tu nulla est capax4 ,hoc laude solus fruere3 divinum est opus ,animam creare2 proximum huic1 ostendere4 8,hic cerno levia affectuum vestigia1 ,gracilesque ,sensus lineas2 video quibus ,vehantur alis blanduli ,cupidines1 ,quibusque stimulis urgeant ,ir graves1 ,hic et ,dolores et ,voluptates suos ,produnt recessus2 ipsi nec ,timor latet40 ,,footnotes3 #cg ,ep4 i4 v4 #fa-fh4 ,works1 vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #e1 #f4 #ch ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,,iii4 v4 #ebf-ece4 #ci ,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect1 #b;d edition1 p4 #cb1 #cc4 #dj ,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect1 #b;d edition1 p4 #bf-cj4 with some alterations and exclusions4 ,,lecture ,,xi4 ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,physical ,,inquiry1 ,,to ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,mind1 ,,concluded4--,,on ,,consciousness1 ,,and ,,on ,,mental ,,identity4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i considered1 very fully1 the two species of inquiry which the philosophy of mind admits in exact analogy to the two species of inquiry in the philosophy of matter1--the consideration of the mental phenomena1 as successive1 and therefore susceptible of arrangement in the order of their succession1 as causes and effects1--and the consideration of them as complex1 and therefore susceptible of analysis4 ,i stated to you1 that it was chiefly1 if not wholly1 in this latter view1 as analytical1 that ,i conceived the philosophy of mind to be a science of progressive discovery2 though1 as a science of analogy1 it has not merely produced results1 as astonishing1 perhaps1 in some cases1 as any of those which the analysis of matter has exhibited1 but presents still a field of inquiry1 that may be considered as inexhaustible2 since the mind cannot exist1 without forming continually new combinations1 that modify its subsequent affections1 and vary1 therefore1 the products1 which it is the labour of our intellectual analysis to reduce to their original elements4 ,what the chemist does1 in matter1 the intellectual analysis does in mind2 the one distinguishing by a purely mental process of reflection1 the elements of his complex feelings1 as the other operates on his material compounds1 by processes that are themselves material4 ,though the term analysis1 however1 may be used in reference to both processes1 the mental1 as well as the material1 since the result of the process is virtually the same in both1 it has been universally employed by philosophers1 in the laws of the mind1 without any accurate definition of the process2 and ,i was careful1 therefore1 to explain to you the peculiar meaning1 in which it is strictly to be understood in our science2 that you might not extend to the mind and its affections1 that essential divisibility1 which is inconsistent with its very nature2 and suppose that1 when we speak of complex notions1 and of thoughts and feelings that are united by association with other thoughts and feelings1 we speak of a plurality of separable things4 ,the complex mental phenomena1 as ,i explained to you1 are complex only in relation to our mode of conceiving them4 ,they are1 strictly and truly1 as simple and indivisible states of a substance1 which is necessarily in all its states simple and indivisible--the results1 rather than the compounds1 of former feelings1--to which1 however1 they seem to us1 and from the very nature of the feelings themselves1 cannot but seem to us1 to bear the same species of relation1 which a whole bears to the parts that compose it4 ,the office of intellectual analysis1 accordingly1 in the mode in which ,i have explained it to you1 has regard to this relation only4 ,it is to trace the various affections or states of mind that have successively contributed1 to form or to modify any peculiar sentiment or emotion1 and to develope the elements1 to which1 after tracing this succession1 the resulting sentiment or emotion is felt by us to bear virtually that relation of seeming comprehensiveness of which ,i spoke4 ,if1 indeed1 our perspicacity were so acute that we could distinguish immediately all the relations of our thoughts and passions1 there could evidently be no discovery in the science of mind2 but1 in like manner1 what discovery could there be1 in the analysis of matter1 if our senses were so quick and delicate1 as to distinguish immediately all the elements of every compound8 ,it is only slowly that we discover the composition of the masses without2 and we have therefore a science of chemistry3--,it is only slowly that we discover the relations of complex thought to thought2 and we have therefore a science of mental analysis4 ,it is to the imperfection of our faculties1 then1 as forcing us to guess and explore what is half concealed from us1 that we owe our laborious experiments and reasonings1 and consequently all the science which is the result of these2 and the proudest discoveries which we make may thus1 in one point of view1 whatever dignity they may give to a few moments of our life1 be considered as proofs and memorials of our general weakness4 ,if1 in its relation to matter1 philosophy be founded1 in a very great degree1 on the mere badness of our eyes1 which prevents us from distinguishing accurately the minute changes that are constantly taking place in the bodies around us2 we have seen1 in like manner1 that1 in its relation to the mind1 it is founded chiefly1 or perhaps wholly1 on the imperfection of our power of discriminating the elementary feelings1 which compose our great complexities of thought and passion2 the various relations of which are felt by us only on attentive reflection1 and are1 therefore1 in progressive discovery1 slowly added to relations that have before been traced4 ,in both cases1 the analysis1 necessary for this purpose1 is an operation of unquestionable difficulty4 ,but it is surely not less so1 in mind1 than in matter2 nor1 when nature exhibits all her wonders to us1 in one case1 in objects that are separate from us1 and foreign2 and1 in the other1 in the intimate phenomena of our own consciousness1 can we justly think1 that it is of ourselves we know the most4 ,on the contrary1 strange as it may seem1 it is of her distant operations1 that our knowledge is least imperfect2 and we have far less acquaintance with the sway which she exercises in our own mind1 than with that by which she guides the course of the most remote planet1 in spaces beyond us1 which we rather calculate than conceive4 ,the only science1 which1 by its simplicity and comprehensiveness1 seems to have attained a maturity that leaves little for future inquiry1 is not that which relates immediately to man himself1 or to the properties of the bodies on his own planet1 that are ever acting on his perceptive organs1 and essential to his life and enjoyment2 but that which relates to the immense system of the universe1 to which the very orb1 that supports all the multitudes of his race1 is but an atom of dust1 and to which himself1 as an individual1 is as nothing4 8,could he1 whose rules the rapid comet bind1 ,describe or fix one movement of his mind8 ,who saw its fires here rise1 and there descend1 ,explain his own beginning or his end8 ,go1 wondrous creature6 mount where ,science guides1 ,go1 measure earth1 weigh air1 and state the tides2 ,instruct the planets in what orbs to run1 ,correct old ,time1 and regulate the ,sun2 ,go1 soar with ,plato to th' empyreal sphere1 ,to the first good1 first perfect1 and first fair2 ,go1 teach ,eternal ,wisdom how to rule-- ,then drop into thyself1 and be a fool60#da ,that man should know so much of the universe1 and so very little of himself1 is1 indeed1 one of the circumstances1 which1 in the language of the same poet1 most strongly characterize him1 as the 8jest and riddle0 of that world1 of which he is also no less truly 8the glory40 8,that the intelligence of any being10 to use the words of ,d',alembert1 8should not pass beyond certain limits--that1 in one species of beings1 it should be more or less circumscribed1 than in another--all this is not surprising1 more than that a blade of grass should be less tall than a shrub2 or a shrub than an oak4 ,but that the same being should be at once arrested by the narrow circle which nature has traced around him1 and yet constantly reminded1 that1 beyond these limits1 there are objects which he is never to attain--that he should be able to reason1 till he loses himself1 on the existence and nature of these objects1 though condemned to be eternally ignorant of them--that he should have too little sagacity to resolve an infinity of questions1 which he has yet sagacity enough to make--that the principle within us1 which thinks1 should ask itself in vain1 what it is which constitutes its thought1 and that this thought1 which sees so many things1 so distant1 should yet not be able to see itself1 which is so near1--that self1 which it is notwithstanding always striving to see and to know--these are contradictions1 which1 even in the very pride of our reasoning1 cannot fail to surprise and confound us40 ,all that remains for us1 in that impossibility which nature has imposed on us of attaining a more intimate knowledge of the essence and constitution either of mind or of matter1 is to attend to the phenomena which they present1 analysing whatever is complex1 and tracing the order of every sequence4 ,by attentive reflection on the phenomena themselves1 and on all the circumstances which precede or follow them1 we shall be able to discover the relations which they mutually bear1 and to distinguish their casual coincidence1 or succession1 from those invariable relations which nature has established among them as causes and effects4 ,this1 humble as it may seem1 is1 as ,i have said1 the true philosophy of man2 because it is all of which man is capable4 ,to inquire1 as may be thought1 more deeply into the essences of things1 or the nature of certain supposed bonds by which they are connected1 is to show1 not that we have advanced far in the progress of science1 but that we have gone far astray2 not that we know more than philosophers of humbler views and pretensions1 but that we know less2 since it proves that we are unacquainted with the limits within which nature has bounded our prospect1 and have not attained that prime knowledge1 which consists in knowing how little can be known4 ,if the philosophy1 not of mind only1 but of the universe1 is to be found1 as ,hobbes has boldly said1 within ourselves1--in the same manner as the perfect statue is to be found in the rude block of the quarry1 when all the superfluous mass1 that adheres to it1 has been removed1--in no respect can it more justly be said to be in our own minds than in this1 that it is only by knowing the true extent1 and consequently the limits1 of our intellectual powers1 that we can form any rational system of philosophic investigation4 ,then1 indeed1 ,philosophy may be truly said1 in his strong figurative language1 to be ,human ,reason herself1 hovering over all created things1 and proclaiming their order1 their causes1 and effects4 8,philosophiam noli credere eam esse1 per quam fiunt lapides philosophici1 neque illam quam ostentant codices metaphysici2 sed ,rationem ,humanum naturalem per omnes res creatas sedulo volitantem1 et de earum ordine1 causis1 et effectibus1 ea qu vera sunt renuntiantem4 ,mentis ergo tu1 et totius mundi filia philosophia in te ipso est2 nondum fortasse figurata1 sed genitori mundo qualis erat in principio informi similes4 ,faciendum ergo tibi est quod faciunt statuarii1 qui materiam exculpentes supervacraeum1 imaginem non faciunt sed inveniunt40#db ,after these remarks on physical inquiry in general1 and its particular application to our own science1 ,i trust that we shall now proceed to observe1 and analyse1 and arrange the mental phenomena1 with clearer views1 both of the materials on which we have to operate1 and of the nature of the operations which we have to perform4 ,we may consider the mind as now lying open before us1 presenting to us all its phenomena1 but presenting them in assemblages1 which it is to be our labour to separate and arrange4 ,in this separation and arrangement1 there are difficulties1 ,i confess1 of no slight kind4 ,but1 ,i trust1 that you have the spirit1 which delights in overcoming difficulties1 and which1 even if its most strenuous exertions should fail1 delights in the very strenuousness of the endeavour4 ,in what admits our analysis1 and in what transcends it1 we shall always find much that is truly wonderful in itself1 and deserving of our profoundest admiration2 and1 even in the obscurest parts of the great field of mind1 though we may see only dimly1 and must1 therefore1 be cautious in inquiring1 and fearful of pronouncing1 we may yet1 perhaps1 be opening paths that are to lead to discovery1 and1 in the very darkness of our search1 may perceive some gleams of that light1 which1 though now only dawning upon us1 is to brighten on the inquirers of other ages4 ,in proceeding to examine and compare the mental phenomena1 the first circumstance that strikes us1 prior to any attempt to arrange them in classes1 is1 that the mind which exhibits these is susceptible of a variety of feelings1 every new feeling being a change of its state2 and1 indeed1 it is by such changes alone that it manifests itself1 either in our own consciousness1 or in the actions of our fellow men4 ,if it could exist only in one everlasting state1--such as now constitutes the feeling of any particular moment1--it is quite superfluous to say1 that it could not reason upon this state1--for this very reasoning would itself imply the change1 which is supposed to be impossible2 and as little could this one unchanged and unchangeable feeling be an object of reasoning to others1 even if there were any mode of its becoming manifest to them1 which there evidently could not be4 ,it is1 perhaps1 even not too extravagant an assertion of ,hobbes1 who supposes a mind so constituted as to perceive only one colour1 and to perceive this constantly1 and affirms1 that1 in that case1 it would be absurd to say that it had any perception at all1 being rather1 as he expresses it1 stupified than seeing4 8,attonitum esse et fortasse aspectare eum1 sed stupentem dicerem1 videre non dicerem2 adeo sentire semper idem1 et non sentire ad idem recidunt40 ,mind1 then1 is capable of existing in various states2 an enumeration of the leading classes of which1 as ,i before remarked1 is all that constitutes our definition of it4 ,it is that1 we say1 which perceives1 remembers1 compares1 grieves1 rejoices1 loves1 hates2 and though the terms1 whatever they may be1 that are used by us1 in any such enumeration1 may be few1 we must not forget that the terms are mere inventions of our own for the purpose of classification1 and1 that each of them comprehends a variety of feelings1 that are as truly different from each other1 as the classes themselves are different4 ,perception is but a single word2 yet1 when we consider the number of objects that may act upon our organs of sense1 and the number of ways in which their action1 may be combined1 so as to produce one compound effect1 different from that which the same objects would produce separately1 or in other forms of combination1 how many are the feelings which this single word denotes6--so many1 indeed1 that no arithmetical computation is sufficient to measure their infinity4 ,amid all this variety of feelings1 with whatever rapidity the changes may succeed each other1 and however opposite they may seem1 we have still the most undoubting belief1 that it is the same individual mind1 which is thus affected in various ways4 ,the pleasure1 which is felt at one moment1 has indeed little apparent relation to the pain that was perhaps felt a few moments before2 and the knowledge of a subject1 which we possess1 after having reflected on it fully1 has equally little resemblance to our state of doubt when we began to inquire1 or the total ignorance and indifference which preceded the first doubt that we felt4 ,it is the same individual mind1 however1 which1 in all these instances1 is pleased and pained1 is ignorant1 doubts1 reflects1 knows4 ,there is something 8changed in all1 and yet in all the same10 which at once constitutes the thoughts and emotions of the hour1 and yet outlives them1--something1 which1 from the temporary agitations of passion1 rises1 unaltered and everlasting1 like the pyramid1 that lifts still the same point to heaven1 amid the sands and whirlwinds of the desert4 ,the consideration of the mind1 as one substance1 capable of existing in a variety of states1 according as it is variously affected1 and constituting1 in these different states1 all the complex phenomena of thought and feeling1 necessarily involves the consideration of consciousness1 and of personal identity4 ,to the examination of these1 accordingly1 ,i now proceed1 as essential to all the inquiries and speculations1 in which we are afterwards to be engaged2 since1 whatever powers or susceptibilities we may consider as attributes of the mind1 this consideration must always suppose the existence of certain phenomena1 of which we are conscious1 and the identity of the sentient or thinking principle1 in which that consciousness resides1 and to which all the varieties of those ever-changing feelings1 which form the subjects of our inquiry1 are collectively to be referred4 ,our first inquiry1 then1 is into the nature of ,,consciousness4 ,in the systems of philosophy1 which have been most generally prevalent1 especially in this part of the ,island1 consciousness has always been classed as one of the intellectual powers of the mind1 differing from its other powers1 as these mutually differ from each other4 ,it is accordingly ranked by ,dr ,reid1 as separate and distinct1 in his ,catalogue of the ,intellectual ,powers2 and he says of it1 that 8it is an operation of the understanding of its own kind1 and cannot be logically defined4 ,the objects of it are our present pains1 our pleasures1 our hopes1 our fears1 our desires1 our doubts1 our thoughts of every kind1--in a word1 all the passions1 and all the actions and operations of our own minds1 while they are present40 ,and in various parts of his works1 which it would be needless to quote1 he alludes to its radical difference from the other powers of the mind1 as if it were a point on which there could be no question4 ,to me1 however1 ,i must confess1 it appears that this attempt to double1 as it were1 our various feelings1 by making them not to constitute our consciousness1 but to be the objects of it1 as of a distinct intellectual power1 is not a faithful statement of the phenomena of the mind1 but is founded1 partly on a confusion of thought1 and still more on a confusion of language4 ,sensation is not the object of consciousness different from itself1 but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment2 as a particular hope1 or fear1 or grief1 or resentment1 or simple remembrance1 may be the actual consciousness of the next moment4 ,in short1 if the mind of man1 and all the changes which take place in it1 from the first feeling with which life commenced1 to the last with which it closes1 could be made visible to any other thinking being1 a certain series of feelings alone1 that is to say1 a certain number of successive states of the mind1 would be distinguishable in it1 forming1 indeed1 a variety of sensations1 and thoughts1 and passions1 as momentary states of the mind1 but all of them existing individually1 and successively to each other4 ,to suppose the mind to exist in two different states1 in the same moment1 is a manifest absurdity4 ,to the whole series of states of the mind1 then1 whatever the individual momentary successive states may be1 ,i give the name of our consciousness1--using that term1 not to express any new state additional to the whole series1 7for to that1 which is already the whole nothing can be added1 and the mind1 as ,i have already said1 cannot be conceived to exist at once in two different states17 but merely as a short mode of expressing the wide variety of our feelings2 in the same manner1 as ,i use any other generic word1 for expressing briefly the individual varieties comprehended under it4 ,there are not sensations1 thoughts1 passions1 and also consciousness1 any more than there is quadruped or animal1 as a separate being1 to be added to the wolves1 tigers1 elephants1 and other living creatures1 which ,i include under those terms4 ,the fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling1 which is said to be its object1 has arisen1 in a great measure1 from the use of the personal pronoun ,i1 which the conviction of our identity1 during the various feelings1 or temporary consciousnesses of different moments1 has led us to employ1 as significant of our permanent self1 of that being1 which is conscious1 and variously conscious1 and which continues1 after these feelings have ceased1 to be the subject of other consciousness1 as transient as the former4 ,i am conscious of a certain feeling1 really means1 however1 no more than this--,i feel in a certain manner1 or1 in other words1 my mind exists in that state which constitutes a certain feeling2 the mere existence of that feeling1 and not any additional and distinguishable feeling that is to be termed consciousness1 being all which is essential to the state of my mind1 at the particular moment of sensation2 for a pleasure1 or pain1 of which we are not conscious1 is a pleasure or pain1 that1 in reference to us at least1 has no existence4 ,but when we say1 ,i am conscious of a particular feeling1 in the usual paraphrastic phraseology of our language1 which has no mode of expressing1 in a single word1 the mere existence of a feeling1 we are apt1 from a prejudice of grammar1 to separate the sentient ,i and the feeling as different1--not different1 as they really are1 merely in this respect1 that the feeling is one momentary and changeable state of the permanent substance ,i1 that is1 capable of existing also1 at other moments1 in other states1--but so radically different1 as to justify our classing the feeling1 in the relation of an object1 to that sentient principle which we call ,i1--and an object to it1 not in retrospect only1 as when the feeling is remembered1 or when it is viewed in relation to other remembered feelings1--but in the very moment of the primary sensation itself2 as if there could truly be two distinct states of the same mind1 at that same moment1 one of which states is to be termed sensation1 and the other different state of the same mind to be termed consciousness4 ,to estimate more accurately the effect1 which this reference to self produces1 let us imagine a human being to be born with his faculties perfect as in mature life1 and let us suppose a sensation to arise for the first time in his mind4 ,for the sake of greater simplicity1 let us suppose the sensation to be of a kind as little complex as possible2 such for example1 as that which the fragrance of a rose excites4 ,if1 immediately after this first sensation1 we imagine the sentient principle to be extinguished1 what are we to call that feeling1 which filled and constituted the brief moment of life8 ,it was a simple sensation1 and nothing more2 and if only we say1 that the sensation has existed1--whether we say1 or do not say1 that the mind was conscious of the sensation1--we shall convey precisely the same meaning2 the consciousness of the sensation being1 in that case1 only a tautological expression of the sensation itself4 ,there will be1 in this first momentary state1 no separation of self and the sensation1--no little proposition formed in the mind1 ,i feel1 or ,i am conscious of a feeling2 but the feeling and the sentient ,i will1 for the moment1 be the same4 ,it is this simple feeling1 and this alone1 which is the whole consciousness of the first moment2 and no reference can be made of this to a self1 which is independent of the temporary consciousness2 because the knowledge of self1 as distinct from the particular feeling1 implies the remembrance of former feelings1--of feelings1 which1 together with the present1 we ascribe to one thinking principle1--recognizing the principle1 the self1 the one1 as the same1 amid all its transient diversities of consciousness4 ,let us now1 then1 instead of supposing life1 as in the former case1 to be extinguished immediately after the first sensation1 suppose another sensation to be excited1 as for instance that which is produced by the sound of a flute4 ,the mind either will be completely absorbed in this new sensation1 without any subsequent remembrance1--in which case the consciousness of the sensation1 as in the case of the fragrance that preceded it1 will be only another more paraphrastic expression of the simple sensation--or the remembrance of the former feeling will arise4 ,if the remembrance of the former feeling arise1 and the two different feelings be considered by the mind at once1 it will now1 by that irresistible law of our nature1 which impresses us with the conviction of our identity1 conceive the two sensations1 which it recognizes as different in themselves1 to have yet belonged to the same being1--that being1 to which1 when it has the use of language1 it gives the name of self1 and in relation to which it speaks1 as often as it uses the pronoun ,i4--,the notion of self1 as the lasting subject of successive transient feelings1 being now1 and not till now1 acquired1 through the remembrance of former sensations or temporary diversities of consciousness1 the mind will often again1 when other new sensations may have arisen1 go through a similar process1 being not merely affected with the particular momentary sensation1 but remembering other prior feelings1 and identifying it with them1 in the general designation of self4 ,in these circumstances the memory of the past will often mingle with and modify the present2 and now indeed1 to form the verbal proposition1 ,i am conscious of a particular sensation1--since the very word ,i implies that this remembrance and identification has taken place1--may be allowed to express something more than the mere existence of the momentary sensation3 for it expresses also that the mind1 which now exists in the state of this particular sensation1 has formerly existed in a different state4 ,there is a remembrance of former feelings1 and a belief that the present and the past have been states of one substance4 ,but this belief1 or in other words1 this remembrance of former feelings1 is so far from being essential to every thought or sensation1 that innumerable feelings every moment arise1 without any such identification with the past4 ,they are felt1 however1 for this is necessarily implied in their existence2 but they exist1 as transient thoughts or sensations only1 and the consciousness1 which we have of them1 in these circumstances1 is nothing more1 than the thoughts or sensations themselves1 which could not be thoughts or sensations if they were not felt4 ,in the greater number of our successions of momentary feelings1 then1 when no reference is made to former states of the mind1 the consciousness is obviously nothing more than the simple momentary feeling itself as it begins and ceases2 and when there is a reference to former states of the mind1 we discover on analysis only a remembrance1 like all our other remembrances1 and a feeling of common relation of the past and the present affection of the mind to one permanent subject4 ,it is the belief of our continued identity which involves this particular feeling of relation of past and present feelings2 and consciousness1 in this sense of the term1 is only a word expressive of that belief4 ,that the fragrance of a rose1 the sound of a flute1 and in general all the other objects of sense1 might have excited precisely the same immediate sensations as at present1 ,doctor ,reid admits1 though the belief of our personal identity had not been impressed upon us2 for he ascribes this belief to an instinctive principle only1 and acknowledges1 that there is nothing in our sensations themselves1 from which any such inference could be drawn by reason4 ,if1 then1 this instinctive belief of identity had not been1 as at present1 a natural law of human thought1--operating irresistibly on the remembrance of our different feelings1 we should have had no notion of self1 of me1 the sentient and thinking being1 who exists at the present moment1 and who existed before the present moment3--and what1 then1 would have been the consciousness1 accompanying1 and different from1 our sensations1 when they merely flashed along the mind and vanished8 ,the most zealous defender of consciousness1 as a separate intellectual power1 must surely admit1 that1 in such circumstances1 it would have been nothing more than sensation itself4 ,it is the belief of our identity only1 which gives us the notion of self1 as the subject of various feelings1 and it is the notion of self1 as the subject of various former feelings1 which leads us to regard the consciousness of the moment1 as different from the sensation of the moment2 because it suggests to us those former feelings1 which truly were different from it1 or at least that subject mind1 which unquestionably existed before the present sensation4 ,if it be said1 that the faculty of consciousness is nothing more than this reference to the past1 and consequent belief of identity1 we may1 in that case1 very safely admit its existence2 though the classification of it1 as a peculiar intellectual power1 would in that case be a most singular anomaly in arrangement1 and would involve a very absurd1 or at least a very awkward use of a term4 ,to assert this signification of it1 however1 would be to admit everything for which ,i have contended4 ,but it certainly is not the sense1 which has been attached to it by philosophers2 and indeed1 in this sense1 consciousness1 instead of having for its objects1 as ,doctor ,reid says1 all 8our present pains1 our pleasures1 our hopes1 our fears1 our desires1 our doubts1 our thoughts of every kind2 in a word1 all the passions1 and all the actions and operations of our own mind1 while they are present10 would be limited to the comparatively few1 of which the consideration of our personal identity forms a part4 ,in far the greater number of our feelings1 as ,i have already said1 the sensation dies away1 almost in the moment1--not indeed1 without being enjoyed or suffered1 but without any reference to self1 as the subject of various feelings1 or remembrance of any prior state of mind1 as distinct from the present4 ,the belief of our identity1 is surely not the only belief that arises from an instinctive principle2 and if its existence entitle us1 in our systematic arrangements1 to the possession of a new intellectual power1 every other belief that arises instinctively from a principle of our constitution1 must give us a similar title to enlarge the catalogue of our faculties4 ,the never-failing and instant faith1 by which we expect1 without the slightest doubt of the similarity of the future1 that events will continue to follow each other1 in the same order as at present1--that bodies will fall to the ground1 fire burn1 food satisfy the craving of our appetite--that immediate intuitive principle of belief1 on which all our foresight depends1 and according to which we regulate our whole conduct in providing for the future1--should certainly1 in that case1 be ascribed by us to some peculiar intellectual power1 for which it would be easy to invent a name4 ,it is not1 by any inference of our reason1 we believe1 that the sound of a flute which preceded the fragrance of a rose1 and the fragrance of a rose which followed the sound of a flute1 excited sensations that were states of the same identical mind2 for there is nothing1 in either of the separate sensations1 or in both together1 from which such an inference can be drawn2 and yet1 notwithstanding the impossibility of inferring it1 we believe this1 at least as strongly1 as we believe any of the conclusions of our reasoning4 ,in like manner1 it is not by any inference of reason we believe1 that fire will warm us to-morrow1 as it has warmed us to-day2 for there is nothing1 in the fire of to-day1 or in the sensation of warmth1 considered as a mere sequence of it1 from which the succession of a similar sensation to the fire of to-morrow can be inferred2 yet we also rely on this future sequence1 at least as strongly1 as we believe any of the conclusions of our reasoning4 ,in both cases the parallel is complete2 and in both1 the evidence of a particular intellectual faculty1 must consequently be alike1--or in neither is there sufficient evidence of such a power4 ,there is1 indeed1 one other sense1 in which we often talk of our consciousness of a feeling1 and a sense1 in which1 it must be allowed1 that the consciousness is not precisely the same as the feeling itself4 ,this is1 when we speak of a feeling1 not actually existing at present1 but past--as when we say1 that we are conscious of having seen1 or heard1 or done something4 ,such a use of the term1 however1 is pardonable only in the privileged looseness and inaccuracy of familiar conversation3 the consciousness1 in this case1 being precisely synonymous with remembrance or memory1 and not a power1 different from the remembrance4 ,the remembrance of the feeling1 and the vivid feeling itself1 indeed1 are different4 ,but the remembrance1 and the consciousness of the remembrance1 are the same--as the consciousness of a sensation1 and the sensation1 are the same2 and to be conscious that we have seen or spoken to any one1 is only to remember that we have seen or spoken to him4 ,much of this very confusion with respect to memory1 however1 ,i have no doubt1 has been always involved in the assertion of consciousness as a peculiar and distinct power of the mind4 ,when we think of feelings long past1 it is impossible for us not to be aware that our mind is then truly retrospective2 and memory seems to us sufficient to account for the whole4 ,but when the retrospect is of very recent feelings--of feelings1 perhaps1 that existed as distinct states of the mind1 the very moment before our retrospect began1 the short interval is forgotten1 and we think that the primary feeling1 and our consideration of the feeling1 are strictly simultaneous4 ,we have a sensation2--we look instantly back on that sensation1--such is consciousness1 as distinguished from the feeling that is said to be its object4 ,when it is any thing more than the sensation1 thought1 or emotion1 of which we are said to be conscious1 it is a brief and rapid retrospect4 ,its object is not a present feeling1 but a past feeling1 as truly as when we look back1 not on the moment immediately preceding1 but on some distant event or emotion of our boyhood4 ,after thus distinguishing all that is truly present in consciousness1 from common remembrance1 ,i surely need not undertake1 at any length1 to distinguish it from that peculiar species of remembrance1 which goes under the name of conscience2 though their similar etymology may have a slight tendency to mislead4 ,conscience is our moral memory2--it is the memory of the heart1 if ,i may apply to it a phrase1 which1 in its original application1 was much more happily employed1 by one of the deaf and dumb pupils of the ,abbe ,sicard1 who1 on being asked what he understood by the word gratitude1 wrote down immediately1 8,gratitude is the memory of the heart40 ,the power of conscience does1 indeed1 what consciousness does not4 ,it truly doubles all our feelings1 when they have been such as virtue inspired2 8,hoc est vivere bis1 vita posse priore frui20 and it multiplies them in a much more fearful proportion1 when they have been of an opposite kind--arresting1 as it were every moment of guilt1 which1 of itself1 would have passed away1 as fugitive as our other moments1 and suspending them forever before our eyes1 in fixed and terrifying reality4 8,prima et maxima peccantium est pna10 says ,seneca1 8peccasse2 nec ullum scelus1 illud fortuna exornet muneribus suis1 licet tueatur ac vindicet1 impunitum est quoniam sceleris in scelere supplicium est40#dc 8,the first and the greatest punishment of guilt1 is to have been guilty2 nor can any crime1 though fortune should adorn it with all her most lavish bounty1 as if protecting and vindicating it1 pass truly unpunished2 because the punishment of the base or atrocious deed1 is in the very baseness or atrocity of the deed itself40 ,but this species of memory1 which we denominate conscience1 and1 indeed1 every species of memory1 which must necessarily have for its object the past1 is essentially different from the consciousness which we have been considering1 that1 in its very definition1 is limited to present feelings1 and of which1 if we really had such an intellectual power1 our moral conscience would1 in ,dr ,reid's sense of the term1 be an object rather than a part4 ,consciousness1 then1 ,i conclude1 in its simplest acceptation1 when it is understood as regarding the present only1 is no distinct power of the mind1 or name of a distinct class of feelings1 but is only a general term for all our feelings1 of whatever species these may be1 sensations1 thoughts1 desires2--in short1 all those states or affections of mind1 in which the phenomena of mind consist2 and when it expresses more than this1 it is only the remembrance of some former state of the mind1 and a feeling of the relation of the past and the present as states of one sentient substance4 ,the term is very conveniently used for the purpose of abbreviation1 when we speak of the whole variety of our feelings1 in the same manner as any other general term is used1 to express briefly the multitude of individuals that agree in possessing some common property of which we speak2 when the enumeration of these1 by description and name1 would be as wearisome to the patience1 as it would be oppressive to the memory4 ,but still1 when we speak of the evidence of consciousness1 we mean nothing more1 than the evidence implied in the mere existence of our sensations1 thoughts1 desires1--which is utterly impossible for us to believe to be and not to be2 or1 in other words1 impossible for us to feel and not to feel at the same moment4 ,this precise limitation of the term1 ,i trust1 you will keep constantly in mind in the course of our future speculations4 ,,footnotes3 #da ,pope's ,essay on ,man1 ,ep4 ii4 v4 #ce-ci2 #ai-bd2 and #bi1 #cj4 #db ,ad ,lectorem4--,a ,note prefixed to the ,elementa ,philosophi4 #dto4 ,amstelod4 #affh4 #dc ,epist4 #ig4 ,,lecture ,,xii4 ,,on ,,consciousness1 ,,continued1--,,on ,,mental ,,identity1--,,identity ,,irreconcilable ,,with ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,materialism1--,,difference ,,between ,,personal ,,identity ,,and ,,mental ,,identity1--,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,mental ,,identity ,,stated4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i brought to a conclusion my remarks on the nature and objects of ,physical ,inquiry1--the clear understanding of which seemed to me1 essentially necessary before we could enter with any prospect of success1 on the physiological investigation of the ,mind4 ,we then opened our eyes1 as it were on the great field of thought and passion1 and on all the infinite variety of feelings1 which1 in assemblages more or less complex1 and in colours more or less brilliant or obscure1 it is every moment presenting to our internal glance4 ,the very attempt to arrange these transient feelings as phenomena of the mind1 however1 implies evidently some consideration of the nature of that varied consciousness in which they consist1 and of the identity of the permanent substance1 as states of which we arrange them4 ,my last ,lecture1 therefore1 was devoted to this primary consideration of consciousness1--which we found reason to regard1 not as any separate and peculiar faculty of the mind1 of which our various feelings are1 to use ,dr ,reid's expression1 objects1 and which is1 therefore1 to be added1 in every instance1 to the separate pleasures1 pains1 perceptions1 remembrances1 passions1 that constitute the momentary states of the mind1--but merely as a short general term1 expressive of all these momentary states in reference to the permanent subject mind4 ,the sensation of fragrance1 for example1 is the consciousness of one moment1 as the remembrance of that sensation1 or some other sensation1 is1 perhaps1 the consciousness of the succeeding moment2--the mind1 at every moment1 existing in one precise state1 which1 as one state can be accurately denoted only by one precise name1 or by names that are synonymous1 not by names that are significant of total diversity4 ,all which we know1 or can be supposed to know1 of the mind1 indeed1 is a certain series of these states or feelings that have succeeded each other1 more or less rapidly1 since life began2 the sensation1 thought1 emotion1 of the moment being one of those states1 and the supposed consciousness of the state being only the state itself1 whatever it may be1 in which the mind exists at that particular moment2 since it would be manifestly absurd to suppose the same indivisible mind to exist at the very same moment in two separate states1 one of sensation1 and one of consciousness4 ,it is not simply because we feel1 but because we remember some prior feeling1 and have formed a notion of the mind as the permanent subject of different feeling1 that we conceive the proposition1 8,i am conscious of a sensation10 to express more than the simple existence of the sensation itself2 since it expresses1 too1 a reference of this to the same mind which had formerly been recognised as the subject of other feelings4 ,there is a remembrance of some former feeling1 and a reference of the present feeling to the same subject2 and this mere remembrance1 and the intuitive belief of identity which accompanies remembrance1 are all that philosophers1 by defective analyses1 and a little confusion of language and thought1 have asserted to be the result of a peculiar mental faculty1 under the name of consciousness2--though consciousness1 in this sense1 far from embracing all the varieties of feeling1--that1 in the greater number of instances1 begin and cease1 without any accompanying thought of that permanent substance to which the transient feeling is referable1--must be limited to the comparatively few1 in which such a reference to self is made4 ,consciousness1 in short1 whenever it is conceived to express more than the present feeling1 or present momentary state of the mind1 whatever that may be1 which is said to be the object of consciousness1--as if it were at once something different at every moment from the present state or feeling of the mind1 and yet the very state in which the mind is at every moment supposed to exist1--is a retrospect of some past feeling1 with that belief of a common relation of the past and present feeling to one subject mind1 which is involved in the very notion1 or rather constitutes the very notion1 of personal identity1--and all which distinguishes this rapid retrospect from any of the other retrospects1 which we class as remembrances1 and ascribe to memory as their source1 is the mere briefness of the interval between the feeling that is remembered1 and the reflective glance which seems to be immediately retrospective4 ,a feeling of some kind has arisen1 and we look instantly back upon that feeling2 but a remembrance is surely still the same in nature1 and arises from the same principle of the mental constitution1 whether the interval which precedes it be that of a moment1 or of many hours1 or years4 ,i now then proceed1 after these remarks on our consciousness as momentary1 to a most important inquiry1 which arises necessarily from the consideration of the successions of our momentary consciousness1 and must be considered as involved in all our attempts to arrange them1--the inquiry into the ,identity of the ,mind1 as truly one and permanent1 amid all the variety of its fugitive affections4 ,in our examination of this very wonderful coincidence of sameness and diversity1 ,i shall confine my remarks to the phenomena which are purely mental1 omitting the objections drawn from the daily waste and daily aliment of our corporeal part1 the whole force of which objection may be admitted1 without any scruple by those who contend for the identity only of the thinking principle2 since the individuality of this would be as little destroyed1 though every particle of the body were completely changed1 as the individuality of the body itself would be destroyed1 by a change of the mere garments that invest it4 ,the manner in which the mind is united to a system of particles1 which are in a perpetual state of flux1 is1 indeed1 more than we can ever hope to be able to explain2 though it is really not more inexplicable1 than its union to such a system of particles would be1 though they were to continue forever unchanged4 ,i may remark1 however1 by the way1 that though the constant state of flux of the corporeal particles furnishes no argument against the identity of the principle which feels and thinks1 if feeling and thought be states of a substance1 that is essentially distinct from these changing particles1 the unity and identity of this principle1 amid all the corpuscular changes1--if it can truly be proved to be identical1--furnish a very strong argument1 in disproof of those systems which consider thought and feeling as the result of material organization4 ,indeed the attempts which have been seriously made by materialists to obviate this difficulty1 involve1 in every respect1 as much absurdity1 though certainly not so much pleasantry1 at least so much intentional pleasantry1 as the demonstrations1 which the ,society of ,freethinkers communicated to ,martinus ,scriblerus1 in their letter of greeting and invitation4 ,the arguments1 which they are represented as urging in this admirable letter1 ludicrous as they may seem1 are truly as strong1 at least1 as those of which they are a parody2 and indeed1 in this case1 where both are so like1 a very little occasional change of expression is all which is necessary1 to convert the grave ratiocination into the parody1 and the parody into the grave ratiocination4 8,the parts 7say they7 of an animal body10 stating the objection which they profess to answer1 8are perpetually changed1 and the fluids which seem to be the subject of consciousness1 are in a perpetual circulation2 so that the same individual particles do not remain in the brain2 from whence it will follow1 that the idea of individual consciousness must be constantly translated from one particle of matter to another1 whereby the particle ,a1 for example must not only be conscious1 but conscious that it is the same being with the particle ,b that went before4 8,we answer1 this is only a fallacy of the imagination1 and is to be understood in no other sense than that maxim of the ,english law1 that the king never dies4 ,this power of thinking1 self-moving1 and governing the whole machine1 is communicated from every particle to its immediate successor1 who1 as soon as he is gone1 immediately takes upon him the government1 which still preserves the unity of the whole system4 8,they make a great noise about this individuality1 how a man is conscious to himself that he is the same individual he was twenty years ago1 notwithstanding the flux state of the particles of matter that compose his body4 ,we think this is capable of a very plain answer1 and may be easily illustrated by a familiar example4 8,sir ,john ,cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings1 which his maid darned so often with silk1 that they became at last a pair of silk stockings4 ,now supposing those stockings of ,sir ,john's endued with some degree of consciousness at every particular darning1 they would have been sensible1 that they were the same individual pair of stockings both before and after the darning2 and this sensation would have continued in them through all the succession of darnings2 and yet after the last of all1 there was not perhaps one thread left of the first pair of stockings2 but they were grown to be silk stockings1 as was said before4 8,and whereas it is affirmed1 that every animal is conscious of some individual self-moving1 self-determining principle2 it is answered1 that1 as in a ,house of ,commons all things are determined by a majority1 so it is in every animal system4 ,as that which determines the house is said to be the reason of the whole assembly2 it is no otherwise with thinking beings1 who are determined by the greater force of several particles1 which1 like so many unthinking members1 compose one thinking system40#dd ,the identity1 which we are to consider1 is1 as ,i have already said1 the identity only of the principle which feels and thinks1 without regard to the changeable state of the particles of the brain1 or of the body in general4 ,this unity and permanence of the principle1 which thinks1 if we had still to invent a phrase1 ,i would rather call mental identity1 than personal identity1 though the latter phrase may now be considered as almost fixed by the general use of philosophers4 ,on no system can there be this absolute identity1 unless as strictly mental2 for1 if we adopt the system of materialism1 we must reject the absolute lasting identity of the thinking principle altogether2 and if we do not adopt that system1 it is in the mind alone that we must conceive the identity to subsist4 ,the person1 in the common and familiar meaning of the term1 though involving the mind1 is yet more than the mere mind2 and1 by those1 at least1 who are not conversant with the writings of philosophers on the subject1 sameness of person would be understood as not mental only1 but as combining with the absolute identity of the mind1 some sort of identity of the body also2 though1 it must be confessed1 that1 in its application to the body1 the term identity is not used with the same strictness1 as in its application to the mind2 the bodily identity being not absolute1 but admitting of considerable1 and ultimately1 perhaps1 even of total1 change1 provided only the change be so gradual1 as not to be inconsistent with apparent continuity of existence4 ,still1 however1 identity of person1 at least in the popular notion of it1 is something more than identity of mind4 8,all mankind10 says ,dr ,reid1 8place their personality in something1 that cannot be divided or consist of parts4 ,a part of a person is a manifest absurdity4 8,when a man loses his estate1 his health1 his strength1 he is still the same person1 and has lost nothing of his personality4 ,if he has a leg or an arm cut off1 he is the same person he was before4 ,the amputated member is no part of his person1 otherwise it would have a right to a part of his estate1 and be liable for a part of his engagements2 it would be entitled to a share of his merit and demerit1 which is manifestly absurd4 ,a person is something indivisible1 and is what ,leibnitz calls a monad40#de ,that all mankind place their personality in something1 which cannot be divided into two persons1 or into halves or quarters of a person1 is true2 because the mind itself is indivisible1 and the presence of this one indivisible mind is essential to personality4 ,but1 though essential to personality in man1 mind is not all1 in the popular sense of the word at least1 which this comprehends4 ,thus1 if1 according to the system of metempsychosis1 we were to suppose the mind1 which animates any of our friends1 to be the same mind1 which animated ,homer or ,plato1--though we should have no scruple1 in asserting the identity of the mind itself1 in this corporeal transmigration1--there is no one1 ,i conceive1 who would think himself justifiable1 in point of accuracy1 in saying of ,plato and his friend1 that they were as exactly1 in every respect1 the same person1 as if no metempsychosis whatever had intervened4 ,it does not follow from this1 as ,dr ,reid very strangely supposes1 that a leg or arm1 if it had any relation to our personality1 would1 after amputation1 be liable to a part of our engagements1 or be entitled to a share of our merit or demerit2 for the engagement1 and the moral merit or demerit1 belong not to the body1 but to the mind1 which we believe to continue precisely the same1 after the amputation1 as before it4 ,this1 however1 is a question merely as to the comparative propriety of a term1 and as such1 therefore1 it is unnecessary to dwell upon it4 ,it is of much more importance1 to proceed to the consideration of the actual identity of the mind1 whether we term it simply mental or personal identity4 8,that there is something undoubtedly which thinks10 says ,lord ,shaftesbury1 8our very doubt itself and scrupulous thought evinces4 ,but in what subject that thought resides1 and how that subject is continued one and the same1 so as to answer constantly to the supposed train of thoughts or reflections1 which seem to run so harmoniously through a long course of life1 with the same relation still to one single and self-same person1 this is not a matter so easily or hastily decided1 by those who are nice self-examiners1 or searchers after truth and certainty4 8',twill not1 in this respect1 be sufficient for us to use the seeming logic of a famous#df modern1 and say1 #8,we think2 therefore we are4' ,which is a notably invented saying1 after the model of that like philosophical proposition1 that #8,what is1 is4' ,miraculously argued6 ,if #8,i am1 ,i am4' ,nothing more certain6 ,for the ego or ,i being established in the first part of the proposition1 the ergo1 no doubt1 must hold it good in the latter4 ,but the question is1 #8,what constitutes the we or ,i8' ,and1 #8,whether the ,i of this instant be the same with that of any instant preceding1 or to come4' ,for we have nothing but memory to warrant us1 and memory may be false4 ,we may believe we have thought and reflected thus or thus2 but we may be mistaken4 ,we may be conscious of that1 as truth1 which perhaps was no more than dream2 and we may be conscious of that as a past dream1 which perhaps was never before so much as dreamt of4 8,this is what metaphysicians mean1 when they say1 #8,that identity can be proved only by consciousness2 but that consciousness withal may be as well false as real1 in respect of what is past4' ,so that the same successional we or ,i must remain still1 on this account1 undecided4 8,to the force of this reasoning ,i confess ,i must so far submit1 as to declare that for my own part1 ,i take my being upon trust4 ,let others philosophize as they are able2 ,i shall admire their strength1 when1 upon this topic1 they have refuted what able metaphysicians object1 and ,pyrrhonists plead in their own behalf4 8,meanwhile1 there is no impediment1 hinderance1 or suspension of action1 on account of these wonderfully refined speculations4 ,argument and debate go on still4 ,conduct is settled4 ,rules and measures are given out1 and received4 ,nor do we scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere supposition that we are1 as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times1 to the full satisfaction of our metaphysical or ,pyrrhonean antagonist40#dg ,in stating the objections1 that may be urged against our mental identity1 by such metaphysical or ,pyrrhonean antagonists1 as those of whom ,lord ,shaftesbury speaks1 ,i shall endeavour to exhibit the argument in as strong a light as possible1 and in a manner that appears to me in some measure1 new4 ,it is surely unnecessary for me to warn you1 that the argument1 however specious1 is a sophistical one2 and the nature of the peculiar sophistry which it involves shall be afterwards pointed out to you4 ,but ,i conceive it to be most important1 in teaching you to reflect for yourselves1--by far the most important lesson which you can be taught1--that you should be accustomed to consider the force of objections that may be urged1 as clearly by the force of that surer evidence which they oppose1--and that even sophistry itself1 when it is to be exhibited and confuted1 should1 therefore1 always be exhibited fairly4 ,we pay truth a very easy homage1 when we content ourselves with despising her adversaries4 ,the duty which we owe to her is of a more manly kind4 ,it is to gird ourselves for the battle1--to fit us for overcoming those adversaries1 whenever they shall dare to present themselves in array2 and this we cannot do1 with absolute confidence1 unless we know well the sort of arms1 which they may use1 strong or feeble as those arms may be4 ,i can have no fear1 that any argument of this kind1 in whatever manner it may be stated1 can have the slightest influence on your conviction2 because it is directly opposed by a principle of our nature1 which is paramount to all reasoning4 ,we believe our identity1 as one mind1 in our feelings of to-day and our feelings of yesterday1 as indubitably as we believe that the fire1 which burned us yesterday1 would1 in the same circumstances1 burn us to-day1--not from reasoning1 but from a principle of instant and irresistible belief1 such as gives to reasoning itself all its validity4 ,as ,lord ,shaftesbury justly says1 8,we act as resolutely1 upon the mere supposition that we are1 as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times40 ,to identity1 it may be said1 it is necessary that the qualities be the same4 ,that of which the qualities are different1 cannot be the same2 and the only mode of discovering whether a substance have the same or different qualities1 is to observe1 how it affects and is affected by other substances4 ,it is recognized by us as the same1 or1 at least1 as perfectly similar1 when1 in two corresponding series of changes1 the same substances affect it in the same manner1 and it affects1 in the same manner1 the same substances2 and when either the same substances do not affect it in the same manner1 or it does not affect1 in the same manner1 the same substances1 we have no hesitation in considering it as different4 ,thus1 if a white substance1 resembling exactly1 in every external appearance1 a lump of sugar1 do not melt when exposed to the action of boiling water1 we do not regard it as sugar1 because the water does not act on it as we have uniformly known it to act on that substance2 or if the same white lump1 in every other respect resembling sugar1 affect our taste as bitter or acrid rather than sweet1 we immediately1 in like manner1 cease to consider it as sugar1 because it does not act upon our nerves of taste in the same manner as sugar acts upon them4 ,the complete similarity1 in other respects1 is far from sufficient to make us alter our judgment2 a single circumstance of manifest difference1 in its mode either of acting upon other substances1 or of being acted upon by them1 being sufficient to destroy the effect of a thousand manifest resemblances4 ,let this test of identity1 then1 it may be said1 be applied to the mind1 at different periods1 if the test be allowed to be a just one2 and let it be seen1 whether1 in the series of changes in which it acts or is acted upon1 the phenomena precisely correspond in every case4 ,if the same objects do not act upon it in the same manner1 it must then be different1 according to the very definition to which we are supposed to have assented4--,you1 of course1 understand1 that ,i am at present only assuming the character of an objector1 and that ,i state an argument1 the principle of which you will afterwards find to be false4 ,when we compare the listless inactivity of the infant1 slumbering1 from the moment at which he takes his milky food1 to the moment at which he awakes to require it again1 with the restless energies of that mighty being which he is to become1 in his maturer years1 pouring truth after truth in rapid and dazzling profusion1 upon the world1 or grasping in his single hand the destiny of empires1 how few are the circumstances of resemblance which we can trace1 of all that intelligence which is afterwards to be displayed1 how little more is seen1 than what serves to give feeble motion to the mere machinery of life4 ,what prophetic eye can venture to look beyond the period of distinct utterance1 and discern that variety of character by which even boyhood is marked1 far less are the intellectual and moral growth of the years that follow--the genius1 before whose quick glance the errors and prejudices1 which all the ages and nations of mankind have received as truths1 are to disappear--the political wisdom1 with which1 in his calm and silent meditations1 he is to afford more security to his country than could be given to it by a thousand armies1 and which1 with a single thought1 is to spread protection and happiness to the most distant lands--or that ferocious ambition1 with which1 in unfortunate circumstances of power1 he is perhaps to burst the whole frame of civil society1 and to stamp1 through every age1 the deep and dark impression of his existence1 in the same manner as he leaves on the earth which he has desolated1 the track of his sanguinary footsteps4 ,the cradle has its equality almost as the grave4 ,talents1 imbecilities1 virtues1 vices1 slumber in it together1 undistinguished2 and it is well that it is so1 since1 to those who are most interested in the preservation of a life that would be helpless but for their aid1 it leaves those delightful illusions which more than repay their anxiety and fatigue1 and allows them to hope1 for a single being1 every thing which it is possible for the race of man to become4 ,if clearer presages of the future mind were then discoverable1 how large a portion of human happiness would be destroyed by this single circumstance6 ,what pleasure could the mother feel1 in her most delightful of offices1 if she knew that she was nursing into strength1 powers1 which were to be exerted for the misery of that great or narrow circle1 in which they were destined to move1 and which to her were to be a source1 not of blessing1 but of grief1 and shame1 and despair6 8,these shall the fury passions tear1 ,the vultures of the mind10 says ,gray1 on thinking of a group of happy children2 8,for see1 how all around them wait1 ,the ministers of human fate1 ,and black ,misfortune's baleful train2 ,oh6 shew them1 where in ambush stand1 ,to seize their prey1 the murd'rous band6 ,oh6 tell them1 they are men60 ,,ode ,,iii4 ,to tell them they are men1 though they were capable of understanding it1 even in this sense of the word1 would not communicate information so melancholy or so astonishing to themselves1 as1 by breaking too soon that dream of expectation1 which is not to last forever1 but which fulfils the benevolent purpose of nature while it lasts1 it would communicate to the parent who watches over them1 and who sees in them only those pure virtues1 and that happiness as pure1 which are perhaps more than the nature of man admits1 and which1 at least in the case before her1 are never to be realized4 ,is the mind1 then1 in infancy1 and in mature life1 precisely the same1 when in the one case1 so many prominent diversities of character force themselves upon the view1 and1 in the other case1 so little appears to distinguish the future ornament of mankind1 from him who is afterwards 8,to eat his glutton meal with greedy haste1 ,nor know the hand which feeds him80 ,if we apply the test of identity1 do we find that the same objects1 in these different periods1 act upon the mind in exactly the same manner2 and are its own feelings1 in the successive trains1 intellectual and moral1 of which they form a part1 attended with consequents exactly the same8 ,every age1--if we may speak of many ages1 in the few years of human life1--seems to be marked with a distinct character4 ,each has its peculiar objects that excite lively affections2 and in each1 exertion is excited by affections1 which1 in other periods1 terminate1 without inducing active desire4 ,the boy finds a world in less space than that which bounds his visible horizon2 he wanders over his range of field1 and exhausts his strength in pursuit of objects1 which1 in the years that follow1 are seen only to be neglected2 while1 to him1 the objects that are afterwards to absorb his whole soul1 are as indifferent as the objects of his present passions are destined then to appear4 ,in the progress of life1 though we are often gratified with the prospect of benevolence increasing as its objects increase1 and of powers rising over the greatness of their past attainments1 this gratification is not always ours4 ,not slight changes of character only appear1 which require our attentive investigation to trace them1 but1 in innumerable cases1 complete and striking contrasts press1 of themselves1 upon view4 ,how many melancholy opportunities must every one have had in witnessing the progress of intellectual decay1 and the coldness that steals upon the once benevolent heart6 ,we quit our country1 perhaps at an early period of life1 and1 after an absence of many years1 we return with all the remembrances of past pleasure1 which grow more tender as we approach their objects4 ,we eagerly seek him1 to whose paternal voice we have been accustomed to listen1 with the same reverence as if its predictions had possessed oracular certainty1--who first led us into knowledge1 and whose image has been constantly joined in our mind1 with all that veneration which does not forbid love4 ,we find him sunk1 perhaps1 in the imbecility of idiotism1 unable to recognize us--ignorant alike of the past and of the future1 and living only in the sensibility of animal gratification4 ,we seek the favourite companion of our childhood1 whose gentleness of heart we have often witnessed when we have wept together over the same ballad1 or in the thousand little incidents that called forth our mutual compassion1 in those years when compassion requires so little to call it forth4 ,we find him hardened into man1 meeting us scarcely with the cold hypocrisy of dissembled friendship--in his general relations to the world1 careless of the misery which he is not to feel--and1 if he ever think of the happiness of others1 seeking it as an instrument1 not as an end4 ,when we thus observe all that made us one1 and gave an heroic interest even to our childish adventures1 absorbed in the chillness of selfish enjoyment1 do we truly recognize in him the same unaltered friend1 from whom we were accustomed to regret our separation1 and do we use only a metaphor of little meaning1 when we say of him1 that he is become a different person1 and that his mind and character are changed8 ,in what does the identity consist8 ,the same objects no longer act upon him in the same manner2 the same views of things are no longer followed by similar approbation or disapprobation1 grief1 joy1 admiration1 disgust2 and if we affirm that substance to be1 in the strictest sense of identity1 the same on which1 in two corresponding series of phenomena1 the same objects act differently1 while itself also acts differently on the same objects2 in short1 in which the antecedents being the same1 the consequents are different1 and1 the consequents being the same1 the antecedents are different1 what definition of absolute diversity can we give1 with which this affirmation of absolute identity may not be equally consistent8 8,behold the child1 by nature's kindly law1 ,pleas'd with a rattle1 tickled with a straw2 ,some livelier plaything gives his youth delight1 ,a little louder1 but as empty quite2 ,scarfs1 garters1 gold1 amuse his riper stage2 ,and beads and prayer-books are the toys of age4 ,pleas'd with this bauble still1 as that before2 ,till1 tir'd1 he sleeps1--and life's poor play is o'er40#dh ,the supposed test of identity1 when applied to the mind in these cases1 completely fails4 ,it neither affects1 nor is affected1 in the same manner1 in the same circumstances4 ,it1 therefore1 if the test be a just one1 is not the same identical mind4 ,this argument against the identity of the mind1 drawn from the occasional striking contrasts of character in the same individual at different periods of life1 or when1 by great changes of fortune1 he may have been placed suddenly in circumstances remarkably different1 must1 in some degree1 have forced itself upon every one who has been at all accustomed to reflect2 and yet1 in no one instance1 ,i may safely say1 can it have produced conviction even for a moment4 ,i have stated it to you1 without attempting to lessen its force by any allusion to the fallacy on which it is founded2 because the nature of this fallacy is afterwards to be fully considered by us4 ,there is another argument that may be urged against the identity of the sentient and thinking principle1 which has at least equal semblance of force1 though it does not occur so readily1 because it does not proceed on those general and lasting changes of character with which every one must be struck1 but on the passing phenomena of the moment1 which are not inconsistent with a continuance of the same general character1 and which1 as common to all mankind1 and forming1 indeed1 the whole customary and familiar series of our thoughts and emotions1 excite no astonishment when we look back on them in the order of their succession4 ,the mere diversity of our feelings at different moments1 it may be said1 is of itself incompatible with the strict and absolute unity which is supposed to belong to the thinking principle4 ,if joy and sorrow1 such as every one has felt1 be different1 that which is joyful1 and that which is sorrowful1 cannot be precisely the same4 ,on the supposition of complete unity and permanence of the thinking principle1 nothing is added to it1 nothing is taken away from it2 and1 as it has no parts1 no internal change of elementary composition can take place in it4 ,but that to which nothing is added1 from which nothing is taken away1 and which has no parts to vary their own relative positions and affinities1 is so strictly the same1 it may be said1 that it would surely be absurd to predicate of it any diversity whatever4 ,joy and sorrow imply an unquestionable diversity of some kind2 and if this diversity cannot be predicated of that substance which is precisely the same1 without addition1 subtraction1 or any internal change of composition whatever1 that which is joyful1 and that which is sorrowful1 cannot have absolute identity2 or if we affirm1 that a diversity1 so striking as to form an absolute contrast1 is yet not inconsistent with complete and permanent unity and identity1 we may1 in like manner1 affirm1 that a substance which is hard1 heavy1 blue1 transparent1--which unites with acids1 not1 with alkalies1--and which is volatilizable at a low temperature1--is precisely the same substance as that1 which is soft1 light1 green1 opaque1--which unites with alkalies1 not with acids1--and which is absolutely infusible and fixed in the highest temperature to which we can expose it4 ,i have thus endeavoured to place1 in the strongest possible light1 the most imposing arguments which ,i can conceive to be urged against the permanent identity of the sentient and thinking principle1 that1 in combating even ,sophistry itself1 you may learn1 as ,i have said1 to combat with it on equal ground1 and assume no advantage but that irresistible advantage which ,truth must always afford to him who is the combatant of ,error4 ,the positive evidence of the identity of the mind ,i shall proceed to consider in my next ,lecture4 ,,footnotes3 #dd ,mart4 ,scrib4 chap4 vii4--,pope's ,works1 edit4 #ageg1 v4 vii4 p4 #hb-hd4 #de ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,iii4 chap4 iv4--v4 #a4 p4 #cda4 ,edit4 ,ed4 #ahjh4 #df ,monsieur ,des ,cartes4 ,shaftesb4 #dg ,shaftesbury's ,characteristics1 vol4 iii4 p4 #agb-agd4 ,edit4 #agde4 #dh ,pope's ,essay on ,man1 ,ep4 ,,ii4 v4 #bge-bhb4 ,,lecture ,,xiii4 ,,on ,,the ,,direct ,,evidence ,,of ,,mental ,,identity2 ,,and ,,objections ,,answered4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was employed in considering the great question of the ,identity of the ,mind1 as one and permanent1 amid all the infinite variety of our feelings2 and particularly1 in stating the two most forcible objections1 which ,i can imagine to be urged against this identity1--one founded on the striking contrasts1 intellectual and moral1 which the same mind exhibits in different periods of life1 and in different circumstances of fortune1--the other1 more abstract1 and1 therefore1 less obvious1 but not less forcible1 founded on the mere diversity of our temporary feelings1 as itself inconsistent with identity1 at least with that strict and absolute identity1 to which1 as in the case of the mind1 nothing can have been added1--from which nothing can have been taken away1--and which1 by its very nature1 as simple and indivisible1 must have been incapable of any elementary change4 ,since the exposure of the fallacy1 on which these objections are founded1 would1 however1 afford only a sort of negative evidence of that great truth which they oppose1 it will be of advantage1 before entering on an examination of the objections themselves1 to state1 in the first place1 the nature of that positive evidence1 which does not1 indeed1 lead us to the belief of the unity and permanence of our spiritual being1 by that slow process which is denominated reasoning1 but constitutes to us1 primarily and directly1 an impossibility of disbelieving it4 ,i do this the more readily1 from the opportunity which it gives of making you acquainted with the paramount importance of those principles of intuitive belief1 which are essential to philosophy in all its forms1 as they are physically essential1 indeed1 to the very preservation of our animal existence2 and which the rash and unphilosophic extension of them by one class of philosophers1 and the equally unphilosophic misapprehension of them by other writers who controverted them1 have rendered more necessary1 than it would otherwise have been1 to state to you with precision4 ,of these first truths1 as they have been termed1 the subject1 which we are at present considering1 affords one of the most striking examples4 ,the belief of our identity is not the result of any series of propositions1 but arises immediately1 in certain circumstances1 from a principle of thought1 as essential to the very nature of the mind1 as its powers of perception or memory1 or as the power of reasoning itself1 on the essential validity of which1 and consequently on the intuitive belief of some first truth on which it is founded1 every objection to the force of these very truths themselves must ultimately rest4 ,to object is to argue2 and to argue is to assert the validity of argument1 and1 therefore1 of the primary evidence1 from which the evidence of each succeeding proposition of the argument flows4 ,to object to the authority of such primary intuitive belief1 would thus be to reason against reason1--to affirm and deny at the same moment1--and to own that the very arguments which we urge are unworthy of being received and credited4 ,as the nature of the process of reasoning has not yet come under our review1 it may not at first appear to you1 how essential the truths of intuition are to those very truths which are usually opposed to them4 ,but that they are thus essential1 a very little attention will be sufficient to show you4 ,all belief1 it is evident1 must be either direct or indirect4 ,it is direct1 when a proposition1 without regard to any former proposition expressed or understood1 is admitted as soon as it is expressed in words1 or as soon as it rises silently in the mind4 ,such are all the order of truths1 which have been denominated1 on this account1 first truths4 ,the belief is indirect1 when the force of the proposition1 to which assent is given1 is admitted only in consequence of the previous admission of some former proposition1 with which it is felt to be intimately connected2 and the statement in words1 or the internal developement of these relative propositions in the order in which their relation to the primary proposition is felt1 is all that constitutes reasoning4 ,the indirect belief which attends the result of reasoning1 even in the proudest demonstration1 is thus only another form of some first truth1 which was believed directly and independently of reasoning2 and1 without this primary intuitive assent1 the demonstration itself1 in all its beautiful precision and regularity1 would be as powerless and futile as the most incoherent verbal wrangling4 ,without some principles of immediate belief1 then1 it is manifest1 that we could have no belief whatever2 for we believe one proposition1 because we discover its relation to some other proposition1 which is itself1 perhaps1 related1 in like manner1 to some other proposition formerly admitted1 but which1 carried back as far as it may1 through the longest series of ratiocination1 must ultimately come to some primary proposition1 which we admit from the evidence contained in itself1 or1 to speak more accurately1 which we believe from the mere impossibility of disbelieving it4 ,all reasoning1 then1 the most sceptical1 be it remarked1 as well as the most dogmatical1 must proceed on some principles1 which are taken for granted1 not because we infer them by logical deduction1 for this very inference must then itself be founded on some other principle assumed without proof2 but because the admission of these first principles is a necessary part of our intellectual constitution4 ,the ridicule1 therefore1 with which ,dr ,priestley and some other ,english metaphysicians1 were disposed to regard the decision of philosophical questions1 on certain ultimate principles of common sense1 was surely1 at least in its wide degree of extension1 misplaced2 though the phrase common sense1 it will be admitted1 was not the happiest that could have been chosen4 ,the controversy1 indeed1 was truly a verbal and insignificant one1 unless as far as it had reference to the unnecessary multiplication of these principles1 by the philosophers of this part of the island whom ,dr ,priestley opposed2 since1 if traced to their ultimate evidence1 it could have been only from some one or more of the principles of common sense1 at least from those primary universal intuitions of direct belief1 which were all that ,dr ,reid and his friends meant to denote by the term1 that the very reasonings employed against them derived even the slightest semblance of force4 ,an argument that rejects not the phrase common sense only1 which is of little consequence1 but also what the phrase was intended1 by its authors1 to imply1 is an argument confessedly founded upon nothing2 which1 therefore1 as wholly unfounded1 requires no answer1 and which1 at any rate1 it would be vain to attempt to answer1 because the answer1 if it proceed on any ground whatever1 must begin with assuming what the argument rejects1 as inadmissible4 ,all reasoning1 then1 ,i repeat1 whether sceptical or dogmatical1 must take for granted1 as its primary evidence1 the truth of certain propositions1 admitted intuitively1 and independently of the reasoning1 which follows1 but cannot precede1 the perception of their truth2 and hence1 as we cannot suppose that the subsequent ratiocination1 though it may afford room for errors in the process1 can at all add evidence to these primary truths2 which1 as directly believed1 are themselves the ultimate evidence of each successive proposition1 down to the last result of the longest argument2 we must admit that our identity1 if it be felt by us intuitively1 and felt universally1 immediately1 irresistibly1 is founded on the very same authority as the most exact logical demonstration1 with this additional advantage1 that it is not subject to those possibilities of error in the steps of the demonstration1 from which no long series of reasoning can be exempt4 ,so little accustomed are we1 however1 to think of this primary fundamental evidence of every reasoning1 while we give our whole attention to the consecutive propositions which derive from it their force1 that we learn1 in this manner1 to consider truth and reasoning as necessarily connected1 and to regard the assertion of truths that do not flow from reasoning1 as the assertion of something which it would be equally unworthy of philosophy to assert or to admit2 though every assertion and every admission1 which the profoundest reasoner can make1 must1 as we have seen1 involve the direct or indirect statement of some truth of this kind4 ,nor is it wonderful that we should thus think more of the reasoning itself1 than of the foundation of the reasoning2 since the first truths1 which give force to reasoning but require no reasoning to establish them1 must necessarily be of a kind which all admit1 and which1 therefore1 as always believed by us1 and undisputed by others1 have excited no interest in discussion1 and have never seemed to add to our stock of knowledge1 like the results of reasoning1 which have added to it truth after truth4 ,yet that they are thus uninteresting to us1 is the effect only of their primary1 and universal1 and permanent force4 ,they are the only truths1 in short1 which every one admits2 and they seem to us unworthy of being maintained as truths1 merely because they are the only truths which are so irresistible in evidence1 as to preclude the possibility of a denial4 ,it is not as the primary evidence of all our processes of reasoning1 however1 that they are chiefly valuable4 ,every action of our lives is an exemplification of some one or other of these truths1 as practically felt by us4 ,why do we believe1 that what we remember truly took place1 and that the course of nature will be in future such as we have already observed it8 ,without the belief of these physical truths1 we could not exist a day1 and yet there is no reasoning from which they can be inferred4 ,these principles of intuitive belief1 so necessary for our very existence1 and too important1 therefore1 to be left to the casual discovery of reason1 are1 as it were1 an internal never-ceasing voice from the ,creator and ,preserver of our being4 ,the reasonings of men1 admitted by some1 and denied by others1 have over us but a feeble power1 which resembles the general frailty of man himself4 ,these internal revelations from on high1 however1 are omnipotent like their ,author4 ,it is impossible for us to doubt them1 because to disbelieve them would be to deny what our very constitution was formed to admit4 ,even the ,atheist himself1 therefore1 if1 indeed1 there be one who truly rejects a ,creator and ,ruler of the universe1 is thus every moment in which he adapts his conduct implicitly1 and without reasoning1 to these directions of the ,wisdom that formed him1 obeying1 with most exact subserviency1 that very ,voice which he is professing to question or to deride4 ,that the assertion of principles of intuitive belief1 independent of reasoning1 may be carried to an extravagant and ridiculous length1--as1 indeed1 seems to me to have been the case in the works of ,dr ,reid1 and some other ,scotch philosophers1 his contemporaries and friends1--no one can deny2 nor that the unnecessary multiplication of these would be in the highest degree injurious to sound philosophy1--both as leading us to form false views of the nature of the mind1 in ascribing to it principles which are no part of its constitution1 and1 still more1 as checking the general vigour of our philosophic inquiry1 by seducing us into the habit of acquiescing too soon1 in the easy and indolent faith1 that it is unnecessary for us to proceed farther1 as if we had already advanced as far as our faculties permit4 ,it is the more unfortunate1 because our very avidity for knowledge1 which is only another name for that philosophic curiosity in which inquiry originates1 is itself favourable to this too easy acquiescence2 tending1 consequently1 by a sort of double influence1 to repress the very speculation to which it gave rise4 ,this it does1 by rendering the suspense of ungratified curiosity so painful to us1 as to resemble1 in a very great degree1 the uneasiness which we feel from the ungratified cravings of bodily appetite4 ,we more readily1 therefore1 yield to the illusion which seems to remove this suspense3 and are happy to think1 however falsely1 that we have now completed our inquiry1 and that1 without attempting any more elementary analysis1 we may content ourselves with simply classing the results which we have already obtained4 ,though there is no human being who must not have felt doubts on some point or other1 it is not every one who knows how to doubt4 ,to the perfection of a doubt1 indeed1 it is essential1--if ,i may apply to it what rhetoricians say of an epic or dramatic narrative1--that it should have a beginning1 a middle1 and in many cases1 too1 though not in all1 an end4 ,the middle is a very easy matter2 the great difficulty relates to the beginning and the end1 and to the end not less than the beginning4 ,we err equally1 when the doubt ceases too soon1 and when it does not cease where it ought to cease4 ,there is a scepticism as different from the true spirit of philosophy1 as the most contented ignorance1 that has never questioned a single prejudice2 a scepticism1 which1 instead of seeking to distinguish truth from falsehood1 professes to deny altogether the competency of our faculties as to making such a distinction in any case1 and to which any proposition1 therefore1 is as likely as its opposite4 ,with this wild half reasoning extravagance1 which is ignorant whether it affirms or denies1 and which does not even know certainly that it has any uncertainty at all1 it would be manifestly absurd to reason2 and we may even truly say of it1 notwithstanding the high character of perfect doubting which it affects1 that it does not know how to doubt more than the all-credulous imbecility which it despises and derides2 because it does not know in what circumstances doubt is legitimate1 and in what circumstances it should cease4 ,but1 at the same time1 he also1 it may be said1 does not know how to doubt1 who is completely satisfied with the result of an inquiry which he is capable of prosecuting still further1--even though it were only by the addition of a single step to the thousand which he may already have made4 ,truth is the last link of many long chains2 the first links of all of which1 ,nature has placed in our hands4 ,when we have fairly arrived at the last1 and feel completely that there is no link beyond1 it would be manifestly absurd to suppose1 that we can still proceed further2--but if we stop before we have arrived at the last1 maintaining1 without stretching out our hand to make the experiment1 that there cannot be yet another link after that which we have reached1 it matters not how far we may have advanced4 ,truth is still beyond us--to be grasped only by an arm more vigorous and persevering4 ,if1 instead of maintaining boldly1 that we have reached the last link of the chain1 we content ourselves with affirming1 that we have reached the last which human effort can reach1 we must beware that we do not measure the incapacity of the whole race of mankind by our own individual inability1 or1 which is far from improbable1 that we do not mistake for inability1 even in ourselves1 what is only the irksomeness of long continued exertion4 ,our power is often much greater than we are willing to believe2 and in many cases1 as ,la ,rochefoucault very justly says1 it is only to excuse to ourselves our own indolence that we talk of things as impossible4 8,non putant fieri10 says ,seneca1 speaking of persons of this character1 8quicquid facere non possunt4 ,ex infirmitate sua ferunt sententiam40--8,scis quare non possumus ista8 ,quia nos posse non credimus40--8,magno animo de rebus magnis judicandum est2 alioqui videbitur illarum vitium esse quod nostrum est40 ,much evil1 then1 it must be admitted1 would arise in the ,philosophy of ,mind from a disposition to acquiesce too soon in instinctive principles of belief4 ,but though these may be1 and have been1 multiplied unnecessarily1 and beyond the truth of nature1 it is not less certain1 that of our mental nature such principles are truly a part4 ,we should1 indeed1 draw monsters1 not men1 if we were to represent the human head and trunk with a double proportion of arms and legs2 but we should also give an unfaithful portraiture of the human figure1 and should draw monsters1 not men1 if we were to represent them with but one arm and leg1 or with no arm or leg at all4 ,in like manner1 to suppose the mind endowed with more principles of intuition than belong to it1 would be to imagine a species of mental monster4 ,but it would not less be a mental monster1 if we were to attempt to strip it of the principles which it truly possesses4 ,in contending1 then1 for the authority of certain first principles of belief1 such as that on which ,i conceive the conviction of our identity to be founded1 ,i am sufficiently aware1 in how many instances1 reference to these has been rashly made by philosophers2 when a deeper and more minute analysis would have shewn1 that the supposed first principles were not elementary laws of thought1 but were resolvable into others more simple4 ,it is not to be inferred1 however1 from the rash attempts to establish principles of intuitive belief which do not exist1 that there are no such principles in our mental constitution1 any more than it is to be inferred1 from the general prevalence of bad reasoning1 that it is impossible for a human being to reason accurately4 ,i trust1 at any rate1 that ,i have already sufficiently warned you1 against the danger of acquiescing too soon in any proposition1 as a law of thought1 precluding all further inquiry1 from its own primary and independent evidence2 and that ,i have impressed you1 not merely with the necessity of admitting some principles of this sort1 as essential to every reasoning1 but with the necessity also1 of admitting them1 only after the most cautious examination4 ,the difficulty of ascertaining precisely1 whether it be truth which we have attained1 is1 in many cases1 much greater1 than the difficulty of the actual attainment4 ,philosophy has in this respect been compared1 by a very happy illustration1--which1 therefore1 homely and familiar as it is1 ,i make no scruple to quote1--to 8a game at which children play1 in which one of them1 with his eyes bandaged1 runs after the others4 ,if he catch any one1 he is obliged to tell his name2 and if he fail to name him1 he is obliged to let him go1 and to begin his running once more4 ,it is the same10 says ,fontenelle1 the author from whom ,i borrow this image1 8in our seeking after truth4 ,though we have our eyes bandaged1 we do sometimes catch it4--,but then we cannot maintain with certainty that it is truth1 which we have caught2--and in that moment it escapes from us40 ,if there be1 as it has been already shewn that there must be1 intuitive truths2 and1 if we are not to reject1 but only to weigh cautiously1 the belief which seems to us intuitive1 it will be difficult to find any1 which has a better claim to this distinction1 than the faith which we have1 in our identity1 as one continued sentient and thinking being1 or rather1 to speak more accurately1 as one permanent being capable of many varieties of sensation and thought4 ,there is to be found in it1 every circumstance which can be required to substantiate it as a law of intuitive belief4 ,it is universal1 irresistible1 immediate4 ,indeed1 so truly prior and paramount is it to mere reasoning1 that the very notion of reasoning necessarily involves the belief of our identity as admitted4 ,to reason1 is to draw a conclusion from some former proposition2 and how can one truth be inferred from another truth1 unless the mind1 which admits the one1 be the mind1 which admitted the other8 ,in its order1 as much as in its importance1 it may be truly considered as the first of those truths which do not depend on reasoning1 and as itself necessarily implied1 perhaps in all1 certainly in the greater number1 of our other intuitions4 ,i believe1 for example1 without being able to infer it1 or even to discover the greater probability of it1 by any process of reasoning1 that the course of nature in future will resemble the past2 and1 since all mankind have the same irresistible tendency1 ,i have no scruple in referring it to an original principle of our nature4 ,in taking for granted this similarity1 however1 in the order of succession of two distinct sets of phenomena1 ,i must previously have believed1 that ,i1 the same sentient being1 who expect a certain order in the future phenomena of nature1 have already observed a certain order in the past4 ,since1 then1 the belief of our identity is intuitive and irresistible1 the only inquiry which remains is as to the circumstances in which the belief arises4 ,identity is a relative term4 ,it implies of course1 in every instance1 a double observation of some sort4 ,the identity of our mind is its continuance1 as the subject of various feelings1 or at least as that which is susceptible of various feelings4 ,the belief of it therefore1 can arise only on the consideration of its successive phenomena2 and is indeed involved in the mere consideration of these as successive4 ,the knowledge of our mind as a substance1 and the belief of our identity during successive feelings1 may be considered as the same notion1 expressed in different words4 ,our identity is the unity and sameness of that which thinks and feels1--itself substantially unchanged amid the endless variety of its thoughts and feelings1--capable of existing separately in all these different states2 not ceasing therefore when they cease1 but independent of their transient changes4 ,the knowledge of mind1 then1 as a substance1 implying the belief of identity during changes of state cannot be involved in any one of these separate states2 and1 if our feelings merely succeeded each other1 in the same manner as the moving bodies of a long procession are reflected from a mirror1 without any vestige of them as past1 or consequently1 any remembrance of their successions1 we should be as incapable of forming a notion of the sentient substance mind1 abstracted from the momentary sensation1 as the mirror itself2 though we should indeed differ from the mirror1 in having what mind only can have1 the sensations themselves1 thus rapidly existing and perishing4 ,but1 if it be only on the consideration of some past feeling1 that the belief of the permanent substance mind can arise1 it is to the principle which recals to us past feelings1 that the belief is ultimately to be traced4 ,we remember2--and in that remembrance is involved the belief1 the source of which we seek4 ,it is not merely a past feeling that arises to us1 in what is commonly termed memory1 but a feeling that is recognized by us as ours1 in that past time of which we think1--a feeling1 therefore1 of that mind which now remembers what it before saw1 perhaps1 or heard1 or enjoyed1 or suffered4 ,we are told by writers on this subject1 that it is from a comparison of our present with our past consciousness1 that the belief of our identity in these states arises2 and this use of the term comparison1 which is commonly applied to a process of a different kind1 may perhaps mislead you as to this simpler process4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that the belief arises from a feeling of the past1 that is remembered1 together with the consciousness of our remembrance as a present feeling1--a contemplation1 as it were1 of two successive states of the mind4 ,but the comparison is nothing more than this4--,it is not to be supposed that we discover in the two feelings some common quality or proportion1 as when1 in arithmetic or geometry we compare two numbers1 or two regular figures2 for the two feelings may have nothing common1 except that very belief of identity which is involved in the remembrance itself4 ,we remember the past1--we feel the present1--we believe1 and cannot but believe1 that the rememberer of the past existed in that past which he remembers4 ,the process itself is sufficiently simple1 however truly wonderful one of the feelings may be which forms the most important part of the process2--for we are not to forget that the remembrance itself1 the revealer of the past1 is not a past1 but a present feeling4 ,it is the mind existing for the present moment in a particular state1 as much as any primary and immediate sensation is the mind existing in a particular state4 ,that this state of remembrance1 itself a present feeling1 should be representative to us of some former feeling1 so as to impress us irresistibly with the belief of that former state of the mind1 is indeed most wonderful2 but that it does impress us with this belief1 is as undeniable as the belief itself is irresistible4 ,our faith in our identity1 then1 as being only another form of the faith which we put in memory1 can be questioned only by those who deny all memory1 and with memory all reasoning of every kind1--who believe only the existence of the present moment1 and who with respect to every thing else1 are as incapable of opposing or questioning as they are of believing4 ,if our memory be unworthy of the faith which we intuitively give to it1 all that is founded on memory1 and therefore demonstration itself1 must equally deceive us4 ,we cannot admit the most rigid demonstration1 or expect it to be admitted1 without having already admitted1 intuitively1 that identity1 which in words only we profess to question1 and to question which1 even in words1 is to assert the reality of that which we deny4 ,the belief of the identity of self1 then1 as the one permanent subject of the transient feelings remembered by us1 arises from a law of thought1 which is essential to the very constitution of the mind4 ,it has accordingly all the qualities1 which ,i can imagine to be required by the most rigid scrutinizer of our principles of intuitive assent4 ,it is universal1 and immediate1 and irresistible4 ,i do not believe1 with more confidence1 that the half of thirty-two is equal to the square of four1 than ,i believe1 that ,i1 who computed the square of four1 am the same with that mind1 which computes the half of thirty-two1 and asserts the equality of the two numbers4 ,this consideration is of itself decisive of the question of identity2 since1 if it be manifest1 that there is an universal1 immediate1 and irresistible impression of our identity1--an impression1 which cannot be traced to any law of thought more simple1--its truth is established by a species of evidence1 which must be allowed to be valid1 before the very objections can be put1 in which it is professedly denied2--every objection1 however sceptical1 involving1 as we have seen1 and necessarily involving1 the assertion of some such intuitive proposition1 from which alone its authority1 if it have any authority1 is derived4 ,in endeavouring to move the whole world of truth with his lever1 there must still be some little spot at least1 on which the sceptic must be content to rest his foot as firmly as others4 1 he must still be condemned to say with ,archimedes2 and if we allow no resting-place to his foot1--or1 even allowing him this1 if we allow no fulcrum for the instrument which he uses1 he may contract or lengthen his lever at pleasure2 but all the efforts1 which in such circumstances1 he can make1 will exhibit nothing so striking to those by whom the efforts are witnessed1 as the laborious impotence of him who employs them4 ,to deny any first principles of intuitive belief1 that are not themselves to stand in need of a demonstration1--which1 as a demonstration1 or series of consecutive propositions1 can be founded1 in its primary evidence1 only on some principle of the same kind1--is1 indeed1 for such a sceptical mechanic1 to set his foot upon air1 rather than on the ground1 on which all around him are standing1 and to throw away the single fulcrum on which his lever rests1 and from which alone all its power is derived4 ,the belief of our mental identity1 then1 we may safely conclude1 is founded on an essential principle of our constitution1--in consequence of which1 it is impossible for us to consider our successive feelings1 without regarding them as truly our successive feelings--states1 or affections of one thinking substance4 ,but though the belief of the identity of the substance which thinks1 is thus established on the firmest of all grounds1 the very ground1 as we have seen1 on which demonstration itself is founded1--even though no particular fallacy could be traced in the objections brought against it1 which ,i detailed in my last ,lecture1--it is still an interesting inquiry1 in what the fallacy of the objections consists2 and the inquiry is the more interesting1 as it will lead us to some remarks and distinctions1 which1 ,i flatter myself1 will throw some light on the philosophy of all the changes1 material as well as mental1 that are every moment taking place in the universe4 ,the objections brought against the identity of the mind1 from a supposed incompatibility of its diversities of state with sameness of substance1 appear to me to depend on the assumption of a test of identity1 transferred1 without sufficient reason1 from the obvious appearances of matter to mind1 and which1 if matter be accurately considered1 is equally false1 too1 as applied to it4 ,the cause of the transference1 however1 from the obvious material appearances1 is a very natural one1--the same1 which has included so many analogies1 from external things1 in the language1 which we employ to express the intellectual functions4 ,it is with the changes of the material substances around us1 that all our operations1 which leave any fixed and permanent marks of our agency1 are immediately concerned4 ,it is indeed only through them1 that our communication with other minds can be at all carried on2 and it is not wonderful1 therefore1 that1 in considering the nature of change1 of every kind1 our philosophy should be strongly tainted with prejudices1 derived from the material world1 the scene of all the immediate and lasting changes1 which it is in our power to produce4 ,how much the mere materialism of our language has itself operated1 in darkening our conceptions of the nature of the mind1 and of its various phenomena1 is a question1 which is obviously beyond our power to solve2 since the solution of it would imply1 that the mind of the solver was itself free from the influence which he traced and described4 ,but of this1 at least1 we may be sure1 that it is almost impossible for us to estimate the influence too highly2 for we must not think1 that its effect has been confined to the works of philosophers4 ,it has acted1 much more powerfully1 in the familiar discourse1 and silent reflections of multitudes1 that have never had the vanity to rank themselves as philosophers1--thus incorporating itself1 as it were1 with the very essence of human thought4 ,in that rude state of social life1 in which languages had their origin1 the inventor of a word probably thought of little more1 than the temporary facility1 which it might give to himself and his companions1 in communicating their mutual wants1 and concerting their mutual schemes of co-operation4 ,he was not aware1 that1 with this faint and perishing sound1 which a slight difference of breathing produced1 he was creating that which was afterwards to constitute one of the most imperishable of things1 and to form1 in the minds of millions1 during every future age1 a part of the complex lesson of their intellectual existence1--giving rise to lasting systems of opinions1 which1 perhaps1 but for the invention of this single word1 never could have prevailed for a moment1 and modifying sciences1 the very elements of which had not then begun to exist4 ,the inventor of the most barbarous term may thus have had an influence on mankind1 more important1 than all which the most illustrious conqueror could effect1 by a long life of fatigue1 and anxiety1 and peril1 and guilt4 ,of the generalship of ,alexander1 and the valour of his armies1--of all which he suffered1 and planned1 and executed1 what permanent vestiges remain1 but in the writings of historians6 ,in a very few years1 after the termination of his dazzling career1 every thing on the earth was almost as if he had never been4 ,a few phrases of ,aristotle achieved a much more extensive and lasting conquest1 and are1 perhaps1 even at this moment1 exercising no small sway on the very minds which smile at them with scorn1 and which1 in tracing the extent of their melancholy influence on the progress of science1 in centuries that are past1 are unconscious that they are describing and lamenting prejudices1 of which they are themselves still1 in a great measure1 the slaves4 ,how many truths are there1 of which we are ignorant1 merely because one man lived6 ,to return1 however1 to the objections1 which we are to consider4 ,diversity of any kind1 it is said1 is inconsistent with absolute identity1 in any case1 and in the mind1 which is by supposition indivisible1 nothing can be added to it or taken away1 and no internal change can take place1 in the relative positions and affinities of parts which it has not4 ,joy and sorrow are different in themselves2 that which is joyful1 therefore1 and that which is sorrowful1 cannot be precisely the same1 or diversity of any kind might be consistent with absolute identity4 ,that the joyful and sorrowful mind are precisely the same1 is not asserted1 if the sameness be meant to imply sameness of state2 for it is admitted1 that the state of the mind is different in joy and sorrow6 and the only question is1 whether this difference1 to which we give the name of difference of state1 be incompatible with complete and absolute sameness of substance4 ,the true key to the sophistry is1 as ,i have already said1 that it assumes a false test of identity1 borrowed1 indeed1 from the obvious appearances of the material world1 but from these obvious appearances only4 ,because diversity of any kind seems1 in these familiar cases1 to be inconsistent with absolute identity1 we draw hastily the universal conclusion1 that it is inconsistent with absolute identity in any case4 ,paradoxical as the assertion may appear1 however1 we may yet safely assert1 that1 not in mind only1 but1 as we shall find1 in matter also2 some sort of diversity is so far from being inconsistent with absolute identity1 that there is scarcely a single moment1 if1 indeed1 there be a single moment1 in which every atom in the universe is not constantly changing the tendencies that form its physical character1 without the slightest alteration of its own absolute identity2 so that the variety of states or tendencies of the same identical mind1 in joy and sorrow1 ignorance and knowledge1 instead of being opposed1 as you might think1 by the general analogy of nature1 is in exact harmony with that general analogy4 ,it is from our view of matter1 unquestionably1 as implying1 in all its visible changes of state1 some loss of identity1 some addition or subtraction of particles1 or change of their form of combination1 that the objection1 with respect to the identity of the mind1 during its momentary or lasting changes of state1 is derived2 and yet we shall find1 that it is only when we consider even matter itself superficially and slightly1 that we ascribe the changes which take place in it1 to circumstances that affect its identity4 ,to view it more profoundly and accurately1 is to observe1 even in matter1 constant changes of state1 where the identity has continued entire1 and changes as opposite1 as those of the mind itself1 when1 at different periods1 it presents itself in different aspects1 as sad and cheerful1 ignorant and wise1 cruel and benevolent4 ,the apparent mystery of the continued identity of one simple and indivisible mind1 in all the variety of states1 of which it is susceptible1 is thus in a great measure1 solved1 when we find this union of variety and sameness to be the result of a law that is not limited to our spiritual being1 but extends to the whole universe1 or at least to every thing which we know in the universe4 ,it can no longer appear to us peculiarly wonderful1 that the mind should exist at different moments in opposite states1 and yet be the same in its own absolute nature1 when we shall find that this compatibility is true of every atom around us1 as much as of the mind itself4 ,,lecture ,,xiv4 ,,continuation ,,of ,,the ,,answer ,,to ,,objections ,,against ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,mental ,,identity4 ,my ,lecture yesterday was1 in a great measure1 employed in illustrating the primary evidence of those principles of intuitive assent1 to which we traced our belief of the identity of the mind as one and permanent1 in all the variety of its ever-changing affections4 ,i explained to you1 particularly with a view to that vague and not very luminous controversy1 in which ,dr ,priestley was engaged with some philosophers of this part of the ,island1 in what manner the truth of these intuitive propositions must be assumed or admitted by all who reason1 even by the wildest sceptic who professes to question them2 pointing out to you1 at the same time1 the danger to which two of the strongest principles of our constitution1 our indolence and our love of knowledge1 alike expose us--the danger of believing too soon that we have arrived at truths which are susceptible of any minuter analysis4 ,in conformity1 therefore1 with the caution which this danger renders necessary1 we examined the belief of our continued identity2 and we found it to possess the distinguishing marks1 which ,i ventured to lay down as the three great characters of intuition1 that it is universal1 immediate1 and irresistible2--so universal1 that even the very maniac1 who conceives that he was yesterday emperor of the ,moon1 believes that he is to-day the very person who had yesterday that empire--so immediate1 that we cannot consider any two feelings1 of our mind as successive1 without instantly considering them as feelings of our mind1 that is to say1 as states of one permanent substance1 and so irresistible that even to doubt of our identity1 if it were possible for us truly to doubt of it1 would be to believe1 that our mind1 which doubts1 is that very mind which has reflected and reasoned on the subject4 ,having thus stated the positive ground of belief1 in our spiritual identity1 ,i proceeded to consider the negative evidence which might arise from the confutation of the objections urged against it1--objections drawn from the supposed incompatibility of the changes of our mental affections1 with that strict absolute identity of substance1 to which nothing can have been added1 and from which nothing can have been taken away4 ,the test of identity1 which this supposed incompatibility implies1 ,i stated to be a very false one1 transferred from matter to mind1 and borrowed1 not from a philosophical1 but from a very superficial view even of matter itself4 ,if it appear1 on a closer inquiry1 that matter itself1 without the slightest loss of identity1 exists at different moments1 in states which are not merely different but opposite1 and exists in almost infinite variety of such states1 it cannot surely seem wonderful1 that the mind also should1 without the slightest loss of its identity1 exist at different moments1 in states that are different and opposite4 ,that a superficial view of matter1 as it presents itself to our mere organs of sense1 should lead us to form a different opinion1 is1 however1 what might readily be supposed1 because the analogies1 which that superficial view presents1 are of a kind that seem to mark a loss of identity whenever the state itself is altered4 ,in experimental philosophy1 and in the obvious natural phenomena of the material world1 whenever a body changes its state1 some addition or separation has previously taken place4 ,thus1 water becomes steam by the addition1 and it becomes ice by the loss1 of a portion of that matter of heat which is termed by chemists caloric2 which loss and addition are1 of course1 inconsistent with the notion of absolute numerical identity of the corpuscles1 in the three states of water as a solid1 a liquid1 and a gaseous vapour4 ,perception1 by which the mind is metaphorically said to acquire knowledge1 and forgetfulness1 by which it is metaphorically said to lose knowledge1 have1 it must be confessed1 a very striking analogy to these processes of corpuscular loss and gain2 and1 since absolute identity seems to be inconsistent with a change of state in the one set of phenomena1 with which we are constantly familiar1 we find difficulty in persuading ourselves1 that it is not inconsistent with a change of state in the other set also4 ,it is a difficulty of the same kind as that which every one must have felt1 when he learned1 for the first time1 the simple physical law1 that matter is indifferent as to the states of motion and rest1 and that it requires1 therefore1 as much force to destroy completely the motion of a body1 as to give it that motion when at rest4 ,we have not been accustomed to take into account the effects of friction1 and of atmospherical resistance1 in gradually destroying1 without the interference of any visible force1 the motion of a ball1 which we are conscious of effort in rolling from our hand2 and we think1 therefore1 that rest is the natural state of a body1 and that it is the very nature of motion to cease spontaneously4 8,dediscet animus sero1 quod dedicit diu40 ,it is a very just saying of a ,french writer1 that 8it is not easy to persuade men to put their reason in the place of their eyes2 and that when1 for example1 after a thousand proofs1 they are reasonable enough to do their best to believe1 that the planets are so many opaque1 solid1 habitable orbs1 like our earth1 they do not believe it in the same manner as they would have done if they had never looked upon them in another light4 ,there still comes back upon their belief something of the first notion which they had1 that clings to them with an obstinacy1 which it requires a continual effort to shake off40#di ,it is1 then1 because some substantial loss or gain does truly take place in the changing phenomena of the bodies immediately around us1 to which we are accustomed to pay our principal attention1 that we learn to regard a change of state in matter as significant of loss of identity1 and to feel1 therefore1 some hesitation in admitting the mental changes of state to be consistent with absolute sameness of substance4 ,had our observation of the material phenomena been different1 there would have been a corresponding difference in our view of the changes of the phenomena of the mind4 ,if1 for example1 instead of previously gaining or losing caloric1--as in the constitution of things of which we have our present experience1--the particles of the water had suddenly assumed the state of vapour on the sounding of a trumpet at a distance1 and the state of ice immediately on the rising of the sun1---in short1 if the different changes of state in bodies1 by which their physical character for the time seems1 in many cases1 to be wholly altered1 had occurred without any apparent loss or gain of substance1 we should then no longer have found the same difficulty in admitting the changes of state in mind as consistent with its identity2 and the sentient substance1 which previously existed in a different state1 might then1 on the sounding of a trumpet1 have been conceived by us to begin to exist1 in the state which constitutes that particular sensation of hearing1 or1 on the rising of the sun1 to exist in that different state which constitutes the sun's change of colour as readily as the material substance1 previously existing in the form of water1 to begin at the same moment1 without any essential or numerical change1 and consequently with perfect identity1 to exist in the new state of steam1 or in the state of a chrystalline mass1 as solid as the rock from which it hangs as an icicle1 or that glitters with its gemmy covering4 ,but it may be said1 that the very supposition which we now make is an absurd one2 that the mere presence of the sun in the firmament1 at a distance from the water1 cannot be supposed to convert it into ice1 unless the water gain or lose something1 and consequently cease to have absolute identity2 and that the case1 therefore1 is of no value1 as illustrating the compatibility of change of state in our various sensations1 with unaltered identity of the sentient mind4 ,to this ,i might answer1 that although the presence of the sun certainly does not operate in the manner supposed1--as the sequences of events are now arranged in the great system of nature1--it is only by experience1 and not by intuition or reasoning1 we know1 that the presence of the sun has not the very effect which the separation of caloric now produces1 and that there is nothing absolutely more wonderful in the one case than in the other4 ,if our experience had been the reverse of this1--if the change of place of a few particles of caloric had not1 as now1 converted the liquid water into that solid congeries of crystals which we call ice1--we should then have found as little difficulty in conceiving that it should not have this effect1 as we now find in adapting our belief to the particular series of events which constitute our present experience4 ,it is not necessary1 however1 to have recourse to suppositions of this kind2 since the system of nature1 even according to our present experience of it1 furnishes sufficient proof of changes as wonderful in the state of bodies produced obviously at a distance1 and1 therefore1 without any loss or addition which can affect their identity4 ,for sufficient evidence of this1 ,i need appeal only to the agency of the celestial gravitation2 that gigantic energy of nature which fills the universe1 like the immediate presence of the ,deity himself1--to which1 in the immensity of its influence1 the distances1 not from planets to planets merely1 but from suns to suns1 are like those invisible spaces between the elements of the bodies around us1 that seem actual contact to our eyes1--and in comparison with which1 the powers1 that play their feeble part in the physical changes on the surface of our earth1 are as inconsiderable as the atoms1 on which they exercise their little dominion1 are to the massy orbs which it wields and directs at will1-- 8,those bright millions of the heavens1 ,of which the least full ,godhead had proclaim'd1 ,and thrown the gazer on his knee40--8,admire ,the tumult untumultuous6 ,all on wing1 in motion all2 yet what profound repose6 ,what fervid action1 yet no noise6--as aw'd ,to silence by the presence of their ,lord40 ,the action of these great planetary bodies on each other1--it surely cannot be denied1--leaves them separate identities1 precisely as before2 and it is a species of agency1 so essential to the magnificent harmony of the system1 that we cannot conceive it to have been interrupted1 for a single moment1 since the universe itself was formed4 ,an action1 therefore1 has been constantly taking place on all the bodies in the universe1--and consequently a difference of some sort produced1--which yet leaves their identities unaffected4 ,but1 though the identity of the substance of the separate orbs is not affected by their mutual attractions1 the state1 or temporary physical character1 of these orbs1--considered individually as one great whole1--must be affected1--or it would be absurd to speak of their mutual agency at all2 for action implies the sequence of a change of some sort1 and there can be no action1 therefore1 where the substances continue precisely the same1 and their state also precisely the same1 as before the action4 ,accordingly1 we find1 on our own globe1 that great changes of state1 such as form the most striking of its regular visible phenomena1 are produced by this distant operation4 ,the waters of our ocean1 for example1 rise and fall1--and1 therefore1 must have altered states1 or physical tendencies1 in consequence of which they rise and fall1 as there is no corresponding addition or subtraction of matter1--at regular intervals1--which it is in our power to predict with infallible accuracy1--not because we can divine any loss of identity in the fluid mass1--any internal change in its elementary composition1 or the nature and varieties of the winds1 which are to sweep along its surface1--but because we know well1 at what hours1 and in what relative situation1 a certain great body1 at the distance of some hundreds of thousands of miles1 is to be passing along the heavens4 ,if1 then1 the mere position of a distant heavenly body can cause the particles of our ocean to arrange themselves in a different configuration1--from that in which they would otherwise have existed1 and1 therefore1 must have produced in the particles that change of state1 which forces them1 as it were1 into this altered form1--without addition to them of any thing1 or subtraction of any thing1--in short1 leaving in them the same absolute numerical or corpuscular identity as before1--there surely can be no greater difficulty1 in supposing1 as in the case before imagined1 that a certain position of the sun might have immediately caused the particles of a distant liquid1 to arrange themselves in the particular configuration1 that constitutes the solid ice1--which1 though perhaps a more striking change of state1 would not have been more truly a change of state1 than that1 which it now unquestionably produces1 in modifying the rise or fall of our tides4 ,and1 if a distant body can produce in matter a change of state1 without affecting its identity1 by any addition or subtraction1 we may surely admit1 that the presence of an external body1 as in perception1 may1 in mind also1 produce a change of state1 without affecting its identity2 unless indeed1 7which is not impossible1 because nothing is impossible to human folly17 we should be inclined to reverse our prejudices1 and maintain1 that matter may be easily conceived to change the affinities or tendencies that form its physical character1 in the particular circumstances observed1 without any addition or subtraction of substance1 but that some positive addition or subtraction of substance is1 notwithstanding1 essential to the simple changes or affections of the mind4 ,if the moon were suddenly annihilated1 our earth would still be the same identical planet1 without the loss or gain of a single particle of substance4 ,but the state of this planet1 as a whole1 and of every atom of this planet1 would be instantly altered1 in many most important respects1--so completely altered1 indeed1 that not an atom of the mass would tend to the other atoms of the mass1 in the same manner as before4 ,in like manner1 if the light1--which now1 operating on one of my organs of sense1 causes my mind to exist in the state that constitutes the sensation of a particular colour1--were suddenly to vanish1 the state of my mind would be instantly changed1 though my mind itself1 considered as a substance1 would still continue unaltered4 ,in both cases1--the spiritual1 and the material1--and in both cases1 alike1--absolute identity1 in the strictest sense of the term1 is consistent with innumerable diversities4 ,in the discussion of this supposed difficulty1 ,i have chosen1 for illustration1 in the first place1 to consider the planetary attractions1 in preference to those which occur1 in the minuter changes1 that are simply terrestrial2 because in the case of operations at a distance1 it is impossible for us1 not to perceive1 that1 even in matter1 a change of state is not inconsistent with complete permanence of absolute corpuscular identity2 while1 in the compositions or decompositions1 that occur spontaneously1 or by artificial experiment1 in the physical changes on the surface of our earth1 the additions or subtractions of matter1 that appear to us to constitute these phenomena1 truly destroy the corpuscular identity of the substances1 in which the change takes place2 and the change of state is thus considered by us1 as implying a positive substantial change4 ,but when we examine even these phenomena a little more deeply1 we shall find1 that1 like the great operations of gravitation on the masses of the universe1--the change1 in these also1 is not a positive change of substance1 but is simply a change of state in a congeries of independent substances1 which we term one substance1 merely because the spaces1 that are really between them1 are imperceptible to our very imperfect organs2 the addition or subtraction of matter being not that which constitutes the new states or tendencies of the particles which continue present1 but merely that which gives occasion to those changes of state or tendency2--as the positions of the heavenly bodies do not constitute the phenomena of our tides1 but merely give occasion to that difference of state in the particles of the ocean1 in consequence of which they assume of themselves a different configuration4 ,man is placed1 as it has been truly said1 on a point1 between two infinities1--the infinitely great1 and the infinitely little4 ,it may be an extravagant speculation1 to which ,i have before alluded1--but it is not absolutely absurd1 to suppose1 that in the unbounded system of nature1 there may be beings1 to whose vision the whole planetary attendants of each separate sun1 which to us appear to revolve at distances so immense1 may yet seem but one small cohesive mass1 in the same manner1 as to those animalcul1 whose existence and successive generations had been altogether unknown to man1 till the microscope created them1 as it were to his feeble sight1--and which1 perhaps1 are mighty animals compared with races of beings still more minute1 that are constantly living in our very presence1 and yet destined never to be known to us1--those bodies1 which to us seem one small cohesive mass1 may appear separated by distances1 relatively as great1 as to us are those of the planets4 ,that light1 itself a body1 should pass freely through a mass of solid crystal1 is regarded by us as a sort of physical wonder2 and yet it is far from impossible1 that1 between the atoms which compose this apparently solid mass1 whole nations of living beings maybe dwelling1 and exercising their mutual works of peace or hostility2 while perhaps1 if philosophy can be exercised1 in brains of such infinitesimal dimensions1 in the same manner as in our coarser organs1 the nature of the atoms1 or distant worlds around them1 may be dividing with endless absurdities1 the ,ptolemies and ,aristotles of the little republics4 ,we have all so much of the nature of the inhabitants of ,brobdignag1 that a supposition of this kind1--which is perhaps truly in itself not a very probable one1--yet appears to us much more improbable1 than it really is4 ,we smile1 as recognizing our own nature1 when the sovereign of that country of giants is represented by the most unfortunate1 or rather the most fortunate of all voyagers1 as 8turning to his first minister1 who waited behind him with a white staff1 near as tall as the mainmast of the ,royal ,sovereign1 and observing how contemptible a thing was human grandeur1 which could be mimicked by such diminutive insects40 8,and yet10 said he1 8,i dare engage1 those creatures have their titles and distinctions of honour2 they contrive their nests and burrows1 that they call houses and cities2 they make a figure in dress and equipage2 they love1 they fight1 they dispute1 they cheat1 they betray40 ,and we fully enter into the difficulty which the savans of the country1 who had all agreed that the new-discovered animal could not have been produced according to the regular laws of nature1 must have found1 in giving him a name4 8,one of them seemed to think that ,i might be an embryo1 or abortive birth4 ,but this opinion was rejected by the other two1 who observed my limbs to be perfect and finished2 and that ,i had lived several years1 as it was manifest from my beard1 the stumps whereof they plainly discovered through a magnifying-glass4 ,they would not allow me to be a dwarf1 because my littleness was beyond all degrees of comparison2 for the queen's favourite dwarf1 the smallest ever known in that kingdom1 was near thirty feet high4 ,after much debate1 they concluded unanimously1 that ,i was only relplum scalcath1 which is interpreted literally lusus natur2 a determination exactly agreeable to the modern philosophy of ,europe1 whose professors1 disdaining the old evasion of occult causes1 whereby the followers of ,aristotle endeavoured in vain to disguise their ignorance1 have invented this wonderful solution of all difficulties1 to the unspeakable advancement of human knowledge40#ej ,whatever may be thought of speculations of this kind1 however1 with respect to the relative distance of the atoms of bodies1 it is not the less certain1 that these atoms are separate substances1 independent of the other similar or different substances that apparently adhere to them in continuity1--that they are1 in truth1 the only material substances which really exist1 since the bodies which we term masses are only those very atoms under another name1--that they remain1 and cannot but remain1 identical1 amid all the changes of chemical composition or decomposition1--and that the change which they suffer1 therefore1 however strikingly their physical character may be altered for the time1 is a change not of substance but of state only4 ,in the case of the formation of ice1 for example1 the elementary atoms themselves1 which are all that truly exist in nature1 are not1 and cannot be1 changed2 but particles1 which were formerly easily separable from adjacent particles1 now resist this separation by a considerable force4 ,there is a change in their state1 therefore1 since they now exist with a different degree of tendency toward each other1--a change1 to which the separation of a quantity of caloric may1 indeed1 have given occasion1 but which is to be distinguished from that momentary separation itself1 since the solidity1 which is only another name for the corpuscular resistance1 continues after the separation is complete1 and would continue forever1 unless a change of temperature were again to restore that former state or tendency of the particles1 in which they were easily separable4 ,to him who has learned to consider bodies as1 what they truly are1 a multitude of separate and independent corpuscles1 there is no change of identity1 and cannot be any change of identity1 in all the phenomena or changes of the universe4 ,the atoms1 which alone existed1 continue as before2 and all which constitutes the phenomenon1 or varieties of successive phenomena1 is a change of their place or tendency4 ,this corpuscular view of the material universe1--which1 of course1 admits an infinite variety of applications1 corresponding with the infinite variety of its phenomena1--has many most striking analogies in that moral universe1 with the phenomena of which we are chiefly concerned4 ,indeed1 when we consider any of the masses before us1 as deriving all its apparent magnitude from a number of separate bodies1 of which it is composed1--any one of which1 individually1 would be too minute to be distinguishable by us1--it is scarcely possible not to think of the similarity which it presents to the multitudes of human beings that are as it were1 massed together in the great nations of the earth2 and in which any single individual1 if he could be supposed to have exercised his powers separately1 would have been truly as insignificant as a single atom separated from the mass of which it is a part4 ,what we call the greatness of a nation1 is nothing more than the union of a number of little interests and little passions joined in one common object2 to which insignificant elements1 so wonderful when combined1 if we could distinctly reduce1 by analysis1 the most unrivalled power that has ever commanded the admiration and envy of the world1 it would1 at first view1 run some little risk of appearing contemptible4 ,the advantages of this social union of mankind1 as silently felt at every moment1 are unquestionably so infinite in comparison1 as almost to sink into nothing the occasional evils to which the aggregation and massing of so many powers1 when ill directed1 may give rise1--though these terrific evils1 when they occur1 may dwell more permanently in the mind2--like the visitations of storms and earthquakes1 which we remember forever1 while1 with a sort of thankless forgetfulness1 we scarcely think of the calm beauty and regularity which1 season after season1 passes over us4 ,the rock which1 descending from the top of a mountain1 lays waste whatever it meets in its progress1--and to attempt to stop which1 while its short career lasts1 would be almost like instant annihilation1--derives this overwhelming force from an infinite number of independent corpuscles1 any one of which1 if it had fallen singly1 would have been far less destructive than the flutter of an insect's wing2 and that tyrannical power of a single man1 before which1 in unhappy ages of successful oppression1 the earth has so often trembled1--as before some power of darkness1 endowed with more than human sway1--has derived its irresistible might1 not from powers included in itself1--which1 in reference to the objects achieved by it1 would have been feeble indeed1--but from the united powers of beings still feebler1 who were trembling while they executed commands to which themselves alone gave omnipotence4 ,to this corpuscular view1 however1 though it is unquestionably the sort of view to which1 in our ultimate physical inquiries into the phenomena of matter1 we must come1 you may1 perhaps1 not be sufficiently accustomed1 to enter fully into the reasoning on the subject4 ,it will probably be less difficult for you1 if we take rather1 as an illustration1 the simpler case of impulse2 in which the bodies affecting each other are not1 as in chemistry1 indistinguishable corpuscles1 but masses1 clearly defined1 and easily perceptible4 ,i need not1 of course1 repeat the arguments formerly stated1 to prove that attraction1 however general it may be as a law of matter at all visible distances1 does not continue1 but gives place to an opposite tendency at those smaller distances1 which we are unable to perceive with our weak organs1 and which we learn to estimate only by effects that are inconsistent with absolute contact2--for example1 by the well-known fact of the compressibility of bodies1 which could not take place if their particles were already in contact1 and which by continually increasing resistance to the compressing force that would bring the corpuscles nearer1 shews1 that there is1 at different degrees of nearness1 a tendency continuing to operate1 which is the very reverse of attraction4 ,there is1 therefore1 every reason to believe1--since repulsion1 as the fact of forcible compression shews1 takes place while the particles of bodies are still at a certain distance1--that the motion produced in one body by another1 and ascribed to immediate impulse1 is produced1 without actual contact1 by this mutual repulsion1 as it is called1 of the bodies when brought within a certain invisible degree of vicinity to each other2 or1 in other words1--for repulsion means nothing more mysterious than this simple fact1--the tendency which bodies1 in certain relative positions of apparent but not actual contact1 have to fly off from each other with certain degrees of velocity1 as in certain other relative positions1 of distinguishable distance1 they have a tendency to approach each other4 ,this repulsion1 or tendency from each other at one point of nearness1 is of itself as easy to be conceived1 as that attraction1 or tendency toward each other at other points of distance1 to which we give the name of gravitation2 and it is only from our greater familiarity with the one1 as operating at distances which are visible1 while the other1--except in a few cases1 such as those of magnetism and electricity1--operates only at distances which are imperceptible to us1 that we feel a little more difficulty in admitting the repulsion than the attraction of matter4 ,there is then1--however universal gravitation may seem1 when we think only of perceptible distances1--a certain point of near approach1 before actual contact1 at which gravitation ceases2 and1 beyond this point1 the tendency of bodies toward each other is converted1--as the force necessary to compress them evidently shews1--into a tendency from each other2 both tendencies1 indeed1 being inexplicable1 but the one in no respect more so than the other4 ,for this apparent digression1 on a point of general physics1 ,i make no apology1 as it is absolutely necessary for illustrating the particular case to which ,i am to proceed4 ,the consideration of it requires1 what the whole of this discussion1 indeed1 has already required from you1 no small exercise of patient attention2 but ,i trust that ,i sufficiently prepared you for this1 in a former ,lecture1 when ,i stated the importance of such attention1 not merely in relation to the subject considered at the time1 but as a part of your mental discipline1 and the advantage which might thus be derived to your intellectual character1 from the very difficulties which the subject presents4 ,it is in philosophy1 as in many a fairy tale4 ,the different obstacles which the hero encounters1 are not progressively greater and greater2 but his most difficult achievements are often at the very commencement of his career4 ,he begins1 perhaps1 with attacking the castle of some enchanter1 and has to force his way1 unassisted1 through the griffins and dragons that oppose his entrance4 ,he finishes the adventure1 with the death of the magician--and strips him of some ring1 or other talisman1 which renders his subsequent adventures comparatively easy and secure4 ,i cannot venture to say1 indeed1 that a perfect acquaintance with the difficulties of the present question1 and of some of the late questions which have engaged us1 will be such a talisman to you1 in your future career of intellectual science4 ,but ,i may safely say1 that the habit of attentive thought1 which the consideration of subjects1 so abstract1 necessarily produces1 in those who are not too indolent to give attention to them1 or too indifferent to feel interest in them1 is more truly valuable than any talisman1 of which accident or force might deprive you4 ,the magic with which this endows you1 is not attached to a ring1 or a gem1 or any thing external2 it lives1 and lives forever1 in the very essence of your minds4 ,when a billiard ball1 on being struck1 approaches another1 which is at rest1 it soon arrives at the point of seeming1 but not actual contact1 at which their mutual attraction ceases1 and the force which it has acquired still carrying it on1 it passes this bounding point1 and arrives at a point at which repulsion has already begun4 ,accordingly the body1 formerly at rest1 now flies off1 on a principle precisely similar1 7though the mere direction be opposite7 to that by which the same ball1 if dropped from a hand that supported it1 would1 without the actual impulse of any body1 have quitted its state of rest1 as in the present case1 and have gravitated1 or1 which is the same thing1 have moved of itself toward the earth4 ,before the first ball1 which you will1 perhaps more easily remember by the name1 ,a1 arrived so very near to the second ball ,b1 as to have come within the sphere of their mutual repulsion1 this second ball was at rest1 that is to say1 it had no tendency to move in any direction4 ,this state of rest1 however1 is only one of the many states1 in which a body may exist2 and if1 which must surely be allowed1 a body having a tendency to continued motion1 be in a different state1 from one which has no such tendency1 this change of state implying1 it must be remarked1 not even the slightest loss of identity1 has been produced in the body ,b1 by the mere vicinity of the body ,a4 ,for the sake of illustration1 let us now suppose this body ,a to be hot or luminous4 ,it will still1 as before1 produce the new state of tendency to motion1 in ,b1 when it arrives within the limits of their sphere of repulsion4 ,is it less conceivable1 then1 that the mere presence of this hot or luminous body should produce the new sensation of warmth1 or of colour1 which are different states of the sentient mind1 without affecting in the slightest degree the identity of the mind itself1 than that it should produce1 without any loss of absolute identity1 in the body ,b1 an immediate tendency1 in that body1 to move along with a certain velocity1 a state as different from that in which it remains at rest1 as the sensation of warmth1 which is one state of the mind1 is different from the sensation of colour1 which is another state of the mind8 ,nor does the parallel end here2 for1 since a body at rest1 acquiring a tendency to begin motion in one particular direction1 as1 for example1 to move north1 must be in a different state from that in which it would have been1 if it had acquired an instant tendency to move east1 or in any other direction2 and1 the direction once begun1 being the same1 since a body having a tendency to move with one velocity1 must1 at every moment of its progress1 be in a different state from that in which it has a tendency to move with a different velocity1 it is evident1 that the mere presence of a body may produce1 in a second body1 according to the difference of their positions and relative magnitudes1 a variety of states1 that1 when all the varieties of direction1 and all the varieties of velocity are estimated together1 may be considered as infinite1--equal at least in number1 to the different states of which the mind is susceptible1 in its almost infinite variety of feelings2 and all this without any essential change1 that can affect the identity of the quiescent or moving body1 or any essential change1 that can affect the identity of the mind4 ,i am aware1 that1 when you consider1 for the first time1 this assertion of an infinite variety of states1 corresponding with all the innumerable varieties of direction and velocity1 in the tendencies of a simple billiard-ball1 which1 in the various circumstances supposed1 appears to us precisely the same1 in all its sensible qualities1 you may be apt to conceive1 that the assertion must be founded on a mistake1 and1 from the influence of former prejudice may be inclined to think1 that1 when it exhibits a tendency to begin to move east1 at one time1 and1 at another time1 a beginning tendency to move north1 this does not arise from any difference of state in itself1 but from its being merely carried along by the first ball1 which was itself previously moving in one or other of these particular lines of direction4 ,when the elastic billiard-ball1 however1 bounds away from the ball which strikes it1 this supposition is manifestly inapplicable2--and1 in all cases1 it is the influence only of former prejudice which can lead you to this opinion1--the influence of that prejudice1 by which you may have been accustomed to consider impulse1 not as inducing a tendency to motion at some little distance1 but as involving the necessity of actual contact4 ,to destroy this prejudice1 a very little reflection on the phenomena of elastic bodies1 in their shocks and mutual retrocessions1 is surely all that can be requisite2 and if the motion of ,b1 and consequently its tendency to motion1 have begun1 without contact of ,a1 as it afterwards continues while ,a1 the elastic body which struck it1 is moving back in an opposite direction1 it could not be by mechanical trusion1 as carried along by ,a1 which is still at some points of distance from it when its motion begins1 and at still greater distance the longer the motion continues1 that ,b has assumed any one of its variety of states1--that1 for example1 in which1 in one case1 it tends to move east1 in another case to move north1 in one case to move rapidly1 in another slowly4 ,to say that the body acquires this new tendency because it is impelled1 is only to say that it is impelled because it is impelled4 ,it is an equally idle use of language1 to affirm1 as if a word could obviate the difficulty instead of merely stating it1--that ,a1 in communicating a different tendency to ,b1 which was before at rest1 does this by a principle1 or power of repulsion2 for this1 as ,i have said1 is merely to state in a single word1 the regularity in certain circumstances of the very fact asserted4 ,the different tendencies of ,b1 and consequently the different states in which ,b exists1--are not the less different1 in whatever manner the difference may have been produced1 or by whatever word1 or combination of words1 the difference may be expressed4 ,there is no magic1 in the phrase1 principle of repulsion1 or power of repulsion1 which can render the same1 states or tendencies that are in themselves opposite2--for1 as far as we understand the phrase1 it expresses nothing more than the invariableness of the simple fact1 that in certain circumstances of relative position1 bodies have a tendency to fly off from each other1 as in certain other circumstances of relative position1 which constitute the phenomena of gravitation1 they have a tendency to approach4 ,whatever term we may employ to denote it1 it is still a physical fact1 that at a certain point of near and seemingly close approach of another mass1 a body which was before in a state of rest1 acquires immediately a tendency to fly off in different directions1 and with different velocities at different times1 and consequently1 that1 if the tendency to begin or to continue motion1 in one direction1 and with one velocity1 be a state different from that which constitutes the tendency to begin or to continue motion in another direction1 and with another velocity1 the ball ,b1 in these different circumstances1 however identical it may be in substance1 exists in two different states2--or all states1 however different1 may be said to be the same4 ,it may be admitted1 then1 that the feeling of rapture is a state of mind1 completely different from that which constitutes the feeling of agony1--that the sensation of the fragrance of a rose1 has no resemblance to our conception of a sphere or of an equilateral triangle1--and that1 in general1 all those thoughts and emotions1 which1--more truly than the mere union of the immortal spirit within us with the body which it animates1--may be said to constitute life1 8,love1 ,hope1 and ,joy1 fair ,pleasure's smiling train1-- ,hate1 ,fear1 and ,grief1 the family of ,pain20 these1 as they prevail1 in different hours1 render the same individual mind more unlike to itself1 if its states or tendencies alone1 and not its substantial identity be considered1 than the minds perhaps of any two human beings1 at the same moment4 ,but still1 as we have seen1 even from the analogy of the material world1--which was supposed to furnish a powerful objection1 it is no argument against the absolute identity of the mind1 that exists in different states1 however opposite1 any more1 than it is an argument against the absolute identity of a body1 that it1 at one moment1 has a tendency to one particular motion1--at another moment a tendency to a different motion1--and at another moment1 no tendency whatever to motion of any kind2 since1 in all these cases1 as much as in the varying affections of the mind1 there is a change of state1 with absolute identity of substance4 ,,footnotes3 #di ,fontenelle1 ,pluralit des ,mondes1 ,conversat4 #fme4 #ej ,gulliver's ,travels1 part ii4 chap4 #c4 ,,lecture ,,xv4 ,,consideration ,,of ,,the ,,objections ,,against ,,mental ,,identity1 ,,continued2 ,,opinion ,,of ,,mr ,,locke ,,respecting ,,identity2 ,,source ,,of ,,his ,,paradox ,,on ,,this ,,subject2 ,,and ,,reflections ,,suggested ,,by ,,it4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was employed in considering the general objection to the ,identity of the ,mind1 drawn from the contrasts of its momentary feelings1--an objection founded on the supposed incompatibility of diversity of any kind1 with strict and absolute identity4 ,after the very full examination which it received1 it is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the other objection1 drawn from changes of general character1 in the same individual1 at different periods of life1 or in different circumstances of fortune2 since precisely the same arguments1 from the general analogy of nature1 which disprove the supposed incompatibility in the one case1 disprove it also in the other4 ,even matter itself1 we have seen1 may1 without the slightest alteration of its identity1 exist in an almost infinite variety of states2 having1 in some of these states1 qualities precisely the reverse of those1 which it exhibited in other states1 attracting what it repelled1 repelling what it attracted2--and it surely is not more wonderful1 therefore1 that the same identical mind1 also1 should1 in relation to the same objects1 in different circumstances1 be susceptible of an almost infinite variety of affections1--approving1 disapproving1 choosing1 repenting4 ,if we knew nothing more of the relations of two billiard balls to each other1 than the phenomena which they exhibit1 in the moment of their mutual percussion1 when they have been forced1 within a certain degree of close vicinity1 by the impelling stroke1 we should regard them1 from their instant reciprocal repulsion1 as having a natural tendency to fly off from each other2 and1 in the state in which they then exist1 there is no question that such is their tendency1--a tendency1 which1 in these circumstances1 may be regarded as their genuine physical character4 ,yet we have only to imagine the two balls placed at a distance from each other1 like that of the remotest planet from the sun2 and1 in traversing the whole wide void that intervenes1 what a different physical character would they exhibit1 in their accelerating tendency toward each other1 as if their very nature were lastingly changed8 ,if there are1 then1 such opposite tendencies in the same bodies1 without any loss of identity1 why may not the same minds also have their opposite tendencies1 when1 in like manner1 removed1 as it were1 into circumstances that are different1 loving1 perhaps1 what they hated before1 and hating what they loved8 ,if the change of state be not temporary1 but permanent1 the resulting affections may well be supposed to be permanently different2 and1 indeed1 if they be different at all1 cannot but be permanently different1 like the altered state4 ,it is as little wonderful1 therefore1 when any lasting change of circumstances is taken into account1 that the same individual should no longer exhibit the same intellectual and moral appearances1 as that matter1 in its different states1 should no longer exhibit the same obvious phenomena1 attracting1 perhaps1 the very bodies which it before repelled1 and repelling the very bodies which it before attracted1 and attracting and repelling with differences of force1 and consequent differences of velocity in the bodies moved1 the varieties of which it would require all the powers of our arithmetic to compute4 ,when we observe1 then1 in a mind1 which we have long known and valued1 any marks of altered character1--when1 for example1 in one1 who1 by the favour1 or rather by the cruelty of ,fortune1 has been raised1 from a situation comparatively humble1 to sudden distinctions of power and opulence1 we see the neglect of all those virtues1 the wider opportunity of exercising which seemed to him formerly the chief1 or even the only1 advantage that rendered such distinctions desirable1--the same frivolous vanity1 which before appeared to him ridiculous in others1 and the same contemptuous insolence of pride1 which before appeared to him contemptible1--a craving and impatient desire of greater wealth1 merely because he has no longer any use to make of it1 unless1 indeed that it has become more necessary to his avarice1 than it ever was before to his want1--and a gay and scornful indifference to miseries1 that are still sometimes able to force themselves upon his view1 the relief of which1 that once seemed to him so glorious a privilege1 would now not require of him even the scanty merit of sacrificing a single superfluity3 ,when we perceive this contrast1 and almost say within ourselves1 ,is this the same being8 we should remember that the influence of fortune is not confined to the mere trapping1 which it gives or takes away1--that it operates within as much as without1--and that1 accordingly1 in the case now imagined by us1 the new external circumstances have been gradually modifying the mind1 in the same manner1 as new external circumstances of a different kind modify the bodies1 which happen to be placed in them1--not affecting their identity1 but altering their state2 and that1 if we could distinguish1 as accurately1 the series of changes1 which take place in mind1 as we can distinguish those which take place in matter1 we should not be more astonished1 that1 in circumstances of rare and unhappy occurrence1 a disposition once apparently generous is generous no more1 than we are to observe a body1 attracted to another body1 at one distance1 and afterwards repelled from it1 in consequence merely of a change of their mutual position1--a change so very slight as to be altogether undistinguishable by our senses4 ,i have dwelt on this question at much greater length than ,i should otherwise have done1 however interesting it truly is as a question of metaphysics1 because ,i was anxious to obviate a prejudice which is very closely connected with this point1 and which1 most unfortunately for the progress of the ,philosophy of ,mind1 has given a wrong bias to the speculations of many very enlightened men4 ,no one1 ,i am aware1 can be so sincerely sceptical as to doubt1 even for a moment1 his own identity1 as one continued sentient being1 whatever ingenious sophistry he may urge in support of the paradox which he professes to hold4 ,but still1 while the compatibility of diversity with absolute identity1 as now explained to you1 was but obscurely felt1--a compatibility which1 to the best of my remembrance1 no writer1 with whom ,i am acquainted1 has attempted to illustrate1--the difficulty of reconciling the growth or decay of knowledge1 and all the successive contrasts or changes of feeling1 which our sensations1 thoughts1 emotions1 exhibit1 with the permanent indivisible unity of the same sentient principle1 has been sufficient1 in many cases1 to produce a vague and almost unconscious tendency to materialism1 in minds that would not otherwise have been easily led away by a system so illusive2 and1 where it has not produced this full effect1 it has at least produced a tendency1 in many cases1 to encumber the simple theory of the mental phenomena with false and unnecessary hypotheses1 very much akin to those of absolute materialism4 ,without this absolute materialism1 mind must still be left1 indeed1 as the ultimate subject of sensation1 and the difficulty truly remains the same2 but it is contrived to complicate1 as much as possible1 the corporeal part of the process1 which precedes this ultimate mental part1 by the introduction of phantasms1 or other shadowy films1 animal spirits1 vibratiuncles1 or other sensorial motions1 that a wider room may thus be left for a play of changes1 and the difficulty of accounting for the diversity of sensations be less felt1 when it is to be divided among so many substances in almost constant motion2 while the attention is1 at the same time1 led away from the immediate mental change1 in which alone the supposed difficulty consists1 to the mere corpuscular changes1 in which there is no supposed difficulty4 ,it is a general law of our internal1 as well as of our external perceptions1 that we distinguish most readily what is least complicated4 ,in a chorus of many voices1 a single discordant voice may escape even a nice discriminator of musical sounds1 who would have detected instantly the slightest deviation from the melody of a simple air4 ,a juggler1 when he wishes to withdraw a single card1 is careful to present to us many2 and1 though the card which he withdraws is truly before our eyes at the very moment at which he separates it from the pack1 we do not discover the quick motion which separates it1 however suspiciously watchful we may be1 because our vigilance of attention is distracted by the number of cards which he suffers to remain4 ,it is not because the card which he removes is not before us1 then1 that we do not observe the removal of it1 but because it is only one of many that are before us4 ,it is precisely the same in those complicated material processes1 with which some theorists encumber the simple phenomena of the mind4 ,the difficulty which seems1 to them1 to attend any diversity whatever in a substance that is identical1 simple1 indivisible1 and incapable of addition or subtraction1 remains1 indeed1 ultimately in all its force1 and would strike us equally1 if this supposed difficulty were to be considered alone4 ,but many hypothetical vibrations1 or other motions1 are given to our consideration at the same moment1 that glance upon our mental view like the rapid movements of the juggler's hand4 ,we1 therefore1 do not feel so painfully as before a difficulty which occupies our attention only in part2 and1 in our feeble estimation of things1 to render a difficulty less visible to us1 is almost like a diminution of the difficulty itself4 ,for obviating this tendency to materialism1 or to what may be considered almost as a species of semi-materialism in the physiology of the mind1 it is of no small consequence to have accurate views of the nature of our mental identity4 ,above all1 it is of importance1 that we should be sufficiently impressed with the conviction1 that absolute identity1 far from excluding every sort of diversity1 is perfectly compatible1 as we have seen1 with diversities that are almost infinite4 ,when we have once obtained a clear view of this compatibility1 as independent of any additions or subtractions of substance1 we shall no longer be led to convert our simple mental operations into long continued processes1 of which the last links only are mental1 and the preceding imaginary links corporeal2 as if the introduction of all this play of hypotheses were necessary for saving that identity of mind1 which we are perhaps unwilling to abandon altogether2 for it will then appear to us not more wonderful1 that the mind1 without the slightest loss of identity1 should at one moment begin to exist in the state which constitutes the sensation of the fragrance of a rose1 and at another moment should begin to exist in the state which constitutes the sensation of the sound of a flute1 or in the opposite states of love and hate1 rapture and agony--than that the same body1 without the slightest change of its identity1 should exist1 at one moment1 in the state which constitutes the tendency to approach another body1 and at another moment in the opposite state which constitutes the tendency to fly from it1 or that1 with the same absolute identity1 it should exist1 at different moments in the different states1 which constitute the tendencies to begin motion in directions that are at right angles to each other1 so as to begin to move in the one case north1 in the other east1 and to continue this motion1 at one time with one velocity1 at other times with other velocities1 and consequently1 with other tendencies to motion that are infinite1 or almost infinite4 ,with these remarks1 ,i conclude what appears to me to be the most accurate view of the question of our personal1 or1 as ,i have rather chosen to term it1 our mental identity4 ,we have seen1 that the belief of this arises1 not from any inference of reasoning1 but from a principle of intuitive assent1 operating universally1 immediately1 irresistibly1 and therefore justly to be regarded1 as essential to our constitution1--a principle1 exactly of the same kind1 as those1 to which reasoning itself must ultimately be traced1 and from which alone its consecutive series of propositions can derive any authority4 ,we have seen1 that this belief1--though intuitive1--is not involved in any one of our separate feelings1 which1 considered merely as present1 might succeed each other1 in endless variety1 without affording any notion of a sentient being1 more permanent than the sensation itself2 but that it arises1 on the consideration of our feelings as successive1 in the same manner1 as our belief of proportion1 or relation in general1 arises1 not from the conception of one of the related objects or ideas1 but only after the previous conception of both the relative and the correlative2 or rather1 that the belief of identity does not arise as subsequent1 but is involved in the very remembrance which allows us to consider our feelings as successive2 since it is impossible for us to regard them as successive1 without regarding them as feelings of our sentient self2--not flowing1 therefore1 from experience or reasoning1 but essential to these1 and necessarily implied in them1--since there can be no result in experience1 but to the mind which remembers that it has previously observed1 and no reasoning but to the mind which remembers that it has felt the truth of some proposition1 from which the truth of its present conclusion is derived4 ,in addition to this positive evidence of our identity1 we have seen1 that the strongest objections which we could imagine to be urged against it1 are1 as might have been expected1 sophistical1 in the false test of identity which they assume1--that the contrasts of momentary feeling1 and even the more permanent alterations of general character1 in the same individual1 afford no valid argument against it2 since1 not in mind only1 but in matter also1--7from a superficial and partial view of the phenomena of which the supposed objections are derived17--the most complete identity of substance1 without addition of any thing1 or subtraction of any thing1 is compatible with an infinite diversity of states4 ,i cannot quit the subject of identity1 however1--though from my belief of its importance1 ,i may already1 perhaps1 have dwelt upon it too long1--without giving you some slight account of the very strange opinions of ,mr ,locke on the subject4 ,i do this1 both because some notice is due1 to the paradoxes1--even though they be erroneous1--of so illustrious a man1 and because ,i conceive it to be of great advantage1 to point out to you occasionally the illusions1 which have been able to obscure the discernment of those bright spirits1 which nature sometimes1 though sparingly1 grants1 to adorn at least that intellectual gloom1 which even they cannot irradiate2 that1 in their path of glory1 seem to move along the heavens by their own independent light1 as if almost unconscious of the darkness below1 but cannot exist there for a moment1 without shedding1 on the feeble and doubtful throngs beneath1 some faint beams of their own incommunicable lustre4 ,it is chiefly1 as connected with these eminent names1 that fallacy itself becomes instructive1 when simply exhibited1--if this only be done1 not from any wish to disparage merits1 that are far above the impotence of such attempts1 but with all the veneration which is due to human excellence1 united as it must ever be to human imperfection1 8,even the errors of great men10 it has been said1 8are fruitful of truths20 and1 though they were to be attended with no other advantage1 this one at least they must always have1 that they teach us how very possible it is for man to err2 thus lessening at once our tendency to slavish acquiescence in the unexamined opinions of others1 and--which is much harder to be done--lessening also1 as much as it is possible for any thing to lessen1 the strong conviction1 which we feel1 that we are ourselves unerring4--,the first and most instructive lesson1 which man can receive1 when he is capable of reflection1 is to think for himself2 the second1 without which the first would be comparatively of little value1 is to reject1 in himself1 that infallibility1 which he rejects in others4 ,the opinion of ,locke1 with respect to personal identity1 is1 that it consists in consciousness alone2 by which term1 in its reference to the past1 he can mean nothing more than perfect memory4 ,as far back as we are conscious1 or remember2 so far and no farther1 he says1 are we the same persons4 ,in short1 what we do not remember1 we1 as persons1 strictly speaking1 never did4 ,the identity of that which remembers1 and which is surely independent of the remembrance itself1 is thus made to consist in the remembrance1 that is confessedly fugitive2 and1 as if that every possible inconsistency might be crowded together in this simple doctrine1 the same philosopher1 who holds1 that our personal identity consists in consciousness1 is one of the most strenuous opponents of the doctrine1 that the soul always thinks1 or is conscious2 so that1 in this interval of thought1 from consciousness to consciousness1--since that which is essential to identity is1 by supposition1 suspended1 the same identical soul1 as far as individual personality is concerned1 is not the same identical soul1 but exists when it does not exist4 8,there is another consequence of this doctrine10 says ,dr ,reid1 8which follows no less necessarily1 though ,mr ,locke probably did not see it4 ,it is that a man be1 and at the same time not be1 the person that did a particular action4 8,suppose a brave ,officer to have been flogged when a boy at school1 for robbing an orchard1 to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign1 and to have been made a ,general in advanced life3 ,suppose also1 which must be admitted to be possible1 that when he took the standard1 he was conscious of his having been flogged at school2 and that when made a ,general1 he was conscious of his taking the standard1 but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging4 8,these things being supposed1 it follows1 from ,mr ,locke's doctrine1 that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard2 and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a ,general4 ,whence it follows1 if there be any truth in logic1 that the ,general is the same person with him who was flogged at school4 ,but the ,general's consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging1 therefore1 according to ,mr ,locke's doctrine1 he is not the person who was flogged1 ,therefore the ,general is1 and at the same time is not1 the same person with him who was flogged at school40#ea ,but it is needless to deduce consequences1 from this very strange paradox2 since its author himself has done this1 most freely and fully1 and often with an air of pleasantry1 that1 but for the place in which we find it1 as forming a part of a grave methodical essay on the understanding1 would almost lead us to think1 that he was himself smiling1 in secret1 at his own doctrine1 and propounding it with the same mock solemnity with which the discoverer of ,laputa has revealed to us all the secrets of the philosophy of that island of philosophers4 ,he allows it to follow1 from his doctrine1 that1 if we remembered at night1 and never but at night1 one set of the events of our life2 as1 for instance1 those which happened five years ago2 and never but in the day time1 that different set of events1 which happened six years ago2 this1 8day and night man10 to use his own phrase1 would be two as distinct persons1 as ,socrates and ,plato2 and1 in short1 that we are truly as many persons as we have1 or can be supposed to have1 at different times1 separate and distinct remembrances of different series of events4 ,in this case1 indeed1 he makes a distinction of the visible man1 who is the same1 and of the person who is different4 8,but yet possibly it will still be objected10 he says1 8suppose ,i wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life1 beyond a possibility of retrieving them1 so that perhaps ,i shall never be conscious of them again2 yet am ,i not the same person that did those actions1 had those thoughts that ,i once was conscious of1 though ,i have now forgot them8 ,to which ,i answer1 that we must here take notice what the word ,i is applied to2 which1 in this case1 is the man only4 ,and the same man being presumed to be the same person1 ,i is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person4 ,but if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times1 it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons2 which we see is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions2 human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions1 nor the sober man for what the mad man did1 thereby making them two persons3 which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in ,english1 when we say such an one is not himself1 or is beside himself2 in which phrases it is insinuated1 as if those who now1 or at least first used them1 thought that self was changed1 the self-same person was no longer in that man40#eb ,such is the doctrine of a philosopher1 whose intellectual excellence was unquestionably of the highest rank1 and whose powers might be considered as entitling him to exemption1 at least1 from those gross errors which far weaker understandings are capable of discovering1 if even this humble relative privilege had not been too great for man4 ,he contends1 that our remembrance of having done a certain action1 is not merely to us1 the rememberers1 the evidence by which we believe that we were the persons who did it1 but is the very circumstance that makes us personally to have done it1--a doctrine1 which1 if the word person were to be understood in the slightest degree in its common acceptation1 would involve1 as has been justly said1 an absurdity as great as if it had been affirmed1 that our belief of the creation of the world actually made it to have been created4 ,if we could suppose ,mr ,locke to have never thought on the subject of personal identity1 till this strange doctrine1 and its consequences1 were stated to him by another1 it may almost be taken for granted1 that he would not have failed instantly to discover its absurdity1 as a mere verbal paradox2 and1 yet1 after much reflection on the subject1 he does not perceive that very absurdity1 which he would have discovered1 but for reflection4 ,such is the strange nature of our intellectual constitution4 ,the very functions1 that1 in their daily and hourly exercise1 save us from innumerable errors1 sometimes lead us into errors1 which1 but for them1 we might have avoided4 ,the philosopher is like a well armed and practised warrior1 who1 in his helmet and coat of mail1 goes to the combat with surer means of victory1 than the ill disciplined and defenceless mob around him1 but who may yet sometimes fall where others would have stood1 unable to rise and extricate himself1 from the incumbrance of that very armour1 to which he has owed the conquests of many other fields4 ,what1 then1 may we conceive to have been the nature of the illusion1 which could lead a mind like that of ,mr ,locke1 to admit1 after reflection1 an absurd paradox1 and all its absurd consequences1 which1 before reflection1 he would have rejected8 ,it is to be traced chiefly1 ,i conceive1 to a source which is certainly the most abundant source of error in the writings and silent reflections of philosophers1 especially of those who are gifted with originality of thought1--the ambiguity of the language they use1 when they retain a word with one meaning1 which is generally understood in a different sense2 the common meaning1 in the course of their speculations1 often mingling insensibly with their own1 and thus producing a sort of confusion1 which incapacitates them from perceiving the precise consequences of either4 ,mr ,locke gives his own definition of the word person1 as comprised in the very consciousness which he supposes to be all that is essential to personal identity2 or at least he speaks of consciousness so vaguely and indefinitely1 as to allow this meaning of his definition to be present to his own mind1 as often as he thought of personality4 8,to find10 he says1 8wherein personal identity consists1 we must consider what person stands for2 which1 ,i think1 is a thinking intelligent being1 that has reason and reflection1 and can consider itself as itself1 the same thinking thing1 in different times and places1 which it does only by that consciousness1 which is inseparable from thinking40#ec ,having once given this definition of a person1 there can be no question1 that personal identity1 in his sense1 is wherever consciousness is1 and only where consciousness is4 ,but this is true of a person1 only as defined by him2 and1 if strictly analysed1 means nothing more1 than that consciousness is wherever consciousness is1--a doctrine1 on which1 certainly1 he could not have thought it worth his while to give any very long commentary4 ,it appears more important however1 even to himself1 and worthy of the long commentary which he has given it1 because1 in truth1 he cannot refrain from still keeping1 in his own mind1 some obscure impression of the more common meaning of the term1 and extending to a person1 as thus commonly understood1 what is true only of a person1 as defined by him4 ,it is as if some whimsical naturalist should give a definition of the word animal1 exclusive of every winged creature1 and should then think that he was propounding a very notable and subtile paradox1 in affirming that no animal is capable of rising for a few minutes above the surface of the earth4 ,it would be a paradox1 only inasmuch as it might suggest to those who heard it1 a meaning different from that of the definition2 and1 but for this misconception1 which the author of it himself might share1 would be so insignificant a truism1 as not to deserve even the humblest of all praise1 that of amusing absurdity4 ,when1 in such cases as this1 we discover that singular inconsistency1 which is to be found even in the very excellence of every thing that is human1--the perspicacity which sees1 at an immeasurable distance1 in the field of inquiry1 what no other eye has seen1 and which yet1 in the very objects which it has grasped1 is unable to distinguish what is visible to common eyes1 are we to lament the imperfection of our mental constitution1 which leaves us liable to such error8 ,or1 as in other instances1 in which1 from our incapacity of judging rightly1 we are tempted at first to regret the present arrangement of things1 are we not rather to rejoice that we are so constituted by nature8 if man had not been formed to err1 in the same manner as he is formed to reason1 and to know1 that perfect system of faculties1 which excluded error1 must have rendered his discernment too quick1 not to seize instantly innumerable truths1 the gradual discovery of which1 by the exercise of his present more limited faculties1 has been sufficient to give glory and happiness to whole ages of philosophical inquiry4 ,if1 indeed1 the field had been absolutely boundless1 he might still have continued to advance1 as at present1 though with more gigantic step1 and more searching vision1 and found no termination to his unlimited career4 ,but the truths which relate to us physically1 on this bounded scene of things in which we are placed1 numerous as they are1 are still in some measure finite1 like that scene itself2 and the too rapid discoveries1 therefore1 of a few generations1 as to the most important properties of things1 would have left little more for the generations which were to follow1 than the dull and spiritless task of learning what others had previously learned1 or of teaching what themselves had been taught4 ,philosophy is not the mere passive possession of knowledge2 it is1 in a much more important respect1 the active exercise of acquiring it4 ,we may truly apply to it what ,pascal says of the conduct of life in general4 8,we think10 says he1 8that we are seeking repose1 and all which we are seeking is agitation40 ,in like manner1 we think that it is truth itself which we seek1 when the happiness which we are to feel most strongly1 is in the mere search2 and all that would be necessary1 in many cases1 to make the object of it appear indifferent1 would be to put it fairly within our grasp4 8,our hopes1 like towering falcons1 aim ,at objects in an airy height2 ,but all the pleasure of the game1 ,is afar off to view the flight40 ,what little value do we set on discoveries that have been long familiar to us1 though their own essential value must still continue the same4 ,even on the whole mass of knowledge1 that has been gradually and slowly transmitted to us1 we reflect with little interest1 unless as it may lead to something yet unknown2 and the result of a single new experiment1 which bears no proportion to the mass to which it is added1 will yet be sufficient to rouse and delight every philosopher in ,europe4 ,it is a very shrewd remark of a ,french writer1 in reference to the torpor1 which the most zealous inquirer feels1 as to every thing which he knows1 and his insatiable avidity for every thing which he does not know1 that 8if ,truth were fairly to show herself as she is1 all would be ruined2 but it is plain1 that she knows very well1 of how great importance it is1 that she should keep herself out of sight40 ,if we were to acquire1 by an unhappy foresight1 the knowledge which is not yet ours1 it is very evident1 that we must soon regard it1 in the same manner1 as the knowledge which we have already acquired4 ,the charm of novelty1 the delights of gratified curiosity1 would not be for us4 ,the prey would be at our feet2 and it would be vain1 therefore1 to expect that ardour of soul1 which is kindled1 amid the hopes and the fears1 the tumult and the competition of the chase4 8,if man were omnipotent1 without being ,god10 says ,rousseau1 8he would be a miserable creature3 he would be deprived of the pleasure of desiring2 and what privation would be so difficult to be borne60 ,it may be said1 at least with equal truth1 that1 if man were omniscient1 without the other perfections of the ,divinity1 he would be far less happy than at present4 ,to infinite benevolence1 indeed1 accompanied with infinite power1 a corresponding infinity of knowledge must afford the highest of all imaginable gratifications1 by its subservience to those gracious plans of good1 which are manifested in the universe1 and which1 in making known to us the existence of the ,supreme ,being1 have made him known to us1 as the object of grateful love and admiration4 ,but if1 in other respects1 we were to continue as at present1--with our erring passions1 and moral weaknesses of every sort1--to be doomed to have nothing to learn1 would be a punishment1 not a blessing4 ,in such circumstances1 if they were to continue forever1 the annihilation of our intellectual being would not be an evil so great1 as the mere extinction of our curiosity1 and of all the delights and consolations which it affords1 not merely when we gratify it1 but when we are merely seeking to gratify it4 8,else wherefore burns1 ,in mortal bosoms1 this unquenched hope ,that breathes from day to day sublimer things1 ,and mocks possession6 ,wherefore darts the mind1 ,with such resistless ardour1 to embrace ,majestic forms1 impatient to be free1 ,proud of the strong contention of her toils1 ,proud to be daring80#ed-- 8,why departs she wide#ee ,from the dull track and journey of her times1 ,to grasp the good she knows not8 ,in the field ,of things which may be1 in the spacious field ,of science1 potent arts1 or dreadful arms1 ,to raise up scenes1 in which her own desires ,contented may repose1--when things which are ,pall on her temper like a twice told tale40#ef ,it is sufficient1 that we are endowed with powers of discovery4 ,our gratitude is due to ,heaven for the gift2 and the more due for that gracious wisdom1 which has known how to limit the powers which it gave1 so as to produce a greater result of good by the very limitation4 ,our prejudices1 which sometimes forbid reasoning1 and the errors1 to which our imperfect reasoning often leads us1 we should consider1 when all their remote relations are taken into account1 as indirect sources of happiness2 and though we may wish1 and justly wish1 to analyse them1 and to rise above their influence1--for1 without this exertion1 and consequent feeling of progress1 on our part1 they would be evil rather than good1--we must not forget1 that it is to them we owe the luxury1 which the immediate analysis affords1 and the acquisition of the innumerable truths1 which the prevalence of these errors1 in past ages1 has left to be discovered by the ages which succeed4 ,in this1 and in every thing which relates to man1 ,nature has had in view1 not the individual or the single generation only1 but the permanent race4 ,she has therefore1 not exhausted her bounty on any one period of the long succession2 but1 by a provision1 which makes our very weakness instrumental to her goodness1 she has given to all1 that distant and ever-brightening hope1 which1 till we arrive at our glorious destination1 8,leads from goal to goal1 ,and opens still1 and opens on the soul40 ,with enough of mental vigour to advance still farther in the tracks1 of science that are already formed1 and to point out new tracks to those who are to follow1 we have enough of weakness to prevent us from exploring and exhausting1 what is to occupy1 in the same happy search1 the millions of millions that are to succeed us4 ,truth itself1 indeed1 will always be progressive2 but there will still1 at every stage of the progress1 be something to discover1 and abundance to confute4 8,in #bd1jjj years10 to borrow the prediction of a very skilful prophet1--8,in #bd1jjj years1 there will arise philosophers1 who will boast1 that they are destroying the errors which have been reigning in the world for #cj1jjj years past2 and there will be people who will believe1 that they are then only just beginning to open their eyes40 ,in these remarks1 on the nature of our varied consciousness1 and on the unity and identity of the mind in all its varieties1--we have considered the mental phenomena in their general aspect4 ,we have now to consider them as arranged in kindred classes1--or rather to attempt the difficult task of the classification itself4 ,to this ,i shall proceed in my next ,lecture4 ,,footnotes3 #ea ,reid's ,essays on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,iii4 ,chap4 vi4 #eb ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ii4 c4 xxvii4 sect4 #bj4 #ec ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ii4 c4 xxvii4 sect4 #i4 #ed ,pleasures of ,imagination1 7first form of the poem17 ,b4 i4 v4 #aff-aga4 #agc-e4 #ee ----,why departs the soul ,wide from the track4--,,orig4 #ef ,pleasures of ,imagination1 7second form of the ,poem17 ,b4 i4 v4 #bac-bbj4 ,,lecture ,,xvi4 ,,on ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,mind4 ,after considering the ,phenomena of the ,mind in general1 we are now to proceed to consider them1 in the separate classes in which they may be arranged4 ,the phenomena themselves1 indeed1 are almost infinite1 and it might seem1 on first reflection a very hopeless task1 to attempt to reduce1 under a few heads1 the innumerable feelings1 which diversify almost every moment of our life4 ,but to those1 who are acquainted with the wonders1 which classification has performed1 in the other sciences1 the task1 difficult as it is1 will still seem not absolutely hopeless2 though in one respect1 its difficulty will be more highly estimated by them1 than by others2--since they only1 who know the advantage of the fixed and definite nature of the objects of classification1 in other sciences1 can feel1 how much greater the obstacles must be1 to any accurate arrangement1 in a science1 of which the objects are indefinite1 and complex1 incapable of being fixed for a moment in the same state1 and destroyed by the very effort to grasp them4 ,but1 in this1 as in other instances1 in which nature has given us difficulties with which to cope1 she has not left us to be wholly overcome2 or1 if we must yield1 she has at least armed us for so vigorous a struggle1 that we gain additional intellectual strength1 even in being vanquished4 8,studiorum salutarium1 etiam citra effectum1 salutaris tractatio est40 ,if she has placed us in a labyrinth1 she has at the same time furnished us with a clue1 which may guide us1 not indeed through all its dark and intricate windings1 but through those broad paths1 which conduct us into day4 ,the single power1 by which we discover resemblance or relation in general1 is a sufficient aid to us1 in the perplexity and confusion of our first attempts at arrangement4 ,it begins1 by converting thousands1 and more than thousands1 into one1 and1 reducing1 in the same manner1 the numbers thus formed1 it arrives at last at the few distinctive characters of those great comprehensive tribes1 on which it ceases to operate1 because there is nothing left to oppress the memory1 or the understanding4 ,if there had been no such science as chemistry1 who could have ventured to suppose1 that the innumerable bodies1 animate and inanimate1 on the surface of our globe1 and all1 which we have been able to explore in the very depths of the earth itself1 are reducible1 and even in the imperfect state of the science1 have been already reduced1 to a few simple elements8 ,the science of mind1 as it is a science of analysis1 ,i have more than once compared to chemistry1 and pointed out to you1 and illustrated1 its various circumstances of resemblance4 ,in this too1 we may hope the analogy will hold1--that1 as the innumerable aggregates1 in the one science1 have been reduced and simplified1 the innumerable complex feelings in the other will admit of a corresponding reduction and simplification4 ,the classes which we form1 in the mental as well as in the material universe1 depend1 as you cannot but know1 on certain relations which we discover in the phenomena2 and the relations according to which objects may be arranged1 are of course various1 as they are considered by different individuals in different points of view4 ,some of these relations present themselves immediately1 as if to our very glance2 others are discoverable only after attentive reflection2--and though the former1 merely as presenting themselves more readily1 may seem on that account1 better suited for the general purpose of arrangement1 it is not the less true that the classification1 which approaches nearest to perfection1 is far from being always that which is founded on relations1 that seem at first sight the most obvious4 ,the rudest wanderer in the fields may imagine1 that the profusion of blossoms around him1--in the greater number of which he is able1 himself1 to discover many striking resemblances1--may be reduced into some order of arrangement4 ,but he would be little aware1 that the principle according to which they are now universally classed1 has relation1 not to the parts which appear to him to constitute the whole flower1 but to some small part of the blossom1 which he does not perceive1 at the distance at which he passes it1 and which scarcely attracts his eye1 when he plucks it from the stem4 ,to our mental classifications the remark is equally applicable4 ,in these too1 the most obvious distinctions are not always those which answer best the purposes of systematic arrangement4 ,the phenomena of the mind1 are only the mind itself existing in certain states2 and1 as many of these states are in their nature agreeable1 and others disagreeable1 this difference1 which is to the sentient being himself the most important of all differences1 may be supposed1 to afford the most obvious principle of classification4 ,what is pleasant1 what is painful1 are perhaps the first classes1 which the infant has formed long before he is capable of distinguishing them by a name2 and the very imbecility of idiotism itself1 to which nothing is true or false1 or right or wrong1--and to which there is no future1 beyond the succeeding moment1--is yet capable of making this primary distinction1 and of regulating1 according to it1 its momentary desires4 8,the love of pleasure is man's eldest-born1 ,born in his cradle1 living to his tomb4 ,wisdom1--her younger sister1 though more grave1 ,was meant to minister1 not to dethrone#eg ,imperial ,pleasure1 queen of human hearts40#eh ,the distribution1 which we should be inclined to make1 of our mental phenomena1 according to this obvious principle1 would be into those which are pleasing1 those which are painful1 and those which are neither painful nor pleasing4 ,but1 however obvious this first distinction may seem1 as a principle of arrangement1 the circumstances1 on which the differences depend1 are so very indefinite1 that the distinction1--though it may be useful to have it in view1 in its most striking and permanent cases1--cannot be adopted1 as the basis of any regular system4 ,to take the mere pleasures and pains of sense1 for example1--to what intelligible division could we reduce these1 which are not merely fugitive in themselves1 but vary1 from pain to pleasure1 and from pleasure to pain1 with a change of their external objects1 so slight often1 as to be scarcely appreciable1 and1 in many cases1 even when the external objects have continued exactly the same8 ,how small1 and how variable a boundary separates the warmth which is pleasing from the heat which pains6 ,a certain quantity of light is grateful to the eye4 ,increase it2--it becomes1 not indifferent1--though that would be a less change1--but absolutely painful2 and1 if the eye be inflamed1 even the small quantity of light1--which was agreeable before1 and which seemed1 therefore1 to admit of being very safely classed among the sources of pleasure1--is now converted into a source of agony4 ,since it is impossible1 therefore1 to fix the limits of pain and pleasure1 and every affection or state of mind1 agreeable1 disagreeable1 or indifferent1 may1 by a very trifling change of circumstance1 be converted into an opposite state1 it is evident1 that any division1 founded on this vague and transient distinction1 must perplex1 and mislead us1 in our attempts to systematize the almost infinite diversities of thought and feeling1 rather than give us any aid in the arrangement4 ,the great leading division of the mental phenomena which has met with most general adoption by philosophers1 is into those which belong to the understanding1 and those which belong to the will2--a division which is very ancient1 but though sanctioned by the approbation of many ages1 very illogical2 since the will1 which1 in this division1 is nominally opposed to the intellect1 is so far from being opposed to it in reality1 that1 even by the asserters of its diversity1 it is considered as exercising1 in the intellectual department1 an empire almost as wide1 as in the department allotted to itself4 ,we reason1 and plan1 and invent1 at least as voluntarily1--as we esteem1 or hate1 or hope1 or fear4 ,how many emotions are there too1 which cannot1 without absolute torture1 be forced into either division6 ,to take only a few instances1 out of many1--to what class are we to reduce grief1 joy1 admiration1 astonishment1 which perhaps are not phenomena of the mere understanding1 and which1--though they may lead indirectly to desires or volitions1--have nothing1 in themselves1 that is voluntary1 or that can be considered as in any peculiar degree connected with the will8 ,the division of the mental phenomena into those which belong to the understanding1 and those which belong to the will1 seems1 therefore1 to be as faulty1 as would be the division of animals1 into those which have legs and those which have wings2 since the same animals might have both legs and wings1 and since whole tribes of animals have neither one nor the other4 ,another division of the phenomena of mind1 similar to the former1 and of equal antiquity1 since it corresponds with the very ancient division of philosophy into the contemplative and the active1 is into those which belong to the intellectual powers1 and those which belong to the active powers4 8,philosophia et contemplativa est et activa2 spectat simulque agit40 ,i must confess1 however1 that this division of the mental phenomena1 as referable to the intellectual and the active powers of the mind1--though it has the sanction of very eminent names1 appears to me to be faulty1 exactly in the same manner as the former1 which1 indeed1 it may be considered almost as representing1 under a change of name4 ,its parts are not opposed to each other1 and it does not include all the phenomena which it should include4 ,is mere grief1 for example1 or mere astonishment1 to be referred to our intellectual or to our active powers8 ,i do not speak of the faculties which they may or may not call into action2 but of the feelings themselves1 as present phenomena or states of the mind4 ,and1 in whatsoever manner we may define the term active1 is the mind more active1 when it merely desires good and fears evil1 when it looks with esteem on virtue1 and with indignation1 or disgust1 and contempt on vice1 than when it pursues a continued train of reasoning1 or fancy1 or historical investigation8 when1 with ,newton1 it lays down the laws of planetary motion1 and calculates1 in what exact point of the heavens1 any one of the orbs1 which move within the immense range of our solar system1 will be found to have its place at any particular moment1 one thousand years hereafter2 when1 with ,shakespeare1 it wanders beyond the universe itself1 calling races of beings into existence1 which nature never knew1 but which nature might almost own--or when1 with ,tacitus1 it enrols slowly1 year after year1 that dreadful reality of crimes and sufferings1 which even dramatic horror1 in all its license of wild imagination1 can scarcely reach--the long unvarying catalogue1 of tyrants1--and executioners1--and victims1 that return thanks to the gods and die1--and accusers rich with their blood1 and more mighty1 as more widely hated1 amid the multitudes of prostrate slaves1 still looking whether there may not yet have escaped some lingering virtue1 which it may be a merit to destroy1 and having scarcely leisure to feel even the agonies of remorse1 in the continued sense of the precariousness of their own gloomy existence8 ,when it thus records the warning lessons of the past1 or expatiates in fields1 which itself creates1 of fairy beauty or sublimity1 or comprehends whole moving worlds within its glance1 and calculates and measures infinitude--the mind is surely active1 or there are no moments in which it is so4 ,so little1 indeed1 are the intellectual powers opposed to the active1 that it is only when some intellectual energy co-exists with desire1 that the mind is said to be active1 even by those who are unaccustomed to analytical inquiries1 or to metaphysical nomenclature4 ,the love of power1 or the love of glory1 when there is no opportunity of intellectual exertion1 may1 in the common acceptation of the word1 be as passive as tranquillity itself4 ,the passion is active only when1 with intellectual action1 it compares means with ends1 and different means with each other1 and deliberates1 and resolves1 and executes4 ,chain some revolutionary usurper to the floor of a dungeon1 his ambition may be active still1 because he may still be intellectually busy in planning means of deliverance and vengeance2 and1 on his bed of straw1 may conquer half the world4 ,but1 if we could fetter his reason and fancy1 as we can fetter his limbs1 what activity would remain1 though he were still to feel that mere desire of power or glory1 which1 though usually followed by intellectual exertion1 is itself as prior to these exertions1 all that constitutes ambition1 as a passion8 ,there would1 indeed1 still be in his mind the awful elements of that force1 which bursts upon the world with conflagration and destruction2 but1 though there would be the thunder1 it would be the thunder sleeping in its cloud4 ,to will1 is to act with desire2 and1 unless in the production of mere muscular motion1 it is only intellectually that we can act4 ,to class the active powers1 therefore1 as distinct from the intellectual1 is to class them1 as opposed to that1 without which1 as active powers1 they cannot even exist4 ,it may1 certainly1 be contended1 that1 though the mental phenomena1 usually ranked under this head1 are not immediately connected with action1 they may yet deserve this generic distinction1 as leading to action indirectly1--and if they led1 in any peculiar sense1 to action1 however indirectly1 the claim might be allowed4 ,but1 even with this limited meaning1 it is impossible to admit the distinction asserted for them4 ,in what sense1 for example1 can it be said1 that grief and joy1 which surely are not to be classed under the intellectual powers of the mind1 lead to action even indirectly1 more than any other feelings1 or states1 in which the mind is capable of existing8 ,we may1 indeed1 act when we are joyful or sorrowful1 as we may act when we perceive a present object1 or remember the past2 but we may also remain at rest1 and remain equally at rest1 in the one case1 as in the other4 ,our intellectual energies1 indeed1 even in this sense1 as indirectly leading to action1 are1 in most cases1 far more active1 than sorrow1 even in its very excess of agony and despair2 and1 in those cases in which sorrow does truly lead to action1 as when we strive to remedy the past1 the mere regret which constitutes the sorrow1 is not so closely connected with the conduct which we pursue1 as the intellectual states of mind that intervened--the successive judgments1 by which we have compared projects with projects1 and chosen at last the plan1 which1 in relation to the object in view1 has seemed to us1 upon the whole1 the most expedient4 ,if1 then1 as ,i cannot but think1 the arrangement of the mental phenomena1 as belonging to two classes of powers1 the intellectual and the active1 be at once incomplete1 and not accurate1 even to the extent to which it reaches1 it may be worth while to try at least some other division1 even though there should not be any very great hope of success4 ,though we should fail in our endeavour to obtain some more precise and comprehensive principle of arrangement1 there is also some advantage gained1 by viewing objects1 according to new circumstances of agreement or analogy4 ,we see1 in this case1 what had long-passed before us unobserved1 while we were accustomed only to the order and nomenclature of a former method2 for1 when the mind has been habituated to certain classifications1 it is apt1 in considering objects1 to give its attention only to those properties which are essential to the classification1 and to overlook1 or at least comparatively to neglect1 other properties equally important and essential to the very nature of the separate substances that are classed1 but not included in the system as characters of generic resemblance4 ,the individual object1 indeed1 when its place in any system has been long fixed and familiar to us1 is probably conceived by us less1 as an individual1 than as one of a class of individuals1 that agree in certain respects1 and the frequent consideration of it1 as one of a class1 must fix the peculiar relations of the class1 more strongly in the mind1 and weaken proportionally the impression of every other quality that is not so included4 ,a new classification1 therefore1 which includes1 in its generic character1 those neglected qualities1 will of course draw to them attention1 which they could not otherwise have obtained2 and1 the more various the views are1 which we take of the objects of any science1 the juster consequently1 because the more equal1 will be the estimate which we form of them4 ,so truly is this the case1 that ,i am convinced1 that no one has ever read over the mere terms of a new division1 in a science1 however familiar the science may have been to him1 without learning more than this new division itself1 without being struck with some property or relation1 the importance of which he now perceives most clearly1 and which he is quite astonished that he should have overlooked so long before4 ,i surely need not warn you1 after the observations which ,i made in my ,introductory ,lectures1 on the ,laws and ,objects of ,physical ,inquiry in ,general1 that every classification has reference only to our mode of considering objects2 and that1 amid all the varieties of systems which our love of novelty1 and our love of distinction1 or our pure love of truth and order may introduce1 the phenomena themselves1 whether accurately1 or inaccurately classed1 continue unaltered4 ,the mind is formed susceptible of certain affections4 ,these states or affections we may generalize more or less2 and1 according to our generalization1 may give them more or fewer names4 ,but whatever may be the extent of our vocabulary1 the mind itself1--as independent of these transient designations1 as ,he who fixed its constitution1--still continues to exhibit the same unaltered susceptibilities1 which it originally received2 as the flowers1 which the same divine ,author formed1 spring up1 in the same manner1 observing the same seasons1 and spreading to the sun the same foliage and blossoms1 whatever be the system and the corresponding nomenclature according to which botanists may have agreed to rank and name their tribes4 ,the great ,preserver of nature has not trusted us1 with the dangerous power of altering a single physical law which ,he has established1 though ,he has given us unlimited power over the language which is of our own creation4 ,it is still with us1 as it was with our common sire in the original birthplace of our race4 ,the ,almighty presents to us all the objects that surround us1 wherever we turn our view2 but ,he presents them to us1 only that we may give them names4 ,their powers and susceptibilities they already possess1 and we cannot alter these1 even as they exist in a single atom4 ,it may1 perhaps1 seem absurd1 even to suppose1 that we should think ourselves able to change1 by a few generic words1 the properties of the substances which we have classed2 and if the question were put to us1 as to this effect of our language1 in any particular case1 there can be no doubt1 that we should answer in the negative1 and express astonishment that such a question should have been put4 ,but the illusion is not the less certain1 because we are not aware of its influence2 and1 indeed1 it could no longer be an illusion1 if we were completely aware of it4 ,it requires1 however1 only a very little reflection on what has passed in our own minds1 to discover1 that1 when we have given a name to any quality1 that quality acquires immediately1 in our imagination1 a comparative importance1 very different from what it had before2 and though nature in itself be truly unchanged1 it is ever after1 relatively to our conception1 different4 ,a difference of words is1 in this case1 more than a mere verbal difference4 ,though it be not the expression of a difference of doctrine1 it very speedily becomes so4 ,hence it is1 that the same warfare1 which the rivalries of individual ambition1 or the opposite interests1 or supposed opposite interests1 of nations have produced1 in the great theatre of civil history1 have been produced1 in the small but tumultuous field of science1 by the supposed incompatibility of a few abstract terms2 and1 indeed1 as has been truly said1 the sects of philosophers have combated1 with more persevering violence1 to settle what they mean by the constitution of the world1 than all the conquerors of the world have done to render themselves its masters4 ,still less1 ,i trust1 is it necessary to repeat the warning1 already so often repeated1 that you are not to conceive1 that any classification of the states or affections of the mind1 as referable to certain powers or susceptibilities1 makes these powers any thing different and separate from the mind itself1 as originally and essentially susceptible of the various modifications of which these powers are only a shorter name4 ,and yet what innumerable controversies in philosophy have arisen1 and are still frequently arising1 from this very mistake1 strange and absurd as the mistake may seem4 ,no sooner1 for example1 were certain affections of the mind classed together1 as belonging to the will1 and certain others1 as belonging to the understanding1--that is to say1 no sooner was the mind1 existing in certain states1 denominated the understanding1 and in certain other states denominated the will1--than the understanding and the will ceased to be considered as the same individual substance1 and became immediately1 as it were1 two opposite and contending powers1 in the empire of mind1 as distinct1 as any two sovereigns1 with their separate nations under their controul2 and it became an object of as fierce contention to determine1 whether certain affections of the mind belonged to the understanding1 or to the will1 as1 in the management of political affairs1 to determine1 whether a disputed province belonged to one potentate1 or to another4 ,every new diversity of the faculties of the mind1 indeed1 converted each faculty into a little independent mind1--as if the original mind were like that wonderful animal1 of which naturalists tell us1 that may be cut into an almost infinite number of parts1 each of which becomes a polypus1 as perfect as that from which it was separated4 ,the only difference is1 that those who make us acquainted with this wonderful property of the polypus1 acknowledge the divisibility of the parent animal2 while those1 who assert the spiritual multiplicity1 are at the same time assertors of the absolute indivisibility of that which they divide4 ,after these warnings1 then1 which1 ,i trust1 have been almost superfluous1 let us now endeavour to form some classification of the mental phenomena without considering1 whether our arrangement be similar or dissimilar to that of others4 ,in short1 let us forget1 as much as possible1 that any prior arrangements have been made1 and think of the phenomena only4 ,it would1 indeed1 require more than human vision1 to comprehend all these phenomena of the mind1 in our gaze at once1-- 8,to survey1 ,stretch'd out beneath us1 all the mazy tracts ,of passion and opinion1--like a waste ,of sands1 and flowery lawns1 and tangling woods1 ,where mortals roam bewilder'd40 ,but there is a mode of bringing all this multitude of objects1 within the sphere of our narrow sight1 in the same manner1 as the expanse of landscape1 over which the eye would be long in wandering1--the plains1 and hills1 and woods1 and waterfalls1--may be brought1 by human art1 within the compass of a mirror1 far less than the smallest of the innumerable objects which it represents4 ,the process of gradual generalizing1 by which this reduction is performed1 ,i have already explained to you4 ,let us now proceed to avail ourselves of it4 ,all the feelings and thoughts of the mind1 ,i have already frequently repeated1 are only the mind itself existing in certain states4 ,to these successive states our knowledge of the mind1 and consequently our arrangements1 which can comprehend only what we know1 are necessarily limited4 ,with this simple word state1 ,i use the phrase affection of mind as synonymous1 to express the momentary feeling1 whatever it may be1--with this difference only1 that the word affection seems to me better suited for expressing that momentary feeling1 when considered as an effect1--the feeling itself as a state of the mind1 and the relation which any particular state of mind1 may bear to the preceding circumstances1 whatever they may be that have induced it4 ,our states of mind1 however1 or our affections of mind1 are the simplest terms1 which ,i can use for expressing the whole series of phenomena of the mind in all their diversity1 as existing phenomena1 without any mixture of hypothesis1 as to the particular mode in which the successive changes may be supposed to arise4 ,when we consider1 then1 the various states or affections of the mind1 which form this series1 one circumstance of difference must strike us1 that some of them arise immediately1 in consequence of the presence of external objects1--and some1 as immediately1 in consequence of certain preceding affections of the mind itself4 ,the one set1 therefore1 are obviously the result of the laws both of matter and of mind1--implying1 in external objects1 a power of affecting the mind1 as well as1 in the mind1 a susceptibility of being affected by them4 ,the other set result from the susceptibilities of the mind itself1 which has been formed by its divine ,author to exist in certain states1 and to exist in these in a certain relative order of succession4 ,the affections of the one class arise1 because some external object is present2--the affections of the other class arise1 because some previous change in the states of the mind has taken place4 ,to illustrate this distinction by example1 let us suppose ourselves1 in walking across a lawn1 to turn our eyes to a particular point1 and to perceive there an oak4 ,that is to say1 the presence of the oak1 or rather of the light reflected from it1 occasions a certain new state of the mind1 which we call a sensation of vision1 an affection1 which belongs to the mind alone1 indeed1 but of which we have every reason to suppose1 that the mind1 of itself1 without the presence of light1 would not have been the subject4 ,the peculiar sensation1 therefore1 is the result of the presence of the light reflected from the oak2 and we perceive it1 because the mind is capable of being affected by external things4 ,but this affection of the mind1 which has an external object for its immediate cause1 is not the only mental change which takes place4 ,other changes succeed it1 without any other external impression4 ,we compare the oak with some other tree which we have seen before1 and we are struck with its superior magnificence and beauty2--we imagine how some scene more familiar to us would appear1 if it were adorned with this tree1 and how the scene before us would appear1 if it were stripped of it2--we think of the number of years1 which must have passed1 since the oak was an acorn2--and we moralize1 perhaps1 on the changes1 which have taken place1 in the little history of ourselves and our friends1 and1 still more1 on the revolutions of kingdoms1--and the birth and decay of a whole generation of mankind1--while it has been silently and regularly advancing to maturity1 through the sunshine and the storm4 ,of all the variety of states of the mind1 which these processes of thought involve1 the only one1 which can be ascribed to an external object as its direct cause1 is the primary perception of the oak2 the rest have been the result not immediately of any thing external1 but of preceding states of the mind2--that particular mental state1 which constituted the perception of the oak1 being followed immediately by that different state1 which constituted the remembrance of some tree observed before1 and this by that different state which constituted the comparison of the two2 and so successively1 through all the different processes of thought enumerated4 ,the mind1 indeed1 could not without the presence of the oak1--that is to say1 without the presence of the light which the oak reflects1--have existed in the state which constituted the perception of the oak4 ,but as little could any external object1 without this primary mental affection1 have produced immediately1 any of those other states of the mind1 which followed the perception4 ,there is1 thus1 one obvious distinction of the mental phenomena2 as in relation to their causes1 external or internal2 and1 whatever other terms of subdivision it may be necessary to employ1 we have1 at least1 one boundary1 and know what it is we mean1 when we speak of the external and internal affections of the mind4 ,the first stage of our generalization1 then1 has been the reduction of all the mental phenomena to two definite classes1 according as the causes1 or immediate antecedents1 of our feelings are themselves mental or material4 ,our next stage must be the still further reduction of these1 by some new generalizations of the phenomena of each class4 ,the former of these classes1--that of our external affections of the mind1--is1 indeed1 so very simple1 as to require but little subdivision4 ,the other class1 however1 that of the internal affections or states of the mind1--comprehends so large a proportion of the mental phenomena1 and these so various1 that1 without many subdivisions1 it would be itself of little aid to us in our arrangement4 ,the first great subdivision1 then1 which ,i would form1 of the internal class1 is into our intellectual states of mind1 and our emotions4 ,the latter of these classes comprehends all1 or nearly all the mental states1 which have been classed1 by others1 under the head of active powers4 ,i prefer1 however1 the term emotions1 partly1 because ,i wish to avoid the phrase active powers1--which1 ,i own1 appears to me awkward and ambiguous1 as opposed to other powers1 which are not said to be passive2 and partly1 for reasons before mentioned1 because our intellectual states or energies1--far from being opposed to our active powers1--are1 as we have seen1 essential elements of their activity1--so essential1 that1 without them1 these never could have had the name of active2 and because ,i wish to comprehend1 under the term1 various states of the mind1 which cannot1 with propriety1 in any case1 be termed active1--such as grief1 joy1 astonishment1--and others which have been commonly1 though1 ,i think1 inaccurately1 ascribed to the intellectual faculties1--such as the feelings of beauty and sublimity1--feelings1 which are certainly much more analogous to our other emotions1--to our feelings of love or awe1--for example1--than to our mere remembrances or reasonings1 or to any other states of mind1 which can strictly be called intellectual4 ,i speak at present1 it must be remembered1 of the mere feelings produced by the contemplation of beautiful or sublime objects1--not of the judgment1 which we form1 of objects1 as more or less fit to excite these feelings2 the judgment being truly intellectual1 like all our other judgments2 but being1 at the same time1 as distinct from the feelings which it measures1 as any other judgment from the external or internal objects which it compares4 ,the exact meaning of the term emotion1 it is difficult to state in any form of words1--for the same reason which makes it difficult1 or rather impossible1 to explain1 what we mean by the term thought1 or the terms sweetness or bitterness4 ,what can be more opposite than pleasure and pain6 the real distinction of which is evidently familiar1 not to man only1 but to every thing that lives2 and yet if we were to attempt to show1 in what their difference consists1 or to give a verbal definition of either1 we should find the task to be no easy one4 ,every person understands1 what is meant by an emotion1 at least as well1 as he understands what is meant by any intellectual power2 or1 if he do not1 it can be explained to him1 only by stating the number of feelings to which we give the name1 or the circumstances which induce them4 ,all of them1 indeed1 agree in this respect1 that they imply peculiar vividness of feeling1 with this important circumstance1 to distinguish them from the vivid pleasures and pains of sense1--that they do not arise immediately from the presence of external objects1 but subsequently to the primary feelings1 which we term sensations or perceptions4 ,perhaps if any definition of them be possible1 they may be defined to be vivid feelings1 arising immediately from the consideration of objects1 perceived1 or remembered1 or imagined1 or from other prior emotions4 ,in some cases1--as in that of the emotion which beauty excites1--they may succeed so rapidly to the primary perception1 as almost to form a part of it4 ,yet we find no great difficulty of analysis1 in separating the pleasing effect of beauty1 from the perception of the mere form and colour1 and can very readily imagine the same accurate perception of these1 without the feeling of beauty1 as we can imagine the same feeling of beauty to accompany the perception of forms and colours very different4 8,sure the rising sun1 ,o'er the cerulean convex of the sea1 ,with equal brightness1 and with equal warmth1 ,might roll his fiery orb2 nor yet the soul ,thus feel her frame expanded1 and her powers ,exulting in the splendour she beholds1 ,like a young conqueror moving through the pomp ,of some triumphal day4 ,when join'd at eve1 ,soft murmuring streams1 and gales of gentlest breath1 ,melodious ,philomela's wakeful strain ,attemper1 could not man's discerning ear1 ,through all its tones1 the sympathy pursue2 ,nor yet this breath divine of nameless joy ,steal through his veins1 and fan the awaken'd heart1 ,mild as the breeze1 yet rapturous as the song40#ei ,our emotions1 then1 even in the cases in which they seem most directly to co-exist with perception1 are still easily distinguishable from it2 and1 in like manner1 when they arise from the intellectual states of memory1 imagination1 comparison1 they are equally distinguishable from what we remember1 or imagine1 or compare4 ,they form truly a separate order of the internal affections of the mind1--as distinct from the intellectual phenomena1 as the class1 to which they both belong1 is distinguishable from the class of external affections1 that arise immediately from the presence of objects without4 ,,footnotes3 #eg ,instead of 8not to dethrone10 the original has 8and not to mar40 #eh ,night ,thoughts1 viii4 #eie-eii4 #ei ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,,iii4 v4 #dfd-dgh4 ,,lecture ,,xvii4 ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,mind4--,,class ,i4 ,,external ,,states4--,,introductory4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i endeavoured to prepare the way1 for arranging1 in certain classes1 that almost infinite variety of phenomena1 which the mind exhibits1--pointing out to you the peculiar difficulty of such a classification1 in the case of phenomena so indefinite and fugitive1 as those of the mind1 and the nature of that generalizing principle of analogy or resemblance1 on which every classification1 whether of the material or mental phenomena1 must alike proceed4 ,i then took a slight view of the primary1 leading1 divisions of the phenomena of the mind1 which have met with most general adoption1--the very ancient division of them1 as of two great departments1 belonging to the understanding and the will1--and the similar division of them1 as referable to two classes of powers1 termed the intellectual and active powers of the mind4 ,i explained to you the reasons1 which led me to reject both these divisions1 as at once incomplete1 from not comprehending all the phenomena1 and inaccurate1 from confounding even those phenomena1 which they may truly be considered as comprehending4 ,after rejecting these1 it became necessary to attempt some new arrangement1 especially as we found reason to believe that some advantage could scarcely fail to arise from the attempt itself1 even though it should fail as to its great object2 and we1 therefore1 proceeded to consider and arrange the phenomena1 as nearly as possible1 in the same manner as we should have done1 if no arrangement of them had ever been made before4 ,in thus considering them1 the first important distinction which occurred to us1 related to their causes1 or immediate antecedents1 as foreign to the mind1 or as belonging to the mind itself2 a distinction too striking to be neglected as a ground of primary division4 ,whatever that may be1 which feels and thinks1 it has been formed to be susceptible of certain changes of state1 in consequence of the mere presence of external objects1 or at least of changes produced in our mere bodily organs1 which1 themselves1 may be considered as external to the mind2 and it is susceptible of certain other changes of state1 without any cause external to itself1 one state of mind being the immediate result of a former state of mind1 in consequence of those laws of succession of thoughts and feelings1 which ,he1 who created the immortal soul of man1 as a faint shadow of ,his own eternal spirit1 has established in the constitution of our mental frame4 ,in conformity with this distinction1 we made our first division of the phenomena of the mind1 into its external and internal affections2 the word affection being used1 by me1 as the simplest term for expressing a mere change of state induced1 in relation to the affecting cause1 or the circumstances1 whatever they may have been1 by which the change was immediately preceded4 ,the class of internal affections1--by far the more copious and various of the two1--we divided into two great orders1 our intellectual states of mind1 and our emotions1 words which are1 perhaps1 better understood1 before any definition is attempted of them1 than after it1 but which are sufficiently intelligible without definition1 and appear to exhaust completely the whole internal affections of the mind4 ,we have sensations or perceptions of the objects that affect our bodily organs2 these ,i term the sensitive or external affections of the mind2 we remember objects--we imagine them in new situations--we compare their relations2 these mere conceptions or notions of objects and their qualities1 as elements of our general knowledge1 are what ,i have termed the intellectual states of the mind2 we are moved with certain lively feelings1 on the consideration of what we thus perceive1 or remember1 or imagine1 or compare1 with feelings1 for example1 of beauty1 or sublimity1 or astonishment1 or love1 or hate1 or hope1 or fear2 these1 and various other vivid feelings1 analogous to them1 are our emotions4 ,there is no portion of our consciousness1 which does not appear to me to be included in one or other of these three divisions4 ,to know all our sensitive states or affections1--all our intellectual states1--and all our emotions1 is to know all the states or phenomena of the mind2 8,unde animus scire incipiat1 quibus inchoet orsa ,principiis seriem rerum tenuemque catenam ,mnemosyne2 ,ratio unde1 rudi sub pectore tardum ,augeat imperium1 et primum mortalibus gris ,ira1 dolor1 metus1 et cur nascantur inanes40#fj ,it must not be conceived1 however1 that1 in dividing the class of internal affections of the mind1 into the two distinct orders of intellectual states1 and emotions2 and1 in speaking of our emotions as subsequent in their origin1 ,i wish to be understood1 that these never are combined1 at the same moment1 in that sense of combination1 as applied to the mind1 which ,i have already explained too frequently1 to need again to define and illustrate it4 ,on the contrary1 they very frequently concur2 but1 in all cases in which they do concur1 it is easy for us to distinguish them by reflective analysis4 ,the emotion of pity1 for example1 may continue in the mind1 while we are intellectually planning means of relief1 for the sufferers who occasioned it2 but1 though the pity and the reasoning co-exist1 we have little difficulty in separating them in our reflection4 ,it is the same with all our vivid desires1 which not merely lead to action1 but accompany it4 ,the sage1 who in the silence of midnight1 continues still those labours which the morning began1 watching1 with sleepless eye1 the fate of some experiment1 that almost promises to place within his hand the invisible thread1 which leads into the labyrinths of nature1 or exploring those secrets of the mind itself1 by the aid of which he is afterwards to lay down rules of more accurate philosophizing1 and to become the legislator of all who think1 is not cheered1 in his toils1 merely by occasional anticipations of the truths that await his search4 ,the pleasure of future discovery is1 as it were1 a constant light1 that shines upon him and warms him2 and1 in the very moments in which he watches1 and calculates1 and arranges1 there are other principles of his nature1 in as lively exercise as his powers of observation and reasoning4 ,the warrior1 at the head of an army1 which he has often led from victory to victory1 and which he is leading again to new fields of conflict1 does not think of glory only in the intervals of meditation or action4 ,the passion which he obeys1 is not a mere inspiring genius1 that occasionally descends to rouse or invigorate4 ,it is the soul of his continued existence1--it marches with him1 from station to station1--it deliberates with him in his tent1--it conquers with him in the field1--it thinks of new successes1 in the very moment of vanquishing2 and1 even at night1 when his body has yielded at last to the influence of that fatigue1 of which it was scarcely conscious1 while there was room for any new exertion by which fatigue could be increased1 and when all the anxieties of military command are slumbering with it1 the passion that animates him1 more active still1 does not quit him as he rests1 but is wakeful in his very sleep1 bringing before him dreams1 that almost renew the tumults and the toils of the day4 ,our emotions1 then1 may co-exist with various sensations1 remembrances1 reasonings1--in the same manner as these feelings1 sensitive or intellectual1 may variously co-exist with each other4 ,but we do not think it less necessary to class our sensations of vision as different from our sensations of smell1 and our comparison1 as itself different from the separate sensations compared1 because we may1 at the same moment1 both see and smell a rose1 and may endeavour to appreciate the relative amount of pleasure which that beautiful flower thus doubly affords4 ,in like manner1 our intellectual states of mind1 and our emotions1 are not the less to be considered as distinct classes1 because any vivid passion may continue to exist together with those intellectual processes of thought1 which it originally prompted1 and which1 after prompting1 it prolongs4 ,in all these cases1 however1 in which an emotion co-exists with the results of other external or internal influences1 it is still easy to distinguish its subsequence to the feelings that preceded it4 ,pity1 for example1 as in the case to which ,i have before alluded1 may co-exist with a long train of thoughts1 that are busily occupied in endeavouring to relieve most effectually the misery which is pitied2 but the misery must have been itself an object of our thought1 before the state of mind which constitutes pity1 could have been induced4 ,the emotion which we feel1 on the contemplation of beauty1 may continue to co-exist with our mere perception of the forms and colours of bodies2 but these forms and colours must have been perceived by us1 before the delightful emotion could have been originally felt4 ,in short1 our emotions1 though like the warmth and radiance1 which seem to accompany the very presence of the sun1 rather than to flow from it--they may seem in many cases to be a part of the very feelings which excite them1 are yet1 in every instance1 as truly secondary to these feelings1 as the light which beams on us1 on the surface of our earth1 is subsequent to the rising of the great orb of day4 ,as yet1 we have advanced but a short way1 in our generalization of the mental phenomena3 though1 as far as we have advanced1 our division seems sufficiently distinct and comprehensive4 ,the mind is susceptible of certain existing affections1 of certain intellectual modifications which arise from these1 and of certain emotions which arise from both2 that is to say1 it is capable of existing in certain states1 the varieties of which correspond with these particular designations4 ,we see1 we remember1 or compare1 what we have seen1 regard what we see1 or remember1 or compare1 with desire or with aversion2 and of these1 or of states analogous to these1 the whole of life1 sensitive1 intellectual1 or moral1 is composed4 ,every minute1 therefore1 of every hour1 in all its variety of occupation1 is but a portion of this complicated tissue4 ,let us suppose ourselves1 for example1 looking down from an eminence1 on the prospect beneath4--,on one side all is desolation1--and we see perhaps1 at a little distance1 some half-roofless hovel1 as miserable1 as the waste immediately around it1 which has scarcely the appearance of a dwelling for any living thing1 but seems rather1 as if ,nature herself had originally placed it there1 as a part of the general sterility and ruggedness4 ,on the other side1 all is plenty and magnificence2--and we see1 amid lawns and wooded banks1 a mansion as different in aspect1 as if the beings that inhabited it were of a different race1--which1 as a part of the scene1 where it is placed1 accords so harmoniously with the whole1 that1 without it1 the scene itself would appear incomplete1 and almost incongruous1 as if stripped of some essential charm4 ,to view these separate dwellings1 and all the objects around them--if no other feeling arose--would be to have a series of external or sensitive affections only4 ,but it is scarcely possible for us to view them1 without the instant rise of those intellectual states of mind which constitute comparison1 and of those affections of another order1 which constitute the emotions of admiration and desire in the one case1 and in the other the emotions that are opposite to admiration and desire1 together perhaps with some of those bitter emotions which the sight of misery makes in every breast that is not unworthy of so sacred an influence4 ,in this example1 our intellectual states of mind1 and our emotions1 have for their objects things really existing without2 but the external affections of our senses1 though the most permanent1 and usually the most vivid1 and therefore the best remembered1 of all the sources of our internal feelings are far from being necessary1 in every instance1 to the production of these4 ,there is a constant1 or almost constant succession of internal affections of mind1 of thoughts1 and emotions1 following thoughts and emotions1 which even though we were to be rendered incapable of a single new sensation1--if our animal life could in these circumstances be long protracted1--would still preserve to us also that intellectual and moral existence1 which is the only life1 that is worthy of the name4 ,the knowledge which we acquire from without1 lives in us within2 and1 in such a case as that which ,i have now imagined1 our memory would be to us in some measure every sense1 which we had lost1 creating to us again that very world which had vanished before us4 ,if we could compare and love or hate only things actually present1 we should be far from the maturity and perfection of an infant's mind1 and should scarcely be advanced to the rank of idiocy1 which limited as it is in its range1 still comprehends in its little sphere of foresight and memory1 some few moments at least of the past1 and even a moment or two of the future4 ,it is with the future and with the past1 that1 intellectually and morally1 we are chiefly conversant4 ,to these high capacities of our being1 the subjects1 which can exercise our powers and feelings1 however distant in time or place1 are as it were everlastingly present1--like that mysterious eternal now1 of which theologians speak1--in which past1 present1 and future are considered1 as1 in every moment of every age1 alike visible to the omniscient glance of the ,divinity4 ,we love the virtues1 of which we read1 with the same sort of emotion1 with which we love the virtues that are mingling with us in the present hour4 ,the patriot of the most remote age1--of whom we know nothing1 but the historical tale1 of his voluntary perils or sufferings1 in some generous cause1--is like the friend of our familiar intercourse2 and the sacrifices1 that wrought the happiness of millions of beings1 who are now not merely unknown to us1 but of whom not a single name is remembered on the earth1 awake a sort of veneration1 that is almost combined with gratitude1 as if we were in the presence of a personal deliverer4 ,it is the same with absolute unreality1 nor merely with that which no longer exists1 but with that which never had existence4 ,we are struck with the beauty of what we only imagine1 in the same manner1 though perhaps not with the same liveliness of feeling1 as we are struck with the beauty of external things4 ,our emotions then1 however dependent they may have been originally1 are now no longer dependent1 on these external things4 ,they may arise1 from memory or imagination1 as readily as from perception2 but when they arise from memory or imagination1 they are as truly distinguishable from what we remember and imagine1 as they are distinguishable from our perceptions of mere forms and colours and other sensible qualities1 when they arise from what we perceive4 ,to have arranged all the varieties of feelings of which the mind is susceptible1 in the three great divisions to which our arrangement as yet has extended1--though it is unquestionably to have made some advance in our generalization1--is yet to have made only a small part of the necessary progress2 since each of these three orders comprehends almost innumerable phenomena1 which require the aid of more minute division4 ,in the class of our external affections1 indeed1 this subdivision is very simple and easy2 since our separate organs of sense furnish1 of themselves1 a very evident ground of distinction4 ,but the two orders of our internal affections have no such obvious and tangible distinction1 to serve as the basis of their subdivisions4 ,they admit1 however1--as ,i trust we shall find1--of distinctions1 which1 though not equally obvious1 are almost equally definite1 and require only a very little reflection1 to be understood as clearly1 as the organic relations1 according to which we distinguish our sensations of sound1 or smell1 or sight4 ,it is not my intention1 however1 to proceed1 at present1 to the consideration of these subdivisions2 since the nature of the more minute arrangement will1 ,i conceive1 be better understood1 when we come to treat of each separate order fully1 than they could be now1 by the mere enumeration of a few names1 of the propriety of which1 as mere names1 and1 still more of the propriety of the arrangement which they involve1 you could not be expected to form any accurate judgment1 without a fuller elucidation4 ,all which ,i must request you1 then1 at present1 to keep in remembrance1 is the primary division1 which we have made1 of the different states of the mind into two great classes1 and the secondary division which we have made of one of these classes1 into its two very comprehensive orders4--,you will remember1 then1 that the various affections1 of which the mind is susceptible1 are either external1 as they arise from causes without the mind1 or internal1 as they arise from previous states1 of the mind itself2--that of these internal affections1 some are mere conceptions or notions of former feelings1 or of objects and of the qualities or relations of objects1 as remembered or variously combined or compared1--results of different susceptibilities of our intellectual constitution1 to which different names have been given1 conception1 memory1 imagination1 abstraction1 reason1 and other synonymous terms2--that these internal affections or states of the mind1 which ,i have denominated its intellectual states1 are distinctly separable1 in our reflective analysis1 from certain vivid feelings1 that may arise instantly in the mind1 on the consideration of these mere intellectual results1 or on the perception of objects without1--feelings of admiration1 love1 desire1 and various other analogous1 or opposite states of the mind2--but that there is such an order of vivid feelings1 which arise1 in many cases1 on the mere consideration of what we perceive or remember1 or imagine1 or compare1 and that this order is what ,i wish to be distinguished by the name of emotions4 ,according to this division1 therefore1 of the mental phenomena1 into those which are of external and those which are of internal origin1 and the subdivision which we have made of this latter class1 ,i shall proceed to consider1 first1 ,the external powers or susceptibilities of the mind2 #b;dly1 ,the intellectual powers or susceptibilities of the mind2 and1 #c;dly1 ,its susceptibilities of emotion1--beginning with that class1 which we have every reason to suppose to be first1 in the actual order of developement1--the powers or susceptibilities of the mind1 in its immediate relation to its own bodily organs4 ,certain states of our bodily organs are directly followed by certain states or affections of our mind2--certain states or affections of our mind are directly followed by certain states of our bodily organs4 ,the nerve of sight1 for example1 is affected in a certain manner2 vision1 which is an affection or state of the mind1 is its consequence4 ,i will to move my hand2 the hand obeys my will1 so rapidly1 that the motion1 though truly subsequent1 seems almost to accompany my volition1 rather than to follow it4 ,in conformity with the definitions before given of power and susceptibility1 the one as implying a reference to something consequent1 the other a reference to something antecedent1 ,i should be inclined to consider the sensation which follows the presence of an external object as indicating a mental susceptibility of being so affected2--the production of muscular motion by the will1 as indicating a mental power4 ,but the terms are of less consequence1 if you understand fully the distinction that is implied in them2 and you may be allowed still1 in compliance with the general language1 to speak of the power or faculty of sensation or perception1 if you mean nothing more1 as often as you use these terms1 than that the mind is affected in a certain manner1 and1 therefore1 must have had a previous susceptibility of being thus affected whenever certain changes have previously taken place1 in that nervous system1 with which it is connected4 ,in considering the susceptibilities of the mind1 ,i comprehend1 under its external affections1 all those phenomena or states of the mind1 which are commonly termed sensations2 together with all our internal organic feelings of pleasure or pain1 that arise from states of the nervous system1 as much as our other sensations4 ,many of these are commonly ranked under another head1 that of appetites1--such as hunger1 thirst1 the desire of repose1 or of change of muscular position1 which arises from long-continued exertion2 the oppressive anxiety1 which arises from impeded respiration1 and various other diseases1 arising from bodily uneasiness4 ,but these appetites evidently admit of being analysed into two distinct elements1--a pain of a peculiar species1 and a subsequent desire of that which is to relieve the pain1--states of mind1 of which one may immediately succeed the other2 but which are1 unquestionably1 as different in themselves1 as if no such succession took place1--as different as the pleasure of music is from the mere desire of enjoying it again1 or as the pain of excessive heat1 in burning1 from the subsequent desire of coolness4 ,the pain1 which is one element of the appetite1 is an external affection of the mind1 to be classed with our other sensations1--the succeeding desire1 which is another element of it1 is an internal affection of the mind1 to be classed with our other emotions of desire4 ,we might have felt the same pain of hunger1 though we had not been aware1 that it arose from want of food1 and consequently could not have felt any desire of food1 but merely the general desire of relief which attends every disagreeable sensation4 ,we might have felt the same uneasiness1 which we term thirst1 though we had not been aware1 that it would be relieved by a draught of any beverage1--and the same pain of impeded respiration or fatigue1 though nature had not led us instinctively1 in the one case to perform the muscular actions necessary for expiration and inspiration2 in the other1 to change our posture1 and thus give repose to the wearied limbs4 ,whatever be the organic states1 which occasion these painful feelings1 that are elementary in our appetites1 there can be no doubt1 that some organic affections precede them1 as truly as some affection of an external organ precedes the pain of a burn1 or the painful temporary blindness1 when we are dazzled with excessive light4 ,and though1 in the case of the appetite1 we may give the same name to the pain1 and to the desire of that which is to relieve the pain2 or rather1 may give one name to the combination of the two feelings1--which is not to be wondered at1 where the two feelings are so universally and so immediately successive1--this error1 or rather this mere abbreviation of language1 is no reason that we should consider the elementary pain itself1 as different1 in kind1 from our other pains1 that have not merely half a term to express them1 but a whole undivided word of their own4 ,the pain1 of which the appetite desires the relief1 is a sensation1 as much as any other internal bodily pain which we feel1--a state or affection of the mind1 arising1 immediately and solely1 from a state or affection of the body1--which is the only definition that can be given of a sensation4 ,the pain of hunger and thirst1 then1 and1 in general1 every internal pain arising from a state of the bodily organs1--and distinct from the subsequent desires which they occasion1--are as truly sensations1 as any other sensations2 and the desires that follow these particular sensations1 are as truly desires1 as any other desires of which we have the consciousness4 ,we may1 indeed1 if we resolve to invent a new name1 for those particular desires1 that terminate immediately in the relief of bodily pain1 or the production of bodily pleasure1 give to such desires the name of appetites2 but it is surely a very simple analysis only1 that is necessary to separate1 from the desire of relief1 the feeling of the pain which we wish to be relieved2 since it is very evident1 that the pain must have existed primarily before any such desire could be felt4 ,that the various species of uneasiness1 which are elementary parts of our appetites1 recur1 at intervals1 in which there is some degree of regularity1 does not alter their nature1 when they do recur1 so as to render a peculiar arrangement necessary for including them4 ,the mental states1 which constitute the uneasiness that is felt1 recur thus at intervals1 not from any thing peculiar in the mind itself1 the phenomena of which alone we are considering1 but because the body is only at intervals in the state1 which precedes or induces those peculiar mental affections4 ,if1 instead of the two or three periods1 at which the appetite of hunger recurs1 the nervous system were1 one hundred times in the day1 at intervals the most irregular1 in that state1 which is immediately followed by the feeling of hunger1 the painful feeling1--and the consequent desire of food1 which has been found to relieve it1--would of course1 be felt one hundred times in the day4 ,the regularity1 therefore1 of the recurrence of this state of the nerves1 is a phenomenon1 which belongs to the consideration of the physiologist of the body1 not of the physiologist of the mind1 whose immediate office is finished1 when he can trace any particular feeling of the mind to some affection of our organic frame1 as its invariable antecedent2 and who knowing1 therefore1 that the feeling of pain in any of our appetites1 is the effect or result of some organic affection1 is not surprised that it should not recur1 when that organic affection has not previously taken place1--any more than he is surprised that we do not enjoy the fragrance of roses or violets1 when there are no particles of odour to be inhaled by us2 or do not listen to songs and choral harmonies1 when there is no vibration to be transmitted to the auditory nerve4 ,it is at certain regular periods1 that the full light of day1 and the twilight of morning and evening1 are perceived by us4 ,but we do not think it necessary1 on this account1 to give any peculiar name to these visual perceptions1 to distinguish them from others less regular1 because we know1 that the reason of the periodic recurrence of these perceptions1 is that the various degrees of sunshine1 which produce them1 exist only at such intervals4 ,we are hungry1 when the nerves of the stomach are in a certain state2 we perceive the sun1 when the organ of vision is in a certain state4 ,it is as little wonderful1 that we should not have the feeling of hunger1 except when the nerves of the stomach are in this state1 as that we should not have the perception of the meridian sun1 when the sun itself is beneath our horizon4 ,since the mere pains of appetite1 however1 most important as they truly are1 for the ends which they immediately answer1 are yet of little importance in relation to our general knowledge1 it is unnecessary to dwell on them at length4 ,but ,i cannot quit the consideration of them1 without remarking that admirable provision which the gracious ,author of ,nature has made by them1 for the preservation not of our being merely1 but of our well-being--of that health and vigour1 without which1 a frail and feverish existence1 at least in its relation to this earthly scene1 would be of little value4 ,the daily waste of the body requires daily supply to compensate it2 and if this supply be neglected1 or be inadequate--or1 on the other hand1 if it be inordinately great1 disease is the necessary consequence4 ,to preserve the medium1 therefore1 or at least to prevent any very great deviation from it1 ,he1 who planned our feelings and faculties as well as our bodily frame1 has made it painful for us to omit what is so important to life2 and painful also to prolong the supply in any great proportion1 after the demands of nature have been adequately satisfied4 ,if food had afforded gratification only as relieving the pain of hunger1 these natural boundaries of appetite would have required no aid from moral or physical lessons of temperance4 ,but the indulgence of nature1 in conferring on us the sense of taste1 and making food a luxury as well as a relief1 we abuse1 as we abuse her other kindnesses4 ,the pleasures of this most intemperate of senses1 may lead1 in some degree1 beyond the due point of supply1 the greater number of mankind2 and may drive1 to excesses more injurious1 all those herds of unthinking sensualists who prefer the sickly enjoyment of an hour1 to the health and virtue1 and intellectual as well as physical comfort1 of more frugal repasts4 ,yet even to them1 nature points out in the feeling of satiety1 where intemperance begins1 or where it has already begun2 and if they persist1 notwithstanding this feeling1 how much more would they be in danger of over-loading the powers of life1 if there had been no such feeling of growing uneasiness1 to suppress the avidity of insatiable indulgence4 8,though a man knew10 says ,dr ,reid1 8that his life must be supported by eating1 reason could not direct him when to eat1 or what2 how much1 or how often4 ,in all these things1 appetite is a much better guide than reason4 ,were reason only to direct us in this matter1 its calm voice would often be drowned in the hurry of business1 or the charms of amusement4 ,but the voice of appetite rises gradually1 and1 at last1 becomes loud enough to call off our attention from any other employment40#fa ,if indeed1 the necessary supply were long neglected1 the morbid state of the body which would ensue1 though no pain of actual hunger were to be felt1 would convince1 at last1 the sufferer of his folly4 ,but the providence of our gracious ,creator1 has not trusted the existence of man to the dangerous admonition of so rough a monitor1 which might1 perhaps1 bring his folly before him only when it was too late to be wise4 ,the pain of hunger--that short disease1 if it may be so termed1 which it is in our power so speedily to cure1 prevents diseases that more truly deserve the name4 ,between satiety on one side1 and want on the other1 the stream of health flows tranquilly along1 which1 but for these boundaries1 would speedily waste itself and disappear2 as the most magnificent river1 which1 if dispersed over a boundless plain1 would flow almost into nothing1 owes its abundance and majestic beauty to the very banks that seem to confine its waters within too narrow a channel4 ,besides those particular feelings of bodily uneasiness1 which1 as attended with desire1 constitute our appetites1 there are other affections of the same class1 which1 though not usually ranked with our external sensations or perceptions1 because we find it difficult to ascribe them to any local organ1 are unquestionably to be arranged under the same head2 since they are feelings which arise1 as immediately and directly from a certain state of a part of the nervous system1 as any of the feelings which we more commonly ascribe to external sense4 ,of this kind is that muscular pleasure of alacrity and action1 which forms so great a part of the delight of the young of every species of living beings1 and which is felt1 though in a less degree1 at every period of life1 even the most advanced2 or which1 when it ceases in age1 only gives place to another species of muscular pleasure--that which constitutes the pleasure of ease--the same species of feeling1 which doubles1 to ever one1 the delight of exercise1 by sweetening the repose to which it leads1 and thus making it indirectly1 as well as directly1 a source of enjoyment4 ,in treating of what have been termed the acquired perceptions of vision1 which are truly what give to vision its range of power1 and without which the mere perception of colour would be of little more value than any other of the simplest of our sensations1 ,i shall have an opportunity of pointing out to you some most important purposes1 to which our muscular feelings are instrumental2 and in the nicer analysis which ,i am inclined to make of the perceptions commonly ascribed to touch1--if my analysis be accurate--we shall find them operating at least as powerfully4 ,at present1 however1 ,i speak of them merely as sources of animal pleasure or pain1 of pleasure during moderate exercise and repose1 and of pain during morbid lassitude1 or the fatigue of oppression and unremitted labour4 ,the pleasure which attends good health1 and which is certainly more than mere freedom from pain1 is a pleasure of the same kind4 ,it is a pleasure1 however1 which1 like every other long continued bodily pleasure1 we may suppose1 to be diminished by habitual enjoyment2 and it is therefore1 chiefly1 on recovery from sickness1 when the habit has been long broken by feelings of an opposite kind1 that we recognize what it must originally have been2 if1 indeed it be in our power to separate1 completely1 the mere animal pleasure from those mingling reflecting pleasures which arise from the consideration of past pain1 and the expectation of future delight4 ,to those among you1 who know what it is to have risen from the long captivity of a bed of sickness1 ,i need not say1 that every function is1 in this case1 more than mere vigour2 it is a happiness1 but to breathe and to move2 and not every limb merely1 but almost every fibre of every limb1 has its separate sense of enjoyment4 8,what a blessed thing it is to breathe the fresh air60 said ,count ,struensee1 on quitting his dungeon1 though he was quitting it only to be led to the place of execution1 and cannot1 therefore1 be supposed to have felt much more than the mere animal delight4 8,he does not scorn it1 who1 imprisoned long ,in some unwholesome dungeon1 and a prey ,to sallow sickness1 which the vapours1 dank ,and clammy of his dark abode have bred1 ,escapes at last to liberty and light2 ,his cheek recovers soon its healthful hue2 ,his eye relumines its extinguish'd fires2 ,he walks1 he leaps1 he runs--is wing'd with joy1 ,and riots in the sweets of every breeze40#fb ,on these mere animal gratifications1 however1 ,i need not dwell any longer4 ,there is much more to interest our curiosity1 in the sensations and perceptions which more frequently go under those names2 to the consideration of which ,i shall proceed in my next ,lecture4 ,,footnotes3 #fj ,gray de ,principiis ,cogitandi1 ,lib4 ,i4 v4 #a-e4 #fa ,on the ,active ,powers1 ,essay ,,iii4 c4 #a4 #fb ,cowper's ,task1 book i4 ,,lecture ,,xviii4 ,,on ,,the ,,more ,,definite ,,external ,,affections ,,of ,,mind ,,in ,,general4 ,in my ,lecture yesterday1 after some further elucidation of the triple division which we formed of the mental phenomena1 as external or sensitive affections of the mind1 intellectual states of the mind1--emotions1--,i proceeded to consider the first of these divisions1 of which the characteristic distinction is1 that the phenomena included in it have their causes or immediate antecedents external to the mind itself4 ,in this division1 ,i comprehended1 together with the feelings which are universally ascribed to certain organs of sense1 many feelings1 which1 though unquestionably originating in states of our bodily organs1 as much as our other sensations1 are yet commonly ranked as a different order--such as our various appetites1 or rather that elementary uneasiness which is only a part1 but still an essential part of our appetites1 and which is easily distinguishable from the mere desire1 which is the other element2 since1 however rapid the succession of them may be1 we are yet conscious of them as successive4 ,the particular uneasiness1 it is evident1 must have been felt as a sensation before the desire of that which is to relieve the uneasiness could have arisen4 ,to the same class1 too1 ,i referred the various organic feelings1 which constitute the animal pleasure of good health1 when every corporeal function is exercised in just degree2 and in a particular manner1 our muscular feelings1 whether of mere general lassitude or alacrity2 or those fainter differences of feelings which arise in our various motions and attitudes1 from the different muscles that are exercised1 or from the greater or less contraction of the same muscles4 ,these muscular feelings1 though they may be almost unnoticed by us1 during the influence of stronger sensations1 are yet sufficiently powerful1 when we attend to them1 to render us1 independently of sight and touch1 in a great measure sensible of the position of our body in general1 and of its various parts2 and comparatively indistinct as they are1 they become1--in many cases1 as in the acquired perceptions of vision1 for example1 and equally too1 as ,i conceive1 in various other instances1 in which little attention has been paid to them by philosophers1--elements of some of the nicest and most accurate judgments which we form4 ,it is1 however1 to that widest and most important order of our external affections1 which comprehends the feelings more commonly termed sensations1 and universally ascribed to particular organs of sense1 that we have now to proceed4 ,in these1 we find the rude elements of all our knowledge1 the materials on which the mind is ever operating1 and without which1 it seems to us almost impossible to conceive that it could ever have operated at all1 or could1 even in its absolute inactivity1 have been conscious of its own inert existence4 ,this order of our external feelings comprehends all those states of mind1 however various they may be1 which immediately succeed the changes of state1 produced1 in any of our organs of sense1 by the presence of certain external bodies4 ,the mental affections are themselves1--as ,i have said1--commonly termed sensations2 but we have no verb1 in our language1 which exactly denotes what is expressed in the substantive noun4 ,to feel is1 in its two senses1 either much more limited or much more general1 being confined1 in its restricted meaning1 to the sensations of one organ1 that of touch1--and as a more general word1 being applicable to all the varieties of our consciousness1 as much as to those particular varieties1 which are immediately successive to the affections of our organs of sense4 ,we are said1 in this wider use of the term1 to feel indignation1 love1 surprise1 as readily as we are said to feel the warmth of a fire1 or the coldness of snow4 ,in defining our sensations1 to be those mental affections1 which are immediately successive to certain organic affections1 produced by the action of external things1 it is very evident1 that ,i have made two assumptions1--first of the existence of external things1 that affect our organs of sense2 and1 secondly of organs of sense1 that are affected by external things2--unless1 indeed1 the assumption of the existence of organs of sense be considered1--as in philosophic truth it unquestionably is--only another form of the assumption of the existence of external things1 since1 in relation to the sentient mind1 the organs thus supposed to exist1 are1 in strictness of language1 external1 as much as the objects supposed to act upon them4 ,all of which we are truly conscious1 in sensation1 is the mental affection1 the last link of the series1 in the supposed process2 what we term our perceptions of organs of sense1 or of other external things that act upon these--our ideas1 for example1 of a brain or an eye1 a house or a mountain1 being as truly states of our own percipient mind1 and nothing but states of our own mind1 as our feeling of joy or sorrow1 hope or fear1 love or hate1--to which we never think of giving an existence1 nor a direct and immediate cause of existence1 out of ourselves4 ,by the very constitution of our nature1 however1 or by the influence of associations as irresistible as intuition itself1--it is impossible for us not to feel this essential reality in the causes of one set of our mental affections1 in the same manner as it is impossible for us to ascribe it to another set4 ,the brain1 the eye1 the house1 the mountain1 we believe1 and cannot but believe1 to have external existence1 independent of our own2 the joy and sorrow1 hope and fear1 love and hate1 we believe1 and cannot but believe1 to be merely states of our own mind1 occasioned by other former states of mind1 and dependent1 therefore1 for their continuance1 on our own continued existence only4 ,even in our wildest dreams1--in which we imagine all things that are possible1 and almost all things which are impossible2 we never consider our joy or sorrow1 as directly indicative of any thing separate from ourselves1 and independent of us1 8,while o'er our limbs sleep's soft dominion spread1 ,what tho' our soul fantastic measures trod1 ,o'er fairy fields2 or mourn'd along the gloom ,of pathless woods2 or down the craggy steep ,hurl'd headlong1 swam with pain the mantled pool2 ,or scaled the cliff1--or danced on hollow winds1 ,with antic shapes1 wild natives of the brain20 it was still only the cliff1 the wood1 the pool1 which we considered as external3 the sorrow with which we mourned along our gloomy track1 the pain with which we swam the turbid water1 the horror which we felt at the antic shapes1 with which we mingled in the ghostly dance1 were felt to be wholly in ourselves1 and constituted1 while they lasted1 the very feeling of our own existence4--,the belief of an external world is1 however1 to come afterwards under our full examination3--,it is sufficient1 for the present1 to know1 that in the period after infancy1 to which alone our memory extends1 we are led1 irresistibly1 to believe in it2 and that the belief of it1 therefore1 in whatever manner it may have originated in the imperfect perceptions of our infancy1 is now1 when those perceptions are mature1 so completely beyond the power of argument to overcome1 that it exists1 as strongly1 in those who reason against it1 as in those who reason for it2--that the reference to a direct external cause1 however1 does not accompany every feeling of our mind1 but is confined to a certain number of that long succession of feelings1 which forms the varied consciousness of our life1--and that the feelings1 with respect to which this reference is made1 are the class of sensations1 which1 when combined with this reference1 have commonly been distinguished by the name of perceptions4 ,that we have no perfect evidence of the external existence thus ascribed by us1--independently of our own irresistible belief of it1 may be allowed to the sceptic2 and the reasoning of ,doctor ,reid on the subject1 as far as he proceeds beyond the assertion of this irresistible belief1 and attempts1 what has been commonly regarded as a confutation of the scepticism on this point1--by representing it as proceeding on a mistake1 with respect to the nature of our ideas1--is itself1 as we shall afterwards find1 nugatory and fallacious4 ,but still1 notwithstanding the errors of philosophers with respect to it1 the belief itself is1 in the circumstances in which we now exist1 so truly a part of our constitution1 that to contend against it in argument would be to admit its validity1 since it would be to suppose the existence of some one whom we are fairly undertaking to instruct or to confute4 ,in what circumstance the intuitive belief1--if1 as ,i have said1 the belief be in any case intuitive1--arises2 or rather1 in how large a proportion of cases1 in which the reference seems primary and immediate1 it is1 more probably1 the effect of secondary associations transferred from sense to sense1 will appear better after the minute analysis on which we are to enter1 of the different tribes of our sensations4 ,in referring to the particular class of sensations1 and consequently to an external cause1 a certain number only of the affections of our mind1 there can be no doubt1 that we proceed now1 in the mature state of our knowledge1 with more accuracy1 than we could have attained1 in that early period of life1 when our original feelings were more recent4 ,we have now a clearer and more definite belief of an external world1 and of objects of sensations separate from our sensations themselves2 without which general belief1 previously obtained1 we should as little have ascribed to an external organic cause many of our feelings1 which we now ascribe to one--our sensations of sound and fragrance1 for example1--as we now ascribe to such an immediate external cause1 our emotions of joy or sorrow4 ,a still more important acquisition1 is our knowledge of our own organic frame1 by which we are enabled1 in a great measure1 to verify our sensations1--to produce them1 as it were at pleasure1 when their external objects are before us1 and in this way to correct the feelings1 which have risen spontaneously1 by those1 which we ourselves produce4 ,thus1 when1 in reverie1 our conceptions become peculiarly vivid1 and the objects of our thought seem almost to exist in our presence2 if only we stretch out our hand1 or fix our eyes on the forms that are permanently before us1 the illusion vanishes4 ,our organ of touch or of sight1 is not affected in the same manner1 as if the object that charms us in our musing dream1 were really present2 and we class the feeling1 therefore1 as a conception1--not as a sensation1--which1 but for the opportunity of this correction1 we should unquestionably1 in many instances1 have done4 ,but though1 in forming the class of our sensations1 we derive many advantages from that full knowledge which the experience of many years has given1 we purchase these by disadvantages which are perhaps as great1 and which are greater1 from the very circumstance1 that it is absolutely out of our power to estimate their amount4 ,what we consider as the immediate sensation1 is not the simple mental state1 as it originally followed that corporeal change1 which now precedes it2 but1 at least in the most striking of all the tribes of our sensations1 is a very different one4 ,we have the authority of reason1 a priori1 as shewing no peculiar connexion of the points of the retina with one place of bodies more than with another2 and we have the authority also of observation1 in the celebrated case of the young man who was couched by ,cheselden1 and in other cases of the same peculiar species of blindness1 in which the eyes1 by a surgical operation1 have been rendered for the first time capable of distinct vision1 that if we had had no organ of sense but that of sight1 and no instinctive judgment had been superadded to mere vision1 we should not have had the power of distinguishing the magnitude and distant place of objects2--a mere expanse of colour being all which we should have perceived1 if even colour itself could in these circumstances1 have been perceived by us as expanded4 ,yet it is sufficient now1 that rays of light1 precisely the same in number1 and in precisely the same direction1 as those which at one period of our life1 exhibited to us colour1 and colour alone1 should fall once more on the same small expanse of nerve1 to give us instantly that boundlessness of vision1 which1 almost as if the fetters of our mortal frame were shaken off1 lifts us from our dungeon1 and makes us truly citizens1 not of the earth only1 but of the universe4 ,simple as the principle may now seem1 which distinguishes our secondary or acquired perceptions of vision from those which were primary and immediate1 it was long before the distinction was made2 and till a period which--if we consider it in relation to those long ages of philosophic inquiry1 or1 rather1 most unphilosophic argumentation1 which had gone before--may be considered almost as in our own time1 longitudinal distance was conceived to be as completely an original object of sight as the varieties of mere colour and brilliancy4 ,there may1 therefore--though we have not yet been able1 and may never be able1 to discover it1--be a corresponding difference in our other sensations1 which now seem to us simple and immediate4 ,in the case of sound1 indeed1 there is a very evident analogy to these visual acquired perceptions2 since a constant reference to place mingles with our sensations of this class1 in the same manner1 though not so distinctly1 as in our perceptions of sight4 ,we perceive the sound1 as it were near or at a distance1 in one direction rather than in another2 as1 in the case of longitudinal distance in vision1 we perceive colour at one distance rather than at another4 ,yet there is as little reason1 from the nature of the organic changes themselves1 to suppose1 that different affections of our auditory nerves should originally give us different notions of distance1 as that such notions should originally be produced by different affections of the retina3 and1 as in sight and hearing1 so it is far from improbable1 that1 in all our senses1 there may1 by the reciprocal influence of these upon each other1 or by the repeated lessons of individual experience in each1 be a similar modification of the original simple feelings1 which1 in that first stage of existence that opened to us the world and its phenomena1 each individual organ separately afforded4 ,our reasoning with respect to them1 therefore1 as original organs of sense1 may1 perhaps1 be as false1 as our chemical reasoning would be1 were we to attempt to infer the properties of an uncombined acid1 or alkali1 from our observation of the very different properties of a neutral salt1 into the composition of which we know that the acid or the alkali has entered4 ,if1 indeed1 it were in our power to be introduced to a society1 like that of which ,diderot speaks1 in his ,letter on the ,deaf and ,dumb1 and to hold communication with them1 all our doubts on this subject would be removed4 8,what a strange society10 says he1 8would five persons make1 each of them endowed with one only of our five different senses2 and no two of the party with the same sense6 ,there can be no doubt1 that1 differing1 as they must differ1 in all their views of nature1 they would treat each other as madmen1 and that each would look upon the others with all due contempt4 ,it is1 indeed1 only an image of what is happening every moment in the world2 we have but one sense1 and we judge of every thing40#fc--8,there is1 however10 he justly remarks1 8one science1 though but one science1 in which the whole society of the different senses might agree1--the science which has relation to the properties of number4 ,they might each arrive1 by their separate abstractions1 at the sublimest speculations of arithmetic and algebra2 they might fathom the depths of analysis1 and propose and resolve problems of the most complicated equations1 as if they were all so many ,diophantuses4 ,it is perhaps10 he adds1 8what the oyster is doing in its shell40#fd ,from such a society1--if1 indeed1 we could hold any communication with these profound algebraists1 except in their common science of numbers1--we might undoubtedly learn1 what are the direct immediate affections of mind1 to which our senses individually give rise1 and consequently1 how much1 while feeling has blended with feeling1 they have reciprocally operated on each other4 ,but1 in our present circumstances1 unaided by intercourse with such living abstractions1 it is impossible for us to remove wholly this uncertainty1 as to the kind and degree of influence1 which experience may have had1 in modifying our primary sensations4 ,we may wish1 indeed1 to be able to distinguish our present feelings1 from those which the same objects originally excited2 but1 since no memory can go back to the period1 at which we did not perceive longitudinal distance1 as it were1 immediately by the eye1 as little1 we may suppose1 can any memory go back to the period1 when other sensations1 less interesting than those of vision1 were first excited4 ,could we trace the series of feelings1 in a single mind1--as variously modified1 in the progress from infancy to maturity1--we should know more of the intellectual and moral nature of man1 than is probably ever to be revealed to his inquiry1--when in ages1 as remote from that in which we live1 and perhaps as much more enlightened1 as our own age may be said to be in relation to the period of original darkness and barbarism1 he is still to be searching into his own nature1 with the same avidity as now1 ,he must1 indeed be a very dull observer1 who has not felt1 on looking at an infant1 some desire to know the little processes of thought1 that are going on in his curious and active mind2 and who1 on reflecting on the value1 as an attainment in science1 which the sagest philosopher would set on the consciousness of those acquisitions which infancy has already made1 is not struck with that nearness1 in which1 in some points1 extreme knowledge and extreme ignorance may almost be said to meet4 ,what metaphysician is there1 however subtile and profound in his analytical inquiries1 and however successful in the analyses which he has made1 who would not give all his past discovery1 and all his hopes of future discovery1 for the certainty of knowing with exactness what every infant feels8 ,the full instruction1 which such a view of our progressive feelings1 from their very origin1 in the first sensations of life1 would afford1 ,nature1 in her wisdom1 however1 has not communicated to us1--more than she has communicated to us the nature of that state of being1 which awaits the soul after it has finished its career of mortality4 ,our existence seems1 in our conception of it1 never to have had a beginning4 ,as far back as we can remember any event1 there is always a period1 that appears to us still farther back1 the events of which we cannot distinguish2 as1 when we look toward the distant horizon1 we see1 less and less distinctly1 in the long line which the sunshine of evening still illuminates1 plains1 and woods1 and streams1 and hills1 more distant1 half melting into air1 beyond which our eye can find nothing1--though we are still certain1 that other woods1 and streams1 and plains are there1 and that it is only the imperfection of our sight1 which seems to bound them as in another world4 ,it is to man1 when he thinks upon his own beginning1 as if he felt himself in a world of enchantment1 amid the shades and flowers of which he had been wandering1 unconscious of the time at which he entered it1 or of the objects that are awaiting him1 when he shall have arrived at the close of that path1 whose windings still lead him forward1--and knowing little more1 than that he is himself happy1 and that the unknown ,being1 who has raised this magnificent scene around him1 must be the ,friend of the mortal1 whom he has deigned to admit into it4 8,well pleased he scans ,the goodly prospect1--and1 with inward smiles1 ,treads the gay verdure of the painted plain1-- ,beholds the azure canopy of heaven1 ,and living lamps1 that over-arch his head1 ,with more than regal splendour1--bends his ear ,to the full choir of water1 air1 and earth2 ,nor heeds the pleasing error of his thought1 ,nor doubts the painted green or azure arch1 ,nor questions more the music's mingling sounds1 ,than space1 or motion1 or eternal time2 ,so sweet he feels their influence to attract ,his fixed soul1 to brighten the dull glooms ,of care1 and make the destined road of life ,delightful to his feet4 ,so1 fables tell1 ,the adventurous hero1 bound on hard exploit1 ,beholds with glad surprise1 by secret spell ,of some kind sage1 the patron of his toils1 ,a visionary paradise disclosed1 ,amid the dubious wild2--,with streams1 and shades1 ,and airy songs1 the enchanted landscape smiles1 ,cheers his long labours1 and renews his frame40#fe ,the philosophic use of the term sensation does not necessarily imply1 what1 in its popular use1 is considered almost as involved in it2 and perhaps1 therefore1 it may not be superfluous to warn you1 that it is not confined to feelings1 which are pleasurable or painful1 but extends to every mental affection1 that is the immediate consequence of impression on our organs of sense1--of which mental states or affections1 many1 and1 as ,i am inclined to think1 by far the greater number1 are of a kind1 that cannot be termed either agreeable or disagreeable4 ,of the objects of sight1 for example1 which are of such very frequent occurrence1 how few are there1 at which we look1 either with pleasure or with pain1--if we except that indirect pleasure1 which1 in particular cases1 they may afford1 as communicating to us information1 that is valuable in itself1 or as gratifying even our idlest curiosity4 ,to take one of the most striking cases of this sort1--though we may derive1 from the perusal of a work that interests us1 the purest delight1 it is a delight1 resulting only from the conceptions1 which the author1 in consequence of the happy contrivance of symbolic characters1 has been able to transfuse1 as it were1 from his own mind into ours2 but1 during all the time of the perusal1 sensations1 almost innumerable1 have been excited in us1 by the separate characters1 with which the pages are covered1 that have never mingled even the faintest direct pleasure1 with the general emotion1 which they1 and they alone1 have indirectly produced4 8,i apprehend10 says ,dr ,reid1 8that1 besides the sensations1 that are either agreeable or disagreeable1 there is still a greater number that are indifferent4 ,to these we give so little attention1 that they have no name1 and are immediately forgot1 as if they had never been2 and it requires attention to the operations of our minds1 to be convinced of their existence4 ,for this end1 we may observe1 that1 to a good ear1 every human voice is distinguishable from all others4 ,some voices are pleasant1 some disagreeable2 but the far greater part can neither be said to be one or the other4 ,the same thing may be said of other sounds1 and no less of tastes1 smells1 and colours2 and if we consider1 that our senses are in continual exercise while we are awake1 that some sensation attends every object they present to us1 and that familiar objects seldom raise any emotion1 pleasant or painful1--we shall see reason1 besides the agreeable and disagreeable1 to admit a third class of sensations1 that may be called indifferent4 ,the sensations that are indifferent1 are far from being useless4 ,they serve as signs1 to distinguish things that differ2 and the information we have concerning things external1 comes by their means4 ,thus1 if a man had no ear to receive pleasure from the harmony or melody of sounds1 he would still find the sense of hearing of great utility2 though sounds gave him neither pleasure nor pain1 of themselves1 they would give him much useful information2 and the like may be said of the sensations we have by all the other senses40#ff ,it is as signs1 indeed1 far more than as mere pleasures in themselves1 that our sensations are to us of such inestimable value4 ,even in the case to which ,i before alluded1 of the symbolic or arbitrary characters of a language1 when we consider all the important purposes to which these are subservient1 as raising us originally from absolute barbarism1 and saving us from relapsing into it1 there might be an appearance of paradox1 indeed1 but there would be perfect truth in asserting1 that the sensations which are themselves indifferent1 are more precious1 even in relation to happiness itself1 than the sensations which are themselves accompanied with lively delight1 or rather1 of which it is the very essence to be delightful4 ,happiness1 though necessarily involving present pleasure1 is the direct or indirect1 and often the very distant result of feelings of every kind1 pleasurable1 painful1 and indifferent4 ,it is like the beautiful profusion of flowers1 which adorn our summer fields4 ,in our admiration of the foliage1 and the blossoms1 and the pure airs and sunshine1 in which they seem to live1 we almost forget the darkness of the soil in which their roots are spread4 ,yet how much should we err1 if we were to consider them as deriving their chief nutriment from the beams that shine around them1 in the warmth and light of which we have wandered with joy4 ,that delightful radiance alone would have been of little efficacy1 without the showers1 from which1 in those very wanderings1 we have often sought shelter at noon2 or at least without the dews1 which were unheeded by us1 as they fell silently and almost insensibly on our evening walk4 ,with the common division of our sensations into five classes1--those of smell1 taste1 hearing1 sight1 touch1 we have been familiar1 almost from our childhood2 and though the classification may be far from perfect1 in reference to our sensations themselves1 considered simply as affections of the mind1 it is sufficiently accurate1 in reference to the mere organs of sense2 for1 though our sensations of heat and cold1 in one very important respect1 which is afterwards to be considered by us1 have much less resemblance to the other sensations which we acquire by our organs of touch1 or at least to sensations1 which we are generally supposed to derive from that organ1 than to sensations1 which we receive by the medium of other organs1 our sensations of smell and sound for example--still1 as they arise from an affection of the same organ1 they may be more conveniently referred to the same1 than to any other class2 since1 if we quit that obvious line of distinction1 which the difference of organs affords1 we shall not find it easy to define them by other lines as precise4 ,but whatever may be the arbitrary division or arrangement which we may form either of our sensations themselves1 or of the organs that are previously affected1 the susceptibility of the mind1 by which it is capable of being affected by the changes of state in our mere bodily organs1 must be regarded as1 in every sense of the word1 of primary value in our mental constitution4 ,to the individual1 indeed1 it may be said to be in itself all the things which are around him1 however near or afar2 because it is truly that1 by which alone all things near or afar become known to him4 ,it constitutes by this mutual relation1 which it establishes1 a power of more than magic agency1 before which the great gulf1 that appeared to separate forever the worlds of matter and of spirit1 disappears1--which thus links together substances1 that seemed1 in their nature1 incapable of any common bond of union1--and which1 bringing the whole infinity of things1 within the sphere of our own mind1 communicates to it some faint semblance of the omnipresence of its ,author4 8,what is that organ10--says an eloquent ,french writer1 speaking of the eye1--8what is that astonishing organ1 in which all objects acquire1 by turns1 a successive existence1--where the spaces1 the figures1 and the motions1 that surround me1 are as it were created1--where the stars1 that exist at the distance of a hundred millions of leagues1 become a part of myself1--and where in a single half inch of diameter1 is contained the universe80 ,this power of external sense1 which first awakes us into life1 continues1 ever after1 to watch1 as it were1 round the life which it awoke1 lavishing on us perpetual varieties of instruction and delight2 and if1 from the simple pleasures1 and simple elementary knowledge which it immediately affords1 we trace its influence1 through all the successive feelings to which it indirectly gives rise1 it may be said to exist1 by a sort of intellectual and moral transmutation1 in the most refined and etherial of all our thoughts and emotions4 ,what ,grey says of it1--in the commencement of his beautiful fragment ,de ,principiis ,cogitandi1 addressed to his friend ,west1 is not too high a panegyric1--that every thing delightful and amiable1 friendship and fancy1 and wisdom itself1 have their primary source in it4 8,non illa leves primordia motus ,quanquam parva1 dabunt4 ,ltum vel amabile quicquid ,usquam oritur1 trahit hinc ortum2 nec surgit ad auras1 ,quin ea conspirent simul1 eventusque secundent4 ,hinc vari vitai artes1 ac mollior usus1 ,dulce et amiciti vinclum3 ,sapientia dia ,hinc roseum accendit lumen1 vultuque sereno1 ,humanas aperit mentes1 nova gaudia monstrans4 ,illa etiam1 qu te 7mirum7 noctesque diesque ,assidue fovit inspirans1 linguamque sequentem ,temperat in numeros1 atque horas mulcet inertes1 ,aurea non alia si jactat origine ,musa40#fg ,so much1 indeed1 of human knowledge1 and of all that is valuable and delightful in human feeling1 involves these elementary sensations1 as it were in the very essence of the thoughts and feelings themselves1 that one of the most acute of modern ,french metaphysicians1 and1 with scarcely an exception1 all the philosophers of the ,french metaphysical school1 who are his followers1 have considered the whole variety of human consciousness1 as mere sensation variously transformed2 though1 in stating the nature of this transformation1 and the difference of the sensations as transformed from the primary forms of mere external feeling1 they have not been so explicit1 as the assertors of a system so paradoxical ought assuredly to have been4 ,on the fallacies of this very prevalent theory of mind1 however1 which is afterwards to be examined by us fully1 ,i need not at present make any remarks4 ,though this excessive simplification of the phenomena of human thought and feeling is1 however1 far more than the phenomena truly allow1 it is not the less certain1 that all the varieties of our consciousness1 though not mere transformations of external sense1 are1 when traced to their source1 the results of sensation1 in its various original forms4 ,in inquiring into the phenomena of our senses1 then1 we begin our inquiry1 where knowledge itself begins1 and though the twilight1 which hangs over this first opening of intellectual life1 is perhaps only a presage1 or a part of that obscurity which is to attend the whole track of human investigation1 it still is twilight only1 not absolute darkness4 ,we can discover much1 though we cannot discover all2 and where absolute discovery is not allowed1 there is still left to us a probability of conjecture1 of which1 in such limited circumstances1 even philosophy may justly avail herself1 without departing from her legitimate province4 ,,footnotes3 #fc uvres1 tom4 ii4 p4 #ab4 #fd ,p4 #aca4 #fe ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,,iii4 v4 #dic--ead4 ,the fixed soul1 v4 #eje4 ,exploits1 v4 #ejh2 and ,spells1 v4 #eji4 ,orig4 #ff ,on the ,intellectual powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #af4 #fg ,lib4 ,i4 v4 #ah-be4 and #bh-ca4 ,,lecture ,,xix4 ,,brief ,,notice ,,of ,,the ,,corporeal ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,process1 ,,in ,,sensation4 ,the mental phenomena1 of the class which is at present under our consideration1 being those1 which arise1 in consequence of certain previous affections of our organs of sense1 it is necessary1 that we should take some notice of the corporeal part of the process2 though it must always be remembered1 that it is the last part of the process1 the mental affection only1 which truly belongs to our science1--and that1 if this1 in all its varieties1 had been the result of any other species of affections of organs constituted in any other manner1--as long as there was the regular correspondence of certain mental affections with certain organic affections1--the philosophy of mind would have continued precisely the same as now4 ,our systems of anatomy1 and of the physiology of our mere bodily frame1 would indeed have been different1--but not that more intimate physiology1 which relates to the functions of the animating spirit1 whose presence is life1 and without which our bodily frame1 in all its beautiful adaptation of parts to parts1 is a machine1 as inert and powerless1 as the separate atoms that compose it4 ,the great essential organ of all sensation is the brain1 with its appendages1 particularly the nerves that issue from it to certain organs1 which are more strictly termed the organs of sense2 as it is there the immediate objects1 or external causes of sensation1 the particles of light1 for example1 in vision1 or of odour in smell1 arrive1 and come1 as it were1 into contact with the sensorial substance4 ,each organ1 as you well know1 has objects peculiar to itself1 which it would be superfluous to enumerate2 and since the blind are still sensible of sound1 the deaf of colour1 and both of smell1 and taste1 and touch1 there must evidently be some difference1 either in the sensorial substance itself which is diffused over the different organs1 or in the mode of its diffusion and exposure in the different organs1 from which this striking diversity of their relative sensibilities proceeds4 ,the nervous matter however1 considered separately from the coats in which it is enveloped1 is of the same half-fibrous1 but soft and pulpy texture1 as the substance of the brain itself1 and is in perfect continuity with that substance1 forming1 therefore1 with it1 what may be considered as one mass1 as much as the whole brain itself may be considered as one mass2 which has1 indeed1 for its chief seat the great cavity of the head2 the 8,superas hominis sedes1 arcemque cerebri2 ,namque illic posuit solium1 et sua templa sacravit1 ,mens animi2--0#fh but which extends1 by innumerable ramifications1 over the whole surface1 and through the internal parts of the body4 ,the mind1 in that central brain in which it is supposed to reside1 communicating with all these extreme branches1 has been compared1 by a very obvious1 but a very beautiful similitude1 to the parent ,ocean1 receiving from innumerable distances the waters of its filial streams3 8,ac uti longinquis descendunt montibus amnes1 ,velivolus ,tamisis1 flaventisque ,indus aren1 ,euphratesque1 ,tagusque1 et opimo flumine ,ganges1 ,undas quisque suas volvens1--cursuque sonoro ,in mare prorumpunt2 hos magno acclinis in antro ,excipit ,oceanus1 natorumque ordine longo ,dona recognoscit venientum1 ultroque serenat ,coeruleam faciem1 et diffuso marmore ridet4 ,haud aliter species properant se inferre novell ,certatim menti40#fi ,in the brain itself1 the anatomist is able to shew us1 with perfect clearness1 many complicated parts1 which we must believe to be adapted for answering particular purposes in the economy of life2 but when we have gazed with admiration on all the wonders which his dissecting hand has revealed to us1 and have listened to the names with which he most accurately distinguishes the little cavities or protuberances which his knife has thus laid open to our view1 we are still as ignorant as before of the particular purposes to which such varieties of form are subservient2 and our only consolation is1--for there is surely some comfort in being only as ignorant as the most learned1--that we know as much of the distinct uses of the parts as the anatomist himself1 who exhibits them to us1 and teaches us how to name them4 ,a structure1 in every respect different1 though assuredly less fit than the present which has been chosen by infinite wisdom1 might1 as far as we know1 have answered exactly the same end2 which is as much as to say1 that our ignorance on the subject is complete4 ,the only physiological facts of importance1 in reference to sensation1 are1 that if the nerves1 which terminate in particular organs1 be greatly diseased1 the sensations which we ascribe to those particular organs cease2 and cease1 in like manner1 if the continuity of the nerves be destroyed1 by cutting them in any part of their course1 or if1 without loss of absolute continuity1 their structure1 in any part of their course be impaired by pressure1 whether from tight ligatures drawn around them for the purpose of experiment1 or from natural morbid causes4 ,in short1 if the brain and nerves be in a sound state1 and certain substances be applied to certain parts of the nervous system1--as1 for instance1 sapid bodies to the extremities of the nerves of taste1 or light to that expansion of the optic nerve1 which forms what is termed the retina1--there is then instant sensation2 and when the brain itself is not in a sound state to a certain extent1 or when the nerve which is diffused on a particular organ is1 either at this extremity of it1 or in any part of its course1 to a certain degree impaired1 then there is no sensation1 though the same external causes be applied4 ,this very slight general knowledge of the circumstances in which sensation takes place1 and of the circumstances in which it does ,,not take place1 is all the knowledge which physiology affords us of the corporeal part of the process2--and it is likely to continue so forever1--at least in all the more important respects of our ignorance1--since any changes which occur in the corpuscular motion1 and consequent new arrangement of the particles of the substance of the brain and nerves1 corresponding with the diversities of feeling during those particular states1--if such corpuscular motions or changes do really take place1--are probably far too minute to be observable by our organs2 even though we could lay open all the internal parts of the brain to complete observation1 without destroying1 or at all affecting1 the usual phenomena of life3-- ,in 8following life through creatures we dissect1 ,we loose it1 in the moment we detect40 ,indeed1 we are not able to do even so much as this2 for life has already vanished1 long before we have come upon the verge of its secret precincts4 ,it is like a ,magician1 that operates at a distance on every side1 but still keeps himself apart1 within a narrow circle4 ,if we remain without the circle1 we may gaze with never-ceasing admiration1 on the wonders that play in rapid succession before our eyes4 ,but1 if we rush within1 to force an avowal1 of the secret energy that produces them1 the enchanter and the enchantments alike are fled4 ,the brain1 then1 and the various nerves of sense in continuity with it1 may1 when taken together1 be considered as forming one great organ1 which ,i would term briefly the sensorial organ1 essential to life1 and to the immediate production of those mental phenomena which constitute our sensations1 and1 perhaps1 too1 modifying in some measure1 directly or indirectly1 all the other phenomena of the mind4 8,dum mens alma caput cerebrique palatia celsa ,occupat1 et famulos sublimis dirigit artus1 ,et facili imperio nervorum flectit habenas1 ,illius ad nutum sensus extranea rerum ,explorant signa1 et studio exemplaria fido ,ad dominam adducunt2 vel qui statione locantur ,vicina1 capitisque tuentur limina1 ocelli1 ,naresque1 auriculque1 et vis arguta palati2 ,vel qui per totam currit sparso agmine molem ,tactus1 ad extremas speculator corporis aras4 ,his sensim auxiliis instructa fidelibus1 olim ,mens humilis nulloque jacens ingloria cultu ,carceris in tenebris mox sese attolit in auras ,dives opum variarum1 et sidera scandit ,olympi40 ,of the nature of the connexion of this great sensorial organ with the sentient mind1 we never shall be able to understand more than is involved in the simple fact1 that a certain affection of the nervous system precedes immediately a certain affection of the mind4 ,but1 though we are accustomed to regard this species of mutual succession of bodily and mental changes1 as peculiarly inexplicable1 from the very different nature of the substances which are reciprocally affected1 it is truly not more so than any other case of succession of events1 where the phenomena occur in substances that are not different in their properties1 but analogous1 or even absolutely similar2 since1 in no one instance of this kind1 can we perceive more than the uniform order of the succession itself2 and of changes1 the successions of which are all absolutely inexplicable1 or1 in other words1 absolutely simple1 and unsusceptible1 therefore1 of further analysis1 none can be justly said to be more or less so than another4 ,that a peculiar state of the mere particles of the brain1 should be followed by a change of state of the sentient mind1 is truly wonderful2 but if we consider it strictly1 we shall find it to be by no means more wonderful1 than that the arrival of the moon1 at a certain point of the heavens1 should render the state of a body on the surface of our earth1 different from what it otherwise would naturally be or that the state of every particle of our globe1 in its relative tendencies of gravitation1 should be instantly changed1 as it unquestionably would be1 by the destruction of the most distant satellite of the most distant planet of our system1 or probably too1 by the destruction even of one of those remotest of stars1 which are illuminating their own system of planets1 so far in the depth of infinity1 that their light1--to borrow a well-known illustration of sidereal distance1--may never yet have reached our earth1 since the moment at which they darted forth their first beams1 in the creation of the universe4 ,we believe1 indeed1 with as much confidence1 that one event will uniformly have for its consequent another event1 which we have observed to follow it1 as we believe the simple fact that it has preceded it1 in the particular case observed4 ,but the knowledge of the present sequence1 as a mere fact1 to be remembered1 and the expectation of future similar sequences1 as the result of an original law of our belief1 are precisely of the same kind1 whether the sequence of changes be in mind1 or in matter singly1 or reciprocally in both4 ,what the nature of the change is1 that is produced at the extremity of the nerve1 it is beyond our power to state1 or even to guess2 and we are equally ignorant of the manner in which this affection of the nerve is communicated1 or is supposed to be communicated1 to the brain4 ,but that some affection is gradually propagated1 from the one to the other1 so as to render the change in the state of the brain subsequent1 by a certain interval1 to the change in the state of the nerve1 is universally believed4 ,in applying to this change the term impression1 a term indeed which had been in common use before1 ,dr ,reid is careful to point out the reason for which this term appears to him preferable to others2 and though ,i confess that the word seems to me to convey too much the notion of a peculiar well known species of action2 that which consists in producing a certain configuration of the object impressed1 corresponding with the figure of the impressing object1 the very notion that has had so pernicious an effect in the theory of perception2 and though ,i conceive the simple term change or affection to be all which is safely admissible1 as long as the nature of the particular change is absolutely unknown2 still it must be confessed that impression is a term a little more general than the other names of action1 to which ,dr ,reid alludes1 and therefore preferable to them1 in the present case4 8,there is sufficient reason10 he says1 8to conclude1 that1 in perception1 the object produces some change in the organ2 that the organ produces some change upon the nerve2 and that the nerve produces some change in the brain4 ,and we give the name of an impression to those changes1 because we have not a name more proper to express1 in a general manner1 any change produced in a body1 by an external cause1 without specifying the nature of that change4 ,whether it be pressure1 or attraction1 or repulsion1 or vibration1 or something unknown1 for which we have no name1 still it may be called an impression4 ,but with regard to the particular kind of this change or impression1 philosophers have never been able to discover any thing at all40#gj ,that the word impression is not so free1 as ,dr ,reid supposes1 from that hypothetical meaning which he wished to avoid1 ,i have already remarked4 ,but the reason assigned by him for his preference of it1 is unquestionably a just one2 since a phrase which expresses the least possible knowledge1 must be allowed to be the best suited to human ignorance1--that ignorance1 which1 not in the philosophy of intellect only1 but in whatever track of science we may proceed1 and whatever truths we may proudly discover in our way1 still meets us at the end of every path1 as if to mock at once our weakness and our pride1--and which seems to us to be every where1 because it is1 wherever we are ourselves4 ,the splendour of nature1 as it exists in itself1 is1 if ,i may speak figuratively1 like sunshine on a boundless plain1 on the flowers and herbage of which1 though there be innumerable varieties of colour1 there is brilliancy in all4 ,but the misfortune is1 that1 as soon as we have approached near enough to distinguish the diversity of tints1 their brilliancy is so obscured by our very approach to them1 that their nice diversities are no longer distinguishable2 as if man could not move along1 without throwing his own shadow on every thing before him4 ,when ,i say1 that we are ignorant of the nature of that change1 which is propagated along the nerve to the brain1 ,i speak in reference to an opinion that is universal4 ,but1 though it may be improbable1 it is certainly far from impossible1 that there is really no such progressive communication1 as this which is supposed4 ,the brain and nerves1 though1 from the difference of names1 you might be led1 perhaps1 to consider them as distinct1 ,i have already said1 are not separate organs1 but are in continuity with each other1 at least as much as various parts of the brain itself1 which are comprehended under that single term1 can be said to be continuous4 ,when taken together1 they form what is truly one complicated sensorial organ1--the organ of all our sensations1 according to the different states in which the organ exists1 or the different parts of it which are chiefly affected4 ,in hearing1 for example1 a certain state of that part of the sensorial organ1 which constitutes the auditory nerves1--in vision1 a certain state of that part of it1 which constitutes the optic nerves1 is necessary to sensation1--and1 in both cases1 according to the universal supposition on the subject1 all or part of the brain likewise must exist in a certain state1 of which we know nothing more1 than that it is followed1 in the one case1 by the sensation of sound1 in the other case by that of sight4 ,the connexion of the mind with the bodily frame1--which must be equally inexplicable on every supposition that can be formed1--is not supposed1 by any philosopher1 to depend on the state of a single physical point of the brain alone2 and1 if it extend to more than one such point1 there is nothing1--in the nature of the connexion itself1 independently of experience1--which necessarily limits it to one portion of the complex sensorial organ1 more than to another1--to the particles of the central mass of the brain1 for example1 more than to those of the nerve itself4 ,it is experience1 then1 to which we are referred2 and experience1 though it shows that certain nerves are not essential to life1 since life continues equally1 after they may have been impaired1 or even destroyed1 is far from showing that an affection of them is not essential to sensation1 at the very moment of the particular sensation2 nor does it afford even the slightest evidence1 to justify the belief1 that the only use of the nerve is to communicate a certain affection to the brain1 which affection of the mere central part of the sensorial organ1 would1 of itself1 immediately induce sensation1 though the nerves were annihilated in the preceding instant4 ,the sensation may be the immediate effect1 not of the state of the brain only1 but of the state of the brain1 and of any particular nerve1 considered as existing together at the moment2 in the same manner1 as1 by those who ascribe the immediate origin of sensation to the mere brain1 exclusive of its nervous appendages1 it is supposed to depend on the state1 not of one physical point of the central brain1 but on the state of many such co-existing points4 ,we know not1 to what extent1 in the great sensorial organ1 this change is necessary2 but we believe1 that1 to some extent1 it is necessary2 and the question is1 whether1 in the whole portion so affected1 the affection be produced by a succession of changes1 propagated from part to part8 ,this may1 perhaps1 be the more probable supposition3--but1 whatever may be the comparative probability or improbability1 it certainly has not been demonstrated by observation or experiment2 nor can there be said to be1 a priori1 any absurdity in the opposite supposition1 that the sensorial affection1 to whatever extent it may be necessary1 is not progressive1 but immediate1--that1 as long as the sensorial organ1 7under which term ,i comprehend1 as ,i have already frequently repeated1 not the brain merely1 but also its nervous appendages1 that exist in apparent continuity with the brain17 is unimpaired1 by accident or disease1 the presence of the immediate object of sense1 at the external organ1 which on every supposition1 must be followed by some sensorial change of state1 is instantly followed by that general change of state of the internal organ1 whatever it may be1 which is necessary to sensation1 in the particular case2 in the same manner1 as the presence of a celestial body1 at a certain point in the heavens1 is immediately followed by a change of state1 in the whole gravitating particles of our globe2 the change in any long line of these gravitating particles being not communicated from each to each1 but depending only on the presence of the distant sun or planet2 and beginning in the most remote particles of the line1 at the very same instant1 as in that which is nearest1 on the surface of the earth4 ,an instant change1 in the long line of sensorial particles1--if the affection of a long line of these particles be necessary1--on the presence of a particular object1 is not more improbable in itself1 than this instant and universal influence of gravitation1 that varies with all the varying positions of a distant object4 ,but is it1 indeed1 certain1 that1 in sensation1 there is an affection of the central brain1 whether immediate or progressive8 ,is it not possible1 at least1 or more than possible1 that the state of the mind1 when we perceive colours and sounds1 may be the immediate consequent of the altered state of that part of the sensorial organ1 which forms the expansion of the nerve in the eye or ear8 ,the sensations must be supposed1 in every theory1 to be the consequents of states induced in some sensorial particles1 and there is nothing but the mere names of brain and nerve1 invented by ourselves1 and the notions which we have chosen1 without evidence1 to attach to these mere names1 which would mark the sensorial particles in the nervous expanse itself1 as less fitted to be the immediate antecedents of sight and hearing1 than the similar sensorial particles in any portion of the central mass of the brain4 ,there is no reason1 in short a priori1 for supposing that a state of the sensorial particles of the nerves cannot be the cause of sensation1 and that the sensation must be the effect of a state equally unknown1 of apparently similar particles1 in that other part of the general sensorial organ1 which we have denominated the brain4 ,sensation1 indeed1 is prevented by decay1 or general disease of the brain1 or by separation of the nerve1 or pressure on it1 in any part of its course4 ,but it is far from improbable1 that these causes1 which must evidently be injurious to the organ1 may act1 merely by preventing that sound state of the nerve1 which is necessary for sensation1 and which1 in an organ so very delicate1 may be affected by the slightest influences1--by influences far slighter1 than may naturally be expected to result from such an injury of such a part4 ,the nerves and brain1 together1 form one great organ2 and a sound state of the whole organ1 even from the analogy of other grosser organs1 may well be supposed to be necessary for the healthy state and perfect function of each separate part4 ,if1 indeed1 the appearance of the brain and nerves were such1 as marked them to be peculiarly fitted for the communication of motion of any sort1 there might be some presumption1 from this very circumstance1 in favour of the opinion1 that sensation takes place1 only after a progressive series of affections of some sort1 propagated along the nerve to the interior brain4 ,but it must be remembered1 that the nature1 both of the substance of the nerves themselves1 and of the soft and lax substance1 in which they are loosely embedded1 renders them very ill adapted for the communication of nice varieties of motion1 and gives some additional likelihood1 therefore1 to the supposition1 that affections of the sensorial organ1 so distinct as our sensations are from each other1 and so exactly corresponding with the slightest changes of external objects1 do not depend on the progressive communication of faint and imperceptible motion1 in circumstances so unfavourable to the uninterrupted progress even of that more powerful motion1 which can be measured by the eye4 ,in a case so doubtful as this1 however1 in which the intervening changes supposed by philosophers1--if such a progressive series of motions do really take place1--are confessed to be beyond our observation1 it is impossible for any one1 who has a just sense of the limits1 which nature has opposed to our search1 to pronounce with certainty1 or even perhaps with that faint species of belief1 which we give to mere probability4 ,my conjectures on the subject1 therefore1 ,i state simply as conjectures1 and nothing more4 ,if1 indeed1 what is but a mere conjecture could be shown to be well founded1 it would add another case to the innumerable instances1 in which philosophers have laboured1 for ages1 to explain what did not exist1--contenting themselves1 after their long toil1 with the skill and industry which they have exhibited1 in removing difficulties1 which they had before1 with great skill and industry1 placed in their own way4 8,i am not so much convinced of our radical ignorance10 says an ingenious writer1 8by the things that are1 of which the nature is hid from us1 as by the things that are not1 of which notwithstanding we contrive to give a very tolerable account2 for this shews that we are not merely without the principles which lead to truth1 but that there are other principles in our nature1 which can accommodate themselves very well1 and form a close connexion1 with what is positively false40 ,but whatever reason there may be for removing this supposed link of the corporeal part of the process of sensation1 there is another prior link1 which it appears to me of great importance to separate from the chain4 ,i allude to the distinction1 which is commonly made1 of the objects of sense1 as acting themselves on our organs1 or as acting through what is termed a medium4 8,a second law of our nature10 says ,dr ,reid1 8regarding perception is1 that we perceive no object1 unless some impression is made upon the organ of sense1 either by the immediate application of the object1 or by some medium which passes between the object and the organ4 ,in two of our senses1 to wit1 touch and taste1 there must be an immediate application of the object to the organ4 ,in the other three1 the object is perceived at a distance1 but still by means of a medium1 by which some impression is made upon the organ4 ,the effluvia of bodies drawn into the nostrils1 with the breath1 are the medium of smell2 the undulations of the air1 are the medium of hearing2 and the rays of light passing from visible objects to the eye1 are the medium of sight4 ,we see no object1 unless rays of light come from it to the eye4 ,we hear not the sound of any body1 unless the vibrations of some elastic medium1 occasioned by the tremulous motion of the sounding body1 reach our ear4 ,we perceive no smell1 unless the effluvia of the smelling body enter into the nostrils4 ,we perceive no taste1 unless the sapid body be applied to the tongue1 or some part of the organ of taste4 ,nor do we perceive any tangible quality of a body1 unless it touch the hands1 or some part of our body40#ga ,it is evident1 that1 in these cases of a supposed medium1 which ,dr ,reid considers as forming so important a distinction of our sensations1 the real object of sense is not the distant object1 but that which acts immediately upon the organs1--the light itself1 not the sun which beams it on us1--the odorous particles1 which the wind has wafted to us from the rose1 not the rose itself upon its stem1--the vibrations of the air1 within our ear1 not the cannon that is fired at the distance of miles4 ,the light1 the odour1 the vibrating air1 by which alone our senses are affected1 act on our nerves of sight1 of smell1 and hearing1 with an influence as direct1 and as little limited in the kind of action1 as that with which the fruit1 which we eat or handle1 acts on our nerves of taste or touch4 ,this influence of the objects immediately external is all1 in which our organs of sense1 and consequently the mind as the principle of mere sensation1 is concerned4 ,the reference to the distant sun1 or rose1 or cannon1 which alone leads us to speak of a medium in any of these cases1 is the effect of another principle of our intellectual nature1--the principle of association1 or suggestion1--that is afterwards to be considered by us1 without which1 indeed1 our mere transient sensations would be comparatively of little value2 but which1 as a quality or susceptibility of the mind1 is not to be confounded with that1 by which the mind becomes1 instantly sentient1 in consequence of a certain change produced in the state of its sensorial organ4 ,since1 however1 precisely the same series of changes must take place in nature1 whether we class the sun1 the flower1 the cannon1 as the objects of sense1 or merely the light1 the odorous particles1 and the vibrating air1 it may perhaps be thought1 that the distinction now made is only a verbal one1 of no real importance4 ,but it will not appear such to those who are conversant with the different theories of perception which we are afterwards to review2 many of which1 that have had the greatest sway1 and a sway the most fatal to the progress of intellectual philosophy1 appear1 to me1 to have arisen entirely1 or at least chiefly1 from this very misconception as to the real external object of sense4 ,it is sufficient at present to allude to the effect1 which the mere distance of the supposed object must have had1 in giving room to all the follies of imagination to fill up the interval4 ,it may be necessary1 however1 to remark by the way1 that though ,i do not conceive the bodies which act through a medium1 as it is said to be the real objects of the particular sense2--the immense orb of the sun1 for example1 in all its magnitude1 to be the object of that small organ by which we are sensible of light2 or the cannon1 which exists we know not where1 to be the object of that organ by which we are sensible of sound2--,i am still far from objecting to the popular and very convenient phraseology1 by which we speak of seeing the sun1 and hearing the cannon--a phraseology that expresses briefly a reference1 which could not otherwise be expressed but by a very awkward circumlocution1 and to make any innovation in which would be as absurd1 as to reject the popular phrases of the sun's rising and setting merely because they are inconsistent with our astronomical belief4 ,the most rigid philosophy can require no more1 than that1 when we talk of the sun's actual setting1 we should mean by it1 only a certain position relative to that great luminary at which the earth arrives in its diurnal revolution1--and that1 when we talk of seeing it descend1 we should mean nothing more1 than that we see light of a certain brilliancy1 from which we infer the existence and relative position of the orb that has projected it4 ,i have been led into these observations1 on the various parts of the corporeal process which precedes sensation1 by the desire of removing1 as much as possible1 any obscurity in which your notions on the subject might be involved1--as ,i know well the influence which even a slight confusion in our notion of any part of a complicated process has1 in spreading1 as it were1 its own darkness and perplexity over parts of the process1 which otherwise we should have found no difficulty in comprehending4 ,you might think1 that you knew less distinctly the mental sensation itself1 because you knew only obscurely the series of bodily changes that precede sensation2 but still it must be remembered1 that it is only the last link of the corporeal chain1--the ultimate affection of the sensorial organ1 in whatever manner and to whatever extent it may be affected1--immediately antecedent to the affection of the mind1 which is to be considered as that with which nature has united the corresponding change in our mental frame4 ,this mysterious influence of our bodily on our mental part has been poetically compared to that which the sun was supposed to exercise on a lyre1 that formed part of a celebrated ,egyptian statue of ,memnon1 which was said to become musical when struck with its beams2 and though the poet has extended the similitude1 beyond our mere elementary sensations1 to the complex perception of beauty1 it is still a very happy illustration--as far as a mere poetic image can be an illustration--of the power which matter exercises over the harmonies of mind3-- 8,for as old ,memnon's image1 long renown ,by fabling ,nilus1 to the quivering touch ,of ,titan's ray with each repulsive string ,consenting1 sounded through the warbling air ,unbidden strains1--even so did ,nature's hand1 ,to certain species of external things ,attune the finer organs of the mind4 ,so the glad impulse of congenial powers1 ,or of sweet sound1 or fair proportion'd form1 ,the grace of motion1 or the bloom of light1 ,thrills through ,imagination's tender frame1 ,from nerve to nerve4 ,all naked and alive1 ,they catch the spreading rays2 till now the soul ,at length discloses every tuneful spring1 ,to that harmonious movement from without4 ,responsive4 ,then the charm1 by ,fate prepar'd ,diffuses its enchantment4#gb ,fancy dreams ,of sacred fountains1 and ,elysian groves1 ,and vales of bliss6 the ,intellectual ,power ,bends from his awful throne a wondering ear1 ,and smiles2 the ,passions1 gently soothed away1 ,sink to divine repose2 and ,love and ,joy ,alone are waking40#gc ,when we consider the variety of our feelings thus wonderfully produced1--the pleasures1 and1 still more1 the inexhaustible knowledge1 which arise1 by this mysterious harmony1 from the imperceptible affection of a few particles of nervous matter1 it is impossible for us not to be impressed with more than admiration of that ,power1 which even our ignorance1 that is scarcely capable of seeing any thing1 is yet1 by the greatest of all the bounties of heaven1 able to perceive and admire4 ,in the creation of this internal world of thought1 the ,divine ,author of our being has known how to combine infinity itself with that which may almost be considered as the most finite of things2 and has repeated1 as it were1 in every mind1 by the almost creative sensibilities with which ,he has endowed it1 that simple but majestic act of omnipotence1 by which1 originally1 ,he called from the rude elements of chaos1 or rather from nothing1 all the splendid glories of the universe4 ,,footnotes3 #fh ,gray de ,princip1 ,cogit4 lib4 i4 v4 #dh-ej4 #fi ,gray de ,princip4 ,cogit4 lib4 i4 v4 #ed-fc4 #gj ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 chap4 ii4 #ga ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 chap4 ii4 #gb 8,then the charm10 c4 to 8enchantment10 from the second form of the ,poem4 ,the corresponding clause1 in the first form1 from which all the rest of the quotation is taken1 is this1 8,then the inexpressive strain ,diffuses its enchantment40 #gc ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,i4 v4 #aji--aca4 ,,lecture ,,xx4 ,,particular ,,consideration ,,of ,,our ,,sensations4--,,nameless ,,tribes ,,of ,,sensations--,,sensations ,,of ,,smell--,,of ,,taste--,,of ,,hearing4 ,a considerable portion of my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was employed in illustrating the corporeal part of the process of perception1 which1 though less immediately connected with our ,science than the mental part of the process1 is still1 from its intimate connexion with this mental part1 not to be altogether neglected by the intellectual inquirer4 ,the importance of clear notions of the mere organic changes is1 indeed1 most strikingly exemplified in the very false theories of perception which have prevailed1 and in some measure still prevail2 and which evidently1 in part at least1 owe their origin to those confused notions1 to which ,i alluded in my last ,lecture1 of the objects of perception1 as supposed to operate at a distance through a medium1 and of complicated series of changes supposed to take place in the nerves and brain4 ,in considering the ,phenomena of our ,mind1 as they exist when we are capable of making them subjects of reflection1 ,i mentioned to you1 in a former ,lecture1 that although we have to encounter many additional difficulties1 in consequence of early associations1 that modify forever after our original elementary feelings1 with an influence that is inappreciable by us1 because it is truly unperceived1 there are yet some advantages1 which though they do not fully compensate this evil1 at least enable us to make some deduction from its amount4 ,the benefit to which ,i allude1 is found chiefly in the class of phenomena which we are now considering1--a class1 indeed1 which otherwise we should not have regarded as half so comprehensive as it truly is1 since1 but for our previous belief of the existence of a permanent and independent system of external things acquired from other sources1 we should have classed by far the greater number of the feelings1 which we now refer to sense1 among those which arise spontaneously in the mind1 without any cause external to the mind itself4 ,though the sensations1 which arise from affections of the same organ--as those of warmth and extension for example1 or at least the feeling of warmth and a tactual feeling1 that is commonly supposed to involve extension1 from affections of the same nerves of touch1--are not1 in every case1 more analogous to each other1 than the sensations which arise from affections of different organs1--and though1 if we were to consider the sensations alone1 therefore1 without reference to their organs1 we might not form precisely the same classification as at present1--the division1 according to the organs affected1 in most cases corresponds1 so exactly1 with that which we should make1 in considering the mere sensations as affections of the mind1 and affords in itself a principle of classification1 so obvious and definite1 that we cannot hesitate1 in preferring it to any other which we might attempt to form4 ,in the arrangements of every science1 it is of essential consequence1 that the lines of difference1 which distinguish one class from another1 should be well marked2 and this advantage is peculiarly important in the science of mind1 the objects of which do not1 as in the other great department of nature outlast inquiry1 but are1 in every case1 so very shadowy and fugitive1 as to flit from us1 in the very glance1 that endeavours to catch their almost imperceptible outline4 ,in examining1 then1 according to their organs1 our classes of sensation2 and considering what feelings the organic affections excite at present1 and what we may suppose them to have excited originally1--,i shall begin with those which are most simple1 taking them in the order of smell1 taste1 hearing1--not so much1 from any hope1 that the information1 which these afford will throw any great light on the more complex phenomena of sight and touch1 as because the consideration of them is easier1 and may prepare you gradually for this difficult analysis1 which awaits us afterwards1 in the examination of those more perplexing phenomena4 ,i begin1 then1 with the consideration of that very simple order of our sensations which we ascribe to our organ of ,,smell4 ,the organ of smell1 as you well know1 is principally in the nostrils1--and partly also in some continuous cavities on which a portion of the olfactory nerves is diffused4 ,naribus interea consedit odora hominum vis ,docta leves captare auras1 ,panchaia quales ,vere novo exhalat1 ,florve quod oscula fragrant ,roscida1 cum ,zephyri furtim sub vesperis hora ,respondet votis1 mollemque aspirat amorem4#gd ,when the particles of odour affect our nerves of smell1 a certain state of mind is produced1 varying with the nature of the odoriferous body4 ,the mere existence of this state1 is all the information which we could originally have received from it1 if it had been excited previously to our sensations of a different class4 ,but1 with our present knowledge1 it seems immediately to communicate to us much more important information4 ,we are not merely sensible of the particular feeling1 but we refer it1 in the instant1--almost in the same manner1 as if the reference itself were involved in the sensation1--to a rose1 hemlock1 honeysuckle1 or any other substance1 agreeable or disagreeable2 the immediate presence1 or vicinity of which we have formerly found to be attended with this particular sensation4 ,the power of making the reference1 however1 is unquestionably derived from a source different from that1 from which the mere sensation is immediately derived4 ,we must previously have seen1 or handled1 the rose1 the hemlock1 the honeysuckle2 or if1 without making this particular reference1 we merely consider our sensation of smell as caused by some unknown object external to our mind1 we must at least have previously seen or handled some other bodies1 which excited1 at the same time1 sensations analogous to the present4 ,if we had been endowed with the sense of smell1 and with no other sense whatever1 the sensations of this class would have been simple feelings of pleasure or pain1 which we should as little have ascribed to an external cause1 as any of our spontaneous feelings of joy or sorrow1 that are equally lasting or equally transient4 ,even at present1 after the connexion of our sensations of a fragrance with the bodies which we term fragrant1 has been1 in a great measure1 fixed in our mind1 by innumerable reflections1 we still1 if we attend to the process of the reference itself1 are conscious of a suggestion of remembrance1 and can separate the sensation1 as a mere feeling of the mind1 from the knowledge of the object or external cause of the sensation1 which seems to us a subsequent state of the mind1 however close the succession may be4 ,indeed1 what is there which we can discover1 in the mere sensation of fragrance1 that is itself significant of solidity1 extension1 or what ever we may regard as essential to the existence of things without8 ,as a mere change in the form of our being1 it may suggest to us the necessity of some cause or antecedent of the change4 ,but it is far from implying the necessity of a corporeal cause2--any more than such a direct corporeal cause is implied in any other modification of our being1 intellectual or moral1--in our belief1 for example1 of the most abstract truth1 at which we may have arrived by a slow developement of proposition after proposition1 in a process of internal reflective analysis1--or in the most refined and sublime of our emotions1 when1 without thinking of any one of the objects around1 we have been meditating on the ,divinity who formed them--himself the purest of spiritual existences4 ,our belief of a system of external things1 then1 does not1 as far as we can judge from the nature of the feelings1 arise from our sensations of smell1 more than from any of our internal pleasures or pains2 but we class our sensations of smell as sensations1 because we have previously believed in a system of external things1 and have found1 by uniform experience1 that the introduction of some new external body1 either felt or seen by us1 was the antecedent1 of those states of mind which we denominate sensations of smell1 and not of those internal pains or pleasures1 which we therefore distinguish from them1 as the spontaneous affections of our own independent mind4 ,,on ,,taste4 ,with the organ of taste you are all sufficiently acquainted4 ,in considering the phenomena1 which it presents1 in the peculiar sensations that directly flow from it1 it is necessary to make some little abstraction from the sensation of touch1 which accompanies them1 in consequence of the immediate application of the tangible sapid body to the organ2 but the sensations1 thus co-existing1 are so very different in themselves1 as to be easily distinguishable4 ,when the organ of taste is in a sound state1 the application of certain substances produces1 immediately1 that change or affection of the sensorial organs1 which is attended with a corresponding change or affection of the sentient mind4 ,in our present state of knowledge1 we immediately refer this simple sensation1 to something1 which is bitter1 or sweet1 or acrid1 or of some other denomination of sapid quality2 and we have no hesitation1 in classing the sensations as sensations1--effects of laws of action that belong jointly to matter and mind1--not as feelings that arise in the mind1 from its own independent constitution4 ,but1 if we attend sufficiently to the feeling that arises in the case of taste1 we shall find1 however immediate the reference to a sapid body may seem to be1 that it is truly successive to the simple sensation1 and is the mere suggestion of former experience1 when a body previously recognized by us as an external substance1 was applied to our organ of taste2--in the same manner1 as1 when we see ashes and dying embers1 we immediately infer some previous combustion1 which we could not have inferred1 if combustion itself had been a phenomenon altogether unknown to us4 ,in the simple sensation which precedes the reference1--the mere pleasure of sweetness or the mere pain of bitterness--there is nothing which seems to mark more distinctly the presence of honey or wormwood1 or any similar external substance1 than in any of our joys or sorrows1 to which we have not given a name2 and there can be no doubt1 that1 if the particular feeling which we now term joy1 and the particular feeling which we now term sorrow1 had been excited1 whenever we knew1 from other sources1 that certain bodies were applied to the tongue1 we should have considered these internal feelings as sensations1 in the strict sense of the word1 precisely in the same manner1 as we now regard1 as sensations1 the feeling which we term sweetness1 and the feeling which we term bitterness1 because1 like these sensations1 they could not have failed to suggest to us1 by the common influence of association1 the presence and direct coincidence of the object without4 ,in the case of taste1 therefore1 as in the case of smell1 we could not1 from the simple sensations1--if these alone had been given to us1--have derived any knowledge of an external world1 of substances extended and resisting2 but we consider them as sensations1 in the strict philosophic meaning of the term1 because we have previously acquired our belief of an external world4 ,it may be remarked of these two classes of sensations1 now considered1 that they have a greater mutual resemblance1 than our sensations of any other kind4 ,it is only a blind man who thinks1 that what is called scarlet is like the sound of a trumpet2 but there are tastes which we consider as like smells1 in the same manner as we consider them to be like other tastes2 and1 if we had not acquired a distinct knowledge of the seats of our different organs1 and had yet known that smells and tastes arose from external causes acting upon some one or other of these1 we should probably have been greatly puzzled1 in many cases1 in our attempt to refer the particular sensation to its particular organ4 ,in considering the advantages which we derive from our organs of smell and taste1 the mere pleasures which they directly afford1 as a part of the general happiness of life1 are to be regarded1 from their frequent occurrence1 as of no considerable amount4 ,the fragrance of the fields enters largely into that obscure but delightful group of images1 which rise in our minds on the mere names of spring1 summer1 the country1 and seems to represent the very form of ethereal purity1 as if it were the breath of heaven itself4 ,if we imagine all the innumerable flowers which nature pours out1 like a tribute of incense to the ,god who is adorning her1 again to be stripped1 in a single moment1 of their odour1 though they were to retain all their bright diversities of colouring1 it would seem as if they were deprived of a spirit which animates them1--how cold and dead would they instantly become1--and how much should we lose of that vernal joy1 which renders the season of blossoms almost a new life to ourselves4 8,in vain the golden ,morn aloft ,waves her dew-bespangled wing2 ,with vermeil cheek and whisper soft ,she woos the tardy ,spring2 ,till ,april starts1 and calls around ,the sleeping fragrance from the ground10#ge ,it is by this delightful quality that the tribes of vegetable life seem to hold a sort of social and spiritual communion with us4 ,it is1 as it were1 the voice with which they address us1 and a voice which speaks only of happiness4 ,to him who walks among the flowers which he has tended1 8,each odoriferous leaf1 ,each opening blossom1 freely breathes abroad ,its gratitude1 and thanks him with its sweets40 ,the pleasures of the sense of taste1 in the moderate enjoyment of which there is nothing reprehensible1 are1 in a peculiar manner1 associated with family happiness4 ,to have met frequently at the same board1 is no small part of many of the delightful remembrances of friendship2 and to meet again at the same board1 after years of absence1 is a pleasure that almost makes atonement for the long and dreary interval between4 ,in some half-civilized countries1 in which the influence of simple feelings of this kind is at once more forcible in itself1 and less obscured in the confusion of ever varying frivolities and passions1 this hospitable bond forms1 as you well know1 one of the strongest ties of mutual obligation1 sufficient often to check the impetuosity of vindictive passions which no other remembrance could1 in the moment of fury1 restrain4 ,had there been no pleasure attached to a repast1 independent of the mere relief from the pain of hunger1 the coarse and equal food would probably have been taken by each individual apart1 and might even1 like our other animal necessities1 have been associated with feelings which would have rendered solitude a duty of external decorum4 ,it would not be easy1 even for those who have been accustomed to trace a simple cause through all its remotest operations1 to say1 how much of happiness1 and how much even of the warm tenderness of virtue1 would be destroyed1 by the change of manners1 which should simply put an end to the social meal2 that meal which now calls all the members of a family to suspend their cares for a while1 and to enjoy that cheerfulness1 which is best reflected from others1 and which can be permanent only when it is so reflected1 from soul to soul1 and from eye to eye4 ,one very important advantage1 more directly obvious than this1 and of a kind which every one may be disposed more readily to admit1 is afforded by our senses of smell and taste1 in guiding our selection of the substances which we take as alimentary4 ,to the other animals1 whose senses of this order are so much quicker1 and whose instincts1 in accommodation to their want of general language1 and consequent difficulty of acquiring knowledge by mutual communication1 are providentially allotted to them1 in a degree1 and of a kind1 far surpassing the instincts of the slow but noble reflector man1 these senses seem to furnish immediate instruction as1 to the substances proper for nourishment1 to the exclusion of those which would be noxious4 ,to man1 however1 who is under the guardianship of affections more beneficial to him than any instinct of his own could be1 there is no reason to believe1 that they do this primarily1 and of themselves1 though1 in the state in which he is brought up1 instructed with respect to every thing noxious or salutary1 by those who watch constantly over him in the early period of his life1 and having1 therefore1 no necessity to appeal to the mere discrimination of his own independent organs1 and1 still more1 as in the artificial state of things1 in which he lives1 his senses are at once perplexed and palled1 by the variety and confusion of luxurious preparation1 it is not easy to say1 how far his primary instincts1--if it had not been the high and inevitable dignity of his nature to rise above these1--might1 of themselves1 have operated as directors4 ,but1 whatever their primary influence may be1 the secondary influence of his organs of taste and smell is not the less important4 ,when we have once completely learned what substances are noxious1 and what are salutary1 we then1 however similar they may be in their other sensible qualities1 discriminate these as often as they are again presented to us1 by that taste or smell1 which they affect with different sensations2 and our acquired knowledge has thus ultimately1 in guiding our choice1 the force and the vivacity of an original instinct4 ,,hearing4 ,in considering the phenomena of the sense of hearing1 to which ,i now proceed1 ,i may apply to them the same remark1 which has been already applied to the phenomena of the senses before considered4 ,they are classed by us1 as sensations1 merely in consequence of our previous belief in the existence of those external bodies1 the motion of which we have known to be followed by similar feelings4 ,our mind begins suddenly to exist in a certain state2 and we call this state joy or sorrow1 without supposing that it depends on the immediate presence of any external object4 ,it begins again to exist1 in a different state1 and we say1 that we hear a flute1 referring the feeling immediately to an external cause4 ,but there can be no doubt1 that1 in making this reference1 in the one case1 and not in the other1 we are influenced by experience1 and by experience alone4 ,if we suppose ourselves endowed with the single sense of hearing1 and incapable therefore of having previously seen or felt the flute1 which is breathed before us1 or any other extended and resisting object whatever1 we may imagine the mere sound to recur1 innumerable times1 without discovering any mode by which it can give us more knowledge1 than we should receive from a similar recurrence of any internal joy or sorrow4 ,that we should be able to refer it to a body1 such as we now mean1 when we speak of a flute1 is manifestly impossible2 since this implies knowledge of solidity1 and form1 and colour1 which could not be acquired without touch and sight4 ,but there seems even no reason to think1 that we should refer it to any external cause whatever1 unless1 indeed1 such a reference necessarily accompanied every feeling1 which we know is far from being the case1 since we have many internal pleasures1 not more like to each other1 than they are to the sound of a flute1 which we do not refer to any thing1 separate or separable1 from the constitution of our own mind4 ,in hearing1 therefore1 as in taste and smell1 we do not derive from its sensations our knowledge of things external1 but1 in consequence of our knowledge of things external1 we regard these feelings1 as sensations1 in the common philosophic meaning of that term4 ,simple as our sense of hearing may seem1 it affords a striking specimen of that almost infinite variety1 which is not inconsistent with the closest resemblance2 and the notion which we may form of the innumerable varieties of sound1 is perhaps not more vast1 when we attempt to wander over its boundless discrepancies1 than when we limit ourselves to its greatest similarities1 in a single word of a language1 or1 in that which we might be inclined at first to regard as simplicity itself1 a single musical tone4 8,a flute1 a violin1 a hautboy1 and a ,french horn10 it has been truly remarked1 8may all sound the same tone1 and be easily distinguishable4 ,nay1 if twenty human voices sound the same note1 and with equal strength1 there will still be some difference4 ,the same voice1 while it retains its proper distinctions1 may be varied many ways1 by sickness or health1 youth or age1 leanness or fatness1 good or bad humour4 ,the same words1 spoken by foreigners and natives1 nay1 by different provinces of the same nation1 may be very easily distinguished40#gf ,when we speak of the value of this sense as a part of our mental constitution1 it is enough to say1 that it is to it we are indirectly indebted for the use of verbal language1--that power so peculiarly distinctive of man1 that1 in the poetical phraseology of one celebrated country1 it gave him his name as a divider of the voice1 or1 in other words1 an utterer of articulate sounds4 ,if we consider speech simply as a medium of the reciprocal expression of present feelings to the little society of citizens and friends of which we are a part1 even in this limited view1 of what inestimable value does it appear6 ,to communicate to every one around us1 in a single moment1 the happiness which we feel ourselves1--to express the want1 which we have full confidence1 will be relieved as soon as it is known1--or to have the still greater privilege of being ourselves the ministers of comfort to wants1 which otherwise could not have been relieved by us1 because they could not have been discovered1--when the heart which we love is weighed down with imaginary grief1 to have it in our power1 by a few simple sounds1 to convert anguish itself into rapture1--these are surely no slight advantages2 and yet compared with the benefit which it affords to man as an intellectual being1 even these are in considerable4 ,to be without language1 spoken or written1 is almost to be without thought2 and if1 not an individual only1 living among his fellows whose light may be reflected upon him1 but our whole race had been so constituted1 it is scarcely possible to conceive that beings1 whose instincts are so much less various and powerful than those of the other animals1 could have held over them that dominion1 which they now so easily exercise4 ,wherever two human beings1 therefore1 are to be found1 there language is4 ,we must not think1 in a speculative comparison of this sort1 of mere savage life2 for the rudest savages would be as much superior to a race of beings without speech1 as the most civilized nations at this moment are1 compared with the half-brutal wanderers of forests and deserts1 whose ferocious ignorance seems to know little more than how to destroy and be destroyed4 ,even these are still associated in tribes1 that concert together verbally their schemes of havoc and defence2 and employ1 in deliberating on the massacre of beings as little human as themselves1 or the plunder of a few huts1 that seem to contain nothing but misery and the miserable1 the same glorious instrument with which ,socrates brought wisdom down from heaven to earth1 and ,newton made the heavens themselves1 and all the wonders which they contain1 descend1 as it were to be grasped and measured by the feeble arm of man4 ,such are the benefits of language1 even in its fugitive state2 but the noblest of all the benefits which it confers1 is in that permanent transmission of thought1 which gives to each individual the powers and the wisdom of his species2 or1 rather1--for the united powers and wisdom of his species1 as they exist in myriads1 at the same moment with himself1 upon the globe1 would be comparatively a trifling endowment1--it gives him the rich inheritance of the accumulated acquisitions of all the multitudes1 who1 like himself1 in every preceding age1 have inquired1 and meditated1 and patiently discovered1 or by the happy inspiration of genius1 have found truths which they scarcely sought1 and penetrated1 with the rapidity of a single glance1 those depths of nature1 which the weak steps and dim torch-light of generations after generations had vainly laboured to explore4 ,by that happy invention1 which we owe indirectly to the ear1 the boundaries of time seem to be at once removed4 ,nothing is past2 for every thing lives1 as it were1 before us4 ,the thoughts of beings who had trod the most distant soil1 in the most distant period1 arise again in our mind1 with the same warmth and freshness as when they first awoke to life in the bosom of their author4 ,that system of perpetual transmigration1 which was but a fable1 as believed by ,pythagoras1--becomes reality when it is applied1 not to the soul itself1 but to its feelings4 ,there is then a true metempsychosis1 by which the poet and the sage1 in spreading their conceptions and emotions from breast to breast1 may be said to extend their existence through an ever-changing immortality4 ,who does not feel the justness of what ,lucan says1 when he speaks of the events of ,pharsalia1 and predicts the lively feelings with which they are afterwards to be regarded1 not as past1 and therefore indifferent1 but as present1 and almost future3 8,hc et apud seras gentes1 populosque nepotum1 ,sive sua tantum venient in secula fama1-- ,sive aliquid magnis nostri quoque cura laboris ,nominibus prodesse potest1--cum bella legentur1 ,spesque metusque simul1 perituraque vota movebunt2 ,attonitique omnes1 veluti venientia fata ,non transmissa legent1 et adhuc tibi magni favebunt40#gg 8,there is without all doubt10 as has been justly observed1 8a chain of the thoughts of human kind1 from the origin of the world down to the moment at which we exist1--a chain not less universal than that of the generation of every being that lives4 ,ages have exerted their influence on ages2 nations on nations2 truths on errors2 errors on truths40 ,in conformity with this idea of the generation of thought1 ,i may remark1 that we are in possession of opinions1--which1 perhaps1 regulate our life in its most important moral concerns1 or in all its intellectual pursuits1--with respect to which1 we are as ignorant of the original authors1 by whom they have been silently and imperceptibly transmitted to us from mind to mind1 as we are ignorant of those ancestors1 on whose existence in the thousands of years which preceded our entrance into the world1 our life itself has depended1 and without whom1 therefore1 we should not have been4 ,the unlimited transmission of thought1 which the invention of language allows1 brings the universe of mind into that point of view1 in which an eloquent living ,french author has considered the physical universe1--as exhibiting1 at once1 all its splendid varieties of events1 and uniting1 as it were1 in a single moment the wonders of eternity4 8,combine10 says he1 8by your imagination1 all the fairest appearances of things4 ,suppose that you see1 at once1 all the hours of the day1 and all the seasons of the year1--a morning of spring and of autumn1--a night brilliant with stars1 and a night obscure with clouds1--meadows1 enamelled with flowers1--fields1 waving with harvest1--woods1 heavy with the frosts of winter1--you will then have a just notion of the spectacle of the universe4 ,is it not wondrous1 that while you are admiring the sun1 who is plunging beneath the vault of the west1 another observer is beholding him as he quits the regions of the east1--in the same instant reposing1 weary1 from the dust of the evening1 and awaking1 fresh and youthful1 in the dews of morn6 there is not a moment of the day1 in which the same sun is not rising1 shining in his zenith1 and setting on the world6 or1 rather1 our senses abuse us1 and there is no rising1 nor setting1 nor zenith1 nor east1 nor west2 but all is one fixed point1 at which every species of light is beaming at once from the unalterable orb of day40 ,in like manner1--,if ,i may venture to consider the phenomena of the mind in the same fanciful point of view1--every moment may be said to be exhibiting the birth1 and progress1 and decay of thought4 ,infancy1 maturity1 old age1 death1 are mingled1 as it were1 in one universal scene4 ,the opinions which are perishing in one mind1 are rising in another2 and often1 perhaps1 at the last fading ray of the flame of genius1 that may have almost dazzled the world with excess of brilliancy1 some star may be kindling1 which is to shine upon the intellectual universe with equal light and glory3--#gh 8,flowers of the sky6 ye1 too1 to age must yield1 ,frail1 as your silken sisters of the field6 ,star after star from ,heaven's high arch shall rush2 ,suns sink on suns1 and systems systems crush2 ,headlong1 extinct1 to one dark centre fall1 ,and ,death1 and ,night1 and ,chaos1 mingle all6 ----,till1 o'er the wreck1 emerging from the storm1 ,immortal ,nature lifts her changeful form2 ,mounts from her funeral pyre on wings of flame1 ,and soars1 and shines1--another1 and the same40 ,such are the benefits resulting from that happiest of all inventions1 which we may be said to owe to our sense of ,hearing1--if1 indeed1 it be an invention of man1 and not rather1 as many have thought1 a coeval power1 bestowed on him by his provident ,creator at the very moment which gave him life4 ,but still1 whether original or invented1 the ear must equally have been its primary recipient4 ,we have seen1 in the view which we have taken of it1 that of our more social intercourse it constitutes the chief delight1--giving happiness to hours1 the wearying heaviness of which must otherwise have rendered existence an insupportable burthen2 and that1 in its more important character1 as fixed1 in the imperishable records which are transmitted1 in uninterrupted progression1 from the generation which passes away to the generation that succeeds1 it gives to the individual man1 the product of all the creative energies of mankind2 extending1 even to the humblest intellect1 which can still mix itself with the illustrious dead1 that privilege1 which has been poetically allotted to the immortality of genius1 of being 8the citizen of every country1 and the contemporary of every age40 ,,footnotes3 #gd ,gray de ,principiis ,cogitandi1 ,lib4 ,i4 v4 #acj-acd4 #ge ,gray on the ,pleasure arising from ,vicissitude1 ,stanza ,i4--,in v4 i4 the original has1 instead of 8in vain10 8now40 #gf ,reid's ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 c4 iv4 sect4 #a4 #gg ,pharsalia1 lib4 vii4 v4 #bjg--bac4 #gh ,darwin's ,botanic ,garden1 ,canto ,,iv4 v4 #cga--chj4 ,,lecture ,,xxi4 ,,on ,,hearing--,,continued4 ,gentlemen1 after considering1 in a former ,lecture1 some states of mind1 which arise immediately from affections of our nerves1 and which1 therefore1 ,i can see no reason for classing apart from our other sensations1 ,i proceeded1 in my last ,lecture1 to consider the feelings1 which are more commonly termed sensations1 beginning with the most simple of these1 in the order of smell1 taste1 and hearing4 ,in the elucidation of these1 my great object was to show1 that there is nothing1 in the mere states of mind1 that constitutes the sensations of fragrance1 sweetness1 sound1 which could have led us to ascribe them to corporeal objects as their causes1--more than in any of our internal joys or sorrows1--if we had had no other means of acquiring knowledge of those causes1 than are afforded by the sensations themselves1--that1 in short1 we consider them as sensations1 or external affections of the mind1 because we have previously believed in an external world1--not that we believe in an external world1 merely because we have had those particular sensations4 ,the various advantages1 which these three senses afford1 ,i endeavoured to point out to you2 and1 in particular occupied a great part of my ,lecture1 in illustrating the advantages for which we are indebted to our organ of hearing1 as the medium of language1 and by it1 more or less directly1 not of the high acquisitions of science and civilization only1 but of the rudest forms of social communication1 and almost of social existence4 ,after the remarks on this advantage received from language1 which is unquestionably1 and beyond all comparison1 the most inestimable benefit which the sense of hearing affords1--it would be improper to omit wholly the mention of the pleasure1 which we receive from it1 as a source of musical delight1--of that expression of feeling1 which itself1 almost like verbal discourse1 may be said to be a language1 since it is the utterance of thought and emotion from heart to heart1--but which has a voice1 as independent of the mere arbitrary forms of speech1 as the tears of gratitude1 or the smiles of love1 that may indeed1 give eloquence to words1 but require no words to render them eloquent4 ,though1 when very strictly considered1 even the pure1 and almost spiritual delight of music1 may perhaps be counted only a pleasure of sense1 it yet approaches1 by so many striking analogies1 to the nature of our intellectual enjoyments1 that it may almost be said to belong to that class2 and though1--relatively to minds that are capable of enjoyments more truly intellectual1--it is to be considered as a mere pastime or relaxation1 it assumes a far higher character1 in its relation to the general pleasures of common minds1 and may be said1 at least1 to be the intellectual luxury of those1 who are incapable of any other luxury1 that deserves so honourable a name4 ,and it is well1 that there should be some intermediate pleasure of this sort1 to withdraw for a while the dull and the sensual1 from the grosser existence in which they may be sunk1 and to give them some glimpses1 at least1 of a state of purer enjoyment1 than that which is to be derived from the sordid gains1 and sordid luxuries1 of common life4 ,of the influence1--whether salutary or injurious1--which music has upon the general character1--when cultivated1 to great refinement1 and so universally as almost to become a part of the habit of daily social life1--it is not1 at present1 the place to speak4 ,but of its temporary influence1 as a source of tranquillizing delight1 there can be no doubt1--nor1 perhaps too1 of its occasional efficacy1 in exciting emotions of a stronger kind1 when peculiar circumstances may have predisposed to them in a very high degree4 ,but there can be as little doubt1 that by far the greater number of anecdotes of this kind1 which have been handed down in ancient history1 are as fabulous1 as the existence of that god of music1 to whose miraculous influence alone1 they could1 with any decent appearance of epic or dramatic truth1 have been ascribed4 8,hear1 how ,timotheus' varied lays surprise1 ,and bid alternate passions fall and rise2 ,while at each change1 the son of ,lybian ,jove ,now burns with glory1 and then melts with love1-- ,now his fierce eyes with sparkling fury glow1 ,now1 sighs steal out1 and tears begin to flow2 ,persians and ,greeks like turns of nature found1 ,and the world's victor stood subdued--by sound60#gi ,on these lines1 which allude to the celebrated ode of ,dryden1--who adapted1 with most happy application1 to the burning of the ,persian palace1 an anecdote recorded of the power of ,timotheus over the same great warrior1 on another occasion1--,i may remark1 by the way1 what influence the accidental composition of this ode has had1 in giving almost a sort of dignity to the very madness of the act which it records4 ,it is impossible for us1--even though we knew well how fictitious is the circumstance attached to it1--not to look upon the action1 in a different light1 from that in which we should have viewed it1 if we had read only the historical account of it1 as originating in a drunken debauch1 at the instigation of a drunken prostitute4 ,such is the influence of genius4 ,its power extends not over the present and the future merely1 but1 in some measure1 also over the past1 which might have seemed fixed forever4 ,in spite of our conviction1 we look upon an action of ,alexander differently1 because an individual existed1 many centuries after him1 and in a country which would then have been justly counted barbarous1 by the very barbarians whom he overcame4 8,ebrio scorto de tanta re ferente sententiam1 unus et alter1 et ipsi mero onerati1 assentiunt3 ,rex quoque fuit avidior quam patientior4 #8,quin igitur ulcisimur ,grciam1 et urbi faces subdimus8' ,omnes incaluerant mero2 itaque surgunt temulenti ad incendendam urbem1 cui armati1 pepercerant40#hj ,of the wonders1 which were said1 in ancient times1 to have been performed1 on the mind and body1 by a judicious adaptation of musical sounds1 to the nature of the particular case1 intellectual1 moral1 or corporeal1 ,i might read many histories to you1 from the original authors1 which would perhaps not be less truly ludicrous in the serious gravity of their narration1 than in the affected solemnity of the fictitious personage whose speech ,i am about to quote4 ,the experiment with which the quotation closes is1 it must be allowed1 a very powerful one1 and certainly could not have been more successful1 in the hands of ,timotheus himself4 8,the bare mention of music threw ,cornelius into a passion4 #8,how can you dignify1' quoth he1 #8this modern fiddling with the name of music8 ,will any of your best hautboys encounter a wolf now-a-days with no other arms but their instruments1 as did that ancient piper ,pythocaris8 ,have ever wild boars1 elephants1 deer1 dolphins1 whales1 or turbots1 shewed the least emotion at the most elaborate strains of your modern scrapers1 all which have been1 as it were tamed and humanized by ancient musicians8 ,whence proceeds the degenerancy of our morals8 ,is it not from the loss of ancient music1 by which 7says ,aristotle7 they taught all the virtues8 ,else might we turn ,newgate into a college of ,dorian musicians1 who should teach moral virtues to those people4 ,whence comes it that our present diseases are so stubborn8 whence is it that ,i daily deplore my sciatical pains8 ,alas6 because we have lost their true cure1 by the melody of the pipe4 ,all this was well known to the ancients1 as ,theophrastus assures us1 7whence ,clius calls it loca dolentia decantare7 only indeed some small remains of this skill are preserved in the cure of the ,tarantula4 ,did not ,pythagoras stop a company of drunken bullies from storming a civil house1 by changing the strain of the pipe to the sober spondaeus8 and yet your modern musicians want art to defend their windows from common nickers4 ,it is well known that when the ,lacedaemonian mob were up1 they commonly sent for a ,lesbian musician to appease them1 and they immediately grew calm as soon as they heard ,terpander sing3 ,yet ,i don't believe that the ,pope's whole band of music1 though the best of this age1 could keep his holiness's image from being burnt on a fifth of ,november4' #8,nor would ,terpander himself1' replied ,albertus1 #8at ,billingsgate1 nor ,timotheus at ,hockley in the ,hole1 have any manner of effect1 nor both of them together bring ,horneck to common civility4' #8,that's a gross mistake1' said ,cornelius1 very warmly1 #8and to prove it so1 ,i have here a small lyra of my own1 framed1 strung1 and tuned after the ancient manner4 ,i can play some fragments of ,lesbian tunes1 and ,i wish ,i were to try them upon the most passionate creatures alive4'--#8,you never had a better opportunity1' says ,albertus1 #8for yonder are two apple-women scolding1 and just ready to uncoif one another4' ,with that ,cornelius1 undressed as he was1 jumps out into his balcony1 his lyra in hand1 in his slippers1--with a stocking upon his head1 and waist-coat of murrey-coloured satin upon his body3 ,he touched his lyra with a very unusual sort of an harpegiatura1 nor were his hopes frustrated4 ,the odd equipage1 the uncouth instrument1 the strangeness of the man and of the music1 drew the ears and eyes of the whole mob that were got about the two female champions1 and at last of the combatants themselves4 ,they all approached the balcony1 in as close attention as ,orpheus's first audience of cattle1 or that of an ,italian opera1 when some favourite air is just awakened4 ,this sudden effect of his music encouraged him mightily1 and it was observed he never touched his lyre in such a truly chromatic and enharmonic manner as upon that occasion4 ,the mob laughed1 sung1 jumped1 danced1 and used many odd gestures1 all which he judged to be caused by the various strains and modulations4 #8,mark1' quoth he1 #8in this1 the power of the ,ionian1 in that1 you see the effect of the olian4' ,but in a little time they began to grow riotous1 and threw stones2 ,cornelius then withdrew4 #8,brother1' said he1 #8do you observe ,i have mixed unawares too much of the ,phrygian8 ,i might change it to the ,lydian1 and soften their riotous tempers3 ,but it is enough3 learn from this sample to speak with veneration of ancient music4 ,if this lyre in my unskilful hands can perform such wonders1 what must it not have done in those of a ,timotheus or a ,terpander8' ,having said this he retired with the utmost exultation in himself1 and contempt of his brother2 and1 it is said1 behaved that night with such unusual haughtiness to his family1 that they all had reason to wish for some ancient ,tibicen to calm his temper40#ha ,that1 in enlightened countries1 so many wonders should have been related and credited1--if no phenomena that could justify them were truly observed1--may perhaps on first reflection1 appear so unaccountable1 as almost to induce belief of the wonders themselves1 as less inexplicable than the very credit which was given to them4 ,but it must be remembered1 that1 in all ages1 and even in countries of philosophers1 there is a very large fund of credulity in man1--which yields1 very readily1 to every thing that is not absolutely impossible1 and which is even not very nice1 in estimating what is impossible1--leaning always1 whenever there is the slightest doubt on this point1 with a very favourable inclination to the side of the possibility2--and1 in the second place1 that the phenomena of music are precisely of a kind1 which gives this credulity the widest scope4 ,they are pleasing in themselves1 and of a kind therefore1 on which it is gratifying to the imagination to dwell--their influence on the mind is felt in a very high and wonderful degree1 even without any fabulous addition2--they are produced by instruments1 which seem1 in their sensible appearance1 so little adequate to the production of them1 that the result is almost like the effect of supernatural agency1 to which we know not how to give any limits2--and1 when a little mystery is once admitted1 the imagination1 which has fairly got over the difficulty of this first admission1 is not very scrupulous afterwards as to degrees1 but is sufficiently ready of itself to admit a great deal more1 without pausing to consider its exact amount4 ,the phenomena of music1 in addition to their general interest1 are truly worthy1 in another respect1 of our astonishment1 from that striking diversity of organic power in the perception of melody and still more of harmony which they exhibit in different individuals1 in whom all other circumstances are apparently the same1--a diversity which has often attracted the attention of philosophers1 and has led even those who have no great tendency to speculation of any kind1 to wonder at least1 which is the first step of all philosophizing4 ,in the present instance1 however1 unfortunately1 this first step is the only step which philosophers have been able to take4 ,they have been obliged to desist1 after all their efforts to proceed farther1 and to submit to share1 and even to acknowledge that they share1 the ignorance of the vulgar4 ,if1 indeed1 the want of musical ear had involved either a general defect of hearing1 or a general slowness of discrimination in other cases of nice diversity1 the wonder would not have been great4 ,but those1 who are without ear for music1 perceive as readily as others1 the faintest whisper2--they distinguish like them1 the faintest shades of difference in the mere articulations of sound which constitute the varieties of language1 nor the articulations only1 but the differences also of the mere tones of affection or displeasure1 grief or gaiety1 which are so strikingly analogous to the varied expression of musical feeling2--and their power of discrimination in every other case1 in which the judgment can be exercised1 is not less perfect4 ,nay1--to increase still more the difficulty1--they are often as sensible1 as others1 of the beauty of series of tones of a different kind2 and some of our best poets and declaimers1--who of course must have had a quick discernment of metrical rhythm1 and of the melody of elocution1--have yet been incapable of distinguishing the musical relations of sounds1 as reciprocally high or low1--the melody that results from them in certain successions1 and the harmony or the discord of their union4 ,that it depends1 chiefly1 or perhaps entirely1 on the structure or state of the mere corporeal organ of hearing1--which is of a kind1 it must be remembered1 peculiarly complicated1 and therefore susceptible of great original diversity in the parts1 and relations of the parts that form it1 is very probable2 though the difference of the separate parts themselves1 or of their relations to each other1 may1 to the mere eye1 be so minute1 as never to be discovered by dissection1--thus leaving1 to every future race of inquirers1 the same difficulty which has perplexed ourselves1 and the same impossibility of overcoming it4 ,in the sense of vision1 ,i may remark1 there is a species of defect1 very analogous to the want of musical ear1--a defect1 which consists in the difficulty1 or rather the incapacity1 of distinguishing some colours from each other--and colours which1 to general observers1 seem of a very opposite kind4 ,as the want of musical ear implies no general defect of mere quickness of hearing1 this visual defect1 in like manner1 is to be found in persons1 who are yet capable of distinguishing1 with perfect accuracy1 the form1 and the greater or less brilliancy of the coloured object2--and ,i may remark too1 in confirmation of the opinion1 that the want of musical ear depends on causes not mental but organic2 that1 in this analogous case1 some attempts1 not absolutely unsuccessful1 have been made1 to explain the apparent confusion of colours1 by certain peculiarities of the external organ of sight4 ,though the one case1 however1 were to throw no light upon the other1 it is still gratifying to philosophers1 to have a case at all analogous1 to which1 when they are weary of considering what has baffled all their endeavours to explain it1 they may have the comfort of turning away their attention1 without the mortification of seeming absolutely to fly from the subject4 ,such is the strange constitution of our nature1 that merely to have another difficulty presented to us1 though it may yet be absolutely unsurmountable in itself1--if only it have some slight resemblance to a former difficulty1--seems to us almost as if we had succeeded in explaining the first2--and each difficulty1 by a very convenient transposition1 which our pride knows well how to make1 supplies1 according as we may have been considering the one rather than the other1 the place of explanation to that which is afterwards to explain it1 no less clearly1 in its turn4 ,in considering sound relatively to its external cause1 we give the name of vibration to the successive pulses1 or alternate approaches and recessions of the particles of the elastic sounding body2 and the word is a very convenient one for expressing this series4 ,but still it may be necessary to warn you1 that the word1 though single1 is not the less expressive of a plurality of states1 which have no other unity1 than as they are comprehended in this single word1--a word1 like many other single words1 by which we express the combination of various objects1 or invented by us1 merely to aid our weakness1 that is incapable1 without such helps1 of conceiving or remembering even a small part of that wide series of physical changes1 which we are able to discover in the universe1 if each event of the series were to be distinguished by a peculiar name4 ,this mere aid of our weakness1 however1 we are apt1 by a very absurd1 but a very general fallacy1 to consider as something1 much more dignified in its nature than a mere arbitrary verbal abbreviation1--as truly an explanation of the very phenomena1 or series of phenomena1 which it simply designates4 ,you must not flatter yourselves1 however1 that you have advanced the slightest step1 in explaining the connexion of sound with the pulses of air1 when you have merely invented a brief term for those successive pulses1 and ascribed the sound to vibration2 you have1 indeed1 given a name to a series of corpuscular phenomena1 but you have not discovered any thing additional to the phenomena themselves1 which can be considered as explanatory to the changes produced4 ,what1 then1 is truly meant1 when it is said1 that1 for producing the mental affection1 which constitutes hearing1 some previous vibration is necessary8 ,it certainly cannot mean1 as ,i have already remarked1 that the vibration is any thing in itself different from the series of physical events which it expresses1 however few or numerous these may be1 since it is only the name which we give to them1 when we consider them together2 nor can it mean that the direct cause of the sensation is any thing different from the one organic state immediately preceding the sensation1--a state which may1 indeed1 have resulted from a long sequence of prior organic states1 produced during the continued vibratory motion of the air1 but which is itself1 in its relation to the phenomenon which succeeds it1--that affection of the sentient mind which constitutes hearing1--to be considered independently of these prior states1 that have no other relation to the mind1 than as gradually inducing that ultimate organic state1 which is the state that is followed by sensation4 ,there is a part1 less or greater1 of the sensorial organ1 which must be affected1 in a certain manner1 before the sensation of hearing can take place2 and1 in vibration1 there is nothing but a repeated approach and secession of the vibrating particles4 ,if vibration1 then1 or a series of pulses1 be necessary1 it is evident that a corresponding series of changes in the organ is necessary2 that is to say1 there is no one instant1 at which the vibrating particles are in such a state relatively to the sensorial organ1 that if no previous change had been excited in the organ itself1 they could have produced in it immediately1 the precise state1 which is instantly followed by the mental affection of hearing4 ,there must1 therefore1 be a series of changes1 in the sensorial organ itself1 the last of which only is followed by sensation4 ,the particles of the air1 or any other elastic medium1 for example1 must1 in their first appulse1 produce a certain state of the sensorial organ2 in their second appulse1 a different state1 by acting on an organ1 already affected in a certain manner2 in their third appulse1 a still different state2 and thus successively1 till1 at last1 they produce that particular definite state of the sensorial organ1 in consequence of which1 the mind becomes instantly sentient1--a state which could not have been produced by any single impulse of the particles on the unaffected organ1 because then vibration1 or a series of pulses1 would not have been necessary4 ,to this successive modification of states of an organ1 terminating in a particular result1 different from each of the prior states1 there are abundant analogies in the history of the mind1 and many in the phenomena of sensation itself4 ,one of the most remarkable of these is the production of the sensation of whiteness1 by the rapid revolution of a cylinder1 on which the separate prismatic colours1 and the separate colours only1 are painted1 in certain proportions2 each colour1 in this case1 acting on the organ already affected by a former colour1 till a sensation altogether different from the result of each of them when separate1 is their joint ultimate result1 the sensation of whiteness1 without any external object that is white4 ,in this way only1 by a series of progressive organic affections1 and not by any single affection1 can the vibration of an elastic medium1 as different from one simple unrepeated impulse1 terminate in the production of sound4 ,it is1 in short1 a name for this series of changes1 and nothing more4 ,if1 in a case so very obscure as that of musical ear1 in which all that is truly evident1 is1 that in different individuals1 there is a diversity of some kind or other--,i could permit myself to indulge any conjecture with respect to this diversity1--,i might perhaps1 be inclined to look to the view now given of the real nature of vibration1 and its progressive effects on the auditory part of our nervous system1 as furnishing some slight ground1 not1 indeed1 for any theory1 which is far too presumptuous a word1 but for the preference of one mere possibility1 to other mere possibilities1 which is all that can be hoped in any conjecture1 on so very dim and impalpable a subject4 ,we have seen that the series of pulses of the vibrating air1--if vibration1 or a series of pulses be necessary to sound1--must produce a series of changes in the sensorial organ1 which produce no corresponding affection of the mind1 till1 at last1 a state of the organ is produced1 which is attended with sensation4 ,this1 and this only1 can be meant1 when we speak of vibration as the antecedent of sound1--a series of organic changes1 and1 after this series1 an affection of the mind4 ,in such circumstances1 it is certainly more probable1 that the organ thus affected with a series of progressive changes1 does not pass instantly from the greatest change to the state in which it was originally1 before the first pulse1 but that it retains this state1 for a time1 however1 short1 or1 at least1 passes through some series of states1 in its gradual return1 so that1 if a new vibration be excited by the pulse of any sounding body1 before the organ of hearing have returned to its original state1 the effect may be supposed to be different from that which it would have been1 if the same vibration had been primarily communicated to the organ1 in its state of rest1 or in that state1 which1 from our want of a better word1 may be termed its state of rest4 ,the phenomena most analogous to these vibratory affections of the ear1 as depending on successive impulses1 are unquestionably the phenomena of titillation1 or rather1 to express what is so familiar and simple1 by a more homely and appropriate word1 the phenomena of tickling4 ,in this1 the great circumstance distinguishing musical feeling1 is to be found1 that the feeling arises not from the separate impressions1 but from their successions or co-existence4 ,when the palm of the hand is gently tickled1 as the finger passes rapidly and repeatedly over the palm1 the parts first affected are again affected with various degrees of pressure1 as the ear1 in melody1 is successively affected by repeated varieties of vibration2 and various parts of the organ of touch exist1 at the same moment1 in various states1 forming one joint result of sensation1 as1 in harmony1 various vibrations of the organ of hearing co-exist1 and blend together in one mingled delight4 ,to produce tickling1 a certain rapidity of succession is necessary2 for1 if the parts1 first affected1 have returned to their original state1 before other parts begin to be affected1 or themselves to be affected again1 the slow motion1 it is evident1 may be continued1 for any length of time1 without any effect1 different from that of simple pressure4 ,the quicker1 then1 the return of the parts may be to their original state1 the less will be the titillation2 and1 it is very probably1 a difference in this quickness of return1 which constitutes the difference of ticklishness1 so remarkable in different individuals1 who feel1 equally1 the light pressure of each separate touch4 ,that there is a difference of ticklishness1 in different persons1 you all know2 some being easily excited even to convulsive laughter1 by slight motions1 that scarcely produce any effect in others1 beyond that of the simple primary sensation of touch4 ,a person who is ticklish1 and a person who is not ticklish1 agree in receiving this first tactual sensation2 but they differ afterwards1 in this respect1 that when the same slight impulse is rapidly repeated1 on the same surface1 it produces a livelier effect than before1 in the one1 but not in the other4 ,the organ of the one who is not ticklish is in the same state1 or nearly in the same state1 when it receives the second1 third1 and fourth impression1 as when it received the first1 and no peculiar excitement1 therefore1 is produced4 ,the organ of the other1 more susceptible1 or more tenacious of the affection produced1 has not returned to its original state1 when the rapid impression is repeated1 and is1 therefore1 at every new impression1 affected in a different manner4 ,proceeding on the analogy of these phenomena1--of mere tickling1 with which ,i may suppose you to be all acquainted1--an analogy which1 striking as it is in many circumstances1 ,i readily own1 does not justify more than conjecture in the case to which ,i would apply it1--,i conceive it to be1 at least1 not absolutely impossible1 since a diversity of some kind1 there must be1 that in those who receive no pleasure from music1 as in those who are not ticklish1 there is a rapid return of the nervous organ1 after each separate affection1 to its original state2 that each separate touch or pressure in the one case1 and each separate tone in the other case1 produces its particular effect1--that effect which it would have produced in all1 if unaccompanied by any other tone in music1 or slight pressure in tickling1--but that a succession of these produces no effect different from that which each would have produced singly4 ,a certain interval is necessary for distinct hearing in every case2 and1 before this interval has passed1 the auditory nerves1 in this case1 may be imagined to be again quiescent1 or nearly quiescent4 ,i need not add1 that1 in an inquiry of this sort1 all which is necessary1 is to account for the mere original defect of pleasure2 since1 if the relations of notes1 as reciprocally high or low1 never gave any delight1 the ear1 having no object of interest in these successions1 would soon habitually neglect them1 and at length cease altogether to distinguish them1 attending only to the verbal meaning of sounds1 and not to their tone2 in the same manner1 as we pay little attention to another relative difference of voices as more or less loud1 unless when the difference is very considerable1 and not in those common differences of intensity which distinguish every voice in conversation from every other voice1--or as1 after living long in a province1 the dialect of which is distinguished by any accentual peculiarities1 we at last become unconscious of these1 and hear the words1 as it were1 stripped of their peculiarity of tone4 ,in what is termed the cultivation of a musical ear1 however1 we have not an analogy merely1 but a direct proof of this influence of habit4 ,that the ear may be improved by cultivation1 or1 in other words1 by nice attention to the differences of musical sound1 every one knows2 and if this attention can enable us1 even in mature life1 to distinguish sounds as different in themselves1 which1 but for the habitual attention1 we should have regarded as the same1 it may well be supposed1 that continued inattention1 from earliest infancy1 may render us insensible of musical relations still more obvious and precise1 than those which we have thus only learned to distinguish2 or1 which is the same thing1 that continued attention from infancy to slight musical differences of sound1--an attention which may be regarded as the natural effect of pleasure received1--may render us capable of distinguishing tones as very dissimilar1 the differences of which1 however obvious at present1 we should scarcely1 but for such original attentive discrimination1 have been able to detect4 ,what1 in comparison1 the refined musical ear of a performer1--almost every hour1 and every moment1 of whose life has been spent amid sounds1 8,untwisting all the chains1 that tie ,the hidden soul of harmony10-- is to a common musical ear1 that common musical ear may be to those in whom this discriminating skill seems to be wholly or nearly defective4 ,the refined musician1--who1 but for the long practice of his art1 would have shared that incapacity which now excites his wonder1--is astonished1 that persons of common ear do not distinguish the nice differences which appear to him almost as remarkable as those differences which they are capable of perceiving2 and the person of common musical ear only does the same thing1 when he is astonished that the less refined differences1 remarked by himself1 are not obviously distinguishable by all mankind1 or1 at least1 by all who have no deafness to incapacitate them from hearing the separate sounds4 ,the discrimination in both has depended on previous attention1 which has necessarily been greater in one case than in the other2 and what attention can we suppose to have been originally given1 if from the cause which ,i have ventured to state as a possible one in persons without musical ear1 no pleasure had originally been felt by them in any sequence of notes as successive1 and the whole value of sound been to them the meaning of which it was symbolically representative1 which1 accordingly1 they have learned to discriminate in every case1 as accurately as others4 ,i might follow out this speculation at much greater length2 but ,i have already dwelt too long on what is at best a conjecture1 and what1 perhaps1 even as a mere conjecture1 is founded only on a slight analogy4 ,after the examination of the phenomena of ,smell1 ,taste1 and ,hearing1 which are peculiarly simple1 ,i proceed to the consideration of ,senses1 which afford phenomena that are more complicated1 or1 at least1 which seem more complicated1 as considered in the mature state of the mind2 when the sensations that arise from one set of organs1 by frequent co-existence with sensations that arise from affections of other sets of organs1 are1 as it were1 blended with them in one compound perception1 and so permanently modified forever after1 that it is difficult in all cases1 and in many cases perhaps impossible1 to form any accurate notion of the sensations as they existed in their original elementary state4 ,since1 of the two senses of ,sight and ,touch1 that of ,sight1--as far1 at least1 as we are able1 by intellectual analysis at present to discover its original sensations1--is more simple1 and more analogous to the senses before considered1 ,i should be inclined1 on these accounts1 to proceed to the consideration of it1 previously to any inquiry into the sense of ,touch4 ,but this order1 though unquestionably the more regular1 if we had to consider only the original sensations of each organ1 would be attended with great inconvenience in considering their subsequent modified sensations2 since those of ,vision depend1 in a very great degree1 on the prior affections of ,touch1 with the nature of which1 therefore1 it is necessary for you to be acquainted in the first place4 ,i am aware1 indeed1 that1 in considering even ,touch1 ,i may sometimes find it necessary to refer1 for illustration to the phenomena of ,vision1 though these have not been considered by us1 and must1 therefore1 for the time1 be taken upon trust4 ,but when phenomena are at all complicated1 such occasional anticipations are absolutely unavoidable4 ,sensation1 indeed1 says ,aristotle1 is a straight line1 while intellect is a circle1-- 1 1--or to use the paraphrastic translation of ,cudworth1 in his treatise on ,immutable ,morality1 8,sense is of that which is without4 ,sense wholly gazes and gads abroad2 and1 therefore1 doth not know and comprehend its object1 because it is different from it4 ,sense is a line1 the mind is a circle4 ,sense is like a line1 which is the flux of a point running out from itself2 but intellect like a circle1 that keeps within itself40#hb ,that sense is not a circle is1 indeed1 true1 since it terminates in a point2 but far from being a straight line1 it is one of the most perplexing of curves1 and is crossed and cut by so many other curves1--into many of which it flows1 and unites with them completely1--that when we arrive at the extremity of the line1 it is almost impossible for us to determine with accuracy what curve it is1 which1 in the strange confusion of our diagram1 we have been attempting to trace from its initial point4 ,i proceed1 then1 to the consideration of the phenomena of the sense of ,,touch4 ,if priority of sensation alone were to be regarded1 the sense of touch might deserve to be considered in the first place2 as it must have been exercised long before birth1 and is probably the very feeling with which sentient life commences4 ,the act of birth1 in relation to the mind of the little stranger1 who is thus painfully ushered into the wide scene of the world1 is a series of feelings1 of this class2 and the first feeling which awaits him1 on his entrance1--in the change of temperature to which he is exposed1--is still to be referred to the same organ4 ,it is at this most important moment of existence1 when one dark and solitary life of months1 of which no vestige is afterwards to remain in the memory1 is finished1 and a new life of many years1--a life of sunshine and society1--is just beginning1 that1 in the figurative language of the author1 whom ,i am about to quote to you1 ,pain1 the companion of human life1 receives him on the first step of his journey1 and embraces him in his iron arms4 8,primas tactus agit partes1 primusque minut ,laxat iter ccum turb1 recipitque ruentem4 ,non idem huic modus est qui fratribus2 amplius ille ,imperium affectat senior1 penitusque medullis1 ,viceribusque habitat totis1 pellisque recentem ,funditur in telam1 et late per stamina vivit4 ,necdum etiam matris puer eluctatus ab alvo ,multiplices solvit tunicas1 et vincula rupit2 ,sopitus molli somno1 tepidoque liquore ,circumfusus adhuc2 tactus tamen aura lacessit ,jamdudum levior sensus1 animamque reclusit4 ,idque magis1 simul ac solitum blandamque calorem ,frigore mutavit cli1 quod verberat acri ,impete inassuetos artus2 tum svior adstat1 ,humanque comes vit ,dolor excipit2 ille ,cunctantem frustra et tremulo multa ore querentem ,corripit invadens1 ferreisque amplectitur ulnis40#hc ,it is at this moment1 so painful to himself1 that he is affording to another bosom1 perhaps the purest delight of which our nature is capable1 and has already kindled1 in a heart1 of the existence of which he is as ignorant1 as of the love which he excites in it1 that warmth of affection1 which is never1 but in the grave1 to be cold to him1 and to which1 in the many miseries that may await him1--in sorrow1 in sickness1 in poverty1--and perhaps too in the penitence of guilt itself1--when there is no other eye1 to whose kindness he can venture to look1 he is still to turn with the confidence1 that he has yet1 even on earth1 one friend1 who will not abandon him1--and who will still think of that innocent being1 whose eye1 before it was conscious of light1 seemed to look to her for the love and protection1 which were ready to receive him4 ,,footnotes3 #gi ,pope's ,essay on ,criticism1 v4 #cgd--cha4 #hj ,quintus ,curtius1 lib4 v4 cap4 #g4 #ha ,mart4 ,scrib4 ,book ,i4 c4 #g4 with some exclusions4 #hb ,page #ih1 #ii4 #hc ,gray de ,princip4 ,cogit4 lib4 i4 v4 #fd-hj4 ,,lecture ,,xxii4 ,,on ,,the ,,feelings ,,ascribed ,,to ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,touch1--,,and ,,analysis ,,of ,,these ,,feelings4 ,in my ,last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i finished the remarks which ,i had to offer1 on our sense of hearing2 and in the conclusion of it1 had begun the consideration of a very important order of our feelings1 those which belong to the sense of touch4 ,of these1 ,i may mention1 in the first place1 the sensations of heat and cold1--sensations that arise from affections of our nerves of touch1 or at least from affections of nerves1 which1 as equally diffused and intermingled with them1 it is impossible to distinguish from those which constitute our organ of touch1 the same wide surface rendering us sensible1 as it were1 at every point of warmth as of pressure4 ,i have also remarked to you1 how little analogy there is of our sensations of warmth1 to the other sensations commonly ascribed to this organ2 and the great difference of the feelings1 has led some physiologists to believe1 that the organs of sensations so different1 must themselves be different4 ,but even though the sensations were as dissimilar as is supposed1 there is no reason a priori to believe1--and to experience1 it is evident1 that1 in this case1 we cannot appeal1 so as to derive from it any ground for believing1--that sensations1 which are very different1 must arise from affections of different organs4 ,as far1 indeed1 as we can safely appeal to experience1 in this very case1 there are sensations which we never hesitate in referring to our tactual nerves1 as different from the more common sensations ascribed to touch1 as the sensation of warmth itself4 ,i allude to the pain of puncture or laceration of the skin4 ,indeed1 if the brain be ultimately the great organ of all our sensations1 it is evident that we must refer to affections of one sensorial organ1 not the various feelings of touch only1 but1 with them the still greater variety of feelings1 that constitute our sensations of smell1 taste1 sound1 and colour4 ,but are we indeed sure1 that there truly is that great dissimilarity supposed1 or may not our belief of it arise from our reference to touch of sensations that truly do not belong to it8 ,such1 at least1 is the opinion1 to which1 ,i think1 a nicer analysis will lead us4 ,the primary original feelings1 which we owe to our mere organ of touch1 ,i consider as of a kind1 all of which are far more analogous to the sensations of warmth1 or of pain on puncture1 than to the perceptions of form and hardness1 which are generally regarded as tangible4 ,before entering on the analysis1 however1 it will be necessary to consider1 what are the sensations which we are supposed to owe to this organ4 ,the sensations of heat and cold1--as received from our organ of touch1--we may almost lay out of account in our analytical inquiry4 ,it is unnecessary to dwell on them1 or even to repeat1 in application to them1 the argument1 which has been already applied more than once to the sensations before considered4 ,it is quite evident1 that1 in classing our warmth or chillness1 as a sensation1--and not as a feeling that has arisen spontaneously in the mind1--we are influenced by that experience1 which has previously given us the belief of objects external1--at least1 of our own corporeal frame1--and that1 if we had been unsusceptible of any other sensations1 than those of heat and cold1 we should as little have believed these to arise directly from a corporeal cause1 as any of our feelings of joy or sorrow4 ,the same remark may be applied to the painful sensations of puncture and laceration4 ,it is only to the other more important information ascribed to the sense of touch1 therefore1 that our attention is to be directed4 ,by touch1 we are commonly said to be made acquainted with extension1 magnitude1 divisibility1 figure1 motion1 solidity1 liquidity1 viscidity1 hardness1 softness1 roughness1 smoothness4 ,these terms1 ,i readily allow1 are very convenient for expressing notions of certain forms or states of bodies1 that are easily distinguishable4 ,but1 though specifically distinguishable1 they admit generically of very considerable reduction and simplification4 ,hardness and softness1 for example1 are expressive only of greater or less resistance1--roughness is irregularity of resistance1 when there are intervals between the points that resist1 or when some of these points project beyond others1--smoothness is complete uniformity of resistance1--liquidity1 viscidity1 are expressive of certain degrees of yieldingness to our effort1 which solidity excludes1 unless when the effort employed is violent4 ,all1 in short1 ,i repeat1 are only different species or degrees of that which we term resistance1 whatever it may be1 which impedes our continued effort1 and impedes it variously as the substances without are themselves various4 ,such is one order1 then1 of the feelings commonly ascribed to the sense which we are at present considering4 ,to proceed to the other supposed tangible qualities1 before included in our enumeration1--figure is the boundary of extension1 as magnitude is that which it comprehends2 and divisibility1 if we consider the apparent continuity of the parts which we divide1 is only extension under another name4 ,if we except motion1 therefore1 which is not permanent1 but accidental1--and the knowledge of which is evidently secondary to the knowledge which we acquire of our organs of sense1 before which the objects are said to move1 and secondary in a much more important sense1 as resulting not from any direct immediate organic state of one particular moment1 but from a comparison of sensations past and present1--all the information1 which we are supposed to receive primarily and directly from touch1 relates to modifications of resistance and extension4 ,though it is to the sense of touch1 however1 that the origin of the knowledge of these is generally ascribed1 ,i am inclined to think1 in opposition to this opinion1 that in both cases1 the reference is wrongly made1--that if we had the sense of touch only1 we should not be sensible of resistance1 nor1 ,i conceive1 even of extension1--and that we seem to perceive the varieties of extension and resistance immediately by touch only1 because the simple original tactual feeling has become representative of these1 in the same manner1 and for the same reason1 as we seem to perceive the varieties of distance immediately by the eye4 ,the sense of touch has unquestionably1 like all our other senses1 its own peculiar feelings1 though1 for the simple original feelings1 attached to the affections of this most extensive of organs1 we have unfortunately no name1 but that which is applied in popular1 and even in philosophic language1 to all the affections of the mind4 ,our joy or grief1 hope or fear1 love or hate1 ,i before remarked1 we term feelings1 as readily and frequently1 as we use this term to express our sensations of touch2 and that1 which1 however restricted in its original meaning1 is now the common name of our mental affections of every class1 has1 by this extension1 unfortunately1 become a very unfit one1 for distinguishing a limited order of those affections4 ,whatever be the term1 which we may use1 however1 there is1 and must be1 a sensation peculiar to touch1 without regard to the extent or quantity of the surface impressed1--as there is1 in colour1 a sensation peculiar to vision1 without regard to the extent of the portion of the retina on which the light may have fallen4 ,every physical point of our organ of touch1 when existing in a certain state1 is capable of inducing in the mind a peculiar feeling1 though no other physical point of the organ were affected1--as every physical point of the retina1 though but a single ray of light were admitted to the eye1 is capable of inducing in the mind a peculiar affection of vision2 and when many such physical points are affected together1 by some impressing surface1 the form of which we think that we discover immediately by touch1 it is from experience only that we can learn the vicinity of the physical points of our own tactual surface thus impressed1 and consequently the continued extension of the object which impresses them4 ,before we have so much knowledge of external things1 as to know even that we have any bodily organs whatever1--and it is of this state of absolute ignorance alone that we must think1 as often as we speculate on the information which our senses separately afford1--when we know as little of our bodily frame1 as of that material universe1 of which we know nothing1 we cannot1 by the very terms of this supposition1 know that different points of our organ of touch are affected in a certain manner1--that these points are contiguous to each other--and that the mass affecting these contiguous points must consequently itself be composed of points1 that are1 in like manner1 contiguous4 ,we know nothing of our organs--we know nothing of any external masses--but a certain feeling is excited in our mind2 and it is this simple feeling alone1 whatever it may be1 which constitutes the direct elementary sensation of touch1 though this simple elementary sensation1 like many other sensations1 may afterwards be so blended with other feelings1 as to become significant of them1 and even to seem to involve them1 as if originally and necessarily coexisting4 ,it is impossible for us at present1 indeed1 to have a body impressed on us1 without the immediate notion of something external and extended1--as it is impossible for one1 whose sight is perfect1 to open his eyes1 in the light of day1 without perceiving1 as it were immediately1 the long line of variegated landscape1 in the scenery before him3--the one impossibility is exactly equal to the other2 yet we know1 in the case of vision1 that all which we immediately perceive1 at the very moment1 when our eyes seem to comprehend the worlds of half infinity1 in the hemisphere on ,which we gaze1 is a small expanse of light1--if even1 which ,i greatly doubt1 there truly be1 in our original perceptions of this sense1 so much of extension1 as is implied in the smallest possible expanse4 ,in touch1 in like manner1 ,i conceive1 that the immediate sensation1 though1 like colour1 it may now seem inseparable from extension and outness1--if1 on the authority of ,berkeley1 ,i may venture to use that barbarous but expressive term1--was1 like colour1 originally distinct from them1--that1 by the mere original sensations of this organ1 in short1 we could as little know the existence of an impressing body1 as1 by the mere original sensations of vision1 we could learn that such a body existed at the extremity of the room in which we sit4 ,in defining sensation1 when we began our inquiry into its nature1 ,i stated it to be that affection of the mind1 which is immediately subsequent to the affection of certain organs1 induced by the action of external bodies2 and ,i admitted1 that1 in this definition two assumptions were made1--the existence of foreign changeable external bodies1 as separate from the mind1--and the existence of organs1 also separate from the mind1 and in relation to it truly external1 like other bodies1 but forming a permanent part of our corporeal frame1 and capable of being affected1 in a certain manner1 by the other bodies1 of which the existence was assumed4 ,as far as our analytical inquiry has yet proceeded1 these assumptions are assumptions still4 ,we have not been able to detect1 in the sensations considered by us1 more than in any of our internal pleasures or pains1 any circumstances that seem to be indicative of a material world without4 ,our analytical inquiry itself1 however1 even in attempting to trace the circumstances1 in which the belief originates1 must proceed on that very belief4 ,accordingly1 in examining our senses of smell1 taste1 and hearing1 ,i uniformly took for granted the existence of odoriferous1 sapid1 and vibrating bodies1 and considered merely1 whether the sensations1 excited by these1 were1 of themselves1 capable of communicating to us any knowledge of the external and independent existence of the bodies which excited them4 ,in the present stage of our inquiry1 ,i must1 in like manner1 take for granted the existence of bodies1 which act1 by their contiguity or pressure1 on our organ of touch1 as the odoriferous or sapid particles1 act on our nerves of smell and taste--not that ,i assume this belief1 as existing in the mind whose intellectual acquisitions are the subject of inquiry1--for1 in that case1 the inquiry itself would be superfluous4 ,i assume it1 merely as existing in the mind of us the inquirers1--and only1 because it is impossible1 without such an assumption to make the suppositions that are necessary for the inquiry4 ,all our language is at present adapted to a system of external things4 ,there is no direct vocabulary of scepticism2 and even the most cautious and philosophic inquirer1 therefore1 must often be obliged to express his doubt1 or his dissent1 in language that implies affirmation4 ,in the present case1 when we attempt to analyse our sensations1 it is impossible to speak of the circumstances in which the infant is placed1 or1 ,i may say even1 to speak of the infant himself1 without that assumption which we have been obliged to make4 ,the real existence of an external universe1 and the belief of that existence1 are1 however1 in themselves1 perfectly separate and distinct2 and it is not the existence of an external world1 which we are now endeavouring to establish as an object of belief4 ,we are only endeavouring1 in our analysis of the sensations afforded by our different organs1 to ascertain in what circumstance the belief arises4 ,there might be a world of suns and planets1 though there were no human being1 whose mind could be affected with belief of it2 and even the most zealous defenders of the reality of external nature must admit1 that1 though no created thing but ourselves were in existence1 our mind might still have been so constituted1 as to have the very series of feelings1 which form at present its successive phenomena1 and which are ascribed in no small number to the action of external things4 ,are the primary sensations derived from the organ of touch1 then1 of such a kind as to afford us that knowledge1 which they are supposed to give of things without8 ,let us imagine a being1 endowed with the sense of touch1 and with every other sense and faculty of our mind1 but not with any previous knowledge of his own corporeal frame1 or of other things external1--and let us suppose a small body1 of any shape1 to be pressed1 for the first time1 on his open hand4 ,whatever feelings mere touch can give1 directly of itself1 would of course be the same in this case1 as now1 when our knowledge is increased1 and complicated1 from many other sources4 ,let the body1 thus impressed1 be supposed to be a small cube1 of the same temperature with the hand itself1 that all consideration of heat or cold may be excluded1 and the feeling produced be as simple as possible4 ,what1 then1 may we suppose the consequent feeling to be8 ,it will1 ,i conceive1 be a simple feeling of the kind of which ,i have already spoken1 as capable of arising from the affection of a single point of our organ of touch1--a feeling that varies indeed with the quantity of pressure1 as the sensation of fragrance varies with the number of the odorous particles1 but involves as little the notion of extension1 as that notion is involved in the mere fragrance of a violet or a rose4 ,the connection of this original tactual feeling1 however1 with that of extension1 is1 now1 so indissoluble1 as1 indeed1 it could not fail to become1 in the circumstance in which it has uniformly arisen1 that it is almost impossible to conceive it as separate4 ,we may perhaps1 however1 make a near approach to the conception of it1 by using the gentle gradual pressure of a small pointed body1 which1 in the various slight feelings1 excited by it1--before it penetrate the cuticle1 or cause any considerable pain1--may represent1 in some measure1 the simple and immediate effect1 which pressure in any case produces1--exclusively of the associate feelings which it indirectly suggests4 ,such of you1 as have the curiosity to try the experiment1 with any small bodies1 not absolutely pointed1--such as the head of a pin1 or any body of similar dimensions1--will be astonished to feel1 how very slightly1 if at all1 the notion of extension or figure is involved in the feeling1 even after all the intimate associations of our experience2--certainly far less than the notion of longitudinal distance seems to us to be involved in the immediate affections of our sense of sight4 ,it is an experiment1 therefore1 which ,i must request you not to neglect to make4 ,but the pressure of such a large body1 as the cube1 which we have supposed to be pressed against our organ of touch1 now awakens very different feelings4 ,we perceive1 as it were immediately1 form and hardness4 ,may not1 then1 the knowledge of resistance and extension1 and consequently the belief of the essential qualities of matter1--be originally communicated by the affections of this organ8 ,the feeling of resistance1--to begin with this1--is1 ,i conceive1 to be ascribed1 not to our organ of touch1 but to our muscular frame1 to which ,i have already more than once directed your attention1 as forming a distinct organ of sense2 the affections of which1 particularly as existing in combination with other feelings1 and modifying our judgments concerning these1 7as in the case of distant vision1 for example17 are not less important than those of our other sensitive organs4 ,the sensations of this class1 are1 indeed1 in common circumstances1 so obscure1 as to be scarcely heeded or remembered by us2 but there is probably no contraction1 even of a single muscle1 which is not attended with some faint degree of sensation1 that distinguishes it from the contractions of other muscles1 or from other degrees of contraction of the same muscle4 ,i must not be understood1 however1 as meaning that we are able1 in this manner1 by a sort of instinctive anatomy1 to perceive and number our own muscles1 and when many of them are acting together1 as they usually do1 to distinguish each from each2 for1 till we study the internal structure of our frame1 we scarcely know more1 than that we have limbs which move at our will1 and we are altogether ignorant of the complicated machinery which is subservient to the volition4 ,but each motion of the visible limb1 whether produced by one or more of the invisible muscles1 is accompanied with a certain feeling1 that may be complex1 indeed1 as arising from various muscles1 but which is considered by the mind as one2 and it is this particular feeling1 accompanying the particular visible motion1--whether the feeling and the invisible parts contracted be truly simple or compound1--which we distinguish from every other feeling accompanying every other quantity of contraction4 ,it is as if a man1 born blind1 were to walk1 for the first time1 in a flower garden4 ,he would distinguish the fragrance of one parterre from the fragrance of another1 though he might be altogether ignorant of the separate odours united in each2 and might even consider as one simple perfume1 what was1 in truth1 the mingled product of a thousand4 ,obscure as our muscular sensations are in common circumstances1 there are other circumstances1--which ,i pointed out to you in treating before of this subject1--in which they make themselves abundantly manifest4 ,i need not refer to the diseased state of the muscles1 in which they become painfully sensible2 and ,i will admit1 that the reference to such a morbid state1 in which the structure may be supposed to be altered by the disease1 would perhaps scarcely be a fair one4 ,it is sufficient to refer to phenomena of which every one must have been conscious innumerable times1 and which imply no disease nor lasting difference of state4 ,what is the feeling of fatigue1 for example1 but a muscular feeling8 that is to say1 a feeling of which our muscles are as truly the organ1 as our eye or ear is the organ of sight or hearing4 ,when a limb has been long exercised1 without sufficient intervals of rest1 the repetition of the contraction of its muscles is accompanied1 not with a slight and obscure sensation1 but with one which amounts1 if it be gradually increased1 to severe pain1 and which before it arrives at this1 has passed progressively through various stages of uneasiness4 ,even when there has been no previous fatigue1 we cannot make a single powerful effort at any time1 without being sensible of the muscular feeling connected with this effort4 ,of the pleasure which attends more moderate exercise1 every one must have been conscious in himself1 even in his years of maturity1 when he seldom has recourse to it for the pleasure alone2 and must remember1 still more the happiness which it afforded him in other years1 when happiness was of less costly and laborious production than at present4 ,by that admirable provision1 with which nature accommodates the blessings which she gives1 to the wants that stand in need of them1 she has1 in that early period1--when the pleasure of mental freedom1 and the ambitions of busy life1 are necessarily excluded1--made ample amends to the little slave of affection1 in that disposition to spontaneous pleasure1 which renders it almost an effort to be sad1 as if existence itself were delight2 giving him a fund of independent happiness in the very air which she has poured around him1 and the ready limbs which move through it1 almost without his bidding4 ,in that beautiful passage1 in which ,goldsmith describes the sounds that come in one mingled murmur from the village1 who does not feel the force of the happiness which is comprised in the single line1 that speaks of 8,the playful children1 just let loose from school80#hd ,it is not the mere freedom from the intellectual task of which we think2 it is much more1 that burst of animal pleasure1 which is felt in every limb1 when the long constraint that has repressed it is removed1 and the whole frame is given once more to all the freedom of nature4 ,it is by the pleasure of exertion1 and the pain of inexertion1 that we are roused from that indolence1 into which1 with great injury to society1 that requires our contribution of active aid1 we otherwise might sink2--as we are roused1 in like manner1 by the pleasure of food1 and the pain of hunger1 to take the aliment that is necessary for our individual sustenance2 and though the mere aliment is1 indeed1 more important for life1 it is not more important for happiness than that pleasure of activity which calls and forces us from our slothful repose4 8,thee1 too1 ,my ,paridel1--,i saw thee there1 ,stretch'd on the rack of a too easy chair40 ,with the same happy provision with which she has considered the young of our own species1 ,nature has1 in the other animals1 whose sources of general pleasure are still more limited than in the child1 converted their muscular frame into an organ of delight4 ,it is not in search of richer pasture that the horse gallops over his field1 or the goat leaps from rock to rock2 it is for the luxury of the exercise itself4 8,if the shell-fish on the shore10 says ,dr ,ferguson1 8perform no visible action but that of opening and closing his shell1 to receive the brine that accommodates1 or to exclude the foul matter that annoys him1 there are other animals that1 in the opposite extreme1 are active2 and for whom ,nature seems to administer the means of supply1 merely as a restorative of that strength which they are so freely to waste in the seemingly sportive or violent exercises to which they are disposed40#he 8,the bounding fawn1 that darts across the glade1 ,when none pursues1 through mere delight of heart1 ,and spirits buoyant1 with excess of glee2 ,the horse as wanton1 and almost as fleet1 ,that skims the spacious meadow at full speed1 ,then stops1 and snorts1 and1 throwing high his heels1 ,starts to the voluntary race again2 ,the very kine1 that gambol at high noon1-- ,the total herd1--receiving first from one1 ,that leads the dance1 a summons to be gay2 ,though wild their strange vagaries1 and uncouth ,their efforts1 yet resolved1 with one consent1 ,to give such act and utterance as they may ,to ecstacy1 too big to be suppress'd40#hf ,it is this appearance of happy life which spreads a charm over every little group1 with which ,nature animates her scenery2 and he who can look without interest on the young lamb1 as it frolics around the bush1 may gaze1 indeed1 on the magnificent landscape as it opens before him1--but it will be with an eye which looks languidly1 and in vain1 for pleasure which it cannot find4 ,these observations1 on our muscular pains and pleasures1 in conformity with that view of them which ,i endeavoured to give you1 in a former lecture1 are not digressive now1 nor uselessly repeated4 ,it is of great importance for the applications which we have to make1 that you should be fully aware that our muscular frame1 is not merely a part of the living machinery of motion1 but is also truly an organ of sense4 ,when ,i move my arm1 without resistance1 ,i am conscious of a certain feeling2 when the motion is impeded1 by the presence of an external body1 ,i am conscious of a different feeling1 arising partly1 indeed1 from the mere sense of touch1 in the moving limb compressed1 but not consisting merely in this compression1 since1 when the same pressure is made by a foreign force1 without any muscular effort on my part1 my general feeling is very different4 ,it is the feeling of this resistance to our progressive effort1 7combined1 perhaps1 with the mere tactual feeling7 which forms what we term1 our feeling of solidity or hardness2 and1 without it1 the tactual feeling would be nothing more1 than a sensation indifferent or agreeable1 or disagreeable or severely painful1 according to the force of the pressure1 in the particular case2 in the same way1 as the matter of heat1 acting1 in different degrees1 on this very organ of touch1 and on different portions of its surface1 at different times1 produces all the intermediate sensations1 agreeable1 disagreeable1 or indifferent1 from the pain of excessive cold1 to the pain of burning2 and produces them in like manner1 without suggesting the presence of any solid body1 external to ourselves4 ,were the cube1 therefore1 in the case supposed1 pressed1 for the first time1 on the hand1 it would excite a certain sensation1 indeed1 but not that of resistance1 which always implies a muscular effort that is resisted1 and consequently not that of hardness1 which is a mode of resistance4 ,it would be very different1 however1 if we fairly made the attempt to press against it2 for1 then1 our effort would be impeded1 and the consequent feeling of resistance would arise2 which1 as co-existing in this case1 and in every case of effort1 with the particular sensation of touch1 might afterwards be suggested by it1 on the simple recurrence of the same sensation of touch1 so as to excite the notion of hardness1 in the body touched1 without the renewal of any muscular effort on our part1 in the same manner as the angular surfaces of the cube1 if we chance to turn our eye on it1 are suggested by the mere plane of colour1 which it presents to our immediate vision1 and which is all that our immediate vision would1 of itself1 have made known to us4 ,the feeling of resistance1 then1 ,i trust1 it will be admitted1 and consequently of hardness1 and all the other modes of resistance1 is a muscular1 not a tactual feeling4 ,but though the resistance or hardness of the cube1 as implying some counter effort1 may not be immediately sensible to our superficial organ of touch1 are not its dimensions so perceived8 ,its cubical form1 it will be allowed1 cannot be felt1 as only one of its surfaces is supposed to be pressed upon the hand2 but1 is not at least this square surface perceived immediately8 ,in short1 does not touch1 originally and immediately1 convey to us the knowledge of extension8 ,with our present complete belief of external things1 indeed1 and especially of our organs of sense1 the most important of these1 the origin of our knowledge of extension1 seems to us a matter of very easy explanation4 ,the square surface presses on our organ of touch1--it affects not a single physical point merely1 but a portion of the organ1 corresponding exactly1 in surface with itself2 and the perception of the similar square1 it will be said1 thus immediately arises4 ,but1 in all this easy explanation1 it is very strangely forgotten1 that the feeling1 whatever it may be1 which the impression of the square surface produces1 is not itself the square configuration of our tactual organ1 corresponding with that surface1 but the state of a very different substance1 which is as little square1 as it is round or elliptical1--which is1 indeed1 from its own absolute simplicity1 incapable of resemblance in shape to any thing2 and the resemblance of which1 therefore1 to the shape of the mere organ1 is as little to be expected in the sensations of touch1--as that other state of mind1 which constitutes the sensation of the fragrance of a rose1 can be expected to resemble the shape of the odorous particles themselves1 or of the organ of smell1 which is affected by them4 ,the very knowledge which touch is supposed to give1 is1 in this case1 most inconsistently1 assumed1 as existing in the mind1 before the very touch which is supposed to give it4 ,if1 indeed1 the mind could know1 that a part of its external corporeal organ is compressed into the form of a square1 or that another square surface is compressing that organ1 the difficulty would be at an end2 for it would1 then1 most undoubtedly1 have that very knowledge of extension1 the origin of which we seek4 ,but it is not explained1 how the mind1 which alone can have sensation or knowledge1 and which certainly is not square itself1 is to be made acquainted with the squareness of its own corporeal organ1 or of the foreign body2 nor1 indeed1 how the squareness of the mere external organ should produce this particular affection of the mind1 more than if the organ were compressed into the shape of a polygon of one thousand sides4 ,let it be supposed1 that1 when a small cube is pressed on the hand1 one hundred physical points of the organ of touch are affected in a certain manner4 ,we have1 it is said1 an immediate perception of a square surface4 ,let it next be supposed1 that1 instead of one hundred of these continuous points of the organ1 an equal number of points1 at various distances in the surface of the body1 are affected in the same manner4 ,on this supposition it will scarcely be said1 that the perception of a square would arise1 when there is no square1 more than any other imaginable form1 in the space comprehended in the pressure4 ,yet what difference is there1 in these two cases1 to a mind that is1 by supposition1 absolutely ignorant of every bodily organ1 and consequently alike ignorant of the nearness or distance of the points of the organ of touch8 ,in both cases1 one hundred points1 equally sensible1 are affected1 and are affected precisely in the same manner2--and there is truly no difference1 unless we tacitly suppose the mind to be conscious of the bodily frame1 and1 therefore1 of the continuity of certain points of the organ of touch1 with the other points that are proximate to them1--a sort of knowledge1 for which it would not be easy to account1 and which it is impossible to conceive1 without conceding the very point in question4 ,a little attentive reflection on the circumstances of these two cases1 will1 perhaps1 aid you in freeing your minds from the illusive belief1 of which it may not be easy for you at first to divest yourselves1--that the continuity and similarity of shape1 which are known to us the inquirers1 are known also to that little sentient being1 whose first elements of knowledge we are endeavouring to trace4 ,we are too apt to forget1 in inquiries of this sort1 that it is not in our organ of touch merely1 that a certain extent of the nervous extremity of our sensorial organ is affected4 ,this occurs1 equally1 in every other organ4 ,in the superficial expansion of the nerves of hearing1 smell1 taste1 for example1 it is not a point merely that is affected1 but a number of continuous points1 precisely1 as in the superficial organ of touch2 and if1 therefore1 the notion of extension in general1 or of figure1 which is limited extension1 arose whenever a part of the nervous expansion was affected in any way1 we should derive these notions as much from a taste1 or a smell1 or a sound1 as from any of the configurations or affections of our organ of touch4 ,it is not1 therefore1 merely because a certain limited part of the sensorial organ is affected1 that we have the notion of the square surface1 in the case supposed by us3 for1 if this alone were necessary1 we should have square inches1 and half inches1 and various other forms1 rectilinear or curvilinear1 of fragrance and sound4 ,but1 it may perhaps be urged1 though all our organs must1 indeed1 exist equally with our organ of touch of a certain shape when affected1--and though the sensorial figure of our other organs1 is not accompanied with any of those mental affections1 which constitute the perception of angular or curvilinear figure1 there is something1 in the nature of that part of the sensorial organ1 which terminates on the general surface of the body1 that impresses the mind1 immediately1 with a sensation1 corresponding with the exact figure1 in which the organ may itself exist4 ,when the square1 therefore1 in the case imagined by us1 is impressed upon the organ1 the mental affection which constitutes our notion of a square may immediately arise1 though it would not arise from the similar squareness of our organs of smell or hearing4 ,in answer to this mere supposition1 ,i may remark1 that the sensorial organ of touch exists1 at every moment1 of a certain shape1 and that we yet have no perception of this shape1 so as to be able to delineate the whole extent of our tactual organ1 in the same manner as we could delineate the impressing square1 in the case supposed3 or1 if it be said1 that the configuration of the organ does not excite this mental affection1 in the quiescent state of the part1 but only when it is itself affected1 ,i may remark1 that we are as little able to delineate its figure1 when we are exposed to the action of heat1 which yet acts most powerfully upon this very organ1 inducing sensations1 at least as vivid as those of hardness or figure4 ,it may still1 however1 be contended1 for in a question of this sort ,i wish fairly to imagine every possible argument--it may still be contended1 that1 though the organ of touch has no effect1 in this way merely as configured1 and might1 in any other configuration operate1 precisely in the same manner1 on the sentient mind1--still the harmony of the bodily and mental changes is so arranged by nature1 that the organic state in touch1 whatever it may be1 is immediately followed by the knowledge of the extension of the impressing body1--in the same manner as a certain state of the organ of smell1 whatever that state may be1 is immediately followed by that affection of the mind1 which constitutes our sensation of the fragrance of a rose4 ,though this argument1 in truth1 rather begs the question1 than attempts to meet it1 let us give to it all the force which it may claim4 ,the accurate determination of the point may1 indeed1 seem1 at first almost impossible2 since in whatever manner the seeming perception may arise1 it must be admitted1 that we now seem to perceive extension1 as it were immediately1 by touch2 though not more immediately than in vision we seem to perceive the positions of objects in different distances before our eyes4--,but there is1 fortunately1 at least one test1 which the point in question still admits4 ,if the apparent perception of extension by touch1 be truly and originally immediate1 and not acquired1 like the apparent perception of distance in vision1 so as to involve a sort of intellectual measurement or suggestion of some sort1 after the primary sensation1--the perception must be constant and universal1 not confined to a few simple and familiar forms1 which1 if we can distinguish these alone1 we may be supposed to have learned from experience1 but extending to forms of every kind2 for it would certainly be a very strange abuse of the license of supposition1 to imagine that we perceive a square immediately1 but not a circle1 or a circle but not a square1 or indeed any other figure4 ,even at present1 then--though the circumstances of the trial1--when the experience of many years must have exhausted so many varieties of form1 associating the notion of these with the particular tactual feeling whatever that may be--are surely very unfavourable to the opinion which ,i maintain1--even at present1 ,i may safely trust to experiment1 the determination of the question4 ,when a body which we do not see1 is pressed on any part of our tactual organ1 do we immediately discover its form1--as immediately1 as we are sensible of fragrance1 when our organ of smell is in a healthy state1 and an odoriferous body is presented to it1 or of sound1 when a cannon is fired beside us8 ,this we certainly should do1 if figure were as direct an object of the sense of touch1 as fragrance and sound are of the senses of smell and hearing4 ,even though it be a form of the simplest kind1 square1 round1 triangular1 that is thus pressed upon our palm1 we scarcely distinguish the precise species of figure for a moment1 and are long before we can convince ourselves1 that we have perceived its exact magnitude1 in the determination of which1 after all1 we shall very probably be mistaken1 if we confine ourselves to the mere intellectual measurement2 though we should even add to the immediate sensation of touch1 all the discriminating skill of our judgment and reflection4 ,but1 if the body be irregular in form1--however slight the irregularity may be1 and of a species that would not perplex in the slightest degree our sense of sight1 and which certainly1 therefore1 should perplex as little our sense of touch1 which is supposed to be still more immediately perceptive of form1--we are incapable for some time1 and ,i may even say are incapable altogether1 of fixing1 with precision1 its magnitude and figure--that very magnitude and figure which are yet said to be the direct objects of touch4 ,of this a single trial may convince any one2 it is a trial which as it seems to me decisive1 ,i must request you to make4 ,are we then entitled to say1 in the case of the square surface of the cube pressed upon our hand1 that though we cannot discover other forms and magnitudes1 we yet discover its extension1 and consequently its figure1 by the immediate sense of touch8--or may we not rather conclude with confidence1 that what is true of other forms is true of this also1 that it is only in consequence of more frequent experience we have learned as it were to distinguish1 with some degree of certainty1 the simpler forms1 which1 as mere forms1 are not more direct objects of the sense of touch than forms the most irregular1 and that without such experience1 therefore1 our mere sense of touch is incapable of informing us of the figure of bodies1 immediately and originally4 ,if then the knowledge of extension be not derived from our immediate sense of touch1 it must be derived from some other source1 which allows it to be associated with the feelings of touch1 and afterwards suggested by these1 in the same manner as distant extent1 in the case of vision1 is suggested by a few slight varieties of colour4 ,let us endeavour1 then1 since some such source there must be1 to discover what the source is4 ,,footnotes3 #hd ,deserted ,village1 v4 #abj4 #he ,principles of ,moral and ,political ,science1 ,part ,i4 c4 i4 sect4 i4 #hf ,cowper's ,task1 ,book ,,iv4 ,,lecture ,,xxiii4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,feelings ,,usually ,,ascribed ,,to ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,touch1 ,,continued4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was employed in considering the information which we receive from the sense of touch1 or rather the information which we are commonly supposed to receive from that sense1--but which1 in a great part at least1 ,i am inclined to ascribe to another source4 ,the qualities of bodies1 supposed to be made known to us by touch1 ,i reduced to two1 of which all--whatever be the variety of names that express them1--are mere varieties1 ,,resistance and ,,extension3--solidity1 liquidity1 viscidity1 hardness1 softness1 roughness1 smoothness1 being modes of ,,resistance1 and nothing more2--figure1 magnitude1 divisibility1 as evidently nothing more than modes of ,,extension3 and ,i stated reasons1 which induce me to believe1 that neither our feeling of resistance nor that of extension1 has its direct origin in the sense of touch2 though the original simple feeling1 which this organ affords1 is now1 from constant association1 almost indiscriminately combined with both1 in some one or other of their varieties4 ,the first of these classes1--that which includes the various modifications of resistance1--,i examined at great length1 and showed1 ,i trust1 that it is not to our organ of touch we are indebted for these1 but that they are feelings of another sense1 of which our muscular frame is the organ1--the feelings1 in short1 of which every one must have been conscious1 who has attempted to grasp any body1 or to press against it1 when the full contraction of the muscles must1 of course1 have been impeded4 ,according as the body is hard or soft1 rough or smooth1--that is to say1 according as it resists1 in various degrees1 the progress of our effort of contraction1--the muscular feeling1 which arises from the variously impeded effort1 will vary in proportion2 and we call hard1 soft1 rough1 smooth1 that which produces one or other of the varieties of these muscular feelings of resistance1--as we term sweet or bitter1 blue or yellow1 that which produces either of these sensations of taste or vision4 ,with the feeling of resistance1 there is1 indeed1 in every case1 combined1 a certain tactual feeling1 because we must touch whatever we attempt to grasp2 but it is not of this mere tactual feeling we think1 when we term bodies hard or soft1--it is of the greater or less resistance which they afford to our muscular contraction4 ,i next proceeded to consider the other class of supposed tangible qualities1 which includes the various modifications of extension1 and urged many arguments to show1 in like manner1 that1--however indissolubly these may seem at present to be connected with the simple feelings of our organ of touch1--it is not to our simple original feelings of this sense1 that we owe our knowledge of them1 as qualities of things without4 ,though the notion of extension1 however1 may arise in the manner which ,i have supposed1 this1 it may be said1 is not the notion of external existence4 ,to what1 then1 are we to ascribe the belief of external reality1 which now accompanies our sensations of touch8 ,it appears to me to depend on the feeling of resistance1--the organ of which1 as a muscular feeling1 ,i before explained to you1 which breaking in1 without any known cause of difference1 on an accustomed series1 and combining with the notion of extension1 and consequently of divisibility1 previously acquired1 furnishes the elements of that compound notion1 which we term the notion of matter4 ,extension1 resistance2--to combine these simple notions in something which is not ourselves1 and to have the notion of matter1 are precisely the same thing2 as it is the same thing to have combined the head and neck of a man with the body and legs of a horse1 and to have the notion of that fabulous being1 which the ancients denominated a centaur4 ,it certainly1 at least1 would not be easy for any one to define matter more simply1 than as that which has parts1 and that which resists our effort to grasp it2 and1 in our analysis of the feelings of infancy1 we have been able to discover how both these notions may have arisen in the mind1 and arisen too1 in circumstances1 which must lead to the combination of them in one complex notion4 ,the infant stretches out his arm for the first time1 by that volition without a known object1 which is either a mere instinct1 or very near akin to one1--this motion is accompanied with a certain feeling1--he repeats the volition which moves his arm fifty or one thousand times1 and the same progress of feeling takes place during the muscular action4 ,in this repeated progress1 he feels the truth of that intuitive proposition1 which1 in the whole course of the life that awaits him1 is to be the source of all his expectations1 and the guide of all his actions1--the simple proposition1 that what has been as an antecedent1 will be followed by what has been as a consequent4 ,at length he stretches out his arm again1 and instead of the accustomed progression1 there arises1 in the resistance of some object opposed to him1 a feeling of a very different kind which1 if he persevere in his voluntary effort1 increases gradually to severe pain1 before he has half completed the usual progress4 ,there is a difference1 therefore1 which we may1 without any absurdity1 suppose to astonish the little reasoner2 for the expectation of similar consequents1 from similar antecedents1 is observable even in his earliest actions1 and is probably the result of an original law of mind1 as universal1 as that which renders certain sensations of sight and sound the immediate result of certain affections of our eye or ear4 ,to any being1 who is thus impressed with belief of similarities of sequence1 a different consequent necessarily implies a difference of the antecedent4 ,in the case at present supposed1 however1 the infant1 who as yet knows nothing but himself1 is conscious of no previous difference2 and the feeling of resistance seems to him1 therefore1 something unknown1 which has its cause in something that is not himself4 ,i am aware1 that the application to an infant1 of a process of reasoning expressed in terms of such grave and formal philosophic nomenclature1 has some chance of appearing ridiculous4 ,but the reasoning itself is very different from the terms employed to express it1 and is truly as simple and natural1 as the terms1 which our language obliges us to employ in expressing it1 are abstract and artificial4 ,the infant1 however1 in his feeling of similarity of antecedents and consequents1 and of the necessity1 therefore1 of a new antecedent1 where the consequent is difficult1 has the reasoning1 but not the terms4 ,he does not form the proposition as universal1 and applicable to cases that have not yet existed2 but he feels it in every particular case1 as it occurs4 ,that he does truly reason1 with at least as much subtility1 as is involved in the process now supposed1 cannot be doubted by those who attend to the manifest results of his little inductions1 in those acquisitions of knowledge1 which show themselves in the actions1 and1 ,i may say1 almost in the very looks of the little reasoner1--at a period long before that to which his own remembrance is afterwards to extend1 when1 in the maturer progress of his intellectual powers1 the darkness of eternity will meet his eye alike1 whether he attempt to gaze on the past1 or on the future2 and the wish to know the events1 with which he is afterwards to be occupied and interested1 will not be more unavailing1 than the wish to retrace events1 that were the occupation and interest of the most important years of his existence4 ,then1 8,so--when the mother1 bending o'er his charms1 ,clasps her fair nurseling in delighted arms2-- ,with sparkling eye the blameless plunderer owns ,her soft embraces and endearing tones1 ,seeks the salubrious fount with opening lips1 ,spreads his inquiring hands1 and smiles and sips40#hg ,even then1 many a process of ratiocination is going on1 which might have served as an example of strict logic to ,aristotle himself1 and which affords results1 far more valuable to the individual reasoner1 than all the contents of all the folios of the crowd of that great logician's scholastic commentators4 ,that the notions of extension and external resistance1 which are thus supposed to be acquired from the progressive contraction of muscles1 and the difficulty opposed to their accustomed contraction1 which introduces suddenly a new feeling1 when all the antecedent feelings had been the same1 should be directly combined1 only with the sensations of touch1 cannot appear wonderful1 when we reflect1 that it is only in the case of touch1 there is that frequent coexistence or immediate succession1 which is necessary to the subsequent union4 ,in the case of the acquired perceptions of vision1 it might1 in like manner1 be asked1 why is it that we do not smell the exact distance of a rose1 as we see its exact distance1 as soon as we have turned our eye on the bush on which the rose is growing8 ,and the only answer which can be given1 is that there has not been in smell that exact and frequent coexistence of feelings which has occurred in vision4 ,it surely is not more wonderful1 therefore1 that the same argument should hold in the acquired perceptions of touch1 in which the coexistence is still more frequent and exact4 ,when we listen to a flute1 our muscles may be contracted as before1 or quiescent as before2 when the odour of a rose is wafted to us1 not a single muscle may be more or less affected4 ,but1 without the action of muscles1 we cannot grasp a ball1 nor press against a resisting body1 nor move our hand along its surface4 ,whatever feelings1 therefore1 are involved in muscular contraction1 may be1 or rather ,i may say1 if the common laws of association operate1 must be associated with the simple feelings thus constantly coexisting1 whatever they may be1 which the organ of touch originally affords4 ,to suppose1 that1 in a case of such frequent coexistence or succession1 no association takes place1 and that our feelings of touch1 are1 at this moment1 as simple as they were originally1 would surely be to suppose the universal influence of the associating principle to be suspended in this particular case4 ,i have already explained the manner1 in which1 ,i suppose1 the infant1 to obtain the notion of something external and separate from himself1 by the interruption of the usual train of antecedents and consequents1 when the painful feeling of resistance has arisen1 without any change of circumstances1 of which the mind is conscious in itself2 and the process by which he acquires this notion1 is only another form of the very process1 which1 during the whole course of his life1 is involved in all his reasonings1 and regulates1 therefore1 all his conclusions1 with respect to every physical truth4 ,in the view which ,i take of the subject1 accordingly1 ,i do not conceive that it is by any peculiar intuition1 we are led to believe in the existence of things without4 ,i consider this belief as the effect of that more general intuition1 by which we consider a new consequent1 in any series of accustomed events1 as the sign of a new antecedent1 and of that equally general principle of association1 by which feelings that have frequently coexisted1 flow together1 and constitute afterwards one complex whole4 ,there is something which is not ourself1 something which is representative of length--something which excites the feeling of resistance to our effort2 and these elements combined1 are matter4 ,but1 whether the notion arise in the manner ,i have supposed1 or differently1 there can be no doubt that it has arisen1 long before the period to which our memory reaches2 and the belief of an external world1 therefore1 whether founded directly on an intuitive principle of belief1 or1 as ,i rather think1 on associations as powerful as intuition in the period which alone we know1 may be said to be an essential part of our mental constitution1 at least as far back as that constitution can be made the subject of philosophic inquiry4 ,whatever it may have been originally1 it is now as impossible for us to disbelieve the reality of some external cause of our sensations1 as it is impossible for us to disbelieve the existence of the sensations themselves4 ,on this subject1 scepticism may be ingenious in vain2 and equally vain1 ,i may say1 would be the attempted confutation of scepticism2 since it cannot affect the serious internal belief of the sceptic1 which is the same before as after argument2 unshaken by the ingenuity of his own reasonings1 or rather1 as ,i have before remarked1 tacitly assumed and affirmed in that very combat of argument1 which professes to deny it4 ,it is in vain1 that ,berkeley asserts his system1 with a zeal and acuteness1 which might1 perhaps1 have succeeded in convincing others1 if they could only have previously succeeded in convincing himself1 not as a speculative philosopher merely1 but as a human being1 conversant with his kind1 acting1 and suffering1 and remembering1 and hoping1 and fearing4 ,this1 however1 was more than mere ingenuity of argument could perform4 ,even in publishing his work with the sincere desire of instructing and converting others1 the great and primary convert was yet to be made1 in the converter himself4 ,in the ,life of ,berkeley1 prefixed to the edition of his collected works1 an account is given of a visit which he paid1 at ,paris1 to ,malebranche1 the celebrated author of a system1 in many respects similar to his own4 ,he found him in a weak state of health1 but abundantly eager to enter into disputation1 on a science which he loved1 and especially on his own doctrines1 which he loved still more2 but the discussion was at last carried on with more vehemence than the feeble bodily frame of ,malebranche could bear2 and his death was said to be occasioned1 or at least hastened1 by this unfortunate intellectual combat4 ,when we consider this interview of two illustrious men1 each of whom1 in accordance with his own system1 must have been incapable of any direct knowledge of the existence of the other1 the violent reciprocal action of these mutual nonentities1 might seem ludicrous1 if there were not1 in the death of any one1 and especially of a philosopher so estimable in every respect as the author of ,the ,search of ,truth1 something too serious to be consistent with any feeling of levity4 ,it is more suitable1 both to the occasion itself1 and to our own intellectual weakness1 to regard this accidental interview of two philosophers1 contending so strenuously against each other1 for the truth of doctrines1 which rendered the real existence of each1 at best1 very problematical1 as only a striking instance of the readiness with which all the pride of human reason yields itself1 as it were1 spontaneously and humbly1 to the sway of those more powerful principles1 which ,he1 who has arranged our mutual constitution1 has so graciously accommodated to the circumstances in which ,he has placed us4 ,the gift of reason itself1 that most inestimable of our intellectual gifts1 would have been truly1 if nothing more had been added to it1 a perilous acquisition1 to beings not absolutely incapable of error2 since these are points on which a single mistake1 if there had been no opportunity of repairing it1 might have been fatal1 not to our happiness merely1 but to our very existence4 ,on these points1 however1 ,nature has not left us to a power so fallible1 and to indolence1 which might forget to exercise even this feeble power4 ,she has given us principles which do not err1 and which operate without the necessity of any effort on our part4 ,in the wildest speculative errors1 into which we may be led1 there is a voice within1 which speaks1 indeed1 only in a whisper1 but in a whisper of omnipotence1 at which the loud voice that led us astray1 is still1--thus operating on our mind1 as the secret irresistible influence of gravitation operates on our body1 preserving it1 amid all the disorder and irregularity of its spontaneous motions1 still attached to that earthly home which has been prepared with every bountiful provision for our temporary residence4 ,if there were1 indeed1 any sceptic as to the existence of an external world1 who could seriously profess that his practical conduct was in accordance with his speculative disbelief1 we might very justly exercise1 with respect to his own profession1 that philosophic doubt or disbelief1 which he recommends4 ,pyrrho1 the great founder of this philosophy1 is1 indeed1 said to have acted so truly on his principles1 that if a cart ran against him1 or a dog attacked him1 or if he came upon a precipice he would not stir a foot to avoid the danger4 8,but his attendants10 says ,dr ,reid1 8who happily for him1 were not so great sceptics1 took care to keep him out of harm's way1 so that he lived till he was ninety years of age40#hh ,in all these cases1 we may safely take for granted1 that this venerable sceptic1 when he exhibited himself with his domestics knew1 at least as well as the spectator1 the nature of the comedy which he was acting1 for their entertainment1 and his own imagined glory2--that he could discriminate1 with perfect accuracy1 the times when it would be safe1 and the times when it would be unsafe1 for him to be consistent2--and that he would never feel1 in so strong and lively a manner1 the force of his own principles1 as when he was either absolutely alone1 or with attendants within a very few inches of the ground on which he was philosophizing4 ,we are told1 accordingly1 that when his passions were too strongly roused1 to allow him to remember the part which he was acting1 he entered with sufficient readiness into his native character of a mere human being4 ,of this1 one ludicrous instance is recorded1 in which his anger against his cook so completely got the better1 both of his moral and physical philosophy1 that1 with the spit in his hand1 and the meat on it1 which had been roasting1 he pursued him to the very market-place4 ,many stories of this sort1 however1 we may well suppose1 would be invented against philosophers1 of a class1 that at once challenged the opposition of the whole mob of mankind1 and afforded subjects of that obvious and easy ridicule1 which the mob of mankind1 even without the provocation of such a challenge1 are always sufficiently ready to seize4 ,into a detail of the sceptical system of ,berkeley1 it is unnecessary to enter at any length2 since1 notwithstanding the general acuteness which its truly illustrious author has displayed in this1 and in all his works1 ,i cannot but consider his ideal system1 as presenting a very imperfect and inaccurate view1 not merely of the real phenomena of the mind1 but even of the sceptical argument against the existence of matter4 ,it was not as a sceptic1 however1 that this most devout and amiable of philosophers1 to whom ,pope scarcely paid a higher compliment than was strictly due1 in ascribing to him 8every virtue under heaven10#hi--;it was not as a sceptic that he was desirous of being ranked4 ,on the contrary1 ,i have no doubt that his system seemed to him valuable1 chiefly for being1 as he conceived1 an antidote to scepticism1 and that he was far less anxious to display acuteness1 than to expose the sophistry of materialism1 and to present as he thought1 an additional argument for the existence of a divine omnipresent mind1 which unquestionably it would have afforded1 and an argument too1 it must be owned1 completely irresistible1 if our mere ideas were what he conceived them to be4 ,these1 he evidently considered1 not as states of the individual mind1 but as separate things existing in it1 and capable of existing in other minds1 but in them alone2 and it is in consequence of these assumptions1 that his system1 if it were to be considered as a system of scepticism1 is chiefly defective4 ,but having1 as he supposed1 these ideas1 and conceiving that they did not perish1 when they ceased to exist in his mind1 since the same ideas recurred at intervals1 he deduced from the necessity which there seemed for some omnipresent mind1 in which they might exist during the intervals of recurrence1 the necessary existence of the ,deity2 and if1 indeed1 as he supposed1 ideas be something different from the mind itself1 recurring only at intervals to created minds1 and incapable of existing but in mind1 the demonstration of some infinite omnipresent mind1 in which they exist during these intervals of recurrence to finite minds1 must be allowed to be perfect4 ,the precise nature of the argument1 and its demonstrative force1 if the hypothetical circumstances which ,berkeley himself was far from considering as hypothetical1 be admitted1 have not been sufficiently regarded by philosophers1 when they express their astonishment1 that a system1 which1 if not scepticism1 is at least so much akin to it1 or so favourable1 at least1 to the general sceptical spirit1 should yet have been brought forward1 as its truly pious author informs us1 for the express purpose of combating scepticism4 ,he is not1 indeed1 always a very perspicuous unfolder of his own opinions1 but in a passage of his third ,dialogue1 the series of propositions which ,i have now stated as constituting his demonstration1 are delivered by himself1 with great distinctness and brevity4 8,when ,i deny10 says ,philonous to ,hylas1 8when ,i deny sensible things1 an existence out of the mind1 ,i do not mean my mind in particular1 but all minds4 ,now1 it is plain1 they have an existence exterior to my mind1 since ,i find them1 by experience1 to be independent of it4 ,there is1 therefore1 some other mind wherein they exist during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them1 as likewise they did before my birth1 and would do after my supposed annihilation4 ,and as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits1 it necessarily follows1 there is an ,omnipresent ,eternal ,mind1 which knows and comprehends all things1 and exhibits them to our view1 in such a manner1 and according to such rules1 as he himself hath ordained1 and are by us all termed the laws of ,nature40#ij ,the existence of ideas as separate from the mind1 and the permanent existence of these1 when they have ceased to exist in the individual mind1 are evidently assumptions as gratuitous as the assumption of the external existence of matter itself could have been2 or rather1 the permanent and independent ideas1 are truly matter1 under another name2 and to believe that these foreign independent substances1 which pass from mind to mind1 exist in the mind1 is not to intellectualize matter1 but to materialize intellect4 ,a mind containing1 or capable of containing something foreign within itself1 and not merely one foreign substance1 but a multitude of foreign substances1 at the same moment1 is no longer that simple indivisible existence1 which we termed spirit4 ,any of the elementary atoms of matter is1 indeed1 more truly spiritual2 the very notion of recipiency of any kind1 being as little consistent with our notion of mind1 as the notion of hardness or squareness4 ,the whole force of the pious demonstration1 therefore1 which ,berkeley flattered himself with having urged irresistibly1 is completely obviated1 by the simple denial1 that ideas are any thing more than the mind itself affected in a certain manner2 since1 in this case1 our ideas exist no longer than our mind is affected1 in that particular manner1 which constitutes each particular idea2 and1 to say that our ideas exist in the divine mind1 would thus be to say1 only1 that our mind itself exists in the divine mind4 ,there is not the sensation of colour1 in addition to the mind1 nor the sensation of fragrance in addition to the mind2 but1 according to that juster view of the mental phenomena1 which ,i have repeatedly endeavoured to impress on you1 the sensation of colour is the mind existing in a certain state1 and the sensation of fragrance1 is the mind existing in a different state4 ,the most philosophic scepticism1 as to the existence of external things1 is unquestionably that1 which is founded on this very view of the phenomena of the mind4 ,all the terms1 which we use to express our knowledge1 sensations1 perceptions1 ideas1 notions1 propositions1 judgments1 intuitions1 conclusions1--or whatever other terms we may employ to express particular varieties of thought1 are significant1 it may be said1 and truly said1 of states or affections of the mind1 and of nothing more4 ,what ,i term my perception of the colour1 or softness1 or shape1 or fragrance1 or taste of a peach1 is a certain state of my own mind1 for my mind surely can be conscious only of its own feelings2 or rather1 as the consciousness of present feelings is a redundancy of language1 my mind1 affected in a certain manner1 whether it be with what is termed sensation or knowledge1 or belief1 can still be nothing more than my mind itself affected in a certain manner1--my mind1 itself existing in a certain state4 ,against this argument1 ,i confess that ,i know no mere argument which can be adduced in opposition1--any more1 than ,i know any mere argument which can be adduced1 against the strange conclusions that are most legitimately drawn from the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter1 and various other physical and mathematical applications of the notion of infinity4 ,in no one of these cases1 however1 do we feel our belief shaken2--because it is founded either on associations so early1 and strong1 and indissoluble1 as those which we have been endeavouring to trace1 or is not in those1 or in principles of direct intuition1 in that species of internal revolution which gives to reason itself1 in the primary truths on which every argument proceeds1 its divine authority2 and we only smile at conclusions1 in which it is impossible for us to find a single logical error1 but which from the constitution of our nature1 it is physically impossible for us to admit1 or to admit at least1 without an instant dissent1 which renders our momentary logical admission as nugatory1 as if the direct existence of an external world had been established by the clearest logical demonstration4 ,in one of the ,anniversary ,orations of ,sir ,william ,jones1 of which the subject is the philosophy of the ,asiatics1 he informs us that a system of idolism1 very similar to that of ,berkeley1 is to be found in the metaphysics of ,hindostan4 ,the fundamental tenet of one great school of the philosophers of that ancient land of philosophy1 is the disbelief of the existence of matter--the phenomena of the seeming material universe1 being conceived by them to be only an illusive representation which the ,deity presents to the mind1 7and which they distinguish by the name of ,maja37--while the opposite species of scepticism is to be found in another sect of the philosophers1 who disbelieve the existence of mind1 and reduce all the phenomena of thought to material organization4 ,the same subtilty and refinement of scepticism1 which have led to the systems of materialism and idolism in our ,western ,world1 are to be found1 we are told1 in the corresponding systems of the ,east4#ia ,why is it that we are struck with no common emotion on finding1 in the metaphysics of that distant country1 systems of opinions so similar to our own8 ,is it that the notion of the immense space1 which separates us1 unites with our conception1 and impresses us1 as it were1 with the omnipresence of our own intellectual nature1--when we recognize on scenes so remote and in circumstances of society so different1 the same thoughts1 and doubts1 and errors1 which have perplexed1 and occupied1 and delighted ourselves8 ,this recognition1 in whatever circumstances it may occur1 gives to us a feeling of more than kindred1--a sort of identity with the universal nature of man1 in all its times and places4 ,the belief which others share with us seems to be our own belief which has passed from each to each1 or is present to all1 like those permanent ideas of which ,berkeley speaks1 that quit one intellect to exist in another4 ,we cannot separate the thought which we remember from the notion of the mind which we remember to have conceived it2--and it seems to us1 therefore1 not as if similar doubts and errors1 but almost as if the very doubts and errors of our own mind1 and its ardour of inquiry1 and frequent disappointments1 and occasional1 but rare felicities of discovery1 had spread and renewed themselves in a remote existence4 ,it is this recognition of our common nature1 which gives the chief interest to scenes that have been occupied with the passions of beings like ourselves4 ,the mountains1 which the ,titans were fabled to have heaped up in their war against ,jupiter1 must have excited even in the most devout believers of ,grecian mythology1 emotions far less ardent and immediate1 than the sight of the humbler cliffs1 at which the small ,spartan host1 and their gallant leader1 devoted themselves in the defensive war against the ,persian invader4 ,the races of men may perish1 but the remembrance of them still lives imperishable1 and seems to claim kindred with us1 as often as we tread the same soil1 or merely think of those who have trod it4 8,turn thy sight eastward1 o'er the time-hush'd plains1 ,now graves of vanish'd empire1 once gleam'd o'er ,from flames on hallow'd altars1 hail'd by hymns ,of seers1 awakeners of the worshipp'd ,sun6 ,ask silent ,tigris--,bid ,euphrates tell ,where is the grove-crown'd ,baal1 to whose stern frown ,bow'd haughty ,babylon8--,chaldea1 famed ,for star-taught sages1--hard ,phenicia's sons4 ,fierce fear-surmounting curbers of the deep1 ,who stretch'd a floating sceptre o'er the seas1 ,and made mankind one empire8--,where is now ,egypt's wide-homag'd ,isis8--where the ,thors1 ,that shook the shakers of the ,roman world80 ,the very gods of all these countries have perished1 but the mortals who bent the knee before them still survive in the immortality of our common nature1--in that universal interest which gives to us a sort of intellectual existence in scenes and times the most remote1 and makes the thoughts and emotions of others as it were a part of our own being1--uniting the past1 the present1 and the future1 and blending man with man wherever he is to be found4 ,,footnotes3 #hg ,darwin's ,botanic ,garden1 ,canto ,,iii4 v4 #cec-d1 and #ceg-cfj4 #hh ,reid's ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 chap4 i4 sect4 #e4 #hi ,epilogue to the ,satires1 ,dial4 ,,ii4 v4 #gc4 #ij ,three ,dialogues1 c4 p4 #aji-aaj4 #ia ,the substance of this reference occurs in the ,eleventh ,anniversary ,discourse1--,works1 v4 i4 p4 #afe-f4 #dto4 ,edit4 ,,lecture ,,xxiv4 ,,the ,,same ,,subject1 ,,continued4 ,gentlemen1 having stated1 in a former ,lecture1 the reasons which seem to show1 that the origin of our notion of extension1 and of the notions1 which it involves1 of figure1 magnitude1 divisibility1 is not to be found in our sense of touch1 ,i endeavoured1 in my last ,lecture1 to trace these to their real source1--cautioning you at the same time1 with respect to the great difficulty of the inquiry1 and the very humble reliance1 therefore1 which we can have any title to put1 on the results of our investigation of a subject so very obscure4 ,in our present circumstances1 when we attempt such an investigation1 it is impossible for us to derive even the slightest aid1 from remembrance of our original feelings2 since memory1--which afterwards can look back through so many long and busy years1 and comprehend all of life1 but the very commencement of it1--sees yet1 in this dawn of being1 a darkness which it cannot penetrate4 ,we have already formed1--spontaneously1 and without the aid of any one1--our little system of physical science1 and have1 in truth1 enriched ourselves with acquisitions1 far more important than any which we are afterwards to form1 with all the mature vigour of our faculties1 and all the splendid aids of traditionary philosophy1--at a time1 when we seem scarcely capable of more than of breathing and moving1 and taking our aliment1 and when the faculties1 that leave us so much invaluable knowledge1 are to leave us no knowledge of the means1 by which we have acquired it4 ,to the period of our first sensations1 therefore1 we cannot look back2 and1 hence1 all which remains for us1 in an inquiry of this kind1 is to consider the circumstances in which the infant is placed1 and to guess1 as nearly as general analogy will allow us1 the nature and the order of the feelings1 which1 in such circumstances1 would arise1 in a being possessing the powers and susceptibilities of man1 but destitute of all the knowledge which man possesses4 ,in these first circumstances of life1 the infant1 of course1 cannot know that he has a bodily frame1 or a single organ of that frame1 more than he can know1 that there are other bodies in nature1 that act upon his own2 and we are not entitled to suppose1--however difficult it may be for us to accommodate our supposition to the true circumstances of the case1--that because we1 the inquirers1 know1 that external bodies are pressing on his organ of touch1 the little sensitive being is to have any knowledge1 but of the mental affections1 which these external bodies excite4 ,how the knowledge of any thing more than his own mind is acquired1 is1 in truth1 the very difficulty1 which it is our labour to solve4 ,in conformity with this view1 then1--when we look on the infant1--one of the most remarkable circumstances1 which strike us1 is its tendency to use its muscles1 with almost incessant exercise1 particularly the muscles of those parts1 which are afterwards its principal organs of measurement4 ,its little fingers are continually closing and opening1 and its little arms extending and contracting4 ,the feelings1 therefore1--whatever these may be1--which attend the progressive contraction of those parts1--and some feeling unquestionably attends the contraction in all its stages1--must be continually arising in its mind1 beginning and finishing1 in regular series1 and varying exactly1 with the quantity of the contraction4 ,a succession of feelings1 however1 when remembered by the mind1 which looks back upon them1 we found to involve1 necessarily1 the notion of divisibility into separate parts1 and1 therefore1 of length1 which is only another name for continued divisibility4 ,time1 in short1 is to our conception1 a series in constant onward progress1 and cannot be conceived by us1 but as a progressive series1 of which our separate feelings are parts2 the remembrance of the events of our life1 whenever we take any distant retrospect of them1 being like the remembrance of the space1 which we have traversed in a journey1--an indistinct continuity of length1 as truly divisible1 in our conception1 into the separate events which we remember1 as the space1 which we remember to have traversed1 into its separate variety of scenes4 ,time1 then1 or remembered succession1 we found to involve1 not metaphorically1 as is commonly said1 but truly and strictly1 in its very essence1 the notions of length and divisibility1--the great elements of extension2 and whatever other feelings may be habitually and uniformly associated with these1 will involve1 of course1 these elementary notions4 ,the series of muscular feelings1 of which the infant is conscious1--in incessantly closing and opening his little hand1--must1 on these principles1 be accompanied with the notion1--not1 indeed1 of the existence of his hand1 or of any thing external1--but of a certain length of succession2 and each stage of the contraction1 by frequent renewal1 gradually becomes significant of a particular length1 corresponding with the portion of the series4 ,when any hard body1 therefore1 is placed in the infant's hand1--though he cannot1 indeed1 have any knowledge of the object1 or of the hand1--he yet feels1 that he can no longer perform the accustomed contraction1--or1 to speak more accurately1--since he is unacquainted with any parts that are contracted1 he feels1 that he can no longer produce his accustomed series of feelings2 and he knows the quantity of contraction1 which remained to be performed1 or rather the length of the series1 which remained to be felt4 ,the place of this remaining length is now supplied by a new feeling1 partly muscular1 and partly the result of the affection of the compressed organ of touch1--and is supplied by the same feeling1 at the same point of the series1 as often1 as he attempts to renew the contraction1 while the body remains within his hand4 ,the tactual feeling1 therefore1--whatever it may be1--becomes1 by this frequent repetition1 associated with the notion of that particular progressive series1 or length1 of which it thus uniformly supplies the place2 and at last becomes representative of this particular length1 precisely in the same manner1 as1 in the acquired perceptions of vision1 certain shades of colour become representative of distance1 to which they have1 of themselves1 no resemblance or analogy1 whatever2 and we thus learn to feel length1 as we learn to see length1--not directly by the mere affections of our tactual or visual organs1 but by the associated notions which they suggest4 ,if time1--as perceived by us in the continued series of our feelings1--do involve conceptual length and divisibility1 it seems1 indeed1 scarcely possible1 that1 in the circumstances supposed1 the notions supposed should not arise1--that the infant should be conscious of a regular series of feelings1 in the contraction of its fingers and arms1 and yet that portions of this series should not become significant of various proportional lengths2--and1 if the notion of certain proportional lengths do truly accompany certain degrees of progressive contraction1 it seems equally impossible1 according to the general principles of our mental constitution1 that the compound tactual and muscular feeling1 which must arise in every case1 in which any one of these degrees of contraction is impeded1 should not become associated with the notion of that particular length1 of which it supplies the place1 so as at last to become truly representative of it4 ,in this manner1 ,i endeavoured to explain to you1 how our knowledge of the mere length of bodies may have been acquired1 from varieties of length that are recognized as coexisting and proximate1 and are felt to unite1 as it were1 and terminate in our sensation of resistance1 which interrupts them equally1 and interrupts always a greater number of the coexisting truths1 in proportion to the size of the body compressed2 and1 in a similar manner1 our notions of the other dimensions of bodies1 which are only these varieties of length in different directions4 ,i cannot conclude this summary1 however1 without recalling to your attention1 a very simple experiment1 which ,i requested you to make for yourselves1--an experiment1 that1 even in the unfavourable circumstances in which it must now be tried1 is yet1 ,i conceive1 demonstrative of the influence of mere time1 as an element of that complex notion1 which we have been examining1 when the more rapid measurements of vision1--which are confessedly not original but acquired1--are excluded4 ,if1 in passing our finger1 with different degrees of slowness or rapidity1 along the same surface1 with our eyes shut1--even though we should previously know the exact boundaries of the extent of surface1--we feel it almost impossible not to believe1--and but for the contrary evidence of vision1 could not have hesitated a single moment in believing1--that this extent is greater or less1 according as the time employed in performing exactly the same quantity of motion1 with exactly the same force of pressure1 on the same quantity of our organ of touch1 may have been greater or less1--it must surely be admitted1 that the notion of the length1 which thus uniformly varies with the time1 when all other circumstances are the same1 is not absolutely independent of the time1--or it must1 in like manner1 be believed1 that our notion of visual distance1 which varies with the distribution of a few rays of light on the small expanse of the optic nerve1 is yet independent of those faint shades of colouring1 according to the mere varieties of which1 it seems at one time to lay open to our view a landscape of many miles1 and at another time to present to us1 as it were before our very eyes1 an object of scarcely an inch in diameter4 ,the greater dimness1 and diminished size of a few objects in the back ground of a picture1 which is in itself one coloured plane of light1 does not more truly seem to increase the line of distance of those objects1 than1 in the other case1 the increased slowness of the motion of our hand along any surface1 seems to lengthen the line which separates one of its boundaries from the other4 ,that we now seem to perceive extension1 immediately by touch1 cannot be denied2 and1 in a case so obscure as this1--with our very limited knowledge1 and our very limited power of adding to this knowledge1--it may seem the most prudent1 and perhaps even the most suitable1--as it is1 without all question1 by far the easiest part1--to acquiesce in the opinion1 that the perception1 which now seems immediate1 was so originally1--that the belief of the presence of an external figured body1 is1 by the very constitution of our nature1 attached to a certain affection of the mere organ of touch4 ,but1 since there are circumstances1--as we have seen1--which show this opinion1 when very nicely examined1 to be inadmissible1 we may1 at least1 attempt to proceed a little farther1 if we do this with a sufficient sense of the very great difficulty of the attempt1 in relation to our power and knowledge1 and consequently with a very humble assurance1 as to the certainty of any opinion which we may be led to form4 ,to know the mind well1 is to know its weaknesses as well as its powers2 and it is precisely in a case of this sort1 that he1 whose knowledge is least imperfect1 will be the best judge of its imperfection1 and1 therefore1 the least disposed to put complete reliance on it in his own speculations1--or to assert it dogmatically1 when he offers it1 as all opinions1 on so very obscure a subject1 should be offered1 to the inquiry1 rather than to the undoubting assent4 ,the analysis1 ,i own1 is one which must require a considerable effort of attention on your part1 because it is truly one of the most subtile on which ,i could call you to enter4 ,but you must be aware1 that this subtlety is in the nature of the very inquiry itself2 since it is an inquiry into the elements and progressive growth of feelings1 which seem to us1 at present1 simple and immediate1 and that the alternatives1 therefore1 are not those of greater or less subtlety and refinement of analysis1 but of attempting the analysis1 or abandoning it altogether4 ,before proceeding farther1 in our inquiry with respect to the origin of the notion of extension1 it may1 however1 be of advantage1 to take a short retrospect of the progress which we have already made2 for1 if we have found nothing more1 we have1 at least1 as ,i conceive1 found reason to reject a considerable part of our former belief on the subject1 which1 though a negative acquisition1 is yet a very important one4 ,though we should not be able to discover the true source of the notion which we seek1 it is something1 at least1 to know1 that we have little reason to expect to find it1 where we have uniformly been accustomed to seek it4 ,in the first place1 then1 we have seen the fallacy of the supposition1 that our knowledge of extension may be easily accounted for1 by the similarity in figure of the compressed part of the organ of touch to the compressing body1 since the notion of extension is not a state of the material organ1 compressed and figured1 which1 as mere matter1 however exquisitely organized1 is as little capable of this notion1 as of smell1 or taste1 love or aversion1 but1 a state of the mind itself1 which is susceptible of shape or pressure1 being as little square1 when it perceives a square1 as when it perceives a circle2 and any affection of which1 therefore1 may be supposed as much to follow any one shape1 as any other shape of the mere external organ4 ,if1 indeed1 as this explanation most strangely seems to assume1 we could be supposed to have any previous knowledge of the shape of our organ of touch1 nothing more would be necessary1 for we should then have a perfect knowledge of extension1 though no other extended body but our own organ of touch were in existence4 ,to refer us to the organ is1 however1 only to bring the very same difficulty one step nearer1 since previously to the application of an external body1 the mind has as little knowledge of the shape of its organ of touch1 as it has of the body compressing it2 and it is manifestly most absurd1 to ascribe the origin of our knowledge of extension1 to our knowledge of the resemblance in figure of an external body to our organ2 since this very knowledge of the resemblance must imply the previous knowledge of the figure of both1 and consequently of that very extension1 which1 according to this supposition1 must be known to us ,,before it is known4 ,in the second place1 we have seen1 that1 if the configuration of the sensorial organ were the only circumstance necessary1 to induce1 immediately1 in mind1 the notion of figure1 this notion should accompany every sensation of every kind2 the smell of a rose1 for example1 as much as the pressure of a cube or a sphere3 for the nervous expansion1 in the organ of smell1 and in every other organ1 is of a certain figure1 before sensation1 during sensation1 and after sensation1 as much as the nervous expansion of the organ of touch4 ,and1 though we were to confine ourselves wholly to this organ1 the nervous matter in it is1 at all times1 of a certain shape1 as much when there is no pressure on it1 as when it is exposed to such pressure2 yet the mere figure of the organ of touch1 is not then accompanied with the mental notion of its figure2 nor is this the case1 merely when the sense is quiescent1 but1 in many cases1 in which it is affected in the most lively manner2 as1 for example1 when we are exposed to great cold or heat1 in which cases1 the shape of this very tactual organ1 thus strongly affected1 is as much unperceived by us1 as when there is no affection of it whatever4 ,lastly1 which is a point of much more importance1 because it has relation to the only philosophic view of touch1 as the immediate organ of extension2 the view1 in which the mere configuration of the compressed organ1 as similar to that of the compressing body1 is laid out of account1 and the immediate belief of extension is supposed to depend on the original constitution of the mind1 by which its affections have been arranged1 so as to correspond with certain affections of the bodily organs2 the mental state which constitutes the perception of a square1 arising immediately when the organ of touch is affected1 in a certain manner1 as that mental state which constitutes the sensation of the fragrance of a rose1 arises immediately1 when the organ of smell is affected1 in a certain manner2 this opinion too1 philosophic as it is1 compared with those which we before considered1 though1 in truth1 it only assumes the point in question1 without attempting to solve any difficulty1 supposed to be connected with it1 we have yet found to be as little tenable1 as the opinions that suppose the mental notion of figure to depend on the peculiar figure of the compressed material organ4 ,the consideration which1 as ,i stated in my last ,lecture1 seems to me decisive on this point1 is1 that1 if touch inform us of extension immediately1 as smell informs us of fragrance1 sight of colour1 and hearing of sound2 it must do this in every instance1 without relation to particular figure1 as smell1 sight1 and hearing1 extend to all odours1 hues1 and sounds2 for it would certainly be1 as ,i said1 a very strange abuse of the license of supposition1 to imagine that we perceive a square immediately by touch1 but not a circle2 or a circle1 but not a square2 or any one figure1 but not any other figure4 ,in short1 if figure be the direct primary object of touch1 as sight is of vision1 we should feel immediately every form impressed1 as we see immediately every colour4 ,it is only when the figures are very simple and regular1 however1 such as we might be supposed to have easily learned1 in the same manner as we learn1 visually1 to judge of distances1 that we are able to discover them1 as it were1 immediately1 by touch2 and1 even when we are able1 in this manner1 to determine the species of figure1 that is to say1 the mere outline of a body1 we are rarely able to determine the exact magnitude which that outline comprehends2 yet1 as our organ must be affected by each part of the compressing surface1 by the central parts1 as much as by the exterior parts which form its outline1 and by these1 as much as by the central parts2 and as every feeling which the organ directly affords1 must be immediate1 when there is no change of the position1 or other circumstances of the object1 that might vary the sensation1 we should1 if mere touch communicated to us the knowledge supposed1 be able to determine1 exactly and instantly1 the magnitude and figure2 or1 it is evident1 that the determination of magnitude and figure must depend wholly1 or in part1 on something that is different from touch4 ,the magnitude we are far from being able to discover exactly1 even of simple figures2 and when the form is very irregular1 and we know nothing more1 than that a certain body is pressed against our hand1--the magnitude and figure are alike difficult to be discovered2 so difficult1 that ,i may safely say1 that no one1 who makes the experiment1 will find1 on opening his eyes1 that his tactual or intellectual measurement has1 in any one case1 been exact1 or his notion of the figure half so distinct as it now is1 after a single glance4 ,can we then think that it is by mere touch we discover figure1 as exactly as by the glance of our mature vision1--that we discover it1 in all its varieties1 originally by touch1 and as accurately at first1 as after innumerable trials1--when we discover it1 only in a few cases1 that are previously familiar to us1 and even in these very imperfectly8 ,the determination of the form impressed1 in which we are almost conscious of a sort of intellectual measurement1 has surely a much greater resemblance to the perceptions1 which we term acquired1 than to those which are immediate4 ,in vision1 for example1 when the original power of that sense has been strengthened and enriched1 by the acquisitions which it is capable of receiving from other sources1 we see a long line of distance before us2 and the small distances with which we are familiar1 we distinguish with sufficient accuracy2 but1 in our visual measurement of greater distances1 we are almost certain to err1 taking often the less for the greater1 and the greater for the less4 ,it is precisely the same in touch4 ,when a small body1 which we have never seen1 is pressed upon our hand1 we are able1 if its surface be square1 or circular1 or of any other form1 with which we are well acquainted1 to determine its figure1 without much hesitation2 because we have learned1 tactually1 to distinguish these regular figures4 ,but1 in endeavouring to determine1 in this manner1 by touch alone1 the figure of any irregular body1 less familiar to us1 though1 as a direct object of sense1 if touch be the sense of figure1 it should be equally and as immediately tangible as the most regular form1 we feel a hesitation of the same sort1 as when we attempt to ascertain by our eye1 the exact distance of a remote object4 ,to know extension or figure1 is to know1 not one point merely in the surface of a body1 but many continuous points2 and if1 when the surface1 is circular1 we know these continuous points1 and their relation to each other1 immediately on pressure1 we must know1 as immediately1 the same points and their relations1 though the surface comprehending them1 instead of being circular1 should be of an outline more irregular4 ,we certainly cannot know this irregular surface to have any extension at all1 unless we know some parts of it2 and1 when the pressure is uniform from every point1 and the organ of touch uniform1 on which the pressure is made1 it would be absurd to suppose1 that we know fifty1 or eighty1 of the hundred points which form the impressing surface1 but cannot determine its figure1 because we are ignorant of the twenty of fifty remaining points2 when these remaining points are acting on our organ of touch1 in exactly the same manner as the fifty or eighty which we know1 and when1 if the surface containing merely the same number of points1 had been circular1 or of any other single form1 as familiar to us1 the whole hundred points would have been known to us equally and at once4 ,when our perceptions of form1 then1 are so various and irregular1 and are more or less quick and precise1 exactly as the shape which we endeavour to determine1 has more or less resemblance to shapes that are familiar to us1 it does not seem too bold an inference to conclude1 that the knowledge of figure1 which1 as all extension that is capable of being perceived by us1 must have some boundary1 is nothing more than the knowledge of extension1 is not the state of mind originally and immediately subsequent to affections of our organs of touch1 any more than the perception of distance is the state of mind originally and immediately subsequent to affections of our organ of sight2 and the very striking analogy of these two cases1 it will be of great importance for you to have constantly in view2 as it will render it less difficult for you to admit many circumstances1 with respect to touch1 which you might otherwise have been slower to conceive4 ,that we should seem to perceive extension immediately by touch1 though touch originally1 and of itself1 could not have afforded this perception1 will not then appear more wonderful1 than the apparently immediate perception of distance by the eye1 which1 of itself1 originally afforded us no perception of that sort2 nor the impossibility of feeling a body1 without the notion of it1 as extended1 be more wonderful than the similar impossibility of separating colour from extension1 in the case of distant vision4 ,above all1 the analogy is valuable1 as shewing the closeness and indissolubleness of the union1 which may be formed of feelings that have in themselves no resemblance4 ,what common properties1 could we have conceived in vision1 and that absolute blindness1 which has never had a single sensation from light6 and1 yet1 it is worthy of remark1 that the perceptions of the blind1 in consequence of this singular power of association1 form truly the most important part of those very perceptions of vision1 of which1 as a whole1 they are unfortunately deprived4 ,we do not merely see with our eyes1 what we may have felt with our hands2 but our eyes1 in the act of vision1 have borrowed1 as it were1 those very sensations4 ,the proof1 that our perception of extension by touch1 is not an original and immediate perception of that sense1 is altogether independent of the success of any endeavour which may be made1 to discover the elements of the compound perception4 ,it would not be less true1 that touch does not afford it1 though we should be incapable of pointing out any other source1 from which it can be supposed to be derived4 ,of the difficulty of the attempt1 and the caution with which we should venture to form any conclusion on the subject1 ,i have already spoken4 ,but the analysis1 difficult as it is1 is too interesting not to be attempted1 even at the risk1 or perhaps ,i should rather say1 with the very great probability1 of failure4 ,in such an analysis1 however1 though we are to proceed with the greatest caution1 it may be necessary to warn you1 that it is a part of this very caution1 not to be easily terrified1 by the appearance of paradox1 which the result of our analysis may present4 ,this appearance we may be certain1 that any analysis which is at all accurate must present1 because the very object of the analysis is to shew1 that sensations1 which appear simple and direct1 are not simple1--that our senses1 in short1 are not fitted1 of themselves1 to convey that information1 which they now appear1 and through the whole course of our memory have appeared to us instantly to convey4 ,it is very far1 indeed from following1 as a necessary consequence1 that every analysis of our sensations which affords a paradoxical result1 is1 therefore1 a just one--for error may be extravagant in appearance as well as in reality4 ,but it may truly be regarded as a necessary consequence1 that every accurate and original analysis of our sensations must afford a result1 that1 as first stated1 will appear paradoxical4 ,to those who are wholly unacquainted with the theory of vision1 nothing certainly can seem1 as first stated1 more absurd than the assertion1 that we see1 not with our eyes merely1 but chiefly by the medium of another organ1 which the blind possess in as great perfection as ourselves1 and which1 at the moment of vision1 may perhaps be absolutely at rest4 ,it must not surprise you1 therefore1 though the element which seems to me to form the most important constituent of our notion of extension should in like manner1 as first stated to you1 seem a very unlikely one4 ,this element is our feeling of succession1 or time--a feeling1 which necessarily1 involves the notion of divisibility or series of parts1 that is so essential a constituent of our more complex notion of matter1--and to which notion of continuous divisibility1 if the notion of resistance be added1 it is scarcely possible for us to imagine1 that we should not have acquired1 by this union1 the very notion of physical extension1--that which has parts1 and that which resists our effort to grasp it4 ,that memory is a part of our mental constitution1 and that we are thus capable of thinking of a series of feelings1 as successive to each other1 the experience of every moment teaches us sufficiently4 ,this succession frequently repeated1 suggests immediately1 or implies the notion of length1 not metaphorically1 as is commonly said1 but as absolutely as extension itself3 and1 the greater the number of the successive feelings may have been1 the greater does this length appear4 ,it is not possible for us to look back on the years of our life1 since they form truly a progressive series1 without regarding them as a sort of length1 which is more distinct indeed1 the nearer the succession of feelings may be to the moment at which we consider them1 but which1 however remote1 is still felt by us as one continued length1 in the same manner1 as when1 after a journey of many hundred miles1 we look back1 in our memory1 on the distance over which we have passed1 we see1 as it were1 a long track of which some parts1 particularly the nearer parts1 are sufficiently distinct1 but of which the rest seems lost in a sort of distant obscurity4 ,the line of our long journeying--or1 in other words1 that almost immeasurable line of plains1 hills1 declivities1 marshes1 bridges1 woods1--to endeavour to comprehend which in our thought1 seems an effort as fatiguing as the very journey itself--we know well1 can be divided into those various parts3--and1 in like manner1 the progressive line of time--or1 in other words1 the continued succession1 of which the joy1 the hope1 the fragrance1 the regret1 the melody1 the fear1 and innumerable other affections of the mind1 were parts1 we feel that we can mentally divide into those separate portions of the train4 ,continuous length and divisibility1 those great elementary notions of space1 and of all that space contains1 are thus found in every succession of our feelings4 ,there is no language in which time is not described as long or short1--not from any metaphor--for no mere arbitrary metaphor can be thus universal1 and inevitable1 as a form of human thought--but because it is truly impossible for us to consider succession1 without this notion of progressive divisibility attached to it3 and it appears to us as absurd to suppose1 that by adding1 to our retrospect of a week1 the events of the month preceding1 we do not truly lengthen the succession1 as it would be to suppose1 that we do not lengthen the line of actual distance1 by adding1 to the few last stages of a long journey1 the many stages that preceded it4 ,it is this spreading out of life into a long expanse1 which allows man to create1 as it were1 his own world4 ,he cannot change1 indeed1 the scene of external things4 ,but this may be said1 in one sense1 to be the residence only of his corporeal part4 ,it is the moral scene in which the spirit truly dwells2 and this adapts itself1 with harmonious loveliness1 or with horror as suitable1 to the character of its pure or guilty inhabitant4 ,if but a single moment of life1--a physical point1 as it were1 of the long line--could be reviewed at once1 conscience would have little power of retribution4 ,but he who has lived1 as man should live1 is permitted to enjoy that best happiness which man can enjoy1--to behold1 in one continued series1 those years of benevolent wishes or of heroic suffering1 which are at once his merit and his reward4 ,he is surrounded by his own pure thoughts and actions1 which1 from the most remote distance1 seem to shine upon him wherever his glance can reach2 as in some climate of perpetual summer1 in which the inhabitant sees nothing but fruits and blossoms1 and inhales only fragrance1 and sunshine1 and delight4 ,it is in a moral climate as serene and cloudless1 that the destined inhabitant of a still nobler world moves on1 in that glorious track1 which has heaven before1 and virtue and tranquillity behind2--and in which it is scarcely possible to distinguish1 in the immortal career1 when the earthly part has ceased1 and the heavenly begins4 ,is it in metaphor only1 that a youth and maturity1 and old age of guilt1 seem to stretch themselves out in almost endless extent1 to that eye which1 with all its shuddering reluctance1 is still condemned to gaze on them1--when1 after the long retrospect seems finished1 some fraud1 or excess1 or oppression1 still rises and adds to the dreadful line--and when eternity itself1 in all the horrors which it presents1 seems only a still longer line of the same dreadful species1 that admits of no other measure1 than the continued sufferings1 and remembrance1 and terrors that compose it6 ,it is a just and beautiful observation of an ancient ,stoic1 that time which is past is like something consecrated to the gods1 over which fortune and mortality have no longer any power1 and that1 dreadful as it must be to the wicked1 to whom their own memory is an object of terror1 it still1 to the virtuous1 offers itself as a consolation or joy--not in single moments like the present hour1 but in all that long series of years which rises before us1 and remains with us at our bidding4 8,ille qui multa ambitios cupiit1 superb contempsit1 insidios decepit1 avar rapuit1 prodig effudit1--necesse est memoriam suam timeat4 ,atqui hc est pars temporis nostri sacra ac dedicata1 omnes humanos casus supergressa1 extra regnum fortun subducta2 quam non inopia1 non metus1 non morborum incursus exagitat4 ,hc nec turbari nec eripi potest2 perpetua ejus et intrepida possessio est4 ,singuli tantm dies1 et hi per momenta1 prsentis sunt3 at prteriti temporis omnes1 cum jusseris aderunt1 ad arbitrium tuum se inspici ac detineri patientur40 ,by those1 who can look back on years that are long past1 and yet say1 that the continued progress1 or the length and the shortness of time1 are only metaphorical expressions1 it might be said with equal justness1 that the roundness of a sphere1 is a metaphor1 or the angularity of a cube4 ,we do not more truly consider the one as angular and the other as round1 than we consider the time to be continuously progressive1 in which we considered1 first the one figure1 and then the other1 and inquired into the properties of each4 ,that which is progressive must have parts4 ,time1 or succession1 then involves the very notions of longitudinal extension and divisibility1 and involves these1 without the notion of any thing external to the mind itself2--for though the mind of man had been susceptible only of joy1 grief1 fear1 hope1 and the other varieties of internal feeling1 without the possibility of being affected by external things1 he would still have been capable of considering these feelings1 as successive to each other1 in a long continued progression1 divisible into separate parts4 ,the notions of length1 then1 and of divisibility1 are not confined to external things1 but are involved1 in that very memory1 by which we consider the series of the past1--not in the memory of distant events only1 but in those first successions of feeling1 by which the mind originally became conscious of its own permanence and identity4 ,the notion of time1 then1 is precisely coeval with that of the mind itself2 since it is implied in the knowledge of succession1 by which alone1 in the manner formerly explained to you1 the mind acquires the knowledge of its own reality1 as something more than the mere sensation of the present moment4 ,conceiving the notion of time1 therefore1 that is to say of feelings past and present1 to be thus one of the earliest notions which the infant mind can form1 so as to precede its notions of external things1 and to involve the notions of length and divisibility1 ,i am inclined to reverse exactly the process commonly supposed2 and1 instead of deriving the measure of time from extension1 to derive the knowledge and original measure of extension from time4 ,that one notion or feeling of the mind may be united indissolubly with other feelings1 with which it has frequently coexisted1 and to which1 but for this coexistence1 it would seem to have no common relation1 is sufficiently shown by those phenomena of vision to which ,i have already so frequently alluded4 ,in what manner1 however1 is the notion of time peculiarly associated with the simple sensation of touch1 so as to form1 with it1 the perception of extension8 ,we are able1 in the theory of vision1 to point out the coexistence of sensations which produce the subsequent union2 that renders the perception of distance apparently immediate4 ,if a similar coexistence of the original sensations of touch1 with the notion of continued and divisible succession1 cannot be pointed out in the present case1 the opinion which asserts it1 must be considered merely as a wild and extravagant conjecture4 ,the source of such a coexistence is not merely to be found1 but is at least as obvious1 as that which is universally admitted in the case of vision4 ,before ,i proceed1 however1 to state to you1 in what way ,i conceive the notion to be acquired1 ,i must again warn you of the necessity of banishing1 as much as possible1 from your view of the mind of the infant in this early process1 all those notions of external things1 which we are so apt to regard as almost original in the mind1 because we do not remember the time1 when they arose in our own4 ,as we know well1 that there are external things1 of a certain form1 acting on our organs1 which are also of a certain form1 it seems so very simple a process1 to perceive extension--that is to say1 to know that there exist without us those external forms1 which really exist--that to endeavour to discover the mode1 in which extension1 that now appears so obvious a quality of external things1 is perceived by us1 seems to be a needless search1 at a distance1 for what is already before our very eyes4 ,and it will be allowed1 that all this would1 indeed1 be very easy to a mind like ours1 after the acquisitions of knowledge which it has made2 but the difficulty of the very question is1 how the mind of the infant makes these acquisitions1 so as to become like ours4 ,you must not think of a mind1 that has any knowledge of things external1 even of its own bodily organs1 but of a mind simply affected with certain feelings1 and having nothing but these feelings to lead it to the knowledge of things without4 ,to proceed1 then1--,the hand is the great organ of touch4 ,it is composed of various articulations1 that are easily moveable1 so as to adapt it readily to changes of shape1 in accommodation to the shape of the bodies which it grasps4 ,if we shut our hand gradually1 or open it gradually1 we find a certain series of feelings1 varying with each degree of the opening or closing1 and giving the notion of succession of a certain length4 ,in like manner1 if we gradually extend our arms1 in various directions1 or bring them nearer to us again1 we find that each degree of the motion is accompanied with a feeling that is distinct1 so as to render us completely conscious of the progression4 ,the gradual closing of the hand1 therefore1 must necessarily give a succession of feelings1--a succession1 which1 of itself1 might1 or rather must1 furnish the notion of length1 in the manner before stated1 the length being different1 according to the degree of the closing2 and the gradual stretching out of the arm gives a succession of feelings1 which1 in like manner1 must furnish the notion of length1--the length being different according to the degree of the stretching of the arm4 ,to those who have had opportunities of observing infants1 ,i need not say1 how much use1 or rather what constant use1 the future inquirer makes of his little fingers and arms2 by the frequent contraction of which1 and the consequent renewal of the series of feelings involved in each gradual contraction1 he cannot fail to become so well acquainted with the progress1 as to distinguish each degree of contraction1 and1 at last1 after innumerable repetitions1 to associate with each degree the notion of a certain length of succession4 ,the particular contraction1 therefore1 when thus often repeated1 becomes the representative of a certain length1 in the same manner as shades of colour1 in vision become ultimately representative of distance1--the same principle of association1 which forms the combination in the one case1 operating equally in the other4 ,in these circumstances of acquired knowledge1--after the series of muscular feelings1 in the voluntary closing of the hand1 has become so familiar1 that the whole series is anticipated and expected1 as soon as the motion has begun1--when a ball1 or any other substance1 is placed for the first time in the infant's hand1 he feels that he can no longer perform the usual contraction1--or1 in other words1 since he does not fancy that he has muscles which are contracted1 he feels that the usual series of sensations does not follow his will to renew it1--he knows how much of the accustomed succession is still remaining2 and the notion of this particular length1 which was expected1 and interrupted by a new sensation1 is thus associated with the particular tactual feeling excited by the pressure of the ball1--the greater or less magnitude of the ball preventing a greater or less portion of the series of feelings in the accustomed contraction4 ,by the frequent repetition of this tactual feeling1 as associated with that feeling1 which attends a certain progress of contraction1 the two feelings at last flow together1 as in the acquired perceptions of vision2 and when the process has been repeated with various bodies innumerable times1 it becomes1 at last1 as impossible to separate the mere tactual feeling1 from the feeling of length1 as to separate the whiteness of a sphere1 in vision1 from that convexity of the sphere1 which the eye1 of itself1 would have been forever incapable of perceiving4 ,as yet1 however1 the only dimension of the knowledge1 of which we have traced the origin1 is mere length2 and it must still be explained1 how we acquire the knowledge of the other dimensions4 ,if we had had but one muscle1 it seems to me very doubtful1 whether it would have been possible for us1 to have associated with touch any other notion than that of mere length4 ,but nature has made provision1 for giving us a wider knowledge1 in the various muscles1 which she has distributed over different parts1 so as to enable us to perform motions in various directions at the same instant1 and thus to have coexisting series of feelings1 each of which series was before considered as involving the notion of length4 ,the infant bends one finger gradually on the palm of his hand2 the finger1 thus brought down1 touches one part of the surface of the palm1 producing a certain affection of the organ of touch1 and a consequent sensation2 and he acquires the notion of a certain length1 in the remembered succession of the muscular feelings during the contraction3--he bends another finger2 it1 too1 touches a certain part of the surface of the palm1 producing a certain feeling of touch1 that coexists and combines1 in like manner1 with the remembrance of a certain succession of muscular feelings4 ,when both fingers move together1 the coexistence of the two series of successive feelings1 with each of which the mind is familiar1 gives the notion of coexisting lengths1 which receive a sort of unity1 from the proximity in succession of the tactual feelings in the contiguous parts of the palm which they touch1--feelings1 which have before been found to be proximate1 when the palm has been repeatedly pressed along a surface1 and the tactual feelings of these parts1 which the closing fingers touch at the same moment1 were always immediately successive1--as immediately successive1 as any of the muscular feelings in the series of contraction4 ,when a body is placed in the infant's hand1 and its little fingers are bent by it as before1 sometimes one finger only is impeded in its progress1 sometimes two1 sometimes three1--and he thus adds to the notion of mere length1 which would have been the same1 whatever number of fingers had been impeded1 the notion of a certain number of proximate and coexisting lengths1 which is the very notion of breadth2 and with these1 according as the body is larger or smaller1 is combined always the tactual affection produced by the pressure of the body1 on more1 or fewer1 of the interior parts of the palm1 and fingers1 which had before become1 of themselves1 representative of certain lengths1 in the manner described2 and the concurrence of these three varieties of length1 in the single feeling of resistance1 in which they all seem to meet1 when an incompressible body is placed within the sphere of the closing fingers1--however rude the notions of concurring dimensions may be1 or rather must be1 as at first formed1--seems at least to afford the rude elements1 from which1 by the frequent repetition of the feeling of resistance1 together with the proximate lengths1 of which it has become representative1 clearer notions of the kind may gradually arise4 ,the progressive contractions of the various muscles which move the arms1 as affording similar successions of feelings1 may be considered in precisely the same light1 as sources of the knowledge of extension2 and1 by their motion in various directions1 at the same time with the motion of the fingers1 they concur powerfully1 in modifying1 and correcting1 the information received from these4 ,the whole hand is brought1 by the motion of the arm1 to touch one part of the face or body2 it is then moved1 so as to touch another part1 and1 with the frequent succession of the simple feelings of touch1 in these parts1 is associated the feeling of the intervening length1 derived from the sensations that accompanied the progressive contraction of the arm4 ,but the motion is not always the same2 and1 as the same feeling of touch1 in one part1 is thus followed by various feelings of touch in different parts1 with various series of muscular feelings between1 the notion of length in various directions1 that is to say1 of length in various series commencing from one power1 is obtained in another way4 ,that the knowledge of extension1 or in other words1 the association of the notion of succession with the simple feelings of touch1 will be rude and indistinct at first1 ,i have already admitted2 but it will gradually become more and more distinct and precise3 as we can have no doubt1 that the perception of distance by the eye1 is1 in the first stages of visual association1 very indistinct1 and becomes clearer after each repeated trial4 ,for many weeks or months1 all is confusion in the visual perceptions1 as much as in the tactual and muscular4 ,indeed1 we have abundant evidence of this continued progress of vision1 even in mature life1 when1 in certain professions that require nice perceptions of distance1 the power of perception itself1 by the gradual acquisitions which it obtains from experience1 seems to unfold itself more and more1 in proportion to the wants that require it4 ,the theory of the notion of extension1 of which ,i have now given you but a slight outline1 might1 if the short space of these ,lectures allowed sufficient room1 be developed with many illustrations1 which it is now impossible to give to it4 ,i must leave you1 in some measure1 to supply these for yourselves4 ,it may be thought1 indeed1 that the notion of time1 or succession1 is1 in this instance1 a superfluous incumbrance of the theory1 and that the same advantage might be obtained1 by supposing the muscular feelings themselves1 independently of the notion of their succession1 to be connected with the notion of particular lengths4 ,but this opinion1 it must be remarked1 would leave the difficulty precisely as before2 and sufficient evidence in confutation of it1 may be found in a very simple experiment1 which it is in the power of any one to make4 ,the experiment ,i cannot but consider as of the more value1 since it seems to me1--,i will not say decisive1 for that is too presumptuous a word1--but strongly corroborative of the theory1 which ,i have ventured to propose2 for it shows1 that1 even after all the acquisitions1 which our sense of touch has made1 the notion of extension is still modified1 in a manner the most striking and irresistible1 by the mere change of accustomed time4 ,let any one1 with his eyes shut1 move his hand1 with moderate velocity1 along a part of a table1 or any other hard smooth surface1 the portion1 over which he presses1 will appear of a certain length2 let him move his hand more rapidly1 the portion of the surface pressed will appear less2 let him move his hand very slowly1 and the length1 according to the degree of the slowness1 will appear increased1 in a most wonderful proportion4 ,in this case1 there is precisely the same quantity of muscular contraction1 and the same quantity of the organ of touch compressed1 whether the motion be rapid1 moderate1 or slow4 ,the only circumstance of difference is the time1 occupied in the succession of the feelings2 and this difference is sufficient to give complete diversity to the notion of length4 ,if any one1 with his eyes shut1 suffer his hand to be guided by another1 very slowly along any surface unknown to him1 he will find it impossible to form any accurate guess as to its length4 ,but it is not necessary1 that we should be previously unacquainted with the extent of surface1 along which the motion is performed2 for the illusion will be nearly the same1 and the experiment1 of course1 be still more striking1 when the motion is along a surface with which we are perfectly familiar1 as a book which we hold in our hand1 or a desk at which we are accustomed to sit4 ,i must request you1 not to take for granted the result which ,i have now stated1 but to repeat for yourselves an experiment1 which it is so very easy to make1 and which1 ,i cannot but think is so very important1 as to the influence of mere difference of time1 in our estimation of longitudinal extent4 ,it is an experiment1 tried1 unquestionably1 in most unfavourable circumstances1 when our tactual feelings1 representative of extension1 are so strongly fixed1 by the long experience of our life2 and yet1 even now1 you will find1 on moving your hand1 slowly and rapidly1 along the same extent of surface1 though with precisely the same degree of pressure in both cases1 that it is as difficult to conceive the extent1 thus slowly and rapidly traversed1 to be the same1 as it is difficult to conceive the extent of visual distance to be exactly the same1 when you look alternately through the different ends of an inverted telescope4 ,if when all other circumstances are the same1 the different visual feelings1 arising from difference of the mere direction of light1 be representative of length1 in the one case1--the longer or shorter succession of time1 when all other circumstances are the same1 has surely as much reason to be considered as representative of it1 in the other case4 ,are we1 then1 to believe1 that the feeling of extension1 or1 in other words1 of the definite figure of bodies1 is a simple feeling of touch1 immediate1 original1 and independent of time2 or is there not rather reason to think1 as ,i have endeavoured to show1 that it is a compound feeling1 of which time1 that is to say1 our notion of succession1 is an original element8 ,,lecture ,,xxv4 ,,on ,,the ,,distinction ,,between ,,sensation ,,and ,,perception1--,,and ,,between ,,the ,,primary ,,and ,,secondary ,,qualities ,,of ,,matter4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 was chiefly employed in considering the nature of that complex process which takes place in the mind1 when we ascribe the various classes of our sensations to their various external objects1--to the analysis of which process we were led1 by the importance which ,dr ,reid has attached to the distinction of sensation and perception2--a sensation1 as understood by him1 being the simple feeling that immediately follows the action of an external body on any of our organs of sense1 considered merely as a feeling of the mind2 the corresponding perception being a reference of this feeling to the external body as its cause4 ,the distinction ,i allowed to be a convenient one1 if the nature of the complex process which it expresses be rightly understood4 ,the only question that seemed1 philosophically1 of importance1 with respect to it1 was1 whether the perception in this sense1--the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause1--imply1 as ,dr ,reid contends1 a peculiar mental power1 coextensive with sensation1 to be distinguished by a peculiar name in the catalogue of our faculties1 or be not merely one of the results of a more general power1 which is afterwards to be considered by us1--the power of association1--by which one feeling suggests1 or induces1 other feelings that have formerly coexisted with it4 ,it would be needless to recapitulate the argument minutely1 in its relation to all the senses4 ,that of smell1 which ,dr ,reid has himself chosen as an example1 will be sufficient for our retrospect4 ,certain particles of odorous matter act on my nostrils1--a peculiar sensation of fragrance arises1--,i refer this sensation to a rose4 ,this reference1 which is unquestionably something superadded to the original sensation itself1 is what ,dr ,reid terms the perception of the fragrant body4 ,but what is the reference itself1 and to what source is it to be ascribed8 ,that we should have supposed our sensations to have had a cause of some sort1 as we suppose a cause of all our feelings internal as well as external1 may indeed be admitted4 ,but if ,i had had no other sense than that of smell1--if ,i had never seen a rose1--or1 rather1 since the knowledge which vision affords is chiefly of a secondary kind1 if ,i had no mode of becoming acquainted with the compound of extension and resistance1 which the mere sensations of smell1 it is evident1 are incapable of affording1--could ,i have made this reference of my sensation to a quality of a fragrant body8 ,could ,i1 in short1 have had more than the mere sensation itself1 with that general belief of a cause of some sort1 which is not confined to our sensations1 but is common to them with all our other feelings8 ,by mere smell1 as it appears to me1 ,i could not have become acquainted with the existence of corporeal substances1--in the sense in which we now understand the term corporeal1--nor1 consequently1 with the qualities of corporeal substances2 and1 if so1 how could ,i have had that perception of which ,dr ,reid speaks1--that reference to a fragrant body1 of which1 as a body1 ,i was before in absolute ignorance8 ,i should1 indeed1 have ascribed the sensation to some cause or antecedent1 like every other feeling2 but ,i could as little have ascribed it to a bodily cause1 as any feeling of joy or sorrow4 ,i refer it now to a rose2 because1 being endowed with other sensitive capacities1 ,i have previously learned1 from another source1 the existence of causes without1 extended and resisting1--because ,i have previously touched or seen a rose1 when the sensation of fragrance coexisted with my visual or tactual sensation2 and all which distinguishes the perception from the mere sensation1 is this suggestion of former experience1 which reminds me now of other feelings1 with the continuance or cessation of which1 in innumerable former instances1 the fragrance itself also continued or ceased4 ,the perception in short1 in smell1 taste1 hearing1 is a sensation suggesting1 by association1 the notion of some extended and resisting substance1 fragrant1 vapid1 vibratory1--a notion which smell alone1 taste alone1 hearing alone1 never could have afforded2 but which1 when once received from any other source1 may be suggested by these as readily as any other associate feeling that has frequently coexisted with them4 ,to the simple primary sensations of vision the same remark may be applied4 ,a mere sensation of colour could not have made me acquainted with the existence of bodies1 that would resist my effort to grasp them4 ,it is only in one sense1 therefore1--that which affords us the knowledge of resistance1--that any thing like original perception can be found2 and even in this1 the process of perception1 as ,i formerly explained to you1 implies no peculiar power1 but only common sensations1 with associations and inferences of precisely the same kind1 as those which are continually taking place in all our reasonings and trains of thought4 ,extension and resistance1 ,i need scarcely repeat1 are the complex elements of what we term matter2 and nothing is matter to our conception1 or a body1 to use the simpler synonymous term1 which does not involve these elements4 ,if we had no other sense than that of smell1 and1 therefore1 could not have referred the sensations to any fragrant body1 what1 in ,dr ,reid's meaning of this term1 would the supposed power of perception1 in these circumstances1 have been8 ,what would it have been1 in like manner1 if we had had only the sense of taste in sweetness and bitterness1--or of hearing in melody1--or of vision in colour1--without the capacity of knowing light as a material substance1 or the bodies that vibrated1 or the bodies of another kind that were sweet or bitter8 ,it is only by the sense of touch1 or1 at least1 by that class of perceptions which ,dr ,reid ascribes to touch1--and which1 therefore1 though traced by us1 in part1 to another source1 ,i1 for brevity's sake1 comprehend under that term in our present discussion1--it is only by touch that we become acquainted with those elements which are essential to our very notion of a body2 and to touch1 therefore1 in his own view of it1 we must be indebted1 directly or indirectly1 as often as we refer the sensations of any other class to a corporeal cause4 ,even in the supposed perceptions of touch itself1 however1 as we have seen1 the reference of our feelings to an external cause is not demonstrative of any peculiar power of the mind1 to be classed separately from its other faculties4 ,but when a body is first grasped1 in infancy1 by fingers that have been accustomed to contract without being impeded1 we learn to consider the sensation as the result of a cause that is different from our own mind1 because it breaks an accustomed series of feelings1 in which all the antecedents1 felt by us at the time1 were such as were before uniformly followed by a different consequent1 and were expected1 therefore1 to have again their usual consequent4 ,the cause of the new sensation1 which is thus believed to be something different from our sentient self1 is regarded by us as something which has parts1 and which resists our effort1 that is to say1 as an external body2--because the muscular feeling1 excited by the object grasped is1 in the first place1 the very feeling of that which we term resistance2 and1 secondly1 because1 by uniformly supplying the place of a definite portion of a progressive series of feelings1 it becomes ultimately representative of that particular length of series1 or number of parts1 of which it thus uniformly supplies the place4 ,perception1 then1 even in that class of feelings by which we learn to consider ourselves as surrounded by substances extended and resisting1 is only another name1 as ,i have said1 for the result of certain associations and inferences that flow from other more general principles of the mind2 and with respect to all our other sensations1 it is only another name for the suggestion of these very perceptions of touch1 or at least of the feelings1 tactual and muscular1 which are1 by ,dr ,reid1 ascribed to that single sense4 ,if we had been unsusceptible of these tactual and muscular feelings1 and1 consequently1 had never conceived the existence of any thing extended and resisting till the sensation of fragrance1 colour1 sweetness1 or sound had arisen1 we should1 after any one or all of these sensations1 have still known as little of bodies without1 as if no sensation whatever had been excited4 ,the distinction1 then1 on which ,dr ,reid has founded so much1 involves1 in his view of it1 and in the view that is generally taken of it1 a false conception of the nature of the process which he describes4 ,the two words sensation and perception1 are1 indeed1 as ,i have already remarked1 very convenient for expressing1 in one case1 the mere existence of an external feeling1--in the other case1 the reference which the percipient mind has made of this feeling to an external cause4 ,but this reference is all1 which the perception superadds to the sensation2--and the source of the reference itself we are still left to seek1 in the other principles of our intellectual nature4 ,we have no need1 however1 to invent a peculiar power of the mind for producing it2 since there are other principles of our nature1 from which it may readily be supposed to flow1--the principle by which we are led to believe1 that every new consequent1 in a train of changes1 must have had a new antecedent of some sort in the train1--and the principle of association1 by which feelings1 that have usually coexisted1 suggest or become representative of each other4 ,with these principles1 it certainly is not wonderful1 that when the fragrance of a rose has uniformly affected our sense of smell1 as often as the flower itself was presented to us1 we should ascribe the fragrance to the flower which we have seen and handled2--but though it would not be wonderful1 that we should make it1 it would indeed be wonderful1 if1 with these principles1 we did not make that very reference1 for which ,dr ,reid thinks it necessary to have recourse to a peculiar faculty of perception4 ,such1 then1 is the view1 which ,i would take of that distinction of sensation and perception1 which ,dr ,reid1 and the philosophers who have followed him1 and many of philosophers1 too1 that preceded him1--for the distinction1 as ,i have said1 is far from being an original one1--have understood in a different sense2 in consequence1 as ,i cannot but think1 of a defective analysis of the mental process1 which constitutes the reference of our feelings of this class to causes that are without4 ,there is another distinction1 which he has adopted from the philosophers that preceded him1 and which forms an important part of his system of perception1--a distinction1 that is just to a certain extent1--though not to the full extent1 and in the precise manner1 in which he and other writers have maintained2--and with respect to which1 therefore1 it will be necessary to point out to you1 how far ,i conceive it to be safely admissible4 ,i allude to the division1 which has been formed of the primary and secondary qualities of matter4 8,every one knows that extension1 divisibility1 figure1 motion1 solidity1 hardness1 softness1 and fluidity1 were by ,mr ,locke called primary qualities of body2 and that sound1 colour1 taste1 smell1 and heat or cold1 were called secondary qualities4 ,is there a just foundation for this distinction8 ,is there any thing common to the primary1 which belongs not to the secondary8 ,and what is it8 8,i answer1 that there appears to me to be a real foundation for the distinction2 and it is this3 ,that our senses give us a direct and a distinct notion of the primary qualities1 and inform us what they are in themselves2 but of the secondary qualities1 our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion4 ,they inform us only1 that they are qualities that affect us in a certain manner1 that is1 produce in us a certain sensation2 but as to what they are in themselves1 our senses leave us in the dark4 8,the notion we have of primary qualities is direct1 and not relative only4 ,a relative notion of the thing1 is1 strictly speaking1 no notion of the thing at all1 but only of some relation which it bears to something else4 8,thus gravity sometimes signifies the tendency of bodies towards the earth2 sometimes it signifies the cause of that tendency3 ,when it means the first1 ,i have a direct and distinct notion of gravity3 ,i see it1 and feel it1 and know perfectly what it is2 but this tendency must have a cause3 ,we give the same name to the cause2 and that cause has been an object of thought and of speculation4 ,now what notion have we of this cause1 when we think and reason about it8 ,it is evident1 we think of it as an unknown cause1 of a known effect4 ,this is a relative notion1 and it must be obscure2 because it gives us no conception of what the thing is1 but of what relation it bears to something else4 ,every relation which a thing unknown bears to something that is known1 may give a relative notion of it2 and there are many objects of thought1 and of discourse1 of which our faculties can give no better than a relative notion4 8,having premised these things to explain what is meant by a relative notion1 it is evident1 that our notion of primary qualities is not of this kind2 we know what they are1 and not barely what relation they bear to something else4 8,it is otherwise with secondary qualities4 ,if you ask me1 what is that quality or modification in a rose which ,i call its smell1 ,i am at a loss to answer directly4 ,upon reflection ,i find1 that ,i have a distinct notion of the sensation which it produces in my mind4 ,but there can be nothing like to this sensation in the rose1 because it is insentient4 ,the quality in the rose is something which occasions the sensations in me2 but what that something is1 ,i know not4 ,my senses give me no information upon this point4 ,the only notion1 therefore1 my senses give is this1 ,that smell in the rose is an unknown quality or modification1 which is the cause or occasion of a sensation which ,i know well4 ,the relation which this unknown quality bears to the sensation with which nature hath connected it1 is all ,i learn from the sense of smelling2 but this is evidently a relative notion4 ,the same reasoning will apply to every secondary quality4 8,thus ,i think it appears1 that there is a real foundation for the distinction of primary from secondary qualities2 and that they are distinguished by this1 that of the primary we have by our senses a direct and distinct notion2 but of the secondary only a relative notion1 which must1 because it is only relative1 be obscure2 they are conceived only as the unknown causes or occasions of certain sensations with which we are well acquainted40#ib ,though1 as ,i have explained to you fully1 in my former ,lectures1 we should not1--at least in far the greater number of our sensations1--have considered them1 originally1 as proceeding from external causes1 we yet1 after the acquisitions of knowledge1 with which the first years of our life enrich us1 believe1 that there is an external cause of all our sensations1--of smells and tastes1 as much as of those feelings of the mind1 which constitute our notions of extension and resistance4 ,but the difference1 in these cases1 is1 that though we learn1 by experience of certain successions or co-existences of feelings1 to refer to a corporeal cause our sensations of fragrance1 and various other species of sensations1 there is nothing in the sensation of fragrance itself1 or in the other analogous sensations1 of which ,i speak1 that might not indicate as much a cause directly spiritual1 as a cause like that to which we at present give the name of body1--while the very notion of extension and resistance combined1 seems necessarily to indicate a material cause1 or rather is truly that which constitutes our very notion of matter4 ,we believe1 indeed1 that our sensations of fragrance1 sweetness1 sound1 have causes of some sort1 as truly as we believe1 that our feelings of extension and resistance have a cause1 or causes of some sort2 but if we have previously given the name of matter1 with direct reference to the one set of effects1 and not with direct reference to the other1 it necessarily follows1 that1 in relation to matter1 as often as we speak or think of it1 the qualities which correspond with the one set of effects1 that have led us to use that name1 must be regarded by us as primary1 and the others1 which may1 or may not coexist with these1 only as secondary4 ,an external body may1 or may not be fragrant1 because fragrance is not one of the qualities previously included by us in our definition of a body2 but it must be extended1 and present an obstacle to our compressing force1 because these are the very qualities1 which we have included in our definition1 and without which1 therefore1 the definition must cease to be applicable to the thing defined4 ,if1 originally1 we had invented the word matter to denote the cause1 whatever it might be1 of our sensations of smell1 it is very evident1 that fragrance would then have been to us the primary quality of matter1 as being that which was essential to our definition of matter1--and all other qualities1 by which the cause of smell might1 or might not at the same time affect our other senses1 would then have been secondary qualities only1--as being qualities compatible with our definition of matter1 but not essential to it4 ,what we now term matter1 however1 ,i have repeatedly observed1--is that which we consider as occupying space1 and resisting our effort to compress it2 and those qualities of matter may well be said to be primary1 by which matter itself1 as thus defined1 becomes known to us1--or by the union of which1 in our conception1 we form the complex notion of matter1 and give or withhold that name according as these qualities are present or absent4 ,extension and resistance are the distinguishing qualities that direct us in all our applications of the word which comprehends them4 ,they are truly primary qualities1 therefore2 since1 without our consideration of them1 we never could have formed the complex notion of the substance itself1 to which we afterwards1 in our analysis of that complex notion1 ascribe them separately as qualities2--and all the other qualities1 which we may afterwards find occasion to refer to an extended resisting substance1 must evidently be secondary1 in reference to those qualities1 without which as previously combined in our thought1 we could not have had the primary notion of the substance to which we thus secondarily refer them4 ,if1 in the case which we have already frequently imagined1 of the single sense of smell1 we had been absolutely unsusceptible of every other external feeling1 we might1 indeed1 have considered our sensation as the effect of some cause1--and even of a cause that was different from our mind itself2 but it is very evident that we could not have considered it as the effect of the presence of matter1 at least as that term is now understood by us4 ,if1 in these circumstances1--after frequent repetition of the fragrance1 as the only quality of bodies with which we could be acquainted1--we were to acquire in an instant all the other senses which we now possess1--so as to become capable of forming that complex notion of things extended and resisting1 which is our present notion of matter1 we should then1 indeed1 have a fuller notion of the rose1 of the mere fragrance of which we before were sensible1 without knowing of what it was the fragrance1 and might learn to refer the fragrance to the rose1 by the same coexistences of sensations which have led us1 in our present circumstances1 to combine the fragrance with other qualities1 in the complex conception of the flower4 ,even then1 however1 though the fragrance1 which was our first sensation1 had truly been known to us before the other qualities1 and though the sensation1 therefore1 would deserve the name of primary1 the reference of this earlier feeling to the external rose as its cause1 would still truly be secondary to the earlier reference1 or rather to the earlier combination of other qualities1 in one complex whole1 by which we had formed to ourselves the notion of the extended and resisting rose1 as a body1 that admitted the subsequent reference of the delightful sensation of fragrance to be made to it1 as the equal cause of these different effects4 ,in this sense1 then1 the distinction of the primary and secondary qualities of matter is just1--that1 whatever qualities we refer to a material cause must be1 in reference1 secondary to those qualities that are essential to our very notion of the body1 to which the subsequent reference of the other qualities is made4 ,we have formed our definition of matter2 and1 as in every other definition of every sort1 the qualities included in the definition1 must always1 in comparison of other qualities1 be primary and essential1 relatively to the thing defined4 ,nor is this all4--,it will be admitted likewise1 that the qualities termed primary1--which alone are included in our general definitions of matter1 and which are all1 as we have seen1 modifications of mere extension and resistance1 are1 even after we have learned to consider the causes of all our sensations as substances external to the mind1 still felt by us to be external1 with more clearness and vividness1 than the other qualities1 which we term secondary4 ,the difference is partly1 and chiefly1 in the nature of the sensations themselves1 as already explained to you1 but depends also1 ,i conceive1 in no inconsiderable degree1 on the permanence and universality of the objects which possess the primary qualities1 and the readiness with which we can renew our feeling of them at will1 from the constant presence of our own bodily frame1 itself extended and resisting1 and of the other causes of these feelings of extension and resistance1 that seem to be every where surrounding us4 ,tastes1 smells1 sounds1--even colours though more lasting than these--are not always before us2--but there is not a moment at which we cannot1 by the mere stretching of our hand1 produce at pleasure1 the feeling of something extended and resisting4 ,it is a very natural effect of this difference1 that the one set of causes which are always before us1 should seem to us1 therefore1 peculiarly permanent1 and the other set1 that are only occasionally present1 should seem almost as fugitive as our sensations themselves4 ,in these most important respects1 there is1 then1 a just ground for the distinction of the primary from the secondary qualities of bodies4 ,they are primary in the order of our definition of matter2 and they are felt by us as peculiarly permanent1 independently of our feelings1 which they seem at every moment ready to awake4 ,the power of affecting us with smell1 taste1 sight1 or hearing1 may or may not be present2 but the power of exciting the feelings of extension and resistance is constantly present1 and is regarded by us as essential to our very notion of matter1--or1 in other words1 we give the name of matter1 only where this complex perception is excited in us4 ,we seem1 therefore1 to be constantly surrounded with a material world of substances extended and resisting1 that is to say1 a world of substances capable of exciting in us the feelings which are ascribed to the primary quality of matter2--but still the feeling of these primary qualities1 which we regard as permanent1 is not less than the feeling of the secondary qualities1 a state or affection of the mind1 and nothing more2--and in the one case1 as much as in the other1 in the perception of the qualities termed secondary1 as much as of the qualities termed primary1 the feeling1 when it occurs1 is the direct or immediate result of the presence of the external body with the quality of which it corresponds2--or1 if there be any difference in this respect1 ,i conceive that our feeling of fragrance1 or sweetness1 was1 originally at least1 a more immediate result of the presence of odorous or sapid particles1--than any feeling of extension1 without the mind1 was the effect of the first body which we touched4 ,to the extent which ,i have now stated1 then1 the difference of these classes of qualities may be admitted4 ,but as to the other differences asserted1 they seem to be founded on a false view of the nature of perception4 ,i cannot discover any thing in the sensations themselves1 corresponding with the primary and secondary qualities1 which is direct1 as ,dr ,reid says1 in the one case1 and only relative in the other4 ,all are relative1 in his sense of the term1 and equally relative1--our perception of extension and resistance1 as much as our perception of fragrance or bitterness4 ,our feeling of extension is not itself matter1 but a feeling excited by matter4 ,we ascribe1 indeed1 our sensations as effects to external objects that excite them2 but it is only by the medium of our sensations that these1 in any case1 become known to us as objects4 ,to say that our perception of extension is not relative1 to a certain external cause of this perception1 direct or indirect1 as our perception of fragrance is relative to a certain external cause1 would be to say that our perception of extension1 induced by the presence of an external cause1 is not a mental phenomenon1 as much as the perception of fragrance1 but is something more than a state of the mind2 for1 if the perception of extension be1 as all our perceptions and other feelings must surely be1 a mental phenomenon1 a state of mind1 not of matter1 the reference made of this to an external cause1 must be only to something which is conceived relatively as the cause of this feeling4 ,what matter is independently of our perception1 we know not1 and cannot know1 for it is only by our sensations that we can have any connexion with it2 and even though we were supposed to have our connexion with it enlarged1 by various senses additional to those which we possess at present1 and our acquaintance with it1 therefore1 to be far more minute1 this very knowledge1 however widely augmented1 must itself be a mental phenomenon1 in like manner1 the reference of which1 to matter1 as an external cause1 would still be relative only like our present knowledge4 ,that the connexion of the feeling of extension1 with a corporeal substance really existing without1 depends on the arbitrary arrangement made by the ,deity2 and that all of which we are conscious might1 therefore1 have existed1 as at present1 though no external cause had been1 ,dr ,reid1 who ascribes to an intuitive principle1 our belief of an external universe1 virtually allows2 and this very admission surely implies1 that the notion does not1 directly and necessarily1 involve the existence of any particular cause1 whatever it may be in itself1 by which the ,deity has thought proper to produce the corresponding feeling of our mind4 ,it is quite evident1 that we cannot1 in this case1 appeal to experience1 to inform us what sensations or perceptions are more or less direct2 for experience1 strictly understood1 does not extend beyond the feelings of our own mind1 unless in this very relative belief itself1 that there are certain external causes of our feelings1--causes which it is impossible for us not to conceive as really existing1 but of which we know nothing more than that our feelings1 in all that wide variety of states of mind1 which we express briefly by the terms sensation or perception1 are made to depend on them4 ,in the series of states in which the mind has existed1 from the first moment of our life1 to the present hour1 the feelings of extension1 resistance1 joy1 sorrow1 fragrance1 colour1 hope1 fear1 heat1 cold1 admiration1 resentment1 have often had place2 and some of these feelings1 it has been impossible for us not to ascribe to a direct external cause2 but there have not been in the mental series1 which is all of which we can be conscious1 both that feeling of the mind which we term the perception of extension1 and also body itself1 as the cause of this feeling2 for body1 as an actual substance1 cannot be a part of the consciousness of the mind1 which is a different substance4 ,it is sufficient for us to believe1 that there are external causes of this feeling of the mind1 permanent and independent of it1 which produce in regular series1 all those phenomena that are found by us in the physical events of the universe1 and with the continuance of which1 therefore1 our perceptions also will continue2 we cannot truly suppose more1 without conceiving our very notion of extension1 a mental state1 to be itself a body extended1 which we have as little reason to suppose1 as that our sensation of fragrance1 another mental state1 is itself a fragrant body4 ,it is needless to prolong this discussion1 by endeavouring to place the argument in new points of view4 ,the simple answer to the question1 8,is our notion of extension1 or of the other primary qualities of matter1 a phenomenon or affection of matter or of mind80 would be of itself sufficient2 for if it be a state of the mind1 as much as our feeling of heat or of fragrance1 and a state produced by the presence of an external cause1 as our sensations of heat or fragrance are produced1 then there is no reason to suppose1 that the knowledge is1 in one case1 more direct than in the other4 ,in both1 it is the effect of the presence of an external cause1 and in both it must be relative only1--to adopt ,dr ,reid's phrase1--to that particular cause which produced it2 the knowledge of which cause1 in the case of extension1 as much as in the case of fragrance1 is nothing more than the knowledge1 that there is without us1 something which is not our mind itself1 but which exists1 as we cannot but believe1 permanently and independently of our mind1 and produces according to its own varieties1 in relation to our corporeal frame at one time1 that affection of the mind which we denominate the perception of extension2 at another time1 that different affection of the mind1 which we denominate the perception of fragrance4 ,what it is1 as it exists in absolute independence of our perceptions1 we who become acquainted with it1 only by those very perceptions1 know not1 in either case2 but we know it at least1--which is the only knowledge important for us1--as it exists relatively to us2 that is to say1 it is impossible for us1 from the very constitution of our nature1 not to regard the variety of our perceptions1 as occasioned by a corresponding variety of causes1 external to our mind2 though1 even in making this reference1 we must still believe our perceptions themselves1 to be altogether different and distinct from the external causes1 whatever they may be1 which have produced them2 to be1 in short1 phenomena purely mental1 and to be this equally1 whether they relate to the primary or the secondary qualities of matter2 our notion of extension1 in whatever way the ,deity may have connected it with the presence of external things1 being as much a state of the mind itself1 as our notion of sweetness or sound4 ,these observations1 on the process of suggestion1 which1 in the reference to an external cause1 distinguishes our perceptions from our simpler sensations1--and on the real and supposed differences of the primary and secondary qualities of matter1--will have prepared you1 ,i trust1 for understanding better the claim which ,dr ,reid has made to the honour of overthrowing what he has termed the ideal system of perception4 ,it is a claim1 as ,i have said1 which appears to me truly wonderful1 both as made by him and admitted by others2 the mighty achievement which appeared to him to be the overthrow of a great system1 being nothing more1 than the proof that certain phrases are metaphorical1 which were intended by their authors to be understood only as metaphors4 ,in perception there is1 as ,i have already frequently repeated1 a certain series--the presence of an external object--the affection of the sensorial organ--the affection of the sentient mind4 ,as the two last1 however1 belong to one being--the being called self--which continues the same1 while the external objects around are incessantly changing2--it is not wonderful1 that1 in speaking of perception1 we should often think merely of the object as one1 and of ourself1 7this compound of mind and matter17 as also one1--uniting the organic and mental changes1 in the single word which expresses our perception4 ,to see and to hear1 for example1 are single words1 expressive of this whole process--the bodily as well as the mental part--for we do not consider the terms as applicable1 in strict philosophic propriety1 to cases1 in which the mere mental affection is the same1 but the corporeal part is believed by us to be different1--as in sleep1 or reverie1 when the castle1 the forest1 the stream1 rise before us as in reality1 and we feel as if we were truly listening to voices which we love4 ,that we feel1 as if we were listening1 and feel as if we saw1 is our language1 when1 in our waking hours1 we speak of this phenomena of our dreams1--not that we actually saw and heard--thus evidently shewing1 that we comprehend1 in these terms1--when used without the qualifying words as if--not the mental changes of state only1 but the whole process of perception1 corporeal as well as mental4 ,the mere organic part of the process1 however1 being of importance1 only as it is followed by the mental part1--and being always followed by the mental part1--scarcely enters into our conception1 unless in cases of this sort1 when we distinguish perception from vivid imagination1 or when the whole compound process of perception is a subject of our philosophic inquiry4 ,as sight1 hearing1 perception1 involve1 in a single word1--process both mental and corporeal1--so1 ,i have no doubt1 that idea1 though now confined more strictly to the feelings of the mind1 was long employed with a more vague signification1 so as sometimes to mean the mental affection1 sometimes the organic affection1 sometimes both2--in the same manner1 as at present we speak of sight1 sometimes as mental1 sometimes as organic1 sometimes as both4 ,it comprehends both1 when we distinguish the mountain or forest which we see1 from the mountain or forest of which we dream4 ,it is mental only1 when we speak of the pleasure of sight4 ,it is organic only1 when we say of an eye1 in which the passage of the rays of light has become obstructed1 that its sight is lost1 or has been injured by disease4 ,the consideration of this double sense of the term idea1 in some of the older metaphysical writers1 corresponding with our present double sense of the word perception1 as involving both the corporeal and mental part of the process1 removes1 ,i think1 much of that apparent confusion1 which is sometimes to be found in their language on the subject2 when they combine with the term expressions1 which can be understood only in a material sense1 after combining with it1 at other times1 expressions1 which can be understood only of the mind2 as it is not impossible that a period may arrive1 when much of our reasoning1 that involves no obscurity at present1 may seem obscure and confused1 to our successors1 in that career of inquiry1 which1 perhaps1 is yet scarcely begun2 merely because they may have limited1 with stricter propriety1 to one part of a process1 terms1 which we now use as significant of a whole process4 ,in the same manner1 as we now exclude wholly from the term idea every thing organic1 so may every thing organic hereafter be excluded from the term sight2 and from the simple phrase1 so familiar at present1 that an eye has lost its sight1 some future philosopher may be inclined to assert1 that we1 who now use that phrase1 consider the perception of vision1 as in the material organ2 and1 if he have the talents of ,dr ,reid1 he may even form a series of admirable ratiocinations1 in disproof of an opinion which nobody holds1 and may consider himself1 and perhaps1 too1 if he be as fortunate as the author of the ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 may be considered1 by others1 as the overthrower of a mighty system of metaphysical illusion4 ,how truly this has been the case1 in the supposed overthrow of the ideal system1 ,i shall proceed to shew in my next ,lecture4 ,,footnote3 #ib ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #ag4 ,,lecture ,,xxvi4 ,,on ,,dr ,,reid',s ,,supposed ,,confutation ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,system2 ,,hypothesis ,,of ,,the ,,peripatetics ,,regarding ,,perception2 ,,and ,,opinions ,,of ,,various ,,philosophers ,,on ,,the ,,same ,,subject4 ,the remarks which ,i offered1 in my last ,lecture1 in illustration of what have been termed the primary and secondary qualities of matter1 were intended chiefly to obviate that false view of them1 in which the one set of these qualities is distinguished1 as affording us a knowledge that is direct1 and the other set1 a knowledge that is relative only2--as if any qualities of matter could become known to the mind1 but as they are capable of affecting the mind with certain feelings1 and as relative1 therefore1 to the feelings which they excite4 ,what matter is1 but as the cause of those various states of mind1 which we denominate our sensations or perceptions1 it is surely impossible for us1 by perception1 to discover4 ,the physical universe1 amid which we are placed1 may have innumerable qualities that have no relation to our percipient mind1--and qualities1 which1 if our mind were endowed with other capacities of sensation1 we might discover as readily as those which we know at present2 but the qualities that have no relation to the present state of the mind1 cannot to the mind1 in its present state1 be elements of its knowledge4 ,from the very constitution of our nature1 indeed1 it is impossible for us not to believe1 that our sensations have external causes1 which correspond with them1 and which have a permanence1 that is independent of our transient feelings1--a permanence1 that enables us to predict in certain circumstances1 the feelings which they are again to excite in our percipient mind2 and to the union of all these permanent external causes1 in one great system1 we give the name of the material world4 ,but the material world1 in the sense in which alone we are entitled to speak of it1 is still only a name for a multitude of external causes of our feelings1--of causes which are1 recognized by us as permanent and uniform in their nature2 but are so recognized by us1 only because1 in similar circumstances1 they excite uniformly in the mind the same perceptions1 or1 at least1 are supposed by us to be uniform in their own nature1 when the perceptions which they excite in us are uniform4 ,it is according to their mode of affecting the mind1 then1 with various sensations1 that we know them1--and not according to their own absolute nature1 which it is impossible for us to know1--whether we give the name of primary or secondary to the qualities which affect us4 ,if our sensations were different1 our perceptions of the qualities of things1 which induce these sensations in us1 would instantly have a corresponding difference4 ,all the external existences1 which we term matter1--and all the phenomena of their motion or their rest1--if known to us at all1 are known to us only by exciting in us1 the percipients of them1 certain feelings3--and qualities1 which are not more or less directly relative to our feelings1 as sentient or percipient beings1 are1 therefore1 qualities which we must be forever incapable even of divining4 ,this1 and some other discussions which have of late engaged us1 were in part intended as preparatory to the inquiry on which we entered in the close of my ,lecture1--the inquiry into the justness of the praise which has been claimed and received by ,dr ,reid1 as the confuter of a very absurd theory of perception1 till then universally prevalent3--and if1 indeed1 the theory1 which he is said to have confuted1 had been the general belief of philosophers till confuted by him1 there can be no question1 that he would have had a just claim to be considered as one of the chief benefactors of the ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,at any rate1 since this glory has been ascribed to him1 and his supposed confutation of the theory of perception1 by little images of objects conveyed to the mind1 has been considered as forming one of the most important eras in intellectual science1 it has acquired1 from this universality of mistake with respect to it1 an interest which1 from its own merits1 it would certainly be far from possessing4 ,in the ,philosophy of the ,peripatetics1 and in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of that system1 ideas were truly considered as little images derived from objects without2 and1 as the word idea still continued to be used after this original meaning had been abandoned1 7as it continues still1 in all the works that treat of perception17 it is not wonderful that many of the accustomed forms of expression1 which were retained together with it1 should have been of a kind that1 in their strict etymological meaning1 might have seemed to harmonize more with the theory of ideas as images1 which prevailed when these particular forms of expression originally became habitual1 than with that of ideas as mere states of the mind itself2 since this is only what has happened with respect to innumerable other words1 in the transmutations of meaning which they have received during the long progress of scientific inquiry4 ,the idea1 in the old philosophy1 had been that1 of which the presence immediately preceded the mental perception1--the direct external cause of perception2 and accordingly1 it may well be supposed1 that when the direct cause of perception was believed to be1 not a foreign phantasm1 but a peculiar affection of the sensorial organ1 that word1 which had formerly been applied to the supposed object1 would still imply some reference to the organic state1 which was believed to supply the place of the shadowy film1 or phantasm1 in being1 what it had been supposed to be1 the immediate antecedent of perception4 ,idea1 in short1 in the old writers1 like the synonymous word perception at present1 was expressive1 not of one part of a process1 but of two parts of it4 ,it included1 with a certain vague comprehensiveness1 the organic change as well as the mental1--in the same way as perception now implies a certain change produced in our organs of sense1 and a consequent change in the state of the mind2 and hence it is surely not very astonishing1 that while many expressions are found in the works of these older writers1 which1 in treating of ideas1 have a reference to the mental part of the process of perception1 other expressions are occasionally employed which relate only to the material part of the process1--since both parts of the process1 as ,i have said1 were1 to a certain degree1 denoted by that single word4 ,all this might very naturally take place1 though nothing more was meant to be expressed by it than these two parts of the process1--the organic change1 whatever it might be1 and the subsequent mental change1 without the necessary intervention of something distinct from both1 such as ,dr ,reid supposes to have been meant by the term ,idea4 ,it is this application1 to the bodily part of the process1 of expressions1 which he considered as intended to be applied to the mental part of perception1 that has sometimes misled him in the views which he has given of the opinions of former philosophers4 ,but still more frequently has he been misled1 by understanding in a literal sense phrases which were intended in a metaphorical sense1 and which seem so obviously metaphorical1 that it is truly difficult to account for the misapprehension4 ,indeed1 the same metaphors1 on the mere use of which ,dr ,reid founds so much1 continue still to be used in the same manner as before he wrote4 ,we speak of impressions on the mind1--of ideas bright or obscure1 permanent or fading1--of senses1 that are the inlets to our knowledge of external things1--and of memory1 in which this knowledge is stored1--precisely as the writers and speakers before us used these phrases2 without meaning any thing more1 than that certain organic changes1 necessary to perception1 are produced by external objects1--and that certain feelings1 similar to those originally excited in this manner1 are afterwards renewed1 with more or less permanence and vivacity1 without the recurrence of the objects that originally produced them2--and to arrange all the moods and figures of logic in confutation of mere metaphors1 such as ,i cannot but think the images in the mind to have been1 which ,dr ,reid so powerfully assailed1 seems an undertaking not very different from that of exposing1 syllogistically and seriously1 all the follies of ,grecian ,paganism as a system of theological belief1 in the hope of converting some unfortunate poetaster or poet1 who still talks1 in his rhymings to his mistress1 of ,cupid and the ,graces4 ,there is1 however1 one very important practical inference to be drawn from this misapprehension1--the necessity of avoiding1 as much as possible1 in philosophic disquisition1 the language of metaphor1 especially when the precise meaning has not before been pointed out1 so as to render any misconception of the intended meaning1 when a metaphor is used1 as nearly impossible as the condition of our intellectual nature will allow4 ,in calculating the possibility of this future misconception1 we should never estimate our own perspicuity very highly2 for there is always in man a redundant facility of mistake1 beyond our most liberal allowance4 ,as ,pope truly says1-- 8,the difference is as great between ,the optics seeing1 as the objects seen20 and1 unfortunately1 it is the object only which is in our power4 ,the fallible optics1 that are to view it1 are beyond our controul2 and whatever opinion1 therefore1 the most cautious philosopher may assert1 he ought never to flatter himself with the absolute certainty1 that1 in the course of a few years1 he may not be exhibited1 and confuted1 as the assertor of a doctrine1 not merely different from that which he has professed1 but exactly opposite to it4 ,the true nature of the opinions really held by philosophers is1 however1 to be determined by reference to their works4 ,to this then let us proceed4 ,the language of ,mr ,locke1--to begin with one of the most eminent of these1--is unfortunately1 so very figurative1 when he speaks of the intellectual phenomena17though ,i have no doubt that he would have avoided these figures1 if he could have foreseen the possibility of their being interpreted literally17 that it is not easy to show1 by any single quotation1 how very different his opinions as to perception were1 from those which ,dr ,reid has represented them to be4 ,the great question is1 whether he believed the existence of ideas1 as things in the mind1 separate from perception1 and intermediate between1 the organic affection1 whatever it might be1 and the mental affection2 or whether the idea and the perception were considered by him as the same4 8,in the perception of external objects10 says ,dr ,reid1 8all languages distinguish three things1--the mind that perceives1--the operation of that mind1 which is called perception1--and the object perceived4 ,philosophers have introduced a fourth thing1 in this process1 which they call the idea of the object40#ic ,it is the merit of shewing the nullity of this supposed fourth thing1 which ,dr ,reid claims1 and which has been granted to him1 without examination4 ,the perception itself1 as a state of the mind1 or1 as he chooses to call it1 an operation of the mind1 he admits1 and he admits also the organic change which precedes it4 ,did ,mr ,locke then contend for any thing more1 for that fourth thing1 the idea1 distinct from the perception1--over which ,dr ,reid supposes himself to have triumphed8 ,that he did not contend for any thing more1 nor conceive the idea to be any thing different from the perception itself1 is sufficiently apparent from innumerable passages both of his ,essay itself1 and of his admirable defence of the great doctrines of his ,essay1 in his controversy with ,bishop ,stillingfleet4 ,he repeatedly states1 that he uses the word idea1 as synonymous with conception or notion1 in the common use of those terms2 his only reason for preferring it to notion1 7which assuredly ,dr ,reid could not suppose to mean any thing1 distinct from the mind7 being1 that the term notion seems to him better limited to a particular class of ideas1 those which he technically terms mixed modes4 ,that ideas are not different from perceptions is clearly expressed by him4 8,to ask at what time a man has first any ideas10 he says1 8is to ask when he begins to perceive2 having ideas and perception being the same thing40#id ,if he speaks of our senses1 as the inlets to our ideas1 the metaphor is surely a very obvious one2 or1 if any one will still contend1 that what is said metaphorically must have been intended really1 it must be remembered1 that he uses precisely the same metaphor1 in cases in which the real application of it is absolutely impossible1 as1 for example1 with respect to our perceptions or sensations1 and that1 if we are to understand1 from his use of such metaphors1 that he believed the ideas1 thus introduced1 to be distinct from the mind1 we must understand1 in like manner1 that he believed our sensations and perceptions1 introduced1 in like manner1 to be also things self-existing1 and capable of being admitted1 at certain inlets1 into the mind as their recipient4 8,our senses1 conversant about particular sensible objects1 do convey10 he says1 8into the mind1 several distinct perceptions of things1 according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them40#ie 8,the senses are avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations40#if ,i cannot but think1 that these1 and the similar passages that occur in the ,essay1 ought1 of themselves1 to have convinced ,dr ,reid1 that he who thus spoke of ,,perceptions1 conveyed into the mind1 and of avenues provided for the reception of ,,sensations1 might also1 when he spoke of the conveyance of ideas into the mind1 and of avenues for the reception of ideas1 have meant nothing more than the simple external origin of those notions1 or conceptions1 or feelings1 or affections of mind1 to which he gave the name of ideas2 especially when there is not a single argument in his ,essay1 or in any of his works1 that is founded on the substantial reality of our ideas1 as separate and distinct things in the mind4 ,i shall refer only to one additional passage1 which ,i purposely select1 because it is1 at the same time1 very full of the particular figures1 that have misled ,dr ,reid1 and shews1 therefore1 what the true meaning of the author was at the time at which he used these figures4 8,the other way of retention1 is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas1 which after imprinting have disappeared1 or have been as it were laid aside out of sight2 and thus we do1 when we conceive heat or light1 yellow or sweet1 the object being removed4 ,this is memory1 which is1 as it were the storehouse of our ideas4 ,for the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once1 it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas1 which at another time it might have use of4 ,but our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind1 which cease to be any thing1 when there is no perception of them1 this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory1 signifies no more but this1 that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions1 which it has once had1 with this additional perception annexed to them1 that it has had them before4 ,and in this sense it is1 that our ideas are said to be in our memories1 when indeed they are actually no where1 but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again1 and as it were paint them a-new on itself1 though some with more1 some with less difficulty2 some more lively1 and others more obscurely40#ig ,the doctrine of this truly eminent philosopher1 therefore1 is1 that the presence of the external object1 and the consequent organic change1 are followed by an idea1 8which is nothing but the actual perception20 and that the laying up of these ideas in the memory1 signifies nothing more1 than that the mind has1 in many cases1 a power to revive perceptions which it has once had4 ,all this1 ,i conceive1 is the very doctrine of ,dr ,reid on the subject2 and to have confuted ,mr ,locke1 therefore1 if it had been possible for him1 must have been a very unfortunate confutation1 as it would have been also to have confuted as completely the very opinions on the subject1 which he was disposed himself to maintain4 ,i may now proceed further back1 to another philosopher of great eminence1 whose name1 unfortunately for its reputation1 is associated more with his political and religious errors1 than with his analytical investigations of the nature of the phenomena of thought4 ,the author to whom ,i allude is ,hobbes1 without all question one of the most acute intellectual inquirers of the country and age in which he lived4 ,as the physiology of the mind1 in ,britain at least seemed at that time to be almost a new science1 he was very generally complimented by his contemporary poets1 as the discoverer of a new land4 ,some very beautiful ,latin verses1 addressed to him1 ,i quoted to you1 in a former ,lecture1 in which it was said1 on occasion of his work on ,human ,nature1 that the mind1 which had before known all things1 was now for the first time made known to itself4 8,omnia hactenus ,qu nosse potuit1 nota jam primum est sibi40 ,and in which he was said1 in revealing the mind1 to have performed a work1 next in divinity to that of creating it4 8,divinum est opus ,animum creare1 proximum huic ostendere40 ,by ,cowley1 who styles him 8the discoverer of the golden lands of new philosophy10 he is compared to ,columbus1 with this difference1 that the world1 which that great navigator found1 was left by him1 rude and neglected1 to the culture of future industry2 while that which ,hobbes discovered might be said to have been at once explored by him and civilized4 ,the eloquence of his strong and perspicuous style1 ,i may remark by the way1 seems to have met with equal commendation1 from his poetical panegyrists1 with whom1 certainly not from the excellence of his own verses1 he appears to have been in singular favour4 ,his style is thus described1 in some verses of ,sheffield1 ,duke of ,buckingham3 8,clear as a beautiful transparent skin1 ,which never hides the blood1 yet holds it in2 ,like a delicious stream it ever ran ,as smooth as woman1 and as strong as man40#ih ,the opinions of ,hobbes1 on the subject which we are considering1 are stated at length1 in that part of his ,elements of ,philosophy1 which he has entitled ,physica2 and1 far from justifying ,dr ,reid's assertion1 with respect to the general ideal system of philosophers1 may be considered1 in this important respect1 as far1 at least1 as relates to the unity of the idea1 and the perception itself1 as similar to his own4 ,sensation or perception1 he traces to the impulse of external objects1 producing a motion along the nerves towards the brain1 and a consequent reaction outwards1 which he seems to think1 very falsely indeed1 may account for the reference to the object as external4 ,this hypothesis1 however1 is of no consequence4 ,the only important point in reference to the supposed universality of the system of ideas1 is whether this philosopher of another age1 asserted the existence of ideas1 as intermediate things1 distinct from the mere perception2 and1 on this subject1 he is as explicit as ,dr ,reid himself could be4 ,the idea or phantasma1 as he terms it1 is the very perception or actus sentiendi4 8,phantasma enim est sentiendi actus2 neque differt a sensione1 aliter quam fieri differt a factum esse40#ii ,the same doctrine1 and ,i may add also1 the same expression of the unity of the actus sentiendi and the phantasma1 are to be found in various other parts of his works4 ,i may1 however1 proceed still further back1 to an author of yet wider and more varied genius1 one of those extraordinary men whom nature gives to the world1 for her mightiest purposes1 when she wishes to change the aspect1 not of a single science merely1 but of all that can be known by man2 that illustrious rebel1 who1 in overthrowing the authority of ,aristotle1 seemed to have acquired1 as it were by right of conquest1 a sway in philosophy1 as absolute1 though not so lasting1 as that of the ,grecian despot4 8,time10 says one of the most eloquent of his countrymen1 8has destroyed the opinions of ,des ,cartes4 ,but his glory subsists still4 ,he appears like one of those dethroned monarchs1 who1 on the very ruins of their empire1 still seem born for the sovereignty of mankind40 ,on the opinions of ,des ,cartes1 with respect to perception1 ,dr ,reid has dwelt at great length1 and has not merely represented him as joining in that belief of ideas1 distinct from perception1 which he represents as the universal belief of philosophers1 but has even expressed astonishment1 that ,des ,cartes1 whose general opinions might have led him to a different conclusion1 should yet have joined in the common one4 8,the system of ,des ,cartes10 he says1 8is with great perspicuity and acuteness explained by himself1 in his writings1 which ought to be consulted by those who would understand it40#ajj ,he probably was not aware1 when he wrote these few lines1 how important was the reference which he made1 especially to those whom he was addressing2 since1 the more they studied the view which he has given of the opinions of ,des ,cartes1 the more necessary would it become for them to consult the original author4 8,it is to be observed10 he says1 8that ,des ,cartes rejected a part only of the ancient theory1 concerning the perception of external objects by the senses1 and that he adopted the other part4 ,that theory may be divided into two parts1--the first1 that images1 species1 or forms of external objects1 come from the object1 and enter by the avenues of the senses to the mind2 the second part is1 that the external object itself is not perceived1 but only the species or image of it in the mind4 ,the first part ,des ,cartes and his followers rejected1 and refuted by solid arguments2 but the second part1 neither he nor his followers have thought of calling in question2 being persuaded that it is only a representative image1 in the mind1 of the external object that we perceive1 and not the object itself4 ,and this image1 which the ,peripatetics called a species1 he calls an idea1 changing the name only1 while he admits the thing40#aja--8;,des ,cartes1 according to the spirit of his own philosophy1 ought to have doubted of both parts of the ,peripatetic hypothesis1 or to have given his reasons1 why he adopted one part1 as well as why he rejected the other part2 especially since the unlearned1 who have the faculty of perceiving objects by their senses1 in no less perfection than philosophers1 and should therefore know1 as well as they1 what it is they perceive1 have been unanimous in this1 that the objects they perceive are not ideas in their own minds1 but things external4 ,it might have been expected1 that a philosopher1 who was so cautious as not to take his own existence for granted1 without proof1 would not have taken it for granted1 without proof1 that every thing he perceived was only ideas in his own mind40#ajb ,all this might certainly have been expected1 as ,dr ,reid says1 if the truth had not been1 that the opinions of ,des ,cartes are precisely opposite to the representation which he has given of them1--that1 far from believing in the existence of images of external objects1 as the immediate causes or antecedents of perception1 he strenuously contends against them4 ,the presence of the external body1--the organic change1 which he conceives to be a sort of motion of the small febrils of the nerves and brain1--and the affection of the mind1 which he expressly asserts to have no resemblance whatever to the motion that gave occasion to it1--these are all which he conceives to constitute the process of perception1 without any idea1 as a thing distinct1--a fourth thing intervening between the organic and the mental change4 ,and this process is exactly the process which ,dr ,reid himself supposes1 with this only difference1--an unimportant one for the present argument1--that ,dr ,reid1 though he admits some intervening organic change1 does not state1 positively1 what he conceives to be its nature1 while the ,french philosopher supposes it to consist in a motion of the nervous fibrils4 ,the doctrine of ,des ,cartes is to be found1 very fully stated1 in his ,principia ,philosophi1 in his ,dioptrics1 and in many passages of his small controversial works4 ,he not merely rejects the ,peripatetic notion1 of images or shadowy films1 the resemblance of external things1 received by the senses1--contending1 that the mere organic affection--the motion of the nervous fibril--is sufficient1 without any such images1 8diversos motus tenuium uniuscujusque nervi capillamentorum sufficere ad diversos sensus producendum20 and proving this by a very apposite case1 to which he frequently recurs1 of a blind man determining the dimensions of bodies by comprehending them within two crossed sticks1--in which case1 he says1 it cannot be supposed1 that the sticks transmit1 through themselves1 any images of the body2 but he even proceeds to account for the common prejudice1 with respect to the use of images of perception1 ascribing it to the well-known effect of pictures in exciting notions of the objects pictured4 8,such is the nature of the mind10 he says1 8that1 by its very constitution1 when certain bodily motions take place1 certain thoughts immediately arise1 that have no resemblance whatever1 as images1 to the motions in consequence of which they arise4 ,the thoughts which words1 written or spoken1 excite1 have surely no resemblance to the words themselves4 ,a slight change in the motion of a pen may produce1 in the reader1 affections of mind the most opposite2 nor is it any reply to this to say1 that the characters traced by the pen are only occasions1 that excite the mind itself to form opposite images1--for the case is equally striking1 when no such image can be formed1 and the feeling is the immediate result of the application of the external body4 ,when a sword has pierced any part1 is not the feeling excited as different altogether from the mere motion of the sword1 as colour1 or sound1 or smell1 or taste2 and since we are sure1 in the case of the mere pain from the sword1 that no image of the sword is necessary1 ought we not to extend the same inference1 by analogy1 to all the other affections of our senses1 and to believe these also to depend1 not on any images1 or things transmitted to the brain1 but on the mere constitution of our nature1 by which certain thoughts are made to arise1 in consequence of certain corporeal motions80 ,the passage is long1 indeed1 but it is so clear1 and so decisive1 as to the misrepresentation by ,dr ,reid of the opinion which he strangely considered himself as confuting1 that ,i cannot refrain from quoting the original1 that you may judge for yourselves1 of the real meaning1 which a translation might be supposed to have erred in conveying4 8,probatur deinde1 talem esse nostr mentis naturam1 ut ex eo solo quod quidam motus in corpore fiant ad quaslibet cogitationes1 nullam istorum motuum imaginem referentes1 possit impelli2 et speciatim ad illas confusas1 qu sensus1 sive sensationes dicuntur4 ,nam videmus1 verba1 sive ore prolata1 sive tantum scripta1 quaslibet in animis nostris cogitationes et commotiones excitare4 ,in eadem charta1 cum eodem calamo et atramento1 si tantum calami extremitas certo modo supra chartam ducatur1 literas exarabit1 qu cogitationes prliorum1 tempestatum1 furiarum1 affectusque indignationis et tristiti in lectorum animis concitabunt2 si vero alio modo fere simili calamus moveatur1 cogitationes valde diversas1 tranquillitatis1 pacis1 amnitatis1 affectusque plane contrarios amoris et ltiti efficiet4 ,respondebitur fortasse1 scripturam vel loquelam nullos affectus1 nullasque rerum a se diversarum imaginationes immediate in mente excitare1 sed tantummodo1 diversas intellectiones2 quarum deinde occasione anima ipsa variarum rerum imagines in se efformat4 ,quid autem dicetur de sensu doloris et titillationis8 ,gladius corpori nostro admovetur2 illud scindit2 ex hoc solo sequitur dolor2 qui sane non minus diversus est a gladii1 vel corporis quod scinditur locali motu1 quam color1 vel sonus1 vel odor1 vel sapor4 ,atque ideo cum clare videamus1 doloris sensum in nobis excitari ab eo solo1 quod aliquae corporis nostri partes contactu alicujus alterius corporis localiter moveantur1 concludere licet1 mentem nostram esse talis natur1 ut ab aliquibus etiam motibus localibus omnium aliorum sensuum affectiones pati possit4 8,prterea non deprehendimus ullam differentiam inter nervos1 ex qua liceat judicare1 aliud quid per unos1 quam alios1 ab organis sensuum externorum ad cerebrum pervenire1 vel omnino quidquam eo pervenire prter ipsorum nervorum motum localem40#ajc ,it is scarcely possible to express more strongly1 or illustrate more clearly1 an opinion so exactly the reverse of that doctrine of perception1 by the medium of representative ideas or images1 ascribed by ,dr ,reid to its illustrious author4 ,it would not be more unjust1 even after all his laborious writings on the subject1 to rank the supposed confuter of the ideal system1 as himself one of its most strenuous champions1 than to make this charge against ,des ,cartes1 and to say of him1 in ,dr ,reid's words1 that 8the image which the ,peripatetics called a species1 he calls an idea1 changing the name only1 while he admits the thing40#ajd ,to these authors1 whose opinions1 on the subject of perception1 ,dr ,reid has misconceived1 ,i may add one1 whom even he himself allows1 to have shaken off the ideal system1 and to have considered the idea and the perception1 as not distinct1 but the same1 a modification of the mind1 and nothing more4 ,i allude to the celebrated ,jansenist writer1 ,arnauld1 who maintains this doctrine as expressly as ,dr ,reid himself1 and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with ,malebranche4 ,but1 if ,i were to quote to you every less important writer1 who disbelieved the reality of ideas or images1 as things existing separately and independently1 ,i might quote to you almost every writer1 ,british and foreign1 who1 for the last century1 and for many years preceding it1 has treated of the mind4 ,the narrow limits of a ,lecture have forced me to confine my notice to the most illustrious4 ,of all evidence1 however1 with respect to the prevalence of opinions1 the most decisive is that which is found1 not in treatises read only by a few1 but in the popular elementary works of science of the time1 the general text-books of schools and colleges4 ,i shall conclude this long discussion1 therefore1 with short quotations from two of the most distinguished and popular authors1 of this very useful class4 ,the first is from the logic or rather the pneumatology1 of ,le ,clerc1 the ,friend of ,locke4 ,in his chapter1 on the nature of ideas1 he gives the history of the opinions of philosophers on this subject1 and states among them the very doctrine which is most forcibly and accurately opposed to the ideal system of perception4 8,others10 he says1 8held that ideas and the perception of ideas are absolutely the same in themselves1 and differ merely in our relative application of them2 that same feeling of the mind1 which is termed an idea1 in reference to the object which the mind considers1 is termed a perception1 when we speak of it relatively to the percipient mind2 but it is only of one modification of the mind that we speak in both cases40 ,according to these philosophers1 therefore1 there are1 in strictness of language1 no ideas distinct from the mind itself4 8,alii putant ideas et perceptiones idearum easdem esse1 licet relationibus differant4 ,idea1 uti censent1 proprie ad objectum refertur1 quod mens considerat2--perceptio1 vero1 ad mentem ipsam qu percipit2 sed duplex illa relatio ad unam modificationem mentis pertinet4 ,itaque secundum hosce philosophos1 null sunt proprie loquendo ide a mente nostra distinct40#aje ,what is it1 ,i may ask1 which ,dr ,reid considers himself as having added to this very philosophic view of perception8 and1 if he added nothing1 it is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detecting errors1 the counter statement to which had long formed a part of the elementary works of the schools4 ,in addition to these quotations1--the number of which may perhaps already have produced at least as much weariness as conviction1--,i shall content myself with a single paragraph1 from a work of ,de ,crousaz1 the author1 not of one merely1 but of many very popular elementary works of logic1 and unquestionably one of the most acute thinkers of his time4 ,his works abound with many sagacious remarks1 on the sources of the prejudice involved in that ideal system1 which ,dr ,reid conceived himself the first to have overthrown2 and he states1 in the strongest language1 that our ideas are nothing more than states or affections of our mind itself4 8,cogitandi modi--quibus cogitatio nostra modificatur1 quos induit alios post alios1 sufficiunt1 ut per eos ad rerum cognitionem veniat2 nec sunt fingend ide1 ab illis modificationibus divers40#ajf ,i may remark by the way1 that precisely the same distinction of sensations and perceptions1 on which ,dr ,reid founds so much1 is stated and enforced in the different works of this ingenious writer4 ,indeed so very similar are his opinions1 that if he had lived after ,dr ,reid1 and had intended to give a view of that very system of perception which we have been examining1 ,i do not think that he could have varied in the slightest respect1 from that view of the process which he has given in his own original writings4 ,it appears then1 that1 so far is ,dr ,reid from having the merit of confuting the universal1 or even general illusion of philosophers1 with respect to ideas in the mind1 as images or separate things1 distinct from the perception itself2 that his own opinions as to perception on this point at least1 are precisely the same1 as those which generally prevailed before4 ,from the time of the decay of the ,peripatetic ,philosophy1 the process of perception was generally considered1 as involving nothing more1 than the presence of an external object--an organic change or series of changes--and an affection of the mind immediately subsequent1--without the intervention of any idea as a fourth separate thing between the organic and the mental affection4 ,i have no doubt1 that1--with the exception of ,berkeley and ,malebranche1--who had peculiar and very erroneous notions on the subject1 all the philosophers whom ,dr ,reid considered himself as opposing1 would1 if they had been questioned by him1 have admitted1 before they heard a single argument on his part1 that their opinions1 with respect to ideas were precisely the same as his own2--and what then would have remained for him to confute8 ,he might1 indeed1 still have said1 that it was absurd1 in those who considered perception as a mere state or modification of the mind1 to speak of ideas in their mind3 but the very language1 used by him for this purpose1 would probably have contained some metaphor as little philosophic4 ,we must still allow men to speak of ideas in their mind1 if they will only consent to believe that the ideas are truly the mind itself variously affected2--as we must still allow men to talk of the rising and setting of the sun1 if they will only admit that the motion which produces those appearances is not in that majestic and tranquil orb1 but in our little globe of earth1 which1 carrying along with it1 in its daily revolution1 all our busy wisdom and still busier folly1 is itself as restless as its restless inhabitants4 ,that a mind1 so vigorous as that of ,dr ,reid1 should have been capable of the series of misconceptions which we have traced1 may seem wonderful1 and truly is so2 and equally1 or rather1 still more wonderful1 is the general admission of his merit in this respect4 ,i trust it will impress you with one important lesson1--which could not be taught more forcibly than by errors of so great a mind1--that it will always be necessary for you to consult the opinions of authors1--when their opinions are of sufficient importance to deserve to be accurately studied--in their own works and not in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account of them4 ,from my own experience1 ,i can most truly assure you1 that there is scarcely an instance1 in which1 on examining the works of those authors whom it is the custom more to cite than to read1 ,i have found the view which ,i had received of them to be faithful4 ,there is usually something more or something less1 which modifies the general result1--some mere conjecture represented as an absolute affirmation1 or some limited affirmation extended to analogous cases1 which it was not meant to comprehend4 ,and1 by the various additions or subtractions1 thus made1 in passing from mind to mind1 so much of the spirit of the original doctrine is lost1 that it may1 in some cases1 be considered as having made a fortunate escape1 if it be not at last represented1 as directly opposite to what it is4 ,it is like those engraved portraits of the eminent men of former ages1--the copies of mere copies1--from which every new artist1 in the succession1 has taken something1 or to which he has added something1 till not a lineament remains the same4 ,if we are truly desirous of a faithful likeness1 we must have recourse once more to the original painting4 ,,footnotes3 #ic ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 #id ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ii4 chap4 i4 sect4 #i4 #ie ,sect4 #c4 #if ,sect4 #ab4 #ig ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ii4 chap4 x4 sect1 #b4 #ih ,on ,hobbes and his ,writings1 v4 #cg-dj4--,works1 p4 #ahj4 #dto ,edit4 #ii ,elementa ,philosophi1 ,pars ,,iv4 c4 xxv4 sect4 #c4 #ajj ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #h4 #aja ,ibid4 #ajb ,ibid4 #ajc ,principia ,philosophi1 ,pars ,,iv4 ,sect4 #aif4--p4 #aij1 #aia4 ,amst4 #affd4 #ajd ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #h4 #aje ,clerici ,pneumatologia1 ,sect4 i4 cap4 v4 subsect4 #aj4 #ajf ,tentamen ,novum ,metaphysicum1 ,sect4 xxxvii4--,groning1 #agbe4 ,,lecture ,,xxvii4 ,,examination ,,of ,,dr ,,reid',s ,,supposed ,,confutation ,,of ,,idealism1 ,,concluded4 ,my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 brought to a conclusion the remarks which ,i had to offer on the ,sense of ,touch1 and particularly on the manner in which ,i supposed the mind to acquire its knowledge of external things4 ,with this very important question of the existence of matter1 the name of ,dr ,reid is intimately connected1 to whom the highest praise is usually given1 for his supposed confutation of all scepticism on the subject2 as if he had truly established1 by argument1 the existence of a material world4 ,and yet1 ,i confess1 that with all my respect for that excellent philosopher1 ,i do not discover1 in his reasonings on the subject1 any ground for the praise which has been given4 ,the evidence for a system of external things1--at least1 the sort of evidence for which he contends1--was not merely the same1 but was felt also to be precisely the same1 before he wrote as afterwards4 ,nay1 ,i may add1 that the force of the evidence1--if that term can be justly applied to this species of belief1--was admitted1 in its fullest extent1 by the very sceptic1 against whom chiefly his arguments were directed4 ,that ,dr ,reid was a philosopher of no common rank1 every one1 who has read his works with attention1 and with candour1 must admit4 ,it is impossible to deny1 that1 to great power of patient investigation1 in whatever inquiries he undertook1 he united great caution1 in discriminating the objects of legitimate inquiry1 together with considerable acuteness1 of the same sage and temperate kind1 in the prosecution of such inquiries as appeared to him legitimate4 ,and1--which is a praise1 that1 unfortunately for mankind1 and still more unfortunately for the individual1 does not always attend mere intellectual renown1--it is impossible to deny to him the more covetable glory1 that his efforts1 even when he erred speculatively1 had always in view those great interests1 to which1 and to which alone1 philosophy itself is but a secondary consideration1--the primary and essential interests of religion and morality4 ,these praises are certainly not higher than his merits4 ,but1 at the same time1 while by philosophers in one part of the island1 his merits seem to have been unjustly undervalued1 ,i cannot but think also1 that1 in his own country1 there has been an equal or rather a far greater tendency to over-rate them1--a tendency arising in part from the influence of his academic situation1 and his amiable personal character--partly1 and in a very high degree1 from the general regard for the moral and religious objects which he uniformly had in view1 as contrasted with the consequences that are supposed to flow from some of the principles of the philosopher1 whose opinions he particularly combated--and partly also1 ,i may add1 from the eloquence of his ,illustrious ,pupil1 and ,friend1 and ,biographer1 whose understanding1 so little liable to be biassed by any prejudices but those of virtue and affectionate friendship1 has yet1 perhaps1 been influenced in some degree by those happy and noble prejudices of the heart1 and who1 by the persuasive charms both of his ,lectures and of his ,writings1 could not fail to cast1 on any system of opinions which he might adopt and exhibit1 some splendour of reflection from the brilliancy of his own mind4 ,the genius of ,dr ,reid does not appear to me to have been very inventive1 nor to have possessed much of that refined and subtile acuteness1 which1--capable as it is of being abused1--is yet absolutely necessary to the perfection of metaphysical analysis4 ,it is chiefly on his opinions1 in relation to the subject at present under our view1 that his reputation as an original thinker rests4 ,indeed1 it is on these that he has inclined himself to rest it4 ,in a part of a letter to ,dr ,gregory1 preserved in ,mr ,stewart's ,memoir1 he considers his confutation of the ideal system of perception1 as involving almost every thing which is truly his4 8,i think there is hardly any thing that can be called mine10 he says1 8in the philosophy of mind1 which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice40#ajg ,yet there are few circumstances1 connected with the fortune of modern philosophy1 that appear to me more wonderful1 than that a mind1 like ,dr ,reid's1 so learned in the history of metaphysical science1--and far too honourable to lay claim to praise to which he did not think himself fairly entitled1--should have conceived1 that1 on the point of which he speaks1 any great merit--at least any merit of originality--was justly referable to him particularly4 ,indeed1 the only circumstance1 which appears to me more wonderful1 is1 that the claim thus made by him1 should have been so readily and generally admitted4 ,his supposed confutation of the ideal system is resolvable into two parts--first1 his attempt to overthrow what he terms 8the common theory0 of ideas or images of things in the mind1 as the immediate objects of thought--and secondly1 the evidence which the simpler theory of perception may be supposed to yield1 of the reality of an external world4 ,the latter of these inquiries would1 in order1 be more appropriate to our late train of speculation2 but we cannot understand it fully1 without some previous attention to the former4 ,that ,dr ,reid did question the theory of ideas or images1 as separate existences in the mind1 ,i readily admit2 but ,i cannot allow1 that1 in doing this1 he questioned the common theory4 ,on the contrary1 ,i conceive1 that1 at the time at which he wrote1 the theory had been universally1 or at least almost universally1 abandoned2 and that1 though philosophers might have been in the habit of speaking of ideas or images in the mind1--as we continue to speak of them at this moment1--they meant them to denote nothing more then1 than we use them to denote now4 ,the phraseology of any system of opinions1 which has spread widely1 and for a length of time1 does not perish with the system itself4 ,it is transmitted from the system which expires1 to the system which begins to reign1--very nearly as the same crown and sceptre pass1 through a long succession1 from monarch to monarch4 ,to tear away our very language1 as well as our belief1 is more than the boldest introducer of new doctrines can hope to be permitted1 for it would be to force our ignorance or errors too glaringly on our view4 ,he finds it easier1 to seduce our vanity1 by leaving us something which we can still call our own1 and which it is not very difficult for him to accommodate to his own views2 so that1 while he allows us to pronounce the same words1 with the same confidence1 we are sensible only of what we have gained1 and are not painfully reminded of what we have been forced to discard4 ,by this1 too1 he has the advantage of adding1 in some measure1 to his own novelties the weight and importance of ancient authority2 since the feelings1 associated with the name as formerly used1 are transferred1 secretly and imperceptibly1 with the name itself4 ,there is scarcely a term in popular science1 which has not gone through various transmutations of this sort4 ,it is not wonderful1 therefore1 that the phrase image in the mind1 which was no metaphor as used by the ,peripatetics1 should have been retained1 in a figurative sense1 in metaphysical discussions1 long after the authority of ,aristotle had ceased1 and when one who could maintain1 with a square cap on his head1 8a thesis on the universal a parti rei10 was no longer1 as ,voltaire says1 8considered as a prodigy40 ,at the time of ,dr ,reid's publication1 the image in the mind was as truly a mere relic of an obsolete theory of perception1 as the rising and setting of the sun were relics of that obsolete astronomy1 in which this great luminary was supposed to make his daily journey1 round the atom which he enlightened4 ,before proceeding to the proof of this assertion1 however1 with respect to the originality and importance of ,dr ,reid's remarks on this subject1 some previous observations will be necessary4 ,in the discussions1 which1 as yet1 have engaged our attention1 you may1 perhaps1 have remarked that ,i have made little1 if any1 use of the word idea1--a word of very frequent occurrence1 in the speculations of philosophers1 with respect to the phenomena of perception1 and the intellectual phenomena in general4 ,i have avoided it1 partly on account of its general ambiguity1 but1 more especially1 with a view to the question at present before us1 that1 on examining it1 you might be as free as possible1 from any prejudice1 arising from our former applications of the term4 ,the term1 ,i conceive1 though convenient for its brief expression of a variety of phenomena1 which might otherwise require a more paraphrastic expression1 might yet be omitted altogether1 in the metaphysical vocabulary1 without any great inconvenience1--certainly without inconvenience1 equal to that which arises from the ambiguous use of it1 with different senses1 by different authors4 ,but1 whatever ambiguity it may have had1 the notion of it1 as an image in the mind separate and distinct from the mind itself1 had certainly been given up1 long before ,dr ,reid had published a single remark on the subject4 ,in its present general use1 it is applied to many species of the mental phenomena1 to our particular sensations or perceptions1 simple or complex1 to the remembrances of these1 either as simple or complex1 and to the various compositions or decompositions of these1 which result from certain intellectual processes of the mind itself4 ,the presence of certain rays of light1 for example1 at the retina1 is followed by a certain affection of the sensorial organ1 which is immediately followed by a certain affection of the sentient mind4 ,this particular affection1 which is more strictly and definitely termed the sensation or perception of redness1 is likewise sometimes termed1 when we speak more in reference to the external light1 which causes the sensation1 than to ourselves1 as sentient of it1 an idea of redness2 and when1 in some train of internal thought1 without the renewed presence of the rays1 a certain state of the mind arises1 different1 indeed1 from the former1 but having a considerable resemblance to it1 we term this state the conception or remembrance of redness1 or the idea of redness2 or1 combining this particular idea with others1 which have not co-existed with it as a sensation1 we form1 what we term the complex idea1 of a red tree1 or a red mountain1 or some other of those shadowy forms1 over which ,fancy1 in the moment of creating them1 flings1 at pleasure1 her changeful colouring4 ,an idea1 however1 in all these applications of the term1 whether it be a perception1 a remembrance1 or one of those complex or abstract varieties of conception1 is still nothing more than the mind affected in a certain manner1 or1 which is the same theory1 the mind existing in a certain state4 ,the idea is not distinct from the mind1 or separable from it1 in any sense1 but is truly the mind itself1 which in its very belief of external things1 is still recognizing one of the many forms of its own existence4 8,qualis ,hamadryadum1 quondam1 si forte sororum ,una novos peragrans saltus et devia rura1 7,atque illam in viridi suadet procumbere ripa ,fontis pura quies et opaci frigoris umbra7 ,dum prona in latices speculi de margine pendet1 ,mirata est subitam venienti occurrere ,nympham2 ,mox eosdem quos ipsa artus1 eadem ora gerentem ,una inferre gradus1 una succedere sylv1 ,aspicit alludens1 seseque agnoscit in undis4 ,sic sensu interno rerum simulacra suarum ,mens ciet1 et proprios observat conscia vultus40#ajh ,in sensation1 there is1 as we have seen1 a certain series1--the presence of the external body1 whatever this may be in itself1 independently of our perception1--the organic affection1 whatever it may be1 which attends the presence of this body1--and the affection of mind that is immediately subsequent to the organic affection4 ,i speak only of one organic affection2 because1 with respect to the mind1 it is of no consequence whether there be one only1 or a series of these1 prior to the new mental state induced4 ,it is enough1 that1 whenever the immediate sensorial organ has begun to exist in a certain state1 whether the change which produces this state be single1 or second1 third1 fourth1 or fifth1 of a succession of changes1 the mind is instantly affected in a certain manner4 ,this new mental state induced is sensation4 ,but1 says ,dr ,reid1 the sensation is accompanied with a perception1 which is very different from it2 and on this difference of sensation and perception is founded the chief part of his system4 ,the distinction thus made by him1 has been commonly1 though very falsely1 considered as original2 the radical difference itself1 whether accurate or inaccurate1 and the minor distinctions founded upon this1 being laid down with precision in some of the common elementary works of logic1 of a much earlier period4 8,when ,i smell a rose10 he says1 8there is in this operation both sensation and perception4 ,the agreeable odour ,i feel1 considered by itself1 without relation to any external object1 is merely a sensation4 ,it affects the mind in a certain way2 and this affection of the mind may be conceived1 without a thought of the rose1 or any other object4 ,this sensation can be nothing else than it is felt to be4 ,its very essence consists in being felt2 and when it is not felt1 it is not4 ,there is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it2 they are one and the same thing4 ,it is for this reason1 that we before observed1 that1 in sensation1 there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt2 and this holds true with regard to all sensations4 8,let us next attend to the perception which we have in smelling a rose4 ,perception has always an external object2 and the object of my perception1 in this case1 is that quality in the rose which ,i discern by the sense of smell4 ,observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near1 and ceases when it is removed1 ,i am led1 by my nature1 to conclude some quality to be in the rose1 which is the cause of this sensation4 ,this quality in the rose is the object perceived2 and that act of my mind1 by which ,i have the conviction and belief of this quality1 is what in this case ,i call perception40#aji ,that the reference to an external object is1 in this case1 something more than the mere sensation itself1 is very evident2 the only question is1 whether it be necessary to ascribe the reference to a peculiar power termed perception1 or whether it be not rather the result of a common and more general principle of the mind4 ,when ,i smell a rose1 that is to say1 when certain odorous particles act on my organ of smell1 a certain state of mind is produced1 which constitutes the sensation of that particular fragrance2 and this is all which can justly be ascribed to the mind as simply sentient4 ,but the mind is not sensitive merely1 in the strict sense of that term1 for there are many states of it1 which do not depend on the immediate presence of external objects4 ,those feelings1 of any kind1 which have before existed1 together1 or in trains of succession1 arise afterwards1 as it were spontaneously1 in consequence merely of the existence of some other part of the train4 ,when the fragrance of a rose1 therefore1 has been frequently accompanied with the sensations of vision1 that arise1 when a rose is before us1 with the muscular and tactual sensations1 that arise on handling it1 the mere fragrance1 of itself1 will afterwards suggest these sensations1 and this suggestion is all1 which1 in the case of smell1 instanced by ,dr ,reid1 is termed the perception1 as distinguished from the mere sensation4 ,we ascribe the fragrance to the unseen external rose1 precisely in the same manner as we ascribe smoke and ashes to previous combustion2 or1 from a portrait1 or a pictured landscape1 infer the existence of some artist who painted it4 ,yet1 in inferring the artist from the picture1 it is surely not to any mere power of sense1 that we ascribe the inference1 and as little should we trace to any such simple power1 what is in this instance termed perception4 ,the perception is a suggestion of memory1 combined with the simple sensation4 ,there are not1 in ascribing the smell to odorous particles of a rose1 as its cause1 sensation1 perception1 and association or suggestion1 as three powers or general principles of the mind4 ,but there are sensation and the associate suggestion2 and1 when these coexist1 perception coexists1 because perception is the name which we give to the union of the former two4 ,there is1 indeed1 the belief of some cause of the sensation1 as there is a belief of some cause of every feeling of the mind1 internal as well as external2 but the cause1 in the case of smell1 is supposed to be external1 and corporeal1 merely because the presence of an external rose has been previously learned from another source1 and is suggested when the sensation of fragrance recurs1 in intimate association4 ,in the case of taste1 to proceed to our other senses--the perception1 as it is termed by ,dr ,reid1 is precisely of the same kind--a mere reference of association4 ,we have previously learned1 from other sources1 to believe in things without1 and these1 as sapid bodies acting on our tongue1 are suggested by the mere sensation1 which1 but for the means of this suggestion1 would have been a sensation alone1 of which the cause would have been as little conceived to be corporeal as the causes of any of the internal affections of the mind4 ,the melody of a flute1 if we had had no sense but that of hearing--the redness of a rose1 if we had had no sense but that of vision1 would as little1 as the sensation of smell when considered as a transient state of the mind1 have involved1 or given occasion to1 the notion of corporeal substance4 ,we refer the melody to the external flute1 and redness to the external rose1 because we have previously acquired the notions of extension and resistance--of a flute and of a rose as external substances--and this reference of mere suggestion is all1 which1 in these cases1 distinguishes the perception from the sensation4 ,without the suggestions of memory1 in short1 we could not in these cases have had1 in ,dr ,reid's sense of the term1 any perceptions whatever1 to distinguish the causes of our sensations as external1 more than the causes of any of our other feelings4 ,the great perception1 then1 in the sense1 in which he understands the term1 is that by which we primarily form the complex notion of extension and resistance--that which has parts1 and that which resists our attempt to grasp it--since all the other perceptions1 of which he speaks1 in contradistinction from mere sensations1 are only these complex notions1 suggested by the particular sensations1 and combined with them1 in consequence of former association1 and the general reference to a cause of some sort1 which may be supposed to attend our feelings of every kind1 internal as well as external1 when considered as changes or new phenomena4 ,it is not1 however1 from any peculiar power1 to be distinguished by the name of perception1 that this complex notion of extended resistance appears to me to arise1 but from the union of our notion of extension1 acquired by the mere remembrance of various progressive series of feelings1 with the notion of resistance1 when an accustomed series of muscular feelings without any change of circumstances1 in the mind itself1 is interrupted by that peculiar and very different muscular feeling which arises from impeded effort4 ,perception1 in short1 in all our senses1 is nothing more than the association of this complex notion with our other sensations--the notion of something extended and resisting1 suggested by these sensations1 when the sensations themselves have previously arisen2 and suggested in the same manner1 and on the same principle1 as any other associate feeling suggests any other associate feeling4 ,it is very evident that perception1 in ,dr ,reid's sense1 is not the mere reference to a cause of some sort1 for it would then be as comprehensive as all the feelings or changes of the mind1--our hope1 fear1 anger1 pity1--which we ascribe to some cause or antecedent1 as much as our tastes and smells2 it is the reference of certain feelings to a corporeal cause1 that is say1 to a cause extended and resisting4 ,if1 for example1 without any previous knowledge of external things1 on the first sensation of fragrance1 or sweetness1 or sound1 or colour1 we could be supposed to be capable of believing that there was some cause of this new state of our being1 this would not be perception1 in the sense in which he uses that term2 and yet but for our organ of touch1 or at least but for feelings which are commonly ascribed to that organ1 it would be manifestly impossible for us to make more than this vague and general inference4 ,when a rose is present1 we find1 and have uniformly found1 that a certain sensation of fragrance arises1 which ceases when the rose is removed4 ,the influence of association1 therefore1 operates in this1 as in every other case of ordinary co-existence4 ,we do not merely suppose that the sensation has some cause1 as we believe that our joys and sorrows have a cause1 but we ascribe the fragrance to the external substance1 the presence of which we have found to be so essential to the production of it4 ,perception in every case1 as ,i have said1 in which it is to be distinguished from the prior sensation1 is a reference of this prior sensation to a material cause2--and this complex notion of a material cause1--that is to say1 of something extended and resisting1--mere smell1 mere taste1 mere hearing1 mere vision1 never could have afforded4 ,i have already explained how this notion of matter1 as it appears to me1 is produced1 or may be imagined to be produced4 ,a train of muscular feelings has been frequently repeated1 so that the series has become familiar to the infant1 constituting in its remembrance the notion of a certain progressive length4--,when all the known antecedent circumstances have been the same1 the well-known series is suddenly broken1 so as to excite in the mind of the infant the notion of a cause which is not in itself2--this cause1 which is something foreign to itself1 is that which excites the particular muscular feeling of resistance1--and it is combined with the notion of a certain length1 because it uniformly supplies the place of what has been felt as a certain length1 so as at last1 by the operation of the common laws of association1 to become truly representative of it1 or rather to involve it in one complex feeling1 in the same manner as colour1 in vision1 seems to involve whole miles of distance4 ,such is all that seems to me to constitute what ,dr ,reid would term perception1 even with respect to the feelings commonly termed tactual2--and in all the other classes of sensations it is obviously nothing more than the suggestion of these associate feelings1 in the same way as any other feelings1 in our trains of thought and emotions1 are suggested by those conceptions or other feelings which have frequently accompanied them4--,it is sufficient to think of a mind1 possessing all the other susceptibilities of sensation1 but those which give us the perceptions commonly ascribed to touch1 to be sensible how truly what we term perception in the other senses1 is the mere suggestion of these4 ,if we were capable only of smelling1--or had no other sensations than those of mere taste1 mere sound1 mere colour1--what perception could we have had of a material cause of these sensations8--and if it be to the mere suggestion of the object of another sense that we owe what is termed perception in all these sensations1--in what circumstance does the reference of these to a resisting and extended substance1 differ from any other of the common references which the principle of association enables us to make8 8,sensation10 says ,dr ,reid1 8can be nothing else than it is felt to be4 ,its very essence consists in being felt2 and when it is not felt1 it is not4 ,there is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it2 they are one and the same thing40#aaj ,but this is surely equally true1 of what he terms perception1 which1 as a state of mind1 it must be remembered1 is1 according to his own account of it1 as different from the object perceived1 as the sensation is4 ,we may say of the mental state of perception too1 in his own language1 as indeed we must say of all our states of mind1 whatever they may be1 that it can be nothing else than it is felt to be4 ,its very essence consists in being felt2 and when it is not felt1 it is not4 ,there is no difference between the perception and the feeling of it2 they are one and the same thing4 ,the sensation1 indeed1 which is mental1 is different from the object exciting it1 which we term material2 but so also is the state of mind which constitutes perception2 for ,dr ,reid was surely too zealous an opponent of the systems1 which ascribe every thing to mind alone1 or to matter alone1 to consider the perception as itself the object perceived4 ,that in sensation1 as contradistinguished from perception1 there is no reference made to an external object1 is true2 because1 when the reference is made1 we then use the new term of perception2 but that in sensation there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt2 no object independent of the mental feeling1 is surely a very strange opinion of this philosopher2 since what he terms perception1 is nothing but the reference of this very sensation to its external object4 ,the sensation itself he certainly supposes to depend on the presence of an external object1 which is all that can be understood1 in the case of perception1 when we speak of its objects1 or1 in other words1 of those external causes1 to which we refer our sensations2 for the material object itself1 he surely could not consider as forming a part of the perception which is a state of the mind alone4 ,to be the object of perception1 is nothing more than to be the foreign cause or occasion1 on which this state of the mind directly or indirectly arises2 and an object1 in this only intelligible sense1 as an occasion1 or cause of a certain subsequent effect1 must on his own principles1 be equally allowed to sensation4 ,though he does not inform us1 what he means by the term object1 as peculiarly applied to perception--7and indeed1 if he had explained it1 ,i cannot but think that a great part of his system1 which is founded on the confusion of this single word1 as something different from a mere external cause of an internal feeling must have fallen to the ground17--he yet tells us1 very explicitly1 that to be the object of perception1 is something more than to be the external occasion1 on which that state of the mind arises which he terms perception2 for1 in arguing against the opinion of a philosopher1 who contends for the existence of certain images or traces in the brain1 and yet says1 8that we are not to conceive the images or traces in the brain to be perceived1 as if there were eyes in the brain2 these traces are only occasions1 on which1 by the laws of the union of soul and body1 ideas are excited in the mind2 and1 therefore1 it is not necessary1 that there should be an exact resemblance between the traces and the things represented by them1 any more than that words or signs should be exactly like the things signified by them30#aaa--;,he adds1 8,these two opinions1 ,i think cannot be reconciled4 ,for if the images or traces in the brain are perceived1 they must be the objects of perception1 and not the occasions of it only4 ,on the other hand1 if they are only the occasions of our perceiving1 they are not perceived at all40#aab--;,did ,dr ,reid1 then1 suppose that the feeling1 whatever it may be1 which constitutes perception as a state of the mind1 or1 in short1 all of which we are conscious in perception1 is not strictly and exclusively mental1 as much as all of which we are conscious in remembrance1 or in love1 or hate2--or did he wish us to believe that matter itself1 in any of its forms1 is1 or can be1 a part of the phenomena or states of the mind2--a part therefore of that mental state or feeling which we term a perception8 ,our sensations like our remembrances or emotions1 we refer to some cause or antecedent4 ,the difference is1 that in the one case we consider the feeling as having for its cause some previous feeling or state of the mind itself2 in the other case we consider it as having for its cause something which is external to ourselves1 and independent of our transient feelings1--something which1 in consequence of former feelings suggested at the moment1 it is impossible for us not to regard as extended and resisting4--,but still what we thus regard as extended and resisting1 is known to us only by the feelings which it occasions in our mind4 ,what matter1 in its relation to the percipient mind1 can be1 but the cause or occasion1 direct or indirect1 of that class of feelings which ,i term sensations or perceptions1 it is absolutely impossible for me to conceive4 ,the percipient mind1 in no one of its affections1 can be said to be the mass of matter which it perceives1 unless the separate existence1 either of matter or of mind1 be abandoned by us1 the existence of which1 ,dr ,reid would have been the last of philosophers to yield4 ,he acknowledges that our perceptions are consequent on the presence of external bodies1 not from any necessary connexion subsisting between them1 but merely from the arrangement which the ,deity1 in his wisdom1 has chosen to make of their mutual phenomena2 which is surely to say1 that the ,deity has rendered the presence of the external object the occasion of that affection of the mind1 which is termed perception2 or1 if it be not to say this1 it is to say nothing4 ,whatever state of mind perception may be2 whether a primary result of a peculiar power1 or a mere secondary reference of association that follows the particular sensation1 of which the reference is made1 it is itself1 in either view of it1 but a state of the mind2 and to be the external occasion or antecedent of this state of mind1 since it is to produce1 directly or indirectly1 all which constitutes perception1 is surely1 therefore1 to be perceived1 or there must be something in the mere word perceived1 different from the physical reality which it expresses4 ,the confusion of ,dr ,reid's notions on this subject1 seems to have arisen from a cause1 which has been the chief source of the general confusion that prevails in intellectual science2 and1 indeed1 it was principally with the view of exhibiting this confusion1 and its source1 to you strongly1 that ,i have dwelt so long on a criticism1 which1 to those among you who are not acquainted with the extensive and important applications that have been made of this doctrine1 may1 perhaps1 have appeared of very little interest4 ,dr ,reid1 it is evident1 was not sufficiently in the habit of considering the phenomena of the mind1--its perceptions1 as well as its remembrances1 judgments1 passions1 and all its other affections1 whatever these may be1--in the light in which ,i have represented them to you1 merely as the mind affected1 in a certain manner1 according to certain regular laws of succession1 but as something more mysterious than the subject of this sequence of feelings2 for1 but for this notion of something more mysterious1 the object of perception1 and the external occasion of that state of mind which we term perception1 must have conveyed precisely the same notion4 ,to have a clear view of the phenomena of the mind1 as mere affections or states of it1 existing successively1 and in a certain series1 which we are able1 therefore1 to predict1 in consequence of our knowledge of the past1 is1 ,i conceive1 to have made the most important acquisition which the intellectual inquirer can make4 ,to say1 merely1 that it is to have learned to distinguish that which may be known1 from that which never can be known1 and which it therefore would be an idle waste of labour to attempt to discover1--would be to say far too little4 ,it is to see the mind1 in a great measure1 as it is in nature1 divested of every thing foreign1 passing instantly from thought to thought1 from sensation to sensation1 in almost endless variety of states1 and differing as completely from that cumbrous representation of it1 which philosophers are fond of representing to us1 as the planets revolving freely in the immense space of our solar system1 differ from those mimic orbs1 which1 without any principle of motion in themselves1 are1 as it were1 dragged along1 in the complex mechanism of our orreries4 ,in objecting1 however1 to ,dr ,reid's notion of perception1 ,i am far from wishing to erase the word from our metaphysical vocabulary4 ,on the contrary1 ,i conceive it to be a very convenient one1 if the meaning attached to it be sufficiently explained1 by an analysis of the complex state of mind1 which it denotes1 and the use of it confined rigidly to cases in which it has this meaning4 ,sensation may exist1 without any reference to an external cause1 in the same manner as we may look at a picture1 without thinking of the painter2 or read a poem1 without thinking of the poet1--or it may exist with reference to an external cause2 and it is convenient1 therefore1 to confine the term sensation to the former of these cases1 and perception to the latter4 ,but1 then1 it must be understood1 that the perception is nothing but the suggestion of ideas associated with the simple sensation1 as it originally took place1--or is only another name for the original simple sensation itself1 in the cases1 if any there be1 in which sensation involves immediately in itself1 the belief of some existence external to the sentient mind1--or is only a mere inference1 like all our other inferences1 if it arise1 in the manner in which ,i have endeavoured to explain to you1 how the notions of extension and resistance in an external cause of our feelings1 might arise1 and be afterwards suggested in association with other feelings that had frequently accompanied it4 ,to give a brief summary1 however1 of the argument which ,i have urged2--in that state of acquired knowledge1 long after the first elementary feelings of infancy1 in which modified state alone1 the phenomena of the mind can become to us objects of reflective analysis1 certain feelings are referred by us to an external material cause4 ,the feelings themselves1 as primarily excited1 are termed sensations1 and1 when followed by the reference to an external cause1 receive the name of perceptions1 which marks nothing more in addition to the primary sensations1 than this very reference4 ,but what is the reference itself1 in consequence of which the new name is given8 ,it is the suggestion of some extended resisting object1 the presence of which had before been found to be attended with that particular sensation1 which is now again referred to it4 ,if we had had no sense but that of smell2 no sense but that of taste2 no sense but that of sound2 no sense but that of sight2 we could not have known the existence of extended resisting substances1 and1 therefore1 could not have referred the pleasant or painful sensations of those classes to such external causes1 more than we refer directly to an external cause1 any painful or pleasing emotion1 or other internal affection of the mind4 ,in all but one class of our sensations1 then1 it is evident that what ,dr ,reid calls perception1 as the operation of a peculiar mental faculty1 is nothing more than a suggestion of memory or association1 which differs in no respect from other suggestions arising from other coexistences or successions of feelings1 equally uniform or frequent4 ,it is only in a single class of sensations1 therefore1--that which ,dr ,reid ascribes to touch1--that perception1 which he regards as a peculiar faculty1 extending to all our sensations1 can be said to have any primary operation1 even though we should agree with him in supposing1 that our belief of extended resistance is not reducible by analysis1 to any more general principles4 ,if1 however1 my analysis of the complex notion of matter be just1 perception1 in its relation to our original sensations of touch1 as much as in relation to the immediate feelings which we derive from smell1 taste1 sight1 and hearing1 is only one of the many operations of the suggesting or associating principle4 ,but1 even on his own principles1 ,i repeat1 it must be confined to the single class of feeling1 which he considers as tactual1 and is not an original principle1 coextensive with all the original varieties of sensation4 ,even in the single class1 to which it is thus1 on his own principles1 to be confined1 it is not so much what he would term a faculty1 as an intuitive belief1 by which we are led irresistibly1 on the existence of certain sensations1 to ascribe these to causes that are external and corporeal2 or1 if we give the name of faculty to this peculiar form of intuition1 we should give it equally to all our intuitions1 and rank among our faculties1 the belief of the continued order of ,nature1 or the belief of our own identity1 as much as our belief of external things1 if our senses themselves are unable to give us any information of them4 ,,footnotes3 #ajg ,account of the ,life1 c4 p4 xci4 prefixed to ,reid's ,works4 ,edin4 #ahjc4 #ajh ,gray1 de ,princip4 ,cogit4 ,lib4 ,i4 v4 #adc--aec4 #aji ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #af4 #aaj ,see before1 p4 #daf4 #aaa ,on the ,intellectual ,powers1 ,essay ,,ii4 c4 #h4 #aab ,ibid4 ,,lecture ,,xxviii4 ,,on ,,dr ,,reid',s ,,supposed ,,proof ,,of ,a ,,material ,,world--,,on ,,vision--,,and ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,feelings ,,ascribed ,,to ,,it4 ,in my ,lecture of yesterday1 ,gentlemen1 we were engaged in considering the grounds of ,dr ,reid's claim to the honour of detecting and exposing the fallacy of the hypothesis of ideas as images1 or things1 in the mind1 distinct from the mind itself1--a claim which1 though made by one who has many other indubitable titles to our respect and gratitude1 we found1 in this particular instance1 to be inadmissible4 ,it appeared1 on an examination of the original works of the eminent philosophers who preceded him for more than a century1 and even of the common elementary treatises of the schools1 that1 though after the ,peripatetic hypothesis of species had been universally or generally abandoned1 the language of that hypothesis continued to subsist metaphorically1--as it continues with equal force at this moment1--it was only metaphorically that it did thus continue2 and that when ,dr ,reid1 therefore1 conceived1--in proving ideas not to be self-existing things1 separate and distinct from the percipient mind itself1--that he was confuting what every body believed1 he merely assumed as real what was intended as metaphorical1 and overthrew opinions which the authors1 to whom he ascribes them1 would themselves have been equally eager to overthrow4 ,but there is yet another point1 connected with the theory of perception1 on which he is believed to have made an important addition to our metaphysical knowledge4 ,i allude to his supposed proof of the existence of a material world4 ,in this1 too1 we shall find1 that he has truly added nothing to our former knowledge2 that he has left us1 in short1 our belief as originally felt by us1 but has not supplied us with the slightest evidence in addition to the force of that original belief itself1 nor given any additional strength to that very belief1 which before was confessedly irresistible4 ,the confutation of the scepticism on this subject1 it is evident1 may be attempted in two ways1--by shewing the arguments urged by the sceptic to be logically false2 or by opposing to them the belief itself1 as of evidence either directly intuitive1 or the result1 at least1 of other intuitions1 and early and universal associations and inferences1 so irresistible after the first acquisitions of infancy1 as to have then all the force of intuition itself4 ,as long as ,dr ,reid confines himself to the latter of these pleas1 he proceeds on safe ground2 but his footing is not so firm when he assails the mere logic of the sceptic1--for the sceptical argument1 as a mere play of reasoning1 admits of no reply4 ,it is vain for him to say1 that the scepticism proceeding1 as he thinks1 on the belief of ideas in the mind1 as the direct objects of perception1 must fall with these ideas2 for1 though the scepticism may be consistent with the belief of ideas as separate existences in the mind1 it does not depend1 in the slightest degree1 on their existence or non-existence4 ,we have only to change the term ideas into the synonymous phrase affections or states of the mind1 and the scepticism1 if not stronger1 is at least in strength exactly what it was before4 ,in the one case the sceptic will say1 that we are sensible of ideas only1 not of external objects1 which may have no resemblance to our ideas2 in the other case1 that perception is but a state of the mind as much as any of our other feelings1 and that we are conscious only of this1 and other states or affections of our mind1 which have variously succeeded each other1 and not of external objects1 which themselves can be no parts of that train of mental consciousness4 ,whatever weight there may be in the former of these sceptical theories1 exists1 ,i may say1 even with greater force1 because with greater simplicity1 in the second2 and the task1 therefore1 of proving by logic1--if logical proof were requisite for our belief1--the existence of a material world1 would remain as laborious as before1 after the fullest confutation of the system1 which might suppose perception to be carried on by the medium of little images of bodies in the mind4 ,so far1 indeed1 would the confutation of this hypothesis as to perception1--even if ,dr ,reid had truly overthrown it1--be from lessening the force of the scepticism as to the existence of matter1 that1 of two sceptics1 one believing every thing with respect to ideas which ,dr ,reid supposed himself to have confuted1 and the other believing ideas to be mere states of his mind1 there can be no question1 that the former would be the more easy to be overcome1 since his belief would already involve the existence of ,,something separate from the mind2 while the other might maintain1 that all of which he was conscious1 was the mere series of affections of his own mind1 and that beyond this consciousness he could know nothing4 ,against the argument of one1 who founds his very argument on his consciousness merely1 and professes to have no knowledge either of little images1 or of any thing else beyond his consciousness1 it would be as idle to urge1 that ideas are not little images in the mind1 as it would have been for a ,cartesian to attempt to confute the ,newtonian system of attraction1 by a denial of the ,ptolemaic spheres4 ,all that remains1 then1 to supply the place of logical demonstration1 which would be needless where the belief is as strong as that of demonstration itself1 is the paramount force of this universal and irresistible belief2 and there is no fear that this can be weakened by any argument1 or be less felt by him who denies it1 than by him who asserts it4 ,we are conscious1 indeed1 only of the feelings that are the momentary states of our own mind2 but some of these it is absolutely impossible for us not to ascribe to causes that are external1 and independent of us2 and the belief of a system of external things1 is one of these very states of the mind1 which itself forms1 and will ever form1 a part of the train of our consciousness4 ,this ,mr ,hume himself1 the great sceptic whom ,dr ,reid opposes1 admits as readily as ,dr ,reid himself3--8,a ,copernican or ,ptolemaic1 who supports each his different system of astronomy1 may hope to produce a conviction1 which will remain constant and durable1 with his audience4 ,a ,stoic or ,epicurean displays principles1 which may not only be durable1 but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour4 ,but a ,pyrrhonian cannot expect1 that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind3 or1 if it had1 that its influence would be beneficial to society4 ,on the contrary1 he must acknowledge1 if he will acknowledge any thing1 that all human life must perish1 were his principles universally and steadily to prevail4 ,all discourse1 all action1 would immediately cease2 and men remain in a total lethargy1 till the necessities of nature1 unsatisfied1 put an end to their miserable existence4 ,it is true1 so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded4 ,nature is always too strong for principle2 and1 though a ,pyrrhonian may throw himself1 or others1 into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings1 the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples1 and leave him the same1 in every point of action and speculation1 with the philosophers of every other sect1 or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches4 ,when he awakes from his dream1 he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself40#aac ,in what respect does this differ from the language of ,dr ,reid himself1 when he says1 that 8the belief of a material world is older1 and of more authority1 than any principles of philosophy4 ,it declines the tribunal of reason1 and laughs at all the artillery of the logician40#aad ,surely1 if it decline the tribunal of reason1 it is not by reasoning that it is to be supported1--even though the reasoner should have the great talents which ,dr ,reid unquestionably possessed4 ,the sceptic1 and the orthodox philosopher of ,dr ,reid's school1 thus come precisely to the same conclusion4 ,the creed of each1 on this point1 is composed of two propositions1 and of the same two propositions2 the first of which is1 that the existence of a system of things1 such as we understand when we speak of an external world1 cannot be proved by argument2 and the second1 that the belief of it is of a force1 which is paramount to that of argument1 and absolutely irresistible4 ,the difference1 and the only difference is1 that1 in asserting the same two propositions1 the sceptic pronounces the first in a loud tone of voice1 and the second in a whisper1--while his supposed antagonist passes rapidly over the first1 and dwells on the second1 with a tone of confidence4 ,the negation in the one case1 and the affirmation in the other case1 are1 however1 precisely the same4 ,to him1 indeed1 who considers the tone only1 and not the meaning1 there may seem to be a real strife of sentiment2 but1 if we neglect the tone1 which is of no consequence1 and attend to the meaning only of what is affirmed and denied by both1 we shall not be able to discover even the slightest discrepancy4 ,there is no argument of mere reasoning that can prove the existence of an external world2 it is absolutely impossible for us not to believe in the existence of an external world4 ,we may call these two propositions1 then1 a summary of the doctrine of ,reid1 or of the doctrine of ,hume1 as we please2 for it is truly the common and equal doctrine of the two4 ,though we have thus seen reason to deny to ,dr ,reid the merit commonly ascribed to him1 on the points which we have been considering1 relative to the theory of perception1 ,i trust you will not on that account1 be insensible to the merits which he truly possessed4 ,he knows little1 indeed1 of the human mind1 who does not know1 how compatible many errors and misconceptions are with the brightest and most active energies of intellect4 ,on this 8,isthmus of a middle ,state10 of which ,pope speaks1 man1 though not 8reasoning but to err10 is yet subject to occasional error1 even in his proudest reasonings4 ,with all his wisdom1 he is still but 8darkly wise20 and with all the grandeur of his being1 but 8rudely great40 ,,vision4 ,our inquiry into the nature of the sensations of touch1--or at least of those sensations1 which are truly1 and of others which are commonly1 though1 ,i think1 falsely1 ascribed to this organ1 has led us into speculations1 in the course of which ,i have been obliged to anticipate many remarks1 that more peculiarly belong to the sense which still remains to be considered by us1--the sense of sight1 that to which we owe so much of our most valuable information1 with respect to nature1 and so many of those pleasures1 which the bounty of ,him1 who1 has formed us to be happy1 as well as to be wise1 has so graciously intermingled1 with all the primary means of our instruction4 ,the anticipations1 into which ,i have been led1 were necessary for throwing light on the subjects before considered1 particularly on the complex feelings ascribed to touch1--the knowledge of which feelings1 however1 was still more necessary1 for understanding fully the complex perceptions of this sense4 ,it is thus scarcely possible1 in science1 to treat of one subject1 without considering it in relation to some other subject1 and often to subjects between which1 on first view1 it would be difficult to trace any relation4 ,every thing throws light upon every thing1--though the reflection1--which is1 in many cases1 so bright1 as to force itself upon common eyes--may1 in other cases1 be so faint1 as to be perceptible only to eyes of the nicest discernment4 ,it may almost be said1 that there is an universal affinity in truths1--like that universal attraction1 which unites to each other1 as one common system1 the whole masses which are scattered through the infinity of space1 and by which1 as ,i have before remarked1 the annihilation of a single particle of matter1 in any one of these orbs1--however inconceivably slight its elementary modification might be of the general sum of attraction1--would in that very instant be productive of change throughout the universe4 ,it is not easy to say1 what any one science would have been1 if any other science had not existed4 ,how different did ,astronomy become1 in consequence of the accidental burning of a few sea-weeds upon the sand1 to which the origin of glass has been ascribed2 and1 when we think of the universal accessions1 which navigation has made to every department of knowledge1 what an infinity of truths may be considered as almost starting into existence1 at the moment1 when the polarity of the magnet was first observed6 8,true to the pole1 by thee the pilot guides ,his steady helm1 amid the struggling tides1 ,braves with broad sail the unmeasurable sea1 ,cleaves the dark air1 and asks no star but thee40#aae ,the anticipations1 which have been made1 in the present instance1 will be of advantage1 in abridging much of the labour1 which would have been necessary in treating of vision simply4 ,i may now safely leave you1 to make1 for yourselves1 the application of many arguments1 on which ,i have dwelt at length1 in treating of the other senses4 ,the organ of sight1 as you well know1 is the eye1--a machine of such exquisite and obvious adaptation to the effects produced by it1 as to be1 of itself1 in demonstrating the existence of the ,divine ,being who contrived it1 equal in force to many volumes of theology4 ,the atheist1 who has seen1 and studied1 its internal structure1 and yet continues an atheist1 may be fairly considered as beyond the power of mere argument to reclaim4 ,the minute details of its structure1 however1 belong to the anatomist4 ,it is enough for our purpose to know1 that1 by an apparatus of great simplicity1 all the light1 which1 from every quarter strikes on the pellucid part of the ball of the eye1--and which if it continued to pass in the same direction1 would thus produce one mingled and indistinct expanse of colour1--is so refracted1 as it is termed1 or bent from its former direction to certain focal points1 as to be distributed again on the retina1 in distinct portions1 agreeing with the portions which come from each separate object1 so exactly1 as to form on it a miniature landscape of the scenery without4 ,nor is this all4 ,that we may vary1 at our pleasure1 the field of this landscape1 the ball of the eye is furnished with certain muscles1 which enable us to direct it more particularly toward the objects which we wish to view2 and according as the light which falls from these may be more or less intense1 there are parts which minister to the sensibility of the eye1 by increasing or diminishing in proportion the transparent aperture at which the light is admitted4 ,there are1 then1 in this truly wonderful and beautiful process1 in the first place1 as determining what objects1 in the wide scene around us1 are to be visible at the moment1 the contraction of certain muscles1 on which the particular field of our vision depends1 and which may almost be said to enable us to increase the extent of our field of vision1 by enabling us to vary it at will2--in the second place1 the external light1 emitted from all the objects within this radiant field1 which1 on its arrival at the retina1 is itself the direct object of vision2 in the third place1 the provision for increasing or diminishing the diameter of the pupil1 in proportion to the quantity of that incident light2--in the fourth place1 the apparatus1 by which the dispersed rays of light are made to assume within the eye1 the focal convergence necessary for distinct vision2--and lastly1 the expansion of the optic nerve1 as a part of the great sensorial organ1 essential to sensation4 ,the difference of the phenomena1 produced by the varieties of the external light itself1 is exhibited in almost every moment of our waking existence2 and the diversities1 arising from other parts of the process1 are not less striking4 ,there are peculiar diseases which affect the optic nerve1 or other parts of the sensorial organ immediately connected with it1--there are other diseases which affect the refracting apparatus1--others which affect the iris1 so as to prevent the enlargement or diminution of the pupil1 when different quantities of light are poured on it1--others1 which affect the muscles that vary the position of the ball1--and1 in all these cases1 we find1 as might be expected1 a corresponding difference of the phenomena4 ,to open our eyes at present1 is not to have a single simple feeling2 it is1 as it were1 to have innumerable feelings4 ,the colour1 the magnitude1 the figure1 the relative position of bodies1 are seen by us at once4 ,it is not a small expanse of light1 which we perceive1 equal merely to the surface of the narrow expansion of the optic nerve4 ,it is the universe itself4 ,we are present with stars1 which beam upon us1 at a distance that converts to nothing the whole wide diameter of our planetary system4 ,it is as if the tie1 which binds us down to the globe on which we dwell1 belonged only to our other senses1 and had no influence over this1 which1 even in its union with the body1 seems still to retain all the power1 and unbounded freedom1 of its celestial origin4 ,it is of importance1 however1 to remember1 that1 even in the perception of the most distant body1 the true object of vision is not the distant body itself1 but the light that has reached the expansive termination of the optic nerve2 and the sense of vision1 therefore1 which seems so independent of the tie that binds us to our small spot of earth1 is as truly limited to it1 as any of our other senses4 ,if the light could exist in the same manner1 moving in the same varieties of direction1 as at present1--though no other bodies were in existence1 than the light itself1 and our sensorial organ1--all the sensations belonging to mere sight would be exactly the same as now2 and accordingly we find1 as light is1 in a great measure1 manageable by us1 that we have it in our power to vary at pleasure1 the visual notions1 which any one would otherwise have formed of bodies1--without altering the bodies themselves1 or even their position with respect to the eye1--by merely interposing substances1 to modify the light reflected or emitted from them4 ,the same paper1 which we term white1 when we observe it with our naked eye1 seems blue or red1 when we look at it through glass1 of such a kind1 as absorbs all the light which enters it1 but the rays of those particular colours2 and it seems larger or smaller1 as we look at it through a concave or convex lens1 which leaves the object precisely as it was1 and affects only the direction of the rays that come from it3--the reason of all which diversities of perception is1 that1 though what we are accustomed to term the object continues the same1--whatever substance may be interposed between it and the eye1--that1 which is really the object of vision1 is different2 and our perceptions1 therefore1 correspond with the diversity of their real objects4 ,in treating of the distinction which has been made1 of those objects of sense which act directly on our organs1 and of those which act through a medium1 as it has been termed1 ,i before remarked to you the confusion1 into which we might be led1 by this distinction1 which forgets that the supposed medium is itself the real object1 as truly1 as any of the objects1 which in their relations to other senses1 are termed direct4 ,in no instance1 however1 has it led to so much confusion1 as in the case of vision4 ,it is the more important1 therefore1 for you1 to have precise notions on this subject1 and to have constantly in mind1 that1 though indirectly1 we may be said to perceive by sight distant objects1 as truly as we perceive colour1 still the direct object of vision is not the object1 existing permanently at a distance1 but those rays of light1 whose existence is independent of the object1 and which have received1 from the object that reflects them1 nothing more than a change of their direction1 in consequence of which they have come within the boundary of that small pellucid circle of the eye1 which1 insignificant as it may seem1 comprehends in itself what is truly the whole sphere of our vision4 ,sight1 then1 which comprehends all the varieties of colour1 is the object1 and the only object1 of the sense which we are considering4 ,but1 simple as it is1 of what instruction1 and joy1 and beauty1 and ever-varying magnificence1 is it the source6 8,carmine quo ,dea te dicam1 gratissima coeli ,progenies1 ortumque tuum2 gemmantia rore ,ut per prata levi lustras1 et floribus halans ,purpureum ,veris gremium1 scenamque virentem ,pingis1 et umbriferos colles1 et crula regna8 ,gratia te ,venerisque lepos1 et mille colorum1 ,formarumque chorus sequitur1 motusque decentes4 ,at caput invisum ,stygiis ,nox atra tenebris4 ,abdidit1 horrendque simul ,formidinis ora ,pervigilesque stus ,curarum1 atque anxius ,angor2 ,undique ,ltiti florent mortalia corda1 ,purus et arridet largis fulgoribus ther40#aaf 8,hail1 holy light1 offspring of heaven first born6 ,or of the ,eternal1 coeternal beam1 ,may ,i express thee unblam'd8 since ,god is light1 ,and never but in unapproached light ,dwelt from eternity2 dwelt then in ,thee1 ,bright ,effluence of bright ,essence increate6 --,or hear'st thou rather1 pure ethereal ,stream6 ,whose fountain who shall tell8 ,before the ,sun1 ,before the heavens1 ,thou wert1 and at the voice ,of ,god1 as with a mantle didst invest ,the rising world of waters dark and deep1 ,won from the void and formless infinite40#aag ,how pathetic is the very beauty of this invocation1 when we consider the feelings with which it must have been written by him1 who1 8,like the wakeful bird1 ,sung darkling10#aah and who seems to have looked back on that loveliness of nature1 from which he was separated1 with the melancholy readiness1 with which the thoughts of the unfortunate and the sorrowful still revert to past enjoyments2 as the prisoner1 even when fettered to his dungeon-floor1 still turns his eye1 almost involuntarily1 to that single gleam of light1 which reminds him only of scenes that exist no longer to him4 8,thus with the year ,seasons return2 but not to me returns ,day1 or the sweet approach of even or morn1 ,or sight of vernal bloom1 or summer's rose1 ,or flocks1 or herds1 or human face divine2 ,but cloud instead1 and ever-during dark ,surround me40#aai ,how often must he have felt1--and how deeply must such a mind have felt1--the force of that complaint1 which he puts into the mouth of ,samson1--a complaint1 which may surely be forgiven1 or almost forgiven1 to the blind3-- 8,o why was sight ,to such a tender ball as the eye confined1 ,so obvious1 and so easy to be quench'd2 ,and not1 as feeling1 through all parts diffused1 ,that she might look at will through every pore80#abj ,the immediate object of vision1 we have seen1 then1 is light1 which gives rise to all the various sensations of colour2 and1 since the days of ,berkeley1 philosophers have1 with scarcely any exception1 admitted1 that the knowledge of the distance1 magnitude1 and real figure of objects1 which seems at present to be immediately received by sight1 is the result of knowledge acquired by the other senses3--though they have1--,i think without sufficient reason1--as universally supposed1 that the superficial extension1 of length and breadth1 becomes known to us by sight originally2--that there is1 in short1 a visible figure of objects1 corresponding with the picture which they form on the retina1 and changing1 therefore1 with their change of position relatively to the eye1--and a tangible figure of objects1 permanent and independent of their change of place2 the latter being the real figure suggested by the former1 nearly in the same manner as the conception of objects is suggested1 by the arbitrary sounds1 or written character1 which denote them4 ,the inquiry1 with respect to the truth of this visible figure1 as a sensation1 may1 however1 be omitted1 till we have considered the former opinion1 which respects the visual perception of distance1 and of the figure and magnitude which are termed tangible4 ,if it had been duly considered1 that it is light which is the true object of vision1 and not the luminous body1 the question1 as far as it depends on reasoning a priori1 exclusively of any instinctive connexions that might be supposed1 could not have admitted of very long discussion4 ,from whatever distance light may come1 it is but the point of the long line which terminates at the retina1 of which we are sensible2 and this terminating point must be the same1 whether the ray has come from a few feet of distance1 or from many miles4 ,the rays1 that beam from the adjacent meadow1 or the grove1 are not nearer to my eye1 at the instant of vision1 than those which have been reflected from the mountain1 on the very verge of the horizon1 or from the cloud that hangs at an immeasurable distance above my head4 ,the light1 that converges on our eye1 from all the stars of heaven1 within what we term the field of our vision1 is collected1 in a space1 that cannot be larger than the retina on which it falls4 ,a cube or a sphere is represented to us1 by the two dimensions of a coloured plane1 variously shaded1 as truly1 as by the object itself with its triple dimensions2 and1 in the determination of the exact correspondence of these double and triple dimensions1 in all their varieties of relation to the eye1 the whole art of perspective consists4 ,a coin of a single inch in diameter1 when placed before the eye1 and1 of course1 intercepting only an extent of light equal to the extent of its own surface1 is sufficient to hide from us1 by actual eclipse1 the fields1 and villages1 and woods1 that seemed stretched in almost endless continuity before us4 ,unless1 therefore1 there be some instinctive and immediate suggestion1 of certain distances1 magnitudes1 and figures1 by certain varieties of the sensation of colour1 there is nothing in the mere light itself1 or in its relation to the eye at the moment of vision1 which seems fit to communicate the knowledge of these4 ,not of distance2 for the rays from distant objects1 when they produce vision1 are as near to the retina1 as the rays from objects that are contiguous to the eye4 ,not of real magnitude2 for an object1 with which we are familiar1 appears to us of the same size1 at distances1 at which every thing merely visual is so completely changed1 that its magnitude1 as far as it depends on mere radiation1 may be demonstrated1 from the laws of optics1 to be equal only to a half1 or a tenth part of its apparent magnitude1 when nearer4 ,not of figure2 for1 without the knowledge of longitudinal distance1 we could not distinguish a sphere or a cube from a plane surface of two dimensions2 and an object1 with the shape of which we are familiar1 appears to us of the same form1 in all directions2 though it may be demonstrated optically1 that the visual figure1 as far as it depends on mere radiation1 must vary with every variety of position4 ,i have said1 that the knowledge of the real magnitude1 figure1 and position of bodies1 could not be obtained immediately from the diversities of the mere surfaces of light at the retina2 unless it were the suggestion of some instinctive principle1 by which the one feeling was1 originally and inseparably1 connected with the other3 and ,i have made this exception1 to prevent you from being misled1 by the works on this subject1 so as to think1 that the original perception of distance implies1 in the very notion of it1 a physical impossibility4 ,some diversity there evidently must be of the immediate sensation of sight1 or of other feelings coexisting with it1 when a difference of magnitude or figure is suggested3 the visual affection1 which is followed by the notion of a mile1 cannot be the same as that which is attended with the notion of half a foot2 nor that which is attended with the perception of a sphere1 be the same as that which suggests a plane circular surface4 ,whatever the number of the varied suggestions of this kind may be1 there must be1 at least1 an equal variety of the immediate sensations that give rise to them2 and these corresponding series of sensations and suggestions1 may originally be associated together by an instinctive principle1 as much as any other pairs of phenomena1 the connexion of which we ascribe to instinct2 or1 in other words1 suppose an adaptation of them to each other1 by the gracious provision of the ,power which formed us1 for a purpose unforeseen by us1 and unwilled at the moment4 ,it is not more wonderful1 a priori1 that a sensation of colour should be immediately followed by the notion of a mile of distance1 than that the irritation of the nostril1 by any very stimulant odour1 should be immediately and involuntarily1 followed by the sudden contraction of a distant muscular organ1 like the diaphragm1 which produces1 in sneezing1 the violent expiration necessary for expelling the acrid matter2--or that an increase of the quantity of light poured on the eye1 should be instantly1 and without our consciousness1 followed by a contraction of the transparent aperture4 ,i am far from saying1 that there truly is such an instinctive association of our original visual feelings1 with corresponding notions of distance and magnitude1 in the present case2 for1 at least in man1 ,i believe the contrary4 ,i mean only1 that the question has1 a priori1 only greater probability on one side1 not absolute certainty2 and that experience is necessary1 before we can decide it with perfect confidence4 ,in the case of the other animals1 there seems to be little reason to doubt1 that the tedious process1 by which man may be truly said to learn to see1 is not necessary for their visual perceptions4 ,the calf1 and the lamb1 newly dropt into the world1 seem to measure forms and distances with their eyes1 as distinctly1 or at least almost as distinctly1 as the human reasoner measures them1 after all the acquisitions of his long and helpless infancy4 ,of these races of our fellow animals1 ,nature is as once the ,teacher and the great ,protectress1--supplying to them1 immediately1 the powers which are necessary for their preservation1--as1 in the long continued affection of the human parent1 she far more than compensates to man1 the early instincts which she has denied to him4 ,if the other animals had to learn to see1 in the same manner with ourselves1 it would be scarcely possible1 that their existence should be preserved to the period1 at which the acquisitions necessary for accurate perception could be made2 even though the hoof had been an instrument of touch and measurement1 as convenient as the hand4 ,for this difference in the relative circumstances of their situation1 the ,almighty ,being1--to whose universal benevolence1 nothing which he has created is too humble for his care1--has made sufficient provision1 in giving them that early maturity1 which makes them1 for many months1 the superiors of him1 who is afterwards to rule them with a sway1 that is scarcely conscious of effort4 8,hale are their young1 from human frailties freed1 ,walk unsustained1 and1 unsupported1 feed4 ,they live at once1--forsake the dam's warm side1-- ,take the wide world1 with nature for their guide1-- ,bound o'er the lawn1 or seek the distant glade1 ,and find a home in each delightful shade40#aba ,this instinctive suggestion1 which1 however subsequent it may be to the primary visual sensation1 seems like immediate perception in the young of other races of animals1 is a very strong additional proof1 if any such were necessary1 that there is no physical impossibility1 in the supposition that a similar original suggestion may take place in man4 ,the question1 as ,i before said1 becomes truly a question of observation and experiment4 ,but1 in man1 there is not that necessity for the instinct1 which exists in the peculiar situation of the other animals2 and we find accordingly1 that there is no trace of the instinct in him4 ,it is long before the little nurseling shews1 that his eye has distinguished objects from each other1 so as to fix their place4 ,we are able almost to trace in his efforts the progress which he is gradually making2--and1 in those striking cases1 which are sometimes presented to us1 of the acquisition of sight1 in mature life1 in consequence of a surgical operation1--after vision had been obstructed from infancy1--it has been found1 that the actual magnitude and figure1 and position1 of bodies1 were to be learned like a new language1--that all objects seemed equally close to the eye1--and that a sphere and a cube1 of each of which the tangible figure was previously known1 were not so distinguishable in the mere sensation of vision1 that the one could be said1 with certainty1 to be the cube1 and the other the sphere4 ,in short1 what had been supposed1 with every appearance of probability1 was demonstrated by experiment1--that we learn to see1--and that vision is truly1 what ,swift has paradoxically defined it to be1 the art of seeing things that are invisible4 ,,footnotes3 #aac ,essays--,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,sect4 xii4 ,part #b4 #aad ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 c4 ,chap4 v4 ,sect4 #g4 #aae ,darwin's ,botanic ,garden1 ,canto ,,ii4 v4 #bjc-f4 #aaf ,gray1 de ,princip4 ,cogit4 lib4 i4 v4 #he-if4 #aag ,paradise ,lost1 ,book ,,iii4 v4 #a-ab4 #aah ,ib4 v4 #ch1 #ci4 #aai ,ib4 v4 #dj-da4 #abj ,samson ,agonistes1 v4 #ic-ig4 #aba ,young's ,paraphrase on a part of the ,book of ,job1 v4 #bce-bdj4 ,,lecture ,,xxix4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,feelings ,,ascribed ,,to ,,vision1 ,,continued4 ,the chief part of my last ,lecture was employed in considering the ,phenomena of ,vision1 and particularly in proving1 that vision1--simple and immediate1 as it now seems to us1 even in its most magnificent results1--is truly the application of an art1 of long and tedious acquirement1--of that art with which we learn to measure forms and distances1 with a single glance1 by availing ourselves of the information1 previously received from other sources2--the mixed product of innumerable observations1 and calculations1 and detections of former mistakes--which were the philosophy of our infancy1 and each of which1 separately1 has been long forgotten1--recurring to the mind1 in after-life1 with the rapidity of an instinct4 ,of all the arts1 which man can acquire1 this is1 without question1 the richest1 both in wonder and in value--so rich in value1 that if the race of man had been incapable of acquiring it1 the very possibility of their continued existence seems scarcely conceivable2 and so rich in subjects of wonder1 that to be most familiar with these1 and to study them with most attention1 is to find at every moment new miracles of nature1 worthy of still increasing admiration4 8,per te quicquid habet mundus1 mirabile nobis1 ,panditur2 acceptumque tibi decus omne refertur ,terrarum4 ,gentes nequicquam interluit stu ,vicinas pelagus2 tu das superare viarum ,ardua1 et obtutu ,seston conjungis ,abydo4 ,necmaris angusti tantum discrimina solers ,decipis1 oceanique moras2 ,tu sidera ,cli ,subjicis humanis oculis1 et dissita longe ,das spectare loca1 et ,dias invisere sedes4 ,nativa hinc quamvis ferimur gravitate deorsum ,ad ,stygias sedes1 ,ditisque inamabile regnum1-- ,mente tamen sursum rapti ad sublimia2 molem ,exuimus terrenam1 animosque quamus ,olympo40#abb ,on this subject the remarks of ,dr ,reid1 which ,i am about to quote1 are not less just than they are strikingly expressed4 8,if we shall suppose an order of beings1 endued with every human faculty but that of sight1 how incredible would it appear to such beings1 accustomed only to the slow informations of touch1 that1 by the addition of an organ1 consisting of a ball and socket of an inch diameter1 they might be enabled in an instant of time1 without changing their place1 to perceive the disposition of a whole army1 or the order of a battle1 the figure of a magnificent palace1 or all the variety of a landscape8 ,if a man were by feeling to find out the figure of the peak of ,teneriffe1 or of even ,st ,peter's ,church at ,rome1 it would be the work of a lifetime4 8,it would appear still more incredible to such beings as we have supposed1 if they were informed of the discoveries which may be made by this little organ in things far beyond the reach of any other sense3 ,that by means of it we can find our way in the pathless ocean2 that we can traverse the globe of the earth1 determine its figure and dimensions1 and delineate every region of it4 ,yea1 that we can measure the planetary orbs1 and make discoveries in the sphere of the fixed stars4 8,would it not appear still more astonishing to such beings1 if they should be further informed1 ,that1 by means of this same organ1 we can perceive the tempers and dispositions1 the passions and affections of our fellow-creatures1 even when they want most to conceal them8 ,that when the tongue is taught most artfully to lie and dissemble1 the hypocrisy should appear in the countenance to a discerning eye2 ,and that by this organ1 we can often perceive what is straight and what is crooked in the mind as well as in the body8--,how many mysterious things must a blind man believe1 if he will give credit to the relations of those that see6 ,surely he needs as strong a faith as is required of a good ,christian40#abc ,the same observation has been put in a strong light1 by the supposition1 that it had been as uncommon1 to be born with the power of sight1 as it is now to be born incapable of it2--in which case it has been truly said1 that 8the few who had this rare gift would appear as prophets or inspired teachers to the many40#abd ,the very easy predictions thus made1 would be found1 constantly1 or almost constantly fulfilled1 by those who could form no conception of the means by which the effects predicted were foreseen2 and wonderful as the dreams and visions of prophetic inspiration may appear1 they surely could not seem more wonderful1 as a medium of communication1 than that by which the very secrets of the mind1 and events apparently the most distant1 were made known1 through the intervention of a small ball like the eye4 ,in shewing the manner by which we learn to combine1 with our visual sensations1 the knowledge obtained by touch2 or1 as ,i am rather inclined to think1 for reasons formerly stated1 the knowledge falsely ascribed to mere touch2 it will not be necessary to go over the different varieties of figure1 magnitude1 distance4 ,the most striking of these is distance1--which1 indeed1 may be truly said to involve the other two2 since the distance of an object is merely the extension of the long line that intervenes between the object and our eye1 and the consequent magnitude of the intervening objects1 and that which we consider1 regarded as one extended whole4 ,of this one great whole1 what we term the distant object1 is nothing more than the boundary4 ,the cottage1 at the end of a field1 is a part of that compound magnitude of which the field and the cottage are separately parts1 exactly in the same manner as the wing of a house1 is a part of the compound magnitude of the whole building4 ,the line of field which connects our eye with the cottage1 may1 indeed1 be a longer line1 but it is a line of precisely the same sort as that which connects the wings of the house with our organ of sight1 or with each other4 ,it is vain to think of ascribing the perception of distance to the measurement of the different angles subtended by objects1 at different distances1 or to an equally nice measurement of the different degrees of inclination of the axis of the eyes1 necessary for distinct vision1 in particular cases1--as if all men were instinctively geometers1 and the peasant and the very idiot were incessantly occupied in measuring angles2 for if this measurement were truly instinctive1 it would occur1 in infancy1 as in maturity1 and be immediate1 in those who have acquired the power of vision1 by that surgical operation to which ,i alluded in my last ,lecture4 ,but the most decisive of all considerations1 with respect to this supposed geometry1 is1 that the angles1 subtended by the object at its different distances1 and the inclination of the optic axis1 in the spontaneous accommodation of the eyes to the distinct vision of the object at different distances1 though truly existing1 to the mere optical examiner of the object1 and the light1 and the eye1 as one compound phenomenon1 have no real existence1 as feelings of the mind1 of the individual who sees1 and are known but to very few of the immense multitudes1 who without the slightest acquaintance with geometry1 or the slightest knowledge of the very lines1 whose angles they are supposed to measure1 are yet able to distinguish the distances of objects as accurately as the most expert mathematician4 ,how is it possible that the angles1 which remote objects make relatively to the eye1 should be known originally1 when the remote objects themselves are not known1 but merely the points of light on the retina8 ,in relation to the eye1 as the organ1 and to the mind1 as originally sentient in vision1 these points of light were truly all that existed4 ,the light1 indeed1 traversed a certain space1 in passing from the object to the eye1 and the lines of direction of the different rays1 in arriving at one focal point at the retina1 formed truly different angles4 ,but the angles could not be known1 unless the radiant lines themselves were known2 and of these1 the mind could have no knowledge4 ,during the whole time of their convergence1 till they reached the expansion of the optic nerve1 the rays of light were as little capable of producing vision1 as darkness itself2 and1 when they reached the retina1 the lines1 and consequently the angles1 existed no more4 ,of whatever use1 therefore1 such angles may be to the optician1 in laying down1 and illustrating the principles of his science1 they are of no use in the actual living measurements of sight4 ,man may reason1 indeed1--but he must reason from what he knows2 and1 therefore1 if the determination of distance be the result of any judgment1 it must be of a judgment formed from feelings which truly have1 or have had existence4 ,such feelings1 the elements of our visual judgments1 it is not very difficult to discover4 ,the great principle1 in this case1 is the principle of association1 by which the notions derived from touch1--or1 at least1 the notions which are commonly supposed to be derived from that sense1 are suggested immediately by the visual feelings which coexisted with the sensations of touch2 in the same manner1 as the words of a language1 when a language has been fully learned1 suggest whatever the words may have been used to denote4 ,a child1 whose eye has already learned to distinguish objects1 hears the word cup frequently repeated1 when a cup is held before him2 and the word afterwards suggests the thing4 ,this process every one understands4 ,but we are not equally aware1 that1 in the prior stage of learning to distinguish the cup by the eye1 the child went through a process exactly similar1--that the visual feeling1 which the rays of light from the cup excited1 coexisted with the tactual and muscular feeling1 when he handled the cup2 and that the one feeling was thus associated1 forever after with the other4 ,the means by which we acquire our knowledge of the distance of objects1 may be reduced to three1--the difference of the affections of the optic nerve1--the different affections of the muscles1 employed in varying the refracting power of each eye1 according to the distance of objects1 and in producing that particular inclination of the axis of the two eyes1 which directs them both equally on the particular object1--and1 thirdly1 the previous knowledge of the distance of other objects1 which form1 with that which we are considering1 a part of one compound perception4 ,to begin1 then1 with the affections of the retina4 ,these become signs of distance1 in two ways1 by the extent of the part of the retina affected1 and by the more or less vivid affection of the part4 ,it is evident1 from the laws of optics1 that1 according to the distance of the object from the eye1 there must1 when all other circumstances are the same1 be a difference of the extent of the retina1 on which the light falls4 ,this illuminated portion of the nervous expanse1 as supposed to be instantly perceived1 is what is termed the visible figure of an object2 and1 though ,i am disposed to question the knowledge1 which the mind is believed to acquire of this figure1 from the mere sensation of colour1 to which the affection of the retina gives rise1--,i am far from denying1 that the sensation itself1 whatever it may originally be1 will be different according to the extent of the retina affected1 as the sensation of heat is different1 according to the extent of the surface1 which has grown warmer or colder1--or of fragrance1 according as a small number of odorous particles have acted on a portion of the surface of the organ of smell1 or a greater number of these on a greater portion of that surface4 ,the different feelings1 then1 when more or less of the retina has been affected1 are capable of being associated with other feelings1 which may coexist with them4 ,an object1 held at the distance of a foot from the eye1 affects one part of the retina1--held at arm's length1 it affects less of the retina2 and this difference1 not indeed as perceived in figure1 but as perceived in the variety1 whatever that may originally be1 of the resulting sensation1 being found constant and uniform1 becomes of itself significant of the distance4 ,another mode1 in which the affection of the retina becomes significant of distance1 is by the brightness or dimness of the visible figure1 and its distinctness or indistinctness of outline2 or1 as ,i would rather say1 by the peculiar sensations1 without regard to figure1 which accompany those varieties of light4 ,since1 at a distance1 less light falls from objects on the eye1 and their outline becomes less definite1 a new measure is thus obtained1 in addition to that which is derived from the mere difference in extent of the retina affected4 ,in the illusion of this spontaneous measurement1 consists the chief magic of the painters art4 ,by different shades of colour1 he produces corresponding perceptions of distance2 and thus1 making one part of a plane surface seem more remote than another1 converts it1 as far as the mere eye can judge1 into a cube or sphere1 or any other solid1 which he chuses to present to us4 ,by the indistinct outline which he gives to his small figures1 in the back ground of a landscape1 he leads us to consider them1 not as diminutive in themselves1 which we should conceive them to be1 if1 with equal smallness1 their outline were clearer1 but merely as less or more remote4 ,he is thus able to vary his figures in three ways1 to make them larger or smaller1 more or less bright1 and more or less precisely defined2 and1 by uniting these varieties1 in various proportions1 to distinguish not merely what is large from what is small1 but the diminutive from the distant1 and the gigantic from the near4 ,accordingly we find1 that1 in circumstances1 in which the medium of transmission of light from objects is much altered1 our perception of distance and magnitude becomes less accurate4 ,in a fog1 objects appear to us greatly magnified2 because1 the effect produced on the retina1 in the extent of the visible figure and its dimness and indefinite outline1 is truly the same1 as when a larger object1 in the common state of the atmosphere1 is seen by us at a distance4 ,from the same principle1 objects seen under a brighter sky1 and in purer air1 seem nearer than they really are1 to those1 whose notions of distance have been acquired in a less happy climate4 ,this has been remarked1 by travellers in ,italy1 and particularly by one of the most illustrious of those who have visited that beautiful country1--a traveller1 whose attention had been particularly turned to observations of this sort4 ,the very acute observer1 of whom ,i speak1 is ,berkeley1 in whose ,theory of ,vision there is to be found a very interesting ,section1 in which he at once describes this impression1 and accounts for it4 ,our affections of the retina1 then1 both in the extent of the nervous expansion affected1 and in the species of affection1 afford one set of feelings1 with which the notion of distance may be associated1 in the same manner as the sounds or visual characters of a language may be associated with the conceptions which they denote1 or any other feelings with any other feelings4 ,the next set of feelings which we have to consider1 in relation to our perception of distance1 belong to a class1 of the importance of which ,i have had frequent occasion to speak1 the muscular feelings1 in the contraction of those muscles1 which adapt the nice refracting apparatus in each eye1 to the degree of refraction1 necessary for distinct vision in the particular case1 and produce that inclination of the axis of vision to each other1 which is necessary for directing both eyes equally on the object4 ,the muscular feeling may be slight indeed1 but still it is sufficient to modify1 in some degree1 the whole compound sensation of the moment4 ,one degree of contraction is attended with a particular feeling2 another degree with a different feeling2 and1 as there are various muscles1 subservient to the motions of the eyes1 some of which are exerted1 while others are quiescent1--the feeling1 it is evident1 must vary1 not with the degree of contraction merely1 but also with the muscles contracted4 ,a certain muscular feeling1 however simple or complex1 accompanies the mere visual sensation1 and blends with it2 and it is with this compound feeling1 muscular and visual1 that the notion of distance is associated4 ,the muscular adaptation1 however1 it may be remarked1 seems1 in a great measure1 to imply the very knowledge which it is supposed to give2 since we cannot1 instantly and voluntarily1 adapt our eyes to the state necessary for distinct vision1 at a particular distance1 unless we have previously known that particular distance4 ,the necessary adaptation1 however1 if it be not the result of a rapid change of various degrees of contraction in each particular case may depend1 not on our knowledge and will1 but on an instinctive connexion of certain motions with certain feelings1 in which there is as little consciousness of design1 as in that very analogous instinct1 or connexion of motions with feelings1 which increases or diminishes the diameter of the pupil1 according to the quantity of light which is poured upon the eye1 when the individual1 far from willing the contraction1 does not know even that such a contraction has taken place4 ,a third element1 in the calculation of the distance of an object1 is the previous knowledge of the distance of other objects1 which form together with it one compound perception4 ,thus1 when we look along a road1 and observe a man on horseback1 who has nearly approached a house which we know1 we have of course little difficulty in determining the distance of the rider4 ,every one must have felt how much easier his judgments of the distance of moving objects are1 in scenes with which he is in some degree acquainted1 than in a country which is new to him2 and what aid the interposition of a variety of objects gives1 even though we may not be well acquainted with the exact extent and distance of each4 ,to an inexperienced eye1 therefore1 in a first voyage1 a ship at a distance seems far nearer than it truly is1 from the absence of varied intervening objects in the line between4 ,even in the case of a river1 which is not so broad as to prevent us from distinguishing objects on the opposite side1 it is with great difficulty that we attempt to guess the distance1 with any approach to exactness4 ,there is a constant tendency to suppose the breadth of the river less than it is1 and consequently the objects on the opposite bank nearer than they are4 ,for the same reason1 the horizontal line1 in which innumerable objects intervene between the eye and the horizon1 appears so much longer than the line of altitude of the meridian1 that the vault of the sky does not seem a hemisphere1 but a far smaller segment of a great sphere4 ,on this subject1 however1 rich as it is in illustration1 my time will not allow me to dwell longer4 ,but ,i regret this the less1 as the subject is one of those1 which in the department of optics1 come under the consideration of one of my ,colleagues1 whose happy ,genius has the art of describing fully what the narrow compass of his lectures may have obliged him to state briefly2 and who leaves little for others to add1 even on subjects to which he alludes only for incidental illustration4 ,these few very slight remarks1 however1 will be sufficient to show1 in what manner the notion of distance may be associated with mere visual feelings1 that in themselves originally involve no notion of distance1 as the words of a language1 which1 in themselves1 either as sounds or characters1 involve no relation to one object more than to another1 become instantly significant of particular objects1 and excite emotions of love or joy1 or hate1 or indignation1 like the very presence of some living friend or foe4 ,it has been very justly remarked1 that1 if all men had uniformly spoken the same language1 in every part of the world1 it would be difficult for us not to think that there is a natural connexion of our ideas and the words which we use to denote them2 and it is not wonderful1 therefore1 that a similar illusion should take place with respect to what may be termed the universal language of vision2 since1 in the case of visual perception1 all men may be truly said to have the same language2 the same sensations of sight1 being to all significant of magnitude and distance4 ,and it is well that the judgments which we form1 on these important points1 are thus prompt and spontaneous2 for1 if we had to wait till we had calculated the distance and magnitude of every thing around us1 by a measurement of angles1 we should be cut off1 in our optical career1 before we could1 with all our geometry1 determine1 with precision1 whether the things which we needed most1 or the objects of greatest peril to us1 were ten or a thousand paces distant1 and whether they were of the bulk of a mole hill or of a mountain4 ,a miniature image of the objects which we see1 is pictured on the retina1 in an inverted position2 and though an image is pictured in each eye1 we see not two objects but one4 ,to philosophers1 who are even more expert in finding mysteries than in solving them1 this single vision of the erect object1 from a double image of the object inverted1 has usually seemed very mysterious2 and yet there is really nothing in it at all mysterious1 to any one1 who has learned to consider how much of the visual perception is referable to association4 ,if the light1 reflected from a single object touched by us1 had produced not two merely1 but two thousand separate images in our eyes1 erect or inverted1 or in any intermediate degree of inclination1 the visual feeling1 thus excited1 however complex1 would still have accompanied the touch of a single object2 and if only it had accompanied it uniformly1 the single object would have been suggested by it1 precisely in the same manner as it is now suggested by the particular visual feeling that attends the present double inverted image4 ,to this supposed anomaly in the language of vision1 a perfect analogy is to be found in the most obvious cases of common language4 ,the two words he conquered excite exactly the same notion as the single ,latin word vicit2 and if any language were so paraphrastic as to employ ten words for the same purpose1 there would be no great reason for philosophic wonder at the unity of the notion suggested by so many words4 ,the two images of the single object1 in the arbitrary language of visual perception1 are1 as it were1 two words significant of one notion4 ,whatever the simple original sensation of vision may be1 then1 it is capable of being associated with other notions1 so as to become significant of them4 ,but to what does the simple original sensation itself amount8 ,is it mere colour1--or is it something more8 ,the universal opinion of philosophers is1 that it is not colour merely which it involves1 but extension also1--that there is a visible figure1 as well as a tangible figure--and that the visible figure involves1 in our instant original perception1 superficial length and breadth1 as the tangible figure which we learn to see1 involves length1 breadth1 and thickness4 ,that it is impossible for us1 at present1 to separate1 in the sensation of vision1 the colour from the extension1 ,i admit2 though not more completely impossible1 than it is for us to look on the thousand feet of a meadow1 and to perceive only the small inch of greenness on our retina2 and the one impossibility1 as much as the other1 ,i conceive to arise only from intimate association1 subsequent to the original sensations of sight4 ,nor do ,i deny1 that a certain part of the retina1--which1 being limited1 must therefore have figure1--is affected by the rays of light that fall on it1 as a certain breadth of nervous expanse is affected in all the other organs4 ,i contend only1 that the perception of this limited figure of the portion of the retina affected1 does not enter into the sensation itself1 more than in our sensations of any other species1 there is a perception of the nervous breadth affected4 ,the immediate perception of visible figure has been assumed as indisputable1 rather than attempted to be proved1--as1 before the time of ,berkeley1 the immediate visual perception of distance1 and of the three dimensions of matter1 was supposed1 in like manner1 to be without any need of proof2--and it is1 therefore1 impossible to refer to arguments on the subject4 ,i presume1 however1 that the reasons1 which have led to this belief1 of the immediate perception of a figure termed visible1 as distinguished from that tangible figure1 which we learn to see1 are the following two1--the only reasons which ,i can even imagine1--that it is absolutely impossible1 in our present sensations of sight1 to separate colour from extension1--and that there are1 in fact1 a certain length and breadth of the retina1 on which the light falls4 ,with respect to the first of these arguments1 it must be admitted1 by those who contend for the immediate perception of visible figure1 that it is now impossible for us to refer to our original feelings1 and that we can speak1 with absolute certainty1 only of our present feelings1 or1 at least1 of those which we remember1 as belonging to a period long after our first sensations4 ,what may1 or may not1 have been originally separable1 we cannot then1 determine4 ,but what1 even now1 is the species of extension1 which it is impossible for us1 in our visual perceptions1 to separate from colour8 ,is there the slightest consciousness of a perception of visible figure1 corresponding with the affected portion of the retina1--or is not the superficial magnitude1 and the only magnitude1 which we connect with colour1 in any case1 the very superficial magnitude which we term tangible1--a magnitude1 that does not depend on the diameter of the retina1 but is variously1 greater or less1 depending only on the magnitude and distance of the external object4 ,the mere length and breadth1 then1 which we cannot separate from colour1 are not the length and breadth of the figure termed visible1--for of the perception of these limited dimensions1 we have no consciousness1--but the length and breadth that are truly tangible2--and there is not a single moment of visual perception1 in which the slightest evidence is afforded by our consciousness of that difficulty of separation1 with respect to the affected portion of the expanse of the retina1 on which the supposed argument1 as to the perception of visible figure1 is founded4 ,even though the superficial dimensions of length and breadth1 connected with colour in vision1 were those of the figured retina affected1 and were necessarily limited to its small expanse1 there would still be no greater impossibility of separating the colour from mere length and breadth in vision1 than of separating it from the triple dimensions of length1 breadth1 and thickness3 and the argument1 therefore1 if it had any force1 would be equally applicable to these4 ,i open my eyes1 in the light of day1 with a wide landscape around me4 ,i have a sensation1 or perception1 of varieties of colour1 and of all the dimensions of matter4 ,i cannot separate the colour from the length and breadth of the trunk of a large oak before me2 but equally impossible is it for me1 to separate the colour from the convexity and the magnitude2 and1 from this equal impossibility1 ,i might conclude1 with equal force1 that the perception of the convexity and the magnitude is immediate and original1 as the perception of mere length and breadth4 ,where all things are equal1 we cannot justly deny to one what we allow to another4 ,he who affirms1 that1 in looking at a sphere1 he can separate1 as elements of his sensation1 the colour and the convexity1 may be allowed to use this argument of impossibility1 as proof of original connexion1 in the other case4 ,but it is only a person so privileged by nature1--and where is such a person to be found8--who can fairly use it4 ,we are able1 indeed1--not while we continue to look at the sphere1 but with a sort of mental effort1 afterwards to separate the colour from the convexity1 and to imagine the same colour united with any other surface1 plane or concave1--the reason of which is very evident4 ,our sensation of colour has not been uniformly associated with one species of extension1 but with all its varieties2 and may1 therefore1 be suggested in possible coexistence with all4 ,in all these varieties1 however1 two dimensions have been constantly implied2 and1 therefore1 the association of colour with these is complete and indissoluble4 ,if every surface in nature had been convex1 it is by no means improbable1 that we should have found the same difficulty1 in attempting to separate colour from convexity1 which we now find1 in attempting to separate it from mere length and breadth4 ,it is the same1 in various other affections of the mind1 as in our sensations4 ,there are feelings1 which we cannot separate from other feelings1 and which1 we yet know1 must have been originally separate4 ,i might refer to the silent growth and maturity of almost every passion1 of which the mind is susceptible4 ,but there is sufficient proof1 even in affections1 which seem instantaneous4 ,the mother1 when she looks at her babe1 cannot behold it without feelings1 very different from those1 which the same form and colour1 in another infant1 would have excited2 and yet1 impossible as it is to separate1 in this case1 the mere visual sensation1 from that emotion of happy and instant fondness which accompanies it1 there is surely no natural connexion of the emotion1 with the mere length1 and breadth1 and colour4 ,the impossibility of separating the sensation of colour from the notion of extension1 it appears1 then1 is not a decisive proof of an original connexion of these2 for1 if it were decisive1 it would prove still more2--and we might1 from this alone1 assert with equal confidence1 the original visual perception of three dimensions1 as that of two1 and of the magnitude and figure1 which we term tangible1 as much as of those1 which we have chosen to term visible4 ,it is surely as little possible for us1 when we open our eyes on some wide and magnificent landscape1 to separate the colour1 as a mere visual sensation1 from the field1 the mountain1 the forest1 the stream1 the sky1 as to separate it from the half inch1 or inch of our retina1 of the perception of which we have no consciousness in any case2 and it is too much for those who deny the immediate perception of those greater magnitudes1 to urge1 in proof of the necessary original perception of this inch or half inch1 what1 if valid in any respect1 must establish no less the proposition which they deny1 than the proposition which they affirm4 ,but1 it will be said1 there is truly a certain figure of the part of the retina1 on which the light falls4 ,the fact is undeniable4 ,but the question is1 not whether such a figure exist1 but whether the perception of the figure necessarily form a part of the sensation4 ,the brain1 and nervous system in general1 are of a certain form1 when they are affected in any manner4 ,but it does not therefore1 follow1--as the fact sufficiently shows1--that the knowledge of this form constitutes any part of the changeful feeling of the moment4 ,to confine ourselves1 however1 to the mere senses1--it is not in the organ of sight only1 that the nervous matter is of a certain shape3--it is expanded into some shape or other1 in every organ4 ,when the whole1 or a part1 therefore1 of the olfactory organ1 is affected by the rays of odour1 if ,i may so term them1 we might1 with exactly the same ground for our belief1 suppose1 that the knowledge of a certain extension must accompany the fragrance1 because a certain nervous expanse is1 in this case1 affected1 as that the notion of a certain extension must1 for the same reason1 and for the same reason alone1 accompany the sensation of colour4 ,it is because the same light1 which acts upon the organ of one person1 may be made visible to another1 that we conceive it more peculiarly to be figured1 as it were1 on the nervous expanse1 when it is not in itself truly more figured1 than the number of coexisting particles of odour1 which affect the nerve of smell4 ,we cannot exhibit the particles of odour1 however1 acting on the nostril of any one4 ,but1 when the eye is dissected from its orbit1 we can show the image of a luminous body1 distinctly formed upon the retina4 ,we1 the observers of the dissected eye1 have thus a clearer notion of the length and breadth of the nervous matter affected in the one case than in the other4 ,but it is not in the dissected eye that vision takes place2 and as the living eye1 and the living nostrils1 are alike affected in more than one physical point1 we must surely admit1 that in both cases1 and in both cases equally1 a certain length and breadth are affected1 and that there is an olfactory figure as truly as a visible figure4 ,the mere visibility of the image to another person cannot alter the nature of the organic affection itself to the sentient individual4 ,if the olfactory figure be not necessarily accompanied with the perception of extension1 there is no stronger reason a priori1 to suppose that what is termed the visible figure1--which is nothing more than a similar affection of a nervous expanse1--should be accompanied with the knowledge of the part of the retina affected4 ,these arguments1 however1 though they seem to me to invalidate completely the only arguments which ,i can imagine to be urged in support of our original perception of figure by the eye1 are negative only4 ,but there is also a positive argument1 which seems to me truly decisive1 against the supposed necessary perception of visible figure1--that it implies the blending of things which cannot be blended4 ,if the mere visual sensation of colour imply1 in itself1 no figure1 ,i can conceive it to be blended with any figure2 but not so1 if it imply1 in itself1 a fixed definite figure1 so essential to the very sensation of the colour1 that without it the colour could not for a single moment be perceived4 ,during the whole time1 then1 in which ,i am gazing on a wide landscape1 there is1 according to the opinion of those who contend for the necessary perception of visible figure1 not colour merely1 but a certain small coloured expanse1 of definite outline1 constantly perceived--since1 without this1 colour itself could not be perceived2 and1 during all this time1 there is also a notion of a figure of a very different kind1 of three dimensions1 and of magnitude almost infinitely greater1 combined1 not with colour merely1 but with the same coloured expanse4 ,there must1 therefore1 be some possible combination of these forms and magnitudes2 since it is the colour which we perceive that is blended with the tangible magnitudes suggested4 ,now1 though there are certain feelings which may coexist and unite1 it appears to me1 that there are others which cannot be so blended4 ,i may combine1 for example1 my notion of a plane or convex surface1 with my notion of whiteness or blueness1 hardness or softness1 roughness or smoothness2 but ,i cannot blend my notions of these two surfaces1 the plane and the convex1 as one surface1 both plane and convex1 more than ,i can think of a whole which is less than a fraction of itself1 or a square1 of which the sides are not equal1 and the angles equal only to three right angles4 ,the same blue or white surface cannot appear to me1 then1 at once plane and convex1 as it must do if there be a visible figure of one exact outline coexisting with the tactual figure which is of a different outline2 nor1 even though the surface were in both cases plane1 can it appear to me1 at the same moment1 half an inch square1 and many feet square4 ,all this must be done1 however1 as often as we open our eyes1 if there be truly any perception of visible figure coexisting with the mere suggestions of touch4 ,the visible figure of the sphere1 on which ,i fix my gaze1 is said to be a plane of two dimensions inseparable from colour1 and this inseparable colour must yet be combined with the sphere1 which ,i perceive distinctly to be convex4 ,according to the common theory1 therefore1 it is at once1 to my perception1 convex and plane2 and1 if the sphere be a large one1 it is perceived1 at the same moment1 to be a sphere of many feet in diameter1 and a plane circular surface of the diameter of a quarter of an inch4 ,the assertion of so strange a combination of incongruities would1 indeed1 require some powerful arguments to justify it2 yet is has been asserted1 not merely without positive evidence1 as if not standing in need of any proof1 but in absolute opposition to our consciousness2 and the only arguments which we can ever imagine to be urged for it1 are1 as we have seen1 of no weight1--or would tend as much to prove the original visual perception of tangible figures1 as of the figure that is termed visible4 ,is it not at least more probable1 therefore1 that though1 like the particles of odour when they act upon our nostrils1 the rays of light affect a portion of the retina1 so as to produce on it an image1 which1 if the eye were separated from its orbit1 and its coats dissected1 might be a distinct visible figure to the eye of another observer2 this figure of the portion of the retina affected1 enters as little into the simple original sensation of sight1 as the figure of the portion of the olfactory nervous expanse1 when it is affected1 enters into the sensations of smell8--and that1 when the simple affection of sight is blended with the ideas of suggestion1 in what are termed the acquired perceptions of vision1--as1 for example1 in the perception of a sphere1--it is colour only which is blended with the large convexity1 and not a small coloured plane8--which small coloured plane being necessarily limited in extent and form1 so as never to be larger than the retina itself1 cannot blend with various forms and magnitudes1 and which1 if it could even be supposed to constitute a part of the convexity of a sphere perceived by us1 still could not diffuse its own limited and inseparable colour over the whole magnitude of the sphere4 ,i have stated to you my own opinion with respect to visible figure1--an opinion1 which to myself1 ,i confess1 appears almost certain1 or1 at least1 far more probable than the opinion generally entertained1 that has no evidence in our consciousness at any one moment of vision to support it4 ,but on subjects of this kind1 which are in themselves so very subtile1 and1 therefore1 so liable to error1 ,i must beg you1 at all times1 and especially when the opposite sentiment has the authority of general belief1 to consider any opinion1 which ,i may submit to you1 as offered more to your reflection1 than for your passive adoption of it4 ,if ,i wish you1--reverently1 indeed1 but still freely1--to weigh the evidence of doctrines of philosophy1 which are sanctioned even by the greatest names of every age1 ,i must wish you still more1 because it will be still more your duty1 to weigh well the evidence of opinions that come to you1 with no other authority than that of one very fallible individual4 ,in looking back on the senses which we have been considering1 what a boundless field do we seem already to have been endeavouring to traverse8 and how admirable would the mind have been1 even though it had been capable of no other office than that of representing1 in the union of all its sensations1 as in a living mirror of the universe1 the splendid conceptions of the great ,being who formed it2 or1 rather of creating a-new in itself1 that very universe which it represents and admires8 ,such is the power of the senses2--of ----8senses1 that inherit earth and heavens1 ,enjoy the various riches ,nature yields2-- ,far nobler1 give the riches they enjoy2 ,give taste to fruits1 and harmony to groves1 ,their radiant beams to gold1 and gold's bright fire2 ,take in at once the landscape of the world1 ,at a small inlet1 which a grain might close1 ,and half create the wonderous world they see4 ,but for the magic organ's powerful charm1 ,earth were a rude1 uncoloured chaos still2-- ,like ,milton's ,eve1 when gazing on the lake1 ,man makes the matchless image1 man admires40#abe ,,footnotes3 #abb ,judicium ,paridis1 v4 #adf--aeh4 ,ap4 ,mus4 ,anglican1 vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bgd4 ,,edit4 #agda4 #abc ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 c4 c4 #f4 sect4 #a4 #abd ,reid's ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 c4 c4 #f4 sect4 #b4 #abe ,young's ,night ,thoughts1 ,,vi4 v4 #dbj-dbg1 #dbi-dcj1 and #dce-dcf4 ,,lecture ,,xxx4 ,,history ,,of ,,opinions ,,regarding ,,perception4 ,gentlemen1 in my last ,lecture1 ,i brought to a conclusion my remarks on ,vision1 with an inquiry into the justness of the universal belief1 that1 in the perception of objects by this sense1 there are two modifications of extension1 a visible as well as a tangible figure2 the one originally and immediately perceived by the eye1 the other suggested by former experience4 ,i stated1 at considerable length1 some arguments which induce me to believe1 in opposition to the universal doctrine1--that1 in what are termed the acquired perceptions of sight1 there is not this union of two separate figures of different dimensions1 which cannot be combined with each other1 more than the mathematical conceptions of a square and a circle can be combined in the conception of one simple figure2 that the original sensations of colour1 though1 like the sensations of smell or taste1 and every other species of sensation1 arising from affections of definite portions of nervous substance1 do not involve the perception of this definite outline1 more than mere fragrance or sweetness1 but that the colour is perceived by us as figured1 only in consequence of being blended by intimate associations with the feelings commonly ascribed to touch4 ,philosophers1 indeed1 have admitted1 or1 at least1 must admit1 that we have no consciousness of that which they yet suppose to be constantly taking place1 and that the only figure which does truly seem to us1 in vision1 to be combined with colour1 is that which they term tangible1--that1 for example1 we cannot look at a coloured sphere1 of four feet diameter1 without perceiving a coloured figure1 which is that of a sphere four feet in diameter1 and not a plain circular surface of the diameter of half an inch2 yet1 though we have no consciousness of perceiving any such small coloured circle1 and have no reason to believe that such a perception takes place1 they still contend1 without any evidence whatever1 that we see at every moment what we do not remember to have ever seen4 ,after our very full discussion of the general phenomena of perception1--as common to all our senses1 and as peculiarly modified in the different tribes of our sensations1--,i might now quit a subject1 to which its primary interest as the origin of our knowledge1 has led me to pay1 perhaps1 a disproportionate attention4 ,but besides the theories1 to the consideration of which our general inquiry has incidentally led us1 there are some hypothetical opinions on the subject1 of which it is necessary that you should know at least the outline1--not because they throw any real light on the phenomena of perception1 but because1 extravagantly hypothetical as they are1 they are yet the opinions of philosophers1 whose eminence1 in other respects1 renders indispensable some slight knowledge even of their very errors4 ,in reviewing these hypotheses1 it will be necessary to call your attention to that doctrine of causation1 which ,i before illustrated at great length1 and which ,i trust1 therefore1 ,i may safely take for granted that you have not forgotten4 ,in sensation1 ,i consider the feeling of the mind to be the simple effect of the presence of the object2 or1 at least1 of some change1 which the presence of the object produces in the sensorial organ4 ,the object has the power of affecting the mind2 the mind is susceptible of being affected by the object1--that is to say1 when the organ1 in consequence of the presence of the external object1 exists in a certain state1 the affection of the mind immediately follows4 ,if the object were absent1 in any particular case1 the mind would not exist in the state which constitutes the sensation produced by it2 and1 if the susceptibility of the mind had been different1 the object might have existed1 as now1 without any subsequent sensation4 ,in all this series of mere changes1 or affections1 in consequence of certain other preceding changes1 or affections1 though a part of the series be material1 and another part mental1 there is truly1 as ,i have repeatedly remarked to you1 no more mystery than in any other series of changes1 in which the series is not in matter and mind successively1 but exclusively in one or the other4 ,there is a change of state of one substance1 in consequence of a change of some sort in another substance2 and this mere sequence of change after change is all which we know in either case4 ,the same ,almighty ,being1 who formed the various substances to which we give the name of matter1 formed also the substance to which we give the name of mind2 and the qualities with which he endowed them1 for those gracious ends which he intended them to answer1 are mere susceptibilities of change1 by which1 in certain circumstances1 they begin immediately to exist in different states4 ,the weight of a body is its tendency to other bodies1 varying according to the masses and distances2--in this instance1 the quality may be said to be strictly material4 ,the greenness or redness ascribed to certain rays of light1 are words expressive merely of changes that arise in the mind when these rays are present on the retina2 in this case1 the quality1 though ascribed to the material rays as antecedent1 involves the consideration of a certain change of state in the mind which they affect4 ,but the greenness or redness1 though involving the consideration both of mind affected1 and matter affecting1 is not less conceivable by us as a quality of matter than the weight1 which also involves the consideration of two substances1 affecting and affected1 though both go under the name of matter alone4 ,all the sequences of phenomena are mysterious1 or none are so4 ,it is wonderful1 that the presence of a loadstone should cause a piece of iron to approach it2 and that the presence of the moon1 in different parts of the heavens1 should be continually altering the relative tendencies of all the particles of our earth4 ,in like manner1 it is1 indeed1 wonderful1 that a state of our bodily organs should be followed by a change of state of the mind1 or a state of our mind by a change of state of our bodily organs2 but it is not more wonderful1 than that matter should act on distant matter1 or that one affection of the mind1 should be followed by another affection of the mind1 since all which we know in either case1 when matter acts upon matter1 or when it acts upon mind1 is1 that a certain change of one substance has followed a certain change of another substance1--a change which1 in all circumstances exactly similar1 it is expected by us to follow again4 ,we have experience of this sequence of changes alike in both cases2 and1 but for experience1 we could not1 in either case1 have predicted it4 ,this view of causation1 however1--as not more unintelligible in the reciprocal sequences of events in matter and mind than in their separate sequences1--could not occur to philosophers while they retained their mysterious belief of secret links1 connecting every observed antecedent with its observed consequent2 since mind and matter seemed1 by their very nature1 unsusceptible of any such common bondage4 ,a peculiar difficulty1 therefore1 as you may well suppose1 was felt1 in the endeavour to account for their mutual successions of phenomena1 which vanishes1 when the necessity of any connecting links in causation is shewn to be falsely assumed4 ,in their views of perception1 therefore1 as a mental effect produced by a material cause1 philosophers appear to have been embarrassed by two great difficulties3--the production of this effect by remote objects1--as when we look at the sun and stars1 in their almost inconceivable distances above our heads2 and the production of this effect by a substance1 which has no common property that renders it capable of being linked with the mind in the manner supposed to be necessary for causation4 ,these two supposed difficulties appear1 to me1 to have led to all the wild hypotheses that have been advanced with respect to perception4 ,the former of these difficulties1--in the remoteness of the object perceived1--even though the principle had not been false which supposes1 that a change cannot take place in any substance1 in consequence of the change of position of a distant object1--a principle1 which the gravitation of every atom disproves1--arose1 it is evident1 from false views of the real objects of perception4 ,it is on this account1 that ,i was at some pains1 when we entered on our inquiry into the nature of perception1 to shew the futility of the distinction which is made of objects that act immediately on the senses1 and those which act on them through a medium1--the medium1 in this case1 as light in vision1 and the vibrating air in sound1 being the real object of the particular sense1--and the reference to a more remote object being the result1 not of the simple original sensation1 but of knowledge previously acquired4 ,the mistake as to the real object of perception1 and the supposed difficulty of action at a distance1 must have had very considerable influence in producing the ,peripatetic doctrine of perception by species1 of which the cumbrous machinery seems to have been little more than a contrivance for destroying1 as it were1 the distance between the senses and the objects that were supposed to act on them4 ,according to this doctrine1 every object is continually throwing off certain shadowy films or resemblances of itself1 which may be directly present to our organs of sense1 at whatever distance the objects may be1 from which they flowed4 ,these species or phantasms1--the belief of the separate existence of which must have been greatly favoured by another tenet of the same school1 with respect to form as essentially distinct from the matter with which it is united1 were supposed to be transmitted1 in a manner1 which there was no great anxiety to explain1 to the brain and to the mind itself4 ,i need not detail to you the process by which these sensible species1 through the intervention of what were termed the active and passive intellect1 were said to become1 at last1 intelligible species1 so as to be objects of our understanding4 ,it is with the mere sensitive part of the process1 that we have at present any concern2 and in this1 of itself1 there is sufficient absurdity1 without tracing all the further modifications1 of which the absurdity is capable1 if ,i may speak so lightly of follies that have a name1 which1 for more than a thousand years1 was the most venerable of human names1 to pass them current as wisdom1--and which were read and honoured as wisdom by the wise of so many generations4 ,i cannot pay you so very poor a compliment1 as to suppose it necessary to employ a single moment of your time in confuting what is not only a mere hypothesis1 7and an hypothesis which leaves all the real difficulties of perception precisely as before17 but which1 even as an hypothesis1 is absolutely inconceivable4 ,if vision had been our only sense1 we might1 perhaps1 have understood1 at least1 what was meant by the species1 that directly produce our visual images4 ,but what is the phantasm of a sound or an odour8 or what species is it1 which1 at one moment1 produces only the feeling of cold1 or hardness1 or figure1 when a knife is pressed against us1 and the next moment1 when it penetrates the skin1 the pain of a cut8 ,the knife itself is exactly the same unaltered knife1 when it is merely pressed against the hand1 and when it produces the incision2 and the difference1 therefore1 in the two cases1 must arise1 not from any species which it is constantly throwing off1 since these would be the same1 at every moment1 but from some state of difference in the mere nerves affected4 ,i fear1 however1 that ,i have already fallen into the folly which ,i professed to avoid1--the folly of attempting to confute1 what1 considered in itself1 is not worthy of being seriously confuted1 and scarcely worthy even of being proved to be ridiculous4 ,it must be remembered1 however1 in justice to its author1 that the doctrine of perception1 by intermediate phantasms1 is not a single opinion alone1 but a part of a system of opinions1 and that there are many errors1 which1 if considered singly1 appear too extravagant for the assent of any rational mind1 that lose much of this extravagance1 by combination with other errors1 as extravagant4 ,whatever difficulties the hypothesis of species involved1 it at least seemed to remove the supposed difficulty of perception at a distance1 and by the half spiritual tenuity of the sensible images1 seemed also to afford a sort of intermediate link1 for the connexion of matter with mind2 thus appearing to obviate1 or at least to lessen1 the two great difficulties1 which ,i suppose to have given occasion to the principal hypothesis on this subject4 ,when the doctrine of species1 as modified1 in the dark and barren age of ,dialectics1 by all the additional absurdities1 which the industrious sagacity of the schoolmen could give to it1 had1 at length1 lost that empire1 which it never should have possessed1 the original difficulty of accounting for perception1 remained as before4 ,if the cause was to be linked1 in some manner or other1 with its effect1 how was matter1 so different in all its properties1 to be connected with mind8 ,the shortest possible mode of obviating this difficulty1 was1 by denying that any direct causation whatever took place between our mind and our bodily organs8 and hence arose the system of occasional causes1 as maintained by the most distinguished of the followers of ,des ,cartes1--a system1 which supposed1 that there is no direct agency of our mind on matter1 or of matter on our mind1--that we are as little capable of moving our own limbs by our volition1 as of moving1 by our volition1 the limbs of any other person1--as little capable of perceiving the rays of light1 that have entered our own eyes1 as the rays which have fallen on any other eyes1--that our perception or voluntary movement is1 therefore1 to be referred1 in every case1 to the immediate agency of the ,deity1 the presence of rays of light1 within our eye1 being the mere occasion on which the ,deity himself affects our mind with vision1 as our desire of moving our limbs is the mere occasion1 on which the ,deity himself puts our limbs in motion4 ,it is of so much importance to have a full conviction of the dependence of all events on the great ,source of ,being1 that it is necessary to strip the doctrine1 as much as possible1 of every thing truly objectionable1 lest1 in abandoning what is objectionable1 we should be tempted to abandon also the important truth associated with it4 ,the power of ,god is so magnificent in itself1 that it is only when we attempt to add to it in our conception1 that we run some risk of degrading what it must always be impossible for us to elevate4 ,that the changes which take place1 whether in mind or in matter1 are all1 ultimately1 resolvable into the will of the ,deity1 who formed alike the spiritual and material system of the universe1 making the earth a habitation worthy of its noble inhabitant1--and man an inhabitant almost worthy of that scene of divine magnificence1 in which he is placed1 is a truth1 as convincing to our reason1 as it is delightful to our devotion4 ,what confidence do we feel1 in our joy1 at the thought of the ,eternal ,being1 from whom it flows1 as if the very thought gave at once security and sanctity to our delight2 and how consolotary1 in our little hour of suffering1 to think of ,him who wills our happiness1 and who knows how to produce it1 even from sorrow itself1 by that power which called light from the original darkness1 and still seems to call1 out of a similar gloom1 the sunshine of every morning4 ,every joy thus becomes gratitude1--every sorrow resignation4 ,the eye which looks to ,heaven seems1 when it turns again to the scenes of earth1 to bring down with it a purer radiance1 like the very beaming of the presence of the ,divinity1 which it sheds on every object on which it gazes1--a light 8,that gilds all forms ,terrestrial1 in the vast1 and the minute2 ,the unambiguous footsteps of the ,god1 ,who gives its lustre to an insect's wing1 ,and wheels ,his throne upon the rolling worlds40#abf ,that the ,deity1 in this sense1 as the ,creator of the world1 and willer of all those great ends1 which the laws of the universe accomplish1--is the author of the physical changes which take place in it1 is then most true1--as it is most true also1 that the same ,power1 who gave the universe its laws1 can1 for the particular purposes of his providence1 vary these at pleasure4 ,but there is no reason to suppose1 that the objects which he has made surely for some ends1 have1 as made by him1 no efficacy1 no power of being instrumental1 to his own great purpose1 merely because whatever power they can be supposed to have1 must have been derived from the ,fountain of all power4 ,it is1 indeed1 only as possessing this power1 that we know them to exist2 and their powers1 which the doctrine of occasional causes would destroy altogether1 are1 relatively to us1 their whole existence4 ,it is by affecting us that they are known to us4 ,such is the nature of the mind1 and of light1 for example1 that light cannot be present1 or1 at least1 the sensorial organ cannot exist in a certain state1 in consequence of its presence1 without that instant affection of mind1 which constitutes vision4 ,if light have not this power of affecting us with sensation1 it is1 with respect to us1 nothing1--for we know it only as the cause of the visual affection4 ,that which excites in us the feelings of extension1 resistance1 and all the qualities of matter1 is matter2 and1 to suppose that there is nothing1 without us1 which excites these feelings1 is to suppose1 that there is no matter without1 as far as we are capable of forming any conception of matter4 ,the system of occasional causes seems1 therefore1 to be only a more awkward and complicated modification of the system of ,berkeley2 for1 as the ,deity is1 in this system1 himself the author of every change1 the only conceivable use of matter1 which cannot affect us1 more than if it were not in existence1 must be as a remembrance1 to ,him who is ,omniscience itself1 at what particular moment he is to excite a feeling in the mind of some one of his sensitive creatures1 and of what particular kind that feeling is to be2 as if the ,omniscient could stand in need of any memorial1 to excite in our mind any feeling1 which it is ,his wish to excite1 and which is to be traced wholly to his own immediate agency4 ,matter then1 according to this system1 has no relations to us2 and all its relations are to the ,deity alone4 ,the assertors of the doctrine1 indeed1 seem to consider it1 as representing1 in a more sublime light1 the divine ,omnipresence1 by exhibiting it to our conception1 as the only power in nature2 but they might1 in like manner1 affirm1 that the creation of the infinity of worlds1 with all the life and happiness that are diffused over them1 rendered less instead of more sublime1 the existence of ,him1 who1 till then1 was the sole existence2 for power1 that is derived1 derogates as little from the primary power1 as derived existence derogates from the ,being from whom it flows4 ,yet the assertors of this doctrine1 who conceive1 that light has no effect in vision1 are perfectly willing to admit that light exists1 or rather1 are strenuous affirmers of its existence1 and are anxious only to prove1 in their zeal1 for the glory of ,him1 who made it1 and who makes nothing in vain1 that this1 and all ,his works1 exist for no purpose4 ,light1 they contend1 has no influence whatever4 ,it is as little capable of exciting sensations of colour1 as of exciting a sensation of melody or fragrance2 but still it exists4 ,the production of so very simple a state as that of vision1 or any other of the modes of perception1 with an apparatus1 which is not merely complicated1 but1 in all its complication1 absolutely without efficacy of any sort1 is so far from adding any sublimity to the divine nature1 in our conception1 that it can scarcely be conceived by the mind1 without lessening1 in some degree1 the sublimity of the ,author of the universe1 by lessening1 or rather destroying1 all the sublimity of the universe which he has made4 ,what is that idle mass of matter1 which cannot affect us1 or be known to us1 or to any other created being1 more than if it were not8 ,if the ,deity produces1 in every case1 by his own immediate operation1 all those feelings which we term sensations or perceptions1 he does not first create a multitude of inert and cumbrous worlds1 invisible to every eye but his own1 and incapable of affecting any thing whatever1 that he may know when to operate1 as he would have operated before4 ,this is not the awful simplicity of that ,omnipresence1 8,whose word leaps forth at once to its effect2 ,who calls for things that are not1 and they come40#abg ,if1 indeed1 the complication of the process could remove any difficulty which truly exists1 or even any difficulty which is supposed to exist1 the system might be more readily adopted by that human weakness1 to which the removal of a single difficulty is of so much value4 ,but the very attempt to remove the difficulty1 is merely by presenting it in another form4 ,omnipresent1 as the ,creator is1 he is still1 like that mind which he has formed after his own image1 a spiritual ,being2 and though there can be no question as to the extent of his power over matter1 the operation of this infinite power is as little conceivable by us1 in any other way than as a mere antecedence of change1 as the reciprocal limited action of mind and matter1 in man1 and the objects which he perceives and moves4 ,it is itself indeed1 a proof of action of this very kind2 and to state it1 with the view of obviating any difficulty that may be supposed to be involved in the mutual influence of mind and matter1 seems as absurd1 as it would be for a sophist1 who should profess to believe1 from an examination of the wings of birds1 that their heavy pinions are incapable of bearing them through the air1 to illustrate his paradox by the majestic soaring of the eagle1 when he mounts still higher and higher through the sunshine that encircles him1 before he stoops from his height above the clouds1 to the cliffs which he deigns to make his lowly home4 ,the system of occasional causes1 though it ceased to be known1 or at least to be adopted1 under that name1 has not the less continued1 by a mere change of denomination1 to receive the assent of philosophers1 who rejected it under its ancient name4 ,it is1 indeed1 the spirit of this system alone1 which gives any sense whatever to the distinction that is universally made of causes1 as physical and efficient1--a distinction which implies1 that1 beside the antecedents and consequents1 in a series of changes1 which are supposed to have no mutual influence1 and might1 therefore1 be antecedent and consequent in any other order1--there is some intervening agency1 which is1 in every event of the series1 the true efficient4 ,matter1 in short1 does not act on mind1 nor mind on matter4 ,the physical cause1 in this nomenclature1 that exists for no purpose1 as being absolutely insufficient2 or1 in other words1 absolutely incapable of producing any change whatever1 is the occasional cause of the other nomenclature1 and nothing more2 and all which was cumbrous and superfluous in the one1 is equally cumbrous and superfluous in the other4 ,on this subject1 however1 which ,i have discussed at large in my ,work on ,cause and ,effect1 ,i need not add any remarks to those which ,i offered in an early part of the course4 ,it is sufficient1 at present1 to point out the absolute identity of the two doctrines in every thing but in name4 ,the next system to which ,i would direct your attention1 is that of ,malebranche1 who is1 indeed1 to be ranked among the principal asserters of the doctrine of occasional causes1 which we have now been considering1 but who1 in addition to this general doctrine1 had peculiar views of the nature of perception4 ,his opinions1 on this subject1 are delivered1 at great length1 in the second volume of his ,search of ,truth--,la ,recherche de la ,verit--a work which is distinguished by much eloquence1 and by many very profound remarks on the sources of human error1 but which is itself an example1 in the great system which it supports1 of error as striking as any of those which it eloquently and profoundly discusses4 ,it is truly unfortunate for his reputation as a philosopher1 that these discussions do not form a separate work1 but are blended with his own erroneous system1 the outline of which every one knows too well1 to think of studying its details4 ,all that is necessary1 to give him his just reputation1 is merely that he should have written less4 ,he is at present known1 chiefly as the author of a very absurd hypothesis4 ,he would have been known1 and studied1 and honoured1 as a very acute observer of our nature1 if he had never composed those parts of his work1 to which1 probably1 when he thought of other generations1 he looked as to the basis of his philosophic fame4 ,his hypothesis1 as many of you probably know1 is1 that we perceive not objects themselves1 but the ideas of them which are in ,god4 ,he begins his supposed demonstration of this paradox with a sort of negative proof1 by attempting to shew the inadequacy of every other mode of accounting for our perception of the ideas of things2 for ,i need scarcely state to you1 what is involved in the very enunciation of his metaphysical theorem1--that he regards ideas as distinct from perception itself1 not the mind affected in a certain manner1 but something separate and independent of the mind4 ,he then proceeds to his positive proof1 asserting1 in the first place1 that it is 8absolutely necessary that ,god should have in himself the ideas of all the beings which he has created1 since otherwise he could not have produced them20#abh and1 in the second place1 that ,god is united to our soul by his presence1 8so that he may be said to have that relation of place to the mind1 which space has to body40#abi ,wherever the human mind is1 there ,god is1 and consequently all the ideas which are in ,god4 ,we have thus a fund of all the ideas necessary for perception1 and a fund1 which1 in consequence of the ubiquity of the divine mind1 is ever present1 requiring1 therefore1 for our perception of them1 only that divine will1 without which no change can take place4 ,that perception takes place1 by the presence of this one stock of ideas eternally present in the divine mind1 with which every other mind is united1--rather than by the creation of an infinite number of ideas in each separate mind1--he conceives to be proved1 by various reasons1--by the greater simplicity of this mode1--by its peculiar consistency with that state of dependence on the divine ,being1 as the source of all light1 in which the mind of man is represented in many passages of ,scripture1--by various notions1 such as those of infinity1 genera1 species1 c4 the universality of which he conceived to be inconsistent with the absolute unity and limitation of every idea1 that does not derive a sort of infinity from the mind in which it exists1--and by some other reasons1 very mystical and very feeble1 in which1 though it may not be difficult to discover what their author meant1 it is certainly very difficult to conceive1 how a mind so acute as his1 could have been influenced by them4 ,it is1 indeed1 only this relation of the mind of ,malebranche to his own very strange hypothesis1 which there is any interest in tracing2 for1 though ,i have thought it my duty to give you a slight sketch of the hypothesis itself1 as a part of the general history of our science1 with which the reputation and genius of its author render it necessary for you to have some acquaintance1 ,i am far from thinking1 that it can throw any light on our speculations1 in the present improved state of the ,science of ,mind4 ,i shall not waste your time1 therefore1 with pointing out to you the innumerable objections to his hypothesis1 which1 after the view already given by me of the simple process of perception1 are1 ,i trust1 so manifest1 as not to require to be pointed out4 ,it may be more interesting to consider1 in the history of the ,philosophy of ,mind1 what circumstances led to the formation of the hypothesis4 ,in the first place ,i may remark1 that1 notwithstanding his veneration for the greater number of the opinions of ,des ,cartes1 ,malebranche unfortunately had not adopted the very enlightened views of that eminent philosopher1 with respect to the nature of ideas4 ,he considered them as existing distinct from the sentient or percipient mind1--and1 reasoning very justly from this error1 inferred their presence in the mind of the ,deity1--who formed the universe1 not casually1 but according to conceptions1 that must have preceded creation1--the archetypes1 or exemplars1 of all that was to be created4 ,this opinion1 as to the eternal forms subsisting in the divine mind1 agrees exactly with that of ,plato1 in one of the most celebrated of his doctrines1 and certainly one of the most poetical1--which1 though a term of praise that usually does not imply much excellence of philosophy1 is the species of praise to which the philosophy of ,plato has the justest claim4 ,it has been delivered1 in very powerful verse1 by one of our own poets1 who describes himself as1 in science1 a follower of the genius of ancient ,greece1 and who was worthy of the inspiring presence of that majestic guide3 8,ere the radiant sun ,sprang from the east1 or 'mid the vault of night ,the moon suspended her serener lamp2 ,ere mountains1 woods1 or streams1 adorn'd the globe1 ,or ,wisdom taught the sons of men her lore1-- ,then lived the ,almighty ,one1 then1 deep retired ,in his unfathom'd essence1 view'd the forms1 ,the forms eternal of created things2 ,the radiant sun1 the moon's nocturnal lamp1 ,the mountains1 woods1 and streams1 the rolling globe1 ,and ,wisdom's mien celestial4 ,from the first ,of days1 on them1 his love divine1 he fix'd ,his admiration1 till1 in time complete1 ,what he admired and loved1 his vital smile ,unfolded into being4 ,hence1 the breath ,of life1 informing each organic frame2 ,hence1 the green earth1 and wild resounding waves2 ,hence1 light and shade alternate1 warmth and cold1 ,and clear autumnal skies1 and vernal showers1 ,and all the fair variety of things40#acj ,it is in the writings of ,st ,augustine1 however1--who had himself imbibed a considerable portion of the spirit of the ,platonic philosophy1--that the true source of the hypothesis1 which we are now reviewing1 is to be found4 ,this very eminent father of the church1--whose acuteness and eloquence would have entitled him to very high consideration1 even though his works had related to subjects less interesting to man1 than those noble subjects of which they treat1--seems to have met with peculiar honour from the ,french theologians1 and to have given a very evident direction to their intellectual inquiries4 ,it is indeed impossible to read the works of any of the theological metaphysicians of that country1 without meeting with constant references to the opinions of ,st ,austin1 and an implied reference1 even where it is not expressed1--particularly to the very opinions most analogous to those of ,malebranche4 ,the opinion of ,augustine1 to which ,i particularly allude1 is that which forms the principal doctrine of his metaphysical philosophy1--that there is a supreme eternal universal ,truth1 which is internally present to every mind1 and in which all minds alike perceive the truths1 which all alike are1 as it were1 necessitated to believe1--the truths of arithmetic and geometry1 for example1 and the primary essential truths of morality4 ,these truths we feel to be eternal1 because we feel that they are not contingent on the existence of those who perceive them1 but were1 and are1 and must forever be the same2 and we feel also1 that the truth is one1 whatever be the number of individuals that perceive it1 and is not converted into many truths1 merely by the multitude of believers4 8,if10 says he1 8in discoursing of any truth1 ,i perceive that to be true which you say1 and you perceive that to be true which ,i say1--where1 ,i pray you1 do we both see this at the very moment8 ,i certainly see it not in you1 nor you in me1--but both see it in that unchangeable truth1 which is beyond and above our individual minds40 8,si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis1 et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico1 ubi1 quso1 id videmus8 ,nec ego utique in te1 nec tu in me2 sed ambo in ipsa qu supra mentes nostras est1 incommutabili veritate40 ,you must not conceive that ,i am contending for the justness of the opinion which ,i am now stating to you--,i state it merely as illustrative of the system of ,malebranche4 ,if we suppose1 with ,augustine1 that there is one eternal ,truth1 which contains all truths1 and is present to all minds that perceive in it the truths which it contains1 it is but one step more1 and scarcely one step more1 to believe that our ideas of all things are contained and perceived in one omnipresent ,mind1 to which all other minds are united1 and which is itself the eternal ,truth1 that is present to all4 ,indeed1 some of the passages which are quoted in the ,search of ,truth1 from ,st ,austin1 show how strongly the author conceived his own opinions to be sanctioned by that ancient authority4 ,for some of the happiest applications which have been made of this very ancient system of ,christian metaphysics1 ,i may refer you particularly to the works of ,fenelon1--to his demonstration of the existence of ,god1 for example1--in which many of the most abstract subtleties of the ,metaphysics of ,augustine become living and eloquent1 in the reasonings of this amiable writer1 who knew so well how to give1 to every subject which he treated1 the tenderness of his own heart1 and the persuasion and devout confidence of his own undoubting belief4 ,in this ,protestant country1 in which the attention of theologians has been almost exclusively devoted to the ,scriptures themselves1 and little comparative attention paid to the writings of the ,fathers1--unless1 as strictly illustrative of the texts of ,scripture1 or of the mere ,history of the ,church1--the influence of the metaphysical opinions of ,st ,austin is less to be traced2 and the argument drawn from the eternal omnipresent ideas of unity1 and number and infinity1 on which so much stress is laid by ,catholic philosophers1 in demonstrating the existence of ,god1 is hence scarcely to be found at all1 or1 at least1 occupies a very inconsiderable place1 in the numerous works of our countrymen1 on the same great subject4 ,the system of ,malebranche1 might1 indeed have arisen in this country2 for we have had writers1 who1 without his genius1 have adopted his errors2 but there can be no doubt1 that it was1 by its very nature1 much more likely to arise1 in the country which actually produced it4 ,,footnotes3 #abf ,cowper's ,task1 ,book ,v4 v4 #haj-had4 #abg ,cowpers ,task1 ,book ,v4 v4 #fhf-g4 #abh ,recherche de la ,verit1 ,liv4 ,,iii4 c4 vi4 #abi ,recherche de la ,verit1 ,liv4 ,,iii4 c4 vi4 #acj ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,i4 v4 #ei-gh4 ,,lecture ,,xxxi4 ,,history ,,of ,,opinions ,,regarding ,,perception1 ,,concluded--,,on ,,the ,,external ,,affections ,,combined ,,with ,,desire1 ,,or ,,on ,,attention4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i gave you a slight sketch of some theories1--or1 to speak more accurately1 of some hypothetical conjectures1 which have been formed with respect to perception1--pointing out to you1 at the same time1 the two supposed difficulties which appear to me to have led to them1 in false views of the real objects of perception1 and of the nature of causation2 the difficulty of accounting1 with these false views1 for the supposed perception of objects at a distance1 and for the agency of matter on a substance1 so little capable as mind1 of being linked with it1 by any common bond of connexion4 ,of such hypotheses1 we considered three1--the doctrine of the ,peripatetics as to perception by species1 or shadowy films1 that flow from the object to the organ1--the ,cartesian doctrine of the indirect subserviency of external objects1 as the mere occasions on which the ,deity himself1 in every instance1 produces in the mind the state which is termed perception1--and the particular doctrine of ,malebranche1 himself a zealous defender of that general doctrine of occasional causes1 as to the perception of objects1 or rather of the ideas of objects in the divine mind4 ,the only remaining hypothesis1 which deserves to be noticed1 is a very celebrated one1 of ,leibnitz1 the doctrine of the pre-established harmony1 which1 ,i have no doubt1 originated in the same false view of the necessity of some connecting link in causation2 and was intended1 therefore1 like the others1 to obviate the supposed difficulty of the action of matter on mind1 and of mind on matter4 ,according to this doctrine1 the body never acts on the mind1 nor the mind on the body1 but the motions of the one1 and the feelings of the other1 are absolutely independent1 having as little influence on each other1 as they have on any other mind and body4 ,the mind feels pain1 when the body is bruised1 but1 from the pre-established order of its own affections1 it would have felt exactly the same pain1 though the body1 at that moment1 had been resting upon roses4 ,the arm1 indeed1 moves at the very moment1 when the mind has willed its motion2 but1 it moves of itself1 in consequence of its own pre-established order of movement1 and would move1 therefore1 equally1 at that very moment1 though the mind had wished it to remain at rest4 ,the exact correspondence of the motions and feelings1 which we observe1 arises merely from the exactness of the choice of the ,deity1 in uniting with a body1 that was formed by ,him1 to have of itself1 a certain order of independent motions1 a mind1 that was formed of itself to have a certain order of independent but corresponding feelings4 ,in the unerring exactness of this choice1 and mutual adaptation1 consists the exquisiteness of the harmony4 ,but1 however exquisite1 it is still a harmony only1 without the slightest reciprocal action4 ,the mind1 and its organic frame1 are1 in this system1--to borrow the illustration of it which is commonly used1--like two time-pieces1 which have no connexion with each other1 however accurately they may agree1--and each of which would indicate the hour1 in the very same manner1 though the other had been destroyed4 ,in like manner1 the soul of ,leibnitz1--for the great theorist himself may surely be used to illustrate his own hypothesis1--would1 though his body had been annihilated at birth1 have felt and acted1 as if with its bodily appendage1--studying the same works1 inventing the same systems1 and carrying on1 with the same warfare of books and epistles1 the same long course of indefatigable controversy2--and the body of this great philosopher1 though his soul had been annihilated at birth1 would not merely have gone through the same process of growth1 eating1 and digesting1 and performing all its other ordinary animal functions1--but would have achieved for itself the same intellectual glory1 without any consciousness of the works which it was writing and correcting1--would have argued1 with equal strenuousness1 for the principle of the sufficient reason1--claimed the honours of the differential calculus1--and laboured to prove this very system of the pre-established harmony1 of which it would1 certainly1 in that case1 have been one of the most illustrious examples4 ,to say of this hypothesis1 which was the dream of a great mind1--but of a mind1 ,i must confess1 which was very fond of dreaming1 and very apt to dream1--that it is a mere hypothesis1 is to speak of it too favourably4 ,like the doctrine of occasional causes1 it supposes a system of external things1 of which1 by the very principle of the hypothesis1 there can be no evidence1 and which is absolutely of no utility whatever1 but as it enables a philosopher to talk1 more justly1 of pre-established harmonies1 without the possibility1 however1 of knowing that he is talking more justly4 ,if the mind would have exactly the same feelings as now1--the same pleasures1 and pains1 and perceptions of men and houses1 and every thing external1 though every thing external1 comprehending of course the very organs of sense1 had been annihilated ages of ages before itself existed1 what reason can there be to suppose1 that this useless system of bodily organs1 and other external things1 exist at present8 ,the universal irresistible belief of mankind1 to which philosophers of a different school might appeal1 cannot be urged in this case1 since the admission of it1 as legitimate evidence1 would at once1 disprove the hypothesis4 ,we do not more truly believe1 that light exists1 than we believe1 that it affects us with vision1 and that1 if there had been no light1 there would have been no sensation of colour4 ,to assert the pre-established harmony1 is1 indeed1 almost the same thing1 as to affirm and deny the same proposition4 ,it is to affirm1 in the first place1 positively1 that matter exists1 since the harmony1 which it asserts1 is of matter and mind2 and then to affirm1 as positively1 that its existence is useless1 that it cannot be perceived by us1 and that we are1 therefore1 absolutely incapable of knowing whether it exists or not4 ,after stating to you so many hypotheses1 which have been formed on this subject1 ,i need scarcely remark1 what a fund of perpetual conjecture1 and1 therefore1 of perpetual controversy1 there is in the varied wonders of the external and internal universe1 when it is so very difficult for a few philosophers to agree1 as to what it is which gives rise to the simplest sensation of warmth1 or fragrance1 or colour4 ,it might be thought1 that1 in the intellectual opera1 if ,i may revert to that ingenious and lively allegory1 of which ,i availed myself in one of my early ,lectures1 in treating of general physical inquiry1--as the whole spectacle which we behold1 is passing within our minds1 we are1 in this instance at least1 fairly behind the scenes1 and see the mechanism of ,nature truly as it is4 ,but though we are really behind the scenes1 and even1 in one sense of the word1 may be said to be ourselves the movers of the machinery1 by which the whole representation is carried on1 still the minute parts and arrangements of the complicated mechanism are concealed from our view1 almost as completely as from the observation of the distant spectators4 ,the primary springs and weights1 indeed1 by the agency of which ,phaeton seemed to be carried off by the winds1 are left visible to us2 and we know1 that when we touch a certain spring1 it will put in motion a concealed set of wheels1 or that when we pull a cord1 it will act upon a system of pullies1 which will ultimately produce a particular effect desired by us2 but what is the number of wheels or pullies1 and how they are arranged and adapted to each other so as to produce the effect1--are left to our penetration to divine4 ,on this subject we have seen1 that as many grave absurdities have been formed into systems1 and honoured with commentaries and confutations1 as in the opera of external nature1 at which1 in the quotation formerly made to you1 the ,pythagorases and ,platos were supposed to be present4 8,it is not a system of cords and pullies which we put in motion10 says ,aristotle1 8--for to move such a heavy and distant mass would be beyond our power1--but only a number of little phantasms connected with them1 which have the form1 indeed1 of cords and pullies1 but not the substance1 and which are light enough1 therefore1 to fly at our very touch40--8,we do not truly move any wheels10 says the great inventor of the ,system of ,occasional ,causes2 8for1 as we did not make the wheels1 how can we know the principle on which their motion is to depend1 or have such a command over them as to be capable of moving them8 ,but when we touch a spring1 it is the occasion on which the ,mechanist himself1 who is always present1 though invisible1 and who must know well how to move them1 sets them instantly in motion40--8,we see the motion10 says ,malebranche1 8not by looking at the wheels or pullies1--for there is an impenetrable veil which hides them from us1 but by looking at the ,mechanist himself1 who must see them1 because ,he is the mover of them3 and whose eye1 in which they are imaged as he gazes on them1 must be a living mirror of all which he moves40--8,it is not a spring that acts upon the wheels10 says ,leibnitz2 8though1 when the spring is touched1 the wheels begin to move immediately1 and never begin to move at any other time4 ,this coincidence1 however1 is not owing to any connexion of one with the other2 for1 though the spring were destroyed1 the wheels would move exactly as at present1 beginning and ceasing at the same precise moments4 ,it is owing to a preestablished harmony of motion in the wheels and spring2 by which arrangement the motion of the wheels1 though completely independent of the other1 always begins at the very moment when the spring is touched40--8,no10 exclaims ,berkeley1 8it is all illusion4 ,the wheels1 and cords1 and weights1 are not seen because they exist1 but exist because they are seen2 and1 if the whole machinery is not absolutely annihilated when we shut our eyes1 it is only because it finds shelter in the mind of some other ,being whose eyes are never shut1--and are always open1 therefore1 at the time when ours are closing40 ,from all this variety of conjectural speculations1 the conclusion which you will perhaps have drawn most readily1 is that which is too often the result of our researches in the ,history of ,science1--that there may1 as ,d',alembert truly says1 be a great deal of philosophizing1 in which there is very little of philosophy4 ,i have now finished the remarks which ,i had to make on the very important class of our external affections of mind1 as they may be considered simply2 but it is not always simply that they exist2 and1 when they occur in combination with other feelings1 the appearance which they assume is sometimes so different1 as to lead to the erroneous belief1 that the complex feeling is the result of a distinct power of the mind4 ,when1 in my attempt to arrange the various feelings of which the mind is susceptible1 ,i divided these into our external and internal affections1 according as their causes are1 in the one case1 objects without the mind1 and1 in the other case1 previous feelings1 or affections of the mind itself3 and subdivided this latter class of internal affections into the two orders of our intellectual states of mind1 and our emotions2 ,i warned you1 that you were not to consider these as always arising separately1 and as merely successive to each other2--that1 in the same manner1 as we may both see and smell a rose1 so may we see1 or compare1 or remember1 while under the influence of some or other of our emotions2 though1 at the same time1 by analysis1 or at least by a reflective process that is similar to analysis1 we may be able to distinguish the emotion from the coexisting perception1 or remembrance1 or comparison1--as we are able1 by a very easy analysis1 in like manner1 when we both see and smell a rose1 to distinguish in our complex perception1 the fragrance from the colour and form4 ,there is one emotion1 in particular1 that is capable of so many modifications1 and has so extensive a sway over human life1 which it may be said almost to occupy from the first wishes of our infancy to the last of our old age1 that it cannot fail to be combined with many of our other feelings1 both sensitive and intellectual4 ,the emotion to which ,i allude is desire2 a feeling which may exist of various species and degrees1 from the strongest passion of which the mind is susceptible1 to the slightest wish of knowing a little more accurately the most trifling object before us2--and though1 in speaking of it at present1 ,i am anticipating what1 according to the strict division which we have made1 should not be brought forward till we consider the emotions in general1 this anticipation is absolutely unavoidable for understanding some of the most important phenomena1 both of perception1 which we have been considering1 and of those intellectual faculties which we are soon to consider4 ,i need not repeat to you1 that ,nature is not to be governed by the systems which we form2 that though our systematic arrangements ought not to be complicated1 her phenomena are almost always so2 and that1 while every thing is thus intermixed and connected with every thing in the actual phenomena of mind as well as of matter1 it would be vain for us to think of accommodating our physical discussions with absolute exactness1 even to the most perfect divisions and subdivisions which we may be capable of forming4 ,all that is necessary is1 that we should not depart from our order of arrangement without some advantage in view1 and an advantage greater than the slight evil which may arise from the appearance of temporary confusion4 ,the reason of my anticipation1 in the present instance1 is to explain to you what ,i conceive to constitute the phenomena of attention1--a state of mind which has been understood to imply the exercise of a peculiar intellectual power1 but which1 in the case of attention to objects of sense1 appears to be nothing more than the coexistence of desire1 with the perception of the object to which we are said to attend2 as1 in attention to other phenomena of the mind1 it is1 in like manner1 the coexistence of a particular desire with these particular phenomena4 ,the desire1 indeed1 modifies the perception1 rendering our feeling more intense1 as any other emotion would do1 that has equal relation to the object4 ,but there is no operation of any power distinct from the desire and perception themselves4 ,to understand this fully1 however1 it may be necessary to make some previous remarks on the coexistence of sensations4 ,in the circumstances in which we are placed by our beneficent ,creator1 in a world of objects capable of exciting in us various feelings1 and with senses awake to the profusion of delight1--breathing and moving in the midst of odours1 and colours1 and sounds1 and pressed alike in gentle reaction1 whether our limbs be in exercise or repose1 by that firm soil which supports us1 or the softness on which we rest1--in all this mingling action of external things1 there is scarcely a moment in which any one of our feelings can be said to be truly simple4 ,even when we consider but one of our organs1 to the exclusion of all the others1 how innumerable are the objects that concur in producing the complex affections of a single sense8 ,in the eye1 for example1 how wide a scene is open to us1 wherever our glance maybe turned8--woods1 fields1 mountains1 rivers1 the whole atmosphere of light1 and that magnificent luminary1 which converts into light the whole space through which it moves1 as if incapable of existing but in splendour4 ,the mere opening of our eyelid is like the withdrawing of a veil1 which before covered the universe3--,it is more2 it is almost like saying to the universe1 which had perished1 ,exist again6 ,innumerable objects1 then1 are constantly acting together on our organs of sense2 and it is evident1 that many of these can1 at once1 produce an effect of some sort in the mind1 because we truly perceive them as a coexisting whole4 ,it is not a single point of light only which we see1 but a wide landscape2 and we are capable of comparing various parts of the landscape with each other1--of distinguishing various odours in the compound fragrance of the meadow or the garden1--of feeling the harmony of various coexisting melodies4 ,the various sensations1 then1 may coexist1 so as to produce one complex affection4 ,when they do coexist1 it must be remarked1 that they are individually less intense4 ,the same sound1 for example1 which is scarcely heard in the tumult of the day1 is capable of affecting us powerfully if it recur in the calm of the night2 not that it is then absolutely louder1 but because it is no longer mingled with other sounds1 and other sensations of various kinds1 which rendered it weaker1 by coexisting with it4 ,it may be regarded1 then1 as a general law of our perceptions1 that when many sensations coexist1 each individually is less vivid than if it existed alone4 ,it may be considered almost as another form of the same proposition to say1 that when many sensations coexist1 each is not merely weaker1 but less distinct from the others with which it is combined4 ,when a few voices sing together1 we easily recognize each separate voice4 ,in a very full chorus1 we distinguish each with more difficulty2 and1 if a great multitude were singing together1 we should scarcely be able to distinguish any one voice from the rest1 more than to distinguish the noise of a single billow1 or a single dashing of a few particles of agitated air1 in the whole thunders of the ocean and the storm4 ,when many sensations coexist1 and are1 therefore1 of course weaker and less distinct1 if any one were suddenly to become much more intense1 the rest would fade in proportion1 so as scarcely to be felt4 ,a thousand faint sounds murmur around us1 which are instantly hushed by any loud noise4 ,if1 when we are looking at the glittering firmament of suns in a winter night1 any one of those distant orbs were to become as radiant as our own sun1 which is itself but the star of our planetary system1 there can be no question1 that1 like our sun on its rising1 it would quench with its brilliancy1 all those little glimmering lights1 which would still shine on us1 indeed1 as before1 but would shine on us without being perceived4 ,it may be regarded1 then1 as another general law of the mind1 that when many sensations coexist of equal intensity1 the effect of the increased intensity of one is a diminished intensity of those which coexist with it4 ,let us now1 for the application of these remarks1 consider1 what it is which takes place in attention1 when many objects are together acting on our senses1 and we attend1 perhaps1 only to a single sensation4 ,as a mere description of the process1 ,i cannot use a happier exemplification1 than that which ,condillac has given us in his ,logique4 ,let us imagine a castle1 which commands1 from its elevation1 an extensive view of a domain1 rich with all the beauties of nature and art4 ,it is night when we arrive at it4 ,the next morning our window-shutters open at the moment when the sun has just risen above the horizon1--and close again the very moment after4 ,though the whole sweep of country was shewn to us but for an instant1 we must have seen every object which it comprehends within the sphere of our vision4 ,in a second or a third instant we could have received only the same impressions which we received at first2 consequently1 though the window had not been closed again1 we should have continued to see but what we saw before4 ,this first instant1 however1 though it unquestionably shewed us all the scene1 gave us no real knowledge of it2 and1 when the windows were closed again1 there is not one of us who could have ventured to give even the slightest description of it1--a sufficient proof1 that we may have seen many objects1 and yet have learned nothing4 ,at length the shutters are opened again1 to remain open while the sun is above the horizon2 and we see once more what we saw at first4 ,even now1 however1 if1 in a sort of ecstacy1 we were to continue to see at once1 as in the first instant1 all this multitude of different objects1 we should know as little of them when the night arrived1 as we knew when the window shutters were closed again after the very moment of their opening4 ,to have a knowledge of the scene1 then1 it is not sufficient to behold it all at once1 so as to comprehend it in a single gaze2 we must consider it in detail1 and pass successively from object to object4 ,this is what ,nature has taught us all4 ,if she has given us the power of seeing many objects at once1 she has given us also the faculty of looking but at one1--that is to say1 of directing our eyes on one only of the multitude2 and it is to this faculty1--which is a result of our organization1 says ,condillac1--that we owe all the knowledge which we acquire from sight4 ,the faculty is common to us all3 and yet1 if afterwards we were to talk of the landscape which we had all seen1 it would be very evident1 that our knowledge of it would not be exactly the same4 ,by some of us1 a picture might be given of it with tolerable exactness1 in which there would be many objects such as they were1 and many1 certainly1 which had very little resemblance to the parts of the landscape which we wished to describe4 ,the picture which others might give1 would probably be so confused1 that it would be quite impossible to recognize the scene in the description1 and yet all had seen the same objects1 and nothing but the same objects4 ,the only difference is1 that some of us had wandered from object to object irregularly1 and that others had looked at them in a certain order4 ,now1 what is this order8 ,nature points it out to us herself4 ,it is the very order in which she presents to us objects4 ,there are some which are more striking than others1 and which1 of themselves1 almost call to us to look at them2 they are the predominant objects1 around which the others seem to arrange themselves4 ,it is to them1 accordingly1 that we give our first attention2 and when we have remarked their relative situations1 the others gradually fill up the intervals4 ,we begin1 then1 with the principal objects2 we observe them in succession2 we compare them1 to judge of their relative positions4 ,when these are ascertained1 we observe the objects that fill up the intervals1 comparing each with the principal object1 till we have fixed the positions of all4 ,when this process of successive1 but regular observation1 is accomplished1 we know all the objects and their situations1 and can embrace them with a single glance4 ,their order1 in our mind1 is no longer an order of mere succession2 it is simultaneous4 ,it is that in which they exist1 and we see it at once distinctly4 ,the comprehensive knowledge thus acquired1 we owe to the mere skill with which we have directed our eyes from object to object4 ,the knowledge has been acquired in parts successively2 but1 when acquired1 it is present at once to our mind1 in the same manner1 as the objects which it retraces to us1 are all present to the single glance of the eye that beholds them4 ,the description which ,i have now given you1 very nearly after the words of ,condillac1 is1 ,i think1 a very faithful representation of a process of which we must all repeatedly have been conscious4 ,it seems to me however1 faithful as it is1 as a mere description1 to leave the great difficulty unexplained1 and even unremarked4 ,we see a multitude of objects1 and we have one complex indistinct feeling4 ,we wish to know the scene more accurately1 and in consequence of this wish1 though the objects themselves continue as before1 we no longer seem to view them all1 but only one1 or a few2 and the few1 which we now see1 we see more distinctly4 ,such ,i conceive to be the process2 but the difference is1 that though we seem to view only a few objects1 and these much more distinctly1 the field of the eye still comprehends a wide expanse1 the light from which scarcely affects us1 while the light from other parts of it1 though not more brilliant1 produces in us distinct perception4 ,it is vain for ,condillac to say1 that it is in consequence of a faculty which we have of directing our eyes on one subject1 a faculty which is the result of our organization1 and which is common to all mankind2 for1 in the first place1 if this direction of our eyes1 of which he speaks1 on a single object1 be meant1 in its strict sense1 of the eye itself1 which we direct1 it is not true that we have any such faculty4 ,we cannot direct our eyes so as not to comprehend equally in our field of vision1 many objects beside that single object which is supposed to have fixed our attention2 and if1 by the direction of our eyes1 be meant the exclusive or limited perception by our mind itself1 there remains the difficulty1--how it happens1 that while light from innumerable objects falls on our retina as before1 it no longer produces any distinct vision relatively to the objects from which it comes1--while light certainly not more brilliant1 from other objects1 produces vision much more distinct than before4 ,let us consider this difficulty which1 in truth1 constitutes the principal phenomenon of attention1 a little more fully4 ,when ,condillac speaks of the faculty of the mind1 by which he supposes it capable of directing the eye1 exclusively1 on certain objects1 he must speak of that only1 of which we are conscious1 previously to the more distinct perception of those objects1 as certain parts of the scene4 ,what is it1 then1 of which we are conscious1 between the indistinct perception of the wide scene1 and the distinct perception of parts of the scene8 ,in the first place1 there is a general desire of knowing the scene more accurately4 ,this is the primary feeling of the process of attention4 ,but this primary feeling is soon succeeded by others4 ,indistinct as the whole complex scene may be1 some parts of it more brilliant1 or more striking in general character1 are less indistinct than others4 ,there are a few more prominent parts1 as ,condillac says1 around which the rest are indistinctly arranged4 ,with some one of these1 then1 as in itself more impressive and attractive1 we begin2 our general desire of knowing the whole scene having been followed by a wish to know this principal part more accurately4 ,the next step is to prevent the eye itself from wandering1 that no new objects may distract it1 and that there may be as little confusion as possible of the rays from different objects1 on that part of the retina1 on which the rays fell from the particular object which we wish to consider4 ,we fix our eyes1 therefore1 and our whole body1 as steadily as we can1 by the muscles subservient to these purposes4 ,so far1 unquestionably1 no new faculty is exercised4 ,we have merely the desire of knowing the scene before us1--the selection of some prominent object1 or rather the mere perception of it1 as peculiarly prominent1--the desire of knowing it particularly1--and the contraction of a few muscles1 in obedience to our volition4 ,no sooner1 however1 has all this taken place1 than instantly1 or almost instantly1 and without our consciousness of any new and peculiar state of mind intervening in the process1 the landscape becomes to our vision altogether different4 ,certain parts only1 those parts which we wished to know particularly1 are seen by us2 the remaining parts seem almost to have vanished4 ,it is as if every thing before had been but the doubtful colouring of enchantment1 which had disappeared1 and left to us the few prominent realities on which we gaze2 or rather1 it is as if some instant enchantment1 obedient to our wishes1 had dissolved every reality besides1 and brought closer to our sight the few objects which we desired to see4 ,still1 however1 all of which we are truly conscious1 as preceding immediately the change of appearance in the scene1 is the mere desire1 of which ,i have spoken1 combined certainly with expectation of that more distinct vision which follows4 ,there may be a combination of feelings1 but no new and peculiar feeling1 either as simple1 or coexisting with other feelings1--no indication1 in short1 of the exercise of new power4 ,even though we should be incapable1 therefore1 of understanding how the desire should have this effect1 it would not be the less true1 that the desire of knowing accurately a particular object in a group1 is instantly1--or1 at least1 instantly after some organic change which may probably be necessary1--followed by a more vivid and distinct perception of the particular object1 and a comparative faintness and indistinctness of the other objects that coexist with it2 and that what we call attention is nothing more4 ,are the comparative distinctness and indistinctness1 however1 a result which we had no reason to expect8 or are they not rather what might1 in some degree at least1 have been expected1 from our knowledge of the few physical facts with respect to our co-existing sensations1 which ,i have already pointed out to you1 and from the circumstance which we are next to consider8 ,we have seen1 in the observations already made by us1 that many co-existing perceptions are indistinct1 and that when one becomes more vivid1 the others become still fainter4 ,all that is necessary1 therefore1 is to discover some cause of increased vividness of that one to which we are said to attend4 ,if we can discover any reason why this should become more vivid1 the comparative indistinctness of the other parts of the scene may be considered as following of course4 ,such a cause exists1 unquestionably1 in that feeling of desire1 without which there can be no attention4 ,to attend1 is to have a desire of knowing that to which we attend1 and attention without desire is a verbal contradiction1--an inconsistency1 at least1 as great as if we were said to desire to know without any desire of knowing1 or to be attentive without attention4 ,when we attend1 then1 to any part of a complex group of sensations1 there is always an emotion of desire1 however slight the emotion may be1 connected exclusively with that particular part of the group to which we attend2 and whatever effect our emotions produce on the complex feelings that accompany them1 we may expect to be produced1 in some greater or less degree1 by the desire in the complex process which we term attention4 ,the effect which our expectation might anticipate1 is the very effect that is truly found to take place1--an increased liveliness of that part of the complex group1 to which alone the desire relates4 ,that it is the nature of our emotions of every sort1 to render more vivid all the mental affections with which they are peculiarly combined1 as if their own vivacity were in some measure divided with these1 every one who has felt any strong emotion1 must have experienced4 ,the eye has1 as it were1 a double quickness1 to perceive what we love or hate1 what we hope or fear4 ,other objects may be seen slightly2 but these1 if seen at all1 become instantly permanent1 and cannot appear to us without impressing their presence1 as it were1 in stronger feeling on our senses and our soul4 ,such is the effect of emotion1 when combined even with sensations that are of themselves1 by their own nature1 vivid2 and mark1 therefore1 less strikingly1 the increase of vividness received4 ,the vivifying effect1 however1 is still more remarkable1 by its relative proportion1 when the feelings with which the emotion is combined1 are in themselves peculiarly faint1 as in the case of mere memory or imagination4 ,the object of any of our emotions1 thus merely conceived by us1 becomes1 in many cases1 so vivid1 as to render even our accompanying perceptions comparatively faint4 ,the mental absence of lovers1 for example1 is proverbial2 and what is thus termed in popular language absence1 is nothing more than the greater vividness of some mere conception1 or other internal feeling1 than of any1 or all of the external objects present at the time1 which have no peculiar relation to the prevailing emotion4 8,the darkened sun ,loses his light2 ,the rosy-bosom'd ,spring ,to weeping ,fancy pines2 and yon bright arch ,contracted1 bends into a dusky vault4 ,all nature fades1 extinct2 and she alone1 ,heard1 felt1 and seen1 possesses every thought1 ,fills every sense1 and pants in every vein4 ,books are but formal dulness1--tedious friends1 ,and sad amid the social band he sits ,lonely and unattentive4 ,from his tongue ,the unfinished period falls2 while1 borne away ,on swelling thought1 his wafted spirit flies ,to the vain bosom of his distant ,fair2 ,and leaves the semblance of a lover1 fix'd ,in melancholy site1 with head declined ,and love-dejected eyes40#aca ,what brighter colours the fears of superstition give to the dim objects perceived in twilight1 the inhabitants of the village who have to pass the churchyard at any late hour1 and the little students of ballad lore1 who have carried with them1 from the nursery1 many tales which they almost tremble to remember1 know well4 ,and in the second sight of this northern part of the island1 there can be no doubt1 that the objects which the seers conceive themselves to behold1 truly are more vivid1 as conceptions1 than1 but for the superstition and the melancholy character of the natives1 which harmonize with the objects of this gloomy foresight1 they would have been2 and that it is in consequence of this brightening effect of the emotion1 as concurring with the dim and shadowy objects which the vapoury atmosphere of our lakes and vallies presents1 that fancy1 relatively to the individual1 becomes a temporary reality4 ,the gifted eye1 which has once believed itself favoured with such a view of the future1 will1 of course1 ever after have a quicker foresight1 and more frequent revelations2 its own wilder emotion communicating still more vivid forms and colours to the objects which it dimly perceives4 ,on this subject1 however1 ,i need not seek any additional illustration4 ,i may fairly suppose you to admit1 as a general physical law of the ,phenomena of ,mind1 that the influence of every emotion is to render more vivid the perception or conception of its object4 ,i must remark1 however1 that when the emotion is very violent1 as in the violence of any of our fiercer passions1 though it still renders every object1 with which it harmonizes1 more vivid and prominent1 it mingles with them some degree of its own confusion of feeling4 ,it magnifies and distorts2 and what it renders brighter1 it does not therefore render more distinct4 8,the flame of passion1 through the straggling soul ,deep-kindled1 shews across that sudden blaze ,the object of his rapture1 vast of size1 ,with fiercer colours and a night of shade40#acb ,the species of desire which we are considering1 however1 is not of this fierce and tempestuous kind4 ,emotions of a calmer species have the vivifying effect1 without the indistinctness2 and precisely of this degree is that desire which constitutes attention as coexisting with the sensations1 or other feelings to which we are said to attend4 ,we have found1 then1 in the desire which accompanies attention1 or rather which chiefly constitutes it1 the cause of that increased intensity which we sought4 ,when all the various objects of a scene are of themselves equally1 or nearly equally1 interesting or indifferent to us1 the union of desire1 with any particular perception of the group1 might be supposed1 a priori1 to render this perception in some degree more vivid than it was before4 ,it is not necessary that this difference of vividness should take place wholly1 or even be very striking1 in the first instant2 for1 by becoming in the first instant even slightly more vivid1 it acquires additional colouring and prominence1 so as to increase that interest1 which led us originally to select it for our first minute observation1 and thus to brighten it more and more progressively4 ,indeed1 when we reflect on our consciousness during what is called an effort of attention1 we feel that some such progress as this really takes place1 the object becoming gradually more distinct while we gaze1 till at length it requires a sort of effort to turn away to the other coexisting objects1 and to renew with them the same process4 ,attention1 then1 is not a simple mental state1 but a process1 or a combination of feelings4 ,it is not the result of any peculiar power of the mind1 but of those mere laws of perception1 by which the increased vividness of one sensation produces a corresponding faintness of others coexisting with it1 and of that law of our emotions1 by which they communicate greater intensity to every perception1 or other feeling1 with which they coexist and harmonize4 ,,footnotes3 #aca ,thomson's ,seasons--,spring1 v4 #ajjf-ajba4 #acb ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,,ii4 v4 #acg-adj4 ,,lecture ,,xxxii4 ,,on ,,the ,,external ,,affections ,,of ,,mind ,,combined ,,with ,,desire1 ,,continued4--,,on ,,the ,,internal ,,affections ,,of ,,mind4--,,classification ,,of ,,them4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,gentlemen1 ,i concluded my sketch of the different hypotheses of philosophers with respect to perception1 with an account of that ,pre-established ,harmony1 by which ,leibnitz1 excluding all reciprocal agency of mind and matter1 endeavoured to account for the uniform coincidence of our mental feelings with our bodily movements1--an hypothesis which1 though it does not seem to have gained many followers out of ,germany1 produced the most enthusiastic admiration in the country of its author4 ,i may remark by the way1--as a very striking example of the strange mixture of seemingly opposite qualities1 which we frequently find in the character of nations1--that1 while the country1 of which ,i speak1 has met with ridicule1--most unjust in degree1 as national ridicule always is1--for the heaviness of its laborious erudition1 it must be allowed to surpass all other countries in the passionate enthusiasm of its philosophy1 which1 particularly in metaphysics1 from the reign of ,leibnitz to the more recent worship paid to the transcendentalism of ,kant1 seems scarcely to have admitted of any calm approbation1 or to have known any other inquirers than violent partisans and violent foes4 ,after my remarks on this hypothesis1 which closed my view of our external affections of mind1 as they exist simply1 ,i next proceeded to consider them1 as they exist1 combined with desire1 in that state of the mind1 which is termed attention1--a state which has been supposed to indicate a peculiar intellectual power1 but which1 ,i endeavoured to shew you1 admits of being analyzed into other more general principles4 ,it is to our consciousness1 of course1 that we must refer for the truth of any such analysis2 and the process which it reveals to us1 in attention1 seems1 ,i think1 to justify the analysis which ,i made1 indicating a combination of simpler feelings1 but not any new and distinct species of feeling1 to be referred to a peculiar faculty4 ,we see many objects together1 and we see them indistinctly4 ,we wish to know them more accurately1--and we are aware1 that this knowledge can be acquired only in detail4 ,we select some one more prominent object1 from the rest1--or rather1 without any selection on our part1 this object excites1 in a higher degree1 our desire of observing it particularly1 merely by being more prominent1 or1 in some other respect1 more interesting than the rest4 ,to observe it particularly1 we fix our body1 and our eyes1--for it is a case of vision which ,i have taken for an example1--as steadily as possible1 that the light from the same points of the object may continue to fall on the same points of the retina4 ,together with our wish1 we have an expectation1 the natural effect of uniform past experience1 that the object will now be more distinctly perceived by us2 and1 in accordance with this expectation1 when the process1 which ,i have described1 is completed1 the object1 as if it knew our very wish1 and hastened to gratify it1 does become more distinct2 and1 in proportion as it becomes thus more vivid1 the other objects of the group become gradually fainter1 till at length they are scarcely felt to be present4 ,such1 without the intervention of any new and peculiar state of mind1 is the mental process1 as far as we are conscious of it2 and1 if this be the process1 there is no reason to infer in it the operation of any power of the mind different from those which are exercised in other cases4 ,the general capacities of perception1 and desire1 and expectation1 and voluntary command of certain muscles1 which1 on every view of the phenomena of attention1 we must allow the mind to possess1 are1 of themselves1 sufficient to explain the phenomena1 and preclude1 therefore1 any further reference4 ,the brightening of the objects to which we attend1 that is to say1 of the objects which have interested us1 and which we feel a desire of knowing1 and the consequent fading of the other coexisting objects1 ,i explained1 by the well known influence1 not of desire merely1 but of all our emotions1 in rendering more vivid those objects of perception or fancy1 with which they harmonize2 and ,i illustrated this influence by various examples4 ,the phantasms of imagination1 in the reveries of our waking hours1 when our external senses are still open1 and quick to feel1 are1 as mere conceptions1 far less vivid than the primary perceptions1 from which they originally flowed2 and yet1 under the influence of any strong emotion1 they become so much more bright and prominent than external things1 that1 to the impassioned muser1 on distant scenes and persons1 the scenes and persons truly around him1 are almost1 as if they were not in existence4 ,if a mere conception1 then1 faint as it must always be by its own nature1 can thus be rendered more vivid than reality1 by the union of any strong desire1 it is surely less wonderful1 that the same cause should communicate the same superior vividness to the brighter realities of perception4 ,if what we remember with interest1 and wish to see again1 become so much more vivid in our fancy1 merely by this very wish1 that we scarcely perceive any one of the innumerable objects before our eyes1 what we truly see1 in its own lively colouring1 and feel a strong desire of knowing more intimately1 may well be supposed to render us less sensible to the other coexisting objects1 which the very shadows of our imagination1 when brightened by a similar desire1 were able mutually to annihilate or eclipse4 ,in addition to this direct vivifying influence of the desire itself1 some part1--and1 perhaps a very considerable part--of the brightening of the object1 during attention1 may arise indirectly from the mere muscular adaptation of the organ4 ,i do not speak merely of that internal adaptation1 whatever it may be1 which accommodates the organ to the object1 and1 therefore1 varies with the distance of the object1 but of that simpler contraction1 which keeps the organ1 as a whole1 steadily fixed4 ,it is proved by many facts1 that a certain time is necessary1 for vision1 and1 probably1 in like manner1 for all our perceptions4 ,a cannon ball1 for example1 though it must have reflected light to us1 during its passage1 may yet pass before our eyes1 so rapidly1 as not to be perceived2 and1 if a part of the eye be affected1 in a certain manner1 by one colour1 and a different colour fall upon it so rapidly after the first1 that the former affection has not previously ceased1 the result is not the visual affection1 which the second colour alone would have produced1 but that which would have arisen at once from a mixture of the two colours4 ,in this way1 in an experiment which has been often performed1 for the demonstration of this simple and beautiful fact2 if a cylinder be painted in longitudinal bars1 with the prismatic colours1 in certain proportions1 and be revolved rapidly on its axis1 its surface to the eye will not seem to present any one of the colours1 which are really painted on it1 but an uniform whiteness1 which it has not1 on a single point of its whole surface4 ,if rays of different colours1 falling in rapid succession1 on the same points of the retina1 thus seem to mingle with each other1 and produce one confused effect1 it must evidently be of great importance1 for distinct vision1 that the eyes should be so fixed1 that the rays from the objects which we wish to observe1 may not fall1 on some parts of the retina1 previously affected by the light of other objects1 but1 as much as possible1 on the same parts1 during the whole time of our observation4 ,this can be done1 as ,i have said1 only by the continued agency of certain muscles2 and hence arises that feeling of muscular effort1 of which we are conscious in the process4 ,how difficult is it for us1 to keep a muscle1 for any length of time1 in the same exact point of contraction1 without the slightest deviation from this point1 is well known to physiologists2 and1 it is not wonderful1 therefore1 that in attention1 we should be conscious of a considerable effort1 in endeavouring to fix steadily any of our organs4 ,the power of thus fixing our muscles1 is a power which improves by habitual exercise2 and it is probably very much in this way1 that the practised eye is able so rapidly to distinguish the minute parts of objects1 which require from others a much longer effort of attention4 ,but1 whatever the effect of the muscular adaptation may be1 it is not the less certain1 if we reflect on our feelings1 that the mental part of the process of attention involves nothing more1 in addition to the primary perception1 which is its object1 than desire with expectation4 ,this is all of which we are truly conscious1 previously to the brightening of the perception itself1 to which we are said to attend2--a brightening1 which1 from the general laws of emotion1 might very naturally be expected as the result of the union of desire1 with any of our sensations4 ,in such circumstances1 then1 it is not wonderful1 that we should remember best the objects to which we pay most attention1 since this is only to say1 that we remember best the objects on which we have dwelt longest1 and with greatest interest1 and which we have1 therefore1 known most accurately4 ,such are our sensations or perceptions1 when united with desire1 exhibiting appearances1 which seem1 at first1 to indicate1 though they do not truly indicate1 a peculiar power or susceptibility of the mind4 ,we shall find1 in considering our intellectual states of mind1 the order of mental phenomena1 to which we next proceed1 that the union of desire with these1 has led1 in like manner1 to the belief of many distinct intellectual powers1 which yet1 like attention1 admit of being analyzed into simpler elements4 ,these intellectual phenomena themselves1 in their simple state1 must1 however1 be first examined by us4 ,having now1 then1 offered all the observations for which our limited course allows me room1 on the very important primary class of external affections of the mind1 ,i proceed according to our general division1 to consider the secondary class of its internal affections2 those states of it1 which are not the result of causes foreign to the mind itself1 but immediate consequents of its own preceding feelings4 ,the ,divine ,contriver of our mental frame1 who formed the soul to exist in certain states1 on the presence of external things1 formed it also to exist1 in certain successive states1 without the presence or direct influence of any thing external2 the one state of the mind1 being1 as immediately the cause of the state of mind which follows it1 as1 in our external feelings1 the change produced1 in our corporeal organ of sense1 is the cause of any one of the particular affections of that class4 ,in the one class1 that of our internal affections1 the phenomena depend on the laws which regulate the successive changes of state of the mind itself4 ,in the other class1 that of our external affections1 they depend on the laws of the mind1 indeed1 which is susceptible of these peculiar changes of state2 but they depend1 in an equal degree1 on the laws which give to matter its peculiar qualities1 and1 consequently1 its peculiar influence on this mental susceptibility4 ,if light were to be annihilated1 it is very evident1 that1 though our mind itself were to continue endowed with all its present susceptibilities1 it never again could behold the sun1 around whose cold and gloomy mass our earth might still revolve as now2 nor1 in such circumstances1 is there any reason to suppose that it would exist in any one of those various states1 which constitute the delightful sensations of vision4 ,these sensations1 then1 depend on external things1 as much as on the mind itself4 ,but1 though after we have once been enriched with the splendid acquisitions1 which our perceptive organs afford us1 every thing external were to vanish1 not from our sight merely1 but from all our senses1 and our mind alone were to exist in the infinity of space1 together with that ,eternal ,majesty which formed it1--still thought after thought1 and feeling after feeling1 would arise1 as it were1 spontaneously1 in the disembodied spirit1--if no change in its nature were to take place2 and the whole world of light1 and fragrance1 and harmony1 would1 in its remembrance1 almost rise again1 as if outliving annihilation itself4 ,it is by this capacity of internal change of state1 indeed1 that the soul is truly immortal1 which1 if it were capable of no affections1 but those which ,i have termed external1 would itself be virtually as mortal as all the mortal things that are around it2 since1 but for them1 as causes of its feelings1 it could not1 in these circumstances1 of complete dependence1 have any feelings whatever1 and could1 therefore1 exist only in that state of original insensibility1 which preceded the first sensation that gave it consciousness of existence4 ,it is1 in the true sense of immortality of life1 immortal1 only because it depends for its feelings1 as well as for its mere existence1 not on the state of perishable things1 which are but the atmosphere that floats around it1 but on its own independent laws2 or1 at least1--for the laws of mind1 as well as the laws of matter1 can mean nothing more1--depends1 for the successions of its feelings1 only on the provident arrangements1 of that ,all-foreseeing ,power whose will1 as it existed at the very moment at which it called every thing from nothing1 and gave to mind and matter their powers and susceptibilities1 is thus1 consequently1 in the whole series of effects1 from age to age1 the eternal legislation of the universe4 ,even while our soul is united to this bodily frame1 and continually capable of being affected by the objects that are continually present with it1 by far the greater number of our feelings are those which arise from our internal successions of thought4 ,innumerable as our perceptions are1 they are but a small part of the varied consciousness of a day4 ,we do not see1 or feel1 objects merely1 for this alone would be of little value1--but we compare them with each other1--we form plans of action1 and prosecute them with assiduous attention1--or we meditate on the means by which they may most effectually be prosecuted2 and with all our perceptions of external things1 and plans of serious thought1 a continued fairy work of involuntary fancy1 is incessantly mingling1 in consequence of the laws of suggestion in the mind itself1 like the transient shadows1 on a stream1 of the clouds that fled over it1 which picture on it their momentary forms1 as they pass in rapid variety1 without affecting the course of the busy current1 which glides along in its majestic track1 as if they had never been4 ,if we had the power of external sense only1 life would be as passive as the most unconnected dream1 or rather far more passive and irregular than the wildest of our dreams4 ,our remembrances1 comparisons1 our hopes1 our fears1 and all the variety of our thoughts and emotions1 give a harmony and unity to our general consciousness1 which make the consciousness of each day a little drama1 or a connected part of that still greater drama1 which is to end only with the death of its hero1 or rather with the commencement of his glorious apotheosis4 ,how wide a field the internal affections of the mind present1 without dependence on the system of material things1--with which we are connected1 indeed1 by many delightful ties1 but by ties that have relation only to this mortal scene1--is proved in a very striking manner1 by the increased energy of thought which we often seem to acquire in those hours of the quiet of the night1 when every external influence is nearly excluded1--the hours of inward meditation1 in which the mind has been poetically said1 to retire into the sanctuary of its own immense abode1 and to feel there and enjoy its spiritual infinity1 as if admitted to the etherial dwellings and the feasts of the ,gods4 8,nonne vides1 quoties nox circumfunditur atra ,immensi terga ,oceani terramque polumque1 ,cum rerum obduxit species obnubilus ,aer ,nec fragor impulsas aut vox allabitur aures1 ,ut nullo intuitu mens jam defixa1 recedit ,in sese1 et vires intra se colligit omnes8 ,ut magno hospitio potitur1 seque excipit ipsa ,totam intus2 seu jussa ,deum discumbere mensis4 ,nam neque sic illam solido de marmore tecta ,nec cum porticibus capiunt laquiaria centum ,aurea1 tot distincta locis1 tot regibus apta1 ,qusitque epul1 ,tyrioque instructus ab ostro2 ,ut gaudet sibi juncta1 sibique intenditur ipsa1 ,ipsa sibi tota incumbens1 totamque pererrans ,immensa immensam spatio longeque patentem4 ,seu dulces inter latebras ,heliconis amni1 ,et sacram ,phbi nemorum divertitur umbram1 ,fcundum pleno exercens sub pectore numen2 ,seu causas rerum occultas1 et semina volvit1 ,et queis fderibus conspirent maximus ther ,neptunusque ,pater1 ,tellusque1 atque omnia gignant2 ,sive altum virtutis iter subducit1 et almus ,molitur leges1 queis fortunata juventus ,pareat1 ac pace imperium tutetur et armis40#acc ,the internal states of mind1 then1 which form the class next to be considered by us1 present to our inquiry no narrow or uninteresting field4 ,we are to find in these again every thing1 though in fainter colours1 which delighted and interested us in the former class2 while we are1 at the same time1 to discover1 an abundant source of feelings still more delightful and sublime in themselves1 and still more interesting to our analysis4 ,we are no longer mere sensitive beings1 that gaze upon the universe1 and feel pain or pleasure as a few of its elementary particles touch our nerves4 ,we are the discoverers of laws1 which every element of the universe obeys1--the tracers of events of ages that are past1--the calculators and prophets of events1 that are not to occur till generation after generation of the prophetic calculators that succeed us shall themselves have passed away2--and1 while we are thus able to discover the innumerable relations of created things1 we are1 at the same time1 by the medium of these internal states of our own mind1 the discoverers also of that ,infinite ,being1 who framed every thing which it is our glory to be capable merely of observing1 and who1 without acting directly on any of our organs of sense1 is yet present to our intellect with as bright a reality of perception1 as the suns and planets which he has formed are present to our corporeal vision4 ,the species of philosophical inquiry1 which our internal affections of mind admit1 is exactly the same as that which our external affections admit2 that is to say1 we are in our inquiry1 to consider the circumstances in which they arise1 and the circumstances which follow them1 with the relations which they appear to us mutually to bear to our external feelings1 and to each other1 and nothing more4 ,it is as little possible for us1 independently of experience1 to discover a priori1 any reason that one state of mind should be followed directly by another state of mind1 as1 in the case of our external feelings1 to discover any reason1 that the presence of light should be followed by that particular mental state which constitutes the sensation of colour1 not by that which constitutes the perception of the song of a nightingale1 or the fragrance of a violet1--or that those external causes should be followed by their peculiar sensations1 rather than by the perception of colour4 ,it is equally vain for us to think of discovering any reason1 in the nature of the mind itself1 which could have enabled us to predict1 without actual experience1 or1 at least1 without analogy of other similar instances1 any of the mere intellectual changes of state1--that the sight of an object1 which we have seen before in other circumstances1 should recal1 by instant spontaneous suggestion1 those other circumstances which exist no longer2--that in meeting1 in the most distant country1 a native of our own land1 it should be in our own power1 by a single word to annihilate1 as it were1 for the moment1 all the seas and mountains between him and his home2--or1 in the depth of the most gloomy dungeon1 where its wretched tenant1 who has been its tenant for half a life1 sees1 and scarcely sees1 the few faint rays that serve but to speak of a sunshine1 which he is not to enjoy1 and which they deprive him of the comfort of forgetting1 and to render visible to his very eyes that wretchedness which he feels at his heart1--that even this creature of misery1--whom no one in the world perhaps remembers but the single being1 whose regular presence1 at the hour at which he gives him1 day by day1 the means of adding to his life another year of wretchedness like the past1 is scarcely felt as the presence of another living thing1--should yet1 by the influence of a single thought1 enter into the instant possession of a freedom beyond that which the mere destruction of his dungeon could give1--a freedom which restores him not merely to the liberty1 but to the very years which he had lost1--to the woods1 and the brook1 and the fields of his boyish frolics1 and to all the happy faces which were only as happy as his own4 ,the innumerable examples of such successions of thought we know from experience1 but from experience only4 ,it is enough for us1 however1 to ascertain the simple fact1 that the internal suggestions of thought after thought1 without the recurrence of any external object does take place1 as truly as sensation itself1 when external objects recur1--to observe the general circumstances relating to the suggestion1--and to arrange the principle on which it seems to depend1 as a principle of our intellectual constitution4 ,while we attempt no more than this1 we are certain at least that we are not attempting any thing which is beyond the sphere of human exertion4 ,to attempt more1 and to strive to discover1 in any one of the series of our internal feelings1 some reason which might have led us originally to predict its existence1 or the existence of the other mental affections which succeed it1 would be to hope to discover1 what is not merely beyond our power even to divine1 but what we should be incapable of knowing that we had divined1 even though we should casually have succeeded in making the discovery4 ,in the classification of our internal feelings1 as in every classification1 and1 indeed1 in every thing1 intellectual or moral1 which can exercise us1 it is evident1 that we may err in two ways1 by excess or deficiency4 ,we may multiply divisions without necessity1 or we may labour in vain to force into one division individual diversities1 which cannot1 by any labour1 be made to correspond4 ,the golden mean1 of which moralists speak1 is as important in science1 as in our practical views of happiness2 and the habit of this cautious speculative moderation1 is1 probably1 of as difficult attainment in the one1 as the habitual contentment which is necessary to the enjoyment of the other4 ,when we think of the infinite variety of the physical objects around us1 and of the small number of classes in which they are at present arranged1 it would seem to us1 if we were ignorant of the history of philosophy1 that the regular progress of classification must have been to simplify1 more and more1 the general circumstances of agreement1 on which arrangement depends2 that1 in this progressive simplification1 millions of diversities must have been originally reduced to thousands1--these1 afterwards1 to hundreds1--and these again1 successively1 to divisions still more minute4 ,but1 the truth is1 that this simplicity of division is far from being so progressive in the arrangement even of external things4 ,the first steps of classification must1 indeed1 uniformly be1 to reduce the great multitude of obvious diversities to some less extensive tribes4 ,but the mere guess-work of hypothesis soon comes in to supply the place of laborious observation or experiment1 and of that slow and accurate reasoning on observations and experiments1 which1 to minds of very rapid imagination1 is perhaps1 a labour as wearisome1 as1 in the long observation itself1 to watch for hours1 with an eye fixed like the telescope through which it gazes1 one constant point of the heavens1 or to minister to the furnace1 and hang over it in painful expectance of the transmutations which it tardily presents4 ,by the unlimited power of an hypothesis1 we in a moment range together1 under one general name1 myriads of diversities the most obstinately discordant2 as if the mere giving of a name could of itself alter the qualities of things1 making similar what was dissimilar before1 like words of magic1 that convert any thing into any thing4 ,when the hypothesis is proved to be false1 the temporary magic of the spell is of course dissolved2 and all the original diversities appear again1 to be ranged once more in a wider variety of classes4 ,even where1 without any such guess-work of hypothetical resemblance1 divisions and arrangements have been formed on the justest principles1 according to the qualities of objects known at the time1 some new observation1 or new experiment1 is continually shewing differences of composition or of general qualities1 where none were conceived before2 and the same philosophy is thus1 at the same moment1 employed in uniting and disuniting1--in reducing many objects to a few1 and separating a few into many1--as the same electric power1 at the moment in which it is attracting objects nearer to it1 repels others which were almost in contiguity1 and often brings the same object close to it1 only to throw it off the next moment to a greater distance4 ,while a nicer artificial analysis1 or more accurate observation1 is detecting unsuspected resemblances1 and1 still more frequently1 unsuspected diversities1 there is hence no fixed point nor regular advance1 but a sort of ebb and flow of wider and narrower divisions and subdivisions2 and the classes of an intervening age maybe fewer than the classes both of the age which preceded it1 and of that which comes after it4 ,for a very striking example of this alternation1 ,i may refer to the history of that science1 which is to matter what our intellectual analysis is to mind4 ,the elements of bodies have been more and fewer successively1 varying with the analyses of almost every distinguished chemist2 far from having fewer principles of bodies1 as chemistry advances1 how many more elements have we now than in the days of ,aristotle6 ,there can be no question1 that when man first looked around him with a philosophic eye1 and saw1 in the sublime rudeness of nature1 something more than objects of savage rapacity1 or still more savage indifference1 he must have conceived the varieties of bodies to be innumerable2 and could as little have thought of comprehending them all under a few simple names1 as of comprehending the whole earth itself within his narrow grasp4 ,in a short time1 however1 this narrow grasp1 if ,i may venture so to express myself1 did strive to comprehend the whole earth2 and soon after man had made the first great advance in science1 of wondering at the infinity of things in which he was lost1 we had sages1 such as ,thales1 ,anaximenes1 and ,heraclitus1 who were forming every thing of a single principle1--water1 or air1 or fire4 ,the four elements1 which afterwards reigned so long in the schools of physics1 gave place to a single principle with the alchemists2 or to three principles1--salt1 sulphur1 and mercury1--with chemists less bold in conjecture4 ,these1 again1 were soon multiplied by observers of still nicer discrimination2 and modern chemistry1 while it has shewn some bodies1 which we regarded as different1 to be composed of the same elements1 has1 at the same time1 shewn1 that what we regarded as elements1 are themselves compounds of elements which we knew not before4 ,to him who looks back on the history of our own science1 the analytic science of mind1 which1 as ,i have already said1 may almost be regarded1 in its most important aspects1 as a sort of intellectual chemistry1--there will appear the same alternate widening and narrowing of classification4 ,the mental phenomena are1 in one age or country1 of many classes2 in a succeeding age1 or in a different country1 they are of fewer2 and again1 after the lapse of another age1 or the passage of a river or a mountain1 they are of many more4 ,in our own island1 after the decay of scholastic metaphysics1 from ,hobbes to ,hume1--if ,i may use these names1 as dates of eras1 in a science1 on which1 with all their unfortunate errors on many of the most important points of human belief1 they both unquestionably threw a degree of light1 which rendered their errors on these subjects the more to be lamented1--in this long and brilliant period1--which1 of course1 includes1 with many other eminent names1 the very eminent author of the ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1--there was a tendency to simplify1 as much as possible1 the classification of the phenomena of mind2 and more regard1 perhaps1 was paid to the similarities of phenomena1 than to their differences4 ,subsequently to this period1 however1 the philosophy of ,dr ,reid1 and1 in general1 of the metaphysicians of this part of the island1 has had the opposite tendency1--to enlarge1 as ,i conceive1 far beyond what was necessary1 the number of classes which they considered as too limited before2--and1 in proportion1 more regard has perhaps been paid to the differences1 or supposed differences of phenomena1 than to their resemblances4 ,there can be no doubt1 at least1 that we are now accustomed to speak of more powers or operations of the mind1 than even the schoolmen themselves1 fond as they were of all the nicest subtleties of infinitesimal subdivision4 ,the difference in this respect1 however1 is not so striking1 when we consider successions of ages1 in which1 of course1 from our general notion of the effects of time1 we are accustomed to expect variety1 as when we look to neighbouring countries at the same period1 especially if we consider the advantage of that noble art1 which might have been supposed1 by the wide diffusion which it gives to opinion1 to have removed1 as to human sentiment1 all the boundaries of mere geographic distance4 ,slight1 however1 as the distance is which separates the two countries1 the philosophy of ,france1 in its views of the phenomena of mind1 and the philosophy of ,britain1 particularly of this part of ,britain1 have for more than half a century differed as much1 as in the philosophy of different ages2 certainly in a degree far greater1 than1 but for experience1 it would have been easy for us to suppose4 ,in ,france1 all the phenomena of mind have been1 during that period1 regarded as sensations1 or transformed sensations1 that is to say1 as sensations variously simplified or combined4 ,the works of ,condillac1 who professed to have founded his system on that of ,locke1 but who evidently did not understand fully what ,locke intended1 gave the principal tone to this philosophic belief2 and it has been fostered since by that passion for the simple and the wonderful1 which1 when these two objects can be united1 is perhaps the strongest of all our intellectual passions4 ,in the system of the ,french metaphysicians1 they are united in a very high degree4 ,that this universal presence of sensation1 whether true or false1 is at least very simple1 cannot be denied2 and there is certainly abundant matter of wonder in the supposed discovery1 that all the variety of our internal feelings are those very feelings of a different class1 to which they have so little appearance of belonging4 ,it is a sort of perpetual masquerade1 in which we enjoy the pleasure of recognizing a familiar friend in a variety of grotesque dresses1 and the pleasure also of enjoying the mistakes of those around us1 who take him for a different person1 merely because he has changed his robe and his mask4 ,the fallacy of the doctrine is precisely of that kind1 which1 if once admitted1 is most difficult to be shaken off4 ,it relates to a system which is very simple1 very wonderful1 and obviously true in part4 ,indeed1 when there are so many actual transformations of our feelings1 so many emotions1 of which the principal elements are so little recognizable1 in the complex affection that results from them1--the supposition that all the varieties of our consciousness may be only modes of one simple class of primary feelings1 false as it is1 is far from being the most striking example which the history of our science presents of the extravagance of philosophic conjecture4 ,the speculations of the ,french school of philosophers1 to which ,i have now alluded1 as to the supposed universal transmutations of feeling1 bear1 as you can scarcely fail to have remarked1 a very obvious resemblance1 in extreme simplicity1 to the speculations of alchemists on transmutations of another kind4 ,the resemblance is stated with great force by a living ,french author1 himself a metaphysician of no humble rank4 ,i allude to a passage which you will find quoted by ,mr ,stewart1 in one of the valuable preliminary dissertations of his volume of ,essays1 from a work of ,de ,gerando4 8,it required nothing less10--says this ingenious writer1--8than the united splendour of the discoveries brought to light by the new chemical school1 to tear the minds of men from the pursuit of a simple and primary element2 a pursuit renewed in every age1 with an indefatigable perseverance1 and always renewed in vain4 ,with what feelings of contempt would the physiologists of former times have looked down on the chemists of the present age1 whose timid and circumscribed system admits nearly forty different principles in the composition of bodies6 ,what a subject of ridicule would the new nomenclature have afforded to an alchemist6 8,the ,philosophy of ,mind has its alchemists also2 men whose studies are directed to the pursuit of one single principle1 into which the whole science may be resolved2 and who flatter themselves with the hope of discovering the grand secret1 by which the pure gold of truth may be produced at pleasure40#acd ,this secret of the intellectual opus magnum1 ,condillac conceived himself to have found2 or1 rather1 as ,i have already said1 he ascribed the grand discovery to our own illustrious countryman4 ,in this reference the whole school of ,french metaphysicians have very strangely agreed2 conferring on ,mr ,locke a praise which they truly meant to do him honour1 but praise which the object of it would have hastened to disclaim4 ,he certainly was not that alchemist in the science of mind which they conceived him to be2 though he was a chemist in it1 unquestionably1 and a chemist of the highest rank4 ,,footnotes3 #acc ,d4 ,heinsius4 ,de ,contemptu ,mortis1 ,lib4 i4 #acd ,chap4 ,i4 ,sect4 ii4 p4 #ae1 #af4 #dto4 ,edit4 ,,lecture ,,xxxiii4 ,,on ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,mental ,,phenomena1 ,,by ,,locke--,,by ,,condillac--,,by ,,reid--,a ,,new ,,classification4 ,gentlemen1 in the conclusion of my last ,lecture1 ,i alluded to the system of the ,french metaphysicians1 as an instance of error from extreme simplification in the analysis of that class of our feelings which we are now considering4 ,of this system1--which deserves some fuller notice1 on account both of the great talents which have stated and defended it1 and of its very wide diffusion1--,i may remark1 in the first place1 that it is far from being1 what its author and his followers consider it to be1 a mere developement of the system of our illustrious countryman4 ,on the contrary1 they agree with ,locke only in one point1 and that a negative one1--as to which all philosophers may now be considered as unanimous1--the denial of what were termed innate ideas4 ,in every thing which can be strictly said to be positive in his system1 this great philosopher is nearly as completely opposed to ,condillac and his followers1 as to the unintelligible wranglers of the ancient schools4 ,to convince you of this1 a very slight statement of the two systems will be sufficient4 ,according to ,locke1 the mind1 to whose existence thought or feeling is not essential1 might1 but for sensation1 have remained forever without feeling of any kind4 ,from sensation we acquire our first ideas1--to use a word1 which1 from its ambiguity ,i am not very fond of using1 but which1 from its constant occurrence1 is a very important one in his system4 ,these ideas we cannot merely remember as past1 and compound or decompound them in various ways1 but we can compare them in all their variety of relations2 and according as their objects are agreeable or disagreeable1 can love or hate those objects1 and fear or hope their return4 ,we remember not external things only1 so as to have ideas of them1--ideas of sensation1--but we remember also our very remembrance itself1--our abstractions1 comparisons1 love1 hate1 hope1 fear1 and all the varieties of reflex thought1 or feeling2 and our remembrance of these internal feelings1 or operations of our mind1 furnishes another abundant source of ideas1 which he terms ideas of reflection4 ,the comparison1 however1--and it is this point alone which can be of any consequence in reference to the ,french system1--the comparison1 as a state of the mind1 even when it is exercised on our sensations or perceptions1 is not itself a sensation or perception1--nor is our hope1 or fear1 or any other of our reflex feelings2 for then1 instead of the two sources of our ideas1 the distinction of which forms the very groundwork of the ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 we should truly have but one source1 and our ideas of reflection would themselves be the very ideas of sensation to which they are opposed4 ,our sensations1 indeed1 directly or indirectly give rise to our reflex feelings1 but they do not involve them2 they are only prior in order1--the occasions1 on which certain powers or susceptibilities of feeling in the mind evolve themselves4 ,such is the system of ,locke1 on those very points1 on which the ,french philosophers most strangely profess to regard him as their great authority4 ,but it is surely very different from the system1 which they affect to found on it4 ,according to them1 sensation is not merely that primary affection of mind1 which gives occasion to our other feelings1 but is itself1 as variously composed or decomposed1 all the variety of our feelings4 8,if we consider10 says ,condillac1 in a paragraph1 which may be said to contain a summary of his whole doctrine1 with respect to the mind--8if we consider that to remember1 to compare1 to judge1 to distinguish1 to imagine1 to be astonished1 to have abstract ideas1 to have ideas of number and duration1 to know truths1 whether general or particular1 are but so many modes of being attentive2 that to have passions1 to love1 to hate1 to hope1 to fear1 to will1 are but so many different modes of desire2 and that attention1 in the one case1 and desire1 in the other case1 of which all these feelings are modes1 are themselves1 in their origin1 nothing more than modes of sensation1 we cannot but conclude1 that sensation involves in itself--enveloppe--all the faculties of the soul40#ace ,whatever we may think of this doctrine1 as true or false1 ingenious or absurd1 it seems1 at least1 scarcely possible1 that we should regard it as the doctrine of ,locke--of him1 who sets out1 with a primary division of our ideas1 into two distinct classes1 one class of which alone belongs to sensation2 and who considers even this class of our mere ideas1 not as involving all the operations of the mind with respect to them1 but only as the objects of the mind1 in these various operations2--as being what we compare1 not the very feeling of our comparison itself--the inducements to passion1 not what constitutes any of our passions1 as a state1 or series of states1 of the mind4 ,to render the paragraph1 which ,i have quoted from ,condillac1 at all accordant with the real doctrine of ,locke1 it would be necessary to reverse it1 in almost every proposition which it involves4 ,the doctrine1 then1 as exhibited by ,condillac and his followers1 whatever merit it may have in itself1 or however void it may be of merit of any kind1 is not the doctrine of him from whom it is said to be derived4 ,but its agreement or disagreement with the system of any other philosopher1 is comparatively1 of very little consequence4 ,the great question is1 whether it be just1--whether it truly have the merit of presenting a faithful picture of the mental phenomena1 which it professes to develope to us more clearly4 ,have we reason to believe1 then1 that all the various feelings of our mind1 which form the classification of its internal affections1 are merely1 to use ,condillac's phrase1 transformed sensations8 ,transformed sensations1 it is evident1 on his own principles1 though the phrase might seem vague and ambiguous1 in any other system1 can mean nothing more than sensations more or less lively1 or more or less complex4 ,it cannot signify any thing that is absolutely different or superadded2 for1 if there be any thing1 in any complex feeling of the mind1 which did not originally form a sensation1 or a part of a complex sensation1 this addition1 however slight1 is itself a proof1 that all the phenomena of the mind are not mere sensations1 variously repeated--that sensation1 in short1 does not 8involve0 all the affections and faculties of the soul4 ,is every feeling1 then1 in the whole series of our varied consciousness1 referable1 in all its parts1 to sensation1 as its original source8--not its source merely1 in one very evident respect1 as that which is1 in order1 truly primary to all our other feelings1 but as that which essentially constitutes them all1 in the same manner as the waters of the fountain are afterwards the very waters which flow along the mead8 ,to prove the affirmative of this1 it is astonishing1 with what readiness ,condillac1--who is generally regarded as a nice and subtile reasoner1 and who certainly1 as his work on that subject shows1 had studied with attention the great principles of logic1--passes from faculty to faculty1 and from emotion to emotion1 professing to find sensation everywhere1 without exhibiting to us even the semblance of what he seeks1 and yet repeating the constant affirmative1 that he has found it1--as if the frequent repetition1 were itself a proof of what is frequently repeated1--but proving only that the various feelings of the mind agree1 as might be supposed1 in being feelings of the mind--not that they agree in being sensations1 as that word is used by himself1 and as it is1 in common philosophic use1 distinguished from the other more general term4 ,except the mere frequency of the affirmation1 and the unquestionable priority in order of time1 of our sensations to our other feelings1--there is not the slightest evidence1 in his system1 of that universal transmutation which it affirms4 ,it may be necessary to mention1 that1 in these remarks on the system of the illustrious preceptor of the ,prince of ,parma1 ,i allude1 in particular1 to his ,treatise 8of ,sensations10 which contains his more mature opinions on the subject--not to his earlier work1 on the origin of human knowledge1 in which he has not ventured on so bold a simplification2 or at least1 has not expressed it in language so precise4 ,the great error of ,condillac1 as it appears to me1 consists in supposing that1 when he has shown the circumstance from which any effect results1 he has shown this result to be essentially the same with the circumstance which produced it4 ,certain sensations have ceased to exist1 certain other feelings have immediately arisen2--these new feelings are therefore the others under another shape4 ,such is the secret1 but very false1 logic1 which seems to pervade his whole doctrine on the subject4 ,if all that is meant were merely1 that whatever may be the varying feelings of the mind1 the mind itself1 in all this variety1 when it remembers or compares1 hates or loves1 is still the same substance1 as that which saw1 heard1 smelled1 tasted1 touched1 there could be nothing objectionable in the doctrine1 but there would then certainly be nothing new in it2--and1 instead of thinking either of ,locke or of ,condillac1 we might think1 at pleasure1 in stating such a doctrine of any of the innumerable assertors of the spirituality of the thinking principle4 ,such1 however1 is not the meaning of the ,french metaphysician4 ,he asserts this identity of substance1 indeed1 like the philosophers who preceded him1 but he asserts still more4 ,it is not the permanent substance of mind only which is the same4 ,its affections1 or states1 which seem1 in many respects1 absolutely different1 are the same as those very affections1 or states1 from which they seem to differ--and are the same1 merely because they have succeeded them2 for1 as ,i have already said1 except the frequency of his affirmation1 that they are the same1 there is no other evidence but that of the mere succession in order of time1 by which he attempts to substantiate their sameness4 ,the origin of this false reasoning ,i conceive to be the analogy of ,,matter1 to which his system1 by reducing all the affections of mind to that class which is immediately connected with external things1 must have led him to pay peculiar attention4 ,yet1 in justice to him1 ,i must remark1 that1 although a system which reduces every feeling to mere sensation1 and consequently connects every feeling1 in its origin1 with the qualities of matter1 must be favourable to materialism1 and has unquestionably fostered this1 in a very high degree1 in the ,french school of metaphysics1 there is no reason to consider ,condillac himself as a materialist2 on the contrary1 his works contain many very just remarks on the errors of materialism4 ,but still his system1 as ,i have said1 by leading him continually to our organs of sense1 and to the objects which act upon them1 must have rendered the phenomena of matter peculiarly apt to recur to his mind in all its speculations4 ,now1 in matter1 there can be no question as to the reality of that transmutation1 which1 as applied to mind1 forms the chief principle of his intellectual analysis4 ,in the chemistry of the material elements1 the compounds are the very elements themselves4 ,when any two substances1 present together1 vanish as it were from our view1 and a third substance1 whether like or unlike to either of the former1 presents itself in their place1 we believe this third substance1 however dissimilar it may appear1 to be only the coexistence of the two others2 and indeed1 since we have no reason to believe that any change takes place1 in the number of the corpuscles of which our planet is composed1 the whole series of its corpuscular changes can be only new combinations of particles that existed before4 ,the doctrine of ,pythagoras1 in its application to the material world1 is in this respect philosophically accurate3 ,tempus edax rerum1 tuque invidiosa vetustas ,omnia destruitis1 vitiataque dentibus vi ,paulatim lenta consumitis omnia morte4 ,nec species sua cuique manet2 rerumque novatrix ,ex aliis alias reparat natura figuras4 ,nec perit in toto quicquam1 mihi credite1 mundo1 ,sed variat faciemque novat2 nascique vocatur ,incipere esse aliud quam quod fuit ante1--morique ,desinere illud idem4 ,cum sint hue forsitan illa1 ,hc translata illuc1 summa tamen omnia constant4#acf ,with respect to the mere elements of matter1 therefore1 the present may be said1 and truly said1 to be exactly the past2 and1 in the whole series of phenomena of the material universe1 from the moment of its creation to this present moment1 there has been nothing new1 but mere changes of relative position4 ,this absolute sameness of result1 in all the apparent changes of matter1 ,condillac applies1 by a most unwarrantable extension1 to the mere affections of the mind2 and1 because two affections of mind are followed by a third1 he considers this third to be the two former co-existing1 or1 as he terms it1 transformed4 ,the feeling which follows another feeling1 however seemingly different1 is thus1 in his system1 the same1 because it results from it2 and it is very easy for him1 in this way1 to prove all our feelings to be sensations1 by this simplest of arguments1 that sensation was the first state induced in mind1 and that1 hence1 since all our other feelings1 of every species1 must have followed it1 they must have originated in it1 and therefore1 been this very sensation under a mere change of form4 ,it is number one of the long series2 and1 if number two be a transformed sensation1 because it results from number one1 which was a sensation1 number three must be equally so1 because it follows number two2 and thus1 successively1 the whole series4 ,i perceive a hare2 ,i perceive a sheep3--each of these separate states of my mind is a sensation4 ,i cannot attend to them long1 he says1 without comparing them1 and perceiving those circumstances of agreement1 which lead me to apply to both the word quadruped4 ,all this is most indubitably true4 ,it is impossible1 or1 at least1 it is not very common for us to observe any two animals long1 together1 without thinking of some of the circumstances in which they agree or differ4 ,the one state of mind is a consequence of the other state of mind4 ,but this is far from proving the comparison itself1 as a subsequent state or phenomenon of the mind1 to be the same mental state as the mere perception of the two animals which simply preceded it4 ,if the evidence of our consciousness is to be trusted1 it is very different2 and in what other evidence can the assertion of their sameness be founded8 ,we do not feel the state of mind1 which constitutes the comparison1 to be virtually equal to the two states of mind which constituted the separate perception1 as we feel the relation of virtual equality between our notion of the number eight1 and our notions of six and two combined2 the one feeling does not virtually comprehend the two others1 and it surely does not comprehend them in any grosser physical sense2 for there certainly is nothing in the absolute spiritual unity of our thinking principle which can lead us to believe that the state or affection of mind which constitutes the perception of a horse1 and the state or affection of mind which constitutes the perception of a sheep1 unite1 in that different state or affection of mind1 which constitutes the comparison of the two1 in the same manner as the solid chrystals of any salt unite1 in solution1 with the liquid which dissolves them4 ,they do not involve or constitute1 they merely give occasion to this third state1 and give occasion to it1 merely in consequence of the peculiar susceptibilities of the mind itself1 as formed1 by its divine ,author1 to be affected in this particular manner1 after being affected in those different manners1 which constitute the separate perceptions1 as sensation itself1 the primary feeling1 was made1 to depend on some previous organic affection produced by an external object4 ,it is not1 therefore1 as being susceptible of mere sensation1 but as being susceptible of more than mere sensation1 that the mind is able to compare its sensations with each other4 ,we may see1 and certainly do see1 objects together1 without forming uniformly the same comparison2 which could not be the case if the mere coexistence of the two perceptions constituted or involved the comparison itself4 ,in the case of a horse and sheep1 for example1 though these1 in the sensations which they excite1 cannot1 at different times1 be very different1 we compare1 at different times1 their colour1 their forms1 their magnitudes1 their functions1 and the uses to which we put them1 and we consider them as related in various other ways4 ,the perceptions being the same1 the comparisons1 or subsequent feelings of relation1 are different2 and though the relation cannot be felt but when both objects are considered together1 it is truly no part of the perception of each4 ,according to the ,french system1 the science1 which we now strangely regard as of difficult acquirement1 would be nothing more than the mere opening of our eyes4 ,were we to shew to a peasant1 absolutely unacquainted with the very elements of geometry1 diagrams representing two right angles1 and a plane triangle1 he might certainly1 though he could not give them names1 perceive these figures as clearly as the most expert mathematician4 ,every thing which mere sensation could produce1 in this case1 would be the same in both2 and nothing can be added to this primary sensation1 since every thing is said to be actually involved in the sensation itself4 ,yet1 with all his accurate perception of the figures1 however clear1 and vivid1 and lasting1 the peasant would not find1 in this immediate perception1 the equality of the two right angles taken together to the three angles of the triangle1 or any other geometrical relation4 ,the comparison1 then1 and the belief of an universal truth of proportion1 which results from that comparison1 are certainly something more than the mere sensation itself4 ,they are1 in short1 new states of mind1 as distinct from the mere perception of the figures in the diagram1 as the perception of a circle itself differs from the perception of a square4 ,to compare one animal with another1 is1 indeed1 to have different visual images2 but the mere coexistence of visual images is only a group1 larger1 or smaller1 as the images are more or fewer1 and all which transformation can do is to add to this group or take away from it4 ,innumerable objects may be1 and are1 continually present to us at once1 so as to produce one complex affection of mind1--fields1 groves1 mountains1 streams1--but the mere coexistence of these1 so as to form in our thought one scene1 involves no feeling of comparison2 and if the mind had not been susceptible of other affections than those of sense1 or of mere remembrance of the past objects of sense1 either in whole or in part1 it might1 when such a scene was present1 have existed forever in the state which forms the complex perception of the scene1 without the slightest notion of the ,,relation of its parts to the whole1 or to each other4 ,when ,i thus attempt to prove1 by so many wearying arguments1 that the feeling which constitutes our comparison of our sensations1 or1 in other words1 our belief of their agreement or disagreement1 is itself a state of mind1 different from either of the separate sensations which we compare1 and different from both1 as merely coexisting1 ,i cannot but feel1 what many of you have probably felt already1 as if ,i were labouring to demonstrate a mere truism4 ,indeed1 when ,i consider the argument as any thing more1 it is necessary for me to call to mind the great name1 and great talents1 of the author whose system ,i oppose1--the praise which the system has received1 of extreme subtlety of analysis1 combined with extreme simplicity1 and its wide diffusion1 as the universal1 or nearly universal1 metaphysical creed1 of one of the most enlightened nations of ,europe4 ,but for these remembrances1 ,i must confess1 that the system which supposes our comparison to be the ideas compared1 and nothing more1 as if these had flowed together into one1 would appear to me to correspond almost exactly with an ironical theory of the same process1 and1 indeed1 of all the intellectual processes1 proposed in our own country1--not in the ,essay on ,human ,understanding1 but in a very different work1--a theory which supposes comparison1 or judgment1 to be only the conflux of two ideas1 in one propositional canal4 8,simple ideas are produced by the motion of the spirits in one simple canal3 when two of these canals disembogue themselves into one1 they make what we call a proposition3 and when two of these propositional channels empty themselves into a third1 they form a syllogism1 or a ratiocination4 ,memory is performed in a distinct apartment of the brain1 made up of vessels similar1 and like situated to the ideal1 propositional1 and syllogistical vessels1 in the primary parts of the brain4 ,after the same manner1 it is easy to explain the other modes of thinking2 as also why some people think so wrong and perversely1 which proceeds from the bad configuration of those glands4 ,some1 for example1 are born without the propositional or syllogistical canals2 in others1 that reason ill1 they are of unequal capacities2 in dull fellows1 of too great a length1 whereby the motion of the spirits is retarded2 in trifling geniuses1 weak and small2 in the over-refining spirits1 too much intorted and winding2 and so of the rest40#acg ,in examining the system of ,condillac1 which must certainly be allowed to bear a considerable resemblance to this system1 ,i have instanced the feeling of relation1 in comparison1 merely as being one of the simplest examples which ,i could select4 ,i might1 with equal reason1 have instanced other states of mind2 in particular1 all the variety of our emotions1--astonishment or desire1 for example1 which are as little sensations1 in the philosophical meaning of the term1 as they are fear or sorrow4 ,the feeling of pleasure1 in all its degrees of vividness or faintness1 is a state of mind very different from that which constitutes desire of the recurrence of its object2 for1 otherwise1 the desire would be itself the very gratification1 which it supposes to be absent4 ,it is induced1 indeed1 by the remembrance of the pleasure2 but it is a consequence of the remembrance1 not a part of it4 ,it is like that general activity of life1 to which amid the mild breathings of spring1 the torpid animal awakes1 that1 in continual winter would have slumbered forever in insensibility1--or1 like the bud1 which1 without warmth and moisture1 never could have burst from the leafless stem2 but which is still1 in itself1 something very different from the sunshine and the shower4 ,it seems to me not improbable1 that the error of ,condillac1 and of the other ,french metaphysicians1 who have adopted his leading doctrine1 may have arisen in part1 or1 at least1 may have escaped detection more readily1 from the ambiguous signification of the word sentir1 which is a verb originally1 indeed1 and strictly expressive of mere sensation2 but applied also1 by a sort of metaphorical extension1 to our emotions and other affections of mind1 that do not originate directly like sensation1 in an external cause4 ,though this mere arbitrary word1 however1 may be applicable to a variety of feelings1 it does not1 therefore1 follow1 that these are all modifications of that small class of feelings1 to which the word was1 in its primary sense1 confined1--any more than from the still wider use1 in our language1 of the term feeling1 as applicable to all the states of the mind1 it would follow1 that these are all modes of affection of our sense of touch4 ,still1 however1 ,i cannot but think1 that1 if the term sentir had been of less vague application1 a mind1 so acute as that of ,condillac1 could not have failed to discover1 in the imaginary proof which he offers of the intellectual transmutations of his simple and universal principles1 those unwarrantable assumptions1 which1 even to humbler minds1 seem so obvious1 as scarcely to require for the detection of them1 many moments' thought4 ,these observations1 ,i flatter myself1 have shown sufficiently the error of the system1 which would convert all our feelings into sensations1 in some indescribable state of metamorphosis4 ,the system1 ,i confess1 appears to me a very striking example of an extreme1 into which we are more apt to fall1 from the very false notion1 that it is characteristic of philosophic genius1--the extreme of excessive simplification1--which is evil1 not merely as being false in itself1 but1 ,i may remark also1 as being productive of the very confusion1 to which simplicity is supposed to be adverse4 ,when we think of love1 or hate1 or fear1 or hope1 as fundamentally and truly nothing more than affections of external sense1 we try to recognize the original sensations of smell1 taste1 hearing1 touch1 and sight1 which have been transformed into them2 but we try in vain to recognize what is essentially different1 and lose ourselves1 therefore1 in the attempt4 ,we perceive every thing1 as it were1 through a mist1 which it is impossible for our vision to penetrate1 and we are at least as much perplexed by having only one object to seek amid the multitude1 as if we considered all the phenomena of mind1 without any classification whatever4 ,before closing this slight review of the theory of transformed sensations1 ,i must remark1 that1 even though it were strictly true1 that all the feelings of the mind1 if considered simply as feelings of the mind1 are mere sensations varied or transformed by some strange internal process1 undescribed and indescribable1--still1 in conformity with every just principle of philosophizing1 it would be necessary to form two classes of these mental phenomena1 corresponding with the primary classification which we have made of them4 ,that the mind should begin immediately to exist in a certain state1 in consequence of the presence of external objects1 so that it would not1 at that moment1 have existed in that state1 but for the presence of the external object1 is a proof of one set of laws1 which connect mind directly and immediately with matter4 ,that it should afterwards begin to exist in a similar state1 without the recurrence of any external cause whatever1 in consequence of its own susceptibilities only1 is a proof of another set of laws peculiar to the mind itself4 ,the complete difference of the cause1 in the two instances1 would justify1 or rather require a different arrangement of the effect2 as1 when the same motion of a piece of iron is produced1 at one time by impulse1 at another by the presence of a magnet1 at another by its mere gravity1 we consider the motion1 though itself the same in velocity and direction1 as referable to different physical powers4 ,with the same states of mind variously produced1 we should still have to speak of external and internal mental susceptibilities of affection1 as1 with the same motions of a piece of iron variously produced1 we speak of magnetism1 impulse1 gravitation4 ,the very celebrated system which ,i have now been combating1--a system1 which1 by the universality of transmutation supposed in it1 truly deserves the name of intellectual alchymy1--may then be regarded as exemplifying one species of error in arrangement1--the error of a simplification beyond what the phenomena allow4 ,this species of error1 in the philosophy of mind1 has not prevailed very generally in our country1--by far the more general tendency1 especially on this part of the island1 being to excessive amplification4 ,instead of wasting the labour of our analysis on elements that do not admit of any further decomposition1 we have given up this labour too soon1 and have classed1 in many cases1 as ultimate principles1 what appear to me to be susceptible of still nicer analysis4 ,the phenomena of mind are1 accordingly1 in the general technical language of the science1 referred by us to many powers1 which ,i cannot but think1 are not so different as to furnish ground of ultimate distinction1 but are truly only varieties of a few more simple powers or susceptibilities4 ,while ,i am far from conceiving1 therefore1 with ,condillac and his followers1 that all our states of mind are mere sensations modified or transformed1 since this belief appears to me to be a mere assumption without even the slightest evidence in our consciousness1 ,i am equally unwilling to admit the variety of powers1 of which ,dr ,reid speaks4 ,in one sense1 indeed1 the susceptibilities1 or powers1 which the mind possesses1 may be said1 with propriety1 to be still more numerous1--as numerous as its feelings themselves1--for it must never be forgotten1 that what we term classes1 are only words of our own invention1--that the feelings which we arrange as belonging to one class1 are truly different in themselves1 precisely in the same manner as the feelings arranged in different classes are reciprocally different1--that each feeling is1 and must be1 indicative of a peculiar susceptibility of being affected in that particular manner1--and that the mind has1 therefore1 truly1 as many susceptibilities1 as1 in various circumstances1 it can have different feelings4 ,but still1 when we arrange these different phenomena in certain classes1 it is an error in classification to give a new name to varieties that can be referred to other parts of the division already made2 and it is on this account ,i object to the unnecessary amplification of our intellectual systems1 in arranging the phenomena of mind under so many powers as those of which we are accustomed to speak4 ,our various states or affections of the mind1 ,i have already divided into two classes1 according to the nature of the circumstances which precede them1--the ,external and the ,internal1--and this latter class into two orders1--our ,intellectual ,states of ,mind1 and our ,emotions4 ,it is with the intellectual phenomena that we are at present concerned2 and this order ,i would arrange under two generic capacities1 that appear to me to comprehend or exhaust the phenomena of the order4 ,the whole order1 as composed of feelings1 which arise immediately1 in consequence of certain former feelings of the mind1 may be technically termed1 in reference to these feelings which have induced them1 ,suggestions2 but1 in the suggested feelings themselves1 there is one striking difference4 ,if we analyse our trains of intellectual thought exclusively of the ,emotions which may coexist or mingle with them1 and of sensations that may be accidentally excited by external objects1 we shall find them to be composed of two very distinct sets of feelings1--one set of which are mere conceptions or images of the past1 that rise1 image after image1 in regular sequence1 but simply in succession1 without any feeling of relation necessarily involved1--while the perceptions of relation1 in the various objects of our thought1 form another set of feelings1 of course as various as the relations perceived4 ,conceptions and relations1--it is with these1 and with these alone1 that we are intellectually conversant4 ,there is thus an evident ground for the arrangement of the internal suggestions1 that form our trains of thought1 under two heads1 according as the feeling excited directly by some former feeling1 may be either a simple conception1 in its turn1 perhaps1 giving place to some other conception as transient2 or may be the feeling of a relation which two or more objects of our thought are considered by us as bearing to each other4 ,there is1 in short1 in the mind1 a capacity of association2 or as1 for reasons afterwards to be stated1 ,i would rather term it1--the capacity of ,simple ,suggestion1--by which feelings1 formerly existing1 are revived1 in consequence of the mere existence of other feelings1 as there is also a capacity of feeling resemblance1 difference1 proportion1 or relation in general1 when two or more external objects1 or two or more feelings of the mind itself1 are considered by us1--which mental capacity in distinction from the former1 ,i would term the capacity of ,relative ,suggestion2 and of these simple and relative suggestions1 our whole intellectual trains of thought are composed4 ,as ,i am no lover of new phrases1 when the old can be used without danger of mistake1 ,i would very willingly1 substitute for the phrase relative suggestion1 the term comparison1 which is more familiar1 and expresses very nearly the same meaning4 ,but comparison1 though it involve the feeling of relation1 seems to me also to imply a voluntary seeking for some relation1 which is far from necessary to the mere internal suggestion or feeling of the relation itself4 ,the resemblance of two objects strikes me1 indeed1 when ,i am studiously comparing them2 but it strikes me also1 with not less force1 on many other occasions1 when ,i had not previously been forming the slightest intentional comparison4 ,i prefer1 therefore1 a term which is applicable alike to both cases1 when a relation is sought1 and when it occurs1 without any search or desire of finding it4 ,the term judgment1 in its strict philosophic sense1 as the mere perception of relation1 is more exactly synonymous with the phrase which ,i have employed1 and might have been substituted with safety1 if the vulgar use of the term1 in many vague significations1 had not given some degree of indistinctness even to the philosophical use of it4 ,i may remark1 too1 that in our works of logic and intellectual physiology1 judgment and reasoning are usually discussed separately1 as if there were some essential difference of their nature2 and1 therefore1 since ,i include them both1 in the relative suggestions of which ,i shall afterwards have to treat1 it seems advisable1 not to employ for the whole1 a name which is already appropriated1 and very generally limited1 to a part4 ,as the rise in the mind of the feeling of relation1 from the mere perception or conception of objects1 is1 however1 what ,i mean to denote by the phrase ,relative ,suggestion2 and as judgment1 in its strictest sense1 is nothing more than this feeling of relation1--of any two or more objects1 considered by us together1--,i shall make no scruple1 to use the shorter and more familiar term1 as synonymous1 when there can be no danger of its being misunderstood4 ,the intellectual states of the mind1 then1 to give a brief illustration of my division1 ,i consider as all referable to two generic susceptibilities1--those of ,simple ,suggestion and ,relative ,suggestion4 ,our perception or conception of one object excites1 of itself1 and without any known cause1 external to the mind1 the conception of some other object1 as when the mere sound of our friend's name1 suggests to us the conception of our friend himself1--in which case1 the conception of our friend1 which follows the perception of the sound1 involves no feeling of any common property1 with the sound which excites it1 but is precisely the same state of mind1 which might have been induced1 by various other previous circumstances1 by the sight of the chair on which he sat1--of the book which he read to us1--of the landscape which he painted4 ,this is ,simple ,suggestion4 ,but1 together with this capacity of ,simple ,suggestion1 by which conception after conception arises in the mind1--precisely in the same manner1 and in the same state1 as each might have formed a part of other trains1 and in which the particular state of mind that arises by suggestion does not necessarily involve any consideration of the state of mind which preceded it1--there is a suggestion of a very different sort1 which1 in every case1 involves the consideration1 not of one phenomenon of mind1 but of two or more phenomena1 and which constitutes the feeling of agreement1 disagreement1 or relation of some sort4 ,i perceive1 for example1 a horse and a sheep at the same moment4 ,the perception of the two is followed by that different state of mind which constitutes the feeling of their agreement in certain respects1 or of their disagreement in certain other respects4 ,i think of the square of the hypotenuse of a rightangled triangle1 and of the squares of the two other sides2--,i feel the relation of equality4 ,i see a dramatic representation2 ,i listen to the cold conceits which the author of the tragedy1 in his omnipotent command over warriors and lovers of his own creation1 gives to his hero1 in his most impassioned situations2--,i am instantly struck with their unsuitableness to the character and the circumstances4 ,all the intellectual successions of feeling1 in these cases1 which constitute the perception of relation1 differ from the results of simple suggestion in necessarily involving the consideration of two or more objects or affections of mind that immediately preceded them4 ,i may think of my friend1 in the case of simple suggestion1--that is to say1 my mind may exist in the state which constitutes the conception of my friend1 without that previous state which constitutes the perception of the sound of his name2 for the conception of him may be suggested by various objects and remembrances4 ,but ,i cannot1 in the cases of relative suggestion1 think of the resemblance of a horse and a sheep2 of the proportion of the squares of the sides of a right-angled triangle2 or of the want of the truth of nature in the expressions of a dramatic hero1 without those previous states of mind1 which constitute the conceptions of a horse and a sheep--of the sides of the triangle1--or of the language of the warrior or lover1 and the circumstances of triumph1 or hope1 or despair1 in which he is exhibited to us by the creative artist4 ,with these two capacities of suggested feelings1 simple and relative1 which are all that truly belong to the class of intellectual states of the mind1--various emotions may concur1 particularly that most general of all emotions1 the emotion of desire1 in some one or other of its various forms4 ,according as this desire does or does not concur with them1 the intellectual states themselves appear to be different2 and1 by those who do not make the necessary analysis1 are supposed1 therefore1 to be indicative of different powers4 ,by simple suggestion1 the images of things1 persons1 events1 pass in strange and rapid succession2 and a variety of names1 expressive of different powers1--conception1 association1 memory1--have been given to this one simple law of our intellectual nature4 ,but1 when we wish to remember some object2 that is to say1 when we wish our mind to be affected in that particular manner1 which constitutes the conception of a particular thing1 or person1 or event1--or when we wish to combine new images1 in some picture of fancy1 this coexistence of desire1 with the simple course of suggestion1 which continues still to follow its own laws1 as much as when no desire existed with it1--seems to us to render the suggestion itself different2 and recollection1 and imagination or fancy1 which are truly1 as we shall afterwards find1 nothing more than the union of the suggested conceptions1 with certain specific permanent desires1 are to us1 as it were1 distinct additional powers of our mind1 and are so arranged in the systems of philosophers1 who have not made the very simple analysis1 which alone seems to me to be necessary for a more precise arrangement4 ,in like manner1 those suggestions of another class1 which constitute our notions of proportion1 resemblance1 difference1 and all the variety of relations1 may1 as ,i have already remarked1 arise1 when we have had no previous desire of tracing the relations1 or may arise after that previous desire4 ,but1 when the feelings of relation seem to us to arise spontaneously1 they are not in themselves1 different from the feelings of relation1 that arise1 in our intentional comparisons or judgments1 in the longest series of ratiocination4 ,of such ratiocination1 they are truly the most important elements4 ,the permanent desire of discovering something unknown1 or of establishing1 or confuting1 or illustrating1 some point of belief or conjecture1 may coexist1 indeed1 with the continued series of relations that are felt1 but does not alter the nature of that law1 by which these judgments1 or relative suggestions1 succeed each other4 ,there is no power to be found1 but only the union of certain intellectual states of the mind1 with certain desires1--a species of combination not more wonderful in itself1 than any other complex mental state1 as when we1 at the same moment1 see and smell a rose1--or listen to the voice of a friend1 who has been long absent from us1 and see1 at the same moment1 that face of affection1 which is again giving confidence to our heart1 and gladness to our very eyes4 ,our intellectual states of mind1 then1 are either those resemblances of past affections of the mind1 which arise by simple suggestion1 or those feelings of relation1 which arise by what ,i have termed relative suggestions1--the one set resulting1 indeed1 from some prior states of the mind1 but not involving necessarily1 any consideration of these previous states of mind1 which suggested them1--the other set1 necessarily1 involving the consideration of two or more objects1 or two or more affections of mind1 as subjects of the relation which is felt4 ,how readily all the intellectual states of mind1 which are commonly ascribed to a variety of powers1 may be reduced to those two1 will appear more clearly1 after we have considered and illustrated the phenomena of each set4 ,i shall proceed1 therefore1 in the first place1 to the phenomena of simple suggestion1 which are usually referred to a principle of association in our ideas4 ,,footnotes3 #ace ,traite des ,sensations1 ,part ,i4 ,chap4 vii4 ,sect4 #b4 #acf ,ovid4 ,metamorph4 ,lib4 ,,xv4 v4 #bcd-f1 and #beb-h4 #acg ,mart4 ,scrib4 c4 xii4 ,,lecture ,,xxxiv4 ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,internal ,,affections ,,of ,,mind1 ,,continued1--,,on ,,simple ,,suggestion1--,,advantages ,,resulting ,,from ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,suggestion1--,,on ,,mr ,,hume',s ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,associate ,,feelings4 ,gentlemen1 my general arrangement of the various phenomena1 or states of the mind1 is1 ,i trust1 now sufficiently familiar to you4 ,we know the mind only in the succession of these states1 as they vary1 from moment to moment2 and you have learned to class them1 as1 in the first place1 ,external or ,internal ,affections1 according as the mental changes of state that are induced1 have arisen immediately from the presence of external objects1 or from some preceding state of the mind itself1--and the latter of these classes1 you have learned also to subdivide into its two distinct orders of ,intellectual ,states of the ,mind and ,emotions4 ,thus far we have proceeded1 ,i trust1 without much risk of misconception4 ,in my last ,lecture1 ,i proceeded to consider the former of these orders1 and arranged all the variety of our ,intellectual ,states of ,mind under two generic capacities1--those of ,simple and of ,relative suggestion4 ,intellectually1 we conceive or we judge2 our past feelings1 in ,simple ,suggestion1 of image after image1 arise again1 in colours more or less faint1 without any known cause exterior to the mind4 ,by our capacity of the other species of ,suggestion1 we are impressed with feelings of a different order1 that arise when two or more objects are contemplated together1--feelings of their agreement1 proportion1 or some one or other of the variety of their relations4 ,of these two orders of feelings1 and of these alone1 consists the whole varied tissue of our trains of thought4 ,all the intellectual powers1 of which writers on this branch of science speak1 are1 as we shall find1 only modes of these two1 as they exist simply1 or as they exist in combination with some desire more or less permanent1--with the desire of prosecuting a continued inquiry1 for example1 or of evolving its results to others1--as in the long series of our ratiocination2 or of framing some splendid succession of images and incidents1 as in the magic pictures of poetry and romance4 ,the simplification may1 perhaps1 at present appear to you excessive2 but ,i flatter myself1 that after the two generic capacities themselves shall have been fully considered by us1 it will not appear to you more than is absolutely necessary for accuracy of analysis and arrangement4 ,,simple ,,suggestion4 ,the intellectual phenomena which we are1 in the first place1 to consider1 then1 are those of ,simple ,suggestion1 which are usually classed under the general term of the ,association of ,ideas1--a term employed to denote that tendency of the mind1 by which feelings1 that were formerly excited by an external cause1 arise afterwards1 in regular successions to each other1 as it were spontaneously1 or at least without the immediate presence of any known external cause4 ,the limitation of the term1 however1 to those states of mind1 which are exclusively denominated ideas1 has1 ,i conceive1 tended greatly to obscure the subject1 or at least to deprive us of the aid which we might have received from it in the analysis of many of the most complex phenomena4 ,the influence of the associating principle itself extends1 not to ideas only1 but to every species of affection of which the mind is susceptible4 ,our internal joys1 sorrows1 and all the variety of our emotions1 are capable of being revived in a certain degree by the mere influence of this principle1 and of blending with the ideas or other feelings which awakened them1 in the same manner as our conceptions of external things4 ,these last1 however1 it must be admitted1 present the most striking and obvious examples of the influence of the principle1 and are1 therefore1 the fittest for illustrating it4 ,the faint and shadowy elements of past emotions1 as mingling in any present feeling1 it may not be easy to distinguish2 but our remembrances of things without are clear and definite1 and are easily recognized by us as images of the past4 ,we have seen1 in the history of our senses1 by what admirable means ,nature has provided for communicating to man those first rude elements of knowledge1 which are afterwards to be the materials of his sublimest speculations1--and with what still more admirable goodness she has ministered to his pleasure in these primary elements of thought1 and in the very provision which she has formed for the subsistence of his animal frame1--making the organs by which he becomes acquainted with the properties of external things1 not the fountain of knowledge only1 but an ever-mingling source of enjoyment and instruction4 ,it is through the medium of perception1 as we have seen1--that is to say1 through the medium of those sensitive capacities already so fully considered by us1--that we acquire our knowledge of the properties of external things4 ,but if our knowledge of these properties were limited to the moment of perception1 and were extinguished forever with the fading sensation from which it sprang1 the acquisition of this fugitive knowledge would be of little value4 ,we should still1 indeed1 be sensible of the momentary pleasure or pain2 but all experience of the past1 and all that confidence in the regular successions of future events1 which flows from experience of the past1 would of course1 be excluded by universal and instant forgetfulness4 ,in such circumstances1 if the common wants of our animal nature remained1 it is evident1 that even life itself1 in its worst and most miserable state1 could not be supported2 since1 though oppressed with thirst and hunger1 and within reach of the most delicious fruits and the most plentiful spring-water1 we should still suffer without any knowledge of the means by which the suffering could be remedied4 ,even if1 by some provision of ,nature1 our bodily constitution had been so framed1 as to require no supply of subsistence1 or if1 instinctively and without reflection1 we had been led on the first impulse of appetite1 to repair our daily waste1 and to shelter ourselves from the various causes of physical injury to which we are exposed1 though our animal life might then have continued to be extended to as long a period as at present1 still1 if but a succession of momentary sensations1 it would have been one of the lowest forms of mere animal life4 ,it is only as capable of looking before and behind1--that is to say1 as capable of those spontaneous suggestions of thought which constitute remembrance and foresight1--that we rise to the dignity of intellectual being1 and that man can be said to be the image of that ,purest of ,intellects1 who looks backward and forward1 in a single glance1 not on a few years only1 but on all the ages of eternity4 8,deum te scito esse10 says ,cicero1 in allusion to these powers1--8,deum te scito esse1 siquidem ,deus est1 qui viget1 qui sentit1--qui meminit1 qui prvidet1 qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus1 cui prpositus est1 quam hunc mundum princeps ille ,deus40 8,were it not so1 the ,soul1 all dead and lost1 ,as the fix'd stream beneath the impassive frost1#ach ,form'd for no end1 and impotent to please1 ,would lie inactive on the couch of ease2 ,and1 heedless of proud fame's immortal lay1 ,sleep all her dull divinity away40#aci ,without any remembrance of pleasures formerly enjoyed1 or of sorrows long past and long endured1--looking on the persons and scenes which had surrounded us from the first moment of our birth1 as if they were objects altogether unknown to us1--incapable even of as much reasoning as still gleams through the dreadful stupor of the maniac1--or of conveying even that faint expression of thought with which the rudest savages1 in the rudest language1 are still able to hold some communication of their passions or designs2--such1 but for that capacity which we are considering1 would have been the deplorable picture of the whole human race4 ,what is now revered by us as the most generous and heroic virtue1 or the most profound and penetrating genius1 would have been nothing more than this wretchedness and imbecility4 ,it is the suggesting principle1 the reviver of thoughts and feelings which have passed away1 that gives value to all our other powers and susceptibilities1 intellectual and moral--not indeed1 by producing them1 for1 though unevolved1 they would still1 as latent capacities1 be a part of the original constitution of our spiritual nature1--but by rousing them into action1 and furnishing them with those accumulating and inexhaustible materials1 which are to be the elements of future thought and the objects of future emotion4 ,every talent by which we excel1 and every vivid feeling which animates us1 derive their energy from the suggestions of this ever-active principle4 ,we love and hate1--we desire and fear1--we use means for obtaining good1 and avoiding evil1--because we remember the objects and occurrences which we have formerly observed1 and because the future1 in the similarity of the successions which it presents1 appears to us only a prolongation of the past4 ,in conferring on us the capacity of these spontaneous suggestions1 then1 ,heaven has much more than doubled our existence2 for1 without it1 and consequently without those faculties and emotions which involve it1 existence would scarcely have been desirable4 ,the very importance of the benefits which we derive from it1 however1 renders us perhaps less sensible of its value2 since it is so mingled1 with all our knowledge1 and all our plans of action1 that we find it difficult to conceive a state of sentient being1 of which it is not a part1 and to estimate1 consequently1 at a just amount1 the advantage which it affords4 ,the future memory of perception seems to us almost implied in perception itself2 and to speculate on that strange state of existence which would have been the condition of man1 if he had been formed without the power of remembrance1 and capable only of a series of sensations1 has1 at first1 an appearance almost of absurdity and contradiction1 as if we were imagining conditions which were in their nature incompatible4 ,yet1 assuredly1 if it were possible for us to consider such a subject a priori1 the real cause of wonder would appear to be1 not in the absence of the suggestions of memory1 as in the case1 imagined1 but in that remembrance of which we have the happy experience4 ,when a feeling1 of the existence of which consciousness furnishes the only evidence1 has passed away so completely1 that not even the slightest consciousness of it remains1 it would surely1--but for that experience1--be more natural to suppose that it had perished altogether1 than that it should1 at the distance of many years1 without any renewal of it by the external cause which originally produced it1 again start1 as it were of itself1 into being4 ,to foresee that which has not yet begun to exist1 is1 in itself1 scarcely more unaccountable1 than to see as it were before us1 what has wholly ceased to exist4 ,the present moment is all of which we are conscious1 and which can strictly be said to have a real existence1 in relation to ourselves4 ,that mode of time1 which we call the past1 and that other mode of time1 which we call the future1 are both equally unexisting4 ,that the knowledge of either should be added to us1 so as to form a part of our present consciousness1 is a gift of ,heaven1 most beneficial to us indeed1 but most mysterious1 and equally1 or nearly equally mysterious1 whether the unexisting time1 of which the knowledge is indulged to us1 be the future or the past4 ,the advantage which we derive from the principle of suggestion1 it must1 however1 be remarked1 consists1 not in its mere revival of thoughts and feelings1 of which we had before been conscious1 but in its revival of these in a certain order4 ,if past objects and events had been suggested to us again1 not in that series1 in which they had formerly occurred1 nor according to any of those relations1 which human discernment has been able to discover among them1 but in endless confusion and irregularity1 the knowledge thus acquired1 however gratifying as a source of mere variety of feeling1 would avail us little1 or rather would be wholly profitless1 not merely in our speculative inquiries as philosophers1 but in the simplest actions of common life4 ,it is quite evident1 that1 in this case1 we should be altogether unable to turn our experience to account1 as a mode of avoiding future evil or obtaining future good2 because1 for this application of our knowledge1 it would be requisite that events1 before observed1 should occur to us1 at the time1 when similar events might be expected4 ,we refrain from tasting the poisonous berry1 which we have known to be the occasion of death to him who tasted it2 because the mere sight of it brings again before us the fatal event1 which we have heard or witnessed4 ,we satisfy our appetite with a salutary fruit1 without the slightest apprehension2 because its familiar appearance recals to us the refreshment1 which we have repeatedly received4 ,but1 if these suggestions were reversed1--if the agreeable images of health and refreshment were all that were suggested by the poisonous plant1 and pain1 and convulsions1 and death were the only images suggested by the sight of the grateful and nourishing fruit1 there can be no doubt1 to which of the two1 our unfortunate preference would be given4 ,to take the most familiar of all instances1--that of language1--which1 either as written or spoken1 is in such constant use1 and which is so essential1 not merely to our first advance1 from absolute barbarism1 but to the common domestic necessities1 even of barbarous life1 that1 without it1 we can scarcely conceive two individuals1 however rude1 to exist together1--this1 it is evident1 could not have been invented1--nor1 if invented1 could it serve any other purpose than to mislead1--if the words spoken were to have no greater chance of suggesting the meaning intended by the speaker1 than any other meaning1 which any other words of the language might be employed to denote4 ,what social affection could continue for an hour1 if the sight of a friend were to suggest1 in intimate combination1 not the kindnesses which he had conferred1 and all the enjoyments of which he had been the source1 but the malice1 and envy1 and revenge of some jealous and disappointed enemy8 ,he who has given us1 in one simple principle1 the power of reviving the past1 has not made his gift so unavailing4 ,the feelings1 which this wonderful principle preserves and restores1 arise1 not loosely and confusedly--for what is there in the whole wide scene of nature1 which does so occur8--but1 according to general laws or tendencies of succession1 contrived with the most admirable adaptation to our wants1 so as to bring again before us the knowledge formerly acquired by us1 at the very time when it is most profitable that it should return4 ,a value is thus given to experience1 which otherwise would not be worthy of the name2 and we are enabled to extend it almost at pleasure1 so as to profit1 not merely by that experience which the events of nature1 occurring in conformity with these general laws1 must at any rate have afforded to us1--but to regulate this very experience itself1--to dispose objects and events1 so that1 by tendencies of suggestion1 on the firmness of which we may put perfect reliance1 they shall give us1 perhaps at the distance of many years1 such lessons as we may wish them to yield1--and thus to invent and create1 in a great measure1 the intellectual and moral history of our future life1 as an epic or dramatic writer arranges at his will the continued scenes of his various and magnificent narrative4 ,i need not add1 that it is on this skilful management of the laws1 which regulate our trains of thought1 the whole theory and practice of education are founded2--that art1 which ,i have already repeatedly represented to you as the noblest of all the arts of man--itself the animating spirit of every other art--which exerts its own immediate operation1 not on lifeless things1 but on the affections and faculties of the soul itself--and which has raised us from the dust1 where we slept or trembled1 in sluggish1 yet ferocious ignorance1 the victims of each other1 and of every element around us1 to be the sharers and diffusers of the blessings of social polity1 the measurers of the earth and of the skies1 and the rational worshippers of that eternal ,being by whom they and we were created4 ,that there is a tendency of ideas to suggest each other1 without any renewed perception of the external objects which originally excited them1 and that the suggestion is not1 altogether loose and indefinite1 but that certain ideas have a peculiar tendency to suggest certain other relative ideas in associate trains of thought1 is too familiar to you1 as a general fact of our intellectual nature1 to require to be illustrated by example4 ,it has been beautifully compared1 by the most philosophic of our poets1 to the mutual influence of two sympathetic needles1 which ,strada1 in one of his ,prolusions1 availing himself of a supposed fact1 which was then believed1 or scarcely doubted by many philosophers1 makes the subject of verses1 supposed to be recited by ,cardinal ,bembo1 in the character of ,lucretius4 ,the needles were fabled to have been magnetized together1 and suspended over different circles1 so as to be capable of moving along an alphabet4 ,in these circumstances1 by the remaining influence of their original kindred magnetism1 they were supposed1 at whatever distance1 to follow each other's motions1 and pause accordingly at the same point2 so that1 by watching them at concerted hours1 the friends1 who possessed this happy telegraph1 were supposed to be able to communicate to each other their feelings1 with the same accuracy and confidence as when they were together4 8,for when the different images of things1 ,by chance combin'd have struck the attentive soul ,with deeper impulse1 or1 connected long1 ,have drawn his frequent eye2 howe'er distinct ,the external scenes1 yet oft the ideas gain ,from that conjunction an eternal tie ,and sympathy unbroken4 ,let the ,mind ,recal one partner of the various league1-- ,immediate1 lo6 the firm confederates rise1 ,and each his former station straight resumes2 ,one movement governs the consenting throng1 ,and all at once with rosy pleasure shine1 ,or all are sadden'd with the glooms of care4 ',twas thus1 if ancient fame the truth unfold1 ,two faithful needles1 from the informing touch ,of the same parent-stone1 together drew ,its mystic virtue1 and at first conspir'd ,with fatal impulse quivering to the pole1 ,then1 though disjoin'd by kingdoms1--though the main ,roll'd its broad surge betwixt1--and different stars ,beheld their wakeful motions1--yet preserv'd ,the former friendship1 and remember'd still ,the alliance of their birth4 ,whate'er the line ,which one possessed1 nor pause nor quiet knew ,the sure associate1 ere1 with trembling speed1 ,he found its path1 and fixed unerring there4 ,such is the secret union1 when we feel ,a song1 a flower1 a name1 at once restore ,those long connected scenes where first they mov'd ,the attention4 ,backward through her many walks1 ,guiding the wanton fancy to her scope1 ,to temples1 courts1 or fields1--with all the band ,of 7living7#adj forms1 of passions1 and designs1 ,attendant2 whence1 if pleasing in itself1 ,the prospect from that sweet accession gains ,redoubled influence o'er the listening ,mind4 ,by these mysterious ties1 the busy power ,of ,memory her ideal train preserves ,entire2 or1 when they would elude her watch1 ,reclaims their fleeting footsteps1 from the waste ,of dark ,oblivion40#ada ,what then are these mysterious ties8--or1 to state the question more philosophically1 what are the general circumstances which regulate the successions of our ideas8 ,that there is some regularity in these successions1 must1 as ,i have already remarked1 have been felt by every one2 and there are many references to such regularity in the works of philosophers of every age4 ,the most striking ancient reference1 however1 to any general circumstances1 or laws of suggestion1--though the innumeration of these is hinted1 rather than developed at any length1--is that which you will find in a passage1 quoted by ,dr ,beattie and ,mr ,stewart1 from ,aristotle4 ,it is a passage explanatory of the process by which1 in voluntary reminiscence1 we endeavour to discover the idea of which we are in search4 ,we are said to hunt for it--7 is the word in the original7--among other ideas1 either of objects existing at present1 or at some former time2 and from their resemblance1 contrariety1 and contiguity-- 1 1 ' 1 1 4 4#adb ,this brief enumeration of the general circumstances which direct us in reminiscence is worthy of our attention on its own account2 and is not less remarkable on account of the very close resemblance which it bears to the arrangement afterwards made by ,mr ,hume1 though there is no reason to believe that the modern philosopher was at all acquainted with the classification which had1 at so great a distance of time1 anticipated his own4 ,i must remark1 however1 that though it would be in the highest degree unjust to the well-known liberality and frankness of ,mr ,hume's character1 to suppose him to have been aware of any enumeration of the general circumstances on which suggestion appears to depend1 prior to that which he has himself given us1 his attempt was far from being so original as he supposed4 ,i do not allude merely to the passage of ,aristotle1 already quoted1 nor to a corresponding passage1 which ,i might have quoted1 from one of the most celebrated of his commentators1 ,dr ,thomas ,aquinas1 but to various passages which ,i have found in the works of writers of much more recent date1 in which the influence of resemblance and contiguity1 the two generic circumstances to which1 on his own principles1 his own triple division should have been reduced1 is particularly pointed out4 ,thus1 to take an example from an elementary work of a very eminent author1 ,ernesti1 published in the year #agcd1--;his ,initia ,doctrin ,solidioris1--with what precision has he laid down those very laws of association of which ,mr ,hume speaks4 ,after stating the general fact of suggestion1 or association1 under the ,latin term phantasia1 he proceeds to state the principles which guide it4 ,all the variety of these internal successions of our ideas1 he says1 may be reduced to the following law4 ,when one image is present in the mind1 it may suggest the image of some absent object--either of one that is similar in some respect to that already present--or of one of which the present is a part--or of one which has been present together with it on some former occasion4 8,hujus autem phantasi lex hc est2 ,prsentibus animo rerum imaginibus quibuscunque1 recurrere et redire ad animum possunt rerum absentium olimque perceptarum imagines1 prsentibus similes1 vel quarum1 qu sunt prsentes1 partes sunt1--vel denique1 quas cum prsentibus simul hausimus40#adc ,even the arrangement1 as stated by ,mr ,hume1 is not expressed in more formal terms4 ,but as it is to his arrangement the philosophers of our own country are accustomed to refer1 in treating of association1 the importance thus attached to it gives it a preferable claim to our fuller discussion4 ,it is stated by him briefly in two paragraphs of his ,essay on the ,association of ,ideas4 8,though it be too obvious to escape observation10 he says1 8that different ideas are connected together1 ,i do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association2 a subject1 however1 that seems worthy of curiosity4 ,to me there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas1 viz4 resemblance1 contiguity in time or place1 and cause or effect4 8,that these principles serve to connect ideas1 will not1 ,i believe1 be much doubted4 ,a picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original4 ,the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others4 ,and if we think of a wound1 we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it4 ,but that the enumeration is complete1 and that there are no other principles of association except these1 may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man's own satisfaction4 ,all we can do1 in such cases1 is to run over several instances1 and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other1--never stopping1 till we render the principle as general as possible4 ,the more instances we examine1 and the more care we employ1 the more assurance shall we acquire1 that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire40#add ,on these paragraphs of ,mr ,hume1 a few obvious criticisms present themselves4 ,in the first place1 however1 ,i must observe1--to qualify in some degree the severity of the remarks which may be made on his classification1--that it is evident1 from the very language now quoted to you1 that he is far from bringing forward his classification as complete4 ,he states1 indeed1 that it appears to him1 that there are no other principles of connexion among our ideas than the three which he has mentioned2 but he adds1 that though the reality of their influence as connecting principles will not1 he believes1 be much doubted1 it may still be difficult to prove1 to the satisfaction of his reader1 or even of himself1 that the enumeration is complete2 and he recommends1 in consequence1 a careful examination of every instance of suggestion1 in the successive trains of our ideas1 that other principles1 if any such there be1 may be detected4 ,but to proceed to the actual classification1 as presented to us by ,mr ,hume4 ,a note1 which he has added to the paragraph that contains his system1 affords perhaps as striking an instance as is to be found in the history of science of that illusion1 which the excessive love of simplicity tends to produce1 even in the most acute and subtile philosopher1 so as to blind1 to the most manifest inconsistencies1 in his own arrangement1 those powers of critical discernment which would have flashed instant detection on inconsistencies far less glaringly apparent in the speculations of another4 ,after stating1 that there appear to him to be only the three principles of connexion already mentioned1 ,mr ,hume adds1 in a note1--as an instance of other connexions apparently different from these three1 which may1 notwithstanding1 be reduced to them1-- 8,contrast or contrariety1 also1 is a species of connexion among ideas4 ,but it may perhaps be considered as a mixture of causation and resemblance4 ,where two objects are contrary1 the one destroys the other1 i4 e4 is the cause of its annihilation1 and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence40 ,when we hear or read for the first time this little theory of the suggestions of contrast1 there is1 perhaps no one who does not feel some difficulty in believing it to be a genuine speculation of that powerful mind which produced it4 ,contrast1 says ,mr ,hume1 is a mixture of causation and resemblance4 ,an object1 when contrasted with another1 destroys it4 ,in destruction there is causation2 and we cannot conceive destruction1 without having the idea of former existence4 ,thus1 to take an instance1--,mr ,hume does not deny1 that the idea of a dwarf may suggest1 by contrast1 the idea of a giant2 but he says that the idea of a dwarf suggests the idea of a giant1 because the idea of a dwarf destroys the idea of a giant1 and thus1 by the connecting principle of causation involved in all destruction1 may suggest the idea destroyed2 and he adds1 as an additional reason for the suggestion1 that the idea of the annihilation of a giant implies the idea of the former existence of a giant4 ,and all this strange and complicated analysis1--this explanation1 not of the obscurum per obscurius1 which is a much more intelligible paralogism1 but of the lucidum per obscurum1 is seriously brought forward by its very acute author1 as illustrating the simple and familiar fact of the suggestion of opposites1 in contrast1 by opposites4 ,in the first place1 ,i may remark1 that in ,mr ,hume's view of contrast1 it is not easy to discover what the resemblance is of which he speaks1 in a case in which the objects in themselves are said by him to be so contrary1 that the one absolutely destroys the other by this contrariety alone2 and1 indeed1 if there be truly this mixed resemblance in contrast1 what need is there of having recourse to annihilation or causation at all1 to account for the suggestion1 since the resemblance alone in this1 as in every other case1 might be sufficient to explain the suggestion1 without the necessity of any separate division2--as the likeness of a single feature in the countenance of a stranger1 is sufficient to bring before us in conception the friend whom he resembles1 though the resemblance be in the single feature only4 ,in the second place1 there is no truth1 if1 indeed1 there be any meaning whatever1 in the assertion that in contrast one of the objects destroys the other2 for1 so far is the idea of the dwarf from destroying the idea of the giant1 that1 in the actual case supposed1 it is the very reason of the existence of the second idea2 nay1 the very supposition of a perceived contrast implies that there is no such annihilation2 for both ideas must be present to the mind together1 or they could not appear either similar or dissimilar1 that is to say1 could not be known by us as contrasted1 or contrary1 in any respect4 ,it is1 indeed1 not very easy to conceive1 how a mind so acute as that of ,mr ,hume should not have discovered that grossest of all logical and physical errors1 involved in his explanation1 that it accounts for the existence of a feeling1 by supposing it previously to exist as the cause of itself4 ,if as he says1 the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence--an assertion which is by no means so favourable as he thinks to his own theory--it must surely be admitted1 that no annihilation can take place before the existence of that which is to be annihilated4 ,whether1 therefore1 we suppose1 that the idea of the dwarf1 which suggests the idea of the giant1 annihilates that idea1 or is itself annihilated by it1 the two ideas of the dwarf and the giant must have existed1 before the annihilation of either4 ,the suggestion1 in short1 which is the difficulty1 and the only difficulty to be explained1 must have completely taken place1 before the principle can even be imagined to operate1 on which the suggestion itself is said to depend4 ,such minute criticism1 however1 is perhaps more1 than it is necessary to give to a doctrine so obviously false1 even sanctioned as it is by so very eminent a name4 ,,footnotes3 #ach 8,like the tall cliff beneath the impassive frost40--,,orig4 #aci ,cawthorn4--,regulation of the ,passions1 c4 v4 #ae-bj4 #adj ,painted--,,orig4 #ada ,pleasures of ,imagination1 ,book ,,iii4 v4 #cab-ceb4 #adb ,aristot4 de ,memor4 and ,reminisc4 c4 ii4-v4 ,,ii4 p4 #hf4 ,edit4 ,du ,val4 #adc ,de ,mente ,humana1 ,c4 ,i4 ,sect4 xvi4 p4 #ach1 #aci4 #add ,hume's ,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,sect4 ,,iii4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,,first4 ,transcriber's notes3 ,obvious typos have been corrected1 but obsolete spellings have been retained 7e4g4 8develope01 8controul01 8recal074 ,italic text has been marked with underscores4 ,text originally in small capitals has been made ,,upper ,,case4 ,inconsistent hyphenation 7e4g4 8co-exist0 and 8coexist07 has been retained4 ,footnotes have been numbered consecutively and gathered at the end of each lecture4 ,the original edition sometimes lacked appropriate opening or closing quotation marks2 they have been added where evident based on other editions of the work4 ,greek characters follow the original and may contain diacritical errors4