,transcriber's note3 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 ,text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face 7bold74 ,sidenotes have been moved to precede their facing paragraphs1 and are indicated by double equal signs3 sidenote text4 ,greek words are shown in ,greek and then in ,english transliterations that are indicated by ,greek3 and were added by the transcribers4 ,accent mark errors in ,greek text have been remedied4 ,,theoretical ,,ethics by ,,milton ,,valentine1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4 ,d4 ,ex-,president of ,pennsylvania ,college1 and ,professor of ,theology in the ,lutheran ,theological ,seminary1 ,gettysburg1 ,pa41 ,author of ,natural ,theology or ,rational ,theism4 ,chicago ,scott1 ,foresman ,co4 #aijj ,copyright1 #ahig1 by ,scott1 ,foresman ,co4 ,press of ,the ,henry ,o4 ,shepard ,co4 ,chicago ,,preface4 ,ethical ,theory has felt the full force of recent scientific and philosophical agitation4 ,the earlier systems have been subject to earnest and continued discussion4 ,the severest tests available by the progress of knowledge have been applied to both their premises and their conclusions4 ,new theories1 based on changed conceptions of man and the world1 have been variously elaborated1 presenting greatly altered views of the whole phenomenon of morality4 ,while not overthrowing old views these have given instructive suggestions4 ,the ethical field has thus been largely re-surveyed1 and whatever light modern science and speculation have furnished has been thrown upon this great and unceasingly important subject4 ,in some respects the agitation has brought confusion and uncertainty4 ,the clash of theories has been disturbing4 ,but on the whole ethical philosophy has been the gainer4 ,the discussions have certified the immovable foundations and essential features of the moral system4 ,the fresh light from the advance of knowledge has proved1 as it always does1 not destructive1 but corrective and confirmatory4 ,the abiding truth has been shown and vindicated by the ordeal through which it has passed4 ,this volume is largely the outcome of the author's many years of class-room lecturing on the subject4 ,its object is to furnish for students and general readers a compendious view of the ethical facts and principles as the author believes them to be established by the best accredited knowledge and thought of our times4 ,there seems to be room for such a work4 ,the method is believed to give proper recognition to both the empirical and metaphysical sides of the subject4 ,starting from the universal phenomenon of moral distinctions in life1 it determines the conscience psychologically1 as a rationally intuitive power discerning the moral distinction and the reality and authority of moral law4 ,the implications of conscience and moral law necessarily become theistic4 ,the metaphysical examination finds for the real phenomena of the subjective faculty the objective and abiding reality of the ethical law which the faculty discerns1 and the right or morally good itself so perceived as consisting proximately in a conformity of conduct with the relations of life in which moral requirement meets human freedom1 and as ultimately grounded in the absolute and perfect source of the moral constitution of the universe4 ,the movement carries to the conclusion of eternal and immutable moral law4 ,the disclosures of revelation confirm the ethical law of the natural reason1 completing the moral view and supplying1 in the divine forces of ,christianity1 the proper dynamic for the realization of the ethical life4 ,the volume is humbly sent forth in the hope that it may contribute somewhat to the cause of truth and prove quickening to the life of duty and righteousness4 ,,gettysburg1 ,dec4 #a1 #ahif4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,definition ,,and ,,general ,,divisions4 ,,pages #a4 ,definition and ,statement of the ,subject-matter #ae-ag #b4 ,historical ,glance at the ,beginning and ,progress of the ,science #ag-bj #c4 ,theoretical and ,practical #bj-bc #d4 ,relations to ,psychology1 ,natural ,theology1 and ,christian ,theology #bc-bg ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,fact ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions4 #a4 ,revealed in ,personal ,consciousness #bh-bi #b4 ,incorporated in the ,social ,organism #bi #c4 ,witnessed to in ,history #bi-ca #d4 ,shown in the ,religious ,world #ca-cc #e4 ,pervades ,literature #cc-cd #f4 ,ethnic and ,anthropological ,information #cd-ce #g4 ,unaffected by ,theories of its ,cause or ,significance #ce-cf ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,faculty ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions--,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,conscience4 #a4 ,the ,importance of this ,question #cg-ci #b4 ,proofs of its ,existence #ci-ee #a4 ,the ,moral ,distinctions in ,personal ,consciousness and the ,world #ci-dj #b4 ,the ,peculiar ,character of its ,perceptions #dj-dd #c4 ,special ,feelings from its ,perceptions #dd-dg #d4 ,objection from ,diversity of ,moral ,judgments ,noticed #dg-ec #e4 ,these ,proofs ,independent of the ,mode of the ,origin of the ,power #ec-ee ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions--,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,conscience4 #a4 ,the ,importance of ,determining its ,nature #ef-ei #a4 ,for ,scientific ,accuracy #ef-eg #b4 ,as ,involving the ,authority of ,conscience #eg-ei #b4 ,a ,psychological ,question #ei #c4 ,conscience in place only in the ,total ,complex of ,man's ,psychical ,powers #ei-fb #d4 ,specific ,psychology of ,conscience #fb-gf #a4 ,perception of the ,ethical ,distinction #fb-fd #b4 ,perception of ,obligation #fd-fg #c4 ,identification of the ,moral ,quality in ,acts #fg-fh #d4 ,perception of ,merit and ,demerit #fh-gb #e4 ,emotions ,arising from these ,perceptions #gb-gf #e4 ,special ,characteristics ,disclosed #gf-hj #a4 ,conscience ,fundamentally ,intellectual #gf-gg #b4 ,moral ,quality its ,sole ,percept #gg-gh #c4 ,its ,action ,marked by ,necessity #gh-hj #f4 ,relation of ,phenomenalistic ,philosophy to this ,view #hj-hc #g4 ,effect of ,theistic ,evolution ,theory #hc-he ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,supremacy ,,of ,,conscience4 #a4 ,involved in the ,sphere of its ,judgments #hf-hg #b4 ,shown by the ,nature of its ,action #hg-hh #c4 ,the ,absurdity of a ,possible ,supremacy in any other ,faculty #hh-ib #d4 ,difficulties ,considered #ib-ii ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,moral ,,agency4 #a4 ,rational ,intelligence #ajb-ajd #b4 ,the ,conscience #ajd-aje #c4 ,free ,will #aje-aae #d4 ,powers of ,sensibility and ,action #aae-aah ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,right ,,and ,,wrong4 #a4 ,the ,source of ,doubt the ,relativity of ,knowledge #abj-abe #b4 ,positive ,statement of the ,reality #abe-abi #a4 ,the ,moral ,distinctions and ,qualities not merely ,subjective ,phenomena but ,objectively ,real for ,perception #abe-abf #b4 ,independent of the ,mental ,organization of the ,race #abg #c4 ,immutable and ,eternal #abg-abi #c4 ,the ,importance of this ,truth #abi-acj #d4 ,marks of the ,dividing ,line between ,true and ,false ,moral ,philosophies #acj-acb #e4 ,the ,relation of ,evolutionism to this ,reality #acb-acg #a4 ,theistic ,evolution #acb-acc #b4 ,atheistic and ,materialistic ,evolution #acc-acg ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,ground ,,of ,,right4 #a4 ,the ,question ,defined #ach-aci #b4 ,leading ,views and ,theories3 ,the ,egyptian ,teaching--,chinese--,indian--,persian-- ,greek--,roman--,divine ,absolutism--,civil ,authority--,utilitarianism--,evolutiona ry ,utilitarianism--,failure of ,utilitarianism-- ,plausible ,side of ,utilitarian ,theory-- ,theory of ,conformity to ,relations--,spiritual ,excellence ,theory--,theory of an ,imperative in its ,own ,right #adj-afg ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,ground ,,of ,,right--,,continued4 #a4 ,statement of ,proximate ,ground #afh-agh #a4 ,sustained by the ,moral ,consciousness in ,constant ,experience #aga-agb #b4 ,implied in the ,logical ,pre-suppositions to ,responsibility #agb-age #c4 ,verified in the ,character of the ,various ,virtues and their ,opposite ,immoralities #age-agf #d4 ,supported by ,analogy of ,organic and ,instinctive ,action #agf-agg #e4 ,assumed in the ,conceptions and ,language of ,common ,life #agh #b4 ,the ,ultimate ,ground #agh-aha ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,objects ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,judgment4 #a4 ,personal ,actions #ahb-ahg #b4 ,the ,various ,feelings1 ,passions1 and ,desires #ahg-aij #c4 ,intentions #aij-aia #d4 ,the ,activities and ,uses of the ,intellect #aia-aib #e4 ,acts of the ,will #aib-aie ,,chapter ,,xi ,,the ,,ethical ,,view ,,under ,,christian ,,teaching4 #a4 ,christianity ,recognizes the ,truths and ,principles ,established in ,true ,ethical ,science #aif-aig #b4 ,it ,contributes ,immensely to the ,ethical ,view #aig-bjj #c4 ,the ,two ,sources of the ,christian ,view #bjj-bje #a4 ,primarily1 the ,sacred ,scriptures #bja-bjd #b4 ,secondarily1 the ,christian ,moral ,consciousness #bjd-bje #d4 ,particular ,features of the ,christian ,view #bje-baf #a4 ,known ,duties ,made ,more ,distinct and ,definite #bje-bjf #b4 ,human ,relations ,better ,disclosed #bjf-bjh #c4 ,moral ,obligations ,disclosed as ,duties to ,god #bjh-baj #d4 ,guilt of ,offending against ,moral ,law #baj-bac #e4 ,the ,universalism of the ,moral ,law #bac-bae #f4 ,fulfilment ,requires ,regeneration #bae-baf ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,task ,,under ,,christianity4 #a4 ,helped by the ,completion of the ,ethical ,view #bai-bbj #b4 ,quickened by ,assurance of ,success #bbj-bbb #c4 ,the ,religious ,interest ,brought to ,reinforce the ,moral #bbb-bbd #d4 ,the ,enlightening and ,enforcing ,power of the ,holy ,spirit #bbd-bbe #e4 ,through ,spiritual ,regeneration #bbe-bbg ,,theoretical ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,definition ,,and ,,divisions4 ,ethics ,defined4 #a4 ,ethics is the science of rectitude and duty4 ,it treats of the right and its obligations4 ,its subject is morality4 ,its sphere is the sphere of virtuous conduct4 ,it covers a double range of inquiry1 as the subject-matter lies within or without the human constitution4 ,on the one side it investigates and sets forth the facts and laws of man's moral constitution2 on the other1 the nature and grounds of the distinction of right and wrong4 ,in the light of the whole investigation into these fundamental verities1 it determines the principles and rules of duty in the various relations of life4 ,it thus discovers and elucidates the underlying pre-suppositions and principles upon which the phenomena of moral discernment and obligation rest1 and on which man rises into the possibility and reality of character1 as his supreme distinction among the orders of existence on earth4 ,the inquiry throughout is conducted according to the scientific method of careful observation and analysis of the unquestionable facts concerned1 and an orderly presentation of their necessary logical implications and conclusions4 ,hence the product of the investigation1 as the systematized view of the facts1 with their underlying principles1 may justly be called1 as it usually is called1 moral science4 ,the term ,ethics1 which we thus use to designate this branch of study1 with its systematized truth1 is not employed with etymological strictness4 ,for it comes from the ,greek ,greek3 thos1 moral character1 which1 according to ,aristotle is derived from ,greek3 ethos custom1 under the notion that moral virtue is a product of repeated acts of voluntary preference4#a ,taken strictly this would build rectitude or the ethically right on the mere habits or usages of a people4 ,but this conception of the basis of virtue must not be included and carried into the scientific use of the word1 or be at all allowed to prejudice the final decision of this great question of the foundation of right1 in the end1 in the light of all the facts in the case4#b ,the ,latin equivalent for ,greek3 thos was mos1 with similar suggestion as to the nature of rectitude1 and human duty was treated under the head of ,de ,moribus4 ,cicero says3 ,quia pertinet ad mores1 quod ,greek3 thos illi vocant1 nos eam partem philosophi ,de ,moribus appellare solemus2 sed decet augentem linguam ,latinam nominare ,moralem4#c ,this suggestion of ,cicero has given the common ,english designation ,morals or ,moral ,philosophy4 ,recent usage1 however1 speaks of the study rather as moral science1 in harmony with the prevailing preference for the term science in all investigations conducted under the inductive method4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 as will appear1 largely a metaphysical and philosophical investigation1 and1 if classed as science1 must be counted as pre-eminently a philosophical science4 ,historical ,glance4 #b4 ,the beginning of the movement to give a systematic view of ethical truth may be traced to ,socrates4 ,the pre-,socratic philosophy failed to produce anything that can be called a system in this connection4 ,the difficulty in the way was not only the want of a scientific spirit at that period1 but especially the inadequate and false light in which human beings were viewed4 ,outside of the ,hebrew people there was little or no recognition of the freedom of man1 as man4 ,such freedom was denied both in thought and in life4 ,everywhere1 in ,india1 ,china1 and ,egypt1 as well as in ,greece and ,rome1 the immense mass of the population were in a condition of abject slavery1 regarded as chattels1 not amenable to the responsibilities of moral life4 ,only the free citizens were viewed as capable of virtue4 ,slavery was a part of the very conception of the ,state4 ,the essential characteristics and rights of humanity were not thought of as belonging to all men4 ,but moral life1 as will appear1 can exist only in the sphere of liberty4 ,even the most advanced philosophers of the ancient world extended the conception of moral manhood only to the free citizen1 the status of the rest not bringing them within the possibility of even civic virtue4 ,and even the so-called free citizen existed almost absolutely for the ,state4 ,his sacred selfhood disappeared under ownership by the ,government1 by which he was held and used as a machine for military service4 ,even long after ,socrates opened the way1 within this limited range1 toward some connected view of ethical life1 these disabling causes continued to distort and impede all efforts to systematize the principles which underlie and determine it4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 and the philosophers generally1 continued to know nothing of a morality for all human beings4#d ,it is to be remembered1 too1 that this tardy appearance of effort in scientific ethics is part of the wider fact1 that in that period of human history even the most advanced tribes and nations had not risen to science at all4 ,all knowledge was in the non-scientific form1 or only fragmentarily and inchoately adjusted4 ,the moral consciousness and personal virtues1 however1 of course existed1 as part of the normal constitution and practical activities of human life4 ,the various peoples had collections of moral precepts and rules for right living1 often bright with gems of ethical truth and beauty1 usually in close connection with religious beliefs and convictions2 but these were not based and unified on any underlying principles bringing them logically into compact and consistent system4 ,just as the facts and practices of religion existed1 in even rich luxuriance1 anterior to the appearance of speculative theologies1 and the phenomena of nature for long centuries preceded the formation of the natural sciences1 so the moral constitution of the race and practical morality existed long in advance of the explanations and systemization that create the science of ethics4 ,the history of the science does not come within the purpose of this work4 ,the greatness of the speculative and practical questions involved in the subject1 clearly and impressively apparent when once brought forward1 could not fail to awaken and hold the most earnest interest of the human mind4 ,they concerned the powers and possibilities of man in the crowning endowments of his nature1 and in the highest ascent of their evident intention and adaptation4 ,they touched the great problems of personal and social welfare in the most vital relations and decisive interests4 ,so the old sages became moralists and their great themes were the themes of virtue and duty4 ,not very deeply1 however1 did they1 for centuries1 succeed in penetrating the rational principles of the moral life and the authority of the moral judgments4 ,yet clear gems of thought and deep suggestion mark the pathway of their thinking4 ,in passing on1 and over from pagan into ,christian development1 the treatment was mostly in connection with religious truths1 and as involved in theological doctrine4 ,in the light of the ,christian ,scriptures the whole subject came under a new illumination4 ,the various duties1 however1 in the different relations of life1 were permitted to rest1 without much theorizing1 on the warrant of supernatural revelation and divine precept4 ,down through the early ,christian period1 and the centuries of medival scholasticism1 and on through the ,renaissance and the ,reformation and the subsequent dogmatic period of ,protestant theology1 ethics continued to be treated simply as a division of theology1 based almost wholly on the ,sacred ,scriptures1 with but little inclusion of any effort to determine its natural basis and significance4 ,but with the age of modern philosophy and science a new interest and direction came to ethical inquiry4 ,explanation began to be sought for the unique authority of the ethical judgments1 and concerning the place of the moral power in the essential constitution of the human soul4 ,special emphasis was given to the fact that1 even apart from the precepts of revelation1 man is bound to rectitude by an imperative within him1 which is not of his choice1 but claims the right to dominate his choices4 ,and since the seventeenth century the ethical constitution of humanity1 together with the nature and grounds of right1 has been made1 apart from theology1 the distinct and separate theme of scientific and philosophical investigation and discussion4 ,it has been among the leading subjects of rational inquiry and constructive effort4 ,especially in ,great ,britain and in our own country has the inquiry been conducted on this basis1 and directed to the exhibition of the natural foundation and character of the ethical distinctions and judgments1 and to a systemization of the ethical realities and laws thus determinable4 ,the work thus done has created an immense literature1 and established a body of securely authenticated scientific results4 #c4 ,ethics1 in its comprehensive sense1 is naturally divided into two leading parts--,theoretical ,ethics1 and ,practical or ,applied ,ethics4 ,theoretical ,ethics4 7#a7 ,theoretical ,ethics deals with the essential realities and principles which form the fundamental basis and source of obligation and moral law1 in the constitution of man and of the world4 ,it is a speculative study1 seeking a rational account of the foundations of morality and behests of duty4 ,it secures a theory from and of the facts4 ,it has1 however1 a double range of investigation1 as it seeks to determine the truth with respect to the two great essential factors in the aggregate inquiry4 ,in the one range it examines and ascertains the facts and laws of man's moral nature4 ,it investigates the constitution of the moral agent1 in whose conscious experience1 in the presence of the concrete world1 the moral phenomena arise4 ,in this part1 the inquiry is psychological1 and its results are scientific4 ,in the other range it investigates the nature and ground of right1 or the morally good4 ,in this the search is not for what is discoverable within the moral agent1 or the phenomena of the moral perceptions and emotions1 but for that which is without him and to which his moral life is1 at least apparently1 required to be adjusted4 ,here the work is metaphysical1 passing on from what is phenomenal within man1 and looking for the super-phenomenal realities implied4 ,the process and results here are philosophical4 ,it thus appears that the one range of investigation moves subjectively1 the other objectively4 ,the first discovers what man is--at least so far as his constitution embraces those powers1 perceptions1 judgments and feelings in which he becomes and recognizes himself a moral being2 the second seeks to know what rectitude is1 or what is that to which the moral perceptions and discriminations refer and bind4 ,when the truth on both these sides is discovered and brought together1 the whole view1 with the particulars logically correlated1 will present the aggregate theory of duty1 or the rationale of obligation4 ,practical ,ethics4 7#b7 ,practical ,ethics sets forth the proper application of these fundamental principles of right and duty1 as developed and justified in theoretical ethics1 to the varied relations of men1 personally1 in the ,family1 in ,society1 and in the ,state4 ,it passes on from the philosophy of moral obligations to a settlement of particular duties in the different spheres of human life and activity4 ,the connection between theoretical and practical ethics is very close and vital4 ,theory and practice always affect each other4 ,they cannot be held wholly apart4 ,they act and react on each other1 in ceaseless influences4 ,it is so in every department of thought and life4 ,theoretical error in physical science1 in art1 in trade1 in political economy1 can hardly fail to appear in faulty or misdirected practice4 ,every failure to grasp first principles correctly and firmly is sure to mean failure also to grasp and maintain the true order and beauty of right living4 ,false views as to the reality and grounds of moral obligation weaken1 vitiate and corrupt life4 ,they become1 often1 the fountain of far-flowing streams of evil and blight4 ,at best they lack power for the true and right life4 ,a correct theory of ethical truth is1 therefore1 demanded by all the high interests in the moral life of man and the order of the world4 ,it is apparent1 however1 that it is only the theoretical part that constitutes the science of ethics4 ,it alone settles the systematic view of it1 revealing its underlying pre-suppositions and principles1 exhibiting its reasons and determining its laws4 ,practical ethics1 as simply pointing out how these bear upon men's temper and conduct in actual life1 is apart from the scientific investigation4 ,though this has usually constituted a large portion of formal treatises on the subject1 we1 for the reason thus given1 omit it from this discussion4 #d4 ,a few of the relations of ethical science are properly called to mind here4 ,its place will thus be more clearly seen4 ,it sustains very close relations to three other great branches of study4 ,relation to ,psychology4 7#a7 ,to psychology4 ,it is organically related to this4 ,in that part of its work which determines the reality and nature of moral obligation from the constitution and action of the human mind1 moral science joins with psychology in the investigation of man's mental capacities and powers4 ,ever since the days of ,aristotle ethics has been seen to have real psychological basis and pre-suppositions4#e ,yet1 as a result of the later general subsuming of ethics under religious and theological precepts1 this basis received but little distinct investigation till the time of ,shaftesbury who1 though failing to give adequate or correct account of it1 brought it prominently forward4 ,mental science is essentially conditional for moral science4 ,the behests of duty are provided for and sanctioned in human nature4 ,the moral discriminations and convictions emerge as psychical phenomena4 ,to understand what man ought to do1 it is necessary to know what he is4 ,in the very structure and adjustment of his powers1 it becomes apparent that he has been made for duty and organized under obligations4 ,but while psychology and ethics both study the powers and functions of the soul1 they do so with different aims4 ,the one has no aim beyond a knowledge of the phenomena and laws of the mind as mind4 ,the other studies it with a view to the light which this knowledge sheds on the problems of virtue and duty4 ,there are1 indeed1 some questions in ethics that transcend the province of psychology1 and belong to the further realm of metaphysics--as1 for instance1 the validity and ground of the distinction between right and wrong--yet1 so far as it is the science of conscience or of man's moral nature1 it is thoroughly psychological4 ,and well would it have been for moral science if1 instead of speculatively and arbitrarily theorizing on the subject1 it had more critically1 fully1 and exactly searched out the real facts in actual psychology and moved forward always toward the conclusions necessitated by these fundamental and abiding realities4 ,relation to ,natural ,theology4 7#b7 ,to ,natural ,theology4 ,as ,natural ,theology seeks to determine the existence1 character and will of ,god as ,creator and ,moral ,governor of the world1 and the consequent relations and responsibilities of men1 it covers1 to some extent1 the same ground as a system of ethics constructed simply upon the basis of reason and the data found in man's nature and place4 ,both1 if properly drawn out1 bring to view the reality of a power that makes for righteousness#f in the natural constitution of the world1 and exhibit the laws of obligation that bind men under the action of conscience4 ,both treat of the fact and authentications of human duty4 ,a science of ethics1 as well as a theology1 may be constructed1 apart from supernatural revelation1 from the data of reason and nature alone4 ,the possibility of this is implied in ,rom4 #b3ad1 #ae4 ,this would be a system of natural ethics4 ,there is still1 however1 a large difference--though theology and ethics be kept apart from the teachings of special revelation4 ,for ,natural ,theology keeps more prominently and controllingly in view the being and character of ,god1 and aims more distinctly to produce the religious sentiments1 while authenticating the reality and action of the moral law4 ,ethics1 on the other hand1 puts the facts of human nature and life into the front and includes the religious element only as a consequential1 though necessary1 inclusion4 ,relation to ,christian ,theology4 7#c7 ,to ,christian ,theology1 or revealed religion4 ,as this is the fullest disclosure of the duty of man1 in all his relations1 to ,god1 to his fellow-men1 and to his own end1 it is not surprising that for so many centuries1 the treatment of morals was made simply a part of general theology1 and merely distinguished as ,moral ,theology4 ,in the modern separation of ethics from theology and treatment of it as a science1 it is not meant to deny the close affinity between the two investigations or the rich illumination that duty receives from supernatural revelation1 but only to trace out more distinctly and fully1 in independent and scientific form1 the deep and immovable foundations of the principles of duty in the very constitution of man and the world4 ,this exhibition of the natural basis of ethical law and obligation becomes an independent and generic enforcement of the principles of righteousness4 ,it gives a philosophic vindication of one of the first assumptions of ,christianity--the supremacy of the law of rectitude for human life4 ,and ,christianity is vindicated and exalted when it comes recognizing and confirming all the principles and duties discoverable in our moral nature1 and adding a supernatural disclosure of the way in which righteousness may be established in our lives1 and men may attain their right character and destiny4 ,christianity1 while much more than this1 appears as a divine re-publication of the ethical truth which from the first has been incorporated in the organization of humanity4 ,in it the light of conscience is supplemented and made clear4 ,the ethics of human reason and those of revelation thus cover1 to a great extent1 the same ground4 ,when correctly read they are never in conflict1 but in harmony4 ,both show man to be under moral law--and under broken law1 that is1 under sin4 ,but the light of the ,scriptures is broader and fuller4 ,for in addition to their confirmation of a natural ethic for man1 they disclose a scheme of redemption1 with otherwise undiscoverable moral relations and obligations1 introducing new and vital elements into the science of ethics4 ,the inclusion of these elements and truths turns pagan or natural ethics into ,christian4 ,whatever interpretation may be given by different ,christians to the redemption thus disclosed1 the ethical teaching of the ,sacred ,scriptures1 by universal consent1 surpasses1 in clearness1 elevation and completeness1 every other ethical view or system in the world4 ,the loftiest philosophical thought has reached no higher summit--and has climbed to its best only in the light which ,christianity has supplied4 ,no system of morals is now worthy of the name that fails to avail itself of its ethical teaching4 ,only when this is properly included1 illuminating natural ethics with its supernatural light1 can we have the whole view of human duty4 ,he who refuses the ,christian grade and completeness of moral view goes back from the full daylight into the obscure dawn before the morning4 ,nevertheless the natural basis of ethical laws needs to be clearly apprehended and distinctly borne in mind4 ,in these days when the foundations of all truths are put to scrutinizing tests1 it is of fundamental importance that1 through the verifying processes of careful science1 we shall recognize the ethical verities and responsibilities1 affirmed by revelation1 as primarily and immutably a part of the very nature of man and the constitution of the world4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,fact ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions4 ,moral ,distinctions4 ,the primary fact underlying the science of ethics is the great phenomenon of moral distinctions in the world4 ,scarcely anything in human life has been more conspicuous and indubitable than the existence of ideas of right and wrong and their application to human conduct4 ,this has characterized mankind everywhere and in all ages4 ,its prevalence is as broad as humanity4 ,a phenomenon so universal and permanent must necessarily be regarded as in some way organic in the human constitution4 ,it calls for examination and justifies scientific inquiry into its cause and implications4 ,the certainty and largeness of the phenomenon become deeply impressive when it is traced out and fairly considered4 ,revealed in ,personal ,consciousness4 #a4 ,the distinction between right and wrong appears in every man's personal consciousness4 ,each one is directly and fully aware of it in his own case4 ,he approves and condemns on this basis1 and in doing so finds himself in harmony with a principle marking the sentiments of others around him4 ,he passes quick1 spontaneous judgments on his own conduct and on that of his fellow-men4 ,the distinction1 to greater or less degree1 shapes itself into a sense of obligation and a law of duty4 ,nothing can wipe it out from his knowledge and feelings4 ,incorporated in ,social ,organism4 #b4 ,it is found incorporated into the social organism4 ,what each man is conscious of doing in his own inner life1 society1 in its solidarity or constitutional unity1 is found doing and enforcing4 ,organic humanity reveals the presence of the ethical conception and sure lines of its action everywhere4 ,however diverse may be its judgments1 there is such a thing as a public conscience that holds up conduct to favor or reprobation1 not simply as beneficial or injurious but as being intrinsically right or wrong4 ,the social constitution is in fact framed together under the human capacity and necessity of perceiving and fulfilling the duties that arise in the inter-relations of associated life4 ,for1 the very laws and administrations on which the social order and welfare are dependent1 and through which they are in a measure secured1 are the embodiment of the ethical ideas and judgments of the people4 ,no adjustment of relations is possible except upon this foundation4 ,the obliteration of these ideas would mean social anarchy4 ,society1 says ,prof4 ,borden ,p4 ,bowne1 in its organized form1 is a moral institution with moral ends4 ,however selfish individuals may be1 they cannot live together without a social order which rests on moral ideas4#g ,witnessed in ,history4 #c4 ,the great volume of history is witness to the universal phenomenon4 ,its records testify to the presence and action of the moral distinctions everywhere and in all the ages of the world4 ,whether these records present the customs and habits of early tribes1 the rise and fall of nations1 the reigns of princes and emperors1 the exploits of generals and conquerors1 the march and overthrow of armies1 the relentless cruelty of tyrants or the noble service of patriots and benefactors1 the establishment of just institutions or the miseries of the people where the oppressor's millstones grind on1 all the pages are replete with evidence that men1 around all the globe and through all the centuries1 have been wont either to accuse or excuse the conduct and motives of one another according to some standard of moral judgment or sentiments of right and wrong4 ,it is true that from some pages of history the moral sense seems darkened out of sight4 ,they bring before us thousands of men1 often the most conspicuous in the ever-changing drama of public life1 from whose thinking the notions of right and wrong seem to have been wanting or obliterated1 acting only from selfishness1 avarice1 or ambition1 monsters of injustice1 heartlessness1 cruelty and blood4 ,many of its chapters are but the sickening stories of tribal and national feuds and wars1 of crime1 plunder and devastation1 of hate1 scheming and treachery1 of thirst for power1 fame and treasure1 of moving armies and fields of carnage and fire-swept lands1 seeming to report that the moral sense had no place or force whatever in the men who were the actors in those scenes4 ,but these chapters of lurid crime and wrong1 like the records of crime to-day1 do not represent all the thought of the humanity of such times4 ,they tell of the men and deeds that most completely defied the moral ideas that belonged to their own nature1 and whose remorseless wrong-doing evoked the deep1 indignant reprobation of the thousands and millions of innocent and injured sufferers4 ,and when the pen of history1 with eye on the relations of cause and effect and the unfolding issues of such flagrant violation of right and justice1 has traced the steps of a divine ,nemesis1 a stern ,avenger1 following the guilty1 age after age1 the record proves to be1 all the more emphatically1 a ceaseless testimony to the great fact of moral distinctions as a world-wide and ceaseless phenomenon of human life4 ,shown in ,all ,religions4 #d4 ,the religions of the world all show the same fact4 ,while these present a ,godward side and express the perpetual human need of union and fellowship with the infinite divine ,source of all ,good1 they at the same time testify to a distinctively moral constitution and action of human life4 ,the sense of obligation1 duty and guilt appears in the warp and woof of religion everywhere4 ,while with a singular breach with reason religious rites and practices here and there have shown a wide departure from correct moral principles1 yet the religious consciousness of the race has been almost a synonym for the action of the moral sense4 ,in all lands and all ages this consciousness has carried with it1 in greater or less clearness and force1 a conviction that the ,power above men not themselves is a ,power that makes for righteousness1 establishing and enforcing principles of duty among men4 ,and the various religions of mankind1 especially those of monotheistic teaching and more distinct development1 present clear and emphatic codes of moral principles and requirement4 ,some of them are resolvable largely into philosophies of life1 with ethical directions for the regulation of conduct4 ,in the ,egyptian ,book of the ,dead1 which belongs to the age of the pyramid builders1 from #bjjj to #cjjj ,b4 ,c41 we find set forth a morality marked by surprising breadth and purity4#h ,in all the wide-spread religions of ,asia1 some of them emerging out of the darkness of prehistoric times1 the ,akkadian and ,babylonian1 ,zoroastrianism1 ,brahmanism1 ,confucianism1 ,buddhism1 ,toism1 ,shintoism1 and ,mohammedanism1 with their countless millions of followers1 everywhere the constitution of man and social life is recognized as laid in laws of moral obligation and order1 and religious life1 in greater or less degree1 is called to aspire to that which is judged to be right and good4 ,ancient ,druidism was strongly marked by its emphatic moral tone4 ,no ,christian needs to be reminded with what sublime distinctness ,christianity1 with its redemption economy1 declares the eternal distinction between moral good and evil1 and calls men to peace and blessedness through faith and righteousness4 ,religion1 it is to be remembered1 is in the broadest sense a fact of humanity4 ,the distinguished anthropologist ,quatrefages is sustained by the fullest evidence when he asserts that man is essentially a religious being4 ,it appears in every tribe on earth4 ,moral conceptions and sentiments1 however faint and faultily applied1 are a part of this omnipresent religious mind of the race4 ,pervades ,literature4 #e4 ,such moral conceptions pervade the general literature of the world4 ,wherever a people has progressed in culture sufficiently to create and preserve a literature1 it is found to be many-tongued witness to a recognized difference between right and wrong4 ,in its pages these discriminations appear as a never-ceasing characteristic of human thought4 ,they come to us out of the remotest past and from regions untaught by the decalogue of ,sinai4 ,they illuminate1 as already implied1 the sacred books of ,india1 ,china1 ,egypt1 ,persia and ,babylonia1 as well as the classic writings of ancient ,greece and ,rome and the ,saga writing of ,northern ,europe4 ,they not only form the body of the moral disquisitions of ,socrates1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,cato1 ,cicero1 ,seneca1 ,marcus ,aurelius and many others1 but color and shape the drama and lyric poetry in which the thought and sentiment of the race have been embalmed4 ,to see illustrations of this we need only read the tragedies of ,sophocles1 for instance dipus ,tyrannus1 lines #hfc-hga1 or ,antigone1 lines #ddi-dfj1 or listen to the verse of ,horace1 ,book ,,iii1 ,ode #c1 tracing the supremacy and triumph of a consciousness of right over all other authority and power4 ,with the advance of humanity as the centuries have passed away literature is more and more the representation of human sentiment and life under the action and reaction of these ethical discriminations in the ever-changing conditions of the world4 ,philosophy and science and fiction and poetry and politics and jurisprudence are occupied in dealing with the principles and questions thus raised1 and our modern libraries are largely the accumulated treasures of the thinking world on the significance and application of these principles4 ,anthropological ,confirmation4 #f4 ,the ethnic and anthropological information of the present day reports no people or tribe1 even the rudest1 altogether without moral ideas and some measure of application of them to conduct4 ,enthusiastic scientists1 travelers and missionaries1 traversing the earth1 have thoroughly established this point4 ,often1 indeed1 has the universality here asserted been disputed4 ,reports were brought of tribes discovered altogether destitute of the ethical sense4 ,but closer inspection of the tribal and personal life has corrected the first impression1 and evidences of the disputed fact have become indubitable4 ,a low and confused manifestation had been mistaken as none whatever4 ,in degraded and besotted conditions of human life1 it is altogether reasonable to believe that the particular discrimination in question would appear only in the crude and uncertain forms in keeping with the undeveloped grade of all the functions of thought and sentiment4 ,the sunken humanity has carried down and buried its proper and normal manifestations almost out of sight4 ,as soon as uplift comes to a tribe1 the powers of moral discernment and knowledge1 whose action was scarcely discoverable before1 emerge in unmistakable certainty and force4 ,and no phenomenon that science is seeking to investigate to-day can be more justly regarded as universally human than the fact under consideration4 ,not ,affected by ,explanations4 #g4 ,it needs to be distinctly fixed in mind that this great fact is not at all affected by any offered theory of its cause and significance4 ,it stands independent of any particular explanation of it1 and indeed of all solutions4 ,if1 for instance1 the origin of these moral judgments should be traced back and accounted for1 as is done by ,herbert ,spencer1 as the result of accumulated experiences of utility1 gradually organized and inherited as spontaneous approval and disapproval1 the theory still recognizes the fact of ethical judgments while endeavoring to account for them4 ,or1 when the older utilitarianism seeks to explain them as resolvable into the pleasure or satisfaction men feel toward certain forms of conduct or principles of behavior that are found to be useful and promotive of happiness1 the fact still remains that judgments of right and wrong are actually established and dominate the thought and life of men4 ,the very attempt to identify the virtues of life with its utilities1 while making the virtues only its utilities1 concedes that the obligation to them is part of the recognized reality of human life4 ,or1 further1 should a bolder and more radical view allege that these notions of right and wrong are mere matters of taste and prejudice1 a fictitious product of adventitious circumstances and education1 without verity or validity at bottom1 the offered explanation would be simply a denial1 but no disproof of the fact concerned4 ,for it would amount to a claim that in the absolute sense one thing is essentially as good as another1 and would thus disregard the real affirmation as it stands in the moral judgment of mankind4 ,such a claim1 it has been well said1 no theorist of the present day would pretend to maintain outside of his closet4#i ,not in any race or people has the ethical sense allowed that essentially and at bottom all acts are equally right4 ,this is the very point of the great phenomenon presented4 ,whatever may be the final explanation of it1 somehow or other the reason1 sentiment and practical sense of mankind insist on a real difference1 and look upon all denial of the distinction as a manifest and intolerable absurdity4 ,the universal recognition of this distinction1 revealed in every man's consciousness1 involved in the organic relations of society1 testified to everywhere in the pages of history1 embodied essentially in the religious nature and sentiments of mankind1 woven into general literature1 found to-day unmistakably in the thinking1 laws and customs of all races and tribes1 and acknowledged in the philosophical view of humanity wherever man is studied1 irreducible as a fact by any account of its genesis or explanation of its significance1 presents the occasion and primary materials of ethical science4 ,the great phenomenon calls for investigation4 ,we want to know the reasons for it and the import of it4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,faculty ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions--,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,conscience4 ,the ,moral ,faculty4 ,the great fact of moral distinctions1 found to be universal in human thought and life1 must be traced back to the particular power of the mind which discerns and feels these distinctions4 ,back of the phenomenon must be recognized the psychical capacity and action out of which the discriminations arise4 ,the moral faculty answers to and in part accounts for the moral fact4 ,in modern general literature it is usually called the conscience4 ,ethical science properly accepts the designation4 ,it is sometimes called the moral consciousness1 or the moral sense4 ,it expresses a power of the personal ego or self to make the moral discrimination and discern the obligation to rectitude4 ,without such power1 as an adequate capacity for the ideas1 it is plain that the ethical judgments could not arise4 ,the very idea of obligation1 the ethical ought1 would be wanting4 ,the whole realm of what this science considers would be a blank4 ,in the moral faculty or conscience itself1 as the immediate source of the ethical distinctions and laws of duty1 we are furnished with additional material for this study4 ,no particular stress is here laid on the term faculty1 as a designation of the moral power4 ,there is1 indeed1 no validity in the claim of some recent psychologists that the term must be abandoned on the ground that psychology discovers only mental acts1 without a psychic subject with distinct faculties back of the acts4 ,yet the term faculty has often been used and understood in a way inconsistent with the essential and conscious unity of the personal ego or self1 making the soul seem a bundle of independent and separately acting parts of a psychical organism4 ,the perfect oneness of the personal self must be maintained1 and the term faculty1 when used for any form of psychical ability1 must be understood simply as expressing the soul's capacity or power to do any specific form of work1 or to act in any particular and distinctively definable way1 as1 for instance1 to know1 to feel1 to will1 to remember1 to compare4 ,in this sense the use of the term stands fully justified in psychological usage and propriety4 ,but the reason for abating from the claim of strict exactness in the term in this connection is that the conscience1 in its full conception and action1 as will hereafter appear1 while exhibiting a specific and simple power as its central reality1 will be found to include also subordinately the conjoint action of several other forms of psychical power4 ,it stands for a complex of capacities and powers4 ,this will appear when we reach its analysis4 ,but the question of the absolute simplicity of the faculty does not affect the substance of our inquiry into its existence nor the propriety of employing the term for the power in its totality4 ,for1 as naming the central and decisive reality in the conscience1 it is justly spoken of as a special faculty4 ,even when it is viewed as standing for a complex of powers converging1 in their functions1 to the discernment of moral distinctions and the reality of duty1 it has sufficient individuality to be rightly and scientifically designated in this way4 ,the question to be considered1 and upon which the logical conclusions of the science will depend1 is not its absolute simplicity1 but the fact of such a power as a normal part in the soul's essential constitution of powers4 ,if the power be found integral and normal in the soul's actual capacities1 we have all that is essential for the foundation of ethics4 ,the existence of the conscience as a specific and natural faculty of discernment of right and duty may seem to the student or reader to need no formal proof1 as something substantially everywhere acknowledged4 ,but as various theories undertake to question its existence1 in the sense thus explained1 and resolve the affirmations of right and duty into pseudo-products developed in a roundabout way1 or by some illusive transformation of ideas or sentiments given by the other faculties of the soul1 ideas or sentiments which in fact are really unethical1 it becomes necessary to vindicate the asserted existence of this moral faculty4 ,moral ,distinctions ,prove ,conscience4 #a4 ,the primary and fundamental evidence is the great fact1 already set forth1 of the moral distinctions which arise out of its action and fill personal consciousness and the life of the world with their attesting presence4 ,the known object implies a power by which it is known4 ,without the faculty1 in the sense of a power to know1 the knowledge here in question could not exist4 ,its existence is proof of the reality and action of the faculty perceptive of it4 ,the only alternative to this would be a total denial of the ethical distinction1 even as a genuine phenomenon1 and an assertion that the supposed knowledge of it is1 and always has been1 illusory and unreal4 ,and this would be equivalent to a claim that men may and should abandon the ethical distinction and believe that there is absolutely no moral difference between justice and injustice1 between kindness and hatred1 between truth and lying1 between friendship and treachery1 between charity and murder4 ,and this again would mean that we are to repudiate1 as without validity1 the whole notion which the ages1 especially the most intelligent and best ages1 have cherished1 that man is capable of character1 as good or bad1 excellent or blameworthy4 ,but this whole alternative becomes impossible1 by reason of the necessary and invincible contrary judgment by which the moral distinctions are affirmed as actual and valid for human life4 ,the faculty of moral discernment proves its existence by making the contrary of its discernment an impossible conception4 ,the ,moral ,perceptions ,peculiar4 #b4 ,its existence is further proved by the unique and peculiar character of its data or perceptions4 ,these are unlike any other1 sui generis4 ,they are original and cannot be deduced from other data4 ,the ethical percept is something that can be understood only in terms of itself4 ,it cannot be described or expressed in the terms of the percepts or knowledge given by the other faculties of the soul1 either general or special1 either separately or in combination4 ,hence we must1 according to all sound psychological procedure1 postulate a special faculty1 as distinctive and normal as is the percept1 for this original and irresolvable ethical idea4 ,a little explanation will help to show this4 ,let us make search for the ethical idea or perception among the well-known data of the other faculties4 ,manifestly it is not given by the sense-perception1 for it presents none of the physical properties which this makes known4 ,clearly1 too1 it is not created by the consciousness1 which presents simply the states or acts of the mind1 with the personal self as their subject1 but which does not itself originate the states or acts it reveals--any more than does the light of the morning create the objects of the landscape which it discloses4 ,further1 it is evidently not given by the power of representation1 for this merely reproduces and re-knows what was before known through the sense-perception and revealed in consciousness1 revived in the form of memory or rearranged and recombined in the forms of the constructive imagination4 ,it supplies no original data4 ,it1 further still1 cannot be the product of the logical faculty1 as the power or function of discursive reasoning1 because this originates no new material1 but only reconnects and judges of relations in the material already known1 simply dealing with ideas furnished to it4 ,nor can the ethical percept1 as an intuition to the obligation to rectitude1 be at all identified with the a priori ideas of time and space1 or the categories of substance and attribute1 identity and difference1 means and end1 or the law of causation4 ,and yet it stands out in an originality as positive and distinct as do any of the unquestionable data or percepts of the soul's acknowledged specific faculties4 ,just as little can the ethical idea1 as the discrimination of right and wrong1 be referred to the sensibility1 as the pleasure or dislike with which we regard what is found useful and conducive to enjoyment or the reverse4 ,for1 though a certain pleasure is connected with the ethically right1 this specific feeling follows1 and is dependent on no other perception than of the right4 ,it is a satisfaction which the ethically good thus awakens4 ,but the knowledge which experience gives of what is useful and conducive to enjoyment is generically different from the moral idea and its sense of obligation4 ,utility and the ethical discrimination are not the same conception4 ,they belong to two diverse realms of thought and knowledge4 ,whatever relations may be traced between them1 they cannot be identified or held as convertible percepts4 ,the autonomous imperative of the ethical idea often positively prohibits the very things men judge to be profitable and pleasurable4 ,it is a remarkable fact that the testimonies from literature and life to the phenomenon of moral distinctions everywhere maintain the difference between the idea of right and that of the pleasurable or profitable4 ,what is right is one thing2 what is agreeable is another thing4 ,the two conceptions are not identical1 but are often placed in immediate and irreducible antithesis4 ,those who do right1 choosing it and heroically loyal to it despite the appeals of ambition1 the temptations of avarice1 the enticements of ease1 and the favor or the wrath of the wicked1 are approved and honored4 ,to such the gates of the divine favor and recompense are pictured as ever standing open4 ,there is another consideration in this connection which shows beyond question that this ethical faculty1 whose action is everywhere traceable1 is not to be confounded with mere intellectuality or the action of simply the general intellectual powers4 ,it exhibits itself in a distinct line of working and results1 like a particular current in the common sea1 and often in open contrast4 ,it is a peculiar and significant fact1 often observed by historians1 that as the civilizations of antiquity1 of ,assyria1 ,egypt1 ,phenicia1 ,greece and ,rome1 advanced in intellect they declined in morals4 ,intellectualism may be at its height while the moral side of life may suffer a submergence beneath the floods of luxury and refined social vices4 ,buckle confesses that intellect and morals are not only distinguishable1 but separable4#aj ,herbert ,spencer says3 ,the belief in the moralizing effects of intellectual culture1 flatly contradicted by facts1 is absurd a priori4#aa ,lord ,wolseley makes a statement not flattering to the boasted advantage claimed for simple intellectualism3 ,the virtue of the ,zulu women was superior to that of any civilized people ,i know of4#ab ,the function of the conscience in human nature and life stands clearly distinguishable from the common data and powers of mere intellectualism4 ,the world will not be ethically saved by intellect alone4 ,the conscience must dominate mere intellectual results and forces4 ,and the high distinctive place and peculiar character of the conscience-perception is seen when it is thus observed that the perception is not of something that is1 but of what ought to be1 in the sphere of conduct and character4 ,its object is apprehended as lying in the ideal realm of obligation4 ,the reality perceived is transcendent1 as what should be in life1 in order that life may accord with a super-sensible reality in the realm of righteousness4 ,it as truly reaches beyond sense as do the intuitions of time and space or the law of causation2 and1 as truly as they1 it calls for the recognition of a special and original psychical faculty or provision1 among the powers of the soul1 for its perception4 ,the conscience1 ,deep-seated in our mystic frame1 discerns a law of righteous obligation1 which is not the dictate of mere desire or pleasure or self-advantage1 but a law established at once over us and in us not dependent on our will or choice but demanding conformity of will and choice to itself4 ,feelings from ,conscience ,perceptions4 #c4 ,the existence of the conscience as an integral power of the human constitution is evidenced also by the special feelings which attend its perceptions4 ,they are distinctively peculiar4 ,this is illustrated in the sense of obligation arising from the idea of right and the perception of duty4 ,it is even more clearly illustrated in the satisfaction which attends and follows duty done1 and the remorse which follows wrong or crime committed4 ,the sense of obligation1 i4 e4 the emotion awakened by the perception of obligation1 is unique among the emotions of the sensibility4 ,in the presence of recognized right or wrong men feel bound to correspondent action as they feel bound under no other perceptions4 ,the conscience1 indeed1 uses no compulsion1 but it presents the right or wrong and correspondent obligation4 ,freedom is not annulled1 but appealed to4 ,the feeling1 as the sensibility excited1 is the feeling of ought or ought not1 added to the perception of it4 ,nothing like this appears in connection with any of the other perceptions4 ,we may perceive truth1 but if the truth is not the particular truth of obligation itself1 there is only the pleasure1 gratification or admiration in its discovery and attainment4 ,we may perceive beauty1 but if the beauty be apart from that of ethical excellence1 the feeling is simply sthetic and different from the obligatory feeling3 ,i ought4 ,we may perceive utility or understand what is simply profitable1 but the feeling awakened is but desire4 ,all these and like simply intellectual perceptions awaken no sense of obligation to cherish any special sentiments or perform any special acts4 ,but as soon as men1 in pure and normal state of their rational and emotional nature1 perceive the right as over against the wrong1 the sensibility which always in greater or less degree responds to every act of knowledge1 presents a form of feeling1 in the ethical ought1 generically different from the feelings that arise out of all other kinds of knowledge4 ,this feeling is itself a part and parcel of the aggregate or complex of the conscience4 ,but its presence marks the conscience as a special power normally constituent of human nature4 ,the other moral emotions named1 viz43 satisfaction in duty done and remorse or compunction for wrong1 bring us to the same conclusion4 ,these feelings are sui generis4 ,they are distinctively characteristic1 and are never called forth but in connection with the moral intuitions4 ,these peculiar satisfactions or compunctions never appear upon perception of a truth of mathematics or a fact in chemistry or a gem of art4 ,such knowledge evokes no sense of duty and is followed by no feeling of remorse or rush of compunction1 flooding the soul with self-condemnation4 ,a sense of loss1 in failing to gain a possible advantage1 is incapable of being confounded with the feeling of having done wrong4 ,some of the highest elevations of ethical satisfaction are felt when men have maintained their fidelity to the right in face of the most enormous losses and of the most desolating sufferings4 ,the deepest remorse the human soul ever knows may spring up in view of ways and acts which have given men all the things they have coveted and judged to be the most useful and enjoyable4 ,there must surely be a special power whose peculiar discernments call the sensibilities into such unique and peculiar forms of feeling4 ,conflict of ,moral ,judgements4 #d4 ,this conclusion is not weakened1 as has sometimes been supposed1 by the diversity and seeming conflict of moral judgments among men4 ,this diversity seems1 in the view of many persons1 inconsistent with the supposition of a conscience1 in the sense given4 ,the fact of such diversity is freely conceded4 ,the progress of history shows many changes in moral judgments4 ,an advance is clearly traceable1 in which once accepted rules of conduct have been superseded by different requirements4 ,things approved in one land and tribe are condemned in another4 ,pascal has said that conscience is one thing north of the ,pyrenees and another south4 ,in every community what some look upon as right others declare wrong4 ,infanticide1 which under our civilization is punished as murder1 on the banks of the ,ganges has been esteemed a high religious duty4 ,polygamy1 which our government is trying to wipe out as an immorality and foul blot1 is held by the ,mormons as a sacred right4 ,slavery is still regarded by some as right though condemned by the convictions of the nation as morally indefensible4 ,most startling diversities and contrasts are continually appearing4 ,hence it has often been said that our moral judgments rest1 in fact1 on no original and permanent principles discerned by a distinct and universal faculty of the soul1 but are a purely adventitious and accidental product1 shaped in ideas that come of circumstances1 education or the shifting spirit of the age4#ac ,the law of morality is reduced to the dictates of expediency or to sentiment and caprice born of our changeful desires4 ,this virtually denies both the validity of the ethical behests and the reality of an ethical faculty provided for perception of rectitude and duty4 ,but the difficulty from this diversity and apparent contradiction loses its force when carefully considered4 ,it disappears when we recall the following indubitable facts3 ,ethical ,sense ,persists4 ,first1 that in the midst of this variety and conflict in the moral judgments1 the ethical sense still persists in maintaining its function4 ,if convicted of acting inconsistently1 it still acts4 ,though it is found judging differently1 it still judges1 asserting its place and office1 and imposing its decisions as obligatory in conduct4 ,under the view alleged in the objection1 the sense of obligation ought to disappear1 its supposed authority having been explained away4 ,the person finds that in very truth the moral behest1 though in him is not of him1 is not of his will or choice1 but arises out of the necessary action of a power that he cannot displace by refusal to obey it4 ,the faculty or power does not consent1 so to speak1 to omit or withdraw its ethical distinction and assertion of duty4 ,it does not abdicate1 when men allege the illegitimacy of its authority4 ,agreement in ,judgments4 ,secondly1 that while there is diversity as to many points1 there is none in its judgments as to the great body of virtues and vices of human life4 ,as to all the leading qualities of character and conduct there is full and universal agreement4 ,with respect to all the cardinal virtues1 such as justice1 kindness1 veracity1 love1 courage1 fidelity1 generosity1 the moral judgments approve them as the magnet owns its pole1 in all the multi-form relations and offices of life4 ,on the other hand1 injustice1 falsehood1 enmity1 treachery1 cruelty1 adultery1 theft1 murder and similar dispositions and acts in their thousand forms of unmistakable manifestation1 are universally condemned4 ,there is no question anywhere around our globe that one who deliberately kills his mother or mangles his father1 or tortures the innocent or defrauds his friend1 is a wrong-doer1 of abhorrent guilt4 ,over almost the entire broad field of moral obligation there is a consentient1 clear and consistent judgment by the moral sense of man in all ages and places4 ,it is only along dividing lines1 wider or narrower as they may be1 that1 by reason of the fainter presence of the moral element or the complexity of the relations concerned1 the moral judgments exhibit this diversity or act with less assured and certain accuracy4 ,the perplexity and difference find place only in limited degree and on remoter points1 where the distinctions are so subtle as to require the nicest balancing of all the complex relations and elements which develop the ethical obligations4 ,if1 indeed1 the conscience reported entirely different codes throughout1 from bottom to top and from center to circumference1 or codes with contradictions as to the cardinal virtues and vices1 then we might well question the existence and action of a real1 original and normal faculty as actually perceiving a real moral distinction and principle of duty4 ,but if such diversities are found only in limited degree1 on marginal ground and in complex situations1 we are simply in the presence of a fact of great similarity of the conscience with all the rest of the finite and fallible faculties of the human mind4 ,upon a hundred points of practical morals the intelligent conscience would be likely to agree quite as well as the judgments of men in any other sphere of practical knowledge and life4 ,agreement in ,principles4 ,thirdly1 that even with respect to the cases in which there is the most startling diversity1 there is often an underlying agreement1 overlooked by superficial thought4 ,take1 for instance1 the ,hindu mother's act of infanticide4 ,underneath her act and guiding it1 is one or the other1 or possibly both1 of these principles3 #a4 ,whatever sacrifice ,god calls for ought to be made2 or1 #b4 ,whatever is best for the child ought to be done4 ,falsely taught to believe that ,god calls for the sacrifice of her child1 or that this surrender of it to him is the best thing for it1 the mother makes the offering4 ,essentially as to the principles from which she acts her conscience and the ,christian conscience are at one4 ,but she has been misled as to the will of ,god4 ,her understanding is without correct information as to matters of fact1 and she applies mistakenly the principles of duty which are in her moral nature4 ,take1 again1 the crimes of religious intolerance and persecution4 ,the religious zealot believes that every man is to be1 without weakness or shadow or turning1 faithful to the truth4 ,so also does the dissenter from the creed which the persecutor defends4 ,they agree as to the underlying principle of action4 ,each feels bound by the same ethical law of fidelity to the truth1 but the persecutor is in grievous error in understanding that this fidelity binds him to coerce the mind of his dissenting brother4 ,difference of ,perceptions4 ,fourthly1 the difference must be clearly kept in view between the essential ethical perception1 viz43 the distinction of right and wrong with the involved obligation1 and the application of that perception--between the primary and secondary moral judgment4 ,the primary is the intuition of the law of right1 the secondary affirms the quality of right or wrong with respect to particular actions4 ,in the one case the moral sense perceives that justice1 love1 veracity1 kindness1 etc41 are right1 and injustice1 hatred1 falsehood and cruelty are wrong2 in the other the judgment is concerned with the further question whether this1 that1 or the other act comes under one or the other of these categories4 ,the fundamental ethical distinction and obligation1 with approval of justice1 truth1 etc41 are generic1 and altogether irrespective of any particular actions or instances4 ,the secondary judgments apply the distinction to particular modes of conduct or forms of temper and feeling4 ,the latter are only in part moral judgments1 i4 e4 only so far as the particular feeling or deed exhibits to the conscience the presence of the ethical quality4 ,it is an unquestionable fact that in many of the activities of life there are open alternatives of choice where the question of moral quality is not raised at all4 ,as1 for instance1 between taking one path or another to a certain point1 or in writing a letter with a pen or typewriter1 the choice is morally indifferent4 ,the decision involves no ethical judgment4 ,but in most contemplated action there are relations that raise the question of right or wrong--in some cases only by remote implication1 in others in clear and burning emphasis4 ,there are degrees in this respect1 all the way from the faintest glimmering of ethical quality to the boldest and most transparent certainty4 ,we are by no means entitled to doubt the existence of conscience1 because in all these unequal conditions1 with imperfect knowledge of the relations of particular actions and feelings1 it fails to apply its unchanging affirmations of generic duty1 with equal or unmistaken certainty and exactness1 to all the varied motives1 feelings and deeds of men4 ,it is clear how differing moral judgments may occur1 without any impeachment whatever of either the ethical reality or the existence of the faculty for its discernment4 ,infallibility ,not ,involved4 ,fifthly1 we must add that the reality of this faculty1 as an essential endowment of the human soul1 by no means involves infallibility in its action4 ,no one of the human faculties is1 in all its range and the application of its data1 absolutely infallible1 incapable of error or of being misled4 ,the sense-perceptions1 the memory1 the logical power1 the power of applying the notions of time and space1 are all liable to error4 ,yet these are all original1 constitutional and normal faculties of man1 divinely-given guides for his self-direction and suited to the ends for which they exist4 ,the reality of a faculty is not disproved by its fallibility4 ,finiteness1 limitation and consequent incompetence to exclude mistake or only partial discernment1 are no reason for denying the existence of any faculty within the range of its given action and real discriminations4 ,the very errors that appear in its action are at once evidence of its existence and proof of limitations which harmonize it with the aggregate human psychology4 ,the objection against the conscience from its fallibility1 which is but another name for this diversity in its applicatory judgments1 if applied to all the psychical faculties1 would discredit the reality of the aggregate complex of the psychical powers and overthrow the basis of all our knowledge1 even of that which is employed to effect such overthrow4 ,no diversity occurs in the primary judgment of distinction between moral good and evil4 ,as already explained1 it is easy to see how differences1 varied and great1 should appear in the application of the distinction to the complicated1 obscure and ever-changing aspects and relations of human conduct4 ,proofs ,independent of ,origin4 #e4 ,these proofs of conscience as a distinct endowment of the human mind are independent of the whole question of the mode of its origin4 ,for they consist of facts1 as clear1 peculiar1 indisputable and irreducible as are the facts that guarantee any particular science whatever4 ,they are capable of verification under perpetual tests1 as they have been verified in the consentient experience of mankind in all its normally developed conditions4 ,and the logic of the facts is altogether irrespective of any theory of the mode of the origin of conscience4 ,it is needful that this point should be clearly fixed in mind1 especially in view of the wide favor at present shown to the hypothesis of an evolutionary genesis of man4 ,except in the materialistic and atheistic form of the hypothesis the theory distinctly presents evolution not as the cause1 but only as the mode of the creation of man with all his now given endowments4 ,it is1 of course1 incumbent on the supporters of the hypothesis1 in any form whatever1 in order to vindicate its scientific claims1 to show its competency to account for the existence and action of the moral faculty with its ethical discernment and law4 ,an hypothesis that fails to solve any of the involved phenomena discredits itself1 not the facts4 ,so far as the materialistic1 non-teleological form of evolutionism is concerned1 which proposes matter and force as the full cause and account of man1 it is condemned by its own utter inadequacy to explain the genesis of conscience with its moral law1 as well as of the other great psychical realities in the nature and life of man4 ,it is helpless before the task4 ,its only resource is to seek to resolve both the ethical fact and the ethical faculty into illusion4 ,with respect to theistic evolutionism1 which stands simply as an hypothesis of the mode of creation by ,god1 the existence of the moral faculty may still be admitted1 as having its all-sufficient cause in the divine creative power as the source of all things4 ,if1 instead of an immediate creation of man1 the idea of his gradual creation from the inferior animal orders be maintained as the actual method of the divine work1 then the law of evolution must be regarded as having been adjusted and used for the production of man with the faculty of moral discernment4 ,the teleological principle1 everywhere illuminating the structure of organisms and the constitution of life1 must1 from the first1 have guided the development for this enthronement of right in the human personality4 ,asserting its method of a progressive genesis of conscience1 this kind of evolutionism confesses its existence4 ,whether or not its account is satisfactory is another question1 to be decided according to the evidence furnished4 ,it is more than doubtful if it has yet succeeded in making clear the possibility of its origin under the hypothesis4 ,some serious difficulties have still to be overcome4#ad ,if it ever does succeed it must be1 not by denial of the conscience1 but by showing the evolutionary movement in some way or other competent to its creation4 ,this lengthened presentation of the evidence of the existence of the conscience as an essential endowment and part of human nature1 may seem to the reader to have been unnecessary or beyond the importance of the question involved4 ,but1 as will appear hereafter1 the firm establishment of this point is vitally needful1 in order to exclude various forms of erroneous teaching and secure a firm and immovable foundation for a just ethical system4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,moral ,,distinctions--,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,conscience4 ,right ,view ,necessary4 ,in close connection with the indubitable fact of conscience1 as an essential faculty of the human soul1 follows a more careful inquiry into the nature of this faculty4 ,it is necessary to ascertain precisely1 if possible1 what it is as a peculiar psychical power1 as revealed and defined in and by its own action4 #a4 ,the importance of determining1 at this place1 the exact nature of the conscience is apparent from two considerations4 ,scientific ,accuracy4 7#a7 ,scientific accuracy in the whole ethical view is possible only through a true and thoroughly accurate understanding of the power that gives rise to the whole phenomenon of obligation4 ,the final theoretical view is dependent on finding the truth at this point4 ,mistake or inexactness here must inevitably introduce1 or at least allow1 confusion or error in all the dependent questions of the science4 ,a false conception of the conscience will at once mislead4 ,even an only partial or obscure view of it will fail to afford sufficient light for the subsequent steps of the investigation4 ,a conception of it1 with true and false elements combined1 must necessarily introduce perplexity or contradiction and weaken or distort the conclusion4 ,such differing views have in fact introduced the utmost confusion into the problems of this science4 ,the conscience has sometimes been spoken of as an instinct1 which identifies it with the non-intelligent1 blind action in the bee which builds cells after geometrical principles1 or in birds or fishes which migrate with the changing seasons4 ,often it has been represented as but a special feeling or sentiment that arises inexplicably1 if not fortuitously1 prior to perception of any ethical quality1 itself the basis of judgments of duty4#ae ,again it has been made to stand simply for accumulated or established approbative judgments from experiences of pleasure or advantage1 transformed and fixed as rules of conduct4#af ,sometimes it has been regarded as an immediate1 almost supernatural voice of ,god within men1 with its inexplicable direct imperative of duty4 ,it is plain that these and other differing notions of conscience must always affect1 as they always have affected1 the whole theory of ethics4 ,condition of ,authority4 7#b7 ,a right view of its nature is necessary to a correct conception of its authority4 ,this makes the question more than simply speculative or important for correct ethical theory4 ,it involves the interests of practical morality4 ,the right of the conscience to rule us is sustained or denied according as one or another conception of its nature is entertained4 ,it is natural that we should feel prompted to examine the nature of a part of our constitution that is constantly obtruding its distinctions and asserting a ruling authority over us4 ,as it has its place within us irrespective of our will and presents laws of duty to the will1 we want to see on what ground its asserted authority can be justified4 ,but not all views of its nature afford equal explanation of this peculiarity in its action4 ,for instance1 if the conscience be nothing but a blind1 irrational instinct1 or a feeling without any perception of reality to give rise or right to the feeling1 or if it be but a standard judgment of prudence or utility from experiences of what has been helpful or hurtful1 perhaps slowly accumulated and hereditarily transmitted1 a clear and rational ground of ethical authority cannot be made out4 ,such a power may indicate what is useful1 but can1 if this be all1 impose on us no obligation4 ,it may tell us what is pleasurable or desirable1 but cannot speak to us concerning the other question3 ,what is right8 ,it cannot hold us guilty because we may choose to forego personal advantage or enjoyment4 ,if1 however1 examination can show that the conscience is a faculty of actual perception1 discerning a fundamental distinction between right and wrong and an immutable obligation to apply it in the constituted relations of life1 its rightful authority is at once vindicated4 ,it is seen to be an authoritative guide in its sphere of perception1 as are the other cognitive powers1 each in its own sphere of real knowledge4 ,when it becomes clear that the moral faculty1 in the presence of the existing conditions and relations of life1 perceives what ought to be done1 and what men are obligated to do1 and what they cannot disregard without demerit1 ill-desert or guilt1 then the right of conscience to direct conduct is justified4 ,at any rate1 whether the examination may confirm or discredit this claim of rightful rulership1 the inquiry into the nature of the conscience is essential to a correct settlement of the great question of its authority and the grounds of it4 ,question of ,psychology4 #b4 ,the primary and proper source of information to settle the question of the nature of this faculty is to be found1 not in speculative theorizing or arbitrary assumptions1 but in the actual working of the human mind4 ,it is a psychological question1 and must be settled1 as all psychological questions must1 by the facts as they are discovered in experience and consciousness4 ,the method of inductive inquiry is here the true and essential one4 ,the full phenomena of action must be carefully examined1 analyzed and traced to their psychical genesis4 ,such examination can leave but little doubt in the conclusion4 ,in the facts of consciousness1 as found in connection with the operations of our minds in the sphere of moral self-determination and action1 the entire movement can be observed1 marked and recorded4 ,place of ,conscience4 #c4 ,in a preliminary way1 it must be noted and remembered that the power and action of conscience can have place only in connection with the total complex of man's psychical powers4 ,it is not an isolated1 independent faculty in the midst of the different powers of the soul4 ,this truth will require fuller consideration in another place1 but it is necessary to note it here so far as to show the essential psychological conditions of conscience4 ,the very possibility of such a faculty or power is conditioned in all the human faculties of intelligence1 sensibility and choice1 in which man becomes a moral agent4 ,while the soul or self is a unit1 its powers act under a law of inter-dependence1 exhibiting a striking and beautiful order of conditioning and being conditioned1 from the primary and fundamental forms of activity to those that are highest and crown all the rest4 ,at the very base and beginning of its action are sense-perception and consciousness--these furnishing knowledge of the outer and inner worlds1 of the realities and relations in the system of things in the midst of which man finds himself4 ,dependent upon the percepts by the senses and the states of consciousness thus furnished comes the further capacity of representative knowledge in the forms of memory and the imagination4 ,only as the original acts of perception and consciousness have supplied their data1 is the memory or the imagination possible4 ,but the representative power and action are then necessary to the action of the higher powers4 ,without memory the logical power1 the discursive function in comparison1 judgment and conclusion1 in analysis1 synthesis and systemization1 would have no materials and could do no work4 ,the mind could not do this advance work except upon the basis of work of a different kind done before4 ,and then1 too1 the reason1 as the power of intuitive or a priori truths1 would be without a knowledge of the phenomenal world1 in the midst of which1 or on occasion of the experiences of which1 these a priori truths appear and are seen to be necessary4 ,the various kinds of knowing exercised by the undivided and indivisible self are plainly arranged in an ascending order1 till at their summit they are crowned with the intuitional power which we may term1 as we here do1 the reason--the power of discerning necessary universal truths4 ,but it is equally clear that of the powers below the reason--sense-perception and consciousness furnishing facts objective and subjective1 memory restoring them before the mental eye1 and the logical power rushing to necessary conclusions--none1 either singly or together1 can stand for the conscience4 ,sense and consciousness can give us only what is1 not what ethically ought to be4 ,the memory can but renew to mental view what was before known4 ,the sense of logical necessity is clearly different from the perception of moral rightness and obligation4 ,but the action of these antecedent powers or faculties supplies the conditions for the existence and action of the conscience--gives knowledge of the personal self and the relations of life1 in the midst of which moral right and wrong and obligation and duty are developed and are seen to arise4 ,upon this knowledge1 in which man knows himself and his relations to the world of which he forms a part1 the soul rises to an outlook in the clear atmosphere of which the reality of ethical distinctions1 duty and responsibility become visible4 ,and to the crowning power of the reason1 as rational insight1 must be assigned the central function of this ethical perception of right and obligation--somewhat as to it belong1 in another field of view1 also the intuitions into the realities of time and space and the categories of substance1 attribute1 and causality4 ,this position of the conscience as1 in its fundamental action1 a form of rational intuition1 among the summit forms of the mind's powers1 makes evident its relation of dependence on the entire complex of psychical faculties which furnish the conditions for its discernments and imperative4 ,but there is something more4 ,as we shall yet see1 its total function1 in guiding the moral life1 includes the action of many of the common functions of both intellect and sensibility4 #d4 ,the specific psychology of the conscience itself1 under close and complete analysis1 will disclose the following clearly distinguishable elements in its action4 ,they reveal the nature of the conscience-power in its total complex reality4 ,these elements are not separable in fact1 but are distinguishable in the analytic thinking that examines them4 ,ethical ,distinctions4 7#a7 ,the primary element is a simple irreducible perception of the distinction between right and wrong4 ,this is the first and fundamental ethical idea4 ,in it we have the initial point in the moral action of the mind4 ,the universal ethical fact is the recognition of a distinction between right and wrong in conduct4#ag ,this distinction appears among the necessary ideas of the human mind4 ,it is a phenomenon in the psychology of the race4 ,it is developed1 in the presence of the facts and relations of life1 as something provided for in the normal and necessary action of the rational self-conscious ego4 ,it must be viewed as an intuition of the reason4 ,it can not otherwise be accounted for4 ,in its nature it is not a feeling1 though it gives rise to feeling4 ,it is not a volition1 for it comes irrespective of choice and asserts its own rights before the will4 ,it is not a mere experience1 though it arises on occasion of experience4 ,the idea stands for something beyond experience--experience being limited to the profitable1 the enjoyable or the painful4 ,we experience the useful and the agreeable1 but the right1 the ethical idea1 must be perceived or rationally seen1 as a super-sensible reality in the ideal realm of the demands of duty4 ,it is not a perception of relations themselves1 but of a distinction as to something due in human relations and life4 ,if we describe this primary and fundamental distinction1 as it appears in the action of the conscience1 it will be found marked by the following characteristics4 ,first1 the distinction is perceived--a datum of the cognitive intellect4 ,as discerned by the knowing faculty1 its object1 viz43 the distinction1 exists4 ,for knowing always involves that the thing known is4 ,the distinction between right and wrong is real in the sphere of moral relations4 ,second1 it is universal1 marking the human mind's action everywhere and in all ages4 ,third1 it cannot be obliterated4 ,through all questions about it and objections to its validity1 it remains undestroyed and seemingly indestructible4 ,it disappears only with the wreck of rationality itself4 ,fourth1 it is unique and simple1 an original perception1 incapable of being resolved into more elementary ideas or deduced from them4 ,fifth1 it is the first of its kind of discernments1 i4 e4 of ethical perceptions4 ,obligation ,perceived4 7#b7 ,along with1 though dependent on1 the perception of the moral distinction between right and wrong1 there is also a perception of obligation with respect to right and wrong--to do or not to do4 ,this is an essential part of the aggregate conscience-discernment4 ,the perception of the right is thus the discovery also of law for conduct4 ,the soul1 it must be specially noted1 perceives this obligation as truly as it does the ethical distinction itself4 ,the term obligation may express also a feeling1 but the ego1 or personal self1 perceives the obligation before it feels it4 ,for in all cases rational emotion or feeling can arise in the mind only as the mind discerns something to awaken it4 ,belongs to the ,agent4 ,it is to be particularly observed1 further1 that the obligation1 thus perceived and then felt1 is perceived and felt as due by the moral agent with respect to right and wrong4 ,the ethical quality of rightness belongs to the act or principle of action4 ,the motive1 the intention1 the conduct of men1 is in itself morally right or wrong1 good or evil4 ,but the obligation appears as what is owed by the moral agent to what is right4 ,the relation between right and obligation corresponds to that between right and duty4 ,right is in the conduct2 duty is for the responsible person4 ,the terms express two sides in the ethical reality1 the first the objective side1 the second the subjective4 ,the two imply and call for each other4 ,the right in the contemplated action means obligation or duty in the person4 ,to the right there is always a corresponding duty2 for duty in fact expresses what is due to the right forever by all persons4#ah ,this perception of obligation1 with its attendant feeling of it1 is the central reality of the conscience4 ,it is the very core of it4 ,for in this the moral faculty carries and asserts its imperative for the regulation of conduct4 ,on the basis of the idea of right1 it affirms duty1 and brings mankind under the reality and behests of moral law4 ,the distinction of right and wrong1 if conceived of as unattended with this further discernment of obligation1 would manifestly fall short of establishing the principle of duty or fixing in the soul a conscious bond to righteousness4 ,but in this further discernment is revealed the nexus that binds together perceived right and man's responsibility to it4 ,hence1 this is the cardinal thing in the conscience1 for which the ethical idea prepares1 and upon which the moral life rests4 ,it is the point at which humanity is organized under a moral constitution and the behests of moral law4 ,it is the sublime endowment in which man's nature is capacitated for its position1 as standing face to face with the sublimer reality of the divine government over the world4 ,it is to be distinctly observed1 however1 that the imperative disclosed in this perceived obligation1 does not mean compulsion4 ,the idea of obligation can have no place where there can be no choice as to accepting it4 ,the whole sphere of morals1 as we have already seen and shall need often to be reminded1 exists1 and can exist only in connection with personality or intelligent free agency4 ,its realm is that of freedom4 ,law in ethics is something in clear contrast with law in the processes of physical nature4 ,the perception of it is not the perception of what must be or will be1 or shall be1 but what ought to be4 ,its appeal is to our freedom1 and the duty is ideated before it is performed4 ,further1 it is well to observe here again how distinctly peculiar is this percept of obligation among the data of our cognitive faculties4 ,the sense-perception notifies us of what is4 ,so does the consciousness4 ,memory renews to consciousness a knowledge of what was4 ,the logical processes reveal abstract relations4 ,that two and two make four1 or that a straight line is the shortest between two points1 or that oxygen and hydrogen united in certain proportions form water1 are truths distinctly known when the mind is directed to these subjects2 but the perception of these truths is without the unique idea of obligation or the duty of cherishing any particular feeling or of conforming to a standard of righteousness4 ,only through the discernments of right and wrong by the conscience1 is there given this peculiar intuition of the reality of obligation4 ,moral ,quality ,identified4 7#c7 ,a third thing to be marked in this psychological analysis of the action of conscience1 and revealing its nature1 is the affirmation of right or wrong to particular acts or principles of conduct4 ,in this the function of conscience passes from its fundamental idea into the form of an applicatory judgment4 ,the ideas of right and obligation are applied to the actual affairs and activities of life4 ,the quality of right or wrong is connected with particular actions1 feelings or purposes1 and these are affirmed to be right or wrong according as they have or have not such moral quality4 ,this application is both a perception and a judgment--a perception in that it sees the ethical quality in the deed or motive1 and a judgment in that it affirms the connection4 ,these judgments take the forms of approval or disapproval1 as the conduct is discerned to be morally good or bad4 ,it is plain that such judgments of application would be impossible were there not in the mind the fundamental ethical distinctions already explained4 ,manifestly these judgments of application belong to the general judging power of the mind4 ,all knowing may be said to be judging1 or at least tends to take the form of judgment4 ,they are specific here1 only with respect to the material they take account of4 ,they are the acts of the judging faculty in the sphere of applying the ethical distinctions and obligations4 ,as a basis for the judgments1 not only must the ethical distinction exist in the mind1 but the action or conduct to be judged must be seen or understood in all its essential relations and motives4 ,as duties are developed by relations1 the moral character of the contemplated conduct or deed cannot be determined apart from a correct knowledge of those relations4 ,the judging capacity will err without the light of true and full information concerning the place and purposes of the action4 ,and its insights and affirmations will vary in their approximation to entire correctness according to the degree in which all the elements entering into the particular conduct are understood and considered4 ,merit and ,demerit ,perceived4 7#d7 ,the action of the conscience includes also perception of merit and demerit in connection with conduct4 ,the meaning of these terms needs to be carefully defined and limited4 ,they express something more than the simple approval or disapproval already noted in connection with the discernment of the rightness or wrongness of an action4 ,the terms stand for a step of discernment and judgment beyond these1 and denote the ethical reality of good-desert or ill-desert for the moral agent who conforms to rightness1 or offends against its claims4 ,he who conforms deserves well2 he that offends deserves ill4 ,they1 therefore1 mark distinctly and definitely the point in the psychology of the conscience where the faculty discerns that those who do right ought to receive favor and those who do wrong ought to experience disfavor4 ,they express a principle of just consequences4 ,the principle is1 that for right conduct good is due1 for wrong done evil is due4 ,the wrong-doer is guilty1 i4 e4 justly subject to punitive action4 ,his deed deserves it for him4 ,on the other hand doing right is worthy of reward1 or of the good that befits the good done4 ,the conscience discerns and affirms this reality of good and evil-desert4 ,here is reached the psychological source of the great fact of responsibility in the world4 ,it emerges into consciousness and into actual force in human life from this point in the disclosures and affirmations of the moral sense4 ,hence arises the unspeakably varied but ever persistent human necessity under which men are compelled to regard themselves and others as justly amenable to the law of moral consequences4 ,its application is seen in every sphere of life1 personal1 domestic1 social1 and national4 ,a moral administration is seen in the world only as the administration is found to be conformed to and carrying out the principle of distributing good according to moral desert4 ,any failure in the adjustment of recompense or given good under this idea is felt to be a lapse from justice and proper order4 ,it stands as something abnormal and monstrous4 ,so firmly does the decision of conscience establish this principle of happy consequences as due to right conduct and punitive effects to wrong-doing1 so strongly does it fix the conviction that the divine administration must on the whole adjust award and happiness on this basis1 that thoughtful philosophers have ever been wont to find here one of the most assuring guarantees of a future life in which the fragmentary justice of this world will be filled out in fully given recompense4 ,it must be noted1 as is apparent1 that this merit or demerit does not belong to men's acts1 but to themselves as the moral agents4 ,to action and conduct pertain the moral qualities of rightness and wrongness1 but what is done is itself altogether impersonal and not responsible for its own occurrence4 ,the doer of the deed deserves whatever good or evil is due in connection with it4 ,the practical application of this principle of moral desert is found to be almost infinitely varied1 both with respect to the import of the principle and the measure of merit and demerit4 ,with respect to its import1 good desert may mean simply that he who chooses the morally right is entitled to his own self-approbation and the approval of others and the moral excellence which he thus prefers4 ,or it may signify various degrees and kinds of more positive reward which the divine constitution and moral administration of the world may be adjusted to give in the way of happiness and the best external conditions of existence4 ,on the other hand1 the demerit of the wrong-doer may mean anything he deserves1 from the simple loss of the moral good which he does not choose1 to the extremest penalties1 objective and subjective1 which a righteous divine government may have to employ for the repression of wickedness4 ,in its import1 both merit and demerit may refer to endlessly varied experiences and forms of good and evil4 ,with respect to the measure of merit and demerit and the adjustment of due recompense1 a similar wide range of difference must be recognized when we come to the application of the principle to human acts and conduct4 ,conformity to right and offense against it are exhibited in myriad degrees under conditions as varied as are the positions and relations and inner state of all the individuals of the race4 ,the very nature of different persons is in unequal adjustment to virtue and vice4 ,environment1 too1 brings stronger temptations to some than to others4 ,hereditary forces and early training strengthen or weaken the moral perceptions and forces4 ,thousands of differences perplex the attempt to equate the measure of moral desert to men4 ,it can be determined only in full and perfect view of all the conditions within and the relations surrounding the moral agent2 and the apportionment of the due award1 it would seem1 can be perfectly made only by a being of infinite knowledge and justice4 ,the measurement of merit and demerit is1 however1 but another form of judgments of application1 in which the moral sense can act in only approximate determinations4 ,here variation and uncertainty find place4 ,but there can be none as to the fact of good desert and guilt where right and wrong are done4 ,emotions ,awakened4 7#e7 ,emotions or feelings1 awakened by the perceptions of right and wrong1 obligation1 merit and demerit1 complete the action of conscience4 ,these feelings are peculiar and original1 unlike the feelings springing from any other perceptions and incapable of being resolved into or deduced from others4 ,psychologically1 it is to be remembered1 feeling is in no case a part of perception or cognition1 but an additional psychical action of a different kind4 ,a purely cognitive intelligence might have perfect knowledge of things and their relations to itself2 it might know that things1 or courses of action1 would destroy its own existence2 it might even know that its own existence was about to be destroyed2 but this knowledge alone would imply no feeling4 ,such intellect would be like a mirror2 it would accurately reflect all that passed before it2 but it would be as indifferent as the mirror4#ai ,but knowing is followed by feeling1 a different kind of action of the soul4 ,this is not its action in the form of intellect1 but in the form of sensibility4 ,it is action of another order--not itself a cognition1 but arising out of cognition4 ,this is the place and relation of these moral feelings4 ,they are awakened in the soul by and through the ethical perceptions4 ,they are determined by these1 and form the final element in the total action of the conscience4 ,these moral feelings1 while they form one class1 as having their origin in the ethical discriminations1 exhibit distinguishing differences4 ,these differences develop in a twofold way1 presenting special forms of feeling4 ,they must be noted as they differ by these two conditions of their development4 ,correspondent to ,right or ,wrong4 ,first1 according as the moral quality1 the perception of which awakens them1 is good or evil4 ,the soul cannot discern the great distinctions between right and wrong without correspondent emotional awakening4 ,the sensibility is moved by the perception1 and takes the form of a feeling of approval for the morally good1 and a feeling of reprobation for the wrong4 ,our language furnishes no single term to designate either of these feelings1 but this phraseology is sufficiently descriptive to point them out4 ,the feeling toward the right may be denoted as moral love2 that toward wrong as moral aversion4 ,when the quality of rightness or wrongness is exhibited in specially intense degree in particular conduct1 the feelings may take the form of ethical admiration or of abhorrence4 ,before and ,after ,action4 ,secondly1 as arising before or after the moral action4 ,if the feeling is awakened in view of action proposed to be done1 it may be described1 in the absence of a more specific designation1 as a sense of obligation to do or not to do the deed--this feeling of obligation being based on a perception of the obligation4 ,from the intellectual discernment the emotional sensibility springs as a sentiment which forms part of the impelling force of conscience4 ,when the feeling arises with respect to an act already done1 it takes the nature of ethical satisfaction1 a peculiar pleasure in which are blended a sense of self-approbation and of joy1 if the deed be right2 of self-reproach and remorse1 if wrong4 ,remorse--a gnawing sense of guilt1 whether the feeling be the slightest disquiet of emotion or of agonizing and unsolaceable compunction--appears to be the aptest term to express this state of mind4 ,differences of ,degree4 ,besides the differences thus arising1 there are differences in the degree or intensity of these moral feelings4 ,innumerable causes may affect the differences in this respect4 ,personal temperament1 acquired character1 or external conditions may make the feeling greater or less4 ,the mental organization of some persons is more emotional4 ,education may have given a peculiar development4 ,temporary circumstances may heighten the excitation4 ,but other things being equal the degree of positiveness in the moral emotions is generally dependent on two things3 7a7 the clearness with which the moral distinction and the consequent obligation is discerned1 and 7b7 the pureness and tenderness of the person's moral nature4 ,if the ethical idea and obligation are unclearly seen or hardly seen at all1 the impression in the feelings must be comparatively slight4 ,but if seen under strong light and with their supreme import1 the intuition impresses with greater force4 ,so1 too1 the state of the whole moral nature is a reason of higher or lower moral sensibility4 ,the more unblighted is the condition of personal life1 the more is it responsive to the ethical discernment4 ,habitual refusal of duty1 easy and indifferent familiarity with wrong-doing1 or any continued enslavement of the higher nature to the lower1 necessarily blunts the delicateness of the sensibilities and lowers the strength of the moral feelings4 ,the process of injury may go on until a condition of callousness is reached which fulfils the striking description3 ,seared as with a hot iron4 ,motive ,power4 ,it is through these feelings that the conscience becomes a motive power for moral life4 ,the perception of duty alone1 as purely intellectual1 would be1 as said1 like a mirror accurately reflecting the ethical reality passing before it1 but as indifferent as the mirror4 ,but upon the perception the emotional nature springs into action4 ,knowledge1 if at all1 always goes into effect mediately through the sensibilities in which the soul is stirred by affections and desires4 ,these may be toward moral good as truly as toward sensuous good4 ,we may love the true and the beautiful and the right4 ,we may love the right as right4 ,according to our choices we make the ethically good our own and mould our life into its excellence and blessedness1 or the contrary4 ,these feelings are motive powers1 bringing occasions for choices4 ,it is proper to take note1 however1 that it is only the feelings in view of the right or wrong of an act yet to be done1 that are directly moral motives4 ,for it is only through these that we are face to face with the question of choosing or refusing the right in the proposed conduct4 ,the feelings that arise1 as satisfaction or remorse after wrong acts1 have no existence till the conduct is in retrospect1 and can have no motive force for it4 ,and when memory brings these experiences as motives for subsequent conduct1 they stand mainly1 if not wholly1 as considerations for enjoyment4 ,they are not feelings of pure obligation to rightness1 but remembrances of pleasure or pain influential as prompting or dissuading on the lower ground of comfort4 ,there is a generic and indelible difference between the feeling of duty1 under the pure behests of right1 and the natural desire to gain the enjoyment or avoid the misery which we have learned to anticipate from experiences in conduct4 ,in the one case it presents love of the right as right2 in the other a love of the more agreeable consequences of right4 ,unquestionably1 indeed1 a desire of the better consequences is a proper motive for choices4 ,in these consequences virtue is proving its adaptation to bring its own reward4 ,but the merit of virtue is not in seeking the reward1 but in seeking virtue itself4 ,the mercenary spirit is not the love of righteousness1 nor as high as it4 #e4 ,this analysis makes clear the following characteristics of the conscience4 ,conscience is ,intellectual4 ,first1 it is primarily and fundamentally intellectual4 ,it is a power of rational perception4 ,it perceives1 in direct or intuitive way1 the primary ethical distinction between right and wrong1 perceives the quality of rightness or wrongness in particular acts or conduct1 perceives the obligation of the moral agent with respect to right and wrong1 as also the merit or demerit of the moral agent4 ,but along with and blended in inseparable concurrence1 moves the function of the sensibility1 in feelings of approval and obligation1 satisfaction or remorse4 ,both the intellectual and emotional action of the soul are1 therefore1 included in what is named the conscience--the perceptive action1 here as everywhere else1 being primary and conditional for the emotional4 ,if there were no ethical distinction perceived1 none would be felt4 ,the conscience1 taken in its totality1 thus includes both sides of the human psychology1 the intellect and the sensibility1 and it addresses its behests of duty to the will in its own peculiar way of moral law for conduct4 ,the strife between intuitional theories and sentimental theories of conscience is1 therefore1 composed by the concurrence of both knowing and feeling in the action of this power4 ,but the intellectual part is necessarily logically prior to the emotional1 and conditional for it4 ,to make a feeling of obligation the basal fact in the psychology of conscience would be an inversion of the whole order of dependence revealed in consciousness4 ,and1 surely1 the feelings here developed are rational1 not physiological sensations4 ,they cannot1 for a moment1 be identified with the physical sensations which condition the sense-perceptions4 ,their true place is among the rational emotions4 ,sole ,percept ,moral ,quality4 ,secondly1 the sole object of perception by the conscience is moral quality--the quality of rightness or wrongness1 together with the correspondent obligation4 ,it is something supersensible and ideal2 not actions themselves as known by sense1 but their quality as morally good or evil as discovered by the ethical reason4 ,the thing discerned by the conscience is generically different from the things discerned by the sense-perception or consciousness4 ,through our senses we know the whole world of objective existences1 events and their relations2 through consciousness the states1 acts and experiences of the subjective personal self are given4 ,but the conscience does not furnish us with a knowledge of any of the substances1 events or relations which constitute the world about us or the world within us1 but solely of the moral quality of conduct and sentiment1 as duty is developed in these relations4 ,it takes notice of the ethical character of the actions and motives of intelligent and responsible beings4 ,conscience ,acts of ,necessity4 ,thirdly1 the action of the conscience is marked by necessity4 ,and by this we are to understand something more than the simple uniformity in which all the psychical activity1 except that of the choices of the will1 is held under fixed laws of thought and feeling4 ,the necessity here affirmed is that unique necessity which distinguishes and marks intuitive or a priori cognition1 as of time1 space1 and causality4 ,necessity is justly conceded to be one of the criteria of these and other intuitional first truths4 ,it is not at the option of the human mind whether it will think the world under the relations of time and space1 or events as occurring under the principle of causation4 ,these are forms of knowledge1 knowledge of super-sensible realities1 that come not at our choice but by an unavoidable insight4 ,the primary and fundamental ethical distinction belongs to such rational intuition1 and is marked by the peculiar necessity of intuitional action4 ,as on occasion of knowing material bodies with three dimensions1 or of changes in consciousness or in the outer world1 with the fact of co-existence or succession and duration1 the phenomenal sphere is necessarily transcended and time and space are necessarily discerned1 so when we understand the manifold relations in which our lives are to be lived1 in which we may use our personal powers1 either in harmony with or in violation of our given adaptations1 and with either great injury or rich good to others1 in the same necessary way the conscience must discern the distinction of right and wrong and the reality of duty4 ,the great implication in this necessity1 as we shall hereafter see in examining the nature of virtue1 is that the principle of righteousness or the law of duty is something that belongs to the objective order of the world as constituted by ,god1 a divine reality permanent and immutable1 not produced but perceived by the conscience4 ,it is not made by man but finds him--finds him through the intelligence by which he is informed of the realities to which he must adjust his life4 ,moral law stands for a reality that rays itself into view in the human reason whether men will or not4 ,the intuitions of it do not come at the call1 or desire1 or even at the consent of man4 ,the law revealed stands independent of the individual's personality or choices and asserts itself over him4 ,while this is true of the law revealed1 the perception of the law becomes a necessity with the moral agent that is normally endowed and developed4 ,man does not furnish the moral law to himself4 ,he is not the giver of it1 but the recipient4 ,the conscience1 therefore1 is an open window of our being1 through which the objective law of righteousness to which the ,creator has adjusted our nature and the constitution of the universe may be discerned by us1 a sphere of reality enfolding us1 with which our freedom is to harmonize our conduct4 ,francis ,newman has admirably marked the position of this conscience-power in our constitution3 ,this energy of life within is ours1 yet it is not we4 ,it is in us1 belongs to us1 yet we cannot control it1 ,it acts without our bidding1 and when we do not think of it1 ,nor will it cease its acting at our command1 or otherwise obey us1 ,but while it recalls from evil1 and reproaches us for evil1 ,and is not silenced by our effort1 surely it is not we2 ,yet it pervades mankind1 as one life pervades the trees4#bj ,the reason of these intuitions of the conscience is that back of it and around it and above it is a realm of moral obligations which must1 without contingency1 be made known to us1 that we may order our lives aright4 ,erroneous ,theory4 #f4 ,it is proper at this place to express dissent from some forms of theory which are at variance with the truth thus brought to light4 ,almost all of them are the outcome of the philosophical phenomenalism of which ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason is the best illustration4 ,it discredits the competency of our cognitive faculties to reach knowledge of things as they really are4 ,we can know1 it is said1 only phenomena1 while the noumena or things in themselves are incognizable2 and doubt is raised whether there is a reality corresponding to what our faculties report4 ,it is suggested that the data of these faculties1 especially in the forms of intuition and universal judgments1 may be mere forms of thought1 forms of knowing but not of real being1 created within as well as by the mind itself1 and projected thence in connection with apprehended phenomena4 ,they may be mental fictions in whole or in part1 in which the ideal must not be held as standing for actual being4 ,thus while time and space are necessary forms of thought under which all bodies and events must be known1 yet time and space1 it is alleged1 may be but subjective forms given to the phenomena by and in the cognitive action4 ,we are obliged1 indeed1 it is conceded1 in practical life to follow the guidance of our necessary forms of thought4 ,but the knowledge is merely regulative for present activity2 and being a product created and shaped largely by the particular organization of our minds1 this merely relative and regulative perception of truth may be different in other minds or be hereafter so changed as to present changed phenomena1 superseding the judgments now given by other judgments under other views4 ,when the adherents of the ,positive ,philosophy proceed to define matter as merely a permanent possibility of sensations1#ba faith in the reliability of our knowledge of the realities about us1 as true for those realities1 is thoroughly undermined4 ,this tendency toward an invalidating of our knowledge as real for objective truth1 has been fostered by recent physiological psychology which1 under materialistic implications1 magnifies the effect of the physical organization and condition upon the mental products4 ,in these ways extreme idealism and positive materialism join hands in effort to reduce to uncertainty or illusion what our cognitive faculties perceive of reality and truth in both the material and moral systems about us4 ,but ethical science1 in harmony with the soundest and best sustained philosophy of the ,christian centuries1 rejects these agnostic suggestions1 as not only unproved but untenable4 ,they form a theory of our intellectual faculties which cuts away the foundations of all knowledge1 even of that which is most clear1 fixed1 necessary and unchangeable in the intelligence of the race4 ,the theory becomes intellectual suicide1 as it nullifies the real validity of all the fundamental perceptions of both sense and reason1 on which its own conclusion rests4 ,its suggestions discredit themselves by confessing that their own foundation is but a part of the illusory1 phantasmal action of faculties which1 instead of perceiving what is1 present but forms which they produce4 ,while it is conceded that1 even on this agnostic basis1 the conscience would still possess regulative authority--as it still asserts its imperative ought for life--yet rational ethics1 like self-respecting philosophy1 must not vacate for our cognitive faculties the great function of knowing while attempting to exercise it1 nor fail to maintain that they have been organized for real knowledge1 within the sphere and measure opened to them1 of the genuine realities with which we have to do1 in both the material and moral worlds4 ,the conscience1 therefore1 must be held1 not as formative of its peculiar phenomena1 but perceptive of the ethical realities of right and obligation4 ,consistent with ,theistic ,evolution4 #g4 ,it is proper also to point out here that this view of the nature of the conscience is not necessarily affected by the question of its evolutionary origin4 ,should the theory of man's derivative origin1 under some form of theistic and teleological evolution1 ever pass from its position as an hypothesis into that of scientific truth1 this would not require us essentially to alter our account of the nature of this faculty4 ,for the nature of the faculty has not been found in considerations of the mode of its origin1 but from analysis of the elemental facts in its action4 ,the adherents of the evolution hypothesis have1 indeed1 found one of their most formidable difficulties in attempting a satisfactory explanation of a possible origination of this faculty in the assumed forces and laws of evolutionary action4 ,keeping in view the fact that the very center of the conscience-function appears in regulation and often in denial of inherited feelings and habits1 the difficulty of attributing its creation to hereditary action is clearly seen and deeply felt4 ,it has been well pointed out that the injunctions of conscience do not run with the stream of our hereditary tendencies1 but rather against them4#bb ,that a law of the work and victory of hereditary forces should issue in organizing an endowment for control and repression of hereditary tendencies1 seems to involve too much of a contradiction to be accepted4 ,that the survival of the strongest in the battle of individual existence1 the reign of tooth and talon1 should gradually create a faculty for asserting the obligation and law of love and kindness to the weak1 fails to come properly under our conception of the working of cause and effect4#bc ,even in the theistic form of the theory1 in which evolution offers itself as presenting not the cause but only the mode of creation1 it is hard to conceive of the adaptation of such a process for the production of such a result--a result standing apart from the means by a total difference in both their nature and direction4 ,it is as if the flow of the stream should create the principle of repression of flowing4 ,the actual attempts of evolutionist writers to construct an ethical view which shall explain the phenomena of conscience and justify its authority1 has added further evidence of the difficulty on this point4 ,no such attempts have thus far been satisfactory4 ,but the nature of the conscience1 as has already been shown1 is properly settled1 not by the mode of its origin1 but by an examination of its actual psychology and intrinsic powers4 ,if this makes it clear1 as it unquestionably does1 that it is primarily intellectual and percipient in its function1 then any failure of evolution or any other theory to explain its origin must much rather discredit the theory than disprove the nature of the endowment which stands as a fact4 ,but an origin of the conscience by evolution1 should it ever be proved1 would introduce no trouble at this point in the science of ethics4 ,for the faculty is competent for its office in virtue of what it is1 and not by the mode through which the divine creative power worked in its formation4 ,the necessity in the case would be met should the evolutionary mode be shown to be capable of evolving an intellectual endowment high enough in perceptive power to discern the ethical distinctions and bind their obligations on men4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,supremacy ,,of ,,conscience4 ,by the supremacy of conscience is meant its right to exercise moral control4 ,it expresses its proper authority4 ,this authority is not to be thought of as original or independent1 but as resting on and revealing the absolute authority of ,god1 who has constituted the moral relations of the world and has set the conscience1 with its discerning and regulative function1 in the human soul4 ,the question involved is not the right of one merely subjective faculty to impose obligation on another faculty or on all the human capacities and powers--one part of the personal self playing the role of sovereign over the other parts4 ,this would be a shallow and misleading notion of this authority4 ,the whole conception of the conscience is theistic1 and implies1 as it also testifies to1 an absolute law of righteousness over all the world1 established by ,him who is creator and sovereign of all4 ,it is in the discernment of this principle of rightness1 with its demand for obedience to it1 that the conscience comes into its position of authority and its authority becomes de jure supreme4 #a4 ,but the proof that such authority rightly belongs to it needs to be more fully exhibited4 ,it is explained and made unquestionable in the following facts3 ,its ,sphere of ,judgments4 7#a7 ,it is involved in the very sphere of its discernments4 ,this sphere is the sphere of right and duty1 which1 by very conception1 subordinate everything else4 ,its primary perception is of the right1 as having claim on every rational free agent--and then of obligation which immediately presses its moral requirement into the presence of our capacity for conformity to it4 ,there is1 indeed1 a degree of authority belonging to each and all the psychical faculties1 in the functions they fulfil for the direction and welfare of life4 ,but the peculiarity of the conscience is that the realm of its functions and direction is higher than that of the other powers1 the realm in which manhood reaches its supreme purpose and worth4 ,moral goodness1 excellence of character1 is the summit of the ascent to which human nature is adapted4 ,in this our nature reaches the supreme and all-inclusive good1 compared with which all things else are of inferior claim and merit4 ,the authority of the conscience1 as a faculty1 is thus identified with the supremacy which belongs to the idea of the morally right1 of obligation1 duty1 the irrepealable ought for the conduct of life4 ,shown by ,nature of ,action4 7#b7 ,this is more distinctly apparent when we recall the nature of its action4 ,psychologically1 the conscience does not stand as a thing of our own personal will1 or as in any way making the obligation which it presents4 ,when we examine it1 as it appears in our consciousness1 its movement is in the form of a necessary perception of an obligation that is upon us irrespective of our will1 a law of duty not of our own framing1 but imposing itself on us and demanding the homage of our will4 ,it possesses its authority1 therefore1 in the fact that it is the discernment of something higher than our will or ourselves1 a principle transcending our personality and appearing as supreme law for our life and conduct4 ,and the law connotes a lawgiver and a judge4 ,the conscience thus puts us in the presence of ,one who has sovereign and absolute right to rule in us and over us4 ,it thus becomes authoritative by its being the power or faculty through which is made known to us the principle or law of righteousness which ,god has established for the moral order of the world4#bd ,the ,contrary is ,absurd4 7#c7 ,these facts1 at once psychologically and metaphysically well certified1 would themselves be sufficient to explain and vindicate the peculiar right of supremacy almost universally conceded to belong to the moral sense4 ,but the proof1 thus given1 is confirmed by the fact that the contrary conclusion involves a manifest absurdity4 ,in the first place1 it is incredible to suppose that man1 as an intelligent1 rational1 free agent1 capable of character1 should have no provision in his mental make-up1 no faculty of knowledge1 furnishing a principle of guidance for meeting the responsibilities of life4 ,for1 such an absence of endowment for this purpose1 would necessarily mean1 either that responsibility is an illusion1 a conclusion belied by the hard fact that the organization of human life inexorably treats and exacts it as real1 or that man's nature is constructed in a falsehood1 being bound to a high task for which it contains no endowment4 ,somewhere1 therefore1 among the human faculties1 must appear a power or complex of powers whose disclosures or impulses shall furnish a rightful principle of control4 ,to say that there is no rightful principle--that the morally good has no more right than the morally bad--would be not only absurd to reason1 but fly in the face of the spontaneous and ineradicable sense of mankind1 which makes the moral distinction4 ,further3 ,while the authority for self-control1 to meet the ethical task and responsibilities of life1 must thus be found somewhere in man's constitution1 careful consideration makes it also clear that the right of supremacy cannot be attributed to any other capacity1 function or impulse of our nature4 ,the well-known argumentum ad absurdum is fully applicable here4 ,besides the conscience itself1 the only other motive-forces for conduct are the physiological appetites1 the desires for enjoyment1 and the benevolent affections4 ,the right of supreme control cannot be supposed to belong to the physical appetites and passions4 ,the supremacy of these would be subversive of character and deadly to personal and social welfare4 ,this is not simply the judgment of reason1 but a fact attested by the most melancholy experiences in which blight and woe have fallen on men4 ,nor can the right of ruling authority belong to the desire of enjoyment4 ,when this dominates it becomes the reign of selfishness1 which1 according to the consent of mankind1 is utterly inconsistent with the development of noble character1 or the discharge of those inter-human duties on which both individual and social well-being depends4 ,it forms the soul of anarchy1 in which the family1 society1 and the state would be dissolved4 ,the true excellence and happiness of man would be impossible4 ,the rulership of this class of motive forces is thus inconsistent with the highest and best ends to which his nature has been correlated4 ,nor can the supremacy belong to the benevolent affections4 ,these1 summed up in the word love1 are indeed very high and must be regarded as among the worthiest and best elements of character and principles of action4 ,god is love1 and so near does love come to being the very essence of virtue1 that it is declared to be the fulfilling of the law4 ,but the love that ,god is said to be is not alone in ,his character1 nor does it rule without regard to holiness1 justice1 purity1 or righteousness4 ,it cannot be conceived as subordinating these to a desire to make creatures happy4 ,on the other hand we are obliged to think of love as able to confer its favors only in accordance with the principle of righteousness4 ,even in its supreme exhibition1 in the salvation of men1 in giving its gifts1 it could only act through a way that declared the divine righteousness while granting forgiveness to those that repent and forsake wrong4 ,in human life1 the love that in its own degree and order helps to the fulfillment of the law is not alone1 or unregulated1 or superior to the principle of duty1 of truth1 purity and holiness4 ,it cannot get above these1 but is itself right only when it holds its ends1 of making its objects happy1 in subordination to what is morally good4 ,we must remind ourselves exactly what the supremacy of the benevolent affections would mean4 ,unless guided in the action through which they reach their object1 they would subject everything to their own ends and take no account of the character of the ways and means1 as right or wrong4 ,as unregulated love they would lack an essential element for the office of moral control4 ,if it be true1 as it unquestionably is1 that some things are wrong1 no matter how lovingly they may be done1 the benevolent affections cannot be the supreme guide for even the loving activities of life4 ,blind affection may run1 as it does in thousands of relations and instances1 into the widest departures from good character and into gross vices4 ,however high the benevolent feeling may be as a motive1 all its purposes and the activities through which these purposes are accomplished need the guidance of the law of righteousness1 if they are to be maintained in harmony with essential virtue1 holy character and human welfare4 ,their function must therefore be held subordinate to the authority of conscience as the capacity through which the law of rectitude1 with its obligation1 is presented and kept before the mental view4 ,this conclusion does not remove love from its high position1 at the very summit of things that are right and good and essential for character4 ,it allows it to stand1 as it does all other springs of action1 in its full rights and value among human motives and virtues in determining duty in conduct4 ,but it is the conscience1 and not love itself1 that judges and decides the obligation to it and the high rank that ought to be given it as an element of character4 ,thus the regulative function1 even for benevolence1 belongs to the ethical sense1 through perception of what sentiments and acts are right in conduct4 ,and so the peculiar business of the conscience is to watch all the forces of our nature and keep each in its place4 ,the view which gives the right of moral control to the conscience is thus vindicated by the plain fact that there is no other faculty or spring of action in the human constitution adapted to this function1 so unquestionably requisite for the order and welfare of life4 ,difficulties4 #b4 ,an apparent difficulty1 however1 arises in connection with this conclusion4 ,it calls for a brief consideration1 lest it should be thought to form a refutation of the correctness of our view3 ,it comes from the acknowledged fallibility of the conscience4 ,this seems1 at first sight1 inconsistent with a right to such ruling authority4 ,if its discernment of duty in particular relations may not be fully clear and is liable to be misled1 how can it be justly regarded as having this authoritative office8 ,if its applicatory judgments are often found erroneous and need to be revised and superseded by better judgments1 can we fairly hold it as charged with such regulative function8 ,in different men1 as already stated1 it exhibits differing and even conflicting directions4 ,in different nations and times its indications of duty fail to agree4 ,advance in civilization1 knowledge and culture is marked by higher ethical standards1 modifying1 if not reversing1 former judgments4 ,but this large fact1 so unquestionable and1 apparently1 so formidable1 becomes1 when analyzed1 easily reconcilable with the position of authority given to the conscience-discernments and imperatives4 ,for a faculty may be highest in human nature1 and yet1 like every other capacity1 limited4 ,its functional action may be comparatively undeveloped1 or may be strengthened and clarified4 ,in its applicatory judgments1 for fixing the ethical law of right in all the varied and complex relations and conditions of human life1 it is dependent on all the subordinate faculties for the requisite light4 ,whatever limitations may rest on its ability1 whatever partialness may mark its development1 whatever complications may perplex it in adjusting duty to all the actual situations in human life1 it yet remains the faculty through which the law of duty is disclosed to view1 and if duty is not indicated through it1 it is not indicated through any human insight at all4 ,but no faculty loses its own particular special authority in its own place by its natural limitations and liability to error4 ,authority must not be confounded with infallibility4 ,despite its fallibility every faculty of the soul carries the authority for its own psychical office--the intellect for knowledge1 the sensibility for feeling1 the will for choices4 ,the sense-perception has decisive authority for phenomena about us1 the logical faculty for just conclusions from given data1 the memory for recall of past experiences1 the intuitional reason for axiomatic truths and first principles4 ,if the liability to error in the psychic functions and their application to the myriad conditions in which their immediate data are used1 does not vacate their place of authority in their spheres1 no more does the similar liability vacate the unique authority of the conscience1 which it has by its action in the supreme realm of the right and of moral obligation4 ,its position of authority in its sphere remains1 and remains supreme1 because the sphere of its action and discernments is1 as pointed out1 the supreme sphere of eternal righteousness and obligation4 ,but a further question arises at this point4 ,if it is sometimes in error and1 like an imperfect watch1 gives an incorrect indication1 should the conscience always be followed8 ,does not this fact1 if it does not wholly take away its right to supremacy1 at least modify the positiveness of our duty to follow its dictates8 ,this has sometimes been a perplexing casuistic question4 ,but the perplexity arises from failure to keep in mind the precise points involved in the problem1 and to take account of the whole process through which particular duties become apparent and obligatory4 ,since the decision of the conscience1 when rightly and fully reached1 is1 at the time it is given and as to the point it decides1 the soul's conviction as to what is right and duty1 to violate or disregard it becomes necessarily the very essence of the immoral spirit and conduct4 ,to go contrary to what the soul sees as duty1 through the only capacity it has for knowing it1 is essentially moral rottenness4 ,whewell's statement3 ,to disobey the commands and prohibitions of conscience1 under any circumstances1 is utterly immoral3 it is the very essence of immorality1#be is hardly too emphatic4 ,to some writers this has seemed extravagant1 in view of the fact that some of the greatest wrongs and foulest crimes of history1 such as the burning of ,latimer and ,ridley1 the ,st4 ,bartholomew massacre1 the gun-powder plot1 might be palliated or even justified under the plea of conscientiousness in the perpetrators4#bf ,but the reconciliation of this seeming conflict between conscience and real duty is made plain by remembering two things3 ,first1 that the conscience1 being a complex faculty or power1 its particular judgments of duty in particular cases1 being judgments of application of the principle of rightness1 are reached often through very complex processes1 in which the obscuration of imperfect information1 or misconception of the relations involved1 or the misleading effect of prejudice created by wrong training1 or some falsely imagined divine authority1 may leave not only a state of doubt as to duty1 but throw the decision into error4 ,examples of the process occur in daily experience4 ,a question of duty is presented4 ,we come to it with sincere1 honest mind1 and study it by taking into consideration all the facts and relations concerned4 ,we get all the light we can1 and we decide what the moral principle requires of us4 ,this is the course that fair dealing with ourselves and duty requires us to pursue4 ,but suppose that1 after all this1 in the fallibility of the applicatory judgments1 we are thus led to do the very thing that ought not to be done1 and violate instead of fulfil the duty which the actual relations call for from us4 ,the following of conscience may thus have put wrong conduct1 objectively viewed1 in place of the right conduct which was due from us in the case4 ,the deed1 in its external form and bearing1 may have been unfitting and one that ought not to have been done4 ,but this is not the whole view or full account of the matter4 ,for though1 while in obeying our fallible conscience1 we have thus failed to bring our whole outward action in the case into harmony with full duty1 or have even done what to others about us or to ,god above us was wrong1 we have maintained our own subjective personal moral integrity1 in maintaining that which is the fundamental and essential element of all morality1 the right intention and effort4 ,this is the prime and the grandest element of all moral character1 and is itself more than four-fifths of conduct4 ,there is such a thing as being innocent even when we have done what1 viewed objectively1 ought not to have been done4 ,the aim1 in genuine integrity of moral purpose1 was to do right4 ,the deed was a mistake4 ,the moral status in which we may thus be placed as a result of following our conscience1 is1 ethically1 at the opposite pole from that which we make ours when we disregard duty as fixed for us in and by our own moral judgments4 ,this is disobedience to obligations as perceived and felt--an attitude in its nature immoral4 ,secondly1 the crimes and wrongs often attributed to obeying the conscience are1 probably1 not fairly credited to the action of conscience at all4 ,we must distinguish what men1 even conscientious men1 have done or do in the name of conscience1 and what the moral judgment itself has pointed out and urged as duty4 ,it is safe to affirm that nearly all these crimes have come not by the light and dictates of the conscience1 but by its suppression4 ,there are1 as all history1 observation and experience testify1 many other strong and bad motive-forces in human nature4 ,the appetites and passions1 the lusts of ambition1 the desire of wealth and power1 the striving for place and fame1 the willfulness of selfishness and prejudice1 are forever suggesting their objects1 filling the soul with their varied and plausible pleadings1 until life is driven hither and thither under the restless forces4 ,in some men these forces hardly allow any place for the conscience to act4 ,not from the intuition of the moral sense or the force of conscience1 but from the suggestion and direction of other motives1 come the crimes that are credited to zeal inspired by conscience4 ,conscience is not at the helm in this business4 ,the wrongs are a result of failure to consult its dictates--of the force and direction of other elements and tendencies of action in human nature4 ,it was not conscience that burnt ,latimer and ,ridley1 but intolerant fanatical hate1 hot passion ruling the hour4 ,it was not conscience that made ,st4 ,bartholomew's day full of cruelty1 blood and horror1 but prejudice1 hatred1 the unreasoning rush of excited passions4 ,it may1 indeed1 seem plausible to say that day was made by the ,church's conscience asserting the duty of repressing or overthrowing heresy4 ,and it is conceivable that that conscience should testify against the evil of heresy1 and the duty of endeavoring to overcome it4 ,but the suggestion of torture1 blood and slaughter as the means of such repression1 was not the work of conscience4 ,its guidance was thrust aside in that conduct4 ,for this use of violence1 cruelty and murder1 with all their repulsive horrors1 conscience did not give the command1 even as ,god did not4 ,the truth with respect to the authority of conscience may be summed up as its right to control our lives in all things involving moral quality or character4 ,specifically3 7#a7 ,in the regulation of our physical appetencies2 7#b7 ,in the use to which we put our intellectual endowments and capacities2 7#c7 ,in the direction and relations in which we use our emotional and affectional capacities1 embracing our natural disposition1 desires and aims2 7#d7 ,in deciding our choices or the way we use our power of free self-determination1 covering our intentions and aims2 and 7#e7 ,in the use we make of our capacities for physical action by which thought1 feeling and the preferences of choice are turned into conduct which either fulfils or violates the duties which are evolved by our relations to being around us or above us4 ,the authority of conscience touches at each and all of these different points1 because at each and all human life is taking shape in moral character1 as either conformed to duty or variant from it4 ,our personal life is1 in its deepest reality1 a single self-conscious unit1 and the action of all its capacities and powers needs to be rhythmically adjusted to the morally good4 ,but the imperative of the conscience addresses itself pre-eminently and peculiarly to the will1 or the personal self as free in choosing1 and thus capable of directing and using all the personal capacities and functions4 ,it is upon the self as free-will1 as the self-determining and directive power1 that the responsibility for the conduct of life is thrown1 and through it1 if at all1 the responsibility is to be met4 ,and this authority becomes supreme not by any arbitrary right of one subjective faculty over another or over all the rest1 but from the fact of the supremacy of what the conscience discerns and discloses1 the authority of right over wrong1 the obligation to eternal righteousness4 ,righteousness is king4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,moral ,,agency4 ,our consideration of the great truth of the distinction between right and wrong which marks human life in all ages and places1 and of the existence and nature of the moral faculty discerning and enforcing this distinction1 leads up to an inquiry into the aggregate complex of endowments which are essential to moral agency4 ,the great fact of moral agency is implied and made certain in what has already been brought into view4 ,but the pre-supposition of such moral agency is manifestly the moral agent1 with all the requisite endowments for the sublime reality of ethical life4 ,what are the constituents of the moral nature1 in which man rises to the lofty grade of moral agency8 ,there are two special reasons for examining and fixing the truth on this point4 ,first1 it is needful in order to complete the scientific ethical view4 ,such view must be comprehensive enough to include the sum total of the powers or faculties concerned in living the moral life4 ,the view remains faulty if any parts or features of the actual constitution are omitted or their relations to each other and to the whole are misconceived4 ,secondly1 false and confusing representations have often been made on this point4 ,for instance1 because all the moral life moves so closely about the conscience there has been a tendency to think of the conscience and the moral nature as the same4 ,in the eighth edition of the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 ,dr4 ,alexander taught3 ,the moral nature of man is summed up in the word conscience4 ,moral nature and conscience are two names for the same thing4 ,an analysis of conscience1 therefore1 will unfold man's moral nature4 ,this resolves the whole of our moral nature into this one particular faculty4 ,a full and correct statement must make it embrace much more4 ,though the conscience may be the culminating thing1 it is by no means all that is requisite to endow a being with the capacities necessary for moral agency4 ,the truth of this is easily made clear4 ,it is self-evident that all the essentials for moral action must be embraced in the moral nature4 ,some of these1 manifestly1 are not identical with the faculty of conscience1 however closely allied to it they may be4 ,for example1 the general function of knowing is not the same as the conscience1 yet it is necessary to moral action4 ,the faculty of choice is not itself conscience or a part of conscience4 ,still moral action is impossible without it4 ,some of these essential elemental functions may in themselves possess no moral character whatever4 ,for instance1 to know is not itself a moral act1 yet it is necessary for moral agency4 ,the faculty of feeling is not per se moral4 ,the emotions arise necessarily or at least spontaneously from acts of knowledge1 and may be neither meritorious nor blameworthy4 ,yet the emotional function1 through which thought passes into action and conduct1 is involved in meeting the obligations of life4 ,thus it becomes plainly evident that besides the conscience by which the ethical quality and obligation are perceived1 other powers by which conduct may be conformed to this obligation are requisite to fit beings for the responsibilities of moral agency4 ,in other words1 our moral nature is not only the conscience by which we approve and condemn1 but also all the other endowments by which we originate or work out what is approvable or condemnable4 ,illustrations of this appear in our lives every day4 ,conscience does not love1 yet love of what is good is a moral act or temper4 ,conscience does not care for the sick or feed the hungry1 yet such charities are acts of the moral life4 ,we must1 therefore1 mark the constituents which together form man's moral constitution4 ,rational ,intelligence4 #a4 ,the first and fundamental thing1 unquestionably1 is his rational intelligence4 ,a being incapable of knowledge is incapable of the idea or sense of duty4 ,in a world in which creative production should present no creature able to know or think1 there could be no moral agency whatever4 ,between rocks and trees and irrational living organisms no moral relations can exist nor duties be developed4 ,rational intelligence1 which is the basal reality of personality1 is the first essential for moral agency4 ,and this must be understood to mean the whole intellectual endowment1 embracing self-consciousness1 perception1 memory1 imagination1 intuitional insight1 and the varied powers of reflection and the discursive understanding4 ,since1 as will hereafter appear 7,chapter ,,ix71 duties are developed by the relations in which men stand in the system of which they are made to form a part1 a knowledge of themselves and of their relations is clearly essential to a discharge of these duties4 ,their very constitution carries also an adaptation to an end which they must know1 in order to meet their duty to themselves and others4 ,this dependence of ethical life upon knowledge makes itself impressively clear in the experiences and course of common life and the lessons of history4 ,while the absence of rational intelligence1 as in the case of idiocy1 annuls all possibility of character and responsibility1 the lower the grade of men and races in mental development1 the poorer is their equipment for the demands of the full ethical standard of conduct4 ,it is almost axiomatic that we should not look for as high grade of moral ideals and rules among ignorant people and savage tribes as in the life of intelligent civilizations4 ,though the principle of duty is not always turned into character in proportion to the measure of mental development and secular culture1 yet experience and history affirm a clear tendency in increased knowledge to bring better sense of obligation and more prevalent rectitude of life4 ,so well established is the recognition of this relation between intelligence and conduct1 that the advocates of the evolutionist origin of man with one consent represent the emergence of intelligence as conditional for the appearance of moral agency4 ,a knowledge of one's self and of his relations to the world around him and ,god above him1 and the destiny to which his powers appoint him1 is thus fundamental in the constitution of a nature for the sphere and reality of moral life4 ,the ,conscience4 #b4 ,the conscience--resting in the general rational intelligence and rising into the peculiar discernments and judgments which mark it--is another constituent4 ,this is universally conceded by moral philosophy4 ,there is1 therefore1 need here only to recall the place and relations of this special power in the total organism of psychical powers4 ,the conscience1 in its essential perceptions and judgments1 as appears from the analysis already given1 is part of the rational intelligence4 ,it designates the power and function of the intelligent ego1 or personal self1 for discernment in the sphere of right and duty--for insight into the reality of ethical law and obligation which belong to good conduct among rational1 self-directing beings4 ,it expresses1 therefore1 the highest ascent of the rational intelligence1 where1 overlooking the whole realm of existence and relations known in other forms of knowledge1 it sees1 and through the emotional nature1 feels1 how to live as life ought to be lived4 ,further1 while thus the summit point in the rational intelligence1 the conscience employs for its perceptions and judgments the data of all the other functions of the mind4 ,its discernments are made in the light of all the truth which in any way illuminates the understanding4 ,this explains why and how the conscience is educable4 ,it is dependent on all the other intellectual powers for a knowledge of the relations of life which develop duties and in view of which every duty is to be determined and judged4 ,the very position of the conscience1 as highest of all the powers of the intelligence1 makes it1 not the most independent1 but the most dependent of all4 ,all knowledge should supply light for the right conduct of life4 ,the clearer the light1 other things being equal1 the clearer and more correct will be the ethical judgments4 ,ignorance is a darkened atmosphere to see duty in4 ,the advance of general civilization1 the progress of knowledge1 the widening of the realm of science1 the supernatural information given by special divine revelation1 are all1 therefore1 if used as they should be1 factors in developing the faculty of conscience into its best ability for insight into duty and for practical morality4 ,free ,will4 #c4 ,free-will4 ,the only truly satisfactory psychological account of the will is that which presents it as the soul's power of causation for choices4 ,it is the capacity of the personal ego or self for real choosing or free election4 ,as in intellectual action the soul is causal for knowing or thinking1 and in the sensibility it is causal for feeling or really feels1 so in will the ego or rational self is acting as the cause of the choices which it makes4 ,using the term for this capacity of the personal self to choose1 the will is self-determining4 ,it originates movement4 ,it is creative of its own acts4 ,it is causal of its volutions4 ,morality consists in deliberate self-submission to the law of rectitude4 ,duty must be freely chosen2 and the autonomy of the will1 i4 e4 of the personal self1 is involved in the very conception of virtue4 ,freedom must1 therefore1 be a prime characteristic of a moral nature4 ,the whole fabric of obligation and responsibility is built upon it4 ,it is this1 as well as rational intelligence1 that lifts man above the order and ongoing of material nature and makes him amenable to the claims of right and duty4 ,it is essential to personality and its presence or absence makes and marks the deepest difference between persons and things4 ,we can imagine intellectual automatism2 but the most brilliant intellectuality1 a corruscation of mental mechanism1 without reaching up into a capacity for free choice and voluntary action1 would1 manifestly1 not make a free agent or exalt into the high realm of ethical life4 ,the idea of duty is inapplicable except in the sphere of freedom4 ,moral responsibility is inconceivable without it4 ,in this1 more than in anything else1 the whole aggregation of human endowments comes to its crown4 ,in it man becomes1 in a real sense1 a supra-natural being1 endowed with the lofty distinction of self-direction1 self-dominion and self-rulership in the presence of the great realities of right and obligation4 ,he becomes capable of character and answerable for his conduct1 as he shapes that character and determines that conduct4 ,and this freedom cannot be merely the freedom of simple spontaneity or voluntariness4 ,it must be the capacity of alternative choice4#bg ,there could not be real choice without capacity and room to elect between different possibilities4 ,it is a well known definition3 ,free will is possessed when1 the conditions of doing something being given1 one can either do or not do it4#bh ,a capacity simply to act1 even though it should be through intelligence and consciousness1 in a way that can have no alternative and allows no choice or option1 could not open a field of personal virtue or responsibility4 ,where only one thing is really made possible in action1 and that one possible thing is already somehow necessitated1 there can be no place for choice4 ,it presents no sphere for the exercise of election--even though the faculty of election should exist4 ,a field of choice and the faculty of choice imply and call for each other4 ,both are necessary for the freedom implied in responsibility4 ,human responsibility rests on the possession of a real capacity to make decision between real alternatives4 ,without these there could be no more place for morality among men than there is among the atoms or molecules of the chemical elements in their behavior in the laboratory4 ,the proof of free-will1 in this sense1 might be left to rest upon the fact that it is a necessary pre-supposition to the very conception of morality and of actual accountability4 ,this accountability1 recognized in conscience and exacted by the constitution of the world1 is an omnipresent and inerasable reality4 ,so must free-will also be4 ,freedom is part of the moral idea1 and the idea falls apart and lapses into contradiction and confusion without it4 ,the same necessity that obliges us to accept the truth of morality itself1 obliges us to assert free-will as an attribute of a moral nature and a condition of moral agency4 ,but the truth of freedom is sustained by other proofs4 ,it is proper to recall and fix clearly in mind several of these4 7#a7 ,the testimony of consciousness4 ,this is clear and explicit4 ,we are directly conscious of free choice4 ,and there can be no evidence more immediate and authoritative than that of consciousness4 ,it is the form of evidence in which all psychical facts1 activities1 powers1 and laws1 are made known and stand certified in our knowledge4 ,it is the certifying element for both the form and reality of all our knowing4 ,it is that in which we know that we know1 and without which there can be no knowledge4 ,it is1 therefore1 the foundation certitude4 ,our systems of science1 our conclusions in philosophy1 our intuitions into first truths and laws1 and all the confidence with which we accept truth in all these great realms of mental life1 rest back on the observations1 reasonings and conclusions for whose reality and order consciousness is our most fundamental voucher4 ,to its tests and verifications all the processes of knowing must submit4 ,no truth is even visible except in the light in which consciousness holds all our acts and forms of intelligence4 ,no form of our knowing can be surer than this4 ,to discredit it is to discredit that without whose help not a step in knowledge can be taken4 ,upon this fundamental and unsurpassable evidence rests the great fact of free-will4 ,no person1 in the simple light of his unperverted and unperplexed consciousness1 doubts his free-will4 ,he finds himself in exercise and use of it every day and every hour4 ,he knows himself to be perpetually making decisions within his own liberty1 if he knows anything4 ,the witness to it is direct1 and he holds himself1 and others hold him1 responsible for his choices and the deeds he does in carrying them out4 ,he deliberately and consciously elects his way through clearly seen open alternative possibilities4 ,if he is to believe that in reality he does not do so1 he must believe that his consciousness is a perpetual fraud upon him4 ,but thus the authority for the reality of all his psychical capacities and acts is overthrown1 and he does not know that he knows in any of his knowing4 ,it is not a sufficient answer to all this1 when it is said that in this way of proof we are making the testimony of consciousness reach further than it actually does4 ,some psychologies undertake to limit consciousness to a disclosure of simply the actual volition1 or other psychical acts1 and not of acts or volitions which we imagine might have been but were not4 ,thus1 it is said1 the proof of another possible choice1 as an alternative to that of the actual volition1 fails to be covered by the consciousness4 ,the supposed act is outside of its reach of purview and testimony4 ,but such a psychology is untrue to the full deliverance of the consciousness4 ,a just and full account of it1 as is clearly seen in our experience1 must hold it as covering not only the act of choice1 but the power to choose4 ,the human consciousness is a self-consciousness1 and in it we truly know the personal self as the power for the various forms of activity which it reveals4 ,not more truly are we conscious of the power really to think or feel than really to choose1 among diverse possibilities4 ,we have direct knowledge of the power of electing in the very act of election4 ,and thus1 not only the untutored consciousness1 but one trained to the sharpest and deepest self-inspection1 will be found a full witness to free-will as a capacity of alternative choice4 7#b7 ,the implications of the natural constitution of the world4 ,mankind are in fact framed into and held under the principle of freedom4 ,the whole system of which man forms a part answers to the testimony of consciousness4 ,bishop ,butler1 in his immortal ,analogy1 has shown with resistless clearness and force that in the constitutional organism of society and the experiences of actual life free-will is assumed for human nature4#bi ,both by natural and moral law men are governed as free agents4 ,the physical order of the earth1 as a place where bodily and moral welfare are conditioned on obedience to discoverable relations and principles1 pre-supposes human intelligence and liberty4 ,nature in her ongoings requires every individual to adjust himself carefully to its laws of health1 safety and happiness4 ,there is an incessant appeal to him to use his intelligence and liberty in accordance with the demands of his ever-changing conditions and relations in life4 ,the idea that everything takes place by necessity is not only at variance with his sense of freedom1 but is found utterly inapplicable in practical living4 ,a youth1 if such a case be supposed1 trained under the notion that he must not be held responsible for his acts1 since they take place by necessity1 would soon find his dream of irresponsibility disturbed and disallowed4 ,at every turn he would find the inexorable forces of nature and society refusing to recognize his claim4 ,government1 law1 administration1 all the various functions through which human affairs are held together in orderly movement1 assume the individual's power and obligation to determine his conduct and hold him chargeable with consequences4 ,though supposed speculatively true1 the doctrine proves false in practice4 ,it is in fact untrue to the constitution of human life4 ,the thing here insisted on1 says ,butler1 is that under the present natural government of the world we find ourselves treated and dealt with as if we were free1 prior to all consideration whether we are or not4 ,were this opinion1 therefore1 of necessity admitted to be ever so true1 yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things1 that whenever we apply it to life and practice1 this application of it always misleads us1 and cannot but mislead us1 in a most dreadful manner1 with regard to our present interests4 ,beyond all question1 as is evident to every thoughtful person1 mankind deal one with another on the pre-supposition and principle of freedom1 and of the responsibility which is ethically unthinkable except on that freedom4 ,personal1 social1 and governmental relations are framed upon this principle1 and are a perpetual expression of it4 ,men universally treat each other--and under the actual inter-relations of life cannot but treat each other--as free beings4 ,the inference is direct and necessary that they are such1 unless we concede that human life is organized into a necessary order of living that is false to their real nature and unjust in its penalties4 7#c7 ,it is to be further noted that while freedom rests thus on the direct and positive evidence of consciousness and the actual order of life1 the contrary doctrine of necessity or determinism arises only from assumptions or implications of speculative thought4 ,this is a fact that needs to be clearly and fully fixed in mind4 ,necessitarianism is without any direct witness of consciousness1 and is not forced or even suggested by the natural sense of mankind4 ,it is not required as a working theory for the business or natural conduct of life4 ,it is only a product of speculation or ideal theorizing4 ,it is constructed from different standpoints of thought4 ,in some speculation it rests simply on certain ontological assumptions1 sometimes pantheistic as in ,spinozism1 sometimes materialistic as in non-theistic evolutionism4 ,in both these cases freedom disappears in the absoluteness with which the substance of the universe unfolds into all its products and manifestations4#cj ,in some other speculations it appears as a conclusion from certain metaphysical views of the law of causation and its supposed application in the realm of psychical activity4 ,in this form of theory every volition is viewed as standing in the relation of a mere effect to a cause which determines the will to it1 in fixed connection and force of antecedence and consequence4 ,the volition comes1 it is represented1 as the necessary result--not as a real choice by self-determining personality1 but produced by environment1 mental structure1 and disposition4 ,not the ego or personal self1 as free spirit endowed with capacity for real election1 but the environment1 motives1 and disposition decide and fix the volition for the person1 which by an illusion of consciousness appears as done by himself4 ,in still other speculation necessitarianism comes as an inference from conceptions formed as to the divine sovereignty and the absoluteness with which it must direct creature movement4 ,the doctrine thus has its plausibility1 not from the conscious working of the human mind or the natural order of conduct and welfare1 but as theoretical conclusions from certain forms of speculative thinking4 ,it is therefore the product of metaphysical theorizing4 ,it is not a datum of pure psychology4 ,it is not taught by life4 ,it is not known as a fact4 ,it is not called for by the practical needs of daily self-direction4 ,it has only secondary forms of suggestion and support--the precarious evidence from special theorizing in ontology and metaphysics4 ,and it introduces more difficulties than it shuts off1 while it collides with the moral consciousness of mankind and its sense of responsibility for conduct and the formation of character4 ,in the light of these truths it ought not to be regarded as having any validity4 ,it is surely incredible that the doctrine of necessity should be true when the actual constitution of human life1 in all its personal1 social1 and governmental relations1 requires us to treat it as false1 being practically inapplicable4 ,utterly beyond belief is it that while the inexorable necessities of daily behavior bind us to the principle of freedom and responsibility1 there should be in the real constitution of the world no actual freedom in deciding on choices or determining our conduct4#ca ,moral agency must be free agency1 in open alternatives of choice4 ,it involves both the subjective capacity to choose and a realm for its exercise in diverse possibilities4 ,sensibility and ,actions4 #d4 ,powers of sensibility and action1 by which the dictates of conscience may be turned into actual conduct and character1 complete the moral constitution4 7#a7 ,it has already been seen 7pages #dd-dg7 that in the complex action of the conscience itself the sensibility awakened in the form of emotion1 as a feeling of obligation arising from a perception of obligation4 ,this has already shown the sensibility to be a part of the moral organization4 ,conscience itself includes emotion4 ,duty perceived becomes duty felt1 if the moral life is normal2 and the feeling is motive-force for the choice and the fulfillment of duty4 ,emotional powers are thus constituent in the structure of man's moral nature4 ,the moral emotions are occasions for ethical choices and deeds4 7#b7 ,but1 further1 the movements of the sensibilities are themselves either morally good or evil1 and form a sphere of personal life to which moral quality belongs4 ,man's affections and desires1 his loves and hatreds1 his enjoyments and aversions1 constitute a domain where the ethical distinctions are to be applied4 ,they hold and exhibit elements of character4 ,we may not1 indeed1 say that a being of pure intellect1 void of all emotion1 would be utterly incapable of character and irresponsible1 but we are compelled to think that the moral life in such case would be without what forms the highest ethical excellence and glory of character1 viz43 love1 benevolence1 delight in righteousness and joy in pure affection4 ,the regulation of the affections and passions1 the purification of the inmost thoughts of what the sacred scriptures call the heart is vital to right character4 ,the capacity to love is an equipment for the moral life4 ,it is virtuous to love what ought to be loved4 ,the capacity to hate is also such an equipment--the obligation being to hate what ought to be hated as morally wrong4 ,benevolence may not be1 as some have contended it is1 the essence or ground of all virtue1 but1 unquestionably1 it is a virtue of highest rank1 and the capacity for it is a prominent element in man's moral organization4 ,the same is true of the whole emotional and affectional capacity in the human soul4 ,it is part of the constitution for true character and life4 7#c7 ,still further1 man's powers of action1 in which the ethical distinctions and choices are wrought out into their proper deeds1 are part of his organization for the true moralities of life4 ,however deeply the foundations of ethics may be laid in personal individuality1 the ethical life concerns more than self1 and finds its largest field in inter-human relations4 ,human solidarity is as real as human individuality4 ,humanity is an organism1 in which each person has his place and mission4 ,the individual's sphere of duty is not simply his own soul1 but the broad reach of all his relations to the world about him1 in which duties are developed and right conduct is required4 ,in all this wide sphere obligation can be met only through his endowment with power to carry into effect1 in action1 his moral judgments and convictions of right4 ,moral science must consider man not merely as a knower and contemplator or lover of the right1 but also as a doer of it in righteous deeds4 ,hence man's moral nature1 as his endowment for the moral life1 is not all brought under review until it is seen to include the realm of his feelings and those executive powers which turn the ethical discriminations and choices into righteous conduct4 ,we thus sum up the constituents of man's moral nature3 intelligence1 the conscience1 free-will1 and capacities for affection and doing4 ,where these are united the subject is organized for knowing duty and fulfilling it4 ,but a final fact1 of profound import1 needs yet to be added1 not as a further faculty1 but rather as a consequence resultant from the union and co-action of these endowments1 viz43 that this organism of faculties presents not simply a capacity as a possibility of the moral life1 but a positive1 vital motive adjustment and organic pre-disposition toward it4 ,it is not simply framed to it as an articulation of dead timber1 but is adapted to it as a complex of living forces for normal movement4 ,the moral constitution1 if not disordered or wrecked1 carries thus a living trend or impulse toward knowing duty and doing it4 ,this impulse1 seemingly pervading1 if not standing behind1 the whole mental activity1 as a sub-conscious pre-disposition1 appears as an original aptitude or incorporated purpose in the total human psychical organization4 ,hence human nature1 if normal1 is not indifferent to right and wrong4 ,its true life is one of positive affinity for the good4 ,if1 under internal disorder or particular circumstances1 counter-tendencies appear and prevail1 this does not disprove the fundamental and normal set of humanity for the moral life4 ,man is made for the right as he is made for ,god4 ,this conception of the positiveness of his total moral organization is necessary to complete the view of man as a moral agent4#cb ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,right ,,and ,,wrong4 ,in this chapter we pass the dividing line between the two great parts of ethics4 ,thus far we have considered only the facts and manifestations of our moral nature4 ,we have traced the unquestionable phenomena of moral distinctions and obligation in human thinking1 feeling1 and conviction4 ,we have found the explanation of these phenomena in the action of a faculty or complex of faculties of the human soul1 that discerns and affirms these distinctions4 ,we have studied this power and marked its data from its initial perception of the ethical distinction through its further discernments1 emotions and judgments to its full assertion of moral responsibility4 ,we have seen its unique authority explained by the supremacy of the law of right and duty which it reveals1 and have noted the aggregate of endowments belonging to man's moral agency4 ,but the mere registry of these moral phenomena is not the full explanation of them4 ,we must examine yet what they imply4 ,from the faculty that perceives we must turn to look at the nature of that which is perceived4 ,we may call the part already traversed the science of ethics1 as dealing with and systematizing the facts of experience4 ,the part that remains takes us into the metaphysics of ethics1 as exhibiting the abiding verities so perceived and to which we find ourselves so responsibly related--not what is in us1 but what is above and over us to which our moral consciousness corresponds4 ,having visited the moral consciousness in its own home and listened to its story of right and duty and responsibility1 we must go forth and explore the realm that answers to that story4 ,this realm is the objective moral system to which human conduct is to be adjusted4 ,the precise question of this chapter is whether the distinction of right or wrong1 subjectively and psychologically made1 is also objectively true and real1 marking an actual qualitative difference in the deeds and intentions of men1 or is a mere appearance1 a fiction and illusion of our own minds4 ,is the principle of duty a reality for right life1 as something belonging to the constitution of the world1 or only an idea which our minds have manufactured--only our own thought reflected back upon us1 as is our face that seems so real in the mirror8 ,it would seem that the very asking of this question should be itself a sufficient answer4 ,but doubt has been raised by speculative metaphysics4 ,hence we must examine it4 ,source of ,doubt4 #a4 ,the doubt comes from misleading representations of the relativity of knowledge4 ,unquestionably there is a sense in which our knowledge may justly be said to be relative4 ,it is not absolute1 unconditioned or unlimited4 ,we can know only as we have facilities for knowing1 and under the conditions and aspects in which objects are presented to them4 ,we are restricted to the modes and degrees of our given capacities4 ,there are probably many realities about us of which we can know nothing4 ,we have no organs for their perception4 ,even the things that we do know reach off into transcendent relations4 ,philosophy has long confessed the relative character of our knowledge4 ,even the percepts of sense-experience1 say for instance1 of sight or hearing1 when analyzed in physical science are found to be1 in their objective cause or material conditions1 somewhat different from the simple report of the organ of sense--color being the subjective sensation of light-rays on the retina of the eye1 and sound the effect of vibrations of the atmosphere upon the sensorium4 ,but in recent times various theories have represented our knowing faculties as largely untrustworthy and their data as invalid in spheres where their functions appear most certain and explicit4 ,locke gave basis for a movement in this direction by teaching that the immediate objects of the mind are not things1 but ideas4 ,berkeley's idealism repudiated the sufficiency of sense-perception to prove the objective existence of the material world4 ,hume questioned the substantial existence of both matter and mind4 ,in the view of ,kant human knowledge reaches only to phenomena1 the appearance of things1 while the things as they are in themselves can not be known4 ,the mind projects and imposes its own subjective forms of thought upon the universe4 ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton1 ,dean ,mansel1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,alexander ,bain and ,herbert ,spencer have developed theories1 variously modified but agreeing in this1 that even our necessary forms of rational perception are not to be held as standing for more than relative truth1 i4 e4 subjective impressions in our minds in the presence of environment4 ,doubt is cast upon the point whether what is true to our necessary or actual thought is also really true for the objective world4 ,the teaching will be best understood by several quotations4 ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton1 though a natural realist1 influenced by the speculations of ,kant1 while acknowledging an underlying reality for phenomena1 taught that we can never know them except under modifications determined by our own faculties4#cc ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 going further1 says3 ,our knowledge of objects1 and even our fancies about objects1 consist in nothing but the sensations they excite1 or which we imagine them exciting in ourselves4444 ,this knowledge is merely phenomenal4444 ,the object is known to us only in one special relation1 namely1 as that which produces1 or is capable of producing certain impressions on our senses2 and all that we really know is these impressions4#cd ,herbert ,spencer asserts the relativity of all knowledge1 and says3 ,clearly as we seem to know it1 our apparent knowledge proves on examination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself4 ,ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas1 alike turn out to be merely symbols of the actual1 not cognitions of it4#ce ,plainly these theories do not make our knowledge a genuine apprehension of reality1 but merely internal and unreliable mental states4 ,it is only a subjective phenomenon4 ,we cannot know that it stands for the real truth of things4 ,rather1 we are told1 it does not4 ,it is but an effect within the mind1 determined1 it may be1 by things without1 but modified1 if not created1 by the constitution and action of the mind itself4 ,the receiving mind1 like the receiving lens1 determines the shape and color of the apprehended phenomenon4 ,if there be any reality behind it and correspondent to it1 we can never assure ourselves of it4 ,the theory thoroughly discredits the trustworthiness of our faculties1 both of sense-perception and of reason4 ,they do not report the things of the world as they really are1 but merely as they affect us4 ,our necessary conceptions1 such as time1 space1 beauty1 cause1 moral law1 cannot be proved to be anything else than phenomena within us4 ,the conclusion is well stated in the language of ,mr4 ,grote in his explanation of the views of the ,greek sophists3 ,as things appear to me1 so they are to me2 as they appear to you1 so they are to you4#cf ,it is altogether a subjective matter4 ,we can have only a relative morality--not conformed to an objective and universal standard1 but to the particular impressions we find within us4 ,evidently this doctrine of relativity lands us in universal intellectual skepticism4 ,it gives us agnosticism4 ,nothing is sure in a single department of knowledge4 ,if our minds are forever presenting to us internal forms of thought that stand not really for the forms of being in the real world1 if they are actually creating or painting for us what we seem to perceive and what appear to be realities objective to our faculties and existing independently of them1 there is no possibility of reaching truth of any kind4 ,but in the domain of morals this theory would prove peculiarly destructive4 ,if the qualities of right and wrong be not in very truth real1 if they be not verities of conduct in the constituted relations of human life1 if the ideas answer not to a true distinction set before us for our recognition and conformity1 then virtue is a dream1 obligation an illusion1 and conscience a fraud4 ,over against this false we must place the true conception of the relativity of knowledge4 ,we must hold1 as the spontaneous sense of mankind and the best sustained psychology and philosophy of the centuries affirm1 that our cognitive powers are genuine faculties for discerning the truth of things1 that1 while not infallible nor unlimited1 they give us substantially correct knowledge1 as far as it goes1 of the realities of the natural and moral world in which we are placed4 ,these powers of intelligence are not set to act delusively and imprison us in phantasmagoria or a factitious system false to that which actually exists4 ,the correct theory1 the only one that is really rational and can be lived out1 must ever be that1 as far as we have faculties to know at all and use them loyally1 we know what is and because it is4 ,the true reason of our knowing is the real existence of knowable realities4#cg ,instead of knowing only appearances1 we know the very things that appear--not perfectly1 or without possibility of mistake1 but yet truly4 ,the end of knowledge is not to give us a phantasmagorical world for endless illusion1 but the actual world1 with its divine constitution and movement1 in which we are to live1 and with whose facts and laws1 physical and moral1 we are to harmonize our lives4 #b4 ,the false conception of the relativity of knowledge being thus set aside1 and the psychological law1 that the correlate of knowing is reality1 being recognized1 we are prepared to see the truth on the point of inquiry in this chapter1 as follows3 ,objective ,reality4 7#a7 ,the qualities of right and wrong1 involved in the ethical distinction1 are not merely subjective impressions or appearances1 imposed on conduct by the human mind1 but are objective1 belonging to the external world of relations and action1 real for apprehension and conformity4 ,they are without us as well as within us4 ,and they come within us because they are realities without us for us to know and observe4 ,the moral qualities1 as real features of required behavior of free beings in their given relations to each other1 belong to the constitution of the world as well as to the faculties of the human mind4 ,they are real qualities of action and motives to action whether men perceive or take note of them or not4 ,as truly as the starry sky is above us1 before we open our eyes to see it1 so the principle of righteousness is established for life before we enter it or our faculties awake to discover it4 ,the principle of moral law is framed into the constitution of the world and human life4 ,it is back of the discernment of it1 imbedded in the demand which the constituted relations of nature make for proper behavior of free1 intelligent beings4 ,the law of duty is fixed in these relations4 ,it abides there to be recognized and fulfilled by all beings endowed with moral perception and freedom4 ,moral law is a profounder and broader thing than a simple uncertain mental fiction in personal thinking4 ,it belongs to the immense1 almost infinite realm of creature inter-relations of the universe4 ,the reality1 however1 is not to be thought of as a material entity or substantive essence1 but solely as a quality of the intentions and conduct demanded by and in the relations sustained by men and other moral beings4 ,it is the reality of an established obligation4 ,it belongs to character4 ,the right1 as moral law1 has ever been venerated as something supersensible1 absolute1 and divine4 ,the early ,egyptian teaching represented its home as in ,deity4 ,buddhistic philosophy conceives of it as an imperishable dominion over gods and men4 ,christianity has enforced it as based in the very nature of ,god1 and as a principle of order ordained for the whole universe of personal life and behavior4 ,not more real are the solid rocks of the mountain or the strong waves of the sea4 ,not more real for the material realm is the law of gravitation than is the law of ethical righteousness for the spiritual realm1 the realm of free conduct4 ,and the latter is superior and of higher value than the former4 ,this truth speaks in the old apothegm3 fiat justitia1 ruat clum4 ,not ,dependent on ,organization4 7#b7 ,the qualities of right and wrong in conduct are not dependent on the peculiar mental organization or temperament of the race4 ,this results from the objectivity of the law of obligation4 ,only the perception of them is so dependent1 while the moral qualities are abidingly real for all beings high enough in the scale of being to discern them4 ,just as we must believe that the sun exists as an extended body independently of our eyes or minds1 and would have to be so apprehended by any inhabitant of ,neptune or ,jupiter endowed with capacity to perceive it as it is1 so we must believe that truth and love and kindness are right1 and falsehood1 injustice1 malignity and ingratitude are wrong1 not as made so by our peculiar personal constitution1 but per se1 in any inhabited world of the stellar heavens2 and that the only subjective condition for their so appearing is the possession of the faculty for perception of moral quality4 ,there may1 indeed1 be a doubt among finite moral agents1 with limited knowledge1 how far a certain thing may be true or false1 kind or malignant1 just or unjust1 but the quality of truth or falsehood1 kindness or malignity1 justice or injustice being perceived in it1 it is impossible that such truth1 kindness and justice should not be judged right and their opposites wrong4 ,the ethical distinction1 objectively viewed1 is an ethical difference1 perceived as such1 if perceived at all4 ,immutable and ,eternal4 7#c7 ,the moral distinctions1 with the moral qualities involved1 being thus objective1 and not the product of a special temporary organization of the percipient1 are immutable and eternal4 ,this is involved in the very nature of the qualities themselves4 ,by eternal necessity of what they are1 justice and love must be unchangeably and forever right4 ,they are not thus right because we think or feel them so1 but we think and feel them so because they are so1 because of the immutable and enduring nature of justice and love themselves4 ,they hold and carry the kind of motive and action that ought to prevail in the relations of intelligent personal life1 everywhere and in all time4 ,so malignity1 injustice1 falsehood1 and cruelty are wrong by the very nature of the qualities that make and mark them2 and the personal intentions and conduct that hold them can never be right any more than a thing can be itself and yet other than itself4 ,men's judgments as to whether particular conduct is fair or just or kind or honest1 may change and do change4 ,different nations and ages class certain acts and ways of men very differently4 ,but these are only judgments of application1 and so only secondary ethical judgments4 ,this has already been pointed out in ,chap4 ,,iv1 pp4 #fg-fh4 ,they depend on the degree to which the moral qualities of the conduct may be discerned amid the complicated relations and obscurities that often perplex a right understanding of it4 ,but while men change their judgments of the justice1 benevolence1 or truth of particular forms of behavior1 they do not change their judgments that justice1 love and truth are right--necessarily and immutably so4 ,the behests of duty are imbedded in the necessary relations of intelligent free beings4 ,virtue is no shifting subjective illusion1 shaped by our inner mental mould4 ,no change of the percipient's intellectual constitution can change the realities of right and wrong4 ,no removal from world to world can change them4 ,no distant age in eternity can reverse them1 and discover virtue to be wrong or sin right1 or either as without moral quality4 ,the distinction is eternal1 and no future can arrest our responsibility with respect to it4 ,god calls us to identify ourselves with what is right and shun all wrong1 as realities with which we stand in immutable1 unending relation1 for good or evil4 ,grandeur of ,moral ,law4 #c4 ,the truth thus reached on this point is one of exceeding importance4 ,it brings to view the grandeur of the moral law4 ,it shows this law to be truly transcendental1 belonging not to transient material forms or physiological structure1 nor to special psychical constitutions of men or races1 nor organized instinct1 nor subjective mental illusion1 nor peculiar hereditary experience1 nor transformed sense of realized or supposed utility1 nor any local adventitious circumstances and training1 but to the supreme super-sensible realm of universal and necessary ideas and truth1 in which the universe of rational thought and divine order lives and moves and has its being and welfare4 ,in this truth1 therefore1 the moral law begins to appear in its true greatness and value1 in its universal dominion and infinite importance4 ,it comes down upon us with a mighty impression4 ,it thrills us into enthusiasm4 ,as long as the moral idea is accounted a mere product of environment and biological evolution or experienced utility1 a blind hereditary instinct1 an organized impulse1 a fiction of education1 or a temporary behest of individual or racial organization1 it is a thing of but little dignity and of limited moment4 ,it is worthy of no more reverence than a form of protoplasm or a passing mental impression4 ,not reflecting an objective reality of universal1 supreme and permanent validity1 but only a special phenomenon of the human organization and this transient life1 it can inspire but small respect4 ,only in the truth here reached does the authority of the moral law stand out in its majesty and illimitable range and sweep4 ,only in it can that law be rightly effective for the good conduct of men and the safe formation of character in the mould of immortal excellence4 ,reality is ,dividing ,line4 #d4 ,the recognition of the objective validity of the moral distinctions marks one of the chief dividing lines between true and false theories of moral philosophy4 ,a failure to recognize this point not only leaves the point itself a blank1 but usually means error both in the conception of the nature and function of conscience and of the grounds and claims of right and virtue4 ,with respect to conscience the failure reduces it from a power of true discernment of what is1 into an instinct acting blindly or a make-believe of obligation through judgments indistinguishable from those of utility1 pleasure or advantage1 or into a passing product of racial experience or education4 ,so instead of explaining the unique authority of the conscience it undermine and dissolves that authority into non-moral elements4 ,obligation itself becomes but a synonym for an impulse toward certain forms of pleasure or advantage4 ,as to the grounds and claims of right1 these are thus caused to disappear in the non-moral elements into which right and wrong are dissolved4 ,the ethical distinctions1 the great moral phenomena of the ages1 with all the interests of practical morality1 instead of being explained and justified1 are explained away4 ,if1 therefore1 ethical theory is to exhibit the metaphysical validity of the moral consciousness of men1 no view can reasonably be regarded as correct that dissipates the very reality which the conscience assumes to see and without which the moral judgments lose their rational foundations4 ,for if the objective and transcendent character of the ethical distinction be denied1 morality necessarily drops down into1 at best1 a temporary biological provision for the utilities of this ephemeral life1 or1 at worst1 into a deep fraud of our faculties1 estopping the use of our freedom by a phantom bugbear of moral distinctions4 ,if1 therefore1 virtue is not to be disrobed of its honor1 if righteousness is not to be cast down from the supreme place which the reason of mankind has ever accorded it1 if the idea of duty is not to be belittled1 invalidated and overthrown1 ethical theory must recognize and emphasize the objective and permanent reality of the moral law as an unchanging law of obligation and responsibility for the conduct of free agents4 ,otherwise the so-called ethical theory is not a theory of the ethical reality1 but one that sinks the supposed ethical reality into non-moral elements and illusion4 ,to vindicate the authority of conscience1 the immutable foundations of righteousness must be maintained1 not dissolved4 ,relation to ,evolution4 #e4 ,the relation of this truth to the wide-spread hypothesis of the evolutionary origin of man dare not be ignored at this place4 ,frank admission has already been made that this hypothesis1 as setting forth a mere mode of creation by ,god1 does not appear to be necessarily inconsistent with the existence of conscience4 ,any mode that can produce a faculty of mental power capable of perceiving or making the ethical distinction1 suffices on that point--though grave difficulties stand in the way of accounting for it under any evolutionist explanation thus far given4 ,but how is it with respect to the supersensible reality of the moral law1 as the reality perceived by the conscience8 ,can evolution account for it1 or even allow any place for it8 ,theistic ,evolution4 ,to these questions1 the answer must be1 first1 that evolution1 in the theistic conception1 if supposed capable of developing the faculty of conscience1 must also be regarded as consistent with existence and place of the moral law4 ,the infinite intelligence and purpose back of the creative evolution1 and through it originating a power for ethical perception1 must be conceded to be equally capable1 in that method of forming the universe1 of establishing the principle and law of duty in the relations in which rational and self-determining creatures are to live4 ,provided only that a rational first cause be assumed and the plan of the world be viewed as laid in aims of divine order1 a moral system as well as moral agents may1 surely1 be created by slow advance of life no less completely than by instantaneous fiat of power4 ,the theistic theory of evolution1 assuming the cosmic system to be grounded in the will and power of ,god and filled with his ever-working presence does not necessarily bring any trouble into the question of fixed moral law4 ,the moral law1 resting in the same divine source whence arise the laws that are revealed in physical nature1 comes into play as soon as moral agents are created in relations which call for right sentiments and conduct4 ,the rational purpose which ordained physical laws1 in necessity1 for material order1 ordains moral law for order of personal agents acting in freedom4 ,the question1 therefore1 with respect to this kind of evolution need not embarrass the question of the reality of immutable moral law--at least when the theory of evolution is so shaped as to give its fundamental assumptions full and consistent place and force4 ,atheistic ,evolution4 ,but1 secondly1 on the other hand1 answer must be made1 that under no theory of atheistic and merely materialistic and naturalistic evolution can the objective existence of moral law be logically or rationally maintained4 ,this kind of evolutionism is not only helpless before the task of accounting for it1 but logically excludes the possibility of it4 ,for any theory that presents the cosmos as a pure naturalism of matter1 or is agnostic as to an intelligent author of nature1 furnishes no realm or materials for moral law4 ,this becomes evident1 beyond doubt1 from the following considerations3 7#a7 ,according to the hypothesis the potency of all things is in matter with its energy and modes of motion4 ,this is the all and the one 7,greek3 to pan kai hen7 of the universe1 at once the only essence and ground of its existence and ongoing4 ,no intelligent first cause is assumed1 no creative reason to begin or determine the evolution4 ,there is no ordering mind or purpose in it--for its origin1 in the process1 or as to its end4 ,it is avowedly a purely mechanical theory of the universe--matter and force acting in self-contained energy without design4 ,all rational1 purposive1 or teleological idea is wanting4 ,now it is evident that this pure mechanism of matter and energy must be not only without any moral element whatever1 but necessarily incapable of evolving the moral4 ,it is an infinite and endless automatism4 ,though it should run on on after on it is still only a mechanism of atoms in eternally unfree material movement4 ,the unmoral elements can never produce moral law2 and1 ex hypothesi1 there is no intelligent free moral being behind or in the movement to create or establish moral law through it4 7#b7 ,further1 this form of evolutionism1 returning1 as it does1 to the ancient notion of the universe as a perpetual flux1 even if imagined to be able to evolve the moral out of non-moral elements1 could present no permanent and stable ethical law4 ,in such evolution1 without beginning and without end1 all things are only a continual becoming1 an eternal process moving on4 ,there is and can be nothing fixed1 whether of forms or relations1 but only a shifting1 necessitated1 everlasting scene of aimless beginnings and disappearances4 ,could we even conceive--which we cannot1 because the concept is possible only in connection with purpose and ideal order--that the ethical ought should momentarily appear1 it would soon be broken up and passed by1 like the bubble on a stream1 ,a moment here1 then gone forever4 ,manifestly1 this perpetual motion1 forever changing and superseding its own forms and products1 cannot be considered father to even a rational stable conscience1 much less a sure abiding moral law for its steady recognition and eternally reverent regard4 ,the child of contingency remains contingent4 ,and so the advocates of this empirical1 materialistic1 and atheistic evolutionism consistently maintain that there is no absolute moral law1 and that what seems so is only shifting hereditary judgments generated by experience and utility or some instinct formed by biological processes4 7#c7 ,but further4 ,in this merely naturalistic evolution all the essential presuppositions of moral law are wanting and excluded4 ,this is easily seen4 7a7 ,it has already been pointed out that the action of conscience is theistic1 its authority arising from its perception of a law of duty imposed on it and representing a moral law-giver 7,see ,chap4 ,,iv1 pp4 #gi-hj2 ,chap4 ,v1 pp4 #hg-hh74 ,so moral law1 as a rule of ethical righteousness1 is necessarily theistic4 ,it is thinkable only as a requirement made by rational intelligence for fitting conduct among personal agents4 ,it rests in a world-system of rational ends and ideal requirements4 ,the standard is established by intelligence4 ,should it be objected1 that we may regard the standard as made by the mind of men only1 and altogether a human and subjective thing1 it is enough to remind the reader that according to the hypothesis1 there is no human mind as a different entity from matter1 the only mentality left being merely particular effects of molecular or brain activity1 and therefore only successive passive products1 simply revealing what1 if it exists at all1 must exist as the molecular matter behind them4 ,the autocratic moral law which the conscience finds1 but does not make1 is conceivable therefore1 only as part of intelligent ordering in a rational world-system4 ,but according to the hypothesis no moral reason has framed or regulates the order of the physical forces that create the relations of life4 7b7 ,moral law1 with responsibility1 is inconceivable except in connection with personal freedom in the subject of it4 ,but in this kind of evolutionism1 everything is reduced to the mechanism of matter2 and its supporters agree that our personal freedom is an illusion4 ,there can be no more morality in the thoughts1 aims and conduct of men than in the digestion of food or the growth and decay of a tree4 ,while1 therefore1 theistic evolution does not present anything inconsistent with the reality and recognition of moral law1 every hypothesis which exhibits the world1 in its ground and processes1 as the mere mechanism of material forces1 stands in logical and irreconcilable antagonism4 ,this antagonism1 however1 is not to be taken as overthrowing or even weakening the truth set forth in this chapter4 ,rather1 the antagonistic hypothesis1 which fails in so many other respects to meet the necessities of a rational or scientific account of the phenomena of the universe1 discredits itself still further by its incongruity on this great point4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,ground ,,of ,,right4 ,this topic carries the inquiry concerning moral law one step further than that determined in the last chapter4 ,it being settled that that law is objectively and permanently real1 for the recognition of conscience1 we must yet seek some explanation of the basis of the reality4 ,why are some things right and others wrong8 ,what is the reason of the difference8 ,on what is the law of right grounded8 ,we seek the explanation of its existence and the obligation it imposes4 ,it must be remembered that even those who hold the moral behests to be merely subjective1 products in some way of the psychological constitution1 nevertheless endeavor to account for them in some relations or forces back of themselves4 ,these accounts1 as will appear1 are exceedingly varied4 ,inasmuch1 therefore1 as nearly all the differing ethical theories seek to give some explanation and ground for moral obligation1 the inquiry now before us presents the point about which the chief contests of moral philosophy have been waged4 ,the different answers have been the main determinants of the different systems4 ,our examination must include three things3 a clear definition of the point of inquiry2 some notice of the leading theories2 and a positive statement of the ground as demanded by reason and the interests of moral life4 ,the ,question ,defined4 ,i4 ,definition4 ,this is necessary because it has sometimes been confounded with the question3 ,what is the ground of obligation8#ch ,we must distinguish between the ground of right and the ground of obligation4 ,the point before us is not why we are under obligation to do a right act1 but why the act is right4 ,manifestly the rightness of the proposed action is the ground of the obligation to do it2 that is1 the obligation is grounded on the right4 ,the exact inquiry is--and must be1 in order to reach the real and abiding moral foundations--on what is the right1 whose perception obligates1 grounded8 ,a quest after the ground of the obligation simply1 might satisfy those who reduce conscience to a mere instinct or sentiment1 and the moral standard to a mere internal product of association1 education or of biological organization4 ,to them it might seem enough to give an explanation of the felt obligation4 ,in such case they might plausibly1 as they often do1 affirm that the moral bond1 being thus organically insured and fixed in the moral consciousness1 must remain the same1 no matter what theories1 even though purely materialistic1 may be formed of its genesis and nature4 ,but so soon as the ethical reality is seen in its cosmic place and transcendental character we want an explanation not only of the ground of obligation to right conduct1 but also of the ground of the right which evokes the sense of obligation4 ,various ,theories4 ,,ii4 ,leading ,theories4 ,we must include1 in this review1 both the theories which offer only an explanation of the phenomenon of obligation and those that seek an elucidation of the principle of righteousness as objective moral law4 ,in the long continued discussion of the subject these theories have been immensely varied and modified1 but the differences thus noted divide all explanations into two classes1 viz41 those which make the moral stand in something subjective and those that find it objective4 ,in the cursory rehearsal of them1 here needed1 we will present them in chronological order1 irrespective of their belonging to one class or the other1 noting1 however1 their relation to this distinction which divides them4 ,such historical glance will give an outline of the development of thought on the subject1 and help us to reach and appreciate the true conclusion4 ,egyptian ,teaching4 #a4 ,egypt's golden age was in the morning of the world's historical period1 and we must look far back for its best ethical thought4 ,with the ,egyptians morality and religion were closely identified4 ,the ethical view was united with the theological and determined by it4 ,they1 however1 dealt with the subject of duty only in separate maxims and precepts1 without framing a theory of obligation4 ,but the purity and elevation of these precepts have been a wonder to many in our modern days4 ,it is1 however1 easily explained4 ,their religion was monotheistic4 ,god was a good and righteous ,being1 with power and rulership1 the source of all things for man4 ,the ,egyptians connected all that was pure and good with ,god and recognized their dependence on ,him and their duty to live according to ,his will4 ,thus their moral consciousness rose above the function of a mere subjective instinct or a feeling of responsibility to their fellow-men1 and included a sense of direct amenability to divine authority4 ,the goal of the moral endeavor1 ever overcoming evil1 was regarded as attained1 not in this1 but in a future life of blessedness under the divine approval4 ,their view grounded all duty objectively1 and practically identified it with piety4#ci ,chinese ,teaching4 #b4 ,chinese teaching1 too1 was theological4 ,the theology was essentially monotheistic1 but overgrown with superstitions and idolatrous practices4 ,it taught that man is the creature of ,god1 and was endowed by heaven with a nature for the practice of good1 a nature that1 if followed properly--i4 e4 in the golden mean--invariably leads men aright4 ,the path indicated by nature is the will of ,god concerning duty4 ,what heaven has conferred is called the nature2 an accordance with this nature is called the path of duty2 the regulation of this path is called instruction4#dj ,the chief contribution to the ,chinese teaching by the sage ,confucius 7,b4 ,c4 #eea-dgh7 was his proclamation of the principle of reciprocity1 i4 e4 doing as we would have others do to us4 ,though the elements of the moral problem were thus included fairly well for ordinary conduct1 they were not framed into a distinct philosophy of the ground of right4 ,views in ,india4 #c4 ,india's sacred books abound in moral maxims and counsels4 ,brahmanism is substantially a philosophy of life rather than a religion4 ,but its pantheism and doctrine of the pre-existence and transmigration of souls have distorted and misdirected the moral idea4 ,its pantheism confounds the human with the divine1 both in its origin and destination4 ,its belief in transmigration1 with its perpetual succession of rebirths into conditions of woeful individual life unless the soul's unhappy agitations and unrest should be composed by virtue1 shapes the moral task mainly1 not only into restraint of the appetites and passions1 but into such austerity and stern self-abnegation as may prepare the soul1 on the death of the body1 to attain the perfect repose of ,nirvana the complete extinction of human passions1 or1 as ,buddhism represents1 annihilation of conscious individuality in reabsorption into the absolute existence4 ,in this system the aim of morality is not the right1 but the desired good of tranquil happiness1 or the final goal of merging self-conscious personality back again into the ,great ,all from which it arose4 ,the ground of the moral striving--it can hardly be called obligation--is the adaptedness of it to secure this result4#da ,persian ,teaching4 #d4 ,zoroastrianism 7,mazdism71 from about ,b4 ,c4 #aejj-ajjj1 confessedly presents an ethical teaching that1 among oriental views1 is second only to that of the ,hebrews4 ,its theological dualism1 which seems to have encroached upon an earlier purer monotheism1 of two eternal principles or powers1 ,ormuzed 7,ahura ,mazda7 the good power1 and ,ahriman 7,angra ,mainyou7 the evil power1 manifestly arose from the effort to solve the dread problem of evil in the world4 ,zoroastrian teaching represents ,ormuzed as the all-knowing and the holy creator of the world4 ,he cannot create evil4 ,he is the source of all purity1 order and righteousness4 ,wrong and misery have come into the world from ,ahriman1 the opposite contending power in the universe4 ,zoroastrianism thus gives the world-system a moral foundation and law of order4 ,the moral life is a holy conflict with the forces of evil within human nature and assailing it4 ,the supreme end of life is to increase the ascendency of righteousness and establish its everlasting reign of truth and goodness4 ,the goal of it comes in a future life of blessedness4 ,the ground of righteousness is thus placed in the nature and will of the eternal creator1 to whom obedience is due1 against the influences of the malign power of evil4#db ,greek ,theories4 #e4 ,among the ,greeks ethical philosophy began with ,socrates4 ,their earlier writers dealt with the subject of duty but little in a speculative way4 ,when the philosophy of it came to be sought the theories mainly connected it closely with the good or the highest good1 the summum bonum of life4 ,this designation was ambiguous4 ,the good 7 1 ,greek3 to agathon1 ,greek3 ta agatha7 might be conceived of as either intellectual or sensuous good1 as consisting in one's intrinsic state or in outward condition1 as either happiness or personal well-being4 ,and because this method failed to distinguish clearly and fully between this indefinite good--having at best no more authority than the beautiful--and the right which forms the true essence of the ethical principle1 their explanations failed to become clear1 and stopped short of being actual explanations of the ground of right4 ,hence their theories1 though not always consistently exhibited1 and variously interpreted by expounders of them1 were substantially eudmonistic#dc and utilitarian4 ,specifically3 7#a7 ,socrates made all virtue consist in knowledge1 especially self knowledge or wisdom1 leading men to proper self-regulation and happiness4 ,he put emphasis upon man's rational nature as essentially good1 and to this rational nature belonged the office of self-mastery and control of all appetites1 dispositions1 and passions4 ,the life in knowledge became the good and happy life4 ,though this great sage maintained that the world is governed by a supreme intelligence1 he failed to connect clearly and closely the moral law with this high source1 and rested the moral life simply subjectively4 7#b7 ,plato developed his view substantially on the basis of that of ,socrates4 ,he identified the highest good with the intellect rather than the sensibility1 and looked upon all virtues as united in knowledge1 not only as guiding the soul in acting out its proper destination1 but1 according to some statements1 even as in itself all-sufficing4 ,though ,plato's speculative view of the universe contains the elements for the construction of a sublime immutable ethical standard1 and he even suggests ,god-likeness as the goal of man's moral life1#dd the implications of his view are not consistently carried out2 and when he comes to apply his ideas to life in his ideal ,republic he lapses into what seems a caricature of his better thought1 and is content to rest morality simply on the authority and laws of the state4#de 7#c7 ,aristotle1 in whom ,plato's theistic view of the world receded into the background1 made the chief good consist in happiness or felt well-being1 which depends on man's living according to his rational nature4 ,such living includes both the activities of the mind and habitual conduct4 ,the reason must not only develop its own energies1 but rule the lower powers and passions4 ,on this double requirement he founded two kinds of virtue1 the intellectual 7dianoetic7 and the practical4 ,the one consists in knowledge or wisdom1 the other in formed habits or character4 ,the moral life1 therefore1 consists in the true use1 without abuse1 of our rational nature4 ,the rule for it1 as taught by ,aristotle1 is to avoid extremes and pursue the golden mean4 ,the theory thus rests morality wholly on subjective good and identifies it with the calculations of prudence4 ,it is simply secularistic1 without religious element or appeal4#df 7#d7 ,in ,epicurus 7,b4 ,c4 #cda-bgj7 and his followers eudmonism descended into hedonism4 ,the supreme good is happiness in the sense of personal enjoyment1 pleasure4 ,the universe1 without theistic ground1 was regarded as eternal1 forever evolving in fortuitous concourse of atoms4 ,it is without rational order1 design1 or government4 ,the human soul is material1 and at death men cease to be4 ,the good of life consists in the avoidance of pain and the securing of pleasure4 ,the pleasure may be intellectual or sensuous and gross1 as men may prefer4 ,the pursuit of it is the highest virtue and best wisdom4 ,enjoyment is the end of life4 ,the whole question of ethics thus came to be a calculation and balancing of pains and pleasures1 and the cardinal virtue prudent selfishness4 ,it was complete subjectivism4 7#e7 ,in ,stoicism 7founded by ,zeno of ,citium1 about #cjh ,b4 ,c47 we have a view that1 in its principal features1 was in strong contrast with ,epicureanism4 ,it arose in close relation to the teaching of ,socrates4 ,but it taught that happiness was not necessary1 and should never be made the end of endeavor4 ,virtue itself was the highest good1 and to be sought for its own sake4 ,itself was sufficient for happiness--not because it could make men insensible to pain or pleasure1 but because it made them superior to it4 ,virtue was immutably excellent in itself1 a permanent reality for man's realization1 and subordinated everything else4 ,it consisted essentially in living according to nature1#dg i4 e4 not simply in harmony with one's self1 but with the nature of the universe1 with the whole constitution of the world as ordained and ruled by ,god1 of which a man's own nature forms a part4 ,the stress was not at all to be laid on self1 but upon the great total of being4 ,man exists for society1 and virtue is impossible apart from the social state4 ,so ,stoic teaching inculcated subordination of self to more general interests--to family1 country1 mankind4 ,it taught that all creatures are children of one father1#dh and duty was owed to all4 ,we may hardly1 however1 speak of this as altruism1 in the sense of unselfish benevolence or self-sacrificing goodness2 since1 in the general ,stoic philosophy1 not the sentiment of sympathetic helpfulness1 but of victorious superiority to pain1 was the temper fostered4 ,love was almost submerged in the stern spirit of duty4 ,the blessedness of virtue was to stand independent of the sufferings which befell men4 ,in fact the dreadful inexorableness of fate 7 ,greek3 heimarmen71 conceived by the ,stoic philosophy as eternally embracing the life of both ,god and nature1 gave to virtue1 not so much the temper of free1 loving obedience to either ,god or righteousness1 as the sternness of a proud intellectual resoluteness in yielding1 for virtue's sake1 to the inevitable in the fate-bound universe4 ,under this conception the ,stoic moral obedience could never rise to the free joyousness that belongs to the obedient life under the light of the ,christian truth that ,god is love--eternal love1 ruling in absolute freedom and desiring to exalt ,his children to the perfect holiness to which alone happiness forever belongs4 ,all these ,greek theories1 except the ,stoic1 are thus seen to have been marked by two features4 ,first1 they dissolved the right1 which alone has direct authority and forms moral law1 into the good1 which is simply something offered to us as an object of desire1 but which has no imperative for the conscience1 and may be innocently foregone4 ,secondly1 despite the clear better implications supplied to them in their accepted theistic conceptions of the world1 they failed to define distinctly any grounding of the moral law on anything higher or more permanent than the subjective elements of the human constitution4 ,for1 even ,plato's objective basing of it1 for citizen duty1 on the law of the state1 assumed only a subjective basis in the person of the ruler himself4 ,the ,stoic theory1 however1 had glimpses of some higher and broader ground1 though it failed to see it truly4 ,roman ,teaching4 #f4 ,the ,roman moralists adopted substantially the doctrine of the ,greek ,stoics4 ,this was finely exhibited and commended1 especially by ,seneca1 ,epictetus and ,marcus ,aurelius4 ,but we have no new theory among the ,roman philosophers4 ,after the establishment of ,christianity1 whose progress thenceforward determined and marked the intellectual activity and advancing philosophy and culture of mankind1 the discussion of ethics became simply a part of theology4 ,and according to the spirit and method of theology in the early ,church and during the middle ages1 even down to modern times1 the discussion was not philosophical1 but biblical4 ,it was concerned simply to set forth human duty1 especially the duties of the ,christian life1 as taught in the scriptures of the ,old and ,new ,testaments4 ,resting the moral law upon revealed divine authority1 it paid small attention to the question of its metaphysical validation4 ,but when modern philosophy began its investigations1 it of necessity soon came upon this point1 and inquired after the natural basis or ultimate ground of the great law whose unique authority both the sacred ,scriptures and the moral consciousness of men agreed in asserting4 ,divine ,absolutism4 #g4 ,modern theories begin with that of ,divine absolutism--making the moral law1 like physical laws1 only a product of ,god's will4 ,it makes it rest absolutely optional in ,his sovereignty of choice4 ,it not only seeks no ulterior reason1 or logical prius1 for his choice1 but distinctly disconnects it from any4 ,god's will is not the expression or revelation1 but the originator1 of the moral distinction1 constituting it1 with its obligatoriness1 as ,he has done1 when ,he might have constituted it otherwise1 even the very contrary4 ,he determined the right according to no norm1 but as creating and establishing a norm4 ,whether there should be any moral distinction and what it should be1 was a matter of the divine choice4 ,the view is a one-sided conception of ,god's sovereignty4 ,it was set forth by ,hugo ,grotius 7#aehc-afde7 and ,ren ,descartes 7#aeif-afej71 and has found prominent advocacy frequently since4 ,but it collides with both sound theology and an adequate moral philosophy4 7#a7 ,it fails to recognize any eternal essential moral character in ,god ,himself4 ,the interests of both morality and religion require faith in ,him as ,himself eternally the righteous and holy creator and moral ruler1 in ,his immutable nature4 ,the morally good can not be something contingent1 but must be absolute1 irrepealable and irreversible even by ,god4 ,we need for both religion and character1 to hold fast to the great truth which represents ,god in ,his moral will as choosing righteousness as righteousness1 loving the morally good as good#di--not as by mere will originating the moral distinction and fixing a code of conduct upon arbitrary ordination4 ,for real moral character in ,god we must go even further and regard ,him as loving righteousness1 not simply as good in ,himself1 but as good in itself1 good by the immutable quality of its own nature4 ,for a moral government we must have a moral governor4 ,and ,god can be such1 not by enforcing responsibility to an arbitrary code1 but by ruling according to distinctions that are per se supreme in eternal reason--enforcing not a mere rule of power but of essential rightness4 7#b7 ,further1 the action of the conscience itself1 in discerning right and wrong where it has received no information as to the will of ,god1 implies that the distinction is rationally based4 ,to discern it is not always conditioned on such information4 ,reason itself--the human in the image of the divine--in some degree reveals the right4 ,so clear is this discernment1 and so independent of all contingency does the right appear1 that even pagan writers have been wont to make virtue superior even to the displeasure of the gods1 nobly standing self-approved4#ej 7#c7 ,the true relation between the will of ,god and the ethically good must be conceived of as1 indeed1 involving a profound and indissoluble identity--what ,he wills being always and necessarily right1 though ,he wills it in perfect freedom--but yet as moving in the logical order of thought1 that right is not made right by ,his willing it1 but that ,he wills it because it is right4 ,civil ,authority4 #h4 ,thomas ,hobbes 7#aehh-afgi71 holding the natural state of man as utterly selfish and a state of war1 gave to civil government1 as necessary to the social order1 supreme authority1 and asserted that the basis of all moral obligation was positive law issued by the sovereign4 ,duty rested on the legal statute1 whose direction was final4 ,it knew no higher law4 ,the theory was a repetition of the travesty of ethics in ,plato's ,republic4 ,it has had no following1 and needs no confutation4 ,but a theory that thus ignored individual conscience and essential right1 reducing morality to civic obedience1 with no other foundation than the positive enactment of a monarch1 at once and strongly re-acted in strengthening the conviction of the necessity and truth of the intuitional view of the moral faculty1 and of the importance of finding a better basis for the ethical principle1 both in the constitution of mankind and in the author of nature4 ,the ,sympathetic ,theory4 #i4 ,the ,sympathetic ,theory is naturally associated with that conception of conscience which makes it consist fundamentally1 not in intellect1 but in instinct or feeling4 ,taking the suggestion from ,hume1 the theory was elaborated by ,adam ,smith 7#agbc-agij74 ,it explained moral obligation as produced by the special action of our nature in which we spontaneously sympathize with certain intentions or conduct of our fellow-men--this sympathy taking the form of approval4 ,the bond to duty was viewed as thus formed by these instinctive sentiments pointing out what is morally good and obligating to corresponding behavior4 ,of course the individual's sympathetic appreciation had to be broadened and trained by the standard of general sentiment4 ,and the explanation was helped out by noting the adaptation of this rule of conduct to promote personal and social happiness4 ,but a theory resting duty on a basis so thoroughly subjective1 and so uncertain and changeful as are men's unguided feelings1 likely often to be in sympathy with evil1 could not commend itself to wide acceptance4 ,it presented neither the ground of right nor a safe rule4 ,utilitarianism4 #aj4 ,the theory of ,utilitarianism had its prototypes in the teachings of ,socrates1 ,aristotle1 and the ,epicureans4 ,its modern forms have been greatly varied1 but they all agree in founding the morally good in utility4 ,that which experience shows to be useful1 as promotive of personal or social interests and happiness1 becomes thereby right1 or the norm of moral choices and conduct4 ,the theory1 in all its modifications1 is a goods theory1#ea interpreting obligation as simply the behest to conform life to the attainment of the various forms of good1 even the chief1 as happiness or enjoyment1 provided for in man's nature and condition4 ,named from the object or objects sought1 it is eudmonism2 named from the way or means of its attainment1 it is utilitarianism4 ,sometimes the good is simply happiness1 sometimes personal well-being1 sometimes social welfare4 ,sometimes it is purely selfish1 sometimes altruistic or in some sense benevolent4 ,but a few examples will make plain both its general character and chief variations4 7#a7 ,william ,paley 7#agdc-ahje71 adopting eudmonistic principles1 rested all obligation to duty on its tendency to secure everlasting happiness4 ,he says3 ,actions are to be estimated by their tendency4 ,whatever is expedient is right4 ,it is the utility of any moral rule alone1 which constitutes the obligation to it4#eb ,the will of ,god is accepted as the rule of virtue1 seemingly not1 however1 as the direct ground of it1 but rather as the sure guide as to what has the tendency to gain for us everlasting happiness4 ,for1 ,paley explains3 ,such is the divine character that what promotes the general happiness is required by the will of ,god4 ,this view makes the spirit of duty1 even in religion1 supreme selfishness4 ,it places the self-regarding impulses on the throne4 7#b7 ,jeremy ,bentham 7#agdh-ahcb71 the chief apostle of modern utilitarianism1 gave it great popularity by making it distinctly altruistic4 ,adopting suggestions in this direction by ,shaftsbury 7#agac71 ,hutcheson1 ,butler1 and ,hume1 he measurably lifted its aim above the individual's care of his own interests1 and made the principle of right authoritative because promotive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,this seemed to subordinate1 without excluding1 the individual's advantage to that of the many1 and the selfish instinct to the higher and nobler aims of love4 ,it developed a rule by which the brotherhood of man could have place1 and character could rise and broaden into magnanimity and worth4 ,it gave an objective standing and broadly human aim to the principle of obligation4 ,james ,mill1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill and ,alexander ,bain have been conspicuous recent representatives of this general view1 while modifying some particular features of it4 ,it must be added1 however1 that this modern altruism1 when analyzed to its final view1 does not become disinterested benevolence4 ,for the greatest general good is viewed as conditioning the best good of each individual1 and the individual is to include it for the sake of his own share4 ,so this so-called altruism1 after all1 is still ruled by the self-regarding aim1 and stands only for the broadest and most successful utilitarianism4 7#c7 ,evolutionist ,utilitarianism4 ,this is its recent and present most characteristic form4 ,the variety of types of evolutionism1 however1 has prevented the bringing of it1 thus far1 into a definite universally accepted formulation4 ,although1 as already stated1#ec monistic evolutionism1 whether materialistic or pantheistic1 by excluding freedom from the universe1 leaves no place for moral action or responsibility1 it still continues to speak about obligation and the reality of personal character4 ,in this case the obligation can be only acquiescence in the fatalistic onward evolution of nature with its inevitable events4 ,theistic evolution1 however1 holding itself as only the mode of the divine creation1 though it has difficulties in explaining the genesis of an authoritative conscience1 maintains both its existence in some sense and a ground for the obligation which it urges4 ,its utilitarianism differs from earlier forms in substituting an historical and biological explanation of the origin and force of the moral sentiments for the purely psychological one4 ,these sentiments are declared to be the results of accumulated experiences of utility1 gradually organized and inherited4#ed ,in its better forms of statement this process of organizing a guiding instinct or intuition is represented as the divine work of transferring the moral law over us into our subjective consciousness--a process1 however1 that moves on the principle of utility and is always incomplete4#ee ,against the whole utilitarian theory1 as a widely urged explanation of the ground of right and the sense of obligation1 the following considerations are decisive3 ,first1 the idea of right is generically distinct and different from that of happiness or utility4 ,however closely related they refuse to be identified and must not be confounded4 ,in reference to any particular act or to any general course of conduct1 beyond the question of pleasure or advantage arises the further question3 ,is it right8 ,every day of their lives men are required to forego enjoyment and the forwarding of what appears to be their interests1 in order to do right and follow their conscience4 ,perceived adaptations to happiness are not the same as the obligation to right4 ,utilitarianism stands apart from the moral idea1 in a by-play with the idea of profit4#ef ,secondly1 as a matter of fact1 clear in our consciousness1 we do not1 in deciding the right or wrong of purposes and conduct1 go through the process of first determining the question of utility or adaptedness to secure the greatest happiness to the greatest number or even our own greatest happiness4 ,in actual moral experience1 the first fact is the notion of right and duty4 ,even when pleasure or advantage is making an appeal1 duty is decided by the further question3 ,is it right8 ,if it be claimed that the process of calculation has become largely unnecessary through the experience which has been teaching lessons and training into judgments so spontaneous as to seem almost intuitive1 there are still cases enough where the right is a distinct issue1 irrespective of advantage1 and where it is chosen in the face of loss and suffering4 ,this fact shows that right is a distinct principle and higher than pleasure4 ,to do right rather than seek sensitive good is the noblest exaltation of character4 ,it is especially in evolutionist utilitarianism that the absence of such conscious calculating of advantage in questions of duty1 is supposed to be explained4 ,the enjoyment of the useful is represented as gradually organized and transformed into moral approbation1 and through hereditary descent appears1 as ,herbert ,spencer says1 in certain emotions responding to right and wrong1 which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility4 ,but philosophy fails to explain how the idea of the useful can thus become identical with the idea of the right1 or even explanatory of it4 ,if a lifetime's experience of utility does not suffice to transmute the idea of one into the other1 why should we think a longer time would do it8 ,if duty does not become the same as happiness or as the tendency of conduct to promote it1 in the ascending steps of individual evolution1 what warrant have we to assume that it did so in some period far back of the consciousness of the present individuals of the race8 ,thirdly1 utilitarianism is inconsistent with the authority which belongs to right1 as witnessed in the moral consciousness4 ,it is the distinctive peculiarity of conscience that it reveals a law or principle of obligation1 not of our own making1 and which our wills cannot displace4 ,manifestly this authority is not of the faculty itself1 but belongs to the law of right which it discloses4 ,it is right1 therefore1 that is authoritative1 with and through the conscience1 because right is a revelation of that absolute authority not ourselves which makes for righteousness in the world and the whole universe4 ,it represents the perfections and will of ,god4 ,no theory of obligation is adequate which does not square with this fact of unique authority in right1 as recognized and enforced by the moral imperative4 ,but neither happiness nor the utilities that tend to promote it1 possess it4 ,they are not obligatory in the peculiar sense in which the ethical behest binds to righteousness4 ,they are offered to our enjoyment1 as sensitive good1 but we may forego them or neglect to seek them1 without direct criminality4 ,duty may1 and often does1 require us not to make them a controlling object of desire4 ,among pleasures1 some are higher or larger than others1 and appeal to some persons more strongly than to others4 ,we can innocently choose between them4 ,to seek the greater instead of the smaller1 or indeed to neglect them all1 is a prudential characteristic1 not a moral one4 ,where a person has simply foregone pleasure1 he may regret it as an error1 but not repent of it as a sin4 ,considered with respect to the individual alone1 and free from relations that may incidentally involve other points than his own personal pleasure1 a man's happiness may be regarded as his own free concern4 ,if he chooses to neglect its pursuit1 or sacrifice it to other aims1 so far as it is only and purely a question as between greater or less enjoyment1 his choice cannot be challenged as guilty1 but only as poor economy4 ,unquestionably it ought to be believed that ,god desires men to be happy1 and has provided the needful conditions for happiness1 but its enjoyment is an offer of ,his love1 and not a requirement of law4 ,happiness is a thing to be gratefully appreciated2 right is a thing we are bound to4 ,happiness is a thing the less likely to be enjoyed the more covetously it is sought after2 right claims our unforgetful and completest loyalty4 ,utilitarianism1 therefore1 assuming to ground right1 which has direct authority in the moral consciousness1 upon happiness which in itself has none1 necessarily falls short of being an adequate theory of the ethical reality4 ,it attempts to deduce the moral from the non-moral4 ,this difference between questions of right and questions of utility easily solves a supposed difficulty in the moral freedom of the will4 ,if choices were simply between greater or less degrees of pleasure or advantage1 it might easily be imagined that the will would be necessarily determined by the greater pleasure4 ,as between inducements of the same kind1 the larger would prevail4 ,but the ethical choices have their place in the presence of motives of different kinds1 between right and enjoyment1 duty or gain2 and here there is unquestionable room for free ethical choices4 ,the question of freedom in moral life is at once relieved by taking it out of the utilitarian view into the clear atmosphere where the profitable is no longer confounded with the right4 ,fourthly1 utilitarianism inverts the true relation between right and utility4 ,unquestionably the connection between them is very close4 ,in a moral system true happiness belongs to righteousness4 ,man cannot attain his true welfare in sin4 ,whatever uncertainties and inequalities the abuse of free agency may bring temporarily into human enjoyment1 in the long run right in its very nature promotes the happiness which has been intended for us4 ,but the logical order of relations is1 not that an act is right because it is useful1 but useful because right4 ,under a moral government happiness1 in the highest and fullest sense1 comes as the legitimate fruit of righteousness1 as wrong-doing1 also1 brings its true consequences in suffering1 pain and misery4 ,right is the quality of highest rank1 and all blessedness comes into unity and harmony under it4 ,their rightness gives to actions their quality of usefulness1 which cannot1 therefore1 ground the right4 ,utilitarianism inverts the real relation4 ,this true relation explains how it is that the right stands the very highest in the grade of values1 without its becoming right by its profitableness4 ,it is of supreme worth1 the greatest good1 but it is so by what it is in itself4 ,its good consequences spring from its nature4 ,but while utilitarianism is thus utterly inadequate as a statement of the ground of right1 it nevertheless1 especially in its altruistic form1 brings to view some genuine and profound principles of the philosophy of duty4 ,this has given it its plausibility and wide acceptance4 ,it is proper1 therefore1 to mark and recognize the truth that belongs to the theory4 7#a7 ,the tendencies of conduct to promote true happiness1 or the contrary1 furnish1 in fact1 a valuable practical rule in questions of right and duty4 ,for1 by the moral constitution of the world1 right-doing1 despite the disorders that temporarily obstruct and confuse the real law of consequences1 is the way of true welfare4 ,happiness1 in the true1 though not hedonistic sense1 is an end of our being1 and virtue is conducive to it4 ,the way of the transgressor is hard1 under the law of natural cause and effect4 ,the utilitarian theory therefore justly appeals to the great lessons of experienced utility to show the way of duty and guide conduct into righteousness4 ,so that while utility does not explain why an act is right1 it becomes1 if correctly interpreted1 a principle of great value in determining the right4 7#b7 ,it is unquestionably true that the altruistic principle of the greatest good to the greatest number presents a principle of genuine moral authority4 ,it opens to view the whole realm of obligation to beneficent activity and self-sacrifice4 ,it points to deeds that are noblest in life and highest in ethical character4 ,it even gives a reason for their obligatoriness4 ,in this form the theory no longer bases duty simply on one's own personal enjoyment or advantage1 identifying morality with supreme selfishness1 but lifts it into the sphere of benevolence and doing good4 ,for1 in altruism individual enjoyment and interests are necessarily subordinated to the well-being of the many4 ,and when utility is thus put into the service of love or good-will1 it carries the quality of right into wide ranges of purpose and conduct4 ,it will be observed1 however1 that the theory thus obtains its appearance of explaining the foundation of right and duty only after utility has been itself changed and identified with the virtue of active good-will or beneficence which1 of course1 is right and obligatory to the degree of every man's ability4 ,in other words1 only when it ceases to be purely and really a utilitarian theory1 and stands in the name and rights of benevolence--getting ethical authority surreptitiously from the quality of love instead of profitableness--does it also get the plausibility that it seems to possess4 7#c7 ,it is true1 too1 that a person's opportunities to promote his own happiness and true interests involve a degree of obligation to do so1 as far as this may be consistent with other duties4 ,a proper self-regard is right4 ,in general1 on the one hand1 we may justly make1 as we have done1 a distinction between enjoyment1 which is offered to our option1 and right1 which is required by moral law4 ,were there no considerations involved but that of one's own happiness1 this distinction would be unqualified4 ,on the other hand1 it must1 at the same time1 be confessed that the moral consciousness of mankind often condemns the conduct of men reckless of their own happiness or well-being1 not simply as poor economy1 but also as morally wrong4 ,except in benevolent sacrifice no man can innocently throw away his own happiness4 ,the explanation of this is easy4 ,there are other considerations involved than his own happiness4 ,to understand the whole truth at this point the underlying fact must be borne in mind1 that man is created for two great ends1 primarily for excellence of character1 secondarily and consequently for happiness4 ,in moral order the way to the latter is in and through the former4 ,character stands as the irrepealable condition of reaching man's proper and true happiness4 ,and it is1 therefore1 true that in throwing away his happiness a man may be guilty of more than poor economy1 but only in case he does this by violating the law of right in surrendering his nature to vice4 ,it is not the consent to surrender enjoyment in itself that involves guilt4 ,for1 one may innocently and virtuously forego this for the sake of doing right4 ,he may sacrifice pleasure or present happiness to serve the good of others4 ,in such disregard and sacrifice of enjoyment to do good1 there is no sin against the law of right2 for we are not bound to enjoyment as we are to right4 ,nor is there in it any sin against the divine provision for happiness in our own nature2 for under the rule of moral order righteousness and happiness must finally coincide4 ,while1 therefore1 there is a sense in which to throw away one's happiness is morally wrong1 as well as bad policy1 it is only when it is thrown away by conduct that is first a violation of the law of right4 ,there are two other profound ethical facts which help to explain how men are bound to regard their own happiness1 although right is not grounded in it4 ,one is1 that every man sustains relations to the welfare of his fellow-men1 being a unit in the solidarity of social humanity1 making it impossible to separate his own happiness from the well-being and rights of others4 ,the other is that he sustains also relations to an intended possible personal destiny4 ,in the first of these he is bound in duty to his fellow-men4 ,in the second he is obligated in duty to ,god4 ,in the former case1 he cannot wantonly trifle with his own interests without wrong and injury to those to whom he is bound in the relationships of life4 ,in this way a moral wrong comes in4 ,in the latter case1 as ,god has rights in ,his plan for each man's worthy and happy destiny1 it is a sin against ,him when men make their own welfare inferior by failure to observe the moral principle which conditions true happiness in righteousness4 ,sacrifice of happiness by such disregard of moral principle is not to be confounded with sacrifice of it through loyalty to right and holy self-denial in doing good4 ,it thus1 however1 becomes evident1 even in this discussion and exhibition of the truth which utilitarianism has in its favor1 that the theory fails to present the real ground of right4 ,for in its primary and fundamental form1 viewing conduct as right because promotive of our personal interests and happiness1 it plainly resolves morality into mere calculation of selfishness4 ,it presents supreme egoism4 ,and in its altruistic form it either maintains its selfish character1 by explaining that only by the rule of the greatest good to the greatest number can the common interest1 and consequently each man's share be fully secured1 implying that he is to contribute to the common welfare for the sake of his own larger portion2 or by subordinating the idea of utility to that of good-will actively seeking the interests of others1 it practically confesses that it must seek some other ground than mere utility or the consequences of conduct1 in which to find the principle of right4 ,and this good-will1 benevolence or love1 thus added1 also fails4 ,for since good-will is a virtue1 it cannot be placed as the ground of virtue1 both in itself and in all virtues4 ,the moral law is by no means exhausted in benevolence2 it must include also justice1 purity1 veracity and many other duties4 ,a benevolence that would be unaccompanied by condemnation of the evil-doer and his wrongs1 might quickly go astray4 ,it has often been pointed out that good-will itself throws no light as to the right methods of realizing even itself4 ,itself needs a guide as to how it may proceed--the very principle of right after whose basis we are inquiring4 ,love1 unless united with reprobation of evil-doing1 is as likely to act immorally as morally4 ,benevolent endeavor1 however excellent in itself1 must subject its methods to the fundamental principles of right4 ,and not until we find the relations that require both benevolence and its utilities1 do we reach the ground of right and obligation4 ,theory of ,relations4 #aa4 ,the ,theory of ,relations is variously modified4 ,as expressed by ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke1 right is based on the fitness of things4 ,wollaston grounded it on the truth of things1 wrong action being in all cases out of harmony with the realities of existence4 ,jouffroy found it in the demands of universal order1 the particular good and duty of each man being elements or parts of an absolute good and universal order appearing to reason as obligatory4 ,dr4 ,wayland makes right rest upon conformity of action to the relations which man sustains in life4#eg ,we shall come upon the essential features of this theory in our next chapter1 in our positive account of the development and basis of right4 ,spiritual ,excellence ,theory4 #ab4 ,as defined by ,dr4 ,hickok3 ,the ground in which the ultimate rule of right is seen1 is the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being4444 ,every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that and that only which is due to his spiritual excellency4#eg ,but it is a plain matter of fact that men do not go through a process of correlating their proposed conduct with the spiritual excellency of their nature1 before deciding on its moral character4 ,and even if they did so1 it would give them but a self-centred rule4 ,dr4 ,gregory well says of this attempt to put one's own spiritual excellency as the principle of right3 ,it is only by a self-deification1 by making man a god to himself1 that it can be made a supreme end4#eh ,theory of ,intuitions4 #ac4 ,some writers search for no ground beyond the immediate intuition4 ,this view forbears to seek for any basis behind the immediate affirmation of the moral sense4 ,right is ultimate in its own intuition4 ,the intuition creates law4 ,this seems to be the teaching of ,cudworth1 ,kant1 ,coleridge1 ,calderwood1 and others4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,ground ,,of ,,right--,,continued4 ,the review of theories in the last chapter prepares us to apprehend the real ground of right4 ,all the subjective theories fail1 because the moral quality is objectively real to the percipient conscience4 ,the endmonistic and utilitarian explanations are at fault1 because they attempt to deduce the moral from the unmoral and can give no account of the unique authority which is the characteristic mark of moral law4 ,the full ground of right1 as the essential elements of the problem have made clearly apparent1 must be regarded as twofold1 embracing1 first1 the proximate or immediate ground1 and secondly1 the ultimate ground4 ,proximate ,ground ,stated4 ,i4 ,the proximate ground--as becomes easily manifest if we keep our view close to the witness of consciousness in actual experience--is in a rational conformity of conduct to the relations which men sustain to one another and to other beings in the divinely constituted system of the world4 ,these relations immediately call for fitting conduct4 ,they create the ought of moral law4 ,the right is found in conforming to the requirements which they develop and impose4 ,duty consists in fulfilling the demands which they involve and express to the moral reason4 ,this1 it will be noticed1 accords with the fundamental principle already referred to1 that the conception of moral law allies itself normally only with the theistic view of the world1 and the truth that the constituted human relations have been framed under a rational ideal of order and welfare4 ,these relations form a rational system in which intelligent free activity is to actualize a divine plan of excellence and well-being4 ,they require conduct in accordance with themselves and with the ends of well-being and happiness to which they have been adapted4 ,the human reason reads the meaning of the relations1 and the moral discernment recognizes the obligation to correspondent sentiment and action4 ,moral conduct thus becomes simply the conduct that actualizes the ideas of divine order to which the framework of human relations has been constituted4 ,what is right springs immediately from the relations1 as what is due in ideal moral order4 ,the relations themselves exhibit a moral constitution as the immediate environment of the human moral personality4 ,they bring the ethical requirement which they contain to the recognizing capacity of the reason and the obedience of the will4 ,it is to be noticed1 further1 that the term relations is to be understood here in its most comprehensive sense and applicability4 ,it embraces all relations with respect to which the human personality in its freedom has to determine and harmonize itself--relations individual1 social1 and divine4 ,social relationship has often been absurdly mistaken as the only sphere of moral obligation2 and the individual1 if contemplated as alone and perfectly isolated1 has sometimes been supposed to be entirely without ethical bonds4 ,in what concerns himself only1 he is imagined to be unbound4 ,but this is an unwarrantable limitation of the term4 ,for the individual1 even viewed utterly apart from his race1 yet sustains relations to the adaptations and intentions in his own nature4 ,as in society he owes something to the humanity around him1 even alone he would still owe something to the humanity committed to his own keeping4 ,he cannot absolve himself from the bond that binds him to that--as in fact he cannot from that which unites him to his fellow-men4 ,mere pleasures or enjoyments which are apart from his essential character he may1 indeed1 disregard1 but not what concerns its intended excellence and honor4 ,it has been well said3 ,robinson ,crusoe did not become a non-moral being when thrown on the desert island2 for he still owed respect to his own humanity4#ei ,many a deed is wrong1 not as injuring others1 but as violative of the agent's relation to the purposes lodged in his own constitution4 ,this is as real as are those that connect him with his fellow-men around him or with ,god above him4 ,and it is very superficial thought that finds no relations but those that are objective4 ,sometimes1 strangely1 in popular thinking1 man's relation to ,god is also omitted from a place in morality1 by a relegation of it to the sphere of religion4 ,but this relation is the most fundamental and vital of all human relations and most replete with moral obligations and responsibilities4 ,this view of the immediate ground of right is fully established by the following additional considerations3 ,sustained by ,moral ,consciousness4 #a4 ,it is directly sustained by the moral consciousness itself1 in constant experience4 ,as a question of psychological metaphysics the point must be settled in harmony with the testimony of consciousness4 ,appealing to this1 there can be no doubt that these relations do develop and call for the duties which the conscience is constantly discerning and enforcing4 ,this is simply a fact--a fact which speculations about the origin of conscience or the education of its judgments1 must not be allowed to obscure4 ,it assures that actual morality is no abstraction1 but concrete conduct rightly answering to each person's relations in real life4 ,beyond all question1 as thus witnessed in the universal moral consciousness1 these relations from the most general1 that of man to man1 down through all special connections1 as between parents and children1 husband and wife1 brothers and sisters1 friends and neighbors1 rulers and citizens1 employer and employ1 rich and poor1 capable and helpless1 and all the other human interrelations in their thousands of diversified forms1 do determine and impose both general and specific duties4 ,the duties come into view as developed by the relations1 and change as they are modified and changed4 ,this basing of what is right and obligatory for men on their relations to one another1 to ,god1 and to appointed ends1 is not a mere theory1 but an unquestionable reality in their consciousness4 ,and this accords with the best cosmic philosophy4 ,for this holds all these relations as parts of a rationally designed system of world-order for universal well-being1 and the moral reason as capacitated to discern1 with more or less clearness and fulness1 the moral requirement which they involve and present for observance4 ,we know of no morality that exists1 or can exist1 in human life1 apart from them4 ,strike them all away1 and all duties disappear4 ,take1 as illustration1 the most generic virtue of all the virtues recognized by the ethical judgments1 that of good-will or love4 ,the moral reason recognizes this as resting1 according to eternal fitness1 in the broadest and most generic of all relations1 that of one intelligent sentient being to another4 ,in the inter-human connection it is based in the brotherhood of man4 ,and this generic good-will1 thus required in ideal moral right by the generic relation1 becomes differentiated and modified in thousands of special types and forms by the endlessly diversified particular relations of life4 ,presuppositions in ,responsibility4 #b4 ,it is implied in the logical presuppositions to all moral responsibility4 ,among such presuppositions1 as conceded by all1 are intelligence to know1 and freedom to conform to these relations4 ,these prerequisites are essential to the very conception of moral action and amenability4 ,it is the universal sense of the race that creatures that cannot know themselves and the relations they sustain1 and are without free-will to fulfil them1 are morally irresponsible and incapable of virtue or vice4 ,to them the moral realm becomes a blank1 and the moral judgments become impossible4 ,and equally universal is the admission that the moral insight is helped and responsibility increased by every increase of light giving larger and truer knowledge of the complex and intricate connections of human life4 ,with every broadened and clarified vision of these connections fresh obligations appear4 ,a defective apprehension of the relations in which we stand to ,god and to our fellow-men1 will prevent our seeing our specific duties4#fj ,this fact furnishes direct evidence that right conduct must be held as a certain intelligent adjustment to the relations sustained4 ,the value of this point is magnified when we remind ourselves how it explains and illuminates the sometimes troublesome phenomenon of different and even conflicting moral judgments in the same case by different persons1 and the fact of progress in moral standards as civilization and culture advance4 ,differing apprehension of one or more of the many elements or factors converging1 with confusing force1 into almost every situation which calls for duty1 easily accounts for most of the perplexing diversity4 ,the relations are seen from different angles1 and interpreted in different light4 ,and the advance of civilizations1 with their science and philosophy1 brings truer and completer views of man's place and relations4 ,the moral ideas of the human reason are1 indeed1 essentially identical in all men and all ages1 and when human relations are apprehended in the same light1 with equal clearness and fulness1 the moral judgments substantially agree4 ,but the progress of knowledge1 throwing increasing light on these relations1 leads the onward civilizations up into truer and better application of the principles of right in life4 ,the different codes do not mean a change of primary moral ideas1 but merely reflect and illustrate the changed and advancing apprehension of man's true relations to which these unchanging ideas are1 and are forever to be1 applied4 ,another and kindred fact is explained1 adding still further confirmation of the correctness of this theory4 ,with perfect intentions men fulfil objective duty only in measure4 ,duty is only approximately accomplished1 in varying degrees1 from very faulty success to high grades of accuracy and completeness4 ,a correct view of the ground of right must necessarily allow a consistent explanation of this fact4 ,sometimes the fact has been looked upon as inconsistent with any absolute dividing line between right and wrong1 on one or the other side of which every action must fall4 ,not all good acts are perfect or faultless2 not all evil ones are equally violations of duty4 ,of right actions some measure up better than others toward all that full duty requires4 ,dr4 ,martineau1 partly in order to account for this scope of variety in moral correctness1 urges a special definition of right and wrong3 ,every action is right1 which1 in presence of a lower principle1 follows a higher2 every action is wrong1 which1 in presence of a higher principle1 follows a lower4#fa ,by the great difference in the rank of moral motives the reason of men's differing grades in the ascending or descending scale of character seems to come into view4 ,but while the definition furnishes a rule frequently serviceable for guidance in questions of duty1 it fails to define the ground of right2 for it leaves unsettled the very point in this question1 viz43 why one principle 7as a motive7 is morally higher or lower than another1 or why some intentions or actions are right or wrong in any degree4 ,and the offered explanation is unnecessary2 for the unquestionable principle of moral requirement developed in relations1 and discerned by the intuitive insight of the conscience fully explains the variety1 when we remember the various degrees of accuracy and fulness with which these relations are understood and estimated4 ,every relation calling for duty is composite and complex1 the various parts being often so connected as to come only partially or one-sidedly into view1 preventing full insight of the moral demand1 or accurate adjustment of sentiment and conduct to it4 ,rarely is any relation simple and alone4 ,often1 indeed commonly1 conscience has to decide duty as a resultant obligation out of very complicated and even antagonistic relationships4 ,all this is amply sufficient to explain the different degrees in which the conduct meets duty4 ,it is the necessary result of the impossibility of exactly fitting the moral sentiment or act to the demands of the moral relations4 ,and the transparent explanation which this theory furnishes of the fact of such degrees strongly corroborates its scientific correctness4 ,verified in ,moral ,concepts4 #c4 ,it is verified1 further1 in the character of the various virtues1 and their opposite immoralities4 ,in their very conceptions these imply relations4 ,they are moulded by them1 and carry the shaping thus received4 ,justice1 for example1 in inter-human affairs1 is absolute equity between man and man--exact reciprocity4 ,veracity expresses something that is due from one to another among beings whose welfare requires them to live according to the truth of things4 ,the duty to speak the truth answers to the need and right of each one to know it4 ,love1 or good-will1 has already been shown to express the feeling which1 in eternal fitness1 is due from one sentient rational being to another1 in the most generic relationship4 ,honesty means seeking equality of values in dealings one with another4 ,sincerity signifies genuineness in the temper and way we relate ourselves to those about us4 ,we might run through all the precepts of the ,christian decalogue and note that every one is based on some general or special relation1 either of man to ,god or of men to their fellow-men4 ,no virtue can get away from relations4 ,the very concept of every one is moulded by them1 and carries the shaping which they enstamp upon it as the coin does that of the die4 ,supported by ,analogy4 #d4 ,it is supported also by the analogy of organic and instinctive action4 ,in organic action1 the physically right is adaptation to environment1 in which each part and movement fills its sphere and accomplishes its functions in the given place and relations4 ,in instinctive action1 the force is adjusted to the position and connections in which the animal is placed4 ,for example1 that of the bee is made to move correspondently to its relations to the individuals of its own kind and to the end of supporting and preserving the species4 ,the instinct of the beaver adjusts its house to its peculiar surroundings2 that of birds constructs their nests in distinct adaptation to the conditions that surround them4 ,in animals that harvest and store their food1 it suits the action to the particular environment and changing seasons4 ,in every case instinct fits the activity to the given place and relations of its subject4 ,this method by which organic and instinctive functions are set to secure right action in their special spheres1 is exceedingly significant of the generic principle of all right action4 ,in the light of the analogy1 the morally right is a continuation of the same principle of harmony with constituted relations which is seen to be omnipresent in all the lower domain of nature extending up to human personality1 but becoming moral at this point by being subject to free will and accomplished by it4 ,it is to be remembered that teleologic plan and adaptation run through the entire cosmic order1 from atoms to worlds and from minutest structures of body to the loftiest endowments of intelligent beings akin to ,god4 ,automatic action secures accordance in the inferior ranges4 ,the grand distinction of the moral realm appears when1 as the crowning ascent of life is reached1 the principle of ethical harmony with divinely constituted relations is to be accepted and accomplished by the intelligence and freedom of man and is made the moral ought under personal responsibility4 ,assumed in ,common ,life4 #e4 ,it adds confirmation to this explanation1 that it is implicitly assumed in all the conceptions and language of common life4 ,unbiassed by speculative theories the every-day thinking and speech of mankind connect duties with men's personal place and relations--duties modified and fixed according to the form and specialty of individual situations4 ,the fact of duty itself is not more certain than this fact of the way in which spontaneous and unperverted thought grounds it4 ,this fixing of the world's conceptions and speech in this form cannot be fairly interpreted as a caprice or accident1 but as the true effect of the actual reality1 which stands as its cause or warrant4 ,and it is significant that speculative theorists who have framed for themselves some other account1 whenever momentarily off their guard or forgetting to act as watch-dog for their theory1 have been wont to turn unconsciously into forms of expression recognizing this relational ground for human duties4 ,the ,ultimate ,ground4 ,,ii4 ,in thus finding the right grounded directly on conformity to the relations given men in the constituted order of life1 we have not yet reached the full solution of the great problem4 ,for these relations are only a part of the aggregate moral constitution1 and are not the last term of moral authority4 ,they do not stand in their own independent right4 ,though they do directly create and shape the immediate duties for which they call1 they are not the ultimate reality in which moral law has its deep foundations4 ,so we must go back to the source and reason of these relations4 ,the ultimate ground can be found1 only in ,god himself who1 in his underived eternal nature1 is the absolute ground of the whole created universe1 with all its interrelations which develop the reality of moral law4 ,the true conception of the divine creative action is that in it the thought and moral character of ,god become transitive and appear in the relations established and the ethical requirements which the relations impose4 ,the constituted connections and order of life1 which involve an ideal standard of right conduct and duty1 reveal the divine mind or intention and in it the ultimate authority4 ,the proximate basis1 already discovered1 in ideal conformity to the moral relations in which the moral agent is placed1 therefore represents ,god1 who1 as the first cause and eternal ground of the creation with all its adaptations and laws1 is the ultimate and unchangeable ground of right and of all moral law4 ,this statement of the ultimate ground means more than a resting of right simply on the will of ,god4 ,a reference of it to his will has often stood for a claim that the moral law stands merely in the option of ,god or as only a product of his choice4 ,many have represented it as only an effect whose cause is an act of his will--that will originating or making the right rather than observing and declaring it1 and the moral law having no basis other than such enactment of will4 ,but this would imply that ,god himself is without moral character1 acting from no norm of essential right1 but simply by mere will ordaining what should pass as right among mankind4 ,our fundamental ethical conception of him1 however1 is that of a moral being and moral ruler4 ,and to be moral means to love and choose the right as right4 ,we must keep in mind here the relation between moral law and will1 or the choices of the will4 ,moral authority does not exist as will1 but as right4 ,the great conception of the right1 as witnessed to in universal conscience1 is of something that appeals to will and requires the will to bow to its claim4 ,right is superior and authoritative for will1 and cannot1 therefore1 be simply an effect of it4 ,the right itself is basal for right willing1 even with ,god himself4 ,he wills according to it4 ,hence the moral law is not to be considered a product of his will1 but an expression of his nature4 ,in perfect freedom he wills the good because he is good1 being in his eternal nature the absolute and infinite moral ,perfection4 ,it is a deep conviction in the moral consciousness of mankind1 that ,god himself is in his very nature righteous and good1 a conviction which utters itself evermore in the spontaneous exclamation3 ,shall not the judge of all the earth do right6 ,out of a non-moral ground the moral could never arise1 and only in the very nature of ,god himself as perfect1 infinite and unchangeable righteousness1 do we reach the ultimate ground both of the constituted relations of human life and of the sublime and inextinguishable reality of moral law for the ordering of these relations4 ,the profound meaning of the poet's couplet3 ,for right is right since ,god is ,god1 ,and right the day must win1 is to identify ,god and right as united in the eternal foundation of the moral system4 ,there is thus1 for the universe1 what has been often designated an eternal and immutable morality whose authority and standard rest in the very ,ground of the universe itself4 ,the conclusion thus apparent is vindicated by the very conception of the authority which binds men ethically4 ,mere might cannot make right or be that which has the reverence of the moral nature4 ,moral sovereignty does not attach to a simple absolutism of power4 ,the ethical will bows to the right only4 ,it would be a great contradiction to think of the power to which the moral submission of the soul is due as itself anything other than an ethical power1 the morally good power1 the morally good ,being4 ,this ultimate ground of right1 thus found1 makes plain why ethics1 in its full meaning and issue1 is so closely allied to religion4 ,religion1 in its spirit and aim1 means fellowship with ,god1 accordance of desire1 will1 and life with him4 ,and ethics1 even in the view of its early student ,plato1 looks to the same goal1 likeness to ,god4 ,the supreme aim of ,christianity is ethical1 the transformation and exaltation of human conduct and character into the excellence and happiness of righteousness4 ,that the moral life of man may1 out of his broken1 corrupt and disabled state of sin1 thus become again harmonized with ,god and the divine constitution of things1 redemption comes with its supernatural powers and help for human nature1 enabling and accomplishing a realization of the ethical law in human character4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,objects ,,of ,,moral ,,judgment4 ,a full view of the ethical reality and its meaning for us requires yet an examination into the question3 ,of what may we justly affirm moral quality8 ,where does the conscience apply the distinctions of right and wrong8 ,what are properly the objects1 and the only objects1 of moral approval or condemnation8 ,or1 to put it in a way possibly more easily understood1 to what human activities or features of life does moral quality belong8 ,it has already been noted in general that only personal beings can be moral agents or become1 in what they are and do1 objects of moral judgment4 ,apart from personality1 no place for virtue or vice can be found4 ,of things1 whether natural products or products of human industry1 as rock or star or stream1 or ship or watch or engine1 we cannot predicate moral character4 ,we may speak of them as beautiful1 useful1 or perfect1 or as ugly1 useless1 or faulty1 but all distinctly ethical terms are inapplicable to them4 ,the moral approbation or condemnation which we feel for the temper1 words1 and actions of men is felt toward them as personal phenomena4 ,detached from personality they would no more be subjects of praise or blame than the temperature of the sea1 the noise of the wind1 or the down-pour of rain ,moral character belongs to them only as the characteristics and manifestations of the self-conscious and self-directed life of a moral agent4 ,to the question what activities of a moral agent may have ethical quality1 it ought to be sufficient to say that it belongs to all his conscious and self-directed conduct4 ,obligation claims sway over the whole personality4 ,but for clearness and definiteness1 it is necessary to specify4 ,personal ,actions4 #a4 ,the action itself1 in its external form1 may be right or wrong1 as in conformity to moral relations or incongruous with them4 ,it may be either the deed that is due to the relations and a fulfilment of the duty they call for1 or it may be one that clashes with their rational and actual requirement4 ,it may be in itself just the action in which conduct is rightly adjusted to the actual relations--an act that ought to appear in them4 ,or it may be in itself an action whose very form contradicts the moral demand of the relations1 and which ought not to be done1 no matter how good a motive may prompt the deed4 ,for example1 the motive to use them in a worthy charity could never justify a theft of goods or money1 nor could filial care of a helpless parent be in itself wrong1 even should a bad motive inspire it4 ,moral law repudiates the first deed2 it condemns the wrong motive in the second1 but declares the material of the deed itself to be right and good4 ,we must here distinguish between the moral character of the doer and of the deed4 ,the quality of right and wrong belongs to the action2 guilt or innocence belongs to the person4 ,this is the basis of the well known fact that in some cases the doer of a wrong act may nevertheless be held as innocent and even virtuous in it4 ,he may have honestly meant to do right1 and acted from praiseworthy motives1 but from not understanding correctly or fully the situation1 may have done what has violated the moral call of the relations4 ,the action may be condemned1 while he himself may be acquitted of guilt4 ,the full ethical demand1 however1 requires such a use of all our faculties of knowledge and behavior1 as not only to maintain a good intention1 but to keep our outward conduct in harmony with objective righteousness4 ,many writers have shown a disposition to deny moral quality to the external action4 ,locating it all in the inner sentiment or intention1 their analysis separates the visible part from its source1 and holds up to view the action1 so separated1 as mere physical motion1 characterizable as useful and expedient or the contrary1 but neither moral nor immoral4 ,independently of its motive it is resolved into mere natural movement1 as non-ethical as a muscular spasm1 sleepwalking1 the dashing of a wave1 or the biting of frost4 ,but this is as misleading as it is plausible4 ,the error becomes clear by the following considerations3 7#a7 ,the supposed separation of the deed from the inward intention falsifies the actual facts in the case4 ,the essential element in the problem is that we are contemplating1 not physical movement only1 like spasms or waves1 but personal deeds1 as acts of moral agents4 ,of course1 moral quality does not attach to the action of non-moral beings1 as the striking of clocks or the barking of dogs1 but to deeds of self-directing personality4 ,let it be freely admitted that the inner sentiment does give quality to conduct4 ,the obligation to the conduct that shall fulfil duty attaches to the personal agent2 the innocence or guilt also belongs to him4 ,but there is obligation upon him with respect to conduct only because conduct1 in its external forms as well as inward springs1 forms the total material of morality4 ,there could be no responsibility for conduct if no moral quality belonged to actions4 ,to separate--after the manner referred to--the action from the personal moral agent and think of it as physical motion only1 makes it no longer the action about whose character we are inquiring4 7#b7 ,we must bear in mind several just distinctions in the application of the term right4 ,along with duty1 obligation1 merit1 innocence1 or guilt1 it may be affirmed of the moral agent4 ,we may say1 he is right1 in doing so or so4 ,we may speak of the inner sentiment as right or wrong4 ,so we may of the external action4 ,for the true and full extent of moral quality1 we must make it cover the agent himself1 and both the inner and outer sides of his personal conduct4 ,conduct has an internal and an external part4 ,the motive is only one part4 ,an action is relatively right1 with respect to the agent1 when he has the right will in right motive2 it is absolutely right only when it is also shaped into accordance with the relations so as to realize the moral demand upon the person4 ,the distinction1 often made1 between formal right and material right1 throws the point into clear light4 ,it is well stated by ,prof4 ,bowne3 ,the former depends upon the attitude of the agent's will toward his ideal of right1 the latter depends on the harmony of the act with the laws of reality and its resulting tendency to produce and promote well-being4 ,conduct which is formally right may be materially wrong2 and conduct which is materially right may be formally wrong2 but no conduct can be even formally right when the agent does not aim to be materially right4 ,the ideal of conduct demands both formal and material rightness1 and as long as either is lacking the outcome is imperfect4444 ,if one does 'the best he knows1' it is often said nothing more can be demanded of him4 ,and yet it is plain that this formal righteousness is altogether insufficient for the person's well-being4 ,the reason is that the law of well-being is independent of our will4 ,if we misconceive that law and act accordingly1 we may be formally right1 but because of the misconception we should be materially wrong4 ,it is1 then1 by no means sufficient that one be formally right1 that is1 true to his convictions of duty2 he must also be materially right1 that is1 in harmony with reality and its laws4 ,formal rightness1 of course1 is ethically the more important1 as it involves the good will2 but material rightness is only less important1 as without it our action is out of harmony with the universe4#fb 7#c7 ,the moral consciousness1 when unperverted by speculative theory1 does in fact judge the actions of men4 ,it steadily holds them as essentially right or wrong1 over and above all question as to the motives for them4 ,it is found perpetually condemning even well-meant deeds as traversing duty and righteousness1 hardly able to excuse the blundering ignorance to which they are due4 ,this feeling of reprobation is genuine1 normal1 and wholesome4 ,on the other hand the overthrow of this feeling and the adoption of the claim of a non-ethical character for actions1 tends directly and strongly to consequences which witness against the validity of the claim4 ,the demoralizing effect has often been illustrated4 ,the resolving of duty into a mere matter of good intentions has led off into ways and forms of behavior shocking to enlightened consciences4 ,it has made quite plausible the illusion that the end sanctifies the means1 and in the name of religion has stretched men on the rack and lighted the faggots at the stake4 ,under a fancy that purity is simply a thing of the heart1 men have been known to excuse not a little sensualism of life4 ,while ethics must lay stress on the inner good-will1 it must also look after the harmony of the outward acts with the law of right relations4 ,no amount of good motive can make blasphemy or murder right or virtuous4 ,the ,feelings1 ,passions and ,desires4 #b4 ,the various feelings1 passions1 and desires are not only springs of action that may issue in conduct1 but are in themselves either right or wrong1 according as they are exercised in harmony with moral law or in conflict with it4 7#a7 ,though our feelings spring spontaneously and immediately out of our knowledge and fundamental psychical character1 they are subject to training and regulation by the will1 and their states and movements are part of our moral life4 ,and though by natural unperverted constitution all these primary feelings and affections have right and good functions1 their activities1 under noxious stimulation1 may run into forms and in directions thoroughly immoral4 ,love1 which1 in its holiest direction1 toward ,god1 and in its purest forms of benevolence1 toward men1 is the highest virtue1 may take forbidden directions and corrupt and disorder life4 ,hate1 the reverse of love1 instead of being directed against evil which ought to be hated1 often emits its venom against that which ought to be loved for its goodness4 ,self-esteem1 as a proper respect for what has been put into a person's being to be cared for and enjoyed1 frequently runs into condemnable selfishness4 ,many of the desires are apt to be in offense because of over-development1 clashing in anarchic insubordination in the soul1 or rushing toward unlawful objects4 ,desire for possessions tends to grow into covetousness1 desire for honor into unscrupulous ambition1 desire for pleasure into a ruling passion4 ,such feelings as malice and envy1 mongrel products of selfishness and ill-will1 are at once adjudged to be sinful4 7#b7 ,were further proof needed that morality attaches to the affections and desires1 it is found in their relations as motives to conduct4 ,we have not traced actions completely to their moral source when we have ascertained the volition from which they proceed4 ,we must go a step further back and mark the impulses that either rightly or wrongly influenced the will4 ,we must do as do courts of justice in seeking the character of an act1 and ascertain not only that the act was done in free-will1 but also what feelings influenced the free-will in doing it4 ,an act of volition may have very different motives behind it4 ,the immoral character of the volition is not only from the immorally-acting will itself1 but also from the wrong feelings or desires acting on the will4 ,indeed1 the very will is betrayed into wrong-doing by their perverting persuasions4 ,it becomes clear1 therefore1 that if it be at all true that actions take moral character from their motives1 this character must be predicable of these motive sensibilities4 7#c7 ,a special question has place here--whether moral quality belongs even to the personal dispositions1 propensities and inclinations that lie back of the exercise of the feelings1 as attitudes or habitudes of the soul with respect to good and evil8 ,the facts of life unquestionably show the existence of such propensities or tendencies derived through heredity and descending from generation to generation4 ,the scientific theory of evolution recognizes them and draws many of its conclusions1 both psychological and moral1 from them4 ,they express rather a state of the personal constitution than any exercise of its faculties4 ,they denote so basally the psychical life-condition1 that they characterize rather what the person is than what he does morally4 ,since they1 as states of the personal agent1 constitute his attitude1 among other things1 toward good and evil1 an attitude either right or wrong1 this question manifestly requires an affirmative answer4 ,aims and ,intentions4 #c4 ,intentions4 ,in judging conduct we inquire especially into the aim1 purpose1 intention1 which directed it4 ,we look at the end sought4 ,and in a peculiar degree conduct is pronounced right or wrong according to this4 ,for the intention is pre-eminently the very heart and informing principle of the moral act4 ,besides largely shaping the material action in agreement or conflict with objective duty it is the inner soul of the total deed4 ,it may make an act that in its external form is morally indifferent thoroughly virtuous or deeply criminal--such as that of handing a sum of money to another1 in one case to relieve suffering1 in another to secure murder4 ,the intention to do what is known to be wrong1 even when the overt deed is prevented1 stamps upon the person its own moral character4 ,in intentions we find the teleology of the ethical conduct--the chosen ends at which men are aiming in their constant endeavor--and they have a place of importance corresponding to this directive relation4 ,life moves as these turn1 and the great body of human activity1 in its mighty sweep of purposive conduct1 whether rising into its loftiest and purest virtues or descending to its lowest and most horrid crimes1 is their result4 ,in this teleological position they differ as motives from the motives found in the simple feelings1 affections and passions which act non-voluntarily and unconscious of ends1 but are springs of impulse and incentives from the subjective psychical organization4 ,intentions are deliberate voluntary purposes aiming at chosen objects and adjusting means to ends4 ,for this class of motives1 therefore1 we are peculiarly and pre-eminently responsible4 ,activities of the ,intellect4 #d4 ,the activities and uses of the intellect4 ,often theorists have denied any moral element in these1 mainly because of a certain necessity in intellect under psychical law1 and because its function is simply to know4 ,it does nothing1 either good or bad2 it only knows4 ,its sphere is the sphere of knowledge1 not of conduct4 ,but this is a very inadequate view of its total activity1 and of its place in the moral agent's life4 ,as to the question of necessity1 the activities of the intellect are as much under the command of the moral agent as are his sensibilities1 his affections1 desires1 and passions4 ,it would be difficult to see why he should be amenable for the direction and regulation of these desires and passions1 and not also for the direction and character of his intellectual work and the use he makes of these high endowments4 ,as to the question of the non-moral character of cognitive or thought activities1 they are correctly conceded to be1 in very large measure1 without any ethical quality4 ,but it is also true1 that there may be activities1 as for example1 in the imagination1 and in purposive scheming1 which are impure and grossly violative of justice and right4 ,because the intellect in itself1 as contradistinguished from the will1 does not choose and has no choice1 we may not1 indeed1 say of its activity3 ,it is guilty1 it is under obligation1 since obligation and guilt pertain not to the act but to the moral person2 but yet we may speak of intellectual activity or work as morally right or wrong1 according as it is in harmony or in conflict with the true ends for which the intellectual powers have been framed and the well-being they are designed to serve4 ,it would be difficult to see why the intellectual activity which plans out the details of a theft or a murder is not as really immoral1 i4 e4 something morally condemnable1 as is the desire or wish to commit it1 or why the person is less blameworthy for the one than the other4 ,in both cases it is part of his personal activity4 ,and if he is blameworthy1 it is only because the activity is in itself wrong4 ,is he any less guilty for allowing his intellect to think out the wrong than his feelings to desire it8 ,the moral sense must condemn this intellectual work as inconsistent with the relations of the intellect to human well-being and righteousness4 ,in these days of worship of intellectual brilliancy1 and the large prostitution of the imagination to activities which flood literature with thoughts that defile and suggestions that carry moral blight and desolation1 producing every form of vice and crime1 it is of prime importance to recognize that this intellectualism does not stand altogether apart from moral quality1 and that men are under the completest obligation to keep it all in harmony with righteousness and the ethical ends of life4 ,acts of the ,will4 #e4 ,our view of intentions has touched on part of the functions of the will with respect to moral quality1 but its acts in the stricter sense and more specific forms require further statement4 ,intentions are1 indeed1 under the command of the will1 yet they are there as motives1 whose force and quality stand specially in the objects desired and aimed at4 ,they draw their quality rather from the ends sought than from the working of the will which consents to the ends4 ,we must see yet whether the conscience judges also the proper and specific acts of the will4 ,of course that which we name the will is simply the soul's power of choosing1 or rather1 it is the personal self as causal for choices and executive action4 ,its acts are volitions4 ,does moral quality attach to these8 ,there can be no doubt of it4 ,upon these volitions1 preferential and executive choices1 electing between duty and its opposite1 between conduct in harmony or in conflict with moral requirement1 between indulgence of good or wicked feelings1 between virtuous and evil intentions1 between higher and lower motives1 between actions materially right or wrong1 making the decision for or against righteousness and goodness and purity1 in all the questions of daily behavior in which life rises into ethical excellence and blessedness or descends into wrong1 vice1 crime1 and consequent wretchedness1 the moral sense of mankind pours its most unequivocal approvals or reprobations4 ,it not only judges them as right or wrong in themselves1 but as1 among all human activities1 most creative or most destructive of moral character4 ,it is a fundamental postulate in ethical thinking that moral law binds the will4#fc ,in the action of the will the moral judgment finds its object of highest approval and of most thorough condemnation4 ,it is to the will1 i4 e4 the personal self1 that moral law presents its claims4 ,it is the point in which personality is summed up in free and responsible selfhood1 and where the great reality of responsibility is pivoted4 ,the will1 as another name for the soul's power of choosing1 sustains the decisive relation between all the motives that precede and the actions which follow the volitions4 ,the action contemplated may be right or wrong1 the motive may be good or bad1 but when the question is brought by the conscience into the presence of the will1 the place of supreme and final responsibility for virtue or sin is reached4 ,this justifies the conclusion that moral character belongs to the exercise of the will as it does not to any other activity of our moral nature4 ,for it is the point1 and the only point1 of freedom in our whole constitution4 ,necessity marks the action of each and every part from the lowest functions up to the will2 and beyond this there stretches on another realm of necessity in the consequences of volition4 ,for example1 necessity rules in the physical nature4 ,the processes go on under fixed uniform laws1 with no freedom or choice4 ,so in the intellect and the sensibility4 ,we begin to think in non-optional spontaneity1 or we would not think at all4 ,in perception1 representation1 in the discursive and intuitive powers1 and in the emotions1 affections and desires that arise from the activity of the intellect1 the movement is bound up under laws of cause and effect4 ,whatever power of regulation1 change or control we possess over these functions does not belong to the powers themselves1 but to the will or the personal capacity of free choice and self-regulation4 ,it is only through our will-power that we can handle and direct our thinking or control the direction and force of our feelings4 ,so1 too1 the ideas of right and wrong1 the perceptions of duty and the sense of obligation come into the presence of the will of necessity4 ,all before the will is of necessity4 ,thus men see the right and perceive obligation4 ,at this point all the responsibility of character is thrown upon the will4 ,if contemplated action appear right or wrong1 as action that ought or ought not to be done1 the will must decide whether it shall be done4 ,if good or bad motives plead for rulership1 the will must say which shall prevail4 ,if feelings are out of harmony with duty and right in the relations of life1 with respect to ,god or man1 it is to be remembered that the feelings cannot choose1 and the will alone can guide them in virtuous action4 ,to it1 therefore1 virtue or guilt belongs as nowhere else4 ,for it not only accepts and makes its own all the right or wrong that appears elsewhere1 but it also remains true or becomes false to its own supreme duty and obligation to moral law1 when1 under the behests of conscience1 it directs life and character either up the heights of moral excellence and happiness1 or into the wrong and guilt and miseries of immorality4 ,where the will is moral the man is moral2 for the will is the zenith of personality4 ,where it is immoral the man is immoral4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,view ,,under ,,christian ,,teaching4 ,these conclusions with respect to the nature and office of conscience1 the ethical distinction1 its theistic implications1 its transcendental character and objective validity1 its relation to personality and freedom1 the proximate and ultimate ground of right1 and the different parts of human activity to which moral quality belongs1 are conclusions reached by the scientific method and stand on the warrant of reason4 ,they arise from phenomena of history and life1 and form1 in their essential statements1 a body of scientific and philosophical knowledge of equal certainty and authority with the most assured results of other branches of rational investigation4 ,ethics1 therefore1 finds its fundamental truths in the natural constitution of the world1 and is able to build these truths into a science possessed of all the rights and force of systematized and established knowledge4 ,christianity ,recognizes ,ethics4 #a4 ,christianity fully recognizes these truths and all the essential principles which ethical science formulates and certifies4 ,it does more4 ,it magnifies their importance by building upon them its own divine view of moral requirement and the way of its realization4 ,all that ethical science shows to be true in the moral constitution of man1 in the reality of moral law for the free regulation of his conduct1 and in respect to the source and immutable authority of that law1 abides as fundamental presuppositions in the divine superstructure of religion and duty presented by ,christianity4 ,redemption starts and works upon the basal facts of human nature and man's condition1 relations1 duties1 responsibilities and needs4 ,if ,christianity assumes the existence and rulership of ,god1 a moral constitution of human life1 and the existence of conscience with its perceptions of duty and sense of obligation2 if it assumes man to be a free agent and yet bound in the exercise of his autonomy by laws of obligation and responsibility2 if it assumes the law of right to be essentially unalterable and irrepealable1 a reality to which ,god himself conforms1 all these are great truths fully certified in the rational conclusions of ethical science4 ,contributions to ,ethical ,view4 #b4 ,but ,christianity contributes immensely to the ethical view4 ,it is1 indeed1 a great misconception to think that supernatural revelation has been given simply to teach morality1 or to look on ,christianity as merely a code of ethics4 ,but though its first great object is redemption1 presenting ,god to our view in redeeming love and activity1 and offering deliverance from the guilt and life of sin1 it necessarily also aims to recover men to personal righteousness4 ,indeed1 both forgiveness and renewal look to this as the goal to which redemption is to bring its subjects4 ,while primarily ,christianity is a religion and redemptory1 its ultimate aim is the establishment of men in obedience to ,god1 righteousness1 and excellence4 ,the very summit of its purpose1 the ,alp that rises above every other ,alp1 is character and right life4 ,so the very law of its movement is supremely ethical4 ,forgiveness of sin1 justification by faith1 stands as only the first step in the application of redemption1 and beyond this ,christianity pre-eminently means a life1 the increasing recovery and perfection of human nature in its ethical character and action1 enthroning the principles of duty1 love1 and righteousness in the conscience and the heart1 and bringing personal conduct into rhythmic harmony with eternal righteousness and goodness4 ,and the science of ethics has not properly completed its view until it has fully included the distinctive teaching of ,christianity4 ,for beyond all question the data of this teaching have produced the purest and loftiest moral life that the world has seen1 the best product of the moral history of mankind4 ,its ideal is confessedly the highest and the best sustained4 ,even apart from the question of the well-proved supernatural claims of ,christianity1 its ethical work lifts its moral teachings to the most authoritative place1 the supreme court1 for the decisions and formulations of the complete scientific view4 ,the total contribution of ,christianity to morality comes along two lines of help3 #a4 ,in the way of fuller disclosure of moral principles and of essential duties2 and #b4 ,in the way of furnishing an efficient dynamic for their fulfilment4 ,the first of these two topics claims attention in this chapter2 the second must be left for the next4 ,the need of larger knowledge1 than that furnished by simply naturalistic ethics1 for the perfection of moral life1 has everywhere been evident4 ,the debasement of moral thought and the worse debasement of moral life frequently found among peoples outside of the atmosphere illuminated by ,christian truth1 is sad proof how crying this need of right knowledge may become4 ,the strife of conflicting opinions as to the root and validity of moral principles1 even among many in ,christendom who look at the subject with faces averted from ,christianity1 is perpetual remembrancer of the room for more and better information4 ,and the perplexing phenomenon of wide diversity of moral judgments in daily life1 to which we have had occasion several times already to refer1 resulting from the different degrees of correctness with which the relations of life are understood and interpreted1 enforces the same truth4 ,the moral power is educable4 ,it sees its objects in the light1 not in darkness1 nor fully in dawn4 ,it acts best when flooded with the fullest knowledge4 ,men can discern duty accurately and fully only when they comprehend all their relations to ,god above them1 their fellow-men around them1 their destiny before them1 and the significance and moral demand of these relations4 ,from the high origin of their nature1 in the image of ,god1 they may carry some impress of the moral law from ,god in their hearts1 in the inner order of insight and spiritual vision1 and in measure read ,god's thoughts after ,him about love and justice and truth and other essential virtues4 ,but this rational reading of duty from the law of right within them and from the moral constitution about them1 is grandly helped when revelation throws its illumination on the nature and relations of men1 the meaning of life and the reach of its responsibilities4 ,whatever has been the short-coming of ,christianity's professors in exemplifying its moral teaching1 the history of its work is full proof of its containing the best ethical direction and power the earth has yet seen4 ,in individuals and communities in which its teachings have been worthily turned into character and life1 it presents an inspiring suggestion of what it is capable of doing for human exaltation when its instruction is truly followed4 ,it is the completing factor for moral guidance1 and the scientific view is false to itself when it fails to include the teachings and the phenomena of the ,christian consciousness and life4 ,since ,christianity has come and given the world its highest civilizations and elevations1 its grandest progress in philosophy1 science1 art1 literature1 invention1 enterprise and prosperity1 all the purest and most beautiful amenities of life1 and is still leading the best nations onward and upward1 it is surely worse than idle to think of forcing ethical science back to a pagan or merely naturalistic standpoint4 ,this would ignore the greatest moral phenomenon of history and the most impressive facts in the present condition of the world4 ,christian ethics is ethics in the highest--ethics raised to the highest power--the last and fullest moral interpretation of the world and its history4#fd #c4 ,the ,christian ethical view has its special moral conceptions from two sources4 ,the one is primary and principal2 the other secondary and auxiliary4 ,sources of ,christian ,view4 7#a7 ,the principal source is the ,sacred ,scriptures of the ,old and ,new ,testaments4 ,along with their distinctively religious purpose and teaching1 these pages of ,god's supernatural revelation1 from first to last1 look to ethical ends1 and are replete with principles1 laws1 and precepts for duty and righteousness4 ,as for a knowledge of ,christianity as a religion we must come to these writings as its own accredited records1 presenting its truths and requirements1 so also for a knowledge of its moral teachings4 ,whatever help may be obtainable from other sources1 say from study of the ,christian consciousness or of the effects of ,christianity on personal and social life1 the chief and highest source is these ,sacred ,scriptures4 ,for the best ,christian life falls short of the ideal standard of conduct there presented4 ,it would be unfair to study it or judge it only in the partial1 fragmentary1 one-sided1 imperfect illustrations of it4 ,every ideal thus gained must be corrected and greatly up-raised before it can stand for the complete divine ideal that shines out from the teachings of the ,scriptures and the life of the ,christ therein revealed4 ,the perfect image of ,christian ethics has never been fully reflected by either the inward or outward life of the believer4 ,the ,sacred ,scriptures1 therefore1 are the only infallible normative authority for ,christian ethics1 as they are for ,christian theology4 ,this use of the ,scriptures as the determinative authority1 however1 must take account of the fact that they present an historical and progressive revelation4 ,as ,god's redemptive action advanced historically1 unfolding religious truth and grace gradually and educationally1 so the moral ideal1 which ,christianity in its fulness of provision and power should exhibit1 is found more and more clearly revealed till the view is completed4 ,this accounts for the higher ethical view reached in the ,new ,testament4 ,the ,old ,testament1 which is the record of the earlier stages of the ,christian revelation1 distinctly preparatory and prophetic1 forms a continual instruction in duty and righteousness4 ,it grounds the moral life essentially in the religious1 but religion must walk in holiness4 ,fundamental in it stands the decalogue1 a summary of moral law1 of most profound and comprehensive sweep1 which is still the great code of duty for the guidance of human conduct1 and so clearly beyond the mere thinking of ,moses or the people he led1 as to prove its divine origin4 ,all the types and symbols of the ,old ,testament1 its sacrifices of cleansing and expiation1 are impressive condemnations of sin and calls to repentance4 ,the ever-ringing voices of prophecy are thrilling rebukes to wrong-doing and clarion appeals for righteousness4 ,its psalms and music are but echoing praise for the divine grace that renews the heart and restores the life to the blessedness of obedience to the moral laws of ,god4 ,the lofty ethical demands of the ,hebrew ,scriptures1 along with their revelation of grace1 form a unique and distinguishing feature among ancient literatures4 ,their ceaseless voice is3 ,keep judgment and do righteousness2 ,cease to do evil and learn to do well2 ,offer to ,god the sacrifices of righteousness4 ,nowhere else at that day was the moral ideal lifted so high1 or with such imperative authority4 ,the ,old ,testament ethics was a fit prophecy and preparation for the full ,christian teaching4 ,if the ethics of the old dispensation had not passed into the fulfilment of the new1 the ,hebrew prophets and poets would still be the world's most inspiring teachers of high ethical hopes and ideals1 and the moral code of ,israel would be the school of righteousness1 reverence1 and law1 to which the generations should go for the loftiest instruction4#fe ,the ,new ,testament1 which completes the authoritative records of ,christianity1 completes also ,christianity's normative statement of the truths and principles of duty4 ,these appear in the threefold form of 7#a7 ,christ's recorded teaching1 7#b7 ,his personal example1 and 7#c7 the inspired interpretations of ,christian duty in the apostolic writings4 ,the teaching of ,jesus1 all through the gospels1 while primarily religious and religiously spiritual1 deals with the great realities of character and conduct1 and1 particularly in the ,sermon on the ,mount1 ascends to the very heights and penetrates to the very depths of the laws of duty4 ,it carries those laws into a spirituality1 solemnity1 and glory before unknown1 and forms a representation which stands before the moral sense of the race as the unsurpassed and the unequalled ethical ideal4 ,the view is carried up to the goal3 ,be ye perfect1 even as your ,father in heaven is perfect4 ,this divine teaching is at the same time reflected from the personal life of ,christ4 ,it is presented in living form4 ,the example is part of the teaching--an example which is never lowered below the exalted range of the given precepts1 and which has been instructing and inspiring all the centuries since4 ,in the apostolic writings1 under the guiding ,spirit of truth1 the teaching and pattern of ,christ1 together with his redemptive gospel1 are applied to wide and varied ranges of practical life1 the apostles themselves being filled with an ever-increasing appreciation of their divine import and transcendence4 ,these inspired ,scriptures1 because of their unique and supreme authority for ,christianity itself1 are the fundamental and decisive standard of ,christian ethics4 7#b7 ,but there is a secondary and auxiliary source for formulation of ,christian ethics--in the ,christian moral consciousness4 ,in this1 ,christianity exhibits its moral principles and meaning as they enter into the inner experience of men1 where they may be studied and estimated4 ,christianity is a life1 a new life1 in whose moral consciousness its principles and forces are acting formatively for character4 ,not only of the life that in ,christ was the light of men1#ff but of all the pure life that is from him1 is it true3 the life is the light of men4 ,the ethicised ,christian consciousness reveals the principles and laws that have come into it4 ,it is a maxim in theology that only the regenerated and sanctified mind has a clear interpretative insight into spiritual truth1 and can form the true theologian4 ,the maxim holds1 just as truly1 with respect to moral truth4 ,the spiritual and moral are inseparably united1 and no man can judge with unhindered and reliable discrimination in matters of ,christian ethics whose heart is unsympathetic or averse to the duties of the ,christian life4 ,the light shines in the darkness1 but the darkness comprehends it not4 ,christian ethics1 therefore1 in formulating its ideas and completing its theoretical view rightly1 draws upon the ,christian consciousness1 as that consciousness is scripturally determined1 and interprets1 not the ,scriptures alone1 but also1 in auxiliary relation1 the ethicised life of ,christian humanity4 ,while1 therefore1 it is the science of ,biblical morality1 it is also of the whole moral development of ,christianized life1 both in personal consciousness and in the observed historical fruitage of ,scripture doctrine4 #d4 ,it is necessary to look at some of the particular elements or features of the clearer and fuller ethical view which comes from these sources4 ,duties made ,more ,definite4 7#a7 ,most of the duties naturally discerned by the conscience from the known relations of life are brought into more distinct and definite view by ,christian revelation and experience4 ,the natural discernment is often unclear1 uncertain1 partial1 and faulty4 ,the blindness1 mistakes and misgivings of the moral sense form a large and perplexing chapter in the story of non-,christian morality4 ,it has often led to doubt whether there is such a thing as a fixed1 sure1 immutable morality4 ,a remedy for this has been needed4 ,by its immense number of specific precepts for particular relations and circumstances1 revelation gives correctness1 minuteness1 and fulness of application to the general principles of duty asserted by the moral sense4 ,in manifold cases the conscience would be in the dark1 or have only obscure or partial view1 without the instruction and guidance thus supplied4 ,scarcely a situation or emergency in life can be named for which precept and counsel have not been given4 ,when the sun rises the eye sees not only farther1 but more minutely and with more certainty4 ,myriads of objects and relations before unseen flash into view4 ,so by the light of the ,scriptures1 more of duty is known and better known4 ,by common consent1 even among skeptics as to the ,christian religion1 the ethical precepts of ,christianity1 in their purity and elevation1 in their quickening directness and radical thoroughness1 in their explicitness and universality1 form an aggregate moral directory unapproached by the best codes of pagan sages or human philosophies1 and add a grand aid to the moral judgments4 ,human ,relations4 7#b7 ,the human relations1 on which duty rests1 have been brought into broader and fuller view by ,christian teaching4 ,much of the disability1 under which morality has suffered1 has always come from a faulty understanding1 if not total ignorance1 of the varied relations which are to be filled out with their exact and full measure of duty4 ,the idea of ,god and man's relation to him has often been falsely or misleadingly conceived4 ,the history of thought as to inter-human relations1 from the closest to the most extended1 presents a sad story of misapprehension1 error1 ignorance and consequent wrong4 ,when these great vital relations are themselves misconceived1 looked at from a false or obscuring view-point1 one of the prime conditions for correct moral judgments is absent4 ,positive misdirection is in play4 ,when our knowledge has not yet shown us clearly man's place in ,god's plan of the world1 or the adaptations and purposes in human nature itself2 when neither the great fact of personality nor that of human solidarity is correctly understood1 as for example1 when the individual is reduced1 as has often been the case1 to mere material for the state or for possible enslavement by captors1 or he is1 on the other hand1 looked upon as an isolated and unrelated unit2 or when the reality and meaning of the universal brotherhood of man1 under the universal fatherhood of ,god1 is not seen1 the duties and obligations of life must necessarily be much obscured and unperceived4 ,but here the ,christian revelation comes in with one of its great forms of help--a divine disclosure of our moral relations4 ,it reveals some otherwise undiscoverable relations1 opening to view additional obligations and responsibilities4 ,it sets before us our solemn relations to ,god1 to his renewing and saving grace1 as well as to his creating and preserving love1 to offered blessings1 gracious rewards1 and eternal destinies4 ,the whole horizon of life is lifted and broadened1 and the sphere of the moral activity and consequences extends into a future life4 ,man becomes a child of immortality and his home is eternity4 ,the world and human life have a grandly changed meaning under the gospel4 ,man's place in the system of things1 as to the past1 present1 and future is revealed in a light increased and broadened like that on the landscape when morning rises upon night2 and in this light he sees a thousand new responsibilities on which he is touching every moment1 and which stretch out and on in illimitable ranges4 ,conscience is enabled to act in view of all these new relations as well as the irradiated old ones1 and taught to hold the heart and life1 the will and activities to the moral requirements of this enlarged and illuminated ethical domain4 ,moral ,duties ,divine ,obligations4 7#c7 ,christian teaching has elevated the ethical view in closely uniting all moral obligation with duty to ,god4 ,natural ethics1 when its implications are rationally followed up1 is1 indeed1 theistic1 and finds the seat of moral law in ,god as the absolute ground of the whole moral constitution4 ,but from this movement1 rising from the law of right in the conscience and in the moral constitution of the world1 such ethics has yet this limitation1 that duty is thought of from the human side1 and not from the standpoint of ,god1 who in his personal nature and will is both the source and goal of moral law4 ,in this mode of forming the theory ,god is apt to be left remote1 virtue is abstractly conceived and remains a reality too much by itself and separated from any enforcing or helping authority4 ,it becomes too abstract and simply humanistic4 ,but our view of moral good must be lifted into closer and more living connection with ,god4 ,and so1 ,christianity1 to transfuse the ethical sense with religious light and motives1 teaches us to look upon right and duty from the standpoint of ,god4 ,this is in accordance with the very design of ,christianity as a redemptive and saving religion1 seeking to bring man into true and practical fellowship with ,god4 ,the moral discernment is to be filled and animated by the religious spirit1 so that the moral training may be carried on and completed together with the development and consummation of the ,christian life4 ,thus the form of the appeal is3 ,be ye holy1 for ,i am holy4 ,be ye perfect1 even as your ,father in heaven is perfect4 ,in a high and peculiar emphasis all duty is required to be done as unto ,god4 ,forasmuch as ye have done it to the least of these1 ye have done it unto me4 ,we should so fear and love ,god1 as not to offend against any part of the law or fail in doing good4 ,through the ,christian revelation alone the ethical conception and relation of ,god is truly attained1 and with it a right conception of man and the highest spirit of duty4 ,in thus teaching that all duties should be fulfilled as something due to ,god1 and under inspiration of love to ,him1 ,christian ethics is not to be understood to mean that rational ethical theory is mistaken when it claims that men are to do right because it is right4 ,but it means to remind us where alone the absolute right is found--only in ,god4 ,and it means that both the religious and the ethical life is to upraise and anchor us to ,him1 and to eternal righteousness as it is in ,him4 ,all duty is owed finally to ,god1 because ,he is the one absolute righteous ,being to whom the whole universe owes its very existence and all its blessings4 ,thus ,christian ethics sets forth fully what rational thought has often caught a glimpse of and hinted at1 but wanted vision to see clearly1 viz43 that the goal of the ethical aim is to be like ,god4 ,its aim1 as is that of religion itself1 is to bring our moral life into living fellowship with ,him and ,his blessedness4 ,this marked feature of ,christian teaching presents the ethical view in its highest elevation1 purification and power4 ,moral ,guilt4 7#d7 ,in harmony with this close connection of the moral with the religious life1 a further special feature of ,christian ethics is a peculiar emphasis upon the guilt of offence against the moral law4 ,in pagan ethics1 often with no clear perception of the existence of ,god1 always without just conception of his character1 though the moral distinction was recognized and wrong was regarded as condemnable1 yet because the wrong was viewed as traversing only an abstract principle or an accredited usage or order of best happiness1 it evoked no strong sense of guilt4 ,right was always little else than a conforming of one's self to nature1 or reason1 or civil authority1 or conditions of well-being or enjoyment1 or at best to an ideal conception of virtue4 ,in the ethical view which materialistic philosophies present1 though the phenomenon of conscience is acknowledged and obedience to its direction admitted to be necessary for proper right order1 yet the condemnatory judgment on immorality is rather a judgment of it as unwise1 imprudent1 and injurious than as guilty and worthy of punishment4 ,it is at most a non-conformity to an impersonal1 mechanically determined1 ongoing nature4 ,the whole utilitarian conception of morality1 which makes it consist essentially in following the teachings of experience as to what is most advantageous and useful1 may hold disregard of it as a great evil1 economically viewed1 but almost annuls1 if it does not completely remove1 the idea of guilt1 by substituting that of loss4 ,even in simply rational theistic ethics1 despite theistic pre-suppositions and conclusions1 the view may still deal too much with abstractions and rest too much on abstract ideas or impersonal things4 ,right and wrong are1 indeed1 developed by natural relations1 to which men are bound to conform1 but only because these relations1 by being divinely established1 represent ,god1 who in the perfections of his nature and will1 is at once the free ,creator and righteous personal ,ruler of the universe4 ,moral law not only applies alone to free personality1 but has its source and authority in the ,absolute ,personality whose holy and beneficent will has constituted the moral relations and requirements of life4 ,morality pertains1 not to the relations of mere things to things1 or of persons to simply impersonal nature1 but of persons to persons4 ,inter-human relations create and exhibit obligations because ,god's plan and will speak in them1 but the full solemnity of moral obligation appears only when all inter-human obligations are seen carried up and united in the supreme and all-embracing obligation to ,god1 to whom all duty is due4 ,when these inter-human duties are refused1 they are refused to ,god who requires them and has expressed that requirement to reason through the relations themselves and through his word4 ,not only the religious duties1 as faith and love and gratitude and prayer1 but all human duties are owed to ,him4 ,here all religious duties become moral obligations2 and all moral obligations become religious duties4 ,and the guilt of wrong-doing is heightened by the fact that it is a sin against the just1 holy1 supreme authority and will of ,god1 the absolute personal ground of the right order and blessedness of the universe4 ,in ,him the moral authority is identified with the rights of the ,creator to whom every good in the universe is owed4 ,this emphasis upon the transcendent authority and sanctity of moral law and consequent guilt of its violation is a special feature in the ,christian ethical view and necessary for the true force and efficiency of the moral sense4 ,any separation of morality from the position of something due to ,god personally1 obscures and weakens the ethical view4 ,this has been the bane not only of pagan1 materialistic1 atheistic1 or grossly utilitarian theories1 but also of many other forms of representation4 ,whenever the sense of duty is resolved into an instinct1 or blind feeling1 or sympathy1 or a product of custom1 its true authority is kept out of sight4 ,the guilt of neglect of it disappears4 ,though fervently regarded by many great thinkers as a sublime statement of the moral principle1 even the ,kantian categorical imperative1 an immediate behest of the reason1 saying3 ,do this1 or do that1 giving no account of itself or ground for its authority1 but speaking autocratically in its own right1 and as sufficient and final in its own imperative1 under the abstract rule3 ,act as if the maxims of thy action were to become by thy will the law of the universe1 holds the whole moral authority too abstractly and remote from ,god for complete theory or effective power4 ,he is not brought clearly into view or made livingly near1 but left in the background--a ,being whose existence1 along with freedom and immortality1 is only inferred and to be believed because this ideal law requires ,him for its maintenance4 ,sublime as the categorical imperative may often have seemed1 this shaping of the theory of obligation is not suited to fill and vivify the moral consciousness of men as does a sense of the sublimer reality of the holy will and supreme authority of ,god1 as present in and speaking through that moral consciousness4 ,but the ,christian view brings us face to face with this righteous will and authority in every moral obligation1 and teaches us to see in all the established personal relations of life a divine call to right and duty4 ,moral ,law ,universal4 7#e7 ,the ,christian view makes uniquely clear the universalism of the moral law4 ,in natural theories the reach and identity of the law has failed rightly to appear4 ,the theory has formed only an ethics for a race1 a nation1 a condition or caste4 ,it has been particularistic1 limited by race lines1 tribal or national boundaries1 class distinctions1 or ancestral traditions4 ,codes of duty have been shaped to local and exclusive conditions4 ,so we have a national ethics created by civil law1 or a class ethics1 as of free citizens contra-distinguished from slaves1 or of ,brahmans as different from low caste people4 ,or we have an ethics of individuals1 in which the code of duty of each is determined by his own personal instincts1 feelings1 swing of sympathy1 preference in pleasure1 development of reason1 calculations of utility1 ancestral inheritance1 or a mysterious categorical imperative4 ,moral codes have been immensely and confusingly diversified4 ,a self-identical and common standard does not appear1 nor the clear1 sure foundation of any4 ,the moral law is not exhibited in its universality and permanence4 ,its grandeur is unseen by reason of the kaleidoscopic variations presented by the moving fragmentary theories4 ,its authority is brought into doubt4 ,the great want has been a view of morality for man as man1 authoritative everywhere and always1 co-extensive with humanity4 ,the defect of the theories has been twofold4 #a4 ,they have not brought the whole race of man together in the essential sameness of a universal humanity1 each individual being endowed with the high attributes of a personality1 made in the image of ,god1 and all bound together in one all-inclusive brotherhood4 #b4 ,they have failed clearly to unite this total humanity1 in all its personalities1 with ,god1 whose nature and will is the only and absolute source of the moral law which sweeps round and through all the world4 ,the ,christian ,scriptures and the ,christian consciousness supply the needed completion of view by throwing both these truths into clear light4 ,christianity invests human personality with a worth1 sacredness1 and responsibility never elsewhere recognized4 ,it is at the point of personality that each individual is to be united in fellowship with the personal ,god1 who1 as righteousness and love1 sits upon the throne4 ,christianity seeks to make so real and living the brotherhood of man1 that the throb of love and sympathy may be felt across all national lines and race distinctions around the earth4 ,and while it thus strengthens the vitality and sacred force of the relations that thus bind men together1 it teaches that the moral duties to men which these relations require1 are to be done as unto ,god4 ,monotheism brings mono-nomism4 ,the moral law1 which is absolute1 self-identical1 eternal and immutable in the holy nature and will of ,god1 becomes universal and irrepealable not only for the earth but for all the moral universe4 ,condition of ,fulfillment4 7#f7 ,a special extension in the ,christian ethical view is the truth that the moral law can be truly fulfilled only in and through a spiritual regeneration and renovation of the personal life4 ,this is a truth which simply rational theories fail to formulate1 though they are not without materials to justify the formulation of it4 ,few facts of life and history are more conspicuous than the impotence of the ethical perceptions and motives to get and maintain rightful rulership4 ,some hindering and disabling depravity in the human condition prevents attainment of the moral ideal4 ,apart from the dreadful sway of vice and crime and cruel wrong1 even with the well-disposed1 full duty to neither ,god nor man is completely realized4 ,the words put by ,ovid in the mouth of ,medea3 ,video meliora1 proboque1 detereora sequor 7,i see and approve the better1 ,i follow the worse71 voice the moral weakness felt even in pagan consciousness4 ,this incompetency of the ethical behests to accomplish the true and required life1 ,christianity confirms and emphasizes2 and upon its basis unfolds the necessity of a deep1 radical renewal of personal character4 ,in ,christianity1 let it be remembered1 the moral law is a diviner and deeper reality than natural notions of men make it4 ,it looks1 with its divine eye1 down into the very depths of the heart1 and demands loyal and full duty through the whole range of personal relations with respect to both ,god and man4 ,it spreads the force of moral obligation over religious duties1 joining them in indissoluble union4 ,the law of the ,lord is perfect1 and requires this wholeness of duty and righteousness4 ,hence ,christianity holds a merely natural morality always to be faulty1 leaving men under the law's condemnation4 ,without a divine quickening and spiritual enabling1 men can never be brought to true and full obedience and transformed into moral harmony and likeness with ,god4 ,and the proclamation1 looking to this part of the redemptive process1 is3 ,except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of ,god4 ,thus it becomes a unique distinction of the ,christian ethical view1 that it proposes to bring men to spiritual and moral endeavor and victory from the starting-point of a conviction and recognition of their own thorough incompetence for the moral task4 ,it furnishes a true and adequate ability where it has broken up dependence on an insufficient one4 ,but this brings to us the moral task1 which belongs to the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,task ,,under ,,christianity4 ,the ethical task is to fulfil the moral law1 to actualize the ethical ideal in conduct and character4 ,it is to turn obligations into life4 ,it is not enough to know duty1 even in completest theory4 ,it must be realized4 ,in its most important and final view1 ethics is a question of moral power4 ,the impotence of the conscience before the moral task has always been an impressive fact4 ,the perception of duty has lacked efficiency for the enforcement of duty4 ,vision of the right largely fails to secure conformity to it4 ,even the clearest intellectual discriminations and illuminations of the moral law have often been only as the play of cold light1 almost like the aurora of the north quickening nothing into life or fruitage4 ,here is found the chief point of failure in natural ethics4 ,it has power to dictate1 but not to move4 ,it wants an efficient dynamic for overcoming the moral evil that has established itself in human nature and life--evil so positive and dominant as to justify an apostle in representing the better ethical will as disabled3 ,ye cannot do the things that ye would4 ,prof4 ,flint says3 ,the wisdom of the heathen world1 at its very best1 was utterly inadequate to the accomplishment of such a task as creating a due abhorrence of sin1 controlling the passions1 purifying the heart1 and ennobling the conduct4#fg ,the aim of ,christianity is supremely practical4 ,it seeks to save from sin and bring to righteousness4 ,it wastes no effort for simply speculative results4 ,it comes not in word only1 but in power4 ,besides its service to morals in confirming and extending our needed knowledge of duty1 its greatest ethical service is in supplying the needed dynamic or efficacious force for the realization of the holy life4 ,how does it enable the moral task8 ,completion of the ,ethical ,view4 #a4 ,in some degree by the completion of the ethical view itself4 ,the clearer light is forceful and efficacious for a better realization of the moral task4 ,knowledge is power1 especially knowledge which throws into view the most impressive realities and relations1 and appeals with the most cogent motives4 ,by the strong illumination shed upon the general principles of right and virtue1 by the definiteness and detail of the instruction and precepts for all situations in life1 by the elevation of view in which the moral horizon is widened and extended1 so as to show a living brotherhood of every man with every other round the world and a range of moral interests and responsibilities interminable as eternity1 by the emphasis with which men are made amenable to ,god for all moral duties1 even those to men1 thus vivifying the whole moral consciousness with a sense of a close1 unescapable accountability to ,god the conscience is better enlightened and quickened for its task1 strengthened by the fullest certainty and under the vigor of a new inspiration4 ,it has more light for direction2 it bears grander motive forces before the will4 ,assurance of ,success4 #b4 ,by giving assurance of success4 ,in the face of the greatest hindrances and natural incompetence1 it certifies an inspiring goal of the moral endeavor4 ,pointing to redemptive grace1 it makes manifest that the administration of this world is not on the side of moral evil1 or indifferent to its wrong and blight1 but is working for its overthrow1 the deliverance of its subjects1 and their triumph over it4 ,it proclaims an established and ever-advancing kingdom1 whose consummation will bring all those who1 as its subjects1 hunger and thirst after righteousness1 triumphantly through and beyond the present militant stage of the moral life into final victory over evil1 a new earth and a new heaven wherein dwelleth righteousness4 ,in this divine assurance that the domination of moral evil1 with its anarchy and misery in the soul1 is no necessity1 that its overthrow is provided for1 and that ,god's government is so in the interest of righteousness and love as to guarantee victory to even the feeblest that in faith appropriate his grace and help1 there comes the full inspiration1 not only of hope1 but of sure success in the moral endeavor4 ,moral effort is not compelled to be ,like ships that sailed for sunny isles1 ,but never came to shore4 ,it has the certainty that ,to him who sides with ,god ,no chance is lost4 ,the moral help thus supplied by ,christianity is well illustrated by the contrast which it presents to some other teaching1 say as seen in ,buddhism1 extolled in poetry as ,the ,light of ,asia4 ,this is known as one of the great religions4 ,it is1 rather1 a philosophy of life1 a directory for conduct4 ,it is an atheistic1 or at best a pantheistic philosophy1 recognizing no personal ,god and emptying the idea of ,deity of practical validity4 ,it had its origin in a deep and oppressive sense of the evil and misery of life1 and aimed at their solution and the way of deliverance4 ,on the basis of the oriental metempsychosis1 with its supposed perpetual re-births1 on account of earlier sins1 into successive distressful lives1 it elaborated1 for deliverance1 a code of duty pervaded by the ascetic spirit and demanding the severest self-discipline4 ,in many of its separate precepts it rises1 indeed1 here and there to elevations and beauties of moral idea that seem almost akin to the finest and purest of ,new ,testament inculcations4 ,but whether viewed as a philosophy or a religion ,buddhism has no personal ,god1 who loves and values men as his own children made in his own image1 and ready to come to their help4 ,it has heard1 and in its atheistic cosmos1 can hear1 no voice of redemption1 knows of no manifestation of a loving ,god for deliverance of his sinful children from their sins and their exaltation to the dignity and happiness of fellowship with ,himself4 ,in this despair of help from ,god1 in this dolefully pessimistic view of the world and life1 and driven to depend only on self-help1 is it any wonder that the moral task is directed1 not to the development1 elevation and joy of personal life1 but to its repression1 subjugation1 and reduction1 so as to bring it1 at its earthly close1 to ,nirvana1 extinction of conscious individual existence1 as the greatest good6 ,by as much as this theory of despair is suited to atrophy all nerve for the ethical task1 and sink personality from its true intended elevation of divine fellowship and excellence into the inanity of unconscious being1 by so much does the ,christian truth of the assured success and victory of right and goodness in the advancing kingdom of ,god's grace and eternal love1 exalting the worth and force of personality to the highest1 inspire and sustain the moral endeavor4 ,forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the ,lord4 ,much has been written in late years about the evolution of the moral life1 by writers who seek to account for it through the action of merely naturalistic forces in the human constitution and in its physical environment4 ,the above contrast is suggestive of factors in the problem which many of these writers overlook4 ,religious ,interest4 #c4 ,by uniting the moral side of life with the religious1 and so bringing all the powers of the religious interest in vital help for the moral task4 ,the common false diremption between morality and religion1 classifying duties to ,god as religious1 and only duties to fellow-men or self as moral1 each standing in isolation1 and largely of separate accomplishment1 allowing men to be moral while repudiating all their duties to ,god1 or religious while without a conscience enforcing duty to men1 leaves flabby nerve for moral endeavor4 ,all the mighty motives from the ,godward side are lost4 ,no quickening force for inter-human duties comes from a consciousness of ,god and his authority1 or the future life4 ,any view that severs morality from ,god and is bounded by this world and temporal good1 must fail to realize the moral life of man4 ,but the ,christian view allows no such separation4 ,it unites the two as two sides of the same life of duty1 out of one conscience1 with vision of both ,god and men1 and one heart true to the indivisible spirit of right4 ,as religious duties are all moral1 as obligations to ,god1 and all moral duties are religious1 as due to ,him1 the ,christian consciousness of ,god must re-inforce and vivify with new efficiency the whole twofold moral endeavor4 ,all the distinctly religious interests and forces1 reverence of ,deity1 repentance before ,god1 gratitude1 faith1 love1 hope1 spiritual joy1 aspiration1 desire of immortality and endless blessedness1 thus brought into concurrent action with the ,christianly enlightened natural conscience1 bring an immensely advantageous condition for the actualization of the ethical life4 ,to believe in an ever-living and perfect ,mind1 supreme over the universe1 is to invest moral distinctions with immensity and eternity1 and lift them from the provincial stage of human society to the imperishable theatre of all being4 ,when planted thus in the very substance of things1 they justify and support the ideal estimates of the conscience2 they deepen every guilty shame2 they guarantee every righteous hope2 and they help the will with a ,divine casting-vote in every balance of temptation4#fh ,power of ,holy ,spirit4 #d4 ,by the enlightening and obligating force of the ,holy ,spirit4 ,this reality is assured both in the teaching of the ,scriptures and the testimony of the ,christian consciousness4 ,we must distinguish between the simply natural action of conscience and the quickening and helping by the divine ,spirit4 ,revelation fully recognizes the natural conscience and its obligating energy1 ,rom4 #b3ae2 #a3bj4 ,it designates it by the term ,greek3 syneidsis from ,greek3 synoida1 conscius sum--a knowing with1 i4 e4 a conjoined consciousness of self and of right1 or a knowing with ,god1 whose law it discerns4 ,its natural functions of discernment and imperative are not set aside by the ,spirit1 but enlightened and re-inforced4 ,his part must not be counted zero4 ,when the ,spirit is come1 ,he will convince the world of sin1 of righteousness1 and of judgment1 ,john #af3h4 ,he works through the truth1 in and through men's natural faculties4 ,while the ,christian's own conscience is acting in its natural functions1 it is not acting alone4 ,it is not alone2 for the ,holy ,spirit is there as a quickening and helping power4 ,in this is fulfilled the experience expressed by ,st4 ,paul3 ,my conscience also bearing me witness in the ,holy ,ghost1 ,rom4 #i3a4 ,this is a ,christian conscience1 one acting not alone and unaided1 but embraced within and filled by the influence of the ,holy ,spirit4 ,this influence has been well expressed as like the energy of the sunshine in the fruit4 ,spiritual ,regeneration4 #e4 ,through spiritual regeneration and renovation4 ,it is through this profound reality that ,christianity accomplishes its great ethical result4 ,it places the principle of holiness1 of duty to ,god and men1 in the very heart of human nature and life4 ,it writes the law in the love of the soul4 ,the divine wisdom of ,christianity is marked by the stress which it places upon a purification of the inner life1 the heart1 the very fountain of thought1 purpose1 and conduct4 ,it points to the immoral source of the immoralities of conduct3 ,out of the heart proceed murders1 adulteries1 etc4 ,the remedy must purify the fountain4 ,when this is secured and the law of holiness is established there1 the ethical life1 in its manifoldness and many-sidedness1 comes into realization4 ,it is thus that the conscience gains control4 ,its failures result from the strength of opposing passions1 desires1 and perverted inclination1 excited often by temptations without4 ,the affections do not find their centre and rest in ,god and righteousness4 ,they are irregular1 often sordid and misleading4 ,the appetites and passions obscure the moral discernments and resist the moral judgments4 ,there is a law of sin in the members4 ,the will1 which should bow to the direction of the conscience1 is swayed by wrong motives4 ,the scepter of the moral faculty is broken by the rebellion of desires at war with right and duty4 ,the faintest whisper of conscience ought to be decisive1 but against the imperious ascendency of wrong affections its loudest imperatives prove impotent4 ,but in this moral renovation1 giving its new heart and right spirit1 the affections come into harmony with ,god and all that is good4 ,it is the writing of the law again in the heart1 in the understanding and love4 ,to this new life in the affections1 duty becomes a pleasure4 ,the conscience1 no longer perplexed and overborne by evil desires1 becomes able to assert its rightful authority4 ,the will attains its rightful freedom and power to control efficiently in the domain of righteousness1 and to hold the life in the harmonies of right and duty4 ,put these different elements of the ,christian ethical dynamic together4 ,they aggregate the final moral power4 ,christianity completes the ethical view1 flooding all the principles of right and duty with impressive light4 ,it throws broad and strong illumination over all the moral relations of men1 extending the view into the future life1 and giving certifying precepts for guidance and support4 ,it gives the inspiring assurance of the triumph of righteousness in the kingdom which ,god's love is establishing for it4 ,it unites all moral duties under the sanctions and solemnities of obligation to ,god1 and re-inforces them by all the motives and appeals which the religious sentiments and interests address to men4 ,it supplies an exhaustless wealth of truths which give nerve to moral endeavor and are directly convertible into character4 ,and1 as expressing the line along which these elements all pass into full effect1 by its regenerative action it secures for the innermost sources of conduct a transforming influence which does for the life what making the tree good does for its fruit4 ,love of right turns convictions of right into character4 ,the efficiency of the conscience no longer stands only in the intellectual judgments1 but also in affection for the morally good4 ,with love toward what is good a feebler conscience could sway the life aright4 ,but under this deep inward change1 we have clearer moral vision and stronger imperative1 together with a transformation of the whole nature into predominant love of righteousness4 ,as the ,christian life advances1 the principles of duty are more and more established in the heart and conduct as life-forces1 and the conscience becomes more and more de facto1 as it is de jure1 sovereign for moral obedience4 ,and thus ,christianity supplies the divine and sufficient dynamic for the full realization of the ethical life4 ,,index4 ,absolutism1 ,divine1 #adi-aea4 ,actions1 objects of moral judgment1 #ahc-ahg4 ,affections1 benevolent1 not supreme1 #ij-ib4 ,agnostic tendencies1 #ha-hc1 #abj-abd4 ,aim1 ethical1 in ,christianity1 #aig-aih4 ,altruism1 #aed1 #afa4 ,analogy1 supports relational theory1 #agf-agg4 ,anthropological testimony1 #cd4 ,applicatory moral judgments1 #ea-eb1 #fg-fh1 #ib-ig1 #abh4 ,arnold1 ,matthew1 quoted1 #be4 ,aristotle1 #af1 #ah1 #cc1 #aeb4 ,assyria1 #dc4 ,assurance of success1 quickening to moral endeavor1 #bbj-bbb4 ,aurelius1 ,marcus1 #cc4 ,authority1 moral1 belongs not to utility or pleasure1 #aeh-afj2 nor to the beautiful1 #add2 but to the right1 supremely1 #gi-hj1 #hg-hh1 #abf-acf1 #aeh-aei1 #agh-aia2 to conscience1 as discerning the right1 #eg-eh1 #hf-ii1 #ajd4 ,bain1 ,alexander1 #aba1 #aed4 ,benevolent affections1 not supreme1 #ij-ib4 ,bentham1 ,jeremy1 #aed4 ,book of the ,dead1 #cc4 ,bowne1 ,prof4 ,borden ,p41 #bi1 #cf1 #fb1 #aec1 #agj1 #ahf4 ,brahmanism1 #cb1 #adb4 ,buckle1 #dc4 ,buddhism1 #cb1 #abf1 #adb1 #bba-bbb4 ,butler1 ,bishop1 #aaj-aaa1 #aed4 ,calderwood1 #afg4 ,cato1 #cc4 ,christ1 personal embodiment of his own teaching1 #bjc-bjd4 ,christian ethics1 completes the ethical view1 #aih-bjj2 sources of1 #bjj-bje2 special features of1 #bje-bag4 ,christianity1 relation of1 to rational ethics1 #bf-bg1 #aif-aih2 its distinctive teachings1 #bje-bag2 affords power for the moral task1 #bah-bbg4 ,cicero1 #af1 #cc4 ,clarke1 ,samuel1 #aff4 ,cocker1 ,b4 ,d41 quoted1 #agc4 ,coleridge1 #afg4 ,confucianism1 #cb4 ,confucius1 #ada4 ,conscience1 simple or complex1 #cg-ci2 its existence proved1 #ci-ee2 its psychological place1 #ei-fb2 its nature determined1 #fb-hc2 theistic1 #gi-hj1 #hf-hh2 supremacy of1 #hc-ib2 acts of necessity1 #gh-hj2 educable1 #ajd1 #aii-bjj2 conceivably formed through theistic evolution1 #hc-he2 enlightened by ,christian teaching1 #aih-bag2 becomes efficient through ,christian forces1 #bah-bbg4 ,consciousness1 testimony as to freedom1 #ajh-aaj2 ,christian1 source for formulation of ethics1 #bjd-bje4 ,cudworth1 #afg4 ,demerit1 import and measure of1 #gj-gb4 ,deontology1 #af 7note74 ,des ,cartes1 ,ren1 #aej4 ,dividing line between true and false ethical theories1 #acj-acb4 ,diversity of moral judgments1 #dh1 #agc4 ,dorner1 ,dr41 quoted1 #aej4 ,druidism1 #cb4 ,duty defined1 #fe4 ,dynamic1 moral1 #aih1 #bah-bbg4 ,education of conscience1 #gd1 #ajd4 ,egypt1 #dc1 #abf4 ,epictetus1 #adh4 ,ethics1 defined1 #ae-ag2 historically sketched1 #ag-bj2 how divided1 #ba-bc2 relation to psychology1 #bc2 to natural theology1 #bd2 to ,christian theology1 #be2 partly psychological1 #ba-bb1 #ei2 partly metaphysical1 #ba-bb1 #aai-abj2 relation of evolution to1 #ed-ee1 #hc-he1 #acb-acg2 illuminated by ,christianity1 #aif-bag2 task of1 under ,christianity1 #bah-bbg4 ,eudmonism1 #add-aec4 ,evolution1 in relation to conscience1 #ed-ee1 #hc-he1 #acb2 to objective moral law1 #acb-acg1 #aed-aee4 ,fact1 the primary ethical1 #bh-cf4 ,faculty1 as applied to the conscience1 #cg-ch2 psychologically described1 #fb-hj4 ,failure of utilitarianism1 #aee-afj4 ,fallibility of conscience1 #eb1 #ib-id1 #ajc-aje4 ,fatalism1 in ,stoic virtue1 #adg4 ,feelings1 moral1 a part of conscience1 #gb-gg2 feelings1 objects of moral judgment1 #ahg-ahi4 ,flint1 ,prof41 quoted1 #bah4 ,freedom1 personal1 abridged in ancient nations1 #ag-ah4 ,free-will1 necessary to moral agency1 #ff1 #aje-ajf2 alternative choice1 #ajf-ajg1 #aei2 proof of1 #ajg-aab2 excluded by materialism1 #aab-aac4 ,god1 existence of required by moral law1 #gi-hj1 #hg-hh1 #ace2 relation to moral law1 #abf1 #ace-acf1 #adi-aea1 #aeh1 #afi1 #agb1 #agh-aha1 #bjh-bae2 moral duties due to ,him1 #afi-agj1 #bbb-bbc4 ,good1 the chief1 #adc1 #ade1 #adf1 #adh4 ,greece1 #ag1 #dc1 #adc-adh4 ,gregory1 ,dr4 ,d4 ,s41 #aff4 ,grote1 #abc4 ,grotius1 ,hugo1 #adi-aej4 ,ground of right1 the point defined1 #aci2 sometimes confounded with ground of obligation1 #ach-aci2 various theories1 #adj-afg2 ,egyptian1 #adj2 ,chinese1 #ada2 ,indian1 #adb2 ,zoroastrian1 #adb-adc2 ,greek1 #adc-adh2 ,roman1 #adh2 ,divine absolutism1 #adi-aej2 of ,hobbes1 #aea2 sympathetic1 #aeb2 utilitarian1 #aeb-afe2 of relations1 #afe2 spiritual excellence1 #aff2 direct intuition1 #afg2 as subjective or objective1 #aci-adj1 #afh2 proximate ground1 #afh-agh2 ultimate1 #agh-aha2 not in mere will of ,god1 #agi-ahj4 ,guilt of wrong-doing1 #baj-bab4 ,hamilton1 ,sir ,william1 #aba1 #abb4 ,happiness1 an end1 but not supreme1 #afa-afc2 idea of1 not identical with that of right1 #aef2 without the moral imperative1 #aeh-afj4 ,hedonism1 #adf4 ,herbert ,spencer1 on moralizing effects of intellectualism1 #dc2 on relativity of knowledge1 #abb2 explanation of the moral sentiments1 #ce1 #aee4 ,heredity and conscience1 #hc-hd4 ,hickock1 ,dr4 ,laurens ,p41 #aff4 ,historical witness to the ethical distinctions1 #bi-ca4 ,history of ethics1 glance at1 #ag-bj4 ,hobbes1 #aea4 ,horace1 #cc4 ,hume1 #aeb1 #aed4 ,hutcheson1 #aed4 ,imperative1 the moral1 #fe-ff1 #ii1 #aeh1 #bab-bac4 ,instinct1 not conscience1 #eg-eh4 ,intentions1 have moral quality1 #aij2 teleological motives1 #aij4 ,intuitional1 the conscience perceptions1 #fj-fc1 #gf1 #gh-gi4 ,jouffroy1 ,theo4 ,simon1 #aff4 ,judgments1 moral1 universal1 #bi2 conflict of1 #dg2 agreement1 #dh-ea2 primary1 #fb-fg2 secondary1 #ea1 #abh2 not infallible1 #eb4 ,kant1 ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 #ha2 phenomenalism1 #aba-abb2 on the ground of right1 #afg2 categorical imperative1 #bab-bac4 ,knowledge1 relation of1 to moral judgments1 #ea-eb1 #ei-fb1 #fg-fh1 #ib-ic1 #ie-if1 #ajb-aje1 #agb-age1 #bje-bji4 ,lecky1 quoted1 #aeg 7note74 ,literature1 its testimony to the moral sense1 #cc4 ,mansel1 ,dean1 #aba4 ,marcus ,aurelius1 #adh4 ,martineau1 ,james1 #hh1 #agd1 #bbc-bbd4 ,merit and demerit1 import of1 #fh-gj2 measure of1 #ga4 ,metaphysics of ethics1 #ba1 #aai-aie4 ,mill1 ,james1 #aed4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,stuart1 #hb1 #aba-abb1 #aed4 ,mohammedanism1 #cb4 ,monism1 material1 #acc-acg1 #aee4 ,moral agency1 #ajj-aah1 #agb1 #ahb4 ,moral distinctions1 fact of1 #bh-cf2 faculty of1 #cg-he2 objectively real1 #abe-abf2 not made by mental organization1 #abg2 intuitions1 #fc2 immutable and eternal1 #abg-abh4 ,moral emotions1 #dd-dg4 ,moral ,law1 perceived obligation1 #fd-ff2 theistic1 #gi-hj1 #hg-hh1 #ace2 only for free agents1 #acf2 grandeur of1 #abi-acj2 universal1 #bac-bae4 ,morality1 relation of ,christianity to1 #aig-aih4 ,moral motives1 #gc1 #ge-gf4 ,moral qualities1 predicable of personal beings1 #ahb2 external acts1 #ahc-ahg2 feelings1 desires1 etc41 #ahg-ahi2 hereditary propensities1 #ahi2 intellectual activities1 #aia2 intentions1 #aij2 will1 #aic-aie4 ,necessitarianism1 #aab-aae4 ,necessity1 in the action of conscience1 #gh2 in intellect and sensibility1 #agd-age4 ,nemesis1 in history1 #ca4 ,newman1 ,francis1 #hj4 ,nirvana1 #adb1 #bbb4 ,obligation1 perceived1 #fd2 felt1 #fd-fe2 belongs to moral agent1 #fe2 central in conscience1 #fe2 implies objective moral law1 #abe-acg4 ,old ,testament ethics1 #bjb-bjc4 ,paley1 ,william1 #aec4 ,pascal1 #dg4 ,peculiarity of the moral perceptions1 #dj4 ,persistence of the moral sense1 #dh1 #fd4 ,phenicia1 #dc4 ,phenomenalism1 #ha1 #aba-abe4 ,philosophical part of ethics1 #ba4 ,plato1 #ah1 #cc1 #add1 #adh1 #aeb4 ,plausibility of utilitarianism1 #afa-afe4 ,positive ,philosophy1 #hb4 ,principles1 higher and lower1 ,dr4 ,martineau's rules1 #agd-age4 ,presuppositions to responsibility1 #ajb-ajc1 #aje-ajh1 #agb4 ,psychology1 relation to ethics1 #bc2 in study of conscience1 #ei2 shows the place of conscience1 #ei-fb4 ,quatrefages1 #cb4 ,regeneration1 to realize the ethical life1 #bae-bag1 #bbe-bbf4 ,relativity of knowledge1 #ha1 #abj-abe4 ,religion1 witness to the ethical distinctions1 #ca-cc2 becomes moral obligation1 #afi-agj1 #bbb-bbc4 ,right1 rated in value1 #afj4 ,robinson ,crusoe1 #agj4 ,roman teaching1 #adh4 ,rome1 #dc4 ,seneca1 #cc1 #adh4 ,sensibility1 the1 as related to the conscience1 #gb-gf2 to moral agency1 #aae4 ,shaftesbury1 #aed4 ,shintoism1 #cb4 ,skepticism1 intellectual1 #abc4 ,smith1 ,adam1 #aea4 ,smyth1 ,dr4 ,newman1 quoted1 #bjj1 #bjc4 ,society1 ethical constituted1 #bi1 #aaf4 ,socrates1 #ag1 #adc1 #add1 #aec4 ,solidarity of humanity1 #afd4 ,sophocles1 #cc4 ,spencer1 ,herbert1 #ce1 #dc1 #abb1 #aeg4 ,spinozism1 #aab4 ,stoic ethics1 #adf-adh4 ,supremacy of conscience1 #hf-ii4 ,sympathetic ,theory1 #aea4 ,toism1 #cb4 ,theology1 relation to ethics1 #bd1 #be4 ,theoretical and practical ethics distinguished1 #ba-bc4 ,universalism of moral law1 #abg-acj1 #bac-bae4 ,utilitarianism1 #ce1 #aeb-afd2 error of1 #aee-afj2 measure of truth involved in1 #afa-afe2 evolutionist1 #aee-aef1 #aei2 ,lecky on1 #aeg 7note74 ,value of the morally good1 #afj4 ,volitions1 objects of moral judgment1 #aic-aif4 ,wayland1 ,dr4 ,francis1 #aff4 ,whewell1 #ie4 ,will1 free1 #ajf-aab2 point of personal responsibility1 #aid-aie4 ,will of ,god1 not itself the absolute ground of right1 #agi-aha4 ,wollaston1 #aff4 ,wolseley1 ,lord1 #dc4 ,zoroastrianism1 #cb1 #adb4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chap4 ,i4 #b ,the term ,deontology1 from ,greek3 to deon1 what is due or binding1 and ,greek3 logos1 discourse1 has been used by some modern writers as a fit designation of moral science4 ,though it has never come into general use1 it is etymologically well adapted to express the element of obligation involved in the moral sense4 ,see ,krauth-,flemming ,vocabulary of the ,philosophical ,sciences1 p4 #acb4 #c ,de ,fato1 ,cap4 ,i1 #a4 #d ,see ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #fi-abb4 #e ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics1 ,i1 p4 #ie4 ,int4 to ,aristotle's ,ethics1 p4 vi 7,bohn's ,ed474 #f ,matthew ,arnold1 ,literature and ,dogma1 ,chap4 ,i4 #g ,philosophy of ,theism1 ,harper ,brothers1 ,n4 ,y41 p4 #bbj4 #h ,see ,the ,oldest ,book in the ,world1 ,bibliotheca ,sacra1 ,october1 #ahhb 7,vol4 ,,xlv74 ,also ,c4 ,loring ,brace's ,the ,unknown ,god 7,a4 ,c4 ,armstrong ,son1 ,new ,york1 #ahij71 pp4 #a-dj4 #i ,prof4 ,borden ,p4 ,bowne4 ,philosophy of ,theism1 p4 #baf4 #aj ,history of ,civilization1 p4 #abe 7,d4 ,appleton ,co41 ,n4 ,y474 #aa ,study of ,sociology1 p4 #cfc4 #ab ,fortnightly ,review1 ,december1 #ahhh4 #ac ,see1 for instance1 ,paley's ,moral ,philosophy1 ,chap4 ,v4 #ad ,see ,chap4 ,,iv1 p4 #hc4 #ae ,so ,hume1 ,adam ,smith1 ,thomas ,brown4 #af ,jeremy ,bentham1 ,jas4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,herbert ,spencer4 #ag ,borden ,p4 ,bowne1 ,int4 to ,psychological ,theory 7,harper ,brothers1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhg71 p4 #bjf4 ,prof4 ,bowne thinks1 indeed1 that this distinction1 traced to its roots1 depends on a feeling of approval or disapproval in connection with the aims and principles of conduct1 and that the ideal of life and the law of conduct spring out of this basal feeling4 ,he asserts that we can only represent the motives and actions to ourselves1 and wait for the immediate feeling of approval or disapproval to manifest itself4 ,he maintains that nothing is gained by regarding the distinction as an intuition of the reason instead of a feeling1 because1 he says1 its universality depends on its content1 and not upon its psychological classification4 ,but we may well ask if it really does make no difference whether this distinction1 the ethical ideal1 comes as a perception of reality1 the action of a knowing power1 or as a feeling which perceives nothing and to account for which there is no perceived ethical reality1 no discernment of the elemental ideas of right and wrong1 upon which approval or disapproval can arise and rest4 ,we are entitled to ask3 ,how can there be a feeling of ethical approval when there is no insight of the distinction between moral good and evil8 ,the feeling that arises from no perception of anything to approve1 or that approves without any perceived principle or law of approval1 is blind4 ,it has no standard or reason for an ethical approval4 ,moreover1 ,prof4 ,bowne admits3 ,as long as they the aims and principles of conduct are unrecognized there is no moral life4 ,as long as they are unclearly perceived1 there are only the germs of a moral life4 ,when they are brought out into clear recognition1 the self-conscious moral life begins4 #ah ,see ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics 7,nelson ,phillips1 ,n4 ,y471 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #aci1 #adj4 #ai ,borden ,p4 ,bowne's ,int4 to ,psychological ,theory 7,harper ,bros41 ,n4,y41 #ahhg71 p4 #ahd4 #bj ,theism1 p4 #ac4 ,quoted from ,william ,knight's ,essays in ,philosophy 7,houghton1 ,mifflin ,co41 ,boston1 #ahij71 p4 #bgf4 #ba ,j4 ,stuart ,mill4 #bb ,the ,crisis in ,morals1 by ,jas4 ,thomas ,bixby1 ,ph4 ,d4 7,boston1 ,roberts ,brothers1 #ahia74 #bc ,prof4 ,huxley1 in one of his latest utterances1 puts this point strongly3 ,the practice of what is ethically best--what we call goodness or virtue--involves a course of conduct which1 in all respects1 is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence4 ,in place of ruthless self-assertion1 it demands self-restraint2 in place of thrusting aside1 or treading down1 all competitors1 it requires that the individual shall not merely respect1 but shall help his fellows2 its influence is directed1 not so much to the survival of the fittest1 as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive4 ,lecture at ,oxford on ,ethics and ,evolution4 #bd ,see ,dr4 ,martineau's ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,,ii1 pp4 #e1 #ii-aaj4 #be ,w4 ,whewell1 ,elements of ,morality1 ,sect4 #bge4 #bf ,the ,doctrine of ,morality1 by ,dr4 ,r4 ,b4 ,fairbairn 7,whitaker1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhg71 pp4 #aji-aac4 #bg ,this feature is recognized in what is usually termed formal freedom1 i4 e4 that psychical capacity of rational choice which is essentially formative of personality4 ,to lose this would be the loss of personality4 ,whether the power of free choice between good and evil is impaired in man's corrupt state1 being put in bondage or subserviency to a depraved love of sin1 is quite a different question4 #bh ,liberum arbitrium habetur1 quando positis ad agendum requisitis1 potest quis agere vel non agere4 ,quoted from ,w4 ,s4 ,lilly's ,right and ,wrong1 p4 #ajd1 #b;d ,ed41 ,london1 ,chapman and ,hall4 #bi ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,,vi4 #cj ,materialistic evolution1 which holds matter as being the energy and cause of all things1 leaves no place for free-will1 because in truth it leaves no place for mind4 ,for mind or soul as a real entity or being which thinks1 feels and wills1 it substitutes mere mentality as an effect of atomic or molecular changes in the brain4 ,mind1 as a self-conscious spirit that itself self-knowingly acts1 is repudiated4 ,nothing is left but a series of sensations1 thoughts and wishes that are as truly physically-produced effects as are the varied perfumes of flowers1 the fall of rain or the waves of the sea4 ,no selfhood remains in man but the physical organism which1 in material causation1 gives out the various forms of products or manifestations denominated mental4 ,but this materialistic theory is not science4 ,it not only stands contradicted by the common judgment of mankind in all ages1 but breaks down utterly in the presence of scientific psychology4 ,for this finds among its unquestionable and irreducible facts a real self-conscious subject or self back of the series of thoughts1 emotions and volitions1 holding all these psychical experiences in its unitary consciousness1 and1 with its memories of the past1 carrying its personal identity through present activity on into the future4 ,the series of mental experiences1 in the theory1 are independent of each other and dependent only on the brain changes which directly produce them1 and thus1 by necessity1 ignorant of each other4 ,personal identity1 therefore1 is full disproof of the theory4 ,for personal identity rests in a single abiding consciousness1 in which all separate mental acts are known as its own acts1 the materials for memory and comparison4 ,the truth is1 that all moral distinctions arise out of the conviction that each individual1 in the center of his personality1 is a soul1 itself determining its rational choices and responsible for the conduct of life4 #ca ,the contradiction thus involved is well put by ,prof4 ,e4 ,d4 ,roe1 of ,oberlin1 ,o41 in ,bibliotheca ,sacra1 ,oct41 #ahid3 ,this law 7autonomy7 pre-supposes the freedom of the will1 for without freedom 'oughtness1' 'responsibility' and 'repentance' would possess no significance4 ,every one1 as the necessarians admit1 acts under the idea of freedom4 ,their hypothesis to explain this is1 that the subject acts under illusion 7necessary illusion1 of course74 ,but here an hypothesis is necessary to explain the hypothesis4 ,why1 if necessity is the truth1 is the subject necessitated to believe falsity8 ,a very strange truth it is which necessitates itself to be disbelieved4 ,pp4 #fef1 #feg4 #cb ,see ,introduction to the ,study of ,philosophy1 by ,j4 ,h4 ,w4 ,stuckenberg1 ,d4 ,d4 7,armstrong ,sons1 ,new ,york1 #ahhh71 pp4 #cba1 #cbb4 #cc ,metaphysics1 ,lect4 ,,viii4 #cd ,see ,dr4 ,mc,cosh's ,defense of ,fundamental ,truth1 ,chap4 ,x1 #c4 #ce ,first ,principles1 ,chap4 ,,iv1 #bb4 #cf ,quoted from ,dr4 ,mc,cosh4 ,fundamental ,truths1 ,chap4 ,x1 #c4 #cg ,this is the old apothem3 ,the ratio cognoscendi is grounded in the ratio essendi4 #ch ,see ,a4 ,alexander's ,moral ,science1 ,chap4 ,,vii4 #ci ,brace's ,the ,unknown ,god 7,a4 ,c4 ,armstrong ,son1 ,n4 ,y471 pp4 #a-dj2 ,the ,oldest ,book in the ,world1 in ,bibliotheca ,sacra1 ,oct41 #ahhh4 #dj ,quoted by ,prof4 ,jas4 ,legge1 in ,the ,religions of ,china1 from ,confucius's ,doctrine of the ,mean 7,chas4 ,scribner's ,sons1 ,new ,york71 p4 #aci4 #da ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics1 ,i1 pp4 #dg-eb4 #db ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics1 ,i1 p4 #ei2 ,brace's ,unknown ,god1 pp4 #ahb-aig2 ,s4 ,d4 ,f4 ,salmond's ,the ,christian ,doctrine of ,immortality 7,f4 ,t4 ,clark1 #ahie71 ,chap4 ,,vi4 #dc ,greek3 eudaimonia4 #dd ,republic ,x1 #fac;a2 ,theaet41 #agf4 #de ,see ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,sec4 #ad1 and ,martineau's ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,book ,i1 ,branch ,i4 #df ,see ,luthardt's ,christian ,ethics 7,t4 ,t4 ,clark71 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #i4 #dg ,greek3 homologoumens t physei zn1 ,diogenes1 ,l4 ,,vii1 #hg4 #dh ,the quotation1 ,acts #ag3bh1 is probably from the ,phnomena of the ,stoic poet ,aratus4 #di ,see ,dr4 ,dorner's ,system of ,christian ,doc41 ,,ii1 p4 #ad4 #ej ,see ,horace1 ,book ,,iii1 ,ode ,,iii4 ,sophocles' dipus ,tyrannus1 lines #hfc-hga4 ,peter ,bayne's ,testimony of ,christ to ,christianity1 p4 #dd4 #ea ,prof4 ,borden ,p4 ,bowne designates this teaching as the goods ethics4 ,principles of ,ethics 7,harper ,bros471 ,ch4 ,i4 #eb ,moral and ,political ,philosophy1 ,chap4 ,,vi4 #ec ,see pp4 #acc-acg4 #ed ,herbert ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 #de4 #ee ,what is ,reality8 by ,francis ,howe ,johnson 7,houghton1 ,mifflin ,co41 ,boston71 pp4 #dge-dih4 #ef ,lecky1 in ,history of ,european ,morals1 says3 ,in all nations and in all ages1 the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand and of virtue on the other1 have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly distinct1 and all languages recognize the distinction4 ,the terms honor1 justice1 rectitude1 or virtue1 and their equivalents in every language1 present to the mind ideas essentially and broadly differing from the terms prudence1 sagacity1 or interest4 ,the two lines of conduct may coincide1 but they are never confused1 and we have not the slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic4 ,when we say a man is governed by a high sense of honor1 or by strong moral feeling1 we do not mean that he is prudently pursuing either his own interests or the interests of society4 444 ,there is no fact more conspicuous in human nature than the broad distinction1 both in kind and degree1 drawn between the moral and the other parts of our nature4 ,but this on utilitarian principles is altogether unaccountable4 ,if the excellence of virtue consists solely in its utility or tendency to promote the happiness of men1 we should be compelled to canonize a crowd of acts which are utterly remote from all ordinary motives of morality4 ,vol4 ,i1 ,chap4 ,i4 #eg ,moral ,science 7,boston1 #ahfg71 pp4 #ci-dd4 #eh ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #ajd4 #ei ,borden ,p4 ,bowne1 ,principles of ,ethics1 p4 #aac4 #fj ,b4 ,f4 ,cocker1 ,theistic ,conception of the ,world1 p4 #cgg4 #fa ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 #ae4 #fb ,principles of ,ethics1 pp4 #ci-dj4 ,for a clear exposition of this distinction1 see ,dr4 ,d4 ,s4 ,gregory's ,christian ,ethics1 ,pt4 ,i1 ,divis4 ,,iii1 sec4 #a4 #fc ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics 7,general71 #g4 #fd ,newman ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics 7,charles ,scribner's ,sons1 #ahib71 p4 #c4 #fe ,newman ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #fj4 #ff ,john #a3d2 #h3 #ab2 #i3 #e4 #fg ,theism1 p4 #cje4 #fh ,james ,martineau1 in ,nineteenth ,century1 ,vol4 ,i1 quoted by ,prof4 ,drummond in ,natural ,law in the ,spiritual ,world 7,j4 ,pott ,co41 ,new ,york71 p4 #afh4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4 ,page #i3 #fb-gf was misprinted as #fb-hj2 corrected here4 ,page #aj3 #afh-agh was misprinted as #afh-agj2 corrected here4 ,page #ab3 #bjj-bje was printed as #bjj2 changed here for consistency4 ,page #ac3 #bje-baf was printed as #bje2 changed here for consistency4