,,volume ,,iii4 ,,works ,,of ,,plotinos ,,plotinos ,complete ,works ,in ,chronological ,order1 ,grouped in ,four ,periods2 ,with ,,biography by ,,porphyry1 ,,eunapius1 ,,suidas1 ,,commentary by ,,porphyry1 ,,illustrations by ,,jamblichus ,,ammonius1 ,,studies in ,sources1 ,development1 ,influence2 ,,index of ,subjects1 ,thoughts and ,words4 by ,,kenneth ,,sylvan ,,guthrie1 ,professor in ,extension1 ,university of the ,south1 ,sewanee2 ,a4,m41 ,sewanee1 and ,harvard2 ,ph4,d41 ,tulane1 and ,columbia4 ,m4,d41 ,medico-,chirurgical ,college1 ,philadelphia4 ,,vol4 ,,iii ,porphyrian ,books1 #cd-de4 ,,comparative ,,literature ,,press ,p4 ,o4 ,box #db1 ,,alpine1 ,n4,j41 ,u4,s4,a4 ,copyright1 #aiah1 by ,kenneth ,sylvan ,guthrie4 ,all ,rights1 including that of ,translation1 ,reserved4 ,entered at ,stationers' ,hall1 by ,george ,bell and ,sons1 ,portugal ,street1 ,lincoln's ,inn1 ,london4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,six4 ,of ,numbers4 ,,manifoldness ,,is ,,distance ,,from ,,unity1 ,,and ,,evil4 #a4 ,does manifoldness consist in distance from unity8 ,is infinity this distance carried to the extreme1 because it is an innumerable manifoldness8 ,is then infinity an evil1 and are we ourselves evil when we are manifold8 7,that is probable72 or every being becomes manifold when1 not being able to remain turned towards itself1 it blossoms out2 it extends while dividing2 and thus losing all unity in its expansion1 it becomes manifoldness1 because there is nothing that holds its parts mutually united4 ,if1 nevertheless1 there still remain something that holds its parts mutually united1 then1 though blossoming out1 7the essence7 remains1 and becomes manifoldness4 ,,how ,,manifoldness ,,is ,,an ,,evil4 ,but what is there to be feared in magnitude8 ,if 7the essence7 that has increased could feel 7it would feel that which in itself has become evil2 for7 it would feel that it had issued from itself1 and had even gone to a great distance 7from itself74 ,no 7essence71 indeed1 seeks that which is other than itself2 every 7essence7 seeks itself4 ,the movement by which 7an essence7 issues from itself is caused either by audacity1 or necessity4 ,every 7being7 exists in the highest degree not when it becomes manifold or great1 but when it belongs to itself2 now this occurs when it concentrates upon itself4 ,that which desires to become great in some other manner is ignorant of that in which true greatness consists2 instead of proceeding towards its legitimate goal1 it turns towards the outside4 ,now1 on the contrary1 to turn towards oneself1 is to remain in oneself4 ,the demonstration of this may be seen in that which participates in greatness2 if 7the being7 develop itself so that each of its parts exist apart1 each part will indeed exist1 but 7the being7 will no longer be what it originally was4 ,to remain what it is1 all its parts must converge towards unity2 so that1 to be what it was in its being1 it should not be large1 but single4 ,when it possesses magnitude1 and quantity inheres in it1 it is destroyed1 while when it possesses unity1 it possesses itself4 ,doubtless the universe is both great and beautiful2 but it is beautiful only so far as the unity holds it in from dissipating into infinity4 ,besides1 if it be beautiful1 it is not because it is great1 but because it participates in beauty2 now1 if it need participation in beauty1 it is only because it has become so large4 ,indeed1 isolated from beauty1 and considered in itself as great1 it is ugly4 ,from this point of view1 what is great is with beauty in the relation obtaining between matter and form1 because what needs adornment is manifold2 consequently1 what is great has so much more need of being adorned and is so much more ugly 7as it is great74 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,number ,,of ,,the ,,infinite4 #b4 ,what opinion should we hold of that which is called the number of infinity8 ,we must begin by examining how it can be a number1 if it be infinite4 ,indeed1 sense-objects are not infinite2 consequently1 the number which inheres in them could not be infinite1 and he who numbers them1 does not number infinity4 ,even if they were multiplied by two1 or by more1 they still could always be determined2 if they were multiplied in respect of the past or the future1 they would still be determined4 ,it might be objected that number is not infinite in an absolute manner1 but only 7in a relative manner7 in this sense1 that it is always possible to add thereto4 ,but he who numbers does not create numbers2 they were already determined1 and they existed 7before being conceived by him who was numbering them74 ,as beings in the intelligible world are determined1 their number is also determined by the quantity of beings4 ,just as we make man manifold by adding to him the beautiful1 and other things of the kind1 we can make an image of number correspond to the image of every intelligible being4 ,just as1 in thought1 we can multiply a town that does not exist1 so can we multiply numbers4 ,when we number the parts of time1 we limit ourselves to applying to them the numbers that we have in ourselves1 and which1 merely on that account1 do not cease remaining in us4 ,,how ,,the ,,infinite ,,reached ,,existence4 #c4 ,how did the infinite1 in spite of its infiniteness1 reach existence8 ,for the things which have arrived at existence1 and which subsist1 have been preparatorily contained in a number4 ,before answering this question1 we must examine whether1 when it forms part of veritable essences1 multitude can be evil4 ,on high1 the manifoldness remains united1 and is hindered from completely being manifoldness1 because it is the one essence2 but this is inferior to unity by this very condition that it is manifoldness1 and thus1 is imperfect in respect to unity4 ,therefore1 though not having the same nature as the ,one1 but a nature somewhat degraded 7in comparison with unity71 manifoldness is inferior to unity2 but1 by the effect of the unity which it derives from the ,one 7since it is the one essence71 it still possesses a venerable character1 reduces to unity the manifold it contains1 and makes it subsist in an immutable manner4 ,,how ,,infinity ,,can ,,subsist ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,how can infinity subsist in the intelligible world8 ,either it exists among the genuine essences1 and then is determined2 or it is not determined1 and then it does not exist among the veritable essences1 but it must be classified among the things which exist in perpetual becoming1 such as time4#a ,the infinite is determinate1 but it is not any the less infinite2 for it is not the limit#b which receives the determination1 but the infinite#c2 and between the boundary and the infinite there is no intermediary that could receive the determination4 ,this infinite acts as if it were the idea of the boundary1 but it is contained by what embraces it exteriorly4 ,when ,i say that it flees1 ,i do not mean that it passes from one locality to another1 for it has no locality2 but ,i mean that space has existed from the very moment that this infinite was embraced4#d ,we must not imagine that what is called the movement of the infinite consists in a displacement1 nor admit that the infinite by itself possesses any other of the things that could be named2 thus the infinite could neither move1 nor remain still4 ,where indeed would it halt1 since the place indicated by the word where is posterior to infinity8 ,movement is attributed to infinity only to explain that the infinite has no permanency4 ,should we believe that the infinite exists on high in one only and single place1 or that it arises there1 and descends here below8 ,no3 for it is in respect to one only and single place that we are enabled to conceive both what has risen and does not descend1 as well as that which descends4#e ,,infinite ,,is ,,conceived ,,by ,,the ,,thought',s ,,making ,,abstraction ,,of ,,the ,,form4 ,how then can we conceive the infinite8 ,by making abstraction of form by thought4 ,how will it be conceived8 ,we may conceive of the infinite as simultaneously being the contraries1 and not being them4 ,it will have to be conceived as being simultaneously great and small2 for the infinite becomes both of these4#f ,it may also be conceived as both being moved1 and being stable#g2 for the infinite becomes these two things also4 ,but before the infinite becomes these two contraries1 it is neither of them in any determinate manner2 otherwise1 you would have determined it4 ,by virtue of its nature1 the infinite is these things therefore in an indeterminate and infinite manner2 only on this condition will it appear to be these contrary things4 ,if1 by applying your thought to the infinite1 you do not entice it into a determination1 as into a net1 you will see the infinite escaping you1 and you will not find anything in it that would be a unity2 otherwise1 you would have determined it4 ,if you represented to yourself the infinite as a unity1 it would seem to you manifold2 if you say that it is manifold1 it will again make game of you2 for1 all things do not form a manifold where no one thing is one4 ,from still another standpoint1 the nature of the infinite is movement1 and according to another nature1 stability2 for its property of being invisible by itself constitutes a movement which distinguishes it from intelligence#h2 its property of not being able to escape1 of being exteriorly embraced1 of being circumscribed within an unescapable circle constitutes a sort of stability4 ,movement therefore cannot be predicated of infinity1 without also attributing stability to it4 ,,how ,,other ,,numbers ,,form ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 #d4 ,let us now examine how the numbers form part of the intelligible world4 ,are they inherent in the other forms8 ,or are they1 since all eternity1 the consequences of the existence of these forms8 ,in the latter case1 as the very essence possessed primary existence1 we would first conceive the monad2 then1 as movement and stability emanated from it1 we would have the triad2 and each one of the remaining intelligible entities would lead to the conception of some of the other numbers4 ,if it were not so1 if a unity were inherent in each intelligible entity1 the unity inherent in the first ,essence would be the monad2 the unity inherent in what followed it1 if there be an order in the intelligible entities1 would be the pair2 last1 the unity inhering in some other intelligible entity1 such as1 for instance1 in ten1 would be the decad4 ,nevertheless this could not yet be so1 each number being conceived as existing in itself4 ,in this case1 will we be compelled to admit that number is anterior to the other intelligible entities1 or posterior thereto8 ,on this subject ,plato#i says that men have arrived to the notion of number by the succession of days and nights1 and he thus refers the conception of number to the diversity of 7objective7 things4 ,he therefore seems to teach that it is first the numbered objects that by their diversity produce numbers1 that number results from movement of the soul1 which passes from one object to another1 and that it is thus begotten when the soul enumerates2 that is1 when she says to herself1 ,here is one object1 and there is another2 while1 so long as she thinks of one and the same object1 she affirms nothing but unity4 ,but when ,plato says that being is in the veritable number1 and that the number is in the being1#aj he intends to teach that by itself number possesses a hypostatic substantial existence1 that it is not begotten in the soul which enumerates1 but that the variety of sense-objects merely recalls to the soul the notion of number4 ,,pythagorean ,,intelligible ,,numbers ,,discussed4 #e4 ,what then is the nature of number8 ,is it a consequence1 and partially an aspect of each being1 like man and one-man1 essence and one-essence8 ,can the same be said for all the intelligibles1 and is that the origin of all numbers8 ,if so1 how is it that on high 7in the intelligible world7 the pair and triad exist8 ,how are all things considered within unity1 and how will it be possible to reduce number to unity1 since it has a similar nature8 ,there would thus be a multitude of unities1 but no other number would be reduced to unity1 except the absolute ,one4 ,it might be objected that a pair is the thing1 or rather the aspect of the thing which possesses two powers joined together1 such as is a composite reduced to unity1 or such as the ,pythagoreans conceived the numbers1#aa which they seem to have predicated of other objects1 by analogy4 ,for instance1 they referred to justice as the 7,tetrad1 or7 group-of-four1#ab and likewise for everything else4 ,thus a number1 as for instance a group-of-ten1 would be considered as a single 7group of7 unity1 and would be connected with the manifold contained in the single object4 ,this1 however1 is an inadequate account of our conception of ten2 we speak of the objects after gathering 7ten7 separate objects4 ,later1 indeed1 if these ten objects constitute a new unity1 we call the group a decad4 ,the same state of affairs must obtain with intelligible ,numbers4 ,if such were the state of affairs 7answers ,plotinos71 if number were considered only within objects1 would it possess hypostatic existence8 ,it might be objected1 ,what then would hinder that1 though we consider white within things1 that nevertheless the ,white should 7besides7 have a hypostatic substantial existence8 ,for movement is indeed considered within essence1 and yet 7it is agreed that7 movement possesses a hypostatic substantial existence within essence4 ,the case of number1 however1 is not similar to that of movement2 for we have demonstrated that movement thus considered in itself is something unitary4#ac ,moreover1 if no more than such a hypostatic substantial existence be predicated of number1 it ceases to be a being1 and becomes an accident1 though it would not even then be a pure accident2 for what is an accident must be something before becoming the accident 7of some substance74 ,though being inseparable therefrom1 it must possess its own individual nature in itself1 like whiteness2 and before being predicated of something else1 it already is what it is posited4 ,consequently1 if one be in every 7being71 one man is not identical with man2 if one be something different from man#ad and from every other 7being71 if it be something common to all 7beings71 one must be anterior to all men and to all other 7beings71 so that man and all other beings may be one4 ,the one is therefore anterior to movement1 since movement is one1 and likewise anterior to essence1 to allow for essence also being one4 ,this of course does not refer to the absolute ,unity that is recognized as superior to essence1 but of the unity which is predicated of every intelligible form4 ,likewise1 above that of which the decad is predicated subsists the ,decad in itself1 for that in which the decad is recognized could not be the ,decad in itself4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,unity ,,and ,,decad ,,exist ,,before ,,all ,,numbers ,,one ,,or ,,ten4 ,does unity therefore inhere in essences1 and does it subsist with them8 ,if it inhere in essences1 or if it be an accident1 as health is an accident of man1 it must be something individual 7like health74 ,if unity be an element of the composite1 it will first have to exist 7individually71 and be an unity in itself1 so as to be able to unify itself to something else2 then1 being blended with this other thing that it has unified1 it will not longer remain really one1 and will thereby even become double4 ,besides1 how would that apply to the decad8 ,what need of the 7intelligible7 ,decad has that which is already a decad1 by virtue of the power it possesses8 ,will it receive its form from that ,decad8 ,if it be its matter1 if it be ten and decad only because of the presence of the ,decad1 the ,decad will have first to exist in itself1 in the pure and simple state of 7being a7 ,decad4 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,these ,,intelligible ,,numbers8 #f4 ,but if1 independently of the things themselves1 there be an ,one in itself1 and a ,decad in itself2 and if the intelligible entities be unities1 pairs1 or triads1 independently of what they are by their being1 what then is the nature of these ,numbers8 ,what is their constitution8 ,it must be admitted that a certain ,reason presides over the generation of these ,numbers4 ,it is therefore necessary clearly to understand that in general1 if intelligible forms at all exist1 it is not because the thinking principle first thought each of them1 and thereby gave them hypostatic existence4 ,justice1 for instance1 was not born because the thinking principle thought what justice was2 nor movement1 because it thought what movement was4 ,thus thought had to be posterior to the thing thought1 and the thought of justice to justice itself4 ,on the other hand1 thought is anterior to the thing that owes its existence to thought1 since this thing exists only because it is thought4 ,if then justice were identical with such a thought1 it would be absurd that justice should be nothing else than its definition2 for in this case1 the thinking of justice or movement1 would amount to a conception of these objects 7by a definition74 ,now this would be tantamount to conceiving the definition of a thing that did not exist1 which is impossible4 ,,justice1 ,,like ,,an ,,intellectual ,,statue1 ,,was ,,born ,,of ,,itself4 ,the statement that in what is immaterial1 knowledge and the known thing coincide1#ae must not be understood to mean that it is the knowledge of the thing which is the thing itself1 nor that the reason which contemplates an object is this object itself1 but rather1 conversely1 that it is the thing which1 existing without matter1 is purely intelligible and intellection4 ,i do not here mean the intellection which is neither a definition nor an intuition of a thing2 but ,i say that the thing itself1 such as it exists in the intelligible world1 is exclusively intelligence and knowledge4 ,it is not 7the kind of7 knowledge that applies itself to the intelligible1 it is the 7actual7 thing itself which keeps that knowledge 7thereof possessed by reason7 from remaining different from it1 just as the knowledge of a material object remains different from that object2 but it is a veritable 7kind of7 knowledge1 that is1 a knowledge which is not merely a simple image of the known thing1 but really is the thing itself4 ,it is not therefore the thought of the movement which produced movement in itself1 but the movement in itself which produced the thought1 so that the thought thinks itself as movement1 and as thought4 ,on the one hand1 intelligible movement is thought by the intelligible ,essence2 on the other hand1 it is movement in itself because it is first--for there is no movement anterior thereto2 it is real movement1 because it is not the accident of a subject1 but because it is the actualization of the essence which moves1 and possesses actualized 7existence72 it is therefore being1 though it be conceived as different from essence4 ,justice1 for instance1 is not the simple thought of justice2 it is a certain disposition of ,intelligence1 or rather it is an actualization of a determinate nature4 ,the face of ,justice is more beautiful than the evening or morning stars1 and than all visible beauty4#af ,justice may be imagined as an intellectual statue which has issued from itself and which has manifested itself such as it is in itself2 or rather1 which subsists essentially in itself4 ,,intelligence ,,thinks ,,things ,,not ,,because ,,they ,,exist1 ,,but ,,because ,,it ,,possesses ,,them4 #g4 ,we must1 in fact1 conceive intelligible essences as subsisting in one nature1 and one single nature as possessing and embracing all 7things74 ,there no one thing is separated from the others1 as in the sense-world1 where the sun1 moon1 and other objects each occupy a different locality2 but all things exist together in one unity2 such is the nature of intelligence4 ,the 7universal7 ,soul imitates it1 in this respect1 as does also the power called ,nature1 conformably to which1 and by virtue of which individuals are begotten each in a different place1 while she remains in herself4 ,but1 although all things exist together 7in the unity of ,intelligence71 each of them is none the less different from the others4 ,now1 these things which subsist in ,intelligence and being1 are seen by the ,intelligence that possesses them1 not because it observes them1 but because it possesses them without feeling the need of distinguishing them from each other2 because from all eternity they have dwelt within it distinct from each other4 ,we believe in the existence of these things on the faith of those who admire them1 because they have participated therein4 ,as to the magnitude and beauty of the intelligible world1 we can judge of it by the love which the ,soul feels for it1 and if other things feel love for the ,soul1 it is because she herself possesses an intellectual nature1 and that by her the other things can1 to some extent1 become assimilated to ,intelligence4 ,how indeed could we admit that here below was some organism gifted with beauty1 without recognizing that the ,organism itself 7the intelligible world#ag7 possesses an admirable and really unspeakable beauty8 ,further1 the perfect ,organism is composed of all the organisms2 or rather it embraces all the organisms2 just as our ,universe is one1 yet simultaneously is visible1 because it contains all the things which are in the visible universe4 ,,what ,,and ,,how ,,is ,,every ,,intelligible ,,entity4 #h4 ,since then the 7universal7 ,organism possesses primary existence1 since it is simultaneously organism1 intelligence1 and veritable ,being2 and as we state that it contains all organisms1 numbers1 justice1 beauty1 and the other similar beings--for we mean something different by the ,man himself1 and ,number itself1 and ,justice itself--we have to determine1 so far as it is possible in such things1 what is the condition and nature of each intelligible entity4 ,,number ,,must ,,exist ,,in ,,the ,,primary ,,essence4 7,to solve this problem7 let us begin by setting aside sensation1 and let us contemplate ,intelligence by our intelligence exclusively4 ,above all1 let us clearly understand that1 as in us life and intelligence do not consist of a corporeal mass1 but in a power without mass1 likewise veritable ,being is deprived of all corporeal extension1 and constitutes a power founded on itself4 ,it does not indeed consist in something without force1 but in a power sovereignly vital and intellectual1 which possesses life in the highest degree1 intelligence1 and being4 ,consequently1 whatever touches this power participates in the same characteristics according to the manner of its touch2 in a higher degree1 if the touch be close2 in a lower degree1 if the touch be distant4 ,if existence be desirable1 the completest existence 7or1 essence7 is more desirable still4 ,likewise1 if intelligence deserve to be desired1 perfect ,intelligence deserves to be desired above everything2 and the same state of affairs prevails in respect to life4 ,if then we must grant that the ,essence is the first1 and if we must assign the first rank to ,essence1 the second to ,intelligence1 and the third to the ,organism1#ah as the latter seems already to contain all things1 and ,intelligence justly occupies the second rank1 because it is the actualization of ,being--then number could not enter into the ,organism1 for before the organism already existed one and two 7,being and ,intelligence74 ,nor could number exist in ,intelligence1 for before ,intelligence was ,being1 which is both one and manifold4 7,number therefore must exist1 or originate1 in the primary ,being47 ,,number ,,follows ,,and ,,proceeds ,,from ,,essence4 #i4 ,it remains for us to discover whether it were ,being1 in the process of division1 that begat number1 or whether it be the number that divided ,being4 7,this is the alternative37 either being1 movement1 stability1 difference and identity produced number1 or it is number that produced all these 7categories1 or7 genera4 ,our discussion must start thus4 ,is it possible that number should exist in itself1 or must we contemplate two in two objects1 three in three objects1 and so forth8 ,the same question arises about unity as considered within numbers2 for if number can exist in itself independently of numbered things1#ai it can also exist previously to the essences4 ,can number therefore exist before the essences8 ,it might be well preliminarily to assert that number is posterior to the ,essence1 and proceeds therefrom4 ,but then if essence be one essence1 and if two essences be two essences1 one will precede essence1 and the other numbers will precede the essences4 7,would number then precede the essences7 only in thought and conception1 or also in the hypostatic existence8 ,we should think as follows4 ,when you think of a man as being one1 or the beautiful as being one1 the one that is thus conceived in both 7beings7 is something that is thought only afterward4 ,likewise1 when you simultaneously consider a dog and a horse1 here also two is evidently something posterior4 ,but if you beget the man1 if you beget the horse or the dog1 or if you produce them outside when they already exist in you1 without begetting them1 nor producing them by mere chance 7of seeing them71 you will say1 ,we should go towards one 7being71 then pass to another1 and thus get two2 then make one more being1 by adding my person4 ,likewise1 7beings7 were not numbered after they were created1 but before they were created1 when 7the creator7 decided how many should be created4 ,,number ,,split ,,the ,,unity ,,into ,,plurality2 ,,pythagorean ,,identification ,,of ,,ideas ,,and ,,numbers4 ,the universal ,number therefore existed before the essences 7were created72 consequently1 ,number was not the essences4 ,doubtless1 ,number was in ,essence2 but it was not yet the number of ,essence2 for ,essence still was one4 ,but the power of ,number1 hypostatically existing within it1 divided it1 and made it beget the manifold4 ,number is either the being or actualization 7of ,essence72 the very ,organism and ,intelligence are number4 ,essence is therefore the unified number1 while the essences are developed number2 ,intelligence is the number which moves itself1 and the ,organism is the number that contains4 ,since therefore ,essence was born from ,unity1 ,essence1 as it existed within ,unity1 must be ,number4 ,that is why 7the ,pythagoreans#bj7 called the ideas unities and numbers4 ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,number3 ,,essential ,,and ,,unitary4 ,such then is essential ,number 7number that is ,being74 ,the other kind of number1 which is called a number composed of digits1 or unities1 is only an image of the former4 ,the essential ,number is contemplated in the intelligible forms1 and assists in producing them2 on the other hand1 it exists primitively in essence1 with essence1 and before the essences4 ,the latter find therein their foundation1 source1 root and principle4#ba ,indeed1 ,number is the principle of ,essence1 and rests in it1 otherwise it would split up4 ,on the contrary1 the ,one does not rest upon essence2 otherwise essence would be one before participating in the ,one2 likewise1 what participates in the decad would be the decad already before participating in the decad4 ,,essence ,,is ,a ,,location ,,for ,,the ,,things ,,yet ,,to ,,be ,,produced4 #aj4 ,subsisting therefore in the manifold1 ,essence therefore became ,number when it was aroused to multiplicity1 because it already contained within itself a sort of preformation or representation of the essences which it was ready to produce1 offering the essences1 as it were1 a locality for the things whose foundation they were to be4 ,when we say1 so much gold1 or1 so many other objects1 gold is one1 and one does not thereby intend to make gold out of the number1 but to make a number out of the gold2 it is because one already possesses the number that one seeks to apply it to gold1 so as to determine its quality4 ,if essences were anterior to ,number1 and if ,number were contemplated in them when the enumerating power enumerates the objects1 the number of the 7beings71 whatever it is1 would be accidental1 instead of being determined in advance4 ,if this be not the case1 then must number1 preceding 7the beings7 determine how many of them must exist2 which means that1 by the mere fact of the primitive existence of the ,number1 the 7beings7 which are produced undergo the condition of being so many1 and each of them participates in unity whenever they are one4 ,now every essence comes from ,essence because essence1 by itself1 is ,essence2 likewise1 the ,one is one by itself4 ,if every 7being7 be one1 and if the multitude of 7beings7 taken together form the unity that is in them1 they are one as the triad is one1 and all beings also are one2 not as is the ,monad 7or ,unity71 but as is a thousand1 or any other number4 ,he who1 while enumerating1 produced things1 proclaims that there are a thousand of them1 claims to do no more than to tell out what he learns from the things1 as if he was indicating their colors1 while really he is only expressing a condition of his reason2 without which1 he would not know how much of a multitude was present there4 ,why then does he speak so8 ,because he knows how to enumerate2 which indeed he knows if he know the number1 and this he can know only if the number exist4 ,but not to know what is the number1 at least under the respect of quantity1 would be ridiculous1 and even impossible4 ,,an ,,object',s ,,existence ,,implies ,a ,,previous ,,model ,,in ,,itself4 ,when one speaks of good things1 one either designates objects which are such by themselves1 or asserts that the good is their attribute4 ,if one designate the goods of the first order1#bb one is speaking of the first ,hypostasis1 or rank of existence2 if one designate the things of which the good is the attribute1 this implies the existence of a nature of the good which has been attributed to them1 or which produces this characteristic within them1 or which is the ,good in itself1 or which1 producing the good1 nevertheless dwells in its own nature4 ,likewise1 when1 in connection with 7beings71 we speak of a decad1 7or1 group of ten71 one is either referring to the ,decad in itself1 or1 referring to the things of which the decad is an attribute1 one is forced to recognize the existence of a ,decad in itself1 whose being is that of a decad4 ,consequently1 the conferring of the name decad implies either that these 7beings7 are the ,decad in itself1 or above them in another ,decad whose being is that of being a ,decad in itself4 ,,unity ,,and ,,number ,,precede ,,the ,,one ,,and ,,the ,,many ,,beings4 ,in general1 everything which is predicated of an object either comes to it from without1 or is its actualization4 ,unless by nature it be inconstant1 being present now1 and absent then1 if it be always present1 it is a being when the object is a being4 ,if it be denied that its nature were that of a being1 it will surely be granted that it is a part of the essences1 and that it is an essence4 ,now1 if the object can be conceived without the thing which is its actualization1 this thing nevertheless exists contemporaneously with it1 even though in thought it be conceived posteriorily4 ,if the object cannot be conceived without this thing1 as man cannot be conceived of without one1 in this case one is not posterior to man1 but is simultaneous1 or even anterior1 since the man's subsistence is entirely dependent thereon4 ,as to us1 we recognize that ,unity and ,number precede 7,essence and the essences74 ,,unity ,,must ,,exist ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,before ,,being ,,applied ,,to ,,multiple ,,beings4 #aa4 ,it may be objected that the decad is nothing else than ten unities4 ,if the existence of the ,one be granted1 why should we not also grant the existence of ten unities8 ,since the supreme ,unity 7the unity of the first ,essence71 possesses hypostatic existence1 why should the case not be the same with the other unities 7the complex unities contained within each of the essences78 ,it must not be supposed that the supreme ,unity is bound up with a single essence2 for in this case each of the other 7beings7 would no longer be one4 ,if each of the other 7beings7 must be one1 then unity is common to all the 7beings72 that is that single nature which may be predicated of the multiple 7beings71 and which must1 as we have explained it1 subsist in itself 7in the primary essence7 before the unity which resides in the multiple 7beings74 ,,the ,,supreme ,,unity ,,adjusts ,,all ,,lower ,,group ,,unities4 ,as unity is seen in some one 7being71 and then in some other1 if the second unity possess hypostatic existence also1 then the supreme ,unity 7of the first ,essence7 will not alone possess hypostatic existence1 and there will be thus a multitude of unities 7as there is a multitude of beings74 ,if the hypostatic existence of the first ,unity be alone acknowledged1 this will exist either in the ,essence in itself1 or in the ,one in itself4 ,if it exist in the ,essence in itself1 the other unities 7which exist in the other beings7 will then be such merely by figure of speech1 and will no longer be subordinated to the primary unity2 or number will be composed of dissimilar unities1 and the unities will differ from each other in so far as they are unities4 ,if the primary unity exist already in the ,unity in itself1 what need would that ,unity in itself have of that unity to be one8 ,if all that be impossible1 we shall have to recognize the existence of the ,one which is purely and simply one1 which1 by its being is entirely independent of all the other beings1 which is named the chief ,unity1 and is conceived of as such4 ,if unity exist on high 7in the intelligible world7 without any object that may be called one1 why might not another ,one 7the one of the first ,being7 subsist on high also8 ,why would not all the 7beings71 each being a separate unity1 not constitute a multitude of unities1 which might be the multiple unity8 ,as the nature 7of the first ,being7 begets1 or rather1 as it has begotten 7from all eternity72 or at least1 as it has not limited itself to one of the things it has begotten1 thus rendering the unity 7of the first ,being7 somewhat continuous2 if it circumscribe 7what it produces7 and promptly ceases in its procession1 it begets small numbers2 if it advance further1 moving alone not in foreign matters1 but in itself1 it begets large numbers4 ,it thus harmonizes every plurality and every being with every number1 knowing well that1 if each of the 7beings7 were not in harmony with some number1 either they would not exist1 or they would bear neither proportion1 measure1 nor reason4 ,,one ,,and ,,unity ,,are ,,within ,,us2 ,,independently ,,of ,,the ,,one ,,outside4 #ab4 7,aristotle#bc7 objects that ,one and ,unity have no hypostatic 7or1 genuine7 existence4 ,everywhere the ,one is something that is one4 ,that is nothing but a simple modification experienced in our soul in presence of each essence4 ,we might as easily affirm that when we assert essence1 this is but a simple modification of our soul1 ,essence 7in itself7 being absolutely nothing4 ,if it be insisted that ,essence exists because it excites and strikes our soul1 which then represents it to herself1 we see that the soul is equally impressed by the ,one1 and represents ,him to herself4 ,besides1 we should ask 7,aristotle7 if this modification or conception of our soul do not bear to us the aspect of unity or the manifold8 ,so much the more1 we often say that an object is not one2 evidently we then are not deriving the notion of unity from the object1 because we are affirming that there is no unity in it4 ,unity therefore dwells within us1 and it is in us without the object of which we predicate that it is some one thing4 ,,there ,,is ,,indeed ,a ,,unitary ,,mode ,,of ,,existence ,,in ,,outside ,,objects4 ,it may be objected that having this unity in our soul depends on receiving from the exterior object a notion and an image1 which is a conception furnished by this object4 ,as the philosophers who profess this opinion do not differentiate the species of one and of number1 and as they allow them no other hypostatic existence 7than to be conceived by our soul71 if they 7practically do7 allow them any sort of hypostatic existence1 it will be very interesting to scrutinize the opinions of these4#bd ,they then say that the notion or conception that we have of the one or of the number derives from the objects themselves1 is a notion as much a posteriori as those of that1#be something1 crowd1 festival1 army1 or of multitude2 for1 just as the manifold is nothing without the multiple objects1 nor a festival without the men gathered to celebrate the religious ceremony1 thus the ,one is nothing without the one object1 when we posit the one1 conceiving it alone1 having made an abstraction of everything else4 ,the partisans of this opinion will cite many examples of the same kind1 as the right hand side1 the upper part1 and their contraries4 ,what reality indeed 7to speak as they do71 can the right hand side possess outside of a person who stands or sits here or there#bf8 ,the case is similar with the upper side1 which refers to a certain part of the universe1 and the lower side to another4#bg ,our first answer to this argument is that we will allow that there is a certain kind of existence in the things themselves of which we have just spoken2 but that this mode of existence is not identical in all things1 considered either in respect to each other1 or each in respect to the ,one which is in all4 ,further1 we intend to refute one by one these arguments that have been opposed to us4 ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,one ,,does ,,not ,,come ,,from ,,the ,,subject ,,itself4 #ac4 ,to begin with1 it is unreasonable to insist that the notion of the subject one comes to us from the subject itself 7which is one71 from the visible man1 for instance1 or from some other animal1 or even some stone4 ,evidently the visible man and the ,one are things entirely different1 which could not be identified#bh2 otherwise1 our judgment would not be able 7as it is7 to predicate unity of the non-man4 ,besides1 as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for the right side1 and other such things1 seeing a difference of position when it tells us that an object is here1 or there2 likewise1 it also sees something when it says that an object is one2 for it does not experience there an affection that is vain1 and it does not affirm unity without some foundation4 ,it cannot be believed that the judgment says that an object is one because it sees that it is alone1 and that there is no other2 for1 while saying that there is no other1 the judgment implicitly asserts that the other is one4 ,further1 the notions of other and different are notions posterior to that of unity2 if the judgment did not rise to unity1 it would not assert either the other nor the different2 when it affirms that an object is alone1 it says1 there is one only object2 and therefore predicates unity before only4 ,besides1 the judgment which affirms is itself a substantial 7being7 before affirming unity of some other 7being72 and the 7being7 of which it speaks is one likewise before the judgment either asserts or conceives anything about it4 ,thus 7being7 must be one or many2 if it be many1 the one is necessarily anterior1 since1 when the judgment asserts that plurality is present1 it evidently asserts that there is more than one2 likewise1 when it says that an army is a multitude1 it conceives of the soldiers as arranged in one single corps4 ,by this last example1 it is plain that the judgment 7in saying one body71 does not let the multitude remain multitude1 and that it thus reveals the existence of unity2 for1 whether by giving to the multitude a unity which it does not possess1 or by rapidly revealing unity in the arrangement 7which makes the body of the multitude71 the judgment reduces multitude to unity4 ,it does not err here about unity1 any more than when it says of a building formed by a multitude of stones that it is a unity2 for1 besides1 a building is more unified than an army4#bi ,if1 further1 unity inhere in a still higher degree in that which is continuous1 and in a degree still higher in what is not divisible1#cj evidently that occurs only because the unity has a real nature1 and possesses existence2 for there is no greater or less in that which does not exist4 ,,unity1 ,,though ,,by ,,participation ,,existing ,,in ,,sense-,,objects1 ,,is ,,intelligible4 ,just as we predicate being of every sense-thing1 as well as of every intelligible thing1 we predicate it in a higher degree of intelligible things1 attributing a higher degree 7of substantiality7 to the 7beings that are veritable than to sense-objects71 and to sense-objects than to other genera 7of physical objects72 likewise1 clearly seeing unity in sense-objects in a degree higher than in the intelligible 7essences71 we recognize the existence of unity in all its modes1 and we refer them all to ,unity in itself4 ,besides1 just as being and essence#ca are nothing sensual1 though sense-objects participate therein1 so unity1 though by participation it inhere in sense-objects1 is not any the less an intelligible ,unity4 ,judgment grasps it by an intellectual conception2 by seeing one thing 7which is sensual7 it also conceives another which it does not see 7because it is intelligible72 it therefore knew this thing in advance2 and if judgment knew it in advance1 judgment was this thing1 and was identical with that whose existence it asserted4 ,when it says1 a certain object1 it asserts the unity1 as1 when it speaks of certain objects1 it says that they are two or more4 ,if then one cannot conceive of any object whatever without one1 two1 or some other number1 it becomes possible to insist that the thing without which nothing can be asserted or conceived1 does not at all exist4 ,we cannot indeed deny existence to the thing without whose existence we could not assert or conceive anything4 ,now that which is everywhere necessary to speak and to conceive must be anterior to speech and conception1 so as to contribute to their production4 ,if1 besides1 this thing be necessary to the hypostatic existence of every essence--for there is no essence that lacks unity--it must be anterior to being1 and being must be begotten by it4 ,that is why we say an essence instead of first positing essence1 and a only thereafter1 for there must be one in essence1 to make several possible2 but 7the converse is not true2 for7 unity does not contain essence1 unless unity itself produce it by applying itself to the begetting of it4 ,likewise1 the word that 7when employed to designate an object7 is not meaningless2 for instead of naming the object1 it proclaims its existence1 its presence1 its being1 or some other of its kinds of essence4 ,the word that does not therefore express something without reality1 it does not proclaim an empty conception1 but it designates an object as definitely as some proper name4 ,,unity ,,only ,,an ,,accident ,,in ,,sense-,,things1 ,,but ,,something ,,in ,,itself ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 #ad4 ,as to those who consider unity as relative1 they might be told that unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of the affection experienced by some other being without itself being affected4 ,it cannot cease being one without experiencing the privation of unity by division into two or three4 ,if1 on being divided1 a mass become double without being destroyed in respect to its being a mass1 evidently1 besides the subject1 there existed unity2 and the mass lost it because the unity was destroyed by the division4 ,so this same thing which now is present1 and now disappears1 should be classified among essences wherever it be found2 and we must recognize that1 though it may be an accident of other objects1 it nevertheless exists by itself1 whether it manifest in sense-objects1 or whether it be present in intelligent entities2 it is only an accident in posterior 7beings1 namely1 the sense-objects72 but it exists in itself in the intelligible entities1 especially in the first ,essence1 which is ,one primarily1 and only secondarily essence4 ,,two ,,is ,,not ,,an ,,addition ,,to ,,one1 ,,but ,a ,,change 7,,refutation ,,of ,,aristotle74 ,the objection that unity1 without itself experiencing anything1 by the mere addition of something else1 is no longer one1 but becomes double1 is a mistake4#cb ,the one has not become two1 and is not that which has been added to it1 nor that to which something has been added4 ,each of them remains one1 such as it was2 but two can be asserted of their totality1 and one of each of them separately4 ,two therefore1 not any more than pair1 is by nature a relation4 ,if the pair consisted in the union 7of two objects71 and if being united were identical with to duplicate1 in this case the union1 as well as the pair1 would constitute two4 ,now a pair appears likewise in a state contrary 7to that of the reunion of two objects72 for two may be produced by the division of a single object4 ,two1 therefore1 is neither reunion nor division1 as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation4 ,,objects ,,participate ,,in ,,numbers ,,just ,,as ,,they ,,participate ,,in ,,all ,,intelligible ,,entities4 ,what then is the principal cause 7by virtue of which objects participate in numbers78 ,a being is one by the presence of one2 double1 because of the presence of the pair2 just as it is white because of the presence of whiteness2 beautiful1 because of the presence of beauty2 and just by that of justice4 ,if that be not admitted1 we shall be reduced to asserting that whiteness1 beauty and justice are nothing real1 and that their only causes are simple relations2 that justice consists in some particular relation with some particular being2 that beauty has no foundation other than the affection that we feel2 that the object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting this affection either by nature1 or by acquirement4 ,when you see an object that is one1 and that you call single1 it is simultaneously great1 beautiful1 and susceptible of receiving a number of other qualifications4 ,now why should unity not inhere in the object as well as greatness and magnitude1 sweetness and bitterness1 and other qualities8 ,we have no right to admit that quality1 whatever it be1 forms part of the number of beings1 whilst quantity is excluded2 nor to limit quantity to continuous quantity1 while discrete quantity is excluded from the conception of quantity2 and that so much the less as continuous quantity is measured by discrete quantity4 ,thus1 just as an object is great because of the presence of magnitude1 as it is one by the presence of unity2 so is it double because of the presence of being a pair1 and so forth4#cc ,,the ,,veritable ,,numbers ,,are ,,intelligible ,,entities4 ,should we be asked to describe the operation of the participation of objects in unity and in numbers1 we shall answer that this question connects with the more general problem of the participation of objects in intelligible forms4 ,besides1 we shall have to admit that the decad presents itself under different aspects1 according as it is considered to exist either in discrete quantities1 or in continuous quantities1 or in the reduction of many great forces to unity1 or1 last1 into the intelligible entities to which we are later raised4 ,it is among them1 indeed1 that are found the veritable ,numbers 7spoken of by ,plato1#aj7 which1 instead of being considered as discovered in other 7beings71 exist within themselves2 such is the ,decad-in-itself1 which exists by itself1 instead of simply being a decad#cd composed of some intelligible entities4 ,,number ,,exists ,,before ,,every ,,animal1 ,,and ,,the ,,universal ,,animal4 #ae4 7,from the above discussion about the intelligibility of numbers7 let us now return to what we said in the beginning4 ,the universal 7,being7 is veritable ,essence1 ,intelligence1 and perfect living ,organism2 and at the same time contains also all the living organisms4 ,our universe1 which also is an organism1 by its unity imitates so far as it can the unity of the perfect living ,organism4 ,i say1 to the extent of its capacity1 because1 by its nature1 the sense-world has departed from the unity of the intelligible world2 otherwise1 it would not be the sense-world4 ,moreover1 the universal living ,organism must be the universal ,number2 for if it were not a perfect number1 it would lack some number2 and if it did not contain the total number of living organisms1 it would not be the perfect living ,organism4 ,number therefore exists before every living organism1 and before the universal living ,organism4 ,man and the other living organisms are in the intelligible world2 so far as they are living organisms1 and so far as the intelligible world is the universal living ,organism2 for man1 even here below1 is a part of the living ,organism1 so far as itself is a living organism1 and as the living ,organism is universal2 the other living organisms are also in the living ,organism1 so far as each of them is a living organism4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,as ,,potential ,,and ,,actualized ,,in ,,the ,,soul4 ,likewise1 ,intelligence1 as such1 contains all the individual intelligences as its parts4#ce ,these1 however1 form a number4 ,consequently1 the number which is in the ,intelligence does not occupy the first degree4 ,so far as the number is in ,intelligence1 it is equal to the quantity of the actualizations of ,intelligence4 ,now1 these actualizations are wisdom1 justice1 and the other virtues1 science1 and all the 7ideas7 whose possession characterizes it as veritable ,intelligence4 7,if then science exist in the ,intelligence7 how does it happen that it is not there in some principle other than itself8 ,in ,intelligence the knower1 the known1 and science are one and the same thing2 and with everything else within it4 ,that is why every 7entity7 exists in the intelligible world in its highest degree4 ,for instance1 within it1 ,justice is no accident1 though it be one in the soul1 as such2 for intelligible entities are in the soul 7only in7 potential condition 7so long as she remains no more than soul72 and they are actualized when the soul rises to ,intelligence and dwells with it4#cf ,,number ,,as ,,the ,,universal ,,bond ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,besides ,intelligence1 and anterior thereto1 exists ,essence4 ,it contains ,number1 with which it begets 7beings72 for it begets them by moving according to number1 determining upon the numbers before giving hypostatic existence to the 7beings71 just as the unity 7of essence7 precedes its 7existence71 and interrelates it with the ,first 7or1 absolute ,unity74 ,numbers interrelate nothing else to the ,first2 it suffices for ,essence to be interrelated with ,him1 because ,essence1 on becoming ,number1 attaches all 7beings7 to itself4 ,essence is divided not so far as it is a unity 7for its unity is permanent72 but having divided itself conformably to its nature in as many things as it decided on1 it saw into how many things it had divided itself2 and through this 7process7 it begat the number that exists within itself2 for it divided itself by virtue of the potentialities of number1 and it begat as many 7beings7 as number comported4 ,,the ,,generation ,,of ,,everything ,,regulated ,,by ,,number4 ,the first and veritable ,number is therefore the source and principle#ba of hypostatic existence for beings4 ,that is the reason that even here below1 the classified both discrete and continuous quantity#ch and1 with a different number1 it is some other thing that is begotten1 or nothing more can be begotten4 ,such are the primary ,numbers1 so far as they can be numbered4 ,the numbers that subsist in other things play two parts4 ,so far as they proceed from the ,first1 they can be numbered2 so far as they are below them1 they measure other things1 they serve to enumerate both numbers and things which can be enumerated4 ,how indeed could you even say ten without the aid of numbers within yourself8 ,,difficulties ,,connected ,,with ,,these ,,intelligible ,,numbers4 #af4 ,the first objection might be1 ,where do you locate1 or how do you classify these primary and veritable ,numbers8 ,all the philosophers 7who follow ,aristotle7 classify numbers in the genus of quantity4 ,it seems that we have above treated of quantity1 and classified both discrete and continuous quantity#ch among other beings4 ,here however we seem to say that these ,numbers form part of the primary ,essences1 and add that there are1 in addition1 numbers that serve for enumerations4 ,we are now asked how we make these statements agree1 for they seem to give rise to several questions4 ,is the unity which is found among sense-beings a quantity8 ,or is unity a quantity when repeated1 while1 when considered alone and in itself1 it is the principle of quantity1 but not a quantity itself8 ,besides1 if unity be the principle of quantity1 does it share the nature of quantity1 or has it a different nature8 ,here are a number of points we ought to expound4 ,we shall answer these questions1 and here is what we consider our starting-point4 ,,unity ,,contained ,,in ,,sense-,,objects ,,is ,,not ,,unity ,,in ,,itself4 ,when1 considering visible objects1 by which we ought to begin1 we combine one 7being7 with another1 as for instance1 a horse and a dog1 or two men1 and say that they form two2 or1 when considering a greater number of men we say they are ten1 and form a group of ten1 this number does not constitute being1 nor an 7accident7 among sense-objects2 it is purely and simply a quantity4 ,dividing this group of ten by unity1 and making unity of its parts1 you obtain and constitute the principle of quantity 7unity7 for a unity thus derived from a group of ten4 ,,numerals ,,predicated ,,of ,,the ,,man ,,in ,,himself ,,are ,,essential4 ,but when you say that the ,man considered in himself is a number1 as1 for instance1 a pair1 because he is both animal and reasonable1 we have here no more than a simple modality4 ,for1 while reasoning and enumerating we produce a quantity2 but so far as there are here two things 7animal and reasonable71 and as each of them is one1 as each completes the being of the man1 and possesses unity2 we are here using and proclaiming another kind of number1 the essential ,number4 ,here the pair is not posterior to things2 it does not limit itself to expressing a quantity which is exterior to essence2 it expresses what is in the very being of this essence1 and contains its nature4 ,,collective ,,nouns ,,used ,,as ,,proof ,,of ,,independent ,,existence4 ,indeed1 it is not you who here below produce number when you by discursive reason range through things that exist by themselves1 and which do not depend for their existence on your enumeration2 for you add nothing to the being of a man by enumerating him with another4 ,that is no unity1 as in a choric ballet4 ,when you say1 ten men1 ten exists only in you who are enumerating4 ,we could not assert that ten exists in the ten men you are enumerating1 because these men are not co-ordinated so as to form a unity2 it is you yourself who produce ten by enumerating this group of ten1 and by making up a quantity4 ,but when you say1 a choric ballet1 an army1 there is something which exists outside of these objects1 and within yourself4#ci ,how are we to understand that the number exists in you8 ,the number which existed in you before you made the enumeration has another mode 7of existence7 7than the number that you produce by enumeration74 ,as to the number which manifests itself in exterior objects and refers to the number within yourself1 it constitutes an actualization of the essential numbers1 or1 is conformable to the essential ,numbers2 for1 while enumerating you produce a number1 and by this actualization you give hypostatic existence to quantity1 as in walking you did to movement4 ,,the ,,number ,,within ,,is ,,the ,,number ,,constitutive ,,of ,,our ,,being4 ,in what sense does the number which is within us 7before we enumerate7 have a mode 7of existence7 other 7than the one we produce in enumeration78 ,because it is the number constitutive of our being1 which1 as ,plato says1#dj participates in number and harmony1 and is a number and harmony2 for the soul is said to be neither a body nor an extension2 she therefore is a number1 since she is a being4 ,the number of the body is a being of the same nature as the body2 the number of the soul consists in the beings which are incorporeal like souls4 ,then1 for the intelligible entities1 if the animal itself be plurality1 if it be a triad1 the triad that exists in the animal is essential4 ,as to the triad which subsists1 not in the animal1 but in essence1 it is the principle of being4 ,if you enumerate the animal and the beautiful1 each of these two in itself is a unity2 but 7in enumerating them71 you beget number in yourself1 and you conceive a certain quantity1 the pair4 ,if 7like the ,pythagoreans7 you say that virtue is a group of four1 or tetrad1 it is one so far as its parts 7justice1 prudence1 courage1 and temperance7 contribute to the formation of a unity2 you may add that this group of four1 or tetrad1 is a unity1 so far as it is a kind of substrate2 as to you1 you connect this tetrad with the one that is inside of you4#da ,,how ,a ,,number ,,may ,,be ,,called ,,infinite4#db #ag4 ,as the reasons here advanced would seem to imply that every number is limited1 we may ask in which sense may a number be said to be infinite8 ,this conclusion is right1 for it is against the nature of number to be infinite4 ,why do people then often speak of a number as infinite8 ,is it in the same sense that one calls a line infinite8 ,a line is said to be infinite1 not that there really exists an infinite line of this kind1 but to imply the conception of a line as great as possible1 greater than any given line4 ,similarly with number4 ,when we know which is the number 7of certain objects71 we can double it by thought1 without1 on that account1 adding any other number to the first4 ,how indeed would it be possible to add to exterior objects the conception of our imagination1 a conception that exists in ourselves exclusively8 ,we shall therefore say that1 among intelligible entities1 a line is infinite2 otherwise1 the intelligible line would be a simple quantative expression4 ,if however the intelligible line be not this1 it must be infinite in number2 but we then understand the word infinite in a sense other than that of having no limits that could not be transcended4 ,in what sense then is the word infinite here used8 ,in the sense that the conception of a limit is not implied in the being of a line in itself4 ,,intelligible ,,line ,,posterior ,,to ,,number1 ,,and ,,exists ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,what then is the intelligible line1 and where does it exist8 ,it is posterior to number#dc2 for unity appears in the line1 since this starts from the unity 7of the point71 and because it has but one dimension 7length72 now the measure of dimension is not a quantative 7entity74 ,where then does the intelligible ,line exist8 ,it exists only in the intelligence that defines it2 or1 if it be a thing1 it is but something intellectual4 ,in the intelligible world1 in fact1 everything is intellectual1 and such as the thing itself is4 ,it is in this same world1 likewise1 where is made the decision where and how the plane1 the solid1 and all other figures are to be disposed4 ,for it is not we who create the figures by conceiving them4 ,this is so because the figure of the world is anterior to us1 and because the natural figures which are suitable to the productions of nature1 are necessarily anterior to the bodies1 and in the intelligible world exist in the state of primary figures1 without determining limits1 for these forms exist in no other subjects2 they subsist by themselves1 and have no need of extension1 because the extension is the attribute of a subject4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,spherical ,,figure ,,the ,,primitive ,,one4 ,everywhere1 therefore1 in essence1 is a single 7spherical7 figure1#dd and each of these figures 7which this single figure implicitly contained7 has become distinct1 either in1 or before the animal4 ,when ,i say that each figure has become distinct1 ,i do not mean that it has become an extension1 but that it has been assigned to some particular animal2 thus1 in the intelligible world1 each body has been assigned its own characteristic figure1 as1 for instance1 the pyramid to the fire4#de ,our world seeks to imitate this figure1 although it cannot accomplish this1 because of matter4 ,there are other figures here below that are analogous to the intelligible figures4 ,,figures ,,pre-,,exist ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,but are the figures in the living ,organism as such1 or1 if it cannot be doubted that they are in the living ,organism1 do they anteriorly exist in the ,intelligence8 ,if the ,organism contained ,intelligence1 the figures would be in the first degree in the ,organism4 ,but as it is the ,intelligence that contains the ,organism1 they are in the first degree in ,intelligence4 ,besides1 as the souls are contained in the perfect living ,organism1 it is one reason more for the priority of the ,intelligence4 ,but ,plato says1#df ,intelligence sees the ,ideas comprised within the perfect living ,organism4 ,now1 if it see the ,ideas contained in the perfect living ,organism1 ,intelligence must be posterior to the latter4 ,by the words it sees it should be understood that the existence of the living ,organism itself is realized in this vision4 ,indeed1 the ,intelligence which sees is not something different from the ,organism which is seen2 but 7in ,intelligence7 all things form but one4 ,only1 thought has a pure and simple sphere1 while the ,organism has an animated sphere4#dg ,,infinity ,,in ,,number ,,arises ,,from ,,possibility ,,of ,,increasing ,,greatest ,,imaginable ,,physical ,,number4 #ah4 ,thus1 in the intelligible world1 every number is finite4 ,but we can conceive of a number greater than any assigned number1 and thus it is that our mind1 while considering the numbers1 produces the 7notion of the7 infinite4 ,on the contrary1 in the intelligible world1 it is impossible to conceive a number greater than the ,number conceived 7by divine ,intelligence72 for on high ,number exists eternally2 no ,number is lacking1 or could ever lack1 so that one could never add anything thereto4 ,,as ,,unmeasured ,,the ,,intelligible ,,number ,,might ,,be ,,called ,,infinite4 ,nevertheless1 the intelligible ,number might be called infinite in the sense that it is unmeasured4 ,by what1 indeed1 could it be measured8 ,the ,number that exists on high is universal1 simultaneous one and manifold1 constituting a whole circumscribed by no limit 7a whole that is infinite72 it is what it is by itself4 ,none of the intelligible beings1 indeed1 is circumscribed by any limit4 ,what is really limited and measured is what is hindered from losing itself in the infinite1 and demands measure4 ,but all of the intelligible 7beings7 are measures2 whence it results that they are all beautiful4 ,so far as it is a living organism1 the living ,organism in itself is beautiful1 possessing an excellent life1 and lacking no kind of life2 it does not have a life mingled with death1 it contains nothing mortal nor perishable4 ,the life of the living ,organism in itself has no fault2 it is the first ,life1 full of vigor and energy1 a primary ,light whose rays vivify both the souls that dwell on high1 and those that descend here below4 ,this ,life knows why it lives2 it knows its principle and its goal2 for its principle is simultaneously its goal4 ,besides1 universal ,wisdom1 the universal ,intelligence1 which is intimately united to the living ,organism1 which subsists in it and with it1 still improves it2 heightening its hues as it were by the splendor of its wisdom1 and rendering its beauty more venerable4 ,even here below1 a life full of wisdom is that which is most venerable and beautiful1 though we can hardly catch a glimpse of such a life4 ,on high1 however1 the vision of life is perfectly clear2 the 7favored initiate7 receives from ,life both capacity to behold and increased vitality2 so that1 thanks to a more energetic life1 the beholder receives a clearer vision1 and he becomes what he sees4 ,here below1 our glance often rests on inanimate things1 and even when it turns towards living beings1 it first notices in them that which lacks life4 ,besides1 the life which is hidden in them is already mingled with other things4 ,on high1 on the contrary1 all the 7beings7 are alive1 entirely alive1 and their life is pure4 ,if at the first aspect you should look on something as deprived of life1 soon the life within it would burst out before your eyes4 ,,essence ,,alone ,,possesses ,,self-,,existence4 ,contemplate therefore the ,being that penetrates the intelligibles1 and which communicates to them an immutable life2 contemplate the ,wisdom and ,knowledge that resides within them1 and you will not be able to keep from deriding this inferior nature to which the vulgar human beings attribute genuine being4 ,it is in this supreme ,being that dwell life and intelligence1 and that the essences subsist in eternity4 ,there1 nothing issues 7from ,essence71 nothing changes or agitates it2 for there is nothing outside of it that could reach it2 if a single thing existed outside of 7being71 7being7 would be dependent on it4 ,if anything opposed to 7essence7 existed1 this thing would escape the action of 7being72 it would no longer owe its existence to 7being71 but would constitute a common principle anterior to it1 and would be essence4 ,parmenides#dh therefore was right in saying that the ,essence was one2 that it was immutable1 not because there was nothing else 7that could modify it71 but because it was essence4 ,alone1 therefore1 does ,essence possess self-existence4 ,how then could one1 to ,essence1 refuse to attribute existence1 or any of the things of which it is an actualization1 and which it constitutes8 ,so long as it exists1 it gives them to itself2 and since it exists always1 these things therefore eternally subsist within it4 ,,the ,,power ,,and ,,beauty ,,of ,,essence ,,is ,,to ,,attract ,,all ,,things4 ,such are the power and beauty of ,essence that it 7charms and7 attracts all things1 holding them as it were suspended1 so that these are delighted to possess even a trace of its perfection1 and seek nothing beyond1 except the ,good4 ,for ,essence is anterior to the ,good in respect to us 7when we climb up from here below to the intelligible world74 ,the entire intelligible world aspires to the ,life and ,wisdom so as to possess existence2 all the souls1 all the intelligences likewise aspire to possess it2 ,essence alone is fully self-sufficient4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,eight4 ,of ,sight2 or of ,why ,distant ,objects ,seem ,small4#di 7,,of ,,perspective47 ,,various ,,theories ,,of ,,perspective4 #a4 ,what is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller1 and that1 though separated by a great space1 they seem to be close to each other1 while if close1 we see them in their true size1 and their true distance8 ,the cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might be that light needs to be focussed near the eye1 and to be accommodated to the size of the pupils#ej2 that the greater the distance of the matter of the visible object1 the more does its form seem to separate from it during its transit to the eyes2 and that1 as there is a form of quantity as well as of quality1 it is the reason 7or1 form7 of the latter which alone reaches the eye4 ,on the other hand1 7,epicurus7 thinks that we feel magnitude only by the passage and the successive introduction of its parts1 one by one2 and that1 consequently1 magnitude must be brought within our reach1 and near us1 for us to determine its quantity4 ,,quality ,,is ,,more ,,essential ,,than ,,quantity4 7,do objects at a distance seem smaller7 because we perceive magnitude only by accident1 and because color is perceived first8 ,in this case1 when an object is near1 we perceive its colored magnitude2 when at a distance1 we perceive first its color1 not well enough distinguishing its parts to gather exact knowledge of its quantity1 because its colors are less lively4 ,why should we be surprised at magnitudes being similar to sounds1 which grow weaker as their form decreases in distinctness8 ,as to sounds1 indeed1 it is the form that is sought by the sense of hearing1 and here intensity is noticed only as an accident4 ,but if hearing perceive magnitude only by accident1 to what faculty shall we attribute the primitive perception of intensity in sound1 just as primitive perception of magnitude in the visible object is referable to the sense of touch8 ,hearing perceives apparent magnitude by determining not the quantity but the intensity of sounds2 this very intensity of sounds1 however1 is perceived only by accident 7because it is its proper object74 ,likewise1 taste does not by accident feel the intensity of a sweet savor4 ,speaking strictly1 the magnitude of a sound is its extent4 ,now the intensity of a sound indicates its extent only by accident1 and therefore in an inexact manner4 ,indeed a thing's intensity is identical with the thing itself4 ,the multitude of a thing's parts is known only by the extent of space occupied by the object4 ,,differences ,,of ,,color ,,aid ,,in ,,the ,,perception ,,of ,,magnitude4 ,it may be objected that a color cannot be less large1 and that it can only be less vivid4 ,however1 there is a common characteristic in something smaller and less vivid2 namely1 that it is less than what it is its being to be4 ,as to color1 diminution implies weakness2 as to size1 smallness4 ,magnitude connected with color diminishes proportionally with it4 ,this is evident in the perception of a varied object1 as1 for instance1 in the perception of mountains covered with houses1 forests1 and many other objects2 here the distinctness of detail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole4 ,but when the view of the details does not impress itself on the eye1 the latter no longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the extent offered to its contemplation by the details4 ,even in the case where the objects are near and varied1 if we include them all in one glance without distinguishing all their parts1 the more parts our glance loses1 the smaller do the objects seem4 ,on the contrary1 if we distinguish all their details1 the more exactly do we measure them1 and learn their real size4 ,magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye because the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts2 and because1 even if the eye attempt to do so1 it loses itself1 not knowing where to stop1 for lack of difference between the parts4 ,,disappearance ,,of ,,the ,,form ,,implies ,,that ,,of ,,the ,,size4 ,the distant object seems to us close because our inability to distinguish the parts of the intervening space does not permit us to determine exactly its magnitude4 ,when sight can no longer traverse the length of an interval by determining its quality1 in respect to its form1 neither can it any longer determine its quantity in respect to magnitude4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,aristotle',s ,,visual ,,angle ,,theory4 #b4 ,some#ea hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because they are seen under a smaller visual angle4 ,elsewhere#eb we have shown that this is wrong2 and here we shall limit ourselves to the following considerations4 ,the assertion that a distant object seems less because it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest of the eye still sees something outside of this object1 whether this be some other object1 or something external1 such as the air4 ,but if we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object1 whether this object1 as would a great mountain1 occupy the whole extent of the glance1 and permit nothing beyond it to be seen2 or whether it even extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides1 then this object should not1 as it actually does1 seem smaller than it really is1 even though it fill the whole extension of the glance4 ,the truth of this observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky4 ,not in a single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived1 for the glance could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse4 ,even if we grant the possibility of this1 and that the whole glance embraces the whole hemisphere2 still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater than its apparent magnitude4 ,how then by the diminution of the visual angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the sky1 on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle which makes distant objects appear smaller8 ,,first ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,five4 ,does ,happiness ,increase ,with ,time8#ec ,,happiness ,,has ,,nothing ,,to ,,do ,,with ,,duration ,,of ,,time4 #a4 ,does happiness increase with duration of time8 ,no3 for the feeling of happiness exists only in the present4 ,the memory of past happiness could not add anything to happiness itself4 ,happiness is not a word1 but a state of soul4 ,but a state of soul is a present 7experience71 such as1 for instance1 the actualization of life4 ,,happiness ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,satisfaction ,,of ,,the ,,desire ,,to ,,live4 #b4 ,might happiness not be the satisfaction of the desire of living and activity1 inasmuch as this desire is ever present with us8 7,hardly74 ,first1 according to this hypothesis1 the happiness of to-morrow would ever be greater than that of to-day1 and that of the following day than that of the day before1 and so on to infinity4 ,in this case1 the measure of happiness would no longer be virtue 7but duration74 ,then1 the beatitude of the divinities will also have to become greater from day to day2 it would no longer be perfect1 and could never become so4#ed ,besides1 desire finds its satisfaction in the possession of what is present1 both now1 and in the future4 ,so long as these present circumstances exist1 their possession constitutes happiness4 ,further1 as the desire of living can be no more than the desire to exist1 the latter desire can refer to the present only1 inasmuch as real existence 7essence7 inheres only in the present4 ,desire for a future time1 or for some later event1 means no more than a desire to preserve what one already possesses4 ,desire refers neither to the future nor the past1 but to what exists at present4 ,what is sought is not a perpetual progression in the future1 but the enjoyment of what exists from the present moment onward4 ,,increased ,,happiness ,,would ,,result ,,only ,,from ,,more ,,perfect ,,grasp4 #c4 ,what shall be said of him who lived happily during a longer period1 who has longer contemplated the same spectacle8 ,if such longer contemplation resulted in a clearer idea thereof1 the length of time has served some useful purpose2 but if the agent contemplated it in the same manner for the whole extent of time1 he possesses no advantage over him who contemplated it only once4 ,,pleasure ,,is ,,unconnected ,,with ,,happiness4 #d4 ,it might be objected that the former of these men enjoyed pleasure longer than the other4 ,this consideration has nothing to do with happiness4 ,if by this 7enjoyed7 pleasure we mean the free exercise 7of intelligence71 the pleasure referred to is then identical with the happiness here meant4 ,this higher pleasure referred to is only to possess what is here ever present2 what of it is past is of no further value4 ,,length ,,of ,,happiness ,,does ,,not ,,affect ,,its ,,quality4 #e4 ,would equal happiness be predicated of three men1 one who had been happy from his life's beginning to its end1 the other only at its end1 and the third1 who had been happy1 but who ceased being such4#ee ,this comparison is not between three men who are happy1 but between one man who is happy1 with two who are deprived of happiness1 and that at the 7present moment7 when happiness 7counts most74 ,if then one of them have any advantage1 he possesses it as a man actually happy compared with such as are not2 he therefore surpasses the two others by the actual possession of happiness4 ,,if ,,unhappiness ,,increase ,,with ,,time1 ,,why ,,should ,,not ,,happiness ,,do ,,so8 #f4 7,it is generally agreed that7 all calamities1 sufferings1 griefs and similar evils are aggravated in proportion to their duration4 ,if then1 in all these cases1 evil be increased with time1 why should not the same circumstance obtain in the contrary case8 ,why should happiness also not be increased8#ef ,referring to griefs and sufferings1 it might reasonably be said that they are increased by duration4 ,when1 for example1 sickness is prolonged1 and becomes a habitual condition1 the body suffers more and more profoundly as time goes on4 ,if1 however1 evil ever remain at the same degree1 it does not grow worse1 and there is no need of complaining but of the present4 ,consideration of the past evil amounts to considering the traces left by evil1 the morbid disposition whose intensity is increased by time1 because its seriousness is proportionate to its duration4 ,in this case it is not the length of time1 but the aggravation of the evil which adds to the misfortune4 ,but the new degree 7of intensity7 does not subsist simultaneously with the old1 and it is unreasonable to predicate an increase as summation of what is no more to what now is4 ,on the contrary1 it is the fixed characteristic of happiness to have a fixed term1 to remain ever the same4 ,here also the only increase possibly due to duration of time depends on the relation between an increase in virtue and one in happiness2 and the element to be reckoned with here is not the number of years of happiness1 but the degree of virtue finally acquired4 ,,as ,,addition ,,is ,,possible ,,with ,,time1 ,,why ,,cannot ,,happiness ,,increase8 #g4 ,it might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present only1 exclusive of the past 7as in the case of happiness71 when we do not do so in respect of time4 ,for the addition of past to present unquestionably lengthens time4 ,if then we may properly say that time becomes longer1 why may we not say the same of happiness8--,were we to do so1 we would be applying happiness to divisions of time1 while it is precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is considered to be measured by the present exclusively4 ,while considering time1 in respect of things that have vanished1 such as1 for instance1 the dead1 it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past2 but it would be unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness in respect to duration1 because it would be treating happiness as something accidental and temporary4 ,whatever might be the length of time that preceded the present1 all that can be said of it is1 that it is no more4 ,to regard duration while considering happiness is to try to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible1 something that exists only in the present4 ,that is why time is called an image of eternity1 inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's permanence through its own dispersion4#eg ,by abstracting permanence from eternity1 and appropriating it1 time destroys eternity2 for a short period1 permanence may survive in association with time2 but as soon as it becomes fused with it1 eternity perishes4 ,now as happiness consists in the enjoyment of a life that is good1 namely in that which is proper to ,essence 7in itself71 because none better exists1 it must1 instead of time1 have1 as a measure1 eternity itself1 a principle which admits neither increase nor diminution1 which cannot be compared to any length1 whose nature it is to be indivisible1 and superior to time4 ,no comparison1 therefore1 should be instituted between essence and non-essence1 eternity and time1 the perpetual and the eternal2 nor should extension be predicated of the indivisible4 ,if we regard existence of ,essence in itself1 it will be necessary to regard it entire2 to consider it1 not as the perpetuity of time1 but as the very life of eternity1 a life which instead of consisting of a series of centuries1 exists entire since all centuries4 ,,not ,,even ,,memories ,,of ,,the ,,past ,,increase ,,happiness4 #h4 ,somebody might object that by subsisting till the present1 the memory of the past adds something more to him who has long lived happily4 ,in this case it will be necessary to examine what is meant by this memory4 ,if it mean the memory of former wisdom1 and if it mean that he who would possess this memory would become wiser on account of it1 then this memory differs from our question 7which studies happiness1 and not wisdom74 ,if it mean the memory of pleasure1 it would imply that the happy man has need of much pleasure1 and cannot remain satisfied with what is present4 ,besides1 there is no proof that the memory of a past pleasure is at all pleasant2 on the contrary1 it would be entirely ridiculous to remember with delight having tasted a delicious dish the day before1 and still more ridiculous remembering such an enjoyment ten years ago4 ,it would be just as ridiculous to pride one self on having been a wise man last year4 ,,not ,,even ,,the ,,memory ,,of ,,virtue ,,increases ,,happiness4 #i4 ,could not the memory of virtuous actions contribute to happiness8 ,no3 for such a memory cannot exist in a man who has no virtue at present1 and who thereby is driven to seek out the memory of past virtues4 ,,length ,,of ,,time ,,is ,,of ,,no ,,importance1 ,,not ,,even ,,as ,,opportunity ,,of ,,virtue4 #aj4 ,another objection is that length of time would give opportunity for doing many beautiful deeds2 while this opportunity is denied him who lives happily only a short period4 ,this may be answered by denying happiness to a man on the grounds of having done many beautiful deeds4 ,if several parts of time and several actions are to constitute happiness1 then it would be constituted by things that are no more1 that are past1 and by present things2 whereas our definition of happiness limits it exclusively to the present4 ,then we considered whether length of time add to happiness4 ,there remains only to examine whether happiness of long duration be superior because of yielding opportunities of doing more beautiful deeds4 ,to begin with1 the man who is inactive may be just as happy1 if not more happy than he who is active4 ,besides1 it is not actions themselves which yield happiness2 7the sources of happiness7 are states of mind1 which are the principles of beautiful actions4 ,the wise man enjoys welfare while active1 but not because of this activity2 he derives 7this welfare7 not from contingent things1 but from what he possesses in himself4 ,for it might happen even to a vicious man to save his fatherland1 or to feel pleasure in seeing it saved by some other4 ,it is not then these activities which are the causes of the enjoyment of happiness4 ,true beatitude and the joys it yields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul4 ,to predicate it of activity1 would be to make it depend on things alien to virtue and the soul4 ,the soul's actualization consists in being wise1 and in exercising her self-activity2 this is true happiness4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,seven4 ,about ,mixture to the ,point of ,total ,penetration4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,anaxagoras ,,and ,,democritus4 #a4 ,the subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point of total penetration of the different bodies4 ,this has been explained in two ways3 that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to interpenetrate each other totally1 or that only one of them penetrates the other4 ,the difference between these two theories is of small importance4 ,first we must set aside the opinion of 7,anaxagoras and ,democritus#eh71 who explain mixture as a juxtaposition1 because this is a crude combination1 rather than a mixture4#ei ,mixture should render the whole homogeneous1 so that even the smallest molecules might each be composed of the various elements of the mixture4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,aristotle ,,and ,,alexander ,,of ,,aphrodisias4 ,as to the 7,peripatetic7 philosophers who assert that in a mixture only the qualities mingle1 while the material extension of both bodies are only in juxtaposition1 so long as the qualities proper to each of them are spread throughout the whole mass1 they seem to establish the rightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that the two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture4#fj 7,they object7 that the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude by this continuous division which will leave no interval between the parts of either of the two bodies2 for if the two bodies mutually interpenetrate each other in every part1 their division must become continuous4 ,besides1 the mixture often occupies an extent greater than each body taken separately1 and as great as if mere juxtaposition had occurred4 ,now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally1 the resulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them taken separately4 ,the case where two bodies occupy no more space than a single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's expulsion1 which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the pores of the other4 ,besides1 in the case of the mixture of two bodies of unequal extent1 how could the body of the smaller extend itself sufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater8 ,there are many other such reasons4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,the ,,stoics4 ,we now pass to the opinions of 7,zeno and the other ,stoic7 philosophers1#fa who assert that two bodies which make up a mixture mutually interpenetrate each other totally4 ,they support this view by observing that when the bodies interpenetrate totally1 they are divided without the occurrence of a continuous division 7which would make their molecules lose their magnitude74 ,indeed1 perspiration issues from the human body without its being divided or riddled with holes4 ,to this it may be objected that nature may have endowed our body with a disposition to permit perspiration to issue easily4 ,to this 7the ,stoics7 answer that certain substances 7like ivory#fb71 which when worked into thin sheets1 admit1 in all their parts1 a liquid 7oat-gruel7 which passes from one surface to the other4 ,as these substances are bodies1 it is not easy to understand how one element can penetrate into another without separating its molecules4 ,on the other hand1 total division must imply mutual destruction 7because their molecules would lose all magnitude whatever74 ,when1 however1 two mingled bodies do not together occupy more space than either of them separately 7the ,stoics7 seem forced to admit to their adversaries that this phenomenon is caused by the displacement of air4 ,,explanation ,,of ,,mixture ,,that ,,occupies ,,more ,,space ,,than ,,its ,,elements4 ,in the case where the compound occupies more space than each element separately1 it might 7though with little probability71 be asserted1 that1 since every body1 along with its other qualities1 implies size1 a local extension must take place4 ,no more than the other qualities could this increase perish4 ,since1 out of both qualities1 arises a new form1 as a compound of the mixture of both qualities2 so also must another size arise1 the mixture combining the size out of both4 ,here 7the ,peripatetics7 might answer 7the ,stoics73 ,if you assert a juxtaposition of substances1 as well as of the masses which possess extension1 you are actually adopting our opinions4 ,if however one of the masses1 with its former extension1 penetrate the entire mass of the other1 the extension1 instead of increasing1 as in the case where one line is added to another by joining their extremities1 will not increase any more than when two straight lines are made to coincide by superimposing one on the other4 ,,case ,,of ,,mixture ,,of ,,unequal ,,quantities4 ,the case of the mixture of a smaller quantity with a greater one1 such as of a large body with a very small one1 leads 7the ,peripatetics7 to consider it impossible that the great body should spread in all the parts of the small one4 ,where the mixture is not evident1 the 7,peripatetics7 might claim that the smaller body does not unite with all the parts of the greater4 ,when however the mixture is evident1 they can explain it by the extension of the masses1 although it be very doubtful that a small mass would assume so great an extension1 especially when we attribute to the composite body a greater extent1 without nevertheless admitting its transformation1 as when water transforms itself into air4 ,,evaporation ,,may ,,lead ,,to ,a ,,third ,,theory ,,of ,,mixture4 #b4 ,what happens when a mass of water transforms itself into air8 ,this question demands particular treatment2 for how can the transformed element occupy a greater extension8 7,we shall not try to explain it on either the ,peripatetic or ,stoic principles7 because we have sufficiently developed above the numerous reasons advanced by both those schools4 ,we had better now consider which of the two systems we ourselves might adopt1 and on which side lies reason4 ,besides1 we should consider whether1 besides these both1 there be not place for a third opinion4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,stoic ,,explanation ,,of ,,evaporation4 ,when water flows through wool1 or when paper allows water to filter through it1 why does not the whole of the water pass through these substances 7without partly remaining within them78 ,if the water remain therein partially1 we shall not be able to unite the two substances or masses4 ,shall we say that the qualities alone are confused 7or1 mingled78 ,water is not in juxtaposition with the paper1 nor is lodged in its pores2 for the whole paper is penetrated thereby1 and no portion of the matter lacks that quality4 ,if matter be united to quality everywhere1 water must everywhere be present in the paper4 ,if it be not water that everywhere is present in the paper1 but only 7humidity which is7 the quality of the water1 where then is the water itself8 ,why is not the mass the same8 ,the matter that has insinuated itself into the paper extends it1 and increases its volume4 ,now this augmentation of volume implies augmentation of mass2 and the latter implies that the water has not been absorbed by the book1 and that the two substances occupy different places 7and do not interpenetrate each other74 ,since one body causes another to participate in its quality1 why would it not also make it participate in its extension8 ,by virtue of this union with a different quality1 one quality1 united with a different one1 cannot1 either remain pure1 or preserve its earlier nature2 it necessarily becomes weaker4 ,but one extension1 added to another extension1 does not vanish4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,peripatetic ,,explanation ,,of ,,evaporation4 ,one body is said to divide another1 by penetrating it4 ,this assertion1 however1 demands demonstration1 for it is more reasonable to suppose that qualities may penetrate a body without dividing it4 ,such demonstration is attempted by the claim that qualities are incorporeal4#fc ,but if matter itself be as incorporeal as the qualities1 why could not some qualities along with the matter penetrate into some other body8 ,that some solids do not penetrate other bodies1 is due to their possession of qualities incompatible with that of penetration4 ,the objection that many qualities could not1 along with matter1 penetrate some body1 would be justified only if it were the multitude of qualities that produced density2 but if density be as much of a quality as corporeity1 the qualities will constitute the mixture not in themselves alone1 but only as they happen to be determined4 ,on the other hand1 when matter does not lend itself to mixture1 this occurs not by virtue of its being matter1 but as matter united to some determinative quality4 ,that is all the truer as matter is receptive to any magnitude1 not having any of its own4 ,but enough of this4 ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,rationalized ,,matter4 #c4 ,since we have spoken of corporeity1 it must be analyzed4 ,is it a composite of all qualities1 or does it constitute a form1 a reason1 which produces the body by presence in matter8 ,if the body be the composite of all the qualities together with matter1 this totality of qualities will constitute corporeity4 ,but if corporeity be a reason which produces the body by approaching matter1 doubtless it is a reason which contains all the qualities4 ,now1 if this reason be not at all a definition of being1 if it be a reason productive of the object1 it will not contain any matter4 ,it is the reason which applies itself to matter1 and which1 by its presence1 produces the body there4 ,body is matter with indwelling reason4 ,this reason1 being a form1 may be considered separately from matter1 even if it were entirely inseparable therefrom4 ,indeed1 reason separated 7from matter71 and residing in intelligence1 is different 7from reason united to matter72 the ,reason which abides within ,intelligence is ,intelligence itself4 ,but this subject 7,i shall7 refer to elsewhere4#fd ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,seven4 ,how ,ideas ,multiplied1 and the ,good4#fe ,a4 ,,how ,,ideas ,,multiply4 ,,the ,,eyes ,,were ,,implanted ,,in ,,man ,,by ,,divine ,,foresight4 #a4 ,when the 7higher7 ,divinity1 or 7some lower7 divinity1#ff sent souls down into generation1 ,he gave to the face of man eyes suitable to enlighten him1#fg and placed in the body the other organs suited to the senses1 foreseeing that 7a living organism7 would be able to preserve itself only on condition of seeing1 hearing and touching contiguous objects1 to enable it to select some1 and to avoid others4 ,,senses ,,not ,,given ,,to ,,man ,,because ,,of ,,experience ,,of ,,misfortunes4 ,but can you explain this divine foresight8 ,you must not believe that ,he would have begun by making 7animals7 who perished for lack of senses1 and that later 7the divinity7 gave senses to man and other animals so that they could preserve themselves from death4#fh ,,nor ,,because ,,of ,,god',s ,,foresight ,,of ,,these ,,misfortunes4 ,it might1 indeed1 be objected that 7the divinity7 knew that the living organism would be exposed to heat1 cold1 and other physical conditions2 and that as a result of this knowledge1 to keep them from perishing1 ,he granted them1 as tools1 senses and organs4 ,in our turn we shall ask whether the divinity gave the organs to the living organisms that already possessed the senses1 or whether1 ,he endowed souls with senses and organs simultaneously4 ,in the latter case1 though they were souls1 they did not previously possess the sensitive faculties4 ,but if the souls possessed the sensitive faculties since the time they were produced1 and if they were produced 7with these faculties7 in order to descend into generation1 then it was natural for them to do so4 ,in this case it seems that it must be contrary to their nature to avoid generation1 and to dwell in the intelligible world4 ,they would seem made to belong to the body1 and to live in evil4 ,thus divine ,providence would retain them in evil1 and the divinity would arrive at this result by reasoning2 in any case1 ,he would have reasoned4 ,,foresight ,,of ,,creation ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,result ,,of ,,reasoning4 ,if the divinity reason1 we are forced to wonder what are the principles of this reasoning2 for1 if it were objected that these principles are derived from some other reasoning1 we shall1 nevertheless1 in the process of ascending1 have to find something anterior to all reasoning2 namely1 a point of departure4 ,now from whence are the principles of reasoning derived8 ,either from the senses or the intelligence4 7,could the divinity have made use of principles derived from the senses87 7,when ,god created7 there were no senses in existence yet2 therefore 7the divinity must have reasoned7 from principles derived from ,intelligence4 ,but if the premises were conceptions of ,intelligence1 then it was impossible for knowledge and reasoning to have some sense-thing as object1 as reasoning that has intelligible principles and conclusion could not result in producing a conception of the sense-7world74 ,therefore the foresight which presided over the creation of a living being or of a whole world could not have been the result of reasoning4#fi ,,both ,,reasoning ,,and ,,foresight ,,are ,,only ,,figurative ,,expressions4 ,there is indeed no reasoning in the divinity4 ,when we speak of it1 in connection with the divinity1 it is only to explain that ,he has regulated everything as might have been done by some wise man1 who would have reasoned about results4 ,attributing foresight to the divinity indicates merely that ,he has disposed everything as might have been done by some wise man who had foreseen results4#gj ,indeed the only use of reasoning is to put in order things whose existence is not anterior to that of reasoning1 every time that that 7,intelligence71 the power superior to reasoning1 is not strong enough4 ,likewise1 prevision is necessary in this case1 because he who makes use of it does not possess a power that would enable him to forego or do without it4 ,prevision proposes to effect some one thing instead of another1 and seems to fear that that which it desires might not occur4 ,but1 for a 7being7 which can do but one thing1 both foresight and the reasoning that decides between contraries1 are useless2 for there is no need of reasoning when1 of two contrary courses of action1 one only is possible4 ,how would the ,principle which is single1 unitary and simple1 have need to reflect that ,he must do one thing1 so that some other might not take place1 or to judge that the second would occur as alternative to the first8 ,how could ,he say that experience has already demonstrated the utility of some one thing1 and that it is well to make use of it8 ,if the divinity acted thus1 then indeed would ,he have had recourse to prevision1 and consequently1 to reasoning4 ,it is on this hypothesis that we said above that the divinity gave animals senses and faculties2 but it is quite a problem to know what and how ,he really gave them4 ,,in ,,god ,,all ,,things ,,were ,,simultaneous1 ,,though ,,when ,,realized ,,they ,,developed4 ,indeed1 if it be admitted that in the divinity no actualization is imperfect1 if it be impossible to conceive in ,him anything that is not total or universal1 each one of the things that ,he contains comprises within ,himself all things4 ,thus as1 to the divinity1 the future is already present1 there could not be anything posterior to ,him2 but what is already present in ,him becomes posterior in some other 7being74 ,now if the future be already present in the divinity1 it must be present in ,him as if what will happen were already known2 that is1 it must be so disposed as to find itself sufficiently provided for1 so as not to stand in need of anything4 ,therefore1 as all things existed already within the divinity 7when living beings were created71 they had been there from all eternity2 and that in a manner such that it would later be possible to say1 this occurred after that4 ,indeed1 when the things that are in the divinity later develop and reveal themselves1 then one sees that the one is after the other2 but1 so far as they exist all together1 they constitute the universal 7,being71 that is1 the principle which includes its own cause4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible1 ,,everything ,,possesses ,,its ,,reason ,,as ,,well ,,as ,,its ,,form4 #b4 7,by this process7 we also know the nature of ,intelligence1 which we see still better than the other things1 though we cannot grasp its magnitude4 ,we admit1 in fact1 that it possesses the whatness 7essence#ga71 of everything1 but not its whyness 7its cause72 or1 if we grant 7that this cause be in ,intelligence71 we do not think that it is separated 7from its whatness 7or1 essence#gb74 ,let us suppose that1 for instance1 the man1 or1 if possible1 the eye1 should offer itself to our contemplation 7in the intelligible world7 as a statue1 or as a part of it1 would do4 ,the man that we see on high is both essence#gc and cause4 ,as well as the eye1 he must be intellectual1 and contain his cause4 ,otherwise1 he could not exist in the intelligible world4 ,here below1 just as each part is separated from the others1 so is the cause separated 7from the essence74 ,on high1 on the contrary1 all things exist in unity1 and each thing is identical with its cause4 ,this identity may often be noticed even here below1 as for instance1 in eclipses4#gd ,it would therefore seem probable that in the intelligible world everything would1 besides the rest1 possess its cause1 and that its cause constitutes its essence4 ,this must be admitted2 and that is the reason why those who apply themselves to grasp the characteristic#ge of each being succeed 7in also grasping its cause74 ,indeed that which each 7being7 is1 depends on the cause of such a form4#gf ,to repeat3 not only is a 7being's7 form its cause1 7which is incontestable71 but yet1 if one analyses each form considered in itself1 its cause will be found4 ,the only things which do not contain their causes are those whose life is without reality1 and whose existence is shadowy4 ,,intelligence ,,contains ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,all ,,its ,,forms4 ,what is the origin of the cause of what is a form1 which is characteristic of ,intelligence8 ,it is not from ,intelligence1 because the form is not separable from ,intelligence1 combining with it to form one single and same thing4 ,if then ,intelligence possess the forms in their fulness1 this fulness of forms implies that they contain their cause4 ,intelligence contains the cause of each of the forms it contains4 ,it consists of all these forms taken together1 or separately4 ,none of them needs discovery of the cause of its production1 for simultaneously with its production1 it has contained the cause of its hypostatic existence4 ,as it was not produced by chance1 it contains all that belongs to its cause2 consequently1 it also possesses the whole perfection of its cause4 ,sense-things which participate in form do not only receive their nature from it1 but also the cause of this nature4 ,if all the things of which this universe is composed be intimately concatenated2 and if the universe1 containing all things1 also contain the cause of each of them2 if its relation with them be the same as that of the body with its organs1 which do not mature successively1 but which1 towards each other1 are mutually related as cause and effect2 so much the more1 in the intelligible world1 must things have their causes1 all of them in general in respect to the totality1 and each independently in respect to itself4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,each ,,being ,,is ,,accompanied ,,by ,,its ,,whyness4 ,since all intelligible 7entities7 have a hypostatic consubstantial existence affording no room for chance2 and as they are not separated from each other1 things that are caused must bear these their causes within themselves1 and each of them has some sort of a cause1 though without really possessing one4 ,if there be no cause for the existence of the intelligibles2 and if1 though isolated from all causes1 they be self-sufficient2 it can only be because they carry their cause along with them1 when they are considered in themselves4 ,as they contain nothing fortuitous1 and as each of them is manifold1 and as its cause is all that they contain1 we might assign this cause to themselves4 ,thus in the intelligible world being is preceded1 or rather accompanied by its cause1 which is still more being than cause1 or rather which becomes identified with it4 ,what superfluousness1 indeed1 could there be in intelligence1 unless its conceptions resemble imperfect productions8 ,if its conceptions be perfect1 one could neither discover what they lack1 nor define their cause1 and1 since they possess everything1 they also possess their cause4 ,there1 being and cause are united2 the presence of both is recognized in each conception1 in each actualization of intelligence4 ,let us1 for instance1 consider the intelligible ,man2 he seems complete1 in his totality2 all his attributes were his simultaneously from the beginning2 he was always entirely complete4 ,it is the characteristic of that which is generated not always to be what it ought to be1 and to need to acquire something4 ,the intelligible ,man is eternal2 he is therefore always complete2 but that which becomes man must be generated 7being74 ,,intelligence ,,did ,,not ,,deliberate ,,before ,,making ,,sense-,,man4 #c4 ,but why could ,intelligence not have deliberated before producing the sense-man8 ,the 7man we know by our senses7 was 7created7 by similitude to the 7intelligible ,man71 nothing can be added to him1 nothing subtracted4 ,it is a mere supposition to say that ,intelligence deliberates and reasons4 ,the theory that things were created1 implies preliminary deliberation and reasoning2 but 7the latter becomes impossible7 in the case of eternal generation1 for that which originates eternally1#gg cannot be the object of a deliberation4 ,intelligence could not deliberate without having forgotten the course it had followed before2 it cannot improve later on without implying that its beginnings were not perfectly beautiful2 had they been this1 they would have remained so4 ,if things be beautiful1 it is that they represent their cause well2 for even here below an object is beautiful only if it possess all its legitimate possessions2 that is1 if it possess its proper form4 ,it is the form that contains everything2 the form contains the matter1 in the sense that it fashions matter1 and leaves nothing formless therein4 ,but it would contain something formless if a man lacked some part1 as1 for instance1 an organ such as the eye4 ,,being ,,contains ,,its ,,cause4 ,thus1 a thing is fully explained by the clearing up of its cause4 ,why should there be eyebrows above the eye8 ,that it may possess all that is implied in its being4 ,were these parts of the body given to man to protect him from dangers8 ,that would be to establish within being a principle charged to watch over being4 ,the things of which we speak are implied in the being that existed before them4 ,consequently1 being contains within itself the cause which1 if distinct from being1 is nevertheless inseparable therefrom4 ,all things are implied in each other#ajj2 taken together1 they form the total1 perfect and universal ,being2 their perfection is bound up with1 and is inherent in their cause2 thus a 7creature's7 being1 its characteristic 7to ti n einai71 and its cause 7why-ness7 fall together4 7,before asking an important question we must premiss that7 in the intelligible world the cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to it4 ,we must also premiss that1 by virtue of its perfection1 divine ,intelligence contains the causes 7as well as the beings#gh71 so that it is only a posteriori that we observe that things are well regulated4 ,if then the possession of senses1 and indeed of particular ones1 be implied in the form of man by the eternal necessity and perfection of divine ,intelligence1 then the intelligible ,man was by no means mere intelligence1 receiving the senses when descending into generation4 7,if then having senses be implied in the form of man71 does not ,intelligence incline towards the things here below8 ,in what do these senses 7which are attributed to the intelligible ,man7 consist8 ,are these senses the potentiality of perceiving sense-objects8 ,but it would be absurd that1 on high1 man should from all eternity possess the potentiality of feeling1 yet feel only here below1 and that this potentiality should pass to actualization only when the soul became less good 7by its union to the body74 ,,such ,,questions ,,demand ,,scrutiny ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,man4 #d4 ,to answer these questions1 we would have to go back to the nature of the intelligible ,man4 ,before defining the latter1 however1 it would indeed be far better to begin by determining the nature of the sense-man1 on the supposition that we know the latter very well1 while perhaps of the former1 we have only a very inexact notion4 ,,difference ,,between ,,the ,,man ,,known ,,by ,,the ,,senses ,,and ,,the ,,intelligible ,,man4 ,but there are some 7,aristotelians or ,peripatetics7 who might think that the intelligible ,man and the sense-man form but one4 ,let us first discuss this point4 ,does the sense-man have a being different from the soul which produces him1 and makes him live and reason8 ,is he the soul that is disposed in some special manner8 ,is he the soul that uses the body in some particular way8 ,if man be a reasonable living organism1 and if the latter be composed of soul and body1 this definition of man will not be identical with that of the soul4 ,if the man be defined as being the composite of the reasonable soul and the body1 how can he be an immortal hypostatic existence8 ,this definition suits the sense-man only from the moment that the union of the soul and the body has occurred2 it expresses what will be1 instead of setting forth what we call the ,man-in-himself2 rather than being a real determination of his characteristics1 it would be only a description which would not reveal the original being4 ,instead of defining form engaged in matter1 it indicates what is the composite of soul and body1 after the union has occurred4 ,in this case1 we do not yet know what is man considered in his being1 which is intelligible4 ,to the claim that the definition of sense-things should express something composite1 it might be answered1 that we do acknowledge that we must not determine the consistence of each thing4 ,now if it be absolutely necessary to define the forms engaged in matter1 we must also define the being that constitutes the man2 that is necessary especially for those 7,peripateticians7 who1 by a definition1 mean a statement of a being's original characteristics4 ,,man ,,defined ,,as ,a ,,reasonable ,,soul4 ,what then is the being of man8 ,this really is asking for the man-ness of a man1 something characteristic of him1 and inseparable from him4 ,is the genuine definition of a man that he is a reasonable animal8 ,would not this rather be the definition of the composite man8 ,what is the being that produces the reasonable animal8 ,in the above definition of man1 reasonable animal means reasonable life2 consequently1 man may be called the reasonable life4 ,but can life exist without a soul8 7,no71 for the soul will give the man reasonable life2 and in this case1 instead of being a substance1 man will be only an actualization of the soul2 or even1 the man will be the soul herself4 ,but if man be the reasonable soul1 what objection will there be to his remaining man even when his soul should happen to pass into a different body 7as that of a brute animal78 ,,man ,,as ,a ,,soul ,,subsisting ,,in ,a ,,special ,,reason4 #e4 ,man must therefore have as reason 7or1 as essence71 something else than the soul4 ,still1 in this case1 man might be something composite2 that is1 the soul would subsist in a particular reason1 admitting that this reason was a certain actualization of the soul1 though this actualization could not exist without its producing principle4 ,now such is the nature of the seminal reasons4 ,they do not exist without the soul2 for the generating reasons are not inanimate2 and nevertheless they are not the soul purely and simply4 ,there is therefore nothing surprising in the statement that these 7human7 beings are 7seminal7 reasons4 ,,these ,,reasons ,,are ,,the ,,actualizations ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,which ,,begets ,,the ,,animal4 ,of which soul are these reasons1#gi which do not beget the man 7though they do beget the animal71 then the actualization8 ,not of the vegetative soul2 they are the actualizations of the 7reasonable7 soul which begets the animal1#hj which is a more powerful1 and therefore a more living soul4 ,man is constituted#ha by the soul disposed in some manner1 when present to matter disposed in some particular fashion--since the soul is some particular thing1 according as she is in some particular disposition--even in the body4 ,in the bodies1 she fashions a resembling form4 ,so far as the nature of the body allows it1 she thus produces an image of the man1 as the painter himself makes an image of the body2 she produces1 ,i repeat1 an inferior man 7the sense-man1 the animal71 which possesses the form of man1 his reasons1 morals1 dispositions1 faculties1 although in an imperfect manner1 because he is not the first man 7the intellectual man74 ,he has sensations of another kind2 sensations which1 though they seem clear1 are obscure1 if they be compared to the superior sensations of which they are the images4 ,the superior man 7the reasonable man7 is better1 has a diviner soul1 and clearer sensations4 ,it is he doubtless to whom ,plato refers 7when he says1 ,man is the soul#hb72 in his definition he adds1 which makes use of the body1 because the diviner man dominates the soul which uses the body1 and thus uses the body only in an indirect manner4#hc ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,combination ,,begotten ,,by ,,the ,,soul4 ,in fact1 the soul attaches herself to the thing begotten by the soul1 because she was capable of feeling4 ,the soul does this by vivifying it more2 or rather1 the soul does not attach herself thereto1 but draws it to herself4 ,she does not depart from the intelligible world1 but even while remaining in contact with it1 she holds the inferior soul 7which constitutes the sense-man7 suspended to herself2 and by her reason she blends herself with this reason 7or1 she unites herself to this being by her being74 ,that is why this man 7known by the senses71 who by himself is obscure1 is enlightened by this illumination4 ,,the ,,three ,,men ,,in ,,each ,,of ,,us4 #f4 ,what is the relation of the sense-power within the superior ,soul 7or1 in the rational soul78 ,intelligible sensation perceives 7intelligible7 objects that1 speaking strictly1 are not sensible1 and corresponds to the 7intelligible7 manner in which they are perceivable4 ,thus 7by this intelligible sense-power7 the ,soul perceives the supersensual harmony and also the sensual1 but in a manner such as the sense-man perceives it1 relating it so far as possible to the superior harmony1#ii just as he relates the earthly fire to the intelligible ,fire1 which is above1 and which the superior ,soul felt in a manner suitable to the nature of this fire4 ,if the bodies which are here below were up there also1 the superior ,soul would feel them and perceive them4 ,the man who exists on high is a ,soul disposed in some particular manner1 capable of perceiving these objects2 hence the man of the last degree 7the sense-man7 being the image of the intelligible ,man1 has reasons 7faculties7 which are also images 7faculties possessed by the superior ,man74 ,the man who exists in the divine ,intelligence constitutes the ,man superior to all men4 ,he illuminates the second 7the reasonable man71 who in his turn illuminates the third 7the sense-man74 ,the man of this last degree somewhat possesses the two others2 he is not produced by them1 he is rather united to them4 ,the man who constitutes us actualizes himself as the man of the last degree4 ,the third receives something of the second2 and the second is the actualization of the first4#hd ,each man's nature depends on the man according to whom he acts 7the man is intellectual1 reasonable1 or sensual according as he exercises intelligence1 discursive reason1 or sensibility74 ,each one of us possesses the three men in one sense 7potentially72 and does not possess them in another 7in actualization2 that is1 he does not simultaneously exercise intellect1 reason1 or sense74 ,,fate ,,of ,,these ,,three ,,men1 ,,in ,,brutalization ,,and ,,in ,,divinization4 ,when the third life 7the sense-power7 which constitutes the third man1 is separated from the body1 if the life that precedes it 7the discursive reason7 accompany it without nevertheless being separated from the intelligible world1 then one may say that the second is everywhere the third is4 ,it might seem surprising that the latter1 when passing into the body of a brute1 should drag along that part which is the being of man4 ,this being was all beings 7potentially72 only1 at different times1 it acts through different faculties4 ,so far as it is pure1 and is not yet depraved1 it wishes to constitute a man1 and it is indeed a man that it constitutes2 for to form a man is better 7than to form a brute71 and it does what is best4 ,it also forms guardians of the superior order1 but such as are still conformable to the being constituent of manhood4 ,the 7intellectual7 ,man1 who is anterior to this being1 is of a nature still more like that of the guardians1 or rather1 he is already a divinity4 ,the guardian attached to a divinity is an image of him1 as the sense-man is the image of the intellectual man from whom he depends2 for the principle to which man directly attaches himself must not be considered as his divinity4 ,there is a difference here1 similar to that existing between the souls1 though they all belong to the same order4#hf ,besides1 those guardians whom ,plato simply calls guardians 7demons71 should be called guardian-like1 or demonic beings4#hg ,last1 when the superior ,soul accompanies the inferior soul which has chosen the condition of a brute1 the inferior soul which was bound to the superior soul--even when she constituted a man--develops the 7seminal7 reason of the animal 7whose condition she has chosen72 for she possesses that reason in herself2 it is her inferior actualization4 ,,animal ,,seminal ,,reasons ,,may ,,be ,,contrary ,,to ,,soul',s ,,nature2 ,,though ,,not ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,herself4 #g4 ,it may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a brute only when she is depraved and degraded1 she was not originally destined to produce an ox or a horse2 then the 7seminal7 reason of the horse1 as well as the horse itself1 will be contrary to the nature 7of the soul74 ,no3 they are inferior to her nature1 but they are not contrary to her4 ,from her very origin1 the soul was 7potentially7 the 7seminal7 reason of a horse or a dog4 ,when permitted1 the soul which was to beget an animal1 produces something better2 when hindered1 she 7only7 produces what accords with the circumstances4 ,she resembles the artists who1 knowing how to produce several figures1 create either the one they have received the order to create1 or the one that is most suited to the material at hand4 ,what hinders the 7natural and generative7 power of the universal ,soul1 in her quality of universal 7seminal7 ,reason1 from sketching out the outlines of the body1 before the soul powers 7or1 individual souls7 should descend from her into matter8 ,what hinders this sketch from being a kind of preliminary illumination of matter8 ,what would hinder the individual soul from finishing 7fashioning the body sketched by the universal ,soul71 following the lines already traced1 and organizing the members pictured by them1 and becoming that which she approached by giving herself some particular figure1 just as1 in a choric ballet1 the dancer confines himself to the part assigned to him8 ,,the ,,sense-,,world ,,and ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,are ,,connected ,,by ,,the ,,manifold ,,triple ,,nature ,,of ,,man4 ,such considerations have been arrived at merely as result of scrutiny of the consequences of the principles laid down4 ,our purpose was to discover how sensibility occurs in the man himself1 without intelligible things falling into generation4 ,we recognized and demonstrated that intelligible things do not incline towards sense-things1 but that1 on the contrary1 it is the latter that aspire and rise to the former1 and imitate them2 that the sense-man derives from the intellectual man the power of contemplating intelligible entities1 though the sense-man remain united to sense-things1 as the intellectual man remains united to the intelligible entities4 ,indeed1 intelligible things are in some respects sensual2 and we may call them such because 7ideally7 they are ,bodies1 but they are perceived in a manner different from bodies4 ,likewise1 our sensations are less clear than the perception which occurs in the intelligible world1 and that we also call ,sensation1 because it refers to ,bodies 7which exist on high only in an ideal manner74 ,consequently1 we call the man here below sensual because he perceives less well things which themselves are less good2 that is1 which are only images of intelligible things4 ,we might therefore say that sensations here below are obscure thoughts1 and that the ,thoughts on high are distinct ,sensations4 ,such are our views about sensibility4 ,,intelligible ,,animals ,,do ,,not ,,incline ,,towards ,,the ,,sense-,,world ,,for ,,they ,,are ,,pre-,,existing1 ,,and ,,are ,,distinct ,,from ,,their ,,creating ,,image4 #h4 7,now let us pass to the other question we asked74 ,how does it happen that all the ,animals who1 like the ,horse itself1 are contained in divine ,intelligence1 do not incline towards the things here below 7by generating them78 ,doubtless1 to beget a horse1 or any other animal here below1 divine ,intelligence must hold its conception2 nevertheless it must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing the horse1 and only later its conception4 ,evidently1 it could not have wished to produce the horse1 but because it already had the conception thereof2 and it could not have had the conception thereof but because it had to produce the horse4 ,consequently1 the ,horse who was not begotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten4 ,since the first ,horse has been anterior to all generation1 and was not conceived to be begotten1 it is not because the divine ,intelligence inclines towards the things here below1 nor because it produces them1 that it contains the intelligible ,horse and the other beings4 ,the intelligible entities existed already in ,intelligence 7before it begat7 and the sense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence2 for it was impossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles4 ,who indeed could have stopped this power of the 7,intelligence7 which is capable of simultaneous procession1 and of remaining within itself8 ,,irrational ,,animals ,,must ,,exist ,,within ,,intelligence1 ,,unless ,,man ,,alone ,,was ,,to ,,exist4 ,but why should these ,animals 7devoid of reason7 exist in the divine ,intelligence8 ,we might understand that animals endowed with reason might be found within it2 but does this multitude of irrational animals seem at all admirable8 ,does it not rather seem something unworthy of the divine ,intelligence8 ,evidently the essence which is one must be also manifold1 since it is posterior to the ,unity which is absolutely simple2 otherwise1 instead of being inferior to it1 it would fuse with it4 ,being posterior to that ,unity1 it could not be more simple1 and must therefore be less so4 ,now as the unity was the ,one who is excellent1 essence had to be less unitary1 since multiplicity is the characteristic of inferiority4 ,but why should essence not be merely the pair 7instead of the manifold78 ,neither of the elements of the ,pair could any longer be absolutely one1 and each would itself become a further pair2 and we might point out the same thing of each of the new elements 7in which each element of the primary ,pair would have split up74 ,besides1 the first ,pair contains both movement and stability2 it is also intelligence and perfect life4 ,the character of ,intelligence is not to be one1 but to be universal2 it therefore contains all the particular intelligences2 it is all the intelligences1 and at the same time it is something greater than all4 ,it possesses life not as a single soul1 but as a universal ,soul1 having the superior power of producing individual souls4 ,it is besides the universal living ,organism 7or1 ,animal72 consequently1 it should not contain man alone 7but also all the other kinds of animals72 otherwise1 man alone would exist upon the earth4 ,,many ,,animals ,,are ,,not ,,so ,,irrational ,,as ,,different4 #i4 ,it may be objected that ,intelligence might 7well7 contain the ideas of animals of a higher order4 ,but how can it contain the ideas of animals that are vile1 or entirely without reason8 ,for we should consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence1 since it is to these faculties that those who possess them owe their nobility4 ,it is doubtless difficult to understand how things devoid of reason and intelligence can exist in the divine ,intelligence1 in which are all beings1 and from which they all proceed4 ,but before beginning the discussion of this question1 let us assume the following verities as granted3 ,man here below is not what is man in the divine ,intelligence1 any more than the other animals4 ,like them1 in a higher form1 he dwells within 7the divine ,intelligence72 besides1 no being called reasonable may be found within it1 for it is only here below that reason is employed2 on high the only acts are those superior to discursive reason4#hh ,why then is man here below the only animal who makes use of reason8 ,because the intelligence of ,man1 in the intelligible world1 is different from that of other animals1 and so his reason here below must differ from their reason2 for it can be seen that many actions of other animals imply the use of judgment4 7,in reply1 it might be asked7 why are not all animals equally rational8 ,and why are not all men also equally rational8 ,let us reflect3 all these lives1 which represent as many movements2 all these intelligences1 which form a plurality2 could not be identical4 ,therefore they had to differ among each other1 and their difference had to consist in manifesting more or less clearly life and intelligence2 those that occupy the first rank are distinguished by primary differences2 those that occupy the second rank1 by secondary differences2 and so forth4 ,thus1 amidst intelligences1 some constitute the divinities1 others the beings placed in the second rank1 and gifted with reason2 further1 other beings that we here call deprived of reason and intelligence really were reason and intelligence in the intelligible world4 ,indeed1 he who thinks the intelligible ,horse1 for instance1 is ,intelligence1 just as is the very thought of the horse4 ,if nothing but thought existed1 there would be nothing absurd in that this thought1 while being intellectual1 might1 as object1 have a being devoid of intelligence4 ,but since thought and the object thought fuse1 how could thought be intellectual unless the object thought were so likewise8 ,to effect this1 ,intelligence would1 so to speak1 have to render itself unintelligent4 ,but it is not so4 ,the thing thought is a determinate intelligence1 just as it is a determinate life4 ,now1 just as no life1 whatever it be1 can be deprived of vitality1 so no determinate intelligence can be deprived of intellectuality4 ,the very intelligence which is proper to an animal1 such as1 for instance1 man1 does not cease being intelligence of all things2 whichever of its parts you choose to consider1 it is all things1 only in a different manner2 while it is a single thing in actualization1 it is all things in potentiality4 ,however1 in any one particular thing1 we grasp only what it is in actualization4 ,now what is in actualization 7that is1 a particular thing71 occupies the last rank4 ,such1 in ,intelligence1 for instance1 is the idea of the ,horse4 ,in its procession1 ,intelligence continues towards a less perfect life1 and at a certain degree constitutes a horse1 and at some inferior degree1 constitutes some animal still inferior2 for the greater the development of the powers of ,intelligence1 the more imperfect these become4 ,at each degree in their procession they lose something2 and as it is a lower degree of essence that constitutes some particular animal1 its inferiority is redeemed by something new4 ,thus1 in the measure that life is less complete in the animal1 appear nails1 claws1 or horns1 or teeth4 ,everywhere that ,intelligence diminishes on one side1 it rises on another side by the fulness of its nature1 and it finds in itself the resources by which to compensate for whatever it may lack4 ,,apparent ,,imperfections ,,are ,,only ,,lower ,,forms ,,of ,,perfection4 #aj4 ,but how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world8 ,why does the intelligible ,animal have horns8 ,is it for its defense8#hi ,to be perfect and complete4 ,it is to be perfect as an animal1 perfect as intelligence1 and perfect as life2 so that1 if it lack one quality1 it may have a substitute4 ,the cause of the differences1 is that what belongs to one being finds itself replaced in another being by something else2 so that the totality 7of the beings7 may result in the most perfect ,life1 and ,intelligence1 while all the particular beings which are thus found in the intelligible essence are perfect so far as they are particular4 ,,co-,,existence ,,of ,,unity ,,and ,,multiplicity ,,demands ,,organization ,,in ,,system4 ,the essence must be simultaneously one and manifold4 ,now it cannot be manifold if all the things that exist within it be equal2 it would then be an absolute unity4 ,since therefore 7essence7 forms a composite unity1 it must be constituted by things which bear to each other specific differences1 such that its unity shall allow the existence of particular things1 such as forms and reasons 7beings74 ,the forms1 such as those of man1 must contain all the differences that are essential to them4 ,though there be a unity in all these forms1 there are also things more or less delicate 7or highly organized71 such as the eye or the finger4 ,all these organs1 however1 are implied in the unity of the animal1 and they are inferior only relatively to the totality4 ,it was better that things should be such4 ,reason 7the essence of the animal7 is animal1 and besides1 is something different from the animal4 ,virtue also bears a general character1 and an individual one4 ,the totality 7of the intelligible world7 is beautiful1 because what is common 7to all beings71 does not offer any differences4 ,,but ,,how ,,could ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,contain ,,vegetables ,,or ,,metals8 #aa4 7,the ,timaeus of ,plato#ij7 states that heaven has not scorned to receive any of the forms of the animals1 of which we see so great a number4 ,the cause must be that this universe was to contain the universality of things4 ,whence does it derive all the things it contains8 ,from on high8 ,yes1 it received from above all the things that were produced by reason1 according to an intelligible form4 ,but1 just as it contains fire and water1 it must also contain plant-life4 ,now1 how could there be plant-life in the intelligible world8 ,are earth and fire living entities within it8 ,for they must be either living or dead entities2 in the latter case1 not everything would be alive in the intelligible world4 ,in what state then do the above-mentioned objects find themselves on high 7in the intelligible world78 ,first it can be demonstrated that plants contain nothing opposed to reason2 since1 even here below1 a plant contains a reason which constitutes its life4#ia ,but if the essential reason of the plant1 which constitutes it1 is a life of a particular kind1 and a kind of soul1 and if this reason itself be a unity1 is it the primary ,plant8 ,no3 the primary ,plant1 from which the particular plant is derived1 is above that reason4 ,the primary ,plant is unity2 the other is multiple1 and necessarily derives from this unity4 ,if so1 the primary ,plant must possess life in a still higher degree1 and be the ,plant itself from which the plants here below proceed1 which occupy the second or third rank1 and which derive from the primary ,plant the traces of the life they reveal4 ,,how ,,the ,,earth ,,exists ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,but how does the earth exist in the intelligible world8 ,what is its essence8 ,how can the earth in the intelligible world be alive there8 ,let us first examine our earth1 that is1 inquire what is its essence8 ,it must be some sort of a shape1 and a reason2 for the reason of the plant is alive1 even here below4 ,is there then a living 7seminal7 reason in the earth also8 ,to discover the nature of the earth1 let us take essentially terrestrial objects1 which are begotten or fashioned by it4 ,the birth of the stones1 and their increase1 the interior formation of mountains1 could not exist unless an animated reason produced them by an intimate and secret work4 ,this reason is the form of the earth1#ib a form that is analogous to what is called nature in trees4 ,the earth might be compared to the trunk of a tree1 and the stone that can be detached therefrom to the branch that can be separated from the trunk4 ,consideration of the stone which is not yet dug out of the earth1 and which is united to it as the uncut branch is united to the tree1 shows that the earth's nature1 which is a productive force1 constitutes a life endowed with reason2 and it must be evident that the intelligible earth must possess life at a still higher degree1 that the rational life of the earth is the ,earth-in-itself1 the primary ,earth1 from which proceeds the earth here below4 ,,the ,,fire ,,as ,,it ,,is ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,if fire also be a reason engaged in matter1 and in this respect resemble the earth1 it was not born by chance4 ,whence would it come8#ic ,lucretius thought it came from rubbing 7sticks or stones74 ,but fire existed in the universe before one body rubbed another2 bodies already possess fire when they rub up against one another2 for it must not be believed that matter possesses fire potentially1 so that it is capable of producing it spontaneously4 ,but what is fire1 since the principle which produces the fire1 giving it a form1 must be a reason8 ,it is a soul capable of producing the fire1 that is1 a reason and a life1 which 7fuse7 into one thing4 ,that is why ,plato says that in every object there is a soul#id2 that is1 a power capable of producing the sense-fire4 ,thus the principle which produces the fire in our world is a fiery life1 a fire that is more real than ours4 ,since then the intelligible ,fire is a fire more real than ours1 it also possesses a moral life4 ,the ,fire-in-itself therefore possesses life4 ,there is a similar reason in the other elements1 air and water4 ,why should not these things be as animated as earth is8 ,they are evidently contained in the universal living ,organism1 and they constitute parts thereof4 ,doubtless life is not manifest in them1 any more than in the earth2 but it can be recognized in them1 as it is recognized in the earth1 by its productions2 for living beings are born in the fire1 and still more in the water1 as is better known2 others also are formed in the air4 ,the flames that we daily see lit and extinguished do not manifest in the universal ,soul 7because of the shortness of their duration72 her presence is not revealed in the fire1 because she does not here below succeed in reaching a mass of sufficient permanency4 ,,water ,,and ,,air ,,as ,,intelligible ,,entities4 ,it is not otherwise with water and air4 ,if by their nature these elements were more consistent1 they would reveal the universal ,soul2 but as their essence is dispersed1 they do not reveal the power that animates them4 ,in a similar case are the fluids occurring in our body1 as1 for instance1 the blood2 the flesh1 which seems animated1 is formed at the expense of the blood4#ie ,the latter must therefore enjoy the presence of the soul1 though it seem deprived of the 7soul7 because 7the blood7 manifests no sensibility1 opposes no resistance1 and by its fluidity easily separates itself from the soul that vivifies it1 as happens to the three elements already mentioned4 ,likewise the animals which ,nature forms out of condensed air feel without suffering4#if ,as fixed and permanent light penetrates the air so long as the air itself is permanent1 the soul also penetrates the atmosphere surrounding her without being absorbed by it4 ,other elements are in the same case4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,is ,a ,,complete ,,model ,,of ,,this ,,our ,,universe4 #ab4 ,we therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is modeled on the intelligible ,world1 we should so much the more recognize that the latter is the universal living ,organism1 which constitutes all things because it consists of perfect essence4 ,consequently in the intelligible world1 the heavens also are an animated being1 not even lacking what here below are called the stars2 indeed the latter are what constitutes the heavens' essence4 ,neither is the ,earth on high something dead2 for it is alive1 containing all the ,animals that walk on the ground1 and that are named terrestrial1 as well as ,vegetation whose foundation is life4 ,on high exist also the ,sea and the ,water in universal condition1 in permanent fluidity and animation1 containing all the ,animals that dwell in the water4 ,air also forms part of the intelligible world1 with the ,animals that inhabit the air1 and which on high possess a nature in harmony with it4 ,how indeed could the things contained in a living being not also themselves be living beings8 ,consequently they are also such here below4 ,why indeed should not all the animals necessarily exist in the intelligible ,world8 ,the nature of the great parts of this world indeed necessarily determines the nature of the animals that these parts contain4 ,thus from the having and being 7existence and nature7 of the intelligible world is derived that of all the beings contained therein4 ,these things imply each other4 ,to ask the reason for the existence of the ,animals contained in the intelligible world1 is to ask why exists this very world itself1 or the universal living ,organism1 or1 what amounts to the same thing1 why exist the universal ,life1 the universal ,soul1 in which are found no fault1 no imperfection1 and from which everywhere overflows the fulness of life4 ,,all ,,things ,,united ,,by ,a ,,common ,,source4 ,all these things derive from one and the same source2 it is neither a breath nor a single heat2 but rather a single quality1 which contains and preserves within itself all the qualities1 the sweetness of the most fragrant perfumes1 the flavor of the wine1 and of the finest tasty juices1 the gleam of the most flashing colors1 the softness of the objects which flatter touch with the greatest delicacy1 the rhythm and harmony of all the kinds of sounds which can charm the hearing4 ,,simplicity ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,does ,,not ,,deny ,,compositeness1 ,,but ,,infers ,,height ,,of ,,source4 #ac4 ,neither ,intelligence1 nor the ,soul that proceeds therefrom1 are simple2 both contain the universality of things with their infinite variety1 so far as these are simple1 meaning that they are not composite1 but that they are principles and actualizations2 for1 in the intelligible world1 the actualization of what occupies the last rank is simple2 the actualization of what occupies the first rank is universal4 ,intelligence1 in its uniform movement1 always trends towards similar and identical things2 nevertheless1 each of them is identical and single1 without being a part2 it is on the contrary universal1 because what1 in the intelligible world1 is a part1 is not a simple unit1 but a unity that is infinitely divisible4 ,in this movement1 ,intelligence starts from one object1 and goes to another object which is its goal4 ,but does all that is intermediary resemble a straight line1 or to a uniform and homogeneous body8 ,there would be nothing remarkable about that2 for if ,intelligence did not contain differences1 if no diversity awoke it to life1 it would not be an actualization2 its state would not differ from inactivity4 ,if its movement were determined in a single manner1 it would possess but a single kind of 7restricted7 life1 instead of possessing the universal ,life4 ,now it should contain an universal and omnipresent ,life2 consequently1 it must move1 or rather have been moved towards all 7beings74 ,if it were to move in a simple and uniform manner1 it would possess but a single thing1 would be identical with it1 and no longer proceed towards anything different4 ,if however it should move towards something different1 it would have to become something different1 and be two things4 ,if these two things were then to be identical1 ,intelligence would still remain one1 and there would be no progress left2 if1 on the contrary1 these two things were to be different1 it would be proceeding with this difference1 and it would1 by virtue of this difference joined to its divinity1 beget some third thing4 ,by its origin1 the latter is simultaneously identical and different2 not of some particular difference1 but of all kinds of difference1 because the identity it contains is itself universal4 ,thus being universal difference as well as universal identity1 this thing possesses all that is said to be different2 for its nature is to be universal differentiation 7to spread over everything1 to become everything else74 ,if all these differences preceded this 7,intelligence71 the latter would be modified by them4 ,if this be not the case1 ,intelligence must have begotten all the differences1 or rather1 be their universality4 ,,intelligence ,,evolves ,,over ,,the ,,field ,,of ,,truth4 ,essences 7beings7 therefore cannot exist without an actualization of ,intelligence4 ,by this actualization1 after having produced some 7being71 ,intelligence always produces some other one1 somehow carrying out the career which it is natural for veritable ,intelligence to carry out within itself2 this career is that of the beings1 of which each corresponds to one of its evolutions1 7or1 it roams around among beings1 so that through its roaming around these beings unite and form47 ,since ,intelligence is everywhere identical1 its evolutions imply permanence1 and they make it move around the field of truth#ig without ever issuing therefrom4 ,it occupies this whole field1 because ,intelligence has made itself the locality where its evolutions operate1 a locality which is identical with what it contains4 ,this field is varied enough to offer a career to be fulfilled2 if it were not universally and eternally varied1 there would be a stopping-place where variety would cease2 and1 were ,intelligence to stop1 it would not think2 and if it had never stopped1 it would have existed without thought 7or1 it would not exist74 ,this however1 is not the case2 therefore thought exists1 and its universal movement produces the fulness of universal ,being4 ,universal ,being1 however1 is the thought that embraces universal ,life1 and which1 after each thing1 ever conceives some other2 because1 since that which within it is identical is all so different4 ,it continually divides and ever finds something different from the others4 ,in its march1 ,intelligence ever progresses from life to life1 from animated 7beings7 to animated 7beings72 just as some traveller1 advancing on the earth1 finds all that he travels through to be earth1 whatever variations thereof there may have been4 ,in the intelligible world1 the life whose field one traverses is always self-identical1 but it is also always different4 ,the result is that 7this sphere of operations7 does not seem the same to us1 because in its evolution1 which is identical1 life experiences 7or1 traverses7 things which are not the same4 ,that however does not change this life1 for it passes through different things in a uniform and identical manner4 ,if this uniformity and identity of ,intelligence were not applied to different things1 ,intelligence would remain idle2 it would no longer exist in actualization1 and no more be actualization4 ,now these different things constitute ,intelligence itself4 ,intelligence is therefore universal1 because this universality forms its very nature4 ,being thus universal1 ,intelligence is all things2 there is nothing in it which does not contribute to its universality2 and everything is different1 so as to be able still to contribute to totality1 by its very difference4 ,if there were no difference1 if everything in it were identical1 the being of ,intelligence would be diminished1 inasmuch as its nature would no more co-operate towards its harmonic consummation4 ,,intelligence ,,contains ,,the ,,infinite ,,as ,,simultaneousness ,,of ,,one ,,and ,,many ,,and ,,as ,,friendship4 #ad4 ,by intellectual examples we can understand the nature of ,intelligence1 and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit any kind of difference4 ,as example1 consider the 7seminal7 reason of a plant1 and that of an animal4 ,if it be only a unity1 without any kind of variety1 it is not even a reason1 and what is born will be no more than matter4 ,this reason must therefore contain all the organs2 and1 while embracing all matter1 it must not leave any part of it to remain identical with any other4 ,for instance1 the face does not form a single mass2 it contains the nose and the eyes4 ,nor is even the nose something simple2 it contains different parts whose variety make of it an organ2 if it were reduced to a state of absolute simplicity1 it would be no more than a mass4 ,thus ,intelligence contains the infinite1 because it is simultaneously one and manifold2 not indeed like a house1 but as is a 7seminal7 reason which is manifold interiorly4 ,it contains within1 therefore1 a sort of figure 7or scheme7 or even a picture1 on which are interiorly drawn or inscribed its powers and thoughts2 their division does not take place exteriorly1 for it is entirely interior4 ,thus the universal living ,organism embraces other living beings1 within which may be discovered still smaller living beings1 and still smaller powers1 and so on till we arrive at the atomic form4#ih ,all these forms are distinguished from each other by their division1 without ever having been confounded together1 though they all occur in the constitution of a single unity4 ,thus exists in the intelligible world that union 7by ,empedocles7 called friendship2 but such union is very different from that which exists in the sense-world4#afc ,in fact1 the latter is only the image of the first1 because it is formed of completely disparate elements4 ,veritable union however consists in forming but a single 7thing7 without admitting of any separation between 7elements74 ,here below1 however1 objects are separated from each other4 ,b4 ,a ,,study ,,of ,,the ,,good4 ,,all ,,souls ,,are ,,united ,,by ,,their ,,highest1 ,,with ,,intelligence ,,shining ,,down ,,from ,,the ,,peak ,,they ,,form4 #ae4 ,who then will be able to contemplate this multiple and universal ,life1 primary and one1 without being charmed therewith1 and without scorning every other kind of life8 ,for our lives here below1 that are so weak1 impotent1 incomplete1 whose impurity soils other lives1 can be considered as nothing but tenebrous4 ,as soon as you consider these lives1 you no longer see the others1 you no longer live with these other lives in which everything is living2 which are relieved of all impurity1 and of all contact with evil4 ,indeed1 evil reigns here below only#afd2 here where we have but a trace of ,intelligence and of the intelligible life4 ,on the contrary1 in the intelligible world exists that archetype which is beneficent 7which possesses the form of ,good71 as says ,plato1#aja because it possesses good by the forms 7that is1 by the ideas74 ,indeed1 the absolute ,good is something different from the ,intelligence which is good only because its life is passed in contemplating the ,good4 ,the objects contemplated by ,intelligence are the essences which have the form of ,good1 and which it possesses from the moment it contemplates the ,good4 ,intelligence receives the ,good1 not such as the ,good is in itself1 but such as ,intelligence is capable of receiving it4 ,the ,good is indeed the supreme principle4 ,from the ,good therefore1 ,intelligence derives its perfection2 to the ,good ,intelligence owes its begetting of all the intelligible entities2 on the one hand1 ,intelligence could not consider the ,good without thinking it2 on the other1 it must not have seen in the ,good the intelligible entities1 otherwise1 ,intelligence itself could not have begotten them4 ,thus ,intelligence has1 from the ,good1 received the power to beget1 and to fill itself with that which it has begotten4#ajb ,the ,good does not ,himself possess the things which ,he thus donates2 for ,he is absolutely one1 and that which has been given to ,intelligence is manifold4 ,incapable in its plenitude to embrace1 and in its unity to possess the power it was receiving1 ,intelligence split it up1 thus rendering it manifold1 so as to possess it at least in fragments4 ,thus everything begotten by ,intelligence proceeds from the power derived from the ,good1 and bears its form2 as intelligence itself is good1 and as it is composed of things that bear the form of ,good1 it is a varied good4 ,the reader may be assisted in forming a conception of it by imagining a variegated living sphere1 or a composite of animated and brilliant faces4 ,or again1 imagine pure souls1 pure and complete 7in their essence71 all united by their highest 7faculties71 and then universal ,intelligence seated on this summit1 and illuminating the whole intelligible region4 ,in this simile1 the reader who imagines it considers it as something outside of himself2 but 7to contemplate ,intelligence7 one has to become ,intelligence1 and then give oneself a panorama of oneself4 ,,intelligence ,,contains ,,all ,,things ,,that ,,are ,,conformed ,,to ,,the ,,good4 #af4 ,instead of stopping at this multiple beauty1 it must be abandoned to rise 7to the ,good71 the supreme principle4 ,by reasoning not according to the nature of our world1 but according to that of the universal ,intelligence1 we should with astonishment ask ourselves which is the principle that has begotten it1 and how it did so4#ajc ,each one 7of the essences contained in the ,intelligence7 is a 7particular7 form1 and somehow has its own type4 ,as their common characteristic is to be assimilated to the ,good1 the consequence is that ,intelligence contains all the things conformable to the ,good4 ,it possesses therefore the essence which is in all things2 it contains all the animals1 as well as the universal ,life within them1 and all the rest4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,not ,,only ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,being1 ,,but ,,its ,,intuition ,,as ,,well4 ,why must these things be considered as goods1 when considered from this point of view8 ,the solution of this problem may be arrived at from the following consideration4 ,when for the first time ,intelligence contemplated the ,good1 this its contemplation split the ,good's unity into multiplicity4 ,though itself were a single being1 this its thought divided the unity because of its inability to grasp it in its entirety4 ,to this it may be answered that ,intelligence was not yet such the first time it contemplated the ,good4 ,did it then contemplate the ,good without intelligence8 ,intelligence did not yet see the ,good2 but ,intelligence dwelt near it1 was dependent on it1 and was turned towards it4#ajd ,having arrived at its fulness1 because it was operating on high1 and was trending towards the ,good1 the movement of ,intelligence itself led it to its fulness2 since then it was1 no longer a single movement1 but a movement perfect and complete4 ,it became all things1 and possessing self-consciousness1 it recognized that itself was all things4 ,it thus became intelligence1 which possesses its fulness so as to contain what it should see1 and which sees by the light that it receives from ,him from whom it derives what it sees4 ,that is why the ,good is said to be not only the cause of being1 but rather the cause of the vision of being4 ,as for sense-objects1 the sun is the cause that makes them exist1 and renders them visible1 as it is also the cause of vision1 and as however the sun is neither the vision nor the visible objects1 likewise the ,good is the cause of being and of intelligence1#aje it is a light in respect of the beings that are seen and the ,intelligence that sees them2 but it is neither the beings nor the ,intelligence2 it is only their cause2 it produces thought by shedding its light on the beings and on ,intelligence4 ,it is thus that ,intelligence has arrived to fulness1 and that on arriving at fulness it has become perfect and has seen4 ,that which preceded its fulness is its principle4 ,but it has another principle 7which is the ,good71 which is somewhat exterior to it1 and which gave it its fulness1 and while giving it this fulness impressed on it the form 7of itself1 the ,good74 ,,all ,,is ,,intelligence2 ,,but ,,this ,,is ,,differentiated ,,into ,,universal ,,and ,,individual4 #ag4 ,how can 7these beings7 exist within ,intelligence1 and constitute it1 if they were neither in that which has given1 nor in that which has received this fulness1 since1 before receiving its fulness from the ,good1 ,intelligence had not yet received 7these beings78 ,it is not necessary that a principle should itself possess what it gives2 in intelligible things1 it suffices to consider the giver superior1 and the receiver inferior2 that 7giving and receiving7 is the content of generation in the order of veritable beings4#ajf ,what occupies the front rank must be in actualization2 posterior things must be in potentiality of what precedes them4 ,what occupies the front rank is superior to what occupies the second rank2 the giver1 likewise is superior to the gift1 because it is better4 ,if then there be a ,principle anterior to actualization1 it must be superior both to actualization and to life2 and because it gave life to ,intelligence it is more beautiful1 still more venerable than ,life4 ,thus ,intelligence received life1 without necessity for the principle from which it received life having had to contain any variety4 ,life is the impress of ,him who gave it1 but it is not his life4 ,when ,intelligence glanced towards ,him1 it was indeterminate2 as soon as it fixed its glance on ,him1 it was determined by ,him1 although ,he himself had no determination4 ,as soon indeed as ,intelligence contemplated the ,one1 ,intelligence was determined by ,him1 and from ,him it received its determination1 limit and form4 ,the form exists in the receiver2 the giver has none of it4 ,this determination has not been imposed from without on ,intelligence as is the case for the limit imposed on some magnitude2 it is the determination characteristic of that ,life1 which is universal1 multiple and infinite1 because it has radiated from the supreme ,nature4 ,that ,life was not yet the life of any particular principle2 otherwise1 it would have been determined as an individual life4 ,nevertheless it has been determined1 and by virtue of that determination it is the life of a multiple unity4 ,each one of the things that constitute its multiplicity has likewise been determined4 ,indeed1 life has been determined as multiplicity 7of beings7 because of its own multiplicity2 as unity1 because of the very determination it has received4 ,what has been determined as unity8 ,intelligence1 because it is the determined life4 ,what was determined as multiplicity8 ,the multiplicity of intelligences4 ,everything therefore is intelligence2 only1 the ,intelligence that is one is universal2 while the intelligences which form multiplicity are individual4 ,,multiplicity ,,of ,,intelligences ,,implies ,,their ,,mutual ,,differences4 ,if universal ,intelligence comprises all the individual intelligences1 might not the latter all be identical8 ,no1 for then there would be but one of them4 ,the multiplicity of the intelligences implies therefore a difference between them4#ajg ,but how does each differ from the others8 ,its difference resides in its being one2 for there is no identity between the universal ,intelligence1 and any particular intelligence4 ,thus1 in ,intelligence1 life is universal power2 the vision which emanates from it is the power of all things2 and then ,intelligence itself1 when it is formed1 manifests all these things to us4 ,he who is seated above all of them is their principle1 though they do not serve ,him as foundation2 for1 on the contrary1 ,he is the foundation of the form of the first forms1 without ,himself having any forms4 ,in respect to the ,soul1 ,intelligence plays the part that the ,first plays in respect to ,intelligence2 ,intelligence sheds its light on the ,soul1 and1 to determine her1 rationalizes her by communicating that of which itself is the trace4 ,the ,intellect1 therefore1 is the trace of the ,first2 and while it is a form which develops in plurality1 the ,first has no shape nor form1 so as to give form to all the rest4 ,if itself were a form1 ,intelligence would be nothing more than the reason 7the soul74#ajh ,that is why the ,first could not have contained any multiplicity2 otherwise1 its multiplicity itself would have had to be traced to some superior principle4 ,,life1 ,,intelligence1 ,,and ,,idea ,,bear ,,the ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,good4 #ah4 ,in what respects do the 7entities7 which are contained by ,intelligence seem to bear the form of the ,good8 ,is it because each of them is a form1 or because each is beautiful1 or perhaps for some other reason8 ,all that proceeds from the ,good bears its characteristics or impressions1 or at least bears something derived from it1 just as that which is derived from the fire bears a trace of the fire1#aji and as that which is derived from sweetness somehow betrays it4 ,now that1 which1 in ,intelligence1 is derived from the ,good is life1 for life is born from the actualization of the ,good1 and from ,him again is derived the beauty of forms4 ,therefore all these things1 life1 intelligence1 and idea will bear the form of ,good4 ,,this ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,may1 ,,however1 ,,exist ,,at ,,varying ,,degrees4 ,but what element is common to them8 ,it does not suffice for them to proceed from the ,good to have something identical2 they must also have some common characteristic2 for a same principle may give rise to different things2 or again1 one and the same thing may become different while passing from the giving principle into the receivers2 for there is a difference between that which constitutes the first actualization1 and that which is given thereby4 ,thus1 that which is in the things of which we speak is already different4 ,nothing hinders the characteristic of all these things 7in life1 intelligence and idea7 from being the form of ,good1 but this form exists at different degrees in each of them4 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,life ,,are ,,only ,,different ,,degrees ,,of ,,the ,,same ,,reality4 ,in which of these things does the form of the ,good inhere in the highest degree8 ,the solution of this problem depends on the following one4 ,is life a good merely as such1 even if it were life pure and simple8 ,should we not rather limit that word life to the life which derives from the ,good1 so that mere proceeding from the ,good be a sufficient characterization of life8 ,what is the nature of this life8 ,is it the life of the ,good8 ,no3 life does not belong to the ,good2 it only proceeds therefrom4 ,if the characteristic of life be proceeding from the ,good1 and if it be real life1 evidently the result would be that nothing that proceeds from the ,good would deserve scorn1 that life as life should be considered good1 that the same condition of affairs obtains with the primary and veritable ,intelligence1 and that finally each form is good and bears the form of ,good4 ,in this case1 each of these 7life1 intelligence and idea7 possess a good which is either common1 or different1 or which is of a different degree4 ,since we have admitted that each of the above-mentioned things contains a good in its being1 then it is good chiefly because of this good4 ,thus life is a good1 not in so far as it is merely life1 but in so far as it is real life and proceeds from the ,good4 ,intelligence likewise is a good so far as it essentially is intelligence2 there is therefore some common element in life and intelligence4 ,indeed1 when one and the same attribute is predicated of different beings1 although it form an integral part of their being1 it may be abstracted therefrom by thought2 thus from man and horse may be abstracted animal2 from water and fire1 heat2 but what is common in these beings is a genus1 while what is common in intelligence and life1 is one and the same thing which inheres in one in the first degree1 and in the other in the second4 ,,is ,,the ,,word ,,good ,a ,,common ,,label ,,or ,a ,,common ,,quality8 ,is it by a mere play on words that life1 intelligence and ideas are called good8 ,does the good constitute their being1 or is each good taken in its totality8 ,good could not constitute the being of each of them4 ,are they then parts of the ,good8 ,the ,good1 however1 is indivisible4 ,the things that are beneath it are good for different reasons4 ,the primary actualization 7that proceeds from the ,good7 is good2 likewise1 the determination it receives is good1 and the totality of both things is good4 ,the actualization is good because it proceeds from the ,good2 the determination1 because it is a perfection that has emanated from the ,good2 and the combination of actualization and determination because it is their totality4 ,all these things thus are derived from one and the same principle1 but nevertheless they are different4 ,thus 7in a choric ballet7 the voice and the step proceed from one and the same person1 in that they are all perfectly regulated4 ,now they are well regulated because they contain order and rhythm4 ,what then is the content in the above-mentioned things that would make them good8 ,but perhaps it may be objected that if the voice and step are well regulated1 each one of them entirely owes it to some external principle1 since the order is here applied to the things that differ from each other4 ,on the contrary1 the things of which we speak are each of them good in itself4 ,and why are they good8 ,it does not suffice to say that they are good because they proceed from the ,good4 ,doubtless we shall have to grant that they are precious from the moment that they proceed from the ,good1 but reason demands that we shall determine that of which their goodness consists4 ,,good ,,cannot ,,be ,a ,,desire ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #ai4 ,shall the decision of what is good be entrusted to the desire of the soul8#aaj ,if we are to trust this affection of the soul1 we shall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good2 but we would not be seeking why the ,good is desired4 ,thus1 while we use demonstrations to explain the nature of every entity1 we would be trusting to desire for the determination of the ,good4 ,such a proceeding would land us in several absurdities4 ,first1 the ,good would only be an attribute4 ,then1 since our soul has several desires1 and each of the latter has different objects1 we would not be able to decide which of these objects would be the best1 according to desire4 ,it would be impossible to decide what would be better before we know what is good4 ,,no ,,need ,,to ,,seek ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,good ,,as ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,the ,,cause ,,coincides ,,with ,,the ,,nature4 ,shall we then define the good as the virtue characteristic of each being 7as say the ,stoics78 ,in this case1 by strictly following 7the course of dialectics7 we would reduce the ,good to being a form and a reason4 ,but1 having arrived there1 what should we answer if we were asked on what grounds these things themselves are good8 ,in imperfect things1 it seems easy to distinguish the good1 even though it be not pure2 but in intelligible things we may not immediately succeed in discovering the ,good by comparison with the inferior things4 ,as there is no evil on high 7in the intelligible world71 and as excellent things exist in themselves1 we find ourselves embarrassed4 ,perhaps we are embarrassed only because we seek the cause 7whyness7 7of the good71 whereas the cause 7whyness7 is here identical with the nature 7whatness71 as intelligible entities are good in themselves4 ,nor would we have solved the problem if we were to assign some other cause 7of the ,good71 such as the divinity1 to which our reason has not yet forced us to repair4 ,however1 we cannot retire1 and we must seek to arrive by some other road to something satisfactory4 ,,pythagorean ,,oppositions ,,are ,,also ,,worthless ,,as ,,explanations ,,of ,,good4 #bj4 ,since therefore we have given up desires as forms in the determination of the nature and quality 7of the good71 shall we have recourse to other rules1 such as1 for instance 7the ,pythagorean#ajd7 oppositions1 such as order and disorder1 proportion and disproportion1 health and sickness1 form and formlessness1 being and destruction1 consistence and its lack8 ,who indeed would hesitate to attribute to the form of good those characteristics which constitute the first member of each of these opposition-pairs8 ,if so1 the efficient causes of these characteristics will also have to be traced to the good2 for virtue1 life1 intelligence and wisdom are comprised within the form of good1 as being things desired by the soul that is wise4 ,,good ,,not ,,defined ,,by ,,intelligence1 ,,as ,,the ,,soul ,,has ,,other ,,aspirations4 ,it will further be suggested 7by followers of ,aristotle7 that we stop at ,intelligence1 predicating goodness of it4 ,for life and soul are images of ,intelligence4 ,it is to ,intelligence that the soul aspires1 it is according to ,intelligence that the soul judges1 it is on ,intelligence that the soul regulates herself1 when she pronounces that justice is better than injustice1 in preferring every kind of virtue to every kind of vice1 and in holding in high estimation what she considers preferable4 ,unfortunately1 the soul does not aspire to ,intelligence exclusively4 ,as might be demonstrated in a long discussion1 ,intelligence is not the supreme goal to which we aspire1 and not everything aspires to ,intelligence1 whilst everything aspires to the ,good4 ,the 7beings7 which do not possess intelligence do not all seek to possess it1 while those who do possess it1 do not limit themselves to it4 ,intelligence is sought only as the result of a train of reasoning1 whilst ,good is desired even before reason comes into play4 ,if the object of desire be to live1 to exist always1 and to be active1 this object is not desired because of ,intelligence1 but because of its being good1 inasmuch as the ,good is its principle and its goal4 ,it is only in this respect that life is desirable4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,intelligence ,,and ,,primary ,,life4 #ba4 ,what then is the one and only cause to whose presence is due the goodness 7of life1 intelligence and idea78 ,let us not hesitate to say3 ,intelligence and primary ,life bear the form of ,good2 it is on this account alone that they are desirable2 they bear the form of ,good in this respect1 that the primary ,life is the actualization of the ,good1 or rather the actualization that proceeds from the ,good1 and that intelligence is determination of this actualization4 7,intelligence and primary ,life7 are fascinating1 and the soul seeks them because they proceed from the ,good2 nevertheless the soul aspires to them 7only7 because they fit her1 and not because they are good in themselves4 ,on the other hand1 the soul could not disdain them because they bear the form of good2 though#aab we can disdain something even though it be suitable to us1 if it be not a good besides4#aab ,it is true that we permit ourselves to be allured by distant and inferior objects1 and may even feel for them a passionate love2 but that occurs only when they have something more than their natural condition1 and when some perfection descends on them from on high4 ,just as the bodies1 while containing a light mingled with their 7substance71 nevertheless need illumination by some other light to bring out their colors1#aac so the intelligible entities1 in spite of the light that they contain1 need to receive some other more powerful light1 so as to become visible1 both for themselves1 and for others4 ,,good ,,consists ,,in ,,illumination ,,by ,,the ,,extreme4 #bb4 ,when the soul perceives the light thus shed by the ,good on the intelligible entities1 she flies towards them1 tasting an indescribable bliss in the contemplation of the light that illuminates them4 ,likewise here below1 we do not like the bodies for themselves1 but for the beauty that shimmers in them4#aad ,each intelligible entity owes its nature to none but to itself2 but it only becomes desirable when the ,good1 so to speak1 illuminates and colors it1 breathing grace into the desired object1 and inspiring love into the desiring heart4 ,as soon as the soul reacts to the influence of the ,good1 she feels emotion1 swells with fancy1 is stung by desire1 and love is born within her4#aae ,before reacting to the influence of good she feels no transports when facing the beauty of ,intelligence2 for this beauty is dead so long as it is not irradiated by the ,good4 ,consequently the soul still remains depressed and bowed down1 cold and torpid1 in front of ,intelligence4 ,but as soon as she feels the gentle warmth of the ,good1 she is refreshed1 she awakes1 and spreads her wings2 and instead of stopping to admire the ,intelligence in front of her1 she rises by the aid of reminiscence to a still higher principle 7the ,first74 ,so long as there is anything superior to what she possesses1 she rises1 allured by her natural leaning for the ,inspirer of love2 so she passes through the region of ,intelligence1 and stops at the ,good because there is nothing beyond4 ,so long as she contemplates ,intelligence1 she surely enjoys a noble and magnificent spectacle1 but she does not yet fully possess the object of her search4 ,such would be a human countenance1 which1 in spite of its beauty1 is not attractive1 for lack of the charm of grace4 ,beauty is1 indeed1 rather the splendor that enhalos proportion1 than proportion itself2 and it is properly this splendor which challenges love4 ,why indeed does beauty shine radiantly on the face of a living person1 and yet leave hardly a trace after death1 even when the complexion and features are not yet marred8 ,why1 among different statues1 do the most life-like ones seem more beautiful than others that may be better proportioned8 ,why is a living being1 though ugly1 more beautiful than a pictured one1 even though the latter were the most handsome imaginable8 ,the secret is that the living form seems to us most desirable1 because it possesses a living soul1 because it is most assimilated to the ,good2 because the soul is colored by the light of the ,good1 and because1 enlightened by the ,good she is more wakeful and lighter1 and because in her turn she lightens the burdens1 awakes1 and causes participation of the ,good1 so far as she may be able1 in the body within which she resides4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,the ,,good ,,because ,,of ,,his ,,supremacy4 #bc4 ,since it is this ,principle which the soul pursues1 which illuminates ,intelligence1 and whose least trace arouses in us so great an emotion1 there is no ground for astonishment if it possess the power of exerting its fascination on all beings1 and if all rest in ,him without seeking anything beyond4 ,if indeed everything proceeds from this principle1 then there is nothing better1 and everything else is below ,him4 ,now1 how could the best of beings fail to be the ,good8 ,if the ,good be entirely self-sufficient1 and have need of nothing else1 what could it be except the ,one who was what ,he is before all other things1 when evil did not yet exist8 ,if all evils be posterior to ,him1 if they exist only in the objects that in no way participate in the ,good1 and which occupy the last rank1 if no evil exist among the intelligibles1 and if there be nothing worse than evil 7just as there is nothing better than the ,good71 then evils are in complete opposition to this principle1 and it could be nothing else4 ,to deny the existence of the ,good1 we would also have to deny the existence of evil2 and the result would be a complete indifference of choice between any two particular things2 which is absurd4 ,all other things called good refer to ,him1 while ,he refers to nothing else4 ,,the ,,good ,,as ,,creator ,,and ,,preserver4 ,but if this be the nature of the ,good1 what does ,he do8 ,he made ,intelligence1 and life4 ,by the intermediation of ,intelligence1 ,he made the souls and all the other beings that participate in ,intelligence1 in ,reason1 or in ,life4 ,moreover1 who could express the goodness of ,him who is their source and principle8 ,but what is ,he doing at the present time8 ,he preserves what ,he has begotten1 ,he inspires the thought in those who think1 ,he vivifies the living1 by ,his spirit1#aaf ,he imparts to all 7beings7 intelligence and life1 and to those who are unable to receive life1 at least existence4 ,,many ,,further ,,questions ,,about ,,the ,,good2 ,,for ,,the ,,individual ,,it ,,is ,,illumination4 #bd4 ,and what is ,he doing for us8 ,to answer this question1 we would still have to explain the light by which ,intelligence is illuminated1 and in which the ,soul participates4 ,but we shall have to postpone this discussion1 and mention various other questions which may be asked4 ,is the ,good goodness1 and does it receive this name because it is desirable for some being8 ,is that which is desirable for some being the good of this being1 and do we call the ,good that which is desirable for all beings8 ,is being desirable not rather a simple characteristic of the ,good1 and must not that which is desirable have a nature such that it would deserve the name of ,good8#aag ,besides1 do the beings that desire the ,good desire it because they receive from it something1 or merely because possession thereof causes bliss8 ,if they do receive something from it1 what does it consist of8 ,if the possession of the ,good give them joy1 why should their joy come from possession of the ,good1 rather than from possession of anything else8 ls the ,good such by what is characteristic of it1 or by something else8 ,is the ,good an attribute of some other being1 or is the ,good good for itself8 ,must not the ,good rather be good for others1 without being good for itself8 ,for whom anyway is the ,good good8 ,for there is a certain nature 7matter7 for which nothing is good4 ,,attributing ,,good ,,to ,,life ,,is ,,only ,,the ,,result ,,of ,,fear ,,of ,,death4 ,nor can we ignore an objection raised by an opponent who is difficult to convince 7,plato's ,philebus73 ,well1 my friends1 what then is this entity that you celebrate in such pompous terms1 ceaselessly repeating that life and intelligence are goods1 although you said that the ,good is above them8 ,what sort of a good might the ,intellect be8 ,what sort of a good should 7a man7 have1 who thinks the ,ideas themselves1 contemplating everything in itself8 ,perhaps1 indeed1 a man1 when he enjoys these 7,ideas and contemplations71 might be deceived into calling them a good merely because he happened to be in pleasant circumstances2 but should these circumstances become unpleasant1 on what grounds would he call them a good8 ,merely because they 7possess7 existence8 ,but what pleasure or benefit could this afford him8 ,if he did not consider self-love as the foundation thereof1 what difference could there be for him between existence and non-existence8 ,it is therefore to this natural physical error 7of self-love71 and to the fear of death1 that we must trace the cause of the ascription of good to intelligence and life4#aah ,,plato',s ,,answer ,,to ,,philebus3 ,,there ,,are ,,two ,,goods1 ,,the ,,human ,,and ,,the ,,universal4 #be4 ,plato therefore mingled the ,good with pleasure1 and did not posit the ,good exclusively in ,intelligence1 as he wrote in the ,philebus4#aai ,appreciating this difficulty1 he very rightly decided on one hand that good did not consist in pleasure alone1 and on the other1 that it did not consist in intelligence alone1 inasmuch as he failed to discover in it anything to arouse our desire4 ,perhaps ,plato had still another motive 7in calling the ,good a mixture71 because he thought that1 with such a nature1 the ,good is necessarily full of charm1 desirable both for the seeker and the finder2 whence it would result that he who is not charmed has not found the ,good1 and that1 if he who desires be not happy1 he evidently does not yet possess the ,good4 ,it is not without a reason 7that ,plato formed this conception of the ,good72 for he was not seeking to determine the universal ,good1 but the good of man2 and as such human good refers to 7man1 who is7 a being different from the absolute ,good1 then it becomes for him something different from the ,good in itself2 and would therefore be defective and composite4 ,that is why 7according to ,plato71 that which is alone and single has no good1 but is good in another and a higher sense4 ,,the ,,aristotelian ,,supreme ,,good4#abj ,the good must then be desirable2 but it is good not because it is desirable1 but it is desirable because it is good4#aba ,thus in the order of beings1 rising from the last to the ,first1 it will be found that the good of each of them is in the one immediately preceding1 so long as this ascending scale remain proportionate and increasing4 ,then we will stop at ,him who occupies the supreme rank1 beyond which there is nothing more to seek4 ,that is the ,first1 the veritable1 the sovereign ,good1 the author of all goodness in other beings4 ,the good of matter is form2 for if matter became capable of sensation it would receive it with pleasure4 ,the good of the body is the soul2 for without her it could neither exist nor last4 ,the good of the soul is virtue2 and then higher 7waits71 ,intelligence4 ,last1 the good of ,intelligence is the principle called the ,primary nature4 ,each of these goods produces something within the object whose good it is4 ,it confers order and beauty 7as form does on matter72 or life 7as the soul does on the body72 or wisdom and happiness 7as intelligence does on soul74 ,last1 the ,good communicates to ,intelligence its influx1 and actualization emanating from the ,good1 and shedding on ,intelligence what has been called the light of the ,good4 ,the nature of this we shall study later4 ,,the ,,true ,,good ,,implies ,a ,,counterfeit ,,good4 #bf4 ,recognition of goodness and so-called possession thereof consist of enjoyment of the presence of good by the being who has received from nature the faculty of sensation4 ,how could it make a mistake about the matter8 ,the possibility of its being deceived implies the existence of some counterfeit2 in this case1 the error of this being was caused by that which resembled its good2 for this being withdraws from what had deceived it as soon as the ,good presents itself4 ,the existence of a particular good for each being is demonstrated by its desire and inclination4 ,doubtless1 the inanimate being receives its good from without2 but1 in the animated being1 the desire spontaneously starts to pursue the ,good4 ,that is why lifeless bodies are the objects of solicitude and care of living beings1 while the living beings watch over themselves4 ,,the ,,good ,,cannot ,,be ,,pleasure ,,which ,,is ,,changeable ,,and ,,restless4 ,now when a being has attained the good it was pursuing it is sure of possessing it as soon as it feels that it is better1 feels no regret1 is satisfied1 takes pleasure therein1 and seeks nothing beyond4 ,what shows the insufficiency of pleasure is that one does not always like the same thing2 doubtless pleasure ever charms1 but the object which produces it is not the same2 it is always the newest object that pleases most4 ,now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple affection1 existing only in him who feels it2 for he who mistakes this affection for the ,good remains unsatisfied1 he has nothing but an affection that somebody else might equally feel in presence of the ,good4 ,consequently no one will succeed in making himself enjoy a pleasure he has not achieved#abb2 such as1 for instance1 rejoicing in the presence of an absent son2 or1 for a glutton to relish imaginary food2 or1 for a lover1 to tremble at the touch of his absent mistress1 or 7to thrill in a theoretic7 orgasm4 ,a ,,thing',s ,,good ,,is ,,its ,,form2 ,,or1 ,,its ,,intimacy ,,with ,,itself4 #bg4 ,what is the essential of a being's nature8 ,form4 ,matter achieves 7recognition7 through its form2 and a soul's destiny is realized by the virtue which is its form4 ,next we may ask whether this form be a good for a being merely because it suits its 7nature78 ,does desire pursue that which is suitable to it1 or not8 ,no3 a being is suited by its like2 now1 though a being seek and love its like1 its possession does not imply the possession of its good4 ,are we then not implying that something is suitable to a being1 on the strength of its being the good of that being8 ,the determination of what is suitable to a being belongs to the superior ,being of whom the lower being is a potentiality4 ,when a being is the potentiality of some other1 the being needs the other2 now the ,being which it needs because it is superior is1 by that very fact1 its good4 ,of all things matter is the most indigent1 and the form suitable to it is the last of all2 but1 above it1 one may gradually ascend4 ,consequently1 if a being be good for itself1 so much the more will it consider good what is its perfection and form1 namely1 the being that is better than it1 because of a superior nature1 and of supplying the good 7of the lower being74 ,but why should that which a being receives from a superior ,being be its good8 ,is it not this because it is eminently suited to it8 ,no3 ,it is so merely because it is a portion of the ,good4 ,that is why the purest and best ,beings are those that have most intimacy with themselves4#abd ,besides it is absurd to seek the cause why what is good1 is good for itself2 as if1 by the mere fact of its being good1 it should betray its own nature and not love itself4 ,nevertheless1 speaking of simple beings1 it might be asked whether a being which does not contain several things different from each other either possesses intimacy with itself1 or can be good for itself4 ,,pleasure ,,may ,,accompany ,,the ,,good1 ,,but ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,independent ,,thereof4 ,now1 if all that has been said be right1 it is only a gradual upward analysis that reveals the good that is suitable to the nature of any being4 ,desire does not constitute the good1 but is born from its presence4 ,those who acquire the good receive something from it4 ,pleasure accompanies the acquirement of good2 but even should pleasure not accompany the good1 the good should1 none the less be chosen1 and sought for its own sake4 ,,matter ,,is ,,improved ,,by ,,form1 ,,the ,,dream ,,of ,,the ,,good4 #bh4 ,let us consider the implications of the principles we have studied4 ,if that which a being receives as good be everywhere a form1 if the good of matter be a form1 we might ask ourselves whether matter1 granting it here the faculty of volition1 would even wish to be a form8 ,such a wish would be tantamount to a wish to be destroyed4 7,but matter could not wish this71 for every being seeks its own good4 ,but perhaps matter might not wish to be matter1 but simply to be essence2 possessing which1 matter would wish to free itself from all the evil within it4 ,but how can that which is evil 7for such is the nature of matter7 desire the good8#abe ,besides1 we are not attributing desire to matter itself4 ,it was only to meet the exigencies of the discussion that we employed the hypothesis which accorded sensibility to matter1 if indeed it can be granted to matter without destroying its nature4 ,we have at least shown that when form has come1 as a dream of the ,good1#abf to unite itself to matter1 the latter found itself in a better condition4 ,,matter ,,is ,,not ,,wickedness1 ,,but ,,neutral ,,evil4 ,all we have said above goes on the assumption that matter is the evil4 ,but if it were something else1 as1 for instance1 malice1 and if the essence of matter were to receive sensation1 would intimacy with what is better still be the good of matter8 ,but if it were not the malice itself of matter which choose the good1 it was what had become evil in matter4 ,if the essence 7of matter7 were identical with evil1 how could matter wish to possess this good8 ,would evil love itself1 if it had self-consciousness8 ,but how could that which is not lovable be loved8 ,for we have demonstrated that a being's good does not consist in that which is suitable to it4 ,enough about this1 however4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,a ,,nature ,,which ,,possesses ,,no ,,kind ,,of ,,form ,,itself4 ,but if the good be everywhere a form2 if1 in the measure that one rises 7along the ladder of beings71 there is a progression in the form--for the soul is more of a form than the form of the body2 in the soul herself there are graduated forms1 and intelligence is more of a form than the soul--the good follows a progression evidently inverse to that of matter2 the ,good exists in that which is purified and freed from matter1 and exists there in proportion to its purity 7from matter72 so it exists in the highest degree in that which lays aside all materiality4 ,finally1 the ,good in itself1 being entirely separated from all matter2 or rather1 never having had any contact with it1 constitutes a nature which has no kind of form1 and from which proceeds the first form 7,intelligence74 ,but of this more later4#abg ,,the ,,independence ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,from ,,pleasure ,,proved ,,by ,,the ,,temperate ,,man4 #bi4 ,supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good1 but that anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would have naturally given rise to it 7because of its goodness72 why then might not the good be considered lovable8 ,but the mere assertion that good is lovable1 already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure4 ,but supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable 7and consequently not accompanied by pleasure74 ,in that case1 even in presence of the good1 the being that possesses sensibility will not know that the good is present4 ,what would however hinder a being from knowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its possession1 which would exactly represent the case of the temperate man who lacks nothing8 ,the result would be that pleasure could not be suitable to the ,first 7being71 not only because ,he is simple1 but also because pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking 7and the ,first lacks nothing1 therefore could not feel pleasure74 ,,even ,,scorn ,,of ,,life ,,implies ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,good4 ,but1 in order that this truth may appear in its full light1 we shall first have to clear away all the other opinions1 and especially have to refute the teaching opposite to ours4 ,this is the question asked of us3 ,what will be the fruit gathered by him who has the intelligence necessary to acquire one of these goods 7such as existence and life71 if on hearing them named1 he be not impressed thereby1 because he does not understand them1 either because they seem to him no more than words1 or because his conception of each of these things should differ 7from our view of them71 or because in his search for the ,good he seeks some sense-object1 such as wealth1 or the like8 ,the person who thus scorns these things 7existence and life71 thereby implicitly recognizes that there is within him a certain good1 but that1 without knowing in what it consists1 he nevertheless values these things according to his own notion of the ,good2 for it is impossible to say1 that is not the good1 without having some sort of knowledge of the good1#abh or acquaintance therewith4 ,the above speaker seems to betray a suspicion that the ,good in itself is above ,intelligence4 ,besides1 if in considering the ,good in itself1 or the good which most approaches it1 he do not discern it1 he will nevertheless succeed in getting a conception of it by its contraries2 otherwise1 he would not even know that the lack of intelligence is an evil1 though every man desire to be intelligent1 and glory in being such1 as is seen by the sensations which aspire to become notions4 ,if intelligence1 and especially primary ,intelligence1 be beautiful and venerable1 what admiration might not then be felt by him who could contemplate the generating principle1 the ,father of ,intelligence8#abi ,consequently1 he who affects to scorn existence and life receives a refutation from himself and from all the affections he feels4 ,they who are disgusted of life are those who consider not the true life1 but the life which is mingled with death4 ,,two ,,interpretations ,,of ,,plato',s ,,opinion ,,about ,,the ,,good4 #cj4 ,now1 rising in thought to the ,good1 we must examine whether pleasure must be mingled with the ,good to keep life from remaining imperfect1 even if we should1 besides1 contemplate the divine things1 and even ,him who is their principle4 ,when 7,plato#aai7 seems to believe that the good is composed of intelligence1 as subject1 and also of affection which wisdom makes the soul experience1 he is not asserting that this blend 7of intelligence and pleasure7 is either the goal 7of the soul71 or the ,good in itself4 ,he only means that intelligence is the good1 and that we enjoy its possession4 ,this is a first interpretation of 7,plato's7 opinion about the ,good4 ,another interpretation is that to mingle intelligence with pleasure is to make a single subject of both of them1 so that in acquiring or in contemplating such an intelligence we possess the good2 for 7according to the partisans of this opinion71 one of these things could not exist in isolation1 nor1 supposing that it could so exist1 it would not be desirable as a good4 ,but 7shall we ask them71 how can intelligence be mingled with pleasure so as to form a perfect fusion therewith8 ,nobody could be made to believe that the pleasure of the body could be mingled with ,intelligence2 such pleasure is incompatible even with the joys of the soul4 ,,pleasure ,,is ,,indeed ,,an ,,accessory ,,to ,,all ,,goods ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,the element of truth in all this1 however1 is that every action1 disposition and life is joined by some accessory 7pleasure or pain7 that unites with it4 ,indeed1 sometimes action meets an obstacle to its natural accomplishment1 and life is affected by the mixture of a little of its contrary1 which limits its independence2 sometimes1 however1 action is produced without anything troubling its purity and serenity1 and then life flows along a tranquil course4 ,those who consider that this state of intelligence is desirable1 and preferable to everything else1 in their inability to express their thoughts more definitely1 say that it is mingled with pleasure4 ,such likewise is the meaning of expressions used by those who apply to divine things terms intended to express joy here below1 and who say1 ,he is intoxicated with nectar6 ,let us to the banquet6 ,jupiter smiles6#acj ,this happy state of intelligence is that which is the most agreeable1 the most worthy of our wishes1 and of our love2 nor is it transitory1 and does not consist in a movement2 its principle is that which colors intelligence1 illumines it1 and makes it enjoy a sweet serenity4 ,that is why ,plato#aca adds to the mixture truth1 and puts above it that which gives measure4 ,he also adds that the proportion and the beauty which are in the mixture pass from there into the beautiful4 ,that is the good that belongs to us1 that is the fate that awaits us4 ,that is the supreme object of desire1 an object that we will achieve on condition of drawing ourselves up to that which is best in us4 ,now this thing full of proportion and beauty1 this form composed 7of the elements of which we have spoken71 is nothing else but a life full of radiance1 intelligence and beauty4 ,,the ,,soul ,,scorning ,,all ,,things ,,below ,,rises ,,to ,,the ,,good4 #ca4 ,since all things have been embellished by ,him who is above them1 and have received their light from ,him2 since ,intelligence derives from ,him the splendor of its intellectual actualization2 by which splendor it illuminates nature2 since from ,him also the soul derives her vital power1 because she finds in ,him an abundant source of life2 consequently1 ,intelligence has risen to ,him1 and has remained attached to ,him1 satisfied in the bliss of ,his presence2 consequently also the soul1 to the utmost of her ability1 turned towards ,him1 for1 as soon as she has known ,him and seen ,him1 she was1 by her contemplation1 filled with bliss2 and1 so far as she could see ,him1 she was overwhelmed with reverence4 ,she could not see ,him without being impressed with the feeling that she had within herself something of ,him2 it was this disposition of hers that led her to desire to see ,him1 as the image of some lovable object makes one wish to be able to contemplate it oneself4 ,here below1 lovers try to resemble the beloved object1 to render their body more gracious1 to conform their soul to their model1 by temperance and the other virtues to remain as little inferior as possible to ,him whom they love1 for fear of being scorned by ,him2 and thus they succeed in enjoying intimacy with ,him4#acb ,likewise1 the soul loves the ,good1 because1 from the very beginning she is provoked to love ,him4 ,when she is ready to love1 she does not wait for the beauties here below to give her the reminiscence of the ,good2 full of love1 even when she does not know what she possesses1 she is ever seeking2 and inflamed with the desire to rise to the ,good1 she scorns the things here below4 ,considering the beauties presented by our universe1 she suspects that they are deceptive1 because she sees them clothed upon with flesh1 and united to our bodies1 soiled by the matter where they reside1 divided by extension1 and she does not recognize them as real beauties1 for she cannot believe that the latter could plunge into the mire of these bodies1 soiling and obscuring themselves4#acc ,last1 when the soul observes that the beauties here below are in a perpetual flux1 she clearly recognizes that they derive this splendor with which they shine1 from elsewhere4#acd ,then she rises to the intelligible world2 being capable of discovering what she loves1 she does not stop before having found it1 unless she be made to lose her love4 ,having arrived there1 she contemplates all the true beauties1 the true realities#ace2 she refreshes herself by filling herself up with the life proper to essence4 ,she herself becomes genuine essence4 ,she fuses with the ,intelligible which she really possesses1 and in its presence she has the feeling 7of having found7 what she was seeking so long4 ,,the ,,author ,,of ,,this ,,perfection ,,must ,,be ,,above ,,it4 #cb4 ,where then is ,he who has created this venerable beauty1 and this perfect life8 ,where is ,he who has begotten being8 ,do you see the beauty that shines in all these forms so various8 ,it is well to dwell there2 but when one has thus arrived at beauty1 one is forced to seek the source of these essences and of their beauty4 ,their author ,himself cannot be any of them2 for then ,he would be no more than some among them1 and a part of the whole4 ,he is therefore none of the particular forms1 nor a particular power1 nor all of the forms1 nor all the powers that are1 or are becoming1 in the universe2 ,he must be superior to all the forms and all the powers4 ,the supreme ,principle therefore has no form2 not indeed that ,he lacks any2 but because ,he is the principle from which all intellectual shapes are derived4 ,whatever is born--that is1 if there be anything such as birth--must1 at birth1 have been some particular being1 and have had its particular shape2 but who could have made that which was not made by anybody8 ,he therefore is all beings1 without being any of them2 ,he is none of the other beings because ,he is anterior to all of them2 ,he is all other beings because ,he is their author4 ,what greatness shall be attributed to the ,principle who can do all things8 ,will ,he be considered infinite8 ,even if ,he be infinite1 ,he will have no greatness1 for magnitude occurs only among beings of the lowest rank4 ,the creator of magnitude could not himself have any magnitude2 and even what is called magnitude in being is not a quantity4 ,magnitude can be found only in something posterior to being4 ,the magnitude of the ,good is that there be nothing more powerful than ,he1 nothing that even equals ,him4 ,how indeed could any of the beings dependent on ,him ever equal ,him1 not having a nature identical with ,his8 ,even the statement that ,god is always and everywhere does not attribute to ,him any measure1 nor even1 a lack of measure--otherwise1 ,he might be considered as measuring the rest2 nor does it attribute to ,him any figure 7or1 outward appearance74 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,limitless4 ,thus the ,divinity1 being the object of desire1 must be the most desired and the most loved1 precisely because ,he has no figure nor shape4 ,the love ,he inspires is immense2 this love is limitless1 because of the limitlessness of its object4 ,he is infinite1 because the beauty of its object surpasses all beauty4 ,not being any essence1 how indeed could the 7divinity7 have any determinate beauty8 ,as supreme object of love1 ,he is the creator of beauty4#acf ,being the generating power of all that is beautiful1 ,he is at the same time the flower in which beauty blooms#acg3 for ,he produces it1 and makes it more beautiful still by the superabundance of beauty which ,he sheds on her4 ,he is therefore simultaneously the principle and goal of beauty4#ach ,as principle of beauty1 ,he beautifies all that of which ,he is the principle4 ,it is not however by shape that ,he beautifies2 what ,he produces has no shape1 or1 to speak more accurately1 ,he has a shape in a sense different from the habitual meaning of this term4 ,the shape which is no more than a shape is a simple attribute of some substance1 while the ,shape that subsists in itself is superior to shape4 ,thus1 that which participates in beauty was a shape2 but beauty itself has none4 ,,absolute ,,beauty ,,is ,a ,,formless ,,shape4 #cc4 ,when we speak of absolute ,beauty1 we must therefore withdraw from all determinate shape1 setting none before the eyes 7of our mind72 otherwise1 we would expose ourselves to descending from absolute beauty to something which does not deserve the name of beauty but by virtue of an obscure and feeble participation#aci2 while absolute ,beauty is a shapeless form1 if it be at all allowed to be an idea 7or form74 ,thus you may approach the universal ,shape only by abstraction4 ,abstract even the form found in the reason 7that is1 the essence71 by which we distinguish one action from another4 ,abstract1 for instance1 the difference that separates temperance from justice1 though both be beautiful4 ,for by the mere fact that intelligence conceives an object as something proper1 the object that it conceives is diminished1 even though this object were the totality of intelligible entities2 and1 on the other hand1 if each of them1 taken apart1 have a single form1 nevertheless all taken together will offer a certain variety4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,essential ,,beauty2 ,,the ,,shapeless ,,shaper2 ,,transcendent4 ,we still have to study the proper conception of ,him who is superior to the ,intelligence that is so universally beautiful and varied1 but who ,himself is not varied4 ,to ,him the soul aspires without knowing why she wishes to possess ,him2 but reason tells us ,he is essential beauty1 since the nature of ,him who is excellent and sovereignly lovable cannot absolutely have any form4 ,that is why the soul1 whatever object you may show her in your process of reducing an object to a form1 ever seeks beyond the shaping principle4 ,now reason tells us in respect to anything that has a shape1 that as a shape or form is something measured 7or limited71 7anything shaped7 cannot be genuinely universal1 absolute1 and beautiful in itself1 and that its beauty is a mixture4 ,therefore though the intelligible entities be beautiful 7they are limited72 while ,he who is essential beauty1 or rather the super-beautiful1 must be unlimited1 and consequently have no shape or form4 ,he who then is beauty in the first degree1 and primary ,beauty1 is superior to form1 and the splendor of the intelligible 7world7 is only a reflection of the nature of the ,good4 ,,thus ,,love ,,begins ,,physically ,,but ,,becomes ,,spiritual4 ,this is proved by what happens to lovers2 so far as their eyes remain fixed on a sense-object1 they do not yet love genuinely4 ,love is born only when they rise above the sense-object1 and arrive at representing in their indivisible soul an image which has nothing more of sensation4 ,to calm the ardor that devours them they do indeed still desire to contemplate the beloved object2 but as soon as they come to understand that they have to rise to something beyond the form1 they desire the latter2 for since the very beginning they felt within themselves the love for a great light inspired by a feeble glow4 ,the ,shape indeed is the trace of the shapeless4 ,without himself having any shape1 ,he begets shape whenever matter approaches ,him4 ,now matter must necessarily be very distant from ,him1 because matter does not possess forms of even the last degree4 ,since form inherent in matter is derived from the soul1 not even mere form-fashioned matter is lovable in itself1 as matter2 and as the soul herself is a still higher form1 but yet is inferior to and less lovable than intelligence1 there is no escape from the conclusion that the primary nature of the ,beautiful is superior to form4 ,,the ,,formlessness ,,of ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,proved ,,by ,,the ,,fact ,,that ,,the ,,soul ,,when ,,approaching ,,him ,,spontaneously ,,rids ,,herself ,,of ,,forms4 #cd4 ,we shall not be surprised that the soul's liveliest transports of love are aroused by ,him1 who has no form1 not even an intelligible one1 when we observe that the soul herself1 as soon as she burns with love for ,him1 lays aside all forms soever1 even if intelligible2 for it is impossible to approach ,him so long as one considers anything else4 ,the soul must therefore put aside all evil1 and even all good2 in a word1 everything1 of whatever nature1 to receive the divinity1 alone with the alone4 ,when the soul obtains this happiness1 and when 7the divinity7 comes to her1 or rather1 when ,he manifests ,his presence1 because the soul has detached herself from other present things1 when she has embellished herself as far as possible1 when she has become assimilated to ,him by means known only to the initiated1 she suddenly sees ,him appear in her4 ,no more interval between them1 no more doubleness2 the two fuse in one4 ,it is impossible to distinguish the soul from the divinity1 so much does she enjoy ,his presence2 and it is the intimacy of this union that is here below imitated by those who love and are loved1 when they consummate union4 ,in this condition the soul no longer feels 7her body72 she no more feels whether she be alive1 human1 essence1 universality1 or anything else4 ,consideration of objects would be a degradation1 and the soul then has neither the leisure nor the desire to busy herself with them4 ,when1 after having sought the divinity1 she finds herself in ,his presence1 she rushes towards ,him1 and contemplates ,him instead of herself4#adj ,what is her condition at the time8 ,she has not the leisure to consider it2 but she would not exchange it for anything whatever1 not even for the whole heaven2 for there is nothing superior or better2 she could not rise any higher4 ,as to other things1 however elevated they be1 she cannot at that time stoop to consider them4 ,it is at this moment that the soul starts to move1 and recognizes that she really possesses what she desired2 she at last affirms that there is nothing better than ,him4 ,no illusion could occur there2 for where could she find anything truer than truth itself8 ,the soul then is what she affirms2 7or rather71 she asserts it 7only71 later1 and then she asserts it by keeping silence4 ,while tasting this beatitude she could not err in the assertion that she tastes it4 ,if she assert that she tastes it1 it is not that her body experiences an agreeable titillation1 for she has only become again what she formerly used to be when she became happy4 ,all the things that formerly charmed her1 such as commanding others1 power1 wealth1 beauty1 science1 now seem to her despicable2 she could not scorn them earlier1 for she had not met anything better4 ,now she fears nothing1 so long as she is with ,him1 and contemplates ,him4 ,even with pleasure would she witness the destruction of everything1 for she would remain alone with ,him2 so great is her felicity4 ,,the ,,soul ,,scorns ,,even ,,thought3 ,,she ,,is ,,intellectualized ,,and ,,ennobled4 #ce4 ,such1 then1 is the state of the soul that she no longer values even thought1 which formerly excited her admiration2 for thought is a movement1 and the soul would prefer none4 ,she does not even assert that it is ,intelligence that she sees1 though she contemplate only because she has become intelligence1 and has1 so to speak1 become intellectualized1 by being established in the intelligible place4 ,having arrived to ,intelligence1 and having become established therein1 the soul possesses the intelligible1 and thinks2 but as soon as she achieves the vision of the supreme ,divinity1 she abandons everything else4 ,she behaves as does the visitor who1 on entering into a palace1 would first admire the different beauties that adorn its interior1 but who regards them no longer as soon as she perceives the master2 for the master1 by his 7living7 nature1 which is superior to all the statues that adorn the palace1 monopolizes the consideration1 and alone deserves to be contemplated2 consequently the spectator1 with his glance fixed on ,him1 henceforward observes ,him alone4 ,by dint of continual contemplation of the spectacle in front of him1 the spectator sees the master no longer2 in the spectator1 vision confuses with the visible object4 ,what for the spectator first was a visible object1 in him becomes vision1 and makes him forget all that he saw around himself4 ,to complete this illustration1 the master here presenting himself to the visitor must be no man1 but a divinity2 and this divinity must not content ,himself with appearing to the eyes of him who contemplates ,him1 but ,he must penetrate within the human soul1 and fill her entirely4 ,,intelligence ,,has ,,the ,,two ,,powers ,,of ,,intelligence ,,and ,,love4 ,intelligence has two powers3 by the first1 which is her own power of thinking1 she sees what is within her4 ,by the other she perceives what is above her by the aid of a kind of vision and perception2 by the vision1 she first saw simply2 then1 by 7perceptive7 seeing1 she received intellection and fused with the ,one4 ,the first kind of contemplation is suitable to the intelligence which still possesses reason2 the second is intelligence transported by love4 ,now1 it is when the nectar intoxicates her1#ada and deprives her of reason1 that the soul is transported with love1 and that she blossoms into a felicity that fulfils all her desires4 ,it is better for her to abandon herself to this intoxication than to remain wise4 ,in this state does intelligence successively see one thing1 and then another8 ,no3 methods of instruction 7or1 constructive speech7 give out everything successively2 but it is eternally that intelligence possesses the power of thought1 as well as the power not to think2 that is1 to see the divinity otherwise than by thought4 ,indeed1 while contemplating ,him1 she received within herself germs1 she felt them when they were produced and deposited within her breast2 when she sees them1 she is said to think2 but when she sees the divinity1 it is by that superior power by virtue of which she was to think later4 ,,the ,,soul ,,does ,,not ,,think ,,god1 ,,for ,,in ,,that ,,condition ,,she ,,does ,,not ,,think4 ,as to the soul1 she sees the divinity only by growing confused1 as it were by exhausting the intelligence which resides in her2 or rather1 it is her first intelligence that sees2 but the vision the latter has of the divinity reaches down to the soul1 which then fuses with intelligence4 ,it is the ,good1 extending over intelligence and the soul1 and condescending to their level1 which spreads over them1 and fuses them2 hovering above them1 it bestows on them the happy vision1 and the ineffable feeling of itself4 ,it raises them so high that they are no more in any place1 nor within anything whatever1 in any of the senses in which one thing is said to be within another4 ,for the ,good is not within anything2 the intelligible location is within it1 but it is not in anything else4 ,then the soul moves no more1 because the divinity is not in motion4 ,to speak accurately1 she is no longer soul1 because the divinity does not live1 but is above life2 neither is she intelligence1 because the divinity is above intelligence2 because there must be complete assimilation 7between the soul and the divinity74 ,finally1 the soul does not think even the divinity1 because in this condition she does not think at all4 ,,the ,,touch ,,with ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,the ,,greatest ,,of ,,sciences4 #cf4 ,the remainder is plain4 ,as to the last point1 it has already been discussed4 ,still it may be well to add something thereto1 starting from the point reached1 and proceeding by arguments4 ,knowledge1 or1 if it may be so expressed1 the touch of the ,good1 is the greatest thing in the world4 ,plato#adb calls it the greatest of sciences1 and even so he here applies this designation not to the vision itself of the ,good1 but to the science of the ,good that may be had before the vision4 ,this science is attained by the use of analogies1#adc by negations 7made about the ,good71 by the knowledge of things that proceed from it1 and last by the degrees that must be taken 7or1 upward steps that must be climbed to reach up to ,him4#afe7 7,these then are the degrees7 that lead up 7to the divinity73 purifications1 virtues that adorn the soul1 elevation to the intelligible1 settling in the intelligible1 and then the banquet at which nectar feeds him who becomes simultaneously spectator and spectacle1 either for himself1 or for others4#add ,having become ,being1 ,intelligence1 and universal living ,organism1 7the initiate7 no longer considers these things as being outside of him2 having arrived at that condition1 she approaches ,him who is immediately above all the intelligible entities1 and who already sheds ,his radiance over them4 7,the initiate7 then leaves aside all the science that has led him till there2 settled in the beautiful1 he thinks1 so long as he does not go beyond that 7sphere of7 being4 ,but there1 as it were raised by the very flood of intelligence1 and carried away by the wave that swells1 without knowing how1 he suddenly sees4 ,the contemplation which fills his eye with light does not reveal to him anything exterior2 it is the light itself that he sees4 ,it is not an opposition between light on one side1 and the visible object on the other2 nor is there on one side intelligence1 and on the other the intelligible entity2 there is only the 7radiation7 which later begets these entities1 and permits them to exist within it4 7,the divinity7 is no more than the radiation that begets intelligence1 begetting without being consumed1 and remaining within itself4 ,this radiation exists1 and this existence alone begets something else4 ,if this radiation were not what it was1 neither would the latter thing subsist4 ,,god ,,being ,,above ,,thought ,,ignores ,,everything4 #cg4 ,they who attributed thought to the ,first ,principle have at least not attributed to ,him the thought of things that are inferior to ,him1 or which proceed from ,him4#ade ,nevertheless some of them claimed that it was absurd to believe that the divinity ignored other things4 ,as to the former1 finding nothing greater than the ,good1 they attributed to 7the divinity7 the thought of ,himself1#adf as if this could add to ,his majesty1 as if even for ,him1 thinking were more than being what ,he is1 and it were not the ,good ,himself which communicates ,his sublimity to intelligence4 ,but from whom then will the ,good derive ,his greatness8 ,would it come from thought1 or from ,himself8 ,if ,he derive it from thought1 ,he is not great by himself2 or at least1 ,he is no more sovereignly great4 ,if it be from ,himself that ,he derives ,his greatness1 ,he is perfectly anterior to thought1 and it is not thought that renders ,him perfect4 ,is ,he forced to think because ,he is actualization1 and not merely potentiality8 ,if ,he is a being that ever thinks1 and if this be the meaning of actualization1#adg we would be attributing to the ,good two things simultaneously3 being and thought2 instead of conceiving of ,him as a simple ,principle1 something foreign is added to ,him1 as to eyes is added the actualization of sight1#adh even admitting that they see continually4 7,the divinity7 is in actualization1 in the sense that ,he is both actualization and thought1 is ,he not8 ,no1 for being thought itself1 ,he must not be thinking1 as movement itself does not move4#adi ,but do not you yourselves say that 7the divinity7 is both being and actualization8 ,we think that being and actualization are multiple and different things1 whilst the ,first is simple4 ,to the principle that proceeds from the ,first alone belongs thought1 a certain seeking out of its being1 of itself1 and of its origin4 ,it deserves the name of intelligence only by turning towards 7the ,first7 in contemplation1 and in knowing ,him4 ,as to the unbegotten ,principle1 who has nothing above ,him1 who is eternally what ,he is1 what reason might ,he have to think8 ,,the ,,first ,,principle ,,has ,,no ,,function4 ,that is why ,plato rightly says that the ,good is above ,intelligence4 ,to speak of an unthinking intelligence would be a self-contradiction2 for the principle whose nature it is to think necessarily ceases to be intelligent if it does not think4 ,but no function can be assigned to a principle that has none1 and we cannot blame it for idleness because it does not fulfil some function2 this would be as silly as to reproach it for not possessing the art of healing4 ,to the first ,principle then should be assigned no function1 because there is none that would suit ,him4 ,he is 7self7 sufficient1 and there is nothing outside of ,him who is above all2 for1 in being what ,he is1 ,he suffices ,himself and everything else4 ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,principle ,,we ,,may ,,not ,,even ,,say ,,that ,,it ,,is4 #ch4 ,of the ,first we may not even say1 ,he is4 7,he does not need this71 since we do not either say of ,him1 ,he is good4 ,he is good is said of the same principle to which ,he is applies4 ,now ,he is suits the 7divinity7 only on the condition that ,he be given no attribute1 limiting oneself to the assertion of ,his existence4 ,he is spoken of as the ,good1 not as predicating an attribute or quality of ,him1 but to indicate that ,he is the ,good itself4 ,we do not even approve of this expression1 ,he is the ,good1 because we think that not even the article should be prefixed thereto2 but inasmuch as our language would fail to express an entire negation or deprivation1 then1 to avoid introducing some diversity in it1 we are forced to name it1 but there is no need to say it is1 we simply call it1 the ,good4 ,,the ,,self-,,sufficient ,,good ,,does ,,not ,,need ,,self-,,consciousness ,,thereof4 ,but how could we admit 7the existence of7 a nature without feeling or consciousness of itself8 ,we might answer this1 ,what consciousness of self can 7the divinity7 have8 ,can ,he say1 ,i am8 ,but 7in the above-mentioned sense71 ,he is not4 ,can ,he say1 ,i am the ,good8 ,then ,he would still be saying of ,himself ,i am 7whereas we have just explained that this ,he cannot do#aej74 ,what then will ,he add 7to his simplicity7 by limiting ,himself to saying1 ,the ,good8 ,for it is possible to think the ,good apart from ,he is so long as the ,good is not1 as an attribute1 applied to some other being4 ,but whoever thinks himself good will surely say ,i am the good2 if not1 he will think the predicate good1 but he will not be enabled to think that he is so himself4 ,thus1 the thought of good will imply this thought1 ,i am the good4 ,if this thought itself be the ,good1 it will not be the thought of ,him1 but of the good1 and he will not be the ,good1 but the thought4#aea ,if the thought of good is different from the ,good itself1 the ,good will be prior to the thought of the good4 ,if the ,good be self-sufficient before the thought1 it suffices to itself to be the ,good2 and in this respect has no need of the thought that it is the ,good4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,a ,,simple ,,perception ,,of ,,itself2 ,a ,,touch4 #ci4 ,consequently1 the ,good does not think itself either as good1 nor as anything else2 for it possesses nothing different from itself4 ,it only has a simple perception of itself in respect to itself2 but as there is no distance or difference in this perception it has of itself1 what could this perception be but itself8 ,that is why it perceives a difference where being and intelligence appear4 ,in order to think1 intelligence must admit identity and difference simultaneously4 ,on the one hand1 without the relation between the ,intelligible and itself1 the 7mind7 will not distinguish itself from 7the intelligible72 and on the other1 without the arising of an otherness which would enable it to be everything1 it would not contemplate all 7earthly7 entities4 7,without this difference71 intelligence would not even be a pair4 ,then1 since intelligence thinks1 if it think really1 it will not think itself alone1 for why should it not think all things8 7,would it not do so7 because it was impotent to do so8 ,in short1 the principle which thinks itself ceases to be simple1 because in thinking itself it must think itself as something different1 which is the necessary condition of thinking itself4#aeb ,we have already said that intelligence cannot think itself without contemplating itself as something different4 ,now in thinking1 intelligence becomes manifold 7that is1 fourfold73 intelligible object 7thing thought7 and intelligent subject 7thinker72 movement 7or1 moved#aec71 and everything else that belongs to intelligence4 ,besides1 it must be noticed1 as we have pointed out elsewhere1 that1 to be thought1 any thought1 must offer variety#aed2 but 7in the divinity7 this movement is so simple and identical that it may be compared to some sort of touch1 and partakes in nothing of intellectual actualization 7therefore1 thought cannot be attributed to the divinity74 ,what8 ,will 7the divinity7 know neither others nor ,himself1 and will ,he remain immovable in ,his majesty8 7,surely74 ,all things are posterior to ,him2 ,he was what ,he is before them4 ,the thought of these things is adventitious1 changeable1 and does not apply to permanent objects4 ,even if it did apply to permanent objects1 it would still be multiple1 for we could not grant that in inferior beings thought was joined to being1 while the thoughts of intelligence would be empty notions4 ,the existence of ,providence is sufficiently accounted for by its being that from which proceed all 7beings74 ,how then 7in regard to all the beings that refer to ,him7 could 7the divinity7 think them1 since ,he does not even think ,himself1 but remains immovable in ,his majesty8 ,that is why ,plato1#adi speaking of being1 says that it doubtless thinks1 but that it does not remain immovable in its majesty4 ,by that he means that1 no doubt1 being thinks1 but that that which does not think remains immovable in its majesty2 using this expression for lack of a better one4 ,thus ,plato considers the ,principle which is superior to thought as possessing more majesty1 nay1 sovereign majesty4 ,,the ,,first ,,principle ,,has ,,no ,,thought ,,as ,,the ,,first ,,actualization ,,of ,a ,,hypostasis4 #dj4 ,that thought is incompatible with the first ,principle is something well known by all those who have 7in ecstasy7 risen to ,him4#aee ,to what we have already said1 we shall however add several arguments1 if indeed we succeed in expressing thought comprehensibly2 for conviction should be fortified by demonstration4#aef ,in the first place1 observe that all thought exists within a subject1 and proceeds from some object4 ,thought that is connected with the object from which it is derived1 has the being to which it belongs1 as subject4 ,it inheres in him because it is his actualization1 and completes his potentiality1 without1 itself1 producing anything2 for it belongs exclusively to the subject whose complement it is4 ,thought that is hypostatically united with being1 and which underlies its existence1 could not inhere in the object from which it proceeds2 for1 had it remained in him1 it would not have produced anything4 ,now1 having the potentiality of producing1 it produced within itself2 its actualization was being1 and it was united thereto4 ,thus thought is not something different from being2 so far as this nature thinks itself1 it does not think itself as being something different2 for the only multiplicity therein is that which results from the logical distinction of intelligent subject 7thinker7 and intelligible object 7the being thought71 as we have often pointed out4 ,that is the first actualization which produced a hypostasis 7or1 form of existence71 while constituting being2 and this actualization is the image of a ,principle so great that itself has become being4 ,if thought belonged to the ,good1 instead of proceeding therefrom1 it would be no more than an attribute2 it would not1 in itself1 be a hypostatic form of existence4 ,being the first actualization and the first thought1 this thought has neither actualization nor thought above it4 ,therefore1 by rising above this being and this thought1 neither further being nor thought will be met with2 we would arrive to the ,principle superior to being1 and thought1 an admirable principle1 which contains neither thought nor being1 which in solitary guise dwells within itself1 and which has no need of the things which proceed from ,him4 ,he did not first act1 and then produce an actualization 7he did not begin by thinking in order later to produce thought72 otherwise1 he would have thought before thought was born4 ,in short1 thought1 being the thought of good1 is beneath ,him1 and consequently does not belong to ,him4 ,i say3 does not belong to ,him1 not denying that the ,good can be thought 7for this1 ,i admit72 but because thought could not exist in the ,good2 otherwise1 the ,good and that which is beneath it--namely1 the thought of ,good--would fuse4 ,now1 if the good be something inferior1 it will simultaneously be thought and being2 if1 on the contrary1 good be superior to thought1 it must likewise belong to the ,intelligible4#aeg ,,even ,,if ,,the ,,good ,,thought1 ,,there ,,would ,,be ,,need ,,of ,,something ,,superior4 ,since therefore thought does not exist in the ,good1 and since1 on the contrary1 it is inferior to the ,good1 and since it must thus worship its majesty1 7thought7 must constitute a different principle1 and leaves the ,good pure and disengaged from it1 as well as from other things4 ,independent of thought1 the ,good is what it is without admixture4 ,the presence of the ,good does not hinder it from being pure and single4 ,if we were to suppose that ,good is both thinking subject and thought object 7thinker and thought7 or being1 and thought connected with being1 if thus we make it think itself1#aeh it will need something else1 and thus things will be above it4 ,as actualization and thought are the complement or the consubstantial hypostasis 7or1 form of existence7 of another subject1 thought implies above it another nature to which it owes the power of thinking2 for thought cannot think anything without something above it4 ,when thought knows itself1 it knows what it received by the contemplation of this other nature4 ,as to ,him who has nothing above ,him1 who derives nothing from any other principle1 what could ,he think1 and how could ,he think himself8 ,what would ,he seek1 and what would ,he desire8 ,would ,he desire to know the greatness of ,his power8 ,but by the mere fact of ,his thinking it1 it would have become external to ,him2 ,i call it exterior1 if the cognizing power within ,him differed from that which would be known2 if on the contrary they fuse1 what would ,he seek8 ,,thought ,,is ,a ,,help ,,for ,,sub-,,divine ,,natures4 #da4 ,it would seem that thought was only a help granted to natures which1 though divine1 nevertheless do not occupy the first rank2 it is like an eye given to the blind4#aei ,but what need would the eye have to see essence1 if itself were light8 ,to seek light is the characteristic of him who needs it1 because he finds in himself nothing but darkness4#aei ,since thought seeks light1 while the light does not seek the light1 the primary ,nature1 not seeking the light 7since it is light itself71 could not any more seek thought 7since it is thought that seeks light72 thinking could not suit it1 therefore4 ,what utility or advantage would thought bring him1 inasmuch as thought itself needs aid to think8 ,the ,good therefore has not self-consciousness1 not having need thereof2 it is not doubleness2 or rather1 it is not double as is thought which implies 7besides intelligence7 a third term1 namely1 the intelligible 7world74 ,if thought1 the thinking subject 7the thinker7 and the thought object 7the thought7 be absolutely identical1 they form but one1 and are absolutely indistinguishable2 if they be distinct1 they differ1 and can no more be the ,good4 ,thus we must put everything aside when we think of this best ,nature1 which stands in need of no assistance4 ,whatever you may attribute to this ,nature1 you diminish it by that amount1 since it stands in need of nothing4 ,for us1 on the contrary1 thought is a beautiful thing1 because our soul has need of intelligence4 ,it is similarly a beautiful thing for intelligence1 because thought is identical with essence1 and it is thought that gave existence to intelligence4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,not ,,good ,,for ,,itself1 ,,but ,,only ,,for ,,the ,,natures ,,below ,,it4 ,intelligence must therefore fuse with thought1 and must always be conscious of itself1 knowing that each of the two elements that constitute it is identical with the other1 and that both form but a single one4 ,if it were only unity1 it would be self-sufficient1 and would have no further need of receiving anything4 ,the precept know thyself applies only to natures which1 because of their multiplicity1 need to give an account of themselves1 to know the number and the quality of their component elements1 because they either do not know them entirely1 or even not at all2 not knowing what power in them occupies the first rank1 and constitutes their being4#afj ,but if there be a ,principle which is one by itself1 it is too great to know itself1 to think itself1 to be self-conscious1 because it is nothing determinate for itself4 ,it receives nothing within itself1 sufficing itself4 ,it is therefore the ,good not for itself1 but for other natures2 these indeed need the ,good1 but the ,good has no need of itself2 it would be ridiculous1 and would fail to stand up to itself4 ,nor does it view itself2 for1 from this look something would arise1 or exist for ,him4 ,all such things ,he left to the inferior natures1 and nothing that exists in them is found in ,him2 thus 7the ,good7 is not even being4 ,nor does 7the ,good7 possess thought1 since thought is united to being1 and as primary and supreme thought coexisted with essence4 ,therefore1 one can not 7as says ,plato#aej71 express 7the divinity7 by speech1 nor have perception nor science of ,him1 since no attribute can be predicated of ,him4 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,the ,,supreme ,,of ,,three ,,ranks ,,of ,,existence4 #db4 ,when you are in doubt about this matter1 and when you wonder how you should classify these attributes to which reasoning has brought you1 reject from among the things of the second order what seems venerable2 attribute to the ,first none of the things that belong to the second order2 neither attribute to those of the second order 7that is1 to ,intelligence71 what belongs to those of the third 7that is1 to the ,soul72 but subsume under the first ,principle the things of the second order1 and under the second principle the things of the third4 ,that is the true means of allowing each being to preserve its nature1 and at the same time to point out the bond that connects the lower things with the higher1 and showing thus that the inferior things depend on the superior ones1 while the superior ones remain in themselves4 ,that is why 7,plato7 was right in saying1#afa ,all things surround the ,king of all1 and exist on his account4 ,all things means all beings4 ,all things exist on his account means that ,he is the cause of their existence1 and the object of their desire1 because ,his nature is different from theirs1 because in ,him is nothing that is in them1 since they could not exist if the ,first possessed some attribute of what is inferior to ,him4 ,therefore1 if ,intelligence be comprised within what is meant by all things1 it could not belong to the ,first4 ,when 7in the same place ,plato calls the divinity7 the cause of all beauty1 he seems to classify beauty among the ,ideas1 and the ,good above the universal beauty4#afb ,after thus having assigned the intelligible 7entities7 to the second rank1 he classifies1 as dependent on them1 the things of the third order1 which follow them4 ,last1 to that which occupies the third rank1 to the universal ,soul1 he subsumes the world that is derived therefrom4 ,as the ,soul depends on the ,intelligence1 and as ,intelligence depends on the ,good1 all things thus depend from the ,good in different degrees1 mediately or immediately4 ,in this respect1 the things which are the most distant from the ,good are the objects of sense1 which are subsumed under the ,soul4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,eight4 ,of the ,will of the ,one4 ,a4 ,,of ,,human ,,free ,,will4 ,,does ,,free ,,will ,,belong ,,to ,,god ,,only1 ,,or ,,to ,,others ,,only8 #a4 ,do the divinities themselves possess free will1 or is this limited to human beings1 because of their many weaknesses and uncertainties8 7,for we assume that7 the divinities possess omnipotence1 so that it would seem likely that their actions were free and absolutely without petty restrictions4 ,or must we hold that the 7supreme7 ,one alone possesses omnipotence1 and unhampered free will1 while in other beings 7free will and opportunity7 either ignore each other1 or conflict8 ,we shall therefore have to determine the nature of free will in first rank beings 7the divinities7 and also the supreme ,principle 7the ,one71 although we acknowledge that both of them are omnipotent4 ,besides1 in respect to this omnipotence1 we shall have to distinguish possibility from actualization1 present or future4 ,,free ,,will ,,must ,,be ,,for ,,men1 ,,if ,,it ,,is ,,to ,,be ,,for ,,the ,,divinities4 ,before attacking these questions1 we must1 as is usual1 begin by examining whether we ourselves possess freedom of will4#aff ,first then1 in what sense do we possess free will 7or1 responsibility1 that something depends on us72 or rather1 what conception we should form of it8 ,to answer this question will be the only means of arriving at a conclusion about whether or not freedom of will should be ascribed to the divinities1 let alone 7the supreme7 ,divinity4 ,besides1 while attributing to them freedom of will1 we shall have to inquire to what it applies1 either in the other beings1 or in the ,beings of the first rank4 ,,responsibility ,,depends ,,on ,,voluntariness4 ,what are our thoughts when we inquire whether something depends on us8 ,under what circumstances do we question this responsibility8 ,we ask ourselves whether we are anything1 and whether really anything depends on us when undergoing the buffets of fortune1 of necessity1 of violent passions that dominate our souls1 till we consider ourselves mastered1 enslaved1 and carried away by them8 ,therefore we consider as dependent on ourselves what we do without the constraint of circumstances1 necessity1 or violence of passions--that is1 voluntarily1 and without an obstacle to our will4#afg ,hence the following definition3 ,we are responsible for that which depends on our will1 which happens or which is omitted according to our volition4#afh ,we indeed call voluntary what we unconstrainedly do and consciously4#afi ,on us depends only that of which we are the masters to do or not to do4 ,these two notions are usually connected1 though they differ theoretically4 ,there are cases when one of them is lacking2 one might1 for instance1 have the power to commit a murder2 and nevertheless if it were one's own father that he had ignorantly killed1 it would not be a voluntary act4#agj ,in this case1 the action was free1 but not voluntary4 ,the voluntariness of an action depends on the knowledge1 not only of the details1 but also of the total relations of the act4#aga ,otherwise1 why should killing a friend1 without knowing it1 be called a voluntary action8 ,would not the murder be equally involuntary if one did not know that he was to commit it8 ,on the contrary hypothesis1 it may be answered that one had been responsible for providing oneself with the necessary information#agb2 but nevertheless it is not voluntarily that one is ignorant1 or that one was prevented from informing oneself about it4#agc ,,on ,,which ,,psychological ,,faculty ,,is ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,will ,,based8 #b4 ,but to which part of ourselves should we refer free will8 ,to appetite or desire1 to anger or sex passion1 for instance8 ,or shall it be to the reason1 engaged in search after utility1 and accompanied by desire8 ,if to anger or sex passion1#agd we should be supposed to grant freedom of will to brutes1 to children1 to the angry1 to the insane1 to those misled by magic charms1 or suggestions of the imagination1 though none of such persons be master of himself8 ,if again 7we are to ascribe freedom of will7 to reason accompanied by desire1 does this mean to reason even when misled1 or only to right reason1 and right desire8#age ,one might even ask whether reason be moved by desire1 or desire by reason4#agf ,for1 admitting that desires arise naturally1 a distinction will nevertheless have to be established3 if they belong to the animal part1 and to the combination 7of soul and body71 the soul will obey the necessity of nature2 if they belong to the soul alone1 many things which are generally attributed to the domain of our free will will have to be withdrawn therefrom4 ,besides1 passions are always preceded by some sort of abstract reasoning4 ,further1 how can imagination itself--which constrains us2 and desire--which drags us whither ,necessity compels1 make us masters of ourselves#agg under these circumstances8 ,besides1 how can we be masters of ourselves in general when we are carried away8 ,that faculty of ours which necessarily seeks to satisfy its needs1 is not mistress of the things towards which it is compelled to move4#agg ,how should we attribute freedom of will to 7a soul7 that depends on something else8 7,to a soul7 which1 in this thing1 holds the principle of her own determinations8 7,to a soul7 that regulates her life thereby1 and derives therefrom her nature8 7,to a soul7 that lives according to the instructions received therefrom8 ,freedom of will would then have to be acknowledged even in inanimate things2 for even fire acts according to its inborn nature4 ,,preliminary ,,knowledge ,,does ,,not ,,settle ,,the ,,libertarian ,,problem4 ,some person might try to establish a distinction founded on the fact that the animal and the soul do not act unconsciously4 ,if they know it by mere sensation1 how far does that sensation contribute to the freedom of will8 ,for sensation1 limiting itself to perception1 does not yield the percipient mastery over anything4#agi ,if they know it by knowledge1 and if this knowledge contain only the accomplished fact1 their actions are then determined by some other principle4 ,if1 even independently of desire1 reason or knowledge make us perform certain actions1 or dominate us1#ahj to what faculty shall the action be ascribed1 and how does it occur8 ,if reason produce another desire1 how does it do so8 ,if reason manifest itself and liberate us by the process of calming our desires1 the free will lies no longer in the action1 but in intelligence2 for every action1 however much directed by reason1 would then be something mixed1 not revealing an unconfused free will4 ,,liberty ,,referred ,,to ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,intelligence4 #c4 ,the question must be examined carefully1 for it will later be applied to the divinities4 ,responsibility has been traced to the will1 and this to reason first1 and later to right reason4 ,better1 to reason enlightened by knowledge2 for freedom of will is not possessed incontestably if one be ignorant of why his decision or action is good1 if one have been led to do the right thing by chance1 or by some sensible representation4 ,since the latter is not within our power1 we could not impute to free will the actions it inspired4 ,by sensible representation1 or1 phantasy1#aha we mean the imagination excited within us by the passions of the body2 for it offers us different images according as the body has need of food1 of drink1 or of sensual pleasures4 ,those who act according to the sensible representations excited within them by divers qualities of the humors of the body are not wholly responsible for their actions4 ,that is why depraved men1 who usually act according to these images1 do not1 according to us1 perform actions that are free and voluntary4 ,we ascribe free will only to him who1 enfranchised from the passions of the body1 performs actions determined solely by intelligence4 ,we refer liberty1 therefore1 to the noblest principle1 to the action of the intelligence#ahb2 we regard as free only the decisions whose principle it is1 and as voluntary1 only the desires it inspires4 ,this freedom is that which we ascribe to the divinities1 who live in conformity with ,intelligence1 and with the ,desire of which it is the principle4#ahc ,,intelligence ,,has ,,conversion ,,to ,,good ,,and ,,being ,,in ,,itself4 #d4 ,we might ask how that which is produced by a desire could be autocratically free1 since the desire implies a need1 and drags us towards something exterior2 for whoever desires really yields to an inclination1 even though the latter should lead him to the ,good4 ,we might further ask whether intelligence1 doing that which is in its nature to do1 in a manner conformable to its nature1 is free and independent1 since it could have done the opposite4 ,further1 we may ask whether we have the right to attribute free will to that which does not do any deeds2 last1 whether that which does a deed1 is not1 by the mere fact that every action has a purpose1 subject to an external necessity4 ,how indeed could one attribute freedom to a being that obeys its nature8 ,we 7might answer71 how can one say of this being that it obeys1 if it be not constrained to follow something external8 ,how would the being that directs itself towards the ,good be constrained1 if its desire be voluntary1 if it direct itself towards the ,good1 knowing that it is such8 ,only involuntarily does a being depart from the ,good1 only by constraint does it direct itself towards that which is not its good2 that is the very nature of servitude1 not to be able to reach one's own good1 and to be thwarted by a superior power to which obedience is compulsory4 ,servitude displeases us1 not because it deprives us of the liberty to do evil1 but because it hinders us going towards our own1 from ensuing our own good1 forced as we are to work at the good of someone else4 ,when we speak of obeying our nature1 we distinguish 7in the being that obeys its nature7 two principles1 the one which commands1 and the other which obeys4#ahb ,but when a principle has a simple nature1 when it is a single actualization1 when it is not other in potentiality than it is in actualization1 how would it not be free8 ,it cannot be said to be acting conformably to its nature1 because its actualization is not different from its being1 and because1 within it1 essence and action coincide4 ,it surely is free1 if it act neither for another1 nor in dependence on another4 ,if the word independent be not suitable here1 if it be too weak1 we must at least understand that this ,principle does not depend on any other1 does not recognize it as the ruler of its actions1 any more than of its being1 since it itself is principle4 ,indeed1 if ,intelligence depend upon a further principle1 at least this one is not external1 but is the ,good itself4 ,if then it be in the ,good itself that it finds its welfare1 so much the more does it itself possess independence and liberty1 since it seeks them only in view of the ,good4 ,when therefore ,intelligence acts in conformity with the ,good1 it has a higher degree of independence2 for it possesses already the conversion to the ,good1 inasmuch as it proceeds from the ,good1 and the privilege of being in itself1 because ,intelligence is turned towards the ,good2 now it is better for ,intelligence to remain within itself1 since it is thus turned towards the ,good4 ,,freedom ,,of ,,will ,,and ,,virtue ,,are ,,independent ,,of ,,the ,,actions4 #e4 ,do autocratic freedom and independence inhere in pure and thinking ,intelligence exclusively1 or are they also found in the soul which applies its contemplative activity to intelligence1 and its practical activity to virtue8 ,if we grant liberty to the practical activity of the soul1 we will not extend it to its results2 for of this we are not always masters4 ,but if liberty is attributed to the soul which does good1 and which1 in everything acts by herself1 we are near the truth4 ,how would that depend on us8 ,as it depends on us to be courageous when there is a war4 ,nevertheless1 admitting that it then depends on us to be courageous1 ,i observe that1 if there were no war1 we could not perform any action of this nature4 ,likewise1 in all other virtuous deeds1 virtue always depends on accidental circumstances which force us to do some particular thing4#ahb ,now if we were to give virtue the liberty of deciding whether it desired a war1 so as to be able to offer a proof of courage2 or desired injustices1 as opportunities to define and to respect rights2 or wished that people might be poor to be able to show forth its liberality2 or whether it preferred to remain at rest1 because everything was in order2 might virtue not prefer to remain inactive in case nobody needed her services4#ahc ,similarly a good physician1 such as ,hippocrates1 for instance1 would wish that his professional services should not be needed by anybody4 ,if then virtue when applied to actions be forced to engage in such activities1 how could it possess independence in all its purity8 ,should we not say that actions are subject to ,necessity1 whilst the preliminary volition and reasoning are independent8 ,if this be so1 and since we locate free will in that which precedes its execution1 we shall also have to locate autocratic freedom and independence of virtue outside of the 7actual7 deed4 ,,virtue ,,as ,,intellectualizing ,,habit ,,liberates ,,the ,,soul4 ,what shall we now say of virtue considered as habit or disposition8 ,does it not occupy itself with regulating and moderating the passions and desires when the soul is not healthy8 ,in what sense do we then say that it depends on us to be good1 and that virtue has no master8#ahd ,in this sense1 that it is we who will and choose2 more1 in the sense that virtue1 by its assistance1 yields us liberty and independence1 and releases us from servitude4 ,if then virtue be another kind of intelligence1 a habit that intellectualizes the soul1 even in this respect must liberty be sought not in practical activity1 but in the intelligence divorced from activity4 ,,liberty ,,refers ,,to ,,the ,,interior ,,life1 ,,rather ,,than ,,to ,,the ,,exterior4 #f4 ,how then did we previously refer liberty to volition1 saying that that which depends on us1 our responsibility1 is that which occurs according to our will8 ,yes1 but we added1 or does not occur4 ,if indeed we be right1 and if we continue to support our former opinion1 we shall have to recognize that virtue and intelligence are their own mistresses1 and that it is to them that we must refer our free will and independence4 ,since they have no master1 we shall admit that 7our7 intelligence remains within itself1 that virtue must equally remain calm in itself1 regulating the soul so as to make her good1 and that in this respect it itself is both free1 and enfranchises the soul4 ,if passions or necessary actions arise1 7virtue7 directs them automatically2 nevertheless she still preserves her independence 7or1 freedom7 by getting into relations with everything4 ,for instance1 7virtue7 does not engage in exterior things to save the body in times of danger2 on the contrary1 she abandons it1 if it seem advisable2 she orders the man to renounce even life1 wealth1 children1 and fatherland2 for her object is to be honorable1 relinquishing anything beneath her dignity4 ,this evidently shows that our liberty of action and independence do not refer to practical matters1 nor to external occupations1 but to interior activity1 to thought1 to the contemplation of virtue itself4 ,this virtue must be considered as a kind of intelligence1 and must not be confused with the passions that dominate and govern reason2 for these1 as 7,plato#ahe7 says1 seem to derive something from the body1 though trained by exercise and habit4 ,,liberty ,,depends ,,on ,,the ,,highest ,,intelligence4 ,liberty therefore belongs to the immaterial principle1 and to this should be traced our free will4 ,this principle is the volition which rules itself1 and which remains within itself2 even when by necessity compelled to take some resolution affecting external affairs4 ,all that proceeds from 7the immaterial principle7 and exists by it1 depends on us1 and is free2 what is outside of it1 and with it2 what it itself wills and carries out unhindered1 also constitutes what primarily depends on us4 ,the contemplative and primary ,intelligence therefore possesses independence1 because in the accomplishment of its function it depends on no other being1 because fulfilling 7its function1 ,intelligence7 remains entirely turned towards itself1 exclusively engaged with itself1 resting in the ,good1 living according to its will1 satisfied1 and without needs4 ,besides1 will is nothing more than thought2 but it was called will because it was conformed to intelligence2 for will imitates what conforms to intelligence4 ,on the one hand1 will desires the ,good2 on the other1 for ,intelligence to think truly1 is to abide within the ,good4 ,intelligence therefore possesses what the will desires1 and1 in attaining these its desires1 will becomes thought4 ,since1 therefore1 we define liberty as the will's achievement of the ,good1 why should not liberty also be predicated of the ,intelligence which is founded on 7the ,good7 that is the object of the desire of our will8 ,if1 however1 there should still be objection to ascribing liberty to intelligence1 this could be the case only by ascribing it to something still higher 7namely1 super-,intelligence74 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,free ,,by ,,intelligence1 ,,which ,,is ,,free ,,by ,,itself4 #g4 ,the soul therefore becomes free when1 by the aid of intelligence1 she defies all obstacles in her ascent to the ,good2 and whatever she does for the sake of the ,good is responsible action4 ,intelligence1 however1 is free by itself4 ,b4 ,,of ,,the ,,free ,,will ,,of ,,the ,,supreme4 7,let us now consider the free will of the ,good47 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,the ,,desirable ,,in ,,itself4 #h4 ,the nature of the ,good is that which is desirable for its own sake4 ,it is by the ,good that the ,soul and ,intelligence exercise liberty when the ,soul can attain the ,good without obstacle1 and when ,intelligence can enjoy its possession4 ,now since the ,good's empire extends over all lower treasures2 since ,he occupies the front rank2 since ,he is the ,principle to which all beings wish to rise1 on whom they all depend1 and from whom all derive their power and liberty2 it would be difficult to attribute to ,him a liberty similar to our human freedom of will1 when we can hardly1 with propriety1 predicate such a human liberty of ,intelligence4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,free1 ,,but ,,not ,,merely ,,by ,,chance4 ,here some rash person1#ahf drawing his arguments from some other school of thought1 may object that1 ,if the ,good be indeed good1 this occurs only by chance4 ,a man is not master of what he is 7that is1 of his own nature71 because his own nature does not depend on himself 7that is1 is not due to self-determination74 ,consequently1 he enjoys neither freedom nor independence1 as he acts or withholds action as he is forced by necessity4 ,such an assertion is gratuitous1 and even self-contradictory4 ,it destroys all conception of will1 liberty and independence1 reducing these terms to being labels1 and illusions4 ,he who advances such an opinion is forced to maintain not only that it is not within the power of anybody to do or not to do some thing1 but also that the word liberty arouses no conception in his mind1 and is meaningless4 ,if however he insist that he does understand it1 he will soon be forced to acknowledge that the conception of liberty bears a conformity with the reality which he at first denied4 ,the conception of a thing exerts no interference on its substance 7being72 it can do nothing by itself1 nor can it lead to hypostatic existence4 ,it is limited to pointing out to us which being obeys others1 which being possesses free will1 which being depends on no other1 but is master of its own action1 a privilege characteristic of eternal beings so far as they are eternal1 or to beings which attain the ,good without obstacle 7like the ,soul71 or possess it 7like ,intelligence74 ,it is therefore absurd to say that the ,good1 which is above them1 seeks other higher good beyond itself4 ,,being ,,and ,,actualization ,,constitute ,,one ,,self-,,existent ,,principle4 ,nor is it any more accurate to insist that the ,good exists by chance4 ,chance occurs only in the lower and multiple things4 ,we on the contrary insist that the ,first does not exist by chance1 and that one cannot say that ,he is not master of ,his birth1 since ,he was not born4#ahg ,it is not any less absurd to assert that ,he is not free because ,he acts according to ,his nature2 for such an assertion would seem to imply that freedom consists in actions contrary to one's nature4 ,last1 ,his solitariness 7or1 unity7 does not deprive ,him of liberty1 because this unity does not result from ,his being hindered by anybody else 7from having anything else71 but from ,his being what ,he is1 from ,his satisfying 7or1 pleasing7 ,himself1 as ,he could not be any better2 otherwise1 it would be implied that one would lose one's liberty on attaining the ,good4 ,if such an assertion be absurd1 is it not the summit of absurdity to refuse to predicate autocratic liberty of the ,good because of ,his being good1 because ,he remains within ,himself and because since all beings aspire towards ,him1 ,he ,himself aspires to nothing else than ,himself1 and has no need of anything8 ,as ,his higher hypostatic existence is simultaneously ,his higher actualization--for in ,him these two aspects fuse into one1 since they do so even in ,intelligence--,his essence is no more conformed to ,his actualization1 than ,his actualization to ,his essence4 ,he cannot be said to actualize according to ,his nature1 nor that ,his actualization and ,his higher life are traced up into ,his higher being 7so to speak74 ,but as ,his higher being and ,his higher 7actualization7 are intimately united1 and coexist since all eternity1 the result is that these two entities constitute a single ,principle1 which depends on itself1 and nothing else4 ,,physical ,,qualities ,,used ,,of ,,the ,,supreme ,,only ,,by ,,analogy4 #h4 ,we conceive of the self-rule as no accident of the ,good2 but1 from the self-rule proper to 7all7 beings1 we rise1 by abstraction of the contraries1 to ,him who ,himself is liberty and independence1 thus applying to this ,principle the lower attributes that we borrow from inferior beings 7that is1 the ,soul and ,intelligence71 because of our impotence to speak properly of ,him4 ,such indeed are the terms that we could use in referring to ,him1 though it would be absolutely impossible to find the proper expression1 not only to predicate anything of ,him1 but even to say anything whatever about ,him4 ,for the most beautiful and venerable things do no more than imitate ,him1 who is their principle4 ,nevertheless1 from another standpoint1 ,he is not their principle1 since this their imitation must be denied1 and we must withdraw1 as too inferior1 even the terms liberty and self-rule1 for these terms seem to imply a tendency towards something else1 an obstacle1 even if only to avoid it2 the coexistence of other beings1 even if only to imitate ,him uninterruptedly4 ,now no tendency should be attributed to the ,good4 ,he is what ,he is before all other things1 since we do not even say of ,him1 ,he is1 so as not to establish any connection between ,him and beings4 ,neither can we say of ,him1 according to ,his nature2 for this expression indicates some later relation4 ,it is indeed applied to intelligible entities1 but only so far as they proceed from some other principle2 that is why it is applied to being1 because it is born of the 7,good74 ,but if we refer nature to temporal things1 it could not be predicated of being2 for to say that being does not exist by itself would be to affect its existence2 to say that it derives its existence from something else is equivalent to asserting that it does not exist by itself4 ,nor should we say of the ,good that ,his nature is accidental1 nor speak of contingency in connection with 7the ,divinity72 for ,he is contingent neither for ,himself nor for other beings2 contingency is found only in the multiple beings which1 already being one thing1 have accidentally become some other4 ,how indeed could the ,first exist accidentally8 for ,he did not reach ,his present condition fortuitously enough to enable us even to ask1 ,how did ,he become what ,he is8 ,no chance led ,him 7to become ,his present self71 nor led ,him to hypostatic existence2 for chance and luck did not exist anteriorly to ,him1 since even they proceed from a cause1 and exist only in things that grow#ahh 7or1 become74 ,,contingence ,,might ,,be ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,supreme1 ,,if ,,the ,,word ,,be ,,re-,,defined4 #i4 ,if however anybody applied the term contingency to the ,divinity1 we should not dispute about the word1 but go back of it to its underlying meaning4 ,do you1 by it1 mean that the ,first is a principle of particular nature and power2 and that if ,he had had a different nature1 ,he would still1 as principle1 have conformed to the nature ,he would have had8 ,also1 that if ,he had been less perfect1 ,he would still have actualized in conformity with ,his being8 ,we should answer such an assertion thus3 it was impossible for the higher ,principle of all things to be contingent2 or to be less perfect accidentally1 or good in some other manner1 as some higher thing that was less complete4 ,as the principle of all things must be better than they1 ,he must be determinate2 and by this is here meant that ,he exists in an unique manner4 ,this1 however1 not by necessity2 for necessity did not exist before ,him4 ,necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first ,principle1 though the latter impose no constraint upon them4 ,it is by ,himself that the ,first exists uniquely4 ,he could not be anything but what ,he is2 ,he is what ,he ought to have been2 and not by accident4 ,he is that2 ,he had to be what ,he was4 ,so ,he who is what ,he ought to have been is the principle of the things that ought to exist4 ,not by accident1 nor contingently1 therefore1 is ,he what ,he is2 ,he is what ,he had to be2 though here the term had to be is improper4 7,if we be permitted to explain what we mean by an illustration1 we may say that7 the other beings have to await the appearance of their king--which means1 that ,he shall posit ,himself as what ,he really is1 the true ,king1 the true ,principle1 the true ,good4 ,of ,him it must not even be said that ,he actualizes in conformity with the ,good1 for then ,he would seem subordinate to some other principle2 we must say only that ,he is what ,he is4 ,he is not conformed to the ,good1 because ,he is the ,good itself4 ,,not ,,even ,,essence ,,is ,,contingent1 ,,let ,,alone ,,super-,,essence4 ,besides1 there is nothing contingent1 even in 7that which is beneath the ,first71 namely1 ,essence-in-itself2 for if any contingency inhered in it1 it itself would be contingent4 ,but ,essence cannot be contingent1 for not fortuitously is it what it is2 nor does it derive what it is from anything else1 because the very nature of ,essence is to be ,essence4 ,this being the case1 how could ,he who is above ,essence be considered as being what ,he is fortuitously8 ,for ,he begat ,essence1 and ,essence is not what it is fortuitously1 since it exists in the same manner as ,being1 which is what is ,being and ,intelligence--otherwise1 one might even say that ,intelligence was contingent1 as if it could have been anything but what is its nature4 ,thus ,he who does not issue from ,himself1 and does not incline towards anything whatever1 is what ,he is in the most special sense4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,the ,,power ,,really ,,master ,,of ,,himself4 ,what now could be said 7to look down7 from some 7peak7 overhanging 7,essence and ,intelligence71 upon 7their principle78 ,could you describe what you saw from there as being what it is fortuitously8 ,certainly not6 ,neither ,his nature nor ,his manner would be contingent4 ,he is merely 7an absolute1 unexplainable7 existence 7a thus74 ,even this term thus1 however1 would be improper1 for1 on applying it to the ,first1 it would become determinate1 and become such a thing4 ,whoever has seen the ,first would not say ,he was1 or was not that2 otherwise1 you would be reducing ,him to the class of things which may be designated as this or that2 but the ,first is above all these things4 ,when you shall have seen ,him who is infinite 7indefinite71 you will be able to name all the things that are after ,him 7you will be able to name ,him whom all things follow72 but you must not classify ,him among these4 ,consider ,him as the universal ,power essentially master 7of himself71 which is what ,he wishes2 or rather1 who has imposed ,his will upon 7all7 beings1 but who ,himself is greater than all volition1 and who classifies volition as below ,himself4 7,to speak strictly therefore7 ,he did not even will to be what ,he is 7he did not even say1 ,i shall be that72 and no other principle made ,him be what ,he is4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,banishes ,,all ,,chance ,,by ,,assigning ,,limit ,,and ,,shape ,,to ,,each ,,form4 #aj4 ,he 7,strato the ,peripatetic87 who insists that the ,good is what it is by chance1 should be asked how he would like to have it demonstrated to him that the hypothesis of chance is false--in case it be false--and how chance could be made to disappear from the universe8 ,if there be a nature 7such as the nature of the one ,unity71 which makes 7chance7 disappear1 it itself could not be subject to chance4 ,if we subject to chance the nature which causes other beings not to be what they are by chance1 nothing will be left that could have been derived from chance4 ,but the principle of all beings banishes chance from the universe by giving to each 7being7 a form1 a limitation1 and a shape2 and it is impossible to attribute to chance the production of beings thus begotten in a manner conforming to reason4 ,a cause exists there4 ,chance reigns only in things that do not result from a plan1 which are not concatenated1 which are accidental4 ,how indeed could we attribute to chance the existence of the principle of all reason1 order1 and determination8 ,chance no doubt sways many things#ahh2 but it could not control the production of intelligence1 reason1 and order4 ,chance1 in fact1 is the contrary of reason2 how then could 7chance7 produce 7reason78 ,if chance do not beget ,intelligence1 so much the more could it not have begotten the still superior and better ,principle2 for chance had no resources from which to produce this principle2 chance itself did not exist2 and it would not have been in any manner able to impart eternal 7qualities74 ,thus1 since there is nothing anterior to the 7,divinity71 and as ,he is the ,first1 we shall have to halt our inquiry about this ,principle1 and say nothing more about ,him1 rather examining the production of the beings posterior to ,him4 ,as to ,him himself1 there is no use considering how ,he was produced1 as ,he really was not produced4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,as ,,master ,,of ,,his ,,own ,,being4 ,since ,he was not produced1 we must suppose that ,he is the master of ,his own being4 ,even if ,he were not master of ,his own being1 and if1 being what ,he is1 ,he did not endow ,himself with hypostatic form of existence1 and limited ,himself to utilizing ,his resources1 the consequence is that ,he is what ,he is necessarily1 and that ,he could not have been different from what ,he is4 ,he is what ,he is1 not because ,he could have been otherwise1 but because ,his nature is excellent4 ,indeed1 even if one be sometimes hindered from becoming better1 no one is ever hindered by any other person from becoming worse4 ,therefore1 if ,he did not issue from ,himself1 ,he owes it to ,himself1 and not to any outside hindrance2 ,he must essentially be that which has not issued from itself4 ,the impossibility of becoming worse is not a mark of impotence1 because1 if 7the ,divinity7 do not degenerate1 ,he owes it to ,himself1 7and derives it7 from ,himself4 ,his not aspiring to anything other than ,himself constitutes the highest degree of power1 since ,he is not subjected to necessity1 but constitutes the law and necessity of other beings4 ,has necessity then caused its own 7hypostatic7 existence8 ,no1 it has not even reached there1 inasmuch as all that is after the ,first achieved 7hypostatic7 existence on ,his account4 ,how then could ,he who is before 7hypostatic7 existence 7or1 which has achieved a form of existence71 have derived ,his existence from any other principle1 or even from ,himself8 ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,to ,,transcend ,,the ,,first4 #aa4 ,what then is the ,principle which one cannot even say that it is 7hypostatically7 existent8 ,this point will have to be conceded without discussion1 however1 for we cannot prosecute this inquiry4 ,what indeed would we be seeking1 when it is impossible to go beyond1 every inquiry leading to some one principle1 and ceasing there8 ,besides1 all questions refer to one of four things3 existence1 quality1 cause and essence4 ,from the beings that follow ,him1 we conclude to the essence of the ,first1 in that sense in which we say ,he exists4 ,seeking the cause of ,his existence1 however1 would amount to seeking an 7ulterior7 principle1 and the ,principle of all things cannot ,himself have a principle4 ,an effort to determine ,his quality would amount to seeking what accident inheres in ,him in whom is nothing contingent2 and there is still more clearly no possible inquiry as to ,his existence1 as we have to grasp it the best we know how1 striving not to attribute anything to ,him4 ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,god ,,puzzles ,,us ,,only ,,because ,,we ,,habitually ,,start ,,from ,,some ,,pre-,,existent ,,chaos4 7,habitually7 we are led to ask these questions about the nature 7of the divinity7 chiefly because we conceive of space and location as a chaos1 into which space and location1 that is either presented to us by our imagination1 or that really exists1 we later introduce the first ,principle4 ,this introduction amounts to a question whence and how ,he came4 ,we then treat ,him as a stranger1 and we wonder why ,he is present there1 and what is ,his being2 we usually assume ,he came up out of an abyss1 or that ,he fell from above4 ,in order to evade these questions1 therefore1 we shall have to remove from our conception 7of the divinity7 all notion of locality1 and not posit ,him within anything1 neither conceiving of ,him as eternally resting1 and founded within ,himself1 nor as if come from somewhere4 ,we shall have to content ourselves with thinking that ,he exists in the sense in which reasoning forces us to admit ,his existence1 or with persuading ourselves that location1 like everything else1 is posterior to the ,divinity1 and that it is even posterior to all things4 ,thus conceiving 7of the ,divinity7 as outside of all place1 so far as we can conceive of ,him1 we are not surrounding ,him as it were within a circle1 nor are we undertaking to measure ,his greatness1 nor are we attributing to ,him either quantity or quality2 for ,he has no shape1 not even an intelligible one2 ,he is not relative to anything1 since ,his hypostatic form of existence is contained within ,himself1 and before all else4 ,,the ,,supreme1 ,,being ,,what ,,he ,,is1 ,,is ,,not ,,produced ,,by ,,chance4 ,since 7the ,divinity7 is such1 we certainly could not say that ,he is what ,he is by chance4 ,such an assertion about ,him is impossible1 inasmuch as we can speak of ,him only by negations4#ahi ,we shall therefore have to say1 not that ,he is what ,he is by chance2 but that1 being what ,he is1 ,he is not that by chance1 since there is within ,him absolutely nothing contingent4 ,,even ,,we ,,may ,,be ,,said ,,to ,,be ,,masters ,,of ,,ourselves2 ,,how ,,much ,,more ,,the ,,supreme6 #ab4 ,shall we not even refuse to say that 7the divinity7 is what ,he is1 and is the master of what ,he is1 or of that which is still superior8 ,our soul still moots this problem1 because she is not yet entirely convinced by what we have said4 ,our considerations thereof are as follows4 ,by his body1 each one of us is far separated from being2 but by his soul1 by which he is principally constituted1 he participates in being1 and is a certain being2 that is1 he is a combination of difference and being4 ,fundamentally1 we are therefore not a being2 we are not even being2 consequently1 we are not masters of our being2 being itself rather is master of us1 since it furnishes us with difference 7which1 joined with being1 constitutes our nature74 ,as1 in a certain degree1 we are nevertheless the being that is master of us1 we may1 in this respect1 even here below1 be called masters of ourselves4 ,as to the ,principle which absolutely is what ,he is1 which is ,being itself1 so that ,he and ,his being fuse1 ,he is master of ,himself1 and depends on nothing1 either in ,his existence or being4 ,he does not even need to be master of ,himself since 7,he is being71 and since all that occupies the first rank in the intelligible world is classified as being4 ,,how ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,even ,,beyond ,,his ,,own ,,master4 ,as to ,him who made being 7equivalent to7 freedom1 whose nature it is to make free beings1 and who 7therefore7 might be called the author of liberty--excuse the expression--to what could ,he be enslaved8 ,it is ,his being 7or1 nature7 to be free2 or rather1 it is from ,him that being derives its freedom2 for 7we must not forget that7 being is posterior to ,him1 who ,himself 7being beyond it71 has none4 ,if then there be any actualization in ,him1 if we were to consider that ,he was constituted by an actualization1 ,he would nevertheless contain no difference1 ,he will be master of ,his own self that produces the actualization1 because ,he ,himself and the actualization fuse 7and are identical74 ,but if we acknowledge no actualization whatever 7in the ,divinity71 if we predicate actualization only of the things that tend towards ,him1 and from ,him derive their hypostatic existence1 we should still less recognize in ,him any element that is master1 or that masters4 ,we should not even say that ,he was master of ,himself1 nor that ,he had a master1 but because we have already predicated of being what is meant by being master of oneself4 ,we therefore classify 7the ,divinity7 in a rank higher still4 ,but how can there be a principle higher than the one that is master of ,himself8 ,in the ,principle which is master of ,himself1 as being and actualization are two 7separate7 entities1 it is actualization that furnishes the notion of being master of oneself4 ,as however we saw that actualization was identical with being1 in order to be called master of itself1 actualization must have differentiated itself from being4 ,therefore 7the ,divinity71 which is not constituted by two things fused into unity1 but by absolute ,unity1 being either only actualization1 or not even mere actualization1 could not be called master of ,himself4 ,,all ,,such ,,language ,,about ,,the ,,divinity ,,is ,,metaphorical4 #ac4 ,although the above expressions1 when applied to the 7divinity71 are really not exact1 we are nevertheless forced to use them in connection with this disquisition4 ,we therefore repeat what was above rightly stated1 that no doubleness1 not even if merely logical1 should be admitted to our idea of the ,divinity4 ,nevertheless1 that we may be better understood1 we shall for a moment lay aside the strictness of language demanded by reason4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,master ,,of ,,himself ,,because ,,his ,,very ,,essence ,,depends ,,on ,,himself4 ,now supposing the existence of actualizations in the divinity1 and that these actualizations depend on ,his will--for he could not actualize involuntarily--and that simultaneously they constitute ,his being2 in this case1 ,his will and ,his being will be identical 7that is1 will fuse74 ,such as ,he wished to be1 ,he is4 ,that ,he wills and actualizes in conformity to ,his nature1 will not be said in preference to this1 that ,his being conforms to ,his will and ,his actualization4 ,he is absolutely master of ,himself1 because ,his very essence depends on ,himself4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,a ,,unity ,,of ,,will1 ,,being ,,and ,,actualization4 ,here arises another consideration4 ,every being1 that aspires to the ,good1 wishes to be the ,good far more than to be what it is2 and thinks itself as existing most1 the more it participates in the ,good4 ,its preference is to be in such a state1 to participate in the ,good as much as possible1 because the nature of the ,good is doubtless preferable in itself4 ,the greater the portion of good possessed by a being1 the freer and more conformable to its will is its nature 7being72 then it forms but one and the same thing with its will1 and by its will achieves hypostatic existence 7or1 a form of existence74 ,so long as a being does not possess the ,good1 it wishes to be different from what it is2 so soon as the being possesses it1 the being wishes to be what it is4 ,this union1 or presence of the ,good in a being1 is not fortuitous2 its being is not outside of the ,will 7of the ,good72 by this presence of the ,good it is determined1 and on that account1 belongs to itself4 ,if then this presence of the ,good cause every being to make and determine itself1 then evidently 7the ,divinity7 is primarily and particularly the principle through which the rest may be itself4 ,the being 7of the ,good7 is intimately united with the will 7the ,divinity7 has to be such as ,he is--if ,i may be permitted to speak thus--and ,he cannot be understood unless ,he wishes to be what ,he is4 ,as in ,him everything concurs 7in a consummation71 ,he wishes to be1 and is what ,he wishes2 ,his will and ,himself form but one 7are identical1 or1 fuse74 ,he is not any the less one1 for ,he finds that ,he is precisely what ,he may have wished to be4 ,what indeed could ,he have wished to be1 if not what ,he is8 ,,the ,,supreme ,,would ,,wish ,,to ,,be ,,what ,,he ,,is4 ,now supposing that 7the divinity7 were given the chance to choose what ,he would like to be1 and that ,he were permitted to change ,his nature1 ,he would not desire to become different from what ,he is2 ,he would not find in ,himself anything that displeased ,him1 as if ,he had been forced to be what ,he is2 for ,he as ever willed1 and still wills to be what ,he is4 ,the nature of ,good is really ,his will2 ,he has neither yielded to a lure1 nor 7blindly7 followed his own nature1 but ,he preferred ,himself1 because there was nothing different that ,he could have wished to be4 ,with this1 contrast that other beings do not find implied in their own being the reason of pleasing themselves1 and that some of them are even dissatisfied with themselves4 ,in the hypostatic existence of the ,good1 however1 is necessarily contained self-choice1 and self-desire2 otherwise1 there would be nothing in the whole universe that could please itself1 since one pleases himself only inasmuch as he participates in the ,good1 and possesses an image of it within oneself4 ,,every ,,term1 ,,when ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,divinity1 ,,should ,,be ,,preceded ,,by ,a ,,particle ,,reminding ,,it ,,is ,,only ,,used ,,metaphorically4 ,we must1 however1 ask indulgence for our language2 when speaking of the 7divinity7 we are1 by the necessity of being understood1 obliged to make use of words which a meticulous accuracy would question4 ,each of them should be prefixed by a 7warning7 particle1 7meaning somewhat1 or7 higher4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,choice1 ,,being1 ,,will1 ,,self-,,direction1 ,,and ,,self-,,existence4 ,the subsistence of the ,good implies that of choice and will1 because ,he could not exist without these two4 ,but 7in the ,divinity7 7these three1 choice1 being and will7 do not form a multiplicity2 they must be considered as having fused4 ,since ,he is the author of will1 ,he must evidently also be the author of what is called self-direction 7being for oneself74 ,this leads us to say that ,he made ,himself2 for1 since ,he is the author of will1 and as this will is more or less ,his work1 and as it is identical with ,his essence1 7we may say that7 ,he gave himself the form of 7hypostatic7 existence4 ,not by chance therefore is ,he what ,he is2 ,he is what ,he is because ,he wished to be such4 ,,in ,,analysis ,,contingency ,,is ,,eliminated4 #ad4 ,here is still another point of view from which the subject under discussion may be regarded4 ,each one of the beings that are said to be existent1 is either identical with its essence1 or differs from it4 ,thus1 some particular man differs from the ,man-essence1 only participating therein4 ,on the contrary1 the soul is identical with the ,soul-essence1 when she is simple1 and when she is not predicated of anything else4 ,likewise1 the ,man-in-himself is identical with the ,man-essence4 ,the man who is other than the ,man-essence is contingent2 but the ,man-essence is not contingent2 the ,man-in-himself exists in himself4 ,if then the essence of man exist by itself1 if it be neither fortuitous nor contingent1 how could contingency be predicated of ,him who is superior to ,man in himself1 and who begat him1 from whom all beings are derived1 since ,his is a nature simpler than the ,man-essence1 and even of essence in general8 ,if1 in ascending towards greater simplicity1 contingency decreases1 so much the more impossible is it that contingency could extend to the ,nature that is the simplest 7namely1 the ,good74 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,both ,,being ,,and ,,cause4 ,let us also remember that each of the beings which exist genuinely1 as we have said1 and which have received their form of hypostatic existence from the ,good1 likewise owe it to ,him that they are individual1 as are the similarly situated sense-beings4 ,by such individual beings is here meant having in one's own being the cause of his hypostatic existence4 ,consequently1 ,he who then contemplates things can give an account of each of their details1 to give the cause of the individuality of eyes or feet1 to show that the cause of the generation of each part is found in its relations with the other parts1 and that they have all been made for each other4 ,why are the feet of a particular length8 ,because some other organ is such2 for instance1 the face being such1 the feet themselves must be such4 ,in one word1 the universal harmony#aij is the cause on account of which all things were made for each other4#aia ,why is the individual such a thing8 ,because of the ,man-essence4 ,therefore the essence and the cause coincide4 ,they issued from the same source1 from the ,principle which1 without having need of reasoning1 produced together the essence and the cause4 ,thus the source of the essence and the cause produces them both simultaneously4 ,such then are begotten things1 such is their principle1 but in a much superior and truer manner2 for in respect of excellence1 it possesses an immense superiority over them4 ,now since it is not fortuitously1 neither by chance1 nor contingently1 that the things which bear their cause in themselves1 are what they are2 since1 on the other hand1 7the ,divinity7 possesses all the entities of which ,he is the principle1 evidently1 being the ,father of reason1 of cause1 and of causal being--all of them entities entirely free from contingence--he is the ,principle and type of all things that are not contingent1 the ,principle which is really and in the highest degree independent of chance1 of fortune1 and of contingency2 ,he is the cause of ,himself1 ,he is ,he by virtue of ,himself2 for ,he is ,self in a primary and transcendent manner4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,co-,,exists ,,with ,,himself1 ,,and ,,is ,,such ,,as ,,he ,,wishes ,,to ,,be4 #ae4 ,he is simultaneously the lovable and love2 ,he is love of himself2 for ,he is beautiful only by and in ,himself4 ,he coexists with ,himself only on condition that the thing1 which exists in ,himself1 is identical with ,him4 ,now as in ,him the thing that coexists is identical with ,him1 and as in ,him also that which desires1 and that which is desirable play the part of hypostasis and subject1 here once more appears the identity of desire and being4 ,if this be so1 it is evidently again ,he who is the author of ,himself1 and the master of ,himself2 consequently1 ,he was made not such as some other being desired it1 but ,he is such as ,he ,himself desires4 ,,men ,,escape ,,chance ,,by ,,inferior ,,isolation2 ,,therefore ,,the ,,supreme ,,must ,,be ,,free4 ,when we assert that 7the ,divinity7 ,himself receives nothing1 and is received by no other being1 we thereby in another way prove that ,he is what ,he is1 not by chance4 ,this is the case because ,he isolates ,himself1 and preserves ,himself uninfected from all things4 ,besides1 we sometimes see that our nature possesses something similar1 when it finds itself disengaged from all that is attached to us1 and subjects us to the sway of fortune and fatality--for all the things that we call ours are dependent1 and undergo the law of fortune1 happening to us fortuitously4 ,only in this manner is one master of himself1 possessing free will1 by virtue of an actualization of the light which has the form of the ,good1 of an actualization of the ,good1 which is superior to intelligence2 of an actualization which is not adventitious1 and which is above all thought4 ,when we shall have risen thither1 when we shall have become that alone1 leaving all the rest1 shall we not say that we are then above even liberty and free will8 ,who then could subject us to chance1 to fortune1 to contingency1 since we shall have become the genuine life1 or rather1 since we shall be in ,him who derives nothing from any other being1 who is solely himself8 ,when other beings are isolated1 they do not suffice themselves2 but ,he is what ,he is1 even when isolated4 ,,the ,,ascent ,,of ,,life ,,witness ,,to ,,the ,,disappearance ,,of ,,contingency4 ,the first hypostatic form of existence does not consist in an inanimate entity or in an irrational life2 for an irrational life is but weak in essence1 being a dispersion of reason1 and something indeterminate4 ,on the contrary1 the closer life approaches reason1 the further is it from contingency1 for that which is rational has nothing to do with chance4 ,ascending then 7to the ,divinity7 ,he does not seem to us to be ,reason1 but what is still more beautiful than ,reason2 so far is ,he from having arisen by chance6 ,indeed1 ,he is the very root of ,reason1 for it is the goal at which all things find their consummation4 ,he is the principle and foundation of an immense ,tree which lives by reason2 ,he remains in ,himself1 and imparts essence to the ,tree by the reason ,he communicates4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,as ,,everywhere ,,and ,,nowhere2 ,,as ,,inclination ,,and ,,immanence4 #af4 ,as we assert1 and as it seems evident that 7the ,divinity7 is everywhere and nowhere1 it is necessary thoroughly to grasp and understand this conception1 as it applies to the subject of our studies4 ,since 7the ,divinity7 is nowhere1 ,he is nowhere fortuitously2 since ,he is everywhere1 ,he is everywhere what ,he is4 ,he himself is therefore what is named omnipresence1 and universality4 ,he is not contained within omnipresence1 but is omnipresence itself1 and ,he imparts essence to all the other beings because they are all contained within ,him who is everywhere4 ,possessing the supreme rank1 or rather ,himself being supreme1 ,he holds all things in obedience to ,himself4 ,for them ,he is not contingent2 it is they that are contingent to ,him1 or rather1 that connect with ,him2 for it is not ,he who contemplates them1 but they who look at ,him4 ,on ,his part1 ,he1 as it were1 moves towards the most intimate depths within ,himself1 loving ,himself1 loving the pure radiance of which ,he is formed1 ,himself being what ,he loves1 that is1 giving ,himself a hypostatic form of existence1 because ,he is an immanent actualization1 and what is most lovable in ,him constitutes the higher ,intelligence4 ,this ,intelligence being an operation1 ,he himself is an operation2 but as ,he is not the operation of any other principle1 ,he is the operation of ,himself2 ,he therefore is not what chance makes of ,him1 but what ,he actualizes4 ,he is the author of ,himself1 inasmuch as ,he exists particularly because ,he is ,his own foundation1 because ,he contemplates ,himself1 because1 so to speak1 ,he passes ,his existence in contemplating ,himself4 ,he therefore is1 not what ,he fortuitously found ,himself to be1 but what ,he himself wishes to be1 and as ,his will contains nothing fortuitous1 ,he is even in this respect independent of contingency4 ,for1 since ,his will is the will of the ,best that is in the universe1 it could not be fortuitous4 ,if one were to imagine an opposite movement1 one will easily recognize that ,his inclination towards ,himself1 which is ,his actualization1 and ,his immanence in ,himself make of ,him what ,he is4 ,indeed1 should 7the divinity7 incline towards what is outside of ,himself1 ,he would cease being what ,he is4 ,his actualization1 in respect to ,himself1 is to be what ,he is2 for ,he and that actualization coincide4 ,he therefore gives ,himself a hypostatic form of existence1 because the actualization that ,he produces is inseparable from ,himself4 ,if then the actualization of 7the divinity7 did not merely commence1 but if1 on the contrary1 it dated from all eternity2 if it consist in an exciting action1#aib identical to ,him who is excited2 and if1 besides this exciting action1 ,he be ever-being super-intellection1 then 7the divinity7 is what ,he makes himself by ,his exciting action4 ,the latter is superior to ,being1 to ,intelligence1 and to the ,life of ,wisdom2 it is ,himself4 ,he therefore is an actualization superior to ,life1 ,intelligence and ,wisdom2 these proceed from ,him1 and from ,him alone4 ,he therefore derives essence from ,himself1 and by ,himself2 consequently1 ,he is1 not what ,he fortuitously found ,himself to be1 but what ,he willed to be4 ,,providence1 ,,the ,,plan ,,of ,,the ,,universe1 ,,is ,,from ,,eternity4 #ag4 ,here is another proof of it4 ,we have stated that the world and the being it contains are what they would be if their production had been the result of a voluntary determination of their author1 what they would still be if the divinity exercising a prevision and prescience based on reasoning1 had done ,his work according to ,providence4 ,but as 7these beings7 are or become what they are from all eternity1 there must also1 from eternity--within the coexistent beings1 exist 7seminal7 reasons which subsist in a plan more perfect 7than that of our universe72 consequently1 the intelligible entities are above ,providence1 and choice2 and all the things which exist in ,essence subsist eternally there1 in an entirely intellectual existence4 ,if the name ,providence be applied to the plan of the universe1 then immanent ,intelligence certainly is anterior to the plan of the universe1 and the latter proceeds from immanent ,intelligence1 and conforms thereto4#aic ,,the ,,supreme1 ,,assisted ,,by ,,intelligence1 ,,would ,,have ,,no ,,room ,,for ,,chance4 ,since ,intelligence is thus anterior to all things1 and since all things are 7rooted7 in such an ,intelligence as principle1 ,intelligence cannot be what it is as a matter of chance4 ,for1 if on one hand1 ,intelligence be multiple1 on the other hand it is in perfect agreement with itself1 so that1 by co-ordination of the elements it contains1 it forms a unity4 ,once more1 such a principle that is both multiple and co-ordinated manifoldness1 which contains all 7seminal7 reasons by embracing them within its own universality1 could not be what it is as a result of fortune or chance4 ,this principle must have an entirely opposite nature1 as much differing from contingency1 as reason from chance1 which consists in the lack of reason4 ,if the above ,intelligence be the 7supreme7 ,principle1 then ,intelligence1 such as it has been here described1 is similar to this ,principle1 conforms to it1 participates in it1 and is such as is wished by it and its power4 7,the ,divinity7 being indivisible1 is therefore a 7single7 ,reason that embraces everything1 a single 7unitary7 ,number1 and a single 7,divinity7 that is greater and more powerful than the generated 7universe72 than ,he1 none is greater or better4 ,from none other1 therefore1 can ,he have derived ,his essence or qualities4 ,what ,he is for and in ,himself1 is therefore derived from ,himself2 without any relation with the outside1 nor with any other being1 but entirely turned towards ,himself4 ,,chance ,,could ,,not ,,cause ,,the ,,one ,,that ,,is ,,the ,,centre ,,of ,,the ,,circular ,,intelligence4 #ah4 ,if then you seek this 7,principle71 do not expect to find anything on the outside of ,him2 in ,him seek all that is after ,him1 but do not seek to penetrate within ,him2 for ,he is what is outside 7of everything71 the comprehension of all things1 and their measure4#aid ,simultaneously1 ,he is the internal1 being the most intimate depth of all things2 7in which case7 the external would be 7represented by7 ,reason and ,intelligence1 which like a circumference fit around ,him and depend from ,him4 ,indeed1 ,intelligence is such only because it touches ,him1 and so far as it touches ,him1 and depends from ,him#aie2 for it is its dependence from ,him that constitutes its intelligence4 ,it resembles a circle which is in contact with its centre4 ,it would be universally acknowledged that such a circle would derive all its power from the centre1 and would1 in a higher sense1 be centriform4 ,thus the radii of such a circle unite in a single centre by extremities similar to the distal and originating 7extremities74 ,these 7distal7 extremities1 though they be similar to the centric ones1 are nevertheless but faint traces thereof2 for the latter's potentiality includes both the radii and their 7distal7 extremities2 it is everywhere present in the radii1 manifests its nature therein1 as an immature development4 ,this is an illustration how ,intelligence and ,essence were born from 7the divinity7 as by effusion or development2 and by remaining dependent from the intellectual nature of the ,unity1 it thereby manifests an inherent higher ,intelligence1 which 7speaking strictly71 is not intelligence1 since it is the absolute ,unity4 ,a centre1 even without radii or circumference1 is nevertheless the father of the circumference and the radii1 for it reveals traces of its nature1 and by virtue of an immanent potency1 and individual force1 it begets the circumference and the radii which never separate from it4 ,similarly1 the ,one is the higher archetype of the intellectual power which moves around ,him1 being ,his image4 ,for in the ,unity there is a higher ,intelligence which1 so to speak1 moving in all directions and manners1 thereby becomes ,intelligence2 while the ,unity1 dwelling above ,intelligence1 begets it by its power4 ,how then could fortune1 contingency and chance approach this intelligence-begetting ,power1 a power that is genuinely and essentially creative8 ,such then is what is in ,intelligence1 and such is what is in ,unity1 though that which is in ,him is far superior4 ,,as ,,cause1 ,,suitability1 ,,and ,,opportunity1 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,beyond ,,chance4 7,as illustration71 consider the radiance shed afar by some luminous source that remains within itself2 the radiation would represent the image1 while the source from which it issues would be the genuine light4#aif ,nevertheless1 the radiation1 which represents the intelligence1 is not an image that has a form foreign 7to its principle71 for it does not exist by chance1 being reason and cause in each of its parts4 ,unity then is the cause of the cause2 ,he is1 in the truest sense1 supreme causality1 simultaneously containing all the intellectual causes ,he is to produce2 this1 ,his offspring1 is begotten not as a result of chance1 but according to ,his own volition4 ,his volition1 however1 was not irrational1 fortuitous1 nor accidental2 and as nothing is fortuitous in ,him1 ,his will was exactly suitable4 ,therefore ,plato#aig called it the suitable1 and the timely1 to express as clearly as possible that the 7,divinity7 is foreign to all chance1 and that ,he is that which is exactly suitable4 ,now if ,he be exactly suitable1 ,he is so not irrationally4 ,if ,he be timely1 ,he must 7by a ,greek pun71 also be supremely sovereign over the 7beings7 beneath ,him4 ,so much the more will ,he be timely for ,himself4 ,not by chance therefore is ,he what ,he is1 for ,he willed to be what ,he is2 ,he wills suitable things1 and in ,him that which is suitable1 and the actualization thereof1 coincide4 ,he is the suitable1 not as a subject1 but as primary actualization manifesting ,him such as it was suitable for ,him to be4 ,that is the best description we can give of ,him1 in our impotence to express ourselves about ,him as we should like4#aih ,,no ,,person ,,who ,,has ,,seen ,,the ,,supreme ,,could ,,possibly ,,call ,,him ,,chance4 #ai4 ,by the use of the above indications 7it is possible71 to ascend to ,him4 ,having done so1 grasp ,him4 ,then you will be able to contemplate ,him1 and you will find no terms to describe ,his 7greatness74 ,when you shall see ,him1 and resign any attempt at spoken description1 you will proclaim that ,he exists by ,himself in a way such that1 if ,he had any being1 it would be ,his servant1 and would be derived from ,him4 ,no one who has ever seen ,him would have the audacity to maintain that ,he is what ,he is by chance2 nor even to utter such a blasphemy1 for ,he would be confounded by his own temerity4 ,having ascended to ,him1 the 7human observer7 could not even locate ,his presence1 as it were rising up everywhere before the eyes of his soul4 ,whichever way the soul directs her glances1 she sees ,him1 unless1 on considering some other object1 she abandons the divinity by ceasing to think of ,him4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,above ,,being ,,because ,,not ,,dependent ,,thereon4 ,the ancient 7philosophers71 in enigmatical utterances1 said that 7the divinity7 is above being4#aii ,this must be understood to mean not only that ,he begets being1 but because ,he is not dependent on being or on ,himself4 ,not even ,his own being is to ,him a principle2 for ,he himself is the principle of being4 ,not for ,himself did he make it2 but1 having made it1 ,he left it outside of ,himself1 because ,he has no need of essence1 since ,he himself made it4 ,thus1 even though ,he exist1 ,he does not produce that which is meant by that verb4 ,,having ,,made ,,himself ,,does ,,not ,,imply ,,any ,,priority ,,in ,,the ,,divinity4 #bj4 ,it will be objected that the above implies the existence 7of the ,divinity7 before ,he existed2 for1 if ,he made ,himself1 on the one hand1 ,he did not yet exist1 if it was ,himself that ,he made2 and on the other1 so far as it was ,he who made1 ,he already existed before ,himself1 since what has been made was ,himself4 ,however1 7the ,divinity7 should be considered not so much as being made but as making1 and we should realize that the actualization by which ,he created ,himself is absolute2 for ,his actualization does not result in the production of any other being4 ,he produces nothing but ,himself1 ,he is entirely ,himself2 we are not dealing here with two things1 but with a single entity4 ,neither need we hesitate to admit that the primary actualization has no being2 but that actualization should be considered as constituting ,his hypostatic form of existence4 ,if within ,him these two were to be distinguished1 the superlatively perfect ,principle would be incomplete and imperfect4 ,to add actualization to ,him would be to destroy ,his unity4 ,thus1 since the actualization is more perfect than ,his being1 and since that which is primary is the most perfect1 that which is primary must necessarily be actualization4 ,he is what ,he is as soon as ,he actualizes4 ,he cannot be said to have existed before ,he made ,himself2 for before ,he made ,himself ,he did not exist2 but 7from the first actualization7 ,he already existed in entirety4 ,he therefore is an actualization which does not depend on being1 7an actualization7 that is clearly free2 and thus ,he 7originates7 from ,himself4 ,if1 as to ,his essence1 ,he were preserved by some other principle1 ,he himself would not be the first proceeding from ,himself4 ,he is said to contain ,himself because ,he produces 7and parades7 ,himself2 since it is from the very beginning that ,he caused the existence of what ,he naturally contains4 ,strictly1 we might indeed say1 that ,he made ,himself1 if there existed a time when ,he himself began to exist4 ,but since ,he was what ,he is before all times1 the statement that ,he made ,himself means merely that having made and himself are inseparable2 for ,his essence coincides with ,his creative act1 and1 if ,i may be permitted to speak thus1 with his eternal generation4 ,,how ,,the ,,supreme ,,may ,,be ,,said ,,to ,,command ,,himself4 ,likewise1 the statement that the 7divinity7 commands ,himself may be taken strictly1 if in ,him be two entities 7the commander and the commanded72 but if 7we may not distinguish such a pair of entities7 there is only one entity within ,him1 and ,he is only the commander1 containing nothing that obeys4 ,how then1 if ,he contain nothing that was commanded1 could ,he command ,himself8 ,the statement that ,he commands ,himself means that1 in this sense1 there is nothing above ,him2 in which case ,he is the ,first1 not on account of the numerical order1 but by ,his authority and perfectly free power4 ,if ,he be perfectly free1 ,he cannot contain anything that is not free2 ,he must therefore be entirely free within ,himself4 ,does ,he contain anything that is not ,himself1 that ,he does not do1 that is not ,his work8 ,if indeed ,he contained anything that was not ,his work1 ,he would be neither perfectly free nor omnipotent2 ,he would not be free1 because ,he would not dominate this thing2 nor would ,he be omnipotent1 because the thing whose making would not be in ,his power would even thereby evade ,his dominion4 ,,further ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,self-,,autocracy ,,of ,,the ,,divinity4 #ba4 ,could 7the divinity7 have made ,himself different from what ,he made ,himself8 7,if he could not1 ,he would not have been omnipotent74 ,if you remove from ,him the power of doing evil1 you thereby also remove the power of doing good4 7,in the divinity71 power does not consist in the ability to make contraries2 it is a constant and immutable power whose perfection consisted precisely in not departing from unity2 for the power to make contraries is a characteristic of a being incapable of continuously persisting in the best4 ,self-creation 7the actualization by which the divinity created ,himself7 exists once for all1 for it is perfect4 ,who indeed could change an actualization produced by the will of the ,divinity1 an actualization that constitutes ,his very will8 ,but how then was this actualization produced by the volition 7of the divinity7 which did not yet exist8 ,what could be meant by the volition of 7the ,divinity7 if ,he had not yet willed hypostatic form of existence 7for ,himself78 ,whence then came ,his will8 ,would it have come from ,his being 7which1 according to the above objection7 was not yet actualized8 ,but ,his will was already within ,his being4 ,in the 7,divinity71 therefore1 there is nothing which differs from ,his being4 ,otherwise1 there would have been in ,him something that would not have been ,his will4 ,thus1 everything in ,him was will2 there was in ,him nothing that did not exercise volition2 nothing which1 therefore1 was anterior to ,his volition4 ,therefore1 from the very beginning1 the will was ,he2 therefore1 the 7,divinity7 is as and such as ,he willed it to be4 ,when we speak of what was the consequence of the will 7of the ,divinity71 of what ,his will has produced1 7we must indeed conclude that7 ,his will produced nothing that ,he was not already4 ,the statement that 7the ,divinity7 contains ,himself means 7no more than that7 all the other beings that proceed from ,him are by ,him sustained4 ,they indeed exist by a sort of participation in ,him1 and they relate back to ,him4 7,the ,divinity7 ,himself does not need to be contained or to participate2 ,he is all things for ,himself2 or rather1 ,he is nothing for ,himself1 because ,he has no need of all the other things in respect to ,himself4 ,,the ,,obstacle ,,to ,,the ,,divinity ,,is ,,failure ,,to ,,abstract ,,enough ,,from ,,him4 ,thus1 whenever you wish to speak of 7the ,divinity71 or to gain a conception of ,him1 put aside all the rest4 ,when you will have made abstraction of all the rest1 and when you will thus have isolated 7the ,divinity71 do not seek to add anything to ,him2 rather examine whether1 in your thought1 you have not omitted to abstract something from ,him4 ,thus you can rise to a ,principle of whom you could not later either assert or conceive anything else4 ,classify in the supreme rank1 therefore1 none but ,he who really is free1 because ,he is not even dependence on ,himself2 and because he merely is ,himself1 essentially ,himself1 while each of the other beings is itself1 and something else besides4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,one4 ,of the ,heaven4#bjj ,,heaven1 ,,though ,,in ,,flux1 ,,perpetuates ,,itself ,,by ,,form4 #a4 ,nothing will be explained by the perfectly true 7,stoic7 statement that the world1 as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever exist1 is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition of the divinity4 ,we might find an analogy between the change of the elements1 and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of the species here below1 and the universe above1 whose body is subject to a perpetual flux and flow4 ,thus the divine volition could preserve for it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations1 so that1 without perpetually retaining numerical unity1 it would ever preserve the specific unity of form4 ,it would indeed be a remarkable discrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the form alone should be perpetual1 while in the heaven and the stars their individuality should be considered as perpetual as their form4 ,,there ,,must ,,inevitably ,,be ,,change ,,in ,,heaven4 ,the incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing within its breast all things1#bja and to the non-existence of any other thing into which it could change1 as well as to the impossibility of its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it4 ,these theories would indeed1 in a reasonable manner1 explain the incorruptibility of heaven considered as totality1 and universe2 but would fail to explain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are parts of heaven1 instead of being the whole universe1 as is the heaven4 ,it would seem more reasonable that1 just like the fire and similar things1 the stars1 and the world considered as universe would possess a perpetuity chiefly of form4 ,it is quite possible that the heaven1 without meeting any destructive exterior thing1 should be subjected to a perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical but the form1 from the mere mutual destruction of its parts4 ,in this case its substrate1 being in a perpetual flux1 would receive its form from some other principle2 and we would be driven to recognize in the universal living ,organism what occurs in man1 in the horse1 and in other animals2 namely1 that the man or horse 7considered as species7 lasts forever1 while the individual changes4 7,according to this view1 then7 the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent part1 the heaven1 and another ceaselessly changing one1 composed of terrestrial things4 ,all these things will then be subject to the same condition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration1 since celestial bodies are more durable4 ,such a conception of the perpetuity characteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity 7than the popular notion71 and would be freed from all doubt if we were to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the universe in this manner4 ,the theory that the world contains something perpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration that the divine volition can produce such an effect1 but also an explanation why certain things 7according to that theory7 are always identical 7in form and individuality71 while other things are identical only by their form4 ,if the parts of the heaven alone remained identical 7by their individuality71 all other things also should logically remain 7individually7 identical4 ,,rejection ,,of ,,the ,,opinion ,,of ,,heraclitus4 #b4 ,an admission that the heaven and the stars are perpetual in their individuality1 while sublunary things are perpetual only in their form1 would demand demonstration that a corporeal being can preserve its individuality as well as its form1 even though the nature of bodies were a continual fluctuation4 ,such is the nature that the physical philosophers1#bjb and even ,plato himself1 attribute not only to sublunar bodies1 but even to celestial ones4 ,for1 asks 7,plato#bjc71 how could corporeal and visible objects subsist ever immutable and identical with themselves8 7,plato7 therefore admits the opinion of ,heraclitus that the sun itself is in a state of perpetual becoming 7or1 growth74#bjd ,,aristotle ,,has ,,to ,,depend ,,on ,,quintessence4 ,on the contrary1 in the system of ,aristotle1 the immutability of the stars is easily explained1 but only after accepting his theory of a fifth element 7the quintessence#bje74 ,if1 however1 it be rejected1 it would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven1 let alone its parts1 the sun and the stars1 do not perish1 while 7as ,aristotle does7 we regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements as terrestrial animals4 ,,plotinos',s ,,views ,,supported ,,by ,,the ,,heaven',s ,,possession ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,and ,,body4 ,as every animal is composed of soul and body1 the heaven must owe the permanence of its individuality to the nature either of its soul1 or of its body2 or again1 to that of both4 ,on the hypothesis that its incorruptibility is due to the nature of its body1 the ,soul's only function will be to animate it 7by uniting with the body of the world74 ,on the contrary hypothesis that the body1 by nature corruptible1 owes its incorruptibility exclusively to the ,soul1 there is need of demonstration that the state of the body does not naturally oppose this constitution and permanence 7for1 naturally constituted objects admit of no disharmony72 but that1 on the contrary1 here matter1 by its predisposition1 contributes to the accomplishment of the divine volition4 ,,fluctuation ,,need ,,not ,,interfere ,,with ,,continuance4 #c4 7,it might however be objected7 that the body of the world could not contribute to the immortality of the world1 since the body itself fluctuates perpetually4 ,but this fluctuation does not take place in an outward direction1 while the body 7of the world7 remains ever the same because this fluctuation occurs so entirely within the world that nothing issues therefrom4 ,the world therefore could neither increase nor diminish1 nor further grow old4 7,as proof of this we may7 consider how1 from all eternity1 the earth constantly preserves the same shape and mass2 similarly1 the air never diminishes1 any more than the water4 ,the changes within them do not affect the universal living ,organism4 ,even we human beings subsist a long while1 in spite of the perpetual change of our constituent parts1 and though some of these parts even issue from the body4 ,so much the more will the world's nature1 from which nothing issues1 sufficiently harmonize with the nature of the universal ,soul to form along with her an organism which ever remains the same1 and subsists for ever4 ,,fire1 ,,though ,,an ,,apparent ,,exception1 ,,still ,,conforms ,,to ,,this ,,procedure4 ,for example1 fire 7as the principal element of the heaven71 is both lively and swift1 and cannot remain in the inferior regions1 any more than the earth can abide in the superior regions4 ,when it has reached these regions where it is to remain1 it becomes established in the most suitable place4 ,but even so1 like all other bodies1 it still seeks to extend in all directions4 ,however1 it cannot ascend1 since there is no place higher than the one it occupies2 nor can it descend1 because of the opposition of its own nature4 ,the only thing left for it to do is to yield to the guidance and natural impulsion of the life-imparting universal ,soul1 that is1 to move into the most beautiful place1 in the universal ,soul4 ,its falling from here is prevented by the universal ,soul's circular movement which dominates and supports it1 as well as by its innate indisposition to descend1 so that its continuance in the higher regions is unopposed4 7,the fire has no similarity with7 the constitutive parts of our body which are forced to derive their suitable form from elsewhere4 ,if unaided1 they are not even capable of preserving their organization4 ,merely to subsist1 they are forced to borrow parts from other objects4 ,the case is entirely different with the fire of the heaven1 which needs no food because it loses nothing4 ,if indeed it allowed anything to escape1 we might indeed be forced to state that when in the heaven a fire is extinguished1 a substitute must be lit4 ,but in such a case the universal living ,organism would no more remain identical4 ,,the ,,immortality ,,of ,,the ,,heaven ,,is ,,due ,,to ,,residence ,,there ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 #d4 ,apart from the exigencies of our argument1 it may be interesting to consider whether there be any wastage off from heaven1 so as to create a need of being 7replenished or7 fed1 so to speak2 or whether all its contents1 being once for all established1 subsist there naturally1 without allowing any of their substance to escape4 ,in the latter case we would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed of fire exclusively or principally#bac2 and whether1 while dominating the other elements1 the fire engages them in its course4 ,were we to associate 7with fire7 the ,soul1 which is the most powerful of all causes1 so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent 7just as1 in other animals1 the soul chooses the best parts of the body as dwelling-place71 we would have produced a solid argument for the immortality of the heaven4 ,aristotle indeed says that the flame surges1 and that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity#bjf2 but he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire1 for the celestial fire is calm1 immovable1 and in harmony with the nature of the stars4 ,,the ,,heaven',s ,,immortality ,,also ,,due ,,to ,,the ,,universal ,,soul',s ,,spontaneous ,,motion4 ,a still more important reason for the immortality of the heaven is that the universal ,soul1 moving with remarkable spontaneity1 immediately succeeds the most perfect principles 7such as the ,good1 and ,intelligence74 ,she could not therefore allow the annihilation of anything which had once been posited within her4 ,ignorance of the cause that contains the universe could alone permit denial that the universal ,soul which emanates from the divinity excels all other bonds in strength4 ,it is absurd to believe that after having contained something during a certain period1 she could ever cease doing so4 ,this would imply that she had done so till now by some violence2 which would again infer the existence of some plan more natural than the actual state1 and actual admirable disposition of beings within the very constitution of the universe2 which would lastly suggest a force capable of destroying the organization of the universe1 and of undermining the sovereignty of the governing ,soul4 ,,the ,,immortality ,,of ,,the ,,heaven ,,proved ,,by ,,its ,,never ,,having ,,had ,,to ,,begin4 ,we have elsewhere#bjg shown that it would be absurd to suppose that the world ever had a beginning4 ,this however implies that it will never cease to exist4 ,why indeed should it not continue to do so8 ,its component elements are not1 like wood1 and similar things1 exposed to wastage4 ,their continued subsistence1 however1 implies that the universe that they form must also ever subsist4 ,on the other hand1 even if they were subject to a perpetual change1 the universe must still subsist because the principle of this change subsists continually4 ,moreover1 it has elsewhere been shown#bbd that the universal ,soul is not subject to repentance1 because she governs the universe without difficulties or fatigue1 and that even in the impossible case that the body of the universe should happen to perish1 she would not thereby be altered4 ,,why ,,celestial ,,things ,,last ,,longer ,,than ,,terrestrial ,,ones4 #e4 ,the reason why celestial things endure beyond terrestrial animals and elements has been thus stated by ,plato#bbe3 ,divine animals were formed by the divinity ,himself1 while the animals here below were formed by the divinities1 ,his offspring4 ,what the divinity 7,himself7 does could not possibly perish4 ,this implies the existence1 below the demiurge 7,intelligence71 of the celestial ,soul1 with our souls4#bjh ,from the celestial ,soul derives and flows an apparent-form-of-an-image1#bji which forms terrestrial animals4 ,this inferior soul imitates her intelligible principle 7the celestial ,soul71 without1 however1 being able to resemble her completely--because she employs elements which are less good 7than the celestial elements72 because the place where she operates with them is less good 7than heaven7--and because the materials that she organizes could not remain united4 ,consequently1 terrestrial animals could not last for ever4 ,for the same reason this soul does not dominate terrestrial bodies with as much power 7as the celestial ,soul dominates celestial things71 because each of them is governed by another 7human7 soul4 ,,immortality ,,does ,,not ,,extend ,,to ,,the ,,sub-,,lunar ,,sphere4 ,if we be right in attributing immortality to the heaven1 we shall have to extend that conception to the stars it contains2 for unless its parts endured1 neither could the heaven4 ,however1 the things beneath the heaven do not form part of it4 ,the region which constitutes the heaven does not extend further down than the moon4 ,as to us1 having our organs formed by the 7vegetative7 soul which was given us by the celestial divinities 7the stars71 and even the heaven itself1#baj we are united to the body by that soul4 ,indeed1 the other soul 7the reasonable soul71 which constitutes our person1 our me1#baa is not the cause of our being1#bab but of our well-being 7which consists in our intellectual life74 ,she comes to join our body when it is already formed 7by the vegetative soul71 and contributes to our being only by one part1 by giving us reason 7in making of us reasonable beings1 and men74 ,,the ,,stars ,,contain ,,not ,,only ,,fire1 ,,but ,,tangible ,,earth4 #f4 ,is the heaven composed exclusively of fire8 ,does the fire allow any of its substance to flow off1 or escape8 ,does it1 therefore1 need being fed8 7,plato#bac7 thinks the body of the universe is composed of earth and fire2 fire to explain its being visible1 and earth to explain its being tangible4 ,this would lead us to suppose that the stars are composed of fire not exclusively1 but predominatingly1 since they seem to possess a tangible element4 ,this opinion is plausible because ,plato supports it with reasonable grounds4 ,sense1 sight and touch would lead us to believe that the greater part1 if not the whole1 of the heaven1 is fire4 ,but reason suggests that the heaven also contains earth1 because without earth it could not be tangible4#bad ,this however does not imply that it contains also air and water4 ,it would seem absurd to think that water could subsist in so great a fire2 nor could air survive therein without immediately being transformed to steam4 ,it might be objected that two solids which play the parts of extremes in a proportion1 cannot be united without two means4#bac ,this objection1 however1 might have no cogency1 for this mathematical relation might not apply to natural things1 as indeed we are led to surmise by the possibility of mingling earth and water without any intermediary4 ,to this it may be answered that earth and water already contain the other elements4 ,some persons might think that the latter could not effectually unite earth and water2 but this would not disturb our contention that the earth and water are related because each of these two elements contains all the others4 ,,earth ,,contains ,,all ,,the ,,other ,,elements4 ,besides1 we shall have to examine whether the earth be invisible without fire1 and the fire intangible without the earth4 ,were this the case1 nothing would possess its own proper being4 ,all things would be mixed2 each would reclaim its name only by the element preponderating in it2 for it has been claimed that the earth could not exist without the humidity of water1 which alone keeps all its parts united4 ,even were this granted1 it would1 none the less1 remain absurd to say that each of these elements is something1 while claiming that it does not possess any characteristically individual constitution1 except by its union with the other elements1 which1 nevertheless1 would not1 any the more1 exist individually1 each in itself4 ,what reality1 indeed1 would inhere in the nature or being of the earth1 if none of its parts were earth except because the water that operated as a bond8 ,besides1 with what could water unite without the preliminary existence of an extension whose parts were to be bound together for the formation of a continuous whole8 ,the existence of an extension1 however small it be1 will imply the self-existence of earth1 without the assistance of water2 otherwise1 there would be nothing for water to bind together4 ,nor would the earth have any need of air1 since the air exists before the observation of any change within it4 ,nor is fire any more necessary to the constitution of the earth2 fire only serves in making it visible1 like all other objects4 ,it is indeed reasonable to assert that it is fire which renders objects visible1 and it is a mistake#bae to state that one sees darkness1 which cannot be seen any more than silence can be heard4 ,besides1 there is no necessity for fire to be in earth2 light suffices 7to make it visible74 ,snow1 and many other very cold substances are1 without any fire1 very brilliant--that is1 unless we say that the fire approached them1 and colored them before leaving them4 ,,elements ,,are ,,nevertheless ,,individual4 ,as to the other elements1 could not water exist without participating in the earth8 ,air could certainly not be said to participate in earth1 because of its penetrability4 ,it is very doubtful that the fire contains any earth1 because it does not seem continuous1 and does not1 by itself1 seem to be tri-dimensional4 ,true1 fire does seem to contain solidity1 but not of a tri-dimensional kind2 it seems rather to be a sort of resistance corporeal nature#bad74 ,only of earth may hardness be predicated2 indeed1 gold1 in liquid state1 is dense2 not because it is earth1 but because it possesses density1 and is solidified4 ,it would therefore not be unreasonable that fire1 apart by itself1 could subsist by the power of the ,soul which sustains it by her presence4 ,the bodies of 7certain among7 the guardian spirits consist of fire4#baf ,,terrestrial ,,elements1 ,,however1 ,,do ,,not ,,degrade ,,the ,,heaven4 ,it is unlikely that the universal ,organism is composed of universal elements4 ,that terrestrial animals are thus composed is certain2 but to introduce the terrestrial element into the composition of the heaven would be to admit something contrary to nature1 and to the order thereby established4 7,epicurus's opinion that7 the stars carry terrestrial bodies along in their rapid flight is undemonstrable4 ,besides1 the presence of the earth would be an obstacle to the shine and splendor of the celestial fire4 ,,plato ,,postulated ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,earth ,,as ,,basis ,,of ,,life4 #g4 ,plato's view#bag is to be accepted4 ,the universe must contain something solid1 impenetrable1 so that the earth1 when established in the middle of the universe1 might offer a firm foundation for all the animals that walk on it1 and that these animals might possess a certain solidity by the very fact of their terrestriality2 so that the earth might1 by itself1 possess the property of continuousness2 that it might be illuminated by fire1 might also participate in water1 so as not to be desiccated1 and so that its parts might unite1 and that the air might somewhat lighten its mass4 ,,elements ,,are ,,kindred ,,through ,,their ,,common ,,ground1 ,,the ,,universe-,,body4 ,the earth was mingled with the upper fire not to produce the stars1 but because fire has something terrestrial1 as earth has something igneous1 as a result of all the bodies being contained within the body of the universe4 ,in short1 every one of the elements includes mixture of itself and of the other with which it participates4 ,this results from the interrelating community existing within the universe 7the sympathy74 ,so each element1 without combining with any other1 borrows some of its properties4 ,for example1 water participates in the fluidity of the air1 without however mingling therewith2 so the earth does not possess the fire1 but derives its brightness from it4 ,on the other hand1 a mixture would render all properties common to both elements1 confounding them together1#bah and would not limit itself to merely approximating earth and fire1 that is1 a certain solidity with a certain density4 ,on this subject we can invoke the authority of 7,plato#bai71 ,the divinity lit this light in the second circle above the earth1 thereby referring to the sun1 which he elsewhere calls the most brilliant star4 ,by these words he hinders us from admitting that the sun is anything else than fire4 ,he also indicates that fire has no quality other than light1 which he considers as distinct from flame1 and as possessing only a gentle heat4 ,this light is a body4 ,from it emanates another being that we1 by verbal similarity1 also call light1 and which we acknowledge to be incorporeal4 ,this second kind of light derives from the former1 being its flower and brightness1 and constitutes the essentially white 7that is1 brilliant7 body 7of lightning1 or comets74 7,unfortunately1 however71 the word terrestrial 7which designates the element allied to the fire1 as we have said above71 we are wont to regard unfavorably because ,plato makes the earth consist of solidity1 while we speak of the earth as a unity1 though 7,plato7 distinguishes several qualities within this element4 ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,celestial ,,fire ,,and ,,light4 ,the fire of which we speak above emits the purest light1 and resides in the highest region1 by virtue of its nature4 ,these celestial flames are entirely distinct from the earthly flame1 which after ascending to a certain height1 and meeting a greater quantity of air1 becomes extinguished4 ,after ascending1 it falls back on to the earth1 because 7as a comet7 it cannot rise any further2 it stops in the sublunar regions1 though rendering the ambient air lighter4 ,in those cases in which it continues to subsist in higher regions1 it becomes weaker1 gentler1 and acquires a heatless glow1 which is but a reflection of the celestial light4 ,the latter1 on the other hand1 is divided partly among the stars in which it reveals great contrasts of magnitude and color1 and partly in the atmosphere4 ,its invisibility to our eyes is caused both by its tenuity1 and transparence1 which causes it to become as tangible as pure air1 and also because of its distance from the earth4 ,,celestial ,,light ,,is ,,not ,,exposed ,,to ,,any ,,wastage4 #h4 ,since this light subsists in elevated regions1 because the purity of its nature forces it to remain in pure regions1 it cannot be subject to any wastage 7or1 leakage74 ,such a nature could not allow any escape either downwards or upwards1 nor could it meet anything that would force it to descend4 ,moreover1 it will be remembered that there is a great difference of condition in a body united to1 or separated from a soul2 and in this case the body of the heaven is everywhere united to the 7universal7 ,soul4 ,,the ,,heaven ,,does ,,not ,,need ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,either ,,air ,,or ,,fire4 ,besides1 all that approaches the heaven is either air or fire4 ,what of it is air cannot affect the heaven4 ,what of it is fire can neither influence the heaven1 nor touch it1 to act on it4 ,before acting on the heaven1 it would have to assume its nature2 besides1 fire is less great or powerful than the heaven4 ,moreover1 the action of fire consists in heating2 whereas1 #a1 that which is to be heated cannot have been hot by itself2 and as1 #b1 that which is to be dissolved by fire must first be heated1 inasmuch as it is this heating which causes a change of nature4 ,no other body is needed for either the subsistence of the heaven1 or for the functioning of its natural revolutions4#bbj ,moreover1 the heaven does not move in a straight line1 because it is in the nature of celestial things to remain immovable1 or to move in a circular orbit1 and not to assume any other kind of movement without compulsion by some superior force4 ,,the ,,stars ,,are ,,inexhaustible4 ,,and ,,need ,,no ,,refreshment4 ,stars1 therefore1 stand in need of no feeding1#bba and we should not judge them according to our own circumstances4 ,indeed1 our 7human7 soul1 which contains our bodies1 is not identical with the ,soul that contains the heaven2 our soul does not reside in the same place1 while the world-,soul does not1 like our composite bodies lose 7excreta74 ,not as our bodies do the stars need continual metabolic replacing food4 ,from our conception of celestial bodies we should remove all ideas of a change that could modify their constitution4 ,terrestrial bodies are animated by an entirely different nature#bbb2 which though because of its weakness is incapable of insuring them a durable existence1 nevertheless imitates the superior nature 7of the celestial ,soul7 by birth and generation4 ,elsewhere#bbc we have shown that even this very celestial ,soul cannot partake of the perfect immutability of intelligible things4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,six4 ,of ,sensation and ,memory4 ,,stoic ,,doctrines ,,of ,,sensations ,,and ,,memories ,,hang ,,together4 ,if we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul1 similar to the impression of a seal1#bbf we shall also1 for the sake of consistency1 have to deny that memories are notions or sensations preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression1 inasmuch as1 according to our opinion1 the soul did not originally receive any impression4 ,the two questions1 therefore1 hang together4 ,either we shall have to insist that sensation consists in an image impressed on the soul1 and memory1 in its preservation2 or1 if either one of these opinions be rejected1 the other will have to be rejected also4 ,however1 since we regard both of them as false1 we shall have to consider the true operation of both sensation and memory2 for we declare that sensation is as little the impression of an image as memory is its permanence4 ,the true solution of the question1 on the contrary1 will be disclosed by an examination of the most penetrating sense1#bbg and then by induction transferring the same laws to the other senses4 ,a4 ,,of ,,sensation4 ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,sight ,,does ,,not ,,possess ,,the ,,image ,,seen ,,within ,,itself4 ,in general the sensation of sight consists of perception of the visible object1 and by sight we attain it in the place where the object is placed before our eyes1 as if the perception operated in that very place1 and as if the soul saw outside of herself4 ,this occurs1 ,i think1 without any image being produced nor producing itself outside of the soul1 without the soul receiving any impression similar to that imparted by the seal to the wax4 ,indeed1 if the soul already in herself possessed the image of the visible object1 the mere possession of this image 7or type7 would free her from the necessity of looking outside of herself4 ,the calculation of the distance of the object's location1 and visibility proves that the soul does not within herself contain the image of the object4 ,in this case1 as the object would not be distant from her1 the soul would not see it as located at a distance4 ,besides1 from the image she would receive from within herself1 the soul could not judge of the size of the object1 or even determine whether it possessed any magnitude at all4 ,for instance1 taking as an example the sky1 the image which the soul would develop of it would not be so great 7as it is1 when the soul is surprised at the sky's extent74 ,besides1 there is a further objection1 which is the most important of all4 ,if we perceive only the images of the objects we see1 instead of seeing the objects themselves1 we would see only their appearances or adumbrations4 ,then the realities would differ from the things that we see4 ,the true observation that we cannot discern an object placed upon the pupil1 though we can see it at some little distance1 applies with greater cogency to the soul4 ,if the image of the visible object be located within her1 she will not see the object that yields her this image4 ,we have to distinguish two things1 the object seen1 and the seeing subject2 consequently1 the subject that sees the visible object must be distinct from it1 and see it as located elsewhere than within itself4 ,the primary condition of the act of vision therefore is1 not that the image of the object be located in the soul1 but that it be located outside of the soul4 ,,sensations ,,are ,,not ,,experiences1 ,,but ,,relative ,,actualizations4 #b4 ,after denying that sensation consists of such an operation1 it is our duty to point out the true state of affairs4 ,though it be objected that thus the soul would be considered as judging of things she does not possess1 it is nevertheless plain that it is the characteristic of a power1 not to experience or suffer1 but to develop its force1 to carry out the function to which it is destined4 ,if the soul is to discern a visible or audible object the latter must consist of neither images nor experiences1 but actualizations relative to the objects which naturally belong to the domain of these actualizations of the soul4 ,those who deny that any faculty can know its object without receiving some impulsion from it imply that the faculty suffers1 without really cognizing the object before it2 for this soul-faculty should dominate the object instead of being thereby dominated4 ,,this ,,is ,,true ,,not ,,only ,,of ,,sight ,,but ,,of ,,hearing1 ,,taste ,,and ,,smell4 ,the case of hearing is similar to that of sight4 ,the impression is in the air2 the sounds consist in a series of distinct vibrations1 similar to letters traced by some person who is speaking4 ,by virtue of her power and her being1 the soul reads the characters traced in the air1 when they present themselves to the faculty which is suitable to reception of them4 ,as to taste and smell also1 we must distinguish between the experience and the cognition of it2 this latter cognition constitutes sensation1 or a judgment of the experience1 and differs therefrom entirely4#bbh ,,cognition ,,of ,,intelligible ,,objects ,,still ,,less ,,admits ,,of ,,an ,,impression4 ,the cognition of intelligible things still less admits of an experience or impression2 for the soul finds the intelligible things within herself1 while it is outside of herself that she contemplates sense-objects4 ,consequently the soul's notions of intelligible entities are actualizations of a nature superior to those of sense-objects1 being the actualizations of the soul herself1 that is1 spontaneous actualizations4 ,we shall however have to relegate to another place#bbi the question whether the soul sees herself as double1 contemplating herself as another object1 so to speak1 and whether she sees intelligence as single in a manner such that both herself and intelligence seem but one4 ,b4 ,,of ,,memory4 ,,memory ,,acts ,,through ,,the ,,sympathy ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,highest ,,self4 #c4 ,treating of memory1 we must begin by attributing to the soul a power which1 though surprising1 is perhaps really neither strange nor incredible4 ,the soul1 without receiving anything1 nevertheless perceives the things she does not have4 ,the 7secret of this7 is that by nature the soul is the reason of all things1 the last reason of intelligible entities1 and the first reason of sense-objects4#bcj ,consequently the soul is in relation with both 7spheres72 by the intelligible things the soul is improved and vivified2 but she is deceived by the resemblance which sense-objects bear to intelligible entities1 and the soul descends here below as if drawn by her alluring charm4 ,because she occupies a position intermediary between intelligible entities and sense-objects1 the soul occupies a position intermediary between them4 ,she is said to think intelligible entities when1 by applying herself to them1 she recalls them4 ,she cognizes them because1 in a certain manner1 she actually constitutes these entities2 she cognizes them1 not because she posits them within herself1 but because she somehow possesses them1 and has an intuition of them2 because1 obscurely constituting these things1 she awakes1 passing from obscurity to clearness1 and from potentiality to actualization4 ,for sense-objects she acts in the same way4 ,by relating them to what she possesses within herself1 she makes them luminous1 and has an intuition of them1 possessing as she does a potentiality suitable to 7a perception of7 them2 and1 so to speak1 to begetting them4 ,when the soul has applied the whole force of her attention to one of the objects that offer themselves to her1 she1 for a long while1 thereby remains affected as if this object were present2 and the more attentively she considers it1 the longer she sees it4#bca ,that is why children have a stronger memory2 they do not quickly abandon an object1 but lingeringly fix their gaze upon it2 instead of allowing themselves to be distracted by a crowd of objects1 they direct their attention exclusively to some one of them4 ,on the contrary1 those whose thought and faculties are absorbed by a variety of objects1 do not rest with any one1 and do no more than look them over4 ,,memory ,,is ,,not ,,an ,,image1 ,,but ,,the ,,reawakening ,,of ,a ,,faculty4 ,if memory consisted in the preservation of images1#bcb their numerousness would not weaken memory4 ,if memory kept these images stored within itself1 it would have no need of reflection to recall them1 nor could memory recall them suddenly after having forgotten them4 ,further1 exercise does not weaken1 but increases the energy and force of memory1 just as the purpose of exercise of our feet or hands is only to put ourselves in a better condition more easily to accomplish certain things which are neither in our feet nor our hands1 but to which these members become better adapted by habit4 ,besides 7if memory be only storage of images71 why then does one not remember a thing when it has been heard but once or twice8 ,why1 when it has been heard often1 is it long remembered1 although it was not retained at first8 ,this can surely not be because at first only some part of the images had been retained2 for in that case those parts would be easily recalled4 ,on the contrary1 memory is produced suddenly as a result of the last hearing or reflexion4 ,this clearly proves that1 in the soul1 we are only awaking the faculty of memory1 only imparting to it new energy1 either for all things in general1 or for one in particular4 ,again1 memory does not bring back to us only the things about which we have reflected2 7by association of ideas7 memory suggests to us besides a multitude of other memories through its habit of using certain indices any one of which suffices easily to recall all the remainder#bcc2 how could this fact be explained except by admitting that the faculty of memory had become strengthened8 ,once more1 the preservation of images in the soul would indicate weakness rather than strength1 for the reception of several impressions would imply an easy yielding to all forms4 ,since every impression is an experience1 memory would be measured by passive receptivity2 which1 of course1 is the very contrary of the state of affairs4 ,never did any exercise whatever render the exercising being more fitted to suffering 7or1 receptive experience74 ,still another argument3 in sensations1 it is not the weak and impotent organ which perceives by itself2 it is not1 for instance1 the eye that sees1 but the active potentiality of the soul4 ,that is why old people have both sensations and memories that are weaker4 ,both sensation and memory1 therefore1 imply some energy4 ,last1 as we have seen that sensation is not the impression of an image in the soul1 memory could not be the storage-place of images it could not have received4 ,,memory ,,needs ,,training ,,and ,,education4 ,it may be asked however1 why1 if memory be a faculty 7a potentiality7 or disposition1#bcd we do not immediately remember what we have learned1 and why we need some time to recall it8 ,it is because we need to master our own faculty1 and to apply it to its object4 ,not otherwise is it with our other faculties1 which we have to fit to fulfil their functions1 and though some of them may react promptly1 others also may need time to gather their forces together4 ,the same man does not always simultaneously exercise memory and judgment1 because it is not the same faculty that is active in both cases4 ,thus there is a difference between the wrestler and the runner4 ,different dispositions react in each4 ,besides1 nothing that we have said would militate against distinguishing between the man of strong and tenacious soul who would be inclined to read over what is recalled by his memory1 while he who lets many things escape him would by his very weakness be disposed to experience and preserve passive affections4 ,again1 memory must be a potentiality of the soul1 inasmuch as the soul has no extension 7and therefore could not be a storage-place for images which imply three dimensions74 ,,soul ,,events ,,occur ,,very ,,differently ,,from ,,what ,,is ,,supposed ,,by ,,the ,,unobservant ,,or ,,unreflective4 ,in general all the processes of the soul occur in a manner very different from that conceived by unobservant men4 ,psychic phenomena occur very differently from sense-phenomena1 the analogy of which may lead to very serious errors4 ,hence the above unobservant men imagine that sensations and memories resemble characters inscribed on tablets or sheets of paper4#bce ,whether they consider the soul material 7as do the ,stoics71 or as immaterial 7as do the ,peripatetics71 they certainly do not realize the absurd consequences which would result from the above hypothesis4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,one4 ,of the ,ten ,aristotelian and ,four ,stoic ,categories4 ,,historical ,,review ,,of ,,categories4 #a4 ,very ancient philosophers have investigated the number and kinds of essences4 ,some said there was but one2#bif others1 that there was a limited number of them2 others still1 an infinite number4 ,besides1 those who recognized but a single 7essence7 have advanced opinions very different1 as is also the case with those who recognized a limited or unlimited number of essences4 ,as the opinions of these philosophers have been sufficiently examined by their successors1 we shall not busy ourselves therewith4 ,we shall study the doctrine of those who1 after having examined the opinions of their predecessors1 decided on determinate numbers 7of essences72 admitting neither a single essence1 because they recognized that there was a multiplicity even in the intelligibles2 nor an infinite number of essences1 because such an infinity could not exist1 and would render all science impossible2 but who1 classifying the essences whose number is limited1 and seeing that these classifications could not be considered elements1 looked on them as kinds4 ,of these1 some 7the ,peripatetic ,aristotelians7 proposed ten1 while others proposed a lesser number 7the ,stoics taught four71 or a greater number 7the ,pythagorean oppositions1 for instance74 ,as to the kinds1 there is also difference of opinions3 some looked upon the kinds as principle 7,plotinos himself72 while others 7,aristotle7 held that they formed classes4 ,,of ,,the ,,ten ,,aristotelian ,,categories4#bcf ,,statement ,,of ,,aristotle',s ,,position4 ,let us first examine the doctrine that classifies essence into ten 7kinds74 ,we shall have to investigate whether it be necessary to acknowledge that its partisans recognize ten kinds1 all of which bear the name of essence1 or ten categories2 for they say#bcg that essence is not synonymous in everything1 and they are right4 ,,aristotle',s ,,categories ,,neglect ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,let us begin by asking these philosophers whether the ten kinds apply equally to sense-7essences71 and intelligible 7essences71 or whether they all apply to the sense-7essences71 and some only to the intelligible 7essences72 for here there are no longer mutual relations4 ,we must therefore inquire which of those ten kinds apply to intelligible essences1 and see whether intelligible essences can be reduced to one single kind1 that would also apply to sense-essences2 and whether the word being#bch can be applied simultaneously to intelligible and sense-entities1 as a homonymous label4 ,for if being be a homonym1#bci there are several different kinds4 ,if1 however1 it be a synonym 7or1 name of common qualities7 it would be absurd that this word should bear the same meaning in the essences which possess the highest degree of existence1 and in those which possess its lower degree2 for the things among which it is possible to distinguish both primary and lower degrees could not belong to a common kind4 ,but these 7,aristotelian7 philosophers do not1 in their division1 regard the 7,platonic7 intelligible entities4 ,they therefore did not mean to classify all beings2 they passed by those that possess the highest degree of existence4#bie #a4 ,being4#bdj #b4 ,let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds1 and how being could form a kind2 for we are forced to begin our study here4 ,,intelligible ,,and ,,sense-,,being ,,could ,,not ,,form ,a ,,single ,,kind4 ,we have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not form a single kind4#bda ,otherwise1 above both intelligible being1 and sense-being1 there might be some third entity which would apply to both1 being neither corporeal nor incorporeal2 for if it were incorporeal1 the body would be incorporeal2 and if it were corporeal1 the incorporeal would be corporeal4 ,,questions ,,raised ,,by ,,aristotelian ,,theories4 ,in the first place1 what common element is there in matter1 form1 and the concretion of matter and form8 ,the 7,aristotelians7 give the name of being alike to these three entities1 though recognizing that they are not being in the same degree4 ,they say that form is more being than is matter1#bdb and they are right2 they would not insist 7as do the ,stoics7 that matter is being in the greater degree4 ,further1 what element is common to the primary and secondary beings1 since the secondary owe their characteristic title of being to the primary ones8 ,,what ,,is ,,being ,,in ,,general8 ,in general1 what is being8 ,this is a question to which the 7,aristotelians7 could find no answer2 for such mere indication of properties is not an essential definition of what it is1 and it would seem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of successively admitting their contraries1 while remaining identical1 and numerically one1#bdc could not apply to all 7intelligible7 beings4 #c4 ,can we assert that being is a category that embraces simultaneously intelligible being1 matter1 form1 and the concretion of form and matter1 on the same justification that one may say that the race of the ,heraclidae form a kind1 not because all its members possess a common characteristic1 but because they are all descended from a common ancestry8 ,in such case1 the first degree thereof will belong to this being 7from which all the rest is derived71 and the second degree to the other things which are less beings4 ,what then hinders that all things form a single category1 since all other things of which one may say1 they subsist1 owe this property to being8 ,might it then be said that the other things are affections 7or1 modifications71#bcb and that the beings are 7hierarchically7 subordinated to each other in a different manner8 ,in this case1 however1 we could not stop at 7the conception of7 being1 and determine its fundamental property so as to deduce from it other beings4 ,beings would thus be of the same kind1 but then would possess something which would be outside of the other beings4#bdd ,thus the secondary substance would be attributed to something else1 and leave no meaning to whatness 7quiddity or quality71 determinate form 7thatness71 being a subject1 not being a subject1 being in no subject1 and being attributed to nothing else1#bde 7as1 when one says1 whiteness is a quality of the body1 quantity is something of substance1 time is something of movement1 and movement is something of mobility71 since the secondary being is attributed to something else4#bdf ,another objection would be1 that the secondary being is attributed to the primary ,being1 in another sense 7than quality is to being71 as a kind1 as constituting a part1 as being thus the essence of the subject1 while whiteness would be attributed to something else in this sense that it is in a subject4#bdg ,our answer would be that these things have properties which distinguish them from the others2 they will consequently be gathered into a unity1 and be called beings4 ,nevertheless1 no kind could be made up out of them1 nor thus arrive at a definition of the notion and nature of being4 ,enough about this2 let us pass to quantity4 #b4 ,,quantity4 #d4 ,the ,aristotelians call quantity first number1 then continuous size1 space1 and time4#bdh ,to these concepts they apply the other kinds of quantity2 as for instance1 they say that movement is a quantity measured by time4#bdi ,it might also be said reciprocally1 that time receives its continuity from movement4 ,,continuous ,,and ,,definite ,,quantity ,,have ,,nothing ,,in ,,common4 ,if continuous quantity be quantity as far as it is continuous1 then definite quantity will no longer be quantity4 ,if1 on the contrary1 continuous quantity be quantity only accidentally1 then there is nothing in common between continuous and definite quantity4 ,we will grant that numbers are quantities1 although if their nature of being quantities were plain1 one would not see why they should be given that name4 ,as to the line1 the surface1 and the body1 they are called sizes and not quantities2 and the latter name is given them only when they are estimated numerically2 as when1 for instance1 they are measured by two or three feet4#bdi ,a body is a quantity only in so far as it is measured1 just as space is a quantity only by accident1 and not by its spatiality4 ,we must here not consider what is quantity by accident1 but by its quantitativeness1 quantity itself4 ,three oxen are not a quantity2 in this case1 the quantity is the number found in them4 ,indeed1 three oxen belong already to two categories4 ,the case is similar with the line1 and the surface1 both of which possess such quantity4 ,but if the quantity of surface be quantity itself1 why would surface itself be a quantity8 ,it is no doubt only when determined by three or four lines that the surface is called a quantity4 ,,numbers ,,are ,,not ,,quantity ,,in ,,itself4 ,shall we then say that numbers alone are quantity8 ,shall we attribute this privilege to ,numbers in themselves1 which are beings1 because they exist in themselves8#bej ,shall we grant the same privilege to numbers existing in things which participate in them1 and which serve to number1 not unities1 but ten oxen1 for example1 or ten horses8 ,first1 it would seem absurd that these numbers should not be beings1 if the former ones be such4 ,then1 it will seem equally absurd that they should exist within the things they measure1 without existing outside them1#bea as the rules and instruments which serve to measure exist outside of the objects they measure4 ,on the other hand1 if these numbers that exist in themselves serve to measure1 and nevertheless do not exist within the objects that they measure1 the result will be that these objects will not be quantities since they will not participate in quantity itself4 ,,number ,,is ,,not ,,in ,,quantity2 ,,but ,,quantity ,,is ,,in ,,number4 ,why should these numbers be considered quantities8 ,doubtless because they are measures4 ,but are these measures quantities1 or quantity itself8 ,as they are in the order of beings1 even if they should not apply to any of the other things1 the numbers will nevertheless remain what they are1 and they will be found in quantity4 ,indeed1 their unity designates an object1 since it applies to another2 then the number expresses how many objects there are1 and the soul makes use of number to measure plurality4 ,now1 when measuring thus1 the soul does not measure the whatness 7or1 quality7 of the object1 since she says one1 two1 whatever be their objects1 even if of opposite nature2 she does not determine the character of each thing1 for instance1 if it be warm or beautiful2 she limits herself to estimating its quantity4 ,consequently1 whether we take ,number in itself1 or in the objects which participate therein1 quantity exists not in these objects1 but in the number2 quantity finds itself not in the object three feet long1 but in the number three4 ,,magnitude ,,and ,,numbers ,,would ,,be ,,of ,a ,,different ,,type ,,of ,,quantity4 ,why then should sizes also be quantities8 ,probably because they approximate quantities1 and because we call quantities all objects that contain quantities1 even though we do not measure them with quantity in itself4 ,we call large what numerically participates in much2 and small what participates in little4 ,greatness and smallness are quantities1 not absolute1 but relative2 nevertheless the ,aristotelians say that they are relative quantities so far as they seem to be quantities4#beb ,that is a question to be studied2 for1 in this doctrine1 number is a kind apart1 while sizes would hold second rank2 it is not exactly a kind1 but a category which gathers things which are near each other1 and which may hold first or second rank4 ,as to us1 we shall have to examine if the ,numbers which exist in themselves be only substances1 or if they be also quantities4 ,in either case1 there is nothing in common between the ,numbers of which we speak1 and those which exist in things which participate therein4#bec ,,speech ,,as ,a ,,quantity4 #e4 ,what relation to quantity exists in speech1 time1 and movement8 ,first1 let us consider speech4 ,it can be measured4#bed ,in this respect1 speech is a quantity1 but not in so far as it is speech1 whose nature is to be significant1 as the noun1 or the verb4#bee ,the vocal air is the matter of the word1 as it also is of the noun and the verb1 all which constitute the language4 ,the word is principally an impulse launched on the air1 but it is not a simple impulse2 because it is articulated it somehow fashions the air2 consequently it is a deed1 but a significant one4 ,it might be reasonably said that this movement and impulse constitute a deed1 and that the movement which follows is a modification1 or rather that the first movement is the deed1 and the second movement is the modification of another1 or rather that the deed refers to the subject1 and the modification is in the subject4 ,if the word consisted not in the impulse1 but in the air1 there would result from the significant characteristic of the expressive impulse two distinct entities1 and no longer a single category4 ,,neither ,,is ,,time ,a ,,quantity4 ,let us pass to time4#bef ,if it exist in what measures1 that which measures must be examined2 it is doubtless the soul1 or the present instant4 ,if it exist in what is measured1 it is a quantity so far as it has a quantity2 as1 for instance1 it may be a year4 ,but1 so far as it is time1 it has another nature2 for what has such a quantity1 without 7essentially7 being a quantity1 is not any the less such a quantity4 ,,quantity ,,as ,,equal ,,and ,,unequal ,,does ,,not ,,refer ,,to ,,the ,,objects4 ,as to 7,aristotle's7 assertion that the property of quantity is to be both equal and unequal1#beg this property belongs to quantity itself1 and not to the objects which participate in quantity1 unless it be by accident1 so far as one does not consider these objects in themselves4 ,a three foot object1 for instance1 is a quantity so far as it is taken in its totality2 but it does not form a kind with quantity itself2 only1 along with it1 it is traced back to a kind of unity1 a common category4 ,,relation4#beh #f4 ,let us now consider relation4 ,let us see whether1 in relative matters1 there be something common that constitutes a kind1 or which is a point of union in any other manner4 ,let us1 before everything else1 examine whether relation 7as1 for example1 left and right1 double and half1 and so forth7 be a kind of hypostasis1 or substantial act1 or an habituation2 or1 whether it be a kind of hypostatic existence in certain things1 while in others it is not so2 or whether it be this under no circumstances4 ,what is there indeed that is particular in relations such as double and half2 surpasser and surpassed2 in possession1 and in disposition2 lying down1 standing1 sitting2 in the relation of father and son2 of master and slave2 in the like and different2 the equal and unequal2 the active and passive2 measurer and measured2 sensation and knowledge8 ,knowledge1 for instance1 relates to the object which can be known1 and sensation to sense-object2 for the relation of knowledge to the object which can be known has a kind of hypostatic existence in the actualization relative to the form of the object which can be known2 likewise with the relation of sensation to the sense-object4 ,the same may be said about the relation of the active to the passive1 which results in a single actualization1 as well as about the relation between the measure and the measured object1 from which results mensuration4 ,but what results from the relation of the similar to the similar8 ,if in this relation there be nothing begotten1 one can at least discover there something which is its foundation1 namely1 the identity of quality2 nevertheless1 neither of these two terms would then have anything beside their proper quality4 ,the same may be said of equal things1 because the identity of quantity precedes the manner of being of both things2 this manner of being has no foundation other than our judgment1 when we say1 ,this one or that one are of the same size2 this one has begotten that one1 this one surpasses that one4 ,what are standing and sitting outside of him who stands or sits8 ,as to the possession1 if it apply to him who possesses1 it rather signifies the fact of possession2 if it apply to what is possessed1 it is a quality4 ,as much can be said of disposition4 ,what then exists outside of the two relative terms1 but the comparison established by our judgment8 ,in the relation of the thing which surpasses the thing which is surpassed1 the first is some one size1 and the second is some other size2 those are two independent things1 while as to the comparison1 it does not exist in them1 except in our judgment4 ,the relation of left to right and that of the former to the latter consist in the different positions4 ,it is we who have imagined the distinction of right to left2 there is nothing in the objects themselves that answers thereto4 ,the former and the latter are two relations of time1 but it is we who have established that distinction4 ,,whether ,,these ,,relations ,,are ,,subjective ,,or ,,objective4 #g4 ,if1 when we speak of things1 we utter nothing true1 then there is nothing real in the relation1 and this kind of being has no foundation4 ,but if1 when we compare two moments1 we say1 ,this one is anterior1 and that one is posterior1 we speak truly1 then we conceive that the anterior and the posterior are something independent of the subjects in which they exist4 ,likewise with the left and the right1 as well as with sizes2 we admit that in these1 besides the quantity which is suitable to them1 there is a certain habituation1 as far as the one surpasses and the other is surpassed4 ,if1 without our enunciating or conceiving anything1 it be real that such a thing is the double of another2 if the one possess while the other is possessed1 even if we had known nothing about it2 if the objects had been equal before we had noticed them2 if they be likewise identical in respect of quality2 finally if1 in all relative things1 there be a habituation which is independent of the subjects in which it is found2 and if we limit ourselves to noticing its existence 7without creating it72 if the same circumstances obtain in the relation of knowledge to what can be known1 a relation which evidently constitutes a real habituation2 if it be so1 there is nothing left to do but to ask whether this habituation 7named a relation7 be something real4 ,we shall have to grant1 however1 that this habituation subsists in certain subjects as long as these subjects remain such as they were1 and even if they were separate2 while1 in other subjects1 this habituation is born only when they are brought together4 ,we shall also have to grant that1 in the very subjects that remain1 there are some in which this habituation is annihilated or altered 7such as1 for example1 the left direction1 or proximity74 ,this has led people to believe that in all these relations there is nothing real4 ,this point having been granted1 we shall have to seek what common element there is in all these relations1 and to examine whether what is common to them all constitutes a kind1 or an accident2 and last1 we shall have to consider how far that which we have discovered corresponds to reality4 ,,relations ,,are ,,simultaneous ,,existences4 ,we should call relative not what is said absolutely of another thing1 such as1 for instance1 the habits of the soul and the body2 nor what belongs to such a thing1 nor what is in such a thing 7as for instance the soul is said to be the soul of such an individual1 or to be in such a subject71 but what wholly derives its existence from this habit 7called relation74 ,by hypostatic existence ,i here mean not the existence which is proper to subjects1 but the existence which is called relative2 as1 for instance1 the double causes the 7correlative7 existence of the half2 while it does not cause the existence of the two foot object1 nor of two in general1 nor the one foot object1 nor one in general4 ,the manner of existence of these objects consists in that this one is two1 and that one one4 ,as a result of this1 when these objects exist1 the first is called double1 and is such in reality2 and the second is half4 ,these two objects have therefore simultaneously and spontaneously effected that the one was double1 and the other half4 ,they have been correlatively begotten4 ,their only existence lies in their correlation1 so that the existence of the double lies in its surpassing the half1 and the half derives its existence from its being surpassed by the double4 ,consequently these two objects are not1 the one anterior1 and the other posterior1 but simultaneous4#bei ,we might also examine whether or not other things do not also possess this simultaneity of existence1 as happens with father and son1 and other similar cases4 ,the son continues to exist1 indeed1 even after the death of the father2 brother also survives brother1 since we often say that some one person resembles some other deceased person4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,active ,,habituation ,,immediate ,,and ,,remote4 #h4 ,the above digression gives us the opportunity of investigating why there should be a difference between these relations1 and those of which we spoke above4 ,however1 we should be glad to have the ,aristotelians first state what community of existence obtains in this correlation4 ,it would be impossible to claim that this community was anything corporeal4 ,if then it be corporeal1 it must exist either within the very subjects1 or without them4 ,if such a habituation be identical among all1 it is a synonym4 ,if it be a habituation which differs according to the subjects in which it exists1 it is a homonym2 for the mere name of habituation 7in different things7 does not always correspond to the existence of any genuine similarity4 ,should we then divide the habituations into two classes1 recognizing that certain objects have an inert and inactive habituation1 implying simultaneity of existence1 and that other objects have a habituation always implying potentiality and actualization1 so that before actualizing the potentiality be already ready to exert itself1 and to pass from potentiality to actualization in the approximation of relative conditions8 ,must we assert that in general certain things actualize1 while others limit themselves to existing8 ,must we also assert that that which limits itself to existence only gives its correlative a name1 while that which actualizes gives it existence8 ,of this latter kind of things are the father and son1 the active and passive1 for such things exert a kind of life and action4 ,must we then divide habituation in several kinds1 not as possessing something similar and common in the differences1 but as having a nature different in each member of the division1 and thus constituting a homonym 7or1 mere verbal label78 ,in this case1 we would apply to the active habituation the names of doing and suffering1 because both imply an identical action4 ,further1 we will have to posit another habituation which1 without itself actualizing1 implies something which acts in two relative terms4 ,for example1 there is equality2 which equates two objects2 for it is equality which renders things equal1 just as identity makes them identical2 just as the names great and small are derived one from the presence of greatness1 and the other from that of smallness4 ,but if we should consider greatness and smallness in the individuals which participate therein1 it must be acknowledged that such individual is greater by the act of greatness which manifests in him1 and that another is smaller because of the inherent act of littleness4 ,,habituations ,,are ,,reasons ,,that ,,participate ,,in ,,forms4 #i4 ,it must therefore be granted that in the things of which we first spoke1 such as knowing and doing 7active being71 there is an actualization1 an habituation1 and an actualizing reason2 while in the other things there is a participation in form and reason4 ,for indeed1 if the bodies were the only essences1 the relative habituations would bear no reality4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we assign the first rank in existence to incorporeal things1 and to the reasons1 and if we define the habituations as reasons that participate in the forms1 we should say that what is double has the double for its cause1 and what is half1 has the half as its cause2 and that other things are what they are named because of the presence of the same1 or of the contrary form4 ,now either two things simultaneously receive one the double1 and the other the half1 and one greatness1 and the other smallness2 or contraries such as resemblance and dissimilarity are to be found in each thing1 as well as identity and difference2 and everything finds itself simultaneously similar and dissimilar1 identical and different4 ,it might be objected that if one object were ugly1 and another uglier still1 they are such because they participate in a form4 ,not so2 for if these two objects be equally ugly1 they are equal in the absence of the form4 ,if they be unequally ugly1 the least ugly is such because it participates in a form which does not sufficiently subdue matter1 and the uglier is such because it participates in a form which does so still less4 ,they could1 besides1 be judged from the standpoint of deprivation1 comparing them to each other as if they contained some form4 ,the sensation is a form that results from two things 7of that which feels1 and that which is felt72 so also with knowledge4 ,in respect to the thing possessed1 possession is an act which contains1 which has a kind of efficacy4 ,as to mensuration1 which is an actualization of measure1 in respect of the measured object1 it consists in a reason4 ,,while ,,some ,,aristotelian ,,categories ,,are ,,logically ,,possible1 ,,the ,,objects ,,subsumed ,,are ,,impossible4 ,if then1 considering the constitution of the relative relations as a generic form1 it be admitted that it constitutes an unity1 it forms a classification2 consequently it constitutes an existence and a form in all things4 ,but if the reasons 7or1 relations7 be opposed to each other1 if the above-mentioned differences obtain among them1 they do not constitute a class1 and everything must be reduced to a resemblance1 or category4 ,now1 even if we admit that the things of which we have spoken can be reduced to a unity1 it does not follow that all the things gathered under the same category by the ,aristotelians1 could be reduced to a single sort4 ,indeed1 they lump together into the same classification1 both objects and mere statements of their absence1 as well as the objects which derive their appellation from them2 as1 for instance1 doubleness itself1 and the double object4 ,now how is it possible to reduce to the same classification both a thing and the mere lack of it1 as1 for instance1 doubleness and the non-double1 the relative and the non-relative8 ,this is as absurd as it would be to gather into the same classification the living being1 and the non-living being4 ,worse yet1 how could one assort together duplication and the double object1 whiteness and the white object8 ,such things could not possibly be identical4 #c4 ,,qualities4#bfj #aj4 ,we are now to consider quality1 on account of which a being is said to be such4 ,what can be the nature of this quality that it exerts the power of deciding of the phenomena of objects8 ,is there a same1 single quality which is something common to all qualities1 and which1 by its differences1 forms classifications8 ,or are the qualities so different that they could not constitute one and the same classification8 ,what is there in common between capacity and disposition#bfa 7that is1 the physical power71 the affective quality1 the figure1 and the exterior form8#bfb ,,the ,,lack ,,of ,,powers ,,cannot ,,be ,,subsumed ,,under ,,the ,,same ,,category ,,as ,,the ,,powers4 ,what shall be said of thickness and thinness1 of fatness and leanness8 ,if the element common to these conceptions be a power belonging to the capacities1 dispositions1 and physical powers1 which gives to each object the power it possesses1 the statements of the absence of power will no longer be classified along with 7the powers74 ,besides1 in what sense can we call the figure and form of each thing a power8 ,further1 essence would have been deprived of all powers that were essential1 retaining only those it might have received4 ,then1 quality would comprehend all actualizations of the beings1 which1 properly1 are actualizations only so far as they act spontaneously2 and also all actualizations of these properties1 but only so far as they really exist4 ,but quality consists in 7unessential7 powers 7such as habituations and dispositions7 classified below beings4#bfc ,for instance1 boxing ability does not belong among necessary human qualifications1 such as rational functions4 ,the latter would not be called a quality 7as we would speak of boxing ability72 and reasoning would be considered a quality only figuratively4 ,,mere ,,differentials ,,of ,,beings ,,are ,,not ,,genuine ,,qualities4 ,a quality is therefore a power which adds 7essential7 characteristics to already existing beings4 ,these characteristics which differentiate beings can therefore be called qualities only figuratively4 ,qualities are1 rather1 actualizations and reasons1 or parts of reasons1 which proclaim the whatness1 though the latter seem to qualify being4 ,as to the qualities which really deserve this name1 which qualify things1 which we generally call potentialities1 they are the reasons and shapes1 either of the soul or the body1 such as beauty or ugliness4#bfd ,,not ,,all ,,qualities ,,are ,,reasons4 ,how can all qualities be potentialities8 ,it is easy to see that beauty and health are qualities4 ,but how could ugliness and sickness1 weakness and general impotence1 be qualities8 ,is it because they qualify certain things8 ,but what hinders the qualified things from being called such by mere nomenclature1 as homonyms1 and not because of a single 7all-sufficient7 reason8 ,besides1 what would hinder them from being considered not only according to one of the four modes1#bfe but even after each one of the four1 or at least after any two of them8 ,first1 the quality does not consist in acting and experiencing2#bff so that it is only by placing oneself at different viewpoints that one could call what acts and experiences a quality1 in the same sense as health and sickness1 disposition and habitude1 force and weakness4 ,thus power is no longer the common element in these qualities1 and we shall have to seek something else possessing this characteristic1 and the qualities will no longer all be reasons4 ,how indeed could a sickness1 become a habituation1 or be a reason8 ,,quality ,,is ,,not ,a ,,power ,,but ,,disposition1 ,,form ,,and ,,character4 ,shall the affections which consist in the forms and powers1 and their contraries1 the privations1 be called qualities8#bfg ,if so1 one kind will no longer exist2 and we shall have to reduce these things to a unity1 or category2 that is why knowledge is called a form and a power1 and ignorance a privation and impotence4 ,must we also consider impotence and sickness a form1 because sickness and vice can and do accomplish many things badly8 ,not so1 for in this case he who missed his aim would be exerting a power4 ,each one of these things exerts its characteristic activity in not inclining towards the good2 for it could not do what was not in its power4 ,beauty certainly does have some power2 is it so also with triangularity8 ,in general1 quality should not be made to consist in power1 but rather in the disposition1 and to consider it as a kind of form of character4 ,thus the common element in all qualities is found to be this form1 this classification1 which no doubt is inherent in being1 but which certainly is derivative from it4 ,,quality ,,consists ,,in ,a ,,non-,,essential ,,character4 ,what part do the powers 7or1 potentialities7 play here8 ,the man who is naturally capable of boxing owes it to a certain disposition4 ,it is so also with somebody who is unskilful in something4 ,in general1 quality consists in a non-essential characteristic2 what seems to contribute to the being1 or to add to it1 as color1 whiteness1 and color in general1 contributes to the beings as far as it constitutes something distinct therefrom1 and is its actualization2 but it occupies a rank inferior to being2 and though derived therefrom1 it adds itself thereto as something foreign1 as an image and adumbration4 ,,ugly ,,qualities ,,are ,,imperfect ,,reasons4 ,if quality consist in a form1 in a character and a reason1 how could one thus explain impotence and ugliness8 ,we shall have to do so by imperfect reasons1 as is generally recognized in the case of ugliness4#bfh ,but how can a reason be said to explain sickness8 ,it contains the reason of health1 but somewhat altered4 ,besides1 it is not necessary to reduce everything to a reason2 it is sufficient to recognize1 as common characteristic1 a certain disposition foreign to being1 such that what is added to being be a quality of the subject4 ,triangularity is a quality of the subject in which it is located1 not by virtue of its triangularity1 but of its location in this subject1 and of enduing it with its form4 ,humanity has also given to man his shape1 or rather1 his being4 ,,there ,,is ,,only ,,one ,,kind ,,of ,,quality2 ,,of ,,which ,,capacity ,,and ,,disposition ,,partake4 #aa4 ,if this be so1 why should we recognize several kinds of qualities8 ,why should we distinguish capacity and disposition8 ,whether quality be durable or not1 it is always the same2 for any kind of a disposition is sufficient to constitute a quality2 permanence1 however1 is only an accident1 unless it should be held that simple dispositions are imperfect forms1 and that capacities are perfect forms4 ,but if these forms be imperfect1 they are not qualities2 if they be already qualities1 permanence is but an accident4 ,,physical ,,powers ,,do ,,not ,,form ,a ,,secondary ,,kind ,,of ,,quality4 ,how can physical powers form a secondary kind of qualities8 ,if they be qualities only so far as they are powers1 this definition would not suit all qualities1 as has been said above4 ,if boxing ability be a quality as far as it is a disposition1 it is useless to attribute to it a power1 since power is implied in habituation4 ,further1 how should we distinguish the natural boxing ability from that which is scientifically acquired8 ,if both be qualities1 they do not imply any difference so far as one is natural1 and the other acquired2 that is merely an accident1 since the capacity of boxing is the same form in both cases4 ,,the ,,derivation ,,of ,,qualities ,,from ,,affection ,,is ,,of ,,no ,,importance4 ,what does it matter that certain qualities are derived from an affection1 and that others are not derived therefrom8 ,the origin of qualities contributes nothing to their distinction or difference4 ,if certain qualities be derived from an affection1 and if others do not derive therefrom1 how could they be classified as one kind8 ,if it be said that some imply experiencing while others imply action1 they can both be called qualities merely by similarity of appellation 7homonymy74 ,,shape ,,is ,,not ,a ,,quality2 ,,but ,,specific ,,appearance1 ,,or ,,reason4 ,what could be said of the shape of every thing8 ,if we speak of the shape as far as something has a specific form1 that has no regard to quality2 if it be spoken of in respect to beauty or ugliness1 together with the form of the subject1 we there have a reason4 ,,aristotle ,,was ,,wrong ,,in ,,calling ,,rough1 ,,united1 ,,rare1 ,,and ,,dense ,,qualities4 ,as to rough1 united1 rare and dense#bfi these could not be called qualities2 for they do not consist only in a relative separation or reapproximation of the parts of a body1 and do not proceed everywhere from the inequality or equality of position2 if they did1 they might be regarded as qualities4 ,lightness and weight1 also1 could be correctly classified1 if carefully studied4 ,in any case1 lightness is only a verbal similarity 7a homonym7 unless it be understood to mean diminution of weight4 ,in this same class might also be found leanness and slimness1 which form a class different from the four preceding ideas4 ,,psychological ,,theory ,,of ,,quality4 #ab4 ,what other scheme of analysis of quality could we find1 if the above were declared unsatisfactory8 ,must we distinguish first the qualities of the soul from those of the body1 and then analyse the latter according to the senses1 relating them to sight1 hearing1 taste1 smell and touch8 ,to begin with1 how can the qualities of the soul be divided8 ,will they be related to the faculty of desire1 to anger1 or reason8 ,will they be divided according to their suitable operations1 or according to their useful or harmful character8 ,in this case1 would we distinguish several ways of being useful or harmful8 ,should we then likewise divide the properties of the bodies according to the difference of their effects1 or according to their useful or harmless character1 since this character is a property of quality8 ,surely2 to be useful or harmful seems to be the property of both the quality1 and the thing qualified4 ,otherwise1 we should have to seek some other classification4 ,,relation ,,between ,,the ,,thing ,,qualified ,,and ,,the ,,quality4 ,how can the thing qualified by a quality refer to the quality8 ,this must be studied1 because the thing qualified and the quality do not belong to a common kind4 ,if the man capable of boxing be related to the quality1 why should not the same quality obtain between the active man and activity8 ,if then the active man be something qualified1 activity and passivity should not be referred to relation4 ,it would seem preferable to relate the active man to the quality if he be active by virtue of a power1 for a power is a quality2 but if the power be essential1 in so far as it is a power1 it is not something relative1 nor even something qualified4 ,we should not consider that activity corresponds to increase2 for the increase1 so far as it increases1 stands in relation only to the less2 while activity is such by itself4 ,to the objection that activity1 so far as it is such1 is something qualified1 it might be answered that1 at the same time1 as far as it can act on something else1 and that it is thus called active1 it is something relative4 ,in this case the man capable of boxing and the art of boxing itself must be in relation4 ,for the art of boxing implies a relation2 all the knowledge it imparts is relative to something else4 ,as to the other arts1 or at least1 as to the greater number of other arts1 it may1 after examination1 be said that they are qualities1 so far as they give a disposition to the soul2 as far as they act1 they are active1 and1 from this standpoint1 they refer to something else1 and are relative2 and besides1 they are relative in the sense that they are habituations4 ,,activity ,,does ,,not ,,alter ,,the ,,quality4 ,will we therefore have to admit that activity1 which is activity only because it is a quality1 is something substantially different from quality8 ,in animated beings1 especially in those capable of choice because they incline towards this or that thing1 activity has a really substantial nature4 ,what is the nature of the action exercised by the inanimate powers that we call qualities8 ,is it participation in their qualities by whatever approaches them8 ,further1 if the power which acts on something else simultaneously experiences 7or suffers71 how can it still remain active8 ,for the greater thing1 which by itself is three feet in size1 is great or small only by the relation established between it1 and something else 7smaller74 ,it might indeed be objected that the greater thing and the smaller thing become such only by participation in greatness or smallness4 ,likewise1 what is both active and passive becomes such in participating in activity and passivity4 ,,are ,,the ,,sense-,,world ,,and ,,the ,,intelligible ,,separate1 ,,or ,,classifiable ,,together8 ,can the qualities seen in the sense-world1 and those that exist in the intelligible world1 be classified together in one kind8 ,this question demands an answer from those#bgj who claim that there are also qualities in the intelligible world4 ,should it also be asked of those who do not admit of the existence on high of kinds1 but who limit themselves to attributing some habit to ,intelligence8 ,it is evident that ,wisdom exists in ,intelligence2 if this ,wisdom be homonymous 7similar in name only7 with the wisdom which we know here below1 it is not reckoned among sense-things2 if1 on the contrary it be synonymous 7similar in nature also7 with the wisdom which we know here below1 quality would be found in intelligible entities1 as well as in sense-things 7which is false72 unless indeed it be recognized that all intelligible things are essences1 and that thought belongs among them4 ,besides1 this question applies also to the other categories4 ,in respect to each of them it might be asked whether the sensible and the intelligible form two different kinds1 or belong to a single classification4 #d4 ,,when4 #ac4 ,as to the category of time1 when1 the following thoughts are suggested4 ,,if ,,time ,,be ,a ,,quantity2 ,,why ,,should ,,time ,,when ,,form ,a ,,separate ,,category8 ,if to-morrow1 to-day1 and yesterday1 as well as other similar divisions of time1 be parts of time1 why should they not be classed in the same classification as time itself1 along with the ideas it has been1 it is1 and it will be8 ,as they are kinds of time1 it seems proper that they should be classified along with time itself4 ,now time is part of quantity4 ,what then is the use of another category8 ,if the ,aristotelians say that not only it has been and it will be are time-concepts1 but yesterday and formerly1 which are varieties of there has been are also time-concepts 7for these terms are subordinated to there has been71 that it is not only now that is time1 but that when is such also1 they will be forced to answer as follows3 ,first1 if when be time1 time exists2 then1 as yesterday is past time1 it will be something composite1 if the past be something else than time2 we will have to erect two categories1 not merely a simple category4 ,for instance1 they say both that when is in time1 without being time1 and say that when is that which is in time4 ,an example of this would be to say that ,socrates existed formerly1 whereby ,socrates would really be outside of 7present7 time4 ,therefore they are no longer expressing something single4 ,but what is meant by ,socrates being in time1 and that some fact is in time8 ,does it mean that they are part of time8 ,if1 in saying a part of time1 and so far as it is a part of time1 the ,aristotelians believe that they are not speaking of time absolutely1 but only of a past part of time1 they are really expressing several things4 ,for this part1 so far as it is a part1 is by them referred to something2 and for them the past will be some thing added 7to ,time71 or it will become identified with there has been1 which is a kind of time4 ,but if they say that there is a difference1 because there has been is indeterminate1 while formerly and yesterday are determinate1 we shall be deciding something about there has been2 then yesterday will be the determination of there has been1 so that yesterday will be determined time4 ,now1 that is a quantity of time2 so that if time be a quantity1 each one of these two things will be a determined quantity4 ,but1 if1 when they say yesterday they mean thereby that such an event has happened in a determined past time1 they are still expressing several things4 ,therefore1 if some new category is to be introduced whenever one thing acts in another1 as here happened of what occurred in time1 we might have to introduce many additional categories1 for in a different thing the action is different4 ,this will1 besides1 become clearer in what is to follow on the category of place4 #e4 ,,where1 ,,or1 ,,place4 ,,if ,,where ,,and ,,place ,,are ,,different ,,categories1 ,,many ,,more ,,might ,,be ,,added4 #ad4 ,the ,aristotelians 7while treating of this category7 say1 ,where8 ,for instance1 to the ,lyceum1 or1 to the ,academy4 ,the ,academy and the ,lyceum are then places and parts of places1 as the top1 the bottom1 and here are parts or classes of place4 ,the only difference consists in a greater determination4 ,if then the top1 the bottom1 and the middle be places1 as1 for instance1 ,delphi is the middle of the earth1 and1 the ,lyceum and other countries are near the middle of the earth1 what else but place do we have to seek1 since we have just said that each of these things denotes a place8 ,if1 when we say where8 we assert that one thing is in another place1 we are not expressing something single and simple4 ,besides1 each time that we affirm that such a man is there1 we are creating a double relation1 namely1 the relation of the man who is there1 with the place where he is1 and the relation of the containing place and the contained man4 ,why therefore should we not reduce this to the class of relations1 since the relation of both terms with each other produces something8 ,besides1 what is the difference between here and at ,athens8 ,the ,aristotelians grant that here indicates the place2 consequently1 the same is true of in ,athens4 ,if1 in ,athens be equivalent to being in ,athens1 this latter expression contains two categories1 that of place1 and that of being4 ,now1 this should not be the case2 for as one should not say ,quality exists1 but only1 quality4 ,besides1 if being in place and being in time presuppose categories other than place and time1 why would being in a vase not also constitute a separate category8 ,why would it not be so with being in matter1 with being in the subject1 and in general of a part being in the whole1 or the whole in the parts1 the genus in the species1 and the species in the genus8 ,in this manner we would have a far greater number of categories4 #f4 ,,action ,,and ,,experiencing8#bga ,the subject of action gives rise to the following considerations4 ,,actualization ,a ,,far ,,better ,,category ,,than ,,doing ,,or ,,acting4 #ae4 ,the ,aristotelians hold that number and quantity1 and other things referring to being should be subordinated to being2 thus they classify quantity as in a genus different from being4 ,quality also refers to being1 it also is erected into a separate genus4 ,consequently1 as action also refers to being1 it is also considered a separate genus4 ,must then acting1 or rather action1 from which acting is derived1 be considered a separate genus1 as we consider that quality1 from which qualification is derived1 is a separate genus8 7,as to these derivations71 it might be asked whether there were no distinction between action1 to act1 and active1 or between to act1 and action8 ,to act expresses the idea of active1 while action does not express it4 ,to act means to be in some action2 or rather1 in actualization4 ,consequently1 actualization expresses a category rather than action2 since actualization is predicated of being1 like quality1 as was said above2 and actualization1 like movement1 also relates to being2 but movement necessarily constitutes a class of essence4 ,how indeed could we admit that quantity1 quality and relation each form a genus1 in respect to being1 and yet refuse to movement1 which equally refers to being1 the privilege of also forming a genus of being8 ,,how ,,can ,,movement ,,be ,,in ,,time1 ,,if ,,change ,,be ,,outside ,,of ,,time8 #af4 ,it may be objected that movement is an imperfect actualization4#bgb ,in that case actualization should be given the first rank2 and under that genus would follow the species of movement1 with the quality of imperfection1 by saying that movement is an actualization1 and adding 7the specific difference7 that it is imperfect4 ,to say that movement is an imperfect actualization does not deprive it of being an actualization1 but implies that though it be actualization1 there is in it succession1 not to arrive at being actualization1 7which it is already71 but to accomplish something from which it is yet entirely distinct4 ,then 7when that goal is reached71 it is not the movement that becomes perfect1 but the thing which was the goal4 ,for instance1 walking is walking from the very first step2 but if there be a mile to go1 and the mile be not yet finished1 what is lacking of the mile is not lacking to the walking or to movement 7taken absolutely71 but to that particular walk4 ,for the walk was walking and movement from the very first step2 consequently1 he who is moving has already moved1 and he who cuts has already cut4#bgc ,just as actualization1 movement has no need of time2 it needs time only to become such an action4 ,if then actualization be outside of time1 movement1 taken absolutely1 must also be outside of time4 ,the objection that movement is in time because it implies continuity 7proves too much2 for in that case7 intuition itself1 if prolonged1 would also imply continuity1 and therefore would be in time4 ,reasoning by induction1 it may be seen1 #a1 that one can always distinguish parts in any kind of movement2 #b1 that it would be impossible to determine when and since when the movement began1 or to assign the definite point of departure2 #c1 that it is always possible to divide movement by following it up to its origin1 so that in this manner movement that has just begun would find itself to have begun since infinite time1 and1 #d1 that movement would be infinite in regard to its beginning4 ,the fact is that the ,aristotelians distinguish movement from actualization2 they affirm that actualization is outside of time1 but that time is necessary to movement2 not indeed to some particular movement1 but to movement in itself1 because1 according to their views1 it is a quantity4 ,nevertheless1 they themselves acknowledge that movement is a quantity only by accident1 as1 for instance1 when it is a daily movement1 or when it has some particular duration4 ,just as actualization is outside of time1 nothing hinders movement from having begun outside of time1 and time from being connected with movement only because the movement has a certain duration4 ,indeed1 it is generally granted that changes occur outside of time1 for it is usual to say1 ,the changes occur either suddenly or successively4 ,now if change can occur outside of time1 why should it not be so also with movement8 ,we here speak of change1 and not of having changed2 for change does not necessarily have to be accomplished 7while having changed signifies an accomplished fact1 and consequently implies the notion of time74 ,,action ,,and ,,experiencing ,,may ,,be ,,subsumed ,,under ,,movement1 ,,but ,,cannot ,,be ,,considered ,,as ,,separate ,,categories4 #ag4 ,it may be objected that actualization and movement do not1 by themselves1 form a genus1 but belong to the genus of relation1 because actualization exists through the power of something active1 and movement exists by the power of some motor1 as such4 ,we might answer that relative conceptions are produced by habituation 7the manner of being7 even of things1 and not only through the relation established between them by the mind4 ,as the habituation is a mode of hypostatic existence1 although it be the thing of something else1 or although it refer to something else1#bgd it nevertheless possesses its nature before being a relation4 ,now this actualization1 this movement1 this habituation1 which is the thing of some other thing nevertheless possesses the property of existing and of being conceived by itself before being a relation2 otherwise1 all things would be relative conceptions2 for there is nothing1 not excluding the soul herself1 which does not bear some relation to something else4 ,moreover1 why are action and acting not relatives8 ,for they necessarily are either a movement or an actualization4 ,if the ,aristotelians consider action a relative1 and make a genus of acting1 why then do they not also place movement among the relatives1 and make a genus of moving8 ,they might1 indeed1 have subsumed under the genus movement the two species action and reaction 7or1 suffering72 but they have no right to make two distinct genera of acting and reacting1 as they generally do4 ,,on ,,aristotelian ,,principles1 ,,even ,,intellection ,,would ,,be ,,movement ,,or ,,actualization4 #ah4 ,we must further examine if the ,aristotelians have the right to say that acting contains both actualizations and movements1 the actualizations producing themselves instantaneously1 and the movements successively2 as1 for instance1 dividing implies time4 ,or will they say that all actualizations are movements1 or1 at least1 are accompanied by movements8 ,will they trace all actions to experiencing 7or1 reactions71 or will they acknowledge absolute actions1 like walking or speaking8 ,or will they distinguish all actions that relate to experiencing as movements1 and all absolute actions as actualizations8 ,or will they place actions of both kinds among movements1 and among actualizations8 ,they would no doubt classify walking1 which is an absolute thing1 as movement2 and thinking1 which is a verb without passive voice1 as an actualization4#bge ,otherwise the ,aristotelians will be obliged to insist that there is nothing active in walking or thinking4 ,but if walking and thinking do not belong to the category of acting1 it will be necessary to explain to what they do belong4 ,will it be said that thinking relates to the thinkable 7the intelligible71 as intellection does1#bgf because sensation relates to the sense-object8 ,if sensation be related to the sense-object1 why do they not equally relate sensing 7feeling7 to the sense-object8 ,sensation1 relating to something else1 has a relation with that thing2 but1 besides that relation1 it has the property of being an action or an experience 7or1 reaction74 ,if therefore reaction 7or1 suffering71 besides belonging to something else1 or depending on something else1 has the property of itself being something1 like actualization1 then walking1 besides belonging to something else 7to the feet71 and depending on something else 7on the motive power71 nevertheless by itself possesses the property of being movement4 ,in this case1 it will have to be recognized that intellection1 besides being a relation1 by itself also is a movement or an actualization4 ,,do ,,certain ,,actions ,,appear ,,imperfect ,,when ,,not ,,joined ,,to ,,time8 #ai4 ,let us now examine if certain actualizations seem to be imperfect when they are not joined to time1 thus identifying themselves with movements1 as life identifies itself with living4 ,for 7according to the ,aristotelians7 the life of each 7being7 is accomplished in a perfect time1 and happiness is an actualization2 not an individual one1 indeed1 but a sort of movement4#bgg ,consequently we will have to call life and happiness movements1 and movement will have to be made a genus1 though recognizing that movement forms a genus very different from quantity and quality2 and1 like them1 relates to being4 ,this genus could be divided into two species1 movements of body and movements of soul1 or movements spontaneous and communicated2 or again1 movements proceeding from the beings themselves1 or movements proceeding from others4 ,in this case1 the movements proceeding from the beings themselves are actions1 whether they communicate to others1 or remain absolute in themselves 7and not communicating to others1 like speaking and walking72 and the movements proceeding from others are reactions though the communicated movements seem to be identical with the movements proceeding from others4 ,for example1 division is one and the same thing1 whether it be considered within him who divides1 or in that which is divided2 nevertheless dividing is something different from being divided4 ,or again1 division is not one and the same thing according as it proceeds from him who divides1 or as it is received by him who is divided2 to divide means to cause in the divided thing another movement1 which is the result of the dividing action or movement4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 the difference does not lie in the very fact of being divided1 but in the movement which results from the division1 as for instance1 in suffering2 for this is what constitutes reaction 7or passion74 ,what are we to say if there be no suffering8 ,we might answer that the actualization of him who acts is simply present in such a thing 7without correlative reaction74 ,there are thus two manners of acting2 to act within oneself1 and to act outside of oneself4 ,no more will it then be said that the first mode is proper acting1 and the second reacting1 but that there are two ways of acting outside of oneself1 acting and reacting4 ,for instance1 writing is an operation in which one acts on something else without a correlative reaction1 because in writing one produces nothing but the very actualization of writing1 and not something else1 like experiencing2 for the quality of writing that has been produced is nothing that reacts 7or1 experiences74 ,as to walking1 though the earth be stepped on by the feet1 it does not react 7or1 experience7 as a consequence4 ,on the contrary1 if it be the body of an animal that is trod under feet1 it may be conceived that there is reaction1 because one then thinks of the suffering endured by the animal thus trod on1 and not of the walking2 otherwise1 this reaction would have been conceived before 7the notion of this reaction would have been implied in the very notion of walking74 ,,action ,,and ,,reaction ,,form ,,but ,a ,,single ,,genus4 ,thus1 in everything1 acting forms but a single genus along with reacting1 which 7by the ,aristotelians7 is considered its opposite4 ,reacting is what follows acting1 without being its contrary2 to be burnt1 for instance1 follows burning1 but is not its contrary4 ,in this case1 the reaction is what results in the object itself from the fact of burning1 or of being burnt1 which form but one 7process71 whether the result be suffering1 or something else1 as1 for instance1 depreciation4 ,it might be objected1 ,when one 7being7 makes another suffer1 is it not true that the one acts1 and the other reacts8 ,here from a single actualization result two facts1 an action1 and a reaction4 ,besides1 it is not necessary to include in the action the will to cause suffering2 it has only produced something else as a result of which it causes suffering1 something which occurring in the being that suffers1 and being one single 7occurrence71 that causes suffering4 ,what then is this one identical thing which is anterior to the suffering8 ,when there is no suffering1 is there not nevertheless a reaction in him in whom is the modification8 ,for instance1 in him who hears8 ,no3 to hear is not to react1 and sensation is not really a reaction2#bgh but to suffer is to experience a reaction1 and the reaction is not the contrary of the action 7in the sense we have explained74 ,,reactions ,,need ,,not ,,be ,,passive1 ,,but ,,may ,,be ,,active4 #bj4 ,let it be granted1 then1 that reaction is not the contrary of action4 ,nevertheless1 as it differs therefrom1 it could not share the same genus4 ,if both reaction and action be movements1 they share the same genus1 that of alteration1 which is a movement1 as respects quality4#bgi ,when alteration proceeds from the being endowed with quality1 is there any action1 though this being remain impassible8 ,yes1 for though impassible1 it is active4 ,it may be asked1 is this being no longer active when it acts on some other object1 as1 for instance1 by striking it1 and then reacts8 ,the answer is1 that it would be active and passive simultaneously4 ,if it be active1 when it reacts--when1 for instance1 it rubs--why is it considered active rather than passive8 ,because it reacts in being rubbed while it rubs4 ,could we say that1 because it is moved while moving1 there were in it two movements8 ,but how could there be two movements in it8 ,shall we assert that there is but one8 ,in this case1 how could the same movement be action and reaction simultaneously8 ,doubtless1 it will be considered action1 in so far as it proceeds from the mover2 and reaction1 inasmuch as it passes from the mover into the moved2 and this1 without ceasing to be one and the same thing4 ,would you say that reaction was a movement of a kind different from action8 ,how then would the altering movement in a certain manner modify what reacts without an equal reaction in what is acting8 ,but how 7can we conceive7 of reaction in that which acts on another object8 ,is the mere presence of the movement in the moved sufficient to constitute reaction8#bhj ,but if1 on one hand1 the 7seminal7 reason of the swan whitens1 and on the other hand the swan that is being born becomes white1 shall we say that the swan is passive in becoming what it is his nature to be8 ,if he becomes white even after his birth1 is he still passive8 ,if one thing increase1 and another thing be increased1 will we admit that the thing that increases reacts8 ,will we rather attribute reaction to the thing qualified8 ,if one thing be embellished1 and another thing embellishes it1 could we say that the embellished thing reacts8#bha ,if however1 the embellishing thing decreases1 and1 like tin1 tarnishes1 or on the contrary1 like copper1 takes on polish2 shall we say that the tin acts1 and the copper reacts 7that is1 suffers78 ,besides1 it would be impossible to say that that which learns is passive 7suffering78 ,would this be because the action of him who acts passes into him8 ,but how could there be any reaction 7suffering7 since there is nothing there but an act8 ,this action1 no doubt1 is not a reaction 7suffering72 but he who receives it is passive1 because he participates in passivity4 ,indeed1 from the fact that the learner does not himself act1 it does not necessarily result that he is passive2 for learning is not being struck1 but grasping and discerning1 as takes place with the process of vision4 ,,definition ,,of ,,reaction ,,or ,,suffering4 #ba4 ,how may we define the fact of reaction8 ,we do not approve of the definition that it is the passing of the actualization from one being into another1 if its receiver appropriate it4 ,shall we say that a 7being7 reacts when there is no actualization1 but only an effective experience8 ,but is it not possible that the being that reacts becomes better2 while1 on the contrary1 the one who acts1 loses8 ,a 7being7 may also act in an evil manner1 and exercise on another a harmful influence2 and the actualization may be shameful1 and the affective experience be honorable4 ,what distinction shall we then establish 7between action and reaction78 ,shall we say that an action is to cause 7an actualization7 to pass from self into others1 and that reaction is to receive in oneself 7an action7 from someone else8 ,but then what about the 7actualizations7 produced in oneself which do not pass into others1 such as thought and opinion8 ,one can even excite oneself by a reflection or opinion of emotive value1 without this emotion having been aroused by anybody else4 ,we shall therefore define an action as a spontaneous movement1 whether this movement remain in the being who produces it1 or whether it pass into somebody else4 ,what then are the faculty of desire1 and desire in general8 ,if desire be excited by the desired thing 7it is an experience1 or passion71 even if we should not take into consideration the cause of its excitement1 and even if we only noticed that it arose later than the object2 for this desire does not differ from an impression or an impulsion4 ,shall we then1 among desires1 distinguish actions when they proceed from intelligence1 and experiences when they invoke and draw 7on the soul71 so that the being be less passive by what it receives from others1 than by what it receives from itself8 ,doubtless a being can act upon itself4 7,we can then define7 an affective experience1 and a being's experience1 as follows4 ,they consist of undergoing1 without any contribution from oneself1 a modification which does not contribute to being1 and which1 on the contrary1 alters1 or at least1 does not improve4 ,to this 7definition7 it may be objected that if warming oneself consist in receiving such heat as partially contributes to the subject's being1 and partly does not do so1 then we have here one and the same thing which both is1 and is not an experience4 ,to this it may be answered that there are two ways of warming oneself4 ,besides1 even when the heating contributes to the being1 it does so only in the degree that some other object experiences4 ,for instance1 the metal will have to be heated1 and undergo an experience1 for the production of the being called statue1 although this statue itself be heated only incidentally4 ,if then the metal become more beautiful by the effect of that which heats it1 or by the effect of the heating itself1 it undergoes an experience2 for there are two manners of 7undergoing an experience1 or7 suffering3 the one consists in becoming worse1 and the other in becoming better--or at least1 in not altering4 ,,transmission1 ,,reception ,,and ,,relation ,,underlie ,,action ,,and ,,experience4 #bb4 ,the cause that a being undergoes an experience is that it contains the kind of movement called alteration1 whichever way it modify him2 on the contrary1 action means to have in oneself a definite movement1 derived from oneself1 or a movement which has its goal in some other being1 and its origin in self4 ,in both cases there is movement2 but with this distinction3 that action1 so far as it is action1 is impassible2 while an experience consists in the experiencer's reception of a disposition new to him1 without the reception of anything that contributes towards his being2 so as to avoid 7the case of the statue1 above1 where7 the experience happened to one being 7the metal71 while it was another being that was produced 7the statue74 ,consequently1 the same thing will in one state be an action1 and in other1 an experience4 ,thus the same movement will in one being be an action1 because it is considered from a certain viewpoint2 and from another it will be an experience1 because it is disposed some other way4 ,action and experience seem therefore to be relative1 if one consider the action in its relation with experience1 since the same thing is action in the one1 and experience in the other4 ,also1 because neither of these two can be considered in itself1 but only in him who acts1 or experiences1 when the one moves1 and the other is moved4 ,each of these terms therefore implies two categories2 one gives the movement1 the other receives it2 consequently we have transmission and reception1 which result in relation4 ,if he who received the movement possesses it as he possesses color1 why could it not also be said that he possessed movement8 ,absolute movements1 such as walking 7and thinking7 possess steps and thought4 ,,prediction ,,and ,,responsiveness ,,to ,,it ,,do ,,not ,,fall ,,under ,,definition ,,for ,,action ,,and ,,experience4 ,let us now consider whether prediction be an action1 and whether adapting one's course to the prediction of somebody else would constitute experiencing2 for prediction comes from one being and applies to another4 ,however1 although prediction apply to some other1 we would not consider prediction an action1 nor being directed by the prediction of somebody else an experience4 ,in general1 not even thought is an action2 thought1 indeed1 does not pass in to the object thought1 but functions within itself2 it is not at all an action4 ,actualizations are not at all actions1 and not all of them perform actions2 indeed1 they may do so only accidentally4 ,it might be objected that a man who was walking would certainly impress on the ground the trace of his steps1 and would thereby perform an action4 ,such an action would be the consequence of something else1 or the man would act accidentally2 and it would be accidental1 because the man was not thinking of it4 ,it is in this way that even inanimate things perform some action1 that fire heats1 and medicine cures4 ,but enough of this4 #g4 ,,possession4 #bc4 ,let us now examine the category of having 7possession74 ,,having ,,is ,,so ,,indefinite ,,and ,,various ,,that ,,it ,,cannot ,,be ,a ,,category4 ,if the verb to have be used in several senses1 why might we not apply to this category all the various uses of the word2 for instance1 quantity1 because quantity has size2 quality1 because it has color2 the father1 because he has a son2 the son1 because he has a father2 and1 in general1 all kinds of possession8 ,will it be said that the other things that can be possessed have already been classified under the categories considered above1 and that the category of having comprises only arms1 foot-wear1 and clothing8 ,this might be answered by the question why having these objects should constitute a category1 and why burning them1 cutting them1 burying them1 or throwing them away1 would not equally constitute one or more categories8 ,if the answer be that all these things form one category because they refer to the body1 this would then also make another category if we placed a garment over a litter2 or likewise if someone were covered with clothing4 ,if another answer be that the category of having consists in the manner of containing1#bhb and in possession1#bhc then all things which are possessed will have to be reduced to this category1 which will thus contain all possession1 whatever it be1 since the nature of the possessed object could not here prevail to form some distinction4 ,on the other hand1 if the category of having must exclude having a quantity or quality1 because the latter ideas already form their own categories2 nor having parts1 because of the category of being 7which includes parts72 why should this category contain having arms1 when arms1 as well as foot-wear1 belong to the category of being8 ,in any case1 how could the statement1 ,he has arms be considered something simple1 which could be reduced to any one category8 ,that statement expresses the same idea as ,he is armed4 ,can this expression 7he has arms7 refer only to a man1 or even to his statue8 ,the living man possesses very differently from possession by a statue1 and the verb to have is used only as a verbal label 7a homonym71 just as the verb to stand up would mean something very different according as it referred to a man or a statue4 ,besides1 is it reasonable to make a generic category of some merely incidental characteristic8 #h4 ,,situation4 #bd4 ,as to the category of situation1 it contains also such incidental characteristics as being raised1 or seated4 ,here the ,aristotelians do not make a category of situation1 by itself1 but of the kind of situation1 as when it is said1 ,he is placed in such a posture--a phrase in which to be placed and in such a posture express two entirely different ideas--or again1 he is in such a place4 ,now1 as posture and location have already been studied1 what is the use in here combining two categories into one8 ,if1 on the other hand1 the expression he is seated indicate an action or an experience1 must it not then be reduced to the category of action or experience8 ,it would moreover amount to the same thing to say he is raised1 as to say1 he is situated above2 just as we say he is situated in the middle1 or1 he is situated below4 ,besides1 being seated has already been treated of under the category of relation2 why should1 being raised not also be a relative entity1 since the category of relation includes the thing to the left1 and the thing to the right1 as well as the left and right hand themselves8 ,enough of these reflections 7about ,aristotelian categories74 ,b4 ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,stoic ,,categories4 #be4 ,let us now pass to the 7,stoic7 philosophers#bhd who1 recognizing four categories only1 divide everything into substances1 qualities1 modes1 and relations2 and who1 attributing to all 7beings7 something common1 thus embrace them into a single genus4 ,,the ,,category ,,of ,,something ,,common ,,is ,,absurd4 ,this doctrine raises a great number of objections1 especially in that it attributes to all beings something in common1 and thus embraces them in a single class4 ,indeed1 this something of which they speak is quite incomprehensible2 as also is how it could adapt itself equally to bodies and to incorporeal beings1 between which they do not allow for sufficient distinction to establish a distinction in this something4 ,besides1 this something either is1 or is not an essence2 if it be an essence1 it must be a form2 if it be not an essence1 there result a thousand absurdities1 among which would be that essence is not an essence4 ,let us therefore leave this point1 and devote ourselves to the division into four categories4 #a4 ,,substance2 ,,according ,,to ,,them ,,it ,,is ,,split ,,up4 ,the ,stoics assign the first rank to substances1 and place matter before the other substances4 ,from this it results that the ,stoics assign to the same rank their first ,principle1 and with it the things which are inferior thereto4 ,first1 they reduce to a single class both anterior and posterior things1 though it be impossible to combine them in this manner4 ,in fact1 every time that things differ from each other in that some are anterior1 and others posterior1 those which are posterior owe their essence to those which are anterior4 ,on the contrary1 when things are comprised within one and the same class1 all equally owe their essence to this class1 since a class is what is affirmed of kinds of things in regard to essence4 ,the ,stoics themselves recognize this by saying that all things derive their essence from matter4 ,besides1 when they count but a single substance1 they do not enumerate the beings themselves1 but they seek their principles4 ,now there is a great difference between treating of principles and treating of beings4 ,if the ,stoics recognize no essence other than matter1 and think that other things are modifications of matter1 they are wrong in reducing essence and other things to a common class2 they should rather say that essence is being1 and that other things are modifications1 and then distinguish between these modifications4 ,further1 it is absurd to assert that 7among essences71 some should be substances1 and others should be other things 7such as qualities1 modes and relations72 for the ,stoics recognize but a single substance1 which does not contain any difference1 unless by division as of mass into parts2 besides1 they should not attribute divisibility to their substance1 because they teach that it is continuous4 ,they should therefore say1 substance 7and not substances74 ,,matter ,,cannot ,,be ,,the ,,primary ,,principle4 #bf4 ,what is most shocking in the ,stoic doctrine1 is that they assign the first rank to what is only a potentiality1 matter1 instead of placing actualization before potentiality4#bhe ,it is impossible for the potential to pass to actualization if the potential occupy the first rank among beings4 ,indeed1 the potential could never improve itself2 and it implies the necessary anteriority of actualization2 in which case potentiality is no longer a principle4 ,or1 if it be insisted that actualization and potentiality must be simultaneous1 both principles will be found depending on chance4 ,besides1 even if actualization be contemporaneous with potentiality1 why should not the first rank be assigned to actualization8 ,why should this 7matter7 be an essence1 rather than those 7forms78 ,whoever asserts that form is posterior bears the burden of proof2 for matter does not beget form1 and quality could not arise from what has no quality2 nor actualization from what is potential2 otherwise1 actualization would have existed anteriorly1 even in the system of the ,stoics4 ,according to them1 even ,god is no longer simple3 ,he is posterior to matter2 for ,he is a body constituted by form and matter4#bhf ,whence then does ,he derive ,his form8 ,if the divinity exist without matter1 ,he is incorporeal1 by virtue of ,his being principle and reason1 and the active principle would thus be incorporeal4 ,if1 even without having matter1 the divinity be composite in essence1 by virtue of ,his body1 the ,stoics will have to postulate some other kind of matter which may better suit the divinity4 ,,matter ,,is ,,not ,a ,,body ,,without ,,quality1 ,,but ,,with ,,magnitude 7,a ,,stoic ,,definition74 ,besides1 how could matter be the first ,principle1 if it be a body8 ,if the body of which the ,stoics speak be of another nature1 then matter can be called a body only figuratively4#bhg ,if they say that the common property of the body is to have three dimensions1 they are speaking of the mathematical body4 ,if on the contrary they join impenetrability to the three dimensions1 they are no more talking about something simple4 ,besides1 impenetrability is a quality1 or is derived from a quality2 but what is the source of impenetrability8 ,whence comes tri-dimensional extension8 ,who endued matter with extension8 ,matter1 indeed1 is not contained in the idea of tri-dimensional extension any more than the latter is contained in the notion of matter4 ,consequently1 since matter thus participates in size1#bhh it is no longer a simple matter4 ,,absolute ,,existence ,,precedes ,,contingent ,,existence4 ,moreover1 whence is derived the unification of matter8 ,matter is not unity1 but it participates in unity4 ,they would have had to realize that the material mass is not anterior to everything1 and that the first rank pertains to what is not one mass1 to ,unity itself4 ,then they would have to descend from ,unity to multiplicity1 from what is size-less to actual sizes2 since1 if size be one1 it is not because it is ,unity itself1 but only because it participates in unity4 ,we must therefore recognize that what possesses primary and absolute existence is anterior to what exists contingently4 ,but how does contingency itself exist8 ,what is its mode of existence8 ,if the ,stoics had examined this point1 they would have finally hit upon 7the absolute ,unity7 which is not unity merely contingently4 ,by this expression is here meant what is not one by itself1 but by others4 ,,the ,,stoic ,,god ,,is ,,only ,,modified ,,matter4 #bg4 ,the ,stoics did well1 indeed1 to assign the principle of everything to the first rank2 but they should not have recognized as principle1 and accepted as being what was shapeless1 passive1 devoid of life and intelligence1 dark1 and indefinite4 ,because of the universe's beauty1 they are forced to introduce within it a divinity2 but the latter derives ,his very essence from matter2 ,he is composite and posterior 7to matter72 rather1 ,he is no more than modified matter4#bhh ,consequently1 if matter be the subject1 there must necessarily be outside of it some other principle which1 acting upon matter1 makes of it the subject of the qualities which ,he imparts thereto4 ,if this principle resided in matter1 and ,himself were the subject2 if1 in other words1 ,he were contemporaneous with matter1 ,he could not reduce matter to the state of a subject4 ,now it is entirely impossible 7for this principle7 to constitute a subject concurrently with matter2 for in such a case both would have to serve as subject to something higher2 and what could it be1 since there could be no further principle to make a subject of them1 if all things had already been absorbed into this 7concurrent7 subject8 ,a subject is necessarily subject to something2 not to what it has in itself1 but to that whose action it undergoes4 ,now1 it undergoes the action of that which itself is not subject by itself2 consequently1 of that which is outside of itself4 ,this point has evidently been overlooked by the ,stoics4 ,,if ,,everything ,,be ,,derived ,,from ,,matter1 ,,matter ,,can ,,no ,,longer ,,be ,,their ,,subject4 ,on the other hand1 if matter and the active principle need nothing exterior1 if the subject that they constitute can itself become all things by assuming different forms1 as a dancer1 who can assume all possible attitudes1 this subject would no longer be a subject1 but ,he will be all things4 ,just as the dancer is not the subject of the attitudes 7for they are his actualizations71 likewise the matter of the ,stoics will no longer be the subject of all things1 if all things proceed from matter2 or rather1 the other things will no longer really exist1 they will be nothing but modified matter1 just as the attitudes are nothing but the modified dancer4 ,now if the other things no longer really exist1 matter is no longer a subject2 it is no longer the matter of the essences1 but is matter exclusively4 ,it will no longer even be matter1 because what is matter must be matter of something2 but that which refers to something else belongs to the same classification as that thing1 just as half belongs to the same classification as the double1 and is not the being of the double4 ,but how could non-essence1 except by accident1 refer to essence8 ,but the absolute ,essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being essence4 ,now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality1 it cannot constitute being1 which consequently matter could not be4#bhi ,,the ,,monism ,,of ,,the ,,stoics ,,breaks ,,down1 ,,just ,,like ,,dualism4 ,consequently1 the ,stoics1 who reproach other philosophers 7such as ,plato7 for making up beings out of non-beings1#bij themselves make up a non-being out of a being4#bia ,indeed 7in the system of the ,stoics71 the world1 such as it is1 is not being4 ,it is certainly unreasonable to insist that matter1 which is a subject1 should nevertheless be being1 and that bodies should not1 any more than matter be being2 but it is still more unreasonable to insist that the world is being1 not by itself1 but only by one of its parts 7namely1 matter72 that the organism does not owe its being to the soul1 but only to matter2 and last1 that the soul is only a modification of matter1 and is something posterior to others4 ,from whom then did matter receive animation8 ,whence comes the hypostatic existence of the soul8 ,how does1 matter receive form8 ,for1 since matter becomes the bodies1 the soul is something else than matter4 ,if the form came from something else than the soul1 quality1 on uniting to matter1 would produce not the soul1 but inanimate bodies4 ,if something fashion matter and create the soul1 the created soul would have to be preceded by a creating soul4 ,,the ,,fault ,,of ,,the ,,stoics ,,is ,,to ,,have ,,taken ,,sensation ,,as ,,guide4 #bh4 ,the ,stoic theory raises numberless further objections2 but we halt here lest we ourselves incur ridicule in combating so evident an absurdity4 ,it suffices if we have demonstrated that these philosophers mistake non-essence for absolute essence2 7putting the cart before the horse71 they assign the ,first rank to what should occupy the last4 ,the cause of their error is that they have chosen sensation as guide1 and have consulted nothing else in determining both their principles1 and consequences4 ,being persuaded that the bodies are genuine essences1#bib and refusing to believe that they transform themselves into each other1 they believed that what subsisted in them 7in the midst of their changes7 is the real essence1 just as one might imagine that place1 because it is indestructible1 is more essential than 7metabolic7 bodies4 ,although in the system of the ,stoics place remain unaltered1 these philosophers should not have regarded as essence that which subsists in any manner soever2 they should1 first1 have considered what are the characteristics necessarily possessed by essence1 the presence of which 7characteristics7 makes it subsist without undergoing any alteration4 ,let us indeed suppose that a shadow would continuously subsist by following something which changes continuously2 the shadow1 however1 would not be no more real than the object it follows4 ,the sense-world1 taken together with its multiple objects1 is more of an essence than the things it contains1 merely because it is their totality4 ,now if this subject1 taken in its totality1 be non-essence1 how could it be a subject8 ,the most surprising thing1 however1 is that the 7,stoics71 in all things following the testimony of sensation1 should not also have affirmed that essence can be perceived by sensation2 for1 to matter1 they do not attribute impenetrability1 because it is a quality 7and because1 according to them1 matter has no quality74 ,if they insist that matter is perceived by intelligence1#bic it could only be an irrational intelligence which would consider itself inferior to matter1 and attribute to it1 rather than to itself1 the privilege of constituting genuine essence4 ,since in their system intelligence is non-essence1 how could any credibility attach to that intelligence when it speaks of things superior to it1 and with which it possesses no affinity8 ,but we have said enough of the nature of these subjects1 elsewhere4#bid #b4 ,,quality4 ,,qualities ,,are ,,incorporeal4 #bi4 ,since the ,stoics speak of qualities1 they must consider these as distinct from subjects2 otherwise1 they would not assign them to the second rank4 ,now1 to be anything else than the subjects1 qualities must be simple1 and consequently1 not composite2 that is1 they must not1 in so far as they are qualities1 contain any matter4 ,in this case1 the qualities must be incorporeal and active2 for1 according to the ,stoics1 matter is a passive subject4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the qualities themselves be passive1 the division into subjects and qualities is absurd1 because it would classify separately simple and composite things1 and then reunite them into one single classification4 ,further1 it is faulty in that it locates one of the species in another 7matter in the qualities71 as if science were divided into two kinds1 of which one would comprise grammar1 and the other grammar with something additional4 ,,seminal ,,reasons1 ,,as ,,qualified ,,matter1 ,,would ,,be ,,composite2 ,,and ,,secondary4 ,if the ,stoics say that the qualities are qualified matter1 then their 7seminal7 reasons being not merely united to nature1 but 7fully7 material1 will no doubt form a composite2 but before forming this composite they themselves will already be composed of matter and forms2 they themselves will therefore be neither reasons nor forms4 ,,the ,,four ,,stoic ,,categories ,,evaporate1 ,,leaving ,,matter ,,alone ,,as ,,basis4 ,if the 7,stoics7 say that the reasons are only modified matter1 they then admit that qualities are modes1 and the 7,stoics7 should locate the reasons in the fourth category1 of relation4 ,if however relation be something different from modality1 in what does that difference consist8 ,is it that modality here possesses greater reality8 ,but if modality1 taken in itself1 be not a reality1 why then make of it a category8 ,surely it would be impossible to gather in a single category both essence and non-essence4 ,in what then does this modification of matter consist8 ,it must be either essence or non-essence4 ,if it be essence1 it is necessarily incorporeal4 ,if it be non-essence1 it is nothing but a word1 and matter alone exists4 ,in this case1 quality is nothing real1 and modality still less4 ,as to the fourth category1 relation1 absolutely no reality whatever will inhere in it4 ,this ,stoic system1 therefore1 contains nothing else but matter4 ,,the ,,cult ,,of ,,matter ,,implies ,,ignoring ,,soul ,,and ,,intelligence4 ,but on whose authority do we learn this8 ,surely1 not on that of matter itself1 unless that1 because of its modification1 it becomes intelligence2 but this 7alleged7 modification is but a meaningless addition2 it must therefore be matter which perceives these things1 and expresses them4 ,if we should ask whether matter utter sensible things1 we might indeed ask ourselves how matter thinks and fulfils the functions of the soul1 although matter lacks both soul and intelligence4 ,if1 on the contrary1 matter utter something nonsensical1 insisting that it is what it is not1 and what it could not be1 to whom should this silly utterance be ascribed8 ,surely only to matter1 if it could speak4 ,but matter does not speak2 and he who speaks thus does so only because he has borrowed much from matter1 that he has become its slave1 though he have a soul4 ,the fact is that he is ignorant of himself1 as well as of the nature of the faculty which can divulge the truth about this subject 7intelligence74 #c4 ,,modality4 ,,modality ,,should ,,not ,,occupy ,,even ,,the ,,third ,,rank ,,of ,,existence4 #cj4 ,it is absurd to assign the third rank to modalities1 and even assign to them any place whatever2 for all modalities refer to matter4 ,it may however be objected to this that there are differences between the modalities2 the various modifications that matter undergoes are not the same thing as the modalities2 the qualities are doubtless modalities of matter1 but the modalities1 in the strict sense of the word1 refer to qualities4 7,the answer to this is that7 since the qualities are only modalities of matter1 the technical modalities mentioned by the 7,stoics7 themselves reduce to matter1 and necessarily relate thereto4 ,in view of the many differences obtaining between them1 how otherwise could modalities form a category8 ,how could one reduce to a single classification the length of three feet1 and whiteness--since one is a quantity1 and the other a quality8 ,how could time and place be reduced thereto8 ,besides1 how would it be possible to consider as modalities such expressions as yesterday1 formerly1 in the ,lyceum1 and1 in the ,academy8 ,how could time be explained as a modality8 ,neither time1 nor things which are in time1 nor place1 nor the things which are in place1 could be modalities4 ,how is to act a modality1 since he who acts is not himself a modality1 but rather acts within some modality1 or even1 acts simply8 ,nor is he who undergoes an experience any more of a modality2 he experiences something rather in a modality1 or rather1 he undergoes some experience in such a manner4 ,modality rather suits the 7,aristotelian7 categories of situation and possession2 and as to possession1 no man even possesses in such or such a modality1 but possesses purely and simply4 #d4 ,,relation2 ,,the ,,stoics ,,confuse ,,the ,,new ,,with ,,the ,,anterior4 #ca4 ,if the ,stoics did not1 along with the other discussed categories1 reduce relation to a common kind1 there might be good grounds to examine whether they attributed substantial 7or1 hypostatic7 reality to these manners of being2 for often1 they do not attribute to them any4 ,but what is to be said of their confusing things new and anterior in one same classification8 ,this is evidently an absurdity2 for surely one and two must exist before the half or the double4 ,as to the philosophers 7,plato1 for instance71 who have taught other opinions about essences and their principles1 considered as finite or infinite1 corporeal or incorporeal1 or both simultaneously corporeal or incorporeal1 we will examine each of these opinions separately1 considering also the historic objections of the ancient 7philosophers74 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,two4 ,the ,categories of ,plotinos4#big #a4 ,after having discussed the doctrine of the ten categories 7of ,aristotle71 and spoken of the 7,stoics7 who reduce all things to a single genus1 and then distribute them in four species1 we must still set forth our own opinion on the subject1 striving however to conform ourselves to the doctrine of ,plato4 ,,plotinos ,,is ,,forced ,,to ,,demonstration ,,of ,,his ,,divergence ,,from ,,plato4 ,if it were our opinion that essence was one1 we would not need to study whether there was one single genus for all things1 whether all genera could not be reduced to a single one2 whether there were principles2 whether the genera were at the same time principles2 or whether all principles are genera1 without saying conversely that all genera are principles2 or1 if we must distinguish between them1 say that some principles are simultaneously genera1 or some genera are principles1 or1 finally1 whether all principles be genera without the genera being principles1 and conversely4 ,but1 since we do not acknowledge that essence is one1 the reasons#bih for which were advanced by ,plato and other philosophers1 we find ourselves forced to treat all these questions1 and first to explain why we recognize genera of essences1 and what number we decide on4 ,,plotinos ,,adds ,,to ,,essence ,,eternity1 ,,to ,,make ,,essence ,,intelligible4 ,as we are going to treat of essence or essences1 we must before everything else clear up the significance of essence1 which we are now considering1 and distinguish it from what other people mean by that word1 which we would more likely call that which becomes1 what is never genuine essence4 ,and besides1 it must be clearly understood that in making this distinction1 we do not intend to divide a genus in species of the same nature2 as ,plato tried to do4#bii ,for it would be ridiculous to subsume under the same genus both essence and non-essence1 or ,socrates1 and the image of ,socrates4 ,the kind of divisions here attempted will therefore only consist in separating things essentially different1 as1 for instance1 explaining that apparent essence is not the same as the veritable ,essence1 by demonstrating that the latter's nature is entirely different4 ,to clarify this its nature1 it will be necessary to add to the idea of essence that of eternity1 and thus to demonstrate that the nature of being could never be deceptive4 ,it is of this kind of essence 7that is1 of the intelligible ,essence71 that we are going to treat1 admitting that it is not single4 ,later#cjj we shall speak of generation1 of what becomes1 and of the sense-world4 ,,hierarchical ,,constitution ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 #b4 ,holding as we do that the world-,essence is not one1 we must face the question whether the number of beings is determinate1 or infinite4 ,to say that world-,essence is not one1 however1 is to say that it is both one and multiple1 a varied unity that embraces a multitude4 ,it is therefore necessary that the ,one1 so conceived1 be one so far as it forms a single genus1 containing as species the essences by which it is simultaneously one and multiple2 or there must be several genera1 but that they all be subsumed under the single one2 or again1 that there be several genera which however be not mutually subsumed1 of which each1 being independent of the others1 may contain what is below it1 consisting of less extended genera1 or species below which there are no more than individuals2 so that all these things may contribute to the constitution of a single nature1 together making up the organization of the intelligible world1 which we call world-,essence 7or being74 ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,the ,,universe ,,are ,,principles ,,and ,,genera ,,simultaneously4 ,under these circumstances1 the divisions that we establish are no more only genera1 they are simultaneously the very principles of world-,essence2 on the one hand they are genera1 because they contain less extended genera1 beneath which are species1 which end in individuals2 they are also principles1 because world-,essence is composed of multiple elements1 and because these elements constitute the totality of ,essence4 ,if it were only stated that world-,essence is composed of several elements1 and that these elements1 by co-operation1 constitute the ,all1 without adding that they branch out into lower species1 our divisions would indeed be principles1 but they would no longer be genera4 ,for instance1 if it be said that the sense-world is composed of four elements1 such as fire1 or other elements1 these elements are indeed principles1 but not genera1 unless this name be used as a verbal similarity 7or1 homonym1 or pun74 ,,being ,,actualizations1 ,,both ,,genera ,,and ,,individuals ,,will ,,be ,,distinct4 ,admitting therefore the existence of certain genera1 which are simultaneously principles1 we must still consider whether they should be conceived so that these genera1 along with the things contained by each of them1 commingle1 fuse1 and form the whole by their blending4 ,if so1 the genera would exist potentially1 but not in actualization2 none would have anything characteristic4 ,further1 granting the distinctness of the genera1 can we grant that the individuals blend8 ,but what then would become of the genera themselves8 ,will they subsist by themselves1 and will they remain pure1 without mutual destruction of the mingled individuals8 ,later we shall indicate how such things could take place4 ,,fundamental ,,unity ,,of ,,genera ,,would ,,destroy ,,species2 ,,manifoldness ,,must ,,pre-,,exist4 ,now that we have explained the existence of genera1 which1 besides1 are principles of being1 and that from another point of view there are principles 7or elements71 and compounds1 we shall have to set forth the criterion by which we constitute these genera2 we shall have to ask how they may be distinguished from each other1 instead of reducing them to a single 7principle71 as if they had been united by chance1 although it does indeed seem more rational to reduce them to a single 7principle74 ,it would be possible to reduce them in this way if all things were species of essence1 if the individuals were contained within these species1 and if there were nothing outside of these species4 ,but such a supposition would destroy the species--for such species would no longer be species1 or forms2--and from that moment there would be no further need for reducing plurality to unity1 and everything forming a single unity2 so that1 all things belonging to this ,one1 no being outside of the ,one would exist1 as far as it was something else4 ,how indeed could the ,one have become manifold1 and how could it have begotten the species1 if nothing but it existed8 ,for it would not be manifold if there were not something to divide it1 such as a size2 now that which divides is other than that which is divided4 ,the mere fact that it divides itself1 or imparts itself to others1 shows that it was already divisible before the division4 ,,there ,,is ,,more ,,than ,,one ,,genus1 ,,for ,,not ,,everything ,,can ,,be ,,subsumed ,,under ,,being ,,and ,,essence4 ,for this and other reasons1 therefore1 we must take good care to avoid assertion of a single genus2 for it would be impossible to apply to everything the denominations of being and essence4#cdb ,if indeed there be very different objects called essence1 this is only accidentally1 just as if one called the color white a being2 for strictly we cannot apply being to white1 as considered alone4#cja ,,the ,,one ,,is ,,so ,,far ,,above ,,all ,,the ,,genera ,,as ,,not ,,to ,,be ,,counted4 #c4 ,we therefore assert the existence of several genera1 and that this plurality is not accidental4 ,these divers genera1 however1 depend from the ,one4 ,but even though they do depend from the ,one1 if the ,one be not something which may be affirmed of each of them as considered in its being1 then nothing hinders each of them1 having nothing similar to the others1 from constituting a genus apart4 ,we also grant that the ,one1 existing outside of the genera which are begotten of ,him1 is their cause1 although the other essences considered in their being do not proclaim this4 ,yes indeed1 the ,one is outside of the other essences4 ,besides1 ,he is above them2 so much so1 that ,he is not counted as one of them2 for it is through ,him that the other essences exist1 which1 so far as they are genera1 are equal4 ,,we ,,are ,,discussing ,,here ,,not ,,the ,,absolute ,,one1 ,,but ,,the ,,essential ,,related ,,one4 ,still1 it will be asked1 ,of what nature is the ,one which does not count among the genera8 ,this 7absolute ,one7 is outside of our present consideration2 for we are not studying ,him who is above essence1#cdb but the essences themselves4 ,we must therefore pass by the absolute ,one1 and seek the one which is counted among the genera4 ,,the ,,related ,,one ,,is ,,in ,,some ,,genera1 ,,but ,,not ,,in ,,others4 ,to begin with 7if we consider the related ,one from this point of view71 it will seem astonishing to see the cause numbered along with the effects4 ,it would indeed be unreasonable to cram into a single genus both superior and inferior things4 ,if nevertheless1 on counting the one amidst the essences of which ,he is the cause1 ,he was to be considered as a genus to which the other essences were to be subordinated1 and from which they differed2 if1 besides1 the one was not to be predicated of the other essences either as genus1 or in any other respect1 it would still be necessary that the genera which possessed essence subsume species under them2 since1 for instance1 by moving1 you produce walking1 and yet walking cannot be considered a genus subordinate to you2 but above the walking there existed nothing else that could1 in respect to it1 operate as a genus2 and if nevertheless there existed things beneath walking1 walking would1 in respect to them1 be a genus of the essences4 ,,the ,,parts ,,of ,a ,,manifold ,,unity ,,are ,,apart ,,only ,,for ,,examination4 ,perhaps1 instead of saying that the one is the cause of the other things1 we would have to admit that these things are as parts and elements of the one2 and that all things form a single nature in which only our thought establishes divisions2 so that1 by virtue of its admirable power1 this nature be unity distributed in all things1 appearing and becoming manifold1 as if it were in movement1 and that the one should cease being unity as a result of the fruitfulness of its nature4 ,if we were to enumerate successively the parts of such a nature1 we would grant to each of them a separate existence1 ignoring that we had not seen the whole together4 ,but after thus having separated the parts1 we would soon reapproximate them1 not for long being able to keep apart the isolated elements which tend to reunite4 ,that is why we could not help making a whole out of them1 letting them once more become unity1 or rather1 be unity4 ,besides1 this will be easier to understand when we shall know what these essences are1 and how many are the genera of essences2 for we shall then be able to conceive their mode of existence4 ,and as1 in these matters1 it is not well to limit oneself to negations1 but to aim at positive knowledge1 and at the full intelligence of the subject here treated1 we shall have to make this inquiry4 ,,the ,,genera ,,of ,,essence ,,will ,,be ,,determined ,,by ,,an ,,examination ,,of ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,,one ,,and ,,many4 #d4 ,if1 on occupying ourselves with this sense-world1 we wished to determine the nature of bodies1 would we not begin by studying some part thereof1 such as a stone8 ,we could then distinguish therein substance1 quantity--such as dimension--and quality1 such as color2 and after having discovered these same elements in other bodies1 we could say that the elements of the corporeal nature are being1 quantity1 and quality2 but that these three coexist2 and that1 though thought distinguish them1 all three form but one and the same body4 ,if1 besides1 we were to recognize that movement is proper to this same organization1 would we not add it to the three elements already distinguished8 ,these four elements1 however1 would form but a single one1 and the body1 though one1 would1 in its nature1 be the reunion of all four4 ,we shall have to take the same course with our present subject1 intelligible ,being1 and its genera and principles4 ,only1 in this comparison1 we shall have to make abstraction of all that is peculiar to bodies1 such as generation1 sense-perception1 and extension4 ,after having established this separation1 and having thus distinguished essentially different things1 we shall arrive at the conception of a certain intelligible existence1 which possesses real essence1 and unity in a still higher degree4 ,from this standpoint1 one might be surprised how the 7substance which is thus7 one can be both one and many4 ,in respect to bodies1 it is generally recognized that the same thing is both one and many2 the body can indeed be divided infinitely2 color and appearance1 for instance1 are therein very differing properties1 since they are separated here below4 ,but in respect to the soul1 if she be conceived as one1 without extent1 dimension and absolutely simple1 as it appears at first sight1 how could we1 after that1 believe that the soul were manifold8 ,we should have here expected to reach unity1 all the more as1 after having divided the animal in body and soul1 and after having demonstrated that the body is multiform1 composite and diverse1 one might well1 on the contrary1 have expected to find the soul simple2 and to have accepted this conclusion as final1 as the end of our researches4 ,we would thus have taken the soul as a sample of the intelligible world1 just as the body represents the sense-world4 ,having thus considered this soul1 let us examine how this unity can be manifold2 how1 in its turn1 the manifold can be unity2 not indeed a composite formed of separable parts1 but a single nature simultaneously one and manifold4 ,for1 as we have already said1 it is only by starting from this point and demonstrating it1 that we will establish solidly the truth about the genera of essence4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,a ,,plural ,,unity ,,of ,,seminal ,,reasons4 #e4 ,the first consideration that meets us is that each body1 whether of animals or plants1 is multiple1 by virtue of its colors1 forms1 dimensions1 the kinds of parts1 and diversity of their position2 and that nevertheless all things derive from unity1 whether from the absolutely simple ,unity1 or from the habituation of the universal ,unity1 or from some principle having more unity--and consequently more essence--than the things it produces2 because1 the further the distance from unity1 the less the essence4 ,the principle which forms the bodies must therefore be one1 without either being absolutely one1 nor identical with the ,one2 otherwise1 it would not produce a plurality that was distant from unity2 consequently1 it must be a plural-unity4 ,now this principle is the soul2 therefore she must be a plural unity4 ,this plurality1 however1 consists of the 7seminal7 reasons which proceed from the soul4 ,the reasons1 indeed1 are not other than the soul2 for the soul herself is reason1 being the principle of the reasons2 the reasons are the actualization of the soul which acts according to her being2 and this being is potentiality of the reasons4#cjc ,the soul is therefore plurality simultaneously with unity2 which is clearly demonstrated by the action she exerts on other things4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,a ,,definite ,,essence ,,as ,,particular ,,being4 ,but what is the soul considered apart from all action1 if we examine in her the part which does not work at formation of the bodies8#cjd ,will not a plurality of powers still be found therein8 ,as to world-,essence1 nobody even thinks of depriving the soul of it4 ,but is her acknowledged essence the same as that predicated of a stone8 ,surely not4 ,besides1 even in the essence of the stone1 being and being a stone are inseparable concepts1 just as being and being a soul are1 in the soul1 but one and the same thing4#cje ,must we then regard as different in her essence on one side1 and on the other the remainder 7what constitutes the being72 so that it would be the difference 7proper to being7 which1 by being added to her1 constituted the soul8 ,no3 the soul is no doubt a determinate essence2 not as a white man1 but only as a particular being2 in other words1 she has what she has by her very being4 ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,derives ,,from ,,its ,,being2 ,,adding ,,life ,,to ,,essence4 #f4 ,however1 could we not say that the soul does not have all that she has through her being1 in this sense1 that in her we must distinguish on one hand essence1 and on the other some kind of essence8 ,if the soul possess such a kind of essence1 and if this kind of essence come to her from without1 the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far as she is soul2 only partially will it be the being of the soul1 and not in totality4 ,besides1 what would be the essence of the soul without the other things which constitute her being8 ,will the essence be the same for the soul as for the stone8 ,will we not rather have to insist that this essence of the soul derives from her very being2 that this essence is her source and principle2 or rather1 that it is all that the soul is1 and consequently is life2 and finally that in the soul life and essence fuse8 ,,soul ,,unity ,,does ,,not ,,resemble ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,a ,,reason1 ,,including ,,plurality4 ,shall we say that this unity resembles that of a reason 7of a form78 ,no4 ,the substance of the soul is one2 but such unity does not exclude duality or even plurality2 for it admits of all the attributes essential to the soul4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,both ,,being ,,and ,,life4 ,should we say that the soul is both being and life1 or that she possesses life8 ,to say that the soul possesses life would mean that the possessor is not inherently alive1 or that life does not inhere in her being4 ,if then we cannot say that one of the two possesses the other1 we shall have to recognize that both are identical1 or that the soul is both one and manifold1 in her unity embracing all that appears in her2 that in herself she is one1 but manifold in respect to other things2 that1 although she be one by herself1 she makes herself multiple by her movement2 that1 while forming a whole which is one1 she seeks to consider herself in her multiplicity4 ,so ,essence also does not remain unitary1 because its potentiality extends to all it has become4 ,it is contemplation that makes it appear manifold1 the necessary thought has multiplied it4 ,if it appear as one only1 it is only because it has not yet thought1 and it really is still only one4 ,,the ,,first ,,two ,,genera ,,are ,,being ,,and ,,movement4 #g4 ,what and how much can be seen in the soul8 ,since we have found in the soul both being and life1 and as both being and life are what is common in every soul1 and as life resides in intelligence1 recognizing that there is 7besides the soul and her being7 intelligence and its life1 we shall posit as a genus what is common in all life2 namely1 movement2 consequently1 being and movement1 which constitute primary life1 will be our first two categories4 ,although 7in reality7 they fuse1 they are distinguished by thought1 which is incapable of approaching unity exclusively2 and whose exercise compels this distinction4 ,besides1 it is possible1 you can1 in other objects1 clearly see essence1 as distinct from movement or life1 although their essence be not real1 and only shadowy or figurative4#cjf ,just as the image of a man lacks several things1 and1 among others1 the most important1 life2 likewise1 the essence of sense-objects is only an adumbration of the veritable essence1 lacking as it does the highest degree of essence1 namely1 vitality1 which appears in its archetype4 ,so you see it is quite easy to distinguish1 on one hand1 essence from life1 and1 on the other1 life from essence4 ,essence is a genus1 and contains several species2 now movement must not be subsumed under essence1 nor be posited within essence1 but should be equated with essence4 ,when we locate movement within essence1 it is not that we consider life is the subject of movement1 but because movement is life's actualization2 only in thought can either exist separately4 ,these two natures1 therefore1 form but a single one2 for essence exists not in potentiality1 but in actualization2 and if we conceive of these two genera as separated from each other it will still be seen that movement is within essence1 and essence within movement4 ,in the unity of essence1 the two elements1 when considered separately1 imply each other reciprocally2 but thought affirms their duality1 and shows that each of the two series is a double unity4 ,,another ,,genus ,,is ,,stability1 ,,which ,,is ,,only ,,another ,,kind ,,of ,,movement4 ,since then it is in the sphere of essence that movement appears1 and since movement manifests its perfection far rather than it divides its being2 and since essence1 in order to carry out the nature here assigned to it1 must always persevere in movement1 it would be still more absurd to deny it stability1 than to refuse it movement4 ,the notion and the conception of stability are still more in harmony with the nature of essence than are those of movement2 for it is in essence that may be found what is called remaining in the same state1 existing in the same manner1 and being uniform4 ,let us therefore assert that stability is a genus different from movement1 of which it seems to be the opposite4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,stability ,,and ,,essence4 ,in many ways it can be shown that stability must be kept apart from essence4 ,in the first place1 if stability were identical with essence1 why should it be so1 rather than movement1 which is life1 the actualization of being1 and of essence itself8 ,since we have distinguished between movement and essence1 and since we have said that it is both identical therewith1 and still at the same time different from it2 and because essence and movement are different from each other from one viewpoint1 but from another1 are identical2 we must also 7in thought7 distinguish stability from essence without separating it 7in existence72 and by separating it in thought1 we shall be making a distinct genus of it4 ,indeed1 if stability and essence were to be confused together in a perfect union1 if we were to acknowledge no difference between them1 we would still be obliged to identify stability with movement by the intermediation of essence2 in this way stability and movement would together form but one and the same thing4#cjg ,,essence1 ,,stability ,,and ,,movement ,,exist ,,because ,,thought ,,by ,,intelligence4 #h4 ,we must posit these three genera 7essence1 movement1 and stability7 because intelligence thinks each of them separately4 ,by thinking them simultaneously1 ,intelligence posits them2 and1 as soon as ,intelligence thinks them1 they are 7in existence74 ,the things whose existence 7essence7 implies matter do not exist in ,intelligence2 for otherwise they would be immaterial4 ,on the contrary1 immaterial things come into existence by merely being thought4 ,so then contemplate pure ,intelligence1 instead of seeking it with your bodily eyes1 fix on it your interior gaze4 ,then will you see the hearth of ,being1 where shines an unsleeping light2 you will see therein how essences subsist as simultaneously divided and united2 you will see in it an abiding life1 the thought which applies not to the future1 but to the present2 which possesses it already1 and possesses it for ever2 which thinks what is intimate to it1 and not what is foreign4 ,intelligence thinks3 and you have actualization and movement4 ,intelligence thinks what is in itself3 and you have being and essence2 for1 by merely existing1 ,intelligence thinks3 ,intelligence thinks itself as existing1 and the object to which ,intelligence applies its thought exists also4 ,the actualization of ,intelligence on itself is not being2 but the object to which it refers1 the ,principle from which it derives1 is essence4 ,essence1 indeed1 is the object of intuition1 but not intuition itself2 the latter exists 7has essence7 only because it starts from1 and returns thereto4 ,now as essence is an actualization1 and not a potentiality1 it unites both terms 7existence and intuition1 object and subject71 and1 without separating them1 it makes of intuition essence1 and of essence intuition4 ,essence is the unshakable foundation of all things1 and support of their existence2 it derives its possessions from no foreign source1 holding them from itself1 and within itself4 ,it is simultaneously the goal of thought1 because it is stability that never needed a beginning1 and the principle from which thought was born1 because it is unborn stability2 for movement can neither originate from1 nor tend towards movement4 ,the idea also belongs to the genus of stability1 because it is the goal 7or limit7 of intelligence2 but the intellectual actualization by which it is thought constitutes movement4 ,thus all these things form but one thing2 and movement1 stability1 and the things which exist in all essences constitute genera 7or classifications74 ,moreover1 every essence posterior to these genera is1 in its turn1 also definite essence1 definite stability1 and definite movement4 ,,this ,,triune ,,play ,,implies ,,also ,,identity ,,and ,,difference4 ,summing up what we have discovered about the nature of ,essence1 we find first three genera4 ,then1 these three1 ,essence1 ,movement and ,stability were contemplated respectively by the essence1 movement and stability within ourselves1 which we also harmonized with those intelligibles4 ,then again we lost the power of distinguishing them by uniting1 confusing1 and blending these three genera4 ,but a little later we divided1 extricated and distinguished them so as again to see essence1 movement and stability2 three things1 of which each exists apart4 ,the result of this process then is that they are regarded as different1 discerning them by their differences1 and recognizing difference in essence by positing three things each of which exists apart4 ,on the other hand1 if they be considered in their relation with unity and in unity1 if they be all reduced to being something single and identical1 one may see the arising1 or rather the existing of identity4 ,to the three genera already recognized1 therefore1 we shall have to add identity or difference1 or 7in ,platonic language#cjh71 sameness and other-ness4 ,these two classifications added to the three others1 will in all make five genera for all things4 ,identity and difference 7are genuine genera1 indeed1 because they7 also communicate their characteristics to inferior 7beings71 each of which manifests some such element4 ,,these ,,five ,,genera ,,are ,,primary ,,because ,,nothing ,,can ,,be ,,affirmed ,,of ,,them4 ,these five genera that we thus recognize are primary1 because nothing can be predicated of them in the category of existence 7being74 ,no doubt1 because they are essences1 essence might be predicated of them2 but essence would not be predicated of them because being is not a particular essence4 ,neither is essence to be predicated of movement or stability1 for these are species of essence4 ,neither does essence participate in these four genera as if they were superior genera under which essence itself would be subsumed2 for stability1 movement1 identity and difference do not protrude beyond the sphere of essence1 and are not anterior thereto4 ,,why ,,not ,,add ,,others ,,such ,,as ,,unity1 ,,quantity1 ,,quality1 ,,or ,,relation8 #i4 ,these and similar 7,platonic7 arguments demonstrate that those are genuinely primary genera2 but how are we to prove they are exclusive8 ,why1 for example1 should not unity1 quantity1 quality1 relation1 and further 7,aristotelian7 categories1 be added thereto8 ,,neither ,,absolute ,,nor ,,relative ,,unity ,,can ,,be ,a ,,category4 ,unity 7may mean two things74 ,the absolute ,unity1 to which nothing may be added1 neither ,soul1 nor ,intelligence1 nor anything else1 cannot be predicated as attribute of anything1 and therefore cannot be a genus4 ,but if we are referring to the unity which we attribute to essence1 when we say that essence is one1 it is no longer the original ,unity4 ,besides1 how could the absolute ,one1 which within itself admits of no difference1 beget species8 ,if it cannot do this1 it cannot be a genus4 ,how indeed could you divide unity8 ,by dividing it1 you would multiply it2 and thus ,unity-in-itself would be manifold1 and in aspiring to become a genus it would annihilate itself4 ,besides1 in order to divide this unity into species1 you would have to add something to unity1 because it does not contain differences such as exist in being4 ,intelligence might well admit differences between essences1 but this could not possibly be the case with unity4 ,the moment you add a single difference1 you posit duality1 and consequently destroy unity2 for everywhere the addition of a single unity causes any previously posited number to disappear4 ,,unity ,,is ,,not ,,synonymous ,,with ,,essence4 ,it may be objected that the unity which is in essence1 in movement1 and the remainder of the genera1 is common to all of them1 and that one might therefore identify unity with essence4#cji ,it must then be answered that1 just as essence was not made a genus of other things because they were not what was essence1 but that they were called essences in another sense1 here likewise unity could not be a common attribute of other things1 because there must be a primary ,unity1 and a unity taken in a secondary sense4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be said that unity should not be made a genus of all things1 but something which exists in itself like the others1 if afterwards unity be identified with essence1 then1 as essence has already been listed as one of the genera1 we would be merely uselessly introducing a superfluous name4#caj ,distinguishing between unity and essence is an avowal that each has its separate nature2 the addition of something to one makes a certain one2 addition of nothing1 on the other hand1 allows unity to remain absolute1 which cannot be predicated of anything4 ,but why could this unity not be the ,first ,unity1 ignoring the absolute ,unity8 ,for we use first ,unity as a designation of the essence which is beneath the absolute ,unity4 ,because the ,principle anterior to the first ,essence 7that is1 the first and absolute ,unity7 is not essence2 otherwise1 the essence below ,him would no longer be the first ,essence2 here1 on the contrary1 the unity which is above this unity is the absolute ,unity4 ,besides1 this unity which would be separated from essence only in thought1 would not admit of any differences4 ,besides1 there are three alternatives4 ,either this unity alleged to inhere in essence will be1 just like all other essences1 a consequence of the existence of essence2 and consequently1 would be posterior to it4 ,or1 it will be contemporaneous with essence and the other 7categories72 but a genus cannot be contemporaneous with the things of which it is the genus4 ,the third possibility is that it may be anterior to essence2 in which case its relation to ,essence will be that of a principle1 and no longer a genus containing it4 ,if then unity be not a genus in respect to essence1 neither can it be a genus in respect of other things2 otherwise1 we would have to say of essence also that it was a genus embracing everything else4 ,,essence ,,cannot ,,become ,a ,,genus ,,so ,,long ,,as ,,it ,,remains ,,one4 ,considering unity according to its essence1 it seems to fuse and coincide with absolute ,essence1 for essence1 so far as it trends towards unity1 is a single essence2 but in so far as it is posterior to unity1 it becomes all things it can be1 and becomes manifold4 ,now1 so far as essence remains one and does not divide1 it could not constitute a genus4 ,,elements ,,of ,,essence ,,can ,,be ,,said ,,to ,,be ,,one ,,only ,,figuratively4 #aj4 ,in what sense1 therefore1 could each of the elements of essence be called one8 ,in that it is something unitary1 without being unity itself2 for what is a certain one is already manifold4 ,no species is one except figuratively#cjf2 for in itself it is manifold4 ,it is in the same sense that1 in this sense-world1 we say that an army1 or a choric ballet1 constitute a unity4 ,not in such things is absolute unity2 and therefore it may not be said that unity is something common4 ,neither does unity reside in essence itself1 nor in the individual essences2 therefore1 it is not a genus4 ,when a genus is predicated of something1 it is impossible to predicate of the same thing contrary properties2 but of each of the elements of universal essence it is possible to assert both unity and its opposite4 ,consequently 7if we have called unity a genus71 after having predicated of some essence unity as a genus1 we would have affirmed1 of the same essence1 that unity was not a genus4 ,unity1 therefore1 could not be considered one of the primary genera2 for essence is no more one than it is manifold4 ,as to the other genera1 none of them is one without being manifold2 much less could unity be predicated of the secondary genera of which each is quite manifold4 ,besides1 no genus1 considered in its totality1 is unitary2 so that if unity were a genus1 it would merely thereby cease being unity2 for unity is not a number1 and nevertheless it would become a number in becoming a genus4 ,of course1 numbers include an alleged unity1 as soon as we try to erect it into a genus1 it is no longer a unity1 in a strict sense4 ,among numbers unity is not applied to them as would have been a genus2 of such unity it is merely said that it is among numbers1 not that it is a genus2 likewise1 if unity were among the essences1 it would not be there as genus of essence1 nor of anything else1 nor of all things4 ,again1 just as the simple is the principle of the composite without being considered a genus in respect to it--then it would be simultaneously simple and composite--so1 if one were considered to be a principle1 it could not be a genus in respect to things subsumed under it2 and therefore will be a genus neither for essence1 nor for other 7categories or things74 ,,various ,,arguments ,,against ,,unity ,,as ,a ,,category4 ,if unity were to be considered a genus1 it could be that only in respect to the things of which each is said to be one2#cji as if1 for instance1 one should1 from being1 deduce the unity contained within it4 ,unity would then be the genus of certain things2 for just as essence is a genus1 not in respect to all things1 but in respect to those species that possess essence1 so unity would be a genus in respect to the species that possess unity4 ,this1 however1 is impossible2 for things do not differ in respect to unity1 as they do in respect to essence4 ,it might further be objected that if the same divisions which were applied to essence were applied to unity1 and if essence be a genus because it divides itself1 and manifests itself as the same in a number of things1 why then should unity also not be a genus1 since it appears in as many things as essence1 and similarly divides itself8 ,mere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a genus2 whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs1 or to others4 ,merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes a genus4 ,no one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for anything else1 though points be found in all lines4 ,as said1 unity is found in every number1 and nevertheless it is not a genus for any number1 or for anything else4 ,the formation of a genus demands that what is common to several things show specific differences1 constituting species1 and be predicated of what exists4 ,but what are the specific differences within unity8 ,what species does it form8 ,if to this it be answered that it forms the same species as essence1 then it blends with essence1 and 7unity7 is 7as said above71 only another name for essence2 and essence1 as category1 suffices4 ,,genuine ,,relations ,,between ,,unity ,,and ,,essence4 #aa4 ,the questions here to be solved are1 how unity subsists within essence1 how they both divide1 and in general how any genera divide2 and whether their two divisions be identical1 or different4 ,to solve these questions1 we shall first have to ask how in general any thing whatever is said to be one1 and is one2 then1 if it can be said in the same sense that essence is one1 in what sense this is said4 ,evidently1 unity is not the same for everything4 ,it cannot even be understood in the same sense in respect to sense-things1 and intelligible things2 not any more than essence is identical for these two order of 7beings71 or even for sense-things compared to each other4 ,the idea of unity is not the same in reference to a choric ballet1 an army1 a vessel or a house2 it is even less so in respect of one of these things1 and when it deals with continuous objects4 ,and nevertheless1 by their unity all these things imitate the same archetype1 some from far1 some from near4 ,intelligence1 surely1 is assuredly that which most approaches absolute ,unity2 for although the soul already possess unity1 ,intelligence possesses it far more intensely2 for it is the one essence4 ,,unity ,,reigns ,,still ,,more ,,in ,,the ,,good4 ,is the expression of the essence of something simultaneously the expression of its unity1 so that it possesses as much unity as it possesses essence8 ,or does this simultaneousness exist without any direct proportion between the amount of unity and essence8 ,yes2 for it is possible that something have less unity without1 on that account1 having any the less essence2 an army1 a choric ballet have not less essence than a house1 though far less unity4 ,the unity present in each thing seems therefore to aspire to the ,good1 which has the most unity2#caa for the closer something approaches the ,good1 the greater unity does it achieve2 that is the criterion of greater or less unity4 ,indeed1 every 7being7 desires not only merely to be 7alive71 but to enjoy the ,good4 ,that is why everything1 so far as it can1 hastens to become one1 and those 7beings7 which by nature possess unity naturally trend towards ,him by desiring to unite with themselves4 ,for every 7being7 hastens not to separate from others1 but on the contrary their tendency is to tend towards each other and themselves4 ,that is why all souls1 while preserving their individual nature1 would like to fuse into a single soul4 ,the ,one reigns everywhere in the sense-world1 as well as in the ,intelligible4 ,it is from ,him that everything originates1 it is towards ,him that everything trends4 ,in ,him do all 7beings7 seek their principle and their goal2 for only therein do they find their good2 only by that does each 7being7 subsist1 and occupies its place in the universe2 once that it exists1 no 7being7 could help trending towards the ,one4 ,this occurs not only in nature1 but even in the arts2 where each art seeks1 to the extent of its ability1 to conform its works to unity1 to the extent of its ability1 and to the possibilities of its works4 ,but that which succeeds best1 is ,essence itself1 which is quite close to unity4 ,,further ,,reasons ,,why ,,unity ,,is ,,not ,a ,,category4 ,consequently1 in speaking of 7beings7 other than 7essence itself71 as1 for instance1 of man1 we say simply man 7without adding to it the idea of unity#cab72 if however we say a man1 it is to distinguish him from two2 if however we use the word one in still another sense1 it is by adding to it some 7as1 someone74 ,not so is it with essence2 we say1 being one1 conceiving of being 7essence7 and one1 as if forming a single whole1 and in positing essence as one1 we emphasize its narrow affinity with the ,good4 ,thus conceived1 essence becomes one2#cac and in the one finds its origin and goal4 ,nevertheless it is not one as unity itself1 but rather in a different manner1 in this sense that the 7unity of essence7 admits priority and posteriority4 ,what then is 7the unity of essence78 ,must it not then be considered similar in all the parts 7of essence71 as something common to all 7and consequently1 as forming a genus78 ,but in the first place1 the point is also something common to all the lines1 and nevertheless it is not a genus2 in the numbers1 unity is something common to all1 and is not any more of a genus4 ,indeed1 the unity which is found in the monad1 in the dyad 7or pair71 and in other numbers1 cannot be confused with unity in itself4 ,then1 nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior1 and other posterior parts1 both simple and compound ones 7which would be impossible for the ,one in itself74 ,even if the unity found everywhere in all the parts of essence were everywhere identical1 by the mere fact that it would offer no difference1 it could not give rise to species1 and consequently1 it could not be a genus4 ,,by ,,tending ,,towards ,,the ,,one1 ,,everything ,,tends ,,towards ,,the ,,good4 #ab4 ,we therefore assert 7that by moving towards unity everything moves towards the ,good74 ,how can it be1 however1 that ,goodness should consist in coming closer to unity1 even for number1 which is inanimate8#cad ,this question might as well be asked about any inanimate object whatever4 ,if we were told that such 7beings7 do not enjoy 7existence71 we might answer that we are here treating of beings according to their proximity to unity only4 ,if1 for instance1 we were asked how a point can participate in the ,good1 we might answer by a retort1 asking whether we are dealing with the ,point in itself4 ,then we would answer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for all things of the same kind4 ,if however we were pressed about the point considered as existing in some object1 as1 for instance1 in the circle1 we would answer that for such a point1 the ,good is the good of the circle 7of which it forms part72 that such is the ,good towards which it aspires1 and that it seeks that as far as possible through the intermediation of the circle4 ,,these ,,genera ,,exist ,,in ,,both ,,the ,,subordinate ,,objects1 ,,and ,,themselves4 ,but how could we realize such genera8 ,are all these genera susceptible of division1 or do they lie entire within each of the objects they comprehend8 ,if so1 how does this unity find itself8 ,unity exists therein as a genus1 just as the whole exists within the plurality4 ,does unity exist only in the objects that participate therein8 ,not only in these objects1 but also in itself4 ,this point will be studied later4 ,,quantity ,,is ,a ,,secondary ,,genus1 ,,therefore ,,not ,a ,,first4 #ac4 ,now why should we not posit quantity among the primary genera8 ,and why not also quality8 ,quantity is not one of the primary genera like those we have posited1 because the primary genera coexist with essence 7which is not the case with quantity74 ,indeed1 movement is inseparable from essence2 being its actualization and life4 ,stability is implied in being2 while identity and difference are still more inseparable from essence2 so that all these 7categories7 appear to us simultaneously4 ,as to number 7which is discrete quantity71 it is something posterior4 ,as to 7mathematical7 numbers1 far more are they posterior both to these genera1 and themselves2 for the numbers follow each other2 the second depends on the first1 and so forth2 the last are contained within the first4 ,number1 therefore1 cannot be posited among the primary genera4 ,indeed1 it is permissible to doubt whether quantity may be posited as any kind of a genus4 ,more even than number1 extension 7which is continuous quantity71 shows the characteristics of compositeness1 and of posteriority4 ,along with number1 the line enters into the idea of extension4 ,this would make two elements4 ,then comes surface1 which makes three4 ,if then it be from number that continuous dimension derives its quantitativeness1 how could this dimension be a genus1 when number is not8 ,on the other hand1 anteriority and posteriority exist in dimension as well as in numbers4 ,but if both kinds of quantities have in common this1 that they are quantities1 it will be necessary to discover the nature of quantity4 ,when this will have been found1 we shall be able to make of it a secondary genus2 but it could not rank with the primary genera4 ,if1 then1 quantity be a genus without being a primary one1 it will still remain for us to discover to which higher genus1 whether primary or secondary1 it should be subsumed4 ,,number ,,and ,,dimension ,,differ ,,so ,,much ,,as ,,to ,,suggest ,,different ,,classification4 ,it is evident that quantity informs us of the amount of a thing1 and permits us to measure this2 therefore itself must be an amount4 ,this then is the element common to number 7the discrete quantity71 and to continuous dimension4 ,but number is anterior1 and continuous dimension proceeds therefrom2 number consists in a certain blending of movement and stability2 continuous dimension is a certain movement or proceeds from some movement2 movement produces it in its progress towards infinity1 but stability arrests it in its progress1 limits it1 and creates unity4 ,besides1 we shall in the following explain the generation of number and dimension2 and1 what is more1 their mode of existence1 and how to conceive of it rightly4 ,it is possible that we might find that number should be posited among the primary genera1 but that1 because of its composite nature1 continuous dimension should be posited among the posterior or later genera2 that number is to be posited among stable things1 while dimension belongs among those in movement4 ,but1 as said above1 all this will be treated of later4 ,,quality ,,is ,,not ,a ,,primary ,,genus ,,because ,,it ,,is ,,posterior ,,to ,,being4 #ad4 ,let us now pass on to quality4 ,why does quality also fail to appear among the primary genera8 ,because quality also is posterior to them2 it does indeed follow after being4 ,the first ,being must have these 7quantity and quality7 as consequences1 though being is neither constituted nor completed thereby2 otherwise1 being would be posterior to them4 ,of course1 as to the composite beings1 formed of several elements1 in which are both numbers and qualities1 they indeed are differentiated by those different elements which then constitute qualities1 though they simultaneously contain common 7elements74 ,as to the primary genera1 however1 the distinction to be established does not proceed from simpleness or compositeness1 but of simpleness and what completes being4 ,notice1 ,i am not saying1 of what completes 'some one' being2 for if we were dealing with some one being1 there would be nothing unreasonable in asserting that such a being was completed by a quality1 since this being would have been in existence already before having the quality1 and would receive from the exterior only the property of being such or such4 ,on the contrary1 absolute ,being must essentially possess all that constitutes it4 ,,complement ,,of ,,being ,,is ,,called ,,quality ,,only ,,by ,,courtesy4 ,besides1 we have elsewhere pointed out#cae that what is a complement of being is called a quality figuratively only2#cjf and that what is genuinely quality comes from the exterior1 posteriorly to being4 ,what properly belongs to being is its actualization2 and what follows it is an experience 7or1 negative modification74 ,we now add that what refers to some being1 cannot in any respect be the complement of being4 ,there is no need of any addition of being 7existence7 to man1 so far as he is a man1 to make of him a 7human7 being4 ,being exists already in a superior region before descending to specific difference2 thus the animal exists 7as being7 before one descends to the property of being reasonable1 when one says3 ,man is a reasonable animal4#caf ,,the ,,four ,,other ,,categories ,,do ,,not ,,together ,,form ,,quality4 #ae4 ,however1 how do four of these genera complete being1 without nevertheless constituting the suchness 7or1 quality7 of being8 for they do not form a certain being4 ,the primary ,essence has already been mentioned2 and it has been shown that neither movement1 difference1 nor identity are anything else4 ,movement1 evidently1 does not introduce any quality in essence2 nevertheless it will be wise to study the question a little more definitely4 ,if movement be the actualization of being1 if essence1 and in general all that is in the front rank be essentially an actualization1 movement cannot be considered as an accident4 ,as it is1 however1 the actualization of the essence which is in actualization1 it can no longer be called a simple complement of being1 for it is being itself4 ,neither must it be ranked amidst things posterior to being1 nor amidst the qualities2 it is contemporaneous with being1 for you must not suppose that essence existed first1 and then moved itself 7these being contemporaneous events74 ,it is likewise with stability2 for one cannot say that essence existed first1 and then later became stable4 ,neither are identity or difference any more posterior to essence2 essence was not first unitary1 and then later manifold2 but by its essence it is one manifold4 ,so far as it is manifold1 it implies difference2 while so far as it is a manifold unity1 it implies identity4 ,these categories1 therefore1 suffice to constitute being4 ,when one descends from the intelligible world to inferior things1 he meets other elements which indeed no longer constitute absolute being1 but only a certain being1 that possesses some particular quantity or quality2 these are indeed genera1 but genera inferior to the primary genera4 ,,relation ,,is ,,an ,,appendage ,,existing ,,only ,,among ,,definite ,,objects4 #af4 ,as to relation1 which1 so to speak1 is only an offshoot or appendage1#cag it could certainly not be posited amidst the primary genera4 ,relation can exist only between one thing and another2 it is nothing which exists by itself2 every relation presupposes something foreign4 ,,neither ,,can ,,place ,,or ,,time ,,figure ,,among ,,them4#cah ,the categories of place and time are just as unable to figure among the primary genera4 ,to be in a place1 is to be in something foreign2 which implies two consequences3#cai a genus must be single1 and admits of no compositeness4 ,place1 therefore1 is no primary genus4 ,for here we are dealing only with veritable essences4 ,as to time1 does it possess a veritable characteristic8 ,evidently not4 ,if time be a measure1 and not a measure pure and simple1 but the measure of movement1#cbj it also is something double1 and consequently composite4 7,this1 as with place1 would debar it from being ranked among the primary genera1 which are simple74 ,besides1 it is something posterior to movement2 so that it could not even be ranked along with movement4 ,,action1 ,,experience1 ,,possession ,,and ,,location ,,are ,,similarly ,,unsatisfactory4 ,action and experience equally depend on movement4 ,now1 as each of them is something double1 each of them1 consequently1 is something composite4 ,possession also is double4 ,location1 which consists in something's being in some definite way in something else1 actually comprises three elements4 7,therefore possession and location1 because composite1 are not simple primary genera74 ,,neither ,,are ,,good1 ,,beauty1 ,,virtue1 ,,science1 ,,or ,,intelligence4 #ag4 ,but why should not the ,good1 beauty1 virtues1 science1 or intelligence be considered primary genera8 ,if by good we understand the ,first1 whom we call the ,good itself1 of whom indeed we could not affirm anything1 but whom we call by this name1 because we have none better to express our meaning1 ,he is not a genus2 for ,he cannot be affirmed of anything else4 ,if indeed there were things of which ,he could be predicated1 each of them would be the ,good ,himself4 ,besides1 the ,good does not consist in being1 and therefore is above it4 ,but if by good we mean only the quality 7of goodness71 then it is evident that quality cannot be ranked with primary genera4 ,does this imply that ,essence is not good8 ,no2 it is good1 but not in the same manner as the ,first1 who is good1 not by a quality1 but by ,himself4 ,it may however be objected that1 as we saw above1 essence contains other genera1 and that each of these is a genus because it has something in common1 and because it is found in several things4 ,if then the ,good be found in each part of being or essence1 or at least1 in the greater number of them1 why would not also the ,good be a genus1 and one of the first genera8 ,because the ,good is not the same in all parts of ,essence1 existing within it in the primary or secondary degree2 and because all these different goods are all subordinate to each other1 the last depending on the first1 and all depending from a single ,unity1 which is the supreme ,good2 for if all participate in the ,good1 it is only in a manner that varies according to the nature of each4 ,,if ,,the ,,good ,,be ,a ,,genus1 ,,it ,,must ,,be ,,one ,,of ,,the ,,posterior ,,ones4 ,if you insist that the ,good must be genus1 we will grant it1 as a posterior genus2 for it will be posterior to being4 ,now the existence of 7the ,aristotelian7 essence1#cba although it be always united to ,essence1 is the ,good itself2 while the primary genera belong to ,essence for its own sake1 and form being4 ,hence we start to rise up to the absolute ,good1 which is superior to ,essence2 for it is impossible for essence and being not to be manifold2 essence necessarily includes the above-enumerated primary genera2 it is the manifold unity4 ,,if ,,the ,,exclusive ,,good ,,mean ,,unity1 ,a ,,new ,,genus ,,would ,,be ,,unnecessary4 ,but if by ,good we here mean the unity which lies in ,essence1 we would not hesitate to acknowledge that the actualization by which ,essence aspires to ,unity is its true good1 and that that is the means by which it receives the form of ,good4 ,then the good of ,essence is the actualization by which it aspires to the ,good2 that act constitutes its life2 now this actualization is a movement1 and we have already ranked movement among the primary genera4 7,it is therefore useless to make a new genus of ,good conceived as unity74 ,,beauty ,,is ,,treated ,,similarly ,,to ,,the ,,good4 #ah4 ,as to the beautiful1 if that be taken to mean the primary and supreme ,beauty1 we would answer as about the ,good1 or at least1 we would make an analogous answer4 ,if however we mean only the splendor with which the ,idea shines1 it may be answered that that splendor is not the same everywhere2 and that1 besides1 it is something posterior4#cbb ,if the beautiful be considered as absolute ,being1 it is then already comprised with the ,being already considered 7and consequently does not form a separate genus#cbc74 ,if it be considered in respect to us human beings1 who are spectators1 and if it be explained as producing in us a certain emotion1 such an actualization is a movement2 but if1 on the contrary1 it be explained as that tendency which draws us to the beautiful1 this still is a movement4 ,,knowledge ,,is ,,either ,a ,,movement ,,or ,,something ,,composite4 ,knowledge is pre-eminently movement2 for it is the intuition of essence2 it is an actualization1 and not a simple habit4 ,it should1 therefore1 also be reduced to movement4#bii ,it may also be reduced to stability 7if considered as a durable actualization72 or rather1 it belongs to both genera4 ,but if it belong to two different genera1 it is something of a blend2 but anything blended is necessarily posterior 7to the elements which enter into the blend1 and it cannot therefore either be a primary genus74 ,,intelligence1 ,,justice1 ,,virtues ,,and ,,temperance ,,are ,,no ,,genera4 ,intelligence is thinking essence1 a composite of all genera1 and not a single genus4 ,veritable ,intelligence is indeed essence connected with all things2 consequently it is all essence4 ,as to essence considered alone1 it constitutes a genus1 and is an element of ,intelligence4 ,last1 justice1 temperance1 and in general all the virtues are so many actualizations of ,intelligence4 ,they could not1 therefore1 rank amidst the primary genera4 ,they are posterior to a genus1 and constitute species4 ,,essence ,,derives ,,its ,,differences ,,from ,,the ,,other ,,co-,,ordinate ,,categories4 #ai4 ,since these four categories 7which complete essence1 namely1 movement1 stability1 identity and difference7 7with ,essence as a fifth7 constitute the primary genera1 it remains to be examined whether each of them1 by itself1 can beget species2 for instance1 whether ,essence1 entirely by itself1 could admit divisions in which the other categories would have no share whatever4 ,no3 for1 in order to beget species1 the genus would have to admit differences derived from outside2 these differences would have to be properties belonging to ,essence as such1 without however being ,essence4 ,but from where then would ,essence have derived them8 ,impossibly from what does not exist4 ,if then they were necessarily derived from that which exists1 as only three other genera of essences remain1#cbd evidently1 ,essence must have derived its differences from these genera1 which associate themselves with ,essence1 while yet enjoying a simultaneous existence4 ,but from this very fact that these genera enjoy an existence simultaneous 7with ,essence71 they serve to constitute it1 as it is composed of the gathering of these elements4 ,how then could they be different from the whole that they constitute8 ,how do these genera make species out of all 7these beings78 ,how1 for instance1 could pure movement produce species of movement8 ,the same question arises in connection with the other genera4 ,besides1 we must avoid 7two dangers37 losing each genus in its species1 and1 on the other hand1 reducing it to the state of a simple predicate1 by considering it only in its species4 ,the genus must exist both in its species and in itself4 ,while blending 7with the species71 it must in itself remain pure and unblended2 for1 if it should contribute to being otherwise 7by blending with its species71 it would annihilate itself4 ,such are the questions that must be examined4 ,,intelligence ,,as ,a ,,composite ,,is ,,posterior ,,to ,,the ,,categories4 ,now1 we have above posited certain premises4 ,intelligence1 and even every intelligence1 includes within itself all 7essences74 ,we ranked 7,essence or ,being7 above all species that are parts thereof4 ,essence is not yet ,intelligence4 ,from these it results that already developed ,intelligence is already something posterior4 ,we shall therefore make use of this study to achieve the goal we had set ourselves 7namely1 to determine the relation of the genus to its contained species74 ,we shall therefore make use of ,intelligence as an example to extend our knowledge of this subject4 ,,knowledge ,,is ,,the ,,actualization ,,of ,,the ,,notions ,,which ,,are ,,potential ,,science4 #bj4 ,let us1 therefore1 suppose that ,intelligence was in a state in which it did not yet attach itself to anything in particular1 so that it had not yet become an individual intelligence4 ,let us conceive it similar to knowledge considered by itself before the notions of the particular species1 or to the knowledge of a species taken before the notions of the contained parts4 ,universal ,knowledge1 without 7in actualization7 being any particular notion1 potentially lies within all notions1 and reciprocally1 each particular notion is one single thing in actualization1 but all things in potentiality2 likewise with universal ,knowledge4 ,the notions which thus refer to a species exist potentially in universal ,knowledge1 because1 while applying itself to a species1 they potentially are also universal ,knowledge4 ,universal ,knowledge is predicated of each particular notion1 without the particular notion being predicated of universal ,knowledge2 but universal ,knowledge must none the less subsist in itself without blending 7with anything else#cbe74 ,,intelligence ,,is ,,the ,,potentiality ,,of ,,the ,,intelligences ,,which ,,are ,,its ,,actualizations4 ,the case is similar with ,intelligence4 ,there is a kind of existence of universal ,intelligence1 which is located above the particular actualized intelligences1 and is different from that of the particular intelligences4 ,these are filled with universal notions3 universal ,intelligence furnishes to the particular intelligences the notions they possess4 ,it is the potentiality of these intelligences all of which it contains in its universality2 on their side1 these1 in their particularity1 contain universal ,intelligence just as a particular science implies universal science4 ,the great ,intelligence exists in itself1 and the particular intelligences also exist in themselves2 they are implied in universal ,intelligence1 just as this one is implied in the particular intelligences4 ,each one of the particular intelligences exists simultaneously in itself1 and in something else 7in the universal ,intelligence71 just as universal ,intelligence exists simultaneously in itself and in all the others4 ,in universal ,intelligence1 which exists in itself1 all particular intelligences exist potentially1 because it actually is all the intelligences1 and potentially each of them separately4 ,on the contrary1 these are actualizations of the particular intelligences1 and potentially universal ,intelligence4 ,indeed1 so far as they are what is predicated of them1 they are actualizations of what is predicated2 so far as they exist in the genus that contains them1 they are this genus potentially4#cbf ,genus1 as such1 is potentially all the species it embraces2 it is none of them in actuality2 but all are implied therein4 ,so far as genus is in actualization what exists before the species1 it is the actualization of the things which are not particular4 ,as occurs in the species1 these particular things achieve such actualization only by the actualization which emanates from the genus1 and which1 with regard to them1 acts as cause4 ,,how ,,intelligence1 ,,though ,,one1 ,,produces ,,particular ,,things4 #ba4 ,how then does ,intelligence1 though remaining one1 by ,reason produce particular things8 ,this really amounts to asking how the inferior genera derive from the four ,genera4 ,we shall then have to scrutinize how this great and ineffable ,intelligence1 which does not make use of speech1 but which is entire intelligence1 intelligence of all1 universal1 and not particular or individual intelligence1 contains all the things which proceed therefrom4 7,of the essences it contains7 it possesses the number1 as it is both one and many4 ,it is many1 that is1 7it is7 many potentialities1 which are admirable powers1 full of force and greatness1 because they are pure2 powers that are vigorous and veritable because they have no goal at which they are forced to stop2 consequently being infinite1 that is1 supreme ,infinity1 and ,greatness4 ,if then we were to scrutinize this greatness and beauty of being1 if by the splendor and light which surround it1 we were to distinguish what ,intelligence contains1 then would we see the efflorescing of quality4 ,with the continuity of actualization we would behold greatness1 in quiescent condition4 ,as we have seen one 7number71 two 7quality71 and three 7greatness71 greatness1 as the third thing1 presents itself with universal quantity4 ,now1 as soon as quality and quantity show themselves to us1 they unite1 blend into one and the same figure 7outward appearance74 ,then comes difference1 which divides quality and quantity1 whence arise different qualities1 and differences of figure4 ,the presence of identity produces equality1 and that of difference1 inequality1 both in quantity1 number1 and dimension2 hence the circle1 the quadrilateral1 and the figures composed of unequal things2 hence numbers that are similar1 and different1 even and uneven4 ,,this ,,intellectual ,,life ,,possesses ,,the ,,reasons ,,or ,,ideas4 ,thus intellectual ,life1 which is the perfect actualization1 embraces all the things that our mind now conceives1 and all intellectual operations4 ,in its potentiality it contains all things as essences1 in the same manner as ,intelligence does4 ,now ,intelligence possesses them by thought1 a thought which is not discursive 7but intuitive74 ,the intellectual life therefore possesses all the things of which there are reasons 7that is1 ideas72 itself is a single ,reason1 great1 perfect1 which contains all reasons1#cbg which examines them in an orderly fashion1 beginning with the first1 or rather1 which has ever examined them1 so that one could never really tell that it was examining them4#cbh ,for all things that we grasp by ratiocination1 in whatever part soever of the universe they may be located1 are found as intuitively possessed by ,intelligence4 ,it would seem as if it was ,essence itself which1 7being identical with ,intelligence71 had made ,intelligence reason thus 7by producing its conceptions71#cbi as appears to happen in the 7seminal7 reasons which produce the animals4#ccj ,in the 7ideas1 that is in the seminal7 reasons which are anterior to ratiocination1 all things are found to possess a constitution such that the most penetrating intelligence would have considered best1 by reasoning4#cca ,we should therefore expect 7great and wonderful things7 of these ,ideas1 superior and anterior to ,nature and 7seminal7 reasons4 ,there ,intelligence fuses with ,being2#cbi neither in essence nor intelligence is there anything adventitious4 ,there everything is smoothly perfect1 since everything there is conformable to intelligence4 ,all ,essence is what ,intelligence demands2 it is consequently veritable primary ,essence2 for if it proceeded from some other 7source71 this also would be ,intelligence4 ,,from ,,essence ,,are ,,born ,,all ,,living ,,organisms4 ,thus ,essence reveals within itself all the ,forms and universality4 ,this could not have been particular2 for it could not be single1 the double presence of difference and identity demanding it to be simultaneously one and many4 ,since1 from its very origin1 ,essence is one and many1 all the species it contains must consequently simultaneously contain unity and plurality1 revealing dimensions1 qualities1 and different figures2 for it is impossible that ,essence should lack anything1 or should not be complete universality2 for it would no longer be universal1 if it were not complete4 ,life1 therefore1 penetrates every thing2 is everywhere present within it4 ,hence results that from that ,life must have been born all living organisms1 for since matter and quality are found within their bodies1 these also are not lacking4 ,now1 as all living organisms are born within it1 and have ever subsisted within it1 they were essentially embraced within eternity1 yet1 taken separately1 each of them is a different essence4 ,taken together they form a unity4 ,consequently1 the complex and synthetic totality of all these living organisms is ,intelligence1 which1 thus containing all 7beings71 is the perfect and essential living ,organism4 ,when ,intelligence allows itself to be contemplated by what derives existence from it1 ,intelligence appears thereto as the intelligible1 and receives this predicate properly and truly4#ccb ,,thus ,,intelligence ,,begets ,,world ,,soul ,,and ,,individual ,,souls4 #bb4 ,this was what ,plato meant1 when he said1 enigmatically1 ,intelligence contemplates the ,ideas contained within the perfect living ,organism2 it sees what they are1 and to how many they amount4#ccc ,indeed1 the 7universal7 ,soul1 which ranks immediately after ,intelligence1 possesses the ,ideas in herself inasmuch as she is a soul2 but she sees them better in the ,intelligence which is above her4#ccd ,likewise1 our own intelligence1 which also contains the ideas1 sees them better when it contemplates them in the superior ,intelligence2 for1 in itself1 it can only see2 but in the superior ,intelligence it sees that it sees4#cce ,now this intelligence that contemplates the ideas is not separated from the superior ,intelligence1 for it proceeds therefrom2 but as it is the plurality that has proceeded from the unity1 because it adds difference 7to identity71 it becomes manifold unity4 ,being thus both unity and plurality1 ,intelligence1 by virtue of its multiple nature1 produces the plurality 7of beings74 ,besides1 it would be impossible to discover therein anything that was numerically unitary1 or anything that might be called individual4 ,whatever be contemplated in it1 it is always a form1 for it contains no matter4 ,that is why1 again1 ,plato1 referring to this truth1 said that being was divided to infinity4#ccf ,descending from genus to species1 we have not yet arrived at infinity2 for that which thus arises is defined by the species that have been begotten by a genus2 the name of infinity applies better to the last species1 which can no longer be divided into species4 ,that is why 7as ,plato teaches71 when one has arrived at individuals1 they must be abandoned to infinity4#ccg ,thus1 the individuals are infinite so far as they are considered in themselves2 but1 in so far as they are embraced by unity1 they are reduced to a number4 ,intelligence therefore embraces what comes after it1 the ,soul2 so that the ,soul1 till the last of her powers1 is contained by a number2 as to the last power 7matter71 it is entirely infinite#cch ,considered in this condition 7where1 turning towards what is below it1 it begets the ,soul71 ,intelligence is a part 7because it applies itself to something particular71 though it possess all things1 and though1 in itself1 it be universal2 the intelligences which compose it are each a part 7each constituting a particular intelligence by virtue of the actualization of ,intelligence which exists 7and thus exists in itself74 ,as to the ,soul1 she is the part of a part 7that is1 a part of the ,intelligence which itself is a part1 as has just been said71 but exists by virtue of the actualization of the ,intelligence which acts outside of itself4 ,indeed1 when ,intelligence acts in itself1 the actualizations it produces are the other intelligences2 when it acts outside of itself1 it produces the ,soul4 ,when in her turn1 the ,soul acts as genus or species1 she begets the other souls which are her species4 ,these souls themselves have two actualizations2 the one1 directed towards what is above them1 constitutes their intelligence2 the other1 directed towards what is below them1 gives birth to the other rational powers1 and even to a last power which is in contact with matter1 and which fashions it4#cci ,the inferior part of the soul does not hinder the whole remainder from remaining in the superior region4#cdj ,besides1 this inferior part is only the very image of the soul2 it is not separated from her1#cda but it resembles the image reflected by a mirror1 an image which persists only so long as the model remains before the mirror4 ,what should be our conception of the model placed before the mirror8 ,down through what is immediately above the image 7that is1 down through the soul herself71 we have the intelligible world1 composed of all the intelligible entities1 where everything is perfect4 ,the sense-world is no more than the imitation thereof1 and it imitates that intelligible world so far as it can1 in that it itself is a living organism which is the image of the perfect living ,organism4 ,the sense-world imitates it as the portrait that is painted1 or reflected by the surface of water reproduces the person situated before the painter1 or above the water4 ,this portrait obtained by the painting1 or reflected by the surface of the water is not the image of the composite which constitutes the man 7the soul and body71 but of one or two parts only1 the body which was fashioned by the soul4 ,likewise1 therefore1 the sense-world1 which was made to resemble the intelligible world1 offers us images1 not of its creator1 but of the 7essences7 contained within its creator1 among which is man1 along with all other animals4 ,now1 in common with its creator1 each living organism possesses life1 though each possess it differently2 both1 besides1 equally form part of the intelligible world4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,three4 ,plotino's ,own ,sense-,categories4 ,,genera ,,of ,,the ,,physical ,,are ,,different ,,from ,,those ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible4 #a4 ,we have thus declared our views about 7intelligible7 ,being1 and shown how they agree with the doctrines of ,plato4 ,now we have to study the other nature 7the ,being of the sense-world72 and we shall have to consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as for the intelligible world1 or to posit a greater number1 by adding some to those already recognized2 or whether the genera differ in each being entirely1 or only partially1 some remaining identical1 while others differ4 ,if any of them be identical in both beings1 that can be understood only by analogy2#cdc that is what will become evident when each of these beings are fully understood4 ,,the ,,world ,,must ,,be ,,studied1 ,,just ,,as ,,one ,,would ,,analyze ,,the ,,voice4 ,this is by what we must begin4 ,having to speak of sense-objects1 and knowing that all of them are contained in this world here below1 we must first scrutinize this world1 establish within it divisions according to the nature of the 7beings7 which compose it1 and then distribute them into genera1 just as we would do if we had to analyze the voice whose nature is infinite 7by the diversity of sounds it produces71 reducing it to a definite number of kinds4#cdd ,observing the elements common to many sounds1 we would reduce them to one unity1 then1 to a superior unity1 further to a supreme unity1 in which these sounds appear as a small number of classes4 ,then1 the elements common to these individuals would be called species1 and that common to various species would be called a genus4 ,as to the voice1 it is easy enough to discover each species1 to reduce all the species to unity1 and to predicate of all of them 7as highest genus or category7 the general element1 the voice4 ,but an analysis as summary as this is impossible with the 7more complicated universe74 ,in the sense-world we will have to recognize several genera1 which will differ from those of the intelligible world1 since the sense-world itself differs from the intelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart1 but only its image1 whose only element common 7to its model7 is the name4 ,,we ,,must ,,first ,,dissect ,,away ,,the ,,soul ,,from ,,the ,,body1 ,,to ,,examine ,,it4 ,as here below in the mixture 7or blend1 the soul71 and the composition 7the body7 7which form our nature7 there are two parts1 soul and body1 the totality of which forms the living organism2#cde as the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world1 and consequently does not belong to the same order of things as the sense-world1 we shall1 however difficult it may be1 have to separate the soul#cdf from the sense-objects which we are here alone to consider4 7,we shall illustrate this by a parable74 ,he who would wish to classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and professions1 would have to leave aside the foreign residents4 ,as to the passions which arise from the union of the soul with the body1 or1 that the soul experiences because of the body1#cdg we shall later examine how they should be classified4#cdh ,this however must follow our study of the sense-objects4 ,,what ,,is ,,being ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,is ,,generation ,,in ,,the ,,sense-,,world4 #b4 ,first let us consider what mundane name ,being must be applied to4 ,to begin with1 it must be explained that physical nature can receive the name of being only as a figure of speech2#cdc or rather1 should not receive it at all1 since it implies the idea of perpetual flowing 7that is1 change#cdi72 so1 the more suitable denomination would be generation4#cej ,we shall also have to acknowledge that the things that belong to generation are very different2 nevertheless all bodies1 some simple 7such1 as elements71 the others composite as mixtures71 together with their accidents and effects1 must1 during the process of classification1 be reduced to a single genus4 ,in bodies1 one may besides distinguish on one hand matter1 on the other1 the form imprinted thereon2 and we designate each of these separately as a genus1 or subsume both under a unity1 inasmuch as we designate both by the common label#cdc of being1 or rather1 generation4 ,but what is the common element in matter and form8 ,in what manner1 and of what is matter a genus8 ,for what difference inheres in matter8 ,in what sequence could we incorporate that which is composed of both8 ,but in the case that that which is composed of both be itself corporeal being1 while neither of the two is a body1 how then could either be incorporated in a single genus1 or within the same genus along with the compound of both8 ,how 7could this incorporation into a single genus be effected with7 the elements of some object and the object itself8 ,to answer that we should begin by the 7composite7 bodies3 which would be tantamount to learning to read by beginning with syllables 7and not with letters74 ,,can ,,we ,,analyze ,,this ,,world ,,by ,,analogy ,,with ,,the ,,intelligible8 ,let us now grant that symmetrical analysis by individual objects is impossible4 ,might we not1 as a means of classification1 then employ analogy8 ,in this case the 7intelligible1 higher7 being would here be represented by matter2 and movement above1 by form here1 which would thus quicken and perfect matter4 ,the inertia of matter would correspond to rest above1 while the 7intelligible7 identity and difference would correspond to our earthly manifold resemblance and differences4#cea 7,such an analogic method would misrepresent the state of affairs in this world74 ,to begin with1 matter does not receive form as its life or actualization1 but 7form7 approaches and informs 7matter7 as something foreign 7form deriving from being1 while matter is only a deception2 so that there is no kinship between them74 ,then in the 7intelligible world7 form is an actualization and motion1 while here below movement is different1 being accidental2 we might far rather call form the halting or rest of matter1 for form defines that which in itself is indefinite 7unlimited74 ,there 7in the intelligible world7 identity and difference refer to a single essence1 which is both identical and different4 ,here below1 essence differs only relatively1 by participation 7in the difference7 for it is something identical and different1 not by consequence1 as above1 but here below1 by nature4 ,as to stability1 how could it be attributed to matter1 which assumes all dimensions1 which receives all its forms from without1 without itself ever being able to beget anything by means of these forms8 ,such a division1 therefore1 will have to be given up4 ,,physical ,,categories ,,are ,,matter1 ,,form1 ,,combination1 ,,attributes ,,and ,,accidents4 #c4 ,what classification shall we adopt8 ,there is first matter1 then form1 and further the combination which results from their blending4 ,then we have a number of conceptions which refer to the three preceding classes1 and are predicated of them2 the first1 simply1 as attributes2 the others1 besides1 as accidents4 ,among the latter1 some are contained within the things1 while others contain them2 some of them are actions1 and the others experiences 7passions7 or their consequences4 ,,the ,,three ,,first ,,physical ,,categories ,,of ,,matter1 ,,form ,,and ,,combination4 ,matter is something common which is found in all things2#ceb nevertheless it does not form a genus because it does not admit of any differences1 unless its differences consist in appearing in different forms2 as1 here1 fire1 and there1 air4 ,philosophers who consider that matter is a genus base this opinion on the fact that matter is common to all the things in which it exists1 or that it stands in the relation of the whole to the parts of particular objects 7or1 matters74 ,in this case1 however1 the term genus would be used in a sense differing from the one it bears usually4 ,it would then be no more than an only or single element1 if we admit that an element can be a genus4 ,if1 conceiving that matter is united to matter1 or exists within it1 we add form to matter1 matter would thereby be differentiated from the other forms1 but it will not comprehend every being-like form4 ,were we to call the generating principle of being form1 and were we to call the reason which constitutes the form being-like reason1 we shall not yet have clearly defined the nature of being4 ,finally1 if we give the name of being only to the combination of matter and form1 the result will be that neither of these two 7matter or form taken separately7 will themselves be being4 ,if1 however1 we were to assert that not only their combination1 but also each of them separately were being1 we then would be faced with the problem of what is common to all three4 ,,different ,,physical ,,categories4 ,as to the things which are simply posited as attributes1 they should1 as principles or elements1 be classified under relation4 ,among the accidents of things1 some1 like quantity and quality1 are contained within them2 while others contain them1 as time and place4 ,then there are actions and experiences1 as movements2 then their consequences1 as being in time1 and being in place2 the latter is the consequence of the combination1 the former is the consequence of movement4 ,,five ,,physical ,,categories4 ,we decide1 therefore1 that the three first things 7matter1 form1 and their combination7 contribute to the formation of a single genus1 which1 by a figure of speech1 we call 7corporeal7 ,being1 a genus which is common to them1 and whose name applies to all three4 ,then come the other genera2 such as relation1 quantity and quality2 the 7relation of7 being contained in place1 and in time2 movement2 and place and time4 ,but as the category of time and place would render superfluous that of being in place and of being in time1#cec we should limit ourselves to the recognition of five genera1 of which the first 7being7 comprises matter1 form and the combination4#ced ,if1 however1 we should not count matter1 form and combination as a single genus1 our analysis will assume the following shape3 matter1 form1 combination1 relation1 quantity1 quality1 and movement4 ,otherwise1 the latter three might be subsumed under relation1 which possesses more extension than they4 ,,sense-,,being4 #d4 ,what is the common element in these three things 7matter1 form and their combination78 ,what constitutes their 7sublunary1 mundane or7 earthly being8 ,is it because matter1 form and their combination form a foundation for other things8 ,in that case1 as matter is the foundation1 or seat of form1 then form will not be in the genus of being4 ,but1 as the combination also forms foundation for other things1 then form united to matter will be the subject of the combinations1 or rather1 of all the things which are posterior to the combination1 as quantity1 quality1 and movement4 ,,being ,,is ,,that ,,which ,,is ,,predicated ,,of ,,nothing ,,else4 ,it would seem that 7physical7 being is that which is not predicated of anything else2#cee for whiteness and blackness may1 for instance1 be predicated of some white or black subject4 ,likewise with the idea of doubleness2--,i mean here not the doubleness which is the opposite of one half1 but the doubleness predicated of some subject1 as when one says this wood is double4 ,so also paternity1 and science1 are attributes of another subject1 of which that is said4 ,so space is that which limits1 and time that which measures something else4 ,but fire1 or wood considered as such1 are not attributes4 ,neither are ,socrates1 nor composite being 7composed of matter and form71 nor form which is in the being1 because it is not a modification of any other subject4 ,indeed1 form is not an attribute of matter2 it is an element of the combination4 ,man and form of man are one and the same thing4#cef ,matter also is an element of the combination2 under this respect1 it may be predicated of a subject1 but this subject is identical with itself4 ,on the contrary1 whiteness1 considered in itself1 exists only in the subject of which it may be predicated4 ,consequently1 the thing which exists only in the subject of which it is predicated is not 7physical7 being4#cef ,being1 on the contrary1 is that which is what it is by itself4 ,in case it form part of some subject1 then it completes the combination2 whose elements exist each in itself1 and which are predicated of the combination only in a condition other than that of existing in it4 ,considered as a part1 being is relative to something other than itself2 but considered in itself1 in its nature1 in what it is1 it is not predicable of anything4#ceg ,,physical ,,being ,,is ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,all ,,other ,,things4 ,to be a subject is then a property common to matter1 to form1 and to the combination4 ,but this function of subject is fulfilled differently by matter in respect to form1 and by form in respect to the modifications1 and by the combination2 or rather1 matter is not a subject in respect to form2 form is the complement which completes it when it still is only matter1 and when it exists only potentially4#ceh ,to speak strictly1 form is not in matter2 for when one thing forms only a unity with something else1 one cannot say that one is in the other 7as some accident in its subject74 ,only when both are taken together do matter and form form a subject for other things2#cei thus ,man in general1 and a particular man constitute the subject of passive modifications2 they are anterior to the actions and consequences which relate to them4 ,being therefore is the principle from which all other things derive1 and by which they exist2 that to which all passive modifications relate1 and from which all actions proceed4#cfj ,,relation ,,between ,,physical ,,and ,,intelligible ,,terms ,,are ,,merely ,,verbal4 #e4 ,such are the characteristics of sense-being4 ,if in any way they also suit intelligible being1 it is only by analogy1#cdc or by figure of speech 7homonymy74#cfa ,so1 for instance1 the first is so called in respect of the remainder2 for it is not absolutely first1 but only in respect to the things which hold an inferior rank2 far more1 the things which follow the first are also called first in respect to those which follow4 ,likewise1 in speaking of intelligible things1 the word subject is used in a different sense4 ,it may also be doubted that they suffer 7experience71 and it is evident that if they do suffer1 it is in an entirely different manner4#cfb ,,physical ,,being ,,is ,,that ,,which ,,is ,,not ,,in ,a ,,subject4 ,not to be in a subject is then the common characteristic of all being1 if1 by not being in a subject1 we mean not to form part of any subject1 and not to contribute to the formation of a unity therewith4 ,indeed1 that which contributes to the formation of a composite being1 with something else1 could not be in that thing as in a subject2 form therefore is not in matter as in a subject1 and neither is man in ,socrates as in a subject1 because man forms part of ,socrates4#cfc ,thus1 being is that which is not in a subject4 ,if we add that being is not predicated of any subject1 we must also add1 insofar as this subject is something different from itself2 otherwise man1 predicated of some one man1 would not be comprised within the definition of being1 if 7in asserting that being is not predicated of any subject71 we did not add1 so far as this subject is something different from itself4 ,when ,i say1 ,socrates is a man1 ,i am practically saying1 ,white is white1 and not1 wood is white4 ,while actually asserting that ,socrates is a man1 ,i am asserting that a particular man is a man1 and to say ,the man who is in ,socrates is a man1 amounts to saying ,socrates is ,socrates1 or1 that particular reasonable living organism is a living organism4 ,,all ,,the ,,other ,,physical ,,categories ,,refer ,,to ,,matter1 ,,form ,,or ,,combination4 ,it might however be objected that the property of being does not consist in being a subject2 for the difference 7as1 for instance1 a biped71 is also one of those things which are not in a subject4#cfc ,if biped be considered as a part of being1 we are compelled to recognize that biped is not in a subject2 but if by biped we do not mean some particular being but the property of being a biped1 then we are no longer speaking of a being1 but of a quality1 and biped will be in a subject4 ,but time and place do not seem to be in a subject6 ,if we define time as the measure of movement1#cfd 7there are two possibilities74 ,first1 time might be measured movement2 and then it will be in movement as in a subject1 while movement itself will be in the moved thing4 ,or1 time will be what measures 7the soul1 or the present moment71 and then it will be in what measures as in a subject4 ,as to space1 as it is the limit of what contains1 it will also reside in what contains4#cfe ,it is otherwise with the being that we are here considering4 ,being1 then1 will have to be considered as consisting in either one1 or in several1 or in all the properties of which we are speaking2 because these properties simultaneously suit matter1 form1 and the combination4 ,,being ,,draws ,,its ,,existence ,,from ,,the ,,intelligible4 #f4 ,it may perhaps be objected that we have here indicated the properties of being1 but we have not described its nature4 ,such a request amounts to asking to see what sense-being is2 now sense-being is1 and being is not something which can be seen4 ,what then8 ,are fire and water not beings8 ,doubtless1 they are4 ,but are they beings merely because they are visible8 ,no4 ,is it because they contain matter8 ,no4 ,is it because they have a form8 ,no4 ,is it because they are combinations8 ,no4 ,they are beings1 because they are4 ,but one can also say that quantity1 as well as that quality is6 ,yes1 doubtless1 but if we speak thus about quantity and quality1 it is only by a figure of speech4#cdc1cfa1 #cff ,then1 in what consists the being of earth1 fire1 and other similar things8 ,what is the difference between the being of these things and of others8 ,the essence of the earth1 of the fire1 and so forth1 exists in an absolute manner1 while the essence of other things 7is relative7 and for instance1 means merely being white4 ,is added to white is not the same thing as essence taken absolutely2 is it8 ,certainly not4 ,essence taken absolutely is essence in the first degree2 to be added to white1 is essence by participation1 essence in the second degree2 for to be1 added to white1 makes white an essence2 and white added to essence makes the being white2 that is why white is an accident for essence1 and to be an accident to white4 ,it is not the same thing as if we said1 ,socrates is white1 and1 the ,white is ,socrates2 for in both cases ,socrates is the same being2 but it is not thus with whiteness2 for1 in the second case1 ,socrates is contained in the white1 and in the first case1 white is a pure accident4 ,when we say1 the being is white1 the white is an accident of being2 but when we say1 the ,white is essence1 the white contains essence4 ,in short1 white possesses existence only because it refers to being1 and is in being4 ,it is therefore from being that it receives its existence4 ,on the contrary1 essence draws its existence from itself2 and from white it receives whiteness1 not because it is in the white1 but because the white is within it4#cff ,as the essence which is in the sense-world is not ,essence by itself1 we must say that it draws its existence from the veritable ,essence1 in itself2 and1 finally1 the ,white in itself possesses essence because it participates in the intelligible ,essence4 ,,being ,,cannot ,,be ,,ascribed ,,to ,,matter1 ,,which ,,derives ,,its ,,being ,,from ,,the ,,intelligible4 #g4 ,if somebody should object that material things derive their essence from matter1 we should have to ask from whence matter itself draws its essence and existence2 for we have elsewhere demonstrated that matter does not hold the first rank4#cfg ,if1 however1 it be further objected1 that the other things could not exist without being in matter1 we will answer that that is true only for sense-things4 ,but if matter be anterior to sense-things1 that does not hinder itself being posterior to many other things1 and to all intelligible things2 for the existence of matter is far more obscure than the things in matter1 if these things be 7seminal7 reasons1 which participate deeper in essence1 while matter is completely irrational1 being an adumbration1 and a decay of reason4#cfh ,it may further be objected that matter gives essence to material things1 as ,socrates gives essence to the white that is in him4 ,we will answer that what possesses a superior degree of ,essence may well confer a lesser degree of essence to what possesses a still inferior degree thereof1 but that the reciprocal or converse condition is impossible4 ,now1 as form is more essence than matter1#cfi essence cannot be predicated equally of matter and form1 and being is not a genus whose species is matter1 form and the combination4#cgj ,these three things have several common characteristics1 as we have already said1 but they differ in respect to essence2 for when something which possesses a superior degree of essence approaches something which possesses an inferior degree 7as when form approaches matter71 this thing1 although anterior in 7the ontological7 order1 is posterior in respect to being2 consequently1 if matter1 form and the combination be not beings equally1 no longer is being for them something common1 like a genus4 ,nevertheless1 being will be in a less narrow relation with things which are posterior to matter1 to form1 and to the combination1 though it gives each of them the property of belonging to themselves4 ,it is thus that life has different degrees1 one stronger1 the other weaker1 and that the images of a same object are some more lively1 others more obscure4#cga ,if essence be measured by a lower degree of essence1 and if the superior degree which exists in other things be omitted1 essence thus considered will be a common element4 ,but that is not a good way of procedure4 ,indeed1 each whole differs from the others1 and the lesser degree of essence does not constitute something that was common to all2 just as1 for life1 there is not something common to vegetative life1 to sensitive life1 and rational life4#cga ,,essences ,,differ ,,according ,,to ,,participation ,,in ,,form4 ,consequently1 essence differs both in matter and in form2 and these two 7entities7 depend from a third 7intelligible ,being71 which communicates itself to them unequally4 ,the anterior ,being possesses a better nature 7essence7 than any posterior being1 not only when the second proceeds from the first1 and the third from the second2 but when two things proceed from one and the same thing1 the same 7condition of affairs7 may be observed4 ,thus does the clay 7when fashioned by the potter7 become a tile not only according as it participates in the fire more or less 7is more or less thoroughly baked74 ,besides1 matter and form do not proceed from the same intelligible principle2#cgb for the intelligibles also differ among each other4 ,,difference ,,between ,,matter ,,and ,,form ,,due ,,to ,,that ,,of ,,intelligible ,,entities ,,from ,,which ,,they ,,depend4 #h4 ,besides1 it is not necessary to divide the combination in form and matter1 now that we speak of sense-being1 a being which has to be perceived by the senses1 rather than by reason4 ,neither is it necessary to add of what this being is composed2 for the elements which compose it are not beings1 or at least not sense-beings4 ,what has to be done here is to embrace in a single genus what is common to stone1 to earth1 to water1 and to the things compounded of them2 namely1 to plants and animals so far as they respond to sensation4 ,in this way1 we shall consider both form and matter2 for sense-being contains them both4 ,thus fire1 earth1 and their intermediaries are both matter and form2 as to the combinations1 they contain several beings united together4 ,what then is the common characteristic of all these beings1 which separates them from other things8 ,they serve as subjects to other things1 and are not contained in one subject1 and do not belong to something else2#cgc in short1 all the characteristics we have enumerated above suit sense-being4 ,,sense-,,being ,,consists ,,in ,,the ,,reunion ,,of ,,qualities ,,and ,,matter4 ,but how shall we separate the accidents from sense-being1 if it have no existence without dimension or quality8 ,of what will sense-being consist1 if we remove from it dimension1 figure 7or outward appearance71 color1 dryness1 and humidity8 ,for sense-beings are qualified4 ,the qualities which change simple into qualified being refer to something4 ,thus1 it is not the entire fire which is being1 but something of the fire1 one of its parts4 ,now what is this part1 if it be not matter8 ,sense-being1 therefore1 consists in the reunion of quality and matter2 and being is constituted by the totality of these things blended in a single matter4 ,each thing taken separately will be quality or quantity1 and so forth2 but the thing whose absence makes being incomplete is a part of that being4 ,as to the thing which is added to already complete being1 it has its own place2#cgd and it is not lost in the blending which constitutes being4 ,i do not say that such a thing1 taken with others1 is a being when it completes a matter of some particular size and quality1 and that it is no more than a quality when it does not complete this mass2 ,i say that even here below not everything is being1 and that only the totality which embraces everything is being4 ,let none complain that we are constituting being as of that which is not being2 for even the totality is not a veritable being4 7,here this word is used in both sensual and intelligible senses1 as a pun71 and only offers the image of the veritable 7,being71 which possesses essence independently of all that refers to it1 and itself produces the other things because it possesses veritable 7,existence74 ,here below the substrate possesses essence only incompletely1 and1 far from producing other things1 is sterile2 it is only an adumbration1 and onto this adumbration are reflected images which have only the appearance 7instead of real existence47#cge ,,classification ,,of ,,bodies4 #i4 ,so much then for what we had to say of sense-being1 and the genus it constitutes4 ,it remains to analyze it into species4 ,every sense-being is a body2 but there are elementary and organized bodies2 the former are fire1 earth1 water and air2 the organized bodies are those of plants and animals1 which are distinguished from each other by their forms4 ,the earth and the other elements may be divided into species4 ,plants and bodies of animals may be classified according to their forms2 or we could classify apart the terrestrial animals1 that inhabit the earth1 and those which belong to some other element4 ,we might also analyze bodies into those that are light1 heavy1 or intermediary2 the heavy bodies remaining in the middle of the world1 the light bodies in the superior region which surrounds the world1 and the intermediary bodies dwelling in the intermediary region4 ,in each one of these regions the bodies are distinguished by their exterior appearance 7or1 figure72 thus there exist the bodies of the 7stars1 or7 celestial bodies1 and then those that belong to particular elements4 ,after having distributed the bodies according to the four elements1 they could be blended together in some other manner1 and thus beget their mutual differences of location1 forms1 and mixtures4 ,bodies could also be distinguished as fiery1 terrestrial1 and so forth1 according to their predominating element4 ,,primary ,,and ,,secondary ,,beings ,,are ,,divided ,,by ,,no ,,substantial ,,difference4 ,as to the distinction drawn between primary and secondary being1#cgf it must be admitted that some particular fire1 and the universal ,fire differ from each other in this1 that the one is individual1 and the other universal2 but the difference between them does not seem to be essential4 ,indeed1 does the genus of quality contain both ,white1 and a particular white2 or ,grammar1 and some particular grammatical science8 ,how far does ,grammatical science then have less reality than some particular grammatical science1 and ,science1 than some particular science8 ,grammatical science is not posterior to some particular grammatical science2 ,grammatical science must already have existed before the existence of the grammatical science in you1 since the latter is some grammatical science because it is found in you2 it is besides identical with universal ,grammatical science4 ,likewise1 it is not ,socrates that caused him who was not a man to become a man2 it is rather the universal ,man who enabled ,socrates to be a man2 for the individual man is man by participation in the universal ,man4 ,what then is ,socrates1 if not some man8 ,in what does such a man contribute to render being more being8 ,if the answer be that he contributes thereto by the fact that the universal ,man is only a form1 while a particular man is a form in matter1 the result will only be that a particular man will be less of a man2 for reason 7that is1 essence7 is weaker when it is in matter4 ,if the universal ,man consist not only in form itself1 but is also in matter1 in what will he be inferior to the form of the man who is in matter1 since it will be the reason of the man which is in matter8 ,by its nature the universal is anterior1 and consequently the form is anterior to the individual4 ,now that which by its nature is anterior is an absolute anterior4 ,how then would the universal be less in being8 ,doubtless the individual1 being better known to us1 is anterior for us2 but no difference in the things themselves results4#cgg ,besides1 if we were to admit the distinction between primary and secondary beings1 the definition of being would no longer be one2 for that which is first and that which is second are not comprised under one single definition1 and do not form a single and same genus4 ,,bodies ,,may ,,be ,,classified ,,not ,,only ,,by ,,forms2 ,,but ,,by ,,qualities2 ,,etc4 #aj4 ,bodies may also be distinguished by heat or dryness1 wetness or cold1 or in any other desired manner1 by taking two qualities simultaneously1 then considering these things as a composition and mixture1 and ceasing at the combination thereof4 ,or1 bodies may be divided in terrestrial bodies1 that dwell on the earth1 or distribute them according to their forms1 and the differences of animals2 by classifying not the animals themselves1 but their bodies1 which are their instruments1#cgh as it were4 ,it is proper to establish a classification according to the forms1 as it is equally reasonable to classify bodies according to their qualities1 such as heat1 cold1 and so forth4 ,if it be objected that bodies are constituted rather by their qualities1 it may be answered that they are just as much classified by their blends1 their colors1 and their figures4 ,when analyzing sense-being1 it is not unreasonable to classify it according to the differences that appear to the senses4#cgi ,this 7being7 does not possess absolute 7,essence72 it is the totality of the matter and qualities which constitutes the sense-being1 since we have said that its hypostatic existence consists in the union of the things perceived by the senses1 and that it is according to the testimony of their senses that men believe in the existence of things4 ,,bodies ,,are ,,classifiable ,,according ,,to ,,specific ,,forms4 ,the composition of the bodies being varied1 they may also be classified according to the specific forms of the animals4 ,such1 for instance1 would be the specific form of a man united to a body2 for this form is a quality of body1 and it is reasonable to analyze it according to the qualities4 ,if it should be objected that we have said above that some bodies are simple1 while others are composite1 thus contrasting the simple and the composite1 we shall answer that1 without regarding their composition1 we have also said that they are either brute or organized4 ,the classification of bodies should not be founded on the contrast between the simple and the composite1 but1 as we first did1 we may classify the simple bodies in the first rank4 ,then1 by considering their blendings1 one may start from another principle to determine the differences offered by the composites under the respect of their figure or their location2 thus1 for instance1 bodies might be classified in celestial and terrestrial4 ,this may close our consideration of sense-being1 or generation4 ,,definition ,,of ,,quantity4 #aa4 ,let us now pass to quantity and quantitatives4 ,when treating of quantity1 we have already said that it consists in number and dimension1 in so far as some thing possesses such a quantity1 that is1 in the number of material things1 and in the extension of the subject4#chj ,here indeed we are not treating of abstract quantity1 but of a quantity which causes a piece of wood to measure three feet1 or that horses are five in number4 ,consequently1 as we have said1 we should call extension and number 7considered from the concrete viewpoint7 quantitatives2 but this name could could be applied neither to time nor space2 time1 being the measure of movement1#cha re-enters into relation2 and place1 being that which contains the body1#chb consists of a manner of being1 and consequently1 in a relation4 7,so much the less should we call time and place quantitatives1 as7 movement1 though continuous1 does not either belong to the genus of quantity4 ,,large ,,and ,,small ,,are ,,conceptions ,,belonging ,,to ,,quantity4 ,should large and small be classified within the genus of quantity8 ,yes3 for the large is large by a certain dimension1 and dimension is not a relation4 ,as to greater and smaller1 they belong to relation2 for a thing is greater or smaller in relation to something else1 just as when it is double4 ,why then do we sometimes say that a mountain is large1 and that a grain of millet is small8 ,when we say that a mountain is small1 we use the latter term instead of smaller2 for they who use this expression themselves acknowledge that they call a mountain small only by comparing it to other mountains1 which implies that here little stands for smaller4 ,likewise1 when we say that a grain of millet is large1 this does not mean large in any absolute sense1 but large only for a grain of millet2 which implies that one compares it to things of the same kind1 and that here large means larger4#chc ,,beauty ,,is ,,classified ,,along ,,with ,,the ,,relatives4 ,why then do we not also classify the beautiful among the relatives8 ,because beauty is such by itself1 because it constitutes a quality1 while more beautiful is a relative4 ,nevertheless the thing which is called beautiful would sometimes appear ugly1 if it were compared to some other1 as1 for instance1 if we were to contrast the beauty of men with that of the gods2 hence the expression 7of ,heraclitus's#chd73 ,the most beautiful of monkeys would be ugly if compared with an animal of a different kind4 ,when beauty is predicated of something1 it is considered in itself2 it might perhaps be called more beautiful or more ugly if it were compared to another4 ,hence it results that1 in the genus of which we are treating1 an object is in itself great because of the presence of greatness1 but not in respect to some other4 ,otherwise1 we would be obliged to deny that a thing was beautiful because of the existence of some more beautiful one4 ,neither therefore must we deny that a thing is great because there is only one greater than it2 for greater could not exist without great1 any more than more beautiful without beautiful4 ,,quantity ,,admits ,,of ,,contraries 7,,polemic ,,against ,,aristotle74#che #ab4 ,it must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries4 ,even our thought admits of contraries when we say great and small1 since we then conceive of contraries1 as when we say1 much and little2 for much and little are in the same condition as great and small4 ,sometimes it is said1 ,at home there are many people1 and by this is intended a 7relatively7 great number2 for in the latter case it is a relative4 ,likewise it is said1 ,there are few people in the theatre1 instead of saying1 there are less people1 7relatively72 but when one uses the word many a great multitude in number must be understood4 ,,how ,,multitude ,,is ,,classified ,,with ,,relatives4 ,how then is multitude classified among relatives8 ,it forms part of relatives in that multitude is an extension of number1 while its contrary is a contraction4 ,likewise is it with continuous dimension2 we conceive of it as prolonged4 ,quantity therefore has a double origin3 progression of unity1 and of the point4 ,if either progression cease promptly1 the first one produces little1 and the second1 small4 ,if both be prolonged1 they produce much1 and large4 ,what then is the limit that determines these things8 ,the same question may be asked about the beautiful1 and about warmth2 for there is also warmer2 only1 the latter is a relative1 while ,warm1 taken absolutely1 is a quality4 ,as there is a reason of the beautiful 7a reason that would produce and determine the beautiful71 likewise there must be a reason for the ,great1 a reason by participation in which an object becomes great1 as the reason of the ,beautiful makes beautiful4 ,such are the things for which quantity admits contraries4 ,,there ,,is ,,no ,,contrary ,,for ,,place4 ,for space1 there is no contrary1 because strictly space does not belong to the genus of quantity4 ,even if space were part of quantity1 high would not be the contrary of anything unless the universe contained also low4 ,the terms high and low1 applied to parts1 signify only higher and lower than something else4 ,it is so also with right and left1 which are relatives4 ,,classification ,,of ,,syllables ,,and ,,speech4 ,syllables and speech are quantitatives2 they might be subjects in respect to quantity1 but only so by accident4 ,indeed1 the voice1 by itself1 is a movement1#chf it must therefore be reduced to movement and action4 ,,discrete ,,quantity ,,quite ,,distinct ,,from ,,continuous ,,quantity4 #ac4 ,we have already explained that discrete quantity is clearly distinguished from continuous quantity1 both by its own definition1 and the general definition 7for quantity74#chg ,we may add that numbers are distinguished from each other by being even and odd4 ,if besides there be other differences amidst the even and odd numbers1 these differences will have to be referred to the objects in which are the numbers1 or to the numbers composed of unities1 and not any more to those which exist in sense-beings4 ,if reason separate sense-things from the numbers they contain1 nothing hinders us then from attributing to these numbers the same differences 7as to the numbers composed of unities74#chh ,,elements ,,of ,,continuous ,,quantity4 ,what distinctions are admitted by continuous quantity8 ,there is the line1 the surface1 and the solid2 for extension may exist in one1 two or three dimensions 7and thus count the numerical elements of continuous size7 instead of establishing species4#chi ,in numbers thus considered as anterior or posterior to each other1 there is nothing in common1 which would constitute a genus4 ,likewise in the first1 second and third increases 7of a line1 surface1 and solid7 there is nothing in common2 but as far as quantity is found1 there is also equality 7and inequality71 although there be no extension which is quantitative more than any other4#cij ,however1 one may have dimensions greater than another4 ,it is therefore only in so far as they are all numbers1 that numbers can have anything in common4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 it is not the monad that begets the pair1 nor the pair that begets the triad1 but it may be the same principle which begets all the numbers4 ,if numbers be not derivative1 but exist by themselves1 we may1 at least within our own thought1 consider them as begotten 7or1 derivative74 ,we conceive of the smaller number as the anterior1 the greater as posterior4 ,but numbers1 as such1 may all be reduced to unity4 ,,study ,,of ,,geometrical ,,figures4 ,the method of classification adopted for numbers may be applied to sizes1 and thus distinguish the line1 the surface1 and the solid or body1 because those are sizes which form different species4 ,if besides each of these species were to be divided1 lines might be subdivided into straight1 curved and spiral2 surfaces into straight and curved2 solids into round or polyhedral bodies4 ,further1 as geometers do1 may come the triangle1 the quadrilateral1 and others4 ,,study ,,of ,,the ,,straight ,,line4 #ad4 ,but what about the straight line8 ,is it not a magnitude8 ,possibly2 but if it be a magnitude1 it is a qualified one4#cia ,it is even possible that straightness constitutes a difference of the 7very nature of the7 line1 as line1 for straightness refers solely to a line2 and besides1 we often deduce the differences of ,essence from its qualities4 ,that a straight line is a quantity added to a difference does not cause its being composed of the line1 and of the property of straightness2 for1 were it thus composed1 straightness would be its chief difference4 ,,study ,,of ,,the ,,triangle4 ,now let us consider the triangle1 which is formed of three lines4 ,why should it not belong to quantity8 ,would it be so1 because it is not constituted by three lines merely1 but by three lines arranged in some particular manner8 ,but a quadrilateral would also be constituted by four lines arranged in some particular manner4 7,but being arranged in some particular manner does not hinder a figure from being a quantity74 ,the straight line1 indeed1 is arranged in some particular manner1 and is none the less a quantity4 ,now if the straight line be not simply a quantity1 why could this not also be said of a limited line8 ,for the limit of the line is a point1 and the point does not belong to any genus other than the line4 ,consequently1 a limited surface is also a quantity1 because it is limited by lines1 which even more belong to quantity4 ,if then the limited surface be contained in the genus of quantity1 whether the surface be a triangle1 a quadrilateral1 a hexagon1 or any other polygon1 all figures whatever will belong to the genus of quantity4 ,but if we assigned the triangle or quadrilateral to the genus of quality merely because we are speaking of some one definite triangle or quadrilateral1 nothing would hinder one and the same thing from being subsumed under several categories4 ,a triangle would then be a quantity so far as it was both a general and particular magnitude1 and would be a quality by virtue of its possessing a particular form4 ,the same might be predicated of the ,triangle in itself because of its possessing a particular form2 and so also with the sphere4 ,by following this line of argument1 geometry would be turned into a study of qualities1 instead of that of quantities1 which of course it is4 ,the existing differences between magnitudes do not deprive them of their property of being magnitudes1 just as the difference between essences does not affect their essentiality4 ,besides1 every surface is limited1 because an infinite surface is impossible4 ,further1 when ,i consider a difference that pertains to essence1 ,i call it an essential difference4 ,so much the more1 on considering figures1 ,i am considering differences of magnitude4 ,for if the differences were not of magnitude1 of what would they be differences8 ,if then they be differences of magnitude1 the different magnitudes which are derived from differences of magnitude should be classified according to the species constituted by them 7when considered in the light of being magnitudes74 ,,geometry ,,studies ,,quantities1 ,,not ,,qualities4 #ae4 ,but how can you qualify the properties of quantity so as to call them equal or unequal8#cib ,is it not usual to say of two triangles that they are similar8 ,could we not also predicate similarity of two magnitudes8 ,doubtless1 for what is called similarity1#cic does not conflict with similarity or dissimilarity in the genus of quantity4#cid ,here1 indeed1 the word similarity is applied to magnitudes in a sense other than to quality4 ,besides1 if 7,aristotle7 said that the property characteristic of quantities is to enable them to be called equal or unequal1 this does not conflict with predicating similarity of some of them4 ,but as it has been said that the special characteristic of qualities is to admit of being called similar or dissimilar1 we must1 as has already been explained1 understand similarity in a sense other than when it is applied to magnitudes4 ,if similar magnitudes be identical1 we must then consider the other properties of quantity and quality which might be present in them 7so as clearly to contrast their differences74 ,it may also be said that the term similarity applies to the genus of quantity so far as this contains differences 7which distinguish from each other similar magnitudes74 ,,differences ,,which ,,complete ,,the ,,being ,,must ,,be ,,prefixed ,,to ,,that ,,to ,,which ,,they ,,refer4 ,in general1 the differences which complete a being should be classified along with that of which they are the differences1 especially when a difference belongs to a single subject4 ,if a difference complete the being of a subject1 and do not complete the being of another1 this difference should be classified along with the subject whose being it completes1 leaving that whose being it does not complete for separate consideration4 ,by this we do not mean completing the ,being in general1 but completing some particular being1 so that the subject spoken of as a particular one admits no further essential addition4 ,we therefore have the right to say that triangles1 or that quadrilaterals1 as well as surfaces and solids1 are equal1 and to predicate equality or inequality of quantitative entities4 ,but we yet have to study whether quality only can be said to be similar or dissimilar4#cie ,,whether ,,quality ,,only ,,can ,,be ,,called ,,similar ,,or ,,dissimilar4 ,when we were treating of things that were qualified1 we had already explained that matter1 united to quantity1 and taken with other things1 constitutes sense-being2 that this being seems to be a composite of several things1 that it is not properly a whatness1#cif but rather qualification 7or1 qualified thing74 ,the 7seminal7 reason1 for instance that of fire1 has more of a reference to whatness1 while the form that the reason begets is rather a qualification4 ,likewise1 the 7seminal7 reason of man is a whatness1 whilst the form that this reason gives to the body1 being only an image of reason1 is rather a qualification4 ,thus if the ,socrates that we see was the genuine ,socrates1 his mere portrait composed of no more than colors would also be called ,socrates4 ,likewise1 although this 7seminal7 reason of ,socrates be that which constitutes the genuine ,socrates1 we nevertheless also apply the name of ,socrates to the man that we see2 yet the colors1 or the figure of the ,socrates we see1 are only the image of those which are contained by his 7seminal7 reason4 ,likewise1 the reason of ,socrates is itself only an image of the veritable reason 7of the idea7 of the man4 ,this is our solution of the problem4#cig ,,the ,,various ,,terms ,,expressing ,,quality4 #af4 ,when we separately consider each of the things which compose sense-being and when we wish to designate the quality which exists among them1 we must not call it whatness1 any more than quantity or movement1 but rather name it a characteristic1 employing the expressions such1 as1 and this kind4 ,we are thus enabled to indicate beauty and ugliness1 such as they are in the body4 ,indeed1 sense-beauty is no more than a figure of speech1#cdc in respect to intelligible beauty2 it is likewise with quality1 since black and white are also completely different 7from their reason1 or their idea74 ,,the ,,seminal ,,reason ,,harmonizes ,,with ,,its ,,appearing ,,actualization4 ,is the content of 7seminal7 reason and of a particular reason1 identical with what appears1 or does it apply thereto only by a figure of speech8#cdc ,should it properly be classified among the intelligible1 or the sense-objects8 ,sensual beauty of course evidently differs from intelligible beauty2 but what of ugliness--in which classification does it belong8 ,must virtue be classified among intelligible or sensual qualities1 or should we locate some in each class8 7,all this uncertainty is excusable1 inasmuch7 as it may be asked whether even the arts1 which are reasons1 should be classified among sense-qualities8 ,if these reasons be united to a matter1 they must have matter as their very soul4 ,but what is their condition here below1 when united to some matter8 ,these reasons are in a case similar to song accompanied by a lyre2#cih this song1 being uttered by a sense-voice1 is in relation with the strings of the lyre1 while simultaneously being part of the art 7which is one of these seminal reasons74 ,likewise1 it might be said that virtues are actualizations1 and not parts 7of the soul74 ,are they sense-actualizations8 7,this seems probable71 for although the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal1 we still classify it among the things which refer to the body1 and belong to it4 ,as to arithmetic1 and geometry1 two different kinds must be distinguished3 the first kind deals with visible objects1 and must be classified among sense-objects2 but the second kind deals with studies suitable to the soul1 and should therefore be classified among intelligible entities4 ,plato#cii considers that music and astronomy are in the same condition4 ,,many ,,other ,,conceptions ,,belong ,,among ,,sense-,,qualities4 ,thus the arts which relate to the body1 which make use of the organs1 and which consult the senses1 are really dispositions of the soul1 but only of the soul as applied to corporeal objects2 and consequently1 they should be classified among sense-qualities4#djj ,here also belong practical virtues1 such as are implied by civil duties1 and which1 instead of raising the soul to intelligible entities1 fructify in the actions of political life1 and refer to them1 not as a necessity of our condition1 but as an occupation preferable to everything else4#dja ,among these qualities we shall have to classify the beauty contained in the 7seminal7 reason1 and1 so much the more1 black and white4 ,,in ,,spite ,,of ,,this ,,classification ,,the ,,soul ,,herself ,,remains ,,incorporeal4 ,but is the soul herself a sense-being1 if she be disposed in a particular way1 and if she contain particular reasons 7that is1 faculties1 virtues1 sciences and arts1 all of which refer to the body1 and which have been classified as sense-qualities78#djb ,it has already been explained that these reasons themselves are not corporeal2 but that they have been classified among sense-qualities only because they referred to the body1 and to the actions thereby produced4 ,on the other hand1 as sense-quality has been defined as the meeting of all the above enumerated entities1 it is impossible to classify incorporeal ,being in the same genus as the sensual being4 ,as to the qualities of the soul1 they are all doubtless incorporeal1 but as they are experiences 7or1 sufferings1 or1 passions7 which refer to terrestrial things1 they must be classified in the genus of quality1 just as the reasons of the individual soul4 ,of the soul we must therefore predicate experience1 however dividing the latter in two elements1 one of which would refer to the object to which it is applied1 and the other to the subject in which it exists4#djc ,though then these experiences cannot be considered as corporeal qualities1 yet it must be admitted they relate to the body4#djd ,on the other hand1 although we classify these experiences in the genus of quality1 still the soul herself should not be reduced to the rank of corporeal being4 ,last1 when we conceive of the soul as without experiences1 and without the reasons above-mentioned1 we are thereby classifying her along with the ,world from which she descends1#dje and we leave here below no intelligible being1 of any kind whatever4 ,,qualities ,,are ,,classified ,,as ,,corporeal ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #ag4 ,qualities1 therefore1 should be classified as of the body1 and of the soul4#djf ,even though all the souls1 as well as their immaterial qualities1 be considered as existing on high1 yet their inferior qualities must be divided according to the senses1 referring these qualities either to sight1 hearing1 feeling1 taste1 or smell4 ,under sight1 we will classify the differences of colors2 under hearing1 that of the sounds2 and likewise1 with the other senses4 ,as to the sounds1 inasmuch as they have but a single quality1 they will have to be classified according to their being soft1 harsh1 agreeable1 and the like4 ,,differences ,,of ,,being ,,should ,,be ,,distinguished ,,according ,,to ,,quality4 ,it is by quality that we distinguish the differences which inhere in being1 as well as the actualizations1 the beautiful or ugly actions1 and in general1 all that is particular4 ,only very rarely do we discover in quantity differences which constitute species2 so much is this the case1 that it is generally divided by its characteristic qualities4 ,we must therefore leave quantity aside1 and that leads us to wonder how we may divide quality itself 7since it is made use of to distinguish other things74#djg ,,difference ,,of ,,quality ,,cannot ,,be ,,distinguished ,,by ,,sensation4 ,what sort of differences1 indeed1 might we use to establish such divisions1 and from what genus would we draw them8 ,it seems absurd to classify quality by quality itself4 ,this is just as if the difference of beings were to be called beings4 ,by what indeed could one distinguish white from black1 and colors from tastes and sensations of touch8 ,if we distinguish the difference of these qualities by the sense-organs1 these differences would no longer exist in the subjects4 ,how indeed could one and the same sense distinguish the difference of the qualities it perceives8 ,is it because certain things exercise an action that is constructive or destructive on the eyes1 or the tongue8 ,we would then have to ask what is the constructive or destructive element in the sensations thus excited8 ,yet1 even were this answered1 such an answer would not explain wherein these things differ4#djg ,,difference ,,in ,,effects ,,is ,,limited ,,to ,,the ,,intelligibles4 ,a further possibility is that these things should be classified according to their effects1 and that it is reasonable to do so with invisible entities1 such as sciences2 but this would not be applicable to sense-objects4 ,when indeed we divide sciences by their effects1 and when1 in general1 we classify them according to the powers of the soul1 by concluding from the diversity of their effects that they differ1 our mind grasps the difference of these powers1 and it determines not only with what objects they deal1 but it also defines their reason 7or1 essence74 ,let us admit that it is easy to distinguish arts according to their reasons1 and according to the notions they include2 but is it possible to divide corporeal qualities in that manner8 ,even when one studies the intelligible world1 there is room for doubt as to how the different reasons distinguish themselves from each other2 it is easy enough to see that white differs from black2 but in what does it do so8 ,,it ,,is ,,absurd ,,to ,,distinguish ,,being1 ,,qualities ,,and ,,differences ,,by ,,themselves4 #ah4 ,all the questions we have asked show that we doubtless must seek to discover the differences of the various 7beings71 so as to distinguish them from each other2 but that it is as impossible as it is unreasonable to inquire what are the differences of the differences themselves4#djh ,being of beings1 quantities of quantities1 qualities of qualities1 differences of differences cannot be discovered2 but we should1 wherever possible1 classify exterior objects1 either according to their effects1 or according to salient characteristics4 ,when this is impossible1 objects should be distinguished1 as for instance dark from light green4 ,but how is white distinguished from black8 ,sensation or intelligence tell us that those things are different without informing us of their reason2 either sensation1 because its function is not to set forth the reason of things1 but only to bring them somehow to our attention2 or intelligence1 because it discerns things that are simple by intuition1 without having to resort to ratiocination1 and limits itself to the statement that something is such or such4 ,besides1 in each one of the operations of intelligence there is a difference 7a special distinctive characteristic7 which enables it to distinguish different things1 without this difference 7which is proper to each of the operations of intelligence7 itself having need to be discerned by the help of some other difference4 ,,some ,,qualities ,,are ,,differences4 ,are all qualities differences1 or not8 ,whiteness1 colors1 qualities perceived by touch and taste1 may become differences between different objects1 though they themselves be species4 ,but how do the sciences of grammar or of music constitute differences8 ,the science of grammar renders the mind grammatical1 and the science of music renders the mind musical1 especially if they be untaught2 and these thus become specific differences4 ,besides1 we have to consider whether a difference be drawn from the same genus 7from which the considered things are drawn71 or from some other genus4 ,if it be drawn from the same genus1 it fulfils1 for the things of this genus1 the same function as does a quality to the quality to which it serves as difference4 ,such are virtue and vice2 virtue is a particular habit1 and vice is also a particular habit2 consequently1 as habits are qualities1 the differences of these habits 7either of virtue or vice7 will be qualities4 ,it may perhaps be objected that a habit without difference is not a quality1 and that it is the difference alone which constitutes the quality4#dji ,we will answer that it is 7commonly7 said that sweet is good1 and that bitter is bad2 this then implies a recognition of their difference by a habit 7a manner of being71 and not by a quality4 ,what if sweet be said to be crude1 or thick and bitter1 thin or refined8 ,the answer is that coarseness does not inform us of the nature of sweetness1 but indicates a manner of being of what is sweet2 and similarly1 with what is refined4 ,,there ,,are ,,differences ,,which ,,are ,,not ,,qualities4 ,there remains for us to examine if a difference of a quality never be a quality1 as that of a being is not a being1 nor that of a quantity1 a quantity4 ,does five differ from three by two8 ,no3 five does not differ from three1 it only exceeds it by two4 ,how indeed could five differ from three by two1 when five contains two8 ,likewise1 a movement does not differ from a movement by a movement4 ,as to virtue and vice1 here is one whole opposed to another whole1 and it is thus that the wholes are distinguished4 ,if a distinction were drawn from the same genus1 that is1 from quality1 instead of founding itself on another genus2 as1 for instance1 if one said that such a vice referred to pleasures1 some other to anger1 some other to acquisitiveness1 and if one were to admit that such a classification was good2 it would evidently result that there are differences that are not qualities4 ,,various ,,derivatives ,,of ,,the ,,category ,,of ,,quality4 #ai4 ,as has been indicated above1 the genus of quality contains the 7beings7 which are said to be qualified 7qualitative entities71 inasmuch as they contain some quality 7as1 for instance1 the handsome man1 so far as he is endowed with beauty74#daj ,these 7beings7 however do not properly belong to this genus1 for otherwise there would here be two categories4 ,it suffices to reduce them to the quality which supplies their name4 ,so non-whiteness1 if it indicate some color other than white1 is a quality2 if it express merely a negation1 or an enumeration1 it is only a word1 or a term which recalls the object2 if it be a word1 it constitutes a movement 7so far as it is produced by the vocal organ72 if it be a name or a term1 it constitutes1 so far as it is a significative1 a relative4 ,if things be classed not only by genera1 if it be admitted that each assertion and expression proclaim a genus1 our answer must be that some affirm things by their mere announcement1 and that others deny them4 ,it may perhaps be best not to include negations in the same genus as things themselves1 since1 to avoid mingling several genera1 we often do not include affirmations4 ,as to privations1 it may be remarked that if the things of which there are privations are qualities1 then the privations themselves are qualities1 as toothless1 or blind4#daa ,but naked and 7its contrary7 clothed are neither of them qualities2 they rather constitute habits1 and thus belong among relatives4 ,passion1 at the moment it is felt1 does not constitute a quality1 but a movement2 when it has been experienced1 and has become durable1 it forms a quality2#daj further1 if the 7being7 which has experienced the passion have kept none of it1 it will have to be described as having been moved1 which amounts to the same thing as really being moved4 ,however1 in this case1 the conception of time will have to be abstracted from that of movement2 for we must not add the conception of the present to that of movement4#dab ,finally1 7the adverb7 well1 and the other analogous terms may be reduced to the simple notion of the genus of quality4 ,it remains to examine if we must refer to the genus of quality being red without also doing so for reddening#daj for blushing does not belong to it1 because he who blushes suffers 7experiences71 or is moved4 ,but as soon as he ceases blushing1 if he have already blushed1 this is a quality2 for quality does not depend on time1 but consists in being such or such2 whence it follows that having blushed is a quality4 ,therefore we shall regard as qualities only habits1 and not mere dispositions2#daj being warm1 for instance1 and not warming up2 being sick1 but not becoming sick4 ,,contrariness ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,greatest ,,possible ,,difference4 #bj4 ,does every quality have an opposite8#daj ,as to vice and virtue1 there is1 between the extremes1 an intermediary quality which is the opposite of both1#daa but1 with colors1 the intermediaries are not contraries4 ,this might be explained away on the ground that the intermediary colors are blends of the extreme colors4 ,however1 we ought not to have divided colors in extremes and intermediaries1 and opposed them to each other2 but rather have divided the genus of color into black and white1 and then have shown that other colors are composed of these two1 or differentiated another color that would be intermediate1 even though composite4 ,if it be said that intermediary colors are not opposite to the extremes because opposition is not composed of a simple difference1 but of a maximal difference1#dac it will have to be answered that this maximal difference results from having interposed intermediaries2 if these were removed1 the maximal difference would have no scale of comparison4 ,to the objection that yellow approximates white more than black1 and that the sense of sight supports this contention2 that it is the same with liquids where there is no intermediary between cold and hot2 it must be answered that white and yellow and other colors compared to each other similarly likewise differ completely2 and1 because of this their difference1 constitute contrary qualities2 they are contrary1 not because they have intermediaries1 but because of their characteristic nature4 ,thus health and sickness are contraries1 though they have no intermediaries4 ,could it be said that they are contraries because their effects differ maximally8 ,but how could this difference be recognized as maximal since there are no intermediaries which show the same characteristics at a less degree8 ,the difference between health and sickness could not therefore be demonstrated to be maximal4 ,consequently1 oppositeness will have to be analyzed as something else than maximal difference4 ,does this mean only a great difference8 ,then we must in return ask whether this great mean greater by opposition to something smaller1 or great absolutely8 ,in the first case1 the things which have no intermediary could not be opposites2 in the second1 as it is easily granted that there is a great difference between one nature and another1 and as we have nothing greater to serve as measure for this distance1 we shall have to examine by what characteristics oppositeness might be recognized4 ,,contraries ,,are ,,those ,,things ,,that ,,lack ,,resemblance4 ,to begin with1 resemblance does not mean only belonging to the same genus1 nor mere confusion from more or less numerous characteristics1 as1 for instance1 by their forms4 ,things that possess resemblance1 therefore1 are not opposites4 ,only things which have nothing identical in respect to species are opposites2#dad though we must add that they must belong to the same genus of quality4 ,thus1 though they have no intermediaries1 we can classify as opposites the things which betray no resemblance to each other2 in which are found only characteristics which do not approximate each other1 and bear no kind of analogy to each other4 ,consequently1 objects which have something in common in the respect of colors could not be contraries4 ,besides1 not everything is the contrary of every other thing2 but one thing is only the contrary of some other2 and this is the case with tastes as well as with colors4 ,but enough of all this4 ,,qualities ,,admit ,,of ,,degree4 ,does a quality admit of more or less8#daj ,evidently the objects which participate in qualities participate therein more or less4 ,but the chief question is whether there be degrees in virtue or justice8 ,if these habits possess a certain latitude1 they have degrees4 ,if they have no latitude1 they are not susceptible of more or less4 ,,reasons ,,why ,,movement ,,is ,a ,,category4 #ba4 ,let us pass to movement4#dae ,admittedly movement is a genus with the following characteristics3 first1 movement cannot be reduced to any other genus2 then1 nothing higher in the scale of being can be predicated of it2 last1 it reveals a great number of differences which constitute species4 ,,movement ,,cannot ,,be ,,reduced ,,to ,,any ,,higher ,,genus4 ,to what genus could 7movement7 be reduced8 ,it constitutes neither the being nor the quality of the 7being7 in which it exists4 ,it is not even reducible to action1 for in passion 7or1 experience7 there are several kinds of movements2 and it is the actions and passions which are reducible to movement4 ,further1 movement need not necessarily be a relative merely because movement does not exist in itself1 that it belongs to some being1 and that it exists in a subject2 otherwise1 we should have to classify quality also as a relation2 for quality belongs to some 7being7 and exists in a subject2 it is not so however1 with a quantity4 ,it might be objected that1 though each of them exist in some subject1 the one by virtue of its being a quality1 and the other1 of being a quantity1 they themselves are not any the less species of essences4 ,the same argument would apply to movement2 though it belong to some subject1 it is something before belonging to a subject1 and we must consider what it is in itself4 ,now what is relative is not at first something by itself1 and then the predicate of something else2#daf but what is born of the relation existing between two objects1 is nothing else outside the relation to which it owes its name2 thus the double1 so far as it is called doubleness1 is neither begotten1 nor exists except in the comparison established between it and a half1 since1 not being conceived of before1 it owes its name and its existence to the comparison thus established4 ,,is ,,change ,,anterior ,,to ,,movement8 ,what then is movement8 ,while belonging to a subject1 it is something by itself before belonging to a subject1 as are quality1 quantity1 and being4 ,to begin with1 nothing is predicated before it1 and of it1 as a genus4 ,is change#dag anterior to movement8 ,here change is identical with movement1 or if change is to be considered a genus1 it will form a genus to be added to those already recognized4 ,besides1 it is evident that1 on this hypothesis1 movement will become a species1 and to it will be opposed1 as another species1 generation1 as1 for instance1 generation is a change1 but not a movement4#dah ,why then should generation not be a movement8 ,is it because what is generated does not yet exist1 and because movement could not exist in non-being8 ,consequently1 neither will generation be a change4 ,or is this so because generation is an alteration and increase1 and because it presupposes that certain things are altered1 and increase8 ,to speak thus is to busy ourselves with things that precede generation4 ,generation presupposes production of some other form2 for generation does not consist in an alteration passively undergone1 such as being warmed1 or being whitened2 such effects could be produced before realization of the generation4 ,what then occurs in generation8 ,there is alteration4 ,generation consists in the production of an animal or plant1 in the reception of a form4 ,change is much more reasonably to be considered a species1 than movement2 because the word change means that one thing takes the place of another1 while movement signifies the actualization by which a being passes from what is proper to it1 to what is not1 as in the translation from one place to another4 ,if that be not admitted 7to define movement71 it will at least have to be acknowledged that the action of studying it1 as that of playing the lyre1 and in general1 all the movements that modify a habit1 would be subsumed within our definition4 ,alteration therefore could not be anything else but a species of movement2 since it is a movement which produces passage from one state to another4#dai ,,definition ,,of ,,alteration4 #bb4 ,granting that alteration is the same thing as movement1 so far as the result of movement is to render something other than it was1 7we still have to ask7 what then is movement8 ,to indulge in a figurative expression1#cdc it is the passage of potentiality to the actualization of which it is the potentiality4#dbj ,,movement ,,as ,a ,,form ,,of ,,power4 ,let us1 indeed1 suppose1 that something which formerly was a potentiality succeeds in assuming a form1 as potentiality that becomes a statue1 or that passes to actualization1 as a man's walk4#dba ,in the case where the metal becomes a statue1 this passage is a movement2 in the case of the walking1 the walk itself is a movement1 like the dance1 with one who is capable of it4 ,in the movement of the first kind1 where the metal passes into the condition of being a statue1 there is the production of another form which is realized by the movement4#dbb ,the movement of the second kind1 the dance1 is a simple form of the potentiality1 and1 when it has ceased1 leaves nothing that subsists after it4#dbc ,,movement ,,is ,,active ,,form1 ,,and ,,cause ,,of ,,other ,,forms4 ,we are therefore justified in calling movement an active form that is aroused1 by opposition to the other forms which remain inactive4 7,they may be so named71 whether or not they be permanent4 ,we may add that it is the cause of the other forms1 when it results in producing something else4 ,this 7sense-7 movement may also be called the life of bodies4 ,i say this movement1 because it bears the same name as the movements of the intelligence1 and those of the soul4 ,,questions ,,about ,,movement4 ,what further proves that movement is a genus1 is that it is very difficult1 if not impossible1 to grasp it by a definition4 ,but how can it be called a form when its result is deterioration1 or something passive8 ,it may then be compared to the warming influence of the rays of the sun1 which exerts on some things an influence that makes them grow1 while other things it shrivels4 ,in both cases1 the movement has something in common1 and is identical1 so far as it is a movement2 the difference of its results is due to the difference of the beings in which it operates4 ,are then growing sick and convalescence identical8 ,yes1 so far as they are movements4 ,is their difference then due to their subjects1 or to anything else8 ,this question we will consider further on1 while studying alteration4 ,now let us examine the elements common to all movements2 in that way we shall be able to prove that movement is a genus4 ,,common ,,element ,,in ,,growth1 ,,increase ,,and ,,generation4 ,first1 the word movement can be used in different senses1 just as essence1 when considered a genus4 ,further1 as we have already said1 all the movements by which one thing arrives at a natural state1 or produces an action suitable to its nature1 constitute so many species4 ,then1 the movements by which one thing arrives at a state contrary to its nature1 have to be considered as analogous to that to which they lead4 ,but what common element is there in alteration1 growth and generation1 and their contraries8 ,what is there in common between these movements1 and the displacement in space1 when you consider the four movements1 as such8#dbe ,the common element is that the moved thing1 after the movement1 is no longer in the former state2 that it no more remains quiet1 and does not rest so long as the movement lasts4 ,it ceaselessly passes to another state1 alters1 and does not remain what it was2 for the movement would be vain if it did not make one thing other than it was4 ,consequently otherness does not consist in one thing becoming other than it was1 and then persisting in this other state1 but in ceaseless alteration4 ,thus1 time is always different from what it was because it is produced by movement2 for it is movement measured in its march and not in its limit of motion1 or stopping point2 it follows1 carried away in its course4 ,further1 one characteristic common to all kinds of movement is that it is the march 7or process7 by which potentiality and possibility pass into actualization2 for every object in movement1 whatever be the nature of this movement1 succeeds in moving only because it formerly possessed the power of producing an action1 or of experiencing the passion of some particular nature4 ,,movement ,,for ,,sense-,,objects4 #bc4 ,for sense-objects1 which receive their impulse from without1 movement is a stimulus which agitates them1 excites them1 presses them1 prevents them from slumbering in inertia1 from remaining the same1 and makes them present an image of life by their agitation and continual mutations4 ,besides1 one must not confuse the things that move with movement2 walking is not the feet1 but an actualization of the power connected with the feet4 ,now as this power is invisible1 we perceive only the agitation of the feet2 we see that their present state is quite different from that in which they would have been1 had they remained in place1 and that they have some addition1 which however1 is invisible4 ,thus1 being united to objects other than itself1 the power is perceived only accidentally1 because one notices that the feet change place1 and do not rest4 ,likewise1 alteration in the altered object1 is recognized only by failure to discover in it the same quality as before4 ,,movement ,,as ,,influx4 ,what is the seat of a movement acting on an object by passing from internal power to actualization8 ,is it in the motor8 ,how will that which is moved and which suffers be able to receive it8 ,is it in the movable element8 ,why does it not remain in the mover8 ,movement must therefore be considered as inseparable from the mover1 although not exclusively2 it must pass from the mover into the mobile 7element7 without ceasing to be connected with the mover1 and it must pass from the mover to the moved like a breath 7or influx74#dbf ,when the motive power produces locomotion1 it gives us an impulse and makes us change place ceaselessly2 when it is calorific1 it heats2 when1 meeting matter1 it imparts thereto its natural organization1 and produces increase2 when it removes something from an object1 this object decreases because it is capable thereof2 last1 when it is the generative power which enters into action1 generation occurs2 but if this generative power be weaker than the destructive power1 there occurs destruction1 not of what is already produced1 but of what was in the process of production4 ,likewise1 convalescence takes place as soon as the force capable of producing health acts and dominates2 and sickness occurs1 when the opposite power produces a contrary effect4 ,consequently1 movement must be studied not only in the things in which it is produced1 but also in those that produce it or transmit it4 ,the property of movement consists therefore in being a movement endowed with some particular quality1 or being something definite in a particular thing4 ,,movement ,,of ,,displacement ,,is ,,single4 #bd4 ,as to movement of displacement1 we may ask if ascending be the opposite of descending1 in what the circular movement differs from the rectilinear movement1 what difference obtains in throwing an object at the head or at the feet4 ,the difference is not very clear1 for in these cases the motive power is the same4 ,shall we say that there is one power which causes raising1 and another that lowers1 especially if these movements be natural1 and if they be the result of lightness or heaviness8 ,in both cases1 there is something in common1 namely1 direction towards its natural place1 so that the difference is derived from exterior circumstances4 ,indeed1 in circular and rectilinear movement1 if someone move the same object in turn circularly and in a straight line1 what difference is there in the motive power8 ,the difference could be derived only from the figure 7or outward appearance7 of the movement1 unless it should be said that the circular movement is composite1 that it is not a veritable movement1 and that it does not produce any change by itself4 ,in all of these cases1 the movement of displacement is identical1 and presents only adventitious differences4 ,,explanation ,,of ,,composition ,,and ,,decomposition4 #be4 ,of what do composition 7blending1 or mixture7 and decomposition consist8 ,do they constitute other kinds of movement than those already noticed1 generation and destruction1 growth and decrease1 movement of displacement and alteration8 ,shall composition and decomposition be reduced to some one of these kinds of motion1 or shall we look at this process inversely8 ,if composition consist in approximating one thing to another1 and in joining them together2 and if1 on the other hand1 decomposition consist in separating the things which were joined1 we have here only two movements of displacement1 a uniting1 and a separating one4 ,we should be able to reduce composition and decomposition to one of the above recognized kinds of motion1 if we were to acknowledge that this composition was mingling1#dbg combination1 fusion1 and union--a union which consists in two things uniting1 and not in being already united4 ,indeed1 composition includes first the movement of displacement1 and then an alteration2 just as1 in increase1 there was first the movement of displacement1 and then movement in the kind of the quality4#dbh ,likewise1 here there is first the movement of displacement1 then the composition or decomposition1 according as things approximate or separate4#dbi ,often also decomposition is accompanied or followed by a movement of displacement1 but the things which separate undergo a modification different from the movement of displacement2 similarly1 composition is a modification which follows the movement of displacement1 but which has a different nature4 ,,composition ,,and ,,decomposition ,,are ,,not ,,alterations4 ,shall we have to admit that composition and decomposition are movements which exist by themselves1 and analyze alteration into them8 ,condensation is explained as undergoing an alteration2 that means1 as becoming composite4 ,on the other hand1 rarefaction is also explained as undergoing an alteration1 namely1 that of decomposition2 when1 for instance1 one mingles water and wine1 each of these two things becomes other than it was1 and it is the composition which has operated the alteration4 ,we will answer that here composition and decomposition no doubt precede certain alterations1 but these alterations are something different than compositions and decompositions4 ,other alterations 7certainly7 are not compositions and decompositions1 for neither can condensation nor rarefaction be reduced to these movements1 nor are they composed of them4 ,otherwise1 it would be necessary to acknowledge the 7existence of7 emptiness4 ,besides1 how could you explain blackness and whiteness1 as being composed of composition and decomposition8 ,this doctrine would destroy all colors and qualities1 or at least1 the greater part of them2 for if all alteration1 that means1 all change of quality1 consisted in a composition or decomposition1 the result would not be the production of a quality1 but an aggregation or disaggregation4 ,how indeed could you explain the movements of teaching and studying by mere composition8 ,,movements ,,divided ,,in ,,natural1 ,,artificial1 ,,and ,,voluntary4 #bf4 ,let us now examine the different kinds of movements4 ,shall we classify movements of displacement in movements upwards and downwards1 rectilinear or curvilinear1 or in movements of animate and inanimate beings8 ,there is indeed a difference between the movement of inanimate beings1 and that of animate beings2 and these latter have different kinds of motion1 such as walking1 flying1 and swimming4 ,their movements could also be analyzed in two other ways1 according as it was conformable to1 or against their nature2 but this would not explain the outer differences of movements4 ,perhaps the movements themselves produce these differences1 and do not exist without them2 nevertheless1 it is nature that seems to be the principle of the movements1 and of their exterior differences4 ,it would further be possible to classify movements as natural1 artificial1 and voluntary2 of the natural1 there are alteration and destruction2 of the artificial1 there are the building of houses1 and construction of vessels2 of the voluntary1 there are meditation1 learning1 devoting oneself to political occupations1 and1 in general1 speaking and acting4 ,last1 we might1 in growth1 alteration and generation1 distinguish the natural movement1 and that contrary to nature2 or even establish a classification founded on the nature of the subjects in which these movements occur4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,stability ,,and ,,stillness4 #bg4 ,let us now study stability or stillness1 which is the contrary of movement4#dbe ,are we to consider it itself a genus1 or to reduce it to some one of the known genera8 ,first1 stability rather suits the intelligible world1 and stillness the sense-world4 ,let us now examine stillness4 ,if it be identical with stability1 it is useless to look for it here below where nothing is stable1 and where apparent stability is in reality only a slower movement4 ,if stillness be different from stability1 because the latter refers to what is completely immovable1 and stillness to what is actually fixed1 but is naturally movable even when it does not actually move1 the following distinction should be established4 ,if stillness here below be considered1 this rest is a movement which has not yet ceased1 but which is imminent2 if by stillness is understood the complete cessation of movement in the moved1 it will be necessary to examine whether there be anything here below that is absolutely without movement4 ,as it is impossible for one thing to possess simultaneously all the species of movement1 and as there are necessarily movements that are not realized in it--since it is usual to say that some particular movement is in something--when something undergoes no displacement1 and seems still in respect to this movement1 should one not say about it that in this respect it is not moving8 ,stillness is therefore the negation of movement4 ,now no negation constitutes a genus4 ,the thing we are considering is at rest only in respect to local movement2 stillness expresses therefore only the negation of this movement4 ,,movement ,,is ,,more ,,than ,,the ,,negation ,,of ,,rest4 ,it may perhaps be asked1 why is movement not rather the negation of rest8 ,we shall then answer that movement 7is something positive71 that it brings something with it2 that it has some efficiency1 that it communicates an impulsion to the subject1 that produces or destroys many things2 stillness1 on the contrary1 is nothing outside of the subject which is still1 and means no more than that the latter is still4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,stability ,,does ,,not ,,imply ,,stillness4 ,but why should we not regard the stability of intelligible things also as a negation of movement8 ,because stability is not the privation of movement2 it does not begin to exist when movement ceases1 and it does not hinder it from simultaneous existence with it4 ,in intelligible being1 stability does not imply the cessation of movement of that whose nature it is to move4#dcj ,on the contrary1 so far as intelligible being is contained in 7or1 expressed by7 stability1 it is stable2 so far as it moves1 it will ever move2 it is therefore stable by stability1 and movable by movement4 ,the body1 however1 is no doubt moved by movement1 but it rests only in the absence of movement1 when it is deprived of the movement that it ought to have4 ,besides1 what would stability be supposed to imply 7if it were supposed to exist in sense-objects78 ,when somebody passes from sickness to health1 he enters on convalescence4 ,what kind of stillness shall we oppose to convalescence8 ,shall we oppose to it that condition from which that man had just issued8 ,that state was sickness1 and not stability4 ,shall we oppose to it the state in which that man has just entered8 ,that state is health1 which is not identical with stability4 ,to say that sickness and health are each of them a sort of stability1 is to consider sickness and health as species of stability1 which is absurd4 ,further1 if it were said that stability is an accident of health1 it would result that before stability health would not be health4 ,as to such arguments1 let each reason according to his fancy6 ,,conclusion ,,of ,,the ,,study4 #bh4 ,we have demonstrated that acting and experiencing were movements2 that1 among the movements1 some are absolute1 while others constitute actions or passions4#dca ,we have also demonstrated that the other things that are called genera must be reduced to the genera we have set forth4#dcb ,we have also studied relation1 defining it as a habit1 a manner of being of one thing in respect of another1 which results from the co-operation of two things2 we have explained that1 when a habit of being constitutes a reference1 this thing is something relative1 not so much as it is being1 but as far as it is a part of this being1 as are the hand1 the head1 the cause1 the principle1 or the element4#dcc ,the relatives might be divided according to the scheme of the ancient 7philosophers71 by saying that some of them are efficient causes1 while others are measures1 that the former distinguish themselves by their resemblances and differences1 while the latter consist in excess or in lack4 ,such are our views about the 7categories1 or7 genera 7of existence74 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,seven4 ,of ,time and ,eternity4#dce ,a4 ,,eternity4 ,,introduction4 ,,eternity ,,exists ,,perpetually1 ,,while ,,time ,,becomes4 7#a47dcf ,when saying that eternity and time differ1 that eternity refers to perpetual existence1 and time to what becomes 7this visible world71 we are speaking off-hand1 spontaneously1 intuitionally1 and common language supports these forms of expression4 ,when however we try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail1 we become embarrassed2 the different opinions of ancient philosophers1 and often even the same opinions1 are interpreted differently4 ,we however shall limit ourselves to an examination of these opinions1 and we believe that we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining the teachings of the ancient philosophers1 without starting any minute disquisition of our own4 ,we do indeed insist that some of these ancient philosophers1 these blessed men#dcg have achieved the truth4 ,it remains only to decide which of them have done so1 and how we ourselves can grasp their thought4 ,,eternity ,,is ,,the ,,model ,,of ,,its ,,image1 ,,time4 ,first1 we have to examine that of which eternity consists1 according to those who consider it as different from time2 for1 by gaining a conception of the model 7eternity71 we shall more clearly understand its image called time4#dch ,if then1 before observing eternity1 we form a conception of time1 we may1 by reminiscence1 from here below1 rise to the contemplation of the model to which time1 as its image1 resembles4 ,,relation ,,between ,,the ,,aeon ,,and ,,intelligible ,,being4 #a4 7#b74 ,how shall we define the aeon 7or1 eternity78 ,shall we say that it is the intelligible being 7or1 nature7 itself1 just as we might say that time is the heaven and the universe1 as has been done1 it seems1 by certain 7,pythagorean7 philosophers8#dci ,indeed1 as we conceive and judge that the aeon 7eternity7 is something very venerable1 we assert the same of intelligible being1 and yet it is not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank2 as1 on the other hand1 the principle which is superior to them 7the ,one7 could not be thus described1 it would seem that we would have the right to identify intelligible being 7or1 nature71 and the aeon 7or1 eternity71 so much the more as the intelligible world and the aeon 7age1 or eternity71 comprise the same things4 ,nevertheless1 were we to place one of these principles within the other1 we would posit intelligible nature 7being7 within the aeon 7age1 or eternity74 ,likewise1 when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal1 as 7,plato7 does3#cdf the nature of the model is eternal1 we are thereby implying that the aeon 7age or eternity7 is something distinct from intelligible nature 7being71 though referring thereto1 as attribute or presence4 ,the mere fact that both the aeon 7eternity7 and intelligible nature 7being71 are both venerable does not imply their identity2 the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative from that of the other4 ,the argument that both comprise the same entities would still permit intelligible nature 7being7 to contain all the entities it contains as parts1 while the aeon 7or age1 or eternity7 might contain them as wholes1 without any distinctions as parts2 it contains them1 in this respect1 that they are called eternal on its account4 ,,faults ,,of ,,the ,,definition ,,that ,,eternity ,,is ,,at ,,rest1 ,,while ,,time ,,is ,,in ,,motion4 ,some define eternity as the rest#ddj of intelligible nature 7being71 just like time is defined as motion here below4 ,in this case we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with rest in general1 or only in such rest as would be characteristic of intelligible nature 7being74 ,if indeed eternity were to be identified with rest in general1 we would first have to observe that rest could not be said to be eternal1 any more than we can say that eternity is eternal1 for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity2 further1 under this hypothesis1 we should have to clear up how movement could ever be eternal2 for if it were eternal1 it would rest 7or1 it would stop74 ,besides1 how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea of perpetuity1 not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time1 but of that of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial 7or1 eternal78 ,besides1 if the rest characteristic of intelligible being in itself alone contain perpetuity1 this alone would exclude from eternity the other genera 7or categories7 of existence4 ,further yet1 eternity has to be conceived of as not only in rest1 but 7according to ,plato#dch7 also in unity1 which is something that excludes every interval--otherwise1 it would become confused with time2--now rest does not imply the idea of unity1 nor that of an interval4 ,again1 we assert that eternity resides in unity2 and therefore participates in rest without being identified therewith4 ,,eternity ,,as ,a ,,union ,,of ,,the ,,five ,,categories4 #b4 7#c74 ,what then is that thing by virtue of which the intelligible world is eternal and perpetual8 ,of what does perpetuity consist8 ,either perpetuity and eternity are identical1 or eternity is related to perpetuity4 ,evidently1 however1 eternity consists in an unity1 but in an unity formed by multiple elements1 in a conception of nature derived from intelligible entities1 or which is united to them1 or is perceived in them1 so that all these intelligible entities form an unity1 though this unity be at the same time manifold in nature and powers4 ,thus contemplating the manifold power of the intelligible world1 we call being its substrate2 movement its life2 rest its permanence2 difference the manifoldness of its principles2 and identity1 their unity4#dda ,synthesizing these principles1 they fuse into one single life1 suppressing their difference1 considering the inexhaustible duration1 the identity and immutability of their action1 of their life and thought1 for which there is neither change nor interval4 ,the contemplation of all these entities constitutes the contemplation of eternity2 and we see a life that is permanent in its identity1 which ever possesses all present things1 which does not contain them successively1 but simultaneously2 whose manner of existence is not different at various times1 but whose perfection is consummate and indivisible4 ,it therefore contains all things at the same time1 as in a single point1 without any of them draining off2 it resides in identity1 that is1 within itself1 undergoing no change4 ,ever being in the present1 because it never lost anything1 and will never acquire anything1 it is always what it is4 ,eternity is not intelligible existence2 it is the 7light7 that radiates from this existence1 whose identity completely excludes the future and admits nothing but present existence1 which remains what it is1 and does not change4 ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,intelligence ,,is ,,ever ,,contemporaneous4 ,what that it does not already possess could 7intelligible existence7 possess later8 ,what could it be in the future1 that it is not now8 ,there is nothing that could be added to or subtracted from its present state2 for it was not different from what it is now2 and it is not to possess anything that it does not necessarily possess now1 so that one could never say of it1 it was2 for what did it have that it does not now have8 ,nor could it be said of it1 it will be2 for what could it acquire8 ,it must therefore remain what it is4 7,as ,plato thought#dch71 that possesses eternity of which one cannot say either it was1 or will be1 but only1 it is2 that whose existence is immutable1 because the past did not make it lose anything1 and because the future will not make it acquire anything4 ,therefore1 on examining the existence of intelligible nature1 we see that its life is simultaneously entire1 complete1 and without any kind of an interval4 ,that is the eternity we seek4 ,,eternity ,,is ,,not ,,an ,,accident ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible1 ,,but ,,an ,,intimate ,,part ,,of ,,its ,,nature4 #c4 7#d74 ,eternity is not an extrinsic accident of 7intelligible7 nature1 but is in it1 of it1 and with it4 ,we see that it is intimately inherent in 7intelligible nature7 because we see that all other things1 of which we say that they exist on high1 are of and with this 7intelligible7 nature2 for the things that occupy the first rank in existence must be united with the first ,beings1 and subsist there4 ,thus the beautiful is in them1 and comes from them2 thus also does truth dwell in them4 ,there the whole in a certain way exists within the part2 the parts also are in the whole2 because this whole1 really being the whole1 is not composed of parts1 but begets the parts themselves1 a condition necessary to its being a whole4 ,in this whole1 besides1 truth does not consist in the agreement of one notion with another1 but is the very nature of each of the things of which it is the truth4 ,in order1 really to be a whole1 this real whole must be all not only in the sense that it is all things1 but also in the sense that it lacks nothing4 ,in this case1 nothing will1 for it1 be in the future2 for to say that1 for it1 something will be for it implies that it lacked something before that1 that it was not yet all2 besides1 nothing can happen to it against nature1 because it is impassible4 ,as nothing could happen to it1 for it nothing is to be1 will be1 or has been4 ,,to ,,begotten ,,things ,,the ,,future ,,is ,,necessary2 ,,but ,,not ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,as the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring 7something or another71 they will be annihilated by a removal of their future4 ,an attribution of the future to the 7intelligible7 entities of a nature contrary 7to begotten things71 would degrade them from the rank of existences4 ,evidently they will not be consubstantial with existence1 if this existence of theirs be in the future or past4 ,the nature 7being7 of begotten things on the contrary consists in going from the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time beyond which they will no longer exist2 that is in what their future consists4#ddb ,abstraction of their future diminishes their life1 and consequently their existence4 ,that is also what will happen to the universe1 in so far as it will exist2 it aspires to being what it should be1 without any interruption1 because it derives existence from the continual production of fresh actualizations2 for the same reason1 it moves in a circle because it desires to possess intelligible nature 7being74 ,such is the existence that we discover in begotten things1 such is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence in the future4 ,the ,beings that occupy the first rank and which are blessed1 have no desire of the future1 because they are already all that it lies in them to be1 and because they possess all the life they are ever to possess4 ,they have therefore nothing to seek1 since there is no future for them2 neither can they receive within themselves anything for which there might be a future4 ,thus the nature 7being7 of intelligible existence is absolute1 and entire1 not only in its parts1 but also in its totality1 which reveals no fault1 which lacks nothing1 and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity could be added2 for intelligible existence must not only embrace in its totality and universality all beings1 but it must also receive nothing that pertains to nonentity4 ,it is this disposition and nature of intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon 7or eternity72 for 7according to ,aristotle7#ddc this word is derived from aei on1 being continually4 ,,difference ,,between ,,eternity ,,and ,,perpetuity4 #d4 7#e74 ,that this is the state of affairs appears when1 on applying one's intelligence to the contemplation of some of the intelligible ,entities1 it becomes possible to assert1 or rather1 to see that it is absolutely incapable of ever having undergone any change2 otherwise1 it would not always exist2 or rather1 it would not always exist entirely4 ,is it thus perpetual8 ,doubtless2 its nature is such that one may recognize that it is always such as it is1 and that it could never be different in the future2 so that1 should one later on again contemplate it1 it will be found similar to itself 7unchanged74 ,therefore1 if we should never cease from contemplation1 if we should ever remain united thereto while admiring its nature1 and if in that actualization we should show ourselves indefatigable1 we would succeed in raising ourselves to eternity2 but1 to be as eternal as existence1 we must not allow ourselves to be in anyway distracted from contemplating eternity1 and eternal nature in the eternal itself4 ,if that which exists thus be eternal1 and exists ever1 evidently that which never lowers itself to an inferior nature2 which possesses life in its fulness1 without ever having received1 receiving1 or being about to receive anything2 this nature would be aidion1 or perpetual4 ,perpetuity is the property constitutive of such a substrate2 being of it1 and in it4#ddc ,eternity is the substrate in which this property manifests4 ,consequently reason dictates that eternity is something venerable1 identical with the divinity4#ddd ,we might even assert that the age 7aion1 or eternity7 is a divinity that manifests within itself1 and outside of itself in its immutable and identical existence1 in the permanence of its life4 ,besides1 there is nothing to surprise any one if in spite of that we assert a manifoldness in the divinity4 ,every intelligible entity is manifoldness because infinite in power1 infinite in the sense that it lacks nothing2 it exercises this privilege peculiarly because it is not subject to losing anything4 ,,eternity ,,is ,,infinite ,,universal ,,life ,,that ,,cannot ,,lose ,,anything4 ,eternity1 therefore1 may be defined as the life that is at present infinite because it is universal and loses nothing1 as it has no past nor future2 otherwise it would no longer be whole4 ,to say that it is universal and loses nothing explains the expression3 the life that is at present infinite4 ,,eternity ,,is ,,sempiternal ,,existence4 #e4 7#f74 ,as this nature that is eternal and radiant with beauty refers to the ,one1 issues from ,him1 and returns to ,him1 as it never swerves from ,him1 ever dwelling around ,him and in ,him1 and lives according to ,him1 ,plato was quite right#dch in saying not casually1 but with great profundity of thought1 that eternity is immutable in unity4 ,thereby ,plato not only reduces the eternity to the unity that it is in itself1 but also relates the life of existence to the ,one itself4 ,this life is what we seek2 its permanence is eternity4 ,indeed that which remains in that manner1 and which remains the same thing1 that is1 the actualization of that life which remains turned towards1 and united with the ,one1 that whose existence and life are not deceptive1 that truly is eternity4 7,for intelligible or7 true existence is to have no time when it does not exist1 no time when it exists in a different manner2 it is therefore to exist in an immutable manner without any diversity1 without being first in one1 and then in another state4 ,to conceive of 7existence71 therefore1 we must neither imagine intervals in its existence1 nor suppose that it develops or acquires1 nor believe that it contains any succession2 consequently we could neither distinguish within it1 or assert within it either before or after4 ,if it contain neither before nor after1 if the truest thing that can be affirmed of it be that it is1 if it exist as being and life1 here again is eternity revealed4 ,when we say that existence exists always1 and that there is not one time in which it is1 and another in which it is not1 we speak thus only for the sake of greater clearness2 for when we use the word always1 we do not take it in an absolute sense2 but if we use it to show that existence is incorruptible1 it might well mislead the mind in leading it to issue out from the unity 7characteristic of eternity7 to make it run through the manifold 7which is foreign to eternity74 ,always further indicates that existence is never defective4 ,it might perhaps be better to say simply existence4 ,but though the word existence suffices to designate being1 as several philosophers have confused being with generation1 it was necessary to clear up the meaning of existence by adding the term always4 ,indeed1 though we are referring only to one and the same thing by existence and existing always1 just as when we say philosopher1 and the true philosopher1 nevertheless1 as there are false philosophers1 it has been necessary to add to the term philosophers the adjective true4 ,likewise1 it has been necessary to add the term always to that of existing1 and that of existing to that of always2 that is the derivation of the expression existing always1 and consequently 7by contraction71 aion1 or1 eternity4 ,therefore the idea always must be united to that of existing1 so as to designate the real being4 ,,the ,,creator1 ,,being ,,outside ,,of ,,time1 ,,precedes ,,the ,,universal ,,only ,,as ,,its ,,cause4 ,always must therefore be applied to the power which contains no interval in its existence1 which has need of nothing outside of what it possesses1 because it possesses everything1 because it is every being1 and thus lacks nothing4 ,such a nature could not be complete in one respect1 but incomplete in another4 ,even if what is in time should appear complete1 as a body that suffices the soul appears complete1 though it be complete only for the soul2 that which is in time needs the future1 and consequently is incomplete in respect to the time it stands in need of2 when it succeeds in enjoying the time to which it aspires1 and succeeds in becoming united thereto1 even though it still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal similarity4 ,but the existence whose characteristic it is not to need the future1 not to be related to any other time--whether capable of being measured1 or indefinite1 and still to be indefinite--the existence that already possesses all it should possess is the very existence that our intelligence seeks out2 it does not derive its existence from any particular quality1 but exists before any quantity4 ,as it is not any kind of quantity1 it could not admit within itself any kind of quantity4 ,otherwise1 as its life would be divided1 it would itself cease to be absolutely indivisible2 but existence must be as indivisible in its life as in its nature 7being74 7,plato's expression1#ddf7 the ,creator was good does indeed refer to the notion of the universe1 and indicates that1 in the ,principle superior to the universe1 nothing began to exist at any particular time4 ,never1 therefore1 did the universe begin to exist within time1 because though its ,author existed before it1 it was only in the sense that its author was the cause of its existence4 ,but1 after having used the word was1 to express this thought1 ,plato immediately corrects himself1 and he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the ,things that possess eternity4 ,,to ,,study ,,time ,,we ,,have ,,to ,,descend ,,from ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 #f4 7#g74 ,speaking thus of eternity1 it is not anything foreign to us1 and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves4 ,for indeed1 how could we understand anything that we could not perceive8 ,how could we perceive something that would be foreign to us8 ,we ourselves1 therefore1 must participate in eternity4 ,but how can we do so1 since we are in time8 ,to understand how one can simultaneously be in time and in eternity1 it will be necessary to study time4 ,we must therefore descend from eternity to study time4 ,to find eternity1 we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world2 now we are obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time2 not indeed descending therefrom entirely1 but only so far as time itself descended therefrom4 ,b4 ,,time4 ,,the ,,opinions ,,of ,,the ,,philosophers ,,about ,,time ,,must ,,be ,,studied4 ,if those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their views about time1 we would only need to add to the idea of eternity what we have to say of the idea of time1 and to set forth our opinion on the subject1 trying to make it correspond with the already expressed notion of eternity4 ,but we now must examine the most reasonable opinions that have been advanced about time1 and observe how far our own opinion may conform thereto4 ,,time ,,considered ,,either ,,as ,,motion2 ,,as ,,something ,,movable2 ,,or ,,something ,,of ,,motion4 ,to begin with1 we may divide the generally accepted opinions about time into three classes3 time as movement1 as something movable1 or as some part of movement4 ,it would be too contrary to the notion of time to try to define it as rest1 as being at rest1 or as some part of rest2 for time is incompatible with identity 7and consequently with rest1 and with what is at rest74 ,those who consider time as movement1 claim that it is either any kind of movement1 or the movement of the universe4 ,those who consider it as something movable are thinking of the sphere of the universe2 while those who consider time as some part of movement consider it either as the interval of movement1 or as its measure1 or as some consequence of movement in general1 or regular movement4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,stoics2 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,movement4 #g4 7#h74 ,time cannot 7as the ,stoics claim1#ddg7 be movement4 ,neither can we gather together all movements1 so as to form but a single one1 nor can we consider the regular movement only2 for these two kinds of motion are within time4 ,if we were to suppose that there was a movement that did not operate within time1 such a movement would still be far removed from being time1 since1 under this hypothesis1 the movement itself is entirely different from that in which the movement occurs4 ,amidst the many reasons which1 in past and present1 have been advanced to refute this opinion1 a single one suffices3 namely1 that movement can cease and stop1 while time never suspends its flight4 ,to the objection that the movement of the universe never stops1 we may answer that this movement1 if it consist in the circular movement 7of the stars1 according to ,hestius of ,perinthus2 or of the sun1 according to ,eratosthenes#ddg7 operates within a definite time1 at the end of which it returns to the same point of the heavens1 but it does not accomplish this within the same space of time taken up in fulfilling the half of its course4 ,one of these movements is only half of the other1 and the second is double4 ,besides1 both1 the one that runs through half of space1 and the one that runs through the whole of it1 are movements of the universe4 ,besides1 it has been noticed that the movement of the exterior sphere is the swiftest4 ,this distinction supports our view1 for it implies that the movement of this sphere1 and the time used to operate it1 are different entities2 the most rapid movement is the one that takes up the least time1 and runs through the greatest amount of space2 the slowest movements are those that employ the longest time1 and run through only a part of that space4#ddh ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,pythagoreans3 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,what ,,is ,,movable4 ,on the other hand1 if time be not the movement of the sphere1 evidently it is far less 7than that which is movable1 as thought the ,pythagoreans1#ddi7 or 7as ,pythagoras thought71 the sphere 7of heaven7 itself1 as some have thought1 because it moves4 7,this fact alone is sufficient to refute the opinion that confuses time with that which is movable74 ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,stoic ,,zeno3 ,,time ,,is ,,no ,,interval ,,of ,,movement4 ,is time then some part of movement8 7,zeno#dej7 calls it the interval of movement2 but the interval is not the same for all movements1 even if the latter were of similar nature2 for movements that operate within space may be swifter or slower4 ,it is possible that the intervals of the most rapid and of the slowest movement might be measured by some third interval1 which might far more reasonably be considered time4 ,but which of these three intervals shall be called time8 ,rather1 which of all the intervals1 infinite in number as they are1 shall time be8 ,if time be considered the interval of the regular movement1 it will not be the particular interval of every regular movement2 otherwise1 as there are several regular movements1 there would be several kinds of time4 ,if time be defined as the interval of movement of the universe1 that is1 the interval contained within this movement1 it will be nothing else than this movement itself4 ,,persistent ,,movement ,,and ,,its ,,interval ,,are ,,not ,,time1 ,,but ,,are ,,within ,,it4 ,besides1 this movement is a definite quantity4 ,either this quantity will be measured by the extension of the space traversed1 and the interval will consist in that extension2 but that extension is space1 and not time4 ,or we shall say that movement has a certain interval because it is continuous1 and that instead of stopping immediately it always becomes prolonged2 but this continuity is nothing else than the magnitude 7that is1 the duration7 of the movement4 ,even though after consideration of a movement it be estimated as great1 as might be said of a great heat--this does not yet furnish anything in which time might appear and manifest2 we have here only a sequence of movements which succeed one another like waves1 and only the observed interval between them2 now the sequence of movements forms a number1 such as two or three2 and the interval is an extension4 ,thus the magnitude of the movement will be a number1 say1 such as ten2 or an interval that manifests in the extension traversed by the movement4 ,now the notion of time is not revealed herein1 but we find only a quantity that is produced within time4 ,otherwise1 time1 instead of being everywhere1 will exist only in the movement as an attribute in a substrate1 which amounts to saying that time is movement2 for the interval 7of the movement7 is not outside of movement1 and is only a non-instantaneous movement4 ,if then time be a non-instantaneous movement1 just as we often say that some particular instantaneous fact occurs within time1 we shall be forced to ask the difference between what is and what is not instantaneous4 ,do these things differ in relation to time8 ,then the persisting movement and its interval are not time1 but within time4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,strato3 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,motion ,,and ,,rest4 ,somebody might object that time is indeed the interval of movement1 but that it is not the characteristic interval of movement itself1 being only the interval in which movement exerts its extension1 following along with it4 ,all these terms lack definition4 ,this 7extension7 is nothing else than the time within which the movement occurs4 ,but that is precisely the question at issue1 from the very start4 ,it is as if a person who had been asked to define time should answer time is the interval of the movement produced within time4 ,what then is this interval called time1 when considered outside of the interval characteristic of movement8 ,if the interval characteristic of time be made to consist in movement1 where shall the duration of rest be posited8 ,indeed1 for one object to be in motion implies that another 7corresponding object7 is at rest2 now the time of these objects is the same1 though for one it be the time of movement1 and for the other the time of rest 7as thought ,strato#dea74 ,what then is the nature of this interval8 ,it cannot be an interval of space1 since space is exterior 7to the movements that occur within it74 ,,polemic ,,against ,,aristotle3 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,number ,,and ,,measure ,,of ,,movement4 #h4 7#i74 ,let us now examine in what sense it may be said 7by ,aristotle#deb7 that time is the number and measure of movement1 which definition seems more reasonable1 because of the continuity of movement4 ,to begin with1 following the method adopted with the definition of time as the interval of movement1 we might ask whether time be the measure and number of any kind of movement4#dec ,for how indeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular movement4 ,what system of numbering or measurement shall we use for this8 ,if the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement1 in their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten applied equally to horses and oxen2 and further1 such measure might also be applied to dry and wet substances4 ,if time be a measure of this kind1 we clearly see that it is the measure of movements1 but we do not discover what it may be in itself4 ,if the number ten can be conceived as a number1 after making abstraction of the horses it served to measure1 if therefore a measure possess its own individuality1 even while no longer measuring anything1 the case must be similar with time1 inasmuch as it is a measure4 ,if then time be a number in itself1 in what does it differ from the number ten1 or from any other number composed of unities8 ,as it is a continuous measure1 and as it is a quantity1 it might1 for instance1 turn out to be something like a foot-rule4 ,it would then be a magnitude1 as1 for instance1 a line1 which follows the movement2 but how will this line be able to measure what it follows8 ,why would it measure one thing rather than another8 ,it seems more reasonable to consider this measure1 not as the measure of every kind of movement1 but only as the measure of the movement it follows4#deb ,then that measure is continuous1 so far as the movement it follows itself continue to exist4 ,in this case1 we should not consider measure as something exterior1 and separated from movement1 but as united to the measured movement4 ,what then will measure8 ,is it the movement that will be measured1 and the extension that will measure it8 ,which of these two things will time be8 ,will it be the measuring movement1 or the measuring extension8 ,time will be either the movement measured by extension1 or the measuring extension2 or some third thing which makes use of extension1 as one makes use of a foot-rule1 to measure the quantity of movement4 ,but in all these cases1 we must1 as has already been noticed1 suppose that movement is uniform2 for unless the movement be uniform1 one and universal1 the theory that movement is a measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible4 ,if time be measured movement1 that is1 measured by quantity--besides granting that it at all needs to be measured--movement must not be measured by itself1 but by something different4 ,on the other hand1 if movement have a measure different from itself1 and if1 consequently1 we need a continuous measure to measure it1 the result would be that extension itself would need measure1 so that movement1 being measured1 may have a quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which it is measured4 ,consequently1 under this hypothesis1 time would be the number of the extension which follows movement1 and not extension itself which follows movement4 ,,nor ,,can ,,time ,,be ,a ,,numbered ,,number 7,,as ,,aristotle ,,claimed#deb74 ,what is this number8 ,is it composed of unities8 ,how does it measure8 ,that would still have to be explained4 ,now let us suppose that we had discovered how it measures2 we would still not have discovered the time that measures1 but a time that was such or such an amount4 ,now that is not the same thing as time2 there is a difference between time and some particular quantity of time4 ,before asserting that time has such or such a quantity1 we have to discover the nature of that which has that quantity4 ,we may grant that time is the number which measures movement1 while remaining exterior thereto1 as ten is in ten horses without being conceived with them 7as ,aristotle claimed1 that it was not a numbering1 but a numbered number74 ,but in this case1 we still have to discover the nature of this number that1 before numbering1 is what it is1 as would be ten considered in itself4#ded ,it may be said that it is that number which1 by following number1 measures according to the priority and posteriority of that movement4#deb ,nor do we yet perceive the nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority4 ,in any case1 whatever measures by priority or posteriority1 or by a present moment1#dee or by anything else1 certainly does measure according to time4 ,thus this number 787 which measures movement according to priority or posteriority1 must touch time1 and1 to measure movement1 be related thereto4 ,prior and posterior necessarily designate either different parts of space1 as for instance the beginning of a stadium1 or parts of time4 ,what is called priority is time that ends with the present2 what is called posteriority1 is the time that begins at the present4 ,time therefore is something different from the number that measures movement according to priority or posteriority1--,i do not say1 any kind of movement1 but still regular movement4 ,besides1 why should we have time by applying number either to what measures1 or to what is measured8 ,for in this case these two may be identical4 ,if movement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate thereto1 why will we not have time without number8 ,this would amount to saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the existence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity4 ,since 7,aristotle#def7 says that time is infinite1 and that it is such effectually1 how can it contain number without our taking a portion of time to measure it8 ,from that would result that time existed before it was measured4 ,but why could time not exist before the existence of a soul to measure it8 7,aristotle7 might have answered that it was begotten by the soul4 ,the mere fact that the soul measures time need not necessarily imply that the soul produced the time2 time1 along with its suitable quantity1 would exist even if nobody measured it4 ,if however it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to measure time1 we will answer that this is of no importance to determine the notion of time4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,epicurus3 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,an ,,accident ,,or ,,consequence ,,of ,,movement4 #i4 7#aj74 ,when 7,epicurus#deg7 says that time is a consequence of movement1 he is not explaining the nature of time2 this would demand a preliminary definition of the consequence of movement4 ,besides1 this alleged consequence of movement--granting the possibility of such a consequence--must be prior1 simultaneous1 or posterior4 ,for1 in whatever way we conceive of it1 it is within time4 ,consequently1 if the consequence of movement be time1 the result would be that time is a consequence of movement in time 7which is nonsense74 ,,plotinos ,,can ,,go ,,no ,,further ,,in ,,refuting ,,endless ,,definitions ,,of ,,time4 ,now1 as our purpose is to discover1 not what time is not1 but what it really is1 we notice that this question has been treated at great length by many thinkers before us2 and if we were to undertake to consider all existing opinions on the subject1 we would be obliged to write a veritable history of the subject4 ,we have here1 however1 gone to the limit of our ability in treating it without specializing in it4 ,as has been seen1 it is easy enough to refute the opinion that time is the measure of the movement of the universe1 and to raise against this opinion the objections that we have raised against the definition of time as the measure of movement in general1 opposing thereto the irregularity of movement1 and the other points from which suitable arguments may be drawn4 ,we are therefore free to devote ourselves to an explanation of what time really is4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,time ,,will ,,be ,,revealed ,,by ,,its ,,origin4 #aj4 7#aa74 ,to accomplish this we shall have to return to the nature which1 as we pointed out above1 was essential to eternity2 that immutable life1 wholly realized all at once1 infinite and perfect1 subsisting in1 and referring to unity4 ,time was not yet1 or at least1 it did not yet exist for the intelligible entities4 ,only1 it was yet to be born of them1#deh because 7as was the world71 time1 by both its reason and nature1 was posterior to the 7intelligible entities#dei74 ,are we trying to understand how time issued from among intelligible entities while these were resting within themselves8 ,here it would be useless to call upon the ,muses1 for they did not yet exist4 ,still this might perhaps not be useless2 for 7in a certain sense1 that time had already begun1 then1 so far as they existed within the sense-world7 they existed already4 ,in any case1 the birth of time will be plain enough if we consider it only as it is born and manifested4 ,thus much can be said about it4 ,,time ,,arose ,,as ,,measurement ,,of ,,the ,,activity ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 ,before priority and posteriority1 time1 which did not yet exist1 brooded within existence itself4 ,but an active nature 7the universal ,soul71 which desired to be mistress of herself1 to possess herself1 and ceaselessly to add to the present1 entered into motion1 as did time1 along with 7the ,soul74 ,we achieve a representation of the time that is the image of eternity1 by the length that we must go through with to reach what follows1 and is posterior1 towards one moment1 and then towards another4#dfj ,,like ,,time1 ,,space ,,is ,,the ,,result ,,of ,,the ,,procession ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 ,as the universal ,soul contained an activity that agitated her1 and impelled her to transport into another world what she still saw on high1 she was willing to retain all things that were present at the same time4 7,time arose not by a single fiat1 but as the result of a process4 ,this occurred within the universal ,soul1 but may well be first illustrated by the more familiar process within7 ,reason1 which distributes unity1 not indeed ,that which remains within itself1 but that which is exterior to itself4 ,though this process seem to be a strengthening one1 reason developing out of the seed in which it brooded unto manifoldness1 it is really a weakening 7or destructive one71 inasmuch as it weakened manifoldness by division1 and weakened reason by causing it to extend4 ,the case was similar with the universal ,soul4 ,when she produced the sense-world1 the latter was animated by a movement which was only an image of intelligible movement4 7,while trying to strengthen7 this image-movement to the extent of the intelligible movement1 she herself 7weakened71 instead of remaining exclusively eternal1 became temporal and 7involuntarily7 subjected what she had produced to the conditions of time1 transferring entirely into time not only the universe1 but also all its revolutions4 ,indeed1 as the world moves within the universal ,soul1 which is its location1 it also moves within the time that this ,soul bears within herself4#dfa ,manifesting her power in a varied and successive manner1 by her mode of action1 the universal ,soul begat succession4 ,indeed1 she passes from one conception to another1 and consequently to what did not exist before1 since this conception was not effective1 and since the present life of the soul does not resemble her former life4 ,her life is varied1 and from the variety of her life results the variety of time4#dfb ,,time ,,is ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,considered ,,in ,,the ,,movement ,,by ,,which ,,she ,,passes ,,from ,,one ,,actualization ,,to ,,another4 ,thus1 the extension of the life of the soul produces time1 and the perpetual progression of her life produces the perpetuity of time1 and her former life constitutes the past4 ,we may therefore properly define time as the life of the soul considered in the movement by which she passes from one actualization to another4 ,,what ,,eternity ,,is ,,to ,,intelligence1 ,,time ,,is ,,to ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 ,we have already decided that eternity is life characterized by rest1 identity1 immutability and infinity 7in intelligence74 ,it is1 further1 7admitted that7 this our world is the image of the superior ,world 7of intelligence74 ,we have also come to the conclusion that time is the image of eternity4 ,consequently1 corresponding to the ,life characteristic of ,intelligence1 this world must contain another life which bears the same name1 and which belongs to that power of the universal ,soul4 ,instead of the movement of ,intelligence1 we will have the movement characteristic of a part of the soul 7as the universal ,soul ceaselessly passes from one thought to another74 ,corresponding to the permanence1 identity1 and immutability 7of ,intelligence71 we will have the mobility of a principle which ceaselessly passes from one actualization to another4 ,corresponding to the unity and the absence of all extension1 we will have a mere image of unity1 an image which exists only by virtue of continuity4 ,corresponding to an infinity already entirely present1 we will have a progression towards infinity which perpetually tends towards what follows4 ,corresponding to what exists entirely at the same time1 we will have what exists by parts1 and what will never exist entire at the same time4 ,the soul's existence will have to be ceaseless acquiring of existence2 if it is to reveal an image of the complete1 universal and infinite existence of the soul2 that is the reason its existence is able to represent the intelligible existence4 ,,time ,,is ,,as ,,interior ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,as ,,eternity ,,is ,,to ,,existence4 ,time1 therefore1 is not something external to the soul1 any more than eternity is exterior to existence4 ,it is neither a consequence nor a result of it1 any more than eternity is a consequence of existence4 ,it appears within the soul1 is in her and with her1 as eternity is in and with existence4 ,,time ,,is ,,the ,,length ,,of ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 #aa4 7#ab74 ,the result of the preceding considerations is that time must be conceived of as the length of the life characteristic of the universal ,soul2 that her course is composed of changes that are equal1 uniform1 and insensible1 so that that course implies a continuity of action4 ,now let us for a moment suppose that the power of the ,soul should cease to act1 and to enjoy the life she at present possesses without interruption or limit1 because this life is the activity characteristic of an eternal ,soul1 an action by which the ,soul does not return upon herself1 and does not concentrate on herself1 though enabling her to beget and produce4 ,now supposing that the ,soul should cease to act1 that she should apply her superior part to the intelligible world1 and to eternity1 and that she should there remain calmly united--what then would remain1 unless eternity8 ,for what room for succession would that allow1 if all things were immovable in unity8 ,how could she contain priority1 posteriority1 or more or less duration of time8 ,how could the ,soul apply herself to some object other than that which occupies her8 ,further1 one could not then even say that she applied herself to the subject that occupied her2 she would have to be separated therefrom in order to apply herself thereto4 ,neither would the universal ,sphere exist1 since it does not exist before time1 because it exists and moves within time4 ,besides1 even if this ,sphere were at rest during the activity of the ,soul1 we could measure the duration of her rest because this rest is posterior to the rest of eternity4 ,since time is annihilated so soon as the ,soul ceases to act1 and concentrates in unity1 time must be produced by the beginning of the ,soul's motion towards sense-objects1 by the ,soul's life4 ,consequently 7,plato#dfc7 says that time is born with the universe1 because the ,soul produced time with the universe2 for it is this very action of the ,soul which has produced this universe4 ,this action constitutes time1 and the universe is within time4 ,plato does indeed call the movements of the stars1 time2 but evidently only figuratively1 as 7,plato7 subsequently says that the stars were created to indicate the divisions of time1 and to permit us to measure it easily4 ,,time ,,is ,,not ,,begotten ,,by ,,movement1 ,,but ,,only ,,indicated ,,thereby4 ,indeed1 as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the ,soul1 and to measure within themselves the parts of an invisible and uncognizable duration1 especially for men who did not know how to count1 the 7world7 ,soul created day and night so that their succession might be the basis of counting as far as two1 by the aid of this variety4 ,plato#dfd indicates that as the source of the notion of number4 ,later1 observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn to another1 we were able to discover an interval of time determined by an uniform movement1 so far as we direct our gaze thereupon1 and as we use it as a measure by which to measure time4 ,the expression to measure time is premeditated1 because time1 considered in itself1 is not a measure4 ,how indeed could time measure1 and what would time1 while measuring1 say8 ,would time say of anything1 ,here is an extension as large as myself8 ,what indeed could be the nature of the entity that would speak of myself8 ,would it be that according to which quantity is measured8 ,in this case1 time would have to be something by itself1 to measure without itself being a measure4 ,the movement of the universe is measured according to time1 but it is not the nature of time to be the measure of movement2 it is such only accidentally2 it indicates the quantity of movement1 because it is prior to it1 and differs from it4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of a movement produced within a determinate time1 and if a number be added thereto frequently enough1 we succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed4 ,it is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution operated by the universal ,sphere measures time so far as possible1 by its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time1 since it can neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise4 ,thus what is measured1 that is1 what is indicated by the revolution of the universal ,sphere1 is time4 ,it is not begotten1 but only indicated by movement4 ,,movement ,,is ,,said ,,to ,,be ,,measured ,,by ,,space1 ,,because ,,of ,,its ,,indetermination4 ,the measure of movement1 therefore1 seems to be what is measured by a definite movement1 but which is other than this movement4 ,there is a difference1 indeed1 between that which is measured1 and that which measures2 but that which is measured is measured only by accident4 ,that would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is an extension1 without defining what extension in itself is4 ,in the same way1 because of the inability to define movement more clearly because of its indeterminate nature1 we say that movement is that which is measured by space2 for1 by observation of the space traversed by movement1 we can judge of the quantity of the movement4 ,,time ,,is ,,measured ,,by ,,movement1 ,,and ,,in ,,that ,,sense ,,it ,,is ,,the ,,measure ,,of ,,movement4 #ab4 7#ac74 ,the revolution of the universal ,sphere leads us therefore to the recognition of time1 within which it occurs4 ,not only is time that in which 7all things become1 that is1 grow71 but time has to be what it is even before all things1 being that within which everything moves1 or rests with order and uniformity4 ,this is discovered and manifested to our intelligence1 but not produced by regular movement and rest1 especially by movement4 ,better than rest1 indeed1 does movement lead us to a conception of time1 and it is either to appreciate the duration of movement than that of rest4 ,that is what led philosophers to define time as the measure of movement1 instead of saying1 what probably lay within their intention1 that time is measured by movement4 ,above all1 we must not consider that definition as adequate1 adding to it that which the measured entity is in itself1 not limiting ourselves to express what applies to it only incidentally4 ,neither did we ever discern that such was their meaning1 and we were unable to understand their teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured entity4 ,no doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was that they were addressing their teachings to learned 7thinkers71 or well prepared listeners1 and therefore1 in their writings1 they failed to explain the nature of time considered in itself1 whether it be measure or something measured4 ,,plato ,,does ,,make ,,some ,,statements ,,that ,,allow ,,of ,,being ,,justified4 ,plato himself1 indeed1 does say1 not that the nature of time is to be a measure or something measured1 but that to make it known there is1 in the circular movement of the universe1 a very short element 7the interval of a day71 whose object is to demonstrate the smallest portion of time1 through which we are enabled to discover the nature and quantity of time4 ,in order to indicate to us its nature 7being71 7,plato#dch7 says that it was born with the heavens1 and that it is the mobile image of eternity4 ,time is mobile because it has no more permanence than the life of the universal ,soul1 because it passes on and flows away therewith2 it is born with the heavens1 because it is one and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and time4 ,if1 granting its possibility1 the life of the ,soul were reduced to the unity 7of the ,intelligence71 there would be an immediate cessation of time1 which exists only in this life1 and the heavens1 which exist only through this life4 ,,time ,,as ,,the ,,prior ,,and ,,posterior ,,of ,,the ,,movement ,,of ,,this ,,life ,,would ,,be ,,absurd4 ,the theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this 7earthly7 movement1 and of this inferior life1 is ridiculous in that it would imply on one hand that 7the priority and posteriority of this sense-life7 are something2 and on the other1 refusing to recognize as something real a truer movement1 which includes both priority and posteriority4 ,it would1 indeed1 amount to attributing to an inanimate movement the privilege of containing within itself priority with posteriority1 that is1 time2 while refusing it to the movement 7of the ,soul71 whose movement of the universal ,sphere is no more than an image4 ,still it is from the movement 7of the ,soul7 that originally emanated priority and posteriority1 because this movement is efficient by itself4 ,by producing all its actualizations it begets succession1 and1 at the same time that it begets succession1 it produces the passing from one actualization to another4 ,,the ,,primary ,,movement ,,of ,,intelligence ,,the ,,informing ,,power ,,of ,,time4 7,some objector might ask7 why we reduce the movement of the universe to the movement of the containing ,soul1 and admit that she is within time1 while we exclude from time the 7universal7 ,soul's movement1 which subsists within her1 and perpetually passes from one actualization to another8 ,the reason is that above the activity of the ,soul there exists nothing but eternity1 which shares neither her movement nor her extension4 ,thus the primary movement 7of ,intelligence7 finds its goal in time1 begets it1 and by its activity informs its duration4 ,,why ,,time ,,is ,,present ,,everywhere2 ,,polemic ,,against ,,antiphanes ,,and ,,critolaus4 ,how then is time present everywhere8 ,the life of the ,soul is present in all parts of the world1 as the life of our soul is present in all parts of our body4 ,it may indeed be objected1#dfe that time constitutes neither a hypostatic substance1 nor a real existence1 being1 in respect to existence1 a deception1 just as we usually say that the expressions ,he was and ,he will be are a deception in respect to the divinity2 for then ,he will be and was just as is that1 in which1 according to his assertion1 he is going to be4 ,to answer these objections1 we shall have to follow a different method4 ,here it suffices to recall what was said above1 namely1 that by seeing how far a man in motion has advanced1 we can ascertain the quantity of the movement2 and that1 when we discern movement by walking1 we simultaneously concede that1 before the walking1 movement in that man was indicated by a definite quantity1 since it caused his body to progress by some particular quantity4 ,as the body was moved during a definite quantity of time1 its quantity can be expressed by some particular quantity of movement--for this is the movement that causes it--and to its suitable quantity of time4 ,then this movement will be applied to the movement of the soul1 which1 by her uniform action1 produces the interval of time4 ,,the ,,movement ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,attributed ,,to ,,the ,,primary ,,movement4 ,to what shall the movement of the 7universal7 ,soul be attributed8 ,to whatever we may choose to attribute it4 ,this will always be some indivisible principle1 such as primary ,motion1 which within its duration contains all the others1 and is contained by none other2#dff for it cannot be contained by anything2 it is therefore genuinely primary4 ,the same obtains with the universal ,soul4 ,,approval ,,of ,,aristotle3 ,,time ,,is ,,also ,,within ,,us4 ,is time also within us8#dfg ,it is uniformly present in the universal ,soul1 and in the individual souls that are all united together4#dfh ,time1 therefore1 is not parcelled out among the souls1 any more than eternity is parcelled out among the 7,entities in the intelligible world7 which1 in this respect1 are all mutually uniform4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,arist4 ,physics1 iii4 #g4 #b ,or1 the finished1 the boundary1 the ,gnostic ,horos4 #c ,plato1 ,philebus1 #bd2 ,cary1 #cg4 #d ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #eb2 ,cary1 #bf4 #e ,see vi4 #c4ac4 #f ,see ,plato1 ,philebus1 ,cary1 #dj2 see ii4 #d4aa4 #g ,see vi4 #c4bg4 #h ,see ii4 #d4aj4 #i ,timaeus1 #ci2 ,cary1 #ad2 see iii4 #g4aa4 #aj ,parmenides1 #add2 ,cary1 #cg4 #aa ,possibly a reference to ,numenius' book thereon4 #ab ,aristotle1 ,met4 i4 #e2 ,jamblichus1 de ,vita4 ,pyth4 #bh4aej2 and #bi4afb2 found in their oath2 also ,numenius1 #fj4 #ac ,see vi4 #b4g4 #ad ,see vi4 #f4e4 #ae ,as thought ,plato and ,aristotle combined1 see ,ravaisson1 ,essay1 ii4 #djg4 #af ,atheneus1 xii4 #edf2 see i4 #f4d4 #ag ,plato1 ,timaeus1 #ci;e1 ,cary1 #ae4 #ah ,see iii4 #h4g4 #ai ,as thought the ,pythagoreans2 see ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,hypotyposes ,pyrrh4 #c4ah1 p4 #afe4 #bj ,olympiodorus1 ,comm4 ,i ,alcibiades1 x4 p4 #ie2 ,arist4 ,met41 i4 #e2 ,sextus ,emp41 ,h4 ,p41 iii4 #aeb2 ,porphyry2 ,vit4 ,pyth41 #dh4 #ba ,as said ,theon of ,smyrna1 of the ,pythagoreans1 ii4 p4 #bc2 ,jamblichus1 ,vit4 ,porph4 #bh4aej2 #bi4afb4 #bb ,see i4 #h4b4 #bc ,met4 x4 #b2 iv4 #b2 v4 #bd ,peripatetic commentators on ,aristotle's ,metaphysics1 which was used as a text-book in ,plotinos's school4 #be ,see end of ,sec4 #ac4 #bf ,see vi4 #a4f4 #bg ,see ,aristotle1 ,categories1 ii4 #f4 #bh ,as ,aristotle thought1 ,met4 x4 #b4 #bi ,see vi4 #i4b4 #cj ,met4 x4 #a4 #ca ,the ,numenian secret name of the divinity1 fr4 #bj4 #cb ,met4 xiii4 #g4 #cc ,aristotle1 ,met4 x4 #b4 #cd ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 xiii4 #g4 #ce ,see iv4 #h4c4 #cf ,see iv4 #d4e4 #cg ,see v4 #g4c4 #ch ,see vi4 #c4ac4 #ci ,see vi4 #i4a4 #dj ,see ,timaeus1 #ce2 ,cary1 #ab4 ,jamblichus1 ,on the ,soul1 #b2 ,macrobius1 ,dream of ,scipio1 i4 #e4 #da ,see ,jamblichus1 ,about ,common ,knowledge of ,mathematics4 #db ,see ,sec4 #b4 #dc ,macrobius1 ,dream of ,scipio1 #a4e4 #dd ,parmenides quoted in ,plato's ,theataetus1 #ahj ,e4 ,jowett1 iii4 #chc4 #de ,plato1 ,timaeus1 #ef2 ,cary1 #cj4 #df ,in the ,timaeus1 #ci2 ,cary1 #ad4 #dg ,parmenides1 quoted by ,plato1 in the ,sophists1 #bdd2 ,cary1 #fa4 #dh ,in ,plato's ,theataetus1 #ahj2 ,jowett ,tr4 iii4 #chc4 #di ,evidently ,porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an addition to the former book on the theory of vision2 see iv4 #e4 #ej ,as thought the ,stoics4 #ea ,like ,aristotle1 de ,sensu et ,sensili1 #b4 #eb iv4 #e4 #ec ,these ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of ,porphyry's questioning habit1 without which1 ,plotinos said1 he might have had nothing to write2 see ,biography1 #ac4 #ed ,as ,epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect happiness1 ,diog4 ,laert4 x4 #aba4 #ee ,see ,aristotle1 ,nic4 ,ethics1 #a4aj4 #ef ,see ,cicero1 de ,finibus1 ii4 #bg-bi4 #eg ,see iii4 #g4 #eh ,plutarch1 ,dogm4 ,philos4 i4 #ag2 ,stob4 ,eclog4 i4 #ah4 #ei ,arist4 ,topic4 iv4 #b2 de ,gener4 et ,cor4 i4 #aj2 ,ravaisson1 ,,ema1 i4 #dbb4 #fj ,as did ,alexander of ,aphrodisias1 in his treatise on ,mixture2 ,ravaisson1 ,,ema1 ii4 #big4 #fa ,stob4 ,eclog4 i4 #ah4 #fb ,see ,plutarch1 ,whether ,wickedness ,renders ,one ,unhappy4 #fc ,as said ,numenius1 #dd4 #fd ,see vi4 #g4 ,this is another proof of the chronological order1 as vi4 #g follows this book4 #fe ,bouillet explains that in this book ,plotinos summated all that ,plato had to say of the ,ideas and of their dependence on the ,good1 in the ,timaeus1 ,philebus1 ,phaedrus1 the ,republic1 the ,banquet1 and the ,alcibiades2 correcting this summary by the reflections of ,aristotle1 in ,met4 xii4 ,but ,plotinos advances beyond both ,plato and ,aristotle in going beyond ,intelligence to the supreme ,good4 7,see ,sec4 #cg47 ,this treatise might well have been written at the instigation of ,porphyry1 who desired to understand ,plotinos's views on this great subject4 #ff ,the famous ,philonic distinction between ho theos1 and theos4 #fg ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #de1 ,cary1 #ai4 #fh ,see iii4 #b4 #fi ,see iii4 #b4a4 #gj ,plato's ,timaeus1 pp4 #cj-dj1 ,cary1 #aj-ae4 #ga ,an ,aristotelian idea1 from ,met4 vii4 #a4 #gb ,aristotle1 ,met4 vii4 #ag4 #gc ,met4 vii4 #a4 #gd ,met4 vii4 #g4 #ge ,aristotle1 ,met4 v4 #h4 #gf ,met4 #a4c4 #gg ,see ii4 #i4c4 #gh ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #b2 ,met4 vii4 #ag4 #gi ,porphyry1 ,of the ,faculties of the ,soul1 fr4 #e4 #hj ,see ii4 #e4c4 #ha ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 i4 #c2 ii4 #b-d4 #hb ,plato1 ,i ,alcibiades1 p4 #acj1 ,cary1 #eb4 #hc ,see i4 #a4c4 #hd ,bouillet explains this as follows3 ,discursive reason1 which constitutes the real man1 begets sensibility1 which constitutes the animal2 see i4 #a4g4 #he ,see iii4 #d4c-f4 #hf ,see iii4 #d4f4 #hg ,these demons are higher powers of the human soul4 #hh ,see iv4 #c4ah4 #hi ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #gf1 ,cary1 #ed4 #ij p4 #ci1 ,cary1 #ae4 #ia ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #gg1 ,cary1 #ee4 #ib ,see iv4 #d4bb4 #ic ,lucretius1 v4 #ajie4 #id ,diogenes ,laertes1 iii4 #gd4 #ie ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #hj1 ,cary1 #fa4 #if ,see iv4 #c4ah4 #ig ,plato1 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bdh1 ,cary1 #fj2 see i4 #c4d4 #ih ,see v4 #g4 #ii ,see v4 #a4i4 #ajj ,see i4 #h4f1 #g4 #aja ,rep4 vi4 p4 #eji1 ,cary1 #ai4 #ajb ,see v4 #a4g4 #ajc ,see v4 #a4e4 #ajd ,see v4 #a4g4 #aje ,plato1 ,rep4 vi4 p4 #eji1 ,cary1 #ai4 #ajf ,see v4 #a4f4 #ajg ,see iv4 #h4c4 #ajh ,see v4 #a4d4 #aji ,see v4 #a4f4 #aaj ,arist4 ,nic4 ,eth4 #a4a4 #aaa ,see ,arist41 ,met4 i4 #e4 #aab ,according to ,plato's ,banquet1 p4 #bjf1 ,cary1 #ca4 #aac ,see iv4 #e4g4 #aad ,see #a4f4 #aae ,plato1 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bdi1 ,cary1 #fc4 #aaf ,see v4 #a4b4 #aag ,see vi4 #g4be4 #aah ,plato1 ,philebus1 p4 #fj1 ,cary1 #ada2 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgd1 ,cary1 #ff4 #aai p4 #fa1 ,cary1 #add4 #abj ,see ,met4 xii4 #aba ,met xii4 #g4 #abb ,plato1 ,rep4 vi41 p4 #eje1 ,cary1 #ag4 #abc ,according to the proverb1 like seeks its like1 mentioned by ,plato1 in his ,banquet2 p4 #aie1 ,cary1 #ba4 #abd ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejg1 ,cary1 #acf4 #abe ,see i4 #h4e4 #abf ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #eb1 ,cary1 #bf4 #abg ,see below1 ,sec4 #cb4 #abh ,plato1 ,rep4 vi41 p4 #ejf1 ,cary #ag4 #abi ,as said ,plato1 ,republic vi41 p4 #ejh1 ,cary1 #ai4 #acj ,see iii4 #e4i4 #aca ,in his ,philebus1 p4 #fe1 ,cary1 #aee4 #acb ,as ,plato said1 in his ,banquet1 p4 #ahd1 ,cary1 #ab4 #acc ,see i4 #f4e4 #acd ,see i4 #f4g4 #ace ,as says ,plato1 in his ,banquet1 p4 #baj1 ,cary1 #ce4 #acf ,as ,plato says1 in his ,phaedrus1 p4 #bej1 ,cary1 #fe4 #acg ,as ,plato says1 in his ,banquet1 p4 #ahc1 ,cary1 #aa4 #ach ,see i4 #f4i4 #aci ,see i4 #f4h4 #adj ,as ,plato said1 in his ,banquet1 p4 #baa1 ,cary1 #ce4 #ada ,see iii4 #e4i4 #adb ,rep4 vi41 p4 #eje1 ,cary1 #af4 #adc ,see iii4 #c4f4 #add ,as thought ,plato1 in the ,banquet1 p4 #baj1 ,cary1 #ce4 #ade ,arist4 ,met4 xii4 #i2 see v4 #a4i4 #adf ,met4 xii4 #g4 #adg ,met4 xii4 #i4 #adh ,see iv4 #f4c4 #adi ,met4 xii4 #h4 #aej ,plato1 ,rep4 vi4 p4 #eji1 ,cary1 #ai4 #aea ,met4 xii4 #g4 #aeb ,see v4 #c4aj4 #aec ,see vi4 #b4g4 #aed ,see v4 #c4aa4 #aee ,see iii4 #i4f4 #aef ,see vi4 #e4aa4 #aeg ,see v4 #c4ac4 #aeh ,arist4 ,met4 xii4 #g4 #aei ,as thought ,plato1 ,rep4 vi41 p4 #ejh1 ,cary1 #ai4 #afj ,see iv4 #c4a4 #afa ,letter ii4 #cab2 ,cary1 p4 #dhb4 #afb ,see i4 #f1 end4 #afc ,numenius1 fr4 #cb4 #afd ,see ,numenius1 fr4 #dh4 #afe ,banquet1 p4 #baa1 ,cary1 #ce4 #aff ,as ,aristotle asks1 ,eth4 ,nic4 iii4 #afg ,arist4 ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #a4 #afh ,eud4 ,eth4 ii4 #f4 #afi ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #b4 #agj ,eud4 ,mor4 ii4 #i4 #aga ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #b4 #agb ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #f4 #agc ,plato1 ,alcinous1 #ca2 this is opposed by ,aristotle1 ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #b4f4 #agd ,aristotle1 ,eud4 ,eth4 ii4 #aj4 #age ,aristotle1 ,mor4 ,magn4 i4 #cb2 ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #f4 #agf ,aristotle1 ,nic4 ,eth4 iii4 #d4 #agg ,arist4 de ,anim4 iii4 #aj4 #agh de ,anim4 iii4 #i4 #agi ,magn4 ,mor4 i4 #ag4 #ahj de ,anim4 iii4 #i4 #aha ,this ,stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by ,numenius1 #b4h1 #ac2 #c4d1 #e2 ,guthrie1 ,numenius1 p4 #ada4 ,he taught that it was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul 7#eb74 ,its relation to free-will and responsibility1 here considered1 had been with ,numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on ,lacydes4 #ahb ,nic4 ,eth4 x4 #h4 #ahc ,nic4 ,eth4 x4 #g4 #ahd ,plato1 ,republic1 x4 p4 #fag2 ,cary1 #ae4 #ahe ,in his ,phaedo1 p4 #hc2 ,cary1 #gd4 #ahf ,such as ,strato the ,peripatetic1 and the ,epicureans4 #ahg ,plato1 ,rep4 x4 p4 #eif;c2 ,cary1 #a4 #ahh ,see ,jamblichus's ,letter to ,macedonius1 on ,destiny1 #e4 #ahi ,see iii4 #i1 end4 #aij ,numenius1 #cb4 #aia ,see vi4 #g4b4 #aib ,aris4 ,met4 ix4 #a2 xii4 #i2 ,nic4 ,eth4 x4 #h2 ,plato ,timaeus1 p4 #eb2 ,cary1 #bf2 ,plotinos1 ,enn4 ii4 #e4c4 #aic ,this etymology of providence applies in ,english as well as in ,greek2 see iii4 #b4a4 #aid ,plato1 ,laws1 iv41 p4 #gaf2 ,cary1 #h4 #aie ,arist4 ,met4 xii4 #g4 #aif ,see iii4 #h4i4 #aig ,in his ,cratylos1 p4 #dai2 ,cary1 #gf4 #aih ,see iii4 #i1 end4 #aii ,as said ,plato in the ,timaeus1 p4 #db2 ,cary1 #ah2 see ,numenius1 #aj1 #cb4 #bjj ,in this book ,plotinos uses synonymously the ,heaven1 the ,world1 the ,universal ,organism or ,animal1 the ,all 7or universe71 and the ,whole 7or ,totality74 ,this book as it were completes the former one on the ,ideas and the ,divinity1 thus studying the three principles 7,soul1 ,intelligence and ,good7 cosmologically4 ,we thus have here another proof of the chronological order4 ,in it ,plotinos defends ,plato's doctrine against ,aristotle's objection in de ,anima i4 #c4 #bja ,as thought ,heraclitus1 ,diog4 ,laert4 ix4 #h2 ,plato1 ,timaeus1 p4 #ca2 ,cary1 #aa2 ,arist4 ,heaven1 #a1 #h1 #i4 #bjb ,such as ,heraclitus4 #bjc ,in the ,cratylus1 p4 #djb2 ,cary1 #da4 #bjd ,rep4 vi41 p4 #dih2 ,cary1 #aa4 #bje ,see ,apuleius1 de ,mundo1 p4 #gjh2 ,ravaisson1 ,e4,m4,a4 ii4 #aej2 ,plato1 ,epinomis1 c4 #e4 #bjf ,which would render it unfit for fusion with the ,soul1 ,arist41 ,meteorology1 i4 #d2 ,plato1 ,tim41 p4 #eh2 ,cary1 #cc4 #bjg ,see ii4 #i4c2 iii4 #b4a2 iv4 #c4i4 #bjh ,phaedo1 p4 #aji2 ,cary1 #acd2 that is1 the universal ,soul is here distinguished into the celestial ,soul1 and the inferior ,soul1 which is nature1 the generative power4 #bji ,the inferior soul1 or nature4 #baj ,see ii4 #c4i-ae4 #baa ,see i4 #a4g-aj4 #bab ,as is the vegetative soul1 which makes only the animal part of us2 see i4 #a4g-aj4 #bac ,in his ,timaeus1 p4 #ca2 ,cary1 #aa4 #bad ,timaeus1 p4 #ef2 ,cary1 #cj4 #bae ,see i4 #h4i4 #baf ,plato1 ,epinomis1 p4 #ihd2 ,cary1 #h4 #bag ,in the ,timaeus1 p4 #ca1 #ea2 ,cary #aa1 #bd1 #be4 #bah ,see ii4 #g4 #bai ,who in his ,timaeus says1 p4 #ci2 ,cary1 #ad4 #bbj ,see ii4 #b4 #bba ,as thought ,heraclitus and the ,stoics1 who thought that the stars fed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters2 see ,seneca1 ,nat4 ,quest4 vi4 #af4 #bbb ,see ii4 #a4e4 #bbc ,see iii4 #g2 ,plotinos may have already sketched the outline of this book 7number #de71 and amplified it only later4 #bbd ,see ii4 #i4f1 or #cc2 another proof of the chronological order4 #bbe ,in his ,timaeus1 p4 #fi2 ,cary1 #dd4 #bbf ,as the ,stoics think1 ,plutarch1 ,plac4 ,phil4 iv4 #aa4 #bbg ,as ,aristotle would say1 de ,anima1 iii4 #c4 #bbh ,aristotle1 de ,sensu1 #f4 #bbi v4 #c4 #bcj ,porphyry1 ,principles1 #bd4 #bca ,arist41 ,mem4 et ,rec41 #b4 #bcb ,porphyry1 ,principles1 #be4 #bcc ,aristotle1 ,mem4 et ,rec41 #b4 #bcd ,porphyry1 ,treatise1 ,psych4 #bce ,locke's famous tabula rasa4 #bcf ,substance1 ,quantity1 ,quality1 ,relation1 ,when1 ,where1 ,action-and-,reaction1 to ,have1 and ,location4 ,aristotle's treatment thereof in his ,categories1 and ,metaphysics4 #bcg ,met4 v4 #g4 #bch ,or1 substance1 ousia4 #bci ,cat4 i4 #a1 #b2 or1 mere label in common4 #bdj ,aristotle1 ,met4 vii4 #c1 distinguished many different senses of ,being2 at least four principal ones3 what it seems1 or the universal1 the kind1 or the subject4 ,the subject is that of which all the rest is an attribute1 but which is not the attribute of anything4 ,being must be the first subject4 ,in one sense this is matter2 in another1 form2 and in the third place1 the concretion of form and matter4 #bda ,see ii4 #d4f-af1 for intelligible matter1 and ii4 #d4b-e for sense-matter4 #bdb ,arist41 ,met4 vii4 #c4 #bdc ,arist41 ,cat4 #b4e4be4 #bdd ,arist41 ,cat4 ii4 #e4ae4 #bde ,arist41 ,met4 vii4 #a2 ,cat4 ii4 #e4 #bdf ,categ4 ii4 #e4a1 #b4 #bdg ,cat4 ii4 #e4af1 #ag4 #bdh ,cat4 ii4 #f4a1 #b4 #bdi ,met4 v4 #ac4 #bej ,met4 xiii4 #f4 #bea ,met4 xiii4 #c4 #beb ,categ4 ii4 #f4ah-bc4 #bec ,see vi4 #f4 #bed ,categ4 ii4 #f4d4 #bee ,arist41 ,hermeneia1 #d4 #bef ,see iii4 #g4h4 #beg ,categ4 ii4 #f4bf4 #beh ,categ4 ii4 #g4a2 ,met4 v4 #ae4 #bei ,categ4 ii4 #g4ag-ai4 #bfj ,see ,categ4 viii4 #bfa ,arist41 ,categ4 ii4 #h4c1 #g1 #h1 #ac1 #ad4 #bfb ,see ii4 #f4c4 #bfc ,see ii4 #f4c4 #bfd ,see ii4 #f4a4 #bfe ,these are3 #a1 capacity and disposition2 #b1 physical power or impotence2 #c1 affective qualities2 #d1 the figure and exterior form4 #bff ,met4 v4 #ad4 #bfg ,categ4 ii4 #h4 #bfh ,see i4 #f4b4 #bfi ,categ4 ii4 #h4ae4 #bgj ,among whom ,plotinos is not2 see vi4 #a4aj4 #bga ,the reader is warned that the single ,greek word paschein is continually played upon in meanings experiencing1 suffering1 reacting1 or passion4 #bgb ,met4 xi4 #i4 #bgc ,that is1 to move and to cut express an action as perfect as having moved and having cut4 #bgd ,as ,aristotle says1 ,categ4 ii4 #g4a4 #bge ,plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and intransitive1 but as verbs expressing a completed action or state1 7as to think71 and those expressing successive action1 7as1 to walk74 ,the ,french language makes this distinction by using with these latter the auxiliary tre4 ,each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action1 by which the subject alone is modified2 and into other verbs expressing relative action1 referring to1 or modifying an exterior object4 ,these alone are used to form the passive voice1 and ,plotinos does not want them classified apart4 #bgf ,in ,greek the three words are derived from the same root4 #bgg ,see i4 v4 #bgh ,see iii4 #f4a4 #bgi ,categ4 iii4 #ad4 #bhj ,for this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover4 #bha ,that is1 the ,greek word for suffering4 #bhb ,a ,greek pun1 kathexis4 #bhc ,a ,greek pun1 hexis also translated habit1 and habitude4 #bhd ,see ,chaignet1 ,hist4 of ,greek ,psychology1 and ,simplicius1 ,commentary on ,categories4 #bhe ,see iv4 #g4ad4 ,this is an ,aristotelian distinction4 #bhf ,see ii4 #d4a4 #bhg ,by verbal similarity1 or homonymy1 a pun4 #bhh ,see ii4 #d4a4 #bhi ,see ii4 #e4e4 #bij ,for ,plato placed all reality in the ,ideas4 #bia ,logically1 their conception of matter breaks down4 #bib ,cicero1 ,academics1 i4 #aa4 #bic ,see ii4 #d4aj4 #bid ,see ,enn4 ii4 #d1 #e2 iii4 #f4 ,another proof of the chronological order4 #bie ,plotinos was here in error2 ,aristotle ignored them1 because he did not admit existence4 #bif ,this refers to the ,hylicists1 who considered the universe as founded on earth1 water1 air or fire2 or1 ,anaxagoras1 who introduced the category of mind4 #big ,plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of ,plato1 found in his ,sophists1 for the intelligible being2 and yet he harks back to ,aristotle's ,categories and ,metaphysics1 for his classification of the sense-world4 #bih ,see vi4 #d1 #f1 #i4 #bii ,in his ,sophist4 p4 #bdh e-#bej2 ,cary1 #gb-gf4 #cjj ,in vi4 #c4 #cja ,see vi4 #c4f4 #cjb ,see vi4 #c4c4 #cjc ,see iii4 #b4af4 #cjd ,that is1 the higher part1 the principal power of the soul2 see ii4 #c4ag1 #ah4 #cje ,here being and essence have had to be inverted4 #cjf ,verbal similarity1 homonymy1 or pun4 #cjg ,see ,plato's ,sophists1 p4 #bej c2 ,cary1 #ge4 #cjh ,sophists1 p4 #bed d2 ,cary1 #hf4 #cji ,as said ,aristotle1 ,met4 iv4 #b4 #caj ,plato1 ,sophist1 p4 #bde2 ,cary1 #fc4 #caa ,see vi4 #i4a4 #cab ,see vi4 #d4 #cac ,arist41 ,met4 xiv4 #f4 #cad ,aristotle4 ,met4 xiv4 #f4 #cae ,see ii4 #f4b4 #caf ,see vi4 #g4c-f4 #cag ,as said ,aristotle4 ,eth4 ,nic4 i4 #f4b4 #cah ,against ,aristotle4 #cai ,see vi4 #a4ad4 #cbj ,see iii4 #g4aa4 #cba ,to ti n einai4 #cbb ,see i4 #f4 #cbc ,see v4 #h4 #cbd ,counting identity and difference as a composite one8 ,see note #aa4 #cbe ,see iv4 #i4e4 #cbf ,see iv4 #h4c4 #cbg ,see iii4 #b4af4 #cbh ,see iv4 #h4h4 #cbi ,see iii4 #h4g4 #ccj ,see iii4 #h4b4 #cca ,see iii4 #b4b4 #ccb ,see iii4 #i4a4 #ccc ,see #c4i4a2 ,timaeus1 p4 #ci2 ,cary1 #ad4 #ccd ,see ii4 #i4a4 #cce ,see v4 #c4d4 #ccf ,plato1 ,philebus1 p4 #ah2 ,cary1 #bc4 #ccg ,plato1 ,philebus1 p4 #ag e2 ,cary1 #ba4 #cch ,see iii4 #d4a4 #cci ,see iv4 #h4c-g4 #cdj ,see iv4 #h4h4 #cda ,see iv4 #d4bi4 #cdb ,here ,plotinos purposely mentions ,numenius's name for the divinity 7fr4 #bj4f71 and disagrees with it1 erecting above it a supreme ,unity4 ,this1 however1 was only ,platonic1 ,rep4 vi4 #ai1 #eji b41 so that ,plotinos should not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of philosophy4 ,even ,numenius held the unity1 fr4 #ad4 #cdc ,this means1 by mere verbal similarity1 homonymy1 or1 punning4 #cdd ,as said ,plato1 in his ,philebus1 p4 #ah1 ,cary1 #bc4 #cde ,see i4 #a4g4 #cdf ,see ,bouillet1 vol4 #a1 p4 #chj4 #cdg ,see iii4 #f4a-e4 #cdh ,see sect4 #af4 #cdi ,see ii4 #a4b4 #cej ,or1 mortal nature1 or1 decay2 see i4 #h4d2 ii4 #d4e-f4 #cea ,see vi4 #b4g1 #h4 #ceb ,see ii4 #d4f4 #cec ,see vi4 #a4ac1 #ad4 #ced ,in vi4 #c4aa1 and vi4 #a4ac1 #ad1 he however subsumes time and place under relation4 #cee ,according to ,aristotle1 ,met4 vii4 #c4 #cef ,aristotle1 ,met4 viii4 #e4f4 #ceg ,aristotle1 ,categ4 ii4 #e4 #ceh ,see ii4 #e4d4 #cei ,met4 vii4 #aa4 #cfj ,met4 vii4 #ag4 #cfa ,see ii4 #d4c-e4 #cfb ,see iii4 #f4 #cfc ,categ4 ii4 #e4 #cfd ,see iii4 #g4h4 #cfe ,see sect4 #aa4 #cff ,arist4 ,met4 vii4 #a4 #cfg ,see vi4 #a4bf4 #cfh ,see ii4 #d4aj4 #cfi ,see ,met4 vii4 #c4 #cgj ,see vi4 #a4b1 #c4 #cga ,see iii4 #h4g4 #cgb ,matter is begotten by nature1 which is the inferior power of the universal ,soul1 iii4 #d4a42 and the form derives from ,reason1 which is the superior power of the same ,soul1 ii4 #c4ag4 #cgc ,met4 v4 #h4 #cgd ,being an accident1 ,met4 v4 #cj1 see#dcd4 #cge ,see iii4 #f4ab4 #cgf ,see ,categ4 ii4 #e4a-b4 #cgg ,plotinos is here defending ,plato's valuation of the universal1 against ,aristotle1 in ,met4 vii4 #ac4 #cgh ,arist4 de ,anima1 ii4 #a4 #cgi ,see sect4 #h4 #chj ,plotinos follows ,aristotle in his definition of quantity1 but subsumes time and place under relation4 ,plot41 vi4 #a4d2 ,arist4 ,categ4 ii4 #f4a1 #b4 #cha ,arist4 ,met4 v4 #ac4 #chb ,see vi4 #c4e2 iii4 #f4ag4 #chc ,categ4 ii4 #f4 #chd ,quoted by ,plato in his ,hippias1 p4 #bhi1 ,cary1 #bj4 #che ,see ,categ4 #b4f4 #chf ,see vi4 #a4e4 #chg ,see sect4 #aa4 #chh ,see vi4 #f4 #chi ,met4 v4 #f4 #cij ,categ4 iii4 #f4bf4 #cia ,met4 v4 #ad4 #cib ,categ4 ii4 #f4bf4 #cic ,in speaking of quality1 ,categ4 ii4 #h4cj4 #cid ,following the ,latin version of ,ficinus4 #cie ,bouillet remarks that ,plotinos intends to demonstrate this by explaining the term similarity not only of identical quality1 but also of two beings of which one is the image of the other1 as the portrait is the image of the corporeal form1 the former that of the seminal reason1 and the latter that of the ,idea4 #cif ,by this ,plotinos means the essence1 or intelligible form1 vi4 #g4b4 #cig ,see vi4 #g4c-f4 #cih ,see iii4 #f4d4 #cii ,in his ,banquet1 p4 #ahf-ahh2 ,cary1 #ad1 #ae4 #djj ,see v4 #i4aa4 #dja ,see i4 #b4a4 #djb ,see vi4 #g4e4 #djc ,see iii4 #f4d4 #djd ,categ4 ii4 #h4c1 #g1 #h1 #ac1 #ad4 #dje ,see i4 #a4b4 #djf ,arist4 ,categ4 ii4 #h4h-ac4 #djg ,met4 v4 #ad4 #djh ,met4 vii4 #ab4 #dji ,met4 v4 #ad4 #daj ,categ4 ii4 #h4 #daa ,arist4 ,categ4 iii4 #aj4 #dab ,see vi4 #a4ag4 #dac ,met4 v4 #aj4 #dad ,categ4 iii4 #aa4 #dae ,categ4 iii4 #ad4 #daf ,categ4 ii4 #g4 #dag ,by a pun1 this change is used as synonymous with the alteration used further on4 #dah ,arist4 de ,gen4 i4 #d4 #dai ,alteration is change in the category of quality1 ,arist4 de ,gen4 i4 #d2 ,physics1 vii4 #b4 #dbj ,arist4 ,metaph4 ix4 #f2 xi4 #i4 #dba ,met4 xi4 #i4 #dbb ,see ii4 #e4a1 #b4 #dbc ,see ii4 #e4b4 #dbd ,see ii4 #e4b4 #dbe ,categ4 iii4 #ad4 #dbf ,arist4 ,met4 xi4 #i4 #dbg ,see ii4 #g4 #dbh ,arist4 de ,gen4 i4 #e4 #dbi ,arist4 de ,gen4 i4 #aj4 #dcj ,here we have ,numenius's innate motion of the intelligible1 fr4 #cj4ba4 #dca ,see vi4 #a4ae-bb4 #dcb ,namely1 time1 vi4 #a4ac2 place1 vi4 #a4ad2 possession1 vi4 #a4bc2 location1 vi4 #a4bd4 #dcc ,for relation1 see vi4 #a4f-i4 #dcd ,for ,aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its essence4 #dce ,in this book ,plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively2 first considering ,plato's views in the ,timaeus1 and then the views of ,pythagoras 7#a71 ,epicurus 7#i71 the ,stoics 7#g71 and ,aristotle 7#d1 #h1 #ab74 #dcf ,the bracketed numbers are those of the ,teubner edition2 the unbracketed1 those of the ,didot edition4 #dcg ,see ii4 #i4f4 #dch ,as thought ,plato1 in his ,timaeus1 p4 #cg1 ,cary1 #ad4 #dci ,stobaeus4 ,ecl4 ,phys4 i4 #bdh4 #ddj ,a category1 see vi4 #b4g4 #dda ,see vi4 #b4g4 #ddb ,or1 with ,mueller1 therefore1 in a permanent future4 #ddc ,de ,caelo1 i4 #i4 #ddd ,that is1 with this divinity that intelligible existence is4 #dde ,arist4 ,met4 iii4 #b4 #ddf ,in the ,timaeus1 p4 #bi1 ,cary #aj4 #ddg ,stob4 ,ecl4 ,physic4 ix4 #dj4 #ddh ,porphyry1 ,principles1 #cb1 end4 #ddi ,especially ,archytas1 ,simplicius1 ,comm4 in ,phys4 ,aristot4 #afe2 ,stob4 ,ecl4 ,physic4 ,heeren1 #bdh-bej4 #dej ,stobaeus1 #bed4 #dea ,see ,stobaeus1 #bej4 #deb ,aristotle1 ,physica1 iv4 #ab4 #dec ,mueller3 ,whether this may be predicated of the totality of the movement4 #ded ,see vi4 #f4d-aj4 #dee ,as ,aristotle1 ,phys4 iv4 #aa1 claimed4 #def ,in ,physica1 iii4 #g4 #deg ,stobaeus1 ,ecl4 ,phys4 ix4 #dj4 #deh ,when collectively considered as ,a-pollo1 following ,numenius1 #db1 #fg1 ,plotinos1 v4 #e4f4 #dei ,see ii4 #i4c4 #dfj ,see iii4 #g4a1 ,introd4 #dfa ,see iii4 #f4af1 #ag4 #dfb ,porphyry1 ,principles1 #cb4 #dfc ,in the ,timaeus1 p4 #ch1 ,cary1 #ad4 #dfd ,in his ,timaeus1 p4 #ci1 ,cary1 #ad1 #ae4 #dfe ,as by ,antiphanes and ,critolaus1 ,stobaeus1 ,eclog4 ,phys4 ix4 #dj1 p4 #beb1 ,heeren4 #dff ,see iii4 #g4b4 #dfg ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,mem4 et ,remin4 ii4 #ab4 #dfh ,see iv4 #i4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected4 ,inconsistent capitalization has not been changed4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4 ,infrequent spelling of ,plotinus changed to the predominant ,plotinos4 ,several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched2 ,transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong4 ,page #fgh3 ,a line containing ,how then could one1 appears to have been partly duplicated in the original4 ,the duplicate text1 which has been removed here1 was3 ,essence sence possess self-existence4 ,how then could4 ,page #fij1 footnote #ec 7originally #a73 he might have had noth- does not complete on the next line and has been changed here to he might have had nothing4 ,page #gjj3 ,the two opening parentheses in '7from its whatness 7or1 essence#gb74' share the one closing parenthesis2 unchanged4 ,page #gdd3 unmatched closing quotation mark removed after a being is suited by its like4 ,page #hjd3 ,closing parenthesis added after single 7unitary4 ,page #hbc3 resistance corporeal nature#ae74 has no matching opening parenthesis2 unchanged here4 ,page #icj3 ,phrase beginning 7each constituting a particular intelligence appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase 7and thus exists in itself74 ,page #ice3 ,closing parenthesis in phrase composite as mixtures71 does not have a matching opening parenthesis2 unchanged4 ,page #ihd3 ,footnote #cie 7originally #ec71 corporeal form1 the former that of originally was corporeal form1 the latter that of4 ,footnote ,issues3 ,in these notes1 anchor means the reference to a footnote1 and footnote means the information to which the anchor refers4 ,anchors occur within the main text1 while footnotes are grouped in sequence at the end of this e,book4 ,the structure of the original book required some exceptions to this1 as explained below4 ,the original text used chapter endnotes4 ,in this e,book1 they have been combined into a single1 ascending sequence based on the sequence in which the footnotes 7not the anchors7 occurred in the original book1 and placed at the end of the e,book4 ,three kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes3 #a4 ,some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor1 so two or more anchors may refer to the same footnote4 #b4 ,some anchors were out of sequence1 apparently because they were added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another anchor4 ,they have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes to which they refer4 #c4 ,some footnotes have no anchors4 ,these are noted below4 ,page #fgi3 ,footnote #cg has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #fgj4 ,page #gga3 ,footnote #he 7originally #ba7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #gji or #gaj4 ,page #ggb3 ,footnote #aaa 7originally #dg7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #gcf4 ,page #ggb3 ,footnote #abc 7originally #ei7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #gdd or #gde4 ,page #haa3 ,footnote #agh 7originally #ac7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #ggf4 ,page #icb3 ,footnote #cjb 7originally #f7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #hie or #hif4 ,page #ihd3 ,footnote #dbd 7originally #hb7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be on page #igd or #ige4 ,page #ajae3 ,footnote #dde 7originally #aa7 has no anchor4 ,the missing anchor would be in page range #iib-iie4