,,volume ,,ii4 ,,works ,,of ,,plotinos4 ,,plotinos ,complete ,works ,in ,chronological ,order1 ,grouped in ,four ,periods2 ,with ,,biography by ,,porphyry1 ,,eunapius1 ,,suidas1 ,,commentary by ,,porphyry1 ,,illustrations by ,,jamblichus ,,ammonius1 ,,studies in ,sources1 ,development1 ,influence2 ,,index of ,subjects1 ,thoughts and ,words4 by ,,kenneth ,,sylvan ,,guthrie1 ,professor in ,extension1 ,university of the ,south1 ,sewanee2 ,a4,m41 ,sewanee1 and ,harvard2 ,ph4,d41 ,tulane1 and ,columbia4 ,m4,d41 ,medico-,chirurgical ,college1 ,philadelphia4 ,,vol4 ,,ii ,amelio-,porphyrian ,books1 #bb-cc4 ,,comparative ,,literature ,,press ,p4 ,o4 ,box #db1 ,,alpine1 ,n4,j41 ,u4,s4,a4 ,copyright1 #aiah1 by ,kenneth ,sylvan ,guthrie4 ,all ,rights1 including that of ,translation1 ,reserved4 ,entered at ,stationers' ,hall1 by ,george ,bell and ,sons1 ,portugal ,street1 ,lincoln's ,inn1 ,london4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,four4 ,the ,one ,identical ,essence is ,everywhere ,entirely ,present4 ,,why ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,is ,,everywhere ,,entire ,,in ,,the ,,world-,,body4 #a4 ,is it because the body of the universe is so great that the ,soul is everywhere present in the universe1 though being naturally divisible in 7human7 bodies8 ,or it is by herself1 that she is everywhere present8 ,in the latter case1 she has not been drawn away everywhere by the body1 but the body found her everywhere in existence before it2 thus1 in whatever place it may be1 it found the ,soul present before it itself was part of the universe1 and the total body of the universe was located in the ,soul that existed already4 ,,how ,,could ,,the ,,soul ,,have ,,no ,,magnitude1 ,,if ,,she ,,already ,,filled ,,all ,,space8 ,but if the ,soul had such an extension before the body approached her1 if she already filled all space1 how can she have no magnitude8 ,besides1 how could she have been present in the universe when the latter did not yet exist8 ,last1 being considered indivisible and non-extended1 is she everywhere present without having any magnitude8 ,if the answer be that she extended herself throughout the body of the universe without herself being corporeal1 the question is not yet resolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to the ,soul2 for it would then be reasonable to ask how she grew great by accident4 ,the ,soul could not extend herself in the entire body in the same manner as quality1 as for instance1 sweetness or color2 for these are passive modifications of the bodies1 so that one must not be astonished to see a modification spread all over the modified body1 being nothing by itself1 inhering in the body1 and existing only within it2 that is why the soul necessarily has the same magnitude as the body4 ,besides1 the whiteness of one part of the body does not share the experience#a 7or1 passion7 experienced by the whiteness of another part2 the whiteness of one part is identical1 in respect to species1 to the whiteness of another part2 but it is not identical therewith in respect to number2 on the contrary1 the part of the soul which is present in the foot is identical with the portion of the soul present in the hand1 as may be seen in the percepts thereof4 ,last1 what is identical in the qualities is divisible1 while that which is identical in the soul is indivisible2 if it be said to divide1 it is in this sense that it is present everywhere4 ,,the ,,soul ,,was ,,capable ,,of ,,extension ,,before ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,body4 ,in view of these facts1 let us1 starting from the very beginning1 explain in a clear and plausible manner1 how the soul1 being incorporeal and extended1 could1 nevertheless1 have assumed such an extension1 either before the bodies1 or in the bodies4 ,if indeed one see that she was capable of assuming extension before the bodies existed1 it will be easily understood that she could have done so within the bodies4 ,,description ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,being4 #b4 ,there exists a genuinely universal 7,being74 ,the world that we see is no more than its image4 ,this veritably universal 7,being7 is in nothing2 for nothing has proceeded from its existence4 ,what is posterior to this universal 7,being7 must1 to exist1 be in it1 since it would depend on it1 and without it could neither subsist nor move4 ,do not therefore place our world in this genuinely universal 7being7 as in a place1 if by place you understand the limit of the body containing so far as it contains1 or a space which before had1 and which still has emptiness for nature4 ,conceive of the foundation on which our world rests as existing in the 7,being7 which exists everywhere1 and contains it4 ,conceive their relation exclusively by the mind1 setting aside all local nomenclature4 ,indeed1 when one speaks of place1 it is only in relation with our visible world2 but the universal 7being71 being the ,first1 and possessing genuine existence1 has no need of being in a place1 nor in anything whatever4 ,being universal1 it could not fail to support itself1 for it fills itself1 equals itself1 and is where is the universal because it is this itself4 ,what has been built on the universal1 being other than it1 participates in it1 and approaches it1 receives strength from it1 not by dividing it1 but because it finds it in itself1 because it approaches it1 since the universal 7being7 is not outside of itself2 for it is impossible for the essence to be in non-essence2 on the contrary1 it is non-essence that must subsist in essence1 and consequently unite entirely with the whole essence4 ,we repeat1 the universal could not separate itself from itself2 and if we say that it is everywhere1 it is only in this sense that it is in essence1 that is1 in itself4 ,it is not surprising that what is everywhere is in essence and in itself2 for that which is everywhere is in the unity4 ,we1 however1 positing that the 7,being7 in question is sense-7existence71 believe that it is everywhere here below2 and1 as the sense-7existence7 is great1 we wonder how nature 7that is1 the intelligible essence7 can extend in that which has so great a magnitude4 ,in reality1 the 7,being7 which is called great is small2 the 7,being7 which is regarded as small is great1 since the whole of it penetrates in every part of all2 or rather1 our world1 by its parts everywhere approaching the universal 7,being71 finds it everywhere entire1 and greater than itself4 ,consequently1 as it would receive nothing more by a greater extension 7for1 if it were possible1 it would thereby exclude itself from the universal ,being71 it circles around this ,being4 ,not being able to embrace it1 nor to pierce into its innermost1 it contented itself with occupying a place1 and with having a place where it might preserve existence while approaching the universal 7,being71 which in one sense is present to it1 and in another1 is not present2 for the universal 7,being7 is in itself1 even when something else wishes to unite itself to it4 ,therefore1 approaching it1 the body of the universe finds the universal ,being2 having no need of going any farther1 it turns around the same thing because the thing around which it turns is the veritably universal 7,being71 so that in all its parts it enjoys the presence of this whole entire ,being4 ,if the universal 7,being7 were in a place1 our world should 7instead of having a circular motion71 rush towards it in a straight line1 touching different parts of this ,being by different parts of its own1 and find itself on one side distant from it1 and on the other side near it4 ,but as the universal 7,being7 is neither near one place1 nor distant from1 another1 it is necessarily entirely present as soon as it is at all present4 ,consequently1 it is entirely present to each of these things from which it is neither near nor far2 it is present to the things that are able to receive it4 ,,the ,,universal ,,being ,,is ,,indivisible4 #c4 ,is the universal 7,being7 by itself present everywhere8 ,or does it remain within itself1 while from its innermost its powers descend on all things1 and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere present8 ,yes1 doubtless4 ,that is why it is said that souls are the rays of this universal 7,being71 that it is built on itself1 and that from it1 souls descend into various animals4 ,the things which participate in its unity1 incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature conformed to its nature1 enjoy the presence of the universal 7,being7 in this sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers4 ,they are not1 however1 entirely separated from it1 because it is not separated from the power which it communicates to each of them4 ,if they do not have more1 it is only because they are not capable of receiving more from the presence of the entire whole 7,being74 ,evidently it is always entirely present there where its powers are present4 ,it however remains separated1 for if it became the form of any one particular being1 it would cease to be universal1 to subsist everywhere in itself1 and it would be the accident of some other being4 ,therefore1 since it belongs to none of these things1 even of those that aspire to unite themselves with it1 it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire it1 and in the measure in which they are capable thereof2 but it does not belong to any of them in particular4 ,it is not surprising1 therefore1 that it should be present in all things1 since it is not present in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone4 ,it is also reasonable to assert that1 if the soul share the passions of the bodies1 it is only by accident1 that she dwells in herself1 and belongs neither to matter nor to body1 that the whole of her illuminates the whole world-body4 ,it is not a contradiction to say that the 7,being7 which is not present in any place is present to all things each of which is in a place4 ,what1 indeed1 would be surprising and impossible would be that the universal 7,being7 could1 while occupying a determinate place1 be present to things which are in a place1 and could at all be present in the sense in which we have explained it4 ,reason forces us1 therefore1 to admit that the universal 7,being7 must1 precisely because it does not occupy any place1 be entirely present to the things to which it is present2 and1 since it is present to the universe1 be entirely present to each thing2 otherwise1 one part of it would be here1 and another there2 consequently1 it would be divisible1 it would be body4 ,how otherwise could one divide the 7,being78 ,is it its life that shall within it be divided8 ,if it be the totality of the 7being7 that is life1 no part of it would be that4 ,or will somebody try to divide the ,intelligence1 so that one of its parts be here1 and the other there8 ,in this case1 neither of the two parts would be intelligence4 ,or will the 7,being7 itself be divided8 ,but if the totality be the 7,being71 no one part of it would be that4 ,it might be objected that the parts of the bodies are still bodies themselves4 ,but that which is divided is not the body 7as such71 but a certain body of a certain extent2 now each of its parts possesses the form that causes it to be named body2 while the form not only does not have some particular extension1 but even any kind of extension at all4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,being ,,does ,,not ,,exclude ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,other ,,beings4 #d4 ,how can there be a plurality of essences1 intelligences and soul1 if essence be one8 ,the essence is one everywhere2 but its unity does not exclude the existence of other 7beings71 which may be said to conform thereto4 ,it is so also with the unity of the intelligence1 and of the soul1 although the ,soul of the universe be different from the particular souls4 ,,essence ,,is ,,divisible ,,if ,,thereby ,,not ,,diminished4 ,it would seem as if there were a contradiction between the present assertions and other statements of ours2 and perhaps our demonstration imposes rather than convinces4 ,it is impossible to believe that the essence which is one be also everywhere identical2 it would seem preferable to admit that essence1 considered in its totality1 is susceptible of division1 so long as this division does not diminish it2 or1 to use more careful terms1 that it begets all things while remaining with itself2 and that the souls that are born of it1 and are its parts1 fill up everything4 ,but if it be admitted that the ,one essence remains in ,himself because it seems incredible that a principle could everywhere be present entire1 the same difficulty would hinder us in regard to souls2 for it will result that each of them will no longer be entire in the whole body1 but will be divided therein1 or1 if each individual soul remain entire1 that it is by remaining in one part of the body1 that the soul will communicate her power to it4 ,these same questions about the soul could be raised about the powers of the soul1 and we might ask if they be all entire everywhere4 ,last1 one could be led to believe that the soul was in one member1 while her power was in another4 ,,the ,,soul1 ,,as ,,comprising ,,many ,,souls1 ,,is ,,infinite4 ,let us first explain how there can be a plurality of intelligences1 souls1 and essences4 ,if we consider the things that proceed from the first principles1 as they are numbers and not magnitudes1 we shall also have to ask ourselves how they fill the universe4 ,this plurality which thus arises from the first principles does not in any way help us to solve our question1 since we have granted that essence is multiple because of the difference 7of the beings that proceed from it71 and not by place2 for though it be multiple1 it is simultaneously entire2 essence everywhere touches essence1#b and it is everywhere entirely present4 ,intelligence likewise is manifold by the difference 7of the intelligences that proceed therefrom71 and not by space2 it is entire everywhere4 ,it is so also with souls2 even their part which is divisible in the bodies is indivisible by its nature4 ,but the bodies possess extension because the soul is present with them2 or rather1 it is because there are bodies in the sense-world2 it is because the power of the ,soul 7that is universal7 which is in them manifests itself in all their parts1 that the ,soul herself seems to have parts4 ,what proves that she is not divided as they are1 and with them1 that she is entirely present everywhere1 is that by nature she is essentially one and indivisible4 ,thus1 the unity of the ,soul does not exclude the plurality of souls1 any more than the unity of essence excludes the plurality of 7beings71 or that the plurality of intelligibles does not disagree with the existence of the ,one4 ,it is not necessary to admit that the ,soul imparts life to the bodies by the plurality of souls1 nor that that plurality derives from the extension of the body 7of the world74 ,before there ever were any bodies1 there was already one 7universal7 ,soul and several 7individual7 souls4 ,the individual souls existed already in the universal ,soul1 not potentially1 but each in actuality4 ,the unity of the universal ,soul does not hinder the multitude of the individual souls contained within her2 the multitude of the individual souls does not hinder the unity of the universal ,soul4 ,they are distinct without being separated by any interval2 they are present to each other instead of being foreign to each other2 for they are not separated from each other by any limits1 any more than different sciences are within a single soul4 ,the ,soul is such that in her unity she contains all the souls4 ,such a nature is1 therefore1 infinite4 ,,the ,,greatness ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,has ,,nothing ,,to ,,do ,,with ,,the ,,size ,,of ,,the ,,body4 #e4 ,the magnitude of the ,soul does not consist in being a corporeal mass2 for every corporeal mass is small1 and reduces to nothing1 if it be made to undergo a diminution4 ,as to the magnitude of the ,soul1 nothing can be removed from it2 and if something were removed1 she would not lose anything4 ,since1 therefore1 she cannot lose anything1 why fear that she should be far from something8 ,how could she be far from something since she loses nothing1 since she possesses an eternal nature1 and is subject to no leakage8 ,if she were subject to some leakage1 she would advance till where she could leak2 but as she cannot leak at all 7for there is no place where or into which she could leak71 she has embraced the universe1 or rather1 she herself is the universe1 and she is too great to be judged according to physical magnitude4 ,we may say that she gives little to the universe2 but she gives it all it can receive4 ,do not consider the universal ,being 7,essence7 as being smaller1 or as having a smaller mass 7than our universe72 otherwise1 you would be led to ask yourself how that which is smaller can unite with that which is greater4 ,besides1 one should not predicate comparative smallness of the universal ,essence1 nor compare1 in regard to mass1 that which has no mass with that which has2 that would be as if somebody said that the science called medicine is smaller than the body of the doctor4 ,neither attribute to the universal ,essence an extent greater 7than that of our universe72 for it is not in extension that the soul is greater than the body4 ,what shows the veritable magnitude of the soul1 is that1 when the body increases1 the same soul which formerly existed in a smaller mass is present in this whole mass that has become greater2 now it would be ridiculous to suppose that the soul increases in the same manner as a corporeal mass4 ,,the ,,souls ,,will ,,differ ,,as ,,will ,,the ,,sensations4 #f4 ,why 7if the universal ,soul possess the magnitude here attributed to her71 does she not approach some other body 7than that which she animates2 that is1 some individual body78 ,it would be this body's 7privilege or duty7 to approach the universal ,soul1 if it be able to do so2 on approaching to her1 it receives something1 and appropriates it4 ,but would this body1 that would approach the universal ,soul1 not already possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself1 since these souls 7the universal ,soul1 and the individual soul7 do not appear to differ from each other8 ,the fact is1 that as their sensations differ1 so must the passions that they experience likewise differ4 ,the things are judged to be different1 but the judge is the same principle successively placed in presence of different passions1 although it be not he who experiences them1 but the body disposed in some particular manner4 ,it is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure experienced by the finger1 and the pain felt by the head4 ,but why does not our soul perceive judgments made by the universal ,soul8 ,because this is a judgment1 and not a passion4 ,besides1 the faculty that judged the passion does not say1 ,i have judged1 but it limits itself to judging4 ,thus1 in ourselves1 it is not the sight which communicates its judgment to the hearing1 although both of these senses made separate judgments2 what presides over these two senses is reason1 which constitutes a different faculty4 ,often reason cognizes the judgment made by some other 7being71 while being conscious simultaneously of the passion it experiences4 ,but this question has been treated elsewhere4 ,,how ,,can ,,the ,,same ,,principle ,,exist ,,in ,,all ,,things8 ,let us return to this question3 ,how can the same principle exist in all things8 ,this question amounts to asking how each of the sense-objects which form a plurality and which occupy different places1 can1 nevertheless1 participate in the same principle2 for it is not allowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts2 it would be more fitting to reduce the multitude of parts to unity1 which could not approach them4 ,but when these parts occupy different places1 they have led us to believe that unity likewise is split up1 as if the power which dominates and which contains were divided into as many parts as that which is contained4 ,the hand itself 7though corporeal71 may hold an entire body1 such as a piece of wood several feet in length1 and other objects4 ,in this case1 the force that holds makes itself felt in the whole object that is felt1 and does not distribute itself in as many parts as it may contain1 though it be circumscribed by the limit of the reach of the hand4 ,nevertheless1 the hand is limited by its own extension1 and not by that of the body which is held or suspended4 ,add to the suspended body some other length1 and admitting that the hand can carry it1 its force will hold the entire body without dividing into as many parts as it may contain4 ,now suppose that the corporeal mass of the hand be annihilated1 and1 nevertheless1 allow the force which1 before1 existed in the hand and held the weight1 to persist2 will not this same force1 indivisible in the totality1 be equally indivisible in each of its parts8 ,,light ,,exists ,,simultaneously ,,within ,,and ,,without4 #g4 ,imagine a luminous point which serves as centre1 and imagine around it a transparent sphere1 so that the clearness of the luminous point shines in the whole body that surrounds it without the exterior receiving any light from elsewhere2 you will surely have to acknowledge that this interior light1 by remaining impassible1 penetrates the whole surrounding mass1 and that it embraces the whole sphere from the central point in which it is seen to shine4 ,the truth is that the light did not emanate from the little body placed in the centre2 for this little body did not glow inasmuch as it was a body1 but inasmuch as it was a luminous body2 that means1 by virtue of an incorporeal power4 ,now in thought annihilate the mass of the little luminous body1 and preserve its luminous power2 could you still say that light is somewhere8 ,will it not be equally in the interior1 and in the whole exterior sphere8 ,you will no longer perceive where it was fixed before1 and you will no longer say whence it comes1 nor where it is2 in this respect you will remain uncertain and astonished2 you will see the light shine simultaneously in the interior and in the exterior sphere4 ,an example of this is the solar light that shines in the air when you look at the body of the sun1 at the same time that you perceive everywhere the same light without any division2 that is demonstrated by objects that intercept the light2 they reflect it nowhere else than in the direction from which it came2 they do not shatter it into fragments4 ,but if the sun were an incorporeal power1 you could not1 when it would radiate light1 tell where the light began1 nor from where it was sent2 there would be but a single light1 the same everywhere1 having neither point of beginning1 nor principle from which it proceeds4 ,,unity ,,is ,,in ,,the ,,manifold ,,by ,a ,,manner ,,of ,,existence4 #h4 ,when light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines1 because the location of that body is known4 ,but if a being be immaterial1 if it have no need of a body1 if it be anterior to all bodies1 and be founded on itself1 or rather if it have no need1 as has a body1 or resting on any foundation--then1 a being endowed with such a nature has no origin from which it is derived1 resides in no place1 and depends on no body4 ,how could you then say that one of its parts is here1 and another is there8 ,for thus it would have an origin from which it had issued1 and it would depend from something4 ,we must1 therefore1 say that if something participate in this being by the power of the universe1 it participates in this being entirely1 without thereby being changed or divided2 for it is a being united to a body that suffers 7although often that happens to it only accidentally71 and in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible1 since it is some part of the body1 either its passion1 or form4 ,as to the 7being7 which is united to any body1 and to which the body aspires to be united1 it must in no manner share the passions of the body1 as such2 for the essential passion of the body1 as such1 is to divide itself4 ,if1 therefore1 the body be by nature inclined to divide itself1 then is the incorporeal1 by nature1 indivisible4 ,how1 in fact1 could one divide that which has no extension8 ,if1 therefore1 the extended 7being7 participate in the 7being7 which has no extension1 it participates in this 7being7 without dividing it2 otherwise1 this 7being7 would have extension4 ,consequently1 when you say that the unity 7of the universal essence7 is in the manifold1 you do not say that unity has become manifoldness1 but you refer to this unity the manner of existence of the multitude1 seeing it in this whole multitude simultaneously4 ,as to this ,unity1 it will have to be understood that it belongs to no individual1 nor to the whole multitude1 but that it belongs to itself alone1 that it is itself1 and that1 being itself1 it does not fail to support itself4 ,nor does it possess a magnitude such as of our universe1 nor1 let alone1 such as that of one of the parts of the universe2 for it has absolutely no magnitude4 ,how could it have any magnitude8 ,it is the body that should have such magnitude4 ,as to the 7being7 whose nature is entirely different from that of the body1 no magnitude should be ascribed to it4 ,if it have no magnitude1 it is nowhere2 it is neither here nor there2 for if so1 it would be in several places4 ,if then the local division suits only the 7being7 of which one part is here1 and the other there1 how could the 7being7 that is neither here nor there be divided8 ,consequently1 the incorporeal 7being7 must remain indivisible in itself1 although the multitude of things aspire to unite itself to it1 and succeeds therein4 ,if they aspire to possess it1 they aspire to possess it entire1 so that if they succeed in participating in that 7being71 they will participate in that entire 7being7 so far as their capacity reaches4 ,nevertheless1 the things that participate in this 7being7 must participate in it as if they did not participate in it1 in this sense that it does not belong exclusively to any of them4 ,it is thus that this 7being7 dwells entirely in itself1 and in the things in which it manifests2 if it did not remain entire1 it would no more be itself1 and things would no longer participate in the 7being7 to which they aspire1 but in some other 7being7 to which they did not aspire4 ,,potentialities ,,are ,,inseparable ,,from ,,their ,,beings4 #i4 ,if this unity 7of the universal ,soul7 divided itself in a multitude of parts such that each would resemble the total unity1 there would be a multitude of primary 7beings72 for each one of these 7beings7 would be primary4 ,how then could one distinguish from each other all these primary 7beings71 so that they might not all in confusion blend into a single one8 ,they would not be separated by their bodies1 for primary 7beings7 could not be forms of bodies2 as they would be similar to the primary 7,being7 which is their principle4 ,on the other hand1 if the things named parts were potentialities of the universal 7,being71 7there would be two results74 ,first1 each thing would no longer be the total unity4 ,then1 one might wonder how these potentialities separated from the universal 7,being71 and abandoned it2 for if they abandoned it1 it could evidently only be to go somewhere else4 ,there might also be reason to ask oneself if the potentialities which are in the sense-world are still or no longer in the universal 7,being74 ,if they be no longer in it1 it is absurd to suppose it diminished or became impotent1 by being deprived of the powers it possessed before4 ,it is equally absurd to suppose that the potentialities would be separated from the beings to which they belong4 ,on the contrary1 if the potentialities exist simultaneously in the universal 7,being7 and elsewhere1 they will1 here below1 be either wholes or parts2 if they be parts1 that part of them that will remain on high will also form parts2 if they be wholes1 they are here below the same as above2 they are not divided here below in any way1 and thus the universal 7,being7 is still the same without any division4 ,or again1 the potentialities are the particularized universal 7,being71 which has become the multitude of the things of which each is the total unity2 and these potentialities are mutually similar4 ,in this way1 with each being there will be but a single potentiality1 united to ,being1 and the other things will be no more than mere potentialities4 ,but it is not easier to conceive of a being without potentiality1 than a potentiality without a being2 for above 7among the ideas7 the potentiality consists of hypostatic existence and being2 or rather1 it is something greater than being4 ,here below there are other potentialities1 less energetic or lively2 they emanate from the universal 7,being7 as from a brilliant light would emanate another less brilliant light2 but the beings inhere in these potentialities1 as there could be no potentiality without being4 ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,is ,,everywhere ,,entire1 ,,including ,,souls ,,split ,,infinitely4 ,among such potentialities1 which are necessarily conformable to each other1 the universal ,soul must be the same everywhere1 or1 if she be not absolutely everywhere1 she must1 at least1 in every place1 be entire without division1 as in one and the same body4 ,in this case1 why could she not also be thus in the whole universe8 ,if we were to suppose that each particular soul were divided into infinity1 the universal ,soul will no longer be entire1 and1 as a result of this division1 she will become completely impotent4 ,then1 as there will be entirely different powers in different parts of the world1 there will be no more sympathy among souls4 ,last1 the image1 separated from the essence it represents1 and the light1 separated from the source of which it is only a weakened emanation1 could no longer subsist2 for in general everything that derives its existence from anything else and its image could no longer subsist without its model4 ,likewise1 these powers which radiate from the universal ,soul would cease to be if they found themselves separated from their principle4 ,if so1 the ,principle which begets these powers will exist everywhere they are2 consequently1 from this standpoint also1 the universal 7,being7 must be everywhere present as a whole1 without undergoing any divisions4 ,,the ,,image ,,is ,,bound ,,to ,,its ,,model ,,by ,,radiation4 #aj4 ,it may be objected that the image need not necessarily be attached to its model2 for there are images that subsist in the absence of their model from which they are derived4 ,for instance1 when the fire ceases1 the heat that proceeds from it does not any the less remain in the warmed object4 ,the relation between this image and its model should be understood as follows4 ,let us consider an image made by a painter4 ,in this case1 it is not the model who made the image1 but the painter2 and even so it is not even the real image of the model1 even if the painter had painted his own portrait2 for this image did not arise from the body of the painter1 nor from the represented form1 nor from the painter himself1 but it is the product of a complex of colors arranged in a certain manner4 ,we1 therefore1 do not really here have the production of an image1 such as is furnished by mirrors1 waters1 and shadows4 ,here the image really emanates from the pre-existing model1 and is formed by it1 and could not exist without it4 ,it is in this manner that the inferior potentialities proceed from the superior ones4 ,,souls ,,are ,,as ,,immortal ,,as ,,the ,,one ,,from ,,whom ,,they ,,proceed4 ,let us proceed to the objection drawn from the heat that remains after the withdrawal of the fire4 ,the heat is not the image of the fire1 or at least1 we may deny that there is always fire in heat2 but even so heat would not be independent of fire4 ,besides1 when you withdraw from a body the fire that heats it1 this body grows cold1 if not instantaneously1 at least gradually4 ,it would1 however1 be wrong to say that the powers that descend here below also gradually grow extinct2 for this would amount to stating that only the ,one is immortal1 while the souls and intelligences are mortal4 ,besides1 it is not reasonable to admit that even the things that derive from a being that wastes away also gradually exhaust themselves2 for even if you should immobilize the sun1 it would still shed the same light in the same places4 ,if it were objected that it would not be the same light1 the conclusion would be 7the absurdity7 that the body of the sun is in a perpetual wastage4 ,last we have elsewhere demonstrated at length that what proceeds from the ,one does not perish1 but that all souls and intelligences are immortal4 ,,beings ,,partake ,,of ,,the ,,one ,,differently ,,according ,,to ,,their ,,capacities4 #aa4 ,but if 7the intelligible ,being7 be present everywhere1 why do not all 7beings7 participate in the intelligible 7,being7 entire8 ,why are there several degrees amidst these 7beings71 one being the first1 the other the second1 and so on8 ,because the 7beings7 which are capable of absorbing 7intelligible ,being7 are counted as present thereto4 ,essence exists everywhere in that which is essence1 thus never failing itself4 ,everything that can be present to it is present in reality1 in the measure of its capacity1 not in a local manner1 as light is modified by transparence2 for participation takes place differently in an opaque body4 ,if we distinguish several degrees among beings1 we shall surely have to conceive that the first is separated from the second1 and the second from the third1 only by its order1 its power1 its 7individual7 differences1 but not by its location4 ,in the intelligible world nothing hinders different things from subsisting together1 such as soul and intelligence1 and all the sciences1 superior or inferior4 ,thus also in a single apple the eye sees color1 the nostril smells perfume1 and each other sense-organ perceives its individual quality4 ,all these things subsist together and are not separated from each other4 ,,the ,,different ,,kinds ,,of ,,presences4 ,is the intelligible 7,being7 then so varied and manifold8 ,it is indeed varied1 but it is simultaneously simple2 it is both one and manifold2 for reason 7which is the essence of the universal ,soul71 is both one and manifold4 ,the universal 7,being7 is also one2 though any difference in it 7in this sense1 that it contains different essences71 results from its own constitution2 the difference inheres in its nature1 for it could not belong to non-being4 ,the constitution of ,essence is such as to be inseparable from unity2 unity is present wherever essence is1 and the one ,essence subsists in itself4 ,it is indeed possible that an essence which in a certain respect is separated from another essence1 is1 however1 entirely present with it4 ,but there are different kinds of presence2 first1 when sense-things are present with intelligible things1 at least to those to which they can be present2 second1 when intelligible entities are present to each other2 likewise1 when the body is present to the soul2 another1 when a science is present to the soul2 further1 when a science is present to another science1 and both coexist in the same intelligence2 last1 when a body is present to another body4 ,,how ,,various ,,things ,,can ,,participate ,,in ,,the ,,same ,,principle4 #ab4 ,when a sound resounds in the air1 and when it constitutes a word1 the ear that is present hears and perceives this sound and this word1 especially if the place be quiet4 ,if another ear should come to be in this place1 the sound and the word approach it likewise1 or rather1 this ear will approach the word4 ,suppose also that several eyes consider the same object2 all are filled with its sight1 although this object occupy a determinate place4 ,thus the same object will impress different organs with different perceptions1 because the one is an eye1 and the other is an ear4 ,likewise1 all the things that can participate in the soul do participate therein1 but each receives a different power from one and the same principle4 ,the sound is everywhere present in the air2 it is not a divided unity1 but a unity present everywhere1 entirely4 ,likewise1 if the air receive the form of the visible object1 it possesses it without division1 for1 in whatever place the eye should place itself1 it perceives the form of the visible object2 at1 least1 according to our opinion1 for not all philosophers agree herewith4 ,we give these examples to explain how several things may participate in one and the same principle4 ,besides1 the example of the sound suffices to demonstrate what we here wish to explain2 namely1 that the entire form is present in the entire air2 for all men would not hear the same thing1 if the word uttered by the sound were everywhere entire1 and if each ear did not likewise hear it entire4 ,now if in this case the entire word spread in the entire air1 without some definite part of the word being united to a certain part of the air1 and some other part of the word being united with another part of the air1 how could we refuse to admit that a single ,soul penetrates everywhere without dividing herself with the things1 that she is entirely present everywhere where she is1 that she is everywhere in the world without dividing into parts that correspond to those of the world8 ,when she has united with the bodies1 in whatever kind of union1 she bears an analogy to the word which has been pronounced in the air1 while before uniting with the bodies1 she resembles him who pronounces1 or is about to pronounce some word4 ,nevertheless1 even when she has united to the bodies1 she does not really in certain respects cease resembling him who pronounces a word1 and who1 while pronouncing it1 possesses it1 and gives it at the same time4 ,doubtless the word does not have a nature identical with those things that we proposed to illustrate by this example2 nevertheless1 there is much analogy between them4 ,,the ,,body',s ,,relation ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,a ,,passage ,,into ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,life4 7,let us study7 the relation of the 7world7 ,soul to bodies4 ,as this relation is of a different kind1 it must be understood that the ,soul is not partly in herself and partly in the bodies4 ,simultaneously she dwells entirely within herself1 and also projects her image into the multiplicity of the bodies 7which reflect her1 like mirrors74 ,suppose that some definite body approach the ,soul to receive life from her2 it obtains life silently1 and thus possesses what already was in other bodies4 ,indeed1 conditions had not been arranged so that a part of the ,soul1 located in a certain place1 should await a body1 so as to enter into it4 ,but this part of the ,soul which enters into a body1 so to speak1 existed already in the universe1 that is to say1 in herself1 and she continued to exist in herself although she seemed to have descended here below4 ,how indeed should the ,soul descend here below8 ,therefore1 if she did not descend here below1 if she only manifested her actual presence1 without awaiting the body which was to participate in her1 evidently the ,soul dwells in herself simultaneously with becoming present to this body4 ,now1 if the ,soul dwell in herself at the same time as she becomes present to this body 7for it is not the ,soul that came into this body71 it is the body which entered into her2 it is the body which1 being till then outside of veritable ,essence1 entered into it1 and passed into the world of life4 ,now the world of life was all in itself1 without extension1 and1 therefore1 without division4 ,the body has1 therefore1 not entered into it as in something that possesses extension4 ,it commenced by participating1 not in one of the parts of the world of life1 but in this whole world1 entirely4 ,if an additional body should also enter it1 it will participate in it in the same way 7entirely74 ,consequently1 if we said that the world of life is entire in these bodies1 it is similarly entire in each of them4 ,it is1 therefore everywhere the same1 and numerically one1 without dividing1 but always present entire4 ,,extension ,,is ,,merely ,a ,,sign ,,of ,,participation ,,in ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,life4 #ac4 ,whence originates extension in our universe1 and in the animals8 ,the world of life contains no extension4 ,sensation1 whose testimony hinders us from believing what we are told in this respect1 reveals to us here and there the world of life4 ,but reason tells us that1 if we see it thus1 it is not that it is really extended here and there1 but that all that possesses extension has participated in the world of life1 which1 however1 has no extension4 ,,participation ,,can ,,be ,,only ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,when a being participates in something1 evidently it does not participate in itself2 for thus it would really participate in nothing1 and would remain what it was4 ,the body that participates in something must1 therefore1 not participate in corporeal nature1 for it possesses it already4 ,consequently1 the body will not participate in the corporeal nature1 any more than a magnitude would participate in a magnitude1 which it possesses already4 ,let us even admit that a magnitude be increased1 yet on that account alone it would not participate in magnitude2 for a two-foot object does1 not become a three-foot object1 but the object which first had a certain quantity merely changes to some other quantity2 otherwise two would become three4 ,thus1 since that which has extension and is divided participates in genus that is different1 and even very different1 the thing in which it participates must neither be divided1 nor have extension2 but have absolutely no kind of quantity4 ,consequently1 the 7being7 which everywhere is present entire must be present1 though remaining indivisible4 ,it is not indivisible merely because it is small1 which would not make it any less divisible2 only1 it would no more be proportioned to the universe1 it would not spread in the corporeal mass in the degree that it increases4 ,neither does it resemble a point1 but it includes an infinity of points2 consequently what you might suppose was a point would include an infinity of 7separate7 points1 and could not be continuous1 nor1 consequently1 proportion itself to the universe4 ,if then every corporeal mass possess the 7being7 which is present everywhere1 it must possess it entire in all the parts that compose it4 ,,nothing ,,in ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,is ,,begotten2 ,,it ,,only ,,seems ,,so4 #ad4 ,but if one and the single ,soul be in each person1 how does each have his own soul8 ,how then can one soul be good1 while the other is evil8 ,the universal ,soul communicates her life to each1 for she contains all the souls and all the intelligences4 ,she possesses simultaneously unity and infinity2 in her breast she contains all the souls1 each distinct from her1 but not separated2 otherwise how could the ,soul possess the infinite8 ,it might still be objected that the universal ,soul simultaneously contains all things1 all lives1 all souls1 all the intelligences2 that these are not each circumscribed by limits1 and that that is the reason they form a unity4 ,indeed1 there had to be in the universal ,soul a life not only one1 but infinite1 and yet single2 this one life had to be one so far as it was all lives1 as these did not get confused in this unity1 but that they should originate there1 while at the same time they should remain located in the place from where they had started2 or rather1 they never left the womb of the universal ,soul1 for they have always subsisted in the same state4 ,indeed1 nothing was begotten in the universal ,soul2 she did not really divide herself1 she only seems divided in respect to what receives her2 everything within her remains what it has always been4 ,but that which was begotten 7namely1 the body7 approaches the ,soul1 and seems to unite with her1 and depends on her4 ,,relation ,,of ,,man ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,and what are we8 ,are we the universal ,soul1 or are we what approaches her1 and what is begotten in time 7that is1 the body78 ,no3 7we are not bodies74 ,before the generation of the bodies had been accomplished1 we existed already on high2 some of us were men1 others of us were even divinities----that is1 we were pure souls1 intelligences connected with universal ,being2 we formed parts of the intelligible world1 parts that were neither circumscribed nor separated1 but which belonged to the entire intelligible world4 ,even now1 indeed1 we are not separated from the intelligible world2 but the intelligible ,man in us has received1 and is joined by a man who desired to be different from the former 7that is1 the sense-man desired to be independent71 and finding us1 for we were not outside of the universe1 he surrounded us1 and added himself to the intelligible man who then was each one of us4 ,,we ,,are ,,not ,,always ,,both ,,men1 ,,as ,,we ,,should ,,be4 ,now suppose a single sound or word2 those who listen to it hear it and receive it1 each in his own way2 hearing passes into each of them in the condition of an actualization1 and perceives what is acting on it4 ,we thus became two men at once 7the intelligible ,man1 and the sense-man who added himself to the former72 we are no longer1 as before1 only one of the two2 or rather1 we are sometimes still only one of them1 the man who added himself to the first4 ,this occurs every time that the first ,man slumbers in us1 and is not present1 in a certain sense 7when we fail to reflect about the conceptions of intelligence74 ,,how ,,the ,,body ,,approached ,,the ,,soul4 #ae4 ,but how did the body approach the universal ,soul8 ,as this body had an aptitude for participation in the ,soul1 it received that for which it was fit2 now it was disposed to receive a particular soul2 that is why it did not receive the universal ,soul4 ,although the latter be present with this body1 she does not become entirely suitable to it2 that is why plants and the non-human souls likewise possess only so much of the universal ,soul1 as they were able to receive from her4 ,likewise1 when a voice challenges notice1 so some 7persons7 grasp only the sound1 others grasp also the signification4 ,as soon as the animal has been begotten1 it possesses within itself the presence of a soul derived from the universal 7,being71 and by which it remains united with this 7,being7 because then it possesses a body that is neither empty nor inanimate4 ,this body was not before in an inanimate place1 and 7when it was begotten71 it only further reapproximated itself to the soul by its aptitude 7to receive life72 it became not only a body1 but also a living body2 thanks to the neighborhood to the soul1 it received a trace 7of the soul72 and by that ,i do not mean a part of the soul1 but a kind of heat or light which emanated from the soul1 and which1 in the body1 begat desires1 pleasures1 and pains4 ,the body of the thus begotten animal was1 therefore1 not a body foreign 7to life74 ,the ,soul1 that had issued from the divine principle1 remained tranquil according to her own nature1 and was subsisting in herself1 when that part1 which was troubled by her own weakness1 and was spontaneously fluctuating around when assailed by impulsions from without1 first complained audibly by herself1 and then in that part of the animal which is common to the soul and body1 and communicated her disturbance to the entire living being4 ,thus when a deliberative assembly calmly examines some question1 a confused mob1 driven by hunger or excited by some passion1 may come to spread trouble and disorder in the whole assembly4 ,as long as such people keep quiet1 the voice of the wise man may be heard by them2 and as a result the crowd retains orderliness1 its worse part remaining subordinate2 otherwise the worst part dominates1 while the better part remains silent1 because the trouble hinders the crowd from listening to reason4 ,thus does evil come to reign in a city and in an assembly4 ,likewise evil reigns in him who allows himself to be dominated by this disorderly crowd of fears1 desires and passions that he bears within his breast2 and that will last until he reduce that crowd to obedience1 until he become again the man he formerly was 7before descending here below71 and until he regulate his life 7according to the better ,man72 what he then will grant to the body will be granted as to something foreign4 ,as to him who lives now in one manner1 and now in another1 he is a man of mingled good and evil4 ,,this ,,doctrine ,,explains ,,the ,,myths ,,of ,,ancient ,,philosophers4 #af4 ,if the soul could not become evil1 and if there be but a single way for the soul to enter the body1 and to remain present within it1 there would be no meaning in the periodical descents and ascents of the soul1 the chastisements she undergoes1 and the migration into the bodies other 7than human bodies1 that is1 animal ones74 ,such 7mythological7 teachings have indeed been handed down from the ancient philosophers who best expounded the soul4 ,now it will be well to show that our doctrine harmonizes with that which they have taught1 or that at least there is no contradiction between them4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,descent ,,into ,,the ,,body4 ,we have just explained that1 when the body participates in the soul1 the soul does not somehow go beyond herself to enter into the body1 that it is on the contrary the body which enters into the soul1 on participating in life1 or evidently1 when the ancient philosophers say that the soul comes into the body1 this means that the body enters into essence1 and participates in the life and the soul2 in one word1 to come does not here signify passing from one place into another1 but indicates in what way the soul enters into dealings with the body4 ,therefore to descend means1 for the soul1 to grow into a body1 in the sense in which we have explained it2 that means1 to give the body something of the soul1 and not for the soul to become 7the property7 of the body4 ,consequently1 the soul's issuing from the body must again mean that the body ceases to participate in life4 ,,procedure ,,of ,,the ,,descent ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,this is how this participation takes place for the parts of this universe 7that is1 the bodies74 ,being situated as it were on the confines of the intelligible world1 the soul often gives the body something of herself2 for1 by her power 7or potentiality71 she is the neighbor of the body2 and finding herself close to it1 she enters into dealings therewith by virtue of a law of her nature2 but this intercourse is of evil1 and to enfranchise herself from the body is good4 ,why8 ,because if the soul be not the 7property or slave7 of the body in this intercourse1 she1 nevertheless1 unites herself to it1 and though she were universal1 she becomes individual2 for her activity no longer is exclusively confined to the intelligible world1 although 7she still1 by nature7 belong thereto4 ,it is as if someone1 who was an expert in a whole science1 confined himself to a single proposition thereof2 whereas a person who possesses a whole science should naturally consider its entirety1 and not a mere part of it4 ,likewise the soul1 which belonged entirely to the intelligible world1 and which partially blended her particular essence with the total ,essence1 withdrew out of the universal ,essence1 and became individual essence1 because the body to which she confines her activities is only a part of this universe4 ,it is as if the fire1 endowed with the ability of burning everything1 was reduced to burn out some small object1 although it possessed power of universal scope4 ,indeed1 when the particular soul is separated from the body1 she is no longer particular 7in actualization72 on the contrary1 when she has separated herself from the universal ,soul1 not by passing from one locality to another1 but by applying her activity 7to a part of this universe1 to a body71 she becomes particular 7in actualization71 though she remain universal in another manner 7in potentiality72 for when the soul presides over no body she is truly universal1 and is particular only in potentiality4 ,,what ,,hell ,,means ,,for ,,the ,,career ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,consequently1 when we say that the soul is in hell 7,hades71 if we mean by hades an invisible place1 that means that the soul is separated from the body2 if1 on the contrary1 we understand hell to mean a lower locality1 we may also offer a reasonable interpretation3 for now our soul is with our body and is located with it4 ,but what is meant by saying that the soul is in hell after the body no longer exists8 ,if the soul be not separated from her image1 why should she not be where her image is8 ,if the soul were separated from her image by philosophy1 this image will alone go to the lower locality1 while the soul lives purely in the intelligible world1 without any emanation4 ,this is what we had to teach about the image born of some particular individual4 ,as to the soul1 if she concentrate in her breast the light that radiates around her1 then1 turned towards the intelligible world1 she entirely re-enters into this world2 she is no longer in actualization4 ,but this does not cause her to perish 7for when she is incarnated in a body1 and is particular1 she exists only potentially2 while she attains to actualization when she becomes universal74 ,so much for this point2 now let us return to our subject4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,five4 ,the ,one ,identical ,essence is ,everywhere ,entirely ,present4 ,,unity ,,must ,,be ,,sought ,,for ,,in ,,essence4 #a4 ,it is a common conception of human thought that a principle single in number and identical is everywhere present in its entirety2 for it is an instinctive and universal truism that the divinity which dwells within each of us is single and identical in all4#c ,it cannot be expected that the men who will use this expression should be able to explain how ,god is present in us1 and without subjecting their opinion to the scrutiny of reason2 they will only affirm that such is the state of the case2 and resting in this conception which is the spontaneous result of their understanding1 they will all hold to this something that is single and only1 and will refuse to give up this unity4 ,that is the most solid principle of all1 a principle that our souls whisper instinctively1 and which is not deduced from the observation of particular things1 but which claims our attention far before them1 even before the maxim that everything aspires to the ,good4 ,now this principle is true if all the beings aspire to unity1 form an unity and tend towards unity4 ,this unity1 advancing towards all other things1 so far as it can advance seems to be manifold1 and indeed becomes so1 in certain respects1 but the ancient nature which is the desire of the ,good1 that belongs to itself1 really leads to unity2 and every nature aspires to possess this unity by turning towards itself2 for the good of the nature which is ,one1 is to belong to oneself1 to be oneself2 that is1 to unify oneself4 ,that is why it is reasonably said that the ,good peculiarly belongs to 7this nature71 and must not be sought outside of it4 ,how indeed could the ,good have fallen outside of the essence1 or be found in non-essence8 ,it must evidently be sought in essence1 since itself is not non-essence4 ,if then the ,good be essence1 and may be found in essence1 it must be within itself in each of us4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 be far from essence1 but we are in it4 ,neither is it far from us4 ,all 7beings71 therefore1 constitute but a unity4 ,,being ,,is ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,judgment ,,in ,,things ,,participating ,,in ,,being4 #b4 ,as the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here raised is not one1 but divided1 it makes use of corporeal nature in its researches1 by borrowing its principles4 ,that is why reason1 thinking it intelligible being1 similar to bodies1 divides it1 doubting its unity4 ,it could not be otherwise1 because its investigation was not founded on the proper immanent principles4 ,we must1 therefore1 in our discussion about the one universal ,essence1 choose principles capable of enlisting support1 principles that would be intellectual1 that is1 would connect with intelligible entities1 and veritable being4 ,for since our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux1 being subject to all kinds of changes1 trending towards all directions of space2 it should consequently be called not being1 but generation1 or becoming4 ,the eternal ,essence1 on the contrary1 is not divided2 it subsists ever in the same manner and in the same state1 neither is born1 nor perishes2 occupies neither place nor space2 does not reside in any determinate location2 neither enters1 nor issues1 but remains in itself4 ,a discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this 7physical7 nature1 and the things that are related to it1 which 7deductively7 give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms equally probable4 ,but when we deal with intelligible entities1 our starting-point must be the nature of the being considered2 principles have to be legitimately derived therefrom2 and then1 without surreptitiously substituting any other nature 7inductively71 borrow from the intelligible ,being itself the conception formed about it2 for being1 or whatness1 is everywhere taken as principle2 and it is said that the definition of an object1 when well made1 sets forth many of its accidents4 ,therefore1 when we are dealing with things where being is everything1 we must1 so much the more1 apply our whole attention to this being2 base all our 7arguments7 thereon1 and refer everything to it4 ,,intelligible ,,essence ,,is ,,both ,,in ,,and ,,out ,,of ,,itself4 #c4 ,if intelligible essence be essential essence2 if it be immutable2 if it never evade itself2 if it admit of no generation2 and be not in any place1 the result is1 that by virtue of its nature1 it ever remains within itself1 has no parts distant from each other1 located in different places2 that it does not issue from itself1 which would lead it to inhere in different subjects1 or at least to inhere in one subject1 and1 consequently1 no longer to dwell in itself1 and no longer to remain impassible2 for if it inhered in something different from itself1 it would be exposed to suffering 7passion1 or1 experience74 ,as1 however1 this is impossible1 it can not inhere in anything other than itself4 ,therefore1 since it never departs from itself1 as it is never divided1 as it exists within several things simultaneously without undergoing any change1 as it exists within itself one and simultaneously entire1 it must1 while existing in several things1 remain everywhere identical2 that is1 be everywhere entire both in itself1 and out of itself4 ,consequently1 it does not 7exist7 within any determinate thing1 but the other things participate in it1 so far as they are capable of approaching it1 and so far as they do approach it in the measure in which they are capable4 ,,that ,,entire ,,being ,,is ,,present ,,everywhere ,,is ,,the ,,only ,,solution ,,of ,,the ,,puzzle4 ,consequently1 it will be necessary either to reject the propositions set forth above1 that is1 the principles which have been established1 and deny the existence of the intelligible entities2 or1 as this is impossible1 to recognize the truth of what has been advanced from the very beginning 7of this discussion73 the ,essence which is one and identical is indivisible1 and exists as single everywhere4 ,it is not distant from any of the other things2 and1 nevertheless1 7to be near them7 it has no need of spreading1 of letting certain portions of its essence flow4#d ,it remains entire in itself1 and though it produce something inferior1 it does not1 on that account1 abandon itself1 and does not extend itself hither and yon in other things2 otherwise1 it would be on one side1 while the things it produces would be on the other1 and it would occupy a place1 finding itself separated therefrom4 ,as to these 7produced things71 each of them is either a whole or a part4 ,if it be a part1 it will not preserve the nature of the all1 as we have already said2 if1 however1 it be all1 we shall have to divide it in as many parts as that in which it subsists--or1 it will have to be granted that the identical essence can simultaneously be everywhere entire4 ,this is a demonstration drawn from the matter itself1 which contains nothing external to the being that we are examining1 and which does not borrow anything from any other nature4 ,,god',s ,,presence ,,everywhere ,,entire ,,described ,,as ,,infinite4 #d4 ,let us1 therefore1 contemplate this ,divinity who is not present here1 and absent there1 but who is everywhere4 ,all those who have any idea of the divinities admit that they1 as well as that supreme ,divinity1 are present everywhere4 ,reason compels this admission4 ,now1 since the ,divinity is everywhere1 ,he is not divided2 otherwise1 ,he would not be present everywhere2 ,he would have ,his parts1 one here1 and another there4 ,he would no longer be a unity2 ,he would resemble an expanse divided into a number of parts2 ,he would be annihilated in this division1 and all ,his parts would no longer form the whole2 in short1 ,he would have become body4 ,if that be impossible1 we shall have to admit that to which before we refused assent1 to which all human nature testifies1 namely1 that the ,divinity is everywhere simultaneously present1 entire1 and identical4 ,if we acknowledge such a nature as infinite1 since it has no limits1 this will be granting that it lacks nothing4 ,now if it lack nothing1 it must be present to every essence2 if it could not be essence1 there would be places1 where it did not exist1 and it would lack something4 ,the essences which exist beneath the ,one exist simultaneously with ,him1 are posterior to ,him1 refer to ,him1 and reattach themselves to ,him as ,his creatures2 so that to participate in what is posterior to ,him is to participate in ,himself4 ,as1 in the intelligible world1 there is a multitude of beings which there occupy the first1 second1 or third ranks1 in that they depend from that only centre of a single sphere2 and as they coexist there without any separating distance between them1 the result is that the essences which occupy the first or second ranks are present there even where are the beings that occupy the third rank4 ,,example ,,of ,,the ,,sun ,,and ,,the ,,rays4 #e4 ,in order to clear up this point1 the following illustration has been much used4 ,let us imagine a multitude of rays1 which start from a single centre2 and you will succeed in conceiving the multitude begotten in the intelligible world4 ,but1 admitting this proposition1 that things begotten in the intelligible1 and which are called multitude1 exist simultaneously1 one observation must be added3 in the circle1 the rays which are not distinct may be supposed to be distinct1 because the circle is a plane4 ,but there1 where there is not even the extension proper to a plane1 where there are only potentialities and beings without extension1 all things must be conceived as centres united together in a single centre1 as might be the rays considered before their development in space1 and considered in their origin1 where1 with the centre1 they form but a single and same point4 ,if now you imagine developed rays1 they will depend from the points from where they started1 and every point will not be any the less a centre1 as nothing will separate it from the first centre4 ,thus these centres1 though united to the first centre1 will not any the less have their individual existence1 and will form a number equal to the rays of which they are the origins4 ,as many rays as will come to shine in the first centre1 so many centres will there seem to be2 and1 nevertheless1 all together will form but a single one4 ,now if we compare all intelligible entities to centres1 and ,i mean centres that coincide in a single centre and unite therein1 but which seem multiple because of the different rays which manifest1 without begetting them1 such rays could give us some idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible being seems to be manifold and present everywhere4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,manifoldness4 #f4 ,intelligible entities1 indeed1 though they form a manifold1 nevertheless1 form an unity4 ,on the other hand1 though they form an unity1 yet by virtue of their infinite nature they also form a manifold4 ,they are the multitude in unity1 and unity in multitude2 they all subsist together4 ,they direct their actualization towards the whole1 with the whole1 and it is still with the whole1 that they apply themselves to the part4 ,the part receives within itself the first action1 as if it were that of only a part2 but1 nevertheless1 it is the whole that acts4 ,it is as if a ,man-in-himself1 on descending into a certain man1 became this man without1 however1 ceasing being the ,man-in-himself4 ,the material man1 proceeding from the ideal ,man1 who is single1 has produced a multitude of men1 who are the same because one and the same thing has impressed its seal on a multitude4 ,thus the ,man-in-himself1 and every intelligible entity in itself1 and then the whole entire universal ,essence is not in the multitude1 but the multitude is in the universal ,essence1 or rather1 refers to it2 for if whiteness be everywhere present in the body1 it is not in the same manner as the soul of an individual is present and identical in all the organs4 ,it is in this latter manner that the essence is present everywhere4 ,,parable ,,of ,,the ,,head ,,with ,,faces ,,all ,,around4 #g4 ,our nature and we ourselves all depend on 7cosmic7 being2 we aspire to it1 we use it as principle1 from the very beginning4 ,we think the intelligible 7entities contained in essence7 without having either images or impressions thereof4 ,consequently1 when we think the intelligible 7entities71 the truth is that we are these very intelligible entities themselves4 ,since we thus participate in the genuine knowledge1 we are the intelligible entities1 not because we receive them in us1 but because we are in them4 ,however1 as beings other than we constitute intelligible entities1 as well as we1 we are all the intelligibles4 ,we are intelligible entities so far as they subsist simultaneously with all essences2 consequently1 all of us together form but a single unity4 ,when we turn our gaze outside of ,him from whom we depend1 we no longer recognize that we are an unity2 we then resemble a multitude of faces which 7being disposed in a circle7 would1 as seen from the exterior1 form a plurality1 but which in the interior would form but a single head4 ,if one of these faces could turn around1 either spontaneously1 or by the aid of ,minerva1 it would see that itself is the divinity1 that it is the universal ,essence4 ,no doubt1 it would not at first see itself as universal1 but later1 not being able to find any landmarks by which to determine its own limits1 and to determine the distance to which it extends1 it would have to give up the attempt to distinguish itself from the universal 7,essence71 and it would become the universal 7,essence7 without ever changing location1 and by remaining in the very foundation of the universal 7,essence74 ,,this ,,is ,,proved ,,by ,,the ,,participation ,,of ,,matter ,,in ,,ideas4 #h4 ,whoever will consider the participation of matter in ideas will be impressed with the above theory1 will declare it not impossible1 and express no further doubts4 ,it is necessary to admit the impossibility of a conception such as the following3 on one hand1 the ideas separate from matter2 on the other hand1 matter at a distance from them1 and then an irradiation from on high descending on matter4 ,such a conception would be senseless4 ,what meaning would lie in this separation of the ideas1 and this distance of matter8 ,would it not then be very difficult to explain and to understand what is called the participation of matter in ideas8 ,only by examples can we make our meaning clear4 ,doubtless1 when we speak of an irradiation1 we do not1 however1 mean anything similar to the irradiation of some visible object4 ,but as the material forms are images1 and as they have ideas1 as archetypes1 we say that they are illuminated by the ideas1 so as to convey the idea that that which is illuminated is different from that which illumines4 ,now1 however1 to express ourselves more exactly1 we shall have to enforce that the idea is not locally separated from matter1 and does not reflect itself therein as some object does in water4 ,on the contrary1 matter surrounds the idea on all sides2 touches it somehow without touching it2 then1 in its entirety1 it receives what1 it is capable of receiving from its vicinity 7to the idea71 without any intermediary1 without the idea penetrating through the whole of matter1 or hovering above it1 without ceasing to remain within itself4 ,,the ,,soul1 ,,as ,,entire1 ,,fashioned ,,the ,,whole ,,and ,,the ,,individuals4 ,since the idea of fire1 for instance1 is not in matter1 let us imagine matter serving as subject for the elements4 ,the idea of fire1 without itself descending into matter1 will give the form of the fire to the whole fiery matter1 while the fire1 first mingled with matter will constitute a multiple mass4 ,the same conception may be applied to the other elements4 ,if then the intelligible fire appear in everything as producing therein an image of itself1 it does not produce this image in matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally1 as would have occurred in the irradiation of a visible object2 otherwise it would be somewhere1 and it would fall under the senses4 ,since the universal ,fire is multiple1 we must conclude that1 while its idea remains in itself outside of all place1 it itself has begotten the localities2 otherwise we would have to think that1 having become multiple 7by its parts71 it would extend1 by withdrawing from itself1 to become multiple in this manner1 and to participate several times in the same principle4 ,now1 being indivisible1 the idea has not given a part of its being to matter2 nevertheless1 in spite of its unity1 it has communicated a form to what was not contained in its unity2 it granted its presence to the universe without fashioning this by one of its parts1 and that by some other part4 ,it was as an entire whole that it fashioned the whole and the individuals4 ,it would indeed be ridiculous to suppose that there was a multitude of the ideas of fire1 so that each fire might be formed by its own particular idea2 if that were the case1 the ideas would be innumerable4 ,further1 how would we divide the things that have been generated by the ,fire1 since it is single1 and continuous8 ,if we augment the material fire by adding to it another fire1 it is evidently the same idea which will produce in this portion of matter the same things as in the remainder2 for it could not be another idea4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,proves ,,that ,,of ,,the ,,supreme4 #i4 ,if all the elements1 when begotten1 were to be gathered into one sphere1 7there would be an opportunity of observing and comparing them4 ,the result would be a conclusion that7 this sphere does not have a plurality or a diversity of authors1 one of whom would have created one part1 and another author1 another4 ,the production of this sphere will imply a single ,author1 who created it by acting1 as a whole2 not producing one part of creation by one part of ,himself1 and another part of creation1 by another part of ,himself4 ,in the latter case1 the sphere might still have several authors1 if the production of the totality were not traced to a single1 indivisible ,principle4 ,though this single and indivisible ,principle be the author of the entire sphere1 it does not interpenetrate the sphere2 for it is the entire ,sphere which depends on its author4 ,one only and single ,life contains the entire ,sphere1 because this is located in a single ,life4 ,all the things that are in the sphere may1 therefore1 be reduced to a single ,life1 and all the souls form a ,soul which is single1 but which is simultaneously infinite4 ,that is why certain philosophers have said that the soul is a number2#e others1 that the number produces increase in the soul1 no doubt meaning by that1 that nothing is deficient in soul1 that she is everywhere without ceasing to be herself4 ,as to the expression1 to produce increase to the soul1 this must not be taken literally1 but so as to mean that the soul1 in spite of her unity1 is absent nowhere2 for the unity of the soul is not a unity that can be measured2 that is the peculiarity of another being which falsely claims unity for itself1 and which succeeds in gaining the appearance of unity only by participating therein4 ,the ,essence which really is one is not a unity composed of several things2 for the withdrawal of one of them would destroy the total unity4 ,nor is it separated from the other things by limits2 for if the other things were assimilated thereto1 it would become smaller in the case where these would be greater2 either it would split itself up into fragments by seeking to penetrate all1 and instead of being present to all1 as an entirety1 it would be reduced to touching their parts by its own parts4 ,if then this ,essence may justly be called one1 if unity may be predicated of its being1 it must1 in a certain manner1 seem to contain the nature opposed to its own2 that is1 the manifold2 it must not attract this manifoldness from without1 but it must1 from and by itself1 possess this manifold2 it must veritably be one1 and by its own unity be infinite and manifold4 ,being such1 it seems as if it were everywhere a ,reason 7a being71 which is single1 and which contains itself4 ,it is itself that which contains2 and thus containing itself1 it is no where distant from itself2 it is everywhere in itself4 ,it is not separated from any other being by a local distance2 for it existed before all the things which are in a locality2 it had no need of them2 it is they1 on the contrary1 which need to be founded on it4 ,even though they should come to be founded on it1 it would not1 on that account1 cease resting on itself as a foundation4 ,if this foundation were to be shaken1 immediately all other things would perish1 since they would have lost the base on which they rested4 ,now this ,essence could not lose reason to the point of dissolving itself by withdrawing from itself2 and to be about to trust itself to the deceptive nature of space which needs it for preservation4 ,,the ,,being ,,loves ,,essence ,,as ,,entire4 #aj4 ,animated by wisdom1 this ,essence dwells in itself1 and it could never inhere in other things4 ,it is these1 on the contrary1 that come to depend from it1 as if with passion seeking where it may be4 ,that is the love that watches at the door of the beloved1 which remains ever near the beautiful1 agitated with the desire of possessing it1 and esteeming itself happy to share in its gifts4 ,indeed1 the lover of the celestial beauty does not receive ,beauty itself1 but1 as he stands near it1 he shares in its favors1 while the latter remains immovable in itself4 ,there are1 therefore1 many beings which love one only and same thing1 who love it entire1 and who1 when they possess it1 possess it entire in the measure in which they are capable of doing so2 for they desire to possess it entire4 ,why then should not this ,essence suffice to all by remaining within itself8 ,it suffices precisely because it remains within itself2 it is beautiful because it is present to all as an entire whole4 ,,reason ,,also ,,is ,a ,,whole4 ,for us ,wisdom also is a whole2 it is common to all of us1 because it is not different in different places2 it would1 indeed1 be ridiculous for it to need existence in some locality4 ,besides1 wisdom does not resemble whiteness2 for 7whiteness is the quality of a body1 while7 ,wisdom does not at all belong to the body4 ,if we really participate in ,wisdom1 we necessarily aspire to some thing single and identical1 which exists in itself1 as a whole1 simultaneously4 ,when we participate in this ,wisdom1 we do not receive it in fragments1 but entire2 and the ,wisdom which you possess entire is not different from that which ,i myself possess4 ,we find an image of this unity of ,wisdom in the assemblies and meetings of men1 where all those present seem to help in making up a single ,wisdom4 ,it seems that each one1 isolated from the others1 would be powerless to find wisdom2 but when the same person is in a meeting1 where all the minds agree together1 in applying themselves to a single object1 he would produce1 or rather discover1 ,wisdom4 ,what indeed hinders different minds from being united within one same and single ,intelligence8 ,although ,intelligence be common to us and to other men1 we do not notice this community4 ,it is as if1 touching a single object with several fingers1 one should later imagine having touched several objects2 or as if one had struck a single chord of the lyre without seeing it 7and thinking that one had struck different chords74 ,,by ,,the ,,intelligible ,,parts ,,of ,,their ,,being1 ,,all ,,men ,,share ,,the ,,same ,,intelligible4 ,let us return to our subject4 ,we were seeking how we might attain the ,good with our souls4 ,the ,good that you attain is not different from the one that ,i myself attain2 it is the same4 ,and when ,i say that it is the same1 ,i do not mean that from the ,good descended upon us both different things1 so that the ,good would remain somewhere on high1 while ,his gifts descended down here2 on the contrary1 ,i mean that ,he who gives is present to those who receive1 so that these may veritably receive2 ,i mean besides that ,he gives ,his gifts to beings who are intimately united with ,him1 and not to beings who might be foreign to ,him2 for intellectual gifts cannot be communicated in a local manner4 ,one even sees different bodies1 in spite of the distance that separates them1 receiving the same gifts1 because the gift granted1 and the effect produced tend to the same result2 much more1 all the actions and passions which produce themselves in the body of the universe are contained within it1 and nothing comes to it from without4 ,now if a body1 which by its nature as it were scatters itself 7because it is in a perpetual flowing wastage71 nevertheless1 receives nothing from without1 how would a being that has no extension retain nothing from without1 how would a being that has no extension retain something from without8 ,consequently1 as all are contained in one and the same ,principle1 we see the good1 and we altogether touch it by the intelligible part of our nature4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,has ,,much ,,more ,,unity ,,than ,,the ,,sense-,,world4 ,besides1 the intelligible world has much more unity than the sense-world2 otherwise1 there would be two sense-worlds1 since the intelligible sphere would not differ from the sense-sphere if the former did not have more unity than the latter4 ,in respect to unity1 therefore1 the intelligible world would surpass the sense-sphere4 ,it would indeed be ridiculous to admit that one of the two spheres would have an extension suitable to its nature2 while the other1 without any necessity1 would extend1 and would withdraw from its centre4 ,why would not all things conspire together to unity1 in the intelligible world8 ,there1 indeed1 no one thing hinders another by impenetrability1 any more than the conception that you have of a notion or of a proposition in no wise hinders the one that ,i have in myself1 any more than different notions mutually hinder each other in the same soul4 ,to the objection that such a union could not take place for 7separate7 beings1 an affirmative answer may be given1 but only if one dare to suppose that veritable beings are corporeal masses4 ,,how ,,the ,,intelligible ,,may ,,remain ,,unmoved ,,and ,,yet ,,penetrate ,,in ,,the ,,world4 #aa4 ,how can the intelligible1 which has no extension1 penetrate into the whole body of the universe1 which has no such extension8 ,how does it remain single and identical1 and how does it not split up8 ,this question has been raised several times1 and we sought to answer it1 so as to leave no uncertainty4 ,we have often demonstrated that the things are thus2 nevertheless1 it will be well to give some further convincing proofs1 although we have already given the strongest demonstration1 and the most evident one1 by teaching the quality of the nature of the intelligible1 explaining that it is not a vast mass1 some enormous stone which1 located in space1 might be said to occupy an extension determined by its own magnitude1 and would be incapable of going beyond its limits2 for its mass and its power would be measured by its own nature1 which is that of a stone4 7,the intelligible ,essence1 on the contrary17 being the primary nature1 has no extension that is limited or measured1 because it itself is the measure of the sense-nature2 and because it is the universal power without any determinate magnitude4 ,nor is it within time1 because the time is continually divided into intervals1 while eternity dwells in its own identity1 dominating and surpassing time by its perpetual power1 though this seemed to have an unlimited course4 ,time may be compared to a line which1 while extending indefinitely1 ever depends from a point1 and turns around it2 so1 that1 into whatever place it advances1 it always reveals the immovable point around which it moves in a circle4 ,if1 by nature1 time be in the same relation 7as is this line with its centre71 and if the identical ,essence be infinite by its power as well as by its eternity1 by virtue of its infinite power it will have to produce a nature which would in some way be parallel to this infinite power1 which rises with it1 and depends from it1 and which finally1 by the movable course of time1 tries to equal this power which remains movable in itself4#f ,but then even this power of the intelligible ,essence remains superior to the universe1 because the former determines the extension of the latter4 ,,how ,,the ,,inferior ,,nature ,,can ,,participate ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,how could then the inferior nature participate in the intelligible1 at least to the extent of its capacity8 ,because the intelligible is everywhere present in its entirety1 although1 by the impotence of the things that receive it1 it be not perceived in its entirety in each of these things4 ,the identical essence is present everywhere1 not indeed as the material triangle1 which is multiple in respect to number in several subjects1 although it be identical therein in respect to being2 but as the immaterial triangle from which depend material triangles4 ,why then is the material triangle not everywhere1 like the immaterial triangle8 ,because matter does not entirely participate in the immaterial triangle1 as it also receives other forms1 and since it does not apply itself entirely to every intelligible entity4 ,indeed1 the primary ,nature does not give itself as an entirety to every thing2 but it communicates itself first to the primary genera 7of essences27 then1 through these1 it communicates itself to the other essences2 besides1 it is not any the less from the very beginning present to the entire universe4 ,,life ,,interpenetrates ,,all2 ,,and ,,knows ,,no ,,limits4 #ab4 ,but how does this 7primary ,nature7 make itself present to the whole universe8 ,it is present to the universe because it is the one ,life4 ,indeed1 in the world considered as a living being1 the life does not extend to certain limits1 beyond which it cannot spread2 for it is present everywhere4 ,but how can it be everywhere8 ,remember1 the power of life is not a determinate quantity2 if1 by thought1 it be infinitely divided1 still it never alters its fundamental characteristic of infinity4 ,this ,life does not contain any matter2 consequently1 it cannot be split up like a mass1 and end in being reduced to nothing4 ,when you have succeeded in gaining a conception of the inexhaustible and infinite power of the intelligent ,essence2 of its nature that is unceasing1 indefatigable2 that suffices itself completely1 to the point that its life1 so to speak1 overflows1 whatever be the place on which you fix your gaze1 or direct your attention2 where will you find absence of that intelligible ,essence8 ,on the contrary1 you can neither surpass its greatness1 nor arrive at anything infinitely small1 as if the intelligible ,essence had nothing further to give1 and as if it were gradually becoming exhausted4 ,,if ,,you ,,see ,,anything ,,beyond ,,it1 ,,you ,,depart ,,from ,,it4 ,when1 therefore1 you will have embraced the universal ,essence and will be resting within it1 you must not seek anything beyond it4 ,otherwise1 you will be withdrawing from it2 and1 directing your glance on something foreign1 you will fail to see what is near you4 ,if1 on the contrary1 you seek nothing beyond it1 you will be similar to a universal ,essence4 ,how8 ,you will be entirely united to it1 you will not be held back by any of its parts1 and you will not even be saying1 ,this is what ,i am6 ,by forgetting the particular being that you are1 you will be becoming the universal ,being4 ,you had1 indeed1 already been the universal ,essence1 but you were something besides2 you were inferior by that very circumstance2 because that which you possessed beyond the universal ,essence did not proceed from the universal ,essence1 for nothing can be added thereto2 but rather had come from that which is not universal4 ,when you become a determined being1 because you borrow something from non-essence1 you cease being universal4 ,but if you abandon non-essence1 you will be increasing yourself4 ,it is by setting aside all the rest that the universal ,essence may be discovered2 for essence does not reveal itself so long as one remains with the rest4 ,it does not approach you to make you enjoy its presence2 it is you who are straying from it1 when it ceases to be present4 ,besides1 when you stray away1 you are not actually straying away from it1 as it continues to be present2 you are not distant from it1 but1 though being near ,essence1 you have turned away from it4 ,thus even the other divinities1 though they be present to many human beings1 often reveal themselves only to some one person1 because he alone is able 7or1 knows how7 to contemplate them4 ,these divinities 7according to ,homer71#g assume many different forms1 and haunt the cities4 ,but it is to the supreme ,divinity that all the cities1 all the earth1 and all the heavens turn2 for the universe subsists by ,him1 and in ,him4 ,from ,him also do all real essences derive their existence2 it is from ,him that all depend1 even the 7universal7 ,soul1 and the universal ,life2 it is to ,his infinite unity that they all turn as to their goal2 a unity which is infinite precisely because it has no extension4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,sixth4 ,the ,superessential ,principle ,does ,not ,think2 ,which is the ,first ,thinking ,principle1 and ,which is the ,second8 ,,by ,,thinking1 ,,intelligence ,,passes ,,from ,,unity ,,to ,,duality4 #a4 ,one may think oneself1 or some other object4 ,what thinks itself falls least into the duality 7inherent to thought74 ,that which thinks some other object approaches identity less2 for though it contain what it contemplates1 it nevertheless differs therefrom 7by its nature74 ,on the contrary1 the principle that thinks itself is not1 by its nature1 separated from the object thought4 ,it contemplates itself1 because it is intimately united to itself2 the thinking subject1 and the object thought form but a single being within it1#h or1 it thus becomes two1 while it is only one4 ,it thinks in a superior manner1 because it possesses what it thinks2 it occupies the first rank as thinking principle1 because the thinking principle must simultaneously be unity and duality4 ,if it were not unity1 it would think some object other than itself2 it would no longer be the first thinking principle4 ,indeed1 that which thinks an object other than itself could not be the first thinking principle1 since it does not think the object of its thought as belonging to its essence2 and1 consequently1 it does not think itself4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the thinking principle possess the object1 if it be thought as belonging to its being 7or nature71 then the two terms of the thought 7the object and the subject71 will be identical4 ,the thinking principle1 therefore1 implies unity and duality simultaneously2 for unless it join duality to unity1 it will have nothing to think1 and1 consequently1 it will not think4 ,it must1 therefore1 be simple1 and not simple simultaneously4#i ,we better understand the necessity of this double condition when1 starting from the ,soul1 we rise to intelligence1 for within the latter it is easier to distinguish the subject from the object1 and to grasp its duality4#aj ,we may imagine two lights of which the one1 the soul herself1 is less brilliant1 and we may then posit as equal the light that sees and the light that is seen4 ,both of them1 having nothing further that distinguishes them1 will form but a single thing1 which thinks by virtue of its duality1 and which sees by virtue of its unity4 ,here by reason 7which is the characteristic faculty of the soul71 we have passed from duality to unity4 ,but1 while thinking1 intelligence passes from unity to duality2 it becomes1 or rather is1 duality1 because it thinks2 and is one1 because it thinks itself4 ,a ,,supra-,,thinking ,,principle ,,is ,,necessary ,,to ,,the ,,working ,,of ,,intelligence4 #b4 ,since we have distinguished two principles1 the one which is the first thinking principle 7the ,intelligence71 and the other which is the second 7the ,soul71 the ,principle superior to the first thinking principle must itself not think4 ,in order to think1 it would have to be ,intelligence2 to be ,intelligence1 it would have to think an object2 to be the first thinking principle1 it would have to contain this object4 ,now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should possess intelligence1 and should think2 otherwise it would not only be intelligible1 but even ,intelligence2 being thus dual1 it would not be the first4 ,on the other hand1 intelligence cannot subsist1 if there be not a purely intelligible nature 7being71 which is intelligible for ,intelligence1 but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor intelligible4 ,indeed1 that which is intelligible must be intelligible for something else4 ,as to ,intelligence1 its power is quite vain1 if it does not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks2 for it cannot think1 if it have no object to think2 and it is perfect only when it possesses this4 ,now1 before thinking1 it must by itself be perfect by nature 7being74 ,therefore1 the principle through which intelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks2 consequently1 it has no need to think1 since1 before thinking1 it suffices to itself4 ,it will1 therefore1 not think4#aa ,,the ,,first ,,thinking ,,principle ,,is ,,the ,,second ,,principle4 ,therefore1 the ,first principle 7the ,one7 does not think2 the second 7,intelligence7 is the first thinking principle2 the third 7the ,soul7 is the second thinking principle4 ,if the first ,principle thought1 it would possess an attribute2 consequently1 instead of occupying the first rank1 it would occupy only the second2 instead of being ,one1 it would be manifold1 and would be all the things that it thought2 for it would already be manifold1 even if it limited itself to thinking itself4 ,,the ,,first ,,must ,,be ,,one ,,exclusively1 ,,which ,,would ,,make ,,thought ,,impossible4 #c4 ,it might be objected that nothing 7in all this7 would hinder the first ,principle from being both single and manifold4 ,we will answer that the manifold needs a single subject4 ,the manifold cannot exist without the ,one from which it comes1 and in which it is2 without the ,one which is counted the first outside of other things1 and which must be considered only in itself4 ,even on the supposition that it co-exists with other things1 it must1 none the less1 while being taken with the other things with which it is supposed to co-exist1 be considered as different from them4 ,consequently1 it must not be considered as co-existing with other things1 but be considered as their subject 7or1 substrate71 and as existing in itself1 instead of co-existing with the other things of which it is the subject4 ,,without ,,something ,,simple1 ,,nothing ,,manifold ,,could ,,exist4 ,indeed1 that which is identical in things other than the ,one1 may no doubt be similar to the ,one1 but cannot be the ,one4 ,the ,one must exist alone in itself1 thus to be grasped in other things1 unless we should claim that its 7nature7 consists in subsisting with other things4 ,under this hypothesis1 there will not exist either anything absolutely simple1 nor anything composite4 ,nothing absolutely simple will exist1 since that which is simple could not subsist by itself2 neither could anything composite exist1 since nothing simple will exist4 ,for if no simple thing possess existence1 if there be no simple unity1 subsisting by itself1 which could serve as support to the composite1 if none of these things be capable of existing by itself1 let alone communicating to others1 since it does not exist2 we must conclude that that which1 of all these things1 is composite1 could not exist1 since it would be made up out of elements that do not exist1 and which are absolutely nothing4 ,therefore1 if we insist on the existence of the manifold1 we are implying the existence of the ,one before the manifold4 ,now since that which thinks is multiple1 the principle that is not manifold will not think4 ,but as this ,principle is the first1 then ,intelligence and thought are entities later than the first4 ,,good1 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,soul ,,are ,,like ,,light1 ,,sun ,,and ,,moon4 #d4 ,as the ,good must be simple1 and self-sufficient1 it has no need to think4 ,now that which it does not need could not be within it1 since nothing 7that is different from it7 exists in it2 consequently1 thought does not exist in it 7because it is essentially simple#ab74 ,besides1 the ,good is one thing1 and ,intelligence another2 by thinking1 ,intelligence takes on the form of ,good4 ,besides1 when in two objects unity is joined to something other than itself1 it is not possible that this unity1 which is joined to something else1 should be ,unity itself4 ,unity in itself should exist in itself before this unity was joined to anything else4 ,for the same reason1 unity joined to something else presupposes absolutely simple ,unity1 which subsists in itself1 and has nothing of what is found in unity joined to other things4 ,how could one thing subsist in another if the principle1 from which this other thing is derived1 did not have an existence that was independent1 and prior to the rest8 ,what is simple cannot derive anything from any other source2 but what is manifold1 or at least indicates plurality1 is of derivative 7nature74 ,the ,good may be compared to light1 ,intelligence to the sun1 and the ,soul to the moon that derives her light from the sun4 ,the ,soul's intelligence is only borrowed1 which intellectualizes her by coloring her with its light4 ,on the contrary1 ,intelligence1 in itself1 possesses its own light2 it is not only light1 but it is essentially luminous4 ,the ,principle that illuminates ,intelligence and which is nothing but light1 is absolutely simple light1 and supplies ,intelligence with the power to be what it is4 ,how could it need anything else8 ,it is not similar to what exists in anything else2 for what subsists in itself is very different from what subsists in something else4 ,,as ,,thought ,,is ,,inspiration ,,to ,,the ,,good1 ,,intelligence ,,implies ,,the ,,latter4 #e4 ,what is manifold needs to seek itself1 and naturally desires to embrace itself1 and to grasp itself by self-consciousness4 ,but that which is absolutely ,one could not reflect on itself1 and need self-consciousness4 ,the absolutely identical principle is superior to consciousness and thought4 ,intelligence is not the first2 it is not the first either by its essence1 nor by the majestic value of its existence4 ,it occupies only the second rank4 ,it existed only when the ,good already existed2 and as soon as it existed1 it turned towards the ,good4 ,in turning towards the ,good1 ,intelligence cognized the latter2 for thought consists of conversion towards the ,good1 and aspiration thereto4 ,aspiration towards the ,good1 therefore1 produced thought1 which identifies itself with the ,good2 for vision presupposes the desire to see4 ,the ,good1 therefore1 cannot think2 for it has no good other than itself4 ,besides1 when something other than the ,good thinks the ,good1 it thinks the ,good because it takes the form of the ,good1 and resembles the ,good4 ,it thinks1 because itself becomes for itself a good and desirable object1 and because it possesses an image of the ,good4 ,if this thing always remain in the same disposition1 it will always retain this image of the ,good4 ,by thinking itself1 ,intelligence simultaneously thinks the ,good2 for it does not think itself as being actualized2 yet every actualization has the ,good as its goal4 ,,the ,,good ,,as ,,supra-,,cogitative ,,is ,,also ,,supra-,,active4 #f4 ,if the above arguments be worth while1 the ,good has no place for thought4 ,what thinks must have its good outside of itself4 ,the ,good1 therefore1 is not active2 for what need to actualize would actualization have8 ,to say that actualization actualizes1 is tautology4 ,even if we may be allowed to attribute something to actualizations which relate to some principle other than themselves1 at least the first actualization to which all other actualizations refer1 must be simply what it is4 ,this actualization is not thought2 it has nothing to think1 as it is the ,first4 ,besides1 that which thinks is not thought1 but what possesses thought4 ,thus there is duality in what thinks2 but there is no duality in the ,first4 ,,primary ,,existence ,,will ,,contain ,,thought1 ,,existence ,,and ,,life4 ,this may be seen still more clearly by considering how this double nature shows itself in all that thinks in a clearer manner4 ,we assert that all essences1 as such1 that all things that are by themselves1 and that possess true existence1 are located in the intelligible world4 ,this happens not only because they always remain the same1 while sense-objects are in a perpetual flow and change#ac--;although1 indeed1 there are sense-objects 7such as the stars#ad71 that remain the same--but rather because they1 by themselves1 possess the perfection of their existence4 ,the so-called primary being must possess an existence which is more than an adumbration of existence1 and which is complete existence4 ,now existence is complete when its form is thought and life4 ,primary being1 therefore1 will simultaneously contain thought1 existence and life4 ,thus the existence of essence will imply that of intelligence2 and that of intelligence1 that of essence2 so that thought is inseparable from existence1 and is manifold instead of being one4 ,that which is not manifold 7the ,one71 cannot1 therefore1 think4 ,in the intelligible world1 we find ,man1 and the thought of man1 ,horse and the thought of horse1 the ,just ,man and the thought of the just man2 everything in it is duality2 even the unity within it is duality1 and in it duality passes into unity4 ,the ,first is neither all things that imply duality1 nor any of them2 it contains no duality whatever4 ,,the ,,first1 ,,therefore1 ,,being ,,supra-,,cogitative1 ,,does ,,not ,,know ,,itself4 ,elsewhere we shall study how duality issues from unity4 ,here we merely insist that as the ,one is superior to being1 it must also be superior to thought4 ,it is1 therefore1 reasonable to insist that it does not know itself1 that it does not contain anything to be known1 because it is simple4 ,still less will it know other beings4 ,it supplies them with something greater and more precious than knowledge of beings1 since it is the ,good of all beings2 from it they derive what is more important 7than mere cogitation71 the faculty of identifying themselves with it so far as possible4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,five4 ,of the ,aristotelian ,distinction ,between ,actuality and ,potentiality4 ,,questions ,,to ,,be ,,discussed4 #a4 7,aristotle7 spoke of 7things7 existing potentially1 and actually2 and actuality is spoken of as a being4 ,we shall1 however1 have to examine this potential and actual existence2 and whether this actual existence be the same as actuality1 and whether this potential existence be identical with potentiality2 also1 whether these conceptions differ so that what exists actually be not necessarily actuality4 ,it is evident that among sense-objects there exist things potentially4 ,are there also such among the intelligibles8 ,this then is the problem3 whether the intelligibles exist only actually2 and on the hypothesis of the existence among intelligibles of something existing potentially1 whether1 because of its eternity1 this always remains there in potentiality2 and1 because it is outside of time1 never arrives to actuality4 ,,definition ,,of ,,potentiality4 ,let us first define potentiality4 ,when a thing is said to exist potentially1 this means that it does not exist absolutely4 ,necessarily1 what exists potentially is potential only in relation to something else2 for example1 metal is the statue potentially4 ,of course1 if nothing were to be done with this thing1 or within it1 if it were not to become something beyond itself1 if there were no possibility of its becoming anything else1 it would only be what it was already4 ,how could it then become something different from what it was8 ,it did not1 therefore1 exist potentially4 ,consequently1 if1 on considering what is a thing that exists potentially1 and one that exists actually1 we say that it exists potentially1 we must mean that it might become different from what it is1 whether1 after having produced this different thing1 it remain what it is1 or whether1 on becoming this different thing1 which it is potentially1 it ceases being what it is itself4 ,indeed1 if metal be a statue potentially1 this is a relation different from water being metal potentially1 as air is potentially fire4#ae ,,distinction ,,between ,,existing ,,potentiality ,,and ,,potentiality4 ,shall we say that what thus exists potentially is potentiality in respect of what is to be2 as1 for instance1 that the metal is the potentiality of a statue8 ,not so1 if we refer to the producing potentiality2 for the producing potentiality cannot be said to exist potentially4 ,if1 then1 we identified existing potentially not only with existing actually1 but also with actuality1 then potentiality would coincide with potential existence4 ,it would be better and clearer1 therefore1 to contrast potential existence with actual existence1 and potentiality with actuality4 ,the thing which thus exists potentially is the substance underlying the reactions1 shapes and forms which it is naturally fitted to receive1 to which it aspires for their betterment or deterioration1 and for the destruction of those whose actualization constitutes differentiation4 ,,matter ,,is ,,nothing ,,actually4 #b4 ,as to matter1 we shall have to examine whether it be something actually1 while simultaneously it potentially is the shapes it receives2 or whether it be nothing at all actually4 ,everything else of which we predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on receiving its form1 and remaining the same4 ,we may call a statue an actual statue1 thus contrasting with it a potential statue2 but an actual statue will not be implied by the metal which we called the potential statue4 ,consequently1 what exists potentially does not become what exists actually2 but from what was previously a potential 7statue7 proceeds what later is an actual 7statue74 ,indeed1 what exists actually is the compound1 and not the matter2 it is the form added to matter2 this occurs when there is produced another being2 when1 for example1 from the metal is made a statue2 for the statue exists by this very being something other than the metal2 namely1 the compound4#ag ,,in ,,permanent ,,things1 ,,potentiality ,,and ,,actuality ,,may ,,coincide4 ,in non-permanent things1 what exists potentially is evidently something quite different 7from what is said to exist actually74 ,but when the potential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian1 why should not the potential and actual coincide8 ,the potential wise ,socrates is the same as the actual ,socrates4 ,is the ignorant man1 who was potentially learned1 the same as the learned8 ,no3 only accident makes of the ignorant man a learned one2 for it was not his ignorance that made him potentially wise2 with him1 ignorance was only an accident2 but his soul1 being by herself disposed 7to be actually learned71 still remains potentially learned1 in so far as she was actually so1 and still keeps what is called potential existence2 thus the actual grammarian does not cease being a potential grammarian4#ah ,nothing hinders these two different things 7of being a potential and actual grammarian7 from coinciding2 in the first case1 the man is no more than a potential grammarian2 in the latter1 the man is still a potential grammarian1 but this potentiality has acquired its form 7that is1 has become actual#ai74 ,,difference ,,between ,,general ,,and ,,particular ,,actuality4 ,if however what is potential be the substrate1 while the actual is both 7potential and actual7 at the same time1 as in the 7complete7 statue1 what then shall we call the form in the metal8 ,we might well call the actuality by which some object exists actually1 and not merely potentially1 the form and shape2 therefore not merely actuality1 but the actuality of this individual thing4 ,,the ,,form ,,added ,,to ,,matter ,,is ,,the ,,specific ,,actuality4 ,the name actuality would better suit the 7general7 actuality rather 7than the actuality of some one thing72 the actuality corresponding to the potentiality which brings a thing to actuality4 ,indeed1 when that which was potential arrives at actuality1 it owes the latter to something else4#bj ,,what ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,is ,a ,,passive ,,capacity1 ,,in ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,an ,,active ,,faculty4 ,as to the potentiality which by itself produces that of which it is potentiality1 that is1 which produces the actuality 7corresponding to this potentiality71 it is a 7,stoic7 habituation2 while the actuality 7which corresponds to this habituation7 owes its name thereto2 for instance1 the habituation is courageousness2 while the actuality is being brave4#ba ,but enough of this6 ,,intelligible ,,matter ,,is ,,not ,,potential4 #c4 ,the purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual2 to decide whether every intelligible exist only actually1 or whether it be only an actuality2 and third1 how even up there in the intelligible1 where all things are actualities1 there can also exist something potentially4 ,if1 then1 in the intelligible world1 there be no matter which might be called potential1 if no being is to become something which it not yet is1 nor transform itself1 nor1 while remaining what it is1 beget something else1 nor by altering1 cause any substitution1 then there could not be anything potential in this ,world of eternal essence outside of time4 ,let us now address the following question to those who admit the existence of matter1 even in intelligible things3 ,how can we speak of matter in the intelligible world1 if by virtue of this matter nothing exists potentially8 ,for even if in the intelligible world matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world1 still in every being would be the matter1 the form and the compound which constitutes it4 ,they would answer that in intelligible things1 what plays the part of matter is a form1 and that the soul1 by herself1 is form2 but1 in relation to something else1 is matter4 ,is the soul then potential in respect of this other thing8 ,hardly1 for the soul possesses the form1 and possesses it at present1 without regard to the future1 and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason2 if she contain matter1 it is only because thought conceives of her as double 7by distinguishing form and matter in her74 ,but these two things form a single nature1 as ,aristotle also says that his quintessence is immaterial4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,the ,,producing ,,potentiality2 ,,not ,,the ,,potentiality ,,of ,,becoming4 ,what shall we say8 ,potentially1 she is the animal1 when it is unborn1 though to be born4 ,potentially she is the music1 and all the things that become1 because they are transient4 ,thus in the intelligible world there are things which exist1 or do not exist potentially4 ,but the soul is the potentiality of these things4#bb ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,everything ,,is ,,actual4 ,how might one apply actual existence to intelligible things8 ,each of them exists actually because it has received form1 as the statue 7the compound7 exists actually1 or rather1 because it is a form1 and because its essence is a perfect form4 ,the intelligence does not pass from the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking4#bc ,otherwise1 it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not pass from potentiality to actuality1 which would possess everything by itself2 for what exists potentially implies another principle whose intervention brings it to actuality1 so as to be something existing actually4 ,a being is an actuality when it always is what it is1 by itself4 ,therefore1 all first principles are actualities2 for they possess all they should possess by themselves1 eternally4 ,such is the state of the soul which is not in matter1 but in the intelligible world4 ,the soul which is in matter is another actuality2 she is1 for instance1 the vegetative soul2 for she is in actuality what she is4 ,we shall1 therefore1 have to admit that 7in the intelligible world7 everything exists actually1 and that thus everything is actuality1 because it has rightly been said#bd that intelligible nature is always awake1 that it is a life1 an excellent life1 and that there on high all actualities are perfect4 ,therefore1 in the intelligible world1 everything exists actually1 and everything is actuality and life4 ,the place of intelligible things is the place of life1 the principle and source of the veritable soul1 and of intelligence4 ,,matter ,,is ,,non-,,being1 ,,and ,,can ,,not ,,be ,,anything ,,actual4 #d4 ,all the other objects 7the sense-objects71 which are something potentially1 are also actually something else1 which1 in regard to the ,first1 may be said to be potential existence4 ,as to matter1 which exists potentially in all beings1 how could it actually be some of these beings8 ,evidently1 it would then no longer be all beings potentially4 ,if matter be none of the beings1 it necessarily is not a being4 ,if it be none of the beings1 how could it actually be something8 ,consequently1 matter is none of the beings that in it become4 ,but might it not be something else1 since all things are not in matter8 ,if matter be none of the beings which are therein1 and if these really are beings1 matter must be non-being4 ,since1 by imagination1 it is conceived as something formless1 it could not be a form2 as being1 it could not be counted among the forms2 which is an additional reason why it should be considered as non-being4 ,as matter1 therefore1 is no being neither in respect of beings1 nor of forms1 matter is non-being in the highest degree4 ,since matter does not possess the nature of veritable beings1 and since it cannot even claim a place among the objects falsely called beings 7for not even like these is matter an image of reason71 in what kind of being could matter be included8 ,if it cannot be included in any1 it can evidently not be something actually4 ,,aristotle ,,said1 ,,matter ,,is ,,nothing ,,real ,,actually1 ,,but ,,only ,,potentially4 #e4 ,if this be so1 what opinion shall we form of matter8 ,how can it be the matter of beings8 ,because matter potentially constitutes the beings4 ,but1 since matter already exists potentially1 may we not already say that it exists1 when we consider what it is to be8 ,the being of matter is only what is to be2 it consists of what is going to be2 therefore matter exists potentially2 but it is potentially not any determinate thing1 but all things4 ,therefore1 being nothing by itself1 and being what it is1 namely1 matter1 it is nothing actually4 ,if it were something actually1 what it would actually be would not be matter2 consequently1 matter would no longer be absolutely matter2 it would be matter only relatively1 like metal4 ,matter is1 therefore1 non-being2 it is not something which merely differs from being1 like movement1 which relates to matter because it proceeds from matter1 and operates in it4 ,matter is denuded and despoiled of all properties2 it can not transform itself1 it remains ever what it was at the beginning1 non-being4 ,from the very being it actually was no being1 since it had withdrawn from all beings1 and had never even become any of them2 for never was it able to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to assume4 ,its permanent condition is to trend towards something else1 to exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow4 ,as it appears where ends the order of intelligible beings1 and as it is contained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it1 it is their last degree4 ,being contained in both intelligible and sense-things1 it does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes of beings4 ,it exists only potentially2 it limits itself to being a feeble and obscure image1 which can not assume any form4 ,may we not thence conclude that matter is the image actually2 and consequently1 is actually deception8 ,yes1 it truly is deception1 that is1 it is essentially non-being4 ,if then matter actually be non-being1 it is the highest degree of non-being1 and thus again essentially is non-being4 ,since non-being is its real nature1 it is1 therefore1 far removed from actually being any kind of a being4 ,if it must at all be1 it must actually be non-being1 so that1 far from real-being1 its being 7so to speak7 consists in non-being4 ,to remove the deception of deceptive beings1 is to remove their being4 ,to introduce actuality in the things which possess being and essence potentially1 is to annihilate their reason for being1 because their being consists in existing potentially4 ,,eternal ,,matter ,,exists ,,only ,,potentially4 ,therefore1 if matter were to be retained as unchangeable1 it would be first necessary to retain it as matter2 evidently1 it will be necessary to insist that it exists only potentially1 so that it may remain what it essentially is2 the only alternative would be to refute the arguments we have advanced4 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,sixth4 ,of the ,impassibility of ,incorporeal ,entities 7,soul and and ,matter74 ,a4 ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,,questions ,,about ,,the ,,passibility ,,of ,,judgment ,,and ,,the ,,soul4 #a4 ,sensations are not affections1#be but actualizations1 and judgments1 relative to passions4 ,the affections occur in what is other 7than the soul72 that is1 in the organized body1 and the judgment in the soul4 ,for if the judgment were an affection1 it would itself presuppose another judgment1 and so on to infinity4#bf ,though accepting this statement1 we must1 nevertheless1 examine whether the judgment itself1 as such1 in nowise participates in the nature of its object2 for if it receive the impression thereof1#bg it is passive4 ,besides1 the images derived from the senses--to use the popular language--are formed in a manner entirely different from what is generally believed4 ,they are in the same case as the intellectual conceptions1 which are actualizations1 and through which1 without being affected1 we know objects4 ,in general1 neither our reason nor our will permit us1 in any way1 to attribute to the soul modifications and changes such as the heating or cooling of bodies4 ,further1 we have to consider whether that part of the soul1 that is called the passive 7or affective1 or irrational71 must also be be considered as unalterable1 or as being affectible4 ,but we will take up this question later2 we must begin by solving our earlier problems4 ,,how ,,can ,,the ,,soul ,,remain ,,impassible1 ,,though ,,given ,,up ,,to ,,emotion8 ,how could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and passion remain unalterable1 while admitting vice1 false opinions1 and ignorance 7or folly72 when it has desires or aversions2 when it yields itself to joy or pain1 to hate1 jealousy1 and appetite2 when1 in one word1 it never remains calm1 but when all the things that happen to it agitate it1 and produce changes within it8 ,,on ,,the ,,stoic ,,hypothesis ,,of ,,corporeity ,,the ,,soul ,,cannot ,,remain ,,impassible2 ,,as ,,it ,,is ,,impassible ,,all ,,terms ,,to ,,the ,,contrary ,,are ,,only ,,figurative4 ,if1 7on the ,stoic hypothesis7 the soul were extended1 and corporeal1 it would be difficult1 or rather impossible for her to remain impassible and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within her4 ,if1 on the contrary1 she be a being that is unextended1 and incorruptible1 we must take care not to attribute to her affections that might imply that she is perishable4 ,if1 on the contrary1 her being be a number#bh or a reason1#bi as we usually say1 how could an affection occur within a number or a reason8 ,we must therefore attribute to the soul only irrational reasons1 passions without passivity2 that is1 we must consider these terms as no more than metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies1 taking them in an opposite sense1 seeing in them no more than mere analogies1 so that we may say that the soul experiences them without experiencing them1 and that she is passive without really being such 7as are the bodies74 ,let us examine how all this occurs4 ,,virtue ,,as ,a ,,harmony2 ,,vice ,,as ,a ,,disharmony4 #b4 ,what occurs in the soul when she contains a vice8 ,we ask this because it is usual to say1 to snatch a vice from the soul2 to introduce virtue into her1 to adorn her1 to replace ugliness by beauty in her4 ,let us also premiss1 following the opinions of the ancients1#cj that virtue is a harmony1 and wickedness the opposite4 ,that is the best means to solve the problem at issue4 ,indeed1 when the parts of the soul 7the rational part1 the irascible part1 and the part of appetite71 harmonize with each other1 we shall have virtue2#ca and1 in the contrary case1 vice4 ,still1 in both cases1 nothing foreign to the soul enters into her2 each of her parts remain what they are1 while contributing to harmony4 ,on the other hand1 when there is dissonance1 they could not play the same parts as the personnel of a choric ballet1 who dance and sing in harmony1 though not all of them fill the same functions2 though one sings while the remainder are silent2 and though each sings his own part2 for it does not suffice that they all sing in tune1 they must each properly sing his own part4 ,in the soul we therefore have harmony when each part fulfils its functions4 ,still each must have its own virtue before the existence of a harmony2 or its vice1 before there is disharmony4 ,what then is the thing whose presence makes each part of the soul good or evil8 ,evidently the presence of virtue or vice4 ,the mere statement that1 for the rational part 7of the soul7 vice consists in ignorance1#cb is no more than a simple negation1 and predicates nothing positive about reason4 ,,this ,,definition ,,suffices ,,to ,,explain ,,the ,,facts ,,of ,,evil ,,in ,,the ,,soul4 ,but when the soul contains some of those false opinions which are the principal cause of vice1 must we not acknowledge that something positive occurs in her1 and that one of her parts undergoes an alteration8 ,is not the disposition of the soul's irascible part different according to its courage or cowardliness8 ,and the soul's appetitive-part1 according to whether it be temperate or intemperate8 ,we answer that a part of the soul is virtuous1 when it acts in conformity with its being1 or when it obeys reason2 for reason commands all the parts of the soul1 and herself is subjected to intelligence4 ,now to obey reason is to see2 it is not to receive an impression1 but to have an intuition1 to carry out the act of vision4#cc ,sight is of the same 7nature7 when in potentiality1 or in actualization2 it is not altered in passing from potentiality to actualization1#cd she only applies herself to do what it is her 7nature7 to do1 to see and know1 without being affected4 ,her rational part is in the same relation with intelligence2 she has the intuition thereof4#ce ,the nature of intelligence is not to receive an impression similar to that made by a seal1 but in one sense to possess what it sees1 and not to possess it in another2 intelligence possesses it by cognizing it2 but intelligence does not possess it in this sense that while seeing it intelligence does not receive from it a shape similar to that impressed on wax by a seal4 ,again1 we must not forget that memory does not consist in keeping impressions1 but is the soul's faculty of recalling and representing to herself the things that are not present to her4 ,some objector might say that the soul is different before reawakening a memory1 and after having reawakened it4 ,she may indeed be different1 but she is not altered1 unless indeed1 we call the passing from potentiality to actualization an alteration4 ,in any case1 nothing extraneous enters into her1 she only acts according to her own nature4 ,,only ,,the ,,physical ,,organs1 ,,not ,,the ,,immaterial ,,natures1 ,,could ,,be ,,affected4 ,in general1 the actualizations of immaterial 7natures7 do not in any way imply that these 7natures7 were altered--which would imply their destruction--but1 on the contrary1 they remain what they were4 ,only material things are affected1 while active4 ,if an immaterial principle were exposed to undergo affections1 it would no longer remain what it is4 ,thus in the act of vision1 the sight acts1 but it is the eye that is affected4 ,as to opinions1 they are actualizations analogous to sight4 ,,psychological ,,explanation ,,of ,,anger-,,part',s ,,courage ,,or ,,cowardliness4 ,but how can the soul's irascible-part#cf be at one time courageous1 and at the other cowardly8 ,when it is cowardly1 it does not consider reason1 or considers reason as having already become evil2 or because the deficiency of its instruments1 that is1 the lack of weakness of its organs1 hinders it from acting1 or feeling emotion1 or being irritated4 ,in the contrary condition it is courageous4 ,in either case1 the soul undergoes no alteration1 nor is affected4 ,,psychological ,,explanation ,,of ,,virtue ,,or ,,vice ,,of ,,appetite4 ,further1 the soul's appetite is intemperate when it alone is active2 for then1 in the absence of the principles that ought to command or direct her1 it alone does everything4 ,besides1 the rational part1 whose function it is to see 7by considering the notions it receives from intelligence71 is occupied with something else1 for it does not do everything simultaneously1 being busy with some other action2 it considers other than corporeal things1 so far as it can4#cg ,perhaps also the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably on the good or evil condition of the organs2 so that1 in either case1 nothing is added to the soul4 ,,the ,,soul ,,originates ,,movements1 ,,but ,,is ,,not ,,altered 7,,against ,,stoics74 ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,stoic ,,theory ,,of ,,passions4 #c4 ,there are desires and aversions in the soul1 which demand consideration4 ,it is impossible to deny that pain1 anger1 joy1 appetite and fear are changes and affections which occur in the soul1 and that move her4#ch ,we must here draw a distinction1 for it would be denying the evidence to insist that there are in us no changes or perception of these changes4 ,we cannot attribute them to the soul1 which would amount to the admission#ci that she blushes1 or grows pale1 without reflecting that these passions1 though produced by the soul1 occur in a different substance4 ,for the soul1 shame consists in the opinion that something is improper2 and1 as the soul contains the body1 or1 to speak more exactly1 as the body is a dependency of the animating soul1 the blood1 which is very mobile1 rushes to the face4 ,likewise1 the principle of fear is in the soul2 paleness occurs in the body because the blood concentrates within the interior parts4 ,in joy1 the noticeable dilation belongs to the body also2 what the body feels is not a passion4 ,likewise with pain and appetite2 their principle is in the soul1 where it remains in a latent condition2 what proceeds therefrom is perceived by sensation4 ,when we call desires1 opinions and reasonings movements of the soul1 we do not mean that the soul becomes excited in the production of these movements1#dj but that they originate within her4 ,when we call life a movement1 we do not by this word mean an alteration2 for to act according to one's nature is the simple and indivisible life of each part of the soul4 ,,virtue ,,and ,,vice ,,affect ,,the ,,soul ,,differently ,,from ,,all ,,the ,,other ,,passions4 ,in short1 we insist that action1 life and desire are not alterations1 that memories are not forms impressed on the soul1 and that actualizations of the imagination are not impressions similar to those of a seal on wax4#da ,consequently in all that we call passions or movements1 the soul undergoes no change in her substance 7substrate7 or being 7nature72 virtue and vice in the soul are not similar to what heat1 cold1 whiteness or blackness are in bodies2 and the soul's relation to vice and virtue is entirely different1 as has been explained4 ,,passional ,,changes ,,occur ,,in ,,the ,,body1 ,,not ,,even ,,to ,,the ,,passional ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #d4 ,let us now pass to that part of the soul that is called the passional 7or1 affective74 ,we have already mentioned it1#db when treating of all the passions 7that is1 affections71 which were related to the irascible-part and appetitive part of the soul2 but we are going to return to a study of this part1 and explain its name1 the passional 7or1 affective7 part4 ,it is so called because it seems to be the part affected by the passions2#dc that is1 experiences accompanied by pleasure or pain4#dd ,amidst these affections1 some are born of opinion2 thus1 we feel fear or joy1 according as we expect to die1 or as we hope to attain some good2 then the opinion is in the soul1 and the affection in the body4 ,on the contrary1 other passions1 occurring in an unforeseen way1 give rise to opinion in that part of the soul to which this function belongs1 but do not cause any alteration within her1 as we have already explained4 ,nevertheless1 if1 on examining unexpected fear1 we follow it up higher1 we discover that it still contains opinion as its origin1 implying some apprehension in that part of the soul that experiences fear1 as a result of which occur the trouble and stupor which accompany the expectation of evil4 ,now it is to the soul that belongs imagination1 both the primary imagination that we call opinion1 and the 7secondary7 imagination that proceeds from the former2 for the latter is no longer genuine opinion1 but an inferior power1 an obscure opinion1 a confused imagination which resembles the action characteristic of nature1 and by which this power produces each thing1 as we say1 unimaginatively4#de ,its resulting sense-agitation occurs within the body4 ,to it relate trembling1 palpitation1 paleness1 and inability to speak4 ,such modifications1 indeed1 could not be referred to any part of the soul2 otherwise1 such part of the soul would be physical4 ,further1 if such part of the soul underwent such affections these modifications would not reach the body2 for that affected part of the soul would no longer be able to exercise its functions1 being dominated by passion1 and thus incapacitated4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,affective ,,part ,,may ,,be ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,affections2 ,,but ,,is ,,incorporeal4 ,the affective part of the soul1 therefore1 is not corporeal2 it is a form indeed1 but a form engaged in matter1 such as the appetite1 the power of growth1 both nutritive and generative1 a power which is the root and principle of appetite1 and the affective part of the soul4 ,now a form cannot undergo an affection or a passion1 but must remain what it is4 ,it is the matter 7of a body7 which is capable of being affected by a passion 7an affection71 when this affection is produced by the presence of the power which is its principle4 ,indeed it is neither the power of growth that grows1 nor the nutritive power that is fed2 in general1 the principle that produces a motion is not itself moved by the movement it produces2 in case it were moved in any way1 its movement and action would be of an entirely different nature4#df ,now the nature of a form is an actualization1 by its mere presence producing 7something71 just as if the harmony alone could cause the vibration of the strings of a lyre4 ,thus the affective part 7of the soul1 without itself being affected7 is the cause of the affections1 whether the movement proceed from it1 that is1 from sense-imagination1 or whether they occur without 7distinct7 imagination4 ,,the ,,affections ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,compared ,,to ,a ,,musician ,,playing ,,the ,,lyre4 ,we might further consider whether1 inasmuch as opinion originates in a higher principle 7of the soul71 this principle does not remain immovable because it is the form of harmony1 while the cause of the movement plays the role of the musician1 and the parts caused to vibrate by the affection1 that of the strings2 for it is not the harmony1 but the string that experiences the affection2 and even if the musician desired it1 the string would not vibrate unless it were prescribed by the harmony4 ,,passions ,,are ,,produced ,,by ,,external ,,images2 ,,and ,,their ,,avoidance ,,is ,,the ,,task ,,of ,,philosophy4 #e4 ,if then1 from the very start1 the soul undergo no affections1 what then is the use of trying to render her impassible by means of philosophy8 ,the reason is that when an image is produced in the soul by the affective part1 there results in the body an affection and a movement2 and to this agitation is related the image of the evil which is foreseen by opinion4 ,it is this affection that reason commands us to annihilate1 and whose occurrence even we are to forestall1 because when this affection occurs1 the soul is sick1 and healthy when it does no occur4 ,in the latter case1 none of these images1 which are the causes of affections1 form within the soul4 ,that is why1 to free oneself from the images that obsess one during dreams1 the soul that occupies herself therewith is to be wakened4#dg ,again1 that is why we can say that affections are produced by representations of exterior entities1 considering these representations as affections of the soul4 ,,psychological ,,process ,,involved ,,in ,,purifying ,,the ,,soul1 ,,and ,,separating ,,soul ,,from ,,body4 ,but what do we mean by purifying the soul1 inasmuch as she could not possibly be stained8 ,what do we mean by separating 7or1 weaning7 the soul from the body8 ,to purify the soul is to isolate her1 preventing her from attaching herself to other things1 from considering them1 from receiving opinions alien to her1 whatever these 7alien7 opinions or affections might be1 as we have said2 it consequently means hindering her from consideration of these phantoms1 and from the production of their related affections4 ,to purify the soul1 therefore1 consists in raising her from the things here below to intelligible entities2 also1 it is to wean her from the body2 for1 in that case1 she is no longer sufficiently attached to the body to be enslaved to it1 resembling a light which is not absorbed in the whirlwind 7of matter#dh71 though even in this case that part of the soul which is submerged does not1 on that account alone1 cease being impassible4 ,to purify the affective part of the soul is to turn her from a vision of deceitful images2 to separate her from the body1 is to hinder her from inclining towards lower things1 or from representing their images to herself2 it means annihilating the things from which she thus is separated1 so that she is no longer choked by the whirlwind of the spirit which breaks loose whenever the body is allowed to grow too strong2 the latter must be weakened so as to govern it more easily4 ,b4 ,,of ,,matter4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,the ,,escoreal ,,numenian ,,fragment4 #f4 ,we have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible being which is entirely comprised within the genus of form4 ,but as matter also1 though in another manner1 is an incorporeal entity1 we must examine its nature also4 ,we must see whether it may be affected1 and undergo every kind of modification1 as is the common opinion2 or whether1 on the contrary1 it be impassible2 and in this case1 what is the nature of its impassibility4 ,,nonentity ,,will ,,have ,,intelligent ,,life ,,only ,,as ,,beneath ,,being4 ,since we are thus led to treat of the nature of matter1 we must first premiss that the nature of existence1 being and essence#di are not what they are thought to be by people generally4 ,existence is2 it is in the genuine meaning of that word2 that is1 it is essentially2 it is absolutely1 lacking nothing of existence4 ,fully being existence1 its existence and preservation are not dependent on anything else2 so much the more1 if other things seem to be1 they owe this thereto4 ,if this be true1 existence must possess life1 perfect life--for otherwise it would not be existence any more than non-existence4 ,now perfect life is intelligence and perfect wisdom4 ,existence therefore is determinate and definite4 ,nothing outside of it exists even potentially2 otherwise it would not fully satisfy itself4 ,it is therefore eternal1 immutable1 incapable of receiving anything1 or of adding anything to itself2 for what it would receive would have to be foreign to it1 and consequently be nonentity4 ,in order to exist by itself1 existence must therefore possess all things within itself2 it must be all things simultaneously1 it must at the same time be one and all1 since this is of what we consider existence to consist2 otherwise instead of emanating from existence1 intelligence and life would be incidental thereto4 ,therefore they could not originate from nonentity2 and1 on its side1 existence could not be deprived of intelligence and life4 ,true nonentity1 therefore1 will have intelligence and life only as they must exist in objects inferior and posterior to existence4 ,the principle superior to existence 7the ,one71 on the other hand1 gives intelligence and life to existence1 without itself needing to possess them4#ej ,,materialists ,,cannot ,,understand ,,how ,,solid ,,earth ,,is ,,nearest ,,nonentity2 ,,and ,,why ,,greatest ,,existence ,,is ,,least ,,material4 ,if such be the nature of existence1 it could be neither body1 nor the substrate of bodies2 for their existence is nonentity4 7,materialists1 however1 object71 ,how could we refuse to attribute being to the nature of bodies1 such as these cliffs and rocks1 to the solid earth1 and in short1 to all these impenetrable objects8 ,when ,i am struck1 am ,i not by the shock forced to acknowledge that these objects exist as 7real7 being8 ,on the other hand1 how does it happen that entities that are not impenetrable1 which can neither shock others nor be shocked by them1 which are completely invisible1 like soul and intelligence1 are genuine beings8#ea ,our answer is that the earth1 which possesses corporeal nature in the highest degree1 is inert2 the element that is less gross 7the air7 is already more mobile1 and resides in a higher region2 while fire withdraws still more from corporeal nature4 ,the things which best suffice themselves least agitate and trouble the others2 those that are heavier and more terrestrial1 by the mere fact that they are incomplete1 subject to falling1 and incapable of rising1 fall by weakness1 and shock the others by virtue of their inertia1 and their weight4 ,thus inanimate bodies fall more heavily1 and shock and wound others more powerfully4 ,on the contrary1 animated bodies1 by the mere fact of greater participation in existence1 strike with less harshness4 ,that is why movement1 which is a kind of life1 or at least an image of life1 exists in a higher degree in things that are less corporeal4 ,,corporeity ,,is ,,nonentity ,,because ,,of ,,lack ,,of ,,unity4 ,it is therefore an eclipse of existence which renders an object more corporeal4 ,while studying those psychoses called affections1 we discover that the more corporeal an object is1 the more is it likely to be affected2 the earth is more so than other elements1 and so on4 ,indeed1 when other elements are divided1 they immediately reunite their parts1 unless there be some opposition2 but when we separate parts of earth1 they do not come together again4 ,they thus seem to have no natural earth2 since1 after a light blow1 they remain in the state where they are left by the blow that struck or broke them4 ,therefore the more corporeal a thing is1 the more it approaches nonentity1 returning to unity with the greater difficulty4 ,the heavy and violent blows by which bodies act on each other are followed by destruction4 ,when even a weak thing falls on something weak1 it may still be relatively powerful2 as is nonentity hitting nonentity4 ,,sensation ,,as ,,the ,,dream ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,from ,,which ,,we ,,must ,,wake4 ,such are the objections that may be raised against those who consider all beings as corporeal2 who wish to judge of their existence only by impressions they receive therefrom1 and who try to found the certitude of truth on the images of sensation4#gc ,they resemble sleeping men who take as realities the visions they have in their dreams4 ,sensation is the dream of the soul2#eb so long as the soul is in the body1 she dreams2 the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation from the body1 and not in rising along with the body4 ,to rise with the body is to pass from one sleep into another kind2 from one bed to another2 really to awake is to separate oneself completely from the body4 ,the body1 whose nature is contrary to that of the soul1 consequently has a nature contrary to that of being4 ,this is proved by the generation1 flux1 and decay of bodies1 all processes contrary to the nature of being4 ,,matter ,,compared ,,to ,a ,,mirror ,,which ,,reflects ,,everything ,,though ,,really ,,empty4 #g4 ,let us return to matter as a substrate1 and then to what is said to exist within it4 ,this will lead us to see that it consists of nonentity1 and that it is impassible4 ,matter is incorporeal because the body exists only as posterior thereto1 because it is a composite of which it constitutes an element4 ,it is called incorporeal because existence and matter are two things equally distinct from the body4 ,not being soul1 matter is neither intelligence1 nor life1 nor 7seminal7 reason1 nor limit4 ,it is a kind of infinity4#ec ,neither is it an 7active7 power2#ed for what could it produce8 ,since matter is none of the above-mentioned things1 it could not be called existence4 ,it deserves only the name nonentity yet not even in the sense in which we may say that movement or rest are not existence2#ee matter is real nonentity4 ,it is an image and phantom of extension1 it is aspiration to a form of hypostatic existence4 ,its perseverance is not in rest 7but in change74 ,by itself1 it is invisible1 it escapes whoever wishes to see it4 ,it is present when you do not look at it1 it escapes the eye that seeks it4 ,it seems to contain all the contraries3 the large and small1 the more and the less1 the lack and excess4#ef ,it is a phantom equally incapable of remaining or escaping2 for matter does not even have the strength of avoiding 7form71 because it has received no strength from intelligence1 and it is the lack of all existence4 ,consequently1 all its appearances are deceptions4 ,if we represent matter as being greatness1 it immediately appears as smallness2 if we represent it as the more1 we are forced to recognize it as the less4 ,when we try to conceive of its existence1 it appears as nonentity2 like all the things it contains1 it is a fugitive shadow1 and a fleeting game1 an image within an image4 ,it resembles a mirror1 in which one might see the reflections of objects external to it2 the mirror seems to be filled1 and to possess everything1 though really containing nothing4 ,,as ,,objects ,,are ,,merely ,,reflections ,,in ,a ,,mirror1 ,,matter ,,is ,,no ,,more ,,affected ,,by ,,them ,,than ,,would ,,be ,a ,,mirror4 ,thus matter is a shapeless image1 into which enter1 and out of which issue the images of beings4 ,these appear in it precisely because matter has no shape1 though they seem to produce something in it1 they really produce nothing in it4#eg ,they have no consistence1 strength1 nor solidity2 as matter has none either1 they enter into it without dividing it1 as if they would penetrate water1 or as shapes might move in emptiness4 ,if the images that appear in matter had the same nature as the objects they represent and from which they emanate1 then1 if we attribute to the images a little of the power of the objects that project them1 we might be right in considering them able to affect matter4 ,but as the things that we see in matter do not have the same nature as the objects of which they are the images1 it is not true that matter suffers when receiving them2 they are no more than false appearances without any resemblance to what produces them4 ,feeble and false by themselves1 they enter into a thing that is equally false4#eh ,they must therefore leave it as impassible as a mirror1 or water2 producing on it no more effect than does a dream on the soul4 ,these comparisons1 however1 are yet imperfect1 because in these cases there is still some resemblance between the images and the objects4 ,,since ,,matter ,,cannot ,,be ,,destroyed1 ,,it ,,cannot ,,be ,,affected4 #h4 7,according to ,aristotle#ei71 it is absolutely necessary that what can be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things that approach it1 and affect it4 ,thus1 it is the cold that alters the heat of an object1 and humidity that alters its dryness1 and we say that the substrate is altered1 when it ceases being hot1 and grows cold2 and ceasing to be dry1 becomes humid4 ,another proof of this truth is the destruction of the fire that1 by changing1 becomes another element4 ,then we say that it is the fire1 but not the matter that has been destroyed4 ,what is affected is therefore that which is destroyed2 for it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction4 ,consequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable notions4 ,now it is impossible for matter to be destroyed2 for how could it be destroyed1 and in what would it change8 ,,objection ,,that ,,matter ,,must ,,be ,,passible ,,if ,,its ,,qualities ,,change ,,as ,,they ,,do4 ,it may be objected that matter receives heat1 cold1 and numerous1 or even innumerable qualities2 it is characterized by them1 it possesses them as somehow inherent in its nature1 and mingled with each other1 as they do not exist in isolated condition4 ,how could nature avoid being affected along with them1#fj serving as it does as a medium for the mutual action of these qualities by their mixture8#fa ,if matter is to be considered impassible1 we shall have to consider it as somehow outside of these qualities4 ,but every quality which is present in a subject cannot be present in it without communicating to it something of itself4 ,,different ,,senses ,,of ,,participation ,,will ,,allow ,,for ,,matter ,,to ,,remain ,,impassible4 #i4 ,it must be noticed that the expressions3 such a thing is present to such a thing and such a thing is in such other thing have several meanings4 ,sometimes one thing improves or deteriorates some other thing by its presence1 making it undergo a change2 as may be seen in bodies1 especially those of living beings4 ,again1 one thing improves or deteriorates another without affecting it2 this occurs with the soul1 as we have already seen4#fb ,again1 it is as when one impresses a figure on a piece of wax2 the presence of the figure adds nothing to the 7nature7 of the wax1 and its destruction makes it lose nothing4 ,likewise1 light does not change the figure of the object which it enlightens with its rays4 ,a cooled stone participates a little in the nature characteristic of the thing that cools it2 but none the less remains stone4 ,what suffering can light inflict on a line or a surface8#fc ,one might perhaps say that in this case corporeal substance is affected2 but how can it suffer 7or be affected7 by the action of light8 ,suffering1 in fact1 is not to enjoy the presence of something1 nor to receive something4 ,mirrors1 and1 in general1 transparent things1 do not suffer 7or are not affected7 by the effect of images that form in them1 and they offer a striking example of the truth we are here presenting4 ,indeed1 qualities inhere in matter like simple images1 and matter itself is more impassible than a mirror4 ,heat and cold occur in it without warming or cooling it2 for heating and cooling consist in that one quality of the substrate gives place to another4 ,in passing1 we might notice that it would not be without interest to examine whether cold is not merely absence of heat4 ,on entering into matter1 qualities mostly react on each other only when they are opposite4 ,what action1 indeed1 could be exercised by a smell on a sweet taste8 ,by a color on a figure8 ,how1 in general1 could things that belong to one genus act on another8 ,this shows how one quality can give place to another in a same subject1 or how one thing can be in another1 without its presence causing any modification in the subject for which or in which it is present4 ,just as a thing is not altered by the first comer1 likewise that which is affected and which changes does not receive a passive modification1 or change1 from any kind of an object4 ,qualities are affected only by the action of contraries4 ,things which are simply different cause no change in each other4 ,those which have no contraries could evidently not be modified by the action of any contrary4 ,that which is affected1 therefore1 can not be matter2 it must be a composite 7of form and matter71 or something multiple4 ,but that which is isolated or separated from the rest1 what is quite simple must remain impassible in respect of all things1 and remain as a kind of medium in which other things may act on each other4 ,likewise1 within a house1 several objects can shock each other without the house itself or the air within it being affected4 ,it is therefore qualities gathered in matter that act on each other1 so far as it belongs to their nature4 ,matter itself1 however1 is still far more impassible than the qualities are among each other1 when they do not find themselves opposite4 ,,if ,,form ,,be ,,unchangeable1 ,,so ,,is ,,matter4 #aj4 ,if matter could be affected1 it would have to preserve some of the affection1 retaining either the affection itself1 or remain in a state different from the one in which it was before it was affected4 ,but when one quality appears after another quality1 it is no longer matter that receives it1 but matter as determined by a quality4 ,if even this quality should evanesce1 though leaving some trace of itself by the action it has exercised1 the substrate will still more be altered2 proceeding thus it will come to be something entirely different from pure matter1 it will be something multiple by its forms and by its manners of existence4 ,it will no longer be the common receptacle of all things1 since it will contain an obstacle to many things that could happen to it2 matter would no longer subsist within it1 and would no longer be incorruptible4 ,now if1 by definition1 matter always remains what it was since its origin1 namely matter1 then1 if we insist that it be altered1 it is evident that matter no longer remains such4 ,moreover1 if everything that is altered must remain unchanged in kind1 so as not to be changed in itself1 though changed in accidents2 in one word1 if that which is changed must be permanent1 and if that which is permanent be not that which is affected1 we come to a dilemma2 either matter is altered1 and abandons its nature2 or it does not abandon its nature1 and is not changed4 ,if we say that matter is changed1 but not in so far as it is matter1 it will1 to begin with1 be impossible to state in what it is changed2 and further1 we would thereby be forced to insist it was not changed4 ,indeed1 just as other things1 which are forms1 cannot be changed in their being 7or1 nature71 because it is this very unalterability which constitutes their being 7or1 nature71 likewise1 as the being 7or1 nature7 of matter is to exist in so far as it is matter1 it cannot be altered in so far as it is matter1 and it must necessarily be permanent in this respect4 ,therefore if form be unalterable1 matter must be equally unalterable4 ,,matter ,,participates ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,only ,,by ,,appearance4 #aa4 ,this was no doubt the thought present to ,plato when#fd he rightly said1 ,these imitations of the eternal beings which enter into matter1 and which issue therefrom4 ,not without good reason did he employ the terms enter and issue2 he wanted us carefully to scrutinize the manner in which matter participates in ideas4 ,when ,plato thus tries to clear up how matter participates in ideas1 his object is to show1 not how ideas enter into matter1 as before so many have believed1 but their condition within it4 ,doubtless1 it does seem astonishing that matter remains impassible in respect to the ideas that are present therein1 while the things that enter in it are affected by each other4 ,we nevertheless have to acknowledge that the things which enter into matter expel their predecessors1 and that it is only the composite that is affected4 ,nevertheless it is not every kind of composite that is affected1 but only that composite that happens to need the thing that was introduced or expelled1 so that its constitution becomes defective by the absence of that 7quality71 or more complete by its presence4 ,nothing is added to the nature of matter1 however1 by the introduction of anything2 the presence of that thing does not make matter what it is1 and matter loses nothing by its absence2 matter remains what it was since its origin4 ,to be ornamented is to the interest of something that admits of order or ornament2 it can receive that ornament without being changed1 when it only puts it on1 so to speak4 ,but if this ornament penetrate into it as something that forms part of its nature1 it then cannot receive it without being altered1 without ceasing to be what it was before1 as for instance1 ceasing to be ugly2 without1 by that very fact1 changing2 without1 for instance1 becoming beautiful1 though ugly before4 ,therefore if matter become beautiful1 though before ugly1 it ceases to be what it was before2 namely1 ugly2 so that on being adorned it loses its nature1 so much the more as it was ugly only accidentally4 ,being ugly enough to be ugliness itself1 it could not participate in beauty2 being bad enough to be badness itself1 it could not participate in goodness4 ,therefore matter participates in the ideas without being affected2 and consequently1 this participation must operate in another manner2 and1 for instance1 consist in appearance4#fe ,this kind of participation solves the problem we had set ourselves2 it enables us to understand how1 while being evil1 matter can aspire to the ,good without ceasing to be what it was1 in spite of its participation in the ,good4 ,indeed if this participation operate in a manner such that matter remains without alteration1 as we say1 and if it always continue to be what it was1 there is no reason to be surprised if1 though being evil1 it can participate in the ,good2 it does not swerve from its manner of existence4 ,on one hand1 as for her1 this participation is unavoidable1 it participates as long as it endures2 on the other hand1 as matter continues to be what it is1 by virtue of the kind of participation which does not interfere with its nature1 it undergoes no alteration on the part of the principle which gives it something2 it always remains as bad as it was1 because its nature persists4 ,if matter really participated in the ,good1 if matter were really modified thereby1 its nature would no longer be evil4 ,therefore1 the statement that matter is evil is true enough if it be considered to imply that it is impassible in respect to ,good2 and this really amounts to saying that it is entirely impassible4 ,,sense-,,objects ,,are ,,unreal ,,and ,,are ,,chiefly ,,made ,,up ,,of ,,appearance4 #ab4 ,plato#ff agreed with this1 and being persuaded that1 by participation1 matter does not receive form and shape1 as would some substrate that should constitute a composite of things intimately united by their transformation1 their mixture1 and their common affections2 in order to demonstrate the opposite1 namely1 that matter remains impassible while receiving forms1 invented a most apposite illustration of a participation that operates without anything being affected 7namely1 that engravers1 before using dies on the soft wax1 clean them carefully74 ,almost any other kind of illustration would fail to explain how the substrate can remain the same in the presence of forms4 ,while trying to achieve his purpose1 ,plato has raised many questions2 he has besides applied himself to demonstrate that sense-objects are devoid of reality1 and that a large part of their hypostatic substance is constituted by appearance4 ,plato demonstrates the permanence and identity of matter by showing that it is by the figures with which it is endued that matter affects animated bodies1 without itself suffering any of their affections4 ,he wishes to convince us that in being endued with these figures1 matter undergoes neither affection nor alteration4 ,indeed1 in the bodies that successively assume different figures1 we may1 relying on analogy1 call the change of figures an alteration2 but since matter has neither figure nor existence1#fg how could we1 even by analogy1 call the presence of a figure an alteration8 ,the only sure way of avoiding a misunderstanding in expression is to say that the substrate possesses nothing in the manner it is usually supposed to possess it4 ,how then could it possess the things it contains1 unless as a figure8 ,plato's illustration means that matter is impassible1 and that it contains the apparent presence of images which are not really present therein4 ,,plato',s ,,figurative ,,language ,,might ,,lead ,,to ,,errors ,,about ,,his ,,real ,,opinions4 ,we must still further preliminarily insist on the impassibility of matter2 for by using the usual terms we might be misled into wrongly thinking that matter could be affected4 ,thus ,plato speaks#fh of matter being set on fire1 being wetted1 and so forth1 as if it received the shapes of air or water4 ,however1 ,plato modifies the statement that matter receives the shapes of air and water by the statement that matter is set on fire and wetted1 and he demonstrates that by receiving these shapes it nevertheless has none of its own1 and that forms do not more than enter into it4 ,this expression matter is set on fire must not be taken literally2 it means only that matter becomes fire4 ,now to become fire is not the same thing as being set on fire2 to be set on fire can achieve no more than what is different from fire1 than what can be affected2 for that which itself is a part of fire could not be set on fire4 ,to insist on the opposite would amount to saying that metal itself formed a statue1 or that fire itself spread into matter and set it on fire4 ,the theory that a 7seminal7 reason had approached matter1 forces us to question how this reason could have set matter on fire4 ,the theory that a figure had approached matter would imply that that which is set on fire is already composed of two things 7matter and a figure71 and that these two entities form a single one4 ,although these two things would form a single one1 they would not affect each other1 and would act only on other entities4 ,nor would they even in this case act jointly2 for one would effect no more than to hinder the other from avoiding 7form74 ,the theory that when the body is divided matter also must be divided1 would have to answer the question1 ,how could matter on being divided1 escape the affection undergone by the composite 7of form and matter78 ,on such a theory1 one might even assert that matter was destroyed1 and ask1 ,since the body is destroyed1 why should not matter also be destroyed8 ,what is affected and divided must be a quantity or magnitude4 ,what is not a magnitude cannot experience the same modifications as a body4 ,therefore those who consider matter affectible would be forced to call it a body4 ,,matter ,,as ,,the ,,eternal ,,location ,,or ,,residence ,,of ,,generation4 #ac4 ,they would further have to explain in what sense they say that matter seeks to elude form4 ,how can it be said to seek to elude the stones and the solid objects which contain it8 ,for it would be irrational to say that it seeks to elude form at certain times1 but not at others4 ,if matter seeks to elude form voluntarily1 why does it not elude form continuously8 ,if necessity keep matter 7within form71 there can be no moment when it would not inhere in some form or other4 ,the reason why matter is not always contained by the same form must not be sought for within matter1 but in the forms that matter receives4 ,in what sense then could it be said that matter eludes form8 ,does it always and essentially elude form8 ,this would amount to saying that matter1 never ceasing being itself1 has form without ever having it4 ,otherwise1 the statement would be meaningless4#fi 7,plato7 says that matter is the nurse and residence of generation4 ,if then matter be the nurse and residence of generation1 it is evidently distinct from the latter4 ,only that which can be affected is within the domain of generation4 ,now as matter1 being the nurse and residence of generation1 exists before the latter1 it must also exist before any alteration4 ,therefore to say that matter is the nurse and residence of generation is tantamount to saying that matter is impassible4 ,the same meaning attaches to such other statements as that matter is that in which begotten things appear1 and from which they issue1#gj that matter is the 7eternal7 location1 and place 7of all generation74#ga ,,matter ,,as ,,location ,,of ,,forms ,,remains ,,impassible4 ,when ,plato1 rightfully1 calls matter the location of forms1 he is not thereby attributing any passion to matter2 he only indicates that matters go on in a different manner4 ,how8 ,since matter1 however1 by its nature1 cannot be any of the beings1 and as it must flee from the being of all beings1 and be entirely different from them--for 7seminal7 reasons are genuine beings--it must necessarily preserve its nature by virtue of this very difference4 ,it must not only contain all beings1 but also not appropriate what is their image2 for this is that by which matter differs from all beings4 ,otherwise1 if the images that fill a mirror were not transient1 and if the mirror remained invisible1 evidently we would believe that the things the mirror presents to us existed really4 ,if then there be something in a mirror1 that is that which sense-forms are in matter4 ,if in a mirror there be nothing but appearance1 then there is nothing in matter but appearance1 recognizing that this appearance is the cause of the existence of beings1 an existence in which the things that exist always really participate1 and in which the things which do not really exist do not participate2 for they could not be in the condition where they would be if they existed without the existence of existence in itself4 ,,the ,,myth ,,of ,,poverty ,,and ,,abundance4 #ad4 ,what6 ,would nothing exist 7in the sense-world7 if matter did not exist8 ,nothing6 ,it is as with a mirror2 remove it1 and the images disappear4 ,indeed1 that which by its nature is destined to exist in something else could not exist in that thing2 now the nature of every image is to exist in something else4 ,if the image were an emanation of the causes themselves1 it could exist without being in anything else2 but as these causes reside in themselves1 so that their image may reflect itself elsewhere1 there must be something else destined to serve as location for that which does not really enter into it2 something which by its presence1 its audacity1 its solicitations1 and by its indigence1 should as it were forcibly obtain 7what it desires71 but which is deceived because it does not really obtain anything2 so that it preserves its indigence1 and continues to solicitate 7satisfaction#gb74 ,as soon as ,poverty exists1 it ceaselessly begs1 as a 7well-known ,platonic7 myth tells us2#ig that shows clearly enough that it is naturally denuded of all good4 ,it does not ask to obtain all that the giver possesses2 it is satisfied with the possession of some of it1 thus revealing to us how much the images that appear in matter are different from real beings4 ,even the very name of ,poverty1 which is given to matter1 indicates that it is insatiable4 ,when ,poverty is said to unite with ,abundance1 we do not mean that it unites with ,existence or ,fulness1 but with a work of wonderful skill1 namely1 a thing that is nothing but specious appearance4#gd1ih ,,the ,,miracle ,,is ,,that ,,matter ,,participates ,,in ,,existence ,,without ,,participating ,,in ,,it4 ,it is indeed impossible that that which is outside of existence should be completely deprived of it2 for the nature of existence is to produce beings4 ,on the other hand1 absolute nonentity cannot mingle with existence4 ,the result is something miraculous3 matter participates in existence without really participating in it1 and by approaching to it obtains something1 though by its nature matter cannot unite with existence4 ,it therefore reflects what it receives from an alien nature as echo reflects sound in places that are symmetrical and continuous4 ,that is how things that do not reside in matter seem to reside in it1 and to come from it4 ,,generation ,,illustrated ,,by ,,lighting ,,fire ,,by ,,refraction4 ,if matter participated in the existence of genuine beings and received them within itself1 as might easily be thought1 that which would enter into it would penetrate deeply into matter2 but evidently matter is not penetrated thereby1 remaining unreceptive of any of it4 ,on the contrary1 matter arrests their procession1 as echo arrests and reflects sound-waves1 matter being only the residence 7or1 jar or vase7 of the things that enter within it1 and there mingle with each other4 ,everything takes place there as in the case of persons who1 wishing to light fire from the rays of the sun1 should place in front of these rays polished jars filled with water1 so that the flame1 arrested by the obstacles met within1 should not be able to penetrate1 and should concentrate on their outside4 ,that is how matter becomes the cause of generation2 that is how things occur within it4 ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,matter ,,to ,,reason ,,illustrated ,,by ,,that ,,of ,,opinion ,,and ,,imagination4 #ae4 ,the objects that concentrate the rays of the sun1 are themselves visible1 by receiving from the fire of sensation what takes fire in their hearth4 ,they appear because the images that form themselves are around and near them1 and touch each other1 and finally because there are two limits in these objects4 ,but when the 7seminal7 reason is in matter1 it remains exterior to matter in an entirely different manner2 it has a different nature4 ,here it is not necessary that there be two limits2 matter and reason are strangers to each other by difference of nature1 and by the difference between their natures that makes any mixture of them impossible4 ,the cause that each remains in itself is that what enters into matter does not possess it1 any more than matter possesses what enters into it4 ,that is how opinion and imagination do not mingle in our soul1#ge and each remains what it was1 without entailing or leaving anything1 because no mingling can occur4 ,these powers are foreign to each other1 not in that there is a mere juxtaposition1 but because between them obtains a difference that is grasped by reason1 instead of being seen by sight4 ,here imagination is a kind of phantom1 though the soul herself be no phantom1 and though she seem to accomplish1 and though she really accomplish many deeds as she desires to accomplish them4 ,thus imagination stands to the soul in about the same lation as 7form7 with matter4 ,nevertheless 7imagination7 does not hide the soul1 whose operations often disarrange and disturb it4 ,never could imagination hide the soul entirely1 even if imagination should penetrate the soul entirely1 and should seem to veil it completely4 ,indeed1 the soul contains operations and reasons contrary 7to imagination71 by which she succeeds in putting aside the phantoms that besiege her4#gf ,but matter1 being infinitely feebler than the soul1 possesses none of the beings1 either of the true or false1 which characteristically belong to it4 ,matter has nothing that could show it off1 being absolutely denuded of all things4 ,it is no more than a cause of appearance for other things2 it could never say1 ,i am here1 or there6 ,if1 starting from other beings1#gg profound reasoning should succeed in discovering matter1 it ultimately declares that matter is something completely abandoned by true beings2 but as the things that are posterior to true beings themselves seem to exist1 matter might1 so to speak1 be said to be extended in all these things1 seeming both to follow them1 and not to follow them4 ,,the ,,magnitude ,,of ,,matter ,,is ,,really ,,derived ,,from ,,the ,,seminal ,,reason4 #af4 ,the 7seminal7 reason1 on approaching matter1 and giving it the extension it desired1 made of it a magnitude4 ,the reason drew from itself the magnitude to give it to the matter1 which did not possess it1 and which did not1 merely on that account1 acquire size2 otherwise the magnitude occurring within it would be magnitude itself4 ,if we remove form from matter1 the substrate that then remains neither seems nor is large 7since magnitude is part of form74 ,if what is produced in matter be a certain magnitude1 as for instance a man or a horse1 the magnitude characteristic of the horse disappears with the form of the horse4#gh ,if we say that a horse cannot be produced except in a mass of determined size1 and that this magnitude remained 7when the form of the horse disappeared71 we would answer that what would then remain would not be the magnitude characteristic of the horse1 but the magnitude of mass4 ,besides1 if this mass were fire or earth1 when the form of fire or that of earth disappeared1 the magnitude of the fire or of the earth would simultaneously disappear4 ,matter therefore possesses neither figure nor quantity2 otherwise1 it would not have ceased being fire to become something else1 but1 remaining fire1 would never become fire4#gi ,now that it seems to have become as great as this universe1 if the heavens1 with all they contain were annihilated1 all quantity would simultaneously disappear out of matter1 and with quantity also the other inseparable qualities will disappear4 ,matter would then remain what it originally was by itself2 it would keep none of the things that exist within it4 ,indeed1 the objects that can be affected by the presence of contrary objects can1 when the latter withdraw1 keep some trace of them2 but that which is impassible retains nothing2 for instance1 the air1 when penetrated by the light1 retains none of it when it disappears4 ,that that which has no magnitude can become great is not any more surprising than that which has no heat can become hot4 ,indeed1 for matter to be matter is something entirely different from its being magnitude2 magnitude is as immaterial as figure4 ,of matter such as it really is we should say that it is all things by participation4 ,now magnitude forms part of what we call all things4 ,as the bodies are composite1 magnitude is there among the other qualities1 without however being determinate therein4 ,indeed1 the reason of the body also contains magnitude4#hj ,on the contrary1 matter does not even contain indeterminate magnitude1 because it is not a body4 ,,magnitude ,,is ,,an ,,image ,,formed ,,by ,,the ,,universal ,,reflection ,,of ,,universal ,,beings4 #ag4 ,neither is matter magnitude itself2 for magnitude is a form1 and not a residence2 it exists by itself#ha 7for matter cannot even appropriate the images of beings74 ,not even in this respect1 therefore1 is matter magnitude4 ,but as that which exists in intelligence or in the soul desired to acquire magnitude1 it imparted to the things that desired to imitate magnitude by their aspiration or movement1 the power to impress on some other object a modification analogous to their own4 ,thus magnitude1 by developing in the procession of imagination1 dragged along with itself the smallness of matter1 made it seem large by extending it along with itself1 without becoming filled by that extension4 ,the magnitude of matter is a false magnitude1 since matter does not by itself possess magnitude1 and by extending itself along with magnitude1 has shared the extension of the latter4 ,indeed as all intelligible beings are reflected1 either in other things in general1 or in one of them in particular1 as each of them was large1 the totality also is1 in this manner1 great 7874 ,thus the magnitude of each reason constituted a particular magnitude1 as1 for instance1 a horse1 or some other being4#hb ,the image formed by the universal reflection of intelligible beings became a magnitude1 because it was illuminated by magnitude itself4 ,every part of it became a special magnitude2 and all things together seemed great by virtue of the universal form to which magnitude belongs4 ,thus occurred the extension of each thing towards each of the others1 and towards their totality4 ,the amount of this extension in form and in mass necessarily depended on the power1 that transformed what in reality was nothing to an appearance of being all things4 ,in the same manner color1 that arose out of what is not color1 and quality1 that arose out of what is not quality1 here below were referred to by the same name as the intelligible entities 7of which they are the images74 ,the case is similar for magnitude1 which arose out of that which has none1 or at least out of that magnitude that bears the same name 7as intelligible magnitude74 ,,sense-,,objects ,,appear1 ,,and ,,are ,,intermediary ,,between ,,form ,,and ,,matter4 ,sense-objects1 therefore1 occupy a rank intermediary between matter and form itself4#hc ,they no doubt appear1 because they are derived from intelligible entities2 but they are deceptive1 because the matter in which they appear does not really exist4#hd ,each of them becomes a magnitude1 because it is extended through the power of the entities that appear here below1 and which locate themselves here4 ,thus we have1 in every direction1 the production of an extension2 and that without matter undergoing any violence1 because 7potentially7 it is all things4 ,everything produces its own extension by the power it derives from the intelligible entities4 ,what imparts magnitude to matter is the appearance of magnitude1 and it is this appearance that forms our earthly magnitude4 ,matter yields itself everywhere entirely to the extension it thus1 by the universal appearance of magnitude1 is forced to take on4 ,indeed1 by its nature1 matter is the matter of everything1 and consequently is nothing determinate4 ,now that which is nothing determinate by itself could become its opposite 7of what it is71 and even after thus having become its own opposite1 it is not yet really this opposite2 otherwise this opposite would be its nature4#he ,,magnitude ,,is ,,only ,,appearance4 #ah4 ,let us now suppose that a conception of magnitude were possessed by some being which would have the power not only to be in itself1 but also to produce itself externally2 and that it should meet a nature 7such as matter7 that was incapable of existing within intelligence1 of having a form1 of revealing any trace of real magnitude1 or any quality4 ,what would such a being do with such a power8 ,it would create neither a horse nor an ox2 for other causes 7the seminal7 reasons would produce them4#hf ,indeed1 that which proceeds from magnitude itself cannot be real magnitude2 it must therefore be apparent magnitude4#hg ,thus1 since matter has not received real magnitude1 all it can do is to be as great as its nature will permit2 that is1 to seem great4 ,to accomplish that1 it must not fail anywhere2 and1 if it be extended1 it cannot be a discrete quantity1 but all its parts must be united1 and absent in no place4 ,indeed1 it was impossible for a small mass to contain an image of magnitude that would equal the real magnitude1 since it is only an image of magnitude2 but1 carried away with the hope of achieving the magnitude to which it aspired1 this image extended to its limit1 along with matter1 which shared its extension because matter could not follow it4 ,that is how this image of magnitude magnified what was not great1 without however making it seem really great1 and produced the magnitude that appears in its mass4 ,none the less does matter preserve its nature1 though it be veiled by this apparent magnitude1 as if by a garment with which it covered itself when it followed the magnitude that involved it in its extension4 ,if matter ever happened to be stripped of this garment1 it would nevertheless remain what itself was before2 for it possesses magnitude only in so far as form by its presence makes it great4#hh ,,if ,,matter ,,were ,a ,,primary ,,principle1 ,,it ,,would ,,be ,,the ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,universe1 ,,such ,,as ,,soul ,,is4 ,as the soul possesses the forms of beings1 and as she herself is a form1 she possesses all things simultaneously4#hi ,containing all the forms1 and besides seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards her1 and approaching her1 she is not willing to accept them1 along with their manifoldness4 ,she considers them only after making abstractions of their mass2 for the soul could not become other than she is4#ij ,but as matter does not have the strength to resist1 possessing as it does no special characteristic activity1 and being no more than an adumbration1 matter yields to everything that active power proposes to inflict on it4 ,besides1 that which proceeds from intelligible 7nature7 possesses already a trace of what is to be produced in matter4 ,that is how discursive reason which moves within the sphere of representative imagination1 or the movement produced by reason1 implies division2 for if reason remained within unity and identity1 it would not move1 but remain at rest4 ,besides1 not as the soul does1 can matter receive all forms simultaneously2 otherwise it would be a form4 ,as it must contain all things1 without however containing them in an indivisible manner1 it is necessary that1 serving as it does as location for all things1 it should extend towards all of them1 everywhere offering itself to all of them1 avoiding no part of space1 because it is not restricted within any boundary of space1 and because it is always ready to receive what is to be4 ,how then does it happen that one thing1 on entering into matter1 does not hinder the entrance of other things1 which1 however1 cannot co-exist with the former thing8 ,the reason is that matter is not a first principle4 ,otherwise1 it would be the very form of the universe4 ,such a form1 indeed1 would be both all things simultaneously1 and each thing in particular4 ,indeed the matter of the living being is divided as are the very parts of the living being2 otherwise nothing but reason#ia would exist4 ,,matter ,,as ,,mother1 ,,nurse1 ,,residence1 ,,and ,,other ,,nature4 #ai4 ,when things enter into the matter that plays the part of mother to them1 they neither hurt it1 nor give it pleasure4 ,their blows are not felt by matter2 they direct their blows only against each other1 because the powers act upon their opposites1 and not on their substrates1 unless indeed we consider the substrates as united to the things they contain4 ,heat makes cold disappear1#ib as whiteness affects blackness2 or1 if they mingle1 they produce a new quality by their mixture4#ic ,what is affected is the things that mingle1 and their being affected consists in ceasing to be what they were4 ,among animate beings1 it is the body that is affected by the alteration of the qualities1 and of the forces possessed4 ,when the qualities constitutive of these beings are destroyed1 or when they combine1 or when they undergo some change contrary to their nature1 the affections relate to the body1 as the perceptions do to the soul4 ,the latter indeed knows all the affections that produce a lively impression4 ,matter1 however1 remains what it is2 it could not be affected when it ceases to contain heat or cold1 since neither of these qualities is either characteristic or foreign4 ,the name that best characterizes matter1 therefore1 is nurse or residence4#id ,but in what sense could matter1 that begets nothing1 be called mother8 ,those who call it such consider a mother as playing the part of mere matter1 towards her child1 merely receiving the germ1 without contributing anything of itself1 because the body of the child owes its growth to nourishment4 ,if however the mother does contribute anything 7to the formation of the child7 she then plays the part of form1 and does not restrict herself to the part of matter4 ,indeed1 the form alone is fruitful1 while the other nature 7that is1 matter71 is unfruitful4 ,,the ,,myth ,,of ,,the ,,ithyphallic ,,hermes4 ,that no doubt was the meaning of those ancient sages who in mysteries and initiations symbolically represented the ancient ,hermes#ie with the generative organ in erection1 to teach that it is intelligible reason that begets sense-objects4 ,on the other hand1 these same sages signify the sterility of matter1 condemned to perpetual self-identity1 by the eunuchs who surround ,rhea1#if making of it the mother of all things1 to use the expression they employ in designating the principle that plays the part of substrate4 ,,the ,,sterility ,,of ,,nature ,,indicated ,,by ,,castration4 ,that name indicates the difference between matter and a mother4 ,to those who1 refusing to be satisfied with superficialities1 insist on thoroughness1 they thus signified in as precise a manner as possible 7without lifting the veil of7 obscurity1 that matter was sterile1 although feminine also to extent at least that matter receives1 without contributing to1 the act of generation4 ,they indicated it by this1 that the 7,galli7 who surround ,cybele are not women1 but neither are they men1 possessing no power of generation2 for by castration they have lost a faculty that is characteristic only of a man whose virility is intact4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,three4 ,psychological ,questions4 ,a4 ,,are ,,not ,,all ,,souls ,,parts ,,or ,,emanations ,,of ,a ,,single ,,soul8#ii ,,psychology ,,obeys ,,the ,,precept ,,know ,,thyself1 ,,and ,,shows ,,how ,,we ,,are ,,temples ,,of ,,the ,,divinity4 #a4 ,among the questions raised about the soul1 we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance1 but also such as may be considered matters of doubt1 considering our researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt4 ,this should prove an interesting study4 ,what indeed better deserves careful examination and close scrutiny than what refers to the soul8 ,among other advantages1 the study of the soul has that of making known to us two order of things1 those of which she is the principle1 and those from which she herself proceeds4 ,this examination will be in line with the divine precept to know ourselves4#ajj ,before seeking to discover and understand the remainder1 it is no more than right first to apply ourselves to finding out the nature of the principle that embarks in these researches#aja2 and as we are seeking what is lovable1 we will do well to contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles 7that of our own intellectual nature72 for if there be a duality1 in the universal 7,soul71 so much more likely will there be a duality in individual intelligences4 ,we should also examine the sense in which it may be said that souls are sanctuaries of the divinity2 but this question will not admit of solution till after we have determined how the soul descends into the body4 ,,are ,,individual ,,souls ,,emanations ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul8 ,now we must consider whether our souls themselves are 7emanations7 from the universal ,soul4 ,it may be insisted that1 to demonstrate that our souls are not particles of the universal ,soul1 it does not suffice to show that our souls go as far 7in their procession7 as the universal ,soul1 nor that they resemble 7the universal ,soul7 in their intellectual faculties1 granting indeed that such a resemblance be admitted2 for we might say that parts conform to the whole they compose4 ,we might invoke ,plato's authority1 and insist that he teaches this opinion in that 7part of the ,philebus#ajb7 where he affirms that the universe is animate3 ,as our body is a part of the universe1 our soul is a part of the ,soul of the universe4 ,we might add that 7,plato7 states and clearly demonstrates that we follow the circular movement of heaven1 that from it we receive1 our moral habits and condition2 that as we were begotten in the universe1 our soul must be derived from the surrounding universe#ajc2 and as each part of us participates in our soul1 we ourselves should participate in the ,soul of the universe1 of which we are parts in the same way as our members are parts of ourselves4 ,last1 we might quote the following words3 ,the universal ,soul takes care of all that is inanimate4 ,this sentence seems to mean that there is no soul outside of the universal ,soul2 for it is the latter that cares for all that is inanimate4 ,,conformity ,,to ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,implies ,,that ,,they ,,are ,,not ,,parts ,,of ,,her4 #b4 ,consider the following answers4 ,to begin with1 the assertion that souls conform 7to each other71 because they attain the same objects1 and the reduction of them to a single kind1 implicitly denies that they are parts 7of the universal ,soul74 ,we might better say that the universal ,soul is one and identical1 and that each soul is universal 7that is1 that she conforms to the universal ,soul1 because she possesses all the latter's powers74 ,now1 assertion of the unity of the universal ,soul defines her as being something different 7from individual souls72 namely1 a principle which1 specially belonging neither to one nor the other1 neither to an individual1 nor to a world1 nor to anything else1 itself carries out what is carried out by the world and every living being4 ,it is right enough to say that the universal ,soul does not belong to any individual being1 inasmuch as she is 7pure7 being2 it is right enough that there should be a ,soul which is not owned by any being1 and that only individual souls should belong to individual beings4 ,,limitations ,,to ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,parts1 ,,in ,,physical ,,things4 ,but we shall have to explain more clearly the sense in which the word parts must here be taken4 ,to begin with1 there is here no question of parts of a body1 whether homogeneous or heterogeneous4 ,we shall make but a single observation1 namely1 that when treating of homogeneous bodies1 parts refer to mass1 and not to form4 ,for instance1 take whiteness4 ,the whiteness of one part of the milk1 is not a part of the whiteness of all the milk in existence2 it is the whiteness of a part1 and not the part of whiteness2 for1 taken in general1 whiteness has neither size nor quantity4 ,only with these restrictions can we say that there are parts in the forms suitable to corporeal things4 ,,when ,,applied ,,to ,,incorporeal ,,things1 ,,parts ,,have ,,different ,,senses4 ,further1 treating of incorporeal things1 parts is taken in several senses4 ,speaking of numbers1 we may say that two is a part of ten 7referring exclusively to abstract numbers74 ,we may also say that a certain extension is a part of a circle or line4 ,further1 a notion is said to be a part of science4 ,,such ,,mathematical ,,senses ,,cannot ,,be ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,soul4 ,when dealing with numbers and geometrical figures1 as well as with bodies1 it is evident that the whole is necessarily diminished by its division into parts1 and that each part is smaller than the whole4 ,rightly1 these things should be susceptible to increase or diminution1 as their nature is that of definite quantities1 not quantity in itself4 ,it is surely not in this sense that1 when referring to the soul1 we speak of quantities4 ,the soul is not a quantity such as a dozen1 which forms a whole divisible into unities2 otherwise1 we would end in a host of absurdities1 since a group of ten is not a genuine unity4 ,either each one of the unities would have to be soul1 or the ,soul herself result from a sum of inanimate unities4 ,,actual ,,division ,,into ,,parts ,,would ,,be ,,tantamount ,,to ,a ,,denial ,,of ,,the ,,whole4 ,besides1 our opponents have granted that every part of the universal ,soul conforms to the whole4 ,now1 in continuous quantities1 it is by no means necessary that the part should resemble the whole4 ,thus1 in the circle and the quadrilateral 7the parts are not circles or quadrilaterals74 ,all the parts of the divided object 7from which a part is taken7 are not even similar to each other1 but vary in manifold ways1 such as the different triangles of which a single triangle might be composed4 ,our opponents also acknowledge that the universal ,soul is composed of parts that conform to the whole4 ,now1 in a line1 one part might also be a line1 while differing from the whole in magnitude4 ,but when we speak of the soul1 if the difference of the part from the whole consisted in a difference of size1 the soul would be a magnitude and a body2 for then she would differentiate in quantity by psychic characteristics4 ,but this would be impossible if all souls be considered similar and universal4 ,it is evident that the soul cannot1 like magnitudes1 be further divided2 and even our opponents would not claim that the universal ,soul is thus divided into parts4 ,this would amount to destroying the universal ,soul1 and reducing her to a mere name1 if indeed in this system a prior universal 7,soul7 can at all be said to exist4 ,this would place her in the position of wine1 which might be distributed in several jars1 saying that the part of the wine contained in each of them is a portion of the whole4#ajd ,,nor ,,is ,,the ,,soul ,a ,,part ,,in ,,the ,,sense ,,that ,,one ,,proposition ,,is ,a ,,part ,,of ,a ,,science4 ,nor should we 7apply to the soul7 the word part in the sense that some single proposition is a part of the total science4 ,in this case the total science does not remain any less the same 7when it is divided71 and its division is only as it were the production and actualization of each of its component parts4 ,here each proposition potentially contains the total science1 and 7in spite of its division71 the total science remains whole4 ,,the ,,difference ,,of ,,functions ,,of ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,and ,,individual ,,souls ,,makes ,,entire ,,division ,,between ,,them ,,impossible4 ,if such be the relation of the universal ,soul to the other souls1 the universal ,soul1 whose parts are such1 will not belong to any particular being1 but will subsist in herself4 ,no longer will she be the soul of the world4 ,she will even rank with the number of souls considered parts4 ,as all souls would conform to each other1 they would1 on the same grounds1 be parts of the ,soul that is single and identical4 ,then it would be inexplicable that some one soul should be ,soul of the world1 while some other soul should be one of the parts of the world4 ,,are ,,individual ,,souls ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,as ,,is ,,the ,,local ,,consciousness ,,of ,,some ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,body ,,to ,,the ,,whole ,,consciousness8 #c4 ,are individual souls parts of the universal ,soul as1 in any living organism1 the soul that animates 7or vivifies7 the finger is a part of the entire soul back of the whole animal8 ,this hypothesis would force us to the conclusion either that there is no soul outside of the body1 or that the whole universal ,soul exists entire1 not in a body1 but outside of the body of the world4 ,this question deserves consideration4 ,let us do so by an illustration4 ,,study ,,of ,,the ,,question ,,by ,,observation ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,organism4 ,if the universal ,soul communicate herself to all individual animals1 and if it be in this sense that each soul is a part of the universal ,soul--for as soon as she would be divided1 the universal ,soul could not communicate herself to every part--the universal must be entire everywhere1 and she must simultaneously be one and the same in different beings4 ,now this hypothesis no longer permits us to distinguish on one hand the universal ,soul1 and on the other the parts of this soul1 so much the more as these parts have the same power 7as the universal ,soul72 for even for organs whose functions are different1 as the eyes and ears1 it will not be claimed that there is one part of the soul in the eyes1 and another in the ears--such a division would suit only things that have no relation with the soul4 ,we should insist that it is the same part of the soul which animates these two different organs1 exercising in each of them a different faculty4 ,indeed1 all the powers of the soul are present in these two senses 7of sight and hearing71 and the only cause of the difference of their perceptions is the differences of the organs4 ,nevertheless all perceptions belong to forms 7that is1 to faculties of the soul71 and reduce to a form 7the soul7 which can become all things 7874#aec ,this is further proved by the fact that the impressions are forced to come and centre in an only centre4 ,doubtless the organs by means of which we perceive cannot make us perceive all things1 and consequently the impressions differ with the organs4 ,nevertheless the judgment of these impressions belongs to one and the same principle1 which resembles a judge attentive to the words and acts submitted to his consideration4#aje ,we have1 however1 said above that it is one and the same principle which produces acts belonging to different functions 7as are sight and hearing74 ,if these functions be like the senses1 it is not possible that each of them should think2 for the universal alone would be capable of this4 ,if thought be a special independent function1 every intelligence subsists by itself4 ,further1 when the soul is reasonable1 and when she is so in a way such as to be called reasonable in her entirety1 that which is called a part conforms to the whole1 and consequently is not a part of the whole4 ,,intellectual ,,difficulty ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,being ,,one ,,and ,,yet ,,in ,,all ,,beings4 #d4 ,if the universal ,soul be one in this manner1 what about consequences of this 7conception78 ,might we not well doubt the possibility of the universal ,soul's simultaneously being one1 yet present in all beings8 ,how does it happen that some souls are in a body1 while others are discarnate8 ,it would seem more logical to admit that every soul is always in some body1 especially the universal ,soul4 ,for it is not claimed1 for the universal ,soul1 as it is for ours1 that she ever abandons her body1 and though it be by some asserted that the universal ,soul may one day leave her body1 it is never claimed that she would ever be outside of any body4 ,even admitting that some day she should be divided from all body1 how does it happen that a soul could thus separate1 while some other could not1 if at bottom both are of the same nature8 ,as to ,intelligence1 such a question would be impossible2 the parts into which it is divided are not distinguished from each other by their individual difference1 and they all exist together eternally1 for ,intelligence is not divisible4 ,on the contrary1 as the universal ,soul is divisible within the bodies1 as has been said1 it is difficult to understand how all the souls proceed from the unitary 7pure7 ,being4 ,,the ,,healthy ,,soul ,,can ,,work1 ,,the ,,sick ,,soul ,,is ,,devoted ,,to ,,her ,,body4 ,this question may be answered as follows4 ,the unitary ,being 7that is ,intelligence71 subsists in itself without descending into the bodies4 ,from unitary ,being proceed the universal ,soul and the other souls1 which1 up to a certain point1 exist all together1 and form but a single soul so far as they do not belong to any particular individual 7contained in the sense-world74 ,if1 however1 by their superior extremities they attach themselves to ,unity1 if within it they coincide1 they later diverge 7by their actualization71 just as on the earth light is divided between the various dwellings of men1 nevertheless remaining one and indivisible4 ,in this case1 the universal ,soul is ever elevated above the others because she is not capable of descending1 of falling1 of inclining towards the sense-world4 ,our souls1 on the contrary1 descend here below1 because special place is assigned to them in this world1 and they are obliged to occupy themselves with a body which demands sustained attention4 ,by her lower part1 the universal ,soul resembles the vital principle which animates a great plant1 and which there manages everything peaceably and noiselessly4 ,by their lower part our souls are similar to those animalcul born of the decaying parts of plants4 ,that is the image of the living body of the universe4 ,the higher part of our soul1 which is similar to the higher part of the universal ,soul1 might be compared to a farmer who1 having noticed the worms by which the plant is being devoured1 should apply himself to destroying them1 and should solicitously care for the plant4 ,so we might say that the man in good health1 and surrounded by healthy people1 is entirely devoted to his duties or studies2 the sick man1 on the contrary1 is entirely devoted to his body1 and becomes dependent thereon4 ,,souls ,,retain ,,both ,,their ,,unity ,,and ,,differences ,,on ,,different ,,levels4 #e4 ,how could the universal ,soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself and of other persons8 ,might she be the soul of one person by her lower strata1 and that of somebody else by her higher strata8 ,to teach such a doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that the soul of ,socrates would be alive while being in a certain body1 while she would be annihilated 7by losing herself within the universal ,soul7 at the very moment when 7as a result of separation of the body7 she had come into what was best 7in the intelligible world74 ,no1 none of the true beings perishes4 ,not even the intelligences lose themselves up there 7in the divine ,intelligence71 because they are not divided as are bodies1 and each subsists in her own characteristics1 to their differences joining that identity which constitutes being4 ,being located below the individual intelligences to which they are attached1 individual souls are the reasons 7born7 of the intelligences1 or more developed intelligences2 from being but slightly manifold1 they become very much so1 while remaining in communion with the slightly manifold beings4 ,as however they tend to introduce separation in these less divisible beings 7that is1 intelligences71 and as nevertheless they cannot attain the last limits of division1 they simultaneously preserve both their identity and difference4 ,each one remains single1 and all together form a unity4 ,,souls ,,develop ,,manifoldness ,,just ,,as ,,intelligence ,,does4 ,we have thus succeeded in establishing the most important point of the discussion1 namely1 that all souls proceed from a single ,soul1 that from being one they become manifold1 as is the case with the intelligences1 divided in the same way1 and similarly undivided4 ,the ,soul that dwells in the intelligible world is the one and indivisible reason 7born7 of intelligence1 and from this ,soul proceed the particular immaterial reasons1 in the same manner as on high 7the individual intelligences proceed from the one and absolute ,intelligence74 ,,why ,,should ,,creation ,,be ,,predicated ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,and ,,not ,,of ,,the ,,human8 #f4 ,if there be similarity between the universal ,soul and the individual souls1 how does it happen that the former created the world1 while the others did not do so1 though each of them also contain all things within herself1 and since we have already shown that the productive power can exist simultaneously in several beings8 ,by explaining its reason we can thus examine and discover how the same nature 7being7 can act or experience1 or act and experience1 in a different manner in different beings4 ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,alone ,,creates ,,because ,,she ,,remains ,,nearest ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,how and why did the universal ,soul make the universe1 while the individual souls only manage a part thereof8 ,that is not more surprising than to see1 among men who possess the same knowledge1 some command a greater number1 and others a lesser4 ,this is the case because there is a great difference between souls4 ,some1 instead of separating from the universal ,soul1 have remained in the intelligible world1 and still contain the body 7of the universal71 while others1 when the body 7of the universe7 already existed1 and while the universal ,soul1 their sister1 governed it1 accepted destinies assigned them by fate1 as if 7the universal ,soul7 had prepared for them dwellings to receive them4#ajf ,besides1 the universal ,soul contemplates universal ,intelligence1 and the individual souls rather contemplate individual intelligences4 ,these souls might indeed possibly have also been capable of making the universe2 but that is no longer possible to them now that the universal ,soul has already done it1 and has preceded them4 ,besides1 the very same question would have arisen even if an entirely different soul had first made the universe4 ,perhaps it is better to state that if the universal ,soul has created the universe1 it is chiefly because she is more closely related to intelligible entities1 for the souls that are nearest thereto are the most powerful4 ,maintaining themselves in this quiet region1 they act with greater facility2 for to act without suffering is the sign of a greater power4 ,thus the power depending on the intelligible world abides within itself1 and by abiding within itself1 produces4 ,the other souls1 descending towards the body1 withdraw from the intelligible world1 and fall into the abyss 7of matter74 ,perhaps also the element of manifoldness within them1 finding itself drawn towards the lower regions1 along with it dragged the conceptions of those souls1 and made them descend hither4 ,indeed the distinction of the second or third rank for souls must be understood in this sense that some are nearer1 and some further from the intelligible world4 ,likewise1 among us1 all souls are not equally disposed in regard to this world4 ,some succeed in uniting with it1 others approach it by their aspirations2 others do not quite succeed1 because they do not all use the same faculties1 and some use the first1 others the second1 and some the third1 though they all equally possess all faculties4 ,,difference ,,between ,,individual ,,and ,,universal ,,souls4 #g4 ,that is what seems true to us4 ,as to the ,philebus passage 7quoted in the first section71 it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal ,soul4 ,that1 however1 is not its true meaning1 as held by some4 ,it only means what ,plato desired to assert in this place1 namely1 that heaven is animate4 ,plato proves this by saying that it would be absurd to insist that heaven has no soul1 when our body1 which is only a part of the body of the universe1 nevertheless has a soul2 but how could a part be animate1 unless the whole was so also8 ,it is especially in the ,timaeus#ajg that ,plato clearly expresses his thought4 ,after having described the birth of the universal ,soul1 he shows the other souls born later from the mixture made in the same vase from which the universal ,soul was drawn4 ,he asserts that they are similar to the universal ,soul1 and that their difference consists in that they occupy the second or third rank4 ,that is further confirmed by this passage of the ,phaedrus#ajh3 ,the universal ,soul cares for what is inanimate4 ,outside of the ,soul1 indeed1 what power would manage1 fashion1 ordain and produce the body8 ,it would be nonsense to attribute this power to one soul1 and not to another4 7,plato7 adds 7in substance73 ,the ,perfect ,soul1 the ,soul of the universe1 hovering in the ethereal region1 acts on the earth without entering into it1 being borne above him as in a chariot4 ,the other souls that are perfect share with it the administration of the world4 ,when ,plato speaks of the soul as having lost her wings1 he is evidently distinguishing individual souls from the universal ,soul4 ,one might also conclude that our souls are part of the universal ,soul from his statement that the souls follow the circular movement of the universe1 that from it they derive their characteristics1 and that they undergo its influence4 ,indeed1 they might very easily undergo the influence exercised by the nature of the special localities1 of the waters and the air of the towns they inhabit1 and the temperament of the bodies to which they are joined4 ,we have indeed acknowledged that1 being contained in the universe1 we possess something of the life-characteristic of the universal ,soul1 and that we undergo the influence of the circular movement of the heavens4 ,but we have also shown that there is within us another 7rational7 soul1 which is capable of resistance to these influences1 and which manifests its different character precisely by the resistance she offers them4 ,the objection that we are begotten within the universe may be answered by the fact that the child is likewise begotten within its mother's womb1 and that nevertheless the soul that enters into its body is distinct from that of its mother4 ,such is our solution of the problem4 ,,sympathy ,,between ,,individual ,,and ,,universal ,,soul ,,comes ,,from ,,common ,,source4 #h4 ,the sympathy existing between souls forms no objection4 ,for this sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from the same principle from which the universal ,soul also is derived4 ,we have already shown that there is one ,soul 7the universal7 and several souls 7human souls72 and we have also defined the difference between the parts and the whole4 ,last1 we have also spoken of the difference existing between souls4 ,let us now return to the latter point4 ,,difference ,,between ,,souls4 ,this difference between souls is caused principally by the constitution of the bodies they animate2 also by the moral habits1 the activities1 the thoughts and behavior of these souls in earlier existence4 ,according to ,plato#aji the choice of the souls' condition depends on their anterior existence4 ,on observing the nature of souls in general1 we find that ,plato recognizes differences between them by saying that some souls occupy the second or third ranks4#aaj ,now we have said that all souls are 7potentially7 all things1#aaa that each is characterized by the faculty principally exercised thereby1 that is1 that some souls unite with the intelligible world by actualization1 while others do so in thought or desire4#aab ,souls1 thus contemplating different objects1 are and become all that they contemplate4 ,fulness and perfection also belong to soul1 but in this respect they are not all identical1 because variety is the law that directs their co-ordination4 ,indeed1 the universal#aac reason is on the one hand manifold1 and on the other varied1 like a being that is animate1 and which possesses manifold forms4#aad ,in this case1 there is co-ordination2 beings are not entirely separated from each other1 and there is no place for chance either in real beings1 nor in bodies2 consequently the number of beings is definite4 ,to be individual1 beings must first be stable1 then they must remain identical1 and last1 they must numerically be one in order to achieve individuality4 ,bodies which by nature perpetually ooze away1 because for them form is something incidental1 never possess formal existence but by their participation in 7and imitation of71 genuine ,beings4 ,on the contrary1 for the latter1 that are not composite1 existence consists in each of them being numerically single1 in possessing this unity which dates from the beginning1 which does not become what it was not1 and which will never cease being what it is4 ,if indeed they cannot exist without some producing principle1 that principle will not derive them from matter4 ,it will have to add to them something from its own being4 ,but if intelligible entities thus have at times more1 and at times less1 perfection1 they will change2 which would contradict their 7nature1 or7 being1 which is to remain identical4 ,why indeed should they become such as they are now1 and why should they not always have been such as they now are8 ,further1 if they be at times more or less perfect1 if they become1 they are not eternal4 ,but it is granted that the ,soul 7as an intelligible being7 is eternal4 ,,like ,,the ,,divinity1 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,always ,,one4 7,it might still be asked7 whether what is stable can be called infinite8 ,that which is stable is potentially infinite1 because its power is infinite without being also infinitely divided2 for the divinity too is infinite4#aae ,thus each soul is what the divinity's nature is1 without receiving from any other either limit or determinate quantity4 ,the soul extends as far as she wishes4 ,she is never forced to go further1 but everywhere she descends towards bodies and penetrates into them1 according to her nature4 ,besides1 she never separates from herself1 though present in finger or in foot4 ,not otherwise is it with the universe3 wherever the ,soul penetrates1 she ever remains indivisible1 as when she penetrates into the different parts of a plant4 ,then1 if you cut a certain part1 the principle which communicates life to it remains present both in the plant and in the part detached therefrom4 ,the body of the universe is single1 and the ,soul is everywhere in her unity4 ,,soul ,,powers ,,remain ,,the ,,same ,,throughout ,,all ,,changes ,,of ,,body4 ,when numberless vermin arise out of the putrefaction of a body1 they do not derive their life from the soul of the entire animal2 the latter has abandoned the body of the animal1 and1 being dead1 no longer dwells in the body4 ,but the matter derived from putrefaction1 being well suited for the generation of vermin1 each receives a different soul1 because the 7universal7 ,soul is not lacking anywhere4 ,nevertheless1 as one part of the body is capable of receiving her1 while another is not1 the parts that thus become animated do not increase the number of souls2 for each of these little beings depends1 as far as she remains one1 on the single ,soul 7that is1 on the universal ,soul74 ,this state of affairs resembles that in us4 ,when some parts of our bodies are cut off1 and when others grow in their place1 our soul abandons the former1 and unites with the latter1 in so far as she remains one4 ,now the ,soul of the universe ever remains one2 and though amidst things contained within this universe1 some are animate1 while others are inanimate1 the soul-powers nevertheless remain the same4 ,b4 ,,why ,,and ,,how ,,do ,,souls ,,descend ,,into ,,bodies8 ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,transmigration4 #i4 ,let us now examine how it happens that the soul descends into the body1 and in what manner this occurs2 for it is sufficiently astonishing and remarkable4 ,for a soul1 there are two kinds of entrance into a body4 ,the first occurs when the soul1 already dwelling in a body1 undergoes a transmigration2 that is1 passes from an aerial or igneous body into a terrestrial body4 ,this is not usually called a transmigration1 because the condition from which the soul comes is not visible4 ,the other kind occurs when the soul passes from an incorporeal condition into any kind of a body1 and thus for the first time enters into relations with a body4#aaf ,,study ,,of ,,first ,,incarnation4 ,we must here examine what1 in the latter case1 is experienced by the soul which1 till then pure from all dealings with the body1 for the first time surrounds herself with that kind of a substance4 ,besides1 it is not only just but even necessary for us to begin by a consideration of 7this event in7 the universal ,soul4 ,to say that the ,soul enters the body of the universe and comes to animate it1 is no more than a statement made to clarify our thoughts2 for the succession in her actions thus established is purely verbal4 ,there never was a moment when the universe was not animated1 when its body existed without the ,soul1 or when matter existed without form4#aag ,but these things can be separated in thought and speech1 since as soon as an object is formed1 it is always possible to analyse it by thought and speech4 ,that is the truth4 ,,how ,,the ,,universe ,,is ,,animated ,,by ,,the ,,world ,,soul4 ,if there were no body1 the soul could not have any procession1 since the body is the natural locality of her development4 ,as the soul must extend1 she will beget a receiving locality1 and will1 consequently1 produce the body4 ,the soul's rest is based1 and depends for growth on 7the intellectual category of7 rest itself4 ,the soul thus resembles an immense light which weakens as it becomes more distant from its source1 so that at the extremity of its radiation1 it has become no more than an adumbration4 ,however1 the soul evidently gave a form to this adumbration from the very beginning of things4 ,it was1 indeed1 by no means suitable that what approached the soul should in no way participate in reason#aah2 consequently there came to be an adumbration of reason in 7matter71 this adumbration being the soul4 ,the universe thus became a beautiful and varied dwelling1 which was not deprived of the presence#aai of the universal ,soul by her not totally incorporating within it4 ,she judged that the whole universe was worthy of her care1 and she thus gave it as much being and beauty as it was able to receive1 without herself losing any of it1 because she manages the world while herself remaining above it in the intelligible sphere4 ,by so animating it1 she thus grants it her presence1 without becoming its property2 she dominates it1 and possesses it1 without being1 thereby1 dominated or possessed4 ,the universe1 indeed1 is in the containing ,soul1 and participates therein entirely4 7,the universe is in the ,soul as is7 a net in the sea1 on all sides penetrated and enveloped by life1 without ever being able to appropriate it4 ,so far as it can1 this net extends along with the sea1 for none of its parts could be elsewhere than it is4 ,by nature the universal ,soul is immense1 because her magnitude is not definite2 so that by one and the same power she embraces the entire body of the world1 and is present throughout the whole extension4 ,without it1 the world-,soul would make no effort to proceed into extension1 for by herself she is all that it is her nature to be4 ,the magnitude of the universe therefore is determined by that of the location of the ,soul2 and the limits of its extent are those of the space within which it is animated by her4 ,the extension of the adumbration of the ,soul is therefore determined by that of the reason which radiates from this focus of light2 and on the other hand1 this reason was to produce such an extension as its nature urged it to produce4#abj ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,progressively ,,informs ,,all ,,things4 #aj4 ,now let us return to that which has always been what it is4 ,let us1 in thought1 embrace all beings3 air1 light1 sun1 and moon4 ,let us then consider the sun1 the light1 and so forth1 as being all things1 without ever forgetting that there are things that occupy the first rank1 others the second1 or the third4 ,let us1 at the summit of this series of beings1 conceive of the universal ,soul as subsisting eternally4 ,let us then posit that which holds the first rank after her1 and thus continue till we arrive at the things that occupy the last rank1 and which1 as it were1 are the last glimmerings of the light shed by the soul4 ,let us represent these things as an extension first dark1 and then later illuminated by the form which comes to impress itself on an originally dark background4 ,this background is embellished by reason in virtue of the entire universal ,soul's independent power of embellishing matter by means of reasons1 just as the seminal reasons themselves fashion and form animals as microcosms4 ,according to its nature1 the ,soul gives a form to everything she touches4 ,she produces without casual conception1 without the delays of deliberation1 or of those of voluntary determination4 ,otherwise1 she would not be acting according to her nature1 but according to the precepts of a borrowed art4 ,art1 indeed1 is posterior to nature4 ,art imitates by producing obscure and feeble imitations of nature's works1 toys without value or merit2 and besides1 art makes use of a great battery of apparatus to produce these images4 ,on the contrary1 the universal ,soul1 dominating bodies by virtue of her nature 7being7 makes them become and be what she desires2 for the things themselves that exist since the beginning cannot raise resistance to her will4 ,in inferior things1 as the result of mutual obstruction1 matter does not receive the exact form that the 7seminal7 reason contains in germ4 ,but as the universal ,soul produces the universal form1 and as all things are therein co-ordinated1 the work is beautiful because it is realized without trouble or obstacle4 ,in the universe there are temples for the divinities1 houses for men1 and other objects adapted to the needs of other beings4 ,what indeed could the ,soul create if not what she has the power to create8 ,as fire warms1 as snow cools1 the soul acts now within herself1 and then outside of herself1 and on other objects4 ,the action which inanimate beings elicit from themselves slumbers1 as it were1 within them2 and that which they exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves that which is capable of an experience4 ,to render the rest similar to itself1 is indeed the common characteristic of every being4 ,the soul's power of acting on herself and on others is a vigilant faculty4 ,it communicates life to beings who do not have it in themselves1 and the life communicated to them is similar to the life of the soul herself4 ,now as the soul lives in reason1 she imparts a reason to the body1 which reason is an image of the one she herself possesses4 ,indeed1 what she communicates to the bodies is an image of life4 ,she also imparts to them the shapes whose reasons she contains4 ,now as she possesses the reasons of all things1 even of the divinities1 the world contains all things4 ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,as ,,model ,,of ,,reason1 ,,as ,,intermediary ,,and ,,interpreter4 #aa4 ,the ancient sages1 who wished to materialize the divinities by making statues of them1 seem to me to have well judged the nature of the universe4 ,they understood that the being of the universal ,soul was easy to attract anywhere1 that her presence can easily be summoned in everything suited to receive her action1 and thus to participate somewhat in her power4 ,now anything is suited to undergo the action of the soul when it lends itself like a mirror to the reflection of any kind of an image4 ,in the universe nature most artistically forms all beings in the image of the reasons it contains4 ,in each of 7nature's7 works the 7seminal7 reason that is united to matter1 being the image of the reason superior to the matter 7of the idea71 reattaches itself to divinity 7to ,intelligence71 according to which it was begotten1 and which the universal ,soul contemplated while creating4#aba ,it was therefore equally impossible that there should be here below anything which did not participate in the divinity1 and which the latter brought down here below2 for 7the divinity7 is ,intelligence1 the sun that shines there on high4 ,let us consider 7the universal ,soul7 as the model of reason4 ,below the ,intelligence is the ,soul1 which depends on it1 which subsists by and with it4 ,the ,soul holds to this sun 7of ,intelligence72 the ,soul is the intermediary by which the beings here below are reattached to intelligible beings2 she is the interpreter of things which descend from the intelligible world into the sense-world1 and of the things of the sense-world which return into the intelligible world4 ,indeed1 intelligible things are not separated from each other2 they are distinguished only by their difference and their constitution4 ,each of them remains within itself1 without any relation to locality2 they are simultaneously united and separate4 ,the beings that we call divinities deserve to be considered such because they never swerve from intelligible entities1 because they depend on the universal ,soul considered in her principle1 at the very moment of the ,soul's issuing from ,intelligence4 ,thus these beings are divinities by virtue of the very principle to which they owe their existence1 and because they devote themselves to the contemplation of ,intelligence1 from which the universal ,soul herself does not distract her gaze4 ,,souls ,,are ,,not ,,cut ,,off ,,from ,,intelligence ,,during ,,their ,,descent ,,and ,,ascent4 #ab4 ,human souls rush down here below because they have gazed at their images 7in matter7 as in the mirror of ,bacchus4 ,nevertheless1 they are not separated from their principle1 ,intelligence4 ,their intelligence does not descend along with them1 so that even if by their feet they touch the earth1 their head rises above the sky4#abb ,they descend all the lower as the body1 over which their intermediary part is to watch1 has more need of care4 ,but their father ,jupiter1 pitying their troubles1 made their bonds mortal4 ,at certain intervals1 he grants them rest1 delivering them from the body1 so that they may return to inhabit the region where the universal ,soul ever dwells1 without inclining towards things here below4#abc ,indeed what the universe at present possesses suffices it both now and in the future1 since its duration is regulated by eternal and immutable reasons1 and because1 when one period is finished1 it again begins to run through another where all the lives are determined in accordance with the ideas4#abd ,in that way all things here below are subjected to intelligible things1 and similarly all is subordinated to a single reason1 either in the descent or in the ascension of souls1 or in their activities in general4 ,this is proved by the agreement between the universal order and the movements of the souls which by descending here below1 conform to this order without depending on it2 and perfectly harmonize with the circular movement of heaven4 ,thus the actions1 fortunes and destinies ever are prefigured in the figures formed by the stars4#abe ,that is the symphony whose sound is so melodious that the ancients expressed it symbolically by musical harmony4#abf ,now this could not be the case unless all the actions and experiences of the universe were 7well7 regulated by reasons which determine its periods1 the ranks of souls1 their existences1 the careers that they accomplish in the intelligible world1 or in heaven1 or on the earth4 ,the universal ,intelligence ever remains above the heaven1 and dwelling there entirely1 without ever issuing from itself2 it radiates into the sense-world by the intermediation of the ,soul which1 placed beside it1 receives the impression of the idea1 and transmits it to inferior things1 now immutably1 and then changeably1 but nevertheless in a regulated manner4 ,,why ,,souls ,,take ,,on ,,different ,,kinds ,,of ,,bodies4 ,souls do not always descend equally2 they descend sometimes lower1 sometimes less low1 but always in the same kind of beings 7among living beings74 ,each soul enters into the body prepared to receive her1 which corresponds to the nature to which the soul has become assimilated by its disposition2 for1 according as the soul has become similar to the nature of a man or of a brute1 she enters into a corresponding body4 ,,how ,,souls ,,come ,,to ,,descend4 #ac4 ,what is called inevitable necessity and divine justice consists in the sway of nature which causes each soul to proceed in an orderly manner into the bodily image which has become the object of her affection1 and of her predominating disposition4 ,consequently the soul1 by her form1 entirely approaches the object towards which her interior disposition bears her4 ,thus she is led and introduced where she is to go2 not that she is forced to descend at any particular moment into any particular body2 but1 at a fixed moment1 she descends as it were spontaneously where she ought to enter4 ,each 7soul7 has her own hour4 ,when this hour arrives1 the soul descends as if a herald was calling her1 and she penetrates into the body prepared to receive her1 as if she had been mastered and set in motion by forces and powerful attractions exerted by magic4#abg ,similarly in an animal1 nature administers all the organs1 solves or begets everything in its own time1 grows the beard or the horns1 gives special inclinations and powers to the being1 whenever they become necessary4 ,similarly1 in plants1 7nature7 produces flowers or fruits at the proper season4 ,the descent of souls into the bodies is neither voluntary nor forced2 it is not voluntary1 since it is not chosen or consented to by souls4 ,it is not compulsory1 in the sense that the latter obey only a natural impulsion1 just as one might be led to marriage1 or to the accomplishment of various honest actions1 rather by instinct than by reasoning4 ,nevertheless1 there is always something fatal for each soul4 ,one accomplishes her destiny at some one moment2 the other soul at some other moment4 ,likewise1 the intelligence that is superior to the world also has something fatal in its existence1 since itself has its own destiny1 which is to dwell in the intelligible world1 and to make its light radiate therefrom4 ,thus individuals come here below by virtue of the common law to which they are subjected4 ,each one1 indeed1 bears within himself this common law1 a law which does not derive its power from outside1 but which depends on the nature of those who are subject to it1 because it is innate in them4 ,consequently all voluntarily carry out its decrees at the predestined time1 because this law impels them to their goal2 and because1 deriving its force from those whom it commands1 it presses and stimulates them and inspires them with the desire to go whither their interior vocation calls them4 ,,by ,a ,,pun ,,on ,,world ,,and ,,adornment1 ,,plotinos ,,shows ,,men ,,add ,,to ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,the ,,world4 #ad4 ,that is how this world1 which already contains many lights1 and which is illuminated by souls1 finds itself still further adorned by the various beauties derived from different beings4 ,it receives beauties from the intelligible divinities and from the other intelligences which furnish it with souls4 ,this is probably the allegorical intent of the following myth4 ,,by ,a ,,pun ,,on ,,prometheus ,,and ,,providence1 ,,plotinos ,,employs ,,the ,,myth ,,of ,,pandora4 7,following both ,hesiod and the ,gnostics1 ,plotinos relates that7 a woman was formed by ,prometheus1 and adorned by the other divinities4 ,this piece of clay1 after having been kneaded with water1 was endowed with a human voice1 and received a form similar to the deities4 ,then ,venus1 the ,graces and the other deities each gave her a gift4 ,that is why this woman was called ,pandora1 because 7as her name implies1 in ,greek7 she had received gifts1 which had been given by all the divinities4 ,all1 in fact1 made some present to this piece of clay already fashioned by some kind of providence 7,prometheia1 or ,prometheus74 ,when ,epimetheus rejects the gift of ,prometheus1 it only indicates that it is better to live in the intelligible world4#abh ,the creator of ,pandora1 however1 is bound because he seems attached to his work4 ,but this bond is entirely exterior1 and it is broken by ,hercules1 because the latter possesses a liberating power4 ,whatever other interpretation the myth of ,pandora may receive1 it must still signify gifts received by the world1 and its import must agree with our teaching4 ,,why ,,many ,,souls ,,succumb ,,to ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 #ae4 ,on descending from the intelligible world1 souls first come into heaven1 and they there take a body by means of which they pass even into terrestrial bodies1 according as they more or less advance 7outside of the intelligible world74 ,there are some who issue from heaven into the bodies of an inferior nature2 there are some also who pass from one body into another4 ,the latter no longer have the power to reascend into the intelligible world because they have forgotten2 they are weighted down by the burden they carry along with themselves4 ,now souls differ either by the bodies to which they are united1 or by their different destinies1 or by their kind of life1 or by their primitive nature4 ,thus differing from each other in all these relations1 or in only some1 the souls here below either succumb to fate1 or are alternately subjected to it1 and liberated2 or1 while supporting what is necessary1 preserve the liberty of devoting themselves to actions that are characteristic of them1 and live according to some other law1 following the order that rules the whole universe4 ,this order embraces all the 7seminal7 reasons1 and all the causes1 the movements of the souls1 and the divine laws4 ,it agrees with these laws1 it borrows from them its principles1 and relates thereto all things that are its consequences4 ,it preserves in an imperishable condition all the beings which are able to preserve themselves conformably to the constitution of the intelligible world4 ,it leads the other beings whither their nature calls them1 so that whithersoever they may descend1 there is a cause which assigns to them some particular position or condition4 ,,the ,,significance ,,of ,,misfortunes ,,and ,,punishments4 #af4 ,the punishments which justly overtake the evil must therefore be derived from that ,order which rules all things with propriety4 ,the unjust evils1 accidents1 misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm the good1 may all be said to be consequences of anterior faults4 ,these evils are intimately related to the course of events1 and are even represented therein by their signs1 so that they seem to happen according to the ,reason 7of the universe74 ,we must however acknowledge that they are not produced by natural reasons1 that they are not within the purview of ,providence1 and that they are only its accidental consequences4 ,thus when a house happens to fall1 it buries anybody below it1 whoever he may happen to be2 or again1 whether some regular movement drives on some one thing1 or even several things1 it breaks or crushes anything that happens to lie in its path4 ,these accidents which seem unjust1 are not evils for those who suffer them1 if you consider how they take their place within the legitimate order of the universe2 perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and are the expiations of earlier faults4 ,it would be incredible that one series of beings in the universe should obey its order1 while another series should be subject to chance or caprice4 ,if everything happen through causes and natural consequences1 in conformity with a single reason1 and to a single order1 the smallest things must form part of that order1 and agree with it4 ,injustice practiced against somebody else is an injustice for him who commits it1 and must attract a punishment to him2 but by the place which it holds in the universal order1 it is not an injustice1 even for him who suffers it4 ,it had to be thus4 ,if the victim of this injustice was an honest man1 for him it can have only a happy ending4 ,this universal order must not be accused of being undivine and unjust1 but we should insist that distributive justice exercises itself with perfect propriety4 ,if certain things seem worthy of blame1 it is because they are due to secret causes that escape our knowledge4 ,,from ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world1 ,,souls ,,first ,,go ,,into ,,heaven4 #ag4 ,from the intelligible world souls first descend into the heaven4 ,for if the heaven is the best part of the sense-world1 it must be nearest to the limits of the intelligible world4 ,the celestial bodies are therefore the first that receive the souls1 being most fitted to receive them4 ,the terrestrial body is animated the last1 and it is suited to the reception of an inferior soul only1 because it is more distant from the incorporeal nature4 ,all souls first illuminate the sky1 and radiate from it their first and purest rays2 the remainder is lit up by inferior powers4 ,there are souls which1 descending lower1 illuminate inferior things2 but they do not gain anything in getting so far from their origin4 ,,the ,,descending ,,graduations ,,of ,,existence4 ,we must imagine a centre1 and around this centre a luminous sphere that radiates from 7,intelligence74 ,then1 around this sphere1 lies a second one that also is luminous1 but only as a light lit from another light 7the universal ,soul74 ,then1 beyond and outside of these spheres lies a further one1 which no more is light1 but which is illuminated only by an alien light1 for lack of a light peculiar to 7this world of ours74 ,outside of those two spheres there is indeed a rhomboid1 or rather another sphere1 that receives its light from the second sphere1 and which receives it the more intensely1 the closer it is thereto4 ,the great light 7,intelligence7 sheds its light though remaining within itself1 and the brilliancy that radiates around it 7on to the soul7 is reason4 ,other souls radiate also1 some by remaining united to the universal ,soul1 others by descending lower in order better to illuminate the bodies to which they devote their care2 but these cares are troublous4 ,as the pilot who steers his ship over the troubled waves forgets himself in the effort of his work1#abi to the point of forgetting that he exposes himself to perish with the ship in the shipwreck1 likewise souls are dragged down 7into the abyss of matter7 by the attention they devote to the bodies that they govern4 ,then they are chained to their destiny1 as if fascinated by a magic attraction1 but really retained by the potent bonds of nature4 ,if every body were as perfect as the universe1 it would completely suffice itself1 it would have no danger to fear1 and the soul that is present within it1 instead of this1 could communicate life to it without leaving the intelligible world4 ,c4 ,,does ,,the ,,soul ,,employ ,,discursive ,,reason ,,while ,,discarnate8 ,,the ,,soul ,,does ,,not ,,use ,,discursive ,,reason ,,except ,,while ,,hindered ,,by ,,the ,,obstacles ,,of ,,the ,,body4 #ah4 ,does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon the body1 and after having left it8 ,no3 she reasons only while in a body1 because she is uncertain1 embarrassed and weakened4 ,to need to reason in order to arrive at complete knowledge always betrays weakening of intellect4 ,in the arts reasoning occurs only when the artist hesitates before some obstacle4 ,where there is no difficulty in the matter1 art masters it1 and produces its work instantly4 ,,the ,,soul ,,can ,,reason ,,intuitionally ,,without ,,ratiocination4 7,it might be objected7 that if the souls on high do not reason1 they will no longer be reasonable4 ,they remain reasonable1 however1 because they are well able to penetrate into the essence of something1 whenever the occasion demands it4 ,ratiocination should be considered as follows4 ,if it consist in a disposition that is always derived from ,intelligence1 in an immanent act1 a reflection of this power in souls1 these must also reason in the intelligible world2 but then they have no further need of language4 ,likewise1 when they inhabit heaven1 neither do they need to take recourse to speech1 as do the souls here below1 as a result of their needs and uncertainties4 ,they act in an orderly manner1 and in conformity with nature1 without premeditation or deliberation4 ,they know each other by a simple intuition1 as even here below we know our like without their talking to us1 by a mere glance4 ,on high every body is pure and transparent4 ,each person there1 is1 as it were1 an eye4 ,nothing is hidden or simulated4 ,before you have spoken1 your thought is already known4 ,it is probable that speech is used by the guardians and other living inhabitants of the air1 for they are living beings4 ,d4 ,,how ,,can ,,the ,,soul ,,simultaneously ,,be ,,divisible ,,and ,,indivisible8 ,a ,,decision ,,will ,,depend ,,on ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,the ,,terms4 #ai4 ,must we consider that 7in the soul71 the indivisible and the divisible are identical1 as if they were mingled together8 ,or should we consider the distinction between the indivisible and the divisible from some other point of view8 ,should the first be considered as the higher part of the soul1 and the latter as the lower1 just exactly as we say that one part of the soul is rational1 and the other part is irrational8 ,such questions can be answered only by a close scrutiny of the nature of the divisibility and indivisibility of the soul4 ,,the ,,body ,,needs ,,the ,,soul ,,for ,,life4 ,when ,plato#acj says that the soul is indivisible1 he speaks absolutely4 ,when he insists that she is divisible1 it is always relatively 7to the body74 ,he does indeed say that she becomes divisible in the bodies1 but not that she has become such4 ,let us now examine how1 by her nature1 the body needs the soul to live1 and what necessity there is for the soul to be present in the entire body4 ,,sense1 ,,growth ,,and ,,emotion ,,tend ,,towards ,,divisibility4 ,by the mere fact that it feels by means of the entire body1 every sense-power undergoes division4 ,since it is present everywhere1 it may be said to be divided4 ,but as1 on the other hand1 it manifests itself everywhere as a whole1 it cannot really be considered as divided4 ,we cannot go further than the statement that it becomes divisible in bodies4 ,some might object that it was divided only in the sense of touch4 ,it is however also divided in the other senses1 since it is always the same body that receives it1 but only less so4 ,the case is the same with the power of growth and nutrition2 and if appetite have its seat in the liver1 and anger in the heart1 these appetites must be subject to the same conditions4 ,besides1 it is possible that the body does not receive those appetites in a mixture1 or that it receives them in some other manner1 so that they result from some of the things that the body derives from the soul by participations4 ,reason and intelligence1 however1 are not communicated to the body because they stand in no need of any organs to fulfil their functions4 ,on the contrary1 they find in them only an obstacle to their operations4 ,,the ,,soul ,,as ,a ,,whole ,,of ,,two ,,distinct ,,divisible ,,and ,,indivisible ,,parts4 ,thus the indivisible and the divisible are in the soul two distinct parts1 and not two things mingled together so as to constitute but a single one4 ,they form a single whole composed of two parts1 each of which is pure and separable from the other by its characteristic power4 ,if then the part which in the body becomes divisible receives from the superior part the power of being indivisible1 this same part might simultaneously be divisible and indivisible1 as a mixture of divisible nature and of the 7indivisible7 power received by it from the higher part4 ,e4 ,,relations ,,between ,,soul ,,and ,,body4 ,,if ,,functions ,,are ,,not ,,localized ,,the ,,soul ,,will ,,not ,,seem ,,entirely ,,within ,,us4 #bj4 ,are the above-mentioned and other parts of the soul localized in the body1 or are some localized1 and others not8 ,this must be considered1 because if none of the parts of the soul are localized1 and if we assert that they are nowhere either in or out of the body1 the latter will remain inanimate1 and we will not be able to explain the manner of the operations occurring by help of the organs4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the soul1 without localizing other parts1 the unlocalized parts will seem not to be within us1 and consequently not the whole of our soul will seem to be in the body4 ,,space ,,is ,,corporeal2 ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,within ,,the ,,soul4 ,of the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the body as a locality4 ,the property of space is to contain some body4 ,where everything is divided it is impossible for the whole to be in every part4 ,but the soul is not body1 and the soul contains the body rather than the body contains the soul4 ,,nor ,,is ,,the ,,body ,a ,,vase1 ,,for ,,proximate ,,transmission ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,nor is the soul in the body as in a vase4 ,in this case1 the body would be inanimate1 and would contain the soul as in a vase or locality4 ,if the soul be considered as concentrated in herself and as communicating to the body something of herself by close transmission 7as the ,stoics would say71 that which the soul will transmit to this vase would for her become something lost4 ,,many ,,metaphysical ,,objections ,,to ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,soul ,,as ,,localized4 ,considering location in the strict sense of the word1 it is incorporeal1 and consequently cannot be a body4 ,it would no longer need the soul4 ,besides 7if the soul be in the body as if in a locality7 the body will approach the soul by its surface1 and not by itself4 ,many other objections can be raised to the theory that localizes the soul in the body4 ,under this hypothesis1 indeed1 place would have to be carried around along with the thing in which it will locate4 ,but that which would carry place around with it 7would be a monstrosity74 ,moreover1 if the body be defined as being an interval1 it will be still less true to say that the soul is in the body as a locality2 for an interval should be empty2 but the body is not empty1 being within emptiness4 ,,nor ,,is ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,as ,a ,,quality ,,in ,a ,,substrate4 ,nor will the soul be in the body as 7a quality7 is in a substrate4 ,the attribute of being a substrate is a mere affection1 like a color1 or a figure2 but the soul is separable from the body4 ,,nor ,,is ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,as ,a ,,part ,,in ,,the ,,whole4 ,nor will the soul be in the body as a part in the whole2 for the soul is not a part of the body4 ,nor is it a part of the living whole2 for this would still demand explanation of the manner of this being within it4 ,she will not be within it as wine in a jar1 or as one jar in another1 nor as one thing is within itself 7as the ,manicheans thought74 ,,nor ,,is ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,as ,a ,,whole ,,in ,a ,,part4 ,nor will the soul be in the body as a whole is in its parts2 for it would be ridiculous to call the soul a whole1 and the body the parts of that whole4 ,,nor ,,will ,,the ,,soul ,,be ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,as ,,form ,,in ,,matter4 ,nor will the soul be in the body as form is in matter2 for the form that is engaged in matter is not separable4 ,moreover1 that form descends upon matter implies the preliminary existence of matter2 but it is the soul that produces form in matter2 and therefore the soul must be distinct from form4 ,though the soul be not form begotten in matter1 the soul might be a separable form2 but this theory would still have to explain how this form inheres in the body1 since the soul is separable from the body4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,said ,,to ,,be ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,because ,,the ,,body ,,alone ,,is ,,visible4 ,all men say that the soul is in the body1 however1 because the soul is not visible1 while the body is4 ,observing the body1 and judging that it is animated because it moves and feels1 we say that it has a soul1 and we are thereby led to suppose that the soul is in the body4 ,but if we could see and feel the soul1 and if we could realize that she surrounds the whole body by the life she possesses1 and that she extends around it equally on all sides till the extremities1 we would say that the soul is in no way in the body1 but that on the contrary the accessory is within its principle1 the contained within the container1 what flows within the immovable4 ,,this ,,leaves ,,the ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,manner ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,presence4 #ba4 ,how would we answer a person who1 without himself making any statements in regard to the matter1 should ask us how the soul is present to the body2 whether the whole soul is present to the body in the same manner1 or whether one of her parts is present in one way1 and another in some other way8 ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,a ,,body ,,as ,a ,,pilot ,,in ,a ,,ship4 ,since none of the comparisons that we have formerly examined seems to express the relation of the soul to the body1 properly we might say that the soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship4#aca ,this illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the soul's being separable from the body2 but it does not properly indicate the presence of the soul in the body4 ,if the soul be present in the body as a passenger in a ship1 it would be there only by accident1 and the illustration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot's presence in the ship he is steering2 for the pilot is not present to the whole of the ship as the whole soul is in the body4#acb ,one might illustrate the soul's presence in the body as an art inheres in its instruments2 as1 for instance1 in the helm1 which might be supposed to be alive1 containing the power of steering the ship skilfully4 ,this is still unsatisfactory1 because such an art comes from without4 ,the soul might indeed be compared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm2 and the soul might be in the body as in some natural instrument1#acc so that the soul would move it at pleasure4 ,this however might still fail to explain the manner in which the soul would exist in her instrument4 ,therefore1 though the latter illustration is an improvement on the former1 we must still seek one which closer approaches reality4 ,,the ,,soul ,,present ,,in ,,the ,,body ,,as ,,light ,,in ,,air4 #bb4 ,this is the better illustration3 the soul is present in the body as light is present in air4 ,light is indeed present in air without being present to it2 that is1 light is present to the whole air without mingling with it1 and light remains within itself while the air escapes4 ,when the air1 within which light radiates1 withdraws from the light1 the air keeps none of the light2 but it is illuminated so long as the air remains subject to the action of light4 ,air1 therefore1 is in light1 rather than light is in air4 ,while explaining the generation of the universe1#acd therefore1 ,plato properly locates the body 7of the world7 in the soul1 and not the soul in the body4#ace ,he also states that there is a part of the soul that contains the body1 and another in which there is no body1 in this sense1 that there are soul-powers of which the body has no need4 ,the case is similar with the other souls4 ,their powers in general are not present to bodies1 and only those powers of which the body stands in need are present to it4 ,these however are present to the body without being built up either on the members1 or upon the body as a whole4 ,for sensation1 the faculty of feeling is entirely present to the whole organ which is feeling 7as1 for instance1 to the whole brain72 likewise for the other functions1 the different faculties are each present to a different organ4 ,i shall explain myself4 ,,while ,,the ,,soul-,,power ,,is ,,everywhere1 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,action ,,is ,,localized ,,in ,,the ,,special ,,organ4 #bc4 ,since1 for the body1 being animated amounts to being penetrated by the light shed by the soul1 every part of the body participates therein in some particular manner4 ,each organ1 according to its fitness1 receives the power suitable to the function it fulfils4 ,thus we may say that the power of sight resides in the eyes2 that of hearing in the ears2 that of taste in the tongue2 that of smell in the nose2 that of touch in the whole body1 since1 for the latter sense1 the whole body is the organ of the soul4 ,now as the instruments for touch are the first nerves1 which also possess the power of moving the organism1 as they are the seat of this power2 as1 besides1 the nerves originate in the brain1 in the brain has been localized the principle of sensation and appetite--in short1 the principle of the whole organism2 no doubt because it was thought that the power which uses the organs is present in that part of the body where are the origins of these organs4 ,it would have been better to say that it is the action of the power that makes use of the organs that originates in the brain2 for that part of the body from which starts the movement impressed on the organ had to serve somewhat as a foundation for the power of the workman1 a power whose nature is in harmony with that of the organ 7it sets in motion72 or rather1 this part of the body does not serve as foundation for this power1 for this power is everywhere1 but the principle of the action is in that part of the body in which is the very principle of that organ4 ,,reason ,,is ,,in ,,the ,,head1 ,,but ,,not ,,in ,,the ,,brain1 ,,which ,,is ,,the ,,seat ,,of ,,the ,,intermediary1 ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,sensation4 ,on the other hand1 as the power of sensation and the power of appetite1 which belong to the sensible and imaginative soul1 are beneath reason1 because they are related to what is inferior1 while reason is above1#acf the result was that the ancients localized reason in the highest part of the animal1 in the head2 not that reason is in the brain1#acg but because reason is seated in the sense-power1 by the intermediation of which1 only1 reason may be said to reside in the brain4 ,the sense-power1 surely1 had to be attributed to the body1 and1 within the body1 to the organs most capable of lending themselves to its action4 ,reason1 which has no 7direct7 dealing with the body1 had however to be in relation with the sense-power1 which is a form of the soul1 and can participate in reason4 ,the sense-power1 does1 to a certain extent1 judge2 and the power of imagination has something intellectual4 ,last1 the appetite1 and the desire somehow connect with imagination and reason4 ,reason1 therefore1 is in the head1 not as in a locality1 but because it is in relation with the sense-power which resides in that organ1 as has been shown above4 ,,growth ,,is ,,localized ,,in ,,the ,,liver1 ,,anger ,,in ,,the ,,heart4 ,as the power of growth1 nutrition1 and generation operates all through the entire body2 and as it is by the blood that the body is nourished2 as the blood is contained in the veins2 and as the veins1 as well as the blood1 originate in the liver2 this organ has been assigned as the seat of that part of the soul called appetite2 for appetite is involved in the power of begetting1 of feeding and increasing the body4 ,further as the blood 7purified by respiration7 is subtle1 light1 mobile and pure1 the heart becomes a suitable instrument for the power of anger1 for the blood that possesses these qualities starts from the heart4 ,therefore1 with good reason1 the heart is assigned as the seat of the turbulent convulsions of the power of anger4 ,f4 ,,where ,,goes ,,the ,,soul ,,after ,,death8 ,,the ,,soul ,,after ,,death ,,goes ,,to ,,the ,,place ,,suited ,,to ,,it ,,by ,,retribution4 #bd4 ,whither will the soul pass when she shall have left the body8 ,she will not go where there is nothing suitable to receive her4 ,she could not pass into what is not naturally disposed to receive her1 unless there be something that would attract a soul that had lost her prudence4 ,in this case1 the soul remains in whatever is capable of receiving her1 and follows it whither that 7receptive matter7 can exist and beget4 ,now as there are different places1 it is necessary that the difference 7of the dwellings in which the souls come to dwell7 should be derived from the disposition of each soul1 and of justice which reigns above beings4 ,no one indeed could escape the punishment which unjust actions deserve4 ,the divine law#ach is inevitable1 and possesses the power of carrying out the judgments 7according to its decrees74 ,the man who is destined to undergo a punishment is1 in spite of himself1 dragged towards that punishment1 and is driven around#aci by a movement that never stops4 ,then1 as if wearied of struggling against things to which he desired to offer resistance1 he betakes himself to the place that is suitable to him1 and thus by a voluntary movement undergoes involuntary suffering4 ,the law prescribes the greatness and duration of the punishment4 ,later1 as a result of the harmony that directs everything in the universe1 the end of the punishment endured by the soul coincides with the soul's receiving strength to leave those places4 ,,pure ,,incorporeal ,,souls ,,dwell ,,within ,,intelligence ,,in ,,divinity4 ,the souls that have a body thereby feel the corporeal punishments they are undergoing4 ,pure souls1 however1 that do not carry along with them anything corporeal1 necessarily enjoy the privilege of abiding in the incorporeal4 ,being free from having to dwell in anything corporeal as they have no bodies1 they reside where is being and essence1 and the divine2 that is1 in the divinity4 ,there1 in the divinity1 with the intelligible beings1 dwells the pure ,soul4 ,if you wish to locate the ,soul still more exactly1 go to where are the intelligible entities2 and if you are looking for them1 do not look for them with the eyes1 as if they were 7physical7 bodies4 ,g4 ,,what ,,are ,,the ,,conditions ,,of ,,the ,,operation ,,of ,,memory ,,and ,,imagination8 ,,cosmic ,,questions ,,about ,,memory ,,depend ,,on ,,exact ,,definition ,,of ,,what ,,memory ,,is4 #be4 ,memory raises the following questions4 ,does memory generally remain with the bodies that have issued from here below8 ,does it subsist only in some of them8 ,in this case is memory general or special1 durable or transitory8 ,these questions cannot be answered until we define that interior principle in us to which memory belongs4 ,that is1 we shall have to determine1 not what is memory1 but in what kind of beings it must exist by virtue of its nature1 for elsewhere we have often defined and treated of memory itself4 ,we must therefore exactly define that principle within us to which memory is natural4#adj ,,memory ,,inapplicable ,,except ,,to ,,beings ,,subject ,,to ,,limitations ,,of ,,time4 ,as memory presupposes a knowledge or casual experience1 memory cannot be attributed to beings that are impassible1 and outside of the limitations of time4 ,memory is therefore inapplicable to the ,divinity1 to ,essence1 and to ,intelligence1 all of whom exist outside of time1 as eternal and immutable1 without a conception of priority or subsequentness1 who ever abide in the same condition1 without ever experiencing any change4 ,how could that which is identical and immutable make use of memory1 since it could neither acquire nor keep a disposition differing from the preceding one1 nor have successive thoughts of which the one would be present1 while the other had passed into the condition of being remembered8 ,,there ,,is ,a ,,timeless ,,memory ,,consisting ,,of ,,self-,,consciousness4 ,it 7may be objected7 that nothing hinders ,intelligence from knowing the changes of other beings1 such as1 for instance1 the periodical revolutions of the world1 without itself undergoing any change4 ,but then it would have to follow the changes of the moving object1 as it would think first of one thing1 and then of another4 ,besides1 thought is something else than memory1 and we must not apply to self-consciousness the name of memory4 ,indeed1 intelligence does not busy itself with retaining its thoughts1 and with hindering them from escaping2 otherwise it might also fear lest it lose its own nature 7,being74 ,for the soul herself1 remembering is not the same as recalling innate notions4 ,when the soul has descended here below1 she may possess these notions without thinking of them1 especially if it be only recently that she entered into the body4#ada ,the ancient philosophers seem to have applied the terms memory and reminiscence to the actualization by which the soul thinks of the entities she possesses2 that 7however7 is a quite special kind of memory1 entirely independent of time4#adb ,,definition ,,of ,,memory ,,depends ,,on ,,whether ,,it ,,belongs ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,or ,,organism4 ,but perhaps our solution seems superficial1 and appears to rest on an insufficient analysis4 ,it might indeed be asked whether memory and reminiscence1 instead of belonging to the rational soul1 might not characterize the lower soul1 or the composite of soul and body that we call the organism8 ,if indeed they belong to the lower soul1 from where does the latter derive them1 and how does she possess them8 ,the same question may further be asked in the case of the organism4 ,to answer all this1 we shall1 as said above1 have to study our own interior principle to which memory belongs4 ,if it be the soul that possesses memory1 we shall have to ask what faculty or part thereof is constituted by memory4 ,if1 as has been urged by some1 it be the organism to which memory belongs1 and considering the organism as the sentient principle1 how could this faculty operate within it8 ,besides1 what is it that we should call the organism8 ,further1 is it the same power that perceives sense-objects1 and intelligible entities1 or are there two distinct powers8 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,sensation4 #bf4 ,if the two elements which compose the animal share in the act of sensation1 the sensation is common to the soul and the body1 such as the acts of piercing or weaving4#adc ,thus1 in sensation1 the soul plays the part of the workman1 and the body that of his tool2 the body undergoes the experience1 and serves as messenger to the soul2 the soul perceives the impression produced in the body1 or by the body2 or she forms a judgment about the experience she has undergone4 ,consequently sensation is an operation common to the soul and body4 ,,in ,,any ,,case ,,memory ,,is ,,peculiar ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,and ,,body4 ,this could not be the state of affairs with memory1 by which the soul1 having already through sensation perceived the impression produced in the body1 preserves it1 or dismisses it4 ,it might be claimed that memory also is common to the soul and body1 because its efficiency depends on the adjustments of the bodies4 ,no doubt the body can hinder or promote the exercise of memory1 without this faculty ceasing to be peculiar to the soul4 ,how shall we try to prove that the memory of knowledge acquired by study1 belongs to the compound1 and not to the soul alone8 ,if the organism be the composite of soul and body1 in the sense that it is some third object begotten by their union1 it will be absurd to say that it is neither soul nor body4 ,indeed1 it could not be anything different from the soul and body1 neither if the soul and body were transformed into the composite of which they are the elements1 nor if they formed a mixture1 so that the soul would be no more than potentially in the organism4 ,even in this case1 it is still the soul1 and the soul alone1 that would remember4 ,thus in a mixture of honey and wine1 it is the honey alone that should be credited with any sweetness that may be tasted4 ,,that ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,incarnate ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,her ,,possessing ,,memory4 ,it may again be objected that it is indeed the soul that remembers2 but only because she is resident in the body1 and is not pure2 she must be affected in some particular manner to be able to impress the body with the forms of sense-objects2 her seat must be in the body to receive these forms1 and to preserve them4 ,but to begin with1 these forms could not have any extension2 then they could not be either 7,stoic7 seal-imprints1 or impressions2 for in the soul there is no impulsion1 nor any imprint similar to that of a seal on wax1 and the operation itself by which it perceives sense-objects is a kind of thought 7or intellection74 ,indeed1 it would be impossible to speak of an impression in the act of thought4 ,thought has no need of the body or a corporeal quality4 ,it is besides necessary for the soul to remember her movements1 as for instance1 her desires which have not been satisfied1 and whose object the body has not attained2 for what could the body tell us of an object which the body has not yet reached8#add 7,speaking of thoughts71 how could the soul1 conjointly with the body1 remember things which the body1 by its very nature1 could absolutely not know8 ,,memory ,,belongs ,,to ,,the ,,soul ,,alone4 ,doubtless we will have to acknowledge that there are affections which pass from the body into the soul2 but there are also affections which belong exclusively to the soul1 because the soul is a real being1 with characteristic nature and activities4 ,in this case1 the soul must have desires1 and recall them1 remembering that they have1 or have not been satisfied2 because1 by her nature1 she does not form part of the things which are 7as ,heraclitus said7 in a perpetual flow4 ,otherwise1 we could not attribute to the soul coenesthesia 7or1 common feeling71 conscience1 reflection1 or the intuition of herself4 ,if she did not possess them by her nature1 she would not acquire them by union with the body4 ,doubtless there are activities which the soul cannot carry out without the assistance of the organs2 but she herself possesses the faculties 7or powers7 from which these activities are outgrowths4 ,besides1 she1 by herself1 possesses other faculties1 whose operations are derived from her alone4 ,among these is memory1 whose exercise is only hindered by the body4 ,indeed1 when the soul unites with the body1 she forgets2 when she separates from the body1 and purifies herself1 she often recovers memory4 ,since the soul possesses memory when she is alone1 the body1 with its changeable nature1 that is ever subject to a perpetual flow1 is a cause of forgetfulness1 and not of memory2 the body therefore is1 for the soul1 the stream of ,lethe 7or forgetfulness74 ,to the soul alone1 therefore1 belongs memory4 ,,memory ,,belongs ,,both ,,to ,,the ,,divine ,,soul1 ,,and ,,to ,,that ,,derived ,,from ,,the ,,world-,,soul4 #bg4 ,to which soul1 however1 does memory belong8 ,to the soul whose nature is more divine1 and which constitutes us more essentially1 or to the soul that we receive from the universal ,soul 7the rational and irrational souls78 ,memory belongs to both2 but in one case it is general1 and in the other particular4 ,when both souls are united1 they together possess both kinds of memory2 if they both remain separate1 each remembers longer what concerns herself1 and remembers less long what concerns the other4 ,that is the reason people talk of the image of ,hercules being in the hells4#ade ,now this image remembers all the deeds committed in this life2 for this life particularly falls to her lot4 ,the other souls which 7by uniting within themselves the rational part to the irrational7 together possess both kinds of memory4 ,they yet cannot remember anything but the things that concern this life1 and which they have known here below1 or even the actions which have some relation with justice4 ,,what ,,the ,,rational ,,soul1 ,,if ,,separated1 ,,would ,,remember ,,of ,,life4 ,we must still clear up what would be said by ,hercules 7that is1 the man himself71 alone1 and separated from his image4 ,what then would the rational soul1 if separated and isolated1 say8 ,the soul which has been attracted by the body knows everything that the man 7speaking strictly71 has done or experienced here below4 ,in course of time1 at death1 the memories of earlier existences are reproduced2 but the soul1 out of scorn1 allows some to escape her4 ,having indeed purified herself from the body1 she will remember the things that were not present to her during this life4#adf ,if1 after having entered into another body1 she happen to consider the past1 she will speak of this life which will become foreign to her1 of what she has recently abandoned1 and of many other earlier facts4 ,the circumstances which happen during a long period will always remain buried in oblivion4 ,but we have not yet discovered what the soul1 when isolated from the body will remember4 ,to solve this question1 we shall be forced to decide to which power of the soul memory belongs4 ,,memory ,,does ,,not ,,belong ,,to ,,appetite1 ,,because ,,it ,,may ,,be ,,reduced ,,to ,,sensation4 #bh4 ,does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know8 ,is it by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires1 and by anger that we remember the things that irritate us8 ,some will think so4 ,it is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure1 and retains remembrance thereof4 ,thus when1 for instance1 appetite meets an object which has already made it experience pleasure1 it remembers this pleasure on seeing this object4 ,why indeed should appetite not be similarly moved by some other object8 ,why is it not moved in some manner by the same object8 ,why should we not thus attribute to it the sensation of things of this kind8 ,further1 why should appetite itself not be reduced to the power of sensation1 and not do likewise for everything1 naming each thing1 by what predominates therein8 ,,what ,,appetite ,,keeps ,,is ,,an ,,affection1 ,,but ,,not ,a ,,memory4 ,must we attribute sensation to each power1 but in a different manner8 ,in this case1 for instance1 it will be sight1 and not appetite1 which will perceive sense-objects2 but appetite will be later wakened by sensation which will be relayed1 7as the ,stoics would say72 and though it does not judge of sensation1 it will unconsciously feel the characteristic affection4 ,the same state of affairs will obtain with anger4 ,it will be sight which will show us an injustice1 but it will be anger which will resent it4 ,just so1 when a shepherd notices a wolf near his flock1 the dog1 though he have not yet observed anything1 will be excited by the smell or noise of the wolf4 ,it certainly is appetite which experiences pleasure1 and which keeps a trace of it2 but this trace constitutes an affection or disposition1 and not a memory4 ,it is another power which observes the enjoyment of pleasure1 and which remembers what occurred4 ,this is proved by the fact that memory is often ignorant of the things in which appetite has participated1 though appetite still preserve traces thereof4 ,,memory ,,does ,,not ,,belong ,,to ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,sensation4 #bi4 ,can memory be referred to sensibility8 ,is the faculty that feels also the one that remembers8 ,but if the image of the soul 7the irrational soul7 possess the memory1 as we said above1#adg there would be in us two faculties that will feel4 ,further1 if sensibility be capable of grasping notions1 it will also have to perceive the conceptions of discursive reason1 or it will be another faculty that will perceive both4 ,,memory ,,does ,,not ,,belong ,,exclusively ,,to ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,perception4 ,is the power of perception common to the reasonable soul and to the irrational soul1 and will we grant that it possesses the memory of sense-objects and of intelligible things8 ,to recognize that it is one and the same power which equally perceives both kinds of things1 is already to take one step towards the solution of the problem4 ,but if we divide this power into two1 there will nevertheless still be two kinds of memory2 further1 if we allow two kinds of memory to each of the two souls 7the rational and the irrational71 there will be four kinds of memory4 ,,memory ,,is ,,not ,,identical ,,with ,,feeling ,,or ,,reasoning4 ,are we compelled to remember sensations by sensibility1 whether it be the same power which feels sensation1 and which remembers sensation1 or is it also discursive reason which conceives and remembers conceptions4 ,but the men who reason the best are not those who also remember the best2 and those who have equally delicate senses1 do not all1 on that account1 have an equally good memory4 ,on the contrary1 some have delicate senses1 while others have a good memory1 without however being capable of perceiving equally well4 ,on the other hand1 if feeling and remembering be mutually independent1 there will be 7outside of sensibility7 another power which will remember things formerly perceived by sensation1 and this power will have to feel what it is to remember4#adh ,,memory ,,belongs ,,to ,,imagination4 7,to solve all these difficulties7 it may be stated that nothing hinders the admission that the actualization of the sensation produces in memory an image1 and that the imagination1 which differs 7from sensation71 possesses the power of preserving and recalling these images4 ,it is indeed imagination in which sensation culminates2 and when sensation ceases1 imagination preserves its representation4 ,if then this power preserve the image of the absent object1 it constitutes memory4#adi ,according as the image remains for a longer or shorter time1 memory is or is not faithful2 and our memories last1 or are effaced4 ,memory of sense-objects therefore belongs to the imagination4 ,if this faculty of memory be possessed by different persons in unequal degrees1 this difference depends either on the difference of forces1 or on practice 7or exercise71 or on the absence or presence of certain bodily dispositions which may or may not influence memory1 or disturb it4#aej ,but elsewhere we shall study the question further4 ,,intellectual ,,conceptions ,,are ,,not ,,entirely ,,preserved ,,by ,,imagination4 #cj4 ,what about intellectual conceptions8 ,are they also preserved by imagination8 ,if imagination accompany every thought1 and if later it1 as it were1 preserves its image1 we should thus have the memory of the known object2 otherwise some other solution will have to be sought4 ,perhaps reason1 whose actualization always accompanies thought1 has the function of receiving it and transmitting it to imagination4 ,indeed1 thought is indivisible1 and so long as it is not evoked from the depths of intelligence1 it remains as it were hidden within it4 ,reason develops it1 and making it pass from the state of thought to that of image1 spreads it out as it were in a mirror1 for our imagination4#aea ,that is why we grasp 7the thought7 only when the soul1 which always desires rational thought1 has achieved a thought4 ,there is a difference between thought and the perception of thought4 ,we are always thinking1 but we do not always perceive our thought4 ,that comes from the fact that the principle that perceives the thoughts also perceives the sensations1 and occupies itself with both in turn4 ,,the ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,memory ,,imply ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,imagination4 #ca4 ,if theory belong to imagination1 and if both the rational and irrational souls possess memory1 we will have two kinds of imagination 7intellectual and sensual72 and if both souls are separate1 each of them will possess one kind of imagination4 ,the theory of two kinds of imagination within us in the same principle would not account for there being two kinds of imagination2 and it would leave unsolved the question to which of them memory belongs4 ,if memory belong to both kinds of imagination1 there will always be two kinds of imagination--for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible things belongs to the one1 and that of sense-things to the other2 otherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common4 ,if then memory equally belong to both imaginations1 what difference is there between them8 ,besides1 why do we not notice this difference8 ,here is the cause4 ,,of ,,the ,,two ,,imaginations ,,one ,,always ,,predominates ,,or ,,overshadows ,,the ,,other4 ,when both kinds of imagination harmonize1 they co-operate 7in the production of a single act74 ,the most powerful dominates1 and only a single image is produced within us4 ,the weaker follows the stronger1 as the feeble reflection of a powerful light4 ,on the contrary1 when both kinds of imagination disagree and struggle1 then only one of them manifests1 and the other is entirely ignored1 just as we always ignore that we have two souls#aeb2 for both souls are melted into a single one1 and the one serves as vehicle for the other4 ,the one sees all1 but preserves only certain memories when she leaves the body1 and leaves in oblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other4 ,likewise1 after we have established relations with friends of an inferior order1 we may acquire more distinguished friendships1 and we remember the former but very little1 though we remember the latter very distinctly4 ,,partition ,,of ,,the ,,fund ,,of ,,memory ,,between ,,the ,,two ,,souls4 ,what about 7the memory7 of friends1 of parents1 of a wife1 of the fatherland1 and of all that a virtuous man may properly remember8 ,in the image of the soul 7the irrational soul7 these memories will be accompanied by a passive affection2 but in the man 7the rational soul7 they will not be so accompanied4 ,the affections exist since the beginning in the inferior soul2 in the superior soul1 as a result of her dealings with the other1 there are also some affections1 but only proper affections4 ,the inferior soul may well seek to remember the actions of the superior soul1 especially when she herself has been properly cultivated2 for she can become better from her very principle up1 and through the education she receives from the other4 ,the higher soul must willingly forget what comes to her from the inferior soul4 ,when she is good1 she can1 besides1 by her power contain the subordinate soul4 ,the more she desires to approach the intelligible world1 the more she must forget the things from here below1 unless the whole life she has led here below be such that she has entrusted to her memory none but praiseworthy things4 ,even in our own world1 indeed1 it is a fine thing to release oneself from human preoccupations4 ,it would therefore be still finer to forget them all4 ,in this sense we might well say that the virtuous soul should be forgetful4 ,she thus escapes manifoldness1 reduces manifoldness to unity1 and abandons the indeterminate4 ,she therefore ceases to live with manifoldness1 lightens her burdens1 and lives for herself4 ,indeed1 while remaining here below1 she desires to live in the intelligible world1 and neglects all that is foreign to her nature4 ,she therefore retains but few earthly things when she has arrived to the intelligible world2 she has more of them when she inhabits the heavens4 ,hercules 7in heaven7 may well vaunt his valor2 but even this valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at a region still holier than heaven1 when he dwells in the intelligible world1 when he has risen over ,hercules himself by the force manifested in those struggles which are characteristic of veritable sages4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,four4 ,questions ,about the ,soul4 7,second ,part47 ,,speech ,,of ,,soul ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 #a4 ,when the soul will have risen to the intelligible world1 what will she say1 and what will she remember8 ,she will contemplate the beings to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention thereto2 otherwise1 she would not be in the intelligible world4 ,,memory ,,of ,,soul ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,will she have no memory of things here below8 ,will she not1 for instance1 remember that she devoted herself to philosophy2 and that1 during her residence on the earth1 she contemplated the intelligible world8 ,no3 for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object of its thought1 cannot simultaneously contemplate the intelligible and think something else4 ,the act of thought does not imply the memory of having thought4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,all ,,things ,,are ,,simultaneous2 ,,hence ,,not ,,remembered4 ,but this memory is posterior to thought6 ,in this case1 the mind in which it occurs has changed condition4 ,it is therefore impossible that he who is entirely devoted to the pure contemplation of the intelligible should simultaneously remember the things that formerly happened to him here below4 ,if1 as it seems1 thought is outside of time1 because all the intelligible essences1 being eternal1 have no relation with time1 it is evidently impossible that the intelligence which has raised itself to the intelligible world should have any memory of the things here below1 or even have absolutely any memory whatever2 for each 7of the essences of the intelligible world7 are always present to the intelligence which is not obliged to go through them successively1 passing from one to the other4 ,,intelligence ,,unites ,,as ,,it ,,rises ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,will not the intelligence divide itself in descending 7from the genera7 to the species 7or forms78 ,no3 for she reascends to the universal and the superior ,principle4 ,,not ,,even ,,the ,,ascended ,,soul ,,need ,,be ,,divided4 ,granting then that there is no division in the intelligence which possesses everything simultaneously2 will there not at least be division in the soul which has risen to the intelligible world8 ,nothing however forbids that the totality of the united intelligibles be grasped by an intuition equally unitary and total4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,apperception ,,is ,,manifold4 ,is this intuition similar to the intuition of an object grasped in its entirety by a single glance1 or does it contain all the thoughts of the intelligibles contemplated simultaneously8 ,since the intelligibles offer a varied spectacle1 the thought which grasps them must evidently be equally multiple and varied1 comprehending several thoughts1 like the perception of a single sense-object1 as for instance that of a face comprehends several perceptions because the eye1 on perceiving the face1 simultaneously sees the nose and the other features4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,anteriority ,,refers ,,to ,,order1 ,,not ,,to ,,time4 ,it may be objected that it may happen that the soul will divide and develop something which was unitary4 ,this thing must then already have been divided in intelligence1 but such a division is more like an impression4 ,as anteriority or posteriority in ideas does not refer to time1 so also will the mental conception of anteriority and posteriority not be subject to temporal conditions1 but refer to order 7which presides over intelligible things74 ,for instance1 on considering a tree's order that extends from the roots to the tree-top1 priority and posteriority exists only under the relation of order1 inasmuch as the whole plant is perceived at one single glance4 ,,intelligence ,,is ,,not ,a ,,unity2 ,,but ,,its ,,manifold ,,is ,,produced ,,by ,a ,,unity4 ,how can things be prior or posterior1 if the soul that contemplates the ,one embrace all things8 ,the potentiality which is ,one is one in such a manner that it is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle 7,intelligence71 because then it is not simultaneously all things in one single thought4 ,indeed1 the actualizations 7of ,intelligence7 are not a unity2 but they are all produced by an ever permanent potentiality2 they therefore become multiple in the other principles 7the intelligibles72 for ,intelligence1 not being unity itself1 can receive within its breast the nature of the multiple which did not formerly exist 7in the ,one74 ,,the ,,soul ,,does ,,not ,,even ,,remember ,,herself4 #b4 ,granted4 ,but does the soul remember herself8 ,probably not4 ,he who contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he is2 that1 for instance1 he is ,socrates1 that he is a soul or an intelligence4 ,how indeed would he remember it8 ,entirely devoted to the contemplation of the intelligible world1 he does not by thought reflect back upon himself2 he possesses himself1 but he applies himself to the intelligible1 and becomes the intelligible1 in respect to which he plays the part of matter4 ,he assumes the form of the object he is contemplating1 and he then is himself only potentially4 ,actually1 he is himself only when he thinks the intelligible4 ,when he is himself only1 he is empty of all things1 because he does not think the intelligible2 but if by nature he is such that he is all things1 in thinking himself1 he thinks all things4 ,in this state1 seeing himself actually by the glance he throws on himself1 he embraces all things in this intuition2 on the other hand1 by the glance he throws on all things1 he embraces himself in the intuition of all things4 ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible ,,self-,,direction ,,of ,,thought ,,is ,,not ,,changeableness4 ,under the above circumstances1 the soul changes thoughts--something that we above refused to admit4 ,intelligence is indeed immutable2 but the soul1 situated on the extremities of the intelligible world1 may undergo some change when she reflects upon herself4 ,indeed1 what applies to the immutable necessarily undergoes some change in respect to it1 because it does not always remain applied to it4 ,to speak exactly1 there is no change when the soul detaches herself from the things that belong to her to turn towards herself1 and conversely2 for the soul is all things1 and the soul forms but one thing with the intelligible4 ,but when the soul is in the intelligible world1 she becomes estranged from herself and from all that belongs to her2 then1 living purely in the intelligible world1 she participates in its immutability1 and she becomes all that it is2 for1 as soon as she has raised herself to this superior region1 she must necessarily unite herself to ,intelligence1 towards which she has turned1 and from which she is no longer separated by an intermediary4 ,on rising towards intelligence1 the soul attunes herself to it1 and consequently unites herself with it durably1 in a manner such that both are simultaneously single and double4 ,in this state the soul cannot change2 she is immutably devoted to thought1 and she simultaneously has self-consciousness1 because she forms a unity with the intelligible world4 ,,the ,,soul ,,becomes ,,what ,,she ,,remembers4 #c4 ,when the soul departs from the intelligible world2 when instead of continuing to form a unity with it1 she wishes to become independent1 to become distinct1 and to belong to herself2 when she inclines towards the things here below1 then she remembers herself4 ,the memory of intelligible things hinders her from falling1 that of terrestrial things makes her descend here below1 and that of celestial things makes her dwell in heaven4 ,in general1 the soul is and becomes what she remembers4 ,indeed1 to remember is to think or imagine2 now1 to imagine is not indeed to possess a thing1 but to see it and to conform to it4 ,if the soul see sense-things1 by the very act of looking at them she somehow acquires some extension4 ,as she is things other than herself only secondarily1 she is none of them perfectly4 ,placed and established on the confines of the sense and intelligible worlds1 she may equally move towards either4 ,,memory ,,is ,,not ,,as ,,high ,,as ,,unreflective ,,identification4 #d4 ,in the intelligible world1 the soul sees the ,good by intelligence2 for intelligence does not hinder her from arriving to the ,good4 ,between the soul and the ,good1 the intermediary is not the body1 which could be no more than an obstacle2 for if the bodies can ever serve as intermediaries1 it would only be in the process of descending from the first principles to third rank entities4 ,when the soul occupies herself with inferior objects1 she possesses what she wished to possess conformably to her memory and imagination4 ,consequently memory1 even should it apply itself to the very best things1 is not the best thing possible2 for it consists not only in feeling that one remembers1 but also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to the affections1 to the earlier intuitions which are remembered4 ,now it may happen that a soul possesses something unconsciously1 so that she possesses it better than if she were conscious thereof4 ,in fact1 when she is conscious thereof1 she possesses it like something foreign to her1 and from which she is keeping herself distinct2 when1 on the contrary1 she is unconscious of it she becomes what she possesses2 and it is especially this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly effect her degradation 7when she conforms herself to sense-objects1 by applying her imagination thereto74 ,,intelligible ,,entities ,,are ,,not ,,merely ,,images1 ,,but ,,potentialities ,,for ,,memory4 ,that the soul1 on leaving the intelligible world1 brings away with her memories thereof1 implies that even in the 7intelligible7 world she to a certain degree already possessed memory2 but this potentiality was eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities4 ,it would be absurd to insist that the latter existed in the soul in the condition of simple images2 on the contrary1 they there constituted an 7intellectual7 potentiality which later passed into the condition of actualization4 ,whenever the soul happens to cease applying herself to the contemplation of intelligible entities she no longer sees what she formerly saw 7that is1 sense-objects74 ,,intelligible ,,entities ,,return1 ,,not ,,by ,,memory1 ,,but ,,by ,,further ,,vision4 #e4 ,are our notions of intellectual entities actualized by the potentiality which constitutes memory8 ,if these notions be not intuitions1 it is by memory that they become actualized2 if they are intuitions1 it is by the potentiality which has given them to us on high4 ,this power awakes in us every time that we rise to intelligible things1 in it is that which sees what we later talk about4 ,we do not perceive intelligible entities by imagination or reasoning1 which itself is forced to draw its principles from elsewhere2 it is by our faculty of contemplation1 which alone enables us to speak of them while we are here below4 ,we see them by awaking in ourselves here below the same potentiality which we are to arouse when we are in the intelligible world4 ,we resemble a man who1 climbing the peak of a rock1 should1 by his glance1 discover objects invisible for those who have not climbed with him4 ,,when ,,souls ,,descend ,,from ,,the ,,intelligible ,,to ,,the ,,heavens1 ,,they ,,recognize ,,each ,,other4 ,reasonable arguments therefore clearly demonstrate that memory manifests in the soul only when she has descended from the intelligible world into the 7earthly7 heavens4 ,likewise1 it would not surprise us if1 when she had risen from here below to the heavens1 and had dwelt there1 she should remember a great number of things from here below1 of which we have already spoken1 and that she would recognize many souls which she had known earlier1 since these latter must necessarily be joined to bodies with similar countenances4 ,even though the souls should change the shapes of their bodies1 making them spherical1 they would still be recognizable by their habits and individual character4 ,there is nothing incredible in this1 for in admitting that these souls have purified themselves from all these passions1 nothing hinders them from preserving their character4 ,besides1 if they can converse with each other1 they have this as an additional means of recognizing each other4 ,,training ,,here ,,below ,,will ,,help ,,the ,,souls ,,to ,,remember ,,when ,,beyond4 ,what happens when souls descend from the intelligible world into the 7earthly7 heavens8 ,they then recover memory1 but they possess it in a degree less than the souls who have always occupied themselves with the same objects4 ,besides1 they have many other things to remember1 and a long space of time has made them forget many actions4 ,,fall ,,into ,,generation ,,may ,,be ,,partial2 ,,and ,,may ,,be ,,recovered ,,from1 ,,before ,,ruin4 ,but if1 after having descended into the sense-world they fall 7from the heavens7 into generation1 what will be the time when they will remember8 ,it is not necessary that the souls 7which depart from the intelligible world7 should fall into the lowest regions4 ,it is possible that1 after having descended only a little from the intelligible world their movement may be arrested1 and nothing hinders them from returning on high before they have become degraded in the lower regions of generation4 ,,memory ,,is ,,limited ,,to ,,souls ,,that ,,change ,,their ,,condition4 #f4 ,it may therefore be fearlessly affirmed that the souls which exercise their discursive reason1 and which change condition1 remember2 for memory is the characteristic of things that were1 but no more are4 ,,do ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,and ,,the ,,star-,,souls ,,exercise ,,memory8 ,but evidently the souls which dwell in the same state could not exercise memory2 for what would they have to remember8 ,if 7ignoring our arguments above7 human reason should wish to attribute memory to the souls of all the stars1 especially to that of the moon and the sun1 there is nothing to hinder it from doing the same with regard to the universal ,soul1 and it would dare to attribute even to ,jupiter memories which would occupy him with a thousand different things4 ,as soon as it will have entered into this order of ideas1 reason would proceed to speculate about the conceptions and ratiocinations of the star-souls--that is1 granting that they reason at all4 7,but that is a gratuitous assumption72 for if these souls have nothing to discover1 if they do not doubt1 if they have no need of anything1 if they do not learn things that they have ignored before1 what use would they make of reasoning1 of arguments1 or of the conceptions of discursive reason8 ,they have no need of seeking mechanical means of governing human affairs and events2 for they enforce order in the universe in a totally different manner4 ,,these ,,souls ,,do ,,not ,,remember ,,god2 ,,for ,,they ,,continue ,,to ,,see ,,him4 #g4 ,will these souls not even remember that they have seen the divinity8 7,they have no need of doing so1 for7 they see ,him all the time2 as long as they continue to see ,him they cannot say that they have seen ,him1 because such a statement would imply that they see ,him no more4 ,,memory ,,is ,,impossible ,,to ,,these ,,souls1 ,,for ,,to ,,them ,,there ,,is ,,no ,,time1 ,,but ,,one ,,single ,,day4 ,will they not even remember that they performed their revolution yesterday1 or the year before1 that they lived yesterday1 and since have lived a long while8 ,they still live continuously2 now1 what remains the same1 is one4 ,to try to distinguish yesterday and last year in the movement of the stars1 is to do like a man who would divide into several parts the movement which forms one step1 who would wish to reduce unity to multiplicity4 ,indeed1 the movement of the stars is one1 although it is by us subjected to a measure1 as if it were multiple2 so we count the days different one from the other because the nights separate them from each other4 ,but since there is but one single day in the heavens1 how could one count several8 ,how could there be a last year8 ,,but ,,why ,,could ,,the ,,star-,,souls ,,not ,,be ,,conscious ,,of ,,our ,,changes8 ,it may be objected that the space transversed 7by planets7 is not a unity1 but contains several parts1 as notably in the zodiac4 ,why then could the celestial ,soul not say1 ,i have passed this part1 ,i have now arrived at another8 ,besides1 if the star-souls consider human things1 how would they not see that there are changes here below1 that the men existing to-day have succeeded others8 ,if so1 they must know that other men have already existed1 that there have been other facts4 ,they therefore possess memory4 ,,many ,,new ,,things ,,are ,,unnoticed2 ,,nothing ,,forces ,,the ,,perception ,,of ,,new ,,things4 #h4 ,it is not necessary to remember all one sees1 nor by imagination to represent to oneself all the things that follow fortuitously4 ,besides1 when the mind possesses a knowledge and a clear conception of certain objects which later come to offer themselves to his senses1 nothing forces him to abandon the knowledge he has acquired by intelligence1 to look at the particular sense-object which is in front of him1 unless he be charged to administer some of the particular things contained in the notion of the all4 ,,memory ,,is ,,not ,,compulsory4 ,now1 to enter into details1 let us first say that one does not necessarily retain all one has seen4 ,when something is neither interesting nor important1 the senses1 impressed by the diversity of objects without our voluntary direction of consciousness1 are alone affected2 the soul does not perceive the impressions because there is no utility in them for her4 ,when the soul is turned towards herself1 or towards other objects1 and when she applies herself to them entirely1 she could not remember these indifferent things1 for she does not even perceive them when they are present4 ,neither is it necessary that the imagination should represent to itself what is accidental2 nor1 if it does represent them to itself1 that it should retain them faithfully4 ,it is easy to be convinced that a sense-impression of this kind is not perceived1 on the ground of the following arguments4 ,in the act of walking we divide1 or rather traverse the air1 without any conscious purpose2 consequently we neither notice it1 nor think of it1 while we press forward4 ,likewise1 if we had not decided to take some particular road1 and unless we could fly through the air1 we would not think of the region of the earth where we are1 nor of the distance we have traveled4 ,this is proved by the fact that when the mind possesses the general knowledge of what occurs1 and is sure that the things will occur as planned1 a man no longer attends to details4 ,besides1 if a person continues to do the same thing1 it would be useless to continue to observe the similar details4 ,consequently if the stars1 while following their courses1 carry out their duties without attending to the occurrence of what goes on2 and unless their chief duty is to observe occurrences or the occurrence itself2 and if their progress is nothing more than accidental1 while their attention is held by other and greater objects2 and if they regularly continue to pass through the same orbit without considering the calculation of time1 even if it had already been divided 7under these four conditions72 there is no need to suppose that these stars would have a memory of the places they pass by1 or of their periods4 ,their life would be uniform2 because they always travel through the same places1 so that their movement is1 so to speak1 more vital than local1 because it is produced by a single living being 7the universe71 which1 realizing it within itself1 is exteriorly at rest and interiorly in motion by its eternal life4 ,,star-,,motions ,,compared ,,to ,a ,,ballet-,,chorus4 ,the movement of the stars might be compared to that of a choric ballet4 ,let us suppose that it had but a limited duration2 its motion would be considered perfect1 if viewed as a totality1 from beginning to end2 but if considered in its parts only1 it would be imperfect4 ,now if we suppose that it exists always2 then will it always be perfect4 ,if it be always perfect1 there will be neither time nor place where it is becoming perfect2 consequently1 it will not even have any desire1 and it will measure nothing1 neither by time nor place2 and therefore will not remember either4 ,,stars ,,have ,,no ,,memory ,,because ,,they ,,are ,,uniformly ,,blissful4 ,besides1 the stars enjoy a blissful life because they contemplate the real life in their own souls2 because they all aspire to the ,one1 and1 radiating into the entire heavens1 like cords that vibrate in unison1 they produce a kind of symphony by their natural harmony4 ,last1 the entire heavens revolve2 so also do their parts1 which1 in spite of the diversity of their motions1 and of their positions1 all gravitate towards a same centre4 ,now all these facts support the theory we have advanced1 since they show that the life of the universe is one system1 and is uniform4 ,,question3 ,,does ,,jupiter',s ,,royal ,,administration ,,imply ,a ,,use ,,of ,,memory8 #i4 ,jupiter1 who governs the world1 and endues it with order and beauty1 possesses from all eternity#aed a royal soul and intelligence2 he produces things by his providence1 and regulates them by his power2 in an orderly manner he disposes everything in the development and achievement of the numerous periods of the stars4 ,do not such acts on ,jupiter's part imply use of memory by which he may know what periods have already been accomplished1 and busy himself with the preparation of others by his combinations1 his calculations1 and reasonings8 ,his being the most skilful administrator in the world would seem to imply that he uses memory4 ,,the ,,infinity ,,of ,,jupiter',s ,,life ,,opposes ,,his ,,use ,,of ,,memory4 ,we might well1 in respect to the memory of these periods1 examine the number of these periods1 and whether it is known to ,jupiter2 for if it be a finite number1 the universe will have had a commencement within time2 but if it be infinite1 ,jupiter will not have been able to know how many things he has done4 7,to solve this problem7 we must admit that ,jupiter ever enjoys knowledge1 in a single and unitary life4 ,it is in this sense that he must be infinite and possess unity1 not by a knowledge come to him from without1 but interiorly1 by his very nature1 because the infinite ever remains entire in him1 is inherent in him1 is contemplated by him1 and is not1 for him1 simply the object of an accidental knowledge4 ,indeed1 while knowing the infinity of his life1 ,jupiter simultaneously knows that the influence he exercises on the universe is single2 but his knowledge thereof is not due to his exercising it on the universe4 ,,jupiter ,,may ,,be ,,taken ,,in ,a ,,double ,,sense4 #aj4 ,the principle which presides over the order of the universe is double2 from one point of view he is the demiurge2 from the other1 the universal ,soul4 ,by the name of ,jupiter1 therefore1 we designate both the demiurge1 and the ,governor of the universe4 ,as to the demiurge1 we must dismiss all notions of past or future1 and attribute to him nothing but a life that is uniform1 immutable1 and independent1 of time4 ,but the life of the governor of the universe 7which is the universal ,soul71 raises the question whether she be also free from any necessity of reasoning1 and of planning what is to be done8 ,surely1 for the order which is to rule has already been devised and decided1 and that without having been ordered2 for that which is in order was that which became1 and the process of becoming eventuates in order4 ,the latter is the activity of the ,soul which depends from an abiding wisdom1 a wisdom whose image is the order existing within the soul4 ,as the wisdom contemplated by the soul does not change1 neither does its action4 ,indeed1 the ,soul contemplates wisdom perpetually2 if she ceased1 she would lapse into incertitude1 for the soul is as unitary as her work4 ,this unitary principle that governs the world dominates perpetually1 and not only occasionally2 for whence should there be several powers1 to struggle among each other1 or get into uncertainties8 ,the principle that administers the universe is therefore unitary1 and ever wills the same4 ,why1 indeed1 should she desire now one thing1 and then another1 and thus involve herself in uncertainties8 ,still1 even if she altered herself under unitary conditions1 she would not be involved in difficulties4 ,that the universe contains a great number and kinds of parts opposed to each other is no reason that the ,soul does not with certainty know how to arrange them4 ,she does not begin by objects of lowest rank1 nor by parts2 she directs by the principles4 ,starting from these1 she easily succeeds in putting everything in order4 ,she dominates because she persists in a single and identical function4 ,what would induce her to wish first one thing1 and then another8 ,besides1 in such a state of affairs1 she would hesitate about what she ought to do1 and her action would be weakened1 and this would result in a weakness of her activities1 while deliberating about still undecided plans4 ,,ratiocination ,,has ,,no ,,place ,,in ,,the ,,world-,,soul4 #aa4 ,the world is administered like a living being1 namely1 partly from the outside1 and from the resulting members1 and partly from within1 and from the principle4 ,the art of the physician works from outside in1 deciding which organ is at fault1 operating only with hesitation and after groping around experimentally4 ,nature1 however1 starting within from the principle1 has no need to deliberate4 ,the power which administers the universe proceeds not like the physician1 but like nature4 ,it preserves its simplicity so much the better as it comprises everything in its breast1 inasmuch as all things are parts of the living being which is one4 ,indeed1 nature1 which is unitary1 dominates all individual natures2 these proceed from it1 but remain attached thereto1 like branches of an immense tree1 which is the universe4 ,what would be the utility of reasoning1 calculation1 and memory in a principle that possesses an ever present and active wisdom1 and which1 by this wisdom1 dominates the world and administers it in an immutable manner8 ,that its works are varied and changeful1 does not imply that this principle must itself participate in their mutability4 ,it remains immutable even while producing different things4 ,are not several stages produced successively in each animal1 according to its various ages8 ,are not certain parts born and increased at determinate periods1 such as the horns1 the beard1 and the breasts8 ,does one not see each being begetting others8 ,thus1 without the degeneration of the earlier 7seminal7 reasons1 others develop in their turn4 ,this is proved by the 7seminal7 reason subsisting identical and entire within the same living being4 ,,this ,,universal ,,wisdom ,,is ,,permanent ,,because ,,timeless4 ,we are therefore justified in asserting the rule of one and the same wisdom4 ,this wisdom is universal2 it is the permanent wisdom of the world2 it is multiple and varied1 and at the same time it is one1 because it is the wisdom of the living ,being which is one1 and is the greatest of all4 ,it is invariable1 in spite of the multiplicity of its works2 it constitutes the ,reason which is one1 and still is all things simultaneously4 ,if it were not all things1 it would1 instead of being the wisdom of the universe1 be the wisdom of only the latter and individual things4 ,,wisdom1 ,,in ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,does ,,not ,,imply ,,reasoning ,,and ,,memory4 #ab4 ,it may perhaps be objected that this might be true of nature1 but that whereas the ,soul-of-the-universe contains wisdom1 this implies also reasoning and memory4 ,this objection could be raised only by persons who by wisdom understand that which is its absence1 and mistake the search for wisdom for reasonable thinking4 ,for what can reasoning be but the quest of wisdom1 the real reason1 the intelligence of the real essence8 ,he who exercises reason resembles a man who plays the lyre to exercise himself1 to acquire the habit of playing it1 and1 in general1 to a man who learns in order to know4 ,he seeks indeed to acquire science1 whose possession is the distinguishing characteristic of a sage4 ,wisdom consists therefore in a stable condition4 ,this is seen even in the conduct of the reasoner2 as soon as he has found what he sought1 he ceases to reason1 and rests in the possession of wisdom4 ,,omniscient ,,intuition ,,makes ,,memory ,,and ,,reasoning ,,superfluous4 ,therefore1 if the governing ,power of the world seems to resemble those who learn1 it will be necessary to attribute to it reasoning1 reflection1 and memory1 so that it may compare the past with the present or the future4 ,but if1 on the contrary1 its knowledge be such as to have nothing more to learn1 and to remain in a perfectly stable condition1 it evidently possesses wisdom by itself4 ,if it know future things--a privilege that could not be denied it under penalty of absurdity--why would it not also know how they are to occur8 ,knowing all this1 it would have no further need of comparing the past with the present4 ,besides1 this knowledge of its future will not resemble the prevision of the foretellers1 but to the certitude entertained by makers about their handiwork4 ,this certitude admits no hesitation1 no ambiguity2 it is absolute2 as soon as it has obtained assent1 it remains immutable4 ,consequently1 the wisdom about the future is the same as about the present1 because it is immutable2 that is1 without ratiocination4 ,if1 however1 it did not know the future things it was to produce1 it would not know how to produce them1 and it would produce them without rule1 accidentally1 by chance4 ,in its production1 it remains immutable2 consequently1 it produces without changing1 at least as far as permitted by the model borne within it4 ,its action is therefore uniform1 ever the same2 otherwise1 the soul might err4 ,if its work was to contain differences1 it does not derive these from itself1 but from the 7seminal7 reasons which themselves proceed from the creating principle4 ,thus the created things depend from the series of reasons1 and the creating principle has no need to hesitate1 to deliberate1 neither to support a painful work1 as was thought by some philosophers who considered the task of regulating the universe wearisome4 ,it would indeed be a tiresome task to handle a strange matter1 that is1 one which is unmanageable4 ,but when a power by itself dominates 7what it forms71 it cannot have need of anything but itself and its counsel2 that is1 its wisdom1 for in such a power the counsel is identical with wisdom4 ,it therefore needs nothing for creation1 since the wisdom it possesses is not a borrowed wisdom4 ,it needs nothing 7extraneous or7 adventitious2 consequently1 neither reasoning nor memory1 which faculties yield us nothing but what is adventitious4 ,,in ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,wisdom ,,is ,,the ,,highest ,,and ,,nature ,,the ,,lowest4 #ac4 ,how would such a wisdom differ from so-called nature8 7,in the ,soul7 wisdom occupies the first rank1 and nature the last4 ,nature is only the image of wisdom2 now1 if nature occupy no more than the last rank1 she must also have only the last degree of the reason that enlightens the ,soul4 ,as illustration1 take a piece of wax1 on which the figure impressed on one side penetrates to the other2 and whose well-marked traits on the upper face appear on the lower face only in a confused manner4 ,such is the condition of nature4 ,she does not know1 she only produces1 blindly she transmits to matter the form she possesses1 just as some warm object transmits to another1 but in a lesser degree1 the heat it itself possesses4 ,nature does not even imagine3 for the act of imagining1 inferior as it is to that of thinking1 is nevertheless superior to that of impressing a form1 as nature does it4 ,nature can neither grasp nor understand anything2 while imagination seizes the adventitious object and permits the one who is imaging to know what he has experienced4 ,as to nature1 all it knows is to beget2 it is the actualization of the active potentiality 7of the universal ,soul74 ,consequently1 ,intelligence possesses intelligible forms2 the 7universal7 ,soul has received them1 and ceaselessly receives them from her2 that is what her life consists of2 the clearness which shines in her is the consciousness she has of her thought4 ,the reflection which 7the ,soul herself projects on matter is nature1 which terminates the series of essences1 and occupies the last rank in the intelligible world2 after her1 there is nothing but imitations 7of beings74 ,nature1 while acting on matter is passive in respect 7to the ,soul74 ,the 7,soul71 superior to nature1 acts without suffering4 ,finally1 the supreme 7,intelligence7 does not 7itself7 act on the bodies or on matter4 ,,there ,,is ,,continuity ,,between ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,elements4 #ad4 ,the bodies begotten by nature are the elements4 ,as to the animals and the plants1 do they possess nature as the air possesses the light which when retiring does not injure the air1 because it never mingled with the air1 and remained separate from it8 ,or is nature's relation to animals and plants the same as that of the fire with a heated body1 to which1 on retiring1 it leaves a warmth which is different from the heat characteristic of the fire1 and which constitutes a modification of the heated body8 ,surely this4 ,to the essence which it moulds1 nature gives a shape1 which is different from the form proper to nature herself4 ,we might however still consider whether there be any intermediary between nature and the essence which she moulds4 ,however1 we have sufficiently determined the difference that exists between nature and the wisdom which presides over the universe4 ,,how ,,can ,,time ,,be ,,divided ,,without ,,implying ,,division ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,action8 #ae4 ,we still have to solve one question bearing on the above discussion4 ,if eternity relate to ,intelligence1 and time to the ,soul--for we have stated that the existence of time is related to the actualization of the ,soul1 and depends therefrom--how can time be divided1 and have a past1 without the ,soul's action itself being divided1 without her reflection on the past constituting memory in her8 ,indeed1 eternity implies identity1 and time implies diversity2 otherwise1 if we suppose there is no change in the actualizations of the ,soul1 time will have nothing to distinguish it from eternity4 ,shall we say that our souls1 being subject to change and imperfection1 are in time1 while the universal ,soul begets time without herself being in it8 ,,in ,,time ,,are ,,actions ,,and ,,reactions ,,of ,,the ,,soul2 ,,but ,,not ,,the ,,soul ,,herself4 ,let us admit that the universal ,soul is not in time2 why should she beget time rather than eternity8 ,because the things she begets are comprised within time1 instead of being eternal4 ,neither are the other souls within time2 nothing of them1 except their actions and reactions 7,stoic terms74 ,indeed1 the souls themselves are eternal2 and therefore time is subsequent to them4 ,on the other hand1 what is in time is less than time1 since time must embrace all that is within it1 as ,plato says1 that time embraces all that is in number and place4 ,,question3 ,,even ,,the ,,priority ,,of ,,order ,,implies ,a ,,temporal ,,conception4 #af4 ,it may however be objected that if the 7universal ,soul7 contain things in the order in which they were successively produced1 she thereby contains them as earlier and later4 ,then1 if she produce them within time1 she inclines towards the future1 and consequently1 also conversely to the past4 ,,earlier ,,and ,,later ,,exist ,,only ,,in ,,what ,,is ,,begotten2 ,,not ,,in ,,their ,,seminal ,,reason4 ,it may be answered that the conceptions of earlier and later apply only to things which are becoming2 in the ,soul1 on the contrary1 there is no past2 all the 7seminal7 reasons are simultaneously present to her1 as has already been said4 ,on the contrary1 in begotten things1 the parts do not exist simultaneously1 because they do not all exist together1 although they all exist together within the 7seminal7 reasons4 ,for instance1 the feet or the hands exist together in the 7seminal7 reasons1 but in the body they are separate4 ,nevertheless1 these parts are equally separated1 but in a different manner1 in the 7seminal7 reason1 as they are equally anterior to each other in a different manner4 ,if however they be thus separate in the 7seminal7 reason1 they then differ in nature4 ,,things ,,which ,,are ,,anterior ,,can ,,be ,,only ,,in ,,lower ,,principles4 ,but how are they anterior to each other8 ,it must be because here he who commands is identical with him who is commanded4 ,now in commanding he expresses one thing after another2 for why are all things not together8 7,not so74 ,if the command and he who commands were separate entities1 the things would have been produced in the same manner as they have been expressed 7by speech72 but as the commander is himself the first command1 he does not express things 7by speech71 he only produces them one after the other4 ,if he were 7by speech7 to express what he actually does1 he would have to consider the order2 consequently1 he would have to be separate from it4 ,is it asked1 how can the commander be identical with the command8 ,he is not simultaneously form and matter1 but form alone 7that is1 the totality of the reasons which are simultaneously present to him74 ,thus1 the ,soul is both the potentiality and the actualization which occupy the second rank after ,intelligence4 ,to have parts some of which are prior to others suits only such objects as cannot be everything simultaneously4 ,,diagram ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,the ,soul1 such as we are considering her here1 is something venerable2 she resembles a circle which is united to the centre1 and which develops without leaving 7its base of operations1 the centre71 thus forming an undivided extension4 ,to gain a conception of the order of the three principles1 the ,good may be considered as a centre1 the ,intelligence as an immovable circle1 and the ,soul as an external movable circle impelled by desire4 ,,circular ,,movement ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,indeed1 intelligence possesses and embraces the ,good immediately2 while the ,soul can only aspire to 7the ,good71 which is located above the ,intelligence4 ,the whole world-sphere possessing the ,soul which thus aspires 7to the ,good71 is moved by the promptings of its natural aspirations4 ,its natural aspiration1 however1 is to rise in bodily aspiration to the principle on the outside of which it is2 namely1 to extend around it1 to turn1 and consequently to move in a circle4 ,,the ,,intellectual ,,differences ,,between ,,the ,,world-,,soul1 ,,and ,,souls ,,of ,,stars1 ,,earth ,,and ,,men4 #ag4 ,why are the thoughts and rational aspirations in us different 7from what they are in the universal ,soul78 ,why is there in us posteriority in respect to time 7as we conceive things in a successive manner1 while the universal ,soul conceives them simultaneously78 ,why do we have to question ourselves 7about this78 ,is it because several forces are active in us1 and contend for mastery1 and there is no single one which alone commands8 ,is it because we successively need various things to satisfy our needs1 because our present is not determined by itself1 but refers to things which vary continually1 and which are outside of ourselves8 ,yes1 that is the reason why our determinations change according to the present occasion and need4 ,various things come from the outside to offer themselves to us successively4 ,besides1 as several forces dominate in us1 our imagination necessarily has representations that are various1 transient1 modified by each other1 and hindering the movements and actions characteristic of each power of the soul4 ,thus1 when lust arises in us1 imagination represents to us the desired object1 warns us1 and instructs us about the passion born of lust1 and at the same time begs of us to listen to it1 and to satisfy it4 ,in this state1 the soul floats in uncertainty1 whether it grant to the appetite the desired satisfaction1 or whether she refuse it4 ,anger1 for instance1 excites us to vengeance1 and thereby produces the same uncertainty4 ,the needs and passions of the body also suggest to us varying actions and opinions2 as do also the ignorance of the true goods1 the soul's inability to give a certain judgment1 while in this hesitating condition1 and the consequences which result from the mingling of the things we have just mentioned4 ,still our own highest part makes judgments more certain than those reached by the part common 7to the soul and to the body71 a part that is very uncertain1 being a prey to diversity of opinions4 ,,souls1 ,,according ,,to ,,moralization1 ,,resemble ,,various ,,forms ,,of ,,government4 ,right reason1 on descending from the higher realms of the soul into the common part1 is by this mingling weakened1 although it is not naturally weak2 thus1 in the tumult of a numerous assembly1 it is not the wisest counsellor whose word carries weight2 but on the contrary1 that of the most turbulent and quarrelsome1 and the tumult they make forces the wise man to stay seated1 powerless and vanquished1 by the noise4 ,in the perverse man1 it is the animal part that rules2 the diversity of influences which overcome this man represents the worst of governments 7the rule of the mob74 ,in the commonplace man1 things happen as in a republic where some good element dominates the remainder1 which does not refuse to obey4 ,in the virtuous man1 there is a life which resembles the aristocracy1 because he manages to withdraw from the influence of the commonplace part1 and because he listens to what is best in himself4 ,finally1 in the best man1 completely separated from the common part1 reigns one single principle from which proceeds the order to which the remainder is subject4 ,it would seem therefore that there were two cities1 the one superior1 and the other inferior1 which latter derives its order from the former4 ,we saw that the universal ,soul was a single identical principle which commands uniformly2 but other souls1 as we have just explained1 are in a very different condition4 ,enough of this4 ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,not ,,us1 ,,but ,,ours4 #ah4 ,does the body1 thanks to the presence of the soul that vivifies it1 possess something which becomes characteristically its own1 or is its possession nothing more than its nature1 and is this the only thing added to the body8 ,evidently1 the body which enjoys the presence of the soul1 and of nature1 would not resemble a corpse4 ,it will be in the condition of the air1 not when the air is penetrated by the sun-light 7for then it really receives nothing71 but when it participates in the heat4 ,therefore1 plant and animal bodies that possess a nature1 find that it consists of the shadow of a soul4 ,it is to this body1 thus vivified by nature1 that sufferings and pleasures relate2 but it is for us to experience these sufferings and pleasures without ourselves suffering4 ,by us is here meant the reasonable soul1 from which the body is distinct1 without however being foreign to it1 since it is ours 7since it belongs to us74 ,only because of this1 that it is ours1 do we care for it4 ,we are not the body2 but we are not entirely separated from it2 it is associated with us1 it depends on us4 ,when we say we1 we mean by this word what constitutes the principal part of our being2 the body also is ours3 but in another sense4 ,therefore its sufferings and pleasures are not indifferent to us2 the weaker we are1 the more we occupy ourselves with it4 ,in it1 so to speak1 is plunged the most precious part of ourselves1 which essentially constitutes the personality1 the man4 ,,the ,,soul ,,and ,,body ,,together ,,form ,a ,,fusion ,,of ,,both4 ,the passions do not really belong to the soul1 but to the living body1 which is the common part1 or the fusion 7of both1 or the compound74 ,the body and soul1 each taken separately1 are self-sufficient4 ,isolated and inanimate1 the body does not suffer4 ,it is not the body that is dissolved1 it is the unification of its parts4 ,isolated1 the soul is impassible1 indivisible1 and by her condition escapes all affections4 ,but the unification of two things is sure to be more or less unstable1 and on its occurrence1 it often happens that it is tested2 hence the pain4 ,i say1 two things1 not indeed two bodies1 because two bodies have the same nature2 the present is a case where one kind of being is to be united to one of a different kind1 where the inferior being receives something from the superior being1 but receives only a trace of that something1 because of its inability to receive her entirely4 ,then the whole comprises two elements1 but nevertheless forms only a unity2 which1 becoming something intermediary between what it was1 and what it has not been able to become1 becomes seriously embarrassed1 because it has formed an unfortunate alliance1 not very solid1 always drawn into opposite directions by contrary influences4 ,thus it is at one time elated1 and at another1 dejected2 when it is dejected1 it manifests its suffering2 when it is elated1 it aspires to communion between the body and the soul4 ,,the ,,soul ,,feels ,,the ,,passions ,,without ,,experiencing ,,them4 #ai4 ,that is why there is pleasure and pain4 ,that is why grief is said to be a perception of dissolution1 when the body is threatened with the loss of the image of the soul 7of being disorganized by losing the irrational soul74 ,that is why it is said that pleasure is a perception produced in the animal when the image of the soul reassumes its sway over the body4 ,it is the body which undergoes passion2 but it is the sense-potentiality of the soul which perceives the passion by its relation with the organs2 it is she to which all the sensations ultimately report themselves4 ,the body alone is injured and suffers2 for example1 when one member is cut1 it is the mass of the body which is cut2 the soul feels pain not merely as a mass1 but as a living mass4 ,it is likewise with a burn3 the soul feels it1 because the sense-potentiality as it were receives its reaction by its relations with the organs4 ,the soul entire feels the passion produced in the body without however herself experiencing it4 ,,unless ,,the ,,soul ,,were ,,impassible ,,she ,,could ,,not ,,localize ,,and ,,manage ,,pain4 ,indeed1 as the whole soul feels1 she localizes the passion in the organ which has received the blow1 and which suffers4 ,if she herself experienced the suffering1 as the whole of her is present in the whole body1 she could not localize the suffering in one organ2 the whole of her would feel the suffering2 she would not relate it to any one part of the body1 but to all in general3 for she is present everywhere in the body4 ,the finger suffers1 and the man feels this suffering1 because it is his finger4 ,it is generally said that the man suffers in his finger1 just as it is said that he is blond1 because his eyes are blue4 ,it is therefore the same entity that undergoes passion' and suffering1 unless the word suffering' should not here designate both the passion1 and the sensation which follows it2 in this case no more is meant than that the state of suffering is accompanied by sensation4 ,the sensation itself is not the suffering1 but the knowledge of the suffering4 ,the potentiality which knows must be impassible to know well1 and well to indicate what is perceived4 ,for if the faculty which is to indicate the passions itself suffer1 it will either not indicate them1 or it will indicate them badly4 ,,the ,,appetites ,,are ,,located ,,neither ,,in ,,body ,,nor ,,soul1 ,,but ,,in ,,their ,,combination4 #bj4 ,consequently1 it may be said that the origin of the desires should be located in the common 7combination7 and in the physical nature4 ,to desire and seek something would not be characteristic of a body in any state whatever 7which would not be alive74 ,on the other hand1 it is not the soul which seeks after sweet or bitter flavors1 but the body4 ,now the body1 by the very fact that it is not simply a body 7that it is a living body71 moves much more than the soul1 and is obliged to seek out a thousand objects to satisfy its needs3 at times it needs sweet flavors1 at others1 bitter flavors2 again humidity1 and later1 heat2 all of them being things about which it would not care1 were it alone4 ,as the suffering is accompanied by knowledge1 the soul1 to avoid the object which causes the suffering1 makes an effort which constitutes flight1 because she perceives the passion experienced by the organ1 that contracts to escape the harmful object4 ,thus everything that occurs in the body is known by sensation1 and by that part of the soul called nature1 and which gives the body a trace of the soul4 ,on one hand1 desire1 which has its origin in the body1 and reaches its highest degree in nature1 attaches itself thereto4 ,on the other hand1 sensation begets imagination1 as a consequence of which the soul satisfies her need1 or abstains1 and restrains herself2 without listening to the body which gave birth to desire1 nor the faculty which later felt its reaction4 ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,desires3 ,,of ,,the ,,body2 ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,combination1 ,,or ,,nature4 ,why therefore should we recognize two kinds of desires1 instead of acknowledging only one kind in the living body8 ,because nature differs from the body to which it gives life4 ,nature is anterior to the body because it is nature that organizes the body by moulding it1 and shaping it2 consequently1 the origin of desire is not in nature1 but in the passions of the living body4 ,if the latter suffer1 it aspires to possess things contrary to those that make it suffer1 to make pleasure succeed pain1 and satisfaction succeed need4 ,nature1 like a mother1 guesses the desires of the body that has suffered1 tries to direct it1 and to lure it back4 ,while thus trying to satisfy it1 she thereby shares in its desires1 and she proposes to accomplish the same ends4 ,it might be said that the body1 by itself1 possesses desires and inclinations2 that nature has some only as a result of the body1 and because of it2 that1 finally the soul is an independent power which grants or refuses what is desired by the organism4 ,,desires ,,are ,,physical1 ,,because ,,changeable ,,in ,,harmony ,,with ,,the ,,body4 #ba4 ,the observation of the different ages shows that it is indeed the organism which is the origin of desires4 ,indeed1 these change according as the man is a child or a youth1 sick or well4 ,nevertheless that part of the soul which is the seat of desires ever remains the same4 ,consequently the variations of desire must be traced back to the variations of the organism4 ,but this desiring faculty of the soul is not always entirely wakened by the excitation of the body1 although this subsists to the end4 ,often even before having deliberated1 the soul will forbid the body to drink or eat1 although the organism desires it as keenly as possible4 ,nature herself also often forbids the satisfaction of the bodily desire1 because such desire may not seem to it natural1 and because she alone has the right to decide what things are harmonious to or contrary to nature4 ,the theory that the body1 by its different states suggests different desires to the soul's faculty of desire1 does not explain how the different states of the body can inspire different desires in the soul's faculty of desire1 since then it is not itself that it seeks to satisfy4 ,for it is not for itself1 but for the organism1 that the soul's faculty of desire seeks foods1 humidity or heat1 motion1 agitation1 or the satisfaction of hunger4 ,,relation ,,of ,,desire-,,function ,,to ,,the ,,vegetative ,,powers4 #bb4 ,it is possible1 even in plant-life1 to distinguish something which is the characteristic property of their bodies1 and a power that imparts it to them4 ,what in us in the soul's faculty of desire1 is in plant-life the natural element 7or1 vegetative power74 ,,plato ,,is ,,in ,,doubt ,,about ,,the ,,earth',s ,,soul2 ,,whether ,,she ,,is ,,like ,,those ,,of ,,stars4 ,the earth also possesses a soul2 and therefore also such a potentiality2 and it is from the earth that the plants derive their vegetative potentiality4 ,one might reasonably first ask which is this soul that resides in the earth4 ,does she proceed from the sphere of the universe 7to which alone ,plato seems to attribute a soul from the very first71 so as to make of her an irradiation of this sphere upon the earth8 ,or should we on the contrary1 attribute to the earth a soul similar to that of the stars1 as ,plato does when he calls the earth the first and most ancient of the divinities contained within the interior of the heavens8 ,could it1 in this case1 be a divinity1 if it did not have a soul8 ,it is therefore difficult to determine the exact state of affairs1 and the very words of ,plato here instead of diminishing our embarrassment1 only increase it4 ,at first1 how will we manage to form a reasonable opinion on this subject8 ,judging from what the earth causes to grow1 one might conjecture that it possesses the vegetative potentiality4 ,as many living beings are seen to grow from the earth1 why would it itself not be a living being8 ,being besides a great living being1 and a considerable part of the world1 why should the earth not possess intelligence1 and be a divinity8 ,since we consider every star as a living being1 why would we not similarly consider the earth1 which is a part of the universal living being8 ,it would1 indeed1 be impossible to admit that it was exteriorly contained by a foreign soul1 and that interiorly it would have no soul1 as if it were the only being incapable of having an individual soul4 ,why should we grant animation to the 7starry7 bodies of fire1 while not to the earthly body of our earth8 ,indeed1 bodies could as easily be of earth as of fire4 ,not in the stars1 any more than in the earth1 is there any nose1 flesh1 blood1 or humours1 although the earth is more varied than the stars1 and although it be composed of all the other living bodies4 ,as to its inability to move1 this can be said only in reference to local motion4 7,for it is capable of motion in the respect that it can feel47 ,,the ,,earth ,,can ,,feel ,,as ,,well ,,as ,,any ,,of ,,the ,,stars4 ,it will be asked1 ,but how can the earth feel8 ,we shall answer in turn1 ,how can stars feel8 ,it is not the flesh that feels2 a soul is not dependent for feeling on a body2 but the body is dependent on the soul for self-preservation4 ,as the soul possesses judgment1 she should be able to judge the passions of the body whenever she applies her attention thereto4 ,,question3 ,,what ,,passions ,,would ,,be ,,suitable ,,to ,,the ,,earth8 ,it may however still be asked1 ,what are the passions characteristic of the earth1 and which may be objects of judgment for the soul8 ,it may besides be objected that the plants1 considered in the terrestrial element that constitutes them1 do not feel4 ,,sensation ,,will ,,first ,,have ,,to ,,be ,,examined4 ,let us now examine to what beings sensation belongs1 and whereby it operates4 ,let us see whether sensation can take place even without organs4 ,of what use to the earth could sensation be8 ,for it does not serve the earth as means of knowledge2 the knowledge which consists in wisdom suffices for the beings to whom sensation is of no use4 ,this consideration might however be denied1 for the knowledge of sense-objects offers1 besides utility1 some of the charms of the ,muses4 ,such is1 for example1 the knowledge of the sun and the other stars1 whose contemplation itself is agreeable4 ,this problem will therefore demand solution4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,problems ,,involved4 ,we must therefore first investigate if the earth possess senses1 to what animals sensation naturally belongs1 and how sensation operates4 ,it will be necessary to begin by discussing the doubtful points that we have indicated1 and to examine in general if sensation can operate without organs1 and if the senses have been given for utility1 admitting even that they can procure some other advantage4 ,,conceptive ,,thought ,,demands ,,the ,,intermediary ,,process ,,of ,,sensation4 #bc4 ,conception of sense-objects occurs when the soul or the living being experiences perceptions by grasping the bodies' inherent qualities1 and by representing their forms to itself4 ,the soul must therefore perceive sense-objects either with or without the body4 ,how could the soul do so alone8 ,pure and isolated1 she can conceive only what she has within herself2 she can only think4 ,but for conception of objects other than herself1 she must previously have grasped them1 either by becoming assimilated to them1 or by finding herself united to something which may have become similar to them4 ,,the ,,pure ,,soul ,,would ,,remain ,,isolated4 ,it is impossible for the soul to become similar to sense-objects 7in order to grasp them71 by remaining pure4 ,how indeed could a point become similar to a line8 ,the intelligible line itself could not become conformed to the sense-line1 any more than intelligible fire to the sense-fire1 or the intelligible man to the sense-man4 ,nature herself which begets man could not be identical with the begotten man4 ,the isolated soul1 even if she could grasp sense-objects1 will finish by applying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects1 because1 having nothing by which to grasp the former1 she will let them escape4 ,indeed1 when the soul perceives from far a visible object1 although only the form reaches her1 nevertheless what first began by being for her indivisible1 finally constitutes a subject1 whether it be color or a figure1 whose size is determined by the soul4 ,,sensation ,,depends ,,on ,,the ,,sense-,,shape1 ,,which1 ,,like ,,tools1 ,,is ,,intermediate4 ,the soul and the exterior object do not therefore suffice 7to explain sensation72 for there would be nothing that suffers4 ,there must therefore be a third term that suffers1 that is1 which receives the sense-form1 or1 shape4 ,this third term must sympathize1 or1 share the passion of the exterior object1 it must also experience the same passion1 and it must be of the same matter2 and1 on the other hand1 its passion must be known by another principle2 last1 passion must keep something of the object which produces it1 without however being identical with it4 ,the organ which suffers must therefore be of a nature intermediary between the object which produces the passion and the soul1 between the sensible and the intelligible1 and thus play the part of a term intermediary between the two extremes1 being receptive on one side1 making announcements on the other1 and becoming equally similar to both4 ,the organ that is to become the instrument of knowledge must be identical neither with the subject that knows1 nor with the object that is known4 ,it must become similar to both of them2 to the exterior object because it suffers1 and to the cognizing soul because the passion which it experiences becomes a form4 ,speaking more accurately1 the sensations operate by the organs4 ,this results from the principle asserted above1 that the soul isolated from the body can grasp nothing in the sense-world4 ,as used here1 the word organ either refers to the whole body1 or to some part of the body fitted to fulfil some particular function2 as in the case of touch or sight4 ,likewise1 it is easy to see that tools of artisans play a part intermediary between the mind which judges1 and the object which is judged2 and that they serve to discover the properties of substances4 ,for instance1 a 7foot7 rule1 which is equally conformed to the idea of straightness in the mind1 and to the property of straightness in the wood1 serves the artisan's mind as intermediary to judge if the wood he works be straight4 ,,exclusion ,,of ,,other ,,side ,,issues4 ,we have just demonstrated that sensation belongs exclusively to an embodied soul1 and that this implies organs4 ,but we have nothing to do with the question whether the perceived object must be in contact with the organ1 or whether the sensation can take place at a distance from the sense-object1 by means of an intermediary2 as the case of the fire which is located at a distance from our body1 without the intermediary's suffering in any manner4 ,it happens again where1 empty space serving as intermediary between the eye and the color1 one may well ask whether1 to see1 it suffice to possess the potentiality proper to that organ4 ,but it is sure that sensation is some activity of the soul in a body1 or through a body4 ,,are ,,the ,,senses ,,given ,,us ,,only ,,for ,,the ,,sake ,,of ,,utility8 #bd4 ,whether the senses were given us for the sake of utility must be examined as follows4 ,if the soul were separated from the body1 she would not feel2 she feels only when united to a body2 therefore she feels by and for the body4 ,it is from the soul's intimacy with the body that sensation results1 either because all passions1 when keen enough1 reach the soul2 or whether the senses were made for us to take care that no object approaches too near us1 or exercises on our organs an action strong enough to destroy them4 ,if so1 the senses were given us for the sake of utility4 ,even if the senses do serve to acquire knowledge and information1 they would be of no use to a being who possesses knowledge1 but only to one who needs to learn he has the misfortune of being ignorant1 or who needs to remember1 because he is subject to forgetfulness4 ,they are therefore not found in the being who has no need to learn1 and who does not forget4 ,,are ,,senses ,,given ,,the ,,stars ,,for ,,utility8 ,let us consider what consequences may be drawn therefrom for the earth1 the stars1 and especially for the heavens and the whole world4 ,from what we have seen1 the parts of the world which suffer may possess sensation in their relation with other parts4 ,but is the entire world1 capable of feeling1 as it is entirely impassible in its relations with itself8 ,if sensation demand on one hand an organ1 and on the other the sense-object1 the world which includes everything1 can have neither organ to perceive1 nor exterior object to be perceived4 ,we may therefore ascribe to the world a sort of intimate sensation1 such as we ourselves possess1 and deny to it the perception of other objects4 ,when we feel something unusual in our bodies1 we perceive it as being external4 ,now as we perceive not only exterior objects1 but even some part of our body through some other part of the body itself1 similarly the world might very well perceive the sphere of the planets by means of the sphere of the fixed stars2 and perceive the earth with all the objects it contains by means of the sphere of the planets8 ,if these beings 7the stars and the planets7 do not feel the passions felt by other beings1 why might they not also possess different senses8 ,might not the sphere of the planets not only by itself possess sight by itself1 but in addition be the eye destined to transmit what it sees to the universal ,soul8 ,since she is luminous and animated1 she might see as does an eye1 supposing that she did not feel the other passions4#aee 7,plato71 however1 said1 that the heavens have no need of eyes4 ,doubtless the heavens have nothing outside of themselves to see2 and consequently1 they may not have need of eyes1 as we have2 but they contain something to contemplate1 namely1 themselves4 ,if it should be objected that it is useless for them to see themselves1 it may be answered that they were not made principally for this purpose1 and that if they see themselves1 it is only a necessary consequence of their natural constitution4 ,nothing therefore hinders them from seeing1 as their body is diaphanous4 ,,if ,,sensation ,,is ,a ,,soul-,,distraction1 ,,the ,,stars ,a ,,would ,,not ,,indulge ,,therein4 #be4 ,it would seem that in order to see1 and in general to feel1 mere possession of the necessary organs by the soul1 is not enough2 the soul must also be disposed to direct her attention to things of sense4 ,but it is usual for the 7universal7 ,soul to be ever applied to the contemplation of intelligible things2 and mere possession of the faculty of sensation would not necessarily imply its exercise1 because it would be entirely devoted to objects of a higher nature4 ,so when we apply ourselves to the contemplation of intelligible things1 we notice neither the sensation of sight1 nor those of other senses2 and1 in general1 the attention that we give to one thing hinders us from seeing the others4 ,even among us human beings1 to wish to perceive one of our members through another1 as1 for instance1 looking at ourselves1 is both superfluous and vain1 unless this has some very good purpose4 ,moreover1 it is a characteristic of an imperfect and fallible being to contemplate some external thing1 merely because it is beautiful4 ,it may therefore well be said that if to feel1 hear and taste are distractions of a soul that attaches herself to outer objects1 the sun and the other stars cannot see or hear1 except accidentally4 ,it would however not be unreasonable to admit that they turn towards us through the exercise of the senses of sight or hearing4 ,now1 if they turn towards us1 they must be mindful of human affairs4 ,it would be absurd that they should not remember the men to whom they do so much good2 how indeed would they do good1 if they had no memory8 ,,the ,,earth ,,feels ,,and ,,directs ,,by ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,sympathetic ,,harmony4 #bf4 ,the stars know our desires through the agreement and sympathy established between them and us by the harmony reigning in the universe4 ,our desires are granted by the same method4 ,likewise1 magic is founded on the harmony of the universe2 it acts by means of the forces which are interconnected by sympathy4 ,if so1 why should we not attribute to the earth the faculty of sensation8 ,granting this1 what sort of sensations would we attribute to it8 ,to begin with1 why should we not attribute to it touch1 whether by one part feeling the condition of another1 and by the transmission of the sensation to the governing power1 or by the whole earth feeling the fire1 and other similar things2 for if the terrestrial element is inert1 it certainly is not insensible4 ,the earth will therefore feel the great things1 and not those of minor importance4 ,why should it feel8 ,surely if the earth have a soul1 she will not ignore the strongest motions therein4 ,the earth must also be supposed to feel1 in order to dispose all that depends on her for the benefit of humanity4 ,all these things she will suitably dispose by the laws of harmony4 ,she can hear and grant the prayers addressed to her1 but in a manner other than we ourselves would do4 ,besides1 she might exercise other senses in her relations1 either with herself1 or with foreign things2 as1 for example1 to have the sensations of taste and smell perceived by other beings4 ,perhaps even she has need to perceive the odors of the liquids to fulfil her providential functions in respect to animals1 and to take care of her own body4 ,,the ,,earth',s ,,senses ,,may ,,be ,,different ,,from ,,ours4 ,we must however not insist on her organs being the same as ours4 ,not even in all animals are the senses similar4 ,thus1 for instance1 not all have similar ears1 and even those who have no ears at all nevertheless will perceive sounds4 ,how could the earth see1 if light be necessary for her vision8 ,nor must we claim for her the necessity of having eyes4 ,we have already above granted that she possesses the vegetative power2 we should therefore thence draw the deduction that this power is primitively by its essence a sort of spirit4 ,what objection then could there be to assume that this spirit might be resplendent and transparent8 ,arguing merely from its nature of being a spirit1 we should 7potentially at least7 conclude that it is transparent2 and that it is actually transparent because it is illuminated by the celestial sphere4 ,it is therefore neither impossible nor incredible that the soul of the earth should possess sight4 ,besides1 we must remember that this soul is not that of a vile body1 and that consequently1 she must be a goddess4 ,in any case1 this soul must be eternally good4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,earth',s ,,psychology4 #bg4 ,if the earth communicate to plant-life the power of begetting and growing1 it possesses this power within itself1 and gives only a trace of it to the plants which derive from it all their fruitfulness1 and as it were are the living flesh of its body4 ,it gives to them what is best in them2 this can be seen in the difference between a plant growing in the soil1 and of a branch cut from it2 the former is a real plant1 the latter is only a piece of wood4 ,what is communicated to the body of the earth by the ,soul which presides over it8 ,to see this it is sufficient to notice the difference between some earth resting within the soil1 and a piece that is detached therefrom4 ,it is likewise easy to recognize that stones increase in size as long as they are in the bosom of the earth1 while they remain in the same state when they have been plucked out therefrom4 ,everything therefore bears within itself a trace of the universal vegetative 7power7 shed abroad over the whole earth1 and belonging particularly to no one of its parts4 ,as to the earth's power of sensation1 it is not 7like its vegetative power7 mingled with the body of the earth2 it only hovers above and guides it4 ,moreover1 the earth possesses also1 higher than the above powers1 a soul and an intelligence4 ,they bear respectively the names of ,ceres and ,vesta1 according to the revelations of men of prophetic nature1 who allow themselves to be inspired by the divine4 ,,does ,,the ,,irascible ,,power ,,also ,,originate ,,in ,,the ,,body8 #bh4 ,enough of this4 ,let us return to the question from which we digressed4 ,we granted that the desires1 pains and pleasures 7considered not only as sentiments1 but as passions71 originate in the constitution of the organized and living body4 ,must the same origin be assigned to the irascible 7power78 ,were this so1 we would have several questions to ask3 ,does anger belong to the entire organism1 or only to a particular organ1 such as the heart when so disposed1 or to the bile1 as long as it is part of a living body8 ,is anger different from the principle which gives the body a trace of the soul1 or is it an individual power1 which depends on no other power1 whether irascible or sensitive8 ,,the ,,liver ,,is ,,the ,,seat ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,faculty ,,of ,,desire4 ,the vegetative power present in the whole body communicates to every part thereof a trace of the soul4 ,it is therefore to the entire body that we must refer suffering1 pleasure1 and the desire of food4 ,though nothing definite is ascertained about the seat of sexual desire1 let us grant that their seat is in the organs destined to its satisfaction4 ,further1 be it granted that the liver is the seat of the soul's faculty of desire1 because that organ is particularly the theatre of the activities of the vegetative power which impresses a trace of the soul on the body2 and further1 because it is from the liver that the action it exercises starts4 ,,the ,,heart ,,is ,,the ,,seat ,,of ,,anger4 ,as to anger1 we shall have to examine its nature1 what power of the soul it constitutes1 whether it be anger that imparts to the heart a trace of its own power2 if there exist another force capable of producing the movement revealed in the animal2 and finally1 if it be not a trace of anger1 but anger itself which resides in the heart4 ,,anger ,,originates ,,in ,,the ,,vegetative ,,and ,,generative ,,power1 ,,as ,,trace ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,first1 what is the nature of anger8 ,we grow irritated at maltreatment of ourselves or of a person dear to us2 in general1 when we witness some outrage4 ,therefore anger implies a certain degree of sensation1 or even intelligence1 and we should have to suppose that anger originates in some principle other than the vegetative power4 ,certain bodily conditions1 however1 predispose us to anger2 such as being of a fiery disposition1 and being bilious2 for people are far less disposed to anger if of a cold-blooded nature4 ,besides1 animals grow irritated especially by the excitement of this particular part1 and by threats of harm to their bodily condition4 ,consequently we would once more be led to refer anger to the condition of the body and to the principle which presides over the constitution of organism4 ,since men are more irritable when sick than when well1 when they are hungry1 more than when well satisfied1 anger or its principle should evidently be referred to the organized and living body2 evidently1 attacks of anger are excited by the blood or the bile1 which are living parts of the animal4 ,as soon as the body suffers1 the blood as well as the bile boils1 and there arises a sensation which arouses the imagination2 the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the organism1 and disposes the soul to attack what causes this suffering4 ,on the other hand1 when the reasonable soul judges that we have been injured1 she grows excited1 even if there were no disposition to anger in the body4 ,this affection seems therefore to have been given to us by nature to make us1 according to the dictates of our reasons1 repel and threatens us4 7,there are then two possible states of affairs47 ,either the irascible power first is moved in us without the aid of reason1 and later communicates its disposition to reason by means of the imagination2 or1 reason first enters into action1 and then reason communicates its impulse to that part of our being which is disposed to anger4 ,in either case1 anger arises in the vegetative and generative power1 which1 in organizing the body1 has rendered it capable to seek out what is agreeable1 and to avoid what is painful2 diffusing the bitter bile through the organism1 imparting to it a trace of the soul1 thus communicating to it the faculty of growing irritated in the presence of harmful objects1 and1 after having been harmed1 of harming other things1 and to render them similar to itself4 ,anger is a trace of the soul1 of the same nature as the soul's faculty of desire1 because those least seek objects agreeable to the body1 and who even scorn the body1 are least likely to abandon themselves to the blind transports of anger4 ,although plant-life possesses the vegetative power1 it does not possess the faculty of anger because it has neither blood nor bile4 ,these are the two things which1 in the absence of sensation1 leads one to boil with indignation4 ,when however sensation joins these two elements1 there arises an impulse to fight against the harmful object4 ,if the irrational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty of desire1 and that of anger1 and if the former were to be considered the vegetative power1 and the other1 on the contrary1 as a trace of the vegetative power1 residing in either the heart or blood1 or in both2 this division would not consist of opposed members1 because the second would proceed from the first4 ,but there is an alternative3 both members of this division1 the faculties of desire and anger1 might be considered two powers derived from one and the same principle 7the vegetative power74 ,indeed1 when the appetites are divided1 it is their nature1 and not the being from which they depend1 that is considered4 ,this essence itself1 however1 is not the appetite1 but completes it1 harmonizing with it the actions proceeding from the appetite4 ,it is also reasonable to assign the heart as seat of the trace of the soul which constitutes anger2 for the heart is not the seat of the soul1 but the source of the 7arterially7 circulating blood4 ,,when ,,the ,,soul ,,leaves ,,the ,,body1 ,,she ,,leaves ,a ,,trace ,,of ,,life4 #bi4 ,if the body resemble an object warmed rather than illuminated1 why does nothing vital remain after the reasonable soul has abandoned it8 ,it does preserve some vital element1 but only for a short time2 this trace soon disappears1 as vanishes the heat of an object when it is removed from the fire4 ,after death1 some trace of life still remains4 ,this is proved by the growth of hair and nails on corpses2 and it is well known that animals1 even after being cut in pieces1 still move for some time4 ,besides1 the disappearance of the 7vegetative7 life simultaneously with the reasonable soul1 does not prove their identity1 and that they 7the reasonable soul1 and the vegetative soul7 are not different4 ,when the sun disappears1 it causes the disappearance not only of the light that surrounds it immediately1 and as it were depends from it1 but also of the brilliance which these objects receive from this light1 and which completely differs from it4 ,,does ,,the ,,disappearance ,,of ,,these ,,things ,,necessarily ,,imply ,,their ,,destruction8 ,but does that which disappears merely depart1 or does it perish8 ,such is the question which applies both to the light which inheres in the illuminated objects 7and colors them71 as well as to the life inherent in the body1 and which we call the characteristically bodily life4 ,evidently1 there remains no light left in the objects which were illuminated4 ,but the question is to decide whether the light that inhered in them returns to its source1 or is annihilated4 ,annihilation is impossible if anteriorly it was something real4 ,what was it really8 ,so-called color must depend on the very bodies from which light also emanates2 and when these bodies perish1 their coloring perishes with them2 nobody indeed asks after the fate of the color of the fire that has gone out any more than one troubles oneself about what has become of its appearance4 ,it may be objected that the appearance is only a condition1#aef such as holding the hand open or closed1 while the color1 on the contrary1 is the same sort of a quality as sweetness4 ,now1 is there nothing to hinder the sweet or the fragrant body from perishing1 without affecting the existence of the sweetness and fragrance8 ,could they subsist in other bodies without being felt1 because the bodies which participate in the qualities1 are such as not to allow the qualities they possess to be felt8 ,what would hinder the unaffected existence of the light after the destruction of the body it colored1 if it merely ceased to be reflected1 unless one's mind should see that those qualities subsist in no subject8 ,if we were to admit this opinion1 we would also be obliged to admit that qualities are indestructible1 that they are not produced in the constitution of the bodies1 that their colors are not produced by the reasons in seed2 that1 as happens with the changing plumage of certain birds1 the 7seminal7 reasons not only gather or produce the colors of the objects1 but they besides make use of those that still fill the air1 and that they remain in the air without being such as they appear to us when in bodies4 ,enough of this4 ,,three ,,possible ,,interrelations ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,superior ,,and ,,inferior ,,bodies4 ,it may still be asked whether1 if while the bodies subsist1 the light that colors them remains united to them1 and does not separate from them1 why then would not both it1 together with its immediate emanations1 move along with the body in which it inheres1 although it cannot be seen going away any more than it is seen approaching8 ,we shall therefore have to examine elsewhere if the second-rank powers of the soul always remain attached to the higher ones1 and so on2 or if each of them subsist by itself1 and can continue to subsist in itself when it is separated from the higher ones2 or if1 inasmuch as no part of the soul can be separated from the others1 all together form a soul which is simultaneously one and manifold1 but in some still undetermined manner4 ,,can ,,the ,,physical ,,life ,,exist ,,without ,,the ,,soul8 ,what becomes of this trace of life that the soul impresses on the body1 and that the latter appropriates8 ,if it belong to the soul1 it will follow the latter1 since it is not separated from the being of the soul4 ,if it be the life of the body1 it must be subject to the same conditions as the luminous color of the bodies 7and perish with them74 ,indeed1 it will be well to examine if the life can subsist without the soul1 or if1 on the contrary1 the life exists no earlier than the soul is present1 and acts on the body4 ,,stars1 ,,as ,,well ,,as ,,the ,,sun1 ,,have ,,prayers ,,addressed ,,to ,,them4 #cj4 ,we have shown that memory is useless to the stars2 we have agreed that they have senses1 namely1 sight and hearing1 and the power to hear the prayers addressed to the sun1 and also those by many people addressed to the other stars1 because these people are persuaded that they receive from them many benefits2 they think even that they will obtain them so easily that these men ask the stars to co-operate in actions not only such as are just1 but even such as are unjust4 ,questions raised by the latter point must still be considered4 ,,benefits ,,are ,,granted ,,to ,,men ,,through ,,the ,,world-,,soul',s ,,mediation4 ,here arise important questions which have been frequently considered especially by such as will not allow the divinities to be regarded as the accomplices or authors of shameful deeds1 such as love-adventures and adulteries4 ,for this reason1 as well as on account of what was said above about the memory of the stars1 we shall have to examine the nature of the influence they exercise4 ,indeed1 if they grant our petitions1 though not immediately1 and give us what we ask after a time that sometimes is very long1 they must necessarily exercise memory of the prayers addressed to them2 now1 we have above denied that they could have memory4 ,as to the benefits that they grant to men1 it has been said that it seemed as if they had been granted by ,vesta1 that is1 the earth1 unless indeed it should be insisted that the earth alone granted benefits to men4 ,,statement ,,of ,,three ,,questions4 ,we have therefore two points to examine3 we first have to explain that if we do attribute memory to the stars1 it is only in a sense agreeing with our former statements1 and not for the reason advanced by other people2 we shall later have to show that it is a mistake to attribute evil actions to them4 ,in view of this1 we shall try1 as is the duty of the philosopher1 to refute the complaints formed against the divinities which reside in the heavens1 and against the universe which is equally accused1 in the case that any credence whatever is to be attached to such as pretend that heaven can be magically swayed by the arts of audacious men2 last1 we shall explain the administration of the ministry of guardians1 unless the latter point have been explained incidentally to the solution of the former problems4 ,,natural ,,actions ,,are ,,both ,,on ,,wholes ,,and ,,on ,,parts4 #ca4 ,let us in general consider the actions and reactions produced in the universe either by nature or by art4 ,in the works of nature1 there is an action of the whole on the parts1 of the parts on the whole1 and of the parts on the parts4 ,in the works of art1 art either alone accomplishes what it has undertaken1 or depends on natural forces to effect certain natural operations4 ,we may call actions of the universe1 all that the total circular expanse affects on itself or its part4 ,for in fact1 the heavens by moving themselves1 somehow effect themselves and their parts1 both those in its own revolutions1 or on the earth4 ,the mutual reactions and passions of the parts of the universe are easy to recognize1 such as the positions taken up by the sun1 and the influence the sun exercises on the other stars1 and especially in regard to the earth2 further1 the processes in its own elements1 as well as in those of the other constellations1 and of objects on earth--all of which deserve separate consideration4 ,,most ,,of ,,the ,,arts ,,achieve ,,their ,,own ,,ends4 ,architecture and the fine arts1 fulfil themselves in such an object4 ,medicine1 agriculture and similar professions1 however1 are auxiliary arts1 and obey the laws of nature1 assisting their efficient production so as to make them as natural as possible4 ,as to rhetoric1 music1 and other arts of refinement1 which serve the education of souls in improving or degrading men1 it remains an open question how many there are of them1 and what power they possess4 ,in all these things1 we will have to examine what may be of use to us for the questions we are treating1 and we will have to discover the cause of the facts1 as far as possible4 ,,absurdity ,,of ,,ptolemean ,,astrology4 ,it is evident that the revolution of the stars exercises an influence first by disposing them in different arrangement2 then the things contained within its spheres2 then terrestrial beings1 not only in body1 but in soul2 further1 each part of the heavens exercises influence on terrestrial and inferior things4 ,we shall indeed inquire whether the lower things in turn exercise some influence on the superior ones4 ,for the present1 however1 granting that the facts admitted by all1 or at least a majority1 are what they seem to be1 we shall have to try to explain how they are produced1 by following them up to their origins4 ,we must indeed not say that all things are caused exclusively by heat or cold1 with possibly the other qualities named the primary qualities of the elements1 or with those that derive from their mixture#aeg2 neither should we assert that the sun produces everything by the heat1 or some other star 7like ,saturn71 by cold4 ,for indeed what would cold amount to in the heavens1 which are a fiery body1 or in fire1 which has no humidity8 ,moreover1 in this manner it would be impossible to recognize the difference of the stars4 ,then there are many facts that could not be traced to their influence4 ,if the influence of the stars is to be made to account for the differences of human character1 which are supposed to correspond to mixtures of corporeal elements1 producing a temperament in which there is an excess of cold or heat1 to which such causes would one trace hate1 envy1 and malice8 ,granting even that this were possible1 how would one then by the same causes explain good and bad fortune1 poverty and wealth1 nobility of fathers and children1 and the discovery of treasures8 ,a thousand facts equally as foreign to the influence exercised by the physical qualities of the elements on the bodies or souls of animals1 could be cited4 ,,no ,,crimes ,,should ,,be ,,attributed ,,to ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,sublunary ,,divinities4 ,neither should the things which happen to sublunary beings be attributed to either a voluntary decision1 or to deliberations of the universe1 or the stars4 ,it is not permissible to imagine that the divinities sway events in a manner such that some should become thieves1 others should enslave their fellow-beings1 or capture cities1 or commit sacrilege in temples1 or be cowards1 effeminate in their conduct1 or infamous in their morals4 ,to favor such crimes would be unworthy of men of the most commonplace virtue1 let alone divinities4 ,besides1 what beings would be likely to busy themselves favoring vices and outrages from which they were not to reap any advantage8 ,,having ,,confuted ,,astrology ,,and ,,deviltry1 ,,world ,,influence ,,is ,,attributed ,,to ,,the ,,world-,,soul4 #cb4 ,since the influence exteriorly exercised by the heavens on us1 on animals1 and on human affairs generally has been excluded from physical causes 7of astrology7 and from voluntary decisions of divinities1 it remains for us to find some cause to which it may reasonably be attributed4 ,first1 we will have to admit that this universe is a single living being1 which contains within its own organism all living beings2 and that it contains a single ,soul1 which is communicated to all its parts2 namely1 to all beings that form part of the universe4 ,now every being that is contained in the sense-world is a part of the universe4 ,first1 and unrestrictedly1 it is a part of the universe by its body4 ,then1 it is again part of the universe by its soul1 but only so far as it participates 7in the natural and vegetative power7 of the universal ,soul4 ,the beings which only participate in 7the natural and vegetative power7 of the universal ,soul are completely parts of the universe4 ,those who participate in another soul 7the superior power of the universal ,soul71 are not completely parts of the universe 7because they are independent by their rational souls72 but they experience passions by the actions of the other beings1 as far as they have something of the universe 7so far as by their irrational souls1 they participate in the natural and vegetative power of the universe71 and in the proportion in which they possess some part of the universe4 ,this universe is therefore a single living being that is self-sympathetic4 ,the parts that seem distant are not any the less near1 as1 in each animal1 the horns1 nails1 fingers1 the organs at distance from each other1 feel1 in spite of the interval which separates them1 the affection experienced by any other one of them4 ,in fact1 as soon as the parts are similar1 even when they are separated by an interval instead of being placed by each others' side1 they sympathize by virtue of this their similarity1 and the action of the distant one is felt by all the others4 ,now in this universe which is a single living being1 and which forms a single organism1 there is nothing distant enough in place not to be near because of the nature of this being whose unity makes it self-sympathetic4 ,when the suffering being resembles the acting one1 it experiences a passion conformable to its nature2 when on the contrary it differs1 it experiences a passion that is foreign to its nature1 and painful4 ,it is therefore not surprising that though the universe be single1 one of its parts can exert on another a harmful influence1 since it often happens to ourselves that one of our parts wounds another by its action2 as for instance1 that the bile1 setting anger in motion1 should crush and tear some other part of the body4 ,now something analogous to this bile which excites anger1 and to other parts that form the human body1 is discovered in the universe4 ,even in plants there are certain things which form obstacles to others1 and even destroy them4 ,now the world forms not only a single animal1 but also a plurality of animals2 each of them1 as far as it has a share in the singleness of the universe1 is preserved thereby2 but1 in so far as this animal enters into the multiplicity of some other animal1 he can wound it1 or be wounded by it1 make use of it1 or feed on it1 because it differs from itself as much as it resembles itself2 because the natural desire of self-preservation leads us to appropriate what is suitable to itself1 and in its own interest to destroy what is contrary thereto4 ,finally1 each being1 fulfilling its part in the universe1 is useful to those that can profit by its action1 and wounds or destroys those who cannot support it2 thus plants are scorched by the passage of fire1 and the little animals are dragged along or trampled by the greater4 ,this generation and this corruption1 this betterment and deterioration of things render easy and natural the life of the universe considered as a single living being4 ,indeed1 it would not otherwise have been possible that the particular beings it contains should have lived as if they were alone1 should possess their ends in themselves1 and should live only for themselves2 since they are only parts1 they must1 as such1 concur in the ends of the whole of which they are parts2 and1 so far as they are different1 they could not each preserve its own life1 because they are contained in the unity of the universal life2 neither could they entirely remain in the same state1 because the universe must possess permanence1 and because of the universe1 permanence consists in ever remaining in motion4 ,,the ,,stars' ,,motions ,,compared ,,to ,a ,,prearranged ,,dance4 #cc4 ,as the circular movement of the world has nothing fortuitous1 inasmuch as it is produced conformably to the reason of this great animal1 a perfect symphonic 7co-operation7 between what acts and what reacts must exist within it2 and there must also have been an order which would co-ordinate things one with another1 so that at each of the phases of the circular movement of the world there might be a correspondence between the various beings subject to it1 as if1 in a varied choric ballet the dancers formed a single figure4 ,as to our own modern dances1 it is easy to explain the eternal things which contribute thereto1 and which differ for every motion1 like the sounds of the flute1 the songs1 and the other circumstances which are thereto related4 ,it is not however as easy to conceive the motions of a person who conforms himself strictly to each figure1 who accompanies1 who raises one limb1 or lowers another1 who moves this limb1 or holds the other limb motionless in a different attitude4 ,the dancer's eyes are doubtless fixed on some further aim while his limbs are still responding to the motions inspired by the music1 by co-operating in expressing them1 and in completing them symmetrically4 ,likewise1 a man learned in the art of dancing could explain the reason that1 in such a figure1 such a limb is raised1 such a limb is bent1 while others are hidden or lowered2 not indeed that the dancer deliberates about these different attitudes1 but because in the general movement of his body he considers such a posture suitable to such a limb to fulfil its proper part in the dance4 ,likewise do the stars produce certain facts1 and announce other ones4 ,the entire world realizes its universal life by causing the motion of the greater parts it comprises1 by ceaselessly changing the figures1 so that the different positions of the parts1 and their mutual relations may determine the rest1 and that things may occur as in a movement executed by a single moving living organism4 ,thus such a state is produced by such an attitude1 such positions1 such figures2 while some other state is produced by some other kind of figures1 and so forth4 ,consequently1 the real authors of what is occurring do not seem to be those who carry out the figures1 but ,he who commands them2 and ,he who plans the figures does not do one thing while busying ,himself with another1 because ,he is not acting on something different from ,himself2 ,he himself is all the things that are done2 ,he here is the figures 7formed by the universal movement71 ,he himself there is the resultant passions in the animal so moved and constituted by nature1 simultaneously active and passive as the result of necessary laws4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,the ,,universe ,,should ,,be ,,partial ,,only4 #cd4 ,granting that men are influenced by the universe through one of the elements of their being1 it must be by 7their body71 that which forms part of the body of the universe1 not by all those of which they are constituted4 ,consequently1 the surrounding universe should exercise on them only a limited influence4 ,in this respect they resemble wise servants who know how to carry out the orders of their masters without interfering with their own liberty1 so that they are treated in a manner less despotic1 because they are not slaves1 and do not entirely cease to belong to themselves4 ,,astrological ,,influence ,,merely ,,indication4 ,as to the difference found in the figures formed by the stars1 it could not be other than it is1 because the stars do not advance in their course with equal swiftness4 ,as they move according to the laws of reason1 and as their relative positions constitute the different attitudes of this great organism 7which is the world71 and as all the things that occur here below are1 by the laws of sympathy related to those that occur on high1 it would be proper to inquire whether terrestrial things are the consequences of the celestial things to which they are similar1 or whether the figures possess an efficacious power2 and in the latter case1 whether all figures possess this power1 or if figures are formed by stars only2 for the same figure does not bear the same significance1 and does not exert the same action in different things1 because each being seems to have its own proper nature4 ,it may be said that the configuration of certain things amounts to no more than the mere disposition of things2 and that the configuration of other things is the same disposition with another figure4 ,if so1 influence should be attributed not to the figures1 but to the prefigured realities2 or rather1 to things identical by their essence1 and different by their figures2 a different influence will also have to be attributed to the object which differs from the others only by the place it occupies4 ,,astrological ,,influence ,,may ,,be ,,partly ,,action2 ,,partly ,,mere ,,significance4 ,but of what does this influence consist8 ,in significance1 or in 7genuine effective7 action8 ,in many cases1 the combination1 or thing figured1 may be said to have both an action1 and a significance2 in other cases1 however1 a significance merely4 ,in second place1 both the figures and the things figured should be credited with the powers suitable to each2 as with dancers1 the hand exerts an influence similar to that of the other members2 and1 returning to figures1 these would exert an influence far greater than a hand in dancing4 ,last1 the third 7or lowest7 degree of power pertains to those things which follow the lead of the figures1 carrying out 7their significance72 just as1 returning to the dance-illustrations1 the dancer's limbs1 and the parts of those limbs1 ultimately do follow the dance-figures2 or 7taking a more physiological example71 as when the nerves and veins of the hand are contracted by the hand's motions1 and participate therein4 ,,earthly ,,events ,,should ,,not ,,be ,,attributed ,,to ,,the ,,stars' ,,body ,,or ,,will4 #ce4 ,how then do these powers exert themselves8--for we have to retrace our steps to give a clear explanation4 ,what difference is exhibited by the comparison of one triangle with another8 ,what action does the one exert on another1 how is it exerted1 and how far does it go8 ,such are the questions we have to study1 since we do not refer the production of things here below to the stars1 neither to their body1 nor to their will2 not to their bodies1 because the things which happen are not simple physical effects2 nor to their will1 because it is absurd that divinities should by their will produce absurd things4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,the ,,stars ,,consists ,,in ,,their ,,contemplation ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,let us now recall what has already been established4 ,the universe is a single living being by virtue of its unity being sympathetic with itself4 ,the course of its life is regulated by reason2 it is entirely in agreement with itself2 it has nothing fortuitous1 it offers a single order1 and a single harmony4 ,besides1 all the 7star7 figures are each conformed to a reason and to a determinate number4 ,the parts of the universal living beings which constitute this kind of a dance--we mean the figures produced in it1 of the parts figured therein1 as well as the things derived therefrom--are the very actualization of the universe4 ,thus the universe lives in the manner we have determined1 and its powers contribute to this state according to the nature they have received from the reason that has produced them4 ,the figures are1 in some way1 the reasons of the universal ,living being1 the intervals or contrasts 7of the parts7 of the ,living being1 the attitudes they take according to the laws of rhythm1 and according to the reason of the universe4 ,the beings which by their relative distances produce these figures are the divers members of this living being4 ,the different powers of this living being act without deliberation1 as its members1 because deliberation is a process foreign to the nature of themselves or to this living being4 ,aspiration to a single aim is the characteristic of the single living being2 but it includes manifold powers4 ,all these different wills aspire to the same end as the single will of the organism1 for each part desires some one of the different objects that it contains4 ,each wishes to possess something of the other's possessions1 and to obtain what it lacks2 each experiences a feeling of anger against another1 when it is excited against that other2 each increases at the expense of another1 and begets another4 ,the universe produces all these actions in its parts1 but at the same time it seeks the ,good1 or rather1 it contemplates it4 ,it is always the ,good that is sought by the right will1 which is above passions1 and thus accords with the will of the universe4 ,similarly1 servants ascribe many of their actions to the orders received from their master2 but the desire of the ,good carries them where their own master is carried4 ,consequently1 the sun and the other stars exert what influence they do exert on things here below through contemplation of the intelligible world4 ,,star ,,influence ,,is ,,explained ,,by ,,their ,,natural ,,radiation ,,of ,,good4 ,we shall limit ourselves to the above illustration1 which may easily be applied to the rest4 ,the sun does not limit itself to warming terrestrial beings4 ,it makes them also participate in its soul1 as far as possible2 for it possesses a powerful physical soul4 ,likewise1 the other stars1 involuntarily1 by a kind of irradiation1 transmit to inferior beings somewhat of the 7natural7 power they possess4 ,although therefore all things 7in the universe7 form but a single thing of a particular figure1 they offer manifold different dispositions2 which different figures themselves each have a characteristic power2 for each disposition results in appropriate action4 ,,special ,,figures ,,have ,,individual ,,effects1 ,,due ,,to ,,their ,,characteristics4 ,things which appear as a figure themselves possess a characteristic influence1 which changes according to the people with which they are brought in contact4 ,examples of this may be seen daily4 ,why do certain figures or appearances inspire us with terror1 although they have never done us any harm1 while others do not produce the same effect on us8 ,why are some people frightened by certain figures or appearances1 while others are frightened by different ones8 ,because the former's constitution specially acts on the former people1 and the latter on the latter2 they could only produce effects in harmony with their nature4 ,one object attracts attention by a particular appearance1 and would yet attract attention by a different constitution4 ,if it was its beauty that exerted the power of arousing emotion1 why then would this beautiful object move one man1 while the other object would move another1 if there be no potency in the difference of figure or appearance8 ,it would be unreasonable to admit that colors have a characteristic influence and action1 yet deny the same power to figures or appearances4 ,it would1 besides1 be absurd1 to admit the existence of something1 but to refuse it all potency4 ,every being1 because of his mere existence1 must act or suffer4 ,some indeed act exclusively1 while others both act and suffer4 ,substances contain influences independent of their figure or appearance4 ,terrestrial beings also possess many forces which are derived neither from heat nor cold4 ,the reason is that these beings are endowed with different qualities1 that they receive their forms from 7seminal7 reasons1 and participate in the powers of nature2 such are the peculiar virtues of natural stones1 and the surprising effects produced by plants4 ,,nothing ,,in ,,the ,,universe ,,is ,,entirely ,,inanimate4 #cf4 ,the universe is full of variety2 it contains all the reasons1 and an infinite number of different powers4 ,so1 in the human body1 the eye1 the bones1 and the other organs each have their characteristic power2 as1 the bone in the hand does not have the same strength as the bone in the foot2 and in general1 each part has a power different from that possessed by every other part4 ,but unless we observe very carefully1 this diversity escapes us in the case of 7natural7 objects4 ,much more would it escape us in the world2 for the forces that we see in it are 7but7 the traces of those that exist in the superior region4 ,there must then be in the world an inconceivable and admirable variety of powers1 especially in the stars that wander through the heavens4 ,the universe is not a great and vast edifice1 inanimate1 and composed of things of which it would be easy to catalogue the different kinds1 such as stones1 lumber1 and ornamental structures2 it is a wakeful being1 living in all its parts1 though differently so in each2 in short1 it includes all that can ever be4 ,this solves the problem1 how inanimate matter can exist within an animated living being4 ,our discussions have therefore taught us that in the universe 7nothing is inanimate2 that1 on the contrary7 everything it contains is alive2 but each in a different manner4 ,we deny that there is life in objects that we do not see moving2 but nevertheless they do live1 though only with a latent life4 ,those whose life is visible are composed of those whose life is invisible1 but which nevertheless contribute to the life of this animal by furnishing it with admirable powers4 ,it would therefore be equally impossible that the universe should be alive unless each of the things it contained lived with its own life4 ,nevertheless the acts of the universe do not depend on choice2 it acts without needing to choose1 because it precedes any choice4 ,thus many things obey its forces4 ,,consciousness ,,depends ,,on ,,choosing2 ,,everything ,,has ,,powers1 ,,though ,,hidden4 #cg4 ,the universe therefore 7contains all that it needs71 and rejects 7or wastes7 nothing4 ,study1 therefore1 the fire1 and all the other things considered capable of action4 ,satisfactory investigation of their action would demand recognition that these things derive their power from the universe1 and a similar admission for all that belongs to the domain of experience4 ,but we do not usually examine the objects to which we are accustomed1 nor raise questions about them4 ,we investigate the nature of a power only when it seems unusual1 when its novelty excites our astonishment4 ,nevertheless we would not be any less astonished at the objects that we see so often if their power were explained to us at a time when we were not yet so thoroughly accustomed to it4 ,our conclusion therefore is that every thing has a secret 7sub-conscious7 power inasmuch as it is moulded by1 and receives a shape in the universe2 participating in the ,soul of the universe1 being embraced by her1 as being a part of this animated ,all2 for there is nothing in this ,all which is not a part thereof4 ,it is true that there are parts1 both on the earth and in the heavens1 that act more efficiently than do others2 the heavenly things are more potent because they enjoy a better developed nature4 ,these powers produce many things devoid of choice1 even in beings that seem to act 7purposively72 though they are also active in beings that lack that ability to choose4 7,even these powers themselves act unconsciously73 they do not even turn 7towards themselves7 while communicating power1 when some part of their own soul is emanating 7to that which they are begetting74 ,similarly animals beget other animals without implying an act of choice1 without any weakening on the part of the generator1 and even without self-consciousness4 ,otherwise1 if this act was voluntary1 it would consist of a choice1 or the choice would not be effective4 ,if then an animal lack the faculty of choice1 much less will it have self-consciousness4 ,,production ,,is ,,due ,,to ,,some ,,physical ,,soul1 ,,not ,,to ,,any ,,astrological ,,power4 #ch4 ,things which arise from the universe without the incitation of somebody are generally caused by the vegetative life of the universe4 ,as to the things whose production is due to somebody1 either by simple wishes1 or by cunning enchantments1 they should be ascribed not to some star1 but to the very nature of that which is produced4 #a4 ,of course1 the necessaries of life1 or what serves some other use1 should be attributed to the goodness of the stars2 it is a gift made by a stronger part to a weaker one4 ,any harmful effect on the generation of animals exercised by the stars must depend on their substance's inability to receive what has been given them2 for the effect is not produced absolutely1 but relatively to some subject or condition1 for that which suffers or is to suffer must have a determinate nature4 #b4 ,mixtures also exert a great influence1 because each being furnishes something useful to life4 ,moreover1 something good might happen to a person without the assistance of beings which by nature would seem useful4 #c4 ,the co-ordination of the universe does not always give to each person what he desires4 #d4 ,besides1 we ourselves add much to what has been given to us4 #e4 ,all things are not any the less embraced in a same unity2 they form an admirable harmony2 besides1 they are derived from each other1 though originating from contraries2 for indeed all things are parts of a single animal4 ,if any one of these begotten things is imperfect because it is not completely formed1 the fact is that matter not being entirely subdued1 the begotten thing degenerates and falls into deformity4 ,thus some things are produced by the stars1 others are derived from the nature of substance1 while others are added by the beings themselves4 ,,astrological ,,signs ,,are ,,only ,,concatenations ,,from ,,universal ,,reason4 #ci4 ,since all things are always co-ordinated in the universe1 and since all trend to one single and identical aim1 it is not surprising that all 7events7 are indicated by 7astrological7 signs4 ,virtue has no master1 as ,plato said#aeh2 she attaches herself to all who honor her1 and abandons those who neglect her2 ,god is innocent4#aei ,nevertheless1 her works are bound up with the universal order2 for all that is here below depends on a divine and superior principle1 and even the universe participates therein4 ,thus all that happens in the universe is caused not only by the 7seminal7 reasons1 but by reasons of a higher order1 far superior to those 7that is1 the ideas74 ,indeed1 the seminal reasons contain the reasons of nothing produced outside of seminal reasons1 neither of what is derived from matter1 nor from the actions of begotten things exercised on each other4 ,the ,reason of the universe resembles a legislator who should establish order in a city4 ,the latter1 knowing the probable actions of the citizens1 and what motives they would probably obey1 regulates his institutions thereupon1 intimately connects his laws with the conduct of the individuals subject to them1 establishes rewards and punishments for their deeds1 so that automatically all things conspire in mutual harmony by an inerrant current4 ,each therefore is indicated by 7astrological7 signs1 without this indication being an essential purpose of nature2 it is only the result of their concatenation4 ,as all these things form but a single one1 each of them is known by another1 the cause by the effect1 the consequent by the antecedent1 the compound by its elements4 ,,the ,,gods ,,cannot ,,be ,,held ,,responsible ,,for ,,our ,,ills4 ,the above consideration would clear up the problem set above4 ,the gods 7that is1 the stars71 cannot be held responsible for our ills because1 #a4 things produced by the gods do not result from a free choice1 but from a natural necessity2 because1 as parts of the universe1 the gods act on other parts of the universe1 and contribute to the life of the universal organism4 #b4 ,terrestrial beings themselves add very much to the things that are derived from the stars2 #c4 the things given us by the stars are not evil1 but are altered by being mingled2 #d4 the life of the universe is not regulated 7in advance7 for the individual1 but only for the totality2 #e4 matter does not experience modifications completely corresponding to the impressions it receives1 and cannot entirely submit to the form given to it4 ,,magic ,,occurs ,,by ,,love ,,working ,,as ,,sympathy4 #dj4 ,but how shall we explain the enchantments of magic8 ,by the sympathy that things have for each other1 the accord of those that are similar1 the struggle of those that are contrary1 the variety of the powers of the various beings which contribute to the formation of a single organism2 for many things are attracted towards each other and are mutually enchanted1 without the intervention of a magician4 ,the real magic is the ,love that reigns in the universe1 with its contrary of ,hate4 ,the first magician1 him whom men consult to act by the means of his philtres and enchantments1 is ,love2 for it is from the natural mutual love of all things1 and from the natural power they have to compel each others' love1 that is derived the efficaciousness of the art of inspiring love by employing enchantments4 ,by this art1 magicians bring together the natures which have an innate love for each other2 they unite one soul to another as one cross-fertilizes distant plants2 by employing 7symbolic7 figures which possess special virtues2 by themselves taking certain attitudes1 they noiselessly attract the powers of other beings1 and induce them to conspire to unity so much the easier as they themselves are in unity4 ,a being of the same disposition1 but located outside of the universe1 could neither by magic attractions fascinate1 nor by his influence enchain any of the things contained in the world2 on the contrary1 from the moment that he is not a stranger to the world1 he can attract towards himself other beings1 knowing their mutual relations and attractions within the universal organism4 ,there are indeed invocations1 songs1 words1 7symbolic7 figures1 and1 for instance1 certain sad attitudes and plaintive tones which exert a natural attraction4 ,their influence extends even to the soul--,i mean1 the irrational soul2 for neither the will nor the reason permit themselves to be subdued by the charms of music4 ,this magic of music does not arouse any astonishment2 nevertheless those who play or sing1 charm and inspire love unintentionally4 ,nor does the virtue of prayers depend on their being heard by ,beings that make free decisions2 for these invocations do not address themselves to free-will4 ,thus#afj when a man is fascinated by a serpent1 he neither feels nor understands the influence exerted on him2 he perceives what he has felt only after having experienced it--the governing part of the soul cannot anyway experience anything of the kind4 ,consequently when an invocation is addressed to a ,being1 some thing results2 either for him who makes this invocation1 or for some other person4 ,,how ,,prayers ,,are ,,answered4 #da4 ,neither the sun1 nor any other star hears the prayers addressed to it4 ,if they are granted1 it is only by the sympathy felt by each part of the universe for every other2 just as all parts of a cord are caused to vibrate by excitation of any one part2 or1 just as causing one string of a lyre to vibrate would cause all the others to vibrate in unison1 because they all belong to the same system of harmony4 ,if sympathy can go as far as making one lyre respond to the harmonies of another1 so much the more must this sympathy be the law of the universe1 where reigns one single harmony1 although its register contains contraries1 as well as similar and analogous parts4 ,the things which harm men1 like anger1 which1 together with the bile1 relate to the liver1 were not created for the purpose of harming men4 ,it is as if a person1 in the act of taking fire from a hearth accidentally wounded another4 ,this person is doubtless the author of the wound because he transferred the fire from one place to another2 but the wound occurred only because the fire could not be contained by the being to whom it had been transmitted4 ,,as ,,the ,,stars ,,answer ,,prayers ,,unconsciously1 ,,they ,,do ,,not ,,need ,,memories ,,therefor4 #db4 ,the stars therefore have no need of memory to remember our prayers1 nor senses to receive them2 thus is solved the problem considered above4 ,nor even1 if our prayers are answered1 is this due1 as some think1 to any free will on their part4 ,whether or not we address prayers to them1 they exercise over us a certain influence by the mere fact that1 along with us1 they form part of the universe4 ,,the ,,prayers ,,of ,,even ,,the ,,evil ,,are ,,answered1 ,,if ,,made ,,in ,,accordance ,,with ,,natural ,,law4 ,there are many forces that are exercised involuntarily1 either automatically1 without any invitation1 or with the assistance of skill4 ,thus1 in an animal1 one part is naturally favorable or harmful to another2 that is why both physician and magician1 each by his characteristic arts1 force one thing to communicate its power to another4 ,likewise1 the universe communicates to its parts something of its own power1 either automatically1 or as a result of the attraction exercised by the individual4 ,this is a natural process1 since he who asks is not foreign to it4 ,neither should we be astonished if even an evil individual obtains his requests2 for do not the evil drink from the same streams as do the good8 ,in this case1 the granting is done unconsciously2 it grants simply1 and what is granted harmonizes with the order of the universe4 ,consequently1 if an evil individual asks and obtains what is within reach of all1 there is no reason why he should be punished4 ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,and ,,stars ,,are ,,impassible4 ,it is therefore wrong to hold that the universe is subject to experiencing passions4 ,in the first place1 the governing ,soul is entirely impassible2 then1 if there be any passions in her1 they are experienced only by her parts2 as to her1 being unable to experience anything contrary to her nature1 she herself remains impassible4 ,to experience passions seems suitable to stars considered as parts of the universe2 but1 considered in themselves1 they are impassible1 because their wills are impassible1 and their bodies remain as unalterable as their nature1 because their soul loses nothing1 and their bodies remain the same1 even if1 by their soul1 they communicate something of themselves to inferior beings4 ,if something issues from them1 they do not notice it2 if some increase happens1 they pay no attention4 ,,how ,,the ,,wise ,,man ,,escapes ,,all ,,enchantments4 #dc4 ,how will the worthy man be able to escape the action of the enchantments and the philtres employed by magic8 ,his soul escapes them entirely2 his reason is impassible1 and cannot be led to change opinions4 ,the worthy man1 therefore1 can suffer only through the irrational part that he receives from the universe2 this part alone suffers4 ,nor will he be subdued by the loves inspired by philtres1 because love presupposes a soul's inclination to experience what another soul experiences4 ,as enchantments act on the irrational part of the soul1 their power will be destroyed by fighting them2 and by resisting them by other enchantments4 ,as a result of enchantments1 therefore1 it is possible to experience sicknesses1 and even death2 and1 in general1 all the affections relative to the body4 ,every part of the universe is subject to experiencing an affection caused in it by another part or by the universe itself 7with the exception of the wise man1 who remains impassible72 without there being anything contrary to nature it can also feel this affection only at the end of some time4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,guardians4 ,the guardians themselves can suffer through their irrational part4 ,they must have memory and senses1 by nature they must be susceptible to enchantments1 of being induced to commit certain acts1 and to hear the prayers addressed to them4 ,the guardians subjected to this influence are those who approach men1 and they are the more subdued thereby as they approach to men closer4 ,,an ,,active ,,life ,,makes ,,men ,,more ,,liable ,,to ,,enchantments4 ,every being that has some relation with another can be bewitched by him2 he is bewitched and attracted by the being with whom he is in relations4 ,only the being concentrated in himself 7by the contemplation of the intelligible world7 cannot be bewitched4 ,magic exercises its influence on every action1 and on every active life2 for active life trends towards the things which charm it4 ,hence the 7,platonic7 expression1 ,the subjects of the magnanimous ,erechtheus are remarkable by the beauty of their countenances4 ,what indeed does one being feel in his relations with another8 ,he is drawn towards him1 not by the art of magic1 but by the seduction exerted by nature1 which harmonizes and unites two beings joining them one to the other1 not by locality1 but by the power of the philtres employed4 ,,magic ,,has ,,power ,,over ,,man ,,by ,,his ,,affections ,,and ,,weaknesses4 #dd4 ,only the man devoted to contemplation can defy enchantments1 inasmuch as none can be bewitched by himself4 ,the man who contemplates has become unified2 he has become what he contemplates1 his reason is sheltered from all seductive influences4 ,he does what he ought to do1 he accomplishes his life and his proper function4 ,as to the remainder of humanity1 the soul does not fulfil her characteristic function1 nor does reason determine its action2 the irrational soul becomes the principle of action1 and the passions furnish men with directions4 ,the influence of a magic attraction manifests in the disposition to marriage1 in the care we take of our children1 and1 in general1 in all that the bait of pleasure leads us to do4 ,amidst our actions there are some that are provoked by an irrational power1 either by anger1 or the general faculty of desire of the soul4 ,other actions relate to political life1 like the desire of obtaining office1 and they spring from a desire to command4 ,those actions in which we propose to avoid some evil1 are inspired by fear2 while those actions in relating to the desire to possess more than others1 are inspired by cupidity4 ,last1 those actions relating to utility1 and to the satisfaction of our needs1 show with what force nature has attached us to life4 ,,honesty ,,escapes ,,magic ,,only ,,because ,,it ,,results ,,from ,,contemplation ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,it may perhaps be said that the actions whose aim is noble and honest escape the influences of magic2 otherwise contemplation itself would be subject thereto4 ,this is true1 that the man who performs deeds of honesty as being inevitable1 with his eyes fixed on true ,beauty1 could never be bewitched4 ,he knows duty1 and the aim of his life 7which would limit his efforts7 is not anything on earth or in the 7universe74 ,it may indeed be objected that he is bewitched and attached here below by the magic force of human nature1 which binds him to the lives of others and of himself4 ,it would even be reasonable to say that we should not separate ourselves from the body because of the attachment for him inspired by some magic charm4 ,as to the man who 7to contemplation7 prefers practical activity1 and who contents himself with the beauty discovered therein1 he is evidently misled by the deceptive traces of the ,beautiful1 since he seeks beauty in inferior things4 ,every activity unfolded in the domain of what has nothing but the appearance of truth1 every inclination for this kind of thing supposes that the soul is deceived by what attracts it4 ,that is the way in which the magic power of nature is exercised4 ,,how ,,to ,,avoid ,,magic ,,enchantments4 ,indeed1 to follow what is not ,good as if it was the ,good1 to let oneself be misled by its appearance1 and by irrational inclinations1 that is the characteristic of a man who in spite of himself is led whither he does not wish to go4 ,now does this not really amount to yielding to a magic charm8 ,he alone escapes every magic charm who1 though he be carried away by the lower faculties of his soul1 considers good none of the objects that seem such to these faculties1 who calls good only what he by himself knows to be such1 without being misled by any deceptive appearance2 and who regards as good not what he has to seek1 but what he possesses veritably4 ,then only could he in no way be misled by any magic charm4 ,,every ,,being ,,therefore ,,is ,a ,,specialized ,,organ ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 #de4 ,this discussion teaches us that each one of the beings contained in the universe contributes to the purpose of the universe by its actions and passions according to its nature and dispositions1 as1 in an organism1 each organ contributes to the final purpose of the entire body1 by fulfilling the function assigned to it by its nature and constitution4 ,from this each organ derives its place and role1 and besides communicates something else to the other organs1 and from them receives all that its nature would allow4 ,somehow1 all the organs feel what is going on in the others1 and if each of them became an organism1 it would be quite ready to fulfil the function of an organism1 which function differs from that of being merely an organ4 ,,human ,,nature ,,is ,,intermediate1 ,,suffering ,,with ,,the ,,whole1 ,,but ,,also ,,acting ,,on ,,it4 ,we are thus shown our condition4 ,on the one hand1 we exercise a certain action on the whole2 on the other1 we not only experience the passions that it is natural for our body to experience in its relations with other bodies1 but we also introduce into these relations the soul which constitutes us1 bound as we are to the kindred things which surround us by our natural resemblance to them4 ,indeed1 by our souls and dispositions we become1 or rather1 we already are similar on one hand to the inferior beings of the demonic world1 and on the other1 to the superior beings of the intelligible world4 ,our nature cannot be ignored1 therefore4 ,not all of us receive1 not all of us give the same thing4 ,how indeed could we communicate to others the good1 if we do not possess it8 or receive it1 if our nature was not capable of it8 ,,by ,a ,,secret ,,road ,,each ,,one ,,is ,,led ,,to ,,divine ,,retribution4 ,thus the evil man shows what he is1 and he is by his nature impelled towards what already dominates him1 both while he is here below1 or after he has left this place2 when he passes into the place towards which his inclinations draw him4 ,the virtuous man1 on the contrary1 has1 in all these respects1 a different fate4 ,each one is thus driven by his nature1 as by some occult force1 towards the place whither he is to go4 ,in this universe1 therefore1 there obtains an admirable power and order1 since1 by a secret1 and hidden path1 each one is led to the unescapable condition assigned to him by divine justice4 ,the evil man does not know this1 and is1 in spite of himself1 conducted to the place in the universe which he is to occupy4 ,the wise man knows it1 and himself proceeds to his destined abode4 ,before leaving this life1 he knows what residence inevitably awaits him1 and the hope of dwelling there some day in company with the divinities fills his life with happiness4 ,,existence ,,of ,,heaven2 ,,hell',s ,,torments ,,are ,,reformatory4 ,the parts of each small organism undergo changes and sympathetic affections which are not much felt1 because these parts are not individual organisms 7and they exist only for some time1 and in some kinds of organisms74 ,but in the universal organism1 where the parts are separated by so great distances1 where each one follows its own inclinations1 where there is a multitude of different animals1 the movements and change of place must be more considerable4 ,thus the sun1 the moon and the other stars are seen successively to occupy different places1 and to revolve regularly4 ,it is not unreasonable therefore to suppose that souls would change location1 as they change character1 and that they would dwell in a place suitable to their dispositions4 ,they would thus contribute to the order of the universe by occupying some1 a place analogous to the head in the human body2 and others1 a place analogous to the human feet2 for the universe admits of place for all degrees of perfection4 ,when a soul does not choose the best 7actions71 and yet does not attach herself to what is worst1 she would naturally pass into some other place1 which is indeed pure1 but yet proportioned to the mediocrity she has chosen4 ,as to the punishments1 they resemble the remedies applied by physicians to sickly organs4 ,on some the physician lays certain substances2 in some he makes incisions1 or he changes the condition of some others1 to reestablish the health of the whole system1 by giving to each organ the special treatment suitable to it4 ,likewise1 the health of the universe demands that the one 7soul7 be changed2 that another be taken away from the locality where she languishes1 and be located where she would recover from the disease4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,five4 ,psychological ,questions--,,iii4 ,about the ,process of ,vision and ,hearing4 ,,it ,,is ,,uncertain ,,whether ,,an ,,intermediary ,,body ,,be ,,implied ,,by ,,vision4 #a4 ,above#afa we suggested the question whether it be possible to see without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body#afb2 we shall now try to consider it4 ,it has already been asserted that in general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body2 for1 when completely separated from the body 7the soul dwells in the intelligible world74 ,but1 as touch consists of perception1 not indeed of intelligible entities1 but only of sense-objects1 the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body2 for when completely separated from some body1 the soul dwells in the intelligible world4 ,but1 as touch consists of perception1 not indeed of intelligible entities1 but only of sense-object1 the soul in order to come in contact with these sense-objects1 must enter into cognitive or affective relation with them by the means of intermediaries which must possess an analogous nature2 and that is why the knowledge of bodies must be acquired by the means of corporeal organs4 ,through these organs which are so interrelated as to form a sort of unity1 the soul approaches sense-objects in a manner such as to establish effective communion4 ,that contact between the organ and the cognized object must be established is evident enough for tangible objects1 but is doubtful for visible objects4 ,whether contact be necessary for hearing is a question we shall have to discuss later4#afc ,here we shall first discuss whether sight demand a medium between the eye and color4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,aristotle',s ,,insistence ,,on ,a ,,medium ,,of ,,sight4 ,if a medium of sight exist1 it exists only by accident1 and in no way contributes to sight4#afd ,since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight1 and as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle1 it may be said1 indeed1 that mediums contribute to sight1 or at least1 if they do not contribute such thereto1 they may be hindrances as slight 7as possible72 but evidently a medium1 however refined1 is some sort of an obstacle1 however slight4 ,,though ,,the ,,medium ,,experience ,,affection1 ,,the ,,organs ,,feel ,,it ,,better ,,without ,,the ,,medium4 7,there is an opinion that7 the medium first receives and then transmits the affection1 and impression4 ,for instance1 if some one stand in front of us1 and directs his gaze at some color1 he also sees it2 but the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced the affection4 ,to this it may be answered that there is no necessity for the affections to be experienced by the medium1 inasmuch as the affection is already experienced by the eye1 whose function consists precisely in being affected by color2 or at least1 if the medium be affected1 its affection differs from that of the eye4 ,for instance1 a reed interposed between the hand and the fish called the torpedo1 or electric ray1 does not feel the same numbness which it nevertheless communicates to the holding hand2 still1 the hand would not be affected with numbness unless the reed formed a communication between the fish and the hand4#afe ,however1 the matter is not beyond discussion1 for 7even without any intermediary1 if for instance7 the fisher were in 7direct contact7 with the ray inside of the net1 he would also feel the electric numbness4 ,this communication therefore seems based on sympathetic affections4 ,that1 by virtue of its nature1 one being can be sympathetically affected by some other being1 does not necessarily imply that the medium1 if different1 shares that affection2 at least 7it is certain that7 it is not affected in the same manner4 ,in such a case1 the organ destined to experience the affection experiences it far better when there is no medium1 even when the medium itself is susceptible to some affection4 ,,necessity ,,of ,a ,,medium ,,in ,,the ,,theories ,,of ,,various ,,philosophers4 #b4 ,if vision#aff presupposes the union of the light of the eye1#afg with the light interposed 7between the eye7 and the sense-object itself1 the interposed medium is the light1 and this medium is necessary1 on this hypothesis4 7,on the theory of ,aristotle7 the colored substance produces a modification in the medium2 but nothing here would hinder this modification from reaching the eye itself1 even when there is no medium4 ,for1 in this case1 the medium is necessarily modified before the eye is4 7,the ,platonic philosophers7 teach that vision operates by an effusion of the light of the eye4 ,they have no need to postulate a medium1 unless indeed they should fear that the ray of the eye should lose its way2 but this ray is luminous1 and the light travels in a straight line4 7,the ,stoics7 explain vision by the resistance experienced by the visual ray4 ,they cannot do without a medium4#afh 7,the ,atomists and7 the believers in images 7such as ,epicurus71 insist that these images move in emptiness1 thereby implying the existence of a free space to avoid hindering the images4 ,consequently as they will be hindered in a direct ratio to the existence of a medium1 this opinion does not run counter to our own hypothesis 7that there is no medium74 ,a ,,cosmological ,,medium ,,is ,,necessary1 ,,but ,,it ,,affects ,,sight ,,only ,,accidentally4 ,those who 7with ,plotinos himself7 teach that vision operates by sympathy1 assert that vision is poorer through a medium1 because this medium hinders1 fetters1 and weakens sympathy4 ,in this case1 indeed1 the medium necessarily weakens sympathy even though it shared the same nature 7as the eye and the object71 and was affected in the same manner4 7,it acts like the integument7 of some body that is deeply burned by fire applied to it2 the interior parts are less affected because they are protected by the exterior parts4 ,there is no doubt that the parts of one and the same animal will be less affected in experiencing sympathy because of the existence of a medium4 ,the affection will be weakened according to the nature of the medium1 because such a medium would hinder excess of affection1 unless indeed that which is transmitted 7by one part to another7 is not such as to fail to affect the medium4 ,but if the universe sympathize with itself because it constitutes a single organism1 and if we are affected because we are contained within this single organism1 and form part of it1 why should any continuity be necessary for us to feel a distant object8 ,the single organism1 indeed1 could not be continuous without the continuity of some medium2 this continuous medium is affected only by accident2 but otherwise we would have to admit that all can be affected by all4 ,but if these two objects are affected in one manner1 and other two objects are affected in another manner1 there might not always be need of a medium4 ,whoever asserts the need of a medium for vision will have to advance a very good argument1 inasmuch as that which traverses the air does not always affect the air1 and often limits itself to dividing the air4 ,thus when a stone falls the only thing that happens to the air is that it fails to support the stone4 ,as falling is part of the stone's nature1 it would be unreasonable to assert that its falling was due to the reaction exerted by the ambient air4 ,otherwise we would have to assert that it is this same reaction of the ambient air that makes fire ascend1 which is absurd2 because the fire1 by the rapidity of its motion1 forestalls this reaction4 ,that1 by the very rapidity of the motion1 reaction is accelerated1 takes place only by accident1 and has no relation to the upward impulsion2 for trees grow from above without receiving any 7upward7 impulsion4 ,even we1 when walking1 divide the air without being pushed by the reaction of the air2 the air behind us limits itself to filling the void we have created4 ,if then the air allow itself to be divided by bodies without being affected by them1 what would hinder the air from permitting free transit for the images to reach the eye1 without being thereby divided8 ,,images ,,do ,,not ,,reach ,,us ,,by ,,effluence4 ,if these images do not reach us by some sort of effluence1 why should the air be affected1 and why should we ourselves be affected only as a result of the affection experienced by the air8 ,if we felt only because the air had been affected before us1 we would attribute the sensation of sight not to the visible object1 but to the air located near us1 as occurs with heat4 ,in the latter case it is not the distant fire1 but the air located near us which1 being heated1 then warms us2 for the sensation of heat presupposes contact1 which does not occur with vision4 ,we see1 not because the sense-object is imposed on the eye 7but because the medium is illuminated72 now it is necessary for the medium to be illuminated because the air by itself is dark4 ,if the air were not dark1 it would have no need of light2 for 7to effectuate vision7 the obscurity1 which forms an obstacle to vision1 must be overcome by light4 ,that is perhaps the reason why an object placed very near the eye is not seen2 for it brings with it the darkness of the air1 together with its own4 ,,uselessness ,,of ,,air ,,as ,,transmitting ,,medium ,,proved ,,from ,,sight ,,of ,,objects ,,at ,,night4 #c4 ,a strong proof that the forms of sense-objects are not seen merely because the air1 on being affected1 transmits them by relays from point to point1 is that even in darkness the fire1 the stars1 and their forms may be seen4 ,in this case no one would claim that the forms of the objects1 being impressed on the obscure air1 are transmitted to the eye2 otherwise1 there would be no obscurity1 as the fire1 while transmitting its form1 would illuminate4 ,indeed1 in the profound obscurity in which the light of the stars is not seen1 the fire of signals and of light-houses may be perceived4 ,should any one1 in opposition to the testimony of his senses1 claim that even in this case the fire penetrates the air1 he should be answered by having it pointed out to him that in that case human vision should distinguish the smallest objects which are in the air1 instead of being limited to the perception of the fire4 ,if then we see what is beyond a dark medium1 it would be much better seen without any medium whatever4 ,,absence ,,of ,,medium ,,would ,,interfere ,,with ,,vision ,,only ,,by ,,destroying ,,sympathy4 ,it might indeed be objected that without medium1 vision ceases4 ,this occurs not because of the lack of medium1 but because the sympathy of the 7universal7 organism is in such a case destroyed since a medium presupposes that all the parts of this organism together form but a single being4 ,it would indeed seem to be a general condition necessary for sensation that the universal organism be sympathetic with itself2 otherwise1 no one thing could participate in the power of any other thing that might happen to be very distant4 ,,vision ,,is ,,not ,,dependent ,,on ,,the ,,affection ,,of ,,the ,,medium4 ,here is another important 7related7 question4 ,if there existed another world and organism which had no relation with our world1 and if on the surface of the sky was an eye that was looking1 would it perceive this other world at a moderate distance1 or would it have no relation thereto8 ,this question will be considered later4#afi ,now however we shall give a further proof that the medium has nothing to do with vision4 ,if the air were affected1 it would experience a material affection1 similar to the figure impressed on wax4 ,in this case1 a certain part of the object would be impressed on a certain part of the air2 and consequently1 the part of the air nearest to the eye would receive a part of the visible object1 and this part would be of a size equal to that of the pupil4 ,now a visible object is seen in its entirety1 and all those who are in the air equally see it1 whether they behold it from the front1 or side1 or whether they be one behind the other1 without however forming mutual obstacles4 ,this proves that every part of the air contains the entire visible object4 ,this cannot be explained by any corporeal affection1 but by higher laws1 suitable to the soul1 and to the 7universal7 organism which everywhere responds to itself4 ,,mutual ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,eye',s ,,light ,,and ,,the ,,objective ,,light4 #d4 ,what is the mutual relation between the light that emanates from the eye1 and the light which is exterior to the eye1 and which extends between the eye and the object8#agj ,light has no need of air as a medium1 unless indeed somebody should undertake to say that there is no light without air1 in which case air would be a medium only accidentally4 ,light itself1 however1 is an unaffected medium1 for there is no necessity here for an affection1 but only for a medium2 consequently1 if light be not a body1 there is no need of a body 7to act as medium74 ,it might be objected that sight has no need either of a foreign light nor of a medium to see near by1 but has need of them for vision at a distance4 ,later#aga we shall consider whether or not light without air be possible4 ,now let us consider the first point4 ,,intermediary ,,light ,,is ,,unnecessary1 ,,partly ,,being ,,an ,,obstacle4 ,if the light which is contiguous to the eye should become animated1 and if the soul should1 so to speak1 interpenetrate it1 uniting with it as she unites with the interior light1 there would be no need of intermediary light for the perception of the visible object4 ,sight resembles touch2 it operates in light by somehow transferring itself to the object1 without the medium experiencing any affection4 ,now consider3 does the sight transfer itself to the visible object because of the existence of an interval between them1 or because of the existence of some body in the interval8 ,in the latter case1 vision would occur by removing this obstacle4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be because of the existence of a mere interval1 then the nature of the visible object must seem inert and entirely inactive4 ,this is however impossible2 not only does touch announce and experience the neighboring object but1 by the affection it experiences1 it proclaims the differences of the tangible object1 and even perceives it from a distance1 if nothing oppose it2 for we perceive the fire at the same time as the air that surrounds us1 and before this air has been heated by the fire4 ,a solid body heats better than does the air2 and consequently it receives heat through the air1 rather than by the intermediation of air4 ,if then the visible object have the power to act1 and if the organ have the power of experiencing 7or suffering71 why should sight need any intermediary 7besides light7 to exert its power8 ,this would really be needing an obstacle6 ,when the light of the sun reaches us1 it does not light up the air before lighting us1 but lights both simultaneously2 even before it has reached the eye1 while it is still elsewhere1 we have already seen1 just as if the air was not affected at all2 that is the case1 probably1 because the medium has undergone no modification1 and because light has not yet presented itself to our view4 ,under this hypothesis 7which asserts that the air receives and transmits an affection7 it would be difficult to explain why during the night we see the stars and1 in general1 any kind of fire4 ,,not ,,even ,,the ,,light ,,of ,,the ,,eye ,,is ,,to ,,be ,,considered ,,as ,,medium4 ,on the hypothesis that the soul remains within herself1 while making use of the light 7emanated from the eye7 as a rod to reach the visible object1 a very sharp perception would be caused by the resistance experienced by the light in its tension#agb and sense-color4 ,in so far as it is color1 the light itself would possess the property of reflecting light4 ,in this case1 the contact would take place by a medium4 ,but already before this the light has reached the object without any medium2 so that the later contact operated by a medium would produce cognition by a sort of memory or reasoning--which is not the case4 ,,the ,,objective ,,light ,,does ,,not ,,transmit ,,the ,,image ,,by ,,relays4 ,the hypothesis that the light contiguous to the visible object is affected1 and transmits this affection by relays from point to point into the eye1 is essentially identical with that theory which supposes that the medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible object2 a hypothesis that has already been discussed above4 ,,neither ,,for ,,hearing ,,is ,,the ,,air ,,necessary ,,as ,a ,,medium4 #e4 ,as to hearing1 there are several theories4 ,one is that the air is first set in motion1 and that this motion1 being transmitted unaltered from point to point from the 7location of the7 sound-producing air as far as the ear1 causes the sound to arrive to the sense4 ,again1 another theory is that the medium is here affected accidentally1 and only because it happens to be interposed2 so that1 if the medium were annihilated1 we would feel the sound immediately on its production by the shock of two bodies4 ,we might think that the air must first be set in motion1 but the medium interposed 7between the first moved air and the ear7 plays a different part4 ,the air here seems to be the sovereign condition of the production of sound2 for1 at the origin of the sound1 the shock of two bodies would produce no sound if the air1 compressed and struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the motion from point to point as far as the ear4#agc ,but if the production of the sound depend on the impulsion impressed on the air1 the 7qualitative7 difference between voices and 7instrumental7 sounds will challenge explanation2 for there is great difference 7of timbre7 between metal struck by metal of the same kind1 or another4 ,these differences are not merely quantitative1 and cannot be attributed to the air which 7everywhere7 is the same1 nor to the force of the stimulus 7which may be equal in intensity74 ,another theory 7of ,aristotle's7 is that the production of voices and sound is due to the air1 because the impulsion impressed on the air is sonorous4 7,to this it should be answered that7 air1 in so far as it is air1 is not the cause of sound2 for it resounds only in so far as it resembles some solid body1 remaining in its situation1 before it dilates1 as if it were something solid4#agd ,the 7cause of the sound7 then is the shock between objects1 which forms the sound that reaches the sense of hearing4 ,this is demonstrated by the sounds produced in the interior of animals1 without the presence of any air1 whenever one part is struck by some other4 ,such is the sound produced by certain articulations when they are bent 7as1 the knee72 or certain bones1 when they are struck against each other1 or when they break2 in this case air has nothing to do with the production of the sound4 ,these considerations compel a theory of hearing similar to our conclusions about sight4 ,the perception of audition1 like that of vision1 therefore consists in a repercussion 7an affection sympathetically felt7 in the universal organism4 ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,air ,,to ,,the ,,light4 #f4 ,could light exist without air1 if the sun illuminated the surface of bodies1 and if there were a void in the interval which is accidentally illuminated by virtue of its location 7between the sun and the bodies78 ,it is certain that if the other things were affected because the air itself was affected1 and if light were nothing more than an affection of the air1 that is1 its substance2 then indeed this affection could not exist without the experiencing subject 7the air74 ,but 7in our view7 light is not essentially characteristic of air as such2 for all fiery and brilliant bodies1 among which are precious stones1 possess a luminous color4 ,could that which passes from a brilliant body into some other body exist without that other body8 ,if light be but a simple quality of an object1 and as every quality implies a subject on which it depends1 light will have to be sought in the body in which it resides4 ,if1 on the contrary1 light be only an actualization produced by some other thing1 and if there be no body contiguous to the luminous object1 and it be entirely surrounded by a void1 why could light not exist1 and radiate upwards 7as well as downwards1 and in every direction78 ,since light radiates1 why should it not radiate without hindrance8 ,if its nature be to fall1 it will spontaneously descend2 for neither the air nor any illuminated body will make it issue from the illuminating body1 nor can force it to advance1 since it is neither an accident that implies a subject1 nor an affection that implies an affected object4 ,otherwise1 the light would remain 7in the illuminated body7 when the object from which it emanates should happen to withdraw2 but since the light withdraws with it1 it radiates4 ,in what direction does light radiate8 7,its radiation7 demands no more than the existence of sufficient space2 otherwise the body of the sun would lose its actualization2 that is1 the light it radiates4 ,in this case light would not be the quality of a subject1 but the actualization that emanates from a subject1 but which does not pass into any other subject 7as a kind of undulation72 but if another subject be present1 it will suffer an affection4 ,as life1 which constitutes an actualization of the soul1 affects the body if it be present1 and does not any the less constitute an actualization if the body be absent1 likewise light constitutes an actualization subject to the same conditions4 ,it is not the obscurity of the air that begets light1 nor obscurity mingled with the earth which produces an impure light2 otherwise one might produce something sweet by mingling some thing with what is bitter4 ,the statement that light is a modification of the air1 is incomplete without the addition that the air must itself be modified by this modification1 and that the obscurity of the air is no longer obscure after having undergone that change4 ,the air itself1 however1 remains what it was1 just as if it had not been affected4 ,the affection belongs only to that which has been affected4 ,color therefore does not belong to the air1 but subsists in itself2 the air's only function is its presence4 ,but enough of this4 ,,does ,,the ,,withdrawal ,,of ,,the ,,luminous ,,source ,,abandon ,,the ,,light ,,to ,,destruction2 ,,or ,,does ,,the ,,light ,,follow ,,it8 #g4 ,it might be asked whether the withdrawal of the object from which light emanates abandons the light to destruction1 or does the light follow the source into withdrawal8 ,this question is related to the former one2 7and it may be said that7 if the light inhere in the illuminated body in a manner such as to have become characteristic of it1 the light perishes with it4 ,the light is an immanent actualization1 for otherwise it would surround the object from which it emanates1 and remain within it1 accumulating there4 ,if this were so1 the light could not vanish so long as the object from which it emanates itself continues to subsist4 ,if this object pass from one place to another1 light would pass thither also1 not because it turns back on itself or changes locality1 but because the actualization of the luminous object exists and is present as soon as nothing opposes it4 ,if the distance from the sun to the earth were much more considerable than it really is1 the light of the sun would nevertheless reach us1 providing no obstacle were interposed4 ,on the one hand1 there is in the luminous body an actualization1 a kind of superabundant life1 a principle and source of activity2 on the other hand1 beyond the limits of the luminous body1 exists a second actualization which is the image of the actualization characteristic of this body1 and which never separates itself from the body4 ,every being has an actualization which is its image2 so that1 as soon as the being exists1 its actualization exists also2 and so long as the being subsists1 its actualization radiates nearer or further4 ,actualizations 7differ indeed72 some are feeble and obscure1 others are secret or hidden1 others are powerful and radiate afar4 ,when an actualization radiates at a distance it must be admitted to exist there where it acts1 where it exercises and manifests its power4 ,consequently one can see light shine from the eyes of animals whose eyes are naturally brilliant#age2 likewise when the animals that exert a concentrated interior fire happen to open their eyelids1 they radiate rays of light into the darkness2 while1 when they close their eyes1 no more light exists outside them4 ,the light therefore does not perish2 only1 it is no longer produced exteriorly4 ,it does not re-enter into the animal but merely ceases to exist exteriorly1 for the visual fire does not pass outside1 remaining inside4 ,is light itself then within8 ,at least this light remains within2 but 7when the eye is closed7 the eyelid forms an obstacle to its diffusion4 ,,light ,,as ,,actualization ,,is ,,the ,,being ,,of ,,the ,,luminous ,,body1 ,,and ,,is ,,incorporeal4 ,thus the light that emanates from bodies is the actualization of the luminous body which is active exteriorly4 ,the light in the bodies whose original nature is such1 is the formal being of the originally luminous body4 ,when such a body has been mingled with matter1 it produces color4 ,the actualization alone does not suffice to give color2 it produces only the hue1 because the actualization is the property of a subject1 and depends on it1 so that nothing can be withdrawn from the subject without simultaneously being withdrawn from its actualization4 ,light is entirely incorporeal1 though it be the actualization of a body4 ,it could not therefore properly be said of light that it withdraws or is present4 ,the true state of affairs is entirely different2 for the light1 so far as it is the actualization of the luminous body1 is its very being4 ,the image produced in a mirror is therefore an actualization of the visible object1 which acts on anything that is passive 7that can suffer1 or experience71 without letting any of its substance escape by any wastage4 ,if the object be present1 the image appears in the mirror2 it is as it were the image of the color that possesses some particular figure4 ,when the object withdraws1 the diaphanous body no longer possesses what it possessed while the visible object was acting on the mirror4 ,a similar condition is that of the soul2 her actualization dwells within the 7world's7 body so long as this soul herself dwells within it4 ,,life ,,and ,,light ,,do ,,not ,,perish1 ,,but ,,are ,,no ,,more ,,there4 7,curiosity might lead some one to ask about7 a force that were not the actualization of the ,soul1 but which only proceeded from this actualization1 such as the life which we say is proper to the body4 ,is the case of such a force similar to that of the light characteristic of bodies8 ,we said that the light inheres in colored bodies1 so far as that which produces the colors inheres in the bodies4 ,as to the life proper to the bodies1 we think that the body possesses it so far as the soul is present2 for nothing can be inanimate4 ,when the body perishes1 and when it is no longer assisted by the soul which communicated life to it1 nor by the actualization of this soul1 how should life remain in the body8 ,what6 ,has this life perished8 ,no3 this life itself has not perished1 for it is only the image of an irradiation2 it would not be correct to say more than that it is no more there4#agf ,a ,,world ,,outside ,,of ,,our ,,world ,,would ,,not ,,be ,,visible4 #h4 ,if there were a body outside of our world1 and if an eye observed it from here without any obstacle1 it is doubtful that the eye could see that body1 because the eye would have no affection common to it2 for community of affection is caused by the coherence of the single organism 7that is1 the unity of the world74 ,since this community of affection 7or1 sympathy71 supposes that sense-objects and that the senses belong to the single organism1 a body located outside of the world would not be felt1 unless it were part of the world4 ,in this case1 it would be felt4 ,if it were not a part of the world1 but yet by its color and other qualities it was conformed to the organ that was to cognize it1 would it be felt8 ,no1 it would not be felt1 that is1 if such a hypothesis 7of a body located outside of the world7 were at all admissible4 ,if however1 anyone should refuse to admit such a hypothesis1 he would pretend that it is absurd that the eye should not see the color located in front of it1 and that the other senses do not perceive the qualities before them4 ,that is the reason of its absurdity4 ,for we are active or passive only because we are integral parts of the single organism1 and are located within it4 ,is anything still left to be considered8 ,if what we have said suffices1 our demonstration is finished2 otherwise we shall have to give still further proofs to support our proposition4 ,,sensation ,,is ,,limited ,,to ,,common ,,integral ,,parts ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,every organism is coherent 7that is1 is sympathetic with itself74 ,in the case of a single organism1 our demonstration suffices1 and all things will experience common affections so far as they constitute parts of the single organism4 ,the plea that a body exterior to the world could be felt because of its resemblance 7is ill-founded because perception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the organism that possesses perception4 ,for its organ resembles 7the perceived object72 thus sensation would be the perception presented to the soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects4 ,if then the organism feel not only its contents1 but also objects resembling them1 it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature2 and these things will be perceived not because they are contents thereof1 but by virtue of their resemblance thereto4 ,it seems rather that perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their resemblance1 because the soul has familiarized herself with them1 and has assimilated them to herself4 ,if then the soul which has assimilated these objects to herself differ from them1 the things which were supposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign to her4 ,the absurdity of this consequence shows us that there is a flaw in the hypothesis2 for it affirms simultaneously that the soul exists1 and does not exist1 that the things are both conformable and different1 similar and dissimilar4 ,since then this hypothesis implies contradictories1 it is not admissible2 for it supposes that the soul exists in this world1 as a result of the world1 both being and not being universal1 both being and not being different1 both being and not being perfect4 ,the above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned2 and since it implies a contradiction1 no reasonable consequence could be deduced therefrom4 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,eight4 ,of ,nature1 ,contemplation and ,unity4#agg 7,these three subjects are discussed in paragraphs #a-d1 #e-g1 and #h-af4 ,the plain paragraph numbers are those of the ,teubner edition2 those in parenthesis are the ,creuzer 7,didot7 edition47 ,a4 ,,of ,,nature4 ,,introduction3 ,,as ,a ,,joke1 ,,it ,,may ,,be ,,said ,,that ,,even ,,plants ,,aspire ,,to ,,contemplation4 #a4 ,if as a preliminary pleasantry1 we said that all beings1 not only reasonable ones1 but even the irrational1 plants as well as the earth that begets them1 aspire to contemplation1 and are directed towards that end2 that1 as a result of the difference existing between them1 some really achieve contemplation1 while others only accomplish a reflection or image of it1 we would no doubt be told that this was an absurd paradox4 ,but as we are here engaged in a private study1 we may1 as an indulgence1 support this paradox4 ,while thus trifling1 are we ourselves not actually engaging in contemplation8 ,besides1 it would be not only we1 but any who thus trifle1 who aspire to contemplation4 ,we might even say that a joking child1 as well as a meditating man both aim at reaching contemplation when the former jokes1 and the later meditates4 ,indeed1 there is not a single action that does not tend towards contemplation2 more or less externalizing it according as it is carried out strictly or freely4 ,in any case its ultimate aim is always contemplation2 but of this later4#agh ,,enumeration ,,of ,,the ,,lower ,,forms ,,of ,,contemplation4 7#a74 ,let us begin by explaining what could be the nature of contemplation 7thought7 that we attribute to the earth1 to the trees1 and to the plants 7as we promised71 and how the things produced and begotten by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of contemplation2 how nature1 that is usually considered to lack reason and imagination1 nevertheless is quite capable of some kind of contemplation1 thereby producing all its works1 although speaking strictly1 it is incapable thereof4 ,,nature ,,acts ,,on ,,matter ,,not ,,mechanically ,,but ,,by ,,its ,,potency4 #b4 ,evidently nature possesses neither hands1 nor feet1 nor any natural or artificial instrument4 ,for production its only need is a matter on which to work1 and which it forms4 ,the works of nature exclude all ideas of mechanical operation2 not by any impelling force1 nor by using levers nor machines does it produce varied colors1 nor draw the outlines of objects4 ,even the workmen who form wax figures1 to whose work the operations of nature are often compared1 cannot endue objects with colors without borrowing them from elsewhere4 ,besides1 we must observe that these workmen contain a power which remains immutable1 and by the sole means of which they produce their works with their hands4 ,likewise1 nature contains a power which remains immovable as a whole2 it has no need of some parts that would remain immovable1 and others that move4 ,it is matter alone that undergoes movement1 for the forming power is in no way moved4 ,were the forming power moved1 it would no longer be the first motor#agi2 the first motor would no longer be nature1 but whatever might1 in its totality1 be immovable4 ,,nature ,,is ,,immovable ,,as ,a ,,form1 ,,but ,,not ,,as ,,compound ,,of ,,matter ,,and ,,form4 ,it may be objected that the 7seminal7 reason may remain immutable1 but that nature is distinct from reason1 and is mutable4 ,considering the totality of nature1 we include reason4 ,considering only one of its parts as immutable1 this part still will be reason4 ,nature must be a form1 and not a composite of matter and form4 ,what need would it have of a matter that might be either cold or hot1 since matter1 when subjected to form1 either possesses these qualities1 or receives them1 or rather undergoes the action of reason before having any qualities4 ,indeed1 it is not by fire that matter becomes fire1 but by reason4 ,consequently1 in animals and plants1 it is the reasons that produce#ahj2 and nature is a reason that produces other reasons1 imparting some of herself to the substance subjected to her influence1 while remaining within herself4 ,the reason that consists in a visible shape occupies the last rank2 it is dead1 and produces nothing4 ,the living reason 7which administers the body of the living being71 being sister to the reason that produced the visible form 7in begetting the body of the living being71 and possessing the same power as this reason1 alone produces within the begotten being4#aha ,,both ,,nature ,,and ,,reason ,,are ,,contemplation2 ,,while ,,universal ,,reason ,,is ,,both ,,soul ,,and ,,nature4 #c4 7#b74 ,how does nature produce8 ,and how1 in producing1 does she arrive at contemplation8 ,since she produces while remaining immovable within herself1 and as she is a reason1 she is a contemplation also4 ,indeed1 every action is produced according to a reason1 and consequently differs from it4 ,reason assists and presides over action1 and consequently is not an action4 ,since reason is not an action1 it is a contemplation4 ,in universal ,reason1 the reason which holds the last rank itself proceeds from contemplation1 and in this sense still deserves the name of contemplation because it is produced by the contemplation 7of the soul74 ,however universal ,reason1 which is superior to the latter reason1 may be considered under two points of view1 as soul and as nature4 7,let us begin by nature47 ,,the ,,reason ,,of ,,nature ,,is ,,the ,,result ,,of ,,an ,,immovable ,,contemplation4 ,does reason1 considered as nature1 also derive from contemplation8 ,yes1 but on condition that it has contemplated itself somewhat2 for it is produced by a contemplation and a principle which was contemplated4 ,how does it contemplate itself8 ,it does not possess this mode of contemplation which proceeds from 7discursive7 reason2 that is to say1 which consists in discursively considering what one has in himself4 ,being a living reason and a productive power1 how could it fail discursively to consider what it contains8 ,because one considers discursively only what he does not yet possess4 ,now as nature possesses1 she produces by the mere fact that she possesses4 ,to be what she is and to produce what she produces are identical4 ,because she is reason1 she simultaneously is contemplation and contemplated object4 ,as she is all three3 contemplation1 contemplated object1 and reason1 nature produces by the mere fact that it is in her essence to be these things4 ,as we have shown1 evidently action is a sort of contemplation2 for it is the result of the contemplation that remains immutable1 which does nothing but contemplate1 and which produces by its mere contemplation4 ,,nature',s ,,confession ,,that ,,her ,,mother ,,is ,,universal ,,reason1 ,,and ,,her ,,father ,,the ,,formal ,,reasons4 #d4 7#c74 ,if anybody were to ask nature why she produces1 ,nature1 if at all willing to listen and answer would say1 ,you should not have questioned me2 you should have tried to understand1 keeping silence1 as ,i do2 for ,i am not in the habit of speaking4 ,what were you to understand8 ,here it is4 ,first1 what is produced is the work of my silent speculation1 a contemplation effected by my nature2 for1 myself being born of contemplation1 mine is a contemplative nature4 ,besides1 that which in me contemplates1 produces a work of contemplation1 like geometricians who1 while contemplating1 describe figures4 ,for it is not in describing figures1 but in contemplating1 that ,i let drop from within me the lines which outline the forms of the bodies4 ,i preserve within me the disposition of my mother 7the universal ,soul71 and that of the principles that beget me 7the formal 'reasons'74 ,the latter1 indeed1 are born of contemplation3 ,i was begotten in the same way4 ,these principles gave birth to me without any action1 or the mere fact that they are more powerful reasons1 and that they contemplate themselves4 ,,description ,,of ,,nature ,,as ,a ,,weaker ,,contemplation4 ,these words signify that nature is a soul begotten by a superior ,soul that possesses a more potent life1 and contains her contemplation silently within herself1 without inclining towards that which is higher or lower4 ,abiding within her own essence 7being7 that is1 within her own rest and self-consciousness1 having discovered1 so far as it was possible for her1 what was below her1 without going out of her way to seek it1 nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object4 ,if it is desired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature1 these will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man who is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep4#ahb ,for nature peaceably contemplates her object1 which was born in her as effect of nature's abiding within and with herself1 of herself being an object of contemplation1 and herself being a silent1 if weak contemplation4 ,there is1 indeed1 another power that contemplates more strongly2 the nature which is the image of another contemplation4 ,consequently1 what she has produced is very weak1 because a weakened contemplation can beget a weak object only4 ,,it ,,is ,,men ,,who ,,are ,,too ,,weak ,,for ,,contemplation ,,that ,,seek ,a ,,refuge ,,in ,,action4 ,likewise it is men too weak for speculation who1 in action1 seek a shadow of speculation and reason4 ,not being capable of rising to speculation1 and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp that which in itself is intelligible1 and to fill themselves therewith1 though however desiring to contemplate it1 these men seek1 by action1 to achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone4 ,thus we find that action is a weakness or result of contemplation1 when we act1 or desire to see1 or to contemplate1 or to grasp the intelligible1 or try to get others to grasp it1 or propose to act to the extent of our ability4 ,it is a weakness1 for1 after having acted1 we possess nothing of what we have done2 and a consequence1 because we contemplate something better than we ourselves have made4 ,what man indeed who could contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image8 ,this is the explanation of the taste for manual arts1 and for physical activity#ahc 7as thought ,aristotle74 ,b4 ,,contemplation4 ,,the ,,procession ,,of ,,the ,,world-,,soul4 #e4 7#d74 ,after having spoken of nature1 and having explained how generation is a sort of contemplation1 let us pass to the ,soul that occupies a rank superior to nature4 ,this is what we have to say about her4 ,by her contemplative action1 by her ardent desire to learn and to discover1 by the fruitfulness of her knowledge1 and her resulting need to produce1 the ,soul1 her totality having become an object of contemplation1 gave birth to some other object2 just as science1 on fructifying1 by instruction begets a lesser science in the soul of the young disciple who possesses the images of all things1 but only in the state of obscure theories1 of feeble speculations1 which are incapable of self-sufficiency4 ,the higher and rational part of the ,soul ever dwells in the higher region of the intelligible world1 and is1 by this intelligible world1 ever illuminated and fructified#ahd2 while the lower 7natural and generative power7 participates in what the superior part has received1 by immediately participating in the intelligible2 for life ever proceeds from life1 and its actualization extends to everything1 and is present everywhere4 ,in her procession1 the universal ,soul allows her superior part to remain in the intelligible world2 for1 if she detached herself from this superior part1 she would no longer be present everywhere2 she would subsist only in her lower extremities4 ,besides1 the part of the ,soul that thus proceeds out of the intelligible world is inferior to what remains within it4 ,therefore1 if the ,soul must be present and must assert her sphere of activity everywhere1 and if that which occupies the superior rank differs from that which occupies the inferior2 if1 besides1 her activity proceeds either from contemplation or action---though indeed originally from contemplation--because contemplation precedes the action which could not exist without contemplation2 in this state of affairs1 though one actualization would be weaker than another1 yet it would ever remain a contemplation1 so that the action derived from contemplation seems to be no more than a weakened contemplation2 for that which is begotten must always remain consubstantial with its generating principle1 though weaker1 since of lower rank4 ,all things therefore silently proceed from the ,soul1 because they stand in no need of either contemplation or exterior visible action4 ,thus the ,soul contemplates1 and the contemplating part of the ,soul1 being somehow located outside of the superior part1 and being different therefrom1 produces what is below it2 thus it is that contemplation begets contemplation4#ahe ,no more than its object is contemplation limited below2 that is why it extends to everything4 ,where is it not8 ,every soul contains the same object of contemplation4 ,this object1 without being circumscribed as a magnitude1 does not equally inhere in all beings2 consequently1 it is not present in the same way to all parts of the ,soul4 ,that is why ,plato#ahf says that the charioteer of the soul communicates to his horses what he has seen4 ,the latter receive something from him only because they desire to possess what he has seen2 for they have not received the entire intelligible 7world74 ,though they act because of a desire1 they act only in view of what they desire2 that is1 in view of contemplation1 and of its object4 ,,practice ,,is ,,only ,a ,,preparation ,,for ,,contemplation4 #f4 7#e74 ,the purpose of action is to contemplate1 and to possess the contemplated object4 ,the object or activity1 therefore1 is contemplation4 ,it seeks to achieve indirectly what it is unable to accomplish directly4 ,it is not otherwise when one has achieved the object of one's desires4 ,one's real desire is not to possess the desired object without knowing it1 but to know it more thoroughly1 to present it to the sight of the soul1 and to be able to contemplate it therein4 ,indeed1 activity always has in view some good2 one desires to posses it interiorly1 to appropriate it1 and to possess the result of one's action4 ,now as ,good can be possessed only by the soul1 activity once more brings us back to contemplation4 ,since the soul is a reason1 what she is capable of possessing could be no more than a silent reason1 being so much the more silent as it is more a reason1 for perfect reason seeks nothing farther2 it rests in the manifestation of that with which it is filled2 the completer the manifestation1 the calmer is the contemplation1 and the more does it unite the soul4 ,speaking seriously1 there is identity between knowing subject and known object in the actualization of knowledge4 ,if they were not identical1 they would be different1 being alien to each other1 without any real bond1 just as reasons 7are foreign to the soul7 when they slumber within her1 without being perceived4 ,the reason#ahg must therefore not remain alien to the learning soul1 but become united thereto1 and become characteristic of her4 ,therefore when the soul has appropriated a reason1 and has familiarized herself therewith1 the soul as it were draws it out of her 7breast7 to examine it4 ,thus she observes the thing that she 7unconsciously7 possessed1 and by examining it1 distinguishes herself therefrom1 and by the conception she forms of it1 considers it as something foreign to her2 for though the soul herself be a reason and a kind of intelligence1 nevertheless when she considers something1 she considers it as something distinct from herself1 because she does not possess the true fulness1 and is defective in respect to her principle 7which is intelligence74 ,besides1 it is with calmness that she observes what she has drawn from within herself2 for she does not draw from within herself anything of which she did not formerly have even a notion4 ,but she only drew from within herself that of which her view was incomplete1 and which she wished to know better4 ,in her actualizations 7such as sensation71 she adapts the reasons she possesses to exterior objects4#ahh ,on one hand1 as she possesses 7the intelligible entities7 better than does nature1 she is also calmer and more contemplative2 on the other hand1 as she does not possess 7the intelligible entities7 perfectly1 more 7than intelligence7 she desires to have direct experimental knowledge and contemplation of the object she contemplates4 ,after having 7temporarily7 withdrawn from her own higher part1 and having 7by discursive reason7 run through the series of differences1 she returns to herself1 and again gives herself up to contemplation by her higher part 7intelligence7 from which she had withdrawn 7to observe the differences72 for the higher part does not deal with differences1 as it abides within herself4 ,consequently the wise mind is identical with reason1 and in itself possesses what it manifests to others4 ,it contemplates itself2 it arrives at unity not only in respect to exterior objects1 but also in respect to itself2 it rests in this unity1 and finds all things within itself4 ,,this ,,contemplation ,,is ,,the ,,goal ,,of ,,all ,,kinds ,,and ,,grades ,,of ,,existence4 #g4 7#f74 ,thus everything 7ultimately7 derives from contemplation2 everything 7really7 is contemplation1 including the true beings1 and the beings by the former secondarily begotten by giving themselves up to contemplation1 and which themselves are objects of contemplation either for sensation1 or for knowledge or opinion4 ,actions1 and also desire1 result in knowledge4 ,generation originates in speculation1 and ends in the production of a form1 that is3 in an object of contemplation4 ,in general1 all beings that are images of generating principles produce forms and objects of contemplation4 ,begotten substances1 being imitations of beings1 show that the purpose of generating principles is neither generation nor action1 but the production of works which themselves are to be contemplated4 ,contemplation is aimed at by both discursive thought1 and beneath it1 by sensation1 the end of both of which is knowledge4 ,further1 beneath discursive thought and sensation is the nature which1 bearing within herself an object of contemplation1 that is1 a 7seminal7 reason1 produces another reason4#ahi ,such are the truths that are self-evident1 or that can be demonstrated by reasoning4 ,besides it is clear that1 since the intelligible objects devote themselves to contemplation1 all other beings must aspire thereto2 for the origin of beings is also their end4 ,,even ,,lower ,,forms ,,of ,,begetting ,,are ,,due ,,to ,,seminal ,,reasons4 ,the begetting of animals is entirely due to the activity within them of seminal reasons4 ,generation is an actualization of contemplation2 it results from the need of producing multiple forms1 from objects of contemplation1 of filling everything with reasons1 of ceaseless contemplation2 begetting is no more than producing a form1 and to spread contemplation everywhere4#aij ,all the faults met with in begotten or manufactured things are no more than faults of contemplation4 ,the poor workman resembles the producer of bad form4 ,besides1 lovers must be counted among those who study forms1 and who consequently give themselves up to contemplation4 ,but enough of this4 ,c4 ,,of ,,unity4 ,,the ,,different ,,grades ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,life4 #h4 7#g74 ,since contemplation rises by degrees1 from nature to the ,soul1 from the ,soul to ,intelligence2 and as within it thought becomes more and more 7intimate or7 interior1 more and more united to the thinker2 and as in the perfect ,soul the things known are identical with the knower2 and because they aspire to ,intelligence1 the subject must then evidently within ,intelligence be identical with the object2 not through any appropriation thereof1 as the perfect ,soul does indeed appropriate it1 but because their essence 7being7 is identical1 because of the identity between thinking and being 7essence74 ,within intelligence no longer do we have on one side the object1 and on the other the subject2 otherwise we would need another principle where this difference would no longer exist4 ,within it1 then1 these two things1 the subject and the object1 form but a single 7entity74 ,that is a living contemplation1 and no longer an object of contemplation which seems to inhere in something else2 for existence within a living being is not identical with living by oneself4 ,therefore if it is to be alive1 the object of contemplation and of thought must be life itself1 and not the life of plants1 that of sensation1 or psychic life4 ,those are different thoughts1 the one being the thought of plants1 the thought of sensation1 and psychic thought4 ,they are thoughts because they are reasons4 ,,all ,,beings ,,are ,,contemplations4 ,every life is a thought which1 like life itself1 may be more or less true4 ,the truest thought is also the first life2 and the first life is identical with the first ,intelligence4 ,consequently1 the first degree of life is also the first degree of thought2 the second degree of life is also the second degree of thought2 and the third degree of life is also the third degree of thought4 ,therefore every life of this kind is a thought4 ,nevertheless it is humanly possible to define the differences of the various degrees of life without being able to set forth clearly those of thought2 men will limit themselves to saying that some 7of these degrees of thought7 imply intelligence1 while others exclude it1 because they do not seek to penetrate the essence of life4 ,we may observe that the remainder of the discussion brings us back to this proposition1 that all beings are contemplations4#aia ,if the truest life be the life of thought1 if the truest life and the life of thought be identical1 then the truest thought must be alive4 ,this contemplation is life1 the object of this contemplation is a living being and life1 and both form but one4 ,,like ,a ,,circle1 ,,intelligence ,,is ,,inseparably ,,single ,,and ,,manifold4 ,since both are identical1 the unity that they form became manifold because it does not contemplate unity1 or it does not contemplate unity so far as it is one2 otherwise it would not be intelligence4 ,after having begun by being one1 it ceased being one2 unconsciously it became manifold as a result of the fruitful germs it contained4 ,it developed to become all things1 though it would have been better for it not to have desired this4 ,indeed1 it thus became the second principle1 as a circle which1 by developing1 becomes a figure and a a surface1 whose circumference1 centre1 and rays are distinct1 occupying different points4 ,the origin of things is better than their goal4 ,the origin is not equivalent to the origin and goal1 and that which is both origin and goal is not identical with that which is no more than origin4 ,in other words1 intelligence itself is not the intelligence of a single thing1 but universal intelligence2 being universal1 it is the intelligence of all things4#aib ,if then intelligence be universal ,intelligence1 and the intelligence of all things1 then each of its parts must also be universal1 also possess all things4 ,otherwise1 intelligence would contain a part that was not intelligence2 intelligence would be composed of non-intelligences2 and it would resemble a conglomeration of things which would form an intelligence only by their union4 ,thus intelligence is infinite4 ,when something proceeds from it1 there is no weakening2 neither for the things that proceed from it1 for this is also all things1 nor for the intelligence from which the thing proceeds1 because it is not a summation of parts4#aic ,,to ,,the ,,intelligence ,,that ,,simultaneously ,,is ,,the ,,intelligible ,,there ,,must ,,be ,a ,,supreme4 #i4 7#h74 ,such is the nature of ,intelligence4 ,therefore it does not occupy the first rank4 ,above it must be a ,principle1 whose discovery is the object of this discussion4 ,indeed1 the manifold must be posterior to unity4 ,now intelligence is a number2 and the principle of number is unity1 and the principle of the number that constitutes unity is absolute ,unity4 ,intelligence is simultaneously intelligence and the intelligible2 it is therefore two things at once4 ,if then it be composed of two things1 we must seek what is prior to this duality4 ,could this principle be ,intelligence alone8 ,but ,intelligence is always bound to the intelligible4 ,if the ,principle we seek cannot be bound to the intelligible1 neither will it be ,intelligence4 ,if then it be not ,intelligence1 and transcend duality1 it must be superior thereto1 and thus be above ,intelligence4 ,could it be the ,intelligence alone8 ,but we have already seen that the intelligible is inseparable from ,intelligence4 ,if this ,principle be neither ,intelligence1 nor the intelligible1 what can it be8 ,it must be the ,principle from which are derived both ,intelligence and its implied intelligible4 ,,the ,,begetter ,,of ,,intelligence ,,must ,,be ,,simpler ,,than ,,it1 ,,and ,,is ,,reached ,,not ,,by ,,intelligent ,,reasoning ,,but ,a ,,simple ,,intuition4 ,but what is this ,principle1 and how are we to conceive it8 ,it must be either intelligent or not intelligent4 ,if it be intelligent1 it will also be ,intelligence4 ,if it be not intelligent1 it will be unconscious of itself1 and will not be in any way venerable4 ,though true1 it would not be clear or perspicuous to say that it is the ,good itself1 since we do not yet have an object on which we could fasten our thought when we speak of it4 ,besides1 since the knowledge of the other objects in all beings who can know something intelligent1 occurs through ,intelligence and lies in ,intelligence1 by what rapid intellection 7or intuition7 could we grasp this ,principle that is superior to ,intelligence8 ,we may answer1 by that part of us which resembles it2 for there is in us something of it2 or rather1 it is in all things that participate in ,him4 ,everywhere you approach the ,good1 that which in you can participate receives something of it4 ,take the illustration of a voice in a desert1 and the human ears that may be located there4 ,wherever you listen to this voice1 you will grasp it entirely in one sense1 and not entirely in another sense4 ,how then would we grasp something by approximating our intelligence 7to the ,good78 ,to see up there the ,principle it seeks1 ,intelligence must1 so to speak1 return backwards1 and1 forming a duality1 it must somehow exceed itself2 that means1 it would have to cease being the ,intelligence of all intelligible things4 ,indeed1 intelligence is primary life1 and penetration of all things1 not 7as the soul does7 by a still actualizing movement1#aid but by a movement which is ever already accomplished and past4#aie ,therefore1 if ,intelligence be life1 which is the penetration of all things1 if it possess all things distinctly1 without confusion--for otherwise it would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete manner--it must necessarily proceed from a superior ,principle which1 instead of being in motion1 is the principle of motion 7by which ,intelligence runs through all things71 of life1 of intelligence1 and of all things4 ,the ,principle of all things could not be all things1 it is only their origin4 ,itself is neither all things1 nor any particular thing1 because it begets everything2 neither is it a multitude1 for it is the principle of multitude4 ,indeed that which begets is always simpler than that which is begotten4 ,therefore if this principle beget ,intelligence1 it necessarily is simpler than ,intelligence4 ,on the theory that it is both one and all1 we have an alternative1 that it is all things because it is all things at once1 or that it is everything individually4 ,on the one hand1 if it be all things at once1 it will be posterior to all things2 if on the contrary it be prior to all things1 it will be different from all things4 ,for if the ,one co-existed with all things1 the ,one would not be a principle2 but the ,one must be a principle1 and must exist anteriorly to all things1 if all things are to originate from it4 ,on the other hand1 if we say that the ,one is each particular thing1 it will thereby be identical with every particular thing2 later it will be all things at once1 without being able to discern anything4 ,thus the ,one is none of these particular things1 being prior to all things4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,the ,,potentiality ,,of ,,all ,,things1 ,,above ,,all ,,actualization4 #aj4 7#i74 ,this ,principle then is the potentiality of all4#aif ,without it1 nothing would exist1 not even ,intelligence1 which is the primary and universal life4 ,indeed what is above life is the cause of life4 ,the actualization of life1 being all things1 is not the first ,principle2 it flows from this ,principle as 7water7 from a spring4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,as ,a ,,spring ,,of ,,water4 ,the first ,principle may indeed be conceived of as a spring 7of water7 which is its own origin1 and which pours its water into many streams without itself becoming exhausted by what it yields1 or even without running low1 because the streams that it forms1 before flowing away each in its own direction1 and while knowing which direction it is to follow1 yet mingles its waters with the spring4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,as ,,the ,,tree ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,again1 7the ,supreme may be compared to7 the life that circulates in a great tree1 without its principle issuing from the root1 where is its seat1 but which later divides among the branches4 ,though spreading everywhere a manifold life1 the ,principle still dwells in itself exempt from all manifoldness1 though being only its origin4#aig ,,if ,,unity ,,passed ,,into ,,the ,,manifold1 ,,the ,,universe ,,would ,,be ,,destroyed4 ,this contains nothing surprising4 ,why should we be surprised at manifoldness issuing from ,him who is not manifold1 or at the impossibility of the existence of the manifold without the prior existence of ,that which is not manifold8 ,the ,principle is not distributed in the universe2 far rather1 if it were disturbed1 the universe would be annihilated2 for it cannot exist except in so far as its ,principle abides within itself1 without becoming confused with the rest4 ,,this ,,is ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,return ,,to ,,unity4 ,consequently1 there is everywhere a return to unity--for there is for everything a unity to which it may be reduced4 ,consequently1 the universe must be derived from the unity that is superior to it2 and as this unity is not absolutely simple1 it must itself be derived from a still superior unity1 and so on until we arrive at the absolutely simple ,unity1 which cannot be reduced to any other4 ,therefore1 considering what is in a tree--that is1 its permanent principle--or what is unitary in an animal1 in a soul1 or in the universe1 you will everywhere have that which is most powerful and precious4 ,if1 at last1 you consider that unity of the things that really exist1 that is1 their principle1 their source1 their 7productive7 power1 can you doubt its reality1 and believe that this principle amounts to nothing8 ,certainly this principle is none of the things of which it is the principle2 it is such that nothing could be predicated of it1 neither essence1 nor being1 nor life1 because it is superior to all of it4 ,if you grasp it1 by abstracting from it even being1 you will be in ecstasy4 ,by directing your glance towards it1 by reaching it1 and resting in it1 you will get a unitary and simple intuition thereof2 you will conceive of its greatness by both itself and its derivatives4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,not ,,intelligence1 ,,which ,,aspires ,,to ,,the ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,good4 #aa4 7#aj74 ,a further consideration4 ,since intelligence is a sort of intuition1 namely1 a seeing 7or actualizing7 intuition 7or vision71 it really consists of a potentiality that has passed into actualization4 ,it will therefore contain two elements1 which will play the parts of 7intelligible7 matter1#aih and of form1 just like actualized vision1#aii for actualized vision also implies duality4 ,therefore intuition1 before being actualized1 was unity4 ,thus unity has become duality1 and duality has become unity4 7,sense-7 vision receives from sense-objects its fulness1 and its perfection1 so to speak4 ,as to intellectual vision1 however1 its fulness comes from a principle that is the ,good4 ,now if intelligence were the ,good itself1 what would be the use of its intuition or its actualization8 ,other beings1 indeed1 aspire to the ,good1 as the goal of their activity2 but the ,good itself has need of nothing2 and therefore possesses nothing but itself4#bjj ,after having named it1 nothing should be added thereto by thought2 for1 to add something1 is to suppose that ,he needs this attribute4 ,not even intelligence should be attributed to ,him2 that would be introducing therein something alien1 distinguishing in ,him two things1 ,intelligence and the ,good4 ,intelligence needs the ,good1 but the ,good has no need of ,intelligence4 ,on achieving the ,good1 ,intelligence takes its form1 for it derives its form from the ,good2 and it becomes perfect1 because it assumes the nature 7of the ,good74 ,the model 7or1 archetype7 must be judged by the trace it leaves in ,intelligence1 conceiving of its true character according to the impression it leaves4 ,only by this impression does ,intelligence behold and achieve the ,good4 ,that is why ,intelligence aspires to the ,good2 and as ,intelligence ever aspires to the ,good1 ,intelligence ever achieves it4 ,the ,good itself1 however1 never aspires to anything2 for what could ,he desire8 ,nor does ,he achieve anything1 since ,he desires nothing4#bja ,therefore 7the ,supreme7 is not ,intelligence1 which ever desires1 and aspires to the form of ,good4 ,,the ,,good ,,as ,,supreme ,,neither ,,needs ,,nor ,,possesses ,,intellection4 ,no doubt ,intelligence is beautiful2 it is the most beautiful of things1 since it is illuminated by a pure light1 since it shines with a pure splendor1 and contains the intelligible beings of which our world1 in spite of its beauty1 is but an adumbration and image4 ,the intelligible world is located in a region resplendent with clearness1 where is nothing either obscure or indefinite1 where1 within itself1 it enjoys a blissful life4 ,it entrances the human gaze1 especially when one knows how to commune with it4 ,but just as a view of heaven1 and the splendor of the stars leads one to seek and conceive their author1 likewise the contemplation of the intelligible world1 and the fascination it exerts leads 7the beholder7 to seek its author4 ,the question then arises1 ,who is ,he who has given existence to the intelligible world8 ,where and how did ,he beget this so pure ,intellect1 this so beautiful son who derives all of his fulness from his father#bjb8 ,this supreme ,principle itself is neither ,intelligence nor son1 but is superior to ,intelligence1 which is ,his son4 ,intelligence1 ,his son1 succeeds ,him1 because the son needs to receive from the father both intellection and fulness1 which is his food2 so 7the son7 holds the first rank after ,him who has need of nothing1 not even intellection4 ,nevertheless ,intelligence possesses fulness and true intellection1 because it immediately participates in the ,good4 ,thus the ,good1 being above real fulness and intellection1 neither possesses them1 nor needs them2 otherwise1 ,he would not be the ,good4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,eight4 ,concerning ,intelligible ,beauty4 ,,art ,,makes ,a ,,statue ,,out ,,of ,,rough ,,marble4 #a4 ,since he who rises to the contemplation of the intelligible world1 and who conceives the beauty of true intelligence1 can also1 as we have pointed out1 by intuition grasp the superior ,principle1#bjc the ,father of ,intelligence1 let us1 so far as our strength allows us1 try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is possible to contemplate the beauty of ,intelligence and of the intelligible world4 ,let us imagine two pieces of marble placed side by side1 the one rough and inartistic1 the other one fashioned by the sculptor's chisel1 who made of it the statue of a goddess1 a grace1 or a muse2 or that of a man--but not that of any individual whatever1 but that of a 7cultured gentle7 man in whom art would have gathered all the traits of beauty offered by different individuals4 ,after having thus from art received the beauty of the form1 the second marble will appear beautiful1 not by virtue of its essence1 which is to be stone--for otherwise the other block would be as beautiful as this one--but because of the form received through art4 ,the latter1 however1 did not exist in the matter of the statue4 ,it was in the thought of the artist that it existed before passing into the marble2 and it existed therein1 not because it had eyes and hands1 but because it participated in art4 ,it was therefore in art that this superior beauty existed4 ,it could not have become incorporated in stone4 ,dwelling within itself1 it begat an inferior form1 which1 passing into matter1 could neither preserve all its purity1 nor completely respond to the will of the artist1 possessing no perfection other than that allowed by matter4 ,as the nature of art is to produce beauty1 if art succeed in producing beauty which conforms to its constitutive essence1 then1 by the possession of the beauty essential to it1 art possesses a beauty still greater and truer than that which passes into exterior objects4 ,as all form extends by passing into matter1 7this objectified form7 is weaker than that which remains one4 ,all that extends abandons its own 7nature71 as do force1 heat1 and in general any property2 likewise with beauty4 ,every creating principle is always superior to the created thing4 ,it is not the lack of musical ability1 but the music itself that creates the musician2 while it is the intelligible music that creates the sense music4 ,it has been attempted to degrade the arts by saying that to create they imitate nature4 ,this may be answered by pointing out that the natures of beings are themselves the images of other beings 7or essences72 besides1 the arts do not limit themselves to the imitation of objects which offer themselves to our view1 but that they go as far back as the 7ideal7 reasons from which are derived the nature of objects4 ,further the arts independently create many things1 and to the perfection of the object they add what is lacking1 because they possess beauty in themselves4 ,phidias seems to have represented ,jupiter without copying any sense-objects1 conceiving him such as he would appear to us if he ever revealed himself to our eyes4#bjd ,,beauty ,,inheres ,,not ,,in ,,the ,,organism',s ,,physical ,,characteristics1 ,,but ,,in ,,its ,,color ,,and ,,form4 #b4 ,now let us turn away from the arts and consider the objects they imitate1 such as natural beauties1 namely1 rational and irrational creatures1 especially the more perfect1 in which the creator was able to master matter1 and endue it with the desired form4 ,what then constitutes the beauty in these objects8 ,surely not 7the physical characteristics1 such as7 blood or menstrual discharges1 but the color and figure1 which differ essentially therefrom2 otherwise that which constitutes beauty is something indifferent--either something formless1 or something that contains a simple nature 7that is1 the seminal reason71 as does matter1 for instance4 ,,beauty ,,comes ,,from ,,the ,,form ,,imparted ,,by ,,the ,,originator4 ,whence came the beauty of that ,helena about whom so many battles were fought8 ,whence comes the beauty of so many women comparable to ,venus8 ,whence came the beauty of ,venus herself8 ,whence comes the beauty of a perfect man1 or that of one of those divinities who reveal themselves to our eyes1 or who1 without showing themselves1 nevertheless possess a visible beauty8 ,does it not everywhere originate from the creating principle that passes into the creature1 just as1 in the art considered above1 the beauty passes from the artist into the work8 ,it would be unreasonable to assert that the creatures and the 7seminal7 reason united to matter are beautiful1 while denying beauty to the reason which is not united to matter while still residing in the creator in a primary and incorporeal condition2 and to assert that in order to become beautiful this reason must become united to matter4 ,for if mass1 as such1 was beautiful1 then the creative reason would be beautiful only in so far as it was mass4 ,if form1 whether in a large or small object1 equally touches and moves the soul of the beholder1 evidently beauty does not depend on the size of the mass4 ,still another proof of this is that so long as the form of the object remains exterior to the soul1 and as we do not perceive it1 it leaves us insensible2 but as soon as it penetrates into the soul1 it moves us4 ,now form alone can penetrate into the soul by the eyes2 for great objects could not enter by so narrow a space4 ,in this respect1 the size of the object contrasts1 because that which is great is not mass1 but form4#bje ,,recognition ,,of ,,beauty ,,depends ,,on ,,preliminary ,,interior ,,beauty4 ,further1 the cause of beauty must be either ugly1 beautiful or indifferent4 ,if it were ugly1 it could not produce its opposite4 ,if it were indifferent1 it would have no more reason to produce that which is beautiful1 than that which is ugly4 ,therefore nature which produces so many beautiful objects must in herself possess a very superior beauty4 ,but as we do not have the habit of seeing the interior of things1 which remains unknown1 we attach ourselves only to their exterior1 forgetting that which moves us hides itself within them2 and 7in this habit of ours7 we resemble 7,narcissus#bjf71 who1 on seeing his image1 and not knowing whence it came1 would try to catch it4 ,it is not the mass of an object that constitutes its attractiveness for us1 for it is not in mass that beauty inheres4#bjg ,this is revealed by the beauty found in the sciences1 in the virtues1 and in general in the souls1 where it shines more truly and brilliantly on contemplation and admiration of its inherent wisdom4 ,then we do not regard the countenance1 which may be ugly2 we leave aside the form of the body1 to attach ourselves exclusively to interior beauty4 ,if1 carried away by the emotion that such a spectacle should cause1 you should not proclaim its beauty2 and if1 on directing your gaze within yourself1 you should not experience all the charm of beauty1#bjh then you search for intelligible beauty1 by such a method1 would be vain2 for you would seek it only with what is impure and ugly4#bji ,that is why these discussions are not intended for all men4 ,but if you have recognized beauty within yourself they you may rise to the reminiscence 7of intelligible beauty74 ,,beauty ,,is ,,the ,,creating ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,primary ,,reason4 #c4 ,the reason of the beauty in nature is the archetype of the beauty of the 7bodily7 organism4 ,nature herself1 however 7is the image of the7 more beautiful archetypal reason which resides in the 7universal7 ,soul1 from which it is derived4#baj ,this latter shines more brilliantly in the virtuous soul1 whenever it develops therein4 ,it adorns the soul1 and imparts to her a light itself derived from a still higher ,light1 that is1 primary ,beauty4 ,the universal ,soul's beauty thus inhering in the individual soul1 explains the reason of the ,beauty superior to it1 a reason which is not adventitious1 and which is not posited in any thing other than itself1 but which dwells within itself4 ,consequently it is not a reason1 but really the creating principle of the primary ,reason1 that is1 the beauty of the soul1 which in respect to the soul plays the part of matter4#baa ,it is1 in the last analysis1 ,intelligence1 which is eternal and immutable because it is not adventitious4 ,,our ,,image ,,of ,,intelligence ,,is ,,only ,a ,,sample ,,that ,,must ,,be ,,purified4 ,what sort of an image does ,intelligence then afford8 ,this is a material question because we know that any image of ,intelligence supplied by anything else would be imperfect4 ,therefore this image of itself given by ,intelligence also could not be a genuine image2 it can be no more than what is any stray piece of gold in respect to gold in general1 namely1 a sample4 ,but if the gold which falls under our perception be not pure1 we have to purify it either by our labor or by our thought1 observing that it can never be gold in general that we can examine1 but gold in particular1 considered in an individual mass4#bab ,likewise 7in the subject we are studying7 our starting-point must be our purified intelligence1 or1 if you prefer1 the divinities themselves1 considering the kind of intelligence indwelling in them2 for they are all venerable and unimaginably beautiful4 ,to what do they owe their perfection8 ,to ,intelligence1 which acts in them with sufficient force to manifest them4 ,they do not indeed owe it to the beauty of their body2 for their divinity does not consist in the possession of a body#bac2 the divinities therefore owe their character to their intelligence4 ,now all divinities are beautiful1 because they are not wise at certain times1 and at other times unwise4 ,they possess wisdom by an impassible intelligence1 that is immutable and pure4 ,they know everything2 not indeed human things1 but those which are proper to them1 the things which are divine1 and all those that intelligence contemplates4#bad ,,difference ,,between ,,the ,,celestial ,,and ,,inferior ,,divinities4 ,amidst the divinities1 those who reside in the visible heaven1 having much leisure1 ever contemplate the things existing in the superior ,heaven1 but as it were from a distance1 and by raising their head4#bae ,on the contrary1 those in the superior ,heaven1 and who dwell there1 dwell there with their whole personality1 because they reside everywhere4 ,everything on high1 namely1 earth1 sea1 plants1 or animals1 forms part of the heaven2 now all that forms part of the heaven is celestial4 ,the divinities that dwell there do not scorn men1 nor any of the other essences up there1 because all are divine1 and they traverse the whole celestial region without leaving their rest4#baf ,,description ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 #d4 ,that is why the divinities in heaven lead an easy life1 truth being mother1 nurse1 element and food4 ,so they see everything2 not the things which are subject to generation1 but those which have the permanence of being1 so that they see themselves in everything else4 ,in this intelligible world everything is transparent4 ,no shadow limits vision4 ,all the essences see each other and interpenetrate each other in the most intimate depth of their nature4 ,light everywhere meets light4 ,every being contains within itself the entire intelligible world1 and also beholds it entire in any particular being4 ,all things there are located everywhere4 ,every thing there is all1 and all is each thing2 infinite splendor radiates around4 ,everything is great1 for there even the small is great4 ,this world has its sun and its stars2 each star is a sun1 and all suns are stars4 ,each of them1 while shining with its own due splendor1 reflects the light of the others4 ,there abides pure movement2 for ,he who produces movement1 not being foreign to it1 does not disturb it in its production4 ,rest is perfect1 because it is not mingled with any principle of disturbance4 ,the beautiful is completely beautiful there1 because it does not dwell in that which is not beautiful 7that is1 in matter74 ,each one of the celestial things1 instead of resting on an alien foundation1 has its own especial seat1 its origin1 and its principle1 in its own being1 and does not differ from the region within which it dwells1 because it is ,intelligence that is its substrate1 and itself is intelligible4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,compared ,,to ,,lynceus ,,whose ,,sight ,,penetrated ,,all4 ,in order to conceive this better1 we should imagine that this visible sky is a pure light which begets all the stars4 ,here below1 doubtless1 no one part could be begotten by any other1 for each part has its own individual existence4 ,on the contrary1 in the intelligible world every part is born from the whole1 and is simultaneously the whole and a part2 wherever is a part1 the whole reveals itself4 ,the fabled ,lynceus1 whose glance penetrated the very bowels of the earth1 is only the symbol of the celestial life4 ,there the eye contemplates without fatigue1 and the desire of contemplating is insatiable1 because it does not imply a void that needs filling1 or a need whose satisfaction might bring on disgust4 ,in the intelligible world1 the beings do not1 among each other1 differ so as that what is proper to the one would not be proper to the other4 ,besides1 they are all indestructible4 ,their insatiability 7in contemplation7 is to be understood in the sense that satiety does not make them scorn what satiates them4 ,the more that each sees1 the better he sees2 each one follows its nature in seeing as infinite both itself and the objects that present themselves to its view4 ,on high1 life1 being pure1 is not laborious4 ,how indeed could the best life imply fatigue8 ,this life is wisdom which1 being perfectly complete1 demands no research4 ,it is primary wisdom1 which is not derived from any other1 which is being1 and which is not an adventitious quality of intelligence2 consequently there is none superior to it4 ,in the intelligible world absolute knowledge accompanies intelligence1 because the former accompanies the latter1 as ,justice is enthroned by the side of ,jupiter4#bag ,all the essences 7or1 beings7 in the intelligible ,being resemble so many statues which are visible by themselves1 and the vision of which imparts an unspeakable happiness to the spectators4 ,the greatness and power of wisdom is revealed in its containing all beings1 and in its having produced them4 ,it is their origin2 it is identical with them2 it fuses with them2 for wisdom is very being4 ,this we do not easily understand because by sciences#bah we mean groups of demonstrations and propositions1 which is not true even of our sciences4 ,however1 if this point be contested1 let us drop this comparison with our sciences1 and return to knowledge itself1 of which ,plato#bai says that it does not show itself different in different objects4 ,how can that be8 ,plato left that to be explained by us1 that we might show if we deserve to be called his interpreters4#bbj ,we shall undertake this interpretation by the following observation4 ,,demonstration ,,that ,,wisdom ,,is ,,veritable ,,being1 ,,and ,,the ,,converse4 #e4 ,all the productions of nature or art are the works of a certain wisdom which ever presides over their creation4 ,art is made possible only by the existence of this wisdom4 ,the talent of the artist is derived from the wisdom of nature which presides over the production of every work4 ,this wisdom is not a sequence of demonstrations1 as the whole of it forms a unity2 it is not a plurality reduced to unity1 but a unity which is resolved into a plurality4 ,if we admit that this wisdom is primary ,wisdom1 there is nothing to be sought beyond it1 since in this case it is independent of every principle1 and is located within itself4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we say that nature possesses the 7seminal7 reason1 and is its principle1 we shall have to ask whence nature derives it4#bba ,if it be called a superior principle1 we still have to ask the derivation of this principle2 if it be derived from nothing1 we need not go beyond it 7but return to the above demonstration74 ,if1 on the contrary1 it be derived from ,intelligence1 we shall have to examine whether ,intelligence produced wisdom4 ,the first objection here will be1 how could it have done so8 ,for if ,intelligence itself produced it1 ,intelligence could not have produced it without itself being ,wisdom4 ,true ,wisdom is therefore being and1 on the other hand1 being is wisdom1 and derives its dignity from ,wisdom2 that is why being is veritable ,being4 ,consequently1 the being 7essences7 which do not possess wisdom are such beings only because they were created by a certain wisdom2 but they are not true beings 7essences71 because they do not in themselves possess ,wisdom4 ,it would1 therefore1 be absurd to state that the divinities1 or the blessed dwellers in the intelligible world1 in that world are engaged in studying demonstrations4 ,the entities that exist there are beautiful forms1#bbb such as are conceived of as existing within the soul of the wise man2 ,i do not mean painted forms1 but existing 7substantial7 forms4 ,that is why the ancients#bbc said that ideas are essences and beings4 ,,by ,a ,,pun1 ,,egyptian ,,wisdom ,,is ,,adduced ,,as ,a ,,symbol4 #f4 ,the sages of ,egypt seem to me to have shown either a consummate insight or a marvellous instinct when1 in order to reveal to us their wisdom1 they did not1 to express words and propositions1 make use of letters representing sounds and expressions1 but symbolized objects by hieroglyphics1#bbd and in their mysteries symbolically designated each of them by a particular emblem4 ,thus each hieroglyphic sign constituted a kind of science or wisdom2 and without discursive conception or analysis places the thing under the eyes in a synthetic manner4 ,later1 this synthetic notion was reproduced by other signs which developed it#bbe expressing it discursively1 declaring the causes of the constitution of things1 wherever their beautiful disposition excited admiration4 ,the wisdom of the ,egyptians is best seen in this1 that though they did not possess the causes of 7essential7 beings1 7their writing7 was able to express everything so as to harmonize with the causes of essential ,being4 ,,resemblance ,,of ,,earthly ,,things ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible ,,is ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,resemblance ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,to ,,the ,,earthly4 ,if therefore all 7celestial7 entities resemble earthly objects--a truth#bbf which is perhaps impossible to demonstrate1 so much the more must we1 before any examination or discussion1 premiss that all 7earthly7 objects resemble those which exist in the intelligible world4 ,this truth1 which applies to everything1 may perhaps best be understood by an important example4 ,,controversy ,,against ,,the ,,gnostic ,,divine ,,planning ,,of ,,the ,,world4 #g4 ,it is then by all of us agreed that the universe proceeds from a superior ,principle which possesses a certain perfection4 ,the 7,gnostic7 question then arises whether this ,principle1 before creating1 reflected that it was necessary first to form the globe1 and to suspend it to the middle of the world2 then1 to produce the water1 and to spread it over the surface of the earth2 later creating successively the other things contained in the space between the earth and heaven4 ,further1 did ,he give birth to all the animals only after having to ,himself represented all their forms1 and exterior parts8 ,did the ,creator undertake the work only after having conceived the plan of the world in its totality and in its details8 ,certainly not2 ,he cannot have submitted to all such considerations4#bbg ,how could ,he1 never having seen anything such1 have been inclined to them8 ,neither could ,he have borrowed the idea of the things ,he was to produce1 and then carried them out as some workman1 by the use of his hands and feet2 for hands and feet are created entities4 ,the only hypothesis left is that all things were within some one other thing 7that is1 matter1 which is their substrate74 7,being7 was next to this other thing 7matter71 and as no interval separated them1 ,he suddenly begot an image or representation of ,himself1 either by ,himself1 or by the intermediation of the universal ,soul1 or of some particular soul--which detail does not matter to our discussion here4 ,,how ,,creation ,,of ,,the ,,world ,,took ,,place4 ,therefore1 everything here below derives from above there1 and is more beautiful in the superior world2 for forms here below are mingled with matter2 on high1 they are pure4 ,thus this universe proceeds from the intelligible world1 and is contained by the forms from beginning to end4 ,first matter receives the forms of the elements1 later receiving gradual accessions of other forms1 so that ultimately matter becomes so buried under forms that it becomes difficult to recognize4 ,it receives forms easily1 because it 7already7 possesses a form which holds the lowest rank4 ,likewise1 the producing ,principle uses a form as model1 and easily produces forms because it consists entirely of being and form2 as a result1 its work has been easy and universal1 because itself was universal4 ,therefore it met no obstacle1 and still exercises an absolute sovereignty4 ,even of the things that act as obstacles to each other1 none1 even until the present time1 form an obstacle to the demiurgic 7,creator71 because ,he preserves ,his universality4 ,that is why ,i am convinced that if even we were simultaneously the models1 forms and essence of things1 and if the form which produces here below were our essence1 7that is1 being71 we would accomplish our work without trouble1 though man1 in his present state here below1 produces 7his individual body which is7 a form different from himself2 indeed1 on becoming an individual1 man ceased being universal4 ,but on ceasing to be an individual1 man1 in the words of ,plato1#bbh soars in the ethereal region1 and governs the whole world4 ,for1 becoming universal1 he administers the universe4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,principle ,,admits ,,of ,,no ,,reasoning1 ,,demonstration1 ,,faith ,,or ,,cause4 ,returning to our subject1 you can perhaps explain why the earth is located in the middle of the world1 and why its form is spherical#bbi2 you may clear up why the equator is inclined towards the ecliptic2 but you would be wrong in thinking that the divine ,intelligence proposed to achieve these objects because it judged them to be reasonable2 these things are good only because ,intelligence is what it is4 ,its work resembles the conclusion of a syllogism1 whose premises had been withdrawn1 and that was based on the intuition of its causes4 ,in divine ,intelligence nothing is a consequence1 nothing depends on a combination of means2 its plan is conceived independently of such considerations4 ,reasoning1 demonstration1 faith--all these are posterior things4 ,the mere existence of the principle determines here below the existence and nature of the entities depending from it4 ,never is one more right in asserting that the causes of a principle should not be sought1 than when referring to a ,principle which is perfect1 and is both principle and end4 ,that which is simultaneously principle and end is all things at the same time1 and consequently leaves nothing to be desired4 ,,if ,,this ,,principle ,,is ,,not ,,beautiful1 ,,nothing ,,else ,,could ,,be ,,that4 #h4 ,this ,principle is sovereignly beautiful2 it is beautiful entirely and throughout1 so that not a single one of its parts lacks beauty4 ,who could deny that this ,principle is beautiful8 ,only such as do not entirely possess beauty1 possessing it only partially1 or even not at all4 ,if this ,principle were not sovereignly beautiful1 surely none other could claim that distinction4 ,as the superior ,principle 7the one1 superior to ,intelligence7 is above beauty1 that which first presents itself to our view1 because it is a form1 and the object of the contemplation of intelligence1 is that whose aspect is amiable4#bcj ,,plato ,,symbolizes ,,this ,,by ,,making ,,the ,,creator ,,admire ,,his ,,handiwork4 ,it was to express this idea strikingly that ,plato#bca represents the demiurgic creator as admiring his handiwork1 which would lead us also to admire the beauty both of the model and of the idea4 ,after all1 admiration of a work made to resemble a model amounts to admiration of the model itself4 ,however there is no reason for astonishment at persons to whom this idea seems novel1 for lovers1 and in general all those who admire visible beauty do not realize that they admire it only because 7it is the image7 of the intelligible beauty4#bcb ,that ,plato referred to the model the admiration felt by the demiurgic 7creator7 for his work is proved by his adding to the words he admired his work the expression and he conceived the purpose of rendering it still more similar to its model4 ,he betrays the beauty of the model by saying that the work is beautiful1 and that it is the image of the model2 for if this model were not sovereignly beautiful1 and did not possess an unspeakable beauty1 how could there be anything more beautiful than this visible world8 ,it is therefore wrong to criticize this world2 all that can be said of it1 is that it is inferior to its model4#bcc ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,the ,,inferior ,,divinities ,,depends ,,on ,,their ,,inhering ,,in ,,the ,,supreme4 #i4 7,to explain our view we shall propose an experiment#bcd74 ,let us imagine that in the sense-world every being should remain as it is1 confusing itself with the others in the unity of the whole1 to the extent of its ability2 so that all that we see is lost in this unity4 ,imagine a transparent sphere exterior to the spectator1 by looking through which one might see all that it contains1 first the sun and the other stars together1 then the sea1 the earth1 and all living beings4 ,at the moment of picturing to yourself in thought a transparent sphere that would contain all moving1 resting and changeable things1 preserving the form of this sphere1 and without diminishing the size of it1 suppress mass1 extent1 and material conception4 ,then invoke the divinity that created this world of which you have made yourself an image to invest it4 ,his coming down into it may be conceived of as resulting from two causes4 ,either the ,divinity that is simultaneously single and manifold will come to adorn this world in the company of the other inferior divinities which exist within ,him4 ,each of these would contain all the others that are manifold because of their powers2 and nevertheless they would form a single divinity because their multiple powers are contained in unity4 ,or the ,divinity will do this because the only divinity contains all the inferior divinities within ,his breast4 7,which is the more likely hypothesis87 ,,all ,,the ,,inferior ,,divinities ,,are ,,contained ,,within ,,the ,,supreme4 ,indeed1 this only ,divinity loses none of ,his power by the birth of all the divinities contained within ,him4 ,all co-exist1 and their individual distinctions obtain without their occupying separate localities or affecting a sense-form4 ,otherwise the one would be here1 and the other there2 each one would be individual1 without simultaneously being universal in itself4 ,neither have they any parts that differ in each of them1 or from each other2 neither is the whole formed by each of them a power divided in a multiplicity of parts1 a power whose magnitude would be measured by the number of its parts4 ,taken in its universality the intelligible world possesses a universal ,power1 which penetrates everything in its infinite development without exhausting its infinite force4 ,he is so great that even ,his parts are infinite4 ,there is no locality that ,he does not interpenetrate4 ,even our world is great2 it likewise contains all the powers2 but it would be much better1 and its magnitude would be inconceivable if it did not also contain physical powers1 which are essentially small 7because limited74 ,fire and the other bodies cannot be called great powers because they consist only of an image of the infinity of the genuine ,power by burning1 crushing1 destroying1 and contributing to the generation of animals4 ,they destroy only because they themselves are destroyed2 they contribute to generation only because they themselves are generated4 ,,being ,,is ,,desirable ,,because ,,beautiful4 ,the ,power which resides in the intelligible world is pure being1 but perfectly beautiful being4 ,without beauty1 what would become of being8 ,without being1 what would become of beauty8 ,being itself would be annihilated by the beauty of being4 ,being#baa is therefore desirable1 it is identical with beauty1 and beauty is amiable because it is being4 ,seeing that both are of the same nature1 it would be useless to inquire which is the principle of the other4 ,the deceptive being 7of bodies7 needs to receive the image borrowed from beauty to appear beautiful2 and in general1 to exist2 it exists only in so far as it participates in the beauty found in being2 the greater its participation1 the more perfect is it1 because it appropriates this beautiful being#bce all the more4 ,,vision ,,of ,,the ,,supercelestial4 #aj4 ,that is why ,jupiter1 the most ancient of the other divinities1 whose chief he is1 leads them in this divine spectacle of the contemplation of the intelligible world4#bcf ,he is followed by these divinities1 the guardians1 and the souls who can support 7the glory of7 this vision4 ,from an invisible place1#bcg this divine world sheds light on all4 ,on rising above its sublime horizon1 it scatters its rays everywhere1 inundating everything with clearness4 ,it dazzles all those who are located at the foot of the peak where it shines2 and1 like the sun1 it often obliges them to turn away their sight1 which cannot sustain its glory4 ,some however are forced to raise their eyes1 imparting to them strength for this contemplation2 others1 who are at a distance1 are troubled4 ,on perceiving it1 those who can contemplate ,him fix their gaze on it and all its contents4 ,not every one1 however1 sees in it the same thing4 ,one discerns therein the source and being of justice2 another is overwhelmed by the revelation of wisdom1 of which men here below scarcely possess an enfeebled image4 ,indeed1 our vision is only an imitation of intelligible wisdom4 ,the latter1 spreading over all beings1 and as it were embracing immensity1 is the last to be perceived by those who have already long contemplated these brilliant lights4 ,,psychological ,,effect ,,of ,,this ,,vision4 ,such is the vision seen by the divinities1 all together1 and each one separately4 ,it is also beheld by the souls that see all the things contained within the intelligible world4 ,by this sight1 souls themselves become capable of containing1 from beginning to end1 all the entities within their intelligible world2 they dwell within it by that part of theirs which is capable of doing so4 ,often1 even1 the whole of them dwells within it1 at least so long as they do not withdraw therefrom4 ,,this ,,vision1 ,,when ,,transferred ,,within1 ,,becomes ,,sweet ,,as ,,nectar4 ,this is what is beheld by ,jupiter and by all those of us who share ,his love for this revelation4 ,the last thing which then appears is the beauty that shines in its entirety in the essences 7that is1 beings71 as well as in those who participate therein4 ,in the intelligible world everything glows1 and beautifies itself by shedding splendor on those who gaze at it4 ,thus men who have climbed a high mountain on arriving at the summit suddenly shine with the golden color reflected by the ground whereon they stand4 ,now the color that bathes the intelligible world is the beauty that blooms within its flower2 or rather there everything is color1 everything is beauty1 in its most intimate depths2 for beauty1 in the intelligible world1 is not a flower that blooms only on the surface4 ,those who do not apprehend the totality of the view appreciate the beauty of only that which meets their gaze2 but those who1 like men intoxicated with this sweet nectar1#bch are1 to the very soul1 penetrated by the beauty of the intelligible world1 are no longer mere spectators4 ,no longer are the contemplated objects and the contemplated soul two things exterior to each other4 ,if the soul's gaze is piercing enough1 she finds the object she contemplates within herself4 ,often she possesses it without knowing it4 ,then indeed does she contemplate it as she would contemplate some exterior object1 because she seeks to see it in the same manner4 ,every time that one looks at something as a spectacle1 it is seen outside of oneself4 ,now this spectacle of the intelligible world must be transferred within oneself1 and be contemplated as something with which one has fused1 to the point of identity4 ,thus a man1 possessed by a divinity1 whether by ,phoebus or by some ,muse1 would contemplate this divinity within himself1 if he were at all able to contemplate a divinity4 ,,mechanism ,,of ,,the ,,ecstasy4 #aa4 7,the ecstasy operates as follows47 ,when a man is entranced by the divinity1 he loses consciousness of himself4 ,then when he contemplates the 7divine7 spectacle which he possesses within himself1 he contemplates himself and sees his image embellished4 ,however beautiful it be1 he must leave it aside1 and concentrate upon the unity1 without dividing any of it4 ,then he becomes simultaneously one and all with this divinity which grants him ,his presence silently4 ,then is the man united to the divinity to the extent of his desire and ability4 ,if1 while remaining pure1 he return to duality1 he remains as close as possible to the divinity1 and he enjoys the divine presence as soon as he turns towards the divinity4 ,,benefits ,,of ,,this ,,conversion ,,towards ,,the ,,divinity4 ,the advantages derived from this conversion towards the divinity are first self-consciousness1 so long as he remains distinct from the divinity4 ,if he penetrate into his interior sanctuary1 he possesses all things1 and renouncing self-consciousness in favor of indistinction from the divinity1 he fuses with it4 ,as soon as he desires to see something1 so to speak1 outside of himself1 it is he himself that he considers1 even exteriorly4 ,the soul that studies the divinity must form an idea of him while seeking to know him4 ,later1 knowing how great is that divinity to which she desires to unite herself1 and being persuaded that she will find beatitude in this union1 she plunges herself into the depths of the divinity until1 instead of contenting herself with contemplating the intelligible world1 she herself becomes an object of contemplation1 and shines with the clearness of the conceptions whose source is on high4 ,,how ,,the ,,soul ,,may ,,be ,,united ,,to ,,the ,,divinity ,,without ,,seeing ,,him4 ,but how can one be united to beauty1 without seeing it8 ,if it be seen as some thing distinct from oneself1 he is not yet fused with it4 ,if the act of vision imply a relation with an exterior object1 we have no vision2 or1 at least1 this vision consists in the identity of seer and seen4 ,this vision is a kind of conscience1 of self-consciousness2 and if this feeling be too acute1 there is even danger of breaking up this unity4 ,besides1 one must not forget that the sensations of evils make stronger impressions1 and yield feebler knowledge1 because the latter are frittered away by the force of impressions4 ,thus sickness strikes sharply 7but arouses only an obscure notion72 health1 on the contrary1 thanks to the calm that characterizes it1 yields us a clearer notion of itself1 for it remains quietly within us1 because it is proper to us1 and fuses with us4 ,on the contrary1 sickness is not proper to us1 but foreign4 ,consequently it manifests itself vividly1 because it is opposed to our nature2 while we1 on the contrary1 enjoy but a feeble feeling of ourselves and of what belongs to us4 ,the state in which we grasp ourselves best is the one in which our consciousness of ourselves fuses with us4 ,consequently on high1 at the very moment when our knowledge by intelligence is at its best1 we believe that we are ignorant of it1 because we consult sensation1 which assures us that it has seen nothing4 ,indeed it has not seen anything1 and it never could see anything such 7as the intelligible beings74 ,it is therefore the sensation that doubts2 but he who has the ability to see differs therefrom4 ,before the seer could doubt1 he would have to cease believing in his very existence2 for he could not1 so to speak1 externalize himself to consider himself with the eyes of the body4 ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,object ,,of ,,spiritual ,,vision4 #ab4 ,we have just said that a man can see1 either in differing from what he sees1 or in identifying himself with the object seen4 ,now1 when he has seen1 either as being different1 or as being identical1 what does he report8 ,he tells us that he has seen the ,divinity beget an offspring of an incomparable beauty1 producing everything in ,himself1 and without pain preserving within ,himself what ,he has begotten4 ,in fact1 charmed with the things ,he has begotten1 and full of love for his works1 the ,divinity retained them within ,himself1 congratulating ,himself upon their splendor1 as much as upon his own4 ,in the midst of these beauties1 nevertheless inferior to those which have remained within the nature of the ,divinity1 alone of all these beings1 his ,son 7,jupiter1 the son of ,saturn1 here representing the universal ,soul born of divine ,intelligence7 has manifested himself externally4 ,by him1 as by an image1 you may judge of the greatness of his ,father1 and that of his brothers still unissued from within their ,father's nature4 ,besides1 it is not in vain that ,jupiter tells us that he proceeds from his ,father2 for he constitutes another world that has become beautiful1 because he is the image of beauty1 and because it is impossible that the image of beauty and being should not itself be beautiful4 ,jupiter1 therefore1 everywhere imitates his archetype4 ,that is why1 because he is an image1 he possesses life and constitutes being2 and that is why1 because he proceeds from his ,father1 he also possesses beauty4 ,he likewise enjoys the privilege of being the image of his eternity4 ,otherwise he would at one time reveal the image of his ,father1 and at other times he would not2 which is impossible1 because he is not an artificial image4 ,every natural image remains what it was1 so long as its archetype subsists4#bci ,it is therefore an error to believe that1 while the intelligible world subsists1 the visible world could perish1 and that it was begotten in such a manner as that he who had created it1 had done so with deliberation4 ,whatever indeed might have been the manner of operation1 these men#bdj do not wish to conceive and believe that1 so long as the intelligible world shines1 other things that proceed therefrom could not perish2 and that they exist ever since 7their model7 existed4 ,but the 7intelligible world7 has ever existed1 and will ever exist2 for 7in spite of their impropriety71 we are obliged to make use of such terms to express our thought4 ,,saturn ,,is ,,son ,,of ,,coelus1 ,,and ,,father ,,of ,,jupiter4 #ac4 7,saturn7 is always represented as chained1 because ,he remains immovable in his identity4 ,it is said he gave up to his son1 ,jupiter1 the government of the universe1 because such 7an occupation7 did not suit ,him1 who possesses the fulness#bda of good things1#bdb to distract himself from the government of the intelligible world to undertake that of an empire younger and less exalted than himself4 ,besides1 on one hand1 7,saturn7 fixed within himself1 and raised himself up to his father 7,coelus1 or ,uranus74 ,on the other hand1 he likewise fixed the inferior things which were begotten by his son 7,jupiter74 ,between both he 7,saturn7 therefore occupies a rank intermediary between his ,father1 who is more perfect and his son1 who is less so4 ,on one hand he mutilates his ,father1 by splitting primitive unity into two different elements4 ,on the other1 he raises himself above the being which is inferior to him1 disengaging himself from the chains that might tend to lower him4 ,as 7,coelus71 the father of 7,saturn71 is too great to admit of having beauty attributed to him1 7,saturn7 occupies the first rank of beauty4 ,,if ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,and ,,venus ,,be ,,beautiful1 ,,how ,,much ,,more ,,their ,,source8 ,the universal ,soul is beautiful also2 but she is less beautiful than 7,saturn71 because she is his image1 and because1 however beautiful she may by nature be1 she is still more beautiful when contemplating her principle4 ,therefore if the universal ,soul--to use clearer terms--and if even ,venus 7as subordinate to him1 ,jupiter71 possess beauty1 what must be that of ,intelligence8 ,if by their nature the universal ,soul and ,venus receive their beauty from some other principle1 from whom would they derive the beauty they intrinsically possess1 and that which they acquire8 ,as to us1 we are beautiful when we belong to ourselves2 and we are ugly when we lower ourselves to an inferior nature4 ,again1 we are beautiful when we know ourselves1 and ugly when we ignore ourselves4 ,it is therefore in the intelligible world that beauty shines and radiates4 ,are these considerations sufficient for a clear knowledge of the intelligible world1 or must we engage in a further effort to accomplish this8 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,five4 ,that ,intelligible ,entities ,are ,not ,external to the ,intelligence of the ,good4 7,the subject of the quarrel between ,amelius and ,porphyry4#bdc7 ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,intelligible ,,entities ,,implies ,,their ,,presence4 #a4 ,surely1 nobody could believe that the veritable and real ,intelligence could be deceived1 and admit the existence of things that do not exist8 ,its very name guarantees its intelligent nature4 ,it therefore possesses knowledge without being subject to forgetfulness1 and its knowledge is neither conjectural1 doubtful1 nor borrowed1 nor acquired by demonstration4 ,even if we did admit that some of its knowledge was derived from demonstration1 no one will deny that it possesses certain knowledge from within itself4 ,it would be wiser1 however1 to be entirely reasonable and say that it derives everything from within itself4#bdd ,without this1 it would be difficult to distinguish what knowledge it derived from itself1 and what was derived from outside4 ,even the certainty of the knowledge derived from itself would vanish1 and it would lose the right to believe that things really are such as it imagines4 ,indeed1 though the things whose knowledge we derive from the senses seem capable of producing in us the highest evidential value1 it may still be asked whether their apparent nature do not derive more from modifications in us than from the objects themselves4 ,even so1 belief in them demands#bde assent of the intelligence1 or at least of the discursive reason1 for though we admit that things perceived by the senses exist in sensible objects1 it is none the less recognized that what is perceived by sensation is only a representation of the exterior object1 and that sensation does not reach to this object itself1 since it remains exterior to sensation4#bdf ,but when intelligence cognizes1 and is cognizing intelligibles1 intelligence could never even meet them if they are cognized as lying outside of ,intelligence4 ,one explanation would be that intelligence does not at all meet them1 nor cognize them4 ,if it be by chance that intelligence meets them1 the cognition of them will also be accidental and transient4 ,the explanation that cognition operates by union of the intelligence with the intelligible depends on explanation of the bond that unites them4 ,under this hypothesis1 the cognitions of the intelligible gathered by intelligence will consist of impressions 7or1 types#bdg7 of reality1 and will consequently be only accidental impressions4 ,such1 however1 could not exist in ,intelligence2 for what would be their form8 ,as they would remain exterior to ,intelligence1 their knowledge would resemble sensation4 ,the only distinction of this knowledge from sensation would be that intelligence cognizes more tenuous entities4 ,intelligence would never know that it really perceives them4 ,it would never really know for certain that a thing was good1 just or beautiful4 ,in this case the good1 just and beautiful would be exterior and foreign to it2 ,intelligence1 in itself1 will not possess any forms to regulate its judgments1 and deserve its confidence2 they1 just as much as truth1 would remain outside of it4 ,,intelligence ,,is ,,annihilated ,,by ,,the ,,theory ,,that ,,truth ,,is ,,external ,,to ,,it4 ,on the other hand1 the intelligible entities are either deprived of feeling1 life and intelligence1 or they are intelligent4 ,if they be intelligent1 they1 like truth1 fuse with intelligence into the primary ,intelligence4 ,in this case we shall have to inquire into the mutual relations of intelligence1 intelligible entity1 and truth4 ,do these constitute but one single entity1 or two8 ,what in the world could intelligible entities be1 if they be without life or intelligence8 ,they are surely neither propositions1 axioms1 nor words1 because in this case they would be enunciating things different from themselves1 and would not be things themselves2 thus1 when you say that the good is beautiful1 it would be understood that these two notions are foreign to each other4 ,nor can we think that the intelligibles--for instance1 beauty and justice--are entities that are simple1 but completely separate from each other2 because the intelligible entity would have lost its unity1 and would no longer dwell within a unitary subject4 ,it would be dispersed into a crowd of particular entities1 and we would be forced to consider into what localities these divers elements of the intelligible were scattered4 ,besides1 how could intelligence embrace these elements and follow them in their vicissitudes8 ,how could intelligence remain permanent8 ,how could it fix itself on identical objects8 ,what will be the forms or figures of the intelligibles8 ,will they be like statues of gold1 or like images and effigies made of some other material8 ,in this case1 the intelligence that would contemplate them would not differ from sensation4 ,what would be the differentiating cause that would make of one justice1 and of the other something else8 ,last1 and most important1 an assertion that the intelligible entities are external to ,intelligence would imply that in thus contemplating objects exterior to itself ,intelligence will not gain a genuine knowledge of them1 having only a false intuition of them4 ,since1 under this hypothesis1 true realities will remain exterior to ,intelligence1 the latter1 while contemplating them1 will not possess them2 and in knowing them will grasp only their images4 ,thus reduced to perceiving only images of truth1 instead of possessing truth itself1 it will grasp only deceptions1 and will not reach realities4 ,in this case 7intelligence will be in the dilemma7 of either acknowledging that it grasps only deceptions1 and thus does not possess truth2 or intelligence will be ignorant of this1 being persuaded it possesses truth1 when it really lacks it4 ,by thus doubly deceiving itself1 intelligence will by that very fact be still further from the truth4 ,that is1 in my opinion1 the reason why sensation cannot attain the truth4 ,sensation is reduced to opinion#bdh because it is a receptive#bdi power--as indeed is expressed by the word opinion#bej2--;and because sensation receives something foreign1 since the object1 from which sensation receives what it possesses remains external to sensation4 ,therefore1 to seek truth outside of intelligence is to deprive intelligence of truth or verity of intelligence4 ,it would amount to annihilating ,intelligence1 and the truth 7which was to dwell within it7 will no longer subsist anywhere4 ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,intelligence ,,implies ,,its ,,possession ,,of ,,all ,,intelligibles4 #b4 ,therefore intelligible entities must not be regarded as exterior to ,intelligence1 nor as impressions formed in it4 ,nor must we deny it the intimate possession of truth4 ,otherwise1 any cognition of intelligibles is made impossible1 and the reality of both them and ,intelligence itself is destroyed4 ,intimate possession of all its essences is the only possible condition that will allow knowledge and truth to remain within ,intelligence1 that will save the reality of the intelligibles1 that will make possible the knowledge of the essence of every thing1 instead of limiting us to the mere notion of its qualities1 a notion which gives us only the image and vestige of the object1 which does not permit us to possess it1 to unite ourselves with it1 to become one with it4 ,on this condition only1 can ,intelligence know1 and know truly without being exposed to forgetfulness or groping uncertainty2 can it be the location where truth will abide and essences will subsist2 can it live and think--all of which should belong to this blessed nature1 and without which nowhere could be found anything that deserved our esteem and respect4 ,on this condition only will ,intelligence be able to dispense with credulity or demonstration in believing realities2 for ,intelligence itself consists in these very realities1 and possesses a clear self-consciousness4 ,intelligence sees that which is its own principle1 sees what is below it1 and to what it gives birth4 ,intelligence knows that in order to know its own nature1 it must not place credence in any testimony except its own2 that it essentially is intelligible reality4 ,it therefore is truth itself1 whose very being it is to conform to no foreign form1 but to itself exclusively4 ,within ,intelligence fuses both being1 and that which affirms its existence2 thus reality justifies itself4 ,by whom could ,intelligence be convinced of error8 ,what demonstration thereof would be of any value8 ,since there is nothing truer than truth1 any proof to the contrary would depend on some preceding proof1 and while seeming to declare something different1 would in reality be begging the question4 ,,supreme ,,intelligence ,,is ,,divinity ,,and ,,supreme ,,royalty4 #c4 ,thus ,intelligence1 with the essences and truth1 form but one and single nature for us4 ,it forms some great divinity2 or rather1 it is not some certain divinity1 but total 7divinity72 for ,intelligence judges it worthy of itself to constitute all these entities4 ,though this nature be divine1 it is nevertheless but the second divinity#beb2 which manifests itself to us before we see the 7supreme divinity1 ,unity74 ,intelligence forms the magnificent throne which 7the ,supreme7 formed for ,himself1 and whereon ,he is seated immovably4 ,for it was not adequate that something inanimate should either develop within the breast of the divinity1 nor support the supreme ,divinity when advancing towards us4 ,,allegory ,,of ,,the ,,royal ,,procession4 ,so great a ,king deserved to have dazzling beauty as the 7ostentatious7 van of his 7royal7 procession4 ,in the course of rising towards ,him are first met the things which by their inferior dignity are classed among the first ranks of the procession2 later those that are greater and more beautiful2 around the king stand those that are truly royal1 while even those that follow ,him are of value4 ,then1 after all these things1 suddenly breaks in upon our view the ,king himself2 and we who have remained behind after the departure of those who were satisfied with a view of the preliminaries1 fall down and worship4 ,a profound difference distinguishes the great ,king from all that precedes ,him4 ,but it must not be supposed that ,he governs them as one man governs another4 ,he possesses the most just and natural sovereignty4 ,he possesses real royalty because ,he is the ,king of truth4 ,he is the natural master of all these beings that ,he has begotten1 and which compose ,his divine body-guard4 ,he is the king of the king and of the kings1#bec and is justly called ,father of the divinities4 ,jupiter himself 7who is the universal ,soul71 imitates ,him in this respect that he does not stop at the contemplation of his father1 7who is ,intelligence71 and he rises to the actualization of his grandfather1#bed and he penetrates into the hypostatic substance of ,his being4#bee ,,the ,,course ,,upwards ,,is ,,one ,,of ,,unification4 #d4 ,it has already been said that we must rise to the ,principle which is really one1 and not one in the same way as are other things1 which1 being in themselves multiple1 are one only by participation4 ,on the contrary1 that ,principle is not one by participation1 as are all those things which 7being neutral7 would just as lief be multiple as one4 ,we have also said that ,intelligence and the intelligible world1 are more unitary than the remainder1 that they approach ,unity more than all other things1 but that they are not purely one4 ,to the extent of our ability we are now going to examine in what the ,principle which is purely one consists1 purely and essentially1 and not 7accidentally7 from without4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,unique2 ,,the ,,pair2 ,,and ,,the ,,group4 ,rising therefore to the ,one1 we must add nothing to ,him2 we must rest in ,him1 and take care not to withdraw from ,him1 and fall into the manifold4 ,without this precaution there will be an occurrence of duality1#bef which cannot offer us unity1 because duality is posterior to ,unity4 ,the ,one cannot be enumerated along with anything1 not even with uniqueness 7the monad71 nor with anything else4 ,he cannot be enumerated in any way2 for ,he is measure1 without ,himself being measured2 ,he is not in the same rank with other things1 and cannot be added to other things 7being incommensurable74 ,otherwise1 ,he would have something in common with the beings along with which ,he would be enumerated2 consequently1 ,he would be inferior to this common element1 while on the contrary ,he must have nothing above ,him 7if ,he is to be the one first ,being74 ,neither essential 7that is1 intelligible7 ,number1 nor the lower number which refers to quantity1 can be predicated of the unique2 ,i repeat1 neither the essential intelligible ,number1 whose essence is identical with thought1 nor the quantative number1 which1 because all number is quantity1 constitutes quantity concurrently with1 or independently of other genera4#beg ,besides1 quantative number1 by imitating the former 7essential intelligible7 ,numbers in their relation to the ,unique1 which is their principle1 finds its existence in its relation to real ,unity1 which it neither shares nor divides4 ,even when the dyad 7or pair7 is born1 7it does not alter7 the priority of the ,monad 7or ,uniqueness74 ,nor is this ,uniqueness either of the unities that constitute the pair1 nor either of them alone2 for why should it be one of them rather than the other8 ,if then the ,monad or ,uniqueness be neither of the two unities which constitute the pair1 it must be superior to them1 and though abiding within itself1 does not do so4 ,in what then do these unities differ from the ,uniqueness 7or ,monad78 ,what is the unity of the pair8 ,is the unity formed by the pair the same as that which is contained in each of the two unities constituting the pair8 ,the unities 7which constitute the pair7 participate in the primary ,unity1 but differ from it4 ,so far as it is one1 the pair also participates in unity1 but in different ways2 for there is no similarity between the unity of a house and the unity of an army4 ,in its relation to continuity1 therefore1 the pair is not the same so far as it is one1 and so far as it is a single quantity4 ,are the unities contained in a group of five in a relation to unity different from that of the unities contained in a group of ten8 7,to answer this we must distinguish two kinds of unity47 ,the unity which obtains between a small and a great ship1 and between one town and another1 and between one army and another1 obtains also between these two groups of five and of ten4 ,a unity which would be denied as between these various objects would also have to be denied as obtaining between these two groups4 7,enough of this here72 further considerations will be studied later4 ,,puns ,,about ,,vesta1 ,,taken ,,from ,,the ,,cratylus ,,of ,,plato4 #e4 ,returning to our former assertion that the ,first ever remains identical1 even though giving birth to other beings1 the generation of numbers may be explained by the immanence of ,unity1 and by the action of another principle which forms them1 as images of unity4 ,so much the more must the ,principle superior to beings be immanent ,unity2 but here it is the ,first himself who begets the beings1 and not another principle who produces beings in the image of the ,first while this ,first would abide within ,himself4 ,likewise the form of unity1 which is the principle of numbers1 exists within all in different degrees1 because the numbers posterior to unity participate therein unequally4 ,likewise1 the beings inferior to the ,first contain something of ,his nature1 which something constitutes their form4 ,numbers derive their quantity from their participation in unity4 ,likewise here beings owe their being to their containing the trace of the ,one1 so that their being is the trace of the ,one4#beh ,not far from the truth would we be in holding that essence1 which is the 7more common or7 plainer nomenclature of being1#bei is derived from the word hen1 which means one4 ,indeed essence proceeded immediately from the ,one1#bgc and has differentiated from ,him but very little4 ,turning towards its own basis1 it has settled1 and both became and is the being of all4 ,when a man pronounces essence 7on71 and emphasizes it1 he unconsciously approximates the sound meaning one 7hen71 demonstrating that essence proceeds from unity1 as indeed is indicated1 so far as possible1 by the word on1 which means essence4 ,that is why being 7ousia7 and essence 7einai#bfj7 imitate so far as they can the principle of the ,power from which they have emanated4 ,the human mind1 observing these similarities1 and guided by their contemplation1#bfa imitated what it grasped by uttering the words on1#bfb einai1#bfc ousia1#bfd and hestia4#bfe ,indeed1 these sounds try to express the nature of what has been begotten by unity1 by means of the very effort made by the speaker so as to imitate as well as possible the generation of being4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,named ,,apollo4#bff #f4 ,whatever be the value of these etymologies1 as begotten being is a form--for it would be impossible to give any other designation to that which has been begotten by the ,one--as it is1 not a particular form1 but all form1 without exception1 it evidently results that the ,one is formless4 ,as it possesses no form1 it cannot be being1 for this must be something individual1 or determinate4 ,now the ,one could not be conceived of as something determined2 for then ,he would no longer be a principle2 ,he would only be the determined thing attributed to ,him4 ,if all things be in that which has been begotten1 none of them could be unity4 ,if the ,one be none of them1 ,he cannot be what is above them2 consequently1 as these things are essences and essence1 the ,one must be above essence4 ,indeed1 the mere statement that the ,one is above essence1 does not imply any determinateness on ,his part1 affirms nothing concerning ,him and does not even undertake to give ,him a name4 ,it merely states that ,he is not this or that4 ,it does not pretend to embrace ,him1 for it would be absurd to attempt to embrace an infinite nature4 ,mere attempt to do so would amount to withdrawing from ,him1 and losing the slight trace of ,him thereby implied4 ,to see intelligible ,being1 and to contemplate that which is above the images of the sense-objects1 none of these must remain present to the mind4 ,likewise1 to contemplate ,him who is above the intelligible1 even all intelligible entities must be left aside to contemplate the ,one4 ,in this manner we may attain knowledge of ,his existence1 without attempting to determine what ,he is4 ,besides1 when we speak of the ,one1 it is not possible to indicate ,his nature without expressing its opposite4#bfg ,it would indeed be impossible to declare what is a principle of which it is impossible to say that it is this or that4 ,all that we human beings can do is to have doubts poignant enough to resemble pangs of childbirth4 ,we do not know how to name this ,principle4 ,we merely speak of the unspeakable1 and the name we give ,him is merely 7for the convenience of7 referring to ,him as best we can4 ,the name ,one expresses no more than negation of the manifold4 ,that is why the ,pythagoreans#bfh were accustomed1 among each other1 to refer to this principle in a symbolic manner1 calling him ,apollo1#bfi which name means denial of manifoldness4 ,an attempt to carry out the name of ,one in a positive manner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and object1 than if we abstained from considering the name of ,one as the proper name of the first ,principle4 ,the object of the employment of this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first ,principle first to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity1 and consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the best possible4 ,indeed1 this name is not adequate to designate this nature1 which can neither be grasped by hearing1 nor be understood by any who hears it named4 ,if it could be grasped by any sense1 it would be by sight2 though even so there must be no expectation of seeing any form2 for thus one would not attain the first ,principle4 ,,two ,,methods ,,of ,,sight2 ,,the ,,form1 ,,and ,,the ,,light4 #g4 ,when intelligence is in actualization it can see in two ways1 as does the eye4#bgd ,first1 the eye may see the form of the visible object2 second1 it may see the light by which this object is seen4 ,this light itself is visible1 but it is different from the form of the object2 it reveals the form and is itself seen with this form1 to which it is united4 ,consequently it itself is not seen distinctly1 because the eye is entirely devoted to the illuminated object4 ,when there is nothing but light1 it is seen in an intuitive manner1 though it be still united to some other object4 ,for if it were isolated from every other thing1 it could not be perceived4 ,thus the light of the sun would escape our eye if its seat were not a solid mass4 ,my meaning will best appear by considering the whole sun as light4 ,then light will not reside in the form of any other visible object1 and it will possess no property except that of being visible2 for other visible objects are not pure light4 ,likewise in intellectual intuition 7sight of the mind7 intelligence sees intelligible objects by means of the light shed on them by the ,first2 and the ,intelligence1 while seeing these objects1 really sees intelligible light4 ,but1 as ,intelligence directs its attention to the enlightened object1 it does not clearly see the ,principle that enlightens them4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it forget the objects it sees1 in the process of contemplating only the radiance that renders them visible1 it sees both the light itself1 and its ,principle4 ,but it is not outside of itself that that ,intelligence contemplates intelligible light4 ,it then resembles the eye which1 without considering an exterior and foreign light1 before even perceiving it1 is suddenly struck by a radiance which is proper to it1 or by a ray which radiates of itself1 and which appears to it in the midst of obscurity4 ,the case is still similar when the eye1 in order to see no other objects1 closes the eye-lids1 so as to draw its light from itself2 or when1 pressed by the hand1 it perceives the light which it possesses within itself4 ,then1 without seeing anything exterior the eye sees1 even more than at any other moment1 for it sees the light4 ,the other objects which the eye heretofore saw1 though they were luminous1 were not light itself4 ,likewise1 when ,intelligence1 so to speak1 closes its eye to the other objects1 concentrating in itself1 and seeing nothing1 it sees not a foreign light that shines in foreign forms1 but its own light which suddenly radiates interiorly1 with a clear radiance4 ,,intelligible ,,light1 ,,not ,,being ,,spatial1 ,,has ,,nothing ,,to ,,do ,,with ,,place4 #h4 ,when intelligence thus perceives this divine light1 it is impossible to discern whence this light comes1 from within or from without2 for when it has ceased shining the subject first thinks that it came from within1 and later that it came from without4 ,but it is useless to seek the source of this light1 for no question of location can be mooted in connection with it4 ,indeed1 it could neither withdraw from us1 nor approach us2 it merely appears1 or remains hidden4 ,therefore it cannot be sought2 we must restfully wait till it appears1 while preparing ourselves to contemplate it1 just as the eye awaits the rising of the sun which appears above the horizon1 or1 as the poets say1 which springs up from the ocean4 ,,god ,,arises ,,above ,,the ,,horizon ,,of ,,intelligence4 ,whence rises ,he whose image is our sun8 ,above what horizon must ,he rise1 or appear1 to enlighten us8 ,he must appear above the contemplating ,intelligence4 ,thus1 ,intelligence must remain immovable in contemplation1 concentrated and absorbed in the spectacle of pure beauty which elevates and invigorates it4 ,then ,intelligence feels that it is more beautiful and more brilliant1 merely because it has approached the ,first4 ,the latter does not come1 as might be thought2 ,he comes without really coming1 in the proper sense of the word2 ,he appears without coming from any place1 because ,he is already present above all things before ,intelligence approaches ,him4 ,in fact1 it is ,intelligence which approaches and withdraws from the ,first2 it withdraws when it does not know where it should be1 or where is the ,first4 ,the ,first is nowhere2 and if ,intelligence could also be nowhere--,i do not wish to say in no place1 for itself is outside of all place1 that is1 absolutely nowhere--it would always perceive the ,first2 or rather1 it would not perceive ,him1 it would be within the ,first1 and fusing with ,him4 ,by the mere fact that ,intelligence is intelligence1 it perceives the ,first only by that part of itself which is not intelligence 7that is1 which is above ,intelligence74 ,it doubtless seems surprising that the ,one could be present to us without approaching us2 and be everywhere1 though being nowhere4 ,this surprise is based on the weakness of our nature2 but the man who knows the ,first would much more likely be surprised were the state of affairs different4 ,it cannot indeed be otherwise4 ,wonder at it1 if you please2 but what has been said nevertheless represents the real state of the case4 ,,omnipresence ,,is ,,explained ,,by ,,possession ,,of ,,all ,,things ,,without ,,being ,,possessed ,,by ,,them4 #i4 ,all that is begotten by anything else resides either in the begetting ,principle1 or in some other being1 in the case of the existence of any being after or below the generating principle2 for that which was begotten by something else1 and which1 to exist1 needs something else1 needs something else everywhere1 and must consequently be contained within something else4 ,it is therefore natural that the things which contain the last rank should be contained in the things which precede them immediately1 and that the superior things should be contained in those which occupy a still more elevated rank1 and so on till the first ,principle4 ,as there is nothing above ,him1 ,he could not be contained within anything4 ,since ,he is not contained in anything1 and as each other thing is contained in the one immediately preceding it1 the first ,principle contains all the other beings2 ,he embraces them without sharing ,himself with them1 and possesses them without being shared by them4 ,since ,he possesses them without being possessed by them1 ,he is everywhere2 for1 unless ,he be present1 ,he does not possess2 on the other hand1 if ,he be not possessed1 ,he is not present4 ,consequently ,he both is1 and is not present in this sense that1 not being possessed1 ,he is not present2 and that1 finding ,himself independent of everything1 ,he is not hindered from being nowhere4 ,if indeed ,he were hindered from being somewhere1 ,he would be limited by some other principle1 and the things beneath ,him could no longer participate in ,him2 consequently the divinity would be limited1 ,he would no longer exist within ,himself1 and would depend from inferior beings4 ,all things contained within anything else are in the principle from which they depend4 ,it is the contrary with those which are nowhere2 there is no place where they are not4 ,if indeed there be a place lacking the divinity1 evidently this place must be embraced by some other divinity1 and the divinity is in some other2 whence1 according to this hypothesis1 it is false that the divinity is nowhere4 ,but as1 on the contrary1 it is true that the divinity is nowhere1 and false that ,he is anywhere1 because ,he could not be contained in any other divinity1 the result is that the divinity is not distant from anything4 ,if then ,he1 being nowhere1 be not distant from anything1 then ,he will in himself be everywhere4 ,one of his parts will not be here1 while another is there2 the whole of ,him will not be only in one or another place4 ,the whole of ,him will therefore be everywhere2 for there is no one thing which exclusively possesses ,him1 or does not possess ,him2 everything is therefore possessed by ,him4 ,look at the world3 as there is no other world but ,him1 ,he is not contained in a world1 nor in any place4 ,no place1 indeed1 could exist anteriorly to the world4 ,as to its parts1 they depend from it1 and are contained within it4 ,the ,soul is not contained in the world2 on the contrary1 it is the ,soul that contains the world2 for the locus of the ,soul is not the body1 but ,intelligence4 ,the body of the world is therefore in the ,soul1 the ,soul in ,intelligence1 and ,intelligence itself in some other ,principle4 ,but this ,principle ,himself could not be 7contained7 in any other principle1 from which ,he would depend2 ,he is therefore not within anything1 and consequently ,he is nowhere4 ,where then are the other things8 ,they are in the first ,principle4 ,he is therefore not separated from other things1 nor is ,he in them2 there is nothing that possesses ,him1 on the contrary1 it is ,he who possesses all4 ,that is why ,he is the good of all things1 because all things exist by ,him1 and are related to ,him each in a different manner4 ,that is why there are things which are better1 one than the other2 for some exist more intensely than others 7in relation with the ,good74 ,,the ,,manner ,,of ,,perceiving ,,the ,,supreme4 #aj4 ,do not seek to see this ,principle by the aid of other things2 otherwise1 instead of seeing ,him himself1 you will see no more than ,his image4 ,try rather to conceive the nature of the ,principle that must be grasped in ,himself1 that is1 pure and without any admixture1 because all beings participate in ,him1 without any of them possessing ,him4 ,no other thing indeed could be such as ,he2 but nevertheless such a ,being must exist4 ,who indeed could all at once embrace the totality of the power of this ,principle8 ,if a being did so1 how could this being differ from ,him8 ,would the being limit itself to embracing only a part of ,him8 ,you might grasp this ,principle by an intuitive1 simple intellection1 but you will not be able to represent ,him to yourself in ,his totality4 ,otherwise it is you who would be the thinking intelligence1 if indeed you have reached that principle2 but ,he is more likely to flee you1 or more likely still1 you will flee from ,him4 ,when you consider the divinity1 consider ,him in ,his totality4 ,when you think ,him1 know that what you remember of ,him is the ,good2 for ,he is the cause of the wise intellectual life1 because ,he is the power from which life and intelligence proceed4 ,he is the cause of being and essence1 because ,he is one2 ,he is simple and first1 because ,he is principle4 ,it is from ,him that everything proceeds4 ,it is from ,him that the first movement proceeds1 without being in ,him2 it is from ,him also that proceeds the first rest1 because ,he himself has no need of it2 ,he himself is neither in movement nor rest2 for ,he has nothing in which ,he could rest or move4 ,by ,his relation to what1 towards what1 or in what could ,he move or rest8 ,neither is ,he limited1 for by what could ,he be limited8 ,neither is ,he infinite in the manner suggested by an enormous mass2 for whither would ,he have any need of extending ,himself8 ,would ,he do so to get something8 ,but ,he has need of nothing6 ,it is ,his power that is infinite4 ,he could neither change nor lack anything2 for the beings which lack nothing owe this to ,him only4 ,,progress ,,towards ,,him ,,is ,,wakening ,,to ,,true ,,reality4 #aa4 ,the first ,principle is infinite because ,he is one1 and nothing in ,him could be limited by anything whatever4 ,being one1 ,he is not subject to measure or number4 ,he is limited neither by others nor by ,himself1 since ,he would thus be double4 ,since ,he has neither parts nor form1 ,he has no figure4 ,not by mortal eyes therefore must you seek to grasp this principle such as reason conceives of ,him4 ,do not imagine that ,he could be seen in the way that would be imagined by a man who believes that everything is perceived by the senses1 and thus annihilate the principle which is the supreme reality4 ,the things to which the common people attribute reality do not possess it2 for that which has extension has less reality 7than that which has no extension72 now the ,first is the principle of existence1 and is even superior to being4 ,you must therefore admit the contrary of that which is asserted by those commonplace persons2 otherwise1 you will be deprived of the divinity4 ,you would resemble such men as in the sacred festivals gorge themselves with the foods from which one should abstain on approaching the divinities1 and who1 regarding this enjoyment as more certain than the contemplation of the divinity whose festival is being celebrated1 depart without having participated in the mysteries4 ,indeed as the divinity does not reveal ,himself in these mysteries1 these gross men doubt ,his existence1 because they consider real only what is visible by the physical eyes4 ,thus people who would spend their whole life in slumber would consider as certain and real the things they would see in their dreams2 if they were to be waked and forced to open their eyes1 they would place no credence in the testimony of their eyes1 and would plunge themselves again into their somnolence4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,superior ,,to ,,the ,,beautiful1 ,,and ,,is ,,cognized ,,by ,,the ,,mind ,,as ,,its ,,sense4 #ab4 ,we should not seek to perceive an object otherwise than by the faculty that is suitable to cognize it4 ,thus colors are perceived by the eyes1 sounds by the ears1 and other qualities by other senses4 ,analogy would assign to intelligence its proper function1 so that thinking should not be identified with seeing and hearing4 ,to act otherwise would be to resemble a man who would try to perceive colors by the ears1 and who would deny the existence of sounds because he could not see them4 ,we must never forget that men have forgotten the ,principle which from the beginning until this day has excited their desires and wishes4 ,indeed all things aspire to the first ,principle1 tend thither by a natural necessity1 and seem to divine that they could not exist without ,him4 ,the notion of the beautiful is given only to souls that are awake1 and that already possess some knowledge2 at sight of ,him they are simultaneously dazed with ,his sublimity1 and spurred on by love4#bgj ,from ,his very origin1 on the contrary1 the ,good excites in us an innate desire2 ,he is present with us even in sleep2 ,his view never dazes us with stupor1 because ,he is always with us4 ,enjoyment of ,his presence demands neither reminiscence nor attention1 because one is not deprived thereof even in sleep4 ,when the love of the beautiful overwhelms us1 it causes us anxieties1 because the sight of the beautiful makes us desire it4 ,as the love excited by the beautiful is only secondary1 and as it exists only in such persons as possess already some knowledge1 the beautiful evidently occupies only the second rank4 ,on the contrary1 the desire of the ,good is more original1 and demands no preliminary knowledge4 ,that surely demonstrates that the ,good is anterior and superior to the beautiful4 ,besides1 all men are satisfied as soon as they possess the ,good2 they consider that they have reached their goal4 ,but not all think that the beautiful suffices them2 they think that the beautiful is beautiful for itself1 rather than for them2 as the beauty of an individual is an advantage only for himself4 ,last1 the greater number of people are satisfied with seeming beautiful1 even if they are not so in reality2 but they are not satisfied with seeming to possess the ,good1 which they desire to possess in reality4 ,indeed1 all desire to have that which occupies the front rank2 but they struggle1 they engage in rivalry about the beautiful in the opinion that it is born just as they are 7from development of circumstances74 ,they resemble a person who would claim equality with another person who holds the first rank after the king1 because both depend from the king2 such a person does not realize that though both are subject to the king1 yet there is a great difference in hierarchical rank between them#bga2 the cause of this error is that both participate in a same principle1 that the ,one is superior to both of them1 and that lastly the ,good has no need of the beautiful1 while the beautiful is in need of the ,good4#bgb ,the ,good is sweet1 calm1 and full of delights2 we enjoy it at will4 ,on the contrary1 the beautiful strikes the soul with amazement1 agitates it1 and mingles pains with pleasures4 ,in spite of ourselves we are thereby often separated from the ,good1 like a beloved object separates a son from the father4 ,the ,good is more ancient than the beautiful1 not in time1 but in reality2 besides1 it exerts superior power1 because it is unlimited4 ,that which is inferior to it1 possesses only an inferior and dependent power1 instead of having a limitless power 7as belongs to ,intelligence1 which is inferior to the ,good74 ,the ,divinity therefore is master of the power which is inferior to ,his own2 ,he has no need of things that are begotten2 for it is from ,him that all their contents are derived4 ,besides1 ,he had no need of begetting2 ,he still is such as ,he was before2 nothing would have been changed for ,him if ,he had not begotten2 if it had been possible for other things to receive existence 7independently of ,himself7 ,he would not have opposed it through jealousy4 ,it is now no longer possible for anything to be begotten1 for the divinity has begotten all that ,he could beget4 ,nor is ,he the universality of things1 for thus ,he would stand in need of them4 ,raised above all things1 ,he has been able to beget them1 and to permit them to exist for themselves by dominating all4 ,,the ,,supremacy ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,implies ,,he ,,is ,,superior ,,to ,,all ,,possessions4 #ac4 ,being the ,good ,himself1 and not simply something good1 the ,divinity cannot possess anything1 not even the quality of being good4 ,if ,he possessed anything1 this thing would either be good1 or not good2 now in the principle which is good in ,himself and in the highest degree1 there cannot be anything which is not good4 ,on the other hand1 the statement that the ,good possesses the quality of being good is impossible4 ,since therefore 7the ,good7 can possess neither the quality of being good1 or of not being good1 the result is that ,he cannot possess anything2 that ,he is unique1 and isolated from everything else4 ,as all other things either are good without being the ,good1 or are not good1 and as the ,good has neither the quality of being good1 or of not being good1 ,he has nothing1 and this is the very thing that constitutes ,his goodness4 ,to attribute to ,him anything1 such as being1 intelligence1 or beauty1 would be to deprive ,him of the privilege of being the ,good4 ,therefore when we deprive ,him of all attributes1 when we affirm nothing about ,him1 when one does not commit the error of supposing anything within ,him1 ,he is left as simple essence1 without attribution of things ,he does not possess4 ,let us not imitate those ignorant panegyrists who lower the glory of those they praise by attributing to them qualities inferior to their dignity1 because they do not know how to speak properly of the persons they are trying to praise4 ,likewise1 we should not attribute to the ,divinity any of the things beneath and after ,him2 we should recognize ,him as their eminent cause1 but without being any of them4 ,the nature of the ,good consists not in being all things in general1 nor in being any of them in particular4 ,in this case1 indeed1 the ,good would form no more than one with all beings2 consequently1 ,he would differ from them only by ,his own character2 that is1 by some difference1 or by the addition of some quality4 ,instead of being one1 ,he would be two things1 of which the one--namely1 what in ,him was common with the other beings--would not be the ,good1 while the other would be the ,good 7and would leave all beings evil74 ,under this hypothesis1 ,he would be a mixture of good and of not good2 he would no longer be the pure and primary ,good4 ,the primary ,good would be that in which the other thing would particularly participate1 a participation by virtue of which it would become the good4 ,this thing would be the good only by participation1 whilst that in which it would participate would be nothing in particular2 which would demonstrate that the good was nothing in particular4 ,but if1 in the principle under discussion1 the good be such--that is1 if there be a difference whose presence gives the character of goodness to the composite--this good must derive from some other principle which must be the ,good uniquely and simply4 ,such a composite1 therefore1 depends on the pure and simple ,good4 ,thus the ,first1 the absolute ,good1 dominates all beings1 is uniquely the ,good1 possesses nothing within ,himself1 is mingled with nothing1 is superior to all things1 and is the cause of all things4 ,the beautiful and that which is being could not derive from evil1 or from indifferent principles2 for the cause being more perfect1 is always better than its effects4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,against the ,gnostics2 or1 ,that the ,creator and the ,world are ,not ,evil4#bge ,,the ,,supreme ,,principles ,,must ,,be ,,simple ,,and ,,not ,,compound4 #a4 ,we have already seen#bgf that the nature of the ,good is simple and primary1 for nothing that is not primary could be simple4 ,we have also demonstrated that the nature of the ,good contains nothing in itself1 but is something unitary1 the very nature of the ,one2 for in itself the ,one is not some thing to which unity could be added1 any more than the ,good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added4 ,consequently1 as both the ,one and the ,good are simplicity itself1 when we speak of the ,one and the ,good1 these two words express but one and the same nature2 they affirm nothing1 and only represent it to us so far as possible4 ,this nature is called the ,first1 because it is very simple1 and not composite2 it is the absolute as self-sufficient1 because it is not composite2 otherwise it would depend on the things of which it was composed4 ,neither is it predicable of anything 7as an attribute in a subject7 for all that is in another thing comes from something else4 ,if then this nature be not in anything else1 nor is derived from anything else1 if it contain nothing composite1 it must not have anything above it4 ,,the ,,only ,,supreme ,,principles ,,must ,,then ,,be ,,unity1 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,soul4 ,consequently there are no principles other 7than the three divine hypostatic substances72 and the first rank will have to be assigned to ,unity1 the second to ,intelligence1 as the first thinking principle1#bgg and the third to the ,soul4 ,such indeed is the natural order1 which admits of no further principles1 in the intelligible world4 ,if less be claimed1 it is because of a confusion between the ,soul and ,intelligence1 or ,intelligence with the ,first2 but we have often pointed out their mutual differences4#bgh ,the only thing left is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic substances2 and in this case1 what their nature might be4 ,,the ,,aristotelian ,,distinction ,,of ,,potentiality ,,and ,,actuality ,,is ,,not ,,applicable ,,to ,,divinity4 ,the ,principle of all things1 such as we have described it1 is the most simple and elevated possible4 ,the 7,gnostics7 are wrong in distinguishing within that 7supreme ,principle#bgi7 potentiality from actualization#bhj2 for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations1 that 7,aristotelian7 distinction1 and thus to increase the number 7of the divine hypostatic substances4#bha7 ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,rest ,,and ,,movement ,,also ,,inapplicable4 ,neither could we1 below the ,supreme1 distinguish two intelligences1 one at rest1 and the other in motion4#bhb ,we should have to define the resting of the ,first1 and the movement or utterance#bhc of the second4 ,the inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally mysterious4 ,by its being 7or1 nature71 ,intelligence is eternally and identically a permanent actualization4 ,to rise to ,intelligence and to move around it is the proper function of the soul4 ,,an ,,intermediary ,,logos 7,,or ,,aeon ,,jesus71 ,,also ,,unaccountable4 ,reason 7logos7 which descends from ,intelligence into the ,soul1 and intellectualizes her1 does not constitute a nature distinct from the ,soul and ,intelligence1 and intermediary between them4 ,,consciousness ,,is ,,unitary ,,though ,,containing ,,thinker1 ,,object ,,and ,,thought4 ,nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences1 merely because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker4 ,though there be a difference between thinking1 and thinking that one thinks1 these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive consciousness of its actualizations4 ,it would be ridiculous to deny such a consciousness to veritable ,intelligence4 ,it is therefore the same ,intelligence that thinks1 and that thinks that it thinks4 ,otherwise there would be two principles1 of which the one would have thought1 and the other consciousness of thought4 ,the second would doubtless differ from the first1 but would not be the real thinking principle4 ,a mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness of thought would not establish the 7actual7 differences between two 7hypostatic substances74 ,further1 we shall have to consider whether it be possible to conceive of an ,intelligence which would exclusively think1 without any accompanying consciousness of its thought4#bhd ,if we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and discursive reason were in such a condition1#bhe we would1 even if otherwise considered sensible1 be insane4 ,but as true ,intelligence thinks itself in its thoughts1 and as the intelligible1 far from being outside of ,intelligence1 is ,intelligence itself1 ,intelligence1 by thinking1 possesses itself1 and necessarily sees itself4#bhf ,when ,intelligence sees itself1 it does not see itself as unintelligent1 but as intelligent4 ,therefore in the first actualization of thought1 ,intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought1 two things that form but a single one2 not even logically is this a duality4 ,if ,intelligence always thinks what it is1 is there any reason to separate1 even by a simple logical distinction1 thought from the consciousness of thought8 ,the absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first2 we might thus go on to infinity4#bhg ,a ,,differentiated ,,reason ,,would ,,deprive ,,the ,,soul ,,of ,,consciousness4 ,last1 if we suppose that ,reason is derived from ,intelligence1 and then from reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived from ,reason in itself1 so as to constitute a principle intermediary between ,intelligence and ,soul1 the ,soul would be deprived of the power of thought4 ,for thus the ,soul1 instead of receiving reason from ,intelligence1 would receive reason from an intermediary principle4 ,instead of possessing ,reason itself1 the ,soul would possess only an adumbration of ,reason2 the ,soul would not know ,intelligence1 and would not be able to think4#bhh ,,no ,,more ,,than ,,three ,,principles ,,admitted ,,because ,,of ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,consciousness4 #b4 ,in the intelligible world1 therefore1 we shall not recognize more than three principles 7,unity1 ,intelligence1 and ,soul71 without those superfluous and incongruous fictions4 ,we shall insist that there is a single ,intelligence that is identical1 and immutable1 which imitates its ,father so far as it can4 ,then there is our soul1 of which one part ever remains among the intelligibles1 while one part descends to sense-objects1 and another abides in an intermediary region4#bhi ,as our soul is one nature in several powers1 she may at times entirely rise to the intelligible world1 with the best part of herself and of essence2 at other times the soul's lower part allows itself to be dragged down to the earth1 carrying with it the intermediate portion2 for the soul cannot be entirely dragged down4#bij ,this being dragged down occurs only because the soul does not abide in the better region4#bia ,while dwelling in it1 the ,soul1 which is not a part 7of it7 and of which we are not a part1#bib has given to the body of the universe all the perfections of which she was capable4 ,the ,soul governs it by remaining quiet1 without reasoning1 without having to correct anything4 ,with wonderful power she beautifies the universe by the contemplation of the intelligible world4 ,the more the ,soul attaches herself to contemplation1 the more powerful and beautiful she is2 what she receives from above1 she communicates to the sense-world1 and illuminates because she herself is always illuminated 7by ,intelligence74 ,,the ,,world ,,as ,,eternally ,,begotten--,,god',s ,,need ,,to ,,give4 #c4 ,thus the ,soul1 ever being illuminated1 in turn herself illuminates lower things that subsist only through her1 like plants that feed on dew1 and which participate in life1 each according to its capacity4 ,likewise a fire heats the objects that surround it1 each in proportion to its nature4 ,now if such is the effect of fire whose power is limited1 while intelligible beings exert unlimited powers1 how would it be possible for these beings to exist without causing anything to participate in their nature8 ,each of them must therefore communicate some degree of its perfection to other beings4 ,the ,good would no longer be the good1 ,intelligence would no longer be intelligence1 the ,soul would no longer be soul1 if1 beneath that which possesses the first degree of life1 there was not some other thing which possessed the second degree of life1 and which subsisted only so long as subsists ,he who occupies the first rank4 ,it is therefore unavoidable that all things 7inferior to the ,first7 must always exist in mutual dependence1 and that they be begotten1 because they derive their existence from some other source4 ,they were not begotten at a definite moment4 ,when we affirm that they are begotten1 we should say1 they were begotten1 or1 they shall be begotten4 ,nor will they be destroyed1 unless they are composed of elements in which they could be dissolved4 ,those that are indissoluble will not perish4 ,it may be objected that they could be resolved into matter4 ,but why should matter also not be liable to be destroyed8 ,if it were granted that matter was liable to destruction1 there was no necessity for its existence4#bic ,it may be further objected that the existence of matter necessarily results from the existence of other principles4 ,in this case1 this necessity still subsists4 ,if matter is to be considered as isolated 7from the intelligible world71 then the divine principles also1 instead of being present everywhere1#bid will1 as it were1 be walled up in a limited place4#bie ,but if the latter be impossible1 then must matter be illuminated 7by the intelligible world74 ,,by ,a ,,pun ,,on ,,inclination1 ,,plotinos ,,shows ,,that ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,could ,,not ,,have ,,gone ,,through ,,the ,,drama ,,of ,,creation ,,attributed ,,to ,,sophia ,,and ,,achamoth4 #d4 ,but in that case1 the ,soul created only because#bif she had lost her wings4 ,the universal ,soul1 however1 could not have been subject to such an accident4 ,those 7,gnostics7 who claim that she committed a fault should explain the nature of that fault4#big ,why did this fall occur8 ,if she fell from all eternity1 she must similarly remain in her fault2 if only at a determinate time1 why not earlier8 ,we however believe that the ,soul created the world not by inclining 7towards matter71 but rather because she did not incline towards it4 ,thus to incline towards matter the ,soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities2 but if she had forgotten them1 she could not have created the world 7using them as models74 ,from what 7models7 would the soul have created the world8 ,she must have formed it according to the intelligible models she had contemplated above4 ,if she remembered them while creating1 she had not inclined 7away from them towards matter74 ,neither did the ,soul have an obscure notion of the intelligibles2 otherwise she would have inclined herself towards them1 to get a clear intuition of them4 ,for if she kept some memory of the intelligible world1 why would she not have wished to reascend therein8 ,,most ,,generally ,,assigned ,,motives ,,of ,,creation ,,are ,,ridiculous1 ,,or ,,worse4 ,besides1 what advantage could the 7world-,soul7 have imagined she was gaining by creating the world8 ,that she did so in order to be honored#bih seems unworthy1 for it would be attributing to her the desires of a sculptor4 ,another theory is that the 7world-,soul7 created the world by virtue of a rational conception1 and she thus exercised her power1 though creating did not inhere in her nature4 ,if so1 how did she make the world8 ,when will she destroy it8 ,if she repented1 what is she waiting for 7before she destroys her handiwork78 ,if1 however1 she has not yet repented1 she could not repent after time will have accustomed her to her work1 and will have made her more kindly disposed thereto4 ,if however she be awaiting individual souls1 the latter should not have returned into generation1 since1 in the former generation1 they have already experienced evils here below1 and consequently1 they should long since have ceased to descend upon this earth4 ,,the ,,world ,,should ,,not ,,be ,,considered ,,evil ,,because ,,of ,,our ,,sufferings2 ,,nothing ,,more ,,beautiful ,,could ,,be ,,imagined4 ,nor should the world be considered badly made1 merely because we suffer so much therein4 ,this idea results from entertaining unjustifiable expectations of its perfections1 and from confusing it with the intelligible world of which it is an image4 ,could a more beautiful image1 indeed1 be imagined8 ,after the celestial fire could we imagine a better fire than our own8 ,after the intelligible earth1 could we imagine a better earth than ours8 ,after the actualization by which the intelligible world embraces itself1 could we imagine a sphere more perfect1 more wonderful1 or better ordered in its movements#bii8 ,after the intelligible sun1 how could we imagine any sun different from the one that we see8 ,,it ,,is ,,contradictory ,,to ,,consider ,,oneself ,,capable ,,of ,,perfection1 ,,but ,,to ,,deny ,,impassibility ,,to ,,the ,,beautiful ,,works ,,of ,,nature4 #e4 ,is it not absurd to see those 7,gnostics7 who1 like everybody else1 possess a body1 passions1 fears1 and excitements1 holding an idea of their own powers high enough to make them believe themselves capable of attaining the intelligible1#cjj while to the sun1 though it be immutable and perfect1#cja and though it be impassible power1 refusing a wisdom superior to ours1 we who were born only yesterday1 and who find so many obstacles in our search after truth8 ,we certainly are surprised to see these 7,gnostics7 considering the souls of both themselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine1 while refusing immortality to the entire heaven1 to all the stars it contains1 though they be composed of elements more beautiful and purer#cjb 7than we71 though they manifest a marvellous beauty and order1 while 7these ,gnostics7 themselves acknowledge that disorder is observed here below8 ,according to their theories1 however1 the immortal ,soul would have picked out the worst part of the world1 while giving up the best to mortal souls4#cjc ,,an ,,intermediary ,,elemental ,,soul ,,is ,,also ,,inadmissible4 ,it is also absurd to see them introduce into the world1 after the universal ,soul1 another soul said to be composed of elements4 ,how could a composition of elements possess life8 ,a mixture of elements does not produce heat or cold1 humidity or dryness1 or any combination thereof4 ,besides1 how could this soul 7that is inferior to the universal ,soul71 hold in union together the four elements1 if she herself were composed of them1 and therefore were posterior to them8 ,we may also rightfully demand of the 7,gnostics7 an explanation of their predicating perception1 reflection1 and other faculties to this 7mythical7 soul4 ,,the ,,gnostics' ,,new ,,earth1 ,,that ,,is ,,model ,,of ,,the ,,old ,,is ,,unreasonable4 ,besides1 as the 7,gnostics7 have no appreciation of the work of the demiurgic creator1 nor for this earth1 they insist that the divinity has created for them a new earth1 which is destined to receive them when they shall have left here below1 and which is the reason of the world4 ,but what need do they have of inhabiting the model of this world that they pretend to hate8 ,in any case1 from where does this model come8 ,according to them1 the model was created only when its author inclined towards things here below4 ,but what was the use of the model1 if its creator busied himself considerably with the world to make a world inferior to the intelligible world which he possessed8 ,if 7the model were created7 before the world1 what could have been its use8 ,was it for the saved souls8#cjd ,why therefore were those souls not saved 7by remaining within the model78 ,under this hypothesis the creation of the model was useless4 ,if 7the model1 however1 was created7 after this world1 its author derived it from this world1 stealing the form away from matter2 the experience that the souls had acquired in their earlier trials sufficed to teach them to seek their salvation4#cje ,last1 if the 7,gnostics7 pretend to have1 in their souls1 received the form of the world1#cjf we have a new incomprehensible language4#cjg ,,exiles1 ,,repentances1 ,,antitypes1 ,,and ,,other ,,gnostic ,,inventions4 #f4 ,we hardly know what to say of the other new conceptions they have injected into the universe1 such as exiles1#cjh antitypes1#cji and repentances4#caj ,if by repentances and exiles they mean certain states of the ,soul 7in the normal meaning of the word1 where a soul7 yields to repentance2 and if by antitypes they mean the images of the intelligible beings that the ,soul contemplates before contemplating the intelligible beings themselves1 they are using meaningless words1 invented merely as catchwords and terms for their individual sect2 for they imagine such fictions merely because they have failed clearly to understand the ancient wisdom of the ,greeks4 ,before them the ,greeks1 clearly and simply1 had spoken of ascensions of souls that issued from the cavern1 and which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation4 ,the doctrines of these 7,gnostics7 are partly stolen from ,plato1 while the remainder1 which were invented merely to form their own individual system1 are innovations contrary to truth4 ,it is from ,plato that they borrowed their judgments1 the rivers of ,hades4#caa ,they do speak of several intelligible principles1 such as essence1 intelligence1 the second demiurgic creator or universal ,soul2 but all that comes from ,plato's ,timaeus1#cab which says1 ,likewise as the ideas contained in the existing ,organism were seen by ,intelligence1 so he the creator of this universe#cac thought that the latter should contain similar and equally numerous 7natures74 ,but1 not clearly understanding ,plato1 the ,gnostics here imagined 7three principles71 an intelligence at rest1 which contains all 7beings71 a second intelligence that contemplates them 7as they occur7 in the first intelligence1 and a third intelligence that thinks them discursively4 ,they often consider this discursive intelligence as the creative soul1 and they consider this to be the demiurgic creator mentioned by ,plato1 because they were entirely ignorant of the true nature of this demiurgic creator4 ,in general1 they alter entirely the idea of creation1 as well as many other doctrines of ,plato1 and they give out an entirely erroneous interpretation thereof4 ,they imagine that they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible nature1 while ,plato and many other divine intellects never attained thereto4 ,by speaking of a multitude of intelligible principles1 they think that they seem to possess an exact knowledge thereof1 while really they degrade them1 assimilating them to lower1 and sensual beings1 by increasing their number4#cad ,the principles that exist on high must be reduced to the smallest number feasible2 we must recognize that the principle below the ,first contains all 7the essences71 and so deny the existence of any intelligible 7entities7 outside of it1 inasmuch as it contains all beings1 by virtue of its being primary ,being1 of primary ,intelligence1 and of all that is beautiful beneath the ,first ,himself4 ,the ,soul must be assigned to the third rank4 ,the differences obtaining between souls must further be explained by the difference of their conditions or nature4#cae ,,the ,,gnostics ,,may ,,well ,,borrow ,,from ,,the ,,greeks1 ,,but ,,should ,,not ,,depreciate ,,them4 ,instead of besmirching the reputation of divine men1#caf the 7,gnostics7 should interpret the doctrines of the ancient sages in a friendly way1 borrowing from them such as they are right in professing1 as1 for instance1 the immortality of the soul1 the existence of the intelligible world1 and of the first ,divinity 7who is the ,good71 the necessity for the soul to flee from intercourse with the body1 and the belief that separation of the soul from body is equivalent to a return from generation to being4#cag ,they do well indeed if they borrow these ideas from ,plato1 for the purpose of developing them4 ,they are even at liberty to express any opinion they please in diverging from his views2 but their own doctrine should not be established in the minds of their followers by insults and sarcasms against ,greek sages4 ,they could only do so by demonstrating the propriety of their distinctive tenets1 whenever they differ from those of the ancient philosophers1 and by expounding their own tenets with a really philosophic reserve and equanimity4 ,even when they controvert a system they are still bound to consider nothing but the truth1 without any attempt at self-glorification1 either by attacking men whose teachings have long since been approved by worthy philosophers1 or by claims of superiority to the latter4 ,for that which the ancients taught on the subject of the intelligible world will always be considered as the best and wisest by all who do not permit themselves to be misled by the errors that to-day mislead so many4#cah ,,gnostic ,,additions ,,to ,,platonism ,,are ,,their ,,poorest ,,doctrines4 ,if from the doctrines of the 7,gnostics7 we remove what they have borrowed from the teachings of the ancients1 their remaining additions will be discovered as very unfortunate4 ,their polemic against 7,greek philosophy7 consists of an introduction of a great number of genealogies1#cai and destructions1 blaming the intercourse of the soul with the body1#cbj complaining of the universe1 criticising its administration1 identifying the demiurgic creator 7that is1 ,intelligence7 with the universal souls4#cba ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,may ,,not ,,be ,,judged ,,by ,,the ,,human ,,standard4 #g4 ,elsewhere we have demonstrated#cbb that this world never began1 and will never end2 and that it must last as long as the intelligible entities4 ,we have also shown1#cbc and that earlier than these 7,gnostics71 that the soul's intercourse with the body is not advantageous to her4 ,but to judge the universal ,soul according to ours is to resemble a man who would blame the totality of a well governed city by an examination limited to the workers in earth or metal4 ,,differences ,,between ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,and ,,the ,,human ,,soul4 ,the differences between the universal ,soul and our 7human7 souls are very important4 ,to begin with1 the universal ,soul does not govern the world in the same manner 7as our soul governs the body72 for she governs the world without being bound thereto4 ,besides many other differences elsewhere noted1#cbd we were bound to the body after the formation of a primary bond4#cbe ,in the universal ,soul the nature that is bound to the body 7of the world7 binds all that it embraces2 but the universal ,soul herself is not bound by the things she binds4 ,as she dominates them1 she is impassible in respect to them1 while we ourselves do not dominate exterior objects4 ,besides1 that part of the universal ,soul which rises to the intelligible world remains pure and independent2 even that#cbf which communicates life to the body 7of the world7 receives nothing therefrom4 ,in general what is in another being necessarily participates in the state of that being2 but a principle which has its own individual life would not receive anything from any other source4#cbg ,that is why1 when one thing is located within another1 it feels the experiences of the latter1 but does not any the less retain its individual life in the event of the destruction of the latter4 ,for instance1 if the fire within yourself be extinguished1 that would not extinguish the universal fire2 even if the latter were extinguished1 the universal ,soul would not feel it1 and only the constitution of the body 7of the world7 would be affected thereby4 ,if a world exclusively composed of the remaining three elements were a possibility1 that would be of no importance to the universal ,soul1 because the world does not have a constitution similar that of each of the contained organisms4 ,on high1 the universal ,soul soars above the world1 and thereby imposes on it a sort of permanence2 here below1 the parts1 which as it were flow off1 are maintained in their place by a second bond4#cbh ,as celestial entities have no place 7outside of the world71 into which they might ooze out1#cbi there is no need of containing them from the interior1 nor of compressing them from without to force them back within2 they subsist in the location where the universal ,soul placed them from the beginning4 ,those which naturally move modify the beings which possess no natural motion4#ccj ,they carry out well arranged revolutions because they are parts of the universe4 ,here below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to the universal order4 ,for instance1 if a tortoise happened to be caught in the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order1 it would be trodden under foot because it could not withdraw from the effects of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers2 on the contrary1 if it conformed to that order1 it would suffer no harm4 ,,gnostic ,,demands ,,for ,,reason ,,of ,,world',s ,,creation ,,are ,,idle1 ,,and ,,involve ,,still ,,larger ,,questions4 #h4 ,to ask 7as do the ,gnostics7 why the world was created1 amounts to asking the reason of the existence of the universal ,soul1 and of the creation of the demiurgic creator himself4 ,to ask such a question well characterizes men who first wish to find a principle of that which 7in the world7 is eternal1 but who later opine that the demiurgic creator became the creating cause only as a result of an inclination or alteration4#cca ,if indeed they be at all willing to listen to us fairly1 we shall have to teach them the nature of these intelligible principles1 to end their habit of scorning 7those7 venerable 7intelligible7 beings1 and 7to induce them to7 pay these a deserved respect4 ,no one1 indeed1 has the right to find fault with the constitution of the world1 which reveals the greatness of intelligible nature4 ,we are forced#ccb to recognize that the world is a beautiful and brilliant statue of the divinities1 from the fact that the world achieved existence without beginning with an obscure life1 such as that of the little organisms it contains1 and which the productiveness of universal life never ceases to bring forth1 by day or night2 on the contrary1 its life is continuous1 clear1 manifold1 extended everywhere1 and illustrating marvellous wisdom4 ,it would be no more than natural that the world should not equal the model it imitates2 otherwise1 it would no longer be an imitation4 ,it would be an error1 however1 to think that the world imitates its model badly2 it lacks none of the things that could be contained by a beautiful and natural image2 for it was necessary for this image to exist1 without implying reasoning or skill4#ccc ,,intelligence ,,could ,,not ,,have ,,been ,,the ,,last ,,degree ,,of ,,existence4 ,intelligence1 indeed1 could not be 7the last degree of existence74 ,it was necessarily actualization of a double nature1 both within itself1 and for other beings4#ccd ,it was inevitable that it should be followed by other beings1 for only the most impotent being would fail to produce something that should proceed from it1#cce while 7it is granted that7 the intelligible possesses a wonderful power#ccf2 wherefore1 it could not help creating4 ,,this ,,is ,,the ,,best ,,of ,,all ,,possible ,,worlds ,,because ,,we ,,can ,,achieve ,,virtue4 ,what would be the nature of a world better than the present one1 if it were possible8 ,the present one must be a faithful image of the intelligible world1 if the existence of the world be necessary1 and if there be no better possible world4 ,the whole earth is peopled with animate and even immortal beings2 from here below up to the heaven 7the world7 is full of them4#ccg ,why should the stars in the highest sphere 7the fixed stars71 and those in the lower spheres 7the planets71 not be divinities1 in view of their regular motion1 and their carrying out a magnificent revolution around the world#cch8 ,why should they not possess virtue8 ,what obstacle could hinder them from acquiring it8 ,not on high are found the things which here below make men evil2 namely1 that evil nature which both is troubled1 and troubles4 ,with their perpetual leisure why should not the stars possess intelligence1 and be acquainted with the divinity and all the other intelligible deities#cci8 ,how should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs8 ,only a foolish man would entertain such thoughts4 ,how could our souls be superior to the stars when at the hands of the universal ,soul they undergo the constraint of descending here below#cdj8 ,for the best part of souls is that which commands4#cda ,if1 on the contrary1 the souls descend here below voluntarily1 why should the 7,gnostics7 find fault with this sphere whither they came voluntarily1 and from which they can depart whenever it suits them#cdb8 ,that everything here below depends on the intelligible principles is proved by the fact that the organization of the world is such that1 during this life1 we are able to acquire wisdom1 and live out a life similar to that of the divinities4#cdc ,,the ,,inequality ,,of ,,riches ,,is ,,of ,,no ,,moment ,,to ,,an ,,eternal ,,being4 #i4 ,no one would complain of poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth if one realized that the sage does not seek equality in such things1 because he does not consider that the rich man has any advantage over the poor man1 the prince over the subject4#cdd ,the sage leaves such opinions to commonplace people1 for he knows that there are two kinds of life2 that of the virtuous who achieve the supreme degree 7of perfection7 and the intelligible world1 and that of common earthly men4 ,even the latter life is double2 for though at times they do think of virtue1 and participate somewhat in the good1 at other times they form only a vile crowd1 and are only machines1 destined to satisfy the primary needs of virtuous people4#cde ,there is no reason to be surprised at a man committing a murder1 or1 through weakness1 yielding to his passions1 when souls1 that behave like young1 inexperienced persons1 not indeed like intelligences1 daily behave thus4 ,it has been said#cdf that this life is a struggle in which one is either victor or vanquished4 ,but is not this very condition a proof of good arrangement8 ,what does it matter if you are wronged1 so long as you are immortal8 ,if you be killed1 you achieve the fate that you desired4 ,if you have reason to complain of how you are treated in some particular city1 you can leave it4#cdg ,besides1 even here below1 there evidently are rewards and punishments4 ,why then complain of a society within which distributive justice is exercised1 where virtue is honored1 and where vice meets its deserved punishment#cdh8 ,,moreover ,,this ,,world ,,contains ,,traditions ,,of ,,divinity4 ,not only are there here below statues of the divinities1 but even the divinities condescend to look on us1 leading everything in an orderly manner from beginning to end1 and they apportion to each the fate that suits him1 and which harmonizes with his antecedents in his successive existences4#cdi ,this is unknown only to persons who are most vulgarly ignorant of divine things4 ,try therefore to become as good as you can1 but do not on that account imagine that you alone are capable of becoming good#cej2 for then you would no longer be good4 ,other men 7than you7 are good2 there are most excellent 7ministering spirits called7 guardians2 further1 there are deities who1 while inhabiting this world1 contemplate the intelligible world1#cea and are still better than the guardians4 ,further still is the blissful 7universal7 ,soul that manages the universe4 ,honor therefore the intelligible divinities1 and above all the great ,king of the intelligible world1#ceb whose greatness is especially manifested in the multitude of the divinities4 ,,true ,,knowledge ,,shown ,,not ,,by ,,unification1 ,,but ,,revelation ,,of ,,divine ,,power4 ,it is not by reducing all things to unity1 but by setting forth the greatness developed by the divinity itself1 that one manifests his knowledge of divine power4 ,the ,divinity 7manifests ,his power7 when1 though remaining what ,he is1 ,he produces many divinities which depend on ,him1 which proceed from ,him1 and exist by ,him4 ,in this way this world holds existence from ,him1 and contemplates ,him along with all the divinities which announce to men the divine decrees1 and who reveal to them whatever pleases them4#cec ,these stars must not be blamed for not being what the divinity is1 for they only represent their nature4 ,,modesty ,,is ,a ,,part ,,of ,,goodness2 ,,pride ,,is ,,folly4 ,if1 however1 you pretend to scorn these 7stars that are considered7 divinities1 and if you hold yourself in high esteem1 on the plea that you are not far inferior to them1 learn first that the best man is he who is most modest in his relations with divinities and men4 ,in the second place1 learn that one should think of the divinity only within limits1 without insolence1 and not to seek to rise to a condition that is above human possibilities4 ,it is unreasonable to believe that there is no place by the side of the divinity for all other men1 while impudently proposing alone to aspire to that dignity4 ,this by itself would deprive the ,soul of the possibility of assimilation to the ,divinity to the limit of her receptivity4#ced ,this the ,soul cannot attain unless guided by ,intelligence4 ,to pretend to rise above ,intelligence1#cee is to fall short of it4 ,there are people insane enough to believe1 without reflection1 claims such as the following 7,by initiation into secret knowledge1 or gnosis71 you will be better1 not only than all men1 but even than all the deities4 ,these people are swollen with pride#cef2 and men who before were modest1 simple and humble1 become arrogant on hearing themselves say1 ,you are a child of the divinity2 the other men that you used to honor are not his children1 any more than the stars who were worshipped by the ancients4 ,you yourself1 without working1 are better than heaven itself4 ,then companions crowd around him1 and applaud his utterance4 ,he resembles a man who1 though not knowing how to count1 should1 in the midst of a crowd of men1 equally ignorant with him1 hear it said by somebody that he was a thousand feet high while others were only five feet high4 ,he would not realize what was meant by a thousand feet1 but he would consider this measure very great4 ,,other ,,gnostic ,,inconsistencies4 7,gnostics7 admit that the ,divinity interests ,himself in men4 ,how then could ,he 7as they insist71 neglect the world that contains them8 ,could this be the case because ,he lacked the leisure to look after it8 ,in this case ,he would lack the leisure to look after anything beneath ,him 7including men also74 ,on the other hand1 if ,he do care for men1 that care would include the world that surrounds and contains them4 ,if ,he ignored what surrounded men1 in order to ignore the world1 ,he would thereby also ignore the men themselves4 ,the objection that men do need that the ,divinity should care for the world 7is not true71 for the world does need the care of the ,divinity4 ,the ,divinity knows the arrangement of the world1 the men it contains1 and their condition therein4#ceg ,the friends of the ,divinity support meekly all that results necessarily therefrom4 7,they are right71 for that which happens should be considered not only from one's own standpoint1 but also from that of the totality of circumstances4 ,each 7person or thing7 should be considered from his place 7in the scale of existence72 one should ever aspire to ,him to whom aspire all beings capable of 7the ,good72 one should be persuaded that many beings1 or rather that all beings1 aspire thereto2 that those who attain to ,him are happy1 while the others achieve a fate suitable to their nature2 finally1 one should not imagine oneself alone capable of attaining happiness4#ceh ,mere assertion of possession does not suffice for real possession thereof4 ,there are many men who1 though perfectly conscious that they do not possess some good1 nevertheless boast of its possession1 or who really believe they do possess it1 when the opposite is the true state of affairs2 or that they exclusively possess it when they are the only ones who do not possess it4 ,,plotinos ,,addresses ,,himself ,,to ,,those ,,of ,,his ,,friends ,,who ,,were ,,formerly ,,gnostic1 ,,not ,,to ,,the ,,latter ,,who ,,are ,,hopeless4 #aj4 ,on examining many other assertions 7of the ,gnostics71 or rather1 all of their assertions1 we find more than enough to come to some conclusion concerning the details of their doctrines4 ,we cannot1 indeed1 help blushing when we see some of our friends1 who had imbued themselves with 7,gnostic7 doctrines before becoming friends of ours1 somehow or another persevere therein1 working zealously to try to prove that they deserved full confidence1 or speaking as if they were still convinced that they were based on good grounds4#che ,we are here addressing our friends1 not the partisans 7of the ,gnostics74 ,vainly indeed would we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be deceived by men who furnish no proofs--what proofs indeed could they furnish8--but who only impose on others by their boastfulness4#cei ,,plotinos ,,has ,,no ,,intention ,,of ,,writing ,a ,,full ,,confutation4 ,following another kind of discussion1 we might write a refutation of these men who are impudent enough to ridicule the teachings of those divine men who taught in ancient times1 and who conformed entirely to truth4 ,we shall not however embark on this1 for whoever understands what we have already said will from that 7sample7 be able to judge of the remainder4 ,,gnostic ,,theory ,,of ,,creation ,,by ,,mere ,,illumination4#chf ,neither will we controvert an assertion which overtops all their others in absurdity--we use this term for lack of a stronger4 ,here it is3 ,the ,soul and another ,wisdom inclined downwards towards things here below1 either because the ,soul first inclined downwards spontaneously1 or because she was misled by ,wisdom2 or because 7in ,gnostic view71 ,soul and ,wisdom were identical4 ,the other souls descended here below together 7with the ,soul71 as well as the members of ,wisdom1 and entered into bodies1 probably human4 ,nevertheless the ,soul1 on account of which the other soul descended here below1 did not herself descend4 ,she did not incline1 so to speak1 but only illuminated the darkness4 ,from this illumination was born in matter an image 7,wisdom1 the image of the ,soul74 ,later was formed 7the demiurgic creator1 called7 an image of the image1 by means of matter or materiality1 or of a principle by 7,gnostics7 designated by another name 7the ,fruit of the fall7--for they make use of many other names1 for the purpose of increasing obscurity4 ,this is how they derive their demiurgic creator4 ,they also suppose that this demiurgic creator separated himself from his mother1 ,wisdom1 and from him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity of the images4 ,the perpetration of such assertions amounts to a bitter sarcasm of the power that created the world4 ,,the ,,numberless ,,intellectual ,,difficulties ,,of ,,such ,a ,,theory4 #aa4 ,to begin with1 if the ,soul did not descend1 if she limited herself to illuminating the darkness 7which is synonymous with matter71 by what right could it be asserted that the ,soul inclined 7downwards78 ,if indeed a kind of light issued from the ,soul1 this does not justify an inclination of the ,soul1 unless we admit the existence of something 7darkness7 beneath her1 that the ,soul approached the darkness by a local movement1 and that1 on arriving near it1 the ,soul illuminated it4 ,on the contrary1 if the ,soul illuminated it while remaining self-contained1 without doing anything to promote that illumination1#cfj why did the ,soul alone illuminate the darkness8 7,according to the ,gnostics7 this occurred only after the ,soul had conceived the ,reason of the universe4 ,then only could the ,soul illuminate the darkness1 by virtue of this rational conception4 ,but then1 why did the ,soul not create the world at the same time she illuminated the darkness1 instead of waiting for the generation of 7psychic7 images8 ,further1 why did this ,reason of the world1 which 7the ,gnostics7 call the foreign land1 and which was produced by the superior powers1 as they say1 not move its authors to that inclination8 ,last1 why does this illuminated matter produce psychic images1 and not bodies8 7,wisdom1 or7 the image of the ,soul does not seem to stand in need of darkness or matter4 ,if the ,soul create1 then her image 7,wisdom7 should accompany her1 and remain attached to her4 ,besides1 what is this creature of hers8 ,is it a being1 or is it1 as the 7,gnostics7 say1 a conception8 ,if it be a being1 what difference is there between it and its principle8 ,if it be some other kind of a soul1 it must be a soul of growth and generation1 since its principle is a reasonable soul4#cfa ,if however 7this ,wisdom7 be a soul of growth and generation1 how could it be said to have created for the purpose of being honored#cfb8 ,in short1 how could it have been created by pride1 audacity1 and imagination8 ,still less would we have the right to say that it had been created by virtue of a rational conception4 ,besides1 what necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to have formed him of matter and of an image8 ,speaking of conception1 it would be necessary to explain the origin of this term2 then1 unless a creative force be predicated of this conception1 it would be necessary to show how a conception can constitute a real being4 ,but what creative force can be inherent in this imaginary being8 ,the 7,gnostics7 say that this image 7the demiurgic creator7 was produced first1 and that only afterwards other images were created2 but they permit themselves to assert that without any proof4 ,for instance1 how could it be said that fire was produced first 7and other things only later78 ,,how ,,the ,,gnostic ,,demiurge ,,created4 #ab4 ,how could this newly formed image 7the demiurgic creator7 have undertaken to create by memory of the things he knew8 ,as he did not exist before1 he could not have known anything1 any more than the mother 7,wisdom7 which is attributed to him4 ,besides1 it is quite surprising that1 though the 7,gnostics7 did not descend upon this world as images of souls1 but as veritable1 genuine souls1 nevertheless hardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching themselves from the 7sense7 world and by gathering together their memories1 to remember some of the things they previously knew1 while this image 7the demiurgical creator71 as well as his mother 7,wisdom71 which is a material image1 was capable of conceiving intelligible entities in a feeble manner1 indeed1 as say the ,gnostics1 but after all from her very birth4 ,not only did she conceive intelligible things1 and formed an idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world1 but she also discovered with what elements she was to produce the sense-world4 ,why did she first create the fire8 ,doubtless because she judged she would begin thereby2 for why did she not begin with some other element8 ,if she could produce fire because she had the conception thereof1 why1 as she had the conception of the world--as she must have begun by a conception of the totality--did she not create the whole at one single stroke#cfc8 ,indeed1 this conception of the world embraced all its parts4 ,it would also have been more natural1 for the demiurgical creator should not have acted like a workman1 as all the arts are posterior to nature and to the creation of the world4 ,even to-day1 we do not see the natures#cfd when they beget individuals1 first produce the fire1 then the other elements successively1 and finally mingle them4 ,on the contrary1 the outline and organization of the entire organism are formed at once in the germ born at the monthly periods in the womb of the mother4 ,why then1 in creation1 should matter not have been organized at one stroke by the type of the world1 a type that must have contained fire1 earth1 and all the rest of them8 ,perhaps the 7,gnostics7 would have thus conceived of the creation of the world1 if 7instead of an image7 they had had in their system a genuine ,soul4 ,but their demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus4 ,to conceive of the greatness1 and especially of the dimension of the heavens1 of the obliquity of the zodiac1 of the course of the stars1 the form of the earth1 and to understand the reason of each of these things1 would not have been the work of an image1 but rather of a power that proceeded from the better principles1 as the 7,gnostics7 in spite of themselves acknowledge4 ,,the ,,necessity ,,of ,,the ,,illumination ,,of ,,the ,,darkness ,,must ,,have ,,been ,,eternal4 ,indeed1 if we examine attentively that in which this illumination of the darkness consists1 the 7,gnostics7 may be led to a recognition of the true principles of the world4 ,why was the production of this illumination of the darkness necessary1 if its existence was not absolutely unavoidable8 ,this necessity 7of an illumination of the darkness7 was either in conformity with1 or in opposition to nature4 ,if it conformed thereto1 it must have been so from all time2 if it were contrary thereto1 something contrary to nature would have happened to the divine powers1 and evil would be prior to the world4 ,then it would no longer be the world that was the cause of evil 7as the ,gnostics claim71 but the divine powers4 ,the world is not the principle of evil for the soul1 but it is the soul that is the principle of evil for the world4 ,ascending from cause to cause1 reason will relate this world to the primary principles4 ,,even ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,darkness ,,must ,,be ,,related ,,to ,,the ,,soul4 ,if matter is also said to be the cause of evil1 where does it originate8 ,for the darkness existed already1 as say 7the ,gnostics71 when the soul has seen and illuminated them4 ,from whence 7comes darkness78 ,if 7the ,gnostics7 answer that it is the soul herself that created 7darkness7 by inclining 7downwards to matter71 then evidently 7the darkness7 did not exist before the inclination of the soul4 ,darkness therefore is not the cause of this inclination2 the cause is in the nature of the soul4 ,this cause may thus be related to preceding necessities1 and as a result to first principles4#cfe ,,instead ,,of ,,complaining ,,of ,,the ,,world1 ,,understand ,,it ,,and ,,fit ,,yourself ,,to ,,it4 #ac4 ,those who complain of the nature of the world do not know what they are doing1 nor the extent of their audacity4 ,many men are ignorant of the close concatenation which unites the entities of the first1 second1 and third ranks1#cff and which descends even to those of the lowest degree4 ,instead of blaming what is subordinate to first principles1 we should gently submit to the laws of the universe1 rise to first principles1 not undergo those tragic terrors1#cfg inspired in certain people by the spheres of the world which exert on us nothing but a beneficent influence4#cfh ,what is so terrible in them8 ,why should they be feared by these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learning8 ,though celestial spheres do have fiery bodies1 they should not inspire us with any fear1 because they are perfectly harmonious with the universe and with the earth4 ,we must besides consider the souls of the stars to which those 7,gnostics7 consider themselves so superior1 while their bodies1 which surpass ours so much in size and beauty1 efficaciously concur in the production of things that are conformed to the order of nature#cfi2 for such things could not be born if first principles alone existed4 ,finally the stars complete the universe1 and are important members thereof4 ,if even man holds a great superiority over animals1 there must be a far greater superiority in those stars which exist as ornaments to the universe1 and to establish order therein1 and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence4#cgj ,the events that are said to flow from the stars are rather signs thereof than causes4#cga ,besides1 the events that really do flow from the stars differ among each other by circumstances4 ,it is not therefore possible that the same things should happen to all men1 separated as they are by their times of birth1 the places of their residence1 and the dispositions of their souls4 ,it is just as unreasonable to expect that all would be good1 nor1 because of the impossibility of this1 to go and complain on the grounds that all sense-objects should be similar to intelligible objects4 ,moreover1#cgb evil is nothing but what is less complete in respect to wisdom1 and less good1 in a decreasing gradation4 ,for instance1 nature 7that is1 the power of growth and generation7 should not be called evil because she is not sensation2 nor sensation be called evil1 because it is not reason4 ,otherwise1 we might be led to think that there was evil in the intelligible world4 ,indeed1 the ,soul is inferior to ,intelligence1 and ,intelligence is inferior to the ,one4 ,,gnostics ,,wrongly ,,imagine ,,intelligible ,,entities ,,can ,,be ,,bewitched4#chg #ad4 ,another error of the 7,gnostics7 is their teaching that intelligible beings are not beyond the reach of being affected by human beings4 ,when the 7,gnostics7 utter magic incantations1 addressing them to 7intelligible beings71 not only to the ,soul1 but to the ,principles superior thereto1 what are they really trying to do8 ,to bewitch them8 ,to charm them8 ,or1 to influence them#cgc8 ,they therefore believe that divine beings listen to us1 and that they obey him who skilfully pronounces these songs1 cries1 aspirations and whistlings1 to all of which they ascribe magic power4#cgd ,if they do not really mean this1 if they by sounds only claim to express things which do not fall under the senses1 then1 through their effort to make their art more worthy of respect1 they unconsciously rob it of all claim to respect1 in our estimation4 ,,their ,,explanation ,,of ,,disease ,,as ,,demoniacal ,,possession ,,is ,,wrong4 ,they also pride themselves on expelling diseases4 ,if this were done through temperance1 by a well regulated life1 as do the philosophers1 this claim might be respected4 ,but they insist that diseases are demons1 which they can expel by their words1 and they boast of this in order to achieve reputation among the common people1 that is always inclined to stand in awe of magic4 ,they could not persuade rational individuals that diseases do not have natural causes1 such as fatigue1 satiety1 lack of food1 corruption1 or some change depending on an interior or exterior principle4 ,this is proved by the nature of diseases4 ,sometimes a disease is expelled by moving the bowels1 or by the administration of some potion2 diet and bleeding are also often resorted to4 ,is this because the demon is hungry1 or the potion destroys him8 ,when a person is healed on the spot1 the demon either remains or departs4 ,if he remain1 how does his presence not hinder recovery8 ,if he depart1 why8 ,what has happened to him8 ,was he fed by the disease8 ,in this case1 the disease was something different from the demon4 ,if he enter without any cause for the disease1 why is the individual into whose body he enters not always sick8 ,if he enter into a body that contains already a natural cause of disease1 how far does he contribute to the disease8 ,the natural cause is sufficient to produce the disease4 ,it would be ridiculous to suppose that the disease would have a cause1 but that1 as soon as this cause is active there would be a demon ready to come and assist it4 ,,the ,,genuine ,,value ,,of ,,gnosticism ,,seen ,,in ,,its ,,low ,,moral ,,aspects4 ,the reader must now clearly see the kind of assertions given out by the 7,gnostics71 and what their purpose must be4 ,what they say about demons 7or guardians7 has here been mentioned only as a commentary on their vain pretenses4 ,other opinions of the 7,gnostics7 may best be judged by a perusal of their books1 by each individual for himself4 ,remember always that our system of philosophy contains1 beside the other good 7reasons71 the simplicity of moral habits1 the purity of intelligence1 and that instead of vain boasting it recommends the care of personal dignity1 rational self-confidence1 prudence1 reserve1 and circumspection4 ,the remainder 7of ,gnostic philosophy7 may well be contrasted with ours4 ,as all that is taught by the ,gnostics is very different 7from our teachings71 we would have no advantage in a further detailed contrast2 and it would be unworthy of us to pursue the matter7874 ,,the ,,gnostic ,,destiny ,,of ,,man ,,is ,,demoralizing4 #ae4 ,we should however observe the moral effect produced in the soul of those who listen to the speeches of these men who teach scorn of the world and its contents4 ,about the destiny of man there are two principal doctrines4 ,the one assigns as our end the pleasures of the body1 the other suggests honesty and virtue1 the love of which comes from the divinity1 and leads back to the ,divinity1 as we have shown elsewhere4#cge ,epicurus1 who denies divine ,providence1 advises us to seek the only thing that remains1 the enjoyments of pleasure4 ,well1 the 7,gnostics7 hold a still more pernicious doctrine2 they blame the manner in which divine ,providence operates1 and they accuse ,providence itself2 they refuse respect to laws established here below1 and the virtue which has been honored by all centuries4 ,to destroy the last vestiges of honor1 they destroy temperance by joking at it2 they attack justice1 whether natural1 or acquired by reason or exercise2 in one word1 they annihilate everything that could lead to virtue4 ,nothing remains but to seek out pleasure1 to profess selfishness1 to renounce all social relations with men1 to think only of one's personal interest1 unless indeed one's own innate disposition be good enough to resist their pernicious doctrines4 ,nothing that we regard as good is by them esteemed1 for they seek entirely different objects4 ,,the ,,gnostics ,,ignore ,,virtue ,,without ,,which ,,god ,,is ,a ,,mere ,,word4 ,nevertheless1 those who know the ,divinity should attach themselves to ,him even here below1 and by devoting themselves to ,his first principles1 correct earthly things by applying their divine nature thereto4 ,only a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand that of which honor consists2 those who have no virtue could never rise to intelligible entities4 ,our criticism of the 7,gnostics7 is justified by this that they never speak of virtue1 never study it1 give no definition of it1 do not make out its kinds1 and never repeat anything of the beautiful discussions thereof left to us by the ancient sages4 ,the 7,gnostics7 never tell how one could acquire or preserve moral qualities1 how one should cultivate or purify the soul4#cgf ,their precept1 ,contemplate the divinity1#cgg is useless if one does not also teach how this contemplation is to take place4 ,one might ask the 7,gnostics7 if such contemplation of the divinity would be hindered by any lust or anger8 ,what would hinder one from repeating the name of the divinity1 while yielding to the domination of the passions1 and doing nothing to repress them8 ,virtue1 when perfected1 and by wisdom solidly established in the soul1 is what shows us the divinity4 ,without real virtue1 ,god is no more than a name4 ,,scorn ,,of ,,this ,,world ,,is ,,no ,,guarantee ,,of ,,goodness4 #af4 ,one does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities1 the world1 and the beauties it contains4 ,scorn of the divinities is the chief characteristic of the evil4 ,perversity is never complete until scorn of the divinities is reached2 and if a man were not otherwise perverse1 this vice would be sufficient to make him such4 ,the respect which the 7,gnostic7 pretend to have for the intelligible divinities 7the aeons7 is an illogical accident4 ,for when one loves a being1 he loves all that attaches thereto2 he extends to the children the affection for the parent4 ,now every soul is a daughter of the heavenly ,father4 ,the souls that preside over the stars are intellectual1 good1 and closer to the divinity than ours4 ,how could this sense-world1 with the divinities it contains1 be separated from the intelligible world8 ,we have already shown above the impossibility of such a separation4 ,here we insist that when one scorns beings so near to those that hold the front rank1 it can only be that one knows them by name only4 ,,to ,,except ,,certain ,,classes ,,of ,,being ,,from ,,divine ,,care ,,is ,,to ,,show ,,callousness ,,of ,,disposition4 ,how could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine ,providence does not extend to sense-objects1 or at least interests itself only in some of them 7the spiritual men1 not the psychical78 ,such an assertion must surely be illogical4 ,the 7,gnostics7 claim that divine ,providence interests itself only in them4 ,was this the case while they were living on high1 or only since they live here below8 ,in the first case1 why did they descend onto this earth8 ,in the second1 why do they remain here below8 ,besides1 why should the ,divinity not be present here below also8 ,otherwise how could ,he know that the 7,gnostics71 who are here below1 have not forgotten ,him1 and have not become perverse8 ,if ,he know those that have not become perverse1 ,he must also know those who have become perverse1 to distinguish the former from the latter4 ,he must therefore be present to all men1 and to the entire world1 in some manner or other4 ,thus the world will participate in the ,divinity4 ,if the ,divinity deprived the world of ,his presence1 ,he would deprive you also thereof1 and you could not say anything of ,him or of the beings below ,him4 ,the world certainly derives its existence from ,him whether the divinity protect you by ,his providence or ,his help1 and whatever be the name by which you refer to ,him4 ,the world never was deprived of the ,divinity1 and never will be4 ,the world has a better right than any individuals to the attentions of ,providence1 and to participation in divine perfections4 ,this is particularly true in respect to the universal ,soul1 as is proved by the existence and wise arrangement of the world4 ,which of these so proud individuals is as well arranged1 and as wise as the universe1 and could even enter into such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity8 ,indeed1 unless made merely in the course of a discussion1 such a comparison is really an impiety4 ,to doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind and senseless man1 without experience or reason1 and who is so far removed from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not even know the sense-world8 ,could any musician who had once grasped the intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound emotion8 ,what skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy symmetry1 order and proportion1 in the objects that meet his view8 ,though their eyes behold the same objects as common people1 experts see in them different things2 when1 for instance1 with practiced glance1 they examine some picture4 ,when recognizing in sense-objects an image of intelligible 7essence71 they are disturbed and reminded of genuine beauty3 that is the origin of love4#cgh ,one rises to the intelligible by seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face4 ,heavy and senseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible beauties1 this harmony1 and this imposing arrangement1 this grand panoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance1 without being stirred to enthusiasm1 and admiration of their splendor and magnificence4 ,he who can fail to experience such feelings must have failed to observe sense-objects1 or know even less the intelligible world4 ,,gnostics ,,justify ,,their ,,hate ,,of ,,the ,,body ,,by ,,plato2 ,,in ,,this ,,case ,,they ,,should ,,follow ,,him ,,also ,,in ,,admiration ,,of ,,the ,,world4 #ag4 ,some 7,gnostics7 object that they hate the body because ,plato#cgi complains much of it1 as an obstacle to the soul1 and as something far inferior to her4 ,in this case1 they should1 making abstraction of the body of the world by thought1 consider the rest2 that is1 the intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the world1 and then the incorporeal souls which1 in perfect order1 communicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an intelligible model1 so that what is begotten might1 so far as possible1 by its greatness1 equal the indivisible nature of its model2 for the greatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of intelligible power4 ,let the 7,gnostics7 therefore consider the celestial sphere1 whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine power that contains its principle1 middle and end1 or whether they imagine it as immovable1 and not yet exerting its action on any of the things it governs by its revolution4 ,in both ways they will attain a proper idea of the ,soul that presides over this universe4 ,let them then conceive of this soul as united to a body1 though remaining impassible1 and still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of participating therein1#chj some of its perfections1 for the divinity is incapable of jealousy4#cha ,then they will form a proper idea of the world4 ,they will understand how great is the power of the ,soul1 since she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of her receptivity4 ,this body has no beauty by nature1 but when 7it is beautified by the ,soul7 it entrances divine souls4 ,,gnostics ,,boast ,,of ,,lack ,,of ,,appreciation ,,of ,,beauty ,,already ,,recognized4 ,the 7,gnostics7 pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of the world1 and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly bodies4 ,in this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste1 nor recognize beauty in the sciences1 in contemplation1 nor in the divinity itself2 for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation in first principles4 ,if they be not beautiful1 neither could those first principles be such4 ,consequently sense-beings are beautiful1 though less beautiful than intelligible beings4 ,the scorn professed by 7,gnostics7 for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only to the beauty of women and of young boys1 and if its only purpose be to lead to chastity4 ,but you may be sure that they do not boast of scorning what is ugly1 they only boast of scorning what they had at first recognized and loved as being beautiful4 ,,even ,,exterior ,,or ,,partial ,,beauty ,,need ,,not ,,conflict ,,with ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,the ,,universe2 ,,and ,,in ,,any ,,case ,,there ,,would ,,be ,,no ,,evil ,,in ,,it4 ,we must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in the parts and in the whole1 in individuals and in the universe2 that there are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals1 for instance1 in the guardians1 to lead us to admire their creator1 and to prove to us that they indeed are works of his4 ,in this way we may attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal ,soul1 if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects1 and if1 without scorning them1 we know how to rise to intelligible entities4 ,if the interior of a sense-being be beautiful1 we shall judge that it is in harmony with its exterior beauty4 ,if it be ugly we will consider that it is inferior to its principle4 ,but it is impossible for a being really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within2 for the exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the interior4#chb ,those who are called beautiful1 but who are ugly within1 are externally beautiful only deceptively4 ,in contradiction to those who claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly soul1 ,i insist that such never existed1 and that it was a mistake to consider them beautiful4 ,if such men were ever seen1 their interior ugliness was accidental1 and also their soul was1 by nature1 beautiful2 for we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching our goal4 ,but the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from possessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior beauty4 ,the beings to whom nature has not1 from the beginning1 given perfection1 may indeed not attain their goal1 and consequently may become perverted2 but the universe never was a child1 nor imperfect2 it did not develop1 and received no physical increase4 ,such a physical increase would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed everything4 ,nor could we admit that its ,soul had ever1 in the course of time1 gained any increase4 ,but even if this were granted to the 7,gnostics71 this could not constitute any evil4 ,,recognition ,,of ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,the ,,body ,,need ,,not ,,imply ,,attachment ,,thereto2 ,,it ,,is ,,compatible ,,with ,,resignation4 #ah4 7,gnostics7 however might object that their doctrine inspired revulsion from1 and hate for the body1 while 7that of ,plotinos7 really attached the soul to the body 7by recognition of its beauty74 ,hardly4 ,we may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful house4 ,the first guest blamed the disposition of the plan1 and the architect who constructed it1 but nevertheless remained within it4 ,the other guest1 instead of blaming the architect1 praised his skill1 and awaited the time when he might leave this house1 when he should no longer need it4 ,the first guest would think himself wiser and better prepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are composed of lifeless stones and beams1 and that this house was far from truly representing the intelligible house4 ,he would however not know that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion1 is that he did not know how to support necessary things1 while his companion 7who did not blame the house7 will be able to leave it without regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately4 ,so long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed by the 7world7 ,soul1 who is our beneficent sister1 and who had the power to do such great things without any effort4#chc ,,gnostics ,,acknowledge ,,kinship ,,with ,,depraved ,,men1 ,,but ,,refuse ,,it ,,to ,,the ,,beautiful ,,universe1 ,,of ,,which ,,we ,,should ,,be ,,far ,,prouder4 ,the ,gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their brothers1 but refuse this name to the sun1 and the other deities of heaven1 and to the very ,soul of the world1 fools that they are6 ,doubtless1 to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of kindred1 we must no longer be perverse1 we must have become good1 and instead of being bodies1 we must be souls in these bodies2 and1 so far as possible1 we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the universal ,soul dwells within the body of the universe4 ,to do this1 one has to be firm1 not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of sight or hearing1 and to remain untroubled by any reverse4 ,the ,soul of the world is not troubled by anything1 because she is outside of the reach of all4 ,we1 however1 who here below are exposed to the blows of fortune1 must repel them by our virtue1 weakening some1 and foiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul4#chd ,when we shall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach 7of all exigencies71 having approached the ,soul of the universe and of the stars1 we shall try to become her image1 and even to increase this resemblance to the assimilation of fusion4 ,then1 having been well disposed by nature and exercised1 we also will contemplate what these souls have been contemplating since the beginning4 ,we must also remember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege of contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really contemplate this world any more than any other men4 ,,gnostics ,,who ,,boast ,,superiority ,,to ,,the ,,divinities ,,who ,,cannot ,,leave ,,their ,,bodies ,,are ,,in ,,reality ,,ignorant ,,of ,,the ,,true ,,state ,,of ,,affairs4 ,vainly also do some 7,gnostics7 boast of having to leave their bodies when they will have ceased to live1 while this is impossible to the divinities because they always fill the same function in heaven4 ,they speak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside of the body1 and of how the universal ,soul in her entirety wisely governs what is inanimate4 ,,the ,,jealous ,,distinction ,,between ,,the ,,spiritual1 ,,psychic ,,and ,,material ,,is ,,due ,,chiefly ,,to ,,ignorance ,,of ,,other ,,people',s ,,attainments4 ,we ourselves may very well not love the body1 we may become pure1 scorn death1 and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are superior to earthly things4 ,but on this account we should not be jealous of other men1 who are not only capable of following the same goal1 but who do constantly pursue it4 ,let us not insist that they are incapable of doing so4 ,let us not fall into the same error as those who deny the movement of the stars1 because their senses show them to remain immovable4 ,let us not act as do the 7,gnostics71 who believe that the nature of the stars does not see what is external1 because they themselves do not see that their own souls are outside4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,a ,stoic term4 #b ,as says ,parmenides1 verse #hj4 #c ,cicero1 ,tusc4 i4 #af2 ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #a2 ,maxim4 ,tyr4 xvii4 #e4 #d ,as wastage1 see #f4d1 #aj2 as ,numenius might have said in #ab1 #bb4 #e ,as said ,numenius fr4 #df4 #f ,see ,plato's ,timaeus #cg4 #g ,od4 xvii4 #dhf4 #h ,see v4 #c4e1 #f4 #i ,see v4 #c4aj4 #aj ,see v4 #c4h1 #i4 #aa ,see v4 #c4ab-ag4 #ab ,see v4 #e4ac4 #ac ,see ii4 #a4b4 #ad ii #a4a4 #ae ,aristotle1 ,met4 v4 #d4 #af ,aristotle1 ,met4 xii4 #b4 #ag ,aristotle1 ,met4 vii4 #h4 #ah ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #e4 #ai ,aristotle1 ,met4 xii4 #e4 #bj ,aristotle1 ,met4 ix4 #h4 #ba ,aristotle1 ,met4 ix4 #e4 #bb ,that is1 their producing potentiality1 and not the potentiality of becoming these things1 as thought ,aristotle4 ,met4 ix4 #b4 #bc ,as thought ,aristotle1 ,soul1 iii4 #g2 ,met4 xii4 #bd ,by ,plato in the ,timaeus #eb4 #be ,see iv4 #f4 ,a polemic against ,aristotle1 de ,anima ii4 #e1 and the ,stoics1 ,cleanthes1 ,sextus ,empiricus1 adv4 ,math4 vii4 #bhh1 and ,chrysippus1 ,diog4 ,laert4 vii4 #ej4 #bf ,as thought ,chrysippus1 ,diog4 ,laert4 vii4 #aaa4 #bg ,see iv4 #f4 #bh ,see vi4 #f4af4 #bi ,see ii4 #f4b4 #cj ,plato1 in his ,phaedo #abg4 #ca ,see i4 #b4a4 #cb ,see i4 #b4a1 the ,socratic definition4 #cc ,see i4 #a4b4d4 #cd ,see ii4 #e4b4 #ce ,see i4 #b4d4 #cf ,a term of ,stoic psychology4 #cg ,see i4 #b4d4 #ch ,these are the so-called passions of the ,stoic ,chrysippus1 ,diog4 ,laert4 vii4 #aaa4 #ci ,of the ,stoic contention1 ,tert4 de ,anima1 #e4 #dj ,see i4 #a4ac4 #da ,as was taught by ,cleanthes1 ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 vii4 #bhh4 #db ,see iii4 #f4c4 #dc ,or1 affections1 as we shall in the future call them1 in ,english4 #dd ,see i4 #h4ae4 #de ,or1 blindly1 see iii4 #h4a-c2 iv4 #d4ac1 #ad4 #df ,see iii4 #f4c1 and i4 #a4ac4 #dg ,see iii4 #f4f4 #dh ,see i4 #d4h4 #di ,notice this ,numenian name for the divinity used at the beginning of the ,escoreal ,numenius fragment4 #ej ,see iii4 #h4i4 #ea ,as ,plato asked in his ,sophist #bdf2 ,cxi4 #beb4 #eb ,as thought ,philo in ,leg4 ,alleg4 i4 #ec ,see ii4 #d4ae4 #ed ,see ii4 #e4c-e4 #ee ,see vi4 #b4 #ef ,see ii4 #d4aa4 #eg ,as thought ,plato in the ,timaeus #di-eb4 #eh ,see ii4 #e4e4 #ei de ,gen4 et ,corr4 ii4 #b1 #c4 #fj ,as objected ,aristotle1 in de ,gen4 et ,corr4 i4 #g4 #fa ,see ii4 #g4a4 #fb iii4 #f4b4 #fc ,as asked ,aristotle1 de ,gen4 i4 #g4 #fd ,in his ,timaeus #ej4 #fe ,see iii #f4ab1 #ac4 #ff ,in his ,timaeus #ea4 #fg ,see ii4 #d4aa4 #fh ,in his ,timaeus #ea4 #fi ,in his ,timaeus #di4 #gj ,see iii4 #f4aa4 #ga ,as said ,plato1 in his ,timaeus #eb4 #gb ,see ii4 #h4ad4 #gc ,see iii4 #e4i4 #gd ,the myth of ,pandora1 see iv4 #c4ad4 #ge ,see iii4 #f4d4 #gf ,see iii4 #f4e1 #f4 #gg ,by a bastard reasoning1 see ii4 #d4aj4 #gh ,see ii4 #d4i-ab4 #gi ,see iii4 #f4ab4 #hj ,see ii4 #g4b4 #ha ,see iii4 #f4ac4 #hb ,see ii4 #d4h4 #hc ,see ii4 #f4c4 #hd ,see ii4 #d4e4 #he ,see iii4 #d4f4 #hf ,it would create the magnitude that exists in matter2 that is1 apparent magnitude4 #hg ii4 #d4aa2 against ,moderatus of ,gades4 #hh ,see ii4 #d4aa4 #hi ,see iv4 #f4c4 #ij ,see ii4 #d4ab4 #ia ,that is1 intelligible being4 #ib ,see iii4 #f4h4 #ic ,see ii4 #g4a4 #id ,as was suggested by ,plato in the ,timaeus #di-eb4 #ie ,as was suggested by ,herodotus1 ii4 #ea1 and ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 iii4 #bb4 #if ,that is1 ,cybele1 see v4 #a4g4 #ig ,the ,stoics4 #ih ,we have here another internal proof of the rightness of our present chronological order of ,plotinos's ,enneads4 ,the myth of ,pandora occurs in iv4 #c4ad1 which follows this book4 #ii ,against the ,manicheans4 #ajj ,see vi4 #g4da4 #aja ,see i4 #a4ac4 #ajb ,in that port of the ,philebus1 #bi2 ,c ii4 #cde4 #ajc ,as thought ,plato1 in the ,phaedrus1 #bdf-bdh4 #ajd ,as was taught by the ,manicheans4 #aje ,as thought ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #bj2 and ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 iii4 #a-c4 #ajf ,see ii4 #i4ah4 #ajg #db2 #fi4 #ajh #bfd2 ,c vi4 #dh4 #aji ,rep4 x4 ,c #bhg4 #aaj ,see iv4 #c4g4 #aaa ,see iv4 #c4f4 #aab ,see iv4 #c4f4 #aac ,generative4 #aad ,see iii4 #b4af4 #aae ,in the sense that it has no limits4 #aaf ,see iv4 #c4ae4 #aag ,as thought ,xenocrates and ,aristotle1 de ,coelo1 i4 #aj4 #aah ,see iv4 #c4aj4 #aai ,philo1 de ,sommis1 ,m #fdh1 de ,monarchia1 ,m #bag4 #abj ,see iii4 #f4af1 #ag4 #aba ,as said ,numenius1 fr4 #cb4 #abb ,as did ,discord1 in ,homer's ,iliad1 iv4 #ddc4 #abc ,see ii4 #i4g4 #abd ,see v4 #g4a4 #abe ,see ii4 #c4g4 #abf ,plato1 ,rep4 x4 ,c #fag2 ,c x4 #bhf4 #abg ,see iv4 #d1 #bd1 #dj1 #dc2 iv4 #i4c4 #abh ,as was taught by ,himerius2 see also ,plutarch and ,themistius4 #abi ,as ,numenius said1 fr4 #bf4c4 #acj ,in his ,timaeus1 #ce4 #aca ,as said ,numenius1 fr4 #cb4 #acb ,see ,aristotle1 ,plato's ,critias1 ,numenius1 #cb1 and ,proclus4 #acc ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #a4d4 #acd ,in his ,timaeus1 #cd2 #cj4 #ace ,plato does just the opposite4 #acf ,being the power which directs the animal from above1 see i4 #a4g4 #acg ,as thought ,plato in the ,timaeus1 #gc4 #ach iv4 #c4ac4 #aci ,as thought ,plato in the ,menexenus1 #bdh4 #adj ,as ,aristotle asked1 de ,memoria et ,remin4 #a4 #ada ,see i4 #a4aa4 #adb ,plato1 ,philebus1 ,c ii4 #cei4 #adc ,as thought ,plato1 in the ,philebus1 ,c ii4 #ceg4 #add ,as thought ,plato in his ,philebus1 ,c ii4 #cfc4 #ade ,see i4 #a4ab2 iv4 #c4cb2 the irrational soul1 which is an image of the rational soul1 is plunged in the darkness of sense-life4 #adf ,as thought ,plato in his ,philebus1 ,c ii4 #cei4 #adg ,in iv4 #c4bg4 #adh ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,mem4 #a4 #adi ,as thought ,aristotle4 #aej ,as thought ,aristotle4 #aea ,see i4 #d4aj4 #aeb ,as ,numenius said1 fr4 #cb4 #aec ,another reading is3 ,all perceptions belong to forms which can reduce to all things4 ,but this does not connect with the next sentence4 #aed ,according to ,plato ,phaedrus1 #bdf2 ,c vi4 #dj1 and ,philebus1 #cj2 ,c ii4 #cdg4 #aee ,timaeus1 #cc4 #aef ,a pun on schma and schsis4 #aeg ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,gen4 et ,corr4 ii4 #b-h4 #aeh ,rep4 x4 #fag2 ,c x4 #bhg2 see #b4c4i4 #aei ,rep4 x4 #afj ,according to ,aristotle4 #afa iv4 #d4bc4 #afb ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #g4 #afc ,see section #e4 #afd ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,anim4 ii4 #g4 #afe ,as ,plato pointed out in his ,meno1 #hj4 #aff ,as ,plato teaches4 #afg ,a mistaken notion of ,plato's1 then common2 see ,matth4 #f4bc4 #afh ,diog4 ,laert4 vii4 #aeg4 #afi ,section #h4 #agj ,section #b4 #aga ,section #f4 #agb ,this ,stoic theory is set forth by ,diogenes ,laertes in vii4 #aeg4 #agc ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #h4 #agd ,as ,aristotle again thought4 #age ,as thought ,aristotle1 de ,gener4 ,anim4 v4 #a4 #agf ,see iv4 #d4bi4 #agg ,this book sounds more ,numenian or ,amelian1 than the former three1 which seem to have been written to answer questions of ,porphyry's4 #agh ,see section #a-g4 #agi ,as thought ,aristotle in his ,physics1 viii4 #ahj iv4 #c4aj4 #aha ,see ii4 #c4ac4 #ahb iii4 #f4f4 #ahc ,children1 whose minds are still weak1 and cannot understand the theories of speculative sciences exhibited by ,nic4 ,eth4 x4 #g4 #ahd ,this upper part of the universal ,soul is the principal power of the soul2 see ii4 #c4ag4 #ahe ,see ii4 #c4ah4 #ahf ,in his ,phaedrus1 #bgb1 ,cary1 #ge4 #ahg ,that is1 the essence of the known object1 a pun on reason1 as in ii4 #f4b4 #ahh see iv4 #f4c4 #ahi ,which is the visible form2 see iii4 #h4a4 #aij ,as thought ,plato1 ,banquet1 ,cary1 #ca1 and ,aristotle in ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #d4 #aia ,this sounds as if it were a quotation from ,numenius1 though it does not appear in the latter's fragments4 #aib ,see i4 #h4b4 #aic ,see v4 #a4d4 #aid ,see iii4 #g4b4 #aie ,see iii4 #g4aj4 #aif ,notice the connection between this thought and ii4 #e1 written in the same period of his life2 see vi4 #h4ah4 #aig ,see iii4 #c4g and vi4 #h4ae4 #aih ,that is1 the intelligible matter of ii4 #d4c4 #aii ,as thought ,aristotle1 in ,nic4 ,eth4 i4 #g2 de ,anima1 ii4 #a4 #bjj ,see vi4 #h4af4 #bja vi4 #h4ae4 #bjb ,a pun on koros1 meaning both fulness and son4 #bjc ,another proof of the chronological order2 see #c4h4i4 #bjd ,cicero1 ,orator #b2 ,seneca1 ,controversiae v4 #cf4 #bje ii4 #h4a4 #bjf ,see i4 #f4h4 #bjg i4 #f4b4 #bjh i4 #f4i4 #bji i4 #f4h4 #baj i4 #f4b4 #baa i4 #f4f4 #bab i4 #f4e4 #bac iii4 #e4f4 #bad ,as thought ,plato1 in ,phaedrus1 ,cary1 #eh4 #bae ,phaedrus1 ,cary1 #ei1 #fb2 ,numenius1 #cb4 #baf ,see ii4 #b4a4 #bag ,in ,sophocles ,oedipus ,coloneus1 #acge2 a pun on d and dikn4 #bah ,a pun between science and knowledge4 #bai ,in his ,phaedrus2 ,cary1 #eh4 #bbj ,see v4 #a4h4 #bba ,see iv4 #d4aa1 #ab4 #bbb ,a pun on the word meaning forms and statues1 mentioned above4 #bbc ,such as ,numenius fr4 #bj4 #bbd ,pun on agalmata1 which has already done duty for statues and forms4 #bbe ,here ,plotinos refers to the hieratic writing1 which differed from both the hieroglyphic and demotic4 #bbf ,see iii4 #b and #c4 #bbg ,see ii4 #i4ab2 iii4 #b4a4 #bbh ,in his ,phaedrus1 #bdf2 ,cary1 #ee4 #bbi ,as was taught by ,cleomedes1 ,meteora viii1 and ,ptolemy1 ,almagest i1 ,geogr4 i4 #g2 vii4 #e4 #bcj ,see i4 #f4i4 #bca ,in his ,timaeus1 #cg2 ,cary1 c4 #ad4 #bcb ,see i4 #c4b2 i4 #f4h4 #bcc ,referring to the ,gnostics2 see ii4 #i4ag2 this is another proof of the chronological order4 #bcd ,as proposed in ii4 #i4ag4 #bce ,see i4 #h4ae4 #bcf ,as thought ,plato in his ,phaedrus2 ,cary1 #ef4 #bcg ,the infra-celestial vault1 of ,theodor of ,asine4 #bch ,as said ,plato1 in his ,phaedrus2 ,cary1 #ei4 #bci ,see v4 #a4f4 #bdj ,gnostics4 #bda ,pun on koros1 fulness1 or son4 #bdb ,or1 being satiated with good things4 #bdc ,see ,life of ,plotinos1 #ah4 ,notice how well the chronological order works out4 ,the former book 7#ca7 and the next 7#cc7 treat of the ,gnostics1 while this book treats of the philosophical principle of their practical aspect4 ,besides1 it explains the ,amelio-,porphyrian quarrel4 ,like all other difficulties of the time1 it was about ,gnosticism1 and ,amelius's dismissal meant that ,plotinos rejected ,egyptian ,gnosticism1 and ,numenius's true position as a dualist stands revealed2 but after ,porphyry's departure1 ,plotinos harked back to it4 #bdd ,we see here an assertion of the standpoint later asserted by ,berkeley1 ,kant and ,hegel that the mind cannot go outside itself1 and that consequently it is the measure of all things4 ,kant's thing-in-itself1 a deduction from this1 was already discovered by ,plotinos in the result of the bastard reasoning process1 which ,hegel called dialectic4 #bde ,see iii4 #f4a4 #bdf ,the ,kantian thing-in-itself4 ,see ,porphyry1 ,principles of ,intelligibles1 #cc4 #bdg ,see iii4 #f4a4 #bdh ,here is a pun based on doxa4 #bdi ,paradechomen4 #bej ,doxa1 which is derived from dechesthai1 to receive4 #bea ,we would1 in other words1 become pessimists4 #beb ,this is ,philo's secondary divinity1 p4 #bg1 ,guthrie's ,message of ,philo ,judaeus4 #bec ,that is1 of the ,intelligence and of the intelligible entities4 #bed ,who is the ,unity2 a ,numenian conception1 fr4 #cf4 #bee ,a term reminiscent of the famous ,christian ,nicene formulation4 #bef ,that is we will form a pair4 ,numenius1 #ad1 also taught the ,pythagorean pair or doubleness4 #beg ,see vi4 #f4af4 #beh ,pun between essences1 einai1 and one1 or henos4 #bei ,ousia4 #bfj ,notice the two words for essence4 ,plato ,cratylus1 #dbd2 ,cary1 #hg4 #bfa ,as ,plato in his ,cratylus suggests4 #bfb ,or1 essence4 #bfc ,or1 essence1 to be4 #bfd ,being4 #bfe ,the goddess ,hestia in ,greek1 or ,vesta in ,latin2 but hestia also meant a stand4 ,p4 #dja1 ,cratylus1 ,cary1 #dj4 #bff ,see ,numenius1 #fg1 #db4 #bfg ,see ii4 #i4a2 iii4 #i4i4 #bfh ,such as ,numenius1 #db1 and ,plutarch1 de ,isis et ,osiris1 ,fr4 ,tr4 #cha4 #bfi ,from a-polus4 #bgj ,see i4 #f4d2 iii4 #e4a4 #bga ,see v4 #e4a4 #bgb ,see i4 #f1 end4 #bgc ,pun between on and hen4 #bgd ,see ,plato1 ,rep4 vi41 ,cary1 #ac4 #bge ,mentioned in ,biography of ,plotinos1 #af4 #bgf ,see vi4 #i4 ,another proof of the chronological arrangement4 #bgg ,see v4 #f4 #bgh ,see v4 #a1 #b1 #c1 #f2 vi4 #g1 #i4 #bgi ,of ,bythos4 #bhj ,ennoia and ,thelesis4 #bha ,by distinguishing within each of them potentiality and actualization1 ,numenius1 #be1 multiplied them4 #bhb ,nous1 and ,logos or ,achamoth2 see ii4 #i4f4 #bhc ,the prophoric logos1 see i4 #b4c2 and ,philo4 de ,mosis ,vita #c4 #bhd ,see v4 #c4d4 #bhe ,see i4 #a4g4 #bhf ,this is a mingling of ,platonic and ,aristotelic thought1 see ,ravaisson1 ,essay on the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle1 ii4 #djg4 #bhg ,which would be nonsense2 the ,gnostics 7,valentinus7 had gone as far as #cc aeons4 #bhh ,see ii4 #i4aa4 #bhi ,between the sense-world1 and the intelligible world1 see iv4 #c4e-h2 v4 #b4c4 ,plotinos is followed by ,jamblichus and ,damascius1 but ,proclus and ,hermias denied that the soul did not entirely enter into the body1 ,stobaeus1 ,ecl4 i4 #eb4 #bij ,see iv4 #c4ah2 iv4 #d4c4 #bia ,the intelligible world4 #bib ,see iv4 #c4a-h2 iv4 #i4 #bic ,thus ,plotinos opposes the ,gnostic belief that the world was created1 and will perish4 #bid ,see ii4 #i1 #i1 #af4 #bie ,the ,gnostic ,horos4 #bif ,as ,plato said ,phaedrus1 #bdf2 ,cary1 #ee4 #big ,the ,gnostic theory of creation by the fall of ,sophia and ,achamoth4 #bih ,see ii4 #i4aa4 ,valentinus however said only that ,achamoth had created all things in honor of the aeons2 only the later theologians held this view mentioned by ,plotinos4 #bii ,see i4 #b4a1 #b4 #cjj ,see ,i4 ,tim4 vi4 #bj1 #ba2 and ii4 #i4i4 #cja ,see ii4 #c4i4 #cjb ,see ii4 #a4d4 #cjc ,this1 however1 is a mistake of ,plotinos's1 as the ,gnostics held not this1 but that the pneumatic or spiritual humans dwell on earth1 and the psychic in heaven1 as ,bouillet remarks4 #cjd ,so that they should remain in the model instead of descending here below8 #cje ,by remaining in the model1 instead of descending here below4 #cjf ,that is1 the spiritual germs emanating from the plerma4 #cjg ,plotinos here treats as synonymous new earth1 reason of the world1 model of the world1 and form of the world2 but ,bouillet shows that there is reason to believe he was in error in the matter4 #cjh ,from the plerma1 whose seeds of election they were1 and which now become to them a foreign country4 #cji ,of the aeons1 from whom souls1 as intelligible beings1 had emanated4 #caj ,as in the famous drama of ,sophia and ,achamoth4 #caa ,the unseen place2 the transmigrations of ,basilides1 ,valentinus1 ,carpocrates1 and the others4 #cab ,p4 #ci4 ,cary1 #ae4 #cac ,added to ,plato by ,plotinos4 #cad ,plotinos had done so himself 7,intelligence1 and the intelligible world72 ,numenius 7#be7 also did so4 #cae ,see iv4 #c4h1 #ae4 #caf ,such as ,pythagoras and ,plato1 ,life of ,plot4 #bc4 #cag ,see ii4 #i4ag4 #cah ,the doctrine of the ,gnostics4 #cai ,or1 generations1 the syzygies of the aeons1 see ,titus iii4 #i4 #cbj ii4 #i4ag4 #cba ,as in the drama of the fall of ,sophia and ,achamoth4 #cbb ,see ii4 #a4a2 iii4 #b4a2 iv4 #c4i4 #cbc ,see i4 #b4 #cbd iv4 #c4 #cbe ,for the descending souls enter bodies already organized by the universal ,soul1 see iv4 #c4f2 ii4 #a4e2 ii4 #c4i2 ii4 #i4ah4 #cbf ,lower part1 see ii4 #a4e2 ii4 #c4e1 #ah4 #cbg ,see ii4 #a1 #c1 #d1 #e4 #cbh ,the first bond is nature1 the second is the human soul4 #cbi ,see ii4 #a4c4 #ccj ,that is1 the stars1 ii4 #c4g-ac4 #cca ,see ii4 #i4e4 #ccb ,with ,plato's ,timaeus1 #bi1 ,cary1 #i4 #ccc ,in the universal ,soul1 ii4 #c4af1 #ag4 #ccd ,by existing and creating1 see ii4 #e4b4 #cce ,see i4 #h4g1 for matter4 #ccf ,see ii4 #i4c4 #ccg ,see ,philo1 de ,gigant4 i4 #cch ,see ii4 #b4a4 #cci ,see ii4 #c4i-ac4 #cdj ,see iv4 #h4 #cda ,see ii4 #c4i4 #cdb ,see i4 #d4h4 #cdc ,see i4 #b4 #cdd ,see i4 #d4g4 #cde ,see ii4 #c4ac4 #cdf ,see i4 #d4h4 #cdg ,see i4 #d4ad-af4 #cdh ,see ii4 #c4h1 #af4 #cdi ,see ii4 #c4i4 #cej ,see below4 #cea ,the stars1 see ii4 #c4i4 #ceb ,that is1 ,intelligence1 see i4 #h4b4 #cec ,the stars prognosticate events1 see ii4 #c4i4 #ced ,see i4 #b4 #cee ,to the perfect ,father1 ,bythos1 ,irenaeus1 ii4 #ah4 #cef ,see ,irenaeus1 iii4 #ae4 #ceg ,see ii4 #i4af4 #ceh ,see ,irenaeus4 i4 #ba4 #cei ,see ,irenaeus1 iii4 #ae4 #cfj ,see i4 #a4ab4 #cfa ,thus identifying the reasonable soul with ,sophia1 and the soul of growth and generation with ,achamoth4 #cfb ,see ii4 #i4d4 #cfc ii4 #c4af4 #cfd ,or seminal reasons1 ii4 #c4ac4 #cfe ,see iii4 #d4a4 #cff ,as wrote ,plato in his second ,letter1 #b1 #cab1 ,cary1 #dhb4 #cfg ,jeremiah x4 #b4 #cfh ,pindar1 ,olymp4 i4 #dc4 #cfi ,see ii4 #c4i4 #cgj ,see ii4 #c4g4 #cga ,see ii4 #c4g4 #cgb ,as thought ,plato1 ,laws1 x1 p4 #hig1 ,cviii4 #bfe2 ,cary1 ,c#h1 that evil is only negative4 #cgc ,see ,irenaeus1 i4 #be4 #cgd ,see ,origen1 c4 ,cels4 i4 #bd4 #cge ,see i4 #b4 #cgf ,this is1 however1 extreme1 as ,clement of ,alexandria hands down helpful extracts from ,valentinus1 ,strom4 iv42 etc4 #cgg ,see ii4 #i4i #cgh ,see i4 #f4g4 #cgi ,in his ,phaedo1 pp4 #ff1 #fg2 ,cary1 #bi-cb4 #chj ,that is1 according to its receptivity4 #cha ,as thought ,plato in the ,timaeus1 p4 #bi2 ,c xi4 #aaj1 ,cary1 #aj4 #chb ,by the soul that gives it form1 see i4 #f4b4 #chc ,see iii4 #d4f2 v4 #a4b-f4 #chd ,see i4#d4h-ad4 #che ,this was evidently a rebuke to ,amelius1 for his faithfulness to ,numenius2 and it is at this time that ,amelius left ,plotinos4 #chf ,this may refer to ,numenius's views1 see fr4 #bg b4 #aj4 #chg ,compare ,numenius1 fr4 #fa1 #fb;a4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4 ,infrequent spelling of ,plotinus changed to the predominant ,plotinos4 ,several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched2 ,transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong4 ,this four-volume set contains fifty-four ,books1 each of which contains several ,sections4 ,some of the ,books group those ,sections into sub-,chapters whose headings begin with a letter3 ,a41 ,b41 etc4 7see page #chg as an example74 ,in this plain text version of this e,book1 the ,sections and the sub-,chapters are preceded by two blank lines4 ,section headings beginning with letter enumerations1 such as ,a4 ,b4 ,c4 were printed larger than normal ,section headings4 ,page #cgg3 lation as 7form7 perhaps should be relation as 7form72 unchanged here4 ,page #chg3 two order of things perhaps should be two orders of things4 ,page #dei3 who is imaging to know probably should be who is imagining to know4 ,page #dei3 the opening parenthesis in which 7the ,soul herself has no matching closing parenthesis2 it probably belongs after ,soul4 ,page #dfg3 incorrect_/inconsistent single and double quotation marks in the following line have not been changed3 passion' and suffering1 unless the word suffering' ,page #dgj3 ,what in us in the soul's perhaps should be ,what in us is the soul's4 ,page #did3 in the source1 the last line1 who assumes the various poses suggested by the music1 was out of place2 no suitable place for it was found1 so it has been removed for continuity and now appears only in this note4 ,page #ecj3 the closing parenthesis after perceived object also is the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning is ill-founded4 ,there are other instances in this four-volume set in which closing parentheses and quotation marks are shared4 ,page #eee3 within yourself they you may perhaps should be within yourself then you may4 ,page #fac3 a constitution similar that of each probably should be a constitution similar to that of each4 ,footnote ,issues3 ,in these notes1 anchor means the reference to a footnote1 and footnote means the information to which the anchor refers4 ,anchors occur within the main text1 while footnotes are grouped in sequence at the end of this e,book4 ,the structure of the original book required two exceptions to this1 as explained below4 ,the original text used chapter endnotes4 ,in this e,book1 they have been combined into a single1 ascending sequence based on the sequence in which the footnotes occurred in the original book1 and placed at the end of the e,book4 ,several irregularities are explained below4 #a4 ,some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor1 so two or more anchors may refer to the same footnote4 #b4 ,some anchors were out of sequence1 apparently because they were added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another anchor4 ,they have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes to which they refer4 ,page #cdi3 ,footnote #af 7originally #b7 has no anchor4 ,page #eig3 ,footnote #bea 7originally #i7 has no anchor4