,,plotinos ,complete ,works ,in ,chronological ,order1 ,grouped in ,four ,periods2 ,with ,,biography by ,,porphyry1 ,,eunapius1 ,,suidas1 ,,commentary by ,,porphyry1 ,,illustrations by ,,jamblichus ,,ammonius1 ,,studies in ,sources1 ,development1 ,influence2 ,,index of ,subjects1 ,thoughts and ,words4 by ,,kenneth ,,sylvan ,,guthrie1 ,professor in ,extension1 ,university of the ,south1 ,sewanee2 ,a4,m41 ,sewanee1 and ,harvard2 ,ph4,d41 ,tulane1 and ,columbia4 ,m4,d41 ,medico-,chirurgical ,college1 ,philadelphia4 ,,comparative ,,literature ,,press ,p4 ,o4 ,box #db1 ,,alpine1 ,n4,j41 ,u4,s4,a4 ,copyright1 #aiah1 by ,kenneth ,sylvan ,guthrie4 ,all ,rights1 including that of ,translation1 ,reserved4 ,entered at ,stationers' ,hall1 by ,george ,bell and ,sons1 ,portugal ,street1 ,lincoln's ,inn1 ,london4 ,,plotinos ,complete ,works ,in ,chronological ,order1 ,grouped in ,four ,periods2 ,with ,,biography by ,,porphyry1 ,,eunapius1 ,,suidas1 ,,commentary by ,,porphyry1 ,,illustrations by ,,jamblichus ,,ammonius1 ,,studies in ,sources1 ,development1 ,influence2 ,,index of ,subjects1 ,thoughts and ,words4 by ,,kenneth ,,sylvan ,,guthrie1 ,professor in ,extension1 ,university of the ,south1 ,sewanee2 ,a4,m41 ,sewanee1 and ,harvard2 ,ph4,d41 ,tulane1 and ,columbia4 ,m4,d41 ,medico-,chirurgical ,college1 ,philadelphia4 ,,vol4 ,i ,biographies2 ,amelian ,books1 #a-ba4 ,,comparative ,,literature ,,press ,p4 ,o4 ,box #db1 ,,alpine1 ,n4,j41 ,u4,s4,a4 ,,foreword ,it is only with mixed feelings that such a work can be published4 ,overshadowing all is the supreme duty to the ,english-speaking world1 and secondarily to the rest of humanity to restore to them in an accessible form their1 till now1 unexploited spiritual heritage1 with its flood of light on the origins of their favorite philosophy4 ,and then comes the contrast--the pitiful accomplishment4 ,nor could it be otherwise2 for there are passages that never can be interpreted perfectly2 moreover1 the writer would gladly have devoted to it every other leisure moment of his life--but that was impossible4 ,as a matter of fact1 he would have made this translation at the beginning of his life1 instead of at its end1 had it not been for a mistaken sense of modesty2 but as no one offered to do it1 he had to do it himself4 ,if he had done it earlier1 his ,philosophy of ,plotinos would have been a far better work4 ,indeed1 if it was not for the difficulty and expense of putting it out1 the writer would now add to the text an entirely new summary of ,plotinos's views4 ,the fairly complete concordance1 however1 should be of service to the student1 and help to rectify the latest ,german summary of ,plotinos1 that by ,drews1 which in its effort to furnish a foundation for ,hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious1 neglected both origins and spiritual aspects4 ,however1 the present genetic insight of ,plotinos's development should make forever impossible that theory of cast-iron coherence1 which is neither historical nor human4 ,the writer1 having no thesis such as ,drews' to justify1 will welcome all corrections and suggestions4 ,he regrets the inevitable uncertainties of capitalization 7as between the supreme ,one1 ,intelligence ,world-,soul and ,daemon or guardian1 and the lower one1 intelligence1 soul and demon or guardian72 and any other inconsistencies of which he may have been guilty2 and he beseeches the mantle of charity in view of the stupendousness of the undertaking1 in which he practically could get no assistance of any kind1 and also in view of the almost insuperable difficulties of his own career4 ,he1 however1 begs to assure the reader that he did everything ad majorem ,dei gloriam4 ,,index4 ,,plotinos' ,,complete ,,works4 ,preface #a ,concordance of ,enneads and ,chronological ,numbers #b ,concordance of ,chronological ,numbers and ,enneads #c ,biography of ,plotinos1 by ,porphyry #e ,biographies by ,eunapius and ,suidas #ci ,amelian ,books1 #a-ba #dj ,amelio-,porphyrian ,books1 #bb-bc #bhc ,porphyrian ,books1 #cd-de #fda ,eustochian ,books1 #df-ed #ajag ,,plotinic ,,studies ,,in ,,sources1 ,,development ,,and ,,influence4 #a4 ,development in the ,teachings of ,plotinos #abfi #b4 ,platonism3 ,significance1 ,progress1 and ,results #abhh #c4 ,plotinos' ,view of ,matter #abif #d4 ,plotinos' ,creation of the ,trinity #acjj #e4 ,resemblances to ,christianity #acjg #f4 ,indebtedness to ,numenius #acac #g4 ,value of ,plotinos #acbg ,concordance to ,plotinos i ,an outline of the doctrines of ,plotinos is published under the title ,the ,message of ,plotinos4 ,,concordance ,,of ,,enneads ,,and ,,chronological ,,numbers i4#a #ec iii4#a #c v4#a #aj i4#b #ai iii4#b #dg v4#b #aa i4#c #bj iii4#c #dh v4#c #di i4#d #df iii4#d #ae v4#d #g i4#e #cf iii4#e #ej v4#e #cb i4#f #a iii4#f #bf v4#f #bd i4#g #ed iii4#g #de v4#g #ah i4#h #ea iii4#h #cj v4#h #ca i4#i #af iii4#i #ac v4#i #e ii4#a #dj iv4#a #d vi4#a #db ii4#b #ad iv4#b #ba vi4#b #dc ii4#c #eb iv4#c #bg vi4#c #dd ii4#d #ab iv4#d #bh vi4#d #bb ii4#e #be iv4#e #bi vi4#e #bc ii4#f #ag iv4#f #da vi4#f #cd ii4#g #cg iv4#g #b vi4#g #ch ii4#h #ce iv4#h #f vi4#h #ci ii4#i #cc iv4#i #h vi4#i #i ,,concordance ,,of ,,chronological ,,numbers ,,and ,,enneads #a i4#f #ai i4#b #cg ii4#g #b iv4#g #bj i4#c #ch vi4#g #c iii4#a #ba iv4#b #ci vi4#h #d iv4#a #bb vi4#d #dj ii4#a #e v4#i #bc vi4#e #da iv4#f #f iv4#h #bd v4#f #db vi4#a #g v4#d #be ii4#e #dc vi4#b #h iv4#i #bf iii4#f #dd vi4#c #i vi4#i #bg iv4#c #de iii4#g #aj v4#a #bh iv4#d #df i4#d #aa v4#b #bi iv4#e #dg iii4#b #ab ii4#d #cj iii4#h #dh iii4#c #ac iii4#i #ca v4#h #di v4#c #ad ii4#b #cb v4#e #ej iii4#e #ae iii4#d #cc ii4#i #ea i4#h #af i4#i #cd vi4#f #eb ii4#c #ag ii4#f #ce ii4#h #ec i4#a #ah v4#g #cf i4#e #ed i4#g ,life of ,plotinos ,and ,order of his ,writings ,by ,,porphyry4 7,written when about #gj years of age1 see #bc47 ,i4 ,,plotinos1 ,,like ,,porphyry1 ,,despised ,,his ,,physical ,,nature1 ,,but ,a ,,picture ,,of ,,him ,,was ,,secured4 ,plotinos the philosopher1 who lived recently1 seemed ashamed of having a body4 ,consequently he never spoke of his family or home 7,lycopolis1 now ,syout1 in the ,thebaid1 in ,egypt74 ,he never would permit anybody to perpetuate him in a portrait or statue4 ,one day that ,amelius#a begged him to allow a painting to be made of him1 he said1 ,is it not enough for me to have to carry around this image#b1 in which nature has enclosed us8 ,must ,i besides transmit to posterity the image of this image as worthy of attention8 ,as ,amelius never succeeded in getting ,plotinos to reconsider his refusal1 and to consent to give a sitting1 ,amelius begged his friend ,carterius1 the most famous painter of those times1 to attend ,plotinos's lectures1 which were free to all4 ,by dint of gazing at ,plotinos1 ,carterius so filled his own imagination with ,plotinos's features that he succeeded in painting them from memory4 ,by his advice1 ,amelius directed ,carterius in these labors1 so that this portrait was a very good likeness4 ,all this occurred without the knowledge of ,plotinos4 ,,ii4 ,,sickness ,,and ,,death ,,of ,,plotinos2 ,,his ,,birthday ,,unknown4 ,plotinos was subject to chronic digestive disorders2 nevertheless1 he never was willing to take any remedies1 on the plea that it was unworthy of a man of his age to relieve himself by such means4 ,neither did he ever take any of the then popular wild animal remedy1 because1 said he1 he did not even eat the flesh of domestic animals1 let alone that of savage ones4 ,he never bathed1 contenting himself1 with daily massage at home4 ,but when at the period of the plague1 which was most virulent1#c the man who rubbed him died of it1 he gave up the massage4 ,this interruption in his habits brought on him a chronic quinsy1 which never became very noticeable1 so long as ,i remained with him2 but after ,i left him1 it became aggravated to the point that his voice1 formerly sonorous and powerful1 became permanently hoarse2 besides1 his vision became disturbed1 and ulcers appeared on his hands and feet4 ,all this ,i learned on my return1 from my friend ,eustochius1 who remained with him until his end4 ,these inconveniences hindered his friends from seeing him as often as they used to do1 though he persisted in his former custom of speaking to each one individually4 ,the only solution of this difficulty was for him to leave ,rome4 ,he retired into ,campania1 on an estate that had belonged to ,zethus1 one of his friends who had died earlier4 ,all he needed was furnished by the estate itself1 or was brought to him from the estate at ,minturnae1 owned by ,castricius 7author of a ,commentary on ,plato's ,parmenides1 to whom ,porphyry dedicated his treatise on ,vegetarianism74 ,eustochius himself told me that he happened to be at ,puzzoli at the time of ,plotinos's death1 and that he was slow in reaching the bedside of ,plotinos4 ,the latter then said to him1 ,i have been waiting for you2 ,i am trying to unite what is divine in us#d to that which is divine in the universe4 ,then a serpent1 who happened to be under ,plotinos's death-bed slipped into a hole in the wall 7as happened at the death of ,scipio ,africanus1 ,pliny1 ,hist4 ,nat4 xv4 #dd71 and ,plotinos breathed his last4 ,at that time ,plotinos was #ff years old 7in #bgj1 born in #bje71 according to the account of ,eustochius4 ,the emperor ,claudius ,,ii was then finishing the second year of his reign4 ,i was at ,lilybaeum2 ,amelius was at ,apamaea in ,syria1 ,castricius in ,rome1 and ,eustochius alone was with ,plotinos4 ,if we start from the second year of ,claudius ,,ii and go back #ff years1 we will find that ,plotinos's birth falls in the #ahth year of ,septimus ,severus 7#bje74 ,he never would tell the month or day of his birth1 because he did not approve of celebrating his birth-day either by sacrifices1 or banquets4 ,still he himself performed a sacrifice1 and entertained his friends on the birth-days of ,plato and ,socrates2 and on those days those who could do it had to write essays and read them to the assembled company4 ,,iii4 ,,plotinos',s ,,early ,,education4 ,this is as much as we learned about him during various interviews with him4 ,at eight years of age he was already under instruction by a grammarian1 though the habit of uncovering his nurse's breast to suck her milk1 with avidity1 still clung to him4 ,one day1 however1 she so complained of his importunity that he became ashamed of himself1 and ceased doing so4 ,at #bh years of age he devoted himself entirely to philosophy4 ,he was introduced to the teachers who at that time were the most famous in ,alexandria4 ,he would return from their lectures sad and discouraged4 ,he communicated the cause of this grief to one of his friends1 who led him to ,ammonius1 with whom ,plotinos was not acquainted4 ,as soon as he heard this philosopher1 he said to his friend1 ,this is the man ,i was looking for6 ,from that day forwards he remained close to ,ammonius4 ,so great a taste for philosophy did he develop1 that he made up his mind to study that which was being taught among the ,persians1 and among the ,hindus4 ,when emperor ,gordian prepared himself for his expedition against the ,persians1 ,plotinos1 then #ci years old1 followed in the wake of the army4 ,he had spent between #aj to #aa years near ,ammonius4 ,after ,gordian was killed in ,mesopotamia1 ,plotinos had considerable trouble saving himself at ,antioch4 ,he reached ,rome while ,philip was emperor1 and when he himself was #ej years of age4 ,,the ,,school ,,of ,,ammonius4 ,herennius1 7the pagan7 ,origen1 and ,plotinos had agreed to keep secret the teachings they had received from ,ammonius4 ,plotinos carried out his agreement4 ,herennius was the first one to break it1 and ,origen followed his example4 ,the latter limited himself to writing a book entitled1 ,of ,daemons2 and1 under the reign of ,gallienus1 he wrote another one to prove that ,the ,emperor alone is the ,only ,poet 7if the book was a flattery2 which is not likely4 ,therefore it probably meant3 ,the ,king 7of the universe1 that is1 the divine ,intelligence71 is the only 'demiurgic' ,creator47 ,,plotinos ,,an ,,unsystematic ,,teacher4 ,for a long period ,plotinos did not write anything4 ,he contented himself with teaching orally what he had learned from ,ammonius4 ,he thus passed ten whole years teaching a few pupils1 without committing anything to writing4 ,however1 as he allowed his pupils to question him1 it often happened that his school was disorderly1 and that there were useless discussions1 as ,i later heard from ,amelius4 ,,amelius1 ,,plotinos',s ,,first ,,secretary4 ,amelius enrolled himself among the pupils of ,plotinos during the third year of ,plotinos's stay in ,rome1 which also was the third year of the reign of ,claudius ,,ii1 that is1 #bd years4 ,amelius originally had been a disciple of the ,stoic philosopher ,lysimachus4#e ,amelius surpassed all his fellow-pupils by his systematic methods of study4 ,he had copied1 gathered1 and almost knew by heart all the works of ,numenius4 ,he composed a hundred copy-books of notes taken at the courses of ,plotinos1 and he gave them as a present to his adopted son1 ,hostilianus ,hesychius1 of ,apamea4 7,fragments of ,amelius's writings are found scattered in those of ,proclus1 ,stobaeus1 ,olympiodorus1 ,damascius1 and many of the ,church ,fathers47 ,,iv4 ,,how ,,porphyry ,,came ,,to ,,plotinos ,,for ,,the ,,first ,,time1 ,,in #bec4 ,in the tenth year of the reign of ,gallienus1 ,i 7then being twenty years of age71 left ,greece and went to ,rome with ,antonius of ,rhodes4 ,i found there ,amelius1 who had been following the courses of ,plotinos for eighteen years4 ,he had not yet dared to write anything1 except a few books of notes1 of which there were not yet as many as a hundred4 ,in this tenth year of the reign of ,gallienus1 ,plotinos was fifty-nine years old4 ,when ,i 7for the second1 and more important time7 joined him1 ,i was thirty years of age4 ,during the first year of ,gallienus1 ,plotinos began to write upon some topics of passing interest1 and in the tenth year of ,gallienus1 when ,i visited him for the first time1 he had written twenty-one books1 which had been circulated only among a very small number of friends4 ,they were not given out freely1 and it was not easy to go through them4 ,they were communicated to students only under precautionary measures1 and after the judgment of those who received them had been carefully tested4 ,,plotinos',s ,,books ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,period 7,,the ,,amelian ,,period74 ,i shall mention the books that ,plotinos had already written at that time4 ,as he had prefixed no titles to them1 several persons gave them different ones4 ,here are those that have asserted themselves3 #a4 ,of the ,beautiful4 i4 #f4 #b4 ,of the ,immortality of the ,soul4 iv4 #g4 #c4 ,of ,fate4 iii4 #a4 #d4 ,of the ,nature of the ,soul4 iv4 #a4 #e4 ,of ,intelligence1 of ,ideas1 and of ,existence4 v4 #i4 #f4 ,of the ,descent of the ,soul into the ,body4 iv4 #h4 #g4 ,how does that which is ,posterior to the ,first ,proceed from ,him8 ,of the ,one4 v4 #d4 #h4 ,do all the ,souls form but a ,single ,soul8 iv4 #i4 #i4 ,of the ,good1 or of the ,one4 vi4 #i4 #aj4 ,of the ,three ,principal ,hypostatic ,forms of ,existence1 v4 #a4 #aa4 ,of ,generation1 and of the ,order of ,things after the ,first1 v4 #b4 #ab4 7,of the ,two7 ,matters1 7the ,sensible and ,intelligible74 ii4 #d4 #ac4 ,various ,considerations1 iii4 #i4 #ad4 ,of the 7,circular7 ,motion of the ,heavens4 ii4 #b4 #ae4 ,of the ,daemon ,allotted to ,us1 iii4 #d4 #af4 ,of 7,reasonable7 ,suicide1 i4 #i4 #ag4 ,of ,quality1 ii4 #f4 #ah4 ,are there ,ideas of ,individuals8 v4 #g4 #ai4 ,of ,virtues4 i4 #b4 #bj4 ,of ,dialectics4 i4 #c4 #ba4 7,how does the ,soul keep the ,mean between ,indivisible ,nature and ,divisible ,nature87 iv4 #b4 ,these twenty-one books were already written when ,i visited ,plotinos2 he was then in the fifty-ninth year of his age4 ,v4 ,,how ,,porphyry ,,came ,,to ,,plotinos ,,for ,,the ,,second ,,time 7,a4 ,d4 #bfc-bfi74 ,i remained with him this year1 and the five following ones4 ,i had already visited ,rome ten years previously2 but at that time ,plotinos spent his summers in vacation1 and contented himself with instructing his visitors orally4 ,during the above-mentioned six years1 as several questions had been cleared up in the lectures of ,plotinos1 and at the urgent request of ,amelius and myself that he write them down1 he wrote two books to prove that ,,plotinos',s ,,books ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,period 7,,the ,,porphyrian ,,period74 #bb4 ,the ,one and ,identical ,existence is ,everywhere ,entire1 ,i1 vi4 #d4 #bc4 ,second ,part ,thereof4 vi4 #e4 ,then he wrote the book entitled3 #bd4 ,the ,superessential ,transcendent ,principle ,does ,not ,think4 ,which is the ,first ,thinking ,principle8 ,and ,which is the ,second8 v4 #f4 ,he also wrote the following books3 #be4 ,of ,potentiality and ,actualization4 ii4 #e4 #bf4 ,of the ,impassibility of ,incorporeal ,entities4 iii4 #f4 #bg4 ,of the ,soul1 ,first ,part4 iv4 #c4 #bh4 ,of the ,soul1 ,second ,part4 iv4 #d4 #bi4 7,of the ,soul1 ,third2 or1 ,how do ,we ,see87 iv4 #e4 #cj4 ,of ,contemplation4 iii4 #h4 #ca4 ,of ,intelligible ,beauty4 v4 #h4 #cb4 ,the ,intelligible ,entities are not ,outside of ,intelligence4 ,of ,intelligence and of ,soul4 v4 #e4 #cc4 ,against the ,gnostics4 ii4 #i4 #cd4 ,of ,numbers4 vi4 #f4 #ce4 ,why do ,distant ,objects ,seem ,small8 ii4 #h4 #cf4 ,does ,happiness 7,consist in ,duration87 i4 #e4 #cg4 ,of the ,mixture with ,total ,penetration4 ii4 #g4 #ch4 ,of the ,multitude of ,ideas2 ,of the ,good4 vi4 #g4 #ci4 ,of the ,will4 vi4 #h4 #dj4 7,of the ,world74 ii4 #a4 #da4 ,of ,sensation1 and of ,memory4 iv4 #f4 #db4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 ,first4 vi4 #a4 #dc4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 ,second4 vi4 #b4 #dd4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 ,third4 vi4 #c4 #de4 ,of ,eternity and ,time4 iii4 #g4 ,plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years ,i spent with him2 as subjects he would take the problems that happened to come up1 and which we have indicated by the titles of these books4 ,these twenty-four books1 joined to the twenty-one ,plotinos had written before ,i came to him1 make forty-five4 ,,vi4 ,,plotinos',s ,,books ,,of ,,the ,,third ,,period 7,,the ,,eustochian ,,period74 ,while ,i was in ,sicily1 where ,i went in the fifteenth year of the reign of ,gallienus1 he wrote five new books that he sent me3 #df4 ,of ,happiness4 i4 #d4 #dg4 ,of ,providence1 ,first4 iii4 #b4 #dh4 ,of ,providence1 ,second4 iii4 #c4 #di4 ,of the ,hypostases that ,act as ,means of ,knowledge1 and of the ,transcendent4 v4 #c4 #ej4 ,of ,love4 iii4 #e4 ,these books he sent me in the last year of the reign of ,claudius ,,ii1 and at the beginning of the second4 ,shortly before dying1 he sent me the following four books3 #ea4 ,of the ,nature of ,evils4 i4 #h4 #eb4 ,of the ,influence of the ,stars4 ii4 #c4 #ec4 ,what is the ,animal8 ,what is ,man8 i4 #a4 #ed4 ,of the ,first ,good 7or1 of ,happiness74 i4 #g4 ,these nine books1 with the forty-five previously written1 make in all fifty-four4 ,some were composed during the youth of the author1 others when in his bloom1 and finally the last1 when his body was already seriously weakened2 and they betray his condition while writing them4 ,the twenty-one first books seem to indicate a spirit which does not yet possess all its vigor and firmness4 ,those that he wrote during the middle of his life1 show that his genius was then in its full form4 ,these twenty-four books may be considered to be perfect1 with the exception of a few passages4 ,the last nine are less powerful than the others2 and of these nine1 the last four are the weakest4 ,,vii4 ,,various ,,disciples ,,of ,,plotinos4 ,plotinos had a great number of auditors and disciples1 who were attracted to his courses by love of philosophy4 ,among this number was ,amelius of ,etruria1 whose true name was ,gentilianus4 ,he did indeed insist that in his name the letter l should be replaced by r1 so that his name should read ,amerius1 from ameria 7meaning indivisibility1 though ,suidas states that it was derived from the town of ,ameria1 in the province of ,umbria71 and not ,amelius1 from amellia 7negligence74 ,a very zealous disciple of ,plotinos was a physician from ,scythopolis 7or1 ,bethshean1 in ,palestine71 named ,paulinus1 whose mind was full of ill-digested information and whom ,amelius used to call ,mikkalos 7the tiny74 ,eustochius of ,alexandria1 also a physician1 knew ,plotinos at the end of his life1 and remained with him until his death1 to care for him4 ,exclusively occupied with the teachings of ,plotinos1 he himself became a genuine philosopher4 ,zoticus1 also1 attached himself to ,plotinos4 ,he was both critic and poet2 he corrected the works of ,antimachus1 and beautifully versified the fable of the ,atlantidae4 ,his sight gave out1 however1 and he died shortly before ,plotinos4 ,paulinus also1 died before ,plotinos4 ,zethus was one of the disciples of ,plotinos4 ,he was a native of ,arabia1 and had married the daughter of ,theodosius1 friend of ,ammonius4 ,he was a physician1 and much beloved by ,plotinos1 who sought to lead him to withdraw from public affairs1 for which he had considerable aptitude2 and with which he occupied himself with zeal4 ,plotinos lived in very close relations with him2 he even retired to the country estate of ,zethus1 distant six miles from ,minturnae4 ,castricius1 surnamed ,firmus1 had once owned this estate4 ,nobody1 in our times1 loved virtue more than ,firmus4 ,he held ,plotinos in the deepest veneration4 ,he rendered ,amelius the same services that might have been rendered by a good servant1 he displayed for me the attentions natural towards a brother4 ,nevertheless this man1 who was so attached to ,plotinos1 remained engaged in public affairs4 ,several senators1 also1 came to listen to ,plotinos4 ,marcellus1 ,orontius1 ,sabinillus and ,rogatianus applied themselves1 under ,plotinos1 to the study of philosophy4 ,the latter1 who also was a member of the senate1 had so detached himself from the affairs of life1 that he had abandoned all his possessions1 dismissed all his attendants1 and renounced all his dignities4 ,on being appointed praetor1 at the moment of being inaugurated1 while the lictors were already waiting for him1 he refused to sally forth1 and carry out any of the functions of this dignity4 ,he even failed to dwell in his own house 7to avoid needless pomp72 he visited his friends1 boarding and sleeping there2 he took food only every other day2 and by this dieting1 after having been afflicted with gout to the point of having to be carried around in a litter1 he recovered his strength1 and stretched out his hands as easily as any artisan1 though formerly his hands had been incapacitated4 ,plotinos was very partial to him2 he used to praise him publicly1 and pointed him out as a model to all who desired to become philosophers4 ,another disciple of ,plotinos was ,serapion of ,alexandria4 ,at first he had been a rhetorician1 and only later applied himself to philosophy4 ,nevertheless he never was able to cure himself of fondness for riches1 or usury4 ,me also1 ,porphyry1 a native of ,tyre1 ,plotinos admitted to the circle of his intimate friends1 and he charged me to give the final revision to his works4 ,,viii4 ,,personal ,,characteristics ,,of ,,plotinos4 ,once ,plotinos had written something1 he could neither retouch1 nor even re-read what he had done1 because his weak eyesight made any reading very painful4 ,his penmanship was poor4 ,he did not separate words1 and his spelling was defective2 he was chiefly occupied with ideas4 ,until his death he continuously persisted in this habit1 which was for us all a subject of surprise4 ,when he had finished composing something in his head1 and when he then wrote what he had meditated on1 it seemed as if he copied a book4 ,neither in conversation nor in discussion did he allow himself to be distracted from the purpose of his thoughts1 so that he was able at the same time to attend to the needs of conversation1 while pursuing the meditation of the subject which busied him4 ,when the person who had been talking with him went away1 he did not re-read what he had written before the interruption1 which1 as has been mentioned above1 was to save his eyesight2 he could1 later on1 take up the thread of his composition as if the conversation had been no obstacle to his attention4 ,he therefore was able simultaneously to live with others and with himself4 ,he never seemed to need recuperation from this interior attention1 which hardly ceased during his slumbers1 which1 however1 were troubled both by the insufficiency of food1 for sometimes he did not even eat bread1 and by this continuous concentration of his mind4 ,,ix4 ,,plotinos ,,as ,,guardian ,,and ,,arbitrator4 ,there were women who were very much attached to him4 ,there was his boarding house keeper ,gemina1 and her daughter1 also called ,gemina2 there was also ,amphiclea1 wife of ,aristo1 son of ,jamblichus1 all three of whom were very fond of philosophy4 ,several men and women of substance1 being on the point of death1 entrusted him with their boys and girls1 and all their possessions1 as being an irreproachable trustee2 and the result was that his house was filled with young boys and girls4 ,among these was ,polemo1 whom ,plotinos educated carefully2 and ,plotinos enjoyed hearing ,polemo recite original verses 7874 ,he used to go through the accounts of the managers with care1 and saw to their economy2 he used to say that until these young people devoted themselves entirely to philosophy1 their possessions should be preserved intact1 and see that they enjoyed their full incomes4 ,the obligation of attending to the needs of so many wards did not1 however1 hinder him from devoting to intellectual concerns a continuous attention during the nights4 ,his disposition was gentle1 and he was very approachable by all who dwelt with him4 ,consequently1 although he dwelt full twenty-six years in ,rome1 and though he was often chosen as arbitrator in disputes1 never did he offend any public personage4 ,x4 ,,how ,,plotinos ,,treated ,,his ,,adversary1 ,,olympius4 ,among those who pretended to be philosophers1 there was a certain man named ,olympius4 ,he lived in ,alexandria1 and for some time had been a disciple of ,ammonius4 ,as he desired to succeed better than ,plotinos1 he treated ,plotinos with scorn1 and developed sufficient personal animosity against ,plotinos to try to bewitch him by magical operations4 ,however1 ,olympius noticed that this enterprise was really turning against himself1 and he acknowledged to his friends that the soul of ,plotinos must be very powerful1 since it was able to throw back upon his enemies the evil practices directed against him4 ,the first time that ,olympius attempted to harm him1 ,plotinos having noticed it1 said1 ,at this very moment the body of ,olympius is undergoing convulsions1 and is contracting like a purse4 ,as ,olympius several times felt himself undergoing the very ills he was trying to get ,plotinos to undergo1 he finally ceased his practices4 ,,homage ,,to ,,plotinos ,,from ,a ,,visiting ,,egyptian ,,priest4 ,plotinos showed a natural superiority to other men4 ,an ,egyptian priest1 visiting ,rome1 was introduced to him by a mutual friend4 ,having decided to show some samples of his mystic attainments1 he begged ,plotinos to come and witness the apparition of a familiar spirit who obeyed him on being evoked4 ,the evocation was to occur in a chapel of ,isis1 as the ,egyptian claimed that he had not been able to discover any other place pure enough in ,rome4 ,he therefore evoked ,plotinos's guardian spirit4 ,but instead of the spirit appeared a divinity of an order superior to that of guardians1 which event led the ,egyptian to say to ,plotinos1 ,you are indeed fortunate1 ,o ,plotinos1 that your guardian spirit is a divinity1 instead of a being of a lower order4 ,the divinity that appeared could not be questioned or seen for as long a period as they would have liked1 as a friend who was watching over the sacrificed birds choked them1 either out of jealousy1 or fear4 ,,plotinos',s ,,attitude ,,towards ,,the ,,public ,,mysteries4 ,as ,plotinos's guardian spirit was a divinity1 ,plotinos kept the eyes of his own spirit directed on that divine guardian4 ,that was the motive of his writing his book#f that bears the title ,of the ,guardian ,allotted to ,us4 ,in it he tries to explain the differences between the various spirits that watch over mankind4 ,aurelius1 who was very scrupulous in his sacrifices1 and who carefully celebrated the ,festivals of the ,new ,moon 7as ,numenius used to do87 7on the ,calends of each month71 one day besought ,plotinos to come and take part in a function of that kind4 ,plotinos1 however1 answered him1 ,it is the business of those divinities to come and visit me1 and not mine to attend on them4 ,we could not understand why he should make an utterance that revealed so much pride1 but we dared not question the matter4 ,,xi4 ,,plotinos ,,as ,,detective ,,and ,,as ,,prophet2 ,,porphyry ,,saved ,,from ,,suicide4 ,so perfectly did he understand the character of men1 and their methods of thought1 that he could discover stolen objects1 and foresaw what those who resided with him should some day become4 ,a magnificent necklace had been stolen from ,chione1 an estimable widow1 who resided with him and the children 7as matron874 ,all the slaves were summoned1 and ,plotinos examined them all4 ,then1 pointing out one of them1 he said1 ,this is the culprit4 ,he was put to the torture4 ,for a long while1 he denied the deed2 but later acknowledged it1 and returned the necklace4 ,plotinos used to predict what each of the young people who were in touch with him was to become4 ,he insisted that ,polemo would be disposed to amorous relations1 and would not live long2 which also occurred4 ,as to me1 he noticed that ,i was meditating suicide4 ,he came and sought me1 in his house1 where ,i was staying4 ,he told me that this project indicated an unsound mind1 and that it was the result of a melancholy disposition4 ,he advised me to travel4 ,i obeyed him4 ,i went to ,sicily1#g to study under ,probus1 a celebrated philosopher1 who dwelt in ,lilybaeum4 ,i was thus cured of the desire to die2 but ,i was deprived of the happiness of residing with ,plotinos until his death4 ,,xii4 ,,the ,,project ,,of ,a ,,platonopolis ,,comes ,,to ,,naught4 ,the emperor ,gallienus and the empress ,salonina1 his wife1 held ,plotinos in high regard4 ,counting on their good will1 he besought them to have a ruined town in ,campania rebuilt1 to give it with all its territory to him1 that its inhabitants might be ruled by the laws of ,plato4 ,plotinos intended to have it named ,platonopolis1 and to go and reside there with his disciples4 ,this request would easily have been granted but that some of the emperor's courtiers opposed this project1 either from spite1 jealousy1 or other unworthy motive4 ,,xiii4 ,,personal ,,characteristics ,,of ,,plotinos',s ,,delivery4 ,in his lectures his delivery was very good2 he knew how to make immediate apposite replies4 ,nevertheless1 his language was not correct4 ,for instance1 he used to say anamnemisketai for anamimnesketai2 and he made similar blunders in writing4 ,but when he would speak1 his intelligence seemed to shine in his face1 and to illuminate it with its rays4 ,he grew especially handsome in discussions2 a light dew of perspiration appeared on his forehead1 gentleness radiated in his countenance1 he answered kindly1 but satisfactorily4 ,for three days ,i had to question him1 to learn from him his opinions about the union of the body with the soul2 he spent all that time in explaining to me what ,i wanted to know4#h ,a certain ,thaumasius1 who had entered into the school1 said that he wanted to take down the arguments of the discussion in writing1 and hear ,plotinos himself speak2 but that he would not stand ,porphyry's answering and questioning4 ,nevertheless1 answered ,plotinos1 if ,porphyry does not1 by his questions1 bring up the difficulties that we should solve 7notice1 in the course of the ,enneads1 the continual objections71 we would have nothing to write4 ,,xiv4 ,,philosophical ,,relations ,,of ,,plotinos4 ,the style of ,plotinos is vigorous and substantial1 containing more thoughts than words1 and is often full of enthusiasm and emotion4 ,he follows his own inspirations rather than ideas transmitted by tradition4 ,the teachings of the ,stoics and ,peripatetics are secretly mingled among his works2 the whole of ,aristotle's ,metaphysics is therein condensed4 ,plotinos was fully up to the times in geometry1 arithmetic1 mechanics1 optics and music1 although he did not take an over-weening interest in these sciences4 ,at his lectures were read the ,commentaries of ,severus1 of ,cronius2#i of ,numenius1#aj of ,gaius and ,atticus 7,platonic ,philosophers1 the latter1 setting forth the differences between ,plato and ,aristotle72#aa there were also readings of the works of the ,peripatetics1 of ,aspasius1 of ,alexander 7of ,aphrodisia1 whose theory of ,mixture in the ,universe ,plotinos studies several times71 of ,adrastus1 and other philosophers of the day4 ,none of them1 however1 was exclusively admired by ,plotinos4 ,in his speculations he revealed an original and independent disposition4 ,in all his researches he displayed the spirit of ,ammonius4 ,he could readily assimilate 7what he read72 then1 in a few words1 he summarized the ideas aroused in him by profound meditation thereon4 ,one day ,longinus's book ,on the ,principles1 and his ,on ,antiquarians were read4 ,plotinos said1 ,longinus is a literary man1 but not a philosopher4 ,origen 7the ,pagan#ab7 once came among his audience2 ,plotinos blushed1 and started to rise4 ,origen1 however1 besought him to continue4 ,plotinos1 however1 answered that it was only natural for lecturers to cease talking when they were aware of the presence1 in the audience1 of people who already knew what was to be said4 ,then1 after having spoken a little longer1 he rose4 ,,xv4 ,,porphyry ,,earned ,,recognition ,,at ,,the ,,school ,,of ,,plotinos4 ,at a celebration of ,plato's birthday ,i was reading a poem about the ,mystic ,marriage 7of the ,soul7 when somebody doubted my sanity1 because it contained both enthusiasm and mysticism4 ,plotinos spoke up1 and said to me1 loud enough to be heard by everybody1 ,you have just proved to us that you are at the same time poet1 philosopher1 and hierophant4 ,on this occasion the rhetorician ,diophanes read an apology on the utterances of ,alcibiades in ,plato's ,banquet1 and he sought to prove that a disciple who seeks to exercise himself in virtue should show unlimited complaisance for his teacher1 even in case the latter were in love with him4 ,plotinos rose several times1 as if he wanted to leave the assembly2 nevertheless1 he restrained himself1 and after the audience had dispersed1 he asked me to refute the paper4 ,as ,diophanes would not communicate it to me1 ,i recalled his arguments1 and refuted them2 and then ,i read my paper before the same auditors as those who had heard what had been said by ,diophanes4 ,i pleased ,plotinos so much1 that several times he interrupted me by the words1 ,strike that way1 and you will become the light of men6 ,when ,eubulus1 who was teaching ,platonism at ,athens1 sent to ,plotinos some papers on ,platonic subjects1 ,plotinos had them given to me to examine them and report to him about them4 ,he also studied the laws of astronomy1 but not as a mathematician would have done2 he carefully studied astrology2 but realizing that no confidence could be placed in its predictions1 he took the trouble to refute them several times1 in his work4#ac ,,xvi4 ,,plotinos',s ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,gnostics4 ,at that time there were many ,christians1 among whom were prominent sectarians who had given up the ancient philosophy 7of ,plato and ,pythagoras71 such as ,adelphius and ,aquilinus4 ,they esteemed and possessed the greater part of the works of ,alexander of ,lybia1 of ,philocomus1 of ,demostrates and of ,lydus4 ,they advertised the ,revelations of ,zoroaster1 of ,zostrian1 of ,nicotheus1 of ,allogenes1 of ,mesus1 and of several others4 ,these sectarians deceived a great number of people1 and even deceived themselves1 insisting that ,plato had not exhausted the depths of intelligible being1 or essence4 ,that is why ,plotinos refuted them at length in his lectures1 and wrote the book that we have named ,against the ,gnostics4 ,the rest 7of their books7 he left me to investigate4 ,amelius wrote as much as forty books to refute the work of ,zostrian2 and as to me1 ,i demonstrated by numerous proofs that this alleged ,zoroastrian book was apocryphal1 and had only recently been written by those of that ilk who wished to make people believe that their doctrines had been taught by ,zoroaster4 ,,xvii4 ,,start ,,of ,,the ,,amelio-,,porphyrian ,,controversy1 ,,over ,,numenius4 ,the ,greeks insisted that ,plotinos had appropriated the teachings of ,numenius4 ,trypho1 who was both a ,stoic and a ,platonist1 insisted on this to ,amelius1 who wrote a book that we have entitled1 ,on the ,difference ,between the ,teachings of ,plotinos and ,numenius4 ,he dedicated it to me under the title1 ,to ,basil 7the ,king1 recently used as a name1 ,royal74 ,that was my name before ,i was called ,porphyry1 the ,purple ,one4 ,in my own home language 7,phoenician7 ,i used to be called ,malchus2 that was my father's name1 and in ,greek ,malchus is translated by ,basileus 7,basil1 or ,king74 ,indeed1 ,longinus1 who dedicated his book ,on ,instinct to ,cleodamus1 and me jointly1 there calls me ,malchus2 and ,amelius has translated this name in ,greek1 just as ,numenius translated ,maximus 7from ,latin into ,greek by7 ,megaos 7the great one74 7,i will quote the letter in full74 ,greetings from ,amelius to ,basil 7,royal1 or ,purple ,one73 ,you may be sure that ,i did not have the least inclination even to mention some otherwise respectable people who1 to the point of deafening you1 insist that the doctrines of our friend 7,plotinos7 are none other than those of ,numenius of ,apamea4 ,it is evident enough that these reproaches are entirely due to their desire to advertise their oratorical abilities4 ,possessed with the desire to rend ,plotinos to pieces1 they dare to go as far as to assert that he is no more than a babbler1 a forger1 and that his opinions are impossible4 ,but since you think that it would be well for us to seize the occasion to recall to the public the teachings of which we approve 7in ,plotinos's system of philosophy71 and in order to honor so great a man as our friend ,plotinos by spreading his teachings--although this really is needless1 inasmuch as they have long since become celebrated--,i comply with your request1 and1 in accordance with my promise1 ,i am hereby inscribing to you this work which1 as you well know1 ,i threw together in three days4 ,you will not find in it that system and judiciousness natural to a book composed with care2 they are only reflections suggested by the lectures 7received from ,plotinos71 and arranged as they happened to come to mind4 ,i1 therefore1 throw myself on your indulgence1 especially as the thought of 7,plotinos1 that7 philosopher whom some people are slandering to us1 is not easy to grasp1 because he expresses the same ideas in different manners in accordance with the exigencies of the occasion4 ,i am sure you will have the goodness to correct me1 if ,i happen to stray from the opinions of ,plotinos4 ,as the tragic poet says somewhere1 being overwhelmed with the pressure of duties1 ,i find myself compelled to submit to criticism and correction if ,i am discovered in altering the doctrines of our leader4 ,you see how anxious ,i am to please you4 ,farewell6 ,,xviii4 ,,polemic ,,between ,,amelius ,,and ,,porphyry2 ,,amelius ,,teaches ,,porphyry4 ,i have quoted this letter in full to show that1 even in the times of ,plotinos himself1 it was claimed that ,plotinos had borrowed and advertised as his own teachings of ,numenius2 also that he was called a trifler1 and in short that he was scorned--which happened chiefly because he was not understood4 ,plotinos was far from the display and vanity of the ,sophists4 ,when lecturing1 he seemed to be holding a conversation with his pupils4 ,he did not try to convince you by a formal argument4 ,this ,i realized from the first1 when attending his courses4 ,i wished to make him explain himself more clearly by writing against him a work to prove that the intelligible entities subsist outside of intelligence4#ad ,plotinos had ,amelius read it to him2 and after the reading he laughingly said to him1 ,it would be well for you to solve these difficulties that ,porphyry has advanced against me1 because he does not clearly understand my teachings4 ,amelius indeed wrote a rather voluminous work to answer my objections4#ae ,in turn1 ,i responded4 ,amelius wrote again4 ,this third work at last made me understand1 but not without difficulty1 the thought of ,plotinos2 and ,i changed my views1 reading my retraction at a meeting4 ,since that time1 ,i have had complete confidence in the teachings of ,plotinos4 ,i begged him to polish his writings1 and to explain his system to me more at length4 ,i also prevailed upon ,amelius to write some works4 ,,xix4 ,,how ,,the ,,works ,,of ,,plotinos ,,were ,,put ,,into ,,shape4 ,you may judge of the high opinion of ,plotinos held by ,longinus1 from a part of a letter he addressed to me4 ,i was in ,sicily2 he wished me to visit him in ,phoenicia1 and desired me to bring him a copy of the works of that philosopher4 ,this is what he wrote to me about the matter3 ,please send me the works2 or rather1 bring them with you2 for ,i shall never cease begging you to travel in this one of all other countries1 were it only because of our ancient friendship1 and of the sweetness of the air1 which would so well suit your ruined health2#af for you must not expect to find any new knowledge here when you visit us4 ,whatever your expectations may be1 do not expect to find anything new here1 nor even the ancient works 7of myself1 ,longinus87 that you say are lost4 ,there is such a scarcity of copyists here1 that since ,i have been here ,i have hardly been able to get what ,i lacked of ,plotinos here1 by inducing my copyist to abandon his usual occupations to devote himself exclusively to this work4 ,now that ,i have those works of ,plotinos you sent me1 ,i think ,i have them all2 but these that ,i have are imperfect1 being full of errors4 ,i had supposed that our friend ,amelius had corrected the errors of the copyist2 but his occupations have been too pressing to allow of his attending to this4 ,however passionately ,i desire to examine what ,plotinos has written about the soul1 and about existence1 ,i do not know what use to make of his writings2 these are precisely those of his works that have been most mis-written by the copyists4 ,that is why ,i wish you would send them to me transcribed exactly2 ,i would compare the copies and return them promptly4 ,i repeat that ,i beg you not to send them1 but to bring them yourself with the other works of ,plotinos1 which might have escaped ,amelius4 ,all those he brought here ,i have had transcribed exactly2 for why should ,i not most zealously seek works so precious8 ,i have often told you1 both when we were together1 and apart1 and when you were at ,tyre1 that ,plotinos's works contained reasonings of which ,i did not approve1 but that ,i liked and admired his method of writing2 his concise and forceful style1 and the genuinely philosophical arrangement of his discussions4 ,i am persuaded that those who seek the truth must place the works of ,plotinos among the most learned4 ,,xx4 ,,opinion ,,of ,,longinus1 ,,the ,,great ,,critic1 ,,about ,,plotinos4 ,i have made this rather long quotation only to show what was thought of ,plotinos by the greatest critic of our days1 the man who had examined all the works of his time4 ,at first ,longinus had scorned ,plotinos1 because he had relied on the reports of people ignorant 7of philosophy74 ,moreover1 ,longinus supposed that the copy of the works of ,plotinos he had received from ,amelius was defective1 because he was not yet accustomed to the style of ,plotinos4 ,nevertheless1 if any one had the works of ,plotinos in their purity1 it was certainly ,amelius1 who possessed a copy made upon the originals themselves4 ,i will further add what was written by ,longinus about ,plotinos1 ,amelius1 and the other philosophers of his time1 so that the reader may better appreciate this great critic's high opinion of them4 ,this book1 directed against ,plotinos and ,gentilianus ,amelius1 is entitled ,of the ,limit 7of ,good and ,evil87 and begins as follows3 ,there were1 ,o ,marcellus ,orontius#ag many philosophers in our time1 and especially in the first years of our childhood--for it is useless to complain of their rarity at the present2 but when ,i was still a youth1 there were still a rather goodly number of men celebrated as philosophers4 ,i was fortunate enough to get acquainted with all of them1 because ,i traveled early with our parents in many countries4 ,visiting many nations and towns1 ,i entered into personal relations with such of these men as were still alive4 ,among these philosophers1 some committed their teachings to writings1 with the purpose of being useful to posterity1 while others thought that it was sufficient for them to explain their opinions to their disciples4 ,among the former are the ,platonists ,euclides1 ,democritus 7who wrote ,commentaries on the ,alcibiades1 on the ,phaedo1 and on the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle71 ,proclinus1 who dwelt in the ,troad1 ,plotinos and his disciple ,gentilianus ,amelius1 who are at present teaching at ,rome2 the ,stoics ,themistocles1 ,phebion1 and both ,annius and ,medius1 who were much talked of only recently1 and the ,peripatetician ,heliodorus of ,alexandria4 ,among those who did not write their teachings are the ,platonists ,ammonius 7,saccas7 and 7the pagan7 ,origen1#ah who lived with him for a long while1 and who excelled among the philosophers of that period2 also ,theodotus and ,eubulus1 who taught at ,athens4 ,of course1 they did write a little2 ,origen1 for instance1 wrote about ,the ,guardian ,spirits2 and ,eubulus wrote ,commentaries on the ,philebus1 and on the ,gorgias1 and ,observations on ,aristotle's ,objections against ,plato's ,republic4 ,however1 these works are not considerable enough to rank their authors among those who have seriously treated of philosophy2 for these little works were by them written only incidentally1 and they did not make writing their principal occupation4 ,the ,stoics ,herminus1 ,lysimachus1#ai ,athenaeus and ,musonius 7author of ,memorable ,events1 translated in ,greek by ,claudius ,pollio71 who lived at ,athens4 ,the ,peripateticians ,ammonius and ,ptolemy1 who were the most learned of their contemporaries1 especially ,ammonius1 whose erudition was unequalled1 none of these philosophers wrote any important work2 they limited themselves to writing poems1 or festal orations1 which have been preserved in spite of them4 ,i doubt very much that they wished to be known by posterity merely by books so small 7and unrepresentative71 since they had neglected to acquaint us with their teachings in more significant works4 ,among those who have left written works1 some have done no more than gather or transcribe what has been left to us from the ancient 7philosophers72 among these are ,euclides1 ,democritus and ,proclinus4 ,others limited themselves to recalling some details extracted from ancient histories1 and they tried to compose books with the same materials as their predecessors1 as did ,annius1 ,medius1 and ,phebio2 the latter one trying to make himself famous by style1 rather than by thought4 ,to these we might add ,heliodorus1 who has put in his writings nothing that had not been said by the ancients1 without adding any philosophical explanation4 ,but ,plotinos and ,gentilianus ,amelius1 have shown that they really made a profession of being writers1 both by the great number of questions they treated1 and by the originality of their doctrines4 ,plotinos explained the principles of ,pythagoras and ,plato more clearly than his predecessors2 for neither ,numenius1 nor ,cronius1 nor ,moderatus1#bj nor ,thrasyllus1#ba come anywhere near the precision of ,plotinos when they touch on the same topics4 ,amelius tried to follow in his footsteps1 and adopted the greater part of his ideas2 but differs from him in the verbosity of his demonstrations1 and the diffusion of his style4 ,the writings of these two men alone deserve special consideration2 for what is the use of criticizing the works of imitators2 had we not better study the authors whose works they copied1 without any additions1 either in essential points1 or in argumentation1 doing no more than choosing out the best8 ,this has been our method of procedure in our controversy with ,gentilianus ,amelius's strictures on justice1 in ,plato's works2 and in my examination of ,plotinos's books on the ,ideas4#bb ,so when our mutual friends ,basil of ,tyre1 7,porphyry#bc71 who has written much on the lines of ,plotinos1 having even preferred the teachings of ,plotinos to my own 7as he had been my pupil71 undertook to demonstrate that ,plotinos's views about the ,ideas were better than my own1 ,i have fully refuted his contentions1 proving that he was wrong in changing his views on the subject4#bd ,besides1 ,i have criticized several opinions of ,gentilianus ,amelius and ,plotinos1 as for instance in the ,letter to ,amelius which is long enough to form a whole book4 ,i wrote it to answer a letter sent me from ,rome by ,amelius1 which was entitled ,the ,characteristics of the ,philosophy of ,plotinos4#be ,i1 however1 limited myself to entitling my little work1 ,a ,letter to ,amelius4 ,,xxi4 ,,results ,,of ,,longinus',s ,,criticism ,,and ,,vindication ,,of ,,plotinos',s ,,originality4 ,from the above it will be seen that ,plotinos and ,amelius are superior to all their contemporaries by the great number of questions they consider1 and by the originality of their system2 that ,plotinos had not appropriated the opinions of ,numenius1 and that he did not even follow them2 that he had really profited by the opinions of the ,pythagoreans 7and of ,plato72 further1 that he was more precise than ,numenius1 ,cronius1 and ,thrasyllus4 ,after having said that ,amelius followed in the footsteps of ,plotinos1 but that he was prolix and diffuse in his expositions1 which characteristic forms the difference between their styles1 he speaks of me1 who at that time had known ,plotinos for only a short time1 and says1 ,our mutual friends1 ,basil 7,king7 of ,tyre 7,porphyry71 who has written much1 taking ,plotinos as his model4 ,by that he means that ,i have avoided the rather unphilosophical diffuseness of ,amelius1 and have imitated the 7concise7 style of ,plotinos4 ,the quotation of the judgment of this famous man1 the first critic of his day1 should decide of the reverence due to our philosopher1 ,plotinos4 ,if ,i had been able to visit ,longinus when he begged me to do so1 he would not have undertaken the refutation he wrote1 before having clearly understood ,plotinos's system4 ,,xxii4 ,,the ,,apollonian ,,oracle ,,about ,,plotinos4 7,but when ,i have a long oracle of ,apollo to quote1 why should ,i delay over a letter of ,longinus's1 or1 in the words of the proverb1 quoted in ,iliad xxii4 #abf and ,hesiod ,theogony #ce71 ,why should ,i dally near the oak-trees1 or the rock8 ,if the testimony of the wise is to be adduced1 who is wiser than ,apollo1 a deity who said of himself1 ,i know the number of the grains of sand1 and the extent of the ocean2 ,i understand the dust1 and ,i hear him who does not speak6 ,this was the divinity who had said that ,socrates was the wisest of men2 and on being consulted by ,amelius to discover what had become of the soul of ,plotinos1 said3 ,let me sing an immortal hymn to my dear friend6 ,drawing my golden bow1 ,i will elicit melodious sounds from my lyre4 ,i also invoke the symphonic voice of the choir of ,muses1 ,whose harmonious power raises exultant paeans1 ,as they once sang in chorus in praise of ,achilles1 ,a ,homeric song in divine inspiration4 ,sacred choir of ,muses1 let us together celebrate this man1 ,for long-haired ,apollo is among you6 ,o ,deity1 who formerly wert a man1 but now approachest ,the divine host of guardian spirits1 delivered from the narrowing bonds of necessity ,that enchains man 7while in the body71 and from the tumult caused by the ,confusing whirlwind of the passions of the body1 ,sustained by the vigor of thy mind1 thou hastenest to swim 7,and like the sage ,ulysses in ,phaeacia71 to land on a shore not submerged by the waves1 ,with vigorous stroke1 far from the impious crowds4 ,persistently following the straightening path of the purified soul1 ,where the splendor of the divinity surrounds you1 the home of justice1 ,far from contamination1 in the holy sanctuary of initiation1 ,when in the past you struggled to escape the bitter waves1#bf ,when blood-stained life eddied around you with repulsive currents1 ,in the midst of the waters dazed by frightening tumult1 ,even then the divinities often showed you your end2#bg ,and often1 when your spirit was about to stray from the right path1 ,the immortals beckoned you back to the real end2 the eternal path1 ,enlightening your eyes with radiant beams in the midst of gloomy darkness4 ,no deep slumber closed your eyelids1 and when shaken by the eddies 7of matter71 ,you sought to withdraw your eyes from the night that pressed down upon them2 ,you beheld beauties hidden from any who devote themselves to the study of wisdom4 ,now that you have discarded your cloak of mortality1 and ascended ,climbing out from the tombs of your angelic soul1 ,you have entered the choir of divinities1 where breathes a gentle zephyr4 ,there dwell friendship1 and delightful desire1 ever accompanied by pure joy2 ,there may one quench one's thirst with divine ambrosia2 ,there bound by the ties of love1 one breathes a gentle air1 under a tranquil sky4 ,there dwell the sons of ,jupiter1 who lived in the golden age2 ,the brothers ,minos and ,rhadamanthus1 the just ,aeacus1 ,the divine ,plato1 the virtuous ,pythagoras1 ,and all those who formed the band of immortal love1 ,and who by birth belong to the most blessed of divinities4 ,their soul tastes continual joy amidst perpetual feasts6 ,and you1 blessed man1 after having fought many a valiant fight1 ,in the midst of chaste angels1 you have achieved eternal ,felicity4 ,here1 ,o ,muses1 let us close this hymn in honor of ,plotinos2 ,cease the mazes of the dancing of the graceful choir2 ,this is what my golden lyre had to say of this eternally blessed man6 ,,xxiii4 ,,personal ,,characteristics ,,of ,,plotinos2 ,,the ,,ecstatic ,,trances4 ,this oracle 7pieced out of numerous quotations7 says 7in some now lost lines1 perhaps7 that ,plotinos was kindly1 affable1 indulgent1 gentle1 such as1 indeed we knew him in personal intercourse4 ,it also mentions that this philosopher slept little1 that his soul was pure1 ever aspiring to the divinity that he loved whole-heartedly1 and that he did his utmost to liberate himself 7from terrestrial domination7 to escape the bitter waves of this cruel life4 ,that is how this divine man1 who by his thoughts often aspired to the first 7principle71 to the divinity superior 7to intelligence71 climbing the degrees indicated by ,plato 7in his ,banquet71 beheld the vision of the formless divinity1 which is not merely an idea1 being founded on intelligence and the whole intelligible world4 ,i1 myself1 had the blessed privilege of approaching this divinity1 uniting myself to him1 when ,i was about sixty-eight years of age4 ,that is how the goal 7that ,plotinos sought to achieve7 seemed to him located near him4 ,indeed1 his goal1 his purpose1 his end was to approach the supreme divinity1 and to unite himself with the divinity4 ,while ,i dwelt with him1 he had four times the bliss of reaching that goal1 not merely potentially1 but by a real and unspeakable experience4 ,the oracle adds that the divinities frequently restored ,plotinos to the right path when he strayed from it1 enlightening his eyes by radiant splendor4 ,that is why it may truthfully be said that ,plotinos composed his works while in contemplation of the divinities1 and enjoying that vision4 ,thanks to this sight that your 'vigilant' eyes had of both interior and exterior things1 you have1 in the words of the oracle1 gazed at many beauties that would hardly be granted to many of those who study philosophy4 ,indeed1 the contemplation of men may be superior to human contemplation2 but1 compared to divine knowledge1 if it be of any value whatever1 it1 nevertheless1 could not penetrate the depths reached by the glances of the divinities4 ,till here the oracle had limited itself to indicating what ,plotinos had accomplished while enclosed in the vesture of the body4 ,it then proceeds to say that he arrived at the assembly of the divinities where dwell friendship1 delightful desire1 joy1 and love communing with the divinity1 where the sons of ,god1 ,minos1 ,rhadamanthus1 and ,aeacus are established as the judges of souls4 ,plotinos joined them1 not to be judged1 but to enjoy their intimacy1 as did the higher divinities4 ,there indeed dwell ,plato1 ,pythagoras1 and the other sages who formed the choir of immortal love4 ,reunited with their families1 the blessed angels spend their life in continued festivals and joys1 enjoying the perpetual beatitude granted them by divine goodness4 ,,xxiv4 ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,various ,,enneads4 ,this is what ,i have to relate of the life of ,plotinos4 ,he had1 however1 asked me to arrange and revise his works4 ,i promised both him and his friends to work on them4 ,i did not judge it wise to arrange them in confusion chronologically4 ,so ,i imitated ,apollodorus of ,athens1 and ,andronicus the ,peripatetician1 the former collecting in ten volumes the comedies of ,epicharmus1 and the latter dividing into treatises the works of ,aristotle and ,theophrastus1 gathering together the writings that referred to the same subject4 ,likewise1 ,i grouped the fifty-four books of ,plotinos into six groups of nine 7,enneads71 in honor of the perfect numbers six and nine4 ,into each ,ennead ,i have gathered the books that treat of the same matter1 in each case prefixing the most important ones4 ,the ,first ,ennead contains the writings that treat of ,morals4 ,they are3 #a4 ,what is an ,animal8 ,what is a ,man8 #ec4 #b4 ,of the ,virtues1 #ai4 #c4 ,of ,dialectics1 #bj4 #d4 ,of ,happiness1 #df4 #e4 ,does ,happiness 7consist in ,duration78 #cf4 #f4 ,of ,beauty1 #a4 #g4 ,of the ,first ,good1 and of the ,other ,goods1 #ed4 #h4 ,of the ,origin of ,evils1 #ea4 #i4 ,of 7,reasonable7 ,suicide1 #af4 ,such are the topics considered in the ,first ,ennead2 which thus contains what relates to morals4 ,in the ,second ,ennead are grouped the writings that treat of ,physics1 of the ,world1 and of all that it contains4 ,they are3 #a4 7,of the ,world71 #dj4 #b4 ,of the 7,circular7 ,motion 7of the ,heavens71 #ad4 #c4 ,of the ,influence of the ,stars1 #eb4 #d4 7,of both ,matters7 7,sensible and ,intelligible71 #ab4 #e4 ,of ,potentiality and ,actuality1 #be4 #f4 ,of ,quality 7and of ,form71 #ag4 #g4 ,of ,mixture1 ,where there is ,total ,penetratration1 #cg4 #h4 ,of ,vision4 ,why do ,distant ,objects ,seem ,smaller8 #ce4 #i4 7,against ,those ,who say that the ,demiurgic ,creator is ,evil1 as well as ,the ,world ,itself71 ,against the ,gnostics1 #cc4 ,the ,third ,ennead1 which also relates to the world1 contains the different speculations referring thereto4 ,here are its component writings3 #a4 ,of ,destiny1 #c4 #b4 ,of ,providence1 the ,first1 #dg4 #c4 ,of ,providence1 the ,second1 #dh4 #d4 ,of the ,guardian ,spirit who was ,allotted to ,us1 #ae4 #e4 ,of ,love1 #ej4 #f4 ,of the ,impassibility of ,incorporeal ,things1 #bf4 #g4 ,of ,eternity of ,time1 #de4 #h4 ,of ,nature1 of ,contemplation1 and of the ,one1 #cj4 #i4 ,different ,speculations1 #ac4 ,we have gathered these three ,enneads into one single body4 ,we have assigned the book on the ,guardian ,spirit ,who has been ,allotted to ,us1 in the ,third ,ennead1 because this is treated in a general manner1 and because it refers to the examination of conditions characteristic of the production of man4 ,for the same reason the book on ,love was assigned to the ,first ,ennead4 ,the same place has been assigned to the book on ,eternity and ,time1 because of the observations which1 in this ,ennead1 refer to their nature4 ,because of its title1 we have put in the same group the book on ,nature1 ,contemplation1 and the ,one4 ,after the books that treat of the world1 the ,fourth ,ennead contains those that refer to the soul4 ,they are3 #a4 ,of the ,nature of the ,soul1 the ,first1 #d4 #b4 ,of the ,nature of the ,soul1 the ,second1 #ba4 #c4 ,problems about the ,soul1 the ,first1 #bg4 #d4 ,problems about the ,soul1 the ,second1 #bh4 #e4 7,problems about the ,soul1 the ,third1 or7 ,of ,vision1 #bi4 #f4 ,of ,sensation1 of ,memory1 #da4 #g4 ,of the ,immortality of the ,soul1 #b4 #h4 ,of the ,descent of the ,soul into the ,body1 #f4 #i4 ,do not all ,souls form a ,single ,soul8 #h4 ,the ,fourth ,ennead1 therefore1 contains all that relates to ,psychology4 ,the ,fifth ,ennead treats of ,intelligence4 ,each book in it also contains something about the principle superior to intelligence1 and also about the intelligence characteristic of the soul1 and about ,ideas4 #a4 ,about the three ,principal ,hypostatic ,forms of ,existence1 #aj4 #b4 ,of ,generation1 and of the ,order of ,things ,posterior to the ,first1 #aa4 #c4 ,of the ,hypostatic ,forms of ,existence that ,transmit ,knowledge1 and of the ,superior ,principle1 #di4 #d4 ,how that which is ,posterior to the ,first ,proceeds from it8 ,of the ,one1 #g4 #e4 ,the ,intelligibles are not ,outside of ,intelligence4 ,of the ,good1 #cb4 #f4 ,the ,super-essential ,principle ,does ,not ,think4 ,which is the ,first ,thinking ,principle8 ,which is the ,second8 #bd4 #g4 ,are there ,ideas of ,individuals8 #ah4 #h4 ,of ,intelligible ,beauty1 #ca4 #i4 ,of ,intelligence1 of ,ideas1 and of ,existence1 #e4 ,we have gathered the ,fourth and ,fifth ,ennead into a single volume4 ,of the ,sixth ,ennead1 we have formed a separate volume1 so that all the writings of ,plotinos might be divided into three parts1 of which the first contains three ,enneads1 the second two2 and the third1 a single ,ennead4 ,here are the books that belong to the ,sixth ,ennead1 and to the ,third ,volume4 #a4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 the ,first1 #db4 #b4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 the ,second1 #dc4 #c4 ,of the ,kinds of ,existence1 the ,third1 #dd4 #d4 ,the ,one ,single ,existence is everywhere ,present in its ,entirety1 ,first1 #bb4 #e4 ,the ,one ,single ,existence is everywhere ,present in its ,entirety1 ,second1 #bc4 #f4 ,of ,numbers1 #cd4 #g4 ,of the ,multitude of ,ideas4 ,of the ,good1 #ch4 #h4 ,of the ,will1 and of the ,liberty of the ,one1 #ci4 #i4 ,of the ,good1 or of the ,one1 #i4 ,this is how we have distributed into six ,enneads the fifty-four books of ,plotinos4 ,we have added to several of them1 ,commentaries1 without following any regular order1 to satisfy our friends who desired to have explanations of several points4 ,we have also made headings of each book1 following the chronological order1 with the exception of the book on ,the ,beautiful1 whose date of composition we do not know4 ,besides1 we have not only written up separate summaries for each book1 but also ,arguments1 which are contained among the summaries4#bh ,now we shall try to punctuate each book1 and to correct the mistakes4 ,whatever else we may have to do besides1 will easily be recognized by a reading of these books4 ,,life ,,of ,,plotinos1 ,,by ,,eunapius4 ,the philosopher ,plotinos came from ,egypt2 to be accurate1 ,i will add that his home was ,lycopolis4 ,this fact was not set down by the divine ,porphyry1 though he himself1 as he reports1 was a student of ,plotinos1 and had spent a great part of his life near him4 ,the altars dedicated to ,plotinos are not yet cold2 and not only are his books read by the learned more than are even those of ,plato1 but even the multitude1 though incapable of clearly understanding his doctrine1 nevertheless conforms its conduct of life to his suggestions4 ,porphyry has set down all the details of the life of this philosopher1 so that little can be added thereto2 besides ,porphyry seems to have clearly expounded many of ,plotinos's writings4 ,,life ,,of ,,plotinos1 ,,by ,,suidas4 ,plotinos of ,lycopolis1 philosopher1 disciple of that ,ammonius who had once been a porter1 was the teacher of ,amelius1 who himself had ,porphyry as pupil2 the latter formed ,jamblichus1 and ,jamblichus ,sopater4 ,plotinos prolonged his life till the seventh year of the reign of ,gallienus4 ,he composed fifty-four books1 which are grouped in six enneads4 ,his constitution was weakened by the effects of the sacred disease 7epilepsy74 ,he wrote besides other works4 ,,first ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,sixth4 ,of ,beauty4 ,,review ,,of ,,beauty ,,of ,,daily ,,life4 #a4 ,beauty chiefly affects the sense of sight4 ,still1 the ear perceives it also1 both in the harmony of words1 and in the different kinds of music2 for songs and verses are equally beautiful4 ,on rising from the domain of the senses to a superior region1 we also discover beauty in occupations1 actions1 habits1 sciences and virtues4 ,whether there exists a type of beauty still higher1 will have to be ascertained by discussion4 ,,problems ,,concerning ,,higher ,,beauty4 ,what is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful1 that our ears listen with pleasure to rhythms judged beautiful1 and that we love the purely moral beauties8 ,does the beauty of all these objects derive from some unique1 immutable principle1 or will we recognize some one principle of beauty for the body1 and some other for something else8 ,what then are these principles1 if there are several8 ,or which is this principle1 if there is but one8 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,principle ,,by ,,participation ,,in ,,which ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,beautiful8 ,first1 there are certain objects1 such as bodies1 whose beauty exists only by participation1 instead of being inherent in the very essence of the subject4 ,such are beautiful in themselves1 as is1 for example1 virtue4 ,indeed1 the same bodies seem beautiful at one time1 while at another they lack beauty2 consequently1 there is a great difference between being a body and being beautiful4 ,what then is the principle whose presence in a body produces beauty therein8 ,what is that element in the bodies which moves the spectator1 and which attracts1 fixes and charms his glances8 ,this is the first problem to solve2 for1 on finding this principle1 we shall use it as a means to resolve other questions4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,symmetry1 ,,the ,,stoic ,,definition ,,of ,,beauty4 7,the ,stoics71 like almost everybody1 insist that visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the whole1 joined to the grace of colors4 ,if then1 as in this case1 the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just proportion of their parts1 beauty could not consist of anything simple1 and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound4 ,only the totality will be beautiful2 the parts by themselves will possess no beauty2 they will be beautiful only by their relation with the totality4 ,nevertheless1 if the totality is beautiful1 it would seem also necessary that the parts be beautiful2 for indeed beauty could never result from the assemblage of ugly things4 ,beauty must therefore be spread among all the parts4 ,according to the same doctrine1 the colors which1 like sunlight1 are beautiful1 are beautiful but simple1 and those whose beauty is not derived from proportion1 will also be excluded from the domain of beauty4 ,according to this hypothesis1 how will gold be beautiful8 ,the brilliant lightning in the night1 even the stars1 would not be beautiful to contemplate4 ,in the sphere of sounds1 also1 it would be necessary to insist that what is simple possesses no beauty4 ,still1 in a beautiful harmony1 every sound1 even when isolated1 is beautiful4 ,while preserving the same proportions1 the same countenance seems at one time beautiful1 and at another ugly4 ,evidently1 there is but one conclusion3 namely1 that proportion is not beauty itself1 but that it derives its beauty from some superior principle4 7,this will appear more clearly from further examples74 ,let us examine occupations and utterances4 ,if also their beauty depended on proportion1 what would be the function of proportion when considering occupations1 laws1 studies and sciences8 ,relations of proportion could not obtain in scientific speculations2 no1 nor even in the mutual agreement of these speculations4 ,on the other hand1 even bad things may show a certain mutual agreement and harmony2 as1 for instance1 were we to assert that wisdom is softening of the brain1 and that justice is a generous folly4 ,here we have two revoltingly absurd statements1 which agree perfectly1 and harmonize mutually4 ,further1 every virtue is a soul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined2 yet it could not admit of proportion1 as it involves neither size nor number4 ,again1 granting that the soul is divided into several faculties1 who will undertake to decide which combination of these faculties1 or of the speculations to which the soul devotes itself1 will produce beauty8 ,moreover 7if beauty is but proportion71 what beauty could be predicated of pure intelligence8 ,,beauty ,,consists ,,in ,,kinship ,,to ,,the ,,soul4 #b4 ,returning to our first consideration1 we shall examine the nature of the element of beauty in bodies4 ,it is something perceivable at the very first glance1 something which the soul recognizes as kindred1 and sympathetic to her own nature1 which she welcomes and assimilates4 ,but as soon as she meets an ugly object1 she recoils1 repudiates it1 and rejects it as something foreign1 towards which her real nature feels antipathy4 ,that is the reason why the soul1 being such as it is1 namely1 of an essence superior to all other beings1 when she perceives an object kindred to her own nature1 or which reveals only some traces of it1 rejoices1 is transported1 compares this object with her own nature1 thinks of herself1 and of her intimate being as it would be impossible to fail to perceive this resemblance4 ,,beauty ,,consists ,,in ,,participation ,,in ,a ,,form4 ,how can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful8 ,because1 as we said1 sensible objects participate in a form4 ,while a shapeless object1 by nature capable of receiving shape 7physical7 and form 7intelligible71 remains without reason or form1 it is ugly4 ,that which remains completely foreign to all divine reason 7a reason proceeding from the universal ,soul71 is absolute ugliness4 ,any object should be considered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason1 the matter1 not being able to receive perfectly the form 7which the ,soul gives it74 ,on joining matter1 form co-ordinates the different parts which are to compose unity1 combines them1 and by their harmony produces something which is a unit4 ,since 7form7 is one1 that which it fashions will also have to be one1 as far as a composite object can be one4 ,when such an object has arrived at unity1 beauty resides in it1 and it communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole4 ,when it meets a whole1 the parts of which are perfectly similar1 it interpenetrates it evenly4 ,thus it would show itself now in an entire building1 then in a single stone1 later in art-products as well as in the works of nature4 ,thus bodies become beautiful by communion with 7or1 participation in7 a reason descending upon it from the divine 7universal ,soul74 ,,the ,,soul ,,appreciates ,,the ,,beautiful ,,by ,,an ,,aesthetic ,,sense4 #c4 ,the soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty1 whose sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty1 even when the other faculties take part in this judgment4 ,often the soul makes her 7aesthetic7 decisions by comparison with the form of the beautiful which is within her1 using this form as a standard by which to judge4 ,but what agreement can anything corporeal have with what is incorporeal8 ,for example1 how can an architect judge a building placed before him as beautiful1 by comparing it with the ,idea which he has within himself8 ,the only explanation can be that1 on abstracting the stones1 the exterior object is nothing but the interior form1 no doubt divided within the extent of the matter1 but still one1 though manifested in the manifold8 ,when the senses perceive in an object the form which combines1 unites and dominates a substance which lacks shape1 and therefore is of a contrary nature2 and if they also perceive a shape which distinguishes itself from the other shapes by its elegance1 then the soul1 uniting these multiple elements1 fuses them1 comparing them to the indivisible form which she bears within herself1 then she pronounces their agreement1 kinship and harmony with that interior type4 ,,instances ,,of ,,correspondence ,,of ,,outer ,,sense ,,beauty ,,with ,,its ,,idea4 ,thus a worthy man1 perceiving in a youth the character of virtue1 is agreeably impressed1 because he observes that the youth harmonizes with the true type of virtue which he bears within himself4 ,thus also the beauty of color1 though simple in form1 reduces under its sway that obscurity of matter1 by the presence of the light1 which is something incorporeal1 a reason1 and a form4 ,likewise1 fire surpasses all other bodies in beauty1 because it stands to all other elements in the relation of a form2 it occupies the highest regions2#bi it is the subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the incorporeal beings2 without permitting itself to be penetrated by other bodies1 it penetrates them all2 without itself cooling1 it communicates to them its heat2 by its own essence it possesses color1 and communicates it to others2 it shines and coruscates1 because it is a form4 ,the body in which it does not dominate1 shows but a discolored hue1 and ceases being beautiful1 merely because it does not participate in the whole form of color4 ,once more1 thus do the hidden harmonies of sound produce audible harmonies1 and also yield to the soul the idea of beauty1 though showing it in another order of things4 ,audible harmonies can be expressed in numbers2 not indeed in any kind of numbers1 but only in such as can serve to produce form1 and to make it dominate4 ,,transition ,,from ,,sense ,,beauty ,,to ,,intellectual ,,beauty4 ,so much then for sense-beauties which1 descending on matter like images and shadows1 beautify it and thereby compel our admiration4 #d4 ,now we shall leave the senses in their lower sphere1 and we shall rise to the contemplation of the beauties of a superior order1 of which the senses have no intuition1 but which the soul perceives and expresses4 ,,interior ,,beauties ,,could ,,not ,,be ,,appreciated ,,without ,,an ,,interior ,,model4 ,just as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties if we had never seen them1 nor recognized them as such1 if1 in respect to them1 we had been similar to persons born blind1 likewise we would not know enough to say anything about the beauty either of the arts or sciences1 or of anything of the kind1 if we were not already in possession of this kind of beauty2 nor of the splendor of virtue1 if we had not contemplated the 7golden7 face of ,justice1 and of temperance1 before whose splendor the morning and evening stars grow pale4 ,,moral ,,beauties ,,more ,,delightful ,,than ,,sense-,,beauties4 ,to see these beauties1 they must be contemplated by the faculty our soul has received2 then1 while contemplating them1 we shall experience far more pleasure1 astonishment and admiration1 than in contemplation of the sense-beauties1 because we will have the intuition of veritable beauties4 ,the sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration1 a gentle charm1 desire1 love1 and a pleasurable impulse4 ,,they ,,who ,,feel ,,these ,,sentiments ,,most ,,keenly ,,are ,,called ,,lovers4 ,such are the sentiments for invisible beauties which should be felt1 and indeed are experienced by all souls1 but especially by the most loving4 ,in the presence of beautiful bodies1 all indeed see them2 but not all are equally moved4 ,those who are most moved are designated lovers4#cj ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,these ,,emotions ,,is ,,the ,,invisible ,,soul4 #e4 ,let us now propound a question about experiences to these men who feel love for incorporeal beauties4 ,what do you feel in presence of the noble occupations1 the good morals1 the habits of temperance1 and in general of virtuous acts and sentiments1 and of all that constitutes the beauty of souls8 ,what do you feel when you contemplate your inner beauty8 ,what is the source of your ecstasies1 or your enthusiasms8 ,whence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves1 and to refresh yourselves by retirement from your bodies8 ,such indeed are the experiences of those who love genuinely4 ,what then is the object which causes these1 your emotions8 ,it is neither a figure1 nor a color1 nor any size2 it is that 7colorless7 invisible soul1 which possesses a wisdom equally invisible2 this soul in which may be seen shining the splendor of all the virtues1 when one discovers in oneself1 or contemplates in others1 the greatness of character1 the justice of the heart1 the pure temperance1 the imposing countenance of valor1 dignity and modesty1 proceeding alone firmly1 calmly1 and imperturbably2 and above all1 intelligence1 resembling the divinity1 by its brilliant light4 ,what is the reason that we declare these objects to be beautiful1 when we are transported with admiration and love for them8 ,they exist1 they manifest themselves1 and whoever beholds them will never be able to restrain himself from confessing them to be veritable beings4 ,now what are these genuine beings8 ,they are beautiful4 ,,love ,,of ,,beauty ,,explained ,,by ,,aversion ,,for ,,opposite4 ,but reason is not yet satisfied2 reason wonders why these veritable beings give the soul which experiences them the property of exciting love1 from which proceeds this halo of light which1 so to speak1 crowns all virtues4 ,consider the things contrary to these beautiful objects1 and with them compare what may be ugly in the soul4 ,if we can discover of what ugliness consists1 and what is its cause1 we shall have achieved an important element of the solution we are seeking4 ,let us picture to ourselves an ugly soul2 she will be given up to intemperance2 and be unjust1 abandoned to a host of passions1 troubled1 full of fears caused by her cowardliness1 and of envy by her degradation2 she will be longing only for vile and perishable things2 she will be entirely depraved1 will love nothing but impure wishes1 will have no life but the sensual1 and will take pleasure in her turpitude4 ,would we not explain such a state by saying that under the very mask of beauty turpitude had invaded this soul1 brutalized her1 soiled her with all kinds of vices1 rendering her incapable of a pure life1 and pure sentiments1 and had reduced her to an existence obscure1 infected with evil1 poisoned by lethal germs2 that it had hindered her from contemplating anything she should1 forcing her to remain solitary1 because it misled her out from herself towards inferior and gloomy regions8 ,the soul fallen into this state of impurity1 seized with an irresistible inclination towards the things of sense1 absorbed by her intercourse with the body1 sunk into matter1 and having even received it within herself1 has changed form by her admixture with an inferior nature4 ,not otherwise would be a man fallen into slimy mud1 who no longer would present to view his primitive beauty1 and would exhibit only the appearance of the mud that had defiled him2 his ugliness would be derived from something foreign2 and to recover his pristine beauty he would have to wash off his defilement1 and by purification be restored to what he once was4 ,,ugliness ,,is ,,only ,a ,,foreign ,,accretion4 ,we have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly by mingling with the body1 confusing herself with it1 by inclining herself towards it4 ,for a soul1 ugliness consists in being impure1 no longer unmingled1 like gold tarnished by particles of earth4 ,as soon as this dross is removed1 and nothing but gold remains1 then again it is beautiful1 because separated from every foreign body1 and is restored to its unique nature4 ,likewise the soul1 released from the passions begotten by her intercourse with the body when she yields herself too much to it1 delivered from exterior impressions1 purified from the blemishes contracted from her alliance with the body--that is1 reduced to herself1 she lays aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature foreign to her4 ,,virtues ,,are ,,only ,,purifications4 #f4 ,thus1 according to the ancient 7,platonic or ,empedoclean7 maxim1 courage1 temperance1 all the virtues1 nay1 even prudence1 are but purifications4 ,the mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the man who has not been purified will1 in hell1 dwell at the bottom of a swamp2 for everything that is not pure1 because of its very perversity1 delights in mud1 just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud with delight4 ,and indeed1 what would real temperance consist of1 if it be not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of the body1 and to flee from them as impure1 and as only proper for an impure being8 ,what else is courage1 unless no longer to fear death1 which is mere separation of the soul from the body8 ,whoever therefore is willing to withdraw from the body could surely not fear death4 ,magnanimity is nothing but scorn of things here below4 ,last1 prudence is the thought which1 detached from the earth1 raises the soul to the intelligible world4 ,the purified soul1 therefore1 becomes a form1 a reason1 an incorporeal and intellectual essence2 she belongs entirely to the divinity1 in whom resides the source of the beautiful1 and of all the qualities which have affinity with it4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,welfare ,,is ,,to ,,resemble ,,the ,,divinity4 ,restored to intelligence1 the soul sees her own beauty increase2 indeed1 her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas2 only when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all the remainder4 ,that is the reason that it is right to say that the soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity1 because it is the principle of beauty and of the essences2 or rather1 being is beauty1 while the other nature 7non-being1 matter71 is ugliness4 ,this is the ,first ,evil1 evil in itself1 just as that one 7the ,first ,principle7 is the good and the beautiful2 for good and beauty are identical4 ,consequently1 beauty or good1 and evil or ugliness1 are to be studied by the same methods4 ,the first rank is to be assigned to beauty1 which is identical with the good1 and from which is derived the intelligence which is beautiful by itself4 ,the soul is beautiful by intelligence1 then1 the other things1 like actions1 and studies1 are beautiful by the soul which gives them a form4 ,it is still the soul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection2 being a divine essence1 and participating in beauty1 when she seizes an object1 or subjects it to her dominion1 she gives to it the beauty that the nature of this object enables it to receive4 ,,approach ,,to ,,the ,,good ,,consists ,,in ,,simplification4 ,we must still ascend to the ,good to which every soul aspires4 ,whoever has seen it knows what ,i still have to say1 and knows the beauty of the ,good4 ,indeed1 the ,good is desirable for its own sake2 it is the goal of our desires4 ,to attain it1 we have to ascend to the higher regions1 turn towards them1 and lay aside the garment which we put on when descending here below2 just as1 in the 7,eleusynian1 or ,isiac7 mysteries1 those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses of the sanctuary1 after having purified themselves1 lay aside every garment1 and advance stark naked4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,purpose ,,of ,,life ,,is ,,the ,,ecstatical ,,vision ,,of ,,god4 #g4 ,thus1 in her ascension towards divinity1 the soul advances until1 having risen above everything that is foreign to her1 she alone with ,him who is alone1 beholds1 in all ,his simplicity and purity1 ,him from whom all depends1 to whom all aspires1 from whom everything draws its existence1 life and thought4 ,he who beholds him is overwhelmed with love2 with ardor desiring to unite himself with ,him1 entranced with ecstasy4 ,men who have not yet seen ,him desire ,him as the ,good2 those who have1 admire ,him as sovereign beauty1 struck simultaneously with stupor and pleasure1 thrilling in a painless orgasm1 loving with a genuine emotion1 with an ardor without equal1 scorning all other affections1 and disdaining those things which formerly they characterized as beautiful4 ,this is the experience of those to whom divinities and guardians have appeared2 they reck no longer of the beauty of other bodies4 ,imagine1 if you can1 the experiences of those who behold ,beauty itself1 the pure ,beauty1 which1 because of its very purity1 is fleshless and bodiless1 outside of earth and heaven4 ,all these things1 indeed are contingent and composite1 they are not principles1 they are derived from ,him4 ,what beauty could one still wish to see after having arrived at vision of ,him who gives perfection to all beings1 though himself remains unmoved1 without receiving anything2 after finding rest in this contemplation1 and enjoying it by becoming assimilated to ,him8 ,being supreme beauty1 and the first beauty1 ,he beautifies those who love ,him1 and thereby they become worthy of love4 ,this is the great1 the supreme goal of souls2 this is the goal which arouses all their efforts1 if they do not wish to be disinherited of that sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness1 and privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes4 ,real misfortune is not to lack beautiful colors1 nor beautiful bodies1 nor power1 nor domination1 nor royalty4 ,it is quite sufficient to see oneself excluded from no more than possession of beauty4 ,this possession is precious enough to render worthless domination of a kingdom1 if not of the whole earth1 of the sea1 or even of the heavens--if indeed it were possible1 while abandoning and scorning all that 7natural beauty71 to succeed in contemplating beauty face to face4 ,,the ,,method ,,to ,,achieve ,,ecstasy ,,is ,,to ,,close ,,the ,,eyes ,,of ,,the ,,body4 #h4 ,how shall we start1 and later arrive at the contemplation of this ineffable beauty which1 like the divinity in the mysteries1 remains hidden in the recesses of a sanctuary1 and does not show itself outside1 where it might be perceived by the profane8 ,we must advance into this sanctuary1 penetrating into it1 if we have the strength to do so1 closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things1 without throwing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed us4 ,if we do still see corporeal beauties1 we must no longer rush at them1 but1 knowing that they are only images1 traces and adumbrations of a superior principle1 we will flee from them1 to approach ,him of whom they are merely the reflections4 ,whoever would let himself be misled by the pursuit of those vain shadows1 mistaking them for realities1 would grasp only an image as fugitive as the fluctuating form reflected by the waters1 and would resemble that senseless 7,narcissus7 who1 wishing to grasp that image himself1 according to the fable1 disappeared1 carried away by the current4 ,likewise he would wish to embrace corporeal beauties1 and not release them1 would plunge1 not his body1 but his soul into the gloomy abysses1 so repugnant to intelligence2 he would be condemned to total blindness2 and on this earth1 as well as in hell1 he would see naught but mendacious shades4 ,,how ,,to ,,fly ,,to ,,our ,,fatherland4 ,this indeed is the occasion to quote 7from ,homer7 with peculiar force1 ,let us fly unto our dear fatherland6 ,but how shall we fly8 ,how escape from here8 is the question ,ulysses asks himself in that allegory which represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of ,circe or ,calypso1 where neither the pleasure of the eyes1 nor the view of fleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places4 ,our fatherland is the region whence we descend here below4 ,it is there that dwells our ,father4 ,but how shall we return thither8 ,what means shall be employed to return us thither8 ,not our feet1 indeed2 all they could do would be to move us from one place of the earth to another4 ,neither is it a chariot1 nor ship which need be prepared4 ,all these vain helps must be left aside1 and not even considered4 ,we must close the eyes of the body1 to open another vision1 which indeed all possess1 but very few employ4 ,,how ,,to ,,train ,,this ,,interior ,,vision4 #i4 ,but how shall we train this interior vision8 ,at the moment of its 7first7 awakening1 it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling4 ,your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations of man1 and then the beautiful deeds1 not indeed those performed by artists1 but those 7good deeds7 done by virtuous men4 ,later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful actions4 ,nevertheless1 how will you discover the beauty which their excellent soul possesses8 ,withdraw within yourself1 and examine yourself4 ,if you do not yet therein discover beauty1 do as the artist1 who cuts off1 polishes1 purifies until he has adorned his statue with all the marks of beauty4 ,remove from your soul1 therefore1 all that is superfluous1 straighten out all that is crooked1 purify and illuminate what is obscure1 and do not cease perfecting your statue until the divine resplendence of virtue shines forth upon your sight1 until you see temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast4 ,when you shall have acquired this perfection2 when you will see it in yourself2 when you will purely dwell within yourself2 when you will cease to meet within yourself any obstacle to unity2 when nothing foreign will any more1 by its admixture1 alter the simplicity of your interior essence2 when within your whole being you will be a veritable light1 immeasurable in size1 uncircumscribed by any figure within narrow boundaries1 unincreasable because reaching out to infinity1 and entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and quantity2 when you shall have become such1 then1 having become sight itself1 you may have confidence in yourself1 for you will no longer need any guide4 ,then must you observe carefully1 for it is only by the eye that then will open itself within you that you will be able to perceive supreme ,beauty4 ,but if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by vice1 an eye that is impure1 or weak1 so as not to be able to support the splendor of so brilliant an object1 that eye will see nothing1 not even if it were shown a sight easy to grasp4 ,the organ of vision will first have to be rendered analogous and similar to the object it is to contemplate4 ,never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it had assumed its form2 likewise1 the soul could never see beauty1 unless she herself first became beautiful4 ,to obtain the view of the beautiful1 and of the divinity1 every man must begin by rendering himself beautiful and divine4 ,,the ,,landmarks ,,of ,,the ,,path ,,to ,,ecstasy4 ,thus he will first rise to intelligence1 and he will there contemplate beauty1 and declare that all this beauty resides in the ,ideas4 ,indeed1 in them everything is beautiful1 because they are the daughters and the very essence of ,intelligence4 ,above intelligence1 he will meet ,him whom we call the nature of the ,good1 and who causes beauty to radiate around ,him2 so that1 to repeat1 the first thing that is met is beauty4 ,if a distinction is to be established among the intelligibles1 we might say that intelligible beauty is the locus of ideas1 and that the ,good1 which is located above the ,beautiful1 is its source and principle4 ,if1 however1 we desire to locate the ,good and the ,beautiful within one single principle1 we might regard this one principle first as ,good1 and only afterwards1 as ,beauty4 ,,references4 ,page #dj1 line #d1 ,equally ,beautiful1 ,phaedrus p4 #bej1 ,cary #fc-fe2 ,hippias ,major1 #bie1 ,cary #dd2 ,philebus p4 #ag1 ,cary #bj1 #ba4 ,page #da1 line #aa1 ,stoic definition1 ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 iv4 #ac4 ,page #dd1 line #cj1 ,obscurity of ,matter1 ,timaeus1 p4 #ca1 ,cary #aa2 ,philebus1 p4 #bi1 ,cary #eb4 ,page #de1 line #bb1 ,superior ,order1 ,banquet #baj1 ,cary #cd2 ,timaeus1 p4 #ca1 ,cary #aa4 ,page #de1 line #ce1 ,golden ,face of ,justice1 ,athenaeus1 ,deipnosophistae1 xii4 #edf4 ,page #df1 line #aj1 ,pleasurable ,impulse1 ,banquet1 p4 #aia1 ,cary #ag1 #ah2 ,cratylos1 p4 #dbj1 ,cary #gh-hj4 ,page #dg1 line #e1 ,justice of the ,heart1 ,banquet1 p4 #bji1 ,cary #cc2 ,republic1 iii4 #djb1 ,cary #ab4 ,page #dh1 line #bc1 ,ugliness1 ,banquet1 p4 #bae-bag1 ,cary #ci1 #dj2 ,philebus1 p4 #ff1 ,cary #aeh1 #aei4 ,page #di1 line #d1 ,purifications1 ,phaedo1 p4 #fi1 ,cary #cg4 ,page #di1 line #cb1 ,assimilating to ,divinity1 ,republic x4 p4 #fac1 ,cary #ab4 ,page #ej1 line #a1 ,good and ,beautiful1 ,timaeus1 p4 #ce1 ,cary #ab4 ,page #ej1 line #e1 ,identical with ,good1 ,philebus1 p4 #fd1 ,cary #aec-aee2 ,first ,alcibiades1 p4 #aae1 ,cary #bc1 #bd4 ,page #ea1 line #a1 #b1 ,he who ,beholds1 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bgh1 ,cary #ade4 ,page #ea1 line #h1 ,ardor without ,equal2 line #ae1 ,very ,purity2 ,banquet1 p4 #baj1 #baa2 ,cary #cd1 #ce4 ,page #ea1 line #bi1 ,confers ,blessedness1 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bej1 ,cary #fd4 ,page #ec1 line #af1 ,interior ,vision1 ,republic1 x41 p4 #ecc1 ,cary #ac4 ,page #ec1 line #cd1 ,temperance ,seated1 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bgi1 ,cary #adg4 ,page #ed1 line #ai1 ,organ of ,vision1 ,timaeus1 p4 #de1 ,cary #ai4 ,page #ed1 line #bc1 ,assumed its form1 ,republic1 vi41 p4 #ejh1 ,cary #ai4 ,page #ed1 line #bi1 ,rise to ,intelligence1 ,philebus1 p4 #fd1 ,cary #aec-aee4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,seven4 ,of the ,immortality of the ,soul3 ,polemic ,against ,materialism4 ,,is ,,the ,,soul ,,immortal8 #a4 ,are we immortal1 or does all of us die8 7,another possibility would be that7 of the two parts of which we are composed1 the one might be fated to be dissolved and perish1 while the other1 that constitutes our very personality1 might subsist perpetually4 ,these problems must be solved by a study of our nature4 ,,the ,,body ,,as ,,the ,,instrument ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,man is not a simple being2 he contains a soul and a body1 which is united to this soul1 either as tool1 or in some other manner4#ca ,this is how we must distinguish the soul from the body1 and determine the nature and manner of existence 7being7 of each of them4 ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,composite1 ,,and ,,therefore ,,perishable4 ,as the nature of the body is composite1 reason convinces us that it cannot last perpetually1 and our senses show it to us dissolved1 destroyed1 and decayed1 because the elements that compose it return to join the elements of the same nature1 altering1 destroying them and each other1 especially when this chaos is abandoned to the soul1 which alone keeps her parts combined4 ,even if a body were taken alone1 it would not be a unity2 it may be analyzed into form and matter1 principles that are necessary to the constitution of all bodies1 even of those that are simple4#cb ,besides1 as they contain extension1 the bodies can be cut1 divided into infinitely small parts1 and thus perish4#cc ,therefore if our body is a part of ourselves1#cd not all of us is immortal2 if the body is only the instrument of the soul1 as the body is given to the soul only for a definite period1 it still is by nature perishable4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,the ,,individuality1 ,,as ,,its ,,form1 ,,and ,,as ,a ,,skilled ,,workman4 ,the soul1 which is the principal part of man1 and which constitutes man himself1#ce should bear to the body the relation of form to matter1 or of a workman to his tool2#cf in both cases the soul is the man himself4 ,,if ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,incorporeal1 ,,we ,,must ,,study ,,incorporeality4 #b4 ,what then is the nature of the soul8 ,if she is a body1 she can be decomposed1 as every body is a composite4 ,if1 on the contrary1 she is not a body1 if hers is a different nature1 the latter must be examined2 either in the same way that we have examined the body1 or in some other way4 ,a4--,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,not ,,corporeal 7,,as ,,the ,,stoics ,,thought74 7a47 7,neither a material molecule1 nor a material aggregation of material atoms could possess life and intelligence47 ,first1 let us consider the nature of this alleged soul-body4 ,as every soul necessarily possesses life1 and as the body1 considered as being the soul1 must obtain at least two molecules1 if not more 7there are three possibilities73 either only one of them possesses life1 or all of them possess it1 or none of them4 ,if one molecule alone possesses life1 it alone will be the soul4 ,of what nature will be that molecule supposed to possess life by itself8 ,will it be water 7,hippo71 air 7,anaximenes1 ,archelaus1 and ,diogenes71 earth1 or fire 7,heraclitus1 ,stobaeus8#cg7 ,but those are elements that are inanimate by themselves1 and which1 even when they are animated1 possess but a borrowed life4 ,still there is no other kind of body4 ,even those 7philosophers1 like the ,pythagoreans7 who posited elements other 7than water1 air1 earth and fire7 still considered them to be bodies1 and not souls1 not even attributing souls to them4 ,the theory that life results from the union of molecules of which1 nevertheless1 none by itself possesses life1 is an absurd hypothesis4 ,if further any molecule possesses life1 then a single one would be sufficient4 ,,neither ,,mixture ,,nor ,,its ,,principle ,,will ,,explain ,,life ,,as ,a ,,body4 ,the most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules should produce life1 that elements without intelligence should beget intelligence4 ,others 7like ,alexander of ,aphrodisia7 insist that to produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner4 ,that would1 however1 imply 7as thought ,gallen and ,hippocrates#ch7 the existence of a principle which produces order1 and which should be the cause of mixture or1 temperament1#ci and that should alone deserve being considered as soul4 ,no simple bodies could exist1 much less composite bodies1 unless there was a soul in the universe2 for it is 7seminal7 reason which1 in1 adding itself to matter1 produces body4#dj ,but surely a 7seminal7 reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul4 ,,no ,,atomic ,,aggregation ,,could ,,produce ,a ,,self-,,harmonizing ,,unity4 #c4 7b47 7,no aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself47 ,others1 on the contrary1 insist that the soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles 7as thought ,leucippus1 ,democritus and ,epicurus4#da7 ,to refute this error1 we have to examine the nature of sympathy 7or community of affection1 a ,stoic characteristic of a living being1#db7 and juxtaposition4#dc ,on the one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of being united1 and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic whole such as is the soul1 which is sympathetic with herself4 ,on the other hand1 how could a body or extension be constituted by 7a juxtaposition of7 atoms8 ,,soul ,,is ,a ,,simple ,,substance1 ,,while ,,every ,,body ,,is ,,composed ,,of ,,matter ,,and ,,form4 7c47 7,every body is a composite of matter and form1 while the soul is a simple substance47 ,inasmuch as matter possesses no quality1#dd the matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself4 ,that which imparts life to it must then be its form4 ,if form is a being1 the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form2 it will be only matter or form4 ,consequently1 the soul will not be the body1 since the body is not constituted by matter exclusively1 as could be proved analytically1 if necessary4 ,,if ,,soul ,,is ,,only ,,an ,,affection ,,of ,,matter1 ,,whence ,,that ,,affection8 7d47 7,the soul is not a simple manner of being of matter1 because matter could not give itself a form47 ,some ,stoics might deny that form was a being1 asserting the soul to be a mere affection 7or1 manner of being7 of matter4#de ,from whence then did matter acquire this affection and animating life8 ,surely matter itself could not endow itself with a form and a soul4 ,that which endows matter or any body with life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal nature4 ,,no ,,body ,,could ,,subsist ,,without ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 7e47 7,no body could subsist without the power of the universal soul47 ,besides no body could subsist without the power of the universal ,soul 7from ,numenius#df74 ,every body1 indeed1 is in a perpetual flow and movement 7as thought ,heraclitus1 in ,plato1 ,cratylus#dg71 and the world would soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies1 even if some one of them were to be called soul2 for such a soul1 being composed of the same matter as the other bodies1 would undergo the same fate that they do2 or rather1 there would not even be any body1 everything would remain in the condition of shapeless matter1 since there would exist no principle to fashion it4 ,why1 there would not even be any matter1 and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness1 if the care of keeping its parts united were entrusted to some body which would have nothing but the name of soul1 as for instance1 to air1 or a breath without cohesion1#dh which could not be one1 by itself4 ,as all bodies are divisible1 if the universe depended on a body1 it would be deprived of intelligence and given up to chance4 ,how1 indeed1 could there be any order in a spirit which itself would need to receive order from a soul8 ,how could this spirit contain reason and intelligence8 ,on the hypothesis of the existence of the soul1 all these elements serve to constitute the body of the world1 and of every animal1 because all different bodies together work for the end of all2 but without the soul1 there is no order1 and even nothing exists any more4 ,,if ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,not ,,simple ,,matter1 ,,she ,,must ,,be ,a ,,substantial ,,form4 #d4 7f7 7,if the soul is anything but simple matter1 she must be constituted by a substantial form47 ,those who claim that the soul is a body are1 by the very force of the truth1 forced to recognize the existence1 before and above them1 of a form proper to the soul2 for they acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit1 and an intellectual fire 7as do the ,stoics1 following in the footsteps of ,heraclitus1 ,stobaeus#di74 ,according to them1 it seems that1 without spirit or fire1 there cannot be any superior nature in the order of beings1 and that the soul needs a location where she may be built up4 ,on the contrary1 it is bodies alone that need to be built up on something1 and indeed1 they are founded on the powers of the soul4 ,if really we do believe that the soul and life are no more than a spirit1 why add the qualification of a certain characteristic1#ej a meaningless term employed when forced to admit an active nature superior to that of bodies4 ,as there are thousands of inanimate spirits1 not every spirit is a soul4 ,if only that spirit is a soul which possesses that special characteristic1 this special characteristic and this manner of being will either be something real1 or will be nothing4 ,if they are nothing1 there will be nothing real but spirit1 and this alleged manner of being is nothing more than a word4 ,in that system1 therefore1 nothing but matter really exists4 ,god1 the soul1 and all other things are no more than a word2 the body alone really subsists4 ,if1 on the contrary1 that manner of being is something real1 if it is anything else than substrate or matter1 if it resides in matter without being material or composed of matter1 it must then be a nature different from the body1 namely1 a reason 7by a pun74#ea ,,the ,,body ,,exerts ,a ,,uniform ,,action1 ,,while ,,the ,,soul ,,exerts ,a ,,varied ,,one4 7g47 7,the body exerts an uniform action1 while the soul exerts a very diverse action47 ,the following considerations further demonstrate the impossibility of the soul being a body4 ,a body must be hot or cold1 hard or soft1 liquid or solid1 black or white1 or qualities differing according to its nature4 ,if it is only hot or cold1 light or heavy1 black or white1 it communicates its only quality to what comes close to it2 for fire could not cool1 nor ice heat4 ,nevertheless1 the soul produces not only different effects in different animals1 but contrary effects even in the same being2 she makes certain things solid1 dense1 black1 light1 and certain others liquid1 sparse1 white1 or heavy4 ,according to the different quality of the body1 and according to its color1 she should produce but a single effect2 nevertheless1 she exerts a very diverse action4 ,,three ,,more ,,proofs ,,of ,,the ,,incorporeity ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #e4 7h47 7,the body has but a single kind of motion while the soul has different ones47 ,if the soul is a body1 how does it happen that she has different kinds of motion instead of a single one1 as is the case with the body8 ,will these movements be explained by voluntary determinations1 and by 7seminal7 reasons8 ,in this case neither the voluntary determinations1 nor these reasons1 which differ from each other1 can belong to a single and simple body2 such a body does not participate in any particular reason except by the principle that made it hot or cold4 ,,bodies ,,can ,,lose ,,parts1 ,,not ,,so ,,the ,,soul4 7i47 7,souls cannot1 as do bodies1 lose or gain parts1 ever remaining identical47 ,the body has the faculty of making its organs grow within a definite time and in fixed proportions4 ,from where could the soul derive them8 ,its function is to grow1 not to cause growth1 unless the principle of growth be comprehended within its material mass4 ,if the soul that makes the body grow was herself a body1 she should1 on uniting with molecules of a nature similar to hers1 develop a growth proportional to that of the organs4 ,in this case1 the molecules that will come to add themselves to the soul will be either animate or inanimate2 if they are animate1 how could they have become such1 and from whom will they have received that characteristic8 ,if they are not animate1 how will they become such1 and how will agreement between them and the first soul arise8 ,how will they form but a single unity with her1 and how will they agree with her8 ,will they not constitute a soul that will remain foreign to the former1 who will not possess her requirements of knowledge8 ,this aggregation of molecules that would thus be called soul will resemble the aggregation of molecules that form our body4 ,she would lose parts1 she would acquire new ones2 she will not be identical4 ,but if we had a soul that was not identical1 memory and self-consciousness of our own faculties would be impossible4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,everywhere ,,entire2 ,,that ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,case ,,with ,,the ,,body4 7j47 7,the soul1 being one and simple1 is everywhere entire1 and has parts that are identical to the whole2 this is not the case with the body47 ,if the soul is a body1 she will have parts that are not identical with the whole1 as every body is by nature divisible4 ,if then the soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot lose anything without ceasing to be a soul1 she will by losing her parts1 change her nature1 as happens to every quantity4 ,if1 on losing some part of its magnitude1 a body1 notwithstanding1 remains identical in respect to quality1 it does not nevertheless become different from what it was1 in respect to quantity1 and it remains identical only in respect to quality1 which differs from quantity4 ,what shall we answer to those who insist that the soul is a body8 ,will they say that1 in the same body1 each part possesses the same quality as the total soul1 and that the case is similar with the part of a part8 ,then quantity is no longer essential to the nature of the soul2 which contradicts the hypothesis that the soul needed to possess a definite magnitude4 ,besides the soul is everywhere entire2 now it is impossible for a body to be entire in several places simultaneously1 or have parts identical to the whole4 ,if we refuse the name of soul to each part1 the soul is then composed of inanimate parts4 ,besides1 if the soul is a definite magnitude1 she cannot increase or diminish without ceasing to be a soul2 but it often happens that from a single conception or from a single germ are born two or more beings1 as is seen in certain animals in whom the germs divide2#eb in this case1 each part is equal to the whole4 ,however superficially considered1 this fact demonstrates that the principle in which the part is equal to the whole is essentially superior to quantity1 and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity4 ,on this condition alone can the soul remain identical when the body loses its quantity1 because she has need of no mass1 no quantity1 and because her essence is of an entirely different nature4 ,the soul and the 7seminal7 reasons therefore possess no extension4 ,,the ,,body ,,could ,,not ,,possess ,,sensation4 #f4 7k47 7,the body could not possess either sensation1 thought1 or virtue47 ,if the soul were a body1 she would not possess either sensation1 thought1 science1 virtue1 nor any of the perfections that render her more beautiful4 ,here follows the proof4 ,,impossibility ,,for ,,the ,,body ,,to ,,have ,,sensation4 ,the subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single1 and grasp this object in its totality1 by one and the same power4 ,this happens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a single object1 or when1 by a single organ1 we embrace a single complex object in its totality1 as1 for instance1 a face4 ,it is not one principle that sees the face1 and another one that sees the eyes2 it is the same principle which embraces everything at once4 ,doubtless we do receive a sense-impression by the eyes1 and another by the ears2 but both of them must end in some single principle4 ,how1 indeed1 could any decision be reached about the difference of sense-impressions unless they all converged toward the same principle8 ,the latter is like a centre1 and the individual sensations are like radii which from the circumference radiate towards the centre of a circle4 ,this central principle is essentially single4 ,if it was divisible1 and if sense-impressions were directed towards two points at a distance from each other1 such as the extremities of the same line1 they would either still converge towards one and the same point1 as1 for instance1 the middle 7of the line71 or one part would feel one thing1 and another something else4 ,it would be absolutely as if ,i felt one thing1 and you felt another1 when placed in the presence of one and the same thing 7as thought ,aristotle1 de ,anima#ec74 ,facts1 therefore1 demonstrate that sensations centre in one and the same principle2 as visible images are centred in the pupil of the eye2 otherwise how could we1 through the pupil1 see the greatest objects8 ,so much the more1 therefore1 must the sensations that centre in the 7,stoic7 directing principle#ed resemble indivisible intuitions and be perceived by an indivisible principle4 ,if the latter possessed extension1 it could1 like the sense-object1 be divided2 each of its parts would thus perceive one of the parts of the sense-object1 and nothing within us would grasp the object in its totality4 ,the subject that perceives must then be entirely one2 otherwise1 how could it be divided8 ,in that case it could not be made to coincide with the sense-object1 as two equal figures superimposed on each other1 because the directing principle does not have an extension equal to that of the sense-object4 ,how then will we carry out the division8 ,must the subject that feels contain as many parts as there are in the sense-object8 ,will each part of the soul1 in its turn1 feel by its own parts1 or will 7we decide that7 the parts of parts will not feel8 ,neither is that likely4 ,if1 on the other hand1 each part feels the entire object1 and if each magnitude is divisible to infinity1 the result is that1 for a single object1 there will be an infinity of sensations in each part of the soul2 and1 so much the more1 an infinity of images in the principle that directs us4 7,this1 however1 is the opposite of the actual state of affairs47 ,,against ,,the ,,stoics1 ,,sensations ,,are ,,not ,,impressions ,,of ,a ,,seal ,,on ,,wax4 ,besides1 if the principle that feels were corporeal1 it could feel only so long as exterior objects produced in the blood or in the air some impression similar to that of a seal on wax4#ee ,if they impressed their images on wet substances1 as is no doubt supposed1 these impressions would become confused as images in water1 and memory would not occur4 ,if1 however1 these impressions persisted1 they would either form an obstacle to subsequent ones1 and no further sensation would occur2 or they would be effaced by the new ones1 which would destroy memory4 ,if then the soul is capable of recalling earlier sensations1 and having new ones1 to which the former would form no obstacle1 it is because she is not corporeal4 ,,sensation ,,cannot ,,be ,,relayed ,,from ,,sense-,,organ ,,to ,,directing ,,principle4 #g4 ,the same reflections may be made about pain1 and one's feeling of it4 ,when a man's finger is said to give him pain1 this1 no doubt1 is a recognition that the seat of the pain is in the finger1 and that the feeling of pain is experienced by the directing principle4 ,consequently1 when a part of the spirit suffers1 this suffering is felt by the directing principle1 and shared by the whole soul4#ef ,how can this sympathy be explained8 ,by relay transmission1 7the ,stoic7 will answer2 the sense-impression is felt first by the animal spirit that is in the finger1 and then transmitted to the neighboring part1 and so on till it reaches the directing part4 ,necessarily1 if the pain is felt by the first part that experiences it1 it will also be felt by the second part to which it is transmitted2 then by the third1 and so on1 until the one pain would have caused an infinite number of sensations4 ,last the directing principle will perceive all these sensations1 adding thereto its own sensation4 ,speaking strictly1 however1 each of these sensations will not transmit the suffering of the finger1 but the suffering of one of the intermediate parts4 ,for instance1 the second sensation will relay the suffering of the hand4 ,the third1 that of the arm1 and so on1 until there will be an infinity of sensations4 ,the directing principle1 for its part1 will not feel the pain of the finger1 but its own2 it will know none but that1 it will pay no attention to the rest1 because it will ignore the pain suffered by the finger4 ,therefore1 relayed sensation is an impossibility1 nor could one part of the body perceive the suffering felt by another part2 for the body has extension1 and1 in every extension1 parts are foreign to each other 7the opposite of the opinion of ,cleanthes1 ,nemesius74#eg ,consequently1 the principle that feels must everywhere be identical with itself2 and among all beings1 the body is that which is least suitable to this identity4 ,,the ,,body ,,cannot ,,think4 #h4 ,if1 in any sense whatever1 the soul were a body1 we could not think4 ,here is the proof4 ,if feeling#eh is explained as the soul's laying hold of perceptible things by making use of the body1 thinking cannot also of making use of the body4 ,otherwise1 thinking and feeling would be identical4 ,thus1 thinking must consist in perceiving without the help of the body 7as thought ,aristotle#ei74 ,so much the more1 the thinking principle cannot be corporeal4 ,since it is sensation that grasps sense-objects1 it must likewise be thought1 or intellection1 that grasps intelligible objects4 ,though this should be denied1 it will be admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities1 and that we perceive entities that have no extension4 ,how could an entity that had extension think one that had no extension8 ,or a divisible entity1 think an indivisible one8 ,could this take place by an indivisible part8 ,in this case1 the thinking subject will not be corporeal2 for there is no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object2 it would suffice if one of its parts reached the object 7as ,aristotle said against ,plato74#fj ,if then this truth be granted1 that the highest thoughts must have incorporeal objects1 the latter can be cognized only by a thinking principle that either is1 or becomes independent of body4 ,even the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the forms inherent in matter1 implies that these forces cannot be thought unless1 by intelligence1 they are separated from matter4 ,it is not by means of the carnal mass of the body1 nor generally by matter1 that we can effect the abstraction of triangle1 circle1 line or point4 ,to succeed in this abstraction1 the soul must separate from the body1 and consequently1 the soul cannot be corporeal4 ,,the ,,body ,,cannot ,,possess ,,virtue4 ,neither do beauty or justice possess extension1 ,i suppose2 and their conception must be similar4 ,these things can be cognized or retained only by the indivisible part of the soul4 ,if the latter were corporeal1 where indeed could virtues1 prudence1 justice and courage exist8 ,in this case1 virtues 7as ,critias thought71#fa would be no more than a certain disposition of the spirit1 or blood 7as ,empedocles also thought74#fb ,for instance1 courage and temperance would respectively be no more than a certain irritability1 and a fortunate temperament of the spirit2 beauty would consist in the agreeable shape of outlines1 which cause persons1 in whom they occur1 to be called elegant and handsome4 ,under this hypothesis1 indeed1 the types of spirit might possess vigor and beauty4 ,but what need would it have of temperance8 ,on the contrary1 the spirit would seek to be agreeably affected by the things it touches and embraces1 to enjoy a moderate heat1 a gentle coolness1 and to be in contact only with sweet1 tender1 and smooth entities4 ,what incentive would the spirit have to apportion rewards to those who had deserved them8 ,,if ,,virtue ,,were ,,corporeal ,,it ,,would ,,be ,,perishable4 ,are the notions of virtue1 and other intelligible entities by the soul thought eternal1 or does virtue arise and perish8 ,if so1 by what being1 and how will it be formed8 ,it is the same problem that remains to be solved4 ,intelligible entities must therefore be eternal and immutable1 like geometrical notions1 and consequently cannot be corporeal4 ,further1 the subject in whom they exist must be of a nature similar to theirs1 and therefore not be corporeal2 for the nature of body is not to remain immutable1 but to be in a perpetual flow4 ,,bodies ,,are ,,active ,,only ,,by ,,means ,,of ,,incorporeal ,,powers4 7#i47 ,there are men who locate the soul in the body1 so as to give her a foundation in some sphere of activity1 to account for the various phenomena in the body1 such as getting hot or cold1 pushing on or stopping1 7and the like74 ,they evidently do not realize that bodies produce these effects only through incorporeal powers1 and that those are not the powers that we attribute to the soul1 which are thought1 sensation1 reasoning1 desire1 judiciousness1 propriety and wisdom1 all of them entities that cannot possible be attributes of a corporeal entity4 ,consequently1 those 7materialists7 attribute to the body all the faculties of incorporeal essences1 and leave nothing for the latter4 ,,why ,,bodies ,,are ,,activated ,,by ,,incorporeal ,,powers4 ,the proof that bodies are activated only by incorporeal faculties may be proved as follows3 ,quantity and quality are two different things4 ,every body has a quantity1 but not always a quality1 as in the case of matter1 7according to the ,stoic definition1 that it was a body without quality1 but possessing magnitude#fc74 ,granting this1 7you ,stoic7 will also be forced to admit that as quality is something different from quantity1 it must consequently be different from the body4 ,since then every body has a quantity1 how could quality1 which is no quantity1 be a body8 ,besides1 as we said above1#fd every body and mass is altered by division2 nevertheless1 when a body is cut into pieces1 every part preserves the entire quality without undergoing alteration4 ,for instance1 every molecule of honey1 possesses the quality of sweetness as much as all the molecules taken together2 consequently that sweetness cannot be corporeal2 and other qualities must be in a similar case4 ,moreover1 if the active powers were corporeal1 they would have to have a material mass proportional to their strength or weakness4 ,now there are great masses that have little force1 and small ones that have great force2 demonstrating that power does not depend on extension1 and should be attributed to some 7substance7 without extension4 ,finally1 you may say that matter is identical with body1 and produces different beings only by receiving different qualities 7the ,stoics considering that even the divinity was no more than modified matter1 their two principles being matter and quality2#fe the latter1 however1 was also considered as body74 ,how do you 7,stoics7 not see that qualities thus added to matter are reasons1 that are primary and immaterial8 ,do not object that when the spirit 7breath7 and blood abandon animals1 they cease to live2 for if these things are necessary to life1 there are for our life many other necessities1 even during the presence of the soul 7as thought ,nemesius74#ff ,besides1 neither spirit nor blood are distributed to every part of the body4 ,,the ,,soul ,,can ,,penetrate ,,the ,,body2 ,,but ,,two ,,bodies ,,cannot ,,penetrate ,,each ,,other4 7#aj74 ,the soul penetrates the whole body1 while an entire body cannot penetrate another entire body4 ,further1 if the soul is corporeal1 and pervades the whole body1 she will1 with the body1 form 7as ,alexander of ,aphrodisia pointed out7 a mixture1#fg similar to the other bodies 7that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality1 as the ,stoics taught74 ,now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in actualization#fh the soul1 instead of being in actualization in the bodies1 would be in them only potentially2 consequently1 she would cease to be a soul1 as the sweet ceases to be sweet when mingled with the bitter2 we would1 therefore1 have no soul left4 ,if1 when one body forms a mixture with another body1 total penetration occurs1 so that each molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and that each body be distributed equally in the whole space occupied by the mass of the other1 without any increase of volume1 nothing that is not divided will remain4 ,indeed1 mixture operates not only between the larger parts 7which would be no more than a simple juxtaposition72 but the two bodies must penetrate each other mutually1 even if smaller--it would indeed be impossible for the smaller to equal the greater2 still1 when the smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely4 ,if the mixture operates in this manner in every part1 and if no undivided part of the mass remain1 the body must be divided into points1 which is impossible4 ,indeed1 were this division pushed to infinity1 since every body is fully divisible1 bodies will have to be infinite not only potentially1 but also in actuality4 ,it is therefore impossible for one entire body to penetrate another in its entirety4 ,now as the soul penetrates the entire body1 the soul must be incorporeal 7as thought ,nemesius74#fi ,,the ,,stoic ,,development ,,from ,,habit ,,to ,,soul ,,and ,,intelligence ,,would ,,make ,,the ,,perfect ,,arise ,,from ,,the ,,imperfect1 ,,an ,,impossibility4 7#aa74 7,if1 as ,stoics claim1 man first was a certain nature called habit1#gj then a soul1 and last an intelligence1 the perfect would have arisen from the imperfect1 which is impossible74 ,to say that the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit1 and that this spirit became soul only after having been exposed to cold1 and as it were became soaked by its contact1 because the cold subtilized it2#ga this is an absurd hypothesis4 ,many animals are born in warm places1 and do not have their soul exposed to action of cold4 ,under this hypothesis1 the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the concourse of exterior circumstances4 ,the ,stoics1 therefore1 posit as principle that which is less perfect 7the soul71 and trace it to a still less perfect earlier thing called habit 7or form of inorganic things74#gb ,intelligence1 therefore1 is posited in the last rank since it is alleged to be born of the soul1 while1 on the contrary1 the first rank should be assigned to intelligence1 the second to the soul1 the third to nature1 and1 following natural order1 consider that which is less perfect as the posterior element4 ,in this system the divinity1 by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence1 is posterior and begotten1 possessing only an incidental intelligence4 ,the result would1 therefore1 be that there was neither soul1 nor intelligence1 nor divinity2 for never can that which is potential pass to the condition of actualization1 without the prior existence of some actualized principle4 ,if what is potential were to transform itself into actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization will have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something which is not merely potential1 but actualized4 ,nevertheless1 on the hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical1 it will of itself pass into actualization1 and will be superior to the being which is potential only because it will be the object of the aspiration of such a being4 ,we must1 therefore1 assign the first rank to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature1 which is always in actualization4 ,thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature2 the soul1 therefore1 is not a spirit1 and consequently no body4 ,other reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced2 but the above suffices 7as thought ,aristotle74#gc ,,ii4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,neither ,,the ,,harmony ,,nor ,,entelechy ,,of ,,the ,,body--,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,the ,,harmony ,,of ,,the ,,body2 ,,against ,,the ,,pythagoreans4 7#ab74 a4 ,since the soul is not corporeal1 its real nature must be ascertained4 ,shall we assert that she is something distinct from the body1 but dependent thereon1 as1 for instance1 a harmony8 ,pythagoras1 indeed1 used this word in a technical sense2 and after him the harmony of the body has been thought to be something similar to the harmony of a lyre4 ,as tension produces in the lyre-strings an affection 7or1 manner of being1 or state7 that is called harmony1 likewise1 as contrary elements are mingled in our body1 an individual mixture produces life and soul1 which1 therefore1 is only an individual affection of this mixture4 ,,why ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,not ,a ,,harmony4 ,as has already been said above#gd this hypothesis is inadmissible for several reasons4 ,to begin with1 the soul is prior 7to the body71 and the harmony is posterior thereto4 ,then the soul dominates the body1 governs it1 and often even resists it1 which would be impossible if the soul were only a harmony4 ,the soul1 indeed1 is a being1 which harmony is not4 ,when the corporeal principles of which we are composed are mingled in just proportions1 their temperament constitutes health 7but not a being1 such as the soul74 ,besides1 every part of the body being mingled in a different manner should form 7a different harmony1 and consequently7 a different soul1 so that there would be several of them4 ,the decisive argument1 however1 is that this soul 7that constitutes a harmony7 presupposes another soul which would produce this harmony1 as a lyre needs a musician who would produce harmonic vibrations in the strings1 because he possesses within himself the reason according to which he produces the harmony4 ,the strings of the lyre do not vibrate of themselves1 and the elements of our body cannot harmonize themselves4 ,nevertheless1 under this hypothesis1 animated and orderly being would have been made up out of inanimate and disordered entities2 and these orderly beings would owe their order and existence to chance4 ,that is as impossible for parts as for the whole4 ,the soul1 therefore1 is no harmony4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,entelechy ,,of ,,the ,,body 7,,polemic ,,against ,,aristotle74 ,,aristotle',s ,,statement ,,of ,,the ,,problem4#ge 7#ac74 b4 ,now let us examine the opinion of those who call the soul an entelechy4 ,they say that1 in the composite1 the soul plays the part of form in respect to matter1 in the body the soul animates4 ,the soul1 however1 is not said to be the form of any body1 nor of the body as such2 but of the natural body1 that is organized1 and which possesses life potentially4#gf ,,if ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,an ,,entelechy1 ,,she ,,is ,a ,,different ,,one ,,than ,,aristotle',s4 ,if the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the statue to the metal1 the soul will be divided with the body1 and on cutting a member a portion of the soul would be cut along with it4 ,according to this teaching1 the soul separates from the body only during sleep1 since she must inhere in the body of which she is the entelechy1 in which case sleep would become entirely inexplicable4 ,if the soul be an entelechy1 the struggle of reason against the passions would become entirely impossible4 ,the entire human being will experience but one single sentiment1 and never be in disagreement with itself4 ,if the soul be an entelechy1 there will perhaps still be sensations1 but mere sensations2 pure thoughts will have become impossible4 ,consequently the ,peripateticians themselves are obliged to introduce 7into human nature7 another soul1 namely1 the pure intelligence1 which they consider immortal4#gg ,the rational soul1 therefore1 would have to be an entelechy in a manner different from their definition thereof1 if indeed this name is at all to be used4 ,,if ,,an ,,entelechy ,,be ,,granted1 ,,it ,,is ,,inseparable ,,from ,,the ,,body4 ,the sense-soul1 which preserves the forms of sense-objects previously perceived1 must preserve them without the body4 ,otherwise1 these forms would inhere in the body like figures and corporeal shapes4 ,now1 if the forms inhered in the sense-soul in this manner1 they could not be received therein otherwise 7than as corporeal impressions74 ,that is why1 if we do grant the existence of an entelechy1 it must be inseparable from the body4 ,even the faculty of appetite1 not indeed that which makes us feel the need of eating and drinking1 but that which desires things that are independent of the body1 could not either be an entelechy4#gh ,,neither ,,could ,,the ,,soul ,,of ,,growth ,,be ,,an ,,entelechy4 ,the soul's faculty of growth remains to be considered4 ,this at least might be thought an inseparable entelechy4 ,but neither does that suit her nature4 ,for if the principle of every plant is in its root1 and if growth takes place around and beneath it1#gi as occurs in many plants1 it is evident that the soul's faculty of growth1 abandoning all the other parts1 has concentrated in the root alone2 it1 therefore1 was not distributed all around the soul1 like an inseparable entelechy4 ,add that this soul1 before the plant grows1 is already contained in the small body 7of the seed74 ,if then1 after having vivified a great plant1 the soul's faculty of growth can condense into a small space1 and if later it can1 from this small space1 again spread over a whole plant1 it is evidently entirely separable from the 7plant's7 matter4 ,,the ,,entelechy ,,is ,,not ,a ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,body1 ,,as ,,the ,,soul ,,transmigrates4 ,besides1 as the soul is indivisible1 the entelechy of the divisible body could not become divisible as is the body4 ,besides1 the same soul passes from the body of one animal into the body of some other4 ,how could the soul of the first become that of the second1 if she were only the entelechy of a single one8 ,the example of animals that metamorphose demonstrates the impossibility of this theory4 ,the soul1 therefore1 is not the simple form of a body2 she is a genuine being1 which does not owe its existence merely to her being founded on the body1 but which1 on the contrary1 exists before having become the soul of some individual animal4 ,it is1 therefore1 not the body that begets the soul4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,an ,,incorporeal ,,and ,,immortal ,,essence4 ,,the ,,soul ,,being ,,none ,,of ,,corporeal ,,possibilities1 ,,must ,,be ,,incorporeal4 c4 ,what then can be the nature of the soul1 if she is neither a body1 nor a corporeal affection1 while1 nevertheless1 all the active force1 the productive power and the other faculties reside in her1 or come from her8 ,what sort of a being1 indeed1 is this 7soul7 that has an existence independent of the body8 ,she must evidently be a veritable being4 ,indeed1 everything corporeal must be classified as generated1 and excluded from genuine being1 because it is born1 and perishes1 never really exists1 and owes its salvation exclusively to participation in the genuine existence1 and that only in the measure of its participation therein4 ,,the ,,persistence ,,of ,,the ,,changeable ,,implies ,,the ,,eternal ,,in ,,the ,,background4#hj #i4 7#ad74 ,it is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of a nature different from bodies1 by itself fully possessing genuine existence1 which can neither be born nor perish4 ,otherwise1 all other things would hopelessly disappear1 as a result of the destruction of the existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe1 as their beauty and salvation4 ,the soul1 indeed1 is the principle of movement 7as ,plato thought1 in the ,phaedrus72 it is the soul that imparts movement to everything else2 the soul moves herself4 ,she imparts life to the body she animates2 but alone she possesses life1 without ever being subject to losing it1 because she possesses it by herself4 ,all beings1 indeed1 live only by a borrowed life2 otherwise1 we would have to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity4 ,there must1 therefore1 exist a nature that is primarily alive1 necessarily incorruptible and immortal because it is the principle of life for everything else4 ,it is thereon that must be founded all that is divine and blessed1 that lives and exists by itself1 that lives and exists supremely1 which is immutable in its essence1 and which can neither be born nor perish4 ,how indeed could existence be born or perish8 ,if the name of existence really suited it1 it must exist forever1 just as whiteness is not alternately black and white4 ,if whiteness were existence itself1 it would1 with its being 7or nature7 7which is1 to be whiteness71 possess an eternal existence2 but1 in reality1 it is no more than whiteness4 ,therefore1 the principle that possesses existence in itself and in a supreme degree will always exist4 ,now this primary and eternal existence can not be anything dead like a stone1 or a piece of wood4 ,it must live1 and live with a pure life1 as long as it exists within itself4 ,if something of it mingles with what is inferior1 this part meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good2 but it does not lose its nature1 and resumes its former condition on returning to a suitable condition 7as thought ,plato1 in his ,phaedo#ha74 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,incorporeal ,,because ,,of ,,her ,,kinship ,,with ,,the ,,divine4 #aj4 7#ae74 ,the soul has affinities with the divine and eternal nature4 ,this is evident1 because1 as we have demonstrated it1 she is not a body1 has neither figure nor color1 and is impalpable4 ,consider the following demonstration4 ,it is generally granted that everything that is divine and that possesses genuine existence enjoys a happy and wise life4 ,now let us consider the nature of our soul1 in connection with that of the divine4 ,let us take a soul1 not one inside of a body1 which is undergoing the irrational motions of appetite and anger1 and the other affections born of the body1 but a soul that has eliminated all that1 and which1 so far as possible1 had no intercourse with the body4 ,such a soul would show us that vices are something foreign to the nature of the soul1 and come to her from elsewhere1 and that1 inasmuch as she is purified1 she in her own right possesses the most eminent qualities1 wisdom1 and the other virtues 7as thought ,plato#hb74 ,if the soul1 when re-entering into herself1 is such1 how could she not participate in this nature that we have acknowledged to be suitable to every thing that is eternal and divine8 ,as wisdom and real virtue are divine things1 they could not dwell in a vile and mortal entity2 the existence that receives them is necessarily divine1 since it participates in divine things by their mutual affinity and community4 ,anyone who thus possesses wisdom and virtue in his soul differs little from the superior beings2 he is inferior to them only by the fact of his having a body4 ,if all men1 or at least1 if many of them held their soul in this disposition1 no one would be sceptic enough to refuse to believe that the soul is immortal4 ,but as we consider the soul in her present condition of being soiled by vices1 no one imagines that her nature is divine and immortal4 ,,the ,,soul1 ,,like ,,other ,,things1 ,,should ,,be ,,judged ,,in ,,her ,,purest ,,condition4 ,now when we consider the nature of some being1 it should be studied in its rarest condition1 since extraneous additions hinder it from being rightly judged4 ,the soul must be therefore considered only after abstraction of foreign things1 or rather1 he who makes this abstraction should observe himself in that condition4 ,he then will not doubt that he is immortal1 when he sees himself in the pure world of intelligence4 ,he will see his intelligence occupied1 not in the observation of some sense-object that is mortal1 but in thinking the eternal by an equally eternal faculty4#hc ,he will see all the entities in the intelligible world1 and he will see himself become intelligible1 radiant1 and illuminated by the truth emanating from the ,good1 which sheds the light of truth on all intelligible entities4#hd ,then 7like ,empedocles1 in ,diog4 ,laertes#he71 he will have the right to say3 ,farewell1 ,i am now an immortal divinity4 ,for he has ascended to the divinity1 and has become assimilated thereto4 ,as purification permits one to know the better things1 so the notions we have within us1 and which constitute real science1 are made clear4 ,indeed1 it is not by an excursion among external objects that the soul attains the intuition of wisdom and virtue1 but by re-entering into herself1 in thinking herself in her primitive condition4 ,then she clears up and recognizes in herself the divine statues1 soiled by the rust of time4 ,likewise1 if a piece of gold were animated and released itself from the earth by which it was covered1 after first having been ignorant of its real nature because it did not see its own splendor1 it would admire itself when considering itself in its purity2 it would find that it had no need of a borrowed beauty1 and would consider itself happy to remain isolated from everything else4#hf ,,even ,,on ,,the ,,stoic ,,hypothesis ,,the ,,soul ,,must ,,be ,,immortal4 #aa4 7#af74 ,what sensible man1 after having thus considered the nature of the soul1 could still doubt of the immortality of a principle which derives life from naught but itself1 and which cannot lose it8 ,how could the soul lose life1 since she did not borrow it from elsewhere1 and since she does not possess it as fire possesses heat8 ,for1 without being an accident of fire1 the heat1 nevertheless1 is an accident of its matter2 for fire can perish4 ,but1 in the soul1 life is not an accident that comes to add itself to a material subject to constitute a soul4 ,in fact1 there is here an alternative3 either life is a genuine being1 which is alive by itself2 in which case this being is the soul that we are seeking to discover1 and immortality cannot be refused her2 or the soul is a composite1 and she must be decomposed until we arrive at something immortal which moves by itself2 and such a principle could not be subject to death4 ,further1 when 7,stoics7 say that life is only an accidental modification of matter1 they are thereby forced to acknowledge that the principle that imparted this modification to matter is immortal1 and incapable of admitting anything contrary to what it communicates 7that is1 life1 as said ,plato1 in his ,phaedo#hg71 but there is only a single nature that possesses life in actualization4 ,,there ,,is ,,no ,,conceivable ,,way ,,in ,,which ,,soul ,,could ,,perish4 #ab4 7#ag74 7,the ,stoics71 indeed1 claim that every soul is perishable4 ,in this case1 everything should long since have been destroyed4 ,others might say that our soul were mortal1 while the universal ,soul were immortal4 ,on them1 however1 is the burden of proof of a difference between the individual and universal souls4 ,both of them1 indeed1 are a principle of movement2 both live by themselves2 both grasp the same object by the same faculty1 either by thinking the things contained in heaven1 or by considering the nature 7being7 of each being1 ascending unto the first principle4 ,since our soul thinks absolute essences either by the notions she finds within herself1 or by reminiscence1 she evidently is prior to the body4 ,possessing knowledge of eternal entities1 she herself must be eternal4 ,all that dissolves1 existing only by its compositeness1 can naturally dissolve in the same manner that it became composite4 ,but the soul is a single1 simple actualization1 whose essence is life2 not in this manner therefore can the soul perish4 ,neither could the soul perish by division into a number of parts2 for1 as we have shown1 the soul is neither a mass nor a quantity4 ,as little could the soul perish by alteration2 for when alteration destroys anything1 it may remove its form1 but leaves its matter2 alteration1 therefore1 is a characteristic of something composite4 ,consequently as the soul cannot perish in any of these ways1 she is imperishable4 ,,descent ,,into ,,the ,,body ,,need ,,not ,,conflict ,,with ,,the ,,eternity ,,of ,,soul4 #ac4 7#ah74 ,if intelligible entities are separated from sense objects1 how does it happen that the soul descends into a body8#hh ,so long as the soul is a pure and impassible intelligence1 so long as she enjoys a purely intellectual life like the other intelligible beings1 she dwells among them2 for she has neither appetite nor desire4 ,but that part which is inferior to intelligence and which is capable of desires1 follows their impulsion1 proceeds and withdraws from the intelligible world4 ,wishing to ornament matter on the model of the ,ideas she contemplated in ,intelligence1 in haste to exhibit her fruitfulness1 and to manifest the germs she bears within her 7as said ,plato1 in the ,banquet#hi71 the soul applies herself to produce and create1 and1 as result of this application1 she is1 as it were1 orientated 7or1 in tension7 towards sense-objects4 ,with the universal ,soul1 the human soul shares the administration of the whole world1 without1 however1 entering it2 then1 desiring to administer some portion of the world on her own responsibility1 she separates from the universal ,soul1 and passes into a body4 ,but even when she is present with the body1 the soul does not devote herself entirely to it1 as some part of her always remains outside of it2 that is how her intelligence remains impassible4#ij ,,the ,,soul ,,as ,,the ,,artist ,,of ,,the ,,universe4 ,the soul is present in the body at some times1 and at other times1 is outside of it4 ,when1 indeed1 following her own inclination1 she descends from first-rank entities 7that is1 intelligible entities7 to third-rank entities 7that is1 earthly entities71 she proceeds by virtue of the actualization of intelligence1 which1 remaining within herself1 embellishes everything by the ministration of the soul1 and which1 itself being immortal1 ordains everything with immortal power2 for intelligence exists continuously by a continuous actualization4#ia ,,all ,,souls ,,have ,,immortality1 ,,even ,,if ,,sunk ,,into ,,animals ,,or ,,plants4 #ad4 7#ai74 ,what about the souls of animals inferior to man8 ,the 7rational7 souls that have strayed so far as to descend into the bodies of animals are nevertheless still immortal4#ib ,souls of a kind other 7than rational souls71 cannot proceed from anything else than the living nature 7of the universal ,soul72 and they necessarily are the principles of life for all animals4 ,the case is the same with the souls that inhere in plants4 ,indeed1 all souls have issued from the same principle 7the universal ,soul71 all have an individual life1 and are indivisible and incorporeal essences 7beings74 ,,even ,,if ,,the ,,soul ,,has ,,different ,,parts1 ,,the ,,original ,,parts ,,survive4 ,to the objection that the human soul must decompose because she contains three parts1 it may be answered that1 when souls issue from here below1 those that are purified leave what had been added to them in generation 7the irrational soul1#ic7 while the other non-purified souls do free themselves therefrom with time4 ,besides1 this lower part of the soul does not itself perish1 for it exists as long as the principle from which it proceeds4 ,indeed1 nothing that exists is annihilated4 ,,the ,,historic ,,evidence ,,for ,,immortality ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #ae4 7#bj74 ,this1 then1 is our answer to those who seek a philosophical demonstration4 ,those who are satisfied with the testimony of faith and sense1 may be referred to those extracts from history which furnish numerous proofs thereof4#id ,we may also refer to the oracles given by the divinities who order an appeasement of the souls who were victims of some injustice1 and to honor the dead1#ie and to the rites observed by all towards those who live no more2#if which presupposes that their souls are still conscious beyond4 ,even after leaving their bodies1 many souls who lived on the earth have continued to grant benefits to men4#ig ,by revelation of the future2#ih and rendering other services1 they themselves prove that the other souls cannot have perished4 ,as the first book was evidently ,platonic1 the second seems ,numenian1 reminding us of the latter's book on the ,immortality of the ,soul1 one of the arguments from which we find in #c ,e4 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,first4 ,concerning ,fate4 ,,possible ,,theories ,,about ,,fate4 #a4 ,the first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things that become1 and those that are2 the cause of the former being their becoming1 and that of the latter1 their existence4 ,again1 neither of them may have a cause4 ,or1 in both cases1 some may have a cause1 and some not4 ,further1 those that become might have a cause1 while1 of these that exist1 some might partly have a cause4 ,contrariwise1 all things that exist may have a cause1 while of those that become1 parts may have a cause1 and part not4 ,last1 none of the things that become might have any cause4 ,,except ,,the ,,first1 ,,all ,,things ,,are ,,caused4 ,speaking of eternal things1 the first cannot be derived from other causes1 just because they are first4 ,things dependent from the first1 however1 may indeed thence derive their being4 ,to each thing we should also attribute the resultant action2 for a thing's being is constituted by its displayed energy4 ,,stoic ,,and ,,epicurean ,,causeless ,,origin ,,really ,,the ,,utmost ,,determinism4 ,now among the things that become1 or among those that although perpetually existent do not always result in the same actions1 it may be boldly asserted that everything has a cause4 ,we should not admit 7the ,stoic contention#ii7 that something happens without a cause1 nor accept the 7,epicurean#ajj7 arbitrary convergence of the atoms1 nor believe that any body initiates a movement suddenly and without determining reason1 nor suppose 7with ,epicurus again#aja7 that the soul undertakes some action by a blind impulse1 without any motive4 ,thus to suppose that a thing does not belong to itself1 that it could be carried away by involuntary movements1 and act without motive1 would be to subject it to the most crushing determinism4 ,the will must be excited1 or the desire awakened by some interior or exterior stimulus4 ,no determination 7is possible7 without motive4 ,,every ,,good ,,thing ,,has ,,some ,,cause2 ,,nature ,,being ,,the ,,ultimate ,,cause4 ,if everything that happens has a cause1 it is possible to discover such fact's proximate causes1 and to them refer this fact4 ,people go downtown1 for example1 to see a person1 or collect a bill4 ,in all cases it is a matter of choice1 followed by decision1 and the determination to carry it out4 ,there are1 indeed1 certain facts usually derived from the arts2 as for instance the re-establishment of health may be referred to medicine and the physician4 ,again1 when a man has become rich1 this is due to his finding some treasure1 or receiving some donation1 to working1 or exercising some lucrative profession4 ,the birth of a child depends on its father1 and the concourse of exterior circumstances1 which1 by the concatenation of causes and effects1 favored his procreation2 for example1 right food1 or even a still more distant cause1 the fertility of the mother1 or1 still more generally1 of nature 7or1 in general1 it is usual to assign natural causes74 ,,proximate ,,causes ,,are ,,unsatisfactory2 ,,we ,,must ,,seek ,,the ,,ultimate ,,ones4 #b4 ,to stop1 on arriving at these causes1 and to refuse further analysis1 is to exhibit superficiality4 ,this is against the advice of the sages1 who advise ascending to the primary causes1 to the supreme principles4 ,for example1 why1 during the full moon1 should the one man steal1 and the other one not steal8 ,or1 why1 under the same influence of the heavens1 has the one1 and not the other1 been sick8 ,why1 by use of the same means1 has the one become rich1 and the other poor8 ,the difference of dispositions1 characters1 and fortunes force us to seek ulterior causes1 as indeed the sages have always done4 ,,materialists ,,support ,,determinism4 ,those sages who 7like ,leucippus1 ,democritus and ,epicurus7 assumed material principles such as the atoms1 and who explain everything by their motion1 their shock and combinations1 pretend that everything existent and occurring is caused by the agency of these atoms1 their actions and reactions4 ,this includes1 according to them1 our appetites and dispositions4 ,the necessity residing in the nature of these principles1 and in their effects1 is therefore1 by these sages1 extended to everything that exists4 ,as to the 7,ionic ,hylicists71 who assume other physical 7ultimate7 principles1 referring everything to them1 they thus also subject all beings to necessity4 ,,heraclitus1 ,,though ,,more ,,spiritual1 ,,is ,,also ,,determinist4 ,there are others 7such as ,heraclitus#ajb71 who1 seeking the 7supreme7 principle of the universe1 refer everything to it2 saying that this principle penetrates1 moves1 and produces everything4 ,this they call ,fate1 and the ,supreme ,cause4 ,from it they derive everything2 its motions are said to give rise not only to the things that are occurring1 but even our thought4 ,that is how the members of an animal do not move themselves1 but receive the stimulus from the governing principle within them4 ,,the ,,astrologers ,,make ,,cosmic ,,deductions ,,from ,,prognostication4 ,some 7of the astrologers7 explain everything by the circular motion of the heavens1 by the relative positions of the planets and stars1 and by their mutual aspects 7or1 relations74 ,they base this 7principle7 on the prevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures about futurity4 ,,the ,,stoic ,,determinism ,,is ,,based ,,on ,,various ,,theories4 ,others 7like the ,stoic ,chrysippus#ajc7 define ,fate otherwise3 it is the concatenation of causes in their connection towards the infinite1 by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an anterior one4 ,thus the things that follow relate to the things that precede1 and1 as their effects1 necessarily depend thereupon4 ,amidst these 7,stoic7 philosophers there are two conceptions of ,fate3 some consider that everything depends from a single principle1 while others do not4 ,these views we shall study later4 ,we shall first examine the system with which we began2 later we shall review the others4 ,,the ,,physical ,,theories ,,are ,,absurd4 #c4 ,to refer everything to physical causes1 whether you call them atoms or elements1 and from their disordered motion to deduce order1 reason and the soul that directs 7the body71 is absurd and impossible2 nevertheless1 to deduce everything from atoms1 is1 if possible1 still more impossible2 and consequently many valid objections have been raised against this theory4 ,,the ,,stoic ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,epicureans4 ,to begin with1 even if we do admit such atomic principles1 their existence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity of all things1 or fatality4 ,let us1 indeed1 grant the existence of atoms2 now some will move downwards--that is1 if there is an up and down in the universe--others obliquely1 by chance1 in various directions4 ,as there will be no order1 there will be nothing determinate4 ,only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate4 ,it will therefore be impossible to guess or predict events1 whether by art--and indeed1 how could there be any art in the midst of orderless things8--or by enthusiasm1 or divine inspiration2 for prediction implies that the future is determined4 ,true1 bodies will obey the impulses necessarily communicated to them by the atoms2 but how could you explain the operations and affections of the soul by movements of atoms8 ,how could atomic shock1 whether vertical or oblique1 produce in the soul these our reasonings1 or appetites1 whether necessarily1 or in any other way8 ,what explanation could they give of the soul's resistance to the impulsions of the body8 ,by what concourse of atoms will one man become a geometrician1 another become a mathematician and astronomer1 and the other a philosopher8 ,for1 according to that doctrine we no longer produce any act for which we are responsible1 we are even no longer living beings1 since we undergo the impulsion of bodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things4 ,,application ,,of ,,this ,,polemic ,,to ,,the ,,physicists4 ,the same objections apply to the doctrine of the philosophers who explain everything by other physical causes 7such as elements74 ,principles of inferior nature might well warm us1 cool us1 or even make us perish2 but they could not beget any of the operations which the soul produces2 these have an entirely different cause4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,heraclitus',s ,,position4 #d4 ,but might 7,heraclitus7 suppose that a single ,soul interpenetrating the universe produces everything1 and by supplying the universe with motion supplies it simultaneously to all its constituent beings1 so that from this primary cause1 would necessarily flow all secondary causes1 whose sequence and connection would constitute ,fate8 ,similarly1 in a plant1 for instance1 the plant's fate might be constituted by the 7governing7 principle which1 from the root1 administers its other parts1 and which organizes into a single system their actions and reactions4#ajd ,,this ,,would ,,interfere ,,with ,,self-,,consciousness ,,and ,,responsibility4 ,to begin with1 this ,necessity and ,fate would by their excess destroy themselves1 and render impossible the sequence and concatenation of the causes4 ,it is1 indeed1 absurd to insist that our members are moved by ,fate when they are set in motion1 or innervated1 by the governing principle4 ,it is a mistake to suppose that there is a part which imparts motion1 and on the other hand1 a part which receives it from the former2 it is the governing principle that moves the leg1 as it would any other part4 ,likewise1 if in the universe exists but a single principle which acts and reacts1 if things derive from each other by a series of causes each of which refers to the preceding one1 it will no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise through causes1 for their totality will constitute but a single being4 ,in that case1 we are no longer ourselves2 actions are no longer ours2 it is no longer we who reason2 it is a foreign principle which reasons1 wills1 and acts in us1 just as it is not our feet that walk1 but we who walk by the agency of our feet4 ,on the contrary1 common sense admits that every person lives1 thinks1 and acts by his own individual1 proper life1 thought and action2 to each must be left the responsibility of his actions1 good or evil1 and not attribute shameful deeds to the universal cause4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,the ,,astrological ,,theory ,,of ,,fate4 #e4 ,others1 again1 insist that this is not the state of affairs4 ,their disposition depends on the circular movement of the heaven which governs everything1 on the course of the stars1 of their mutual relative position at the time of their rising1 of their setting1 of their zenith1 or of their conjunction4 ,indeed1 such are the signs on which are founded prognostications and predictions of what is to happen1 not only to the universe1 but also to each individual1 both as to his fortunes and his thought4 ,it is noticed that the other animals and vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind of sympathy existing between them and the stars1 that all other things experience their influence1 that various regions of the earth differ according to their adjustment with the stars1 and especially the sun2 that from the nature of these regions depend not only the character of the plants and animals1 but also human forms1 size1 color1 affections1 passions1 tastes1 and customs4 ,in this system1 therefore1 the course of the stars is the absolute cause of everything4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,the ,,astrological ,,system4 ,to this we answer that our astrologer attributes indirectly to the stars all our characteristics3 will1 passions1 vices and appetites2 he allows us no rle other than to turn like mills1 instead of responsibility1 as befits men1 producing actions that suit our nature4 ,on the contrary1 we should be left in possession of what belongs to us by the observation that the universe limits itself to exercising some influence on what we possess already thanks to ourselves1 and which is really characteristic of us4 ,moreover1 one should distinguish the deeds in which we are active1 from those in which we are necessarily passive1 and not deduce everything from the stars4 ,nobody1 indeed1 doubts that the differences of place and climate exert an influence over us1 imparting to us1 for instance1 a cool or warm-hearted disposition4 ,heredity also should be considered2 for children usually resemble their parents by their features1 form1 and some affections of the irrational soul4 ,nevertheless1 even though they resemble them by their facial features1 because they are born in the same place1 they may differ in habits and thoughts1 because these things depend on an entirely different principle4 ,in addition1 we can adduce to the support of this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the temperament and to the appetites4 ,as to the claim that the stars are the causes of everything1 because one can predict what is to happen to each man from a consideration of their positions1 it would be just as reasonable to assert that the birds and the other beings which the augurs consult as omens produce the events of which they are the signs4 ,,horoscopes ,,questioned2 ,,they ,,do ,,not ,,account ,,for ,,simultaneous ,,differences4 ,this leads us to consider1 more in detail1 what sort of facts may be predicted according to the inspection of the positions occupied by the stars presiding over the birth of a man4 ,they who1 from the assertion that the stars indicate a man's future1 draw the consequence that the stars produce them1 are in error4 ,in some person's horoscope which indicates birth from noble parents1 on either maternal or paternal side1 this nobility of birth cannot be attributed to the stars1 as this nobility subsisted already in the parents before the stars had taken the position according to which the horoscope is cast4 ,besides1 astrologers pretend they can discover the parent's fortune from the birth of their children1 and from the condition of the parents the disposition and fate of the unborn offspring4 ,from a child's horoscope1 they announce his brother's death2 and from a woman's horoscope1 the fortunes of her husband1 and conversely4 ,it is unreasonable to refer to the stars things which evidently are necessary consequences of parental conditions4 ,we then reach a dilemma3 the cause lies either in these antecedent conditions1 or in the stars4 ,the beauty and ugliness of children1 when they resemble their parents1 must evidently be derived from them1 and not from the course of the stars4 ,moreover1 it is probable that at any one moment are born a crowd of human and animal young2 now1 inasmuch as they are born under the same star1 they all ought to have the same nature4 ,how does it then happen that1 in the same positions1 stars produce men and other beings simultaneously 7as ,cicero asks#aje78 ,,heredity ,,more ,,important ,,than ,,star-,,influence2 ,,continuation4 #f4 ,each being derives his character from his nature4 ,one being is a horse because he is born from a mare1 while another is human1 because born from a human mother2 and more3 he is that particular horse1 and that particular man because he is born from such and such a horse1 or woman4 ,doubtless1 the course of the stars may modify the result1 but the greatest part of the influence must be allowed to heredity4 ,,stars ,,affect ,,the ,,physical1 ,,not ,,the ,,mental ,,being4 ,the stars act on the body only in a physical way1 and thus impart to them heat1 cold1 and the variety of temperament which results therefrom4 ,but how could they endow the man with habits1 tastes1 and inclinations which do not seem to depend on the temperament1 such as the avocation of a surveyor1 a grammarian1 a gambler1 or an inventor8 ,,irrational ,,claims ,,of ,,astrologers4 ,besides1 nobody would admit that perversity could come from beings who are divinities4 ,how could one believe that they are the authors of the evils attributed to them1 and that they themselves become evil because they set or pass under the earth1 as if they could possibly be affected by the fact that1 in regard to us1 they seem to set2 as if they did not continue to wander around the heavenly sphere1 and remained in the same relation to the earth8 ,besides it is incredible that because a star is in such or such a position in respect of another star1 it becomes better or worse1 and that it affects us with goodness when it is well disposed1 and evil in the contrary case4 ,,stars ,,serve ,,as ,,letters ,,in ,,which ,,to ,,read ,,nature4 ,we grant that by their movement the stars co-operate in the conservation of the universe1 and that they simultaneously play in it another part4 ,they serve as letters for those skilled in deciphering this kind of writing2 and who1 by the observation of the figures formed by the stars1 read into them future events according to the laws of analogy1 as for instance1 if one presaged high deeds from seeing a bird fly high4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,the ,,stoic ,,doctrine1 ,,and ,,the ,,heraclitian4 #g4 ,there remains to be considered the 7,stoic7 doctrine which1 concatenating and interrelating all things among each other1 establishes a single cause which produces everything through seminal reasons4 ,this doctrine reattaches itself to 7,heraclitus's7 which deduces from the action of the universal ,soul the constitution and the movements of the individuals as well as those of the universe4 ,,alexander ,,of ,,aphrodisia',s ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,stoics4 ,in this case1 even if we possessed the power of doing something by ourselves1 we would not be any the less than the remainder of the universe subjected to necessity1 because ,fate1 containing the whole series of causes1 necessarily determines each event4 ,now since ,fate includes all causes1 there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence of that event1 or alter it4 ,if then everything obeys the impulsion of a single principle1 nothing is left to us but to follow it4 ,indeed1 in this case1 the fancies of our imagination would result from anterior facts1 and would in turn determine our appetites2 our liberty would then have become a mere word2 nor would we gain any advantage from obeying our appetites1 since our appetites themselves will be determined by anterior facts4 ,we would have no more liberty than the other animals1 than children1 or the insane1 who run hither and yon1 driven by blind appetites2 for they also obey their appetites1 as fire would do1 and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions of their nature4 ,these objections will be decisive for those capable of apprehending them2 and in the search for other causes of our appetites they will not content themselves with the principles which we have examined4 ,,the ,,human ,,soul ,,as ,,an ,,independent ,,principle4 #h4 ,what other cause1 besides the preceding1 will we have to invoke so as to let nothing occur without a cause1 to maintain order and interdependence of things in the world1 and in order to preserve the possibility of predictions and omens without destroying our personality8 ,we shall have to introduce among the number of beings another principle1 namely3 the soul2 and not only the ,world-soul1 but even the individual soul of every person4 ,in the universal concatenation of causes and effects1 this soul is a principle of no little importance1 because1 instead of1 like all other things1 being born of a seminal reason1 it constitutes a primary cause4 ,outside of a body1 she remains absolute mistress of herself1 free and independent of the cause which administers the world4 ,as soon as she has descended into a body1 she is no longer so independent1 for she then forms part of the order to which all things are subjected4 ,now1 inasmuch as the accidents of fortune1 that is to say1 the surrounding circumstances1 determine many events1 the soul alternately yields to the influence of external circumstances1 and then again she dominates them1 and does what she pleases4 ,this she does more or less1 according as she is good or evil4 ,when she yields to the corporeal temperament1 she is necessarily subjected to desire or anger1 discouraged in poverty1 or proud in prosperity1 as well as tyrannical in the exercise of power4 ,but she can resist all these evil tendencies if her disposition is good2 she modifies her surroundings more than she is affected by them2 some things she changes1 others she tolerates without herself incurring guilt4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,free ,,when ,,following ,,reason4 #i4 ,all things therefore1 which result either from a choice by the soul1 or from exterior circumstances1 are necessary1 or determined by a cause4 ,could anything1 indeed1 be found outside of these causes8 ,if we gather into one glance all the causes we admit1 we find the principles that produce everything1 provided we count1 amidst external causes1 the influence exercised by the course of the stars4 ,when a soul makes a decision1 and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by external things1 and yields to a blind impulse1 we should not consider her determination and action to be free4 ,the soul is not free when1 perverting herself1 she does not make decisions which direct her in the straight path4 ,on the contrary1 when she follows her own guide1 pure and impassible reason1 her determination is really voluntary1 free and independent1 and the deed she performs is really her own work1 and not the consequence of an exterior impulse2 she derives it from her inner power1 her pure being1 from the primary and sovereign principle which directs her1 being deceived by no ignorance1 nor vanquished by the power of appetites2 for when the appetites invade the soul1 and subdue her1 they drag her with them by their violence1 and she is rather passive than active in what she does4 ,,the ,,soul ,,obeys ,,fate ,,only ,,when ,,evil4 #aj4 ,the conclusion of our discussion is that while everything is indicated and produced by causes1 these are of two kinds3 ,first the human soul1 and then only exterior circumstances4 ,when the soul acts conformably to right reason she acts freely4 ,otherwise1 she is tangled up in her deeds1 and she is rather passive than active4 ,therefore1 whenever she lacks prudence1 the exterior circumstances are the causes of her actions2 one then has good reason to say that she obeys ,fate1 especially if ,fate is here considered as an exterior cause4 ,on the contrary1 virtuous actions are derived from ourselves2 for1 when we are independent1 it is natural for us to produce them4 ,virtuous men act1 and do good freely4 ,others do good only in breathing-spells left them in between by their passions4 ,if1 during these intervals1 they practice the precepts of wisdom1 it is not because they receive them from some other being1 it is merely because their passions do not hinder them from listening to the voice of reason4 ,as the first book seemed ,platonic1 and the second ,numenian1 so this third one seems called forth by the practical opposition of astrologers or ,gnostics4 ,later in life1 his thirty-third book1 ii4 #i1 was to take up again this polemic in more extended form4 ,this chronologic arrangement of ,plotinos's first three books reveals his three chief sources of interest--devotion to ,plato1 reliance on ,numenius1 and opposition to the ,gnostics and astrologers4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,first4 ,of the ,being of the ,soul4 ,it is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being4 ,intelligence is the best that there is on high2 but there are also souls2 for it is thence that they descended thither4 ,only1 souls have no bodies1 while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there4 ,on high1 all the intelligences exist together1 without separation or division2 all the souls exist equally together in that world which is one1 and there is no local distance between them4 ,intelligence therefore ever remains inseparable and indivisible2 but the soul1 inseparable so long as she resides on high1 nevertheless possesses a divisible nature4 ,for her dividing herself consists in departing from the intelligible world1 and uniting herself to bodies2 it might therefore be reasonably said that she becomes divisible in passing into bodies1 since she thus separates from the intelligible world1 and divides herself somewhat4 ,in what way is she also indivisible8 ,in that she does not separate herself entirely from the intelligible world1 ever residing there by her highest part1 whose nature it is to be indivisible4 ,to say then that the soul is composed of indivisible 7essence7 and of 7essence7 divisible in bodies means then no more than that the soul has an 7essence7 which dwells partly in the intelligible world1 and partly descends into the sense-world1 which is suspended from the first and extends downwards to the second1 as the ray goes from the centre to the circumference4 ,when the soul descended here below1 it is by her superior part that she contemplates the intelligible world1 as it is thereby that she preserves the nature of the all 7of the universal ,soul74 ,for here below she is not only divisible1 but also indivisible2 her divisible part is divided in a somewhat indivisible manner2 she is indeed entirely present in the whole body in an indivisible manner1 and nevertheless she is said to divide herself because she spreads out entirely in the whole body4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,of ,intelligence1 ,ideas and ,essence4 ,,the ,,sensual ,,man1 ,,the ,,moral1 ,,and ,,the ,,spiritual4 #a4 ,from their birth1 men exercise their senses1 earlier than their intelligence1#ajf and they are by necessity forced to direct their attention to sense-objects4 ,some stop there1 and spend their life without progressing further4 ,they consider suffering as evil1 and pleasure as the good1 judging it to be their business to avoid the one and encompass the other4 ,that is the content of wisdom for those of them that pride themselves on being reasonable2 like those heavy birds who1 having weighted themselves down by picking up too much from the earth1 cannot take flight1 though by nature provided with wings4 ,there are others who have raised themselves a little above earthly objects because their soul1 endowed with a better nature1 withdraws from pleasures to seek something higher2#ajg but as they are not capable of arriving at contemplation of the intelligible1 and as1 after having left our lower region here1 they do not know where to lodge1 they return to a conception of morality which considers virtue to consist in these common-place actions and occupations whose narrow sphere they had at first attempted to leave behind4 ,finally a third kind is that of those divine men who are endowed with a piercing vision1 and whose penetrating glance contemplates the splendor of the intelligible world1 and rise unto it1 taking their flight above the clouds and darkness of this world4 ,then1 full of scorn for terrestrial things1 they remain up there1 and reside in their true fatherland with the unspeakable bliss of the man who1 after long journeys1 is at last repatriated4 ,,the ,,higher ,,region ,,reached ,,only ,,by ,,those ,,who ,,are ,,born ,,philosophers4 #b4 ,which is this higher region8 ,what must be done to reach it8 ,one must be naturally disposed to love1 and be really a born philosopher4#ajh ,in the presence of beauty1 the lover feels something similar to the pains of childbirth2 but far from halting at bodily beauty1 he rises to that aroused in the soul by virtue1 duties1 science and laws4 ,then he follows them up to the cause of their beauty1 and in this ascending progress stops only when he has reached the ,principle that occupies the first rank1 that which is beautiful in itself4#aji ,then only does he cease being driven by this torment that we compare to the pains of childbirth4 ,,love ,,is ,,transformed ,,into ,,progressively ,,higher ,,stages4 ,but how does he rise up thither8 ,how does he have the power to do so8 ,how does he learn to love8 ,here it is4 ,the beauty seen in bodies is incidental2 it consists in the shapes of which the bodies are the matter4#aaj ,consequently the substance changes1 and it is seen changing from beauty to ugliness4 ,the body has only a borrowed beauty4 ,who imparted that beauty to the body8 ,on the one hand1 the presence of beauty2 on the other1 the actualization of the soul which fashioned the body1 and which gave it the shape it possesses4 ,but is the soul1 by herself1 absolute beauty8 ,no1 since some souls are wise and beautiful1 while some others are foolish and ugly4 ,it is therefore only by wisdom that the soul is beautiful4 ,but from what is her wisdom derived8 ,necessarily from intelligence2 not from the intelligence that is intelligent at some time1 though not at others1 but from the genuine ,intelligence1 which is beautiful on that very account4#aaa ,shall we stop at ,intelligence1 as a first principle8 ,or shall we on the contrary still rise above it8 ,surely so1 for ,intelligence presents itself to us before the first ,principle only because it is1 so to speak1 located in the antechamber of the ,good4#aab ,it bears all things within itself1 and manifests them1 so that it displays the image of the ,good in manifoldness1 while the ,good itself remains in an absolute simple unity4 ,,proofs ,,for ,,the ,,existence ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,intelligence4 #c4 ,let us now consider the ,intelligence which reason tells us is absolute essence and genuine being1 and whose existence we have already established in a different manner4 ,it would seem ridiculous to inquire whether ,intelligence form part of the scale of beings2 but there are men who doubt it1 or who at least are disposed to ask for a demonstration that ,intelligence possesses the nature we predicate of it1 that it is separated 7from matter71 that it is identical with the essences1 and that it contains the ideas4 ,this is our task4 ,,in ,,the ,,human ,,world ,,everything ,,is ,a ,,composite ,,of ,,form ,,and ,,matter4 ,all things that we consider to be essences are composites2 nothing is simple or single1 either in works of art1 or in the products of nature4#aac ,works of art1 indeed1 contain metal1 wood1 stone1 and are derived from these substances only by the labor of the artist1 who1 by giving matter its form makes of it a statue1 or bed1 or house4 ,among the products of nature1 those that are compounds or mixtures may be analyzed into the form impressed on the elements of the compound2 so1 for instance1 we may in a man1 distinguish a soul and body1 and in the body four elements4 ,since the very matter of the elements1 taken in itself1 has no form1 every object seems composed of matter and of some principle that supplies it with form4#aad ,so we are led to ask whence matter derives its form1 and to seek whether the soul is simple1 or whether it contains two parts1 one of which plays the parts of matter1 and the other of form1#aae so that the first part would be similar to the form received by the metal of a statue1 and the latter to the principle which produces the form itself4 ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,also ,,is ,a ,,compound ,,of ,,form ,,and ,,matter4 ,applying this conception to the universe1 we rise to ,intelligence1 recognizing therein the demiurgic creator of the world4 ,it was in receiving from it its shapes by the intermediation of another principle1 the universal ,soul1 that the 7material7 substances became water1 air1 earth and fire4 ,on the one hand1 the ,soul shapes the four elements of the world2#aaf on the other1 she receives from ,intelligence the 7seminal7 reasons1#aag as the souls of the artists themselves receive from the arts the reasons which they work out4#aah ,in ,intelligence1 therefore1 there is a part which is the form of the soul2 it is intelligence considered1 as shape4 ,there is another which imparts shape1 like the sculptor who gives the metal the shape of the statue1 and which in itself possesses all it gives4#aai ,now the 7shapes7 which the ,intelligence imparts to the soul connect with the truth as closely as possible1 while those which the soul imparts to the body are only images and appearances4#abj ,,why ,,our ,,ascent ,,cannot ,,stop ,,with ,,the ,,soul4 #d4 ,why should we not1 on arriving at the ,soul1 stop there1 and consider her the first principle8 ,because ,intelligence is a power different from the ,soul1 and better than the ,soul2 and what is better must1 by its very nature1 precede 7the worst74 ,the ,stoics#aba are wrong in thinking that it is the ,soul which1 on reaching her perfection1 begets ,intelligence4 ,how could that which is potential pass into actualization unless there were some principle that effected that transition8 ,if this transition were due to chance1 it could not have occurred at all4 ,the first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in actualization1 which needs nothing1 which is perfect1 while imperfect things must be assigned to the second rank4 ,these may be perfected by the principles that begat them1 which1 in respect to them1 play a paternal part1 perfecting what they had originally produced that was imperfect4 ,what is thus produced is matter1 as regards the creating principle1 and then becomes perfect1 on receiving its form from it4 ,besides1 the ,soul is 7often7 affected2 and we need to discover some thing that is impassible1 without which everything is dissolved by time2 therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul4 ,further1 the ,soul is in the world2 now there must be something that resides outside of the world1 and which consequently would be superior to the ,soul2 for since that which inheres in the world resides within the body1 or matter1 if nothing existed outside of the world1 nothing would remain permanent4 ,in this case1 the 7seminal7 reason of man1 and all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal4 ,the result of all these considerations1 as well as of many others that we could add thereto1 is the necessary assertion of the existence of ,intelligence beyond the ,soul4 ,,intelligence ,,is ,,in ,,actualization ,,because ,,its ,,thought ,,is ,,identical ,,with ,,its ,,essence ,,or ,,existence4 #e4 ,taking it in its genuine sense1 ,intelligence is not only potential1 arriving at being intelligent after having been unintelligent--for otherwise1 we would be forced to seek out some still higher principle--but is in actualization1 and is eternal4 ,as it is intelligent by itself1 it is by itself that it thinks what it thinks1 and that it possesses what is possesses4 ,now since it thinks of itself and by itself1 it itself is what it thinks4 ,if we could distinguish between its existence and its thought1 its being would be unintelligent2 it would be potential1 not in actualization4 ,thought1 therefore1 must not be separated from its object1 although1 from sense-objects1 we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible entities as distinct from each other4 ,,reasons1 ,,as ,,archetypes1 ,,must ,,have ,,existed ,,before ,,stoic ,,habit1 ,,nature ,,or ,,soul4 ,which then is the principle that acts1 that thinks1 and what is the actualization and thought of ,intelligence1 necessary to justify the assertion that it is what it thinks8 ,evidently ,intelligence1 by its mere real existence1 thinks beings1 and makes them exist2 it therefore is the beings4 ,indeed1 the beings will either exist outside of it1 or within it2 and in the latter case they would have to be identical with it4 ,that they should exist outside of ,intelligence1 is unthinkable2 for where would they be located8 ,they must therefore exist within it1 and be identical with it4 ,they could not be in sense-objects1 as common people think1 because sense-objects could not be the first in any genus4 ,the form which inheres in their matter is only the representation of existence2 now a form which exists in anything other than itself is put in it by a superior principle1 and is its image4 ,further1 if ,intelligence must be the creative power of the universe1 it could not1 while creating the universe1 think beings as existent in what does not yet exist4 ,intelligible entities1 therefore1 must exist before the world1 and cannot be images of sense-objects1 being on the contrary1 their archetypes1 and constituting the being of ,intelligence4 ,it might be objected that the 7seminal7 reasons might suffice4 ,these reasons are1 no doubt1 eternal2 and1 if they be eternal and impassible1 they must exist within the ,intelligence whose characteristics we have described1 the ,intelligence which precedes the habit1#abb nature1#abc and the soul1#abd because here these entities are potential4#abe ,,intelligence ,,is ,,postulated ,,by ,,the ,,general ,,necessities ,,of ,,the ,,world4 ,intelligence1 therefore1 essentially constitutes all beings2 and when ,intelligence thinks them1 they are not outside of ,intelligence1 and neither precede nor follow it4 ,intelligence is the first legislator1 or rather1 it is the very law of existence4 ,parmenides#abf therefore was right in saying1 ,thought is identical with existence4 ,the knowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things themselves4 ,that is why ,i recognize myself as a being1 and why ,i have reminiscences of intelligible entities4 ,indeed1 none of those beings is outside of ,intelligence1 nor is contained in any location2 all of them subsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible4 ,that is why they really are beings4 ,if they were born1 or perished1 they would possess existence only in an incidental manner1 they would no longer be beings2 it would be the existence they possessed which would be essence4 ,it is only by participation that sense-things are what they are said to be2 the nature that constitutes their substance derives its shape from elsewhere1 as the metal receives its shape from the sculptor1 and wood from the carpenter2 while the image of art penetrates into the matter1 the art itself remains in its identity1 and within itself possesses the genuine existence of the statue or of the bed4 ,that is how the bodies' general necessity of participating in images shows that they are different from the beings2 for they change1 while the entities are immutable1 possess within themselves their own foundation1 and have no need of existing in any location1 since they have no extension1 and since they subsist in an intellectual and absolute existence4 ,again1#abg the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded#abh by some other principle1 while intelligence1 which furnishes the existence for objects in themselves perishable1 has need of nothing to make itself subsist4 ,,intelligence ,,contains ,,all ,,beings ,,generatively4 #f4 ,thus ,intelligence actually constitutes all beings2 it contains them all1 but not locally2 it contains them as it possesses itself2 it is identical with them4 ,all entities are simultaneously contained within it1 and in it remain distinct1 as many kinds of knowledge may exist within the soul without their number causing any confusion2 each of them appears when needed1 without involving the others4 ,if in the soul each thought be an actualization independent of other thoughts1 so much the more must ,intelligence be all things simultaneously1 with this restriction1 however1 that each of them is a special power4 ,considered in its universality1 ,intelligence contains all entities as the genus contains all species1 as the whole contains all parts4 ,even the seminal powers bear the impress of this universality4 ,each one1 considered in its totality1 is a centre which contains all the parts of the organism in an undivided condition2 nevertheless in it the reason of the eyes differs from that of the hands1 and this diversity is manifested by that of the organs begotten 7therefrom74#abi ,each of the powers of the seed1 therefore1 is the total unity of the seminal reason when this power is united to the others which are implied therein4 ,what in the seed is corporeal contains matter1 as1 for instance1 humidity2 but the seminal reason is the entire form2 it is identical with the generative power1 a power which itself is the image of a superior power of the soul4 ,this generative power contained in seeds is#acj usually called nature4 ,proceeding from the superior powers as light radiates from the fire1 it tames and fashions matter1 imparting thereto the seminal reason#aca without pushing it1 or moving it as by levers4 ,,there ,,are ,,scientific ,,notions ,,that ,,are ,,posterior1 ,,but ,,some ,,that ,,are ,,prior4 #g4 ,the scientific notions that the soul forms of sense-objects1 by discursive reason1 and which should rather be called opinions1#acb are posterior to the objects 7they deal with72 and consequently1 are no more than images of them4 ,but true scientific notions received from intelligence by discursive reasons do not contain any sense-conceptions4 ,so far as they are scientific notions1 they are the very things of which they are the conceptions2 they reveal the intimate union of intelligence and thought4 ,interior ,intelligence1 which consists of the primary 7natures7 possesses itself intimately1 resides within itself since all eternity1 and is an actualization4 ,it does not direct its glances outside of itself1 because it possesses everything within itself2 it does not acquire1 and does not reason to discover things that may not be present to them4 ,those are operations characteristic of the soul4 ,intelligence1 remaining fixed within itself1 is all things simultaneously4 ,nevertheless1 it is not thought which makes each of them subsist2 it is only because intelligence thought the divinity or movement1 for instance1 that the divinity or movement exists4#acc ,when we say that thoughts are forms1 we are mistaken if thereby we mean that the intelligible exists only because ,intelligence thinks it4 ,on the contrary1 it is only because the intelligible exists1 that ,intelligence can think4 ,otherwise1 how would ,intelligence come to think the intelligible8 ,it cannot meet the intelligible by chance1 nor waste itself in fruitless efforts4 ,,thought ,,is ,,the ,,form1 ,,shape ,,the ,,actualization ,,of ,,the ,,being4 #h4 ,since the thought is something essentially one 7871 the form1 which is the object of thought1 and the idea#acd1 #acd;a are one and the same thing4 ,which is this thing8 ,intelligence and the intellectual being1 for no idea is foreign to intelligence2 each form is intelligence1 and the whole intelligence is all the forms2 every particular form is a particular intelligence4 ,likewise science1 taken in its totality1 is all the notions it embraces2 every notion is a part of the total science2 it is not separated from the science locally1 and exists potentially in the whole science4#ace ,intelligence resides within itself1 and by possessing itself calmly1 is the eternal fulness of all things4 ,if we conceived it as being prior to essence1 we would have to say that it was the action and thought of ,intelligence which produced and begat all beings4 ,but as1 on the contrary1 it is certain that essence is prior to ,intelligence1 we should1 within the thinking principle1 first conceive the beings1 then actualization and thought1 just as 7the nature7 of fire is joined by the actualization of the fire1 so that beings have innate intelligence 78#adh7 as their actualization4 ,now essence is an actualization2 therefore essence and intelligence are but a single actualization1 or rather both of them fuse4#acf ,consequently1 they form but a single nature1 as beings1 the actualization of essence1 and intelligence4 ,in this case the thought is the form1 and the shape is the actualization of the being4 ,when1 however1 in thought we separate essence from ,intelligence1 we must conceive one of these principles as prior to the other4 ,the ,intelligence which operates this separation is indeed different from the essence from which it separates2#acg but the ,intelligence which is inseparable from essence and which does not separate thought from essence is itself essence and all things4 ,,intelligence ,,contains ,,the ,,universal ,,archetype4 #i4 ,what then are the things contained within the unity of ,intelligence which we separate in thinking of them8 ,they must be expressed without disturbing their rest1 and we must contemplate the contents of ,intelligence by a science that somehow remains within unity4 ,since this sense-world is an animal which embraces all animals1 since it derives both its general and special existence from a principle different from itself1#ach a principle which1 in turn1 is derived from intelligence1 therefore intelligence must itself contain the universal archetype1 and must be that intelligible world of which ,plato#aci 7well7 says2 ,intelligence sees the ideas contained within the existing animal4#adj ,since an animal1 whose 7seminal7 reason exists with the matter fit to receive it1 must of course be begotten1 so the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual1 all-powerful1 and unhindered by any obstacle--since nothing can interpose between it and the 7substance7 capable of receiving the form--must necessarily be adorned 7or1 created7 by intelligence1 but only in a divided condition does it reveal the form it receives1 so that1 for instance1 it shows us on one hand a man1 and on the other the sun1 while intelligence possesses everything in unity4 ,,in ,,the ,,sense-,,world ,,only ,,those ,,things ,,that ,,are ,,forms ,,proceed ,,from ,,intelligence4 #aj4 ,therefore1 in the sense-world1 all the things that are forms proceed from intelligence2 those which are not forms do not proceed therefrom4 ,that is1 in the intelligible world we do not find any of the things that are contrary to nature1 any more than we find what is contrary to the arts in the arts themselves4 ,thus the seminal reason does not contain the defects1 such as limping would be in a body4 ,congenital lameness is due to the reason's failure to dominate matter1 while accidental lameness is due to deterioration of the form 7idea874 ,,natural ,,characteristics ,,are ,,derived ,,from ,,the ,,categories ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,the qualities that are natural1 quantities1 numbers1 magnitudes1 states1 actions and natural experiences1 movements and recuperations1 either general or particular1 are among the contents of the intelligible world1 where time is replaced by eternity1#ada and space is replaced by the telescoping of intelligible entities 7that are within each other74 ,as all entities are together in the intelligible world1 whatever entity you select 7by itself7 is intellectual and living being1 identity and difference1 movement and rest2#adb it is what moves1 and what is at rest2 it is being1 and quality2 that is1 it is all4 ,there every essence is in actualization1 instead of merely being in potentiality2 consequently it is not separated from quality4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,fails ,,to ,,contain ,,earthly ,,imperfections4 ,does the intelligible world contain only what is found in the sense-world1 or does it contain anything additional8444 ,let us consider the arts1 in this respect4 ,to begin with1 the intelligible world does not contain any imperfection4 ,evils here below come from lack1 privation1 omission2 it is a state of matter1 or of anything similar to matter1 which failed to be completely assimilated4#adc ,,some ,,arts ,,are ,,purely ,,earthly2 ,,others1 ,,like ,,music1 ,,intelligible4 #aa4 ,let us therefore consider the arts and their products4 ,unless as represented within human reason1 we cannot refer to the intelligible world arts of imitation such as painting1 sculpture1 dancing1 or acting1 because they are born here below1 take sense-objects as models1 representing their forms1 motions1 and visible proportions4#add ,if1 however1 we possess a faculty which1 by studying the beauties offered by the symmetry of animals1 considers the general characteristics of this symmetry1 it must form part of the intellectual power which1 on high1 contemplates universal symmetry4 ,music1 however1 which studies rhythm and harmony1 is1 so far as it studies what is intelligible in these things1 the image of the music that deals with intelligible rhythm4 ,,there ,,are ,,many ,,auxiliary ,,arts ,,which ,,help ,,the ,,progress ,,of ,,nature4 ,the arts which produce sense-objects1 such as architecture and carpentry1 have their principles in the intelligible world1 and participate in wisdom1 so far as they make use of certain proportions4 ,but as they apply these proportions to sense-objects1 they cannot wholly be referred to the intelligible world1 unless in so far as they are contained within human reason4 ,the case is similar with agriculture1 which assists the growth of plants2 medicine1 which increases health1 and 7gymnastics7 which supplies the body with strength as well as vigor1#ade for on high there is another ,power1 another ,health1 from which all living organisms derive their needed vigor4 ,,other ,,arts ,,are ,,intelligible ,,when ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,last1 whenever rhetoric1 strategy1 private and public finance and politics weave beauty in their deeds1 and they glance above1 they 7discover7 that they have added to their science a contribution from the intelligible science4 ,the science of geometry1 however1 which deals 7wholly7 with intelligible entities1 must be referred to the intelligible world4 ,so also with philosophy1 which occupies the first rank among sciences because it studies essence4 ,this is all we have to say about arts and their products4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,contains ,,only ,,universal ,,ideas2 ,,particularities ,,are ,,derived ,,from ,,matter4 #ab4 ,if the intelligible world contains the idea of ,man1 it must also contain that of the reasonable man1 and of the artist2 and consequently the idea of the arts that are begotten by ,intelligence4 ,we must therefore insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of the universals1 the idea of ,man as such1 and not1 for instance1 that of ,socrates4 ,still we shall have to decide whether the intelligible world does not also contain the idea of the individual man1 that is1 of the man considered with the things that differ in each individual2 for one may have a ,roman nose and the other a pug nose4 ,these differences are indeed implied within the idea of man1 just as there are differences within the idea of animal4 ,but the differences between a ,roman or a snub nose are derived from matter4 ,likewise1 amidst the varieties of colors1 some are contained within the seminal reason1 while others are derived from matter and space4 ,,besides ,,ideas ,,of ,,individual ,,souls ,,and ,,intelligence1 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,contains ,,the ,,soul ,,itself ,,and ,,intelligence ,,itself4 #ac4 ,it remains for us to study whether the intelligible world contains only what is in the sense-world1 or whether we should distinguish from the individual soul the ,soul itself1 from the particular intelligence1 ,intelligence itself1 as we have above distinguished the particular man from ,man himself4 ,we should not consider all things here below as images of archetypes1 for instance1 the soul of a man as the image of the ,soul herself4 ,only degrees of dignity differentiate souls2 but these souls are not the ,soul itself4 ,as the ,soul itself exists really1 it must also contain a certain wisdom1 justice and science1 which are not images of wisdom1 justice1 and intelligible science1 as sense-objects are images of intelligible entities1 but which are these very entities located here below in entirely different conditions of existence2 for they are not locally circumscribed4 ,therefore when the soul issues from the body1 she preserves these things within herself2 for the sense-world exists only in a determinate place1 while the intelligible world exists everywhere2 therefore all that the soul contains here below is also in the intelligible world4 ,consequently if1 by sense-objects we really mean visible things1 then indeed the intelligible world contains entities not present in this sense-world4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we include within the sense-world the soul and all she implies1 then all things that are above are present here below also4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,being ,,entirely ,,one ,,does ,,not ,,explain ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,manifold4 #ad4 ,can we identify the nature that contains all the intelligibles 7,intelligence7 with the supreme ,principle8 ,impossible1 because the supreme ,principle must be essentially one1 and simple1 while essences form a multitude4 ,but as these essences form a multitude1 we are forced to explain how this multitude1 and all these essences can exist4 ,how can 7the single7 ,intelligence be all these things8 ,whence does it proceed8 ,this we shall have to study elsewhere4#adf ,,the ,,soul ,,receives ,,accidents ,,from ,,matter1 ,,but ,,defects ,,are ,,not ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,it may further be asked whether the intelligible world contains the ideas of objects which are derived from decay1 which are harmful or disagreeable1 such as1 for instance1 mud or excreta4 ,we answer that all the things that universal ,intelligence receives from the ,first are excellent4 ,among them are not found ideas of those dirty and vile objects mentioned above2 ,intelligence does not contain them4 ,but though receiving from ,intelligence ideas1 the soul receives from matter other things1 among which may be found the above-mentioned accidents4 ,besides1 a more thorough answer to this question must be sought for in our book where we explain ,how the ,multitude of ,ideas ,proceeds from the ,one4#adg ,,not ,,all ,,earthly ,,entities ,,have ,,corresponding ,,ideas4 ,in conclusion1 the accidental composites in which ,intelligence does not share and which are formed by a fortuitous complex of sense-objects1 have no ideas corresponding to them in the intelligible world4 ,things that proceed from decay are produced only because the ,soul is unable to produce anything better in this case2 otherwise she would have rather produced some object more agreeing with nature2 she therefore produces what she can4 ,,even ,,the ,,arts ,,are ,,dependent ,,on ,,the ,,soul4 ,all the arts concerned with things natural to man are contained within the ideas of ,man himself4 ,the ,art that is universal is prior to the other arts2 but ,art is posterior to the ,soul herself1 or rather1 to the life that is in ,intelligence before becoming soul1 and which1 on becoming soul1 deserves to be called the ,soul herself4 ,,difficult ,,passages4 7,transcriber's note3 see footnotes #acd;a and #adh47 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,eighth4 ,of the ,descent of the ,soul ,into the ,body4#adi ,,the ,,experience ,,of ,,ecstasy ,,leads ,,to ,,questions4 #a4 ,on waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself1 and on turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on myself1 ,i often observe an alluring beauty1 and ,i become conscious of an innate nobility4 ,then ,i live out a higher life1 and ,i experience atonement with the divinity4 ,fortifying myself within it1 ,i arrive at that actualization which raises me above the intelligible4 ,but if1 after this sojourn with the divinity1 ,i descend once more from ,intelligence to the exercise of my reasoning powers1 ,i am wont to ask myself how ,i ever could actually again descend1 and how my soul ever could have entered into a body1 since1 although she actually abides in the body1 she still possesses within herself all the perfection ,i discover in her4 ,,heraclitus1 ,,the ,,originator ,,of ,,these ,,questions1 ,,answers ,,them ,,obscurely4 ,heraclitus1 who recommends this research1 asserts that there are necessary changes of contraries into each other2 he speaks of ascenscions and of a descent1 says that it is a rest to change1 a fatigue to continue unremittingly in the same kinds of work1 and to be overwrought4 ,he thus reduces us to conjectures because he does not explain himself definitely2 and he would even force us to ask how he himself came to discover what he propounds4 ,,empedocles1 ,,as ,a ,,poet1 ,,tells ,,of ,,pythagorean ,,myths4 ,empedocles teaches that it is a law for souls that have sinned to fall down here below2 and that he himself1 having withdrawn from the divinity1 came down to the earth to become the slave of furious discord4 ,it would seem that he limited himself to advancing the ideas that ,pythagoras and his followers generally expressed by symbols1 both on this and other subjects4 ,besides ,empedocles is obscure because he uses the language of poetry4 ,,plato ,,says ,,many ,,contradictory ,,things ,,that ,,are ,,beautiful ,,and ,,true4 ,last1 we have the divine ,plato1 who has said so many beautiful things about the soul4 ,in his dialogues he often spoke of the descent of the soul into the body1 so that we have the right to expect from him something clearer4 ,unfortunately1 he is not always sufficiently in agreement with himself to enable one to follow his thought4 ,in general1 he depreciates corporeal things2 he deplores the dealings between the soul and the body2 insists#aej that the soul is chained down to it1 and that she is buried in it as in a tomb4 ,he attaches much importance to the maxim taught in the mysteries that the soul here below is as in a prison4#aea ,what ,plato calls the cavern#aeb and ,empedocles calls the grotto1 means no doubt the sense-world4#aec ,to break her chains1 and to issue from the cavern1 means the soul's#aed rising to the intelligible world4 ,in the ,phaedrus1#aee ,plato asserts that the cause of the fall of the soul is the loss of her wings2 that after having once more ascended on high1 she is brought back here below by the periods2#aef that there are souls sent down into this world by judgments1 fates1 conditions1 and necessity2 still1 at the same time1 he finds fault with the descent of the soul into the body4 ,but1 speaking of the universe in the ,timaeus1#aeg he praises the world1 and calls it a blissful divinity4 ,he states that the demiurgic creator1 being good1 gave it a soul to make it intelligent1 because without the soul1 the universe could not have been as intelligent as it ought to have been4#aeh ,consequently1 the purpose of the introduction of the universal ,soul into the world1 and similarly of each of our souls was only to achieve the perfection of the world2 for it was necessary for the sense-world to contain animals equal in kind and numbers to those contained in the intelligible world4 ,,questions ,,raised ,,by ,,plato',s ,,theories4 #b4 ,plato's theories about the soul lead us to ask how1 in general1 the soul has1 by her nature1 been led to enter into relations with the body4 ,other questions arise3 ,what is the nature of the world where the soul lives thus1 either voluntarily or necessarily1 or in any other way8 ,does the ,demiurge#aei act without meeting any obstacle1 or is it with him as with our souls8 ,,human ,,bodies ,,are ,,more ,,difficult ,,to ,,manage ,,than ,,the ,,world-,,body4 ,to begin with1 our souls1 charged with the administration of bodies less perfect than the world1 had to penetrate within them profoundly in order to manage them2 for the elements of these bodies tend to scatter1 and to return to their original location1 while1 in the universe1 all things are naturally distributed in their proper places4#afj ,besides1 our bodies demand an active and vigilant foresight1 because1 by the surrounding objects they are exposed to many accidents2 for they always have a crowd of needs1 as they demand continual protection against the dangers that threaten them4#afa ,but the body of the world is complete and perfect4 ,it is self-sufficient2 it has nothing to suffer contrary to its nature2 and consequently1 it 7acts7 on a mere order of the universal ,soul4 ,that is why the universal ,soul can remain impassible1 feeling no need1 remaining in the disposition desired by her own nature4 ,that is why ,plato says that1 when our soul dwells with this perfect ,soul1 she herself becomes perfect1 soaring in the ethereal region1 and governing the whole world4#afb ,so long as a human soul does not withdraw from the 7universal7 ,soul to enter into a body1 and to belong to some individual1 she easily administers the world1 in the same manner1 and together with the universal ,soul4 ,communicating to the body essence and perfection is therefore1 for the soul1 not an unmixed evil2 because the providential care granted to an inferior nature does not hinder him who grants it from himself remaining in a state of perfection4 ,,how ,,the ,,two-,,fold ,,soul ,,exerts ,a ,,two-,,fold ,,providence4 ,in the universe there are1 indeed1 two kinds of providences4#afc ,the first ,providence regulates everything in a royal manner1 without performing any actions1 or observing the details4 ,the second1 operating somewhat like an artisan1 adjusts its creative power to the inferior nature of creatures by getting in contact with them4#afd ,now as the divine ,soul 7or1 the principal power1#afe always administers the whole world in the first or regal way1 dominating the world by her superiority1 and by injecting into the world her lowest power 7nature71 we could not accuse the divinity of having given a bad place to the universal ,soul4 ,indeed1 this universal ,soul was never deprived of her natural power1 possessing it always1 because this power is not contrary to her being1 possessing it uninterruptedly from all eternity4 ,,star-,,souls1 ,,like ,,unincarnate ,,souls1 ,,govern ,,the ,,world ,,untroubledly4 7,plato7 further states that the relation of the souls of the stars to their bodies is the same as that of the universal ,soul to the universe1#aff where he makes the stars participate in the movements of the universal ,soul4 ,he thus grants to those souls the blessedness which is suitable to them4 ,the intercourse of the soul with the body is usually blamed for two things3 because it hinders the soul from busying herself with the conceptions of intelligence1 and then because it exposes her to agreeable or painful sensations which fill her with desires4 ,now neither of these two results affect the soul that has not entered into a body1 and which does not depend thereon by belonging to some particular individual4 ,then1 on the contrary1 she possesses the body of the universe1 which has no fault1 no need1 which can cause her neither fears nor desires1 because she has nothing to fear4 ,thus no anxiety ever forces her to descend to terrestrial objects1 or to distract herself from her happy and sublime contemplation4 ,entirely devoted to divine things1 she governs the world by a single power1 whose exercise involves no anxiety4 ,,differences ,,between ,,human ,,and ,,cosmic ,,incarnation4 #c4 ,consider now the human soul which#afg undergoes numberless ills while in the body1 eking out a miserable existence1 a prey to griefs1 desires1 fears1 sufferings of all kinds1 for whom the body is a tomb1 and the sense-world a cave or grotto4 ,this difference of opinions about the condition of the universal ,soul and the human soul is not contradictory1 because these two souls do not have the same reasons for descent into a body4 ,to begin with1 the location of thought1 that we call the intelligible world1#afh contains not only the entire universal ,intelligence1 but also the intellectual powers1 and the particular intelligences comprised within the universal ,intelligence2 since there is not only a single intelligence1 but a simultaneously single and plural intelligence4 ,consequently1 it must also have contained a single ,soul1 and a plurality of souls2 and it was from the single ,soul1 that the multiple particular and different souls had to be born1 as from one and the same genus are derived species that are both superior and inferior1 and more or less intellectual4 ,indeed1 in the intelligible world1 there is1 on one hand1 the 7universal7 ,intelligence which1 like some great animal1 potentially contains the other intelligences4 ,on the other hand1 are the individual intelligences1 each of which possess in actualization what the former contains potentially4 ,we may illustrate by a living city that would contain other living cities4 ,the soul of the universal ,city would be more perfect and powerful2 but nothing would hinder the souls of the other cities from being of the same kind4 ,similarly1 in the universal ,fire1 there is on one hand a great fire1 and on the other small fires1 while the universal ,being is the being of the universal ,fire1 or rather1 is the source from which the being of the universal ,fire proceeds4 ,,the ,,rational ,,soul ,,possesses ,,also ,,an ,,individuality4 ,the function of the rational soul is to think1 but she does not limit herself to thinking4 ,otherwise there would be no difference between her and intelligence4 ,besides her intellectual characteristics1 the soul's characteristic nature1 by virtue of which she does not remain mere intelligence1 has a further individual function1 such as is possessed by every other being4 ,by raising her glance to what is superior to her1 she thinks2 by bringing them down to herself1 she preserves herself2 by lowering them to what is inferior to her1 she adorns it1 administers it1 and governs it4 ,all these things were not to remain immovable in the intelligible world1 to permit of a successive issue of varied beings1 which no doubt are less perfect than that which preceded them1 but which1 nevertheless1 exist necessarily during the persistence of the ,principle from which they proceed4 ,,incarnate ,,souls ,,weaken ,,because ,,they ,,contemplate ,,the ,,individual4 #d4 ,there are individual souls which1 in their conversion#afi towards the principle from which they proceed1 aspire to the intelligible world1 and which also exercise their power on inferior things1 just as light1 which does not disdain to throw its rays down to us though remaining suspended to the sun on high4 ,these souls must remain sheltered from all suffering so long as in the intelligible world they remain together with the universal ,soul4 ,they must besides1 in heaven1 share with it the administration of the world2 like kings who1 being colleagues of the great ,king of the universe1 share the government with ,him1 without themselves descending from their thrones1 without ceasing to occupy a place as elevated as ,he4 ,but when they pass from this state in which they live with the universal ,soul to a particular and independent existence1 when they seem weary of dwelling with another1 then each of them returns to what belongs to her individually4 ,now when a soul has done that for a long while1 when she withdraws from the universal ,soul1 and distinguishes herself therefrom1 when she ceases to keep her glances directed towards the intelligible world2 then1 isolating herself in her individual existence1 she weakens1 and finds herself overwhelmed with a crowd of cares1 because she directs her glance at something individual4 ,having therefore separated herself from the universal ,soul as well as from the other souls that remain united thereto1 and having attached herself to an individual body1 and concentrating herself exclusively on this object1 which is subjected to the destructive action of all other beings1 she ceases to govern the whole to administer more carefully a part1 the care of which forces her to busy herself1 and mingle with external things1 to be not only present in the body1 but also to interpenetrate it4 ,,this ,,process ,,explains ,,the ,,classic ,,expressions ,,about ,,her ,,condition4 ,thus1 in the common expression1 she has lost her wings1 and is chained by the bonds of the body1 because she gave up the calm existence she enjoyed when with the universal ,soul she shared the administration of the world2 for when she was above she spent a much happier life4 ,the fallen soul is therefore chained or imprisoned1 obliged to have recourse to the senses because she cannot first make use of intelligence4 ,she is1 as it is said1 buried in a tomb1 or cavern4 ,but by her conversion towards thought1 she breaks her bonds1 she returns upwards towards higher regions1 when1 starting from the indications of reminiscence she rises to the contemplation of the essences2#agj for even after her fall she always preserves something superior to the body4 ,,souls ,,as ,,amphibians4 ,souls therefore are necessarily amphibians2#aga since they alternately live in the intelligible world1 and in the sense-world2 staying longer in the intelligible world when they can remain united to supreme ,intelligence more permanently1 or staying longer or preponderatingly here below when nature or destiny imposes on them a contrary fate4 ,that is the secret meaning of ,plato's words#agb to the effect that the divinity divides the seeds of the souls formed by a second mixture in the cup1 and that ,he separates them into 7two7 parts4 ,he also adds that they must necessarily fall into generation after having been divided into a definite number4 ,plato's statement that the divinity sowed the souls1#agc as well as the divinity's address to the other deities1 must be taken figuratively4 ,for1 in reference to the things contained in the universe1 this implies that they are begotten or produced2 for successive enumeration and description implies an eternal begetting1 and that those objects exist eternally in their present state4 ,,souls ,,descending ,,to ,,help ,,are ,,sent ,,by ,,god4 #e4 ,without any inherent contradiction it may therefore be asserted either1#agd that the souls are sowed into generation1 that they descend here below for the perfection of the universe1 or that they are shut up in a cavern as the result of a divine punishment1 that their fall is simultaneously an effect of their will and of necessity--as necessity does not exclude voluntariness--and that they are in evil so long as they are incarnate in bodies4 ,again1 as ,empedocles says1 they may have withdrawn from the divinity1 and have lost their way1 and have committed some fault that they are expiating2 or1 as says ,heraclitus1 that rest consists in flight 7from heaven1 and descent here below71 and that the descent of souls is neither entirely voluntary1 nor involuntary4 ,indeed1 no being ever falls voluntarily2 but as it is by his own motion that he descends to lower things1 and reaches a less happy condition1 it may be said that he bears the punishment of his conduct4 ,besides1 as it is by an eternal law of nature that this being acts and suffers in that manner1 we may1 without contradiction or violence to the truth1 assert that the being who descends from his rank to assist some lower thing is sent by the divinity4#age ,in spite of any number of intermediate parts 7which separate7 a principle from its lower part1 the latter may still be ascribed to the former4#agf ,,the ,,two ,,possible ,,faults ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,here there are two possible faults for the soul4 ,the first consists in the motive that determines her to descend4 ,the second is the evil she commits after having descended here below4 ,the first fault is expiated by the very condition of the soul after she has descended here below4 ,the punishment of the latter fault1 if not too serious1 is to pass into other bodies more or less promptly according to the judgment delivered about her deserts--and we speak of a judgment to show that it is the consequence of the divine law4 ,if however the perversity of the soul passes all measure1 she undergoes1 under the charge of guardians in charge of her chastisement1 the severe punishments she has incurred4 ,,prompt ,,flight ,,here ,,below ,,leaves ,,the ,,soul ,,unharmed ,,by ,,her ,,stay ,,here4 ,thus1 although the soul have a divine nature 7or being71 though she originate in the intelligible world1 she enters into a body4 ,being a lower divinity1 she descends here below by a voluntary inclination1 for the purpose of developing her power1 and to adorn what is below her4 ,if she flee promptly from here below1 she does not need to regret having become acquainted with evil1 and knowing the nature of vice1#agg nor having had the opportunity of manifesting her faculties1 and to manifest her activities and deeds4 ,indeed1 the faculties of the soul would be useless if they slumbered continuously in incorporeal being without ever becoming actualized4 ,the soul herself would ignore what she possesses if her faculties did not manifest by procession1 for everywhere it is the actualization that manifests the potentiality4 ,otherwise1 the latter would be completely hidden and obscured2 or rather1 it would not really exist1 and would not possess any reality4 ,it is the variety of sense-effects which illustrates the greatness of the intelligible principle1 whose nature publishes itself by the beauty of its works4 ,,continuous ,,procession ,,necessary ,,to ,,the ,,supreme4 #f4 ,unity was not to exist alone2 for if unity remained self-enclosed1 all things would remain hidden in unity without having any form1 and no beings would achieve existence4 ,consequently1 even if constituted by beings born of unity1 plurality would not exist1 unless the inferior natures1 by their rank destined to be souls1 issued from those beings by the way of procession4 ,likewise1 it was not sufficient for souls to exist1 they also had to reveal what they were capable of begetting4 ,it is likewise natural for each essence to produce something beneath it1 to draw it out from itself by a development similar to that of a seed1 a development in which an indivisible principle proceeds to the production of a sense-object1 and where that which precedes remains in its own place at the same time as it begets that which follows by an inexpressible power1 which is essential to intelligible natures4 ,now as this power was not to be stopped or circumscribed in its actions by jealousy1 there was need of a continuous procession until1 from degree to degree1 all things had descended to the extreme limits of what was possible2#agh for it is the characteristic of an inexhaustible power to communicate all its gifts to everything1 and not to permit any of them to be disinherited1 since there is nothing which hinders any of them from participating in the nature of the ,good in the measure that it is capable of doing so4 ,since matter has existed from all eternity1 it was impossible that from the time since it existed1 it should not participate in that which communicates goodness to all things according to their receptivity thereof4#agi ,if the generation of matter were the necessary consequence of anterior principles1 still it must not be entirely deprived of the good by its primitive impotence1 when the cause which gratuitously communicated being to it remained self-enclosed4 ,,sense-,,objects ,,are ,,necessary ,,as ,,revealers ,,of ,,the ,,eternal4 ,the excellence1 power and goodness of intelligible 7essences7 are therefore revealed by sense-objects2 and there is an eternal connection between intelligible 7entities7 that are self-existent1 and sense-objects1 which eternally derive their existence therefrom by participation1 and which imitate intelligible nature to the extent of their ability4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,nature ,,is ,,of ,,an ,,intermediate ,,kind4 #g4 ,as there are two kinds of being 7or1 existence71 one of sensation1 and the other intelligible1 it is preferable for the soul to live in the intelligible world2 nevertheless1 as a result of her nature1 it is necessary for her also to participate in sense-affairs4#ahj ,since she occupies only an intermediate rank1 she must not feel wronged at not being the best of beings4#aha ,though on one hand her condition be divine1 on the other she is located on the limits of the intelligible world1 because of her affinity for sense-nature4 ,she causes this nature to participate in her powers1 and she even receives something therefrom1 when1 instead of managing the body without compromising her own security1 she permits herself to be carried away by her own inclination to penetrate profoundly within it1 ceasing her complete union with the universal ,soul4 ,besides1 the soul can rise above the body after having learned to feel how happy one is to dwell on high1 by the experience of things seen and suffered here below1 and after having appreciated the true ,good by the comparison of contraries4 ,indeed the knowledge of the good becomes clearer by the experience of evil1 especially among souls which are not strong enough to know evil before having experienced it4#ahb ,,the ,,procession ,,of ,,intelligence ,,is ,,an ,,excursion ,,downwards ,,and ,,upwards4 ,the procession of intelligence consists in descending to things that occupy the lowest rank1 and which have an inferior nature1#ahc for ,intelligence could not rise to the superior ,nature4 ,obliged to act outside of itself1 and not being able to remain self-enclosed1 by a necessity and by a law of its nature1 intelligence must advance unto the soul where it stops2 then1 after having communicated of itself to that which immediately follows it1 intelligence must return to the intelligible world4 ,likewise1 the soul has a double action in her double relation with what is below and above her4 ,by her first action1 the soul manages the body to which she is united2 by the second1 she contemplates the intelligible entities4 ,these alternatives work out1 for individual souls1 with the course of time2 and finally there occurs a conversion which brings them back from the lower to the higher natures4 ,,the ,,universal ,,soul1 ,,however1 ,,is ,,not ,,disturbed ,,by ,,the ,,urgencies ,,below ,,her4 ,the universal ,soul1 however1 does not need to busy herself with troublesome functions1 and remains out of the reach of evils4 ,she considers what is below her in a purely contemplative manner1 while at the same time remaining related to what is above her4 ,she is therefore enabled simultaneously on one side to receive1 and on the other to give1 since her nature compels her to relate herself closely with the objects of sense4#ahd ,,the ,,soul ,,does ,,not ,,entirely ,,enter ,,into ,,the ,,body4 #h4 ,though ,i should set myself in opposition to popular views1 ,i shall set down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs4 ,not the whole soul enters into the body4 ,by her higher part1 she ever remains united to the intelligible world2 as1 by her lower part1 she remains united to the sense-world4 ,if this lower part dominates1 or rather1 if it be dominated 7by sensation7 and troubled1 it hinders us from being conscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates4 ,indeed that which is thought impinges on our consciousness only in case it descends to us1 and is felt4 ,in general1 we are conscious of what goes on in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the entire soul4 ,for instance1 appetite1 which is the actualization of lustful desire1 is by us cognized only when we perceive it by the interior sense or by discursive reason1 or by both simultaneously4 ,every soul has a lower part turned towards the body1 and a higher part turned towards divine ,intelligence4 ,the universal ,soul manages the universe by her lower part without any kind of trouble1 because she governs her body not as we do by any reasoning1 but by intelligence1 and consequently in a manner entirely different from that adopted by art4 ,the individual souls1 each of whom administers a part of the universe1#ahe also have a part that rises above their body2 but they are distracted from thought by sensation1 and by a perception of a number of things which are contrary to nature1 and which come to trouble them1 and afflict them4 ,indeed1 the body that they take care of constitutes but a part of the universe1 is incomplete1 and is surrounded by exterior objects4 ,that is why it has so many needs1 why it desires luxuriousness1 and why it is deceived thereby4 ,on the contrary1 the higher part of the soul is insensible to the attraction of these transitory pleasures1 and leads an undisturbed life4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,four4 ,how ,what is ,after the ,first ,proceeds ,therefrom2 of the ,one4 ,,necessity ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,first4 #a4 ,everything that exists after the ,first is derived therefrom1 either directly or mediately1 and constitutes a series of different orders such that the second can be traced back to the ,first1 the third to the second1 and so forth4 ,above all beings there must be ,something simple and different from all the rest which would exist in itself1 and which1 without ever mingling with anything else1 might nevertheless preside over everything1 which might really be the ,one1 and not that deceptive unity which is only the attribute of essence1 and which would be a principle superior even to being1 unreachable by speech1 reason1 or science4 ,for if it be not completely simple1 foreign to all complexity and composition1 and be not really one1 it could not be a principle4 ,it is sovereignly absolute only because it is simple and first4 ,for what is not first1 is in need of superior things2 what is not simple has need of being constituted by simple things4 ,the ,principle of everything must therefore be one and only4 ,if it were admitted that there was a second principle of that kind1 both would constitute but a single one4 ,for we do not say that they are bodies1 nor that the ,one and ,first is a body2 for every body is composite and begotten1 and consequently is not a principle2 for a principle cannot be begotten4#ahf ,therefore1 since the principle of everything cannot be corporeal1 because it must be essentially one1 it must be the ,first4 ,,the ,,first ,,necessarily ,,begets ,a ,,second1 ,,which ,,must ,,be ,,perfect4 ,if something after the ,one exist1 it is no more the simple ,one1 but the multiple ,one4 ,whence is this derived8 ,evidently from the ,first1 for it could not be supposed that it came from chance2 that would be to admit that the ,first is not the principle of everything4 ,how then is the multiple ,one derived from the ,first8 ,if the ,first be not only perfect1 but the most perfect1 if it be the first ,power1 it must surely1 in respect to power1 be superior to all the rest1 and the other powers must merely imitate it to the limit of their ability4 ,now we see that all that arrives to perfection cannot unfruitfully remain in itself1 but begets and produces4 ,not only do beings capable of choice1 but even those lacking reflection or soul have a tendency to impart to other beings1 what is in them2 as1 for instance1 fire emits heat1 snow emits cold2 and plant-juices 7dye and soak7 into whatever they happen to touch4 ,all things in nature imitate the ,first principle by seeking to achieve immortality by procreation1 and by manifestation of their qualities4 ,how then would ,he who is sovereignly perfect1 who is the supreme ,good1 remain absorbed in ,himself1 as if a sentiment of jealousy hindered ,him from communicating ,himself1 or as if ,he were powerless1 though ,he is the power of everything8 ,how then would ,he remain principle of everything8 ,he must therefore beget something1 just as what ,he begets must in turn beget4 ,there must therefore be something beneath the ,first4 ,now this thing 7which is immediately beneath the ,first71 must be very venerable1 first because it begets everything else1 then because it is begotten by the ,first1 and because it must1 as being the ,second1 rank and surpass everything else4 ,,intelligence ,,cannot ,,be ,,the ,,first1 ,,and ,,ranks ,,all ,,else4 #b4 ,if the generating principle were intelligence1 what it begot would have to be inferior to intelligence1 and nevertheless approximate it1 and resemble it more than anything else4 ,now as the generating principle is superior to intelligence1 the first begotten thing is necessarily intelligence4 ,why1 however1 is the generating principle not intelligence8 ,because the act of intelligence is thought1 and thought consists in seeing the intelligible2 for it is only by its conversion towards it that intelligence achieves a complete and perfect existence4 ,in itself1 intelligence is only an indeterminate power to see2 only by contemplation of the intelligible does it achieve the state of being determined4 ,this is the reason of the saying1 ,the ideas and numbers1 that is1 intelligence1 are born from the indefinite doubleness1 and the ,one4 ,consequently1 instead of being simple1 intelligence is multiple4 ,it is composed of several elements2 these are doubtless intelligible1 but what intelligence sees is none the less multiple4 ,in any case1 intelligence is simultaneously the object thought1 and the thinking subject2 it is therefore already double4 ,,the ,,first ,,and ,,second ,,as ,,higher ,,and ,,lower ,,intelligible ,,entities4 ,but besides this intelligible 7entity1 namely1 intelligence71 there is another 7higher7 intelligible 7the supreme ,intelligible1 the ,first74 ,in what way does the intelligence1 thus determined1 proceed from the 7,first7 ,intelligible8 ,the ,intelligible abides in itself1 and has need of nothing else1 while there is a need of something else in that which sees and thinks 7that is1 that which thinks has need of contemplating the supreme ,intelligible74 ,but even while remaining within ,himself1 the ,intelligible 7,one7 is not devoid of sentiment2 all things belong to ,him1 are in ,him1 and with ,him4 ,consequently1 ,he has the conception of ,himself1 a conception which implies consciousness1 and which consists in eternal repose1 and in a thought1 but in a thought different from that of intelligence4 ,if ,he begets something while remaining within ,himself1 ,he begets it precisely when ,he is at the highest point of individuality4 ,it is therefore by remaining in ,his own state that ,he begets what ,he begets2 ,he procreates by individualizing4 ,now as ,he remains intelligible1 what ,he begets cannot be anything else than thought2 therefore thought1 by existing1 and by thinking the ,principle whence it is derived 7for it could not think any other object71 becomes simultaneously intelligence and intelligible2 but this second intelligible differs from the first ,intelligible from which it proceeds1 and of which it is but the image and the reflection4 ,,the ,,second ,,is ,,the ,,actualization ,,of ,,the ,,potentiality ,,of ,,the ,,first4 ,but how is an actualization begotten from that self-limited 7intelligible78 ,we shall have to draw a distinction between an actualization of being1 and an actualization out of the being of each thing 7actualized being1 and actualization emanating from being74 ,actualized being cannot differ from being1 for it is being itself4 ,but the actualization emanating from being--and everything necessarily has an actualization of this kind--differs from what produces it4 ,it is as if with fire3 there is a difference between the heat which constitutes its being1 and the heat which radiates exteriorly1 while the fire interiorly realizes the actualization which constitutes its being1 and which makes it preserve its nature4 ,here also1 and far more so1 the ,first remains in ,his proper state1 and yet simultaneously1 by ,his inherent perfection1 by the actualization which resides in ,him1 has been begotten the actualization which1 deriving its existence from so great a power1 nay1 from supreme ,power1 has arrived at1 or achieved essence and being4 ,as to the ,first1 ,he was above being2 for ,he was the potentiality of all things1 already being all things4 ,,how ,,the ,,first ,,is ,,above ,,all ,,being4 ,if this 7actualization begotten by the ,first1 this external actualization7 be all things1 then that 7,one7 is above all things1 and consequently above being4 ,if then 7this external actualization7 be all things1 and be before all things1 it does not occupy the same rank as the remainder 7of all other things72 and must1 in this respect also1 be superior to being1 and consequently also to intelligence2 for there is ,something superior to intelligence4 ,essence is not1 as you might say1 dead2 it is not devoid of life or thought2 for intelligence and essence are identical4 ,intelligible entities do not exist before the intelligence that thinks them1 as sense-objects exist before the sensation which perceives them4 ,intelligence itself is the things that it thinks1 since their forms are not introduced to them from without4 ,from where indeed would intelligence receive these forms8 ,intelligence exists with the intelligible things2 intelligence is identical with them1 is one with them4 ,reciprocally1 intelligible entities do not exist without their matter 7that is1 ,intelligence74 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,whether ,all ,souls ,form a ,single ,one8 ,,if ,,all ,,souls ,,be ,,one ,,in ,,the ,,world-,,soul1 ,,why ,,should ,,they ,,not ,,together ,,form ,,one8 #a4 ,just as the soul of each animal is one1 because she is entirely present in the whole body1 and because she is thus really one1 because she does not have one part in one organ1 and some other part in another2 and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings which feel1 and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely one in each part of the growing plants2 why then should your soul and mine not form a single unity8 ,why should not all souls form but a single one8 ,why should not the universal 7,soul7 which is present in all beings1 be one because she is not divided in the manner of a body1 being everywhere the same8 ,why indeed should the soul in myself form but one1 and the universal 7,soul7 likewise not be one1 similarly1 since no more than my own is this universal 7,soul7 either material extension1 or a body8 ,if both my soul and yours proceed from the universal 7,soul71 and if the latter be one1 then should my soul and yours together form but a single one4 ,or again1 on the supposition that the universal 7,soul7 and mine proceed from a single soul1 even on this hypothesis would all souls form but a single one4 ,we shall have to examine in what 7this ,soul which is but7 one consists4 ,,souls ,,may ,,not ,,form ,a ,,numeric ,,unity1 ,,but ,,may ,,form ,a ,,generic ,,unity4 ,let us first consider if it may be affirmed that all souls form but one in the sense in which it is said that the soul of each individual is one4 ,it seems absurd to pretend that my soul and yours form but one in this 7numerical7 sense2 for then you would be feeling simultaneously with my feeling1 and you would be virtuous when ,i was1 and you would have the same desires as ,i1 and not only would we both have the same sentiments1 but even the identical sentiments of the universal 7,soul71 so that every sensation felt by me would have been felt by the entire universe4 ,if in this manner all the souls form but one1 why is one soul reasonable1 and the other unreasonable1 why is the one in an animal1 and the other in a plant8 ,on the other hand1 if we do not admit that there is a single ,soul1 we will not be able to explain the unity of the universe1 nor find a single principle for 7human7 souls4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,several ,,souls ,,need ,,not ,,imply ,,their ,,being ,,identical4 #b4 ,in the first place1 if the souls of myself and of another man form but one soul1 this does not necessarily imply their being identical with their principle4 ,granting the existence of different beings1 the same principle need not experience in each the same affections4 ,thus1 humanity may equally reside in me1 who am in motion1 as in you1 who may be at rest1 although in me it moves1 and it rests in you4 ,nevertheless1 it is neither absurd nor paradoxical to insist that the same principle is both in you and in me2 and this does not necessarily make us feel the identical affections4 ,consider a single body3 it is not the left hand which feels what the right one does1 but the soul which is present in the whole body4 ,to make you feel the same as ,i do1 our two bodies would have to constitute but a single one2 then1 being thus united1 our souls would perceive the same affections4 ,consider also that the ,all remains deaf to a multitude of impressions experienced by the parts of a single and same organism1 and that so much the more as the body is larger4 ,this is the state of affairs1 for instance1 with the large whales which do not feel the impression received in some one part of their body1 because of the smallness of the movement4 ,,sympathy ,,does ,,not ,,force ,,identity ,,of ,,sensation4 ,it is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the universe experiences an affection1 the latter be clearly felt by the ,all4 ,the existence of sympathy is natural enough1 and it could not be denied2 but this does not imply identity of sensation4 ,nor is it absurd that our souls1 while forming a single one should be virtuous and vicious1 just as it would be possible that the same essence be at motion in me1 but at rest in you4 ,indeed1 the unity that we attribute to the universal 7,soul7 does not exclude all multiplicity1 such a unity as befits intelligence4 ,we may however say that 7the soul7 is simultaneously unity and plurality1 because she participates not only in divisible essence in the bodies1 but also in the indivisible1 which consequently is one4 ,now1 just as the impression perceived by one of my parts is not necessarily felt all over my body1 while that which happens to the principal organ is felt by all the other parts1 likewise1 the impressions that the universe communicates to the individual are clearer1 because usually the parts perceive the same affections as the ,all1 while it is not evident that the particular affections that we feel would be also experienced by the ,whole4 ,,unity ,,of ,,all ,,beings ,,implied ,,by ,,sympathy1 ,,love1 ,,and ,,magic ,,enchantment4 #c4 ,on the other hand1 observation teaches us that we sympathize with each other1 that we cannot see the suffering of another man without sharing it1 that we are naturally inclined to confide in each other1 and to love2 for love is a fact whose origin is connected with the question that occupies us4 ,further1 if enchantments and magic charms mutually attract individuals1 leading distant persons to sympathize1 these effects can only be explained by the unity of soul4 7,it is well known that7 words pronounced in a low tone of voice 7telepathically87 affect a distant person1 and make him hear what is going on at a great distance4 ,hence appears the unity of all beings1 which demands the unity of the ,soul4 ,,what ,,of ,,the ,,differences ,,of ,,rationality1 ,,if ,,the ,,soul ,,be ,,one8 ,if1 however1 the ,soul be one1 why is some one soul reasonable1 another irrational1 or some other one merely vegetative8 ,the indivisible part of the soul consists in reason1 which is not divided in the bodies1 while the part of the divisible soul in the bodies 7which1 though being one in herself1 nevertheless divides herself in the bodies1 because she sheds sentiment everywhere71 must be regarded as another power of the soul 7the sensitive power72 likewise1 the part which fashions and produces the bodies is still another power 7the vegetative power72 nevertheless1 this plurality of powers does not destroy the unity of the soul4 ,for instance1 in a grain of seed there are also several powers2 nevertheless this grain of seed is one1 and from this unity is born a multiplicity which forms a unity4 ,,the ,,powers ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,are ,,not ,,exercised ,,everywhere ,,because ,,they ,,differ4 ,but why do not all the powers of the soul act everywhere8 ,now if we consider the ,soul which is one everywhere1 we find that sensation is not similar in all its parts 7that is1 in all the individual souls72 that reason is not in all 7but in certain souls exclusively72 and that the vegetative power is granted to those beings who do not possess sensation1 and that all these powers return to unity when they separate from the body4 ,,the ,,body',s ,,power ,,of ,,growth ,,is ,,derived ,,from ,,the ,,whole1 ,,and ,,the ,,soul2 ,,but ,,not ,,from ,,our ,,soul4 ,if1 however1 the body derive its vegetative power from the ,whole and from this 7universal7 ,soul which is one1 why should it not derive it also from our soul8 ,because that which is nourished by this power forms a part of the universe1 which possesses sensation only at the price of suffering4 ,as to the sense-power which rises as far as the judgment1 and which is united to every intelligence1 there was no need for it to form what had already been formed by the ,whole1 but it could have given its forms if these forms were not parts of the ,whole which produces them4 ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,souls ,,is ,a ,,condition ,,of ,,their ,,multiplicity4 #d4 ,such justifications will preclude surprise at our deriving all souls from unity4 ,but completeness of treatment demands explanation how all souls are but a single one4 ,is this due to their proceeding from a single ,soul1 or because they all form a single one8 ,if all proceed from a single one1 did this one divide herself1 or did she remain whole1 while begetting the multitude of souls8 ,in this case1 how could an essence beget a multitude like her1 while herself remaining undiminished8 ,we shall invoke the help of the divinity 7in solving this problem72 and say that the existence of the one single ,soul is the condition of the existence of the multitude of souls1 and that this multitude must proceed from the ,soul that is one4 ,,the ,,soul ,,can ,,beget ,,many ,,because ,,she ,,is ,,an ,,incorporeal ,,essence4 ,if the ,soul were a body1 then would the division of this body necessarily produce the multitude of souls1 and this essence would be different in its different parts4 ,nevertheless1 as this essence would be homogeneous1 the souls 7between which it would divide itself7 would be similar to each other1 because they would possess a single identical form in its totality1 but they would differ by their body4 ,if the essence of these souls consisted in the bodies which would serve them as subjects1 they would be different from each other4 ,if the essence of these souls consisted in their form1 they would1 in form1 be but one single form2 in other terms1 there would be but one same single soul in a multitude of bodies4 ,besides1 above this soul which would be one1 but which would be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies1 there would be another ,soul which would not be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies2 it would be from her that would proceed the soul which would be the unity in plurality1 the multiple image of the single ,soul in a single body1 like a single seal1 by impressing the same figure to a multitude of pieces of wax1 would be distributing this figure in a multitude of impressions4 ,in this case 7if the essence of the soul consisted in her form7 the soul would be something incorporeal1 and as she would consist in an affection of the body1 there would be nothing astonishing in that a single quality1 emanating from a single principle1 might be in a multitude of subjects simultaneously4 ,last1 if the essence of the soul consisted in being both things 7being simultaneously a part of a homogeneous body and an affection of the body71 there would be nothing surprising 7if there were a unity of essence in a multitude of subjects74 ,we have thus shown that the soul is incorporeal1 and an essence2 we must now consider the results of this view4 ,,how ,,an ,,essence ,,can ,,be ,,one ,,in ,a ,,multitude ,,of ,,souls ,,is ,,illustrated ,,by ,,seed4 #e4 ,how can an essence be single in a multitude of souls8 ,either this one essence is entire in all souls1 or this one and entire essence begets all souls while remaining 7undiminished7 in itself4 ,in either case1 the essence is single4 ,it is the unity to which the individual souls are related2 the essence gives itself to this multitude1 and yet simultaneously the essence does not give itself2 it can give of itself to all individual souls1 and nevertheless remain single2 it is powerful enough to pass into all simultaneously1 and to be separated from none2 thus its essence remains identical1 while being present in a multitude of souls4 ,this is nothing astonishing2 all of science is entirely in each of its parts1 and it begets them without itself ceasing to remain entire within itself4 ,likewise1 a grain of seed is entire in each of its parts in which it naturally divides itself2 each of its parts has the same properties as the whole seed2 nevertheless the seed remains entire1 without diminution2 and if the matter 7in which the seed resides7 offer it any cause of division1 all the parts will not any the less form a single unity4 ,,this ,,miracle ,,is ,,explained ,,by ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,potentiality4 ,it may be objected that in science a part is not the total science4 ,doubtless1 the notion which is actualized1 and which is studied to the exclusion of others1 because there is special need of it1 is only partially an actualization4 ,nevertheless1 in a latent manner it potentially comprises all the other notions it implies4 ,thus1 all the notions are contained in each part of the science1 and in this respect each part is the total science2 for what is only partially actualized 7potentially7 comprises all the notions of science4 ,each notion that one wishes to render explicit is at one's disposition2 and this in every part of the science that is considered2 but if it be compared with the whole science1 it seems to be there only potentially4 ,it must not1 however1 be thought that the particular notion does not contain anything of the other notions2 in this case1 there would be nothing systematic or scientific about it2 it would be nothing more than a sterile conception4 ,being a really scientific notion1 it potentially contains all the notions of the science2 and the genuine scientist knows how to discover all its notions in a single one1 and how to develop its consequences4 ,the geometrical expert shows in his demonstrations how each theorem contains all the preceding ones1 to which he harks back by analysis1 and how each theorem leads to all the following ones1 by deduction4 ,,difficult ,,as ,,these ,,explanations ,,are1 ,,they ,,are ,,clear ,,intelligibly4 ,these truths excite our incredulity1 because here below our reason is weak1 and it is confused by the body4 ,in the intelligible world1 however1 all the verities are clear1 and each is evident1 by itself4 ,,sixth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,of the ,good and the ,one4 ,,unity ,,necessary ,,to ,,existence ,,of ,,all ,,beings4 #a4 ,all beings1 both primary1 as well as those who are so called on any pretext soever1 are beings only because of their unity4 ,what1 indeed would they be without it8 ,deprived of their unity1 they would cease to be what they are said to be4 ,no army can exist unless it be one4 ,so with a choric ballet or a flock4 ,neither a house nor a ship can exist without unity2 by losing it they would cease to be what they are4#ahg ,so also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity4 ,on being divided by losing their unity1 they simultaneously lose their nature4 ,consider farther the bodies of plants and animals1 of which each is a unity4 ,on losing their unity by being broken up into several parts1 they simultaneously lose their nature4 ,they are no more what they were1 they have become new beings1 which themselves exist only so long as they are one4 ,what effects health in us1 is that the parts of our bodies are co-ordinated in unity4 ,beauty is formed by the unity of our members4 ,virtue is our soul's tendency to unity1 and becoming one through the harmony of her faculties4 ,,the ,,soul ,,may ,,impart ,,unity1 ,,but ,,is ,,not ,,unity4 ,the soul imparts unity to all things when producing them1 fashioning them1 and forming them4 ,should we1 therefore1 after rising to the ,soul1 say that she not only imparts unity1 but herself is unity in itself8 ,certainly not4 ,the soul that imparts form and figure to bodies is not identical with form1 and figure4 ,therefore the soul imparts unity without being unity4 ,she unifies each of her productions only by contemplation of the ,one1 just as she produces man only by contemplating ,man-in-himself1 although adding to that idea the implied unity4 ,each of the things that are called one have a unity proportionate to their nature 7being72 so that they participate in unity more or less according as they share essence#ahh 7being74 ,thus the soul is something different from unity2 nevertheless1 as she exists in a degree higher 7than the body71 she participates more in unity1 without being unity itself2 indeed she is one1 but the unity in her is no more than contingent4 ,there is a difference between the soul and unity1 just as between the body and unity4 ,a discrete quantity such as a company of dancers1 or choric ballet1 is very far from being unity2 a continuous quantity approximates that further2 the soul gets still nearer to it1 and participates therein still more4 ,thus from the fact that the soul could not exist without being one1 the identity between the soul and unity is suggested4 ,but this may be answered in two ways4 ,first1 other things also possess individual existence because they possess unity1 and nevertheless are not unity itself2 as1 though the body is not identical with unity1 it also participates in unity4 ,further1 the soul is manifold as well as one1 though she be not composed of parts4 ,she possesses several faculties1 discursive reason1 desire1 and perception--all of them faculties joined together by unity as a bond4 ,doubtless the soul imparts unity to something else 7the body71 because she herself possesses unity2 but this unity is by her received from some other principle 7namely1 from unity itself74 ,,being ,,and ,,essence ,,identical ,,with ,,unity4 #b4 7,aristotle#ahi7 suggests that in each of the individual beings which are one1 being is identical with unity4 ,are not being and essence identical with unity1 in every being and in every essence1 in a manner such that on discovering essence1 unity also is discovered8 ,is not being in itself unity in itself1 so that if being be intelligence1 unity also must be intelligence1 as intelligence which1 being essence in the highest degree1 is also unity in the first degree1 and which1 imparting essence to other things1 also imparts unity to them8 ,what indeed could unity be1 apart from essence and being8 ,as man1 and a man are equivalent1#aij essence must be identical with unity2 or1 unity is the number of everything considered individually2 and as one object joined to another is spoken of as two1 so an object alone is referred to as one4 ,,unity ,,is ,,not ,a ,,numbering ,,device1 ,,but ,,is ,,identical ,,with ,,existence4 ,if number belongs to the class of beings1 evidently the latter must include unity also2 and we shall have to discover what kind of a being it is4 ,if unity be no more than a numbering device invented by the soul1 then unity would possess no real existence4 ,but we have above observed that each object1 on losing unity1 loses existence also4 ,we are therefore compelled to investigate whether essence and unity be identical either when considered in themselves1 or in each individual object4 ,,even ,,universal ,,essence ,,contains ,,manifoldness4 ,if the essence of each thing be manifoldness1 and as unity cannot be manifoldness1 unity must differ from essence4 ,now man1 being both animal and rational1 contains a manifoldness of elements of which unity is the bond4 ,there is therefore a difference between man and unity2 man is divisible1 while unity is indivisible4 ,besides1 universal ,essence1 containing all essences1 is still more manifold4 ,therefore it differs from unity2 though it does possess unity by participation4 ,essence possesses life and intelligence1 for it cannot be considered lifeless2 it must therefore be manifold4 ,besides1 if essence be intelligence1 it must in this respect also be manifold1 and must be much more so if it contain forms2 for the idea#aia is not genuinely one4 ,both as individual and general it is rather a number2 it is one only as the world is one4 ,,besides1 ,,absolute ,,unity ,,is ,,the ,,first1 ,,which ,,intelligence ,,is ,,not4 ,besides1 ,unity in itself is the first of all2 but intelligence1 forms and essence are not primary4 ,every form is manifold and composite1 and consequently must be something posterior2 for parts are prior to the composite they constitute4 ,nor is intelligence primary1 as appears from the following considerations4 ,for intelligence existence is necessarily thought and the best intelligence which does not contemplate exterior objects1 must think what is above it2 for1 on turning towards itself1 it turns towards its principle4 ,on the one hand1 if intelligence be both thinker and thought1 it implies duality1 and is not simple or unitary4 ,on the other hand1 if intelligence contemplate some object other than itself1 this might be nothing more than some object better than itself1 placed above it4 ,even if intelligence contemplate itself simultaneously with what is better than it1 even so intelligence is only of secondary rank4 ,we may indeed admit that the intelligence which has such a nature enjoys the presence of the ,good1 of the ,first1 and that intelligence contemplates the ,first2 but nevertheless at the same time intelligence is present to itself1 and thinks itself as being all things4 ,containing such a diversity1 intelligence is far from unity4 ,,unity ,,as ,,above ,,all ,,things1 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,essence4 ,thus ,unity is not all things1 for if so1 it would no longer be unity4 ,nor is it ,intelligence1 for since intelligence is all things1 unity too would be all things4 ,nor is it essence1 since essence also is all things4 ,,unity ,,is ,,difficult ,,to ,,ascertain ,,because ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,fearful ,,of ,,such ,,abstruse ,,researches4 #c4 ,what then is unity8 ,what is its nature8 ,it is not surprising that it is so difficult to say so1 when it is difficult to explain of what even essence or form consist4 ,but1 nevertheless1 forms are the basis of our knowledge4 ,everything that the soul advances towards what is formless1 not being able to understand it because it is indeterminate1 and so to speak has not received the impression of a distinctive type1 the soul withdraws therefrom1 fearing she will meet nonentity4 ,that is why1 in the presence of such things she grows troubled1 and descends with pleasure4 ,then1 withdrawing therefrom1 she1 so to speak1 lets herself fall till she meets some sense-object1 on which she pauses1 and recovers2 just as the eye which1 fatigued by the contemplation of small objects1 gladly turns back to large ones4 ,when the soul wishes to see by herself1 then seeing only because she is the object that she sees1 and1 further1 being one because she forms but one with this object1 she imagines that what she sought has escaped1 because she herself is not distinct from the object that she thinks4 ,,the ,,path ,,of ,,simplification ,,to ,,unity4 ,nevertheless a philosophical study of unity will follow the following course4 ,since it is ,unity that we seek1 since it is the principle of all things1 the ,good1 the ,first that we consider1 those who will wish to reach it must not withdraw from that which is of primary rank to decline to what occupies the last1 but they must withdraw their souls from sense-objects1 which occupy the last degree in the scale of existence1 to those entities that occupy the first rank4 ,such a man will have to free himself from all evil1 since he aspires to rise to the ,good4 ,he will rise to the principle that he possesses within himself4 ,from the manifold that he was he will again become one4 ,only under these conditions will he contemplate the supreme principle1 ,unity4 ,thus having become intelligence1 having trusted his soul to intelligence1 educating and establishing her therein1 so that with vigilant attention she may grasp all that intelligence sees1 he will1 by intelligence1 contemplate unity1 without the use of any senses1 without mingling any of their perceptions with the flashes of intelligence4 ,he will contemplate the purest ,principle1 through the highest degree of the purest ,intelligence4 ,so when a man applies himself to the contemplation of such a principle and represents it to himself as a magnitude1 or a figure1 or even a form1 it is not his intelligence that guides him in this contemplation for intelligence is not destined to see such things2 it is sensation1 or opinion1 the associate of sensation1 which is active in him4 ,intelligence is only capable of informing us about things within its sphere4 ,,unity ,,as ,,the ,,uniform ,,in ,,itself ,,and ,,formless ,,superform4 ,intelligence can see both the things that are above it1 those which belong to it1 and the things that proceed from it4 ,the things that belong to intelligence are pure2 but they are still less pure and less simple than the things that are above ,intelligence1 or rather than what is above it2 this is not ,intelligence1 and is superior to ,intelligence4 ,intelligence indeed is essence1 while the principle above it is not essence1 but is superior to all beings4 ,nor is it essence1 for essence has a special form1 that of essence1 and the ,one is shapeless even intelligible4 ,as ,unity is the nature that begets all things1 ,unity cannot be any of them4 ,it is therefore neither any particular thing1 nor quantity1 nor quality1 nor intelligence1 nor soul1 nor what is movable1 nor what is stable2 it is neither in place nor time2 but it is the uniform in itself1 or rather it is formless1 as it is above all form1 above movement and stability4 ,these are my views about essence and what makes it manifold4#aib ,,why ,,it ,,is ,,not ,,stable1 ,,though ,,it ,,does ,,not ,,move4 ,but if it does not move1 why does it not possess stability8 ,because either of these things1 or both together1 are suitable to nothing but essence4 ,besides1 that which possesses stability is stable through stability1 and is not identical with stability itself2 consequently it possesses stability only by accident1 and would no longer remain simple4 ,,being ,a ,,primary ,,cause1 ,,unity ,,is ,,nothing ,,contingent4 ,nor let anybody object that something contingent is attributed to ,unity when we call it the primary cause4 ,it is to ourselves that we are then attributing contingency1 since it is we who are receiving something from ,unity1 while ,unity remains within itself4 ,,unity ,,cannot ,,be ,,defined2 ,,we ,,can ,,only ,,refer ,,to ,,it ,,by ,,our ,,feelings ,,of ,,it4 ,speaking strictly1 we should say that the ,one is this or that 7that is1 we should not apply any name to it74 ,we can do no more than turn around it1 so to speak1 trying to express what we feel 7in regard to it72 for at times we approach ,unity1 and at times withdraw from it as a result of our uncertainty about it4 ,,we ,,cannot ,,comprehend ,,unity1 ,,which ,,we ,,approach ,,only ,,by ,a ,,presence4 #d4 ,the principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of the ,one comes to us neither by scientific knowledge1 nor by thought1 as the knowledge of other intelligible things1 but by a presence which is superior to science4 ,when the soul acquires the scientific knowledge of something1 she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one2 for science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies manifoldness4 7,to attain ,unity7 we must therefore rise above science1 and never withdraw from what is essentially ,one2 we must therefore renounce science1 the objects of science1 and every other right 7except that of the ,one72 even to that of beauty2 for beauty is posterior to unity1 and is derived therefrom1 as the day-light comes from the sun4 ,that is why ,plato#aic says of 7,unity7 that it is unspeakable and undescribable4 ,nevertheless we speak of it1 we write about it1 but only to excite our souls by our discussions1 and to direct them towards this divine spectacle1 just as one might point out the road to somebody who desired to see some object4 ,instruction1 indeed1 goes as far as showing the road1 and guiding us in the way2 but to obtain the vision 7of the divinity71 is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it4 ,,those ,,who ,,see ,,god ,,without ,,emotion ,,have ,,failed ,,to ,,rid ,,themselves ,,of ,,physical ,,hindrances1 ,,and ,,have ,,not ,,become ,,unified4 ,if your soul does not succeed in enjoying this spectacle1 if she does not have the intuition of the divine light1 if she remains cold and does not1 within herself1 feel a rapture such as that of a lover who sees the beloved object1 and who rests within it1 a rapture felt by him who has seen the true light1 and whose soul has been overwhelmed with brilliance on approaching this light1 then you have tried to rise to the divinity without having freed yourself from the hindrances which arrest your progress1 and hinder your contemplation4 ,you did not rise alone1 and you retained within yourself something that separated you from ,him2 or rather1 you were not yet unified4 ,though ,he be absent from all beings1 ,he is absent from none1 so that ,he is present 7to all7 without being present 7to them74 ,he is present only for those who are able to receive ,him1 and who are prepared for ,him1 and who are capable of harmonizing themselves with ,him1 to reach ,him1 and as it were to touch ,him by virtue of the conformity they have with ,him1 and also by virtue of an innate power analogous to that which flows from ,him1 when at last their souls find themselves in the state where they were after having communicated with ,him2 then they can see ,him so far as his nature is visible4 ,i repeat3 if you have not yet risen so far1 the conclusion must be that you are still at a distance from ,him1 either by the obstacles of which we spoke above1 or by the lack of such instruction as would have taught you the road to follow1 and which would have imbued you with faith in things divine4 ,in any case1 you have no fault to find with any but yourself2 for1 to be alone1 all you need to do is to detach yourself from everything4 ,lack of faith in arguments about it may be remedied by the following considerations4 ,,how ,,such ,,as ,,rise ,,as ,,far ,,as ,,the ,,soul ,,may ,,achieve ,,faith ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 #e4 ,such as imagine that beings are governed by luck or chance1 and that they depend on material causes are far removed from the divinity1 and from the conception of unity4 ,it is not such men that we are addressing1 but such as admit the existence of a nature different from the corporeal one1 and who at least rise 7to an acknowledgment of the existence of7 the ,soul4 ,these should apply themselves to the study of the nature of the soul1 learning1 among other truths1 that she proceeds from ,intelligence1 and that she can achieve virtue by participating in ,intelligence through reason4 ,they must then acknowledge the existence of an ,intelligence superior to the intelligence that reasons1 namely1 to discursive reason4 ,they must 7also realize7 that reasonings imply an interval 7between notions71 and a movement 7by which the soul bridges this interval74 ,they must be brought to see that scientific knowledge consists also of reasons of the same nature 7namely1 rational notions71 reasons suitable to the soul1 but which have become clear1 because the soul has received the succession of intelligence which is the source of scientific knowledge4 ,by intelligence 7which belongs to her71 the soul sees the divine ,intellect1 which to it seems sensual1 in this sense that it is perceptible by intelligence1 which dominates the soul1 and is her father2#aid that is1 the intelligible world1 a calm intellect which vibrates without issuing from its tranquility1 which contains everything1 and which is all4 ,it is both definite and indefinite manifoldness1 for the ideas it contains are not distinct like the reasons 7the rational notions71 which are conceived one by one4 ,nevertheless1 they do not become confused4 ,each of them becomes distinct from the others1 just as in a science all the notions1 though forming an indivisible whole1 yet each has its own separate individual existence4#aie ,this multitude of ideas taken together constitutes the intelligible world4 ,this is the 7entity7 nearest to the ,first4 ,its existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason1 as much as the necessity of the existence of the ,soul herself2 but though the intelligible world is something superior to the ,soul1 it is nevertheless not yet the ,first1 because it is neither one1 nor simple1 while the one1 the principle of all beings1 is perfectly simple4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,one ,,only ,,in ,a ,,figurative ,,sense4 ,the principle that is superior to what is highest among beings1 to ,intelligence 7or intellect1 or intelligible world7 7may well be sought after74 ,there must indeed be some principle above ,intelligence2 for intelligence does indeed aspire to become one1 but it is not one1 possessing only the form of unity4 ,considered in itself1 ,intelligence is not divided1 but is genuinely present to itself4 ,it does not dismember itself because it is next to the ,one1 though it dared to withdraw therefrom4 ,what is above ,intelligence is ,unity itself1 an incomprehensible miracle1 of which it cannot even be said that it is essence1 lest we make of it the attribute of something else1 and to whom no name is really suitable4 ,if however ,he must be named1 we may indeed call ,him in general ,unity1 but only on the preliminary understanding that ,he was not first something else1 and then only later became unity4 ,that is why the ,one is so difficult to understand in ,himself2 ,he is rather known by ,his offspring2 that is1 by ,being1 because ,intelligence leads up to ,being4 ,the nature of the ,one1 indeed1 is the source of excellent things1 the power which begets beings1 while remaining within ,himself1 without undergoing any diminution1 without passing into the beings to which ,he gives birth4#aif ,if we call this principle ,unity1 it is only for the mutual convenience of rising to some indivisible conception1 and in unifying our soul4 ,but when we say that this principle is one and indivisible1 it is not in the same sense that we say it of the 7geometric7 point1 and of the 7arithmetical unity called the7 monad4 ,what is one in the sense of the unity of the point or the monad1 is a principle of quantity1 and would not exist unless preceded by being and the principle which precedes even that being4 ,it is not of this kind of unity that we must think2 still we believe that the point and the monad have analogy with the ,one by their simplicity as well as by the absence of all manifoldness and of all division4 ,,the ,,one ,,may ,,be ,,conceived ,,of ,,as ,,indivisible ,,and ,,infinite4 #f4 ,in what sense do we use the name of unity1 and how can we conceive of it8 ,we shall have to insist that the ,one is a unity much more perfect than the point of the monad2 for in these1 abstracting 7geometric7 magnitude1 and numerical plurality1 we do indeed stop at that which is most minute1 and we come to rest in something indivisible2 but this existed already in a divisible being1 in a subject other than itself1 while the ,one is neither in a subject other than itself1 nor in anything divisible4 ,if it be indivisible1 neither is it of the same kind as that which is most minute4 ,on the contrary1 it is that which is greatest1 not by 7geometric7 magnitude1 but by power2 possessing no 7geometric7 magnitude1 it is indivisible in its power2 for the beings beneath it are indivisible in their powers1 and not in their mass 7since they are incorporeal74 ,we must also insist that the ,one is infinite1 not as would be a mass of a magnitude which could be examined serially1 but by the incommensurability of its power4 ,even though you should conceive of it as of intelligence or divinity1 it is still higher4 ,when by thought you consider it as the most perfect unity1 it is still higher4 ,you try to form for yourself an idea of a divinity by rising to what in your intelligence is most unitary 7and yet ,he is still simpler72 for ,he dwells within ,himself1 and contains nothing that is contingent4 ,,the ,,one ,,is ,,self-,,sufficient ,,and ,,needs ,,nothing ,,for ,,establishment4 ,his sovereign unity may best be understood by ,his being self-sufficient2 for the most perfect principle is necessarily that which best suffices ,himself1 and which least needs anything else4 ,now anything that is not one1 but manifold1 needs something else4 ,not being one1 but being composed of multiple elements1 its being demands unification2 but as the ,one is already one1 ,he does not even need ,himself4 ,so much the more1 the being that is manifold needs as many things as it contains2 for each of the contained things exists only by its union with the others1 and not in itself1 and finds that it needs the others4 ,therefore such a being needs others1 both for the things it contains1 as for their totality4 ,if then there must be something that fully suffices itself1 it must surely be the ,one1 which alone needs nothing either relatively to ,himself1 or to the other things4 ,it needs nothing either to exist1 or to be happy1 or to be composed4 ,to begin with1 as ,he is the cause of the other beings1 ,he does not owe ,his existence to them4 ,further1 how could ,he derive ,his happiness from outside ,himself8 ,within ,him1 happiness is not something contingent1 but is ,his very nature4 ,again1 as ,he does not occupy any space1 ,he does not need any foundation on which to be edified1 as if ,he could not sustain ,himself4 ,all that needs compounding is inanimate2 without support it is no more than a mass ready to fall4 7,far from needing any support7 the ,one is the foundation of the edification of all other things2 by giving them existence1 ,he has at the same time given them a location4 ,however1 that which needs a location is not 7necessarily7 self-sufficient4 ,,the ,,supreme1 ,,as ,,supergoodness1 ,,could ,,not ,,aspire ,,to ,,anything ,,else4 ,a principle has no need of anything beneath it4 ,the ,principle of all things has no need of any of them4 ,every non-self-sufficient being is not self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its principle4 ,if the ,one aspired to anything1 ,his aspiration would evidently tend to destroy ,his unity1 that is1 to annihilate ,himself4 ,anything that aspires evidently aspires to happiness and preservation4 ,thus1 since for the ,one there is no good outside of ,himself1 there is nothing that ,he could wish4 ,he is the super-good2 ,he is the good1 not for ,himself1 but for other beings1 for those that can participate therein4 ,,the ,,one ,,is ,,not ,,thinker ,,but ,,thought ,,itself4 ,within the ,one1 therefore1 is no thought1 because there can be no difference within ,him2 nor could ,he contain any motion1 because the ,one is prior to motion1 as much as to thought4 ,besides1 what would ,he think8 ,would ,he think ,himself8 ,in this case1 ,he would be ignorant before thinking1 and thought would be necessary to ,him1 who fully suffices to ,himself4 ,neither should ,he be thought to contain ignorance1 because ,he does not know ,himself1 and does not think ,himself4 ,ignorance presupposes a relation1 and consists in that one thing does not know another4 ,but the ,one1 being alone1 can neither know nor be ignorant of anything4 ,being with ,himself1 ,he has no need of self-knowledge4 ,we should not even predicate of ,him presence with ,himself1 if we are to conceive of ,him ,unity in sheer purity4 ,on the contrary1 we should have to leave aside intelligence1 consciousness1 and knowledge of self and of other beings4 ,we should not conceive of ,him as being that which thinks1 but rather as of thought4 ,thought does not think2 but is the cause which makes some other being think2 now the cause cannot be identical with that which is caused4 ,so much the more reason is there then to say that that which is the cause of all these existing things cannot be any one of them4 ,this ,cause1 therefore1 must not be considered identical with the good ,he dispenses1 but must be conceived as the ,good in a higher sense1 the ,good which is above all other goods4 ,,the ,,soul ,,must ,,be ,,stripped ,,of ,,form ,,to ,,be ,,illuminated ,,by ,,primary ,,nature4 #g4 ,your mind remains in uncertainty because the divinity is none of these things 7that you know74 ,apply it first to these things1 and later fix it on the divinity4 ,while doing so1 do not let yourself be distracted by anything exterior for the divinity is not in any definite place1 depriving the remainder of its presence1 but it is present wherever there is any person who is capable of entering into contact therewith4 ,it is absent only for those who cannot succeed therein4 ,just as1 for other objects1 one could not discover what one seeks by thinking of something else1 and as one should not add any alien thing to the object that is thought if one wishes to identify oneself therewith2 likewise here one must be thoroughly convinced that it is impossible for any one whose soul contains any alien image to conceive of the divinity so long as such an image distracts the soul's attention4 ,it is equally impossible that the soul1 at the moment that she is attentive1 and attached to other things1 should assume the form of what is contrary to them4 ,just as it is said of matter that it must be absolutely deprived of all qualities to be susceptible of receiving all forms2 likewise1 and for a stronger reason1 the soul must be stripped of all form1 if she desire to be filled with and illuminated by the primary nature without any interior hindrance4 ,thus1 having liberated herself from all exterior things1 the soul will entirely turn to what is most intimate in her2 she will not allow herself to be turned away by any of the surrounding objects and she will put aside all things1 first by the very effect of the state in which she will find herself1 and later by the absence of any conception of form4 ,she will not even know that she is applying herself to the contemplation of the ,one1 or that she is united thereto4 ,then1 after having sufficiently dwelt with it1 she will1 if she can1 come to reveal to others this heavenly communion4 ,doubtless it was enjoyment of this communion that was the basis of the traditional conversation of ,minos with ,jupiter4#aig ,inspired with the memories of this interview1 he made laws which represented it1 because1 while he was drawing them up1 he was still under the influence of his union with the divinity4 ,perhaps even1 in this state1 the soul may look down on civil virtues as hardly worthy of her1#aih inasmuch as she desires to dwell on high2 and this does indeed happen to such as have long contemplated the divinity4 ,,on ,,self-,,knowledge ,,depends ,,recognition ,,of ,,divine ,,kinship4 7,in short71 the divinity is not outside of any being4 ,on the contrary1 ,he is present to all beings1 though these may be ignorant thereof4 ,this happens because they are fugitives1 wandering outside of ,him or rather1 outside of themselves4 ,they cannot reach ,him from whom they are fleeing1 nor1 having lost themselves1 can they find another being4 ,a son1 if angry1 and beside himself1 is not likely to recognize his father4 ,but he who will have learnt to know himself will at the same time discover from where he hails4#aii ,,to ,,be ,,attached ,,to ,,the ,,centre ,,constitutes ,,divinity4 #h4 ,self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's natural movement is not in a straight line1 unless indeed it have undergone some deviation4 ,on the contrary1 it circles around something interior1 around a centre4 ,now the centre is that from which proceeds the circle1 that is1 the soul4#bjj ,the soul will therefore move around the centre1 that is1 around the principle from which she proceeds2 and1 trending towards it1 she will attach herself to it1 as indeed all souls should do4 ,the souls of the divinities ever direct themselves towards it2 and that is the secret of their divinity2 for divinity consists in being attached to the ,centre 7of all souls74 ,anyone who withdraws much therefrom is a man who has remained manifold 7that is1 who has never become unified71 or who is a brute4#bja ,,the ,,celebrated ,,simile ,,of ,,the ,,man ,,whose ,,feet ,,are ,,in ,a ,,bath-,,tub4 ,is the centre of the soul then the principle that we are seeking8 ,or must we conceive some other principle towards which all centres radiate8 ,to begin with1 it is only by analogy that the words centre and circle are used4 ,by saying that the soul is a circle1 we do not mean that she is a geometrical figure1 but that in her and around her subsists primordial nature4#bjb 7,by saying that she has a centre1 we mean that7 the soul is suspended from the primary ,principle 7by the highest part of her being71 especially when she is entirely separated 7from the body74 ,now1 however1 as we have a part of our being contained in the the body1 we resemble a man whose feet are plunged in water1 with the rest of his body remaining above it4 ,raising ourselves above the body by the whole part which is not immerged1 we are by our own centre reattaching ourselves to the ,centre common to all beings1 just in the same way as we make the centres of the great circles coincide with that of the sphere that surrounds them4 ,if the circles of the soul were corporeal1 the common centre would have to occupy a certain place for them to coincide with it1 and for them to turn around it4 ,but since the souls are of the order of intelligible 7essences71 and as the ,one is still above ,intelligence1 we shall have to assert that the intercourse of the soul with the ,one operates by means different from those by which ,intelligence unites with the intelligible4 ,this union1 indeed1 is much closer than that which is realized between ,intelligence and the intelligible by resemblance or identity2 it takes place by the intimate relationship that unites the soul with unity1 without anything to separate them4 ,bodies cannot unite mutually2#bjc but they could not hinder the mutual union of incorporeal 7essences7 because that which separates them from each other is not a local distance1 but their distinction and difference4 ,when there is no difference between them1 they are present in each other4 ,,the ,,famous ,,illustration ,,of ,,the ,,cosmic ,,choral ,,ballet4 ,as the ,one does not contain any difference1 ,he is always present2 and we are ever present to ,him as soon as we contain no more difference4 ,it is not ,he who is aspiring to us1 or who is moving around us2 on the contrary1 it is we who are aspiring to ,him4 ,though we always move around ,him1 we do not always keep our glance fixed on ,him4 ,we resemble a chorus which always surrounds its leader1 but 7the members of7 which do not always sing in time because they allow their attention to be distracted to some exterior object2 while1 if they turned towards the leader1 they would sing well1 and really be with him4 ,likewise1 we always turn around the ,one1 even when we detach ourselves from ,him1 and cease knowing ,him4 ,our glance is not always fixed on the ,one2 but when we contemplate ,him1 we attain the purpose of our desires1 and enjoy the rest taught by ,heraclitus4#bjd ,then we disagree no more1 and really form a divine choric ballet around ,him4 ,,following ,,numenius1 ,,plotinos ,,describes ,,the ,,supreme ,,as ,,giver4 #i4 ,in this choric ballet1 the soul sees the source of life1 the source of intelligence1 the principle of being1 the cause of the good1 and the root of love4 ,all these entities are derived from the ,one without diminishing ,him4 ,he is indeed no corporeal mass2 otherwise the things that are born of ,him would be perishable4 ,however1 they are eternal1 because their principle ever remains the same1 because#bje ,he does not divide ,himself to produce them1 but remains entire4 ,they persist1 just as the light persists so long as the sun remains4#bjf ,nor are we separated from the ,one2 we are not distant from ,him1 though corporeal nature1 by approaching us1 has attracted us to it 7thus drawing us away from the ,one74#bjg ,but it is in the ,one that we breathe and have our being4#bjh ,he gave us life not merely at a given moment1 only to leave us later2 but ,his giving is perpetual1 so long as ,he remains what ,he is1 or rather1 so long as we turn towards ,him4 ,there it is that we find happiness1 while to withdraw from ,him is to fall4 ,it is in ,him that our soul rests2 it is by rising to that place free from all evil that she is delivered from evils2 there she really thinks1 there she is impassible1 there she really lives4 ,our present life1 in which we are not united with the divinity1 is only a trace or adumbration of real life4 ,real life 7which is presence with the divinity7 is the actualization of intelligence4 ,it is this actualization of intelligence which begets the divinities by a sort of silent intercourse with the ,one2 thereby begetting beauty1 justice and virtue4 ,these are begotten by the soul that is filled with divinity4 ,in ,him is her principle and goal2 her principle1 because it is from there that she proceeds2 her goal1 because there is the good to which she aspires1 so that by returning thither she again becomes what she was4 ,life here below1 in the midst of sense-objects1 is for the soul a degradation1 an exile1 a loss of her wings4#bji ,,the ,,parable ,,of ,,cupid ,,and ,,psyche1 ,,leading ,,up ,,to ,,divinization4 ,another proof that our welfare resides up there is the love that is innate in our souls1 as is taught in the descriptions and myths which represent love as the husband of the soul4#baj ,in fact1 since the soul1 which is different from the divinity1 proceeds from ,him1 she must necessarily love ,him2 but when she is on high#baa her love is celestial2 here below1 her love is only commonplace2 for it is on high that dwells the celestial ,venus 7,urania72 while here below resides the vulgar and adulterous ,venus4#bab ,now every soul is a ,venus1 as is indicated by the myth of the birth of ,venus and ,cupid1 who is supposed to be born simultaneously with her4#bac ,so long as she remains faithful to her nature1 the soul therefore loves the divinity1 and desires to unite herself to ,him1 who seems like the noble father of a bride who has fallen in love with some handsome lover4 ,when however the soul has descended into generation1 deceived by the false promises of an adulterous lover1 she has exchanged her divine love for a mortal one4 ,then1 at a distance from her father1 she yields to all kinds of excesses4 ,ultimately1 however1 she grows ashamed of these disorders2 she purifies herself1 she returns to her father1 and finds true happiness with ,him4 ,how great her bliss then is can be conceived by such as have not tasted it only by comparing it somewhat to earthly love-unions1 observing the joy felt by the lover who succeeds in obtaining her whom he loves4 ,but such mortal and deceptive love is directed only to phantoms2 it soon disappears because the real object of our love is not these sense-presentations1 which are not the good we are really seeking4 ,on high only is the real object of our love2 the only one with which we could unite or identify ourselves1 which we could intimately possess1 because it is not separated from our soul by the covering of our flesh4 ,this that ,i say will be acknowledged by any one who has experienced it2 he will know that the soul then lives another life1 that she advances towards the ,divinity1 that she reaches ,him1 possesses ,him1 and in his condition recognizes the presence of the ,dispenser of the true life4 ,then she needs nothing more4 ,on the contrary1 she has to renounce everything else to fix herself in the ,divinity alone1 to identify herself with ,him1 and to cut off all that surrounds ,him4 ,we must therefore hasten to issue from here below1 detaching ourselves so far as possible from the body to which we still have the regret of being chained1 making the effort to embrace the ,divinity by our whole being1 without leaving in us any part that is not in contact with ,him4 ,then the soul can see the ,divinity and herself1 so far as is possible to her nature4 ,she sees herself shining brilliantly1 filled with intelligible light2 or rather1 she sees herself as a pure light1 that is subtle and weightless4 ,she becomes divinity1 or1 rather1 she is divinity4 ,in this condition1 the soul is a shining light4 ,if later she falls back into the sense-world1 she is plunged into darkness4 ,,why ,,does ,,the ,,soul ,,after ,,reaching ,,yonder ,,not ,,stay ,,there8 #aj4 ,why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there8 ,because she has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below4 ,but a time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the divinity1 that is1 when she will no longer be troubled by the passions of the body4 ,the part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the one that is troubled 7the irrational soul71 but the other part 7the rational soul74 ,now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does not lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings1 conjectures and reasonings4 ,in the vision of the divinity1 indeed1 that which sees is not the reason1 but something prior and superior to reason2 if that which sees be still united to reason1 it then is as that which is seen4 ,when he who sees himself sees1 he will see himself as simple1 being united to himself as simple1 and will feel himself as simple4 ,we should not even say that he will see1 but only that he will be what he sees1 in case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which sees from that which is seen1 or to assert that these two things do not form a single one4 ,this assertion1 however1 would be rash1 for in this condition he who sees does not1 in the strict sense of the word1 see2 nor does he imagine two things4 ,he becomes other1 he ceases to be himself1 he retains nothing of himself4 ,absorbed in the divinity1 he is one with it1 like a centre that coincides with another centre4 ,while they coincide1 they form but one1 though they form two in so far as they remain distinct4 ,in this sense only do we here say that the soul is other than the divinity4 ,consequently this manner of vision is very difficult to describe4 ,how indeed could we depict as different from us ,him who1 while we were contemplating ,him1 did not seem other than ourselves1 having come into perfect at-one-ment with us8 ,,illustration ,,from ,,the ,,secrecy ,,of ,,the ,,mystery-,,rites4 #aa4 ,that1 no doubt1 is the meaning of the mystery-rites' injunction not to reveal their secrets to the uninitiated4 ,as that which is divine is unspeakable1 it is ordered that the initiate should not talk thereof to any 7uninitiated person7 who have not had the happiness of beholding it 7the vision74 ,,the ,,trance ,,or ,,entheasm ,,of ,,ecstasy4 ,as 7this vision of the divinity7 did not imply 7the existence of7 two things1 and as he who was identical to ,him whom he saw1 so that he did not see ,him1 but was united thereto1 if anyone could preserve the memory of what he was while thus absorbed into the ,divinity1 he would within himself have a faithful image of the ,divinity4 ,then indeed had he attained at-one-ment1 containing no difference1 neither in regard to himself1 nor to other beings4 ,while he was thus transported into the celestial region1 there was within him no activity1 no anger1 nor appetite1 nor reason1 nor even thought4 ,so much the more1 if we dare say so1 was he no longer himself1 but sunk in trance or enthusiasm1 tranquil and solitary with the divinity1 he enjoyed an the calm4 ,contained within his own being1 7or1 essence71 he did not incline to either side1 he did not even turn towards himself1 he was indeed in a state of perfect stability1 having thus1 so to speak1 become stability itself4 ,,above ,,beauty ,,and ,,above ,,virtue ,,this ,,ecstatic ,,simplification ,,is ,a ,,communion4 ,in this condition1 indeed1 the soul busies herself not even with the beautiful things1 for she rises above beauty1 and passes beyond even the 7,stoic7 choir of virtues4 ,thus he who penetrates into the interior of a sanctuary leaves behind him the statues placed 7at the entrance7 of the temple4 ,these indeed are the first objects that will strike his view on his exit from the sanctuary1 after he shall have enjoyed the interior spectacle1 after having entered into intimate communion1 not indeed with an image or statue1 which would be considered only when he comes out1 but with the divinity4 ,the very word divine spectacle does not1 here1 seem sufficient 7to express the contemplation of the soul72 it is rather an ecstasy1 a simplification1 a self-abandonment1 a desire for intercourse1 a perfect quietude1 and last1 a wish to become indistinguishable from what was contemplated in the sanctuary4#bad ,any one who would seek to see the ,divinity in any other way would be incapable of enjoying ,his presence4 ,,the ,,spiritual ,,truth ,,of ,,the ,,ancient ,,mysteries4 ,by making use of these mysterious figures1 wise interpreters wished to indicate how the divinity might be seen4 ,but the wise hierophant1 penetrating the mystery1 may1 when he has arrived thither1 enjoy the veritable vision of what is in the sanctuary4 ,if he have not yet arrived thither1 he can at least conceive the invisibility 7for physical sight7 of ,that which is in the sanctuary2 he can conceive the source and principle of everything1 and he recognizes it as the one particular principle worthy of the name4 7,but when he has succeeded in entering into the sanctuary7 he sees the ,principle1 enters into communication with it1 unites like to like1 leaving aside no divine thing the soul is capable of acquiring4 ,,subsequent ,,ecstatic ,,experiences ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,before obtaining the vision of the divinity1 the soul desires what yet remains to be seen4 ,for him1 however1 who has risen above all things1 what remains to be seen is ,he who is above all other things4 ,indeed1 the nature of the soul will never reach absolute nonentity4 ,consequently1 when she descends1 she will fall into evil1 that is1 nonentity1 but not into absolute nonentity4 ,following the contrary path1 she will arrive at something different1 namely1 herself4 ,from the fact that she then is not in anything different from herself1 it does not result that she is within anything1 for she remains in herself4 ,that which1 without being in essence1 remains within itself1 necessarily resides in the divinity4 ,then it ceases to be being1 and so far as it comes into communion with the ,divinity it grows superior to being 7it becomes supra-being74 ,now he who sees himself as having become divinity1 possesses within himself an image of the divinity4 ,if he rise above himself1 he will achieve the limit of his ascension1 becoming as it were an image that becomes indistinguishable from its model4 ,then1 when he shall have lost sight of the divinity1 he may still1 by arousing the virtue preserved within himself1 and by considering the perfections that adorn his soul1 reascend to the celestial region1 by virtue rising to ,intelligence1 and by wisdom to the ,divinity ,himself4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,ultimate ,,fate ,,is ,,detachment ,,and ,,flight4 ,such is the life of the divinities2 such is also that of divine and blessed men2 detachment from all things here below1 scorn of all earthly pleasures1 and flight of the soul towards the ,divinity that she shall see face to face 7that is1 alone with the alone1 as thought ,numenius74#bae ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,one4 ,the ,three ,principal ,hypostases1 or ,forms of ,existence4 ,,audacity ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,human ,,apostasy ,,from ,,the ,,divinity4 #a4 ,how does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity8 ,having a divine nature1 and having originated from the divinity1 how could they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves8 ,the origin of their evil is audacity1#baf generation1 the primary diversity1 and the desire to belong to none but themselves4#bag ,as soon as they have enjoyed the pleasure of an independent life1 and by largely making use of their power of self-direction1 they advanced on the road that led them astray from their principle1 and now they have arrived at such an apostasy 7distance7 from the ,divinity1 that they are even ignorant that they derive their life from ,him4 ,like children that were separated from their family since birth1 and that were long educated away from home finally lose knowledge of their parents and of themselves1 so our souls1 no longer seeing either the divinity or themselves1 have become degraded by forgetfulness of their origin1 have attached themselves to other objects1 have admired anything rather than themselves1 have like prodigals scattered their esteem and love on exterior objects1 and have1 by breaking the bond that united them to the divinities1 disdainfully wandered away from it4 ,their ignorance of the divinity is therefore caused by excessive valuation of external objects1 and their scorn of themselves4 ,the mere admiration and quest after what is foreign implies1 on the soul's part1 an acknowledgment of self-depreciation4 ,as soon as a soul thinks that she is worth less than that which is born and which perishes1 and considers herself as more despicable and perishable than the object she admires1 she could no longer even conceive of the nature and power of the divinity4 ,,conversion ,,is ,,effected ,,by ,,depreciation ,,of ,,externalities1 ,,and ,,appreciation ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,herself4 ,souls in such conditions may be converted to the ,divinity1 and raised to the supreme ,principle1 to the ,one1 to the ,first1 by being reasoned with in two ways4 ,first1 they may be led to see the worthlessness of the objects they at present esteem2#bah then they must be reminded of the origin and dignity of the soul4 ,the demonstration of the latter point logically precedes that of the former2 and if clearly done1 should support it4 ,,kinship ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,soul ,,with ,,the ,,divine4 ,it is the second point1 therefore1 that we shall here discuss4 ,it is related to the study of the object we desire to know2 for it is the soul that desires to know that object4 ,now the soul must first examine her own nature in order to know whether she possess the faculty of contemplating the divinity1 if this study be suited to her1 and if she may hope for success therein4 ,for indeed if the soul be foreign to divine things1 the soul has no business to ferret out their nature4 ,if however a close kinship obtains between them1 she both can and should seek to know them4 ,,souls ,,are ,,divine ,,because ,,the ,,world ,,was ,,created ,,by ,,the ,,universal ,,soul4 #b4 ,this is the first reflection of every soul4#bai ,by an influx of the spirit of life1 the universal ,soul produced all the animals upon earth1 in the air and in the sea1 as well as the divine stars1 the sun1 and the immense heaven4 ,it was the universal ,soul that gave form to the heavens1 and which presides over their regular revolutions2 and she effects all that without mingling with the being to whom she communicates form1 movement and life4 ,the universal ,soul is far superior to all created things4 ,while the latter are born or die in the measure that she imparts to them1 or withdraws from them their life1 she herself is being and eternal life1 because she could not cease being herself4 ,to understand how life can simultaneously be imparted to the universe and to each individual1 we must contemplate the universal ,soul4 ,to rise to this contemplation1 the soul must be worthy of it by nobility1 must have liberated herself from error1 and must have withdrawn from the objects that fascinate the glances of worldly souls1 must have immersed herself in a profound meditation1 and she must have succeeded in effecting the silence not only of the agitations of the body that enfolds her1 and the tumult of sensations1 but also of all that surrounds her4 ,therefore let silence be kept by all--namely1 earth1 air1 sea1 and even heaven4 ,then let the soul represent to herself the great ,soul which1 from all sides1 overflows into this immovable mass1 spreading within it1 penetrating into it intimately1 illuminating it as the rays of the sun light and gild a dark cloud4 ,thus the universal ,soul1 by descending into this world redeemed this great body from the inertia in which it lay1 imparting to it movement1 life and immortality4 ,eternally moved by an intelligent power1 heaven became a being full of life and felicity4 ,the presence of the ,soul made an admirable whole from what before was no more than in inert corpse1 water and earth1 or rather1 darkness of matter1 which1 as ,homer#bbj says1 was an object of horror for the divinities4 ,,soul-,,power ,,revealed ,,in ,,the ,,simultaneity ,,of ,,control ,,over ,,the ,,world4 ,the nature and power of the ,soul reveal themselves still more gloriously in the way she embraces and governs the world at will4 ,she is present in every point of this immense body1 she animates all its parts1 great and small4 ,though these may be located in different parts1 she does not divide as they do1 she does not split up to vivify each individual4 ,she vivifies all things simultaneously1 ever remaining whole and indivisible1 resembling the intelligence from which she was begotten by her unity and universality4#bba ,it is her power which contains this world of infinite magnitude and variety within the bonds of unity4 ,only because of the presence of the ,soul are heaven1 sun1 and stars divinities2 only because of her are we anything2 for a corpse is viler than the vilest dung-hill4#bbb ,,as ,,life ,,transfigures ,,matter1 ,,so ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,glorifies ,,us4 ,but if the deities owe their divinity to the universal ,soul1 she herself must be a divinity still more venerable4 ,now our soul is similar to the universal ,soul4 ,strip her of all coverings1 consider her in her pristine purity1 and you will see how precious is the nature of the soul1 how superior she is to everything that is body4#bbc ,without the soul1 no body is anything but earth4 ,even if you add to earth fire1 water and air1 still there is nothing that need claim your veneration4 ,if it be the ,soul that imparts beauty to the body1 why should we forget the souls within ourselves1 while prostituting our admiration on other objects8 ,if it be the soul that you admire in them1 why do you not admire her within yourselves8 ,,the ,,soul ,,as ,,the ,,hypostatic ,,actualization ,,of ,,intelligence4 #c4 ,since the nature of the ,soul is so divine and precious1 you may be assured of being able to reach the divinity through her2 with her you can ascend to ,him4 ,you will not need to search for ,him far from yourself2 nor will there be several intermediaries between yourself and ,him4 ,to reach ,him1 take as guide the divinest and highest part of the ,soul1 the power from which she proceeds1 and by which she impinges on the intelligible world4 ,indeed1 in spite of the divinity which we have attributed to her1 the ,soul is no more than an image of ,intelligence4 ,as the exterior word 7speech7 is the image of the 7interior7 word 7of thought87 of the soul1 the ,soul herself is the word and actualization of ,intelligence4#bbd ,she is the life which escapes from ,intelligence to form another hypostatic form of existence1 just as the fire contains the latent heat which constitutes its essence 7being71 and also the heat that radiates from it outside4 ,nevertheless1 the ,soul does not entirely issue from within ,intelligence2 she does partly reside therein1 but also forms 7a nature7 distinct therefrom4 ,as the ,soul proceeds from ,intelligence1 she is intelligible2 and the manifestation of her intellectual power is discursive reason4 ,from ,intelligence the ,soul derives her perfection1 as well as her existence2 only in comparison with ,intelligence does the ,soul seem imperfect4 ,the ,soul1 therefore1 is the hypostatic substance that proceeds from ,intelligence1 and when the ,soul contemplates ,intelligence the soul is reason actualized4 ,indeed1 while the soul contemplates ,intelligence1 the ,soul intimately possesses the things she thinks2 from her own resources she draws the actualizations she produces2 these intellectual and pure actualizations are indeed the ,soul's only characteristic activities4 ,those of an inferior nature really proceed from a foreign principle2 they are passions4 ,,the ,,soul',s ,,relation ,,to ,,intelligence ,,is ,,that ,,of ,,matter ,,to ,,form4 ,intelligence therefore1 makes the ,soul diviner1 because ,intelligence 7as a father7 begets the ,soul1 and grants its 7helpful7 presence to the ,soul4 ,nothing intervenes between them but the distinction between their natures4 ,the ,soul is to ,intelligence in the same relation as that obtaining between form and matter4#bbe ,now the very matter of ,intelligence is beautiful1 because it has an intellectual form1 and is simple4 ,how great then1 must ,intelligence be1 if it be still greater than the ,soul4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,is ,,the ,,archetype ,,of ,,ours4 #d4 ,the dignity of ,intelligence may be appreciated in still another way4 ,after having admired the magnitude and beauty of the sense-world1 the eternal regularity of its movement1 the visible or hidden divinities1 the animals and plants it contains1 we may 7taking our direction from all this71 rise to this world's archetype1 a more real ,world4 ,there we may contemplate all the intelligible entities which are as eternal as the intelligible world1 and which there subsist within perfect knowledge and life4 ,there preside pure intelligence and ineffable wisdom2 there is located the real ,saturnian realm1#bbf which is nothing else than pure intelligence4 ,this indeed embraces every immortal essence1 every intelligence1 every divinity1 every soul2 everything there is eternal and immutable4 ,since its condition is blissful1 why should ,intelligence change8 ,since it contains everything1 why should it aspire to anything8 ,since it is sovereignly perfect1 what need of development would it have8 ,its perfection is so much completer1 since it contains nothing but perfect things1 and since it thinks them2 it thinks them1 not because it seeks to know them1 but because it possesses them4#bbg ,its felicity is not in any way contingent on anything else2 itself is true eternity1 of which time furnishes a moving image of the sphere of the soul4 ,indeed1 the soul's action is successive1 and divided by the different objects that attract its attention4 ,now it thinks ,socrates1 and then it thinks a horse2 never does it grasp but one part of reality1 while intelligence always embraces all things simultaneously4 ,intelligence1 therefore1 possesses all things immovable in identity4 ,it is2 it never has anything but the present2#bbh it has no future1 for it already is all it could ever later become2 it has no past1 for no intelligible entity ever passes away2 all of them subsist in an eternal present1 all remain identical1 satisfied with their present condition4 ,each one is both intelligence and existence2 all together1 they are universal ,intelligence1 universal ,existence4 ,,above ,,intelligence ,,and ,,existence ,,is ,,their ,,simultaneous ,,principle4 ,intelligence exists 7as intelligence7 because it thinks existence4 ,existence exists 7as existence7 because1 on being thought1 it makes intelligence exist and thinks4#bbi ,there must therefore exist something else which makes intelligence think1 and existence exist1 and which consequently is their common principle4 ,in existence they are contemporaneous and substantial1 and can never fail each other4 ,as intelligence and existence constitute a duality1 their common principle in this consubstantial unity that they form1 and which is simultaneously existence and intelligence1 the thinking subject and the object thought2 intelligence as thinking subject1 and existence as object thought2 for thought simultaneously implies difference and identity4 ,,the ,,six ,,categories ,,from ,,which ,,all ,,things ,,are ,,derived4 ,the first principles1 therefore1 are existence and intelligence1 identity and difference1 movement and rest4#bcj ,rest is the condition of identity2 movement is the condition of thought1 since the latter presupposes the differences of the thinking subject and of the object thought1 and because it is silent if reduced to unity4 ,the elements of thought 7subject and object7 must thus stand in the relation of differences1 but also in that of unity1 because they form a consubstantial unity1 and because there is a common element in all that is derived therefrom4 ,besides1 here difference is nothing else than distinction4 ,the plurality formed by elements of thought constitutes quantity and number2#bca and the characteristic of every element1 quality4#bcb ,from these first principles 7the categories1 that are the genera of being7 all things are derived4 ,,the ,,soul ,,as ,,number ,,connected ,,with ,,intelligence4 #e4 ,thus the human soul is full of this divinity 7of ,intelligence72 she is connected therewith by these 7categories71 unless the soul 7purposely7 withdraws from 7that intelligence74 ,the ,soul approaches ,intelligence1 and thus having been unified1 the ,soul wonders1 ',who has begotten this unity8' ,it must be ,he who is simple1 who is prior to all multiplicity1 who imparts to ,intelligence its existence and manifoldness1 and who consequently produces number4 ,number1 indeed1 is not something primitive2 for the ,one is prior to the pair4 ,the latter ranks only second1 being begotten and defined by unity1 by itself being indefinite4 ,as soon as it is defined1 it is a number in so far as it is a being2 for these are the grounds on which the ,soul also is a number4#bcc ,,thought ,,is ,,actualization ,,of ,,sight1 ,,and ,,both ,,form ,,but ,,one ,,thing4 ,besides everything that is a mass or a magnitude could not occupy the first rank in nature2 those gross objects which are by sensation considered beings must be ranked as inferior4 ,in seeds1 it is not the moist element that should be valued1 but the invisible principle1 number1 and the 7seminal7 reason4 ,number and pair are only names for the reasons 7ideas7 and intelligence4 ,the pair is indeterminate so far as it plays the part of substrate 7in respect to unity74 ,the number that is derived from the pair1 and the one1 constitute every kind of form1 so that ,intelligence has a shape which is determined by the ideas#bcd begotten within it4 ,its shape is derived in one respect from the one1 and in another respect1 from itself1 just like actualized sight4 ,thought1 indeed1 is actualized sight1 and both these entities 7the faculty and the actualization7 form but one4 ,,mystery ,,or ,,derivation ,,of ,,second ,,from ,,first4 #f4 ,how does ,intelligence see1 and what does it see8 ,how did the ,second issue from the ,first1 how was it born from the ,first1 so as that the ,second might see the ,first8 ,for the soul now understands that these principles must necessarily exist4 ,she seeks to solve the problem often mooted by ancient philosophers4 ,if the nature of the ,one be such as we have outlined1 how does everything derive its hypostatic substance 7or1 form of existence71 manifoldness1 duality1 and number from the ,first8 ,why did the ,first not remain within ,himself1 why did ,he allow the leakage of manifoldness seen in all beings1 and which we are seeking to trace back to the ,first8 ,we shall tell it4 ,but we must1 to begin with1 invoke the ,divinity1 not by the utterance of words1 but by raising our souls to ,him in prayer4 ,now the only way to pray is 7for a person71 when alone1 to advance towards the ,one1 who is entirely alone4 ,to contemplate ,unity1 we must retire to our inner sanctuary1 and there remain tranquil above all things 7in ecstasy72 then we must observe the statues which as it were are situated outside of 7soul and intelligence71 and in front of everything1 the statue that shines in the front rank 7,unity71 contemplating it in a manner suitable to its nature 7in the mysteries74#bce ,,generation ,,is ,,the ,,radiation ,,of ,,an ,,image4 ,all that is moved must have a direction towards which it is moved2 we must therefore conclude that that which has no direction towards which it is moved must be at a stand-still1 and that anything born of this principle must be born without causing this principle to cease being turned towards itself4 ,we must1 however1 remove from our mind the idea of a generation operated within time1 for we are here treating of eternal things4 ,when we apply to them the conception of generation1 we mean only a relation of causality and effect4 ,what is begotten by the ,one must be begotten by ,him without any motion on the part of the ,one2 if ,he were moved1 that which was begotten from ,him would1 because of this movement1 be ranked third1 instead of second4#bcf ,therefore1 since the ,one is immovable1 ,he produces the hypostatic 7form of existence7 which is ranked second1 without volition1 consent1 or any kind of movement4 ,what conception are we then to form of this generation of ,intelligence by this immovable ,cause8 ,it is a radiation of light which escapes without disturbing its quietness1 like the splendor which emanates perpetually from the sun1 without affecting its quietness1 which surrounds it without leaving it4 ,thus all things1 in so far as they remain within existence1 necessarily draw from their own essence 7being7 and produce externally a certain nature that depends on their power1 and that is the image of the archetype from which it is derived4#bcg ,thus does fire radiate heat2 thus snow spreads cold4 ,perfumes also furnish a striking example of this process2 so long as they last1 they emit exhalations in which everything that surrounds them participates4 ,everything that has arrived to its point of perfection begets something4 ,that which is eternally perfect begets eternally2 and that which it begets is eternal though inferior to the generating principle4 ,what then should we think of ,him who is supremely perfect8 ,does ,he not beget8 ,on the contrary1 ,he begets that which1 after ,him1 is the greatest4 ,now that which1 after ,him1 is the most perfect1 is the second rank principle1 ,intelligence4 ,intelligence contemplates ,unity1 and needs none but ,him2 but the ,unity has no need of ,intelligence4 ,that which is begotten by the ,principle superior to ,intelligence can be nothing if not ,intelligence2 for it is the best after the ,one1 since it is superior to all other beings4 ,the ,soul1 indeed1 is the word and actualization of ,intelligence1 just as ,intelligence is word and actualization of the ,one4 ,but the ,soul is an obscure word4 ,being an image of ,intelligence1 she must contemplate ,intelligence1 just as the latter1 to subsist1 must contemplate the ,one4 ,intelligence contemplates the ,one1 not because of any separation therefrom1 but only because it is after the ,one4 ,there is no intermediary between the ,one and ,intelligence1 any more than between ,intelligence and the ,soul4 ,every begotten being desires to unite with the principle that begets it1 and loves it1 especially when the begetter and the begotten are alone4 ,now when the begetter is supremely perfect1 the begotten must be so intimately united to ,him as to be separated from ,him only in that it is distinct from ,him4 ,,intelligible ,,rest ,,is ,,the ,,determination ,,and ,,form ,,by ,,which ,,they ,,subsist4 #g4 ,we call ,intelligence the image of the ,one4 ,let us explain this4 ,it is ,his image because ,intelligence is1 in a certain respect1 begotten by ,unity1 because ,intelligence possesses much of the nature of its father1 and because ,intelligence resembles ,him as light resembles the sun4 ,but the ,one is not ,intelligence2 how then can the hypostatic 7form of existence7 begotten by the ,one be ,intelligence8 ,by its conversion towards the ,one1 ,intelligence sees ,him2 now it is this vision#bch which constitutes ,intelligence4 ,every faculty that perceives another being is sensation or intelligence2 but sensation is similar to a straight line1 while intelligence resembles a circle4#bci ,nevertheless1 the circle is divisible1 while ,intelligence is indivisible2 it is one1 but1 while being one1 it also is the power of all things4 ,now thought considers all these things 7of which ,intelligence is the power71 by separating itself1 so to speak1 from this power2 otherwise1 ,intelligence would not exist4 ,indeed1 ,intelligence has a consciousness of the reach of its power1 and this consciousness constitutes its nature4 ,consequently1 ,intelligence determines its own nature by the means of the power it derived from the ,one2 and at the same time ,intelligence sees that its nature 7being7 is a part of the entities which belong to the ,one1 and that proceed from ,him4 ,intelligence sees that it owes all its force to the ,one1 and that it is due to ,him that ,intelligence has the privilege of being a being 7or1 essence74 ,intelligence sees that1 as it itself is divisible1 it derives from the ,one1 which is indivisible1 all the entities it possesses1 life and thought2 because the ,one is not any of these things4 ,everything indeed is derived from the ,one1 because it is not contained in a determinate form2 it simply is the ,one1 while in the order of beings ,intelligence is all things4 ,consequently the ,one is not any of the things that ,intelligence contains2 it is only the principle from which all of them are derived4 ,that is why they are being1 for they are already determined1 and each has a kind of shape4 ,existence should be contemplated1 not in indetermination1 but on the contrary in determination and rest4 ,now1 for ,intelligible entities1 rest consists in determination1 and shape by which they subsist4 ,,myths ,,of ,,saturn1 ,,jupiter ,,and ,,rhea4 ,the ,intelligence that deserves to be called the purest intelligence1 therefore1 cannot have been born from any source1 other than the first ,principle4 ,it must1 from its birth1 have begotten all beings1 all the beauty of ideas1 all the intelligible deities2 for it is full of the things it has begotten2 it devours them in the sense that it itself retains all of them1 that it does not allow them to fall into matter1 nor be born of ,rhea4#bdj ,that is the meaning of the mysteries and myths2 ,saturn1 the wisest of the divinities1 was born before ,jupiter1 and devoured his children4 ,here ,saturn represents intelligence1 big with its conceptions1 and perfectly pure4#bda ,they add1 ,jupiter1 as soon as he was grown1 in his turn begat4 ,as soon as ,intelligence is perfect1 it begets the ,soul1 by the mere fact of its being perfect1 and because so great a power cannot remain sterile4 ,here again the begotten being had to be inferior to its principle1 had to represent its image1 had1 by itself1 to be indeterminate1 and had later to be determined and formed by the principle that begat it4 ,what ,intelligence begets is a reason1 a hypostatic form of existence whose nature it is to reason4 ,the latter moves around ,intelligence2 is the light that surrounds it1 the ray that springs from it4 ,on the one hand it is bound to ,intelligence1 fills itself with it2 enjoys it1 participates in it1 deriving its intellectual operations from it4 ,on the other hand1 it is in contact with inferior things1 or rather1 begets them4 ,being thus begotten by the ,soul1 these things are necessarily less good than the ,soul1 as we shall further explain4 ,the sphere of divine things ends with the ,soul4 ,,plato ,,teaches ,,three ,,spheres ,,of ,,existence4#bdb #h4 ,this is how ,plato establishes three degrees in the hierarchy of being#bdc3 ,everything is around the king of all4 ,he is here speaking of first rank entities4 ,he adds1 ,what is of the second order is around the second principle2 and what is of the third order is around the third principle4 ,plato#bdd further says that ,god is the father of the cause4 ,by cause1 he means ,intelligence2 for1 in the system of ,plato1 it is ,intelligence which plays the part of demiurgic creator4 ,plato adds that it is this power that forms the ,soul in the cup4#bde ,as the cause is intelligence1 ,plato applies the name of father to the absolute ,good1 the principle superior to ,intelligence and superior to ,being4 ,in several passages he calls the ,idea existence and intelligence4 ,he therefore really teaches that ,intelligence is begotten from the ,good1 and the ,soul from ,intelligence4 ,this teaching1 indeed1 is not new2 it has been taught from the most ancient times1 but without being brought out in technical terms4 ,we claim to be no more than the interpreters of the earlier philosophers1 and to show by the very testimony of ,plato that they held the same views as we do4 ,,this ,,doctrine ,,taught ,,by ,,parmenides4 ,the first philosopher who taught this was ,parmenides1 who identified ,existence and ,intelligence1 and who does not place existence among sense-objects1 for1 thought is the same thing as existence4#bdf ,he adds#bdg that existence is immovable1 although being thought4 ,parmenides thus denies all corporeal movement in existence1 so as that it might always remain the same4 ,further1 ,parmenides#bdh compares existence to a sphere1 because it contains everything1 drawing thought not from without1 but from within itself4 ,when ,parmenides1 in his writings1 mentions the ,one1 he means the cause1 as if he recognized that this unity 7of the intelligible being7 implied manifoldness4 ,in the dialogue of ,plato he speaks with greater accuracy1 and distinguishes three principles3 the ,first1 the absolute ,one2 the second1 the manifold one2 the third1 the one and the manifold4 ,he therefore1 as we do1 reaches three natures4 ,,anaxagoras ,,teaches ,,the ,,same ,,thing4 #i4 ,anaxagoras1 who teaches a pure and unmingled ,intelligence#bdi also insists that the first ,principle is simple1 and that the ,one is separated from sense-objects4 ,but1 as he lived in times too ancient1 he has not treated this matter in sufficient detail4 ,,heraclitus ,,also ,,taught ,,the ,,same ,,thing4 ,heraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible ,one2 for ,heraclitus holds that bodies are ceaselessly becoming 7that is1 developing71 and that they are in a perpetual state of flux4#bej ,,empedocles ,,taught ,,the ,,same ,,thing4 ,in the system of ,empedocles1 discord divides1 and concord unites2 now this second principle is posited as incorporeal1 and the elements play the part of matter4#bea ,,aristotle ,,taught ,,the ,,same ,,thing4 ,aristotle1 who lived at a later period1 says that the ,first ,principle is separated from 7sense-objects71 and that it is intelligible4#beb ,but when ,aristotle says that ,he thinks himself1 ,aristotle degrades ,him from the first rank4 ,aristotle also asserts the existence of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres1 so that each one of them might have a principle of motion4 ,about the intelligible entities1 therefore1 ,aristotle advances a teaching different from that of ,plato1 and as he has no plausible reason for this change1 he alleges necessity4 ,a well-grounded objection might here be taken against him4 ,it seems more reasonable to suppose that all the spheres co-ordinated in a single system should1 all of them1 stand in relation to the ,one and the ,first4 ,about ,aristotle's views this question also might be raised3 do the intelligible entities depend on the ,one and ,first1 or are there several principles for the intelligible entities8 ,if the intelligible entities depend on the ,one1 they will no doubt be arranged symmetrically1 as1 in the sense-sphere1 are the spheres1 each of which contains another1 and of which a single ,one1 exterior to the others1 contains them1 and dominates them all4 ,thus1 in this case1 the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up there1 and will be the intelligible world4 ,just as the spheres are not empty1 as the first is full of stars1 and as each of the others also is full of them1 so above their motors will contain many entities1 and everything will have a more real existence4 ,on the other hand1 if each of the intelligible entities is a principle1 all will be contingent4 ,how then will they unite their action1 and will they1 by agreement1 contribute in producing a single effect1 which is the harmony of heaven8 ,why should sense-objects1 in heaven1 equal in number their intelligible motors8 ,again1 why are there several of these1 since they are incorporeal1 and since no matter separates them from each other8 ,,what ,,the ,,pythagoreans ,,taught ,,on ,,the ,,subject4 ,among ancient philosophers1 those who most faithfully followed the doctrine of ,pythagoras1 of his disciples1 and of ,pherecydes1 have specially dealt with the intelligible4#bec ,some of them have committed their opinions to their written works2 others have set them forth only in discussions that have not been preserved in writing4 ,there are others of them1 also1 who have left us nothing on the subject4 ,,to ,,the ,,three ,,principles ,,in ,,the ,,universe ,,must ,,correspond ,,three ,,principles ,,in ,,us4 #aj4 ,above existence1 therefore1 is the ,one4 ,this has by us been proved as far as could reasonably be expected1 and as far as such subjects admit of demonstration4 ,in the second rank are ,existence and ,intelligence2 in the third1 the ,soul4 ,but if these three principles1 the ,one1 ,intelligence1 and the ,soul1 as we have said1 obtain in nature1 three principles must also obtain within us4 ,i do not mean that these three principles are in sense-objects1 for they are separate therefrom2 they are outside of the sense-world1 as the three divine principles are outside of the celestial sphere1 and1 according to ,plato's expression1#bed they constitute the the interior man4 ,our soul1 therefore1 is something divine2 it has a nature different 7from sense-nature71 which conforms to that of the universal ,soul4 ,now the perfect ,soul possesses intelligence2 but we must distinguish between the intelligence that reasons 7the discursive reason71 and the ,intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning 7pure intelligence74 ,the discursive reason of the soul has no need1 for operation1 of any bodily organ2#bee in its operations1 it preserves all its purity1 so that it is capable of reasoning purely4 ,when separated from the body1 it must1 without any hesitation1 be ranked with highest intellectual entities4 ,there is no need of locating it in space2 for1 if it exist within itself1 outside of body1 in an immaterial condition1 it is evidently not mingled with the body1 and has none of its nature4 ,consequently ,plato#bef says1 ,the divinity has spread the ,soul around the world4 ,what he here means is that a part of the ,soul remains in the intelligible world4 ,speaking of our soul he also says1 she hides her head in heaven4#beg ,he also advises us to wean the soul from the body2 and he does not refer to any local separation1 which nature alone could establish4 ,he means that the soul must not incline towards the body1 must not abandon herself to the phantoms of imagination1 and must not1 thus1 become alienated from reason4 ,he means that the soul should try to elevate to the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the sense-world1 and which is occupied in fashioning the body4#beh ,,there ,,must ,,be ,,an ,,objective ,,justice ,,and ,,beauty ,,to ,,which ,,we ,,are ,,intimately ,,united4 #aa4 ,since the rational soul makes judgments about what is just or beautiful1 and decides whether some object is beautiful1 whether such an action be just1 there must exist an immutable justice and beauty from which discursive reason draws its principles4#bei ,otherwise1 how could such reasonings take place8 ,if the soul at times reasons about justice and beauty1 but at times does not reason about them1 we must possess within ourselves the intelligence which1 instead of reasoning1 ever possesses justice and beauty2 further1 we must within us possess the cause and ,principle of ,intelligence1 the ,divinity1 which is not divisible1 which subsists1 not in any place1 but in ,himself2 who is contemplated by a multitude of beings1 by each of the beings fitted to receive ,him1 but which remains distinct from these beings1 just as the centre subsists within itself1 while all the radii come from the circumference to centre themselves in it4#bfj ,thus we ourselves1 by one of the parts of ourselves1 touch the divinity1 unite ourselves with ,him and are1 so to speak1 suspended from ,him2 and we are founded upon ,him 7we are edified by ,him7 when we turn towards ,him4 ,,these ,,principles ,,last ,,ever2 ,,even ,,though ,,we ,,are ,,distracted ,,from ,,them4 #ab4 ,how does it happen that we possess principles that are so elevated1 almost in spite of ourselves1 and for the most part without busying ourselves about them8 ,for there are even men who never notice them4 ,nevertheless these principles1 that is1 intelligence1 and the principle superior to intelligence1 which ever remains within itself 7that is1 the ,one71 these two principles are ever active4 ,the case is similar with the soul4 ,she is always in motion2 but the operations that go on within her are not always perceived2 they reach us only when they succeed in making themselves felt4 ,when the faculty that is active within us does not transmit its action to the power that feels1 this action is not communicated to the entire soul2 however1 we may not be conscious thereof because1 although we possess sensibility1 it is not this power1 but the whole soul that constitutes the man4#bfa ,so long as life lasts1 each power of the soul exercises its proper function by itself2 but we know it only when communication and perception occur4 ,in order to perceive the things within us1 we have to turn our perceptive faculties towards them1 so that 7our soul7 may apply her whole attention thereto4#bfb ,the person that desires to hear one sound must neglect all others1 and listen carefully on its approach4 ,thus we must here close our senses to all the noises that besiege us1 unless necessity force us to hear them1 and to preserve our perceptive faculty pure and ready to listen to the voices that come from above4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,two4 ,of ,generation1 and of the ,order of things that ,rank ,next ,after the ,first4 ,,why ,,from ,,unity ,,this ,,manifold ,,world ,,was ,,able ,,to ,,come ,,forth4 #a4 ,the ,one is all things1 and is none of these things4 ,the ,principle of all things cannot be all things4#bfc ,it is all things only in the sense that all things coexist within it4 ,but in it1 they are not yet1 but only will be4#bfd ,how then could the manifoldness of all beings issue from the ,one1 which is simple and identical1 which contains no diversity or duality8 ,it is just because nothing is contained within it1 that everything can issue from it4#bfe ,in order that essence might exist1 the ,one could not be 7merely7 essence1 but had to be the 'father' of essence1 and essence had to be its first-begotten4 ,as the ,one is perfect1 and acquires nothing1 and has no need or desire1 ,he has1 so to speak1 superabounded1 and this superabundance has produced a different nature4#bff ,this different nature of the ,one turned towards ,him1 and by its conversion1 arrived at the fulness 7of essence74 ,then it had the potentiality of contemplating itself1 and thus determined itself as ,intelligence4 ,therefore1 by resting near the ,one1 it became ,essence2 and by contemplating itself1 became ,intelligence4 ,then by fixing itself within itself to contemplate itself1 it simultaneously became ,essence-and-,intelligence4 ,,by ,,similar ,,effusion ,,of ,,superabundance ,,intelligence ,,created ,,the ,,soul4 ,just like the ,one1 it was by effusion of its power that ,intelligence begat something similar to itself4 ,thus from ,intelligence emanated an image1 just as ,intelligence emanated from the ,one4 ,the actualization that proceeds from ,essence 7and ,intelligence7 is the universal ,soul4 ,she is born of ,intelligence1 and determines herself without ,intelligence issuing from itself1 just as ,intelligence itself proceeded from the ,one without the ,one ceasing from ,his repose4 ,,similarly ,,the ,,universal ,,soul1 ,,by ,,procession1 ,,begets ,,nature4 ,nor does the universal ,soul remain at rest1 but enters in motion to beget an image of herself4 ,on the one hand1 it is by contemplation of the principle from which she proceeds that she achieves fulness2 on the other hand1 it is by advancing on a path different from1 and opposed to 7the contemplation of ,intelligence71 that she begets an image of herself1 sensation1 and the nature of growth4#bfh ,nevertheless1 nothing is detached or separated from the superior principle which begets her4 ,thus the human soul seems to reach down to within that of 7plant7 growth4#bfi ,she descends therein inasmuch as the plant derives growth from her4 ,nevertheless it is not the whole soul that passes into the plant4 ,her presence there is limited to her descent towards the lower region1 and in so far as she produces another hypostatic substance1 by virtue of her procession1 which occurs by her condescension to care for the things below her4 ,but the higher part of the ,soul1 that which depends on ,intelligence1 allows the ,intelligence to remain within itself4444 ,what#bgj then does the soul which is in the plant do8 ,does she not beget anything8 ,she begets the plant in which she resides4 ,this we shall have to study from another standpoint4 ,,procession ,,is ,,universal ,,from ,,highest ,,to ,,lowest4 #b4 ,we may say that there is a procession from the ,first to the last2 and in this procession each occupies its proper place4 ,the begotten 7being7 is subordinated to the begetting 7being74 ,on the other hand1 it becomes similar to the thing to which it attaches1 so long as it remains attached thereto4 ,when the soul passes into the plant1 there is one of her parts that unites thereto 7the power of growth72 but besides1 it is only the most audacious#bga and the most senseless part of her that descends so low4 ,when the soul passes into the brute1 it is because she is drawn thereto by the predominance of the power of sensation4#bgb ,when she passes into man1 it is because she is led to do so by the exercise of discursive reason1 either by the movement by which she proceeds from ,intelligence1 because the soul has a characteristic intellectual power1 and consequently has the power to determine herself to think1 and in general1 to act4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,nowhere ,,but ,,in ,a ,,principle ,,that ,,is ,,everywhere ,,and ,,nowhere4 ,now1 let us retrace our steps4 ,when we cut the twigs or the branches of a tree1 where goes the plant-soul that was in them8 ,she returns to her principle1#bgc for no local difference separates her therefrom4 ,if we cut or burn the root1 whither goes the power of growth present therein8 ,it returns to the plant-power of the universal ,soul1 which does not change place1 and does not cease being where it was4 ,it ceases to be where it was only when returning to its principle2 otherwise1 it passes into another plant2 for it is not obliged to contract1 or to retire within itself4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it retire1 it retires within the superior power4#bgd ,where1 in her turn1 does the latter reside8 ,within ,intelligence1 and without changing1 location2 for the ,soul is not within any location1 and ,intelligence still less4 ,thus the ,soul is nowhere2 she is in a principle which1 being nowhere1 is everywhere4#bge ,,the ,,soul ,,may ,,remain ,,in ,,an ,,intermediate ,,life4 ,if1 while returning to superior regions1 the soul stops before reaching the highest1 she leads a life of intermediary nature4#bgf ,,all ,,these ,,things ,,are ,,in ,,intelligence1 ,,without ,,constituting ,,it4 ,all these entities 7the universal ,soul and her images7 are ,intelligence1 though none of them constitutes ,intelligence4 ,they are ,intelligence in this respect1 that they proceed therefrom4 ,they are not ,intelligence in this respect that only by dwelling within itself ,intelligence has given birth to them4#bgg ,,the ,,whole ,,universe ,,is ,,one ,,immense ,,concatenation ,,of ,,all ,,things4 ,thus1 in the universe1 life resembles an immense chain in which every being occupies a point1 begetting the following being1 and begotten by the preceding one1 and ever distinct1 but not separate from the 7upper7 generating ,being1 and the 7lower7 begotten being into which it passes without being absorbed4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,four4 ,of ,matter4 ,,matter ,,as ,,substrate ,,and ,,residence ,,of ,,forms4 #a4 ,matter is a substrate 7or subject7 underlying nature1 as thought ,aristotle1#bgh and a residence for forms4 ,thus much is agreed upon by all authors who have studied matter1 and who have succeeded in forming a clear idea of this kind of nature2 but further than this1 there is no agreement4 ,opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature 7as thought ,aristotle71#bgi as to its receptivity1 and to what it is receptive4 ,,the ,,stoic ,,conception ,,of ,,matter4 7,the ,stoics1 who condensed ,aristotle's categories to four1 substrate1 quality-mode and relation71#bhj who admit the existence of nothing else than bodies1 acknowledge no existence other than that contained by bodies4 ,they insist that there is but one kind of matter1 which serves as substrate to the elements1 and that it constitutes being2 that all other things are only affections 7passions7 of matter1 or modified matter3 as are the elements4 ,the teachers of this doctrine do not hesitate to introduce this matter into the 7very nature of the7 divinities1 so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified matter4#bha ,besides1 of matter they make a body1 calling it a quantityless body1 still attributing to it magnitude4 ,,matter ,,according ,,to ,,the ,,pythagoreans1 ,,platonists ,,and ,,aristotelians4 ,others 7,pythagoreans1 ,platonists and ,aristotelians7 insist that matter is incorporeal4 ,some even distinguish two kinds of matter1 first1 the 7,stoic7 substrate of bodies1 mentioned above2 the other matter being of a superior nature1 the substrate of forms and incorporeal beings4 ,,the ,,aristotelian ,,intelligible ,,matter4 #b4 ,let us first examine whether this 7latter intelligible7 matter exists1 how it exists1 and what it is4 ,if 7the nature7 of matter be something indeterminate1 and shapeless1 and if in the perfect 7intelligible beings7 there must not be anything indeterminate or shapeless1 it seems as if there could not be any matter in the intelligible world4 ,as every 7being7 is simple1 it could not have any need of matter which1 by uniting with something else1 constitutes something composite4 ,matter is necessary in begotten beings1 which make one thing arise out of another2 for it is such beings that have led to the conception of matter 7as thought ,aristotle74#bhb ,it may however be objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless4 ,whence could it have originated to enter in 7among intelligible beings71 and remain there8 ,if it were begotten1 it must have been so by some principle2 if it be eternal1 it must have had several principles2 in which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be contingent4 ,further1 if 7in those beings7 form come to join matter1 their union will constitute a body1 so that the intelligible 7entities7 will be corporeal4 ,,intelligible ,,matter ,,is ,,not ,,shapeless4 #c4 ,to this it may first be answered that the indeterminate should not be scorned everywhere1 nor that which is conceived of as shapeless1 even if this be the substrate of the higher and better entities2 for we might call even the soul indeterminate1 in respect to intelligence and reason1 which give it a better shape and nature4 ,besides1 when we say that intelligible things are composite 7of matter and form71 this is not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies4 ,even reasons would thus be called composite1 and by their actualization form another alleged composite1 nature1 which aspires to form4 ,if1 in the intelligible world1 the composite tend toward some other principle1 or depend thereon1 the difference between this composite and bodies is still better marked4 ,besides1 the matter of begotten things ceaselessly changes form1 while the matter of the intelligible entities ever remains identical4 ,further1 matter here below is subject to other conditions 7than in the intelligible world74 ,here below1 indeed1 matter is all things only partly1 and is all things only successively2 consequently1 amidst these perpetual changes nothing is identical1 nothing is permanent4 ,above1 on the contrary1 matter is all things simultaneously1 and possessing all things1 could not transform itself4 ,consequently1 matter is never shapeless above2 for it is not even shapeless here below4 ,only the one 7intelligible matter7 is situated differently from the other 7sense-matter74 ,whether1 however1 7intelligible matter7 be begotten1 or be eternal1 is a question that cannot be determined until we know what it is4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,ideas ,,implies ,,an ,,individual ,,form1 ,,which ,,again ,,implies ,a ,,substrate4 #d4 ,granting now the existence of ideas1 whose reality has been demonstrated elsewhere1#bhc we must draw their legitimate consequences4 ,necessarily ideas have something in common1 inasmuch as they are manifold2 and since they differ from each other1 they must also have something individual4 ,now the individuality of any idea1 the difference that distinguishes it from any other1 consists of its particular shape4 ,but form1 to be received1 implies a substrate1 that might be determined by the difference4 ,there is therefore always a matter that receives form1 and there is always a substrate 7even in ideas1 whose matter is genus1 and whose form is its difference74 ,,relying ,,on ,,the ,,pun ,,between ,,world ,,and ,,adornment1 ,,plotinos ,,concludes ,,that ,,if ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world ,,be ,,the ,,image ,,of ,,this1 ,,it ,,must ,,also ,,be ,a ,,composite ,,of ,,form ,,and ,,matter4 ,besides1 our world is an image of the intelligible world4 ,now as our world is a composite of matter 7and form71 there must be matter also on high 7that is1 in the intelligible world74 ,otherwise1 how could we call the intelligible world kosmos 7that is1 either world1 or adornment71 unless we see matter 7receiving7 form therein8 ,how could we find form there1 without 7a residence7 that should receive it8 ,that world is indivisible1 taken in an absolute sense2 but in a relative sense1 is it divisible8 ,now if its parts be distinct from each other1 their division or distinction is a passive modification of matter2 for what can be divided1 must be matter4 ,if the multitude of ideals constitute an indivisible being1 this multitude1 which resides in a single being1 has this single being as substrate1 that is1 as matter and is its shapes4 ,this single1 yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless1 before conceiving of itself as varied4 ,if then by thought you abstract from it variety1 forms1 reasons1 and intelligible characteristics1 that which is prior is indeterminate and shapeless2 then there will remain in this 7subject7 none of the things that are in it and with it4 ,,the ,,bottom ,,of ,,everything ,,is ,,matter1 ,,which ,,is ,,relative ,,darkness4 #e4 ,if1 we were to conclude that there were no matter in intelligible entities1 because they were immutable1 and because1 in them1 matter is always combined with 7shape71 we would be logically compelled to deny the existence of matter in bodies2 for the matter of bodies always has a form1 and every body is always complete 7containing a form and a matter74 ,each body1 however1 is none the less composite1 and intelligence observes its doubleness2 for it splits until it arrives to simplicity1 namely1 to that which can no longer be decomposed2 it does not stop until it reaches the bottom things4 ,now the bottom of each thing is matter4 ,every matter is dark1 because the reason 7the form7 is the light1 and because intelligence is the reason4#bhd ,when1 in an object1 intelligence considers the reason1 it considers as dark that which is below reason1 or light4 ,likewise1 the eye1 being luminous1 and directing its gaze on light and on the colors which are kinds of light1 considers what is beneath1 and hidden by the colors1 as dark and material4 ,,intelligible ,,matter ,,consists ,,of ,,real ,,being1 ,,especially ,,as ,,shaped4 ,besides1 there is a great difference between the dark bottom of intelligible things and that of sense-objects2 there is as much difference between the matter of the former and of the latter as there is between their form4 ,the divine matter1 on receiving the form that determines it1 possesses an intellectual and determinate life4 ,on the contrary1 even when the matter of the bodies becomes something determinate1 it is neither alive nor thinking2 it is dead1 in spite of its borrowed beauty4#bhe ,as the shape 7of sense-objects7 is only an image1 their substrate also is only an image4 ,but as the shape 7of intelligible entities7 possesses veritable 7reality71 their substrate is of the same nature4 ,we have1 therefore1 full justification for calling matter being1 that is1 when referring to intelligible matter2 for the substrate of intelligible entities really is being1 especially if conceived of together with its inherent 7form74 ,for being is the luminous totality 7or complex of matter and form74 ,to question the eternity of intelligible matter is tantamount to questioning that of ideas2 indeed1 intelligible entities are begotten in the sense that they have a principle2 but they are non-begotten in the sense that their existence had no beginning1 and that1 from all eternity1 they derive their existence from their principle4 ,therefore they do not resemble the things that are always becoming1 as our world2 but1 like the intelligible world1 they ever exist4 ,,the ,,categories ,,of ,,movement ,,and ,,difference ,,applied ,,to ,,intelligibles4 ,the difference that is in the intelligible world ever produces matter2 for1 in that world1 it is the difference that is the principle of matter1 as well as of primary motion4 ,that is why the latter is also called difference1 because difference and primary motion were born simultaneously4#bhf ,the movement and difference1 that proceed from the ,first 7the ,good71 are indeterminate1 and need it1 to be determinate4 ,now they determine each other when they turn towards it4 ,formerly1 matter was as indeterminate as difference2 it was not good because it was not yet illuminated by the radiance of the ,first4 ,since the ,first is the source of all light1 the object that receives light from the ,first does not always possess light2 this object differs from light1 and possesses light as something alien1 because it derives light from some other source4 ,that is the nature of matter as contained in intelligible 7entities74 ,perhaps this treatment of the subject is longer than necessary4 ,,substrate ,,is ,,demanded ,,by ,,transformation ,,of ,,elements1 ,,by ,,their ,,destruction ,,and ,,dissolution4 #f4 ,now let us speak of bodies4 ,the mutual transformation of elements demonstrates that they must have a substrate4 ,their transformation is not a complete destruction2 otherwise 7a general7 being#bhg would perish in nonentity4 ,whereas1 what is begotten would have passed from absolute nonentity to essence2 and all change is no more than the passing of one form into another 7as thought ,aristotle74#bhh ,it presupposes the existence of permanent 7subject7 which would receive the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form4 ,this is demonstrated by destruction1 which affects only something composite2 therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite4 ,dissolution proves it also4 ,for instance1 where a vase is dissolved1 the result is gold2 on being dissolved1 gold leaves water2 and so analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in something else1 that is analogous to its nature4 ,finally1 elements necessarily are either form1 or primary matter1 or the composites of form and matter4 ,however1 they cannot be form1 because1 without matter1 they could not possess either mass nor magnitude4 ,nor can they be primary matter1 because they are subject to destruction4 ,they must therefore be composites of form and matter2 form constituting their shape and quality1 and matter a substrate that is indeterminate1 because it is not a form4 ,,the ,,views ,,of ,,empedocles ,,and ,,anaxagoras ,,on ,,matter4 #g4 7,according to ,aristotle71#bhi ,empedocles thinks matter consists of elements2 but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they are exposed4 7,according to ,aristotle71#bij ,anaxagoras supposes that matter is a mixture and1 instead of saying that this 7mixture7 is capable of becoming all things1 he insists that it contains all things in actualization4 ,thus he annihilates the intelligence that he had introduced into the world2 for1 according to him1 it is not intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form2 it is contemporaneous with matter1 instead of preceding it4#bia ,now it is impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter1 for if mixture participate in essence1 then must essence precede it2 if1 however1 essence itself be the mixture1 they will need some third principle4 ,therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede1 what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter1 for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion1 when it is possible to predicate qualities of matter1 because matter had none of its own1 and thus to subject matter entirely to shape8 ,besides1 how could 7the demiurgic creator7 then be in all8 ,,refutation ,,of ,,anaximander',s ,,views ,,about ,,matter4 7,anaximander7#bib had better explain the consistence of the infinity by which he explains matter4 ,does he1 by infinity1 mean immensity8 ,in reality this would be impossible4 ,infinity exists neither by itself1 nor in any other nature1 as1 for instance1 the accident of a body4 ,the infinite does not exist by itself1 because each of its parts would necessarily be infinite4 ,nor does the infinite exist as an accident1 because that of which it would be an accident would1 by itself1 be neither infinite1 nor simple2 and consequently1 would not be matter4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,democritus',s ,,atoms ,,as ,,explanations ,,of ,,matter4 7,according to ,aristotle's account of ,democritus71#bic neither could the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing 7as before thought ,cicero74#bid ,every body is divisible to infinity4 7,against the system of the atoms7 might further be alleged the continuity and humidity of bodies4 ,besides nothing can exist without intelligence and soul1 which could not be composed of atoms4 ,nothing with a nature different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms1 because no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked continuity4 ,many other objections against this system have and can be made2 but further discussion is unnecessary4 ,,matter ,,is ,,nothing ,,composite1 ,,but ,,by ,,nature ,,simple ,,and ,,one4 #h4 ,what then is this matter which is one1 continuous1 and without qualities8 ,evidently1 it could not be a body1 since it has no quality2 if it were a body1 it would have a quality4 ,we say that it is the matter of all sense-objects1 and not the matter of some1 and the form of others1 just as clay is matter1 in respect to the potter1 without being matter absolutely 7as thought ,aristotle74#bie ,as we are not considering the matter of any particular object1 but the matter of all things1 we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls under our senses--no quality1 color1 heat1 cold1 lightness1 weight1 density1 sparseness1 figure or magnitude2 for magnitude is something entirely different from being large1 and figure from the figured object4 ,matter therefore is not anything composite1 but something simple1 and by nature one 7according to the views of ,plato and ,aristotle combined74#bif ,only thus could matter be deprived of all properties 7as it is74 ,,matter ,,and ,,the ,,informing ,,principle ,,must ,,be ,,contemporaries ,,to ,,account ,,for ,,their ,,mutual ,,relations4 ,the principle which informs matter will give it form as something foreign to its nature2 it will also introduce magnitude and all the real properties4 ,otherwise1 it would be enslaved to the magnitude of matter1 and could not decide of the magnitude of matter1 and magnitude would be dependent on the disposition of matter4 ,a theory of a consultation between it and the magnitude of matter would be an absurd fiction4 ,on the contrary1 if the efficient cause precede matter1 matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause1 and be capable of docilely receiving any kind of form1 including magnitude4 ,if matter possessed magnitude1 it would also possess figure1 and would thus be rather difficult to fashion4 ,form therefore enters into matter by importing into it 7what constitutes corporeal being72 now every form contains a magnitude and a quantity which are determined by reason 7being71 and with reason4 ,that is why in all kinds of beings1 quantity is determined only along with form2 for the quantity 7the magnitude7 of man is not the quantity of the bird4 ,it would be absurd to insist on the difference between giving to matter the quantity of a bird1 and impressing its quality on it1 that quality is a reason1 while quantity is not a form2 for quantity is both measure and number4 ,,anti-,,stoic ,,polemic1 ,,against ,,the ,,corporeity ,,of ,,matter ,,and ,,quantity4 #i4 ,it may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of something without magnitude4 ,the fact is that not everything is identical with quantity4 ,essence is distinct from quantity2 for many other things beside it exist4 ,consequently no incorporeal nature has any quantity4 ,matter1 therefore1 is incorporeal4 ,besides1 even quantity itself is not quantative1 which characterizes only what participates in quantity 7in general72 a further proof that quantity is a form1 as an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness2 and as that which1 in the animal1 produces whiteness and the different colors1 is not a varied color1 but a varied reason2 likewise that which produces a quantity is not a definite quantity1 but either quantity in itself1 or quantity as such1 or the reason of quantity4 ,does quantity1 on entering into matter extend matter1 so as to give it magnitude8 ,by no means1 for matter had not been condensed4 ,form therefore imparts to matter the magnitude which it did not possess1 just as form impresses on matter the quality it lacked4#big ,,by ,,abstraction1 ,,the ,,soul ,,can ,,find ,,and ,,descry ,,the ,,quality-,,less ,,thing-,,in-,,itself3 ,,this ,,process ,,is ,,called ,,bastard ,,reasoning4 #aj4 7,some objector7 might ask how one could conceive of matter without quantity8 ,this might be answered by a retort4 ,how then do you 7as you do7 manage to conceive of it without quality8 ,do you again object1 by what conception or intelligence could it be reached8 ,by the very indetermination of the soul4 ,since that which knows must be similar to that which is known 7as ,aristotle#bih quotes from ,empedocles71 the indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate4 ,reason1 indeed1 may be determined in respect to the indeterminate2 but the glance which reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate4 ,if everything were known by reason and by intelligence1 reason here tells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it4 ,by wishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner1 intelligence arrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence1 or rather1 reason forms of matter a bastard or illegitimate image1 which is derived from the other1 which is not true1 and which is composed of the other 7deceptive material called7 reason4 ,that is why ,plato#bii said that matter is perceived by a bastard reasoning4 ,in what does the indetermination of the soul consist8 ,in an absolute ignorance1 or in a complete absence of all knowledge8 ,no3 the indeterminate condition of the soul implies something positive 7besides something negative74 ,as for the eye1 darkness is the matter of all invisible color1 so the soul1 by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that somehow are luminous1 cannot determine what then remains2 and likewise1 as the eye1 in darkness 7becomes assimilated to darkness71 the soul becomes assimilated to what she sees4 ,does she then see anything else8 ,doubtless1 she sees something without figure1 without color1 without light1 or even without magnitude4#cjj ,if this thing had any magnitude1 the soul would lend it a form4 ,,difference ,,between ,,mental ,,blank ,,and ,,impression ,,of ,,the ,,shapeless4 7,an objector might ask7 whether there be identity of conditions between the soul's not thinking1 and her experience while thinking of matter8 ,by no means2 when the soul is not thinking of anything1 she neither asserts anything1 nor experiences anything4 ,when she thinks of matter1 she experiences something1 she receives the impression of the shapeless4 ,when she presents to herself objects that possess shape and magnitude1 she conceives of them as composite2 for she sees them as distinct 7or1 colored87 and determined by qualities they contain4 ,she conceives of both the totality and its two constituent elements4 ,she also has a clear perception1 a vivid sensation of properties inherent 7in matter74 ,on the contrary1 the soul receives only an obscure perception of the shapeless subject1 for there is no form there4 ,therefore1 when the soul considers matter in general1 in the composite1 with the qualities inherent in this composite1 she separates them1 analyzes them1 and what is left 7after this analysis71 the soul perceives it vaguely1 and obscurely1 because it is something vague and obscure2 she thinks it1 without really thinking it4 ,on the other hand1 as matter does not remain shapeless1 as it is always shaped1 within objects1 the soul always imposes on matter the form of things1 because only with difficulty does she support the indeterminate1 since she seems to fear to fall out of the order of beings1 and to remain long in nonentity4 ,,the ,,composition ,,of ,a ,,body ,,needs ,a ,,substrate4 #aa4 7,following the ideas of ,aristotle1#cja ,plotinos wonders whether some objector7 will ask whether the composition of a body requires anything beyond extension and all the other qualities8 ,yes3 it demands a substrate to receive them 7as a residence74 ,this substrate is not a mass2 for in this case1 it would be an extension4 ,but if this substrate have no extension1 how can it be a residence 7for form78 ,without extension1 it could be of no service1 contributing neither to form nor qualities1 to magnitude nor extension4 ,it seems that extension1 wherever it be1 is given to bodies by matter4 ,just as actions1 effects1 times and movements1 though they do not imply any matter1 nevertheless are beings1 it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily imply matter 7without extension71 being individual beings1 whose diverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms4 ,matter without extension1 therefore1 seems to be no more than a meaningless name4 ,,matter ,,as ,,the ,,image ,,of ,,extension1 ,,can ,,yet ,,be ,,residence ,,of ,,form4 7,our answer to the above objection is this37 ,to begin with1 not every residence is necessarily a mass1 unless it have already received extension4 ,the soul1 which possesses all things1 contains them all simultaneously4 ,if it possessed extension1 it would possess all things in extension4 ,consequently matter receives all it contains in extension1 because it is capable thereof4 ,likewise in animals and plants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of their magnitude1 with that of their quality4 ,it would be wrong to claim that magnitude is necessary to matter because1 in sense-objects1 there exists a previous magnitude1 on which is exerted the action of the forming principle2 for the matter of these objects is not pure matter1 but individual matter 7as said ,aristotle74#cjb ,matter pure and simple must receive its extension from some other principle4 ,therefore the residence of form could not be a mass2 for in receiving extension1 it would also receive the other qualities4 ,matter therefore1 is the image of extension1 because as it is primary matter1 it possesses the ability to become extended4 ,people often imagine matter as empty extension2 consequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical with emptiness4 ,i repeat3 matter is the image of extension because the soul1 when considering matter1 is unable to determine anything1 spreads into indetermination1 without being able to circumscribe or mark anything2 otherwise1 matter would determine something4 ,this substrate could not properly be called big or little2 it is simultaneously big and little 7as said ,aristotle74#cjc ,it is simultaneously extended and non-extended1 because it is the matter of extension4 ,if it were enlarged or made smaller1 it would somehow move in extension4 ,its indetermination is an extension which consists in being the very residence of extension1 but really in being only imaginary extension1 as has been explained above4 ,other beings1 that have no extension1 but which are forms1 are each of them determinate1 and consequently imply no other idea of extension4 ,on the contrary1 matter1 being indeterminate1 and incapable of remaining within itself1 being moved to receive all forms everywhere1 ever being docile1 by this very docility1 and by the generation 7to which it adapts itself71 becomes manifold4 ,it is in this way its nature seems to be extension4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,moderatus ,,of ,,gades1 ,,forms ,,demand ,a ,,residence1 ,,vase1 or ,,location4 #ab4 ,extensions therefore contribute to the constitutions of bodies2 for the forms of bodies are in extensions4 ,these forms produce themselves not in extension 7which is a form71 but in the substrate that has received extension4 ,if they occurred in extension1 instead of occurring in matter1 they would nevertheless have neither extension nor 7hypostatic7 substance2 for they would be no more than reasons4 ,now as reasons reside in the soul1 there would be no body4 ,therefore1 in the sense-world1 the multiplicity of forms must have a single substrate which has received extension1 and therefore must be other than extension4 ,all things that mingle form a mixture1 because they contain matter2 they have no need of any other substrate1 because each of them brings its matter along with it4 ,but 7forms7 need a receptacle 7a residence71 a vase 7or stand71 a location 7this in answer to the objection at the beginning of the former section74 ,now location is posterior to matter and to bodies4 ,bodies1 therefore1 presuppose matter4 ,bodies are not necessarily immaterial1 merely because actions and operations are4 ,in the occurrence of an action1 matter serves as substrate to the agent2 it remains within him without itself entering into action2 for that is not that which is sought by the agent4 ,one action does not change into another1 and consequently has no need of containing matter2 it is the agent who passes from one action to another1 and who1 consequently1 serves as matter to the actions 7as thought ,aristotle74#cjd ,,not ,,even ,,corporeity ,,inheres ,,in ,,matter ,,which ,,is ,,reached ,,by ,,bastard ,,reasoning4 ,matter1 therefore1 is necessary to quality as well as to quantity1 and consequently1 to bodies4 ,in this sense1 matter is not an empty name1 but a substrate1 though it be neither visible nor extended4 ,otherwise1 for the same reason1 we would be obliged also to deny qualities and extension2 for you might say that each of these things1 taken in itself1 is nothing real4 ,if these things possess existence1 though their existence be obscure1 so much the more must matter possess existence1 though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the senses4 ,indeed1 matter cannot be perceived by sight1 since it is colorless2 nor by hearing1 for it is soundless2 nor by smell or taste1 because it is neither volatile nor wet4 ,it is not even perceived by touch1 for it is not a body4 ,touch cognizes only body1 recognizes that it is dense or sparse1 hard or soft1 wet or dry2 now none of these attributes is characteristic of matter4 ,the latter therefore can be perceived only by a reasoning which does not imply the presence of intelligence1 which1 on the contrary1 implies the complete absence of matter2 which 7unintelligent reasoning therefore7 deserves the name of bastard 7or1 illegitimate7 reasoning4#cje ,corporeity itself1#cjf is not characteristic of matter4 ,if corporeity be a reason 7that is1 by a pun1 a 'form'71 it certainly differs from matter1 both being entirely distinct4 ,if corporeity be considered when it has already modified matter and mingled with it1 it is a body2 it is no longer matter pure and simple4 ,,the ,,substrate ,,is ,,not ,a ,,quality ,,common ,,to ,,all ,,elements2 ,,for ,,thus ,,it ,,would ,,not ,,be ,,indeterminate4 #ac4 ,those who insist that the substrate of things is a quality common to all elements are bound to explain first the nature of this quality2 then1 how a quality could serve as substrate2 how an unextended1 immaterial 787 quality could be perceived in something that lacked extension2 further1 how1 if this quality be determinate1 it can be matter2 for if it be something indeterminate1 it is no longer a quality1 but matter itself that we seek4 ,,even ,,this ,,privation ,,might ,,be ,,considered ,a ,,quality2 ,,but ,,such ,a ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,would ,,destroy ,,all ,,coherent ,,reasoning4 ,let us grant that matter has no quality1 because1 by virtue of its nature1 it does not participate in a quality of any other thing4 ,what1 however1 would hinder this property1 because it is a qualification in matter1 from participating in some quality8 ,this would be a particular and distinctive characteristic1 which consists of the privation of all other things 7referring to ,aristotle78#cjg ,in man1 the privation of something may be considered a quality2 as1 for instance1 the privation of sight is blindness4 ,if the privation of certain things inhere in matter1 this privation is also a qualification for matter4 ,if further the privation in matter extend to all things1 absolutely1 our objection is still better grounded1 for privation is a qualification4 ,such an objection1 however1 amounts to making qualities and qualified things of everything4 ,in this case quantity1 as well as being1 would be a quality4 ,every qualified thing must possess some quality4 ,it is ridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what itself has no quality1 being other than quality4 ,,by ,a ,,pun ,,between ,,difference ,,and ,,otherness1 ,,plotinos ,,defines ,,the ,,characteristic ,,of ,,matter ,,as ,,being ,a ,,disposition ,,to ,,become ,,something ,,else4 ,some one may object that that is possible1 because being something else is a quality4 ,we would then have to ask whether the thing that is other be otherness-in-itself8 ,if it be otherness-in-itself1 it is so not because it is something qualified1 because quality is not something qualified4 ,if this thing be only other1 it is not such by itself1 it is so only by otherness1 as a thing that is identical by identity4 ,privation1 therefore1 is not a quality1 nor anything qualified1 but the absence of quality or of something else1 as silence is the absence of sound4 ,privation is something negative2 qualification is something positive4 ,the property of matter is not a form2 for its property consists precisely in having neither qualification nor form4 ,it is absurd to insist that it is qualified1 just because it has no quality2 this would be tantamount to saying that it possessed extension by the very fact of its possessing no extension4 ,the individuality 7or1 property7 of matter is to be what it is4 ,its characteristic is not an attribute2 it consists in a disposition to become other things4 ,not only are these other things other than matter1 but besides each of them possesses an individual form4 ,the only name that suits matter is other1 or rather1 others1 because the singular is too determinative1 and the plural better expresses indetermination4 ,,privation ,,is ,a ,,form ,,of ,,matter4 #ad4 ,let us now examine if matter be privation1 or if privation be an attribute of matter4 ,if you insist that privation and matter are though logically distinct1 substantially one and the same thing1 you will have to explain the nature of these two things1 for instance1 defining matter without defining privation1 and conversely4 ,either1 neither of these two things implies the other1 or they imply each other reciprocally1 or only one of them implies the other4 ,if each of them can be defined separately1 and if neither of them imply the other1 both will form two distinct things1 and matter will be different from privation1 though privation be an accident of matter4 ,but neither of the two must even potentially be present in the definition of the other4 ,is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose1 and the man with the stub nose 7as suggested by ,aristotle78#cjh ,then each of these is double1 and there are two things4 ,is their relation that between fire and heat8 ,heat is in fire1 but fire is not necessarily contained in heat2 thus matter1 having privation 7as a quality71 as fire has heat 7as a quality71 privation will be a form of matter1 and has a substrate different from itself1 which is matter4#cji ,not in this sense1 therefore1 is there a unity 7between them74 ,,privation ,,is ,,nonentity1 ,,and ,,adds ,,no ,,new ,,concept4 ,are matter and privation substantially identical1 yet logically distinct1 in this sense that privation does not signify the presence of anything1 but rather its absence8 ,that it is the negation of beings1 and is synonymous with nonentity8 ,negation adds no attribute2 it limits itself to the assertion that something is not4 ,in a certain sense1 therefore1 privation is nonentity4 ,,being ,,substantially ,,identical1 ,,but ,,logically ,,distinct ,,is ,,nonsense4 ,if matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is not essence1 but something else than essence1 there is still room to draw up two definitions1 of which one would apply to the substrate1 and the other to the privation1 merely to explain that it is a disposition to become something else8 ,it would be better to acknowledge that matter1 like the substrate1 should be defined a disposition to become other things4 ,if the definition of privation shows the indetermination of matter1 it can at least indicate its nature4 ,but we could not admit that matter and privation are one thing in respect to their substrate1 though logically distinct2 for how could there be a logical distinction into two things1 if a thing be identical with matter as soon as it is indeterminate1 indefinite1 and lacking quality8 ,,matter ,,as ,,the ,,infinite ,,in ,,itself4 #ae4 ,let us further examine if the indeterminate1 or infinite1 be an accident1 or an attribute of some other nature2 how it comes to be an accident1 and whether privation ever can become an accident4 ,the things that are numbers and reasons are exempt from all indetermination1 because they are determinations1 orders1 and principles of order for the rest4 ,now these principles do not order objects already ordered1 nor do they order orders4 ,the thing that receives an order is different from that which gives an order1 and the principles from which the order is derived are determination1 limitation and reason4 ,in this case1 that which receives the order and the determination must necessarily be the infinite 7as thought ,plato74#caj ,now that which receives the order is matter1 with all the things which1 without being matter1 participate therein1 and play the part of matter4 ,therefore matter is the infinite itself4#caa ,not accidentally is it the infinite2 for the infinite is no accident4 ,indeed1 every accident must be a reason2 now of what being can the infinite be an accident8 ,of determination1 or of that which is determined8 ,now matter is neither of these two4 ,further1 the infinite could not unite with the determinate without destroying its nature4 ,the infinite1 therefore1 is no accident of matter 7but is its nature1 or being74 ,matter is the infinite itself4 ,even in the intelligible world1 matter is the infinite4 ,,the ,,infinite ,,may ,,be ,,either ,,ideal ,,or ,,real1 ,,infinite ,,or ,,indefinite4 ,the infinite seems born of the infinity of the ,one1 either of its power1 or eternity2 there is no infinity in the ,one1 but the ,one is creator of the infinite4 ,how can there be infinity simultaneously above and below 7in the ,one and in matter78 ,because there are two infinities 7the infinite and the indefinite2 the infinite in the ,one1 the indefinite in matter74 ,between them obtains the same difference as the archetype and its image4#cab ,is the infinite here below less infinite8 ,on the contrary1 it is more so4 ,by the mere fact that the image is far from veritable being1 it is more infinite4 ,infinity is greater in that which is less determinate 7as thought ,aristotle74#cac ,now that which is more distant from good is further in evil4 ,therefore the infinite on high1 possessing the more essence1 is the ideal infinite2 here below1 as the infinite possesses less essence1 because it is far from essence and truth1 it degenerates into the image of essence1 and is the truer 7indefinite7 infinite4 ,,matter ,,as ,,the ,,infinite ,,in ,,itself4 ,is the infinite identical with the essence of the infinite8 ,there is a distinction between them where there is reason and matter2 where however matter is alone1 they must be considered identical2 or1 better1 we may say absolutely that here below the infinite does not occur2 otherwise it would be a reason1 which is contrary to the nature of the infinite4 ,therefore matter in itself is the infinite1 in opposition to reason4 ,just as reason1 considered in itself1 is called reason1 so matter1 which is opposed to reason by its infinity1 and which is nothing else 7than matter71 must be called infinite4 ,,matter ,,is ,,nonessential ,,otherness4 #af4 ,is there any identity between matter and otherness8 ,matter is not identical with otherness itself1 but with that part of otherness which is opposed to real beings1 and to reasons4 ,it is in this sense that one can say of nonentity that it is something1 that it is identical with privation1 if only privation be the opposition to things that exist in reason4 ,will privation be destroyed by its union with the thing of which it is an attribute8 ,by no means4 ,that in which a 7,stoic7 habit occurs is not itself a habit1 but a privation4 ,that in which determination occurs is neither determination1 nor that which is determined1 but the infinite1 so far as it is infinite4 ,how could determination unite with the infinite without destroying its nature1 since this infinite is not such by accident8 ,it would destroy this infinite1 if it were infinite in quantity2 but that is not the case4 ,on the contrary1 it preserves its being for it1 realizes and completes its nature2 as the earth which did not contain seeds 7preserves its nature7 when it receives some of them2 or the female1 when she is made pregnant by the male4 ,the female1 then1 does not cease being a female2 on the contrary she is so far more1 for she realizes her nature 7being74 ,,indigence ,,is ,,necessarily ,,evil4 ,does matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in the good8 ,yes1 because it was formerly deprived of good1 and did not possess it4 ,that which lacks something1 and obtains it1 holds the middle between good and evil1 if it be in the middle between the two4 ,but that which possesses nothing1 that which is in indigence1 or rather that which is indigence itself1 must necessarily be evil2 for it is not indigence of wealth1 but indigence of wisdom1 of virtue1 of beauty1 of vigor1 of shape1 of form1 of quality4 ,how1 indeed1 could such a thing not be shapeless1 absolutely ugly and evil8 ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,both ,,kinds ,,of ,,matter ,,to ,,essence4 ,in the intelligible world1 matter is essence2 for what is above it 7the ,one71 is considered as superior to essence4 ,in the sense-world1 on the contrary1 essence is above matter2 therefore matter is nonentity1 and thereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of essence4 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,fragments ,about the ,soul1 the ,intelligence1 and the ,good4 ,,difference ,,between ,,intelligence ,,and ,,the ,,existing ,,animal4 #a4 ,plato says1 ,the intelligence sees the ideas comprised within the existing animal4 ,he adds1 ,the demiurge conceived that this produced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous to those that the intelligence sees in the existing animal4 ,does ,plato mean that the ideas are anterior to intelligence1 and that they already exist when intelligence thinks them8 ,we shall first have to examine whether the animal is identical with intelligence1 or is something different4 ,now that which observes is intelligence2 so the ,animal himself should then be called1 not intelligence1 but the intelligible4 ,shall we therefrom conclude that the things contemplated by intelligence are outside of it8 ,if so1 intelligence possesses only images1 instead of the realities themselves--that is1 if we admit that the realities exist up there2 for1 according to ,plato1 the veritable reality is up there within the essence1 in which everything exists in itself4 ,,relation ,,between ,,intelligence ,,and ,,the ,,intelligible4 7,this consequence is not necessary74 ,doubtless ,intelligence and the intelligible are different2 they are nevertheless not separated4 ,nothing hinders us from saying that both form but one1 and that they are separated only by thought2 for essence is one1 but it is partly that which is thought1 and partly that which thinks4 ,when ,plato says that intelligence sees the ideas1 he means that it contemplates the ideas1 not in another principle1 but in itself1 because it possesses the intelligible within itself4 ,the intelligible may also be the intelligence1 but intelligence in the state of repose1 of unity1 of calm1 while ,intelligence1 which perceives this ,intelligence which has remained within itself1 is the actuality born therefrom1 and which contemplates it4 ,by contemplating the intelligible1 intelligence is assimilated thereto and is its intelligence1 because ,intelligence thinks the intelligible it itself becomes intelligible by becoming assimilated thereto1 and on the other hand also something thought4 ,it is 7intelligence71 therefore1 which conceived the design in producing in the universe the four kinds of living beings 7or elements71 which it beholds up there4 ,mysteriously1 however1 ,plato here seems to present the conceiving-principle as different from the other two principles1 while others think that these three principles1 the animal itself 7the universal ,soul71 ,intelligence and the conceiving principle form but a single thing4 ,shall we here1 as elsewhere1 admit that opinions differ1 and that everybody conceives the three principles in his own manner8 ,,the ,,world-,,soul ,,is ,,the ,,conceiving-,,principle4 ,we have already noticed two of these principles 7namely1 intelligence1 and the intelligible1 which is called the ,animal-in-itself1 or universal ,soul74 ,what is the third8 ,it is he who has resolved to produce1 to form1 to divide the ideas that intelligence sees in the ,animal4 ,is it possible that in one sense intelligence is the dividing principle1 and that in another the dividing principle is not intelligence8 ,as far as divided things proceed from intelligence1 intelligence is the dividing principle4 ,as far as intelligence itself remains undivided1 and that the things proceeding from it 7that is1 the souls7 are divided1 the universal ,soul is the principle of this division into several souls4 ,that is why ,plato says that division is the work of a third principle1 and that it resides in a third principle that has conceived2 now1 to conceive is not the proper function of intelligence2 it is that of the ,soul which has a dividing action in a divisible nature4 ,,how ,,the ,,soul ,,ascends ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,is ,,possessed ,,by ,,touching ,,it ,,with ,,the ,,best ,,part ,,of ,,oneself4 #b4 7,as ,nicholas of ,damascus used to say7 the totality of a science is divided into particular propositions1 without1 however1 thereby being broken up into fragments1 inasmuch as each proposition contains potentially the whole science1 whose principle and goal coincide4 ,likewise1 we should so manage ourselves that each of the faculties we possess within ourselves should also become a goal and a totality2 and then so arrange all the faculties that they will be consummated in what is best in our nature 7that is1 intelligence74 ,success in this constitutes dwelling on high 7living spiritually72 for1 when one possesses the intelligible1 one touches it by what is best in oneself4 ,,of ,,the ,,descent ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,into ,,the ,,body4 ,,the ,,soul ,,is ,,not ,,in ,,the ,,body2 ,,but ,,the ,,body ,,is ,,in ,,the ,,soul4 #c4 ,the universal ,soul has not come into any place1 nor gone into any2 for no such place could have existed4 ,however1 the body1 which was in its neighborhood1 participated in her1 consequently1 she is not inside a body4 ,plato1 indeed1 does not say that the soul is in a body2 on the contrary1 he locates the body in the soul4 ,,individual ,,souls1 ,,however1 ,,may ,,be ,,said ,,to ,,come ,,and ,,go4 ,as to individual souls1 they come from somewhere1 for they proceed from the universal ,soul2 they also have a place whither they may descend1 or where they may pass from one body into another2 they can likewise reascend thence to the intelligible world4 ,,the ,,universal ,,soul ,,ever ,,remains ,,in ,,the ,,intelligible4 ,the universal ,soul1 on the contrary1 ever resides in the elevated region where her nature retains her2 and the universe located below her participates in her just as the object which receives the sun's rays participates therein4 ,,how ,,the ,,soul ,,incarnates4 ,the individual soul is therefore illuminated when she turns towards what is above her2 for then she meets the essence2 on the contrary1 when she turns towards what is below her1 she meets non-being4 ,this is what happens when she turns towards herself2 on wishing to belong to herself1 she somehow falls into emptiness1 becomes indeterminate1 and produces what is below her1 namely1 an image of herself which is non-being 7the body74 ,now the image of this image 7matter71 is indeterminate1 and quite obscure2 for it is entirely unreasonable1 unintelligible1 and as far as possible from essence itself4 7,between intelligence and the body7 the soul occupies an intermediary region1 which is her own proper domain2 when she looks at the inferior region1 throwing a second glance thither1 she gives a form to her image 7her body72 and1 charmed by this image1 she enters therein4 ,,by ,,its ,,power1 ,,the ,,one ,,is ,,everywhere4 #d4 ,how does manifoldness issue from ,unity8 ,unity is everywhere2 for there is no place where it is not2 therefore it fills everything4 ,by ,him exists manifoldness2 or rather1 it is by ,him that all things exist4 ,if the ,one were only everywhere1 ,he would simply be all things2 but1 as1 besides1 ,he is nowhere1 all things exist by ,him1 because ,he is everywhere2 but simultaneously all things are distinct from ,him1 because ,he is nowhere4 ,why then is ,unity not only everywhere1 but also nowhere8 ,the reason is1 that ,unity must be above all things1 ,he must fill everything1 and produce everything1 without being all that ,he produces4 ,,the ,,soul ,,receives ,,her ,,form ,,from ,,intelligence4 #e4 ,the soul's relation to intelligence is the same as that of sight to the visible object2 but it is the indeterminate sight which1 before seeing1 is nevertheless disposed to see and think2 that is why the soul bears to intelligence the relation of matter to form4 ,,we ,,think ,,an ,,intellectual ,,nature ,,by ,,thinking ,,ourselves4 #f4 ,when we think1 and think ourselves1 we see a thinking nature2 otherwise1 we would be dupes of an illusion in believing we were thinking4 ,consequently1 if we think ourselves1 we are1 by thinking ourselves1 thinking an intellectual nature4 ,this thought presupposes an anterior thought which implies no movement4 ,now1 as the objects of thought are being and life1 there must be1 anterior to this being1 another being2 and anterior to this life1 another life4 ,this is well-known to all who are actualized intelligences4 ,if the intelligences be actualizations which consist in thinking themselves1 we ourselves are the intelligible by the real foundation of our essence1 and the thought that we have of ourselves gives us its image4 ,,the ,,one ,,is ,,superior ,,to ,,rest ,,and ,,motion4 #g4 ,the ,first 7or ,one7 is the potentiality of movement and of rest2 consequently1 ,he is superior to both things4 ,the ,second principle relates to the ,first by its motion and its rest2 it is ,intelligence1 because1 differing from the ,first1 it directs its thought towards ,him1 while the ,first does not think 7because ,he comprises both the thinking thing1 and the thing thought72 ,he thinks himself1 and1 by that very thing1 ,he is defective1 because ,his good consists in thinking1 not in its hypostasis 7or existence74 ,,of ,,actuality ,,and ,,potentiality4 #h4 ,what passes from potentiality to actuality1 and always remains the same so long as it exists1 approaches actuality4 ,it is thus that the bodies such as fire may possess perfection4 ,but what passes from potentiality to actuality cannot exist always1 because it contains matter4 ,on the contrary1 what exists actually1 and what is simple1 exists always4 ,besides1 what is actual may also in certain respects exist potentially4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,superior ,,to ,,thought2 ,,the ,,highest ,,divinities ,,are ,,not ,,the ,,supreme4 #i4 ,the divinities which occupy the highest rank are nevertheless not the ,first2 for ,intelligence 7from which proceed the divinities of the highest rank1 that is1 the perfect intelligences7 is 7or1 is constituted by7 all the intelligible essences1 and1 consequently1 comprises both motion and rest4 ,nothing like this is in the ,first4 ,he is related to nothing else1 while the other things subsist in ,him in their rest1 and direct their motion towards ,him4 ,motion is an aspiration1 and the ,first aspires to nothing4 ,towards what would ,he1 in any case1 aspire8 ,he does not think himself2 and they who say that ,he thinks ,himself mean by it only that ,he possesses ,himself4 ,but when one says that a thing thinks1 it is not because it possesses itself1 it is because it contemplates the ,first2 that is the first actuality1 thought itself1 the first thought1 to which none other can be anterior2 only1 it is inferior to the principle from which it derives its existence1 and occupies the second rank after it4 ,thought is therefore not the most sacred thing2 consequently1 not all thought is sacred2 the only sacred thought is that of the ,good1 and this 7,good7 is superior to thought4 ,,the ,,good ,,is ,,superior ,,even ,,to ,,self-,,consciousness ,,and ,,life4 ,will the ,good not be self-conscious8 ,it is claimed by some that the ,good would be good only if it possessed self-consciousness4 ,but if it be ,goodness1 it is goodness before having self-consciousness4 ,if the ,good be good only because it has self-consciousness1 it was not good before having self-consciousness2 but1 on the other hand1 if there be no goodness1 no possible consciousness can therefore exist4 7,likewise1 someone may ask7 does not the ,first live8 ,he cannot be said to live1 because ,he ,himself gives life4 ,,the ,,supreme ,,is ,,therefore ,,above ,,thought4 ,thus the principle which is self-conscious1 which thinks itself 7that is1 ,intelligence71 occupies only the second rank4 ,indeed1 if this principle be self-conscious1 it is only to unite itself to itself by this act of consciousness2 but if it study itself1 it is the result of ignoring itself1 because its nature is defective1 and it becomes perfect only by thought4 ,thought should therefore not be attributed to the ,first2 for1 to attribute something to ,him would be to imply that ,he had been deprived thereof1 and needed it4 ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,two4 ,about the ,movement of the ,heavens4 ,,questions ,,about ,,the ,,movements ,,of ,,the ,,heavens4 #a4 ,why do the heavens move in a circle8 ,because they imitate ,intelligence4 ,but to what does this movement belong8 ,to the ,soul1 or to the body8 ,does it occur because the ,soul is within the celestial sphere1 which tends to revolve about her8 ,is the ,soul within this sphere without being touched thereby8 ,does she cause this sphere to move by her own motion8 ,perhaps the ,soul which moves this sphere should not move it in the future1 although she did so in the past2 that is1 the soul made it remain immovable1 instead of ceaselessly imparting to it a circular movement4 ,perhaps the ,soul herself might remain immovable2 or1 if she move at all1 it will at least not be a local movement4 ,,three ,,kinds ,,of ,,movement4 ,how can the ,soul impart to the heavens a local movement1 herself possessing a different kind of motion8 ,perhaps the circular movement1 when considered by itself1 may not seem a local movement4 ,if then it be a local movement only by accident1 what is its own nature1 by itself8 ,it is the reflection upon itself1 the movement of consciousness1 of reflection1 of life2 it withdraws nothing from the world1 it changes the location of nothing1 while embracing all4 ,indeed1 the power which governs the universal ,animal 7or world7 embraces everything1 and unifies everything4 ,if then it remained immovable1 it would not embrace everything either vitally or locally2 it would not preserve the life of the interior parts of the body it possesses1 because the bodily life implies movement4 ,on the contrary1 if it be a local movement1 the ,soul will possess a movement only such as it admits of4 ,she will move1 not only as soul1 but as an animated body1 and as an animal2 her movement will partake both of the movement proper to the soul1 and proper to the body4 ,now the movement proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight line2 the movement proper to the ,soul1 is to contain2 while both of these movements result in a third1 the circular movement which includes both transportation and permanence4 ,,fire ,,moves ,,straight ,,only ,,preliminarily4 ,to the assertion that the circular movement is a corporeal movement1 it might be objected that one can see that every body1 even fire1 moves in a straight line4 ,however1 the fire moves in a straight line only till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal order 7it constitutes the heavens1 which are its proper place74 ,by virtue of this order its nature is permanent1 and it moves towards its assigned location4 ,why then does the fire as soon as it has arrived there1 not abide there quiescently8 ,because its very nature is constant movement2 if it went in a straight line1 it would dissipate2 consequently1 it necessarily possesses a circular motion4 ,that is surely a providential arrangement4 ,providence placed fire within itself 7because it constitutes the heavens1 which are its location72 so that1 as soon as it finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously move in a circle4 ,,why ,,soul ,,assumes ,a ,,circular ,,motion4 ,we might further say that1 if the fire tended to move in a straight line1 it must effect a return upon itself in the only place where it is possible 7in the heavens71 inasmuch as there is no place outside of the world where it could go4 ,in fact there is no further place1 beyond the celestial fire1 for itself constitutes the last place in the universe2 it therefore moves in a circle in the place at its disposal2 it is its own place1 but not to remain immovable1 but to move4 ,in a circle1 the centre is naturally immovable2 and were the circumference the same1 it would be only an immense centre4 ,it is therefore better that the fire should turn around the centre in this living and naturally organized body4 ,thus the fire will tend towards the centre1 not in stopping1 for it would lose its circular form1 but in moving itself around it2 thus only will it be able to satisfy its tendency 7towards the universal ,soul74 ,however1 if this power effect the movement of the body of the universe1 it does not drag it like a burden1 nor give it an impulsion contrary to its nature4 ,for nature is constituted by nothing else than the order established by the universal ,soul4 ,besides1 as the whole ,soul is everywhere1 and is not divided into parts1 it endows the sky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate1 which can occur only by traversing all of it4 ,if the ,soul remained immovable in one place1 she would remain immovable as soon as the heavens reached this place2 but as the ,soul is everywhere1 they would seek to reach her everywhere4 ,can the heavens never reach the ,soul8 ,on the contrary1 they reach her ceaselessly2 for the ,soul1 in ceaselessly attracting them to herself1 endues them with a continual motion by which she carries them1 not towards some other place1 but towards herself1 and in the same place1 not in a straight line1 but in a circle1 and thus permits them to possess her in all the places which she traverses4 ,,why ,,the ,,heavens ,,do ,,not ,,remain ,,still4 ,the heavens would be immovable if the ,soul rested1 that is1 if she remained only in the intelligible world1 where everything remains immovable4 ,but because the ,soul is in no one determinate place1 and because the whole of her is everywhere1 the heavens move through the whole of space2 and as they cannot go out of themselves1 they must move in a circle4 ,,how ,,other ,,beings ,,move4#cad #b4 ,how do the other beings move8 ,as none of them is the whole1 but only a part1 consequently1 each finds itself situated in a particular place4 ,on the contrary1 the heavens are the whole2 they constitute the place which excludes nothing1 because it is the universe4 ,as to the law according to which men move1 each of them1 considered in his dependence towards the universe1 is a part of all2 considered in himself1 he is a whole4 ,,why ,,the ,,heavens ,,move ,,in ,a ,,circle4 ,now1 if the heavens possess the ,soul1 wherever they are1 what urges them to move in a circle8 ,surely because the ,soul is not exclusively in a determinate place 7and the world does not exclusively in one place desire to possess her74 ,besides1 if the power of the ,soul revolve around the centre1 it is once more evident that the heavens would move in a circle4 ,,difference ,,between ,,the ,,centre ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,and ,,the ,,body4 ,besides1 when we speak of the ,soul1 we must not understand the term centre in the same sense as when it is used of the body4 ,for the ,soul1 the centre is the focus of 7the intelligence7 whence radiates a second life 7that is1 the ,soul72 as to the body1 it is a locality 7the centre of the world74 ,since1 however1 both soul and body need a centre1 we are forced to use this word in an analogous meaning which may suit both of them4 ,speaking strictly1 however1 a centre can exist only for a spherical body1 and the analogy consists in this1 that the latter1 like the ,soul1 effects a reflection upon itself4 ,in this case1 the ,soul moves around the divinity1 embraces ,him1 and clings to ,him with all her might2 for everything depends from ,him4 ,but1 as she cannot unite herself to ,him1 she moves around ,him4 ,,the ,,addition ,,of ,,our ,,bodies ,,introduces ,,conflicting ,,motions4 ,why do not all souls act like the universal ,soul8 ,they do act like her1 but do so only in the place where they are4 ,why do our bodies not move in a circle1 like the heavens8 ,because they include an element whose natural motion is rectilinear2 because they trend towards other objects1 because the spherical element#cae in us can no longer easily move in a circle1 because it has become terrestrial1 while in the celestial region is was light and movable enough4 ,how indeed could it remain at rest1 while the ,soul was in motion1 whatever this movement was8 ,this spirit7ual body7 which1 within us1 is spread around the soul1 does the same thing as do the heavens4 ,indeed1 if the divinity be in everything1 the ,soul1 which desires to unite herself to ,him1 must move around ,him1 since ,he resides in no determinate place4 ,consequently1 ,plato attributes to the stars1 besides the revolution which they perform in common with the universe1 a particular movement of rotation around their own centre4 ,indeed1 every star1 in whatever place it may be1 is transported with joy while embracing the divinity2 and this occurs not by reason1 but by a natural necessity4 ,,how ,,motion ,,is ,,imparted ,,to ,,lower ,,existences4 #c4 ,one more subject remains to be considered4 ,the lowest power of the universal ,soul 7the inferior soul71#caf rests on the earth1 and thence radiates abroad throughout the universe4 ,the 7higher1 or celestial7 power 7of the world-,soul7 which1 by nature1 possesses sensation1 opinion1 and reasoning1 resides in the celestial spheres1 whence it dominates the inferior power1 and communicates life to it4 ,it thereby moves the inferior power1 embracing it in a circle2 and it presides over the universe as it returns 7from the earth7 to the celestial spheres4 ,the inferior power1 being circularly embraced by the superior power1 reflects upon itself1 and thus operates on itself a conversion by which it imparts a movement of rotation to the body within which it reacts4 7,this is how motion starts7 in a sphere that is at rest3 as soon as a part moves1 the movement spreads to the rest of it1 and the sphere begins to revolve4 ,not otherwise is our body2 when our soul begins to move1 as in joy1 or in the expectation of welfare1 although this movement be of a kind very different from that natural to a body1 this soul-movement produces local motion in the body4 ,likewise the universal ,soul1 on high1 while approaching the ,good1 and becoming more sensitive 7to its proximity71 thereby impresses the body with the motion proper to it1 namely1 the local movement4 7,our own human7 sense-7faculty71 while receiving its good from above1 and while enjoying the pleasures proper to its nature1 pursues the ,good1 and1 inasmuch as the ,good is everywhere present1 it is borne everywhere4 ,the intelligence is moved likewise2 it is simultaneously at rest and in motion1 reflecting upon itself4 ,similarly the universe moves in a circle1 though simultaneously standing still4 ,,third ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,four4 ,of ,our ,individual ,guardian4 ,,outline ,,of ,,natures ,,in ,,the ,,universe4 ,other principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting their 7hypostases1 substantial acts1 or7 forms of existence4 ,the 7universal7 ,soul1 however1 is in motion while producing and exhibiting her 7substantial act1 or7 forms of existence1 namely1 the functions of sensation and growth1 reaching down as far as 7the sphere of the7 plants4 ,in us also does the ,soul function1 but she does not dominate us1 constituting only a part of our nature4 ,she does1 however1 dominate in plants1 having as it were remained alone there4 ,beyond that sphere1 however1 nature begets nothing2 for beyond it exists no life1 begotten 7matter7 being lifeless4 ,all that was begotten prior to this was shapeless1 and achieved form only by trending towards its begetting principle1 as to its source of life4 ,consequently1 that which is begotten cannot be a form of the ,soul1 being lifeless1 but must be absolute in determination4 ,the things anterior 7to matter1 namely1 the sense-power and nature71 are doubtless indeterminate1 but only so within their form2 the are not absolutely indeterminate2 they are indeterminate only in respect of their perfection4 ,on the contrary1 that which exists at present1 namely1 7matter71 is absolutely indeterminate4 ,when it achieves perfection1 it becomes body1 on receiving the form suited to its power4 ,this 7form7 is the receptacle of the principle which has begotten it1 and which nourishes it4 ,it is the only trace of the higher things in the body1 which occupies the last rank amidst the things below4 ,,after ,,death1 ,,man ,,becomes ,,what ,,he ,,has ,,lived4 #b4 ,it is to this 7universal7 ,soul especially that may be applied these words of ,plato3#cag ,the general ,soul cares for all that is inanimate4 ,the other 7individual7 souls are in different conditions4 ,the ,soul 7adds ,plato71 circulates around the heavens successively assuming divers forms2 that is1 the forms of thought1 sense or growth4 ,the part which dominates in the soul fulfills its proper individual function2 the others remain inactive1 and somehow seem exterior to them4 ,in man1 it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate4 ,they do indeed co-exist with the others4 ,neither is it always the best power 7reason71 which always dominates2 for the inferior powers equally have their place4 ,consequently1 man 7besides being a reasonable being7 is also a sensitive being1 because he possesses sense-organs4 ,in many respects1 he is also a vegetative being2 for his body feeds and grows just like a plant4 ,all these powers 7reason1 sensibility1 growth71 therefore act together in the man2 but it is the best of them that characterizes the totality of the man 7so that he is called a reasonable being74 ,on leaving the body the soul becomes the power she had preponderatingly developed4 ,let us therefore flee from here below1 and let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world1 so as not to fall into the pure sense-life1 by allowing ourselves to follow sense-images1 or into the life of growth1 by abandoning ourselves to the pleasures of physical love1 and to gormandizing2 rather1 let us rise to the intelligible world1 to the intelligence1 to the divinity6 ,,laws ,,of ,,transmigration4 ,those who have exercised their human faculties are re-born as men4 ,those who have made use of their senses only1 pass into the bodies of brutes1 and particularly into the bodies of wild animals1 if they have yielded themselves to the transports of anger2 so that1 even in this case1 the difference of the bodies they animate is proportioned to the difference of their inclinations4 ,those whose only effort it was to satisfy their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of lascivious and gluttonous animals4#cah ,last1 those who instead of following their desires or their anger1 have rather degraded their senses by their inertia1 are reduced to vegetate in plants2 for in their former existence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power1 and they worked at nothing but to make trees of themselves4#cai ,those who have loved too much the enjoyments of music1 and who otherwise lived purely1 pass into the bodies of melodious birds4 ,those who have reigned tyrannically1 become eagles1 if they have no other vice4#cbj ,last1 those who spoke lightly of celestial things1 having kept their glance directed upwards1 are changed into birds which usually fly towards the high regions of the air4#cba ,he who has acquired civil virtues again becomes a man2 but if he does not possess them to a sufficient degree1 he is transformed into a sociable animal1 such as the bee1 or other animal of the kind4 ,,our ,,guardian ,,is ,,the ,,next ,,higher ,,faculty ,,of ,,our ,,being4 #c4 ,what then is our guardian8 ,it is one of the powers of our soul4 ,what is our divinity8 ,it is also one of the powers of our soul4 7,is it the power which acts principally in us as some people think87 ,for the power which acts in us seems to be that which leads us1 since it is the principle which dominates in us4 ,is that the guardian to which we have been allotted during the course of our life8#cbc ,no3 our guardian is the power immediately superior to the one that we exercise1 for it presides over our life without itself being active4 ,the power which is active in us is inferior to the one that presides over our life1 and it is the one which essentially constitutes us4 ,if then we live on the plane of the sense-life1 our guardian is reason2 if we live on the rational plane1 our guardian will be the principal superior to reason 7namely1 intelligence72 it will preside over our life1 but it itself does not act1 leaving that to the inferior power4 ,plato truly said that we choose our guardian2 for1 by the kind of life that we prefer1 we choose the guardian that presides over our life4 ,why then does ,he direct us8 ,he directs us during the course of our mortal life 7because he is given to us to help us to accomplish our 7destiny72 but he can no longer direct us when our destiny is accomplished1 because the power over the exercise of which he presided allows another power to act in his place 7which however is dead1 since the life in which it acted is terminated74 ,this other power wishes to act in its turn1 and1 after having established its preponderance1 it exercises itself during the course of a new life1 itself having another guardian4 ,if then we should chance to degrade ourselves by letting an inferior power prevail in us1 we are punished for it4 ,indeed1 the evil man degenerates because the power which he has developed in his life makes him descend to the existence of the brute1 by assimilating him to it by his morals4 ,if we could follow the guardian who is superior to him1 he himself would become superior by sharing his life4 ,he would then take as guide a part of himself superior to the one that governs him1 then another part1 still more elevated until he had arrived at the highest4 ,indeed1 the soul is several things1 or rather1 the soul is all things2 she is things both inferior and superior2 she contains all the degrees of life4 ,each of us1 in a certain degree1 is the intelligible world2 by our inferior part we are related to the sense-world1 and by our superior part1 to the intelligible world2 we remain there on high by what constitutes our intelligible essence2 we are attached here below by the powers which occupy the lowest rank in the soul4 ,thus we cause an emanation1 or rather an actualization which implies no loss to the intelligible1 to pass from the intelligible into the sense-world4 ,,the ,,intelligible ,,does ,,not ,,descend2 ,,it ,,is ,,the ,,sense-,,world ,,that ,,rises4 #d4 ,is the power which is the act of the soul always united to a body8 ,no2 for when the soul turns towards the superior regions1 she raises this power with her4 ,does the universal 7,soul7 also raise with herself to the intelligible world the inferior power which is her actualization 7nature78 ,no3 for she does not incline towards her low inferior portion1 because she neither came nor descended into the world2 but1 while she remains in herself1 the body of the world comes to unite with her1 and to offer itself to receive her light's radiation2 besides1 her body does not cause her any anxiety1 because it is not exposed to any peril4 ,does not the world1 then1 possess any senses8 ,it has no sight 7says ,plato#cbd7 for it has no eyes4 ,neither has it ears1 nostrils1 nor tongue4 ,does it1 then1 as we1 possess the consciousness of what is going on within it8 ,as1 within the world1 all things go on uniformly according to nature1 it is1 in this respect1 in a kind of repose2 consequently1 it does not feel any pleasure4 ,the power of growth exists within it without being present therein2 and so also with the sense-power4 ,besides1 we shall return to a study of the question4 ,for the present1 we have said all that relates to the question in hand4 ,,the ,,guidance ,,of ,,the ,,guardian ,,does ,,not ,,interfere ,,with ,,moral ,,responsibility4 #e4 ,but if 7before coming on to the earth7 the soul chooses her life and her guardian1 how do we still preserve our liberty8 ,because what is called choice designates in an allegorical manner the character of the soul1 and her general disposition everywhere4 ,again1 it is objected that if the character of the soul preponderate1 if the soul be dominated by that part which her former life rendered predominantly active1 it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil2 for if the character of the soul be anterior to her union with the body2 if she have the character she has chosen2 if1 as said 7,plato71 she do not change her guardian1 it is not here below that a man may become good or evil4 ,the answer to this is1 that potentially man is equally good or evil4 7,by his choices7 however he may actualize one or the other4 ,,the ,,soul ,,has ,,the ,,power ,,to ,,conform ,,to ,,her ,,character ,,the ,,destiny ,,allotted ,,to ,,her4 ,what then would happen if a virtuous man should have a body of evil nature1 or a vicious man a body of a good nature8 ,the goodness of the soul has more or less influence on the goodness of the body4 ,exterior circumstances cannot thus alter the character chosen by the soul4 ,when 7,plato7 says that the lots are spread out before the souls1 and that later the different kinds of conditions are displayed before them1 and that the fortune of each results from the choice made amidst the different kinds of lives present--a choice evidently made according to her character--7,plato7 evidently attributes to the soul the power of conforming to her character the condition allotted to her4 ,,our ,,guardian ,,is ,,both ,,related ,,to ,,us1 ,,and ,,independent ,,of ,,us4 ,besides1 our guardian is not entirely exterior to us2 and1 on the other hand1 he is not bound to us1 and is not active in us2 he is ours1 in the sense that he has a certain relation with our soul2 he is not ours1 in the sense that we are such men1 living such a life under his supervision4 ,this is the meaning of the terms used 7by ,plato7 in the ,timaeus4#cbe ,if these be taken in the above sense1 all explains itself2 if not1 ,plato contradicts himself4 ,,our ,,guardian ,,helps ,,us ,,to ,,carry ,,out ,,the ,,destiny ,,we ,,have ,,chosen4 ,one can still understand thus why he says that our guardian helps us to fulfil the destiny we have chosen4 ,in fact1 presiding over our life1 he does not permit us to descend very far below the condition we have chosen4 ,but that which then is active is the principle below the guardian and which can neither transcend him1 nor equal him2 for he could not become different from what he is4 ,,that ,,man ,,is ,,virtuous ,,whose ,,highest ,,principle ,,is ,,active ,,within ,,him4 #f4 ,who then is the virtuous man8 ,he in whom is active the highest part of the soul4 ,if his guardian contributed to his actions1 he would not deserve being called virtuous4 ,now it is the ,intelligence which is active in the virtuous man4 ,it is the latter1 then1 who is a guardian1 or lives according to one2 besides1 his guardian is the divinity4 ,is this guardian above ,intelligence8 ,yes1 if the guardian have1 as guardian1 the principle superior to ,intelligence 7the ,good74 ,but why does the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the beginning8 ,because of the trouble he felt in falling into generation4 ,even before the exercise of reason1 he has within him a desire which leads him to the things which are suitable to him4 ,but does this desire direct with sovereign influence8 ,no1 not with sovereignty2 for the soul is so disposed that1 in such circumstances becoming such1 she adopts such a life1 and follows such an inclination4 ,,between ,,incarnations ,,is ,,the ,,time ,,of ,,judgment ,,and ,,expiation4 7,plato7 says that the guardian leads the soul to the hells1#cbf and that he does not remain attached to the same soul1 unless this soul should again choose the same condition4 ,what does the guardian do before this choice8 ,plato teaches us that he leads the soul to judgment1 that after the generation he assumes again the same form as before2 and then as if another existence were then beginning1 during the time between generations1 the guardian presides over the chastisements of the souls1 and this period is for them not so much a period of life1 as a period of expiation4 ,,even ,,the ,,souls ,,entering ,,into ,,animal ,,bodies ,,have ,a ,,guardian4 ,do the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also have a guardian8 ,yes1 doubtless1 but an evil or stupid one4 ,,condition ,,of ,,souls ,,in ,,the ,,higher ,,regions4 ,what is the condition of the souls that have raised themselves on high8 ,some are in the sensible world1 others are outside of it4 ,the souls that are in the sense-world dwell in the sun1 or in some other planet1 or in the firmament1 according as they have more or less developed their reason4 ,we must1 indeed1 remember that our soul contains in herself not only the intelligible world1 but also a disposition conformable to the ,soul of the world4 ,now as the latter is spread out in the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere by her various powers1 our soul must possess powers conformable to these1 each of which exercise their proper function4 ,the souls which rise from here below into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmonizes with their moral life1 and with the power which they have developed2 with their divinity1 or their guardian4 ,then they will have either the same guardian1 or the guardian which is superior to the power which they exert4 ,this matter will have to be considered more minutely4 ,,fate ,,of ,,the ,,divisible ,,human ,,soul4 ,as to the souls which have left the sense-world1 so long as they remain in the intelligible world1 they are above the guardian condition1 and the fatality of generation4 ,souls bring with them thither that part of their nature which is desirous of begetting1 and which may reasonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible in the body1 and which multiplies by dividing along with the bodies4 ,moreover1 if a soul divide herself1 it is not in respect to extension2 because she is entirely in all the bodies4 ,on the other hand1 the ,soul is one2 and from a single animal are ceaselessly born many young4 ,this generative element splits up like the vegetative nature in plants2 for this nature is divisible in the bodies4 ,when this divisible essence dwells in the same body1 it vivifies the body1 just as the vegetative power does for plants4 ,when it retires1 it has already communicated life1 as is seen in cut trees1 or in corpses where putrefaction has caused the birth of several animals from a single one4 ,besides1 the vegetative power of the human soul is assisted by the vegetative power that is derived from the universal 7,soul71 and which here below is the same 7as on high74 ,,fate ,,consists ,,in ,,the ,,unpredictable ,,circumstances ,,which ,,alter ,,the ,,life-,,currents4 ,if the soul return here below1 she possesses1 according to the life which she is to lead1 either the same guardian1 or another4 ,with her guardian she enters into this world as if in a skiff4 ,then she is subjected to the power 7by ,plato7 called the ,spindle of ,necessity2#cbg and1 embarking in this world1 she takes the place assigned to her by fortune4 ,then she is caught by the circular movement of the heavens1 whose action1 as if it were the wind1 agitates the skiff in which the soul is seated2 or rather1 is borne along4 ,thence are born varied spectacles1 transformations and divers incidents for the soul which is embarked in this skiff2 whether because of the agitation of the sea which bears it1 or because of the conduct of the passenger who is sailing in the bark1 and who preserves her freedom of action therein4 ,indeed1 not every soul placed in the same circumstances makes the same movements1 wills the same volitions1 or performs the same actions4 ,for different beings1 therefore1 the differences arise from circumstances either similar or different1 or even the same events may occur to them under different circumstances4 ,it is this 7uncertainty7 that constitutes ,providence4 ,,first ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,nine4 ,of ,suicide4 ,,evil ,,effects ,,of ,,suicide ,,on ,,the ,,soul ,,herself4 #a4 7,as says pseudo-,zoroaster1 in his ,magic ,oracles71 ,the soul should not be expelled from the body by violence1 lest she go out 7dragging along with her something foreign1 that is1 corporeal74 ,in this case1 she will be burdened with this foreign element whithersoever she may emigrate4 ,by emigrating1 ,i mean passing into the ,beyond4 ,on the contrary1 one should wait until the entire body naturally detaches itself from the soul2 in which case she no longer needs to pass into any other residence1 being completely unburdened of the body4 ,,how ,,to ,,detach ,,the ,,soul ,,from ,,the ,,body ,,naturally4 ,how will the body naturally detach itself from the soul8 ,by the complete rupture of the bonds which keep the soul attached to the body1 by the body's impotence to fetter the soul1 on account of the complete destruction of the harmony which conferred this power on it4 ,,voluntary ,,soul-,,detachment ,,is ,,forbidden4 ,one may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the fetters of the body4 ,when violence is employed1 it is not the body which disengages itself from the soul1 it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself from the body1 and that by an action which accomplishes itself not in the state of impassibility 7which suits a sage71 but as the result of grief1 or suffering1 or of anger4 ,now such an action is forbidden1 or unworthy4 ,,suicide ,,unavailable ,,even ,,to ,,avoid ,,insanity4 ,may one not forestall delirium or insanity1 if one become aware of their approach8 ,to begin with1 insanity does not happen to a sage1 and if it does1 this accident should be considered one of those inevitable things which depend from fatality1 and in which case one should direct one's path less according to his intrinsic quality than according to circumstances2 for perhaps the poison one might select to eject the soul from the body might do nothing but injure the soul4 ,,suicide ,,is ,,unadvisable1 ,,for ,,two ,,reasons4 ,if there be an appointed time for the life of each of us1 it is not well to forestall the decree of ,providence1 unless1 as we have said1#cbh under absolute compulsion4 ,last1 if rank obtained above depend on the state obtaining at the time of exit from the body1 no man should separate himself from it so long as he might still achieve progress4#cbi ,,second ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,six4 ,of ,essence and ,being4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,essence ,,and ,,being4 #a4 ,is essence something different from being8 ,does essence indicate an abstraction of the other 7four categories71 and is being1 on the contrary1 essence with the other 7four categories71 motion and rest1 identity and difference8 ,are these the elements of being8 ,yes3 being is the totality of these things1 of which one is essence1 the other is motion1 and so forth4 ,motion1 therefore1 is accidental essence4 ,is it also accidental being8 ,or is it being completely8 ,motion is being1 because all intelligible things are beings4 ,but why is not each of the sense-things a being8 ,the reason is1 that on high all things form only a single group of totality1 while here below they are distinct one from another because they are images that have been distinguished4 ,likewise1 in a seminal 7reason71 all things are together1 and each of them is all the others2 the hand is not distinct from the head2 while1 on the contrary1 in a body all the organs are separate1 because they are images instead of being genuine beings4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,complements ,,of ,,being1 ,,and ,,qualities4 ,we may now say that1 in the intelligible world1 qualities are the characteristic differences in being or essence4 ,these differences effect distinction between the beings2 in short1 they cause them to be beings4 ,this definition seems reasonable4 ,but it does not suit the qualities below 7in the sense-world72 some are differences of being1 as biped1 or quadruped 7as thought ,aristotle72#ccj others are not differences1 and on that very account are called qualities4 ,still1 the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of the being1 and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a complement of the being1 but an accident3 as1 for instance1 whiteness is a complement of being in a swan1 or in white lead2 but in a human being like you1 it is only an accident 7as thought ,aristotle74#cca ,so long as the whiteness is in the 7seminal7 reason1 it is a complement of being1 and not a quality2 if it be on the surface of a being1 it is a quality4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,essential ,,and ,,modal ,,qualities4 ,two kinds of qualities must be distinguished2 the essential quality1 which is a peculiarity of its being1 and the mere quality1 which affects the being's classification4 ,the mere quality introduces no change in the essence1 and causes none of its characteristics to disappear2 but1 when the being exists already1 and is complete1 this quality gives it a certain exterior disposition2 and1 whether in the case of a soul or body1 adds something to it4 ,thus visible whiteness1 which is of the very being of white lead1 is not of the being of the swan1 because a swan may be of some color other than white4 ,whiteness then completes the being of white lead1 just as heat completes the being of fire4 ,if igneousness is said to be the being of fire1 whiteness is also the being of white lead4 ,nevertheless1 the igneousness of the visible fire is heat1 which constitutes the complement of its being2 and whiteness plays the same part with respect to white lead4 ,therefore 7differing according to the difference of various beings7 the same things will be complements of being1 and will not be qualities1 or they will not be complements of being1 and will be qualities2 but it would not be reasonable to assert that these qualities are different according to whether or not they are complements of being1 since their nature is the same4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,whatness ,,and ,,affections ,,of ,,being4 ,we must acknowledge that the reasons which produce these things 7as heat1 and whiteness7 are beings1 if taken in their totality2 but on considering their production1 we see that what constitutes a whatness or quiddity 7the ,aristotelian what it were to be7 in the intelligible world1 becomes a quality in the sense-world4 ,consequently1 we always err on the subject of the quiddity1 when we try to determine it1 mistaking the simple quality for it 7as thought ,plato71#ccb for1 when we perceive a quality1 the fire is not what we call fire1 but a being4 ,as to the things which arrest our gaze1 we should distinguish them from the quiddity1 and define them by the qualities of sense 7objects72 for they do not constitute the being1 but the affections of being4 ,,actualized ,,being ,,less ,,perfect ,,than ,,essence4 ,we are thus led to ask how a being can be composed of non-beings8 ,it has already been pointed out that the things subject to generation could not be identical with the principles from which they proceed4 ,let us now add that they could not be beings4 ,but still1 how can one say that the intelligible being is constituted by a non-being8 ,the reason is that in the intelligible world since being forms a purer and more refined essence1 being really is somehow constituted by the differences of essence2 or rather1 we feel it ought to be called being from considering it together with its energies 7or1 actualizations74 ,this being seems to be a perfecting of essence2 but perhaps being is less perfect when it is thus considered together with its actualizations2 for1 being less simple1 it veers away from essence4 ,,suchness ,,is ,,later ,,than ,,being ,,and ,,quiddity4 #b4 ,let us now consider what quality in general is2 for when we shall know this1 our doubts will cease4 ,first1 must it be admitted that one and the same thing is now a quality1 and then a complement of being8 ,can one say that quality is the complement of being1 or rather of such a being8 ,the suchness of being implies a previously existing being and quiddity4 ,,being ,,cannot ,,precede ,,such ,,being4 ,taking the illustration of fire1 is it mere being before it is such being8 ,in this case1 it would be a body4 ,consequently1 the body will be a being2 fire will be a hot body4 ,body and heat combined will not constitute being2 but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the property of having a stub nose 7as said ,aristotle74#ccc ,consequently1 if we abstract heat1 shine and lightness1 which seem to be qualities1 and also impenetrability1 nothing will remain but tridimensional extension1 and matter will be being4 ,but this hypothesis does not seem likely2 it is rather form which will be being4 ,,form ,,is ,,not ,a ,,quality2 ,,but ,a ,,reason4 ,is form a quality8 ,no3 form is a reason4 ,now what is constituted by 7material7 substance1 and reason8 7,in the warm body7 it is neither what burns1 nor what is visible2 it is quality4 ,if1 however1 it be said that combustion is an act emanating from reason1 that being hot and white are actualities1 we could not find anything to explain quality4 ,,qualities ,,are ,,acts ,,of ,,being1 ,,proceeding ,,from ,,reasons ,,and ,,essential ,,potentialities4 ,what we call a complement of being should not be termed a quality1 because they are actualizations of being1 actualizations which proceed from the reasons and the essential potentialities4 ,qualities are therefore something outside of being2 something which does not at times seem to be1 and at other times does not seem not to be qualities2 something which adds to being something that is not necessary2 for example1 virtues and vices1 ugliness and beauty1 health1 and individual resemblance4 ,though triangle1 and tetragon1 each considered by itself1 are not qualities2 yet being transformed into triangular appearance is a quality2 it is not therefore triangularity1 but triangular formation1 which is a quality4 ,the same could be said of the arts and professions4 ,consequently1 quality is a disposition1 either adventitious or original1 in already existing beings4 ,without it1 however1 being would exist just as much4 ,it might be said that quality is either mutable or immutable2 for it forms two kinds1 according to whether it be permanent or changeable4 ,,difference ,,between ,,intelligible ,,and ,,sense-,,quality4 #c4 ,the whiteness that ,i see in you is not a quality1 but an actualization of the potentiality of whitening4 ,in the intelligible world all the things that we call qualities are actualizations4 ,they are called qualities because they are properties1 because they differentiate the beings from each other1 because in respect to themselves they bear a particular character4 ,but since quality in the sense-world is also an actualization1 in what does it differ from the intelligible quality8 ,the sense-quality does not show the essential quality of every being1 nor the difference or character of substances1 but simply the thing that we properly call quality1 and which is an actualization in the intelligible world4 ,when the property of something is to be a being1 this thing is not a quality4 ,but when reason separates beings from their properties1 when it removes nothing from them1 when it limits itself to conceiving and begetting different from these beings1 it begets quality1 which it conceives of as the superficial part of being4 ,in this case1 nothing hinders the heat of the fire1 so far as it is natural to it1 from constituting a form1 an actualization1 and not a quality of the fire2 it is a quality when it exists in a substance where it no longer constitutes the form of being1 but only a trace1 an adumbration1 an image of being1 because it finds itself separated from the being whose actualization it is4 ,,qualities ,,are ,,accidental ,,shapes ,,of ,,being4 ,qualities1 therefore1 are everything that1 instead of being actualizations and forms of beings1 are only its accidents1 and only reveal its shapes4 ,we will therefore call qualities the habituations and the dispositions which are not essential to substances4 ,the archetypes 7or models7 of qualities are the actualizations of the beings1 which are the principles of these qualities4 ,it is impossible for the same thing at one time to be1 and at another not to be a quality4 ,what can be separated from being is quality2 what remains united to being is being1 form1 and actualization4 ,in fact1 nothing can be the same in itself1 and in some other condition where it has ceased to be form and an actualization4 ,what1 instead of being the form of a being1 is always its accident1 is purely and exclusively a quality4 ,,fifth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,seven4 ,do ,ideas of ,individuals ,exist8 ,,two ,,possible ,,hypotheses ,,of ,,ideas ,,of ,,individuals4 #a4 ,do ideas of individuals 7as well as of classes of individuals71 exist8 ,this means that if ,i1 in company with some other man1 were to trace ourselves back to the intelligible world1 we would there find separate individual principles corresponding to each of us4 7,this might imply either of two theories47 ,either1 if the individual named ,socrates be eternal1 and if the soul of ,socrates be ,socrates himself1 then the soul of each individual is contained in the intelligible world4 ,or if1 on the contrary1 the individual named ,socrates be not eternal1 if the same soul can belong successively to several individuals1 such as ,socrates or ,pythagoras1 then 7as ,alcinoous1 e4 g41 and other ,platonists insist71 each individual does not have his idea in the intelligible world4 ,,the ,,first 7,,non-,,platonic7 ,,hypothesis ,,alone ,,right4 ,if the particular soul of each man contains 7seminal7 reasons of all the things she does1 then each individual corresponds to his idea in the intelligible world1 for we admit that each soul contains as many 7seminal7 reasons as the entire world4 ,in this case1 the soul would contain not only the 7seminal7 reasons of men but also those of all animals1 the number of these reasons will be infinite1 unless 7as the ,stoics teach7 the world does not re-commence the identical series of existences in fixed periods2 for the only means of limiting the infinity of reasons1 is that the same things should reproduce themselves4 ,,difference ,,of ,,things ,,depend ,,on ,,their ,,seminal ,,reasons4 ,but1 if produced things may be more numerous than their specimens1 what would be the necessity for the reasons and specimens of all individuals begotten during some one period8 ,it would seem that the 7idea of7 the man himself to explain the existence of all men1 and that the souls of a finite number of them could successively animate men of an infinite number4 7,to this contention we demur3 for7 it is impossible for different things to have an identical 7seminal7 reason4 ,the 7idea of7 the man himself would not1 as model1 suffice 7to account7 for men who differ from each other not only by matter1 but also by specific differences4 ,they cannot be compared to the images of ,socrates which reproduce their model4 ,only the difference of the 7seminal7 reasons could give rise to individual differences4 7,as ,plato said71#ccd the entire period contains all the 7seminal7 reasons4 ,when it recommences1 the same things rearise through the same reasons4 ,we need not fear that1 as a consequence1 there would be an infinite 7number or variety7 of them in the intelligible world2 for the multitude 7of the seminal reasons7 constitutes an indivisible principle from which each issues forth whenever active4 ,,sex ,,alone ,,would ,,not ,,account ,,for ,,this ,,diversity4 #b4 7,first objection73 ,the manner in which the 7seminal7 reasons of the male and female unite1 in the act of generation1 suffices to account for the diversity of individuals1 without implying that each of them possesses its own 7seminal7 reason4 ,the generating principle1 the male1 for example1 will not propagate according to different 7seminal7 reasons1 since it possesses all of them1 but only according to its own1 or those of its father4 ,since it possesses all of the 7seminal7 reasons1 nothing would hinder it from begetting according to different reasons1 only1 there are always some which are more disposed to act than are others4 ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,diversity ,,from ,,same ,,parents 7,second objection73 ,please explain how differing individuals are born from the same parents4 ,this diversity1 if it be anything more than merely apparent1 depends on the manner in which the two generating principles concur in the act of generation2 at one time the male predominates1 at other times1 the female2 again1 they may both act equally4 ,in either case1 the 7seminal7 reason is given in its entirety1 and dominates the matter furnished by either of the generating principles4 ,,variety ,,may ,,depend ,,on ,,the ,,latency ,,of ,,part ,,of ,,seminal ,,reasons4 7,third objection73 ,what then is the cause of the difference of the individuals conceived in some other place 7than the womb1 as in the mouth71 7as ,aristotle#cce and ,sextus ,empiricus#ccf asked78 ,would it arise from matter being penetrated by the 7seminal7 reason in differing degrees8 ,in this case1 all the individuals1 except one1 would be beings against nature 7which1 of course1 is absurd74 ,the varieties of the individuals are a principle of beauty2 consequently1 form cannot be one of them2 ugliness alone should be attributed to the predominance of matter4 ,in the intelligible world1 the 7seminal7 reasons are perfect1 and they are not given any less entirely for being hidden4 ,,leibnitz',s ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,indiscernibles4 7,fourth objection73 ,granting that the 7seminal7 reasons of the individuals are different1 why should there be as many as there are individuals which achieve existence in any one period8 ,it is possible that identical reasons might produce individuals differing in external appearance2 and we have even granted that this may occur when the 7seminal7 reasons are given entirely4 ,it is asked1 is this possible when the same reasons are developed8 ,we teach that absolutely similar things might be reproduced in different periods2 but1 within the same period1 there is nothing absolutely identical4 ,,there ,,are ,,different ,,ideas ,,for ,,twins1 ,,brethren1 ,,or ,,works ,,of ,,art4 #c4 7,fifth objection73 ,but how could 7seminal7 reasons be different in the conception of twins1 and in the act of generation in the case of animals who procreate multiple offspring8 ,here it would seem that when the individuals are similar1 there could be but one single reason4 ,no so2 for in that case there would not be so many reasons as there are individuals2 and1 on the contrary1 it will have to be granted that there are as many as there are individuals that differ by specific differences1 and not by a mere lack of form4 ,nothing therefore hinders us from admitting that there are different reasons1 even for animal offspring which show no difference1 if there were such4 ,an artist who produces similar works cannot produce this resemblance without introducing in it some difference which depends on reasoning2 so that every work he produces differs from the others1 because he adds some difference to the similarity4 ,in nature1 where the difference does not derive from reasoning1 but only from differing 7seminal7 reasons the 7individual7 difference will have to be added to the specific form1 even though we may not be able to discern it4 ,the 7seminal7 reason would be different if generation admitted chance as to quantity 7the number of offspring begotten74 ,but if the number of things to be born is determinate1 the quantity will be limited by the evolution and development of all the reasons1 so that1 when the series of all things will be finished1 another period may recommence4 ,the quantity suitable to the world1 and the number of beings who are to exist therein1 are things regulated and contained in the principle which contains all the reasons 7that is1 the universal ,soul71 from the very beginning4 ,,first ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,two4 ,concerning ,virtue4 ,,virtue ,,the ,,road ,,to ,,escape ,,evils4 #a4 ,man must flee from 7this world7 here below 7for two reasons73 because it is the nature of the soul to flee from evil1 and because inevitable evil prevails and dominates this world here below4 ,what is this flight 7and how can we accomplish it78 7,plato71#ccg tells us it consists in being assimilated to divinity4 ,this then can be accomplished by judiciously conforming to justice1 and holiness2 in short1 by virtue4 ,,can ,,these ,,virtues ,,be ,,ascribed ,,to ,,the ,,divinity8 ,if then it be by virtue that we are assimilated 7to divinity71 does this divinity to whom we are trying to achieve assimilation1 ,himself possess virtue8 ,besides1 what divinity is this8 ,surely it must be ,he who must most seem to possess virtue1 the world-,soul1 together with the principle predominating in her1 whose wisdom is most admirable 7supreme ,intelligence7--for it is quite reasonable that we should be assimilated to ,him4 ,nevertheless1 one might1 unreflectingly1 question whether all virtues might suit this divinity2 whether1 for instance1 moderation in his desires1 or courage could be predicated of ,him2 for1 as to courage1 nothing can really harm ,him1 and ,he therefore has nothing to fear2 and as to moderation1 no pleasant object whose presence would excite ,his desires1 or whose absence would in ,him awaken regrets1 could possibly exist4 ,but inasmuch as the divinity1 just as we ourselves1 aspires to intelligible things1 ,he is evidently the source of our gracious sanity and virtues4 ,so we are forced to ask ourselves1 ,does the divinity possess these virtues8 ,,homely ,,virtues ,,assimilate ,,us ,,to ,,divinity ,,only ,,partially4 ,it would not be proper to attribute to ,him the homely 7or1 civil7 virtues1 such as prudence1 which relates to the rational part of our nature2 courage1 which relates to our irascible part2 temperance1 which consists of the harmonious consonance of our desires and our reason2 last1 of justice1 which consists in the accomplishment by all these faculties of the function proper to each of them1 whether to command1 or to obey1 7as said ,plato#cch74 ,but if we cannot become assimilated to the divinity by these homely virtues1 that process must demand similarly named virtues of a superior order4 ,however1 these homely virtues would not be entirely useless to achieve that result1 for one cannot say that while practising them one does not at all resemble the divinity as they who practise them are reputed to be godlike4 ,these lower virtues do therefore yield some resemblance to the divinity1 but complete assimilation can result only from virtues of a higher order4 ,,the ,,divine ,,need ,,not ,,possess ,,the ,,lower ,,virtues ,,by ,,which ,,we ,,are ,,assimilated ,,to ,,him4 ,virtues1 even if they be not homely1 are therefore ultimately ascribed 7to the divinity74 ,granting that the divinity does not possess the homely virtues1 we may still become assimilated to ,him by other virtues for with virtues of another order the case might differ4 ,therefore1 without assimilating ourselves to the divinity by homely virtues we might nevertheless by means of virtues which still are ours1 become assimilated to the ,being which does not possess virtue4 ,this may be explained by an illustration4 ,when a body is warmed by the presence of fire1 the fire itself need not be heated by the presence of another fire4 ,it might be argued that there was heat in the fire1 but a heat that is innate4 ,reasoning by analogy1 the virtue1 which in the soul is only adventitious1 is innate in ,him from whom the soul derives it by imitation2 7in other words1 the cause need not necessarily possess the same qualities as the effect74 ,our argument from heat might however be questioned1 inasmuch as the divinity really does possess virtue1 though it be of a higher nature4 ,this observation would be correct1 if the virtue in which the soul participates were identical with the principle from which she derives it4 ,but there is a complete opposition2 for when we see a house1 the sense-house is not identical with the intelligible ,house1 though possessing resemblance thereto4 ,indeed1 the sense-house participates in order and proportion1 though neither order1 proportion1 nor symmetry could be attributed to the idea of the ,house4 ,likewise1 we derived from the divinity order1 proportion and harmony1 which1 here below1 are conditions of virtue1 without thereby implying that the divinity ,himself need possess order1 proportion1 or harmony4 ,similarly1 it is not necessary that ,he possess virtue1 although we become assimilated to ,him thereby4 ,such is our demonstration that human assimilation to the divine ,intelligence by virtue does not 7necessarily imply7 7in the divine ,intelligence itself7 possession of virtue4 ,mere logical demonstration thereof is not1 however1 sufficient2 we must also convince4 ,,there ,,are ,,two ,,kinds ,,of ,,resemblance4 #b4 ,let us first examine the virtues by which we are assimilated to the divinity1 and let us study the identity between our soul-image which constitutes virtue1 and supreme ,intelligence's principle which1 without being virtue1 is its archetype4 ,there are two kinds of resemblance3 the first entails such identity of nature as exists when both similar things proceed from a same principle2 the second is that of one thing to another which precedes it1 as its principle4 ,in the latter case1 there is no reciprocity1 and the principle does not resemble that which is inferior to it2 or rather1 the resemblance must be conceived entirely differently4 ,it does not necessitate that the similar objects be of the same kind2 it rather implies that they are of different kinds1 inasmuch as they resemble each other differently4 ,,how ,,homely ,,virtues ,,may ,,assimilate ,,man ,,to ,,the ,,supreme4 7,it is difficult to define7 what is virtue1 in general or in particular4 ,to clear up the matter1 let us consider one particular kind of virtue3 then it will be easy to determine the common essence underlying them all4 ,the above-mentioned homely virtues really render our souls gracious1 and improve them1 regulating and moderating our appetites1 tempering our passions1 delivering us from false opinions1 limiting us within just bounds1 and they themselves must be determined by some kind of measure4 ,this measure given to our souls resembles the form given to matter1 and the proportion of intelligible things2 it is as it were a trace of what is most perfect above4 ,what is unmeasured1 being no more than formless matter1 cannot in any way resemble divinity4 ,the greater the participation in form1 the greater the assimilation to the formless2 and the closer we get to form1 the greater the participation therein4 ,thus our soul1 whose nature is nearer to divinity and more kindred to it than the body is1 thereby participates the more in the divine1 and increases that resemblance enough to make it seem that the divinity is all that she herself is4 ,thus arises the deception1 which represents her as the divine divinity1 as if her quality constituted that of the divinity4 ,thus are men of homely virtues assimilated to the divinity4 ,,plato ,,distinguishes ,,between ,,the ,,homely ,,and ,,the ,,higher ,,virtues4 #c4 ,we will now1 following 7,plato71#cci speak of another kind of assimilation as the privilege of a higher virtue4 ,we will thus better understand the nature of homely virtues1 and the higher virtues1 and the difference between them4 ,plato is evidently distinguishing two kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation to the divinity consists in fleeing from 7the world7 here below2 when he adds the qualification homely to the virtues relating to social life2 and when in another place he asserts#cdj that all virtues are processes of purification2 and it is not to the homely virtues that he attributes the power of assimilating us to the divinity4 ,,how ,,virtues ,,purify4 ,how then do the virtues purify8 ,how does this process of purification bring us as near as possible to the divinity8 ,so long as the soul is mingled with the body1 sharing its passions and opinions1 she is evil4 ,she becomes better1 that is1 she acquires virtues1 only when1 instead of agreeing with the body1 she thinks by herself 7this is true thought1 and constitutes prudence72 when she ceases to share its passions 7in other words1 temperance72 when she no longer fears separation from the body 7a state called courage72 and last1 when reason and intelligence can enforce their command 7or justice74 ,,self-,,control ,,is ,,assimilation ,,to ,,the ,,divinity4 ,we may therefore unhesitatingly state that the resemblance to the divinity lies in such regulation1 in remaining impassible while thinking intelligible things2 for what is pure is divine and the nature of the divine action is such that whatever imitates it thereby possesses wisdom4 ,but it is not the divinity that possesses such a disposition1 for dispositions are the property of souls only4 ,besides1 the soul does not think intelligible objects in the same manner as the divinity2 what is contained in the divinity is contained within us in a manner entirely different1 or even perhaps is not at all contained4 ,for instance1 the divinity's thought is not at all identical with ours2 the divinity's thought is a primary principle from which our thought is derived and differs4 ,as the vocal word is only the image of the interior reason#cda of the soul1 so also is the word of the soul only the image of the ,word of a superior principle2 and as the exterior word1 when compared to the interior reason of the soul1 seems discrete1 or divided1 so the reason of the soul1 which is no more than the interpreter of the intelligible word1 is discrete1 in comparison with the latter4 ,thus does virtue belong to the soul without belonging either to absolute ,intelligence1 nor to the ,principle superior to ,intelligence4 ,,purification ,,produces ,,conversion2 ,,and ,,virtue ,,makes ,,use ,,of ,,this4 #d4 ,purification may be either identical with the above-defined virtue1 or virtue may be the result of purification4 ,in this case1 does virtue consist of the actual process of purification1 or in the already purified condition8 ,this is our problem here4 ,the process of purification is inferior to the already purified condition2 for purity is the soul's destined goal4 7,negative7 purity is mere separation from extraneous things2 it is not yet 7positive7 possession of its prize4 ,if the soul had possessed goodness before losing her purity1 mere purification would be sufficient2 and even in this case the residuum of the purification would be the goodness1 and not the purification4 ,what is the residuum8 ,not goodness2 otherwise1 the soul would not have fallen into evil4 ,the soul therefore possesses the form of goodness1 without however being able to remain solidly attached thereto1 because her nature permits her to turn either to the good1 or the evil4 ,the good of the soul is to remain united to her sister intelligence2 her evil1 is to abandon herself to the contrary things4 ,after purifying the soul1 therefore1 she must be united to the divinity2 but this implies turning her towards ,him4 ,now this conversion does not begin to occur after the purification1 but is its very result4 ,the virtue of the soul1 therefore1 does not consist in her conversion1 but in that which she thereby obtains4 ,this is the intuition of her intelligible object2 its image produced and realized within herself2 an image similar to that in the eye1 an image which represents the things seen4 ,it is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess this image1 nor had any reminiscence thereof2 she no doubt possessed it1 but inactively1 latently1 obscurely4 ,to clarify it1 to discover her possessions1 the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness4 ,as1 however1 the soul possesses only the images of the intelligibles1 without possessing the intelligibles themselves1 she will be compelled to compare with them her own image of them4 ,easily does the soul contemplate the intelligibles1 because the intelligence is not foreign to her2 when the soul wishes to enter in relations with them1 all the soul needs to do is to turn her glance towards them4 ,otherwise1 the intelligence1 though present in the soul1 will remain foreign to her4 ,this explains how all our acquisitions of knowledge are foreign to us 7as if non-existent71 while we fail to recall them4 ,,the ,,limit ,,of ,,purification ,,is ,,that ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,self-,,control4 #e4 ,the limit of purification decides to which 7of the three hypostases of7 divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself2 therefore we shall have to consider that limit4 ,to decide that would be to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress anger1 appetites1 and passions of all kinds1 to triumph over pain and similar feelings--in short1 to separate her from the body4 ,this occurs when1 recollecting herself from the various localities over which she had1 as it were1 spread herself1 she retires within herself2 when she estranges herself entirely from the passions1 when she allows the body only such pleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains1 to recuperate from its fatigues1 and in avoiding its becoming importunate2 when she becomes insensible to sufferings2 or1 if that be beyond her power1 in supporting them patiently1 and in diminishing them by refusing to share them2 when she appeases anger as far as possible1 even suppressing it entirely1 if possible2 or at least1 if that be impossible1 not participating therein2 abandoning to the animal nature all unthinking impulses1 and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements2 when she is absolutely inaccessible to fear1 having nothing left to risk2 and when she represses all sudden movements1 except nature's warning of dangers4 ,evidently1 the purified soul will have to desire nothing shameful4 ,in eating and drinking1 she will seek only the satisfaction of a need1 while remaining foreign to it2 nor will she seek the pleasures of love2 or1 if she does1 she will not go beyond the exactions of nature1 resisting every unconsidered tendency1 or even in remaining within the involuntary flights of fancy4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,reason ,,is ,,suggestive4 ,in short1 the soul will be pure from all these passions1 and will even desire to purify our being's irrational part so as to preserve it from emotions1 or at least to moderate their number and intensity1 and to appease them promptly by her presence4 ,so would a man1 in the neighborhood of some sage1 profit thereby1 either by growing similar to him1 or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might disapprove4 ,this 7suggestive7 influence of reason will exert itself without any struggle2 its mere presence will suffice4 ,the inferior principle will respect it to the point of growing resentful against itself1 and reproaching itself for its weakness1 if it feel any agitation which might disturb its master's repose4 ,,the ,,goal ,,of ,,purification ,,is ,,second ,,divinity1 ,,intelligence4 #f4 ,a man who has achieved such a state no longer commits such faults2 for he has become corrected4 ,but his desired goal is not to cease failing1 but to be divine4 ,in case he still allows within himself the occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflecting impulses1 he will be simultaneously divinity and guardian1 a double being2 or rather1 he will contain a principle of another nature 7,intelligence71 whose virtue will likewise differ from his4 ,if1 however1 he be not troubled by any of those motions1 he will be wholly divine2 he will be one of those divinities who 7as ,plato said7#cdb form the attending escort of the ,first4 ,it is a divinity of such a nature that has come down from above to dwell in us4 ,to become again what one was originally1 is to live in this superior world4 ,he who has achieved that height dwells with pure ,intelligence1 and assimilates himself thereto as far as possible4 ,consequently1 he feels none of those emotions1 nor does he any more commit any actions1 which would be disapproved of by the superior principle who henceforth is his only master4 ,,the ,,higher ,,virtues ,,merge ,,into ,,wisdom4 ,for such a being the separate virtues merge4 ,for him1 wisdom consists in contemplating the 7essences7 possessed by ,intelligence1 and with which ,intelligence is in contact4 ,there are two kinds of wisdom1 one being proper to intelligence1 the other to the soul2 only in the latter may we speak of virtue4 ,in the ,intelligence exists only the energy 7of thought71 and its essence4 ,the image of this essence1 seen here below in a being of another nature1 is the virtue which emanates from it4 ,in ,intelligence1 indeed1 resides neither absolute justice1 nor any of those genuinely so-called virtues2 nothing is left but their type4 ,its derivative in the soul is virtue2 for virtue is the attribute of an individual being4 ,on the contrary1 the intelligible belongs to itself only1 and is the attribute of no particular being4 ,,incarnate ,,justice ,,is ,,individual2 ,,if ,,absolute1 ,,it ,,is ,,indivisible4 ,must justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in fulfilling its proper function8 ,surely1 as long as it inheres in a principle with several parts 7such as a human soul1 in which several functions may be distinguished72 but its essence lies in the accomplishment of the function proper to every being1 even when inhering in a unitary principle 7such as ,intelligence74 ,absolute and veritable ,justice consists in the self-directed action of an unitary ,principle1 in which no parts can be distinguished4 ,,the ,,higher ,,forms ,,of ,,the ,,virtues4 ,in this higher realm1 justice consists in directing the action of the soul towards intelligence2 temperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards intelligence2 courage is the 7suggestive fascination7 or impassibility1 by which the soul becomes similar to that which it contemplates2 since it is natural for intelligence to be impassible4 ,now the soul derives this impassibility from the virtue which hinders her from sharing the passions of the lower principle with which she is associated4 ,,even ,,the ,,lower ,,virtues ,,are ,,mutually ,,related4 #g4 ,within the soul the virtues have the same interconnection obtaining within ,intelligence between the types superior to virtue4 ,for ,intelligence1 it is thought that constitutes wisdom and prudence2 conversion towards oneself is temperance2 the fulfillment of one's proper function is justice1 and the intelligence's perseverance in remaining within itself1 in maintaining itself pure and separated from matter1 is analogous to courage4 ,to contemplate intelligence will therefore1 for the soul1 constitute wisdom and prudence1 which then become virtues1 and no longer remain mere intellectual types4 ,for the soul is not identical with the essences she thinks1 as is intelligence4 ,similarly1 the other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior types4 ,it is not otherwise with purification1 for since every virtue is a purification1 virtue exacts preliminary purification2 otherwise1 it would not be perfect4 ,,the ,,higher ,,virtues ,,imply ,,the ,,lower2 ,,but ,,not ,,conversely4 ,the possessor of the higher virtues necessarily possesses the potentiality for the inferior virtues2 but the possessor of the lower does not1 conversely1 possess the higher4 ,such are the characteristics of the virtuous man4 ,,prudence ,,to ,,decide ,,whether ,,it ,,is ,,possible ,,to ,,possess ,,virtues ,,unsymmetrically8 7,many interesting questions remain74 ,is it possible for a man to possess the higher or lower virtues in accomplished reality1 or otherwise 7merely theoretically78 ,to decide that1 we would have individually to examine each1 as1 for example1 prudence4 ,how could such a virtue exist merely potentially1 borrowing its principles from elsewhere8 ,what would happen if one virtue advanced naturally to a certain degree1 and another virtue to another8 ,what would you think of a temperance which would moderate certain 7impulses71 while entirely suppressing others8 ,similar questions might be raised about other virtues1 and the arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have attained would have to be prudence4 ,,the ,,homely ,,virtues ,,must ,,be ,,supplemented ,,by ,,divine ,,discontent4 ,no doubt1 under certain circumstances1 the virtuous man1 in his actions1 will make use of some of the lower1 or homely virtues2 but even so he will supplement them by standards or ideas derived from higher virtues4 ,for instance1 he will not be satisfied with a temperance which would consist in mere moderation1 but he will gradually seek to separate himself more and more from matter4 ,again1 he will supplement the life of a respectable man1 exacted by common-sense homely virtues2 he will be continually aspiring higher1 to the life of the divinities2 for our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere respectability1 but to the gods themselves4 ,to seek no more than to become assimilated to respectable individuals would be like trying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image1 itself modelled after another image 7but not copying the original74 ,the assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a superior being4 ,,first ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,three4 ,of ,dialectic1 or the ,means of ,raising the ,soul to the ,intelligible ,world4 ,,search ,,for ,a ,,demonstration ,,of ,,divinity ,,such ,,that ,,the ,,demonstration ,,itself ,,will ,,deify4 #a4 ,what method1 art or study will lead us to the goal we are to attain1 namely1 the ,good1 the first ,principle1 the ,divinity1#cdc by a demonstration which itself can serve to raise the soul to the superior world8 ,,methods ,,differ ,,according ,,to ,,individuals2 ,,but ,,there ,,are ,,chiefly ,,two4 ,he who is to be promoted to that world should know everything1 or at least1 as says 7,plato71#cdd he should be as learned as possible4 ,in his first generation he should have descended here below to form a philosopher1 a musician1 a lover4 ,that is the kind of men whose nature makes them most suitable to be raised to the intelligible world4 ,but how are we going to raise them8 ,does a single method suffice for all8 ,does not each of them need a special method8 ,doubtless4 ,there are two methods to follow3 the one for those who rise to the intelligible world from here below1 and the other for those who have already reached there4 ,we shall start by the first of these two methods2 then comes that of the men who have already achieved access to the intelligible world1 and who have1 so to speak1 already taken root there4 ,even these must ceaselessly progress till they have reached the summit2 for one must stop only when one has reached the supreme term4 ,,return ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,of ,,the ,,philosopher1 ,,musician ,,and ,,lover4 ,the latter road of progress must here be left aside 7to be taken up later71#cde to discuss here fully the first1 explaining the operation of the return of the soul to the intelligible world4 ,three kinds of men offer themselves to our examination3 the philosopher1 the musician1 and the lover4 ,these three must clearly be distinguished1 beginning by determining the nature and character of the musician4 ,,how ,,the ,,musician ,,rises ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 ,the musician allows himself to be easily moved by beauty1 and admires it greatly2 but he is not able by himself to achieve the intuition of the beautiful4 ,he needs the stimulation of external impressions4 ,just as some timorous being is awakened by the least noise1 the musician is sensitive to the beauty of the voice and of harmonies4 ,he avoids all that seems contrary to the laws of harmony and of unity1 and enjoys rhythm and melodies in instrumental and vocal music4 ,after these purely sensual intonations1 rhythm and tunes1 he will surely in them come to distinguish form from matter1 and to contemplate the beauty existing in their proportions and relations4 ,he will have to be taught that what excites his admiration in these things1 is their intelligible harmony1 the beauty it contains1 and1 in short1 beauty absolute1 and not particular4 ,he will have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments that will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored1 though he possessed them instinctively4 ,such arguments will be specified elsewhere4#cdf ,,how ,,the ,,lover ,,rises ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible4 #b4 ,the musician can rise to the rank of the lover1 and either remain there1 or rise still higher4 ,but the lover has some reminiscence of the beautiful2 but as here below he is separated 7from it1 he is incapable of clearly knowing what it is74 ,charmed with the beautiful objects that meet his views1 he falls into an ecstasy4 ,he must therefore be taught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body1 but1 by reason1 to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty2 showing him what is identical in all1 informing him that it is something alien to the bodies1 which comes from elsewhere1 and which exists even in a higher degree in the objects of another nature2 citing1 as examples1 noble occupations1 and beautiful laws4 ,he will be shown that beauty is found in the arts1 the sciences1 the virtues1 all of which are suitable means of familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things4 ,he will then be made to see that beauty is one1 and he will be shown the element which1 in every object1 constitutes beauty4 ,from virtues he will be led to progress to intelligence and essence1 while from there he will have nothing else to do but to progress towards the supreme goal4 ,,how ,,the ,,philosopher ,,rises ,,to ,,the ,,intelligible ,,world4 #c4 ,the philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to the intelligible world4 ,borne on by light wings1 he rushes thither without needing to learn to disengage himself from sense-objects1 as do the preceding men4 ,his only uncertainty will concern the road to be followed1 all he will need will be a guide4 ,he must therefore be shown the road2 he must be helped to detach himself entirely from sense-objects1 himself already possessing1 as he does1 the desire1 being since a long while already detached therefrom by his nature4 ,for this purpose he will be invited to apply himself to mathematics1 so as to accustom him to think of incorporeal things1 to believe in their existence4 ,being desirous of instruction1 he will learn them easily2 as1 by his nature1 he is already virtuous1 he will need no more than promotion to the perfection of virtue4 ,after mathematics1 he will be taught dialectics1 which will perfect him4 ,,what ,,dialectics ,,is4 #d4 ,what then is this dialectics1 knowledge of which must be added to mathematics8 ,it is a science which makes us capable of reasoning about each thing1 to say what it is1 in what it differs from the others1 in what it resembles them1 where it is1 whether it be one of the beings1 to determine how many veritable beings there are1 and which are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable essence4 ,this science treats also of good and evil2 of everything that is subordinated to 7being71 the ,good1 and to its contrary2 of the nature of what is eternal1 and transitory4 ,it treats of each matter scientifically1 and not according to mere opinion4 ,instead of wandering around the sense-world1 it establishes itself in the intelligible world2 it concentrates its whole attention on this world1 and after having saved our soul from deceit1 dialectics pastures our soul in the meadow of truth1#cdg 7as thought ,plato74 ,then it makes use of the ,platonic method of division to discern ideas1 to define each object1 to rise to the several kinds of essences#cdh 7as thought ,plato72 then1 by thought concatenating all that is thence derived1 dialectics continues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain of the intelligible4 ,then1 by reversing1 dialectics returns to the very ,principle from which first it had started out4#cdi ,resting there1 because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find rest1 no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects1 because it has arrived at unity1 dialectics considers its logic1 which treats of propositions and arguments4 ,this logic is an art subordinate to dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought4 ,in logic1 dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary1 and others as constituting preparatory exercises4 ,then1 along with everything else1 subjecting these principles to its criticism1 it declares some of them useful1 and others superfluous1 or merely technical4 ,,dialectics ,,is ,,the ,,highest ,,part ,,of ,,philosophy4 #e4 ,whence does this science derive its proper principles8 ,intelligence furnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of receiving4 ,having discovered and achieved these principles1 dialectics puts their consequences in order4 ,dialectics composes1 and divides1 till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things2 for according to 7,plato71#cej dialectics is the purest application of intelligence and wisdom4 ,in this case1 if dialectics be the noblest exercise of our faculties1 it must exercise itself with essence and the highest objects4 ,wisdom studies existence1 as intelligence studies that which is still beyond existence 7the ,one1 or the ,good74 ,but is not philosophy also that which is most eminent8 ,surely4 ,but there is no confusion between philosophy and dialectics1 because dialectics is the highest part of philosophy4 ,it is not 7as ,aristotle thought7 merely an instrument for philosophy1 nor 7as ,epicurus thought7 made up of pure speculations and abstract rules4 ,it studies things themselves1 and its matter is the 7real7 beings4 ,it reaches them by following a method which yields reality as well as the idea4 ,only accidentally does dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms4 ,dialectics considers them alien to its mission1 and as produced by a foreign principle4 ,whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced1 dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains4 ,dialectics1 however1 does not care for propositions1 which1 to it1 seem only mere groupings of letters4 ,nevertheless1 because it knows the truth1 dialectics also understands propositions1 and1 in general1 the operations of the soul4 ,dialectics knows what it is to affirm1 to deny1 and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions4 ,further1 dialectics distinguishes differences from identities1 grasping the truth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the senses2 but dialectics leaves to another science1 that enjoys those details1 the care of treating them with exactness4 ,,the ,,various ,,branches ,,of ,,philosophy ,,crowned ,,by ,,dialectics4 #f4 ,dialectics1 therefore1 is only one part of philosophy1 but the most important4 ,indeed1 philosophy has other branches4 ,first1 it studies nature 7in physics71 therein employing dialectics1 as the other arts employ arithmetic1 though philosophy owes far more to dialectics4 ,then philosophy treats of morals1 and here again it is dialectics that ascertains the principles2 ethics limits itself to building good habits thereon1 and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good habits4 ,the 7,aristotelian7 rational virtues also owe to dialectics the principles which seem to be their characteristics2 for they chiefly deal with material things 7because they moderate the passions74 ,the other virtues#cea also imply the application of reason to the passions and actions which are characteristic of each of them4 ,however1 prudence applies reason to them in a superior manner4 ,prudence deals rather with the universal1 considering whether the virtues concatenate1 and whether an action should be done now1 or be deferred1 or be superseded by another#ceb 7as thought ,aristotle74 ,now it is dialectics1 or its resultant science of wisdom which1 under a general and immaterial form1 furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs4 ,,without ,,dialectics ,,lower ,,knowledge ,,would ,,be ,,imperfect4 ,could the lower knowledge not be possessed without dialectics or wisdom8 ,they would1 at least1 be imperfect and mutilated4 ,on the other hand1 though the dialectician1 that is1 the true sage1 no longer need these inferior things1 he never would have become such without them2 they must precede1 and they increase with the progress made in dialectics4 ,virtues are in the same case4 ,the possessor of natural virtues may1 with the assistance of wisdom1 rise to perfect virtues4 ,wisdom1 therefore1 only follows natural virtues4 ,then wisdom perfects the morals4 ,rather1 the already existing natural virtues increase and grow perfect along with wisdom4 ,whichever of these two things precedes1 complements the other4 ,natural virtues1 however1 yield only imperfect views and morals2 and the best way to perfect them1 is philosophic knowledge of the principles from which they depend4 ,,fourth ,,ennead1 ,,book ,,two4 ,how the ,soul ,mediates ,between ,indivisible and ,divisible ,essence4 ,,outline ,,of ,,the ,,psychological ,,study ,,of ,,iv4 #g4 #a4 ,while studying the nature 7being7 of the soul1 we have shown 7against the ,stoics7 that she is not a body2 that1 among incorporeal entities1 she is not a harmony 7against the ,pythagoreans72 we have also shown that she is not an entelechy 7against ,aristotle71 because this term1 as its very etymology implies1 does not express a true idea1 and reveals nothing about the soul's 7nature itself72 last1 we said that the soul has an intelligible nature1 and is of divine condition2 the being or nature of the soul we have also1 it would seem1 clearly enough set forth4 ,still1 we have to go further4 ,we have formerly established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature1 assigning the soul to the intelligible world4 ,granting this1 that the soul forms part of the intelligible world1 we must1 in another manner1 study what is suitable to her nature4 ,,existence ,,of ,,divisible ,,beings4 ,to begin with1 there are 7beings7 which are quite divisible and naturally separable4 ,no one part of any one of them is identical with any other part1 nor with the whole1 of which each part necessarily is smaller than the whole4 ,such are sense-magnitudes1 or physical masses1 of which each occupies a place apart1 without being able to be in several places simultaneously4 ,,description ,,of ,,indivisible ,,essence4 ,on the other hand1 there exists another kind of essence 7being71 whose nature differs from the preceding 7entirely divisible beings71 which admits of no division1 and is neither divided nor divisible4 ,this has no extension1 not even in thought4 ,it does not need to be in any place1 and is not either partially or wholly contained in any other being4 ,if we dare say so1 it hovers simultaneously over all beings1 not that it needs to be built up on them1#cec but because it is indispensable to the existence of all4 ,it is ever identical with itself1 and is the common support of all that is below it4 ,it is as in the circle1 where the centre1 remaining immovable in itself1 nevertheless is the origin of all the radii originating there1 and drawing their existence thence4 ,the radii by thus participating in the existence of the centre1 the radii's principle1 depend on what is indivisible1 remaining attached thereto1 though separating in every direction4#ced ,,between ,,them ,,is ,,an ,,indivisible ,,essence ,,which ,,becomes ,,divisible ,,within ,,bodies4 ,now between entirely indivisible 7,being7 which occupies the first rank amidst intelligible beings1 and the 7essence7 which is entirely divisible in its sense-objects1 there is1 above the sense-world1 near it1 and within it1 a being of another nature1 which is not1 like bodies1 completely divisible1 but which1 nevertheless1 becomes divisible within bodies4 ,consequently1 when you separate bodies1 the form within them also divides1 but in such a way that it remains entire in each part4 ,this identical 7essence71 thus becoming manifold1 has parts that are completely separated from each other2 for it then is a divisible form1 such as colors1 and all the qualities1 like any form which can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely separate1 at a distance1 and foreign to each other because of the different ways in which they are affected4 ,we must therefore admit that this form 7that resides in bodies7 is also divisible4 ,,by ,,procession ,,the ,,soul ,,connects ,,the ,,two4 ,thus the absolutely divisible 7essence7 does not exist alone2 there is another one located immediately beneath it1 and derived from it4 ,on one hand1 this inferior 7essence7 participates in the indivisibility of its principle2 on the other1 it descends towards another nature by its procession4 ,thereby it occupies a position intermediary between indivisible and primary 7essence71 7that is1 intelligence71 and the divisible 7essence7 which is in the bodies4 ,besides it is not in the same condition of existence as color and the other qualities2 for though the latter be the same in all corporeal masses1 nevertheless the quality in one body is completely separate from that in another1 just as physical masses themselves are separate from each other4 ,although 7by its essence7 the magnitude of these bodies be one1 nevertheless that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community of affection which constitutes sympathy1#cee because to identity is added difference4 ,this is the case because identity is only a simple modification of bodies1 and not a being4 ,on the contrary1 the nature that approaches the absolutely indivisible ,being is a genuine being 7such as is the soul74 ,it is true that she unites with the bodies and consequently divides with them2 but that happens to her only when she communicates herself to the bodies4 ,on the other hand1 when she unites with the bodies1 even with the greatest and most extended of all 7the world71 she does not cease to be one1 although she yield herself up to it entirely4 ,,division ,,as ,,the ,,property ,,of ,,bodies1 ,,but ,,not ,,the ,,characteristic ,,of ,,soul4 ,in no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body2 for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts1 of which each is different from the others1 and occupies a different place4 ,nor does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of the qualities4 ,thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and indivisible1 and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being continuous 7of which each part is external to every other72 it is divisible1 because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies1 but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body1 and in each of its parts4#cef ,when we thus consider the nature of the soul1 we see her magnitude and power1 and we understand how admirable and divine are these and superior natures4 ,without any extension1 the soul is present throughout the whole of extension2 she is present in a location1 though she be not present therein4#ceg ,she is simultaneously divided and undivided1 or rather1 she is never really divided1 and she never really divides2 for she remains entire within herself4 ,if she seem to divide1 it is not in relation with the bodies1 which1 by virtue of their own divisibility1 cannot receive her in an indivisible manner4 ,thus division is the property of the body1 but not the characteristic of the soul4 ,,soul ,,as ,,both ,,essentially ,,divisible ,,and ,,indivisible4 #b4 ,such then the nature of the soul had to be4 ,she could not be either purely indivisible1 nor purely divisible1 but she necessarily had to be both indivisible and divisible1 as has just been set forth4 ,this is further proved by the following considerations4 ,if the soul1 like the body1 have several parts differing from each other1 the sensation of one part would not involve a similar sensation in another part4 ,each part of the soul1 for instance1 that which inheres in the finger1 would feel its individual affections1 remaining foreign to all the rest1 while remaining within itself4 ,in short1 in each one of us would inhere several managing souls 7as said the ,stoics74#ceh ,likewise1 in this universe1 there would be not one single soul 7the universal ,soul71 but an infinite number of souls1 separated from each other4 ,,polemic ,,against ,,the ,,stoic ,,predominating ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 ,shall we have recourse to the 7,stoic7 continuity of parts#cei to explain the sympathy which interrelates all the organs8 ,this hypothesis1 however1 is useless1 unless this continuity eventuate in unity4 ,for we cannot admit1 as do certain 7,stoic7 philosophers1 who deceive themselves1 that sensations focus in the predominating principle by relayed transmission4#cfj ,to begin with1 it is a wild venture to predicate a predominating principle of the soul4 ,how indeed could we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein8 ,by what superiority1 quantity or quality are we going to distinguish the predominating part in a single continuous mass8 ,further1 under this hypothesis1 we may ask1 ,who is going to feel8 ,will it be the predominating part exclusively1 or the other parts with it8 ,if that part exclusively1 it will feel only so long as the received impression will have been transmitted to itself1 in its particular residence2 but if the impression impinge on some other part of the soul1 which happens to be incapable of sensation1 this part will not be able to transmit the impression to the 7predominating7 part that directs1 and sensation will not occur4 ,granting further that the impression does reach the predominating part itself1 it might be received in a twofold manner2 either by one of its 7subdivided7 parts1 which1 having perceived the sensation1 will not trouble the other parts to feel it1 which would be useless2 or1 by several parts simultaneously1 and then we will have manifold1 or even infinite sensations which will all differ from each other4 ,for instance1 the one might say1 ,it is ,i who first received the impression2 the other one might say1 ,i received the impression first received by another2 while each1 except the first1 will be in ignorance of the location of the impression2 or again1 each part will make a mistake1 thinking that the impression occurred where itself is4 ,besides1 if every part of the soul can feel as well as the predominating part1 why at all speak of a predominating part8 ,what need is there for the sensation to reach through to it8 ,how indeed would the soul recognize as an unity the result of multiple sensations2 for instance1 of such as come from the ears or eyes8 ,,the ,,soul ,,has ,,to ,,be ,,both ,,one ,,and ,,manifold1 ,,even ,,on ,,the ,,stoic ,,hypotheses4 ,on the other hand1 if the soul were absolutely one1 essentially indivisible and one within herself1 if her nature were incompatible with manifoldness and division1 she could not1 when penetrating into the body1 animate it in its entirety2 she would place herself in its centre1 leaving the rest of the mass of the animal lifeless4 ,the soul1 therefore1 must be simultaneously one and manifold1 divided and undivided1 and we must not deny1 as something impossible1 that the soul1 though one and identical1 can be in several parts of the body simultaneously4 ,if this truth be denied1 this will destroy the nature that contains and administers the universe 7as said the ,stoics72 which embraces everything at once1 and directs everything with wisdom2 a nature that is both manifold1 because all beings are manifold2 and single1 because the principle that contains everything must be one4 ,it is by her manifold unity that she vivifies all parts of the universe1 while it is her indivisible unity that directs everything with wisdom4 ,in the very things that have no wisdom1 the unity that in it plays the predominating part1 imitates the unity of the universal ,soul4 ,that is what ,plato wished to indicate allegorically by these divine words#cfa3 ,from the ,being that is indivisible and ever unchanging2 and from the being which becomes divisible in the bodies1 the divinity formed a mixture1 a third kind of being4 ,the 7universal7 ,soul1 therefore1 is 7as we have just said7 simultaneously one and manifold2 the forms of the bodies are both manifold and one2 the bodies are only manifold2 while the supreme ,principle 7the ,one71 is exclusively an unity4 ,paragraph #c of this book 7iv4 #b1--ba7 will be found in its logical position--judging by the subject matter1--on pages #ge to #gh1 in the middle of iv4 #g1--b4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,see #g4 #b ,see vi4 #g1 #h4 #c ,a4,d4 #bfb4 #d ,see vi4 #e1 #a4 #e ,see #bj4 #f iii4 #d4 #g ,see above1 #f4 #h ,see iv4 #b4 #i ,often quoted by ,porphyry in his ,cave of the ,nymphs4 #aj ,see #c4 #aa ,euseb4 ,prep4 ,ev4 xi4 #b2 xv4 #d-i1 #ab-ac4 #ab ,see #c4 #ac ,see ii4 #c2 iii4 #a1 #b1 #d4 #ad ,see v4 #e4 #ae ,this suggests that ,suidas was right in claiming that ,amelius was the teacher of ,porphyry4 #af ,see #aa4 #ag ,see #g4 #ah ,see #c4 #ai ,see #c4 #bj ,mentioned in ,porphyry's ,life of ,pythagoras1 #dh1 living under ,nero4 #ba ,living under ,tiberius1 see ,suetonius1 ,life of ,tiberius1 #ad4 #bb ,see vi4 #e4 #bc ,see #ag4 #bd ,see #ah4 #be ,see #ag4 #bf ,see ii4 #c4 #ag4 #bg ,see #bc4 #bh ,the fragments of all this are probably the ,principles of the ,theory of the ,intelligibles1 by ,porphyry4 #bi ,see ii4 #a4 #cj ,see i4 #c4 #ca ,as pilot1 perhaps1 iv4 #c4 #ba4 #cb ,see ii41 #d4 #f4 #cc ,see ii4 #g4 #a4 #cd ,see i4 #a4 #aj4 #ce ,see i4 #i4 #h4 #aj4 #cf ,see iv4 #c4 #bj1 #ba4 #cg ,ecl4 ,phys41 p4 #gig1 ,heeren and ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 i4 #b4 #ch ,see ,nemesius1 de ,nat4 ,hom4 #b4 #ci ,see ii4 #g1 #a4 #dj ,see ii4 #g1 #c4 #da ,stob4 ,ecl4 ,phys4 #gig4 #db ,see ii4 #c1 #e4 #dc ,see ii4 #g1 #a4 #dd ii4 #d1 #g4 #de ,see iv4 #g1 #h4 #df ,euseb41 ,prep4 ,ev4 xv4 #ag4 #dg p4 #ed1 ,cousin4 #dh ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #i4 #di ,ecl4 ,phys4 #gig1 ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 iii4 #ad4 #ej ,see ii4 #d1 #a4 'ps echon4' of ,dikearchus and ,aristoxenus4 #ea ,see ii4 #f1 on 'logos4' #eb ,see v4 #g1 #c4 #ec iii4 #b4 #ed ,see iv4 #b1 #b4 #ee iv4 #b1 #a4 #ef ,plutarch1 de ,placitis ,philosoph1 iii4 #h4 ,the ,stoic definition of sensation being that senses are spirits stretched 7by relays with tension7 from the directing principle to the organs4 #eg de ,nat4 ,hom4 #b4 #eh ,see iv4 #d1 #bc4 ,in the words of ,zeno1 as1 for the ,stoics1 the principal act of the intelligence was comprehensive vision1 phantasia kataleptike4 #ei de ,anima1 iii4 #d1 #e4 #fj de ,anima1 i4 #c4 #fa de ,anim4 ,arist4 i4 #b4 #fb ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #i4 #fc ,see ii4 #d1 #a4 #fd ,see iv4 #g1 #e4 #fe ,see ii4 #d1 #a4 #ff de ,nat4 ,hom4 #b4 #fg ,see ii4 #g4 #fh ,see ii4 #g1 #a4 #fi ,nat4 ,hom4 #b4 #gj ,see ii4 #d1 #af4 #ga ,as thought ,chrysippus1 in ,plutarch1 de ,stoic4 ,repugnant4 #gb ,see ii4 #d1 #af4 #gc ,met4 xii4 #f2 see ii4 #e1 #c4 #gd iv4 #g1 #c4 #ge ,from end of iv4 #b1 #c4 #gf ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #a4 #gg ,arist4 de ,anima1 ii4 #b2 iii4 #e4 #gh ,see ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 i4 #e4 #gi ,see ,aristotle1 de ,anima1 ii4 #b4 #hj ,here we resume ,ennead ,,iv4 ,book #g4 ,the bracketed numbers are those of the ,teubner text2 the unbracketed those of the ,didot edition4 #ha ,page #bii1 ,cousin4 #hb ,quoted in i4 #a1 #ab1 in ,republic x4 #hc ,see i4 #a1 #aa4 #hd ,see i4 #f1 #i4 #he ,see viii4 #fb4 #hf ,see i4 #f1 #e4 #hg ,page #big1 ,cousin4 #hh ,see iv4 #h1 #e4 #hi ,pages #bjf1 #cab1 #cac1 ,cousin4 #ij ,see iv4 #h1 #h4 #ia ,see iv4 #h1 #f1 #g4 #ib ,see i4 #a1 #aa4 #ic ,see iv4 #e1 #g4 #id ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #ab-af4 #ie ,such as ,porphyry's ,philosophy derived from ,oracles4 #if ,plato1 in ,diog4 ,laert41 iii4 #hc4 #ig ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #ah1 #cg4 #ih ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #ab1 #ah2 de ,divinat1 i4 #eh4 #ii ,chrysippus1 in ,cicero1 de ,fato1 #aj4 #ajj ,cicero1 de ,finibus1 i4 #f4 #aja ,cicero1 de ,natura ,deorum1 i4 #be4 #ajb ,stobeus1 ,ecl4 ,phys4 i4 #f1 p4 #agh4 #ajc ,aulus ,gellius1 ,noctes ,attic1 vi4 #b4 #ajd ,as thought the ,stoics1 ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #aa4 #aje ,cicero1 de ,divinatione1 ii4 #dd4 #ajf ,as thought ,plato1 in the ,phaedo1 ,c#ha4 #ajg ,see i4 #f4h4 #ajh ,see i4 #c4a4 #aji ,see i4 #c4 #aaj ,see i4 #f4b4 #aaa ,see i4 #f4f4 #aab ,see i4 #f4i1 and the ,philebus of ,plato1 ,c#fd4 #aac ,as suggested in the ,phaedo of ,plato4 #aad ,see ii4 #d4f4 #aae ,the rational soul and intelligence1 see iii4 #i4e4 #aaf ,see ii4 #i4ab2 iv4 #d4ad4 #aag ,see ii4 #c4ag4 #ah2 ii4 #i4b1 #c2 vi4 #d4i4 #aah ,a pun on reason1 or logos1 i4 #f4b2 ii4 #c4af2 ii4 #d4c2 ii4 #f4b2 ii4 #g4c4 #aai ,see iv4 #d4ajab4 #abj ,far from the truth2 see iii4 #h4c4 #g4 #aba ,stoics1 see iv4 #g4h4 #abb ,or ,stoic form of inorganic objects4 #abc ,the form of lower living beings4 #abd ,the form of human nature4 #abe ,see iv4 #g4ad4 #abf ,parmenides1 see v4 #a4h4 #abg ,as ,plato hints in his ,cratylos1 ,c#ej1 by a pun between soma and sozesthai4 #abh ,the later theological saved4 #abi ,see ,aristotle1 de ,gen4 i4 #ah4 #acj ,by ,stoics4 #aca ,see iii4 #h4a-c4 #acb ,see v4 #e4a4 #acc ,see v4 #a4d4 #acd ,in ,greek a pun on eidos and idea4 #acd;a ,this sentence might well be translated as follows3 ,when therefore thought 7meets7 the essentially one1 the latter is the form1 and the former the idea4 ,while this version seems more literal1 it makes no connected sense with what follows4 #ace ,see iv4 #i4e4 #acf ,see iii4 #i4a4 #acg ,see iii4 #i4a4 #ach ,the universal ,soul4 #aci ,timaeus1 ,c#ci4 #adj ,see iii4 #i4a4 #ada ,see iii4 #g4aj4 #adb ,see ii4 #g4b4 #adc ,to form1 see i4 #f4b4 #add ,as thought ,plato1 in his ,republic1 x4 #ade ,as thought ,plato in ,gorgias1 ,c#dfd4 #adf vi4 #g4 #adg vi4 #g4 #adh ,or1 so that it may contain the intelligence which is one1 as its own actualization4 #adi ,see iv4 #c4i-ag4 #aej ,in the ,cratylus1 ,c#djj4 #aea ,as in the ,phaedo1 ,c#fb4 #aeb ,republic1 vii1 ,c#ead4 #aec ,see ,jamblichus1 ,cave of the ,nymphs1 #h4 #aed ,procession1 or rising4 #aee ,c#bdf4 #aef ,of the universe4 #aeg ,c#cd4 #aeh ,timaeus1 ,c#cj4 #aei ,the ,creator1 who is the universal ,soul4 #afj ,see iv4 #c4i-aa4 #afa ,see iv4 #c4ag4 #afb ,as thought ,plato in his ,phaedrus1 ,c#bdf4 #afc ,the ,first belongs to the principal power of the universal ,soul1 the second to its natural and plant power1 see iii1 #h4a and iv4 #d4ac4 #afd ,see iv4 #d4ac4 #afe ,see ii4 #c4ah4 #aff ,as in the ,timaeus1 ,c#db4 #afg iv4 #h4a4 #afh ,see iv4 #b4b4 #afi ,see iv4 #c4f4g4 #agj ,as thought ,plato in his ,phaedrus1 ,c#bdi and ,phaedo1 ,c#gb4 #aga ,that lead an alternate or double life4 #agb ,in his ,timaeus1 ,c#db1 #fi4 #agc ,in the stars4 #agd ,as does ,plato1 see iv4 #h4a4 #age ,as a messenger1 see iv4 #c4ab4ac4 #agf ,see ii4 #i4b4 #agg ,without having given herself up to it4 #agh ,see i4 #h4g4 #agi ,that is1 of form1 ii4 #d4d4 #ahj ,see iv4 #f4c4 #aha ,see iii4 #b4h4 #ahb ,see iv4 #h4e4 #ahc ,see iv4 #c4ah4 #ahd ,see ii4 #i4b4 #ahe ,that is1 the body to which she is united4 #ahf ,as thought ,plato in his ,parmenides1 ,c#aed4 #ahg ,see vi4 #f4ac4 #ahh ,being4 ,it has been found impossible1 in order to preserve good ,english idiom1 to translate ousia by being1 and to on by essence1 with uniformity4 ,where the change has been made1 the proper word has been added in parentheses1 as here4 #ahi ,in his ,metaphysics1 iv4 #b4 #aij ,aristotle1 ,met4 iv4 #b4 #aia ,evidently a pun on forms and ideas4 #aib ,see vi4 #b4g4 #aic ,in the ,timaeus not accurately quoted4 #aid ,as ,plato said in the ,timaeus1 #cg4 #aie ,see iv4 #i4e4 #aif ,see vi4 #h4aa4 #aig ,odyss4 xix4 #agh4 #aih ,see i4 #b4b4 #aii ,see iv4 #c4a4 #bjj ,see ii4 #b4b4 #bja ,see the beginning of ,plato's ,republic1 ix4 #bjb ,see i4 #h4g4 #bjc ,because they do not allow of mutual penetration4 #bjd ,see iv4 #h4e4 #bje ,as thought ,numenius #bi4 #bjf ,see ii4 #c4 #bjg ,see i4 #h4ad4 #bjh ,see ,acts1 xvii4 #be1 #bg1 #bh4 #bji ,see iv4 #c4g1 following the ,phaedrus of ,plato4 #baj ,cupid and ,psyche1 as interpreted by ,apuleius4 #baa ,see iii4 #e4b4 #bab ,see iii4 #e4d4 #bac ,see iii4 #e4g-i4 #bad ,see v4 #e4aa2 i4 #f4g1 #h2 v4 #h4d2 vi4 #i4aa4 ,it has been contended that this was a description of the ,isiac temple in ,rome4 #bae ,num4 #aj4 #baf ,by virtue of which1 according to the ,pythagoreans1 the dyad dared to issue from the unity4 #bag ,that is the desire which leads souls to separate themselves primitively from the divinity1 and to unite themselves to bodies4 #bah ,we have seen this elsewhere1 i4 #c4a4 #bai ,see ii4 #b4c4 #bbj ,iliad xx4 #fe4 #bba ,see vi4 #d4d4 #bbb ,as said ,heraclitus1 ,plutarch1 ,banquet1 iv4 #d4 #bbc ,see iv4 #g4aj4 #bbd ,see i4 #b4c2 iv4 #c4aa4 #bbe ,see iii4 #i4e4 #bbf ,as thought ,plato in his ,cratylus1 ,c4 xi4 #ci1 and ,macrobins1 in his ,commentary on the ,dream of ,scipio1 i4 #aa4 #bbg ,see i4 #h4b2 ii4 #i4b4 #bbh ,see iii4 #g4b-d4 #bbi ,see v4 #i4b1 #g4 #bcj ,see vi4 #b4 #bca ,see vi4 #h4 #bcb ,see vi4 #c4 #bcc ,see iii4 #f4a4 #bcd ,pun on ideas and forms4 #bce vi4 #i4 #aa4 ,this seems to refer to the ,roman temple of ,isis in front of which stood the statues of the divinities1 vi4 #i4aa4 #bcf ,would be soul1 instead of intelligence4 #bcg ,see v4 #d4a4 #bch ,see iii4 #h4aj4 #bci ,as thought ,plato1 ,laws1 x42 see ii4 #b4c4 #bdj ,see iii4 #f4ai4 #bda ,as thought ,plato1 in the ,cratylos1 ,c4 xi4 #ci4 #bdb ,this paragraph is founded on ,numenius #cf1 #ci4 #bdc ,see ,plato's ,second ,letter1 #cab2 in ,english1 ,burges1 p4 #dhb2 i4 #h4b4 #bdd ,in ,timaeus1 #cd4 #bde ,in his ,timaeus1 ,c#dc4 #bdf ,as quoted by ,clemens ,al4 ,strom4 vi4 p4 #fbg4 #bdg ,in ,simplicius1 ,comm4 in ,phys4 ,arist41 #i4 #bdh ,see ,plato's ,sophists1 ,c#bdd4 #bdi ,see ii4 #g4g4 #bej ,see ii4 #a4b4 #bea ,see ii4 #d4g4 #beb ,see ,metaph4 xii4 #g4h4 #bec ,referring to ,numenius's work on ,the ,good1 and on the ,immateriality of the ,soul4 #bed ,in the ,acibiades1 ,c#cf4 #bee ,see i4 #a4i4 #bef ,in his ,timaeus1 ,c#cj4 #beg ,in the ,phaedrus4 #beh ,see iii4 #f4e4 #bei ,see v4 #c4c4 #bfj ,from the circumference1 see iii4 #h4g4 #bfa ,cicero1 ,tusculans1 i4 #bb4 #bfb ,see i4 #d4i4 #bfc ,see iii4 #i4i4 #bfd ,see iii4 #h4i4 #bfe iii4 #i4d4 #bff iii4 #h4i4 #bfg ,see v4 #a4g4 #bfh ,see i4 #a4h2 iv4 #i4c4 #bfi ,see iii4 #d4a1 #b4 #bgj ,fragment belonging here1 apparently1 but misplaced at end of next paragraph4 #bga ,see v4 #a4a4 #bgb ,see iii4 #d4b4 #bgc ,see iv4 #d4bi2 iv4 #e4g4 #bgd ,that is1 in the principal power of the universal soul1 see ii4 #c4ah4 #bge ,see vi4 #e2 that is1 within intelligence4 #bgf ,between celestial and terrestrial life2 see iii4 #d4f4 #bgg ,see iii4 #h4g4 #bgh ,met4 vii4 #c4 #bgi ,met4 v4 #h4 #bhj ,diog4 ,laertes vii4 #fa4 #bha ,see ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #ae4 #bhb ,met4 viii4 #a4 #bhc ,see vi4 #g4 #bhd ,see i4 #h4d4 #bhe ,see i4 #h4ae4 #bhf ,plotinos's six categories are identity1 difference1 being1 life1 motion and rest4 ,see v4 #a2 v4 #b2 vi4 #b4 #bhg ,not the absolute eternal existence1 nor the totality of the constitutive qualities of a thing1 as in ii4 #f4 #bhh ,met4 xii4 #b4 #bhi ,met4 i4 #c4 #bij ,met4 xi4 #f4 #bia ,see v4 #a4i4 #bib ,as reported by ,diog4 ,laert4 ii4 #b4 #bic ,met4 i4 #d2 vii4 #ac4 #bid de ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #bd4 #bie ,met4 viii4 #d4 #bif ,in the ,timaeus1 ,c#di-eb1 ,met4 vii4 #c4 #big ,see ii4 #g4c4 #bih ,in ,met4 iii4 #d and de ,anima i4 #b4e2 ii4 #e4 #bii ,in the ,timaeus4 #cjj ,see i4 #h4i2 ii4 #d4ab4 #cja ,met4 vii4 #c1 see iii4 #f4g-ai4 #cjb ,met4 viii4 #d4 #cjc ,met4 i4 #f4 #cjd ,met4 vii4 #g4 #cje ,see ii4 #d4aj4 #cjf ,see ii4 #g4c4 #cjg ,met4 xii4 #b4 #cjh ,met4 vi4 #a2 vii4 #e4 #cji ,see i4 #b4a4 #caj ,in the ,philebus1 #beb4 #caa ,the same definition is given of evil in i4 #h4aj-ad4 #cab ,see i4 #h4h4 #cac ,physics4 iii4 #g4 #cad ,this paragraph interrupts the argument4 #cae ,plato's spirit in the ,timaeus1 ,c#gi4 #caf ,the inferior soul1 see ii4 #c4ah4 #cag ,in his ,phaedrus1 ,c#bdf4 #cah ,plato1 ,phaedo1 ,c4 i4 #bdb4 #cai ,plato1 ,tim4 ,c#gg4 #cbj ,plato1 ,rep4 x4 p4 #bia4 #cba ,plato1 ,tim4 #ia4 #cbb ,the text is very difficult4 #cbc ,plato1 ,rep4 x4 p4 #fag-fbj4 #cbd ,in the ,timaeus4 #cbe ,c#ij4 #cbf ,phaedo1 p4 #ajg1 c4 i4 p4 #cjj4 #cbg ,rep4 x4 #faf1 p4 #bcd4 #cbh ,in i4 #b4h1 #af4 #cbi ,see ii4 #i4ah4 #ccj ,as thought ,aristotle1 ,met4 v4 #ad4 #cca ,as thought ,aristotle1 ,met4 v4 #cj4 #ccb ,as thought ,plato1 ,letter #g1 #cdc4 #ccc ,as said ,aristotle1 ,met4 vii4 #e4 #ccd ,phaedros ,c#a1bag4 #cce de ,gen4 ,an4 #d4b4 #ccf ,adv4 ,math4 #e4ajb p4 #cee4 #ccg ,theataetus1 ,c#b1acb4 #cch ,rep4 iv4 ,e#c1dcd4 #cci ,theataetus1 #agf4 #cdj ,plato1 ,phaedo1 #fi4 #cda ,pun on the word logos1 which means both reason and word4 #cdb ,plato1 ,phaedrus1 #bdf4 #cdc v4 #a4a4 #cdd ,in his ,phaedrus1 ,et4 #bff4 #cde ,in v4 #a4a4 #cdf i4 #c4 #d1 #e1 #f2 i4 #f4 #cdg ,in his ,phaedrus1 p4 #bdh4 #cdh ,in his ,politician1 p4 #bfb4 #cdi v4 #a4 #cej ,in his ,sophist41 p4 #bec4 #cea ,see i4 #b4c-f4 #ceb ,morals i4 #cd1 #ce2 ,nicom4 ,eth41 vi4 #h1 #aa4 #cec ,see iv4 #a4bb4 #ced ,see iii4 #h4g4 #cee ,see iv4 #b4b4 #cef ,see iv4 #c4ai1 #bb1 #bc2 iv4 #d4bh4 #ceg ,see iv4 #c4bj-bb4 #ceh ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #ca-cc4 #cei ,see #d4g4f1 #g4 #cfj ,plutarch1 de ,plac4 ,phil4 v4 #ba2 ,cicero1 de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii4 #aa4 ,the predominating principle had appeared in ,plato's ,timaeus1 p4 #da4 #cfa ,of the ,timaeus1 p4 #ce4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected4 ,inconsistent capitalization has not been changed4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4 ,infrequent spelling of ,plotinus changed to the predominant ,plotinos4 ,several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched2 ,transcriber has not attempted to remedy them4 ,the ,index near the beginning of the book actually is a ,table of ,contents for the four-volume set4 ,page #aa3 the last paragraph seems to end abruptly3 to prove that ,page #id3 parent's probably should be parents'1 but is unchanged here4 ,page #bcf3 the closing parenthesis for 7destiny7 also seems to be the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning 7because he is given 4444 ,there are several instances in this text where a closing quotation mark is shared in a similar manner4 ,footnote ,issues3 ,in these notes1 anchor means the reference to a footnote1 and footnote means the information to which the anchor refers4 ,anchors occur within the main text1 while footnotes are grouped in sequence at the end of this e,book4 ,the structure of the original book required two exceptions to this1 as explained below4 ,the original text used a combination of footnotes 7indicated by symbols7 and endnotes 7indicated by numbers74 ,in this e,book1 they have been combined into a single1 ascending sequence based on the sequence in which the footnotes occurred in the original book1 and placed at the end of the e,book4 ,several irregularities are explained below4 ,footnotes sometimes were printed in a different sequence than their anchors 7as on page #fj3 third and fourth footnotes were printed in incorrect sequence74 and the symbols used for the anchors sometimes were in a different sequence than the footnotes 7as on page #gb1 second and third symbols74 ,except as noted below1 all footnotes have been resequenced to match the sequence of their anchors4 ,page #he3 ,the last footnote is printed out of sequence and followed by a paragraph that appears to be a final comment4 ,in this e,book1 that footnote has been repositioned to be in the sequence of its anchor4 ,pages #aaa and #aah3 ,anchor #acd 7originally #bi7 originally referred to two footnotes4 ,in this e,book1 they are footnotes #acd and #acd;a4 ,pages #ahf and #aib3 section ,,plato ,,teaches ,,three ,,spheres ,,of ,,existence4#bdb 7originally #dg7 used an out-of-sequence endnote number that matched the last endnote in the chapter2 that endnote has been repositioned to be in the overall footnote sequence4 ,page #aif3 ,footnote #bfg 7originally #e7 has no anchor2 the missing anchor would be on page #aic or #aid4 ,page #bdb3 ,footnote #cbb 7originally #f7 has no anchor2 the missing anchor would be on page #bce4